ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esq.  Attorney ID# 031032010  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent  [...] [...]  [...] Date Submitted: November 26, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS  ........................................................................................................ ii  COUNTER PRELIMINARY  STATEMENT ...........................................................................  1 COUNTER PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...............................................................................  1 COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................  1  A. Appellant’s Account .................................................................................................  9  B. Transfer and Assignment of the Account .................................................................  11  C. Appellant’s Class Action .........................................................................................  11  COUNTER ARGUMENT .................................................................................................  13  I.  STANDARD ON APPEAL .........................................................................................  13  II.  THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DENIED APPELLANT’S MOTION  BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT IS NOT VOID PURSUANT TO RULE 4:50-1(d) ..................................................................................................................  13  A.  Appellant’s Motion was Not Filed within a Reasonable Time ....  15  B.  Appellant’s Motion is Barred by the Doctrine of Laches ..............  19  C.  The Judgment is Not Void Due to Insufficient Service of Process ..................................................................................................................  25  D.  Appellant’s NJCFLA Claims are Barred by the Doctrines of Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel, and Entire Controversy ....................  30  E. Appellant’s NJCFLA Claims Lack Merit ............................................................... 33 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 40 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases 257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC v. Roberto, 477 N.J. Super. 339 (App. Div. 2023) .................................................. 13 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Howard Sav. Institution, 127 N.J. Super. 479 (Ch. Div. 1974) .................................................. 23 Ass’n of N.J. Chiropractors, Inc. v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc., 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2677 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 4, 2013) .................................................. 35 Bascom Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 363 N.J. Super. 334 (2003) ................................................................. 17 Berger v. Paterson Veterans Taxi Serv., 244 N.J. Super. 200 (1990) ................................................................. 17 Castro v. NYT Television, 370 N.J. Super. 282 (N.J. Super. Ct. May 25, 2004) ............................ 39 Citibank, N.A. v. Russo, 334 N.J. Super. 346 (2000) ................................................................. 15, 16
[directive] No Prior Court Involvement (Mitigating Factor #5)  Mitigating Factor #5 applies if the defendant has not previously been offense9 convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for an and has never been admitted to pretrial intervention under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 or conditional discharge under N.J.S.A. 2C:36A-1.  The point value for this mitigating factor is -3.  Although the defendant’s criminal record is already accounted for in the determination of the appropriate Criminal History Category, it is possible for a defendant to fall under Criminal History Category I (Minor) even though he or she has previously been convicted of one third-degree crime, or two fourth-degree crimes, or multiple disorderly persons offenses.  This Mitigating Factor thus allows the prosecutor to distinguish those defendants who have a “minor” criminal record from those who have no record at all.  Compare N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(7), which establishes a mitigating circumstance where the defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity, and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1e, which establishes a presumption of non-imprisonment for a person convicted of third and fourth- degree crimes (excluding the drug-free school zone offense) who “has not previously been convicted of an offense. ”  9  As used throughout these Guidelines, the term “offense” includes crimes (indictable offenses) and disorderly persons offenses.  For the purposes of these Guidelines, the term does not include petty disorderly persons offenses or motor vehicle offenses.  Page 84
[brief] Because [...] has standing to challenge the seizure of this evidence, its suppression means it cannot be used against [...].  See Point I.C, infra.  \(^8\)  It is unclear from [...]’s testimony whether he believed prior to effectuating the stop that [...] had followed [...] from New York or whether this was a belief that [...] developed later.  He testified in the present tense that, “I believe that [[...]] must have followed [[...]] from New York, due to the New York license plate tag. ” (4T 18-8 to 12)  After the stop, [...] admitted to following [...] from New York, but that information cannot be used to support a finding of reasonable suspicion.  See *State v. Rosario*, 229 N.J. 263, 277 (2017) (observing that information subsequently obtained cannot “be used, post hoc, to establish the reasonable and articulable suspicion required at the outset of the investigative detention”); *State v. Bruzzese*, 94 N.J. 210, 221 (1983) (“Facts learned by the authorities after the search and seizure occurs will not validate unreasonable intrusions. ”).  C.  Because The Narcotics Seized From [...]’s Car Were Illegally Obtained, They Cannot Factor Into The Analysis Of Whether There Was Probable Cause To Issue A Search Warrant For The Storage Unit.  “[A] search warrant based on illegally obtained information is itself tainted and all evidence seized pursuant to it must be suppressed. ”  State v. Parisi, 181 N.J. Super. 117, 119 (App. Div. 1981) (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471).  Where, as here, a warrant affidavit contains both information lawfully and unlawfully obtained, the unlawfully obtained information is “tainted” and may not be considered in evaluating whether the issuance of a search warrant was justified.  See Ortense, 174 N.J. Super. at 454-455.  Because police lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop [...]’s car, all information about the subsequent search of the car and anything else that occurred as a result of the illegal stop is “tainted. ”  Accordingly, this information must be excised from the affidavit when evaluating whether the affidavit set forth probable cause to believe that the storage unit contained evidence of criminality.  See Ortense, 174 N.J. Super. at 454-455.  Without this tainted evidence, the warrant affidavit does not establish probable cause to search the storage unit.  See Point II, infra.  POINT II
[directive] Pretrial Seeking of Presumption the Overcoming 7.4.6  70  Page pursuant detention pretrial seeking of presumption rebuttable a is there where case any  In pretrial for motion a file shall prosecutor the 7.4.5, or 7.4.4, 7.4.2, 7.4.3, 7.4.1, subsection to (1) that: determines Section 7.8 to pursuant designated prosecutor supervisory a unless detention release imposing adequately by controlled be can release defendant's by posed risks the be not of justice would interests the (2) or program, services pretrial the by monitored conditions the overcome to is made determination the If detention. pretrial for applying by served the document shall prosecutor supervisory the detention, pretrial for applying of presumption file.
[brief] [...] has not shown an abuse of discretion on this ruling.  **CONCLUSION**  For all these reasons and those set forth in the Appellant’s Brief, [...] respectfully requests that the Court - reverse [...]’s July 22 and September 8 Orders denying Rule 4:50 relief to [...], and vacate the equitable distribution and alimony provisions contained in the Final Judgment of Divorce previously entered in this case, and remand for a fresh determination of those issues with all of the financial disclosures, discovery rights, and judicial findings of fact and law that New Jersey law requires; and ■ deny respondent’s cross-appeal in its entirety.
[brief] *Ibid.*  Article 1 of the Act sets forth a specific type of claim that may be asserted against an employer in the Superior Court that is subject to limited defenses and places the burden proof on the employer.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -6.  Because the employer has limited defenses and carries the burden of proof, a claim under Article 1 is not a traditional common-law negligence cause of action.  *Ibid.*  Second, section 72 does not require an employer to maintain workers compensation insurance to meet those obligations.
[directive] These form orders (Krol orders) implement the requirements for proceedings pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8 seq. and State Krol, 68 N.J. 236 (1975).  The orders et. v. were drafted by the Forensic Evaluation Workgroup, which included various criminal practice and forensic system stakeholders such as representatives from the Judiciary, the Office of the Attorney N.J. General, the Office of the Public Defender, county prosecutors, and executive and clinical administration from the Division of Mental Health and Addiction Services.  Additionally, this Directive memorializes the requirement that court orders for commitments resulting from criminal proceedings must be forwarded to the County Adjuster because they are responsible for processing involuntary commitments and voluntary admissions pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10:7-3.1, and entering commitment orders into the Civil Commitment Automated Tracking System (CCATS).  As such, the Krol orders specify that a copy of the order to be forwarded to the County is Adjuster's office.  Similarly, the orders promulgated for proceedings under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-5 et seq. by Directive# 17-18, "New and Revised Form Orders for Competency and Sanity Evaluations" (issued November 2018), specify that a copy of the order to be forwarded to the County Adjuster's office.  is 1,  Additionally, court staff should forward court orders for proceedings under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 et seq.) to the County Adjuster's office where the crime was committed.  The procedures for NGRI defendants are as follows:  (1) the Judgment of Acquittal should include the maximum period of imprisonment that could have been imposed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(3); Km!  (2) the orders should also include the maximum term of commitment or supervision, where ADA ENSURING ml DOOR  AN OPEN TO JUSTICE with Americans Act Disabilities Directive# 21-20 --  Proceeding for Defendants Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI) and Other Commitments  Resulting from Criminal Proceedings  August 5, 2020
[brief] The SPA provided that the contract “will be legally binding” after the review period, unless an attorney reviews and disproves of it.  (Id.).  Plaintiffs retained counsel, [...], Esq., the managing partner of [...] (“[...]”), to review and advise them on the fully executed contract documents, including the Public Offering Statement.  (DA362)  There was no dispute raised below that Plaintiffs and their counsel received the documents and completed review of same during the three-day attorney review period.
[brief] Over the years since [...] purchased the Property, [...] tried, on multiple occasions, to repurchase the Property, but was never successful.  Da240.  By way of example, in January 2017, [...] purportedly agreed to sell [...] (and thereby the Property) to [...] for $7,121,590.98 and a Limited Liability Purchase Agreement was drafted (the “2017 Unexecuted Agreement”), but [...] “changed his mind” and the 2017 Unexecuted Agreement was never signed and a closing did not occur.  --- \(^3\)  [...]’s claim that [...] was holding “legal title” while she was holding “equitable title” is belied by the facts and evidence, disputed by Appellants, and not cognizable under New Jersey law.  See, e.g., Courtney v. Hanson, 3 N.J. Super. 47,51 (App. Div. 1949), aff’d, 3 N.J. 571 (1950); N.J.S.A. 25:1-13; McEvoy v. Brooks, 89 N.J. Eq. 37, 39 (Ch. 1918); Prant v. Sterling, 332 N.J. Super. 369, 380 (Ch. Div. 1999), aff’d, 332 N.J. Super. 292 (App. Div. 2000); Morton v. 4 Orchard Land Tr., 180 N.J. 118, 129 (2004).
[directive] Officers who are not committed to the truth, who cannot convey facts and observations in an accurate and impartial manner and whose credibility can be impeached in court cannot advance the State’s interests in criminal matters.  In addition, defendants in criminal matters may be entitled to certain evidence the prosecutor has concerning the credibility of prosecution witnesses, including police officers.  Prosecutors are considered to possess such evidence even when law enforcement agencies create and maintain information concerning the honesty of individual officers.  Furthermore, prosecutors may be required to provide such evidence to the court.  It is therefore imperative that the internal affairs investigator assist prosecutors with their legal duty to review and, if necessary, disclose evidence that may impact the credibility of police officers.  (See Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2019-6).
[brief] THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING ARTICLE  1  PARAGRAPHS 1 & 6 OF THE COMPLAINT WHERE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE EXIST REGARDING THE DEFENDANT  [...]’S MALICE TOWARD [...] AND HIS DELIBERATE EFFORTS TO CHILL [...]’S FREEDOM OF SPEECH BY ILLEGALLY TERMINATING [...] WHEN HE SOUGHT ELECTIVE OFFICE.  (T1 62 L15-18)  Defendant [...] testified that he knew Mr. Allen was taking out petitions the day before he obtained them.  Defendant [...] testified that he thought it was crazy and could not have someone in his office running for his position.  He admitted that he terminated him because he was running for the same elected position that he held, by uttering this on the very few trustworthy statements he made during his deposition.  His attempts to cure his testimony after his attorney’s objections are apparent and telling.  His natural utterances are the most reliable and credible, but that too is for the jury to decide.  Defendant [...]’s credibility is a cause for concern that only a jury can evaluate and opine on.  His constant contractions during his deposition testimony, lack of knowledge of a position he held for eight years and his evasiveness further create genuine issues of material facts in dispute.  The claims of breach of contract and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing require an analysis of one’s intent.
[directive] P~elimina~y and/or Cause Probable Affidavit of in Report. the 4.6), Section (see administered ODARA is which the in cases violence domestic In shall Report Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary and/or the Cause Probable of Affidavit the through exist to found factors risk all of presence the indicating statements concise include the during confined victim was the that determined was if it example, For investigation.  officer's Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary and/or the Cause Probable of Affidavit the assault, cases violence domestic all  Moreover, in confined. was victim the that indicate shall Report Preliminary the and/or Cause Probable of Affidavit the not), or scored is ODARA the (whether a to posed risks the to relevant circumstances include shall Report Incident Enforcement Law 4.6.10.
[brief] See Nestle Foods Corp., 135 F.R.D. at 104 (“[T]he question of relevancy is to be more loosely construed at the discovery stage than at the trial. ”).  [...] does not acknowledge that “[i]t is important to distinguish the right to obtain information by discovery from the right to use it at trial. ”  See ibid.  Although [...] contends that discovery is limited exclusively to “relevant” evidence as that term is understood under the Rules of Evidence, (Db13-15), Rule 4:10-2(a) explicitly allows the discovery of evidence that is irrelevant and therefore inadmissible at trial so long as “the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. ”  The discovery rules have a broad scope, and they are intended to ensure that parties can obtain all relevant, admissible evidence, even if that requires the production of some irrelevant evidence as well.  Accordingly, the trial court’s discovery protocol was consistent with the Rules and not an abuse of that court’s broad discretion.
[brief] J-14 May 14, 1999, Amended Lease Agreement between the [...] and [...], and Rider to Amended Lease Agreement [KEANS 45 - KEANS 52]  J-15 Resolution #55 adopted by the [...] on March 6, 1999, authorizing advertising for bids for leases and Resolution #61 adopted by the [...] on April 27, 1999, authorizing Lease with [...]  [KEANS 39 - KE39 -44]
[brief] Procedural History and Statement of Facts ...........................................................................1  Legal Argument .....................................................................................................................6  POINT I ....................................................................................................................................6  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE MOTOR VEHICLE STOP BECAUSE THE STOP WAS UNSUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF A REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.  (Da17-Da18).  Conclusion ...............................................................................................................................14
[directive] This criteria includes, but is not limited to, a finding that: (1) you are a drug or alcohol dependent person, and (2) that you were drug or alcohol dependent at the time of the commission of the present offense, and (3) that you did not possess a firearm at the time of the present offense or any pending charge, and (4) that you do not have certain prior disqualifying convictions, and (5) there is suitable treatment available for you, and (6) no danger to the community will result from your serving a “Drug Court” sentence.
[brief] 1T103:18-104:7; (Aa515).  No evidence was presented at trial that any of the Defendants, including [...], had IT credentials, training, or experience.  After WCS, she worked at [...] as a National Vice President, Field Operations making $170,000.00 per year.  1T104:3-9; (Aa515).  [...], recognizing her high value, initially hired [...] at a company called [...] ([...]) where he was employed as CEO to serve as VP of Client Service Delivery at $110,000.00.  1T104:16-22.  Later, after a disagreement with the owner.  [...], [...] and [...] left [...] and together with [...] formed [...], where she was to utilize her vast IT experience to run the operations team and coordinate its functions related to the Network design while implementing her sales experience when the sales lead [...] was unable to generate any sales.  1T35:1-8; (Aa515).  Following her testimony on her extensive experience and qualifications, Plaintiff testified that she became partner in the new venture.  1T34:17-47:8.  She was approached by [...] to form [...] for an agreed salary in the amount of $150,000.00 per year and a 10% stake in equity as a shareholder, which the Trial Court found to be true.  (Aa59); 1T93:15-21.  [...] made the company several millions of dollars over her time at [...].  1T174:1-10.  When Plaintiff discovered self-dealings of [...] that would adversely affect [...], she spoke up and challenged his improper conduct at her own peril.  T329:8-9.  Plaintiff testified in detail about her assault by [...] and subsequent ouster.  1T6:5-24; 1T65:24-83:11.  Plaintiff was subject to a full day of direct questioning by the Court and cross-examination by Defendants.  1T1:1-214:25.  None of the Defendants testified on the first day.  2.
[brief] As stated throughout this reply, once again the Respondents are inappropriately turning to the NCA as a basis for preemption when it was specifically determined by the lower court that the NCA did not apply.  Further, State v. Holland, State v. Bynum and State v. Friedman, all cited in the Borough’s Appellate brief, refer to the HRA as authority for the respective municipality’s enactment of noise ordinances.
[brief] Defense counsel’s summation in no way suggested anything improper or argued anything outside of the evidence, and he certainly did not tell the jury that there was any scheme between the plaintiff, her daughters, and her counsel.  Defense counsel merely pointed out to the jury that the plaintiff’s own expert testified that his opinions were based off of a conversation in the Home Depot parking lot with the plaintiff, her two daughters, and her counsel.  (7T23:25-24:15)  If the jury wanted to infer that this was a “scheme” it was free to do so based on the evidence.  Moreover, the jury was charged at the end of the case that the lawyers are here as advocates for their clients and while they may consider the lawyer’s comments made during their opening statements and summation, none of their comments are evidence and are not binding on them.  (7T89:3-9).  Finally, the plaintiff’s argument that counsel could not comment on a witness’ absence because the trial court did not agree to give an adverse inference charge is without merit.  The plaintiff cites to no case law to support the proposition that counsel cannot comment on the absence of a fact witness when no adverse inference charge will be given.  In sum, the plaintiff waived some of her challenges to the summation of defense counsel, the summation was proper and within the bounds of the law and, the trial court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.
[brief] Pa261a.  On the night of the accident (as was typical on milling and paving jobs), there were twelve pieces of machinery belonging to [...] in the work zone, along with two sweepers and at least five dump trucks.  Pa199a, 206a, 208a.  [...] employees testified that prior to going out on a job, the [...] employees on the job would meet to discuss what they were “going to go out and do,” and that the internal traffic controls for milling and paving jobs were “pretty much the same” every night.  Pa243a; Pa217a.  [...] confirmed that on the night of the accident, the [...] workers on the job met “as always” before the job started to discuss where they would be operating and what they would be doing that night.  Pa222a-23a.  [...] testified that in the 15,000 hours that he had logged on prior jobs, including a majority on the Garden State Parkway and New Jersey Turnpike, he has never seen or gone over a written internal traffic control plan on any of those jobs.
[brief] The lie that [...] and his lawyer told the family judge who entered the divorce judgment, the complete absence of required findings of fact and conclusions of law, the enforcement of a “Mid-Marriage Agreement” that New Jersey law provides is inherently coercive and generally unenforceable, coupled with the inequitable distribution and complete denial of alimony to the plainly less monied spouse, warrant that equity intervene on the affected spouse’s behalf and provide her with a fair opportunity to litigate the equitable distribution and alimony issues.  Due process and fundamental fairness require an aboveboard process that any ordinary observer would view as fair to both sides – especially critical in a high value divorce case involving two very unequal spouses like this case.  CONCLUSION
[brief] LAW  OFFICES OF [...]  Attorney for the Plaintiff-Appellant  George T. Daggett  [...]  Date: 9/13/23  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...] AND COMMISSIONERS  [...], [...] AND [...], Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...] ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, SUSSEX COUNTY  DOCKET NO.: [...] SAT BELOW: Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS