ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] DA082 o EXHIBIT J, CORRESPONDENCE DATED JUNE 16, 2021 FROM [...], ESQ. TO [...], ESQ.  DA084 o EXHIBIT K, CORRESPONDENCE DATED JUNE 17, 2021 FROM [...], ESQ. TO [...] DA086 o EXHIBIT L, CORRESPONDENCE DATED AUGUST 10, 2021 FROM [...] TO [...], ESQ.  [omitted] o EXHIBIT M, PENSION CORRESPONDENCE DATED FEBRUARY 1, 2021  FROM THE [...] TO [...]  DA088 o EXHIBIT N, CORRESPONDENCE DATED AUGUST 30, 2021 FROM [...], ESQ.  TO [...]  DA090 o EXHIBIT O, EMAIL DATED OCTOBER 22, 2021  FROM [...], ESQ.  TO [...], ESQ.  DA093 o EXHIBIT P, EMAIL DATED NOVEMBER 5, 2021 FROM [...], ESQ.  TO [...], ESQ.  DA095 o EXHIBIT Q, CORRESPONDENCE DATED JANUARY 27, 2022 FROM [...], ESQ.  TO ARTHUR THIBAULT, ESQ.  DA097 o EXHIBIT R, CORRESPONDENCE DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2022 FROM [...], ESQ. TO [...], ESQ.  DA100 o EXHIBIT S, CORRESPONDENCE DATED MAY 9, 2022  FROM [...], ESQ. TO [...], ESQ.  DA104 o EXHIBIT T, CORRESPONDENCE DATED JUNE 1, 2022  FROM [...], ESQ.  TO [...], ESQ.  DA107 o EXHIBIT U, CORRESPONDENCE DATED JUNE 2, 2022  FROM [...], ESQ.  TO [...], ESQ.  DA110 o EXHIBIT V, APRIL 18, 2023  CONSENT ORDER DA113 o EXHIBIT W, UNPUBLISHED
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum C | April 2025 Barricaded Individuals 7 Training 7.1 Integrated Training.  Tactical Teams and Crisis Negotiation Teams shall conduct regular training with the mental health professionals associated with their teams.  It is suggested that this training occur at least quarterly.  The training should provide an opportunity to clarify the roles for each member of the team and to explore the processes for mental health professionals to provide real time input during the course of an incident involving a barricaded individual.  Familiarity and trust among team members must be established prior to the response to an incident.  Training may include classroom presentations, table top exercises and live scenario-based exercises.  7.2  Associations.  County and Municipal Tactical Teams and Crisis Negotiation Teams should establish relationships with mental health professionals and agencies within their areas of responsibility.  The [...] and other agencies with statewide areas of responsibility should have mental health professionals available within regions or counties that can respond within a reasonable amount of time to incidents involving barricaded individuals and hostage situations.  In order to ensure the availability of mental health professionals for qualified tactical teams operating within their respective counties during pursuant to Section 5.3, incidents involving barricaded individuals, and County Prosecutors should assist the [...] and other agencies with statewide areas of responsibility in establishing relationships with mental health professionals in their region or county if the state agency has not already established its own relationship.  7.3  Training of First Responding Officers.  The [...] shall develop and include barricaded individual training for law enforcement officers in all of its basic training courses.  This mandatory training will include proper identification of barricaded individuals, responses to barricaded individual and hostage situations, and interacting with individuals in behavioral and mental health crises.  In addition, the [...] shall develop an online in-service course for law enforcement officers on the provisions and requirements of this Policy.  7.4  After Action Reviews.  Tactical and Crisis Negotiation Teams shall conduct after action reviews of all barricade situations, which shall include the mental health professionals and any County Prosecutor’s Office legal personnel who assisted in the response.  The scope of these reviews shall be commensurate with the complexity and scale of the incident response.  15  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] The decision to admit a prior conviction of a defendant to impeach his credibility “rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge,” and cannot be reversed unless it is determined that it constituted an abuse of that discretion.  State v. Hutson, 211 N.J. Super. 49, 53 (App. Div. 1986), aff’d 107 N.J. 222 (1987), see also State v. Hedgespeth, 249 N.J. 234, 250 (2021).
[brief] See generally Krosnowski v. Krosnowski, 22 N.J. 376, 387 (1956).  [...] could not avoid its duties under the PSA merely by casting itself as “caught in the cross-fire between these parties following the collapse of their deal,” as it argued in the trial court.  Indeed, [...] was to be well-compensated for the performance of its contractual duties – which were designed to benefit both Plaintiff and [...], and not just [...] as happened here.  (Pa113-114, PSA § 10.5).  As alleged in the Complaint, [...] played a material role in the events leading to Plaintiff’s damages.  [...] acted in bad faith, breached its contractual and fiduciary duties to Plaintiff, affirmatively acted with [...] to deceive and circumvent Plaintiff, and thus played an active role in the “collapse of [the] deal. ” (Pa15-16, Complaint, ¶¶ 68-79).  The PSA contemplated that Plaintiff would take fee title to the real property directly from the Fee Owner, and [...] was to take title only to the improvements at the site.  (Pa104, PSA § 6.1; Pa111, PSA § 10.3).  As title agent and escrow agent and as a signatory to the PSA, [...] was fully aware that Plaintiff was entitled to take title in its name, and that [...] had no right under the PSA to take title to both the real property and the improvements – which is what it ultimately did, after breaching its obligations to Plaintiff and covertly proceeding to close without Plaintiff.
[brief] Additional remediation was necessary to address the impacted soil, and until complete, the public health continues to be at risk from that contamination.  Despite this evidence, the Trial Court concluded that the testimony of the Mayor and Board Planner were insufficient because of Plaintiff’s LSRP testimony regarding the drinking water.  (T3, 56:28-21).  Essentially, the Trial Court erroneously substituted its opinion for the Borough’s.  It was reasonable for the Borough to conclude that the contamination was creating a detriment to the public health and safety because the contamination was impacting the soil.
[brief] This is not the case.  The deferential standard has been found to be valid only when an agency is involved in complex, technical domains where they are plain experts in the field, and where additionally the court may lack expertise.  This is not the case here.  The [...] is a part time committee that meets only once a month; has no true career staff leading it; whose members include members of the Public, School Administrators, and School Board members.  Its primary purpose is only to rule on cases relevant to the School Ethics Act, an area where this court does have expertise.  In short, the nature of the Commission does not require the deference of this court.
[brief] That paragraph states:  The Tenant shall be responsible for all interior repairs and maintenance, including but not limited to, plumbing, electrical, heating system, mechanical, etc.  Landlord shall be responsible for all roof, foundation, and structural repairs.  Essentially, Plaintiff posits that “interior repairs and maintenance” such as fixing a leaky pipe or repairing a heating unit is somehow akin to a wholesale fire loss.  Adopting the Plaintiff’s reading of the Lease, if a hurricane was to destroy the premises, Defendant would be responsible for the “repairs and maintenance” following the destruction.  Plaintiff’s argument is simply not credible.  Further outlining the specious nature of Plaintiff’s argument, Paragraph 15 speaks to the Tenant’s rent obligations if the premises were made untenantable while Paragraph 42 is silent as to rent obligations.  Clearly Paragraph 42 was not meant to address a fire which makes the premises untenantable.  (Pa19, Pa24)
[brief] *N.J.S.A.* 58:10B-1.2.  Pursuant to *N.J.S.A.* 58:10B-12(c)(1), [...] is tasked with developing soil standards for both nonresidential and residential properties that are “protective of public health and safety. ”  Importantly, [...] is not permitted to require implementation of a remedial action workplan unless sampling reveals the existence of a contaminant above applicable remediation standards.  N.J.S.A. 58:10B-12(i).
[directive] SBI Number – Part 1  Must be completed by the Prosecutor  Reasons for requesting electronic monitoring:  1.  Victim/Witness ☐ ☐ a.  Is the victim/witness a person, not a place of business?  Yes No  If Yes, will you be able to provide the victim’s address to the ☐ ☐ b.  Yes No  Pretrial Service staff?  ☐ ☐ c.  Does the defendant reside within 2500 feet (about half a mile) of Yes No the victim/witness residence?  2.  Other extraordinary circumstance: Was the defendant’s release recommendation either “Release with ☐ ☐ a. Yes No – Weekly reporting + HD/EM” or “No Release condition Recommended”?  b.  Explain the extraordinary circumstance:  Prosecutor’s Name  Prosecutor’s Signature Date s/ Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #19-23 (10/17/2023), CN 12220 page 1 of 5  Electronic Monitoring Screening Criteria (for Electronic Monitoring as a Condition of Pretrial Release)
[brief] To be considered actionable, the conduct must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to have altered plaintiff's conditions of employment in an important and material manner. ”  El-Sioufi v. St. Peter's Univ. Hosp., 382 N.J. Super. 145, 176 (App. Div. 2005).  Therefore, “[t]he denial of a singular request for vacation does not constitute an actionable adverse employment action. ”  *Robinson v. N. Am. Composites*, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86223, at *16 (D.N.J. June 6, 2017) (alteration added); see also *Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 1 v. City of Camden*, 842 F.3d 231, 241 (3d Cir. 2016) (affirming district court's determination that cancellation of vacation is not an adverse employment action); *Mieczkowski v. York City Sch. Dist.*, 414 F. App'x 441, 445-47 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming district court's determination that plaintiff had not suffered adverse employment actions where, among other things, plaintiff was “arbitrarily asked to cancel vacation days”); *Viggiano v. State of New Jersey*, 136 F. App'x 515, 518 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that plaintiff suffered no adverse employment actions where defendant “den[ied] him time off for personal and medical reasons”); *Tucker v. Merck & Co.*, 131 F. App'x 852, 857 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that requiring employee to take vacation day rather than personal day did not constitute an adverse employment action).
[brief] ”  Chiofalo v. State, 238 N.J. 527, 544 (2019) (quoting Battaglia, 214 N.J. at 559).  However, in support of her argument, [...] can point only to [...]’s self-serving deposition testimony.  (See Pb18-19).  [...]’s testimony cannot support [...]’s belief on this point.  Especially given that [...] testified that none of [...]’s conduct was ever directed at her.  (Pa241 at 62:5-12).  Far from criminal harassment, the record reflects only that [...] was difficult to work with on a day to day basis, that she was occasionally mean to her employees, and that they did not like her sometimes.  (See, e.g., Pa446) ([...] texting a coworker “I’m over [...] and her bullshit. ”); Pa237-38 at 49:1-55:25; \(^4\)  Under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, criminal harassment requires “intent to harass. ”  State v. Duncan, 376 N.J. Super. 253, 261 (App. Div. 2005) (“A finding that defendant acted with a purpose or intent to harass another is integral to a determination of harassment. ”).  “The mere exposure to profanity, though irritating to many people, is not necessarily indicative of an intention to harass. ”  Id. at 263.  Similarly, “mere venting of frustration or irritation at the situation is insufficient by itself to constitute harassment under the statute. ”  Id. at 264.  Pa242 at 72:13-17; Pa243 at 74:5-24 (noting [...]’s bickering with other staffing coordinators); Pa175 at 67:13-68:6 ([...] stating [...] would “freak out on everybody”); Pa240 at 64:10-18 (staffing coordinators upset at the way [...] “treated people”); Pa285 at 30:23-31:5 ([...] stating [...] was not a “team player”); Pa286 at 35:1-7 ([...] treated the staffer coordinators like children); Pa184 at 101:22-102:6 ([...] was belittling and degrading toward staffing coordinators)).  As noted above, New Jersey case law has clearly established that these sort of petty workplace grievances are not covered under CEPA.  The trial court correctly found that it was objectively unreasonable for [...] to believe that [...]’s challenging management style constituted criminal harassment.
[brief] Indeed, Price held that the trial court erred in submitting negligence to the jury after it ruled that the evidence established as a matter of law that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by intentional conduct.  90 N.J. Super. at 485.  Thus, it was proper to instruct the jury that [...]’s negligence was limited to self-defense.  Otherwise, the jury may have been misled to believe that it could find [...] liable for negligence based on his intentional conduct.  Furthermore, the trial court’s instruction was consistent with this Court’s prior decision, which framed the fact issue as either an assault or negligent self-defense:
[brief] June 23, 2021 Hearing  Lacking any facts in the record to support its position, the Board arbitrarily reduced the monthly management fee paid by [...] to [...] from $150 to $100.  11T:46, 62-69; DA 54.  The Board then revisited the issue of [...]’s equity in the Unit.  One Board Member stated that, because [...] is a protected tenant, his Unit should not be considered valued at 1/11 of the entire Property (11T:103:15-104:4), thereby, ignoring that at the time of both the purchase and improvements, the Property had not yet been converted into a condominium property which gave [...] the protected status he claims.  The Chairwoman’s methodology comparing taxes of the Unit to another unit to ascertain value did not begin to consider the equalization ratio.  Fundamentally, the Chairwoman attempted to determine [...]’s equity using her own unique formula not supported by any testimony or document in the record that would ensure a very low equity.
[brief] Order, dated June 23, 2023, signed by Hon. [...], JSC, denying Defendants’ Motion to Vacate  Final Judgment dated January 11, 2019 .................................................................Da13  Order, dated July 10, 2023, signed by Hon. [...], JSC, amending January 11, 2019  Final Judgment  Pursuant to August 25, 2021  Appellate Court Decision .................................................................Da15  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[directive] Burglar’s Tools  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $2,500 10% permissible employ.  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $2,500 10% permissible  Actor attempts to or purposely or knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or attempts by physical 2C:12-1a(1)(2)(3)
[brief] In Its Second Legal Point, Respondents Continues To Make the Same Error as They Did in Their First Legal Legal Point While at the Same Time Making Arguably False Statement Concerning the Diagrammatic Elevation that Undermine Its Argument that the Trial Court Should Defer to the Decision Set Forth in the Amended Resolution.  Most of the Respondents’ arguments concerning this legal point involve a continuation of the errors already outlined in Appellant’s response to the first legal point.  They can therefore be disregarded as irrelevant to this appeal.
[directive] During the COVID-19 Pandemic  The Court entered its April 20, 2020 Order when court locations essentially were physically closed to the public.  Limited in-person court events followed in “Phase 2” of the Court’s Post-Pandemic Plan, starting on June 22, 2020.  As court buildings reopened, some matters proceeded to in-person hearings.  In other cases, parties who previously had withheld consent changed their position and agreed to proceed remotely.  Throughout the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the Judiciary has continued to expand remote operations, including by increasing the numbers and types of events that are conducted using remote technologies.
[brief] [3T35-36]  [...] then proceeded to eviscerate [...] in cross-examination on the very qualification problems that [...] was retained to address (4T173):  Q  Now, it’s a fair statement that from 2011 through 2022, you did not do one bowel surgery?  A  That’s true.  Q  And you did not do one major abdominal surgery during that same 10 year period, correct?  A  True.  Q  And have you done any bowel surgery in the last six months?  A  No, I’m privileged for it but I haven’t.  Q  So you still haven’t done bowel surgery since 2010, correct?  A  Yes.  Q
[brief] 42  Colucci v. Oppenheim, 326 N.J. Super. 166, 177, 740 A.2d 1101 (App. Div. 1999) .................................................................  22 Crego v. Carp, 295 N.J. Super. 565, 577 (App. Div. 1996) .................................................. 30, 31 Cutler v. Dorn, 196 N.J. 419, 430 (2008) .................................................................  32  Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 12 (1969) .................................................................  39  Dougherty v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 325 N.J. Super. 549, 553 (App. Div. 1999) .................................................................  37  Fertile v. St. Michael's Med. Ctr., 169 N.J. 481, 495 (2001)
[brief] On March 4, 2020, a Somerset County grand jury returned Indictment Number [...] charging defendant, [...], with fourth-degree criminal trespass, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(a).  (Da1).  On June 2, 2021, a Somerset County grand jury returned Indictment Number [...] charging defendant with third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and 2C:35-5(b)(5).  (Da2).  On July 29, 2020, defendant’s motion to suppress under Indictment Number [...] was held before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. (1T).  On August 4, 2020, the court denied the motion in a written opinion.  (Da3-9).  On September 23, 2022, defendant pleaded guilty to third-degree possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance under Indictment Number [...] and to an amended petty disorderly persons offense of criminal trespass, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b), under Indictment Number [...].  (Da10-15; 2T3-17 to 19-2).  In exchange, the State recommended a four-year prison sentence on the possession with intent charge and a concurrent 30-day jail sentence on the trespassing charge as well as the dismissal of two complaints charging disorderly persons offenses.  (Da13, 15; 2T3-24 to 4-3).  On December 9, 2022, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement.  (Da16-22; 3T6-11 to 9-24).  As provided for in the plea agreement, the custodial sentence was stayed pending defendant’s appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress.  (Da16, 19; 2T4-4 to 10; 3T9-24 to 10-4).  On December 15, 2022, defendant filed a notice of appeal.  (Da23-27).
[brief] See, Banco Popular, N.A. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161 (2005); Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472 (1995).  In Petrillo, the Court quoted from the proposed Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers.  In the comments to the same section cited in Petrillo, the Restatement provides:  Opposing parties.  A lawyer representing a party in a litigation has no duty of care to the opposing party under this section and hence no liability for lack of care, except in unusual situations such as when a litigant is provided with an opinion letter from opposing counsel as part of a settlement …  [T]he opposing party is protected by the rules and procedures of the adversary system and, usually, by counsel.  See, *Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers* Section 51 cmt.b (1998); *DeAngelis v. Rose*, 320 N.J. Super. 263, 274-275 (App. Div. 1999) (citing the same tentative draft of the *Restatement*).
[brief] Pa2114.  • [...], [...]’s Customer Service Team Lead in the [...] Wrap Up Department, could not locate any documents that related to a cancellation of coverage under a general liability policy.  Pa2444.  •  [...] of [...] testified that [...] never received any notice from either [...] or [...] that [...] was no longer enrolled in the CCIP.  Pa2352-Pa2353.  •  When shown a form letter that would advise contractors that they were excluded from a CCIP program, [...] of [...], listed as the contact person on [...]’s Certificate of Liability Insurance, testified that he had never seen such a letter that was issued to [...].  He also testified that his intent in emailing [...]’s wrap up team to “cancel effective 8/1/2015” was to cancel the workers’ compensation policy.  Pa2460, Pa2485.  •  [...] of [...] testified that although he believed [...] was “erroneously” enrolled, there was no formal process at the time to inform erroneously enrolled contractors that they were not covered, and it was unclear to [...] whether a notice of cancellation was sent to [...].  Pa2211-Pa2212.
[brief] It was proper for the sentencing court to consider the legislative history of the statute, defendant’s stated purpose of the statute is inaccurate, and the court below did not indicate consecutive sentences are necessary or required when sentencing a defendant under the statute.  First, it should be noted that it was not “the court’s true motivation” to impose consecutive sentences because it was concerned that to do otherwise would render the statute meaningless, as defendant claims.  (Db21).  Although the court made that comment, as stated above, it gave a thorough and comprehensive opinion laying out its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences.  Defendant cannot point to small instances in the transcript to belie that fact.
[brief] THE STANDARD OF REVIEW.  Motions pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted are reviewed de novo.  See, e.g., Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021) (citing Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019)).  “A reviewing court must examine ‘the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint,’ giving the plaintiff the benefit of ‘every reasonable inference of fact. ’”  Id. (citing Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 107 (quoting Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989))) (emphasis added).  “The complaint must be searched thoroughly ‘and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary.’”  Id. (citing Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746 (quoting Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem’l Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957))).  “‘Nonetheless, if the complaint states no claim that supports relief, and discovery will not give rise to such a claim, the action should be dismissed. ’”  Id. (quoting Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 107).  While “dismissals under Rule 4:6-2(e) are ordinarily without prejudice…a dismissal with prejudice is ‘mandated where the factual allegations are palpably insufficient to support a claim upon which relief can be granted,’ [] or if ‘discovery will not give rise to such a claim[.]’  See Mac Property Group LLC & The Cake Boutique LLC v. Selective Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 473 N.J. Super. 1, 17 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting Rieder v. State, 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987) and Dimitrakopoulos 237 N.J. at 107)).  The Court Below properly dismissed this matter with prejudice because “the factual allegations are palpably insufficient to support a claim upon which relief can be granted” and “discovery will not give rise to such a claim. ”  A thorough search of Plaintiffs’ Complaint can only yield one conclusion: there is no “fundament of a cause of action” which may “be gleaned” from any of the allegations contained in the Complaint.  As described in detail below Plaintiff does not plead any defect of the physical property itself in combination with the alleged (illegal) activities which occurred as required by the dangerous condition provision of the TCA and longstanding caselaw interpreting same.