ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] It asserted that the arbitrator misunderstood its proposal and erred in the wholesale adoption of the health benefits language from the firefighters’ unit May 2022 MOA because it only sought to add the health benefits waiver incentive language from the firefighters’ MOA, and not other language which was inapplicable to the [...] contract.  (Aa054).  The [...]’s revised final offers clarified any ambiguity in its health benefits proposal.  However, the arbitrator’s failure to accept the revised final offer, which clarified exactly what parts of the firefighters’ unit MOA language was sought, lead to the [...] being prejudiced by the arbitrator’s misunderstanding of the language sought.  In its decision, the Commission found that:  The arbitrator’s award recited the full “Article VII - Health Benefits” provision from the [...]’s May 2022 MOA with the City and awarded the same health benefits language, including the waiver incentive language, as requested by the [...] in its final offer.  Award at 89-91).  Contrary to the health benefits proposal in the [...]’s revised final offer which, as discussed above, was properly rejected, the [...]’s final offer did not limit its health benefits proposal to only the addition of a health benefits waiver incentive.  Therefore, the arbitrator did not make a mistake by replacing the [...]’s health benefits provision with the same language found in the [...]’s MOA.
[directive] Formulario enmendado promulgado por la directriz #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Spanish página 2 de 7 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Spanish page 2 of 7  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2) or any attempt to commit any of these crimes and at sentencing the court finds that your conduct was characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior you must verify your address with the appropriate law enforcement agency every 90 days or if the court finds your conduct is not characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior, you must verify your address annually?
[brief] The State responded exactly as it said it would, which resulted in [...]’s lay opinion, which was offered not to provide direct evidence of what the videos showed, but rather to explain why [...] contacted defendant’s attorney before the searches took place.  Defendant clearly had a motive to secure a second wallet ID before being suspended.  By January 2016, defendant knew he was accused of failing to perform three calibrations, knew he was accused of making false certifications on forms associated with those calibrations, knew that he would not be permitted to perform any more calibrations, and knew he was likely to be re-assigned to a different unit.
[directive] Guidelines for Downgrades/Dismissals under the Graves Act: Strict Subj: Enforcement of Mandatory Minimum Custodial Terms for Offenses Involving Firearms Date: July 2018  2,  This Directive being promulgated the recommendation of the Conference of is on Criminal Presiding Judges to continue the mandates guidance set forth Directive 0-80 and in #1 "Sentencing Guidelines for Dismissals Under the Graves Act," issued April 1981.  The prior 27, directive was issued for primarily two purposes: ensure that · mandatory prison terms (1) to pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), the Graves Act, were imposed accordance with the in Legislature's intent, and to promulgate guidelines to when a judge may approve a as (2) negotiated plea, which involves dismissal of offense carrying a mandatory custodial term.  an  This directive supersedes Directive #10-80 because the referenced offenses the and mandatory custodial terms have since been amended; however, the overall purposes that in directive are still applicable.  Specifically, these purposes are: to continue to mandate the (1) strict enforcement of the mandatory parole ineligibility terms under the Graves Act in accordance with the Legislature's intent, to reaffirm the guidelines regarding the and (2) 1981 dismissal of Graves Act offenses.  When the prior directive was issued, the mandatory custodial terms for the Graves Act offenses were fixed at between one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed the court or by three years, whichever greater, or eighteen months the case of a fourth degree charge, is in during which the person was ineligible for parole.  The current mandatory minimum terms for a Graves Act offense, effective August 2013, are fixed at one-half of the sentence imposed by 8, the court, or 42 months, whichever greater, or eighteen months for a fourth degree offense, is during which the person ineligible for parole.  is  The prior directive predated N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2, which was adopted effective 14, April 1989 which provides that, motion by the prosecutor to the Assignment Judge, the and on mandatory custodial term for the designated Graves Act offenses (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)) can be [...] • Box 037 • [...]
[brief] See *People v. Luna*, 989 N.E.2d 655, 673 (2013).  When addressing the same criticisms made by defendant here, the Illinois Court of Appeals stated, “Questions concerning underlying data, and an expert’s application of generally accepted techniques, go to the weight of the evidence, rather than its admissibility. ”  Ibid. (quoting Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 326 (2002).  “Before the jury, the examining attorney ‘may expose shaky but admissible evidence by vigorous cross-examination or the presentations of contrary evidence. ’”  Ibid.  (quoting Donaldson, 767 N.E.2d at 330).  Defendant instead relies on Massachusetts Supreme Court rulings, which found the report showed a “need to prevent overstatement of the accuracy of fingerprint comparisons,” and has since required that testimony indicating a latent print matches a known print “be presented as an opinion, not a fact[.]”
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.30.  This list of wages and crafts/trades, as applicable to Passaic County at the time of the bid, is available at lwdwebpt.dol.state.nj.us/archivewages/150122207-passaic-5-29-24.pdf (hereinafter “List of Wages Passaic County”).  “Archaeologist” or “archaeology” is not among them.  To summarize, if a subcontractor will not be performing “construction, reconstruction, demolition, alteration, custom fabrication, duct cleaning, or repair work, or maintenance work,” N.J.S.A. § 34:11-56.26(5), or if the subcontractor’s craft or trade is not identified as one for which the prevailing wage must be paid—then that subcontractor’s work is not subject to the PWCRA, which means that the subcontractor is exempt from the PWCRA’s registration requirement.  N.J.S.A. § 34:11-56.51a.  In the instant case, per the Technical Specifications for the Project, the archaeologist will not be performing any construction, reconstruction, demolition, alteration, custom fabrication, duct cleaning, or repair work, or maintenance work.  See 0912a-0913a § 3.09.  The archaeologist would, instead, be monitoring “all excavation activities” and preparing “monitoring report[s]”.  See id.  Furthermore, “archaeologist” is not identified on the list of crafts and trades subject to the Prevailing Wage Act.  See List of Wages Passaic County.  As such, there is no basis upon which it is possible to conclude that the work of the archaeologist (as described in the Bidding Documents) is subject to the PWCRA.
[brief] ” (emphasis added).  That latter provision is entirely inapplicable to this case.  Third, Plaintiff argues that the $2 million used by the City to construct the senior center is not a “cost of the redevelopment entity” but is rather an “investment” by the City.  Pb25.  Plaintiff’s argument in this regard is purely semantic.  The City incurred at least $2 million in costs to construct the senior center.  Whether the payment of such construction costs is considered a capital investment for accounting purposes does not change the fact that the City incurred those costs to construct the senior center.  Because the $2 million was negotiated and collected by the City to defray its costs incurred in connection with the senior center, the payment was lawful under the plain language of the LRHL.  B.
[brief] In order to succeed on a negligent training or supervision claim, establishing the unfitness of the employee is the first step in proving foreseeability.  It is the employee’s abilities (or lack thereof) or disposition that informs the employer a risk of harm exists and what must be done in terms of supervision or training to eliminate or minimize that risk.  Without evidence that [...]’s abilities or characteristics were insufficient for the tasks he was assigned to perform, there is no evidence that shows that “the failure to supervise or train [[...]] in a certain way [such as allowing him to interact with customers on his own prior to completing the red vest ready program] would create a risk of harm and (2) that risk of harm materializes and causes the plaintiff’s damages.
[brief] (1T).  Following arguments, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendant [...], dismissing Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint with prejudice.  (1T at 16:22 – 18:12).  In support of its decision, the court placed the following reasons on the record:  THE COURT: Okay.  Thank you very much.  All right.  I have had the opportunity to review the moving papers, opposition thereto, the reply therefrom, attachments thereto.  I’m also familiar with the case.  It is therefore determined by this Court that defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
[directive] c. s. 1, eff. Jan. 4OA :5-29.  Acceptance of bequests, legacies, gifts is  Any local unit authorized and empowered to accept bequests, legacies and gifts made to it and is empowered to utilize such bequests, legacies and gifts in the manner set forth in the conditions of the bequest, legacy or gift, provided, however, that such bequest, legacy or gift shall not be put to any use which is inconsistent with the laws of this State and of the United States.  L.1960, 169, 1, 1962.
[brief] The Borough’s Redevelopment Process  The Borough, utilizing the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12-1, et seq. (“LRHL”), for the first time, adopted the [...] Redevelopment Plan on December 15, 2020, through Ordinance No. 1394-20.  (Pa 331.)  Notice of the public hearing on adoption of Ordinance 1394-20 was published on November 26, 2020.  The notice did not include a copy of the Plan or a summary of its contents and did not inform the public how they could obtain a copy of the Plan and ordinance.  (Pa 149.)  The LRHL requires the Borough to wait 45 days from introduction of a redevelopment plan ordinance before holding a public hearing on final passage, to afford time for the Planning Board to remit the report required by N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.  Ordinance No. 1394-20 was introduced on November 17, 2021, and adopted on December 15, 2021, 28 days after introduction.  (Pa 15, Verified Complaint, ¶67; Pa 151.)  The Borough introduced Ordinance No. 1423-21, an amendment to the Redevelopment Plan, at a special meeting held on November 12, 2021.  (Pa 153.)  Notice of the meeting was e-mailed to the designated newspapers on November 10, 2021, too late to be published in either paper.  (Id.)  The notice nonetheless instructed the newspapers that it was not for publication since it was prefaced with “FOR RECORD ONLY” (caps and [sic] in original).  (Id.)  The special meeting notice provided no information on the agenda or how to access the remote meeting, other than referencing the Borough’s website, and failed to indicate whether formal action would or would not be taken.
[brief] The Motion Court agreed there was no evidence Defendants knew or should have known of a particular vicious trait or dangerous propensity attributed to [...] that was not universally shared among breeding stallions and declined to extend strict liability to injuries caused by the inherent traits common to all breeding stallions.  [Pa 1091-92, 1096].  In addition to there being no legal precedent for the outcome urged by Plaintiffs, the trial court further reasoned that imposing strict liability would be contrary to the public policy of limiting liability for injuries caused by the inherent risks of working with horses.  [Pa 1092-96].  In particular, the Motion Judge noted that the Act limits liability for “operators” when “participants” engage in broadly-defined “equine activities,” and that Plaintiff was \(^2\)  In their response to Paragraph 25 of Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, Plaintiffs admitted Defendants never personally observed past aggressive or vicious behavior by [...].
[brief] A party is “indispensable” if it “has an interest inevitably involved in the subject matter before the court and a judgment cannot justly be made between the litigants without either adjudging or necessarily affecting the absentee’s interest. ”  Jennings v. M&M Transp. Co., 104 N.J. Super. 265, 272 (Ch. Div. 1969).  Indispensability is usually determined from the point of view of the absent party and in consideration of whether or not his rights and interests will be adversely affected. ”  LaMar-Gate, Inc. v. Spitz, 252 N.J. Super. 303 (App. Div. 1991).  Whether [...] has authority to regulate buildings on the Property or not, the trial court’s order prejudiced [...]’s express rights under the Genesis Deed and the Plaintiffs should be required to add [...] as an indispensable party to this action before any decision impacting the rights of [...] is rendered.
[brief] On direct examination, the sworn deposition testimony of the plaintiff was read into the record.  (4T208:14-262:4).  Ultimately, the plaintiff’s testimony created issues of credibility and substantive evidence with regard to the cause of her fall at the [...] store, which established a proper foundation for the admission of evidence and testimony on the plaintiff’s prior history of neuropathy, balance and gait issues, prior falls and use of a handicapped placard.  Proofs may be presented to a jury both as impeachment and as substantive evidence.
[brief] *See State v. Nasir*, 355 N.J. Super. 96, 103 (App. Div. 2002).  In any event, Plaintiff is wrong.  Whatever procedural missteps Defendants may have made in seeking relief under UPEPA (there were none), they have no bearing on whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendants’ R.4:50-1(f) motion, which is an entirely different motion than Defendants’ yet-to-be-filed motion for attorneys’ fees under UPEPA.  In any event, Rule 4:67-1 does not apply to this action.  It provides that \[\text{[t]his rule is applicable (a) to all actions in which the court is permitted by rule or by statute to proceed in a summary manner, other than actions for the recovery of penalties which shall be brought pursuant to R. 4:70; and (b) to all other actions in the Superior Court other than matrimonial actions and actions in which unliquidated monetary damages are sought, provided it appears to the court, on motion made pursuant to R. 1:6-3 and on notice to the other parties to the action not in default, that it is likely that the matter may be completely disposed of in a summary manner. }\]  *N.J. Ct. R. R.4:67-1.*  Subsection (a) does not apply here—and Plaintiff does not argue as much—because nothing in UPEPA’s text authorizes such actions to proceed in a summary manner.  *Cf. Courier News v. Hunterdon Cnty.  Prosecutor’s* Off., 358 N.J. Super. 373, 378 (2003) (language in Open Public Records Act providing that “[a]ny such proceeding shall proceed in a summary or expedited manner” required the “trial court to proceed under the procedures described in Rule 4:67. ”).  To be sure, UPEPA requires the court to hear and rule on an order to show cause “as soon as practicable,” but that is not the same as authorizing summary treatment.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-53.  And no case has held that actions subject to UPEPA must proceed summarily.  Nor does subsection (b) apply because Defendants do not seek to have this action treated in a summary manner and have not filed a motion seeking such relief.
[brief] MAG Entertainment LLC v. Div. of Alcohol Bev. Ctrl., 375 N.J. Super 534, 551-53 (App. Div. 2005).  Withdrawal of his OPRA claim in favor of the common law right of access cannot transform the summary proceeding into a plenary proceeding that would allow for discovery nor does it retroactively cure [...]’s prior, improper discovery requests.  To prevail, [...] would have had to satisfy the prerequisites of R. 4:67-5, which requires a showing of good cause at the hearing or upon motion to convert a case before the court on Order to Show Cause into a plenary action.
[directive] ii.  The Court Must Find that the Defendant Has the Following Necessary Technology  Defendants ordered to home detention will by necessity require access to certain technology.  All defendants who are ordered to home detention with or without electronic monitoring must have 24/7 access to a cellular phone with video of or photo capability.  Defendants who cannot access the minimum required level technology, or who are ordered not to possess such technology, shall not be ordered home to detention.  B.
[brief] See, e.g., Kutcher v. Hous. Auth. of City of Newark, 20 N.J. 181, 188-89 (1955) (“The State may not condition a privilege which it may deny altogether on a surrender of constitutional right. ”).  So AICRA could not constitutionally require insurers to waive their right to a jury trial on fraud claims in exchange for the privilege of selling no-fault insurance in New Jersey.  And nothing suggests that the Legislature attempted to put such an unconstitutional condition in AICRA.  There is no voluntary act by which Plaintiffs could opt in to, or out of, PIP ADR that might affect this court’s analysis of whether AICRA could constitutionally require PIP ADR of insurers’ damages claims.
[brief] THE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THE STATE IS LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS.  The trial court correctly found, and Appellants do not seriously dispute on appeal, that the State had demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success on its claim that the Amended Policy violates the LAD.  Appellants’ responses—that the State lacks a settled right to relief; that the Amended Policy finds support in federal and state recordkeeping laws; and that the Amended Policy is necessary to protect parents’ constitutional rights—all fall short.
[brief] ” (3T 21:1).  Court’s focus on whether or not there was a transaction between the Defendants distracted it from the questions of disputed material fact and reasonable inferences supporting Plaintiffs’ claim, including:  - That [...] “engaged in preliminary discussions with [[...]] . . . at his two office locations: [...] .  . . .” (P283a, P750a, P779a).  - That [...] provided a letter of intent to [...] that included an adjustment (i.e., an expense that did not lower the value of the practice) to EBITDA for “[...],” thereby acknowledging that their offer contemplated a new optical shop to replace Plaintiffs’.  (P755a).  - That the LOI was explicitly based upon “the due diligence we have conducted to date based on the information that [the [...]] have provided,” including, one can infer, regarding the “[...]. ” (P750a).  -  That, in defense of this action, [...] had stated that it had no “familiarity” with or “communications . . . regarding” Plaintiffs, but explicitly did not state that [...] was unaware that there was an independently owned optical shop in the building.  (P284a).  •  That conversations between [...] and the [...] continued even after [...] would have been aware of Plaintiffs and the claims they asserted.  (P757a, P759a, P762a, P764a, P766a, P768a).  As discussed below, at the very least, Plaintiffs should have been granted more time to complete discovery from [...].
[brief] As [...] explains, social transitioning is a form of psychological treatment.  ACa12, ACa25-ACa31 ¶¶ 8.e, 31–45.  Indeed, the very purpose of social transitioning is to alleviate the mental suffering that persons with a transgender identity can experience.  ACa14 ¶ 9.  Because social transitioning constitutes psychological treatment, parents have the right to consent when the State is performing that treatment on their children.  See T.F. v. Kettle Moraine School Dist., No. 2021CV1650, 2023 WL 6544917, at *5 (Wis.  Cir. Oct. 03, 2023) (holding that socially transitioning child against parents’ wishes “directly implicates an infringement against the parental . . . right to direct the care for their child”).  The characterization of social transitioning as a form of psychological treatment is not controversial.  Courts across the country have recognized this fact.
[brief] H.  Plaintiff’s Baseless Ad Hominem Attacks are Entirely Without Merit and Inappropriate.  (Pb31-Pb34).  Plaintiff appears to be once again advancing some sort of preposterous conspiracy theory regarding [...]’s counsel in Point Nine of Plaintiff’s Brief.  Plaintiff throughout this litigation has leveled such types of baseless ad hominem attacks not only against counsel for [...], but also against the Court Below, the Borough, and its employees.  These specious attacks are unworthy of comment, however, must be addressed so as to preserve the aforementioneds’ rights.  As [...] argued before the Court Below, Plaintiff’s baseless attacks appear to be based upon a clear misunderstanding of the difference between private retention and assignment from the [...] insuring [...].  Furthermore, Plaintiff is taking issue with responsive correspondence (see Pa035-Pa036) to correspondence of [...], upon information and belief with the assistance of Plaintiff, sent to the Borough advising of possible legal liability and action (see Da014-Da015).  [...] had every right to send the aforementioned responsive correspondence to Plaintiff.  There was absolutely nothing problematic in the conduct complained of by Plaintiff.  In fact, these baseless attacks are potentially defamatory and libelous as there is not even a whiff nor scintilla of proof of any sort of impropriety.  Plaintiff’s uncouth behavior is nothing more than a tantrum borne of a willful inability to comprehend the law, the Rules of Court, and the facts and circumstances of the matter at bar.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s ad hominem attacks must cease and should have no bearing on the matter at bar wherein the Court Below properly dismissed Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint with prejudice.
[brief] ATTORNEY AT LAW  Attorney Id. 019461994  [...] [...]  Facsimile: [...]  E-mail: [...]  Attorney for Defendant, [...]  [...], Plaintiff, vs. [...], [...], [...], [...]  1-20, [...] 1-10, [...] 1-10, and JOHN/JANE DOES 1-20 (last four names being fictitious and presently unknown), Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION  MORRIS COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...]  Civil Action  STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL AS TO DEFENDANT  [...]  To: Clerk of the Superior Court Law Division
[brief] See, e.g., Mazzilli v. Acc. & Cas. Co. of Winterthur, Switz., 35 N.J. 1, 7, 170 A.2d 800, 803 (1961) (“If the controlling language will support two meanings, one favorable to the insurer, and the other favorable to the insured, the interpretation sustaining coverage must be applied. ”); Cypress Point Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Adria Towers, L.L.C., 226 N.J. 403, 416, 143 A.3d 273, 280 (2016) (same).  Vermont law similarly holds that “[a]n insurance policy ‘is to be strictly construed against the insurer. ’”  Rainforest Chocolate, LLC v. Sentinel Ins. Co., 209 Vt. 232, 235, 204 A.3d 1109, 1111 (Vt. 2018).  Under this standard, the undefined term “damages” in the Policy clearly must be construed to have a meaning, consistent with standard dictionary definitions, that encompasses the monies that [...] and his assignor were ordered to pay in the Vermont suit.