ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Czy rozumie Pan(i), że jeśli sąd uzna, że Pana(i) postępowanie stanowiło [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] 3. element powtarzalnego i kompulsywnego zachowania i że nie odniósł(osłaby) Pan(i) korzyści z terapii dla przestępców seksualnych lub jeśli odniósł(osłaby) Pan(i) zdaniem sądu korzyści, ale nie wyraża Pan(i) zgody na terapię, sąd wobec Pana(i) karę pozbawienia wolności w innej placówce, nie orzeknie oferującej terapii dla przestępców seksualnych, że w takim przypadku nie i będzie Pan(i) mieć możliwości złagodzenia kary za dobre sprawowanie lub kary za pracę w okresie spędzonym skrócenia w tej innej placówce?  Do you understand if the court finds your conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive 3. and compulsive behavior and you are not amenable to sex offender treatment or if you are amenable (will benefit from) but you are not willing to participate in such treatment, the court will sentence you to a term of incarceration to be served in another facility which will and not provide for sex offender treatment in such event, you will not receive commutation time for good behavior or earn work credits for time served in such other facility?
[directive] / Defendant’s Initials  피고인의 이니셜 유죄인정 주양식/지령 제01-18 호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 수정 양식, 페이지6/7  CN 10079-Korean Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Korean page 6/7 22.  이외에, [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  이 서식에 언급된 약속 귀하가 유죄를 인정하게 만든 다른 약속이나  위협을 받았습니까?  Have any promises other than those mentioned on this form, or any threats, been made in order to cause you to plead guilty?  23. a. 않으며, [예/Yes] [아니요/No] 검사의 어떤 약속이나 권고가 있어도 판사는 그에 구애되지 판사는 선고를 하기 전에 유죄인정을 거부할 권한과 보다 더 엄한 형을 선고할 권한이 있다는 것을 아십니까? Do you understand that the judge is not bound by any promises or recommendations of the prosecutor and that the judge has the right to reject the plea before sentencing you and the right to impose a more severe sentence?
[brief] Appellants claim the State’s right to relief was insufficiently settled; that the injunction interferes with parents’ constitutional rights; that there was insufficient evidence of irreparable harm; and that the court incorrectly balanced the equities.  But the State’s right to relief could hardly be clearer: these policies violate the LAD, and N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1 provides the Attorney General and the Director the express right to seek preliminary relief that preserves the status quo while their administrative action is pending.  The court’s narrow injunction also does not intrude on parental decision-making, as it neither stops parents from counseling their children or their children from sharing information with their parents.  And the harm from failing to enjoin these policies is obvious: LGBTQ+ children who are involuntarily outed face tremendous and irreversible harms, including that they would be less willing to come out at school in the first place, in turn preventing them from accessing the support they may need.  Appellants’ arguments are based on a flawed understanding of the State’s position and the trial court’s narrow injunction.  The State has always embraced the central role that parents play in decisions regarding their children.  And, consistent with the LAD, schools may disclose a student’s LGBTQ+ status in a number of circumstances, including any time there is a compelling and non-discriminatory justification.  But as the trial court properly held, schools may not adopt or enforce policies that discriminate against any student based on their LAD-protected characteristics, let alone while the State’s administrative action proceeds.  That is dispositive, and this court should affirm.
[brief] (Pa 52, at 83:21-84:7; and Pa 52, at 85:25 – Pa 53, 86:11)  Battalion chief [...] did not immediately perceive [...]’s comments as problematic, interject, or raise any complaints regarding same.  On or around March 20, 2020, [...] finally spoke to Plaintiff about the incident and informed him that he would not have to sit in training with Defendant [...] again.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT IGNORED SETTLED SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS IN DETERMINING THAT THERE WERE NO MATERIAL FACT DISPUTES REGARDING THE ELEMENT OF MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION REQUIRED FOR THE REMEDY OF RESCISSION AND DISREGARDED SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THAT WOULD HAVE AT LEAST CREATED A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT ON THAT ISSUE.  (9)  A.
[brief] The HCH Action Did Not Cease to Be a “Suit” by Reason of Appealable Rulings of the Vermont Trial Court [Pa1, Pa3].  The Policy provides: “We will have the right and duty to defend any ‘suit’ seeking those damages. ”  Pa783 (emphasis added); see Pb4–5.  The Policy defines the term “suit” as follows:  “‘Suit’ or ‘suits’ means a civil proceeding(s) in which ‘loss’ because of ‘wrongful acts’ to which this insurance applies are alleged. ”  Pa787 (emphasis added); see Pb5.  [...] argues that “under Vermont law specifically addressing an insurer’s duty to appeal, the absence of such a duty derives from the uncontrovertible [sic] fact that the judgment was not covered. ”  Db12–13 (emphasis added).  [...]’s argument contravenes Vermont law, which provides that “an insurer under a general duty to defend is required to bring an appeal on its insured’s behalf ‘when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the insured’s interests might be served by an appeal. ’”  Pharmacists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Myer, 187 Vt. 323, 334, 993 A.2d 413, 421 (2010) (quoting 1 A. Windt, Insurance Claims Disputes, § 4:17 at 4-160).  If [...] had fully defended the HCH Action, and if the Vermont Trial Court’s judgment had been affirmed on appeal, it would then become necessary to decide whether the “judicial findings” cited by [...] (Db25) took the judgment of the Vermont Trial Court outside the scope of [...]’s duty to indemnify.  But no such issue need be reached if, as the record here clearly establishes, [...] breached its duty to defend the HCH Action on appeal.
[directive] RestNaining DORO and SASPA, SORO, Violence, Domestic 6.2.3 release or no-contact of a issuance for reason is there appearance first of time the at  If offender sexual 2C:21-25(a), a N.J.S.A. or Law Reform Bail the by authorized condition to pursuant order restraining offender drug or a 2C:14-12, N.J.S.A. to pursuant order restraining the court, any by issued been previously has order restraining such any if or 2C:35-5.7, N.J.S.A. special made restraints be such that request shall general attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant under the orders restraining for apply may victims addition, In release.  pretrial of conditions  The Act.
[brief] And at least one high-salaried employee may have been employed by both the [...] and the [...], creating “potential for procurement issues, diminished incentive to return saved funds to [...], and potential for conflicts in contract oversight of the [...] as a vendor. ” (Ra144; Ra315).  Furthermore, many non-public students do not have an identification number in the [...] Report of Transported Resident Students (DRTRS), which is the State transportation system, creating the risk that students might be counted and funded in multiple counties.  (Ra144; Ra315).  Because of these issues, as well as the multitude of issues listed above, the Comprehensive Report concluded that “[t]he pervasive inefficiencies, deficiencies, and the apparent shortfall in oversight and strategic systemic action by the [...],” rather than the SFRA, have caused [...]’s failure to provide T&E.
[directive] 3. 3.1  An individual’s status evolves from a resistor to an assailant when they use force, threaten to use force, or otherwise act in an aggressive manner that increases the likelihood that they may cause physical injury to an officer or to another person.  However, flight from an officer does not, on its own, qualify a person as an assailant.  When dealing with an individual who poses a threat to the officer, the individual could be considered either a threatening assailant or an active assailant.  To determine the individual’s status for appropriate officer response, the officer must assess whether the threat poses an 7 USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2020 imminent danger.  If the threat is imminent, then that individual is considered an active assailant and all use of force options are available with deadly force being an absolute last resort in accordance with Core Principle Five of this Policy.
[brief] All motions to vacate under Rule 4:50-1 must be filed within a "reasonable time," regardless of the motion's grounds.  *Citibank, N.A. v. Russo*, 334 N.J. Super. 346, 535 (App. Div. 2000), which can be less than one year.  "We have explained that a reasonable time is determined based upon the totality of the circumstances."  *Romero v. Gold Star Distrib., LLC*, 468 N.J. Super. 274, 296 (App. Div. 2021).  While the trial court referenced *New Shrewsbury v. Block 115, Lot 4*, 74 N.J. Super. 1 (App.Div. 1962) and the three-month period, that reference is misplaced.  “The narrow issue before us on this appeal is whether the trial court properly denied [...]’s motion to reopen this tax foreclosure judgment on the ground that it was not made within time [under N.J.S. 54:5-104.67].”
[brief] One study from the National Bureau of Economics found that students “who start school at an older age do better than their younger classmates and have better odds of attending college. ” (Ra185).  There is also evidence, the Report explained, that students who start school earlier are more likely to be “placed in special education or diagnosed with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD),” as “the youngest students in a kindergarten cohort are 40% more likely to be placed in special education than are the oldest students. ”  Ibid.  The Report also examined Policy 2330: Homework, and Policy 7523: School District Provided Technology Devices to Pupils.  (Ra186).  Under Policy 7523, technology devices made available to students are not considered “mandatory to a successful completion of a pupil’s classroom curriculum. ”  Ibid.  Similarly, Policy 2330 states that students do not require a computer to complete assignments.  Ibid.  But these policies are at odds with the current instructional approach used by the District.  *Ibid.*  The Report found that in [...]’s high school, “most instruction . . . uses a SMART Board, a District provided PowerPoint and a Chromebook with Google Classroom installed.
[brief] There, a demand for AAA arbitration was made and requested 3 arbitrators.  Id. at 423.  In order to try to get only a single arbitrator that plaintiff sought declaratory judgment under 9 U.S.C. sec. 5, which permits a court to choose an arbitrator if one party refuses to participate.  Id. at 424.  The district court there compelled the arbitration but refused to decide how many arbitrators the parties’ agreement required in a pre-award setting.
[brief] Plaintiff/Appellant, [...] (formerly [...]) (“Plaintiff”) appeals from the lower court’s Order of January 23, 2024 that denied nearly all of the Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Litigants’ rights (P-1), including almost all of the $470,561.82 that Plaintiff seeks from her ex-husband Defendant/Respondent, Mr. Edward [...], Sr., (“Defendant”), reflecting his share of their two children’s unpaid medical expenses and educational expenses that Plaintiff was forced to pay due to Defendant’s defaults.  Plaintiff also seeks counsel fees and costs, in addition to a directive that Defendant obtain life insurance or provide some type of valid financial assurance that any debt Defendant owes Plaintiff will still be paid, even in the event of Defendant’s death or disability.  The purpose of this Motion, originally filed seven (7) years ago, was simply to compel Defendant to pay his fair share of the parties’ two (2) children’s medical expenses, tuition and educational costs, which Defendant has routinely shirked, much to the financial ruin of Plaintiff.  The trial court abused its discretion when it found that Plaintiff was only owed $186.70 for medical expenses, not owed anything for educational expenses, and then ordered Plaintiff to pay $2,372.50 for Defendant’s counsel fees.  At the outset, it must be emphasized that Defendant lacks all credibility where he committed perjury on his CIS by omitting his one-half interest in his father’s home that was deeded to him 2 months prior to his execution of that CIS, and where his matrimonial attorney, [...], also prepared the deed transferring the one-half interest in Defendant’s father’s house to Defendant, thus suborning perjury, and where [...] invoked the Fifth Amendment during the pre-trial deposition when the Undersigned attempted to explore this issue, entitling Plaintiff to an adverse inference, which was requested but not given.
[brief] The second of the robberies the jury found defendant to have committed occurred around 3:30 a.m. on April 25, 2005 in the [...].  Defendant first entered the motel at approximately 2:30 a.m. with a “large wad” of cash in his hands, and asked about room rates.  However, when the front desk clerk, [...], told defendant he had to produce identification, defendant declined to rent a room.  Around an hour later, defendant returned to the motel and pointed a gun at King as he ran towards the front desk.  King fell on the floor for his own protection, and defendant then jumped over the desk, after which [...] joined him.  Defendant demanded to know the location of the money on the premises, and King told him.  Defendant and [...] removed about $380 from a cash drawer and safe, and fled.
[brief] ”  Additionally, the Plaintiff stated “Plaintiff [...]… is a chess player and participant in the defendants’ events. ”  Pa3.  The Plaintiff’s complaint has multiple other references to the chess rules.  For example, the Plaintiff talks about tournaments where the prize fund is based on a certain number of players showing up.  If not enough players show up then the tournament organizer is still required to pay out 50% of the advertised prize fund.  Or, as the Plaintiff would say, the “prize amounts are cut in half. ”  Pa3.  How does the Plaintiff know this?  Because it’s in the rules that apply to all chess tournaments.  Every tournament that wants to be rated must follow the [...] rules.  T5:5-15 and T11:7-13.  There are organizations like the [...] that run tournaments.  Pa19.  The Plaintiff claims he did not want to sue the Defendants.
[brief] To that end, the conditions and specifications must apply equally to all prospective bidders, thus permitting the contractors to prepare their bids on the same basis. ”) (quoting *D'Annunzio Bros. v. New Jersey Transit Corp.*, 245 N.J. Super. 527, 532-33 (App. Div. 1991)).  When evaluating the deficiencies in a bid and the exercise of government discretion to waive deficiencies, “it is better to leave the door tightly closed than to permit it to be ajar, thus necessitating forevermore in such cases speculation as to whether or not it was purposely left that way. ”  *Meadowbrook*, 138 N.J. at 314 (quoting *Hillside Twp.*, 25 N.J. at 326).
[brief] In State v. [...], A-3644-21 (App. Div. Nov. 2, 2023) (slip op. at *5), certif. denied, 256 N.J. 199 (2024), officers pulled defendant over after receiving an erratic driving complaint about him.  Officers found indicia of CDS in the car and brought out a dog who alerted to the presence of CDS.  Id. at *3.  They subsequently searched the car and located over seventeen bricks of heroin along with cocaine and suboxone.  Ibid.  The judge denied [...]’s motion to suppress, and [...] appealed, contending that “the search of the car’s interior was not unforeseeable and spontaneous because the amount of information progressively gained by the police to support probable cause could have been anticipated as they continued their investigation.
[brief] [3T36; 3T52; 3T86; 3T113; 3T125; 3T143; 4T17; 4T44; 4T55; 4T72].  At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967).  [4T96-21 to 97-13].  [...] denied the motion.  [4T96-21 to 97-13].  Defendant did not call any witnesses and exercised his right to remain silent.  [4T97-22 to 98-6].  The jury convicted defendant of first-degree Robbery but acquitted him of Terroristic Threats.
[brief] *State v. [...]*, 303 N.J. Super 491, is instructive.  There, Hillside police officers obtained an arrest warrant for [...] from the Hillside Municipal Court.  *Id.* at 498.  The officers went to the defendant’s home in Newark, a municipality outside of their territorial jurisdiction, and arrested him, finding contraband incident to that arrest.  *Ibid.*  The panel found that arresting him in Newark violated *N.J.S.A.* 40A:14-152, which limited the police officers’ jurisdiction to the “territorial limits of the[ir] municipality . . . .”  *Ibid.* (quoting *N.J.S.A.* 40A:14-152).  [...] thus contended that the statutory violation required suppression of the contraband.  *Id.* at 499.  This Court rejected the defendant’s claim and held that a “technical violation of a procedural law does not automatically render a search and seizure unreasonable and does not require the exclusion of evidence. ”  *Id.* at 505.  Although the Hillside officers violated *N.J.S.A.* 40A:14-152, the arrest was pursuant to a warrant, based on probable cause, and was executed reasonably.  *Ibid.*  Therefore, the violation was a “technical, procedural, statutory” one — not of constitutional dimension — and thus the officers did not infringe upon the defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and so the exclusionary rule did not require that the contraband be suppressed.  *Id.* at 505-06; see also *White*, 305 N.J. Super. at 332 (assuming Orange police officers violated *N.J.S.A.* 40A:14-152 when they obtained consent to search a Newark apartment, the error was statutory and did not require suppression of the evidence seized pursuant to the search); *State v.* Konzelman, 204 N.J. Super. 389, 394 (Law Div. 1985) (violation of New York law by New Jersey officers arresting defendant in New York was constitutionally reasonable, and so suppression was not required).
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  As the subject appeal addresses an Order dismissing the Complaint with prejudice on summary judgment, it is subject to de novo review.  The appellate court must “review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo and apply the same legal standard as the trial court. ”  Crisitello v. St. Theresa School, 255 N.J. 200, 218 (2023).  The entry of summary judgment is appropriate “when ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ’”  Id. (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 528-29 (1996)(quoting R. 4:46-2)).  A de novo review of the record by an appellate panel will show clearly that summary judgment was properly entered.  It is respectfully submitted that the Law Division ruling should be affirmed, and that Plaintiff’s appeal should be dismissed.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
[brief] See Brill, *supra*.  There was no evidence offered by the Defendant, and the motion record is noticeably bereft of any, to suggest that the driver of the bus stopped suddenly and abruptly in an effort to avoid a collision or hitting someone running in front of it.  This was not the case of the bus merely “jerking and jolting. ”  In *Cohn v. Public Service Co-Ordinated Transport*, 109 N.J.L. 387 (1932), the plaintiff sustained personal injury by the sudden starting of a motor bus operated by the defendant, in which bus he had just become a passenger.
[brief] Appellant also cites *Rieder Cmtys. v. N. Brunswick*, 227 N.J. Super. 214, 221-22 (App. Div.1988) to paint him as having standing to sue as a third-party beneficiary of a contract intentionally made for his benefit.  At this point, it’s clear that Appellant is just picking key phrases from cases to support his points without actually reading the cases.  In *Rieder*, the court ruled plaintiffs did not have standing to sue because they were incidental beneficiaries to a contract between two townships, even though the benefit was an obviously foreseeable one.  Appellant has not made a clear argument as to how he is actually a third-party beneficiary, he simply states a rule cited in the case as self-sufficient proof.  The fact is he is not a third-party beneficiary with standing to sue, for several reasons.
[brief] New Jersey Highway Authority v. International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, Local 193, 274 N.J. Super. 599 (App. Div. 1994), certif. denied 139 N.J. 288 (1994).  See also Borough of East Rutherford v. East Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190 (2013).  The accuracy of the cost of the Award is the foundation for determining whether the Award meets the legal standards for affirmation and survives PERC and Court scrutiny.
[brief] 19 State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283 (2010)............................................................  19 State v. Caronna, 469 N.J. Super. 462 (App. Div. 2021)................................. 9, 10, 11 State v. Carter, 247 N.J. 488 (2021)................................................................. 10 State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014)................................................................... 18, 19 State v. Cullen, 351 N.J. Super. 505 (App. Div. 2002)................................. 20, 21 State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494 (2005)............................................................... 19 State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224 (2007)................................................................. 8 State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355 (2003)................................................................. 25 State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57 (2014)............................................................... 18, 19 State v. Gibson, 318 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1999).....................................  9 State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384 (2022).........................................................  8 State v. Goodson, 316 N.J. Super. 296 (App. Div. 1998)..............................  9 State v. Gray, 474 N.J. Super. 216 (App. Div. 2022).....................................  8 State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249 (2015)............................................................  8 State v. Johnson, 168 N.J. 608 (2001)............................................................  10 State v. Jones, 475 N.J. Super. 520, 535, leave to appeal denied, 255 N.J. 508 (2023) ...........................................  16, 17 State v. Molina, 114 N.J. 181 (1989) .................................................................  20 State v. Nieves, 476 N.J. Super. 405 (App. Div. 2023) ....................... 10, 15, 16 State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95 (1987) .........................................................  10 State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509 (2022) ..............................................................  9 State v. Presley, 436 N.J. Super 440 (App. Div. 2014) .............................  11 State v. Rivera, 124 N.J. 122 (1991) ..............................................................  25 State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285 (2021) ..............................................................  18 State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1 (2009) ............................................................  10, 12 State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424 (2013) ..........................................................  9 State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984) .................................................................  18 State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360 (2017) ...............................................................  9, 12 State v. Sene, 443 N.J. Super. 134 (App. Div. 2015) .................................  24 State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156 (2023) ..............................................................  9 State v. Towey, 244 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1990) ...............................  23 STATUTES N.J.S.A 2C:35-10.5(a)(4) .............................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)