[brief] THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND FOR THE 1998 AMENDMENTS TO EXPAND THE ACT’S IMMUNITY AGAINST CROSSING FATALITIES  The legislative history of the 1998 amendments to the Railroad Immunity Act does not evidence any intent to expand the Act’s immunity against crossing fatalities.  Briefly, as there is no need to even reach this stage of statutory interpretation given the clear textual language and historical context, the New Jersey Assembly Transportation and Communications Committee’s June 3, 1996 Statement in support of then-pending Assembly Bill No. 1788 clearly states the Legislature’s intent:  “This amended bill would clarify the Legislature's intent that the provisions of [N.J.S.A.] 48:12-152 would control in railroad-related injuries sustained by a trespasser; that is, there remains an absolute bar to recovery for these injuries despite the adoption of the comparative negligence doctrine in New Jersey. ” (Pa1024).  None of the Assembly Committee or Senate Committee statements contains any sort of indication the Legislature intended to water down the Act’s crossing exception, or expand the concept of property, or misuse of property.  This Court certainly identified nothing of the sort in Funes v. Norfolk S. Corp, A-5348-10, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2134 (App. Div. Sept. 18, 2012) (Da59), where it conducted an exhaustive review of the 1998 amendments.  Rather, as summarized by this Court, the amendments simply “restor[ed] to railroads the absolute immunity from the claims of trespassers they had enjoyed before Renz, except as to minors, including railroad officers and employees within the protections of the statute, extending the statute’s definition of trespass, and expressly repudiating application of the Comparative Negligence Act to railroad trespassers. ”  *Id.* at *19; (Da63).  To be clear, that “expanded definition of trespass” does not in any way sweep in [...]’s conduct.  Where, [t]he statute previously applied only to those persons injured by ‘an engine or car’ while walking, standing or playing on a railroad[, t]he amended statute applies to anyone ‘com[ing] into contact with any equipment, machinery, wires or rolling stock of any railroad. ’”  *Id.* at *19, n.6.  As case in point that the Legislature’s amendments were carefully crafted, and their boundaries respected, its inclusion of “wires” in its list of railroad property is an abrogation of the 1960’s holding in *Jasiczek v. Pa. R.R.*, 90 N.J. Super. 380, 383-84 (App. Div. 1967), where a plaintiff escaped the immunities because his injury was caused by contact with overhead power lines rather than an “engine or car,” the limited language of the earlier Act.  In amending the Act in this fashion, the Legislature demonstrated jurisprudential awareness sufficient to act when *Renz* and subsequent decisions over-encroached.  Further, the amendments evince legislative knowhow sufficient to craft amendments that targeted decades-old decisions (while promoting modern sensibilities, such as adding Subsection (c), excluding minors, to limit its abrogation of *Jasiczek*).  Against this backdrop, our courts should respect that if our Legislature wished to strike a new balance for circumstances like in Webb or Hendrickson by way of amendment to the Act, it was more than capable.  It simply did not.  Neither the text, nor historical context, nor legislative purpose of the Railroad Immunity Act warrants an interpretation of (b)(5) that bars recovery for a crossing fatality the operator could likely have avoided entirely.  That it not how the Act, nor contributory negligence, have been applied in the past.  This Court should ensure that is not how they are applied moving forward, for the safety and security of the New Jersey public.