[brief] The Lower Court Erred By Failing to Consider the Injunction When Determining Whether the Retaliatory Actions Were Materially Adverse (5a, 9a).  The lower court also failed to consider the scope of the Injunction when determining whether any of the retaliatory actions pled by Plaintiff were materially adverse.  Indeed, the Injunction is not mentioned in the Motion to Dismiss Decision at all, except for in the Statement of Facts.  5a.  The significant of the Injunction cannot be overstated: Defendants were obligated to maintain the status quo and were not allowed to take certain actions as a result, which would include moving Plaintiff’s room or changing her teaching assignment (or transferring/terminating/demoting Plaintiff).  Thus, with the Injunction was in place, there were limited ways that Plaintiff’s employment could be impacted.  Yet, without any mention of the Injunction that prevented certain actions by Defendants, the lower court found that Plaintiff’s employment status remained unperturbed, such that no material alteration had occurred, even though a Disciplinary Letter was issued.  9a.  The lower court also found that Plaintiff was not affected by the sham investigation because the results were not released, which misses the point entirely.  Id.  But this all ignores that the Injunction prohibited other adverse actions.  Ultimately, the lower court erred by failing to perform a nuanced analysis of the pleadings and apply the concepts expressed in the case law against the backdrop of those facts.  At the pleadings stage, when Plaintiff is to be afforded all reasonable inferences and a generous review must be given, the lower court failed to consider what could constitute a materially adverse action when the Injunction prevented certain actions.  In multiple similar cases, this Court reversed dismissals of pleadings at the motion to dismiss stage by holding that allegations of various acts can be taken as a whole, such that the plaintiff may be considered to have suffered an adverse employment action in the terms and conditions of employment.  See e.g., Clarke v. Atlantic City Bd. of Educ., 2010 WL 4107750, *5 (N.J. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2009) (holding that the plaintiff’s LAD retaliation cause of action withstood a motion to dismiss when the plaintiff alleged that he was relocated in the building, when he was the only employee whose request to develop a 504 plan was denied, and by refusing to negotiate a new employment contract unless he agreed to abrogate an earlier settlement); see also Nead v. Union County Educ. Services Com’n, 2011 WL 166245 (N.J. App. Div. Jan. 20, 2011) (reinstating an LAD and CEPA complaint where the employer, a school, was alleged to have retaliated against the plaintiff, a teacher, by filing a bad faith report of child abuse without asking the plaintiff for any details prior to doing so, where the employer argued that the conduct was protected because it was required by law to report a student’s abuse allegation); see also Royster v. New Jersey State Police, 2007 WL 4441103 (N.J. App. Div. Dec. 20, 2007) (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim, where the plaintiff’s complaint alleged NJLAD racial discrimination and retaliation, where the plaintiff alleged he was given a poor performance evaluation following his report of disparate treatment he gleaned by virtue of his job as a staff investigator).  As this case law demonstrates, context matters, and the lower court erred by failing to consider the Injunction, which prohibited many of the actions that the lower court described as materially adverse.  C.