ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Ibid.*  Both [...] and [...], after a proper analysis of the *King* factors, found as fact, based on the credible evidence in the record, that defendant's consent had not been coerced.  (Da24; Da43).  Lastly, except for the cash found in his Queens, New York master bedroom, defendant did not incriminate himself by advising the police where to search for any contraband.  The police already knew where to search for the CDS because they saw defendant take possession of the eight marijuana-filled duffel bags from [...] and place six bags in his BMW and two bags in his Old Bridge Apartment.  (Accord 5T13-14 to 14-13; 8T236-1 to 6; 9T53-21 to 55-5).  Third, in addition to a consent search, the police had a right to seize the silver and black box containing cocaine pursuant to a search incident to a lawful arrest since defendant was carrying this box in his hands when he was arrested.
[brief] Hutton Park Gardens v. West Orange Twn. Council, 68 N.J. 543, 564-65 (1975).  That Appellant’s expert held a differing view on the issue of consistency with the Master Plan does not mean there were “no reasons” for adopting the Redevelopment Plan.  While Appellant disagrees with such reasons, that does not render the Committee’s actions improper or unlawful.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, and those set forth in the opening papers, the [...] respectfully request that this Court reverse the September 15 and November 27, 2023 Orders of the trial court.  Additionally, since the MOU is unenforceable and there was no failure to comply with the September 15, 2023 Order, the [...] also respectfully request that the Court reverse the trial court’s February 5, 2024  Order granting Plaintiff’s fee application.
[brief] ”  See Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465 (1990); Columbia Presbyterian Anesthesiology v. Brock, 379 N.J. Super. 11 (App. Div. 2005).  “An agreement to settle a lawsuit is a contract which, like all contracts may be freely entered into and which a court, absent a demonstration of ‘fraud or other compelling circumstances,’ should honor and enforce as it does other contracts. ” (Emphasis added).  See Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124-25 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 94 N.J. 600 (1983); Honeywell v. Bubb, 130 N.J. Super. 130 (App. Div. 1974).  Here, the co-owners of the Subject Property have never claimed that the settlement reached by way of Consent Judgment on April 13, 2022 was unfair, unreasonable, or unenforceable.  The Court, therefore, should have been guided by the long standing proposition that public policy strongly favors the settlement of litigation, and it should have enforced the terms of the Consent Judgment.  Thus, the Consent Judgment in this case should have been viewed by the Court with a predisposition in favor of its validity and enforceability and should not have been ignored by the Court when deciding the issues presented by [...] through the Order to Show Cause proceeding.
[brief] 22.  By Motion filed December 27, 2022, plaintiffs demanded, for the first time, leave to re-open the action and retroactively name [...] as an expert witness.  Pa499.  23.  By written Opinion and Order of January 20, 2023, the trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion.  Pa 16.  In particular, the trial court found no basis to re-open the action, after two successive dispositive motions and multiple Case Management Orders, to allow a post-judgment expert to be named.  Pa28 to 29.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR LACK OF ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AS TO LIABILITY AND DAMAGES The events giving rise to this action began in 2005.
[brief] **THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD FOR A REVIEW OF AN ORDER FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS DE NOVO**  Plaintiff asserts that the Trial Court made three types of error: 1) factual; 2) application and/or interpretation of laws, statutes, or rules; and 3) interpretation of the Contracts.  Appellate courts, when reviewing summary judgment orders, use a *de novo* standard of review and apply the same standard employed by the trial court.  *Samolyk v. Berthe*, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022).  Therefore, this Court will review if there is a genuine dispute as to any material fact and, if so, whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, entitled the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law.  *R.* 4:46-2(c); *see also Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd.*, 219 N.J. 395, 405-06 (2014); *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  The *de novo* standard also applies to appellate review of rulings about the applicability, validity or interpretation of laws, statutes, or rules, *See In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ.*, 244 N.J. 1, 17 (2020) (agency's interpretation of a statute) as well as interpretation of a contract.  *Serico v. Rothberg*, 234 N.J. 168, 178 (2018); *Kieffer v. Best Buy*, 205 N.J. 213, 222 (2011); *Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp.*, 238 N.J. 191, 207 (2019).  **POINT III**
[brief] Div. 2011) (“when a firm’s shareholders are licensed persons under the statute, a plaintiff is required to provide an AOM in order to pursue litigation against the firm alone”); Shamrock Lacrosse, Inc. v. Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, Branzburg & Ellers, LLP, 416 N.J. Super. 1, 26 (App. Div. 2010) (“it would be ‘entirely anomalous’ to allow a plaintiff to circumvent the affidavit requirement by naming only law firms as defendants in a legal malpractice complaint and not the individual attorneys who performed the services”); Borough of Berlin v. Remington & Vernick Eng’rs, 337 N.J. Super. 590, 598-99 (App. Div.), (when an engineering firm is sued for the alleged negligence of its hydrogeologist, plaintiff properly supplied the firm with an affidavit of merit from a geologist, because “[t]he liability pressed against the engineering firm is solely vicarious”), certif. denied, 168 N.J. 294 (2001).  For instance, it would be contrary to the text and purposes of the AOM statute to allow a licensed nurse to serve as a qualified affiant against a licensed physician who, for example, negligently took and recorded a patient’s blood pressure.  Although nurses and physicians are both trained and authorized to take blood pressure readings, they are each still held professionally accountable under the standards of care of their own individual professions.  It would thwart the screening of objectives of the AOM statute to allow a nurse to vouch for a medical malpractice claim asserted against a physician, and vice-versa.  Id. at 586.\(^4\)  In *Fink v. Thompson*, 167 N.J. 551 (2001), the Supreme Court observed that the AOM statute requires the plaintiff to provide “each defendant” with an affidavit that indicates the plaintiff’s claim has merit.
[brief] The Supplemental Form is Objective and Unambiguous.  Intervenor does not dispute that [...] provided false information in response to an application question.  Rather, Intervenor asserts that New Jersey’s well-established equitable fraud standard does not apply because the Supplemental Form was somehow “ambiguous. ”  As the trial court found, this assertion is contradicted by the plain language of the Supplemental Form.  (1T61-10).  Initially, the Intervenor misguidedly relies upon New Jersey case law addressing how ambiguities in policies should be construed.  As detailed below, such case law does not apply here because this case does not involve policy interpretation.  Rather, it involves a misrepresentation in an application form.
[brief] [...], United States District Judge I.  Background  *1  Through this lawsuit, the [...] (“Plaintiff” or “[...]”) seeks to prove that [...], [...], and [...], (collectively, “Defendants” or “[...]”), committed various violations of the Consumer Financial Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531, 5536, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, and Regulation V of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 12 C.F.R. § 1022.42.
[brief] The second element requires Plaintiffs to have taken a series of steps to comply with the Affidavit of Merit statute.  Plaintiff asserts that the out-of-time Affidavit of Merit authored by [...] constitute such a series of steps.  (Pa61-62)  ³ Abrogated on other grounds by The Palisades At Fort Lee Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. 100 Old Palisade, LLC, 230 N.J. 427 (2017).  However, Plaintiff did not demonstrate that [...]’s opinion was solicited during the sixty-day period following the filing of Defendants’ answer, as the first indication that the affidavit existed was the April 18, 2024 submission date.
[brief] 1.  The Affidavit of service upon [...] was notarized two months before the alleged service of process.  14a.  This Affidavit is facially defective.  2.  The Notary who attested to the Affidavits of Service (according to the alleged process server himself) had no contact whatsoever with the Process Server whose signature she allegedly notarized.  T4, p.23:3-13.  3.  The Process Server had no recollection of this service and could not testify from personal knowledge.  T4:p.21:8-11.  4.  The GPS time stamp on the ServeManager report (provided to Defendants via email from the Process Server Company, [...] who never testified to its authenticity) shows a GPS time stamp which corresponds to the year 2031.  T3, p.63:3-5.  5.  The In-house Process Server company, the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff’s in-house counsel were located in the same office.  The use of an in-house process server is highly irregular and is contrary to Rule 4:4-3(a) although this specific set of facts has never been addressed by our Courts.
[brief] 2/22/22 Tr. at 147:11 to 150:15.  [...] provided a signed certification to the taxing authority explaining an accounting mistake he made that gave rise to the tax deficiency notice, (D-150)  Da989.  But [...] was not satisfied.  He asked [...] to review business records for [...] and [...].  7T82:17-83:11.  In October 2019, [...] sent an email to [...], recommending that [...] should be added to the lawsuit.  2/15/22 Tr. 124:12 to 126:16; D-151.  The initial complaint in this matter was filed on January 17, 2020.
[brief] POINT V THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THESE ERRORS DENIED RINES A FAIR TRIAL.  (Not Raised Below)  Error that may be harmless in itself, when combined with another error, may have a “cumulative effect [that] can cast sufficient doubt on a verdict to require reversal. ”  State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 473 (2008).  Each of the trial errors in Points II, III, and IV are independently sufficient for reversal.  If, however, this Court disagrees, the cumulative effect of these errors nonetheless requires reversal.  See, e.g., State v. Orecchio, 16 N.J. 125, 129 (1954); State v. Jones, 425 N.J. Super. 258, 276 (App. Div. 2012) (reversing based on the unlawful admission of other-crimes evidence and the State’s improper use of expert witness testimony); State v. Blakney, 189 N.J. 88, 96-97 (2006) (reversing based on cumulative error due to prosecutorial misconduct and a failure to give adequate limiting instructions on other-crimes evidence).  The introduction of [...]’s testimony that [...] dealt drugs to her on prior unrelated occasions was not only highly prejudicial propensity evidence, but it also promoted the offensive and unfair picture painted by the prosecutor of [...] as a devious older man preying on the young [...], setting her back in her battle with addiction, and tricking her into taking stronger drugs.  The State relied on improperly admitted evidence and inflammatory arguments to prove intent to distribute because there was no evidence of other drug deals, no packaging materials, and no expert testimony on drug distribution.  Accordingly, whether considered separately or in the aggregate, the myriad trial errors in this case tainted the jury’s verdict and call for reversal of [...]’s convictions.  POINT VI
[brief] A. 18A:26-2, which unambiguously states: “[n]o teaching staff member shall be employed in the public schools by any board of education unless he is the holder of a valid certificate to teach[.]”  Ibid.  And the ALJ concluded that the [...] has “the duty to enforce rules promulgated by the State Board. ”  Ibid. (citing Parsippany-Troy Hills Educ. Assn. v. Bd. of Educ. of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 188 N.J. Super. 161, 166 (App. Div. 1983)).  In [...]’s case, it was undisputed that the State Board had suspended his teaching certificates for two years.  (Pa39-40).  Thus, the ALJ reasoned that because N.J.S.A. 18A:26-2 requires all teaching staff members to hold a valid teaching certificate in order to be employed, the [...] was required to terminate [...]’s employment because his teaching certificates were suspended.  (Pa42-43).  Turning to [...]’s motion to place the matter on the inactive list pending resolution of the State Board matter, the ALJ reasoned that the “question here is not whether the action of the State Board was legal, it is whether the action of respondent [[...]] in November 2021, made in reliance on the decision of the State Board, was legal.
[brief] The reconsideration ruling is a reversible error as it vitiates clear New Jersey precedent regarding employer liability under the NJLAD.  See, e.g., Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 600, 623 (1993); Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 290 N.J. Super. 252, 269 (App. Div. 1996) (“An employer that knows or should know its employee is being harassed in the workplace, regardless of by whom, should take appropriate action”).  The Trial Court’s initial ruling – that Appellant, like her co-plaintiff, is entitled to a jury trial – was correct and should be restored.
[directive] I request that the court review the matter set forth above for the following reason (check one):  Should be dismissed or vacated and dismissed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-23.l.  Should not have been dismissed/vacated/expunged.  ------------------------ Other:  Please provide reason(s) for your request below:  Date Signature Published: 9/2021, [...] of2 page 2 Attachment 2
[brief] (753a-798a)  [...], in fact, is a Defendant in several lawsuits filed by investors alleging that [...] defrauded them (40a-107a) and as set forth in the Affidavits of [...] (198a-202a) and [...] (204a-208a), [...] has misrepresented information to investors and \(^1\)[...] v. [...], et al., Case No.: [...] (“Underlying Litigation”).  close friends related to his abilities and background and status of investments.  Additionally alarming is that there is currently a $77 million judgment obtained by the New York Attorney General related to [...]’s ownership in a fraudulent MAC company (838a-842a) and a finding by the arbitrator in the [...] dissolution arbitration that [...] cannot account for $25 million (847a-852a).  The cases cited by [...] in support of its argument that prohibiting the deposition of a relevant witness is an extraordinary remedy are not applicable to this matter.
[brief] (Aa5).  \(^9\) *[...] v. [...]*, Superior Court Chancery Division – Ocean County.  Docket No. [...].  (Open).  The Board’s conclusion that even if Lacey had submitted a waiver request for entry in the TI program under N.J.A.C. 14:1-1.2(b), it did not adequately demonstrate that it should receive a higher TREC factorization was also reasonable.
[brief] In her brief, the defendant claims that this case is “indistinguishable from Tyler, where ‘the medical examiner performed an autopsy, was unable to render an opinion on cause or manner of death, and then after review of witness statements or information obtained through police investigation, rendered an opinion based largely on that information. ”” (Db23, quoting State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136 (2015)).  Tyler, however, concerned a medical examiner whose conclusion about the cause of the death of a newborn was based “entirely on [the medical examiner’s] belief of [the defendant’s] statements”.  Tyler at 150.
[brief] ”  Pa21.  [...] attempts to create a “nexus” between the PTA Arbitration and [...]’s nonpayment claims on the Hackensack Project when none exists, at least not on sufficient to invoke the entire controversy doctrine.  [...] App. Br. at 27.  [...] is completely incorrect in its claim that the PTA created “the general contractor-subcontractor relationship. ”  Id.  [...] did not become a subcontractor to [...] by way of the PTA; the PTA was a commercial transaction involving the transfer of a business.
[brief] ...........................................  32, 34 Heagan v. Borough of Allendale, 42 N.J. Super. 472 (App.Div. 1956) ............................................ 28, 29, 31 Hilton Acres v. Klein, 35 N.J. 570 (1961) ....................................... 32 Ianieri v. East Brunswick Zoning Bd., 192 N.J. Super. 15 (Law Div. 1983) ............................................. 31, 32 Lake Intervale Homes inc. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills, 28 N.J. 423 (1958) ........................................................................ 18 Loechner v. Campbell, 49 N.J. 504 (1967) ....................................... 18 Loigman v. Tp. Committee of Middletown, 297 N.J. Super. 287 (App.Div.1999) .............................................. 49 Mansfield Swett Inc. v. West Orange, 120 N.J.L 145 (E&A 1938) .......................................................... 20 McDowell Inc. v. Bd. of Adj., 334 N.J. Super. 201 (App.Div. 2000), cert. den. 167 N.J. 88 (2001) ......................................................... 41 Med. Realty v. Bd. of Adj., 228 N.J. Super. 226 (App. Div. 1988) ..........................................
[brief] (Pa11).  However, Association Counsel [...] did not disclose the “Name of defendant’s primary insurance company” on the Civil Case Information Form.  (Pa11).  In the Underlying Complaint, Plaintiffs were “the Association, four members of the Board of Trustees ([...], [...], [...] and [...]), [...], which is the Association’s management company; and Taylor employee [...], whose role is to serve as the on-site property manager for the Association.
[brief] [...] was an [...] supervisor for 20 years, including during [...]’s investigation and prosecution of [...].  [...] moved for recusal given these unique circumstances, but the judge refused because she had not been personally involved with [...]’s case and had left the [...] in 2017.  (25T33-14 to 35-3; Da378-79)  Her denial was an abuse of discretion, and the matter should be remanded and assigned to a new judge.
[brief] Through its Robinson and Abbott decisions, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has a long history of addressing the State’s obligation to provide a thorough and efficient education (T&E) to its public school students, as required by the New Jersey Constitution, through review of the State’s school funding formula.  See N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 1 (T&E clause) (“[t]he Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years”).  In an effort to provide a funding formula that satisfied the T&E clause and the Court’s Abbott mandates, in January 2008 the State enacted a new statewide school funding formula: the SFRA.  L. 2007, c. 260; N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-43 to -71.  The SFRA was enacted as part of New Jersey’s ongoing effort to ensure that public schools throughout the State receive the financial support needed to deliver T&E; it effectively overhauled the prior system of school funding.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-44; Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XX), 199 N.J. 140, 144, 147-48, 152 (2009); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XIX), 196 N.J. 544, 549, 552-53 (2008); 1
[brief] The Police Did Not Have Probable Cause To Search Defendant’s Car.**  Second, the trial court erred in concluding that there was probable cause to search [...]’s vehicle because the trial court erred in crediting [...]’s testimony over [...]’s testimony.  An appellate court must weigh a trial court’s “views of credibility of witnesses, their demeanor, and his general ‘feel of the case’” heavily.  *State v. Sims*, 65 N.J. 359, 373 (1974).
[brief] ”  Da38a.  Based on these factual findings, the court concluded that [...] failed to meet his burden of showing that he was injured through the consumption of mold-contaminated food.  Da38a-Da39a.  Second, the trial court held that there was no occurrence of bodily injury and property damage during the [...] because [...]’s injuries and damages initially manifested in the 1990s, whether applying the first manifestation or the continuous trigger rule.  Da39a-Da43a.  Under either rule, the “last pull” of the coverage trigger is the manifestation of the personal injury, when the symptoms become known.  Da42a.  The court held that [...]’s injuries were obvious to him beginning in the 1990s, well before the inception of the [...].  Da43a.  [...]’s property damage did not impact the court’s analysis, because it was barred by the Mold Exclusion and could not be restored through the Consumption Exception, but in any event manifested in the 1990s.  Id.  Finally, although the trial court concluded that there was no coverage, it separately addressed the reasonableness of the Settlement and stated that it was not presented with enough evidence to conclude that the Settlement was unreasonable or reached in bad faith.  Da46a-Da55a.
[brief] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | SECTION | PAGE NOS. | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS | 4 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | | | POINT I | 7 | | THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE REQUIRE IMMEDIATE APPELLATE REVIEW | | | POINT II | 9 | | THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY BY ADMITTING  MR. SANFORD’S STATEMENT FROM THE UNION COUNTY INDICTMENT BECAUSE IT IS NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER ANY EXCEPTION TO RULE 404(b).  (Dma 3-14) | 9 | | POINT III | 14 | | THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY BY ADMITTING  MR. SANFORD’S STATEMENT  BECAUSE IT CANNOT BE SANITIZED BY ANY JURY INSTRUCTION OR REDACTION.  (Dma 3-14) | 14 | | CONCLUSION | 15 | INDEX TO APPENDIX  [...].........................................................Dma 1-2  Order Granting Motion to Admit Defendant’s Statement..........................  Dma 3-14  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS  Order Granting Motion to Admit Defendant’s Statement..........................  Dma 3-14  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Communication Result Report, Dated 7/7/2020 Pa076  Letter From Police Safety to [...] Regarding Outstanding Bill for Discovery, Dated 7/29/2020 (Attached at Pa0051)  Facsimile to [...] From [...] 6/22/2020 Pa077  Letter From [...] to [...] 6/22/2020 Pa078  Notice of Claim to [...], Dated 2/27/2020 (Attached at Pa0053)  TX Result Report, Dated 2/28/2020 Pa082  Letter From [...] to [...], 6/19/2020 Pa084  Facsimile to [...] from [...], 6/19/2020 Pa086  Email Conversation Between [...] and Prosecutor Regarding Copy of Complaint Summons for Case 11/11/2020 Pa087  Email to [...] from Prosecutor Regarding no Further Discovery  11/12/2020  Pa089  Exhibit D-Attachments to Complaint Notice of Tort Claim Pa092
[brief] It determined that [...] is not eligible to apply for AD, citing N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2), because [...] has no job to return to should his alleged disability diminish in future (PA148; RA11-RA13).  [...]’s appeal was assigned to Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) [...] (PA124-PA130; PA148; RA49).  The ALJ permitted the parties to file motions for summary decision, with the Board filing its motion on April 27, 2022 and [...] filing his motion on April 29, 2022 (PA133; PA148; RA1-RA145).  In his Initial Decision on August 2, 2022, [...] denied the Board’s Motion for Summary Judgment, reversed the Board’s finding that [...] is ineligible to apply for AD, and ordered the Board to process [...]’s AD application on the merits (PA124-PA130; PA148).