ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Properiy forfeited whicn contains or displays coitnterfeir brand name, insignia, any any other identifiable feature which is protected by United States or design feature the or; 2)  1)  copyright, trademark or registration shall be either: destroyed, returned to property, In or owner of the copyright, trademark registration.  lieu of receiving the forfeited the or to of €he owner the copyright, tradernark registration may provide written consent the donation of forfeited property any charitable or non-profit organization operating to ,_ . within the State.  'The charitable or non-profit organization that receives forfeited property in under this provision, shall use the property order to fulfil the mission of the organization and shall not sell the forfeited property any person or entity.  to Law Enforcement prosecutinq aqency Fund for 127 Trust the All forfeited property other than contraband, or any proceeds resulting from funding forfeiture and all monies seized or forfeited, shall become the property of the entity a the prosecuting agency'effecting the forfeiture, and shall, if feasible, be placed in dedicated Law Enforcement Trust Fund established by that entity, as outlined by the Forfeiture Program Administration Model Standard Operating Procedures.
[brief] A.K.A. [...], Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, —against— [...], D/B/A [...], Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE ORDERS ENTERED MARCH 27, 2023 AND JULY 17, 2023, SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION, PASSAIC COUNTY  DOCKET NO. [...] SAT BELOW:  HON.  [...]  J.S.C. REPLY BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT/ THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
[brief] Whereas, the causes for divorce arise during the marriage.  *Id.*  The statutory causes of an action for nullity of marriage are set forth in *N.J.S.A. 2A:34-1* and a court may grant an annulment under one of the following conditions:  a.  Either of the parties has another wife, husband, partner in a civil union couple or domestic partner living at the time of a second or other marriage.  b.  The parties are within the degrees prohibited by law.  If any such marriage shall not have been annulled during the lifetime of the parties the validity thereof shall not be inquired into after the death of either party.  c.  The parties, or either of them, were at the time of marriage physically and incurably impotent, provided the party making the application shall have been ignorant of such impotency or incapability at the time of the marriage, and has not subsequently ratified the marriage.  d.  The parties, or either of them, lacked capacity to marry due to want of understanding because of mental condition, or the influence of intoxicants, drugs, or similar agents; or where there was a lack of mutual assent to the marital relationship; duress; or fraud as to the essentials of marriage; and has not subsequently ratified the marriage.  (emphasis added)  e.  The demand for such judgment is by the wife or husband, who was under the age of 18 years at the time of the marriage, unless such marriage be confirmed by her or him after arriving at such age.  f.  Allowable under the general equity jurisdiction of the Superior Court.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-1(d), an annulment may be granted where there was “fraud as to the essentials of the marriage” and the marriage has not been subsequently ratified.
[brief] [...] analyzed the evidence that Plaintiff submitted reviewing it piece by piece.  (T54-18 to T57-16).  Plaintiff presented the guest incident report as a piece of evidence that allegedly put [...] on notice of litigation, but it was devoid of real details.  (Pa77)  The guest incident report was written by the Plaintiff’s son, her current attorney and trial witness in the case.  (Pa77).  It did not provide any detail as to what the Plaintiff (and her son) would one day allege caused Plaintiff’s fall.  (Pa77).  The TMS records sought are part of a program and loop designed to self-delete after 8 days.
[brief] SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF RESCISSION WAS IMPROPERLY GRANTED BECAUSE IT WAS INCOMPLETE AND BECAUSE THE CERTIFICATION RELIED ON BY RESPONDENTS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTED THEIR ARGUMENT.  (RESPONDENTS’ POINTS II/VIII & APPELLANT’S POINT VI).  Respondents continue to assert that Appellant had no standing to oppose rescission of the “Repurchase Agreement”, as it was a contract solely between [...] and [...] – its original signatories.  This assertion is contradicted, however, by the very same certification (Da593) which Respondents reference in their opposition brief and which was filed in connection with the summary judgment motion seeking rescission.  At paragraph 5 therein, [...] states, “Pursuant to the Final Judgment of Divorce . . . I have no rights or obligations to any entities listed and not listed in the Final Judgment of Divorce and Property Settlement Agreement, entered on March 4, 2020. ”  Da594.  [...] goes on to quote the Paragraph 48 of the Baker’s PSA (Da614) by stating, “Wife shall relinquish to Husband any ownership interest she may have in any corporate entity formed by either party between January 1, 2010 and July 14, 2019. ”  Da594.  Clearly, [...]’s formation on January 18, 2015 falls squarely within the prescribed time period, and it is undisputed that [...] was formed by [...].  Thus, by [...]’s own certification, “any ownership interest she may have” transferred to Appellant when their PSA was signed and divorce finalized on March 4, 2019.  Id.  Notably, Appellant’s opposition to Respondents’ motion for summary judgment was due the very same day that the Baker’s divorce was finalized.  Oral argument was requested (Da433) on the summary judgment motion so that the trial court could be properly brought up to speed on the implications of the Baker divorce settlement and due to the complexity of the ownership issue which Respondents sought to resolve in a summary fashion.  The trial court did not grant oral argument.
[brief] In *State v. Jones*, this Court found the “clear legislative purpose” of the certain persons statute is “to prevent possession of dangerous weapons by previously convicted persons. ”  198 N.J. Super. 553, 565 (App. Div. 1985).  The Court also stated, “the clear statutory purpose is to ‘deter those previously convicted of serious crimes from possessing dangerous weapons. ’”  *Id.* at 563 (citing *State v. Harper*, 153 N.J. Super. 86, 89 (App. Div. 1977)).  The courts do not place any emphasis on the possession element of the offense.  Additionally, in *State v. Wright*, while addressing previous analogous statutes, the Court indicated, “[t]here is a strong legislative policy in this State with respect to gun control, designed to protect the public, which places restrictions on those who may carry such weapons and is intended to prevent criminal and other unfit elements from acquiring and possessing them.
[brief] Date Submitted: June 17, 2024  [...] ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  R.J. Hughes Justice Complex  P.O. Box 106 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Attorney for Respondent [...] (609) 815-2696  Matthew.melton@law.njoag.gov  [...]  Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel  [...] (ID:276482018)  Deputy Attorney General  On the Brief  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Specifically, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the conduct complained of was unwelcome; (2) that it occurred because of the plaintiff’s inclusion in a protected class under the LAD; and (3) that a reasonable person in the same protected class would consider it sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.  *El-Sioufi v. St. Peter's University Hosp.*, 382 N.J. Super. 145, 178 (App. Div. 2005) (citing *Lehmann*); *Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr.*, 174 N.J. 1, 24 (1993). 6  Under the first prong, Appellant must show by the preponderance of the evidence that the harassing conduct would not have occurred but for her gender.  *Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods*, 290 N.J. Super. 252, 266 (App. Div. 1996).  “When the harassing conduct is sexual or sexist in nature, as with sexual comments or touchings, the but-for element will automatically be satisfied. ”  Id. at 266 (citing *Lehmann*, 132 N.J. at 605) (emphasis added).  Turning to the second prong, “severe or pervasive conduct must be conduct that would make a reasonable [woman] believe that the conditions ... are altered and that the ... environment is hostile. ”  *Cutler v. Dorn*, 196 N.J. 419, 431 (2008) (quoting *Lehmann*, 132 N.J. at 604).  The Court must make this assessment based upon the “totality of the circumstances. ”  *Cutler*, 196 N.J. at 431.  And, under the third and fourth prongs, Courts apply a “reasonable woman” standard for evaluating hostile environment sexual harassment.  6  Hostile work environment claims must be evaluated under “all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. ”  *Id.* at 14 (quoting *Cutler*). claims.  *Nabisco*, 290 N.J. Super. at 267.  This “reasonable woman,” “while not hypersensitive, includes women who fall towards the more sensitive side of the spectrum of reasonableness. ”  *Id.* at 267 (citing *Lehmann*, 132 N.J. at 613).  Moreover, to show pretext, a plaintiff “must submit evidence that either casts sufficient doubt upon the employer’s proffered legitimate reason so that a factfinder could reasonably conclude it was fabricated, or that allows the factfinder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not the motivating or determinative cause of the termination decision.
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT COULD NOT HAVE AFFIRMED THE BOARD'S VARIANCE GRANT BASED ON THIS RECORD.  (Order at Pa48; opinion at Pa58 to Pa71)  ........................................  Pb10  A.  THE (C)(2) SETBACK  VARIANCES WERE INSUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTED.  (Opinion at Pa59; Pa62 to Pa63; Pa68)  ........................................  Pb12  1.  THE FINDINGS ON THE POSITIVE CRITERIA ARE LEGALLY UNTENABLE AND IN ANY EVENT FACTUALLY UNSUPPORTED ....................... Pb13  2.  THE NEGATIVE CRITERIA WERE NOT ESTABLISHED AND THE FINDINGS ON SAME ARE DEFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW .....................  Pb18 B.  THE (D)(5) FINDINGS WERE NONEXISTENT BECAUSE THERE WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE DENSITY VARIANCE.  (Opinion at Pa61 to Pa62; Pa64)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pb19 C.  THE (D)(6) HEIGHT VARIANCE SHOULD BE VACATED.  (Opinion at Pa61 to Pa62; Pa64 to Pa65)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pb23 II.  THE APPLICANT'S NOTICE DID NOT SET FORTH "THE LOCATION... AT WHICH ANY MAPS AND DOCUMENTS FOR WHICH APPROVAL IS SOUGHT ARE AVAILABLE"; AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE BOARD LACKED JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE APPLICATION.
[brief] (T55:8-12)  Assuming that this fact is relevant, [...] manager [...] testified at her deposition on August 31, 2018 that the plaintiff and her son informed her that the lighting was factor in the plaintiff’s fall when they filled out the guest incident report so that it does not make any difference that there is no mention of lighting in the guest incident report.  (Pa87 to Pa92))  The fact that there was no “request to preserve the TMS logs for the 8/13/16 date” is not relevant to any of the elements of the fraudulent concealment claim.  (T55:13-14)  There is no requirement that the plaintiff make a request that the spoliating party preserve evidence as a condition of making a fraudulent concealment claim.  The plaintiff did not have any knowledge of the existence of the “in-house” error logs to ask for them shortly after her accident.
[brief] During the week of November 28, 2021, detectives observed [...] engage in what they believed were two narcotics transactions.  (Pa 7)  The detectives twice observed [...] exit the rear door of the restaurant, “retrieve something from inside” his Audi and then “interact with two vehicles that pulled up. ”  (1T 12-23 to 13-8)  The detectives also claimed that they observed [...] engage in “counter surveillance techniques” when driving the Audi.  (1T 23-1 to 23-3)  That is, he did not always take the most direct route when traveling between two locations; rather, “[h]e was going through neighborhoods, he was taking multiple turns,” making it “harder for [police] to surveil [him]. ”  (1T 14-4 to 14-15; 1T 23-1 to 23-7)  On December 9, 2021, the detectives applied for, and were issued, a “30-day GPS tracker warrant,” authorizing the installation of a GPS tracking device on [...]’ car.
[directive] Page2  The process to be followed by the Applicant will be discussed first, then the process for the court.  Applicant Process  The Applicant must first complete the Application.  This requires the Applicant to provide certain identifying information, such as his or her name, date of birth, and address, and to identify the arrests/charges to be expunged.  Proper identification of those charges requires the provision of the date of the arrest/custody, the statute or ordinance the Applicant was charged with violating, and the complaint number.  If an Applicant does not know some or any of this information, the Instructions detail two methods of acquisition.  The Applicant may request a MACS printout of the disposition of the charge from the municipal court where those proceedings were resolved.  In the event a printout is obtained, the Applicant is instructed to attach it to the Application upon submission ..  As will be discussed below, court staff will be tasked with attaching disposition printouts regardless of whether an Applicant requests them.  Alternatively, the Applicant may search for the complaint number using the Municipal Court Case Search on the NJMCDirect website.  Finally, the Applicant must also sign the "Relief Sought" section of the form, which indicates that the Applicant is seeking the expungement of Information relating to the identified charges.  The second step for the Applicant is to complete the Order for Expungemerit of Arrest or Charge Records.
[directive] when property is forfeited as a result of the combined efforts of more than one law enforcement agency, each law enforcement agency contributing to the be in forfeiture is to share proportionately the forfeiture proceeds.  Where property cannot divided, the general policy is sell the property and divide the proceeds among all to in participating law enforcement agencies a manner which will enhance law enforcement  All efforts and cooperation. forfeited property, and all funds derived from the sale, auction for or other disposition of said property shall be used solely law enforcement purposes.  This standard is intended to further these general purposes and shall be interpreted accordingly.  The prosecuting agency shall determine the contributive share to be A. of apportioned to each participating law enforcement agency, including that the prosecuting agency itself.  - - or B.  The prosecuting agency s%alf divide the forfeited property its proceeds in equitably and fairly, and accordance with these standards, with any law enforcement agency, that agency’s use, where the law enforcement for or agency participated the surveillanc6; investigation, arrest prosecution in in which resulted the forfeiture.  C.  The funding entity shall fully credit participating law enforcement agency the with its contributive share of the forfeited property, share is to be which in dedicated solely for law enforcement purposes accordance with these standards.  12:2  Leqal authority or A N.J.S.A 2C:64-7, Under 2C:64% and N.J.S.A the Attorney General the county prosecutor, whichever the prosecuting agency, shall divide the is COntributiOri forfeited property according to each law enforcement agency's the which in to swveiilance, investigation, arrest or prosecution resulted the forfeiture.
[brief] (Pa 515).  [...] further confirmed in his deposition testimony that on or about September 17th and September 21st of 2020, DPW workers were doing work in the area where the Plaintiffs injury occurred.  (Pa 519).  He further confirmed that when working in the area, he typically makes inspections of the roadway.  (Pa 519).  He also stated that if one of his employees noticed the pothole, he would expect them to report it.  (Pa 519).  [...] also testified that street sweepers pass by the area four times per week and sweep each side of the street twice per week.  (Pa 520).  [...], who is employed by [...], stated that his company was hired by the [...] to perform roadwork in connection with the Kearny Avenue Roadway Improvement Project, which included the vicinity of [...], which is the subject of the Plaintiffs accident.
[brief] Finally, there is no merit to Defendant [...]’s accusation that Plaintiff is relying on “sympathy” to support its appeal.  Plaintiff’s legal arguments are based on published cases, such as Mule and Manole, that [...] failed to even address or cite in her opposition brief.  Indeed, it is [...] herself who appears to rely on irrelevant factors by repeatedly noting that Plaintiff, the [...], also applied for workers’ compensation benefits in order to protect its right to receive some compensation in the event the Court were to reject its civil suit on legal grounds.  The filing of alternative claims, even if they are legally inconsistent, is expressly permitted by our Court Rules.  See R. 4:5-6.  If Plaintiff were to prevail on this appeal and ultimately recover an award in its civil suit, any workers’ compensation benefits received would be reimbursed so that there would be no double recovery.  There is no legal or substantive merit to Defendant [...]’s attempt to cast aspersions on Plaintiff for taking every step possible to protect the Estate’s legal rights and to obtain as much compensation as possible for the two children left behind as a result of the subject fatal crash.
[brief] ”  Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 153 N.J. 163, 193-94 (1998).  As such, Plaintiff is not required know the “precise contours and components of the public policy,” may learn of the specific violations after the filing of the complaint and may identify them specifically for the first time as late as on appeal.  See Regan v. New Brunswick, 305 N.J. Super. 342, 355 (App. Div. 1997) (“We also note that plaintiff, when deposed, may not have been aware of the specific statutory provisions implicated.  . . ”).  Plaintiff must demonstrate only that a “reasonable lay person would conclude that illegal activity was going on. ”  See Young v. Schering Corp., 275 N.J. Super. 221, 233 (App. Div. 1994).  Indeed, a reasonable perspective on [...]’s conduct was proffered by [...] in her deposition testimony, when she stated as follows:  I don’t know actually what the law would be called when – is that harassment?  Is that – I mean, I’m sure there’s a terminology for it.  Like whether – I’m not sure what you call it.  I’m sure there’s a law, yes.  There’s definitely a law that says that you can’t act like that in your work environment, and you can’t invade people’s personal space, and you can’t hold the door on people, and you can’t, you know, make statements, and, and just create a toxic work environment.  (Pa308).  Defendants’ argument, accepted by the Trial Court, that Plaintiff’s belief was unreasonable, and that the conduct does not constitute statutory harassment is simply contradictory to the statutory language and, instead, likely draws from perceptions of criminal harassment outside of the text.
[brief] (Pa3).  In the proceedings below, both [...] and the Trial Court suggested that, because [...] had defended [...] under a reservation-of-rights letter, [...] could withdraw coverage at any time, for any reason or for no reason.  That is not the law.  Insurance companies that issue reservation-of-rights letters are still obligated to handle and process claims in good faith and cannot simply withdraw coverage with no legally supportable basis for doing so.  Some decisions, in fact, have held that an insurance company defending under a reservation-of-rights letter has a heightened duty of good faith, due to the type of conflict of interest that [...]’s conduct in this case illustrates.  The purpose of reservation-of-rights letters is to avoid estoppel issues; that is to say, insurance companies who provide a defense to their policyholders usually wish to retain the right to deny coverage later if facts justify such a denial.  See, e.g., O’Dowd v. American Sur. Co. of N.Y., 3 N.Y.2d 347, 165 N.Y.S.2d 458, 144 N.E.2d 952 (1944).  Reservation-of-rights letters are designed to preserve potential coverage defenses.  In this case, [...]’s issuance of a reservation of rights letter meant that its supporting an appeal of the Vermont Trial Court’s summary judgment decision would not have impaired any coverage defenses that [...] might have had.  Issuance of a reservation of rights letter clearly does not eviscerate the insurance company’s duty of good faith and fair dealing.  Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 381, 715 P.2d 1133 (1986) (en banc), is instructive.  There, the Court held as follows:  A reservation of rights agreement is not a license for an insurer to conduct the defense of an action in a manner other than [the manner in which] it would normally be required to defend.  The basic obligations of the insurer to the insured remain in effect.  The ‘basic obligations’ … amount to a duty of good faith…the same standard of fair dealing and equal consideration is unquestionably applicable to a reservation of rights defense.  We find, however, that the potential conflicts of interest between insurer and insured inherent in this type of defense mandate an even higher standard…an insurance company must refrain from engaging in any action which would demonstrate a greater concern for the insurer's monetary interest than for the insured's financial risk.  Id. at 387-88, 715 P.2d at 1137 (citations omitted); see also Beukas v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ, 255 N.J. Super. 420, 422, 605 A.2d 708, 709 (App. Div. 1992) (“freedom of action under [a] reservation of rights was limited by an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing”); *L S Roofing v. St. Paul Fire Marine*, 521 So. 2d 1298, 1304 (Ala. 1988) (“The objective in a reservation-of-rights situation is to put in place a procedure by which the insured can be confident that his interests will not be compromised nor in any way subordinated to those of the insurer”): *American Fire Cas. v. Roller*, 860 N.E.2d 1275, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“when an insurer undertakes to defend its insured under a reservation of rights, it must proceed in good faith”).
[brief] The conduct which prompted a second motion in aid of litigant’s rights in November 2017 related to [...] filing an action in the SDNY and a notice of removal of the case to federal court in October 2017.  (Pa1)  (1T20:8-13)  The Court believed that [...]’s pleading allegations challenged the legitimacy of its change in control order based on language asserted related to the [...] operating agreement.  (1T15:5-16:4)(1T20:8-23:24)  However, these were just allegations in a pleading, not actions that actually prevented management of [...].  As part of its May 2018 Order in aid of litigant’s rights the Court directed [...] to withdraw those claims, which he did.  (Pa3151)  Nevertheless, the Court then still found that the “only remedy” it had to avoid further violations was to award all of the fees and costs reasonably incurred from the 2016 temporary restraining orders, as well as the fees for defending the federal filings by [...] and fees for the second motion.  (1T46:25-47:6)  It thus granted a $503,000 fee application on July 13, 2018, most of which related to the Plaintiffs’ 2016 legal fees and expert fees.  (3T13-24:14-12)(3T32:19-33:16)(Pa3155)