ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The plaintiffs in this employment discrimination case, brought as a class action, have submitted a letter dated February 6, 2014, seeking to compel the defendants to produce all documents identified by a computerized search tool that utilized a series of search terms agreed to by the parties.  The defendants respond that they have produced all such documents that are non-privileged and responsive to the discovery requests propounded by the plaintiffs, as limited by the defendants’ objections.  The plaintiffs contend that the defendants are obligated to produce all documents returned by the search without exercising further judgment with respect to responsiveness.  Traditionally, parties to a litigation have engaged in discovery by means of requests and responses: the requesting party defines those documents it considers relevant, and the responding party searches for them by whatever means it chooses and then produces those responsive to the request, subject to any objections.  In light of the availability of technology-assisted review, another model is possible.  The parties can simply agree on the search methodology, for example by stipulating to search terms, with the understanding that all documents (except those containing privileged information) shall be produced.  This approach essentially elides the search process with the substantive determination of relevance, and it has the advantage of saving resources for the producing party, which need not conduct a further review for responsiveness.  Here, the parties engaged in a hybrid approach.  The plaintiffs propounded document requests and the defendants responded, in some cases objecting to the scope of the request but indicating that they would produce a more narrowly-defined set of documents.  Counsel then discussed and eventually agreed on search terms to be applied to the documents maintained in electronic form by identified custodians.  There is no evidence that the parties agreed—and I did not order—that documents identified by the search tool would be produced without regard to whether they were relevant as defined by the earlier discovery demands and responses.  This is not to say that the plaintiffs did not derive some benefit from negotiating the search protocol to be applied to the defendants’ documents: they were able to assure themselves that the resulting search would be broad enough to capture the vast majority of responsive documents.  But agreement to the protocol did not override the discovery demands and responses, and it is too late in the day for the plaintiffs to contest the scope defined by the defendants’ objections, which were served in January 2011.  Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ application is denied.
[brief] As noted by the trial court, there was no evidence of a dangerous condition which created a substantial risk of injury to traveling motorists.  Furthermore, the [...] report noted the approach as in fair condition and that the roadway was satisfactory.  There was never a finding that the roadway was dangerous or required emergent repair.  The Authority reasonably relied upon its contractors to inspect the bridge and advise of any dangerous conditions needing emergent repair.  As there was no indication of a dangerous condition, it was appropriate for the Authority to rely on its contractors to resolve the settlement issue in due course.  There is no evidence that the Authority’s conduct was palpably unreasonable in this regard.  As such, the Authority made high-level decisions for the allocation of resources pursuant to Contract P200.254 and is also afforded immunity under N.J.S.A.  59:2-3.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Plaintiff’s responses to the [...]’ Statement of Material Facts did not refute any of the cited material facts.  Plaintiff admitted SMF’s 1, 6, and 7.  SMF’s 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 simply related the substance of plaintiff’s Complaint, and of various Court decisions and Orders.  Plaintiff’s response to SMF 13 was argumentative – as plaintiff asserted a legal rather than a factual conclusion.  Plaintiff submitted no Counter-Statement of Material Facts.
[directive] Existe qualquer outra disposição de sentença obrigatória aplicável às corresponde/NA] acusações nos termos da Lei Graves que prevê um período maior de desqualificação à liberdade condicional (por exemplo, NERA, Três Condenações, Assassinato)?  Does any other mandatory sentencing provision apply to the Graves Act count that provides for a greater period of parole ineligibility (e.g., NERA, Three Strikes, Murder)?  Em caso positivo, qual disposição?  If so, which one?  Data/Date
[brief] --- \(^3\)State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54 (2008)  \(^4\)The record reflects that both the police report (S-1) and the DWI packet (D-1) were moved into evidence at trial (7T98-5 to 98-11)  The aggregate of the observations of the Defendant’s demeanor and physical appearance, as testified to by [...], all of which was credible and forthright, the Defendant’s admissions of alcohol consumption and a poor performance on the one-leg stand and the walk-and-turn test, which were documented by the approximate 20-minute video, were more than sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt…The statute does not require the State to prove that the Defendant was absolutely drunk, but only that the Defendant imbibed to the extent that his physical coordination or mental faculties were deleteriously affected.
[brief] Stated differently, tortious interference claims do not require that the injury claimed be “[c]aused by or at the direction of the insured *with the knowledge*” that the injury would result, nor do they require the injury claimed arise out of material published “*with knowledge* of its falsity. ”  (Da182.)  By the plain language of the exclusions cited by [...], tortious interference is not an excluded claim, as it does not require that the intent be to cause --- 2  Moreover, a party, in exercising a right he retains, such as the right to engage in fair competition with a competitor, a tortious interference claim cannot be sustained.  See *Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Farmland Dairy Farms, Inc.*, 282 N.J. Super., 204-05 (App. Div. 1995) (holding that undercutting a competitors price was fair competition and cautioning against a “broad rule which could potentially interfere with legitimate competition”).  an injury.  Instead, the intent required in tortious interference claims is an intent to interfere.  In seeking summary judgment below, [...] provided no binding authority from the State of New Jersey holding that tortious interference claims were excluded under similar policies.  Instead, [...] relied on an unpublished, fifteen-year-old authority from the District of New Jersey, *N. Plainfield Board of Educ. V. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.*, No. 05-4398 (MLC), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39555 (D.N.J. 2008).
[brief] The court’s statutory authority to vacate an arbitration award “serves as a check on whether the arbitration award ‘draw[s] its essence from the bargaining agreement. ’”  New Jersey Transit, 187 N.J. at 554 (citing Cnty. Coll. of Morris Staff Ass’n, 100 N.J. at 392) (alteration in original)).  However, this check on arbitral authority does not alter the traditional scope of review of an arbitration award, which holds that the award is to be affirmed if the arbitrator’s interpretation of the parties’ CNA is open to reasonable debate.
[brief] Plaintiff’s argument is that Pareja v. Princeton International Properties, 246 N.J. 546 (2021), provides exceptions that could impose a duty during an ongoing storm.  Specifically, Plaintiff argues there was a (1) pre-existing deterioration of the surface of the steps which allowed water infiltration and imperceptible freezing onto the surface, (2) the handrails were affixed too far from the pedestrian pathway and (3) the paint job made things “sleeker” in Plaintiff’s opinion.  The ruling in Pareja allowed for two limited exceptions.  The first is when a commercial landowner’s actions increase the risk to pedestrians and invitees.  Id. at 559.  Pareja cites to Terry v. Cent. Auto Radiators, Inc., 732 A.2d 713, 717-18 (R.I. 1999), in defining this exception.  There, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that “unusual circumstances existed” where a defendant moved the plaintiff’s vehicle to the rear of its business and then directed the plaintiff to remove it from there.  Ibid.  The Rhode Island Court found that forcing the plaintiff to walk some one hundred feet over snow and ice that had been accumulating on unknown and difficult terrain was an exacerbation of the risk.  Ibid.  The second exception carved out by Pareja is when there is a pre-existing risk such as failing to remove snow from a previous storm that has since concluded.
[brief] The Plaintiff contends the Developer cannot have --- ¹  Any misrepresentation of fact in connection with the sale of real estate is an unlawful practice regardless of whether the seller knew the statement was false or intended to deceive the buyer.  See N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.  ²  According to an Affidavit of Title executed by the [...] in connection with the sale of Unit 74, the Developer attested “[i]t has not allowed any interests (legal rights) to be created which affect its ownership or use of this property.  No other persons have legal rights in this property, except the right of utility companies[.]”  See Pa99 at ¶7.
[brief] When there is “the possibility of actual juror taint or exposure to extraneous influences (including jury misconduct and ‘comments made to jurors by outside sources’), the judge must voir dire that juror and, in appropriate circumstances, the remaining jurors. ”  *State v. Bisaccia*, 319 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 1999) (emphasis added), quoting State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. 363, 486-491 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 466 (1997); see also State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 89-90 (1988)
[brief] Winne, 14 N.J. at 131-132. ”); Sanders v. Div. of Children & Family Servs., DOCKET NO. A-3720-14T2, 26 (App. Div. Jul. 26, 2017) (“In addition, a six-year statute of limitations applies to malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims.  Earl v. Winne, 14 N.J. 119, 132 (1953).”); Egg Harbor Assocs., LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., DOCKET NO. A-0053-18T4, 5 n.3 (App. Div. Jan. 13, 2020) (“Plaintiff did not dispute the six-year statute of limitations applied to each of its tort claims.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1; see also Earl v. Winne, 14 N.J. 119, 132 (1953)(stating malicious abuse of process claims governed by six-year statute of limitations)”).
[brief] [...]’s Claims are Disguised Tort Claims, Which Were Barred by the Tort Claims Act.  [...] correctly recognized that [...]’s contract claims were “nothing more than a mischaracterization of the nature of the complaint to avoid the well-established sovereign immunity afforded the municipality. ”  Pa949.  N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(b) mandates that “[n]o judgment shall be granted against a public entity or public employee on the basis of strict liability, implied warranty or products liability.
[brief] In fact, at times, he acted as an advocate for Applicants.  An example of this was his questioning almost all of Applicants’ witnesses ad hoc in order to adduce a statement that the Addition did not violate any height restrictions if you disregard the pillars it rests upon.  (Pa477-Pa480)  He even got impatient with one witness who was not answering the question in the manner the [...] required by shouting “I don’t care about Witches.  I want to know from the—”  At which point even Counsel for Applicants had to interrupt him.  (Pa480)  While Appellants offer these examples of disconnects between the Resolution and what little there is of a record, we argue that this is not an analysis for the Appellate Division, but for the motion judge below.  We also do not believe it is up to an appellate panel to conduct the analysis as to whether the transcript of August 22, 2024, in fact, is a verbatim record of what the ZBA considered in reaching its Resolution, which we note is short to detail, analysis and reference to the record.  The absence of a full verbatim record would result in the trial court seeing only parts of what transpired at the ZBA meetings.  It would be akin to trying to read a billboard on the other side of a New York City subway platform as two trains are passing by in opposite directions.  Refusing Appellants an opportunity to make their arguments around a Resolution that resulted from circumstances that unquestionably are exceptional would be unjust.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] October 20, 2023  Order Appointing Condemnation Commissioners  ..................Pa1  TABLE OF APPENDIX  Copy of Order Entered by The Honorable [...], A.J.S.C., October 20, 2023 ..............................................Pa1  Copy of Respondent’s Case Information Statement Filed on November 8, 2023 .................................................................Pa3  Copy of Order Denying Appellant’s Motion for a Stay, November 3, 2023 (Law Division)  ..............................................Pa6  Copy of “Property Map” Indicating the Location of the Lot Which is the Subject of the Litigation ..............................................Pa7  Copy of Ordinance 5-23  Adopted on February 14, 2024 ..................................................Pa8  Copy of Ordinance 7-23  Adopted on March 28, 2023 ..................................................Pa28  Copy of Ordinance 7-23  Adopted on March 28, 2023  Copy of Ordinance 15-23  Adopted on May 9, 2023 ..................................................Pa31 Copies of Correspondence Forwarded to Property Owners by the Township .................................................................Pa35  Pages 2, 4, and 12 of Appellant’s Trial Brief .................................................................Pa42  Copy of Ordinance 26-23  Adopted on August 26, 2023 ..................................................Pa45  Copy of Order Denying Motion to Stay (Appellate Division)  ..............................................Pa48  Deed of Property ..............................................................................................................Pa50  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] THE “THEME” OF PLAINTIFF’S TRIAL PRESENTATION AS SET FORTH IN COUNSEL’S OPENING STATEMENT AND DURING SUMMATION  IMPROPERLY CHARACTERIZED THE DECISION TO GO TO TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES AS A REFUSAL BY DEFENDANTS TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACCIDENT WHICH REQUIRED THE JURY TO HOLD DEFENDANTS “ACCOUNTABLE. ”  (NOT RAISED BELOW)  At the beginning of his opening statement, Plaintiff’s counsel advised the jury that the trial, “and every civil trial,” was about “one thing - - accountability. ”  3T.3:9 to 18.  Thus, counsel advised the jury that “[o]ur entire system of civil law is based on the idea that if your conduct injures someone else, it’s your responsibility to do something to make it right. ”  Ibid.  Based thereon, counsel advised the jurors that their role was to “make sure that that system functions best. ”  Id., at 3:19 to 21.  In essence, counsel advised the jury that it was its responsibility “to make it right” for the Plaintiff.  After advising the jury that the defense had stipulated liability, counsel went on as follows:  So, you’re probably wondering why am I in court today?  The defendants admit they’re at fault.  It goes back to accountability.  Because despite admitting that they caused the collision involved in this case they have for almost five years since this accident happened taken no steps to make things right.  That is why we are all in court today.  Id., at 4:19 to 5:4.  Thus, after introducing the concept of “accountability” as the focus of the trial, counsel advised the jury that the reason the parties were “in court” was because the Defendants had refused to do the right thing over the course of the preceding five years.  Upon previewing the evidence to be introduced concerning Plaintiff’s injuries, counsel returned to his “theme” and said:  Again, this case is about accountability.  The defendants have done the easy part, put up their hands and said, yeah, we caused the accident, and yet in the almost five years since it happened they have never done the second part of what true accountability is - -.  Id., at 10:14 to 19.  Defense counsel objected thereto and the trial court directed counsel to refrain from talking about accountability for the remainder of his opening which concluded almost immediately thereafter.
[brief] (a)  A cleric's inside residence, as defined at § 230-151.A(2)(a): no additional lot area is required.  (b)  Inside educational facilities, as defined at § 230-151.A(2)(b): no additional lot area is required.  (c)  A cleric's outside residence, as defined at § 230-151.A(2)(c): 0.5 acre of additional lot area is required.  (d)  Outside educational facilities, as defined at § 230-151.A(2)(d):  1.0 acre of additional lot area is required.  (e)  Facilities for a convent or other housing for members of a religious order, separate and apart from a residence for the facility's religious leader:  2.5 acres of additional lot area are required.  (f)  Social facilities, as defined at § 230-151.A(2)(f):  2.5 acres of additional lot area are required.  (3)  The lot shall front on and have direct access to a public state, county or municipal street or highway which shall be an arterial or collector street as identified in the Township Master Plan, and not primarily a street serving as access to residential properties.
[brief] In addition to a lack of academic optimism, the Report detailed diminished staff wellness and morale.  Teachers are “overloaded” and many believe that the work “can be defeating and deflating. ” (Ra131-32; Ra193).  And teachers explained that “frequent changes and new rules from the District . . . create confusion and inconsistency, contributing to the overall sense of overwhelm. ” (Ra193).  Lastly, the Report described communication as an area of weakness in the District, particularly with students and parents.
[brief] Therefore, the Judge started off his colloquy with defendant, stating, “[w]e had given you advisements September 12th of 2016, indicating the potential penalties that you faced if I accept your guilty plea.  I should run through them again for you, so that you are aware of that before you make any decisions. ” (1T:3-10 to 3-14).  [...] then proceeded to inform defendant of the penalties of the offense and the penalties for subsequent offenses:
[brief] The Trustee had a legal duty to administer the Trust in accordance with its terms and purposes pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:31-54.  According to the Trust terms, as soon as practicable following the Settlor’s death, the Trustee was instructed to divide all property owned by the Trust, less any costs associated with the testamentary estate, into three equal shares, and transfer those shares outright and free of trust to the three beneficiaries.  This includes the Boonton and Florida Properties as well as the Trust brokerage accounts with approximately $500,000 on deposit.  Again, this process could have been completed quickly and efficiently for under $1,000 in legal fees and costs.
[brief] (Pls.’ Supp’l Mem. at 2).  Plaintiffs also take issue with defendants’ argument that “the Court should not be concerned about low production rates for documents that hit on search terms. ” (Id. at 3).  They cite as an example the production rate of only 31% for an employee with “responsibility for Affirmative Action and EEO compliance” and suggest that “the vast majority of her documents that hit on search terms would likely be responsive, even taking into account the possibility of some mis-hits. ” (Id.).  Plaintiffs also submit that defendants’ argument that a privilege review alone would not be significantly faster than a privilege and responsiveness review “belie common sense and the experience of anyone who has participated in document review. ” (Id.).  They state they are “deeply troubled by [...]’s vague reference to its ‘slow’ collection of laptops and refusal to share additional information with Plaintiffs, as it seems clear that – months after being alerted to the discovery problems – laptops remain outstanding, that documents likely continue to be lost, and that [...]’s counsel is exhibiting no urgency or forthrightness about a gravely serious discovery misconduct issue. ”  (Id.).  *9  After reviewing the parties’ positions, the Court determines that plaintiffs’ arguments that the statistics are “surprisingly low,” or that “most custodians have inexplicably low production rates considering the relevance of the search terms,” and other such statements, lack foundation.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Trial Court decision of the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C., and Statement of Reasons dated September 29, 2023 .................................................................1a  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Trial Courts are not infallible and have the capacity to reach erroneous conclusions.  That irrefutable truth is the reason why our judicial process includes appellate review.  This case represents the precise circumstance, where our Appellate Court should reverse an erroneous decision of the Trial Court below.
[brief] The [...] Stockholder Agreement included customary formalities regarding the operation of the business.  For example, the Agreement required an annual election of the officers of the corporation, established a procedure for voting by the directors and dictated that "[a]ll decisions regarding the operation of the business of the Corporation and the expenditure of the funds thereof shall be made by majority vote of the Stockholders."  Da1507.  In practice, [...] and [...] ran [...] and [...] in a much more informal way.  [...] did not have regular Board of Directors meetings.  3T7:6-8.  [...] and [...] simply agreed that [...] would become Chief Operating Officer and handle the lab, "in charge of all the instruments, all the certifications, all the audits, all the chemists."  2T50:4-9.  [...] would take care of sales, marketing, books and records.  2T48:25-49:2.  [...] did not cede all financial responsibilities to [...].  For example, [...] had check-signing authority, 2T59:4-6, and approved [...]'s expenses before the bookkeeper entered them in QuickBooks.  5T148:15-22-151:18; 13T52:25-55:4.  [...] also had a singularly important role in qualifying [...] as a minority business enterprise (MBE) and a disadvantaged business enterprise (DBE).  To secure this status, which gave the company an advantage in obtaining certain public contracts, [...] acquired a 51% interest and [...] received a 49% interest in the company.
[directive] Except with respect to the New Jersey State Police, the County Prosecutor, with the approval of the Chief of the police department, shall specify in writing those officer(s) in the department who are Designated Supervisory Officers for the purposes of this Directive and who (1) are authorized to review and approve charging decisions, and (2) are 13 authorized to overcome a presumption, after determining that such officers are qualified to perform those decision-making functions considering their duty assignment, experience, demonstrated judgment, and training.  In the alternative, the County Prosecutor may specify a duty position within the department, in which event the officer in that duty position may be authorized to review and approve charging decisions.  With respect to the New Jersey State Police, if the County Prosecutor issues a directive pursuant to this subsection, the Superintendent shall specify in writing those members of the State Police who are Designated Supervisory Officers for purposes of this Directive and who (1) are authorized to review and approve charging decisions, and (2) are authorized to overcome a presumption, after determining that such State Police members are qualified to perform those decision-making functions considering their duty assignment, experience, demonstrated judgment, and training.