ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In Britwood, the [...] and [...] entered into an amended redevelopment agreement which provided that [...] was responsible for “the construction of infrastructure improvements,” which would be paid by fees assessed to subsequent developers and adopted an ordinance approving the agreement.  Id. at 558-59.  A month earlier, the plaintiff purchased the subject property which was located within the redevelopment area.  Id. at 559.  The plaintiff—who was not a redeveloper and who had not entered into any redevelopment agreement with Asbury Park—submitted an application for preliminary and final site plan approval to the Planning Board.  *Ibid.*  During the hearing, the Planning Board concluded that it did not have the authority to condition the approval of the plaintiff’s application on payment of off-site infrastructure contributions.  *Id.* at 560.  Thereafter, the City Council adopted a resolution which granted the plaintiff “subsequent redeveloper” status and required the plaintiff to contribute to the cost of off-site infrastructure improvements.  *Ibid.*  The City Council also adopted an ordinance which set general parameters to apply to contributions to off-site infrastructure costs.  *Ibid.*  Once again, however, unlike the circumstances of this matter, the [...] never entered into a redevelopment agreement with the plaintiff.  The plaintiff then filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs, attacking the validity of the resolution and ordinance to the extent they required the plaintiff to contribute to off-site infrastructure costs.  *Id.* at 562.  The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, but the Appellate Division reversed.  *Id.* at 562-63.  However, the Appellate Division did not hold that the City was prohibited from negotiating the payment of any fee from a redeveloper.  In fact, the Appellate Division said the exact opposite.  The Appellate Division recognized that the City’s ability to impose such payment obligations flowed from its ability to negotiate and enter into a contract with a redeveloper—which is precisely what the City did with [...] in this case.
[brief] Judicial “review of administrative agency action is limited. ”  Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011).  “An administrative agency’s final quasi-judicial decision will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record. ”  Ibid. (quoting In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007)).  This court will “afford substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing. ”  Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007) (citing R & R Mktg., LLC v. Brown-Forman Corp., 158 N.J. 170, 175 (1999) (additional citations omitted)).  “Such deference has been specifically extended to state agencies that administer pension statutes. ”  Piatt v. Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015).  “This deference comes from the understanding that a state agency brings experience and specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating a legislative enactment within its field of expertise. ”  Ibid. (quoting In re Election Law Enf’t Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010) (additional citations omitted)).  “A reviewing court ‘may not substitute its own judgment for the agency’s, even though the court might have reached a different result. ”  In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007) (additional citations omitted).  Here, the Board’s decision that [...] is not eligible to maintain multiple member status was reasonable because it is supported by the plain language of N.J.S.A. 43:15A-25.2, which states in pertinent part: a.
[brief] Defendant [...] (hereinafter “John”) has owned property located at [...] (hereinafter the “property” or “John’s home”) since May 31, 2006.  (Da6)  John spent his hard-earned money and worked hard to renovate the property from a three bedroom to a four bedroom house for his family’s future and retirement.  (Da21)  John subsequently unfortunately over the years suffered severe hardships including but not limited to divorce, bankruptcy, undergoing multiple surgeries, suffering from death in the family and job loss as a result of the pandemic.  (Da21)  Plaintiff filed a motion for final judgment on May 24, 2020 (Da9) and the Court entered final judgment in favor of Plaintiff on June 29, 2020 barring John’s right to redeem and vesting title to John’s property over to Plaintiff.  (Da1)  John was then removed from his home after Plaintiff’s ejectment action.
[brief] Da 1-2 Judgment of Conviction ([...])(most legible) .........................  Da 3-4 [...] .......................................................................  Da 5-6 Plea Agreement ([...]) .............................................................  Da 7-9  Judgment of Conviction ([...])(most legible)  .........................  Da 10-11  Judgment of Conviction ([...])  ................................................  Da 12-13¹  Document and Transcript Request Rejections (Hudson Vicinage)
[brief] This right rests on the constitutionally mandated common-law presumptions of parental fitness and affection—*i.e.*, that (1) “parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment” and (2) the “natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. ”  *Parham v. J.R.*, 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
[brief] (VOLUME I – 1a to 99a)  On the Brief: [...], Esq. [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF APPENDIX  ........................................................................................................ iii TABLE OF ORDERS BEING APPEALED ...................................................................... vii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................ viii PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ......................................................................................... 1 PROCEDURAL STATEMENT ......................................................................................... 4 STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................... 6 THEORY OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE NEGLIGENCE OF [...] .................. 12 LEGAL ARGUMENT: POINT I: SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF MUST BE REVERSED, BECAUSE THE REPEATED FAILURE OF DEFENDANT [...] CONTRACTING TO SUPPLY ITS SURVEYOR WITH AN ACCURATE REVISED GRADING PLAN UPON WHICH TO STAKE OUT THE CONSTRUCTION SITE CONSTITUTED “COMMON KNOWLEDGE NEGLIGENCE” PROVABLE EVEN WITHOUT A DESIGNATED EXPERT WITNESS ON LIABILITY (Pa7-Pa10) ......................................................................................................................... 17 POINT II: PLAINTIFFS CAN PRESENT SUFFICIENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE ON PROXIMATE CAUSE AND DAMAGES TO REACH A JURY THROUGH DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND THE TESTIMONY OF [...] AND OTHER REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT PROFESSIONALS, AND THEREFORE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF MUST BE REVERSED (Pa10-Pa12)
[brief] 2C:20-3(a) | 4, 53 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:21-6(c)(1) | 4 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:21-6(h) | 4 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) | 4 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) | 4, 45, 49 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 | 56 | ### Rules | Rule | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | R. 2:10-2 | 44, 45 | | R. 3:21-4(h) | 58 | ### Rules of Evidence | Rule | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | N.J.R.E. 702 | 31 | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D) | PAGE NOS. | |-----------| | **Constitutional Provisions** | | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 1 ................................................................. 26, 31, 38, 45 | | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 9 ........................................................................... 26, 31, 38, 45 | | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10 ........................................................................... 26, 31, 38, 45 | | U.S. Const. amend. II ............................................................................. 45 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV ............................................................................ 26, 31, 38, 45 | | **Other Authorities** | | Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, Bloodstain Pattern Analysis .................................................................................. 34 | | Model Criminal Jury Charge, “Fresh Complaint: Silence or Failure to Complain,” (Apr. 15, 2013) ............................................................... 38, 42 | | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science, Standard for Methodology in Bloodstain Pattern Analysis (2022) .................................................. 35 | | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science, Standards for a Bloodstain Pattern Analyst’s Training Program (2020) .................................................. 34 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The State charged [...] with murder, felony murder, robbery, kidnapping, and various weapons and theft offenses on the theory that she stabbed [...] and hit him with a tire iron to steal his 20-year-old car and his sneakers.
[brief] .................................................. 24 State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57 (2014) .................................................. 41 State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412 (2014) .................................................. 16 State v. Ghertler, 114 N.J. 383 (1989) .................................................. 41 State v. Hagans, 233 N.J. 30 (2018) .................................................. 25, 26 State v. Henry, 133 N.J. 104 (1993) .................................................. 43 State v. King, 44 N.J. 346 (1965) .................................................. 25, 26, 28, 36, 38 State v. Liepe, 239 N.J. 359 (2019) .................................................................
[brief] (23T108-8 to 11).  He claimed that he gave the disc jockey a flash drive with his songs.  (23T108-11 to 12; 23T108-23 to 25).  Because his stage name was “[...],” he would begin his act by saying, “Deez up. ” (23T111-15 to 20).  When the crowd also started saying, “Deez up,” defendant claimed he saw people throwing up gang signs.  (23T112-5 to 10).  He also saw people pointing up “gun fingers. ” (23T113-11 to 12).  Defendant thought certain people in the audience were annoyed.  (23T113-13 to 18).  Defendant claimed that thirty seconds into his performance, he saw about ten to fifteen people run over to his table and grab bottles from it.
[brief] [...]:  As Your Honor is aware, [...] was also charged in a first degree armed robbery in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for an incident that occurred approximately a half-an-hour before the robbery in Hamilton Township.  Within the past couple of weeks I've had communication with [...], the State has indicated it would be willing to call Pennsylvania and ensure that they would run any sentence he may receive for that armed robbery concurrent to what has been extended in our state.  That is, that he plead guilty to murder, to receive a 30-year period of New Jersey State Prison with a 30-year period of parole ineligibility.  That would run concurrent to not only the Pennsylvania charge but to the robbery in Hamilton as well, I believe the number we placed on it was a 12 NERA.  We have every reason to believe, although we have not received an assurance from Pennsylvania, based on what he is facing, his criminal history and what he would be facing here, that they would be willing to do that, but, as I've indicated to [...], the minute the first juror walks in the door and we begin picking that offer is no longer available.  In the same vein, we would rescind a concurrent offer on our robbery here in the State of New Jersey.  [...] would face each of his three charges in succession and any sentence would be required to run consecutive and that, as Your Honor is well aware, comes from State v. Yarbough.
[brief] Db33-34.  [...]’s opinion on the temperature of the body was simply an expansion connecting his opinion on the temperature of the deceased victim’s body and his observation of the many records of possible ambient temperatures with which he was supplied.  Defendant in fact met with [...] prior to trial, at which they could have asked any and all potential questions regarding possible temperature discrepancies.  And in fact, they did so; the trial judge’s assessment of the record indicated that “[i]n June of 2022, the Defense met with [...] at which time they raised issues relating to discrepancies in the ambient temperature readings by the medical examiner and law enforcement at the scene of the body and the reading of local weather stations that way. ”  Da83.  Defendant invites the State to draw inferences between expert conclusions and provide them to the defense where the inference could be drawn by any person who examines the reports as simply an expansion of the existing opinions.  The trial court judge implicitly acknowledged this by holding that 1) all of the relevant information was discovered between the parties in advance of trial, and 2) the testimony did not contradict his previously provided written reports and the opinions and conclusions contained therein.  Da88.  The trial court judge cited the temperatures from the reports in her opinion, as well as the facts to which the expert testified.  Da82-90.  Her decision did not rest on an impermissible basis and was not based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors.  It did not amount to a clear error in judgment.  To any extent that the State’s actions were improper in not delivering this specific conclusion to Defendant in the same words in which [...] phrased it at trial (which the State does not concede), the Court fashioned an order “as it deem[ed] appropriate” consistent with R. 3:13-3(b)(1)(i) in light of the defendant’s previous conversations with [...] prior to trial, the defendant’s thorough cross-examination on the issue at trial of both [...] and other witnesses, and, as the judge mentioned in her oral opinion and implied in her written opinion, the fact that the defendant’s argument was largely an argument about the weight that should be ascribed to [...]’s opinion, which was within the jury’s province.
[brief] I.  UNRESOLVED LEGAL ISSUES  ...........................................................................................................  5  II.  TIME DELAY FAULT & "PARANOIA"  EXPLANATION .................................................................  9  III.  CONSPIRACY & ADA COMPLAINT ISSUES..................................................................................  10  IV.  STATE'S ERRONEOUS MOTION & LAWSON REMAND ............................................................  14  A.  A POSSIBLE “EASY WAY OUT” OF THE ENFORCEMENT  THE STATE’S ERROR – DISMISSAL FOR “EXACT SAME REASONS” .............................................................................................................  15  V. COMPARISON TO RUBERTON CASE ..........................................................................................  16  VI.  COMPARISON TO OTHER “LONG LIVED” CASES ......................................................................  17  VII.  CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................................
[brief] As to the second step, the State’s brief fails to explain why a “new” State monitor will be more effective than the 10-year succession of multiple State monitors placed in the LSD (at an outlay of more than $2 million by the district).  In a final footnote to its brief [SB 49, n.13], the State seeks to explain the ineffectiveness of the prior and present State monitors, but not why a new State monitor could be more effective.  In an obvious throwing up of the hands, suggesting that installing a new State monitor is a kind of bureaucratic Hail Mary, the footnote ends by stating that “Regardless of what past monitors did or did not know, the Department will be installing a new monitor.
[brief] His contention stems from a misinterpretation of the available record.  The sentencing transcript is unavailable.  (Da14-16).  However, the JOC memorializes the imposition of his concurrent sentence and “incorporates all other reasons stated on the record at the time of sentence. ”  (Da4).  Defendant argues that the PCR court erred by not vacating his convictions and “illegally lenient” sentence under [...] because the sentencing court could not have found any reasons to overcome the presumption of imposing a consecutive sentence pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h).  He argues that because the sentencing court found aggravating factors (3), (6), and (9) pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) to apply to his sentence, it “preclude[s] any possibility that the court may have found that based on defendant’s ‘character and condition’ a consecutive sentence would result in a ‘serious injustice. ’” (Db17).  On appeal, he advances five interconnected claims.
[directive] This section includes a matrix of roles and responsibilities that spell out the crux of how both Qualified CBVI Organizations and Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies can take reciprocal steps to coordinate their work.  This matrix includes several areas with scenarios.  Whether these elements are relevant for Qualified CBVI Organizations and Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies depends on whether the CBVI organization offers relevant services.  All are either recommended or discretionary, none are binding, and all are subject to discussion and agreement by the entities.  For all these areas, the Report clarifies roles and responsibilities.
[brief] H203a Letter Order by Hon. [...], A.L.J., issued June 11, 2020, in OAL Dockets [...] and [...] denying [...]’s motion filed March 2, 2020, for order directing [...] to reassess petition in light of the New Jersey EMP, in OAL Dockets [...] and [...] (SOICR #19) ..................... H247a [...]’s motion filed in OAL Dockets [...] and [...] May 5, 2020, for an order striking the rebuttal testimony of [...]’s witnesses [...], [...], and [...] (SOICR #28) .................................................. H254a [...]’s motion March 2, 2020, filed in OAL Dockets [...] and [...] for an order directing [...] to reassess petition in light of the New Jersey EMP (SOICR #19), attaching ............... H269a [...] Township Zoning Board Resolution of Denial of [...]’s Application for Preliminary and Final Site Plan and Use and Related Variances memorialized December 12, 2018 (960 [...] Road)(SOICR #17) .................................................. H280a Order issued by Hon. [...], A.L.J., December 18, 2019, in OAL Dockets [...] and [...] consolidating the [...] Petitions of January 11, 2017, and November 29, 2018, and granting the Motion by [...] to intervene in the consolidated contested cases (SOICR #12)...........................................
[brief] Appellants’ contention that [...] imposed a “material modification” to the Wholesaler Agreement by asking Appellants to propose a plan to achieve 96% of their pre-pandemic sales is disingenuous.  (Pb at 27.)  [...] sought to enforce the Wholesaler Agreement’s “best efforts” clause and to seek from Appellants pursuant to the MBPA and the ABC Law a plan to cure their deficient performance.  There was no “modification.
[brief] First, the State’s handling of counsel’s failure to retain an expert on familiarity is typical of its faulty reasoning.  It State conflates the argument raised on direct appeal (that identifications were inadmissible based the trial record) with the argument raised in PCR (that counsel was ineffective for not consulting with and retaining an expert on familiar identifications).  The State also flatly ignores the uncontroverted evidence provided to the PCR court demonstrating that (1) research from well before trial demonstrated “familiar” identifications can be mistaken and are susceptible to the same factors as stranger identification; (2) [...] attorneys obtained eyewitness expert testimony during this time, including a murder case in which expert testimony on familiarity contributed to an acquittal; and (3) [...] and other organizations trained on eyewitness identification and using such experts years before [...]’s case.  There is no reason to think – let alone evidence to support the premise – that counsel’s failure to consult and retain an expert was strategic.  And even if it was, it would have still been ineffective assistance, as explained in [...]’s opening brief.  The State also misses the point on counsel’s failure to investigate and enable presentation of the Facebook posts.  At this stage, [...] is not required to prove the Facebook posts and evidence would have definitively established his innocence, but rather, that under the circumstances of this case, without counsel’s failure to properly investigate and present the Facebook evidence, there is a reasonable probability he could have established the foundation and authenticity of the Facebook activity, leading to a different outcome.  The State ignored applicable facts and law in other points.  One example is its defense of counsel’s inexplicable failure to demand production of the hard drive (or take any other action), especially after learning [...] had not wiped it as its witnesses had claimed.  In July 2013, [...] IT worker [...] testified that the drive had been completely wiped, and counsel simply took for granted this was accurate, never demanding production of the drive for analysis.  Then as trial was beginning, counsel learned the State had conducted a forensic examination of the drive on February 24, 2014 and found that footage had survived its purported “complete wiping” – strongly suggesting, of course, that it had never been done.  Yet, counsel did nothing with this bombshell disclosure that [...] personnel testified falsely.  He still did not demand the drive be produced for examination, before trial or any point thereafter.  It cannot seriously be claimed he strategically did so after a “thorough investigation of law and facts.
[brief] By way of one example, following the sale of [...], the special fiscal agent sought authority from the court to distribute the proceeds of the sale, of which [...] ultimately received ~$7.5 million towards satisfaction of the judgment.  (Da21).  [...] filed applications related to the sale proceeds and credits related to the sale proceeds, arguing that he should receive credit for the fees paid to the special fiscal agent, and challenging the complex application of credits to the judgment over the last six years.  (Da21).  The Chancery court rejected [...]’s application to receive a credit for the special fiscal agent’s fees, and approved Plaintiff’s calculation of the judgment credits, which was also affirmed by this Court on appeal in 2023.  (Da21; Sipko v. [...], Inc., No. A-439-22 (App. Div. Nov. 13, 2023)).