ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ” (Aa133).  Finally, [...] contends that the [...]’s conclusion that reconstruction of the bulkhead twenty-four inches waterward of its current location is a “significant change” in the location of a structure (Ra205), is inconsistent with the coastal engineering rule, N.J.A.C. 7:7-15.11(d)(2), which allows such bump-outs in certain circumstances.  (Ab22-23; Ab27-28).  But whether reconstruction of the bulkhead is a significant change or not, as the Commissioner observed, the Law’s plain language applies to any change in footprint of a structure, and a certain degree of change is not necessary to trigger the public access requirement under N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a).  (Aa135).  Also, simply because reconstruction of a bulkhead may meet the separate requirements of the CZM’s coastal engineering rule does not mean that reconstruction of a bulkhead does not constitute a “change in the existing footprint of a structure” for purposes of N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a).  Thus, to comply with the Law, the [...] properly added the condition that [...] provide a public access plan to the [...] in the Permit here.  C.  The Public Access Law Does Not Prohibit the [...] from Applying the Law Before New Regulations Are Adopted (Responding to Appellants’ Point III).
[brief] \(^6\) (11T63-3 to 64-7, 65-25 to 66-23; Da90 12:37:54-12:39:11)  At 4:42pm, [...]’s Jaguar arrives at the [...] playground, and [...], [...], and [...]’s daughter get out.  (11T56-13 to 57-16; Da90 4:47:30-4:48:37)  [...] is again seen pulling up his pants a few times.  (11T70-22 to 71-8; Da90 4:49:30-4:51:23)  [...] and his daughter play and eventually walk back to the Jaguar and his daughter gets in.  (11T58-4 to 6, 59-4 to 6; Da90 4:52:00-4:54:37)  [...] begins to walk away with [...], but runs back to kiss [...].  (11T60-11 to 18; Da90 4:54:37-4:55:58)
[directive] On ______________ the above captioned defendant was convicted of charges which could result in his/her incarceration.  In accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6.2(c) we are providing you with the results of our investigation.  The court will proceed with sentencing on ____________ unless otherwise advised by DYFS.  Criminal Division Probation Officer  Phone Number Supplemental Contact: Team Leader  Phone Number c: Team Leader  Defendants File Superior Court – Criminal Division Report On Alternative Care For The Dependents of Detainees
[brief] *Francois v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys.*, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 349 (App. Div. 2010) (citation omitted).  Here, the statute provides for the benefit if a retiree files for it within two years of the effective date of the Ricci Act, i.e., by July 8, 2021.  [...] did not file for the benefit within the time permitted by the statute, so even under a liberal construction, the statute expressly states he is ineligible for the benefit he now seeks.  Nevertheless, [...] argues that the limitation period in the statute should not be strictly applied because it “fails to advance the legislative purpose of the Ricci Act. ” (Pb14).
[directive] When the trial will last more than a week or two, the Committee recommends that judges consider asking the hardship question (which is #2 below) before any of the substantive questions.  This will allow an early excusal of jurors who will be unable to serve on a lengthy trial, thereby enabling them to become available to other courtrooms picking juries.  (Otherwise, it can be asked toward the end).  Note:  In some civil cases, the parties may wish to expedite the voir dire process, either because the nature of the case, in their view, does not warrant an extended process, because they are near settlement, or for any other reason.  These are private disputes, and, with the consent of counsel and the approval of the judge, full use of the model questions in civil trials may be waived.
[brief] As to the defendant’s claim that he was entitled to a rebuttal presumption pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(q)(2) for the lost body-camera footage, the trial court reasoned that the statute did not apply to suppression hearings.  *Id.* at 526.  On appeal, this Court reversed, reasoning that a testimonial hearing was warranted under Rule 3:5-7(c), because the defendant disputed material facts in the pre-hearing submissions.  *Id.* at 528.  This Court also reasoned the trial court erred because “the rebuttable presumption set forth in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(q)(2) is applicable at suppression hearings,” but cautioned that the opinion was “not a determination” that the defendant was “entitled to the presumption. ”  *Id.* at 535.  The Court explained that the trial court should make that determination based on the “parties’ arguments and evidence” in connection with the suppression hearing.  *Id.*  In this case, unlike in Jones, the trial court has already conducted an evidentiary hearing.  At that hearing, defendant did not ask the Court to apply the rebuttable presumption set forth in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(q)(2), and his argument did not meet the preconditions necessary for its application.  Remanding this case for a second bite at the apple to argue for the rebuttable presumption is unwarranted.
[brief] [48a-58a.]²  Given the Borough’s broad request for information through the Application, including a request for “any additional information that the Applicant would like to be considered,” (58a) (emphasis supplied), [...] cannot reasonably claim that it was duped into believing that the Evaluation Sheet was the lone criteria that the Subcommittee would consider in making a recommendation to the Council.  --- ²  [...] cannot plausibly claim that it did not know that the Subcommittee would use the information requested through the Application to make a recommendation to the Council.  Contra Appellant Br. 19 (“[P]ublication of the evaluation sheet did not foster any transparency in the process because the actual criteria would be known only to the Borough and remain hidden from the public”).  [...]’s reliance on Matter of the Application for Med. Marijuana Alt. Treatment Ctr. for Pangea Health and Wellness, LLC, 465 N.J. Super. 343 (App. Div. 2020) is misplaced because it is factually distinguishable.  In Pangea, the Court held that the Department of Health made an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable decision in awarding permits to alternative treatment centers because the Department review committee members were required to provide scores for particular criterion, and in averaging out the scores for each criterion, tolerated too great a degree of “relative error” in its scoring.  465 N.J. Super at 363.  Pangea Health is not applicable here because the Subcommittee was not required to provide scores for any criterion.  Ironically, to the extent that Pangea Health has any relevance to this appeal, it supports [...] and the Borough’s positions.  In Pangea Health, the Court criticized the Department because it failed to do anything more than “compile and tabulate the votes and declare winners based on [a] raw computation” of the average scores of each applicant.  Id. at 380.  But that is exactly what [...] is asking this Court to require the Borough to do: score each applicant based on the Evaluation Sheet and select (without any further inquiry into the criteria scoring or additional considerations) the applicant with the highest score.  Pangea Health provides no legal basis to do so.  POINT II
[brief] Re: In the Matter of the Application of [...] to the [...] for Minor Site Plan Approval with Variances Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c) to Permit the Operation of a Class 5 Dispensary for the Sale of Adult Use Recreational Cannabis at the Subject Property Located at [...], Block 158, Lot 3.01, in the City of [...], [...]  [...]  On Appeal from The [...], [...]
[brief] On July 15, 2016, the Court.  ([...]) rendered an oral Opinion that the Synagogue by the 1963 Agreement Paragraph 10 possessed an easement to park vehicles in the School’s Lot 5 Sixth Street courtyard and the Fifth Street parking area and to have its heating system connect to the School's heating system, granting plaintiff Partial Summary Judgment as to the Second, Third, and Fifth Counts and denied defendant’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
[brief] These two (2) sections have been combined for the sake of brevity and clarity since procedural history and the statement of facts, including Defendant’s wholesale default to pay his fair share of the children’s expenses, are inextricably intertwined.  T1 = Transcript of June 7, 2023  T2 – Transcript of July 14, 2023  Paragraph 25 of the Final Judgment of Divorce (“FJD”), entered on December 3, 1998, requires Defendant’s contribution toward higher education costs and reimbursement of the children’s uninsured medical expenses (P-50 to P-56).  Despite Plaintiff’s continued objections, Defendant has failed to pay his fair (or any) share of the children’s education expenses or reimburse Plaintiff for the children’s uninsured medical expenses as per the terms of the FJD (P-50 to P-56).  Plaintiff originally sought approximately $648,594.00 (P-454) from Defendant reflecting Defendant’s share of their two children’s unpaid medical expenses and educational expenses that Plaintiff was forced to pay due to Defendant’s defaults, as well as a claim for retroactive child support modification, counsel fees and costs, and a directive from the lower court that Defendant obtain life insurance or provide some other type of valid financial assurance that any debt Defendant owes to Plaintiff will still be paid even in the event of Defendant’s death or disability.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  I.  This Court Should Apply Shaw and Hold that Defendants Are Not Exempt from Liability Under the CFA.  The decisions rendered in Shaw and Plemmons are undeniably conflicting.  Unless or until the Supreme Court holds otherwise, this Court is free to decide which case to follow.  “[T]he decisions of one panel of the Appellate Division are not binding upon the remaining panels .  . . . if [the Appellate panel] disagree[s] with [another Appellate decision], [the panel] [is] not required to follow it. ”  David v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 360 N.J. Super. 127, 142 (App. Div. 2003).  See also Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3.3 on R. 1:36-3 (2024) (noting that Appellate panels “are not ‘bound’ to rulings of each other .  . . .”).  A.  Shaw is the More Recent, Better Reasoned Opinion.  Despite Defendants’ arguments to the contrary, this Court should follow Shaw and find that insurance producers are not shielded from liability under the CFA.  Shaw should be followed over Plemmons because it is a more recent, better reasoned opinion.  In fact, one member of this Court who sat on both the Plemmons and the Shaw panels has already concluded as much.  In analyzing applicable exemptions to the CFA, and with the benefit of the Attorney General’s “special role” and insight as the enforcer of the CFA\(^1\), the Shaw Court held that “there is nothing in the text or the purpose of the CFA that supports an exemption for fraudulent or unconscionable activities of semi-professionals such as home inspectors. ”  460 N.J. Super. at 609 (emphasis added).  The Court further reasoned that “the learned professional doctrine, as interpreted, threatens to become the exception that swallows the rule, in contravention of the canon of statutory interpretation that requires that exceptions to a remedial statute are to be narrowly construed” and that “to the extent the Supreme Court continues to recognize a ‘learned professional’ doctrine, ideally that doctrine should be narrowly construed to include only those professions who have historically been recognized as ‘learned . . . .’”  Id. at 618-19.  Because Shaw was decided thirteen years after Plemmons, the Shaw Court was in the unique position to review the practical impact of its prior decision.
[brief] II.  Appellant’s Remaining Arguments are Not Implicated by The Instant Fact Pattern  Appellant’s remaining arguments, that he was improperly passed over for promotion as a disabled veteran, and that he is entitled to appointment under the doctrine of equitable estoppel are not applicable to the genuine issues raised.  Although N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(a) does provide that disabled veterans must be appointed if they are ranked number one on a certification, Appellant was not ranked number one on the certification from which the September and October 2022 vacancies were filled.  This issue boils down to whether there existed “genuine vacancies” at the time certification [...] was promulgated by [...], and it has been established that due to [...]’s reasonable exercise of its legislatively delegated discretion, that no genuine vacancies existed.  Finally, the doctrine of “equitable estoppel” does not apply to the instant matter.
[brief] APPENDIX PAGE  # Certification of [...], Esq dated July 3, 2023 filed in support of defendant’s motion to quash a subpoena served on [...]……………………………  Pa. 37-39  Letter dated June 18, 2021 from [...] to [...] attached as Exhibit A to the July 3, 2023 Certification of Benjamin Paris filed in support of Defendant’s Motion to quash a subpoena……………………………  Pa. 40-41  Order entered on October 20, 2021 by Honorable [...] attached as Exhibit B to the July 3, 2022 Certification of Benjamin in support of Defendant’s Motion to Quash a Subpoena….  Pa. 42-44  Order entered by the Honorable [...] on December 13, 2021  Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice attached as Exhibit C the Certification of [...] in support of Defendant’s Motion to Quash a subpoena………………………………………..  Pa. 45-47  Order entered by the Honorable [...] on March 2022 granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and restoring the case to the active trial list attached as Exhibit D to the Certification of [...] in support of Defendant’s Motion to Quash ………………………………………..
[brief] (emphasis added)  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4(a) defines “medical expense benefits” that the named insured, injured resident relatives, or other persons sustaining bodily injury may be entitled to under the “personal injury protection coverage. ”  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 also explains assignment of benefits to a medical provider as follows:  Benefits payable under this section shall:  . . .  (2)  Not be assignable, except to a provider of service benefits under this section in accordance with policy terms approved by the commissioner, nor subject to levy, execution, attachment or other process for satisfaction of debts.  (emphasis added)  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 clearly states that the payment of medical expense benefits under the personal injury protection coverage of a standard automobile liability insurance policy is only to the insured, injured person, or a medical provider who has an assignment of benefits.
[brief] As such, unless Plaintiff proves all five (5) of the following criteria, the public entity cannot be held liable.  Ibid.  In order for liability to attach to a public entity for a “dangerous condition,” of property, N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 mandates Plaintiff to prove that the property was in fact “public property” and: (1) a dangerous condition existed at the time of injury; (2) the dangerous condition proximately caused the injury; (3) the dangerous condition created a foreseeable risk of injury of the kind incurred; (4) that either: (a) a negligent or wrongful act or omission of a public employee created the dangerous condition, or (b) that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in sufficient time prior to the injury to have protected against the condition; and (5) the action or inaction of the public entity with respect to its effort to protect against the condition was palpably unreasonable.
[brief] [...] would not have plead guilty to crimes he is innocent of.  Furthermore, New Jersey Criminal Practice and Procedures, subsection 12.22, under Conditional Pleas states:  Rule 3:9-3(f) provides for “conditional pleas” of guilty.  A "conditional plea" of guilty is a guilty plea where the defendant reserves the right to appeal from the adverse determination of any specific pretrial motion.  If the defendant wins the appeal, he/she is then afforded an opportunity to withdraw his/her guilty plea (Page 3-4 of Table of authorities).  The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the stop was raced based, without probable cause, or reasonable articulate suspicion (Da 26, Da 27).
[brief] The trial court found Plaintiff’s expert to be “knowledgeable in his stated field,” but “entrenched. ”  4T9:7-9.  However, during a portion of cross-examination of [...] by Defendant’s attorney, [...] was asked whether the Smith Survey created an obligation for Plaintiff to inquire further about ownership of the Strip.  [...] responded “I can’t say. ”  1T106:10-13.  In fact, Defendant’s attorney asked multiple question of [...] that were designed to impose an obligation on the Plaintiff which was presented by Defendant’s attorney.  In its opinion, the court was displeased with [...]’s refusal to answer:
[brief] [...] cannot self-servingly “pick and choose” which contents of the website to discard and which to include as part of the alleged “contract. ”  See Hardy ex rel. Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 103 (2009) (providing that a court must interpret a written agreement “as a whole”); C.L. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 473 N.J. Super. 591, 599 (App. Div. 2022) (“Importantly, a contract should not be interpreted to render one of its terms meaningless”).
[brief] 4T, 88:17-92:1.  [...], testified that said profits, discounted to present value, would be the profits earned by whoever was the developer or developers, whether [...], [...], or anyone else, novice or not.  4T, 131:4-16.  Further, [...] testified that [...] could have developed the affordable housing project on his own or entered into a partnership with an affordable housing developer.  4T, 105:24-106:5.  If [...] developed the affordable housing project on his own, obviously [...] would have received 100% of the profits.  4T, 116:14-21.  However, if [...] entered into a partnership with an affordable housing developer, he would have received 60% of the profits 4T, 125:21-125:3.  Further, [...] testified that the aforesaid range of the percentage of profits [...] would have received from the affordable housing development, but for the actions of Defendants [...] and [...], is also consistent with his many years of experience as an affordable housing development financial advisor to clients undertaking similar affordable housing developments.
[brief] Defendants/Respondents  [...], [...], [...], and [...] (collectively, “CEP Respondents”) oppose Plaintiffs/Appellants [...] and [...]’s (collectively, “Appellants”) attempt to resurrect the legally and factually deficient claims against them.  CEP Respondents focus their submission on the question presented that impacts their proper dismissal from this case:  2.  Did the trial court properly dismiss the claims against the CEP Respondents where (1) Appellants lost their interest in the property and its land approvals by failing to make lease payments under a subsequently terminated lease, (2) the land approvals run with the land under New Jersey law; and (3) none of the CEP Respondents’ alleged conduct occurred during the term of the subject NDA?
[brief] ” (27T 162-21 to 163-4).  The interview lasted around 13 minutes, during which Defendant was primarily asked about [...]’s whereabouts that night to which he responded that he believed [...] had left sometime between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. to see his girlfriend, [...].  (27T 180-7 to 182-22).  After the interview was over, Defendant left the station by getting a ride from his father, and the detectives witnessed him hand his father a large amount of cash.  (27T 183-1 to 183-19).  Subsequently, the detectives were able to obtain the surveillance footage from the [...].
[brief] ” (5T 114:4-9).  The defendant testified that [...] sexually assaulted her that day, so she stabbed him repeatedly with a knife.  (6T 121:9-21, 137:10 to 138:23).  She then drove the Toyota with [...] in it to an Exxon and bought cigarettes with his credit card.  (7T 13:15 to 16:1).  She then drove to the Domino’s parking lot.  (27:12-16).  The defendant identified herself on the surveillance video pulling [...] out of the Toyota.  (7T 35:19 to 36:4).  The defendant said she hit [...] a number of times with a tire iron when she saw him move.  (6T 147:15 to 148:5, Pa 1 at 3:34:07).  The defendant got back into the Toyota and drove away.  (6T 163:11 to 165:7).
[brief] In other words, she relied on the video alone to draw an inference as to the route of the Chevy, and then drew a conclusion about the vehicle’s occupants based upon the inference.  This inference, and the resulting speculative conclusion, were both incorrect.  Accordingly, when the detective made a second inference about the path of travel, this time at trial, she ran the risk of committing the same error because her inference was still not based upon any perception of the suspect’s route.  Whether the evidence supported an inference as to the suspect’s path of travel was not the detective’s determination to make – that role is reserved for the jury.  Watson, 2023 WL 4918557, at *23.  Because the State’s case contained crucial omissions, this inadmissible narration testimony that outlined the shooter’s route based on nothing more than inferences and conjecture was highly prejudicial.  As discussed, the State needed to establish a link between the shooter and the Chevy, and needed to identify [...] as the shooter.  The path-of-travel testimony was a core part of establishing those links because it purported to show that the Chevy traveled from [...]’s home to the area where the victim was found, and because it was the only detail that made the cellphone expert opinion testimony relevant.  The cellphone expert purportedly showed that a cellphone which [...] had used was “sequencing Northbound and then back to the Jersey city area” on the evening of the shooting.  (3T168-5 to 8)  This conclusion would only be relevant if the jury believed that the shooter was traveling in a direction consistent with the path charted by the expert, making the detective’s testimony as to the suspect’s route a crucial component of the State’s case.  But without any firsthand knowledge, the detective’s belief as to the path-of-travel was based only upon an inference she drew from other facts in evidence.  Such an inference is prohibited under Watson, and its improper admission amounted to plain error, requiring reversal.
[brief] “The failure to give such a charge or to give an adequate charge is most often reversible error,” even “absent a specific request. ”  *Id.* at 560-61 (emphasis added on the presumption in favor of reversal).  See also *Sanchez-Medina*, 231 N.J. at 455 (even though no party requested an instruction on evaluating identification evidence, the failure to “instruct the jury on the subject” required reversal); *State v. Pierce*, 330 N.J. Super. 479, 482, 487 (App. Div. 2000) (even though “there was no specific request to charge on the issue of identification and no objection to the instruction to the jury on that issue,” the “inadequacy of the jury instruction as to identification” required reversal); *State v. Frey*, 194 N.J. Super. 326, 329-30 (App. Div. 1984) (“Notwithstanding the failure of defense counsel to request an instruction on identification,” it “was the trial judge’s responsibility to instruct the jury,” and the “instruction … fell far short of properly advising the jury on how to decide such a crucial issue,” “requir[ing] reversal”).