ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **A.  The [...]’s Affordable Housing Obligation**  On June 18, 2018, the Borough, and [...] (“[...]”) entered into a settlement agreement (the “[...] Settlement Agreement”) to address the Borough’s outstanding and non-conforming affordable housing obligations.  Pa327.  On July 24, 2018, the trial court approved the [...] Settlement Agreement.  Pa343.  Pursuant to the terms of the [...] Settlement Agreement, the Borough, on February 26, 2019, adopted Ordinance No. 19-05, which mandated a set-aside of fifteen percent (15%) for affordable rental units on any multifamily residential development of five (5) dwelling units or more.  Pa351.  Simultaneously with Ordinance No. 19-05, the Borough adopted Ordinance No. 19-02, which specifically mandated that for any new construction in the Borough, such construction must contain one-, two-, and three-bedroom housing units to comply with the Borough’s overlay zone.  Pa358.  B.  The Property and the Borough’s “B-3 Zone”
[directive] 2A:162-20(c)(2)  N.J.S.A. other state."  any or of this law the pretrial justify might circumstance this risk. of  Because indicator an as circumstance case-specific this of importance acomplaint-warrant.  issuing for basis a establishes clearly it law, Reform Bail the under detention 39  Page on based be shall fingerprinting following Scan Live process risk-assessment pretrial automated the officer an re-assign to need the (e.g., department delay the by the on placed burdens administrative the the custody, in held defendant the station monitor the to in stay patrol/call-for-service to duties from be shall subsection Nothing this in patrol etc.). duty, return to officer to arresting for the need other or judge a to presented not is the defendant the that extent delay authorize to to construed 3:4-1.
[brief] Id. at 134.  This Court explained that the booking room video was particularly relevant because the sole basis for the conviction was the testimony of the arresting officer.  “The recording may have conclusively established defendant's guilt if the officer was truthful, but it may have conclusively exonerated defendant if the officer was not. ”  *State v. Richardson*, 452 N.J. Super. 124, 142 (App. Div. 2017).  [...] was entitled to the adverse inference because [...] was the experienced officer, who administered the HGN test, knew the scoring factors for all the standardized tests, was present for the administration of all the tests, and was present in the court house at the time of the suppression hearing and trial.  (Da16; 2T12:5-13:11; 2T60:16-61:1.)  The trial court here erred as a matter of law by relying on *Hill* where the Court’s concern was the exact opposite of the facts at bar – in this case, a criminal defendant sought the benefit of the inference because the State, who has the burden of proof, did not call the witness with the superior knowledge.  [...] was prejudiced because the only witness who testified provided a lay opinion without foundation given [...] conceded he knew there were scoring factors for standardized field sobriety tests but he did not know what those factors were and thus, did not use them.  (2T11:3-12:1; 1T63:24-65:3.)  This testimony was prejudicial on its face but even more so because the party with superior knowledge was not called.  POINT FOUR
[brief] AN ORDINANCE OF THE [...], [...], AND STATE OF NEW JERSEY  AMENDING  CHAPTER 230  “LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS” AND CHAPTER 169  “FEE SCHEDULE” OF THE CODE OF THE [...], NEW JERSEY  WHEREAS, the Township Code currently sets forth standards, requirements and fees related to development throughout the Township; and WHEREAS, a review of the Township Code related to these standards, requirements and fees by the [...] has revealed certain deficiencies and changes that must be addressed; and WHEREAS, the [...] has recommended certain amendments to the Code in order to address these matters; and WHEREAS, the [...] has reviewed the proposed changes to the Code and recommends acceptance of the proposed changes.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(a).  The [...] argued that TMDLs should categorically not be addressed here,\(^2\) as “the Project may require an NJPDES permit during construction” and “post-construction, depending on the nature of the activities on site .  . . .”  [...] Rb42.  Compliance with potential NJPDES permits during and after construction of the project does not satisfy the requirement to determine if the project is consistent with the Areawide WQM Plan before the project is built.
[brief] 48a-49a.  Here [...] contends that, through its agent, [...], [...] interfered with its own contract with [...] by not returning the payment [...] had made.  Count IX-Punitive damages, 49a-50a.  Here [...] asserts that [...]’s complained of conduct was actuated by malice and with wanton and willful disregard of the persons who would be harmed by it.  Count X-Indemnification.
[brief] Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r. of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 316 (2019) (“Whether a contractual arbitration provision is enforceable is a question of law,” accordingly we need not defer to the trial court's "interpretative analysis" unless it is “persuasive. ”).  Here, Section F of the Policy provides that disputes between the parties “may” be submitted to arbitration.  Da376-77.  [...]’s decision to incorporate this permissive language into the clause of its pre-printed Policy form is significant.  The word “may” is not compulsory and does not require arbitration of disputes, as is commonly found in other similar provisions.
[brief] ’”  Given that Exemption #11 is an exemption from the Highlands Act – a comprehensive legislative policy designed to protect environmental interests – this well settled legal principle clearly applies here.  Yet, Environmental Appellants note, [...] in the 2013 case of Highlands Applicability took the position that “[t]he Legislature intended the word ‘routine’ to [only] modify the words ‘maintenance and operations’ because this clause is separated from the rest of the list by a comma.
[directive] Maintain housing if if treatment, applicable Address any recommended medical/dental needs, needed in Engage with Cooperate supervision  Demonstrate changing people, places, things and treatment Review plan  Maintain recovery groups establish recovery network per and case as if other  Every week office visits Follow financial plan indicated per plan case  Every other month home visits Address life skills Random drug tests  Establish pro-social activities {minimum 2x/week) * I  90 Minimum Days  Phase 4
[brief] 1a.  The caption of the original tax foreclosure complaint was *[...] v. [...] and [...], spouse of [...]*, Docket No. [...].  1a.  Paragraph 11 of the Foreclosure Complaint states as follows:  “On June 30, 2021, the Plaintiff served written notice, by certified and regular mail with postage prepaid thereon, of Plaintiff’s intention to file the within Complaint, which notice included the amount due on the tax lien or liens to be foreclosed herein as of the date of the note, to the last known addresses of the owner of record and all parties entitled to redeem in accordance with N.J.S.A. 54:5-97.1 and 54:5-54, as amended. ”  Id.  Contrary to the representation in the Foreclosure Complaint, this Notice was never served upon Defendants.  3a.
[brief] In rejecting what seems to have been a previously unrejected body of case law, the Law Division addressed none of the cases cited to it.  Ultimately, the Law Division held that its interpretation of the language, allowing Appellant to file claims in the Law Division should Respondent, alleviated any concern of substantive conscionability.  In so ruling, the Law Division declined to address Appellant’s point that, under the interpretation, Respondent could drag Appellant all the way to the point that an arbitrator’s decision was imminent, and then “veto” that proceeding when Respondent formed the opinion that the arbitration outcome would be adverse, forcing Appellant to start all over again in the Law Division.
[brief] JUDGMENT  SINCE THERE WERE NO MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE AS TO PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AND PLAINTIFF DID NOT ESTABLISH ANY MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE NOR THE NEED FOR DISCOVERY AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT.  | 9 | | A.  The Material Facts Were Not In Dispute | 10 | | B.  The Proposed Counterstatements Of Facts Were Not Supported By The Record And/or Were Not Material.  | 11 | | C.  There Was No Need For Discovery | 13 | | POINT II | 16 | | DEFENDANTS DID NOT OBfuscATE THE FACTS AND LAW REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS | 16 | | POINT III | 19 | | THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT DEFENDANT [...] DID NOT HAVE A DISQUALIFYING CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE VOTE ON THE BOND ORDINANCE.  | 19 | | POINT IV | 25 | | THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE ANY ERRORS IN DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER, VACATE, AMEND AND/OR ALTER THE ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT | 25 | | POINT V | 29 | THE DOCTRINE OF MOOTNESS  FIRST ARGUED BY PLAINTIFF AT ORAL ARGUMENT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT DID NOT DICTATE A DIFFERENT RESULT ON RECONSIDERATION.................................................................29  POINT VI.........................................................................................................................30  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT PROVIDE A BASIS TO VACATE, ALTER AND/OR AMEND THE ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT AND IT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO DO SO UNDER EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL PRINCIPLES.
[brief] Also[,] please make sure the insurance is in place before we start any work. ”  (TRVa1491 and TRVa2783.)  Moreover, based on [...]’s request to revise the prior proposal, [...] provided [...] with a third proposal, No. 107127 (“Proposal Three”), dated August 5, 2015, which replaced Proposal Two and reverts back to the details of Proposal One (i.e., adding back insurance costs due to [...]’s CCIP unenrollment).
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...] IND. NO. [...] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.  CRIMINAL ACTION On Appeal From A Judgment Of Conviction Of The Superior Court of New Jersey, Criminal Division, Ocean Vicinage  Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J.Cr. Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a Jury
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS ---  \(^1\)  There are 7 Transcripts relevant to this brief: 1T – 9/16/22; 2T – 11/29/22; 3T – 11/30/22; 4T – 12/1/22; 5T – 12/2/22; 6T – 12/5/22; 7T – 12/6/22.  Plaintiff, [...] (“[...]”) was a party in litigation entitled Sollecito v. [...] bearing docket number [...] in Superior Court Monmouth County, NJ.  (Pa1).  [...] asked Defendant, the [...], (“[...]”) and specifically its managing partner, [...] to represent him in that matter.  (Pa1-2)  [...] paid a retainer of $50,000 to [...] and signed the retainer agreement.  (Pa2).  [...] did not honor its own retainer agreement and did not provide any invoices to [...] for several months (Pa2).  When [...] finally did send [...] an invoice, it showed excessive and unreasonable billing.  (Pa2).  The bill was substantially inflated and contained numerous instances of “Double billing” (Pa2).  [...] refused to pay the inflated bill and [...] ceased work on behalf of [...] in the Sollecito matter.  (Pa2-3).  [...] filed suit alleging damages resulting from the above (Pa3-4).  [...] denied the allegations and filed a counterclaim for the unpaid invoices (Pa7-22).  During Discovery, Expert Reports are Exchanged
[brief] Despite the extended period of time between the issuance of both parties’ expert reports in 2019 and 2020, the defense was provided with only a week and few days to consult with Defendant’s own expert witness in order to rebut the late-submitted expert opinion of [...].  Given the impact of geo-time analysis evidence and the complexity of that issue, Defendant was most assuredly prejudiced by the rushed manner in which his own expert had to be consulted and formulate a responsive opinion.  On a substantive level, [...]’s testimony should have been disallowed as a result of the expert’s own acknowledgement that the data supplied by the cell phone carrier was admittedly incomplete and unverifiable.
[brief] II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On December 27, 2022, Plaintiffs filed an action against Defendant [...]  (“[...]”)¹, Defendant [...] (the Brackins’ older son, and driver of the vehicle in question), and certain John Does in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County.  (Pa 1-11).  Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on January 12, 2023 to fix a typographical error as to party names.  (Pa 12-20).  The Amended Complaint asserted a cause of action for survivorship and wrongful death against Defendant Brackin.  Id.  As to [...], the Amended Complaint sought a declaration as to coverage under the excess liability coverage part, and the excess UIM coverage part of the [...] Excess Policy.  Id.  On February 9, 2023, Defendant [...] moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint with prejudice pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e).  On March 15, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their opposition.  On March 27, 2023, [...] filed its reply.  Oral argument on the motion to dismiss was held before [...] on March 31, 2023.  (1T).  Judge Hurd issued his oral decision granting [...]’s motion to dismiss with prejudice on May 3, 2023.  (2T).  An Order memorializing the decision was also entered on May 3, 2023.  (Pa 22).  Judge ¹  The policy at issue in this matter was issued by “[...]” and not the named defendant, [...]  [...] reserves the right to assert that Appellants sued the wrong entity.  Hurd held that coverage is barred under the excess liability coverage part of the [...] Excess Policy pursuant to the plain meaning of the Injury to an Insured exclusion, and that coverage is barred under the excess UIM coverage part because the vehicle at issue is not an “underinsured motor vehicle. ”  On December 27, 2023, over six months after the lower court’s decision, Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss their complaint against Defendant Brackin without prejudice.  [...] filed its opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion on January 11, 2024.  Plaintiffs filed a reply on January 11, 2024.  On January 18, 2024, the Superior Court entered an order granting Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss Defendant Brackin without prejudice.  (Pa 24-25).  This appeal followed.  III.
[brief] [Aa055-56]  •  In applying these criteria, [the arbitrator] appropriately considered the City’s financial condition as testified to by the City’s CFO, which includes the City’s receipt of Transitional Aid.  [Aa056]  •  As to internal comparability, the arbitrator considered the 2% salary increase received by the City’s non-uniformed units and the greater than 2.9% salary increases received in the PFA [firefighters] unit’s 2022 MOA.
[brief] As per the [...]’s Request for Expression of Interest for Order for Professional Services T3512, the Consultants, [...] and [...] would be responsible for “provid[ing] services which will include, but not be limited to, inspecting all work to ensure that it is done in compliance with the Contract Plans and Specifications, inspecting all construction materials to be used at the site to ensure compliance with the Contract Plans and Specifications. ”  Pa1800.  In addition, the Consultant was to provide a “Resident Engineer for each contract during all periods of construction activity to perform construction inspection and administrative services for cost control and quality control. ”  Pa1801.  [...] did not require that a resident engineer be a licensed engineer.
[brief] This appeal involves the condemnation of a dilapidated shopping center and its surrounding vacant land (the “Property”) purchased by Defendants/Appellants [...] and [...] (the “[...]”) in [...] for $2,475,000 in August of 1988.  Although condemnation cases are guided by the principles of “just compensation,” the [...] sought a government-funded windfall in demanding $4,295,000 for the Property under a January 27, 1994 date of valuation.  The [...] unsuccessfully asked the Arbitrator to believe that the value of the Property increased by 175% in a mere 5.5 years, when the economy was still recovering from the stock market crash of 1987, in a rural town with depressed demographics, for a deteriorating property which had been declared in need of redevelopment.  Having failed to convince the Arbitrator that a binding, long-term lease on the Property should be disregarded, the [...] now appeal to this Court for a second bite at the proverbial apple.
[brief] xiii.  Improper Division Adjudication was Prejudicial and Harassment under Rule 3.6(A).  [IT]  In addition, Plaintiff argues that the improper division adjudication infringed on right to meaningful access to the courts, procedural and substantive due process, and equal protection under the law.  "The Court is not inclined to address the merits of Plaintiffs' allegations regarding any breach of fiduciary duty by Defendant as Trustee of the Trusts because, as Defendant's motion illustrates, Plaintiffs seek relief in an improper division and an improper venue.  This matter properly belongs in the Chancery Division, Probate Part of the appropriate vicinage."  Cestone v. Cestone DOCKET No. [...] (Ch. Div. May. 14, 2019)
[brief] All of this information is spelled out in the Statement of Facts attributed primarily to [...].  Similarly, as the C2 Bulk Variance, [...] testified that there was no detriment and the benefits of the deviation substantially outweighed any detriment.  Clearly, the evidence and the testimony reveal that this project proposed a zoning alternative to the existing vacant dirt parking lot.  A portion of the application regarding height is bolstered by unique proximity that this property has to the boardwalk which elevated and contains structures that are elevated above the street level.  Here, efforts were made to avoid the bulk of a singular large structure on this corner property.  Instead, three structures were built with the intention of creating access and parking for the future owners, but also allowing open space for views, light and air through the corridor separating the buildings.  [...] identified a number of bases to permit the height variance in this matter.  **DENSITY**
[brief] ”  Macdougall, 144 N.J. at 392.  Indeed, An employer remains free to terminate an at-will employee who engages in grousing or complaining about matters falling short of a “clear mandate of public policy” or who otherwise interferes with the ordinary operation of the workplace by expressions of personal views on matters of no real substance.  Baseless complaints or expressions of purely personal views about the meaning of public policies will not meet the test for a “clear mandate” regardless of the manner or mode in which they are voiced.  Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc., 197 N.J. 81, 109 (2008)  Therefore, “[i]f an employee does not point to a clear expression of public policy, the court can grant a motion to dismiss. ”  Pierce, 84 N.J. at 73.  Here, Plaintiff alleges that “[d]uring the course of her employment, Plaintiff reported and complained about Defendants’ unlawful behavior,” Defendants terminated her as the result of her protestations, and that “[t]he acts of Defendants constitute a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
[brief] (22T:4-13 to 4-19); Da27-29.  Following the denial of his post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal and/or a new trial, see (23T:23-14 to 42-2), defendant appeared before [...] for sentencing on November 5, 2021.  (24T).  After evaluating all applicable aggravating and mitigating factors, see (24T:19-24 to 42-4; 43-14 to 46-25), [...] sentenced defendant to an aggregate custodial terms of 10 years New Jersey State Prison, subject to 42 months of parole ineligibility, along with all mandatory fines and penalties.  (24T:42-10 to 43-12; 25T:4-10 to 5-17); Da30-33.
[brief] (8T153-18 to 154-8; Pa1 to 15).  This transformation was not a net opinion, but rather a recreation based on specific facts that were in evidence.  Indeed, there are only a few comments in the entirety of [...]’s testimony to which defendant objects.  First, defendant claims it was improper for [...] to state, “three of the devices are located in the general area of [the map] that’s been marked ‘crime scene. ’” (8T161-24 to 162-3).  But, as previously stated, the data essentially spoke for itself: the cell phone towers that were utilized by three of the phones around the time of the crime were located a few blocks away from where the murder occurred.  Moreover, as [...] then testified, slide nine of his PowerPoint presentation contained the locations of the cell towers utilizing the data provided by the cellular providers, but did not represent coverage.  (8T164-13 to 165-1; Pa9).  It also did not represent specifically where the cell phones making the calls were located.  Indeed, nearly all of the Detective Sergeant’s slides indicate that the graphics do not represent coverage area.  Thus, [...]’s testimony was proper and defendant’s claim is without merit.
[brief] | | | In re County of Atlantic, | 18 | | 230 N.J. 237 (2017)  | | | JPC Merger Sub LLC v. Tricon Enterprises, Inc., | 18, 19 | | 474 N.J. Super. 145 | | M.J. Pacquet, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 171 N.J. 375 (2002)  ..................................................................................................................18  Martindale v. Sandvik, 173 N.J. 76 (2002)  ..........................................................................................................................15  Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cantone Research, Inc., 427 N.J. Super. 45 (App. Div. 2012)  .........................................................................................10  Moore v. Woman to Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, L.L.C., 416 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 2010)  ............................................................................................19  Oscar v. Simeonidis, 352 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div. 2002)  ..........................................................................................15  Rahway Hosp. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey, 374 N.J. Super. 101 (App. Div. 2005)  .........................................................................................11, 12  Satellite Entertainment Center, Inc. v. Keaton, 347 N.J. Super. 268 (App. Div. 2002)  .........................................................................................14  Shebar v. Sanyo Business Systems Corp., 111 N.J. 276 (1988)  ......................................................................................................................15  Sipko v. Koger, Inc., 214 N.J. 364 (2013)  .......................................................................................................................15  Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 352 N.J. Super. 555 (Ch. Div. 2002)  ............................................................................................19  Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., LLC, 203 N.J. 286 ...................................................................................................................................19  Vasquez v. Glassboro Service Ass’n, Inc., 83 N.J. 86 (1980)  ..........................................................................................................................21  Washington Const. Co. v. Spinella, 8 N.J. 212 (1951)  .........................................................................................................................11, 14, 18  Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427 (1992) .................................................................12  West Caldwell v. Caldwell, 26 N.J. 9 (1958) ........................................................................12  Other Authorities