ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] It is improper for an attorney to interject personal assertions or opinions while interrogating witnesses.  *Morales-Hurtado v. Reinoso*, 457 N.J. Super. 170 (App. Div. 2018).  Not only did Plaintiff’s counsel engage in this behavior during her examination of witnesses, she repeated it during summation.  Counsel’s comments regarding Appellants had no basis in law, were inflammatory and clearly an attack their character meant to influence the jury.  They have no place in proper summation or commentary on the evidence or credibility of testimony.  *Rodd v. Raritan Radiologic Associates, P.A.*, 373 N.J. Super. 154 (App. Div. 2004).  Specific comments made by counsel during summation include:  This has nothing to do with a municipal alliance grant and everything to do with the hostile, abusive work environment based on her religion, her disability, and [Defendants] just overall being bad people.  (7T:80:18-23).  I asked [...], as cocky as she is… (7T:75:16).  [Defendant] [...], she just can’t help herself, she didn’t like him either… (7T:81:11-13).  The conduct of Plaintiff’s counsel “encourage[d] the jury to depart from neutrality and to decide the case on…bias rather than on the evidence. ”  *Geler v. Akawie*, 358 N.J. Super. 437, 464-65 (2003)(citing *Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co.*, 684 F.2d 1226, 1246 (7th Cir.1982), aff’d on other grounds, (1984).  The summation given by Plaintiff’s counsel in this case charged past the boundaries of the broad latitude otherwise afforded to counsel.  Her comments were so prejudicial that they constituted a miscarriage of justice under the law and were clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  Accordingly, this court should remand this matter to the trial court for a new trial.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] On December 26, 2008, [...] transferred $2 million out of [...]’s [...] checking account to his own personal account, and debited the [...] stockholder’s loan account by that amount, purportedly to cover this acquisition.  (26T 8:6 to 9:8; 28T 114:18 to 115:6; 115:12-22; 34T 76:8 to 77:7).  This diversion of funds resulted in a negative balance in the stockholder’s loan account.
[brief] (Rb32-33.)  That is not true.  The notes from [...]’ interview with Defendant [...] read:  [...] asked [...] if they could get charge pay.  [...] saw another Coordinator was getting charge pay ([...] in Cath Lab).  [...] said, "yeah, we can try it if I don’t get in trouble."  It was not a sit-down conversation.  [...] assumed [...] was not in trouble because she did not say anything.  So, [...] thought they were ok.  (Pa547.)  These notes are consistent with [...]’ assertion that Defendant [...], according to her, approved the charge pay.  Defendants’ version of events collapses if Defendant [...] was aware of the charge pay.
[brief] But Neuwirth was not only technically binding upon the trial court, it was also correctly decided in accordance with an extensive line of cases in New Jersey and in federal courts confirming that defamation cases may be dismissed at the pleading stage for failure to allege actual malice.  Neuwirth involved defamation claims brought by a Department of Health employee who claimed he was fired from his position in retaliation for reporting an ethics violation by Governor [...]’s chief of staff.
[brief] DESIGNATIONS | ii | | TABLE OF CONTENTS - APPENDIX | iii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | xviii| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 3 | |  **POINT I:**  [...]’S ARGUMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS AND INFERENCES IN ITS FAVOR IS CONTRARY TO THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW.  | 3 | |  **POINT II:**  NO AOM WAS REQUIRED BECAUSE LIABILITY IS NOT BASED ON THE NEGLIGENCE OF A LICENSED PERSON IN THE COURSE OF THEIR PROFESSION.  | 8 | | **POINT III:**  [...] CANNOT AVOID ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO PLAINTIFF FOR WORK SITE SAFETY BY BLAMING [...] AND [...].  | 11 | | **POINT IV:**  [...] AND [...] CONFLATE THE PLEADING REQUIREMENT OF AN AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT WITH THE PROOF REQUIREMENT OF A TRIAL ON THE MERITS.  | 14 | | CONCLUSION | 15
[brief] Even on the merits, however, the State’s standing argument must fail.  The State asserts that “[a]lthough defendant had automatic standing to challenge the gun’s seizure by virtue of being charged with a possessory offense,” he did not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in [...]’s apartment and therefore cannot challenge the search.  (Sb 19-20)  This argument simply has no basis in New Jersey law.  As our Supreme Court has held, again and again, “[w]henever a defendant ‘is charged with committing a possessory . . . offense -- as in this case -- standing is automatic, unless the State can show that the property was abandoned or the accused was a trespasser.
[brief] (Volume II Pa.328; [...] Dep attached to the Certification of [...] as Exhibit I, TR 34-11 to 23).  Neither [...] nor Ms. [...] could identify a single instance in which the lateness of [...]’s charts caused an insurance payment to be delayed or denied.  (Volume 2, Pa. 299; Mcv Deposition, TR 40-21 to 25; Volume 2 Pa. 331; [...] Deposition TR 47-12 to 22).  [...], the regulatory body with authority over [...] never issued a fine or penalty because [...]’s charts were late.(Volume 2, Pa. 299;[...] Deposition, TR 38-22 to 39-18).
[brief] N.J.A.C. 11:3-4.3 outlines that “[p]ersonal injury protection coverage shall provide reimbursement for all medically necessary expenses for the diagnosis and treatment of injuries sustained from a covered automobile accident…” (emphasis added).  Defendant/Respondent maintains that since the injuries Plaintiff/Appellant sustained were not due to an “automobile accident,” she is not entitled to recovery of PIP benefits.  The accident that caused Plaintiff/Appellant’s injuries was an accidental spill due to the negligence of the [...] employee.  The nature of that accident is separate and apart from the automobile.  This is an accident that happened while Plaintiff/Appellant was seated in an automobile, not an automobile accident.  The relationship between the alleged injury and an automobile is described in terms of legal causation and requires a substantial nexus between the injury and a qualifying vehicle.  See e.g. Morgan v. Prudential, 242 N.J. Super. 638 (App. Div.), certif. den. 122 N.J. 370 (1990).  For these benefits to be recoverable no-fault benefits, the burden is upon the claimant to show that the treatment is linked to an injury suffered as a result of the claimant’s occupation of an automobile.  There must be some nexus between the subject automobile and injury for treatment of same to be recoverable PIP benefits.  The mere fact that Plaintiff was seated within the vehicle at the time of the accident is insufficient to create a basis for coverage.  In Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Companies, 126 N.J. Super. 29; 312 A.2d 664 (App. Div, 1973), these terms and their impact.  The automobile insurance carriers maintain that the motor vehicle in this case was simply the situs of an accident which could have occurred anywhere.
[brief] When the Plaintiffs constructed the driveways the building inspector found them in violation of the zoning ordinances.  The Appellate Division found that the driveways, since they were a means of access to the trailer park, were an expansion of the pre-existing nonconforming use and required a variance.  *Id.* at 198-99.  Similarly, in *Wolf v. Zoning Board of Adjustment*, 79 N.J. Super. 546, 549 (App. Div. 1963), a restaurant sought to pave a portion of its lot, which was zoned as residential and on which a restaurant existed as a pre-existing, nonconforming use.  The court found the parking lot was to be "used as a means of access to, or for the parking of vehicles of patrons of, a business, is in a use accessorial to the business and thus is itself in legal contemplation being used for the business purpose in question."  *Id.* at 550-51.  As the land being paved was previously not used for parking, a variance was required by the court.  *Id.* at 551.  The instant case is the same.
[brief] I think they are similar for legal services for the type of attorneys and the work that is involved here.  The results that have been obtained I think have also shown itself.  Time limitations, the nature and likely professional relationship.  And we are going back to 2007 when you experienced -- even though this fee application is not for the entire time -- and the experience, reputation, ability of the lawyers which I think nobody is disputing that.  And then when we apply the lodestar, the hourly rates, Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 at 337.
[brief] alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  *Ruccolo v. Ardsley W. Cmty. Ass’n, Inc.*, 2024 N.J.  Super. Unpub. LEXIS 518, *19 (App. Div. Mar. 28, 2024).  In conducting its review, the Court must keep in mind that “an issue of fact is genuine only if considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier fact.
[brief] \textsuperscript{86}  The TCA’s tort related notice provisions are designed to “compel a claimant to expose his intention and information early in the process in order to permit the public entity to undertake an investigation while witnesses are available and the \textsuperscript{84}  See Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 580 (1985).  \textsuperscript{85}  International Minerals & Mining Corp. v. Citicorp N. Am., Inc., 736 F. Supp. 587, 597 (D.N.J. 1990).  See also Alloway v. Gen. Marine Indus., L.P., 149 N.J. 620 (1997); Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 116 N.J. 517, 535 (1989) (a title company’s liability is limited to the policy and isn’t liable for negligence unless the company engaged in conduct beyond the policy).  \textsuperscript{86}  See Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434 (1965)(passenger injured in a defective truck leased by a third party); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358 (1960)(personal injury claim against automobile manufacturer in the absence of privity between injured party and manufacturer); Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc., 64 N.J. 260 (1974)(personal injury claim against tire manufacturer in the absence of privity between injured party and manufacturer).  facts are fresh.
[brief] In determining whether a party has waived arbitration, there should be no reason or legal basis to treat an express act or statement of waiver differently than an implied waiver based on a party’s litigation conduct.  Absent a writing or filed order, an express verbal waiver should not carry any more or less legal significance than an implied waiver.  As such, the express nature of a waiver does not override the relevance and import to be given to the factors assessing waiver pursuant to Cole.  Indeed, the Trial Court’s deliberate application of the Cole framework to the facts of this matter inherently acknowledged that, on balance, the circumstances here do not amount to a finding of waiver.  Defendants contend that a verbal waiver, without more, does not negate or override the magnitude of each factor under Cole, which here, undisputedly weighs against a finding of waiver of Defendants’ right to arbitrate.
[brief] See Duignan v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 223 N.J. Super. 208, 216 (App. Div. 1988) (same); Hillman v. Bd. Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 109 N.J. Super. 449, 455 (App. Div. 1970) (same).  Francois v. Board of Trustees, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 349.  A person that is eligible for certain pension benefits is entitled to a liberal interpretation of the pension statute.  The determination below is unreasonable because [...] would otherwise be eligible for accidental disability benefits under the Ricci Act.
[brief] “‘There is no requirement that the Government obtains a warrant at the first moment probable cause exists … [t]he touchstone for determining the constitutionality of warrantless searches is one of reasonableness under the circumstances. ’”  State v. Foreshaw, 245 N.J. Super. 166, 173 (App. Div.) (quoting State v. Bell, 195 N.J. Super. 49, 55 App. Div. 1984), certif. denied, 126 N.J. 337 (1991).  In defendant's case, the police did not have probable cause to arrest him until they saw him take possession of the duffel bags.  Furthermore, the police did not know whether defendant would actually take possession of these duffel bags until defendant arrived on the scene an hour later than he had arranged with [...].  Lastly, the police did not have defendant's street address or apartment number at the large [...] apartment complex.  Despite no definitive record of who had Mirandized defendant, [...] found that Miranda warnings were not necessary prior to receiving defendant's consent to enter and subsequently search defendant's apartment.  (Da25).  [...] ruled that the interests involved in Miranda, to be free from self-incrimination, were fundamentally distinct from the interest of being free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
[brief] National Research Council, The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring Causes And Consequences 139 (2014)  .......................49  National Research Council, The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring Causes And Consequences, (2014)  ..................................49  President’s Council of Advisors on Sci. & Tech., Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods 101 (2016)  ..................................................................................................................12  [...] et al., Accuracy and Reproducibility of Conclusions by Forensic Bloodstain Pattern Analysts, 325 Forensic Sci. Int. 1 (2021)  ....17  Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules (May 15, 2022)  ..........12  [...], More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 985 (2005)  ............13  [...] and [...], Age and the Explanation of Crime, 89 Am. J. Soc. 552 (1983)  ..............................................................49  [...], Substantive Criminal Law § 15.2(b) (3d ed. 2021)  .............33  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] *11  As to the proper relief to award, sanctions must be tailored to address the harm identified.  Republic of Phillippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir.1995); In re Neurontin Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1479, 2011 WL 2357793, at *9 (D.N.J. June 9, 2011).  For the reasons discussed herein, the Court does not find the more drastic forms of relief authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i-vii) to be appropriate.  Defendant did not act in bad faith and any prejudice to plaintiff has been cured.
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE DO NOT REQUIRE AN ENLARGEMENT OF THE FORTY-FIVE DAY APPEAL PERIOD.  (Pa55 – Pa58).  The deadline to file a prerogative writ action is fixed at forty-five days to “give an essential measure of repose to actions taken against public bodies,” Harrison Redev. Agency v. DeRose, 398 N.J. Super. 361, 401 (App. Div. 2008), and to “encourage parties not to rest on their rights. ”  Rocky Hill Citizens for Responsible Growth v. Planning Bd. of Borough of Rocky Hill, 406 N.J. Super. 384, 398 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Horsnall v. Washington Twp. Fire Div., 405 N.J. Super. 304, 313 (App. Div. 2009)).  Recognizing it missed its deadline, [...] attempts to enlarge the permitted forty-five day appeal period, arguing “it is manifest that the interest of justice” requires such an extension under R. 4:69-6(c).  (Pb10).  Although notice once in the official newspaper of the municipality or a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality. ” the law permits this exception to the forty-five day appeal period, application is very narrow.  Reflecting this narrow scope, courts have generally cabined the exception’s application to circumstances involving “important and novel constitutional questions,” “important public rather than private interests which require adjudication or clarification,” or “a continuing violation of public rights. ”  In re Ordinance 2354-12 of West Orange, Essex Cnty. v. Twp. of West Orange, 223 N.J. 589, 601 (2015) (citing Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135, 152 (2001), and quoting in part Reilly v. Brice, 109 N.J. 555, 559 (2018)).  [...] argues unpersuasively its challenge falls within the line of cases discussing “important public rather than private interests which require adjudication or clarification. ” (Pb12 – Pb23).  [...]’s suggestions to apply that exception ignore the law established by this court in Rocky Hill Citizens for Responsible Growth v. Planning Bd. of Borough of Rocky Hill, 406 N.J. Super. 384, 398 (App. Div. 2009).  Rocky Hill sets forth the controlling law on what type of “public interest” is contemplated under this limited exception.  In this matter, the trial court correctly applied Rocky Hill and rejected [...]’s assertion this matter is analogous to Willoughby v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of Deptford, 306 N.J. Super. 266 (App. Div. 1997).  The court held [...]’s private interest “is not the type of interest contemplated under the limitation’s exception. ” (Pa57).  On appeal of this ruling, [...] maintains this case is more analogous to Willoughby, and now claims even if Rocky Hill controls, this case implicates the public interest, as set forth therein.  For the reasons set forth in detail below, the trial court correctly rejected these arguments and that Order should be affirmed.  A.
[brief] *Chicago v. Sturges*, 222 U.S. 313, 322, 32 S.Ct. 92, 93 (1911).  As noted in *Marron v. United States*, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927), "The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.  As to what [or who] is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant."  (Emphasis added).  There are three separate but interrelated issues involved in the particularity requirement: first, the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched; second, it must particularly describe the thing(s) to be seized; and third, where applicable, it must also particularly describe the person to be searched or seized.
[directive] ~ecified agency shall access, of law enforcement officer or civilian employee a law enforcement No an official purpose as recording except for otherwise use a BWC disseminate, or view, copy, permitted only:  BWC recording is use of a stored in this section.  Access to and specified prosecution; investigation or of criminal and in furtherance a a) when relevant to investigation; internal affairs in furtherance of an when relevant to and b) identify management review process to furtherance of a when to and in c) relevant existence misconduct or to determine the police circumstances indicating possible of misconduct; pattern or practice possible of a own preparing his or her recording in BWC made the assist the officer whose d) to 10.2; in section restrictions established report, subject to the police of the actions as part review of an officer's supervisor's when relevant to a e) the agency; supervisory process authorized by demonstrate an officer to complaint against civilian intends to file a show to a who ~ to person make an informed encounter so that the can during the what actually occurred complaint; decision whether to file the prosecutions pursuant to the obligations in discovery comply with the State's g) to of Rules Court; person or over recording to a obligation to turn the with any other legal comply h) to entity;5 entity, non-law enforcement civilian or a recording to a or disseminate the i) to show 5 or Records Act pursuant the Open Public order, or request to or a responding to a subpoena court When providing only after paragraph is permitted recording under this of BWC know, disclosure a common law right to pursuant or designee, Division of Criminal Justice Director of the Prosecutor or designee, or the County to the notice 11 of this Directive. section to 21 Page Prosecutor or designee, or the where County it or public, disseminate the to to disclosure designee, that Criminal determines or of Justice Director Division the of warranted the because or is public person the that particular to entity in interest enforcement law the outweighs for need person's/entity's/public's access maintaining confidentiality; of identity the recording that so edited is the purposes, for that provided training j) the viewing persons by determined recording be cannot in depicted individuals the recording being the to consented have individuals training the unless depicted video purposes; for training used a and department's Directive this with compliance an ensure k) conduct to audit to this to pursuant promulgated order or directive, operating procedure, standing policy, Directive; in information providing intelligence by safety officer public enhance and 1) to the about information providing (~, execution by araid/warrant for preparation County the by approved is use such when searched), be to premises a of layout or Justice Division Criminal of the of Director the or Prosecutor or designee, or designee; or or Prosecutor designee, County the official where purpose other any specified m) writing good in that designee, or finds Criminal Justice Division of of Director the recording.
[brief] Da63-Da64.  Section IV of the Public Health Nuisance Code of 1953, sets forth the provision on Prohibition of Certain Noises or Sounds:  It shall be unlawful for any person to make, cause or suffer or permit to be made or caused upon any premises owned, occupied or controlled by him or it, or upon any public street, alley or thoroughfare in this municipality, any unnecessary noises or sounds by means of the human voice, or by any other means or methods which are physically annoying to person, or which are so harsh, or so prolonged or unnatural, or unusual in their use, time and place as to occasion physical discomfort, or which are injurious to the lives, health, peace and comfort of the inhabitants of this municipality or any number thereof.  §IV, 4.1 Prohibition of Certain Noises or Sounds.  Da97.  The Public Health Nuisance Code Of New Jersey (1953) is preceded by a preface specifically setting forth the recommendation that the Code be adopted in full and that “[t]his Public Health Nuisance Code is a general code. ”  Da96.  Further the preface states, “[s]pecific codes may prove more suitable for local adoption in municipalities having the necessary enforcement facilities. ”  Da96.  The Borough Adoption of Ordinance No. 17-2017
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On February 27, 2020, the [...] (the Committee) adopted Resolution 2020-2-6, directing the Township's [...] ([...]), to study the real property located at [...], commonly known as [...] (the Property), to determine whether the Property constituted an "Area in Need of Rehabilitation" pursuant to the Local Housing Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 to -89 (LRHL).  (Pa22).  The Property formerly operated as was a golf course and country club.  (Pa22).  The [...] subsequently recommended, and the Committee agreed, that the Property qualified as an "Area in Need of Rehabilitation."  (Pa22).  Ordinance No. 2022-15  The Committee introduced Ordinance No. 2022-15 at a meeting of September 8, 2022.  (1T4:9-12).  A Redevelopment Plan (the Plan) was --- 1  Because the facts and procedural history of this case are inextricably intertwined, they are combined to avoid repetition and for the Court's convenience.  2  Citations to "Pa" refer to the Plaintiff/Appellant's Appendix.  3  Appellant is not seeking to challenge the "Area in Need of Rehabilitation" designation in this appeal.