ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], [...], [...], d/b/a [...], [...], [...], SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] [...] produced alleged check copies from 2013, and three purported receipts for payment for snow removal from 2009, 2011 and 2012.  [...] represented it offered these documents as proof that it paid for snow removal on the Property, but there is nothing on the checks or receipts to indicate what properties the snow removal was for.  Even assuming for the sake of argument  [...] could prove these records pertained to snow removal on the Property (which it cannot), these would not amount to any proofs beyond property maintenance.  As the Patton and Caruso Courts articulated, New Jersey requires more than a mere showing of property maintenance to satisfy the actual use and possession prong for adverse possession.  [...]’s claim for adverse possession plainly fails on these grounds.
[brief] Appellants fail to mention that on two (2) separate occasions (April 15, 2024, and May 21, 2024), the parties agreed on a date to conduct the site inspection, only for Appellants to cancel.  Pa0353.  Further, Appellants omit the fact that they already conducted a site inspection of the premises without Respondent’s knowledge.  On April 1, 2024, Appellants produced a report drafted after a purported site inspection of the premises was conducted on March 13, 2022 by an expert retained by Appellants, only weeks after [...]’s injury occurred.  Da0004-Da0020.
[brief] In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 193 (2011), citing In Re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28–29 (2007); Feldman v. Town of Irvington Fire Dep’t, 162 N.J. Super 177, 182 (App. Div. 1978).  It is submitted that “the concept of progressive discipline in this case should be used ‘to mitigate the penalty’ for an employee who has a record largely unblemished by significant disciplinary infractions. ”  In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 193 (2011), citing Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 30–33.  Progressive discipline must be applied in this case to decrease the severity of any proposed discipline since the alleged misconduct is not severe, it is not unbecoming to the employee’s position, it does not render the employee unsuitable for continuation in the position, nor does it cause application of the principle of progressive discipline to be contrary to the public interest.
[directive] Prior Convictions  Where a defendant’s prior conviction or adjudication of delinquency was under federal law or the law of another State, the prosecutor shall attempt to determine the congruent or equivalent degree of offense under New Jersey law for the purposes of assigning an appropriate criminal history point value, or for the purposes of determining the defendant’s eligibility for a standardized waiver plea offer under Section 6.  If for any reason it is not possible or practicable to determine the equivalent New Jersey offense, the prosecutor shall treat the prior federal or out-of-state conviction or adjudication as if it were a fourth-degree crime, provided that a sentence of imprisonment in excess of six months was authorized under the law of the other jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the sentence imposed on the prior conviction or adjudication was suspended or a probationary sentence or lesser term of imprisonment was actually imposed.
[brief] In that case, plaintiff, a pedestrian, was struck by a [...] bus driven by [...] as the plaintiff was entering her parked car.  *Id.* at 398.  Plaintiff’s treating physicians offered several diagnoses, including myositis, fibromyositis of the spine, post-traumatic headache syndrome, disc space narrowing, reversal of normal lordosis of the spine, and chronic pain exacerbated by the usual activities of daily living.  *Id.* at 390-400.  The plaintiff in *Brooks* complained that although she had returned to work as a teacher’s aide, she could not stand or sit for prolonged periods without pain.  *Id.* at 400.  She also claimed continuing headaches, dizziness, and severe, radiating low back pain.  *Id.*  The Supreme Court in *Brooks* held that the itemization of plaintiff’s alleged permanent injuries and limitations failed to satisfy the N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) threshold, requiring permanent loss of a bodily function.
[brief] It’s speculative.  It’s so far afield from what we need here that no way do I find that there’s any possible way that someone could meet the standards to prove a negligence case.  Number one, did negligence cause his injury?  We don’t know that.  We know that there was negligence at the site.  But we don’t know that there was negligence that was – – that there was negligence, A, and B, that it was the proximate cause of his injury.  2T19-24 to 2T20-7.
[brief] In Re City of Margate City, 424 N.J. Super. 242, 245 (App. Div. 2012).  The language cited above was contained in the original enactment in 1917, and has remained unaltered since.  Da102.  Further, “Home rule is basic in our government.  It embodies the principle that the police power of the State may be invested in local government… to meet…needs of the community. ”  *Inganamort v. Ft. Lee*, 62 N.J. 521, 528 (1973) (citing *Bergen County v. Port of New York Authority*, 32 N.J. 303, 312-14 (1960)).
[brief] ”  *Smith*, 134 N.J. 599 at 618. investigate these credible tips.  See State v. Padilla, 321 N.J. Super. 96 (App. Div. 1999).  When the information provided to police is from a known police informant, the reliability of the informant is judged by an indicia of the informant’s veracity and an analysis of the informants basis of knowledge.  See State v. Keyes, 184 N.J. 541, 555-556 (2005).  The veracity factor may be satisfied by demonstrating that this particular information has been proven as reliable in the past.  See State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204 (2001).  Under the “basis of knowledge” prong, a court must consider whether “the information was obtained in a reliable way. ”  State v. Smith 155 N.J. 83, 94 (1998).  In making this determination, courts look to the tip itself, as “the nature and details revealed in the tip may imply that the informant's knowledge of the alleged criminal activity is derived from a trustworthy source. ”  Ibid.  In the alternative, when the tip is from an anonymous source or the details of a tip alone do not establish a basis of knowledge, the tip must be verified by some corroborative effort to support its assertion of illegality, not just its inclination to identify a determinate person.  See State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117 (2002).  In State v. Mai, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that under the totality of the circumstances officers had established facts that warranted a heightened awareness of danger permitting the removal of the passenger from the motor vehicle.
[brief] [...] retired and a new trial judge, the Honorable [...], became the Chancery Judge presiding over the case.  In July 2009, the [...] sought to add [...] as an indispensable party to the action because he would share responsibility for any accounting damages due to his 25% partnership share.  (3981a).  [...] opposed the application, arguing that the matter was ready for trial and should not be delayed.  (2432a).  Shortly thereafter, [...], now also represented by new (and current) counsel, sought to join the case as a plaintiff and to file a new, much-expanded complaint in the litigation, although the case had been pending for nearly two decades and already had reached final judgment, appeal, and limited remand.  (804a).  At that stage, [...] changed its position, arguing that it now sought to file an amended complaint.  C.
[brief] The trial court correctly found that Plaintiff failed to plead or show procedural unconscionability (Pall-14).  In his appellate brief, Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred because it was “obligated to grant limited discovery and then conduct a fact hearing” on the issue of procedural unconscionability.  (Pb21-22).  This argument fails for at least three reasons.  First, the term “procedural unconscionability” is not a magic talisman whose invocation automatically necessitates a hearing.  Indeed, if that were the case, every party seeking to avoid enforcement of an arbitration clause could simply throw the term in an opposition brief, see *Albrecht v. Corr. Med. Servs.*, 422 N.J. Super. 265, 268 (App. Div. 2011) (“To the extent that CMS presented information about itself through its brief and its counsel at oral argument on its motion to dismiss, that information is not evidential and will not be considered. ”), and be guaranteed a hearing which would largely undercut the same efficiencies Plaintiff professes to support.  As our courts have long recognized arbitration as a “favored” means of resolving disputes, such a result is inconsistent with existing precedent and should be rejected without further analysis.  *Angrisani v. Financial Technology Ventures, L.P.*, 402 N.J. Super. 138, 148 (App. Div. 2008) (“Under New Jersey law, arbitration is also ‘favored . . . as a means of resolving disputes,’ and for this reason ‘[a]n agreement to arbitrate should be read liberally in favor of arbitration[.]’” (internal citations omitted)).
[brief] BECAUSE PLAINTIFF’S LIES PERPETRATE A FRAUD ON THIS COURT.  A fraud on the court occurs “where it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system’s ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party’s claim or defense. ”  *E.L.C. v. D.M.F.*, No. A-3033-20, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1955, at *13 (Oct. 21, 2022) (*quoting Triffin v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc.*, 394 N.J. Super. 237, 251 (App. Div. 2007) (*quoting Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp.*, 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989))).
[brief] As a primary matter, although Defendants refer to plaintiff’s injuries simply as “orthopedic injuries” resulting in “fractures” and “surgeries” – without describing the nature and extent of her fractures, surgeries, or recovery – the Court should be aware Plaintiff suffered much more than broken bones.  Plaintiff was entrapped in the vehicle for a significant duration.  She offered this testimony at trial on direct examination:  Q  [... ]  But at some point do you remember the EMTs and the firefighters being on the scene?  A Yes.  Q  And did they have to use any type of special equipment or measures to extract you from the vehicle?  A Yes.  Q  Did that take some time?  A Yes.  Q  Were you in pain while this is going on?  A Yes.  Q  If it's possible can you try to describe for us what that pain was like?  A  I want to say like something's just crushing your legs.  Q  Were you able to move at all inside of the car until they freed you?  A No.  [3T170-171.]
[brief] Exhibit A Order and Written Opinion filed May 23, 2017 in the [...], et als. v. [...], et als., Docket No. [...] Omitted see 322a  Exhibit B Order and memorandum of decision filed on June 8, 2021 granting in part Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim Omitted see 581a  Exhibit C Order and memorandum of decision filed on October 25, 2021 granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration and denying Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration
[brief] VI.  THE DISMISSAL OF COUNT SIX SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE COURT’S FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF SLEPT ON ITS RIGHTS FOR 35 YEARS IS CONTRARY TO THE RECORD (T1, p. 18, Ins. 1-14).  In dismissing Count Six with prejudice, the court observed the Count sought equitable relief.  See T1 at p. 18, Ins. 1-5.  Applying the maxim ‘he who seeks equity must do equity,’ the Court found Plaintiff could not obtain relief because it stood on its rights for 35 years.  Id. at lns. 3-14.  However, this finding does not consider the fact the Developer admitted to leasing Unit for 35 years knowing it was a common element.  See SOMF at ¶¶19-20 (Pa41).  Moreover, it fails to appreciate that the Developer is the one who wrongfully created the lease agreement in the first place by leveraging its control over the Condo Association.  It is clear the unit owners were unaware the Developer lacked the authority to lease and sell Unit 74.  In essence, the Court faulted the Plaintiff for mistakenly believing that the Developer was authorized to do all that it was doing.  Id. at p. 18, Ins. 7-14.  For these reasons, the dismissal of Count Six should be reversed.
[brief] To aid the jury in understanding the definition of first-degree robbery, the model jury charge defines “deadly weapon” as: any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance ... *which in the manner it is used or intended to be used*, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury or *which in the manner it is fashioned* would lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.  *[Model Jury Charge (Criminal), “Robbery in the First Degree” (2010) (emphasis added).*]  By omitting the definition, the jury was required to speculate about the meaning of “deadly weapon,” an essential element of the charge.
[brief] The State argues that [...]’s PCR petition is barred under Rule 3:22-4(b)(2)(B) because [...]’ Sworn Statement was discoverable earlier; Rule 3:22-5 for being substantially similar to a prior claim; and Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(B) for having been filed five years after discovery.  State Br. at 19-20.  For the reasons set forth infra, [...]’s PCR petition is neither procedurally barred nor time barred.
[directive] As jurors are challenged for cause or peremptorily and excused from the box, the judge will seat the replacement juror(s).  The judge will preliminarily ask each replacement juror if he or she understood the questions when they were read earlier.  If the juror requests clarification or rereading of any one or more of the questions, the judge shall do so.  The judge will then ask whether the juror answered yes or uncertain to any question and, if so, ask appropriate follow up questions.  When questioning the jurors about the written form, the judge must refer to questions by number or description, sufficient to establish for the record the question to which the juror is responding.  An unmarked copy of the printed form should be made part of the record as a court exhibit.  8.
[brief] On appeal, [...] attempted to upend the predicate for those findings, and specifically appealed from [...]’s finding that they ever were bound by such a duty to their partners.  (39120a)  Thus, [...] properly found that [...]’s “opposition to this argument furthered Plaintiffs’ RICO claims. ”  (39120a)  The Special Master recommended awarding NJRICO fees for work done opposing [...]’ appeal from the Trial Court’s punitive damage ruling for similar reasons.  Having read the parties’ Briefs on appeal, [...] aptly noted that [...] themselves conceded that reversing the Trial Court’s findings regarding their “mental states” for purposes of vacating punitive damages would also be grounds for vacating the Court’s RICO liability determination:  [The Wilfs] … argu[ed on appeal] that … punitive damages were improper because: (1) they did not act with “actual malice or accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard,” which made the award both improper and excessive; and (2) the Trial Court erred in failing to allocate punitive damages between the different tort claims.  (Dab at 52-55.)  Arguments regarding [[...]]’ mental states overlaps with the mental states needed to satisfy the mens rea requirements for the RICO predicate acts, and stem from the same factual basis.  See Remand R&R 1 at V(B).  Had the Appellate Division determined there was no evidence on the record to establish the necessary mental state for punitive damages, it would have also meant there was insufficient evidence on the record to establish the predicate acts necessary for Plaintiffs’ RICO claims (an argument [[...]] also made on appeal, see Dab at 66-67).
[brief] Id. at 374.  When this issue was presented to the Appellate Division in Mejia v. [...], Nos. A-5708-17T2, A-0450-18T2, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 483, at *1 (App. Div. Mar. 4, 2019) (Pa83), that Court ruled that if a plaintiff succeeded in obtaining a finding of sixty percent (60%) or greater against any direct defendant, that defendant would be responsible for all the damages pursuant to the JTCL. Id. at *11-12.  The Appellate Division further explained that the direct defendants “were entitled to implead [another provider] and prove his responsibility as a joint tortfeasor so as to limit any allocation of its own fault for plaintiff’s damages, and thereby limit any award against it. ”  Id. at *12.  Of course, doing so would entitle the third-party defendant to have counsel at trial to oppose those claims (i.e., not receive a so-called “Burt defendant” designation).  In this sense, the Mejia panel called into question the very impetus and rationale for the ruling in Burt.  The Mejia Appellate Division opinion observes that defendants have an independent right and ability to bring third-party claims, which is not dependent on the plaintiff’s conduct.  Presumably, this conflict between these two rulings prompted certification of the Mejia matter to the Supreme Court.
[brief] *(See, Brief at 29, 43, 48.)*  Statement of Items Submitted on Summary Judgment  Motions  Pursuant to R.2:6-1(a)(1)  Travelers’ Summary Judgment Motion  Exhibit A - Excerpts of the Complaint in the underlying action…………Dta636  Exhibit B - Excerpts of an Agreement between [...] and [...]…………………………………………………Dta430  Exhibit C - Excerpts of a July, 2015 Agreement between [...] and [...]………………………………………………………Dta814  Exhibit D - Excerpts of invoices and orders for various work performed by [...] for [...] at the W/Element Hotel project…Dta815  Exhibit E - Excerpts of an insurance policy issued by defendant [...]………………………………..Dta75
[brief] [Pb45].  Referencing the Partners’ Certificate executed by the parties on May 21, 2019, [Da90], Plaintiff claims that the 1991 Partnership Agreement and 2007 Addendum – both of which he intentionally failed to disclose in the first instance – was not in effect at the time of Plaintiff’s termination.  Plaintiff’s selective reference, however, fails to acknowledge that the Partnership Interest Purchase Agreement (“Purchase Agreement”), cited in Plaintiff’s Complaint, contains several, explicit references to the valid Partnership Agreement.
[brief] As a note of clarification, Appellant would mention that the Court seems to be confused with regards to the specific height the Appellant objects to.  Section 196-6 of the Municipal Code of the City of Hoboken defines “building height” as measured to the “highest roof beams” of a flat-roofed building such as [...].  This is not the height Appellant has been challenging.  The height Appellant has been challenging is the relative height of 138 Park in relation to the building adjacent to it on the southerly side.  The Diagrammatic Elevation specified that the height of the façade of [...] would not exceed the height of the property to its south by more than one foot (4a).  It may be that the maximum “building height” allowed by the Amended Resolution stands in conflict with the relative height limitation imposed by the Diagrammatic Elevation.  If so, it would be incumbent on the developer, [...], to return to the [...] to resolve the conflicts — not to simply ignore one of the limitations placed on the project by the Zoning Board.
[directive] The provisions of this Executive Directive are not intended to serve as an operational manual covering every aspect of law enforcement operations and procedures affecting schools.  Rather, it is the purpose of this Executive Directive to set forth and reaffirm overriding State policies, and to establish an organizational framework and decision-making and consultation process by which to ensure that law enforcement officers at all times demonstrate a proper respect and appreciation for the rights and interests of students and professional educators.  It should be noted, finally, that the provisions of this Executive Directive were developed as a direct result of the specific recommendations of the School Zone Narcotics Enforcement Working Group established pursuant to SNAP Directive 5.14.  The policies and procedures established in this Executive Directive are therefore the product of a frank and thoughtful dialogue between representatives at every level of the New Jersey law enforcement and professional education communities.
[brief] [...] Db37-Db45.  But CCIP policies are insurance policies subject to the same cancellation requirements as all other insurance policies.  [...] and [...] point to no authority for a new rule that relieves CCIP insurers of their basic obligation to provide notice of cancellation to their insureds.  [...] and [...] first claim the statutory and Administrative Code provisions cited at Section I.C. of Plaintiffs’ initial brief, Pb33-Pb34, does not apply because the CCIP Policy itself was not “cancelled. ”  [...] Db37.  This semantic argument characterizing the cancellation of [...]’s insurance as a mere “unenrollment,” ignores the reality that unenrollment results in the cancellation of insurance.  [...] and [...] cannot escape their notice obligations by recharacterizing the cancellation of [...]’s insurance, which was confirmed with its Certificate of Liability Insurance, as a mere “enrollment” issue.  [...] and [...] also claim the Code does not apply as the CCIP Policy contains a workers’ compensation component and because the CCIP covered multi-state location risks, which supposedly places this situation outside of the subchapter’s scope.
[brief] The test is whether the error was “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80, 95 (2004) (quoting R. 2:10-2).  Hynes v. Gibson, 2020 WL 4723742, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 14, 2020).  In the present case, the alleged improper comments made by defense counsel during closing were followed by immediate curative instructions.  Notably, the plaintiff did not object to the curative instructions that were given or request a mistrial.  The trial court instructed the jury not to consider the comments at issue and it is presumed the jurors followed these instructions.  While the plaintiff is dissatisfied with the jury’s verdict and places blame on comments made by defense counsel during closing arguments for the verdict, there was ample evidence to support the verdict.
[brief] Defendant continued to deny that he ever went into the building, but said that [...] told him he “went in there and fought that man.  . . . and robbed him” (7T182-3 to 183-4).  [...] continued to press defendant about the video showing him he went into the building, and defendant continued to deny – “Man, I’m telling you I wasn’t in the building. ” (7T184-3 to 16).  [...] emphasized that he was not saying he knew defendant “assaulted the man. . . [or] robbed the man.
[brief] . . .”  W.V. Pangborne & Co. v. New Jersey Dep't of Transp., 116 N.J. 543, 553, 562 A.2d 222, 227, 1989 N.J. LEXIS 114, *14 (quoting Carlsen v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan Trust, 80 N.J. 334, 339 (1979)).  The doctrine of equitable estoppel bars Plaintiff’s claims.  Plaintiff [...] engaged in a fraud by listing [...] as the grantee of the 293 Property and forging Sam’s signature on title transfer paperwork (Da343 – Da350).