ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Without addressing the substance of Defendant’s assertions, which Plaintiff denies, Plaintiff notes that the FDCPA only applies to debt collectors.  “The FDCPA’s provisions generally apply only to ‘debt collectors’”.  Pollice v. National Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 403 (3d Cir. 2000); Cooper v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP, 912 F. Supp. 2d 178, 184 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2012)(“The law is clear that FDCPA only applies to ‘debt collectors’ as that term is defined in the Act. ”).  Plaintiff is a “creditor” as defined by the FDCPA, not a debt collector, as Plaintiff originated the subject credit card account.  Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(4) with 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (noting the distinction between a “creditor” and a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA).  Accordingly, Defendant’s argument is meritless.
[brief] Compare Judgment of Conviction (Da44) with 15T41-10 to 13.  Stacks in court.  (11T35-23 to 36-8).  [...] was to be paid $5,000 for transporting the marijuana delivery to the East Coast and another $5,000 upon delivery to defendant.  (11T38-2 to 11).  While at the hotel, defendant selected certain “brands” of marijuana, placed them in vacuum-sealed, smell-proof “Smellyproof” bags, and then put them into eight duffel bags.  (8T50-24 to 51-2; 11T40-25 to 41-22).  [...] took these duffel bags to his home in a Ford 150 pick-up truck with Nevada license plates he had borrowed from his friend “[...].
[brief] Furthermore, when there is a dispute as to how a marital settlement agreement should be applied, a Family Part Court has the authority to apply basic principles of equity in an effort to resolve the ambiguities that stem from the absence of clarifying language.  In the case at hand, the divorce agreement does not explicitly state which accounts each spouse would get nor does it mention the value of those accounts.  While it states that “Individual and joint accounts, all accounts will be divided equally (50% to each),” it never states how many accounts there are, or the value of those accounts.  The parties did not have the benefit of exchanging case information statement’s either, therefore one possible argument could be that the parties did not have true knowledge of what they were agreeing too, and equity would be better served by holding the agreements non-binding.  Post nuptial agreements made at the end of a marriage made while the parties are contemplating divorce are enforceable as long as: (1) the agreement is in writing; (2) the agreement is notarized; and (3) the agreement must be done with fair disclosure between the parties.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT.  Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to dismiss the complaint.  (Id. at 6).  She contends that N.J.S.A. 4:22-24a(2) and N.J.S.A. 4:22-17c(3) are “unconstitutionally void for vagueness and overbreadth . . . even as applied. ”  (Id. at 7).  Defendant accuses the trial court of rewriting “the statutes on an ex post facto basis and used a dictionary of its own choosing to save . . . both of the statutes from being declared unconstitutional. ” (Ibid.).  Defendant further suggests that public policy demands a court declare the statutes unconstitutional to avoid arbitrary enforcement and prosecution.  (Id. at 15).  The State submits that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s meritless motion.  The trial court’s order and decision reflect a cogent and reasoned consideration of both the record and defendant’s arguments, which simply did not favor the relief she requested.  For those and the reasons that follow, this Court should not disturb the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.
[brief] They are based on a different statutory scheme.  Plaintiffs argue that the LRHL and the LTTEL must be “construed in concert” with each other (Pb34), citing N.J.S.A. 40A:20-2 (Pb21).  But construing the LTTEL in conjunction with the LHRL does not require the procedural requirements of one be applied to the other, particularly when both statutes provide their own separate procedures.
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[brief] Rankin v. Sowinski, 119 N.J. Super. 393, 399-400 (App. Div. 1972).  A disputed issue of insubstantial nature should not preclude the grant of the motion.  Prant v. Sterling, 332 N.J. Super. 369, 377 (Ch. Div. 1999).  If the evidence is so one-sided that a party must prevail as a matter of law, the motion should be granted.
[brief] I’m not trying your case.  I’m not taking evidence on the merits of your agreement.  So whether you think this is fair is something -- I leave that strictly to you.  I’m not making that decision today.  You understand that?  THE PLAINTIFF: Yes, sir.  THE COURT: All right, [...], we’ll proceed on the agreement first, please.  [25T3-4]  [...] reviewed the agreement with plaintiff.  25T4-5.  Plaintiff said he understood the agreement would resolve all “remaining issues outstanding” between him and his wife, and that he was waiving further proceedings.
[brief] [...]’s testimony about the alleged agreement was that [...] simply asked him to fight [...], (9T 76-1) and [...] testified that his role was to act as a referee to ensure that the fight was “fair. ”  (10T 73-3 to 8)  Thus, as defense counsel argued in summation, even if the jury found that there was an agreement, that agreement was not to cause significant bodily injury:  “Even according to the star witness, [...] Hickox, I went there to fight to cause injury, bodily injury.  Absolutely nothing in this case about significant injury. ”  (13T 130-2 to 13)  Yet the jurors here were told specifically the wrong law, which prevented them from having the legal framework necessary to credit this defense.  Conspiracy to commit aggravated assault requires both a purposeful agreement and a purpose to cause significant bodily injury.  Instead, the jury here was told that they could convict on less than that — if they found there was a purposeful agreement to promote a fight, but only knowledge or conscious disregard of the risk that significant bodily injury would result.  Proper and comprehensive jury instructions are critical to preserving a defendant’s right to due process and a fair trial, even when no objection is lodged.
[brief] **Statement of Procedural History**  On November 21, 2017, Plaintiff filed a three-count complaint asserting claims under NJLAD and CEPA.  (Pa1-116).  On May 1, 2020, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which was heard before the Hon. [...] on August 8, 2020.  [...] granted the motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing the NJLAD claims pursuant to the CEPA exclusivity provision, N.J.S.A. 34:19-8.  The case proceeded to discovery.  On April 14, 2022, Defendants filed their second summary judgment motion, arguing that the remaining CEPA claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations.  After full briefing and a hearing on the motion, on August 7, 2022 [...] granted the motion and dismissed the Complaint, detailing his reasoning on the record.
[brief] *Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding*, Id. at *14-15.  Plaintiff’s citation to *Cox v [...] Roebuck & Co.*, 138 N.J. 2 (1994) stands for the same proposition as *Gonzales* and *Jefferson Loan, infra*.  [...] was found to have committed consumer fraud in relation to the contract for home repairs with Cox.  [...] then tried to collect what it alleged to be an outstanding amount on the contract.  A clear reading of the Court’s conclusion is that if there was consumer fraud committed in the creation of the debt, i.e. the contract which created it, then the “debt” would also run afoul of the CFA.  Again, that fact pattern is distinguishable from 3rd party debt collection where the current owner of the account has no connection with the creation of the debt, nor is there any claim of fraud regarding the account.
[brief] The Court explained:  The record in this case makes it clear that a right of access to the beach is available over the quasi-public lands owned by the Association, as well as the right to use the Association's upland dry sand.  It is not necessary for us to determine under what circumstances and to what extent there will be a need to use the dry sand of private owners who either now or in the future may have no leases with the Association.  Resolution of the competing interests, private ownership and the public trust, may in some cases be simple, but in many it may be most complex.  In any event, resolution would depend upon the specific facts in controversy.  Id. at 333.  Emphasis added.  The Matthews Court recognized that requiring public access on or across private property is an extraordinary remedy and should be invoked only in limited cases.  To that end, the Court identified four factors to be considered before requiring a private party to allow public access on or across their property: (1) the location of the privately owned upland area (referred to in the decision as the “dry sand area”) in relation to the public trust lands; (2) the extent and availability of publicly owned points of access in the vicinity of the property in question; (3) the nature and extent of public demand for access in the area; and (4) the manner in which the privately owned upland area is used by the owners.
[directive] Those were offered in a cooperative spirit that demonstrated a common interest Directive # 4-07 May 16, 2007 Page 2 in serving justice and a shared concern for efficient court operations.  Such efforts are appreciated and encouraged and provide benefits not just for judges, but for others involved at trial, including jurors.  A key focus of comments involved judges being required to repeat the same question to each juror, with general agreement that such action is not necessary to ensure that jurors have heard, understood, and can fully respond to the voir dire questions being asked.  Although they understood that to be the intent of the questioning using the standard voir dire questions, many judges throughout the state indicated their belief that the procedures set forth in the Standards, particularly the questioning method, could be adjusted so as to assure thorough and complete questioning of prospective jurors without requiring excessive repeated readings of questions to jurors.  The matter was considered by the newly established Supreme Court Committee on Jury Selection in Criminal and Civil Trials (Committee), which is chaired by Appellate Division Judge [...] and includes experienced judges and attorneys.
[brief] Appellant  [...]  (“[...]”) should prevail on its appeal because:  (1)  Respondents were admittedly well aware that an agreement governed their [...] relationship, and accepted the benefits (including profits) from that agreement for years, and are thus governed by the agreement’s terms; and independently, (2)  Respondents voluntarily signed up to use [...]’s website, which notified them on the first page and every subsequent page that it was governed by fully available and easily reviewable terms of use that included an arbitration agreement.  For these reasons, those set forth below, and those in [...]’s opening brief, the trial court’s Order should be reversed.
[brief] *Biondi*, 423 N.J. Super at 422.  Res judicata thus bars any claim in this suit for water runoff from the [...]’ driveway caused by preexisting conditions, because plaintiff sued for property damage caused by water runoff from the driveway on the Burke Action.  Cf. Pa46-47, ¶¶ 31-36 & Pa330, ¶¶ 31-36, with Pa8, ¶¶ 5-10.  This case satisfies the elements of res judicata.  First, plaintiff litigated the issue of property damage caused by water runoff from the driveway to a final adjudication in the Burke Action.  Pa181-97.  Because plaintiff was the claimant in both the Burke Actions and this matter, Pa7 & Pa89, and because the [...] purchased the property that was at issue in the Burke Action, Pa7, ¶ 4 & Pa89, ¶ 3, privity exists between the parties in the Burke Action and this matter.
[brief] See R. 2:3-4; Burbridge v. Paschal, 239 N.J. Super. 139, 151 (App. Div. 1990) (“A party may not attack the judgment under review without having appealed. ”); State v. Elkwisni, 190 N.J. 169, 175 (2007)(“Because the State did not appeal from the judgment remanding the issue of the admissibility of defendant’s statement to the police, that issue is not before us. ”); Reich v. Borough of Fort Lee Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment, 414 N.J.Super. 483, 499 n. 9 (App. Div. 2010)(“a respondent must cross-appeal to obtain relief from a judgment. ”)
[brief] In *SB Bldg. Assoc., L.P. v. Planning Board*, Docket No. [...], 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 36, (App. Div. Jan. 6, 2017), certif. den. 230 N.J. 424 (2017).  (Pa992 TO Pa1000), the redevelopment agency made an argument much like that of Defendants below in an effort to support an off-tract improvement without satisfying the requirements of *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-12.  Rejecting this argument, this Court reasoned that The MLUL is a carefully constructed and comprehensive framework governing the powers of municipalities relating to land use and development.  [M]unicipalities must exercise their powers relating to zoning and land use in a manner that will strictly conform with that statute’s provisions.  *Id.* at *12-13.
[brief] Because the Bulletin Prescribes a Legal Standard – That the Holding Company Act Applies to Reciprocal Insurance Exchanges – Clearly Inferable from Statutory Authorization.  The applicability of the Holding Company Act to reciprocal insurance exchanges is “clearly inferable” from the plain language of the statute.  See Airwork, 97 N.J. at 301 (finding that an assessment did not constitute de facto rulemaking because the taxability of the services at issue was “sufficiently clearly and directly inferable from the statute itself”).  Because the applicability of the Holding Company Act to reciprocal exchanges is clearly inferable from the statute, the Bulletin is not a de facto rule, and the Department is therefore not required to engage in notice-and-comment “rulemaking” in accord with the due process procedures included in the APA before applying the statute.
[brief] At the January 12, 2021 hearing below, the [...] interpreted Ordinance Sec. 413.02B, Pa 52a, as limiting to one (1) the number of walkways permitted in the Historic Flared Open Space Area.  IT12 – 2 to 12.  The [...]’s interpretation of Ordinance Sec. 413.02B was the basis of the [...]’s finding of fact 4.  “…that the applicant’s removal of the concrete walkway within the flare amounted to a destruction of a preexisting non-conforming walkway, which once destroyed could not be replaced. ” and the [...]’s conclusion of law “that once a non-conforming structure within the flare is removed, it shall not be replaced. ”  [...] Resolution [...] 2020-226; Pa 20a.  On appeal, the [...] did not render an interpretation of Ordinance Sec. 413.02B nor make an independent conclusion of law that the removal of concrete from the two (2) existing walkways constituted a destruction of a non-conforming structure.  The [...]’s finding of fact on the issue was limited to an acknowledgement that “[t]he [...] argued that the destruction of the pre-existing walkway, once destroyed, could not be replaced…”  [...] Resolution #22-09, Pa 24a.  In its June 10, 2023 Decision, the Court below rejected plaintiffs’-applicants’ argument that the singular term “walkway” as used in Ordinance Sec. 413-02B should be interpreted pursuant to Ordinance Sec. 200, Pa 139a, to include the plural “walkways”.
[brief] Lastly, the New Jersey Supreme Court reiterated the broad scope of the CFA in a decision in response to a question certified to it by the Third Circuit in *Sun* Chemical Corporation v. Fike Corporation, 243 N.J. 319 (2020).  In Sun Chemical, the District Court held that the plaintiff could not assert a CFA claim due to the fact that another statute served to regulate the asserted claims.  Id. at 330.  The Supreme Court rejected that ruling and held:  In addition to its ever-growing scope, “[t]he language of the CFA evinces a clear legislative intent that its provisions be applied broadly. ”  Lemelledo, 150 N.J. at 264.  “[L]ike most remedial legislation, the [CFA] should be construed liberally in favor of consumers. ”  Cox, 138 N.J. at 15.  And, by the plain terms of the statute, “[t]he rights, remedies and prohibitions” created by the CFA are “in addition to and cumulative of any other right, remedy or prohibition accorded by the common law or statutes of this State. ”  N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.13.  Courts are therefore reluctant “to undermine the CFA’s enforcement structure … by carving out exemptions for each allegedly fraudulent practice that may concomitantly be regulated by another source of law. ”  Lemelledo, 150 N.J. at 270.  Id.  The Supreme Court confirmed that there is a “presumption that the CFA applies to a covered activity,” a presumption that can be overcome only when a court is satisfied “that a direct and unavoidable conflict exists between application of the CFA and application of the other regulatory scheme or schemes. ”  Id. at 331 (quoting Lemelledo, 150 N.J. at 270 (emphasis added)).  The trial court did not reason that there is any conflict between the NJCFLA and the CFA, because there is no conflict.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO COUNT VICTORIA GILHAM’S BALLOT BECAUSE SHE PROVIDED SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO WARRANT RECEIVING A CURE LETTER (2T53:3-54:10)  The trial court erred by refusing to count [...]’s mail-in ballot.  Gilham is [...]’s niece.  Gilham testified that she mailed her ballot on February 10, 2025.  (1T27:14-16).  Gilham confirmed that she filled out her name and street address on the ballot’s outer envelope.  (1T22:8-24).  She sealed the ballot inside both the inner and outer envelope.  However, she mistakenly left the certificate itself blank, even though she provided the same required information on the outer envelope, including her name, address, and municipality.  (Da10-Da11).  Gilham testified that upon being notified that her ballot was not counted, she went to the Board to attempt to cure her ballot shortly after Election Day.  (1T18:11-19: 2; 1T24:7-10).  Gilham was told that she could not do so. (1T18:13-19).  9.  Gilham Should Not Be Disenfranchised for Technicalities
[brief] POINT V THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE A LIMITING INSTRUCTION FOLLOWING THE STATE’S SUMMATION.  As stated under POINT III (B) above, reversal of a conviction based on the prosecutor's conduct is appropriate only if that conduct was "'so egregious that it deprived [the] defendant of a fair trial."  State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 474 (1994) (quoting State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 565 (1990)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 (1996).  Likewise, whether a prosecutor’s misconduct denied defendant a fair trial requires consideration of both the "tenor of the trial and the responsiveness of counsel and the court to the improprieties when they occurred."  State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 575 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858 (2001).  Defendant’s argument that the lack of a limiting instruction following the State’s summation deprived defendant of a fair trial is simply without any substantive merit.
[brief] BY DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ABBREVIATE TRANSCRIPTS WITHOUT ANY FACT-FINDING AND TENABLE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.  THE CONCLUSORY STATEMENTS IN THE MAY 3, 2024  ORDER OVERLOOK  PLAINTIFF'S CORE ARGUMENT THAT THE POINTS RAISED ON APPEAL LARGEY CONCERN MATTERS OF LAW.  TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ADDRESS  PLAINTIFF'S PRINCIPAL ARGUMENT LEADS TO A LOGICAL INFERENCE THAT THE JUDGE  ADJUDICATED THE MOTION WITHOUT READING THE MOTION CERTIFICATION OR COMPREHENDING AND ANALYZING THE ARGUMENT THEREIN.
[brief] However, the so-called “Rugbeer test” proposed by the [...] is untenable for several reasons.  First, the Rugbeer test violates federal policy by singling out arbitration of a specific kind of claim – medical malpractice cases - for harsher scrutiny.  Kindred Nursing, 581 U.S. at 247.  This is true at a minimum because the Rudbart test balances four factors.  The proposed “Rugbeer test” requires that a pre-suit arbitration agreement in medical malpractice cases meet each and every condition in order to be enforceable.  Second, the [...] proposes that that “unequal bargaining power” – a feature of nearly every consumer contract - is alone sufficient grounds to set aside a bilateral contract.  See [...] brief at p. 9 (“[i]f the “Rugbeer test” was applied to the present case, the arbitration agreement would be undoubtedly unenforceable because the agreement is contrary to public interest and is unconscionable due to unequal bargaining power”).  Setting aside that the subject arbitration agreement is neither “contrary to public interest,” nor “unconscionable,” the [...] attempts to perform a sleight of hand by claiming that the Rudbart test considers whether an arbitration agreement “is … the result of unconscionability or unequal bargaining power”
[brief] ”  New Jersey State Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. Irvington, 80 N.J. 271, 284 (1979).  Arbitration under the Police and Fire Public Interest Arbitration Reform Act is subject to a statutorily mandated procedure, requiring the arbitrator to “decide the dispute based on a reasonable determination of the issues, giving due weight to [the statutory factors] that are judged relevant for the resolution of the specific dispute.
[brief] As the Superior Court found, the MSRA was intended by the Legislature to be liberally interpreted, and “delineates substantial authority to the State’s ability to terminate and modify existing agreements involving municipalities in need of stabilization and recovery. ” (Pa000027).  Relevant here, the MSRA specifically confers the State with the authority to unilaterally amend or terminate contracts and modify collectively negotiated agreements.  Factually, the entire premise of Plaintiffs’ Complaint (and this appeal) is based on the incorrect assumption that Defendants have somehow failed to pay “earned” wages based solely on contingent agreements (the 2016 MOAs), which were subject to termination and modification under the MSRA.
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[brief] The court refused to consider [...]’s prison record as evidence of maturation, which was erroneous for the same reasons that its refusal to consider his record as evidence of rehabilitation was erroneous (as discussed in Point I.A).  And the court simply disregarded the expert finding of maturity.  Those findings from [...] considered the precise qualities of youth as enumerated in Miller and concluded that “[t]here are strong indications that [[...]’s] maturation and development will continue”; that “Mr. [...] is capable of returning to the community and complying with its laws and norms”; and that there were “no indications that he presents as an incorrigible individual requiring additional incarceration.