ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] After the police made a lawful stop of defendant’s vehicle pursuant to the search warrant, they could then continue their investigation by searching defendant’s home in [...], even without the assistance of [...] police officers.  Again, neither N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152 nor N.J.S.A. 40A:14- 152.1 “preclude[] on the one hand or authorize[] on the other hand a police officer from the jurisdiction in which a crime occurred from conducting an investigation outside of the territorial boundary of the officer’s express jurisdiction.
[brief] *See State v. Rodriguez*, 172 N.J. 117 (2002).  Tips are at their highest point of reliability when they are not made anonymously.  *See Basil*, 202 N.J. 570, 586 (2010) (indicating no need for officers to corroborate tips when informant is named).  Officers may presume that those providing tips are reliable.  *See id.* (discussing heightened responsibility for informants when they are named); *see also State v. Gamble*, 18 N.J. 412, 423 (stating 911 calls are more reliable because of ability to identify caller).
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff-respondent [...] respectfully requests that the Court deny defendant-appellant [...]’s appeal and affirm the Trial Court’s May 1, 2023 Order and Opinion in its entirety.  Perelman’s appeal with respect to the March 8, 2024 Order has been abandoned and, therefore, it too should remain in full force and effect.  Finally, Cohen reserves the right to seek recovery of the fees incurred in connection with this appeal.  Respectfully submitted, COLE SCHOTZ  P.C.  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent, [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  DATED: October 4, 2024
[brief] D.  Even after confirmation of Phase I, [...] attempted to thwart new management’s control, leading to a sweeping injunction ......................... 15  E.  [...]’s conduct during the pendency of a motion for an injunction and, later, for sanctions, further justified the trial court’s decision ..........  18  F.  [...] continued to claim that the February 8 meeting was valid and improperly sought to collaterally invalidate the Arbitration ................. 21  G.  The trial court’s correctly ordered sanctions ....................................................  23  H.  [...] did not “honor” the change in control; he tried to thwart it at every turn, and the trial court’s sanction was entirely justified .............  24  II.
[brief] THE COUNCIL DECISION TO AWARD THE SUPPORT RESOLUTION TO [...] WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, NOR UNREASONABLE, AND WAS PREDICATED UPON A SUBSTANTIAL, CREDIBLE MUNICIPAL RECORD DEVELOPED FOLLOWING A PROCESS THAT COMPLIED WITH APPLICABLE LAW (Pa1) ..................................................................................11 CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................21 ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ### Cases - **Anastasio v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of W. Orange**, 209 N.J. Super. 499 (App. Div. 1986), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 46 (1986) .................................................. 12 - **Bressman v. Gash**, 131 N.J. 517 (1993) ........................................................................................................... 12 - **CBS Outdoor v. Lebanon Plan. Bd.**, 414 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 2010) ......................... 12 - **Cell S. of N.J. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment**, 172 N.J. 75 (2002) .................................................... 12 - **Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair**, 221 N.J. 536 (2015) ................................................................. 11 - **Kellwood Assocs. v. Bd. of Adjustment of the City of Englewood**, 141 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1976) ........................................................................................................... 12 - **Kenwood Assocs. v. Bd. of Adjustment of the City of Englewood**, 141 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1976)
[directive] Dismissal of School Zone Cases as Part of a “Package” Deal  Nothing in these Guidelines should be construed to limit the authority of a prosecutor to dismiss one or more counts under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (Drug-Free School Zone) as part of a negotiated disposition where the defendant will plead guilty in accordance with the Guidelines to another 2C:35-7 or other Brimage- eligible charge.  It should be noted in this regard that under current law, when a defendant is subject to prosecution for multiple drug-free school zone counts involving separate transactions, the decision to impose consecutive or concurrent terms of imprisonment and parole ineligibility is generally vested in the discretion Page 20 Attorney General Brimage Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) of the court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5a, and a prosecutor arguably has no authority under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 to require the court to impose consecutive sentences.
[brief] The claims of the proposed *Gannon* class members could not have been asserted or alleged by any of the members of the *Roma Pizzeria* class on Feb. 20, 2015, because those claims relate only to misconduct occurring *after* that date.  The claims asserted by the *Gannon* plaintiffs did not accrue until [...] engaged in misconduct long after 2015; in fact, [...]’s complaint in federal court outlined several examples of wrongful fees and surcharges occurring in 2020.  (Pa0023-25, at ¶¶ 29-33).  Those claims were brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey on diversity grounds, not New Jersey Superior Court, and the Law Division never had jurisdiction over them because the claims alleged by the *Gannon* class fall well outside the scope of the 2015 Settlement in *Roma Pizzeria*.
[brief] Attorneys for Defendant, [...] /s/ [...]  BRIAN J. NEARY, ESQ.  Of Counsel  Attorney ID 012011976  /s/  [...]  CAITLIN M. KENNY, ESQ.  On The Brief Attorney ID 327942020  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.
[brief] I.  **Standard of Review**  Appellate courts apply a limited and deferential standard of review to the findings of a court after a bench trial.  *Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A.*, 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011); *D'Agostino v. Maldonado*, 216 N.J. 168, 182 (2013).  As one court put it, “We are not to review the record from the point of view of how we would have decided the matter if we were the court of first instance. ”  *Sebring Assocs. v. Coyle*, 347 N.J. Super. 414, 424 (App. Div. 2002).  “Factual findings premised upon evidence admitted in a bench trial ‘are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence. ’”  *Potomac Ins. Co. of Ill by OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Pa. Mfrs.’ Ass'n Ins. Co.*, 215 N.J. 409, 421 (2013) (quoting *Cesare v. Cesare*, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)).  That deference is merited especially when it comes to credibility determinations “because the trial judge ‘hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, and hears them testify,’ affording it ‘a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of a witness. ’”  *Gnall v. Gnall*, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting *Cesare*, 154 N.J. Appellate courts will reverse trial courts on their assessment of witnesses and facts only to ensure there is not a denial of justice.  Id.  A trial court’s evidentiary decisions also receive a deferential standard of review.  Appellate courts disturb those only if there is a showing that the trial court “palpably abused its discretion. ”  Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 34 (2004).  That deference is especially given when it comes to the evaluation of expert testimony.  “It [i]s within the trial court's wide discretion to accept or reject an expert's testimony, either in whole or in part. ”  Sipko v. Koger, Inc., 251 N.J. 162, 188 (2022).  Appellate courts review de novo a “trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts. ”  D'Agostino, 216 N.J. at 182-83.  Based on those standards, each of [...]’s arguments on appeal fail.  II.
[brief] The surrounding circumstances leading up to [...]’s signing of the consent-to-search form were inherently coercive, for several reasons.  First, when [...]h signed the consent form, her mother appeared to be detained by police.  Earlier that evening, [...] told [...], who was standing in the courtyard of the apartment complex: “we’re detaining your mother for questioning. ”  (BWC4-A 23:50 to 24:10)  The next time [...]h saw her mother, [...] was being escorted by at least three police officers towards [...]h’s apartment.  (BWC4-A 34:55 to 35:15)  The implication was that [...] was still subject to a detention.  Undoubtedly, the fact that her mother appeared to be detained by police at the time [...]h signed the consent form is a factor that weighs against voluntariness.
[brief] This court reviews the determination of whether counsel should be disqualified de novo.  Estate of Kennedy v. Rosenblatt, 447 N.J. Super. 444, 451 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting City of Atlantic City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447, 463 (2010)).  Importantly, “there is no right to demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified because of an ethical requirement. ”  Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Any doubt as to the propriety of an attorney’s representation is resolved “in favor of disqualification. ”  Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).  For the reasons set forth below, this court should reverse.  A.  THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE DEFENDANTS’ INHERENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN A CASE SUBJECT TO THE CNA.
[brief] It does not seek to add salary increases after the June 7, 2017 implementation date.  Moreover, the MSRA in no way altered the New Jersey Wage Payment laws which require Defendants to pay earned wages.  While prior Courts have found that the MSRA permits modification of labor contracts for prospective wages, the issue of whether the MSRA permits Defendants to not pay previously earned wages has not been litigated prior to this matter.  The Trial Court’s dismissal was both incorrect and premature as: (1) Plaintiffs have met the Motion to Dismiss pleading standard; (2) the MSRA does not permit Defendants to deprive promoted officers of earned wages; and (3) the MSRA did not modify New Jersey’s wage and hour statutes.  Plaintiffs have pleaded causes of action more than sufficient to survive Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.  Plaintiffs are entitled to discovery and to have this matter litigated on its merits.  Plaintiffs urges this Honorable Court to reverse the Trial Court’s March 4, 2024 Order and remand to the Trial Court for further proceedings.
[brief] [...] did not make observations of the points of impact as the accident occurred.  He did not take measurements, make speed estimations, or access any on board vehicle information.  He made observations as to the damage to the vehicles and the final resting points, and combined that with the statements he took from the 3 parties involved in the crash.  That is all the very same information that our jury considered.  The jury saw the photos, they watched the dash cam video, they heard and read from the admitted portion of the police report limited to what the parties told [...].  Therefore, the Trooper’s not-to-scale drawing – which was not based on personal observation of the crash – offered nothing of probative value.  With regard to the second prong of NJ.R.E. 701, the requirement that the opinion will assist in understanding the witness' testimony or in determining a fact in issue, lay opinion testimony is not permitted if the jury can reach its own conclusions without the aid of opinion testimony.
[directive] Countv of Anvwhere LAW ENFORCEMENT TRUST FUNDS STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS  For the Year Ended DECEMBER 200Y (With Comparative Totals December 200X)  31, 31, Seized Law Asset (Memorandum Only)  Enforcement Asset  Federal Federal Trust Trust Maintenance Justice Treasury I I ' I / - - Account Account Account Account Account FLOWS CASH FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES  200Y 200x  Seized Funds xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxx.xx  Investment Income xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Proceeds from Sale at Auction xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  U.S. Received from Department of Treasury xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Transfer between Accounts xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Forfeited Directly from Defendants xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxx.xx  Cancellation of Outstanding Checks xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Refund of Prior Year Disbursements xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Due from Bank xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx  Cash Provided from Operating Activities  Cash Flows from Investing Activities: Redemption (Purchase) of Idestments xxxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx - Cash Paid to State Treasurer Unclaimed Property xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Cash Paid to County Prosecutor's Law Enforcement Trust Account  xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Cash Paid Asset Maintenance and Forfeiture Costs to xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Cash Paid for Refunds of Seized Funds xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Cash Paid for Asset Maintenance Account  xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Cash Paid for Local Agency Distributions xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Cash Paid for Bank Charge  xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Cash Paid to County xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Cash Paid for Operating Expenditures xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx  Cash Paid from Operating Activities xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx (xxxxxx.xx) (xxxxxx.xx)  xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx (xxxxxx.xx)  Net Increase (Decrease) in Cash xxxx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx
[brief] *State v. Cavallo*, 88 N.J. 508, 520 (1982).  “The primary justification for permitting expert testimony is that the average juror is relatively helpless in dealing with a subject that is not a matter of common knowledge. ”  *State v. Kelly*, 97 N.J. 178, 209 (1984).  Therefore, the initial requirement imposed by *N.J.R.E. 702* is that the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror.  *Kemp ex rel. Kemp v. State*, 174 N.J. 412, 424 (2002).  Expert testimony is not appropriate to explain what a jury can understand by itself.
[brief] *State v. Totowa Lumber*, 96 N.J. Super 115 at 121 (“The number of people who will participate in or benefit by the use for which the property is condemned is not determinant of whether the use is or is not a public one. ”) (quoting *County of Essex v. Hindenlang*, 35 N.J. Super at 479, 491).  Further, the fact that a private party may benefit from the taking does not render the taking private and not for “public use. ”
[brief] Because the officers did not announce their --- 4  Perhaps confusingly, the Model Jury Instruction provides, “It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the law enforcement officer was acting unlawfully in making the arrest, provided (he/she) was acting under color of (his/her) official authority and provided the law enforcement officer announces (his/her) intention to arrest prior to the resistance. ”  Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Resisting Arrest - Flight Not Alleged (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2a)” at 2.  This imposes no general requirement on officers to announce their intention to arrest and instead provides an avenue to conviction if the arrest is unlawful.  That is, if the arrest is unlawful, a defendant can still be guilty of resisting arrest only if the officer announces his intention to effect an arrest.  intention to arrest defendant, the jury was left no choice but to acquit defendant of resisting arrest in light of the trial judge’s instruction.  Certainly, however, the jury was not instructed that no arrest took place. \(^5\)  And while defendant asserts that there was a factual dispute given [...]’s testimony, (Db23), she contradicted herself on the stand and the videos demonstrated that her account of the encounter was false.  A defendant is not entitled to a self-defense instruction simply because a defense witness lies or severely misremembers facts before a jury.  As the Mulvihill Court noted in the context of a “defense of another” instruction, “[t]he intervenor’s mere naked assertion of such appearance and belief [in excessive force], without more, could not as a matter of sound policy be deemed sufficient to take the defense to the jury.
[brief] On May 2, 2022, Plaintiff and Defendant returned to the United States together.  To celebrate their arrival, Plaintiff’s parents had gone to great lengths to make the occasion special.  They had the house beautifully decorated, spending approximately $7,800 to ensure a memorable welcome.  A gathering of 20 to 30 people was organized to surprise them, adding to the excitement of the day.  To further mark the occasion, Plaintiff’s mother took Defendant to a salon for makeup and preparation, spending around $200 to $300 on the experience.  After this, they visited a local temple to receive blessings before heading to Plaintiff’s home in [...].  (1T96).  The first day at the house was filled with joy and celebration, but the mood shifted the following day.  Defendant expressed disappointment, which left Plaintiff puzzled.  She compared her new experiences and the house unfavorably to the high standards she had seen on Indian television.  She also complained about the thinness of her comforter, which she felt was inferior compared to what she was accustomed to.  Plaintiff felt that Defendant was not appreciating the efforts made for their arrival and suggested that they could make adjustments to improve her comfort.  Over time, this sense of dissatisfaction led Plaintiff to feel that Defendant did not truly want to be in the marriage.  (1T97).  Shortly after their arrival in America, Defendant mentioned that she had her period, which meant they could not consummate their marriage.  Plaintiff emphasized that he did not want to pressure her regarding this matter, wanting to respect her boundaries and comfort.  (1T97).  On the second day of their stay, Plaintiff took Defendant to the [...], a place of personal significance for him.  It was where he had studied and passed the NAPLEX & MPJE exam for Pharmacist Licensure.  However, Defendant’s reaction was less than respectful.  She made a dismissive joke about the library visit to a friend, which hurt Plaintiff deeply.  He had hoped she would appreciate the significance of the place to him, but instead, her comment felt dismissive of his past experiences.  (1T98).  A few days later, around May 11 or 12, Plaintiff, Defendant, and Plaintiff’s family went to Brick to select trees and shrubs for planting.  The outing was intended to involve Defendant in the process and to seek her input.  During the planting, Defendant suggested they should get similar plants the following year but referred to “you guys,” which made Plaintiff feel excluded.  Her choice of words underscored a sense of separation and a lack of partnership, furthering Plaintiff’s feeling that their relationship was not as cohesive as he had hoped.  (1T98).  **The Green Card and Deterioration of the Marriage**
[directive] This Directive imposes limitations that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.  B.  Severability.  The provisions of this Directive shall be severable.  If any phrase, clause, sentence, or provision of this Directive is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Directive shall not be affected.  C.  Questions.  Any questions concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Directive shall be addressed to the Executive Director of [...], or their designee.  D.  Effective date.  This Directive shall take effect November 22, 2024.
[brief] It is, therefore, no overstatement that the proposed regulator would immediately be a stranded asset as soon as it were installed and commissioned.  It would be well in excess of what is needed now and into the future to provide safe and adequate service consistent with the state’s environmental policies.  In the proceedings below, [...] refused to commit to not seeking recovery of the costs of the proposed regulator from ratepayers, and so at that point, we can expect a request to the [...] that the costs of the immediately useless gas combustion heated regulator be recovered as a stranded cost.  We remind the [...] that [...] purchased this combustion regulator in a prohibited sole source non-competitive manner.  To quote [...], it will be "a piece of equipment that's no longer needed, and it's -- there's still some unamortized costs on the books of the utility."  The simplest way to avoid burdening the ratepayers with a stranded cost is to avoid incurring the cost in the first place.  The petitions must be denied.
[brief] ”  102 N.J. 265, 278 (1986) (first citing State v. Sinclair, 49 N.J. 525, 540 (1967); and then citing Powell, 84 N.J. at 318-19).  Defendant asserts that, accepting the version of events he presented to police on the night of the murder, there was a rational basis to present a passion/provocation charge to the jury.  Specifically, he claims that his statement that [...] brought the gun to his house that night, coupled with the fact that he claimed they both got into a wrestling match, is enough to so charge the jury.  Defendant relies heavily on the fact that he requested this charge, meaning his threshold is lower.  Defendant is mistaken.  While the rational-basis analysis is less exacting, that does not mean the charge is permitted to be completely baseless so long as a defendant claims he was provoked in some way.
[brief] $50,000 transferred from [...]’s MR line of credit account on December 5, 2014 to [...]’s bank account #8309.  (36T 36:23 to 37:4).  - [...] was shown extracts of the [...] MR line of credit account from the company’s QuickBooks software and was able to tie the transfer of $50,000 from that account to a bank statement for the company for December 2014, which showed the funds were transferred to an account ending in 8309, which Plaintiffs established belonged to [...].
[brief] In a 2019 certification to the [...], Defendant [...] certified that the [...] Firm “does not have a formal Limited Liability Partnership Agreement as in effect on the date hereof. ”  Da36, at Da90.  Thus, according to Defendants’ own certification to their Bank, at the time of Plaintiff’s termination and subsequent litigation, absolutely no arbitration clause was in effect because Defendants had abandoned the 1991 Agreement as of May 2019.
[brief] Moreover, the Tenant Protection Act of 1992 specifically protects tenants like [...] from having to assume the costs of condominium conversation through increased rent, especially when the rent increase effectively amounts to eviction.  Regardless of whether this court finds that the Hoboken RCO guarantees landlords a value-based return on equity, the Board was not required to follow [...]’s methodology for calculating a hardship rent increase.  The *amici* support two alternative approaches to calculating return \(^4\)  See *2023 AFFORDABLE HOUSING REGIONAL INCOME LIMITS BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE*, AFFORDABLE HOUSING PROFESSIONALS OF NEW JERSEY (AHPNJ), https://ahpnj.org/member_docs/Income_Limits_2023.pdf (last updated May 26, 2023).  The monthly rent of approximately $2,400 ordered by the lower court would equal more than two-thirds of [...]’s total monthly income.  on equity advanced by the Board and [...] respectively and ask the court to consider, as both the Board and [...] did, [...]’s actual hardship, not that based on an assumed increase in value due simply to a change in status of the entire building; that is, the company’s hardship must be evaluated in the context of its lucrative investment in the overall property at [...].  A.  Hardship Rent Increases Must Strike a Balance Between the Interests of Landlords and Tenants.