ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The sole issue presently before this Court is whether a public entity, in this case the Defendants/Appellants [...] and [...] (“Defendants”), must be compelled to produce to requestor Plaintiff/Appellant [...] (“Plaintiff”) private email logs under the Open Public Records Act (“OPRA”).  The logs in question would have to be generated from the personal email accounts of elected officials.  Plaintiff’s argument is premised on the theory that, merely because those officials had forwarded, sent or received an email message on a personal service that could relate to the public function of the entity for which they were elected to serve, their private email services must generate logs that constitute government records.  This is a novel issue that is not the subject of any reported case cited by the parties in this matter.  Paff v. Galloway Township, 229 N.J. 340 (2017), established the principle that under OPRA email logs maintained on the official government server by a municipality (and therefore other government entity) constitute public records even if they must be generated based on stored electronic data from the government-controlled email accounts.  Plaintiff, having failed at the trial court level, is asking for the Appellate Division to expand the Supreme Court’s holding to compel government entities to set aside all technological and logistical obstacles necessary to generate logs from web-based email accounts or else violate OPRA.  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] By granting the Defendants’ motions to dismiss the IFPA claims and compelling [...] to arbitrate those dismissed claims, the Law Division disregarded the IFPA and its clear mandate that “insurers may sue. . . in any court of competent jurisdiction. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a).  The Law Division ignored the plain language of the IFPA, AICRA, the regulations interpreting AICRA, and thirty (30) years of State law precedent.  Instead, the Law Division usurped the role of the legislature and the [...] (“[...]”), by engaging in de facto rulemaking and creating new policies and procedures clearly inconsistent with the legislative intent.  The Law Division’s decision also deprives parties of their constitutional right to a jury trial.  If the Law Division’s decision were to become the law of this State, insurers would lose significant incentives to investigate and root out fraud.  Subjecting IFPA claims to dispute resolution – with limited discovery and the inability of arbitrators to award treble damages, attorneys’ fees, and other statutorily-prescribed damages – insurers such as [...] simply cannot afford to incur the time and money necessary to pursue such claims.  Thus, the burden of fighting against fraud and abuse in the system would fall solely on the State, through prosecutions by the Attorney General’s office.  The legislature clearly did not intend for this outcome when drafting the IFPA and AICRA, and Courts in this State have consistently agreed that jurisdiction over IFPA claims is properly in the Superior Court.  Accordingly, because the Law Division’s decision is inconsistent with the statutory intent, and the public policy of combating and preventing insurance fraud in this State, [...] respectfully urges this Court to reverse the Law Division’s decision.
[brief] On the merits, the court flatly discounted plaintiff’s expert report, stating that “the court does not need an expert to interpret and apply the relevant statute to the challenged ordinance and financial agreement. ”  Pa57-58.  The Court relied on Hirth v. City of Hoboken, supra, 337 N.J. Super. at 166-167, but Hirth recognizes that if the validity of an Ordinance “turns on disputed factual issues” the case must “proceed in the same manner as other civil litigation. ”  The Financial Agreement finding that the exemption was necessary to make the project “financially feasible” was a factual finding, and plaintiffs disputed it.  Unless the LTTEL is read to give municipalities the final say on whether exemptions are or not necessary—a position that is an untenable reading of the statute—then plaintiffs were entitled to pursue that factual claim.  In this instance, plaintiffs did so, offering a report by [...] of [...], an eminently qualified expert,\(^{13}\) to support its claim that the exemption did not meet the requirements of LTTEL.
[brief] (Argued Below Da60 – Da64).  N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 24(b) provides as follows:  a.  A person who shall:  (2)  Be present and witness, pay admission to, encourage or assist therein; ...Shall be guilty of a crime of the third degree.  N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 17(c)(3) provides as follows:  c.  It shall be unlawful to purposely, knowingly, or recklessly:  (3)  Cause [sic] or procure [sic] an act described in paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection to be done, by any direct or indirect means, including but not limited to through the use of another living animal or creature; or “an act described in paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection” consists of acts which:  1)  Torment, torture, maim, hang, poison, unnecessarily or cruelly beat, cruelly abuse, or needlessly mutilate a living animal or creature; [or]  (2)  Cause bodily injury to a living animal or creature by failing to provide the living animal or creature with necessary care, whether as the owner or as a person otherwise charged with the care of the living animal or creature;  The material term(s) and element(s) “living animal or creature” is not defined anywhere in N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 17.1 (the “Definitions” section) or in the statute itself.
[brief] The party who claims easement rights in a property subject to a development application - particularly an adjacent owner on notice of the development that may affect his claimed easement - has the obligation to participate at the Board hearing and present his easement rights.  See Kline v. Bernardsville Assn. Inc., 267 N.J. Super. 473, 478-480 (App. Div. 1993).  [...] in 1972 did not assert any claim of easement parking rights on the School property.
[brief] See R. 2:10-2; see also *Hemphill*, 142 S. Ct. 681 (Alito, J., concurring) (recognizing that a defendant may validly waive Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses).  We elect to review defendant's constitutional argument on the merits applying the plain error standard of review.  4  Since *Irving* and *Douglas* were decided, the Supreme Court in *State v. Henderson* recognized that reform of our eyewitness identification jurisprudence was necessary because “[s]tudy after study revealed a troubling lack of reliability in eyewitness identifications” and because the previous standard for assessing eyewitness identification evidence “overstate[d] the jury's inherent ability to evaluate evidence offered by eyewitnesses who honestly believe their testimony is accurate.
[brief] Da24 ¶ 20.  On or around August 18, 2016, however, [...] informed Plaintiff that it required [...], Esq.  (“[...]”), an attorney practicing law in Pennsylvania, to replace [...] as escrow agent.  Da22 ¶ 6; Da25 ¶ 28.  On or around August 25, 2016, Plaintiff retained [...], an attorney licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia, to represent Plaintiff in connection with the escrow arrangement with [...].  Da21 ¶ 2; Da25–26 ¶ 29; Da76–80.  [...] was and remains a resident of Virginia, was an “Of Counsel” employee at [...] at the time, and performed all work in connection with the representation of Plaintiff from [...]’s office in Washington, D.C.
[directive] GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL CASES  3.1  Relevant Conduct  A plea offer under these Guidelines should reflect the actual conduct of the defendant, and not just the specific episode, event or transaction constituting the specific offense to which the defendant will plead guilty, recognizing that drug distribution activity, and especially commercially motivated activity, typically involves conduct of an ongoing and repetitive nature.  A prosecutor in implementing these Guidelines is not permitted to ignore relevant offense characteristics or enumerated aggravating or mitigating circumstances.  By the same token, a prosecutor shall not apply a Special Offense Characteristic, Special Application and Enhancement Feature, Aggravating or Mitigating Factor, or Downward Departure unless there is a good faith basis to do so based upon the information available to the prosecutor and reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such information.  This system is implemented through the use of specially-designed worksheets.  The [...] Standardized Waiver Plea Form (see Appendix IA) uses checkoff boxes to indicate a defendant’s eligibility for a standardized “flat” or “open” plea offer.  The regular [...] Plea Negotiation Worksheet (see Appendices IB and IC) includes a checkoff box for each authorized Special Offense Characteristic, Special Application and Enhancement Feature, and Aggravating and Mitigating Factor, thus indicating to the court whether or not the defendant’s “relevant conduct” implicates that characteristic, feature or factor.  The completed Standardized Waiver Plea Form or regular [...] Plea Negotiation Worksheet must be submitted to the defense counsel and court as part of the written plea offer tendered pursuant to R. 3:9-1(b).  (Note, in contrast, that a draft or unapproved worksheet is confidential attorney workproduct.)  It is the responsibility of a prosecutor in negotiating and structuring a plea agreement to make certain that the plea offer presented to the court reflects the seriousness of the defendant’s offense behavior and does not undermine the purposes of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act, the Court’s decision in State v. [...], 153 N.J. 1 (1998), or the provisions of these Guidelines.  A prosecutor is expected to disclose fully and accurately to the court all facts and circumstances pertaining to the defendant’s conduct so that the court can properly discharge its responsibilities and appropriately determine whether the proposed disposition of the case is in accordance with the policies established in these Guidelines and the requirements of the Court’s decision in State v. [...], 153 N.J. 1 (1998).
[brief] In *United States Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press*, 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989) the unanimous Supreme Court of the United States found that any publication of a CHR is an unwarranted violation of personal privacy even if the report were accurate.  Surely, counsel at [...] was aware of this authority when deciding to publish [...]’s CHR on PACER on December 20, 2009.  [...] never answered or responded to the Summary Judgement Motion (Pa 58) which was not a motion for reconsideration and ignored by the trial court.  The record here makes abundantly clear that [...] knowingly, flagrantly, and repeatedly acted in defiance of the law in this case.  The trial court’s refusal to address these uncontested facts and evidence in this record concerning such defiance of the law is not discretionary.
[brief] Defendant focuses on how the recipient used the data but the conduct proscribed under § 1692c(b) focuses only on stopping regulated debt collectors from disclosing information to others and does not assess liability based on how disclosed information is used.  Defendant argues that when it conveyed the information to the unidentified person, it did not “communicate. ”  The Amended Complaint alleges facts that Defendant conveyed information to a person and that information regards a debt.  The FDCPA defines “communication” as “the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium. ”  Defendant is alleged to have conveyed information regarding a debt to a person and that is a communication.  Defendant also argues that the recipient is not a “person. ”  Defendant contends the unidentified recipient is not a person but a “medium. ”  Defendant sent information to someone.  Presumably, the recipient (and not a medium) was under an enforceable contractual duty to perform a service.  Moreover, Defendant agreed to pay that person (and not a medium) for that service.  Hence, Defendant conveyed the information to a “person.
[brief] It is simply not within the province of the OAE or the Court, however, to sua sponte strike down a law.  Instead, an aggrieved litigant is required -- and enabled -- to challenge the constitutionality of a statute.  Lastly, Defendants’ reliance on the decision in Knight is misplaced, as the Supreme Court found that a statute restricting dealings or relationships of members of the judiciary with casino entities did not violate the Court’s authority to prescribe and enforce standards of conduct for judges and attorneys.  That statute has nothing to do with the practice of law or provision of legal advice or services; it is a conflict-of-interest statute that serves only to regulate business relationships of judiciary members and casino and gaming entities.  3.
[brief] (Db56).  However, this Court did contemplate that plaintiffs could recover against [...] for an intentional assault by [...] because it stated that "[a]n employee's intentional or reckless action may be considered within the scope of employment."  (Pa28, citing Vosough v. Kierce, 437 N.J.Super. 218, 236 (A.D. 2014)).  This Court also stated that the "'fact that the employee's conduct is intentional and wrongful does not in itself take it outside the scope of his employment.'"  (Pa29, citing Vosough v. Kierce, 437 N.J.Super. 218, 236 (A.D. 2014)).  The jury was entitled to believe the plaintiff's version of the events.  If they did, the trial judge's instructions precluded them from finding in plaintiffs' favor on respondeat superior.
[brief] [State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458–59 (1967). ]  Our review of a trial court's denial of a motion for acquittal under Rule 3:18–1 is de novo, and we apply the same standard.  State v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534, 548–49 (2004).  We agree with the trial court's decision.  The State prosecuted [...] on theories of accomplice liability and conspiracy.  N.J.S.A. 2C:2–6a, the statute concerning liability for the conduct of another, provides that “[a] person is guilty of an offense if it is committed ... by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable[.]”  A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when he or she “is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of an offense,” or is “engaged in a conspiracy with such other person.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  [...] Final Decision 11/29/23……………………………Pa9  [...]  Initial Decision  6/13/23…………………………..Pa29  PROCEDURAL  HISTORY  On or about July 8, 2019, the Bill Ricci Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Ricci Act”) was signed into law.  On or about March 3, 2023, [...], along with many others, filed his Eligibility Registration Form to register his presence at Ground Zero under the Ricci Act, along with a Request for Amended Benefits Form, Affidavit, and Petition.  Pa35.  Pa61.  Pa63.  Pa65.  On or about May 2, 2023, the [...] administratively denied [...]’s appeal, and the matter was transmitted to the [...].  Pa76.  On or about June 13, 2023, the [...] issued an initial decision to deny [...]’s request to register for the Ricci Act.  Pa29.  On or about July 17, 2023, [...] appealed the Board’s initial decision and requested an administrative hearing.  Pa20.  The Board denied an administrative hearing and issued a Final Agency Decision on November 29, 2023.  Pa9.  This appeal ensued.  Pa1.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[directive] Private citizen complaints charging disorderly persons offenses against other persons (i.e., those who do not hold elected public office or are not candidates or nominees for elected public office) are subject to County Prosecutor review prior to a probable cause not determination.  Upon filing, these complaints, when entered into the eCDR system, will electronically sent to a judicial officer for a probable cause finding.  The same holds true be for all other private citizen complaints where the most serious charge a petty disorderly is persons offense, a traffic violation, a local ordinance, or any other lesser matter handled by the Municipal Courts, as these complaints are similarly not subject to County Prosecutor review.
[brief] ”  *Gonzalez v. City of Jersey City*, 247 N.J. 551, 571 (2021).  The Supreme Court of New Jersey has “made clear” that: the “exercise of … discretion” in N.J.S.A. 59:2-3(a) refers to actual, high-level policymaking decisions involving the balancing of competing considerations.  Such decisions have been traditionally entrusted to coordinate branches of government, and courts, utilizing standard tort principles, are ill-equipped to interfere with them.  These discretionary determinations likely include such decisions as “whether to utilize the Department’s resources and expend funds for the maintenance of [a] road; whether to repair the road by patching or resurfacing, [and] what roads should be repaired…”  Once it is determined that a maintenance program involving resurfacing will be undertaken, however, the government will ordinarily be held to the standard of care set forth in N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.  Although the exercise of some discretion may still be involved (e.g., the transportation planners may choose one resurfacing plan over another), the immunity rule will protect only basic policy determinations.  _Coyne, supra_, 182 N.J. at 489-90 (citing _Costa, supra_, 83 N.J. at 55 (internal citation omitted)).
[brief] This overpayment represents the damages sought by [...] herein.  While the Court held that the TPDs breached their fiduciary obligations to [...], it erroneously held that [...], a not-for-profit entity, was not damaged because the purchase of the Share was funded by a donation.  The Court further held that any [...]’s actions to protect the mosque taken after being damaged somehow negated [...]’s damages and absolved the TPDs from liability.  These erroneous conclusions by the Trial Court below are under appeal herein.
[brief] “Probable cause is a flexible, nontechnical concept.  It includes a conscious balancing of the governmental need for enforcement of the criminal law against the citizens’ constitutionally protected right of privacy. ”  Kasabucki, 52 N.J. at 116.  Thus, [w]hen a police officer seeking a search warrant presents the basis therefor in affidavit form to a judge for evaluation on the issue of probable cause, the judge’s approach must be a practical and realistic one.  The officer’s statements must be looked at in a common sense way without a grudging or negative attitude.  There must be an awareness that few policemen have legal training and that the material submitted to demonstrate probable cause may not be described with the technical nicety one would expect of a member of the bar.  Moreover, the judge should take into account the specialized experience and work-a-day knowledge of policemen.  [Id. at 117.]  Thus, the task of the issuing judge “is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. ”  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (emphasis added); accord Chippero, 201 N.J. at 28 (“Probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant requires a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
[brief] The statutory standard for merger, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(a), “provid[es] that offenses are different when each requires proof of facts not required to establish the other. ”  Tate, 216 N.J. at 307 (quoting State v. Hill, 182 N.J. 532, 542 (2005)).  That approach “has been characterized as ‘mechanical. ’”  Ibid.  Thus, New Jersey instead follows “a ‘flexible approach’ in merger issues. ”  Hill, 182 N.J. at 542 (quoting State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 561 (1994)).  The more flexible approach requires courts “to focus on the elements of the crimes and the Legislature’s intent in creating them, and on the specific facts of each case. ”  Ibid.  Courts should consider the time and place of each . . . violation; whether the proof submitted as to one count . . . would be . . . necessary . . . to a conviction under [the other] count; whether one act was . . . part of a larger scheme . . . ; the intent of the accused; and the consequences of the criminal standards transgressed.  [Tate, 216 N.J. at 311 (quoting Davis, 68 N.J. at 81) (alterations in original). ]  Under any merger analysis, [...]’s fourth-degree harassment, stalking, and retaliation-for-past-official-action convictions must merge.
[brief] (Pa49).  The Commissioner explained that New Jersey regulations require school districts to “‘remove from the position any teaching staff member who fails to maintain’ the required certificate. ”  (Pa48) (quoting N.J.A.C. 6A:9B-5.1(c)).  Because [...] did not have a valid certificate, as of the State Board’s October 28, 2021 order of suspension, the Commissioner found that “the [Woodbridge] Board acted in accordance with law when it terminated petitioner from his teaching position. ”  Ibid.  The Commissioner also agreed with the ALJ’s denial of [...]’s motion to place the tenure matter on the inactive list, noting that the [...]’s decision to terminate [...] had been based on the undisputed fact that his certificates was suspended and that the dispositive question of “[w]hether the Board’s actions in November 3 N.J.A.C. 6A:9B-5.1(a) requires:
[directive] 1.  Èske w konprann ke si w plede koupab de nenpòt ki enfraksyon swivan sa yo: lidè rezo trafik dwòg (2C:35-3); jere yon lokal kab pwodwi sistans kontwole ki danjre (2C:35-4); fabrike yon sistans kontwole ki danjre (2C:35-5) distribisyon, posesyon oswa fabrikasyon gamma hydroxybtututyrate (2C:35-5.2); distribisyon, posesyon oswa fabrikasyon flunitrazepam (2C:35-5.3), anboche jivenil pou distribiye dwòg (2C:35-6); distribisyon, livrezon oswa posesyon ak lentansyon pou distribiye yon sistans kontwole ki danjre a 1000 pye de pwopriyete lekòl (2C:35-7); distribisyon, livrezon oswa posesyon yon sistans kontwole ki danjre a 500 pye de lojman piblik, pak oswa bildin (2C:35-7.1); oswa, distribisyon, posesyon oubyen fabrikasyon imitasyon sistans kontwole ki danjre (2C:35-11)
[brief] (Pa484 to Pa492).  However, not a single Board member specifically addressed the positive or negative criteria analysis for a “c” variance.  The Board members set forth some minimal explanations regarding some aspects of the application that they did not like, without clearly analyzing the requests under the statutory criteria required.  The Board attempts to rectify this in its Amended Resolution by simply rejecting the substantial, credible expert testimony presented by Plaintiff and relying on the Board’s flawed assumptions.  Therefore, the Board’s denial of the requested bulk variances was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and must be vacated.
[directive] Negotiating Cases Under N.J.S.A. County Defendant Name  SBI Number  Use this form to notify the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice that the plea offer that was accepted by the defendant and the court was based on incomplete and/or inaccurate Criminal History information.  Criminal History Category Used to Determine Plea Offer: Corrected  Criminal History Category: As a result of additional criminal history information learned after the plea was taken pursuant to 3:9-3 (e.g., information detailed in the presentence investigation report), the...  Prosecutor moved to withdraw the plea offer.  Prosecutor elected not to withdraw original plea offer, but the court vacated the plea.  The court accepted the original plea offer and defendant was sentenced thereunder.  Comments (optional):  Send to: [...] [...]