ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Density variance d (5) - Negative Criteria  To satisfy the negative criteria for a density variance, the Board requires a showing that the variance "can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance."  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.  The Board found that the Applicant did not show that the variance could be granted without substantial detriment to the public good.  The problems delineated above in the analysis regarding the positive criteria have applicability in this analysis.  The increased density would affect the access to open space and passive recreation for the community.  The Applicant’s expert did not provide credible testimony to counter this obvious deleterious effect.  The public good would suffer substantial detriment as traffic would increase in the area.  The applicant’s expert’s testimony that the increases he noted in his study would not have a substantial impact on the surrounding roadways were found to not be credible or supported.  Applicant could not meet its burden to show that the project would not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the Master Plan and zoning ordinance.  The Board found that an increased number of units was only possible in the project by requesting numerous variances and reconfiguring parking such that cars would be much closer to buildings.  The Board found the application akin to a request for spot zoning and the grant of the relief would entail a substantial impairment to the zone plan pursuant to T.W.C. Realty v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 315 N.J. Super. 205 (Law Div. 1998).  As such, this prong of the negative criteria could not be met by the Applicant, and it did not meet its burden of proof.
[directive] Officers shall use the least amount of force that is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional to safely achieve the legitimate law enforcement objective under the circumstances.  3.1  Limitations on use of force.  In situations where officers are justified in using force, officers shall use only that degree of force that is reasonable, necessary, and proportional considering the totality of the circumstances, including the subject’s mental and physical condition, the nature of the offense, and most importantly the level of resistance or threat known to the officer at the time.
[brief] 8.  On December 7, 2021 [...] filed a Medpay arbitration which was assigned Docket Number [...] as a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on May 7, 2021 involving the injured party [...] and the [...] insured, [...].  On or about September 23, 2022, the Arbitrator entered an award in favor of [...] NJ Insurance Company in the amount of $5,000.00.  See arbitration award (Da178 – Da186).
[directive] 2.  The county prosecutor shall authorize all disbursements from CLETA.  Before funds can be disbursed, the county prosecutor shall notify its funding entity in writing of the intended This expenditures.  notification shall include at minimum: the a date, amount of disbursement, description of requested propertylfunds.  purposelreason of disbursement, personlcompanylagency receiving the propertylfunds, an indication of the proposed law enforcement use and the signature of the county prosecutor.  disbursements in  All $10,000 excess of shall require the signature of the county prosecutor and the chief administrative officer of the prosecutor’s office.  Seized Asset Account  B.
[brief] *Colloty v. Schuman*, 73 N.J.L. 92, 94 (Sup. Ct. 1905).  An agency relationship exists “when one person (a principal) manifests assent to another person (an agent) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act. ”  *N.J. Lawyers’ Fund for Client Prot. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co.*, 203 N.J. 208, 220 (2010) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (2006)).  “Even if a person is not an “actual agent,” he or she may be an agent by virtue of apparent authority based on manifestations of that authority by the principal. ”  *Sears Mortg. Corp. v. Rose*, 134 N.J. 326, 338 (1993).  Even accepting Plaintiffs’ version of the facts, Plaintiffs’ daughter agreed to the December Terms cloaked with both actual and apparent authority.
[brief] Had the plaintiffs argued that [...] cannot require proof of hardship to justify a waiver, the Township would have to have been joined as a party and given an opportunity to defend its ordinance.  *Cobble Close Farm v. Bd. of Adjustment of Middletown Tp.*, 10 N.J. 442, 455 (1952).  At 4T41-9 to 4T21-22, the court cited the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review and questioned whether the applicant presented sufficient supporting evidence to justify the grant of the waivers.  The applicant presented no competent evidence because it misunderstood the hardship required under Sec. 18-601.  "There are no 'peculiar conditions pertaining to the subject parcel' requiring non-compliant lot lines or necessitating the placement of a drainage system where there are supposed to be street trees those are by-design self created hardships by those who prepared the subdivision plans at the direction of the applicant in order to increase Lot yield and is there for the applicant’s profit.  At 4T41-23 to 4T47-6, the judge pointed out that the Board's professionals saw nothing wrong with the applications.  None of the Board's professionals applied Sec. 18-601, which requires hardship as the basis of a waiver.  The interpretation of an ordinance is a question of law, *Wyzykowski v. Rizas*, 132 N.J. 509, 518 (1993), and in the present case it is impossible to defer to professionals who do not recognize the standard for subdivision waivers in [...] Township.
[directive] Accordingly, every department shall be required to develop and maintain a BWC control ledger or log, which may be computerized.  9.2.1  Every department shall establish and implement a system to ensure that relevant BWC recordings are provided in discovery in a timely fashion.  The system established by the agency should include a provision to ensure that police arrest/incident/continuation reports indicate whether the incident or investigative activity described in the report was electronically recorded by a BWC.  Police reports should, when feasible, indicate the corresponding BWC control ledger/log number, and the BWC control ledger/log should cross-reference the incident case number.  Copies of BWC recordings made for the purpose of complying with the State’s discovery obligations shall be provided to the prosecutor in a readily available media format.
[brief] A.  The Award Is Supported by Clear, Convincing and Substantial Evidence  [...]’ rather offensive assertion that “the record before the trial court did not warrant punitive damages” (Db46) is belied, both on the facts and law, by this Court’s recent and remarkably analogous decision in Devli v. Tasci, A-2573-20, 2022 WL 17491290 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2022).
[brief] *See Audi of Am. v. Bronsberg & Hughes Pontiac*, 2017 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 233248.  This ruling is against the current law that plaintiff must prove that she suffered actual damages as a result of Defendants’ breach of duties before the Court can award legal fees incurred by Plaintiff to vindicate her rights, not the other way around!  In addition, in this case Plaintiff had spent typical litigation discovery cost through the two additional years of contested divorce proceedings after the re-opening of the Fou v. Fou matrimonial action by [...].
[brief] “The seminal case in New Jersey to consider whether a state statute confers an implied private right of action is *In re State Comm'n of Investigation.*”  *R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc.*, 168 N.J. at 273 (internal pin cite omitted).  “There, the Court considered whether the plaintiffs, who were being investigated by the [...] ([...]), could be granted an injunction to enforce the [...]’s statutorily mandated confidentiality obligations.
[brief] In cases where a defendant has been convicted of a lesser included offense, our courts hold that the sufficiency of the evidence should be tested upon a consideration of the entire record and not merely upon a limited application of the Reyes criteria to the State's proofs to determine whether a conviction of the lesser-included offense can be sustained.  State v. Sugar, 240 N.J. Super. 148, 153 (App. Div. 1990).  It is only if the State's evidence and its favorable inferences can support a guilty verdict, that the motion for acquittal should be denied.  Jones, supra, 242 N.J. at 168.  Contrast this matter with State v. Lane, 288 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1995), where a jury conviction for reckless manslaughter, death by auto and various motor vehicle offenses was affirmed since there was a sufficient factual basis upon which to support the verdict.
[brief] At the suppression hearing, the trial court heard testimony from [...], the officer who conducted the unlawful stop and search at issue.  (T3-24 to 3-6)  At around 6:00 p.m. on December 15, 2023, [...] responded to a dispatch about an alleged fight inside a convenience store in [...].  (T5-3 to 24, 6-8 to 11)  The only information [...] had about the individuals involved in the alleged fight was that they were Black men.  (T6-17 to 20)  [...] drove approximately a half mile to the store.  (T7-2 to 6)  As [...] drove up to the store, he did not see a fight.  Instead, he saw many individuals, including [...], outside the store.  (T7-10 to 17, 10-21 to 11-7)  Some of these individuals, including [...], appeared to be Black men.  (Db1: 10:29 to 10:41)  [...] was walking down the sidewalk; he had one hand in a fanny pack bag worn across his torso.  (T7-16 to 8-2, 82-22 ¹ [...] adopts the State’s abbreviations and adds “Sb” for the State’s merits brief and “Da” for the appendix to this response brief. to 25)  [...] testified that he believed based on his training and experience that [...] was holding a firearm in his bag.
[brief] A.  The Consumption Exception Restores Coverage Only For Bodily Injuries Caused By Consuming Food Contaminated By Indoor-Growing Mold  .........................41  1.  Nationwide Case Law Supports [...]’s Position ..................................................................................41  2.  The Plain Terms Of The Consumption Exception Require A Consumption-Caused Injury ..........................................................................................................................44  3.  [...]’s Interpretation Breaks Fundamental Rules of Policy Interpretation ..............................................46
[brief] (Aa 1 to 26)¹  The motion for reconsideration was supported by a certification of [...], Forensic Expert (Aa 21 to 23), and [...].  (Aa 24 to 26)  ¹  To avoid any confusion, the defendant has referenced his appendix to the prose supplemental brief by (Aa).  The defendant also relies on the appendix to appellate counsel’s brief referenced as (Da) and the transcript listings.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Rather, than extending the holding of *Omar*, the court should have engaged in a true best position analysis, which would have taken into account that: (1) Respondent and its predecessor failed to do anything at all to prevent the loss or mitigate the damages, and (2) --- \(^7\)  Both parties acknowledged that there was a lack of case law in New Jersey as to whether an escrow agent is considered the agent of the refinance lender.  (1T45:25-46:5; 48:10-14.)  Nonetheless, agency law in New Jersey is clear: “[a]n agency relationship is created when one party consents to have another act on its behalf, with the principal controlling and directing the acts of the agent. ”  *Sears Mortg. Corp. v. Rose*, 134 N.J. 326, 337 (1993).
[brief] Neither should the building story height limit.  2.5-story height limits on dwellings are imposed for fire safety and because most homes have attics for storage, which increases the physical height in feet of the home.  Here, [...]’s building has an extra level of floor beams, but none of the problems associated with 3-story homes, such as physical height exceeding the limit in the zone or a potentially dangerous firefighting condition.  In the case of the former, the building comported with the physical height limitation in the R-20A Zone, and in the latter, it would obviously need to be sprinklered and have fire stairs as required by the Uniform Construction Code.  With respect to the monument sign that [...] proposed, that too was, at worst, subsumed within the use variance request because signs are permitted for institutional uses, just not for single-family residential uses.
[brief] In connection with [...]’s review of [...]’s initial Waterfront Development Permit application, [...] determined that [...] could reduce the dock by 18 ft. and still meet the CZM Rules and in particular, the Submerged Aquatic Vegetation Rule, N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.6(b)(6)(i).  Appellant has put forth no evidence to dispute the location of the dock on that basis.  [...] also inspected [...]’s dock and considered the objections of Appellant and other third parties in issuing the 2017 WFD Permit and 2019 Permit Modification.  A review of the record, and in particular, Appellant’s photographs from its dock, reveal that the true basis for Appellant’s challenge is Appellant’s view.  (Aa0152).  Appellant also posted about the impact of [...]’s dock on the view from Appellant’s location online.  (Aa0424).  Additional fact-finding is not necessary as [...] previously determined on multiple occasions that [...]’s dock was constructed in accordance with all applicable laws and that the objections thereto were without merit.  Furthermore, this Court has already held that [...]’s dock met the CZM Rules in its May 8, 2024 unpublished opinion issued in In the Matter of P.T. [...] Family Limited Partnership [...], [...].
[brief] ”  Bartz v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1640, *12 (App. Div. Aug. 26, 2020) (emphasis added).  Mutual assent may be manifested through a party's written or spoken words, silence, conduct, or failure to act, so long as the party “intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he assents. ”  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 19(1)-(2).
[brief] [...] DID NOT WAIVE HIS AMBIGUITY ARGUMENT.  (1T at 22:4 to 23:18).  Instead of disputing Dr. Hole’s arguments regarding ambiguity, [...] simply states that the issue has been waived.  (Pb19-20).  However, as made clear in the initial brief, the exclusions at issue are susceptible to multiple interpretations, which is why there are two cases in New Jersey that required interpretation of those provisions.  *Superior Integrated Sols.*, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2147, at *22; *SL Indus., Inc.*, 128 N.J. at 198.  Coverage is only precluded when an injury is caused by the insured with “the knowledge that the injury would result” or arises out of the publication of material published “with knowledge of its falsity. ” (Da16-17).  A reasonable insured person may easily interpret those exclusions to not apply to tortious interference claims or allegations of tortious interference.  See *Cumberland Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Murphy*, 183 N.J. 344, 351 (2005) (holding that a provision which simultaneously did not require injury to be “expected or intended” but still required “willful harm” was ambiguous).  [...] cannot argue on one hand that the subject exclusions are clear and unambiguous to an insured reading the Policy, but then rely on case law such as *North Plainfield* to attempt to interpret the exclusions.  **IV.
[brief] Letter dated July 21, 2021 from [...] regarding Trial scheduled for August 17, 2021 (Attached at Pa279)  Letter dated August 2, 2021 from [...] regarding Trial scheduled for August 25, 2021 (Attached at Pa280)  Letter dated August 19, 2021 from [...] regarding Trial scheduled for September 22, 2021 (Attached at Pa281)
[brief] [...]’s initiation of booking changed nothing about defendant’s demeanor, as defendant continued to claim innocence despite the lack of questioning by police.  Defendant thrice acknowledged or interrupted [...]’s explanation that he could speak to the detectives in the interview room after processing.  [...] first acknowledged that defendant “said something about a lawyer,” and after fingerprinting, they would bring him to the interview room, re-read him his Miranda rights, and allow him to tell his side of the story if he elected to waive those rights.  Defendant immediately offered another explanation, but [...] stated again that he would re-read defendant’s Miranda rights in the interview room after fingerprinting.
[brief] Instead of a simple divorce, plaintiff has gotten an endless nightmare with over a decade of litigation.  In April 2018 a jury verdict was returned against defendants in the amount of $500,000 based on the jury finding that defendants had committed malpractice in their representation of plaintiff.  Thereafter, a final judgment, which included an award of attorney’s fees and interest, was entered by the trial court in January 2019.  Defendants appealed the final judgment and in August 2021, this Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the matter for the entry of an amended final judgment pursuant to this Court’s findings.  After this Court’s decision, defendants sought leave to appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court.  Their application was denied.  Following the denial before the New Jersey Supreme Court, defendants sought leave to appeal to the United States Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court rejected defendants’ arguments.  On remand, even though this Court had already addressed defendants’ arguments on appeal, defendants again attempted to overturn the jury verdict by filing a motion to vacate the final judgment.  The trial court, now sitting before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., denied defendants’ motion.  Thereafter, on July 10, 2023, the trial court entered an amended final judgment which followed the instructions provided in this Court’s opinion to reset plaintiff’s damage award and recalculate the interest.  The Appellate Division opinion did not disturb the attorney’s fee award.  As the amended final judgment was being entered pursuant to this Court’s instructions, there was no need for the trial court to hear new argument from the parties.  Despite the fact that the amended final judgment was entered pursuant to the decision of this Court, here, the parties are again rehashing the same arguments from defendants.
[brief] A.  **[...] History and Operations. **  Between 1957 and 1962, work at the [...] primarily involved rolling and fabricating steel and titanium, and fabricating uranium fuel elements under a license with the [...] (“[...]”).  Nuclear manufacturing ceased in 1962.  (Pa0093.)  After 1963, the Site was expanded to eventually include 12 buildings where gold and silver wire and stock for the jewelry and electronics industry were manufactured.  (Pa0008; Pa0093.)  Operations at the [...] ceased in 1993.  (Pa0008.)  B.  Contamination at the [...]
[brief] **PUNITIVE DAMAGES WERE WARRANTED IN THIS MATTER AND THE COURT REJECTION OF THIS REQUEST SHOULD BE REVIEWED BY THE APPELLATE COURT AND REVERSED BASED ON THE FACTS DELINEATED IN THIS MATTER.  Pa1, Pa211**  The Court considered whether punitive damages could be awarded and found that punitive damages could be awarded in Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., *supra* at 601.  There were two conditions that had to be met as prerequisites to the award of punitive damages in a discrimination suit under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.  *Rendine v. Pantzer*, 141 N.J. 292, 313 (1995).  Those two requirements are: (1) "actual participation in or willful indifference to the wrongful conduct on the part of upper management" and (2) "proof that the offending conduct is `especially egregious."  *Id.* at 314.  *Baker v. National State Bank*, 161 N.J. 220 (N.J. 1999).  In this case, there was willful indifference to the actions of the teachers that engaged in discriminatory behavior.  The blatant use of a racial slur by [...] occurred in two separate incidents, one in January of 2019 and again in May of 2019.  The actions of Ms. [...] were made known to the Superintendent of Human Resources, [...] as well as [...].  There was blatant indifference to the wrongful actions of Ms. [...] where she repeatedly uttered the racial slur, nigger and asked the students why can’t she use the word nigger.  This behavior was egregious and the complaint by students in May of 2019 represented the second incident of Ms. [...] using the racial slur.  Further, as noted in Taylor v. Metzger, one utterance of a racial slur establishes a hostile work environment.  Taylor and other cases of that type establish the fact that use of racial slurs is egregious.  Therefore, the requirements to warrant the award of punitive damages are present in this case.  Respondents predictably claimed that there are no facts to support the award of punitive damages when the actions of [...] were well known to Respondents, so, the read is that this kind of behavior is allowed.  This position taken by the Respondents was adopted by the Trial Court despite the record presented.  Punitive damages are warranted and alert the offender that the behavior for which punitive damages are awarded should never happen again.  The award of punitive damages is necessary to bring about the conformance of behavior and put the school system on notice that the unlawful behavior has to be addressed.  It is requested that the Appellate Court reverse and remand this matter to the trial court so that the record can be completed.  It is also requested that upon return to the trial court that the matter should be reassigned to another judge for completion.  A request is further made that the Appellate Court consider transferring this matter to another County on return to the Trial Court.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] On December 22, she emailed the prosecutor regarding interrogatories.  In response to his January 7, 2023 reply that they had not been propounded, she propounded them on March 15.  (Da305-18; 23T4-4 to 9)  In a May 12 letter, the prosecutor asserted they sought irrelevant information.  (Da319)  On June 19, [...] moved to compel compliance with the prior discovery order.  (Da320-21)  On June 21, Hon. [...] denied the motion and sua sponte decided the prior discovery orders were improvidently granted, vacating them.  (24T24-4 to 9; Da322-26)  On June 27, 2023, [...] filed a motion to reconsider and a letter requesting an adjournment.  (Da327-30)  PCR counsel explained that she still had open investigations and had not completed her submissions.  (Da329)  On June 28, 2023, [...] filed motions to recuse and for dismissal or rehearing based on newly discovered evidence and prosecutorial misconduct.  (Da331-34)  That day, [...] denied pending motions and heard argument on the PCR petition.  (25T32-19 to 41-3)  On June 29, she issued written opinions denying recusal and the PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing.