[brief] I.  REPLYING TO POINT I, THE STATE MOST CERTAINLY DID IMPLY THAT [...] IDENTIFIED [...] AS THE SHOOTER IN THE OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENT.  At Pb3, the prosecution flat out denies that which is set forth at 2T32-8 to 2T33-11.  The State failed to produce Sosa and other witnesses who allegedly identified Pena as the shooter.  The prosecutor circumvented the problem by eliciting [...]'s testimony that he spoke with the people, then identified Pena.  The prosecution (at Pb3) misunderstands the holding in *State v. Bankston*, 63 N.J. 263 (1973).  The issue there was not whether a testifying police officer may refer to 'information received.'  The problem was that the witness went further and led the jury "to believe that . . . [the] informer, who was not present in court and not subjected to cross-examination, had told the officers that defendant [had] committ[ed] a crime."  *Id.* at 271.  The reliance on *State v. Roach*, 146 N.J. 208 (1996), see Pb3, is unavailing.  There, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that "it is the 'creation of the inference, not the specificity of the statements made,' that determines whether the hearsay rule was violated."  *Id.* at 225 (quoting *State v. Irving*, 114 N.J. 427, 447 (1989)).  The deprivation of the defendant's confrontation right was deemed harmless in that case.  "'The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction."  Id. at 226 (quoting Bankston, 63 N.J. at 273).  The jurors specifically requested [...]'s report and Sosa's statement, and was told that they had to rely on their recollection of Brown's testimony.  Quoting from State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397, 419 (2020), the State (at Pb4) refers to "anything else tying the defendant to the crime[.]"  The State appears to be suggesting that the use of hearsay and the deprivation of confrontation rights is irrelevant because of the video footage.  The jurors obviously did not agree because they asked to see the Brown report and Sosa's statement.  The State refers to "the context of the testimony" (Pb4).  The detective testified that he heard out-of-court declarations, then he identified the shooter.  One is at a loss how [...] is taking the testimony out of context.  At Pb5, the prosecution paraphrases portions of the transcript regarding [...]'s investigation.  At Db6, the defense directly quoted 2T32-8 to 2T33-11.  The "inescapable inference" (Medina, 242 N.J. at 409 (quoting Bankston, 63 N.J. at 271)) was that the non-testifying witnesses told the detective that Pena shot Sosa.  If the State did not intend that inference, then Brown's representation that he spoke with the declarants would have been pointless.  At Pb5 to Pb6, the prosecution continues to tout what it claims to have seen on the video.  The jurors saw the video -- and they asked the judge for [...]'s report and the witness statement.  "'The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.'"  Bankston, 63 N.J. at 273 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)).  There is more than a reasonable probability that the jurors convicted [...] based on what they assumed [...] had said to the detective.  At Pb7, the State cites R. 2:10-2.  To the extent the prosecution is insinuating that [...] failed to object to the hearsay below, the claim is belied by the record.  See 2T33-5.  II.