ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] By email dated April 12, 2022, [...] was again advised by the court staff that the additional information requested to consider the application for indigency had not been received, that the application was already out of time and that the appeal was not considered filed until the indigency request was decided by [...] and/or Plaintiff decided to pay the fee and order the transcripts.  (Pa317).  On April 2, 2022, [...], J.S.C., entered an Order dismissing Defendant’s (Plaintiff in the instant case) appeal.
[brief] In other words, [...] entered the 2016 Lease with [...] before acquiring any ownership interest in the property.  B.  2011 Lease Agreement  In its Summary Judgment Motion, [...] sought to rely upon a 2011 Lease Agreement (the “2011 Lease”) between Joseph [...] Realty, L.L.C.  (“Joseph”) and Elizabeth [...] Realty, L.L.C. (“Elizabeth”), as the landlords, and [...], as the tenant.  However, [...] did not produce this 2011 Lease in discovery, and the only lease produced was the 2016 Lease between [...], as landlord, and [...], as Tenant.  Moreover, the 2011 Lease is irrelevant to the present matter because the title history of the Property establishes that the owner of the Property immediately prior to [...]’s ownership were the former individual defendants, [...], [...] and [...], not Joseph and Elizabeth.  (Pa0035-0043).  There is no evidence of a lease agreement between [...], [...] and [...], as landlords, and [...], as the tenant.  Nor was there evidence showing that the 2011 Lease was assigned by Joseph and Elizabeth to [...], [...] and [...].  (Pa0001-0033).  C. [...]’s Fatal Electrocution Occurred While He was Trying to Replace an Emergency Light Fixture Ahead of an Annual Fire Inspection.
[brief] Plaintiffs/Appellants, the [...] ("Appellants") file this Brief in support of their appeal of the Trial Court’s decision to deny the Appellants’ Motion to Affirm the Sufficiency of their Affidavits of Merit, and outright dismiss the defendant, [...] (the “Defendant”) with prejudice at the outset of the case.  This is a medical malpractice matter that arises out of care provided to the decedent while he was a resident of the defendant, [...] – a residence affiliated with the Defendant.  On February 15, 2023, the decedent was provided an improper amount of insulin medication for treatment of his diabetes.  This resulted in the decedent suffering from a severe hypoglycemic episode that went unnoticed, resulting in his demise at the age of 28.  The Complaint in this matter was filed on February 6, 2024, alleging claims of malpractice against various providers, including the Defendant - an entity that is alleged to be vicariously liable for the negligence of the co-defendant care providers and entities.
[brief] ”); Variblend Dual Dispensing Sys., LLC v. Seldel GmbH & Co., KG, 970 F. Supp. 2d 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“the rights of an assignee are subject to . . . all the terms of the contract between the account debtor and assignor and any defense or claim arising therefrom.  This principle applies to arbitration provisions, which would be of no value if a party could escape the effect of such a clause by assigning a claim subject to arbitration between the original parties to a third party"); *Banque v. Amoco Oil Co.*, 573 F. Supp. 1464 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); *Mark v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54498, 2015 WL 1910527 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2015) (Da75-Da78) (arbitration clause enforced in case filed by consumer against debt collector who purchased account from original creditor); *Bellows v. Midland Credit Mgmt.*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48237, 2011 WL 1691323 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (Da1-Da6); *James v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20786, 2015 WL 720195 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (Da55-Da60) (arbitration clause enforced in case filed by consumer against debt collector who purchased account from original creditor); *Ramos v. Hertz Corp.*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165803, at *6, 2018 WL 4635972 (D. Col. Sept. 26 2018) (Da87-Da92) (holding assignee stands in shoes for purposes of arbitration); *Funderburke v. Midland Funding, L.L.C.*, No. 12-2221-JAR-DJW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13438, 2013 WL 394198, at *5 (D. Kan. Feb. 1, 2013) (Da30-Da37) (holding non-signatory to an arbitration agreement containing an assignment clause could enforce the arbitration agreement because the non-signatory was an assignee, and thus "it steps into the shoes of" the assignor who signed the arbitration agreement").
[brief] D.  [...]’s Conclusion About the Vehicle Incidents is Supported by the Record and Should be Upheld.  [...] begins by citing N.J.S.A. 39:3-10, which states in relevant part, “No person shall drive a motor vehicle on a public highway in this State unless the person is . . . in possession of a validated permit, or a probationary or basic driver’s license issued to that person”.  [Pa50].  [...] also discussed how TPD Rules and Regulations 8-7, which requires that any motor vehicle incident must be reported to a TPD officer’s superior officer, was applicable to the instant matter.  [Pa50].  [...] discussed how Appellant never reported any of the five (5) incidents involving Appellant’s vehicle, which occurred on October 13, 2014, January 25, 2015, April 19, 2018, May 2, 2018, and November 29, 2018.  [Pa50-Pa51].  [...] correctly concluded that Appellant was required to report the aforementioned vehicle incidents and failed to do so.  [Pa50-51].  [...]’s conclusion about the Ewing Vehicle Incidents and the Vehicle incidents was based on uncontroverted record evidence [1T53:6-9; 5T41:1-3, 5T42:17 – 5T43:19, 5T45:12-13], and should not be disturbed.
[brief] Thus, the [trial] court should assess the experience and skill of the prevailing party’s attorneys and compare their rates to the rates prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.  [Ibid.]  The Court stressed that this determination “need not be unnecessarily complex or protracted. ”  Ibid.  Rather, trial courts should be satisfied “that the assigned hourly rates are fair, realistic and accurate, or should make appropriate adjustments. ”  Ibid.  Also, the hourly rates are to be “based on current rates rather than those in effect when the services were performed.
[brief] Even if [...] were able to compel arbitration through the doctrine of equitable estoppel, [...] waived its purported ability to compel arbitration through affirmative litigation conduct, inconsistent with its ostensible desire to compel arbitration.  There is no mandate that requires arbitration each and every time an arbitration clause may be part of a contract.  *See Arafa v. Health Express Corp.*, 243 N.J. 147, 164-65 (N.J. 2020).  Despite the incredibly broad language contained in the arbitration provision (Pa30) of the CSA with [...], [...] engaged in affirmative litigation conduct for several months, repeatedly affording itself of judicial resources and seeking relief from the court.  [...] engaged in motion practice and sought to have [...]’s claims dismissed on the merits.  It was only after [...]’s first Motion to Dismiss was denied (Pa44) that [...] sought to compel arbitration of [...]’s claims.  Moreover, [...] failed to assert arbitration or jurisdiction as affirmative defenses in their Answer to the Amended Complaint—filed less than two months prior to the Motion to Dismiss and compel arbitration—despite asserting twenty-two separate affirmative defenses.  Rather, [...] expressly certified that no arbitration proceedings were contemplated.  (Pa61).  In 2013, prior to the prejudice requirement for waiver being effectively removed by *Morgan*, supra, the New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed waiver of arbitration in *Cole v. Jersey City Med. Ctr.*, 215 N.J. 265 (2013).  In *Cole*, the court reasoned:  Any assessment of whether a party to an arbitration agreement has waived that remedy must focus on the totality of the circumstances.  That assessment is, by necessity, a fact-sensitive analysis.  In deciding whether a party to an arbitration agreement waived its right to arbitrate, we concentrate on the party's litigation conduct to determine if it is consistent with its reserved right to arbitrate the dispute.  Among other factors, courts should evaluate: (1) the delay in making the arbitration request; (2) the filing of any motions, particularly dispositive motions, and their outcomes; (3) whether the delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party's litigation strategy; (4) the extent of discovery conducted; (5) whether the party raised the arbitration issue in its pleadings, particularly as an affirmative defense, or provided other notification of its intent to seek arbitration; (6) the proximity of the date on which the party sought arbitration to the date of trial; and (7) the resulting prejudice suffered by the other party, if any.  No one factor is dispositive.  A court will consider an agreement to arbitrate waived, however, if arbitration is simply asserted in the answer and no other measures are taken to preserve the affirmative defense .
[brief] ”  Id. at 238.  In order to satisfy the first requirement, directly negating guilt, the exculpatory evidence must “squarely refute[] an element of the crime in question. ”  Hogan, 144 N.J. at 237; Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. at 427; see e.g., Smith, 269 N.J. Super. at 97-98 (three witness statements putting defendant “at a different location and intoxicated some one and one-half hours before the robbery” did not negate guilt); State v. Gaughran, 260 N.J. Super. 283, 290-91 (Law Div. 1992) (prosecutor mislead the grand jury by withholding medical report which directly contradicted victim’s claims of sexual assault).
[directive] Bail Schedule 2  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description
[brief] [...] collected a “red, black, white and yellow warm [-]up jacket” and a “red, white and blue warm[-]up jacket” from the [...] both of which were taken from [...].  [...] was treated for his wounds at [...].  [...] collected from this medical facility the following items of clothing worn by [...] when he was admitted to the hospital under the name “[...]”: a pair of brown boots, a white thermal long sleeve shirt, a grey hooded sweatshirt, a pair of black and blue gym shorts, boxer shorts, and a pair of blue jeans with a black and white leather belt.  [...] confirmed that [...] was not wearing a jacket when he first reported for treatment of his gunshot wound.
[brief] This case involves basic zoning law and procedures established by the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL) for determining the validity and legality of non-conforming uses/structures.  The law as to burden of proof and MLUL procedures has been long defined by case law.  This case has become convoluted and distracted by collateral litigation as to whether the predecessor in title to the [...] property owned by [...] ("[...]" or "[...]") granted an easement by a 1963 agreement to the [...] ("[...]" or "[...]") for [...] staff/attendees to park on [...] property.  In the collateral litigation --- now in a companion appeal ([...]) --- the Chancery Court determined an easement for this [...] off-site parking was established.  However, the issue before the Zoning board was whether this off-site parking use/facility on the [...] property was ever authorized and legal under zoning law.  The zoning law issue --- whether the [...] off-site parking use on the [...] property is currently a permitted use and, if not, was the off-site parking use demonstrated to be a legal pre-existing nonconforming use --- was brought to the Zoning Board by the [...] as per N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68.  The fact is that whether the off-site parking use was granted permission by the property owner by an easement or simply an informal license is not relevant to its zoning illegality.  The Zoning Board --- despite repeated erroneous advice from the Zoning Board attorney --- rendered the legally correct determination and Resolution that the [...] off-site parking on the [...] property is a prohibited use under current zoning and there was no proof presented by the proponent to demonstrate that the off-site parking was ever a legally permitted use under zoning regulations.
[directive] Czy rozumie Pan(i), że zanim sędzia uzna Pana(i) winę, będzie Pan(i) musiał(a) powiedzieć b.  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No] sędziemu, co Pan(i) zrobił(a), co powoduje, ze jest Pan(i) winny(a) tego przestępstwa/wykroczenia?  Do you understand that before the judge can find you guilty, you will have to tell the judge what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s)?  3.  Czy rozumie Pan(i) znaczenie postawionych zarzutów?  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  Do you understand what the charges mean?
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[directive] Force that an officer uses with the purpose of causing, or that a reasonable officer knows creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury.  Discharging a firearm, constitutes deadly force, unless the discharge occurred during the course of a law enforcement training exercise, routine target practice at a firing range, a lawful animal hunt, or the humane killing of an injured animal.  A threat to cause death or serious bodily injury by the display of a weapon or otherwise, so long as the officer’s purpose is limited to creating an apprehension that deadly force will be used if necessary, does not constitute deadly force.
[brief] MANSLAUGHTER AS LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSES FOR THE MURDER COUNTS.  (5T184-1 to 188-5)  ......................................................  7  A.  The Testimony at the Trial that a Physical Struggle Ensued Between [...] and the Victims as They Tried to Remove Him From the House, and that One of the Victims Engaged in the Struggle Was Armed with a Loaded Handgun, Was Sufficient to Warrant a Passion/Provocation Instruction.  .............................................  8  B.  Defense Counsel  Sufficiently Advocated for the Passion/Provocation Instruction to the Court  Despite an Initial Request for an All-or-Nothing Trial, and the Trial Court’s Stated Reasons for Denying the Instruction Were Legally Erroneous.  .......................  15 POINT II AT SENTENCING, THE TRIAL COURT MADE ERRORS IN WEIGHING THE AGGRAVATING FACTORS AND FAILED TO CONDUCT THE APPROPRIATE ANALYSIS BEFORE IMPOSING THREE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES, RESULTING IN AN EXCESSIVE SENTENCE AMOUNTING TO LIFE WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE.
[brief] The entire controversy doctrine’s preclusive effect applies “not only to matters actually litigated, but to all aspects of a controversy that might have been thus litigated and determined. ”  Vision Mortg. Corp. v. Patricia J. Chiapperini, Inc., 307 N.J. Super. 48, 52 (App. Div. 1998) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).  The doctrine is clear that “[a] plaintiff bringing an action based on two distinct legal theories is required to bring those claims together in one proceeding. ”  DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at 271.  This appeal is simply [...]’s impermissible attempt to have this Court consider, for the second time, whether it should have a chance to litigate a bad faith claim.
[brief] Dixon v. Jacobsen Mfg. Co., A. Excluding The Testimony Of [...] Was Proper Under N.J.R.E. 407  And N.J.R.E. 403  Plaintiff argues that [...] should have been permitted to testify that Defendant mopped the wet floor and placed a hazard sign down, after Plaintiff’s slip-and-fall incident.  Plaintiff argues that evidence of such subsequent remedial measures is admissible as to “other issues” besides negligence of Defendant.  Plaintiff, however, failed at the time of trial and presently, to set forth the “other issues” of substance or merit related to the trial the testimony was being offered.
[brief] The State objected to defendant's motion for a mistrial by noting that the “evidence at issue is not before the jury right now.  So, as far as a mistrial goes, there is nothing now in front of this jury that would cause a mistrial....  [I]t is really a motion in limine that is being made by [defense counsel].”  In response, defense counsel argued that the proposed in-court identification of defendant by [...] was “the most prejudicial identification that could possibly be....  There is no one else sitting next to me, and I'm clearly the defense attorney.  How is that a valid identification?”  The judge noted that defendant's objection went to the weight of any such in-court identification, but not to its admissibility.  The court gave defense counsel the opportunity to request a Rule 104(a) hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether the in-court identification would be permitted.  Defense counsel indicated that rather than immediately proceed with the Rule 104(a) hearing, she would instead speak to [...] along with her investigator and show him the photo array to see whether he could still make an identification of defendant.  She would then decide whether a 104(a) hearing would be necessary.  The court agreed with that procedure, and the sidebar ended with the court formally denying the defense request for a mistrial.
[brief] We submit that if the Trial Court had agreed that a property under renovation is more like a commercial property than a private residential premises, the motion may have been defeated.  The property owner’s duty in this case arises out of a fact pattern that is unique, and the nuances of the relationship between the property owner and pedestrian are more like, we submit, the relationship between the commercial property owner and pedestrian than the residential property owner and pedestrian.  In order to determine the nature and extent of the duty owed by the property owner to a third party who enters onto the property, the Court typically will evaluate the nature of the relationship between the property owner and the individual on the property.  Here, while the property was a residential house, it was not a residence.  It begs the question – if the property is not a residence, why should the respondents get the benefit of “residential property owner immunities? ”  We respectfully submit the property could only be considered commercial, or perhaps a hybrid of the two, up and until the time it became a residence.  Although the Trial Court emphasized that the NJ Supreme Court decision in *Luchejko v. City of Hoboken*, 207 N.J. 191 (2011) was controlling, it is important to first consider that the condominium building involved in the *Luchejko* case was an occupied condominium – and so was an actual residence at the time.  Like a commercial entity, the respondents in the matter before the Court were renovating the property, thereby increasing its value, for nearly ten months prior to residing in the property, and then the accident occurred six months prior to occupancy.
[directive] 9.10.3  Honesty is an essential job function for every New Jersey law enforcement officer.  Officers who are not committed to the truth, who cannot convey facts and observations in an accurate and impartial manner and whose credibility can be impeached in court cannot advance the State’s interests in criminal matters.  In addition, defendants in criminal matters may be entitled to certain evidence the prosecutor has concerning the credibility of prosecution witnesses, including police officers.  Prosecutors are considered to possess such evidence even when law enforcement agencies create and maintain information concerning the honesty of individual officers.  Furthermore, prosecutors may be required to provide such evidence to the court.  It is therefore imperative that the internal affairs investigator assist prosecutors with their legal duty to review and, if necessary, disclose evidence that may impact the credibility of police officers.  (See Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2019-6).
[brief] The Comments made by Defense Counsel in Summation were Improper, Prejudicial, and had the Clear Capacity to Cause an Unjust Result (7T21:25-22:3; 7T24:7-15; 7T25:2-6; 7T33:1-4; 7T35:18-36:20; 7T39:24-40:3).  “Summations must be fair and courteous, grounded in the evidence, and free from any potential to cause injustice. ”  Risko v. Thompson Muller Automotive Group, Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 522 (2011).  Although counsel is given broad latitude in summation, comments must be restrained within the facts shown or reasonably suggested by the evidence adduced during the course of trial.  Colucci v. Oppenheim, 326 N.J. Super. 166, 177 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 395 (2005).  Counsel may also not use disparaging language to discredit the opposing party or their witnesses or accuse the party’s attorney of trying to deceive the jury or deliberately distorting the evidence.  Szczecina v. PV Holding Corp., 414 N.J. Super. 173, 178 (App. Div. 2010).  When a summation has the capacity to improperly influence the jury’s ultimate decision making, judicial intervention, including the granting of a motion for a new trial, is required.  *Bender*, 187 N.J. at 431.  In this matter, the plaintiff was unable to appear at trial due to unrelated health issues.
[brief] | .4 hrs. | $152.00 | $437.00 | | 3 | 12/7/21 |  Research for opposition and begin draft brief in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend to [...] | 3.70 hrs. | $1,406.00 | $1,843.00| | 4 | 12/8/21 |  Draft brief in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to amend.  Review proposed discovery dates.