ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The change in the Redevelopment Plan based on the New Agreement among the [...], [...], The Redeveloper And [...] (the “County”).  On or about July 26, 2021, the Redevelopment Agency, the Borough, the Redeveloper and the County entered into an Agreement (the “Four Party Purchase Agreement”) pursuant to which the Redevelopment Agency agreed to re-sell one-half of Plaintiff’s Property (11 acres) to the County for Open Space if the Redevelopment Agency acquires Plaintiff’s Property.  (Pa 45-64).  Prior to the Four Party Purchase Agreement, the Redevelopment Plan, as it then existed, contemplated that the Redevelopment Agency, with funding provided by the Redeveloper, would acquire the 22.5 acre Plaintiff’s Property.  (Pa 111).  [...] would then transfer the 22.5 acre property to the Redeveloper who would construct the 350 Unit [...] on the site, which would need to include 70 affordable units to partially comply with the Borough’s Mt. Laurel obligation as ordered by the 2012 Judgment for Municipal Compliance.  (Pa 111-112).  In addition, under the prior plan, an approximately 50 foot wide greenway running along the bank of Mill Pond (approximately 4 acres) would be sold to the County as part of an Open Space plan creating a walkway for the public around Mill Pond and some connecting waterways.  This is the plan that was described by the Borough as part of its 2019 Master Plan.  (Pa 30, 38).  Under the new Four Party Purchase Agreement entered into in 2021 which the Ordinance is intended to facilitate, the Borough and the Redevelopment Agency have contractually agreed not to proceed with the 350 Unit [...], but instead have agreed to adopt a new Redevelopment Plan.  (Pa 64).  Under that new Redevelopment Plan only one-half (11 acres) of Plaintiff’s Property would be retained by the Redeveloper for a reduced residential development of 300 units and the other half of Plaintiff’s Property (11 acres) would be sold to the County for Open Space.  A copy of the new Redevelopment Plan is attached as an exhibit appearing as the last page of the Four Party Purchase Agreement.  (Pa 64).  As a result of this Agreement, the density of the residential component of the project increased from 19 residential units per acre to 27 units per acre, a 42% increase.  (Pa 64).  Although the total residential units would be reduced to 300 residential units from 350 residential units under the original plan, the number of Mount Laurel units to be provided stays the same at 70 units which will likely affect the economic viability of the project and the likelihood of it ever getting built.  Building the affordable housing is one of the objectives of the Master Plan which is actually being hurt by the Ordinance, making the Ordinance inconsistent with the Master Plan even if only the Objectives of the Master Plan are examined.  (Pa 64).  G.
[brief] ’  *F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains*, 100 N.J. 418, 426–27, 495 A.2d 1313 (1985).  As our Supreme Court has written, ‘even with respect to public entities, equitable considerations are relevant in evaluating the propriety of conduct taken after substantial reliance by those whose interests are affected by subsequent actions. ’  *Skulski v. Nolan*, [68 N.J. 179, 198 [(1975)], 343 A.2d 721.
[brief] [...] alleged that he visited a [...] branch, where he was taken into the manager’s office, was asked some questions, entered his new user name and password into a computer, and signed an iPad.  (Id.)  Later, in response to [...]’s Motion, [...] asserted that no one explained what he was signing, and he received no documents.  (PA135–136.)  On May 18, 2022, [...] electronically signed a [...] account application.  (PA029–037.)  Among other things, the account application states:  Each person who signs the “Certified/Agreed To” section of this Application certifies that:  A.  The Customer’s use of any [...] Bank, N.A. (“Bank”) deposit account, product or service will confirm the Customer’s receipt of, and agreement to be bound by, the Bank’s applicable fee and information schedule and account agreement that includes the Arbitration Agreement [i.e., the DAA] under which any dispute between the Customer and the Bank relating to the Customer’s use of any Bank deposit account, product or service will be decided in an arbitration proceeding before a neutral arbitrator as described in the Arbitration Agreement and not by a jury or court trial.  (PA035.)  [...]’s signature appears in the “Certified/Agreed To” section of the account application.  (Id.)  The DAA appears in the record.  (PA091-130.)  On its first full page of text, the DAA states:
[directive] The manner and form by which satisfaction of these requirements is communicated by the law enforcement agency to its agent who impounded the vehicle are to be determined by each law enforcement agency.  Under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23d(1), and regardless of the ownership of the vehicle, the person claiming the vehicle must present the following documentation or authority.  •  A valid driver's license.  • Proof of ownership of the vehicle or evidence of lawful authority to operate that vehicle.  •  Proof of valid insurance for the vehicle.  In addition, the person claiming the vehicle must satisfy the following criteria as required under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23d(2) & (3).  •  The person must be able to operate the vehicle in a safe manner.  •  The person would not be in violation of Title 39 by operating the vehicle.  •  The person has met any other conditions for the release of the vehicle as established by the law enforcement agency, including but not limited to the payment of the reasonable fees for any towing and/or storage of the vehicle.
[brief] Ignorance of Ordinance 13-2022 does not Toll the 45-Day Appeal Period under R. 4:69-6(a).  (T2, 19:10-18 & 48:7-14).  The Trial Court properly rejected Plaintiff’s argument that it was not required to file its Complaint until it understood the effect of Ordinance 13-2022.  (Pa62).  In rejecting this argument, the Trial Court quoted Rocky Hill Citizens for Responsible Growth v. Planning Bd. of Borough of Rocky Hill, 406 N.J. Super. 384, 402 (App. Div. 2009), which rejected a “‘wait and see’” strategy by the plaintiffs in that case.  (Pa62).  The Court in Rocky Hill explained, “[t]o suggest that the right to challenge should accrue when the [agency’s] interpretation [of an ordinance] is contrary to one’s view subordinates the public interest in repose to the private interests of the objectors. ”  Ibid.  Other Courts have been clear that ignorance of a cause of action does not prevent the running of the 45-day appeal period under Rule 4:69-6(a) absent some countervailing equity.  See Hopewell Valley Citizens' Grp., Inc., supra 204 N.J. at 571 and DeRose, supra, 398 N.J. Super. at 401.  In fact, consideration of the countervailing equities is the very purpose of the enlargement provision set forth in Rule 4:69-6(c).  "[R]elaxation depends on all the relevant **equitable** considerations under the circumstances."  [...], *Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey*, comment 7.3 on R. 4:69-6, 1648 (2024 Ed.) (emphasis added).  Thus, the Trial Court properly rejected Plaintiff’s claims for tolling due to ignorance.  **IV.
[brief] Regarding the d(1) use variance, [...] opined that the requested relief meets the positive criteria under Medici v. BRP Co., 107 N.J. 1 (1987).  Pa268-Pa269, at 41:11-43:20.  First, [...] testified that the Property was particularly suitable for the Second Application based on the location and size of the Property.  Pa269, at 42:7-43:20.  [...] noted that the area surrounding the Property is a “mixed- use neighborhood,” containing both residential and commercial properties.  Id., at 38:10-39:5.  Further, [...] indicated that the proposed development is “highly compatible” with the permitted uses in the B-3 Zone.
[brief] In reaching its decision dismissing [...]’s Complaint and determining that the [...] is the owner of the Property (including the Quinlan Tract), [...] made multiple factual findings about the persuasiveness of the evidence and about the credibility of the witnesses presented by the parties at trial.  [...] noted in his oral opinion that “. . . while the experts had differing opinions in the case, those are matters that really require the Court, as the finder of fact, to make a determination with respect to which opinion more credibly relies on the facts in the case. ”
[brief] Id. at *5.  It explicitly rejected the defendants’ attempts to “dissect an ongoing investigation into pieces” in their attempt to argue that probable cause had become foreseeable under the circumstances.  Ibid.  “We are satisfied that the finding of probable cause here, predicated on --- 5  This unpublished decision has been included in the State’s appendix.  (Pa17-22).  The State is unaware of any contrary authority for the general propositions cited.  the smell of burnt marijuana and then the K-9 sniff, arose from unforeseeable and spontaneous circumstances.
[directive] (b)  When an agency concludes that a report is subject to disclosure under Section 9.6.2(a), it shall redact the following before disclosure:  5  (1)  The names of complainants, witnesses, informants, victims and cooperators, in addition to information that could reasonably lead to discovery of their identities;3  (2)  Non-public, personal identifying information about any individual named in the report, such as their home addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, social security numbers, familial relationships, etc.; (3)  Medical information or history, including but not limited to, mental health or substance abuse services and drug or alcohol evaluation, counseling or treatment; (4)  Information regarding any criminal investigation or prosecution that is not already contained in a public filing, or any information that would impede or interfere with a pending criminal or disciplinary proceeding; (5)  Any records or material prohibited from disclosure by law; (6)  Juvenile records; (7)  Any information which is the subject of a judicial order compelling confidentiality; (8)  Any other information that would violate a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy; and (9)  Any information regarding law enforcement personnel, procedures, or resources that could create a risk to the safety of any person, including but not limited to law enforcement personnel. to the situations described in Sections 9.6.1 and 9.6.2, 9.6.3
[brief] 9.  **Possession.**  If Lessor is unable to deliver possession of the premises at commencement hereof...Lessee shall not be liable for any rent until possession is delivered.  (Pa504, Pa869)  The lease also contained an indemnification provision as follows:  10.  **Indemnification of lessor.**  Lessor shall not be liable for any damage or injury to lessee, or any other person, or to any property occurring on the demised premises or any part thereof, and Lessee agrees to hold Lessor harmless from any claims for damages, no matter how caused.
[brief] There are four appendices supporting this appeal, separately bound and accordingly labeled as Appendix A to D.  | Appendix | Pages | |----------------|-----------| | Appendix A | Pa1 - Pa83| | Appendix B | Pa84 - Pa136| | Appendix C | Pa137- Pa232| | Appendix D | Pa233- Pa300|  Per Rule 2:5-4(a) every page in the appendices was a paper filed below (excluding the letter to Presiding Judge (Pa135)).  Electronic copy of the Appendices emailed to the appellate clerk bears the original file dated stamp for given page on the top of each page, however JEDS stamp is invisible on printed copies presented to the Appellate Division.  Document supplied via appendices are on e-Courts under Docket No. [...] (excluding the said letter to the PJ).
[brief] The trial court improperly granted Respondent [...], d/b/a [...]’s (“[...]”) motion to stay this litigation and compel the parties to arbitration.  The trial court overlooked a critical fact: neither Appellant-Plaintiffs, [...] nor [...] (the “[...]”), ever knowingly agreed to arbitrate any disputes with [...].  Lacking prima facie showing that an arbitration agreement exists between the parties, the trial court’s basis for compelling arbitration is legally deficient and should be reversed and remanded.  Even if [...] could demonstrate the Appellants’ consent to arbitration, it has, as a matter of law, waived that right by engaging in extensive discovery.  [...] has benefited from multiple rounds of interrogatory responses and depositions of the Appellants while delaying its own production of critical discovery materials.  After 426 days of civil discovery, [...]’s sudden request to invoke arbitration should have been considered untimely and denied by the trial court.  Finally, even assuming both consent to arbitration and a timely motion (neither of which has been shown by [...]), the arbitration agreement itself fails to meet the legal standard for enforceability.  The agreement did not provide sufficient notice to the Appellants of the rights they would waive, rendering it unenforceable.  For any of these reasons, this Court should reverse and remand the trial court’s decision to grant [...]’s motion to compel arbitration.
[brief] *(Raised below in Brief-Trial Judge’s Opinion Pa 7-8)*  A.  **Plaintiff did not Agree to Arbitration with the Bank. **  The only document purporting to have Plaintiff’s signature produced by the Bank is the account application, (Pa 29), which mentions arbitration on Page 7:  “Each person who signs the “Certified/Agreed to” section of this application certifies that:  “The Customer’s use of any [...] (“Bank”) deposit account, ... will confirm the Customer’s receipt of, and agreement to be bound by, the Bank’s applicable ... account agreement that includes the Arbitration Agreement under which any dispute between the Customer and the Bank relating to the Customer’s use of any Bank deposit account, will be decided in an arbitration proceeding before a neutral arbitrator as described in the Arbitration Agreement and not by a jury or court trial”.  (Pa 35).  The Bank’s application and this language has been the subject of much litigation in this and other jurisdictions because of [...]’s lax procedures.
[directive] a.  Actor operates a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension or revocation in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40, and the actor’s license was suspended or revoked for a first Operating Motor violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 or N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a, and the actor had previously been 2C:40-26(a)(b)  Vehicle During Period convicted of violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 while under suspension for that first offense.  4th Degree $2,500 to $25,000 10% permissible of License Suspension b.
[brief] The [...] and Defendants entered a similar agreement, which provided that “the City may effectuate such promotions as it deems necessary from Sergeant to Lieutenant, and/or Lieutenant to Captain with no increase in pay until a salary increase, including rank deferential and any other increase, is ratified between the City, the State Monitor and the [...], or until such salary increases are awarded by an interest arbitrator in accordance with the statutory provisions set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16, et seq.  All increases shall be retroactive to the date of promotion. ” (Pa000035-37, Compl. ¶ 19).  Plaintiffs allege that the agreements were ratified by the [...] and [...] and were thereafter approved by the [...] on June 8, 2016.
[directive] 3.2  Bodily Injury.  Bodily injury means physical pain, or temporary disfigurement, or any impairment of physical condition.  Bodily harm and bodily injury have the same definition for the purposes of this Policy.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(a); N.J.S.A. 2C:3-11(e).  3.3  Conducted Energy Device (CED).  A conducted energy device means any device approved by the Attorney General that is capable of firing darts/electrodes that transmit an electrical charge or current intended to temporarily disable a person.  3.4  Deadly Force.  Deadly force means force that an officer uses with the purpose of causing, or that a reasonable officer knows creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury.  Discharging a firearm, constitutes deadly force, unless the discharge occurred during the course of a law enforcement training exercise, routine target practice at a firing range, a lawful animal hunt, or the humane killing of an injured animal.  A threat to cause death or 3  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] The action below was a re-filing of an essentially identical action by plaintiffs, filed on March 16, 2015 under Docket No. [...].  Da1.¹  That action was withdrawn and dismissed without prejudice in December 2016, while on the trial list, at plaintiffs’ request.  On March 3, 2017, plaintiffs filed their second Complaint regarding the matters in question.  Pa30.  On June 23, 2017, defendants-appellants filed their Answer.  Pa41.  On October 6, 2017, a Case Management Order was entered requiring that any party proposing to call an expert witness must serve the name, address, qualifications and report of the proposed expert no later than May 15, 2008.  Pa70; see Paragraph 6 at Pa71.  ¹  The prior action of 2015 and its dismissal were referenced in the court’s decision of September 29, 2020, 1T 55-22 to 56-2.  On June 29, 2018, a further Case Management Order was entered, on consent.  Pa74.  This Order required the service of expert reports for plaintiffs by September 30, 2018 (Pa74) and extended the Discovery End Date to January 31, 2018.  Pa75.  Plaintiff [...] was never named as a proposed expert witness, nor were his qualifications or a report served for plaintiffs.
[directive] Required.  Review not is Jury Grand  Where Circumstances b. or Prosecutor County the section, this of a(1) subsection of provisions  Notwithstanding the facts undisputed the where jury grand matter the to the present to required shall be not Director to construed be shall herein Nothing law.  the under justifiable was force of use the that indicate determines Director or Prosecutor County the where jury grand matter the to the presenting preclude 8 Page jury.
[directive] ____________________________________________________________________________________________________  ____________________________________________________________________________________________________  ____________________________________________________________________________________________________  □ □ 15.  Did the witness look at all of the photos?  Y N □ □ 16.  Did the witness identify any photo as depicting the perpetrator?  Y N 17.  If yes to #16, did you ask the witness during the procedure to make a statement concerning their level of □ □ confidence that the photo he/she selected depicts the perpetrator?  Y N
[directive] The SPC/SPS shall ensure that the Disposition Order, copies 3. of court documents, and the agency’s instructions are provided to the national seized property contractor within three business days of the receipt the documents of (3) from the seizing agency.  The national seized property contractor will verify lien, 4. mortgage, and tax information, conduct appropriate title and appraisal actions; and advise the seizing agency of any discrepancies that may require resolution by the seizing ageniy:  .’i  If the national seized property contractor does not find 5. any discrepancy that could delay the sale and closing of the property, the contractor will send a letter to the No. ‘See page Chapter [...], Asset Forfeiture Manual, 2, 06, 4, Volume Law and Practice.
[brief] The Court notes that there must be a “reasonable basis” for disqualification as it cannot be based on imagined scenarios of conflict.  Plaintiff’s assert that because of potential crossclaims, third-party claims and settlement offers the [...] and [...] firms’ representation of multiple clients is materially limited by the lawyers’ responsibilities to each set of co-defendants.  Plaintiff infers that under the CNA each defendant has an incentive to minimize their own liability at the expense of their co-defendants.  The CNA may create a conflict of interest if this matter proceeds to trial but for purposes of this motion, the Court does not find this to be a conflict of interest.  All the Defendants assert that they have signed informed consent waivers to any potential conflicts of interests, there are no pending cross or third-party claims being pursued by any defendant against another, and each attorney is confident in their ability to represent their clients.  This Court finds that the representation of the [...] and [...] firms in this matter is not prohibited by law as each client’s position are not aligned directly against one another “in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal”.  M.R.P.C. 1.7 cmt. 17.  The Court finds that the Plaintiff’s contentions are based on speculation which is not grounds to disqualify counsel under Dewey and Loyal.  See Dewey, supra, 109 N.J. at 221-22; See Also Loyal, 164 N.J. at 434 (2000).  The Court notes that the numerous Defendants have signed informed consent waivers and have been properly informed by their attorneys of the potential risks involved with multi-defendant representation.  Plaintiff may refile this application to relieve counsel.  (C.C.Da.110).  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] THE CCIP POLICY AND MANUAL  Under the CCIP, [...] was the primary insurer for Commercial General Liability Policy [...], for Named Insured [...] for policy period August 3, 2015 to December 23, 2018, for the first $2 million in coverage.  Pa104.  [...] was the excess liability carrier for Excess Liability Policy [...], for Named Insured [...] for policy period August 3, 2015 to December 23, 2018, with a coverage limit of $25 million excess over [...]’s CCIP primary insurance of $2 million.  Pa223 ([...]’s and [...]’s Policies are collectively, the “CCIP Policy”).
[brief] ADA Title II:  State and Local Government activities require that State and local governments give people with disabilities an equal opportunity to benefit from all of their programs, services and activities (e.g. courts).  They are required to make reasonable modifications to policies, practices, and procedures where necessary to avoid discrimination, unless they can demonstrate that doing so would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program or activity being provided; the defendant’s requests did not offer any alterations to the proceedings.
[brief] What do you mean you 18 didn't see the study?  19  [...]:  It was testimony that 20 was given at a hearing, and I saw the accident racing.  21  The testimony, knew where the location was, looked at 22 the location, and professionally, it was another level 23 of support that I could give that backs up what the 24 feds say, what the state says, and what these studies 25 say, which is it's safe.  THE CHAIRMAN:
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1 STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ......................................................................................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN ADMITTING TESTIMONY OF THE INVESTIGATING OFFICERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF IMPEACHING THE CREDIBILITY OF PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT, ALEX BALIAN ..................................  2 POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF TEXTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS THAT CONTRADICTED TYMIV’S CLAIM THAT HE IS UNABLE TO WORK .............................................  6 POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PRECLUDED PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL FROM COMMENTING ON HASSAN’S ABSENCE DURING TRIAL AND WHEN IT DENIED PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR AN ADVERSE INFERENCE CHARGE .................................................................................. 12  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................