ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Second, even if the doctrine potentially applies to the guaranty statute of frauds, there is absolutely no evidence in the case that any of the guarantors part performed under the guarantees.  Thus no guarantor has paid any personal funds for the Tenant LLC’s obligations, ever.  Indeed, it is undisputed that after the signing of the lease in 2015, there was no verbal or written contact between Plaintiff and either [...] or [...] until Plaintiff made a claim under the guaranty by letter dated January 12, 2019.
[brief] A cause of action for fraud requires proof of (1) the material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the defendant of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting damages.  Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 61, 172-73 (2005).  Pursuit of a private RICO action requires not only proof of a pattern of racketeering activity through the commission of certain criminal offenses, see N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1(d) and 2C:41-1a(1) and (2), but also proof of resulting damages.  See Interchange State Bank v. Veglia, 286 N.J. Super. 164, 180 (App. Div. 1995).
[brief] See 2T108:7-11; 109:25-110:5; 1T86:12-19 (testimony pointing out the “overlap” between users of the [...] and the [...]).  According to the Authority, the approximate cost of this [...] project was $30 million.  2T103:11-13.  ii.  The Authority Applied And Received Preliminary Approval For ERG Tax Credits To Defray Cost Of The [...]
[brief] Defendant [...] And Her Distinguished Service.  [...] is a distinguished alumna of Rutgers who has deep roots in Middlesex County.  (Da71-72.)  She is a certified public accountant and is managing director at a prominent accounting firm located in Middlesex County where she currently works.  (Da71.)  [...] lived in Middlesex County for 50 years, beginning in 1970 through October 2020 when she relocated to Monmouth County.  (Da72.)  Prior to her most recent service as a member of the BOG, [...] served as a Trustee from 2009 through 2016.  (Da71.)  Her service there concluded when she was appointed by the Trustees to serve as a member of the BOG.  (Da71.)  On December 14, 2016, [...] was first appointed to fill the remainder of another BOG member’s unexpired term ending on June 30, 2019.  (Da71.)  On June 19, 2019, [...] was reappointed as a Trustee-member of the BOG for a six-year term ending on June 30, 2025.  (Da71-72.)  Prior to her removal, she had served on the BOG continuously for over seven years.  (Da72.)
[brief] ”  Aa0077 (emphasis added).  But, in the [...] Certificate issued on April 21, 2022 for the East 300 Upgrade Project, that expert federal agency only found evidence of the first reason (i.e. market need for the Project by [...]).  In the Certificate, [...] states that “[...] has shown that natural gas demand in its service territories is exceeding its available firm natural gas interstate pipeline capacity and that additional transportation capacity is needed to serve its existing and new customers...To meet this demand, [...] entered into a precedent agreement [with [...]] for firm transportation service on the [P]roject. ”  Overall, [...] states that “the proposed [P]roject will enable Tennessee [Gas] to provide up to 115,000 Dth per day of firm transportation service, which constitutes 100% of the project’s capacity, to [...]. ”  In fact, [...] “[found] that Tennessee[ ] [Gas’s] [P]roject will not adversely affect service to Tennessee[ ] [Gas’s] existing customers.  The [P]roject will enable Tennessee [Gas] to provide long-term, firm transportation service.  --- 33 [...], Order Issuing Certificate, 179 [...] ¶ 61,041 (April 21, 2022)  P 17 (emphasis added).  34  Id. at P 20 (emphasis added). to [...] through the proposed upgrades to Tennessee’s system while maintaining existing service. ”  Thus, [...] found that sole purpose of the East 300 Upgrade Project (including Compressor Station 327) was the market need of [...] – not [...]’s reliability need.  [...]’s April 21, 2022 Certificate – despite being issued after [...]’s June 23, 2021 HAD Decision – should, based on [...]’s own prior precedent, be considered dispositive of the issues of whether and why [...]’s Compressor Station 327 is needed.
[brief] WESTFIELD PROPERLY RAISED AND/OR PRESERVED THE ARGUMENTS IT ASSERTS ON APPEAL  [...] adequately preserved its arguments.  With respect to the issue of “as applied” versus “facial” challenge to [...]’s ordinance, the issue was briefed and otherwise preserved on multiple occasions; specifically at PA-25a, PA-41a, PA-10a at n. 3; DA-252a (request # 8); DA-382a (interrogatory # 13); Transcript at 6:23-7:8; and Transcript 27:9 — 28:4.  With respect to the assertion that [...] did not brief or otherwise preserve the issue that [...] did not distinguish  In re Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358 (1961) because [...] does not base its authority on the Municipal Land Use Law or general police power, that issues was addressed at DA-90a et seq.; PA-15a – PA-16a; PA-26a – PA-27a; PA-30a; PA-40a.  Regarding the issue the issue that N.J.S.A. 48:2-23 is inapplicable, it was preserved in the aggregate at PA-35a; DA-347a; DA-301a; and DA-323a.  With respect to N.J.A.C. 14:5-7.1 and N.J.A.C. 14:3-8.5(d), [...] did not brief the inapplicability of those regulations because there was no reason to believe that the court below would not read and give effect to the express language of those regulations.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Consequently, trial courts are tasked with determining the reliability of expert testimony and ensuring jurors are not exposed “to unsound science through the compelling voice of an expert. ”  In re Accutane Litig., 234 N.J. 340, 389 (2018).  “The danger of prejudice through introduction of unreliable expert evidence is clear.  While juries would not always accord excessive weight to unreliable expert testimony, there is substantial danger that they would do so, precisely because the evidence is labeled ‘scientific’ and ‘expert. ’”  Id. at 390 (quoting State v. Cavallo, Thus, the trial court serves as a gatekeeper, requiring the court “to assess both the methodology used by the expert to arrive at an opinion and the underlying data used in the formation of the opinion.
[brief] In the Matter of the Estate of [...], 2023 WL 176098, at *12 (App. Div. Jan. 13, 2023).  Likewise, the MBPA is a complex statutory scheme that expressly contemplates and articulates the Legislature’s desire that the courts—not private arbitral bodies—enforce public policy in an area that “vitaly affects the general economy and revenues of the State, as well as the public interest and public welfare. ”  Sending this important litigation to the dark cavern of arbitration—potentially in another state and without the protection of the MBPA, as Defendants desire—is counter to the policy and intent of this State, and should make it even more essential that an arbitration clause be explicit in giving up the right to a determination in Superior Court, as the Legislature intended.  C.
[brief] Appellant continues to assert that the board did not deliberate about the requested d(s) density variance or the positive and negative criteria.  As set forth below, Appellant fails to establish any legal or factual basis that would support the conclusion that the Court should enter a judgment finding the Board’s decision arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  At the time of the initial hearing and at the hearing on remand, the Board exhaustively examined the Board’s deliberations concerning the d (5) variances.  The Board’s determination is well-reasoned and supported by evidence in the record.
[brief] Further, the trial court’s comment about possible mis-joinder of plaintiffs was mistaken, because the various transactions constituted a series of transactions involving [...], his companies, and the defendants.  Turning to the various plaintiffs, [...] testified that he was a member and manager of [...].  1T33:17–18.  He testified that he managed the [...] portfolio, 1T9:2–16, that [...] III was owned by [...], 1T11:5–7, and that he was property manager for [...].  1T11:8–16.  As to [...], he was one of three owners of the company.  1T11:22–23.  Any finding that he was not an appropriate witness or that the Plaintiffs were not the ultimate customer is unsupported by the record.  Somehow the trial court found that [...] “was not buying the services for his own use,” that the plaintiffs themselves “were not renovating or improving those for their own use,” and that plaintiffs were not “the ultimate users” of the improvements.
[brief] In Frantzen v. Howard, 132 N.J. Super. 226 (App. Div. 1975), the Appellate Division ruled that the plaintiff had no right to appeal the adverse portions of an incomplete judgment without leave of court, citing R. 2:2-4.  Id., at 227.  The Frantzen court explained the prevailing policy:  Piecemeal reviews, ordinarily, are anathema to our practice, as expressed in the rules which require the final disposition of all issues at one hearing on the trial level followed by orderly appellate review.
[brief] (2T17-15 to 18-24).  On May 30, 2023, [...] further elaborated that defendant ingested cocaine prior to the crash for it to have metabolized as it did.  (4T17-18 to 19-13).  When asked whether defendant’s conduct at the scene was consistent with onset effects of cocaine, [...] said “no,” in which case we would have expected defendant to be stimulated, not drowsy.  (2T42-14 to 21; 2T16-10 to 18).  Conversely, [...] explained that a person on the “crash side” of cocaine would have a depression of the central nervous system and be “uncontrollably sleepy or disorientated. ” (2T16-19; 2T19-17 to 23; 4T133-18 to 134-13).  When asked about defendant at the time of the crash, [...] stated “[t]he behaviors and the observations of disorientation, confusion, the involvement of an accident including traveling to the other side of the road, crossing double yellow lines, lack of evasive maneuvers, memory loss, drowsiness, sedation, all of that is consistent with impairment by central nervous system depress[ion].” (4T17-7 to 15).  [...] made clear, “[t]he crash side [of cocaine] can make someone dysphoric as well as really sleepy so that can mimic what you would see for a central nervous system depression. ” (4T134-11 to 13).  [...] explained she could not opine about cocaine impacting defendant during the crash because that stimulant was not found in defendant’s blood.  (4T135-23 to 136-8; 1T16-8 to 17-5).  [...] further explained that, while BZE was detected in defendant’s blood, BZE is inactive and itself does not affect the central nervous system; rather, “it’s a marker of cocaine exposure. ”  (4T17-18 to 18-2; 1T19-2 to 23).
[brief] Thus, the trial court’s Order granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be reversed.  CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff-Appellant [...] respectfully requests that the October 4, 2023 Order granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be reversed.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  Tel. & Fax: [...]  Dated: April 19, 2024  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  CASSANDRA A. VALENTINE, on behalf : of herself and those similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], [...], and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] There is no dispute that the deed to Plaintiffs’ property located at [...] in [...] (the “Property”) contains restrictive covenants originating from the [...]’ 1948 conveyance of the Property to the original purchaser.  This “Genesis Deed” included the following restrictions running with the land:  (1)  “ALL property owners” must become “members of a property owner’s association known or to be known as ‘[...],’” which has authority to implement and enforce any “rules and regulations it chooses,” and all property owners must “faithfully abide” by those rules; and (2) “[n]o building, alteration, fence or addition shall be made without the written approval of the [...] ”  These same restrictions are also contained within over one thousand other deeds to hundreds of parcels in the [...] section of Toms River.  For the last 75 years, [...] Surf Club Unit 1 (“[...]”) has served as the “property owner’s association” that has adopted and enforced the “rules and regulations” to which all property owners—including Plaintiffs—agreed by deed to “faithfully abide. ”  In 2020, Plaintiffs sought to rebuild their home.  Pursuant to [...]’s rules, Plaintiffs submitted building plans depicting, among other things, the proposed height of the new home and sought approval from [...] to begin construction.  [...] rejected Plaintiffs’ application because the proposed height of the building exceeded the height limitation permitted in [...]’s construction rules.  Plaintiffs then filed suit and moved for partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that [...] lacks authority to implement and enforce any of its construction rules.  With one stroke of a pen, the trial court upended over 75 years of past practice and declared that [...] has no authority to enforce its rules, including the construction rules at issue herein.
[brief] It is undisputed that the defendant gave consent for the search of his cell phone at 1:50am on February 15, 2014, at which time he signed a consent to search form and waived his right to be present during the search.  Da11; Da16.  The form specified that consent could be withdrawn, consistent with state law.  State v. White, 305 N.J. Super. 322, 332 (App. Div. 1997).  The phone was kept and stored due to technical difficulties with the software used by the State to “dump” cell phones.  Da13.  On March 24, 2014, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., issued a search warrant ordering law enforcement to search for and seize evidence stored on the phone or removable media located within that was reasonably relevant to the offenses that took place on February 13-14, as well as any and all electronic information pertaining to passwords and/or encryption related to the computer system, computer software, and/or any related device.  Da12.  The phone “dump” occurred the following day, March 25, 2024.  Da13.  It is further undisputed that the defendant was upset on February 24, 2014 that his phone had not been returned to him.  That day, Defendant and his partner at the time, [...], went to the prosecutor’s office to inquire about his phone.  Neither Carlin nor [...], who testified at the suppression motion about overhearing some of Defendant’s anger from her cubicle on February 24 (2T), were able to recall the specifics of about which the defendant spoke.  The defendant later cashed the voucher given to him by the State to purchase another cell phone.  The phone “dump” did not occur until after acquisition of a warrant for the same, thus the objection is to the seizure, rather than the search, of the cell phone.
[brief] Unable to dispute this reality, the Trial Court simply ignored it in its erroneous decision.  Ultimately, Res Judicata and the Entire Controversy Doctrines are equitable doctrines to be considered and applied in the interest of justice.  As the Court in J- M Mfg. Co. v. Phillips & Cohen, LLP, 443 N.J. Super. 447, 459, 129 A.3d 342, 349 (App. Div. 2015) held:  The decision whether to apply the Entire Controversy Doctrine is “ultimately ‘one of judicial fairness and will be invoked in that spirit. ’”  Archbrook, supra, 414 N.J.Super. at 104, 997 A.2d 1035 (quoting Crispin, supra, 96 N.J. at 343, 476 A.2d 250).  It is not an artificial bright line rule.  See id. at 104–05, 997 A.2d 1035.  The Trial Court’s application of Res Judicata and the Entire Controversy Doctrine was a perversion of such equitable principles.  A litigant cannot attempt to knock on one courtroom door, be told by the judge to instead go knock on the next courtroom door because the judge believes there is no prejudice to the litigant as the case will not be dismissed by the second judge, only for the second judge to then dismiss the case with prejudice because the second judge believes the claims should have been heard and/or were dismissed by the first judge.  This is not justice.  This madness is not what equitable doctrines were designed to accomplish.  Plaintiffs have not only been the victims of numerous erroneous decisions, but also of maddening inconsistency within the interplay of those decisions.
[directive] 1.  You have the right to remain silent and refuse to answer any questions.  (Usted tiene el drecho de guarder silencio y negarse a contester cualquier pregunta.)  Do you understand?  (¿Comprende?)  ____Yes (Sí) ____No  2.  Anything you say may be used against you in a court of law.  (Cualquier cosa que usted diga pued usarse en su contra en un tribunal.)  Do you understand?  (¿Comprende?)  ____Yes (Sí)  ____No 3.  You have the right to consult with an attorney at any time and have him/her present before and during questioning.  (Usted tiene el derecho de consultar con un(a) abogado(a) en cualquier momento y contar con su presencia antes y durante un interrogatorio.)  Do you understand?  (¿Comprende?)  ____Yes (Sí)  ____No 4.  If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided if you so desire prior to any questioning.(Si usted no tiene los recursos para contratar a un(a) abogado(a), se le facilitara un(a) abogado(a), si lo desea, antes de cualquier interrogatorio.)  Do you understand?  (¿Comprende?)  ____Yes (Sí)  ____No 5.  A decision to speak to us is not final and you may stop talking to us at any time.  (La Decision de hablar con nosotros no tiene character definitive, y a usted se le permite dejar de hablar con nosotros en cualquier momento.)  Do you understand?  (¿Comprende?)  ____Yes (Sí)  ____No  If the member is aware of any criminal complaint that has been filed against the subject relating to the questions to be asked, the member must advise the subject of the charges.
[directive] 2.  Law enforcement officers are required by law to use all reasonable diligence in apprehending and prosecuting offenders against the law.  However, law enforcement officers must recognize that school officials and administrators share a similar but independent responsibility to provide for the safety and proper discipline of children in their charge.  3.  It is essential to the success of the deterrent scheme established by the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987 that all citizens know and understand the legal consequences associated with the illicit use and distribution of controlled dangerous substances, and the efforts by law enforcement, as embodied in the Statewide Narcotics Action Plan, which are designed to increase the likelihood that all drug offenders will be identified, apprehended and subject to prosecution.  4.
[brief] (Da197-212).  On October 7, 2022, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied defendant’s petition for certification.  (Da213).  On January 24, 2021, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”).  (Da214-18).  On July 21, 2023, following a hearing, the Honorable [...], P.J. Cr., denied the petition.  (21T; Da254).  On August 4, 2023, [...] issued an amended order, reaffirming the reasons stated on the record for denying defendant’s PCR petition, except those regarding the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim for not calling a specific witness.  (Da255).  For the reasons in an accompanying letter-decision, [...] ruled that that claim was denied only on the basis that defendant did not proffer evidence consistent with Rule 3:22-10(c).  (Da255-56).  On November 1, 2023, defendant filed an amended notice of appeal with this Court.  (Da346-49).  This appeal follows.
[brief] In analysis of the factual pattern applied to the legal principles and decisional law and the oral argument before the trial court, Defendant (Respondent) [...] respectfully submits that this Court affirm the Order below and deny Appellants’ motion to reinstate the final judgment, and sustain and affirm the Order of August 14, 2023 vacating the motion to vacate the final judgment and the motion for reconsideration of October 6, 2023, which confirmed the earlier order of the trial court.  Respectfully submitted, By: [...]  Dated: March 4, 2024  March 14, 2024  Honorable Judges of the Appellate Division Superior Court of New Jersey  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex  PO Box 006 Trenton, NJ 08625-0006  APPELLANT’S LETTER SUR-REPLY
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1(b) (“[L]imits for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage shall not exceed the insured’s motor vehicle liability policy limits for bodily injury and property damage. ”).  Stated plainly, plaintiffs avoided, or at least thought they were avoiding, the definitional exclusion in the [...] policy that is now being invoked by [...] by ensuring that all of the vehicles owned and made available for use by family members were insured under the [...] policy.  Indisputably, given the facts of the current matter, [...] would never be in a position to invoke the definitional exclusion in its policy being invoked by [...] because plaintiffs obtained full liability coverage of all their vehicles with [...]. \(^1\)  It is ambiguous, to say the least, where a definitional exclusion is being invoked by an excess carrier that appears, not in the excess carrier’s policy, but rather in the policy of an underlying insurance carrier who would never be able to invoke that exclusion.
[brief] I.  The Suit Limitation Clause of the Defendant-Respondent, [...]’s Policy does not conflict with State Law.  Amicus curiae, [...] (“[...]”)’s Counsel argues that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 solely governs the statute of limitations applicable to uninsured and underinsured motorist claims.  [...] argues that since N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 provides a six year statute of limitations on contract actions, the suit limitation provision of the [...] policy of insurance conflicts with the State Law and is invalid.  It is argued that [...]’s argument in this regard is misplaced.
[brief] (Da 21-23)  [...] also moved to suppress all evidence seized from his person and statements he made during a traffic stop that occurred on August 30, 2018 -- just after police sought a warrant to search the storage unit -- as well as all evidence seized from his person and his vehicle on September 17, 2018, when police went to arrest him.  (Da 21-25)  No evidentiary hearing was held on the motions.  (1T 4-12 to 20; 2T 26-5 to 8)  In an oral decision on March 5, 2020, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., granted the motions in part, suppressing all evidence seized and statements made during the course of the August 30 traffic stop, and otherwise denied them.  (2T 26-15 to 45-5; Da 24-25)  On April 8 and April 26, 2021, an evidentiary hearing was held before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., on co-defendant [...]’s motion to suppress all evidence seized during the traffic stop of [...].  (3T, 4T)  During the hearing, [...] ruled that [...] did not have standing to join [...]’s suppression motion.  (4T 8-7 to 9-10)  [...] denied [...]’s motion on August 3, 2021.  (Da 26-39)  On February 22, 2023, [...] entered a guilty plea to first-degree possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) (Count 11), and second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (Count 12).  (5T 11-11 to 18; Da 40-45)  In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss all remaining counts in the Indictment and recommend a sentence of 14 years flat on the controlled dangerous substance charge and five years with a 42-month parole ineligibility period on the firearm charge, to be served concurrently.  (5T 7-3 to 6; Da 42)  On March 31, 2023, [...] sentenced [...] in accordance with the plea agreement to an aggregate term of 14 years with a 42-month parole ineligibility period.  (6T 24-16 to 20; Da 46-49)  [...] imposed all appropriate fines and assessments and dismissed the remaining counts in the Indictment.  (6T 26-2 to 13, 20-22; Da 46-49)  [...] filed a notice of appeal on August 22, 2023, as within time.  (Da 50-54)