ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ARGUMENT POINT I  THE BULLETIN IS NOT A DE FACTO RULE UNDER THE METROMEDIA ANALYSIS.  Amicus implies its support of the Appellant’s argument that a reciprocal insurance exchange is subject only to the Reciprocal Exchange Act, N.J.S.A. 17:50-1 to -19, enacted in 1945.  Over the past 78 years since the Reciprocal Exchange Act was enacted, the regulatory oversight of the insurance industry has evolved to enhance consumer protection and financial stability of the industry.  As an example, the Holding Company Act, enacted in 1970 and amended several times since then, is a comprehensive law that regulates an insurance company system to help ensure financial stability and solvency.
[brief] To avoid simply repeating the arguments made in [...]’s appellant brief on this point, it should suffice to say that the State’s brief does nothing to support this factor.  It is always true that a defendant could have decided not to commit the crimes he has been convicted of, and it is nearly always true that the facts of the case “could have been worse. ” (Sb18).  None of this supports a finding that the crimes were “committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1).  Nor does the State say anything about the fact that much of the trial court’s reasoning on this factor constitutes impermissible double-counting.  See State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 74-75 (2014).  With respect to the errors in the trial court’s assessment of the aggravating and mitigating factors, the State argues that, even if they are errors, they are irrelevant because [...] got the statutory minimum on his individual convictions, and thus, the only relevant issue is the imposition of consecutive sentences.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.  In determining whether an “accident” qualifies for the purposes of PIP eligibility, courts have required that there be a “substantial nexus” between the injury and use of the vehicle.  Lindstrom by Lindstrom v. Hanover Ins. Co. ex rel. N.J. Auto Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 138 N.J. 242, 250 (1994); See also Bowe v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 367 N.J. Super 128, 137 (App. Div. 2004).  A substantial nexus is found where the injury, though unexpected, was a natural or reasonable incident or consequence of the automobile’s use.  Lindstrom, 138 N.J. at 250 (citing Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 126 N.J. Super. 29, 28 (App. Div. 1973)).  In applying the substantial nexus test, courts have done so liberally, consistent with the aim of providing the broadest possible coverage to claimants.
[brief] The standard of review is one of deference.  The test on appeal is not whether a reviewing court would have reached a different conclusion on what an appropriate sentence should be; it is rather whether, on the basis of the evidence, no reasonable sentencing court could have imposed the sentence under review.  State v. Ghertler, 114 N.J. 383, 388 (1989); see also State v. Ball, 268 N.J. Super. 72, 145 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 141 N.J. 142 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1075 (1996).  A person convicted of first-degree murder shall be sentenced “to a term of 30 years, during which the person shall not be eligible for parole, or be sentenced to a specific term of years which shall be between 30 years and life imprisonment of which the person shall serve 30 years before being eligible for parole. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1).  For sentencing purposes, “life imprisonment” is calculated to seventy-five years.  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(b).  Murder is specifically exempted from the Criminal Code’s provision that courts “shall” sentence defendants to a presumptive sentencing term.  State v. Abdullah, 184 N.J. 497, 507 (2005); N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(1).
[directive] Questions have been raised concerning the practical implementation of the revised Brimage Guidelines with respect to the third enumerated eligibility criterion for an “open” standardized waiver offer.  See Section 6.5.1.  This eligibility criterion may be established by two distinct means: first, if the defendant at the time of the present offense was less than 26 years of age, or second, if the current offense involved a small amount of drugs, which is operationally defined as an aggregate amount of controlled substances less than one-quarter of the amount needed to establish a second-degree crime pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 (e.g., 3.54 grams of heroin or cocaine).  A defendant is deemed to have satisfied this eligibility criterion if either of these distinct conditions exist.  Thus, for example, if the defendant at the time of the present offense was less than 26 years of age, the amount of drugs involved would be irrelevant for the purposes of determining the offer.1  defendant’s eligibility for an “open” plea  Several prosecutors have expressed concern because in some cases, the aggregate weight of the drugs involved may not be documented in the case file at the time of the initial screening process when decisions would ordinarily be made as to whether a defendant is eligible for a standardized “flat” or “open” plea offer.  (Note that standardized waiver offers are available only pre-indictment or the functional equivalent of pre-indictment.  See Section 6.2.)  Accordingly, there may be cases where the prosecutor is fully satisfied that the amount of drugs involved does not exceed the second-degree statutory threshold (which would automatically render the defendant ineligible for a standardized “flat” offer), but it is not certain whether the amount involved exceeds the lower threshold for eligibility for a  1  Where the Brimage-eligible offense involves a second-degree amount of drugs, the defendant is automatically ineligible for any standardized waiver offer.
[brief] L. 1978, c. 95, § 2C:21-19(f).  (Pa126).  The newly adopted criminal provision contained the same “debt adjuster” definition and the same exemption list as the 1960 civil statute, including the exemption for “an attorney-at-law of this State. ”  Compare L. 1978, c. 95, § 2C:21-19(f) to L. 1960, c. 177, § 1.  (Pa126).  The next incarnation of the civil debt adjustment statute was the DACCA.
[brief] Therefore, we submit that the law that would typically guide the court regarding a residential fall-down on snow and ice is not applicable; we submit that the property is more properly characterized as either a commercial property under construction or a hybrid type of property status that would require the respondent to keep the area clear.  We submit that the property could not be a residence, however, because the term “residence” necessarily contemplates the concept of “domicile” and clearly that was not the case here.  As outlined below, and according to the testimony of the defendant [...], on the date of the accident, the property was not occupied by [...] until six months later, at some time in August 2021.  (Pa129).
[brief] Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011) (quoting In re Tr. Created By Agreement Dated Dec. 20, 1961, 194 N.J. 276, 284 (2008)).  Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. at 594-595.  Because a trial court “‘hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, [and] hears them testify’, it has a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of witnesses. ”  Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 33 (1988) (quoting Gallo v. Gallo, 66 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App.Div.1961)) (alterations in original).  “An appellate court’s reading of a cold record is a pale substitute for a trial judge’s assessment of the credibility of a witness he has observed firsthand. ”  State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518 (2013).  The trial court “has the opportunity to make first-hand credibility judgments about the witnesses who appear on the stand; it has a ‘feel of the case’ that can never be realized by a review of the cold record. ”  The higher court noted that they are “obliged to give deference to those findings of the trial judge which are substantially influenced by [the] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the ‘feel’ of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy. ”  State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)).  “We will set aside a trial court's findings of fact only when such findings ‘are clearly mistaken. ’”  State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 538 (2017) (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015)).  We respectfully submit that Plaintiff-Appellant-Purchaser (Plaintiff) cannot show such a “clear mistake” in the case at bar.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 39:4-124 (emphasis add).  There is no dispute that the Plaintiff made a left turn from the center lane which was designated by the “Giant Arrow” for travel to go straight through the intersection, not to make a left-hand turn.  As such, Plaintiff’s action was unequivocally in direct violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-124.  [...] was executing his left turn from the designated left turn lane in accordance with pavement markings and the rules of the road.  If one party was at fault here for this accident, it wasn’t [...], it was Plaintiff, [...].  B.
[brief] Second, the trial court found that: “what really led to all of this, was in April of 2019, [...] received a tax notice from the New Jersey Department of the Treasury indicating an audit of his 2015 tax return and that there was tax owed of $98,038. ” (36T 13:14-18).  After months of trying to obtain financial records from [...], [...] filed suit less than a year later.  Third, the trial court repeatedly explained that [...] had created a series of “webs” and “mazes” of accounts with the company finances, including conduit accounts, co-mingled funds, and step transactions.  These “mazes” and “webs” inhibited [...] from discovering the defendants’ conduct sooner and allowed [...] and the defendants to conceal their conduct.  (36T 22:21 to 23:7; 33:14-16; 53:9-10; 37T 72:13-15; 73:3-13; 75:14-21; 79:7-16; 86:18-20; 89:5-11).  See Motamed v. Chubb Corp., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33301, at *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2016) (“While Ayco argues that the discovery rule should not apply to Fay’s breach of contract claim, the Court finds that the rule is applicable here because Ayco’s alleged actions are ‘by their nature . . . self-concealing or undiscoverable. ’”).  Fourth, and in light of these findings, the trial court concluded that “there was no way” for [...] to know in 2014 that the $6.3 million figure provided by [...] was inaccurate.  [...]’s forensic analysis was critical.  As the trial court explained: “[i]t took a million dollars and two years to figure it out. ” (37T 89:12-17).  Whether Plaintiffs knew or should have known that the defendants were misappropriating funds is a pure fact question that the trial court resolved in the Plaintiffs’ favor.  The appellant may disagree with the trial court’s findings after weighing all of the evidence, but those findings are entitled to deference on appeal.  In sum, the failure to affirmatively raise the statute of limitations argument below is fatal to the appellant’s claim.
[brief] In fact, most forensic disciplines do not have the foundational science necessary to establish an error rate at all.  Garrett, *Autopsy of a Crime Lab*; see also National Research Council.  In scientific disciplines, error rates are established by accruing a large body of literature that can demonstrate “repeatability” (the same examiner makes similar decisions across time and cases) and “reproducibility” (different examiners make similar decisions with the same data).  In the context of forensic science, this could include “black box” studies,\(^2\) blind proficiency tests,\(^3\) or other controlled, empirical approaches to estimating the rate of incorrect identifications and exclusions in forensic examinations.  There are now several disciplines that have one or two black box studies or blind proficiency tests (\(e.g.\), fingerprints and firearms analysis), but this is not a “body of literature” that can be used to opine about error rates in real casework.  Furthermore, the rate of error in most of these studies is likely to be lower than would be seen in real cases because the samples used in the studies are better quality than the evidence typically obtained from crime scenes.
[brief] On or about March 3, 2023, the Bill Ricci Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Ricci Act”) was signed into law.  On or about March 3, 2023, [...], along with many others, filed his Eligibility Registration Form to register his presence at Ground Zero under the Ricci Act, along with a Request for Amended Benefits Form, Affidavit, and a Petition.
[directive] 3.  Do you understand if the court finds your conduct is characterized by a pattern of [Yes] [No] repetitive and compulsive behavior and you are not amenable to sex offender treatment or if you are amenable (will benefit from) but you are not willing to participate in such treatment, the court will sentence you to a term of incarceration to be served in another facility which will not provide for sex and offender treatment in such event, you will not receive commutation time for good behavior or earn work credits for time served in such other facility?  4.  Do you understand you will be able to challenge the findings of the Department [Yes] [No] of Corrections in a hearing and at that hearing you will have the right to confront the witnesses against you and to cross examine them and then present evidence on your own behalf?
[brief] It is not, per se, a professional negligence claim.  To fall under the AOM statute, the claim must be for damages resulting from malpractice or negligence of one of the limited, enumerated licensed persons acting within that person’s profession.  See Shamrock Lacrosse, Inc. v. Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, Branzburg & Ellers, LLP, 416 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2010).  In Haviland, the Appellate Division was presented with the issue whether a plaintiff must submit an AOM in support of a vicarious liability claim against a licensed entity, based on the alleged negligent conduct of an employee who is not a “licensed person” under the AOM statute.
[brief] For example, months before Plaintiff’s accident, there were two separate inspections that identified the settlement on the Garden State Parkway at the southbound north abutment joint of the Rt. 30 overpass.  First, on April 22, 2015, the Biennial Bridge Inspection was performed on behalf of the [...] on the Rt. 30 (a.k.a. Structure 40) overpass bridge.  (Pa1343).  The inspection identified settlement in the southbound left lane at the north abutment joint.  (Pa1351 and Pa1367).  The settlement condition was described as “[r]amped up and deteriorated in the left shoulder and left lane” with settlement up to 2 inches at the southbound north approach roadway.  (Pa1349, Pa1351 and Pa1367)(Emphasis Added).  [...], the engineering group that performed the inspection, recommended that the abutment joint be repaired.  (Pa1350).  A second inspection was of the Rt. 30 bridge was performed on June 24, 2015, after concerns related to the deck quality arose during the construction.
[brief] For all of the foregoing reasons of fact and law as stated herein, it is respectfully requested that this Honorable Court affirm the Order of the lower court in all respects.  Respectfully submitted, LAW  OFFICE OF FRANCIS D. MACKIN  Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, [...] BY:_____________________________________  [...], Esquire  Dated: April 26, 2024  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...] [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Respondent.
[brief] New Jersey Court Rule 4:9-1 governs the propriety of amendments to pleadings.  While leave to amend is “freely given in the interest of justice,” it is well-settled that granting leave, while liberal, is not completely unfettered.  Interchange State Bank v. Rinaldi, 303 N.J. Super. 239, 257 (App. Div. 1997); Fox v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp., 281 N.J. Super. 476, 483 (App. Div. 1995).  Indeed, such applications “are best left to the sound discretion of the trial court in light of the factual situation existing at the time each motion is made. ”  Id.  “That exercise of discretion requires a two-step process: whether the non-moving party will be prejudiced, and whether granting the amendment would nonetheless be futile.
[brief] In a letter dated February 5, 2020, [...]’s then-counsel advised the City Council that [...] “has spent almost six years seeking to assemble these properties for development” and thus, “[b]y this effort to condemn the Area, [as a result of the Blight Study,] the City is unfairly and illegally favoring a competing developer, and assisting its interference with our client’s efforts. ” (See Pa527 (emphasis added). )  B.  The February 13, 2020 City Council Meeting.
[directive] When LHDs receive new cases, they interview people to confirm where they are staying and, if needed, transfer cases to a new jurisdiction.  In areas with a high volume of cases, interviewing all new cases can take several days.  In addition, addresses may change over the duration of a person’s illness, such as when someone is hospitalized or admitted to a nursing home.  Unable to get current address.  Sometimes a person will refuse to provide their address to the • LHD, or they give an incorrect or outdated address.  This may be due to factors such as fear of being stigmatized, fear of being penalized (e.g, undocumented persons) or fear of being refused services.  Current address does not match driver’s license or other legal address.  Cases are stored in • CDRSS using the address reported by a laboratory, healthcare provider or case.  This may not match a person’s driver’s license, tax record or other previously reported address.  It is important to remember public health is not the same as law enforcement; LHDs are seeking information to conduct public health investigations, and this does not require proof of address or matching other databases such as DMV.
[brief] A plenary hearing on the Motion to Vacate Default Judgment was conducted in this matter on March 29, 2023, (T3) and then resumed and completed on April 20, 2023.  T4.4 ---  4  References to the Transcripts are as follows:  The Court erred in denying the Defendants Motion to Vacate, stating, while questioning the standard to be applied, that “if the standard is clear and convincing evidence, its not clear and convincing evidence that the process was not served”.  T4, p.99:13-16.  This is despite the uncontroverted testimony and report of Defendants’ GPS expert who placed the process server a third of a mile away (by the Collins School), not at the [...]’s home, at the time of alleged service if the Affidavit with all its errors and irregularities is allowed to stand.  233a.  The process server whose name appeared on the Affidavit could not recall [...] or anything about service at issue.  T4, p. 8:18-21; T4, p. 20:14-23.  Furthermore, EZ pass records, photos and testimony proved that Defendants left for vacation prior to the alleged service.  The Court found that it was “within the realm of possibility” that service was effectuated.  T4, p. 100:21-23.  On April 27, 2023, the Court signed an Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Default Judgment.  353a.  A Notice of Appeal was filed on April 27, 2023.  354a.  An Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on May 3, 2023.  360a.  _____________________  T1 – Pretrial conference December 13, 2022  T2 – Pretrial conference January 3, 2023  T3 – Plenary hearing March 29, 2023  T4 – Plenary hearing April 20, 2023  Plaintiff’s sale of the Property
[brief] [...] asks that this Court adopt (or appoint a Special Adjudicator to recommend) a sprawling jury instruction covering, “at a minimum,” topics including specific language an expert can use regarding the source of latent fingerprints, the subjectivity and fallibility of fingerprint analysis in general, whether fingerprints are unique, the accuracy of the ACE-V process specifically, various factors on which fingerprint identification is _____________________  3  This point responds to Point V of the Innocence Project’s amicus brief.  dependent, the existing New Jersey model charge on fingerprints, an explanation of circumstantial evidence, and the probativeness of fingerprint-analysis evidence.  (See IPAb at 21-23).  To oblige the Innocence Project’s request would subsume the admission of fingerprint-analysis evidence by advancing arguments more appropriate for cross-examination or testimony by a defense expert, and it would risk confusing the jury.  “Jury charges must provide a ‘comprehensible explanation of the questions that the jury must determine, including the law of the case applicable to the facts that the jury may find. ’”  State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 181-82 (2012) (quoting State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 287-88 (1981)).  Rather than explain the law, the Innocence Project’s suggested instruction, coming from the judge, a neutral arbiter, would risk biasing the jury against fingerprint-analysis evidence in its entirety.  Indeed, at trial, when defense counsel proposed that the judge read a customized fingerprint instruction (one that was less expansive than the instruction proposed by the Innocence Project), the judge declined to do so because the proposed instruction was based on a report not in evidence and because he “anticipated” that defense counsel would “make these arguments in closing. ” (6T132-12 to 21).  This aligns with the assistant prosecutor’s concern at the charge conference that reading such a charge “would have [the judge] testify to perceived weaknesses within the latent print analysis field, which is not what a jury instruction is designed to do. ” (6T131-16 to 20).  As explained in the State’s main response brief, the judge read the proper instruction to guide the jury.  Neither defense counsel’s nor the Innocence Project’s requests for a new jury charge should be granted.
[brief] First, the Board grasps at straws in criticizing [...]’s traffic safety expert, [...], for not reading a “study” he relied on for his expert testimony.  (Rb14.)  It is very clear that this was an excuse used by the Board, not a legitimate criticism.  [...] testified as to the danger of billboards in Pennsylvania and other areas.  He testified that he relied upon existing studies *and testimony from hearings on those same billboards that described the area and any purported danger.*  (2T:21-22.) \(^1\)
[brief] And it was disclosed in time for its effective use at trial.  In \textit{Brady}, the Court held that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good \textsuperscript{18}  Defense counsel misconstrued that the State’s argument, in its brief in opposition to defendant’s motion for leave to appeal, was “that dismissal was not warranted because [the] motion to suppress was granted. ” (Db18).  Dismissal of the indictment with prejudice was still unwarranted, whether defendant’s motion to suppress had been granted or not, because there were less drastic remedies available to cure defendant’s allegations of prejudice and because the judge found that the State’s conduct was not willful or outrageous. faith or bad faith of the prosecution.