ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]’s argument -- that the Correction of Errors statute, N.J.S.A. 43:15A-54 should allow her to purchase service credit (Pb18-19) -- should also fail because there is no longer an error to correct.  The Board acted in compliance with the governing statute and regulation and found the equitable principles are not warranted in [...]’s favor as discussed above.  (Pa93-96).  [...] also argues that the Board’s denial of her request for an administrative hearing deprived her right of due process.
[brief] (188a)  Thereafter, Plaintiffs discovered an Affidavit of Title executed by [...] as sole member of [...].  622a.  In addition, and most importantly, Plaintiffs discovered checks showing that [...], four months prior to May 7, 2008, had already been repaid the alleged $250,000.00 loan for which Teddy [...] allegedly gave him the Collateral Assignment.  625a–627a; 645a–650a.  Thus, Plaintiffs discovered that at the time [...] signed the Mortgage, the Collateral Assignment had already been extinguished since the loan had been repaid.  Thus, the only reason [...] signed the Mortgage as sole member of [...] was because [...] was in fact sole member of [...], as he certified and was notarized, notwithstanding self-serving and perjurious testimonies of co-conspirator --- ² Pursuant to Rule 2:6-1(a)(2), [...]’s brief is permissible content for Appellants’ Appendix as it raises an issue which is germane to the appeal.
[brief] (Pa000017-18, 26-29)  The State first assumed the powers under N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-5 to modify, amend or terminate current CNAs, act as the City’s bargaining representative, and change conditions of employment on November 9, 2016 and was prevented by Court Order from making any changes until June 7, 2017. \(^4\)  The MSRA is silent on whether this power extends to wages and terms of employment accrued prior to the trigger date.  Both the Trial Court and Defendants’ position is that the MSRA permits the State to claw back wages and benefits earned prior to the Implementation Memo.  Under this logic, the State could modify wages and benefits accrued and paid by the City prior to June 7, 2017 and then pursue these employees for reimbursement.  This is clearly not the intention of the New Jersey Legislature.  A more expansive interpretation is that the MSRA permits changes to wages and terms and conditions of employment, whether contractual or not, when the powers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-5 are triggered.  There are no powers for the --- \(^4\)  The Trial Court identified Vadel, et al. v. City of Atlantic City, et al. where the Hon. [...] P.J.Cv., determined that the State was permitted to eliminate terminal leave payments accrued prior to the MSRA takeover.  PA0000026.  Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs in that matter have filed an appeal which is pending.  For the reasons discussed herein, the MSRA does not permit the elimination of accrued earned wages.  State to reach back for prior paid or owed wages or benefits.  Earned wages cannot be divested absent a knowing and intentional waiver by each person adversely affected.  Matter of Morris School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 310 N.J. Super. 332 (App. Div. 1998).  None of Plaintiffs’ members have executed any such knowing and intentional waiver.  The New Jersey Supreme Court recently discussed accumulated sick leave as a vested right in Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park, 241 N.J. 595, 601 (2020).  In that case, the Supreme Court found that a modification to terminal leave was effective because those benefits do not vest until a triggering event, such as retirement or separation from employment.  Id. at 601.  In this matter, the event triggering the payment of accumulated sick leave was the July 1, 2016 promotion, because the contractual right to wage increases was "a present fixed interest which […] should be protected against arbitrary state action."  Phillips v. Curiale, 128 N.J. 608, 620 (1992) (quoting Pa. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Rosenthal, 14 N.J. 372, 384 (1954)).  Under no reasonable interpretation of the MSRA is the State permitted to eliminate earned wages that were fully vested prior to the State acquiring the authority to modify those terms on June 7, 2017.  The Trial Court’s March 4, 2024 Order must, therefore, be reversed.  CONCLUSION
[directive] W ap oblije pije 85% santans ke yo enpoze w an pou zak sa a ( sa yo) anvan pou w ta elijib pou libète kondisyonèl pou zak sa a (sa yo)?  you will be required to serve 85% of the sentence imposed for that offense(s) before you will be eligible for parole on that offense(s)?  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  2.  Èske w konprann ke le fèt dèske ou plede koupab de akizasyon sa yo tribinal la oblije enpoze yon tèm de lane de libète sou sipèvizyon ka va komanse osito ou finn pije santans la nan prizon?  Premye Degre Tèm Libète Kondisyonèl sou Sipèvizyon - 5 lane  Dezyèm Degre Tèm Libète Kondisyonèl sou Sipèvizyon - 3 lane  Fòm Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11170-Haitian paj 1 nan 2  Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11170-Haitian page 1 of 2  Do you understand that because you have pled guilty to these charges the court must impose a year term of parole supervision and that term will begin as soon as you complete the sentence of incarceration?
[brief] The model jury charge is “often helpful to trial courts performing this important function[,]” but in some cases, as here, the trial court must “mold the instruction in a manner that explains the law to the jury in the context of the material facts of the case. ”  *State v. Concepcion*, 111 N.J. 376, 379 (1988).  Here, the Court read an incorrect charge to the jury with respect to Possession of a Weapon for an Unlawful Purpose.  (15T:242-8 to 245-8).  The charge as it was originally read to the jury stated “a weapon is anything readily capable of lethal use or of inflicting serious bodily injury. ” (15T:242-8 to 9).  However, on the verdict sheet, there was a sentencing enhancer pursuant to *N.J.S.A.* 2C:43-6(c), which requires [...] to possess a firearm while in the course of or attempting to commit the foregoing crime.  (Da9-15).  When the charge was initially read to the jury, the Court never defined what a firearm was. (15T:242-8 to 9).  Similarly, the charge did not define what possession meant.  (15T:242-8 to 9).  On February 24, 2022, the day after charge was initially read, the Court reread the charge on Possession of a Weapon for an Unlawful Purpose to include the definition of a firearm and the definitions of actual and constructive possession.  (16T:7-23 to 16-1).  The erroneous charge couple with the rereading an additional charge the following day was confusing and warrants the Court granting the defendant’s motion or a new trial.  (16T:11-6 to 20).  POINT VIII
[brief] Among other issues it resolved, the PSA (DA 282) provided for the equitable distribution of any proceeds from the sale of the only real property at issue in the divorce, specifically, the famed [...], formerly of [...].  The PSA refers to any proceeds of the “sale” of Olga’s Diner only.  It does not state that Plaintiff should share in any monies from the sale of the land that the diner was situated on.  No sale of the land ever took place as it was foreclosed upon in 2014.
[brief] This requirement is also echoed specifically in the CBD 15 Zone, wherein the Ordinance provides, "All development must be approved by the Borough Land Use Board and shall be submitted through the normal site plan and subdivision procedures as identified by *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D et seq., and the Borough Land Development Regulations."  (BTG Cert. Ex. "P")  The Trial Court confirmed the Subject Property not being mentioned in ANY document over the span of eight (8) years, stating:  The Off-Site Property is not identified in the Settlement Agreement, or in the Order of Conditional Judgment of Compliance and Repose.  The court finds no basis to grant automatic site approval where the Off-Site Project undeniably would require multiple variances which have not been properly reviewed or approved by the Local Land Use Board.  There is nothing in the record which compels approval of the Off-Site Project when other avenues of compliance are available to the Redeveloper.  [...]'s main cited legal authority for Court intervention are both factually inapposite to those presented here.
[brief] However, [...] did locate and highlight a significant piece of financial information found in an Exhibit 13 titled “Home Building Income Statement Summary by Plan” in [...]’s exemption application.  Pa593  The exhibit indicates that the ‘Unleveraged IRR’ produced by the project would be a remarkably high 67.9% on the developer’s invested equity capital’.  (emphasis added)  [...] explained that “IRR” is an abbreviation for Internal Rate of Return.  “Unleveraged IRR” is a term used widely in the real estate capital markets to assess the financial attractiveness and feasibility of a proposed equity investment in a real estate project.  Based on his professional experience, he concluded that “a well-conceived and sponsored project needs to demonstrate an unleveraged IRR in the range of 10% - 12% in order to attract the equity capital needed as a source of funds.  By the developer’s own calculation.  . . . the subject project is expected to produce an unleveraged IRR [internal rate of return] of 67.9%, more than five times this benchmark standard.  This extraordinarily profitable return is projected despite these so-called ‘extraordinary costs,’ and with a very modest short-term PILOT agreement. ”  (emphasis added)  From defendant [...]’s own financial disclosure, [...] further concluded that the “project would be financially viable if it were subject to full taxes. ”  The PILOT agreement, he said, provided minimal property tax relief over the life of the exemption,\(^{14}\) with a structure providing that the PILOT is 99.5% of taxes (essentially full taxes) for most of the term of the Agreement.  He reasoned \(^{14}\)  The relief from full taxes within this 30-year agreement is quite modest and short term.  The multi-family rental apartments will pay 66% of full taxes in years 1–5, then 75% of taxes in year 6-10, and then 99.5% of taxes (essentially full taxes) for the last 20 years of the Agreement.  For the for-sale homes, the tax relief is even more modest and short term for the developer.  The PILOT would be 75% of full taxes for just five years (years 1-5), and thereafter, for the remaining 25 year term of the Agreement, the PILOT is 99.5% of taxes (essentially full taxes for most of the term of the Agreement). that the project would have been constructed even at full taxes since even a reduced unleveraged IRR would have been at least two or three times the IRR level needed to confirm the project as financially feasible. ”  (emphasis added)  [...] also questioned the 30-year term of the tax exemption, finding no basis whatsoever related to financial need for the term of this Financial agreement to extend for 30 years. ”  Pa706, par 23.
[brief] And that explains the low coverage limit for single-family uses in the R-20A Zone compared to conditional uses in the R-20A Zone that must obtain site plan approval under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-67(b).  The Board’s commentary that it could not mitigate the impacts to the MPA through the imposition of conditions is at odds with the requirements of Sica.  The third prong of Sica requires land use boards to mitigate detrimental effects of the variance.
[brief] The audio is probative of exactly what was going on in the Plaintiff’s mind and body in terms of pain immediately upon police arrival at the scene of the crash on -- back in December of 2019.  That’s four years earlier than this Plaintiff will have an opportunity to testify at trial, and memories sometimes fade.  The video’s audio is the best evidence of what the Plaintiff was feeling in terms of pain immediately at the crash.  It’s the best evidence of her conscious pain and suffering at that time and really perhaps the only evidence that could accurately reflect in realtime her pain and discomfort and distress at that moment.
[brief] The accident occurred in the morning and it was undisputed that a thin layer of snow covered the roads in the area causing them to be slippery.  Plaintiff [...] stopped her car in the intersection and was prepared to turn left into her employer’s parking lot at the time of the accident.  Her turn signal was operating and she was awaiting a break in the southbound traffic on Washington Avenue before making her turn.  While stopped, she observed through her rearview mirror the Defendant’s bus as it approached and struck her car in the rear.  There was evidence in the case that the school bus was going about 15 to 20 miles per hour.  The Defendant driver testified that he had been driving the school bus since 7:00 a.m. and that he knew the roads were slippery due to the covering of a thin layer of snow.  He testified that he had not skidded when he had stopped previously and that he was driving at a speed of about 10 miles per hour.  When he reached the point of about 50 feet from the rear of the Plaintiff’s vehicle, he applied his brakes, but the bus skidded.  He turned his wheel to the right in an attempt to avoid the [...] vehicle, but the bus kept going straight and struck Plaintiff [...]’s vehicle in the rear.  As in the [...] case, the Appellant here was aware of the precipitation and wet roads, but had not previously encountered any loss of control or slippery conditions.
[brief] Defendant Has Ample Comparable Evidence Available to Him and Will Receive the Benefit of an Adverse-Inference Charge.  Defendant has the ability to recreate the profile during his trial and any harm remaining from the loss of it would be eliminated by providing the jury with an adverse-inference charge.  [...] nevertheless determined defendant was irreparably prejudiced and the only possible remedy was a dismissal of his indictment.  Where a defendant cannot prove either bad faith on the part of the State or the obvious exculpatory nature of the lost evidence, he is not entitled to relief unless he can make a “showing of manifest prejudice or harm arising from the failure to preserve evidence” as required under the third Hollander factor.
[brief] The Authority’s suggestion that [...] would have rejected financing because of insufficient parking demand lacks credibility for two reasons.  First, the Authority \textit{never} conducted any study or analysis of parking demand that would have led it to believe, at any point prior to 2009, that the Project would not generate sufficient parking demand.  2T90:15-22; see also Sections G-H, supra.  Second, there is \textit{no} evidence in the record to suggest that, after execution of the Redevelopment Agreement in 2005, which included the [...] representation in Section 8.7(b), the projected parking demand for the Project would not justify construction of the Authority Garage by 2009.  In his testimony, [...] \textit{never} identified any change in circumstances surrounding the Project, and so the Authority’s supposed inability to obtain [...] approval of financing for the Authority Garage, if true, can only be blamed on the Authority itself.  Moreover, even if [...] had actually rejected financial approval for the Authority Garage, the Redevelopment Agreement required the Authority to seek alternative financing.  Specifically, Section 8.7(d) of the Redevelopment Agreement provided that “[i]n the event that [...] does not agree to insure the Authority’s bonds or other obligations expected to be issued to finance the Authority Garage, the parties agree to negotiate other financial alternatives in good faith for a period of 90 days after [...]’s determination. ”  Da112 (§ 8.7(d)).  Thus, had the Authority submitted an application to finance the Authority Garage and [...] denied that application, the Authority was required to negotiate with [...] to attempt alternative financing.  Ibid.  Because the Authority never actually sought [...] approval to issue bonds to finance the Authority Garage and never explored alternate financing options, the Authority’s assertion that the Authority Garage could not be built due to an inability to obtain financing was not credible.  **J.
[directive] ADULT  An individual who is 18 years of age or older.  ADOLESCENT  An individual who is at least 13 years of age but less than 18 years of age.  Adolescents are eligible for a full range of services by the SART.  Current New Jersey law requires that before any sexual assault medical forensic examination of an adolescent is performed, parental notification is required, unless it is determined it is not in the best interest of the victim.  See N.J.S.A. 9:17A-4.  CHILD  An individual who is under the age of 13 years old.  A child is not eligible for services of the SART, however, children aged 12 and under may receive an emergent sexual assault medical forensic examination.  CONFIDENTIAL SEXUAL VIOLENCE ADVOCATE (CSVA)
[brief] In this case, Defendants never even asked the Board members to compile a log or otherwise explain the parameters of their private email use for government business.  From there it can be evaluated if the --- \(^6\)  For example, the OPRA statute renders the municipal clerk the custodian for a municipal body but the municipal clerk typically has no control or involvement over police reports or building permits.  The “record custodian” is merely the person “on point” and the vessel through which the ultimate responsive records will flow.  The Paff certification mechanism clearly facilitates this practical constraint.  individual Board members must be subject to subpoena or other processes to compel compliance.  There is no defense for the government to simply assert that “in theory” it does not have access to the records, particularly without even trying to obtain access and possession.  The trial court’s Order bars any exploration or explanation of the private email account usage simply because the Board does not control it.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] *(See* 38842a-38871a (50-State Survey)).  Further, this Court has specifically applied the *Code of Judicial Conduct*’s conflict-of-interest rules to Special Masters in the context of *Mount Laurel* litigation.  *See Deland v. Twp. of Berkeley*, 361 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2003).  In rejecting disqualification here, the Special Master and the trial judge referenced the differences between Special Masters and ordinary judges.  The Special Master stated that “[s]pecial masters are most often attorneys in private practice who would be reluctant to take on appointments that would disqualify them from large swatches [sic] of potential work.
[directive] Prior custodial sentence of 30 days or more  Prior custodial sentence:  The final disposition for an offense committed by the Defendant, handed down before the Index Assault.  ✔The sentence itself must be for at least 30 days.  ✔The Defendant must have been admitted to an adult or juvenile correctional facility, prison, or jail, but the Defendant need not have been in custody for the entire 30 days.  Count the sentence, not the time spent in custody.
[brief] When he reviewed [...]’s January 2, 2018, statement to the police on, [...] did so with “a skeptical and hopefully discerning eye” as he would any statement made by anyone that he reviewed.  (13T52-22 to 53-4).  [...] understood “that not everything that people are quoted as saying is quoted accurately.  Not everything that they’re saying is true.  Of course.  And so I’m trying to weigh the likelihood of various events being true or not true. ” (13T53-4 to 9).  [...] was explaining the approach he applied generally in reviewing every witness statement provided to him.
[brief] [...] submitted discovery evidence to the trial court, Burlington Superior Court, documenting her medical state, issues of jurisdiction and challenges within the elements plaintiff must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, proof of her whereabouts and vehicle information; the plaintiff agreed with [...].  On April 13, 2022, defendant submits a motion to dismiss to the initial trial court, Burlington Superior, on the basis for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficient service of process, or failure to state a claim via NJ JEDS.
[brief] The trial court held, among other things, that (i) pay-when-able loans are enforceable under New Jersey law; (ii) Plaintiff’s claims were not barred by *N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1*; (iii) [...] breached the parties’ April 26, 2013 pay-when-able loan agreement; and (iv) Plaintiff had not discharged Defendants’ prior loan obligation by signing a Discharge of Mortgage which, in fact, served only to discharge the collateral (i.e., the real property encumbered by the mortgage) that secured [...]’s guarantee of that prior loan.  Da1-66.  The trial court also found overwhelmingly that [...] was not a credible witness.\textsuperscript{2}  The trial court awarded Plaintiff the sum of $274,260.64, plus post-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum in accordance with the terms of the parties’ loan agreement.  Da62-63, 68.  On September 20, 2023, Defendants sought reconsideration of the trial court’s award of post-judgment interest at the contract rate of 10%, its finding that the discharge of mortgage was not a satisfaction of a prior loan, and its imposition of liability against [...].
[brief] [...] maintains the absolute right to set the standards of performance for its employees.  It is beyond dispute that [...] could not perform the essential functions of her carpentry position when she was terminated from her employment on January 6, 2020.  [...] based its decision on the only information it had before it at the time; a single doctor’s note stating that [...] could not perform numerous tasks integral to her position for at least six months.  Based on that information, [...] exercised its right to terminate her employment because she could not perform her essential job functions.  The Arbitrator infringed upon the [...]’s authority by creating an ultra vires work rule that adds a restriction upon [...]’s authority found nowhere in the CBA.  In essence, his award rewrites Article III of the CBA to state that [...] has the exclusive right “[t]o hire all employees, and subject to the provisions of law, to determine their qualifications and conditions of continued employment, or assignment,” except for employees on temporary disability.  The case law on the issue is unequivocal that an arbitrator cannot add any such qualification; as the Supreme Court stated in County College of Morris, an arbitrator cannot “read in” an additional term over which the parties did not collectively bargain.
[brief] (Pa 209, at 44:16-23)  Director [...] further testified in his deposition that Defendant [...] admitted to him it was a squint:  Q: “Did he [[...]] admit to making the squinting eye gesture?”  A: “Yes. ”  Q: “Did he [[...]] deny that he was squinting and say he was just closing his eyes?  A: No.  (Pa 90, at 44:21 – 45:1)  On April 6, 2020, Plaintiff had a meeting with Director Childress, his union representatives, [...], and [...].
[brief] The new policy singles out transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students for differential treatment, as it requires school staff to inform parents only about those students who request a “public name/identity/pronoun change, bathroom/locker room accommodation, or club/sports accommodations, or the like. ” (Da169-70).  In other words, the new policy categorically and facially treats transgender students (subject to blanket notification) differently than it treats cisgender students (subject to no parental notification).  Although Appellants below argued that the Amended Policy could apply to cisgender students who requested a social transition, as the court aptly noted, “who but transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students would request public and social accommodations or express a change in gender identity or expression?” (Da128).  Appellants no longer seriously argue that the Amended Policy applies equally to cisgender students.  Other evidence of differential treatment abounds.  The Amended Policy’s title—“Transgender Students”—underscores that it does not apply to cisgender students, and the remainder of its language eliminates any doubt.