ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In addition, Rule 1:7-4(b) provides:  On motion made not more than 20 days after service of the final order or judgment upon all parties by the party obtaining it, the court may grant a rehearing or may, on the papers submitted, amend or add to its findings and may amend the final order or judgment accordingly, but the failure of a party to make such motion or to object to findings shall not preclude the party’s right thereafter to question the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings.  The motion to amend the findings, which may be made with a motion for a new trial, shall state with specificity the basis on which it is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions that counsel believes the court has overlooked or on which it has erred.  Rule 1:13-1 permits:  [c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight and omission may at any time be corrected by the court on its own initiative or on the motion of any party, and on such notice and terms as the court directs, notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal.  Rule 4:49-2 governs reconsideration of “final” and not interlocutory orders.  The Rule 4:49-2 standard is essentially whether the rationale was palpably incorrect or irrational, and whether the judge failed to consider or appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.  In Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128 (App. Div. 2021), Presiding Appellate Judge [...], together with Judges [...] and [...], explained:  But some reconsideration motions-those that argue in good faith a prior mistake, a change in circumstances, or the court’s misappreciation of what was previously argued-present the court with an opportunity to either reinforce and better explain why the prior order was appropriate or correct a prior erroneous order.  Judges should view well-reasoned motions based upon Rule 4:42-2 as an invitation to apply Cromwell’s rule:  “I beseech you . . . think it possible you may be mistaken. ”  The fair and efficient administration of justice is better served when reconsideration motions are viewed in that spirit and not as nuisance to be swatted away.
[brief] (Aa222-231).  The Commission issued its decision on June 7, 2023 determining that [...] was ineligible for promotion to the subject position and that, had the Commission been made aware of [...]’s demotion, [...]’s name would not have been certified on November 4, 2022.  (Aa001-008).  As such, the Commission determined that [...] should have been the first ranked eligible on the November 4, 2022 certification and, accordingly, needed to be either promoted or removed from the eligible list pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:5-2.2(c).
[brief] The trial court’s holding was as follows:  And, the reason I’m denying the motions and we’re starting to run late, is because while I’m really—I wrestled with this for a long time and spent a lot of time with you guys because I have some real problems with how the plaintiff handled this.  But at the end of the day, I think that the plaintiff was misled by the landlord.  I don’t know whether it was intentional or not.  But you have a situation where there’s discovery that has taken place.  And the landlord tells the plaintiff that there are no other parties who might be responsible.  Yes, the plaintiff knew the identities of these tenants.  But I cannot fault the plaintiff for not including these tenants if he didn’t really have a theory of liability against them.  And at that point in time not only—so he knew the identities of the—all of the stores in the strip mall, but when asked, the landlord said there’s nobody else that’s responsible.  And then the plaintiff began the process of trying to get those leases.  It required motion practice and repeated efforts to get the leases.  Ultimately he got some leases that seemed to demonstrate that there might be some responsibility on the part of the tenants.  And I think that those—the efforts that were made were sufficient efforts, not great, not perfect, they were sufficient efforts to identify whether there was a cause of action.  And for that reason, I'm denying the motions.
[brief] Israel as an occupying power does not have that right to self-defense. ”  As a result of [...]’s hateful remarks, the White House announced that it was ending its work with [...] on crafting a national antisemitism strategy, and issued an unusually --- 2 [...], [...] director says he was ‘happy’ on Oct. 7, Israel ‘does not have right to self-defense,’ FOX News (December 7, 2023), available at https://www.foxnews.
[brief] This court “review[s] a ruling on summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard governing the trial court. ”  Brennan ex rel. State v. Lonegan, 454 N.J. Super. 613, 618 (App. Div. 2018); see also F.K. v. Integrity House, Inc., 460 N.J. Super. 105, 114 (App. Div. 2019).  In particular, whether a statutory amendment applies retroactively is a question of law reviewed de novo.  See Maia v. IEW Constr. Grp., 475 N.J. Super. 44, 48 (App. Div. 2023); In re G.H., 455 N.J. Super. 515, 526 (App. Div. 2018), aff’d, 240 N.J. 113 (2019).  Accordingly, on review of a summary judgment ruling, “[t]he trial court’s conclusions of law and application of the law to the facts warrant no deference from a reviewing court. ”  F.K., 460 N.J. Super. at 114 (quoting W.J.A. v. D.A., 210 N.J.  229, 238 (2012)).  The court’s “interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference,” and issues of law are “subject to de novo plenary appellate review. ”  Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 382–83 (2010) (quotation marks omitted).  II.
[brief] * * *  “Loss” is defined as “damages, settlements and/or defense costs. ”  The fees awarded by the Vermont Superior Court do not constitute “damages” and were not for “defense” of any claims by the Association or receiver, and, thus, are outside the scope of the “loss” definition and not covered for that reason.  See also Feb. 10, 2021 Decision of Vermont Superior Court (Pa371) (“Defendants point out that the complaint sought multiple remedies for breach of fiduciary duty, but only injunctive relief was awarded.  The court, however, did not deny other relief – Plaintiffs chose not to seek it. ”)  The foregoing confirms that the damage claims had been abandoned and that an appeal, even if successful, only would have served to overturn a non-covered award of injunctive relief which is outside the definition of “loss”, particularly considering that the equitable relief awarded did not require [...] to expend any monies; it merely blocked his effort to manipulate the Association’s litigation positions to benefit himself and his wife.  Because damage claims had been voluntarily dismissed, there was, of course, no prospect of their resurrection even if an appeal were successful.  See Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 206 N.J. 596 (2011) (discussing at length distinction between monetary damages and injunctive relief and finding no coverage because award fell into latter category); see also Abouzaid v. Mansard Gardens, LLC, 207 N.J. 67, 70 (2011) (stating that duty to defend ends where potentially-covered claim “drops out” of case).
[brief] An example of one outburst is the following:  THE WITNESS:  No, he’s badgering me, and you’re allowing it.  So, I’m going to be combative against him.  THE COURT: Okay, [...].  THE WITNESS: Well, don’t let him badger me then.  THE COURT: [...].  THE WITNESS: I will not be badgered on this witness stand, ma’am.  THE COURT: Okay.  I think I heard an objection from your attorney.  THE WITNESS: -- you allowed it to go on, and I’m getting badgered.  THE COURT: What did I tell you earlier?  What happens when your attorney makes an objection?  THE WITNESS: But you allowed him to continue badgering me.  …  THE WITNESS: The whole jury saw this, and you allowed it to continue.  You want it to continue over?  We can do this all day.  [...]: May I request a brief recess.
[brief] The Court: Well, what you're going to get is you're going to get an order that's going to be sent to you by [...].  She's a lawyer.  And you may hear from [...].  [...] is also a lawyer who I have appointed as administratrix for this estate.  I took [...] off, I put [...] in.  So, anything she ask you for, you're obligated to provide.  Ms. [...] knows that this is the rule, this is the order of the Court, and that's how we're going to do it.  (6T-47).  The Court asked if there was a conflict with [...] since [...] appeared to be involved in some way.
[brief] Defendants [...], [...], [...], and [...] (collectively “United Defendants”) and [...] (“MultiPlan”) (collectively “Defendants”) urge its reversal.  First, the ESI Order plainly exceeds the bounds of Rule 4:10-2(a), which authorizes a court to compel production only of documents relevant to the claims or defenses involved in the pending action.  As this Court has repeatedly emphasized, relevancy is the touchstone of discovery, and Rule 4:10-2(a) expressly applies the relevancy standard to paper documents and ESI alike.  Yet the trial court declined to apply the relevancy limitation, adopting the ESI Order even though it would admittedly require production of a “significant number” of irrelevant documents.  The court cited no legal authority justifying an order compelling a party to produce concededly irrelevant documents.  Second, and independently, the trial court abused its discretion by imposing enormous burdens on Defendants with no countervailing justification.  There is never good reason to compel production of irrelevant documents, but Defendants have particular reason for concern here: in a related case, Plaintiffs’ affiliate breached a confidentiality order by disclosing Defendants’ sensitive business information.  And beyond those case-specific concerns, mandating production of irrelevant document is especially unreasonable where readily-available alternative procedures would minimize burdens on the parties and the court, including the appointment of a special discovery master—a standard mechanism the trial court itself had already invoked in this case.
[brief] (Da 4)  Ibid.  While the judge properly instructed the jury that possessing less than 3.5 grams of pure cocaine constituted a third-degree crime, the judge failed to instruct the jury that, for the purposes of the second-degree crime, the jury had to determine whether the amount of cocaine the defendant possessed included at least 3.5 grams of pure cocaine.  Ibid.  This Court held that “[t]he error requires reversal of the conviction even though the State’s evidence is uncontradicted. ”  Ibid.  In this case, the jury was similarly not told that the element that elevates robbery from a second-degree crime to a first-degree crime is whether the defendant used or threatened to use a deadly weapon.
[brief] (22T 40, lines 20-25)  The Court further stated:  Your client has gone to great lengths to ignore Court Orders, avoid their responsibilities, and to ensure that this litigation, which should have been simple, turned into a mockery.  It turned - ever time they-she could do something to thwart the administration of this Estate, it's clear that that's what happened.  The simple request for the EIN number.  The answers to discovery were an abomination.  They're - with full knowledge that there was a life insurance policy.  They only answer was there was health insurance?  My head almost came off its shoulders.  [...] had to remove your client because of her actions.  This case went on for a year longer than it needed to because none of the information could be supplied simply.  (22T 42)  An award of attorney's fees in a probate action is first governed by R. 4:42-9(3):
[brief] [...] of conspiracy, as charged in Count Three, but acquitting him of all other charges.  (Da 7-9)  On June 20, 2022, [...] heard argument on the defendants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial.  By Order issued that same date (Da 10)  [...] denied the motions.  Also on that date, [...] heard Mr. [...]’s guilty pleas to violations of probation, and discharged him from probation on those matters without improvement.  (18T 135-16 to 146-20)  She thereupon sentenced Mr. [...] on the sole remaining count in the instant matter to an 11-year term of incarceration subject to the provisions of the No Early Release Act.  All requisite fines and penalties were imposed.
[brief] On the other hand, New Jersey courts have correctly allowed parol evidence where a party sought to void a contract that had been secured by fraudulent representations.  *See:* *Walid v. Yolanda for Irene Couture, Inc.*, 425 N.J. Super. 171 (App. Div. 2012)(allowed evidence of fraudulent accounting in suit to void contract to purchase a business); *Berman v. Gurwicz*, 189 N.J. Super. 89 (Ch.Div.1981)(allowed evidence of undisclosed lease of swimming pool to condominium purchasers seeking to void lease payments); and *Square Two, LLC v. JJJ Solutions, LLC*, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 369 (App. Div. 2021) (allowed evidence of misrepresentations of income from restaurant despite a “no reliance” clause in contract in suit to void purchase contract).
[brief] The Township’s lofty and unsubstantiated language about environmental concerns, economic benefits, and more are not tied to anything particular about the Township at all.  Nor is there any citation to the record to support these claims.  This Court in Mipro recognized that the municipality there “had a reasonable basis for concern” about adding residential development to the area after the Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) “recognized” that the acquisition of the site promoted slowing down development after the DEP approved a grant for the acquisition.  379 N.J. Super. at 376.  Moreover, there was evidence of a longstanding concern about maintaining open space and the Appellate Division relied on very specific numbers regarding Mount Laurel’s rapid population growth and years of careful consideration by the municipality to slow that growth down.  Id. at 362-63.  Plaintiff’s brief here only cites to the State public policy concerns to which the Court in *Mipro* cited.  But the Township is unable to cite to any document in the trial court record – or in the municipal record – regarding its newfound rationale to justify the taking of private property.
[directive] Juvenile 4.8 2A:4A-26.1 N.J.S.A. to pursuant court adult to waived is juvenile a that event the In shall prosecutor the juvenile), election of (waiver at 2A:4A-27 N.J.S.A. or waiver) (involuntary issued (CDR-2) is complaint-warrant or (CDR-1) complaint-summons new a that certain make not is she or complaint-warrant, he by charged not is defendant a if that Note court. adult the by the by monitored be not would thus and Law, Reform Bail the under defendant" "eligible an when Accordingly, detention. pretrial of possibility the to subject or be program services pretrial charged be should waiver upon juvenile the that Directive this under determines prosecutor the acomplaint-warrant prepare shall prosecutor the acomplaint-warrant, of means by adult an as whether to deciding In packet. motion waiver juvenile the of part as court the to it submit and shall prosecutor the acomplaint-warrant, for court the to apply or to acomplaint-summons issue been had originally person the if as Directive this of Section/subsection(s) appropriate apply the an as treated shall be court adult waived to juvenile 2.2.1 (a subsection See adult. an as arrested waiver involuntary an justifying circumstances the that expected is It Directive).
[brief] If the defendant was arrested for, charged with, pleaded guilty to, and was sentenced on an unlawful possession of a firearm offense the day before the commission, arrest, and formal charging of burglary and theft in Morris County, the State agrees factor a(5) would not act as a disqualifier for Recovery Court.  However, these are not the circumstances presented in the instant appeal.  Instead, this defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm in Essex County on July 2, 2022, approximately five months after he was formally charged with the Morris County offenses on January 19, 2022.  When convicted, it was established the defendant did, in fact, unlawfully possess a firearm the night of July 1, 2022.  His violation of his Morris County pretrial release conditions as a result of the new Essex County firearm charges formulated the basis of the State’s Motion to Revoke Release and does not bear upon the applicability of factor a(5), as the defendant would have this Court believe.  Rather, the State, as does the Legislature, focuses upon the physical act of possessing the firearm and when that act of possession occurred.
[directive] Attachment 3  Juvenile Disposition Order ([...])  Civil Action Order - Juvenile County Interim Final Disposition  Amended Commitment □ □ Tape # Counter # to State in the Interest of: CourtSmart □  Juvenile: Juv: Contact Information Parent: Change of Address/Phone Number  Defense Attorney: Juv: Birth Date Gender FACTS ID Number SBI Number Interpreter for: Prosecutor: (include language needed)  Parent 1-=----============--l Juvenile Other Appearances: An accommodation for a disability: Parent Probation Officer: Juvenile Type of Hearing Counsel  Whereby, the following is ORDERED on: USC ASFA Finding (42 671(a)(15))
[brief] [...] engaged [...] (“[...]”) to launch an internal investigation into Appellant’s use of [...] PCards for personal expenditures.  (Pa4, Pa84, Da113-120).  [...]’s investigation concluded that Appellant made approximately $256,612.14 in personal purchases, many of which were purchases from [...] and [...], a computer electronics retailer.  (Pa85, Da113-120).  While the investigation was pending, Appellant retained counsel who sent an October 16, 2020 demand letter threatening to file a lawsuit for wrongful termination if [...] did not provide a definitive answer regarding the status of Appellant’s employment “within ten (10) days. ” (Pa.84, Da122-123).  Although Respondents’ investigation continued, on November 9, 2020, Appellant, through his counsel again threatened to file suit and attached a proposed complaint, certification of Appellant, and a draft Order to Show Cause.  (Pa84-Pa85, Da125-141).  On November 12, 2020, [...] responded through its counsel that Appellant’s employment was terminated.
[brief] However, in the State’s summation, the Prosecutor stated that [...] had been “researching abnormal psychology and mass murders and serial killers and whatnot. ” (14T:115-2 to 4).  The State told the jury that [...] did research on mass murders and serial killers based on a hearsay document from notes from a social worker that never testified.  (14T:118-3 to 11).  This information was never introduced in the State’s case in chief and was only testified to by the State’s expert.  The State told the jury that [...] did work at the [...] to learn to pump himself up or calm himself down.  (14T:119-25 to 3).  Again, this was information that was based on the records of a school therapist that did not testify in the trial.  The State also quoted reports of medical professionals as substantive evidence that [...] wasn’t paranoid around the time of the shootings.
[brief] On May 2, 2018 – the day before the shooting – defendant and [...] went to a park in Jackson so defendant could work out.  Typically, while defendant exercised, [...] would edit pictures on her phone, draw, paint or listen to music.  On that particular day, they ended up sleeping in the park.  (7T:101-100-25 to 101-12).  The following morning, they got up, went to get food, and then decided to go to the beach in Asbury Park.
[directive] Depending on the extent of the reduction, the Downward Departure for Trial Proof Issues may have to be approved by a supervisor designated by the county prosecutor or by the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice in cases prosecuted by the Division.  8.  The prosecutor must determine whether there is a basis for a Downward Departure based upon the defendant’s substantial cooperation.  (See Section 13).  Any such Downward Departure for Substantial Cooperation must be approved by a supervisor designated by the county prosecutor or by the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice in cases prosecuted by the Division and must comply with the criteria established in Section 13.
[brief] (29a ¶97).  Notably, the most recent CNA has a section titled “Duration.” (91a).  This section, Article XLIV, provides as follows:  "This Contract shall be in full force and effect from January 1, 2013 until midnight, December 31, 2015.  The parties agree that negotiations for a successor Agreement modifying, amending or altering the terms and provisions of this Agreement shall commence the first week of September 2015.  In the event no successor Agreement is completed before December 31, 2015, the present Contract will continue in full force."
[brief] 6T:20:9-22:2; 30:9-14; 31:6-11; 33:20-24; 35:17-19; 40:17-22; 44:18; 54:20-23.  Specifically, the Rent Increase set by the Court was not impacted by the conversion of the Unit to a condominium but was based on the average of (i) the Unit’s purchase price equal to $47,727 ($525,000 divided by 11 units), adjusted for inflation since 1993 (the purchase year) (7T:37:13-38:5) and capital improvements in 2002 totaling $76,900 for the Unit, adjusted for inflation since 2002 (Pa 48; 1T:6:14-16; 44:10-16; 5T:74:12- 25; 10T:138:12-15); and (ii), [...]’s assessment of the Unit based only upon replacement cost, without the equalization ratio being applied, less approximately thirty-five percent (35%) due to the existence of a protected tenant in the Unit.  6T:20:9-22:2; 21:21; 30:9-14; 31:6-11; 33:20-24; 35:17-19; 40:17-22; 44:18; 54:20-23.  Thus, notwithstanding the contrary contentions by Amicus (and Defendant), Plaintiff’s equity in the Unit did not derive from its market value based upon its value as a condominium.
[brief] During the ensuing police investigation, [...] not only failed to identify [...] from two photo arrays, but identified the picture of another man the police had used as a “filler. ”  Detectives interviewed [...] and retrieved the bag that [...] had left at [...]'s house.  The bag contained two Holiday Inn key cards, cell phones, a laptop, car keys, clothing, a wallet, and a camera.  When detectives arrested [...], she gave them a statement implicating [...] and [...].  B.  A Bergen County grand jury charged [...], [...], and [...]\(^4\) in a twelve-count indictment with first degree murder, \(N.J.S.A.\) 2C:11–3a(1) and (2) (count one); first degree felony murder, \(N.J.S.A.\) 2C:11–3a(3) (counts two and seven); first degree robbery, \(N.J.S.A.\) 2C:15–1 (counts three, four, and five); second degree conspiracy to commit robbery, \(N.J.S.A.\) 2C:5–2 and 2C:15–1b (count six); first degree kidnapping, \(N.J.S.A.\) 2C:13–1 (counts eight and nine); second degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, \(N.J.S.A.\) 2C:39–4a (count ten); and third-degree possession of a handgun without a permit, \(N.J.S.A.\) 2C:39–5b (count eleven).