[brief] In so doing, the Trial Court cited to the representations from the Appellant’s counsel at the hardship hearing before [...], where he represented:  This is a farm property so the inspection process was somewhat more intensive[c].  Environmental inspections, farmland preservation inspections, house inspections, surveys, things of that nature had to be done.  It was discovered during the inspection process that the existing tenant had done some things to the property that needed to be remediations.  For example, he put a parking lot on part of it with what I’ll refer to as asphalt millings…That had to be removed.  And that’s’ been done.  (Pa 21a.)  Further, the Trial Court pointed out that in the Law Division the [...] argued that the [...]’ Counterclaims, Cross-Claims and Third Party claims were not viable in part because of the representations by the Philllipses to [...] that the [...] had satisfactorily removed the millings, which was relied on by [...] to limit their hardship stay.  The Trial Court dismissed the argument that the equitable relief entered by the Chancery Division did not serve to bar the legal remedies sought in the Law Division, citing to In re Estate of Gabrellian, 372 N.J. Super. 432, 46-47 (App Div. 2004).  (Pa 22a.)  Additionally, the Trial Court relied on the prior opinions of the Law Division, where [...] dismissed the claims against the [...] because the court was “not satisfied: that the Philllipses had “presented any new information. ”  (Pa 22a.)  Based on this thorough review and multiple prior legal opinions the Trial Court concluded that as:  [T]hese prior Orders explain, [the [...]] cannot now argue that the Property was not properly remediated after representing that remediation was completed satisfactorily and such representation was adopted in a prior proceeding.  This is the exact situation barred by judicial estoppel….  The [...] represented to [...] that the condition was remediated satisfactorily on August 28, 2015, and no new information has been presented to this Court that requires the Court to reopen the issue.  Therefore, the environmental claims against the [...] are barred by the doctrines of judicial estoppel, as well as res judicata and collateral estoppel.  (Pa 23a.)  Additionally, the Trial Court denied the Motion to Amend the Complaint noting that the claim was futile, and not sustainable as a matter of law, because the Appellant attempted to replace himself with [...] as the Plaintiff.  (Pa 26a.)  Notably, “[...]” as denoted in the name of the proposed substitute plaintiff, merely stands for “[...],” and therefore makes the amendment futile, given that [...] was an assign that is bound by the prior determinations and settlements related to the Property.  (Pa. 26a.)  Accordingly, the Trial Court ruled there was privity between the [...] and [...].  Id.  The Trial Court concluded that “because there is privity between the [...] and [...], [...] is bound by the prior determinations and prior settlements”.  (Pa 26a.)  As a result, on October 16, 2023, [...] entered an Order granting the dismissal of the Appellant’s Complaint and denying their Motion to Amend the Complaint.  (Pa 1a-2a.)  The Appellant then filed the instant appeal of the Court’s Order and is seeking to relitigate these same issues once more.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED APPELLANT’S COMPLAINT