ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Procedurally, the Trial Court’s reconsideration of its earlier denial of the [...]’ motion for summary judgment was appropriate.  As the Court rightfully concluded, the Court mistakenly held that the issue of the [...]’ “control” of the [...] employees was not an issue of fact, as no evidence has ever been produced that CFS could somehow control the [...] workplace.  Quite the contrary was true – that the [...] had no ability to dictate the terms and conditions of employment for [...] employees.  As a threshold matter, the Court’s reconsideration was entirely appropriate under the circumstances.  With that in mind, the fallacy in plaintiff’s argument on appeal is best demonstrated by her continued insistence to conflate the [...] with the [...] Defendants; and thus, attempting to hold the [...] liable for the alleged actions of the State Defendants (and, most notably, [...] employee Defendant/Respondent [...] (“[...]”) who Plaintiff alleges sexually harassed her while they were both stationed at the same [...] office in [...], [...]).
[brief] order to provide the endorsed Council candidate an advantage over the other candidates.  *Ibid.*  Like the Board member in *DeMeo*, the circumstances surrounding [...]’s conduct would lead someone to reasonably assume that his request for legal research was made in his official capacity as President of the Board in order to secure an advantage over [...].  See also *IMO [...], Hackensack Bd. of Educ., Bergen Cnty.*, SEC No. C49-12 (August 25, 2014), *aff’d*, Commissioner No. 325-10/15 (December 15, 2014) (affirming Commission’s decision that Bembry violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b) when she participated in a board vote concerning the evaluation of a principal with whom she shared a substantial history of antipathy); *Smith v. [...]*, Commissioner No. 3-3/20A (October 20, 2020), *aff’d*, Dep’t of Educ. v. [...], No. A-835-20 (App. Div. Sept. 2, 2022) (affirming Commissioner’s decision that [...] violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) and (f) when he unilaterally accepted a potential vendor’s offer to attend an all-expenses paid conference in Arizona, in his official capacity as a board member).¹⁰
[brief] If it had been a demand loan, the statute of limitations would have begun to run when the loan was made.  Da37 (citing Flynn at *3, which cited Denville, 84 N.J. Super. at 169).  If it were deemed to be a pay-when-able loan, however, the limitations period on repayment would not begin to run until the debtor was able to repay the loan.  Da37 (citing Da37 (citing Flynn at *3, which cited Guerin v. Cassidy, 38 N.J. Super. 454, 460 (Ch. Div. 1955)).  In his Opinion in this case, [...] analyzed the language of the Flynn opinion and the Appellate Division’s recognition that both types of loans, i.e., demand and pay-when-able loans, are enforceable.
[brief] c.  RELITIGATION OF THIS MATTER IS A VIOLATION OF VICTIM’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS  The New Jersey Legislature has a clear interest in protecting the rights of victims of crimes.  The Victims’ Rights Amendment (VRA) set forth enumerated rights of crime victims.  N.J. Const. art. 1, para. 22.  The New Jersey Constitution specifically states, “A victim of a crime shall be treated with fairness, compassion and respect by the criminal justice system. ”  N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 22.  The court must interpret the above principles and apply them in every case involving a victim, as to not violate the rights of those who have already been violated.  In the present case, this Court must balance the defendant’s constitutionally based interests with the victim’s constitutional rights.  On April 29, 2011, this Defendant murdered [...].  He was a husband. He was a father.  He was a brother.  He was an uncle.  The victims in this case, who survived [...], have the right to fairness, compassion, and respect from the criminal justice system.  They waited over five years for Defendant to admit that he murdered their loved one.  Nothing can bring back [...], but at least his family got justice and closure.  Defendant’s newest attempt to relitigate a crime that he has already admitted to is directly against the interest of these victims.  These victims will be retraumatized.  As directly stated in the Constitution, it is the job of the Court to respect these victims.
[brief] In *Guidi*, we found that the language in§ 2.l(b) prohibiting "any matter, thing, condition or act which is or may become an annoyance or interfere with the comfort or general well-being of the inhabitants of this municipality" subjected defendants to an unascertainable standard.  *Ibid.*  Noting that the ordinance left citizens at the mercy of its enforcers, we held that the violation of an ordinance should not depend upon which enforcement officer or which judge happens to be considering the actor's conduct.  *Id.* at 245-46, 668 A.2d 1098.  We determined that the ordinance was overbroad because it did not permit an enforcement officer, acting in good faith, "to point to objective facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that his or her conduct was a violation of the ordinance."  *Id.* at 246, 668 A.2d 1098.  Although acknowledging that it would be impossible to draft an ordinance addressing all potential types of conduct posing a health hazard, we observed that the United States Supreme Court requires municipalities to enact ordinances "directed with reasonable specificity toward the conduct to be prohibited."  *Ibid.* (quoting *484 Coates v. Cincinnati*, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688, 29 L Ed.2d 214,217 (1971)).  We concluded that "[t]he feeding of pigeons and other birds in a seaside community is a common enough problem that this conduct, if undesirable, should be specifically prohibited by ordinance."  *286 N.J.Super.* at 246, 668 A.2d 1098.  1112  Applied to the case before us, *Guidi* requires a finding that [...] Ordinance 18-3.1 § 2.l(b) is unconstitutionally vague and unenforceable.
[brief] For these reasons and the reasons to follow, the trial court’s 1) final Order, dated May 10, 2024, 2) the oral decision entered on October 20, 2023, wherein the court awarded the Defendant [...] attorney’s fees and costs, 3) the Order entered on December 5, 2023, setting attorney’s fees and costs, 4) the Order entered on March 6, 2024, wherein the court granted the [...] summary judgment; and 5) the Order entered on March 6, 2024, wherein the court denied Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment, must be reversed.
[brief] He received letters both during and since making an assertion of innocence post conviction and at the time he pled because he was under the threat and duress of his co-defendant being told that if you don’t take the weight for this, if you don’t, you know, say this, then I’m going to come after you and your family.  You know, and at first maybe there were certain anonymous threats that came through but it became very clear who was driving these threats to [...] and his family.  You know, we know where your family lives and that, you know, if he wasn’t going to take the charges, that his family would be killed.  Then the timing of this, I think, shows how viable those threats were and how that impinged on [...]’ thought process at the time of plea because post-conviction, you know, during the appeal process when the robbery charge gets vacated and the State dismisses and [...], you know, is still serving time on the homicide is when [...] starts saying well, wait a minute, I’m innocent.
[brief] ”  W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506, 518 (2023)(internal citation omitted).  “The invocation of that rule requires an assumption that the allegations of the pleading are true and affords the pleader all reasonable factual inferences. ”  Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, 348 N.J. Super. 243, 249-50 (App. Div. 2002).  “Appellate review of an order dismissing an action on this basis is governed by a standard no different than that applied by the trial courts.  Accordingly, we base our review of the order in question in light of the facts pleaded by plaintiffs and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. ”  Id. at 50.  Here, Plaintiff’s argument that the court’s failure to consider extrinsic evidence in its decision to grant defendant’s motion to dismiss justifies Plaintiff’s appeal of that Order demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the scope of analysis for a dismissal on the pleadings, under R. 4:2-6(e).  See Ibid.  The trial court’s Orders dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint was properly decided in light of the facts pleaded by plaintiff and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.  B.
[brief] Respondent argues that granting Appellants’ motion would have disrupted the discovery process.  Allowing [...] to testify would have required the review of at most, one or two of the Appellants’ experts (as the topic of the report was restricted by law to the specific area of practice of that expert.)  There was no dispute that the opinion of [...] was practically the same or similar to [...]’s opinion.  No defense expert deposition had taken place.  The only additional deposition added to the developing deposition schedule would have been for [...].  There would have been no disruption to the discovery process and the additional one or two reports and one deposition could have been easily achieved within the allotted time prior to trial.
[directive] When the Working Group reconvened in September, 1985 it was agreed that a pamphlet entitled "Survivors Rights to Information and Property", which had been discussed in the original meetings of the Working Group, should be developed for the survivor or significant other to assist in the grieving process by answering questions often asked by survivors.  The Working Group agreed that survivors need this information within 72 hours after the death of a loved one and the only common denominator for all survivors in this time period is the funeral director.  The newly created [...] in the [...] and the [...] in the [...] agreed to publish the pamphlet, and the [...] in the [...] agreed to handle its distribution.  Further, the [...] was requested to determine that distribution of this pamphlet by funeral directors to survivors be a mandatory requirement to be set forth in the New Jersey Administrative Code.
[brief] (Pa230, Pa324-417, Pa367-68, Pa675, Pa655-722, Pa678-79, Pa681, Pa981, Pa999)  During the November 29, 2018 meeting, Respondents [...] and [...] pressed Appellant on why she did not tell [...] “no” and inquired into allegations that Appellant’s attire violated the address code, her “over-socialization,” and her apparent “substance abuse. ”  These complaints were made by “DCPP management. ”  (Pa675, Pa678-79)  80:1-81:23, 93:10-22, 94:1-106:23.  Respondents [...] and [...] then discussed transferring Appellant– the victim.  Appellant objected to the transfer, which she viewed as clear retaliation.
[brief] In any event, Petitioner does not dispute that Cardinale was decided prior to the execution of the Settlement Agreement.  disability “is irrelevant” in determining his eligibility to apply for a disability retirement pursuant to the return to work statute.  It is noteworthy that [...] did not even mention Cardinale or M.R., let alone distinguish those cases, in his decision (PA124-PA130), although those cases were briefed below (RA6-RA7).  [...]’s assertion that N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2) cannot provide grounds for barring an individual from applying for AD (PA128) flies in the face of Cardinale and M.R., and his decision was properly rejected by the Board.
[brief] 34  POINT I - The Trial Court Properly Declined To Award [...] Its Attorneys’ Fees And Expenses .................................................................................................  34  A.  The Trial Court Denied [...]’s Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees Pursuant to Both PSA Section 17.1 and 18.2 ....................... 34  B.  Upon Reversal of the Orders Dismissing the Complaint, the Issue of Any Parties’ Entitlement to an Award of its Attorneys’ Fees Will be Rendered Academic – or, at Least, Premature ......................................................
[brief] This core precept of OPRA must give this Panel great pause before making the sweeping declaration that records that may be “too difficult” to produce because of the actions taken by government officials themselves to keep secret materials from the public.  Both Burnett v. Gloucester County, 415 N.J. Super. 506, 517 (App. Div. 2010) and Simmons v. Mercado, 247 N.J. 24, 42 (2021) expressly warn of creating the perverse incentive to “outsource” records maintenance/storage and making them more difficult to access.  And yet now the [...] is seeking have this Court reward them for doing exactly that.
[brief] 16  | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D)  PAGE NOS.  Other Authorities (Cont'd)  [...] & [...], Age, Gender, and Crime Across Three Historical Periods: 1935, 1960, and 1985, 69 Social Forces 869 (1991) ..................................................................................................................  15  [...], Age and Crime, 7 Crime and Justice 189 (1986) .............  16  [...], et al., Symposium: Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 641 (2016) .................................................................
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  Based on the foregoing, [...] respectfully requests that the Court enter an Order reversing the decision below and reinstating [...]’s Complaint, together with such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.  Dated: Hackensack, New Jersey  February 21, 2024  [...]  /s/ [...]  [...]  Attorney ID No.: 028322009  [...]  Telephone No. [...] [...] and [...]  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)  620 8th Ave 38th floor  New York, New York 10018  Telephone No. [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant  [...], Inc.  MAGNETEK, INC, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...], [...] f/k/a MONSANTO, and [...], Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No: [...]  On Appeal From Docket No.: [...]  Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS
[brief] This is because the Department is barred from unilaterally and precipitously amending policy without affording the regulated community the opportunity to be heard:  When an agency’s determination alters the status quo, persons who are intended to be reached by the finding, and those who will be affected by its future application, should have the opportunity to be heard and to participate in the formulation of the ultimate determination.  [Northwest, 167 N.J. at 136 (quoting Metromedia, 97 N.J. at 330). ]  See also B.H., 400 N.J. Super. at 430 (noting agency must follow APA when it “effects a material change in existing law or alters the status quo”).  Where an agency pronouncement is a rule under the APA, as was done here, and the agency fails to engage in proper rulemaking, the pronouncement should be set aside and the agency directed to proceed in accordance with the APA.  See In re Provision of Basic Generation Serv., 205 N.J. at 362 (reversing Appellate Division and remanding to agency “to commence the process anew, [to] provide the regulated parties and the public with notice and an opportunity to comment”); Grimes v. N. J. Dep’t of Corr., 452 N.J. Super. 396, 408 (App. Div. 2017) (remanding “for prompt commencement of rulemaking”); In re N.J.A.C. 7:1B-1.1 et seq., 431 N.J. Super at 133 (finding agency “engaged in de facto rulemaking in violation of the APA's notice and comment requirements” and invalidated documents “as de facto rulemaking without APA compliance”); N.J. Hosp. Assoc., 227 N.J. Super. at 568 (finding agency allocation decision a “rule” such that “the full panoply of provisions prescribed by the APA should be invoked” and finding those requirements “fundamental”).
[brief] (Pa1091-Pa1092).  Specifically, Defendants argued that the entire controversy doctrine applied to this matter.  (Pa1092-Pa1093).  Second, Defendants argued generally that the Legislature instructed the courts to liberally construe the MSRA to assist municipalities in fiscal distress.  (Pa1095-Pa1096).  Based upon the Trial Court's December 15, 2023 email to the parties requesting additional briefing, Plaintiffs' opposition brief to Defendants' motion for reconsideration primarily focused on countering Defendants' preclusion arguments.  (Pa1107-Pa1114).  Plaintiffs also argued that the *Superior Officers* decision was not binding authority for this litigation and distinguishable.  (Pa1125-Pa1126).  Further, Plaintiffs also explicitly briefed the Takings Clause constitutional argument.  (Pa1119-Pa1123).  For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reject Defendants' argument that there has been a waiver of any of Plaintiffs' claims.  Plaintiffs fully briefed their arguments before the Trial Court during the initial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim motion practice.  Further, Plaintiffs raised their Takings Clause argument in response to Defendants' motion for reconsideration.
[brief] By her appeal, plaintiff-appellant [...] requests that this Court overturn the Order entered below by The Honorable [...], J.S.C., on June 28, 2024, granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-respondents Christopher and [...] (hereinafter “[...]”).  However, the record below clearly demonstrates that upon the completion of pre-trial discovery, the Motion Court correctly applied the law to the facts of record before it and granted summary judgment on the basis that: (a) [...] were entitled to summary judgment in this case as long-standing and very clear New Jersey law holds that residential property owners do not have a duty to repair, maintain, or clear snow and/or ice from public sidewalks that abut or are adjacent to their property and, consequently, [...] have no liability for plaintiff-appellant [...]’s alleged slip and fall and her injuries; (b) contrary to plaintiff-appellant’s assertions, [...]’ property bordering the public sidewalk on which plaintiff-appellant slipped and fell is not a commercial property, a finding that would have eliminated the application of residential property owner immunity in this case, and; (c) [...] did not create a new hazard or exacerbate an existing hazard as alleged by plaintiff-appellant.  This holding by the Motion Court was proper and well-supported, and it should now be affirmed by this Court.  Procedural History
[brief] *Loigman* explained that “a state court placed in the position of ascertaining the content of federal law should look for the view taken by a majority of the lower federal courts. ”  *Loigman*, at 105 n.7.  Consequently, *Loigman* followed the lower federal courts’ majority view as what constitutes a “debt” covered by the FDCPA and rejected what was, at that time, the minority view of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals notwithstanding that the Third Circuit encompasses New Jersey.  (The Third Circuit subsequently overruled its prior decision and joined the majority view.)  To be clear, *Dewey* does not compel a New Jersey court to treat the lower federal court decisions as if they were binding authorities.  But, at a minimum, the “due respect” *Dewey* requires compels a New Jersey court to consider those federal court decisions and either follow them or explaining why it rejected those decisions.  But wholly ignoring their existence and reasoning does not suffice.  Here, Plaintiff briefed the federal cases which universally conclude that the plain and unambiguous statutory language in § 1692c(b) means that alleging a debt collector’s conveyance of information about a debt to a third-party mail vendor states a claim for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) upon which relief can be granted.  The motion court rejected those decisions despite that each of them expressly concluded that alleging a debt collector’s conveyance of debt information to a mail vendor states a claim for violation of § 1692c(b).  Those decisions and the motion court’s rejection of them are discussed below in Point III.
[brief] In her appeal, Plaintiff does not separately argue that the Superior Court improperly denied her cross-motion for leave to amend her Complaint.  However, to the extent that argument is advanced in her appeal, it is without merit.  Generally, if a matter is to be dismissed under R. 4:6-2(e), “(it) should be without prejudice to a plaintiff filing an amended complaint. ”  Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 772.  However, when the plaintiffs have not offered either a certification or a proposed amended pleading that would suggest their ability to cure the defects of the complaint, and it appears to the court that the opportunity to amend would be futile, the appellate court has found it proper to dismiss the complaint with prejudice.  Johnson, 401 N.J. Super. at 246-47.  Amendment remains a matter addressed to the court's sound discretion.
[brief] | Court Rule | Page Number(s) | |----------------------------|----------------| | N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 | 6, 16 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41 | 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16 | | R. 1:2–4(a) | 21 | | R. 1:4-4(b) | 25 | | R. 4:50-1 | 30 | | Case Law | | |----------------------------|----------------| | Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 708 A.2d 401 (1998) | 25, 26 | | Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567 (2021) | 15 | | Brazza v. Kagen, 2023 WL 4418263 at *1 | 30, 31 | | Buck v. Henry, 207 N.J. 377 (2011) | 8 | | Crescent Park Tenants Ass’n v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 275 A.2d 433 (1971) | 27 | | D’Atria v. D’Atria, 242 N.J.Super. 392, (Ch. Div.1990) | 28, 29 | | Fink v. Thompson, 167 N.J. 551 (2001) | 26 | | Galik v. Clara Maass Medical Center, 167 N.J. 341 (2001) | 25, 26, 27 | | Georgis v. Scarpa, 226 N.J.Super. 244, 543 A.2d 1043 (App. Div. 1988) | 22 | | Case Law | Page Number(s) | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------| | Hoover v. Wetzler, 472 N.J.Super. 230 (App. Div. 2022) | 7, 8, 16 | | In re Comm'r of Insurance Issuance of Orders, 274 N.J. Super. 385, 644 A.2d 616 (App. Div. 1993) | 27 | | Irani v. K–Mart Corp., 281 N.J.Super. 383, 657 A.2d 911 (App. Div. 1995) | 21, 27 | | Jansson v. Fairleigh Dickinson University, 198 N.J.Super. 190, 486 A.2d 920 (App. Div. 1985) | 22 | | Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping Corp., 220 N.J.Super. 250, 257, 531 A.2d 1078 (App. Div. 1987) | 28 | | Johnson v. Mountainside Hosp., 199 N.J.Super. 114, 488 A.2d 1029 (App. Div. 1985) | 22 | | Mayfield v. Community Medical Associates, P.A., 335 N.J. Super. 198 (2000) | 25, 27 | | Michel v. Michel, 210 N.J.Super. 218, 509 A.2d 301 (Chanc. Div. 1985) | 28 | | Pfannenstein v. Surrey, 475 N.J. Super. 83 (App. Div. 2023) | 8, 9, 10 | | Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 2015) | 16 | | Ponden v. Ponden, 374 N.J. Super. 1, 863 A.2d 366 (App. Div. 2004) | 27 | | Rivers v. LSC Partnership, 378 N.J.Super. 68 (App. Div. 2005) | 17 | | Savoia v. Woolworth, 88 N.J. Super. 153, 211 A.2d 214 (App. Div. 1965) | 27 | | Case Law | Page Number(s) | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------| | Triarsi v. BSC Grp. Servs., LLC, 422 N.J.Super. 104 (App. Div. 2011) | 7 | | Tucci v. Tropicana Casino and Resort, Inc., 364 N.J.Super. 48, 50 (App. Div. 2003) | 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 27 | | Tumarkin v. Friedman, 17 N.J. Super. 20, 27, 85 A.2d 304 (App. Div. 1951) | 27 | | Woodward–Clyde v. Chem. & Pollution Sciences, 105 N.J. 464, 523 A.2d 131 (1987) | 22 | | Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 440 A.2d 1329 (1982) | 22, 27 | | Zamel v. Port of New York Authority, 56 N.J. 1, 264 A.2d 201 (1970) | 24, 25 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The Appellant submits this Brief appealing various trial court Orders, discussed at length herein, which ultimately led to the dismissal of the Appellant’s Complaint with prejudice against the majority of the Respondents in this matter.