ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Instead, it turned to *dicta* expressed in a decision from the Eastern District of New York which dismissed the mail vendor claim because that court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  Pa55-Pa56.  The court seemed to liken mail vendors to clerks or stenographers.  There is nothing in the record to support that factual comparison.  To the contrary, under R. 4:6- --- \(^2\) *Ali v. Credit Corp. Sols., Inc.*, No. 21-cv-5790, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59126, 2022 WL 986166 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2022).  It was cited below and is reproduced beginning at Pa66.  2(e) standard, any inferences about the mail vendor’s role and function should be drawn in Plaintiff’s favor.  Furthermore, the motion court unjustifiably presumed that the focus of § 1692c(b) was on preventing the debtor’s embarrassment by disclosures to those who might know the debtor.  Pa49, Pa50, Pa52, Pa53.  There is nothing in § 1692c(b), in the FDCPA generally, in the legislative history, or in any agency interpretation which supports that view.  The concern expressed in the legislative history cited by the motion court on Pa49 concerning the disclosure of information to neighbors, relatives, and employers is limited to § 1692b, not § 1692c(b).  The motion court overlooked the second of a short two-paragraph description of the Act’s prohibited practices contained in the Senate Report which states:  In addition, this legislation adopts an extremely important protection recommended by the National Commission on Consumer Finance and already the law in 15 States: it prohibits disclosing the consumer’s personal affairs to third persons.  […]  Such contacts are not legitimate collection practices and result in serious invasions of privacy, as well as the loss of jobs.  S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 4, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1699.  The Senate Report’s section-by-section summary includes the following with respect to § 1692c(b):  There is a general prohibition on contacting any third parties (other than to obtain location information) except for: the consumer’s attorney; a credit reporting agency; the creditor, the creditor’s or debt collector's attorney; or any other person to the extent necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy.  S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 7, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1701 (emphasis added).  Nothing in the legislative history states or implies any limit on the meaning of “any person” in § 1692c(b) (other than the inapplicable exceptions).  POINT IV.
[brief] In Count 14, Petitioner alleges ethical violations regarding lawn signs despite his admission that he possesses no knowledge as to who was responsible for the creation and dissemination of the signs.  His complaint states: “It is not clear if the [Board] created these signs, or if they were created by private citizens. ”  (35a.)  Notwithstanding his critical lack of knowledge regarding the origin of the signs, Petitioner nonetheless alleges that Respondents violated section (g).  Even if accepted as true, Petitioner’s allegation could not establish violations of section (g) because it fails to include sufficient credible facts to support a finding that any individual board member provided inaccurate information to the public or otherwise violated any aspect of that provision.
[brief] In their years working together, [...] had never known [...] to have deceived him.  (15T 110:11-14; 110:24 to 111:3).  After [...] and [...] reached their handshake deal, [...] told [...] that he didn’t need a lawyer and that he ([...]) would draft up an agreement for them and their wives to sign.  Initially, [...] agreed, but once he started receiving communications from [...] about memorializing the deal, [...] noticed that they had been drafted by an attorney that [...] engaged ([...] learned that [...] subsequently terminated his lawyer’s services).
[brief] Threats from Defendant’s Family  On September 5, 2022, [...]’s family reached out to [...]’s family with a request for a divorce.  During his testimony, Plaintiff explained that Defendant’s family called Plaintiff’s family in India to make this request.  The conversation took a threatening turn when Defendant’s family warned that they would take extreme actions if Plaintiff did not travel to India to facilitate the divorce the Defendant and her family were demanding.  (2T42-49).  Additionally, after filing for annulment, Plaintiff began receiving threats from Defendant’s family directly.  One recorded threat urged Plaintiff to withdraw his claim for annulment, warning that Defendant could fabricate claims and get Plaintiff imprisoned.  Distressed by these threats, [...] contacted his attorney on April 5, 2023.  Initially, he did not report the threats to the police but later chose to do so due to growing concerns for his family's safety.  The threats made Plaintiff and his family afraid to travel to India, exacerbating their anxiety.
[brief] Thus, the relationship between [...] and the \textsuperscript{13}  When the Exchange was created in 2003, the POA terms were executed by each individual policyholder; they changed with the approval of a new POA in 2013 for surplus contributions.  This change required: 1) an entirely new POA to be filed with the Department; 2) the new POA to be issued and delivered to every individual policyholder; and 3) each subscriber to execute it.  subscriber is an arm’s length transaction to which SSAP No. 25 does not apply.  See Delaney v. Dickey, 244 N.J. 460, 488 (2020) (noting that in an arm’s length transaction both parties are “free to negotiate mutually acceptable contractual terms pursuant to their individual best interests”); JPC Merger Sub LLC v. Tricon Enter., Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 145, 164 (App. Div. 2022) (enforcing contracts that are free from duress, mistake or unconscionability).
[brief] a.  If the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered is a specialist or subspecialist recognized by the American Board of Medical Specialties or the American Osteopathic Association and the care or treatment at issue involves that specialty or subspecialty recognized by the American Board of Medical Specialties or the American Osteopathic Association, the person providing the testimony shall have specialized at the time of the occurrence that is the basis for the action in the same specialty or subspecialty, recognized by the American Board of Medical Specialties or the American Osteopathic Association, as the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered, and if the person against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is being offered is board certified and the care or treatment at issue involves that board specialty or subspecialty recognized by the American Board of Medical Specialties or the American Osteopathic Association, the expert witness shall be: (1) a physician credentialed by a hospital to treat patients for the medical condition, or to perform the procedure, that is the basis for the claim or action; or (2) a specialist or subspecialist recognized by the American Board of Medical Specialties or the American Osteopathic Association who is board certified in the same specialty or subspecialty, recognized by the American Board of Medical Specialties or the American Osteopathic Association, and during the year immediately preceding the date of the occurrence that is the basis for the claim or action, shall have devoted a majority of his professional time to [ ]: (a) the active clinical practice of the same health care profession in which the defendant is licensed, and, if the defendant is a specialist or subspecialist recognized by the American Board of Medical Specialties or the American Osteopathic Association, the active clinical practice of that specialty or subspecialty recognized by the American Board of Medical Specialties or the American Osteopathic Association….  Id.  For the reasons discussed herein, [...] qualifies as an AOM expert against [...].
[brief] (Da1143-1155). of Defendant’s alleged improprieties and illegal activity.  This resulted in [...]’s imposing monetary sanctions against Plaintiff. \(^5\)  The beneficiaries of the Estate did not benefit from the endless litigation that was engaged in by Plaintiff.  See page 40, supra.  Moreover, The Estate paid administration fees totaling more than $322,809.33, which was to the detriment of everyone.  Plaintiff achieved his goals, as set forth throughout this brief, but Plaintiff’s lawsuit provided no benefit to the other beneficiaries.  Plaintiff initiated an investigation in New Jersey that lasted years in an attempt to gain information.  He wanted to apply pressure on the family to give him a greater inheritance than Korean law permitted (see the content of the secretly-recorded family meeting at pages Da835-911).  The Appellate Division in its Decision on the initial attorney fee appeal quoted the Administrator’s statement that, “Plaintiff never provided him with any hard evidence of additional New Jersey assets belonging to the estate or other gifts made by decedent to defendant. ” (Da242).  It is clear that Plaintiff used his lawsuit primarily as a springboard to launch a time-consuming search to punish his family by initiating a search for assets that did not exist.  --- \(^5\)  As discussed in the Statement of Facts above, after an extensive investigation of [...] financial information by the Korean prosecutors and tax authorities, Defendant was completely exonerated.  (Da1070, ¶16; Da1089-1095; Da1180, ¶17).  Equitable considerations dictate that Plaintiff’s ploy that should not be rewarded through an award of any legal fees.  The trial court erred on the remand by not following the proper procedure for determining whether attorney fees were appropriate in this case, and, if so, in what amount.  The court’s legal fee award should be reversed.
[directive] For the purposes of this document, “law enforcement executive” refers to a law enforcement agency’s highest ranking 1 sworn law enforcement officer, typically the chief of police.  In situations where the highest ranking officer is recused from a matter, then “law enforcement executive” refers to the next highest-ranking officer without a conflict.  “Law enforcement executive” also refers to the Attorney General and relevant County Prosecutor in cases of supersession, whether that supersession is in whole or in part.  Even without supersession, the law enforcement executive remains subject to the direction of the Attorney General and relevant County Prosecutor.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022
[brief] The Trial Court’s Judgment Against Defendant For Conversion Was Manifestly Unsupported By The Evidential Record And Impermissible Net Opinion Testimony Of [...]  In addition to completely ignoring material evidence, the trial court’s reasoning for holding Defendant liable for conversion was manifestly unsupported by the evidential record at trial.  Namely, the trial court made no findings of fact that support its holding:  I'm dealing with proofs that I have to consider and from the proofs that were presented, and I could only rule on what has been presented, I do believe that [...] was shortchanged on certain monies .  . .  I think it's really the conversion claims here which are paramount, and I think the burden's been met.  It's more likely than not that these funds were diverted and ultimately it lead to an unjust enrichment.  36T52-1 to -14.  The court stated its conclusory holding without any direct testimony from [...] explaining how and why the Disputed Transactions were wrongful or how exactly Defendant was involved.  Instead, the court relied exclusively on [...]’s net expert testimony in its decision that the Disputed Transactions were unauthorized (which included improper assessments of defendants’ motives regarding these Transactions), despite [...]’s admitted lack of personal knowledge regarding the nature, character and purpose of the Transactions.  20T124-16 to 130-9; 21T25-11 to 28-12; 22T25-11 to 28-12, 50-21 to 52-2, 89-10 to -20; 23T11-5 to 28-18; 36T23-8 to 37-23.  The court permitted [...]’s net opinion testimony at trial over defendants’ repeated objections.  20T69-24 to 25, 70-7 to -10, 71-9 to -12, 102-4 to -6, 119-25 to 120-5; 21T18-20 to 35-4.  As a result, the trial court committed reversible error in (1) denying summary judgment, (2) permitting [...] to testify regarding his net opinions and (3) relying on [...]’s net opinion testimony in reaching its conclusion that the Disputed Transactions were unauthorized.
[brief] [...] did not tell Plaintiffs that subcontractors were involved.  Camera malfunctions, installation leaks and damages were reported to and responded to by [...] representatives who attempted to fix these problems for many months before submitting the matter to its insurance carrier.  (Pa22-45)  [...]’s carrier’s agent blamed the subcontractor (Pa50), whose agents blamed [...].  These facts “identify” exactly how and why this arbitration agreement is “unenforceable”.  In contrast, [...] and [...] present nothing to articulate the substantive bases for their boilerplate agreements.  Conspicuously absent in this record, and the motion below, is 4  Neither Defendant addresses the lack of signature by anyone on behalf of [...] any Certification or facts from any of their representatives or witnesses with respect to the formation and execution of this Contract.  Even more conspicuous is [...]’s refusal to file an Answer or identify its defenses to Plaintiffs’ Complaint filed on October 24, 2023.  (Pa1)  [...] did not respond to the Court’s Dismissal Notice dated August 16, 2024 pursuant to R. 1:13-7.  (Pra272)  Nor did [...] respond to motions to enter default against it filed by Plaintiffs in the trial court on October 15, 2024 and the appellate division on December 5, 2024.  [...] also chose not to participate in the Court ordered arbitration pursuant to R. 4:21A-1, thus preventing the arbitration from proceeding.  (Dr86)  Application of settled New Jersey law to the record before this Court requires that the trial court be reversed, the binding arbitration requirement in [...]’s Contract held to be unenforceable, and the waiver and exculpatory provisions in Paragraphs E and F of the Contract invalidated and severed.
[brief] It was clear that the agreement was that there would be no evidence in terms of permanent wage loss.  The agreement was if he produced the records and documentation regarding the Worker’s Compensation lien then The Court would mold the verdict.  (2T:30-1 to 10).  In defense counsel’s argument he indicated that it was improper to address retirement because “there is an agreement that we had the only thing we were stipulating to was the temporary disability payments.  2T:33-5 to 9).  As a result, The Court instructed the jury during opening arguments as follows:  Assuming you find the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict, the plaintiff is not pursuing any claim for lost wages of any sort in this matter.  His claims are for pain, suffering, disability, and the loss of enjoyment of life, and I’ll explain what that means to you next week.  But there are no claims for lost wages, either past or future wages, in this matter.  So don’t speculate about any lost wages that the plaintiff may have incurred.  The issue is pain, suffering, disability, and the loss of enjoyment of life; and I will explain what that means in greater detail.  (2T:38-7 to 20).  The parties further put some housekeeping issues on the record on June 15, 2022, at the end of the trial day.
[brief] Db19.  The application was made before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., who accepted the briefs and heard argument but did not issue an opinion before being reassigned.  Db19-20.  The PCR was transferred to the Honorable [...], J.S.C., who heard motions on orders to compel discovery filed by Defendant.  Db20.  In an oral ruling and written order, [...] ordered the prosecutor to determine the status of what Defendant claimed was evidence, a hard drive that had previously stored surveillance video of a location where Defendant was eventually apprehended.  Db20.  At a later hearing, [...] ordered the State to accept and respond to interrogatories promulgated by Defendant regarding the hard drive.  Db20; Da304.  The order regarding interrogatories was reversed as improvidently granted after new PCR counsel was substituted and another judge, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., took over the PCR, as interrogatories are not used in criminal cases nor is PCR discovery typically permitted.  24T 24:4-9; Da322-26; Db20.  Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration as well as a letter requesting an adjournment.  Da327-30; Db21.  The adjournment was not granted and the following day, Defendant filed motions to recuse and for dismissal or rehearing based on newly discovered evidence and prosecutorial misconduct.  Db21.  [...] denied the motions and heard argument on the PCR petition.  25T.  She issued written opinions denying recusal and the PCR application for an evidentiary hearing, and later written opinions denying the motions for recusal, dismissal/rehearing, and for reconsideration.  Da335-90.  Defendant filed an amended notice of appeal on October 25, 2023.  Da391-95; Db21.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] On Friday, November 30, 2018, [...] called [...] and directed him to come into IA.  (T5 37:23-38:7; Pa120).  [...] responded he was on his way to Florida to attend his stepfather’s funeral.  (T5 38:1-7).  [...] replied he could come in on Monday.  (T5 38:8-21).  Seeking to avoid further issue, [...] turned his vehicle around and came home.  (T5 38:12-21).  [...] called [...] the next morning advising he was home and available to come into IA.  (T5 38:22-39:9).  [...] told him to come in Monday.  (T5 38:22-39:9).  No evidence was produced that [...] was untruthful in telling [...] he was on his way to Florida.  (T2 96:9-98:15; T3 61:2-63:15).  [...] testified that it was confusing to him that after having spoken to [...] late in the evening that he was available to go to IA so early the next morning.  (T3 60:4-62:25).  [...] conceded that [...]’s version of events could have adequately explained [...]’s confusion.  (T3 62:8-25).  On December 3, 2018, [...] reported to IA, where [...] advised him that the IA investigation was complete.
[brief] Likewise, any losses sustained by any of the Individual Plaintiffs, as members of the [...], were also not "unequal."  All the members of the [...], [...] included, allegedly lost value in their [...] membership interests as an alleged result of the [...] losing value in its stock in [...].  Continuing onward, the Tully court observed:  In the context of a closely-held corporation, courts have discretion to construe a derivative cause of action as a direct claim if doing so will not (i) unfairly expose the corporation or the defendants to a multiplicity of actions, (ii) materially prejudice the interests of creditors of the corporation, or (iii) interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery among all interested persons.
[brief] Trial courts should “‘excise any reference to a criminal defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel’ from the statement that the jury hears. ”  Id. at 292 (quoting State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 75-76 (1998)).  Redaction of a defendant’s invocation of his Miranda rights is required because, on hearing a defendant’s invocation, the jury may draw “impermissible inferences” about his guilt “that could undermine a defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial. ”  Feaster, 156 N.J. at 76.  After all, as Miranda itself recognized, it is widely understood that “silence in the face of accusation is itself damning and will bode ill when presented to a jury. ”  384 U.S. at 468.  Last year, in Clark, our Supreme Court unanimously reversed a defendant’s murder conviction where the State played video of the defendant’s police interview that showed him repeatedly asking for an attorney.  251 N.J. at 273-75.  In the interview, the defendant told the police to “call my attorney” and twice said, “go get my attorney. ”  Id. at 278-79.  The Court held that “it was error to play for the jury the portion of the statement wherein defendant invoked his right to counsel,” finding that there was “no question that . . . that portion of the recording should have been excised. ”  Id. at 293-94.  Because [...]’s interrogation was played unredacted, the jury saw [...] attempt to invoke his rights both before signing the waiver form and then throughout the course of the interview.
[directive] To ensure the integrity of the investigation of “Law Enforcement Incidents” conducted pursuant to AG Directive 2019-4, and to avoid possible contamination of a witness's personal recollection of events that could undermine his or her credibility as a witness, notwithstanding any other provision of this Policy, no civilian or law enforcement witness, including the principals of the investigation, shall be given access to, view, or receive an accounting of a BWC recording of the incident, or a BWC recording of the response or on-scene investigation of the incident, without the express prior approval of the “Independent Investigator,” as that term is defined in AG Directive 2019-4.  10.3  Restriction on Access to BWC Recordings Prior to Creating Reports, Statements, Interviews.  A law enforcement officer shall be permitted to review or receive an accounting of a BWC recording prior to creating any required substantive initial reports, providing a statement, or submitting to an interview regarding the recorded event, except under the following circumstances: (a) the incident involves the use of force by the officer, where the officer knows or should know that the use of force resulted in significant or serious bodily injury or death; (b) the incident involves the discharge of a firearm or any other use of deadly force by the law enforcement officer;6
[brief] 48  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Order for Judgment Filed September 14, 2023  Da59  Order Denying New Trial Filed October 7, 2023  Da69  Order for Judgment Filed November 9, 2023  Da71  Order Denying Reconsideration Filed December 1, 2023  Da74  Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment Dated March 31, 2023
[brief] True as those distinctions may be, [they] offer reasonable guidelines for assessing proofs that an insurer’s claims are evidence of effective notice of policy cancellation. ”).  Thus, at least five different sources required [...] and [...] to provide notice to [...] of the purported cancellation of its CCIP coverage, but [...] and [...] admittedly complied with none of them as summarized in the following chart:  | SOURCE OF CANCELLATION REQUIREMENT | CANCELLATION REQUIREMENT | NOTICE GIVEN TO [...]? | |-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------| | CCIP Policy | 90 days’ notice | No | | CCIP Manual | 30 days’ notice | No | | Certificate of Liability Insurance | Notice in accordance with the policy provisions (90 days) | No | | New Jersey Common Law | Notice in accordance with Administrative Code, policy provisions, and/or reasonable expectations of insureds | No | | New Jersey Administrative Code | 30 days’ notice | No |  As explained above, cancellation is not a pro forma requirement.  Rather, there is a compelling public policy supporting this requirement, and there is no reason to treat CCIP insureds differently than other insureds.  Rather, the ambiguity arising from lack of proper notice drives the need for clear notice to insureds to avoid the very confusion that came to pass in this case.  [...] and [...] did not take the necessary steps required by the CCIP Policy, the CCIP Manual, the Certificate of Service, or New Jersey law to cancel [...]’s insurance.  As a result, [...] was insured in the CCIP at the time of the Hood accident and entitled to coverage under the CCIP Policy.