ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Cf. *Kochen v. Consolidated Pol., etc., Pension Fund Comm.*, 71 N.J. Super. 463, 472 (177 A.2d 304) (App.Div.1962).  *Id.* at 284.  Here, The Chair indicated, on the record, that he received the information he relied on directly from the tax assessor and that the calculations contained in the documents the Chair prepared derived from the tax assessor.  (Id. at 105:1-105:12.)  The Chair presented the results of his research and his analysis as received from the tax assessor regarding whether the taxes increased on the unit as a result of the condominium conversion.  The Chair’s proposed method of calculation was placed on the record and the Board and parties were given an opportunity to agree or disagree with his reasoning and his conclusion that only 30% of the property tax claimed by [...], or $1,937.22, should be considered as an expense in the operation of the unit since that is the only amount that could be charged to the tenant in light of the TPA.  (Id. at 69:1-80:10.)  Notably, the Board did not blindly accept the Chair’s conclusion or reasoning but instead engaged in lengthy deliberations on this issue, questioning the Chair’s calculations and reasoning.  (Id. at 81:5-87:4.)  Ultimately, the Board endorsed the Chair’s method and his conclusion, and voted to approve a tax figure of $1,937.22.  (Id. at 87:5-88:10.)  Therefore, the Chair complied with the requirement that his basis for reaching his conclusions be placed on the record.
[brief] .........................................................  30 Laidlow v. Hariton Mach. Co., Inc., 170 N.J. 602 (2002) .............................................................................11, 26, 28 Leimgruber v. Claridge Assocs., 73 N.J. 450 (1977) ......................................................................................  28  Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N. J. 161 (1985) ....................................................................................11, 26, 28 Mull v. Zeta Consumer Prods., 176 N.J. 385 (2003)  ....................................................................................26, 28  Myska v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 440 N.J. Super. 458 (App. Div.), appeal dism., 224 N.J. 523 (2015)  ...............  9  New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co. v. Delta Plastics Corp., 188 N.J. 582 (2006)  ....................................................................................21, 22, 24 Parkway Ins. Co. v. N.J. Neck & Back, 330 N.J. Super. 172 (Law Div. 1998)  ..........................................................  25 Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Haas, 137 N.J. 190 (1994)  ....................................................................................  27 Peck v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 344 N.J. Super. 169 (App. Div. 2001) ..........................................................  14  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989)  ......................................................................................  9  Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 41 Cal.  3d 903, 718 P.2d 920 (1986) ............................................................19, 20 Rezem Fam. Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 208 N.J. 366 (2011) .......... 8 Rodriguez v. Shelbourne Spring, LLC, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2386 (App. Div. Dec. 22, 2023), leave to appeal granted, 257 N.J. 247 (2024) ..............................................23, 24 Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Interstate Racking & Shelving, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2072 (App. Div. Sept. 3, 2021), certif. denied, 249 N.J. 90 (2021) ...............................................................23, 24 Ruvolo v. Am. Cas. Co., 39 N.J. 490 (1963) ........................................................................................................... 15 Schmidt v. Smith, 155 N.J. 44 (1997) ........................................................................................................ passim Seneca Ins. Co. v. Cybernet Ent., LLC, 760 F.App’x 541 (9th Cir. 2019) .........................................................................................
[brief] ”  State v. McGuire, 419 N.J. Super. 88, 139 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 322 (1987)).  Further, in the final jury instruction after summations, the judge charged the jury that a defendant on trial “is presumed to be innocent and unless each and every essential element of an offense charged is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant must be found not guilty of that charge.
[brief] “It has been generally understood that the appropriate coercive method ought to be carefully tailored and sometimes issued in a particular sequence--from least to most drastic.  In truth courts should hesitate before leaping to the most severe sanction. ”  Board of Educ., Tp. of Middletown v. Middletown Tp. Educ. Ass'n, 352 N.J. Super. 501, 509 (App. Div. 2001).  [B]efore ordering any sanction, [a Court] must determine that defendant has the ability to comply with the order [that] he has violated * * *.  Essex County Welfare Bd. v. Perkins, 133 N.J. Super. 189, 195, 336 A.2d 16 (App.Div.1975).  [Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 392 (1995)].
[brief] (Da64-Da71, ¶ 4; Da4; Da5).  [...] confirmed this was his current address through confirmation from CPE results (Transunion), TLO and Accurint results as well as Presort results which were obtained from the National Change of Address database through the Post Office.  (Pa35-Paa44, ¶¶ 21-24).  All of these databases indicated that Appellant still lived at the NJ Address.
[brief] ”  *State v. G.C.*, 188 N.J. 118, 131 (2006), citations omitted.  “[T]he testimony of a competent witness cannot be capriciously rejected.  There must appear some good reason for such action, as, for example, that his story was inherently improbable, or that it was contradicted by some other testimony, or by some proven fact or circumstance, or by testimony impeaching his truth and veracity. ”  Baldauf v. Nathan Russell, Inc., 88 N.J.L. 303, 306 (1915).
[brief] He testified that the Synagogue takes care of lighting and snow removal on the Fifth Street lot and School’s courtyard.  He also testified as to how the 2007 “corporate action” document (Da907) that attached the 1963 Agreement was unilaterally executed and recorded in the County Clerk’s office at his instigation because he was concerned the School Lot 5 was possibly changing ownership.  (8T5-1 to 13-23)  On cross-examination, he testified he came to Lakewood in 1978 as a student and became involved with the synagogue in the early 1990's.  (8T14-1 to 28-6)  He acknowledged that around 2013 a portion of curb on Sixth Street in front of the Synagogue Lot 8 was chiseled out by the Synagogue to facilitate staff/attendee vehicles driving onto the Synagogue's Lot 8 and then crossing over and parking in the School’s Courtyard.  Prior to that, the curb had been painted yellow for years.  (8T34-1 to 36-25)  [...] was questioned about the statements in the 2007 “corporate action” document (Da907) that recorded the 1963 Agreement; he acknowledged the synagogue had for years and continues to own the nearby vacant Lot 6 that is available for parking for synagogue attendees and for School overflow parking.  (8T32-1 to 25)  He testified that the Sixth Street courtyard has been used primarily by a limited number of synagogue staff/attendees with some type of disability, usually about 6 or 7 vehicles (8T14-3 to 96-18).  On re-direct, Rabbi [...] stated in recent years there are three daily morning services at 7:00, 7:50 and 8:15 A.M., also three services each night and student programs all day.  When he started as Rabbi in 1995, there was only one morning service, the number of services (and parking use) has increased over the years (8T96-18 to 110-25).
[brief] The third letter contained edits – words were crossed out and language was added – that [...] said he made, and at the bottom of the paper, the first two sentences of the letter were rewritten in noticeably different handwriting, which [...] said, “was supposed to be me rewriting it.  I started but never finished. ”  (Da 58; 10T 28-19 to 29-5)  [...] made the following claims regarding the letters.
[brief] (1T80:1-7).  On Monday, February 24, 2025, [...] received the mail-in ballot results from the Board of Elections.  (1T80:15-20).  That same day, February 24, she was cutting the machine tapes because they were “all strung together” to then be placed into a fireproof safe.  (1T80:5-7; 1T81:21-25).  It was then, and only then, when she saw on the third tape printout had two write-in votes cast for candidates.  (1T81:21-82:7).  That same day, [...] then called the Board of Elections to ask the process for how machines count write-in votes and was told voters “. . . could only vote for two people” and “[t]he two write-ins count as their two people. ” (1T82:18-20).  She was assured that the machines would not allow someone to vote for two people and write another, thereby double voting, and that was the extent of the advice she was given.
[brief] “Whether the facts found by the trial court are sufficient to satisfy the applicable legal standard is a question of law subject to plenary review on appeal. ”  Cleveland, 371 N.J. Super. at 295 (citing State v. Sailor, 355 N.J. Super. 315, 320 (App. Div. 2001)); State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010).
[brief] Why?  Because [...] after perjuring himself not once, but twice, acknowledged he could not remember where he was located when allegedly observing [...] rolling through a stop sign (1T 29-23 through 30-5).  It is one thing to be unprepared.  But it is another to attempt to hide your lack of preparation by lying repeatedly under oath.  This is not a case where the Trooper was confused or made an honest mistake.  This is a case where the Trooper fabricated his testimony twice in order to justify the motor vehicle stop.
[brief] On the Brief: [...] ID# [...]  [...] ID# [...]  [...] ID# [...]  [...] (Pro Hac Vice)  [...] [...]  [...] [...] [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff- Respondent [...] (For Continuation of Appearances, See Inside Cover)  Date Submitted: April 3, 2024  [...], AND [...], [...], [...], [...], AND [...], its predecessor by merger, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], BOFA  MERRILL LYNCH ASSET HOLDINGS, INC., AND BANK OF AMERICA  MERRILL LYNCH, and [...], [...] SMITH BARNEY LLC, [...] & CO. LLC, and [...] CAPITAL GROUP INC., Defendants.  [...]  [...] [...]  [...] [...] [...] [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent  [...] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED | iv | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | v | | TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS | xiii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 3 | | I.
[brief] Pursuant to Land Use Law, use of the School property must be strictly in conformance with that Approved Site Plan and Resolution.  Neither the School, nor the plaintiff, nor anyone else, including the Court, has any authority to disregard or supersede the Approved Site Plan.  Any significant revision of a previously Approved Site Plan, even arising from litigation, requires a re-hearing and approval before the relevant Board with public Notice.  See Whispering Woods v. Middletown Tp., 220 N.J. Super. 161 (Law Div. 1987).  The Trial Court does not have the unilateral jurisdiction or authority to supersede or violate this 1972 Resolution and Site Plan, or to order that this School courtyard be used as a joint parking lot or for “priority use” by the Synagogue.
[brief] H707a Holm-166: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-CH-181, that [...] seeks qualification as a expert on N.J. energy and utility regulation and policy; see response to HOLM-[...]-CH-186 for his cv and to his testimony (SOICR p. 12) ..  H708a Holm-167: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-CH-182, to see response to Holm-166 if he contents to be expert at interpreting the New Jersey EMP (SOICR p. 12)  .........................  H709a Holm-168: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-CH-183, that his expertise on the proposed regulator station is in his testimony and referred to his experience at the BPU (SOICR p. 12)  ..........................................................  H710a Holm-169: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-CH-184, states he is not an environmental expert, but has expertise in N.J. energy utility regulation and policy and rebuts contention that Executive Order 100 prohibits approval of the proposed regulator station (SOICR p. 12).  .............................................  H711a Holm-170: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-CH-185, that [...] is solely responsible for his testimony, but did consult with [...] and [...]-Frank (SOICR p. 12)  ...............  H712a Holm-171: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-CH-186, attached his cv as Attachment A (SOICR p. 12)  ..................  H713a Attachment A: [...] background statement ..........
[brief] BURLINGTON COUNTY  DOCKET NO.: [...] : SAT BELOW:  HONORABLE  [...] : J.S.C. BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, [...] [...]  A Professional Corporation  [...]  [...]  [...]  Telephone [...]  Telecopier [...]  E-Mail: [...]  [...], Esquire Attorney ID#012951977  Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, Michael T. Mack, Plaintiff  On the Brief: [...], Esquire  Submitted: August 28, 2024
[brief] Complaint Summons 11/04/2020 – PHOTO  Exhibit F to [...]’s Certification Letter to [...]  From Administration Regarding Notice of Appeal and Indigency Application 3/17/2022  Exhibit G to [...]’s Certification Email Thread Regarding Letter Sent 3/17/2022 to [...] Application for Indigency, Dated 4/12/2022  Exhibit H to [...]’s Certification Order Dismissing Appeal - Quasi Criminal Proceeding Filed 4/22/2022  Exhibit I to [...]’s Certification Letter to Administrator from Honorable [...] Regarding Order to Dismiss Appeal, Dated 4/22/2022  Certification of [...] 7/26/2023  Exhibit AA to [...]’s Certification
[directive] If the lienholder refuses to provide such an agreement, they should be notified that the vehicle will be sold at auction and that the lien will be satisfied from the net proceeds of sale.  If the lienholder agrees accept payment to of the lesser of the unpaid principal balance or appraised value to satisfy the lien, then, the seizing agency should forward that agreement along with the required documentation and information specified on t R e attached to EOAF for Lien Checklist Payment review.
[brief] The trial court stated that [...] claimed issues of fact have been left unaddressed and require further discovery from [...], such as whether the trailer was carrying a hazardous substance; whether [...] had to prepare its facility to accommodate the storage of oil and failed to do so; whether [...] told [...] it was transporting oil; and whether [...] should be considered a potential responsible party for the oil spill.  (PPCIa419-25).  In response, the trial court stated that [...] never filed any claims against [...] and there is “nothing about [...]’s insurance policy or [...]’s lack of responsiveness to [...]’s investigation to the spill here that is within the possession of the Plaintiff because the Plaintiff is not [...]’s policyholder.  That is why the court finds that [...] does not articulate in its opposition to the motion for summary judgment and its motion for reconsideration what information [...] needs to defend against the summary judgment motion brought against [...]. ” (PPCIa419-25).  Also, “the [...] confirmed the discharge was waste oil, a hazardous substance, in the Field Directive and Notice to Insurers attached to the Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint, [and] [...] has had this information for years.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT  CORRECTLY DISMISSED ALL CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS GLAZER AND SARNO AS THE SAME FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW (14a-20a)  Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint sought to assert a single cause of action against Defendants [...] and [...] for individual aider and abettor liability under the NJLAD.  244a-246a.  The trial court properly determined Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants [...] and [...] fail because: (1) Defendant [...] cannot be held individually liable because she is not a supervisor, but rather a coworker of the Plaintiff, a fact conceded by Plaintiff at the trial level not once, but twice (17a-18a); and (2) the allegations against Defendant [...], with respect to her participation in an administrative meeting, do not rise to the requisite level of substantial assistance or encouragement so as to constitute aiding and abetting under the NJLAD.  16a.  Moreover, New Jersey law is clear that in order to find an individual employee liable for aiding and abetting liability, the employer must first be found liable under the NJLAD.  See Ivan v. County of Middlesex, 595 F.Supp.2d 425, 463 (D.N.J. 2009) (for a defendant to be individually liable for aiding and abetting, the employer must also be liable under the LAD); Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70, 82-83 (2004) (there is no individual employee liability under the LAD unless the employer is first found liable).  Thus, as explained infra at Point II, Plaintiff’s failure – and inability – to state a claim for retaliation as against [...] in the first instance, served as a third basis for the trial court’s dismissal of all claims against Defendants [...] and [...].
[brief] Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066.  To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, defendant must demonstrate that counsel erred so seriously that defendant was deprived of a fair trial with reliable results.  Strickland, 466 U.S. 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1511-12; State v. Russo, 333 N.J. Super. 119 (App. Div. 2000).
[brief] Next, Plaintiff argues that the Affidavit of Merit Statute condemns “gamesmanship” and was not intended to reward “defendants who wait for a default before requesting that the plaintiff turn over the affidavit of merit…”  (Pb18)  Plaintiff further argues that Defendants are engaging in such gamesmanship and asserts that “not once did Defendant’s Counsel reach out to Plaintiff’s counsel in an attempt to receive an Affidavit of Merit,” attached some correspondence between the parties, and, finally, “demand[s] Defendants’ Counsel to submit proofs that any attempt to procure Plaintiff’s Affidavit of Merit was sent to Plaintiff’s Counsel.
[brief] Governments and tax lien holders are prohibited from taking above the amount of the tax debt.  Despite same, [...] lost over $300,000.00 in equity for approximately $50,000.00 in unpaid tax.  Fortunately however, in fighting for so long to save his home, [...]’s appeal of the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the unconstitutional tax foreclosure judgment was a pending case, in the pipeline, at the time of the May 25, 2023 US Supreme Court’s decision in Tyler.  As such, retroactivity is afforded and the application of Tyler was mandated and provided grounds on its own for vacating [...]’s judgment under Rule 4:50-1(f).  This leaves no doubt that [...] was legally entitled to save his home from unconstitutional foreclosure and the appeal should have vacated the judgment and permitted redemption.
[directive] It functions under our Constitution as the representative of the community.  It is an arm of the court, not part of the prosecutor’s office.  The Grand Jury does not assist the prosecutor.  The prosecutor assists the Grand Jury.  Individual grand jurors are not permitted to conduct an independent investigation of the alleged charges, such as visiting the crime scene.  However, you are not limited in your investigations to matters brought to your attention by the prosecutor.  As a group, and as determined by a majority of the grand jurors present, you may decide that conditions exist that warrant investigation because you believe a crime has been committed.
[brief] The two pillars of the State’s case against [...] were its interpretation of the surveillance videos and its police informant, [...], who claimed that he saw [...] after the shooting with the same brand of gun used in the shooting.  In response, the defense attempted to impeach [...] by exposing that he approached the detectives while arrested for a gun offense and implicated [...] only after being promised that the detectives would “try to help [him] out in any way [they] can.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  The trial court carefully and holistically analyzed the substantial weight of all of the evidence, including (1) the 1925 Map, (2) the historical use of the implied easement right by the [...], their predecessors and their similarly situated beachfront neighbors, (3) the proximity of the Premises to the beach, (4) the housing restrictions in the Berger Indenture, (5) the historical advertisements, (6) the expectations of a reasonable purchaser, and (7) the fact that for a century, nothing was ever done with the “boardwalk reservation. ”  Following its careful analysis, the trial court appropriately reached the only possible conclusion — the [...] possess an implied easement appurtenant to cross directly from their beachfront home to the high-water line of the Atlantic Ocean.
[brief] N. Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. Vs. Trailor Leasing Co., 158 N.J. 561 (1999).  N.J.S.A. 34:10-6 - CEPA - permits an award of attorney’s fees “if the court determines that an action brought by an employee under the act was without bases in law or fact. ”  See also Noren v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., 488 N.J. Super. 496, (App. Div. 2017).  This Court has further held that the standard for an award of attorney’s fees is similar to the “Frivolous Law Suit Statute”, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1, wherein there must be showing that “… the non-prevailing party either brought the claim in bad faith for harassment, delay, or malicious injury; or knew, or should have known that the complaint or counterclaim was without basis in law or equity. ”
[brief] “The word ‘or,’ while normally used to indicate disjunctive clauses, has often been interpreted to mean the conjunctive if this is more consistent with legislative intent. ”  Id. (quoting Wildwood Storage  See also State v. Carreon, 437 N.J. Super. 81, 87 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Pine Belt Chevrolet v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 132 N.J. 564, 578 (1993) (“Although the Legislature oftentimes uses ‘or’ and ‘and’ interchangeably whether they are conjunctive or disjunctive ‘depends primarily upon the legislative intent. ’”).  Here, the trial court found that the word “or” in N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2) did not need to be read conjunctively in order to “avoid constructions that make the relevant statutory provisions redundant or meaningless.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the reasons previously stated, this appeal should be DENIED.  Specifically, the jury was advised of the elements of first degree robbery and accomplice liability, and was thus able to understand the findings of fact necessary for a guilty verdict.  The failure to state the parole disqualifier in the context of the robbery conviction was harmless error, as the Defendant was advised that he had to serve 85% of his term on the forty year conviction for accomplice liability to felony murder.  That term was in the middle of the permissible range of sentence and was in accordance with the balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors, with the aggravating factors outweighing the latter.  ACCORDINGLY, the sentence below should not be disturbed.
[brief] This is very similar to the way that a “reasons resolution” renders a Board’s findings moot in the adoption of a zoning ordinance amendment under the Municipal Land Use Law at Section 62.a.  Additionally, [...] held “[t]he Court finds no fault with the substance of the Township’s action simply because they chose to act by adoption of 2022-17, rather than some amendment process that is being suggested on the redevelopment plan. ” (3T51:18-22).