ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 4.  **Decedent Contemplated Divorce**  The Petitioner opines that any notion that the Decedent contemplated divorce is an “illusion. ”  In alleging that the Decedent never broached the issue of divorce, he ignores his “personal feelings are that the marriage should dissolve,” as expressed in his 2005 letter to her.  It also goes without saying that (1) the trial court did not have the benefit of the Decedent’s testimony on this issue, and (2) the Petitioner was not a credible witness.  The Petitioner attempts to rebut the testimony of [...] on this issue, citing various rules of evidence.  (Pb 16-17).  Such argument, not presented below, is not properly before the Appellate Division on appeal.  In any event, [...]’s testimony relating to the issue of divorce readily satisfies the requirement that [...]’s opinion be rationally based on her perception acquired through the use of her senses.  See, N.J.R.E. 701; Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corp., 447 N.J. Super. 98, 123-124 (App. Div. 2016), aff’d as mod. 231 N.J. 234 (2017).  5.
[brief] ”  Although subsequently amended by the Congress in the wake of the Stephens decision, the version of “§48” ruled upon by the Supreme Court provided as follows:  (a)  Creation, sale, or possession.  Whoever knowingly creates, sells, or possesses a depiction of animal cruelty with the intention of placing that depiction in interstate or foreign commerce for commercial gain, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.  (b)  Exception.  Subsection (a) does not apply to any depiction that has serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value.  (c)  Definitions.  In this section (1) the term “depiction of animal cruelty” means any visual or auditory depiction, including any photograph, motion-picture film, video recording, electronic image, or sound recording of conduct in which a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed, if such conduct is illegal under Federal law or the law of the State in which the creation, sale, or possession takes place, regardless of whether the maiming, mutilation, torture, wounding, or killing took place in the State; and (2) the term “State” means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.  (Da68)  The Supreme Court struck §48 down as unconstitutionally overbroad even though it had legislatively crafted definitions, articulated a requisite *mens rea* and was more narrowly crafted and was constructed with complete thoughts.
[brief] In effect, [...]’s authorization functioned like an anticipatory warrant, which permits a search “conditioned on a triggering event that would establish probable cause --- \(^6\) [...] confirmed in his testimony at the suppression hearing that the alleged controlled purchase took place in Toms River. (1T11-11 to 12-11) to search. ”  *Facebook v. State*, 254 N.J. 329, 367 (2023) (citation omitted).  To authorize such a warrant, a court must find “that, based on facts existing when the warrant is issued, there is probable cause to believe the contraband, which is not yet at the place to be searched, will be there when the warrant is executed. ”  *United States v. Golson*, 743 F.3d 44, 54 (3d Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted) (cleaned up).  And like an anticipatory warrant, [...] found that, if [...] traveled to Toms River in the Jaguar, then there was probable cause that contraband would be in the car.
[directive] Certain Marijuana and Hashish Cases  Pursuant to The Marijuana Decriminalization Law, L. 2021, 19 c. of of NJ  Take notice that the undersigned requests judicial review in the matter  State v. ( defendant/juvenile name) , charged with the offense( s) listed below; Published: 9/2021, CN: 12840 of page 1 2 of arising out (municipality) as set forth in (original indictment/accusation/summons/warrant/complaint/FJ or FO docket number)
[brief] D.  Defendant’s Expert Inappropriately Spoke to Defendant’s Attorney During a Break in Testimony (Raised Below: 3T59; 4T14).  New Jersey Court Rule 4:14-3(f) prohibits a deponent from communicating with his counsel once he has been sworn for testimony except with regard to a claim of privilege, a right to confidentiality or a limitation pursuant to court order.  Defendant’s expert spoke to his counsel during a break in his testimony.  Although the trial court was aware of this inappropriate interaction, the court incorrectly determined that it did not have any bearing on the court’s assessment of the witness’s credibility.  4T14:11-23.  Plaintiff’s counsel questioned Defendant’s expert about his interaction with counsel during the break in testimony:  Q.  Did you discuss any of your testimony from yesterday with [...] in between the break from yesterday to today?  MR. WEBBER: Objection, Your Honor, attorney client privilege.  THE COURT:  Well, the fact that there was a discussion is – whether or not there was a discussion is not privileged.  MR. WEBBER: Okay.  THE COURT: It’s an allowable question.  THE WITNESS: Could you repeat the question?  BY MR. RUDOLPH: Q.  Did you discuss your testimony yesterday on the stand with [...] after you left the courthouse and before you returned here today?  A. Yes.  Q.  Did you discuss the specifics of what you testified about?  MR. RUDOLPH: I’m not going to ask, Judge, what the – what the actual discussion, the words and what was exchanged was.  BY MR. RUDOLPH:  Q.  I just simply want to know, did you discuss the contents of your testimony?  MR. WEBBER: Just for the record, Your Honor, same objection.  THE COURT: Yeah, overruled on that.  THE WITNESS: Yes, I did.  BY MR. RUDOLPH:  Q.  Were you given any documents between yesterday and today?  A. No. 3T59:7-60:13.  Considering that the trial court gave significant weight to Defendant’s expert’s testimony, the trial court should have recognized that this interaction was inappropriate, and thus should have diminished her perception of Defendant’s credibility.  POINT III
[directive] Intent to Distribute Heroin or cocaine, 1/2 ounce or more but less than 5 ounces; LSD or its analog, in a quantity of less than 100 milligrams, or where the amount is undetermined; or phencyclidine or its analog in a quantity of less than 10 grams, or where the amount is undetermined; or 2nd Degree $75,000 to $150,000  No 10% methamphetamine or its analog, 1/2 ounce or more but less than 5 ounces; or marijuana, 5 pounds but less than 25 pounds; or 10 or more marijuana plants but less than 50 marijuana plants; or hashish, 1 pound or more but less than 5 pounds.  69
[directive] Other Provisions  Non-en/ orceability by third parties.  This Di rec ti e is issued pursuant to the Attorney General's authority to supervise operations of the Department.  This Directive imposes limitation that ma be more r trictive than the limitations impos d under the United tates and e J r ey Con titutions and federal and state statutes and regulation .  othing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced b any third party.  Severability.  The provisions of this Directive shall be severable.  If any phrase, clause, B. is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be s ntence, or provision of this Directiv alidity of the r mainder of the document shall not be affected. in alid the Questions.  Any que tions concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Directive C. shall be addressed to the CAO of Admini tration or their design Effective date.  D.  This Directive shall take effect immediately and remain in force and effect unless and until it is r pealed amended or superseded by Order of the Attorney General.
[brief] (Pa408)  Because Appellant did not have the opportunity to complete her deposition, she was unable to testify to the discrimination that she experienced from [...].  The statements by the teachers which were racially charged were minimized by [...] and other Defendants despite the serious impact that it had on the students and Appellant.  Appellant did not have to experience racially charged statements being made to her specifically per Dixon v. Rutgers to be negatively impacted by those statements that were made by Caucasian employees.  Appellant was impacted by the treatment subjected to and saw [...] for counsel.  (Pa390, [...] Report)  Appellant’s deposition was not completed as it is absent questioning by this Counsel, therefore, the claim that the only discrimination Appellant experienced were the comments by the teachers is inaccurate.  The treatment that Appellant was subjected to denotes a hostile work environment where Appellant experienced harassment which was based on race.
[brief] A court’s decision with respect to standing is a question of law subject to de novo review.  *Cherokee LCP Land, LLC. v. City of Linden Plan. Bd.*, 234 N.J. 403, 414-15 (2018)  The concept of standing itself refers to a litigant’s ability or entitlement to maintain an action in court.  *N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Protection v. Exxon Mobil Corp.*, 453 N.J.Super. 272, 291 (App. Div. 2018)  (citations omitted)  The issue of whether a party has standing is a threshold justiciability determination and the standing requirement is one that cannot be waived, nor may standing be conferred by consent.  *In re Adoption of Baby T.*, 160 N.J. 332, 341 (1999).  Rather, it is a threshold inquiry as lack of standing by a plaintiff precludes a court from entertaining any of the substantive issues for determination.  *Id.*, at 340.  Similarly stated, while courts are obligated to defer to a judge’s factual determination when supported by the evidential record, *Brunson v. Affinity Fed.* Credit Union, 199 N.J. 381, 397 (2009), they accord no special deference to a trial judge’s interpretation of the law and legal consequences that flow from established facts, Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. Of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995), which is reviewed de novo.  Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. V. Kafil, 395 N.J.Super. 597, 601 (App. Div. 2007).  LEGAL ARGUMENT Point
[brief] At the conclusion of [...]’s testimony, [...] argued defendant's motion to suppress the traffic stop.  She noted that [...] testified that one of the reasons he stopped defendant was for failing to maintain his lane, but the dashcam and MVR video established that defendant drove in the center lane and there was no proof that he ever changed lanes.  She also argued that the video contradicted [...]’s testimony that defendant failed to slow down once he approached the other patrol cars.  She noted that the video showed [...]’s speedometer indicating that he was travelling at 44 m.p.h.  Finally, [...] argued that defendant did not have the opportunity to make a safe lane change as he approached the patrol vehicles.  The judge denied defendant’s motion to suppress the stop, finding that Sgt. [...] had reasonable suspicion based on defendant’s failure to slow down for the parked patrol vehicles, failure to change lane away from those vehicles, and failure to maintain his current lane.
[brief] *Malanga v. Township of West Orange*, 253 N.J. 291, 310, 290 A.3d 1212 (2023) (quoting *State v. Lopez-Carrera*, 245 N.J. 596, 612, 247 A.3d 842 (2021)).  "We ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole."  *DiProspero v. Penn*, 183 N.J. 477, 492, 874 A.2d 1039 (2005) (citations omitted).  We will not "rewrite a plainly written enactment of the Legislature . . . [or] presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language."  *Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc.*, 197 N.J. 543, 553, 964 A.2d 741 (2009) (omission and alteration in original) (quoting *O'Connell v. State*, 171 N.J. 484, 488, 795 A.2d 857 (2002)).  *Kennedy v. Weichert Co.*, Id. at 302.  The circumstances in *Dimitrakopoulos*, supra, cited by Appellant, for the proposition that plaintiff is “entitled to every reasonable inference of fact” (Ab at 6) were far different from the instant case, where, as Appellant pointed out in her recitation of the procedural history, the instant litigation extended over two years.
[brief] ”  Ibid.  In Sabato, the panel reaffirmed Molino and added that arbitrators, in a PIP benefits dispute, are “empowered to determine the issues of coverage and fraud. ”  337 N.J. Super. at 394-97.  Specifically, the panel held that defenses, including fraud, should be resolved by an arbitrator and that the “statutorily mandated arbitration [was] not as narrow and circumscribed as” the insurance carrier claimed.  Id. at 396.  Indeed, the panel reminded that arbitration “is mandated by statute” and cannot be evaded by insurances carriers bringing claims in courts.  Ibid.  The panel reiterated that the arbitration was “mandated by statute” and that insurers could not avoid arbitration “by characterizing PIP disputes as questions of ‘entitlement’ or ‘coverage’ and then seeking judicial resolutions of those issues. ”  Id. at 396-97 (noting that “[a]rbitration proceedings shall be administered and subject to procedures established by the [...]").  With those precedents in mind, the resolution of this current dispute should be clear: [...] must arbitrate the PIP benefits disputes that is has recast to seek judicial resolution.
[directive] Jesli przestypstwo wiiJZalo siy z naruszeniem N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(3) (powodowanie lub zezwalanie dziecku na angazowanie siy w czynnosci seksualne, kt6re majiJ bye fotografowane lub eksponowane ), jesli przestypstwo mialo miejsce I lutego 2018 lub p6zniej, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4) (fotografowanie lub filmowanie 1 dziecka zaangazowanego w czynnosci seksualne ), jesli przestypstwo mialo miejsce Jutego 2018 r. Jub p6zniej, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(b) (swiadome posiadanie Jub swiadome ogliJdanie pomografii dzieciycej), l N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.l (prowadzenie sieci pomografii dzieciycej),jesli przestypstwo mialo miejsce lutego 2018 Jub p6zniej, N.J.S.A. 2C:34-3 (sprzedaz, dystrybucja Jub pokazywanie nieprzyzwoitych material6w osobie ponizej 18. roku zycia)  Jub jesli przestypstwo zwiiJZane z przestypczosci4 komputerow4 stanowilo naruszenie kt6regokolwiek z przepis6w Tytulu 2C, rozdzial 20, zostanie na Pana(i!!)  nalozona obowiiJZkowa kara za kazde przestypstwo, do kt6rego sit; Pan(i) przyznal(a) zgodnie z ponizsz4 list4?
[brief] Since [...] expanded its development footprint along tidal waters of the State by pushing its land area waterward and legalizing various private in-water structures, the plain terms of the Public Access Law required [...] to provide public access on its property.  Notwithstanding the DEP’s statutory obligation to ensure that its permitting decisions recognize the public’s right to meaningful access to the State’s tidal waters, [...] challenged the express permit condition that required [...] to submit a public access plan to DEP for review and approval before constructing the project authorized by the permit.  Following cross-motions for summary decision, and a detailed Initial Decision in DEP’s favor, the DEP Commissioner issued a Final Decision affirming the ALJ’s finding that [...]’s development fell squarely within the scope of activities that require additional onsite public access as a condition of receiving a permit.  In this appeal from the Final Decision, [...] rehashes the arguments raised below without disputing any specific findings or conclusions in the Final Decision.  But for the reasons explained below, the Commissioner’s decision is reasonable, supported by the facts in the record and the Law, and should be affirmed.
[brief] (Ja182, No. 5).  Shortly thereafter, in 2015, [...]’s husband experienced deteriorating health conditions.  (Ja4, ¶15; Ja159, No. 5).  Distraught and distracted with her husband’s health, and having not received any mailed notice of tax assessment or delinquency at her residential address, [...] did not pay the 2015 taxes assessed on the Property.  On October 1, 2015, at an electronic auction of municipal property tax liens, Defendant [...] sold a tax lien on the Property to the City for $4,787.76, which was the total amount of tax liability including interest, penalties, and costs, with interest at the legal maximum rate of 18%.  (Ja4, ¶16; Ja21–22).  No notice of the sale was sent to [...]’s residential mailing address.  (Ja182, No. 5).  On October 15, 2015, [...] obtained a Construction Permit issued by the City indicating the City’s permission to proceed with roofing and siding work.  (Ja5, ¶21; Ja26).  She paid approximately $1,914.00 in fees to acquire the permit.  (Id.).  At no point in the permitting process did the City or any of its officials inform [...] of the Property’s tax delinquency or the fact that a tax lien had been taken on it two weeks prior.  (Ja202, No. 7).  In September, 2017, the City instituted a foreclosure action against the Property by filing a complaint in the Chancery Division of Superior Court of New Jersey, Essex County, Docket No. [...].
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **In re Adopted Amend. to N.J.A.C. 7:7A-2.4,** | | | 365 N.J. Super. 255 (App. Div. 2003) | 14 | | **Airwork Serv. Div. v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n,** | | | 97 N.J. 290 | 28 | | **Alderiso v. Med. Ctr. of Ocean Cnty., Inc.,** | | | 167 N.J. 191 (2001) | 16 | | **Allen v. Fauver,** | | | 167 N.J. 69 (2001) | 19 | | **Arnold v. Mundy,** | | | 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821) | 16 | | **In re Attorney Gen.’s “Directive on Exit Polling: Media & Non-** | | | Partisan Pub. Int. Grps.
[brief] As argued earlier in this point, this paltry evidence could not reasonably qualify as proof beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] had entered into a conspiracy with [...].  As the judge accurately instructed the jury, “[a]n inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts established by the evidence. ”  (18T 129-5 to 7)  That [...] was a passenger in the Corolla at the time of the shooting might be such a logical and reasonable inference from the evidence in this case.  That he had even known of [...]’s plan, let alone that he had conspired with [...] to commit attempted murder was certainly not.  D.  Alternative Motion for a New Trial
[directive] Criminal prosecutions do not begin merely because someone accuses another of violating the law.  There must be an inquiry made by a Grand Jury before an accused person may be brought to trial.  The Grand Jury, does not determine guilt or innocence.  That is the responsibility of a petit jury.  When a case reaches the Grand Jury, evidence concerning the charge is presented, primarily in the form of sworn testimony, and a vote is taken on whether or not to indict.
[directive] Rather, juxtapose the grid. necessary to it not complaint-warrant, is NCA value presumption or an elevated may be sufficient to trigger a FTA value an elevated Directive, either this which then program an acomplaint-warrant, would provide the pretrial services apply for will that police  In other if NCA of release. words, the FTA score is low but the conditions appropriate recommend opportunity to on degree of the offense), acomplaint-warrant be sought.
[brief] Lack of Any Meaningful Opportunity for Discovery.  Point I of [...]’s appeal brief seeks to cast much blame upon [...] for what occurred in the trial court below – particularly as it relates to [...]’s lack of opportunity to engage in meaningful discovery.  [...] ignores the procedural status of the case by the time that [...] was made a party and also misrepresents critical facts.  By the date on which [...] was made a party to the [...] v. [...] litigation, the discovery end date had already passed (PPCIa355), as a consequence of the mis-designation of the case as a Track I case (150 days discovery), rather than as a Track IV environmental case (PPCIa043).  [...] attempted to remedy that error by filing a motion to change the track designation (PPCIa350-56), but withdrew such motion (without notice to [...]) on account of what appears to have been a “side deal” between [...] and [...] – whereby [...] would consent to an order allowing counsel for [...] to withdraw and, in consideration, [...] would withdraw its motion to change the track assignment (PPCIa362-65).  Contrary to [...]’s representation that [...] never sought to extend discovery (Pb24), [...] later moved to change the track designation to Track IV (“environmental/environmental coverage litigation”) (see PPCIa421-25).  [...]’s motion was denied, such that it was unfairly denied discovery to prepare its defenses and to prosecute its declaratory judgment counterclaim.  That was not surprising, given that the trial court, without the benefit of a developed factual record, had already made up its mind that “[...] is the responsible party” and even stated that “any further discovery would not change [that] fact” (1T at 13:11-15).  Any motion by [...] to extend discovery or change the track assignment would have been denied, regardless of when such motion had been filed.  [...]’s attempt to cast [...] as the villain here is both false and disingenuous.  [...] also argues that because [...] had filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court it must have been “well aware of [the [...] lawsuit] the moment it was filed” (Pb23).
[directive] Committed While on Release for Any Offense Charged by Complaint-Warrant.  In any case not otherwise covered under Section 8.3, except as authorized pursuant to subsection 8.4.5, where there is probable cause to believe that a defendant has committed a first- or second-degree any indictable crime while on release for any offense charged by a complaint- warrant, the prosecutor shall presumptively file a motion seeking revocation of release pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-24.  Presumption of Seeking Revocation of Release When Defendant Tampers with an 8.4.2 Electronic Monitoring Device While on Release with Conditions.  Any New Crime Is Committed While on Release for a Serious Crime.  Except as authorized pursuant to subsection 8.4.5, where there is probable cause to believe that a defendant, while on pretrial release for (i) an indictable crime or (ii) a disorderly persons offense involving domestic violence as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a), removed, tampered with, or rendered inoperable an electronic monitoring device required as a condition of pretrial release, the prosecutor shall presumptively file a motion seeking revocation of release pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-24.  Page 69
[brief] BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................................................................................ii  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................iv  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS.........................................................xi  PROCEDURAL HISTORY........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS.......................................................................................................2  STANDARD OF REVIEW......................................................................................................7  LEGAL ARGUMENT...............................................................................................................9  POINT I THE DECISION OF THE STATE POLICE RETIREMENT  BOARD WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below).............................................................................................................9  POINT II  THE DECISION BELOW WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below)..........................................................................................................16  CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................................19