ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Defendants’ opposition wholly adopts the trial court’s conclusion that marketable title was conveyed simply because the transaction was contemplated by the Master Deed.  See Db at 9; see also Db at 23 (“In addition, the [Plaintiff] has title to the Unit which paragraph 8(e) of the Master Deed specifically contemplated and provided for via purchase. ”).  Aside from a fleeting mention that Unit 74 is actually a condominium unit, the opposition fails to reinforce the trial court’s ‘no fraud’ conclusion with any legal authority or argument.  Nor does it squarely address the Plaintiff’s argument that Unit 74’s status of a common element is at odds with the representations made by the Developer in its Affidavit of Title.  For example, the Defendants assert the trial court was correct to conclude the master deed authorized the sale of Unit 74 but summarily concludes ‘marketable’ title was conveyed based upon that authority.  See Db at p. 23.  The opposition does not buttress this conclusion with any additional argument.  Similarly, the Defendants do not focus on whether the Developer’s representations as to its quality of title were accurate in light of Unit 74 having been designated as a common element.  Instead, it chooses to emphasize the fact that Plaintiff subjectively believed it was acquiring the unit pursuant to Section 8(e) of the Master Deed.  See Db at p. 6.  The Defendants avoid addressing Plaintiff’s arguments by casually dismissing them as an improper attempt to ‘reinterpret’ the Master Deed.  See Db at pp. 1, 2, 7, 14.  As set forth herein, the record unquestionably demonstrates the Developer designated Unit 74 as a common element shortly after the Condominium was created in 1983.  As a result of that designation, the owners of the condominium collectively held a 100% undivided interest in Unit 74; it cannot be sold like other parcels of real property.
[brief] **[...]’S FAILURE TO IDENTIFY A PWCRA-REGISTERED ARCHAEOLOGIST IN ITS BID WAS A MATERIAL NON-WAIVABLE DEFECT**  Even if [...]’s bid does not contain a statutory defect (although it clearly did), [...]’s failure to identify a PWCRA-registered archaeologist in its bid is a material defect that is not waivable.  In Township of River Vale v. R.J. Longo Constr. Co., 127 NJ. Super. 207,216 (Law Div. 1974), [...] adopted an often followed two-prong test for determining whether a bid defect is material and non-waivable: [F]irst, whether the effect of a waiver would be to deprive the municipality of its assurances that the contract will be entered into, performed and guaranteed according to its specified requirements, and second, whether it is of such a nature that its waiver would adversely affect competitive bidding by placing a bidder in a position of advantage over other bidders or by otherwise undermining the necessary common standard of competition.
[brief] As a threshold matter, the State misrepresents the defense challenge to the reliability of the fingerprint analysis in this case.  The defense is not arguing that all fingerprint testimony based on the ACE-V method is unreliable.  The defense is arguing that the State failed to demonstrate the reliability of a fingerprint comparison that took place as a result of a database search.  The defense spent nine pages of its brief explaining this issue: database searches lead to the discovery of “close non-matches,” which have not been demonstrated to be distinguishable from a true match by fingerprint examiners.  (Db 14-22)¹  The State does not address this issue at all.  In addition to this the broad challenge to the reliability of fingerprint analysis generated by this specific method, [...] argues that because fingerprint analysis, like all disciplines, is not infallible and because jurors are inclined to believe it is, steps needed to be taken throughout trial to make sure the strength of that evidence was not overstated or overestimated.
[brief] ”  As the Jackowitz Court recognized, defendants are entitled to “resolve by trial validly contested claims against them” free from “insinuations of bad faith” for disputing plaintiffs’ claims.  In this case, Plaintiff’s counsel not only insinuated bad faith but argued that the defense was based upon “jokes and doodles” about which Plaintiff had a right to be outraged.  Plaintiff’s counsel’s remarks were neither fleeting nor isolated.  They admittedly presented the “theme” of the case and warrant a new trial on damages despite defense counsel’s failure to renew his objection.  When, such as here, a showing of plain error is required to order a new trial due to counsel’s failure to object at trial to the matter now argued to have been improper, it must be shown that Plaintiff’s counsel’s comments had the “clear capacity to produce an unjust result. ”  Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWeber, Inc., 197 N.J. 81, 128 (2008).  “To be reversible under the harmless error standard, the possibility must be real, one sufficient to raise reasonable doubt as to whether [the error] led the jury to a verdict it otherwise might not have reached. ”  Willner v. Vertical Reality, Inc., 235 N.J. 65, 79 (2018) (internal citations omitted).  Error cannot be harmless if there is some degree of possibility it led to an unjust result.  Ibid.  By focusing the jury on the alleged need to hold Defendants accountable for damages for which they refused to take responsibility, counsel’s opening and closing remarks repeatedly implored the jury to use its verdict to right the “wrong” suffered by Plaintiff as the result of the defense’s decision to contest his claim.  Given the pervasiveness of the “theme” presented, there is ample reason to believe that the jury was led by it to a verdict it would not have reached otherwise, and a new trial must be ordered.
[brief] Appellant’s theory is contrary to decisions from the agencies tasked with implementing and enforcing the FDCPA.  In construing a federal statute, courts consider the decisions of the congressionally empowered agencies as binding and, at the very least, highly persuasive.  *Madison v. Res. for Hum. Dev., Inc.*, 233 F.3d 175, 187 (3d Cir. 2000).  The agencies Congress tasked with interpreting and implementing the FDCPA — the [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) — have expressly approved of the use of service providers—and specifically, letter vendors.
[brief] [DA169.]  At the conclusion of this section is a separate line item requesting “Buyer’s initials. ”  Both Plaintiffs individually initialed the SPA directly next to the Arbitration Provision and executed the SPA on December 23, 2017.  (Id.).  On January 3, 2018, [...], Chairman of Defendant-Appellant [...] signed the SPA on behalf of the Seller, thereby accepting Plaintiffs’ offer on Unit 1601.
[brief] And we have today is the day for a case management conference.  And I got a letter from [...] dated March 29th that goes through a lot of different issues, one of which is did [...]'s deposition take place as planned?"  (5T 4, lines 17-24)  [...] responded: No, Your Honor.  I had no documentation whatsoever from [...] on behalf of [...], which would have made the deposition fruitful."  (5T 4 lines 22-25)
[brief] Binding New Jersey precedent from the Court of Error and Appeals, the predecessor to the present New Jersey Supreme Court created by the 1947 Constitution, provides as follows:  The word “adjoining” implies a closer relation than “adjacent. ”  The latter word, uncontrolled by the context or subject-matter, is not inconsistent with the idea of something intervening.  But the primary meaning of the word “adjoining” is to lie next to, to be in contact with, excluding the idea of any intervening space.  Yard v. Ocean Beach Association, 49 N.J.Eq. 306, 312 (1892)¹.
[brief] Pa 48. renovated); 5T:64:14-16 (Agreeing that new bathroom was installed); 5T:64:17-20 (Agreeing that kitchen was improved); 5T:64:24-65:3 (Agreeing that new windows were installed); 5T:67 (Agreeing that renovation of the Unit and remainder of building occurred in 2001).  Nowhere does [...] testify that no improvements were made to his Unit, despite repeatedly characterizing his Unit as “unrenovated” and “misfit” (while staying there for more than thirty (30) years at a monthly rent less than eight hundred dollars ($800)).
[directive] R. 7:10-2(a); State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. at 11-12.  The Court where the defendant is currently found guilty or has entered a plea of guilty to a DWI or DWI refusal violation, does not have jurisdiction to review or otherwise rule upon the validity of any prior conviction or any penalties imposed in connection with that conviction.  This applies equally to any administrative suspensions imposed by [...].  State v. 17.9 Laurick, 120 N.J. at 13,  In such cases, a Court should impose the sentence based upon the prior record, as it is at the time of conviction.  See, N.J.S.A. 2B:25-5.1, requiring Municipal Prosecutors to review motor vehicle abstracts of DWI offenders and present that information to the Court.
[brief] Criminal Action:  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division (Criminal), Mercer County Sat  Below: Honorable [...], J.S.C.  Honorable Judges:  Please accept this letter memorandum, pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b), in lieu of a more formal brief submitted on behalf of the State of New Jersey.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................................  1  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT .......................................................................................  7 POINT I ...........................................................................................................  7  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS CONCLUSION  ....................................................................................................
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On December 12, 2022, defendant [...] (the Applicant) filed a development application (Pa7 to Pa16) with defendant [...] (the Board).  A hearing in connection with same was conducted on February 27, 2023 (1T3-1 to 1T85-20); at the conclusion, there was a motion and a unanimous vote to approve the proposal (1T84-20 to 1T85-18).  The Board's March 27, 2023 memorializing resolution is at Pa18 to Pa27.  On May 9, 2023, [...] appealed by filing an action in lieu of prerogative writs in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division-Civil Part, Ocean County.  See Pa1 to Pa5 (complaint).  The Board answered the complaint on June 20.  See Pa32 to Pa34.  The Applicant filed answer and counterclaim (Pa35 to Pa39) on July 5; the counterclaim was dismissed on July 31.  See stipulation at Pa40.  On August 17, 2023, [...] filed a motion for summary judgment.  See Pa41 to Pa43 (notice of motion).  The Honorable [...], A.J.S.C., denied the motion on September 22.  See order at Pa44 to Pa45.  On October 2, 2023, a pretrial order (Pa46 to Pa47) issued.  The matter was tried before [...] on April 5, 2024.  See 2T4-25 to 2T30-15.  On --- 1  Transcript references: 1T__-___ (February 27, 2023 [...] hearing); 2T__-__ (April 5, 2024 Ocean County Law Division trial).  April 11, 2024, the Court entered an order (Pa48) dismissing the complaint with prejudice.  The accompanying written opinion is at Pa49 to Pa71.  On May 20, 2024, [...] appealed to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.  See Pa72 to Pa75 (notice of appeal).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] In order for the co-employee immunity to apply, three conditions must be satisfied: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered a compensable injury; (2) the plaintiff and defendant must have been co-employees; and (3) the defendant must have been acting in the course of his/her employment.  McDaniel, 419 N.J. Super. at 492; Daus v. Marble, 270 N.J. Super. 241, 246 (App. Div. 1994); Wunschel v. City of Jersey City, 96 N.J. 651, 659 (1984).
[brief] *In re Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permits*, 185 N.J. at 470.  Nor do associated interests shared with other property owners provide third-party objectors to meet these rigorous standards requiring a particularized property interest.  *In re NJPDES No. NJ0025241*, 185 N.J. 474, 482 (2006); see also *In re Freshwater Wetlands*, 185 N.J. at 464, 470; *Normandy Beach Improvement Ass’n v. Comm’r, Dep’t of Envt’l Prot.*, 193 N.J. Super. 57 (App. Div. 1983) (quality of life concerns not sufficient to establish particularized property interest); *In re Amico/Tunnel Carwash*, 371 N.J. Super. 199, 211(App. Div. 2004) (adverse aesthetic impacts and traffic impacts are generalized and insufficient to establish particularized property interest); *See Spalt*, 237 N.J. Super. at 212 (close residency, fear of resultant injury to property, damage to recreational interest or shared generalized property rights are not particular property rights); *In re Riverview Dev.*, 411 N.J. Super. at 437-38 (general claims of adverse aesthetic and traffic impacts did not create sufficient property interest to entitle neighboring homeowners to hearing).
[brief] In the meantime, this case establishes a dangerous precedent that plaintiff can create damages in any legal malpractice case just by commencing action to incur legal fees so long as there are some evidence that the defendant has breached the duty in providing legal services to the plaintiff.  The two cases relied on by the Appellate Division in the decision to support the ruling are either not applicable or in fact in support of Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff needs to prove causation and damages in addition to breach of duty before being awarded legal fees, because incurring legal fees per se is not the element of damage in the tort claim.  Plaintiff must prove actual damages sustained in the underlying matrimonial case before being awarded legal fees in the malpractice case pursuant to “trial within a trial” doctrine in legal malpractice case.
[brief] ”  Id. at 405-406.  In Center 48 Ltd., supra, the Court found that but for the execution of the lease guarantee, Plaintiff’s predecessor would not have entered into the lease with [...] which was [...]’s subsidiary.  Similarly, in Benjamin vs. Garden Operations Corp., 2013 WL 6508491 (App. Div. 2013) (unpublished) Pa239, the Court held “the purpose of requiring an individual guarantee from the owner of a corporation … is to have security greater than the corporation’s gossamer assurances of payment. ”  Id. at *7, citing Shelter System Group Corporation vs. Lanni Builders, Inc., 263 N.J. Super. 373, 376 (App. Div. 1993).  “When a corporate debtor defaults in payment to a supplier the personal guarantor is frequently the only available source of funds…”  Id.  Thus, the Court must take into consideration commercial reality and reasonable expectations of the parties in the present case.
[brief] ”  See Dental Health Assocs. S. Jersey, P.A. v. RRI Gibsboro, LLC, 471 N.J. Super. at 194 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted); see also O Builders & Assocs., Inc. v. Yuna Corp. of NJ, 206 N.J. 109, 129 (2011) (noting that a party’s “bald and unsubstantiated assertions” that she “disclosed business, financial and legal information” related to Yuna [C]orp. and other “general information about the circumstances of [her] business and legal affairs” cannot suffice to satisfy Defendant’s burden on a disqualification motion”) (emphasis added).
[brief] One unique factor is that for more than three years this case has largely been stayed or in binding mediation/arbitration – at the request and/or consent of [...].  Thus, the passage of time alone cannot be analyzed in a vacuum.  Indeed, the current Case Management Order, which is presently stayed, demonstrates that the Indemnity Claim is in its infancy – the schedule addresses written discovery, document production, party and non-party depositions, expert discovery, motion practice and trial.  Da391-93.
[directive] Investigation and Adjudication of Serious Complaints  6.3.1  All serious complaints shall be forwarded to the internal affairs function.  This includes complaints of criminal activity, excessive force, improper or unjust arrest, improper entry, improper or unjustified search, differential treatment, serious rule infractions and repeated minor rule infractions.  6.3.2  Unless otherwise directed to do so by the County Prosecutor, the prosecutor's office must be immediately notified of all allegations of criminal conduct.  The internal affairs investigator shall refrain from taking any further investigative action until directed to do so by the County Prosecutor unless an imminent threat exists to the safety or welfare of an individual.  Once a complaint has been forwarded to the prosecutor's office, that office shall endeavor to review the allegation within 30 days and advise the law enforcement agency whether a criminal investigation will be conducted.  In the event the prosecutor's office cannot reach a decision within the initial 30 day period, the deadline may be extended in 30 day increments at the discretion of the County Prosecutor.  The law enforcement agency shall be advised of any extensions of the deadline.  6.3.3  If a criminal investigation is initiated, the law enforcement agency shall receive periodic and timely updates concerning the course of the investigation.  While a criminal investigation is pending, complainants and witnesses may be referred by the law enforcement agency to the county victim witness office for information concerning the criminal investigation.  Once the criminal investigation is complete and a disposition of the allegation has been made, the prosecutor's office shall provide the law enforcement agency with its investigative file for use in the internal affairs investigation subject to applicable state statutes, court rules and case law.
[brief] The policy of our Courts has generally been to discourage piecemeal litigation.  Id. (citations omitted) (giving the example of the single controversy doctrine as having been designed to prevent harassment and unnecessary clogging of the judicial system, and to avoid wasting time and effort of the parties.)  Our Courts have also utilized the doctrine out of a recognition that the expertise of an administrative agency may not be exercised or known until it renders its final decision, and usually upon judicial review due deference is accorded that expertise.  Garrow 79 N.J. at 559.  A public employee, such as Respondent, and a public employer, such as Appellant, are subject to the Civil Service Act ("Act") N.J.S.A. 11A:1-1 et seq. and the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
[brief] [...] Parties’ Negotiations With Appellants**  In or about April 2017, [...] approached Appellant, [...], expressing an interest in acquiring the Solar Rights to the Solar Project.  [FEDa114].  To evaluate the Solar Project, [...] requested access to all information relating to the Solar Project and the Property.  [Pa1095].  [...], two (2) years earlier, had entered into a “Non-Disclosure/Non-Circumvention Agreement” dated --- \(^2\)  As found by the trial court in its Opinion granting summary judgment to the [...] Parties in the Underlying Action:
[brief] Plaintiff Has No Basis For A Claim Against [...] Or [...] Asserting That Plaintiff Is An Oppressed Minority Shareholder  [...] is a Delaware LLC.  See, fn. 12, supra.  Delaware does not have an oppressed minority shareholder statute, nor does it recognize such an independent cause of action.  See, e.g., Lidya Holdings Inc. v. Eksin, 2022 Del. Ch. LEXIS 22, *6-7 (Ch. 2022).  Thus, there is no basis for asserting this cause of action here.  However, even if New Jersey law were applied, it references oppressive actions by those in control of the entity toward a minority owner, which here relates only to [...]’ actions toward plaintiff, not [...]’s or [...]’s.  N.J.S.A. 14A:12-7(1)(c) (In a close corporation, relief may be available when “the directors or those in control have acted fraudulently or illegally, mismanaged the corporation, or abused their authority as officers or directors or have acted oppressively or unfairly toward one or more minority shareholders in their capacities as shareholders, directors, officers, or employees. ”); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., Inc., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 155 (Law Div. 1979), aff’d, 173 N.J. Super. 559 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 112 (1980); Pa53.  Moreover, there is no basis to apply oppressed minority shareholder relief as to an admittedly defunct entity.  1T8:3-4; 2T89:6-8.  In sum, the Trial Court properly dismissed all of plaintiff’s claims against [...] and [...].
[brief] PAGE NOS.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS  .......................................................................3  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................6  POINT I  DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION WHEN THE TRIAL COURT DENIED HIS REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF OFFHAND WITHOUT ANY MEANINGFUL CONSIDERATION.  (3T 75-4 to 15)  .........................6  POINT II  DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS DUE PROCESS AND CONFRONTATION RIGHTS WHEN THE TRIAL COURT REMOVED HIM FROM THE COURTROOM FOR THE REST OF TRIAL.  (Ruling at: 4T 12-17 to 13-24)  ..................................................................................14  POINT III  THE MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED AS THE STATE PRESENTED  INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF FIRST-DEGREE ROBBERY OF EITHER OF THE TELLERS AND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT HIM OF SECOND-DEGREE ROBBERY OF ONE TELLER. (4T 96-21 to 97-13)
[brief] (23T 176-23 to 177-2; 24T 205-7 to 16, 217-20, 289-1 to 4)  When he learned that two people had been shot and the police were looking for him, he retained an attorney and turned himself in.  (9T 148-16 to 18, 175-8 to 17; 24T 242-3 to 11)
[brief] (a)  *The Legislature finds that the people of the State have a paramount interest in the restoration, maintenance and preservation of the quality of the waters of the State for the protection and preservation of public health and welfare, food supplies, public water supplies .  . . .  The Legislature further finds that the State’s groundwaters are a precious and vulnerable resource.*  (b)  The Legislature declares that the objective of this act is, wherever attainable, to restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the waters of the State, including groundwaters, and the public trust therein; . . . .  N.J.S.A. 58:11A-2(a), (b) (emphasis added).  The Legislature also has declared water resources in general to be within the public trust:  *The Legislature finds and declares that the water resources of the State are public assets of the State held in trust for its citizens* and are essential to the health, safety, economic welfare, recreational and aesthetic enjoyment, and general welfare, of the people of New Jersey; *that ownership of these assets is in the State as trustee of the people*; . . . .  N.J.S.A. 58:1A-2 (emphasis added).  Courts likewise have recognized public water supplies as public trust resources:
[brief] Defense counsel began their cross-examination by attacking Plaintiff’s decision to stand while giving testimony.  “You were just seated, right?  Am I correct?  And you were seated outside in the hall?” (3T, at 64:21-22).  From there, Defense counsel pursued lines of questioning common on cross-examination in motor vehicle collision cases.  This included a heated exchange where Plaintiff disagreed with characterizations of his condition contained in treatment records he had never seen before (3T, at 90:21-106:14; 113:16-24). \(^3\)