ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This court’s unanimous March 6 decision that Lakewood’s public school students were being denied T&E elevated them to a status previously accorded only students in the Abbott districts.  Together they constitute the only New Jersey public school students to have been judicially identified as being denied those fundamental constitutional rights.  The Abbott litigation resulted in the students being accorded special constitutional status.  The best statement of that appears in the first paragraph of [...]’s opinion for the court in Abbott XXI:  The schoolchildren who comprise the plaintiff class in the Abbott v. Burke litigation have been denominated victims of a violation of constitutional magnitude for more than twenty years.  [footnote omitted].  Because of the severity of their constitutional deprivation, that class of pupils was determined to be deserving of special treatment from the State.  ...The State has for decades recognized the special status of that plaintiff class of pupils, [footnote omitted] and its compliance with this Court’s remedial orders demonstrates the State’s long recognition that plaintiffs’ constitutionally based remedies have imbued them with status akin to that given to wards of the State.  In sum, the Abbott plaintiffs have been the long-standing beneficiaries of specific judicial remedial orders, which were entered to correct proven constitutional deprivations that the State was unable to correct on its own.
[brief] In the context of another type of civil sanction, the New Jersey Supreme Court has made clear that a Court considering a monetary penalty must consider whether the subject party has already been, or is likely to be, punished for the same conduct.  See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 108 N.J. 123, 139 (1987).  In Kimmelman, the New Jersey Supreme Court established seven factors that should be considered by a court determining a civil penalty.  Id. at 137-140.  Notably, the sixth factor in the Kimmelman analysis was whether criminal or treble damages actions have also been filed since “[a] large civil penalty may be unduly punitive if other sanctions have been imposed for the same violation …”  This Court has since clarified that the sixth factor of the Kimmelman analysis requires a court “to specifically acknowledge and evaluate the impact of the totality of the sanctions imposed … to decide whether, in the aggregate, it would be unduly punitive to impose a substantial penalty on top of those sanctions. ”  Comm'r of Banking & Ins. v. [...], No. A-6060-04T1, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1758, at *7-8 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 30, 2007) (remanding an agency decision in which the evaluating commissioner failed to properly evaluate whether other punishment aimed at the defendant for the same conduct should reduce the sanction issued).  While Kimmelman was decided in the context of a determining a sanction under the New Jersey Antitrust Act, --- 13
[brief] Pa250a-51a.  [...] also testified, however, that when a dump truck fills up and leaves, there may be a time gap between when that truck leaves and when another truck takes its place.  Pa249a.  On the night of the accident, a dump truck was assigned to the sweeper at some point.  Pa258a.  At the time of the accident, however, the sweeper truck had to drive around the milling machine because it did not have a dump truck with it to dump its sweepings into.
[brief] But there is more.  Even if the Rules could be construed as granting trial courts discretion to permit discovery of irrelevant information, the ESI Order reflects a serious abuse of any such discretion.  Far from being narrowly tailored to any unique circumstances here, the Order unnecessarily and unreasonably compels a deeply invasive and burdensome production of tens of thousands of irrelevant documents, forgoing clear alternatives that are less intrusive and more protective of the parties’ privacy rights.  The ESI Order is insupportable and should be reversed.
[brief] The ordinance does not interfere with any legislative objective.  Ordinance No. 17-2017 does not interfere with any of the Legislature’s objectives established in the Local Health Services Act or in the statutes dealing with local Boards of Health.  The [...] is still able to perform all the duties and services needed to meet the standards of conduct as established by the Commissioner of Health or the Public Health Council.  The Borough’s ability to enforce a local ordinance to ensure peace and quiet for its residents does not impact the ability to maintain the environmental standards called for in the Local Health Services Act.  Rather Ordinance No. 17-2017 only furthers the Legislature’s specific enabling grant of authority for a governing body to be able to regulate disturbing noises.
[brief] ”).  To begin, Plaintiffs’ own Complaint demonstrates the frivolous nature of their lawsuit.  As detailed above, the Complaint contained a \textit{single} substantive allegation concerning [...] -- namely, that [...] “was going to sell” his practice(s) and real estate to [...].  (Pa58a ¶ 44). \(^{10}\)  Of course this allegation, even if it were true, did not provide a basis for a cause of action against [...].  The frivolous nature of the Complaint, however, is perhaps most apparent from what the Complaint did \textit{not} allege.  It did \textit{not} allege that a sale with [...] actually took place.  It did \textit{not} allege that [...] had any knowledge of Plaintiffs’ existence, let alone Plaintiffs’ alleged “de facto” \(^9\) \underline{Trautner} is included in [...]’s appendix containing unpublished cases even though it has been approved for publication.
[brief] In attempting to explain why SFRA and its application to [...] is not the cause of the acknowledged denial of T&E, the Final Decision asserts that:  ...the record demonstrates that [...]’s own choices and management issues have resulted in the unavailability of funds that could and should asked [...], Deputy Assistant Commissioner of Finance, “if there’s any end game here, without continually raising the [loan] amount that [...] gets.  Assuming everything stayed the same. ”  [...] answered, “We’re just going year by year at this point. ”  (14T 146-3 to 6).  have been used to provide T&E to its students...[That [...]] has chosen not to require its tax base to further support its schools, and suffers from local mismanagement regarding its transportation and special education costs....[That] [...]’s decision to not maintain adequate local fair share contributed to the district’s current fiscal problems.
[brief] ”  Pa 127, n. 12.  At its October 12, 2022 hearing, the Planning Board considered the following points of the Borough Planner’s testimony, keyed to Section D of the Master Plan:  Objective two talks about how future plans should provide for additional parks and open space in the borough.  And one of the -- you may recall one of the main purposes behind the last amendment to the plan was to change some of the standards because the county, borough, the redevelopment agency, the redeveloper had entered into a four party agreement that … called for the -- the county to acquire a larger piece of -- of the property to be used for -- for open space ...  Objective three talks about … satisfying the borough’s affordable housing obligation through the provision of low and moderate income house units.  [A]nd also the … 2019 housing element and fair share plan identifies the [...] as one of the ... primary mechanisms to accomplish that.  [C]alling for the provision of 70 units to satisfy the -- the borough’s second round obligation and a portion of the borough’s third round obligation.  ... And then objective six of the re-examination report calls for addressing -- working to address environmental impacts including local flooding events through a lens of ... resiliency and sustainability and calling for additional green space along the ... [...] additional ... area that could be natural space and certainly act as flood storage furthers that goal as well.
[brief] Legislative intent must be given effect and the sources of the intent include the language of the statute and policy behind it.  *Coletti v. Union County Board of Chosen Freeholders*, 217 N.J. Super 31, 35 (App. 1987).  Hence, the News article one day after [...] signed Executive Order MEO-08-2008, must be read as part of the legislative intent.  In the case at bar, [...] did not seek to become certified as a candidate for elective office after he was terminated, he began the process of certification and was terminated as result of obtaining petitions.  [...] did not decide to run for office after he was terminated.  [...] took out petitions before he was terminated and [...] became certified, shortly after he was terminated.  He decided to run and it was known he was running by the very tortfeasor who terminated him in retaliation for [...]’s exercise of his constitutional rights to run for West Ward Councilman.  The Executive Order would be for naught, and based on the testimony of [...] and the news article of September 24, 2008, this termination or denial of rights was not the intent of the Executive Order MEO-08-2008 or [...]’s reason for enacting the Order.  But it is not of what I am certain, it is what a reasonable fact finder believes.  This is not a case which rest on quantifiable proofs or analogous caselaw.  It is pure credibility, who does the Jury believe.  “Thus, it is clear that questions of a party’s state of mind, knowledge, intent, or motive should not generally be decided on a summary judgment.
[brief] ”  Comando v. Nugiel, 2014 WL 2117877, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 22, 2014) citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475–76 (1989).  Because arbitration is a favored means of dispute resolution, under New Jersey law waiver of the right to arbitrate must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.  Cole, 215 N.J. at 276.  Under this standard, [...] should be ordered to arbitrate [...]’s Indemnity Claim.  II.
[brief] POINT V THE TRIAL COURT  REVERSIBLY ERRED IN REFUSING TO ISSUE  A LIMITING INSTRUCTION ON THE STATE’S MISLEADING DUI  HYPOTHETICAL MADE WITH RESPECT TO MANSLAUGHTER DURING ITS SUMMATION.  (9T104-13 to 105-25)  ...........................................................................  46  POINT VI  SEVERAL ERRORS IN THE SENTENCING COURT’S ANALYSIS RESULTED IN THE ERRONEOUS IMPOSITION OF A SENTENCE THAT WAS THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF LIFE WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE.  (11T53-10 to 65-13)  ..................................................................................  51  A.  The Trial Court Failed to Merge the Possession of a Weapon for an Unlawful Purpose Conviction with the Murder Conviction.  .................................................................  52  B.  The Trial Court Erred In Refusing To Apply Mitigating Factor Four When It Was Uncontested That [...] Suffered From Mental Health Issues That Contributed To The Commission Of The Offense.  .............................................................................  53  C.  The Trial Court Failed to Engage in the Required Yarbough/Torres Analysis Before Imposing Consecutive Sentences  ..............................................................................  56  D.  The Trial Court Imposed An Extraordinarily Significant Restitution Without Conducting An Ability To Pay Hearing.  ............................................................................. 58  CONCLUSION  ...........................................................................................................  60  | INDEX TO APPENDIX | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------|-----------| | Indictment | Da1-4 | | Verdict Sheet | Da5-7 | | Verdict Sheet, Judge’s Copy | Da8-10 | | Judgment of Conviction | Da11-14 | | Notice of Appeal | Da15-18 | | Motion Certification of Trial Counsel | Da19-25 | | Order Denying New Trial | Da26 | | Records Request Response | Da27-30 | | Certification of Appellate Counsel | Da30-35 | JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] ” (Pa113).  This argument is completely contradicted by the record.  In relation to the supposed 2009 injury, [...]’s report states that [...] “was in a fight as a police officer [and] tackled a man to the ground. ” (Pa163).  The report also states that [...] filed a workers’ compensation claim in relation to the incident.\(^2\) (Pa163).  However, if the injury occurred at work, and a workers’ compensation claim was filed, then why did [...]’s employers not produce documentation in relation to a 2009 injury?  The employers produced documentation in relation to [...]’s other work-related injuries.  (Pa84).  Moreover, in addition to the absence of workers’ compensation records, there are no medical records at all in relation to a 2009 injury.  (Pa84).  As summarized in the ALJ’s initial decision, “[u]nlike [[...]’s] injuries from 2000 and 2004, where there were workers’ compensation cases opened for both, plus medical records and test results, any claim of injury from 2009 was not so documented. ” (Pa84).  Finally, [...] himself testified that a 2009 injury did not occur.\(^3\) (1T54:18-55:20).  It is clear that a 2009 injury did not occur.
[brief] For the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully submitted that the trial court properly granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  Dated: October 4, 2024  [...] – 011352005  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Third-Party  Defendant/Respondent, [...]  [...] and [...], his wife, Plaintiffs- Respondents, v. [...], and [...], as employee representative of O.A PETERSON CONSTRUCTION i/j/s/a, Defendants- Appellants, And [...], Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DYNAMIC PROTECTION SYSTEM
[brief] The [...] contends that the arbitrator did not give due weight to internal comparability because the City’s settlements with other uniformed and non-uniformed units provided for 2% or more in salary increases.  The City responds that the arbitrator properly considered all nine 16(g) statutory factors and explained why he found factors 16(g)(1), (5), (6) and (9), pertaining to the interest and the welfare of the public, financial impacts, and lawful authority and statutory restrictions, to all be relevant and related.  The City asserts that the arbitrator thoroughly explained his reasoning for not awarding 2% salary increases based on the City’s financial condition.  The City notes that the arbitrator properly found that the City presented the expert financial testimony of its CFO, whereas the [...] did not present an expert witness to challenge the City’s evidence concerning the City’s financial condition.
[brief] Not only is the distinction between a “claim” and “proceeds of a claim” not recognized by binding authority, but the assignments at issue in this case do not support that distinction.  Specifically, the [...] defined as “Collateral” as “All of [[...]’s] rights, Title … and all money … in the civil action filed” by [...] against [...].  The use of the word ‘rights’, ‘title’ ‘and interest’ ‘and all money,’ expressly indicates that the claims, as well as ‘all of the proceeds’ are included in the Collateral.
[brief] 32 State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) ............................................................................. 36 State v. Cassidy, 235 N.J. 482 (2018) .....................................................................  19 State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373 (1988) .................................................................  32 State v. Cuff, 239 N.J.  321 (2019) .............................................................................. 35 State v. Derry, 250 N.J. 611 (2022) ............................................................................. 26 State v. Hampton, 61 N.J. 250 (1972) .......................................................................... 30 State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117 (1997) ........................................................................... 19 State v. Hedgespeth, 249 N.J. 234 (2021) ................................................................. 23, 28, 33 State v. Hyman, 451 N.J. Super. 429 (App. Div. 2017) .............................................. 26, 27 State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265 (2018) ............................................................................. 19 State v. Jackson, 272 N.J. Super. 543 (App. Div. 1994) ............................................ 34 State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178 (1984) ............................................................................... 18 State v. Labrutto, 114 N.J. 187 (1989) ........................................................................ 26 State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2 (1990) .............................................................................. 32 State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011) ......................................................................... 25 State v. Papasavvas, 163 N.J. 565 (2000) ..................................................................  18 State v. Ragland, 105 N.J. 189 (1986) ........................................................................  34 State v. Rhett, 127 N.J. 3 (1992) ................................................................................  32 State v. Ridout, 299 N.J. Super. 233 (App. Div. 1997) ..............................................  30, 31 State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 468 (2017) ..............................................................................  23, 28, 33 State v. Simms, 224 N.J. 393 (2016)  .............................................................................  26 State v. Smith, 436 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 2014) .................................................  26 State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021) .............................................................................  35 State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473 (2006)  .....................................................................  19  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Fifth, while HGN is not admissible at trial to prove intoxication, *State v. Doriguzzi*, 334 N.J.Super. 530, 547 (App.Div. 2000), and it was not offered in this case other than as a placeholder, nonetheless, while [...] did this test, he apparently followed directions and had no difficulty standing still while it was administered.  Sixth, the courts below failed to account for the many signs of sobriety which [...] exhibited.  [...]’s testimony notwithstanding, MVR shows [...]’s speech as clear and distinct.  He was forthright and direct in expressing his feelings.  He was oriented to his surroundings and responded appropriately to [...]’s questions and instructions.  Outside of OLS and W&T, [...] walked and stood without difficulty.  Finally, OLS and W&T have high false-positive rates.
[brief] Is that what [...] told you?  A: To use the designated cut-through.  [...]: That’s not the question.  Q:  That wasn’t the question I asked.  The question I asked was, did [...] tell you that it was a grass covered cut-through that had both lanes closed and cones present?  Did he tell you that when he corresponded with you or communicated to you at 10:00 on 7/20/22?  A: Yes.  Q: And when you relayed that message to your drivers that you own (sp) a responsibility to for safety and security, what exact words did you tell them?  [...]: Objection to the form.
[brief] [...] did not conduct any traffic counts, but applied a multiplier to Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE) data based on what they called "local research."  Trip generation estimates for the 9 single family dwellings were made based on data published by the ITE in the 10th Edition of the Trip Generation Manual and local trip generation rates developed by [...] for similar residential developments within [...].  The [...] research data in [...] has revealed a higher trip rate than the ITE recommended trip rate by 60-90 percent.  Therefore, based on local research, a trip rate of 1.41 and 1.95 per dwelling for the AM and PM peak hours respectively was utilized.  *Table II* details the peak hour traffic projections.  Ia26 (page 2).  [...] do not identify the "similar" developments for verification.
[brief] ”)  On September 1, 2018, New Jersey Court Rule 4:5B-4 was enacted, which required courts to hold Ferreira Conferences in relation to Affidavit of Merit production.  See Rule 4:5B-4.  Further bolstering Plaintiff’s claim that exceptional circumstances exist in this case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Moschella, reasoned that: “[i]f we were to reach the question of extraordinary circumstances, however, the trial court’s failure to hold a Ferreira Conference would weigh heavily in favor of such a finding.
[brief] This Public Access Rule at N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(k) is also important here because it only applies to new development, whereas the rules for existing development—to which the reconstruction of [...]’s bulkhead is most analogous—do not require new on-site access, off-site access, or a monetary contribution under any circumstances.  Nevertheless, the Public Access Rule at N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(k) illustrates the Department’s recognition that feasibility and convenience must be considered when contemplating the reasonableness and meaningfulness of new public access points, as well as what the contours of “reasonable or meaningful” public access are under common law and the Public Access Law (to the extent, if any, that the Law altered the Public Trust Doctrine in New Jersey).  In this case, the Department’s approach toward the provision of reasonable or meaningful public access is woefully inadequate.  There is nothing in the record below suggesting that Department gave any consideration to, at a minimum: (1) whether the relative benefits outweigh the potential risk to the public and to [...] residents from encouraging public pedestrian access through and across a large residential parking lot and driveway; (2) whether the proposed access point is one which would be convenient to anyone other than the residents of [...]; and/or (3) whether the public would even be inclined to use the access point.  If the answer to any of these questions is “no,” then requiring [...] to provide onsite access would be neither meaningful nor reasonable.  [...] maintains that the Department’s proposal for the Property would result in public access that is neither reasonable nor meaningful, and the Department’s failure to introduce any analysis of the three above-identified inquiries into the record renders it impossible to verify the merit of Department’s assertion to the contrary.
[brief] ”  *Id.*  The *Polk* analysis is required to differentiate a subsequent injury to a body part that was previously injured, whether aggravation of the prior injury is alleged or not.  *Bennett v. Lugo*, 368 N.J. Super. 466, 473 (App. Div. 2004).  Similarly, the court in *Sherry v. Buonansonti*, 287 N.J. Super. 518 (1996), in reliance upon *Polk*, found Plaintiff failed to meet their burden in surmounting the verbal threshold due to the absence of a comparative medical analysis.
[brief] On February 20, 2015, Plaintiff [...] (“Plaintiff”) as Landlord and Defendant [...] d/b/a [...] (“[...]”) as Tenant entered into a month to month lease for commercial property located at [...] (“the Lease”).  Pa59.  At the time the Lease was executed [...] had three members: [...] ("[...]"), [...] ("[...]") and [...] ("[...]").  The Lease was signed by [...], [...] and [...] but all in their capacity as members of [...].
[brief] N.J.S.A. 4:19-23 .................................................................4  N.J.S.A. 4:19-23(a)(1) ..........................................................4  N.J.S.A. 4:19-23(a)(2)(a) .....................................................4, 5 N.J.S.A. 4:19-23(a)(2)(b) .....................................................4, 5 N.J.S.A. 4:19-19 .................................................................8  June 3, 2024  New Jersey Appellate Division  Appellate Division Clerk  [...]  Attn.: [...] Re: State v [...]  Docket No.: [...], [...]