ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [12T14-6 to -9].  He identified two wounds in the back of her head, approximately two and one-half inches apart.  [12T16-12 to -22].  He also observed soot and gunpowder deposited on the collar of the shirt she was wearing.  [12T16-12 to -22].  [...] recovered the one .380 heavily-nosed jacketed caliber bullet from her head.  [12T18-19 to -23].  The exit wound of the other bullet appeared just above her hairline.  [12T20-11 to -16].  [...] referred to the shooting as “execution-style” explaining that it was in close range as evidenced by the gunpower stippling around the wounds.  [12T23-7 to -17].  [...] opined that either of the wounds would have been fatal because they were so close to [...]’s brain stem, and that a person seizing, or having a shaking motion, is not an uncommon involuntary movement after sustaining a brain injury such as a gunshot.  [12T24-17 to 25-18].  [...] concluded that [...]’s cause of death was two gunshot wounds to her head and the manner of death was homicide.
[directive] See Section 13.1.  These criteria are adapted from federal practice described in § 5K 1.1 in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual.  In addition, procedural safeguards are established so that, for example, a substantial cooperation agreement must be approved by a designated senior assistant prosecutor, or a specifically-designated deputy or assistant attorney general in cases prosecuted by the Division of Criminal Justice, and must be reduced to writing with sufficient clarity so that a court or the Attorney General Page 15 [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) could review the exercise of prosecutorial discretion for arbitrariness.
[brief] [...] Developed Probable Cause to Search Defendant’s Vehicle Spontaneously and Unforeseeably.  Neither [...] nor [...] could have known that defendant, who they did not know or recognize or have any prior information about, would unexpectedly admit that he possessed CDS in his vehicle, which the police also had no prior knowledge of, after he was confronted with officers’ observations of his suspected criminal activity.  Thus, the probable cause to search defendant’s vehicle arose spontaneously and unforeseeably, justifying the warrantless search.
[brief] At the suppression hearing, the State called one witness: [...], a plain clothes detective with the [...]’s Narcotics Gang Unit (NGU).  (1T 6-19 to 7-9)  Wizbicki, however, was not involved in the stop or frisk of [...].  (1T 22-1 to 22-7)  As the bodycam footage established, by the time Wizbicki arrived, uniform officers had already made contact with the four men, other NGU detectives were already on the scene, and the frisk of [...] was already under way.6  (1T 26-19 to 34-10)  With respect to the events that led to the stop and frisk, Wizbicki testified that he and other NGU detectives were “conducting an operation” around --- 6  While the other officers were dealing with the four men, Wizbicki was involved in searching a blue Hyundai parked nearby.  Wizbicki found a gun on the car’s front tire, which he removed and secured, while another officer found drugs on the back tire.  (1T 15-2 to 16-10; 1T 21-3 to 34-10).  When asked about his search of Hyubdai, Wizbicki testified:  “So, in reference to particularly open air drug markets, within the area of our observations, it is common to stash items and narcotics and such in various locations so it is common for -- very common for us to check the immediate area. ”  (1T 41-11 to 41-17)  [...] was not charged in connection with the gun or drugs found on the Hyundai.
[brief] The County solicited bids (“Solicitation”) for a contract (“Anticipated Contract”) to complete the project known as “ENG Project 21-13FA-Resurfacing and Safety Improvements to Berlin-Cross Keys Road in the Townships of Washington and Monroe” (“Project”).  Da15.  The Solicitation included a “Construction Bidders Checklist” that identified certain “mandatory” documents that, if omitted from a bid, would require the bid to be automatically rejected.  Da21.  The Notice of Classification was not identified on the “Construction Bidders Checklist. ”  Da21.  Instead, the Solicitation provided that “prospective bidders are required to submit a NJDOT Notice of Classification” with their bid documents.  Da111.  Notably, however, section 102.10 of the Specifications provided that “[b]ids submitted without a proper Notice of Classification may be considered non-responsive. ”  Da111 (emphasis added).  The Solicitation further provided that the County “reserves the right to . . . waive any irregularities and to award the contract to the bidder whose proposal is best suited to the County’s requirements. ”  Da019.  On July 30, 2024, bids were opened and [...]’s bid was identified as the lowest bid.  Da004.  The bid submitted by [...] in response to the Solicitation (“[...] Bid Proposal”) included all documents deemed mandatory in the Construction Bidders Checklist, but did not include a copy of its existing and publicly available NJDOT Notice of Classification.  Da004.  By letter dated August 7, 2024, but received on August 16, 2024 (“Rejection Letter”), the County advised [...] that its bid was rejected because it “did not provide NJDOT [Notice of Classification] Letter as required. ”  Da350.  [...] was prequalified with the NJDOT and possessed a Notice of Classification Letter: (i) before submitting the [...] Bid Proposal; (ii) at the time of submitting the [...] Bid Proposal; and (iii) after submitting the [...] Bid Proposal.  Da362.  In addition, NJDOT maintains a website that identifies all contractors who are prequalified by it and, at the time [...] submitted its bid in response to the Solicitation, [...] was identified as a prequalified contractor.  Pa001.  In response to the Rejection Letter, [...] protested the rejection of its bid (“Protest Letter”).  Da356.  By letter dated August 20, 2024, [...] submitted to the County a copy of a letter from NJDOT, dated February 15, 2024, entitled “Notice of Classification”, which provided [...]’s pre-qualification rating (“Supplemental Protest Letter”).  Da360.  Pursuant to the Notice of Classification within the Supplemental Protest Letter, [...]’s classification was effective on February 29, 2024, and will expire on March 31, 2025.  Da362.  By letter dated August 20, 2024, the County wrote to [...] advising that it was rejecting [...]’s protest and would be awarding the Anticipated Contract to [...] (“Protest Response”).  Da366.  During a meeting on August 21, 2024, the County passed a resolution awarding the Anticipated Contract to [...].  Da006.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Cases  Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp. L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014)  ...........................................................................................................  21, 24 Cole v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 215 N.J. 265 (2013)  ..............................................................................................................  10, 11, 14, 15, 16  Curtis v. Cellco Partnership, 413 N.J. Super. 26 (App. Div. 2010)  ..................................................................................  22  Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124 (2001)  .............................................................................................................  22  Griffin v. Burlington Volkswagen, Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 515 (App. Div. 2010)  ................................................................................ 22 Hirsch v. Amper Financial Services, LLC, 215 N.J. 174 (2013)  ............................................................................................................. 8, 24 Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, (3d Cir. 1992)  ............................................................................................... 11, 16  In re Arbitration Between Grover & Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 80 N.J. 221 (1979) ...............................................................................................................  25  Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169 (2003)  ............................................................................................................. 10, 21 Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76 (2002)  ...............................................................................................................  22  Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289 (2016)  .............................................................................................................  23  NAACP of Camden Cnty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt., 421 N.J. Super. 404 (App. Div. 2011)  ................................................................................  21  Namerow v. PediatriCare Associates, LLC, 461 N.J. Super. 133 (2018)  .................................................................................................  25  Plaintiffs.  Kleine v. Emeritus at Emerson, 445 N.J. Super. 545 ............................................................................................................. 9, 17, 18, 19  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Rule 2:10-2 provides:  Any error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result, but the appellate court may, in the interests of justice, notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial or appellate court.  Generally, unless an unobjected to issue, even a constitutional issue, goes to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concerns matters of substantial public interest, the appellate court will not consider it.
[directive] Bail Law, Reform violence is involving domestic offense or crime a with charged defendant a  When court the recognizance, bail personal or on trial before custody from released prohibiting order the an issue release of condition a as may release the authorizing to, limited not but including, victim the with any having contact from defendant ofemployment place residence, victim's the entering from defendant the restraining victim's the or victim the stalking or harassing from and school, or business, or order an enter also may court  The way. any in or relatives co-workers, Friends, owned, animal any with contact any having from defendant the prohibiting the in residing child minor or party either a by held or kept, leased, possessed, the of possession the directing order an enter addition, may court the In household.
[brief] However, neither the advertising and marketing materials nor the defendants clearly indicated that the system is only as good as the downspouts that it ties into.  Defendants maintained a duty to advise or direct plaintiff to this issue during planning and design.  The concept that the system had to manage rainfall may be “obvious” here; what was not so obvious was the impact on functionality of the defendants’ system resulting from customization and integration with its structural members.  Given the level of customization in this process, it was at least a genuine issue of material fact whether both defendants had a duty to speak on these issues as the purveyor and holding themselves out as “experts” in the marketplace.
[brief] The Court Erred When It Released The Insurance Proceeds For The 538 AXA Policy To [...] (R-115)  [...] relies on the facts and history previously provided herein but will repeat some matters necessary for this argument.  [...], the wife of the deceased [...], certified that while she was employed at [...] their insurance agent, [...], sold life insurance policies to the couple.  They agreed to maintain a policy for the benefit of each other.  She also asserted that he had recently confirmed the premiums on her policy were current and she confirmed that her premiums on his policy were current.  After her husband passed, she asserted that she was having difficulty getting policy information from May Funeral Home’s insurance agent, [...].  [...] executed Orders allowing the parties to engage in discovery.  The sworn Answers [...] provided with the assistance of the [...] were knowingly false.  It took over two years of hearings, motions, letters, and pleadings to learn the truth.  The discovery Orders also required the parties to respond to a Notice to Produce and attend depositions.  [...] refused to respond to the Notice to Produce and refused to attend depositions.  The Court held a hearing on April 5, 2021 to address Hazel’s noncompliance and [...] made the startling admission that his client, [...], was refusing to provide the documents to him.
[directive] Notwithstanding any other provision of these Guidelines, if the defendant at any time files a pre-trial motion that necessitates the filing of a brief by the prosecutor or that results in an evidentiary hearing, the standardized offer would automatically expire upon the filing by the prosecutor of the brief or the convening of the evidentiary hearing, and the prosecutor at that point would be required to calculate and tender a final post-indictment  Brimage plea offer in accordance with the general requirements of the graduated plea system established in these Guidelines.  See Section 4.8.
[brief] [...] knew that the [...]’s agents and contractors would be utilizing its plans and relying upon them.  When the project plans show work to be done on the property that is not within the project and is not so highlighted, any reasonable person could tell that a mistake was made.  That is not an esoteric concept.  Contrary to the arguments of [...] in opposition to Plaintiffs’ appeal, the trial court did not dismiss any claims that were asserted against [...] in connection with the first motion for summary judgment other than professional negligence claims.
[brief] The Holding Company Act states, “All laws and parts of laws of this State inconsistent with this chapter are hereby superseded with respect to matters covered by this chapter. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:27A-13.  As noted in the Department’s brief filed on November 6, 2023, the Bulletin is not a de facto rule because it: (1) prescribes a legal standard that is clearly inferable from statutory authorization; (2) reflects an administrative policy that has previously been expressed in an official and explicit agency determination, adjudication or rule; and (3) does not constitute a material and significant change from a clear past agency position on the identical subject matter.
[brief] (Da761)  It must be emphasized that the burden of proof - to prove that the documents conveyed an easement, a permanent perpetual property right - rested upon the [...].  See *Thikol Chem. Corp. v. Morris Cty. Bd. of Taxation*, 41 N.J. 405, 416-417 (1964); *Carton v. Cruz Const. Co.*, 89 N.J. Super. 414-419 (App.Div. 1985); *River Dev. Corp. v. Liberty Corp.*, 45 N.J. Super. 445, 463 (Ch. Div.1957); *Camp Clearwater Inc. v. Pluck*, 52 N.J. Super. 583, 596-597 (Ch. Div. 1958), aff. 59 N.J., (App. Div. 1959), cert. den. 32 N.J. 348 (1960).
[brief] Pb38.  The Master Plan language about the GM Zone cited by Plaintiffs discusses some examples of specific offsite impacts for uses in GM Zone of noise, dust, odors and visual.  Plaintiffs overreach by claiming that these are the exclusive concerns about uses in the SM Zone.  In fact, the language of the Master Plan does not state that these are the only concerns for either Zone, merely that they are of special concern for uses in the GM Zone.
[brief] The General Order then indicates that employees will be subject to discipline pursuant to Section 6.3.4 of the policy for “three (3) or more illnesses within any twelve (12) month period of time”.  (Pa23).  Simply taking medical leave 3 times in a year subjects an employee to automatic punishment.  The first time a Firefighter requests and takes medical leave he is assessed one penalty point.  The third time a Firefighter takes medical leave he is assessed with a disciplinary penalty which can range from a reprimand to termination.  As noted earlier, requesting and taking medical leave is a protected activity under the NJLAD.  [T]aking a disability/medical leave is protected by the NJLAD.
[brief] Plaintiff, previously having his accounts hacked and the money replaced by the Bank, due to no fault of his own with no explanation by the Bank as to what or why it happened, could reasonably believe the arbitration provision only applied to his use of the accounts.  The questions of whether there was an agreement to arbitrate or whether the dispute is within the scope of the arbitration clause took on added importance since buried in the arbitration clause on page 36 of the account agreement, (Pa 126) is a small print clause which reads:
[brief] As a public official’s disrespect, offensiveness, and indignity towards the female portion of the population does not serve the public with the highest fidelity, good faith, or integrity, Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., et al., 8 N.J. 474, Respondent’s argument that the public must endure such conduct until the end of Respondent’s appointment is not only contrary to precedent, but senseless.  See, also, Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151-152 (1983), (the court held there is no necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action.
[brief] Additionally, for the convenience of the Court, pursuant to R. 2:8-1(a), [...] summarizes pleadings and other undisputed papers or records which do not accompany the brief.  annexed to the Trial Court’s November 10, 2020 Order revoking the Township Defendants’ temporary immunity, as well as the August 8, 2023 Order enforcing litigant’s rights in favor of [...].  Pa009-Pa020.  This includes the following pertinent facts, which are not challenged by the Township Defendants vis-a-vis this appeal, and are thus undisputed facts underlying this Appeal:
[brief] On January 24, 2021, defendant filed a PCR petition.  (Da214-18).  On July 21, 2023, [...] held a hearing on the petition.  (21T).  Prior to the court’s ruling, defense counsel, in part, relied on the brief submitted by prior counsel and --- 3  When imposing the six-month sentence for false imprisonment, the trial court mistakenly referred to Count Forty-Eight instead of Count Forty-Nine, however, the error was corrected in the Judgment of Conviction.  (20T69-19 to 23; Da192-96).  stated that she believed “many of those issues which were the sentencing issues have been resolved by the Appellate Court; I agree with the State on that. ” (21T5-21 to 24).  The PCR court denied defendant’s PCR petition on procedural and/or substantive grounds.
[brief] [...] was placed in the care of [...] for a number of medical issues, but most importantly, for treatment and care related to end-stage renal disease.  Due to the fact that Defendants never responded to Plaintiff’s discovery requests, the exact dates that he became a resident at Preferred Care is unknown.  See (61a).  However, from the medical records that were obtained by Plaintiff’s Counsel from Mr. Dantzler’s other treating facilities, namely, [...] and [...], it is clear that while under the care of Defendant, [...], Mr. Dantzler developed a serious infection in his right foot.  Id.  In June of 2022, Mr. Dantzler presented to [...] with an infection in his right foot.  Id.  Due to the progression of this infection, it was required that he undergo a toe amputation.  Id.  Then on August 1, 2022, due to improper care of the amputation site, Mr. Dantzler presented back to the emergency room with dehiscence of the surgical site and further infection, which required a Lisfranc amputation due to osteomyelitis.  Id.  Due to being a long-term resident of [...], this facility was tasked with wound care following both amputations.  Id.  On October 6, 2022, after being seen by a podiatrist, [...] was instructed to take Mr. Dantzler to the Emergency Room due to further infection and pain in his right foot.  Id.  Despite this instruction, [...] did not take Mr. Dantzler to the Emergency Room until October 27, 2022, where it was noted that the surgical site was dehisced, ulcerated and infected.  Id.  Thus, Mr. Dantzler had to undergo another procedure to debride the ulceration on his right foot.  Id.  On March 3, 2023, Mr. Dantzler passed away intestate due to atherosclerotic and hypertensive cardiovascular disease to which diabetes mellitus and end-stage renal disease also contributed, per the State of New Jersey’s Autopsy Report.  (C1a and C8a).  After Mr. Dantzler’s passing, his daughter, [...], applied and was granted Administration Ad Prosequendum of Mr. Dantzler’s estate by the Honorable [...] of Cumberland County’s Surrogate Court on March 21, 2023.  (C2a–C7a).
[brief] In searching the voluminous 280-paragraph Complaint with liberality, Plaintiff alleged that she suffered the following “adverse actions” over the past five years: (a) [...] did not respond to one email Plaintiff sent in October of 2018 (Pa34); (b) [...] did not provide Plaintiff with her students’ PARCC scores in November of 2018 (Pa34); (c) The other third grade teachers (not plaintiff) have been “routinely changed” (Pa35); (d)  Another teacher’s request to teach third grade at [...] was denied (Pa36); (e) [...] did not stop by Plaintiff’s classroom to say hello in March of 2021 (Pa37); (f) Plaintiff was not informed that she could bring the students to the cafeteria for mask breaks rather than outside for their breaks (Pa37); (g) Plaintiff had to attend a meeting, where she was provided with the Union representative, for violation of the mask wearing policy (District Policy 1648) for which a letter was placed in her file in November of 2020 (Pa38-Pa45); and (h) Another teacher filed an Affirmative Action Complaint against Plaintiff in March of 2021 (Pa46-Pa55).
[brief] This remedy is already “on the table. ”  I would like it if a Judge would just review my Revised SAC at Pa259 (call it a Third Amended Complaint, if you wish).  Remember, such a review would only be the second time a New Jersey Judge has reviewed the New Jersey Complaint.  I think a second review is warranted given [...]’s rather harsh review of the Original SAC.  This says nothing of [...]’s review of a moot Federal 5th AC.  Her Honor also made a serious error regarding Official Capacity Suits; she thought the fiction has to be in their Personal Capacity, which makes no sense.  **Point II: There is a Prima Facie Case Against All Defendants in This Case (Not Directly Addressed – Assumed to Exit? - Point I in Law Div. Brief)**
[brief] (4T47:18-24).  In the interim, the company grew and became successful.  [...] acquired and operated new labs in Englewood, Edison, Forked River, and eventually Mountainside.  (4T Tr. 52:10-12).  During this period the division of labor between [...] and [...] also crystallized.  [...] managed lab operations and travelled between locations to oversee the technical aspects of [...]’s operations.  [...] was in charge of sales, marketing, books and records, and [...]’s finances.  He maintained the [...] company check book and had primary access to it.  In nearly thirty years of working together, the company issued tens of thousands of checks and wires.  [...] signed a few dozen, usually with [...]’s approval; [...] signed the rest.  (9T39:8 to 41:23; 7T92:10-20).  The trial court found:
[brief] (See A455, Order, Oct. 10, 2019).  Later, specifically on September 4, 2020, [...] moved for summary judgment against [...], pursuant to R. 4:46-1.  That motion was supported by a statement of material facts and a brief and later by oral argument.  That motion too was denied.  (A485, Memorandum of Decision, Feb. 3, 2020).  But in this context, the trial court was constrained by Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520 (1995).  That New Jersey Supreme Court decision required the court to review the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, namely [...].  Phrased otherwise, if a rational fact finder could resolve a disputed issue in favor of the nonmoving party, then the summary judgment motion must be denied.  Here again, under this standard, the denial of Plaintiff’s motion is understandable.  (See A485).  On August 12, 2021, at the conclusion of [...]’s presentation of her entire case, [...] moved for dismissal under R. 4:40-1.