ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] There are very few areas in the municipality where non-residential, non-agricultural pursuits can be achieved.  1.  Of [...]’s 13,728 acres of land: (a) 7,956.36 acres are preserved and 577.39 are unpreserved (but with TDR Credits assigned to them); (b) 689.55 acres are State-owned land; (c) 583 acres comprise the “Receiving Area”; (d) 140 acres are recreation fields and/or open space outside the Receiving Area; (e) [...] and [...] comprise 385 acres; (f) Turnpike Roads comprise: 102.87 acres.  2.  As a result, seventy-six percent (76%) of [...]’s land mass has been dedicated to the purposes of the 1997 Master Plan, and subsequent Master Plan Re-Examination Reports, and/or is physically not developable.  E.  However, no significant commercial or industrial initiatives have been undertaken since TDR was adopted in 1998.
[brief] Indeed, the court’s dicta in Mipro is informative here: that a similar finding to that in *Kessler* may have been warranted if Mount Laurel was seeking to condemn property with proposed affordable housing units.  *See id.* at 377.  [...] argues that “no case holds that [...] loses its right to eminent domain just because it *may* lack sufficient affordable housing for the Third Round” (Db44) (emphasis added).  However, this misreads the record and the actions taken by the trial court.
[brief] (1T 20-3 to 7; 2T 5-23 to 6-1, 6-7 to 10)  Despite his intention to interrogate [...] about the robbery, [...] began the interrogation by telling [...] that he was “under arrest obviously today for whatever happened earlier. ”  (1T 24-23 to 24)  When [...] asked [...] again about the basis of his arrest, [...] reinforced, “whatever you did today is what you’re under arrest for, but I can’t speak to you, because you’re under arrest for that.  . . . [s]o I have to read you your rights at this point. ”\(^2\) (1T 25-11 to 17)  Further, after reading the Miranda warnings and obtaining [...]’s waiver, [...] continued questioning [...] about the drug arrest, asking “[w]hat happened today?” and if “[t]he cops pulled up?” (1T 28-13 to 22)  It was not until after [...] secured [...]’s self-identification that he shifted the conversation from the drug arrest that day to the armed robbery.
[brief] In her December 1, 2023 Order in this case, [...] pointed out that the issue of when plaintiff’s cause of action accrued was decided by both [...] and [...] and held therefore that “the law of the case doctrine is applicable. ” (Aa271).  More particularly, [...] found that both [...] and [...] held that the accrual date for plaintiff’s cause of action, with the exception of plaintiff’s libel and slander claims, was March 6, 2018, “the date that the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed Plaintiff’s violation of probation charge, and which he should have known or discovered an actionable claim. ” (Aa272).  The law of the case doctrine “is a non-binding rule intended to ‘prevent relitigation of a previously resolved issue’” in the same case.  State v. K.P.S., 221 N.J. 266, 276 (2015) (quoting Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517 (2011)).  It is triggered when one court is faced with a ruling on the merits by a different and co-equal court on an identical issue.  Lombardi, 207 N.J. at 539.  Under the doctrine, decisions of law made in a case should be respected by all other lower or equal courts during the pendency of that case. ”  Id. at 538 (quoting Lanzet v. Greenberg, 126 N.J. 168, 192 (1991).  [...] properly applied the law of the case doctrine in the matter at bar.
[brief] ”  Aa0328.  From January to May 2021, DEP received hundreds of public comments on [...]’s HAD Request – all of them in opposition to the construction, operation, and maintenance of new Compressor Station 327.  Aa0337 to Aa1322.  These public submissions included a joint comment from [...], [...], and [...] questioning whether the proposed activity satisfied the statutory and regulatory language of Exemption #11 (i.e. “[t]his is not a routine maintenance or update, but a massive expansion project that should not receive an exemption from the Highlands Act.
[brief] *See Brock*, 149 N.J. at 391.  **A.  Appellant is Not Entitled To Pre-Suit Discovery. **  Even if the Court were to entertain Appellant’s argument relating to her ability to obtain discovery—which is wholly outside the scope of this appeal—it should be rejected as another unauthorized effort to practice law and pursue the underlying litigation on behalf of an estate *pro se*.  Appellant did not (and does not) have standing to demand these pre-suit documents.  Appellant’s Motion for Documents, which the trial court denied in the March 31, 2023 Order, was in direct violation of this Court’s December 2, 2022 Order and was an unauthorized practice of law.  See PA49-66.  This Court previously held that “Plaintiff must be represented by an attorney throughout the renewed trial court proceedings. ”  PA65 (emphasis added); see also id. (“Plaintiff may renew her motion for discovery after filing and serving her amended complaint for consideration in the first instance by the trial court. ”) (emphasis added).  Appellant’s renewed attempt to argue she is entitled to such discovery is another direct violation of both the law and this Court’s prior ruling.
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL DID NOT MAKE COMMIT FRAUD UPON THE COURT  All throughout this litigation, during trial, and during his initial appeal, in an effort to avoid their own responsibility, defendants attempted to concoct a conspiracy theory centered on [...] making misrepresentations to the court.  Those arguments all repeatedly failed.  Now, having failed in their attack on [...] directly, defendants are attempting to undue the award entered against them by attacking plaintiff’s counsel.  Contrary to defendants’ baseless assertions, attorney [...] did not “openly admit[] to the investigator from Office of Attorney Ethics” the he had committed fraud upon the court.  Tung Br. at 32.  This assertion is nothing but another fiction concocted by defendants in an attempt to skirt their own responsibility.  As no admission was made by plaintiff’s counsel and there is no new evidence of fraud on the court, because no fraud occurred, defendants’ entire argument that the amended final judgment should be set aside pursuant to R. 4:50 fails.
[brief] [N.J.S.A. 59:4-3.]  In other words, to prove actual notice, a plaintiff must demonstrate not only that the public entity had actual knowledge of the existence of the condition, but also that the entity knew or should have known of its dangerous character.  N.J.S.A. 59:4-3(a).  “Whether a public entity is on actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition is measured by the standards set forth in N.J.S.A. 59:4–3(a) and (b), not by whether [for example] ‘a routine inspection program’ by the [public entity] . . . would have discovered the condition. ”  Polzo v. Cty. of Essex, 209 N.J. 51, 68 (2012) (“Polzo II”); see also Cherry v. City of Newark, Docket No. [...], 2017 WL 2152749 (N.J. App. Div. May 17, 2017) (where plaintiff’s reliance on photographs taken after the accident and an alleged history of work permits and complaints pertaining only to the surrounding area established neither actual nor constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition).  In Cherry, the Appellate Division found the plaintiff had presented no competent evidence, much less expert proof, as to the length of time the alleged condition existed.  2017 WL 2152749 at *3.  As to actual notice, there is no dispute Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate the Township had actual knowledge of any alleged condition at the subject property.
[directive] It is generally assumed that the complex/protracted litigation downward ad- justment would be made at the time that the pre-indictment plea offer is tendered, although prosecutors are authorized to make this adjustment in calculating an initial post-indictment or even final post-indictment offer provided that the complex or protracted litigation issues have not already been decided and the unusual or extraordinary expenditure of prosecutorial and/or judicial resources has not al- ready been incurred.  Notwithstanding the regular graduated plea or “escalation” provisions of the “Brimage” Guidelines, where the complex or protracted litigation issues first arise or are otherwise made known to the prosecutor only after a pre-indictment or ini- tial post-indictment offer has already been tendered and rejected or otherwise ex- pired (e.g., where a defendant raises a new claim or issue requiring extensive and complex pretrial litigation after an indictment has been returned), the prosecutor is authorized in the exercise of reasoned discretion to tender a new downward pre-indictment adjustment plea based upon a offer calculated in accordance with the “Brimage” Guidelines, notwithstanding that the defendant has already been indicted or has already rejected a final post-indictment offer.  Given such a material change of circumstances (i.e., the newly-discovered prospect of complex or pro- tracted litigation), the prosecutor is hereby authorized to disregard any previous offers and recalculate a downward adjusted offer as if it were the first plea offer tendered to the defendant.  This feature is consistent with the goal of affording prosecutors greater flex- ibility to conserve prosecutorial and judicial resources by avoiding the necessity to engage in further protracted or complex litigation.  This option is reserved for cases where the prosecutor was unaware of the prospect of complex or protracted litiga- tion at the time that the initial plea offer was tendered.  Where the prosecutor elects in the exercise of discretion to “set the clock back” by issuing a downward adjusted pre-indictment offer after the defendant has been indicted, the prosecutor must fully describe the circumstances justifying the invocation of this feature in the required notification to the [...] described in § F(2).  Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a prosecutor to invoke this feature and to tender the functional equivalent of a new pre-indictment offer, and the prosecutor shall have the discretion to apply a com- plex/protracted litigation downward adjustment to an initial post-indictment or final post-indictment offer calculated in accordance with the “Brimage” Guidelines.  (Recall also that the prosecutor in any event retains the discretion to fix the extent -8- of the new downward adjustment at any point within the range established in the table in § C (i.e., e.g., a reduction of between one (1) to twelve (12) months of parole ineligibility in a case involving a third-degree crime committed by a Criminal His- tory Category I, II, or III defendant).)  E.
[brief] II.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE BARRED [...]’S BAD FAITH AND CIVIL CONSPIRACY CLAIMS.  The trial court properly dismissed the Second Action with prejudice based on the Appellate Division’s determination that the bad faith claim alleged in the Proposed Amended Complaint in the First Action should have been raised earlier in the First Action and that, in any event, the bad faith claim lacked merit.  (4T20:9–14.)  The trial court followed the unassailable reasoning of the Appellate Division in holding that the bad faith claim could not be resurrected in the Second Action.  (4T20:9–25.)  This is the precise scenario in which the entire controversy doctrine applies.
[brief] The Court further noted that even if Appellant were still pursuing the matter under his capacity as an attorney registered to practice law within the State of New Jersey, the Court’s conclusion would still yield the same result.  The Court explained its reasoning by reliance upon Segal v. Lynch, which also covered alleged frivolous litigation.  The Court considered Appellant’s request for sanctions, but subsequently did not find that Respondent or Respondent’s Counsel engaged in activity that would constitute defrauding of any Court or warrant imposition of sanctions.  In conclusion, the Court denied Appellant’s demand for the entirety of the $60,000.00 held on deposit by the Superior Court and directed Appellant to file an appropriate motion seeking the turnover of funds previously awarded.
[brief] The exact meaning of the phrase “the routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of public utility lines, rights of way, or systems, by a public utility”\(^{13}\) – specifically, whether the word “routine” not only modifies “maintenance and operations” but also “upgrade” – is a question of law that is foundational to the application of Exemption #11 by [...].  Regarding statutory interpretation, Courts are guided by “the bedrock assumption that the Legislature did not use any unnecessary or meaningless language. ”\(^{14}\)
[brief] The Procedural History and Statement of Facts are addressed in tandem as they are intertwined.  were unsuccessful.  Letter from [...] to the court dated July 24, 2023 (Da199-200).  As a result of the Board’s discussions with Plaintiffs, on June 6, 2023, the Board repealed the Original Policy and passed Revised Policy 8463 which provides for parental notification “by the appropriate administrator and/or staff member” “whenever a student discloses an issue and/or exhibits behaviors that may have an adverse impact on the student’s physical and/or mental health, safety and or social/emotional well-being. ”  (Da110).  The policy provides that it “does not create a duty, implicit or otherwise, for any staff member or administrator to investigate, substantiate or validate the issue and/or behaviors giving rise to a duty to inform….  ”  It further provides that “notification cannot be based solely on a student’s actual and/or perceived protected characteristics under” the LAD.  The policy imposes a duty of confidentiality and candor regarding parental notifications.  The policy dispenses with parental notification whenever there is a reasonable belief that notification would place a student at risk of abuse or neglect as defined under N.J.S.A. 9:6-1.
[brief] “The bottom line is that our client is not going to renegotiate the MOU.  Any attempt to add an indemnification obligation or cover your clients’ personal guarantees is a non-starter. ” (Da121).  Subsequently, Plaintiff sought to have the trial court require the execution of an Assignment of Interest in the Property with no additional terms.  At the hearing on this application, Plaintiff again represented that [...] had “assumed” the debt on the Property:  [...]:  [...] is now obligated to pay off the debt and he is doing everything humanly possible with relentless seriousness to make that happen.  2T21-4.  Yet, as counsel for the holder of the mortgage on the Property pointed out, neither Plaintiff nor [...] had actually taken on the obligation to do anything:  [...]:  They have not agreed.  [...] certainly has not agreed to assume this debt.  All they’ve agreed to do is purchase the entity.  They – there is no requirement that they pay this mortgage off, and I have argued this over and over, Your Honor, there is no requirement.  They could easily mess around with this, the application for two years and then decide it is not working, and then walk away.  2T41-16.  Nonetheless, on November 27, 2023, the Court entered an Order that directed the execution of an Assignment of Interest in Appellee [...] in the form propounded by Plaintiff (the “Assignment”) and awarded Plaintiff counsel fees under the MOU.  (Da9 - 11).  This Order also stated, among other things: “Plaintiff has no obligation to indemnify any guarantors of any debt against the Property or against any of the Defendants. ”  (Da10).  In compliance with the November 27 Order, the Assignment was provided to Plaintiff’s counsel on December 6, 2023.  (Da124).  On January 14, 2024, the trial court denied the [...]’ application for a limited stay.  (Da12-13).  A motion for a limited stay was filed before the Appellate Division on February 21, 2024, and is currently pending.
[brief] In [...]’s Conditional Veto Message on the bill that later became AICRA, the governor noted: “One of the causes of the higher premiums that plague the current system is the employment of superfluous medical testing and treatment. ”  Governor’s Conditional Veto Message to S. 3, L.1998, c.21, § II(C) (ed. note to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1).
[brief] Indeed, Defendants maintained their position that the cited to regulations were not “closely related” to Plaintiff’s complained of conduct, thereby no “substantial nexus” was apparent.  At oral argument on December 20, 2023, the Motion Judge heard both parties’ respective positions.  Defendants argued:  Plaintiff must demonstrate a reasonable belief that Defendants were violating a law, rule, regulation, or public policy, and the Court must identify a legal authority that closely relates to the complaint of conduct…I don’t think a person, a…reasonable person looking at either of [Plaintiff’s cited to] provisions would come away thinking that what Plaintiff complained about was in violation of these code provisions.  (T5:15-8:2).  Rejecting this position, Plaintiff reminded the Motion Judge of the importance of reviewing Plaintiff’s Complaint under the very liberal standard set forth on a motion to dismiss.  Indeed, Plaintiff noted: [The motion to dismiss] standard…limits the Court to examining the facts in the complaint, accepting that as true and giving Plaintiff every favorable inference and an…opportunity to amend prior to dismissing any count of the complaint under Printing Mart-Morriston…this is a very liberal and generous standard, and if there are any doubts, they must be resolved against the moving party.
[directive] 6.2 of Person Seekin~~y Medical Assistance.  De-Activation at the Request a or restricts  Notwithstanding section 5.4, the agency adopts a policy that prohibits and unless B when a person, section, an officer may de-activate a WC de-activation as may be authorized by this herself or another and other than an is seeking emergency medical services for him or arrestee, whether BWC, the officer shall requests that the BWC be de-activated.
[brief] 2  “Pa” refers to appellant’s appendix; “Pb” refers to his brief.  3  A Service Retirement is provided for by N.J.S.A. 53:5A-8 for any member who has established twenty years of service in SPRS and also for troopers who were members of the retirement system as of the effective date of L. 1985, c. 175 regardless of their years of service.  A Special Retirement provides enhanced benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 53:5A-27 and is available to any SPRS member who has established twenty-five years of creditable service.  On August 7, 2019, the [...] added information about the Ricci Act to its website.  (Pa10).
[brief] I.  The Trial Court Improperly Placed Its Thumbs Upon the Scales of Justice.  (Pa79,Pa80,Pa82,1T,2T,3T)  II.  Defendants Obfuscated the Facts and the Law.  (Pa79,Pa80,Pa82,1T,2T,3T)  III.  Defendant [...] Had a Disqualifying Flex Parking Removal Conflict of Interest and Appearance of Impropriety.  (Pa80,Pa82,2T,3T)  IV.  The Trial Court Committed a Series of Patently “Manifestly Unjust” Reversible Errors and Omissions Supporting Reconsideration, Vacation, Amendment and Alteration of the September 22, 2023 Pre-Discovery Dispositive Summary Judgment  Dismissal in Favor of All Defendants.  (Pa79,Pa80,Pa82,1T,2T,3T)
[brief] Statement of Reasons, dated July 17, 2023 .................................................................Pa15  #  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS | Transcript Description | Page | |-------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Transcript of Oral Argument, dated November 5, 2020 | 1T | | Motion Transcript, dated July 14, 2023 | 2T | | Transcript of Oral Argument, dated September 29, 2023 | 3T | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36  ### Black's Law Dictionary, 10th Ed. 2014 - 42  ### IA Corbin on Contracts § 261, at 470 (2d ed. 1963) - 36  ### Murray on Contracts § 42 (4th ed. 2001) - 41  ### Restatement of the Law (Second) Contracts sec.43 (1981) - 40  ### Restatement Restitution, sec.8(2) - 42  ---
[brief] (3T27-13; 3T33-17 to 20).  At trial, she testified that the shooter was dressed in all grey sweat clothes with the hood up.  She also said that the shooter had on Nike Air Force sneakers but could not remember the color.  (3T21-12 to 22; 3T21-23 to 22-4; 3T28-21 to 24).  In her initial statement, she said the sneakers were white.  (3T27-13 to 28-10).
[brief] Instead, Defendants objected to the request as “harassing, broad and vague,” and claimed that the lease agreements were transferred to Plaintiffs and were not retained, although they again reserved their right to amend their response.  Da87.  Defendants’ response to Request No. 21 similarly did not comply with [...]’s instructions to certify that the OPRA documents were the only documents relating to inspections performed at the Property.  1T43:24-44:25.  Instead, Defendants simply referred to those OPRA documents (again documents that Plaintiffs had actually previously produced to Defendants) and again claimed they had the right to amend their response.
[brief] Yet, the court accepted as true [...]’s self-serving hearsay statement that all defendants’ interests are aligned, without any corroborating certification from his co-defendants.  Nor was the certification of [...]’s defense counsel, [...], Esq., illuminating. Pa325-326.  [...] merely stated that “[a]ll defendants were advised of the potential conflict of interest of joint representation, were provided full informed consent, and signed off on same,” without ever explaining what information was communicated to his clients, precluding the trial court from evaluating whether the consent was actually “informed. ”
[brief] Defendant [...]’s Conduct Culminated in an Incident in June 2020.  On June 24, 2020, reacting to a discussion regarding a staffing coordinator’s failure to process certain forms, Defendant [...] emerged from her office visibly upset.  (Pa656 – Pa657).  Defendant [...] exited her office and yelled at Plaintiff.  (Pa656).  Defendant [...] directed profanity at him, telling him to “shut the fuck up,” and continued to berate him telling him he was the laughingstock of the hospital.  (Pa656).  Defendant [...] then mocked Plaintiff’s previous complaints about her harassment, stating: “you know what [...], every time you run to [...], you know what they do, they laugh at you.  They [fucking] laugh at you.  I’m sick of it.  I’m sick of it. ”  (Pa656).  Defendant [...]'s behavior was intended to be physically intimidating, as she stood close to Plaintiff, with her elbows on his desk and her face inches from his face.  (Pa657).  [...] witnessed the incident and was so uncomfortable she moved to the door.  (Pa656).  [...] then left the room because she was afraid that she might urinate out of fear.  (Pa657).  [...] was shocked by the intensity of the altercation.  (Pa658).  [...] also witnessed the incident and feared that Defendant [...] was going to physically strike Plaintiff.  (Pa657).  Plaintiff (who served in the military) testified that the encounter was worse than anything encountered in “boot camp. ” (Pa657).  Following this incident, Plaintiff found it necessary to step away from the office to manage his stress.  (Pa658).  D.