ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE DECISION OF THE [...] WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below).  A decision is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and therefore subject to reversal, where, as here, the agency erred in reaching its conclusion upon examination of the application of the law to the facts.  The arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable standard is generally understood to involve inquiry into whether the decision conforms with relevant law, whether there is substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency's decision, and whether in applying the relevant law to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching its conclusion.  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007) (relying on Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).  Ordinarily for quasi-judicial or rule-making final agency action, there is a substantial body of material comprising the record.
[brief] Second, even if the PSA as a whole had not been terminated, once [...] returned the Deposit at Plaintiff’s request, [...] had no further contractual duties because [...]’s obligations under the PSA were limited to those in Sections IV, X and XVII of the PSA which related to its role as an escrow agent.  (Pa128); see Ex parte McNaughton, 728 So. 2d 592, 595 (Ala. 1998) (“When one party proposes a standard contract to another party, the parties may, of course, agree to be bound by certain of the clauses in the proposed contract and not to be bound by others”).  Once the escrow funds were returned, [...] no longer had any duty per the PSA.  See 28 Am Jur 2d Escrow § 22 (“the escrow agent’s duty is limited by the terms of the escrow agreement’’).  **Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith.
[brief] As the principles cited above dictate, if [...] wanted to expand the requirements for disclosure of attorney discipline issues, it could have done so.  For instance, it could define Legal Services to include bookkeeping and other non-client related matters.  Defendants affirmatively determined not to do so.  The correct result here flows from Defendants’ definitions, not any attempt by Plaintiffs to underreport matters for which no reporting was required by Defendants.  Mazzilli, supra, 35 N.J. at 7.  III.
[brief] The [...] Plaintiffs' December 3, 2018 Complaint Omitted see 16a Exhibit B Omitted see 578a Exhibit C Order consolidating [...] v. [...], [...] with [...], et als. v. Atlantic City, et als., Docket No. [...] filed on September 21, 2020  Omitted see 578a Exhibit D September 22, 2023 correspondence from [...], Esq. to [...], Esq. and [...], Esq………………..667a Exhibit E September 26, 2023 correspondence from [...], Esq. to [...], Esq………………………………………..669a Exhibit F Unpublished decision Atl. City Superior Officers' Ass'n v. City of Atl. City, No. A-3117-20, 2022 WL 2352376 (App. Div. June 30, 2022)……………670a Exhibit G Plaintiffs' redline edited proposed Amended Complaint…………………………678a Exhibit H A clean copy of Plaintiffs' proposed Amended Complaint…………………706a
[brief] o Exhibit I, Defendant, [...]’s School of Pharmacy website pages where Plaintiff witnesses at least seven (7) iterations of [...] School of Pharmacy’s home website page from dates prior to Plaintiff starting the Pharm D program in August of 2012.  o Exhibit J, Significant changes to [...] School of Pharmacy’s website page on September 22, 2012 o Exhibit K, Email dated July 21, 2013 from [...] who advised Plaintiff he would be able to matriculate to the MBA Program later when his GPA was where it needed to be so he may still finish the dual degree program by 2016.
[brief] Before the passage of the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act, N.J.S.A. 17:33A-1, et. seq. ("IFPA"), investigating, pursuing, and recovering fraudulently obtained payments by an auto insurer was a costly prospect.  If a carrier believed an insured or a health care provider committed fraud, it had little recourse other than to pursue common law fraud claims, requiring an extraordinary investment of time, money, and effort to make itself whole.  Even if the insurer was successful, more often than not it was a pyrrhic victory – the fraudulent party had to return what they stole (if they still had the money) and the insurer was out thousands of dollars in fees and expenses, which could reasonably exceed the amount recovered.  The passage of the IFPA changed that calculus.
[brief] (PSR6; Pa8).  On November 1, 1993, defendant pleaded guilty to the armed robbery charge.  (Pa8).  On December 17, 1993, he was sentenced to a ten-year term of imprisonment, after which he was tried and sentenced in this case.  (Pa8).  It is unclear from the record when exactly defendant began serving his Ocean County sentence.  (Pa9).  Given his current parole eligibility date of April 10, 2037 and the forty-year period of parole eligibility, it seems that defendant began serving his Ocean County sentence in April 1997 and has served twenty-seven years thus far.  (Pa9).  illegal sentence.  (Da18).  Appointed counsel filed a supplemental brief substantially identical to defendant's pro se brief on September 15, 2022.  (Da 18).  On October 28, 2022, the Honorable [...], P.J.Cr., heard argument on defendant's motion.  (3T).  On November 2, 2022, [...] issued an eleven-page written decision denying defendant's motion.  (Da17 to 28).  On November 30, 2022, defendant timely filed his notice of appeal.  (Da29 to 32).  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] 38  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS  VOLUME I OF II  PLEADINGS  [R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(A)]  Second Amended Class Action Complaint, filed September 1, 2022..  Pa1 Exhibit A .........................................................................................Pa21 Exhibit B ..........................................................................................Pa26  JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM [R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(C)]  Order being Appealed, filed January 18, 2024 ..................................Pa28  Statement of Reasons ........................................................................Pa30  NOTICE OF APPEAL [R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(F)]  Notice of Appeal filed February 20, 2024 ...........................................Pa61  TRANSCRIPT DELIVERY CERTIFICATION  [R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(G)] Certification of Transcript Completion and Delivery, filed March 11, 2024 ..............................................................................................................Pa65  UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS CITED BELOW [R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(H)]  Unpublished decisions cited below by Plaintiff: Ali v. Credit Corp. Sols., Inc., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59126, 2022 WL 986166 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2022) ........Pa66  Opinion, Mhrez v. First National Collection Bureau, Inc., Dkt. No. HUD-L-2314-22 (Jun. 9, 2023) .........................Pa71 Morales v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 859 Fed. Appx. 625 (3rd Cir. Jul. 6, 2021) .............................Pa81 United States ex rel. Johnson v. AmeriHealth Ins. Co., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37479, 2022 WL 621032 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2022).................................................................Pa85
[brief] Farthing, surpa.  The State cross examined [...] extensively regarding hearsay statements in social worker [...]’s report.  (12T:78-19 to 83-11);(12T:84-5 to 85-25).  The Prosecutor asked these questions for the truth of the matter asserted as was cautioned against in Spencer, 319 N.J. Super. at 299.  The Prosecutor also questioned [...] about hearsay statements in nurse practitioner, [...]’s report.  (12T:83 12 to 84-4).  In Vandeweaghe, the court cautioned against the overreliance of hearsay statements in the cross examination of an expert.  351 N.J. Super. at 481-483.  Here, The State inappropriately interjected hearsay into the case through cross examination of the defense expert.
[brief] Rule 4:42-2(a) provides that, “If an order would be subject to process to enforce a judgment pursuant to R. 4:59 if it were final and if the trial court certifies that there is no just reason for delay of such enforcement, the trial court may direct the entry of final judgment upon fewer than all the claims as to all parties, but only in the following circumstances: (1) upon a complete adjudication of a separate claim; or (2) upon complete adjudication of all the rights and liabilities asserted in the litigation as to any party; or (3) where a partial summary judgment or other order for payment of part of a claim is awarded. ”  The court in *Janicky v Point Bay Fuel, Inc.*, 396 N.J. Super. 545, 550 (App. Div. 2007) stated, “An order may be certified as final under Rule 4:42-2 only if it satisfies two preconditions: first, it must fall within one of the three numbered subparts of the rule, and second, it must be “subject to process to enforce a judgment pursuant to R. 4:59 if it were final[.]”
[brief] A.  The Public Policy in Favor Of Arbitration Has Hard Limits  The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) preempts state laws that may prohibit arbitration agreements; however, the FAA likewise permits states to regulate arbitration agreements under standard contract law principles.  See Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 85 (2002).  In reviewing arbitration agreements, “basic contract formation and interpretation principles still govern, for there must be a validly formed agreement. ”  Kernahan, 236 N.J. at 307 (citing Volt Info Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1909); Garfinkle v. Morristown Obstetrics, 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001)).  Indeed, as the United States Supreme Court held in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), state law principles governing contract formation apply to arbitration agreements.  See Kernahan, 236 N.J. at 307; see also Fawzy v. Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456 469 (2009) (stating that arbitration is a “creature of contract”).  Under New Jersey contract law, a person must “knowingly and voluntarily” waive their statutory rights.  Martindale, 173 N.J. at 96 (emphasis added).  Under basic New Jersey law, a legally enforceable contract necessitates “a meeting of the minds. ”  Morton v. 4 Orchard Land Trust, 180 N.J. 118, 120 (2004).  As to arbitration and the waiver of the right to pursue a case in a judicial forum, “courts take particular care in assuring the knowing assent of both parties to arbitrate, and a clear mutual understanding of the ramifications of that assent. ”  Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., 219 N.J. 430, 442 (2014).  New Jersey courts have repeatedly stated that “[t]he point is to assure that the parties know that in electing arbitration as the exclusive remedy, they are waiving their time-honored right to sue. ”
[brief] According to [...], [...] Assaulted Him.  The parties presented conflicting accounts of the incident at trial.  [...] contends [...] intentionally assaulted him following a verbal exchange.  Specifically, [...] testified that he and his client, [...] went to the Marlboro Lowe’s to purchase supplies for a home remodeling project.  [7T 55:10-56:12].  At some point, he observed [...] and Oganov discussing grout.  [7T 58:6-59:19].  According to [...], he needed grout that could be used on joints that were less than one eighth of an inch, so he believed he needed unsanded grout.  [7T 59:12-61:5].  [...] asked [...], who was holding a push-broom, whether a particular bag of grout could be used for his project.  [7T 59:20-61:20].  In his police statement and answers to interrogatories, the relevant portions of which were read to the jury, [...] stated that [...] told him “the grout was good I should use it. ”  [7T 122:4-123:11, 129:9-130:5].  [...] disagreed with the advice [...] gave him and told [...] to learn more information before helping customers.  [7T 61:21-62:7].  [...] allegedly responded by getting angry and stating “I have a PhD in history, I don’t have to learn this. ”  [7T 62:7-12].  [...] then walked away from [...], down the aisle towards the back of the store, pushing the broom.  [7T 62:24-63:10, 165:17:166:6].  1  [...]’s trial testimony did not mention whether [...] told him the grout was appropriate to use.  [See 7T 61:6-62:20].  [...] became upset over this interaction and, while carrying a ten-pound bag of grout, followed [...] into the neighboring aisle, repeatedly requesting his name so that he could report it to a manager.  [7T 62:18-65:9, 66:18-67:9, 161:23-24, 164:18-166:25].  [...] alleges that he followed [...] approximately ten-to-fifteen feet down the adjacent aisle, maintaining a distance of approximately four feet, and continuing to demand his name.
[brief] Pleadings and Trial | 4 | | II.  Post-Trial Submissions | 5 | | III.  The Post Trial Order | 7 | | IV.  Tenant’s Deposit of the Rent Arrears with the Court, Landlord’s Fee Application and Request for Disbursement of the Rent Arrears | 10 | | V.  Tenant’s Motion for Reconsideration | 11 | | VI.  The Reconsideration Order | 13 | | VII.  Payment of Legal Fee Award and Disbursement of the Rent Arrears | 17 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 17 | |
[brief] [...] and [...] both ask the Court to accept the Association’s argument that it can simply identify every single union member as a “representative” of its negotiations team, which it refers to as its “Bargaining Council,” to “come-and-go” to whichever negotiations meetings that they decide to attend.  See, e.g., Db24 (the Association supporting [...]’s holding that the Act “does not prevent the [Association] from including its Bargaining Council, open to its full membership, to participate in bargaining sessions as part of the [Association’s] negotiations team [emphasis added]”).  [...]’s acceptance of such argument respectfully must be reversed because it frustrates the intent of the statute’s requirement that parties “designate representatives” for negotiations.
[brief] (PA002).  Prior to moving to New Jersey, appellant/plaintiff [...] was a resident of North Carolina.  (PA055-056, T67:L25-T69:L14).  For at least eight (8) months prior to April 13, 2022, appellant/plaintiff [...] permanently resided in New Jersey.  (PA043, T18:L23-30; PA046, T31:L13-24).  Appellant/plaintiff [...] obtained a lease agreement for an apartment in New Jersey in August 2021.  (PA090).  Appellant/plaintiff [...] applied for, and obtained, a [...] policy on January 30, 2022, which became effective February 4, 2022.  (PA073-077; PA079-080).  At the time appellant/plaintiff [...] applied for the [...] policy on January 30, 2022, he was a resident of New Jersey.  (PA073-077; PA046, T28:L14-26; PA048, T37:L5-9).  At the time appellant/plaintiff [...] applied for the [...] policy on January 30, 2022, his apartment lease in Charlotte, North Carolina had expired.  (PA056-057, T72:L19-T76:L24).  Despite his New Jersey residence when he applied for, and obtained the [...] policy, appellant/plaintiff [...]’s [...] policy was written as a North Carolina policy.  (PA073-077; PA079-080; PA085, 4:30-4:40).  Appellant/plaintiff [...]’s [...] policy was written using an insured address in Charlotte, North Carolina.  (PA073-077; PA079-080).  Appellant/plaintiff [...]’s [...] policy insured two vehicles: a 1999 Toyota Corolla and a 2002 Kia Sportage.  (PA079-080).  The 1999 Toyota and the 2002 Kia insured under appellant/plaintiff [...]’s [...] policy were identified as having a “garaging zip code” of [...] (a zip code from North Carolina).  (PA073-077; PA079-080).  The [...] policy provided “Medical Payments” coverage in the amount of $1,000.  (PA079-080).  Prior to April 13, 2022, appellant/plaintiff [...] obtained a New Jersey driver’s license.  (PA070-071; PA051, T51:L13-23).  Appellant/plaintiff [...]’s driver’s license reflects the address/residency in [...].  (PA070-071; PA051, T50:L8-19).  Prior to April 13, 2022, appellant/plaintiff [...] principally garaged his 2002 Kia Sportage in [...].  (PA048, T38:L25-T39:L10; PA048, T40:L7-10; PA070-071).  Plaintiff [...] never updated his insurance policy to reflect “garaging zip codes” in New Jersey.  (PA048, T38:L11-24; PA049, T43:L11-22).  Plaintiff [...] never informed his insurance carrier that plaintiff was a resident of New Jersey.  (PA048, T37:L5-22; PA048, T39:L11-20).  Prior to and on April 13, 2022, plaintiff [...] was insured by the [...] insurance policy (Policy Number: [...]) which was written in North Carolina.  (PA070-071; PA073-077; PA079-080).  Prior to and on April 13, 2022, plaintiff [...]’s address/residency was in [...] 07050.  (PA070-071; PA041, T10:L2-6; PA051, T49:L11-15).  On April 13, 2022, appellant/plaintiff [...] was operating a 2002 Kia Sportage, which vehicle was involved in an accident with respondent/defendant [...].  (PA070-071).  [...] denied appellant/plaintiff [...]’s claims related to the April 13, 2022, accident due to “material misrepresentation. ” (PA082-083).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] See Case, 220 N.J. at 65.  When the sentencing court “fails to identify relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, or merely enumerates them, or forgoes a qualitative analysis, or provides little insight into the sentencing decision, then the deferential standard [of review] will not apply” on appeal.  Ibid. (internal quotations omitted).  In State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 333 (2012), our Supreme Court “held that, upon remand for resentencing a trial court must engage in a de novo review of the aggravating and mitigating factors applicable to the defendant at the time of his resentencing. ”  State v. Jaffe, 220 N.J. 114, 122 (2014); see id. at 124-25 (holding resentencing court must consider defendant’s post-offense efforts at rehabilitation).  A resentencing court must assess the defendant as he stands before the court on that day, and provide him with “the same full review and explanation of the finding and weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors” to which he is entitled at any sentencing hearing.
[brief] Appellant [...] filed a pro se supplemental brief.  Appellant [...] filed pro se supplemental briefs.  Before Judges [...], [...] and [...].  Opinion PER CURIAM.  *1  In these back-to-back appeals, consolidated for purposes of this opinion, defendants [...] and [...] seek to overturn their convictions and sentences for kidnapping, robbing, and murdering [...]; kidnapping and robbing [...]; and kidnapping and robbing [...].
[brief] ................................................................. 40, 41 Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 440 (2001)  ......................... 41  Singer v. State, 95 N.J. 487, 472 A.2d 138, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832, 105 S.Ct. 121, 83 L.Ed.2d 64 (1984)  .................................................................  42  Sun Source, Inc. v. Kuczkir, 260 N.J. Super. 256, 615 A.2d 1280, (App. Div. 1992) ..................................................................................  22 Surkis v. Strelecki, 114 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 1971) ...............................  21,22 Velazquez ex rel. Velazquez v. Jiminez, 336 N.J. Super. 10, 763 A.2d 753, (App. Div. 2000), aff’d, 172 N.J. 240, 798 A.2d 51 (2002) .............................  22 Walker v. Giuffre, 209 N.J. 124 (2012) ..........................................................  38  Statutes and Rules N.J.S.A. 42:2C-39 ......................................................................................
[brief] ”  *N. Haledon Fire Co. No. 1 v. Borough of N. Haledon*, 425 N.J. Super. 615, 631 (App. Div. 2012) (citing *Brock v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.*, 149 N.J. 378, 391, (1997)); *State v. Walker*, 385 N.J. Super. 388, 410 (App. Div. 2006) (“Generally, issues not raised below, even constitutional issues, will not ordinarily be considered on appeal unless they are jurisdictional in nature or substantially implicate public interest.
[brief] *1  On June 23, 2021, the parties in this purported class action filed a Joint Stipulation (alternatively “JS” (ECF No. 150)) in support of their positions regarding plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel (“Motion” or “Mot.” (ECF No. 149)) defendants [...] and [...] (collectively “defendants” or “[...]”), to produce a Rule 30(b)(6) witness on topics related to defendants’ document retention, collection, and review policies and practices, and to produce all non-privileged, newly-discovered documents that hit on any agreed-upon search term; and for the Court to review “in camera privilege log exemplars identified by Plaintiffs and order [defendants] to identify subject lines of logged emails.
[brief] The Appellate Division held that “[a]pplying our highly deferential standard of review, we are satisfied that the record sufficiently supports the Commissions' decision that members were provided with adequate notice and instructions for submitting a request for claims reconsideration prior to the December 31, 2014 deadline. ”  *Id.* at 8-9.  Pra7.  The Supreme Court reversed, holding:  2.  Whenever an administrative agency acts, be that act mandatory or strictly voluntary, it must do so reasonably and in a manner calculated to achieve the policies expressed in the agency's organic statute.  Therefore, because the Commissions determined to reimburse affected members, they were necessarily required to do so reasonably and in a non-arbitrary manner.  Here, that means that the Commissions were required to provide reasonable notice in order that the retroactive benefit would fairly be made known and, thus, made available in a non-arbitrary manner to affected members.
[brief] **The Record Contains Substantial Evidence Which Supports the Finding by [...] That [...]’s Dock Complied With N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.7 (Navigational Channels) and N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5 (Recreational Docks and Piers). **  [...] also properly concluded that [...]’s dock substantially complied with N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.7 (Navigational Channels) and N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5 (Recreational Docks and Piers).
[brief] As of the summer of 2018, [...] was affirmatively representing to [...] that [...] had every intention of continuing the decade-old relationship with [...].  Indeed, at the end of July 2018, [...] expressly wrote to [...] that “I’m not trying to find new distributors, I’m trying to expand our sales with the two I’ve committed to over the years. ” (Pa176).  In reliance on such comments, [...] continued to place orders with [...] for product, such as the product at issue in Plaintiff [...]’s original underlying action against [...].  (See Pa16).  Nevertheless, despite acting as a dutiful Summerset brand distributor for nearly a decade, [...] was subsequently shocked when it was advised toward the end of 2018 that [...] had decided to terminate its distributor rights.  (See Pa177).  Thereafter, by letter dated March 1, 2019, [...] expressly agreed to take back the product placed in this last order.  (See Pa168-Pa169) (“As discussed, we are willing to take back, at a minimum, the order shipped to you in December. ”)  Notably, in this letter, [...] of [...] expressly refers to “the [[...]] distributor arrangement,” tracking the exact language required by the NJFPA.  (Pa168).  Thereafter, despite [...]’s multiple attempts to ship back this order, [...] blocked [...]’s attempts to do so.  In subsequent years, [...] paid hundreds of thousands of dollars to store this [...] product, while attempting to have [...] make good on its written promise to take back the product.  (Pa164-Pa166).  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.