ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In addition to the above, the fact that the trial court’s Orders will require Plaintiff to seek discovery from [...] directly through the processes prescribed by the Hague Convention does not create an independent reason why Plaintiff should be permitted to issue a deposition notice for [...]’s deposition to the German Defendants.  There is no dispute that [...] is not a party to this action.  Nonetheless, Plaintiff claims that he should be entitled to issue a deposition notice to the German Defendants to compel [...]’s deposition because otherwise Plaintiff would be required to comply with the manner of taking depositions and discovery in Germany—where [...] is located.  (See Pb18).  Plaintiff may be dissatisfied that the process for conducting international discovery is not as straightforward as conducting a deposition in the United States, but that does not create a reason to compel [...]’s deposition by deposition notice in lieu of subpoena on a party with no control over him.  Plaintiff has not been precluded from conducting any discovery as to [...]; he simply cannot pursue it in the manner he desires.  This does not equate to an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
[brief] (Dca 1, clip four, 33:53 to 37:15).  On the way to [...]’s apartment, [...] told [...] that her mother was originally from New Jersey, but now lived in Wilmington.  (Dca 1, clip four, 36:35 to 36:48).  [...] then told police, in [...]’s presence, that she once had New Jersey identification, but had moved to Wilmington.  (Dca 1, clip four, 36:48 to 37:15).  On the elevator to [...]’s apartment, the women told police [...] had a bedroom in [...]’s apartment.
[brief] State v. Colon, 298 N.J. Super. 569, 577 (App. Div. 1997), quoting State v. Bess, 53 N.J. 10, 16 (1968) (emphasis added).  “The reasonableness of the defendant's belief is determined by the jury, using an objective standard of what a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have done at the time the force was used.
[brief] 23A N.J. Prac. Landlord and Tenant Law § 39.6(5th ed.) citing Dector vs. Phelps, 136 N.J.L. 53 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Sypherd vs. Myers, 80 N.J.L. 321, 324 (E. & A. 1910); Fleming vs. Matter Construction Co., 11 N.J. Misc. 129, 132 (Cir. Ct. 1933).
[brief] A.  Yes.  ***  Q.  So wouldn’t you agree with me then, to that extent, this statute imposes a restriction on how much debt-adjustment work a licensed attorney in this state can do?  A. Yes.  Pa0047 at 37:25-38:6; 39:20-25; and 43:5-14 (emphasis added).  G.  The Legislature Has Not Defined, And Defendants Have Also Not Defined Or Otherwise Offered Any Guidance, As To The Meaning Of “Principally Engaged” Or “Attorney-At-Law Of This State” As Used In The Act’s Limited Attorney Exemption.
[brief] (179a)  The Thirteenth Count through the Fifteenth Count of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint allege Fraudulent Concealment, and Aiding and Abetting and Conspiracy to commit same, arise solely from Defendants’ fraudulent concealment of the newly discovered evidence in the 2015 Action that [...] was Sole Member of [...] and controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity, and the new claims arising therefrom.  None of these facts nor claims were alleged in the complaint that was dismissed against [...] in the 2015 Action, as said facts were discovered in the course of the 2015 Action following said dismissal.  The Trial Court’s sole bases for dismissing said Counts are Res Judicata and the Entire Controversy Doctrine.
[brief] ”  Williams, 171 N.J. at 164-65, 170; see also Id. at 164 (“Courts have had no difficulty recognizing that a prospective juror may be excused for financial hardship”).  “When … brought into focus at an early stage of a criminal proceeding, the balancing of interests allows greater flexibility favoring the prospective juror with the asserted hardship. ”  Ibid.  [...] neither abused his discretion, nor discriminated against a protected class when he liberally excused jurors who reported they were unavailable for the numerous scheduled trial dates.
[brief] Order of Judgment with Rider, filed January 29, 2024  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPT  DESIGNATIONS  1T – Transcript of Hearing dated January 19, 2024  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS – APPENDIX (Volume 1 of 3 – Ja1 to Ja180) | Document | Page | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Order of Judgment with Rider, filed January 29, 2024 | 1a | | Complaint, filed April 13, 2022 | 17a | | Answer to Complaint of [...], filed June 3, 2022 | 32a | | Consent Judgment, filed July 7, 2023 | 40a | | Order granting leave to file Amended Complaint, filed July 26, 2023 | 43a | | First Amended Complaint, filed July 27, 2023 | 44a | | Notice of Motion to Dismiss of [...], | 62a | | filed September 5, 2023 | | | Certification of [...], filed September 5, 2023 | 64a | | Exhibit A to Certification, Complaint, filed September 5, 2023 (omitted | -- | | here – see 17a) | | | Exhibit B to Certification, Answer of [...], | -- | | filed September 5, 2023 (omitted here – see 32a) | | | Exhibit C to Certification, Consent Judgment, | -- | | filed September 5, 2023 (omitted here – see 40a) | | | Exhibit D to Certification, Order, filed September 5, 2023 | -- | | (omitted here – see 43a) | | | Exhibit E to Certification, First Amended Complaint, | -- | | filed September 5, 2023 (omitted here – see 44a) | | | Exhibit F to Certification, Workers’ Compensation and Employer’s | 66a | | Liability Policy, filed September 5, 2023 | | | Notice of Motion to Dismiss of [...] and Chubb | 84a | | Insurance Co. of N.J., filed September 11, 2023 | | Certification of [...], filed September 11, 2023
[brief] [RPC 1.7(a). ]  RPC 1.7(a) expressly prohibits two types of concurrent representations: (1) direct adversarial representations, and (2) representations that pose a significant risk of material limitation in the lawyer’s responsibilities to a client.  The prohibition contained within RPC 1.7(a) against certain concurrent representations "arises out of the fundamental proposition that an attorney owes a duty of undivided loyalty to his or her client."
[brief] For all the reasons set forth in Point I, the denial of the motion to suppress must be reversed and the matter remanded for [...] to determine whether to withdraw his plea.  In the alternative, the sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant BY: ___/s/ [...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID: 063222014  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] On August 22, 2022, Counsel for [...] instructed that although the events of May 23, 2022 were not recorded, each [...] member should rely on what transpired.  However, Counsel for [...] could not himself remember whether Appellants called any witnesses.  In fact, two Appellants, including Appellant [...], who testified at the May 23, 2022 meeting were not present on August 22, 2022.  The direct testimony of Appellants’ four witnesses was remarkably different as they all anticipated the questions that had been asked on cross-examination on May 23, 2022.  As such the cross-examinations of Counsel for Applicants were likewise “unscripted” and having nothing to do with what transpired on May 23, 2022.  The meeting adjourned after cross-examination as [...] was not present, and the application was carried to September 12, 2022.
[brief] In the matter of Foss v. Cignarella, 196 N.J. Super 3718 (Law Division, 1984) the court was asked a similar question as to whether mere presence in a vehicle was sufficient to require PIP coverage.  In that case, the Foss vehicle rolled forward and bumped the Cignarella vehicle.  Cignarella then got out of his vehicle and approached Foss’ vehicle which was at that time stopped with the door closed and the window opened.  Cignarella proceeded to stab Foss.  Foss sought PIP benefits from [...] for the injuries he sustained from the stabbing.  The court in Foss v. Cignarella found that the claims were not recoverable PIP benefits since the act was not causally connected with the automobile and since it did not originate or arise out of the use of the vehicle.
[directive] Note:  If the VIN number is missing, the Court will not consider the application for a Warrant of Impoundment.  In order to complete the field “Registered to,” the law enforcement officer must æ obtain a printout from the N.J. Motor Vehicle Commission (NJ MVC), formerly the Division of Motor Vehicles, database, containing the information pertaining to the registration and registered owner of the vehicle identified on the Complaint- Summons (Traffic Ticket).  Using the MVC printout, insert the name of the registered owner of the vehicle identified on the Complaint-Summons (Traffic Ticket), then insert, after the word “at,” the address at which that vehicle is registered.  SUB JECT: Guidelines: Implementation
[brief] [...] calculated that in the Spring of 2023, it would have been entitled to an early termination penalty in the amount of approximately $328,740.14 that would have to be borne by [...] (or shared by it with [...]) if the MFSA with [...] was terminated.  As of May 2, 2023, [...] was still insistent upon imposing contingencies upon the sale, specifically as to the amount of termination fees that had to be approved by [...]:  I annex Addendum 1 which has been initialed by the Buyer as requested by [...].  I am requesting that [...] advise that its right of first refusal is being waived so that this matter can close.  I am also requesting updated termination amounts from [...].  The agreement by Buyer to purchase the property continues to be subject to calculation of the amount of termination fees due and owing to [...], and review and acquiescence by Buyer.  Da145.  As reflected by [...]’s own words that it had yet to “acquiesce[]” to the PSA pending the re-calculations of the termination fee, the terms and conditions of the prospective sale were still in flux.
[brief] Case, 220 N.J. at 64.  (“Mitigating factors that are called to the court’s attention should not be ignored, and when amply based in the record…. they must be found[.]” (internal citation omitted).  Instead of crediting this information as mitigating evidence of rehabilitation, the court found that [...]’s positive “progressions over time” demonstrated only that he had “adapt[ed] [his] approach” to “get what [he] want[ed]” and not that [...] had actually “changed that much[.]”  (5T79-22 to 80-8)  The court justified this ruling by pointing out that [...]’s conduct occurred in prison:  “[[...]’s good conduct was] in a much more controlled environment, so it doesn’t tell me a lot that [he has not] gotten into that much trouble. ” (5T78-25 to 79-2)  Rather than defend that reasoning, the State now argues that [...]’s PCR petitions demonstrated a lack of remorse such that the court’s finding was proper.  [...]’s PCR petitions, however, do no such thing.  Accordingly, the court’s “refus[al] to equate defendant’s good conduct with a reformed character,” was not based upon “competent, reasonably credible evidence” in the record, requiring resentencing.
[brief] Here, the Hackensack Subcontract expressly states (1) the parties agreed to arbitrate their Hackensack Project-related disputes, and (2) such arbitration would be conducted “in accordance with its Construction Industry Arbitration Rules in effect on the date of this Agreement” [Pa603], which rules require issues relating to arbitrability to be decided by the arbitrator.  Rule 9(a) of the Construction Industry Rules in effect at the time of the execution of the contract (June 1, 2019) provides that “[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement. ”  Da124.  The parties therefore have expressly agreed to allow the arbitrator in the Hackensack Arbitration decide the arbitrarily of the dispute.
[brief] POINT II  WHEN THE EVIDENCE WAS VIEWED CUMULATIVELY, [...] REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT IT WAS MORE LIKELY THAN NOT THAT PEARSON WAS NEVER INVOLVED IN AN INCIDENT OR ACCIDENT IN 2009 THAT REQUIRED MEDICAL TREATMENT OR RESULTED IN INJURIES OF ANY KIND. (Pa41-Pa42).  All witnesses agreed that [...] had prior workers’ compensation cases in 2000 and 2004.  There were “reports of first injury” from both.  There were workers’ compensation cases opened from both.  There were medical records, including diagnostic testing, from both.  However, when it came to 2009, the only document in evidence that referenced an accident or an incident occurring in that year was Exhibit R1 (Pa161-Pa165), which was [...]’s one narrative.
[brief] The Failure to Produce to [...] the Sworn Statement Prior to His Trial Constitutes Giglio and Jencks Violations --- 4  Discovery constitutes Brady material if it is impeaching or exculpatory, but also if it has the potential to lead to other discoverable information.  By withholding the Sworn Statement, [...] was prevented from seeking additional records that existed and were confirmed by [...].  [...]’s petition for post-conviction relief was predicated on the State’s failure to disclose evidence material to the defense.  Although Brady is the seminal authority in support of that mandate, Brady encompasses various forms of impeachment material, such as Giglio and Jencks.
[directive] Implementation of NJRP-LE training program.  The Director of the Division of Criminal Justice, in consultation with the Chief Resiliency Officer, shall ensure the implementation of a statewide training program, specifically NJRP-LE, in the following manner:  1.  Within 60 days of the issuance of this Directive, each County Prosecutor shall appoint one or more County RPO Trainers, and each State law enforcement agency shall appoint one or more State RPO Trainers.  2.  Within 90 days of the issuance of this Directive, the Director, or their designee, shall create a two-day “train-the-trainer” program to implement the NJRP-LE.  All County RPO Trainers and State RPO Trainers shall complete this program no later than December 31, 2020.  3.  Upon completing the train-the-trainer program, County RPO Trainers shall be responsible for training the RPOs of the local law enforcement agencies within that county.  This responsibility does not preclude a County RPO Trainer from assisting another county in training that county’s RPOs if needed.  4.  Once RPOs of local law enforcement agencies receive training from County RPO Trainers, those RPOs are then responsible for training all law enforcement officers within their own agencies.  4  5.  All law enforcement officers in New Jersey shall be trained in the NJRP- LE no later than December 31, 2022.  F.
[brief] See excerpt of the Court’s decision at [...] initial appeal brief at p. 19.  A second Appellate Division case cited in the [...] initial brief is Lawyers Guild Realty, Inc. v. ICSD, L.L.C., No. A-4908-07T2, 2009 WL 3429755, at *4-6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 6, 2009) (Pa150).
[brief] That action seeking to vacate seven inter-company arbitration awards pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23 was filed by Plaintiff [...], [...], and [...] (herein after “[...]”) against [...] (herein after “[...]”) and was assigned docket number [...].  (Da28 – Da37).  On November 18, 2022 the Honorable [...], J.S.C. entered the Order to Show Cause setting forth a return date.  (Da38 – Da41).  On November 29, 2022, [...] filed an Answer a with counterclaim seeking to enforce the inter-company arbitration awards.  (Da42 – Da61).  On December 23, 2022, [...] filed an answer to [...]’s counterclaim in docket number [...].  (Da62 – Da68).  On December 20, 2022, counsel for [...] filed a motion to issue a commission for the service of a subpoena in Florida and an Order issuing the commission was entered by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on January 13, 2023.
[brief] In this case, the Plaintiffs have complied with the requirements of the Affidavit of Merit Statute such that it was inappropriate for the Trial Court to find that they were statutorily insufficient and deny the Plaintiffs' motion.  The Affidavits of Merit of [...] and [...] were supplied to the Defendant within 60 days following the date of the filing of their Answer to the Complaint.  They identify each of the parties that the Plaintiffs claim are at issue, and indicate that there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited by those parties fell outside acceptable professional treatment standards.  No objection was raised by the Defendant as to the timing of service of the Affidavits or the language contained within them.  Furthermore, there is no objection by the Defendant as to the qualifications of the affiants to author the Affidavits of Merit pursuant to the Affidavit of Merit Statute or the Patients First Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41.  Fundamentally, the Affidavits of Merit of [...] and [...] place the Defendant on notice of the medical providers that the Plaintiffs claim they are vicariously liable for in this matter.  Therefore, they clearly comply with the requirements of the Affidavit of Merit statute and at a minimum, the Plaintiffs have substantially complied with the purpose of the Statute to avoid the defeat of a valid claim.
[brief] POINT I THE DECISION OF THE ACTING CHAIRPERSON OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WAS ARBITRARY CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE.  [...] contends that [...] had until April 13, 2020 to submit medical documentation to extend his leave of absence beyond April 13, 2020, and therefore [...] abandoned his job and resigned not in good standing.  N.J.A.C. 4A: 2-6.2(b) states:  “Any employee who is absent from duty for five or more consecutive business days without the approval of his or her supervisor shall be considered to have abandoned his or her position and shall be recorded as a resignation not in good standing.  Approval of the absence shall not be unreasonably denied. ”  [...] contends he had the approval of [...], Commissioner of [...] to decide to report to work until April 16, 2020 by her letter dated April 14, 2020 (EXHIBIT 6).  [...] contends that the Commissioner of [...] is clearly a supervisor under N.J.A.C. 4A:2-6.2(b).  The Acting Chairperson of Civil Service found that the five consecutive business days ended on April 14, 2020, (EXHIBIT 5, P. 31a of Appendix).  This date is the date of the letter by Commissioner Gutierrez-Scaccetti, which gave [...] until April 16, 2020 (EXHIBIT 6, P. 34a).  By ignoring the letter of the Commissioner of [...] the Acting Chairperson of the Civil Service Commission abused her authority.  [...] acknowledges the Appellate Court review of an agency’s decision is limited and a presumption of reasonableness attaches.  *In re Stallworth* 208N.J.182, 194(2011)  However, the Court can reverse an Agency’s decision when there is clear error by the agency.  *In re Carter* 191 N.J.474, 482-83 (2007).  The clear error alleged by [...] is that the agency ignored the letter dated April 14, 2020 from Commissioner [...].  [...] asks this Appellate Court to reverse the Decision of the Commission dated July 19, 2023 (*EXHIBIT 5*, P. 30a to 33a of Appendix), and to uphold the Decision of [...] dated May 22, 2023 (*EXHIBIT 4*, P. 10a to 29a of Appendix).
[directive] To enable law enforcement officers across New Jersey to better protect themselves and to more effectively use their limited supplies of personal protective equipment (PPE) in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, the [...] ([...]) has authorized New Jersey Local Public Health Officers to share the names and addresses of individuals who have tested enforcement.1 positive for COVID-19 (the “COVID-19 Information”) with law  At the same time, however, [...] has requested that certain steps be followed to secure the information being shared and the privacy of the individuals affected.  This updated directive incorporates [...]’s requests and establishes the procedure for obtaining COVID-19 Information form health officials, the process for sharing such information with law enforcement and others, and the limitations on its use.  To streamline the process by which COVID-19 Information is shared across the state and to address various local interoperability and other information-sharing concerns raised by some agencies, this updated directive establishes the [...] ([...]) as the primary conduit for the sharing of COVID-19 Information.  [...]’s April 11, 2020 memorandum regarding COVID-19  Information sharing is attached 1 as Ex. A and a Frequently Asked Questions (dated April 11, 2020) from [...] is attached as Ex. B.  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2  While COVID-19 Information offers a critical tool for our law enforcement officers, who are stepping up across New Jersey to protect the public’s safety in the face of unprecedented challenges, anyone receiving or accessing such information pursuant to this directive must adhere to the limitations set forth herein or face serious consequences.  Any unauthorized disclosure of this information or any misuse or mishandling of this information may jeopardize the ongoing ability for law enforcement to obtain COVID-19 Information.  Therefore, pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, I, [...], hereby DIRECT all law enforcement agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey to implement and comply with the following policies, procedures, standards, and practices:
[brief] 7T, pp. 61-62.  Thus, [...] explained the conveyance was accomplished through the inclusion of language within the deed after the legal description which indicated that the conveyance also included “such riparian rights and other rights, privileges and franchises in and to the lands lying under the waters of Raritan Bay in front of and adjoining the above-described premises as are vested in” [...].  See 7T at pp. 61-62; see also, Pa0917-Pa0921.  [...] subdivided the uplands portions of the tract of land that it acquired from [...] into separate lots as shown on the map entitled “Map of Keansburg Heights” filed on June 25, 1909 as Map Case #36-19.  See Pa0922.  [...] subsequently conveyed the following tract of these subdivided lots to [...], who at the time was an employee of [...] and was its registered agent, through a deed dated April 6, 1920:
[brief] In neither their Counterclaim nor before the trial court did Appellants ever make any such assertion.  (Da9-Da28; Da87-Da106).  The cases cited by Appellants do not cast any doubt on the trial court’s decision here.  The court in *Diversified Equities, LLC v. Russell*, 31 N.Y.S.3d 920 (N.Y. App. Term. 2016), only addressed whether a monthly late charge of 13% constituted an unenforceable penalty, and not whether a rent concession recovery provision amounted to an unenforceable penalty.  The unpublished, non-precedential ruling in *Freeman v. United Dominion Realty Tr., Inc.*, 2008 WL 1838373, at *8-9* (Cal. App. Apr. 25, 2008), did not conclude that concession recovery provisions are unenforceable penalties, but only ruled that fact issues precluded dismissal at the pleading stage. \(^5\)  The only case Appellants cite to that actually dealt with the enforceability of a concession recovery provision is *Raffel v. Medallion Kitchens*, 139 F.3d 1142 (7th Cir. 1998).  *Raffel*, however, stands alone and is clearly an outlier decision.  As demonstrated above, the majority of states analyzing similar concession recovery provisions have ruled contrary to *Raffel* and found such provisions to be valid and enforceable.  See, e.g., *Lesatz*, 416 N.W.2d at 337; see also *Manning*, 442 S.E.2d at 785; *S. Star*, 872 S.E.2d at 909; *Frank*, 4 S.W.3d at 606.  In sum, the trial court applied the correct law to the undisputed facts in finding that the Concession Recovery Provision, to the extent it could even be construed as a liquidated damages clause, was not an unlawful or unenforceable penalty.