ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Also, [...] testified that defendant was known to him from other cases where defendant had been in possession of a firearm, and knew that defendant was the current suspect in a shooting homicide.  Therefore, based on the information known to him at the time, which included the fact that defendant was believed to be the shooter in a homicide, he was seen entering a residence also connected with the homicide, and knew that defendant was known to carry a firearm, [...] had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was engaging, or about to engage in, criminal activity.
[directive] Pursuant to the Court’s April 30, 2002 order, the electronic process carries the same authority as a manually prepared writ with the judge=s signature.  Use of the automated writ is currently only available to the Criminal and Family Divisions.  Manually prepared writs for inmates will no longer be accepted from those Divisions using the automated writ.  The automated writ will be sent electronically through the computer network to Central Transportation at the Department of Corrections.  Each week judiciary supervisory personnel in Divisions utilizing the automated writ will review an on-line list of writs requested to ensure accuracy and proper authorization.  Electronic writs must be received by the Department of Corrections no later than 48 business hours prior to the scheduled transportation date for the court event.  In extraordinary situations, emergent writs for inmates may be arranged by the court with the Department of Corrections Central Transportation Unit.  Emergent writs require verbal confirmation from Central Transportation.  Without confirmation, writs may not be received in sufficient time for processing.  Cancellation of writs will be accepted on-line as long as the cancellation occurs at least three business days prior to the scheduled appearance date.  If a cancellation is made less than three days prior to the appearance date, both a confirming phone call to the Department of Corrections and cancellation via the on-line screen are required.  When an inmate is produced for a court event as a result of an automated writ, the judge must sign the copy presented at the court hearing.  This signature at the bottom of the writ authorizes the remand or release of the defendant following the hearing.  In addition, the results of the hearing must be noted on the writ or attached to the copy of the writ returned with the inmate to the Department of Corrections.  Any questions regarding this Directive or the procedure set forth herein should be directed to the AOC=s Criminal Practice Division at [...].
[brief] First, unlike in *Smart*, officers were not provided any information about defendant or his vehicle in the months, days, or even hours prior to the April 24, 2019, incident.  (1T14-5 to 8).  [...] confirmed he was in the ShopRite parking lot to see what he could find and was not looking for anyone in particular that day and that neither he nor [...] knew defendant.  (1T14-2 to 4; 1T17-13 to 18; 1T28-20 to 23; 1T29-24 to 25; 1T79-7 to 8).  Second, it was only about thirty minutes from the time Taranto noticed defendant in the parking lot to the time [...] approached him and the majority of that time was spent waiting for defendant to exit the store, not following him around.  (1T7-4 to 13; 1T52-14; 1T82-13 to 16).  This is far less time than the months’ worth of investigative leads, in addition to the 100 minutes from when the surveillance began in Smart.  Third, and most importantly, the officers here had no control over the development of the probable cause.  Unlike in Smart, where officers were the driving force behind the obtaining of the probable cause by culminating their months’ worth of information by calling the canine out to the scene and directing it to conduct a sniff, here, Detective [...] did not control how the probable cause developed in the pending investigation, nor could he have foreseen that it would arise as it did.  Defendant blurted out that there was cocaine in the backseat after he was asked if there was anything illegal in the car.  (1T89-8 to 12).  This is entirely different from the carefully orchestrated steps the officers took over the course of two months in identifying a vehicle to surveil in Smart before the probable cause was culminated in the dog sniff.  Here, as [...] correctly found, the probable cause developed unforeseeably and spontaneously.
[brief] On July 3, 2023, the Plaintiff filed this lawsuit.  Pa1.  The Defendants are in New York and the Plaintiff lives in Ocean County New Jersey.  Pa1.  The Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in Atlantic County.  Pa1.  Having the case in Atlantic County made it a further drive to the courthouse for the Defendants.  On November 13, 2023 a bench trial was held in Atlantic County small claims court.  The Plaintiff testified.T3:4:7, 8:15-18; 12:13-25; 13:15-16; 15:3, 15:12-16, 17:7-21: 16; 22:1-5.  A representative of the Defendant testified.  There was extensive discussion about the tournament, the prizes, the Defendants’ website, and the rules that the [...] (“[...]”) applied to this and all other rated chess tournaments.  The parties presented multiple documents to the court that related to the issues in the case.  T3:1-24:4  The trial court let the Plaintiff argue at length about his position in the case.  Id.  The Plaintiff was allowed to keep arguing even after the Judge ruled.  Id.  On November 13, 2017, following the bench trial, the court found in favor of the Defendants and dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice.  T: 24-3 and Pa7
[brief] (Da169-170; 24T177-14 to 17, 186-15 to 19)  The police transported Defendant from the [...] to the police station in a police vehicle.  (21T24-9 to 10, 38-16 to 23)  Defendant could not remove any items from Room 517 and the police informed Defendant he could not return to the room.  (Da177-178; 21T35-16 to 36-13, 39-3 to 12; 29T42-23 to 43-3)
[directive] More than 1 indicator of substance abuse is needed to score 1 for this Item.  Count any 2 of these specific indicators pertaining to the Defendant.  ✔The Defendant consumed alcohol or used drugs immediately before or during the Index Assault.  ✔The Defendant abused drugs and/or alcohol in the days or weeks before the Index Assault (e.g., alcohol intoxication, frequent alcohol use, use of street drugs, misuse of medication).  ✔The Defendant noticeably increased his/her abuse of drugs and/or alcohol in the days or weeks before the Index Assault (without a return to normal consumption prior to the Index Assault).  ✔The Defendant had been more angry or violent when using drugs and/or alcohol before the Index Assault.  ✔The Defendant consumed alcohol before or during an offense (including driving while intoxicated) pre-dating the Index Assault.  ✔From age 18 to the time of the Index Assault, the Defendant’s alcohol use resulted in problems or interference in his/her life; this can include alcohol use related to violations of the law resulting in a charge or revocation of conditional release, withdrawal symptoms, inability to decrease use, or problems attributable to alcohol use (such as financial, job, relationship, legal, or health problems).  ✔From age 18 to the time of the Index Assault, the Defendant’s illicit or street drug use or misuse of prescription drugs resulted in some problems or interference in his/her life; this can include drug use related to violations of the law resulting in a charge or revocation of conditional release, withdrawal symptoms, inability to decrease use, or problems attributable to drug use (such as financial, job, relationship, legal, or health problems).  ✘Do not include medications taken as prescribed.
[brief] On the contrary, the Board Attorney specifically stated, So the first part of this meeting is going to be, the attorneys are [sic.] trying to do their best, their job to kind of recreate the testimony that was and that evidence that was [sic.] submitted at the May meeting.  Then we’re going to go to cross-examination like we did last time.  And [...] will try to do the best possible be can do of [sic.] recreate his cross and his testimony.  Once we get that done we’re going to then proceed, continue as new stuff.  I don’t perceive that we’re going to finish tonight.
[brief] The MOU has a section on collective bargaining agreements and imposes a two percent cap on increases for the life of the contract which includes benefits in the two percent cap.  (Aa103, September 21, 2023 Tr., 41:15-16, 42 3-12)  Salary increases and the replacement and/or hiring of new personnel are scrutinized as salaries represent seventy five percent (75%) of the [...]’s $300 million budget.  (Aa116)  Of the remaining twenty-five percent (25%), fifteen (15%) of it is not discretionary spending.  (Aa116)  The Contract in this matter expired at the end of 2019.
[brief] Defendant’s March 5, 2024 Motion for Reconsideration of the June 8, 2023 Order and Opinion from the Appellate Division was also Untimely Pursuant to R. 4:50-2.  Notwithstanding Defendant’s inability to satisfy the standard for reconsideration, his motion to vacate the Final Judgment was likewise time-barred pursuant to R. 4:50-2, which requires that the motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (a), (b) and (c) of R. 4:50-1 not more than one year after the judgment.  Further, a motion to vacate a final judgment filed pursuant to subsections (d), (e) and (f) must be brought within a “reasonable time”.
[brief] Notably, the State relies on State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391 (2004) and State v. Hill, 110 N.J. Super. 370 (App. Div. 1970), which actually support [...]’s position.  In Harris, PCR counsel moved to recuse the judge because when Harris had been indicted for an unrelated offense 25 years earlier, the PCR judge had been Acting County Prosecutor.  Id. at 510.  The PCR judge had no recollection being involved in the indictment, and it appeared that his “signature” on the indictment and dismissal motion, was someone else signing for him.  Id. at 510-11.  While the Supreme Court upheld the PCR judge’s decision not to recuse himself based on the unrelated, 25-year-old indictment in which he had no personal involvement, it made clear that it was affirming both because of the lack of personal involvement and because nothing about the indictment being signed in his name that provided a “reasonable basis for defendant, counsel, or the public to question the PCR Court’s impartiality. ”  Id. at 511.  So too with Hill.  There, on direct appeal the defendant argued that the trial judge should have sua sponte disqualified himself merely because he had been assistant prosecutor for four months, more than a year before the trial began, and he had not had any involvement or knowledge of Hill’s case during his stint as a prosecutor.  110 N.J. Super.at 374.  Unsurprisingly, under those circumstance this Court held that there was no indicate of either personal involvement or the appearance of impropriety.  Id. at 375.  The Code of Judicial Conduct and caselaw are clear – judges must avoid both actual conflicts and the appearance of impropriety.  [...]’s varied misconduct occurred when [...] was an [...] supervisor.  [...]’s policies, procedures, trainings, audits, and noncompliance by staff during her employment as section chief were necessarily front and center.  As detailed in [...]’s opening brief, the PCR court had the power to determine whether to allow [...] to seek evidence or rehearing regarding various issues raised in the PCR petition and new-trial motions, as well as making the ultimate decision on granting or denying relief.  [...] utterly abused her discretion in refusing to recuse herself.  She should have done so based on her own first-hand, contemporaneous, supervisory-level knowledge of [...]’s policies, procedures, and practices, along with [...]’s conflicting representations with respect to those policies.  There was also an obvious appearance of impropriety.  Thus, for these reasons and those in the opening brief, a remand is required.
[brief] [...] asserts that, at the time, he did not understand that he “was signing any type of document, application or contract on the ipad. ”  (PA135.)  However, the trial court correctly found that [...] never asked what he was signing, and [...] presented no evidence that [...] misrepresented any fact to him.  (PA007-008.)  Instead, [...] relied on his own subjective and mistaken belief that, by signing his name, he merely acknowledged opening an account and provided a handwriting sample.  (See PA008, PA135-136.)  [...]’s failure to read or otherwise ask about what he was signing, or the effect of his signature, does not excuse him from the “consequences of his inattention. ”  (PA008.)  Whether an agreement to arbitrate exists depends on ordinary contractual principles.
[brief] As previously noted, all charges alleging that Appellant was impaired while on duty were withdrawn by Respondent at the trial’s commencement.  There is no evidence that Appellant either took his medication while on duty, was impaired while at work or tested positive for any drug test.  T4 104:17-19; T1 161:18-23; T4 149:12-150:5.  Further, the source of the Decision’s conclusion that Appellant had an “opioid addiction” and/or used “high doses of opioids” or was “abusing prescription opioids”, while unattributed, was, presumably, [...].  As the ALJ explicitly rejected [...] as an expert in the field of substance abuse, there is no proper evidential basis for these conclusions.  It is apparent that Appellant’s termination was substantially based upon the erroneous, insufficiently supported and uncharged determinations that he abused his opioid medication as described supra.
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[brief] The lower court’s refusal to charge the jury with Model Civil Jury Charge 5.20B(2)(b) was reversible error (7T 90:9-91:14).  It is axiomatic that clear and correct jury charges are essential to a fair trial, and the failure to provide them may constitute plain error.  *State v. Robinson*, 165 N.J. 32, 40 1153 (2000).  “A charge is a road map to guide the jury, and without an appropriate charge a jury can take a wrong turn in its deliberations….  [T]he court must explain the controlling legal principles and the questions the jury is to decide. ”  *State v. Martin*, 119 N.J. 2, 15 (1990).  Therefore, erroneous instructions are poor candidates for rehabilitation as harmless, and are ordinarily presumed to be reversible error. ”  *State v. Afanador*, 151 N.J. 41, 54(1997); *Das v. Thani*, 171 N.J. 518, 527, (2002).  To determine whether alleged defects in a jury charge rise to the level of such reversible error, we must consider those claims within the context of the charge as a whole, not in isolation.  *State v. R.B.*, 183 N.J. 308, 325 (2005).  The question of the legal adequacy of a jury instruction is an issue of law reviewed de novo.  *Fowler ex rel. Edenfield v. Akzo Nobel Chems., Inc.*, 251 N.J. 300, 323 (2022).  A jury instruction that has no basis in the evidence is insupportable, as it tends to mislead the jury.  *Prioleau v. Ky. Fried Chicken, Inc.*, 223 N.J. 245, 257 (2015).  In addition, a jury instruction must be tailored to the “theories and facts” that were presented in the case.  *Velazquez v. Portadin*, 163 N.J. 677, 689.  An instruction that is not so tailored can lead the jury to make improper decisions by applying inapplicable or incorrect law to the wrong set of facts and constitutes reversible error.  *Id.* at 688-89.  To be tailored to the theories and facts of the case, the jury charge must be based on the evidence presented at trial.  *See, Komlodi v. Picciano*, 217 N.J. 387, 420 (2014).  Moreover, Model Jury Charges must be adjusted, as necessary, to conform to the particular facts of a given case.  *Torres v. Pabon*, 225 N.J. 167, 188 (2016).  Here, Appellants submit that the trial court erred by charging the jury *Model Civil Jury Charge* 5.20F(5) regarding the duty owed to invitees as it relates to the condition of premises.
[brief] [...]’s reliance on Ensslin v.  [...], 311 N.J. Super. 333 (App. Div. 1998), is misplaced.  (Pb10).  In Ensslin, a police officer had been terminated from service and the subsequent action he brought against his employer under the Law Against Discrimination was ultimately dismissed.  Ensslin, 311 N.J. Super. at 334.  After the LAD litigation, Ensslin applied for Ordinary Disability Retirement Benefits but the [...], determined he was ineligible as he was not a member in service at the time.  Ibid.  The [...] found that under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3), PFRS membership ceases “if more than 2 years have elapsed from the date of [the member’s] last contributions,” and under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6(1) an application must be made “by a member in service” or on his behalf.  Id. at 335.  This court reversed the Board, holding “that the two-year standard of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3) is not jurisdictional, especially in the circumstances presented” in the particular matter.  *Id.* at 337-38.  In his LAD action, Ensslin’s position was that he was not disabled from his employment with a reasonable accommodation.  *Id.* at 335.  To be considered for Ordinary Disability, Ensslin was required to certify he is disabled.  *Id.* at 336.  Thus, Ensslin was legally barred by the operation of “the doctrine of judicial estoppel” from filing his application for Ordinary Disability while his LAD action was pending.
[brief] (21T 58-25 to 60-21).  Therefore, just as in Erazo, the trial court properly determined that the record reflects that Defendant was treated as a potential witness or person of information rather than a suspect at the time of the interview.  See Erazo, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2023)(slip op. at 13).  As the March 6 interview was properly deemed to be non-custodial, Defendant’s argument that the March 13 interview was the unlawful product of this interview is meritless as the Erazo Court noted that analysis of O’Neill factors is irrelevant when the first interview is non custodial.
[brief] And that’s generally the primary responsibility, although the planning board can make whatever recommendation it so chooses with regard to the plan to the governing body and the governing body in their consideration of the adoption of the proposed amendment will evaluate those comments of the planning board and as well as comments from the public that it receives during the public hearing and second reading and make a determination as to the, whether it intends to adopt the amendment or make any changes and adopt those changes as well.  So in the redevelopment plan and the section of the redevelopment plan which is specifically Section 2.2 which highlights the relationships of the proposed plan to the master plan of the municipality, that section outlines in detail the general level of consistency with the redevelopment plan as to the current master plan as well as the most recent master plan re-examination report.  And suffice it to say that in Section 2.2 of the plan which starts on page 6, it’s a pretty detailed evaluation and we’ve made a determination that in fact that the redevelopment plan as amended is generally consistent with the redevelopment, excuse me, with the master plan of the municipality and subsequent master plan re-examination reports.  And I can read a couple of excerpts and I think that are relevant for the (Planning) Board’s consideration with the reference to the original 1988 master plan, on the bottom of page 6, there’s a quote that, with regard to an overall policy statement of the master plan indicating that, actually I should say the following policy statement included the 1988 master plan is relevant to the redevelopment plan and it quotes the 1988 master plan by saying, stating, “Guide waterfront development which protects the public need for shore protection and flood control, visual and pedestrian access to the waterfront, recreation and open space and economic development.
[brief] “Absent an almost overwhelming showing that the parties to a contract intended such a one-sided, unreasonable construction, courts will not construe a contract as providing some perpetual right or option which one side can exercise against the other at any time in the future. ”  Home Props. of N.Y., L.P. v. Ocino, Inc., 341 N.J. Super. 604, 613 (App. Div. 2001); see also In re Estate of Miller, 90 N.J. 210, 218 (1982).
[brief] See, e.g., Da86, 343.  In order to discover the source of the mold and remediate the issue, Plaintiffs expended significant money to retain an architect.  Pa51-52.  The architect determined that the mold was being caused by moisture coming through the front exterior walls where the apartments were half below grade, and that to cure the mold issue and prevent it from reoccurring, Plaintiffs would have to waterproof the front yard wall, install a foundation drainage system, correct grading of the front yard so the water ran away from the building rather than toward it, and provide dehumidifiers to designated areas.