ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] POINT I [...]’S TESTIMONY THAT THE MANNER OF DEATH WAS “HOMICIDE” WAS APPROPRIATE  EXPERT TESTIMONY WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EXPERTISE AS MEDICAL EXAMINER AND RELIED ON HIS MEDICAL EXPERTISE AND WAS NOT EVIDENCE DIRECTLY WITHIN THE KEN OF THE JURY .........................................................................................................................16  POINT II THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF FORENSIC ANTHROPOLOGIST [...] REGARDING THE TIMING OF SKELETAL INJURIES WAS PROPERLY QUALIFIED BY THE TRIAL COURT AS GENERALLY RELIABLE UNDER THE FRYE STANDARD AND WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL ....................................................................................................................................................................................25 POINT III THE COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN DISQUALIFYING A PROSPECTIVE JUROR BASED ON HIS CONVICTION FOR AN INDICTABLE OFFENSE AND HAD NO AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER OR NOT AN OLD CONVICTION HAD BEEN EXPUNGED WHERE THE JUROR MADE NO REPRESENTATION THAT HE HAD SOUGHT OR RECEIVED AN EXPUNGEMENT .........................................................................................................................32 CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................................36 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## CASES - Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44 (1993) .................................................. 24, 31 - Foley Machinery Co. v. Amland Contractors, Inc., 209 N.J. Super. 70 (App. Div. 1986)
[brief] (Ra15-17).  The email noted assured him:  “In your voicemail message you indicated that you are not a healthcare worker.  You would not be instructed to act in that capacity, only in your capacity as a highway operations technician. ”  (Ibid.).  It also warned [...] that failure to abide by Reactionary Mode constituted job abandonment and requested confirmation of whether he intended to return to work as required.  (Ibid.).  In closing, the email read: “We need your decision by close of business today.  If we do not hear from you by the end of the day, we will take as your decision to no longer be employed by [...]. ”  (Ibid.).
[brief] While it is understood that the [...] opinion is unpublished, the decision represents the first occasion that our Courts have addressed intrafamily liability exclusions in over two decades, and the first time our Courts have addressed intrafamily liability exclusions in context of automobile policies in over three decades.  See Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590 (2001) (dealing with intrafamily liability exclusions in the context of a boating insurance policy).  Furthermore, the facts in [...] case are extraordinarily similar to the current matter.  The Court in [...] was concerned about the operation of an intrafamily exclusion, which “would mean a child severely injured in an accident caused by the parent-driver's negligence could recover only $15,000 in personal injury damages under a $100,000/$300,000 policy as here, whereas the child's friend sitting next to her and also severely injured in the accident could recover the $100,000 policy limits. ”
[brief] Hennessey, 129 N.J. 81, 99-100 (1992).  (PA000006-PA000009).  Therefore, the Motion Judge’s determination that Plaintiff did not “identify a clear mandate of public policy” is incorrect based on *supra* as the "cause of action [was] 'suggested' by the facts" and Plaintiff should have been “entitled to every reasonable inference” based on the reading of her Complaint.  *Printing Mart*, supra, 116 N.J. at 746, 563 A.2d 31.  See also *Green*, supra, 215 N.J. at 452, 73 A.3d 478.  Accordingly, the Court must reverse the trial court’s ruling in this regard.
[brief] Dear [...]:  Please accept this letter on behalf of the Respondent, [...] pursuant to Rule 2:6-11(d) in response to the March 18, 2024 brief and appendix submitted by Appellant, [...].  When this matter came before the Commission at its November 1, 2023 meeting, one of the five members was not in attendance.  (Pa208).  A motion was made to modify Bellamy’s removal to a sixty-calendar day suspension.  Ibid.  Two Commission members voted for this motion while the remaining two members voted to adopt the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) recommendation in full.  Ibid.  Since there was a tie vote, the motion was defeated, no further motions were made, and, therefore, no decision was rendered by the Commission.  *Ibid.*  As a result, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c), the Initial Decision in this matter was deemed adopted by the Commission.  Thus, the Commission takes no position on the merits of this appeal.
[brief] It does not permit the development of properties located within the redevelopment area.  To the contrary, the LRHL expressly states that “[a]ll applications for development or redevelopment of a designated redevelopment area or portion of a redevelopment area shall be submitted to the municipal planning board for its review and approval in accordance with the requirements for review and approval of subdivisions and site plans as set forth by ordinance adopted pursuant to the . . . [MLUL]”.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-13.
[brief] This Court recently affirmed this long-standing precedent in *Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding, LLC*, DOCKET NO. A-1996-21, 2023 WL 6157245 (App. Div. Sept. 21, 2023) (“*Woo-Padva 2*”).  This case is indistinguishable from *Woo-Padva 2*.  In *Woo-Padva 2*, plaintiff defaulted on a credit card account, and defendant purchased the charged off account.  *Woo-Padva 2*, 2023 WL 6157245, at *1.  After defendant obtained a judgment against plaintiff, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment voiding the judgment (and other judgments against putative class members) on the basis that defendant was not licensed pursuant to the NJCFLA.  *Id.*  This Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that “[t]he Legislature . . . did not provide a private right of action under the CFLA – and plaintiff does not contend otherwise.  Instead, the Legislature . . . authorized the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance to punish those who violate any provision of the CFLA.  . . .”  *Id.* at *4.
[brief] Similarly, because a trial court is not bound by an unpublished opinion of the New Jersey appellate court, it is obvious that it is not bound by an unpublished opinion in another jurisdiction.  See In re Bacharach, 344 N.J. Super. 126, 133 (App. Div. 2001).  However, “[t]he frequency with which practitioners cite unpublished opinions in briefs and oral arguments has grown considerably, suggesting that some are improvidently relying on them to the exclusion of reported decisions. ”  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, R. 1:36-3, comment 2 (Gann 2024).  The problem has become so prevalent that “[t]he judiciary has registered its concern with this practice, which should be avoided. ”  Ibid. (citation omitted).  It is readily apparent that defendant attempted to misrepresent the unpublished opinions in Sullivan and Stitsworth as having value as binding precedent when they had none.  See R. 1:36-3; cf. (Pa160-175).  Hence, to the extent that the trial court relied on Sullivan and Stitsworth in rendering its opinion, reversal is warranted.  C.
[brief] While New York’s Alcoholic Beverage Control Law (“ABC Law”) and the MBPA contain similar provisions, the two differ in several key respects.  First, the ABC Law permits modifications to a wholesaler-brewer agreement so long as good cause exists.  ABC Law, 55-c(4)(b).  New Jersey, recognizing the need for stronger protections for wholesalers, specifically provides that a brewer may not terminate, cancel, or refuse to renew a wholesaler agreement because the wholesaler refuses to accept an unreasonable amendment to a wholesaler agreement.  See N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.15(c)(2).  Further, the MBPA requires that any dispute regarding the terms of a wholesaler agreement be determined by a court of this State, while the ABC Law only prohibits mandatory arbitration clauses.  Cf. N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.15(e) with ABC Law, § 55-c(7)(c).  And, notably here, New York does not have a comparable express waiver requirement under Atalese or County of Passaic, which—as further discussed below—would render the arbitration clause in this matter null and void. \(^4\)  Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014); County of Passaic v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 498 (App. Div. 2023).  Finally, to deter brewers from engaging in unreasonable conduct against their wholesalers, New Jersey, which traditionally follows the American Rule, permits fee-shifting unlike New York.  Cf N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.18(a) with ABC Law, 55-c.  \(^4\)  See also Aguirre v. CDL Last Mile Sols., LLC, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 283, *16 (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2024) (holding that application of New York law with respect to arbitration would be “contrary to a fundamental” New Jersey policy, namely, the “right to access [New Jersey’s] courts”).  These differences underscore the efforts of the Legislature to equalize the balance of power between brewers and wholesalers, and the deleterious effect on those efforts (and the resulting dangers to wholesalers statewide) if the trial court’s decision is affirmed.  The MBPA is meant to protect wholesalers from the very harm Plaintiffs allege Defendants caused here.  At bottom, the application of New York law will violate New Jersey’s public policy favoring the protection of wholesalers against more powerful brewers.  POINT THREE
[brief] See, e.g., Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128 (1961); Bonitsis v. New Jersey Institute of Technology, 363 N.J. Super. 505, 524-25 (App. Div. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 180 N.J. 450 (2004); Millison v. E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co., 226 N.J. Super. 572, 591-98 (App. Div. 1988), aff’d, 115 N.J. 252 (1989); McQuaid v.  Burlington County Memorial Hosp., 212 N.J. Super. 472, 475 (App. Div. 1986).  In this case, the defendant did not introduce the NJDOH survey’s finding that there were no regulatory violations in connection with [...]’s care in order to establish the truth of that conclusion.  The documents were never entered into evidence or submitted to the jury.  Rather, defendant introduced plaintiff’s experts’ own testimony regarding their awareness of the NJDOH’s investigation and its conclusions in order to impeach, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 607, plaintiff’s experts who opened the door by talking about purported regulatory violations that were solely within the province of the NJDOH, which found none.  The jury had to consider that evidence when assessing credibility.  Additionally, several exceptions to the general rule that hearsay is inadmissible also vouch for the reliability of the documents.
[brief] When reviewing the sentence imposed by a trial court, we must determine first, whether the correct sentencing guidelines ... [or] presumptions, have been followed; second, whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the findings of fact upon which the sentencing court based the application of the guidelines; and third, whether in applying those guidelines to the relevant facts the trial court clearly erred by reaching a conclusion that could not have reasonably been made upon a weighing of the relevant factors.  [State v. Tindell, 417 N.J.Super. 530, 567 (App.Div.2011) (quoting Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 365–66). ]
[brief] Table of Contents  Table of Authorities .......................................................... iii Table of Orders ................................................................ viii Table of Transcripts ............................................................  viii List of Appended Items ...................................................... viii Statement of Summary Judgement Record ......................... xv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...................................................  2 STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................  4  LEGAL ARGUMENT  I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ESTABLISHED IN THE RECORD THAT CREATE INFERENCES THAT WOULD ALLOW A REASONABLE JURY TO CONCLUDE THAT DEFENDANT VIOLATED CEPA.  ............... 21 (1T; 12a-27a)  A.  The Summary Judgment Standard.................................. 21  B.  The prima facie elements of a CEPA claim and the purpose and important public policy underpinning the statute.  ..................... 22 C.  There is evidence in the record to support: [i] Plaintiff’s reasonable belief of a violation of law or public policy that he objected to or refused to participate in; & [ii] Plaintiff’s whistle-blowing activity, under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3c.  ..............................................  24  D.  There is evidence in the record to support that Plaintiff suffered adverse employment action  ..............................................  37  E.  There are genuine issues of material fact that a jury must consider regarding the fourth prong of CEPA, causation; the record establishes inferences of pretext sufficient to submit the ultimate issue of retaliation to a jury........................................42  CONCLUSION..................................................................................50
[brief] [...] sustained bodily injury at a construction site in [...] on February 21, 2019.  (Pa94, 245)  At the time of the accident, Mr. Wettengel was employed by [...] ("[...]") and was in the process of installing hardwood floors at a residential home under renovation.  (Pa94)  [...] was hired by [...], principal of the property owner, [...], to perform the work under the direction of the general contractor, [...].  (Pa206-207)  Wettengel began working at the site installing flooring in December of 2018.  (Pa94)  When he first arrived, the site was in a "sloppy condition" and Mr. Wettengel complained to the general contractor, [...].  (Pa94)  Wettengel received "pushback" from [...] regarding the issue prompting him to call [...] of [...] who took care of the issue when he arrived the next day.  (Pa94)  When Wettengel arrived for work on February 21, 2019, the worksite was again cluttered and messy.  (Pa94)  There was snow present on the exterior of the property.  (Pa100, 100)  After commencing work at approximately 10:30 a.m., Wettengel walked from the interior of the house to the exterior to throw debris into the dumpster located on the driveway in front of the house.  (Pa94)  He recalled walking toward the dumpster, --- 3  Wettengel was unsure as to whether his accident occurred on February 20 or 21, 2019.  For purpose of this brief, the February 21, 2019 date will be used.  and his next recollection was awakening lying flat on his back on top of a piece of plywood covered with snow on the driveway near the dumpster.  (Pa94)  He was disoriented when he awoke and attempted to stand but kept slipping on the plywood.  (Pa94, 99, 116)  Unbeknownst to him he had suffered a severe laceration and trauma to the rear of his head.  (Pa95)  Ultimately, he crawled off of the plywood to the porch of the home, went inside and laid down in one of the closets.  (Pa94)  After waking up some hours later, he noted that his pants were wet from the fall.  (Pa94)  He returned to his van and again fell asleep.  (Pa94)  His vehicle was blocking another contractor’s van and Wettengel awakened to tapping on the window to move the vehicle.  (Pa94)  He then drove home.  (Pa94)  Upon returning to his home, Mr. Wettengel went to bed early, and when his wife checked on him, she observed bleeding on his head.  (Pa95)  Wettengel’s wife drove him to [...] where he underwent a brain CT-Scan which revealed extensive subarachnoid hemorrhage on the left side.  (Pa95)  He was hospitalized for fourteen (14) days from February 21, 2019 to March 6, 2019.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  Whether done by defense counsel at trial, trial courts, or appellate courts, characterizing any defense as “pretextual” is an affront to due process.  It insults defendants, stripping them of the presumption of innocence and branding them as liars.  It insults judges, deeming them incapable of weighing evidence or assessing credibility.  It insults society, enshrining prejudice to the exclusion of fairness, equanimity, and sober judgment.  Defendant [...] asks this Court to vacate his conviction and remand this matter for a jury trial.
[directive] The major revisions are as follows.  Additionally, other portions of the 2010 policy have been reorganized or condensed.  Oversight.  Establishes ALPR coordinators at the agency, county, and state level to • improve oversight and information sharing.  data.  Requires use of the statewide application program  Sharing and standardization of •  “Automated license plate recognition” or ALPR is technology that uses optical character recognition on images to 1 read vehicle registration plates to create vehicle location data.  ALPR devices may be placed at a stationary location (permanent or portable) or be mobile and affixed to a police vehicle.  The vehicle location data captured by an ALPR device is (1) used to alert law enforcement to vehicles they have a legitimate and specific reason to locate, and (2) stored so that law enforcement may perform searches to further subsequent investigations.  Both situations are described in more detail in this Directive.
[brief] (201a)  Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File a Second Supplemental Complaint established a cause of action for (1) Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty as Trustee by purchasing the Florida Property, for her own account, below fair market value; and (2) Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty as Trustee by failing to make required dispositions in accordance with the Trust terms and misappropriating funds.  (325a)  --- 6  On February 14, 2024, Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File a Second Supplemental Complaint was deemed frivolous and sanctions were imposed.
[brief] 6  Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485 (1985)  17 Leon v. Rite Aid Corp., 340 N.J. Super. 462 (App. Div. 2001)  7 Levin v. County of Salem, 133 N.J. 35 (1993)  11 McGowan v.  Borough of Eatontown, 151 N.J. Super. 440 (App. Div. 1977)  21-22  Muhammad v. N.J. Transit, 176 N.J. 185 (2003)  17  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics, Inc., 116 N.J. 739 (1989)  6, 7 Reider v. State Dep’t of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547 (App. Div. 1987)  7  Rodriguez v. N.J. Sports Exposition Authority, 193 N.J. Super 39 (App. Div. 1983)  11  Roe by M.J. v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 317 N.J. Super. 72 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 160 N.J. 89 (1999)  11-12, 14, 16, 17  [...] v. [...], Docket No. [...] (N.J. Super. App. Div. Nov. 1, 2013) (P-74)
[brief] (10T73-2 to 12; 11T27-3 to 28-8; 16T47-7 to 18).  made a mistake by not using a NIST thermometer, it “probably” would have been investigated by [...] Office of Professional Standards (“OPS”), its version of Internal Affairs.  (11T118-14 to 21; 16T50-21 to 51-5; 16T52-13 to 21).  In the common area, [...] asked defendant if he was willing to perjure himself about performing the calibrations.  (10T70-17 to 25; 11T28-19 to 29-11; 16T53-24 to 54-12).  Defendant did not respond and left.  (10T70-25 to 71-1; 11T29-12 to 30-5; 16T54-12 to 18).  Defendant was so upset that he drove from [...], where [...] was located, to [...] headquarters, in [...].  There, a troop doctor approved stress leave.
[brief] The equitable estoppel doctrine is invoked in the interests of justice, morality and common fairness.  It prevents a party from repudiating a course of action on which another party has relied to his detriment.  Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169 (2003).  [...] did nothing from 2008 to 2020 to in any way put [...] or [...] on notice that they considered the pizzeria to be an illegal non-conforming use.  Although [...] claims to have made complaints to Borough officials at one point, they did nothing more.  And, as [...] points out, they not only dismissed the Borough from the trial, they didn’t call any of the Borough officials as a witness.  In the case of *Summer Cottagers Association v. Cape May*, 19 NJ 493 (1955) the court considered a complaint by members of an association of property owners regarding the sale of neighboring municipally owned property upon which a motel was built.  The plaintiffs contended that the sale of the municipal property was not properly made and, thus, should be to be declared null and void.  Among other claims by the plaintiffs was that they did not receive proper notice of the sale.  The plaintiffs, however, did not make their claim until the construction of the motel was completed.  The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs claim, noting that despite the fact that the plaintiffs were not given formal notice, “the planned structure was a matter of common notoriety from the outset.
[directive] With respect to these models, when the officer activates the recording mode/function, the device automatically preserves an electronic recording of the events that transpired a fixed period of time (e.g., 30 seconds) before the recording mode/function was activated.  This time-delay or “buffering” feature allows the device to capture data concerning the event/circumstances that prompted the officer to activate the BWC.  When an officer does not activate the recording mode/function, data captured while the device is in standby/buffering mode is overwritten automatically.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021
[brief] Likewise, [...]’s written Order on the 2020 motion (Pa1-Pa2) required no such expert testimony to prove the negligence of [...] in causing the grading error.  The only expert testimony required by [...]’s Order was as follows:  “Without expert testimony, plaintiffs may not pursue a claim that but for the grading/elevation error they could have successfully obtained preliminary and final site plan approval (which involves obtaining the necessary variances and satisfying all conditions of approval set forth by the Board professionals) to allow for multiple tenants to occupy the [...] space. ” (emphasis added.)  (Pa2).  This point of [...]’s Order, by its plain meaning, applied to only one aspect of [...]’ damage claim—the loss of ability to rent to multiple tenants in the [...].  But again, [...] misconstrued [...]’s ruling on [...]’ need for expert testimony.
[brief] Tenant’s argument that Landlord failed to mitigate its damages fails for three (3) separate reasons: (i) Tenant is precluded from asserting this argument because it was not raised in the Underlying Action; (ii) Landlord did not seek, nor was it awarded, money damages in the Underlying Action; and (iii) Landlord had no obligation to re-write the Lease and award Tenant unearned Tenant Allowance payments as part of its duty to mitigate damages.  (i)  **Tenant is Barred from Arguing Landlord Failed to Mitigate Damages Because This Issue Was Not Raised Below**
[brief] For the aforementioned reasons, the [...] respectfully urge this Court to vacate the punitive damages award.  The [...] further respectfully request that this Court vacate the award of attorneys’ fees, and remand for consideration by a different Special Master or by the trial court independently of [...]’s recommendations.  The [...] further respectfully urge this Court to reverse the excessive prejudgment compounding interest awarded to Plaintiffs. \(^{10}\)
[brief] ’”  *Id.* (citing *State v. Nishina*, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003) (citation omitted)).  “When determining if the [police] officer's actions were reasonable,’ the court must consider the reasonable inferences that the police officer is entitled to draw ‘in light of his experience. ’”  *Id.* (citing *State v. Arthur*, 149 N.J. 1, 8 (1997)).  Additionally, “the officer ‘must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion. ””  Id. (internal citations omitted).  The State bears the burden of proving that an investigatory stop is valid.