ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  1  SEVERANCE OF INVALID PENALTY  PROVISION DOES NOT ALTER MANDATED REVERSAL AS CONVICTIONS CANNOT STAND WITHOUT A PENALTY AND MUST BE REVERSED (raised below DA 6A, 7A)  The State’s contention that the penalty provision at issue is clear and unambiguous is not responsive.  Defendant did not allege ambiguity but rather stated that the penalty provisions are improper and illegal.  As set in detail in defendant’s initial brief the penalty provisions applicable to each of the ordinances underlying her convictions violate N.J.S.A. 26:3-70.  Respondent’s reliance on the severability of the penalty provisions to “rescue” the convictions is misplaced.  It is true that the provisions are severable and their invalidation does not affect the remainder of the ordinances.  With the penalty provisions severed, however, the ordinances lack a penalty and this Court has held that: “Defendant’s conviction(s) cannot stand without a penalty, and therefore the judgment of the Law Division must be reversed. ”  State v. Capaci, 260 N.J. Super. 65, 69, 615 A.2d 275, 276 (App. Div. 1992)  POINT
[brief] The Court below also states that there was “no proof of eating on the premises” and suggests that photographs were necessary in order to establish that.  (T4 at 13:10; 23:23-24:3).  The proofs regarding this factual allegation are contained in the testimony of [...] and [...] (T1 at 108:10-16; 69:12-71:10; 111:10-11) and the factual allegation was uncontested at trial.  There is a bench that is just outside the front door of the building and that bench was used by patrons of the restaurant to sit and eat the food that they purchased inside the building.
[brief] Our Supreme Court has discussed the broad scope of what is considered the practice of law as follows:  In determining what is the practice of law it is well settled that it is the character of the acts performed and not the place where they are done that is decisive.  The practice of law is not, therefore, necessarily limited to the conduct of cases in court but is engaged in whenever and wherever legal knowledge, training, skill and ability are required.  As was stated in Tumulty v. Rosenblum, 134 N.J.L. 514, 517-18 (Sup. Ct. 1946):  “The practice of law is not confined to the conduct of litigation in courts of record.  Apart from such, it consists, generally, in the rendition of legal service to another, or legal advice and counsel as to his rights and obligations under the law, . . . calling for . . . a fee or stipend, i.e., that which an attorney as such is authorized to do; and the exercise of such professional skill certainly includes the pursuit, as an advocate for another, of a legal remedy within the jurisdiction of a quasi-judicial tribunal.  Such is the concept of R.S. 2:111-1, classifying as a misdemeanor the practice of law by an unlicensed person.
[directive] [Yes/Tak]  [No/Nie]  Training and Equipment Fund penalty of $30?  Jesli przestypstwo mialo miejsce po 8 stycznia 1997 r., musi Pan(i) zaplacic kwoty 30 USO na Fundusz na rzecz Szkolen i Sprzytu dla Funkcjonariuszy Organ6w Scigania?  You will be required to provide a DNA sample, which could be used by law enforcement for h.
[brief] **STANDARD OF REVIEW**  In determining whether a ruling, action or inaction by the lower court or agency constituted error, the appellate court applies a standard of review that gives the appropriate deference to the lower court's decision.  That standard may allow for no deference (review of purely legal decisions), some degree of deference, or a substantial degree of deference (review of findings of fact).  See, [...], *N.J. Appellate Practice* § 34:2-1 (2022).  An appellate court's review of rulings of law and issues regarding the applicability, validity (including constitutionality) or interpretation of laws, statutes, or rules is de novo.
[directive] Do you understand that being sentenced to parole supervision for life means that upon release from incarceration or immediately upon CN 10080-Korean 5/8 지령 제01-18 호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 수정 양식, 페이지 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Korean page 5/8 imposition of a suspended sentence you will be supervised by the Division of Parole for at least 15 years and will be subject to provisions and conditions of parole, including conditions appropriate to protect the public and foster rehabilitation, such as, but not limited to, counseling, Internet access or use, and other restrictions which may include restrictions on where you can live, work, travel or persons you can contact?  [예/Yes]
[brief] [...] was the general contractor for construction of the [...] at [...] (the “Project”).  (Pa3.)  [...] retained [...] to perform “earthwork, SOE [support of excavation] and underpinning” at the Project.  (Pa430; Pa956, [...] Tr., 27:16-28:8.)  Separately, [...] was retained to perform demolition work on a retaining wall at the property line where the [...] was located and encroached onto the Project’s property.  ([...] Tr., 11:12-23 at Pa952, 15:24-16:17 at Pa953, 27:8-15 at Pa956, and 32:7-11 at Pa957; and July 9, 2015 E-Mail at Pa973 with Attachment at Pa977.)  [...] subcontracted portions of this work to [...].  ([...] Tr., 11:2-25 at Pa986; [...] Tr., 76:5-10 and 77:5-19 at Pa968; see also July 9, 2015 E-Mail at Pa973 with Attachment at Pa977.)  **B.  [...]’s Direct Liability Policies**
[brief] In its scant analysis before determining that the tool mark analysis was appropriately admitted, the McGuire court noted merely that “tool mark analysis is not a newcomer to the courtroom” and that “[c]ourts in other jurisdictions have also admitted tool mark evidence. ”  Id. at 130-31.  While true, this is not dispositive of whether all parts of a generalized field are sufficiently reliable to be admitted into evidence.  This Court has recently warned of the dangers of trial courts failing to embody their gatekeeping position to truly scrutinize the reliability of a technique, instead deferring to the fact that courts have admitted the evidence previously, making its future admission a fait accompli.
[brief] N.J.S.A. § 56:8-1 et seq.  Unlawful conduct includes affirmative acts, knowing omissions, and violation of regulations promulgated under N.J.S.A. §§ 56:8-2 and 56:8-4.  Id.  Ascertainable loss means that it is quantifiable or measurable.  See Thiedemann v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234, 244 (2004) (noting that "an objectively ascertainable loss or damage" could be measured by "expert proof of diminution of value" or "out of pocket expenses causally connected with the claimed defect perpetuated by the defendant.").  “[A] claim of loss in value must be supported by sufficient evidence to get to the factfinder.  To raise a genuine dispute about such a fact, the plaintiff must proffer evidence of loss that is not hypothetical or illusory. ”  Id. at 248-49.  For the reasons stated above, there is absolutely no evidence that supports [...]’s allegation that [...] engaged in any unlawful conduct under the CFA or made any misrepresentation about its product.
[directive] 17. the ensure to General's authority Attorney the to pursuant issued is Directive  This justice criminal of administration the and laws the of enforcement efficient uniform and and police by of discretion the on exercise limits imposes Directive  This State. the throughout Law.  Reform of implementation  Bail the efficient and uniform the facilitate to prosecutors those beyond any create rights to way any in construed be shall Directive this in Nothing under or Jersey, of State New the and States United of the Constitutions the under established be to intended are this Directive of provisions  The Rule.  Court or statute Jersey New any Insurance the of Prosecutors, Office the County agencies, police by enforced and implemented any create not do these provisions and Justice, Criminal of Division the and Prosecutor, Fraud or persons entities. other any by enforced be may that rights or promises Directive. of this upon issuance immediately operational become shall Section This EXCEPTIONS 18. the in arise that every situation might anticipate to possible not is it that Recognizing Constitution, the of 11 State I, paragraph Article Law, Reform Bail the implementing of course authorized is Justice hereby of Division Criminal the of Director the Rules, Court applicable and for Directive of any provision from this exception an for request Prosecutor's County a grant to Director. the by determined as cause sufficient and good this Directive. upon of issuance immediately operational become shall Section This QUESTIONS 19. be should this Directive of implementation and interpretation the concerning Questions designee. the Criminal Director's or Justice, of Division the of Director the to addressed Directive. of this upon issuance immediately operational become shall Section This SUPERSEDURE 20. under or manual by issued enforcement law or guideline, directive, any of provision Any is Directive of provision this any with inconsistent that General is Attorney the of authority the inconsistency. such of extent the to superseded hereby 90 Page EFFECTIVE DATE 21. and provisions the amended However, immediately. effect Directive takes
[directive] In addition, the Independent Investigator cannot possess any other actual, potential, or perceived conflict of interest, as described below in Section II.C.2, and cannot rely on the investigative assistance of any individual who works for the same law enforcement agency as the Principal, except pursuant to the narrow exceptions described below in Section II.D.  b.  [...] shall serve as the “default” Independent Investigator in the following circumstances, subject to a conflict check conducted pursuant to Section II.C.2 below:
[brief] “[...] can still testify, the plaintiff is still able to offer the opinion.  Whatever weight the jury chooses to give to [...] or any of the experts in this case is clearly within the province of the fact finder. ”  [...] said there was “potential prejudice to the defendant” by the “11th, at the 10th-and-a-half hour, allowing a new expert report.  I don’t see any authority -- or persuasive authority, based upon the record here and the evidence submitted that would allow that. ”
[brief] The Act makes “notice” a linchpin of New Jersey’s recording regime.  See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 46:26A-12(b) (“A claim under a recorded document affecting the title to real property shall not be subject to the effect of a document that was later recorded or was not recorded unless the claimant was on notice of the later recorded or unrecorded document.  Our courts have focused considerable time on elucidating the meaning of that term. ”).  In short, if a party is on notice of a later recorded or unrecorded claim, that party takes its interest subject to the claim of which the party had notice.  There are three ways a party can be on notice of property interests under the Act: record, actual, or constructive/inquiry.
[brief] [ . . . ]  Obviously, if the Legislature had intended to allow for broader discovery of all suspected PIP abuses, it would not have explicitly and specifically enumerated the types of information deemed disclosable.  See, [Prudential v. Nardone, 332 N.J. Super.126, 136 (Law Div. 2003)](noting that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13(g) is a limited discovery mechanism).  Significantly, the Selective court advised that a carrier would be entitled to the broad discovery permitted under the Rules of Court upon the filing of a Fraud Act claim.  It stated, "in an action filed pursuant to the IFPA for substantive remedial relief from claimed violations thereof, plaintiff would be bound by, and subject to, the ordinary rules of discovery governing civil actions in the Law Division, with their usual limitations as to relevance and protections against oppression and harassment."
[brief] ” (PPCIa419-25).  Regarding [...]’s procedures for handling oil trailers, “the Plaintiff states in his Verified Complaint that Plaintiff is not in the business of providing space for trailers carrying bunker oil or hazardous substances and plaintiff is not a used oil transfer facility. ” (PPCIa419-25).  Regarding whether [...] is a responsible party, “DEP and the [field] directive did not identify plaintiff as a responsible party but named [...] as the responsible party. ” (PPCIa419-25).  The trial court then concluded, “it is clear in this case that [...] is the responsible party in this matter and is the cause of the spill and any further discovery would not change the fact that [...] is a responsible party and is responsible.
[brief] Under the Faulkner Act, the mayor enjoys broad powers, including the supervision and control “of all departments of the municipal government” (see N.J.S.A. 40:69A-40(c)), the examination of “operations of any board,” and N.J.S.A. 40:69A-40(d)), concerning the supervision of the care and custody of all municipal institutions and agencies.  See also N.J.S.A. 40:69A-40(f)).  In other words, the mayor is the official tasked with oversight and control of all governmental functions within a municipality.  It is undisputed that he (or she) is the final policymaking authority in accordance with state law.  Despite all of this, Defendants blithely dismiss the fact that the directive to deny the Plaintiffs’ application came from the Township’s Mayor - the chief executive officer who himself is the final policymaking authority of the Township.  The fact that the Mayor establishes the Township’s policy is further bolstered by the fact that statements evidencing this policy were published and disseminated through a Township newsletter and on the Township’s website, confirming that the Mayor was not simply “acting as a private citizen expressing an opinion,” but as a policy-making official.
[brief] Specifically, [...] had argued:  “At paragraph 53 of his certification he writes that *Tagayun* holds movants bear the burden of proving bad faith.  That is a correct statement of law when seeking fees against a party under *N.J.S.A. §2A:15-59 …*” (See Pa178).  \(^2\)  In his original non-conforming Respondent brief, [...] argued that the cases I had cited (as to reasonableness of attorney fees) were inapplicable because those cases only dealt with plaintiffs.  (See Pra4, which is the relevant page of that version of his brief).  Apparently he realized that this was a meritless argument, so when he submitted the corrected version 2 days later, he then deleted it.  But yet in the fifth point of his Respondent brief, he now inconsistently argues:  "The Appellant's reading of the frivolous litigation statute N.J.S.A. §2A:15-59 is incorrect and does not indicate a burden of proof for bad faith."
[brief] [...] correctly argues that there was no testimony at trial that people in the jewelry business focus on hands, faces, and necks.  However, although not grounded in specific testimony at trial, it is a reasonable inference and fair comment that a salesman looking to make a sale would devote his attention to a prospective customer, especially one who sought the salesman's assistance in making a purchase.  Nonetheless, even if the prosecutor's remarks were improper, they were harmless under the circumstances.  First, there was evidence that [...] and [...] had ample opportunity to view the two defendants at the time of the crime.  In fact, [...] came face to face with [...] on three occasions, first when he came into the store to purchase “an ID” and twice on the date of the robbery.  Although it was [...] who spoke with [...] about purchasing a name plate on the date of the robbery, [...] stood close by at all times.  He was also face to face with [...] and [...] when the handgun was fixed on them and their son.  Also, because [...] raised no objection at trial, we are permitted to infer that defense counsel did not believe “the prosecutor's remarks were ... prejudicial at the time they were made,” State v. Josephs, 174 N.J. 44, 126 (2002); see also State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 83 (1999) (“Generally, if no objection was made to the improper remarks, the remarks will not be deemed prejudicial. ”).  The jury was also instructed that “[a]rguments, remarks, questions, openings, summations of counsel are not evidence and must not be treated as evidence,” and that “[a]ny comments by counsel are not controlling. ”  Thus, in light of the strength of the State's case and the fact that no objection was made at trial, the prosecutor's remarks, even if marginally inappropriate, did not rise to the level of plain error.  See Nero, supra, 195 N.J. at 410.
[brief] COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS  Plaintiff is a union consisting of non-supervisory fire fighters employed by the City.  (Pa8 at ¶8).  Counts I-III – Alleged Failure to Accommodate Disability as to Unidentified Alleged Affected Members in Violation of the NJLAD  Plaintiff claimed the City implemented a policy in July 2022 rendering Union members ineligible for promotion “if they avail themselves of any type of injury or sick leave. ” (Pa11 at ¶11).  Plaintiff claimed this “policy” was relied upon in July 2022 to deny one Union member a promotion to Captain when he was on “sick/injury leave,” identifying him only as “[...]” (Pa11 at ¶12).  Plaintiff alleged the City “fails to accommodate Union members who can perform the essential duties of the position but need a brief accommodation to either heal or convalesce from what may otherwise be an ephemeral illness or injury,” and then listed purported “examples” without any information or allegations that such “examples” are fact or have occurred.  (Pa28-29 at ¶71-72).  Plaintiff asserted that the “policy fails to engage in any sort of interactive process,” but set forth no facts as to any claimed interactive process failure as concerned any actual instance or person (barring, arguably, “[...]”).  (Pa29 at ¶73).  Similarly, Plaintiff alleged that the claimed policy “discriminates against Union members who are injured at work and whose recovery and time on sick/injury leave extends beyond a promotional date,” but failed to identify such “members” and the pertinent alleged circumstances.  (Pa29 at ¶74).
[brief] ”  Pa100.  [...] noted that the Property’s “[u]nique physical attributes include the subject’s extensive street frontage in the heart of this booming development sector of downtown [...] with 200 feet along [...], a main commercial street, and the influence of two (2) highly visible corners offering additional frontage of 95 feet along both [...] and [...]. ”  Pa101.  Accordingly, [...] found that, since the Property is “[l]ocated steps away from the [...] and within close proximity to commuter ferry and PATH service, the subject is well positioned for a mixed-use (retail space and luxury apartments) within the core of a booming development area. ”  \textit{Id.}  In addition to considering the market’s demand for the Property, [...] examined [...]’s current zoning restrictions, local development trends, regional market data and approvals in the area, a concept plan prepared by [...], and the independent planning evaluation of [...], P.P. Pa106-Pa112.
[brief] Private Respondent’s portrayal of Decedent’s finances fails to constitute competent facts.  Db at 19.  From the onset of their marriage, Decedent took control of the finances and handled them exclusively so that even Petitioner was unaware as to what the Decedent was paying.  (7T49:15-17; 8T10:6-21; 8T27:6-10; 8T30:5-20).  Respondent did not establish any foundation for her testimony concerning Decedent’s finances.  In fact, Respondent testified that she was not present during any of the financial transactions that were the subject of her testimony and acknowledged she did not know how the Home was paid for contending that “she did not know all the details. ”  11T95:7 to 96:5.  Yet, relying solely on Respondent’s testimony, the Court held that the mortgages to the Home were eventually satisfied and paid off solely by Decedent.  (Db at 19; (P14a).  Respondent also made erroneous statements about the Decedent’s finances, testifying that Decedent paid for Petitioner’s health insurance through her payments to her employer, [...].  Db at 19.  Decedent’s [...] Confirmation statement reflected that Petitioner Decedent’s benefits did not extend to health, vision or medical coverage for Petitioner.  (12T149:10-25; P743a).  Petitioner is a disabled veteran who had his health coverage through the Veterans Administration.  (12T149:19 to 150:6).  The only “facts” that Respondent provided at Trial about Decedent’s finances is that she observed Decedent use Petitioner’s credit card to purchase items that she wanted.  (11T90:17-22).  The other testimony that Respondent provided about the Decedent’s and/or Petitioners finances should be disregarded as lacking a factual foundation.  6.
[brief] [...], Esq.; [...]; [...]; and [...], [...] (Pa 130).  The Pisano Court found that [...] had “fraudulently joined” [...] and Louis Modugno in the state action because “there was no reasonable basis in fact or colorable ground supporting the claim against those two defendants or no real intention in good faith to prosecute the action against the defendant or seek a joint judgment. ” (Pa 130 Id at 4).  This finding completely ignores the uncontested fact that [...] and Modugno republished [...]’s CHR on December 20, 2009, on PACER despite the fact that [...] struck the Emmanouil Complaint in its entirety on October 11, 2006.  (Pa 271)  This included any of the alleged criminal offenses charged in the March 7, 2006, Complaint in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  [...] had every intention in good faith to prosecute [...] and Modugno for defamation, privacy and false light.  All of those charges are exclusive to the state action.  When [...] struck the Emmanouil Complaint in its entirety on October 11, 2006 (Pa 271 id at 2) the court also recognized the Sealing Order issued by [...] on May 30, 2006, was still in force.
[brief] I performed the test relatively well according to the prosecutor and judge.  (4T:34-(14-20), [5T:8-(19-25), 5T:9-(1-4)], 5T:9-(8-15), 5T:11-(16-21), 5T:6-(14-16)  When told to put my hands behind my back, I did; When asked if I had anything in my pockets that was dangerous, I immediately directed the cops to my work knife.  These are all facts that need to be considered as totality of the circumstances which are all provable via body cam and dash cam (Da 6a).
[brief] “Properly exercised, the gatekeeping function prevents the jury’s exposure to unsound science through the compelling voice of an expert .  . . .  Difficult as it may be, the gatekeeping role must be rigorous. ”  *In re Accutane Litig.*, 234 N.J. 340, 346, 390 (2018).  The trial court erred in dismissing [...]’s motion out of hand.
[brief] In its decision, the Trial Court mistakenly states that Plaintiff argued that the Tort Claims Act does not apply because road maintenance is a ministerial act.  (Pa2146).  This is not an accurate representation of Plaintiffs’ position.  At the trial level, Plaintiff argued that the conduct of the [...] in failing to warn or repair of known roadway hazard should be evaluated based on an ordinary negligence standard as roadway maintenance and the failure to warn are ministerial in nature.  When the [...] filed its motion for summary judgment, one of its arguments was that it was entitled to absolute immunity as its’ decision to contract away the inspection and safety responsibilities during the construction project was a “discretionary” decision.  However, as articulated in opposition to the [...]’s motion, Plaintiff argued that, although the [...] contractually included the Defendants in the responsibility to inspect and maintain the roadway, as owner of the Parkway, the [...] could not absolve itself of its own duties; as the [...]’s duty to inspect and maintain the roadway was non-delegable.  Plaintiff also argued that the [...]’s duty to perform maintenance to repair or at least warn against a known hazard should be considered “ministerial” and, as result, an ordinary negligence standard should be applied.  The Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 59:12-3, provides protection for public entities involved in tort claims.