ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...], Esq. Of Counsel and On the Brief #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Contents | Pages | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS | 4 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 7 | | POINT I | 7 | | THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISQUALIFYING MR. MUELLER AND THE LAW OFFICES OF GEOFFREY D. MUELLER, LLC  DUE TO AN IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST UNDER RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.18 (T3:1-12:16) | 7 | | POINT II | 17 | | PETITIONERS SATISFIED THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF (T3:1-12:16) | 17 | | POINT III | 19 | | O BUILDERS AND ASSOCIATES V. YUNA CORP., 206 N.J. 109 (2011) AND RULE 4:10-2(e)(1)  AUTHORIZED PETITIONERS’ SUBMISSION OF MS.  KNOLL’S CERTIFICATION IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO DISQUALIFY FOR IN CAMERA REVIEW (T3:1-12:16) | 19 | | A. O Builders & Associates | 19 | | B. Rule 4:10-2(e)(1) | 20 | | POINT IV | 23 | | NO EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THERE IS SUFFICIENT INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE RECORD TO DISQUALIFY  MR. MUELLER (NOT RAISED BELOW)  | 23 | | POINT V | 29 | RESPONDENTS  MADE SEVERAL FACTUALLY INACCURATE STATEMENTS AND ATTEMPT TO MALIGN PETITIONERS (NOT RAISED BELOW)  ..................................................................................................................29  POINT VI .................................................................................................................................................31  THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION NOT TO PUBLISH MS.  KNOLL’S CERTIFICATION IS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR (T3:1-12:16)  ..................................................31  POINT VII ...............................................................................................................................................32  RESPONDENTS’ POSITION THAT MR. MUELLER SHOULD NOT BE DISQUALIFIED BECAUSE HIS CLIENTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO HAVE COUNSEL OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING, SHOULD BE DISMISSED OUT OF HAND (Pa151)  ..................................................................................................................32  POINT VIII ..............................................................................................................................................34  THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT THAT IN ANALYZING MR. MUELLER’S DISQUALIFICATION, THERE BE AN ANALYSIS OF PETITIONERS’ LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS (T3:1-12:16)  ...........................................34  CONCLUSION  ............................................................................................................................................35
[brief] In *Diaz*, officers detained defendant, who they believed to be involved in a drug-induced death, outside of his apartment and warned him of his *Miranda* rights.  470 N.J. Super. at 505-06.  When defendant asked about the basis of the arrest, a detective responded that they were conducting a narcotics investigation.  *Id.* at 506.  Defendant was then transported to the stationhouse, where he waived his rights and provided incriminating information.  *Id.* at 506-07.  It was only then that the officers changed the “tenor and substance” of the interrogation to focus on the significantly more serious drug-induced-death charge.  *Id.* at 507-08.  Upon review, the court found defendant’s statement involuntary, holding that detectives affirmatively misled him as to his status “by providing a deliberately vague and incomplete answer to his question as to why he was taken into custody.
[brief] The trial court erred in finding that the actions of [...] warranted an award of punitive damages.  Here, the main issue was whether a group of sophisticated and wealthy businesspeople were compensated properly under the guidelines of the agreement among the partners.  Indeed, this Court recognized that the partners had an understanding that money would be shifted between entities: “the parties involved were all sophisticated businesspersons who would often use multiple partnership during the course of one project in order to limit their financial exposure at various stages. ” (498a).  This type of commercial dispute does not warrant punitive damages.  The harm at issue is purely economic and Plaintiffs were not financially vulnerable parties.
[brief] “Above all, the process is flexible, and ‘sensitive to the fact that the requirements of confidentiality are greater in some situations than in others. ’”  Home News, 144 N.J. at 455, quoting McClain v. Coll. Hosp., 99 N.J. 346, 362 (1985).  “When there is a confidentiality claim, the ‘applicant's interest in disclosure is more closely scrutinized. ’”
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On November 3, 2020, the [...], filed a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action ("PNDA") against [...], a Commissioner of the [...] (Da 27-30).  The PNDA charged [...] with: Misconduct, Inefficiency, and Neglect of Duty, in violation of N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c) and therefore sought his removal ([...] was also charged with violating the [...] Employee Handbook Discipline Policy).  On November 2, 2020, the [...] appointed [...], Esq., as the Hearing Officer for the hearing on the charges.  The parties engaged in discovery and had several pre-hearing conferences.  On February 8, 2021, a Zoom virtual hearing was conducted.  Both parties presented one witness each and introduced exhibits.  They then submitted post-hearing briefs.  On March 26, 2021, [...] rendered his decision (Da 31-42).  He sustained the charge that [...] violated N.J.S.A. 40A:14-5, id., and forwarded the matter to the [...] Council for final determination.  On April 7, 2021, the [...] Council accepted [...]’s recommendation and resolved that “Thomas [...] is removed as a Commissioner of the [...], effective immediately. ” (Da 43).
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Table of Judgments | iii | | Table of Authorities | iv | | Table of Transcripts | vi | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | ARGUMENT | 2 | | I.  The Special Master was Required to Recuse | 2 | | A.  The Special Master’s appearance of impartiality is reasonably | | | questioned in this case (39680a).  | 2 | | B.  The Code of Judicial Conduct’s standard for recusal should be | | | applied here (39680a).  | 7 | | II.  The Trial Court’s Attorneys’ Fees Award Was Erroneous | 8 | | (39989a-40001a; 40005a-40010a).  | | | A.  The Special Master and the Trial Court improperly awarded fees | | | for work performed before RICO claims were added to the case | 11 | | (39067a-39068a).  | | | B.  The Special Master and the Trial Court erroneously awarded fees | | | for work not “reasonably devoted” to or “reasonably required” for | 12 | | the RICO claims (39089a-39090a; 40005a-40010a).  | | | C.  Plaintiffs are not entitled to an award for their unsuccessful | | | cross-appeals (39173a-39177a; 40005a-40010a).  | 16 | | III.  The Trial Court’s Award of Punitive Damages Must be Vacated | 17 | | (39970a-39989a) | | | IV.  The Trial Court’s Award of Compounded Interest and at an Excessive | 20 | | Interest Rate was Error (40006a-40007a; 40009a-40010a).  | | | A.  The Trial Court made no finding that interest should be | | | compounded after December 20, 2013 (40006a-40007a; | 21 | | 40009a-40010a).  | | | B.  The Trial Court awarded an excessive interest rate for the | | | period after December 20, 2013 (40006a-40007a; 40009a-40010a).  | 23 | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS
[brief] Alcantara v. Allen-McMillan, 475 N.J. Super. 58, 71 (App.Div. 2023).  This court also chose not to retain jurisdiction, presumably expecting the AC to respond promptly and fully to the remand order as she was legally obliged to do.  Earlier in its opinion, this court described the AC’s remand responsibilities as follows:  “The Commissioner owed appellants a thorough review of their substantive argument: the funding structure of the SFRA was unconstitutional as applied to Lakewood’s unique demographic situation. ”  [Id. at 67].  Soon thereafter, the student-appellants began pressing the AC for a schedule of how she was going to comply with the remand order.  That led to a March 12, 2023, letter to the student-appellants’ lawyers stating that the comprehensive review by [...] ordered on July 16, 2021, but apparently never started, would be “expedited. ”  She did not, however, provide a schedule for how she would be complying with the court’s remand order.  As the remand period dragged on for months without apparent action by the AC or the [...], the student-appellants tried various formal and informal means of expediting the process, but none bore fruit.  Finally, on October 23, 2023, student-petitioners filed a motion in aid of litigants’ rights with this court, which the court granted on November 27, 2023.  That consisted of an order that the AC submit the FAD on the remand by April 1, 2024.  The comprehensive review, conducted mainly by a highly paid educational consulting firm based in Boston without apparent expertise in school finance, statutory analysis or state constitutional law, was submitted to the appellants and to [...] on March 1, 2024, exactly three years after the ALJ’s initial decision was issued.  The appellants responded with a letter brief to the AC on March 6, 2024, and the [...] submitted a lengthy and detailed rebuttal of the State consultants’ report by their own educational consultant later in March 2024.  As appellants had warned repeatedly in advance, the State consultants’ report did not seem to provide the AC with a basis for responding to the court’s explicit remand order.  When the AC’s FAD was issued on the appointed date of April 1, 2024, that concern became manifest.  Neither the consultants’ lengthy report, nor the AC’s FAD—nor for that matter the State’s Brief responding to appellants’ brief--reflected any serious attempt to respond to this court’s remand order.  They all focused almost exclusively on the perceived failures of the local district and managed to ignore any failures of SFRA.  ARGUMENT SINCE THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION HAS FAILED TO RESPOND ADEQUATELY TO THIS COURT’S REMAND ORDER, AND THE STATE’S BRIEF HAS FAILED TO RESPOND TO THE RELATED CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS PRESENTED BY THE APPELLANTS IN THEIR BRIEF TO THIS COURT SUPPORTING THEIR APPEAL, THE COURT SHOULD RULE NOW ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IT POSED OF WHETHER THE DENIAL OF T&E TO [...] PUBLIC-SCHOOL STUDENTS WAS A RESULT OF SFRA’S UNCONSTITUTIONALITY AS APPLIED TO THE DISTRICT
[brief] For example, in the professional liability defense world, it is common for insurance carrier to appoint a single panel counsel to represent both the professional who is accused of professional negligence as well as his or her employer, where the carrier and panel counsel determine that the interests of such co-defendants are perfectly aligned, and provided that the co-defendants consent to such representation.  [...]’s rationale could be applied to bar joint representation in many other areas of the law as well, such as LAD cases, whistleblower cases, RICO cases, False Claims Act cases, and the like.  Thus, [...]’s theory, if adopted, would ban efficient joint representation across civil cases in many industries and not just in IFPA cases.
[brief] The learned and semi-professional exemption to the CFA has applied to cases involving insurance brokers rendering brokerage services since 2006.  Though this Court in Shaw, 460 N.J. Super. 592, sought to curtail the expansion of the CFA exception, it did not “overrule” or “supersede” Plemmons, as Plaintiff asserts.  A review of Supreme Court jurisprudence makes clear that the learned and semi-professional exemption does not apply as Plaintiff might like.  But even if this Court were to repeat its analysis of the CFA exemption to insurance brokers, the result in this case would still require affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the CFA claims.  Plaintiff’s allegations in his own pleading places this matter squarely within the exemption to the CFA.  In addition, the Legislature and courts in New Jersey have recognized the nature of the services provided, and learning and erudition undertaken by insurance brokers places them in the same category as other professionals exempt from the CFA.
[brief] As noted by the trial court:  The case law is rife with cases such as this, where employees who bring these suits are upset with the way there were treated at work and just general workplace gripes and unpleasantness with their boss.  Clearly it does not give rise to a claim for CEPA.  And internal disputes within the workplace are not criminal harassment.  They are just that, just disagreements within the workplace, unhappiness with their supervisor, and this one isolated incident where [...] screams and yells at [...] is not a basis in my view of criminal harassment.  [1T 29:5-15.]  As the trial court found, the record showed only that [...] was a difficult boss to work for.  [...] has failed to identify any evidence in the record that would allow a reasonable jury to find otherwise.  On this record, even granting her all reasonable inferences of fact, [...] did not have an objectively reasonable belief that [...] was criminally harassing her.  2.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I MR. MUSTAFA’S CONVICTION FOR PURPOSEFUL MURDER MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE JURY ALSO RENDERED UNANIMOUS VERDICTS ON EACH OF THE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSES OF MURDER.  (Not Raised Below)  Given the statements by [...] that he never intended to actually hit the car but only to scare the occupants, the improbable circumstances of the shooting, and the testimony surrounding [...]’s mental health issues, the --- 2  For a discussion on the authenticity of the verdict sheet relied on for this argument point, and counsel’s attempts to authenticate the verdict sheet, please see counsel’s certification attached in this appendix as (Da31-35).  jury was required to be instructed on the various manslaughter lesser-included offenses of murder.  Accordingly, the judge properly instructed the jury on aggravated and reckless manslaughter as lesser-included offenses of murder but told it several times that if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] committed purposeful murder, it could not render any verdicts on the manslaughter offenses.  Likewise, the verdict sheet properly instructed the jury to skip to Count Two and not consider the manslaughter offenses if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] committed purposeful murder.  (Da5-7).  Nonetheless, the jury’s completion of the verdict sheet indicated that not only did it find him guilty of purposeful murder, it also unanimously (and contradictorily) found he committed each lesser-included manslaughter offense.  If the jury unanimously believed [...] committed either reckless or aggravated manslaughter, he cannot have been convicted of purposeful murder.  The verdict returned by the jury was irreconcilable and establishes that, at minimum, the jury did not understand the law surrounding the lesser-included offenses.  Because this issue was never addressed with the jury at the time, the only remedy now available is to vacate [...]’s murder conviction and have a new trial where a jury can properly assess whether he committed either reckless or aggravated manslaughter rather than purposeful murder.
[brief] (6T 91-2 to 3, 94-1 to 22, 95-2 to 3)  Following [...]’s arrest in Pennsylvania, an Essex County Prosecutor’s Office Detective with the crime scene unit was assigned to process the Toyota 4Runner [...] had been driving.  (4T 127-1 to 9, 127-16 to 128-25)  He testified that he saw suspected blood in the car, found a black purse that contained a pocketknife, and a tire iron wrapped in towels.
[brief] The factors for assessing "good cause" (Leitner, supra, 392 N.J. Super. 87) supported plaintiffs’ request:  -  With regard to factor (1), the movant's reasons for the requested extension of discovery, plaintiffs named [...] to address defendant’s continued qualification objections; - With regard to factor (2), the movant's diligence in earlier pursuing discovery, the record showed that plaintiffs diligently worked towards and fulfilled all discovery deadlines in the case; - With regard to factor (4), any prejudice which would inure to the individual movant if an extension is denied, denying [...]’s entry would saddle plaintiffs with the qualification and credentialing problems that defendant would raise against [...] at trial on the most important issue the jury had to decide; • With regard to factor (5), granting plaintiffs’ request would be “consistent with the goals and aims of ‘Best Practices’” since no trial date was set and prejudice and delay was minimal at most; • With regard to factor (6), the “age of the case” was reasonable given its complexity and the COVID-19 delays that impacted all cases; • With regard to factor (7), “the type and extent of discovery” that remained “to be completed” included several expert depositions anyway – adding [...] to the list was not substantially burdensome or delaying; •  With regard to factor (8), “any prejudice which may inure to the non-moving party if an extension is granted,” defendant had [...]’s expert report since July 30 and it was substantially similar to [...]'s report on the same issue.  •  With regard to factor (9), there was no substantive motion practice that would have been impacted by permitting [...] into the case.  Any reasonable balancing of those factors shows that good cause supported plaintiffs’ request to name [...] as their expert for the unscheduled trial.
[brief] *State v. Tierney*, 356 N.J.Super. 468, 481-82, 813 A.2d 560 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 72, 819 A.2d 1188 (2003).  Furthermore, defense counsel's "failure to object points up the fact that experienced counsel did not consider that the use of the words detracted from the clear meaning which the charge as a whole conveyed."
[directive] Force may be used against specific individuals in a crowd for lawful purposes in accordance with the other provisions of this Policy.  Restrictions apply to the use of certain types of force in a crowd as follows:  (a)  OC spray: (1) may be used against specific individuals who are active resistors, threatening assailants or active assailants as defined in Section 3.3 above; (2) shall not be used where bystanders would be unreasonably affected; and (3) shall not be used against passive resistors, or indiscriminately against groups of people.  (b)  CEDs: (1) may be used against specific individuals who are threatening assailants or active assailants as defined in Section 3.3 above; (2) may be used only when the individual can be accurately targeted; and (3) shall never be fired indiscriminately into crowds.  (c)  Less-lethal ammunition: (1) may be used during civil disturbances only against specific individuals who are threatening or active assailants; and (2) shall not be used during a civil disturbance against groups of individuals.  3.8.4
[directive] Only CEDs and less- lethal devices or ammunition approved by the Attorney General or the Attorney General’s designee shall be used in the State of New Jersey by law enforcement officers.  Less-lethal devices and ammunition that are approved shall only be used consistent with rules and regulations established for each device.  No law enforcement agency or officer shall deploy or use a CED or less-lethal device or ammunition pursuant to this policy unless the device or ammunition satisfies the specifications and characteristics approved by the Attorney General.  The Panel shall meet at least four times a year.
[brief] ### TABLE OF STATUTES | Statute | Pages | |-----------------------------|-------| | N.J.S. 56:8-1 | 15, 18, 22, 24, 25 | | N.J.S. 56:8-136 to -152 | 18, 22, 24 | | N.J.S. 56:8-137 | 18 | ### TABLE OF REGULATIONS | Regulation | Pages | |-----------------------------|-------| | N.J.A.C. 13:45A-16.1 | 22, 24 | ### TABLE OF RULES | Rule | Page | |------------------------------|------| | R.2:9-1 | 14 | | N.J.Evid.R. 601 | 16 | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2 on R.2:9-1 (2019) | 14 ## APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS | Description of Item | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------|------| | Complaint | 001 | | Order to Transfer Venue (July 12, 2019) | 016 | | Answer | 017 | | Order relieving counsel (July 10, 2020) | 024 | | Order of Dismissal (May 23, 2022) | 026 | | Notice of Appeal | 027 | | Exhibit P-1 [...] Contract | 031 | | Exhibit P-2 284 Ellison $53,000.00 payment | 037 | | Exhibit P-3 284 Ellison $53,000.00 payment | 038 | | Exhibit P-4 [...] | 039 | | Exhibit P-5 [...] Payment Receipt | 040 | | Exhibit P-6 [...] Invoice | 041 | | Exhibit P-7 [...] Payment Receipt | 042 | | Exhibit P-8 [...] Invoice/payment | 043 | | Exhibit P-9 [...] Payment Receipt | 044 | | Exhibit P-10 [...] Invoice | 045 | | Exhibit P-11[...] Payment Receipt | 046 | | Exhibit P-12[...] Payment Receipt | 047 | | Exhibit P-13 Requests for Admission | 048 | | Answers to Requests | 053 | | Exhibit P-14 Interrogatories | 055 | | Answers to Interrogatories | 077 | | Exhibit P-15 Contractor Registration | 085 | | Exhibit P-16 Text message | 096 | | Exhibit P-17 Verified Petition of [...] | 097 | | Exhibit P-18 Affidavit of [...] | 103 | | Exhibit P-19
[brief] Accordingly, if one paid [...]’s $4.8 million, that would include payment for all the leasehold interests including the [...], all interests in the Furniture, Fixtures and Equipment (FF&E), and the fee simple in Lots 18 and 19.  The property interest owned by the prospective purchaser of the fee simple estate would no longer be subject to the $0.77 cent [...] lease.  B.
[directive] Updated December 2, 2013 Bail Schedule 2 STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail
[directive] No. Rev. October 1995 Directive 3, 18 of Page 8 7 is  If the request processed for payment, the 2. request will be forwarded to the [...] ([...]) for payment to the appropriate local, county or state law enforcement agency.  ~ No. Directive 18  Rev. October 3, 1995  Page of 8 8  DEPARTMENT  THE TREASURY OF EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR ASSET FORFEITURE  27  DIRECTIVE NUMBER: DATE: October 1, 1995
[brief] I didn’t have a bullet to look at anymore, because it was not part of evidence.  One thing I found, I’m gonna rely back on my report, is [...] had matched that particular bullet that was from the knee of the officer.  The bullet itself only had one land and one groove.  Now, when I say land and groove, I’m gonna say basically in a polygonal bore which the Glock has, there is no traditional rifle, they’re just like humps.  And what happens with that is the bullet travels a linear path down the barrel, there is no more traditional rifling to rip the bullet and make it follow that path.  The polygonal rifling is just a -- series of humps.  It spins it, but doesn’t grip it as securely as the lands and grooves.  So what happens, as it’s going down the barrel, there’s slippage.  And not only that, the barrels are so well made by Glock there’s very few accidental marks to compare against.  And what marks you have are sometimes overridden by the slippage.  So in my experience, if you can match 20 25 percent of the Glock bullets, you’re lucky.