ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1.  The Petitioner testified as to extensive training she is given by the Township, including a bi-annual Municipal Building security meeting, annual updates of [...] Ordinances, and being supplied by [...] with books and other manuals for DWI law, Title 2C (Criminal Laws) and Title 39 (Motor Vehicle Laws).  2.  She was also trained by [...] in the Municipal Court Case Resolution System that was established during the Pandemic and attended a training session on how to handle the cases the Court Administrator places on the System.  She also testified she is required by the [...] to attend two meetings each year with the Assistant County Prosecutor who is the liaison to Municipal Courts in Camden County.  In addition, she is governed by Part 7 of the New Jersey Rules of Court and Directives from the Camden County Prosecutor's Office and Attorney General’s Office.  (T26-14)  3.  [...] admitted that she did not know about the Petitioner being involved in security training and that would be indicative of employee status.  (T153-16)  4.  [...] also had to concede that she was not aware that Petitioner trains the Animal Control Officers and Zoning Officers about Municipal Court offenses.  (T155-22)  **FACTOR 3 – INTEGRATION**
[brief] (Pa54-56).  On December 6, 2024, the State filed a brief in opposition, arguing defendant should be barred from moving to suppress.  In support of its collateral estoppel argument, the State filed defendant’s Union County notice of motion to suppress; the parties’ briefs regarding the Union County motion; and the Union County court’s order and opinion denying defendant’s motion.  (Pa61).  On December 20, 2024, defendant filed a brief in support of his motion and in opposition to the State’s motion\(^3\) for collateral estoppel. \(^4\)  The Hudson County court heard oral argument on December 20, 2024.  (Pa67).  On December 27, 2024, the State filed a supplemental brief on the issue of collateral estoppel, and on January 2, 2025, defendant filed a supplemental brief in opposition.  --- \(^3\)  Although the State did not file a motion for collateral estoppel, the court treated the State’s argument as a motion to the extent that it issued an order and opinion denying the application of collateral estoppel.  (Pa1-3).  \(^4\)  Defendant also attached as exhibits the Union County court’s orders denying the State’s motion to consolidate defendant’s Union County and Hudson County cases.  (Pa62).  An appeal from this order denying the motion to consolidate is pending before this court, [...].  On January 24, 2025, the Hudson County court denied the State’s motions for collateral estoppel and a stay, it and scheduled a testimonial hearing for the motion to suppress on February 14, 2025.
[brief] Id. at 609–10. did not provide objective evidence that small pupils are a reliable indicator of intoxication (such as by providing the percentage of the time a person with small pupils is intoxicated) or even testify, for instance, that he had previously investigated or arrested a certain number of people with small pupils and that those individuals were ultimately determined to be under the influence. \(^9\)  See Demeter, 124 N.J. at 386 (finding no probable cause to search a film canister even though the officer testified that “his past experience showed that a high percentage of such film containers, when found without cameras, contained narcotics” and that he had previously investigated at least twenty narcotics incidents involving the use of film containers to hold drugs, and noting the lack of objective evidence “about what percentage of observed containers held drugs”).  In fact, what the officer ultimately conceded was that pupil size “does not indicate of [sic] criminal activity” and that he was “not saying those two [things] are connected.
[brief] Defendant states that his lack of acknowledgment to his BAC on the record should be enough to vacate his plea.  However, defendant not only ignores relevant case law on point regarding a sufficient factual basis, but relies on the unpublished opinion of State v. Vargas, Docket No. [...], Decided September 10, 2020.  As [...] aptly found, this unpublished case “[i]s unpersuasive and has no precedential value. ” (Da 17)(citing R. 1:36-3)).  To be a proper factual basis pursuant to Campfield, a defendant may either explicitly admit guilt or acknowledge facts that constitute an essential element.  Campfield, 213 N.J. at 231.  The elements of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 are straightforward: was the defendant driving and was the defendant under the influence.
[brief] • the Last Will and Testament of [...] (decedent's deceased husband), dated August 8, 2018, • a Codicil to that Will, • a Renunciation of Executrix under the [...] Will, • two Qualifications of Executor, under the [...] Will, • Application for Probate of Will of [...], dated October 11, 2022, • Qualification of Executor under that Will, • Judgment admitting the October 2022 Will to probate, dated April 3, 2023, • Letters Testamentary, Estate of [...], dated April 3, 2023, • March 2, 2023 death certificate of [...], • January 6, 2022 Power of Attorney of [...], and • Deed for sale of condominium, formerly owned by [...] and [...].  Petitioners now admit that none of these documents – or the emails to which they were attached – contain any information that could justify disqualification as inherently harmful.
[directive] The media has a right to cover protests and public demonstrations from any location where the public is normally allowed, and law enforcement officers should allow credentialed journalists to film, broadcast, and otherwise report on these demonstrations without undue interference.  The [...] has published useful guidance on the rights and responsibilities of reporters covering protests.  The guidance notes, for example, that journalists “cannot trespass on private property or engage in other unlawful conduct that occurs during a protest under the guise of gathering news,” but makes clear that “police cannot arrest journalists in retaliation for negative coverage or to prevent reporting on a public demonstration. ”1  If you have not already done so, I strongly encourage you to consult with the law enforcement agencies in your counties to ensure that they take all reasonable steps to safeguard the First Amendment rights of journalists during this turbulent time.
[directive] Community Engagement  Many of our state’s residents are angry, and understandably so.  Now more than ever, we must take the time to listen to the fears and frustrations of our fellow New Jerseyans.  As County Prosecutors, you have done extraordinary work building relationships with members of your community, and now is the time to leverage those relationships and ensure that you are maintaining open lines of communication with as many residents as possible.  Over the next several weeks, I ask that you use whatever time you have available to talk with community members, either through virtual town halls or in-person gatherings (consistent with appropriate social distancing and gathering rules).  I also encourage you to talk with as many young people as possible, as their views are particularly important right now.  REPORTERS
[brief] Persels Holds That An Attorney Exemption In A Debt Negotiation Statute Violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine (T. at 9:5-17:19).  Defendants also attempt to downplay and distinguish the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in Persels & Assocs., LLC v. Banking Comm’r, 122 A.3d 592 (Conn. 2015) – a decision squarely on point to the separation of powers issue.  Defendants’ attempt to distinguish the Connecticut statute at issue with the Act is the epitome of splitting a hair.  Defendants note that Persels involved Connecticut’s “Debt Negotiations Law” whereas the Act involves debt adjustment.  Pursuant to the Act, “debt adjusters” are those engaged “for the purpose of settling, compounding, or otherwise altering the terms of payment of any debts of the debtor;” that is the very essence of “negotiating” a debt.  There is also no distinction between an intermediary or one who acts on behalf of the debtor; clearly an attorney acting as an intermediary and thus qualifying as a “debt adjuster” under the Act is acting on behalf of the debtor client that retained the attorney.  The Persels Court also addressed the “purported attorney model” argument that Defendants raise on appeal, and still held that the attorney exemption in Connecticut’s debt negotiation statute was unconstitutional because it permitted non-judicial regulation of attorneys’ services.
[brief] The intent of the parties to make the specific person or class of persons third party beneficiaries of their agreement is to be determined by the language of the contract.  *Id.*, at 486.  The question is whether the parties intended that the third party receive a benefit which might be enforced in the courts.  *Id.*, at 485, citing *Bor. of Brooklawn v. Brooklawn Housing Corp.*, 124 N.J.L. 73, 77 (E&A 1940).  If there is no expressed intent on the part of the parties to enter into contractual relations with a third party or permit a third party such as plaintiff herein to have the right to sue to enforce the obligations of the contract, that person is merely an incidental beneficiary to the contract and has no standing to assert a claim based upon an alleged breach of the agreement.
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021  (c)  Each agency must thoroughly, objectively, and promptly investigate all allegations against its officers.  (d)  Each agency must notify its officers in writing of complaints made against them, unless this notification would interfere with any investigation resulting from these complaints.  (e)  Each agency must notify its officers of the outcome of any Internal Affairs investigation involving them.  (f)  Each agency must notify complainants of the outcome of their complaints.  (g)  If an agency’s internal affairs investigators are unable to complete an investigation within 45 days of receiving a complaint, they must notify the agency’s law enforcement executive,1 who may take steps to ensure prompt resolution of the matter.
[directive] Serious bodily injury means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.  Serious bodily injury and serious bodily harm have the same definition the purposes of this Policy.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(b); N.J.S.A. 2C:3-11(d).  4
[brief] This Appellate Court may conduct a *de novo* review of questions of law when reviewing a trial court decision and interpreting a contract, including an arbitration agreement.  *Serico v. Rothberg*, 234 N.J. 168, 178 (2018) (noting *de novo* appellate review of contracts); *Kieffer v. Best Buy*, 205 N.J. 213, 222 (2011) (noting same); *Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp.*, 238 N.J. 191, 207 (2019) (noting *de novo* appellate review of arbitration agreements).  This is rightly done for a “review de novo the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint and compelling arbitration. ”  See *Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc.*, 244 N.J. 119, 131 (2020).  As will be clear upon completion of the Court’s plenary review, [...]’s basis for the denial of Appellants’ Motion concluding the parties’ Agreement was clearly unenforceable given the facts and the applicable law.
[brief] In addition, as discussed in greater detail below, --- 3  In footnote 1 on page 4 of her brief [...] incorrectly characterized [...]’s declaratory judgment application as one “aimed towards obtaining injunctive relief. ”  To the contrary, [...] properly sought a declaratory judgment from the Trial Court that, under the Settlement Agreement, [...] agreed—voluntarily—to “refrain” from asserting the very claims to the Palm the Trial Court found it was “clear [[...]] did not intend for [[...]] to receive the Palm Beach Property” under [...]’s estate planning instruments, even in the absence of the Settlement Agreement.  (Da277a.)  The Trial Court described [...]’s assertion that the Palm Beach Property somehow passes to her under the residuary clause of the Revocable Trust as “wholly illogical and contradictory to [[...]’s] intent.
[brief] \(^6\)  The Property is located in the RD-C (Rural Development-Commercial) Zoning District of [...].  (Pa37)  [...] are owners/operators of [...] in [...], which is adjacent to the Property.  In September 2020, [...] initially applied for an Application for a Zoning Permit with respect to the Property, swearing under oath they were going to install a 20' by 40' (800 sq. ft.) addition to an existing 30' by 40' building for use as a two car garage.  (Pa23)  They further swore that the purpose of the extended garage was for parking.  (Pa24).  The plot plan submitted in connection with the 2020 Zoning Application was deceptive, as it only included a hand drawn sketch of the "garage" addition on an old survey from February 22, 2000, but did not show that any grading would be done.  (Pa29)  In addition, the garage in question would have heat and plumbing and would be used --- \(^4\)  Summary Judgment Transcript, October 2, 2023 ("3T")  \(^5\)  The Tomarchios sold the Property in October of 2023.  \(^6\)
[brief] For these reasons, the Lower Court correctly denied Appellant’s Motion.  C.  The Judgment is Not Void Due to Insufficient Service of Process  Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary, the evidence demonstrates Respondent properly served Appellant, but Appellant chose to ignore the Action.  Rule 6:2-3(d) mandates that, in the Special Civil Part, service to initiate a lawsuit may be made by mail to a defendant within New Jersey.  Rule 6:2-3(d); Unifund CCR Partners v. Beras, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 717 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 23, 2011) (service by mail was effective service of process).  “Service to a defendant’s home address is effective unless at least one of the mailings is returned by the postal service indicating that the mail could not be delivered as addressed. ”  Id. (citing Rule 5:2-3 (d)(4).  “If the certified mailing is refused or unclaimed but the ordinary mailing is not returned, service of process is still deemed effective. ”  Id.  “[T]he constitutional requirement of due process does not mandate perfect service.  Rather, due process contemplates effective service. ”  Coryell, L.L.C. v. Curry, 391 N.J. Super. 72, 81 (2006)).  Here, the Lower Court served Appellant in accordance with Rule 6:2-3(d) at his known address – the NJ Address.
[brief] Appellants that they were denied due process because the Commission dismissed their complaint in the absence of a cross-motion for a summary decision on behalf of Respondent.  This contention must be rejected because N.J.A.C. 6:28-9.1(a) reads in applicable part as follows:  Upon return of a matter from the OAL to the Commission, a hearing before the Commission pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:28-9.8, or the Commission's summary review of a complaint pursuant to this chapter, the Commission shall determine by majority vote whether the conduct complained of constitutes a violation of the Act or whether the complaint should be dismissed.  (emphasis added).  Thus, the Commission acted within its authority to dismiss the Complaint after the matters return from the Administrative Law Judge.  The only authority that Appellants cite in support of their argument is Angus v. Bd. of Educ. of Boro. of Metuchen, 475 N.J. Super. 362 (App. Div. 2023).  Angus holds that "[t]he standard governing agency determinations for a summary decision under N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5 is 'substantially the same as that governing a motion under Rule 4:46-2 for summary judgment in civil litigation'", 475 N.J. Super at 367.  The language was followed by a brief discussion regarding how evidence should be considered under the summary judgment standard.  Ibid.  Angus has nothing do with the issuer of whether an agency can dismiss a complaint upon a motion for a summary decision when the respondent does not file such a motion; in Angus, both parties move for a summary decision.  Id. at 366.  Thus, Appellants' contention that the Commission cannot dismiss a Complaint in the absence of a motion or cross motion for a summary decision must be rejected.
[brief] I.  The Law Division’s Denial Of The Motion Should Be Affirmed Because [...] Waived Arbitration | 10 | |  A.  [...] Waived Arbitration Under The Prevailing *Cole* Factors | 10 | | 1.  [...] Waived Arbitration By Delaying Six Years | 11 | | a.  Futility Does Not Excuse [...]’s Six-Year Delay | 14 | | 2.  [...] Actively Participated in Litigation and Dispositive Motion Practice | 20 | | 3.  [...]’s Apparent Delay Strategy | 21 | | 4.  The Parties Have Conducted Extensive Discovery | 24 | | 5.  [...] Failed to Raise Arbitration in Its Pleading | 27 | | 6.  Proximity to the Date of Trial | 31 | | 7.  Arbitration Prejudices [...] | 31 | | B.  [...] Waived Arbitration by Electing to Litigate the Allocation Issue | 35 | | II.
[brief] The Court further held:  “Turning to the facts of this case, the court finds that Plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to create a dispute of material fact as to whether a product defect caused Plaintiff’s injuries.  First, the court finds that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence that the Ozurdex applicator was defective to survive a motion for summary judgment.  Despite Defendant’s argument that the Ozurdex applicator did not deviate from the allowable “manufacturing specifications,” Plaintiff presents testimony Defendant’s own expert that the disbursement of a silicone particulate would deviate from [...]’s own performance standards for the product, and that the Ozurdex applicator was not designed to dispense a silicone particulate with the Ozurdex steroid medication.  See Plaintiff. Opp. Ex. 1, [...] Dep., at 39:14-40:1.  Under the PLA, N.J. Stat. Sec. 2A:58C-2, a manufacturer of a product shall be held liable if the claimant proves that the product causing harm deviated from the “design specifications…or the performance standards of the manufacturer. ”  N.J.S.A. Sec. 2A:58C-2 (emphasis added).
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES  In re Adoption of Amendments to Northeast, Upper Raritan, Sussex County, 435 N.J. Super. 571 (App. Div. 2014)  .................................................. 18  Bayshore Sewerage Co. v. Department of Environmental Protection, 122 N.J. Super. 184 (Ch. Div. 1973) .......................................................... 17, 18 Czar, Inc. v. Heath, 398 N.J. Super. 133 (App. Div. 2008)  .............................  29  Dragon v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 405 N.J. Super. 478 (App. Div. 2009)  .................................................. 33, 34, 35, 36  In re Freshwater General Permit No. 7, 405 N.J. Super. 204 (App. Div. 2009)  ...........................................................................................................  16, 17, 33  In re Freshwater Wetlands General Permits, 372 N.J. Super. 578 (App. Div. 2004)  ...........................................................................................................  16, 17, 18  Matter of Congressional Districts by New Jersey Redistricting Commission, 249 N.J. 561 (2022)  ...........................................................................................................  38  Matter of Egg Harbor Associates (Bayshore Ctr.), 94 N.J. 358 (1983) .... 20, 21  Medford Convalescent & Nursing Center v. Division of Medical Assistance & Health Services, 218 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1985)  ........................................  29  New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. Alloway Township, 438 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div. 2015)  .........................................................  37  In re Nicosia Flood Hazard Gen. Permit by Certification 5, __ N.J. Super. __, __ (App. Div. 2024)  .................................................................................. 17, 29  In re Proposed Xanadu Redevelopment Project, 402 N.J. Super. 607 (App. Div. 2008)  ...........................................................................................................  17  In re Protest of Coastal Permit Program Rules, 354 N.J. Super. 293 (App. Div. 2002)  ...........................................................................................................  20, 21  In re Public Service Electric & Gas Co.’s Rate Unbundling, Stranded Costs & Restructuring Filings, 330 N.J. Super. 65 (App. Div. 2000) ...................... 38 Raleigh Avenue Beach Association v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 185 N.J. 40 (2005)  ...........................................................................................................  21 Rivkin v. Dover Township Rent Leveling Board, 143 N.J. 352 (1996) ........  39  Seigel v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 395 N.J. Super. 604 (App. Div. 2007) .................................................................................. 20, 21 Thomas Makuch, LLC v. Township of Jackson, 476 N.J. Super. 169 (App. Div. 2023)  ...........................................................................................................  40  STATUTES
[brief] Two handguns – a Smith & Wesson 9mm and a Taurus 9mm – were recovered from the pocket of a red jacket that was hanging on the inside of a bedroom door.  (11T:50-23 to 53-13).  Police also seized [...]’ white Toyota Corolla and applied for a search warrant, which was granted.  The search revealed a spent shell casing on the exterior windshield and a black backpack in the back seat.  A search of the backpack revealed a shirt that matched the description of the shirt being worn by the driver of the Corolla in the video, the rental agreement for the Corolla, and a court summons addressed to Gary [...], Jr. (11T:79-6 to 82-11).  Meanwhile, at the satellite office in Asbury, [...] and [...] encountered defendant and [...].
[brief] (Da881; 10T128:25 to 130:9).  •  Defendants argued at trial that part of that $2 million was used to purchase the Jersey City property, and that the funds were also repaid to [...] via a series of four $500,000 deposits in May 2009 by way of capital contributions.  (24T73:8 to 74:25; and see Da881).  •  [...]’s financial records don’t show any connection between the $2 million withdrawn in December 2008 and the subsequent $2 million coming back into the company via capital contributions in May 2009.  [...] admitted that the four $500,000 capital contributions were new funds, not repayment of capital.  ---
[brief] (Da111, [...] Answers to Request for Admissions)  Court ordered mediation was undertaken with Mediator [...] and was not successful.  (Da50, Notice for Early Settlement Program)  The Mediator recommended that a Title Survey be performed in his report.  (Da53).  [...] of [...] performed the Title Survey and documented that [...]’s title history was set out at Parcel B.  (Da118, Parcel B)  The title history for [...] was set out at Parcel A.  (Da122, Parcel A).  Meccia recommended that a survey of the land be performed.  The Court appointed [...] to perform a survey of the land which was done and thereafter, Pronesti sat for deposition.  (Da135).  [...] filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  (Da186).  First Zion  Hope Missionary Baptist Church filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  (Da158).  The Court heard oral argument on the date of June 23, 2023.  (1T, June 23, 2023).  The Court entered a decision on the Motions for Summary Judgment on August 17, 2023.  (Da203)  The Notice of Appeal was filed in September 2023 and was amended on October 4, 2023.  (Da258, Amended Notice of Appeal).  A Motion for Remand was filed by [...] at the Appellate Court because [...] wanted to file a Motion for Counsel Fees Per R. 1:4-8 and the remand was granted.  (Da237, Da238).  The Trial Court entered a decision on the Motion for Counsel Fees Per R. 1:4-8 which was filed after remand and the motion was denied.  (Da235)  The Appellate Court was notified of the decision of the Trial Court.  (Da235)  STATEMENT OF FACTS