ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The possession charges for each drug type should have merged with the respective charges for possession with intent to distribute.  [...] was charged with and convicted of possession of fentanyl (count 1) and possession with intent to distribute that same fentanyl (count 3); and possession of methamphetamine (count 2) and possession with intent to distribute the same methamphetamine (count 4).  Count 1 should have merged into count 3, and count 2 should have merged into count 4.  Because the court failed to merge these offenses, [...] was assessed a total of $6,730 in fines, which was $2,350 in excess of what was statutorily and constitutionally permissible under principles of merger.  (Da 46)  His financial obligation must be reduced to $4,380.  In addition, the judgment of conviction should be amended to reflect the merger of these convictions and the elimination of the concurrent 5-year flat terms of imprisonment on counts 1 and 2.  “The doctrine of merger is based on the concept that an accused [who] committed only one offense . . . cannot be punished as if for two. ”  State v. Tate, 216 N.J. 300, 302 (2013) (quoting State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 77 (1975)) (alterations in original).  Therefore “[m]erger implicates a defendant’s substantive constitutional rights.
[brief] All pleadings shall be liberally construed in the interest of justice. ”  A party’s pleadings must fairly appraise an adverse party of the claims and issued to be raised at trial.  Miltz v. Boroughs-Shelving, 203 N.J.Super. 451, 458, (App.Div.1985); see also Hewitt v. Hollohan, 56 N.J.Super. 372, 377 (App.Div.1959).  In Miltz an allegation in the complaint that plaintiff’s injuries were proximately caused by the defendant’s failure to properly install stairs was insufficient notice of a negligent-inspection theory of the case.  Miltz, 203 N.J. Super. at 458.  This Court ruled the plaintiff in *Miltz* failed to make sufficient claims for relief to sustain a cause of action.
[brief] The bedroom window was open, which [...] said was unusual.  (7T 58-15 to 23)  A wine chiller was found on the bed.  (3T 171-22)  [...] of the [...] testified as a lay witness that he found one fingerprint on the inside lip of the wine chiller and no fingerprints on the outside.  (3T 35-17 to 38-6)  He also testified that he processed it with a substance that reacts with blood, and the results led him to believe there was blood on the chiller.  (3T 14-23 to 16-21)  [...] testified as an expert in latent fingerprint examination and analysis.  (3T 47-16 to 18)  His testimony, which at times exceeded the bounds of his expertise and of scientifically supported opinion, is the subject of Subsection I.A., supra.
[brief] Instead, three weeks after obtaining the benefit for her discharge, Plaintiff filed this putative class action lawsuit seeking recovery for herself.  Plaintiff has thus taken an irreconcilably inconsistent position since she only advised the bankruptcy court that she possessed “potential/unknown consumer protection claims” (without even identifying against who these claims would be brought against) seemingly valued at $1,000 when, in reality, she has commenced the instant putative class action lawsuit that purports to seek much more.  As such, judicial estoppel bars Plaintiff from maintaining this lawsuit because she initially concealed her assets in the bankruptcy but then later took a different position later to utilize the assets for herself.
[brief] The failure of Defendant to commit to a start date resulted in Defendant not commencing the project within the time period acceptable to Plaintiff.  [Pa31].  As an exchange of email between the parties demonstrates, Plaintiff requested in mid-August 2023 that Defendant begin the project, but Defendant thereafter continually delayed in responding and failed to commence the project in a timely fashion.  [Pa31].  After Plaintiff’s repeated requests to commence the project, Defendant finally sent an inexperienced excavator, who was not familiar with digging at beach towns like Mantoloking.  [Pa31].  On or about September 29, 2023, Defendant’s excavator performed approximately two hours of excavation at the Property and thereafter did not return.  [Pa31].  Plaintiff had discussions with [...], Defendant’s General Manager, who acknowledged that the excavator Defendant had sent was inexperienced and not properly familiar with how to dig in beach towns like Mantoloking, and who had not done a proper job.  [...] assured Plaintiff that he would find a new excavator within a few days.  [Pa32].  When work had not re-started by October 16, 2023, Plaintiff declared Defendant in material breach of its obligations, and informed Defendant that Plaintiff was terminating the contract.  [Pa32].  Although Defendant accepted Plaintiff’s termination, Defendant then claimed that its excavator had worked three days on the project, which was inaccurate representation.  [Pa32].  Defendant demanded compensation for three days of excavation, when Defendant’s excavator had worked just two hours on one day, and sought to collect other expenses.  [Pa32].  Despite having materially breached the agreement, Defendant agreed only to refund Plaintiff the sum of $27,890, contending that it was entitled to compensation for permits ($4,493); and three-days of excavation ($15,617).  [Pa32-33].  Among other things, Defendant advised Plaintiff that helical pilings needed to be installed before excavation at the Property but Plaintiff later learned that this was not accurate, after having spent $14,000.00 to install the pilings, as directed by Defendant, even though this expenditure was not necessary.  [Pa33].  When Plaintiff commenced a lawsuit against Defendant, Defendant sought dismissal based on the arbitration language of their agreement.
[brief] Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica, 7 Cal. 3d 473, 498 P.2d 987 (Cal. 1972) .......................20  Winters v. North Hudson Reg. Fire., 212 N.J. 67 (2012) ....................................................31  Yellen v. Kassin, 416 N.J. Super. 113 (App. Div. 2010) ...........................28
[brief] [15T:151-14 to 152-3]  The problem with the Prosecutor’s statement is there is a Court Rule that required [...] to record [...]’s statement.  R. 3:17.  There is no court rule that requires a forensic evaluation to be recorded and they are routinely not recorded.  R. 3:17 requires the State to record custodial interrogations of defendant’s charged with murder.  However, the State insinuated that the State recorded their interviews because they are honest, and the defense did not record interviews to purposely withhold information.  Moreover, the Prosecutor continued disparaging the defense expert as prohibited by Smith, supra, 167 N.J. 182-85, and said “[...] chose to withhold that information from you. ” (15T:152-5).  “I suggest that’s not good enough in any criminal case, and certainly not good enough in a criminal case where you are deciding four criminal charges and one weapon’s offense. ” (15T:152-5 to 9).  Again, there’s no requirement for a psychologist to record a forensic evaluation and they routinely testify based on their report.  However, the State persisted and said, “not good enough in any criminal case, and certainly not good enough in this one. ” (15T:152-8 to 11).  Here, The Prosecutor abdicated his duty of making sure justice was achieved by making these comments with knowledge that forensic evaluations are not required to be recorded and are in fact not recorded the majority of the time.  *State v. Jackson*, 211 N.J. at 408.  (15T:194-5 to 10).  The Prosecutor’s comments were inappropriate, prejudicial and so egregious that it deprived [...] Kologi of a fair trial.  *Smith*, 167 N.J. 182-85.  **d.
[brief] -  By secretly entering into these loan agreements without the knowledge or approval of [...]’s board and [...]’s executive committee, [...] not only breached the bylaws and OA, but demonstrated a pattern of self-dealing and bad faith.  This was properly found by applying the correct legal standard.  In order to establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiffs must demonstrate: (a) defendant owed them a duty, (b) defendant breached that duty, (c) plaintiffs were injured by defendant's breach, and (d) defendant caused the injury.
[brief] TREC funding is not predicated upon legislative appropriation and instead is a creature of Board regulatory development and the various Solar Acts  The Board’s issuance of TREC s involves no expenditure of State funds, and thus no legislative appropriation is implicated.  While SRECs, and the new SRECs-II, have some legislative foundation, N.J.A.C. 14:8-2.2, TREC s are creations of the Board, December 6, 2019, Order, at 33 (042a).  That Order set the price, the obligation for the purchase of these TREC s by the LSEs, and the designation of a TREC Administrator by the EDCs, for the purpose of administering this program.  Id. at 34 (043a).  Specifically, the Order explicitly notes:  The Board HEREBY ORDERS that the EDCs may recover reasonable and prudent costs for TREC procurement and TREC Administrator fees.  Recovery shall be based on each EDC's proportionate share of retail electric sales.  Each EDC shall make an annual filing for its costs and the recovery method, which shall be subject to approval by the Board.  [Ibid.]  This Order makes clear that the financial foundation, and source of payment to the TREC owners, is not in any way based upon or predicated on a legislative appropriation.  If the Board were to approve the still-pending [...] project, or be directed to approve this pending matter, the source of funding would be the same as for all existing TREC projects – the obligation for the load serving entities to purchase and the EDCs to recover through the Board’s ratemaking process.  Thus, even if the program were “over” such that pending and timely applications were simply capable of being unilaterally ignored – which it is not – the additional costs associated with the ability to create and sell TRECs would still be purely an administrative process through the Board, the TREC Administrator, and the EDCs.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] (3T:1.)  On May 15, 2024, the trial court dismissed [...]’s challenge to the Distance Regulation and upheld the Board’s denial.  (Pa1.)  The trial court hypothesized, without any evidence before it, that the Distance Regulation advanced “substantial government interests…traffic safety, siting, and aesthetics. ”  (Pa14.)  All the trial court cited was the “purposes” section of the Distance Regulation.  (Id.)  In upholding the Board’s denial, the trial court overlooked all the deficiencies in the Board’s resolution and tried to fix what the Board could not, ultimately creating a positive/negative criteria analysis far beyond the applicable standard.  (Pa20-23.)  On May 17, 2024, [...] appealed.  (Pa204.)  STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] Third, the Rule creates an enforcement mechanism by which a party who believes that a pleading or filing violates the Rule may so advise the adversary, giving the adversary the opportunity to withdraw the pleading without penalty, failing which, that party may seek or the court may impose a variety of sanctions.  R. 1:4-8(b)(1).  See LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62 (2009).
[brief] Plaintiff’s Motion To Compel  [...]’s Deposition  On January 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed the Motion to Compel, which sought to require the German Defendants and the U.S. Defendants to produce [...] for deposition.  (Pa1-Pa3).  Following a lengthy oral argument, in a thorough and well-reasoned decision read into the record on March 22, 2024, the trial court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel.  (See 1T 8:14-21:5).
[brief] ”); Excel Pharmacy Servs., LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 825 F. App’x 65, 70 (3d Cir. 2020) (“But it is well settled that parties cannot bring a declaratory judgment action under a statute when there is no private right of action under that statute. ”).  See also Browne v. Nat’l Collegiate Student Loan Tr., Civ. No. 21-11871 (KM) (JSA), 2021 WL 6062306, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2021) (holding there is no private right of action under the NJCFLA); North v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, Case No. 2:20-cv-20190 (BRM) (JSA), 2021 WL 4398650, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2021) (same); New Century Fin. v. Trewin, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688, at *8 (Sup. Ct. May 24, 2018) (same).
[directive] Certain and consistency ensure to safeguards p~ocedur~al establishes the of Director or the Prosecutor, by Assistant First or Prosecutor County the by approved be while Division, the by prosecuted cases in Director Deputy a or Justice Criminal of Division attorneys prosecutors/deputy supervisory assistant other by made be may decisions other certain Prosecutor/First Specifically, County Director. or Prosecutor County the by designated general may motion detention pretrial before a required approval is Director Assistant/Director/Deputy defendant detention the (i.e., where of presumption a creates Law Reform Bail the unless filed be or imprisonment), term life of extended or ordinary an to subject or murder is with chaxged is See detention.
[brief] 1.  Right to Consent to Psychological Treatment  First, the Parental Secrecy Policy violates parents’ right to consent when the State performs psychological treatment on their children.  *Parham*, 442 U.S. at 602; see also *Parents United For Better Sch., Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ.*, 148 F.3d 260, 275 (3d Cir. 1998) (recognizing that “parental consent must be secured before medical treatment is obtained” by children); *Kanuszewski v. Michigan Dep’t* of Health & Hum. Servs., 927 F.3d 396, 418 (6th Cir. 2019) (noting parents have the “right to direct their children's medical care”); Mann v. Cnty. of San Diego, 907 F.3d 1154, 1160–61 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding state violates parental right by performing healthcare treatment on children “without notifying the parents . . . and without obtaining either the parent’s consent or judicial authorization”).  As [...] explains, social transitioning is a form of psychological treatment.  ACa12, ACa25-ACa31 ¶¶ 8.e, 29–43.  Indeed, the very purpose of social transitioning is to alleviate the mental suffering that persons with a transgender identity can experience.  ACa14 ¶ 9.  Because social transitioning constitutes psychological treatment, parents have the right to consent when the State is performing that treatment on their children.
[brief] “No party is entitled to have the jury charged in his or her own words; all that is necessary is that the charge as a whole be accurate. ”  *Jordan*, 147 N.J. at 422, (citing *Large v. Rothman*, 110 N.J. 201 (1988); *State v. Thompson*, 59 N.J. 396 (1971)).  “Our courts have consistently placed an extraordinarily high value on the importance of appropriate and proper jury charges to the right to trial by jury. ”  *State v. Allen*, 308 N.J. Super. 421, 431 (App. Div. 1998).
[brief] (Pa948)  He then took photographs of the area where he fell.  (Pa846-849, Pa1149-1151)  He confirmed at his deposition that the area in which he had fallen was not a walkway or a sidewalk; it was “actually part of the parking lot. ”  (Pa845, Pa1148; see also Pa513)  Although he later characterized the area where he had fallen as a “walkway,” (Pa948), it is uncontroverted that the area where plaintiff fell was constructed of black asphalt and not delineated in any way as intended for pedestrian passage.  It was clearly part of the parking lot.  It was not a cement sidewalk.  (Pa847-849, Pa1149-1151)
[brief] ”  Pa213a-15a.  Simply stated, there is no evidence to support Plaintiff’s contention that the ambient lighting conditions violated the minimum lighting requirements set forth in [...]’s contract with the [...].  In the work zone, [...] did not utilize flagmen or spotters.  Pa235a-37a.  [...] testified that having flagmen or spotters in the work zone would not have helped avoid an accident because more people on the ground in the work zone would have been more dangerous.
[brief] *State v. Nyema*, 249 N.J. 509, 527 (2022).  Only “some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop” must be shown.  *State v. Nishina*, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003) (quoting *United States v. Sokolow*, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).  “[R]aw, inchoate suspicion grounded in speculation cannot be the basis for a valid stop. ”  *State v. Scriven*, 226 N.J. 20, 34 (2016).  “Determining whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists . . . is a highly fact-intensive inquiry that demands evaluation of ‘the totality of circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State’s interest in effective law enforcement against the individual’s right to be protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions.
[brief] We represent Respondent, [...], in this appeal from the Department’s issuance of Bulletin No. 22-11 (the “Bulletin”).  The Department has simultaneously filed a motion for leave to reply to amicus curiae [...] (“[...]” or “Amicus”)’s brief.  Kindly accept this letter brief as the Department’s response should this court grant its motion to file a reply.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................................  3 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................  3  ARGUMENT POINT I – THE BULLETIN IS NOT A DE FACTO RULE UNDER THE METROMEDIA ANALYSIS ...........................................................................  5  A.  [...] Is Not Entitled to a Due Process Hearing under the APA  Because the Bulletin Prescribes a Legal Standard – That the Holding Company Act Applies to Reciprocal Insurance Exchanges – Clearly Inferable from Statutory Authorization.  .......................10  B.  The Bulletin Reflects an Administrative Policy Regarding the Holding Company Act That Has Previously Been Expressed in an Official and Explicit Agency Determination, Adjudication or Rule.  ..............................................................................................................14  C.  The Bulletin Does Not Constitute a Material and Significant Change from a Clear Past Agency Position on the Identical Subject Matter.  .............................................................................15  POINT II – SSAP No. 25 APPLIES TO RECIPROCAL INSURANCE EXCHANGES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS-IN-FACT ............................................16  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................19
[brief] ”  Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 543 (2006); see also Gotlib v. Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. 295, 310-11 (App. Div. 2008) (requiring the trial court to consider the Newburgh factors despite the judgement of divorce providing for college contribution because it was silent as to how the expenses would be divided).  The allocation of college expenses is a fact-sensitive task.
[directive] Attorney General's Guidelines on Police Response officers does not supercede the 1  This model policy is based on a comprehensive policy approved by the New Jersey Domestic Violence Fatality and Near Fatality Review Board that was based on a model policy promulgated by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.  Procedures in Domestic Violence Cases and Attorney General Directives  Implementing Procedures for the Seizure of Weapons from Municipal and County Law Enforcement Officers and from All State Law Enforcement Officers Involved in Domestic Violence Incidents [Directives 2000-3 and 2000-4 dated September 1, Attorney General Weapons Seizures Directives].  2000, hereinafter  These guidelines and directives remain in full force and effect and must be followed by law enforcement officers responding to a domestic violence call involving a law enforcement officer.  Failure of any officer or supervisor to comply with any provision of this policy will subject the officer to discipline.
[brief] See, e.g., J.C. Park, et al., \textit{Pupillary Responses in Non-Proliferative Diabetic Retinopathy}, Sci. Rep. 7, 44987 (2017) (available online) (explaining that “pupil size has long been recognized to be abnormally small in diabetics’ and confirming that finding across many variables).  [...] did not know whether [...]’ pupils were small in comparison to [...]’ baseline.  Thus, the fact that [...]’ pupils appeared small did not provide him with reason to believe [...] was under the influence, and also therefore did not provide him with reason to believe that drugs were inside the car.
[directive] 33.  SERIAL NUMBER - Enter the full serial number of the property if it exists.  34.  ESTIMATED VALUE - Enter the estimated value of the property.  35.  DISPOSITION OF ITEM - Enter the disposition of the property from the Disposition Code Table, located in the center right portion of the report.  36.  PRINT RANK/OFF.  NAME - PRINT the rank and name of the officer doing the report.  37.  BADGE NO. - Enter the badge number, if used, of the officer doing the report.  38.  REPORT DATE - Enter the date of the report, month, day, year.  39.  PAGE NO. OF PAGES - If additional page(s) are needed to describe property relating to the case, indicate which page and the total number of A-10 pages that are being submitted.  40.  REVIEWED BY - For use by the person in the agency after reviewing and approving the report(s).  BLOCKS 41 THROUGH 45 ARE TO BE USED FOR TRACKING THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE ITEMS RELATED TO THE CASE.
[brief] Pb  Plaintiff-Appellant’s brief Pa Plaintiff-Appellant’s appendix  Db  Defendant-Respondent’s brief  Da  Defendant-Respondent’s appendix  T Transcript of February 3, 2023, Argument on Plaintiff’s Motions to Reinstate and for Summary Judgment  TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX  Defendants’ February 17, 2010 Notice of Removal to Federal Court  .................................................................Da1  Defendants’ February 19, 2011 Notice of Motion to Dismiss Complaint  Pursuant to Fed.R Civ.P. 12(b)(6) ..............................Da11  Plaintiff’s February 22, 2011 Notice of Motion to Remand to State Court ........................................................................Da13  Plaintiff’s September 23, 2013 Motion Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) To Vacate Order and Opinion Entered on April 14, 2020 ................Da15  Plaintiff’s December 2, 2013 Motion to Take Judicial Notice ...............Da37 Plaintiff’s February 24, 2023 Notice of Motion for An Order for the Court to File a Final Appealable Order ........................................Da47  Plaintiff’s April 24, 2013 Notice of Motion to Vacate the Court’s March 29, 2023 Order For Failure to Address Fraud Upon the Court ........................................................................Da49  Trial Court’s August 15, 2023 Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion For Reconsideration, Including Statement of Reasons ................Da52 Plaintiff’s September 28, 2023 Notice of Appeal ........................................Da56 Plaintiff’s Amended Notice of Appeal ................................................Da59  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  In January of 2010, Plaintiff-Appellant [...] (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint (the “Complaint”) in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County (“Monmouth County”), against certain defendants, including [...] (“[...]”), and [...] (“[...]”), at the time a partner at [...].