ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Aa69).  reliable natural gas services” in the State; (2) the Project is “reasonably necessary for the service, convenience, and welfare of the public”; (3) [...] considered “alternative sites and methods” for the Project; (4) the design for the Project is reasonable “considering the alternatives”; (5) the Project will “minimize adverse impacts on the environment”; (6) the Project is “not adverse to the public health and welfare”; and (7) the Project is “to address reliability concerns and not an expansion or improvement project” and is “consistent with the EMP” as it relates to “[...]’s obligation to maintain a reliable and safe natural-gas system. ” (Aa72; Aa76-77; Aa80; Aa84; Aa86-88; Aa92).  Thus, the ALJ granted [...]’s Petition and concluded that, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19, [...]’s zoning and land-use ordinances and any other ordinances, rules, or regulations promulgated under the auspices of MLUL are not applicable to the “construction, installation, and operation” of [...]’s Project.  (Aa92-93).  [...] submitted exceptions to the Initial Decision on July 5, 2022.  (Aa46).  [...] and the [...] filed replies to [...]’s exceptions on July 29, 2022.  (Aa50; Aa54).  **[...] Decision**
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[brief] Apparently sensitive to this failing, plaintiffs contend the trial court relied upon far more than [...]’s testimony in reaching its decision (Subpoint B of their Point II).  They note first that the court had [...]’s schedules analyzing the financial records and that “for each of the defendants’ misappropriations,” the court “reviewed the underlying records, including bank statements, checks, and other materials to support [...]’s opinion that the defendants misappropriated funds from the [...] and [...] accounts.
[brief] Similarly, a review of the claim for damages in both complaints shows the same claim for the same damages in both cases.  (Pa0001)(Pa0015)(Pa0957).  With respect to damages, the Trial Court correctly concluded that Plaintiff had already suffered damages when he discovered the Defendant's alleged negligence.  (T15:4-5).  The most glaring and egregious example of the interconnectedness of the two actions is found in the Lease Litigation Settlement Agreement provisions.  [...], on behalf of the Plaintiff, placed a provision in the Settlement Agreement where he secured the cooperation of [...] in a subsequent malpractice action against Defendants, wherein it was specifically noted that the transaction is the same as the Lease Litigation.  (Pa1272)(T27:15-21).  The Trial Court correctly found that because the Lease Litigation and the Instant Action were successive, Plaintiff had the ability to bring a claim against the Defendants in the Lease Litigation.  Plaintiff's failure to do so violated the Entire Controversy Doctrine.  (T25:17-22).  It is difficult to imagine that on the one hand Plaintiff argues that they did not have to join Defendants in the Lease Litigation, but then devotes twelve pages of the brief to demonstrate that the allegations of legal malpractice occurred before the Lease Litigation settlement.  (Pb 4-16).  The Entire Controversy Doctrine applies to known and accrued claims that the litigant had a fair and reasonable opportunity to fully litigate in the prior forum.  Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 99-100.  Plaintiff is unable to avoid the Entire Controversy bar because they cannot show that they did not know or reasonably should not have known of the existence of the claims in the underlying action.  They also have failed to put forth any evidence showing that they did not have "a fair and reasonable opportunity" to fully litigate claims against Defendants in the Lease Litigation especially when they were cognizant of the potential malpractice claim, the Lease Litigation was litigated for over two years, and were strategizing how to move forward with the claim in a subsequent action.  The Instant Action is exactly the type that the Dimitrakopoulos Court referenced where claims are not joined in the prior action when the two claims arise from related facts or the same transaction or series of transactions, but need not share common legal theories.  Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 119. (T19:13-17).  The timing and facts of the Lease Litigation and the Instant Action clearly show that the actions are successive.  The Trial Court correctly dismissed the Instant Action as violative of the Entire Controversy Doctrine.
[brief] This is not a permissible use of judicial notice under N.J.R.E. 201, or otherwise.  See Route 15 Assocs. v. Jefferson Twp., 187 N.J. Super. 481, 490 (App. Div. 1982).  Petitioner also attempts to downplay the significance of the finding that the decedent is an essential employee, arguing that petitioner still must prove that the decedent contracted COVID-19 during the claimed occupational period, and that COVID-19 was a material cause of her death.  (Pb3, 13).  This argument is not accurate and even if true, is irrelevant.  A finding that the decedent was an essential employee under N.J.S.A. 34::15-31.11 provides petitioner with the presumption that the decedent contracted COVID-19 in the course of her employment with respondent.  This is just about the most fundamental disputed issue in this and most disputed worker's compensation claims, as evidenced by the fact that petitioner pursued this finding by way of a motion to avoid having to litigate it.
[brief] A plaintiff who alleges fraudulent concealment of evidence must establish the following: (1) that defendant in the fraudulent concealment action had a legal obligation to disclose evidence in connection with an existing or pending litigation; (2) that the evidence was material to the litigation; (3) that plaintiff could not reasonably have obtained access to the evidence from another source; (4) that defendant intentionally withheld, altered or destroyed the evidence with purpose to disrupt the litigation; (5) that plaintiff was damaged in the underlying action by having to rely on an evidential record that did not contain the evidence concealed.  *Rosenblit v. Zimmerman*, 166 N.J. 391, 406-07 (2001).  As set forth above, Plaintiffs-Appellants’ factual allegations against [...] and [...] in the 2020 Action were limited to the assertion that [...] “lied” under oath about who he believed the owner of [...] and [...] to be.  It is axiomatic, however, that allegations that a witness lied during his deposition or court testimony are insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a claim for fraudulent concealment of evidence.
[brief] The phrase “whether or not indemnitee is negligent” in the [...] contract is not Azurak compliant without a specific reference to indemnification for [...]’s own negligence.  [...] argues that its contract requires indemnity for its own negligence because Paragraph 2 contained the phrase “whether or not the indemnitee is negligent. ”  Da45, ¶ 2.  Paragraph 4, entitled “Indemnity,” did not contain that phrase, Da45, ¶ 4, adding to the fatal inconsistency between Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 4.  Englert, 389 N.J. Super. at 48, 57-58.  Further, the phrase “whether or not the indemnitee is negligent” does not satisfy the “bright line” rule of Azurak that a contract requiring indemnity be specific and unequivocal.  Id. at 55-56; Mautz v. J.P. Patti Co., 298 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1997).  The trial court therefore erred in ruling that [...] was entitled to indemnification for its own negligence, because courts interpret the language of an indemnity clause against the drafter.
[brief] No binding caselaw, statute, regulation, or administrative decision exists to support Respondents’ interpretation of the LAD to prohibit parental notification.  The closest existing “authority” are the Transgender Student Guidelines promulgated by the Department of Education.  These are not law and are not how we make law in this State.  If the Legislature intended these guidelines to have the force of law, it would have adopted a statute or directed the Commissioner to adopt regulations in this area.  It did neither.  Further, to the contrary, there is a myriad of law and litigation around the nation, previously cited, which establishes that this matter is far from well-settled.
[brief] [...] R. 4:46(a)  Statement of Uncontroverted Facts, Dated 8/10/2023  [...] Certification in Support of Motion for Summary Judgement, Dated 8/10/2023  Exhibit A to [...]’s Certification Complaint and Jury Demand by [...], Dated 2/12/2022  Exhibit B to [...]’s Certification Answer to Complaint by [...], Dated 5/4/2022  Exhibit C to [...]’s Certification Township Of Edison’s Answers to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories and Responses to Document Production Request  [...]  Standard Police Interrogatories and Production of Documents Request  Geist Incident Data Type/Offense as of 3/6/2020 involving [...]  Officer Report by [...] 2/20/2020 (Attached at Pa303)  Kohut Incident Data Type/Offense as of 3/6/2020 involving [...] (Attached at Pa302)  Officer Report by [...] 2/20/2020 (Attached at Pa022)  CAD Incident Report with Police Statuses #20010068 2/20/2020  Use of Force Report by Officer Geist 2/20/2020 (Attached at Pa030)  Use of Force Report by Officer Kohut 2/20/2020 (Attached at Pa031)  Exhibit D to [...]’s Certification Image of CD with “[...] - BWC IMAGING February 20th, 2020”  Burned onto it  Exhibit E to [...]’s Certification Letter from [...] to [...] Regarding Previously Submitted Discovery Responses, now Including Decision Transcript of State v. Howard, Dated 4/25/2023  Transcript of Decision – State of New Jersey v. Howard 10/27/2021  Exhibit F to [...]’s Certification  Exhibit G to [...]’s Certification Complaint Summons 2/20/2020 (Attached at Pa041)  Return of Service Information (Attached at Pa045)  Affidavit of Probable Cause (Attached at Pa047)  Preliminary Law Enforcement Report (Attached at Pa049)  Exhibit H to [...]’s Certification Certification of Disposition Form, Dated 5/17/2022  [Unsigned Order]  Court Finding Howard Guilty on 10/27/2021 - Payment of Fines, Cost and Other Assessments (Attached at Pa168)  Exhibit I to [...]’s Certification Letter to Administrator from Honorable [...] Regarding Order to Dismiss Appeal, dated 4/22/2022 (Attached at Pa321)  Order Dismissing Appeal - Quasi Criminal Proceeding Filed 4/22/2022 (Attached at Pa319)
[brief] In *Cardona*, plaintiff failed to name the owner and driver of a vehicle involved in a motor vehicle accident in which he was injured.  He named “John Doe” defendants in his complaint, but did not move to substitute the owner and/or the driver of the vehicle for the “John Doe” defendants until after the statute of limitations had run.  The complaint was dismissed against those defendants for failure to comply with the statute of limitations.  The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, saying that plaintiff was not entitled to “relation back” because [he] knew or by the exercise of due diligence could have ascertained the identity of [the owner and driver] before filing his complaint…”
[brief] He attended the Hebrew Day School from age 2 (1990) through 2002.  He testified that the buses left the children off on Fifth Street.  The Sixth Street door to the courtyard was not used for entry, but the students would exit those Sixth Street doors on going home.  He recalls occasionally seeing vehicles parked in the Sixth Street courtyard in 1990-2002 time periods.  After 2002, he attended the synagogue every Saturday, but did not recall any vehicles parking in the Sixth Street courtyard (14T4-25 to 28-7).  On cross-examination, [...] testified that during his school years the Fifth Street lot was used as a playground and only the principal parked a vehicle there.  He confirmed that he had no recollection of vehicles parking in the Sixth Street courtyard on Saturdays after 1990 (14T28-10 to 41-15).  That concluded the Synagogue's rebuttal testimony (14T42-13).
[directive] Yard line.  4 rounds 3 seconds each command  Standing Point Shoulder •  Standing, holding a handheld light in a manner the participant would while conducting a motor vehicle stop or field interview and inspecting credentials (i.e. light held over the shoulder or tucked under the armpit).  •  On command draw and fire 2 rounds.  •  Decock and holster • Repeat once •  Secure handheld lights, no lights are used at the next position.
[brief] While res judicata deals with questions of law, collateral estoppel can apply to issues of law or fact.  In the companion case, [...] has rendered a valid final judgment with regard to the particular legal issue of whether the Ordinance which authorize the land exchange contains a sufficient public purpose so that it is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  One of the purposes of the collateral estoppel doctrine is to prevent litigants such as the Appellant in these matters from using the trial court to attempt to reverse an adverse interest.
[brief] Respondent failed to cross-move altogether, and never requested that the matter be dismissed or that summary decision be granted in her favor.  No party to this matter sought the relief granted.  This was improper at the summary decision state pursuant to Angus, 45 N.J.Super. at 367 (App. Div. 2023) and N.J.C.R. 4:46-2(c).  Further, the Commission had already heard Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss at an earlier stage in litigation.
[brief] Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001)  Archway Programs, Inc. v. Pemberton Twp. Bd. of Educ., 352 N.J. Super. 420, 424 (App. Div. 2002)  Ardan v. Bd. of Rev., 231 N.J. 589, 609-10 (2018)  Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 169 N.J. 135, 157 (2001)
[brief] (Pa683).  On April 8, 2016, [...] reported to [...]:  FYI, we interviewed [...] this morning.  He denied any recollection of being under [...] desk or every having a conversation regarding such.  Accordingly, based on the eyewitnesses who witnessed his activity, our office is preparing a major disciplinary charges to be served to [...] for conduct unbecoming and falsification of statements to our office.
[brief] The Honorable [...] denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (Da1540), holding that the SPA’s arbitration clause was not valid under Atalese because “the agreement is deficient as it fails to include language that plaintiffs are waiving their statutory right to seek relief in court. ” (Da1550).  Her Honor rejected defendants’ contention that Atalese did not apply because plaintiffs were “sophisticated parties” who were represented by counsel.  [...] held that Atalese applies to consumer contracts (“[t]here is no exception recognized by law for “sophisticated parties” in consumer contracts”) (Da1550) and distinguished the principal case upon which defendants relied, County of Passaic v. Horizon Healthcare Services, Inc., 474 N.J. Super 498 (App. Div. 2023) on the grounds that it involved a commercial contract and “[t]his matter does not involve a commercial contract. ” (Da1548).  Finally, Her Honor rejected defendants’ contention that plaintiffs had waived their right to object to the arbitration by filing an Answer and Counterclaims in the arbitration and thereafter repeatedly objecting to the arbitration.  (Da1550).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] This is plainly impermissible (and makes no logical sense with respect to the trial court’s simultaneous holding on “ripeness”).  Stated differently, *how can [...] not have had a “fair and reasonable opportunity” to litigate its claim when it was alleged in its own pleading?*  The trial court inappropriately brushed this critical fact aside as mere “background information,” while moreover ignoring the many days’ worth of testimony and evidence on [...], including (i) [...]’s subcontractor performance at [...], (ii) testimony regarding change orders and [...] being “upside down” on money it alleges it is owed at [...], and (iii) the Arbitrator’s Award finding “serious issues with the project” that supported offsetting [...]’s EGP award down to $0.00.
[directive] 8.  추정되는, 말해서, [예/Yes] [아니요/No] 귀하는 지금 징역형을 받을 것으로  다시  귀하가 주 형무소에 갈 것이 있습니까?  거의 확실한  범죄에 대해 유죄를 인정하고  Are you pleading guilty to a crime that contains a presumption of imprisonment which means that it is almost certain that you will go to state prison?
[brief] [...], a representative of Plaintiffs, presented fact testimony and the following experts testified in support of Plaintiffs’ Amended Application: [...], Esq., an environmental attorney; [...], Esq., an affordable housing attorney; [...], P.E. of [...]; [...] of [...]; [...] of [...]; [...] of [...] (Plaintiffs’ traffic expert); and [...], P.P. (Plaintiffs’ professional planner).  Ra10.
[brief] ”  Id. at (4T: 114:03 – 114:10).  In the instant matter, Appellant admitted to merging from the right travel lane to the left travel lane as he approached stopped traffic, because the traffic-line in the left-lane was shorter.  (2T: 190:01 – 190:15).  Appellant made choices from which the jury had the opportunity to determine Appellant’s reasonableness or lack thereof.  More importantly is the language comparison of the negligence charge read to the jury, to that of the requested charge pursuant to *Mockler*; mainly in its instruction as to the ordinary/reasonable person standard.
[brief] During [...]’s sentencing, the Court highlighted hearsay facts that were detrimental for [...] and ignore or downplay any fact that was beneficial for [...].  Despite the countless mental health examinations and testimony regarding [...]’s limitations at trial, at sentencing the Court stated “yes, he acted a little bit younger than his actual age at times. ” (17T:179-4 to 5).  That is substantially downplaying a sixteen-year-old boy who slept in the bed with his parents and still believed in Santa Claus.  (9T:153-24 to 3); Furthermore, during sentencing the court called [...] a “cold blooded killer” and “mass murderer. ”  (9T:177-11 to 24);(9T:178-4 to 12).
[brief] At the very least, disputed issues of material fact exist as to whether: (i) the [...]; (ii) the [...] in licensing data; and (iii) [...]’s data-licensing component, are “news media. ”  i.  The [...] (Ja1-3; 4T)  An appellate court in California considering a parallel matter initiated by Relator there has held that the [...] is not the news media.  State ex rel. Edelweiss Fund, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 90 Cal. App. 5th 1119, 1147-51 (1st Dist. 2023), rev. denied, Aug. 9, 2023 (“Edelweiss CA”).  So too has a trial court in Illinois.  See Ja3875-77.  Edelweiss CA likened the [...] to an SEC database to which reporting companies were required by regulation to submit information that had been held by another California court to not be the news media.
[brief] ”  This new requirement was expressly excluded from the Original Resolution.  Pa002; Pa025; Pa123.  So brazen was the Stealth Resolution that it freely recognized that, despite approving [...]’s SPA on June 13, 2022, “the Board discussed and ultimately resolved and decided to proceed upon the proposed form of reservation while at the same time adding certain conditions and requirements to be memorialized in [the Stealth Resolution] . . . the Board has adopted the within [Stealth Resolution] for that purpose.
[brief] ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT  Granted.  THIS MATTER being opened to the Court by [...], attorneys for Defendant, [...], upon notice to Plaintiffs' Counsel., upon application for an Order granting Summary Judgment on behalf of Defendant, [...], and the Court having reviewed the papers submitted and for good cause shown, IT IS on this 7TH day of JUNE, 2024, ORDERED that Summary Judgment be and is hereby granted on behalf of Defendant, [...], only, dismissing any and all claims against them and; it is further ORDERED that a true copy of this Order be deemed served upon all counsel when it is uploaded to the E-courts website.
[brief] [...] officials misleading the court and the defense, as appears has occurred, also violated [...]’s rights to confrontation, due process, a fair trial, and to present a complete defense, as well as court rules requiring \(^{13}\) Cf. State v. Hanna, 248 N.J. 148, 181 (2021) (finding counsel ineffective for failure to marshal available evidence of third-party guilt, emphasizing such evidence is admissible if it has rational tendency to engender reasonable doubt defendant is person who committed offense, and noting statements against penal interest are generally admissible when they draw connection between third party and offense) the State to provide defendant with exculpatory information and material.  U.S. Const. amends.  V, VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, 10; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 550 (reiterating that court “would not require a person who is probably innocent to languish in prison because the exculpatory evidence was discoverable and overlooked by a less than reasonably diligent attorney”) (quoting Ways, 180 N.J. at 188); R. 3:13(b).  At the very least, an evidentiary hearing should be granted on fundamental-fairness grounds.  Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 108 (1995) (fundamental fairness “serves…as an augmentation of existing constitutional protections or as an independent source of protection against” unjust or arbitrary state action); In re Directive of the N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 110 N.J. 69, 81 (1988) (fundamental-fairness doctrine has been applied to provide procedural protections beyond due process clause).  POINT III: THE PCR COURT MADE A SERIES OF PROCEDURAL RULINGS THAT INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY DEPRIVED EARLEY OF DUE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, REQUIRING REVERSAL.
[brief] ”  Id.  In this case, documentary evidence revealed the circumstances under which the fraud was planned and committed by the defendants from 2016 to 2019.  As early in 2016 when they found out the error on the deed, [...] and his family started to set up a plan for a quick sale of the Property later.  In 2019, the fraud cumulated in Sam’s signing a fraudulent deed transferring the Property from “[...]” to [...], with all defendants’ knowing that [...] was not the owner of the Property.  In 2019, when Sam signed the name “[...]”, a name that he had never used before on any documents for decades, the defendant’s actual and sole intent was to defraud [...] and steal his property.  When the Trial Court found that when in 2019 [...] signed the name “[...]” on the deed, the defendants had clear knowledge that Sam was not the owner, the Trial Court should also have found the plaintiff’s fraud and fraudulent conveyance claim in favor of the plaintiff.