ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The benefits of LKA and LDW are obvious, and the economic costs of those features in 2016 were also evident, because the features were optional on 60% of new vehicles.  Ordinary consumers were perfectly capable of reaching their own conclusions about whether the costs of these systems in 2016 outweighed the benefits—particularly given that, as the trial court observed, “[a] driver’s responsibility for avoiding collisions by limiting speed, braking and steering, have been an inherent and well-understood characteristic of automobile operation for over a century. ”  (2T26.)  As [...] observes, “[a] product satisfying the well-informed or reasonable safety expectations of the ordinary consumer is not defective. ”  Geisfeld, 74 Brooklyn L. Rev. at 788.
[brief] (Aa20).  According to the plain language of the statute, [...] is not an entity statutorily permitted to withdraw from a school district pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11.  The statute states:  Notwithstanding any other law, rule, or regulation to the contrary, a board of education of a local school district or of a local school district constituting part of a limited purpose regional district, the board of education or governing body of a non-operating school district, or the governing body of a municipality constituting a constituent district of a limited purpose regional district, part of an all purpose regional district, or part of a consolidated school district may, by resolution, withdraw from a limited purpose or all purpose regional district or consolidated school district in order to form or enlarge a limited purpose or all purpose regional district .  . . .  [N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a). ]  Therefore, pursuant to the statute, the following entities may “by resolution, withdraw from a limited purpose or all-purpose regional district or consolidated school district in order to form or enlarge a limited purpose or all-purpose regional district.
[brief] Ia266 to Ia267.  In the present case, the applicant provided notice of a proposal "to subdivide an existing tract known as Lots 23, 24 .01, and 34 in Block 24 into nine (9) new single-family parcels" (Ia170).  However, approval of each lot would allow the applicant or its successors to develop a basement apartment thereon in addition to a single-family residence -- doubling the number of families from nine to eighteen.  A reasonable person who might not mind nine units on three acres abutting a narrow portion of Fourteenth Street, might mind very much if they realized that there could potentially be eighteen units.  The trial court only indirectly addresses [...]'s issue:  There was much discussion at the time of the application regarding basement apartments.  That was not before the board, nor is it before the Court, but would be disingenuous for the Court to assume that that was not a concern that was before the board and the public, that the applicant was creating a subdivision for nine single-family homes.  Everyone recognized that the ordinances in Lakewood permits homeowners to seek permission to create basement apartments, so long as they comply with the Township requirements.  4T37-5 to 4T37-14.  If the notice referred to 'nine parcels' or 'nine residential parcels,' there could be an argument as to whether there was sufficient information under the Perlmart standard.  However, this applicant affirmatively represented that the proposal was for "nine (9) new single-family parcels" (Ia170) when in fact the approved parcels could house as many as eighteen families.  The representation on the notice was misleading, and it is unreasonable for the court to assume that 'everyone' in Lakewood who may have been interested in the application understood UDO Sec. 18-910D.  CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, the Final Order Of the Trial Court granting subdivision approval should be reversed.  Date: June 13, 2024  Respectfully Submitted, [...]  By: [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  [...] AND SOLOMON : HALPERN, INDIVIDUALLY, : Civil Action Plaintiff/Respondent, : v. : ON APPEAL FROM TOWNSHIP OF LAKEWOOD PLANNING : THE SUPERIOR BOARD, [...] (A FICTITIOUS : COURT OF NEW NAME FOR PERSONS PRESENTLY UN- : JERSEY, LAW KNOWN) AND [...] (A FICTITIOUS NAME FOR A BUSINESS ENTITY : DIVISION, COUNTY PRESENTLY UNKNOWN) : OF OCEAN Defendants, And [...], Intervenor/Defendant ______________________________________: BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT PLANNING BOARD OF THE TOWNSHIP OF LAKEWOOD TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................4 TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS ...............................................................6 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS .........................7 PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..............................................................8 STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................10
[brief] To the contrary, it is clear that the trial court understood that prior to the 2023 Amendment, the AG did not have any power to withdraw the public disclosure bar in a relator-led litigation.  See 1T at 13:23–14:3; 4T at 20:4–10, 20:20–21:12, 23:8–20, 28:1–6.  Defendants could always assert the public disclosure bar as an affirmative defense in relator-led actions—regardless of the AG’s view—but could never assert it where the AG intervened and assumed control of the case.  The 2023 Amendment was undeniably designed to give the AG new authority not included in or contemplated by the previous statute.  The 2023 Amendment was accordingly not “designed to reaffirm and clarify the existing standards” under the NJFCA, but rather to “establish different or new standards” for the availability of the public disclosure bar defense in relator-litigated actions.  See Pisack v. B&C Towing, Inc., 240 N.J. 360, 372 (2020) (quoting In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 51 (1996)) (statutory amendments were not curative because they empowered municipalities to levy previously prohibited fees).  Nonetheless, the trial court reasoned that limiting the 2023 Amendment to a solely prospective application “would impair the entire statutory framework and render it impracticable” because it would “in essence . . . preclude the fact that the Attorney General maintains as the party-in-interest for the life of the action” and would “curtail the State’s ongoing opportunity to intervene when circumstances warrant.
[brief] THE COURT:  In that case, the court addressed the affidavit of merit statute.  THE COURT: And specifically addressed whether that -- whether the affidavit of merit statute could be applicable to a breach of contract claim.  The court there found that "it is not the label placed on the action that is pivotal, but the nature of the legal inquiry.  Accordingly, when presented with a tort or contract claim asserted against a professional specified in the statute, rather than focusing on whether the claim is denominated as tort or contract, attorneys and courts should determine if the claims underlying factual allegations require proof of a deviation from the professional standard of care applicable to that specific profession.
[brief] (Pa1.)  As to [...], the Complaint alleges two counts by [...]: breach of contract and promissory estoppel.\(^{12}\) (Pa5, at ¶¶ 29-47; and Pa8, at ¶¶ 48-60.)  The Complaint also demands, on behalf of both Plaintiffs, judgement that [...] is owed defense and indemnity from [...] in the Hood Lawsuit, and that Plaintiffs be reimbursed for all fees and expenses incurred for the DJ Action and the Hood Lawsuit.  (Pa13, at ¶¶ 83-110.)  On June 17, 2019, [...] filed an Answer with Affirmative Defenses, a Counterclaim against [...] for rescission and a Crossclaim against all co-defendants for contribution based on their potential liability.
[brief] (Deposition of [...] 36:15-37:2, 865a).  Then-Administrator [...] admitted that the Township was bound by the ECPO’s findings as a result of its investigation and Defendants were precluded from taking any action against Plaintiff either administratively or criminally arising from his conduct during the July 5, 2016 incident.  ([...] Dep. 63:5-14, 518a).  [...] testified specifically as follows:  Q.  So if the prosecutor’s office found that [...] did not engage in any criminal conduct, and further, their investigation was not able to sustain any allegation of wrongdoing that would give rise to an administrative action or disciplinary charges, the Township would be bound by that; isn’t that correct?  (objection)  A.  Yes.  (Id. at 63:15-24, 518a).  The members of the Township Committee were also advised by the ECPO that Plaintiff did not engage in any misconduct or failure to act which could result in any disciplinary action against him regarding his employment with the Township.  ([...] Dep. 30:21-31:5, 796a; 34:10-22, 797a).  At its meeting on August 1, 2017 the [...] passed a “no confidence” resolution regarding Police Chief [...] and called for his immediate resignation.
[brief] Initially, we address Plaintiff’s brief, pages 1, 12 and 14 FN 1, which misrepresents that the only order on appeal is a September 23, 2022 denial of --- 1  The appendix attached hereto is Defendant’s counsel’s certification of all unpublished cases in Defendant’s opening brief. reconsideration.  On the contrary, Defendant’s Case Information Statement (“CIS”) and Notice of Appeal make clear that she challenged both the September, 2022 and May 31, 2022 orders,² and the May 31 order is attached to the November 7, 2022 CIS.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court has held the correct procedure for deciding cases where the injuries are challenged as being insufficient to meet the lawsuit threshold will follow the summary judgment model.  *Oswin* at 294.  The *Oswin* court reached the conclusion that under the 1988 version of *N.J.S.A.* 39:6A-8, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate through “credible, objective medical evidence,” a material dispute as to the existence of an injury that would fall under one of the threshold categories.
[brief] As per the Complaint and [...] Cert., the invoices were fraudulent and deceitful, and there is evidence that the money was used for other unlawful purposes.  The Board is entitled to discovery to check the veracity of these claims.  \(^{49}\) Pa279 – Pa331 23.  While the parties’ contract required [...] to provide [...] with a listing of all employees, wages, and hours worked, during the time when [...] instructed [...] not to provide services, due to the coronavirus shutdown, [...] obviously could not provide that information, since it did not exist.  **Board’s Response**  Disputed.  The Board is entitled to discovery to check the veracity of these claims. \(^{50}\)  By granting summary judgment 2.5 months before the discovery end date, before the Board could obtain answers to interrogatories and depose Defendants, the court unfairly prohibited the Board from prosecuting its case, and testing the credibility, veracity, and analysis of the alleged payroll document and defendant’s self-serving certification that the court relied on in its dismissal order.
[directive] To maintain those skills necessary to function properly, a K-9 team trainer or supervising K-9 trainer must conduct or assist in the delivery of one or more basic K-9 training courses which satisfy the requirements set forth herein, or other K-9 training which has substantially equivalent requirements, every three years, or periodically participate in the in-service training sessions and/or reevaluations on a regular basis.  While K-9 trainers or supervising K-9 trainers are responsible for the overall K-9 training program, in particular, those areas which involve police officer handler-police dog team training and relevant areas of classroom instruction, specialists should be utilized, as appropriate, to conduct specialty training in their areas of expertise.  The K-9 11 7/2002 K-9 Training Standards and Qualification Requirements trainer or supervising K-9 trainer has the discretion to identify those areas which are appropriately instructed by specialists or other instructors and the responsibility for determining whether the background or knowledge of the specialist or other instructor is sufficient.  Specialty training would include, for example, veterinary medicine and canine care, law, and tracking or scent work.  [A law enforcement officer who is an instructor in the [...] is qualified to re-evaluate police officer bloodhound teams in lieu of the preceding requirements.]
[brief] First, in Houseman v. Dare, 405 N.J. Super. 538 (App. Div. 2009), the Appellate Division opined: “the remedy of specific performance can be invoked to address a breach of an enforceable agreement when money damages are not adequate to protect the expectation interest of the injured party and an order requiring performance of the contract will not result in inequity to the offending party, reward the recipient for unfair dealing or conflict with public policy. ”  Id. at 543-44.  Despite Plaintiff’s Complaint including a request for money damages, the Chancery Division’s opinion departs from Houseman, supra, by failing to address: (1) if and how money damages fail to protect Plaintiff’s expectation interest and (2) if and how will not result in inequity to the [...], reward the Plaintiff for unfair dealing or conflict with public policy.  Second, in Carr, supra, the Appellate Division’s three justifications for affirming the trial court’s decision to deny the plaintiff’s specific performance claim to reform the settlement agreement are each applicable to the instant matter:
[brief] "The Centre Cannot Hold" - The Need for Effective Reform of the U.S. Civil Discovery Process (/file/document/centre-cannot-hold-need-effective-reform-us-civil-discovery-process) (pdf)  From Both Sides Now: Additional Perspectives on "Uncovering Discovery" (/file/document/both-sides-now-additional-perspectives-uncovering-discovery) (pdf)  Pre-Trial Cost Reform Imperative to Preserving Endangered Jury Trial (/file/document/pre-trial-cost-reform-imperative-preserving-endangered-jury-trial) (pdf)  Pretrial Agreements (/file/document/pretrial-agreements) (pdf) and Trial Agreements (/file/document/trial-agreements) (pdf)  The State of Discovery Practice in Civil Cases: Must the Rules Be Changed to Reduce Costs and Burdens, or Can Significant Improvements Be Achieved Within the Existing Rules?  (/file/document/state-discovery-practice-civil-cases-must-rules-be-changed-reduce-costs-and-burdens-or) (pdf)  Uncovering Discovery (/file/document/uncovering-discovery) (pdf)  Judicial Management of the Litigation Process: Is the Solution to Excessive Cost and Delay Greater Judicial Involvement?
[directive] Patients and their primary caregivers who register with the Department of Health are authorized by the New Jersey Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act (“CUMMA”) to possess medical marijuana that had been dispensed to them by a New Jersey “Alternate Treatment Center. ”  The general policy set forth in the Attorney General’s Enforcement Guidelines for Police is that law enforcement officers in this State should not interfere with the CUMMA-authorized acquisition, possession, or use of medical marijuana.  Nor should registered medical marijuana patients and primary caregivers be targeted for heightened police scrutiny.  CUMMA creates an “affirmative defense” to a charge of violating the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act.  When a person in possession of marijuana claims to be a registered medical marijuana patient or primary caregiver, an officer should not make an arrest, file criminal charges, or seize marijuana or associated paraphernalia unless the officer has specific and articulable reasons to believe that the CUMMA affirmative defense does not apply to this suspect or in this situation.  If an officer does make an arrest, file a complaint, or seize marijuana or marijuana- related paraphernalia, the officer should alert the prosecutor that the defendant had claimed to acting in accordance with CUMMA, and the police report should explain the specific reason(s) why the officer had determined that the affirmative defense does not apply.  As a general rule, a police officer dealing with a person who claims to be a medical marijuana patient or caregiver should follow the same investigative procedures and exercise the same type of charging restraint that would be used were the officer addressing the possession or use of oxycodone or any other controlled dangerous substance that can be lawfully dispensed, possessed, and used in accordance with State law.  Police should not follow an “arrest first, let the court 1  This summary highlights a few of the key provisions of the Attorney General Medical Marijuana Enforcement Guidelines For Police.
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[brief] Appellants/Cross-Respondents also appeal from the Court’s denial of various affirmative defenses that the Appellants/Cross-Respondents contend were not fully addressed in the Trial Court’s Opinion including Equitable Estoppel, Fraud, Waiver, Laches, and Failure to Adhere to the Statute of Frauds.  Simply, because the Court concluded that (1) [...]’s conduct in creating the December 1998 Deed was an error made in good faith with the advice of counsel and (2) [...] enjoyed peaceable possession of the Property until 2019 at the earliest, these affirmative defenses have no merit as a matter of law.
[brief] (12T 29-19 to 30-2; 12T 31-10 to 23)  [...] also testified that she noticed defendant to be right-handed, just like the shooter, when he was writing in the courtroom, but she said she was unaware that only ten percent of people are left-handed.  (12T 42-7 to 24; 12T 65-8 to 10)  [...] also testified that she assembled the various video footage that was played in the courtroom into a synchronized four-panel version that was in evidence.  (12T 22-1 to 12; Da 20)  [...] testified that when defendant was transported to the Homicide Task Force after first being taken to Trenton police headquarters, defendant was wearing one sneaker, on his right foot, but when he arrived at Homicide, defendant was not wearing any sneakers.
[brief] [...] failed to give [...] the appropriate advice at the time of the execution of the mortgage of the deeding of the property to [...].  (Pa000003).  The Probate Action was commenced to constitute Article III in Chancery Division, Probate Part. (Pa000011).  [...] negligently drafted the Will of [...] so that it was found to be vague and ambiguous by the Court, and the Court’s holding resulted in an award to [...] of forgiveness of the mortgage which was contrary to [...]’s intent and which damaged [...] and [...]’s Estate.
[brief] The Per Diem Penalty is an amount all parties agreed upon and not intended to represent actual damages.  [Pa032.].  Furthermore, the Trial Court, serving as the trier of fact, also specifically found as follows:  -  The Supplemental Resolution essentially voided the initial resolution the [...] enacted.  Pa033.  -  The [...]’s actions, memorializing a resolution unlawfully, severely delayed [...]’s ability to continue with the project.  Id.  •  The [...], by enacting the Supplemental Resolution, rendered the initial Resolution unworkable and essentially void.  Pa034.  •  The Supplemental Resolution was an act by the [...], either intentionally or unintentionally, to further delay the overall project.  Pa033.  •  It was the [...]’s bad faith that caused the delay, and it should not escape the penalty provision incorporated in the agreement for such tactics.  Id.  Both the [...] and [...] have filed separate appeals concerning the August 8, 2023 and December 19, 2023 Orders asserting identical and thus duplicative arguments.
[brief] (7T 264-7 to 15)  [...] never questioned [...] of his assertions that he testified about on April 29th, 2014, concerning defendant dropping [...] and [...] off in the T-Mobile parking lot located at [...], (13T 17-17 to 21) but wrote in his affidavit in support of probable cause for a search warrant, that defendant dropped [...] and [...] off at "10:56am in the parking lot of [...]" whereas the suspects exited the Buick and walked up to the store, (Da 48) which contradicts [...]'s police report of the [...] and [...] being dropped off at the intersection of [...], (Da 30) and/or Todd's March 13th, 2014 testimony that he observed the Buick go into the T-Mobile parking lot, where the suspects got out and entered the store.  (6T 7-21 to 22)  His affidavit contradicts [...]'s observation that defendant was leaving the area at 10:44am, [...]'s location of the traffic stop and arrest time of defendant that was allegedly conducted on "[...] at 10:56am", (Da 36) and the C.A.D. report that indicates defendant was stopped at "[...] at 10:53am".  (Da 52)  [...] failed to cross examine him about his knowledge of the faulty maps he cosigned on April 29th, 2014, that allegedly placed defendant in the area of the robberies, (13T 29-30-15 to 9) which the State withdrew on August 7th, 2015, because they were not the correct cell sites.
[brief] For the first time in reply, [...] argued that its “SAM Account Registration” website provided notice to Plaintiffs that they waived their right to a jury trial.  (See Da71-87.)  The [...] certification outlined the general procedures and policies [...] has regarding account registration.  (Da77-78.)  In violation of Rule 1:6-6, however, [...] and [...] purport that their “business records’ somehow demonstrate that [...] personally created an account with [...].  (Da83-84; Db23.)  This is especially troublesome because (1) [...] does not have any personal knowledge of whether [...] or [...] ever accessed a computer, let alone registered for an account; (2) [...]’s business records contain no evidence that [...] personally made any account with [...]; and (3) considering the conduct of [...] and his fraudulent conduct in this matter, and that the account was created after [...] “handled” Plaintiffs’ initial account applications, any allegation that [...] personally created a SAM account should be called into question.  Indeed, [...] certified that “[a]ccording to [...] business records, [...] Pacheco registered to utilize [...]’s SAM program on June 27, 2022[,]” and “[o]nce [...] Pacheco completed the registration of the user ID and password on the SAM, she was directed to the ‘New User Registration Complete’ webpage where, again, the same Terms and Conditions of Use in blue hyperlink are set forth on the webpage without scrolling or additional prompts. ”  (Da83-84 ¶¶ 25-26.)  To suggest, as [...] certified to, that he knows [...] personally completed and registered to use [...]’s SAM website is, at best, speculative, and, at worst, a misrepresentation to the Court.  Factual assertions based on conjecture, as is the case here, cannot be permitted.  See Jacobs v. Walt Disney World, Co., 309 N.J. Super. 443, 454 (App. Div. 1998) (“Because Rule 1:6-6 mandates that certifications be based on personal knowledge, factual assertions based merely upon ‘information and belief’ are patently inadequate. ” (quoting Patrolman’s Benevolent Ass’n v. Montclair, 70 N.J. 130, 133-34 (1976)).  If [...] truly sought to refute the allegations of Plaintiffs, it would have submitted a certification of [...] (the only other person with knowledge), however, interestingly it did not do so.  [...], again, is attempting to certify information that it has knowledge of, through business records or otherwise, to circumvent the fact that Plaintiffs never agreed to arbitrate their claims.
[brief] ”  Ibid.  The school’s actions “in no way forced or prevented [...]’s parents from reaching their own disciplinary decision, nor did its actions force her parents to approve or disapprove her conduct. ”  Ibid.  Similarly, in Anspach, the court held that a public health center did not violate the plaintiff-parents’ liberty interests by providing emergency contraception to a minor without first notifying her parents or encouraging her to consult them, because “the conduct complained of was devoid of any form of constraint or compulsion.