ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] •  The State obtained no confession.  Although [...] was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s argument that even [...]’s denials were incriminating, [...] made no admissions of guilt.  See Frey, 194 N.J. Super. at 329 (“denial of guilt” made it “essential” to “instruct the jury on identification”).  •  The DNA testing failed to place [...]’s DNA in [...]’s home, or [...]’s DNA in [...]’s home.  Moreover, at least some of the DNA swabbed at [...]’s home did not belong to [...].  (Da 89-95)  •  The footwear testing failed to show that the shoes seized from [...]’s home had been in [...]’s home.  Instead, the lab concluded that the shoes seized from [...]’s home had not been in [...]’s home.  (Da 96-97)  •  Location-related data from a phone seized from [...]’s home failed to show that the phone had been in [...]’s home.  •  The State only presented speculative proofs of motive.
[brief] Pa164.  [...] attempted to argue it was both the --- 3  [...] failed to include a copy of the trial court’s Order and Statement of Reasons in its Appendix, but [...] encloses a copy of same in its Appendix.  record owner of the Property and owned it via the doctrine of adverse possession, a contradictory position the trial court rejected.  *Ibid.*  On August 21, 2023, the Appellate Division denied [...]’s Application for Permission to File an Emergent Motion.
[brief] **Statement of Reasons for Decision**  The trial court provided a “Statement of Reasons” in its written opinion, in which it stated the following:  Court finds reasonable rate in Essex County is $395 per hour.  | Activity | Rate | |---------------------------------|------| | Drafting Complaint | 2.7 | | Defend Deposition of Client | 2.3 | | Attend Arbitration Hearing | 1.2 | | Expenses: | $552.20 |  Plaintiff’s Counsel has 18 years of experience and has been involved in over 1,000 matters so he is not entitled to be reimbursed for research. \(^8\)  The court is awarding the reasonable fees based on the results obtained.  Plaintiff is awarded $2449.00 in fees and $552.20 in costs.  [Pa21].  On July 2, 2023, plaintiff’s counsel filed a Notice of Appeal.  (Pa1-3).
[brief] See IMO [...], [...], Essex County, [...] (April 11, 2024), aff’d, [...] (April 16, 2024), WL 3313936 *7.  (Attached to Appellant’s Reply Appendix at Ar001-Ar009).  In our case, the agency failed to identify facts that support the conclusion of connection between Appellant’s request for legal services and his attempt to obtain an unwarranted advantage or benefit for himself, his family, or others.
[brief] In the very first paragraph of the Agreement, Paragraph 1 (Defendant Appendix A3) it states as follows:  "[...] and [...] purchased a townhome unit together in [...].  The down payment shall be equally shared by [...] and [...].  As [...] does not have access to such funds then [...] shall front load the down payment required for closing.  [...] shall pay to [...] the sum as designated by calculating the down payment and dividing by two.  ($140,000 divided by two equals $70,000.)  ...  This is the first paragraph of the Agreement and the only obligation that [...] (plaintiff) has to [...] (defendant).  There is a specific representation made by [...] when she states "As [...] does not have access to such funds ..."
[brief] The DACCA is different from the Connecticut Debt Negotiations statute in the following material regards.  First, the Connecticut statute contemplated licensure, supervision, and enforcement actions against attorneys by the Connecticut Commissioner of the Department of Banking.  See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36a-671(b) (“No person shall engage or offer to engage in debt negotiation in [Connecticut] unless such person has first obtained a license for its main office and for each branch office where such business is conducted”); § 36a-671(c) (authorizing the Commissioner of the Department of Banking to issue a license); § 36a-671a (authorizing the Commissioner of the Department of Banking to suspend or revoke a license, to review fees, to order a licensee to remove any individual from employment, and to order cease and desist); and § 36a-671f (outlining prohibited practices).
[brief] The Oxford English Dictionary defines “natural” as “existing in or caused by nature; not made of or caused by humankind. ”  The Oxford English Dictionary’s secondary definition of “natural” is “of or in agreement with the character or makeup of, or circumstances surrounding, someone or something. ”  The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “natural” as “being in accordance with or determined by nature” or “having or constituting a classification based on features existing in nature. ”  The Oxford English Dictionary defines “inclination” as a “natural tendency or urge to act or feel in a particular way; a disposition or propensity.
[brief] A.  The State’s fingerprint expert properly testified to opinions within his expertise and according to applicable standards and New Jersey Law.  .........................................................  9  1.  [...] properly testified defendant’s fingerprint was on the inside lip of the wine chiller.  ............ 10  2.  [...]’s description of the verification process was admissible.................................................. 14  3.  [...]’s testimony remained within the scope of his expertise.................................................. 18  B.
[brief] Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66 (emphasis added).  Thus, our jurisprudence mandates “state deference to parental control over children” because “it is the parents’ responsibility to inculcate ‘moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship. ’”  Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 307 citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233.  The Court’s decision below is contrary to this required Constitutional deference as it deprives parents, and more specifically parents of LGBTQ+ students, of information critical to the parents’ ability to actively guide and foster their children’s moral and psycho-social development.
[brief] *Deland v. Twp. of [...]*, 361 N.J. Super. 1, 18-19 (App. Div. 2003).  In determining that [...] should not have been enjoined from acquiring the plaintiff’s property by eminent domain, the Deland court noted that [...] was in compliance with its Mount Laurel obligations and had a judgment of repose from Mount Laurel lawsuits.  Id. at 18.  The Deland court was careful to distinguish:  [...] has complied with its Mount Laurel obligations under the 1995 order extending the period of repose from Mount Laurel litigation….  Consequently, we are not confronted with a municipality that is seeking to undermine its capacity to satisfy its Mount Laurel obligations by acquiring land suitable for high-density residential development for another purpose.  Id. at 18-19 (emphasis added).  Even though the property at issue in Deland was part of the town’s affordable housing compliance plan, [...] had fulfilled its constitutional obligation by utilizing other sites.  Accordingly, the Deland court sanctioned the municipality’s condemnation of the property for a different public use, but required the property to remain in the compliance plan and retain its multi-family zoning for valuation purposes.  No members of the protected class were harmed.  [...]’s decision in Mount Laurel Twp. v. [...], 379 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 2005) also supports the continuation of restraints against the condemnation of Plaintiff’s property.
[brief] Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 336 N.J. Super.  395 (App. Div. 2001) ......................................................... 24 Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648 (App. Div. 2011) ......................................................... 29 State v. Adubato, 420 N.J. Super. 167 (App. Div. 2011) .............................. 16 State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576 (1996) .................................................................................. 25 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) ................................................... 31 Summit Medical Associates, P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir.1999) .................................................................. 21 Telebright Corp. v. Dir., N.J. Div. of Tax’n, 424 N.J. Super. 384 (App. Div. 2012) ......................................................... 29 Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450 (2014) ........................................................................................................... 20 Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J. Super. 186 (App. Div. 2003) .................................................................................. 22 Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635 (2002) .............................................................................................................. 21 Weinreich v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 1997) ................................................................................................. 23 Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) .................................................................................................................. 20 Yarris v. Cty. of Del., 465 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2006) ............................................................... 34 Statutes 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ....................................................................................................................... 22 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ....................................................................................................................... 19-20, 30, 33 N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50 ..................................................................................................................... 8 N.J.S.A. 10:5-4 .......................................................................................................................... 8, 22 N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) .................................................................................................................... 8, 19 N.J.S.A. 59:2-3(b) .................................................................................................................... 29 N.J.S.A. 59:3-2(b) .................................................................................................................... 29 Court Rules R. 1:13-1 ..................................................................................................................................
[brief] 226 N.J. Super. at 30-35 (emphasis added).  Even in those egregious circumstances where the officer fabricated evidence, this Court on appeal reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the indictments.  In doing so, this Court held that dismissal of the indictments should have only been ordered “upon a finding that [the] defendants’ rights to a fair trial ha[d] been irretrievably lost because of the police misconduct committed,” and questioned “whether the public must pay the price by forfeiting its day in court on otherwise properly found indictments.
[brief] On March 15, 2021, Plaintiff [...] (“Plaintiff”) unilaterally resigned his position as a substitute security officer with defendant [...] (“the Board”).  The common theme throughout Plaintiff’s employment with the Board was an ill-defined yet pervasive sense of malcontent on his part that culminated in Plaintiff’s crude and abusive tirade against a coworker, [...].  In February 2021, Plaintiff made a submission to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that the Board improperly favored female applicants for a full-time position Plaintiff had applied for.  The EEOC declined to pursue Plaintiff’s submission and the Board never received formal notice of it.  When Plaintiff was not selected for the full-time position, he changed tracks and shifted his attention to an attempt to negotiate a raise on behalf of himself and the other substitute security officers.  On March 10, 2021, a coworker informed Plaintiff of two available shifts that Plaintiff allegedly had not seen notice of.  Plaintiff immediately leapt to the conclusion that Mr. Olivo had somehow blocked Plaintiff’s access to the software substitute officers used to schedule shifts.  Despite having no evidence to support his “feeling” that Mr. Olivo had interfered with the software, Plaintiff confronted Mr. Olivo over text in bizarre fashion and threatened to resign.  Mr. Olivo denied the allegation and suggested that Plaintiff speak to their supervisor, defendant [...].  Mr. Gregory and Plaintiff spoke by phone on March 15th.  During that conversation, Plaintiff concedes that Mr. Gregory said that he hoped Plaintiff would continue to work for the District.  Immediately after this call ended, Plaintiff called Mr. Olivo while “very angry” and called Mr. Olivo a “piece of shit. ”  Immediately after this tirade, another security officer texted Plaintiff and told him that he had been barred from the high school.  Plaintiff immediately resigned without confirming the status of his employment with his supervisor.  The trial court granted summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiff’s CEPA and workplace discrimination claims in their entirety.
[brief] Applying the proper standard of deference, this Court must uphold defendant’s sentence.  D.  Defendant can show no abuse of discretion in his new, shorter sentence.  The crux of defendant’s arguments in favor of reversal seems to be that the judge should have weighed some facts and circumstances more heavily than others.  But, as noted above, “the weight to be given to [any applicable] factor is within the sentencing court’s discretion[,]”  Rivera, 249 N.J. at 290, and defendant’s displeasure with the sentencing judge’s ultimate result does not render that decision an abuse of discretion warranting reversal.
[brief] POINT IX  IF OTHERWISE UPHELD, THE THEFT CONVICTION SHOULD BE MODIFIED TO A DISORDERLY-PERSONS OFFENSE; COMMON SENSE DICTATES THAT THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND A STATE-EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION CARD TO CONSTITUTE  A “PUBLIC RECORD, WRITING, OR INSTRUMENT” THAT, WHEN MERELY RETAINED INAPPROPRIATELY, CAUSES THE EMPLOYEE TO BE GUILTY OF COMMITTING A THIRD-DEGREE CRIME, PUNISHABLE BY UP TO FIVE YEARS IN PRISON, RATHER THAN A MERE DISORDERLY-PERSONS OFFENSE.  (RULING AT 20T 11-25 TO 16-1)  The “theft” in this case was alleged to be defendant’s retention of the [...] wallet ID once he was suspended.  Ordinarily, the theft of such a small item would be a disorderly-persons offense.  N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2b(4).  But the State alleged, over defense objection, and the judge accepted (17T 114-17 to 133-7; 18T 33-16 to 47-11), that the ID was a “public record, writing or instrument kept, filed or deposited according to law with or in the keeping of any public office or public servant,” N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2b(2)(g) -- which elevates the theft to third-degree -- and, thus, the judge denied the motion for a judgment of acquittal on the third-degree aspect of the theft.  (20T 11-25 to 16-1)  Because, in fact, at a bare minimum the rule of lenity requires that such an ambiguous statute be interpreted against the State, the Court should hold that N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2b(2)(g) does not cover a State-employee ID card and that this theft was, at most, a disorderly-persons theft.  Defendant’s rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and the state constitution were violated by a conviction of too high a degree unsupported by the evidence.
[brief] On September 26, 2018, three days after the shooting, two to four members of the HCPO Gang Unit picked up twenty-five-year-old [...] from his place of work and transported him in a police car, uncuffed, to the HCPO Homicide Unit.  (3T 7-2 to 8-13, 25-10 to 36-2)  At some point before he was interviewed, the police took his cell phone.  (1T 5-12 to 13, 80-4)  [...] was not present then and admitted that he “d[id]n’t know” what the Gang Unit officers said to [...] to convince him to go with them or whether they told him that he did not have to go, but [...] nonetheless “believe[d]” that they “asked” him to go, though he did not explain the basis of that belief.  (3T 8-16 to 18, 26-23 to 35-17)  The motion court did not make any finding on whether [...] went voluntarily to the station or on [...]’s general credibility.  At the station, [...] “told” [...] to go into a “[c]ramped” interview room and to “[s]it” in a chair near the wall, while the detectives sat between him and the only exit.  (1T 1-13; 3T 36-3 to 46-18)  The interrogation was primarily conducted by Detectives [...] and [...], but two other detectives alternatively participated later.  (1T; 3T 11-20 to 12-7)  The detectives never told [...] that he could leave.  (3T 27-14 to 28-7)  He remained at the station for over seven hours from 3:29 to 10:40 p.m. until he was formally arrested; in that time, he was questioned for over two and a half hours.  (3T 12-25 to 21-21; Da 109, 00:00:30 to 06:49:05)  Although they took breaks and provided water and coffee, he was confined to the interview room the whole time except to use the bathroom. \(^9\) (3T 22-20 to 23-11, 36-12 to 19) --- \(^9\)
[brief] In State v. Johnson, 186 N.J. Super. 423 (App. Div. 1982), the court held that “[a] revocation proceeding is not part of the criminal process, but part of the corrections process. ”  Id. at 431.  Here, the [...], the governmental agency empowered by law to bring the VOP charge against [...], later withdrew that underlying VOP charge on May 7, 2018, after [...]’s VOP conviction was vacated.  See Johnson, 186 N.J. Super. at 431; (Pa228).  As below, [...] offers no substantive argument that the [...] acted outside of its authority in withdrawing [...]’s VOP charge.  (Pb1-Pb43).  Similarly, [...] fails to offer any substantive argument that would rebut the presumption that the administrative withdrawal constituted a favorable termination.  *Ibid.*  As such, were this court to disagree with the trial court’s findings below that [...]’s malicious prosecution related claims first began to accrue at the time of our Supreme Court’s reversal of [...]’s VOP conviction, then this court should find in the alternative that [...]’s said claims began to accrue on May 7, 2018.
[brief] 1.  Respondeat Superior (10T29:23-38:9; 61:1-66:7)  a)  The Jury was Improperly Instructed that [...] Could Only be Liable if [...] Acted Negligently in Self-Defense.  (11T169:20-170:1)  From the outset of this case the plaintiffs have maintained that defendant [...], while acting within the scope of his employment with [...], struck the plaintiff in the head causing plaintiff to sustain severe injuries.  [...] disputed that [...] acted as alleged and argued that, even if he did, [...]'s actions did not occur within the scope of his employment.  The trial court agreed and granted [...] summary judgment.  This Court reversed that ruling.  (Pa7).  This Court, in sending the case back for trial, held that "'[t]he fact that the employee's conduct is intentional and wrongful does not in itself take it outside the scope of his employment.'" (Pa28-29), citing Vosough v. Kierce, 437 N.J.Super. 218, 236 (A.D. 2014).  Thus, even if [...] struck the plaintiff like the plaintiff said he did, under this Court's ruling it is feasible that a jury could find that [...] was acting within the scope of his employment.  This Court, citing the Restatement (Third) of Agency, §7.07 cmt. c (Am. Law Inst. 2006), stated "[w]hen an employee's assigned duties place the employee in situations in which physical consequences may follow in an uninterrupted sequence from verbal exchanges with third parties[,] . . .  [i]t is a question of fact what motivated an employee’s conduct as verbal exchanges escalate or when an employee’s use of physical force becomes more pronounced.  . . .  Whether that escalation transformed [...]’s actions into ‘an independent course of conduct’ outside the scope of his employment, or whether his actions were unexpectable by Lowe’s under the circumstances, Davis [v. Devereax Found., 209 N.J. 269, 303 (2012)] was for a jury to decide. ”  (Pa29-30)  As will be shown, the trial court’s instructions to the jury on respondeat superior (11T168:17-170:1) reflect a serious misreading of this Court’s opinion.
[brief] (Pa000121).  [...], admittedly, only modified the plans in 2021 (Pa000435).  The trial court subsequently stated as follows:  “Plaintiffs were aware of what was going on.  They participated in this.  And these new plans were developed prior to any work being down on the properties at all. ” (2T Hearing, page 8, line 17 to line 20).  Respectfully, the trial court’s statement is a misstatement of the factual record in this matter, which Plaintiffs brought to the trial court’s attention via their motion for reconsideration.  Plaintiffs asserted that they were not aware of SP 3 or the fact that their Property was a part of the Project until well after all the unauthorized physical entries and damages in this matter had already occurred.
[brief] “[T]o determine whether to pierce the corporate veil, the legal conclusion that it has drawn from the facts found is subject to plenary review. ”  See Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding to the extent the court determined the legal effect of certain transactions or events and whether those events were sufficient under New Jersey law to warrant liability, appellate review is plenary (de novo)).  The duty of care in a member-managed limited liability company is “to refrain from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law. ”  N.J.S.A. 42:2C-39(c).  And although a limited liability company’s operating agreement may alter these fiduciary duties, it may not eliminate them.  N.J.S.A. 42:2C-11(d)(2), (3).  Insolvency will not protect shareholders from the repercussions of improper activities.  Richard A. Pulaski Constr. Co. v. Air Frame Hangars, Inc., 195 N.J. 457, 472 (2008).  “To justify holding the principals of a company individually liable, it is not enough to allege that a judgment against the company will be uncollectible; after all, insulating shareholders from liability following corporate enterprise is the primary reason for incorporation. ”  Id. at 472.  (internal citations omitted).  As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained:  The limitations placed on a claimant’s ability to reach behind a corporate structure are intentional, as the purpose of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is to prevent an independent corporation from being used to defeat the ends of justice, to perpetrate fraud, to accomplish a crime, or otherwise to evade the law.  Hence, to invoke that form of relief, the party seeking an exception to the fundamental principle that a corporation is a separate entity from its principal bears the burden of proving that the court should disregard the corporate entity.  Id. at 472.  The two part rule the Trial Court must follow when deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil, is articulated in Ventron 94 N.J. 473 at 501: (1) the corporate entity must have been an alter ego or mere instrumentality of the individual, and (2) the owner abused the corporate form to “perpetrate a fraud or injustice, or otherwise to circumvent the law.
[brief] ’”  Aiello v. Knoll Golf Club, 64 N.J. Super. 156, 162 (App. Div. 1960) (citation omitted).  Under this standard, even uncontroverted evidence may nonetheless fail to meet the elevated clear and convincing evidence standard.  In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 408 (1987).  The clear and convincing standard must be applied to both liability and damages in the Appellants’ attempt to prove fraud in the inducement.  As if the difficulty in meeting this standard is not enough for Appellants, it clearly becomes impossible under New Jersey case law, as extrinsic evidence to show fraud in the inducement is not admissible in disputes where the matters were expressly addressed in the integrated agreement.