ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Court entered an Order requiring Plaintiff’s counsel to submit a copy of the subject Order and a copy of the Commissioners’ report to the above-stated owners of the subject lots.  (Pa95).  The Court required “any of the above parties who wish to contest the merits of said report” to file with the Court a notice of objection and basis for same by January 12, 2024.  (Pa95).  [...] indicated that absent objection to the merits of the Boundary Commissioners’ Report by the other potentially affected parties in the neighboring lots, the Report of the Commissioners would be enforced.
[brief] Specifically, the PWCRA “registration system” was intended to “enforce existing State and federal labor laws concerning wages, unemployment and temporary disability insurance, workers’ compensation insurance, and the payment of payroll taxes” and “enable the [DOL] to better enforce” these existing State and federal statutes.  N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.49.  To be certain, the PWCRA applies to much more than the obligations imposed by the Prevailing Wage Act, N.J.S. A. 34:11-56.26 (“Prevailing Wage Act”).  Despite the broad language of the PWCRA and its clear legislative history and purpose, Respondents argue that archeological subcontractors are excused from the PWCRA because the registration requirement is limited to only trades and crafts.  Not so.  Respondents’ wishful interpretation runs afoul of the legislative history and stated purpose of the PWCRA.  As the broad statutory language and legislative history make certain, the PWCRA is not intended to ensure payment of only prevailing wages.  Rather, a critical component of the registration requirement is to permit the DOL to monitor compliance of and enforce existing laws concerning unemployment and temporary disability insurance and payroll taxes.  N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.49.  Professionals, including archaeologists, are certainly not exempt from these laws nor can they be allowed to avoid DOL scrutiny.  Not only is Respondents’ novel argument belied by the language and purpose of the PWCRA, but it was also soundly and correctly rebuffed by the DOL Commissioner in a decision that is entitled to deference.
[brief] The Trial Court’s May 8, 2023 Final Judgment, June 26, 2023 Order And August 30, 2023 Order, As The Trial Court Improperly Denied Plaintiff’s Request To Appoint A Receiver Or Special Fiscal Agent For [...], As A Neutral Party Should Have Been Required To Monitor The Dissolution By Defendants.  (Raised Below In Plaintiff’s May 28, 2023 Motion For Reconsideration) (Aa8; Aa66; and Aa87).  Defendants improperly dissolved [...], violating NJ RULLCA.
[brief] To that end, numerous jurisdictions have ruled favorably on a party’s right to retract a remedy or right such as waiver before another party has materially changed positions in reliance thereon.  See E. Hedinger AG v. Brainwave Sci., LLC, 363 F. Supp. 3d 499, 507 (D. Del. 2019) (concluding that the defendant did not waive the right to arbitrate based on the fact that the case was in the early stages and no discovery had occurred); Hibbard Brown & Co., Inc. v. ABC Family Trust, 772 F. Supp. 894 (D. Md. 1991) (party that waived its right to arbitrate by filing a court action may revoke its waiver unless the opposing party would be prejudiced or the revocation would result in improper manipulation of the judicial process); Kacha v. Allstate Ins. Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 92 (Ct. App. 2006) (a waiver may ordinarily be revoked absent a showing of prejudice); Max 327, Inc. v. City of Portland, 838 P.2d 631 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) ([a] waiver can be retracted at any time before the other party has materially changed position in reliance thereon).  In this matter, the Trial Court engaged in a balancing analysis of the Cole factors which clearly weighed in favor of referring certain of the Plaintiff’s claims to an arbitral forum, even where an express act of waiver was made on behalf of Defendants.  Namely, the Trial Court’s analysis found that there was no undue delay by the Defendants in making the request for arbitration, the parties have not engaged in dispositive motion practice or significant discovery, the brief delay was not evidence of a litigation strategy or manipulation of the judicial process, there was no scheduled trial date, and finally, the absence of any discernable prejudice on the Plaintiff.
[brief] 3.  The Respondents rely primarily upon falsely-purported facts, and/or upon gross distortions of fact, where much of which had never been raised at trial.  In this section, I will just list (as bullet points) some examples from the Respondents’ brief, which show that the vast majority of the Respondents’ arguments rely primarily upon falsely-purported “facts”, and/or upon gross distortions of fact, where much of which had never even been raised at trial.
[brief] Pa62  *Pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2), briefs are ordinarily not to be included with an appendix.  Plaintiff is filing the above-reference excerpts from the briefs submitted on Defendants’ motion for a new trial in this supplemental appendix under an exception to R. 2:6-1(a)(2), specifically where “the question of whether an issue was raised in a trial court is germane to the appeal.
[brief] 239 N.J. at 31-33.  They reassured [...] that, if he told the truth about his crimes, he would stay out of jail, “remain free to raise his child,” and that “the truth would set him free. ”  Id. at 32.  The Supreme Court held that the defendant’s will was overborne by the detectives because they “undermined the Miranda warning that defendant’s words could be used against him [in part] by telling him the truth would set him free .
[brief] The arbitration agreement will be enforced only if: 1. it does not adversely affect the public interest, 2. the exculpated party is not under a legal duty to perform, 3. it does not involve a public utility or common carrier, 4. the contract does not grow out of unequal bargaining power or is otherwise unconscionable  In judging whether a consumer contract meets this standard, courts must take into consideration the guidelines set forth in the Plain Language Review Act N.J.S.A. 56:12-1 to 56:12-13, specifically N.J.S.A. 56:12-10.  If a party challenges the validity of an arbitration provision, the court must consider the challenge before ordering compliance.
[directive] Central Registry  Juvenile the subsection See decision.  release charging/pretrial bearing the material on a have might that record delinquency recent has a when defendant acomplaint-warrant for applying of (presumption 4.5.7 seeking of (presumption subsection 7.4.3 and crimes) firearms-related or violent for adjudications risk moderate a PSA produces the crime, with serious charged a is defendant detention when pretrial violence).
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................  ii-iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................  1  LEGAL ARGUMENT ......................................................  1-15  POINT I  THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE; THEREFORE, THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION MUST BE REVERSED.  (Sg001-Sg068; Sg073-Sg236)  POINT II  THE COMMISSIONER INCORRECTLY FOUND THAT APPELLANT VIOLATED N.J.S.A 18A:12-24(b), 18A:12-24.1(e), and 18A:12-24.1(f).  (Sg001-Sg007; Sg164-Sg183; Sg186-Sg191; Sg192-Sg201; Sg206-Sg236)  CONCLUSION ............................................................... 15 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES A.B. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 407 N.J. Super. 330 (App. Div. 2009).............................................. 2 Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 142 (1962)........................................................................... 7 Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197 (1997)......................................................................... 2 Dep’t of Educ v. Capers, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1585*............................................. 8 Friends Retirement Concepts v. Bd. of Educ. Borough of Somerville, 356 N.J. Super. 203 (Law Div. 2002).............................................. 6 IMO [...] Belleville Board of Education, Warren County, SEC No. C09-04 (September 30, 2004) aff’d, Commissioner No. 354- 10/04) (November 17, 2004)......................................................... 7 IMO [...], South Orange Maplewood Board of Education, Essex County, SEC No. C22-22 (April 11, 2024), aff’d, OAL No. 09540- 22 (April 16, 2024), WL 3313936............................................... 11 IMO [...], Bergen County, Commissioner No. 65-2/22 (April 14, 2022).................................... 9 IMO [...], Lodi Board of Education, Bergen County, Commissioner No. 15-12/23A (April 22, 2024)............................. 9 In IMO [...], Hackensack Bd. of Educ., Bergen Cnty., SEC No. C49-12 (August 25, 2014), aff’d, Commissioner No. 325-10/15 (December 15, 2014)................................................................. 9 IMO [...], East Orange Board of Education, Essex County, SEC No. C36-19 (December 24, 2019), aff’d OAL No. 18003-19 (October 17, 2023), WL 8176342……………………………………………………………13, 14 In re Polk License Revocation, 90 N.J. 550 (1982)……………………………………………………………..6 Liberty Mut. Ins. Con. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163 (2006)……………………………………………………………..7 Weston v. State, 60 N.J. 36 (1972)……………………………………………………………..4 STATE STATUTES N.J.A.C. 6A:28-1.2……………………………………………………………..13 N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.4(a)(6)……………………………………………………..12 N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b) ………………………………………………………..1, 6, 10, 11 N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e)……………………………………………………….1, 6, 10, 11 N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f) ………………………………………………………1, 6, 8, 10, 12 N.J.S.A. 18A:12-28(b)…………………………………………………………..7 TREATISE Current Rules of Evidence, comment 5a on N.J.R.E. 101(b)(1)(2005)… 7 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The following references will be used throughout the brief: “1T” shall refer to the August 4, 2021 Board Hearing; “2T” shall refer to the September 1, 2021 Board Hearing; “3T” shall refer to the December 1, 2021 Board Hearing; “4T” shall refer to the April 6, 2022 Board Hearing; and “5T” shall refer to the Transcript of Prerogative Writs Oral Argument held on December 8, 2022.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Allendorf v. Kaiserman Enterprises, 266 N.J. Super. 662 (App. Div. 1993)..............................................4, 5 Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J. 411 (2006).............................................12  Comprehensive Neurosurgical, P.C. v. Valley Hosp., 257 N.J. 33 (2024).......13  Gonzalez v. Safe & Sound Sec. Corp., 185 N.J. 100 (2005)..........................10  Pellicer v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 200 N.J. 22 (2009).................................13  Posta v. Chung-Loy, 306 N.J. Super. 182 (App. Div. 1997), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 609 (1998)....................................................8
[brief] (Pa1148).  In opposition to the defendant’s OTSC, the plaintiff filed a reply certification on January 5, 2024 denying defendant’s allegation that he intended to flee the country.  (Pa1171).  Based solely on the parties’ written submissions and without conducting any hearing, the trial court entered an order on January 12, 2024, ordering both parties to deposit their passports along with the child’s passport within 5 days.
[brief] (Pa000106; Pa000109).  Again, the revised plan did not call for any future construction activities on Plaintiffs’ Property.  Specifically, in response to Interrogatory No. 23, [...] explained that the preliminary site plan (requested by [...]) contemplated incorporating the entirety of Church Lane into the redevelopment project.  (Pa000115).  However, after Plaintiffs objected to their Property being included in the project and requested that they retain their portion of Church Lane pursuant to the ordinance, [...] was instructed to revise the site plan to only incorporate that portion of Church Lane that was not being annexed to Plaintiffs’ Property.  (Id.).  As a consequence of these revisions, a portion of a sidewalk that would have traversed Plaintiffs’ Property was removed, and the remaining portion of Church Lane that was not annexed to Plaintiffs’ Property was rendered useless, as it was no longer wide enough to allow for safe vehicle traffic.  (Id.).  The revised site plan was reviewed and approved by the city planner, [...], as well as an independent engineer, [...] of [...].
[directive] N.J.S.A. (check one)  ___  1. the premises, residence, business establishment, location or specified area set forth above, and an additional buffer zone of 500 feet surrounding the area OR ___ 2. the premises, residence, business establishment, location or specified area set forth above, and an additional buffer zone as described below:  I certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true.  I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are wilfully false, I am subject to punishment.
[brief] No variance or other relief may be granted under the terms of this section, including a variance or other relief involving an inherently beneficial use, without a showing that such variance or other relief can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zoning plan and zoning ordinance.  In its Master Plan, the Township sent a signal to the public, its professionals and boards indicating that, inter alia, that Planning must be comprehensive in nature and coordinated, while ensuring that new development is compatible with existing development without degrading the Township’s cultural and natural resources.  In granting the Application the Board abandoned any attempt to comply with these goals and standards.  The Board allowed the significant expansion of a non-conforming use adjacent to an existing permitted agricultural use (the Plaintiffs property).  The RD-C zone permits agricultural uses and makes no provision at all for residential uses.  The conflict between residential and agricultural uses is well known.  The Board approved an expansion of a use which was significantly in conflict with the Zone and the use of the adjacent property.  The Board failed to take into consideration the environmental impacts of the expansion and disregarded the testimony of [...] as to the flooding damage to his property.  Having a residence in zone which allows intensive agricultural uses may bring the residences in conflict with the allowed farm uses when it comes to noise, dust, and animal smells arising from the permitted use next to a residential one.  The [...] acknowledged that a use variance was required under subsection (d) when it advertised.  However, the [...] required at least three variances under subsection d (1), (2) and (5), though as previously stated, the [...] only advertised for one.  Regardless the standard for approval remains the same for all of the variances.  Moreover, as previously noted, it is probable that the [...] also needed c variances which were not included in the Notices nor picked up by the Board’s professionals on their review of the application.  The standards for the grant of a use variance as opposed to the conditional use variance granted, are more stringent, as noted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the case of *Coventry Square v. Westward Zoning Board of Adjustment*, 138 N.J. 285 (1994).
[brief] It is an application filed by the defendant in his self-represented capacity to get his guilty plea back on the murder charge.  It’s an application to vacate the entirety of the guilty plea charge.  [...] articulates a number of broad concerns here that she says warrant this.  First, there’s an assertion that the defendant feared not being able to have a fair trial, that he believed he couldn’t prove his innocence in the face of the evidence that was being admitted and underlying motions not being resolved in his favor.  There is also an assertion that he had a realistic fear which had to do with threats that he was receiving, letters received by him during the time period when he was asserting his innocence, threats from a co-defendant to get him and his family, threats that his family would be killed.  And in support of these reasons, it is asserted that the defendant’s mother and brother representations during a plea proceeding and the trial court's findings during the plea proceeding generally speaking create a formidable barrier that a defendant must overcome in any subsequent proceeding.  It can't be something that is a whimsical change of mind.  That's not an adequate basis to set aside the plea.  And this Court notes that it goes without saying at this point that I was not the judge who took the plea and I had no ability to make observations regarding his demeanor and candor at the time of the plea proceeding but [...] did and he did everything in an appropriate way.
[brief] “[A] government agency's negligent failure to conduct a prompt investigation of a complaint constitutes ‘a failure] to enforce [a] law’ within the intent of N.J.S.A. 59:2-4 and N.J.S.A. 59:3-5. ”  Reaves v. State, Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety, Div. on Civil Rights, 303 N.J. Super. 115, 116-17 (App. Div. 1997).
[brief] On September 12, 2012, [...] rendered the decision.  “Now what we have in this case are really not one agreement, but a series of agreements.  Again, only one of which was presented to the Court at the time of the divorce, which is very troubling.  Because there are some inconsistencies between the agreements.  The agreement that -- agreements that were in Chinese, quite frankly, were the ones I would expect [...] to understand better than anything else because that’s her native language. ” (See Da130–131, Da412–425.)  [...] had so much concerns why only 12 days after the Chinese Agreements were signed, the English PSA was so much different from the Chinese Agreement.  Judge Barry A Weisberg was misled by [...] to draw a conclusion that the Chinese agreements are not consistent, taken as a whole, with the English agreement.  And I think the English agreement, quite frankly in the way it was presented to the Court, unfortunately rises to the level of a fraud upon the Court. ”  “Certainly no judge reading that agreement would have any way of knowing that the separate Chinese agreements exist.  At the very least, it was a knowing concealment of a relevant fact. ”  “And I don’t find that [...] was – even if that was her burden, was sophisticated or savvy enough to bring that to the Court’s attention.  I find that she was being manipulated through this divorce process. ”  (See Da131–132, Da412–425.)  On June 8, 2016, the Appellate Division affirmed the findings and the decision of [...].
[brief] B.  [...]’s conduct justified the sanction.  [...] makes the patently false and, frankly, shocking assertion that “[...] had honored the change of management control Order, as the Court was hoping he would. ” (Db49) (emphasis in original).  Appellant is undoubtedly banking on this Court not reviewing the record itself, as he inexplicably fails to discuss how the myriad violations of the trial court’s orders that led to the Sanction somehow comport with the claim that he “honored” the change in control.  This Court need not, and should not, opine on the propriety of the Sanction in a factual void.
[brief] Voters who chose to use the vote-by-mail system, particularly those who mailed their ballots only a few days before the election or on the day itself, assumed the risk of non-timely delivery.  There is no “mailbox rule” under New Jersey law that validates a ballot based on the date the voter claims it was mailed.  Rather, both the current statutes and their predecessors focus on the timing and manner in which ballots are received.  Further, at trial, [...], [...], and [...] each testified that they had voted by mail in prior elections, were aware that the Fire District election was scheduled for February 15, 2025, and had received their ballots weeks in advance.  (1T30:11–52:13.)  Their testimony that they mailed the ballots on or shortly before election day is immaterial under the statutory framework, which bars the opening of untimely vote-by-mail ballots.  With ample time before the election, these voters had multiple ways to ensure their votes were counted: delivering the ballots to a drop box by 9 p.m. on election day, voting provisionally at the polls, or mailing them earlier.
[brief] (Pa257).  D.  [...] Street Light Installation  [...] installs streetlights at the control and direction of the [...] (“[...]”), specifically defined in the Electric Tariff.  (Pa292-323).  Section 2.5 of the [...] Tariff for Electric Service, dated October 30, 2018, states the following:  Selection of Lighting Options:  [...] will assist in the selection of lighting options by making recommendations for the most appropriate option based on the customer’s defined illumination needs.  However, responsibility for the final selection shall, at all times, rest with the customer.  Any advice given by [...] will be based on the customer’s statements and by giving such advice, [...] assumes no responsibility, nor shall it incur liability.  A light is only installed in a municipality at the control, request, and cost to the municipality.  (Pa255-56).  [...], [...]’s Operations Manager for Sales and Services, testified that the municipality fills out an order form and indicates to [...] the exact streetlight and the pole that they want the light attached to.  (Pa356-64, Pa375-79).
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(3), (4), (5).  To this extent, the judge properly found that the jury had rejected as a lie defendant’s trial testimony that he had not shot and killed [...].  The judge properly considered that the jury rejected defendant’s claim he had acted in self-defense.  This is not a case where the jury found that conduct did not occur.  The jury found that defendant killed [...] and shot [...].  The jury determined no justification or self-defense for his actions.  The video evidence showed that defendant shot both victims.  Unlike Melvin and Morente-Dubon, the trial court in this case did not rely upon an impermissible consideration or rely on conduct that the jury had found defendant not guilty.  Defendant’s argument that [...] improperly relied upon his lack of remorse is also without merit.
[brief] Pa25 Exhibit A, OPRA Request to Governor’s Office dated March 10, 2022 .................................................................  Pa27  Exhibit B, Response from Governor’s Office dated March 21, 2022 .. Pa30  Exhibit C, Executive Order 110 (Byrne 1981) ..............................  Pa32  Certification of [...], Archivist ...............................  Pa36  Certification of [...], DAG, Records Custodian .... Pa43  Certification of Lt. [...], NJSP, Records Custodian, OPRA .  Pa47  Certification of [...], Director, NJSP, OFS ........ Pa51  Plaintiff’s Certification in Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to the Verified Complaint, Order to Show Cause .............................................
[brief] Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 9/10/2020 | $121,016.97 | n/a |  Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 10/28/2020 | $121,016.97 | n/a |  Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 2/1/2021 | $118,820.00 | n/a |  Not in negotiations unit as of 7/31/2019 | | [...]| 2/1/2021 | $121,016.97 | n/a |
[brief] Section 6.5 of the 1999 Agreement provides in pertinent part:  Out of town buildings –  The parties acknowledge that some users are located outside of the Borough for which sewerage is transmitted through mains and lines through the Borough to the Township Treatment Plant.  The Township agrees that it will bill said commercial users directly and further acknowledges that the Borough may reserve the right to impose an additional fee upon such user, for the use of the Borough pipes and other property by said user, which fee shall be billed to the user by the Borough.  [Da115-Da116 (emphasis added).