ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Ia211, Ia250.  Defendant submitted a reply certification May 22, 2023.  Ia309.  Despite having already responded, Defendant filed another certification May 31, 2023, Ia320, another June 2, 2023.  Ia344, yet another on June 21, 2023, Ia361, and still another June 22, 2023.  Ia363.  Plaintiff responded with one on June 23, 2023.  Ia372.  After argument, the judgment was vacated and a seven-page opinion issued August 14, 2023.
[brief] 7  POINT TWO  CONSIDERING THE MBPA’S INTENT, A CHOICE OF LAW  ANALYSIS NECESSITATES THE APPLICATION OF NEW JERSEY LAW TO THIS DISPUTE ........................................................................  11  A.  The MBPA’s Statutory Scheme Requires Any Agreement Between A Brewer And A New Jersey Wholesaler To Comply With New Jersey State Law And The MBPA  ...............................  12  B.  Even If The MBPA Did Not Mandate Application Of New Jersey Law, Application of New York Law Violates New Jersey Public Policy .........................................................................................  13  POINT THREE  THE MBPA’S ENFORCEMENT PROVISION ESTABLISHES THAT NEW JERSEY COURTS ARE THE CORRECT FORUM FOR ACTIONS ARISING UNDER THE MBPA
[brief] Atalese is instead about the circumstances under which a waiver-of-rights provision within a contract can be enforced as a matter of public policy.  The New Jersey Supreme Court described this concept in Rudbart v. North Jersey District Water Supply Commission, 127 N.J. 344 (1992).  The Court noted the “traditional contract principle is that ‘once the objective manifestations of assent are present, the author is bound,’” but also that contracts can nonetheless be unenforceable based on various policy considerations.  Id. at 353; see also Mortensen v. Bresnan Commc’ns, LLC, 722 F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing similar contractual waiver-of-rights rule as being about unconscionability and public policy, not assent).
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE PCR COURT APPROPRIATELY DENIED DEFENDANT’S PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF.  Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his PCR petition because he established a prima facie claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  In arguing his trial attorney was deficient, defendant contends that his attorney counsel failed to ask the court a third-party guilt instruction to the jury; investigate and present his brother and co-defendant, [...] as an exculpatory witness; failed to communicate a favorable plea offer; and failed to negotiate a global plea resolution between Somerset and Middlesex County.  Db14-35.  Because of these claims, defendant argues that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because trial counsel’s performance fell below the standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and thus, prejudiced him.  Defendant’s contentions are simply wrong and find no support in the record.  Contrary to defendant’s argument, trial counsel competently represented the defendant throughout their attorney-client relationship and there is no credible evidence in the record to support the defendant’s _____________________
[brief] We cite these holdings, but I think in this case it has some enhanced meaning that motion practice must come to an end at some point, and if repetitive bites at the apple are allowed, the core will swiftly sour.  That is D’Atria v. D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super, 392 at 402.  Litigants should not seek reconsideration merely because of a dissatisfaction with the decision of the Court…  ***  With regard to [Appellant]…. asking to reconsider the fees, asking to…, reduce even though it is not a substantial amount, so on and so forth, you know, I took a considerable amount of time.  I wasn’t happy about it, and I said it, … and it was argued … and to a certain degree I can understand why fees had to be incurred, that’s why I gave [Respondent’s counsel] fees.  ***  So [Appellant], your application is denied….
[brief] The Easement Area does not Include the Roads (Da11)  Another of the conditions of the 2019 Site Plan Approval for Lot 2.01 was “[a] valid and properly executed easement agreement with the [...] for access to the Passaic River Docks. ”  (Da285 at § D.)  The term “Passaic River Docks” refers to a floating dock on the Passaic River that is accessible from a portion of Lot 2.01 that abuts the Passaic River.  (Da63 at ¶ 23.)  Accordingly, on February 24, 2021, [...] entered into an easement agreement with the [...] (the “Dock Access Easement”), pursuant to which [...] granted the [...] a public access easement for the use of a certain parking area and walkway on Lot 2.01 by persons accessing the dock (the “Easement Area”).  (Da63 at ¶ 24; Da337-Da343.)  The Easement Area cannot be accessed without first traveling on the Boulevard.  (Ibid.)  However, if the Boulevard is a private road (the position taken by the [...]), then the public would have no legal right to access the Easement Area (unless they entered such area from the sky).
[directive] If in such situations, the person convicted of the crime is the parent of a minor child or resides in a household where there are other minor children, the court must make a referral to DYFS.  The court must provide DYFS with the name and address of the person convicted of the crime, information on the person’s criminal history, and the name and address of each minor child of the defendant and/or any minor child who resides in defendant’s household.  The Conferences of Criminal Presiding Judges and Criminal Division Managers, in consultation with representatives of the Division of Youth and Family, developed the following protocol to implement this law’s requirements.
[directive] If the petitioner files a in Criminal Division that is not the respondent's county of residence, staff will contact the in appropriate county to process the petition.  Similarly, if the petitioner applies at a law enforcement agency another county, that agency will contact the appropriate county or municipal law in enforcement agency.  However, if the respondent resides out-of-state, the hearing will be the in county where the petitioner resides.  Superior Court judges will hear petitions for temporary extreme risk protective orders filed at the Criminal Division during standard court business hours.  Municipal Court judges will hear petitions requested weekdays after standard court hours, weekends, holidays or any other on special circumstance when the Superior Court is not session.  However, emergent duty Superior in Court judges also will available to hear temporary petitions requested after regular court hours, be where appropriate.
[brief] This "easement" purportedly was established by a 1963 Agreement (Da19) between the then owners of the school Lot 5 and the [...]'s adjacent Lot 8.  The case in its early stages was under the supervision of Chancery Judges [...] and/or [...], both of whom retired, then assigned to Chancery Judge [...] in approximately 2015.  In 2016, Motions for Partial Summary Judgment were filed by both the [...] and [...].  The [...] sought a determination that the 1963 Agreement (Paragraph 10) established a permanent easement for the Lot 8 staff/attendees to park vehicles on portions of Lot 5.  (Da160)  [...] sought a determination that the 1963 Agreement established only a permission or license which had lapsed, been abandoned, or revoked.  (Da162)  On July 15, 2016 [...] rendered an oral opinion that the 1963 Agreement and subsequent conduct established that the [...] had a permanent easement to park its staff/attendee vehicles in the school's Sixth Street courtyard and Fifth Street parking lot and to have the Synagogue heating system connect to the School's heating system.
[brief] For the forgoing reasons, the Trial Court’s decision granting the Defendants/Respondents Motion to Dismiss must be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  By: /s/ [...]  CHRISTOPHER J. NORMAN  Attorney for Respondent/Defendant [...]  Respectfully submitted, [...]  By: /s/ [...]  STUART A. PLATT  Attorney for Respondent/Defendant [...]  August 12, 2024  VIA ELECTRONIC FILING: [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  [...]  [...]  Re: [...] and [...] v. [...], [...], [...], GOVERNOR [...], GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY and [...] Docket No.: [...]  On Appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division Sat Below: Hon. [...], A.J.S.C. Reply Letter Brief on Behalf of Appellants, [...] and [...] Dear Mr. Orlando: Please accept this letter brief on behalf of Plaintiffs-Appellants, [...] and [...] (“Plaintiffs” or “[...]”) in response to the opposition Briefs of the Defendants-Respondents, [...], [...], [...], [...] (together “State Defendants”) and [...] (“[...]”).1
[brief] (Aa12).  On May 22, 2023, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found that the disciplinary charges were not sustained, reversed the removal, and awarded [...] "back pay, benefits, and seniority."  (Aa10-26).  The ALJ concluded the [...]’s decision to keep the disciplinary issue separate from the Worker’s Compensation issue was “nothing more than an attempt to remove [...] because of his stated intention not to report to duty,” and that the April 13, 2020, effective date was selected because April 16, 2020 “would have resulted [[...]’s] inability to charge him with N.J.A.C. 4A:2-6.2(b). ” (Aa24).  On July 19, 2023, the [...] (“CSC”) rejected the ALJ’s Initial Decision and determined “the action of the appointing authority in resigning [[...]] not in good standing was justified.
[brief] 2 COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT 7  POINT ONE 7  THERE WAS NOTHING IMPROPER REGARDING THE TRIAL JUDGE’S RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT OF POSSESSION BASED ON THE COURT’S BELIEF THAT SHE WAS OWED OUTSTANDING RENT OF AT LEAST $8,000.00 (Db, Da25-Da27).  POINT TWO  11  THE COURT MADE PROPER FACTUAL FINDINGS THAT RENT WAS OUTSTANDING AND DUE AND OWING TO THE LANDLORD (Db, Da25-Da27).  CONCLUSION
[brief] Respondent-plaintiff recognizes that Atalese does not require a written statement of waiver to litigators such as plaintiff and his proffered interpretation of the two provisions of the shareholder’s agreement regarding arbitration do not make any sense and renders the provisions of the shareholder’s agreement meaningless.  At the outset of Appellant-Defendant’s initial brief, Appellant set forth “A basic rule of contract construction is that Courts are to read contracts so as to give meaning to their provisions.  In other words, Courts are not supposed to reach results which render a contract provision meaningless. ”  (Db at 1)  Plaintiff-Respondent’s brief does not attempt to provide any meaningful interpretation of the two provisions found at paragraph 23 and 33 of the Shareholder’s Agreement concerning arbitration.  Pages 15 through 18 of Appellant’s brief, challenged Respondent's to give a rational meaning to paragraph 23 and its terms.  That challenge is completely ignored in Respondent's brief.  Respondents refused to explain to this Court why there is a provision in an agreement between sophisticated parties which is meaningless and would require the parties to subsequently agree to the provision to give it any effect whatsoever.  Respondent fails to indicate why the provision would be drafted and titled “Dispute Resolution” if the provision required subsequent agreement by the parties to be enforceable.  Respondent does not indicate why the parties would include a procedure regarding the selection of an arbitrator if they were both subsequently required to agree to the method of the selection of an arbitrator due to the use of the word “may”.  The Respondent gives no explanation whatsoever as to why the Shareholder’s Agreement would include in paragraph 33’s “the Shareholders hereby submit to Dispute Resolution as defined in Paragraph 23” with the understanding that the arbitrator can order specific performance in addition to damages when the parties would have to again agree to arbitration and the selection of an arbitrator when a dispute arose.  Nor do the Respondents dispute the definitions of “may” set forth in Appellant’s brief (Db17) as meaning “to have permission to” or “shall, must”.  Rather, Defendants rely upon the Trial Court’s erroneous interpretation of the parties’ contract without trying to defend the Trial Court’s reliance on Atalese, supra, as though this was a dispute between unsophisticated consumers in interpreting this provision.  Respondents themselves cite County of Passaic v. Horizon Healthcare Services, Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 498 (App. Div. 2023) which held the Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., LP, 219 N.J. 430 (N.J. 2014) consumer protection provisions do not apply to this dispute between lawyers.
[brief] [...], Prioritizing Privacy in the Courts and Beyond, 103 Cornell L. Rev. 1011 (2018), available at https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol103/iss5/2/ ...................... 17-18, 20 [...], Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy E-Discovery Seas, 10 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 53 (2004), available at https://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt/vol10/iss5/6/  ............  21  [...], A Right to Privacy for Modern Discovery, 29 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 675, 719 (2022), available at https://lawreview.gmu.edu/print__issues/a-right-to-privacy-for- modern-discovery/  .............................................................................  18  Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search & Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 15 Sedona Conf. J. 217 (2014), available at https://thesedonaconference. org/sites/default/files/publications/217-264%20Search%20and%20Information_0.pdf..........................10, 11, 21  The Sedona Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production
[brief] Plaintiff Cannot Establish a Causal Nexus Between Any Protected Activity and an Adverse Employment Action  The alleged retaliatory adverse employment action by Defendants is Plaintiff’s non-renewal, of which she received written notice on May 9, 2019.  (Pa385-86).  That action, however, was not the result of Plaintiff engaging in a protected activity—and there is no evidence to suggest otherwise.  Instead, the non-renewal was based exclusively on Plaintiff’s failure to adequately perform her job to Defendants’ legitimate expectations.  These failings are well-documented, in Plaintiff’s evaluations and otherwise, and there is absolutely no evidence to support a claim that [...]’s and [...]’s ultimate decision to follow [...]’s recommendation of non-renewal was retaliatory.  With regard to the [...] Comment, it is undisputed that Plaintiff’s reporting of it to [...] occurred in 2018.  Plaintiff received notice of her non-renewal on May 9, 2019.  Thus, there is no temporal proximity or nexus.  There are also no facts in the record that would otherwise justify an inference that the non-renewal was somehow related to Plaintiff’s reporting of the [...] Comment.  Furthermore, with regard to Plaintiff’s second basis for her retaliation claim—[...]’s [...] Report—there is no temporal proximity to establish the required nexus.  It is undisputed that the [...] Incident itself and the discipline of [...] occurred in January 2019.  After reviewing [...]’s January 4, 2019 written reprimand of [...] during her deposition, Plaintiff recollected that [...] spoke with [...] in January of 2019.  (Pl. Tr. 253:18-21).  Because Plaintiff’s non-renewal was implemented by [...] in May 2019, and approved by [...] months after that, there is no temporal proximity.  To the extent that Plaintiff relies on her later assistance with drafting [...]’s May 2019 email to [...] to support her retaliation claim, there is no evidence by which a trier-of-fact could reasonable infer any improper motive because Plaintiff’s employer, including [...], was unaware she was involved in [...]’s reporting of the [...] Incident to [...].  Although “in evaluating whether an employer acted pursuant to a retaliatory motive, jurors are permitted to draw an inference from all of the circumstances relating to the decision,” Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 214 N.J. 518, 558 (2013), not every inference is reasonable.  [...]’s non-renewal recommendation could not have been motivated by something he was unaware of.  As there is no direct or circumstantial evidence from which one could reasonably infer the non-renewal was in response to any protected activity of Plaintiff, her retaliation claim fails as a matter of law.
[brief] “Where traffic is not controlled and directed either by a police officer or a traffic control signal, pedestrians shall cross the roadway within a crosswalk[.]”  *N.J.S.A.* 39:4–34.  “[T]hese two sections are aimed at preventing the conduct commonly known as ‘jaywalking[.]’”  See *Abad v. Gagliardi*, 378 N.J. Super. 503, 507 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 295 (2005).
[brief] (1T5:7-11).  In other words, Plaintiff was prepared to proceed “based upon the terms as they were outlined on the [December 20, 2022] transcript[,] and if [the judge was] willing to enforce those terms, [Plaintiff was] satisfied with that. ” (Ibid.).  Indeed, paragraph 11 was even explicitly referenced when Plaintiff’s counsel reiterated that Plaintiff “has no problem taking out paragraph 11” and stated that “[t]here was no discussion on the record about a recis[sion] period or the [OWBPA] language[;] that’s simply something that is generally put into agreements. ” (1T10:24-11:3).  Yet, the trial court ignored and disregarded this point in rendering its decision.  Simply put, the ADEA/OWBPA do not serve as a legal impediment to enforcement of the settlement reached and memorialized on the record, although this was the only basis upon which the trial court refused to enforce the settlement.  Thus, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erroneously denied its OTSC and declined to enforce the agreed-upon and memorialized settlement on grounds wholly independent of and irrelevant to the contractual validity and enforceability of the settlement memorialized on the record.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] Establishing County Policies to Comply with Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States Federal and State precedent require prosecutors disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence to defense counsel.  The United States Supreme Court in Maryland, 373 U.S. Brady v. 83, 87 (1963), held “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. ”  Thereafter, the Supreme Court in Giglio v. States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), further clarified that exculpatory evidence (or “Brady United material”) includes evidence that may be used to impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness.  “When the reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within th[e] general rule [of Brady].”  Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (internal quotations omitted).  Our State Supreme Court followed and in Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 111 Brady Giglio State v. (1982), holding “evidence impeaching testimony of a government witness falls within the Brady rule when the reliability of the witness may be determinative of a criminal defendant’s guilt or innocence. ”  Whether information is determinative of the defendant’s guilt or innocence Giglio requires analysis of that information by the prosecutor in light of the circumstances of the case.  This is important to note because the failure to disclose and material could result in Brady Giglio reversal of a defendant’s convictions.  While prosecutors across the State are well aware of their obligations under and Brady Giglio, there is a great deal of variation among the County Prosecutors’ Offices regarding specific policies.  While some have written policies, others employ a more informal Brady-Giglio New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2 approach.  To ensure compliance and the integrity of criminal prosecutions, however, written guidelines, incorporating the best practices and procedures discussed below, are required.  Therefore, pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I hereby direct all County Prosecutors to implement a policy within their respective counties consistent with this Directive to ensure compliance with and Giglio.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACT ........................................................................................................  12  ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................................  18  Introduction .......................................................................................................................  18  POINT I THE JULY 17 2023 ORDER  ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED RECONSIDERATION OF THE 2020 ORDERS; AND IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY  JUDGMENT [raised at Pa506-511; Ruled at Pa13-20]  ........................................................................................................  24  A.  Plaintiff Did Not Have The Burden of Proving A Doctor Would Have Been Available to Perform The Emergency C-Section, If It Had Been Timely Called...........................................24  1.  The Court Violated Due Process By Raising and Deciding An Issue  Sua Sponte Without Notice to Plaintiff.........................................................................................26  2.  [...] Could And Would Have Performed The [...] C-Section In A Timely Fashion – Except the C-Section Was Not Timely Called ..............................................26  B.  No Precedent Supports The Holding That Plaintiff Needed To Present An Expert To Establish A “Negligent Staffing” Claim  ........32  POINT II  THE NEW MOTION JUDGE ERRED IN ITS SEPTEMBER 29, 2023  DECISION BY EXPANDING THE GROUNDS ALLEGED TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR A GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, WHICH ISSUES HAD NOT BEEN FRAMED BY THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND WHICH AGAIN DECIDED WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE OR OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD  [Raised at Pa506-511; Ruling at Pa1-12]..................................................................................................................35  A.  [...] and [...] Deviated From the Standard of Care.................................................................................................................................37  (i)  The Deviations of [...] and [...] .......................38 (ii)  The Inaccurate Characterization of [...]’s Testimony.........................................................................................................................41  (iii)  The Collapsing of The Timeline .....................................................44 (iv)  The Court Contradicted Itself ..........................................................44  B.  The Court Misconstrued  The Opinions and Testimony Of [...]  ....................................................................................................................45  CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................50
[directive] 6.3.4  As for administrative complaints, the internal affairs supervisor or law enforcement executive will direct that an internal affairs investigator conduct an appropriate investigation.  Investigators must strive to conduct a thorough and objective investigation without violating the rights of the subject officer or any other law enforcement officer.  Internal affairs investigators, and anyone who may be called upon to do an internal investigation, must be thoroughly familiar with the agency's entire internal affairs policy, 28  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 including the protection of the subject officer's rights and the procedures for properly investigating internal complaints.