ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  (884a – 885a; 1T, 79:22 – 80:2).  In other words, [...] ruled that Plaintiffs’ new, previously unknown and unknowable claims at the time of the filing of the original complaint and the dismissal of the original legal malpractice claims in the 2015 Action, were not barred by the Entire Controversy Doctrine.  In addition, during the course of oral argument before [...], counsel for [...] attempted to argue that the dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiffs’ prior claims against [...] precluded the filing of all claims against [...] from the beginning of time, whether known or unknown at the time of the filing of the original complaint and its dismissal.
[brief] (1T:167:17-21; 2T:18:7-19).  Had he done so, the Finance Committee would have required Appellant to turn over the bank records and explain why the required cushion was no longer in the account.  (1T:167:22-168:3; 2T:18:21-19:4).  Had the actual balance been disclosed to the Finance Committee or to the [...] partners, they would have asked for a line-by-line explanation of our situation.  (1T:168:4-21; 184:3-8).  At that time, Appellant did not disclose to the Finance Committee or the [...] partners that the balance was low because he had caused money to be transferred from [...] to his companies [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].
[brief] T.27 L. 24-T.28 L.2.  Plaintiffs allege in their Amended Complaint that [...] was injured, while using the trampoline equipment at the Park.  Pa0039,¶ 4.  As such, he was admittedly participating in the Park activities at the time of the incident.  Moreover, the Agreement's language is clear and unambiguous that it includes [...].  The Agreement provides in relevant part as follows:
[brief] Based on the jury’s factual determination negating the vicarious liability claim, [...]’ cross-appeal arguing Plaintiffs failed to establish a *prima facie* negligent training and supervision claim, is dispositive.  Plaintiffs presented no evidence establishing [...] was incompetent, unskilled or dangerous.  Instead, the record established he was an experienced [...] employee who was skilled in dealing with customers and had no history of complaints.  [...] therefore requests that the Court uphold the jury’s verdict and dismiss Plaintiffs’ appeal.
[directive] See, In re Palumbo, 58 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 1959).  See also, State v. Melendez, 165 N.J. Super. 182 (App. Div. 1979).  In the event a defendant wishes to enter a guilty plea, or to resolve parts of the matter through a plea agreement pursuant to the discussion infra, the Municipal Prosecutor must verify the existence of any collateral legal proceedings.
[brief] The SHO’s recommendation that the Township utilize eminent domain was lawful and proper  As set forth in Section H of the October 15, 2020 Order (M1), the Plaintiffs were to identify all “permits and approvals that are required” for the Project, and “the satisfaction of these ancillary permit requirements shall be a condition of any Order” approving the Amended Application.  As such, Plaintiffs’ traffic expert identified the potential acquisition of additional property needed to enlarge a jughandle on Route 33 at Applegarth Road as an alternate means of accessing the Project.  5T224:3-14.  Therefore, the SHO’s consideration of the possible need for eminent domain to serve affordable housing projects was within his remit.
[brief] Moreover, in *State v. Williams*, this Court held that a defendant’s close proximity to possible criminal activity and ambiguous conduct did not establish reasonable suspicion either.  410 N.J. Super. 549, (App. Div. 2009).  There, police responded to a dispatch about a possible retaliatory shooting at a housing complex.  *Id.* at 552.  Upon arriving at the complex, the officers saw a large group of people gathered outside.  *Id.* at 553.  One of these people, the defendant, was riding his bike around the scene.  *Ibid.*  When the defendant saw the officers, he started to ride away and put his right hand in his pants pocket.  *Ibid.*  The officers ordered the defendant to stop, but he continued to ride away before eventually being stopped.  *Ibid.*  Looking at the totality of the circumstances, this Court found the defendant’s conduct when the officers first arrived was no more suspicious than anyone else’s outside the complex.  *Id.* at 556.  Even when considering how the defendant rode away from the officers and the officers’ belief that the defendant was hiding a weapon in his pocket, this Court nonetheless found such facts “did not provide any additional foundation for an objectively reasonable suspicion. ”  *Id.* at 556-57.  Applying these principles to the totality of the circumstances here, the State cannot establish that [...] had reasonable and particularized suspicion that [...] had committed or was about to commit a crime.
[brief] However, there are flaws in the Defendant’s positions.  Paragraph 8.2 does not provide an immediate right to terminate.  It states that termination is allowed only if there is an uncured material breach prior to the closing date:  “In the event of any material breach . . . discovered prior to the Closing Date, which is not fully cured or corrected prior to the Closing Date”.  (Da203.)  Paragraph 8.2’s inclusion of a cure provision negates Defendant’s reading that it permits an immediate termination due to a material default.  Furthermore, as addressed Defendant rewrites paragraph 13.10 by contending Defendant was required “to use ‘commercially reasonable efforts…prior to the closing’ to obtain an *Acceptable Estoppel Certificate.*” (Pb14-15) [emphasis added].  The fact is the language makes no reference to compel Defendant to obtain same prior to closing, or at any time.  So despite the repetition by Defendant (Pb14, 15, 17, 18, 19.), there exists no requirement on Defendant to provide an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate at closing which, most succinctly, is demonstrated by paragraph 9.1(xix), which requires delivery of an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate “if obtained”.
[brief] ”  Fowler, 239 N.J. at 188 (quoting State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 42 (2006)).  At the charge conference, [...] asked defendant if she wanted any lesser-included offenses, and she said no.  The judge asked specifically if she was asking for a passion/provocation charge, and again, she said no. (7T78-11 to 15).
[brief] .................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................  8  I.  THE TRIAL COURT’S JULY 29, 2024 DECISION COMPELLING ARBITRATION AND STAYING PLAINTIFF’S CASE SHOULD BE REVERSED (Ja5-Ja12)  A.  Standards For Evaluating Motions To Compel Arbitration  ...........................................................................................................  8  B.  The Trial Court’s July 29, 2024 Decision Should Be Reversed Because Whether Plaintiff’s CFA, HCSA, RISA, and TCCWNA Allegations In The Complaint Are Covered By the Arbitration Provision in [...]’s “Membership Agreement” Should Be Determined By A New Jersey Judge And Not An Arbitrator (Ja8-Ja10, Ja12)  .................................................................................................  12  C.  The Trial Court’s July 29, 2024 Decision Should Be Reversed Because The Injunctive Relief Set Forth in Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint Alleging [...]’s CFA, HCSA, RISA, and TCCWNA Violations Is The Type of “Public Injunctive Relief” Specifically Excluded By the Arbitration Provision in [...]’s “Membership Agreement” (Ja10-Ja12)  .................................................................................................  17  Conclusion ............................................................................................................  26  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] This Court then turned to a third ground for its decision, finding that the requirement for a contribution for off-site improvements usurped the planning board’s authority.  The second and third rationales of this Court’s decision are inconsistent with the lower Court’s ruling here.  See also Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning & Land Use Administration at § 11-10.1 (2024) which reaches the same conclusion: The LRHC specifically provides in N.J.
[brief] 7  Scheidt v. DRS Techs, Inc., 424 N.J. Super. 188 (App. Div. 2012).............................................................................  10  Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100, 877 A.2d 267 (App. Div. 2005).........................................................  5  State, Dep’t of Treasury, Div. Of In. ex rel. McCormac v. Quest Commc’ns Intern., Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 469 (App. Div. 2006)..............................................................................  14 Van Dam Egg Co. v. Allendale Farms, Inc., 199 N.J. Super. 452 (App. Div. 1985).............................................................................. 6 Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398 (1991) ............................................................................................................ 6-7 Statutes & Other Authorities: N.J. Ct. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E)................................................................................................. 9 N.J. Ct. R. 4:5-2..................................................................................................................... 6 N.J. Ct. R. 4:6-2(e) .............................................................................................................. 4, 6 N.J. Ct. R. 4:49-2.................................................................................................................. 5 N.J. Ct. R. 4:50-1.................................................................................................................. 5 N.J.S.A. § 1:36-3 .................................................................................................................. 16 N.J.S.A. § 40A:20-1–22....................................................................................................... 12 N.J.S.A. § 55:14K-37(b)...................................................................................................... 12 N.J.S.A. § 59:1-3 .................................................................................................................. 15 N.J.S.A. § 59:2-2 ..................................................................................................................
[directive] All defendants released on ROR and any pretrial monitoring level (PML) will receive reminders and ongoing criminal history checks.  Other monitoring automated court date services will be provided as shown in Table 1 below.  Table 1.  Pretrial Monitoring Level Contacts and Conditions  Monitoring Monitoring  Phone Contacts  Face to Face Additional Home Detention Level Contacts  Conditions of or Electronic Monitoring Monitoring Permitted Limited*  No None  None  ROR Yes No 1 per month None  PML 1 Yes No 1 per month 1 per month  PML 2 Yes No 1 every other 1 every other PML 3 week week Yes Yes 1 every other 1 every other PML 3+ week week  HD/EM * No contact with Victim and No Contact with Witnesses permitted for all levels including ROR  5  Pretrial Release Recommendation
[brief] (9T14-2 to 15-6).  That night, [...] was looking outside the window because there was a lot of noise outside.  (9T17-16 to 18).  While he stood at the window, he saw an Audi come down the block.  (9T16-19 to 21; 9T17-3 to 9).  The Audi “was coming from Hickory.  [He] heard a real loud noise, [he] looked out the window and [he] [saw] the Audi going down the block and [he] heard some gunshots.
[brief] ”  *Id* at 303.  The Court said that it would not assume, infer or imply the employee’s assent.  “Without plaintiff’s signature on the Agreement that accompanied the “You and [...]” handbook, we cannot enforce the arbitration provision unless we find some other explicit indication that the employee intended to abide by that provision.  No such indication appears in the record. ”  *Id.* at 305.  The mere fact that the employee knew of the policy was not enough.  *Id* at 306.  “The record, however, contains no one document or other piece of evidence that unmistakably reflects plaintiff’s agreement to that policy. ”  *Id.*  *Grasser v. United Healthcare Corp.*
[brief] The Afternoon Incident.  A few hours later, Complainant went to the local union office to turn in the petition signatures she gathered and requested to file a complaint against [...] with the local union’s election committee and with the [...].  (Aa3).  According to [...]’s investigative summary, Complainant alleged that [...] heard her say she was going to file a complaint against him and yelled, “Do it D[], Do it D[]” and “Have a nice day, D[].”  (Aa3).  Complainant alleged that she told [...] that he was “done misnaming me, I’ve told you multiple times to stop. ”  (Aa3).  Complainant sent Witness One a text stating “I just went to the office, and he [[...]] is blatantly misnaming me. ” (Aa33).  [...] acknowledged hearing Complainant state to a local union employee that she wanted to file a complaint against him and that he said that Complainant was free to do so.  (Aa4).  [...] reported that as Complainant was then leaving, she yelled, “I just want you to know I’m in a protected class, my name is D[a] and you will respect me. ”  (Aa4).  [...] reported that this was the first time he learned that Complainant had a preferred name other than “D[]”.  (Aa4).  [...] told her he would call her whatever she wanted to be called, but that she could not come to his office and harass his staff.  (Aa4).  Both Complainant and [...] agreed that there was at least one witness at the local union office.  However, [...]’s EEO investigator did not speak with any witnesses to the alleged afternoon incident besides [...] and Complaint.  (Aa33).  Indeed, [...] acknowledged that its investigator abandoned her effort to speak with them after counsel for the local union requested information about the complaint in advance of scheduling interviews with these employees, none of whom were State employees on a union leave.  (Aa33-Aa34).  D.
[brief] This principal of statutory compliance is rooted in the longstanding judicial distinction between “mandatory” or “directory” provisions in election law.  In *Sharrock v. Keansburg*, 15 N.J. Super. 11, 17 (App. Div. 1951), the Appellate Division explained that mandatory provisions impose a duty of obedience and must be followed strictly.  Since the electoral system is a creature of statute with no common-law foundation, courts are obligated to enforce legislative intent as expressed in the statutory scheme.  *Id.* at 16.  Building upon *Sharrock*, the Court in *Petition of Byron*, 165 N.J. Super. 468, 474 (Law. Div. 1978) held that when an election statute "expressly declares that a specified irregularity shall nullify an election, the courts, irrespective of their views of the wisdom or serviceability of the requirement, uniformly respect the legislative declaration."  *Ibid.* (quoting *Sharrock v. Keansburg*, 15 N.J. Super. at 16-17).  There, the Court examined the statutory procedures governing absentee ballots and held that a ballot delivered in a manner not authorized by law, what it called “wrongfully delivered”, must be invalidated.  *Id.* at 476.  The Court reasoned that compliance with the delivery mechanism was essential to uphold legislative intent.  When the statute is mandatory in nature, the ballot or election will be overturned.  *Ibid.*  Just as the wrongful delivery of ballots undermines statutory procedure and calls for the invalidation of ballots, so too does failure to comply with statutory deadlines.  Indeed, if courts must nullify ballots delivered by the wrong hands, they must also do so when ballots arrive at the wrong time.  Even where voter intent is clear, and no fraud is alleged, New Jersey Courts have consistently held that ballots received after statutory deadlines must be rejected.
[brief] [...], who had already interrogated [...] once, interrogated him again with the end goal being to have [...] confess to inappropriate behavior.  [...] admitted that he accepted the other officers’ denial of the posting at face value.  (1T206.14-17; 1T207.17-20).  However, [...] spent 10 to 15 minutes accusing [...] of lying and told him that he had evidence contradicting his statement.  (1T206.18 to 207.1).  [...] never presented that contrary evidence during this administrative hearing.  [...] denied any wrongdoing.  C.  TRIAL TESTIMONY
[brief] Da508  Defendant’s Amended Notice of Appeal Filed 10/10/23 ......  Da513  Certification of Transcripts Completion and Delivery Filed 11/02/23 .................................................................  Da519  Preliminary Statement  Plaintiff [...]’s (“Plaintiff”) opposition to Defendant-property owner, [...]’ (“Defendant”) appeal is rife with misstatements and mischaracterizations of the matter before the Appellate Division.
[brief] At trial, the State called four witnesses.  [...] testified mostly in line with his testimony from the suppression hearing, again claiming that he pulled the Suburban over for a tinted windows violation and searched the car based on the smell of marijuana.  (2T 67-25 to 88-13)  [...]’s testimony regarding the odor of marijuana, however, suffered from several inconsistencies.  [...] initially testified that he did not smell any marijuana when he approached the passenger side of the Suburban and noticed the odor.  ---  3
[brief] Likewise, there was a strong deterrent need to impose an extended term due to defendant’s escalating association with guns and violence.  See Pierce, 188 N.J. at 168.  Moreover, as explained in State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 327-28 (2019), it was proper for the judge to rely on defendant’s criminal record both to determine he was a persistent offender and to support the findings of aggravating factors three, six, and nine.  See also State v. McDuffie, 450 N.J. \(^{12}\)  Defendant mistakenly states that the instant offense was his third criminal conviction.  (Db41).  It was his fourth.  (PSR 8-9); (10T55-2 to 3).  Super. 554, 576-77 (App. Div. 2017) (rejecting the defendant’s claim the sentencing court impermissibly doubled-counted his criminal record when it granted the State’s motion for a discretionary extended term, and again when imposing aggravating factor six).  Thus, not only did defendant have more than the requisite number of offenses to qualify for an extended term, but also all of his prior criminal convictions were for serious second- and third-degree firearms offenses and assault that went well beyond the bare minimum needed to make out a crime.  In light of the aggravating factors dwarfing the single mitigating factor, [...] properly fixed the sentence at the upper end of the sentencing range.  There is no cause to disturb defendant’s fair sentence.  POINT VI
[brief] A1.  The Chancery court granted this relief to plaintiff by the summary judgment Order entered on April 21, 2021.  A1185.  Plaintiff never reinstated the loan.  In approximately August 2022, after the Chancery Division’s “Final Judgment,” it was the [...] who were successful in having the Final Judgment recorded in the [...] (a recording mandated by the Final Judgment and by [...] for the refinancing that the [...] were finally able to obtain).
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS.........................................................................................................3  A. Introduction ......................................................................................................................3  B.  The Shooting ....................................................................................................................9  C. The Investigation .............................................................................................................13  D. [...]’s Testimony ..........................................................................................................15  E. The Defense’s Case ........................................................................................................20  F. The Jury’s Deliberations .................................................................................................23  LEGAL ARGUMENT..............................................................................................................24
[brief] ”  (Da 1)  The verdict sheet included the lesser offense of second-degree robbery.  (Da 4)  To support a conviction of either degree of robbery, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that [...] was in the course of committing a theft; and (2) that while in the course of committing that theft he threatened another with or purposely put him or her in fear of immediate bodily injury.  N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1.  To support a conviction of first-degree robbery, the State was required to prove a third element: that while in the course of committing the theft [...] threatened the immediate use of a deadly weapon.  *Ibid.*  While the State did not need to prove that [...] in fact possessed a deadly weapon, it had to prove that he purposely led the victim to actually and reasonably believe that he possessed such a weapon.
[brief] [...] admitted he was told maintenance fees would increase and the complaint was an error.  (Da78, ¶25).  [...] admitted that nobody told her annual maintenance fees would not increase.  (Da88, ¶52).  [...] admitted he was told maintenance fees would go up.  (Da104, ¶99).  [...] admitted that they were told there was a maintenance fee each year and they simply could not remember anyone affirmatively telling them that maintenance would increase or decrease.  (Da112, ¶126).  Finally, [...] admitted no [...] representative made an oral misrepresentation to her that maintenance fees would not increase.  (Da117, ¶142).  Last, all but three (3) of the plaintiffs claimed that they were told they could exchange their timeshare intervals whenever and wherever they wanted; that they could use their intervals whenever they wanted; and that they could reserve rooms at owner’s rates whenever they wanted.
[brief] He noted that he had seen five to ten drug sales on that block, presumably over the course of his 20 years as an officer, but that testimony is unclear because the officer did not provide a timeline or context for the drug sales he had witnessed.  Furthermore, [the officer] stated that he previously arrested fugitives in that neighborhood, but did not indicate the approximate number of fugitives or a timeline during which those arrests occurred.  Again, as our caselaw has held, the character and prevalence of crime in an area – although insufficient on its own to support particularized suspicion – can be one factor in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed.
[brief] The Agreement between [...] and Respondents is just as enforceable: it covers “all disputes, claims, complaints, or controversies” that [...] “may have against [...] and/or any of its subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, employees, agents, and/or any of its clients or customers,” including “discrimination and/or harassment claims,” and “any other claim under any federal, state, or local statute, constitution, regulation, rule, ordinance, or common law. ”  (Pa000092.)