ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Client [[...]] hereby irrevocably acknowledges the creation of an or otherwise creates an Attorney’s Charging Lien in favor of the Attorney [[...]] and upon any and all of the Client’s proceeds resulting from the [...] Litigation, and any related claims.  [Id.]  These two agreements were the basis of the motion to dismiss the legal malpractice action between Plaintiff and [...].  On February 23, 2023, the Trial Court dismissed Plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim after finding that these were unlawful assignments of the legal malpractice lawsuit and they also resulted in the Plaintiff no longer having standing to bring the lawsuit against [...].  (Pa0354).  In addition to the facts set forth herein, [...] adopts and relies upon the findings of fact made by the Trial Court in its February 23, 2023 oral opinion when it dismissed this matter.  (T1 4:15 – 6:19).  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Plaintiffs also alleged negligence and battery against [...] for the alleged assault, and sought punitive damages.  (Pa39; Pa54).  On March 20, 2020, the Hon. [...], J.S.C. granted [...] summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiffs had not established that any negligent training of [...] was a proximate cause of the assault on the plaintiff, and [...] was not acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the assault.  These rulings were later reversed.  Only the claims of negligence and battery against [...] then remained.  On June 5, 2020 the Hon. [...], J.S.C., who would ultimately preside over the trial, granted [...] summary judgment on the negligence count on the grounds that store employees have no duty “to not commit assaults on customers. ” (Pa91; Pa31, n. 8).  With only the battery and punitive damages counts remaining against defendant [...], plaintiff agreed to dismiss those counts in order to appeal the summary judgment rulings as to negligence.  (Pa95).  In an Opinion dated July 30, 2021, this Court reversed both summary judgment rulings and remanded the case for trial.  Concerning the allegations of direct negligence against Lowe's, the Court stated that "it was for the jury, not the judge, to determine whether Lowe's failed to train and supervise [...] properly, and, if so, whether that failure was a substantial factor in causing the harm at issue in this case."  (Pa26-27).  Significantly for purposes of this appeal, this Court also stated that Lowe's could also be held vicariously liable for [...]'s actions even if they were intentional.  Citing Vosough v. Kierce, 437 N.J. Super. 218, 236 (A.D. 2014), this Court stated that conduct which is "intentional and wrongful does not in itself take it outside the scope of his employment."
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[brief] The arrogation of such authority to oneself is not consistent with the spirit of our Rules of Court.  Counsel should refrain from such conduct in the future”); O’Brien v. Mountainside Hosp., 2017 W.L. 4582823 (App. Div., October 16, 2017) (plaintiff filed a late expert report after discovery closed and a trial date was set and without permission of the trial court; the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment notwithstanding the late provided expert report); Coffey v. Bechemin, 2007 W.L. 419641 (App. Div., February 9, 2007) (plaintiff submitted four new supplemental expert reports in opposition to defendant’s summary judgment motion; the trial court refused to consider them because plaintiff did not establish exceptional circumstances as required by R. 4:24-1(c) and granted defendant’s summary judgment motion; the Appellate Division affirmed).
[brief] ’”  *Id.* at 443 (citing cases and authorities).  [...] also testified that the counsel fees to set aside the English PSA and obtain a new judgment and expenses to attempt to locate and collect assets are recoverable damages for [...].  6T156:18-157:2.  During trial, [...], Esq., the attorney originally responsible for handling the reopening of [...]’s divorce, testified about the process to reopen the divorce and set aside the English PSA and how drawn out it became with [...] fighting it every step of the way by filing motions to dismiss and motions for reconsideration that took a year to deal with.
[brief] ...........................................  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | AUTHORITY | Brief page number | |--------------------|-------------------| | **RULES OF COURT:** | | | Rule 1:3-1 | 36 | | Rule 4:49-2 | 5 | | Rule 4:50-1 | 4, 21, 23, 24, 25, 29, 32, 47 & 48 | | Rule 4:50-1(a) | 28 | | Rule 4:50-1(f) | 28, 30, 31, 47, 49 | | Rule 4:62-2 | 23 | | Case Name | Citation | |-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 257 -261
[brief] Particularly relevant here is that the [...] and [...] demanded that [...] do more to regulate construction in the community or risk reversion of the beach front property conveyances.  During a November 8, 1970 meeting of [...]’s Board of Trustees, [...]’s President made the following report:  President’s Report - [...] reported that he has received a letter from [...] stating that he wants to be released as our attorney due to a conflict of interest.  Since [...] represents [...] and [...], and due to the fact that [...] and [...] are perhaps going to hold the [...] responsible for the violation of the building code, [...] cannot work on both sides of these issues.  [...] wrote to [...] requesting copies for alterations that have to be corrected on properties where violations exist.  (Da570).  During that same meeting, [...]’s Grounds Committee took steps to address the concerns of the [...] and [...] and to prevent the beachfront property from reverting back to them:  Grounds Committee – Building applications, in the future, must be submitted to the trustees and by majority vote of this body will decide whether the application will be accepted or rejected.  [...] has been notified by Fred A. [...] and Edward J. [...] that the trustees have been given one year in which to correct building violations.  He was informed that the trustees are responsible for corrections; otherwise, our beach rights will be threatened.  In the future the trustees are considered the Grounds Committee when building applications are submitted for rejection or approval.  (Da569).
[brief] “…when deciding a motion for summary judgment under R. 4:46-2, the determination whether there exists a genuine issue with respect to a material fact challenged requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.  This assessment of the evidence is to be conducted in the same manner as that required under R. 4:46-2. ”  The judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there exists a genuine issue for trial.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).  It is a movant’s burden to exclude any reasonable doubt as to the existence of genuine issue of material fact, and all inferences of doubt are to be drawn against the movant in favor of opponent of the Motion.
[brief] (7T146: 3 to 147:20; 12T64: to 65:7).  Respondent moved in with [...] in 2006 and not surprisingly Respondent also became addicted to drugs.  (12T25:5-10).  In 2008, after Respondent stole one of Decedent’s family heirlooms, Decedent went to the local bank and opened a safety deposit box for her valuables.  (7T155:24 to 156:8; 7T154:20 to 155:18; 11T104:15 to 106:2; P571a to P572; P596a).  Decedent was anxious and worried about Respondent’s drug problems.  (7T146:15 to 147:20; 11T102:21-25; 7T1927-16; 7T193:15-21).  Respondent’s friend base changed, and she was bringing “friends” to the Home who had criminal background and drug issues.  (11T100:24 to 10I:8; 11T102:9-14; I2T63:20 to 64:12).  Respondent relationship ended with [...] shortly before she was ordered to enter the Rehabilitation Program at [...] in December 2008.  (11T107:6-9).  While at Maryville ATC, Respondent developed another romantic liaison with another addict (hereinafter “[...]”), who had a criminal background.  When she was discharged in 2009, Respondent and [...] moved into the Home (although Decedent did not approve of [...]) but concealed it from Petitioner by moving out on weekends when Petitioner was Home and returning when Petitioner was working.
[brief] But no such “demerger” process exists within Title 18A.  And this makes sense.  Provisions within Chapter 8 reflect an intent towards consolidation and regionalization of districts – not demerger.  See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 18A:8-50; N.J.S.A. 18A:8-51.  Moreover, if former non-operating districts are excluded from availing themselves of the withdrawal and regionalization provisions set forth in Chapter 13, they will be left beholden to the district with which they merged and could not ever initiate efforts to withdraw and to join to form or enlarge a regional school district.  And that would frustrate the Legislature’s intent and contravenes the express provisions within chapters 8 and 13, to encourage K-12 school district regionalization.  A review of the overall statutory scheme demonstrates that municipalities such as [...] have standing to withdraw under N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a).  Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is reasonable and consistent with legislative intent.
[brief] The indemnification provision of the Subcontract states:  To the fullest extent permitted by law, the Subcontractor shall indemnify and hold harmless the Contractor and its consultants, agents and employees or any of them from and against all claims, damages, losses and expenses, including but not limited to attorneys’ fees, arising out of or resulting from performance of the Work, provided that such claim, damage loss or expense is attributable to bodily injury sickness, disease or death sustained by anyone, including employees of Subcontractor or to injury to or destruction of tangible property (other than the Work itself) including loss of use resulting therefrom, caused in whole or in part by negligent acts or omissions of the Subcontractor, anyone directly or indirectly employed by them or anyone for whose acts they may be liable, regardless of whether or not such claim, damaged [sic], loss or expense is caused in part by a party indemnified hereunder.  Such obligation shall not be construed to negate, abridge, or reduce other rights or obligations of indemnity which would otherwise exist between Contractor and Subcontractor.  (Da150).
[directive] The Designated Attorney shall be responsible for determining that the application establishes all of the following: 1.  An adequately specific and detailed description of all places or premises to be searched; 2.  An adequately specific and detailed description of all property to be seized; 3.  In the case of telephonic applications to a court pursuant to R. 3:5- 3b, the existence of exigent circumstances sufficient to excuse the failure to obtain a written warrant obtained by personally appearing before the judge; and 4.  Probable cause to justify a search of each place or premises intended to be searched.  13.
[directive] Law enforcement agencies contemplating an undercover school operation must recognize the risks associated with such operations, which by their nature have the potential to disrupt the educational environment and to interfere with the formation and continuation of trust relationships between members of the school community.  Accordingly, it is necessary to establish uniform, minimum standards by which to ensure that all undercover school operations are planned and conducted so as to maximize their legitimate deterrent benefits, while minimizing to the greatest extent possible the risk of disruption and injury to educational goals and prerogatives.  Part III - Applicability and Effective Date
[directive] See Part II, Section l(e), i~fra, incorporating standards from the Revised Bfima~e Guidelines on when prosecutors may seek to invoke the presumption of imprisonmeut in a third-degree school zone case based on the defendant’s involvement in organized criminal activity.  -7- (1990).  The New Law Requires Statewide Uniformity in the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion to Appeal a Waiver or Reduction of a M~andatorv Minimum Sentence  The new law expressly authorizes the prosecutor to appeal the sentence in any school zone case where the court exercises its authority under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b and elects not to impose a term of parole ineligibility, or places the defendant on probation.  The law further directs the Attorney General to develop guidelines "to ensure the uniform exercise of discretion in making determinations regarding whether to appeal a decision to waive or reduce the minimum term of parole ineligibility or place the defendant on probation."  Pursuant to the statutory uniformity requirement, Part 1/, Section 3 of this Supplemental Directive establishes the substantive standard that prosecutors must apply in deciding whether to initiate any such appeal, namely, an abuse of the sentencing court’s discretion.  To further ensure statewide unifo~aity, Section 3 also specifies who within the prosecuting agency must review and approve the decision to appeal a sentence where the court has exercised its discretion under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b to waive or reduce the mandatory minimum sentence.  The New Law Authorizes Certain State Prison hamates to be Re-Sentenced Under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b
[directive] 5.1.9  Complaints may also be received from other law enforcement agencies, such as neighboring municipal police agencies, the County Prosecutors, the Division of Criminal Justice or federal law enforcement agencies.  Those complaints should be forwarded to internal affairs for immediate investigation.  In some jurisdictions, law enforcement agencies may be subject to the oversight of a civilian review board authorized to accept complaints directly from members of the public.  If a civilian review board refers a complaint to a law enforcement agency, then those complaints should be forwarded to internal affairs for immediate investigation.
[brief] Otherwise, the Defendant, a public entity with the obligation to turn square corners, would unjustly be allowed to continue to realize revenue while obligating [...] to continue to pay costs with absolutely no hope or prospect of recouping any of its significant investment in [...], and essentially breach its obligations to [...] pursuant to the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement without recourse to [...].  Accordingly, if this Court does not affirm the Trial Court’s reformation of the subject agreements, then its remedy should be to remand the matter for the Trial Court with instructions to implement the specific performance of those agreements, pursuant to their terms.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] Further, it clarifies that a document is deemed received upon (1) the transmission of the electronically transmitted document to an approved Judiciary repository or (2) upon being stamped as received if the document was transmitted to the court on paper.  Rule 1 :32-2A provides that a document electronically filed or maintained has the "same force and effect as data and documents maintained by the clerks of court in paper form."  Directive #01-14 ("Electronic Records Management Guidelines") further provides that the "content of an original record or an electronically executed document must be secure and shall not be altered or enhanced."  Where a document is electronically transmitted to an approved Judiciary repository (e.g., JEFIS, eCourts), the document must appear in the court record without alteration.  This same practice applies to the collection of fees for documents submitted on paper.  Thus, where a document is deemed received, whether on paper or electronically, the appropriate fee is due and required and cannot be refunded absent a court order.  This directive applies to all fee payment types, including cash, check, money order and Judiciary collateral account.  Once the document is received, the filing party is entitled to a refund as a matter of course only in certain limited instances.  Those instances are:  [...] · [...] ·[...] # Directive 03-16 June 7, 2016
[brief] Respondent [...]’s Facebook post is a clear violation of section (e).  In arguing that [...]’s Facebook post could not be a violation of section (e) because he “provided the proper disclaimers”, Respondents are claiming a disclaimer is a magical incantation that erases all responsibility of the Board member.  It is not.  The Respondents completely ignore a recent School Ethics Commission Advisory Opinion which stated in part “[A]lthough you want to provide information to the public that stakeholders (and you) feel would be useful and beneficial, because you would be providing information relating to the Board and/or your official duties and responsibilities, any attempt to disclaim your speech (as being in your personal or private capacity) would likely be futile. ” (Pb19, School Ethics Commission, Public Advisory Opinion – A02-22, February 25, 2022).  In this case, despite Mr. [...]’s disclaimer, he engaged in lengthy discourse with members of the public regarding internal school matters, and deliberately spun “facts” regarding the referendum, and omitted material information.  VI.
[brief] (4T156-24 to 157-8).  Clip two, played without narration, showed the same toll payment from inside the toll booth.  (4T157-11 to 15; Da11:S-2).  The third clip was also presented without narration, and [...] explained that the reason the police collected the surveillance video was to track the movements of the Chevy Malibu.  (4T161-18 to 23).  The fourth clip was also played without narration, and [...] stated again that the police "were following the vehicle of interest, which was the Malibu."  (4T161-24 to 162-13; Da11:S-4).  As the rest of the clips played, [...] would point out when the Chevy Malibu appeared on the screen.  These clips included footage from four-way intersections with numerous cars, traffic lights with multiple cars, scenes where the roadway was not the primary focus, two-way streets with multiple cars moving in both directions, and multiple intersections.  (4T166-21 to 167-3; Da11:S-9); (4T167-20 to 168-7; Da11: S-11); (4T168-25 to 169-11; Da11:S-14); (4T170-1 to 6; Da11: S-15); (4T170-12 to 17; Da11:S-16); (4T170-24 to 171-3; Da11: S-17); (4T171-4 to 10; Da11: S-18); (4T171-24 to 172-4; Da11; S-19) ;(4T172-9 to 11; Da11:S-20); (4T172-16 to 20; Da11: S-21); (4T173-2 to 4; Da11: S-22); (4T173-11 to 18; Da11: S-23); (4T174-3 to 6; Da11: S-24); (4T174-14 to 15; Da11: S-25); (4T174-22 to 23; Da11: S-26); (4T175-1 to 4; Da11: S-17); (4T175-12 to 15; Da11: S-28); (4T175-18 to 19; Da11: S-29); (4T176-2 to 5; Da11: S-30); (4T177-5 to 6; Da11: S-34); (4T177-14 to 15; Da11: S-36); (4T177-25 to 178-1; 4T178-17 to 24; Da11: S-37); (4T184-8 to 9; Da11: S-47).
[brief] I don’t know.  [...]: I don’t think it would fall under the terms of the statute, Your Honor.  And again, [...] was 100 feet from the -- not from the property line but from the building.  So, factoring that in, this is not that different from the 100 feet.  I don’t know how -- THE COURT: That was.  That doesn’t seem unreasonable to you, that I can’t have a regular conversation from where I am to before [...]’s picture without somebody filing a summons?  [...]:  I don’t think that any summons would file from that, Your Honor.  [2T60-12 through 2T63-11.]
[directive] Aye Results  Risk-Assessment Pretrial Automated Where Cases  Direct-Indictment 4.9.2  Available.  Not and provisions of the subsection, all this in provided expressly otherwise as  Except determination prosecutor's the apply to shall Directive this of 4  Section in forth set presumptions direct a of return following the acomplaint-warrant issue to court the request to whether this for arrested been have not will case adirect-indictment in defendant the