ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] \(^2\) (Pa7).  [...] further demands \(^2\) Section 9.11.2 of the Attorney General’s IAPP, effective November 2022, states that “if the officer negotiates a plea or there is an administrative or civil settlement with the employer whereby the charge is dismissed, the charge would still be considered sustained, if there was sufficient credible evidence to prove the allegation, and the officer does not challenge the finding and obtain a judgment: (1) dismissing the “sustained findings” against him (Pa6); (2) expunging his “personal and/or disciplinary records” (Pa6); (3) removing his name, the investigation, and the report from [...]’s records (Pa7); (4) removing his name and all references to the complaint and the report from all Brady/Giglio reports and online postings (Pa7); (5) “affirming [his] right to a procedure by which he may challenge the findings of the [...]’s investigation” (Pa8); (6) “directing the [...] to establish or identify the procedure by which [he] may challenge [its findings]” (Pa8); and (7) “directing the [...] to provide [him] with a copy of the formal procedures detailing the particulars and standards for the procedures. ” (Pa8).  [...]’s complaint does not seek monetary damages, and does not assert any claim of constitutional violation or tort.
[brief] *In re Nat. Gas Royalties*, 562 F.3d 1032, 1042 (10th Cir. 2009).  That question has nothing to do with this case, in which Relator alleges that the VRDO data identifies the defendants individually.  Neither *Natural Gas Royalties* nor any of the other cases cited by Relator address public data sets that revealed fraud upon analysis by a sophisticated relator. \(^7\)
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[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 | STATUTES | PAGE | |----------|------| | N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23 | passim | | N.J.S.A. 39:5H-10(c)(2) | 5 | | N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 | 22, 27, 33 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1, et. seq. | 12 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1, et. seq.  | passim | | N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6 | 17, 28, 39 | | N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1, et. seq. | 22, 29 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 | passim | | N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6 | 25, 27 | | N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.2 | 27, 29 | | N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 | 25 | | N.J.S.A. 39:6A-10 | 25 |
[brief] While DEP’s HAD Decision failed to articulate any specific rationale for its decision that [...]’s Project qualified as “The routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of public utility lines, rights-of-way, or systems, by a public utility” – in contrast to its prior HAD decisions in 2010 and 2012 regarding [...]’s 300 Line Project and Northeast Upgrade Project (“NEUP”), respectively (discussed further below in Section II.D) – Environmental Appellants assume that DEP accepted [...]’s assertion in its HAD Request that the “the construction, operation, and maintenance of [new Compressor Station] 327 is an ‘upgrade’ to [[...]’s] existing 300 Line gas pipeline system.
[brief] ..............................................  Da1149  Jury Verdict Sheet (9/30/22)  ..................................................................  Da1190  Order Voiding Plaintiffs’ Timeshare Contracts (10/11/22) .........................  Da1225  Defendant’s Motion for JNOV, RETA Damages (10/18/22)  .....................  Da1227  Defendant’s Motion for JNOV and New Trial (10/20/22)  ........................  Da1233i  Defendant’s Motion to Stay Judgment (10/20/22)  ....................................  Da1350  Order Vacating Award of Damages under the RETA (10/26/22)  ...............  Da1352  Plaintiffs’ Motion to Pay Counsel Fees (11/21/22)  ...................................  Da1355  Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Stay Judgment (12/23/22) ..............  Da1357  Defendant’s Second Motion to Stay Judgment (1/31/23)  ..........................  Da1379  Order and MOD Granting Plaintiffs’ Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (2/1/23)  ....  Da1381  Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration (2/21/23) ..................................... Da1407 Consent Order Staying Final Judgment (3/31/23) .................................... Da1409 Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration (4/17/23) .................. Da1411 Order Entering Final Judgment (5/19/23) ......................................................... Da1421 Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Consent Order & Stay Judgment (6/30/23) .. Da1426 Order Vacating Consent Order and Staying Judgment (7/21/23) .................. Da1428 Defendant’s Amended Notice of Appeal (7/27/23) ........................................ Da1430 Certification of Transcript Completion and Delivery (8/30/23) ..................... Da1449 Certification of Transcript Completion and Delivery (8/30/23) ..................... Da1451 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS & RULINGS Order Denying Summary Judgment and Extending Discovery (10/26/20)
[brief] These principles were most recently reinforced by our Supreme Court in *Gannett Satellite Information Network, LLC v. Tp. Of Neptune*, ___ N.J. ___ (June 20, 2023):  Our law “recognizes that ‘a party may agree by contract to pay attorneys’ fees,’ but our courts ‘strictly construe’ such provisions ‘in light of the general policy disfavoring the award’ of such fees.  In recognizing the discrete exceptions to the American Rule, this Court has consistently “reaffirm[ed] its commitment to ‘New Jersey’s “strong public policy against the shifting of attorney’s fees. ”’ [Ibid., slip. op. at 20-21 (citations omitted). ]  2.  **The Stock Purchase Agreements**
[brief] (Pa13-14).  While a Board is generally bound by its enabling statutes, it has inherent authority to reopen administrative matters upon a showing of good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence.  Minsavage for Minsavage v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 240 N.J. 103, 109 (2019).  A member seeking relief by way of the Board’s inherent powers also “must demonstrate extreme hardship and a clear equity in his favor. ”  Buono v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 188 N.J. Super. 488, 493 (App. Div. 1983).  Contrary to [...]’s assertions, (Pb12-13), the Board considered its inherent power as well as his affidavit and the affidavits of the other troopers that he submitted in support of his contention that he did not receive the postcard.
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that the decision below be reversed, and that [...] be permitted to register his presence at September 11th under the Ricci Act and amend his benefits thereunder.  Respectfully, [...], Esq.  [...], Petitioner-Appellant, v. [...], Respondent-Respondent.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL AGENCY DECISION OF THE [...]  Brief of Respondent
[brief] McGuire, 419 N.J. Super.  at 142.  A video recording of the full interview during which Defendant made this statement was already admitted into evidence as Exhibit S-5 and played for the jury.  (13T:69-17).  Defendant did not object to the admission of the statement, nor does Defendant challenge the admission of the statement on appeal.  Moreover, the Prosecutor only fleetingly referenced this statement in order to “respond to an issue or argument raised by defense counsel” in the Defendant’s summation.  Johnson, 287 N.J. Super. at 266.  Just moments prior to the Prosecutor’s reference to Defendant’s statement, defense counsel in summation stated:
[brief] ”  4T19:3-7.  The trial court then “finds that even if plaintiff is the holder of legal title, it would be inequitable for him to retain and enjoy the beneficial interest as against the interest of the defendant who is equitably entitled to that enjoyment. ”  4T19:21-20:1.  Further, the trial court finds that Defendant is entitled to ownership of the Strip by adverse possession.  4T21:7-13.  The trial court awarded title to the Strip to the Defendant.  4T23:9-11.
[brief] Carey, 168 N.J. at 422-23 (citing State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985)).  These factors should be applied qualitatively, not quantitatively, and therefore the trial court may impose consecutive sentences even though a majority of the factors support concurrent sentences.  *Id.* at 427.  When the trial court properly evaluates the *Yarbough* factors in light of the record, the court’s decision will normally not be disturbed on appeal.
[brief] (Pa895-902)  It is undisputed that Appellant was subjected to sexual harassment in Respondents’ workplace by [...] as nearly three months after the filing of the original complaint, [...] admitted that [...]’s conduct constituted sexual harassment.  (Pa895-902).  The fact that the State’s own investigation conclusively established that [...] subjected Appellant to a sexually hostile working environment makes Appellant [...]’s prima facie case for her.
[brief] Id. at 576, 582.  “In the absence of express trust provisions, we conclude that the hierarchical (Watson) approach should be utilized in church property disputes in this State. ”  Id. at 580; see also [...] v. [...], Appeal No.: [...] (App. Div. Nov. 29, 2021).  In its reasoning, our Supreme Court stated:  Here it has been established that the [...] is a completely integrated hierarchical body, the ecclesiastical determination of which incidentally resolves the question of control over local church property.  This is dispositive of the case.  [...] was incorporated as an affiliated member of the [...].  This incorporation has never been changed and the local church organization and its property are subject to the hierarchical authority of the parent church as indicated in the constitutions and canon law of the national church and its dioceses.  Under the Watson rule, therefore, plaintiffs [the national church] were entitled to the relief sought.  The problem lies in defendants’ [local church] efforts to take the church property with them.  This they may not do.  Graves, 83 N.J. at 580.
[brief] Such statements were excluded from the hearsay rule and made admissible as substantive evidence under the Evidence Rules adopted by Order of the Supreme Court of New Jersey on September 15, 1992.  These rules became effective July 1, 1993, just nine days after the conclusion of defendant's trial.  In the event of a retrial, *N.J.R.E. 803(a)(2)* would permit proof of [the witness’s] prior consistent statements to rebut the assertion that he was fabricating his trial testimony because of a motive to shift the blame to the defendant.  In these circumstances, we cannot say that it was plain error to allow [the witness's] testimony as to his earlier statements that defendant, not he, shot [the victim].  R. 2:10-2.  Further, as N.J.R.E. 803(a)(2) allows the use of such testimony as substantive evidence, it was also not plain error to omit a cautionary charge.  [Id. at 158-59.]  In Neno v. Clinton, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered a similar situation where another officer testified to the substance of statements made by others.
[brief] [...]  NICHOLAS CILENTO, : SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  Petitioner / Appellant, : APPELLATE DIVISION v. : Appellate Div. Dt. No. [...]  BOARD OF EDUCATION :  On Appeal from the Final Administrative OF THE TOWNSHIP OF : Decision of the Commissioner of Education  WOODBRIDGE, : Dept. of Education Agency  Dkt. No. [...]  MIDDLESEX COUNTY, : Commissioner of Education  Dec. No. [...]  Respondent / Respondent. : OAL Dkt. No. [...]  Administrative Action  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER / APPELLANT
[brief] N.J.R.E. 702, 703; Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 53 (2015) (quoting State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 494 (2006)).  The net opinion rule bars expert testimony where the admission into evidence of an expert's conclusions is not supported by factual evidence or other data; the rule requires that an expert give the why and wherefore that supports the opinion, rather than a mere conclusion.  The net opinion rule is a “corollary of [N.J.R.E. 703].”  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 53–54 (2015) (internal citations omitted).
[brief] Carroll v. N.J. Transit, 366 N.J. Super. 380 (App. Div. 2004)  . . . . . . . . . .  4, 5 D'Alessandro v. Hartzel, 422 N.J. Super. 575, 579, 29 A.3d 1112 (App. Div. 2011)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3  Nisivoccia v. Glass Gardens, Inc., 175 N.J. 559, 563, 818 A.2d 314 (2003)  . . . . . . . . . . .  3 O'Shea v. K. Mart Corp., 304 N.J. Super. 489, 492-93, 701 A.2d 475 App. Div. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3  Rowe v. Mazel Thirty, LLC, 209 N.J. 35, 43, 34 A.3d 1248 (2012)  . . . . . . . . . . .  3  Ryder v. Ocean Cty. Mall, 340 N.J. Super. 504, 506 (App. Div. 2001)  . . . . . . .  4  Sussman v. Mermer, 373 N.J. Super. 501, 504, 862 A.2d 572 (2004)  . . . . .  3  TABLE OF STATUTES
[brief] However, this purported factual dispute concerning the navigation impediment faced by Appellant is the exact type of situation that would benefit from an adjudicatory hearing, which would allow further factual development and expert testimony.  The result of the hearing would be a more fully developed record that, at the end of the day, would result in more effective judicial review in the event of an appeal to the Appellate Division.  As noted in Appellant’s initial brief, the factual situation presented in this matter is distinguishable from the case law cited by Respondents, [...] (“[...]”) and [...], in their briefs and relied upon by the [...] in the underlying decision.  In Spalt v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 237 N.J. Super. 206 (App. Div. 1989), the Court held that close residency, fear of resultant injury to property, damage to recreational interest, or shared generalized property rights are not particularized property rights.  1  “Jb” refers to [...]’s appellate brief.  Spalt, 237 N.J. Super. at 212.  In re Riverview Development, LLC, Waterfront Development Permit No. 0908-05-0004.3 WFD 060001, 411 N.J. Super. 409 (App. Div. 2010), held that general claims of adverse aesthetic and traffic impacts did not create sufficient property interests to entitle neighboring homeowners to a hearing.  In re Riverview Dev., 411 N.J. Super. at 437-38.  The Court in In re AMICO stated that simply because some of the plaintiffs reside close to the… site and are fearful of resultant injury to their property, does not mean that they are entitled to an adjudicatory hearing.  Fear of damage to one’s…generalized property rights shared with other property owners is insufficient to demonstrate a particularized property right.  In re AMICO/Tunnel Carwash, 371 N.J. Super. 199, 212 (App. Div. 2004).  Each of these decisions bases the lack of a particularized property interest on the fact that the potential harm faced by the party requesting a hearing is general in nature.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Trial Court  Oral Opinion on Motion ..................................................2T71-2 to 2T94-25 March 14, 2024  Order Declaring Decedent Essential ........................Ra68  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This is an appeal from an Order from the Division of Workers Compensation, in which the petitioner decedent was declared to be a New Jersey essential worker under N.J.S.A. 34:15-31 during a period of occupational exposure.  Petitioner filed a dependency claim petition against respondent, alleging that his wife suffered COVID-19 in the course of her employment as a teacher employed by respondent, which caused her death.  Petitioner moved to declare the decedent to be an essential employee as defined by N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11.  This statute is often referred to as the "Presumption Statute" because it entitles an essential employee to a rebuttable presumption that her COVID-19 disease was related to her employment.  The Judge of Compensation essentially treated petitioner's motion as a summary judgment motion, but relieved petitioner of the basic requirement to present affidavits from individuals with personal knowledge of the relevant facts.  Nevertheless, the Judge of Compensation granted petitioner's motion without being presented with any competent evidentiary materials of any kind.  The Judge of Compensation declared the decedent to be an essential employee based on nothing but petitioner's attorney's certification and legal argument, despite the existence of genuine issues of material fact.  The Judge of Compensation concluded that teachers fall within the definition of essential employees and that this teacher, the decedent, would be declared to be an essential employee.  The Judge of Compensation ignored the fact that the clear language of N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11 does not identify teachers and other educational employees as essential employees, and they are not deemed to be essential employees anywhere in the legislative history that lead to the enactment of the statute.  There was no need to include teachers in the definition of essential employees because after the initial shutdown during the pandemic, schools were closed and learning occurred virtually.  The Judge of Compensation therefore erred procedurally and substantively by summarily declaring the decedent to be an essential employee.  The Order declaring the petitioner decedent to be an essential worker should be reversed, and the matter should be remanded to another Judge of Compensation for a trial on the merits.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] “[T]he evidence a defendant seeks to admit in support of a third-party guilt defense must be capable of demonstrating ‘some link between the [third-party] evidence and the victim or the crime. ’”  *State v. Perry*, 225 N.J. 222, 236-39 (2016), (second alteration in original) (quoting *Koedatich*, 112 N.J. 225, 301).  Indeed, “[s]omewhere in the total circumstances there must be some thread capable of inducing reasonable men to regard the event as bearing upon the State's case. ”  *Sturdivant*, 31 N.J. at 179.  In addition to establishing a link more than “mere conjecture,” evidence in support of third-party guilt must satisfy our court’s Rules of Evidence.  *State v. Fortin*, 178 N.J. 540, 591 (2004) (*Fortin II*).  “A trial court must engage in a fact-sensitive analysis to determine whether the evidence of third-party guilt meets this requirement.
[brief] Indeed, New Jersey courts have already understood the signaling requirement to apply to lane changes, including in cases where the statute’s language was at issue.  Furthermore, at the motion hearing, the State established that the officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion that a turn signal was required under the circumstances of this case because of the other traffic on the road, including the police vehicle.  Giving due deference to the judge’s factual and credibility findings, which are fully supported by the record, this Court should affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.
[brief] “But there is a general agreement that the distribution of water by a municipality to its inhabitants for domestic and commercial uses is a private or proprietary function which in its exercise is subject to the rules applicable to private corporations.  This is the rule in New Jersey. ”  Defendants fail to point to any statute or regulation via which the freedom of contract between the parties and the right to sue thereon is somehow subsumed or preempted.  As our Supreme Court explained when deciding that consumer statutory claims involving the sale of insurance products weren’t preempted by other statutory or regulatory schemes,\(^{15}\) the Legislature, presumed familiar with its laws, took no action to adopt special protections for municipalities facing contract claims.
[brief] However, at the summary judgment stage, Plaintiff is entitled to the inference that her testimony is truthful, and it is within the jury’s province to assess the credibility of these statements.  By essentially dismissing her testimony without allowing a jury to evaluate it, the court improperly weighed evidence.  The court further inferred that the charge pay investigation was independent of the investigation into Defendant [...]’s conduct despite all evidence to the contrary, stating with regard to the June 2020 incident that the “investigation’s already been done into that. ” (T12-6).  However, the record shows that no true investigation had been performed and the proximity between the pending investigation of Defendant [...]’s related to the incident in June 2020 and the subsequent initiation of the charge pay investigation in August 2020 raises questions about the true motivation behind the scrutiny of Plaintiff’s actions.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Claims Are Barred by Immunity Principles.  In denying [...]’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint, the Law Division correctly determined that allowing the amendment would be futile because immunities would bar the proposed claims.  Specifically, the Law Division found applicable: the litigation privilege; the immunity for legislative or judicial action or inaction, or administrative action or inaction of a legislative or judicial nature, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:2-3(b) and N.J.S.A. 59:3-2(b); absolute judicial immunity; and absolute prosecutorial immunity.  (1T42:11 to 44:22).  In his brief, [...] does not appear to address the Law Division’s determination that allowing his proposed claims to proceed would be futile on the grounds of immunity.  Thus, as an initial matter, he has waived the right to contest that determination in this court.
[directive] Is there any one of you who does not meet these requirements?  2.  a.  This trial is expected to last for ______________________.  Is there anything about the length or scheduling of the trial that would interfere with your ability to serve?  b.  Do you have any medical, personal or financial problem that would prevent you from serving on this jury?  Model Criminal Jury Voir Dire Questions Revised as Promulgated by Directive #4-07
[brief] The miscarriage of justice was compounded by the improper comments of defense counsel regarding the plaintiff’s absence from trial.  The plaintiff was unable to appear at trial due to unrelated health issues which she passed away from shortly after the trial was completed.  (Pa33; Pa57; 1T5:13-18; 3T68:14-69:1).  The Trial Court found that the plaintiff was an unavailable witness and properly denied the defendant’s request to give the jury an adverse inference charge because the plaintiff’s absence from trial was due to the unrelated health condition.