[brief] Like in Kucinski, 227 N.J. at 622-23, the lower court here correctly determined that the defendant’s statement, “I don’t want to tell you much,” made in response to the detective’s question, “Can you tell me what happened?”, could not be viewed as an unambiguous invocation of the right to silence.  The lower court found that the plain language used by the defendant simply did not convey a desire not to speak with the detectives at all; defendant wanted to speak with the detectives, but was reticent to tell the detectives everything about his criminal conduct, in light of the nature of the admissions he soon would make.  The lower court found it was not left to speculate that this was the defendant’s intended meaning.  That this was, in fact, the intent of defendant’s words was confirmed by the defendant himself.  Clarification was sought by detectives because the manner in which defendant said that sentence was unclear – the lower court found the defendant had mumbled.  The recording of the statement proved for the lower court that what defendant said was neither clearly spoken, nor clearly understood by the detectives.  Both detectives immediately and instinctively reacted, not only immediately asking defendant what he said, but also immediately engaging in physical behavior well recognized as evidencing a failure to hear what someone has said: both immediately leaned forward as they ask defendant to repeat what he had said.  When the defendant did so, the lower court found that defendant confirmed that what he wanted to convey to the detectives was not a desire not to speak with them, but a reluctance, or inability, to answer their broad question regarding what happened: “I said, I couldn’t say for the most part. ”  This clarification by the defendant was unambiguous.  The lower court found it in no way expressed to the detectives an intent or desire not to speak with them.  Defendant wanted to speak with police, but was putting the detectives on notice that he was having trouble verbalizing his answer.  That this is the correct interpretation was only further supported for the lower court by what defendant told the detectives next, when again asked, “what happened. ”  Defendant told the detectives about something he “never really talked about” – “that certain times in [his] life [he] would ... kind of like see or like hear stuff that wasn’t there. ”  For the lower court, the totality of the circumstances demonstrated defendant did not invoke his right to silence.  The totality of the circumstances demonstrated instead that the detectives’ conduct in response to that one sentence fully comported with New Jersey law.  The lower court simply did not err in rejecting all of defendant’s claims as unsupported by the evidence before it.  In so finding, the lower court expressed no doubt that while the burden of proving the admissibility of defendant’s confession was on the State, the State had met its burden.  The lower court never shifted that burden onto defendant.  The lower court simply refused to rely upon speculation where there existed no facts of record supportive of defendant’s arguments.  The lower court relied upon its eyes and ears – not only what was testified to by [...], but also more importantly what it could see and hear for itself in defendant’s video-recorded confession – in rendering its factual findings.  This Court should defer to these factual findings and, as the lower court did, find that there is simply no merit to defendant’s request for the suppression of his confession.  This Court should affirm.