[brief] **THE SUBCONTRACT IS NOT AMBIGUOUS**  **A.  The Subcontract Makes Specific Reference To The Effect Of The Negligence Of The Indemnitee**  Respondent urges this Court that indemnity provisions are to be “strictly construed against the indemnitee. ”  *Kieffer v. Best Buy*, 205 N.J. 213, 223  However, as [...] points out, it is only strictly construed against the indemnitee, “[i]f the meaning of an indemnity provision is ambiguous. ”  *Ibid.*  Therein lies the crux of this appeal.  The trial court erroneously read ambiguity into an otherwise straightforward provision.  A provision that is widely used by the construction industry throughout the country, one which the United States Supreme Court touted as “an example of an indemnification clause that makes specific reference to the effect of the negligence of the indemnitee. ”  *Seckinger*, 397 U.S. at 212 n.17 (1970)(emphasis added).  “Mak[ing] specific reference to the effect of the negligence of the indemnitee” is *exactly* what our the *Azurak* Court meant by “bright line language. ”  *Azurak v. Corp. Prop. Inv'rs*, 175 N.J. 110, 112-13 (2003)(“Finally, in order to allay even the slightest doubt on the issue of what is required to bring a negligent indemnitee within an indemnification agreement, *we reiterate that the agreement must specifically reference the negligence or fault of the indemnitee*”)(emphasis added).  To hold that the nearly identical language from the instant Contract is ambiguous, would be in direct contravention of the United States Supreme Court, and the New Jersey Supreme Court  Specifically, [...] takes issue with the phrase “is caused. ” (TPDb33).  The earlier version of AIA Document A201 that the United States Supreme Court reviewed in *Seckinger* also contained the unambiguous phrase “is caused. ”  Therefore, it is inarguable that the inclusion of “is caused” means the provision “was never intended to satisfy the bright line requirement. ” (TPDb33).  [...] was mimicking a model that is widely used in the construction industry, and, crucially, a model that “makes specific reference to the effect of the negligence of the indemnitee” just as Azurak and Mantilla v. Nc Mall Assocs., 167 N.J. 262 (2001) require.  See, Seckinger 397 U.S. at 212 n.17.  This Court, in its decision in Leitao v. Damon G. Douglas Co., also found an extremely similar indemnification provision (Db17-18) to be unequivocal.  301 N.J. Super. 187, 191 (App. Div. 1997).  [...] admits this provision is “nearly identical” to the provision at issue.  (TBDb39).  Notably, the provision in Leitao also contained the “is caused” language.  Ibid.  [...] attempts to distinguish the Leitao case by arguing the clause in that case was more concise, but this Court has held: even when a contract is to be strictly construed against an indemnitee, it is not required that the Court search for an ambiguity in every complex provision.  Sayles v. G&G Hotels, Inc., 429 N.J. Super. 266, 274 (App. Div. 2013).  Here, the language of the indemnity provision at issue plainly satisfies the Azurak standard, as it is unambiguous in accordance with this Court’s precedent, and the precedent set by the United States Supreme Court.