ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
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[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(c) permits a hearing to be adjourned “to any time and place. ”  The problem here is that the hearing on the amending ordinance was never commenced and thus never adjourned.  The failure to provide notice of the adjournment invalidates [...].  A meeting, once started, may be adjourned by a governing body without further publication.  The announcement at the public meeting, in the presence of those persons in attendance, is sufficient notice.  LaRue v. East Brunswick, 68 N.J. Super. 435, 451–452 (App. Div. 1961).  Here, no meeting was held, no valid adjournment was authorized and no appropriate notice of the adjournment or of the new date for further consideration of the ordinance was given.  Consequently, for these additional reasons, [...] is invalid.  Township Committee of the Township of Edgewater Park, 187 N.J. Super. at 596.  The Borough made no announcement regarding the scheduled public hearing on [...] at the December 14, 2021, meeting, and thus there was never any notice to the public that the hearing would be held on December 28, 2021.  The Borough kept the public in the dark.  Allowing the Borough to claim conformance with N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 under these facts would allow any municipality to adopt ordinances in secret, in direct contravention of the intent and purpose of the Statute.  POINT IV
[brief] When the litigation commenced in June of 2022, Defendant claimed on dismissal motion that all 320 plus landowners were indispensable parties.  (Da331)5  Interestingly, Defendant failed to claim [...] as an indispensable party.  The claim that [...] is an indispensable party was never asserted until summary judgment motions a year later.  This defense was never raised in any case management conferences and only surfaced in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in 2023.
[brief] An individual stockholder can assert a direct claim against another shareholder when the plaintiff suffers a “special injury. ”  *Tully v. Mirz*, 457 N.J. Super. 114, 124.  “A special injury exists where there is a wrong suffered by the plaintiff that was not suffered by all stockholders generally or where the wrong involves a contractual right of the stockholders such as the right to vote. ”  *Id.*  This difficult and fact sensitive inquiry in the context of larger entities is far simpler in the case of closely held companies like [...] and [...] because shareholders or members owe fiduciary duties not just to the entity but also their fellow shareholders or members.
[brief] [...] had also submitted sufficient reasons for his delay in appearing with counsel, including that he had found one earlier who agreed to appear and sent retainers, but then declined.  (Ibid.)  His ex-wife had also had a stroke leaving him to care for their children, which inhibited his time available to search for counsel he ultimately did find.  (Ibid.)  Most importantly, the request to postpone was not by [...] seeking more time to find an attorney.  It was made by the attorney he had found.
[brief] ”).  In doing so, the [...] attempts to reframe the issue as being whether the Act allows parties “to choose their own negotiations representatives without interference from the other side” (Db17).  This has never been the issue before [...] or the basis of the [...]’s initial filing against the [...].  It is undisputed that the parties are permitted to choose their own representatives for negotiations, within certain limits that are not at issue here, which the [...] does not challenge.  The question, however, is whether a party is permitted to identify its entire membership as “representatives” within the intent of N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 and what the meaning of the term “representative” of a public employment association is.
[brief] According to Respondent, the validity of the $17,900 “free rent” chargeback provision in its residential lease “is supported by the majority of appellate courts in other jurisdictions,” citing intermediary appellate decisions from three states, Missouri, Georgia and Michigan, including Frank v. Sandy Rothschild & Associates, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 602 (Mo. App. 1999); Manning & Associates Pers., Inc. v. Trizec Properties, Inc., 442 S.E.2d 783 (Ga. App. 1994); Lesatz v. Standard Green Meadows, 416 N.W.2d 334 (Mich. App. 1987)).  The Respondent’s representation of the “majority” view is incorrect for several reasons.  First, “the majority” of courts that have considered challenges to contract provisions similar to the “free rent” chargeback provision here have recognized them to be “disguised penalties,” under the Restatement of Contracts principles adopted in New Jersey and many other states.
[directive] MEDICAL FORENSIC EXAM AND TREATMENT  Healthcare professionals shall provide every victim of sexual assault a thorough, compassionate, and timely examination, as well as related services.  Sexual assault victims may seek medical attention at any healthcare facility; however, the specialized services of the SART are only accessible at a SART-participating facility.  There is no fee for services associated with the medical forensic exam, pursuant to N.J.S.A 52:4B-52(k).  All victims of sexual assault who are 13 years of age or older and disclose a sexual assault within five days of when the incident occurred shall be offered a medical forensic exam.  Victims who disclose a sexual assault more than five days after the assault may, but will not routinely, undergo a medical forensic exam.  All victims of sexual assault shall also be given the opportunity to discuss their medical condition, treatment options, and medical referral plan privately with the FNE, sexual assault examiner, or emergency department healthcare provider throughout the medical forensic exam and related treatment.  All medical forensic exams performed in New Jersey, including those performed at agencies that are not SART-participating facilities, should use the SAFE Kit and the DFSA/Tox Kit, where warranted.
[brief] The Zoning Board Denies [...]’s First Application  On March 21, 2022, the Zoning Board denied the First Application by a vote of 4-3 where five votes were required, which was later memorialized in a resolution dated April 18, 2022.  See generally Pa64-Pa106.  The Zoning Board found that a use variance was necessary because the proposed residential apartments (which included the mandatory two and three-bedroom affordable units) were not “efficiency apartments. ”  Pa96.  Further, the Zoning Board ruled that [...] did not meet its burden for the use variance positive criteria.  In addition, the Zoning Board found that the FAR and building coverage were too large for the Property.  Pa98.  [...] did not appeal the April 18, 2022 Resolution, but instead opted to make additional substantial changes to its proposed development given the Zoning Board’s comments during the time of denial.  E.
[brief] (2T 49-3 to 7)  [...] exchanged another set of texts on December 17th, 2012, with the 2078 cell-phone number.  [...] claimed that the text messages amounted to a conversation about the time the store opened and that the two agreed that the recipient would be “out there at 9:00 tomorrow. ”  (2T 53-1 to 54-7)  With respect to the December 19th robbery, [...] testified that [...], [...], and [...] picked him up at school and they drove to the [...].
[brief] (1a)  This “new” Complaint directly tracked the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint and the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint in the 2015 Lawsuit.  Plaintiffs also included three (3) “new” claims for “fraudulent concealment” against all Defendants based on their alleged failure to disclose, during discovery in the 2015 Lawsuit, that “Defendant [...] was the sole member of Defendant [...] and that Defendants [...] and [...] controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity. ”  On March 11, 2020, plaintiffs’ filed a Motion to Consolidate the instant lawsuit with the preexisting case under Docket No. [...].
[brief] That is, Defendants do not dispute that the trial court properly struck their respective pleadings for failure to provide discovery in the first instance.  Instead, Defendants appeal the June 12 Orders of the trial court that suppressed Defendant [...]’s pleading with prejudice and denied Defendants’ cross-motion to restore their pleadings because they had still, at that point, failed to provide “fully responsive discovery” as the Rules of Court clearly require.  While this Court, in granting Defendants’ motion for leave to appeal, appears question whether the trial court’s actions were too extreme, a more fulsome analysis of the proceedings below reveals that the Defendants were given every opportunity to comply with their discovery obligations.  Instead, they continued to insist that after some unspecified search for information and documents that they did not have a single piece of paper having anything to do with the Defendant LLC’s ownership of the building, while also maintaining that they had not lost or destroyed any documents.  To make matters worse, Defendants disregarded clear directives from the trial court as to how they could cure their deficiencies, and refused even to cure those deficiencies when given yet another chance to do so.  All told, multiple judges in the proceedings below all came to the conclusion that Defendants, after several warnings and opportunities, had failed to provide discovery in any meaningful sense.  Those rulings, including the rulings under review here, find ample support in the record and the law.  Accordingly, this Court should affirm the June 12 Orders.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Or, alternatively, that Defendants were seeking attorneys’ fees under the statute governing frivolous lawsuits.  *See, e.g., id.* at 18:3–19:2 (“[Y]ou make this leap that . . . the suit filed by the plaintiff in this matter was, in fact, frivolous; was, in fact, brought with intention to have your client expend resources . . . but where is that demonstrated to the Court?  Despite the other lawsuits he may have filed, despite his other actions in other cases, where is that substantially before the Court that this would even have been ripe for a motion to dismiss given the liberal standard of that requirement that the Court has to adhere to on the case law, court rules?”).  But while Defendants’ counsel remarked on both the meritless nature of Plaintiff’s claims and his track record of filing meritless lawsuits against others, Defendants’ counsel made clear that his purpose in doing so “was to situate [Plaintiff]’s behavior in the broader context of what he’s done previously and that’s because Your Honor’s order of dismissal was without prejudice.  And . . . to explain . . . the risks that would be entailed. ”  Id. at 19:11–16.  In other words, the “exceptional circumstance” warranting reopening of the judgment was that it would be profoundly inequitable for Defendants to be rendered without a remedy “[on] account of [Plaintiff]’s gamesmanship” and “despite attorney’s fees being statutorily authorized.
[directive] In exercising their discretion, municipal prosecutors must adhere: to constitutional, statutory, and ethical restrictions; to rules, guidance, and decisional law adopted by the Judiciary; and to supervisory instructions of the County Prosecutor and the Attorney General.  a.  Plea agreements  From 1974 to 1990, all plea bargaining in municipal courts was prohibited, pursuant to a Supreme Court directive.  See State v. Hessen, 145 N.J. 441, 446-49 (1996).  That prohibition has been relaxed, but the Court’s Part VII Rules and Guidelines still impose significant limits on municipal prosecutors’ discretion to enter into plea agreements, and prohibit the use of plea agreements to resolve certain marijuana and other offenses.  See id. at 451-54.  Plea agreements in municipal court are now governed by Rule 7:6-2; the Court’s Guidelines to Part VII and accompanying Commentary; case law; and guidance from the Office of the Attorney General.
[brief] Ordinary people form misconceptions about forensic science through learning that occurs outside their awareness.  When people think about “learning,” they often think about purposeful, effortful learning that might happen by taking a class, reading a book, or otherwise seeking out information.  But often learning will occur outside of our awareness.  Learning can also be accomplished through exposure to various information that people encounter in their everyday lives or information that is readily available.  Information about forensic science is available to ordinary people though news media, entertainment media (television shows and movies), and social media posts.  Frequent exposure to this sort of information results in the formation of knowledge structures and beliefs about forensic science without any effort or intention on the part of the person receiving the information.
[brief] 319 N.J. Super. at 11-15, citing Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. at 486-491; see also State v. Weiler, 211 N.J. Super. 602 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 37 (1986) (reversing for inadequate voir dire).  Whenever such an issue might affect the verdict, it is the job of the court to make the necessary inquiries of that juror, and, if necessary, others.  R.D., 169 N.J. at 558; State v. Wormley, 305 N.J. Super. 57, 70 (App. Div. 1997).  Without such voir dire, the judge has abdicated her responsibility and the possibility of impropriety is thus presumed to be prejudicial, requiring reversal.  *Tyler*, 176 N.J. at 181-183 (reversing convictions for improperly allowing a tainted juror merely to hear the case with other jurors even though she did not ultimately deliberate on it; because her presence may have influenced other jurors, prejudice was presumed).  Here the trial judge failed badly in her role as “gatekeeper” of the impartiality of the jury and the fairness of the trial.  *Tyler*, 176 N.J. at 181.
[brief] “Quite obviously, the real incentive for participation in a tax sale is the potential to secure marketable title in a foreclosure action. ”  Simon v. Rando, 374 N.J.Super. 147, 152-153 (App.Div. 2005), affirmed 189 N.J. 339 (2007), Landa, supra, 162 N.J.Super. at 323 (after judgment, plaintiff’s title “becomes paramount”).  The statutory command, N.J.S. 54:5-85, "to encourage the barring of the right of redemption" "evidences an intention to impose stricter limits upon the time and the grounds for vacating a judgment of foreclosure than would apply generally under Rule 4:50."  Phillipsburg, supra, 380 N.J. Super. at 166; cf. Bron v. Weintraub, 42 N.J. 87, 91 (1964) (determining it "understandable that the Legislature found it fair to bar the right to redeem by a strict foreclosure").  [...] did not show any exceptional circumstances.  There was no basis for relief under (f), which only applies when "truly exceptional circumstances are present."
[brief] ”  55 N.J. at 405.  Likewise, defendant’s reliance on Montague is inapt, because in the analogous context of a request for a “defense of another” charge, the defendant presented competent evidence of excessive force.  Ibid.  (“[H]ere there was something more”).  In Montague, the defendant testified that he saw his niece leave the car and heard her tell [...] that he was “a [racial slur] cop in uniform”; [...] and the other occupants of the car, as well as Officer [...], were Negroes.  The defendant's testimony continued as follows:  “That is all I could hear but he \(^5\) Additionally, the State notes that this Court accepts inconsistent jury verdicts.  E.g., State v. Petties, 139 N.J. 310, 319 (1995).  said don’t call me no [racial slur] cop or I’ll smack you.  My niece said I’ll smack you back. ”  [Id. at 392.]  In sum, four other witnesses corroborated the defendant’s account that (1) the officer’s arrest of the defendant’s niece was unlawful, and (2) the defendant was acting in defense of another.  Furthermore, there was no video evidence disproving the defendant’s testimony.
[directive] Last Name First Name Middle Name Indictment/ Accusation/ Complaint Number  PROMIS Number SBI Number Summary of State's Allegations  Special Factors Relative to Offense  Defendant's Version (Complete only upon application for PTI and after conviction)  I  Victim Statement(s)  Attached If No, Check Reason Date Request Made I D D D Not Applicable No Response Yes 0No  Revised: 09/2017, CN: 10693
[brief] *Id.* at 170.  See also *State v. P.H.*, 178 N.J. 378, 392 (2004) (“The myth that a victim of sexual assault will naturally cry out and alert others to the crime (‘hue and cry’) harkens back to thirteenth-century notions of feminine behavior.  Even though scientific studies have shown that this ‘timing myth’ is utterly false, the mistaken perception that a victim will report a sexual assault immediately has proven to be one of the most refractory of modern jurisprudence.
[brief] Since Defendants contended that that term has its “usual and customary meanings” once the deposition of [...] was taken we could have retained an expert to address that issue.  At minimum, as noted by the [...] Certification, the insured had the reasonable expectation that the OAE Proceeding was only required to be disclosed if there was a complaint relating to legal services made by a client that would have bearing upon potential exposure.  [Pa567, ¶ 49]  This is why the Application asks for a “Loss Run” if the answer is “yes. ”  Insurers care about losses—not record keeping issues.  There should have been no doubt that the usual and customary meaning of bar complaint is a disciplinary complaint against an attorney brought by a bar association.  Nevertheless, the trial court decided to create its own “usual and customary” meaning of the term in reliance on Webster’s dictionary to define “bar complaint”—concluding that it is “profession of a lawyer” and “formal allegation against a party. ”  From this, the trial court concluded that the OAE Complaint is a bar complaint.  We know, however, that this is not true of a New Jersey ethics complaint because the State of New Jersey Bar Association does not issue bar complaints.  It also raises the question why the OAE Complaint would not qualify as a Disciplinary Proceeding but would as a bar complaint.  Thus, there is a clear ambiguity here created by the trial court’s attempt to define bar complaint without the benefit of any information from Defendants.
[brief] (Pa362-Pa371; Pa319)  Standing between the two homes owned by Appellants and the Subject Structure is real property designated as Lot 1, in Block 768 on the [...]’s tax map.  Prior to [...] acquiring it due to an unpaid tax bill of a little over $300 in 1987, this lot was part of [...].  In fact, the sewer lines, electric lines, cable television lines, telephone lines, gas lines, and water lines all run from [...], across that lot, and tie into the mains located at [...].
[directive] Odpowiedź na poniższe pytania wymagana jest tylko w przypadku, gdy przyznaje się Pan(i) do popełnienia, usiłowania popełnienia lub udziału w zmowie przestępczej mającej na celu popełnienie jednego z następujących r. lub później: przestępstw pierwszego lub drugiego stopnia, które miały miejsce 29 czerwca 2001 zabójstwo, kwalifikowane nieumyślne spowodowanie śmierci lub nieumyślne spowodowanie śmierci, zabójstwo z użyciem pojazdu, kwalifikowana napaść, rozbrojenie funkcjonariusza organów porządku publicznego, uprowadzenie, kwalifikowana napaść na tle seksualnym, napaść na tle seksualnym, napad rabunkowy, uprowadzenie pojazdu, narażeniem innych osób na niebezpieczeństwo utraty życia lub poważnego kwalifikowane podpalenie z uszkodzenia ciała, włamanie, kradzież przez wymuszenie polegające na przejęciu majątku innej osoby poprzez grożenie uszkodzeniem ciała, fizycznym ograniczeniem wolności lub swobody ruchów albo popełnieniem innego przestępstwa, stosowanie pułapek w obiektach służących do wytwarzania lub rozprowadzania niebezpiecznych substancji kontrolowanych albo odpowiedzialność bezwzględna za śmierć wywołaną narkotykiem; albo następujących przestępstw pierwszego lub drugiego stopnia, które miały miejsce 18 czerwca 2002 r. lub później: lub posiadanie broni chemicznej, środków biologicznych albo terroryzm, wytwarzanie urządzeń jądrowych lub radiologicznych; albo następujących przestępstw pierwszego lub drugiego stopnia, 13 stycznia 2008 r. lub później: które miały miejsce zorganizowana działalność przestępcza pierwszego stopnia; albo następujących przestępstw pierwszego lub drugiego stopnia, które miały miejsce 14 sierpnia 2013 r. lub później: pornografia dziecięca; albo następujących przestępstw pierwszego lub drugiego stopnia, które 2013 r. lub później: miały miejsce nielegalny handel bronią.
[directive] Internal Affairs Records ............................................................................ 54 9.1  The Internal Affairs Report .................................................................................................... 54 9.2  Internal Affairs Index File ....................................................................................................... 55 9.3  Investigation Files .................................................................................................................. 55 9.4  Retention Schedule ................................................................................................................ 55 9.5  Security of Internal Affairs Records ....................................................................................... 56 9.6  Confidentiality ....................................................................................................................... 56 9.7  Coordination with Civilian Review Boards ............................................................................. 59 9.8  Coordination with Other Law Enforcement Agencies ........................................................... 62 9.9  Reporting to Law Enforcement Executive ............................................................................. 63 9.10
[brief] In *Jacalone*, the Court found N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2 instructive.  (Aa62-65).  N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2 concerns the consequences to public office holders and employees of convictions for certain crimes.  N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(a) requires a public employee who has been convicted of specified crimes to forfeit his or her public employment, including that the employee “is convicted of an offense involving or touching such office, position or employment. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(a)(2).  In addition, an employee “convicted or an offense involving or touching on his [or her] public office, position or employment, shall be forever disqualified from holding any office or position of honor, trust or profit under this State…”  N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(d).  In 2007, the Legislature added additional language to subsections (a) and (d) to clarify that “as used in this subsection, ‘involving or touching such office, position or employment’ means that the offense was related directly to the person’s performance in, or circumstances flowing from, the specific public office, position or employment held by the person. ”  L.2007, c. 49 §5; N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(a), (d) (emphasis added).