ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] If property subject to forfeiture in an indictable or juvenile case, other than prima facie contraband, is seized by this department, the Detective Bureau must notify the Evidence and Property Control Unit of the County Prosecutor's Office, in writing, within one week of the seizure.  If forfeiture proceedings are approved, the property subject to forfeiture must be immediately turned over to the Evidence and Property Control Unit of the County Prosecutor's Office.  If forfeiture is declined, the property should be returned to its owner provided that the property has no evidential value.  7.1.2
[brief] But [...]'s brief now makes a strange argument: it claims that the EMP is merely an administrative directive as it was not adopted pursuant to notice and comment procedures.  [...]b40.  This is clearly wrong as it contradicts the plain language of the statute, which doesn't say "if there is notice and comment;" it says "shall, to the maximum extent practicable and feasible."  Neither [...] nor the [...] offers any reason why adherence to the EMP in this case is not practicable or feasible.  [...] essentially asks this court to ignore the extensive climate change law.
[brief] ”  (citations omitted)(emphasis in original).  “A trial judge has the inherent power to review, revise, reconsider and modify interlocutory orders at any time prior to the entry of final judgment,” and “[d]enial of summary judgment preserves rather than resolves issues; therefore, later reconsideration of matters implicated in the motion, including the reasons in support of the denial, are not precluded. ”  Blunt v. Kaproth, 309 N.J.Super. 493, 504 (App.Div.1998).  As will be discussed in more detail below, the Trial Court was correct in granting the [...]’ motion for reconsideration, as there was no genuine issue of material fact that would preclude dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against [...].
[brief] (Ca041-Ca070).  In doing so, Appellants expressly reserved the right to appeal the Commission’s prior decision on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to N.J.C.R. 2:2-3(a)(2) once a final order issued as to all claims as to all parties pursuant to N.J.C.R. 2:2-3(b).  (Ca067-068).  Respondent did not file any cross-motion.
[brief] As the trial court held, “no additional discovery will change and/or alter the fact that [...] provided material misrepresentations to [...] in his application and renewal applications for insurance that were relied upon, warranting rescission” of the Policies by [...].  [3T28-24]  Beyond that, the Firm and [...] also had “ample opportunity” to seek any discovery they deemed necessary.  *See Kolos v. Tikal, LLC*, No. A-0076-17T2, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1901, at *4 (App. Div. Aug. 10, 2018) (holding “Plaintiff had an ample opportunity to conduct discovery in advance of [Defendant’s] motion for summary judgment”).  [...] served its responses to document requests on March 19, 2021, served its responses to interrogatories on April 2, 2021, produced documents on May 25, 2021, and did not file its motion for summary judgment (with [...]’s certification) until August 4, 2021.  [Pa820a, ¶¶ 3-5]  The Firm and [...] chose not to issue a notice of deposition until October 7, 2021, and not to schedule a deposition of [...] before opposing [...]’s motion for summary judgment and filing a cross-motion for summary judgment.  [Pa820a, ¶ 6]  *See Jefferson v. Midland Credit Management, Inc.*, No. A-0535-21, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1187, at *13 (App. Div. June 30, 2022) (“In opposing summary judgment, [plaintiff] elected not to propound discovery or request depositions of the individuals…  As a result, she cannot belatedly argue [defendant] failed to proffer sufficient evidence in support of its summary judgment motion. ”).  **II.
[brief] The Agreement Is Valid and Enforceable.  The Petitioner’s overriding argument at trial and on appeal is that because the Agreement is a photocopy and not an original, it cannot be utilized by the Respondent.  This position lacks all merit.  Copies of documents are readily admissible under N.J.R.E. 1003, entitled “Admissibility of duplicates,” which states:  A duplicate as defined by Rule 1001(d) is admissible to the same extent as an original unless a genuine question is raised about the original’s authenticity or the circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate.  Four reasons support the admissibility of the copy of the Agreement.  First, multiple witnesses testified to its existence including Respondent, [...], [...], and [...], Esquire.  Second, the uncontroverted expert opinion of [...] concluded that it was “highly probable” that both signatures of the Petitioner on the antenuptial agreement are genuine.  “Highly probable” is an expression of virtual certainty under the standards of Osborn’s profession.  Osborn also determined that the Petitioner’s two signatures were not a fabrication from another source.  He found no evidence of simulation of the signatures, commonly known as forgery in the legal field.  Osborn also found no evidence of a cut and paste or manipulation with reference to the Petitioner’s signatures.  In assessing the credibility of the Osborn, the Chancery Division held as follows:  This court finds [...]e uncontroverted and extremely credible.  (Pa 26).
[brief] And yet, Plaintiffs \textit{still} tried to oppose [...]’s second motion for summary judgment, filed after the discovery end date expired.  Although the requested fee award was only for the period beginning with the service of the safe harbor letter and lasting until the motion for sanctions was filed, [...] respectfully asks this Court to take into consideration Plaintiffs’ bad faith conduct throughout the entirety of this litigation when it considers awarding the requested fees.  For these reasons and the reasons set forth below, the trial court’s decision sanctioning Plaintiffs should be affirmed, but the fee award re-calculated to grant [...] the full amount of fees requested.
[directive] CSI specialized have who department principal's a by employed or civilians  Officers physical document or collect to authorized be may investigation skills scene crime or Director or the designee, or Prosecutor County the when scene the at evidence the support to necessary personnel is of these use the that determines designee, supervision of direct the under operate personnel such that investigation, provided overseeing the general attorney assistant/deputy or prosecutor assistant on-scene the operate shall employees or officers the that provided further and investigation, County the to directly report and command of chain ordinary their of independently exigent need of the Because designee. or Director or the to or designee, Prosecutor 6 Page skills investigation scene crime specialized with civilians or officers dispatch to order standing a issue may Director or Prosecutor County delay, the without unit, that to assigned personnel and CSI unit agency's of authorizing use the an standing such writing that in Director finds or Prosecutor the that provided evidence of collection/documentation prompt the ensure necessary to is authorization a such without that and incident, ause-of-force following personnel qualified by be not will scene the at evidence that exists probability reasonable standing a order, manner. proper timely and in documented a collected Examiners.
[brief] 1) REVISE MARCH 7, ‘23 ORDER, PAR. 1, TO NOT GRANT TRUST PAYMENT OF $93,277.54 FOR [...] LEGAL FEES (FEB. 1 TO OCT. 25, 2022), & REQUIRE PAYBACK 2) REVISE MARCH 7, 2023 ORDER, PAR. 2, TO REDUCE APPROVED TRUST PAYMENT FOR [...] INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING FEE (FROM $17,649.57 TO $16,575) AND [...]’S TRUSTEE COMMISSION (FROM $2,039.53 TO $1,946.56), & REQUIRE PAYBACK OF OVERPAYMENTS  3)  [...]’S COMPLIANCE WITH OCT. 6, 2022  ORDER, PAR. 2, TO ISSUE  FINAL INFORMAL TRUST ACCOUNTING THAT HE REFUSED TO ISSUE  4)  [...] TO PROVIDE TRUST INFORMATION & DOCUMENTS REQUESTED BY [...], AS A QUALIFIED BENEFICIARY, AS REQ’D BY NJ R.3B:31-67, TO VERIFY ACCURACY & VALIDITY OF FIGURES IN HIS FINAL TRUST ACCOUNTING  5)  REVISE OCT. 6, 2022  ORDER, PAR. 1, BASED ON GRANTING  [...]’ EXCEPTIONS TO TRUST INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING BASED ON HIS AUG. 8, 2022 FILING, & REQUIRE  [...] TO REVISE AND FILE UPDATED ACCOUNTING BASED ON THOSE EXCEPTIONS  6)  REVISE OCT. 6, 2022  ORDER, PAR. 1C, SO PRIOR TRUST PAYMENTS OF $31,259.74 FOR [...] ACCOUNTING FEES FOR 2019-2022 ARE NOT APPROVED  PENDING  MR.  ROSS’ REVIEW FOR ANY ACCOUNTING EXCEPTIONS FOR [...]’S RESOLUTION, OR COURT APPROVAL OR DENIAL, AFTER SUBMITTAL OF HIS REQUESTED R&S INVOICES, AS REQUIRED BY NJ R.3B:31-67  7)  [...] SHALL PAY BACK TO THE TRUST $74,248.18 THAT WAS FOR LEGAL WORK IN 2019-2021
[brief] Plaintiff would later argue that the flex parking removal project violated our State public policy in favor of paying prevailing wages.  Plaintiff would later argue that defendants-fiduciaries of a public trust-used taxpayers trust fund monies as their personal piggy banks for personal projects.  Plaintiff contended that he and other local taxpayers were entitled to know the line-item source of funding the flex parking removal and 911 memorial capital projects after the contested bond ordinance appropriation was rescinded by resolution (and not by ordinance).
[brief] N.J.S.A. 19:15-28.  Such ballots are referred to as “irregular ballots. ”  N.J.S.A. 19:49-5.  Whenever a voter casts an irregular ballot “for any person for any office whose name appears on the machine as a nominated candidate for that office,” that “irregular ballot so voted shall not be counted. ”  Id.; see also N.J.S.A. 19:16-3(f) (any ballot cast by a voter who “writes or pastes the name of any person . . . whose name is printed upon the ballot as a candidate under the same title of office . . . shall not be counted for that office”); N.J.S.A. 19:14-6 (authorizing voters to “write or past the name of any person for whom he desires to vote whose name is not printed on th[e] ballot”).
[brief] Similarly, [...]’s standard of care opinion related to [...]’s services garners no support from the memo prepared by the engineering firm [...].  On direct examination, [...] boldly testified that the [...] memo expressly identified the existence of significant settlement at the north bridge approach.  Based on the content of the memo, [...] testified that “without a doubt” that the defendants, presumably including [...], were aware of the existence of settlement in this area, which plaintiff asserts was the location of his accident.  On cross-examination, [...] was forced to recognize the existence of a clarifying email prepared by the design engineer communicating that the settlement observed on-site involved the south approach to the bridge rather than the north approach.  Candidly, [...] conceded that he was without a basis to challenge the veracity of the clarifying email.  Accordingly, the [...] memo provides no support for [...]’s standard of care opinion.  Plaintiff, however, continues to rely upon the document within his brief.  IV.
[brief] Da39-40.  The trial court explained:  Denville suggests pay-when-able loans are enforceable in this state because the Appellate Division had to first establish the loan in that case was a demand loan to determine the applicable statute of limitations rule.  Denville, 84 N.J. Super. at 169.  The Appellate Division had the opportunity to rule that the loan in question was a demand loan because pay-when-able loans are not recognized in New Jersey.  It did not so rule.  [Da40 (emphasis added)].  The trial court concluded that “persuasive authority here in New Jersey . . . supports the enforceability of pay-when-able loans, particularly when the loans are made between family members or close friends.
[brief] In M.C. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., the appellant filed three successive appeals all challenging the alleged failure of the [...], [...] to afford her a hearing on her request for an undue hardship waiver.  M.C. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., supra, 2019 N.J. Super. at 2.  This Appellate Court observed that the appellant has “already had two bites at the apple” and that the third appeal addressed the same issue as the first two.  Id.  Accordingly, this Appellate Court dismissed the appellant’s third appeal solely on the basis of the appeal’s impropriety, citing to Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E) which enables the Appellate Court to affirm without an opinion where an appellant’s arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.  Id. at 3; R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E)  In the instant matter, just like the appellant in M.C. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., Plaintiff has filed three successive appeals on the exact same issue.  Here, Plaintiff’s successive appeals all challenge the June 23, 2011 summary judgment dismissal of Plaintiff’s case.  [Da6, Da31, and AB1-AB16].  Plaintiff’s second and third appeals are especially egregious as they were filed over a decade after his initial appeal was disposed of by this Appellate Court.  Any new arguments that Plaintiff may be raising in his third appeal were required to be presented in his initial and only appeal as of right; they are otherwise deemed waived.  *State v. Lefante*, supra., 14 N.J. at 591.  Given the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that this Appellate Court can and should dismiss Plaintiff’s third-filed appeal solely on the basis of its impropriety.
[brief] Id.  In granting this motion, the trial judge found that although the law permits some mention of how an accident happened, plaintiff’s counsel “went far beyond the permissible standards for talking about the case. ”  Id. at 502-03.  The Appellate Division also condemned plaintiff’s counsel’s use of the “send a message” motif, ruling that counsel’s references to the defendant’s liability – “running a red light,” “abusing the privilege,” etc. – were not relevant to the happening of the collision, and were only included to “exact punishment. ”  Id. at 508.  Defendants surgically excerpt lines from Plaintiff’s counsel’s opening and closing to make it seem like they called for the jury to “send a message. ”  That phrase was never used at trial.
[brief] [...] argues that [...] waived its ability to argue that [...]’s claims are barred under the Tort Claims Act because [...]’s Answer does not expressly cite Tort Claims Act defenses in its Answer.\(^5\) Pb6-12.  Again, however, this argument is an irrelevant red herring, because [...]’s Complaint does not purport to plead claims under the Tort Claims Act.  Pa32.  And, [...] granted summary judgment because [...]’s claims were based upon a defunct theory that municipal water service is a proprietary function creating a commercial relationship between municipality and resident, \textit{not} based on the Tort Claims Act.  Pa953.  However, so as not to let an erroneous argument go unrebuted, the [...] notes that New Jersey law does not mandate that an affirmative defense can and must only be raised in a party’s answer.
[brief] (Da21, 29, and 30).  The Appellate Division held that the disputed statements should have been redacted.  (Da31).  The Appellate Division also found that the interrogating detective gave improper lay opinions interpreting the evidence, including when he stated that defendant could be seen in the videos carrying a gun and that the image of the shooter matched the image of defendant.  (Da32).  The Appellate decision pointed out that the interrogating detective’s statements were particularly troublesome because they interpreted what was depicted on the videos as undeniable proof that defendant had a gun and was guilty of fatally shooting [...].  (Da33 to Da34).  The interrogating detective also made highly inflammatory statements including that he was “100 percent sure” defendant killed [...], that he could tell defendant was lying, and that defendant was a “stone cold killer. ”  (Da34).  Further, the interrogating detective’s statements suggested he had superior knowledge of what occurred.  (Id.).  That error was compounded by the prosecutor’s summation, which asserted that the interrogating detective knew that defendant was lying based on the evidence he saw.  (Id.).  The trial court provided no guidance on the interrogating detective’s lay opinions, particularly his claims that he knew defendant had a gun and shot [...].  (Da35).  The Appellate Division reversed Defendant’s convictions and remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
[brief] (7T:324-21 to 325-13);(8T:24-4 to 22).  [...] told Detectives that “when everything was going down … it felt like I was further back in my mind. ” (8T:38-24 to 39-3).  [...] also told Detectives that even though it felt like he wasn’t physically in control, he was still able to see everything like he was watching a movie.  (8T:24-11 to 15).  During the interrogation, [...] asked [...] if he would’ve shot him.  (8T:193-21 to 25).  [...] told Steven that he didn’t know if he would have shot him.  (8T:194-3 to 5).  [...] never provided a rational explanation for why he killed his family and told Detectives that he “liked everyone. ” (8T:65-16 to 18).  On January 14, 2022, [...] Kologi went to trial before a Monmouth County jury.
[directive] The National Best Practices for Sexual Assault Kits, issued by the Department of Justice,10 provides guidance regarding storage conditions for the type of evidence included in the SAFE kit as noted in the following table.  The following conditions will apply to all kits – reported and unreported – in an agency’s custody:  Type of Frozen Refrigerated Temp. Controlled Room Evidence Below - Between 2°C and 8°C  Between 15.5°C and Temp. 10°C (36°F and 75°F)  24°C (14°F) with less than 25% (60°F and 75°F) humidity with less than 60% humidity  Liquid blood Never Best Less than 24 hours  Not ideal  Urine Best Less than 24 hours  Not ideal Not ideal Dry biological Not ideal Not ideal Best Acceptable stained item Hair  Not ideal Not ideal Best Acceptable Swabs with biological Not ideal Best (wet)  Best (dried)  Not ideal material  Buccal swabs Best Less than Not ideal Best (liquid)  24 hours  DNA Extracts Best Less than Acceptable (liquid)  Acceptable (dried) (liquid)  24 hours  SAFE kits should only contain dried specimens, and therefore should be stored in a controlled room temperature environment.
[brief] ”  River \textsuperscript{10}  The trial court’s account of what the $17,920 was “in consideration for” shifted from the beginning of the oral opinion, when the court noted that “[...] offered four months' free rent and parking worth $17,920 in concessions in exchange for the [...]'s agreement to sign a two-year lease and to pay rent timely” and not solely “in consideration for” strict compliance with the lease.
[brief] .......................................................................................................27  Appendix .......................................................................................................................28  Table of Citations  Cases  Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380 (1984)  ...........................................21, 23, 26  DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 (2005)  .............................................14  Excel Pharmacy Servs., LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 825 F. App'x 65 (3d Cir. 2020)  ..................................................................................13  Fagliarone v. Twp. of No. Bergen, 78 N.J.Super. 154 (App.Div.1963)  ........10  Housing Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 286 (1994)  ..............23  LVNV Funding v. DeAngelo, 464 N.J. Super 103 (App.Div. 2020) ..........20, 21  In re Resol. of State Comm'n of Investigation, 108 N.J. 35 (1987)  ............13  Mancini v. EDS on Behalf of New Jersey Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 132 N.J. 330 (1993)  ...........................................21, 26  Marder v. Realty Const. Co., 84 N.J. Super. 313 (App.Div.), aff'd, 43 N.J. 508 (1964)  ..................................................................26  Midland Funding LLC v. Williams No. A-2961-22, 2024 WL 1202732 (N.J. Super, App. Div. 2024)  ..................................24  New Century Fin. v. Trewin, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688 (Ch. Div. May 24, 2018)  ..............................................13, 14, 17, 18  New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Sisselman, 106 N.J.Super. 358, (App.Div.1969), certif. den. 54 N.J. 565, (1969)  ...............................................................................................10, 22  R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 255 (2001)  .........................................................................15  Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474 (1974)  ..........................................................................10  State v.  Dickerson 232 N.J. 2 (2018) ................................................................. 9 State v. Fuqua 234 N.J. 583 (2018) ......................................................... 9, 10 State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317 (2015) ............................................................... 9 State v. Revie, 220 N.J. 126 (2014) ............................................................... 9 State v. S.B., 230 N.J. 62 (2017) ................................................................. 9 Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450 (2014) ..................................................... 14, 15 US Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449 (2012) ................................. 26 Veras v. LVNV Funding No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) .............................................................................. 14, 17 Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. A-1996-21, 2023 WL 6157245 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 21, 2023) .................... 12, 13 Statutes
[brief] Additionally, while Counsel credits the delay is deliberations to the vacation schedule of the court and the attorneys, the reality is that it was the unavailability of the jury and the Defense Counsel which caused deliberations to be pushed further out.  On Monday, November 1, 2021, the court proposed continuing deliberations on Wednesday November 3, 2021, as November 2, 2021 was Election Day.  (29T5:17-23).  Counsel then inquired what would happen if there was an issue with Wednesday, to which the court replied that deliberations would continue on Thursday, November 4, 2021.  (29T6:2-4).  Counsel took issue with this, indicating she would not be available that Thursday or Friday.  (29T6:2-11).  The court then inquired of the jury whether it would be available on Wednesday, November 3, 2021.  (29T8:9-16).  It was indicated that five members would not be available.  Ibid.  Thus, three potential days of deliberation were lost due to the Defense’s and Juror’s unavailability.
[brief] The National Association of City Transportation Officials Urban Design Guide ("NATCO") provided some engineering guidance as relating to crosswalk spacing along public streets with 120-200' being sufficient.  Applying this to the subject lot, [...] offered the opinion that a 200' walking distance translates to less than a one minute walk between a parking stall and a dedicated pedestrian route, and while it was logical to attempt to minimize the time, engineers must also consider that over-usage of crosswalk markings would diminish their significance.  Here, the 150' walking distance from the outermost parking stalls in the employee parking section to the central crosswalk translated to an approximate 43 second walk from the incident site.  [...] offered the opinion that this exceeded the industry standard of care.  (Da29-Da30, §2.1.8 Pedestrian Circulation).  Overall, he offered the opinion that to a reasonable degree of engineering certainty that the parking lot design met or exceeded MUTCD standards for the design of parking lots of this size and function and that the incident could not be reasonably attributed to, in whole or in part, the as-built design of the parking lot as it existed at the time of the accident.