ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] If a victim does not qualify for a SART response, the victim remains entitled to, and should be offered, a complete law enforcement investigation and a CVSA’s services, regardless of when or where the incident occurred.  This is similarly true if a victim chooses not to have a medical forensic exam performed, which includes a Sexual Assault Forensic Evidence (SAFE) Kit and a Drug Facilitated Sexual Assault (DFSA)/Toxicology (Tox) Kit.  Additionally, in cases where Child Protection and Permanency (CP&P) are involved with victims between the ages of 13 and 18, law enforcement shall provide the victim and their caseworker with information about the services of a CSVA.  In any case where the victim seeks services in a county other than the one in which the incident occurred, the law enforcement agency in the reporting county shall facilitate communication with the law enforcement agency in whose jurisdiction the incident occurred.  Law enforcement in the county where the incident occurred should respond whenever possible.  Victims who elect to undergo a medical forensic exam should never be referred back to the county of incident to complete a medical forensic exam.  These services shall be provided to the victim regardless of reporting location.  The transfer of SAFE and DFSA/Tox Kits can be arranged after the medical forensic exam by the investigating officer.  However, if timeliness or staffing issues prevent immediate response by the agency with jurisdiction, a law enforcement officer in the county where the victim seeks services shall respond and take the initial report and ensure that the chain of custody of any evidence collected during the examination is preserved.  Sexual Assault Medical Forensic Examination Cases  In all cases where the SART is activated through law enforcement, and the victim choses to have a medical forensic exam, a law enforcement officer shall accompany the victim to the examination site and remain with the victim until the requested SART members arrive.  The law enforcement officer shall also inform the victim about their right to have a CSVA present throughout any interview or medical forensic exam, as well as afford the victim an opportunity to speak with a CSVA before any interview or medical exam.  Efforts shall be made to direct the victim to a SART-participating healthcare facility.  However, if the victim seeks care at a non-participating healthcare facility and declines the option to seek services at a SART-participating facility, the emergency department staff may complete a forensic medical exam.  Non-SART-Participating Healthcare Facility  The investigating officer shall contact the County Prosecutor’s Office to ensure that emergency department staff has access to a SAFE Kit and a DFSA/Tox Kit.  At the conclusion of the examination, a law enforcement officer shall take custody of the sealed SAFE Kit and DFSA/Tox Kit and any other evidence collected by the FNE.  The officer shall assist the victim in arranging transportation from the exam site.  -8-
[brief] [...]’s opinion coupled with the fact that (1) the zoning change impacted one property; (2) the owner of that property paid $2,000,000 to the City to obtain that change; (3) planning officials were not part of the process; and (4) the City Planner could offer no reason to abandon the earlier zoning restrictions created a factual issue as to whether the City engaged in spot zoning.  ARGUMENT POINT I THE TWO MILLION DOLLAR PAYMENT WHICH THE CITY OF LONG BRANCH RECEIVED FROM 290
[brief] The Court requires an affirmative act by Plaintiff demonstrating that her alleged reliance on the “apparent authority” of [...] caused her to behave differently to her detriment.  There is no such reliance in this case.  For instance, in Mercer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 324 N.J. Super. 290, 319-320 (App. Div. 1999), the plaintiffs sued manufacturer Weyerhaeuser as well as a home seller for the negligent selection of aluminum windows for its homes.  In their testimony, Plaintiffs claimed that Weyerhaeuser was a successful building company and that the builder, [...]’s affiliation with it was an important factor in making their purchase decision of a home.  Defendant [...] used Weyerhaeuser on business cards, brochures, press lists correspondence and newspaper advertisement.  On appeal, the Court determined that Weyerhaeuser was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of apparent authority because when Weyerhaeuser authorized a third party ([...]) to use its logo on business cards brochures, press lists and correspondence and advertisements at the time plaintiffs purchased their homes, it caused plaintiffs to act on the third-party credentials and affiliation with the manufacturer.  The Court concluded that Plaintiffs’ reliance on the advertising in its decision-making process prevented Weyerhaeuser from obtaining summary judgment on the issue of apparent authority.  Id. at 321.  Similarly in Arthur v. St. Peters Hospital, 169 N.J. Super. 575, 577 (1979) a hospital was considered to have apparent authority over the doctors, who were independent contractors, but who worked in the hospital’s emergency department.  Both cases demonstrate that apparent authority exists when the plaintiff acted in a particular manner because of the alleged apparent authority that veiled the tortfeasor.  However, as in this matter, where there is no reliance, there is no apparent authority and the Appellate Division should affirm that trial court’s grant summary judgment as the Supreme Court did in *Bahrle v. Exxon Corp.*, 279 N.J. Super. 5, 15 (App. Div. 1995), *aff'd*, 145 N.J. 144 (1996).
[brief] With regard to the State’s expert:  Q  But do you remember if you reviewed [...]’ report?  A  Yes, if it was provided in discovery, I reviewed everything that was provided.  Q  Do you remember if you evaluated, whether or not you thought [...] was qualified to testify in the area.  A  I believe we received his CV as well, so yes.  And he was also voir dired before he testified as well.  ***
[brief] (Pb9).  In Ensslin, a police officer had been terminated from service and the subsequent action he brought against his employer under the Law Against Discrimination was ultimately dismissed.  Ensslin, 311 N.J. Super. at 334.  After the LAD litigation, Ensslin applied for Ordinary Disability Retirement Benefits but the [...], determined he was ineligible as he was not a member in service at the time.  Ibid.  The [...] found that under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3), PFRS membership ceases “if more than 2 years have elapsed from the date of [the member’s] last contributions,” and under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6(1) an application must be made “by a member in service” or on his behalf.  Ensslin, 311 N.J. Super. at 335.  This court reversed the Board, holding “that the two-year standard of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3) is not jurisdictional, especially in the circumstances presented” in the particular matter.  Id. at 337-38.  Specifically, in his LAD action, Ensslin’s position was that he was not disabled from his employment with a reasonable accommodation.  Id. at 335.  To be considered for Ordinary Disability, Ensslin was required to certify he is disabled.  *Id.* at 336.  Thus, Ensslin was legally barred by the operation of “the doctrine of judicial estoppel” from filing his application for Ordinary Disability while his LAD action was pending.  *Ibid.*  The court noted that it has found “equitable and countervailing considerations” in particular circumstances to allow a plaintiff to assert a claim.  *Id.* at 337 (quoting *SMB Assocs. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot.*, 264 N.J. Super. 38, 59 (App. Div. 1993)) (“[A]n “agency has inherent power to waive *de minimis* violations of objective standards. ”)).  The court concluded that under the circumstances presented, fairness and equity required Ensslin to be permitted to apply for Ordinary Disability.  *Id.* at 338.  Here there was no such legal impediment to [...] filing his Eligibility Registration Form nor would he have been sacrificing discrimination claims or other litigation positions by doing so.
[brief] New Jersey law only requires that an arbitration provision explain generally that a signatory is giving up their right to bring claims in court; no “magic or talismanic” words are required.  As experienced investors of real estate, Plaintiffs cannot plausibly contend that they did not understand what “arbitration” meant, especially when Plaintiffs still have failed to argue that fact in an otherwise empty record.  Plaintiffs unmistakably agreed to arbitration.  The Atalese presumption does not apply.  This Court should reverse the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to enforce the Arbitration clause and require the Plaintiffs to participate in Arbitration.
[directive] Because disorderly persons offenses are punishable by up to six months in jail, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-8, judges have discretion to entertain and review motions from defendants charged only with such an offense before those defendants have been detained for six months.  25  New hearings may proceed before the same judge who conducted the original detention hearing or another judge in the vicinage.  An application under section 19(f) does not imply that the initial detention decision was erroneous or that the judge cannot reconsider it.  As a result, there is no reason to transfer hearings based on new information to a different vicinage or special master, as movants requested.  Relying on the Court’s administrative authority, we direct that trial judges conduct reopened hearings in appropriate cases on an expedited basis, and that any appeals be reviewed in the same manner.
[brief] Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ...........................................................................................................  7 State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40 (2011) ..................................................................................................................  6  State v.  Tavares, 286 N.J. Super. 610 (App. Div. 1996) .................................................................................... 6 State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021) .................................................................................................................. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985) .................................................................................................................. 6, 9 State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017) .................................................................................................................. 6, 7 Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) .................................................................................................................. 7 United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) .................................................................................................................. 7 RULES Rule 3:21010(b)(5) ..................................................................................................................... 6 STATUTES N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(b)(4) .................................................................................................................. 16 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS Judgment of Conviction filed June 30, 2023 ........................................ DA1 Letter-Opinion of the Honorable [...], J.S.C., filed on November 1, 2023 ................................................................. DA13 APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Judgment of Conviction filed June 30, 2023 ..................................................  DA1  Notice of Appeal filed December 13, 2023 ..................................................  DA6  Criminal Case Information Statement filed  On December 13, 2023 ..............................................................................  DA10  Letter-Opinion of the Honorable [...], J.S.C., filed on November 1, 2023 ...........................................................................  DA13
[brief] (See Da79-96.)  [[...]’s] affiliates initially produced just 0.6% of documents reviewed in the New York litigation, with significant gaps in production).  [(Da155-56 (emphasis added). )]  [...]’s counsel expressed those concerns again at the Conference, stating that in related litigation matters, [...] affiliates “produced a small number of documents as a result of ESI discovery,” attributing [...]’s use of technology-assisted review (“TAR”) for the stunted production of documents.  (Da182 ¶ 8.)  In response, the trial court directed the parties -- consistent with its prior instructions and in direct response to [...]’s own complaints -- to produce all non-privileged documents based on mutually agreed search terms, with no withholding based on relevance.
[brief] Relator’s knowledge of the alleged fraud—including scienter—is neither direct nor independent because it is based entirely on an analysis of public data, and the application of analysis or specialized expertise to public data can never make a relator an original source.  Ab44–49.  Relator does not dispute this bedrock principle of FCA precedent, which holds true even if a relator uses a patented or unique process to assist the analysis.  Relator’s analogy to *Springfield Terminal* falls flat because the patent on a commercial software product is irrelevant to whether the Excel analysis of public data at issue here is subject to the public disclosure bar.
[brief] “You will have the dedicated training time to better understand your department, practice selling skills, and shadow experienced employees before working by yourself. ” (Emphasis added).  (Pra004)  In addition, the [...] New Associate Resource Guide (Pra007; 5T69:9-70:21) states on page 16:  “After completing your New Associate Orientation, you will begin Red Vest Ready training.  This training provides you with three to five days of ‘protected time’ from customer interactions on the sales floor, to be used for additional observation, training and preparation. ”  (Pra22)  (Emphasis added).
[brief] B.  The PCR court properly denied defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel’s failure to have a forensic expert testify regarding the viability of testing the tire iron for fingerprints and DNA.  Defendant argues that the PCR court erred in denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have a forensic expert testify regarding the viability of testing the tire iron for fingerprints and DNA.  (Db25-29).  The State submits that the PCR court properly rejected defendant’s argument based on the record and respectfully requests that this Court affirm.  The PCR court appropriately ruled that defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim related to fingerprints and DNA was meritless.
[brief] For instance, in Huggins v. Aquilar, 246 N.J. 75 (2021), the Supreme Court held that “[i]nsurance policy provisions that disclaim whole classes of drivers are problematic, and often found violative of public policy .  . . .”  Id. at 83.  The intrafamily liability exclusion contained in [...]’s policy that is currently at issue reads as follows:  We will not provide coverage for damages, defense costs or any other costs or expenses:  14.  Insured  For personal injury to you or an insured under this policy.  This exclusion does not apply to coverage provided under Excess Supplementary Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Coverage, if a limit for this coverage is shown on your Declarations.  [(Pa90, Pa93). ]  In the present matter, [...] has denied liability coverage for the underlying defendant, [...], as against the claims asserted by plaintiff based upon the intrafamily exclusion set forth above.  [...]’s exclusion violates public policy and should be deemed unenforceable.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 7:15  N.J.A.C. 7:15-1.5  N.J.A.C. 7:15-2.3  N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2  N.J.A.C. 7:15-5.1  New Jersey Register: 6 N.J.R. 391 (Oct. 10, 1974)  39 N.J.R. 4573(a) (November 5, 2007)  45 N.J.R. 360(a) (Feb. 19, 2013)  47 N.J.R. 2531(a) (Oct. 19, 2015)  48 N.J.R. 2244(a) (Nov. 7, 2016)  52 N.J.R. 365(a) (March 2, 2020)  54 N.J.R. 2169(a) (Dec. 5, 2022)  55 N.J.R. 1385(b) (July 17, 2023)  Government website: NJ DEP, 2020 New Jersey Scientific Report on Climate Change (June 2020), dep.nj.gov/wp-content/uploads/climatechange/nj-scientific-report-2020.pdf  [...], State of New Jersey, Climate Change Resilience Strategy (Oct. 2021), dep.nj.gov/wp-content/uploads/climatechange/nj-climate-resilience-strategy-2021.pdf  NJ DEP, Water Quality Management Planning Program web page, nj.gov/dep/wqmp/wqmps.html
[brief] ”  Prather, 847 F.3d at 1103.  Federal courts have held that federal FCA amendments that change the availability of an affirmative defense are substantive and not retroactive.  See, e.g., Judd, 638 F. App’x at 165 (noting that “it is clear that the public disclosure bar as amended [in 2010] would eliminate a full defense that [...] would otherwise have to Judd’s qui tam action”); U.S. ex rel. Bogina v. Medline Indus., Inc., 809 F.3d 365, 369 (7th Cir. 2016); May, 737 F.3d at 917–18; Schweizer, 677 F.3d at 1231 n.3.  Where an FCA amendment “eliminates a defense to a qui tam suit”—just as the 2023 Amendment does here—the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that it should not be applied retroactively.
[brief] Pa29.  (Emphasis added).  This section of the contract contains two parenthetical notations, one of which clearly states “i.e.”  The inclusion of “i.e.” in the second parenthetical in Article VI.B.3. obviously denotes that parenthetical is an example.  It also demonstrates that if the parties are aware of how to explicitly denote language as an example.  Therefore, if the parties meant for any of the other parentheticals to be “merely examples” they know how to and would have included “i.e.” – as they did in Article VI.B.3. – but they did not.
[brief] Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss filed March 21, 2024………………………………………..Pa86  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Defendant [...]’s (“[...]”) Brief largely fails to address the substantive arguments raised in Plaintiff [...]’s opening Brief.  Rather, [...] attempts to argue that the issue of licensure under the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (“NJCFLA”), N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1, et seq., was not raised in the trial court.  However, as explained herein, [...]’s failure to be legally licensed under the NJCFLA to enforce (or even possess) Plaintiff’s alleged debt is the central issue to this case and was repeatedly raised in the trial court.  [...] has simply failed to address the plain language of the NJCFLA or the fact that the legislative intent and statutory history behind the NJCFLA clearly evidences and intent by the legislature to provide for an implied private right of action, enabling enforcement of the Act by aggrieved consumers.  Thus, the trial court’s March 21, 2024 Order granting Defendant [...]’s Motion to Dismiss should be reversed.
[brief] (See id.) ¶41.  The nature and formatting of the criminal record information on the website suggest that the information was based on information maintained in the FBI index.  (See Exs. 3.4 ¶¶ 10-11).  H. The New Jersey Action Against the FBI ¶42.  In 2008, [...] filed a lawsuit against the FBI in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging that the FBI had unlawfully disseminated his criminal record.  (Tr. 1: 57-60).  ¶43.
[brief] 1994) .................................................................................................45, 46 Hernandez v. Montville Tp., 354 N.J. Super. 467 (App. Div. 2003), aff’d o.b., 179 N.J. 81 (2004)......................27 Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc., 218 N.J. 8 (2014) ..................................................................................................................28 Housel v. Theodoridis, 314 N.J. Super. 597 (App. Div. 1998) ..................................................................................22 Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67 (1954) ....................................................................................................................22 Klein v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 377 N.J. Super. 28 (App. Div. 2005) .....................................................................................25, 27, 29, 33, 34 Kolb v. Burns, 320 N.J. Super. 467 (App. Div. 1999) ..................................................................................26, 45 Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494 (3d Cir.1997) .................................................................................................47 LeWitt v. Twp. of Gloucester, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 429, at *12 (App. Div. Mar. 15, 2024)..................34 Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362 (2015) ................................................................................................................25 Maimone v. City of Atl. City, 188 N.J. 221 (2006) ................................................................................................................37 Maiorino v. Schering-Plough Corp., 302 N.J. Super. 323 (App. Div. 1997) ..................................................................................46 Martin v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co., 346 N.J. Super. 320 (App. Div. 2002) ..................................................................................22 Massarano v. N.J. Transit, 400 N.J. Super. 474 (App. Div. 2008) ..................................................................................25 N.J. ex rel. Santiago v. Haig's Serv. Corp., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113188, at *33 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2016) ..................................43 Parikh v. UPS, 491 F. App’x 303 (3d Cir. 2012) .........................................................................................43 Petersen v. Township of Raritan, 418 N.J. Super. 125 (App. Div. 2011) .................................................................21  Rich v. Verizon N.J. Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203131, at *65 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2017)  .........................43  Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 284 N.J. Super. 543 (App. Div. 1995)
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Appellant [...] respectfully requests that this court reverse the CSC’s determination rejecting his appeal of the LOD and request for a fact-finding hearing.  Because the CSC’s determination demonstrates a genuine dispute of material fact over what [...] said to Complainant and why, the matter should be remanded and referred to the Office of Administrative Law.  Further, the court should conclude that CSC’s jurisdictional holding was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and should accordingly order that the allegations about the afternoon incident be dismissed because, under the circumstances, DCF lacked jurisdiction under the State Policy to investigate and premise a policy violation in connection with those allegations.
[brief] In *Landa*, *supra* at 320,321, a final judgment tax sale foreclosure was entered on February 23, 1978.  The Defendants delivered an estimated amount to redeem, which was less than required to redeem.  Though Defendants were willing and capable to pay the shortfall, the Plaintiff refused to accept.  The trial court order allowed redemption and Plaintiff, appealed.  The Appellate Division decision refers to the time to redeem on the *same date the final judgment is entered* (*emphasis added*) and did not refer to today’s application of R 4:50-1.  The court at *Landa*, *supra*, at p. 322, 323 states; “We prefer to adopt the rule that landowners be given the whole of the last day allowed by law to redeem,” and that “. further a rule permitting redemption until the close of the final day has the virtue of a certain moment of finality, which is not dependent on the vagaries of whether proof is available on the exact time the judgment was signed or filed.
[brief] In examining the relative hardships, the trial court heavily relied upon the fact that [...] was not only noncompliant, but that the magnitude of noncompliance was so significant in a municipality which was not even close to offering sites for the development of inclusionary housing.  After withdrawing the DJ Action, the Township put forth no concrete affordable housing plan, which served as a red flag for the trial court.  (2T15:14-17:17).