[brief] Which instruction did the jury follow, the right one or all the wrong ones?  [...] and [...] tell this Court that there is no way to tell, and that reversal is mandated.  While there are obvious parallels, as noted, between New Jersey decisions on the topic, at least one out-of-state case is directly on point.  In State v. Culkin, 35 P.2d 233, 245-246 (Haw. 2001), the Supreme Court of Hawaii found the very type of “must convict” command of the instant aggravated-manslaughter instruction to be reversible error in a manslaughter case.  In Culkin, the Court reversed specifically because the instruction ordered the jury to return a conviction based on a finding of the other elements of the crime, but without necessarily finding, or deliberating upon, the absence of self-defense -- despite a separate, correct explanation of self-defense in the jury instruction in that case.  That Court held:  “Particularly problematic is the circuit court’s instruction that ‘if the prosecution [proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Culkin recklessly caused the death of Thomas], then you must return a verdict of guilty of manslaughter based upon reckless conduct’” when, in fact, the case involved a claim of self-defense that the State also had to negate in order to return a conviction.  Id. at 245 (emphasis added, but brackets in original).  The fact that self-defense was properly explained elsewhere in the instruction did not impress the Hawaii Supreme Court in Culkin because that fact at best rendered the overall instruction completely contradictory -- with the manslaughter instruction demanding (“you must return a verdict of guilty”) that the jury convict if it merely found a reckless killing (with no mention of the need for a finding of the absence of self-defense) whereas the separate self-defense instruction was itself internally correct.  In other words, Culkin is precisely on-point to the issue before this court.  The jury in that case was erroneously told that it “must” return a verdict of guilty for manslaughter if it found the defendant recklessly caused death, i.e., the ordinary elements of manslaughter -- with the only mention of the role of self-defense contained in a separate instruction -- and the same thing happened here when the judge told the jury it “must” convict defendant of aggravated manslaughter if it found the ordinary elements of that crime, with the only mention of self-defense contained in separate instructions divorced from the aggravated-manslaughter instruction.  Culkin recognizes that, as argued here, “the jurors confronted seemingly contradictory instructions.  On one hand, the instructions appear to require the jurors to find Culkin guilty of reckless manslaughter if he recklessly caused the death of Thomas.  On the other hand, the [self-defense] instructions advise [elsewhere] that self-defense is a defense to ‘any and all offenses’ brought against Culkin. ’”  Id. at 245-246 (emphasis added).  Culkin adopts the very same legal analysis urged by defendant here and reaches the conclusion that telling a jury that it “must” convict if the jury finds all the non-self-defense elements of a crime is harmful error that is not “cured” by even a correct explanation of self-defense principles elsewhere in the instruction.  Whether following Culkin, or simply recognizing the fully and completely contradictory instructions that the jury was given here as erroneous under the [...]/[...] rationale, in either event, the correct result on appeal should be clear: the jury was given incorrect instructions that had the clear capacity to affect deliberations on the main issue in the case, and thus, under R. 2:10-2, that error is ”plain” -- clearly capable of producing an unjust result -- and the defendant’s aggravated-manslaughter conviction must be reversed and that count remanded for retrial.