ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 2  “Pa” refers to appellant’s appendix; “Pb” refers to his brief.  3  A Service Retirement is provided for by N.J.S.A. 53:5A-8 for any member who has established twenty years of service in SPRS and also for troopers who were members of the retirement system as of the effective date of L. 1985, c. 175 regardless of their years of service.  A Special Retirement provides enhanced benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 53:5A-27 and is available to any SPRS member who has established twenty-five years of creditable service.  On August 7, 2019, the [...] added information about the Ricci Act to its website.  (Pa10).  The webpage included information for active members, retirees, and employers about qualifying dates, locations, health conditions and impairments, the Eligibility Registration Form, the Request for Amended Benefits Form, a sample postcard to be mailed to retirees, and materials for employers regarding dissemination of information to employees.  (Pa10-11).  On August 8, 2019, the Division sent a letter to the Certifying Officers of the SPRS, the Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, and the Public Employees’ Retirement System.  (Pa11).  The subject of the letter was “New Legislation Notice – P.L. 2019, c. 157” and it served to notify active employees of the newly enacted law.  (Pa11).  All Certifying Officers were advised of their responsibilities to distribute the information and to certify that they had done so.  (Pa11).  The Division hired [...] to mail postcards to all 200,647 SPRS retirees at their home addresses on file with the Division.  (Pa64-65).  These postcards included notice of the enactment of L. 2019, c. 157, how to file for Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits under the new law, the deadline for filing for such benefits, and the ramifications for missing the deadline.  (Pa66).  A postcard with this information was sent to --- 4  Also available at: https://www.nj.gov/treasury/pensions/ricci-ch157.shtml.  (Pa10).  [...]’s home address on August 9, 2019.  (Pa14; Pa66).  On June 10, 2021, the Division posted a news item on its website advising members that the statutory eligibility period to register under the Ricci Act was expiring soon and that members must submit the Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.
[brief] \(^7\) *Id.* at 469.  Here, Respondents asserted that [...] should be disqualified since [...] previously represented [...] and [...] in substantially related matters, *i.e.*, in the Lortech, Longo, and Rodriguez matters.  (102a – 201a).  Respondents contend that as a result of the prior litigation, [...] has in its possession confidential information about [...]’ “business operation. ” (107a ¶ 3).  However, just as in *Trupos*, Respondents’ arguments in support of disqualifying [...] are meritless.  These arguments are, at most, the sort of superficial similarity that the *Trupos* Court previously found unavailing.  *See City of Atl. City v. Trupos*, 201 N.J. at 469.  Merely representing [...], [...], or a party \(^7\)
[brief] In upholding [...]’s condemnation of the property, [...] made clear in dicta that the case was different than Kessler, 289 N.J. Super. 329, which “affirmed dismissal of an action to condemn land on which the owner planned to construct a residential development that would have provided multi-family housing affordable to middle-income families. ”  [...] continued to explain that if the case involved affordable housing, the result likely would have been different:  “If [...] had attempted to condemn [...]’s property when its predecessor in title planned to construct an assisted living facility [which would have included units affordable to low-and moderate-income residents], a similar finding might have been warranted.  However, [...]’s plan to construct a development of single-family homes that will be affordable only to upper-income families would not serve a comparable public interest. ”  [379 N.J. Super at 377.]  The Supreme Court called [...]’s decision a “thoughtful and well-written opinion. ”  [...] Twp. v. [...], 188 N.J. at 533.
[brief] (Da113-15).  The court found that defendant’s argument was “belied by the record”, noting that during cross-examination counsel elicited from the State’s expert witnesses that the State did not request to dust the tire iron for fingerprints and in summation counsel pointed out the absence of fingerprint and DNA testing to the jury.  (Da114).  The court further quoted defense counsel’s closing argument that reminded the jury about two State witnesses who contradicted each other—specifically [...] and [...] testifying that if DNA analysis was done on a piece of evidence that fingerprints could not be taken.  (Da114).  The court further found that defendant failed to show that the outcome of the trial would have been different had a defense expert been presented.  (Da115).  The court found that the absence of fingerprints and DNA evidence connecting defendant to the tire iron was established during trial and counsel argued that there was no blood and that the existence of fingerprint or DNA were unknown because the State “never bothered to check”.  (Da115).  The court found “[t]he jury considered the evidence, heard the arguments of counsel, and was unpersuaded about their impact on the defendant’s guilt. ” (Da115).  The court found that even if an expert had been called, the jury still heard [...]’s and [...]’s testimonies identifying defendant as the person who attacked [...] with the tire iron.  (Da115).  It further noted that the jury saw video from the officers’ body-worn cameras showing the tire iron in the front seat of the Impala and that it heard testimony describing [...]’s injuries and the video showed him injured.  (Da115).  The court ruled, “The evidence tending to prove that defendant used the tire iron to assault [...] was substantial.
[brief] Further, the Trial Court properly found that testimony was presented to the Zoning Board confirming that no site work or disturbance could take place before the Board’s consideration of the Site Plan Application and that the Zoning Board’s Resolution approving the subdivision properly included compliance with that testimony as a condition of the subdivision approval.  The Trial Judge found that “[i]n other words, the line-drawing itself has no environmental impact, one way or the other. ”  (Pa312).  In sum, the Trial Court found that the subdivision did not adversely affect the public’s health, safety, or welfare and upheld the Board’s decision finding that [...]’s application was complete and in compliance with the Robbinsville Ordinances.
[brief] Cases  Accountemps Div. of Robert Half, Inc. v. Birch Tree Grp., Ltd., 115 N.J. 614 (1989)  ...........................................................................................................  3 Casamasino v. City of Jersey City, 158 N.J. 333, 354 (1999) ......................................................................................................  4 Cole v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 215 N.J. 265 (2013) .............................................................................................................  10 Eastampton Ctr., LLC v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of Eastampton, 354 N.J. Super. 171 (App. Div. 2002) .................................................................................. 3 Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174 (2013) ..............................................................................................................
[brief] *Id.* at 2.  The plaintiff hired an expert who opined that the defendant negligently failed to install a grab bar as required by industry standard.  *Id.* at 3-4.  [...] explained that “[w]hen expert testimony is offered to prove the existence of an industry standard, an expert must offer evidence of actual customary practices or safety procedures. ”  *Id.* at 9 (citing *Diaz v. N.Y. Downtown Hosp.*, 287 A.D.2d 358, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).  An expert report is insufficient if it “relies solely on the written guidelines, to the complete exclusion of any evidentiary facts supporting an actual custom or practice. ”  *Ibid.*  “[W]hile noncompliance with such a customary practice or industry standard may be evidence of negligence, the failure to abide by guidelines or recommendations that are not generally accepted standards in an industry will not suffice to raise an issue of fact as to a defendant’s negligence. ”  *Ibid.*  In the case at issue, the expert relied solely on written guidelines; it did not present any factual evidence of any standard in the hotel industry or of any motel that has a grab bar installed in each bathroom.  *Ibid.*  And like in this case, “the parties agree[d] that there is no New Jersey regulation in place which requires motels to install grab bars in bathrooms.
[brief] Defendant, [...] & [...] (“[...]”) was the management company at the Subject Property.  Defendant, [...] (“[...]”) performed work on behalf of [...], specifically painting the stairs in question.  Defendant, [...] (the “[...]”) was the condominium association for the building in question.  This brief will concentrate only on the arguments made by the [...]; however, it should be noted that all Defendants’ arguments are aligned.  Namely, Plaintiff-Appellant argues that the Trial Court’s decision should be reversed because the Trial Court abused its discretion in applying the “Ongoing Storm” doctrine and by rejecting his allegations that the Defendants created the risk as a result of alleged “defects” on the stairs in question.  Several Defendants were named in the underlying action.  Plaintiff essentially argues, by cherry picking findings in an expert report, that the condition of the stairs made the ice/snow, more slippery and that the ongoing weather conditions at the time of the injury are of no dipositive significance.  It is respectfully submitted that the Plaintiff-Appellant’s arguments must fail as they are factually distinct from the case at hand and arise from a fundamentally inaccurate interpretation of the Trial Court’s well-reasoned ruling.  As such, the Trial Court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendant-Respondent, [...], should be affirmed.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[directive] Prior to the submission of a urine specimen, a trainee enrolled in a basic training course shall execute a form (Attachment B) advising the trainee that a negative result is a condition of employment and that a positive result will result in the consequences outlined in Section III B of this policy.  The form shall also advise the trainee that the refusal to participate in the test process carries the same penalties as testing positive.  Trainees shall complete a Drug Testing Medication Information form (Attachment D) listing all prescription medication, non-prescription (over-the- counter) medication, dietary supplements, and nutritional supplements that were ingested by the officer during the past 14 days.  The Drug Testing Medication Information form shall be placed in an envelope which is sealed by the donor.  The donor shall date and initial the seal, and write their unique identifier (Donor ID) on the envelope.  4.
[brief] (1T59-10 to 15).  [...] did not observe defendant do anything suspicious as he "[j]ust went in and out of the house."  (1T59-18 to 24).  [...] did not have the search warrant with him at the time as "the search warrant as being approved at this time . . .  The homicide unit would have had that."  (1T48-1 to 9).  [...] testified that if defendant did not run he still would have arrested him and brought him into custody.
[brief] The Probable Cause Hearing Before the Denville Municipal Court  At the probable cause hearing on February 25, 2022, [...] heard the testimony of [...] regarding the arrest of Appellant.  (See generally 2T).  Following [...]’s testimony, Appellant’s trial counsel argued that the State failed to establish that [...] had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to ask Appellant to exit his vehicle on the morning in question.  (2T25:22-26:23).  The State argued that [...] was attempting to render aid and, in the course of doing so, became suspicious that Appellant was under the influence of alcohol.  (2T27:1-28:7).  The State further argued that it established that Appellant had operated the vehicle because Appellant admitted “as to having just operated the vehicle and an intent to operate the vehicle once he remedied whatever caused him to stop in the first place. ” (Id.).  Based on the foregoing, [...] held that [...] had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to ask Appellant to exit his vehicle, and further had probable cause to arrest Appellant.  (2T28:8-30:13).  D.
[brief] The Holmdel Municipal Code defines “conditional use” as permitted use in a zoning district where the applicant demonstrates that “such use in a specified location will comply with the conditions and standards for the location or operation of such use as contained in this chapter and upon the issuance of an authorization” by the HZBA.  Holmdel, N.J., Mun. Code § 30-3(c) (2022).  reduce the Project’s potential noise impacts, the Project would be covered by an eight-foot-high sound wall.  (Aa781; Aa826).  The BPU transmitted the Petition to the OAL as a contested case on December 3, 2018.  (Aa39; Aa62).  On December 18, 2019, [...] issued an order consolidating the January 11, 2017 and November 29, 2018 petitions.
[brief] (Pa143; Pa151).  [...] specified that “[t]he 2,080 multiplier only pertains to 260 working days in a fiscal year.  It does not pertain to a 261-day working day fiscal year or a 262-day working day fiscal year. ” (Pa143).  After a careful review of all evidence presented, the Arbitrator adopted [...]’s position, finding that [...]’s argument could only be accepted if all other evidence, including the remainder of the contractual provision, were ignored.
[brief] PLAINTIFF HAS PRESENTED EXTENSIVE EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY TO CREATE A TRIABLE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT ON CAUSATION.  [ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Pa047, ¶33 – Pa057, ¶71; Da0790-Da0792; Da0794-Da0798; Da0819-Da0829)]  [...] and [...] testified that the Ozurdex applicator used to administer the steroid pellet to Plaintiff on November 6th injected a silicone particulate that caused [...]’s blindness.  (Da0699-Da0700; Pa127; Pa134-Pa139) was defective with the silicone particulate and that such defect likely incited the retinal detachment that occurred within a week of the treatment.  [...] testified that the silicone particulate caused persistent inflammation and corneal edema in [...]’s left eye, which was an adverse effect identified in [...]’s December 28, 2018 Urgent Drug Recall.  (Da0256-Da0257; Pa127; Pa134-Pa139)  Further, [...] testified that the silicone particulate caused a mechanical traction on the retina leading to detachment which required surgery that resulted in the Ozurdex steroid entering [...]’s anterior chamber, thereby causing her to become blind.  (Da0695-Da0696)  In addition to the arguments hereinabove, our courts have established that proximate cause questions should ordinarily be decided by a jury and not at the Summary Judgment stage.
[brief] The Ricci Act simply required that the Board provide notice within thirty days of its enactment, without specifying in what manner.  The Board complied with this requirement when it posted information about the Ricci Act on its website.  [...] identifies no authority suggesting that the Division’s use of its website to fulfill this notice requirement was inadequate.  Even though the Division satisfied the only notice requirement under the Ricci Act through the website posting, it went above and beyond to provide additional notice to its members through other means.  On August 8, 2019, the Division provided a letter about the Ricci Act to all Certifying Officers and advised them of their responsibility to make the letter available to all members at their respective locations.  (Pa11).  On August 9, 2019, a postcard with information about the Ricci Act was mailed to [...]’s home address (as well as the home addresses of over 200,000 other retirees).  (Pa14; Pa82-84).  And, on June 10, 2021, the Division posted a news item on its website advising members and retirees that the statutory eligibility period to register under the Ricci Act was expiring soon and that they must submit the Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.  (Pa11).
[brief] Holmdel, N.J., Mun. Code § 30-155.2(a) (2022); (Aa877).  That testimony establishes that the Project satisfied these zoning requirements.  (Aa63; Aa86; Aa856-57).  Additionally, the Project is consistent with the goals of Holmdel’s Master Plan to maintain “the unique character of Holmdel,” protect “the Township’s open spaces from development,” and provide “adequate infrastructure to serve Township residences and businesses” while “limit[ing] the development of growth-inducing infrastructure. ” (Aa857-59; Aa886-87).  In particular, the record indicates that [...] would implement the Project in a commercially developed site that has existing uses, such as the cellular communications tower and office building.  (Aa859).  As such, the record reflects that the Project would preserve open space.  Ibid.  In addition, consistent with Holmdel’s Master Plan, the Project would also provide reliable natural gas infrastructure to serve Holmdel ratepayers.  (Aa858).  Finally, as already described in [...]’s noise and air quality assessments, the Project would have no adverse impact on ambient noise levels and air quality in Holmdel.  (Aa945-46; Aa948-49).  Therefore, the [...] reasonably found that [...] duly considered Holmdel’s zoning ordinances and Holmdel’s Master Plan when selecting the Project’s site.
[brief] Here, Paragraph 2 of the [...] contract states only that [...] will indemnify [...] for claims of bodily injury or property damage arising out of the use of [...]’s property, “whether or not such claim [for] damage, injury or death results from the negligence of Customer [[...]], Contractor [[...]] or others. ”  Da45, ¶ 2.  It does not expressly state that [...] will provide such indemnity even when [...] has been found to be at fault.  Ibid.  Paragraph 4 does not require indemnification for either party’s own negligence.  Da45, ¶4.  The indemnity clause is therefore not Azurak compliant and is unenforceable with regard to [...]’s own negligence.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(b).  Additionally, defendant is ineligible for Track One if he possessed a firearm “at the time of” the offense(s) of which he has been convicted and for which he seeks admission to Track One.  N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(5).  The second category, concerning other pending charges, is based on a defendant’s pending charges in cases other than the indictment(s) under which he seeks admission into Track One Recovery Court.
[brief] Da286-288.  In her transmittal email, [...] stated the 2022 Addendum was “not a legal document” and was being used solely in her attempt to secure financing with the “details” to be worked out only if accepted by the lender.  Ibid.  On May 23, 2022, the 2022 Addendum, purportedly executed by [...], was emailed back to [...].  Da74.  --- 5  The 2022 Addendum is invalid for many reasons, including, but not limited to, that: (1) [...] specifically represented it was not a legal document; (2) it is riddled with false statements and misrepresentations; (3) it is not signed (or otherwise ratified) by [...] as required by [...]; (4) it contains an undated and unwitnessed signature purporting to be that of [...]; and (5) if executed by [...], same was completed when he lacked the capacity to do so.
[directive] In February 2018, Governor [...] convened the CSDC to review the State’s sentencing laws and provide specific recommendations “to ensure a stronger, fairer, and more state. ”7  just  In November 2019, the Commission issued its first annual report, which Brimage, 153 N.J. 1, 9 (1998) (citing, among other sources, a 1990 report published by the 4 See State v. Division of Criminal Justice titled “A Law Enforcement Response to Certain Criticisms of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act”).
[brief] Moreover, the Board’s argument on page 45 of its brief that it merely reduced the equity by 30% relates to its earlier calculation of equity before the Second Remand.  It was not the equity that the Board ultimately determined, $12,804, which prompted [...]’s operative (and second) complaint to the Superior Court.  [...] did not adjudge the propriety of a 30% discount—it was not before him.  Rather, he rejected the Board’s equity amount of $12,804 as baseless, and unsurprisingly [...] does not seek to justify that amount in his Appeal.  Next, the Board, echoing [...], argues that [...] already earned a sufficient return when the entire Property was converted to a condominium—and thus [...] cannot complain that it must continue to suffer yearly financial losses by subsidizing the Unit for the entirety of [...]’s 40-year protected tenancy.  Like [...], the Board cites [...]’s 2016 tax return, filed as part of [...]’s application for a rent increase, to establish that [...] realized a return on its investment.  Like [...], the Board ignores [...]’s net real estate rental loss totaling $16,490 in 2016 (as well as its prior losses in 2015 and 2014 as shown in those years’ returns submitted with [...]’s application).  PA 073.  Instead, the Board erroneously concludes that [...]’s total assets of $870,000 as listed in its 2016 return derives from the conversion of the Property in 2003.  However, as stated in the return, that sum is principally based upon the sum “due from affiliates” relating to other properties for $755,562.  PA 074.  It does not in any manner represent [...]’s profit from the sale of the Property’s other units in 2003 as [...] has also mistakenly contended.  Lastly, the Board’s assertion on page 47 that “[...] assumed the risk of purchasing the property knowing that it was subject to rent control and that the tenant was a protected tenant under the TPA” is misguided.  [...] purchased the Property in 1993, and [...] applied for protected tenancy status in connection with [...]’s conversion of the Property several years later.  Moreover, no landlord assumes the risk of being deprived a “just and reasonable return” under the law.  [...] merely sought to effectuate its entitlement to a hardship rent increase given [...]’s protected status.  This is not [...] seeking to earn as “large” a return as possible as improperly suggested by the Board; rather [...] merely seeks to exercise its constitutional right to a “just and reasonable” return on a rent-controlled unit.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Whatever may have been those "electrical failures," [...] has never claimed that they were serious, costly or in any way other than normal operation and maintenance issues.  ("There was a malfunction aboard the plane" can mean anything from a broken seatback to a fatal crash.)  Given [...]'s multiple exaggerations on its "icing" claims, it does not deserve any benefit of the doubt here, and it has the burden of proof.  And discovery and cross-examination at the hearing soundly defeated [...]'s inaccurate written testimony.