ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] After the Nestle decision they cite issued, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) was amended to repudiate the misinterpretation of the Rule endorsed in that case.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee’s Notes (2015).  In 2015, the Advisory Committee removed the phrase “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” from the federal rules because the phrase had “been used by some, incorrectly, to define the scope of discovery. ”  Id. (emphasis added).  The Committee observed that given this “misuse” of the “reasonably calculated” phrase “to define the scope of discovery,” the phrase could “swallow any other limitation on the scope of discovery. ”  Id.  To avoid the “problems” created by such misinterpretations, the Committee removed the phrase.  Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee’s Notes (2000) (directing “the parties and the court [to] focus on the actual claims and defenses involved”).  Plaintiffs seek to introduce into New Jersey’s court rules the same mischief and misuse that once plagued federal practice, replacing Rule 4:10-2(a)’s clear-cut “relevance limitations,” Pereira, 475 N.J. Super. at 396, with an indeterminate standard that permits “the disclosure of some amount of irrelevant evidence,” Pb17.
[brief] Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 299 (2020).  Notwithstanding the Court’s strict citation to R. 2:5-1, the Court disregarded it and chose instead, to follow the Appellate Division’s willingness to ‘generously’ address the issues not designated in the notice of appeal, for no other reason than because plaintiffs “provided the complete transcripts.
[brief] The basis of knowledge factor “analyzes whether the informant obtained his information in a reliable manner. ”  *Keyes*, 184 N.J. at 555 (citing *Smith*, 155 N.J. at 94).  Even if the tip does not expressly reveal how the informant became aware of the alleged criminal activity, “the police can still adequately demonstrate the informant’s basis of knowledge ‘if the nature and details revealed in the tip … imply that the informant’s knowledge of the alleged criminal activity is derived from a trustworthy source. ’”  *Ibid*.  Information may be deemed to have come from a trustworthy source “if the informant provides sufficient detail in the tip or recounts information that could not otherwise be attributed to circulating rumors or easily gleaned by a casual observer. ”  *Keyes*, 184 N.J. at 556 (citing *Smith*, 155 N.J. at 95).  Finally, police corroboration is necessary “to ratify the informant’s veracity and validate the truthfulness of the tip and is considered an essential part of the determination of probable cause.
[brief] [...] specifically confirmed that services ensuring compliance with the Authority’s plans and specifications would be considered professional engineering.  Id. at T48:10-18.  [...] further acknowledged that a professional engineer’s failure to take into consideration the risks associated with the operation of milling machines would reflect a deviation from a professional standard of care.  Id. at T53:1-11.  He likewise recognized that a professional engineer was ultimately answerable for the services provided by both [...] and [...].  Id. at T53:12-25.  2.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AN INVALID DEBT IS NOT AN ASCERTAINABLE LOSS UNDER THE CONSUMER FRAUD ACT (Raised Below: T1)**  In order to establish a claim under the CFA, a plaintiff must show an unlawful act by the defendants, an ascertainable loss, and a causal nexus between the two.  *See Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co.*, 332 N.J. Super. 31, 43 (App. Div. 2000).  In granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the trial court reasoned that, despite Defendants’ attempted enforcement of a debt made void by N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b), [...] had failed to show an ascertainable loss under the CFA. ⁴  *See T1 57:14-58:17.*  However, in *Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co.*, 138 N.J. 2, 23 --- ⁴  Even in the absence of a showing of ascertainable loss, “a consumer-fraud plaintiff can recover reasonable attorneys' fees, filing fees, and costs if that plaintiff can prove that the defendant committed an unlawful practice. ”  *Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co.*, 138 N.J. 2, 24 (1994).  Thus, as Defendants’ violations of the NJCFLA unequivocally constitute a “crime of the fourth degree,” Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees, making dismissal without an opportunity for a fee application inappropriate.  *See* N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  (1994), the New Jersey Supreme Court “conclude[d] that an improper debt . . . against a consumer-fraud plaintiff may constitute a loss under the [CFA], because the consumer is not obligated to pay an indebtedness arising out of conduct that violates the Act.
[brief] For example, in Mittra v. University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, 316 N.J. Super. 83 (App. Div. 1998), the plaintiff student brought a breach of contract and tort claims action against a public University (where protections afforded public higher educational institutions in contractual settings are less fulsome than those afforded private institutions) after he was dismissed for poor academic performance.  The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the student’s breach of contract claim against the University, acknowledging that the rigid application of contractual principles does not apply to university-student conflicts.  *Id.* at 90.  The court held that academic decisions concerning student issues bear little resemblance to the type of inquiry traditionally performed by the courts.  *Id.*; see also *Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing*, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985) (“If a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies, far less is it suited to evaluate the substance of the multitude of academic decisions that are made daily by faculty members of public educational institutions—decisions that require an expert evaluation of cumulative information and [are] not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decision-making”); *Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. V. Horowitz*, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978).
[brief] Fairly characterized, Plaintiff’s continuation of this litigation on appeal is itself as incredible as the very filing of such a lawsuit against the two named Defendants - [...] d/b/a [...] (PA) ("[...]") ([...] ("[...]").  On one level, Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts misconceived and legally untenable claims which seek to recover alleged “losses” from a failed real estate transaction.  More fundamentally, Plaintiff’s lawsuit is rotten to its core.
[brief] THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS OF DEFENDANT DID NOT CAUSE PLAIN ERROR  Defendant asks this Court to reverse his conviction based upon the admission of several in-court identification requests and/or identifications made by law enforcement and his estranged family members.  However, at the time that these identification requests were made, defendant lodged no objection.  To the contrary, defendant chose to counteract these lines of questioning via vigorous cross-examination, highlighting deficiencies in these identifications, the estrangement between defendant and his family, and the family members potential motivation to incriminate the defendant.  See, e.g., (14T:203-2 to 203-7) ([...]); (15T:20-20 to 22-7) ([...]); (15T:111-6 to 114-23) ([...]); (15T:161-21 to 162-18; 168-21 to 175-12) ([...]); (15T:196-19 to 198-16) ([...]); (15T:206-20 to 209-8) ([...]).  To the extent that the admission of any of these identifications/requests for in-court identifications ran afoul of State v. Sanchez, 247 N.J. 450 (2021) or State v. Watson, ___ N.J. ___ (2023), any such error does not rise to the level of plain error sufficient to warrant reversal of defendant’s conviction.
[brief] Judges are human beings.  “No less than jurors, they are subject to the wide range of human emotions”  *Hess*, 207 N.J. at 157, including, petitioner submits, the reluctance to change one’s mind.  The re-sentence reflects this reality - though the court conducted a new *Yarbough* analysis - the practical impact is virtually the same.  The court imposed 70 years in prison, 57.9 years to be served before petitioner is eligible for parole.  (20T64-4 to 5, 71-2 to 22; Da192 to 196).  As a result of this new sentence, he will not be released until he is 83 years, 11 months, and 14 days old.  Judges are no less susceptible than lay-persons to the adage that first impressions matter.  The following information and arguments made by re-sentencing counsel had the capacity to make a real difference had they been presented before the sentencing judge had already decided to impose a virtual life sentence.
[brief] The Department’s finding of an “aggressive loss ratio target” in the disapproval letter confirms that the Department never made an “excessiveness” determination.  The Final Decision’s conclusion that the Department based its denial on a finding of “excessiveness” is sleight of hand, at best.  Pa52.  The Final Decision itself makes this plain.  While claiming that the Department’s letter addressing [...]’s applications “denied the rate increases because they were --- 9  Further spotlighting this glaring absence, the Department explicitly mentioned another part of the statute in one of its letters to [...].  See Pa96 (citing N.J.S.A. 17B:26-11)). excessive,” it acknowledges “the fact that the Department did not use the word ‘excessive. ’”  Pa49 (emphasis added).  Having admitted as much and likely recognizing that a post hoc rationalization for the letter could not stand, the Department has strained to suggest that there was somehow an excessive-rate ruling lurking in the disapproval letter all along.  See, e.g., Pa137 (sidestepping the fact that the disapproval letter nowhere mentioned the statutory term “excessive” and arguing the Department has boundless discretion to deny rate increases even if an insurer meets the regulatory standards); Pa138 (tacitly admitting that the letter lacked any reference to “excessiveness” by arguing that testimony of the Department’s witness, [...], provided it as a post hoc justification).
[brief] That authority lies solely with the Township governing body, subject to the guidance of the Township planning board under its own authorities concerning the master plan and ordinance master plan consistency review.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62; N.J.S.A. 40:55D-25, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-26; N.J.S.A. 40:55D-20.  The problem for Plaintiffs argument that changes to markets and business conditions can be the basis for a finding of special reasons for a height variance on the basis of a hardship is that, in accord with the statutory limitations on zoning board powers, the relevant cases say otherwise.
[directive] The Act requires county prosecutors or designees to provide certain information for the court to consider determining whether to issue a temporary extreme risk protective order as set in forth Guideline 3(e).  See N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(f).  As such, the county prosecutor and law in enforcement agency where the respondent lives will be notified when the petition has been filed. [...] • [...] • [...] #19-19- for Protective "Guidelines Directive Extreme Orders"  Risk  August 2019 12, Page6 of Overview  the Proceedings for a Temporary Extreme Risk Protective Order  The court will hear the petition for a temporary order expedited manner the an in in respondent's county of residence pursuant to Guideline 3(a) and (b).
[brief] In order to extend discovery based upon “exceptional circumstances,” the moving party must satisfy four inquiries: (1) why discovery has not been completed within time and counsel's diligence in pursuing discovery during that time; (2) the additional discovery or disclosure sought is essential; (3) an explanation for counsel's failure to request an extension of the time for discovery within the original time period; and (4) the circumstances presented were clearly beyond the control of the attorney and litigant seeking the extension of time.  Rivers v. LSC Partnership, 378 N.J.Super. 68, 79 (App. Div. 2005).  It is clear that each and every one of the requisite inquiries favors the Plaintiff.  First, Plaintiff’s expert, [...], did not provide his expert report within the original discovery end date due to the complexity of the case and the severity of Plaintiff’s injuries.  According to [...]’s own Certification, he could not have provided a comprehensive final report until he obtained more of the Appellant’s ongoing medical records.  Appellant’s counsel kept in constant communication with [...] regarding the timeliness of his report.  [...] expressly certified that he would provide his final report within 90 days of the Court’s Order to extend discovery, which was never granted.  Id.  Second, the additional discovery sought is certainly essential.  It is common knowledge in the practice of law that medical malpractice cases are complex and require the opinions of expert witnesses to provide clarity on whether a medical professional negligently caused a plaintiff’s injuries.  Here, the extension of discovery sought by the Appellant is for the purpose of allowing [...] to diligently examine the Appellant’s ongoing medical records and treatments to prepare a comprehensive report regarding his findings and opinions.  [...]’s report is no doubt essential to this case because, as people not trained in the practice of medicine, we cannot provide the level of insight on the facts and evidence that [...] can.  Third, Appellant’s counsel’s reason for not requesting relief prior to the original discovery end date was due to staffing shortages leading to a simple oversight in counsel’s calendar.  Given that no discovery extension has been previously granted in this case, the lack of unfair prejudice to the defense, and the Appellant’s due diligence otherwise, the Appellant did not deserve to suffer the ultimate sanction of a dismissal with prejudice.  Fourth, the Appellant has had [...] retained since the outset of this case.  It cannot be argued that the Appellant did not perform her due diligence in obtaining an expert to review this case and file a report.  The circumstances leading to the failure to provide defense counsel with the expert report were unquestionably beyond the control of the Appellant.  [...] certified that, in order to provide the most comprehensive final report, he needs to evaluate the Appellant’s ongoing medical treatment.
[brief] But the statutes are distinguishable.  The CFA only permits claims by a plaintiff with an “ascertainable loss. ”  Weinberg v. Sprint Corp., 173 N.J. 233 (2002).  The FDCPA has no similar requirement.  And, unlike the CFA, the FDCPA is not primarily policed by government agencies and there is no requirement that private plaintiffs notify any government official.  POINT II.
[brief] See 6T, at 79:1-8; 216:8-10; 220:2-4; 222:11; 228:6-13.  On January 9, 2019, the Board passed a resolution granting a hardship rent increase of $105.04.  DA-83.  F.  Before the Hon. [...], J.S.C. in 2019.  A few months later, [...] appealed the Board’s determinations, asserting that the hardship increase of $105.04 per month was arbitrary.
[directive] 2  Any law enforcement officer providing COVID-19 Information to [...] employees and Parole Officers should instruct them that they are prohibited from disseminating it further.  Page 4 or other first responders, nor advise or require individuals to provide public notice of status.3  COVID-19 positive/quarantined  7.  No law enforcement officer may flag individuals as COVID-19 positive or quarantined in any CAD or equivalent system unless the information is received pursuant to the processes outlined in this Directive.  8.  Nothing in this Directive restricts a law enforcement officer or agency from handling a call for service in accordance with the agency’s general procedures, such as phone, electronic, or any other applicable reporting.  This Directive shall take effect April 15, 2020, but agencies able to implement all of the requirements set forth herein before that date will not be deemed out of compliance with any prior directive concerning COVID-19 Information.
[brief] Nonetheless, he was permitted to testify at trial because he was still subject to cross-examination.  *Id.* at 226.  On appeal, the Court issued a narrower holding than is advocated by [...], ruling that “a person who actually participated in, attended, or was contemporaneously informed of the unlawful intercept must be deemed to have been tainted by his direct knowledge of the intercept; he is therefore disqualified to testify as a witness in defendant's prosecution.
[brief] Here, the Trial Court did not reach the palpably unreasonable argument as it found that [...] had no notice, neither actual, nor constructive, of the pothole in question.  Had the Trial Court reached the palpably unreasonably analysis, however, it is submitted that it would have ruled in favor of [...].  Where there is simply no credible evidence of palpably unreasonable conduct, the question of palpable unreasonableness may be decided by the court as a matter of law upon application for summary judgment.  *Muhammad v. NJ Transit*, 176 N.J. 185, 199-200 (2003).
[brief] of N.Y. & N.J., | 19 | | 295 N.J. Super. 521 (App. Div. 1996) | | | Meier v. D'Ambose, | 22, 23, 24 | | 419 N.J. Super. 439 (App. Div. 2011) | | | Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., | 19 | | 26 N.J. 379 (1958) | | | Monaco v. Hartz Mt. Corp., | 28 | | 178 N.J. 401 (2004) | | | Parks v. Rogers, | 26 | | 176 N.J. 491 n.1, (2003) | | | Potomac Aviation, LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., | 28 | | 413 N.J. Super. 212 (App. Div. 2010) | | Potomac Ins. Co. of Illinois ex rel. OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Pa. Mfrs.' Ass'n Ins. Co., 215 N.J. 409 (2013)..................................................................................20 Reyes v. Egner, 404 N.J. Super. 433 (App. Div. 2009).............................................. 20, 22, 23, 24, 28 Sanna v. National Sponge Co., 209 N.J. Super. 60 (App.Div.1986)......................................................... 23, 29 Scully v. Fitzgerald, 179 N.J. 114 (2004)..................................................................................28 Szeles v. Vena, 321 N.J. Super. 601 (App. Div. 1999).....................................................22 Zentz v. Toop, 92 N.J. Super. 105 (App. Div. 1966).................................................... 23, 24, 27 Treatises Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 63, at 446 (Fifth Edition, 1984)...................24 TABLE OF JUDGMENT, ORDER, AND RULINGS Order Granting Summary Judgment to Defendants, [...], [...], [...] and [...], dated December 1, 2022 ........................................Pa 0293 Plaintiff, the [...] and [...], Individually, and as Administratrix Ad Prosequendum on behalf of The [...] (“Plaintiff”) respectfully appeals from the order of summary judgment for defendant [...] (“[...]”), which resulted in the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint against [...] as a matter of law.
[brief] On or about July 9, 2020, a demand was filed by [...] seeking recovery of $10,000.00 on behalf of [...] as a result of an automobile collision that reportedly occurred in New Jersey on July 10, 2019.  This arbitration was assigned [...] (Da147-Da155).  9.  On August 22, 2022 the arbitrator denied [...]’s affirmative defense that New Jersey law prohibits [...]’s Med-Pay subrogation claim and as a result, the dispute was outside the scope of the Agreement.  A full arbitration hearing was held on August 22, 2022, and by decision published August 23, 2022, the arbitrator found in favor of [...].  The arbitrator simply found that the [...] insured was fully responsible for the underlying loss.  As a result, the arbitrator directed [...] to reimburse [...] the $10,000.00 demanded (Da147-Da155).
[brief] In fact, the Trial Court performed the exact analysis for which [...] now advocates: it harmonized Paragraphs 24(F) and 24(G) by interpreting them in the only way that gave effect to both provisions without rendering one or the other meaningless.  (See Da272a-75a.)  [...]’s other contention that the Trial Court erred in its analysis because Paragraphs 24(F) and (G) “do not deal with the same subject matter” (see Db18) is equally meritless, and can be quickly disposed of by this Court.
[brief] In the leading case of *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 529 (1995), the Supreme Court stated: a court should deny a summary judgment motion . . . where the party opposing the motion has come forward with evidence that creates a ‘genuine issue as to any material fact challenged. ’  Similarly, in the seminal case of *Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust of Westfield*, 17 N.J. 67 (1954), the Supreme Court held:  The standards of decision governing the grant or denial of a summary judgment emphasize that a party opposing a motion is not to be denied a trial unless the moving party sustains the burden of showing clearly the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.  Id. at 74.  That is because summary judgment is designed to provide a prompt, businesslike and inexpensive method of disposing of any cause which a discriminating search of the merits in the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits submitted on the motion clearly shows not to present any genuine issue of material fact requiring disposition at a trial.  Id.  See also, *Ledley v. William Penn Life Ins. Co.*, 138 N.J. 627, 641-42 (1995).  In the present matter, the record establishes a genuine and vigorous dispute over whether the routing of the 69kV line through Westfield is essential to providing adequate service.  The record was replete with other feasible routes that could accomplish the third connection for [...]’s substations.  That the dispute was material to the court’s decision is made clear by its reliance on N.J.S.A. 48:2-23 (relating to the provision of adequate service) as the grounds for invalidating the Ordinance.  Cases are legion regarding the consequences of a trial court deciding genuine issues.  When a genuine issue of material fact is decided on a motion for summary judgment, the summary judgment must be reversed.  See, e.g., *Wilson v. Parisi*, 268 N.J. Super. 213 (App. Div. 1993); *Simonetti v. Selective Ins. Co.*, 372 N.J. Super. 421, 424 (App. Div. 2004); *Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. Honeywell Protective Servs., Honeywell, Inc.*, 222 N.J. Super. 11, 16 (App. Div. 1987); *Allstate Redevelopment Corp. v. Summit Assocs.*, 206 N.J. Super. 318 (App. Div. 1985); *CPC Intern., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.*, 316 N.J. Super. 351, 379 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 158 N.J. 73 (1999).  Accordingly, the summary judgment below must be reversed.
[brief] (a)  This section applies to a policy of insurance that: (1) covers first party loss to property located in Indiana; and (2) insures against loss or damage to: (A) real property consisting of not more than four (4) residential units, one (1) of which is the principal place of residence of the named insured; or (B) personal property in which the named insured has an insurable interest and that is used within a residential dwelling for personal, family, or household purposes.  (b)  A policy of insurance described in subsection (a) may not be issued, renewed, or delivered to any person in Indiana if the policy limits a policyholder's right to bring an action against an insurer to a period of less than two (2) years from the date of loss.