ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] At the conclusion of oral argument on plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court issued a verbal ruling that plaintiffs have an implied easement appurtenant over the [...].  (T61:8—T73:20)  In so doing, the trial --- \(^2\)  Whether or not NBA, or its predecessors-in-title, previously permitted plaintiffs, or their predecessors-in-title, to cross the [...] to the MHWL is of no legal consequence to plaintiffs’ claim to an implied easement appurtenant.  court relied on the proximity of the [...] to the Atlantic Ocean, as well as its own interpretation of what it thought would have been reasonable for the parties to have assumed about access to the Atlantic Ocean in 1929.  (T66:19—T72:8)  The trial court’s decision was contrary to the record before it, which was to be viewed in the light most favorable to defendants.  Even with a view most favorable to plaintiffs, there was a dearth of information on which to imply an easement across the [...].  Although there was no evidence to support this, the trial court speculated that the original requirement in the [...] that a house built on a lot that bordered the [...] must cost more and be larger than houses built on lots not bordering the [...] somehow meant that the original parties intended there to be an unwritten easement that owners of such bordering lots could cross the [...] to the beach.  (T68:19-69:18)  The trial court similarly speculated, again without evidential support, that the inclusion of terms such as “Surf Fishing” and “Surf Bathing” in a 1920s advertisement for [...] – activities that were available to all purchasers of property in [...] and not just purchasers of lots that bordered the [...] – implied an intent to include an unwritten easement for owners of only the bordering lots to cross the [...] to the beach.  (T66:23—T67:7)  The trial court further relied on its unsupported supposition that the original purchaser of the [...] would not have felt “obligated” to access the beach at one of the many street ends.  (T67:8-15)  Finally, the trial court concluded that [...]’s subsequent decision not to build the planned boardwalk supported its ruling that at the time of the initial conveyance of the [...] the parties intended an unwritten easement to cross the [...] to the beach.  (T69:19—T71:1)
[brief] As that is the sole basis upon which Defendants base their claim that the Jury’s verdict with regards to Plaintiff’s Disability Hostile Work environment claim is against the weight of the evidence, their appeal on this ground must be rejected, and the jury verdict affirmed.  iii.  Application: Defendants Have Made No Argument Concerning the Jury’s Verdict on Plaintiff’s Claims, and as that Portion of the Jury’s Verdict Must Be Affirmed as Unchallenged (RAISED BELOW: Pa54-Pa55)
[brief] (1T 25:8-13).  However, the existence of a subsequent transaction is not a required element in a cause of action for tortious interference.  To the best of our knowledge, no court has ever held that the existence of a subsequent transaction, or even a financial benefit to the interferer, is a required element of a claim for tortious interference.  Indeed, just the opposite is true.  In case after case, courts have found such claims to not only be not frivolous, but indeed actionable.  See Van Horn v. Van Horn, 56 N.J.L. 318, 323 (E. & A. 1894) (holding that the defendant tortiously interfered with the plaintiff’s business by making false statements concerning the plaintiff, which resulted in the plaintiff’s supplier terminating its business with the plaintiff, with no economic benefit to the defendant); Strollo v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 20 N.J. Misc. 217, 222-23 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (finding that agents of the defendant tortiously interfered with the plaintiff’s employment by making false statements about the plaintiff despite the lack of economic benefit conferred upon the defendants); DiMaria Constr., Inc. v. Interarch, 351 N.J. Super. 558, 570 (App. Div. 2001) (affirming jury verdict finding that the defendants tortiously interfered with the plaintiff’s construction project out of personal interest and without economic benefit to the defendants); Daruwala v. Merchant, No. A-1310-13T3, 2015 WL 6829646, at *9 (N.J. App. Div. Nov. 9, 2015) reversing dismissal of tortious interference with contract claim where the plaintiff’s employer failed to renew the plaintiff’s employment for the following year after the receipt of the defendant’s defamatory phone call, even though the interfering party did not realize any form of benefit as a result of its actions).
[brief] Because the C-section was not called by [...] or [...], it was not possible to complete the C-section within fifteen minutes after the deceleration even or any time reasonably thereafter.  As [...] indulged at his deposition, even if the time were extended to 10:10 p.m., the delivery still occurred 17 minutes later than that.  [Pa233, 63:19-22].  Appellant’s three-fold response to the New Motion Judge’s hypothetical remains.
[brief] [...]  Plaintiff claims that Fell made a comment about his being “too old” to go to a conference in 2014 in front of defendant [...] and [...], another DEP manager.  (Pb8, citing only his own internal complaint, Pa659; Pa869-870).  Plaintiff presented no evidence in the record as to Fell’s age relative to his own, though the record is undisputed that they are contemporaries to the extent they have known each other in excess of thirty years and that [...] was the best man at Fell’s wedding.  (Pa320-321).
[brief] The compulsory insurance provisions of the Act simply guarantee that an injured worker will have an avenue of recovery for his or her injury.  That policy objective has been achieved in this case because Plaintiff has been paid the workers’ compensation benefits to which he was entitled for his work-related accident.  See Pa437.  Nothing in the Act guarantees that Plaintiff’s intentional wrong claim, which is asserted in addition to his workers’ compensation claim, will be insured.
[directive] 2.  The court is to consider any no-contact conditions, TRO/FRO, or visitation ordered by other courts.  3.  The court is to consider all other relevant information.  If the court determines modification is appropriate, it must notify the other of court that issued the existing protection order its intended order.  Where there is a conflict regarding contact with a child, the Family order controls.  See R. 3 :26- 1 (b ).
[brief] POINT V [...] HAS OFFERED THE DEVELOPER ALTERNATIVE SITES FOR DEVELOPMENT[See Order dated August 28, 2023 at 21a]  At no time until the present, notwithstanding [...]'s initial Motion in Aid or at any time before or after that, did [...] indicate that it was moving ahead in the absence of Emerson identifying a site and purchasing the triangle block - nor did it ever demand that the [...] identify a site - not at the midpoint review, not in its original motion in aid, and not at the meeting in March of 2019 where it met with the [...] to outline the [...]'s responsibilities as a new administration under the agreements in place.  Curiously, it does not do so today, and has never done so.  [...] alleges the [...] has not proposed any alternative to Block 610 for the construction of seven (7) off-site units, which is patently false.  In fact, the [...] has discussed numerous options and sites with [...] for the construction of the additional units, including a lot that the [...] Engineer believes is suitable for between eight (8) and twelve (12) units.  In fact, when concerns were raised by [...] regarding a wetlands buffer impacting the site, the [...] went so far as to have its own professionals review prior site plans and create a sketch depicting a proposed buildable area on an alternative site for [...] to review, which were shared most recently in December of 2022.  The [...] Engineer opined that looking at the survey if you held a 20’ front yard setback it appears you could fit about a 60x120’ building on the property by utilizing wetlands buffer averaging.  Even without wetlands buffer averaging, the site would accommodate an approximate 50’x75’ building.  Lastly, despite the foregoing, the [...] has held several discussions with [...] regarding alternative sites for development of the off-site units.  The Trial Court agreed, stating:
[brief] Both the Federal and State Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to be present at his trial and to have counsel at “critical stage[s].”  State v. Dangcil, 248 N.J. 114, 135 (2021) (citing U.S. Const. amends. VI; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10); accord R. 3:16(b) (“The defendant shall be present at every stage of the trial . . . .”).  Thus, “[t]he presence of a defendant at trial is a condition of due process to assure a fair and just hearing,” and “[v]indication of that right requires a defendant to be present at every stage of the proceedings, whenever . . . presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.
[brief] Prior to the dismissal in [...] 2, in denying a prior motion to dismiss, the District Court found that Defendants violations of the NJCFLA supported affirmative claims under the FDCPA and that “as a purchaser of debt, [...] meets the definition of consumer lender” under the NJCFLA.  [...] v. Unifund CCR, Inc., Civil Action No. 20-cv-5024, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44747, at *12 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2021) (Pa123) (“[...] 1”).  On January 23, 2023, [...] filed her class action Complaint in the Bergen County Law Division, alleging that Defendants’ unlicensed attempts to enforce a void debt violated the Consumer Fraud Act and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  In dismissing the Complaint, the trial court explicitly determined that [...] had standing to pursue her claims under the FDCPA, but then later dismissed the FDCPA claims based on an ostensible lack of a private right of action under the NJCFLA.  See Statement of Reasons (“SoR”) p. 8, 20 (Pa40, Pa52).  Similarly, the trial court determined that Defendants’ conduct—constituting a fourth-degree crime—was not unlawful conduct under the CFA.  See SoR p. 13-14 (Pa45-Pa46); see also N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  As discussed herein, the trial court failed to consider applicable jurisprudence in a developing area of law and, thus, the trial court’s October 4, 2023 Order granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be reversed.
[brief] d.  [...] did not offer any testimony at trial and was not present. \(^{46}\)  He was never deposed.  [...] submitted nothing to the Court in the form of an Affidavit or otherwise setting forth his alleged \(^{45}\) 1T and 2T.  \(^{46}\) 1T and 2T. damages.  The record is completely silent as to his alleged damages.  He has failed to establish that he has incurred any damage and, even if the Plaintiffs could prevail under some theory of law in this action – which they cannot – his failure to establish even the slightest hint of damage absolutely bars him from sharing in any award of damages entered in this lawsuit.
[brief] Allowing the Township to proceed down the redevelopment and condemnation path in the midst of a builder’s remedy action would create a chilling effect on builder’s remedy actions across the state.  There would be nothing to stop municipalities from waiting for a determination of noncompliance, and then condemning the property to render the builder’s remedy lawsuit moot.  Our courts have consistently held that “a developer may be entitled to a builder’s remedy, even if a municipality has begun moving toward compliance before or during the developer’s lawsuit, provided the lawsuit demonstrates the municipality’s current failure to comply with its affordable housing obligations. ”  Cranford, 445 N.J. Super. at 231 (App. Div. 2016).  If a developer may be entitled to a builder’s remedy even if a municipality has begun moving toward compliance, so much more so for if a municipality has faced the entire process with flagrant disregard.  This court should reaffirm the trial court’s granting of temporary relief in its entirety.
[brief] You’re going to hear that the expert from the plaintiff, the general surgeon by the name of [...], at the time of this treatment wasn’t even doing abdominal surgery.  He wasn’t even doing bowel surgery.  He didn’t have permission at any hospital to do general surgery.  He didn’t have privileges at any hospital to do general surgery.  He hadn’t done a consultation in general surgery on a patient since 2010.  He hadn’t done bowel surgery on a patient since 2010.  And for much of that time he -- or for a significant portion of that time, he left medicine and practiced as a lawyer for about three or four years, New York, suing his colleagues.
[brief] (Da321.)  With respect to the second exception, “[...]’s administrative failures allegedly created an ‘unreasonable risk of harm’ to their patient and therefore fall within the definition of gross negligence,” (Da323), and failure “to follow CDC guidelines, put COVID protocols in place, and provide basic medical care to [...] due to institutional failures.  . . caused his condition to deteriorate and made him susceptible to the deadly COVID virus,” (Da324).
[directive] 10% permissible 2b(2)(a)(b)(d) of victim.  4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500  10% permissible  2C:20-3/2C:20-  Actor unlawfully takes property valued at least $200 but not more than $500, fourth degree.  Theft 2b(3)(4)  If less than $200, disorderly persons offense.  Disorderly Persons
[brief] The Trial Court Improperly Adjudged a “Battle of the Experts” and Wrongly Granted Summary Judgment by Giving [...]’s Expert Report More Credence Than [...]’ Expert Report, Where the Conflicting Reports Raised a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether There was a Preexisting Dangerous Condition of the Defendants’ Making That Precluded Application of the “Ongoing Storm” Doctrine of Pareja.
[brief] This is specifically to avoid "miscommunication among brokers, agents, insureds and carriers."  *Echevarias v. Lopez*, 240 N.J.Super. 104, 108 (App.Div.1990).  [...] conceded that it never sent anything whatsoever to [...], or otherwise communicated with it, to advise [...] of its cancellation from the CCIP, or, as [...] euphemistically calls it, "unenrollment."
[brief] However, more accurately, it was stated that [...] would need her counteroffer in writing before bringing it to the necessary parties.  A counteroffer is a repudiation of a contract.  Berbarian v. Lynn, 355 N.J. Super. 210, 217 (App. Div. 2002)(emphasis added)(holding that a “counteroffer operates a rejection because it implies that the offeree will not consent to the terms of the original offer and will only enter into the transaction on the terms stated in the counter offer.
[brief] However, that document is reflective of the Court’s thinking.  On p. 2 of the Statement of Reasons attached to the December 1st Order, the Court isolates a section of Plaintiff’s deposition.  Although the Court does not indicate where the quote is from, it actually appears on p. 93 at line 19.  There, we see some background as to the Gregory conversation.  Plaintiff was asked:  Q: In the conversation with [...], did he ever mention the EEOC complaint specifically?  A: No.  Q:  Do you know for a fact that he knew about it?  A:  I can’t prove it.  It is just my opinion, because he said I was upset with them hiring a female, and the only way he would have known that is from [...], because I never posted, never called him, never wrote a letter, never made a complaint to Mr. Gregory.  On p. 94 at line 18, Plaintiff was asked:  Q:  When [...] said they weren’t comfortable with you working with other people and -- actually, let me make sure I am getting that right.  A: Yeah, they were not comfortable with me working with certain people.  Q:  Do you know for a fact that he was referring to -- who do you think they were referring to there?  What certain people?  A:  Well, it would either be [...], who I have had some run-ins with, or most likely since you mentioned a female, [...].  Counsel read p. 2:  Q:  Shortly after hanging up with [...], I texted [...] wishing to speak with him.  At approximately 3:50 p.m., he texted me and said [...] advised him I was not allowed in the school.  Did I read that correctly?  A: Correct.  You have a copy of the text message.  On p. 95 at line 20, Plaintiff was asked:  Q: Did you hear that from anyone besides [...]?  A: No.  The following lines, which the Court below cites at p. 2 of 2 of the Statement of Reasons attached to the December 1st Order (Pa-76), at page 98 line 7 the section from page 96 line 6-18 has to be understood in terms of two happenings.  First, the Gregory conversation (1T; 91:5).  So, what Gregory pointed out was that the Plaintiff is a good worker, and he hoped that the Plaintiff would stay on.  Because Gregory had mentioned the word “female” and the Plaintiff had signed a EEOC complaint about [...], the Plaintiff realized that [...] had told Gregory about the EEOC complaint, and the Plaintiff believed that his career at [...] was over.  What the Court below failed to realize is that Gregory’s “you’re a good worker, we hope you’ll stay on,” was a pre-cursor to the fact that Plaintiff would be notified by Spring through Danzo that he was being removed from the high school.
[brief] REPLYING TO POINT II, THE BOARD COULD NOT GRANT § 18-601 RELIEF ON THE RECORD CREATED BY THE APPLICANT; IT WAS ERRONEOUS FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO SECOND-GUESS THE BOARD'S EXERCISE OF DISCRETION.  At Pb26 to Pb27, plaintiffs concede the formidable burden in overturning a land use board's decision.  [...] would add that, per Tomko v. Vissers, it was the Applicant's burden to prove its entitlement to relief before the Board.  The Applicant's proofs failed to establish peculiar conditions/hardship and the Board's authority to deny waiver relief is not subject to challenge.  At Pb27 to Pb28, plaintiffs refer to the application as 'by right.'  Call it whatever they want, the application required waiver relief.  [...] requires proof of peculiar conditions/hardship for waiver relief.  No such evidence was presented, and on its face these waivers were the product of developer greed and not site-specific conditions.  Moreover, even a 100% compliant application (no variance, no waiver) requires proper public notice in order for the Board to exercise jurisdiction.  See Point III of the original merits brief; see also Point III of this brief.  III.
[brief] [...] v. [...], Docket No. [...] (N.J. Super. App. Div. Nov. 1, 2013) (P-74)  11  Saldana v. DiMedio, 275 N.J. Super. 488 (App. Div. 1994)  5, 7, 8, 9  Setrin v. Glassboro State College, 136 N.J. Super. 329 (App. Div. 1975)  4, 5  Shore v. Housing Authority of Harrison, 208 N.J. Super. 348 (App. Div. 1986)  11  Vincitore v. N.J. Sports & Expo. Auth., 169 N.J. 119 (2001)  9  The New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11
[brief] See Chartanovich, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2537 at *5 (“[b]ecause we consider the reasonable time issue before we reach the merits of a motion to vacate under *Rule 4:50-1(d), (e), and (f), we end our inquiry here. ”).  Near identical to the facts, here, in Chartanovich, the appellant delayed in moving to vacate the default judgment six years after the judgment was entered and, as a result, this Court deferred to the Lower Court’s holding that the motion to vacate was not filed within a reasonable time.  Because it reached this conclusion, this Court declined to reach the determination as to whether the debt was void under the NJCFLA.  So, too, should this Court hold.  No different here, the Lower Court did not abuse its discretion in holding Appellant’s Motion to Vacate was untimely and is barred by the doctrine of laches due to the failure to proceed with a motion to vacate her default when, at absolute minimum, she knew of the default judgment for over five (5) years.
[directive] 3.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  있고, 귀하는 성인진단  및 치료센터의 결정에 대해 이의를 제기할 수 대질하고, 심리에서 귀하에게 불리한 증언을 하는 증인들을 그들에게 있으며, 반대심문을 할 수 그런 후에 귀하에게 유리한 증거를 제출할 아십니까?  권리가 있다는 것을  Do you understand you will be able to challenge the findings of the [...] in a hearing and that at that hearing you will have the right to confront the witnesses against you and to cross examine them and then present evidence on your own behalf?
[brief] Regardless, at hearings before the Board, [...] established that the proposed billboard was “safe” for traffic and was not aesthetically different than other signage in the zone.  There was no competent evidence to the contrary.  In E&J Equities, LLC the New Jersey Supreme Court instructed municipalities to actually consider the safety studies on billboards because there was no competent evidence they were unsafe:  The record reveals the existence of a considerable body of literature discussing the impact, or lack thereof, of digital billboards on traffic safety and standards that can be applied to such devices to enhance traffic safety and mitigate aesthetic concerns.  A respected report concluded its exhaustive review of the impact of such devices stating that ample information existed to make informed decisions about such devices.  In addition, [...] had promulgated regulations governing off-premises digital billboards.
[brief] ¶¶37-39, Pa15.  6.  The police stop the strangulation and take him to the hospital.  After he is medicated, they start asking him questions.  They bait him into saying some stupid things about the Second Amendment, etc.\(^2\)  Then they lobby for more medicine.  ¶¶40-41, Pa16; ¶¶44-48, Pa16-17.  7.  The police find out the hospital has finally called his lawyer/dad so they kidnap him from his hospital bed without doctors’ permission.