ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff is an attorney, who is currently, and at all relevant times has been, employed as the Chief Legal Officer for defendant [...].  (Pa29).  As alleged in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, at all relevant times, [...] and [...] functioned as Plaintiff’s joint employers.  (Pa30).  [...] is a German corporation with its principal place of business located in Germany.  (Pa229).  [...] is a wholly owned subsidiary of [...], which is a wholly owned subsidiary of [...].  (Pa229).  [...] is a member of the [...] Management Board and was the Chief Executive Officer of [...], a German corporation and the parent of [...].  (Pa229, Pa235, Pa31).  Plaintiff alleges in this action that, in October 2021, [...] directed [...]’s then-Chief Operating Officer (“COO”) to wire funds to a personal friend based upon an invoice for services that were never performed.  (Pa25).  Plaintiff alleges that the COO reported this conduct to Plaintiff, who advised the COO not to authorize the payment; no payment was made.  (Pa25).  Thereafter, Plaintiff alleges that he contacted [...] to report [...]’s conduct, and that, as a result, [...] informed Plaintiff that he would no longer be recommended to take over [...]’s role as Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of [...].  (Pa25).  According to Plaintiff, the German Defendants “retaliated” against Plaintiff in violation of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”) by approving Plaintiff’s termination (which never happened) and passing Plaintiff over for promotion.  (Pa26-Pa29, Pa41-Pa45).  It is the German Defendants’ position that they are not Plaintiff’s “employer,” nor is he their “employee,” thereby precluding Plaintiff from asserting a CEPA claim against the German Defendants.  (Pa231).  The German Defendants also contend that Plaintiff performed no “whistleblowing activity,” and that Plaintiff did not possess an objectively reasonable belief that any violation of law or public policy occurred, and therefore that Plaintiff’s CEPA claim will ultimately fail.  (Pa231).  Moreover, it is the German Defendants’ position that they did not retaliate against Plaintiff, nor do they have any control over the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment.  (Pa231).  Critically, Plaintiff’s employment was never terminated, and he continues to maintain his position as Chief Legal Officer.  (See Pa29).  B.
[directive] In in that regard, County Prosecutors and other law enforcement agencies shall, to the of of extent applicable, provide notice victims the scheduling the sentencing to hearing, including how the hearing is proposed to be conducted and whether the court of will consider staying the commencement the custodial portion.  If a victim or family of member the defendant, or other appropriate person wishes to participate/address the court at sentence, such arrangements should made by the prosecutor or be of of defense counsel.  The court must be advised these arrangements advance the in sentencing.  (2)  Defense attorneys, prior to sentencing, should review with the defendant the Notice of Appeal Rights form.  At sentencing, defense counsel shall represent that they have if reviewed the form with the defendant, that all questions, any, have been addressed if with the defendant, and advise the defendant has signed the form.  The judge will of If advise the defendant their appellate rights.  defense counsel has not been previously able to have the defendant sign the form, defense counsel the record on should elicit permission from the defendant print the defendant's name the form on to where the signature would ordinarily be.  Defense counsel should then submit the signed form as soon as reasonably practical.
[brief] However, “the rules governing expert opinion testimony do not allow the wholesale admission of every expert’s opinion, even those of qualified experts opining in an area appropriate for expert opinion. ”  Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 582 (2008).  The permissible bases of opinion testimony by experts are set forth in N.J.R.E. 703, which requires that an expert opinion be based on “facts or data derived from (1) the expert’s personal observations, or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily admissible in evidence but which is the type of data normally relied upon by experts in forming opinions on the same subject. ”  State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 494 (2006) (citation omitted).  The corollary of that rule is the net opinion rule, which “forbids the admission into evidence of an expert's conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence or other data."
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  The Plaintiff, [...], is a Labor Organization and Association representing Firefighters employed by the [...].  (Pa8 and Pa10).  Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on May 8, 2023, alleging that the City adopted and applied a policy in which it unilaterally rendered Firefighters in eligible for promotion if they availed themselves of medical leave.  (Pa9).  The Plaintiff alleged that such a policy violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.  (Pa9)  Additionally, Plaintiff asserted a cause of action which claimed that the City’s sick leave disciplinary policy punished Firefighters for utilizing statutory entitled medical or sick leave.  (Pa9).  Plaintiff claimed that Firefighters who utilized statutory medical or sick leave are perceived to be disabled under the terms of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.  (Pa10)  Plaintiff asserted that in July 2022, the City implemented a policy in which Firefighters were declared ineligible for promotion if they availed themselves of any type of medical leave whether it such medical leave was work related or not.  (Pa11).  At least one (1) Firefighter, [...], was denied a promotion to Captain because he was on medical leave for an injury which incurred on the job.  (Pa11).  Fire Fighter [...] had eighteen (18) years of service and had been included in the list of employees then eligible for promotion to Captain.  (Pa11).  At the time when the promotions were to be made Fire Fighter [...] requested and was granted was medical leave.
[brief] THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS ALTERNATIVE CLAIMS FOR AN ELECTIVE SHARE OF THE ESTATE ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ACCEPTABLE LEGAL AND EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL (P36a to 41a)  Under New Jersey law, a surviving spouse "has a right of election to take an elective share of one-third of the augmented estate" of a deceased spouse, under certain limitations.
[brief] Da390  Motion to Exclude Damages for Loss of Ocean View and Increased Vulnerability to Wave Overtopping  Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion to Bar  Defendant’s Engineering Report Filed 12/01/21 .........................................................  Da401  Certification of [...]  In Support of Motion to Bar Filed 12/01/21 ..........................................................  Da404  Exhibit 1  Amended Verified Complaint ...................... Da86
[brief] ”  Canon 2.1.  The Comments to the Code note, “an appearance of impropriety is created when a reasonable person, fully informed person observing the judge’s conduct would have doubts about the judge’s impartiality. ”  Code of Judicial Conduct, cmt. 3 on Rule 2.1.  The Rules also provide that a judge must “disqualify themselves in proceedings in which their impartiality or the appearance of their impartiality might reasonably be questioned” due to “personal bias, prejudice, or knowledge. ”  Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3.17.  To determine whether there is a violation of the Rules of Judicial Conduct, the court looks to whether a “reasonable, fully informed person have doubts about the judge’s impartiality. ”  DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 517 (2008).  Here, the de novo court did not appear impartial when it repeatedly asked about circumstances that exceeded the scope of the trial de novo, in particular, the result of the Alcotest that was not relied on and the reasoning why the Alcotest result was not introduced.  (3T6:13-8:21; 3T18:2-21:5.)  This pattern of inquiry that the trial court admitted it conducts as a matter of routine, demonstrates bias that the individual is intoxicated because there is an Alcotest result, even when the State did not rely on or introduce the test result.  (3T6:13-8:21.)  This Court should end this improper inquiry at de novo trials, and grant this Defendant a new trial de novo with an impartial judge.
[brief] (Db11-14).  Without arguing retroactivity, defendant claims that Fair’s subsequent change in the instruction from having the jury determine whether “a reasonable person” would have viewed the defendant’s words as threatening violence, to whether “a reasonable person similarly situated to the victim” would, alone requires reversal.  (Db11-14).  The State maintains that Fair’s new rule should not be retroactive, but that even if it is given pipeline retroactivity, reversal is not required under the particular circumstances of this case, as it did not affect the jury’s verdict.
[brief] I.  THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE WRONGFUL TERMINATION COUNT OF THE COMPLAINT WHERE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS  IN DISPUTE EXIST REGARDING THE CITY OF NEWARK’S FAILURE TO SET, ENFORCE AND OR ADHERE TO THEIR POLICIES AND INTENTIONALLY VIOLATED MR. ALLEN’S RIGHTS BY WRONGFULLY TERMINATING HIM IN VIOLATION OF ESTABLISHED RIGHTS (T1 P63 L15-18)  The Court erred in deciding as a matter of law that neither [...] nor the [...] wrongfully terminated [...].  Specifically, the court opined that “Plaintiff was terminated for reasons relating to his poor performance and unprofessionalism... [h]e was not yet certified as a candidate prior to being fired and therefore is not subject to the protections of the executive order...[and]  Plaintiff is not part of a class of citizens that the executive order intended to protect....”  T1 p.62 L16-23.  For the reasons set forth below the Court failed to understand the allegations set forth in the Complaint, circumstances surrounding the Plaintiff’s termination, the law governing the same and the questions necessitated by “genuine issues” of material facts in dispute which can only be answered by a jury.
[brief] She took affirmative actions in obtaining the $200,000 due to her by transactions made in September 2014 even before the GSA was reached and during the period of time that she argues the bankruptcy was pending.  To find she had unclean hands based on her own actions would be an understatement.  Similarly, the trial court found: Her assertions that she never received the $200K payment as required by the FJD was also a total façade.
[brief] Moreover, in all of the cases on which defendant relies, the defendants’ mental health was directly implicated in their crimes, either because the defendant raised an insanity defense at trial (State v. Nayee, 192 N.J. 475 (2007), State v. Nataluk, 316 N.J. Super. 336 (App. Div. 1998)) or because the defendant had been abused by the victim (State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123 (2011), State v. Briggs, 349 N.J. Super. 496 (App. Div. 2002)).  Neither condition obtains in this matter.  To support a finding of mitigating factor 11, the defendant must establish that imprisonment “would entail excessive hardship to the defendant or the defendant’s dependents[.]”
[brief] Although Anthony was decided after the trial judge's decision in this case, notably the Court in Anthony, unlike Henderson, did not set forth that its ruling had prospective application only.  Further, under the revised threshold standard adopted in Anthony, in State v. Guerino, 464 N.J. Super. 589, 611 (App. Div. 2020), we applied the ruling retroactively and remanded for the trial court to convene an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of a photo array identification procedure conducted in 2016 because the report did not provide a detailed account of the dialogue between the officer and the witness.  Ibid.  Similarly, here, under the revised threshold, defendant was entitled to a Wade/Henderson hearing without having to prove suggestiveness.
[brief] (42T:150-5 to 17)  By the prosecution’s own characterization, [...] used the imprimatur of his expertise to testify to much more than merely his scientific conclusions.  He bolstered the State’s case by putting all the pieces of trial evidence regarding the “circumstances” of the case together to suit the narrative advanced by the prosecution.  The jury heard extensive testimony about the “circumstances” in which the remains were discovered.  Determining whether those circumstances proved that the death was not accidental was directly within the jury’s ken.  [...]’s determination was nothing more than his opinion that the decision to destroy remains often suggests the decedent died an intentional rather than accidental death.  Cloaking this opinion in the guise of scientific expertise misled the jury by suggesting it was a question of expert judgment and not their own.  The jury was deprived of the ability to exercise its own independent judgment because they “labor[ed] under the erroneous assumption that,” when he opined on the manner of death, [...] was “testifying to an area within his expertise.
[brief] The 2016 Application asks whether any attorney has been “the subject of any bar complaint, investigation or disciplinary proceeding within the past 5 years”: [Pa319a]  The renewal Applications ask whether there “[h]ave been any new bar complaints, investigations or disciplinary proceedings against any attorney”:  [Pa324a; Pa329a; Pa947a]  In an “an attempt to find and/or create coverage where none exists,” as [...] aptly put it, [...] and [...] create a “strained and overly narrow construction” of these questions.
[brief] Court should not be satisfied with the Accounting, since it has become a fraudulent Accounting due to substantive mistaken figures that I verified as requiring corrections, & which [...] refused to make based on his claims that I demonstrated are illegitimate.  No legitimate & reputable CPA would allow these mistakes to remain, let alone in an audited Accounting.  Court cannot be in denial & disregard my Certification identifies substantive "genuine disputes" regarding my filed Exceptions, & that I offered practical resolutions.
[brief] In its opposition to Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment, [...] referred to unrelated materials from over 10 years ago regarding an entirely different entity, [...], which is not a party to this litigation.  [...] cited to unrelated website postings and a listing of [...] as “Director of Sales” and as a distributor for [...], not [...].  [...] is an unrelated corporate entity that is not a party to this suit.  [...] sold outdoor furniture and grills and assorted merchandise.  [...] d/b/a [...] sold grills.  That [...] was a principal in both companies at one point does not make them the same company.  As evidenced by the very corporate filings [...] submitted to the trial court, [...] and [...] are separate corporate entities.
[brief] ”  (Sb26, 29)  This is not an accurate characterization of the record.  Juror 12 informed the court that a friend of theirs gave her husband “all the information about the trial” and that her husband knew “about this case because of his employment at the church in Freehold” that some of [...]’s family members attend.  (24T6-12 to 24)  When the trial court asked Juror 12 whether her husband told her anything, Juror 12 said “I told him to stop giving me any information,” but did not state what information her husband had given her.  (24T6-25 to 7-3)  When the court attempted to follow up by asking how much her husband told her and whether it was limited to the fact that [...]’s family members attend the Freehold church, Juror 12 did not give a clear response; she never stated that the information her husband gave her was limited to the fact that the family members attend the Freehold church nor described the information at all, instead describing her and her husband’s concerns.  (24T7-5 to 14)  Thus, there is simply no basis in the record to conclude that the information Juror 12’s husband conveyed to her was “minor,” as the court failed to ascertain the “specific nature of the extraneous information” that Juror 12 learned from her husband.
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esq.  (Attorney Id.: 012272010)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................  iii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND DECISIONS BEING APPEALED .................................................. vii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................................................ -  1 - PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................................................................................................... - 4 - STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................................................. - 6 - A.  [...] and [...]’s Business Partnership ........................................................................ - 6 - B.  [...]’s Operations ..................................................................................................... - 7 - C.  [...]’s Operations .............................................................................................................. - 9 - D.  [...]’s Material Involvement in [...] and [...]’s Finances ......................... - 9 - E.  The 2014 and 2017 [...] and [...] Buyout Transactions ....................... - 12 - F.  The 2019 Tax Deficiency Notice and Lawsuit ............................................................ - 16 - G. [...] Failed To Establish Plaintiffs’ Conversion Claims ............................... - 17 - LEGAL ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... - 20 - POINT I.  THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY ERRONEOUSLY DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (13T64-6 to 97-9)
[brief] ”); see also Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173, N.J. 76, 87 (2002) (“If the consideration requirement is met, there is no additional requirement of gain or benefit to the promisor, loss or detriment to the promisee, equivalence in the values exchanged, or mutuality of obligations. ’”) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 79 (1979)).  Similarly, the decisions in Caplin Enterprises, Inc. v. Arrington, 145 So. 3d 608, 611 (Miss. 2014), Tillman v. Com. Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 370 (2008), and Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 121, 6 P.3d 669, 694 (2000) all involved other factors – not present here – which were inextricably tied to the Court’s decision on unconscionability.
[brief] First, the Prosecutor stated defendant could only be reckless if he was “aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will result from his conduct and that the death of [...] was a mere possibility. ” (9T:90-1 to 10).  Although he continued on using an example of Driving While Intoxicated (DWI), the context here is important because the Prosecutor then clarified, “That’s not this case....[defendant] didn’t consciously disregard anything.  He consciously decided, not disregarded, he consciously decided that he was going to shoot the person who had the temerity to flash their brights [sic] in his rearview mirror.  That’s what he planned on doing.  That’s what he wanted to do.  That’s what he did. ” (9T:30-23 to 91-5).
[directive] These strategies show the benefits of targeted interventions for populations at key contact points with law enforcement and the criminal justice system—police response, arrest, and court involvement.  These varied approaches to address the overall public safety and public health needs of New Jerseyans require a coordinated approach by law enforcement and those who share the responsibility of public safety.  We must build on these alternative public safety strategies that are smart, just, and which make our communities safer.  We must continue to transform law enforcement and public safety in New Jersey.
[brief] Permitted uses.  The uses set forth below shall be permitted as a development alternative to the underlying zoned uses allowed by this Chapter but shall not replace the underlying zoning district.  A.  Principal Uses.  The following principal uses shall be permitted in the Senior Housing – 2 Overlay District:  (1)  Assisted living facility, as defined at §230-54.  For the purposes of this Article, the term ‘assisted living facility’ may also include memory care facilities and/or continuing care retirement communities.  B.
[brief] The lower court wrongly concluded that the City did not need the consent of other designated developers, such as Plaintiff, [...], because the latter’s redevelopment project had been completed.  A third issue asks this Court to determine whether a change to the development criteria applicable to a single lot in a redevelopment area is, as a matter of law, immune from a spot zoning analysis.  The Court wrongly determined that the spot zoning decision is one of law uninformed by any planning considerations.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] 14  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 6 (1969) ..............................................  7  N. Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co., 158 N.J. 561, 569 (1999)  ...........................................................................  10  Statutes and Rules Rule 4:40-2 ..................................................................................................  7 Rule 4:49-1 ..................................................................................................  7  INDEX TO TRANSCRIPTS | TRANSCRIPT  DESIGNATION | DESCRIPTION | |-------------------------|-------------| | AT | MOTION FOR JNOV DECISION DATED OCTOBER 6, 2023 | | BT | MOTION FOR FEE APPLICATION DECISION DATED MARCH 11, 2024 | | CT | JURY TRANSCRIPT  DATED JULY 24, 2023 | | 1T | TRIAL TRANSCRIPT DATED JULY 25, 2023 | | 2T | TRIAL TRANSCRIPT DATED JULY 26, 2023 | | 3T | TRIAL TRANSCRIPT DATED JULY 27, 2023 | | 4T | TRIAL TRANSCRIPT DATED JULY 28, 2023 | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS¹
[directive] All municipal and other law enforcement agencies having patrol jurisdiction within the State of New Jersey shall make stationhouse adjustments available as a method of handling minor juvenile delinquency offenses within their jurisdiction.  The goal of standardized guidelines and use of a more uniform method of diverting eligible juveniles is to promote equality within the justice system by providing equivalent access to police diversionary programs regardless of domicile.  Stationhouse adjustments shall be conducted in accordance with the standards set forth below.  A model stationhouse agreement is attached hereto.
[directive] supra August 21, 2023  Page 3  The [...] ([...]) will provide training for nurses, prosecutors, law enforcement, and advocates on the implementation of this Directive and the services to be provided by BREATHE Teams to victims statewide no later than November 1, 2023.  BREATHE Teams will consist of an FNE, a law enforcement officer, and a Domestic Violence Response Team (DVRT) Advocate, if the strangulation and/or smothering occurs against a person who, with respect to the actor, meets the definition of a victim of domestic violence, or a Confidential Sexual Violence Advocate (CSVA) if the victim also experienced an act of sexual violence.  The role of each BREATHE Team member will be as follows:  Forensic Nurse Examiner:  A forensic nurse examiner (FNE) is a registered nurse with specialized training to perform a forensic medical examination.  The role of the FNE is to assess and care for a victim’s medical condition, and to obtain and collect samples, specimens, and photographs which may have evidential value.  The standardized procedure for completing the forensic medical examination will be approved by the [...] Director, or their designee, after consultation with the [...].