ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  MAG Entertainment, 375 N.J. Super. at 546.  Yet, that is exactly what [...] was attempting to do.  Setting aside the undue burden that retrieving and searching for responsive records would entail, the OPRA requests is virtually unlimited in scope.  While the OPRA requests have, nominally, a date range of January 17, 2017 to July 3, 2019, the OPRA requests contain no specific subject matter.  Plaintiff did not identify a subject matter in his OPRA requests.  Instead of providing the requisite specificity, he identified the subject matter as “fire commissioner business, discussions, etc. ”  This description is overly broad because it does not distinguish between specific categories of records.  Every single text message ever sent or received by [...] is potentially responsive.  Courts have held that OPRA requests for correspondence, records, or electronic communications such as text messages must identify a specific subject matter.  In Burke v. Brandes, 429 N.J. Super. 169, 176-77 (App. Div. 2012), this Court held that the OPRA request was sufficiently specific because it was limited to emails to or from the Governor’s office regarding EZPass benefits provided by the Port Authority to its employees.
[brief] ....................................................................................................................20, 23 - **Burton v. Teleflex Inc.,** - 707 F.3d 417 (3d Cir. 2013)  ........................................................................................................44 - **Chiofalo v. State,** - 238 N.J. 527 (2019)  ....................................................................................................................28, 30 - **Dolinski v. Borough of Watchung & Chief Joseph Cina,** - 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1242, at *26 (App. Div. July 8, 2022)  .......................33 - **Donofry v. Autotote Sys., Inc.,** - 350 N.J. Super. 276 (App. Div. 2001)
[directive] The officer(s) must also preserve and forward to the prosecutor any other contemporaneous notes concerning the procedure.  New Jersey law requires that law enforcement officers must contemporaneously record the identification procedure.  This may be done in writing, or, if feasible, electronically.  If a contemporaneous record cannot be made, the officer shall prepare a record of the identification procedure as soon as practicable and without undue delay.  Whenever a written record is used, it must include, if feasible, a verbatim account of any exchange between the officer(s) involved in the procedure and the witness.  When a written verbatim account cannot be made, a detailed summary of the identification procedure should be prepared which includes the dialogue between the officer(s) and the witness.  A worksheet should be prepared whether or not the witness was able to make an identification.  If more than one witness is involved in an investigation, a different procedure should be used and a separate worksheet prepared for each witness.  Worksheets should be prepared during the procedure, or immediately thereafter.
[brief] Db refers to the defendant’s brief dated November 7, 2024.  1T refers to the Motion to Suppress Hearing transcript, dated August 6, 2024.  2T refers to the Motion to Suppress Hearing transcript, dated August 8, 2024. granting defendant’s Motion to Suppress and, thus, the court’s order must be reversed on appeal.  As set forth in the State’s initial brief, review of a trial court’s decision to suppress a defendant’s custodial statement to police is limited.
[directive] the County Time No. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 the For 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
[brief] 5.  Do you understand that if you plead guilty:  a.  You will have a criminal record?  [Yes]  [No]  b.  Unless the plea agreement provides otherwise, you could be sentenced to serve the maximum time in confinement, to pay the maximum fine and to pay the maximum Victims of Crime Compensation Agency Assessment?  [Yes]  [No]  c.  You must pay a minimum Victims of Crime Compensation Agency assessment of $50 ($100 minimum if you are convicted of a crime of violence) for each count to which you plead guilty?
[brief] In fact, the first time the Board discussed the matter of safety came as a result, not of any expert testimony, but rather when an unidentified Board Member asked what “leverage” the Board has to deny the application.  (T2: p136, ln 12-13)  It is Plaintiff’s position that the design waivers at issue are merely a red herring which is being used as the “leverage” for the denial the Board desired.  In ruling in the Plaintiff’s favor, the trial court recognized that the Board, for whatever reason, did not like the idea of a nine-lot subdivision.
[brief] ”  Predham v. Holfester, 32 N.J. Super. 419, 424 (App. Div. 1954).  To prevail on this element, [...] must show that it has “acted towards the land in question as would an average owner . . .”.  *Stump v. Whibco*, 314 N.J. Super. 560, 569 (App. Div. 1998).  [...] cannot satisfy this element for the substantially same reason it cannot satisfy the actual use and possession prong.  [...]’s production of the snow removal documents fail for the same reasons discussed above – there is nothing on the checks or receipts to indicate what properties the snow removal was for.  In addition to these deficient documents, [...] produced an incomplete purported utility bill for 2012 and another incomplete purported utility bill from April 17, 2020 to April 20, 2022.  Unfortunately for [...], the incomplete bills themselves indicate that the bills are for [...]’s property at [...] (i.e., Lot 19), and not [...]’s Property at Lot 22.  See Pa175.  [...] has not produced any other documentary evidence to support a claim that an “ordinarily prudent person” passing by would be put on notice that it owned the subject Property.  In fact, outside of [...]’s occasional use of the Property for parking, [...]’s perhaps first overt act of placing the debris piles on the Property resulted in [...]’s reproach and, ultimately, the institution of this lawsuit.
[directive] (1)  $2,000 in the case of a 1st degree crime (2) $1,000 in the case of a 2nd degree crime (3)  $ 750 in the case of a 3rd degree crime (4)  $ 500 in the case of a 4th degree crime (5)  $ 250 in the case of a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense  Total CCPF Penalty $ pou li ta 6.  Èske w konprann ke tribinal la gen diskresyon enpoze yon peryòd tan minimòm nan [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] prizon pou pije anvan menm ou kalifye pou libète kondisyonèl, peryòd tan sa a kab osi long ke la mwatye peryòd santans nan prizon yo enpoze a?
[directive] In apply officer or assistant prosecutor or general police cases, the violence domestic deputy attorney 3.2 or supervisory officer desi g pursuant to with Section na ted accordance in consulted consideration to the following the special circumstances relevant to shall eve subsection 3.3.2 if defendant were complaint- victim to be released on a posed to the risks would be that summons: automatically detention resulting from issuance of a complaint- mandatory whether the (1) situation, from domestic violence might discourage victim exacerbate the a might warrant prosecution, or cooperating with the otherwise serve the or would not pursuing the charge of iustice; interest of nature domestic violence offenses, would be given the repetitive it whether, ~2) in acomplaint-warrant recognition that if the defendant is apply for appropriate to thereafter commits pretrial complaint-summons and a new crime on while char ~ed by to N.J.S.A. cannot movepursuant 2A:162-24 to release. prosecutor revoke release, the 30); Cf. note 4.5.2 and 8.4.3. subsections (See injury, the of such si gns of and extent injury; victim exhibited whether the ~3) the victim, or weapon was used against was used; of threatened to be whether any type ~4) previously any time violated a temporary or final restraining defendant has at whether the (5) presumption of applvin~ for acomplaint-warrant if subsection 4.5.2 (creatin~a cf. order, of in violation a restraining release was committed order or offense the present seriousness of such previous and violation(s); the nature condition), and defendant believe that the possesses one or more firearms that reason to whether there is ~6) seized or Prevention cannot be surrendered pursuant to the or other reasons for practical defendant's from before the release custody on complaint- Violence Act a Domestic of location other than of another a the place arrest such firearm kept at as summons (e.~., a business premises); an office or residence, or suicidal behavior such as or exhibited excessive sadness defendant whether the (7) gself-injury; threatenin or moodiness 52 Page anv at or an victim assault during the did strangle or to attempted defendant the whether (8) and thereto; prior point pet. household harm did a or to threatened defendant the whether (9) basis determining a whether is there in considered be shall circumstances fore~oin~
[brief] (Pa0056).  Bung’s predates both the Appellate Division cases cited above.  By following Bung’s instead of controlling authority from the Appellate Division, and, by finding the issue of costs “undisputed,” the Court clearly abused its discretion.  Because the vast majority of costs sought by [...] are for experts and depositions, it should not be allowed recovery of costs under R. 4:42-8.
[brief] As to traffic, the testimony was questioned by the Board in *El Shaer*, as follows:  [T]he Board had requested appellee to submit to the expert a “gap analysis” study to determine the gaps in traffic … to enable the Board to gauge how much delay would be involved in getting in and out of the development, and no such study was presented….  The Board was therefore entitled to give little weight to the expert's conclusion on this point and instead rely upon its members' own personal knowledge of traffic conditions contiguous to the development site.
[brief] As an initial matter, and as more fully set forth above, Plaintiff has waived any argument as to the trial court’s notice finding by failing to brief same.  Sklodowsky, 417 N.J. Super. at 657; R. 2:6-2, cmt. 5 (“It is, of course, clear that an issue not briefed is deemed waived. ”).  Plaintiff’s only reference on appeal is a single sentencing opining the court’s notice determination was based on the argued improper determination of no dangerous condition and this matter should be remanded.  However, Plaintiff’s failure to brief the issue of notice constitutes waiver of the trial court’s determination of same.  For Plaintiff to recover pursuant to the TCA, there must be proof the Township possessed either actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition which caused Plaintiff’s injuries.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, [...] respectfully requests that the Court reverse the Department’s disapproval of [...]’s 2020 rate filings.  Dated: Florham Park, New Jersey  March 8, 2024  Respectfully submitted, By: [...]  [...]  [...]  [...] *(pro hac vice)*  [...]  [...]  [...] *(pro hac vice forthcoming)*  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
[brief] He was familiar with the foreclosure process for abandoned property as he availed himself to it in purchasing his own tax sale certificate which he foreclosed on June 10, 2021.  Moreover, he failed to pay any taxes during the time he owned the property.  As concerning as was [...] inaction, the plaintiff and intervenor were aware of [...]’s efforts at redemption and did little acknowledge them.  To the contrary, arguably within the three month statutory period for [...] to redeem, and on the date of the filing of [...]’s motion to set aside Final Judgment, [...] purchased the property by way of quit claim deed for nearly $130,000.00 over the amount of the redemption amount including penalties and interest.  Furthermore, defendant has established that it invested nearly $30,000 in commencing the rehabilitation process for the property.  Without reaching the impact of the Tyler v. Hennepin case and/or its retroactivity, and considering that the defendant is merely seeking the right to be granted ten days during which to redeem its tax sale certificate, the court is GRANTING the relief as modified.
[directive] II.  Current Charges  Complaint/Accusation/Indictment No.  Promis/Gavel No.  I  if of co-defendant(s), Name any Charge(s) charged a crime(s) that a presumption of incarceration or a mandatory Are minimum period with has you Yes No of ineligibility?  parole of this application that includes compelling that justify consideration this with reasons  If yes, you must include a separate page application.  attach a separate to this application?  page Did you Yes No  D prosecutor consent consider your application?  the to Did Unknown Yes No Form Revised Promulgated Directive #09-19 (06/04/2019), CN 12305 by of2 page 1
[brief] **  On page 37 of Defendant’s brief, they cite *N.J.S.A. 2A:16-57*, “[n]o declaratory judgment shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding,” and, pursuant to *N.J.S.A. 2A:16-56*, when “declaratory relief is sought, all persons having or claiming any interest which would be affected by the declaration shall be made parties to the proceeding. ”  It is critical to understand here that Plaintiffs have not challenged the original deed restrictions imposed by the developer so there is no relief sought which affects or prejudices the developer.  Additionally, even if the developer were an indispensable party, Defendant effectively waived the defense of indispensable party.  They did not raise the developer as an indispensable party.
[brief] \(^4\)  Second, [...] was not told that police were planning to search her apartment until they were already inside of it, and there is no indication that she consented to their initial entry.  While still outside the apartment building, [...] saw her mother being escorted by police towards her unit.  She followed and asked what was going on, but [...] refused to explain, --- \(^4\) Relying on *United States v. Drayton*, 536 U.S. 194, 205-08 (2002), the State argues that “the arrest of another in the presence of the consenting party does not automatically equal coercion of the consenting party. ”  (Sb 25)  [...] agrees and does not contend that [...]’s consent was made involuntary solely due to the fact of her mother’s detention.  Rather, it must be considered along with all the other evidence of coercive circumstances.
[brief] Further, [...]’s disciplinary history throughout his career evidences gross negligence:  From May of 2008 to present, [...] was disciplined or counseled in regards to the following violations of rules and regulations, policies, procedures, and/or directives/orders:  3  Pattern Sickness.  (Three (3)  Performance Notices)  2  Late to his shift or post (Performance Notice)  1  Failure to Investigate a Domestic Violence Incident (4-day suspension)  1  Failure to notify of lost equipment in a timely manner (Performance Notice)  1 MVA in assigned Patrol vehicle-  Preventable.  (Reprimand)  5  Failing to meet Evaluation Standards during the last five(5) of seven(7) evaluations.  One (1) Performance Notice, One (1) Reprimand, Two (2) Administratively handled, One (1) issue pending.
[brief] ..............................................  Da16  Defendant [...]’s Answer to Amended Complaint dated October 27, 2021 ........................................  Da17  Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment  Dismissing Professional Negligence Claims dated March 3, 2023 .........................  Da29  Defendant [...]’s Notice of Cross Motion for Summary Judgment dated January 9, 2024 ........................................  Da31  Defendant [...]’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts submitted in support of its Cross Motion for Summary Judgment dated January 9, 2024 ........................................  Da33  Defendant [...]’s Certification of Counsel submitted in support of its Cross Motion for Summary Judgment dated January 10, 2024 ........................................  Da35  Exhibit A – Plaintiff’s Complaint (omitted)  Exhibit B – Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (omitted)  Exhibit C – Defendant’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint dated May 11, 2021 (omitted)  Exhibit D – Defendant’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint dated October 27, 2021 (omitted)  Exhibit E – Defendant’s Response to C, C(1) and Supplemental Interrogatories, dated August 10, 2021 Exhibit F – Defendant’s Response to C, C(1) and Supplemental Interrogatories, dated April 11, 2023 – (omitted)  Exhibit G - Amended copy of the certification of [...], P.E., dated June 30, 2023…………………………… Da37 Exhibit H – Plaintiff’s Notice of Claim dated January 24, 2020 – (omitted) Order Granting Cross Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing the Amended Complaint against [...] dated March 3, 2023…………………………………………………………….. Da41 Plaintiff’s February 5, 2024, correspondence requesting clarification of the court’s ruling on Order for Summary Judgment………………………….. Da43 Funes ex rel. Estate of Martinez v. Norfolk S. Corp., No. A-5348-10T1, 2012 WL 4069543, at *3 (App. Div. 2012)………… Da44 Exhibit F to Respondents’ December 22, 2023, Motion for Summary Judgment, Video from the security camera located at the Exchange Place Station from 4:28:40 through 4:34:00 on December 24, 2019¹ ……………………………………………………… Da51 ¹ Plaintiff-Appellant asserted in her appendix and letter to the Court dated May 15, 2024, that Exhibits D and F to Respondent’s Summary Judgment motion and Exhibit E to Plaintiff’s Opposition to the motion were all the same video file and that she submitted them as Pa1152.
[brief] On February 23, 2022, Plaintiff-Appellant filed suit against the Defendants, [...], [...] and [...].  (Pa.1-Pa7).  Thereafter, a Request to Enter Default was filed on April 22, 2022, against Defendant [...].  (Pa9-Pa16).  Plaintiff then filed Stipulations of Dismissal without Prejudice as to Defendants [...] and [...] on April 14, 2022, and December 28, 2022, respectively.  (Pa16-Pa19).  On March 10, 2022, Defendant [...] filed an Answer to the Complaint, essentially denying all claims.  (Pa20-Pa.32).  The parties exchanged written discovery and completed depositions.  Plaintiff also obtain an expert report.  Thereafter, on February 12, 2024, the [...] moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) The [...] is immune under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 because the Town did not have notice of a dangerous condition; (2) That the [...] entitled to immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:2-3 because the Kearny Roadway project represented an exercise of discretionary spending.  (Pa33-Pa427).  Plaintiff filed opposition dated March 7, 2024, arguing that (1) Summary Judgment should be denied because the Plaintiff has met its burden under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 and (2) N.J.S.A. 59:2-3 is inapplicable because the Defendant has not shown that the Plaintiff's injury was caused from “High Level Decision Making.  (Pa428-Pa674).  Defendant filed a reply brief dated March 15, 2024(Pa675-Pa699) and Plaintiff filed a Letter Brief in response dated March 22, 2024 (Pa700-Pa712).  Oral argument of the summary judgment motion was entertained by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on April 3, 2024.  Summary Judgment was granted on April 22, 2024 (Pa.713).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Accessory Uses.  The following accessory uses shall be permitted in the Senior Housing – 2 Overlay District to be used exclusively by the residents of the development and their guests, except as may otherwise be authorized by the Township:  (1)  Off-street parking facilities, including surface parking, under-building parking, and parking garages.  (2)  Fences and walls.  (3)  Signs.  (4)  Patios and gazebos.  (5)  Buildings for storage of maintenance equipment.  (6)  Private indoor and outdoor recreation and community buildings and facilities, including swimming pools, fitness rooms, sport courts, common areas and similar amenities.  (7)  Trash and recycling facilities.  (8)  Roof-mounted solar panels.  (9)  Electric vehicle (EV) charging equipment.  (10)  Other accessory uses customarily incidental to principal permitted uses in the Senior Housing – 2 Overlay District.  §230-274.
[brief] Although New Jersey has not adopted a rule of evidence similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 502 (Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product; Limitations on Waiver), the Parties understand and stipulate that disclosure of Privileged Discovery Materials pursuant to this Stipulation and Order as well as any Clawback or other Order will not prejudice or otherwise constitute a waiver of, or estoppel as to, any claim of attorney-client, work product or other applicable privilege or immunity, under New Jersey law.  For example, the mere production of privileged or work-product-protected documents in this case as part of a mass production is not itself a waiver in this case, or in any other Federal or State proceeding.  Communications involving trial counsel that post-date the filing of the Complaint need not be placed on a privilege log.  Communications may be identified on a privilege log by category, rather than individually, if appropriate.  10.  **Modification**
[brief] No one enters the office until the “suspect” does.  These videos also show an “individual with … sunglasses in his hands” enter a “front door that’s in the parking lot … like a fire door by the bathrooms” that is not a “customer entrance” and that “connects” to the back of “the main bar. ”  The videos then show this individual greet [...], who is already in the main bar area.  This individual in then seen on these camera walk towards “the kitchen area” and “breeze way. ”  This area “leads to … an upstairs office area, a storage area, tool room area” and to “a stairwell that goes downstairs. ”  The tool room was admittedly poorly organized: “Everything didn’t have its own place … if you knew what was supposed to be there and where it was supposed to be, you would know where it is. ”  From the tool room, the cameras captured the “subject” downstairs to the basement office.  The subject appears to have an unknown item in his hand and appears to be “trying to manipulate the door … handle with” this item.  After having no success opening the office door, the subject is then seen back in the main bar area, where it appears that the subject “[o]btain[s] the manager’s key … from behind the cash register,” an area that only employees would know about.  From there, the suspect re-enters the downstairs office and opens the door.  While the suspect is downstairs, the cameras show [...] entering a downstairs bathroom near the Tiffany Room.  When [...] left to go back upstairs, the suspect is seen re-entering the office and close the door.  When the suspect exits the office, he has a backpack in his hands.  The suspect is then recorded leaving through the same fire door.  No one is seen entering the office until [...] enters it post-burglary.
[brief] B.  [...] Policy (Much of this may be moot since [...] has hesitantly abandoned the “cover up” policy allegation.  There remains the agreed upon policy against Family/Counsel Contact.)  (1T52-3-5)  Even according to [...], [...] must have a policy of denying relatives or counsel contact because they certainly had no policy to let [...] call me – even with his own phone.  1T52-3-5.  C.  Differential Discrimination  Besides discrimination or retaliation (whether per se or not), the other major “flavor” in this case is “differential discrimination.