ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Memorandum of Decision Dismissing Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint without prejudice ........................................ Da004 June 23, 2023 Order of Hon. [...], P.J. Cv. Granting Plaintiff Leave to File Second Amended Complaint ........................................ Da008 July 11, 2023  Order of Hon. [...], P.J. Cv. Amending Order of June 23, 2023 ...... Da010 True and accurate copy of the unpublished decision in Giua v. Closter, 2013 WL 12497892 (N.J. Tax Ct. Nov. 19, 2013) ......................... Da011 True and accurate copy of the unpublished decision in Grubb v. Garbutt, 2010 WL 3516847 (App. Div. 2010) ...Da016 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED September 13, 2023  Order of the Hon. [...], J.S.C. Dismissing Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint without Prejudice...........Pa1 September 13, 2023  Memorandum of Decision of the Hon. [...], J.S.C. Dismissing Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint without Prejudice ..........................................................Pa3  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES: Adams v. Atlantic City, 26 N.J. Misc. 259 (1948) ............................................. 42
[brief] 6  POINT I.  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW (Raised Below: T2)  ...........................................  6 POINT II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE AS [...]’S MOTION WAS DEFECTIVE ON ITS FACE (Raised Below: T2)  .................................................................  8 POINT III.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT [...] IS ABLE TO COMPEL ARBITRATION THROUGH EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL (Raised Below: T2)  .................................................................  11 POINT IV.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT [...] DID NOT WAIVE THEIR PURPORTED ABILITY TO COMPEL ARBITRATION (Raised Below: T2)  .................................................................  13  CONCLUSION  .........................................................................................................................  17
[brief] This is an unfounded assumption and even if it were true, the result is Appellant would be an *incidental* beneficiary with no standing to sue.  Appellant says that his late mother had signed the car’s title with a blank space for the title holder, for the specific intention of him benefitting from the sale.  That is also an unfounded assumption and an illogical one.  If his late mother intended for him to benefit from the sale, why wouldn’t she transfer the title appropriately so that he could easily sell it and benefit without any hassle?  All she had to do was write his name as the buyer on the title.  Regardless, he has stated that he can’t find this blank signed title, and just expects to be taken at his word.
[brief] And although [...] will not in this brief attempt to dispute the technical, regulatory violations found by the jury, [...]’s position is this:  Plaintiff/Respondents’ initial complaint and first amended complaint filed in 2018 alleged that they purchased timeshare intervals based on alleged oral misrepresentations.  The oral misrepresentations claimed were those expressly barred by the Real Estate Timeshare Act (“RETA”).  Further, those same alleged oral misrepresentations are expressly contradicted by the contractual documents that Plaintiff/Respondents reviewed, acknowledged and agreed to be bound by.  There was no claim of fraud wholly extraneous to the contracts between the parties.  And there was no ambiguous term or provision in any of the contracts requiring extrinsic evidence for the purpose of interpretation and/or meaning as was the issue in the cases relied upon by the Trial Court at summary judgment and that Plaintiff/Respondents reinforced here.  Those cases are inapplicable.
[directive] Now codified as N.J.S.A. 2C:33- 11.1, the law provides an especially powerful tool for preventing illegal evictions during the current pandemic.  Broadly speaking, Section 33-11.1 criminalizes two types of conduct: illegal evictions, and refusals to allow illegally evicted residents to immediately reenter their homes.  But unlike many offenses, officers cannot charge a person with violating Section 33-11.1 unless that person has been previously warned by the officer or another public official about the illegality of their conduct.  This unusual provision requires officers to take additional measures before they can issue a complaint-summons to any individuals responsible for the illegal eviction.  Section 33.11-1 makes clear what types of illegal evictions trigger the statute: any occasion where a person either “takes possession” or “effectuates a forcible entry or detainer” of a residential property without obtaining the occupant’s consent or complying with lawful eviction procedures.  The statute further defines “forcible entry or detainer” as any means of compliance other than lawful eviction procedures, including the use of violence, the changing of utilities.1 locks, or the shutting off of Any person who engages in such conduct—after being warned of its illegality—can be charged with a disorderly persons offense.  Similarly, any person who refuses to “restore immediately” an occupant displaced in such a manner, after receiving a offense.2 warning, also may be charged with a disorderly persons  Section 33.11-1 also includes a recidivist provision, which upgrades the violation to a fourth-degree crime if the offender has been convicted of the same offense any time in the past five years.
[brief] The record in this case supports the unsurprising finding that transgender students do better in school when they can be themselves and do worse when they are misgendered or mistreated.  The 2019 National School Climate Survey, reflecting the experiences of LGBTQ students, reports that those in schools with higher numbers of supportive staff feel safer, miss fewer days of school, experience a greater sense of belonging, have more ambitious educational aspirations, and achieve higher grade point averages.  [...], Ph.D., et al., [...], The 2019 National School Climate Survey (2020), https://www.glsen.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/NSCS19-FullReport-032421-Web_0.pdf (Da111).
[brief] ” (Db21 (collecting cases).)  While some (non-New Jersey) courts have held as much, others have held the opposite.  In \textit{[...] v. [...]}, for instance, the District Court found it “appropriate to utilize its discretion to grant [...]’s request to order the [[...] (‘[...]’)] to turn over all non-privileged documents that mention ‘[...]’ or ‘[...]. ’”  [...], 2018 WL 6729794, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2018).  In particular, the court recognized that “the [...] has essentially made relevance determinations on [...]’s behalf, instead of treating as presumptively relevant all the search results found utilizing search terms to which [...] has no objection.”  \textit{Ibid}.  It held:
[brief] At the conclusion of the interview, the defendant was charged on Morris County Complaint-Warrant [...] for crimes arising out of [...] on August 6, 2021.  (Sa1-Sa2; Sa44).  On January 25, 2022, after an application was filed by the State, [...], P.J.S.C., entered an order consolidating Essex County Complaint-Warrant [...] with the Morris County case.  (Sa25- --- 3 *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  The State was also cross-designated as a Special Deputy Attorney General to handle the charges from both counties.  On June 8, 2022, a Morris County Grand Jury returned a seven (7) count Indictment, [...], charging the defendant with: one count of Second Degree Conspiracy to Commit Theft by Unlawful Taking, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2a(1) and 2C:20-3a; one count of Third Degree Theft by Unlawful Taking, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3a; one count of Fourth Degree Unlawful Taking of a Means of Conveyance, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-10d; one count of Third Degree Receiving Stolen Property, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7a; one count of Third Degree Conspiracy to Commit Burglary, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2a(1) and 2C:18-2a(1); one count of Third Degree Burglary, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2a(1); and one count of Third Degree Criminal Mischief, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3a(1).
[brief] Indeed, the motion court, in granting the defense’s motion for a Wade/Henderson hearing, found prima facie evidence of suggestiveness.  (Da  Most significantly, [...] initially said the shooter had “wavy” hair -- and she specifically said the hair was not dreadlocks -- and she identified the man in the video with dreadlocks only after what the court found were “leading” and “suggestive” tactics by the detectives.  (Da 176-78)  For example, the detectives tried to “undermin[e]” [...]’s initial account that the shooter’s hair was “wavy”; and at the precise moment that they asked for her identification, they repeated her initial description back to her -- except for her description that the hair was “wavy. ”  (Da 177-78)  In addition, [...] admitted that her vision was “blurry” that night because she had been drinking and smoking when, from across the street, she saw the perpetrator for at most fourteen seconds in the dead of night at 2:12 a.m.; she did not see “his face”; she was not asked to make an identification until three days after the shooting; the identification procedure was similar to a show-up with only one suspect shown in the videos; and it was not blind but conducted by the investigating detectives.  (Da 138-66, 171)
[brief] H.C. Equities, LP v. Cnty. of Union, 247 N.J. 366, 388 (2021) (series-of-steps requirement not met when plaintiff “made no effort to file tort claims notices with the public entities as N.J.S.A. 59:8-7 requires”); Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Associates, 178 N.J. 144, 152–53 (2003) (requirement not met when plaintiff failed to take any steps to forward Affidavit of Merit to opposing counsel within statutory time frame.)  C)  The Third Element: A General Compliance With The Purpose Of The Discovery Rules
[brief] Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128 (App. Div. 2021)  Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F. 3d 666, 669 (3d Cir 2010)  (per curiam)  Loigman v. Township Committee of Middletown, 297 N.J. Super 287 (App. Div. 1997)  Manalapan Realty v. Township Committee, 140 N.J. 366 (1995)  Matlack v. Burlington Cty. Freeholder Bd., 191 N.J. Super. 254 (Law Div 1983), aff’d 194 N.J. Super. 359 (App Div. 1984)  MEPT Journal Square Urban Renewal, LLC v. The City of Jersey City, 455 N.J. Super. 608 (App. Div. 2018) cert. denied 263 N.J. 356 (2019)  Midland Funding LLC v. Albern, 433 N.J. Super. 494 (App Div. 2013)  Millenium Towers v. Municipal Council, 343 N.J. Super. 367 (Law Div. 2001)  National Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Middlesex Cty. Imp. Auth, 291 N.J. Super. 283, 289 (App. Div.) cert. granted, 146 N.J. 565 (1996)  Olivieri v. Y.M.F. Carpet, Inc., 186 N.J. 511 (2006)  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928)  Paxton v. Misuik, 54 N.J. Super. 15 (App. Div. 1959)  Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 218 N.J. 202 (2014)  Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics, 116 N.J. 739 (1989)  Quick Chek Food Stores v. Springfield Tp., 83 N. J. 438 (1980)  Ragusa v. Lau, 119 N.J. 276 (1990)  State v. Roper, 362 N.J. Super. 248 (App. Div. 2003)  Town of Phillipsburg v. Block, 380 N.J. Super. 159 (App. Div. 2005)  Triffin v. Automatic Data Process, Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 292 (App. Div. 2010)  Triffin v. Johnston, 359 N.J. Super. 543 (App. Div. 2003)  United Hearts, LLC v. Zahabian, 407 N.J. Super. 379 (App. Div. 2009)  Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011)  Ward v. Keenan, 3 N.J. 298 (1949)  Winberry Realty v. Rutherford, 247 N.J. 165 (2021)
[brief] NJFCA actions instituted by private relators are filed and maintained under seal until the AG either intervenes to prosecute the action or declines to intervene, in which case the private relator conducts the *qui tam* action on its own.  N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-5(c), (g).  After Relator filed this action under seal in 2015 and amended its complaint twice, the AG declined to intervene on July 17, 2019.  Ja2085–87 (7/17/19 Notice of Election to Decline Intervention).  The trial court then lifted the seal, see 2T at 3:21–24, which allowed Relator to prosecute the action on its own in the name of the State, see N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-5(c), (g)(2).
[brief] That public policy required that the workers’ compensation insurer in [...] to provide coverage for the claim of the minor worker because a ruling that there was no coverage would have frustrated the compensation system codified by the Act and left the injured minor’s claim uncompensated.  The purpose of the compulsory insurance provisions of the Act is to guarantee the promise of the Act that every injured worker will have a remedy for work-related injuries and illnesses.  *[...]*, 172 N.J. Super. at 19-20.  The compulsory insurance provisions of the Act do not guarantee that every possible claim an injured worker might assert will be insured.
[brief] ”  *Hernandez*, 170 N.J. at 127.  This is not the same low threshold as probable cause.  It seems incredible that the trial court could be instilled with a firm conviction regarding the truth of uncorroborated allegations made by an individual with a clear motivation to fabricate, particularly when the State made absolutely no effort to determine the veracity of these allegations before bringing them before the court.  [...] presented an unbelievable story that was not corroborated by any other facts or circumstances in this matter, yet the trial court determined that it constituted clear and convincing evidence of witness tampering because it remained substantially similar to her previous statement, which she admittedly reviewed prior to testifying.  The trial court ignored all of the glaring issues in Diana’s statement and her clear motivation to fabricate to determine that these were issues for cross- examination.  This was not appropriate and resulted in substantial prejudice to the Defense at trial.
[brief] In dispensing with Appellants’ arguments as to due process, the motion judge erroneously concludes that no assertion around the [...] deferring to the [...] appears on the record.  This is simply not accurate.  The motion judge also asserts that Appellants provide no factual basis or made no legal arguments supporting concerns of important and novel constitutional questions.  This too is inaccurate.  Based on the assertions of Counsel to the [...] on the record while the [...] is in session, the [...] defers the decision around impacts to historic districts to the [...].  He goes on to state that [...] is an autonomous municipal entity, Appellants’ recourse in challenge any of its decision is to file a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs.  Counsel made this assertion notwithstanding that decisions of the Landmark Commission are published and are not made during public meetings.  In [...], those who pay millions of dollars, as did the Appellants, to purchase homes in a historic district, have absolutely no ability to challenge, participate, or take legal action around a municipal decision to allow the construction of a three story 50 ultra-modern building across the street from their home.  This construct raises important and novel constitutional questions that should be addressed by the Superior Court.
[brief] N.J.R.E. 403 provides as follows:  Except as otherwise provided by these rules or other law, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of: (a) Undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury; or (b) Undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.  Testimony already in evidence is considered to be cumulative under the Rule.  See Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480, 495, 734 A.2d 1147 (1999).  The burden lies with the party seeking exclusion of the evidence to show that the probative value is substantially outweighed by one or more of the factors listed in Rule 403.  McLean v. Liberty Health System, 430 N.J. Super. 156 (App. Div. Here, Plaintiff herself and Plaintiff’s witness, [...], testified regarding the condition of the floor being wet.  Plaintiff now argues that Castello should have been permitted to state that, after Plaintiff’s incident, Defendant mopped and placed a hazard sign in the area.  To admit this evidence would have been highly improper as it is both evidence of a subsequent remedial measure (See N.J.R.E. 407, supra), and would confuse the jury as to the issue at bar under N.J.R.E. 403.  Moreover, that the floor was wet, was never at issue in the case.  The only issue was whether Defendant was on notice of the wet conditions and whether it was if one could even slip and fall as alleged by Plaintiff if the floor was wet.  Castello’s testimony only shows that subsequent remedial measures took place.  Even if, arguendo, the evidence of [...]’s conduct was relevant to some fact in issue other than negligence, the evidence would still have been excluded under N.J.R.E. 403 as the probative value would have been substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect to Defendant.  For these reasons, the Trial Court properly excluded the testimony regarding the subsequent remedial measures.
[brief] The statutory frame work provides that it is left to the Court to admeasure the compensatory damages — a blend of "reasonable investigation expenses, costs of suit and attorneys' fees," N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a) — and then determine whether "the defendant has engaged in a pattern of violating this act," for purposes of imposing treble damages.  N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(b).
[brief] However, under the challenged statutory scheme, the exclusive right to nominate is effectively the right to control the Council by a private interest group.  The qualifying sportsman on the Council are highly likely to be members of the [...] and support the mission of that organization.  The fact that theoretically the [...] could nominate “sportsmen” who are not members of one of its clubs under N.J. S.A. 13:1B-24, does not mean that it was proper for the trial court to construe the statute on the basis of that remote possibility.  A statute should not be construed in a manner that leads to an absurd result.  State v. Provenzano, 34 N.J. 318, 322 (1961).  Courts will look to extrinsic aids if a literal reading of a statute will lead to absurd results, State v. Harper, 229 N.J. 228, 237-38 (2017); Burnett v. County of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 425 (2009).  Instead of reading the statute in isolation, the trial court should have considered it in the context of “other constituent parts so that a sensible meaning may be given to the whole statutory scheme. ”  Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558, 572 (2012).  In the very next section of the overall legislative scheme, the Legislature facilitated the interests of sportsmen’s clubs throughout the State in becoming members of the [...] “[i]n order to permit the broadest possible representation of sportsmen to membership in the council.  . . ”.  N.J.S.A. 13:1B-25.  It is absurd to assume that a sportsman nominated by the amalgamated sportsmen’s club would not be a member of one of such clubs.  While the Governor appoints each member of the Council with the advice and consent of the Senate, he has no discretion to appoint anyone who is not a sportsman nominated by the [...].  Similarly, while the Governor can remove a member of the Council for cause, the replacement nevertheless is required to be a sportsman nominated by the [...].  Consequently, the Legislature abdicated its regulatory authority to a quasi-legislative body controlled by a private organization with pro hunting and trapping mission in violation of Articles III and IV of the New Jersey Constitution and the private non-delegation doctrine.
[brief] An agency’s factual determinations are presumptively correct; on review of the facts, a court will not substitute its own judgment where the agency’s findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence.  Rooth v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 472 N.J. Super. 357, 365 (App. Div. 2022).  Additionally, this court gives “substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing,” Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007).  “Such deference has been specifically extended to state agencies that administer pension statutes,” because “a state agency brings experience and specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating a legislative enactment within its field of expertise. ”  Piatt v. Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting In re Election Law Enforcement Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010)).  Indeed, “if the language is plain and its meaning clear, the inquiry ends there . . .”
[brief] This feeling of abandonment “pushed him over the edge” and he made stupid choice in a moment of sheer terror, helplessness and hopelessness – caused intentionally or extremely recklessly by the police.  At 1T-46-8-12, there are extreme procedural errors in [...]’s case but he is suing for the substantive right of equal protection.  He was denied equal protection when a state actor destroyed his application, the judge “bounced” his motion, and the assignment judge ignored his legitimate motion for disqualification of Vicinage I while the prosecutor was denying the equal protection of being eligible for PTI.
[brief] \textsuperscript{49}  See Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 536 U.S. 129, 142-43, 122 S. Ct. 1993, 2002, 153 L. Ed. 2d 132, 146 (2002).  \textsuperscript{50}  City of Newark v. Department of Health of State of N. J., 109 N.J. Super. 166 (App. Div. 1970).  \textsuperscript{51}  See Salomon v. Eli Lily and Co., 98 N.J. 58 (1984).  \textsuperscript{52}  Murphy v. Implicito, 392 N.J. Super. 245, 265 (App. Div. 2007); See also Mango v. Pierce-Coombs, 370 N.J. Super.
[brief] It based this conclusion on three additional solid reasons set forth in its FAD:  (1)  “The Board found that, because [...] made no mention of the alleged typographical errors in his expert report, his response to leading questions by [Petitioner’s] counsel does not support the conclusion that he is more credible than [...]” (Pa112); (2) “The Board found that the description in testimony of the 2000 incident…is substantially different than the incident described as occurring in 2009” and “does not find it credible that the difference between these two incidents can be reconciled as a ‘typo’” (Pa113); and (3) “The Board believed it is also feasible…that there is no workers’ compensation or other employer report because it is possible he injured himself outside of work. ” (Pa113).  With regard to its third reason, the Board stated, “this theory is at least as plausible as an orthopedic surgeon making a typographical error in the same report and describing the same incident with discernable differences in detail. ”  (Pa 113).  Here, the Board’s findings and conclusions, including its rejection of the ALJ’s findings, are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record, are stated clearly in its FAD and must be affirmed.
[brief] Indeed, it cannot because the ancient writ of quo warranto does not have the same economic aims which would render its application to unpaid volunteers illogical.  See Burnson v. Evans, 137 N.J.L. 511, 514 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (“The object of prosecuting an information in the nature of a quo warranto is to have the possessor of the office adjudged guilty of usurpation and ousted. ”); see also State by Info. of Hancock ex rel. Banks v. Elwell, 163 A.2d 342, 344 (Me. 1960) (discussing the history of quo warranto).  The Court’s holding in Kratovil is specific to the NJFA and should not be extended to the ancient writ of quo warranto, the purpose of which is to protect the public interest and ensure that an office or franchise is filled in accordance with the law, which here imposes residency requirements for certain members of the BOG and Board of Trustees.3