ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE THEIR CONVERSION CLAIMS.  (24T47:18-50:9)  Conversion is a common law tort that, as our Supreme Court observed, “is long in the tooth.  It is related to the common law action of trover, which entitles one to seek damages for the value of property that is not returned or surrendered to the proper owner. ”  Meisels v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 240 N.J. 286, 303 (2020).  Historically, it was a streamlined vehicle for the return of property to its rightful owner, not a means of obtaining property based upon a legal claim that one is entitled to the property.  As a result, proof of the plaintiff’s right to the return of the property is paramount.  Although the tort is not traditionally applied to money, when it is, it is “essential that the money have belonged to the injured party and that it be identifiable” “as a specific fund set aside for the owner. ”  Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 409 N.J. Super. 444, 455-56 (App. Div. 2009).  A.  Plaintiffs’ opposition fails to cure the deficiency in their proofs and the trial court’s findings to show that the converted funds “belonged” to them.  To prove the tort of conversion, plaintiffs had to show that the defendants converted an identifiable and specific fund set aside for a plaintiff.  They based their conversion counts upon the claim that corporate funds were wrongfully diverted.  If such improper diversion were proven, however, the remedy would be to return those funds to the company.  In their motion for summary judgment dismissing the conversion counts, defendants made this point:  [N]either the Plaintiffs nor their expert [...] has established that any particular defendant wrongfully converted an identifiable sum of money that directly belonged to Plaintiffs.  . . .  Simply summarizing and critiquing intercompany transfers of funds between commonly controlled and owned entities does not establish the requisite elements to support a claim for conversion.  *Pursuant to R:2:6-1(a)(2), Point IV of defendants’ motion for summary judgment is included in the defendant’ reply appendix to rebut plaintiffs’ assertion that defendants waived the argument that plaintiffs were required to make a pre-suit demand.  Dra6-10.  On appeal, plaintiffs fail to meet this deficiency in both their proofs and the trial court’s findings.  Instead, they counter with the conclusory statement that they “presented sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that the defendants exercised unauthorized control and ownership over identifiable funds that rightfully belonged to [...] and [...]
[directive] [Revised August 2, 2022]  ROR  All defendants released on and any pretrial monitoring level (PML) will receive automated court date reminders and ongoing criminal history checks.  Other monitoring services will be provided as shown in Table 1 below.  Table  Pretrial Monitoring Level  Contacts and Conditions Monitoring  1.  Conditions to Face Face  Pretrial Monitoring Level Phone Contact Monitoring Contact per PML 1  None  1 month Yes PML2 per per 1 month 1 month Yes PML3 every every week week other other 1  1  Yes + every week other 1  Yes every EM/HD week other 3  1 PML 4  Making Pretrial Release Recommendation
[brief] ”  An arbitrator exceeds his or her authority by ignoring “the clear and unambiguous language of the agreement. ”  City Ass’n of Supervisors and Admin’rs, 311 N.J. Super. at 312.  See also Commc’ns Workers of Am., Local 1087 v. Monmouth Cty. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 96 N.J. 442, 452-53 (1984) (holding that an arbitrator may not exceed the power authorized under the parties’ collectively negotiated agreement).  Indeed, it is a fundamental labor law principle that “an arbitrator may not disregard the terms of the parties’ agreement, nor may he [or she] rewrite the contract for the parties.
[brief] Maiorino v. Schering-Plough Corp., 300 N.J. Super. 323, certif. denied, 150 N.J. 189 (1997).......................45  Marzano v. Computer Science Corp., 91 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 1996)............................................................17  Massarsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111 (3d Cir.1983)............................................................29  Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 153 N.J. 163 (1998)......................................................................18,23-26
[brief] Transportation.  Finally, the Comprehensive Report reviewed [...]’s transportation practices, finding several areas of concern which “may have an impact on [the] provision of” T&E.  (Ra143; Ra315).  The District is responsible for providing transportation to all eligible public school students, as well as many of the non-public students residing in the District.  N.J.S.A. 18A:39-1; N.J.A.C. 6A:27-1.3, -2.2; (Ra304).  As of October 2023, “the district financially supported transportation for 4,727 public school students . . . and over 36,231 nonpublic school students. ” (Ra304).  Because of the sheer number of non-public students in the District, [...]’s transportation obligations “dwarf[]” that of comparable districts.  (Ra305).  [...] does not operate its own bus yard; instead, it uses the public bidding process to procure contracts for all bus routes.  Ibid.
[brief] The court stated:  To this Court, the board of governors is a working board with meaningful responsibilities.  It is beyond dispute that the board has a fiduciary obligation to the students of Rutgers, as well as to the employees of Rutgers, but also overall to the State of New Jersey.  Furthermore, in this Court’s opinion, the legislature in enacting 18A:65-25 delegated authority and – specific authority and responsibility to the board of governors, which includes, amongst others, determining the policies for the organization, the development of the university, study, educational and financial needs of the university, disburse all monies appropriated to the university by the legislature, monies received from tuition and other sources.  It goes on to say, purchase all lands, buildings, equipment.  It’s responsible for employing architects to plan building[s], secure bids for the construction of [building], manage and maintain and provide for payment of all charges.  And it goes on to say, [authorize] any new educational department or school consistent with the institution’s programmatic [mission or] . . . approved by the [C]ommission [on Higher Education].  So with these responsibilities in mind and with the fiduciar[y] responsibilities a board member has, this Court finds that each board member does hold an office, as contemplated by N.J.S.A. 2A:66-6.
[brief] See Tucci v. Tropicana Casino and Resort, Inc., 364 N.J. Super. 48, 53, 834 A.2d 448 (App. Div. 2003).  The “Best Practices” rules were not designed to do away with substantial justice on the merits or to preclude rule relaxation when necessary to “secure a just determination”.  Id., citing R. 1:1-2.  The "good cause" standard applies to motions to extend discovery unless an arbitration or trial date is fixed.  Leitner v. Toms River Regional Schools, 392 N.J. Super. 80, 90-91, 919 A.2d 899 (App. Div. 2007); Ponden v. Ponden, 374 N.J. Super. 1, 8-10, 863 A.2d 366 (App. Div. 2004).  Therefore, the rule does not permit a trial court to require a party to establish "exceptional or heretofore unforeseen circumstances" for a discovery extension unless the court has previously fixed an arbitration or trial date.
[brief] After executing the PSA, Plaintiff hired a team of professionals who secured a redevelopment designation and plan for the redevelopment of the Property.  Defendants, meanwhile, utterly failed to fulfill the Seller’s Environmental Obligations under the PSA.  Defendants and their professionals did virtually nothing to complete the remedial investigation and work toward securing the RAO, while repeatedly providing Plaintiff with lies and excuses as to their ongoing delays and actions.  As such, Plaintiff was unable to close on the Property, and in April 2022, initiated this lawsuit primarily seeking specific performance of Seller’s Environmental Obligations under the PSA.
[brief] 41  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Funes ex rel. Estate of Martinez v. Norfolk S. Corp., No. A-5348-10T1, 2012 WL 4069543, at *3 (App. Div. 2012)…… 24, 26, 28 Potter v. Charles V. Finch & Sons, 76 N.J. 499, 502 (1978)………  29-31  Tewksbury Twp. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 159 N.J. Super. 44, 47 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Twp. of Tewksbury v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 79 N.J. 398, 400 A.2d 60 (1979)……………………………………… 33-35 Statutes N.J.S.A. 1:1-2…………………………………………………………….. 32-34 N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 (current)……………………………………….. .passim N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 (version prior to 1998)………………………….. 29-30 N.J.S.A. 48:13-17.2………………………………………………….. 32 Legislative History June 3, 1996, Assembly Committee Statement…………………….. 30 December 1, 1997, Senate Transportation Committee Statement… 30-31 APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS (VOLUME I OF I Da1-Da-51) April 20, 2021, Stipulation of Dismissal as to Defendant [...] .......................................................... Da1 Defendant [...]’s Answer to Complaint dated May 11, 2021 ......................................................... Da3 July 23, 2021, Order Dismissing [...]
[brief] It provides as follows:  In any private action arising under this [chapter], all discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss, unless the court finds upon the motion of any party that particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to that party.  15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(3)(B).  “The legislative history of the PSLRA indicates that Congress enacted the discovery stay to prevent plaintiffs from filing securities class actions with the intent of using the discovery process to force a coercive settlement. ”  In re LaBranche Sec. Litig., 333 F. Supp. 2d 178, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  See also In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 234 F. Supp. 2d 301, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting the purpose of the PSLRA discovery stay is to prevent plaintiffs from filing a complaint to initiate a “fishing expedition” in search of sustainable claims).  Only when “particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice” may discovery proceed before a decision is issued on a motion to dismiss.  15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(3)(B).  “The party seeking expedited discovery bears the burden of demonstrating that the PSLRA’s mandatory stay should be lifted. ”  Davis v. Duncan Energy Partners L.P., 801 F. Supp. 2d 589, 592 (S.D. Tex. 2011).  In accordance with the terms of the PSLRA’s discovery stay, no discovery took place while this Court considered Defendants’ motions to dismiss the claims brought under §§ 10(b) and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
[brief] Specifically, the Trial Court ignored established New Jersey law by re-writing the Consent Order, in two key respects.  First, the Trial Court improperly supplemented the Consent Order, so as to provide that the failure to file claims within the "sixty-day deadline" resulted in a dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims \textit{with prejudice}.  The Trial Court committed a clear error because the phrase "with prejudice," is wholly absent from the Consent Order.  (Pa150 - Pa152).  As such, it was improper under the Rules of Court to find that the Consent Order resulted in a dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims \textit{with} prejudice.  \textit{See R. 4:37-1 ("Unless otherwise specified in the order, the dismissal is without prejudice.") (emphasis added).  Importantly, Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief addressed this critical error.  (See e.g. Pb18).  [...], however, ignored this issue and offered no argument to the contrary, so as to avoid highlighting the prevailing Rule of Court and accompanying judicial policy.  [...]'s choice to ignore that unassailable fact, however, does not make it go away.  New Jersey law is clear: where the phrase "with prejudice" is absent, a court cannot find that the consent order resulted in a dismissal with prejudice.  Accordingly, the Trial Court erred by finding that the parties agreed to dismiss any successive claims – whether filed before or after the sixty-day deadline - with prejudice.
[brief] **B.  New Jersey’s Common Law Does Not Require Formal Notice to [...] That It Was Unenrolled From The CCIP**  [...]’ contention that New Jersey common law mandates compulsory coverage for [...] under the CCIP, despite [...] not paying premium towards it, is similarly unpersuasive.  Notably, this argument was not raised in [...]’ original brief in support of summary judgment filed before the trial court.  Rather, [...]’ common law argument was first raised in [...]’ reply brief and goes beyond the issues raised in its summary judgment motion: that [...]’s unenrollment from the CCIP was ineffective based solely on N.J.A.C. § 11:1-20.
[brief] The Resolution, but none of the transcripts, make clear that many of the exhibits that Appellants “marked for identification” were rejected.  Nowhere in the available transcripts, including those of the purported “redo” meetings, is there any instance of Counsel for Appellants identifying any exhibits or moving exhibits into evidence.  Most troubling is that the [...] abdicated its authority and responsibility of protecting the aesthetics of a designated historic district.  Counsel for the [...] states within the available verbatim record that the [...] (the “[...]”) has exclusive authority to approve a proposed structure within a historic district.
[brief] Hobart Bros. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., ..................................26  354 N.J. Super. 229 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 175 N.J. 170 (2002)  Hurwitz v. AHS Hosp. Corp., ......................................................... 14, 33 438 N.J. Super. 269 (App. Div. 2014)  Isko v. Planning Bd. of Livingston Twp., .............................................27  51 N.J. 162 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, 183 N.J. 508 (2005)  K-Land v Landis Sewerage, ..............................................................24  173 N.J. 59 (2002)  Kaselaan & D’Angelo Assocs., Inc. v. Soffian, .......................................25  290 N.J. Super. 293 (App. Div. 1996)  Kimball Intern., Inc. v. Northfield Metal Prods., .................................33  334 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 2000), certif. denied, 167 N.J. 88 (2001)  Kress v. La Villa, ..............................................................................34  335 N.J. Super. 400 (App. Div. 2000), certif. denied, 168 N.J. 289 (2001).  Mancini v. EDS, ...............................................................................37  132 N.J. 330 (1993)  Midland Funding, LLC v. Giambanco, ..................................................36  422 N.J. Super. 301 (App. Div. 2011)  Pascarella v. Bruck, ...........................................................................14  190 N.J. Super. 118 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 94 N.J. 600 (1983)  Petrillo v. Bachenberg, .......................................................................23  263 N.J. Super. 472 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 139 N.J. 472 (1995)  CASES (cont.)
[brief] . . .  All this leads to a single conclusion: plaintiffs’ claims are without basis in law and were properly dismissed. ”) (Da43); Exclusive Detailing v. Prestige Auto Group, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3135, at *14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. December 21, 2021) (“Even if plaintiff could prove that there was a contract from 2011 to 2016, plaintiff could not prove a breach of contract without proof of damages that were related to the breach. ”) (Da39); Ten W. Apparel v. Mueser Rutledge Consulting Eng’rs, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 418, at *17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. February 28, 2020) (“Ten West’s proofs do not demonstrate what, exactly, [...] and [...] were responsible for.  Not only did Ten west fail to provide a reasonable estimate of damages, but it did not prove that [...] and [...]’s negligence caused actual damages. ”)  (Da58); Emerald Bay Developers, LLC v. Lenyk Auto, Inc., 2018 N.J. Unpub. LEXIS 2125, at *15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. September 25, 2018) (“Damages must be proven with reasonable certain proof, which was lacking here.
[directive] FROM: [...], Administrative DirectJJ!~-1  A. of Criminal Justice Reform  Promulgation  Revised Protocol for - RE: Responding to Emergent Pretrial Release  Electronic Monitoring Alerts  DATE: October 10, 2023  This Directive supersedes Directive # 15-19 and promulgates a revised protocol for the expedited process Judiciary staff must follow when an emergent electronic monitoring (EM) alert received.
[brief] Your assumption regarding the acceptable maximum lifetime loss ratio of 64.3% represents an aggressive loss ratio target.  [...]’s positions to both bring the lifetime loss ratio closer to the original pricing target and to use profits from this block to pay claims for other [...] business do not represent an intent for [...] to share the burden of the unfavorable performance for these policies with the policyholder (your response to our Objection 47).  The Department expects carriers to share materially in the unfavorable performance.  [Aa121]  The Department’s chief actuary, [...] (“[...]”), explained the Department’s position.  During the rate filing review phase, [...] offered a 20% rate increase on the pre-rate stability filing on a phone call with [...].  (T3 623:4-14).  The Department’s offer to approve a lower rate increase was consistent with historical approvals, whereas approval of the requested rate (which is multiples higher than any prior approval by the Department) would be unprecedented.  Further, the FBO form was submitted with the rate stability filing, though it would have applied to both the rate stability policies and the pre-rate stability policies.  (T1 222:11-223:11; T3 589:10-24).  That type of submission was improper under the rules.  The Department requested that [...] modify the form request to a 0% premium rate increase for the rate stability policies, so it could approve the form, but [...] declined the Department’s offer.  (T3 589:16 to 590:19).  The Department needed to approve the forms before it could address the increase for the pre-rate stability policies.  H.  The ALJ’s Decision
[brief] 50.  Court doubles down on illegitimate rulings by raising a red herring, bogus argument (p. 15-16) (32a-33a), "[...], a contingent remainder beneficiary of the [...], has no current entitlement to the [...] income.  As such, it cannot be said with certainty that [...] would be adversely affected by the payments of the income or corpus commissions outlined in the Intermediate Account."  Court was in denial that my Accounting Exceptions were **NOT** focused on Commissions nor Income, but on Trust Corpus, and Trust paid expenses deducted against Corpus, all of which affected me as a beneficiary (see also par. 49 above, last sentence, for what my Exceptions focused on).  51.  Court then compounds the error of its ways and ruling by focusing (p. 16) (33a) on the completely wrong substance of the Will in regards to "provid[ing] the "respective child Co-Trustee [Leslie]] with the explicit authority to approve the accounting prior to payment by the [...]".  It is a flawed argument since [...]'s Trust Accounting was NOT filed PRIOR to payments by the [...] for her approval, but was filed AFTER payments were made by the [...].  Court then has the audacity to cite (p. 16) the Will, par. 10.6, in support of its invalid argument based on its misstatement of circumstances that would be detrimental to me.
[brief] Plaintiff testified: “What does the paint have to do with the ice? What does the paint have to do with the ice?  I don’t know. ” (Pa339, 57:8-12).  Plaintiff cannot render a lay opinion on a subject that falls outside the scope of his personal knowledge.  Plaintiff attempts to couch the purported lay opinion as a mere observation of the stairs after they were painted.  The question that the jury would be asked to answer is far more nuanced and complicated.  It involves an analysis of whether [...]’s paint job contributed to a fall on ice over 30 days later.
[brief] Model jury instructions are often helpful to trial judges in performing the important function of instructing a jury.  *State v. Cotto*, 471 N.J. Super. 489, 650 (App. Div. 2022) (citing *State v. Concepcion*, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988).  A jury instruction is presumed to be proper when it tracks the model jury instructions because the process to adopt model jury instructions is “comprehensive and thorough.
[directive] - - 07  2 of State New Jerrey Forfeiture Program Administration Standard Operating Procedure Page:  5.  Certification fonn sign  Upon completion of this form, the requester shall the including their title as well as typing or printing their nameltitle and on form including the current date.  (Item #16)  A signature this certifies that the request complies with all applicable provisions of law, administrative code and Forfeiture Program Administration the Standard Operating Procedures and that information contained is true and correct.  A Form Maintenance of 6.  all or The county prosecutor's office the Division shall maintain or a completed Form A's, which it receives, whether not distribution forms has been approved.
[brief] The gravamen of this appeal filed by the Appellant, [...] (“Appellant”), is whether the Trial Court abused its discretion by not admitting a not-to-scale sketch (“Sketch”) and Home Depot advertisement that contained measurements of a generic cinder block (“Home Depot Ad”) into evidence on the grounds they each lacked relevancy to the merits of Appellant’s claims.  The not-to-scale Sketch had not been relied upon by the Defendant, [...] (“Board”) when considering and approving Respondent’s/Defendant’s [...]’s (“[...]”) site plan application to construct a five story, mixed use building (the “Approved Building”).  The Sketch is merely a not-to-scale drawing that was to depict the approximate dimensions of the Approved Building.  Based on the Board’s resolution and findings, the Trial Court found the Sketch to be wholly irrelevant to the issue at the center of the Appellant’s claim as to whether the building constructed by [...] exceeded the height approved by the Board.  The Sketch was merely a schematic drawing that contained reference to the approximate rooftop height proposed for the Approved Building as compared to the approximate rooftop heights of adjacent buildings in the block.  The Court found that the Home Depot Ad also did not provide any relevant evidence to prove that the building constructed by [...] exceeded the height approved by the Board.  The Appellant repeatedly sought to introduce the Sketch and Home Depot Ad into evidence despite the Trial Court’s finding that they lacked any evidentiary value in regard to Appellant’s claims.  The Trial Court held firm in its findings and conclusions.  The Appellant’s refusal to accept those findings and conclusions is now the basis of this appeal.  The actual approved height of the Approved Building was 43 feet 6 inches above the Design Flood Elevation (“DFE”) as specified in the Board’s Resolution (the “Resolution”) memorializing its approval.  The Appellant did not proffer any competent or otherwise relevant evidence to support his claim that the constructed height of the Approved Building exceeded the height approved by the Board.  The Appellant now asks this Court to reverse the Trial Court’s sound findings of fact and conclusions of law and force [...] to reconstruct portions of its five (5) story building in a manner that complies with the not-to-scale Sketch as opposed to the dimensions expressly stated in the Resolution.  As found by the Trial Court below, the Appellant’s claims lack all merit in fact and in law.  Accordingly, Trial Court’s rulings and decision should be upheld by this Court and this appeal dismissed.