ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The parties met and conferred without success.  Defendants filed a motion for a protective order.  In opposition, inter alia, Plaintiff’s counsel produced an Order in an unrelated case as evidence that another trial court judge ordered that a neuropsychologic examination be performed with a recording device.  However, as [...] certified:  1.  As I explained in previous certifications submitted to this Court, as Board-Certified Neuropsychologist, I firmly believe that the administration of neuropsychologic testing must be done in strict compliance with the conditions under which said testing was calibrated.  2.  This includes the absence of third-party observers and/or recording devices.  3.  In the Costlow v. Oppenheimer case, I was forced to bow out of the litigation after the Court ordered that any neuropsychologic testing would be recorded.  4.  For the same reasons, if this Court were to deny Defendants’ motion for a protective order barring recording devices, I will have no choice but to bow out of these proceedings as well.  5.  I am unwilling to compromise my professional standards in such a manner.  Da39.
[brief] Exhibit “B” – Motion for Fees, Lane v. Wozniak, 3 Brief(s) attached pursuant to R. 2:6-1(c)(2), as the issue of the Verdict amount and Offer of Judgment penalties has been brought into issue, although not raised below, by the instant appeal.  4 Brief(s) attached pursuant to R. 2:6-1(c)(2), as the issue of the Verdict amount and Offer of Judgment penalties has been brought into issue, although not raised below, by the instant appeal.  5  Brief(s) attached pursuant to R. 2:6-1(c)(2), as the issue of the Verdict amount and Offer of Judgment penalties has been brought into issue, although not raised below, by the instant appeal.  [...]…………………………………………………Pa095 o Notice of Motion………………………………………..Pa095 o Brief…………………………………………………..Pa097
[directive] I further agree releases will Program aims which sign to to and allow Court review diagnostic treatment information.  the Drug team and to para vigile necesarios revelaci6n acuerdo todos informaci6n firmar permisos  Estoy la que se de de los con el en de fin mi Programa Tribunal y evaluar tratamiento progreso  Tambien Drogas de programa.  metas este para estoy de de en del las el de finnar autorizaciones para revelaci6n pennitinin Tribunal documentos acuerdo equipo que en del de que los el de la Tratamiento contra sobre diagn6stico y tratamiento.  informaci6n revise Drogas la el 08/24/2021, Revised 10981-Spanish CN I page of3 agostode Revisado 2021, 10981-Spanish de el 24 CN deJ I pt\gina
[brief] The concept of control of an attorney who is regulated by the Code of Professional Conduct is best set forth in ¶16 of the Plaintiff’s Certification where he indicates that, “On one occasion, board members objected to my representation of the developer of a multi-family complex in the Borough of Franklin.  Although I had represented developers of this project for decades, I was forced to withdraw. ”  Control is also indicated when the Plaintiff could not become involved in legal matters that conflicted with his work as county counsel.  That was control because of the position as county counsel prohibited him from any type of work that conflicted with the employer – the Freeholders/Commissioners.  At ¶ 17, the Plaintiff sets forth responsibilities that included administration.  Clearly, the Plaintiff qualified under CEPA, as did [...] as an “employee.
[brief] In the context of this case, the only way for the Trial Court to rule against [...] on the Public Trust Doctrine Issue was for the Trial Court to avoid and to not actually substantively address the issue on its merits.  Permanently closing off long existing public access points, and abolishing 300 public parking spaces, to the beach and related recreation clearly constitutes a violation of the Common Law Public Trust Doctrine, the Statutory Public Trust Doctrine and the [...]’s Public Access Rule.  It is recognized that a Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the municipal body unless it is shown that the actions of the Municipality were arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious.
[brief] This is not a case where anyone would be made homeless.  Simply, one real estate investor has to lose – [...] or [...] – and one was at fault while the other wholly blameless.  Equity will impose a loss against the person whose conduct could first have avoided the loss, the party that should bear the loss is not only the one that could first have avoided it, but who actually caused it in the first place.  Post at 27.  [...] put the entire process into motion and should not have been allowed to impose a loss on [...].  The “prejudice to the other party,” here [...], was not given sufficient weight below.  **C.
[brief] (Pa6).  In that regard, the Board claimed that it considered the Alternative to Violence program that [...] completed, as well as the fact that he advanced in the program to “Lead Facilitator. ”  The Board also claimed that it “considered” the mitigation evidence concerning [...]’s: (1) participation in poetry classes, art therapy, and creative writing projects; (2) extensive one-on-one counseling with [...]; (3) thousands of hours of other relevant therapy and counseling throughout his incarceration; (4) critical role in spearheading the Special Needs Unit for inmates with psychological issues; and (5) authoring and publishing of several books to help at-risk youths.  (Pa3).  The Board provided no explanation as to how this evidence was considered or weighed in reaching its decision to deny parole.
[brief] A pre-existing common law requirement has been grafted onto that constitutional proscription: that, subject to limited exceptions, law enforcement must first knock and announce its purpose before it lawfully may enter a dwelling to execute a warrant.  *State v. Robinson*, 200 N.J. 1, 3-4, 2009.  “The knock-and-announce rule renders unlawful a forcible entry to arrest or search "where the officer failed first to state his authority and purpose for demanding admission."  *Miller v. United States*, 357 U.S. 301, 308 (1958).  Compliance with a knock-and-announce warrant requirement is a critical predicate for a reasonable search under the New Jersey Constitution.  It is simply objectively unreasonable—without justification for police to ignore a knock-and-announce requirement contained in a warrant that they requested and obtained.  Ignoring the requirement contravenes the search and seizure rights of New Jersey residents.  *State v. Caronna*, 469 N.J. Super. 462, 471 (App. Div. 2021).  As mentioned above the Search Warrant entered in this case allowed Law Enforcement officers to enter the premises only after knocking and announcing their presence.
[brief] The arbitrator initially only noticed that the [...]’s revised final offer “does not include the verbatim contract language relevant to each proposal as I requested” and on October 30 he requested that the [...] submit the proposed contract language.  However, following the [...]’s November 2 submission of a second revised final offer, counsel for the [...] informed the arbitrator of “numerous changes proposed that were not part of the Union’s final offer” and objected to the [...]’s submission because “the revised offer was only to include specific language proposals as well as rational[e] for the changes proposed in the final offer. ”  On November 2, the arbitrator acknowledged that he had not had time to review the substance of the [...]’s revised final offer, but reiterated that “the substance of both parties[’] final offers should not have changed since the original submissions.
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2020 Core Principle Six Duty to Render Medical Assistance.  After any use of force, and when the environment is safe, officers shall promptly render medical assistance to any injured person consistent with the officer’s training and shall promptly request emergency medical assistance for that person, if needed or requested.  Officers also have a duty to monitor individuals for potential medical intervention after any officer uses force.  6.1  An officer’s duty to render medical assistance and monitor for potential medical intervention is particularly important following any use of force.  When the force involves the use of OC spray, officers shall take immediate action to address the effects of the OC spray, consistent with training.  6.2  The duty to render medical assistance and monitor applies to all officers on scene and continues throughout any transportation and custody of the individual.  6.3  Officers shall pay particular attention to persons reasonably believed to be pregnant, children, the elderly, physically frail individuals, and those experiencing a mental health or substance use crisis.  18  USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2020
[directive] Supplemental Plea Form for (NERA) Cases (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2) (Spanish)  Es necesario contestar las siguientes preguntas solamente si usted se está declarando culpable de un delito entre el 9 de junio de 1997 y el 29 de junio de 2001.  violento de primer o segundo grado ocurrido  The following questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty to a first or second degree violent crime that occurred between June 9, 1997 and June 29, 2001.
[brief] Respondent cites to *Robey v. SPARC Grp. LLC*, 256 N.J. 541 (2024), suggesting incorrectly, that it set forth a new rule applicable to all CFA claims under N.J.S.A. 56:8-19., requiring that ascertainable loss be established in the form of either “out of pocket damages” or “benefit of the bargain damages. ”  Def. Brief, at 10 – 11.  However, the Court in *Robey* specified that the “out of pocket and “benefit of the bargain” framework was specifically applicable to “CFA cases alleging fraud, misrepresentation, or deception in selling or advertising,” such as the claims alleging misrepresentation of former price in the sale of clothing raised by the plaintiff in *Robey*.
[directive] 3.  Standard and Approval Procedures for Appealing a Discretionary Sentence  When the court exercises its discretion to waive or reduce the three-year mandatory minimum term of parole ineligibility, or to impose a noneustodial or probationary sentence, the prosecutor shall not appeal the sentence unless the County Prosecutor or First Assistant Prosecutor, or Director or Deputy Director of the Division of Criminal Justice in a case prosecuted by the Division, personally determines that the sentence imposed constitutes an abuse of the court’s discretion the court failed to consider and make findings on all of the statutorily- (i.e., e.g., specified relevant circumstances, or otherwise was clearly mistaken in evaluating those or other relevant factors).
[brief] Illinois agents traveled overnight to the New Jersey State Police headquarters in Holmdel, New Jersey, with [...], [...], and the marijuana.  [...] and [...] drove [...]’s pick-up truck.  (8T199-1 to 3).  That next day, law enforcement put the marijuana back into [...]’s truck, placed a GPS tracking device into the truck and equipped [...] with a “KEL” recording device so that the police could hear any conversations [...] had with defendant.  (9T46-1 to 8; 9T47-21 to 48-2).  A GPS tracker was also placed with the marijuana to track [...]’s vehicle and the drugs from Holmdel Station to the meeting place.  (9T48-3 to 7).  At about 1:00 p.m., surveillance was set up at a CVS Pharmacy parking lot in Old Bridge, New Jersey.  (8T92-13 to 20; 9T46-13 to 47-4).  This parking lot was optimal because it was large enough for law enforcement to insert several unmarked cars therein and observe [...] meet with defendant.  (9T46-18 to 24).  This CVS was also close to the location defendant had given [...].  (9T47-2 to 4).  At approximately 2:05 p.m., officers observed a white BMW X5 with New York license plates enter the CVS parking lot and park near [...] and [...]’ truck.  (8T93-13 to 94-16; 9T49-2 to 3).  When the police ran the New York license plates for the BMW, it came back to defendant as the vehicle’s operator.  (9T53-14 to 17).  Defendant stepped out of the BMW and approached the truck.  (9T49-4 to 7).  After [...] exited his truck, he and defendant spoke briefly.  (8T94-17 to 22; 9T13 to 14).  [...] and defendant went back to their vehicles and drove off.  (9T49-13 to 18).  [...] followed defendant's BMW while law enforcement followed [...]’s truck.  (8T94-22 to 95-18; 9T49-13 to 50-9).  The vehicles traveled to the Glenwood Apartments and Country Club, an apartment building complex.  (8T93-13 to 20; 9T50-1 to 14).  [...] and defendant drove to the rear complex parking lot and parked their vehicles side by side on Popular Lane.  (9T50-19 to 23).  At approximately 2:10 p.m., [...] and defendant were seen removing six of the marijuana-filled duffel bags from [...]’s truck and placing them in the back of defendant’s BMW.  (8T236-1 to 4; 9T53-21 to 54-3).  The officers then observed defendant and [...] take the two remaining duffel bags and walk toward [...].  (8T236-5 to 6; 9T54-3 to 12).  Defendant retrieved a key from his pocket, unlocked the apartment door, and placed the two duffel bags inside.  (9T54-15 to 20).  He then closed and locked the apartment door.  (9T54-20 to 21).  Defendant and [...] returned to their vehicles empty-handed.  (9T54-21 to 55-5).  [...] and [...] drove away.  (11T102- 4 to 103-11; 11T107-24 to 108-3).  Neither [...] nor [...] was ever charged with a crime in New Jersey or Illinois.
[brief] No, he went out and hired the largest law firm in New Jersey to move the trial court to enjoin the arbitration for lack of jurisdiction.  When [...] lost that, he sought an interlocutory appeal of that decision (Da452-453).  When he lost that, he filed a Petition for Certification before the New Jersey Supreme Court (which was denied).  (Da460)  Significantly, all of these judicial applications were on notice to the Arbitrator.
[directive] 6.  Youthful Offender  Defendant was less than 26 years of age at the time of the present offense and does not -2 if the defendant at the time of the fall into Criminal History Categories IV or V, offense was less than 21 years of age; does not have a pending charge under N.J.S.A. -1 if the defendant at the time of the 2C:35-6 (using or employing a juvenile in a offense was at least 21 years of age but drug distribution scheme), and is not subject less than 26 years of age to Special Application and Enhancement Feature A (Street Gang Involvement).
[brief] Being served with disciplinary action seeking a 5 day penalty is enough to dissuade a reasonable person from opposing conduct the NJLAD prohibits and this is a jury issue, not one to be decided on summary judgment.  Facts of record show, however, a 5 day penalty was issued against [...], which he appealed.  (Pa311).  This is established by the email from Director [...] who asked [...] “did Alan [...] appeal his disciplinary action (5 day suspension)” (Pa467).  Further, defendants misleadingly claim in their Appellate Brief that “A proposed five-day suspension for the report of [...] being seen under [...]’s desk was dropped after [...] retired on May 1, 2016.
[brief] (Da17; Da43-44.)  The State argues the de novo court’s consideration of the Alcotest result that exceeded the bounds of the scope of review did not amount to bias.  (Sb10-11.)  But there was no reason to inquire into the Alcotest when it had not been before the municipal court.  See State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 147 (2017)(explaining on a trial de novo the Law Division “judge ‘may reverse and remand for a new trial or may conduct a trial de novo on the record below’”)(quoting R. 3:23–8(a)(2)).  Defendant only has to show the potential for bias, which has been shown by the consideration of items that exceeded the scope of appeal.  See P.M. v. N.P. 441 N.J. Super. 127, 141 (App. Div. 2015).  The State further justifies the inquiry pursuant to Guideline 4, but there was no reason for the inquiry into why the Alcotest was not introduced to occur during the trial de novo.  The de novo Rule is clear that the record is limited to what occurred in the municipal court.  R. 3:23-8(a)(2).  The de novo judge’s conduct presents the appearance of bias to an objective person because the Alcotest inquiry had nothing to do with the issues that were on appeal before the de novo court, and the de novo court could have considered it after rendering a decision on the trial de novo.  P.M., 441 N.J. Super. at 141.  Under P.M., the appearance of impartiality is enough for a remand.  There were three main issues: the clerk’s request for documents that exceeded the scope of appeal; the de novo court’s consideration of the Alcotest and HGN test without [...]’ testimony, and the denial of the adverse inference when the State did not call [...].
[brief] [...], a ballistics expert, confirmed that 12 recovered shell casings, and nine of the 18 recovered projectiles (or projectile fragments) from the scene and the autopsy were fired from the 9-mm. Glock that was recovered from the scene near the defendant, while the other nine projectiles or fragments were inconclusive.  (14T:66-10 to 13; 14T: 82-1 to 21; 14T:88-1 to 8; 14T:92-23 to 94-20).
[directive] 1.0  BACKGROUND  The Administrative Office of the Courts worked with the Office of the Attorney General, the Governor's Task Force on Child Abuse and Neglect and the Task Force's Protection Subcommittee to address the need for the "provision of care to dependent persons whose care-givers are either being held in police custody, awaiting initial judicial review for the issuance of arrest warrants or are about to be sentenced to a period of incarceration."  The impetus for this initiative was the tragic death of an infant who died as a result of incompetent care by a family member while the child's mother was serving a short mandatory jail term for shoplifting.  On June 25, 1993, the Protection Subcommittee issued a report recommending, in part, that the Judiciary and law enforcement agencies develop guidelines to more readily identify and ensure appropriate arrangements are made for dependent persons whose care-givers are taken into custody or face incarceration.  Among the measures recommended by the Subcommittee are "complementary training programs, including the development of the type of inquiry for use by law enforcement personnel, prosecutors, judicial staff and judges, at appropriate stages in the custodial process."  The Administrative Office of the Courts has been working with the Attorney General's Office to develop plans to implement those recommendations.  Among the follow-up steps will be the development of complementary training programs and joint county-by-county resource directories of alternate care providers for reference by judges, court staff, police officers, and detainees.  The directories can be used by detainees and public officials seeking care for dependents for whom the detainee is unable to identify a suitable care-giver.  In furtherance of those recommendations, the Attorney General developed a model policy in December, 1993, and requested law enforcement agencies to review and update their existing policies in this area as needed.  The Administrative Director of the Courts also issued complementary draft guidelines on August 31, 1994 and solicited comments within the Judiciary.  On October 12, 1994 S-469 (P.L. 1994, c.113) was enacted and required the development of guidelines for Judges of the Superior and Municipal Courts "to follow in order to insure that appropriate arrangements are made for the care of an incarcerated person's child by a responsible adult."  Pursuant to that legislation the Administrative Director of the Courts, in consultation with the Governor's Task Force on Child Abuse and Neglect, was to present the guidelines to the Chief Justice by February 9, 1995.  The Governor's Task Force on Child Abuse and Neglect, at its January 20, 1995 meeting, endorsed final revisions to draft guidelines in response to comments received from the Judiciary and the Task Force's Protection Subcommittee.  The Task Force's report was forwarded to the Administrative Director on January 25, 1995 and his final recommendations were presented to the Chief Justice on February 7, 1995.  The Chief Justice approved of the guidelines on April 6, 1995 to be effective May 1, 1995.  2.0
[brief] For the reasons set forth above, Respondent respectfully requests that this Appellate Court sustain the Trial Court’s Order that is the subject of this appeal.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...] Esq. [...] Esq.  October 16, 2023  [...], Plaintiffs, v. [...], his heirs, devisees and personal representatives or any of their successors in right, title and interest, 1-10, [...], spouse of Ruslan Milov; [...]; [...], Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  APPELLATE DOCKET NO. [...]  TRIAL COURT DOCKET NO. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. APPELLANT/DEFENDANTS’ REPLY
[brief] On cross-examination, [...] testified that he was not able to say, based upon the data of the exact location of defendant’s phone, only that it is consistent with being in the angle of the tower where [...] happens to be.  [12T196-19 to 197-10].  He also answered that unlike [...]’s phone, he was unable to say defendant’s phone was physically at [...] because defendant’s phone was never physically recovered.  [12T199-4 to -12].  On redirect examination, [...] explained that in S-85 he placed a dot on [...] only to show the location that was involved in the investigation, and not to say that defendant was “definitely there” at the time the call was placed.  [12T203-9 to -20].  He explained again that the 11:04 p.m. phone call hit off the identified tower and that the base of the tower was facing 210 degrees, which included [...], but also included the other streets and area as depicted in S-85.  [12T203-21 to 204-19].  [...] also explained that the call detail records for defendant’s cell phone number indicated that at 2:25 a.m., the phone moved from the area of [...], to [...], and while in Willingboro, attempted to call [...].  [12T204-25 to 205-15].  He clarified again that he had no evidence that places defendant in the area of [...] at 2:25 a.m., only his cell phone.
[brief] On Sunday, July 2, 2023, an Answer was filed to the Complaint by Defendant-Respondent.  (Pa23).  The Answer filed by Defendant-Respondent, [...], contained the affirmative defense “Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Statute of Limitations in such cases made and provided” as well as “Plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of the policy of insurance from which he (sic) seeks benefits.
[brief] *Id.* at *2-3.  The trial judge concluded:  In any event it really appears from this situation that we're talking about a demand loan here.  The evidence that this was a pay when you are able loan similar to the one in *Guerin*, is just not compelling here.  *There's very little evidence in that regard.  The closest we come to it really is [...]'s testimony, that when she handed the check to the defendant she said pay us back when you're able to pay us back.*  *That's not enough to convert it to a pay when you're able loan.*  In fact, [...] made a demand for payment by everybody's account in 1990.  Now the mere fact that the defendant said, I can't pay you back now, I'm not able to, does not convert it to a pay when you are able loan anymore than if there was a promissory note calling for payment within three years and if the plaintiff demanded payment you know, on the third anniversary of the loan and the defendant said, I can't pay you now, and the plaintiff said okay, pay me when you're able, that doesn't covert the note to a pay when you are able loan and stop the Statute of Limitations from starting to run.
[brief] Essentially, she argues that because she knows that she did not touch the child’s hijab maliciously, then no one could reasonably believe it.  And anyone who believes anything different cannot be trusted.  But the Complaint itself belies any such theory.  It makes clear that [...] and the [...] were not the only ones to believe the Student’s account.  Both the school’s administrators and the [...] found the Incident as described by the child and her parents was credible enough to warrant action.