ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Trial Court correctly granted Defendants’/Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment.  Plaintiff/Appellant, [...] (“Appellant”), has misrepresented the facts and law in this case in an attempt to manufacture a cause of action where there is none.  However, as properly occurred in the court below, a full reading of the evidence presented in this matter can only lead to one conclusion, that summary judgment for Respondent on all counts is warranted.  Appellant is a twenty-nine-year-old self-described millennial (a generational status she unconvincingly and unsuccessfully attempts to use as an excuse for a lack of clarity in certain purported communications to her employer).  In the early days of COVID-19, before the existence of any government lockdown orders, Appellant took immediate issue with her employer [...] (“Respondent”) not yet transitioning to a fully remote work environment (as the decision as to [...] is not under appeal, Respondent is used in the singular herein).  On March 13, 2020, despite having just met with her employer on its plans towards transitioning to remote work, she expressed her anger with Respondent’s structured approach by inciting a select group of coworkers to join her in demanding that collectively they be able to immediately work from home because they felt they could at that instance.  All were fired for being insubordinate.  Only in her Complaint, well after the fact, did Appellant allege that there was some sort of New Jersey public policy that required Respondent to immediately switch to a remote workforce, even in the absence of any government lockdown orders.
[brief] Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. dated and entered October 25, 2019 ........................................ M822  Order for Partial Judgment & Other Related Relief of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. dated and entered October 15, 2020 ........................................  M1 Order Designating the Honorable [...], P.J.Cv. to Appoint a Special Hearing officer of the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. dated and entered on October 14, 2020................................. M65  Memorandum of Honorable [...], P.J.Cv. dated October 14, 2020 granting permission to Judge McCloskey to Appoint [...], Esq. as Special Hearing Officer.................................................. M66  Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. dated and entered June 16, 2021..........................................  M462 Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. dated and entered September 14, 2021................................. M474  Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. dated and entered August 9, 2022........................................  M477  Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. dated and entered March 10, 2023.......................................  M718 | REFERENCE/PROCEDURE TYPE | DATE | |---------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------| | (1T)
[brief] This Court “ascertain[s] the intent of the Legislature by first looking to the plain words of the statute,” and “give[s] ‘the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and read[s] them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole. ”  *N.J. Election Law Enf’t Comm’n v. DiVincenzo*, 451 N.J. Super. 554, 576 (App. Div. 2017).  The Court further assumes that the legislature is fully aware of existing laws when enacting a new statute.  *Squires v. Atl. Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders*, 200 N.J. Super. 496, 502 (Law. Div. 1985).  “Where a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face and admits of only one interpretation, a court must infer the Legislature’s intent from the statute’s plain meaning. ”  *N.J. DYFS & Family Servs. v. I.S.*, 214 N.J. 8, 29 (2013).  Importantly, “[i]n interpreting a statute, [a court] strive[s] to give effect to every word rather than to ascribe a meaning that would render part of the statute superfluous.
[brief] IV.  [...] OPPOSED [...]’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON [...]’S TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE AND INDEMNIFICATION CLAIMS BECAUSE MATERIAL FACTS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT.  [...] argues that Eastern Outdoor “failed to substantively oppose [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to tortious interference and indemnification” simply because “[...] failed to cite to any case law or precedent in opposition to [...]’s motion as to its tortious interference indemnification claims. ” (Db38-39).  [...] misconstrues Eastern Outdoor’s entire argument before the Trial Court -- which is that the evidence submitted to the Trial Court precludes summary judgment on these claims.  Eastern Outdoor respectfully, once again, refers to the facts presented in its Opening Brief, as submitted to the Trial Court.  (See Pb36-Pb37).  V. EASTERNA OUTDOOR’S APPEAL OF THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER ON [...]’S “MOTION TO BAR” WAS TIMELY BECAUSE SUCH ORDER WAS INTERLOCUTORY.
[brief] I.  The Trial Court’s Summary-Judgment Decision, Which Dismissed Plaintiff’s Claims Against [...] Should Be Reversed (Pa55).  The trial court erred in awarding [...] summary judgment as it relied upon inapt case law and disregarded extant disputes of material facts.  Appellate review of this award is de novo.  See Calco Hotel Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Gike, 420 N.J. Super. 495, 507 (App. Div. 2011) (conclusions of law are reviewed de novo).  Based on the facts present in the record, this review warrants reversal.
[brief] Yet the public was deprived of any information except the size of the accessory and principal structures, as none of that information is contained in the Notice.  For all intents and purposes the principal structure could have been a refinery and the accessory structure a gasoline storage tank.  How were the citizens of the Township to know otherwise based on the Notice given?  *Northgate Condo. Ass’n v. Borough of Hillsdale Planning Bd.*, 214 N.J. 120, 139-40 (2013).
[brief] Although [...] contends that the Department’s new interpretation of the Holding Act and SSAP No. 25 is simply wrong, and the Bulletin must be vacated, at the very least, the Department was required to give [...] and other affected entities notice and an opportunity to be heard before imposing such a monumental and unilateral change.  This is crucial to the integrity of the entire regulatory process, and the Defendant is not entitled to use the Bulletin to circumvent due process.
[brief] [...] spoke plainly and directly; she answered “yes” and “no,” and admitted unhesitatingly when she made a mistake.  Pa0208.  [...] stated that she did not have environmental training, and at one point confused the acronym “RIR” with “RAO. ”  4T246-10 to 19; 4T249-18 to 250-1 to 8.  Throughout the trial, Plaintiff attempted to use [...]’s misstatement to establish their entitlement to damages.
[brief] In [...], the Supreme Court cited N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., Smart Growth, at http://www.state.nj.us/dep/antisprawl/ (last modified Nov. 14, 2005).  There, the NJDEP stated that New Jersey is the “nation’s most densely populated state, and the most development,” and that “[i]ll-conceived land use and poorly designed development threatens our vital drinking-water supplies, devours our open space, spoils our landscape and creates traffic congestion that pollutes our air. ”  Here, the [...] has determined that through its power of eminent domain, and its power to enter into a land-exchange contract, the Township is able to preserve open space in a desirable area within the Township to allow residents to utilize the open space and promote a planning scheme which promotes the use of the newly obtained open space.  Lastly, no argument has been made by Appellant concerning the fair market value of the property.  Certainly, the Township is willing, ready and able to compensate the Appellant for the full fair market value of the subject properties.  POINT II
[brief] She testified that [...] was on the phone with police during the chase.  (4T 28-7 to 29-19; 4T 32-22 to 25).  [...] testified that [...] got out of the car, followed by [...] and herself, and that she later saw [...] holding a tire iron.  She saw [...] hit [...] once in the face with it, and then [...] and [...] “continually hitting him” while [...] held his legs.  (4T 28-6 to 32-2; 4T 32-13 to 18).  [...] testified that [...] told her to take [...]’s property, and that she took his phone and money.  [...] acknowledged having told police that [...] had said to “put it in the car,” but that the police intervened before she could.  (4T 32-10 to 24; 4T 46-21 to 49-5).  [...] also acknowledged that she had told the police that [...] was merely trying to calm [...] down, and did not punch or assault him.
[brief] Pra5.  Also identical to the within matter, the Division sent a letter to all Certifying Officers with the same exact terms contained in the Certifying Officer Letter’s “EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITIES” section.  *Id.*  Pra6.  Pa76.  The Appellate Division held that “[a]pplying our highly deferential standard of review, we are satisfied that the record sufficiently supports the Commissions' decision that members were provided with adequate notice and instructions for submitting a request for claims reconsideration prior to the December 31, 2014 deadline. ”  *Id.* at 8-9.  Pra7.  The Supreme Court reversed, holding:  2.  Whenever an administrative agency acts, be that act mandatory or strictly voluntary, it must do so reasonably and in a manner calculated to achieve the policies expressed in the agency's organic statute.  Therefore, because the Commissions determined to reimburse affected members, they were necessarily required to do so reasonably and in a non-arbitrary manner.  Here, that means that the Commissions were required to provide reasonable notice in order that the retroactive benefit would fairly be made known and, thus, made available in a non-arbitrary manner to affected members.  As with most agency action, there is room for debate over what is reasonable.  To be reasonable, an agency's choice of action for providing notice does not require adoption of a perfect practice.
[directive] Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4a, endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(3), endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(i) or (ii) (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018), luring or an attempt to commit any of these offenses and the offense occurred on or after January 14, 2004, or violating a condition of a special sentence of community supervision for life if the violation occurred on or after July 1, 2014 the court, in addition to any other sentence, will impose a special sentence of parole supervision for life? (Complete esto solamente si el delito ocurrió el 14 de agosto del (2)(a) [Sí/Yes] [No/No] [NC/NA] 2013 o después de esa fecha)
[brief] III.  ANY REMAND ORDER SHOULD DIRECT THIS MATTER BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE (ISSUE NOT RAISED BELOW)  Trial of this matter concluded on November 10, 2020.  Following an inordinate delay and update requests, [...]’s attorney was compelled to contact the Chief Judge of the ALJ.  A decision was, finally, issued on March 6, 2023 almost two and a half years after the case concluded.  The decision was preceded by fifteen (15) *nunc pro tunc* extensions granted *sua sponte* by the Chief ALJ. (Pa265).  The excessiveness of this delay is self-apparent.  This is especially true for a litigant whom, for almost four (4) years, had been fighting to be reinstated to his employment as a police officer to which he had dedicated his adult life.  That [...]’s attorney was compelled to contact the ALJ’s superior to obtain the decision creates an obvious concern of a resulting bias.  This concern is magnified by the ALJ’s decision wherein not only were all charges sustained but the ALJ took pains to criticize both [...]’s conduct and character including finding, without either any or sufficient evidential basis, that [...] abused narcotics which caused him to be untruthful and place other persons in danger.  It is well understood that a judge should not sit in any matter wherein “a reasonable, fully informed person (would) have doubts about the judge’s impartiality [.]”  *State v. Dalal*, 221N.J. 601, 606 (2015) (quoting *DeNike v. Cupo*, 196 N.J. 502, 517 (2008)).  To this end, even an appearance of impropriety or impartiality compels recusal.  See, *DeNike*, supra, 196 N.J. at 514.  Accordingly, a litigant need not “prove actual prejudice on the part of the (judge) to establish an appearance of impropriety; an ’objectively reasonable’ belief that the proceedings were unfair is sufficient. ”  *DeNike*, supra, 196 N.J. at 514 (quoting *State v. Marshall*, 148 N.J. 89, 279 (1997).  The factual circumstances and history of this matter undoubtedly creates an “objectively reasonable” belief of the potential of partiality or unfairness should the matter be remanded to the same ALJ.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] ” (Pa2233.)  While [...] may have been erroneously enrolled in the CCIP for a few hours before being unenrolled upon the realization that [...]’s work was demolition, it is undisputed that [...] had no other contracts or proposals during this short erroneous enrollment period, and never attempted to re-enroll, ever.  ([...] Tr. 144:4-22 at Pa1051; [...] Tr. 13:1-19 at Pa986.)  Plaintiffs’ argument that enrollment in the CCIP is mandatory is also belied by the CCIP Manual which explicitly states the CCIP provides coverage for “some (but not all)” contractors.
[brief] (Da1-21)  In Pittman, as in this case, the officers were driving in an unmarked car on “proactive patrol”, “looking for suspicious activity” including drug deals “in progress,” specifically surveying parking lots known for drug transactions.  2023 WL 6930025 at *1.  (1T 7-4 to 19)  The officers’ attention was drawn to Pittman’s car in that case because they knew the defendant to be involved in narcotics distribution, ibid., just as the officers’ attention was drawn to [...]’s car because they knew the woman speaking to the driver was a narcotics user and then ran [...]’s plate, recognizing his name as a known narcotics dealer.  (1T 16-4 to 17-14, 42-5 to 12; Da23)  Just as the officers surveilled [...] for two hours and observed what they believed to be several narcotics transactions, the officers then surveilled Pittman’s car for an hour and ten minutes, observing what they believed to be a narcotics transaction.  Id. at *2.  (1T 35-14 to 36-3; 2T 18-21 to 23)  The officers ordered Pittman out of the vehicle and ordered a canine sniff when they did not see any drugs in plain view.  Ibid.  This Court found Pittman on all fours with Smart, as “it was the narcotics detective's ‘suspicions of ... [d]efendant’s narcotics activity’ which prompted the lengthy surveillance of defendant's car, and formed the basis of the stop . . . and the ultimate search of the car. ”  Id. at *4.  Thus, the court concluded “that the circumstances giving rise to probable cause here were not ‘unforeseeable and spontaneous’ but were instead, as in Smart, ‘deliberate, orchestrated, and wholly connected with the reason for the subsequent seizure of the evidence. ””  Id. at *5 (quoting 253 N.J. at 172.)  That conclusion applies equally to the facts of this case.
[brief] (15T 6-22 to 7-1; 15T 27-11 to 13)  Prior to that, he lived with defendant’s family, the [...], on [...] in [...] “for a couple of years,” which were “prior to him going missing” for a few days in early 2017, and, after that incident, he lived with [...] and her husband [...] for a “period of time,” [...] testified.  (15T 7-2 to 7-22)  When her son “went missing” briefly in 2017, he was located in a mental hospital in [...], but [...] claimed that even though [...] went to live with her and her husband upon his discharge from that facility, she did not know what his diagnosis was, --- \(^4\)
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................  3 STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................................................  7 ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................................  9  I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................................................  9  II.  THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPLY  NEW JERSEY RETROACTIVITY LAW AND IGNORED OVERWHELMING FEDERAL FCA PRECEDENT FAVORING PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION.  (Ja1–3; 4T) .........................................................................................  10
[directive] b.  As part of the conflict review, the agency shall identify whether any of the following circumstances exist: supervise2  i.  Whether any person who will or participate in the investigation has had any personal or professional interaction with or relationship to the Principal that might reasonably call the person’s impartiality into question; ii.  Whether the law enforcement agency is prosecuting any case in which the Principal is expected to testify on behalf of the State; or iii.  Whether, within the past five years, the Principal has been assigned to a task force operating under the direct supervision of the law enforcement agency.
[brief] (Db 32; Da 19-22).  Indeed, the municipal judge specifically detailed what she saw on the video:  Not even just the officer who testifies as to the results, but then as the trier of fact, I watched the results of those tests and I have been told that those tests, if they cannot be completed, and cannot be explained away sufficiently by other factors, are in fact intoxication, and impairment, and inability to drive the vehicle.
[directive] Although we find no statutory speedy trial violation, we address several points to offer additional guidance.  26 A. Sua sponte orders.  Defendant argues that the trial court had no authority under the CJRA to issue sua sponte orders that excluded time from the speedy trial clock.  Nothing in the statute or the court rules, however, bars judges from issuing orders about the speedy trial clock on their own accord.  This Court, for example, entered fourteen orders that excluded time from the 180-day clock because of COVID-19 and its consequences.  As noted earlier, the orders were based on “exceptional circumstances,” which expressly “natural disaster[s],” 2A:162-22(b)(1)(f), and “good encompass see N.J.S.A. cause for the delay,” in light of the suspension of and limited capacity for jury trials statewide, see id. at -22(b)(1)(l).
[brief] d/b/a [...]  [...], Esq. (admitted pro hac vice)  [...], Esq. (No. 026622011)  [...], Esq. (No. 212782018)  Of Counsel and On the Brief #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | REPLY ARGUMENT | 1 | | POINT I THE *DE NOVO* STANDARD APPLIES | 1 | | POINT II
[brief] He had no role of any kind in the development of this EMP.  His testimony consisted largely of two parts.  First he claimed that the current EMP is merely advisory.  Second, he claimed that implementing the EMP's natural gas decarbonization mandates will not be achievable, because, in his opinion, the electrical grid is incapable of handling the projected increase in electrical transmission and distribution load.  Both opinions are directly contrary to governing law.  In addition, both "opinions" are inadmissible as expert opinion on an ultimate legal issue.
[brief] Compounding the absurdity, the Borough then states that “the Public Engineer rather pointedly found that the internal roads did not comply with the Municipal Zoning plan and that they could not be approved no matter what their condition. ” (Db27, emphasis omitted; see also Db39-Db40.)  Though the Borough provides no citation to support that statement, it is assumed that the Borough is referring to certain comments made at a Planning Board meeting on \(^8\)  The trial court’s opinion mistakenly says that [...] wasn’t the Borough Engineer, when in fact he was.  (Da15.)  The Borough has attempted to seize on this insignificant mistake to support its bizarre argument, but for the reasons above such argument is still unavailing.
[brief] Second, [...], plaintiff’s engineer, did not contend that the [...] changed the grade of their property.  Pa54, ¶ 85; Pa333, ¶ 85; accord Pa259-60.  He did not calculate the amount of water that ran off the [...]’ property onto plaintiff’s property before the [...] purchased it.  Pa55, ¶ 88; Pa333, ¶ 88; Pa268 at 24:12-:15.  He did not discuss the fact that the rear of plaintiff’s property lies in a flood plain.  Pa272 at 41:2-:4.  He did not calculate the amount of water that would flow downhill from plaintiff’s property into Canoe Brook, which ran along the rear of his lot, nor did he calculate the amount of water that would naturally be absorbed into the ground.  Pa272 at 41:5-:15.  In his deposition, taken after the close of discovery, cf. Pa86, ¶ 5, with Pa262, Mr. [...] offered a new opinion, attempting to quantify the amount of water that would flow off the driveway between the gap in the Belgian block next to plaintiff’s property and the gap in the Belgian block next to the [...]’ house.  Pa273 at 42:21-43:4.  However, he did not include any such opinions in his report.  Pa273 at 44:1-:3.  He did not know the slope of the driveway as it runs from the [...]’ house to plaintiff’s property, Pa56, ¶ 96; Pa334, ¶ 96; Pa270 at 30:7-:25.  Instead, he based that new opinion on looking at a photograph of the driveway marked as D-16 for identification (appended at Pa351) that plaintiff’s counsel showed him during his deposition, Pa273 at 42:21-43:22, instead of on any calculations based on generally-accepted engineering standards.  Pa273 at 44:4-:45:17, Pa274 at 49:3-:9.  Further, nothing in Mr. [...]’s report stated that water would be prevented from running off the [...]’ driveway through the opening in the Belgian block next to the [...]’ house, and noting in his report states how much water would run off the driveway through that opening.  Pa270 at 31:4-:16.  Further, even though he relied on D-16 to claim that before the [...] repaved their driveway, “probably 60 to 70 percent of the water would go towards the rear of the property and not to [...]’s property,” Pa273 at 43:7-:20, he also testified during his deposition that looking at D-16, he had no information about how water flowed off the rear of the driveway before the [...] purchased the property.  Pa271 at 34:24-36:6.  He also admitted that his report did not discuss the amount of water that would have flowed from the [...]’ property to plaintiff’s property before the [...] purchased it or any change in the amount of runoff after the [...] bought it.  Pa272 at 41:21-42:5.  Because plaintiff’s experts failed to support their opinions that the [...] caused any flooding of plaintiff’s property by applying generally-accepted surveying or engineering standards to record facts, their testimony consisted merely of personal opinions.
[brief] In this matter, the record indicates that the subject examination was only open to candidates who were serving as a Sheriff Officer’s Sergeant.  Further, the record indicates that a FNDA was issued indicating that [...], the then first ranked candidate on the subject eligible list, had been demoted to Sheriff’s Officer, effective November 3, 2022.  Therefore, as of November 3, 2022, [...] was no longer eligible for the promotion from the subject examination.  If this agency had been made aware that [...] no longer met the eligibility requirements, it would have removed [...] from the subject promotional eligible list and his name would not have been certified on November 4, 2022, ([...]).