ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] Erred In Determining That The Association Did Not Violate The Act By Refusing To Identify Representatives For Bargaining In Violation Of N.J.S.A. 34:13a-5.3 (Pa215).  | 10 | | A.  The Association’s Entire Membership Does Not Constitute Its “Designated Representatives” Within The Meaning Of The Act.  | 10 | | B.  Acceptance Of The Association’s Position Would Lead To An Absurd Result And Render The Act’s Language Meaningless.  | 15 | | C.  The Association’s Demand To Conduct “Open Negotiations” Is An Unlawful Pre-Condition To Negotiation | 18 | | Point II: [...] Exceeded Its Authority By Unilaterally Binding The Parties To A Ground Rule Requiring The Board To Negotiate With The Association’s Entire Membership As A Precondition To Negotiations (Pa245).
[brief] R. 2:4-l(b).  In the event that this Court considers Appellant’s belated attempt to appeal of the 2019 Permit Modification, it is clear that Appellant’s challenge has no merit.  [...] had authority to issue the 2017 WFD Permit and the 2019 Permit Modification upon finding, as the record reflects, that [...]’s dock complied with the Waterfront Development Law and the CZM Rules.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  Point I  Standard of Review  Appellate courts apply a *de novo* standard of review in determining the enforceability of contracts.  See, e.g., *Goffe v. Foulke Management Corp.*, 238 N.J. 191 (2019).  “When no issue of fact exists, and only a question of law remains, this Court affords no special deference to the legal determinations of the trial court. ”  *Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh*, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016) (citing *Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan*, 140 N.J. 366 (1995)).  There was no discovery taken or testimony given before the trial court, nor did the trial court make any factual findings.  Thus, there are no factual determinations entitled to deference.  Point II
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On August 18, 2022, the [...] heard the Application of the Defendants, [...] and [...] (the “[...]”), in which they requested a "use variance" to allow an existing accessory structure to be larger than the principal use on their property. \(^1\) (Pa1-22).  Plaintiffs, [...] and [...] (jointly the “[...]”) objected on several grounds during the Zoning hearing.  Notwithstanding the objections of the [...], The Board granted the [...]’ Application and issued a Resolution of approval for the variance. \(^2\) (Pa40). \(^3\)  On June 30, 2023, the [...] filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs (the “Complaint”) in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Gloucester County, Docket No. [...] against the Board and the [...].  (Pa51).  The Board and the [...] filed Answers on December 27, 2022 and December 28, 2022.  (Pa65 and Pa78).  On July 24, 2023, the [...] filed their Trial Brief.  (Pa87)  The Defendants filed their briefs on August 7, 2023 and August 8, 2023.  (Pa98 and Pa102)  On October 2, 2023, the Trial Court heard argument from the parties.  On that same date, the Trial Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.  \(^1\)  Hearing Transcript August 18, 2022 (“1T”).  \(^2\)  Zoning Board Resolution transcript October 20, 2022 (“2T”)  \(^3\)  Plaintiffs’-Appellants’ Appendix is cited as “Pa”. and dismissed all counts of the Complaint.\(^4\) (Pa134).  The [...] filed the instant appeal on November 9, 2023.  (Pa136).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Reliability of PCMD  After defendant sought to preclude expert testimony about using PCMD to track the location of a cellphone, the trial court held a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing.  [...] testified that, since 2011, he had been a member of [...], which was “specifically trained in cell phone technology,” locating phones, and determining the “historical location of a phone. ” (1T104-16 to 105-8).  [...] attended classes given by the service providers, including [...], and was familiar with their technology and records.  (1T106-3 to 108-4).  [...] had used PCDM to locate an individual over 100 times, and had performed historical cell site analysis using service providers’ records “thousands of times. ” (1T119-21 to 120-5; 1T122-9 to 123-2; 1T147-23 to 148-5).  [...] acknowledged that the phone companies used PCMD for network optimization and troubleshooting, while [...] used it to locate people and show where they were previously.  (1T112-25 to 113-20; 1T117-7 to 118-3; 1T179-5 to 15).  [...] testified that PCMD “narrows the search area down” and experience showed it to be accurate within “a couple hundred yards,” and sometimes “extremely accurate. ” (1T113-7 to 18; 1T117-23 to 118-3; 1T133-23 to 134-5).  [...] found that when PCMD “says [a phone is] going to be someplace, it is going to be that place. ” (1T119-13 to 15).  While it was not “100 percent accurate,” PCMD gave “a good general area to look for” that in combination with other investigative facts “get you to the exact spot. ” (1T119-16 to 20).  [...] also acknowledged that [...] issued a “disclaimer” that it would not verify the accuracy of the latitude and longitude provided by PCMD.\(^{10}\) (1T116-1 to 117-6).  [...] had found that the latitudes and longitudes in PCMD reports could be misleading, but the distances provided had been accurate.  (1T123-14 to 21; 1T134-2 to 17; 1T160-10 to 17).  Its reliability had been “corroborated” through [...]’s success “finding people. ” (1T166-4 to 13).  In terms of his analysis using PCMD, [...] testified the results are peer reviewed and verifiable for accuracy by other [...] members.  (1T129-23 to 130-8).  \(^{10}\)  A records custodian from [...]—which acquired [...] in 2020—authenticated call detail records and PCMD associated with defendant’s phone number in August 2015.  (2T29-21 to 39-13).  At trial, she could not attest to the completeness of the PCMD, but did affirm its accuracy.  (2T40-13 to 45-3).  After considering [...]’s testimony, [...] ruled that PCMD analysis was sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Frye standard.  (1T196-17 to 20).
[brief] (Aa1).  Before [...] issued the HAD, on October 16, 2020, the [...] sent [...] a letter reviewing the HAD application and the Project’s potential natural resource impacts.  (Aa328-330).  To ensure it “give[s] great consideration and weight” to the Council’s RMP, [...] consults with the [...] about Highlands applications such as [...]’s.  N.J.A.C. 7:38-1.1(i).  In its consistency determination, the [...] found that [...]’s “efforts to avoid, minimize and mitigate for resource impacts are sufficient to find that the project is consistent with the goals of the Highlands Act. ” (Aa330).  The Council noted that the Project is located in a historically disturbed former quarry with invasive vegetation and “disconnected” and “non-functional” resources.  (Aa64; Aa79; Aa200-205; Aa330).  Because of its former industrial use, the site is “characterized by invasive species and small, isolated patches of forested areas. ” (Aa197-211; Aa330).  Only one area of trees of approximately two acres is considered a “forest” by [...]’s rules.  (Aa206; Aa330).  Thus, the [...] determined that [...]’s security fence installation that requires the removal of twenty-three trees, was a de minimis impact on the resource, (Aa206-208; Aa329-330), which [...] is mitigating by replacing an equivalent area of trees, and that constructing the Project with seasonal timing restrictions to minimize impacts on critical wildlife.
[brief] If Defendants’ legal position is correct then the Board members are under no obligation under OPRA to search for the non-government records or explain how frequently or infrequently they used or did not use private email services to conduct government business.  Plaintiff’s legal contentions are inextricably tied to his public policy arguments, which were addressed and determined to be inappropriate for consideration by the trial court:  Plaintiff’s counsel argues that disallowing plaintiff[’]s request will create an avenue for government officials to evade OPRA by use of their private email addresses.
[brief] Plaintiff advocates robust informed civic participation.  Plaintiff advocates enhanced local transparency, accountability, and adherence to the rule of law.  (Pa1-Compl. #29)  Plaintiff prevailed in this action.  In January 2022 and shortly after the trial court denied defendants’ first motion to dismiss on the pleadings, defendants restored plaintiff’s right to be heard on all agenda action items prior to consideration and official action.  (Pa1-Compl#13; Pa295; Pa326-Def SJCSR #36, #37).  **Defendants**
[brief] [4T49:9-12].  The transcript of the March 23 Chancery hearing reads, in pertinent part:  [...]: … I want to confirm on the record—there had been a previous request that there is going to be a motion filed for, the matter to go to arbitration.  I believe it’s been established that that’s been waived and arbitration is no longer an issue.  Correct?  [...]: Correct your Honor.  [...]: Correct your Honor.  [2T6:12-19].  During oral argument on Defendants’ application to compel arbitration, the Trial Court initially stated that an express act of waiver dispenses with the need to analyze the waiver under the seven factors set forth in Cole, with the exception of prejudice.
[brief] The trial court further justified its decision by reference to Rule 4:87-1(b), which states that “[a]n action may be commenced by an interested person to compel a fiduciary referred to in paragraph (a) of this rule to settle his or her account, and, in appropriate circumstances, to file an inventory and appraisement. ”  2T25:6–22.  While there are words of discretion in said Rule, such as “may” and “in appropriate circumstances,” neither are applicable in this circumstance.  First, the word “may” applies to the discretion given to a beneficiary in filing an action to compel an accounting, not to the court in granting such relief.  As for the words “in appropriate circumstances,” this comes after a comma and the word “and,” and only applies to the filing of an inventory and appraisement, not an accounting.  An accounting is not an inventory, as shown by the differing statutes requiring the filing of an inventory, N.J.S.A. § 3B:16-1 to -8, and those for filing an accounting, N.J.S.A. § 3B:17-1 to -13.  Additionally, it should be noted that Rule R. 4:87-1 applies in a number of differing statutory contexts, such as executors, administrators, testamentary trustees, non-testamentary trustees, guardians, and assignees for the benefit of creditors.
[brief] Suarez v. Dosky 171 N.J. Super. 1,9 (App. Div. 1979) cert. denied 82 N.J. 300 (1980).  Thus, the public entity can determine with impunity whether to provide police protection service and, if provided, to what extent.  Rodriguez v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 193 N.J.Super. 39, 43, (App. Div. 1983), certif. denied, 96 N.J. 291 (1984).  This section should be construed as conferring a broad immunity.  Id.  The purpose of the immunity afforded in Section 59:5-4 concerns the right of the public entity to allocate its resources in accordance with its conception of how the public interest will be best served, an exercise of political power which should be insulated from interference by judge or jury in a tort action.
[brief] **POINT I: THE C5 EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSE AT ISSUE IS UNENFORCEABLE.  (Pa1-3)**  A. Standard of Review.  6 B. Insurance Contract Interpretation.  6  C.  The Exclusion Denies Statutorily Mandated Coverage and Is Unenforceable.  7  **POINT II: THE PUBLIC POLICY OF NEW JERSEY MANDATES INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR ALL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES.  (PA1-3)**  14  CONCLUSION
[brief] Filed November 10, 2023 | 27a | | Exhibit D to Certification of [...]--Search Result of New Jersey Division of Revenue and Enterprise Services for "[...]"  Filed November 10, 2023 | 30a | | Exhibit E to Certification of [...]--March 3, 2024  Amended Complaint In [...]  Filed November 10, 2023 | 32a | | Exhibit F to Certification of [...]--June 25, 2024  Settlement Agreement Filed November 10, 2023 | 44a | TABLE OF ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS
[brief] *New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Local 196, IFPTE*, 190 N.J. 283 (2007); *Local 153 v. Trust Co. of New Jersey*, 105 N.J. 442 (1987).  See also *Kearny PBA Local #21 v. Kearny*, 81 N.J. 208, 221 (1979).  New Jersey courts favor arbitration awards which “are generally presumed to be confirmed unless one of the statutory bases for vacation is proven pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8. ” *Local 153*, 105 N.J. 442 (1987); *Alpha Board of Education v. Alpha Education Association*, 190 N.J. 34 (2006); *Kearny PBA Local #21*, 81 N.J. at 221; *State v. State Troopers Fraternal Association*, 91 N.J. 464, 469 (1982).  In his concurring opinion in *Kearny PBA Local #21*, [...] noted that "it is the arbitrator's judgment for which the parties contracted."  81 N.J. at 226-227 (internal citations omitted).  [...] emphasized that the court's enforcement of the "reasonably debatable standard"… leaves unchanged the traditional limitations regarding judicial review of public employee grievance arbitration *Id.* at 224 (Pashman, J. concurring).  There are limitations to the deference given an arbitrator's decision.
[brief] *Santana v. SmileDirectClub, LLC*, 475 N.J. Super. 279, 285 (App. Div. 2023) (motion to compel arbitration); *Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C.*, 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019) (motion to dismiss).
[brief] This Reply Brief has been submitted on behalf of the Defendant-Respondent [...] (the “Board”), in response to the Amended Brief filed on behalf of the Plaintiffs-Appellants [...], and [...] (“Plaintiffs”).  Plaintiffs have appealed the decision of the Trial Court upholding the denial by the [...] of Plaintiffs’ application for a use variance to permit construction in Florence Township of uses accessory to a 48 ft. tall warehouse to be constructed by Plaintiffs on adjoining lands in Mansfield Township.
[brief] ” (3T22:18-20).  [...] was disciplined for submitting an abstract without approval and was assessed and he served a two day suspension, not a one day suspension.  3.  [...]’s continuing opposition to discrimination and retaliation and the Notice of Disciplinary Action dated April 12, 2016 are facts upon which a jury could conclude this was retaliatory (Pa837; 3T)  The circumstances surrounding the April 12, 2016 discipline charges against [...] are also such that a jury could find that they were not taken for legitimate reasons.
[brief] .... 30  Exclusive Detailing v. Prestige Auto Group, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3135 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. December 21, 2021) .......... 29  Hirsch v. General Motors, Corp., 266 N.J. Super. 222 (Law Div. 1993)  .... .......................................................... 28, 31  Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976) ............................
[brief] In reviewing the chain of title:  [t]he searcher beginning his chain of title uses as a starting point the name of the present owner.  By the use of the grantee index, the examiner can ascertain from whom he received the land.  This process is repeated until the owner by deed, 60 or more years back, is found.  The chain is then considered complete.  13B N.J. Prac., Real Estate Law and Practice § 35:16 (3d ed.).  Indeed, our courts have universally indicated that prospective purchasers have constructive or inquiry notice of conveyances and restrictions within the chain of title, including *the acquisition by their immediate predecessor* *(here [...])* *and the significant subsequent acts by that immediate predecessor affecting title.*
[directive] DISORDERLY PERSONS OFFENSES AND PETTY DISORDERLY PERSONS OFFENSES  Note: Some of these offenses are listed elsewhere in Bail Schedule 2 as lesser included offenses  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 (Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b) (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue.
[brief] The transcripts of the proceedings will be referred to as follows:  | Transcripts | Dates | |-------------|-------------| | 1T | 1/19/21 | | 2T | 1/20/21 | | 3T | 2/10/21 | | 4T | 2/15/21 | | 5T | 3/19/21 | | 6T | 10/29/21 | | 7T | 8/12/21 | | 8T | 11/8/21 | | 9T | 11/10/21 | | 10T | 11/11/21 | | 11T | 11/12/21 | | 12T | 11/23/21 | | 13T | 12/20/21 | | 14T | 1/18/22 | | 15T | 1/20/22 | | 16T | 1/25/22 | | 17T | 1/26/22 | | 18T | 1/27/22 | | 19T | 2/8/22 | | 20T | 2/9/22 | | 21T | 2/10/22 | | 22T | 2/15/22 | | 23T | 2/16/22 | | 24T | 2/17/22 | | 25T | 2/22/22 | | 26T | 2/23/22 | | 27T | 2/24/22 | | 28T | 3/1/22 | | 29T | 3/2/22 | | 30T | 3/3/22 | | 31T | 3/8/22 | | 32T | 3/9/22 | | 33T | 3/10/22 | | 34T | 3/16/22 | | 35T | 3/17/22 | | 36T | 6/30/22 | | 37T | 9/9/22 |  Amended Complaint. 36T55-6 to 13; Da02688.  The order also: (1) denied plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages, (2) dismissed Counts 1-4 and 9-10 (fraud) of the Amended Complaint; and (3) dismissed defendants’ counterclaim and third-party complaint.  Da02688.  On September 14, 2022, the trial court entered judgment in the amount of $4,258,878.69 against all defendants.
[brief] [...]’s alternative argument for rescission of the insurance it issued to [...] based on a purported misrepresentation by [...] is factually, legally and intellectually bankrupt.  [...] admits that it never asked [...] anything about anything regarding coverage, precluding a claim that [...] misrepresented facts upon which [...] relied, especially since the policy does not exclude demolition.  It is settled that “an applicant's failure to disclose facts about which no questions were asked will not avoid the policy. ”  *Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hanna*, 316 N.J. Super. 63, 73 (App.Div.1998).  Any claim of reliance also is irrefutably rebutted by [...]’s role in qualifying subcontractors for the CCIP policy.  As the general contractor, it was fully aware of the type of work [...] performed, yet arranged for [...]’s undisputed initial enrollment.  [...]’s employee’s mistake as to the contents of the [...] policy in reconsidering [...]’s eligibility is not a basis for [...] to avoid its obligations.  [...]’s argument is inherently disingenuous and uncreditable.  IV.
[brief] [...] understood the complicated legal and financial issues the couple faced – particularly during the bankruptcy; [...] followed what her husband told her they needed to do on such matters – “go sign paperwork for the business. ”  [...] affirmed below (A84):  A couple months after the Chapter 11 was converted to the Chapter 7, [...] told me I needed to sign some documents to protect us in the bankruptcy.  I was not permitted to review the documents and was not told what they were.  I was told [...], an attorney at [...] prepared the documents and knowing that we hired them to help with the bankruptcy conversion I didn't know to question what the documents were.  I knew nothing of the bankruptcy process or any of the legal aspects of [...], [...], or [...], and left all of that to my husband, who was an attorney, and the team of attorneys we hired throughout the process.  In December of 2013 I was presented with two signature pages to execute.  During the malpractice litigation in 2016 I learned those documents were the Mid-Marriage Agreement (Exhibit "A") and an Irrevocable Power of Attorney (Exhibit "C").  When [...] was presented with the Matrimonial Settlement Agreement 43 days later, [...] assured her this was only an agreement “on paper” -- “43 days after I executed the last page of the Mid -Marriage Agreement and Irrevocable Power of Attorney, [...] advised that he needed to divorce me on paper to protect me.
[brief] 4  1.  Contrary to the Respondents’ arguments, the gravamen of my appeal is based upon the trial court’s rulings of law, and not upon its findings of fact.  4  2.  The Respondents do not – and can not – argue that the trial court’s rulings of law were free from error.  The trial court erred in several rulings of its law, including:  A)  The CFA “merchandise” definition, as it relates to the tournament entry  4  B)  The creation of a contract via the prize offer for my paid tournament entry  5  C)  The proper scope and application of the accord and satisfaction doctrine  5  3.  The Respondents rely primarily upon falsely-purported facts, and/or upon gross distortions of fact, where much of which had never even been raised at trial.  7  4.  Despite my being “cut off at the knees” by the trial court’s ruling about the “merchandise” definition, nonetheless I still was able to prove (to some extent) that there had been a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act.  10  CONCLUSION
[brief] N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22.  Subsection (e) of the Act’s Code of Ethics for school board members states:  e.  I will recognize that authority rests with the board of education and will make no personal promises nor take any private action that may compromise the board.  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e)  II.  APPEAL OF FINAL AGENCY DECISION ([...])
[brief] (Da63-66.)  [...] attempted to present applications through a certification from someone with no personal knowledge of the matter.  (2T9:3-21.)  In reply, for the first time, [...] claimed that Plaintiffs agreed to the “PFSI Shareholder Account Manager” (“SAM”) website’s Terms of Use, which contained an agreement to arbitrate.  (See 2T9:19-10:18.)  [...]’s reply further included a certification from [...]’s COO, [...], who similarly attempted to certify “facts” outside of his personal knowledge and otherwise unsubstantiated by [...]’s business records.  (Da0071-87.)  Plaintiffs’ counsel objected to the inclusion of this additional argument in reply and the motion judge determined that facts not contained in the initial merits brief were included in reply.  (1T9:2-14; 1T22:310.)  The motion judge reserved decision on the matter.  (1T48:5-22.)  On April 12, 2024, the trial court entered an order denying the motion to compel arbitration and issued an oral opinion on the record.
[brief] (2T 48-12 to 25; 3T 15-15 to 23)  In that regard, [...] applied the *Innis* test just as New Jersey law requires: he examined the police’s words and actions and found that they should have known they were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.  See *A.A.*, 240 N.J. at 354 (quoting *State v. Hubbard*, 222 N.J. 249, 267 (2015)).