ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 8.  Section 1:7-5 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:  1:7-5.  Any citizen of the State may, when an application is presented under authority of either section 1:7-1 or section 1:7-4 of this Title, appear before the court, in defense and subpoena and examine and cross-examine witnesses.  9.  Section 1:7-6 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:  1:7-6.  If in any application authorized in this chapter, the court shall adjudge any law or joint resolution, or any part thereof, to be void, the clerk of the court shall thereupon make a true copy of the judgment, certify the same under his hand and seal of the court and deliver the copy to the Governor or person administering the government, who shall issue his proclamation under the great seal of the State, setting forth such judgment.  The proclamation shall be filed, published and printed with the laws as other proclamations are required to be filed, published and printed, and shall be judicially noticed and received in evidence in all courts of the State in the same manner and to the same extent that the law or joint resolution therein specified would have been if such judgment had not been made.  No law or joint resolution, or part thereof, adjudged void shall, after the entry of such judgment as provided in this chapter, be judicially noticed or received in evidence by any of the courts of the State.  10.  Section 1:7-7 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:  1:7-7.  When an application presented under authority of section 1:7-4 of this Title is dismissed the court shall allow and tax the costs and neces- 4 sary expenses of the [...], including a fee to the Attorney- 5 General of not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500.00) in any one case, and 6 shall order the payment thereof by such citizens, and payment thereof may 7 be enforced by execution.  11.  This act shall take effect immediately.
[brief] For all of the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth in his opening brief, Plaintiff/Appellant, [...], respectfully requests that the Court reverse the trial court’s May 18, 2023 Order dismissing this action in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff, and its July 14, 2023 Order denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, and that the Court compel Defendant to provide an accounting to the beneficiaries.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, [...] /s/ [...]
[brief] ......................................................................................................................5  TABLE OF ORDERS BEING APPEALED  Order denying defendant’s motion for reconsideration, granting Plaintiff’s cross-motion to discharge lis pendens, and denying Plaintiff’s cross-motion for the imposition of sanctions entered on April 26, 2024 ........................................Da60  Order denying Defendant’s motion for reconsideration entered on April 26, 2024 .........................................................................................................................Da59  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] Appellants also claim that the Trial Court failed to “perceive the importance of the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163 (“MLUL”). ” (Pb20.)  The MLUL does “not apply to adoption of a redevelopment plan, including the zoning component. ”  Hirth, 337 N.J. Super. at 164; 240 Half Mile, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1002,*20-21 (finding that MLUL “does not govern [a p]laintiff’s challenge to a redevelopment plan”).  Appellants rely on Kaufmann v. Planning Bd. for Warren, 110 N.J. 551 (1988), which does not address the adoption of a redevelopment plan at all.  (Pb20.)  Rather, Kaufmann, involved a challenge to the granting of a c(2) variance on a subdivision application before the planning board.  Id. at 553-55, 563.  As the Kaufmann Court explained, a c(2) variance “must actually benefit the community”—which is why the Court found: “By definition, then, no c(2) variance should be granted when merely the purposes of the owner will be advanced. ”  Id. at 562-63.  Nothing in Kaufmann addressed a governing body’s adoption of a redevelopment plan, and otherwise does not support any argument that the MLUL would apply in connection with a redevelopment plan approval.  Appellants cite no case law whatsoever that the MLUL applies to the adoption of a redevelopment plan at all, much less in the context here.  Accordingly, the Trial Court was correct in finding that the MLUL did not apply, and there is no basis to reverse the Trial Court’s decision on that basis.
[brief] A member of the Police and Firemen’s Retirement System of New Jersey is eligible for AD if that individual has been “mentally or physically incapacitated for the performance of his usual duty or of any other available duty in the department which his employer is willing to assign to him. ”  N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6.  However, in order to be eligible to even apply for AD, applicants must prove “that their asserted disability is ‘the reason the member left employment. ’”  In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, 454 N.J. Super. 386, 397 (App. Div. 2018) (affirming N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4 – i.e., separation from service rule – and holding that “disability retirees must have left service because of the disability in the first instance”).
[brief] A matter should be reversed when inadmissible evidence is used to implicate a defendant’s guilt.  *Weaver*, 219 N.J. at 152 (quoting *State v. Branch*, 182 N.J. 338, 351 (2005)).  Here, the de novo court violated [...]’s rights by making inquiry into the Alcotest results that were not relevant to the trial de novo.  (3T6:13-7:10.)  The de novo court noted that it routinely makes inquiry into the exclusion of Alcotest results, which demonstrates prejudice.  (Id.)  Because [...] does not know what items were actually considered, and the de novo court made inquiry both on the record and in emails before the trial de novo to expand the record, the proper remedy is for a remand for a new trial de novo.
[brief] Ja034.  Again, the Resolution does not explain, describe, or even identify that “shaky evidential foundation. ”  It does not detail why his testimony was “discounted” (and by how much) despite his qualification as an expert witness.  It does not say why his conclusions are unsupported by the testimony of others.  Of course it doesn’t.  It can’t.  Moreover, no planning expert testified to rebut, or even cast doubt upon, [...]’ conclusions.
[brief] Rule 4:42-9(a); see also NJDPM v. N.J. Dept. of Corrections, 185 N.J. 137, 152 (2005).  These exceptions permit recovery of attorneys’ fees in family actions, where there is a “fund in court,” probate actions, mortgage foreclosure and tax sale certificate foreclosure actions, and actions arising out of liability or indemnity policies.  Rule 4:42-9(a)(1)-(6).  Attorneys’ fees are also recoverable where explicitly authorized by Court Rule, see, e.g., Rule 4:42-9(a)(7); Rule 1:4-8 (frivolous actions); Rule 4:14-8 (failure to attend deposition or serve deposition subpoena); Rule 4:23-1 to -5 (discovery sanctions); Rule 4:37-1(b) (voluntary dismissal); Rule 4:86-4(e) (attorney for alleged incompetent); Rule 5:5-5 (early settlement program), or where explicitly authorized by statute; see, e.g., Rule 4:42-9(a)(8); N.J.S.A. § 2C:41-6(c) (RICO Act); N.J.S.A. § 10:5-27.1 (Law Against Discrimination); N.J.S.A. § 20:3-26 (eminent domain); N.J.S.A. § 34:11B-12 (Family Leave Act); N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-59.1 (2017) (frivolous claims); N.J.S.A. §§ 34:19-5 to -6 (Conscientious Employee Protection Act); N.J.S.A. § 56:8-19 (Consumer Fraud Act); see also Garcia v. L&R Realty, Inc., 347 N.J. Super. 481, 492-93 (App. Div. 2002) (awarding attorneys’ fees where plaintiff sued under fee shifting statute of Massachusetts consumer fraud law); Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 440 (2001) (“[A] prevailing litigant can recover attorneys' fees "if they are expressly provided for by statute, court rule, or contract."); Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 385 (2009) (stating, because New Jersey disfavors shifting of attorneys’ fees, that when a contract provides for fee shifting, “the provision should be strictly construed in light of our general policy disfavoring the award of attorneys' fees”).  Plaintiffs’ claim for an implied easement across [...] certainly did not fall within any of these narrow prescribed exceptions, and thus Plaintiffs had no recognized basis to seek attorneys’ fees or to introduce evidence in support thereof.
[brief] In review of the documentary, evidentiary material, the causes of action are supported by the record and Appellant set forth important details in the Complaint that support each and every cause of action (Pa1, Complaint), Appellant’s Answers to Interrogatories provided a number of details which illustrate the fact that Appellant worked in a system where there was discrimination based on race and age (Pa196) which is also supported by the Responses to the Document Production.
[brief] (3)  The Aurora Report: The Biennial Bridge Inspection report is not hearsay.  It is admissible as business record.  N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6).  Further, [...]’ representation to this Court that the engineer that prepared the report concluded that it was not dangerous is wholly inaccurate.  The fact that the report does not use the specific word “dangerous” does not mean that the condition was not dangerous or that it did not pose a risk to users of the roadway.  The author of the report described the settlement as “ramped up and deteriorated in the left shoulder and left lane. ” (Pa1367).  The report recommended that the settlement condition be repaired.  (Pa1349); (Pa1350); (Pa1367).  At the very least, the recommendation to repair it creates the inference that the condition should be fixed because it was dangerous.
[brief] An operating agreement ([...]) was executed, granting 50/50 ownership in [...] to companies owned by their wives, plaintiff [...]  ([...]), owned by [...], and defendant [...], ([...]), owned by [...].  2T61:5-10; (P-2) Da935-46.  Mehta and Hedvat visited [...] with a real estate agent and determined the building could accommodate both the Edison and Englewood operations and had room for expansion.  They agreed to buy the building through [...] and rent it to [...].  2T61:18-62:2.  Their decision to acquire a lab in Maryland was reached in similar fashion.  They both drove to Maryland, where Mehta spoke to all the chemists and Hedvat spoke to the owners of the lab and the building.  They agreed to acquire the assets of the lab and lease the building under a different corporate name, [...], LLC.
[brief] Because the Parental Secrecy Policy presumes that parents will harm their children if told the child is asking to be socially transitioned at school, it is not narrowly tailored to the prevention of child abuse.  *Id.*; see also *Ricard*, 2022 WL 1471372, at *8 (holding parental secrecy overbroad “because it prohibits the disclosure of preferred name and pronoun information to parents without any assessment of whether disclosure would actually post a risk” of harm to the child); *T.F.*, 2023 WL 6544917, at *8 (holding school’s actions in socially transitioning child without parental consent was “not narrowly tailored because there [were] not the necessary procedural protections in place that are necessary to override a parent’s choice of how to . . . treat their child”).
[brief] Specifically, Defendants do not dispute that by the time of the February 6 hearing their respective pleadings had already been suppressed under R. 4:23-5 by Orders of the trial court dated December 22, 2023, the LLC Defendant’s Answer having been suppressed with prejudice and Defendant [...]’s Answer having been suppressed without prejudice.  Da29-31, Pa1-2.  Notably, Defendants’ appeal does not challenge or even address those Orders.  Accordingly, as noted above, the plain language of R. 4:23-5(b) required Defendants to demonstrate they had provide “fully responsive” discovery for their respective pleadings to be restored.
[brief] ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Cases** | | | A.D. v. Franco, 297 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1993) | 32 | | Borough of Paramus v. Block, 1527, Lots 1-2, Assessed to Ridgewood Park Estates, 42 N.J. Super. 369, 375 (App. Div. 1956) | 37 | | Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) | 49 | | D’Atria v. D’Atria, 242, N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990) | 49 | | Delbridge v. Franco, 513 U.S. 832 (1994) | 32 | | Delbridge v. Schaeffer, 238 N.J. Super. 323, 340 (Law Div. 1989) | 32 | | Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) | 49 | | Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624, 155 ALR761.
[brief] The precedential value of the Board’s Foxdale decision is further diminished by the more recent decision of our Supreme Court under the Municipal Land Use Law in *Medici*, which further explains the reasons that variance decisions are not precedential under the MLUL more generally than just the “particular case” language of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d).  The effect of this decision on [...]’ argument is discussed in the Board’s Resolution:
[brief] C.  The State’s Argument is Incorrect because the State Substantially Downplays the fact that [...] was Never Afforded the Opportunity to Consult with his “Guardian” in Private  The State seemingly ignores the fact that [...] was never afforded the opportunity to consult with his “guardian in private at all.  The A.A. court found that the failure of the police to provide an opportunity for private consultation after Miranda warnings are administered should “weigh heavily” in a reviewing court’s totality of the circumstances analysis. ”  240 N.J. at 359.  The protections outlined in Presha remain good law.  To reinforce them and avoid what took place here, we add the following guidance.  The police should advise juveniles in custody of their Miranda rights—in the presence of a parent or legal guardian—before the police question, or a parent speaks with, the juvenile.
[brief] The court also found mitigating factor *N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(6)*, that [...] will compensate the victim ([...]) for the money taken.  The court gave the mitigating factor “slight” weight and concluded that the aggravating factors significantly outweighed the mitigating factors.  *8*  Defendant asserts that the court overlooked the application of mitigating factor *N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(11)*, the imprisonment of [...] would entail excessive hardship to his dependents because at sentencing defendant stated that he has a daughter and “a family that need me out there. ”  Additionally, the court should have considered the fact that he is relatively young (age twenty-five) and has a history of employment.
[directive] Medical Marijuana Enforcement Guidelines for Police, (with Attorney General • and Marijuana memo) — December 6, 2012  Medical Marijuana Enforcement Quick Overview — December 6, 2012  Memorandum of Guidance Regarding Municipal Prosecutors’ Discretion in Prosecuting Marijuana and Other Criminal Offenses — August 29, 2018  Missing Persons Policy of the Attorney General Regarding Missing and Unidentified Persons • Investigations (Updated December 1987)
[brief] (Da20).  Since [...] was ordered to return to jail full-time beginning on April 1, 2022, [...] has made repeated filings to stay or vacate his incarceration.  In March 2022, [...] appealed and filed related emergent applications to stay his full-time commitment.  (Pa202-206).  Shortly thereafter, in May 2022, [...] filed a motion in this Court seeking to vacate his commitment asserting there were changed circumstances based on the Connecticut court’s May 5, 2022 divorce judgment, or in the alternative for a remand to consider an application to reconsider his commitment based on the Connecticut decision or to conduct a hearing under Marshall v. Matthei, 327 N.J. Super. 512 (App. Div. 2000), concerning a claimed inability to pay by [...].
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  On Wednesday, December 8, 2021, Officer [...] of the [...] was on specific duty patrol enforcing traffic violations.  (7T8-1 to 9-10)  Shortly after 9:00 p.m., the officer was traveling on Ocean Avenue and observed Defendant make a left turn against a red light.  (7T11-1 to 13-7)  Officer Marchetti, whose view was clear and unobstructed, briefly followed Defendant before effectuating a motor vehicle stop.  (7T14-3 to 14-12; 15-9 to 15-22)  The officer’s car was equipped with an MVR which recorded all events at the scene.  A copy of this MVR was viewed by the trial court and moved into evidence as S-2.  (7T16-2 to 16-11; 17-11 to 17-13; 98-5 to 98-11)  Upon approaching Defendant’s car and attempting to speak with him, the --- \(^2\)A companion order confirming Defendant’s conviction and sentence was also issued, albeit with a date of April 16, 2024.  (Da25) officer immediately detected an odor of alcohol coming from both the car and Defendant’s breath.  (7T23-10 to 23-15; 8T5-8 to 5-11)  Defendant, whose speech was delayed, “nonchalantly” denied going through the red light and claimed it was “going green. ”  (7T21-1 to 21-7; 8T5-1 to 5-16)  Defendant also admitted he was coming from the [...] where he drank two beers.  (7T21-13 to 21-20; 8T5-5 to 5-11)  When the officer asked him to step out of the car, Defendant was “swaying” and “a little rigid. ”  (7T22-25 to 23-15)  Officer Marchetti then administered several standard field sobriety tests (“SFSTs”), all of which Defendant failed.  Despite being given specific instructions, Defendant kept moving his head and had to be reminded to look at the pen during the HGN test.  (8T5-23 to 6-4)  Officer Marchetti then administered the one-legged stand test.  Defendant denied having any injuries that would limit his ability to perform the test and the officer gave him two opportunities to complete it.  (7T27-11 to 27-18)  Both times Defendant stumbled and lost his balance, raised his foot higher than 6 inches, pointed it to the sky, and put it down before being told to do so.  (7T26-7 to 27-19; 8T6-5 to 6-21)  Finally, Officer Marchetti administered the walk-and-turn test.  Defendant was unable to maintain the starting position, swayed and lost his balance, and had to reset and reposition his feet.  (7T10-16 to 31-21; 8T6-22 to 7-5)  Defendant was then arrested for DWI.
[brief] As a consequence, plaintiff is barred from bringing direct claims against third-party defendants, the heirs at law of [...], deceased, to recover the benefit of the illegal bargain.  Pb 21.  Plaintiff, however, contends there existed a separate or collateral agreement between itself and [...] that was not illegal and, therefore, enforceable.  In support of this proposition, plaintiff looks to paragraph 3 (304a) of the “Important Notice and Disclosure” section of the title commitment issued by [...] through [...]  Pb 7, Pb 12, and Pb 21.  This point was not raised in the briefs submitted to the trial court below.  Rule 2:6-2(6) requires an appellant making a point for the first time on appeal to include in parentheses at the end of the point heading the statement “not raised below” in order to alert the appellate court to the fact that the trial court judge did not hear or directly decide the point.  In the present case, plaintiff never made an argument regarding an “agreement” based on paragraph 3 of the “Important Notice and Disclosure” section of the title commitment.  An issue raised for the first time on appeal will not ordinarily be considered unless it is jurisdictional in nature, or it substantially implicates the public interest.  *State v. Vincenty*, 237 N.J. 122, 135 (2019), citing *State v. Legette*, 227 N.J. 460, 481 fn.1 (2017).  Neither issue is implicated by plaintiff’s new argument.  We ask the court, therefore, to not consider plaintiff’s new argument.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Excerpted copy of Defendant [...]’s Answers to Interrogatories  .........................................................1a  Excerpted copy of Defendant [...]’s Curriculum Vitae Served with Answers to Interrogatories .......................3a  Discovery End Date Notice dated September 10, 2022 ...........................................4a Trial Date Notice dated November 21, 2022 .................................................................5a Defendant [...]’s Cross-Motion to Dismiss, filed December 29, 2022 ....................................................6a Certification of Counsel.................................................................6a Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion to Extend Discovery filed January 11, 2023 ........................................................................9a Certification of Counsel.....................................................................9a Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, filed February 9, 2023 ......................................................................12a Certification of Counsel....................................................................12a Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration filed March 9, 2023 ...........................................................................15a Certification of Counsel....................................................................15a Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate filed May 12, 2023 ............................................................................17a Certification of Counsel....................................................................17a Excerpted Letter Brief\(^2\) dated April 13, 2023 ..................................21a Letters Joining Codefendants’ Motions to Dismiss Appeal filed July 7, 2023 ..............................................................................25a Orders Denying Motions to Dismiss Appeal filed August 23, 2023 .......................................................................28a \(^2\) Excerpted portions of this brief are included, pursuant to Rule 2:6-1(a)(2) to elucidate a reference to “staffing shortages” in the trial court’s Order filed May 12, 2023 (163Pa).  Plaintiff’s appendix fails to include any documents supplied to the Law Division in support of this motion.  CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Excerpted Records of [...] for Plaintiff’s Admission from March 29 to May 17, 2019  ...........................................  1ca TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS  Defendant’s Appendix ......................................................................................... a  Defendant’s Confidential Appendix ................................................................. ca  Plaintiff’s Appendix ..............................................................................................
[brief] (Da15-16, Lease at § 4.01; 1T14-7 to 1T15-12).  Tenant had no obligation to pay rent when completing Tenant’s Work.  (Da11, 13-14, Lease at § 2.01).  Moreover, the Lease expressly provides that Tenant’s Work was solely for Tenant’s benefit:  It is understood and agreed that the improvements and installations being installed by Tenant are specific to Tenant’s business and are being procured for the sole purpose of enhancing Tenant’s business and not to confer any permanent benefit or enhancement in value on the Landlord or the Premises.  (Da34, Lease at § 8.05(b))  Pursuant to the terms of the Lease, Tenant’s Work was to be completed at Tenant’s sole cost and expense.
[brief] 417 N.J. Super. at 553-54.  Rather than separately identifying the possible victims of the terroristic threats charge, the jury instructions provided that the “the State alleges that defendant intended to terrorize . . . persons at or near . . . [the] High School. ”  Id. at 552.  The court also failed to give a specific unanimity instruction.  Ibid.  This Court reversed the conviction because “neither the jury charge nor the verdict sheet required the jurors to reach unanimity on which threat warranted a conviction.