ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] B.  The State Failed To Present Any Evidence From Which A Jury Could Find That [...] Committed First-Degree Robbery Against [...].  The State also failed to show that any robbery committed against [...] was a first-degree crime.  In a case like this, where the perpetrator of the theft did not actually possess a deadly weapon, the State may satisfy the element that elevates second-degree robbery to first-degree robbery by presenting evidence that the victim actually and reasonably believed that the defendant was armed.  Dekowski, 218 N.J. at 599, 608.  Here, the State failed to satisfy this element, as no evidence was presented that [...] actually believed that the perpetrator was armed.  [...] testified that when the man said, “[g]ive me all your money or I’ll shoot,” he had one hand in his sweatshirt pocket, and an object was protruding from the pocket that looked like it could be the tip of a gun.  (3T 95-14 to 19, 97-11 to 14)  From this testimony, a jury could conclude that if [...] did in fact believe that the perpetrator had a gun, that belief was a reasonable one based on the perpetrator’s statement and accompanying gesture.  However, [...] did not testify at trial.  Without [...]’s testimony, the jury had no evidence from which it could find that [...] herself thought that the perpetrator could be hiding a gun in his sweatshirt.  Nor was any evidence presented that would indicate that [...] even saw the perpetrator’s gesture.  If anything, the evidence suggests that [...] may have missed it, as [...]’s testimony established that [...] was with a customer when the perpetrator entered the bank and was not paying attention to the perpetrator’s words or actions.  (3T 95-8 to 11)  The Supreme Court has made clear that there is both a subjective-belief requirement and a reasonable-belief requirement in a simulated deadly weapon case.  See State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 593 (2014) (“That the victim believes that the robber may be armed with a deadly weapon is sufficient to satisfy the actual-belief requirement.  That subjective belief, however, must also be reasonable under the circumstances. ”) (emphasis omitted).  In this case, while the State presented evidence to satisfy the reasonable-belief requirement, it presented no evidence to satisfy the subjective-belief requirement.  The State therefore failed to prove that [...] committed first-degree robbery against [...].  In view of these critical holes in the evidence, the trial court should have granted in part the motion for a judgment of acquittal.
[directive] pretrial for move warrant, 2C:39-5 N.J.S.A. possession under unlawful charging cases in overcome be should rifles and (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)) handguns involving matters those particularly — Attorney consider shall the —prosecutors 2C:39-5(c)) (N.J.S.A. shotguns and as well as Act" of "Graves Enforcement the Uniform Ensure to Directive General 2008 Act'  `Graves of "Clarification entitled Memorandum General Attorney the States From Out-of-State Visitors by Committed Offenses to Respect with Directive Lawful."  Been Have Conduct Would Gun-Possession Their Where under charged offense  Asecond-degree Weapons.
[brief] And [...] advanced a contention that [...] failed to "file a notice of breach of contract along with a demand for payment," as if there was a requirement for some sort of notice to issue before [...] was permitted to file its counterclaim.  As to the wages that [...] had paid its custodians for the May-June 2020 period, [...] challenged the documentation [...] submitted, based upon its being dated in September-October 2020, which is when [...] made the wage payments with the funds it received from [...] in August 2020.  And [...] reiterated the content of a letter [...] had received from the union local to which the custodians assigned to [...] belong, which demanded that [...] make the outstanding payment, but incorrectly asserted that its members were owed wages for the entire period of April-June 2020.  And she asserted that something was amiss because the payment that [...] made to [...] was in an amount greater than the wages paid to its custodians as documented in [...]'s certification, apparently construing the COVID Statute to limit the obligation of the school district to paying the amounts due for wages to the custodians.  As stated above, the lower court entered Orders on both [...]'s and [...]'s motions for summary judgment, and on [...]'s motion to dismiss pursuant to R. 4:6-2; however, it employed the same five page Statement of Reasons for each.
[brief] In order to determine whether a jury has been tainted by extraneous information, the trial court must assess “the gravity of the alleged extraneous information in relation to the case, the demeanor and credibility of the juror or jurors who were exposed ... and the overall impact of the matter on the fairness of the proceedings. ”  *State v. R.D.*, 169 N.J. 551, 559 (2001).
[brief] [...]’s shift had already started at 6:45 a.m. on the date of the fatal collision, which occurred at approximately 7:00 a.m.  Thus, [...] was not where she was supposed to be and was not performing any work functions in the scope of her employment at the time of the crash.  [...] never clocked into work on the day of the crash.  The Legislature cannot have intended for the anomalous and unjust result that occurred here, in which a tortfeasor who caused a fatal collision has escaped without any civil liability, when her conduct had no inherent relationship to her work duties or the scope of her employment.  Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, the trial court’s December 15, 2023 orders granting summary judgment to Defendants [...] and [...] should be reversed and this matter should be remanded for trial.
[brief] It is “[a]n overriding principle of statutory construction” that courts must seek “to harmonize legislative schemes,” Richter, 246 N.J. at 538, “in light of their purposes,” Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. N.J. Div. of Tax’n, 189 N.J. 65, 79-80 (2006).  “Whenever statutory analysis ‘involves the interplay of two or more statutes, [courts] seek to harmonize [them], under the assumption that the Legislature was aware of its actions and intended’ for related laws ‘to work together. ’”
[directive] 19  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  Actor causes injury to another person during the course of an eluding or unlawful taking of a 2C:12-1b(6)  Aggravated Assault  2nd Degree $20,000 to $50,000 10% permissible means of conveyance.  Actor attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes significant bodily injury to another, 2C:12-1b(7)  Aggravated Assault or under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, 3rd Degree $15,000 to $35,000 10% permissible recklessly causes such injury.  Actor knowingly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human 2C:12-1b(9)  Aggravated Assault  3rd Degree $50,000 to $75,000 10% permissible life points or displays a firearm at or in the direction of a police officer.  2C:12-1c(1)(2)(3)  Aggravated Assault  (1)  Actor drives a vehicle or vessel recklessly; fourth degree if serious bodily injury results; 10% permissible 2nd Degree $20,000 to $50,000 by Auto or Vessel disorderly persons offense if bodily injury results.  20
[brief] ” (See Pb28).  But [...]’s testimony on the June 24, 2020 incident leaves no doubt.  (See Pa188 at 119:7-18) ([...] testified that he “just sat there and just kept calm. ”); Pa188 at 119:15-18 ([...] testified that he “relaxed” and “knew to just stay calm. ”); Pa188-89 at 120:25-121:23 ([...] testified that he completed his work after [...] yelled at him); Pa189 at 122:12-123:7 ([...] testified that he maintained his composure throughout the incident, relaxed, and “let her just do her thing”).
[brief] The unlawful search cannot be saved by resort to the inevitable discovery doctrine.  The trial court held that even discounting the heroin seen during the illegal search, there was sufficient probable cause for a warrant to the Mazda.  This seems to be a ruling on the State’s inevitable discovery argument.  In essence, the trial court reasoned that even without the illegal action there was sufficient probable cause so there is no reason to suppress.  This is the wrong inquiry under the inevitable discovery doctrine.  That doctrine permits the admission of illegally seized evidence if the State can establish that it was inevitable that the evidence would have been lawfully obtained, absent the illegality, not that it could have been.  Because the State failed to make that showing, the evidence must be suppressed.  Generally, when police gather evidence through an illegal search, that evidence must be suppressed.
[brief] Under the liberal construction required of pension statutes, his eligibility for the benefit is not in question.  In other words, [...] suffers from a 9/11 illness and is disabled as a result.  He qualifies for accidental disability benefits under the Ricci Act standard.  [...] was denied the ability to register his presence at the September 11th terrorist attacks and therefore also denied accidental disability benefits based on an unsupported finding that Division mailed a post card notifying him of his requirement to register.  This finding is arbitrary, capricious, and against the substantial weight of the evidence.  The Division alleges that the two-year time frame for registration requires strict implementation to “verify applicants’ dates and locations of service as witnesses and memories inevitably continue to become unavailable and fade.
[directive] When the service of a restraining order results in the seizure of weapons, a.  The weapons inventory should be attached to the return of service that is brought or faxed back to the issuing county.  b.  The weapons themselves, along with any licenses, I.D. cards, or other paperwork or documentation shall be secured by the prosecutor in the seizing county for storage.  At such time that the seized property is needed by the prosecutor or Family Division in the issuing county, the prosecutor in the seizing county shall forward same.  3.  Once service on the defendant is attempted, successfully or unsuccessfully, the return of service portion of the TRO (located on the back of the last page of the multipart TRO form) must be filled out by the police or sheriff's department and immediately returned to the Family Division prior to the scheduled final hearing date.
[directive] OPSI.  B.  Leadership of The Office shall operate under the supervision of an Executive Director, who shall be an experienced law enforcement professional appointed by, and who shall operate under the authority of, the Attorney General.  The OPSI Executive Director shall direct and supervise the work of the Office and its constituent organizational units, and shall devote their entire time to the duties of the Office.  The Executive Director of OPSI shall report to the Attorney General, through the First Assistant Attorney General.  OPSI.
[brief] [...] (herewith in “defendant”), defendant, appeals from a judgement of a downgrade N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b) conviction on de novo review, April 24, 2023.  The conviction stems from three of the plaintiff’s witnesses (1) [...] (herewith in “Ackles”), Assistant Superintendent I Corrections of New Jersey’s Juvenile Justice Commission, (2) Ackles “friend”, convicted felon and now exonerated, [...] (herewith in “Adowa”), (3) Ackles, unidentified “family member” [...] (herewith in “Dallad”), and a series alleged incidents that took place on November 2, 2021, November 7, 2021 and November 10, 2021.  It was ultimately the sole testimony of Ackles that led to the plaintiff’s ultimate conviction of the defendant as guilty and guilty on de novo review.  [...] argues the order finding defendant guilty and guilty on de novo review, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2A based on, (1) violation of court Rules, 3:23, 8:11-1, (2) plaintiff’s distorted version of the facts, (3) defendant, [...], did not engage in improper behavior; fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous conduct; (4) defendant’s conduct had no capacity to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm or recklessly creating a risk thereof; (5) defendant is disabled from multiple capacities at the time of the incident; and (6) defendant in no capacity was at the scene of the alleged incidents from November 2-10, 2023.  The decision should be reversed; attached are the supporting reasons and exhibits within this brief.
[brief] However, unlike the Sims plaintiffs, plaintiff argues that defendant [...] created the dangerous condition of the shaved tree root.  While the Sims plaintiffs were unsuccessful in their claim, the decision was based upon the fact that “the city does not have financial resources or the manpower to inspect every tree bordering every street in the city.  The city is allowed to fund and use its resources as it deems best in the face of competing demands. ”  Id.  Plaintiff [...] is not questioning the financial resources of the defendant but continues to argue that defendant [...] caused the decay of the shaved tree root when they conducted the repair of the sidewalk next to the tree.
[directive] Facie Prima the Invoking Cases 7.4.1 seeking of presumption the unless 7.3, Section under covered otherwise not cases  In pretrial apply for shall prosecutor 7.4.6, the subsection to pursuant overcome is detention pretrial recommended.  not is release that determines program services pretrial the if detention New a or Score PSA High Involving a Crimes Second-Degree or Fist- 7.4.2.a of Scope 4.
[brief] For example, in Laidlow, supra, 170 N.J. at 620-21, the Supreme Court, in consideration of evidence that the defendant company kept a safety guard inactive at all times and that plaintiff and another employee had previously experienced "close calls" with the same machine that ultimately caused plaintiff's severe hand injury, found "that [defendant] knew not only that injury was substantially certain to occur, but also that when it did occur it would be very serious."  Thus, the "conduct" prong was deemed satisfied.  Ibid.  Similarly, in Mull v. Zeta Consumer Prods., 176 N.J. 385, 387-92 (2003), the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the conduct prong was satisfied because plaintiff, whose hand was injured while using an industrial machine, presented evidence that defendant company had disabled the machine's safety device and had also been cited by OSHA for failing to properly train employees for use of the machine.
[brief] **The Forfeiture of Equity in the Property Is Severe**  The Property is Appellants’ most significant investment.  (103a-104a).  Appellants invested their life savings into acquiring and obtaining the approvals for the use and renovation of the Property.  (99a-101a).  They purchased the Property for $163,000 in April 2020 (93a-94a), and were successful in having the Property converted to a three family dwelling.  Appellants did not supply the lower court with an independent valuation of the Property, but noted that the Web Site Zillow attributed a value of $294,400 to the Property as of January 31, 2023.  (100a-101a).  Appellants believed this value to be accurate or low, especially based upon the Site Plan Approval converting the use to three (3) family.  (101a-102a).  According to Plaintiff’s Final Judgment, the total due to redeem Plaintiff’s certificate was $4,246.67 as of August 18, 2022.  (85a-88a).  Appellants estimated that with the addition of taxes for 2022, and statutory interest, that the amount necessary to redeem the Certificate was approximately $8,000 in mid-2023.  (102a).  Final Judgment was entered in this matter on November 7, 2022.  (85a-88a).  Title was transferred by Quitclaim Deed to [...] thirty-five (35) days later for consideration of $140,000.(465a-471, 344a-349a, 341a-343a).  H. Appellants’ Motion to Vacate the Final Judgment and the Disposition Thereof
[brief] DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT [...] IMPROPERLY ARGUES THAT TURNING THE SUBJECT PREMISES INTO A “POP-UP BAR” WAS THE ONLY USE OF THE SUBJECT PREMISES WHILE THE “POP-UP BAR” OPERATED AND NOT REASONABLY FORESEEABLE.  (P-59.)  Plaintiffs agree with Defendant [...] – the operation of the large, makeshift liquor concession stand on the Subject Premises was illegal.  See Def. [...]’s Brief at 24-25.  The Plaintiffs further agree with Defendant [...] that the intended users of the Subject Premises and the “objectively reasonable public” were “residents of the surrounding public housing units just trying to live their lives. ”  Def. [...]’s brief at 26.  Defendant [...]’s argument that the Subject Premises’ only use by the public generally was as a “pop-up bar” when the “pop-up bar” was in operation turns the holding of Garrison v. Twp. of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282, 287 (1998) on its head.
[brief] If an individual renders the services personally, then it is more indicative of employee status.  There was uncontradicted testimony that Petitioner renders all of her services personally and her law firm is not a vendor or contractor with [...].  The only information upon which the Respondent relies is there are other prosecutors who substitute for the Petitioner when she is either sick or on vacation.  However, it was conceded that the Court Administrator selects the substitute prosecutor and the special DWI prosecutor who sometimes substitutes for Petitioner, does so personally and not through his special DWI prosecutor appointment.  Even [...], who is a witness called by the Respondent, confirmed that it is the Court Administrator who has the responsibility to find Petitioner’s replacement and not the Petitioner.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6.  This result is confounding as the trial court’s original decision dismissing the Plaintiff’s complaint identified the disjunction in the Plaintiff’s argument that the Township was required to release N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b) information in the context of the Plaintiff’s OPRA request:  Indeed, plaintiff’s request solely sought investigatory reports and notes, not any specific information.
[brief] (6T 70-9 to 18).  On the cross-examination of [...], the investigating police officer conceded that during the pretrial interview, [...] remembered the Audi coming from the opposite direction than seen on the surveillance camera seized from the local business.  (6T 85-22 to 86-15, 90-1 to 21).  Closing arguments centered on the absence of credible evidence pointing to defendant as the shooter.  (10T 23-2 to 3).  Defense counsel argued that [...] did not identify defendant as the shooter at trial and that his pretrial statement to [...] was tainted.
[brief] ”); see also *Francavilla v. Absolute Resolutions VI, LLC*, 478 N.J. Super. 171, 180 (App. Div. 2024) (“[t]he M[aryland]C[onsumer] D[ebt] C[ollection] A[ct] also contains a private right of action, while New Jersey’s CFLA does not. ”); *Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding*, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550, 2023 WL 6157245, *8-9 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 21, 2023) (“Woo-Padva 2”) (“[p]laintiff cannot circumvent the lack of a private right of action by seeking relief under --- 9  *See also Browne v. Nat’l Collegiate Student Loan Trust*, 2021 U.S. Dist. Lexis 244537, 2021 WL 6062306 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2021) (holding there is no private right of action under the NJCFLA); *North v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184974, at *6, 2021 WL 4398650 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2021); *New Century Fin. v. Trewin*, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688 (Sup. Ct. May 24, 2018) (holding there is no private right of action under the NJCFLA).
[brief] Instead, the [...] present themselves as “creditors” of [...] by virtue of an alleged personal injury claim which occurred on July 23, 2021, long before the receiver was appointed and before [...] was in existence.  See [...]’ Brief at 1.  The [...] assert that simply because they have filed a separate lawsuit against [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] (but not the receiver or the Bank), they are “creditors” and have standing to bring this appeal.  However, the [...] are incorrect, and they have not complied with the required statutory procedure to become “creditors” in this instance and are precluded from bringing claims.  Pursuant to N.J. Stat. § 14A:14-15, a creditor is required to present written proof of its claim, under oath, to the receiver.  Once the claim is submitted, the receiver may request records and proofs related to the claim and “shall pass upon, and allow or disallow such claims, and shall notify the creditors of his determination. ”  N.J. Stat. § 14A:14-16.  It is only a “creditor who presents his claim to a receiver pursuant to this chapter and whose claim is disallowed in whole or in part by the receiver” who is entitled to a trial by jury on any issue.  N.J. Stat. § 14A:14-17.  In fact, “[a]ny creditor who does not file his claim…shall be forever barred from suing on such claim or otherwise realizing upon or enforcing it…”  N.J. Stat. § 14A:14-15(2) (emphasis added).  Here, the [...] knew or should have known about the receivership.  If the [...] were injured in July 2021 they had years to file their claim.  They failed to do so.  In fact, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the [...] ever contacted the receiver or otherwise presented their claim pursuant to the statute.  Thus, the [...] are not “creditors” under the law and, even if they were, the [...] would be barred from presenting their claim because they have failed to follow statutory procedure.
[directive] On December 7, 1999, an advisory was sent to all County Prosecutors concerning P.L. 1999, c.185, and the application of these amendments on prosecutions pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4- 50, 39:4-50.4a and 39:3-40.  In that advisory it was recommended that for the purposes of uniform enforcement, prosecutors treat these amendments as a sentence enhancement, not as an element of the underlying offense.  Revised DMV Standard (Refusal) Statements  Page 4 DWI & DWI/CDL Offenses departmental forms.  These Standard Statements are also accessible, in the Adobe Acrobat PDF format, on the Division of Criminal Justice Web Site at www.njdcj.org through the link identified as "DMV Standard Refusal Statement," or through a search under the same key words.
[brief] Count Eight (request for equitable relief) and Count Nine (punitive damages) are derivative of the seven “substantive” counts.  Judgment in favor of defendants on the substantive counts extinguished counts Eight and Nine, thus making a separate analysis unnecessary.  [...], [...] and [...] filed an answer to the second amended complaint on August 29, 2019.  (Pa212).  On October 11, 2019, this Court dismissed Counts Two and Four against defendants [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].  Claims against [...] were dismissed in the entirety.  (Pa223).8  [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...] filed an answer to the second amended complaint on October 23, 2019.  (Pa225).  Summary Judgment Proceedings