ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO [...] .................................................................13  A.  The Trial Court Properly Held That [...] Has No Duty in Connection with the Streetlight ..................................................................................13  B.  The Trial Court Properly Held That [...] Did Not Have Notice of the Alleged Streetlight Outage .................................................................20  C.  The Trial Court Properly Held That There Were No Material Facts in Dispute ...........................................................................................................26 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................27 ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Anderson v. Davoren,** No. A-6430-06T3, 2010 WL 307956 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 28, 2010) | 21, 22 | | **Application of Borough of Saddle River,** 71 N.J. 14 (1976) | 17 | | **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,** 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 11, 12, 13, 26 | | **Cochran v. [...],** 97 N.J.L. 480 (E&A 1922) | 15 | | **Essex Cnty. Welfare Bd. v. N.J. Bell Tel. Co.,** 126 N.J. Super. 417 (App. Div. 1974) | 17 | | **Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield,** 17 N.J. 67 (1954) | 12 | | **Kelsey v. Raymond,** No. A-4511-12T2, 2015 WL 1781565 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 21, 2015) | 12 | | **Polzo v. County of Essex,** 196 N.J. 569 (2008) | 16 | | **Press v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach,** No. A-2807-07T3, 2010 WL 307931 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 28, 2010) | 21, 22 | | **Samolyk v. Berthe,** 251 N.J. 73 (2022) | 13 | | **Sinclair v. Dunagan,** 905 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1995) | 14, 16, 20 | | **State v. Atl. City Elec. Co.,** 23 N.J. 259 (1957) | 17 | Vega by Muniz v. Piedilato, 154 N.J. 496 (1998)
[brief] In [...] v. [...], 311 N.J Super 333 (App. Div. 1998), [...]’s denial of ordinary disability was reversed by the Appellate Division.  On September 22, 1992, more than four years after [...]’s last contribution, the [...] sent him a letter stating that he had to return to work by November 22, 1992, or his pension account would expire.  [...] never received the letter.  [...] was involved in protracted litigation against his employer to request accommodations for a disability, which he claimed he could still work as a police officer.  Upon being denied his LAD claim, [...] applied for ordinary disability benefits.  The Board denied [...]’s application for an ordinary disability retirement on the grounds it was untimely.  Under the applicable PFRS statutes, membership ceases after 2 years from the date of the member's last pension contribution.
[brief] (20T 115-9 to 119-23)  To leave a print on the spot on the magazine where defendant’s print was discovered would have required the magazine to be separate from the gun at the time, [...] testified.  (20T 139-1 to 20)  [...] did not check the doorknob to the carriage house or the gate leading to the carriage house for fingerprints.  (20T 137-8 to 13)  [...], a ballistics expert, testified that both shell casings that were found and the spent projectile that was recovered were all fired from the gun that was recovered at the scene.
[brief] Further, the Court stated that “Merely stating that a pothole was in the general vicinity of the parking lot and yet unidentifiable by concededly accurate photographs is not enough to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on this issue. ”  (Pa9)  This is incorrect as Appellant submitted a photograph in which she circled the area she alleged the pothole to be and the Court does not mention or consider that in their opinion.  Despite Appellant’s allegations in the Complaint, and the statements set forth in her affidavit dated 1/26/21 along with the attached marked photographs, show that Appellant is able to identify the alleged dangerous condition.  (Pa241-251)  Therefore, the Court erred in not properly taking into account the claims alleged as to a dangerous condition and there was sufficient evidence to lead to a substantial issue of material fact for which the jury should have been able to determine whether the condition was considered dangerous.  It can only be concluded that the trial Court, in reviewing pieces of the deposition transcript of Appellant which were provided by the Respondent in the summary judgment motion, determined that although Appellant was asked to point out the condition in a Google image, which was taken at a different angle and from much further away, that because she could not point to the dangerous condition in that image that she was therefore unable to identify the condition at all.  However, this is not accurate as Appellant had previously submitted a certification and marked images of the dangerous condition.
[brief] ”  The Goff court further stated “that the inferential repeal of a statute is a pure question of intention and every reasonable intent will be made against such result.  *Ruckman v. Ranson*, 35 N.J.L. 565 (E.&A.1871)”.  See 6 N.J. at 607.  Similarly, in *Swede v. City of Clifton*, 22 N.J. 303, 317 (1956), the court stated, “The question of repeal is one of legislative intention; and there is a presumption as a matter of interpretative principle and policy against an intent to effect a repeal of legislation by mere implication.
[brief] In how many other cases has [...] fabricated testimony in order to justify a stop or secure a conviction?  DENIED AND THEIR DENIAL WILL BE SUSTAINED ON APPEAL.  We all know that is not how our court system functions.  I am proud to be an attorney in this State and have been practicing for forty-eight years.  I have never seen or heard anything quite like this, although the State drug testing laboratory debacle bears a faint resemblance.  One bad apple can upend what we seek to promote, namely a system of justice that operates above reproach.
[brief] That case was also a dispute about whether payments were due, not about whether a provider obtained benefits through fraud.  Defendants also argue that it would be bad policy to allow insurers to make payments and then sue for fraud.  See SDb23-26.  Plaintiffs did not pay Defendants just so Plaintiffs could later sue in court.  Courts would have tools to address that issue if such evidence existed in another case.  For example, if an insurer knowingly paid a benefit claim for the sole purpose of creating a fraud cause of action, a court might consider whether the insurer was actually deceived.  To the extent that an insurer could have, but chose not to, raise fraud as a defense in PIP ADR when doing so was practicable given the procedural limitations of the process, preclusion principles might apply.  Finally, the Third Circuit’s holding in *GEICO* was based on the narrow and different arguments before it.
[brief] See, Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 116 N.J. 517, 528-529 (1989).  The title commitment clearly required a deed from [...] and [...] to the plaintiff.  The parties do not dispute that plaintiff did not receive a deed for the property.  What is more telling, however, is the fact that [...] visited [...] in jail to have him sign a deed transferring the property into [...]’s name alone.  He did not record this deed, and instead held it until the closing with [...] on April 5, 2019 (263a).  In other words, he showed up at the closing with an instrument that fundamentally changed the real estate transaction because it changed title to the property.  Moreover, there is no evidence the parties to the transaction ever showed the real estate contract (239a) or the use and occupancy agreement (228a) to anyone.  [...] testified he met [...] alone in a conference room to sign the transaction documents.  (86a-87a, 73:9-74:12).  If [...] never received the basic transaction documents, and plaintiff showed up at the closing with an unexpected deed (263a), then the title commitment terminated, and [...] is not bound to issue a policy (301a).  [...] recognized this when he analyzed the motions for summary judgment (34a).  He correctly described this as a transaction between plaintiff as buyer and [...] as seller (38a).  It was a transaction first proposed in the seller’s home.  Id.  They did not receive a title commitment until after deciding on the terms of the sale.  Id.  The parties knew the home was subject to foreclosure and had a deadline of May 6, 2019, to complete the transaction (39a).  The trial court correctly summed up plaintiff’s claims against [...] as the failure to get a deed from [...] and wrongful denial of coverage under a title insurance policy and failure to pay plaintiff the policy limit (39a).
[directive] The Directive provides that determine the lawfulness of police investigations to use of force are not conducted by police rather and under the direct agencies, but are conducted by supervision of a County Prosecutor or Division of Criminal Justice.  the The Directive further provides that critical decisions are subject to multiple levels of independent review.  For example, the Directive specifies that in determining whether the use of force lawful, of was the circumstances the incident must be presented to a grand jury, composed of 23 civilians, for independent review its unless the undisputed facts indicate that the use of force was justified under the law.  Grand juries traditionally of serve to ensure the rights the accused and to assure the community that civilians, not just law enforcement officials, decide whether a criminal prosecution should be initiated.  In any where County Prosecutor overseeing the investigation decides not to present case a matter for review, decision itself substantive review and the to the grand jury its that is subject to approval the Director of the Division of Criminal independent review and oversight by Justice.  This process is made possible by the Attorney supervisory authority as the State's chief law General's officer, enforcement and pursuant to the Attorney General's specific statutory authority to participate in or any criminal investigation.
[brief] (5T:23-22 to 24-3 to 11)  The court noted only that these aggravating factors were “fully supported by the underlying record and … by the Appellate Division. ”  (5T:24-12 to 18)  The court did not address any of the mitigating factors argued by defense counsel apart from mitigating factor fourteen, that [...] was under the age of twenty-six at the time of the offense.
[brief] The written conclusions or opinion of a court do not have the effect of a judgment.  From them no appeal will lie.  ‘It is only what a court adjudicates, not what it says in an opinion, that has any direct legal effect. ”  Id. at 359 (emphasis added).  While an appeal from a final judgment raises the validity of all interlocutory orders that were previously entered in the trial court, In re Carton, 48 N.J. 9, 15 (1966), here there was no interlocutory order addressing the issue, nor was there any opinion addressing the issue belatedly raised on appeal.
[brief] 1T Transcript of October 6, 2020  Summary Judgment Proceeding 2T Transcript of December 14, 2021  Summary Judgment Proceeding 3T Transcript of February 23, 2022 Motions for Reconsideration regarding Summary Judgment 4T Transcript of June 29, 2022  Pretrial Conference 5T Transcript of September 12, 2022 Trial Proceeding 6T Transcript of September 14, 2022 Trial Proceeding 7T Transcript of September 15, 2022 Trial Proceeding 8T Transcript of September 16, 2022 Trial Proceeding 9T Transcript of September 19, 2022 Trial Proceeding 10T Transcript of September 20, 2022 Trial Proceeding 11T Transcript of September 21, 2022 Trial Proceeding 12T Transcript of September 22, 2022 Trial Proceeding 13T Transcript of September 26, 2022 Trial Proceeding 14T Transcript of September 27, 2022 Trial Proceeding 15T Transcript of September 28, 2022 Trial Proceeding 16T Transcript of September 29, 2022 Trial Proceeding 17T Transcript of September 30, 2022 Trial Proceeding 18T Transcript of December 13, 2022  Motions filed by Defendant for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and for a New Trial 19T  Transcript of January 10, 2023  Motion filed by Plaintiffs for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs  20T  Transcript of April 14, 2023  Motion for Reconsideration of the Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs filed by Plaintiffs  [...]’s Appendix was marked deficient on January 2, 2024 for including trial court brief(s).  Pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2), the trial court brief is included as it addresses whether an issue was raised in the trial court germane to the appeal, specifically regarding the Parol Evidence Rule.  All other deficiencies have been corrected.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
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[brief] (Pa0209).  The arbitrator found the parties intended the following outcomes:  1.  [...] could terminate the HPA without cause before tendering the second deposit, but in doing so, he would give up the non-refundable part of his deposit or $137,337 (35% of the initial deposit).  (Pa0206).  2.  Once [...] began work, if [...] defaulted in the performance of its work under the CC, [...] could terminate the CC only for good cause.  CC Article 14E allowed the Owner to terminate “in the event the Contractor shall default in any of its obligations hereunder, or shall default in any of its obligations as Supplier under the Home Purchase Agreement. ”  In addition, Article 14G required that the default event shall have occurred “through no fault of the party initiating the termination. ”  Further, Article 14G also required the party seeking to terminate to give notice and an opportunity for cure.  (Pa0206).  3.  CC Article 5.1 sets forth the payment schedule and required [...], upon signing the contract, to tender an initial deposit of 25% of the contract price of $578,558 for mobilization and on-site work.  It also allowed [...] to elect to cancel or discontinue the Agreement following the tender of the initial deposit but before making a second payment and “prior to commencement of work. ”  In that circumstances, on those conditions, [...] would give up the non-refundable part of the initial deposit or $202,495 (35T of the initial deposit).  (Pa0206).  4.  CC Article 14E states that if the Owner terminates properly, he shall not be obligated to pay any sums other than for work completed and/or supplies and materials delivered to and accepted by Owner.  The CC, however, is silent on the consequences if [...]’s termination was without good cause or if the default event giving rise to his termination notice occurred through some fault of his own.  Thus, ordinary contract principles and remedies apply to a termination without cause.  (Pa0207).  5.  With regard to the non-refundable deposit under the HPA, the parties and their counsel included an explanation in Section 3D.  It says the Purchaser ([...]) acknowledges the Supplier and/or Manufacturer “have incurred valuable time and expense in the preparation of engineering drawings and preparation and ordering of materials required for the production of the House and that any expenses incurred subsequent to the execution of this Agreement would be difficult to accurately estimate. ”  A similar explanation is included in Article 5.1 of the CC.  (Pa0207).  The arbitrator found the parties’ intent under the HPA was clearly expressed.  If [...] cancelled the HPA at any time before making the second payment, the parties understood [...] would keep the non-refundable portion of the initial deposit.
[brief] In that case, the appellant attorneys had been assigned a fifty percent interest in the proceeds of a personal injury claim.  The Court of Errors and Appeals held that "[a] right of action for personal injuries cannot be made the subject of assignment before judgment."  Id. at 662.  Weller was followed by the Court of Errors and Appeals in a later case, Goldfarb v. [...], 112 N.J.L. 413, 171 A. 149 (N.J.Sup.Ct. 1934), aff'd, 113 N.J.L. 399, 174 A. 507 (E. & A.1934).  In Goldfarb v.[...], supra,, the [...] obtained an assignment from [...] of "any and all sums of money which it may become entitled to" in a personal injury claim held by [...] against third parties.  Id. at 112 N.J.L. at 414, 171 A. at 149.  The trial court held that "this attempted assignment of defendant's right of action, or of the moneys to become due when the claim was reduced to judgment, was nugatory.  It is a firmly established rule that a right of action for personal injuries cannot be made the subject of assignment before judgment, in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary."  Id. (citing Weller, supra).  The Court of Errors and Appeals affirmed "for the reasons expressed in the opinion" by the trial court.  Goldfarb, 113 N.J.L. at 400, 174 A. 507.  The adoption of the trial court reasoning by the highest court in New Jersey, and the affirmation of its own prior ruling in Weller had the effect of making it the law in New Jersey.
[directive] Cause of Probable Affidavit of Submission Electronic 5.1 ..... Report 48  Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary Uniform Development of 5.2  Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary a in Information of Scope 5.3  Limited Report..........................................................51  51 ..............................  Information  Victim Contact of Protection 5.4  Charging Inform to Report  Incident Enforcement Law of Preliminary Use 5.5 .......................................................52  Decisions Enforcement Law Preliminary Prepare/Share and Access to Capacity 5.6 ..................................................52  Reports Incident 52 ............................................  Agencies Police 5.6.1  Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary to Access Electronic 5.6.2 53 ................................  Prosecutors On-Call by Reports 53 .......  COMPLAINT-WARRANT ISSUANCE OF AFTER APPEARANCE FIRST 6. 53 ..........................................
[brief] Id.  The Amended Complaint was also accompanied by a Motion for renewed and expanded injunctive relief restricting [...] from competing in any way with [...].  See R. Doc. 19.  Concurrent with the Amended Complaint, [...] also filed a Motion for Contempt, contending that [...] violated the TRO then in place by working for [...] and soliciting [...]’s customers within restricted areas.  See R. Doc. 20.  Thereafter, on October 28, 2013, after a second telephonic hearing, the Court granted the new TRO request in part and enjoined [...] from working in geographic areas covered by the Employment Agreement and from soliciting [...]’s customers within the same area, but denied it to the extent it sought injunctions on a national or company-wide level.  See R. Docs. 30 & 33.  *2  On December 18, 2013, the Court entered a Preliminary Injunction against [...], limited in scope to the terms set forth in the 2005 Employment Agreement, and granted [...]’s motion for contempt as to [...], but denied it as to [...].
[brief] ”  *E&H Steel*, 455 N.J. Super. at 25; See also *N.J.R.E.* 703.  Here, the sole basis for Plaintiff’s claim that paint made the steps in question more slippery is Plaintiff’s testimony during his deposition that “I believe that [the stairs] are sleeker or more – it’s – they’re a little rougher in the rain to navigate or when they’re wet than they were before. ” (Pa330, 20:2-9).  Such testimony is not relevant to the inquiry in this case, because Plaintiff did not slip on a “wet” surface covered by rain – he slipped on ice.  [...] noted this distinction in the trial court’s Statement of Reasons.  (Pa6 (“[I]t is clear that Plaintiff fell on ice, not a wet stair. ”)).  Reliance on Plaintiff’s lay opinion is further belied by the fact that Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he has no personal knowledge of a connection between paint and ice.
[brief] By order dated March 27, 2023, the Trial Court granted [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety, noting on the face of its order that the Trial Court granted summary judgment for the reasons placed on the record at oral argument.  (Pa6-Pa7).  Notably, during the February 27, 2023 and March 27, 2023 oral argument, the Trial Court held that [...]’s NJFPA claim failed as a matter of law because the Trial Court determined that [...] could not establish a “written agreement,” but did not address any basis for dismissing [...]’s tortious interference and indemnity claims.  (See 2T 18:18-19:16).  Based on the Trial Court’s decision to grant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Trial Court denied [...]’s Motion to Bar “as moot”.  (Pa9).  The Trial Court did not address that [...]’s Motion to Bar, which [...] admitted sought dispositive relief, was barred based on the plain language of the Case Management Order requiring such a motion to be filed by January 20, 2023.  (See Pa701-Pa702).  Subsequent to the Trial Court’s grant of [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, on April 17, 2023, [...] filed a Motion to Amend the Trial Court’s March 27, 2023 order granting summary judgment, pursuant to R. 4:49-2.
[brief] (2)  Accessory uses.  (a)  A single apartment, group of rooms, or other residence for the facility's religious leader within the same building or structure as the place of assembly for religious services or worship, hereinafter referred to as "cleric's inside residence."  (b)  Facilities for religious education and instruction, including but not limited to Sunday school, after-school learning and adult study groups, within the same building or structure as the place of assembly for religious services or worship, hereinafter referred to as "inside educational facilities."  (c)  A single apartment, group of rooms, or other residence for the facility's religious leader outside the same building or structure as the place of assembly for religious services or worship, but on the same lot or lots as is situated said place of assembly, hereinafter referred to as "cleric's outside residence."  (d)  Facilities for religious education and instruction, including but not limited to Sunday school, after-school learning and adult study groups, outside the same building or structure as the place of assembly for religious services or worship, hereafter referred to as "outside educational facilities."  (e)  Facilities for a convent or other housing for members of a religious order, separate and apart from a residence for the facility's religious leader, as referred to in (a) and (c) above.  (f)  Facilities for social functions such as, but not limited to, weddings, funerals, bar/bat mitzvahs and other similar events, hereinafter referred to as "social facilities."  B.  Private school facilities associated with a place of worship shall only be permitted as conditional uses wherever permitted in Schedule C, and shall be subject to the requirements set forth in § 230-163.