ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Lall v. Shivani 448 N.J. Super. 38 (App. Div. 2016)  Preliminarily, we note our concern with the trial court's approach.  We perceive no legitimate reason to "throw the law aside" in an effort to achieve a practical solution.  Notwithstanding the best of motives, a judge's role is circumscribed by the law.  A judge is not free to do whatever he or she thinks is best for a defendant, or a crime victim, without reference to controlling legal principles.  To do so is to depart from his or her proper role as a judge.
[brief] (Da4-5; 5T4:1-8; 5T13:25 to 5T14:25)  The case at bar stands in contrast to a factually similar unreported decision.  State v Herold, A-4329-17T4, is instructive because it was decided February 27, 2019, before the statute was amended to add the modifier “serious” to “threat” and “bodily injury. ”  Da9-13.  The lower Court’s finding that Defendant’s dog [...] was potentially dangerous was affirmed by the Superior Court on de novo review and again by the Appellate Division.  [...] was unsupervised and unrestrained on Defendant’s porch when he seized [...], a small dog walking by on a leash.  [...] died from multiple bite wounds on the neck and chest according to the treating veterinarian.  The defendant’s expert in animal behavior hurt, rather than helped, [...]’s case.  Defendant had argued on appeal that the State presented insufficient evidence that [...] posed “a threat of bodily injury to a human” or “a threat of death to a companion animal,” largely because the State called no expert witness.
[brief] See, MEPT Journal Square Urban Renewal LLC v. City of Jersey City, 455 N.J. Super. 608 (App. Div. 2018) cert. denied 263 N.J. 356 (2019); The State Comptroller’s Report on Tax Abatements (Aug. 10, 2010); The Redevelopment Handbook (Jan. 2012); State Office of Local Planning Services Urban Renewal Entity Oversight (Nov. 2018); The Municipal Tax Abatement Handbook (Nov. 2020).  Today, long term tax exemptions are not just confined to urban “areas in need of redevelopment. ”  Today, this festering non-urban renewal entity [...] Section 37 long term tax exemption validity issue is arising in suburban Mount Laurel fair share housing declaratory judgment actions.  Today, long term tax exemptions are a valuable tool to satisfying non-urban constitutional Mount Laurel fair share housing obligations.  Accordingly, residents are entitled to judicial guidance.  IV.
[brief] Thus, how [...] disciplined [...] does not justify a --- 3  The process for terminating tenured staff is more complex than and very different from the non-renewal process for non-tenured staff.  (Da405 ¶¶7-11).  4  Plaintiff claims without any support in the record that [...] used the racial slur again in May 2019 (Pb47), but the record shows that [...] used the slur only once in January 2019, and that the January 2019 incident was merely reported to [...] in May 2019.
[brief] 4.  THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT WAS SERVED ON DEFENDANT [...] AT HER NEW YORK OFFICE, AND DUE PROCESS WAS FULLY SATISFIED, NOTWITHSTANDING HER APPEARANCE PRO SE BY THE SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY FILED WITH THE COURT ON AUGUST 27TH, 2019 (Da4, Da11, Da16).  POINT 5.  THE LOWER COURT’S LETTER FILING IS ACCURATE AND PROPERLY DECIDED  THE ISSUE OF REINSTATEMENT OF THE COMPLAINT AFTER DEFENDANT [...] COMPLETED THE ARBITRATION PROCESS, AS WELL AS ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT [...] (Pa8).
[brief] *Scott v. Eli Lilly & Co.*, 2016 WL 1741241, at *2 (N.J. Super.  Ct. App. Div. May 3, 2016) (affirming summary judgment where the plaintiff had no expert proof of general causation); *Rutigliana v. Valley Bus. Forms*, 929 F. Supp. 779, 783 (D.N.J. 1996) (stating the plaintiff’s expert must first prove general causation).  And while Plaintiff tries to prove specific causation through her experts, neither did the work necessary to offer a reliable specific-causation opinion.  They do not provide the why and wherefore to support their inadmissible net opinions.  They performed no tests, conducted no research, and engaged in no scientific or medical analysis, instead offering personal opinions based solely on temporal association of Plaintiff’s alleged injuries to use of a product from a recalled lot.  The Trial Court failed to properly perform its gatekeeping role, once again, allowing “recall” and temporal association to substitute for qualified expert opinion derived from application of reliable methodology to the facts.  Given Plaintiff’s failure to marshal the evidence required to meet her burden to prove causation, allowing this case to proceed past summary judgment constitutes a manifest injustice.
[directive] The legislation anticipates that the Attorney General may delegate this statutory authority to a unit of the Department of Law and Public Safety, along with such other functions, powers, and duties vested in the Department of Law and Public Safety as the Attorney General may deem appropriate.  I have concluded that such a delegation is appropriate to facilitate the efficient and effective implementation of the functions established under and deriving from P.L.2022, c.56.  Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution; the Law and Public Safety Act of 1948, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-1, seq., which provides for general responsibility of the Department’s operations et and the supervision of the organization of the Department; and P.L.2022, c.56, which provides for the establishment or designation of an office within the Department of Public Safety to exercise all functions, powers, and duties of the Attorney General established under or deriving from that law and such other functions, powers and duties vested in the Department of Law and Public Safety as the Attorney General may deem appropriate, I have determined that the organization described herein is necessary for the efficient and effective operation of the Department’s functions, and hereby direct all Department personnel to implement and comply with the following directives.
[directive] We interpret a "joint law enforcement operationft as meaning a law enforcement effort which:  a.  Is designed to disrupt crime through the arrest of criminal offenders and the seizure of tainted assets, using accepted methods of investigation such as intelligence gathering and sharing, evidence gathering, informant debriefing, witness interviews, crime scene and forensic analysis, electronic monitoring, data analysis, etc.; Is b. conducted using authorized methods of investigation in order that the arrests and seizures become effective prosecutions and forfeitures before the or in courts of the United States of the state which --the operation exists; and . . - < j c.  Involves direct participation of a least one agent of in a federal agency participating the in other TFF than an oversight or coordination capacity; that is, in an operational capacity.  d.  The phrase "direct involvement" is defined as significant sustained participation in investigations, arrests, prosecutions, and related activities.  No. Directive October R e v . 18 1995 3, of Page 2 8 agency resources need not be actively engaged Federal in the operation at all times; nonetheless, they should be committed when the joint law enforcement operation is active.
[brief] *See Morgan St. Developers Urban Renewal Co. v. City of Jersey City*, No. A-2025-14T3, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1984, at *14 (App. Div. Aug. 30, 2016) (declining to allow a litigant to “claim the benefits” of a contract “while refusing its obligations”; Menorah Chapels at Millburn v. Needle, 386 N.J. Super. 100, 110 (App. Div. 2006) (a party may not repudiate one part of a non-divisible contract and claim the benefit of the residue, because to do so “would amount to unjust enrichment and would bind the parties ‘to a contract which they did not contemplate. ’”) (quoting Cty. of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80, 97, 707 A.2d 958 (1998)).  2.
[brief] I.  THE WRITE-IN BALLOT IN THIS MATTER WAS IMPROPERLY CAST AND SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED.............................................8  II.  THE BOARD PROPERLY REJECTED THE CONTESTED MAIL-IN BALLOTS........................12  A.  The Board properly denied the opportunity to cure a blank certification on a mail-in ballot ...........................................12  B.  The Board properly rejected mail-in ballots that were postmarked after the date on which the polls closed ....17  CONCLUSION..................................................................................20
[brief] Indeed, the United States Supreme Court more recently applied the *Brown* three-part test in *Utah v. [...]*, 579 U.S. 232 (2016), where police requested [...] to provide identification during an investigative stop later challenged as unconstitutional.  After relaying [...]’s information to a dispatcher the officer learned he had an open arrest warrant for a traffic violation.  [...] was arrested for the open warrant and drug evidence was seized during a search incident to his arrest.  *Id.* at 235–36.  In finding the discovery of the arrest warrant was a sufficient intervening event that broke the causal chain between the unlawful stop and the seizure of drug evidence, the Court emphasized that the attenuation doctrine evaluates the causal link between the government’s unlawful act and the discovery of evidence, which often has nothing to do with a defendant’s actions.
[brief] In addition, the Hooper Court pointed out that the subject indemnification provision only applied to third-party claims because of surrounding language – including a claim notice provision – that made this intent clear.  Hooper, 548 N.E.2D at 905.  Here, the PSA contains no such notice provision.  Oscar Gruss & Son, Inc. v. Hollander, 337 F.3D 186, 199-200 (2d Cir. 2003) is also distinguishable.
[brief] **Standard of Review**  “An appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction. ”  Rinaldo v. RLRI Inv., 387 N.J. Super. 387, 395 (App. Div. 2006).  “A court abuses its discretion when its ‘decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ’”  State v. Chavis, 247 N.J. 245, 257 (2021) (quoting State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020)).  In determining whether an abuse of discretion exists, a reviewing court “examines whether there are good reasons for an appellate court to defer to the particular decision at issue. ”  State v. R.Y, 242 N.J. at 65 (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).  “When examining a trial court’s exercise of discretionary authority, we reverse only when the exercise of discretion was ‘manifestly unjust’ under the circumstances.
[brief] ”  Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)(internal quotations omitted).  Here, [...] devoted pages 3 through 10 of the Facts section of her Appellate Brief and pages 21 through 27 of the Legal Argument section of her Appellate Brief to matters not raised below concerning the March 18, 2015 uncontested divorce hearing before [...].
[brief] Unlike the judges in Spivey and Reddy, the court in this matter did not inform [...] that he would be allowed to return to the courtroom if agreed to conduct himself appropriately.  Instead, the court told [...] that he would be barred from the courtroom “for the rest of the matter. ”  (4T 13-21 to 24)  This left [...] with the impression that he had lost his right to be present at trial permanently, which Allen does not permit.  See State v. Stuart, No. A-5060-06T4, 2010 WL 1190538, at *8 (App. Div. Mar. 30, 2010) (holding that the trial judge erred by failing to bring the defendant back into the courtroom after removing him to inquire as to whether he was prepared to behave appropriately if allowed to return to trial).6  (Da 11-20)  --- 6  Undersigned counsel is unaware of any contrary unpublished opinions.  R. 1:36-3.  This error requires reversal of [...]’s conviction.  Where a defendant’s absence from trial deprives him of his confrontation rights, prejudice is easily assessed.  *State v. A.R.*, 213 N.J. 542, 558 (2013).
[brief] Notwithstanding any requirements herein to the contrary, the following provisions shall also apply to all farm markets/farm stands:  (a)  Parking areas for farm markets/farm stands may be graveled so as to reduce impervious coverage.  Additional temporary or seasonal parking may be provided on maintained, grassed areas.  (b)  Farm markets/farm stands shall be permitted to be located in a front yard, provided that said structures meet the minimum front yard setback for the zone district in which it is located, and further provided that said structures meet the minimum side and rear yard setbacks set forth for accessory structures in § 230-128A(5).
[brief] We also conclude, for the sake of completeness, that even if we were to find that [...] violated the Rule by failing to mention the pending federal action, no lesser sanction would be appropriate here.  [...] and [...] have not demonstrated they suffered any prejudice by the lack of notice.  The impact of the lack of notice in [...]'s Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) certification was of very brief duration; [...] and [...] soon learned of the federal action and quickly moved for relief.
[brief] Such requests need not demonstrate that the property is “particularly suitable to more intensive development” in order to prove “special reasons” under the MLUL.  Randolph Town Ctr., supra, 324 N.J. Super. at 416.  Rather, in considering such applications, zoning boards of adjustment should focus their attention on whether the applicant's proofs demonstrate “that the site will accommodate the problems associated with a proposed use with [a greater density] than permitted by the ordinance.
[brief] The Court should affirm the trial court because plaintiff’s counsel had actual and apparent authority to settle the case based on plaintiff’s instructions.  Settlement agreements between parties in litigation are contracts.  Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 601 (2008); Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990) (citing Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super 118, 124 (App. Div.), certif. denied 94 N.J. 600 (1983)); Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Env't Prot., 447 N.J. Super. 423, 438 (App. Div. 2016); Kaur v. Assured Lending Corp., 405 N.J. Super. 468, 475 (App. Div. 2009); Jennings v. Reed, 381 N.J. Super. 217, 227 (App. Div. 2005).
[brief] The jury heard that: - [...]’s fingerprint was found on [...]’s car, which was the getaway car.  (12T 225-5 to 14)  - [...] was arrested six weeks before the shooting for “controlled substances” a block and a half away from the scene.  (9T 129-1)  - [...] told officers during his interrogation that [...] picked up “[...]” the day of the shooting and dropped him off near the scene.  (11T 132-2 to 139-6)  The jury did not hear that:
[brief] First, whether or not an arbitration was futile at that time, such purported futility would not excuse [...] from preserving its arbitration rights in its Answer, nor would it grant [...] free license to belatedly arbitrate by surprise almost six years later without at least placing [...] and the other parties on timely notice at the outset of [...]’s intent to arbitrate – particularly after affirmatively certifying to the contrary.  There is no law to support such a position.  Even in Chassen, which is cited by [...], the defendant filed its motion to compel arbitration just one month after a change in the law allowing it to do so.  Chassen v. Fid. Nat’l Fin., Inc., 836 F.3d 291, 303 (3d Cir. 2016).
[brief] See Borough of Glassboro, 457 N.J. Super. at 430-431 & 435.  The JLUB specifically recommended that condemnation not be used unless the Plaintiff did not remediate the Property timely.  (T1, 52:1–53:11).  The governing body shared that sentiment.  We as Council right now with this resolution, are not doing anything to affect the owners of this property.
[directive] Differential treatment.  Complaint that the taking of police action, the failure to take police action or method of police action was predicated upon irrelevant factors such as race, appearance, age or sex.  (g)  Demeanor.  Complaint that an agency member's bearing, gestures, language or other actions were inappropriate.  7  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021  (h)  Serious rule infractions.  Complaint for conduct such as insubordination, drunkenness on duty, sleeping on duty, neglect of duty, false statements or malingering.  (i)  Minor rule infractions.  Complaint for conduct such as untidiness, tardiness, faulty driving, or failure to follow procedures.  2.2.3
[brief] Id. at 553.  Plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of R. 4:9-3, which then permits the adding of the Cross Appellants as defendants, which is amended pleading is related back to the filing of the original Complaint.  First, the claim asserted against Respondents in the Second Amended Complaint arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence alleged or sought to be alleged in the original Complaint.  Specifically, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs’ original Complaint contained allegations concerning the conduct of lessees who may be liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries.  It was just that the Cross Appellants were not identified by name, just as “John Doe” defendants.  Second, the Cross Appellants had sufficient notice of this action and were not prejudiced in maintaining their defenses.  The motion to join the Cross Appellants was filed just twenty-six months after the accident – or just two months after, as they assert, the statute of limitations lapsed.  Discovery up to that date had been limited to written exchanges and document productions, which were all served on the Cross Appellants after their addition to the lawsuit.  Even as of the date they were joined, no depositions had been taken, given the time and effort which, by necessity, needed to be expended on efforts to obtain discovery and motions to compel.
[brief] Despite the PTA’s clear requirements (i.e., the Additional Backlog Conditions) regarding the transformation of a project to a Backlog Project subject to EGP payments and the PTA’s failure to include a method to calculate EGP other than requiring good faith negotiations, the Arbitrator went far beyond the scope of the parties’ agreement by: (1) transforming projects into Backlog Projects despite no agreement among the parties as to EGP and in the complete absence of any written amendment of the PTA signed by both parties,5 (2) claiming to rely on documents that were not signed by both parties and not prepared or identified as amendments to establish EGP as a contractual right or obligation, (3) abandoning the forecast figures in the documents that were ---  5  Under New Jersey law, a Court will enforce the unambiguous terms of a contract, including a requirement that amendments be made by writing, unless there is clear and convincing evidence to prove wavier of the writing requirement.  *Home Owners Constr. Co. v. Glen Rock*, 34 N.J. 305, 316 (1961) (“[The writing requirement may be expressly or impliedly waived by the clear conduct or agreement of the parties or their duly authorized representatives. ”). erroneously treated by the Arbitrator as amendments to the PTA and, instead, relying exclusively on the provably incorrect EGP claimed by [...] in its Statement of Claim, and (4) determining that a project known as [...] was subject to the PTA despite the fact that it was never eligible to be elevated to the status of a Backlog Project, and for the additional simple reason that [...]’s executed the contract for that project after the date as of which the Arbitrator deemed the PTA to have been terminated by [...].
[directive] Under this system, all county prosecutors’ offices will be making these fact-sensitive, case-by- case downward departures from uniformly determined starting points, in contrast to the plea negotiation system found by the New Jersey Supreme Court to be deficient in State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998), where county prosecutors could establish their own “standardized” plea offers that became the variable starting points for the application of upward and downward departures.  It should be noted that a Downward Departure for Trial Proof Issues is made only after the prosecutor has made any authorized adjustment within the applicable range based upon the grand total of Aggravating and Mitigating Factor points, and after the prosecutor has accounted for any increase in the term of parole ineligibility based upon all applicable Special Application and Enhancement Features.  In this way, the court will know the exact extent of the reduction that is based upon the prosecutor’s assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the case.  Note also that a Downward Departure for Trial Proof Issues does not affect the requirement that a defendant plead guilty to additional, nonBrimage-eligible charges when Special Application and Enhancement Features B (Booby Traps and Fortifications), C1 (No Early Release Act Offense) or D (Certain Offenses Involving Firearms) apply.  (This rule stands in contrast to the rule for a Downward Departure for Substantial Cooperation pursuant to Section 13, where a prosecutor is given the authority to refrain from requiring a defendant to plead guilty to an additional nonBrimage-eligible offense as part of a cooperation agreement.)
[brief] Here, the extraordinary circumstances of this case began when Defendants were originally in default for failing to answer within the statutory time period.  Despite dedicating time and resources in preparation for the scheduled Proof Hearing, Plaintiff’s Counsel, in a showing of good faith and professional courtesy, agreed to sign a consent order vacating the default just two days prior to the Proof Hearing.  (55a).  Then, on February 5, 2024, Plaintiff’s Counsel responded to all of Defendants’ Discovery Requests including production of documents.  (57a).  To date, Defendants have failed to respond to any of Plaintiff’s Discovery Requests, including production of medical documents that are necessary and that Plaintiff is entitled to for preparation of their Affidavit of Merit.  A Ferreira Conference was never scheduled by the Trial Court and the Conference was never waived by either party.
[directive] without aComplaint-Warrant for Must Enforcement Apply Where Law Cases 4.4 Complaint-Warrant.  by Charged Be Must That Crimes Specified 4.4.1 this of 4 Section of provision other any notwithstanding and 3:3-1(e), Rule by required  As cause probable to if acomplaint-warrant is there for apply shall agency enforcement law a Directive, committed: defendant the that believe 2C:11-3); J•S•A• (N murder 2C:11-4(a)); .J.S.A. manslaughter aggravated summons; on a released if process summons; a to response in appear will not defendant the that believe reason is to there (6) pretrial services the by release conditions pretrial of monitoring the that believe to reason is there (7) other witness, victim, any protect necessary to 2A:162-25 is N.J.S.A. to pursuant established program community. or the person, specified 35 Page 2C:11-4(b)); (N.J.S.A. manslaughter 2C:14-2(a)); (N.J.S.A. sexual assault aggravated (c)); or (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b) assault sexual 2C:15-1); J•S•A• robbery(N 2C:15-2); (N.J.S.A. carjacking or 2C:29-5(a)); (N.J.S.A. escape foregoing crimes. any the of commit to an attempt14 Detainers. Out-of-State or Jersey, Federal, New and Extradition Cases