[brief] Overturning a Verdict Against the Weight of the Evidence  Mockler actually provides a very relevant discussion as to setting aside a jury’s verdict for being against the weight of the evidence; which is precisely what Appellant is seeking to do herein.  The verdict of the jury may not be set aside as against the weight of the evidence unless it clearly and convincingly appears that it is the result of mistake, partiality, prejudice or passion.  Mockler, 102 N.J. Super. 582, 588 (1968); citing R. 4:61-1.  “We, too, may not set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence unless, having given due regard to the opportunity of the trial court and the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that the verdict was the result of mistake, partiality, prejudice or passion. ”  Id., at 589.  In the instant matter, the jury was given the opportunity to judge the credibility of Appellant’s testimony and to determine those facts to exist as true, to then apply the legal definition of negligence and determine whether Appellant’s conduct constituted negligence.  The jury determined based upon the factual record and the model civil jury instructions that Appellant was negligent; even though they had the opportunity to decide to the contrary had they felt Appellant’s actions were that of a reasonable and/or ordinary person in the same position.  The jury was never instructed that a rear-end collision is negligence and/or that skidding/sliding of a vehicle implies negligence.  There are numerous actions on the part of Appellant, which the jury had to consider: including but not limited to the merge into the left lane and the decision of when to apply his brakes.  There are numerous inactions on the part of Appellant, which the jury had to consider: including but not limited to the failure to brake earlier and/or coming to a stop in traffic as opposed to merging into a shorter line.  Simply put, there is no scenario where it becomes clear and convincing that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence.  Even had the jury been charged with the exact language sought by Appellant, the verdict could have (and likely would have) been the same.  As such, even if by some measure it is determined the Trial Court erred by not instructing the jury as to Appellant’s requested charge, it was harmless error.  Even, however, analyzing the issue under the *plain error* standard of R. 2:10-2, the mere possibility of an unjust result is not enough; and in the context of a jury trial, the possibility must be ‘sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.  *See State v. Funderburg*, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016); *see also State v. G.E.P.*, 243 N.J. 362, 389 (2020).  Thus, the plain error standard requires a determination of: "(1) whether there was error; and (2) whether that error was 'clearly capable of producing an unjust result,' R. 2:10-2; that is, whether there is 'a reasonable doubt . . . as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.'"  *State v. Dunbrack*, 245 N.J. 531, 544 (2021).  Given the abundance of evidence in this matter from which the jury could have determined Appellant’s negligence, regardless of whether the Court read Appellant’s requested charge; even if this Court were to determine it to be plain error not to have given the requested charge, a reversal would not be warranted.  **IV.