ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [Pa233].  Additionally, as the trial court noted in denying leave to amend, the facts supporting the claims in the proposed Second Amended Complaint were known to Appellants at the time they filed their initial Complaint and First Amended Complaint in March 2019 and July 2021, respectively.  [Pa3308].  Specifically, the Appellants were well aware that the Lease contained a confidentiality provision, that the [...] had information as to the Lease and its terms, that the Lease was terminated, that a new lease was entered into with the [...] and that the [...] acquired the Solar Rights when they gained control of the Property.  [Pa3309].  These are the facts that formed the basis for Appellants’ claims in the proposed Second Amended Complaint against [...].  Yet, none of these facts were new or recently discovered.  While these facts were known to Appellants prior to the commencement of the Underlying Action in 2019, the Appellants did not assert any claims against [...].  Instead, they allowed discovery to conclude after 2½ years and four (4) discovery extensions, before ever seeking to add these claims.  The trial court, correctly recognizing the prejudice and the Appellants’ inability to justify their failure to assert the claims earlier, denied Appellants leave to amend the First Amended Complaint.
[brief] Appellant/Plaintiff has argued that his intent upon amending the policy was to notify respondent/defendant [...] that he was living in New Jersey when he updated his mailing online address with [...] and that a layman would not understand that changing a mailing address is not equivalent to chaining the garaging address.  However, [...] has admitted that he did not read the Declarations pages of his insurance policy upon issuance.  Had he read the Declarations page, it would have been clear that the garaging location of the vehicle is separate from the mailing address.  The motor vehicle accident that gave rise to this action occurred over a month after he amended the policy, giving him ample time to read a single page.  It should be noted that this appeal appears to only be for respondent/defendant [...]’s grant of summary judgment, even though [...] was also granted summary judgment on June 7, 2024, through an unopposed motion.
[brief] Defendant was brought before the court for sentencing a month later, on August 25, 2006.  The sentencing proceeding began with the prosecutor recounting the efforts of his office to communicate with the victims of the robberies and the responses his office had received.  The prosecutor advised the trial court that the desk clerk at the [...] in [...], [...], had been “pistol whipped” during the robbery, which had required “extensive dental work,” and that [...] was also suffering from “post traumatic syndrome. ”  In addition, the prosecutor advised the court that the victim of one of the robberies defendant committed in Atlantic City was “severely hurt” and was suffering from “post traumatic syndrome. ”  At this point, the trial court stated that it was “on the fence” with respect to acceptance of the plea bargain between the State and defendant.
[brief] Indeed, as stated in Township Code §175-160: Rural Development Zoning Districts  A. Purpose.  (1)  The rural development zoning district is transitional in nature.  It is fragmented by existing development and agricultural uses.  The area is relatively open in nature and is, thus, important from a cultural, visual and ecological standpoint.  The intention of the Zoning Plan and Ordinance is to both maintain, where practical, the existing character of the district and preserve it as land reservoirs for future community development.
[directive] Prematuras sujetas a la (N.J.S.A. (NERA) 2C:43-7.2)  No Early Release Act  Supplemental Plea Form for (NERA) Cases (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2)  (Spanish)  Es necesario que conteste las siguientes preguntas solamente si está aceptando culpabilidad por de uno de los siguientes el 29 de delitos graves de primer o segundo grado, o por una tentativa o conspiración para cometer tal delito, que ocurrió junio del 2001 o después de esa fecha: asesinato, homicidio no premeditado con agravantes u homicidio no premeditado, homicidio con vehículo, agresión con agravantes, desarmar a un agente del orden público, secuestro, agresión sexual con agravantes, agresión sexual, robo con violencia, robo de un automóvil con personas adentro, incendio intencional con agravantes que expone a otra persona al peligro de muerte o lesiones corporales graves, escalamiento o allanamiento con fines delictivos, robo mediante extorsión al obtener bienes de otro amenazándole con infligirle lesiones corporales, o restringir o sujetar a cualquier persona, o cometer otro delito, trampas explosivas en instalaciones de fabricación o ocurrió el 18 de junio del 2002 distribución de CDS o responsabilidad objetiva por muertes provocadas por drogas; o que o después de esa fecha; terrorismo, o producir o poseer armas químicas, agentes biológicos o dispositivos nucleares o ocurrió el 13 de enero del 2008 o después de esa fecha: radiológicos; o que delitos de mafia de primer grado; o que ocurrió el 14 de agosto del 2013 o después de esa fecha; ocurrió el 1 de noviembre del pornografía infantil; o que 2013 o después de esa fecha; tráfico de armas de fuego.
[brief] The fundamental basis of Defendants’ Appeal is that the Amended Complaint fails to plead actual malice.  They argue that actual malice may not be imputed from one defendant to another, (Db 20-22), and more broadly, that [...]’s allegations about the [...] did not provide any specific facts evidencing the [...]’ state of mind, (Db 23-27).  These arguments, whether correct or not, are completely irrelevant under the “wholly unbelievable” and “dubious veracity” standards.  As set forth in great detail in the Amended Complaint, and in the Amplification Order, Plaintiff pleaded that the Defendants’ defamatory statements were “wholly unbelievable” and that they were made in “reliance on an informant of dubious veracity. ”  Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32, 66, 101, (Da 016, 023-24 & 035-36); see also Amplification Order at p. 6 (Da 218) (“the Complaint in Neuwirth pales in comparison to the record here . . . the allegations in the Amended Complaint demonstrate ‘wholly unbelievable’ and ‘reliance on an informant of dubious veracity. ”).  Indeed, [...] recognized a critically important point about the actual malice standard that the [...] ignore: a plaintiff need not plead a comprehensive series of “behind-the-scenes” or “insider” facts regarding defendants’ communications in order to show that there was a “high degree of awareness of . . . falsity” or that the defendants had “serious doubts” as to the truth of their statements, and thereby satisfy the actual malice standard.  See Neuwirth, 476 N.J. Super. at 391-392; Costello, 136 N.J. at 615 (“[r]arely will direct evidence exist to meet that burden.  Instead, a plaintiff might show actual malice by demonstrating that the defendant had ‘obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports. ’”) (internal citations omitted)); Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1089-90 (3d Cir. 1988); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 692 F.2d 189, 196 (1st Cir. 1982).  Yet, this impossible standard is exactly what the [...] seem to demand of [...].  Through no fault of her own, [...], who has not yet had an opportunity to conduct discovery, does not have access to the [...]’ internal emails or phone records, or other evidence regarding what they knew and when they knew it.  Almost no defamation plaintiff could possibly have access to such evidence prior to discovery.  This is why there is a **second path** to pleading actual malice, as set forth in *Neuwirth*.
[brief] Da4.  [...] was ostensibly the lowest bidder at $707,513.13, while [...] was ostensibly the second lowest bidder at $745,546.15.  Da4.  On August 7, the County wrote to [...] explaining, “your firm has been rejected for the following reason: Contractor did not provide NJDOT Prequalification Letter as required in specification[.]”  Da350.  On August 19, twelve (12) days after the County’s rejection letter and twenty (20) days after bid opening, [...] wrote to the County arguing that the NJDOT Notice was not a required document and, even if it was, the defect was waivable.  Da356-57.  [...] did not provide its NJDOT Notice with its August 19th letter.  Da356-58.  On August 20, thirteen (13) days after the County’s rejection letter and twenty-one (21) days after bid opening, [...] provided a supplemental letter that included a copy of its NJDOT Notice.  Da360-64.  The County responded that it considered [...]’s failure to provide the NJDOT Notice with its bid a material defect and that it could not be waived or cured.
[brief] (Dca 1, clip four, 27:20 to 28:20).  [...] then said that all police needed was the gun, so that defendant could be charged.  (Dca 1, clip four, 28:20 to 28:25).  After confirming with [...] that she was not in trouble, [...] told police how defendant directed her to hide the gun in an apartment, but that, as nobody answered that door, she first left the gun in a bag outside the apartment but later returned, took it, and placed it in her bedroom.  (Dca 1, clip four, 28:25 to 30:15).  [...] quickly mentioned that a Consent to Search form should be obtained, and another officer took a form from a folder.  (Dca 1, clip four, 31:15 to 32:05).  Meanwhile, Sergeant [...] stepped aside to discuss on the phone with an unknown person the subject of searching her room, and whether [...] could be released without charges.  Returning, [...] then explained to her, twice, that she was not in trouble, but would have to travel to a police station to provide a statement.  (Dca 1, clip four, 30:25 to 33:00).  Shortly afterwards, [...] removed [...]’s handcuffs, which she had been wearing for about twelve minutes.  (Dca 1, clip four, 33:53 to 34:08).  Now unshackled, [...] walked at an unhurried pace from the street into the courtyard with Sergeant [...] and other officers, where the group met [...].
[brief] This matter was commenced by complaint on December 2, 2021.  The complaint was titled as a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs.  (Pa380)  An Answer was filed on September 7, 2021 (Pa461)  A Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on March 2, 2023 (Pa24)  The Court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment and issued a final Amended Order on April 28, 2023 (Pa1)  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Defendant’s Resolution also asserts that [...]’s conclusion was “inconsistent with the testimony of other witnesses who testified on behalf of the applicant, namely [...] and [...]. ”  Ja030.  Again, this assertion is pure invention and belied by the evidence.  [...], [...], and [...] provided consistent testimony.  The Resolution never identifies any such inconsistency.  For obvious reasons, it cannot.  [...] repeated several times that the proposed facility would be a “bulk general warehouse storage facility.  It’s not a parcel hub.  It’s not a last mile facility. ”  (2T 17:13-23).  The project will be “[t]ypical bulk distribution, warehouse and distribution building.  The traffic [...] testified to in terms of those activities. ” (4T 43:22-24).  [...] agreed, that “these buildings, really, are representative of bulk warehouse, not fulfillment, not specialized high bay, you know. ” (5T 47:23-25).  Everyone agreed on the character of the facility, and the traffic it will produce based on the ITE classification.  [...] and [...] both testified that the industry has focused on higher buildings because of advancements in the racking process and technology, and in pursuit of increased capacity through greater density, and less utilization of land.  (5T 11:20-25; 12:1-10; 47:12-16; 52:16-23).  But, increased density and capacity by way of taller buildings do not equate to a de facto increase in traffic.  Rather, [...]’s testimony expressly contradicts that conclusion: But more often than not, the higher --the higher the building sometimes can cause a decrease in occupancy count.  Lots of the taller buildings are more automated; therefore, less employee count density.  So predominantly we've actually seen an inverse relationship with building height and number of people working in those facilities.  (5T 53:14-21).  [...] provides a similar conclusion in his testimony about the antiquated height and parking requirements:  [Y]our ordinance has a standard, which I think is somewhat antiquated and requires a lot more parking than these type of facilities generally require, again, given the fact that a lot of the good storage and retrievable is automated, which translates into lower employee ratios than what warehousing had been 20, 30, 40 years ago.  (5T 81:4-10).  A review of the record makes clear that [...]’s conclusion that ‘increased building height does not by default increase traffic’ is supported by his well-reasoned expert testimony, based on the industry standard ITE, and is consistent with the testimony provided by other witnesses.  The Defendant’s unsupported rejection of [...]’s credible testimony, by way of deeming his conclusions a “net opinion”, unsupported by other witness testimony, was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.
[brief] [...] implicitly agreed with this proposition by conceding it is “common sense” that “no one should start a fight just because they disagree with the other person about the application of grout. ”  [8T 92:14-93:3].  As did [...].  [7T 105:11-24].  Ultimately, Plaintiffs’ position presumes that a fully-trained Red-Vest employee would always be able to avoid a violent confrontation when answering a customer question, regardless of that employee’s personal knowledge, characteristics, attributes, or general disposition towards others.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 18A:8-44(2)(a) ............................................................................................20, 21 N.J.S.A. 18A:8-50(8).................................................................................................22, 27 N.J.S.A. 18A:13-1, et seq.  .........................................................................................5  N.J.S.A. 18A:13-34 .................................................................................................25, 26, 27 N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47, et seq.  .....................................................................................17  N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.1 ...............................................................................................18  N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.1, et seq.  ..................................................................................9, 10, 11 N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.3 ...............................................................................................23, 29 N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 ...........................................................................................passim N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a) ....................................................................................16, 18, 25, 27, 28  RULES
[brief] APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO NOTIFY  PROGRESSIVE WAS NOT OVERSIGHT OR MISTAKE  Appellant/plaintiff  [...] argues that by changing his mailing address, he believed to be informing [...] that he was moving to New Jersey and that his car would be kept in New Jersey.  He further argues that this was an oversight or harmless mistake that should not cost him coverage.  Plaintiff argues that they should not be penalized because he failed to navigate the computer system.  Appellant/plaintiff also argued that he did not know what “principally garaged” means.  However, [...]’s omission of not telling [...] that the motor vehicles were insured under the policy was not an honest mistake or mere oversight.  A question in an insurance application that asks where a vehicle is to be garaged is an objective question.  See Kerpchak v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 97 N.J.L, 196, 198 (1922) (question in application requiring applicant to provide address of physician last consulted was not ambiguous and called for a statement of fact, not an expression of an option.  Appellant/plaintiff subject state of mind as to interpret the question is not material and is not relevant in determining its falsity.  State v. Nasir, 355 N.J. Super. 96, 106 (App. Div. 2002).
[brief] Ultimately, the legislative purpose behind the law is to protect consumers from unscrupulous practices of debt adjusters of all types, including those who might use their law licenses as a shield to avoid regulation and scrutiny of their debt-adjustment practice by the Department.  The potential dangers posed by exploitative attorneys in debt adjustment cases are widely recognized in other jurisdictions as illustrated in the comprehensive report by the [...].  (Ra1-188.)  Specifically, unscrupulous attorneys employ the “purported attorney model” which involves “the fraudulent and deceptive inducement of consumers into believing that attorneys will be providing legal assistance in helping them address consumer debts with creditors, while the attorneys involved, if any, do not deliver meaningful legal assistance to individual consumers. ” (Ra78).  Thus, these practitioners act as regular debt adjusters but without supervision of state regulators and without regard to various statutory requirements for debt adjustment.  (Ra77).  The DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor is aimed to address the dangers of the “purported attorney model.
[brief] (Response to Point IA of Appellant’s Brief) | 11 | | B.  The Trial Court Did Not Err In Finding That The Board Did Not Hear Contrary Testimony (Response to Point IB of Appellant’s Brief) | 18 | | C.  The Environmental Impact Assessment Was Submitted In Accordance With The Ordinance Requirement (Response to Point IC of Appellant’s Brief) | 22 | | D.  The Trial Court Did Not Err In Finding That A Review By Board Professionals Is Sufficient And That There Is No Environmental Impact Of The Subdivision (Response to Point IID of Appellant’s Brief) | 23 | | III.
[brief] Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Lease Rider read as follows:  2.  If [Plaintiff] does not receive approvals from the Town of West New York for its proposed use of the property for a café (restaurant), and bakery on the first floor of the building and a retail clothing store on the second floor of the building on or before September 30, 2016, [Plaintiff] shall have the right to accelerate the Termination Date of the Lease on (10) days’ notice to [[...]].  (Pa1244).  a)  [Plaintiff] will provide [[...]] with a copy of its application to the Planning Board or Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Town of West New York, inclusive of Architect’s Plans and all other exhibits or submissions on or before July 15, 2016. (Pa1244).  4.  [Plaintiff] will diligently prosecute its application for approvals referenced in Paragraph 2 above at [Plaintiff] ’s expense.  (Pa1245).  Discovery in both the Lease Litigation and the Instant Action showed that Plaintiff began investigating the sanitary sewer connection in June or July of 2016.  Plaintiff presented deposition testimony in the Lease Litigation that in an effort to determine the ability to establish a sewer connection, [...], on behalf of Plaintiff, ran a camera down a toilet that went “nowhere. ” (Pa0193-Pa0194,T129:14-130:24).  [...] testified that he was looking to apply for permits with the City of West New York but was told that he was “wasting [his] time, there’s no sewer there. ” (Pa0195-Pa0196,T131:16-132:6).  [...] never disclosed this information to Defendants.  Instead [...] claimed that he disclosed this information to [...], who was going to report the findings to [...], but did not know if this ever occurred.  (Pa0198-Pa0199,T134:21-135:18).  [...] purportedly told [...] to cancel the lease sometime in July after learning about the sewer connection issue from the town of West New York.
[brief] Therefore there is no record of this belatedly introduced intent the State asserts it had eight years ago for “two separate, distinct resolutions,” (an assertion belied by the fact that there was in fact one resolution for all of the pending charges).  (State’s brief 8)  The State cannot now for the first time invent a new rationale for its opposition to this motion and assert unsubstantiated facts in support of that opposition.  It had one complaint for the last two years: [...] did not meet the Slater standard.  That is the only issue that should be considered on appeal.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING DEFENDANTS TO ENFORCE A PROVISION OF A CONTRACT DECLARED VOID BY THE LEGISLATURE (Raised Below: T1)  As explained herein, at all times relevant to this action, the Assignor Defendants lacked the licensure required to even possess [...]’s alleged account, let alone enforce the void contract governing the same.  Indeed, the Assignor Defendants have never disputed that they were unlicensed under the NJCFLA.  Rather, in replying to [...]’s Opposition to their Motion to Compel Arbitration, Defendants attempted to obfuscate the purpose of the NJCFLA and undermine the Act’s legislative intent and application.  In granting Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration, the trial court erred by failing to acknowledge or analyze the issue of voidness of the contract governing [...]’s account under the NJCFLA.
[brief] Another relevant case is *Hambsch v. Harrsch* (1991) whereby Harrsch was insured under an [...] policy which had an exclusion for bodily harm "which is expected or intended by the insured."  [...] refused to indemnify Harrsch for committing the intentional "act" of discharging an airhorn; which unfortunately occurred near plaintiff's face resulting in physical injury to Hambsch's right ear.  Defendant [...]'s motion for summary judgment was denied so that "a jury may determine whether the policy exclusion is applicable to defendant Harrsch's actions."  *Hambsch* at 228.  [...]' [...] policy has similar language; and likewise, the matter should be remanded.
[brief] Rb24-31.  The 1998 amendments were created to reverse the continuing judicial abrogation of the immunity statute, with the intent of specifically including [...] in its protections as well as all other railroads operating in New Jersey.  Pa1027.  In doing so, the Legislature specifically modified the statute so that it bars recovery when a person engaged in prohibited conduct, regardless of where the conduct occurs.  Moreover, the legislature removed the sentence present in the prior version that stated, “[t]his section shall not apply to the crossing of a railroad by a person at any lawful public or private crossing”, replaced it with, “[t]his section shall not . . . prohibit a person from using a crossing established by the railroad” and then added a new subsection (b), which bars recovery of any damages caused by contact with a train while the person was “(5) using the property of any railroad in a manner in which it was not intended to be used or in violation of posted regulations.