ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] An appellate court defers to a trial court's evidentiary rulings absent an abuse of discretion.  *State v. Garcia*, 245 N.J. 412, 430 (2021) (citing *State v. Nantambu*, 221 N.J. 390, 402 (2015)).  Appellate courts review the trial court's evidentiary rulings “under the abuse of discretion standard because, from its genesis, the decision to admit or exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to the trial court's discretion. ”  *State v. Prall*, 231 N.J. 567, 580 (2018) (quoting *Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.*, 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010)).  Under that deferential standard, an appellate court “will not substitute [its] judgment unless the evidentiary ruling is ‘so wide of the mark’ that it constitutes ‘a clear error in judgment. ’”  *Garcia*, 245 N.J. at 430 (quoting *State v. Medina*, 242 N.J. 397, 412 (2020)).
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court has taken the rare step of mandating leave to appeal in this matter, yet according to Plaintiffs, this Court should ignore the trial court’s legal error and simply defer to its sweeping discovery order (the “ESI Order”).  In their view, the conceded fact that the Order requires Defendants to produce tens of thousands of entirely irrelevant documents is a “tradeoff” “inherent” to all civil discovery—one this Court cannot question.  Plaintiffs are wrong.  This Court owes no deference to discovery orders based on an incorrect legal premise, as a trial court has no discretion to order discovery unauthorized by the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.  And the ESI Order here is demonstrably contrary to Rule 4:10-2, which explicitly limits the scope of discovery—including e-discovery—to documents that are relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.  Plaintiffs falsely portray the Order as a narrow exercise of discretion unique to this specific case.  But the trial court itself described its procedure as its “usual” practice in all cases involving e-discovery, which the court pronounced to be “fundamentally different” than traditional paper discovery.  The Order thus rests on a clear misunderstanding of New Jersey law, which—consistent with the broad nationwide consensus—applies the same relevance standard to e-discovery that applies to all other forms of discovery.  The trial court had many tools to ensure Plaintiffs received the relevant documents to which they were entitled, but simply overriding Rule 4:10-2(a)’s relevancy limitation was not among them.  That foundational legal error alone compels reversal of the ESI Order.
[brief] Equally irrelevant are pages upon pages of speculations in the Intervenor’s brief – with no citations to the record – regarding purported implications in the Supplemental Form, the distinctions between renting vans before and during the camp period, or what the word “hiring” might mean when applied to Uber or Lyft.  (Ib23).  The issue here is whether [...]’s responses to the straightforward questions on the Supplemental Form were objectively untruthful.  See Tri-State Armored Servs., Inc., 332 B.R. at 710-11.  They plainly were.
[brief] RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION FAILS TO RATIONALLY JUSTIFY THE [...]’S ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE DETERMINATION THAT THE STATE POLICY EXTENDS TO NON-STATE WORKPLACES UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES NOT INVOLVING STATE BUSINESS (Aa10-Aa11).  The [...]’s reasoning that the State Policy applies in this case to conduct that allegedly occurred at the local union office because it is “a location that can be reasonably regarded as an extension of the workplace . . . where State business is being conducted and discussed” is overbroad and plainly erroneous as applied to the facts of this case.  (R2b10 (quoting N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(a)(1).  The [...]’s Statement explains that because [...] “represents other State employees, the Commission correctly determined that the State Policy applied not only to the immediate vicinity of a State building but to the union office as well. ”  (R2b10 (emphasis added)).  Initially, no one disputes that the State Policy applies to the immediate vicinity of a State building.  That suggestion, repeated by [...] in its opposition brief, is a red herring.  (Rb25 (describing the “front of a state building” as “off-site locations ‘where State business is being conducted and discussed’”).  The question is whether [...]’s jurisdiction under the State Policy extends to an off-site location under circumstances where no State business is being conducted or discussed.
[brief] On Counts Three and Four of the Indictment, she sentenced defendant to 12 years in New Jersey State Prison with a four-year period of parole ineligibility.  [6T13-2 to -16].  On Counts One and Two of the Indictment, she sentenced defendant to five years in New Jersey State Prison.  [6T13-19 to 14-4].  [...] ran all of the sentences concurrently to each other.  [6T14-8 to -10].  She imposed the following financial penalties and fines:  On each count, she imposed $50 VCCB, $75 Safe Neighborhoods, and a $50 lab fee.  [6T13-8 to -9; 6T13-16 to -17; 6T13-23 to -24; 6T14-5 to -6].  On Counts Three and Four, she imposed the additional penalties of $2000 DEDR penalty.  [6T13-9; 6T13-16].  On Counts One and Two she imposed $1000 DEDR penalty.  [6T13-24; 6T14-6].  Additionally, on Count Four, she imposed a $30 LEOTEF penalty.  [6T13-8 to -9].  This appeal follows defendant’s conviction.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Plaintiff’s own expert, [...], testified that residents need permission from their attending to call for a c-section; they cannot do so on their own.  (Def. Exhib. B, 62:4-63:22).  He stated the latest that the c-section could be completed was 10:10 (or 17 minutes earlier), if a resident had to follow protocol.  (Def. Exhib. B, 63:4-18).  The facts are that [...] could not have called the c-section.  [...] called [...], who was not at the hospital, when the fetal heartbeat decreased for a second time, [...] left for the hospital.  While she was on the way, [...] was asked to review the decel.  He was in surgery at that time (See Pl. Brief, p. 14 (stating, this places the initiation of this other procedure at about 9:57 p.m. ”)).  In a hypothetical world where [...] did call for the c-section at 9:48, she was not available to perform the procedure.  There is zero evidence that [...] would have started [...]’ c-section prior to the one he was engaged in or before 10:12 p.m.  Therefore, the Court’s decision to grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
[brief] See, In re IMO Town of Harrison and Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 116, 440 N.J. Super. 268, 299 (App. Div. 2015) (“[W]hether a state agency is abiding by a valid state law ‘is a fundamental concern of the Attorney General both in his capacity to the agency and in his capacity and responsibility as protector of the public. ”).  Also see, [...], “Op-Ed: We must call out lawyers who don’t honor their oath” The Star Ledger (May 6, 2023)(Pa528).  (“Beyond representing clients, lawyers take an oath that holds them responsible for being “officers of the court,” which means they have an obligation to tell the truth and obey court rules, to promote justice and uphold the law. ”)  In addition, Rule 1:4-8(a) imposes a continuous obligation of due diligence and candor upon an attorney.  By signing a pleading, an attorney certifies to the court that he or she has read the pleading, written motion or other paper and that: (1) the paper is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; (3) the factual allegations have evidentiary support or, . . .  (4) the denials of factual allegations are warranted on the evidence or, as to specifically identified denials, they are reasonably based on a lack of information and belief or they will be withdrawn or corrected if a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery indicates insufficient evidentiary support.  Here, however, the public entity defendant transcended the boundaries of legitimate legal advocacy.
[brief] The camcorder videos that were turned over to [...]’s Counsel were incomplete and did not fully show who did what to whom.  “The defendants knew that the body cam and dash cam were necessary for plaintiff’s case.  The scenes showing force admittedly stated by police in video and the choke hold by which many black men have died at the arms of the police were not revealed. ”  (1T5-12 to 18; Pa078)  The Highland Park Judge refused to grant the Plaintiff’s Counsel request for an Order dismissing the charges due to the unlawful destruction of the recordings which the city was put on Notice to save and not destroy.
[brief] ”  *Campione v. Arizona Beverages USA*, No. A-1186-22, 2024 WL 65482, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 5, 2024) (internal citations omitted); see also *MacDougall*, 144 N.J. at 391 (1996).  Further, “to support a *Pierce* claim, a plaintiff must show that he or she made a sufficient expression of a disagreement with a corporate policy, directive, or decision based on a clear mandate of public policy derived from legislation, administrative rules, regulations, decisions, or judicial decisions. ”  *Campione*, 2024 WL 65482, at *5.  As the court below properly concluded, no such public policy was in place at the time of Appellant’s termination.  There is not a CEPA case.
[brief] State v. Ruffin, 371 N.J. Super. 371 (App. Div. 2004) ...............................................7 State v. Russo, 333 N.J. Super. 119 (App. Div. 2000) ..............................................17  State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. 363 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 466 (1997) .................................................................9  State v. Serret, 198 N.J. Super. 21 (App.Div.1984), certif. denied, 101 N.J. 217 (1985) ............................................................... passim State v. Twiggs, 233 N.J. 513 (2018) ........................................................................9  State v. Washington, 165 N.J. Super. 149 (App. Div. 1979) ......................... 19, 20, 24 State v. Welek, 10 N.J. 355 (1952) ..........................................................................7  State v. Williams, 441 N.J.  Super. 266 (App. Div. 2015) ........................................6, 11 State v. Zadroga, 255 N.J. 114 (2023) .................................................................  30 State v. Zenquis, 251 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 1991), aff’d, 131 N.J. 84 (1993) .................................................................  26 State, New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Cullen, 424 N.J. Super. 566 (App. Div. 2012), certif. denied 213 N.J. 397 (2013) ...........................................  25
[brief] *See* 2T at 26 (citing *Sanner v. Ford Motor Co.*, 144 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (Law Div. 1976) (“[a] manufacturer is not under a duty to provide every ‘known safety device’”), *aff’d*, 154 N.J. Super.  407 (App. Div. 1977)).  **Plaintiff’s expert** admitted as much, stating: there is no “federal or state law that requires the inclusion of every possible technology, even those that may be considered safety systems on every --- \(^7\)  This is consistent with New Jersey law.  *See* N.J. Stat § 39:4-88 (“When a roadway has been divided into clearly marked lanes for traffic, **drivers of vehicles** shall obey the following regulations … [(b)]  A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from that lane until **the driver** has first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety….”); *see also State v. Woodruff*, 403 N.J. Super. 620, 625 (Law Div. 2008) (“Section 88(b) imposes two requirements.  First, a driver must, as nearly as practicable, drive within his single lane, in other words, maintain his lane.  Second, a driver may not change lanes until he can do so safely.  The first clause of section 88(b) proscribes deviation from a lane.  Thus, it covers situations where the driver has no intention to change lanes, or where the driver does not or cannot change lanes. ”). vehicle. ”  Pa192.  There is simply no duty to design a vehicle that is accident-proof.  *Huddell v. Levin*, 537 F.2d 726, 735 (3d Cir. 1976) (applying New Jersey law; “the manufacturer is not required to produce an accident-proof vehicle”).  For this reason, Plaintiff’s focus on the feasibility of LKAS and LDW, or his experts’ claim that it is safer, or that it may or may not be industry standard, (Pb13-16), does not change the result.
[brief] (8T41-2 to 7).  The judge then applied three aggravating factors—N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), (6), and (9)—and found two mitigating factors, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(1) and (6).  (8T41-11 to 42-2).  As a result, he placed “great weight” on defendant’s prior criminal history, which clearly convinced him that the aggravating factors “substantially outweigh[ed]” the mitigating factors.\(^7\) (8T46-19 to 24).
[brief] But, that is not at all relevant or material to the valuation of the fee simple estate.  The Appraisal of Real Estate, 15th Ed. Recognized as authoritative by New Jersey Courts, states at pg. 415:  ...When the fee simple estate is valued, the presumption is that the property is available to be leased at market rates.  When an appraisal involves the valuation of the fee simple interest in a leased property, the valuation of the entire bundle of rights applies.
[directive] 6.2.1  Following the principle that the primary goal of internal affairs and discipline is to correct problems and improve performance, management in the subject officer's chain of command should handle relatively minor complaints.  Complaints of demeanor and minor rule infractions should be forwarded to the commanding officer of the subject officer's unit because it is often difficult for an immediate supervisor to objectively investigate a subordinate.  In addition, that arrangement might obscure the possibility that part of the inappropriate conduct was the result of poor supervision by the immediate supervisor.  While the structure of each law enforcement agency is different, it is recommended that minor complaints be assigned to and handled by a commanding officer at least one step removed from the officer's immediate supervisor.  This includes complaints from within the agency.  Often Human Resources may need to be notified and involved.  26 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021 6.2.2
[brief] A recent Appellate Division panel considered the application of a different amendment to the NJFCA under different circumstances.  Specifically, *State ex rel. [...] v. [...]*, 2024 WL 875633 (App. Div. Mar. 1, 2024), considered whether a substantive change to the definition of “original source” should apply to a case where the trial court dismissed the complaint more than two years prior to the 2023 amendments.  *[...]* does not apply to this case because it did not consider the 2023 Veto Amendment.  The only question before the court was whether the definition of original source should apply retroactively.  Because that amendment modified the substance of an exception to the public disclosure bar by making it easier for relators to satisfy, see Pa29, it exposed defendants to a greater scope of liability than they faced prior to the amendment.  In contrast, the 2023 Veto Amendment does not alter Defendants’ substantive exposure at all, nor does it change the availability of the public disclosure defense.
[brief] Assocs. Grp. v. Oritani Sav. Bank, | 27 | | 219 N.J. 496 (2014) | | | Baker v. Nat’l State Bank, | 69 | | 161 N.J. 220 (1999) | | | Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., | 70, 71 | | 56 N.J. 383 (1970) | | | Cappell v. Capell, | 43 | | 358 N.J. Super. 107 (App. Div. 2003) | | | Carter v. Reynolds, | 52 | | 175 N.J. 402 (2003) | | | Davis v. Devereaux Foundation, | 50, 57 | | 209 N.J. 269 (2012) | | | Di Cosala v. Kay, | passim | | 91 N.J. 159 (1982) | | | Dynasty, Inc. v. Princeton Ins. Co., | 47 | | 165 N.J. 1 (2000) | | | Est. of Hanges v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., | 39 | | 202 N.J. 369 (2010) | | | Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, | 39, 68 | | 171 N.J. 561 (2002) | | | Frugis v. Bracigliano, | 27 | | 177 N.J. 250 (2020).
[brief] A.  The Clean Energy Act  In 2018, the Clean Energy Act was amended to impose specific annual reductions in natural gas usage in the state.  N.J.S.A. 48:3-87.9 now reads in relevant part:  a.  No later than one year after the date of enactment of P.L.2018, c.17 (C.48:3-87.8 et al.), 1 the Board of Public Utilities shall require each electric public utility and gas public utility to reduce the use of electricity, or natural gas, as appropriate, within its territory, by its customers, below what would have otherwise been used.  ***  Each natural gas public utility shall be required to achieve annual reductions in the use of natural gas of 0.75 percent of the average annual usage in the prior three years within five years of implementation of its gas energy efficiency program.  [N.J.S.A. 48:3-87.9, emphasis added.]  The import of this part of the Clean Energy Act is that [...] and other natural gas utilities must make measurable progress in reductions, B.
[brief] The long-standing public policy barring coverage for intentionally-inflicted injuries “stems from a fear that an individual might be encouraged to inflict injury intentionally if he was assured against the dollar consequences. ”  *Burd v. Sussex Mutual Ins. Co.*, 56 N.J. 383, 398 (1970).  In *Voorhees v. Preferred Mutual Ins. Co.*, supra, the Supreme Court considered the question of when an insurer can refuse to provide coverage for the intentional action of an insured on the ground that the alleged damages did not result from a covered occurrence, defined in that policy and in the NJM policy as “an accident.
[brief] (Ja405-417).  The court concluded that applying Tyler to Plaintiff’s tax foreclosure – which had been completed nearly four years before she filed the present complaint – was tantamount to full retroactivity, in contravention of Roberto’s mandate of pipeline retroactivity.  (Ja413).  Plaintiff appealed.  (Ja419).  \(^6\)  The court also denied as moot Plaintiff’s motion to hold the case in abeyance because Tyler had issued.  (2T5:1-6).  LEGAL ARGUMENT I:
[brief] (See Db26.)  Much like [...]’s attempt to mischaracterize the Trial Court’s thorough analysis of the Settlement Agreement as a “modification” of same, [...] also falsely claims the Trial Court “modified” [...]’s Revocable Trust.  (See id. at p. 28.)  To be clear, and as set forth above, the Trial Court did not “modify” anything—it determined [...]’s probable intent, which was readily apparent based upon the clear and unambiguous terms of [...]’s Revocable Trust.  (See Da277a.)  That interpretation should be affirmed.  The doctrine of probable intent is codified in N.J.S.A. 3B:3-33.1.
[brief] [...] parking lot was a “known narcotics area” due to its location on Route 37 and proximity to the Parkway, despite being unable to articulate a specific number of drug-related arrests and despite not having received any complaints of drug transactions in that area.  1T:39-6 to 40-4.  On the day in question, [...] observed a Toyota pick-up truck, later identified as the Codefendant, pull into the [...] parking lot and park on the southwest side of the lot without exiting the vehicle.  1T:19-21 to 20-1.  Approximately five minutes later, [...] observed a Honda, later identified as the Defendant, pull into the lot and park next to the Codefendant.  1T:21-3 to 21-4.  He then observed the Codefendant exit the vehicle and enter the passenger side of the Defendant’s vehicle.  1T:21-7 to 21-9.  [...] observed that both drivers were male but could not identify either driver.  1T:21-10 to 21-24.  He then observed the Defendant drive around the lot, then stop one aisle away from where the Codefendant’s vehicle was parked, at which point the Codefendant exited the Defendant’s vehicle, entered his vehicle and exited the parking lot.  1T:22-2 to 22-22.  He then observed the Defendant exit the parking lot.  1T:22-23 to 22-25.  [...] did not receive any advanced information about either driver, 1T:40-9 to 40-13, did not witness a hand-to-hand exchange of objects or money between the drivers, 1T:41-15 to 41-17, did not observe either driver attempt to conceal anything, 1T:41-18 to 41-21, and did not notice anything specifically about either driver, 1T:42-1 to 42-5.
[brief] 3T122:1-4.  When confronted about the P&L statements that he prepared and the requests that were asked of him by [...], he agreed that he would do things that seemed “irregular” to him, but that he did them anyway.  3T122:19-123:3.  When asked why he continued to comply with financial processes that were irregular, he testified that “it certainly wasn't worth blowing up the company over that issue. ”  3T123:19-124:22.  While [...] attempted to ask more questions to uncover these irregularities, the Court ordered pro se Plaintiff to end her cross and “step down” as requested by opposing counsel.
[brief] (Pa98.)  The Trial Court found that Plaintiffs “bear the heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of validity according the decision of the Governing Body by showing that it was ‘arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. ’” (Pa92) (citations omitted).  The Trial Court cited to Section 7(d) of the LRHL as the appropriate standard for approving a Redevelopment Plan, i.e., that it either be “substantially consistent” or “designed to effectuate” the Master Plan.  (Pa92 (citing N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d)).  The Trial Court found that Plaintiffs failed to specify how the Redevelopment Plan failed to meet the Section 7(d) standard.  (Pa92)  The Trial Court also pointed to Plaintiffs’ concession that the substantial consistency standard Redevelopment Plan “does allow for ‘some inconsistency. ”” (Pa93 (citing Plaintiffs’ trial brief admitting same).)  The Decision addressed Plaintiffs’ generalized complaints about the Redevelopment Plan, such as increased building heights and traffic, noting that there was “no record support” for such contentions.  (Pa93.)  To the contrary, the Redevelopment Plan addressed all such criteria and demonstrated how they were consistent with the Master Plan.  (Pa93.)  The Decision found that even if Plaintiffs demonstrated that the Redevelopment Plan was not substantially consistent with the Master Plan, they still had the burden to show the Governing Body was arbitrary and capricious, which they did not do.
[brief] (Aa 115 and Aa120)  In other words, the funds to award a two percent raise did not exist.  [...] specifically explained that two percent as applied to this Union would cost the City $17,817,106 including $2,628,370 in retro pay which was 2.8 million dollars over the City’s salary offer and that there was at most $370,000 in reserves in the City’s 2023 budget.  (Aa120)  He went on to state that even if the City haphazardly diverted the entire surplus and cap banking in 2024, it would still come up short.  (Aa121)  The decision leaves little to the imagination with respect to the Arbitrator’s thinking.  Clearly, the Arbitrator thought that it was not in the best interest of the public to use every available penny to fund fire officers’ raises who were already the highest paid group of employees in the City.  With respect to the retro pay award, although the Union may not like the retro pay award, the Arbitrator certainly explained his rationale in detail when discussing the City’s finances and what funds he believed could be utilized to fund salary increases and retro payments.  (Aa 119-122,145-146)  Contrary to the Union’s assertion, internal comparables were considered, but simply did not dictate the result.  [...] took a detailed look at the increases received by the other Unions and acknowledged the importance of maintaining a pattern of settlement among bargaining units of the same employer, but ultimately determined that it would not be appropriate to award a two percent increase.