ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”) ; *Cowger v. Cherry Hill Mitsubishi, Inc.*, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 620, at *14 (App. Div. Mar. 14, 2011).  The Cowger case is especially on point.  There, the plaintiff filed a CFA lawsuit after the defendant car dealership wrongfully retained a $500 deposit she paid to test drive a car.  After receiving service, the dealership issued a credit of $500 to the plaintiff’s bank account and moved for dismissal based on lack of standing and mootness, exactly as [...] has done here.  The Appellate Division rejected this attempt to avoid CFA liability for treble damages through a simple refund, reversing the trial court and holding that [t]he CFA requires only that the plaintiff have suffered an ascertainable loss at the time suit is filed.  See N.J.S.A. 56:8-19 (declaring that "[a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss . . . as a result of the use or employment by another person of any . . . practice declared unlawful . . . may bring an action . . .")...
[brief] **  Defendants attempt to distinguish the soil contamination on the Property from the capped asbestos in *Malanga* by noting, correctly, that capped asbestos is contained while stating, incorrectly, that there is petroleum currently leaking from the underground tanks on the Property.  (Db35-38) (“Capped asbestos is more akin to petroleum products when they are encapsulated within a tank.  Like capped asbestos, when petroleum products are encapsulated within an oil tank, it is not dangerous. ”).  The trial court reviewed the testimony from the Joint Land Use Hearing and the Borough Council meeting and, after applying the standard set forth in *Malanga*, determined:  The testimony of the [borough] planner and comments of the mayor do not appear to be sufficient to meet the needed substantial evidence threshold.  The planner indicated that ‘if not remediated the condition would be detrimental to the safety… of the community. ’  Here, clearly the site is being remediated.  The mayors comments were specifically not addressed to the specific detriment from the site but were in the context of a more general comment as to the risk of soil contamination.  (T3, 56:20-57:4)  The trial court found that, like the asbestos in *Malanga*, the contamination at the Property does not pose a detriment to the safety of the public.  Further, contrary to Defendants’ statements, there is currently no petroleum or petroleum products leaking on the property.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, RAYMOND S.  SANTIAGO  MONMOUTH COUNTY PROSECUTOR  /s/  [...]  By: [...], 041202006  Assistant Prosecutor Director, Appellate Section Of Counsel and  On the Brief email: [...]  MD/mc Date: March 13, 2024 c  [...], A.D.P.D.  April 8, 2024  SCOTT M. WELFEL ID. No. 084402013  Ass’t Deputy Public Defender  [...]  Of Counsel and On the Letter-Brief  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] See id.  Importantly, Appellant certified that she was specifically told that her employment would not begin unless she immediately logged onto the portal and clicked through these various screens.  See id.  As a direct result of the pressure from Respondent [...] about timely acknowledging the policies, Appellant rushed through all of the screens on Respondent [...]’s portal from her cell phone in the waiting room for her doctor’s office.  See id.  Among other things, Appellant recalls these documents related to various company policies, such as the company’s paid time off policy, an employee handbook and appropriate workplace conduct.  See id.  Importantly, Appellant further certified that no one from Respondent [...] explained to Appellant that by clicking through the screens on the portal, Appellant was impacting her legal rights in any way.  See id.  Even after clicking through the screens on the employee portal, Appellant was not provided with copies of the policies she reviewed while awaiting her pre-employment health screening.
[brief] (10T:18-25 to 21-20).  In addition, defendant’s assertion that the trial court’s decision not to give the diminished capacity instruction because there was no “expert testimony” was error completely ignores the Court’s analysis and decision in Baum, thus is legally misplaced.  (Db 21).  In Baum, the New Jersey Supreme Court reiterated its previous holding in Galloway, that “despite the lack of a definition in the Code...whether a condition constitutes a ‘mental disease or defect’ is one to be made in each case by the jury after the court has determined that the evidence of the condition in question is relevant and sufficiently accepted within the psychiatric community to be found reliable for courtroom use.
[brief] *State v. Jamerson*, 153 N.J. 318, 324-25 (1998).  The Court explained that the medical examiner’s “testimony should have been limited to describing the physical properties of the implement that caused the [victims’] deaths, narrating the physiological status of the bodies at the time of death, and ruling out the possibility that the injuries were self-inflicted or sustained as a result of mere inadvertence.
[brief] Here, the trial court prevented me from properly proving my CFA claim, which is completely unlike the defendants’ failure to present any evidence or testimony to challenge my testimony that the undisclosed clause was "unbeknownst to me".  Thus unlike my CFA claim, the trial court did not place any obstacle(s) so as to prevent or impede the defendants from challenging my testimony (which they had accepted as true).  Instead, they never made any attempt at all to introduce any such evidence or testimony at trial.  Further still, even if that had been the scenario, then their correct recourse would have been to file a cross appeal (i.e. challenging the trial court’s decision to disallow that evidence).  But in any event, they don’t get a "do over" to present a better trial case, nor can they add it now to get a better appeal.  within their brief, I was able to prove (at least to some extent) that their omission of their prize limitation clause was in fact an intentional omission on their part.  That is, on two (2) separate occasions during the trial (in connection with my arguments as to the unenforceable submerged clause), I brought it to the court’s attention that they had multiple avenues and opportunities where they could have alerted me (and all other potential tournament entrants) to that prize limitation, simply by adding “one more sentence”, but yet they didn’t do so.
[brief] Although not raised below, defendant asserts that the trial judge abused her discretion by failing to merge the fourth-degree offense of harassment with the fourth-degree stalking conviction, and failing to merge the stalking conviction with the fourth-degree retaliation for past official action conviction.  (Db25-30).  Defendant claims these convictions should have merged because they allegedly were “encompassed” within one another.  (Db25-30).  The State submits that defendant’s claim lacks merit.
[brief] [...]’s claims were squarely rejected by the trial court based on the documentary evidence and multiple witnesses, including notaries:  The court finds the assertions made by defendant to be incredible under the totality of the circumstances…the court’s observations of defendant at trial do not support her assertions that she misunderstood questions and facts at the time she executed the documents being challenged herein, at her depositions or at trial…  The court finds defendant has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she was forced or coerced to sign the documents in question.  The court finds she signed the documents freely and voluntarily.
[brief] Moreover, after the comprehensive review, the Council selected [...] because it is “appropriately located and is suitable for activities related to the operations of the proposed retail cannabis business in the Borough. ” (66a).  As such, the Resolution confirms that [...] was selected because the Council believed that it was appropriately located and suitable for a cannabis retail facility.  In addition to the reasons articulated in the Resolution, Subcommittee Chairperson [...]’s September 20, 2022 meeting notes provides additional clarification as to why she, and the Subcommittee, recommended [...].
[brief] In light of the foregoing, the Supreme Court in Mount Laurel II clarified and established the procedure for builder’s remedy litigation, which provides for a court-ordered rezoning of a plaintiff’s property, notwithstanding the current zoning or the municipality’s otherwise constitutional right to have the property zoned differently.  Id. at 279-292.  The extent of a municipality’s prior compliance or current efforts to comply are irrelevant; a town’s compliance is determined at the time of filing of the builder’s remedy complaint.  See Cranford Dev. Assocs., LLC v. Twp. of Cranford, 445 N.J. Super. 220, 230-31 (App. Div. 2016) (“a developer may be entitled to a builder’s remedy, even if a municipality has begun moving toward compliance before or during the developer’s lawsuit, provided the lawsuit demonstrates the municipality’s current failure to comply with its affordable housing obligations”).  If the court has determined that a municipality is in violation of its constitutional obligation, then “a builder's remedy should be granted unless the municipality establishes that because of environmental or other substantial planning concerns, the plaintiff's proposed project is clearly contrary to sound land use planning. ”  Id. at 279-80.  A “builder’s remedy should not be denied solely because --- 5  The municipal zoning power is granted by the New Jersey Constitution, Sec. VI, ¶ 2, by way of the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62.  the municipality prefers some other location for lower income housing, even if it is in fact a better site. ”  *Id.* at 280.  Once the trial court determines constitutional noncompliance, the town in violation must revise its zoning ordinance to satisfy its *Mount Laurel* obligation.  *Id.* at 281.  *Mount Laurel II* established the process by which trial courts could appoint special adjudicators\(^6\) to assist the parties and the court in connection with the town’s adoption of compliant zoning, including the suitability and rezoning of the builder’s remedy site, after which the adjudicator would present his/her recommendations to the court.  *Id.* at 281-84.  Notably, *Mount Laurel II* mandates that exclusionary zoning litigations, like the instant builder’s remedy matter, “are intended to achieve compliance with the Constitution and the *Mount Laurel* obligations without interminable trials and appeals….  We intend by our remedy to conclude in one proceeding, with a single appeal, all questions involved.
[brief] Cases: Cole v. Jersey City Medical Ctrl, 215 N.J. 265 (2013)  ...........................................11  Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 1996) citing Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414 (3d. Cir.) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967 (1988).  ..............................................................................................................7  Marmo and Sons General Contracting, LLC v. Biagi Farms, LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 593 (App. Div. 2024).  .............................................................................................................19  Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414 (3d. Cir.) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967 (1988).  .................................................................7  Rosenblum v. Borough of Closter, 285 N.J. Super. 230, 241 (App. Div. 1995).  .........................................................................................................................20  Tuckey v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 236 N.J. Super. 221, 224 (App. Div. 1989).  .........................................................................................................................20  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The questions on the Supplemental Form asking whether [...] would use rental vehicles, and whether it would use 12-15 passenger vans at the 2019 Summer Camp, are objective questions seeking information within the applicant’s knowledge.  See Ledley, 138 N.J. at 636.  [...] was specifically required to disclose whether it would use rental vehicles at the 2019 Summer Camp, and whether any of the rental vehicles it used were 12-15 passenger vans.  It is undisputed that [...]: 1) did not disclose its use of rental vehicles; or 2) reveal that it would use 12-15 passenger vans.  (Ia143).  These are clear misrepresentations in response to simple, objective questions.  [...]’s state of mind and whether it intended to defraud [...] is irrelevant under decades of binding legal precedent.
[brief] (NOT RAISED BELOW).  As noted in the Statement of Facts, the defendant’s defense to the allegation that he improperly retained or displayed an official NJSP wallet ID while he was suspended was that he surrendered the only such ID that he possessed on September 19, 2016, and that, if he displayed anything in the 2017 and 2018 traffic stops in question, it was an unofficial NJSP business card that bears a considerable resemblance to the wallet ID, and which everyone agreed he had no duty to surrender when suspended.  The State’s response to that defense was an appalling attempt to smear defendant with irrelevant “bad acts” evidence -- confronting him on cross-examination with the fact that he was in apparent violation of NJSP Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) when he had a business card printed in a format that did not conform to those SOPs.  (16T 174-7 to 175-18)  The prosecutor then took time on summation to remind the jury of that supposed infraction, going so far as to accuse defendant of something he was not charged with: having “crafted” a business card that looked similar to an official ID.  (20T 140-2 to 16)  What the State did in this regard was to attempt, underhandedly, to do what the judge refused to allow them to do via jury instruction: expand the case against defendant to include more than the allegations about the wallet ID.  The judge had specifically told the State that because the indictment was narrowly focused on the retention or display of official NJSP ID, she would not charge the jury on a broader theory of guilt requested by the State that any attempt by defendant to identify himself as a police officer by any means in order to avoid a ticket would be official misconduct. \(^{13}\) (20T 3-25 to 11-10)  What was done \(^{13}\)  In addition to the obvious fact that such a broad theory had not been indicted, that broader theory had another more obvious failing: defendant was still a police officer while suspended.  *State v. Bullock*, 136 N.J. 149, 156 (1994).  Indeed, that was the only reason why his actions while suspended could even conceivably be official misconduct.  Identifying himself as an officer/trooper unto itself was not the issue; he was one!  Rather, he was indicted for official misconduct because the State alleged that he used a wallet ID that only a non-suspended officer could possess.  He was not forbidden from possessing the business card.  here, via cross-examination and then summation, was to accuse defendant of dishonest, forbidden wrongdoing that had absolutely no relevance to the case.  Because the State went far outside the bounds of N.J.R.E. 404(b) in doing so, and thereby violated defendant’s rights to due process and a fair trial guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and the state constitution, defendant’s convictions should be reversed and the matter remanded for retrial.
[brief] The FDCPA’S Legislative History and Agency Interpretations are Consistent with the Federal Courts’ Decisions.  (As to Legislative History, T18:19-T20:14)  Before the motion court, Defendant presented legislative history and agency interpretation of the FDCPA which, it asserted, supported the conclusion that communications with mail vendors are permitted under § 1692c(b).  As explained above under Point III, those extrinsic sources should not be considered when, as is the case here, the ordinary meaning of the statutory language yields a result consistent with the statutory scheme and purpose.  “Legislative history, after all, almost always has something for everyone!”  Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 609 (2010) (Scalia, J. concurring).  If Respondent’s Brief asserts arguments construing the FDCPA based on extrinsic sources, Plaintiff will respond in his Reply Brief.
[brief] For this reason, it is self-evident that no expert testimony is required to prove allegations that monies were transferred from the firm’s attorney trust account fraudulently, or even most blatantly, allegations that an attorney in concert with other co-conspirators instructed a client to make payments via wire transfers and checks made payable to the bank accounts of entities and persons whom the attorney and co-conspirators controlled or manipulated to thereafter transfer funds to the bank accounts of co-conspirators.  None of these allegations involve an attorney’s legal judgment concerning a legal issue, let alone a complex legal issue.  Similarly, in Couri, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that the facts in that case fell beyond the purview of the AOM statute and no AOM was required.  The Supreme Court in Couri explained as follows at 341-42:  Although defendant’s unauthorized dissemination of the report also might implicate a deviation from prevailing professional standards of practice, proof of that deviation is not essential to the establishment of plaintiff’s right to recover based on breach of contract.  Essentially, as the Supreme Court analogously explained in Couri, the crux of Plaintiffs’ Tort Claims is that [...], in concert with non-attorney co-conspirator Defendants, acted wrongfully by creating the fraudulent scheme that is the subject matter of this litigation.  This fraudulent scheme does not implicate a deviation from a professional standard of care, and proof of a deviation from a professional standard of care is not essential to prove Plaintiffs’ Tort Claims.  Indeed, Plaintiffs were permitted to pursue the identical Tort Claims against the non-attorney co-conspirator Defendants without the need of any expert testimony.  Therefore, just as in Couri, no AOM or expert testimony was required in this matter.  Respectfully, either the Trial Court misread the facts of the Complaint and Plaintiffs’ briefs, or the Court was successfully misled by Defendants’ misrepresentation and red herring that the subject transaction was a complex, multi-party, multi-property transaction.
[brief] [Emphasis added.]  Synonyms of fabricate include fable, falsehood, fib, story, taradiddle, untruth, fairytale, lie, prevarication and whopper.  There is no nice way to say it.  [...] twice fabricated his testimony in order to deceive the Court below.  Yet incredibly the court below concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the record to justify this stop (1T 32-3 through 49-17).
[brief] However, neither Goffe nor the fact that [...]’s definition of “Dispute” (Ja37) nullifies arbitration in Plaintiff’s case supports this premise.  In Goffe, 238 N.J. at 195, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:  “In order to be decided by a court, an arbitrability challenge -- a challenge as to whether a particular matter is subject to arbitration or can be decided by a court must be directed at the delegation clause itself (which itself constitutes an arbitration agreement subject to enforcement); a general challenge to the validity of the agreement as a whole will not suffice to permit arbitration to be avoided.  *Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson*, 561 U.S. 63, 72, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 177 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2010). ”  This is exactly what Plaintiff has done in the case, *sub judice*, as the word “Disputes” (which is part of the delegation clause in Paragraph 7.2 of [...]’s Membership Agreement) (Ja36) is specifically, not generally, included in the [...] Membership Agreement arbitration provision and, yet, Plaintiff’s damages (set forth in the Complaint) seeking injunctive relief (Ja27) is specifically excluded from the definition of “Disputes” at Paragraph 7.4 of [...]’s Membership Agreement.  (Ja37)  Accordingly, the trial court should determine whether the arbitration provision applies to the relief sought in Plaintiff’s Complaint based on [...]’s violations of the HCSA, CFA, TCCWNA and RISA, and not an arbitrator.
[brief] *Id.* at 20.  Jury charges are “a road map to guide the jury and without an appropriate charge a jury can take a wrong turn in its deliberations. ”  *State v. Martin*, 119 N.J. 2, 15 (1990).  “A trial court has an ‘independent duty . . . to ensure that the jurors receive accurate instructions on the law as it pertains to the facts and issues of each case.
[brief] TABLE OF VOLUMES | VOLUME I | 001a-221a | |----------|-----------| | VOLUME II – CONFIDENTIAL | 222a-224a | TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS  9/25/2023  TRANSCRIPT OF FORECLOSURE COURT HEARING  1T TABLE OF FORECLOSURE COURT ORDERS UNDER APPEAL  9/25/23  ORDER BY HON. [...]  FORECLOSURE COURT 221a  TABLE OF AUTHORITY
[directive] Vehicular Pursuit Policy 4  Role of the Pursuing Officer  4.1  The decision to initiate and/or continue a vehicular pursuit requires weighing the need to immediately apprehend the violator against the degree of risk to which the officer and others are exposed as a result of the pursuit.  4.2  Upon the initiation of a pursuit, the pursuing officer shall immediately activate all emergency lights, siren, headlights, motor vehicle recorder (MVR), if equipped, and body worn camera (BWC), if equipped.  4.3  Once the pursuit has been initiated, the primary unit must immediately notify communications and a supervisor, providing as much of the following information as is known: (a) reason for the pursuit; (b) direction of travel and designation and location of the roadway; (c) traffic conditions; (d) presence of pedestrians; (e) identification of the violator’s vehicle (year, make, model, color, vehicle registration number, and other identifying characteristics); (f) information on the identity of the driver, if known; (g) number of occupants; (h) the speed of the pursued vehicle; and (i) other information that may be helpful in deciding whether to terminate the pursuit or in resolving the incident.  4.4  The pursuing officer shall have a continuing duty to update the supervisor and communications on the above information as the incident develops.  7  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] *Schiavo v. Marina Dist. Dev. Co. LLC*, 442 N.J. Super. 346, 369 (App. Div. 2015).  Plaintiffs assume that the Revised Policy would disparately impact LGBTQ+ students based on: (1) a survey concluding that a percentage of LGBTQ+ students would be stressed by the prospect of parental notification of their LGBTQ+ status; and (2) an article on the percentage of LGBTQ+ individuals lacking a supportive home environment (Pb24-25).  Stress over parental notifications and unsupportive home environments are not exclusive to LGBTQ+ students.  Plaintiffs further assume that the Revised Policy disparately impacts “LGBTQ+ students … because they are more likely than their non-LGBTQ+ peers to not share that information at home. ” (Pb25).  Again, this assumes that non-LGBTQ+ students invariably apprise their parents of all issues bearing a potentially adverse impact on their health, safety and well-being.  Plaintiffs’ contention that the Revised Policy’s exception in cases presenting a risk of abuse or neglect is insufficient (Pb25-26) ignores that “a state has no interest in protecting children from their parents unless it has some reasonable and articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is in imminent danger of abuse.