ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to require a school district to make payments to a party in material breach of a contract with a contracted service provider if the breach was not due to a closure resulting from a declared state of emergency, declared public health emergency, or a directive by the appropriate health agency or officer.  The April 14th version did not include the language, “and employees of the contracted service provider shall be paid as if the school facilities had remained open and in full operation”.  It was added later and became effective June 29, 2020.
[brief] In the within matter, adding information to a website cannot be construed as notice of the Ricci Act’s enactment or the requirements to register within a certain timeframe.  The statute required the Board to promulgate rules to provide notice to active and retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  The Certifying Officer Letter is proof that the website posting is not sufficient notice.  Pa80.  The notice of the Ricci Act to the Certifying Officers advises the Certifying Officers that they must distribute the information to employees pursuant to N.J.A.C. 17:5-1.4.  It also required that the Certifying Officers to provide a certification that the information was distributed.  The Respondent claims that the mailing of the postcard to a correct address establishes a presumption that the postcard was received.  This presumption is rebutted by the fact that [...] and 98 others certified via affidavits that they did not receive said postcard.  Additionally, the claim that postcards were mailed out to all “200,647 SPRS retirees” is a misstatement of fact.  Rb13.  New Jersey State Troopers are assigned a badge number upon successful completion of the academy and these badge numbers are never repeated.  Currently, the New Jersey State Police badge numbers only reach the 9,000s; meaning that in the entire history of the New Jersey State Police, there are less than 10,000 New Jersey State Troopers, which includes all active or retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  Failure to provide any notice, adequate or actual, is reasonable and equitable grounds for relaxing the deadline for registration under the Ricci Act.
[brief] On July 15, 2020, the Board received a petition for a net metered floating solar project under the new and innovative standard of the January 2020 Order.  (Aa5; Aa81).  In approving that project and assigning a 0.6 TREC factor, the Board determined that floating solar projects “may petition the Board to request a factor greater than 0.6 based upon the specific facts and circumstances attributable to an individual project. ”  (Aa5; Aa85).  The rules codifying the TI program became effective on October 5, 2020.
[brief] Our Legislature has delineated the types of claims and interests that may be assigned.  N.J.S.A. 2A:25-1 declares that, All contracts for the sale and conveyance of real estate, all judgments and decrees recovered in any of the courts of this state or of the United States or in any of the courts of any other state of the United States and all choses in action arising on contract shall be assignable, and the assignee may sue thereon in his own name.  As this statute does not expressly mention tort claims, our courts have reached the conclusion that the Legislature intended that, as a matter of public policy, tort claims are not assignable prior to the entry of judgment.  See E. Orange Lumber Co. v. Feiganspan, 120 N.J.L. 410, 413 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd, 124 N.J.L. 127 (E. & A. 1940); Vill. of Ridgewood v. Shell Oil Co., 289 N.J. Super. 181, 195 (App. Div. 1996); Di Tolvo v. Di Tolvo, 131 N.J. Super. 72, 79 (App. Div. 1974).  Our courts have also determined that legal malpractice claims are "derive[d] from the tort of negligence," Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483, 492 (1993), it is axiomatic that an assignment of a legal malpractice claim is impermissible.  In Alcman Servs. Corp. v. Bullock, 925 F. Supp. 252, 258 (D.N.J. 1996), the District Court stated that "[a] simple syllogism" inexorably proves the point: "a tort claim is not assignable; legal malpractice is a tort claim; therefore, a legal malpractice claim is not assignable."  Based upon this case law, the Trial Court correctly found that a legal malpractice matter is not assignable.  In so holding, the Trial Court correctly rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the agreements “are simply a pledge to debtor of security in any future recovery in this action.
[brief] The local boards could, if the action taken by them in this case were approved, defer adequate compensation to its teachers until their final year, then catapult the teacher to a high level of compensation, and cause the Pension Fund to compensate for the local board’s failure to grant increases in the past.  This would permit the local board a grand gesture of farewell at little expense; it also would draw heavily on the Pension Fund without having provided sufficient compensation in prior years.  [Ibid.]  The settlement of litigation which artificially inflates salaries at or near the end of employment similarly serves to increase retirement allowances without adequate compensation to the fund.  If, by merely allocating a portion or, as here, the entirety of a settlement to the last three years of salary, an employer could substantially increase an employee’s pension, or a pension benefit they were not otherwise entitled to receive, the employer could improperly negotiate more favorable settlements.  The employer could settle in a way that costs them significantly less by unfairly shifting the cost and responsibility for their actions at the expense of the pension system.  Here, [...] was originally paid a salary of $103,682 for the 2018-2019 school year; $105,359 for the 2019-2020 school year; and $106,934 for the 2020-2021 school year.
[brief] Both flaws flow irreversibly from the Arbitrator’s ultra vires creation of a new work rule based not on his reading of the CBA, but on his own sense of fairness.  Indeed, the Arbitrator’s decision was based not on the testimony in the record, or credibility determinations, or weighing of the evidence, or on his reading of the plain language of the CBA, but on the Arbitrator’s opinion that [...] is not permitted to terminate an employee who cannot perform the essential functions of her job because of a temporary disability.
[brief] [...] WORKED AS THE SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS AND WAS ON NOTICE FROM APPELLANT THAT SHE WAS RECEIVING DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT AND FELT THAT THERE WAS A BIAS AGAINST HER AND FAILED TO ADDRESS HER CONCERNS WHICH HE WAS ON NOTICE OF Pa1  According to N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e), it shall be an unlawful employment practice, or as the case may be, unlawful discrimination for any person whether an employer or an employee or not to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this act or to attempt to do so.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e).  The tort of aiding and abetting involves three elements which are: (1) the party whom the defendants aid must perform a wrongful act that causes the injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as a part of the overall illegal or tortuous activity at the time that he provides the assistance; (3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation.  Halbestram v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (DC Cir. 1983).  In Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Department, the supervisor was found to have aided and abetted the Atlantic City Police Department in discriminating against Hurley as Hurley was subjected to sexual harassment and the supervisor failed to act and address this violation.  *Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Department*, 174 F.3d 95, 127 (1999).  In *Cardenas v. Massey*, the supervisory employee was found to be liable for discrimination for aiding and abetting the employer’s violation.  *Cardenas v. Massey*, 269 F.3d 251 (2001).  Similarly, in the more recent case of *Cichetti v. Morris County Sheriff’s Office*, the Court ruled that the supervisor’s individual liability existed for acts of discrimination or for creating a hostile work environment via aiding and abetting which applies to any person engaged in this behavior.  *Cichetti v. Morris County Sheriff’s Office*, 194 N.J. 563 (2008).  [...] was on notice from Appellant regarding the bias that she was experiencing and the differential treatment that she was receiving.  After Appellant met with Aubrey Johnson, he failed to address the issues presented to him by Appellant and therefore, he can be held liable for the discrimination and engagement in aiding and abetting.  Furthermore, Johnson is in the same office as [...] and should have been aware of the issue with [...] using the racial slur in this second incident, yet, he took no action.  The statement that Johnson is Hispanic does not mean that he is absolved with regard to the discrimination experienced by the Appellant.  Of course, the Defendants claimed that there was no aiding and abetting liability.  The Court adopted this position, despite the record presented and case law which is inconsistent with the role that the Court should undertake when presiding over a Summary Judgment proceeding.
[brief] Inconsistently, at the 2023 hearing, the trial judge purported to rule both on the merits of Tenant’s argument as to how § 4.02 of the Lease should be interpreted and to rule that it had no jurisdiction to evaluate the merits of that argument, contending “the order that tenant’s counsel would like me to make adopt [sic] is something I really don’t have jurisdiction to adopt,” and that Tenant was “free to do something in the Law Division” if it wanted to do so (3T14-3 to 3T14-18), because the trial judge was “not ruling on that” and did not “need to decide those issues to decide the case” (3T16-21 to 3T16-23).
[brief] Cases  Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1099 (D.N.J. 1993)  ...........................................  3  Carlyle Towers Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Crossland Sav., 944 F. Supp. 341 (D.N.J. 1996)  .............................................  3  Cavallaro v. Jamco Prop. Mgmt., 334 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div. 2000)  ......................................  3 New Jersey Div. of Child Protection and Permanency v. G.S., 447 N.J. Super. 539 (App. Div. 2016)  ....................................  5  Rohm & Haas Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 187 F.Supp.2d 221 (D.N.J. 2001) ..........................................  3  Twenty-First Century Rail Corp. v. N.J. Transit Corp., 419 N.J. Super. 343 (App. Div.), certif. granted, 206 N.J. 37 (2011)  .................................................  3 Rules Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 ...........................................  1, 8  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] [...] presented no exhibits/evidence; its position in reply to repeated inquiries from the Board Chairman was that it had no burden or need to prove anything and the then in place Chancery Court parking easement ruling (Da29-48) was dispositive (1T25-15 to 34-14).  [...] commenced this lawsuit prior to the Board Resolution being adopted by the premature filing of a Complaint and Order to Show Cause seeking restraints, with a collection of documents appended that were not in evidence before the Zoning Board.  Later in its Pre-Trial submission, the plaintiff listed additional documents not before the Zoning Board as proposed Exhibits (See Cert. Da182-194).
[brief] (Pa236.)  The Minutes show that on January 10, 2022:  The Clerk read a message from the Senate that the Senate has passed the following bills in which the concurrence of the General Assembly is requested, which bills were read for the first time and were referred as indicated:  Senate No. 49, by Senators [...], [...], [...] and [...], without reference, on second reading –  Codifies constitutional right to freedom of reproductive choice.  ...  Senate No. 49 was given third reading.  ...  Senate No. 49 later passed by the following vote . . . (Pa236) (emphasis added).
[brief] Q: . . .  In your April of 2021 report, when you wrote that these conditions will increase the likelihood of an increase in wave over-topping onto the subject property, did you form the opinion that the likelihood of an increase in wave over-topping would result in actual physical damage to the subject property?  A: I just want to be accurate.  So if you could give me a minute here.  No, I didn’t.  Q:  Have you performed any further investigation or analysis since you authored the report on April 7th, 2021, which would allow you to offer the opinion today that physical damages would occur to the subject property from the increase in over-topping?  A: I have not conducted any further investigation on that matter.  Da468:2-18 [emphasis added].  [...] also described the contents of his report as “arguments” and not data or calculations:
[brief] Denying the [...]’ motion without prejudice stating “[s]ee May 30, 2024 order on” the [...]’ cross motion.  Da510.  On May 31, 2024, plaintiff filed an order to show cause in the trial court to dissolve the stay and compel delivery of the deed.  Da511.  On June 4, 2024, the trial court converted the order to show cause to a motion returnable on June 20, 2024.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] The subject accident occurred at a multi-tenant strip mall.  Pursuant to its lease, [...] was obligated to maintain the portions of the strip mall demised to it, as well as the sidewalk abutting the entrance into its business.  Any other portion of the property not leased to it or to the other tenants was, by implication, "common area."  In the context of a strip mall, once the contract has excluded the demised premises and the abutting sidewalk(s) from that definition, there could not be much else other than the parking lot that would remain under control of the landlord.  If this court were to hold that [...], *inter alia*, had the contractual obligation to have maintained the parking lot, the "common area" provision of the lease would become meaningless as there would be little or none of the property to which it could apply.  A contract should not be interpreted to render one of its terms meaningless.  *Porreca*, supra., at 233, citing *Cumberland County Improvement Auth.*, 358 N.J. Super. 484, 497 (App. Div.), certif. denied 177 N.J. 222 (2003)
[brief] (Db 17-19)  See State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 235 (2014) (explaining that a statement of reasons is required for sentencing decisions in order to facilitate appellate review); State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 307 (2010) (“To the extent that the choice about who may speak [at sentencing] is an exercise of discretion, it shares the same attributes of all discretionary determinations, namely, it must be accompanied by some expression of reasons sufficient to permit appellate review. ”); R. 3:29 (“The court shall place on the record the reasons supporting its . . . disposition of a criminal matter.
[brief] Moreover, in response to [...]’s argument the Board’s decision violated policy, the Board noted [...] had failed to identify which policy was supposedly violated by the Board’s decision.  (Pa4).  As to [...]’s argument that Board had impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to him in contravention of the presumption in favor of parole and that the thirty-six-month FET was punitive, the Board noted that: “the punitive aspects of a sentence is not a component in the parole” decision process; parole is not guaranteed because “it is the responsibility of the [Board] to determine whether [[...]] is suitable for parole”; and the Board had properly concluded that [...] was not suitable for parole.
[brief] (Da70).  In addition, [...] abruptly terminated his conversation with [...] and deployed his K-9.  (Ibid.).  The appellate court then found that [...] lacked the “particularized and objective basis” necessary to have suspected [...] of any illegal wrongdoing to conduct a K-9 sniff test.  (Da71).  Despite the [...] majority’s decision, the presiding judge vigorously dissented, stating that [...] did have reasonable suspicion to suspect [...] of criminality.  (Da71-72).  The dissent would have affirmed [...]’s conviction because [...] did not prolong the stop, which lasted “roughly 13 minutes, an amount of time that even the majority acknowledges is not ‘inordinate. ’
[brief] Maxim Sewerage v. Monmouth Ridings, 273 N.J. Super. 84 (Law Div. 1993) ...............................................................  25 Mazzilli v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co., 26 N.J. 307 (1958) .........................................................................................  22 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979) .......................................................................................  23 Morton Intern, Inc. v. General Acc.  Ins. Co. of America, 266 N.J. Super. 300 (App. Div. 1991) ............................................................  22 Notte v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490 (2006) ....................................................................................... 24, 25 Packanack Lake Country Club & Community Assoc. v. Alexander D. Doig Dev. Co., 72 N.J. Super. 360 (App. Div. 1962) .............................................................  26 Pivnick v. Beck, 326 N.J. Super. 474 (App. Div. 1999) ............................................................  23 Rippon v. Smigel, 449 N.J. Super. 344 (App. Div. 2017) ............................................................  20 Rutgers Casualty Ins. Co. v. Dickerson, 215 N.J. Super. 116 (App. Div. 1987).................................................................27  Scarano v. Cent. R.R. Co. of N.J., 203 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1953)..............................................................................16  Selective Ins. Co. v. McAllister, 327 N.J. Super. 168 (App. Div. 2000)...............................................................21, 22 State v.  Gonzales, 75 N.J. 181 (1977).............................................................................................22  Sturdivant v. General Brass & Machine Corp., 115 N.J. Super. 224 (App. Div. 1971).................................................................19  Tassie v. Tassie, 140 N.J. Super. 517 (App. Div. 1976).................................................................19  Terranova v. GE Pension Trust, 457 N.J. Super. 404 (App. Div. 2019).................................................................16  U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449 (2012)............................................................................................16  Velazquez v. Franz, 123 N.J. 498 (1991).........................................................................................20, 28 Wadeer v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 220 N.J. 591 (2015).........................................................................................20  Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 through 61.12 ..................................................................5  Other Authorities Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 27 (1982) ...........................................21  Rules R. 4:6-2..................................................................................................................24 R. 4:9-1..................................................................................................................24  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] | | Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 168 N.J. 124 (2001)  Griffin v. Burlington Volkswagen, Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 515 (App.Div.2010)  Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of Florida, Inc., 236 N.J. 301 (2019)  Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P'ship v. Clark, 580 U.S. 246 (2017)  Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc., 134 N.J. 275 (1993)  Martindale v. Sandvik, 173 N.J. 76 (2002)  Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)  Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co., 225 N.J. 343 (2016)  Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Com, 127 N.J. 344 (1992)  Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., LLC, 203 N.J. 286 (2010)  Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353 (1931)  Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corp, 231 N.J. 234 (2017)  Statutes: PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] ”  Id. at 25, 629 A.2d at 845 (1993); accord Hardwick Recycling & Salvage, Inc. v. Acadia Ins. Co., 177 Vt. 421, 431, 869 A.2d 82, 90 (2004) (“In construing an insurance policy, we construe disputed terms according to their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. ”)  Vermont law is identical to New Jersey law on the meaning of “damages” in the context of a liability insurance policy.
[brief] (7T113-12 to 16).  Read as a whole, the jury instruction repeatedly informed the jurors they could convict defendant only if the State had established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was, in fact, the person who shot [...].  A third-party guilt charge essentially serves to underscore these broader instructions provided to jurors, emphasizing that the State consistently bears the burden of proof in a criminal trial, and the defense is not obligated to prove anything or present evidence.  See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Third Party Guilt Charge" (approved Mar. 9, 2015).  Those specific instructions were given to the jury in this case.  Hence, even if this court determined that not providing the third-party guilt charge was an error, the comprehensive instructions explicitly informed the jury about the State's responsibility to prove that defendant was indeed the person who committed the crimes.  There was thus no error, let alone plain error.
[brief] The purported belated error raised by defendant is that the trial court ended each substantive instruction on aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter with the language in the model jury charge that instructs the jury that if, after considering all of the evidence, it was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime at issue, its verdict for that offense must be guilty.  (6T126-19 to 24; 6T128-14 to 17).  Defendant claims that the jury was incorrectly charged because the elements outlined for each manslaughter offense did not include the State’s burden to disprove self- defense.  (Db22).  Defendant now claims that the judge’s instructions on self-defense, which immediately followed the court’s charge on the elements of aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter, (6T129-1 to 6T134-7), were thus contradictory and confusing.  He also belatedly claims error with the verdict sheet because it did not make any mention of self-defense.  (Da32-33).  Defendant has not sustained his burden under the plain error doctrine.
[brief] The neutral, court-appointed surveyor, [...], confirms [...] owns the Property.  Most importantly, on March 13, 2023, the trial court appointed [...] Surveying, Inc.  (“[...]”) to serve as the court-appointed surveyor and ordered [...] to perform a survey of both [...]’s Lot 22 and [...]’s Lot 20.  Pa89.  On April 19, 2023, [...] served the survey dated April 10, 2023 on both [...] and [...].  Pa92.  The [...] Survey confirms [...] owns Lot 22, including the area of Lot 22 where the debris piles are located (notated as “dirt pile” on the [...] Survey).  Ibid.  The [...] Survey also confirms the accuracy of the measurements depicted on the tax map, namely that the property line of [...]’s Lot 20 begins 184.31 feet from the corner of Fifteenth Avenue and Bergen Street.  Ibid.  On May 23, 2023, the parties deposed Mr. [...] and his testimony confirmed the findings of his Survey.  [...] repeatedly disputed [...]’s attempts to claim that the Property, or any portion of it, was Lot 20.  See, e.g., Da152, 67:8-11.  As [...] unequivocally testified, the Property is [...]’s Lot 22.  Da152, 67:25-68:4 ([...] testifying that he is “a hundred percent sure that Lot 19 and 20 sit as I show it on my survey” (emphasis added)); Da154, 76:23-77:4 (testifying that the debris piles at issue rest entirely on [...]’s Lot 22 other than perhaps 0.1 feet, which is approximately 1.5 inches); Da154, 77:5-7 (“Q. And Lot 22 is owned by [[...]] based upon your research?  A.  Based upon my research, yes. ”).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ORDER