ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa689).  Objectors’ final argument was that the rehearing somehow deprived them of an opportunity to introduce evidence.  In that regard, the Objectors were never deprived of an opportunity to ask questions or introduce exhibits at the rehearing.  (Pa651).  On the contrary, the Objectors made a tactical decision not to introduce certain evidence.  Objectors verbalized this tactical decision at the outset of their cross-examination of the Objectors’ witnesses.  In that regard, Objectors’ counsel stated, on the record, “[j]ust for the Board’s awareness [...] this will not be as exciting.  There’s no point in me asking questions we asked before that you guys objected to.  So we’ll try to narrow the focus. ”  (Pa566).  Aware that there was no record of the objectionable proffers from the night of May 23, 2022, Objectors chose not to make a record and elected to forego the introduction of testimony or exhibits.  (Pa566).  Having elected to forego making a record despite having been given a full and fair opportunity, Objectors blame the [...] for their choice.  The Trial Court acted properly by refusing to give the Objectors a third bite at the apple (via remand) when they refused to take a second bite.
[brief] At his deposition, [...] testified that the other patient was “fine” and “uneventful. ”  [Pa284, Balazs Deposition, 37:17 to 39:8].  Accordingly, if the [...] c-section had been timely and properly called at 9:48 p.m., that would have meant that [...], in the minutes before 10 p.m., would have been presented with two c-section procedures, with a decision as to which one to prioritize.  [...] obviously would have prioritized the emergency.  Moreover, given the timelines that [...] acknowledged for the c-section, it is entirely possible that, given that the [...]’ procedure could have completed shortly after 10 p.m., he still could have managed to scrub and arrive at the other c-section even in time to deliver there by 10:12 p.m.  Although, since that procedure was non-emergent, it is more likely that he simply would have delayed the procedure for a few minutes.  **Fourth**, at his deposition, [...] testified that, with respect to the priority of procedures” that he “treat[Js every Cesarean section that I call for fetal tracing as a C-section that I want to do it as quick as possible. ”  [Pa291, Balazs Deposition, 65:17-21].  Thus, this Court does not even need to draw a factual inference in favor of Plaintiff.  [...] is, point blank, telling the factfinder he would have prioritized the [...]’ c-section in the minutes before 10:00 p.m. that evening.  In the end, this Court should reverse the July 17, 2023 decision, because it based on the misapprehension that “even if the Defendants had called for the surgery … minutes earlier, no attending obstetrician was available to perform it. ”  And that determination is incorrect, **B.  No Precedent Supports The Holding That Plaintiff Needed To Present An Expert To Establish A “Negligent Staffing” Claim**
[brief] | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., et al. v. Lajara, et al.**, 222 N.J. 129 (2015) | 2, 8, 9 | | **Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P.**, 219 N.J. 430 (2014) | 3 | | **Coal. for Quality Health Care v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking & Ins.**, | 8 | | 791 A.2d 1085 (N.J. App. 2002) | | | **Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co.**, 28 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1953) | 6 | | **Endo Surgi Center, P.C. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.**, 391 N.J.Super. 588 (2007) | 4 | | **GEICO v. Mt. Prospect Chiropractic Center, PA**, | 7, 8, 9 | | Consol.  Case Nos. [...], [...] & [...] (April 15, 2024) | | | **Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park**, 187 N.J. 323 (2006) | 3 | | **Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Utility Co.**, 212 N.J. 576 (2013) | 2, 4 | | **Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc.**, 173 N.J. 76 (2002) | 3 | | **Manetti v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co.**, 196 N.J.Super. 317 (1984) | 4 | | **McCarty v. West Hoboken**, 93 N.J.L. 247, 107 A. 265 (E. & A.1919) | 6 | | **NAACP of Camden Cnty.  E. v. Foulke Mgmt.**, | 3 | | 421 N.J.Super. 404 (App. Div.), certif. granted, | | | 209 N.J. 96 (2011), and appeal dismissed, 213 N.J. 47 (2013) | | | **R. Krevolin & Co. v. Brown**, 20 N.J. Super. 85, 92 (App. Div. 1952) | 6 | | **State v. Sailor**, 355 N.J.Super. 315 (App. Div. 2001) | 4 | Other Authorities
[directive] Any questions asked of officers during an internal investigation must be "narrowly and directly" related to performance of their duties and the ongoing investigation.10  Officers must answer questions directly and narrowly related to that performance.  All answers must be complete and truthful, but officers cannot be compelled to answer questions having nothing to do with their performance as law enforcement officers, that do not implicate a rule or regulation violation, or that are unrelated to the investigation.  8.6.5  At the interview’s conclusion, the investigator should review with the subject officer all the information obtained during the interview to alleviate any misunderstandings and to prevent any controversies during a later proceeding.  Gardner v Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968).  10  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 53
[brief] In § 1692’s text, “abusive” appears seven times as part of the phrase “abusive debt collection practices. ”  But “abusive” and “abusive debt collection practices” do not appear elsewhere in the FDCPA.  The Senate Report explained, “This legislation expressly prohibits a host of harassing, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices. ”  Senate Report at *4.  The “abusive debt collection practices” phrase § 1692 is merely another way of saying “a host of harassing, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices. ”  Both phrases describe the FDCPA’s myriad provisions and are not constraints on its scope.  If a plaintiff needed to prove abusiveness in addition to proving the debt collector failed to comply with an FDCPA provision, then the FDCPA’s provisions—except § 1692d—would be surplusage.  In § 1692d, debt collectors “may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass…any person in connection with the collection of a debt. ”  There is nothing to suggest Congress intended all but § 1692d to be surplusage.  Instead, a collector’s violation of an FDCPA provision is per se an abusive practice.  B.
[brief] At a hearing before a governing body concerning the proposed adoption of a municipal ordinance, there is no requirement that evidence be presented providing a factual foundation for the ordinance, and the governing body does not ordinarily make any findings of fact to justify its action.  (Citations omitted.)  Consequently, an action in lieu of prerogative writs challenging the validity of an ordinance is subject to different procedures than an action challenging the quasi-judicial action of a municipal agency.  If quasi-judicial action is challenged, the court's decision “must be based solely on the agency record,” which the court reviews to determine whether the agency's “factual findings are based on ‘substantial evidence’ and whether its discretionary decisions are ‘arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. ’ ”  (Citation omitted.)  In contrast, if an action is brought challenging the validity of an ordinance, and resolution of the challenge turns on disputed factual issues, the case must proceed in the same manner as other civil litigation, with an opportunity for discovery, pretrial motions and a trial.
[brief] ________.  Both defendants [...] and the Moving Defendants’ counsel and co-defendant [...], who made the false representations to the Planning Board by stating that the defendants had “acquired the rights” from plaintiffs, admit in their depositions that they had not acquired anything at all from plaintiffs.  All that they had “acquired” was actually they “obtained a new lease” from the land owner, [...], and never acquired any of plaintiffs’ rights either to the solar rights or to the preliminary and final site plans issued to [...] by the [...], in reliance upon the existence of the solar rights that plaintiffs had purchased from Fiberville for $700,000.00.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RELYING ON THE APPELLATE DIVISION’S FINDINGS IN DENYING THE MOTION TO REINSTATE AND DISMISSING ALL CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE.  The trial court did not err in denying the Motion to Reinstate and dismissing all claims with prejudice based on the First Appellate Action decision.  A “trial court has the discretion to structure the litigation to assure efficient administration, clarity and fairness.
[brief] While the ALJ did not specifically reference the withdrawn charges of being impaired while on duty, there was also no specific reference by number or description as to which charges the above quoted findings applied.  Certainly, the findings reference to Appellant’s opioid use “…while conducting his job duties” and of “put(ting) himself at risk as well as members of the public whom appellant was sworn to protect” creates a reasonable inference that the ALJ’s findings related to impairment while on duty.  As the seriousness of such a finding is self-apparent, it becomes impossible to disentangle those findings from other sustained charges and the penalty of termination.  Accordingly, the matter should be remanded for a new trial.
[brief] (Pa17-Pa18; Pa25-Pa32).  Additional *in limine* motions were raised at the start of trial on behalf of the plaintiff which included a motion seeking to bar evidence and testimony that the vehicle in which the plaintiff was taken to the [...] store on the date of the incident was parked in a handicapped parking space and had a handicapped parking placard.  (1T5:4-7:4).  Trial commenced on June 5, 2023 before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. and a jury and continued on June 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 12th, and 15th 2023.
[brief] State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 419-420 (1998); State v. Ortisi, 308 N.J.  Super. 573, 595 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 383 (1998); State v. Engel, 249 N.J. Super. 336, 379 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393 (1991).  Even in those instances where the prosecutor’s statements amount to misconduct, that misconduct will not be ground for reversal unless it was so egregious as to deprive the defendant as of his right to a fair trial.
[directive] Every that civilian and officers and with BWCs officers equipped that program ensure to training establish a Directive of this provisions with familiar the are recordings handle BWC or access who employees pursuant agency the by promulgated order or procedure, directive, operating standing policy, the and 3.1. section to DEPLOYED/ACTIVATED ARE BWCs THAT NOTICE  4.  Considerations.  Policy General 4.1 expect will citizens private that such commonplace become to likely are BWCs  Eventually, that understand today citizens as just devices, with these equipped are police officers uniformed that as handcuffs and batons, spray, o.c. flashlights, firearms, radios, carry two-way patrol officers it universal, is that becomes of BWCs use time the such as until But equipment. standard said anything to that understand they that so citizens notice of to form some provide appropriate to of sounds the and images the recorded, that and electronically officer be may BWC-equipped a accordance in use enforcement law future for accessible and stored be will interaction police-civilian will to help in use are BWCs that public the to notice Such Directive. this of provisions the with might that conduct engaging in from discouraging persons of benefits above-noted the achieve complaints false filing from persons discouraging and force, enforcement law of use the provoke against police.
[brief] (14T74-4 to 75-2).  In either August or September 2019, seven years after the shooting, she saw some guys hanging out in front of a bodega who told her defendant was incarcerated for a shooting.  (14T57-10 to 58-16; 14T59-11 to 60-14).  She claimed that when she was told about defendant’s incarceration, she remembered she was with him for eight minutes on May 27, 2012.  (14T65-2 to 17).  Afterwards, in December 2019, someone’s brother called her and directed her to take an Uber ride to a detective agency and give a statement.  (14T61-5 to 63-17; 14T64-17 to 25).  [...] was qualified as an expert in digital forensic cell phone tower locations.
[brief] (75a [29:3-16]).  The Plaintiff brought the deed to [...] in prison.  (76a – 77a [33:24-34:1]).  More specifically, Plaintiff received the deed documents he brought to [...] from [...], complete with “sign here” tabs.  (77a [35:11-15]).  The deed indicates it was “prepared by” [...] of [...].  (141a [55:5-18]).  Smith claims his signature on the document is a forgery (142a [58:21-24]).  This claim notwithstanding, Smith’s company [...] recorded the document, including the claimed forged signature.  (142a [59:1-13]).  [...] was led to believe when he left the closing at [...]s’ office that the anticipated transaction between Plaintiff and Seller had been completed, and that the proper deed and paperwork were signed.  (See 86a [71:1-17]).  [...] testified that a deed was signed by the Seller during the closing.  (See 87a [75:23-76:4]).  [...] is a founder and principal of the Defendant [...].
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On July 3, 2019, [...], Administrator of the [...], sent an OPRA request to the District seeking several categories of documentation including emails and text messages sent by [...] from his private phone and email address which concerned “any fire Commissioner, former fire Commissioner, employee, Township employee or any other individual concerning fire Commissioner business. ”  (Da21)  At that time, Defendant [...] was an elected Fire Commissioner for District No. 1 and was represented by both [...], Esq., general counsel for the Board and [...], Esq. who had been appointed as special counsel for the handling of matters involving personnel and related issues, including, but not limited to any issues raised by or on behalf of any employee against the Board of Fire Commissioners or against any individual Commissioners.  (Ra01).  The District advised the requestor that a special service charge would be required to fulfill the request, calculated at the hourly rate of the District’s Attorney of $185 per hour.  (Da019).  Mr. Kubiel filed a complaint with the GRC, challenging the reasonableness of the special service charge.  (Da012).  The District’s Counsel and Special Counsel handled the District’s --- 1  Because the facts and procedural history are intertwined, those sections have been combined. response to the complaint, in the form of the Statement of Information.  All required GRC submissions and the District’s legal response to the complaint were submitted prior to the fire district election on February 15, 2020, when [...] was not re-elected to the Board of Commissioners.
[brief] .........................................................................................................................12  O'Loughlin v. National Community Bank, 338 N.J. Super 592 (App. Div. 2001) .................................................................................................4, 5, 6 Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J. 498 (1991)  ..............................................................................................................................7, 8  Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. Chemical and Pollution Sciences, Inc., 105 N.J. 464 (1987) ...............................................................................................................................9  Other Authorities R. 4:37-1 .............................................................................................................................................3 R. 4:50-1 .............................................................................................................................................14, 15
[brief] Here the Court discounted the actual evidence presented by Appellant and adopted the position of the Respondents despite the fact that there was no evidence to support the claim that there was a legitimate business reason to not renew the Appellant’s contract.  It is requested that the Appellate Court reverse and remand this matter to the trial court so that the record can be completed.  It is also requested that upon return to the trial court that the matter should be reassigned to another judge for completion.  A request is further made that the Appellate Court consider transferring this matter to another County on return to the Trial Court.
[brief] Note: this may be a rare Type “C” ADA case on a “regarded as” standard because neither [...] nor his psychiatrists consider him “mentally ill. ”  See also ¶¶ 68, 76 & 89 at Pa19-22 as well as ¶128 on Pa28.  If the motivation was retaliation against our advocacy, the elements are (1) that [Plaintiff] engaged in protected activity; (2) that the government responded with retaliation; and (3) that the protected activity was the cause of the retaliation.  See Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 161 (3d Cir.1997).  There are numerous engagements in protected activity both in filing lawsuits, (ignored) AOC ADA Complaints and defending people with disabilities in court.
[brief] On January 11, 2024, the trial court issued a well written and sound statement of reasons (Da5 – Da24) and issued a final written order on January 23, 2024 (Pa452).  Plaintiff appealed again, this time on March 5, 2024.  As recently as the Plaintiff’s May 13, 2024 Amended Appellate Division Case Information Statement, the Plaintiff never made inquiry of the trial court judge as to whether or not her honor intended to file a statement or opinion pursuant to R. 2:5 – 1(d) (Pa836).  During the trial, Plaintiff claimed that the parties supposedly discussed “as a family long, long time ago” [sic] that the costs of college for both of the children would be entirely debt financed and then split three (3) ways with the Defendant paying one third (1T:18, L24 – 1T:19, L3).  She claimed that this agreement occurred when they were “married” and before the children were even born perhaps some time around 1990 (1T:44, L11 – 1T:45, L18).  The Plaintiff did not dispute that the only “agreement” about the children’s higher education was contained in Numbered Paragraph 25 of the parties’ December 3, 1998 Final Judgment of Divorce (¶25 of the JOD”) (Pa394) which was prepared with the assistance of legal counsel provides in its entirety as follows:  Plaintiff and defendant shall consult with each other in regards to [sic] the high school and college education of their children at the time of their anticipated enrollment.  Said discussions shall include where the children will go to school, the cost of the same and whether or not the parties can afford said education.  In the event that the parties agree to a specific school for high school and / or college for the [children] it is agreed that the parties shall pay for the same based on their respective incomes at the time of enrollment.  (1T:92, L25 – 1T:92, L14).  The Plaintiff did not take any judicial action pertaining to seeking a contribution towards the children’s college educations until 3 years after [...] graduated college and 1 year after [...] graduated college.
[brief] The general rule applicable to a factual context which presents a facial conflict between the risk covered and an exclusion is found in 5 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, §3083 at 309-311 (1970):  Where a peril specifically insured against sets other caused in motion which, in an unbroken sequence and connection between the act and final loss, produce the result for which recovery is sought, the insured peril is regarded as the proximate cause of the entire loss.  It is not necessarily the last act in a chain of events which is, therefore, regarded as the proximate cause, but the efficient or predominant cause which sets into motion the chain of events producing the loss.  …  In other words, *it has been held that recovery may be allowed* where the insured risk was the last step in the chain of causation set in motion by an uninsured period, or *where the insured risk itself set into operation a chain of causation in which the last step may have been an excepted risk.*  *Franklin Packaging Co. v. California Union Ins. Co.*, 171 N.J.Super. 188, 192 (App. Div. 1970) (emphasis added).  The practical application of Appleman’s rule is that “with regard to sequential causes of loss, [New Jersey] courts have determined that an insured deserves coverage where the included cause of loss is either the first or last step in the chain of causation which leads to the loss.
[brief] (See Pb1-2; Pb10-24.)  According to plaintiff, the defense, in connection with the parties’ motions in limine, misled the motion judge by representing that [...] would be called as a witness a trial to lay the foundation for the admission of the evidence.  (See Pb11.)  The defendant then relied heavily upon the [...]’s conclusion in cross examining plaintiffs’ experts, and again closing argument, leading the jury to incorrectly determine that [...]’s deviations from the standard of care did not proximately cause [...]’s death.
[brief] “A witness may offer lay opinion testimony on an individual’s emotional state if it ‘(a) is rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) will assist in understanding the witness’ testimony or in determining a fact in issue. ’”  Sui Kam Tung, 460 N.J.  Super. at 101 (quoting N.J.R.E. 701).  [...] read the messages himself, and perceived the tone and tenor of the conversation personally.  And, his testimony helped to clarify what the relationship between the two men was.  Thus, this testimony was permitted.
[brief] This brief replies to the responding briefs of both the [...] ([...]) and [...], whose briefs spent 68 pages with convoluted explanations why [...] dispensed with compliance with the Scenic Resources and Design Rule (the “Rule”) when it issued the CAFRA Individual Permit for [...]’s towering block like building so close to the beach and boardwalk.  Their main theses are that high rise buildings along the waterfront were never required to comply with the Rule in Long Branch so it doesn’t matter that [...] waived compliance with the Rule when it issued the CAFRA permit.  This argument is inaccurate.  Such buildings were stepped back under Long Branch Design Guidelines prior to the amendment of its redevelopment ordinances in 2020.  It was that change that [...] never approved, through rule making or otherwise, that triggered the need for a regular CAFRA permit and compliance with the Scenic Resources and Design Rule.  Long Branch knew that the [...] building did not comply with its ordinances and in 2020 specifically spot rezoned the site so it would fit.  And as [...] and [...] stated multiple times, this amendment made the project ineligible for a Long Branch Redevelopment Zone permit issued by Long Branch.  The Long Branch zoning amendment, which was not approved by [...], thus required a regular CAFRA Individual permit.  This is the permit that [...] issued and is the subject of this appeal.
[brief] See generally id.  For example, Plaintiff testified that in January 2017, [...], the director of the department of buildings and grounds (a supervisory-level employee of [...]), in her presence and in the presence of her direct supervisor, stated that a company who was replacing doors in their building was “run by ‘stupid jews. ’”  Id. at 58:2-62:1 (emphasis added).  Plaintiff explained that she informed both [...] and [...] that these comments upset her but received no apology or any indication that discipline had been instituted.  See id. at 62:10-19; 63:17-64:5.  In addition, Plaintiff testified at her deposition that [...] attempted to force her to work a flag raising ceremony on September 30, 2017, and that when she informed him she needed that day off for a Jewish high holy day, he yelled at her in a public setting, saying “Why do you need the day off to go sit and pray?”