ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] . .  Based on the testimony provided at [[...]’s] trial, it is clear that [...] submitted false statements under oath in his Habeas Petition when he claimed to have no knowledge of the Staten Island robbery before it occurred.  (Da084) (emphasis added).  Notwithstanding the conclusion drawn by the Superior Court that the most significant witness against [...] testified falsely at trial, the PCR was nevertheless denied, because Petitioner purportedly did not “satisfy all three prongs of the Carter analysis, [and thus] the grant of a new trial for [[...]] [wa]s not warranted.
[brief] The reference to the written consent by “designated developers” applies to the developer who is being designated by the City to redevelop the subject property for which the amendment applies, i.e., [...].  [...] interpreted Section 15 to mean that “any designated redeveloper of a specific piece of property must be notified before the plan is amended,” and that if a redeveloper owns a piece of property not subject to the amendment, its consent would be unnecessary.  Pa184-185.  Granting a previously designated redeveloper of a different property that does not fall within the purview of the amended redevelopment plan and which has long since completed the construction of its own redevelopment blanket veto authority over an amendment to a redevelopment plan would be ultra vires.
[brief] 20.  In 1972, the [...] filed a variance application (“1972 Application”) for the construction of an addition to its school extending over a portion of its Fifth Street Lot.  *(Da926)*  The 1972 Application was filed to permit the [...] to “[c]onstruct an addition to an existing school with insufficient parking, insufficient side lines and exceeding the maximum lot coverage. ”  *Id.*  There is no reference to the number or location of parking areas on the Subject Property in the 1972 Application or the 1972 site plan (“1972 Site Plan”) submitted in support of the 1972 Application.  *(Da934)*  21.  There is no reference in the Planning Board resolution (“1972 Resolution”) granting the 1972 Application as to where parking is permitted or prohibited on the Subject Property.  The only reference to parking in the 1972 Resolution granting the variance is as follows:  >  [T]he applicant is unable to secure any additional lands surrounding its present location and although evidence presented indicates parking provisions to be less than those required pursuant to the existing ordinance, the applicant will have the benefit of parking facilities on adjoining properties owned by the [...] should additional parking facilities be required.  *Id.* *(Da931-933)*  22.  The 1972 Application, 1972 Resolution, and supporting 1972 Site Plan are devoid of any reference to permitted or prohibited parking areas on the Subject Property owned by Defendant’s predecessor in title.  (13T 60:7-61:24)  23.  The addition to the [...] permitted under the 1972 Resolution did not affect the Congregation’s utilization of the Fifth Street or Sixth Street Lots for parking.
[brief] Final Agency Decision, issued August 22, 2023.  .......................  Ca014  Initial Decision of Administrative Law Judge, issued June 9, 2023.  ......  Ca019  Agency Decision on Motion to Dismiss, issued July 26, 2023 ...........  Ca166  Commissioner of Education’s Order Declining Interlocutory Jurisdiction, issued August 11, 2022 ..................................................  Ca160  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ### CASES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Angus v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Metuchen, 475 N.J. Super. 362 (App. Div. 2023) | 32, 33 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins., 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 45 | | Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) | 39 | | Dennery v. Bd. of Educ. of Passaic Cty. Reg’l High Sch. Dist. No. 1, Passaic Cty., 131 N.
[brief] Besides the illogical and legally impossible nature of [...]’s argument, their argument additionally contradicted their own prior, successful arguments before [...] and the clear prior holdings of [...] with respect to the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ prior claims.  [...] repeatedly, successfully argued that Plaintiffs’ prior claims against [...], however labeled, were legal malpractice claims arising out of [...]’s legal work on behalf of Plaintiffs.  [...] erroneously agreed with [...], and explicitly found that all of Plaintiffs’ claims, however labeled, were legal malpractice claims.  Indeed, [...] dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims due to the lack of an AOM.  A court cannot dismiss non-legal malpractice claims for lack of an AOM.  Therefore, as [...] forcefully and repeatedly argued, and due to [...]’s holding, the procedural posture at the time Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Amend the Complaint was that Plaintiffs had never filed a non-legal malpractice claim against [...].  Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ non-legal malpractice claims against [...] arising out of [...]’s newly discovered role as sole member of [...] were necessarily new claims, because the Trial Court repeatedly held, however erroneously, that all the prior claims against [...] were legal malpractice claims.
[brief] 2005), for the proposition that the “LRHL does not supersede the Municipal Land Use Law. ” (Pa927).  Continuing, the Hoboken Court reasoned that, under *Lusardi v. Curtis Pt. Property Owners Ass’n*, 86 N.J. 217, 226 (1981), a municipality must have statutory authority in order to regulate land use and that [n]one of the detailed provisions of the LRHL authorize a municipality to contract to receive payments or contributions from a Redeveloper for any expenses or public improvements that have no relationship to the area in need of rehabilitation or the project of redevelopment in that area.
[brief] *(Argued at Pa362 – Pa368)*  Even if the court were to found that it had jurisdiction over the Commissioner and that [...] does have a private right to a cause of action to sue the Board in Superior Court, then it still should have dismissed the Counterclaim as out of time under the statute of limitations, doctrine of accord and satisfaction, and equitable doctrine of laches.  **A.  New Jersey Court Rule 4:69-1, et seq. details the procedure to force a government entity to comply with a statute.  Those suits for a writ of mandamus are filed as a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writ, and carry a 45-day statute of limitations under *R. 4:69-6*.  [...]’s Counterclaim clearly and unambiguously seeks to enforce the District’s compliance with *N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)*.  [...]’s Counterclaim for statutory compliance was filed well past the 45-day statute of limitations, necessitating dismissal of the Counterclaim.
[brief] We must always remember that the fact finder is charged with determining "just compensation" for the taking of the shopping center for its highest and best use as the use as of the date of taking.  The remaining tenants and the property owner are to be compensated wholly for what they have lost.  Not what the government is getting.  See: State v. Rohrer, 80 N.J. 462 (1974) wherein the Court cites Nichols, Eminent Domain § 12.21 at 12-86.11(3d Ed. 1978) saying:  [T]he just compensation to which an owner is entitled when his property is taken by Eminent Domain is regarded in law from the point of view of the owner and not the condemnor.  Obviously, the focus is on what is the loss to the owner or leaseholder.  The Court in Gallant was certainly well aware that the State had no use for the looms, and they represented nothing more than scrap or salvage value after the taking.  However, the defendants are entitled to compensation based upon the increased value represented by the FF&E that constitutes a functional unit within the condemned shopping center building.  B.
[brief] (Email, TRVa2822; [...] Tr. 23:8-24:3, TRVa2830; [...] Tr., 120:7-11, TRVa2864 and 139:21-140:10, TRVa2869.)  [...] never tried to re-enroll in the [...], which would have been required.  ([...] Tr., 144:4-22 at TRVa1535; see [...] Manual, at TRVa520 \(^5\) [...]’s August 10, 2015 email is a reply to an email which had confirmed [...]’s enrollment on July 29, 2015 in WC 0181121-00 effective 08/01/15, and, thus, the August 10th email maintains the same subject line.  (requiring subcontractors to “Notify the [...] Administrator of all subcontracts awarded and to provide all necessary enrollment forms[.]”).  [...]’s unenrolled contractor status is confirmed in the Enrollment Status Reports maintained by [...] and sent to [...], covering the period from July 13 to December 15, 2015.  (TRVa2641-2669; see also [...] Tr. 160:12-161:5 at TRVa2602.)  While [...] was listed as “enrolled” on an August 10th Enrollment Report (TRVa2646), it is “excluded” on each Enrollment Report beginning August 11, 2015, including the one in effect on the Accident date (TRVa2649-2669), confirming that [...] remained “excluded.
[brief] *Victor v. State*, 203 N.J. 383, 410 (2010).  After the Plaintiff has satisfied the elements to support discrimination based on race, the matter is then subjected to further evaluation applying the prongs set forth in *McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green*, 511 US 792, 802 (1973).  Because it is difficult to prove racial discrimination as there is difficulty proving discriminatory intent, the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting process is employed to determine whether an employer has engaged in discrimination as typically, the evidence that is possessed is circumstantial evidence of discrimination.  Zive at 446-47; See Gerety v. Atl. City Hilton Casino Resort, 184 N.J. 391, 399 (2005) where the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework was applied to a disparate impact claim under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.  See also: Jansen v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 110 N.J. 363, 380 (1988) where the McDonnell Douglas process was used where the employee alleged discrimination in hiring because of protected status.  In employment of the burden shifting process, (1) the plaintiff must come forward with sufficient evidence to constitute a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the defendant then must show a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision; and (3) the plaintiff must then be given the opportunity to show that defendant's stated reason was merely a pretext or discriminatory in its application.  Dixon v. Rutgers, the State Univ. of N.J., 110 NJ. 432, 442 (1988).  The evidence required of the Plaintiff is modest and must demonstrate to the court that the facts are compatible with a discriminatory intent, therefore, it is possible that discrimination could be the basis for the employer’s action.  Zive supra at 182.  After an inference of discrimination is made, the burden then shifts to the employer to set forth a legitimate business reason for the employer’s action.  Dixon supra at 449.  The burden then returns to the Plaintiff, the employee to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason given by the employer is merely a pretext for discrimination.  Id. at 449.  The Plaintiff must show that the employer’s reason is untrue and also motivated by discriminatory intent.  Id. at 449.  Appellant filed the cause of action of discrimination based on race.
[directive] Page 12 of 29  12.  Have you ever been a witness in a criminal case, regardless of whether it went to trial?  13.  Have you ever testified in any court proceeding?  14.  Have you ever applied for a job as a state or local police officer or with a sheriff’s department or county jail or state prison?  15.  Have you, or any family member or close friend, ever worked for any agency such as a police department, prosecutor’s office, the FBI, the DEA, or a sheriff’s department, jail or prison, either in New Jersey or elsewhere?  16.  As a general proposition, do you think that a police officer is more likely, less likely. or as likely, to tell the truth than a witness who is not a police officer?  17.  Would any of you give greater or lesser weight to the testimony of a police officer merely because of his or her status as a police officer?  18.  Have you or any family member or close friend ever been accused of committing an offense other than a minor motor vehicle offense?  19.  Have you or any family member or close friend ever been the victim of a crime, whether it was reported to law enforcement or not?  If yes, was anyone arrested?  How long ago was it? Where did it occur?  Were you satisfied with the outcome?  Standards for Jury Selection
[brief] Plaintiffs are also wrong that [...] was arguing for an entirely new panel once they amended to add their large monetary claims.  He simply requested a panel of 3 and [...] agreed it would add 2.  [...] said that [...] would stay on.  (Da315-316)  Therefore, had [...] not later changed its position and declared a waiver, [...] would have remained and 2 additional arbitrators would have also presided over the Plaintiffs’ new monetary claims under the Large Complex Case rules.  That would not be an ‘entirely new panel’ or an ‘entirely new arbitration’, as claimed.  Thus, Plaintiffs incorrectly contend that [...] tried to use their amendments to pleadings strategically because he did not like the arbitrator.  [...] was not asking [...] to disqualify [...].  He was also not asking that [...]’s prior “Phase I” rulings be vacated upon the amended pleadings Plaintiffs filed.  He was simply asking that 3 arbitrators decide the large monetary claims that Plaintiffs’ amendment had for the first time presented in 2016, which [...] rules required at the time those monetary claims were “disclosed”.
[brief] In January 2021, [...], through counsel, wrote to the [...], refuting, among other things, their claim that the roadway easement had been extinguished (Da158).  Respondent also explored other options to try to gain access to [...] other than through the [...] (Da513–14).  Specifically, Respondent made inquiry of each of the other adjacent landowners but was unable to establish any formal access due to deed restrictions against one property limiting all uses to agricultural only, and due to the existence of freshwater wetlands, transition buffers, and State open waters along the other side of the land (Da513–514 at ¶¶30, 32–35; Da525; Da545).  In addition to seeking out alternative ways to access the [...], [...] personally went to the [...] and reviewed the chains of title to each of the properties affected by the roadway (Da513 at ¶29; Da515 at ¶37).  [...] located and obtained copies of the deeds granting the [...] owners the right to enter and cross the [...]’ property via the existing roadway, but the [...] refused to acknowledge their validity (Da345; Da433; Da461).
[brief] Considering the circumstances as [...] must have considered them, he cannot be said to have acted unreasonably.  The minor inconvenience of a police officer fetching paperwork from the glove box does not become constitutionally defective because a defendant elected to store his heroin alongside that paperwork.  Neither can the desire to avoid that same inconvenience can be held to outweigh the police officer’s obligation to minimize the risk that a defendant known for reckless flight and weapons possession poses to the community.  While defendant leans heavily on *State v. Johnson*, 476 N.J.Super. 1 (App. Div. 2023) to limit an officer’s ability to retrieve credentials, that decision does not impact the analysis here.
[brief] Hon. [...], P.J.Cr., issued a written decision and Order on January 14, 2020, denying [...]’s motion.............................................. (Da6-29)  [...]’s motion for reconsideration denied on May 8, 2020...............  (Da30)  Hon. [...], J.S.C., issued an Order,  On April 5, 2021, suppressing [...]’s statements made to the police in the parking lot of his apartment complex, “inside Apartment B”, immediately following his arrest; as well as his “unrecorded statements” made to the police at police headquarters, but denied [...]’s motion with regard to “other statements” made to police officers on March 1, 2017........................................................................................................ (Da31)  [...] issued a Statement of Reasons on December 8, 2021...........(Da33-43)  On December 10, 2021, [...] denied [...]’s Motion for reconsideration......................................................................................... (Da32)  By Judgment of Conviction dated October 21, 2022, [...] was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment on Count 2, concurrent to concurrent terms of 5 years on Count 3, and 18 months on Count 4 ........................................................................................................ (Da44-46)
[brief] Per [...] Police Officer [...], Broad Street Station is known for drug activity, and as a place to loiter and obtain drugs, and has been for his entire career, which began in 2003.  (239a, 238a).  Per [...] Police Officer [...], homeless people gather and loiter at the Broad Street Station.  (266a).  In the two years before the attack on [...], the [...] Police issued at least sixty (60) citations and/or arrests for crimes including panhandling, drug possession, disorderly conduct, theft, simple assault, fighting and aggravated assault.  (276a – 757a).  These citations include ten (10) for violent crimes.  (159a).  During this same timeframe, at least one other conductor was punched in the head by a non-employee at Broad Street Station.  (758a).  [...] Assistant Superintendent [...] became aware of assaults at the Broad Street Station from speaking with train crews.  (253a).  Litter and debris surround the Newark Broad Street Station.  (148a – 152a).  Graffiti is also found in and around the Broad Street Station.  (153a).  In December 2016, approximately 13 months before the attack on Plaintiff, his attacker, [...], was issued a citation for disorderly conduct by the [...] Police at Newark Broad Street Station, the location of the attack on [...].  (765a).  As admitted in their discovery responses, [...] does NOT adhere to the industry standard for security in relation to mass transit stations, failing to follow the American Public Transportation Association guidelines.  (767a; 162a).
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Defendants [...], [...] d/b/a Ginarte Gonzalez  Winograd L.L.P. request that this Court reverse the portion of the Trial Court’s January 30, 2024 Order finding an irrevocable, express waiver of the right to proceed to arbitration and direct the arbitrable claims in this matter to proceed to arbitration.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants [...] and Ginarte  Gallardo Gonzalez & Winograd L.L.P. d/b/a Ginarte Gonzalez  Winograd L.L.P.  By: /s/ [...]  DOMENICK CARMAGNOLA  Dated: June 10, 2024
[brief] [...]’S Motion To Enforce is a Disguised Pre-Judgment Writ of Attachment as The Settlement Agreement Does Not Provide For Relief For Environmental Contamination Claims (Pa161).  This appeal is before the Court today because [...] saw an easy and quick opportunity to get a windfall and collect an undeserved $796,484.39 Consent Judgment by asserting that there was a breach of the Settlement Agreement—a breach which [...] itself precipitated and committed.  Because the Trial Court did not rubber-stamp [...]’s request to enter the Consent Judgment based upon conclusory and unproven allegations of contamination, [...] claims this was reversible error.  It was not.  [...]’s claims of “dumping” and “contamination” are currently unsupported allegations that cannot form the basis of a breach of the Settlement Agreement or entry of the Consent Judgment.  Environmental contamination claims are complicated cases that are ill-suited to summary adjudications.  Here, [...] seeks to prove allegations of contamination by mere assertions in an affidavit.  No expert report or objective testing results have been provided by [...].  There is no language in the Settlement Agreement that provides a truncated process in the event of contamination claims.  “Courts cannot make contracts for parties.  They can only enforce the contracts which the parties themselves have made. ”  Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 33 N.J. 36, 43 (1960).  It is not the court's function to supply terms that are absent from the contract.  Temple v. Clinton Trust Co., 1 N.J. 219, 225 (1948).  The court “has no power to add to that judgment. ”  Long v. Mertz, 21 N.J. Super. 401, 403 (App.Div.1952).  Asking this Court to give [...] a judgment close to $800,000 now as part of a Consent Judgment that was never meant to secure all kinds of claims—but only secured payment of the rent owed under settlement—to satisfy an as-yet unproven claim of “dumping” or “contamination” (without any due process or opportunity given to [...] to defend itself or challenge or prove the opposite of [...]’s claims) is tantamount to giving [...] a pre-judgment writ of attachment.
[brief] (Da64-Da71, ¶ 19; 3T\(^4\), generally).  By Order dated July 6, 2023, the Lower Court denied Defendant’s First Motion to Vacate on procedural grounds.  (Da64-Da71, ¶ 20; Pa174-Pa176).  Significantly, however, the Lower Court noted that Appellant had not provided specific proof of non-receipt.
[brief] The first of the robberies the jury found defendant to have committed occurred around 2 a.m.  on April 24, 2005 in the Egg Harbor Econo Lodge.  The front desk clerk, [...], was in the back office when defendant and his confederate, [...], entered the lobby.  After he saw defendant enter the hotel by viewing the monitor of the motel security camera, Reid came out front and saw defendant standing behind the counter with a gun.  Defendant ordered Bennett to his knees and began rifling through the cabinets and cash register.  After finding little money in the cash register, defendant became very aggravated and demanded the money from Bennett's wallet.  Thereafter, defendant took the money from Bennett's wallet and hit Bennett on the side of his head with the gun he was wielding, causing Bennett to lose a tooth.  Defendant and Reid fled with a total of approximately $2100.
[brief] The First Action  On March 16, 2020, Plaintiff commenced the First Action by filing a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs against the City, the [...] and the [...] Planning Board challenging their arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable actions of declaring certain property referred to as the “Laurel-Saddlewood Block” as being a condemnation area in need of redevelopment under N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1, et seq.
[brief] 11, 13, 30  RUTGERS, BY THE NUMBERS, https://www.rutgcrs.cdu/about/by-the-numbers .................................................................  5  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 7.3 on R. 4:69-6 (2024)  .....................................................................................................................  18  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 36.7 (“Continuous tort” and “Discrimination cases”) on R. 4:5-4 (2024)  .....................................................................................................................................  16  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order dated June 27, 2024 ................................................................. Da89  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS  Cite Transcript of Motion Hearing, dated June 27, 2024...........................................  1T  Defendants [...] ([...]) and [...] ([...] or [...]) appeal an adverse judgment entered in a summary action opened by Plaintiffs [...], [...] and [...] Council of AAUP Chapters, [...] ([...]).