ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The State's case rested on the testimony of two cooperating co-defendants: [...] and [...].  [...] was named in 19 of the counts contained in the indictment, including all of the counts from the Gola incident.  [...] was an unindicted co-defendant, who claimed to be involved in each of these incidents.  As a result of his involvement in the robberies, [...] was facing 185 years in prison, with a significant period of parole ineligibility.  (8T 66-9 to 74- 5)  Instead of pleading guilty to any of the charges in the indictment, he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit theft, a third-degree offense.  (8T 25-15 to 24)  The plea bargain called for [...]'s testimony at trial in exchange for a five-year flat sentence.  (8T 26-3 to 12)  This sentence was to run concurrently to an unrelated three-year sentence [...] received for conspiracy to distribute cocaine.  (8T 23-8 to 21, 73-25 to 74-5)  At the time [...] testified, he was serving a 15-year federal sentence for conspiracy to distribute drugs and possession of a weapon.  (8T 88-11 to 20)  Because of his lengthy record and his status as a "career criminal," he faced a life sentence on each of the five robberies contained in the indictment.  (9T 183-1 to 184-15)  As a result of his cooperation, [...] was not prosecuted in relation to any of the incidents charged in the indictment.  (8T 91-8 to 16)  By testifying against petitioner, [...] was hoping to get a further reduction on the federal sentence he was serving at the time of trial.  (8T 91-17 to 20)  While he did not know what sentence reduction he would receive, he was "hoping" for "[e]verything."  (8T 91-21 to 25).
[brief] [...]’s testimony ran grossly afoul of these principles.  He was trying to make himself look like a law-enforcement officer who properly pursued a suspect rather than one who pursued the wrong person and then chose to frame that person.  He was entitled to offer facts to support such a conclusion -- e.g., “I saw a man cross the street away from the crime scene and I followed him" -- but, under McLean and its progeny, he was not allowed to offer an opinion interpreting those facts: telling the jury that defendant’s actions in fleeing the area of the shooting in that manner were “suspicious” and led him to believe defendant was armed and had been involved in the shooting.  Yet that is precisely what [...] did here.  Nothing was more important in this case than whether jurors had a reasonable doubt that police arrested the actual criminals.  Part of that determination involved assessing whether police properly focused on defendant or whether, in fact, their actions in pursuing defendant were misplaced and they later decided to frame him.  [...]’s improper lay-opinion testimony that defendant’s actions were suspicious and indicated to Gonzalez that he was an armed suspect in the shooting were a grossly improper attempt to put a thumb on the scale of that credibility and reasonable-doubt determination.  Reversal of the resulting convictions is necessarily required where, as here, the error potentially tips the jury’s consideration of the credibility or evidentiary worth of the State’s case.  *State v. Briggs*, 279 N.J. Super. 555, 565 (App. Div. 1995); *State v. W.L.*, 278 N.J. Super. 295, 301 (App. Div. 1995); see also *State v. Hedgespeth*, 249 N.J. 234, 253 (2021), citing *State v. Scott*, 229 N.J. 468, 484-485 (2017) (errors which affect the weight the jury will give the State’s evidence or the State’s arguments in favor of conviction versus the defendant’s arguments in favor of acquittal are reversible and never harmless).  Defendant’s resulting convictions should be reversed, and the matter remanded for retrial.
[directive] (a)  If administrative charges have been brought against an officer and a hearing will be held, a copy of all discoverable materials shall be provided to the officer and the hearing officer before the hearing; (b)  If the subject officer, agency or governing jurisdiction has been named as a defendant in a lawsuit arising out of the specific incident covered by an internal investigation, a copy of the internal investigative reports may be released to the attorney representing the subject officer, agency or jurisdiction; (c)  Upon the request or at the direction of the County Prosecutor or Attorney General; or order; or (d)  Upon a court (e)  Upon a request from the Division of Pensions, following an officer’s application for a retirement allowance.  (a)  The described in Section 9.1.1(b) shall 9.6.2 Summary and Conclusions Report be released in response to a request made under the common law right of access by any member of the public or press where it satisfies any of the following conditions: (1)  The led to a result on or after Summary and Conclusions Report January 1, 2023, that requires disclosure pursuant to Section 9.11.2; (2) The agency otherwise concludes that the Summary and Conclusions is subject to release pursuant to applicable law or court order; Report or (3)  Upon the request or at the direction of the County Prosecutor or Attorney General at any time.
[directive] Attorney General Guidelines - Stationhouse Adjustments Page 3 with the Chief Law Enforcement Executive of that agency, take immediate steps to implement a stationhouse adjustment program for that agency.  If it appears that a State Police Road Station is not in compliance with this directive, the County Prosecutor’s Office shall inform the Superintendent of State Police and the Attorney General of the specific deficiencies in the implementation of a stationhouse adjustment program in the State Police Road Station.  Thereafter, the Superintendent shall implement a stationhouse adjustment program in the Road Station.
[brief] As to the alternative argument to vacate Defendant’s plea, the De Novo Court found:  There is no doubt in this Court’s mind that the Defendant did raise to the Municipal Court that in the alternative that the Defendant be permitted to vacate his plea and …that the Judge did not address the second issue of the vacating.  (3T25-7 to 25-14)  The De Novo Court then went on to find that the Trial Court engaged in a “lengthy colloquy” with Defendant and advised him of the penalties on a sentence on a third or subsequent DUI conviction.  (3T46-1 to 46-14)  The Court noted that “at no point…did the Court ever mention that the license suspension for 10 years was to run concurrently with any existing license suspension. ”  (3T46-17 to 46-21)  The De Novo Court concluded:  When the Municipal Court Judge stated that his license would be suspended for 10 more years from today’s date, this was in the broader context of the discussion on defendant’s license already having been suspended.  The con – in this context, “more” implies that the suspension is in addition to the earlier suspension and it’s not simply to run concurrently.  (emphasis supplied)  (3T46-17 to 46-21; 48-15 to 48-21)  The De Novo Court then denied Defendant’s request to vacate his plea, finding the “plea was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily and that Defendant was fully apprised of the potential consequences. ”  (3T49-1 to 49-6)
[brief] There is no dispute that “transient jurisdiction,” i.e., “in personam jurisdiction over an individual who is served while present, even though temporarily, in the forum state,” provides an “exception to [the] minimum contacts analysis. ”  El-Maksoud v. El-Maksoud, 237 N.J. Super. 483, 486–88 (Ch. Div. 1989) (emphasis added); Burnham v. Superior Court of California, Cnty. of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 615–19 (1990) (applying transient jurisdiction to an individual).
[brief] (See Ex. R-4, a federal court opinion in Sutton v. Sutton, 71 F. Supp. 2d 383 (D.N.J. 1999) which details the factual history of the nine lawsuits filed by Petitioner.  If Petitioner was meritorious in his claims against the families’ estates, the payout would have occurred after his marriage to Decedent.  In fact, the Federal Courts Opinion wherein Petitioner lost wasn’t decided until 1999, seven years into the marriage.  [...] testified credibly that Petitioner most likely initiated the Antenuptial Agreement with Decedent due to the pending litigations to assure that the award was separate from marital assets.  In this respect, the Respondent testified:  I mean, [...] has been litigious his whole life, like this is what we were all worried about, getting to this point here, this trial taking like over a year of back and forth, like this is what my mom was trying to protect me from.  We always knew [...] was capable of that.  He always gave unsolicited legal advice, when somebody slipped in the mall to when somebody had an issue at work to anything, he always gave advice about you should sue this one or you should do this, or, you know, sending people to court with papers.  That was like his hobby.  This is like a sport to him.  So I’m not surprised to be here and I’m not surprised that I had to sit through a bunch of, you know, stories and accusations and lies.  (10T161-3 to 17).
[brief] 1T204:7-23; 2T12:2-14:21; see also Plaintiff’s Exhibit 14 (P-785); Duratron Corp. v. Republic Stuyvesant Corp., 95 N.J. Super. 527, 533 (holding it is "a logical, traditional, and valuable tool in the process of fair adjudication"), certif. denied, 50 N.J. 404 (1967).  The lower court abused its discretion by giving weight to the Defendant’s testimony about his alleged financial hardship as he lacks all credibility.
[directive] Any public statements by a law enforcement agency about the conduct of law enforcement officers involved in a firearm discharge require approval by the County Prosecutor or the Attorney General’s Office, depending upon which entity is supervising the investigation.  7.11.4  Agency law enforcement officers including internal affairs personnel will participate in the initial investigation only if directed to do so by the County Prosecutor, OPIA, or other designee of the Attorney General.  In the general course, employees of the same agency as the subject officer shall not participate in the investigation or attend any investigative activities.  This does not, however, preclude any officer from acting as a first responder to the scene of a use-of-force incident, helping to secure the scene, or participating in a be- on-the-lookout search or pursuit related to the incident.  All officers are also obligated to comply with any orders of recusal that may be issued pursuant to the investigation.  7.11.5
[directive] If the defendant was at any time subsequently convicted of an offense, the points for an otherwise temporally remote conviction or adjudication of delinquency shall be counted.  It should be noted that the “remoteness” exclusion set forth in this Section applies only to the calculation of criminal history points, and not to a determination of whether a defendant is eligible for an extended term of imprisonment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f.
[brief] For example, the regulatory language is not “The routine maintenance and operations; rehabilitation, preservation, \textsuperscript{16} *Falcone v. Branker*, 135 N.J. Super. 137, 146-47, 342 A.2d 875 (Law Div.1975) (emphasis added).  \textsuperscript{17}  *U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Hough*, 210 N.J. 187, 199 (2012) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
[brief] For ³  Similarly, the requests at issue in the out-of-state cases that [...] alludes to are equally factually distinct.  See Hangartner v. City of Seattle, 151 Wash. 2d 439 (2004) (“all books, records, [and] documents of every kind” related to a example, in [...] v. Div. of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 375 N.J. Super. 534 (App. Div. 2005), the request was made by a company who was facing administrative charges by the [...] ([...]) and sought “all documents or records evidencing that the [...] sought, obtained or ordered revocation of a liquor license for the charge of selling alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person in which such person, after leaving the licensed premises, was involved in a fatal auto accident.
[brief] There are very few areas in the municipality where nonresidential, non-agricultural pursuits can be achieved.  1.  Of [...]’s 13,728 acres of land: a) 7,956.36 acres are preserved and 577.39 are unpreserved (but with TDR Credits assigned to them); b) 689.55 acres are State-owned land; c) 583 acres comprise the “Receiving Area”; d) 140 acres are recreation fields and/or open space outside the Receiving Area; e) [...] and [...] comprise 385 acres; f) Turnpike Roads comprise: 102.87 acres.  2.  As a result, seventy-six percent (76%) of [...]’s land mass has been dedicated to the purposes of the 1997 Master Plan, and subsequent Master Plan Re-Examination Reports, and/or is physically not developable.  E.  However, no significant commercial or industrial initiatives have been undertaken since TDR was adopted in 1998.
[brief] Wisniewski v. Murphy, 454 N.J. Super. 508, 186 A.3d  An appeal is not moot if "a party still suffers from the adverse consequences . . . caused by [the prior] proceeding."  Ibid. (alterations in original) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.P., 408 N.J. Super. 252, 262 (App. Div. 2009)).  Even if an action becomes technically moot for want of an effective remedy, "courts may still decide a case when its issues are of 'great public importance,' or are 'capable of repetition,' yet [will] evade review."
[brief] This kind of irreconcilable legal inconsistency within a jury’s verdict violates defendants’ constitutional rights, undermines faith in the justice system, and offends notions of fundamental fairness.  Most basically, legal inconsistencies should be prohibited because they result in the “absurd” and “legally impossible” situation, *Pleasant Grove City v. Terry*, 478 P.3d 1026, 1031 (Utah 2020), in which “the same essential element or elements of each crime were found both to exist and not to exist. ”  *State v. Arroyo*, 844 A.2d 163, 171 (R.I. 2004).  In other words, when a legal inconsistency arises, the “acquittal on one count negates a necessary element for conviction on [the other] count[,]” *State v. Powell*, 674 So. 2d 731, 733 (Fla. 1996), such that the State “could not possibly have proved the elements of both crimes with respect to the defendant. ”  *Commonwealth v. Elliffe*, 714 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999).  Accordingly, and unlike with factual inconsistencies where two of more verdicts merely “suggest inconsistent interpretations of the evidence[,]” *Commonwealth v. Gonzalez*, 892 N.E.2d 255, 262 n.8 (Mass. 2008), legal inconsistencies are wholly irreconcilable and particularly noxious.  See also *Doubleday v. People*, 364 P.3d 193, 197 (Colo. 2016); *Conroy v. State*, 202 S.E.2d 398, 401 (Ga. 1973); *Commonwealth v. Magliocco*, 883 A.2d 479, 493 (Pa. 2005).  The jury’s verdict in [...]’s case was legally impossible: that [...]’s use of force as to murder was justified by self-defense yet that exact same use of force amounted to the crime of passion/provocation manslaughter.
[brief] Hence why the court does not recite the contents of any such letter in its order.  \(^2\)  “T” stands for the 9/23/22 transcript. stay of any judgment.  T 15-17.  The court admitted several times that the complaint was dismissed, not stayed.  T 25-26:25-2; 37:1-3.  It claimed that dismissing a case is the same as a stay.  T 42:8-10.  The court held that reinstating a dismissed complaint is the same as a Rule 4:67 filing, and said that although the appellate court may disagree that is what the court thinks.  T 43-44.  It also held that if a defendant knows a lawsuit is filed then that is service.  T 41-20.  On September 23, 2022, the court issued an order denying reconsideration by erroneously stating that the defendant did not present “new arguments that were not previously available” when it issued its May 27, 2022 order.  16a.  That is incorrect because the defendant’s reconsideration motion argued the court’s reliance on cases in its decision was palpably incorrect and stated at oral argument that the cases relied upon in the court’s May 27, 2022 order did not support personal jurisdiction.  T 20:9-23, T 21-22:18-8.  At no time did the court address its lack of subject matter jurisdiction or the relevant law.  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**
[brief] . . .  Thus, a finding that [Defendant] violated the Spill Act would not require a conclusion that it was negligent”) (PPCIra5-6).  A conclusory statement in a pleading that a party acted “negligently,” verified or not, is not “competent evidence” that party was negligent as a matter of law.  Secondly, [...] expressly denied the allegations of paragraph 2 of [...]’s Verified Complaint (that it had been negligent) in its Answer.  PPCIa124.  Thirdly, the statement by [...] in an email shortly after the accident that “one of our drivers . . . had an accident with our chassis parked next to the container[,]” (emphasis by [...]) does not, in any reasonable view, amount to an admission of “negligence” by [...].  It was simply a statement that [...]’s driver had been involved in “an accident” and did not constitute an admission of tortious fault.  Quite simply, [...]’s argument does not respond to (because it cannot rebut) [...]’s point that [...]’s complaint against [...] did not state a cause of action for negligence, such that the trial court did not find and could not have found that as a matter of undisputed fact and as a matter of law, [...] was liable for negligence; that cause of action was never pled by [...] (PPCIa062-71).  As set out in [...]’s brief (Db26-27), [...] would only be liable under the MCS-90 endorsement to pay “a final judgment recovered against the insured for public liability resulting from negligence in the operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles subject to the financial responsibility requirements of Section 29 and 30 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980” (PPCIa183).  [...] does not and cannot dispute that no “final judgment [was] recovered against [[...]] for public liability resulting from negligence in the operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles,” such that [...] should not have been granted summary judgment against [...] under the MCS-90 endorsement.  The April 6, 2023 “Final Judgment” against [...] found [...] liable only under the Spill Act (PPCIa369-71), under which negligence is not an element of liability.  [...]’s allegation in its Verified Complaint that [...] was negligent (which allegation [...] denied) cannot “paper over” that glaring omission.  POINT II
[brief] See S.K.I. Beer Corp. v. Baltika Brewery, 443 F. Supp.2d 313, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that the “overarching purpose of the [ABC Law] is not to regulate out-of-state transactions”).  While there is no dispute that New York law would not provide Appellants the aforementioned protections, Defendants claimed (without support) that the MBPA’s fee-shifting statute is not a “fundamental” policy.  Courts do, however, consider fee-shifting statutes, which are implemented by our Legislature, to be important policy “to ensure ‘that plaintiffs with bona fide claims are able to find lawyers to represent them [,] ... to attract competent counsel in cases involving statutory rights, ... and to ensure justice for all citizens. ’”  Warren Distrib. Co. v. InBev USA, LLC, 2011 WL 770005, at * 7 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2011) (awarding reasonable attorney’s fees under the fee-shifting provision of the NJFPA) (citing _____________________
[brief] First, [...] has already submitted a very detailed accounting explanation its document collective, identification, review and production procedures, including the various individuals involved, each step taken in the process and the overall amount of documents involved.  The Special Master found this accounting to be in compliance with the Special Master’s previous requests for information regarding [...]’s document production.  [...] did not make any objections to this accounting or [...]’s procedures.  See Docs. 214, 219, 222.  Second, [...] was offered the opportunity to restore [...]’s email server in November 2016.  [...] has not made any attempt to restore the server to date.  The Special Master agrees with [...] that if [...] had real, serious issues with [...]’s document production, it would have made an attempt to restore this server.  See Doc. 222.  Third, upon reviewing the exhibits attached to [...]’s Motion and [...]’s Response, it is clear that [...] took the general position that some of the outstanding documents were not responsive to [...]’s RFPs from the beginning of the parties’ discovery dispute.  See Letter from [...] to [...] of November 28, 2016; Letter from [...] to [...] of December 12, 2016.  The parties’ previous communications do not support [...]’s argument that [...] has intentionally avoiding explanation as to why it has no identified or produced these documents.  Fourth, the variations between [...] and [...]’s privilege log and production do not appear to be significant.  Upon review of [...]’s document requests to both [...] and [...], it is clear the requests are not identical.  In light of the different document requests, it follows that [...] and [...] would have some variation in their privilege logs and productions.  See [...]’s Response, App. 1.  Fifth, upon an in camera review of the 26 outstanding documents, [...]’s withholding appears to have been warranted.  The Special Master could not find any nefarious, questionable reason as to why [...] would have withheld these documents.  The Special Master can only conclude [...] withheld the documents based on the reasons it has provided and that are evident from an in camera review.  As such, [...]’s withholding in this regard fails to amount to evidence that there might be some additional unwarranted withholding of responsive documents.  At this point, there is no indication that [...] has improperly withheld any documents from [...].  The cases cited by [...], which resulted in one party providing an explanation to the Court regarding facts and circumstances as to how and why documents were lost or not produced, do not appear to be applicable in this situation.  Those cases involved clear facts of intentional withholding or destruction and/or missing or unavailable documents that were responsive to discovery requests.  There is no indication those facts are at issue here.  See EEOC v. Sizzler USA Restaurants, Inc., No 06-142, 2007 WL 1994157, at 1 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2007); Dr. Greens, Inc. v. Stephens, No. 11-0638, No. 110, at *9 (S.D. Cal. May 6, 2014); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., No. 11-01846, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2011).
[brief] (Da176).  The Condemnation Resolution authorized the Township to investigate whether the Property meets the redevelopment criteria under the LRHL and to allow the Township to use the power of eminent domain.  (Id.).  On February 7, 2024, in furtherance of the efforts started by the Condemnation Resolution, the Planning Board held a hearing for the purpose of determining whether to recommend to the Township Committee that the Property be designated as a Condemnation Redevelopment Area.
[brief] However, there is no legal authority for [...]’s suggestion that Rule 1:3-1—which New Jersey Supreme Court intended to guide procedure in the Judiciary—should automatically control how an entirely separate election statute is applied.  Indeed, the requirement of N.J.S.A. 19:63-22(a) that a postmarked ballot must be bear a postmark date before or of the day of the election indicates the Legislature’s intent to cabin the postmark date to the date of the election.  By specifying that 8:00 p.m. on Election Day is the deadline for a ballot’s postmark, the Legislature intended to ensure that voters are not submitting votes beyond the date of the election, regardless of whether the election is held on a Tuesday or a Saturday.  As noted above, the vote-by-mail laws must be viewed as “a meaningful attempt by the Legislature to effectively guard against one avenue of possible electoral fraud in the process of . . . delivery, i.e., the casting of absentee ballots. ”  In re Petition of Battle, 190 N.J. Super. at 242.