ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] But each of these questions came as a result of defendant’s repeated, volunteered diatribes.  Also, [...], who was present at defendant’s pre-arrest interview with [...] just two days prior, had witnessed defendant acknowledge and waive his Miranda rights at the outset of that interview.  The remainder of the detectives’ statements that defendant alleges constituted “the functional equivalent of questioning” were not “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” under Innis and Mallozzi.  When [...] walked in the booking room, defendant asked him why he was “caught up in this,” to which [...] responded “let’s be real. ”  Rather than encouraging defendant to keep talking, [...]’s response was intended to shut down what he perceived to be an unnecessary question.  Defendant also removes the context from [...]’s allegedly impermissible conduct during the booking process.  First, defendant claims that [...] “continued to encourage” him when [...] expressed that he did not believe defendant stabbed [...].  (Db19).  Yet the transcript and video footage clearly reveal that [...]’s comment clarified defendant’s statement that he was being blamed for [...] “chas[ing] somebody and [getting] himself hurt. ” (11T128-24 to 129-2; Sal at 10:49:27 to 10:49:46; Da52).  And [...]’s statement led directly into an explanation that after fingerprinting defendant, [...] would interview him “for five hours if you want to . . . .” (Sal at 10:49:47 to 10:50:20; Da53) (emphasis added).  Finally, [...]’s statement that, “a lot more evidence has come to light,” led to a clarification as to whether defendant wanted to call his lawyer.  These statements are neither “the functional equivalent of interrogation” nor “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” and were thus properly admitted at trial.  C.
[brief] ”  Ibid. (emphasis added) (citing State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499, 510-12 (1992)).  In Figueroa, the appellate record was “not sufficiently clear to determine precisely the scope of defendant’s request: whether he was requesting the right of self-representation or, instead, the opportunity to engage in hybrid representation. ”  State v. Figueroa, 186 N.J. 589, 595 (2006).  In the trial court’s ensuing colloquy with the defendant, “seeking to determine whether defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and voluntary,” the focus of that inquiry “had an unintended consequence: defendant constantly modified the scope of his request to meet the questions asked of him and, in doing so, appeared to vacillate between a request for self-representation and a request for hybrid representation. ”  Id. at 595-96.  Yet even in light of a potentially ambiguous request by the defendant, the Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s convictions.  The Court explained, “[t]o the extent the record does not disclose the true nature of defendant’s request, we are compelled to conclude that a Faretta/Crisafi/Reddish violation is present. ”  Id. at 596.  As these cases make clear, the State’s claim that [...]’s request to represent himself was not “clearly and unequivocally” made must be rejected.
[brief] The planning and zoning boards are not only protected by statute; courts have also protected their powers to rule on zoning and planning matters free from "adulterat[ion] or interfere[nce] ... by acts of local governing bodies or officials."  Diller & Fisher Co. v. Architectural Review Bd., 246 N.J. Super. 362, 367–68 (Law Div.1990) (emphasis added); see also Paruszewski v. Twp. of Elsinboro, 154 N.J. 45, 53–54 (1998).
[brief] Instead, [...] relied only on his own “experience” and opinion.  Critically, Plaintiffs’ expert could not explain the nature of the dangerous condition he claims [...] should have identified.  Rather, he only speculated about conditions he believed may have existed.  He also frequently contradicted himself and drastically changed his positions.  In the end, as noted by the trial court, [...]’s opinion was a circular assertion -- simply because an accident occurred, there must have been a dangerous condition in the roadway, [...] must have failed to identify it, and therefore [...] was responsible for the accident.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ sole liability expert, rendered a net opinion.  His opinion was unreliable and properly ruled inadmissible.  Without [...]’s opinion, Plaintiffs could not establish the core elements of their cause of action against [...].  [...] was properly granted summary judgment.
[brief] *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995) (citation omitted).  “An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact. ”  R. 4:46-2(c).  A reviewing Court “employ[s] the same standard that governs trial courts in reviewing summary judgment orders.
[brief] Dated: January 15, 2025  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS .........................................................................................  i  TABLE OF AUTHORITY ....................................................................................... ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..............................................................................  1  LEGAL ARGUMENTS ..........................................................................................  2  A. [...] seeks the granting of [...] s as the appropriate remedy ........  2  B.  The matter is not moot as the application was timely filed and considered as part of the program.  .................................................................  3  C.  [...] funding is not predicated upon legislative appropriation and instead is a creature of Board regulatory development and the various Solar Acts ...........................................................................................................  4  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................  5
[brief] N.J.S.A. 48:12-152b lists the five circumstances where a railroad is immune from tort liability for injury or death as a result of contact with railroad equipment.  Section B(1) immunizes railroads when the injured party is intoxicated.  There is no language specific to location in this clause.  This means that if a person is intoxicated and is injured or killed by railroad equipment anywhere—on railroad property, on a right of way, if they are a passenger utilizing parts of railroad designated for passenger use or in a crossing established by the railroad, the railroad is immune.
[brief] All there is in this case is an unclear video, which alone could not be a basis for a conviction, and fingerprint evidence.  The prosecutor himself acknowledged in closing that the surveillance video was not sufficient to determine the identity of the perpetrator(s), directly contradicting the State’s new contention on appeal (Sb 31), but told the jury not to worry because the fingerprint analysis made the case:  Those are [...]’s fingerprints.  The overwhelming evidence presented to you makes it as true that those are [...]’s fingerprints as the fingerprints on his exemplars.  Not one fingerprint, not two fingerprints, not three fingerprints, but four prints, ring finger and middle finger and on the left hand under the register, two prints of the middle finger on the right hand under that register.  That’s the testimony you heard from [...], an expert in the field of fingerprint analysis who has been doing that work for over two decades.  That man is that man, and it’s not because what some officer thought looking at a video clip for a few minutes at four o’clock in the morning.  It’s certainly not what counsel -- what his opinion as to what he sees on these videos, it’s the evidence.  It’s the proof, it’s what was presented to you through reliable investigative techniques.  And at the end of the day, ladies and gentlemen, if we just had some grainy video, I wouldn’t be here today.  We wouldn’t be here for this case.  This is not a video identification case.  As I told you in the opening, the video was a roadmap.  The video provided investigators with areas to look to see what that suspect touched, what [...] touched.  And what did he touch?  He was all over that register, no gloves.  What else did he touch?  What else did that video provide investigators in terms of a map to where to train their attention?  When he came to the pizza shop, here’s a pizza oven.  Take a look at it.  How many prints, how many smudges do you see on that pizza oven?  You watched the video, you watched the body-worn camera footage from [...].  I would suggest it jumps off the screen, one print, [...]’s print.  That’s what the evidence shows, that was the testimony from an expert in the field of latent print analysis.  (7T 10-14 to 11-25)  (emphasis added)  In sum, this case was a fingerprint case.  And despite defense counsel’s repeated attempts to get the court to consider seriously how to handle that central evidence—from voir dire through testimony through jury charges—the court did not act as a gatekeeper and take the steps necessary to ensure that [...] had a fair trial based on reliable evidence before an unbiased jury.  The convictions must be reversed.
[brief] Pursuant to Rule 1:4-8(b)(1), prior to moving for sanctions, the applicant’s notice and demand, attached to its supporting certification, must include the following:  (i) State that the paper is believed to violate the provisions of this rule, (ii) Set forth the basis for the belief with specificity, (iii) Include a demand that the paper be withdrawn, and (iv)  Give notice…that an application for sanctions will be made within a reasonable time thereafter if the offending paper is not withdrawn within 28 days of service of the written demand.
[directive] most note See statute. by an initiate to possible be not would it in event which statute, by required not fingerprinting is which of presumption the overcome whether to determination the assessment, risk pretrial automated Directive of 4.3.1 subsection this and 3:3-1(c) in Rule forth set complaint-summons by charging that Directive this in of forth 4 Section set provisions/presumptions the applying by made shall be 8.
[brief] ”  See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6b.  In interpreting a statute, “[t]he overriding goal . . . is to determine and give meaning to the Legislature’s intent. ”  State v. Carter, 247 N.J. 488, 513 (2021).  “The plain language of a statute is the best indicator of the statute’s meaning, and statutory words should be read as they are commonly used and ordinarily understood. ”  State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 34 (2016).  Courts should “read and construe words and phrases in their context,” “consider[ing] the words of a statute in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole. ”  Carter, 247 N.J. at 513 (internal quotations omitted).  The word “involves” means “to have as a necessary feature or consequence,” or “to relate or affect. ”  See American Heritage Dictionary, “Involves,” (ahdictionary.com).  This Court should find that this case “involves” a child endangering conviction because [...]’s preceding endangering conviction from the other indictment was related to the instant conviction,¹¹ and the ¹¹  As explained earlier, the earlier endangering conviction related to conduct committed against his older child that had been discovered pursuant to the homicide investigation in this case.  Although [...] was charged in separate indictments, the nature of his conduct underlying both indictments was similar.  sentencing court in this case was tasked with considering the overall sentence for these related convictions as the instant plea agreement recommended a sentence to be served consecutively to the prison term imposed for the endangering conviction.  See State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 252 (2021) (holding that the sentencing court is tasked with considering and explaining the overall fairness of the aggregate sentence).
[brief] THE COURT VIOLATED DEFENDANTS’ RIGHT TO FAIRNESS AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS  (Da18)  PLAINTIFF:  “In essence, the Defendants’ due process argument is predicated on their contention that they were not provided with adequate notice that the trial court might, on June 10, 2022, order a sealed bidding procedure for the Boonton Property and approve the sale of the Florida Property to the Trustee in her individual capacity [for the date of death appraised value of $360,000]. ”  (Pb17-18)  DEFENDANTS: This statement is correct.
[brief] Q.  Okay.  And when did you say you didn't want to accept the day program at [...] and you wanted to drop down and be a sub?  A.  When I got a flat tire, and I was on the way to the program, and I was basically told that because I called last minute, stated that I was on the side of the road, that basically I have to call with further notice.  And I said, “Well, it’s just regular wear and tear; I can’t predict that my tire would have got flat. ”  And then at that point, I just knew that my car wasn’t capable for the wear and tear, 40 minutes there and back every day.  (Appx 534 at ¶50 (emphasis added)).  Accordingly, Plaintiff voluntarily took per diem status.  (Appx 534 ¶51).  Per diems are subs who work according to agency needs and the individual’s availability.  (Appx 534 ¶52).  They need to stay in touch with the various managers to get on the schedule at the different group homes.  (Appx 534 ¶52).  After Plaintiff went “per diem,” [...] offered Plaintiff another full time position at [...], which she also declined.
[directive] Additional Retention Requirements.  Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 8.1, 8.2, or 8.3 of this Policy, a BWC recording shall be subject to the following additional retention requirements: (a) when a BWC recording pertains to a criminal investigation or otherwise records information that may be subject to discovery in a prosecution, the recording shall be treated as evidence and shall be kept in accordance with the retention period for evidence in a criminal prosecution; (b) when a BWC records an arrest that did not result in an ongoing prosecution, or records the use of police force, the recording shall be kept until the expiration of the statute of limitations for filing a civil complaint against the officer or the employing law enforcement agency; (c) when a BWC records an incident that is the subject of an internal affairs complaint, the recording shall be kept pending final resolution of the internal affairs investigation and any resulting administrative action.
[brief] (8T 47-7 to 23; see also 6T 102-10 to 22).  [...] prepared a photo array for [...], and in preparing the array, he colored [...]’s distinctive blue eyes so that [...]’s photo did not stand out from the others.  (8T:52-23 to 53-12).  [...] came to the police station the next day and was shown a photo array by [...], who was not involved in the investigation, and acted as a “blind administrator. ”  (6T103:3-8, 103-21 to 23; 7T6:13-15; 8T48:8 to 10.)  [...] looked through all six photos but did not pick any initially.  (6T 111-18 to 112-1).  The detective then asked [...] if he wanted to see the photos again, and on his second viewing, [...] identified [...]’s photo as the shooter.  (6T111:9-11, 111-18 to 112-1, 141-8 to 16, 142-9 to 22; 7T87:4-7).  Admittedly, [...] did not record how confident [...] was in his selection.  (7T 103-1 to 3)  On October 15, a little over two weeks after the shooting, police arrested [...] for the murder.
[brief] (2T66:16-17).  Beyond just this one statutory provision, courts are to bear in mind the fundamental purpose of our overall election scheme: Because the right to vote is the bedrock upon which the entire structure of our system of government rests, our jurisprudence is steadfastly committed to the principle that *election laws must be liberally construed to effectuate the overriding public policy in favor of the enfranchisement of voters.*
[brief] More technically, TMS is software that allows the ingestion of material (moving the digital file of a new movie into the local storage) and scheduling between all auditoriums in the complex.  (Pa231 at ¶5).  According to [...], "[t]he TMS log would not include useful information. ” (Pa232 at ¶6).  It would mostly be things like when a movie file was transferred to local storage two days before the movie opened or to tell the ticketing system that "Batman is scheduled in Auditorium 3 on Wednesday at 3 p.m." (Pa232 at ¶6).  It would not contain an accurate representation of when something actually played at a given auditorium."  (Pa232 at ¶6).  [...] further stated: "[t]he 'gold standard' for determining what actually played back in a theatre is the Security Log ("SL"), which Plaintiff received.
[brief] Witt, 223 N.J. at 431. that officers must suspect a vehicle contains a particular contraband in order for their probable cause to be valid, and in fact, may be “actively” seeking that vehicle on the suspicion it will contain evidence of a particular crime.  This Court is bound by this long-standing precedent.  Nothing in Smart overruled Witt, Alston, or Martin.  On the contrary, the Court emphasized there was no justification to depart from Alston/Witt.  253 N.J. at 174.  Additionally, the Smart Court’s reference in its holding to the dicta from [...] — a case that predates both Alston and Martin and was referenced disapprovingly in Alston — further confirms its inapplicability to this case.  [...] involved the police investigating [...] for a week and eventually gathering enough information to obtain a search warrant for his residence. 79 N.J. at 46-47.  Police also had information about the vehicle they knew the defendant had been driving, but did not request a warrant for it.  Ibid.  Instead, they impounded the vehicle and searched it “for the safety of the vehicle. ”  Ibid.  The [...] Court held that if it was practicable for the police to apply for and receive a search warrant for the residence, they could have applied for a warrant for the vehicle at the same time if they had probable cause.  Ibid.  The Court thus held the officers could not justify the search under the automobile exception.  Ibid.  But [...] is inapplicable to this case for the same reason Smart is.
[brief] According to the State, the relevant exception here is a Terry frisk.  The Terry Court recognized “a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual. ”  392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).  The purpose of a frisk “is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence. ”  Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).  A frisk must be based on a reasonable articulable suspicion that a suspect is armed.  State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 29-30 (2010) (explaining that police may conduct “a limited pat-down for weapons where a reasonably prudent officer would be justified in the 8 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). belief, based on ‘specific and articulable facts[,]’ . . . that the person is armed and dangerous” (alteration in original) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21)).
[brief] (11T128- --- \(^6\)  The Petitioner denied knowing [...].  (7T138-10 to 139-1).  This testimony was shown to be false during the testimony of [...] -- [...]’s grandmother -- who noted that several months prior, the Petitioner had mailed Donahue several photos of [...] that he had in his possession.  These included a photo of [...] at the Decedent’s 40\(^{th}\) birthday party.  These photos were produced by Donahue at trial and identified by her.  (10T138-25 to 145-14).  17 to 131-18).  The charges, obviously false, were “quickly” dismissed by [...].  (11T131-19 to 21).
[brief] (Da553-Da632)  Although [...] was not a participant in that subsequent proceeding, [...]’s opinion included several passages that are relevant to the present case.  After summarizing the trial testimony, [...] began her analysis as follows:  Plaintiff [...] claims an easement by necessity.  He originally sued several neighboring land owners in January of 2005.  Plaintiff --- 5  We anticipate [...] will argue, as it did below, that [...]’s observations regarding Trunell’s express easement claim were merely dicta since that theory was not explicitly pleaded in his complaint and was raised for the first time at the summary judgment stage.  As we will explain in Point II below, Trunell’s express easement claim was actually litigated and adjudicated.
[brief] Olivieri v. Y.M.F. Carpet, Inc., 186 N.J. 511, 521 (2006).  “Even where these requirements are met, the doctrine, which has its roots in equity, will not be applied when it is unfair to do so. ”  Id. at 521-22 (internal quotation omitted); see also Pivnick v. Beck, 326 N.J. Super. 474, 486 (App. Div. 1999), aff’d, 165 N.J. 670 (2000) (“because collateral estoppel is equitable in nature, it should only be applied when fairness requires. ”)  To that end, factors disfavoring application of collateral estoppel include:  [T]he party against whom preclusion was sought could not have obtained review of the judgment in the initial action; the quality or extensiveness of the procedures in the two actions were different; it was not foreseeable at the time of the initial action that the issue would arise in subsequent litigation; and the party sought to be precluded did not have an adequate opportunity to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the first action.  Pivnick, 326 N.J. Super. at 486.  Significantly, when analyzing collateral estoppel, New Jersey courts follow the concepts “described in the Restatement of Judgments. ”  Hernandez v. Region Nine Hous. Corp., 146 N.J. 645, 659 (1996); see also Olivieri, 186 N.J. at 525, n. 7 (applying Restatement of Judgments § 28.)  To the extent the trial court relied on the doctrine of collateral estoppel in dismissing Plaintiff’s claims, it failed to perform any meaningful analysis to determine whether the elements were actually met under the circumstances.  Had the trial court performed a proper analysis, it could have reached only one conclusion: the elements necessary to apply collateral estoppel are not present, whereas all of the factors disfavoring application of the doctrine are present.  The issue was not actually litigated in the First Action.  The issue of “what Plaintiff knew and when it knew it” was not actually litigated in the First Action.
[brief] For more than twelve years, plaintiff has sought a judicial determination as to whether our State Legislature repealed and replaced the non-urban renewal entity [...] Section 37 long term tax exemption effective April 17, 1992 and whether [...] failed to disclose and to collect all long term tax exemption revenues due it under post April 17, 1992 State long term tax exemption laws, rules and regulations.  Our State judicial and executive branches avoided adjudicating these heavy lifting substantive constitutional issues.  The [...] and its related executive and legislative branch defendants were all involved in the “willful blindness” drafting and adoption of the [...] nonurban renewal entity [...] long term tax exemption and the municipality’s failure to turn over statutory long term tax exemption revenues to the County.  The [...] and its related executive and legislative branch defendants were all involved in monitoring and collecting all long term tax exemption revenues due to the County pursuant to certain post April 17, 1992 long term tax exemption laws, rules and regulations.  The [...] related executive branch defendants had oversight over all financially distressed urban municipalities and publicly subsidized affordable housing units located therein.