ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Page Unpublished Order, dated April 16, 2008, in *Spano, et al. v. [...], et al.*, United States District Court, S.D. Illinois, [...] (2008 WL 1774460)  ...........................................Dra1 Unpublished Order, dated February 24, 2016, in *[...]*, United States District Court, S.D. Florida, Miami Division, [...] (2016 WL 1460143)  ......................Dra4 Unpublished Opinion, dated September 20, 2013, in *Montana v. [...], et al.*, United States District Court, D. New Jersey, Camden Vicinage, [...] (2013 WL 11233748)  .................................................................Dra7
[brief] Upon being denied his LAD claim, [...] applied for ordinary disability benefits.  The Board denied [...]’s application for an ordinary disability retirement on the grounds it was untimely.  Under the applicable PFRS statutes, membership ceases after 2 years from the date of the member's last pension contribution.  The Board determined [...] ineligible because more than 2 years had elapsed since his last contribution and because he was not a member in service at the time of the application.  The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the time period should be relaxed:
[brief] Pa125.  Obviously, the Appellate Division would not have remanded the Evans case to the Board unless N.J.S.A. 43:15A-54 permitted retroactive relief for a retired public employee, precisely the relief that I request.  After [...] was elected to the [...], he claims that he asked the Haworth Borough Clerk/Administrator, [...], to enroll him in [...], but that Ms. Fay mistakenly told him that he did not qualify for [...] enrollment at the time.
[brief] The TCA re-establishes an all-inclusive immunity from tort liability for public entities absent specific provisions therein imposing liability upon them.  *Coppola v. State*, 177 N.J. Super. 37, 39 (App.Div. 1981), certif. den. 87 N.J. 398 (1981).  The only provisions of the TCA that impose liability are Section 59:2-2 (vicarious liability for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of a public employee) and Section 59:4-2 (liability for injury caused by a dangerous condition of public property).  When one of the TCA’S provisions establishes liability, that liability is ordinarily negated if the public entity possesses a corresponding immunity. ”
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[brief] Which is not any different, really, than the complaint here.  I think the proposed amended complaint had 80 pages.  This one has 65.  I don't think that 15 pages really makes too much of a difference in the ultimate legal analysis.  It contains parties that can't be sued.  It contains parties that have immunities, clear immunities that I'm sure [...] is well aware of.  It just -- it's just a rambling of different injustices that [...] feels that his son has faced.  And I'm not suggesting that his son hasn't faced some of these injustices throughout this process.  It's just this -- this complaint doesn't concisely explain what they are.  And the -- and the entitlement for relief that he seeks.  He seeks in one section money.  He tells me today he's not really seeking money.  He's seeking a change in the way that people with disabilities are handled within the criminal justice system.  I think that's an issue with the legislature, not with the courts, who have created the PTI program, the MIP program.
[brief] (1T7:6-8)  Turning next to the presence of disk herniations demonstrated by an MRI, counsel for the defendant conceded that “because of that they have satisfied the first prong of the Brooks (phonetic) test, the objective, medical evidence. ”  (1T7:11-14; 1T9:7-8)(“he candidly admits you met the objective standard”)  [...] acknowledged the response, and noted, “like I’m going to be Solomon and decide the subjective prong on a, on a motion for summary judgment.
[brief] I DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (Pa357; Pa651-652; 2T; 3T; 4T)  The familiar, liberal standards governing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to N.J. Ct. Rule 4:6-2(e), were outlined in Plaintiff’s opening brief, at Point I, and are not generally disputed by [...] or [...] in their respective opposition briefs.  Under these well-settled standards, a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss must be considered “with caution,” and granted in “only the rarest [of] instances. ”  See Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 165 (2005), citing Lieberman v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 132 N.J. 76, 79 (1993); see also Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 772 (1989).  The trial court should have sustained the Complaint because Plaintiff more-than satisfied New Jersey’s liberal pleading standards as to each of the claims against [...] and [...].  Even assuming that there were perceived deficiencies in the Complaint, any order granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss should have been *without prejudice* to Plaintiff’s right to file an amended complaint.  *See Printing Mart*, 116 N.J. at 771-72.  **POINT II**
[directive] - Order 6  Evaluation for Non-Compliance with Clinical Conditions of Conditional Release (Attachment G)  This court order would be used to order evaluation for NGRI acquittee who has previously been an an placed conditional release pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(2) and has either been: (1) non-compliant on with the conditions of release or (2) the conditions of the discharge plan are no longer adequate to maintain the acquittee's mental health condition the community.  such cases, this order would be in In used to have the individual evaluated by a screening service.  - Order 7
[brief] Pursuant to R.2:6-2(a)(2), Plaintiff/Appellant, [...], identify the following Orders and Judgments submitted by the Court:  | ITEM | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Order entered 1/22/24 granting defendants-respondents [...] and [...]’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) with prejudice.  | Pa92 | | Order entered 1/22/24 denying Plaintiff-Appellant’s Cross Motion to Amend the Complaint.  | Pa98 | INDEX TO APPENDIX
[brief] Additionally, our courts have long held that vigilant enforcement of Mount Laurel commitments are imperative.  Toll Bros. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 567 (2002) (“[E]xperience demonstrates that absent adequate enforcement, the Mount Laurel doctrine can deliver little more than a vague and hollow promise that a reasonable opportunity for the development of affordable housing will be provided. ”).  Further, the Appellate Division has stated that:  This court’s power to grant such relief is clear.  In Mount Laurel II, the Court held that the trial courts have the broadest possible remedial power to enforce municipality’s Mount Laurel obligations.  Indeed the courts have broad power to order municipal land use agencies to discharge their statutory responsibilities in a timely and proper manner even outside the framework of Mount Laurel litigation.
[brief] In Velazquez ex rel Velazquez v Jimenez, 172 N.J. 240 (2002) our Supreme Court analyzed another immunity statute, the New Jersey Good Samaritan Act and held that “it is our tradition of giving ‘narrow range’ to statutes granting immunity from tort liability because they leave ‘unredressed injury and loss resulting from wrongful conduct’. ”  The Court went on to write “[t]hat narrowly tailored interpretation does the least violence to our citizens’ common law right to institute tort actions against those whose negligence injures them. ”  In Velazquez, the defendant tried to broaden the interpretation of the New Jersey Good Samaritan Statue in a very similar way as the railroad Respondents attempt to broaden the interpretation of N.J.S.A 48:12-152 in the instant case.  New Jersey has a Good Samaritan statute that immunizes medical professionals from tort liability when they render emergency care to a patient at the scene of an accident or emergency or while transporting a patient to a hospital.
[brief] While [...]’s Complaint, including the Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) Certification, which were prepared and filed by its attorney, strongly weighed in favor of waiver, in this case, when all of the facts and circumstances are considered, [...] contends that this Court should not view the pleadings as weighing heavily in favor of waiver.  In addition to the foregoing, a final look at the issue of prejudice is appropriate.  In [...] this Court found that the party opposing [...]’s arbitration request would suffer some slight prejudice because [...] utilized the litigation process to obtain a significant amount of discovery.  More particularly, this Court observed:  “...[...] was able to obtain, through the Superior Court discovery process, a substantial and lopsided amount of early discovery from [...] that it might not have been able to obtain so readily in arbitration.  Even though the extent of prejudice to [...] was arguably modest, it is no completely insignificant. ”  [...], 478 N.J. Super. at 615.  The facts of this matter, in terms of the discovery process, do not demonstrate anything even closely resembling what occurred in [...].  Here, as detailed in the Parties’ initial submissions, there was an exchange of discovery.  It was by no means significantly “lopsided” in favor of either party as occurred in [...].  [...] complains that having had to engage in the discovery process in the litigation that it initiated will equate to prejudice if it now must proceed to arbitration.  Again, [...] ignores the fact that the prejudice that it claims will be incurred would be nonexistent had it not sued [...] in abject disregard to the mandatory arbitration provision in the contract it seeks to enforce.  Stated differently, [...]’s assertion that it will suffer prejudice if it is compelled to arbitration is without merit.  A waiver of the right to arbitration is never presumed and a finding of waiver must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that the party seeking arbitration intended to seek relief in a forum other than the arbitration.  Cole, 215 N.J. at 276.  In this case, when all of the facts of this matter are examined and considered, both those that pertain to [...] and those that pertain to [...], it cannot reasonably be said that the totality of circumstances support a conclusion by clear and convincing evidence that [...] deliberately, knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily waived his right to arbitration.  As such, the lower court’s contrary finding was erroneous and should be reversed by this Court.
[brief] See *Cap. Health Sys., Inc. v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc.*, 230 N.J. 73, 80 (2017) (recognizing that a party must show “good cause” for “withholding *relevant* discovery” (emphasis added)).  And the exception does not even adequately protect Defendants’ interests: given Plaintiffs’ prior conduct, Defendants remain concerned that Plaintiffs will disclose documents that do not fall within this small subset of highly proprietary documents but that are nonetheless confidential and sensitive.
[brief] Pa4 and T12:5-8.  However, the Plaintiff stated at the trial he was “suing for $780. ”  T3:11-12.  Even though the Plaintiff “appreciated everything the defendant has done for the game of chess” he kept arguing after the Judge ruled.  The Plaintiff wanted to bring a motion for reconsideration.  And then the Plaintiff told the Judge he was going to appeal his ruling.  The trial court stated:  “So just remember, but don’t tell me in the beginning of your case that you didn’t want to go ahead and go this far, when you tell me now you’re going to appeal?  Well, at least, at least be consistent. ”T20:13-16  This case involves a 2017 chess tournament.
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[brief] Under subsection (a), there is a concurrent conflict of interest when one of the two following situations is true: (1) “the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client,” or (2) “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. ”  *RPC* 1.7(a)(1)-(2).  As noted in the opening clause of the rule, subsection (b) permits clients to waive a concurrent conflict.  *RPC* 1.7(b).
[brief] A.  The Legislative Process – Senate and General Assembly Proceedings.  On January 6, 2022, the 219th session of the New Jersey Legislature met, after sending public notice and the calendar for the sessions to members of the Senate and Assembly, the Secretary of the State, and the State House Press, and posting notice in accordance with the Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA).  (Pa230-31, 250).  The Senate convened at 12:04 p.m., roll was called, and the President declared a quorum present.  (Pa250).  Among other business, S49, which would codify the constitutional right to freedom of reproductive choice, was introduced, given its first reading, and referred to the Senate Health, Human Services and Senior Citizens Committee.  (Pa250-52).  That Committee met the same day in the State House Annex, which had reopened to the public.  (Pa112).  The Committee considered S49 and took public testimony on the bill.  (Pa205-223).  The Committee then reported the bill favorably to the Senate, without amendment, where it received a second reading.  (Pa253).
[brief] United States v. Grey, 878 F.2d 702 (3rd Cir.)  See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052.  "A lawyer who fails to adequately investigate and to introduce into evidence that raises sufficient doubts as to that question to undermine confidence in the verdict, render deficient performance."  Lord vs. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hart vs. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted and second alternations in original).  In particular, counsel's failure to investigate possible methods of impeachment constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.  See Tucker vs. Ozmint, 350 F.3d 43, 444 (7Th Cir. 2003) ("Trial counsel has the duty to investigate possible methods for impeaching prosecution witnesses and failure to do so may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.  "Although trial counsel is typically afforded leeway in making tactical decisions regarding trial strategy, counsel cannot be said to have made a tactical decision without first obtaining the information necessary to make such a decision  Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052.  See Riley v. Payne, 352 F.3d 1313, 1324 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that, under clearly established Supreme Court law, when defense counsel failed to contact a potential witness, counsel could not "be presumed to have made a tactical decision: not to call that person as a witness.  Cf Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1457 (9th Cir. 1994) (Counsel could not have made a strategic choice when s/he has not yet obtained the facts on which such a decision could be made)."  The cumulative prejudice of [...]'s failure to interview, investigate, cross examine the Detectives and [...] of their inconsistencies and call [...] and [...] as witnesses prejudiced defendant.  Attacks on their credibility would have established their real incentive to lie and explaining why their testimony may have been fabricated.  The failure to adduce such evidence, or even to question the witnesses about their inconsistencies, undermines the confidence in the jury's verdict and establishes a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's failure to elicit the reason for the witnesses to fabricate their testimony, the result would have been different.  Therefore, [...]'s failures constituted a prima facie case of ineffectiveness pursuant to Strickland's two-prong test and/or the Cronic/Davis per se analyses.
[brief] See In re P.L. 2001, Chapter 362, 186 N.J. 368, 372 (2006) (“Probation officers are part of the judicial branch of government and perform many duties that are essential to the mission of our courts, including supervising probationers .  . . .”).  Sentencing courts are, therefore, empowered to formulate “reasonable” conditions of probation or a suspended sentence.  N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1.  A defendant on parole, by contrast, is “in the legal custody of the [...] and under the supervision of the [...].
[brief] *Id.* at 494.  Similarly, if a zoning board granted a variance where the municipality denied a zoning change request for the same use, that action would violate the negative criteria, especially where, as here, there was a clear showing that the request for the zone change was denied and that the Board knew of the denial.  Respondent’s brief recounts all of the highly paid professionals it presented at the zoning board hearings, and its obvious frustration at being denied by the ZBA after all of that effort and expense.  The Applicant should have spent more time doing its due diligence, researching the recent history of the property, the prior attempts at development and the zoning ordinance and master plan prior to signing on as contract purchasers.  Board members are required to be residents of the municipality, and the Board members learned this history and were familiar with the master plan and zone plan.  Further the Board’s professionals have worked in the Township for many years and have institutional knowledge that the Board correctly relies upon and respects.  The Board’s Professional Planners are also the Professional Planners for the Planning Board and provided the analysis for the Township Committee when they considered the [...] request.  It is absolutely appropriate for the Board to decide, when given conflicting expert opinions, that the opinion of its own professionals carries more weight.  **Point II**
[brief] The erroneous decision below inevitably flowed from the trial court’s failure both to understand the substance of [...]’s claims and to adjudicate those claims under the correct legal framework.  Adopting the State’s assertion that [...]’s Complaint amounts to little more than an attempt “to avoid paying its fair share” of school funding, (Db3, Db39),\(^2\) the trial court granted the State summary judgment in large part because “it is constitutional for the State to expect [...] to contribute to its budget.
[directive] The court at the time of sentencing shall order the records of the courts, probation services, and law enforcement agencies to be sealed from the public for a criminal conviction or juvenile adjudication that the following solely includes offense(s):  •  2C:35-5(b)(12)(b)1  N.J.S.A. – distribution of marijuana in a quantity of one ounce or less or hashish in a quantity of five grams or less; or 1  The marijuana decriminalization law, L. 2021, c. 19, reconfigured N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(12) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3) by adding subsection (b) to both statutes, effective February 22, 2021.  Pursuant to Attorney General Directive #2021-1, referenced above, prosecutors will be dismissing the pending charges for N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(12) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3) that occurred on or before February 22, 2021.  ADA rm ENSURING DOOR  AN OPEN TO JUSTICE with Americans Act Disabilities Directive #08- 21 April 7, 2021
[brief] *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America*, 142 N.J. 520, 536 (N.J. 1995).  It is Respondent’s obligation to prove the existence of in personam jurisdiction of the Appellant.  *Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A.*, 902 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1990).  Respondent has not proven that the trial Court had in personam jurisdiction of Appellant.  The question of jurisdiction is a question of law.  *Mastondrea v. Occidental Hotels*, 391 N.J. Super. 261, 268 (App. Div. 2007).  On page 19 of its Brief, Respondent states that its Complaint “set forth sufficient facts”, citing *Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics*, 116 N.J. 739 (N.J. 1989).  However, the plaintiff in that case stated the specific date on which the defamation was made.  The court cited the *Zoneraich v. Overlook Hospital*, 212 N.J. Super. 83 (App. Div. 1986) case in which a complaint was dismissed because it did not allege the date of the defamatory statement.  The Complaint is void because it omitted the date when Appellant allegedly failed to make payment.  **VIII.
[brief] [...] directly tracks the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 16, see MZM Constr. Co. v. N.J. Bldg. Laborers Statewide Benefit Funds, 974 F.3d 386, 402 (3d. Cir. 2020) (“[U]nder Section 4 of the FAA, courts retain the primary power to decide questions of whether the parties mutually assented to a contract containing or incorporating a delegation provision. ”), and New Jersey’s Arbitration Act, specifically N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6(b), which provides that a “court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate. ”  The New Jersey Supreme Court has held this language expressly delegates the determination of enforceability of an arbitration provision to the courts.  Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., 215 N.J. 174, 187-88 (2013); see Muhammad, 189 N.J. at 12 (“‘whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all’ is a ‘gateway’ question” to be determined by a court of
[brief] Ha940; P-10, 18:1-19:2; 6T39.18-45.7.  [...] and the company do not and cannot cite to any provision of the EMP or anything else to support this utter speculation.  [...] repeated this speculation at the hearing, but still offered no evidence in support.  [...]'s claims that the electrical grid is not able to handle the increased load created by the EMP's decarbonization mandates are also inadmissible.  These are decisions entrusted by law to the [...].