ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As articulated above, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., did not commit reversible error in ruling that the indemnification provisions in the contract between [...] and [...] is valid and enforceable.  The court below properly applied the appropriate legal principles and diligently analyzed the contract’s indemnity language.  Appellant’s request for relief should be denied in its entirety, together with any other, further or different relief as this Court deems just and proper.
[brief] Additionally, the In re Collins OAL Judge found that the appellant’s prior disciplinary record was absent of any sustained charges, excluding the present charges.  *Id.* at 14 [Pa249].  This is vastly different from the instant matter, where [...]’s prior disciplinary is anything but unblemished.  [...]’s disciplinary history includes a minor rule infraction on April 25, 2004, a minor rule infraction for attention to duty on September 8, 2007, a minor rule infraction on November 15, 2007, failure to appear for personal court matter on August 21, 2009, a serious rule infractions resulting in a 7 day suspension on May 6, 2011, a minor rule infraction for obedience to laws and rules on May 23, 2011, a rule violation specifically for failure to list medication on December 14, 2014, a violation for absence from duty on October 11, 2015, a rule violation on July 15, 2015, a rule violation specifically for violation of sick leave policy on October 13, 2015, and a rule violation on December 3, 2015.  [Da25-Da26].  These are only the charges sustained against [...] that do not relate to the instant appeal and does not include the charges against [...] that were administratively closed or “complete”.  [Da25-Da26].  In light of [...]’s aforementioned history, it is almost surprising that [...] cites to *Town of W. New York v. Bock*, 38 N.J. 500 (1962), holding that an employee’s past record should be considered when deciding the appropriate level of discipline.
[brief] They fully intended to forever deceive the Court about the existence of insurance monies.  Neither the Court nor the Court-appointed administrator were aware that [...] had executed a Power of Attorney to the [...] on June 20, 2020, which fully permitted them to act on her behalf, obtain documents, and deposit insurance funds into the [...]s Trust account.  (R-660).  Each and every false statement and violation of a Court Order requiring information about the insurance policies and the E.I.N. number must be viewed with hindsight in light of this deception.  The documentation discovered by [...] indicated that with the assistance of [...], [...] collected money for three life insurance policies that were issued to [...].
[brief] The Court did not address how deterrence applies in the context of an autistic sixteen (16) year old boy.  *State v. Jarbath*, 114 N.J. at 405.  The Court did not address [...]’s diagnosis of autism or schizophrenia at all in addressing this factor.  (17T:202-7 to 16).  Instead, the Court relied upon various hearsay passages from voluminous social worker notes that were cherry picked by the Prosecutor during expert testimony.  These were notes from a social worker that did not testify.  Moreover, the Court read the comments out of context.  Specifically, the note says:
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[brief] ”  Bruzzese, 94 N.J. at 219.  Thus, “[t]he fact that the . . . officer does not have the state of mind hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action. ”  Id. at 220 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)); accord State v. Bacome, 228 N.J. 94, 103 (2017).
[brief] Appellant, [...], appeals an August 17, 2023 Final Agency Decision of Respondent [...] (“[...]”), which denied her request to purchase service credit following the recalculation of her retirement benefit.  McCormack was a [...] member in connection with her employment with ¹ Because the procedural history and facts are closely related, they are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience.  the [...].  (Pa12-14).  On or about May 25, 2021, McCormack requested and was provided by the [...] (the “Division”) an estimate of retirement benefits, which reflected her selection of service retirement and a proposed retirement date of September 1, 2021.  (Pa1).  According to the said estimate, she would have nine years and eight months of service credit if she continued to work until August 31, 2021.  Ibid.  She would be seventy years old at the time of her retirement and she would not be entitled to any life insurance benefits after retirement.  Ibid.  The beginning of the estimate letter advised McCormack that “[t]his Estimate of Retirement Benefits was prepared based on current information available in our system and projected information reported by your employer,” and that “[y]our benefit may be recalculated in the future due to an audit based on new information received from your employer or for a discrepancy in your account. ”  Ibid.  On the same day, McCormack requested and was provided by the Division another estimate of retirement benefits, which reflected her selection of service --- 2  “Pa” refers to McCormack’s appendix; “Pb” refers to her brief; “Ra” refers to Respondent’s appendix.  3  There are several types of retirement benefits available to [...] members that vary by membership tiers and requirements including service, early, veteran, deferred, and disability retirements.
[brief] THE COURT VIOLATED DEFENDANTS’ RIGHT TO FAIRNESS AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (18a)  New Jersey  Trial Courts are governed by procedural rules that dictate how issues should be presented and decided.  These rules mandate that significant matters be introduced through formal pleadings and motions.  When a trial court decides on matters not properly introduced into the record, the requirement for judicial fairness and procedural due process can be compromised.  On June 10, 2022, the trial court ordered that [...] “having obtained an appraisal on said property [...] for $360,000.00, shall close on said property by Thursday, August 18, 2022 for this price. ”  (19a)  Additionally, the trial court ordered that [...] and [...] will have until July 14, 2022 to submit bids to determine which brother would purchase the Boonton Property.  (19a)  Upon receipt, [...] and [...] were compelled by Order to accept [...]’s purchase of the Florida Property for $360,000.  Note that [...] had not submitted a motion seeking this specific relief.  Therefore, Defendants were not provided with an opportunity to formally oppose this transaction.  Notwithstanding, during the June 8, 2022 hearing, [...] did testify that he opposed [...]’s efforts “to determine fair market value for herself,” meaning that [...], in her capacity as Trustee, should not be choosing the sale price for the Florida Property to herself.  (3T 10 Ln 1-8)  Furthermore, [...] and [...] were compelled by Order to engage in a sealed bidding procedure for the Boonton Property.  Again, note that neither [...] nor [...] submitted a motion seeking this relief.  Therefore, Defendants were not provided with an opportunity to formally oppose.  Despite this, Defendants did express their opposition by petitioning the court for an injunction to stop the Trustee’s sealed bidding procedure, which was granted on May 27, 2022.  (16a)  Therefore, the trial court’s Order for the disposal of the Boonton and Florida Properties circumvented the procedures set forth to ensure judicial fairness and procedural due process.
[brief] ” (Pa204) (bolding and capitalization in original).  [...] entered another similar order on June 20, 2024, which granted [...]’ companion motion.  (Pa205 – Pa206).  Seeking to appeal the May 24, 2024 Order and the June 20, 2024 Order, Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal on June 20, 2024.  On July 2, 2024, [...] added the following statement of reasons to the May 24, 2024 Order:  This is a LAD, employment case (that does not allege sexual harassment).  The order entered by the court was for a without prejudice dismissal.  During [...]’s onboarding, she signed a Mutual Arbitration Agreement (MAA).  Same was dated January 4, 2022.  The MAA is valid on its face.  Plaintiff’s complaint fails to seek any declaratory relief declaring the MAA void or otherwise unenforceable.  (Pa207 – Pa209) (emphasis in original).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] (Pb20-21)  Citing only Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 947, Plaintiff claims that the Contracts are loans because a loan is a “thing for the borrower’s temporary use. ”  (Pb21)  In contrast, the 3rd Circuit in Karns Prime & Fancy Food, Ltd. v. C.I.R., 494 F.3d 404 (3rd Cir.2007) said that, in determining what is a loan a key question is whether, at the time of receipt of the funds, the recipient of the loan was unconditionally obligated to make repayment.  To determine whether a given transaction constitutes a loan, the substance, rather than the form, of the transaction is controlling.  Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 365-66, 81 S.Ct. 132, 5 L.Ed.2d 128 (1960); The U.S. Supreme Court, the 3rd Circuit, and the Trial Court all concur that a contingent, non-recourse advance is not a loan.
[brief] •  The December 28, 2021, e-mail did not include an agenda (although it indicated one would be forthcoming), did not indicate whether formal action would be taken and did not provide information as to how the public to access the meeting, indicating access information would be available only on the Borough website (Pa 170); •  The Borough’s December 28, 2021, e-mail was the only notice of the rescheduled January 11, 2022, reorganization meeting sent to its designated newspapers; • No designated newspaper published notice of the rescheduled January 11, 2022, reorganization meeting; • The Wednesday, January 26, 2022, notice of the Tuesday, February 1, special meeting to cure the defective January 11, 2022, reorganization meeting was sent only to the [...], and not to two of the Borough’s designated newspapers.  (Pa 165, ¶12 of the [...] Cert.)  The [...] published the notice on January 29, 2022.  It did not include an agenda and did not indicate whether formal action would be taken (Pa 173); •  The Borough’s Friday, January 28, 2022, e-mail notice to both the [...] and [...] again advising of the February 1, 2022, curative special reorganization meeting indicated that an agenda was attached, but did not indicate whether formal action would be taken and did not provide information for the public to access the meeting, referring instead to the Borough website (Pa 175); •  Since [...] publishes on Thursdays, a notice sent on a Friday for a meeting the following Tuesday could not possibly have been published in the newspaper and thus it did not publish notice of the February 1st meeting; •  Since the Borough did not transmit the agenda with its original January 26th e-mail to the [...] but waited until its e-mail of January 28th, the agenda was not included in the newspaper’s January 29, 2022, publication of the February 1st special meeting notice; and •  The agenda for the reorganization meeting was never published, whether prior to the January 4th meeting, prior to the January 11th rescheduled meeting or prior to the February 1st curative special meeting.
[brief] While the LRHL affords latitude to a municipality in making land use decisions, it does not pre-empt other aspects of the MLUL.  *See Weeden v. City Council of the City of Trenton*, 391 N.J. Super. 214, 228 (App. Div.), *cert. den.*  192 N.J. 73 (2007) in which this Court ruled that the LRHL and the MLUL “deal with the same subjects of zoning and land development” and should be construed “in *pari materia.*”  Referring to both statutes, this Court reasoned that:  Construing the two statutes together, we perceive no tension between the purpose of adopting a redevelopment plan and the function of the zoning board to grant use variances from the redevelopment plan, as an overlay upon the existing zoning.  In *Britwood Urban Renewal, LLC v. City of Asbury Park*, 376 N.J. Super. 552, 567, 871 A.2d 129 (App. Div. 2005), we rejected an argument that *N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7c* was evidence that the LRHL superseded the MLUL, observing that, with one exception not relevant here, “no provision of the LRHL specifies that it supersedes the MLUL.
[brief] QUESTIONS PRESENTED  1.  Whether the grant of defendant’s motion to dismiss “for the facial failure to state a claim” was legally erroneous.  ARGUMENT  I  BECAUSE THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS HAD YET TO RUN, THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE REINSTATED AND THE ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 4:6-2(e) SHOULD BE VACATED  [Pa283]  The essence of the motion judge’s rulings concerning defendant [...] who re-sold the rights already sold to plaintiffs, and the CEP  Defendants who claim to have “bought” plaintiffs’ rights from [...], is the mistaken assumption that, contrary to market principles, the solar-energy development rights could not exist separate and apart from the “solar panels” to be planted on a specific parcel of land.  Stated differently, the motion judge was of the view that, because [...] owned the land which had been leased to plaintiffs, once the lease was claimed to have been “terminated” by plaintiffs’ alleged breach of non-payment, all of the rights that had been sold in perpetuity to plaintiffs had, automatically, forfeited by plaintiffs.  [...] sold plaintiffs the solar rights at a significant cost.  Its land lease contained a confidentiality covenant.  Despite these facts, [...] claims that it had the right to re-sell the rights already acquired by plaintiffs and that it could sell plaintiff’s rights by breaching the confidentiality covenant.
[brief] Even assuming, arguendo, that [...]’s argument about the Department of Education was not based on a fundamentally faulty premise, this Court should still ensure that [...]’s Counterclaim remains in the same action as [...]’s Complaint based on the entire controversy doctrine – particularly since it was [...] which chose this forum in which to litigate the matter in the first place.  Accordingly, the entire controversy doctrine, (and common sense), dictate that both the Complaint and [...]’s Counterclaim should be resolved in Superior Court.
[brief] Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825 (3d Cir.1994) .................................................................29  Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of the Superior Court, 351 N.J. Super. 385 cert. denied, 183 N.J. 215 (2005)....................28,31,32,33 Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383 (2010).......................................................................28 Viscik v. Fowler Equipment Co., 173 N.J. 1 (2002).............................................................................37 Wesley v. Palace Rehab. & Care Ctr., L.L.C., 3 F. Supp. 3d 221 (D.N.J. 2014).......................................................46 Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436 (App.Div. 2005) .................................................. 29 Rules, Statutes R. 4:46-2 .............................................................................. 16, 17, 41 N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1 .................................................................... 30 N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(q) ................................................................... 30, 33 N.J.S.A. 34:5A-33(a) ................................................................. 19 N.J.S.A. 34:6A-3 ..................................................................... 19 Other Authorities Obesity, Race/Ethnicity, and COVID-19 | Overweight & Obesity | CDC.. 39, 40 Executive Order No. 102 .......................................................... 6, 20 Executive Order No. 103 .......................................................... 6, 7, 21 Executive Order No. 104 ..........................................................
[brief] Arbitration proceedings shall be administered and subject to procedures --- ²  In 1997, the award of “reasonable investigation expenses, costs of suit, and attorney fees” as an element of the carrier’s compensatory damages was made mandatory.  See Laws of 1997, chapter, 151. established by the [...]. ”  See, Laws of 1983, Chapter 362, Section 5(c) (emphasis added).  The No-Fault Act was next amended in a relevant way in 1998 with the passage of the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA).
[brief] [...] does not argue otherwise.  But mouthing the words “aesthetics, safety, open space,” as [...] and [...] did below, is nothing more than a generic recitation of the zoning purposes of the Municipal Land Use Law.  Div. Sep. 24, 2018) (reversing improper conversion to summary judgment without judicial notice to opposing party and opportunity oppose as summary judgment).  The trial court unfortunately did not do that here, but instead merely asked [...] whether it needed more time to respond to the “motion to dismiss. ”  [...] then responded by saying it would file additional material if the motion was converted.  The trial court only actually converted the motion in its holding.  What the trial court did, effectively, was accept [...]’s “motion to dismiss” as a certified factual record on enactment of the Distance Regulation, which it plainly was not.  This was improper and highlights how the trial court misapplied the burden in this context—the burden was on [...], which submitted nothing beyond the self-disputing record before [...].
[brief] Concerning the appellant’s removal, initially it is noted that the appellant has been provided notice on appeal of the --- 7 Included in the Civil Service Commission Items Comprising the Record. appointing authority’s request to remove her name from the subject promotional eligible list, the basis for that request, and an opportunity to respond.  (AA0006)  However, the Respondent [...] returned the Certification to the Respondent Commission reflecting a bypass of Appellant, not a removal of her name.  (AA0122; AA0001)  Further, as set forth above, [...]’ Certification, the [...]’s position statement and the [...]’s reply all requested vigorously that the bypass be upheld.  (AA018-20; AA0223-232⁸; AA0109-117⁹)
[brief] 162a-226a; 2T 7:21-8:13.  On November 4, 2022, the Appellant filed a certification opposing the Fee Application.  303a-344a.  After hearing arguments on December 22, 2022, and for the reasons stated on February 17, 2023, the trial court entered an order dated March 7, 2023: approving reduced attorney’s fee and costs of $93,277.54; awarding the requested accounting fees and commissions; and denying the Appellant’s motion for reconsideration of the Judgment:
[brief] *Sapp v. Indus Action*, 75 F. 4th 205, 212 (3d. Cir. 2023); *Flintkote Co. v. Aviva, PLC*, 269 F.3d 215, 220 n.3 (3d. Cir. 2014).  Presumably, the Trial Judge, without any evidence to the contrary, accepted Plaintiff’s version of the facts because he decided the question as a matter of law, accepting the Bank’s argument.  At oral argument, the Bank’s attorney stated the Bank did not have to provide an affidavit or certification to refute Plaintiff’s facts since the facts refuting Plaintiff’s account of the transaction in opening the accounts were found on the face of the account application itself.
[brief] (Ja285).  [...] is one of the most experienced and well-respected figures on redevelopment.  (Ja283).  The Planning Evaluation Report and the Roberts Memorandum provided a detailed analysis for each of the 26 tax lots which then comprised the Property, pursuant to which [...] conclusively demonstrated that the Property did not qualify as an “area in need” under LRHL redevelopment criteria “(a)” or “(d)”.
[brief] See T1 31:10-35:24.  The trial court opined that it “[did] not find that Plaintiff has alleged that . . . the definition of the CFA merchandise includes services.  To state a cause of action . . . the Plaintiff must allege the commission of deception, fraud, misrepresentation, et cetera, in connection with the sale of merchandise or services. ”  T1 55:9-15.  However, the trial court’s reasoning 1) plainly misstates N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c)—which defines “merchandise” under the CFA as including “any . . . services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale,” and 2) fails to consider “subsequent performance” in goods or services offered, directly or indirectly, to the public.
[brief] (See e.g., Pb7-Pb19; see also, Pa27-Pa29).  Furthermore, [...] alleges that [...]’s revenue went up after termination, and that [...] was not damaged by [...]’s termination.  This is simply false.  Not only do [...]’s financial records demonstrate that its gross revenue went down in the year subsequent to the termination (see Pa1943-Pa1944), but [...] submitted an expert report establishing its damages and damages calculation (see Pa1974-Pa1990).  At minimum, the financial effect on [...] is a question of fact that cannot be ascertained at the summary judgment stage of this proceeding.
[brief] They parked the Jeep on a dirt lane and walked across the field to the house (16T80-8 to 15).  [...] had on cheap, thin black gardening gloves that he got from the Jeep, and defendant wore black and yellow "mechanic gloves" (16T84-5 to 21;16T143-18).  [...] wore a green sweatshirt and defendant "probably had a grey one on"  [...] generally kept some belongings in defendant's Jeep (16T140-25 to 16T141-2).  Looking through a window, [...] saw [...] lying on the couch (16T85-20 to 21).