ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ................................................................................................................33  N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Boro Auto Wrecking Co., No. A-4920-04T3, 2006 WL 3007394 (App. Div. Oct. 24, 2006)..................41  N.J. State Policeman’s Benevolent Ass’n v. Murphy, 470 N.J. Super. 568 (App. Div. 2022).................................................45  Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 77 N.J. 55 (1978).............................................................................. 5, 17, 38 Pfaus v.
[directive] than has complaint-warrant rather complaint-summons charge by whether to decision  The incarceration of defendant pending initial the besides the consequences legally-significant other  A pretrial program. conducted the services process by recommendation of the completion pending trial unless preventively detained the defendant motion to have a cannot file prosecutor charged by complaint-warrant.  So too, if the defendant is by been charged has the defendant on commits a while thereafter new crime complaint-warrant and than rather complaint-summons 2A:162-24 release pursuant to N.J.S.A. to revoke move prosecutor cannot release, the pretrial Cf. note 30. initial charge.  preventively on that defendant and hold released on least restrictive should be the that a defendant provides Reform Law Bail
[brief] 18  Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp., 150 N.J. 255 (1997)  ..................................................................... 9, 10, 23  Lettenmaier v. Lube Connection, Inc., 162 N.J. 134 (1999)  .....................................................................  18  Lopez v. Law Offices of Faloni & Associates, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124730 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2016)  .......................  30  McQueen v. Fein, Such, Kahn & Shepard, P.C., ESX-L-1439-22, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 640 (Law Div. April 26, 2023)
[brief] (Pa609-614).  In November 2021, the [...] contracted with [...] to have the facade of the building and the exterior steps painted.  (Pa393-399).  According to the painting contract, [...] was to “apply Benjamin Moore exterior acrylic finish paint” to the façade and “[a]pply two coat exterior acrylic walking finish paint” to the steps.  (Pa393).  [...] employees bought from Benjamin Moore a 100% Acrylic Flat House Paint for the façade and bought a Latex Floor and Patio High Gloss Enamel” for the steps.  (Pa395-398).  [...] supervisor [...] testified that on December 1, 2021 [...] painted the façade with the 100% Acrylic Flat House Paint and painted the steps with the Latex Floor and Patio High Gloss Enamel.  (Pa451, Dep. Tr. p. 16; Pa452, Dep. Tr. pp. 18-19).  [...] in his comings and goings from the building noticed that the façade and the steps had been painted, and he testified that after [...]’s paint job, the old concrete exterior steps had become “sleeker or more - it’s – they’re a little rougher in the rain to navigate or when they’re wet than they were before. ” (Pa330, Dep. Tr. p. 20).  He stated that he had no difficulty walking on the newly-painted steps if “they were dry. ” (Pa330, Dep. Tr. p. 20).  On the morning of January 5, 2022, the Jersey City area and [...] saw temperatures just below or around freezing, and some rain and freezing rain had fallen, amounting to no more than a “trace” of precipitation.  (Pa345-347; Pa351; Pa385-387; Pa418).  [...]’s expert [...], Ph.D., PE, AICP, in his post-incident investigation of the stairs concluded that the deteriorating condition of the concrete steps and the [...]’ lack of proper maintenance over the years led to or exacerbated the icy-condition forming on the stairs as a result of a mere trace of freezing rain:
[brief] She did not know what the liquid was, how long it was present or its source.  There had been no complaints about the liquid before the fall.  No one else had fallen in the area before the Appellant’s fall.  Again, the burden of proof lies with the Appellant to establish all elements of a cause of action for negligence including notice.  *Lieberman*, supra, at 342.  The mere existence of an alleged dangerous condition is not constructive notice of it.  *Sims*, supra, at 42.  The absence of such notice is fatal to the Appellant’s claim of premises liability.
[brief] Without addressing the change in [...]’s testimony, [...] denied the motions, citing [...]’s original report and arguments (not [...]’s deposition testimony which clarified the acceptable time frame) referenced in Plaintiffs’ brief that the delivery should have occurred within five to ten minutes of 9:48pm, or before 10:00pm.  (1T50; 1T57; Pa21).  [...] also granted Plaintiffs additional time to respond to the defense placental pathology expert report of [...], whose review of the placental pathology confirmed the infant plaintiff sustained a “massive” fetal hemorrhage that occurred at least 6 hours to a few days prior to delivery.  (Pa631-Pa633; Pa402).  Ultimately, Plaintiffs did not serve any report that disputed [...]’s opinion regarding the timing of the hemorrhage.  After the completion of expert discovery, on May 18, 2023, Defendants moved for reconsideration of the interlocutory orders entered on November 5, 2020, in the interests of justice and to avoid what would no doubt be a month or more trial given the number of expert witnesses.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT THE REDEVELOPMENT PLAN WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE 1988 MASTER PLAN, AND THAT INCONSISTENCY WAS NOT RECOGNIZED OR ADDRESSED AS REQUIRED (APPEALING THE FINAL OPINION/ORDER (Pa1733)  The authority to regulate land use is constitutionally granted to the State Legislature by Article III of the 1947 New Jersey Constitution and by Article IV, Section VI, Paragraph 2 the State can delegate that zoning power to Municipalities by general Laws.  The State Legislature has delegated that power to Municipalities by various Planning or Land Use Laws.  After Zoning was declared constitutional in 1926, the State Legislature enacted the first Zoning Enabling Act in 1928 and the first Planning Act in 1930.  Later, under the 1947 Constitution, the Legislature adopted the 1953 Planning Act, which was more sophisticated and established the two step procedure for Site Plans and Subdividing.  That Zoning Law was thereafter comprehensively recodified by the 1975 MLUL.  The Law has long recognized that zoning must follow planning and that Zoning Regulations must be grounded in a comprehensive plan.  Under early zoning Laws, it was not mandatory that a Municipality have a formal Master Plan, although many Municipalities did have Master Plans in place.
[brief] Critical to the application of the principles of Section 358, particularly as it relates to this case, is that both requirements must be present, that is (1) proof that the lessor knows of the condition and simultaneously (2) proof that the tenant does not know of the condition.  The Restatement and the case law discusses the requirements in the conjunctive, not the disjunctive.  The rule requires both, not one or the other.  As evidenced by uncontradicted testimony of the tenant’s maintenance crew chief, [...], the tenant was aware of the condition of the breaker box panel and directory long before the incident in question.  As [...] said, “this sticks in my memory,” and he “found out the hard way” as he and his co-workers at [...] were “flipping on and off switches to see what turned it off and on” using “trial and error. ” (Pa 155).  This was an issue known to [...] because [...] recalls that three electrical contractors were “building [...]” and “they didn’t know what each of them was doing. ” (Pa 155).  Asked about Line 36 on the directory on the panel door, [...] explained “the panels that were labeled weren’t done right the first time,” so “[...] [[...]’ supervisor] and I to the best of our ability and knowledge stayed after work one night and did trial and error and tried to label them right. ” (Pa 155-156).  The motion judge was acutely aware of this factual record and the requirements of control and Section 358.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN DENYING PLAINTIFF’S  MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ CROSS-MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER (Pa0190; 1T20-23)  The trial court abused its discretion and misapplied the law in denying Plaintiff’s motion to compel the deposition of a representative of the [...] and granting Defendants’ cross-motion for a protective order.  Defendants’ arguments in support of the Discovery Order are unavailing and premised on misstatements of fact and law.  And despite Defendants’ efforts to downplay the issue as not “relevant or vital,” the Discovery Order had a profound impact on this litigation and poisoned the Final Judgment.  Accordingly, the Final Judgment should be reversed to afford Plaintiff the opportunity for limited additional discovery, and the case remanded for re-trial on a full record.
[brief] See *Gallenthin Realty Dev. Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro*, 191 N.J. 344, 358 (2007).  Moreover, the AIA contract was not part of the record below, as that contract was never submitted to nor considered by the trial court.  [...] attempts to – yet again – prevail utilizing an argument that it did not make below relying on documents that were not considered below.  The fact was not “overlooked” by the trial court, it was never raised by [...].  [...] submits the Court must ignore this portion of [...]’s brief.
[directive] the  I agree that participation Court Program terminated if I rearrested, test positive Drug the may be my am 11. in of drugs or alcohol meet court ordered obligations.  I further understand that the court for or to any my fail sanctions, including county jail rather terminate participation program.  I than can impose time, the in my understand that sanctions increased include termination the program. may and may be from of I understand that I charged with violation ofN.J.S.A. 2C:36-10, "Defrauding the Administration may be 12. a Test" if I knowingly attempt defraud a test or possess designed defraud a Drug drug drug item to to any test.  I understand that I a right attorney during court proceedings, which shall include plea, sentence, have to 13.
[brief] “Under that standard, an appellate court should not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court, unless ‘the trial court’s ruling “was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted. ’”  State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001) (quoting State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 484 (1997)).  Accordingly, such rulings “are subject to limited appellate scrutiny,” State v. Buda, 195 N.J. 278, (2008), as trial judges are vested “with broad discretion in making evidence rulings,” Harris, 209 N.J. at 439 (quoting State v. Muhammad, 359 N.J. Super. 361, 388 (App. Div. 2003)).  There are two forms of testimony: “fact testimony” and “opinion testimony.
[brief] There were numerous maps “seeded” throughout this matter.  Each held various dates.  None were specifically attached or referenced to any Resolution or Developer’s Agreement.  Nothing in the record revealed that any of the maps or plats were “approved” by the planning board.  The record is unclear as to the provenance of the maps supplied by the Plaintiff or for what purposes they were prepared.  Plaintiff refers to them as “recorded” subdivision maps, but there is no evidence in the record that the planning board or Borough ever reviewed and “approved” them. \(^1\)  The trial Court primarily relied upon a tax map to identify the roadways in question.  Even if one were to assume that the maps were attached to a particular Resolution of Developer’s Agreement, and assuming that the planning board reviewed them, those maps at best state that the roadways --- \(^1\)  Plaintiff resisted providing transcripts of the prior planning board hearings in this case.  Those transcripts may have revealed what plats were approved or not.  The Borough filed a motion to compel such transcripts and Plaintiff provided only those transcripts of the last proceedings before the planning board in 2018 and not those going back to 2002.  at issue were "proposed streets R.O.W.".  Presumably R.O.W. refers to a Right of Way.  Under the law there are both public and private rights of way.  None of the maps, even assuming they were "approved", stated that the roads in question were "to be dedicated as a public street", just that they would be "rights of way".  A right of way for access, ingress and egress is not necessarily a public street.  When these roadways were first established they were considered private ingress and egress rights of way.  The maps at issue could easily be construed as an internal road or a driveway, as the roadway in questions were originally referenced.  III, (B)
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED COUNT 3, THE CONSUMER CONTRACT WARRANTY AND NOTICE ACT ("TCCWNA") (N.J.S.A. 56:12-15)**  The terms of the TCCWNA are as follows:  No **seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee** shall in the course of his business offer to any consumer or prospective consumer or enter into any written consumer contract or give or display any written consumer warranty, notice or sign after the effective date of this act which includes any provision that violates any clearly established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee as established by State or Federal law at the time the offer is made or the consumer contract is signed or the warranty, notice or sign is given or displayed.  **Consumer** means any individual who buys, leases, borrows, or bails any money, property or service which is primarily for personal, family or household purposes.[N.J.S.A. 56:12–15.]  (Da009)(emphasis added)  In the December 23, 2022 Order, the Trial Court stated that the purpose of the TCCWNA is to “prevent deceptive practices in consumer contracts”  *Spade v. Select Comfort Corp.*, 232 N.J. 504, 515 (2018)(quoting *Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc.*, 231 N.J. 24, 67, 171 A.3d 620 (2017).
[brief] See e.g. DiCarlo v. MoneyLion, Inc., 988 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[t]he UCL, FAL, and CLRA all authorize public injunctive relief”).  Thus, the primary purpose of the plaintiff’s “public injunctive relief” claim in DiCarlo was to enjoin the defendant from “falsely advertising to the general public within the State of California” under statutes that expressly authorized her to seek such “public injunctive relief. ”8  Id., 988 F.3d at 1152 (emphasis added).  7  Even if a private litigant and the Attorney General had the same powers under the CFA, plaintiff mistakenly assumes that any injunction claim asserted by the Attorney General under the CFA qualifies as a claim for “public injunctive relief,” which it does not.
[brief] (1T40-19 to 1T40-24).  The Board Attorney stated “we really need to keep this separate and apart form the site plan and all those issues that will occur then. ” (1T40-19 to 1T40-21).  The Applicant’s attorney also responded and stated “that is part of site plan.  Let me answer your, your question sir.  Number one, that is part of site plan review.  That’s in the file for that…  That is not part of this application.
[brief] If this court were to exercise its original jurisdiction, the appropriate finding for the value of lot 19 should incorporate that rental income number.  Then even using the arbitrator’s over stated 7% vacancy rate and overstated expenses from [...], the math would indicate a value for lot 19 of $3,334,619.00 using a 10% capitalization rate.  $432,752 less 7% vacancy -30,293 $402,459 -65,400  [...]’s expenses $337,059  Net operating income (N.O.I.)  Capitalized at a 10% cap. rate the value would give a market value for Lot 19 of $3,334,059.00 at 10.25% = $3,288,380.00.  --- 4  There was one vacant unit of 1,125 sq. ft. that represents 2.85% of the leaseable area.  CONCLUSION
[directive] Brady Giglio  Brady Giglio C.  Each Procedures for Reviewing and Disclosing and Information.  county’s policy shall establish the following procedures for review and disclosure of and material.  Brady Giglio Procedures for Review.  1.  The prosecutor assigned to a case, in consultation with the prosecutor’s designee or liaison, shall review the potential and Giglio Brady Giglio material and any other information found to be relevant and material to the particular case.  This shall be done in accordance with all relevant case law and court rules.  The prosecutor is to review the material and determine whether it should be disclosed to the court for an review or whether it should be disclosed to the ex parte, in camera defense.  It is the prosecutor’s duty to recommend whether, to what extent, and/or in Page 8 what manner disclosure to the defense and/or the court shall occur.  This shall be done in accordance with the approval process set out in each county’s policy.
[brief] (B)  In disposing of the case, the trial judge stated the following that, SOMEHOW, he “knew” that the respondents had a good faith compromise at work on the matter and the appellant was refusing to accept it:  THE COURT:  “And, [...], if you want to explain that to [...], you're free to have the floor.  I know you're trying to work out a compromise with him, but it doesn't seem that he's open minded at this time,” (1T12, 20 - 23).  This “knowledge” by the trial judge defied material existing facts and evidence, as it was solely based on his blind reliance on the aforesaid statements certified to him by [...], without apparent Duty of Candor.  The trial judge had such firm factual belief, yet he took NO interest in learning what the terms of the alleged “compromise” was, less to use his authority to mediate the matter toward a just end.  The said knowledge by the trial judge, further, defied the [...] letter before him, which stipulated that [...] had referred the case to the [...] in 2020, relinquishing direct involvement over the matter (Pa37).  On November 30, 2023, in reaction to aforesaid revelation/clarification by the [...] (Pa54), [...] issued its letter and administratively closing its case, citing as grounds that “[...] has notified [...] that no further action is warranted” (Pa55).
[brief] b)  The [...] had Notice of the “Dangerous Condition” (Raised below, Pa2148, Pa2152)  N.J.S.A. 59:4-3 provides:  a.  A public entity shall be deemed to have actual notice of a dangerous condition . . . if it had actual knowledge of the existence of the condition and knew or should have known of its dangerous character.  b.  A public entity shall be deemed to have constructive notice of a dangerous condition . . . only if the plaintiff establishes that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character.  However, since "the mere '[e]xistence of an alleged dangerous condition is not constructive notice of it."  Polzo v. County of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 581 (2008) (quoting Sims v. City of Newark, 244 N.J. Super. 32, 42, (Law Div. 1990) it follows that absent actual or constructive notice, the public entity cannot have acted in a palpably unreasonable manner.
[brief] Included with the Petition were other retired Troopers who are requesting registration and amended health benefits in retirement.  Pa23.  All of those Troopers provided affidavits that they also did not receive notice of the Ricci Bill’s passage.  Pa23.  Pa77-Pa112.  Furthermore, other Troopers who are not currently ill, but were only seeking to register for the Ricci Act also filed affidavits that they did not receive notice of the Ricci Act and were included in the Petition.  Pa23.  Pa114-Pa260.  Additionally, other retired Troopers who were not present at the September 11, 2001 attacks and aftermath also submitted affidavits that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act in further support of the Petition.
[brief] Being that R. 3:9-3(f) is the law, and it comes from one of the highest courts of law, the Supreme Court.  What is the state implying?  That the law does not apply to [...].  Is the State asserting that Myers is not afforded the right to withdraw his plea, based on what grounds), Myers prevailed on appeal that is it.  If the state is implying that this law, (3:9-3(f), does not apply to Myers, when it specifically does.  Then who is the state saying it applies to?  Non-Black defendants, people of a certain ethnic background?  Does not R. 3:9-3(f) apply to all defendants who have a conditional plea in place, who prevailed on appeal?  The state further incorrectly states; "if the defendant plead guilty to first degree murder again, he would still have to be sentenced to the mandatory minimum 30/30 and the state "thinks" it would be prejudiced.  (Da 81, 19-24).  Although the state has not provided "how it thinks" it would be prejudiced, that holds no strength here at all, when a defendant wins on appeal by the higher Court.  Whether the state thinks it would or wouldn't be prejudiced, it was the state who agreed to the conditional plea, that was global and all together, as the defendant [...] understood it to be, and the state knew of the conditional plea and the State knew conditional pleas are protected and governed by R. 3:9-3(f).  So, the State could not be prejudiced by the withdrawal of Myers decision to withdraw.  In fact, it is the defendant [...] who will be prejudiced and has been prejudiced by the trial court's error and improperly admitting illegally obtained evidence that stemmed from a vehicle stop that was based solely on racial profiling that wrongfully allowed an unlawful stop and seizure to take place.
[brief] ------------------------------------------------------------------ 25 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)**  ------------------------------------------------------------------- 34 - **N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9)**  ---------------------------------------------------------------- 37, 38 Rules  1  New Jersey Evidence Courtroom Manual § 1 (2023)  ----------------------------- 13 N.J.R.E. 3:7-3(a)  ---------------------------------------------------------------
[brief] As previously mentioned in Point II above, the best measure of future lost rents would be the rate per square foot in the leases already signed by the tenants for the new building next door, who were waiting for certificates of occupancy to be issued by the town pending resolution of the delays caused by the grading error.  Virtually all plaintiff’s damages are liquidated in the form of invoices previously paid to vendors for work already performed or contained in executed property rental leases.  These are fact issues, not opinion issues.  If questions arise as to the reasonableness or necessity of any costs, plaintiff has identified and can produce at trial the actual vendors who performed the work.  As to the causal connection between expense and the alleged negligence of defendant, we submit that the causal links are self-evident, without the need for expert testimony.  The only damage issues presenting any complexity relate to the sale of the [...], previously discussed in Point II.  We submit that Plaintiff [...] is qualified to testify as to the facts of that transaction, which should be sufficient to reach a jury.  POINT IV
[brief] Acting as an ordinarily prudent person, when [...] exited the building, he noted it was cold and that there was a “very light” rain, and he merely took a first step onto the landing.  (Pa328 Dep. Tr. p. 13; Pa329 Dep. Tr. p. 17; Pa331 Dep. Tr. p. 23; Pa332 Dep. Tr. p. 28; Pa339 Dep. Tr. p. 56; Pa341 Dep. Tr. p. 65; Pa343 Dep. Tr. p. 73; Pa351; Pa387).  He ended up on his backside at the bottom of the stairs with a seriously injured left leg.  (Pa329 Dep. Tr. p. 17; Pa330 Dep. Tr. p. 18; Pa331 Dep. Tr. pp. 22, 24; Pa332 Dep. Tr. p. 29; Pa342 Dep. Tr. p. 66).  That result also highlights [...]’s other opinion about the defects of the steps, where [...] had no chance to grab the handrail to steady himself or lessen his fall because the handrails were “too far” from the pedestrian pathway to serve their purpose under the conditions.