ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] .........................................................  8  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Order of Hon. [...], J.S.C., Suppressing Evidence, Dated May 28, 2024.  ..........................................  Pa4  Oral Ruling of Hon. [...], J.S.C., Suppressing Evidence, Dated May 28, 2024.  .........................  1T11-4 to 25-24  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS  For purposes of this reply brief, the State relies on the statements of procedural history and facts set forth in its opening brief, which was filed as amended on August 30, 2024.
[directive] If more than one Department component seeks to retain the same property for official use and the matter cannot be resolved by the agency heads, the Under Secretary (Enforcement), or designee, shall determine which agency may place the property into official use.  Executive Ofice Asset Forfeiture for 14 VI Guidelines Seized and Forfeited Provertv Chapter for ~ TRANSFER FORFEITED PROPERTY OF (To Federal Agencies that did not Participate in the Acts that Led to Seizure)
[brief] Further, Courts are permitted to make decisions on other grounds.  See Cf. Shark River Cleanup Coalition v. Twp. Of Wall, 47 4th 126, 136 (3d Cir. 2022), quoting Panzarella v. Navient Sols, Inc., 37 F.4th 867, 872 (3d Cir. 2022) and stating: “Courts may affirm on any basis supported by the record. ”  See also, Reyes v. Egner, 404 N.J.Super. 433 (App.Div.), certif. granted on other grounds, 199 N.J. 130 (2009) (Granting Certification to the realtor on the issue of the realtor’s duty owed in a short term rental and not considering the Appellate Court’s determination that a duty was owed by the landlord to disclose known latent defects to a tenant in a short term rental).
[directive] 5.  As to superseding indictments, the Court notes that the trial court here relied on courtroom unavailability and the pandemic to extend the time to trial, not on the new charges.  But the Court explains that a superseding indictment does not automatically 2A:162-22(a)(2)(b)(ii) provides that “[t]he return reset the 180-day clock.  N.J.S.A. commence.” of a superseding indictment . . . shall extend the time for the trial to And Rule 3:25-4(f) directs trial courts to scrutinize both indictments with care and consider when the information underlying the new charges was available to determine how much additional time should be excluded.  (pp. 28-31)
[brief] The plaintiff --- having presented no substantive direct case --- over defendant's objection was allowed to present as rebuttal Traffic Engineer [...], former Township Attorney [...], and former Township Engineer [...].  Rea testified that in his opinion the absence of any legend or markings of vehicle parking being allowed in the School courtyard on the 1972 Site Plan did not necessarily mean that parking could not occur there.  He did acknowledge there was no indicia that such parking was approved and the plan showed a concrete walkway across the middle of the courtyard.  (13T55-24 to 104-24)  Former officials Wouters and Staiger briefly testified to a 2013 Township Letter expressing their opinion that the Synagogue chiseling out of a curb cut in 2013 in front of Lot 8 was not illegal.  (13T111-6 to 125-4)  In fact, this Synagogue rebuttal testimony only confirmed that the 1972 Site Plan (Da934) had no reference to permit parking in the courtyard and that no curb cut was authorized or existed in that plan on Sixth Street to foster vehicle access into the Lot 5 courtyard.
[brief] Dewey has not been overturned by our Supreme Court and the principles for which *Dewey* is cited are still applicable today.  Before the Law Division, defendants contended that [...] “performed no substantive work in the defense of this consolidated matter. ”  However, even if that is true, his partners have knowledge which is imputed to [...].  As our Supreme Court has held, “[e]ach partner’s professional knowledge is justifiably imputed to the entire firm, regardless of actual disclosure. ”  Id. at 215 (citing State v. Bellucci, 81 N.J. 531, 541 (1980); see also In re Lankenau, Docket No. DRB 16-442 and Docket No. DRB 17-143 (2017) noting that in a partnership “knowledge is imputed to the other partners and vice versa.
[brief] (ruling at 13T:5-1 to 8-14)  During pretrial motion to bar ballistic expert testimony, defendant moved to limit the testimony of states expert, [...].  Defense argued, [...]’s opinions concerning bullet comparisons, are purely subjective.  [...] did not try to match bullet fragments and the shell casings to any other weapons.  (3T:48-12 to 49-7)  Defense counsel stated [...]’s report is deficient and deprives the defendant from adequately confronting [...].  (3T:51-14 to 21)  On August 9, 2021, relying on U.S. v. Shipp, 422 F. Supp. 3d 762 (E.D.N.Y., 2019), primarily, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to limit, “in some respect the opinion to not saying that with any degree of certainty that there was match that the expert is – you know, as much as reasonably certain that the bullet come from the gun . . .” (12T:5-1 to 20).
[brief] **POINT IV**  **THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE [...] SAM ACCOUNT REGISTRATION WEBSITE DID NOT PROVIDE NOTICE OF THE TERMS OF USE.  (2T14:9-2T18:7). **  A party can be bound to arbitrate by agreeing to a predispute arbitration clause through website terms of use, provided there is reasonable notice.  *E.g.*, *Wollen*, 468 N.J. Super. at 496-97 (“internet contracts are not all that different from traditional, written contracts containing arbitration provisions (citing *Hoffman v. Supplements Togo Mgmt., LLC*, 419 N.J. Super. 596, 611 (App. Div. 2011)); *Atalese*, 219 N.J. at 445-47.  “New Jersey courts have recognized the validity of [web-based] contracts for decades. ”  *Santana v. SmileDirectClub, LLC*, 475 N.J. Super. 279, 286 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting *Wollen*, 468 N.J. Super. at 495).  Here, the trial court erred in concluding that the [...] SAM Account Registration website did not provide a “reasonably conspicuous” hyperlink to the [...] SAM Terms of Use.  The trial court erroneously concluded that *Wollen* “applies almost perfectly” to the *facts* of this case (2T15:5-11; 2T16:25-17:18), and did not consider multiple more recent cases with website designs much more comparable to [...]’s than the site analyzed in *Wollen*.
[brief] | 022a | | Edwards v. McDermott International, Inc. | 027a | | In re Facebook, Inc. Conumser Privacy User Profile Litigation | 023a | | FlowRider Surf, Ltd. v. Pacific Surf Designs, Inc., | 071a | | Hastings v. Ford Motor Company | 079a | | Livingston v. City of Chicago | 083a | | In re Mercedes-Benz Emissions Litigation | 087a | | Palmer v. Cognizant Technology Solutions Corporation | 091a | | Royal Park Investments SA NA v. HSBC Bank USA National Association | 101a | | SinglePoint Direct Solar LLC v. Solar Integrated Roofing Corporation | 103a | | Singleton v. Mazhari | 107a | | Strauch v. Computer Sciences Corp. | 110a | | Total Safety U.S., Inc. v. Rowland | 113a | | United States for Use and Benefit of M. Frank Higgins & Co., Inc. v. Dobco Inc. | 122a | REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
[brief] Although neither [...] nor [...] were “owners,” they operated [...] and made the relevant financial decisions.  As was the case with [...], they each had signing authority for company checks and [...] personally signed corporate checks, transferred funds between the companies and paid corporate expenses.  4T183:2-10; 5T14:3-9; 13T38:25-39:11.  [...], a certified public accountant, provided accounting services to [...], [...], their subsidiaries and related entities,³ as well as to --- ²
[brief] Defense counsel objected to portions of [...]’s testimony as surprise and net opinion.  Defense counsel subsequently filed motions *in limine* to redact the testimony dealing with reasonableness and necessity and to bar evidence as to medical expenses or liens at the time of trial.  (Pa45)  The motions *in limine* were argued before [...] on September 3, 2021.  (9T)²  The Court, and counsel, discussed on the record that the causal relationship of the July 29, 2013 incident and the alleged aggravation of Meniere’s disease has been in dispute in the case throughout and that recovery of medical expenses for treatment of Meniere’s disease --- ²  Note that Plaintiffs did not include the transcript of September 3, 2021 in their appeal. depends upon a finding of causation.
[brief] Da104; Da113.  A close look at the 100-foot distance versus the 50-foot distance, since the trial court seems to find the differential pivotal, illustrates a scenario that could easily be established where the 50-foot requirement is actually a greater distance.  For example, if a home is set back 100 feet on its property, the 50-foot requirement really becomes 150 feet in [...] since measurement begins at the property line versus only 100 feet from the structure where noise is emanating from in [...].  The trial court, focusing on the very same language already adjudged by this Court in Clarksburg Inn to be reasonable, found Ordinance 17-2017 overbroad:  The generally smaller lot sizes in [...] do not provide a basis for permitting the ordinance adopted by [...], which permit subjective application of a rule that prohibits the sound generated by an unamplified human voice, during daytime hours, that can be heard 50 feet from the sound generator’s property line and which “annoys, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, health or welfare or others within the limits of the Borough” to stand.  When viewed from the applicable reasonableness standard, the Ordinance is overbroad.
[brief] Under N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.6, the parties to an NFADR proceeding are the “injured party, the insured, a provider who is an assignee of PIP benefits pursuant to N.J.A.C. 11:3-4.9 … [and] the insurer” (emphasis added).  Significantly, absent an assignment, even a patient’s billing medical entity is not a proper party to an NFADR proceeding.  Here, in addition to the defendant medical providers who billed [...], [...] sued a management company, several realty companies, [...], and layperson, [...], an alleged paper owner of defendant [...].  [...] is unable to join the foregoing individuals and entities in an NFADR proceeding, since they are neither parties to the insurance policy with [...] nor billing medical entities who have taken an assignment of their patients’ claims for payment.  Similarly, since the billing medical entities (e.g. [...] Medical Care, P.C.) are likely the parties that received the assignment of benefits from their patients, [...] could not even join the principals of the defendant medical entities as parties in an NFADR proceeding since those principals have not individually taken assignments from their patients and, thus are not parties to a contract with [...] or providers with an assignment of rights.  If the trial court’s decision is upheld, [...] will be required to litigate with the defendant medical provider entities via an NFADR process and it will be required to forego its claims against the realty entities, the laypersons, the attorney, and the real and paper owners of the medical entities (collectively the dismissed defendants) because plaintiffs’ Complaint against all defendants was dismissed in its entirety.
[brief] Three years later, [...] in Morris County decided *[...] v. [...]*, No. [...] (Law Div. April 12, 2019), a summary action with identical facts to this matter.  [...] ([...]) had filed a demand for intercompany arbitration in Arb Forums seeking recovery of damages against [...] ([...]) in the amount of $5,000.00 paid as extended medical benefits.  The claim was submitted under the Med-Pay intercompany arbitration agreement adopted by both parties.  [...] raised several affirmative defenses to the demand of [...], including the defense that New Jersey law prohibited med-pay subrogation.  At a preliminary hearing, the arbitrator rejected [...]’s affirmative defense that New Jersey law prohibited med-pay subrogation.  At the full arbitration hearing, the arbitrator did not address the merits of the affirmative defense that New Jersey law prohibited med-pay subrogation and awarded damages in favor of [...].  [...] appealed this decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23.  Finding that the appeal was filed timely and articulated a rationale for the appeal under N.J.S.A 2A:23B-23(c), [...] proceeded to address whether med-pay subrogation was prohibited in New Jersey.  It was noted that this was a critical finding as the Med-Pay Arbitration Agreement did not require any member company to arbitrate a case if medical payment subrogation claims are prohibited by statute or judicial decision.  If the affirmative defense asserted by [...] was valid, then there was no agreement to arbitrate the subject dispute and the arbitrator exceeded his/her authority by proceeding with the arbitration hearing.
[brief] A.  Plaintiff Did Not Request That [...] Award Post-Mortgage Foreclosure Judgment Interest At The Contract Rate  The fundamental factual bedrock of plaintiff’s opposition to the [...]  Defendants’ appeal is that, in the two certifications of amounts due of [...] (“[...]”), plaintiff’s authorized signatory, and in plaintiff’s two forms of judgment, plaintiff sought “post [foreclosure] judgment interest at the contract rate for the post [mortgage foreclosure] judgment period”.  Pb 4 (citing Da104, ¶8; Da40; Da42; and Da45).  See also Pb17.  However, as set forth below, this is simply not true and it is inappropriate for plaintiff to attempt to convince this Court otherwise in reliance upon the illusory truth effect, i.e., that the more plaintiff repeats something that is not true, the greater the likelihood that it will be believed.  On April 6, 2023, plaintiff filed its motion for the entry of a final judgment of foreclosure against [...].
[brief] (Db31-32).  The record itself dispels these contentions.  In his closing, defense counsel stated:  So, we have the handwritten – we – we have the letters.  By the way, why didn’t we have a handwriting expert?  Why didn’t we have somebody come in and look at those letters and say, “I can tell you this.  I reviewed [...]’s handwriting and I’ve reviewed the letters that are written and they’re written by [...]."  You know why?  Because it wasn’t going to work, that’s why.  (16T:17-4 to 11).  The jury was thus “reminded” about defendant’s dispute, and about the lack of expert testimony.  As for reminding the jury that they were the factfinders, and it was their assessment of the writing that would control, the prosecutor and trial court took care of that.  In the State’s closing, as defendant candidly quotes, the prosecutor stated multiple times, in terms of the writing comparisons, that the jury should assess the evidence and draw their own conclusions:  If you could compare to [...]’s Miranda form, you’ll have that in the back room.  You can make your own comparison to that, but also from the tone of the letters and the context of them.  (16T:49-15 to 18); …and by the way, when you get in that deliberation room because I am looking at right it now, look at his Miranda form and his printed name and look at the writing on this and [defense counsel] says [...] had enough time to mimic his writing there.  That’s – that’s your decision.  You can certainly find that if you believe that to be the case.  (16T:77-8 to 14).  This is in addition to the jury charge which already told the jurors that they are the “sole and exclusive judges of the evidence...[r]egardless of what counsel said or what I may have said in recalling the evidence in this case [it] is your recollection of the evidence that should guide you as judges of the facts. ” (16T:109-3 to 9).  Defendant’s fears are thus wholly unfounded.  In short, defendant was the one who first asked the jury to compare the different styles of handwriting from [...]’s Miranda form to the letters in question, to argue that [...] forged the letters entirely.  The State, in doing the same with defendant’s Miranda form, merely used the same argument, and left it up to the jury to decide which side the evidence backed.  Moreover, it was not error to ask a lay jury to compare the letters to writings where the authors are undisputed.  The jury was well aware of their role, and was fully equipped to carry it out.  Defendant’s convictions are sound, and should be affirmed.
[brief] For Yarbough factor (c), the Court reasoned that the offense of unlawful possession of the firearm “occurred the moment [[...]] left his residence with that gun in his possession,” which was “somewhere around 3:00, 3:30, maybe 4:00 o’clock,” whereas the shooting did not occur around 8:00 pm.  (8T 90-22 to 91-17)  The Court found that the fact that [...] left the Holley house to retrieve the gun from his home and the four hours that transpired between the retrieval of the gun and the shooting supported a finding that the crimes were committed at different times or separate places.  (8T 95-18 to 97-1).  Contrary to this finding, the fact that [...] retrieved the gun for protection in case the sought “one-on-one” fight at the Holley house got out of control compelled a finding that the possession and manslaughter charges were committed “so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior.
[brief] *Ibid*; see also *In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules*, 180 N.J. 415, 422-23 (2004) (suggesting that lack of control over development sites or finalized plans for project configuration are germane concerns because “applicant[s] seeking to engage in regulated activities . . . [can only do so if they] apply for and secure either a general or an individual permit. ”)  The TI program provided a one year expiration after receiving conditional registration for certain facilities to reach commercial operation.
[brief] ”  Knorr, 178 N.J. at 181.  The judge should consider “the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the ‘changing conditions of either or both parties during the delay. ’”  Ibid. (quoting Lavin, 90 N.J. at 152).  The “central issue” in the application of the doctrine of laches “is whether it is inequitable to permit the claim to be enforced,” and “[i]nequity, more often than not, will turn on whether a party has been misled to his harm by the delay.
[directive] Reform Bail Hearing.  Detention Re-Opening and Detention Seek Decision to Re-Considering 7.7 on based detention pretxral seek to decision reconsider the time any at may prosecutor A the to known not and was Directive that this to pursuant relevant be would that information the if Furthermore, detention. pretrial seek to not made decision was initial an time the at prosecutor the re-open to seek prosecutor may the detention, pretrial for motion prosecutor's denies a court bearing material a has hearing initial that the of time the at known not information on based hearing 2A:162-19(x.
[brief] Pa2303.  The court held that “[a]pplying the law to the facts of this case, we are constrained to reverse the orders dismissing the claims against [...] and [...] and remand for further proceedings. ”  Pa2311.  In April 2018, [...] was dismissed with prejudice.  Also in April 2018, defendant [...] moved for summary judgment.  Pa40.  After briefing and oral argument, on June 22, 2018, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed all plaintiffs’ claims against [...] with prejudice, holding that “a reasonable trier of fact could not find Defendant committed an intentional wrong, thereby forfeiting immunity under the WCA. ”  Pa1; Pa10.  Discovery proceeded through April 2019.  In May 2019, defendants [...] and [...] each moved again for summary judgment based on alleged failure to comply with the AOM statute.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE, HAS BEEN INTERPRETED TO PROHIBIT MED-PAY SUBROGATION IN NEW JERSEY.  Med-Pay subrogation claims are barred by the statutory collateral source rule (N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97), and this has been affirmed by multiple judicial decisions.  There are unpublished decisions written that are particularly relevant as they are directly on point and provide a succinct but well-reasoned analysis.  These unpublished decisions are included herein based on R. 1:36-3 and the Comments relating to Unpublished Opinions.  [...], Current N.J. COURT RULES, Comment R. 1:36-3 (GANN).
[brief] If the Legislature meant a statute is void only when the Constitution is violated, then it would not have added the second clause relating to statutes when it amended the statute.  See In re Jaegle, 83 N.J.L. 313, 314 (Sup. Ct. ¹  The term “Sb” refers to the State’s brief in opposition; the term “Ra” refers to the State’s appendix; the term “Pb” refers to Applicants’ opening appellate brief; the term “Pa” refers to Applicants’ appendix; the term “Pra” refers to Applicant’s appendix filed herewith. 1912)(quoting original statute\(^2\)); see also Med. Soc'y of N.J. v. N.J. Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety, 120 N.J. 18, 26-27 (1990)(explaining court will “give effect to every word” so as that it will not “render part of it superfluous”).  Thus, if the Legislature does not comply with either a constitutional or statutory provision for enactment, a court may void the non-compliant statute.
[brief] Notwithstanding this admission, Plaintiffs then contradicted their own statements in indicating that the Court failed to apply the intent of the law as it relates to takings by governmental authorities as it did not consider just compensation due to the Plaintiffs.  With respect to just compensation representing the financial impacts suffered by Plaintiffs, [...] testified that his profits have increased during and following the remediation project, even directly acknowledging that the store is making more money now than before the project.