ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Specifically, an email dated August 22, 2008, from [...] to [...]’s then co-owner, [...], attaches the four logos that were being considered under the “Summerset” branding.  (Pa756-Pa758).  Indeed, these logos include the sub-brands:  “Summerset Outdoor Living,” “Summerset Outdoor Products,” “Summerset Outdoor Furnishing,” and “Summerset Grills & Burners. ”  [...] expressly references all of these Summerset brands as being under the umbrella of “[o]ur program. ” (Pa756).  The evidence before the Trial Court also overwhelmingly demonstrated the interdependence and symbiotic relationship between [...] and the Summerset owners from the outset.  For example, in August 2008, [...] emailed [...] for Mr. Rodriguez’s input on the [...] logo – confirming that [...] was formed contemporaneously with, and to support the launch of, the Summerset brand -- to which [...] replied “[l]ogo looks good. ” (Pa759-Pa760; see also, Pa764-Pa771).  Tellingly, in the same email, [...] wrote to [...] how he, in coordination with [...], could work together with [...] to support the Summerset furniture and grills together and as a team, writing:  What we can do on the Catalog is have our logos and address’.  This will really get the program going for the East Coast operation.  Jeff [Straubel] is working hard also on the grill and accessory catalog.  The new line of grills look great so we are now able to offer 6 grills and I believe over 12 accessories for the Islands.  As far as patio, we have 6 lines of furniture and I have increased our tables to almost 40, which gives us a huge choice in all four heights.  (Pa759)  (emphasis added).  [...] would repeatedly refer to [...] in correspondence as the East Coast operation of the Summerset brand.  (See Pa763) (August 2008 email to [...]’s [...] where [...] writes “look forward to the new East and West Coast operations. ”)  In October of 2008, [...] and [...]’s design agency -- [...] – further established that Mr. Rodriguez and Mr. Straubel were directly coordinating with – and relying on -- [...] to establish and develop the Summerset brand, *with both [...] and Summerset branding to appear on the initial catalogs for the new Summerset line of products.* (See Pa776-779).
[brief] One of them, who [...] subsequently learned was [...], had his hand in his pocket, which [...]t took to indicate that he had a gun.  (23T 162-5 to 16, 165-10 to 17)  [...]t subsequently learned that the man immediately behind [...] was [...].  (23T 165-6 to 9, 166-8 to 9)  [...]t was close enough to hear [...] tell [...]: “‘I should cap this (N-word) right now.
[brief] ” (Da699).  Third, also on November 29, 1948, the [...] conveyed in a separate instrument a significant “Beach Front Section” of land to [...].  (Da704-09).  The “Beach Front Section” was conveyed on the express condition that it “shall be used” by [...] for the benefit of anyone who “qualifies for membership as defined and provided for in the constitution and by-laws” of [...] for “bathing, sunbathing and kindred sports or pleasures and who comply with the other rules and by-laws of said association[.]” (Da704-09).  The conveyance of the “Beach Front Section” was further conditioned on [...]’s enforcement of the Genesis Deed’s restrictions, which were attached to the instrument.  (Da706-07).  This condition specifically referenced [...]’s authority to enforce the Genesis Deed’s restrictions “as provided in the present by-laws” of [...].  (Da706).  Fourth, on June 7, 1962, [...] conveyed to [...] a “private bathing beach,” on the condition that [...] enforce the same restrictions as in the Genesis Deed.
[brief] 13T:8-9.  Instead, the Court ruled that it would determine the exact amount of the Rent Increase based on additional briefing regarding the calculation of the Rent Increase.  13T:69:5-14.  It also requested briefing on [...]’s claims that the Rent Increase should be retroactive and for attorney’s fees.  On August 11, 2022, [...] filed a legal memorandum calculating the Rent Increase based upon the Court’s rulings, requested that the Rent Increase be retroactive to August 1, 2019 (four years, not five years, from the filing of the hardship application on July 19, 2017, accounting for a one-year delay resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic) and sought legal fees/costs totaling $43,859.04.
[brief] “In determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction, a trial court must consider … whether the legal right underlying [the applicant's] claim is unsettled ….  ”  *Rinaldo v. RLR Inv., LLC*, 387 N.J. Super. 387, 395 (App. Div. 2006) (emphasis added) citing *Crowe v. De Gioia*, 90 N.J. 126, 132–134 1982).  Notably, the trial court adduced no LAD precedent or statutory provision on the issue of parental notification policies versus the rights of LGBTQ+ students under the LAD -- as there is none.  The court invoked the LAD, but the LAD neither: (i) directs that parents be kept ignorant of matters adversely affecting their children because the matters incidentally implicate a protected characteristic such as LGBTQ+ status; nor (ii) equates parents’ knowledge of their child’s LGBTQ+ status with discrimination.  The court cited no case law or statutory provision barring notification to parents of matters bearing a potentially adverse impact upon their children whenever a protected characteristic is incidentally involved.  There is no such law and there can be no such law given the fundamental Constitutional parental right to autonomy in childrearing -- which is further addressed below.  The claims herein entail the tension between this Constitutional parental right and a purported blanket right of minors to withhold information from their parents whenever such information involves a protected characteristic -- a right which has not been established in the LAD nor its case law.  Rather, the purported right is unsettled and is part of an uncertain, evolving area of the law.  See [...], Are Teachers Obliged to Tell Parents their Child Might be Trans?, Education Week, April 28, 2022, p. 5-6.  (Da287-295).  Nor is there any authority according minors a well-settled blanket right of privacy to the exclusion of their parents except where parents are adjudged unfit.  Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 112 (2003) (the law should not disturb the parent/child relationship except upon a clear showing of a parent's gross misconduct or unfitness).  Therefore, the trial court erred in ignoring this fundamental prong of the Crowe test.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For all the reasons above, Appellants respectfully request that the Appellate Division issue an order:  1.  [...]’s August 22, 2023 Final Decision  a. Reversing the [...]’s August 22, 2023 Final Agency Decision; b. Finding that Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) with regard to Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the Amended Complaint; and c. Reinstating the penalty of “censure.
[brief] Advanced by Defendants | Authorities Cited | Result | |-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------| | Sept. 5, 2017 | • [...]’s declaratory judgment action was preemptively filed, depriving the “natural plaintiff” of its choice of forum.  (Pa494-95)  | | • Judicial efficiency and convenience of the parties and witnesses favor | • *Sensient Colors* | | | • *Century Indem. Co.* | | | • *Moses H. Cone* | Motion denied by [...] Oct. 17, 2017 (Pa506-11) | | Date | Missouri (Pa496) | Mem’l Hosp. (Pa493-96)
[brief] The Appellate Division reviews de novo trial court decisions on questions of law, including issues involving the interpretation of statutes, ordinances and contract terms.  *Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v Merck & Co., Inc.*, 192 N.J. 372, 386 (2007).  2.  **[...] IS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION TO PURSUE A PRIVATE AGENDA AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT RECORDS  COUNCIL**
[brief] Id. at 85:17-86:3.  He further stated that he was the opinion that Plaintiff was being retaliated against for retaining counsel because soon after the township received a letter of representation from Plaintiff’s counsel, [...] (Plaintiff’s primary antagonist) was immediately promoted above her.  See id. at 93:25-94:10.  As for [...]’s willful indifference, one needn’t search hard through his testimony to find examples of such indifference.
[brief] The burden is on the plaintiff to establish proximate causation and damages “by a preponderance of the competent, credible evidence and is not satisfied by mere ‘conjecture, surmise or suspicion. ’”  *Finco*, 272 N.J. Super. at 488 (quoting, *Long v. Landy*, 35 N.J. 44, 54 (1961)).  In legal malpractice actions, proximate causation must ordinarily be established by expert testimony that establishes the particular facts of the case.
[brief] Here, the Complainant did not work at the local union office.  Although she was a member of the union, she was not an employee or volunteer of the Union.  Rather, her stated purpose for being at the local union office when the afternoon incident occurred was to seek to change her name on the election petition and to file a complaint with the union against [...] based on their interaction that morning at the DLWD building.  Nonetheless, the CSC held the State Policy applied because the local union office constitutes a “location that can be reasonably regarded as an extension of the workplace. ”  N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(a)1.  Simply because the local union represents, among others, State employees in certain State departments cannot, without more, convert its private offices into “an extension of the workplace” for all State employees.  It was not an extension of Complainant’s workplace.  According to her, she was interacting with [...] in the morning in front of the DLWD building in connection with a dispute about the union’s election.  She went to the local union office later that day in furtherance of her complaint about [...]’s conduct in connection with the election dispute and to seek to change her name on the election petition.  None of this is “State business. ”  This is not a situation where a State employee believed she was the subject of harassment by a State contractor at her regular workplace, as well as at the contractor’s office, where she was required by her job to also report from time to time.  That is precisely the scenario that the State Policy’s language about expanding the scope of a State employee’s workplace is reasonably drafted to cover – a situation where the State could face liability under the LAD for failing to investigate or address complaints of harassment at the contractor’s private office because the State required the complainant to be there as a condition of her State employment and therefore could be vicariously liable.  That risk is entirely absent at the local union’s offices.  Accordingly, the Commission erred in holding that [...] had jurisdiction to investigation Complainant’s allegations about [...]’s conduct at the local union office because that facility is not a State employee “workplace” for the purposes of the State Policy.
[brief] As explained in [...]’s opening Brief, the Court in *Morgan* rejected the need to show prejudice in order to establish waiver of arbitration and held that the FAA “does not authorize federal courts to invent special, arbitration-preferring procedural rules” requiring a finding of harm before a party could waive its right to arbitration.  *Id.* at 418.  Thus, when applying the factors for an analysis of waiver articulated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in *Cole v. Jersey City Med. Ctr.*, 215 N.J. 265 (2013), the Court must remove the requirement of prejudice.  The six remaining *Cole* factors are: (1) the delay in making the arbitration request; (2) the filing of any motions, particularly dispositive motions, and their outcomes; (3) whether the delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party's litigation strategy; (4) the extent of discovery conducted; (5) whether the party raised the arbitration issue in its pleadings, particularly as an affirmative defense, or provided other notification of its intent to seek arbitration; (6) the proximity of the date on which the party sought arbitration to the date of trial.
[brief] Section 509 provides:  “Harm Done by Abnormally Dangerous Domestic Animals”  A. A possessor of a domestic animal that he knows or has reason to know has dangerous propensities *abnormal to its class*, is subject to liability for harm done by the animal to another, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent it from doing the harm.  B.  This liability is limited to harm that results from the abnormally dangerous propensity of which the possessor knows or has reason to know.  Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 509 (emphasis added) (cited approvingly by DeRobertis v. Randazzo, 94 N.J. 144, 153 (1983); Jannuzzelli v. Wilkens, 158 N.J. Super. 36, 42 (App. Div. 1978); Conrad v. Catapano, A-4567-11, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 427 at *10-11 (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2013); and Terhune v. Guerriero, A-0974-10, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2110 at *4 (App. Div. July 26, 2011)).
[brief] [...] selectively ignores cases decided elsewhere that have used Appleman’s Rule to find coverage for mold related claims when a covered cause of loss is in the chain of causation.  *See, e.g.*, *Kelly v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc.*, 281 F.Supp.2d 1290 (W.D. Okla. 2003) (applying the Rule to find coverage in a mold case because “‘the insured risk is regarded as the proximate cause of the entire loss, even if the last step in the chain of causation was an excepted risk. ’”)  *Id.* at 1296 (citation omitted).  [...] cites *Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.*, 770 P.2d 704 (Cal. 1989) to support its argument restricting application of Appleman’s Rule to first-party property insurance claims, but *Garvey* provides no such support.
[directive] The training program shall address the key components and concepts articulated in 28 C.F.R Part 23.  The training shall emphasize the need for adequate documentation so that a supervisor can reliably determine whether the information proposed for submission into SIMS meets all applicable data entry criteria.  c.  The [...] shall within 45 days of the effective date of -5- Page 6 this Directive review the operating procedures for SIMS and shall take steps to make certain that, other than as may be necessary for routine system management and maintenance, no individual or unit of a law enforcement agency shall have access to or in any way operationally use information other than as may be authorized pursuant to the security grading level that has been assigned in the first instance by the agency that had submitted the information.
[brief] Appellant Certification, Motion for Correction of Probation Account  Record Errors and Probation Audit Errors, filed 10/27/2022 DA 339 49.  Appellant’s Certification, , Motion for Reconsideration of Order of 4/4/2023 DA 357 50.  Appellant Certification, Motion for Reconsideration of Order of 3/30/2023 DA 372 51.  Appellant Certification, Reply, Motion for Reconsideration of Order of 3/30/2023 52.  Appellant’s Certification.  Motion for Correction of the Record of 9/21/2020 DA 402 53.  [...] Letter of 10/8/1999 DA 414 54.  Ten letters to [...], 1.10.2022 – 10.24.2022  DA 439 55.  [...], Esq. Letter 4.2.2004 confirming credit & deletion of arrears, Order 3/25/2004 DA 471  [...], Plaintiff/Respondent v. [...], Defendant/Appellant Pro Se
[brief] (504a)  Immediately following this Court’s decision, [...] claimed that their taking of Theoretical and Hypothetical “fees” (however recorded in the partnership’s financial records) did not constitute “theft”, or any of the other predicate crimes that formed the basis of [...]’s NJRICO claims because during the RICO SOL Period, they were “trueing-up” for monies owed to them for prior years.  (223T98:10-99:6)  Thus, it was [...] themselves who placed the pre-SOL facts at the center of [...]’s NJRICO (and related tort) claims.  It was [...]’ patently false narrative – to wit, that they were the “developers,” “builders” and “managers” of [...] and thus were “entitled” to the funds they stole – that compelled [...]’s counsel to spend the time necessary to investigate and establish the actual facts outside the RICO SOL Period.  To refute that narrative, [...] was required to despose and/or to present the live testimony of numerous non-party witnesses who had actual knowledge: (i) of [...]’s role as the sole on-site partner in charge of developing and constructing the Project, working with land use professionals, and overseeing and making the final decisions down to the smallest details; and (ii) that it was [...], and not [...] (as [...] falsely claimed at trial), who was the project’s representative before all relevant governmental bodies, appearing at public meetings and offering testimony where required, and thereafter supervising the build-out of [...] and ultimately its management once tenanted.
[brief] Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 17:4-1.7:  “The following is... noted in every written notice setting forth the Board's determination in a matter where such determination is contrary to the claim made by the claimant or the claimant's legal representative:  "If the member disagrees with the determination of the Board, the member may appeal by submitting a written statement to the Board within 45 days after the date of written notice of the determination.  The statement shall set forth in detail the reasons for the member's disagreement with the Board's determination and shall include any relevant documentation supporting the claim.
[brief] 21  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS  ORDERS AND RULINGS  August 24, 2023  Order of Judgment  Docket No.: [...]…………Da07 October 6, 2023  Order Denying [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration…………Da03 October 6, 2023  Order Granting [...]’s Cross Motion for Reconsideration  Vacating Judgment for $60,398.00 in favor of [...]……………………………Da01 | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **30 River Ct. E. Urb. Renewal Co. v. Capograsso**, 383 N.J. Super. 470, 473-74 (App. Div. 2006) | 12 | | **Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy**, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021) | 8, 19 | | **C.R. v. M.T.**, 248 N.J. 428, 440 (2021) | 9 | | **Caldwell v. Haynes**, 136 N.J. 422, 442 (1994) | 14, 15, 17 | | **Cesare v. Cesare**, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998) | 21 | | **Cortez v. Gindhart**, 435 N.J. Super. 589, 603 (App. Div. 2014) | 14 | | **Cummings v. Bahr**, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) | 18, 20 | | **E.S. for G.S. v. Brunswick Inv. Ltd. P'ship**, 469 N.J. Super. 279, 298 (App. Div. 2021) | 14, 17 | | **Escobar-Barrera v. Kissin**, 464 N.J. Super. 224, 231 (App. Div. 2020) | 13 | | **Fusco v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Newark**, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 461 n.1 (App. Div. 2002) | 12 | | **Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean**, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) | 9 | | **Hoover v. Wetzler**, 472 N.J. Super. 230, 235 (App. Div. 2022) | 8 | | **In re Orchard Enters., Inc. S'holder Litig.**, 88 A.3d 1, 38 (Del. Ch. 2014) | 17 | | **Kornbleuth v. Westover**, 241 N.J. 289, 299, 301 (2020) | 8, 13 | | **Lawson v. Dewar**, 468 N.J. Super. 128, 134 (App. Div. 2021) | 18 | | **Lee v. Brown**, 232 N.J. 114, 126 (2018) | 20 | | **Manalapan Realty v. Manalapan Tp. Comm.**, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) | 10 | | **Metro Storage Int’l LLC v. Harron**, 275 A.3d 810, 822 (Del. Ch. 2022) | 17 | | **Moraes v. Wesler**, 439 N.J. Super. 375, 378 (App. Div. 2015) | 19 | | **Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment**, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015) | 8 | | **Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co.**, 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974) | 9, 10, 21 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants, electric light the most efficient policeman.
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.
[brief] Mercer County Superseding Indictment [...] charged [...] with: murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a (Count One); murder as an accomplice, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a and 2C:2-6 (Count Two); felony murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3) (Count Three); first-degree robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (Count Four); four counts of second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (Counts Five, Six, Seven, and Twelve); two counts of second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (Counts Eight and Nine); fourth-degree tampering with evidence (Count Ten); and first-degree robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 and 2C:5-1 (Count Eleven).
[brief] [...]  and [...] heard a “pop” from what they mistakenly thought was a party popper.  (6T68-7 to 14; 7T143-6 to 13).  Then they heard [...] scream or grunt as more gun shots rang out.  (6T68-14 to 15; 7T143-21 to 144-2).  [...] smelled gunpowder and there were bullet holes in the living room ceiling.  (6T68-20 to 25, 117-14 to 118-5; 7T145-2 to 10).  Defendant had shot his mother five times with his brother [...]’s Century Arms American Variant AK-47 semi-automatic rifle.  (7T79-11 to 23; 9T81-18 to 82-4).  One bullet entered the left side of [...]’s face and ripped through the soft tissue of her neck and jaw.  (9T76-6 to 77-5).  A second bullet struck her left collarbone, tearing through bone and soft tissue in her upper shoulder.  (9T77-19 to 78-16).  A third bullet grazed her skin.  (9T78-21 to 79-4).  A fourth bullet left gun residue on her clothing, indicating the rifle was fired in close range to [...]’s body.  (9T79-6 to 80-19).  A fifth bullet entered through [...]’s right arm and exited through her armpit.  (9T80-20 to 81-6).  [...] died from the significant bleeding caused by the multiple gunshot wounds.
[brief] Petitioner appealed his re-sentence.  By per curiam decision decided on March 31st 2022, this Court affirmed the re-sentencing, finding that the trial court followed the Supreme Court’s instructions on remand and because the resulting aggregate sentence did not shock the judicial conscience in light of the multiple crimes committed.  (Da 198).  Petitioner filed a petition for certification, which the New Jersey Supreme Court denied on October 7th 2022.  (Da 213).  Petitioner initially filed a petition for post-conviction relief on January 24th 2021.  (Da 214)  PCR counsel filed a brief on his behalf (Da 219).  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., heard argument on the petition on July 21st 2023.  (21T).  The court issued an oral decision and order denying the petition on the same date.  (21T6-18 to 20-4; Da 254).  The court entered an amended order, which modified the reasoning on the denial of the claim pertaining to counsel’s failure to call a specified witness (Da 255), and explanatory letter (Da 256), on August 4th 2023.  Petitioner filed an amended Notice of Appeal to this Court on September 18th 2023 (Da 257).
[brief] FARM MARKET  A facility used for the wholesale or retail marketing of the agricultural output of a farm, and products that contribute to farm income, except that if a farm market is used for retail marketing at least fifty-one percent (51%) of the annual gross sales of the retail farm market shall be generated from sales of agricultural output of the farm, or at least fifty-one percent (51%) of the sales area shall be devoted to the sale of the agricultural output of the farm.