ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] WHEREAS, the Attorney General has recognized that the public interest would be served by a review of the structure of the law enforcement community in New Jersey; WHEREAS, the Attorney General has informally assembled a group of individuals who, by virtue of their vast experience and expertise in the area of criminal law enforcement, are uniquely qualified to undertake this review; WHEREAS, the Attorney General finds that the public interest is furthered through formal memorialization of the membership and function of this group on this important public issue; NOW, THEREFORE, I, [...], ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and by the Statutes of this State, do hereby direct:  1.  The Attorney General Advisory Committee (“Committee”) is hereby established within the Department of Law and Public Safety to assist and advise the Attorney General on issues concerning the law enforcement structure of New Jersey; 2.  The membership of the Committee shall consist of the following individuals: a. Attorney General; b. [...]; c. [...]; d. [...]; e. [...]; f. [...]; 3.  The Attorney General shall act as the Chair of the Committee.  The Committee shall meet formally at regular intervals as directed by the Chair.  Meetings of the Committee shall also be scheduled within a reasonable time after the Chair’s receipt of a request for such a meeting by a majority of its members.  4.  The Chair of the Committee may establish such subcommittees as are necessary from time to time.  The members of such subcommittees shall be appointed by the Chair.  5.  The Committee shall prepare and issue such reports, studies and recommendations that it deems appropriate as a result of its review of the structure of the law enforcement community in New Jersey.  6.  The Attorney General shall in his discretion designate such support staff as may be necessary to assist the Committee in its mission.  7.  This Directive shall take effect immediately.  20th  Given under hand and seal, this day of December, in the Year of Our Lord, two thousand one, and the Independence of the United States, the two hundred and twenty-sixth.  [...]
[brief] On the same date, Defendant executed a mortgage in favor of [...] as Nominee for [...]  This mortgage was recorded on March 5, 2005 in the office of the Monmouth County Clerk in Book OR-8443, Page 1637, et seq.  (Pa 1-10)  On or about February 27, 2009, [...] as Nominee for [...] assigned the mortgage to [...] by an assignment of mortgage recorded on March 17, 2009 in the office of the Monmouth County Clerk in Book OR-8762, Page, 1598.(Pa 11-12)  On or about February 28, 2014, [...] s/b/m [...] assigned the mortgage to [...] ("Plaintiff") by an assignment of mortgage recorded on June 23, 2014 in the office of the Monmouth County Clerk in Book OR-9070, Page 364, et seq. (Pa 13-17)  On or about July 27, 2015, the Defendant entered into a loan modification agreement with Plaintiff.
[brief] This reference description will be used throughout this Brief.  The Property is bifurcated by a municipal boundary line, with the eastern one hundred eighteen (118) acres being in Mansfield, and the western ninety-eight (98) acres in Florence.  Ja072; 1T 30:1-3.  Only thirteen (13) of those ninety-eight (98) acres in Florence would be disturbed for development, while forty-four (44) acres in Mansfield would be developed.  Ja073-Ja073; 1T 30:1-3; 4T 8:5-25; 9:1.  The Mansfield side of the Property is in that municipality’s “ODL- Office, Distribution, Laboratory” Zoning District (“ODL”).  Ja029.  The Florence side of the Property is further bifurcated, with the portion bordering Mansfield being in the “SM-Special Manufacturing” Zoning District (“SM”), and the balance, west of the PSE&G easement, being in the “AG-Agricultural Zoning District. ”  Ja030; Ja073; 1T 32:8-14.  Warehouses and distribution facilities are permitted uses in both Mansfield’s ODL and Florence’s SM Zoning Districts, as are the requested accessory uses proposed on the Florence-portion of the tract.  Ja085; Ja097.  However, Florence limits building height in the SM Zone to thirty feet (30'), and Mansfield limits building height in the ODL Zone to fifty feet (50').  Ja025; Ja073; Ja097; Ja181.  Plaintiff’s proposed development is located entirely within the SM and ODL districts; no development is proposed in Florence’s Agricultural Zoning District.  Ja030.  Since the Property is bisected by a municipal boundary line, Plaintiff submitted land development applications to the Defendant and the [...].
[brief] In particular, the defendants in *Lott*, like the Defendants here, pointed to tax bills which defendants claimed should have put the plaintiff on notice of the error in the deed.  *Lott*, 2020 WL 7622039 at *4.  In affirming the trial court, the *Lott* Court specifically held as follows:  > [u]nlike the defendants’ myopic focus on the tax bills, the court properly considered the totality of the circumstances presented by the evidentiary record in its application of the objective standard.  See *Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Hum. Servs.*, 204 N.J. 320, 339 (2010) (explaining the court must evaluate the “totality of the circumstances” in determining the date of accrual of a cause of action under the discovery rule).  *Id.* at *8-9.
[brief] To establish a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must overcome a two-prong test developed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987).  The Strickland Court created a two-prong test wherein a reviewing court must determine whether (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and if so (2) whether there exists a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  The first prong of the Strickland/Fritz test is satisfied by showing that counsel’s acts or omissions fell “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance” considered in light of all the circumstances of the case.  Id. at 690.  There is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistances.  Id. at 689.  The Fritz court characterized the deference given to counsel under the first prong of Strickland/Fritz as “extreme.
[brief] The Trial Court’s decision should be Affirmed and costs should be awarded as the instant appeal is borderline frivolous given the prior decisions by this Court and others regarding the same fact pattern.  Nowhere is her papers does Appellant distinguish this case from any of the prior matters and present any reason for this Court to ignore those prior decisions and the reasonings behind them.  Dated November 4, 2024  Respectfully Submitted _____s/[...]_____  MITCHELL L. WILLIAMSON, Esq. (NJ Bar No. 01206189)  [...] Attorneys for Respondent [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
[brief] The Appellate Court must affirm the decision of the Trial Court affirming the Zoning Board and dismiss plaintiff’s claim with prejudice.  The Board’s memorializing resolution contains all necessary findings of fact and conclusions to support the Board’s decision.  The Board did not act arbitrary, capriciously or unreasonably and therefore, the decision of the Zoning Board must be upheld and affirmed.  **[...]**  Attorneys for Defendants Daniel and [...]  By: /s/[...], Esq.  MICHAEL W. HERBERT  Dated: July 26, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  [...] and [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...], DANIEL TOMARCHIO, LINDA TOMARCHIO, [...], [...], [...], [...] AND JOE SMITH  PARTNERSHIPS, Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] Id., 70 N.J. at 579-580.  In fact, [...] who dissented in Humane Society concluded that the [...] and other private interest groups had a much narrower interest in advocating the mission of their organizations that was unquestionably adverse to the interests of environmentalists and animal rights groups in conservation of fish and game, and that it was arbitrary and unreasonable to limit the membership of persons supposedly knowledgeable of and interested in the conservation of fish and game to sportsmen, farmers and commercial fishermen.  As [...] opined “To accept the majority’s reasoning that the plaintiffs’ interests may be represented by the Council because they are ‘sportsmen’, is like a suggestion that an umpire’s decision may be equally amenable to the effected parties because they all happen to be ‘baseball players’”.  Id. at 584.  Even though this dissenting opinion is not binding on the court, it does manifest that the Court was concerned with the policy underlying the Legislature’s earmarking of private special-interest groups for a favored status in a regulatory agency.
[brief] Pb 51. rule "forbids the admission into evidence of an expert's conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence or other data."  Id. at 53-54.  Here, there were no facts that were "admitted" or "proved" to support [...]'s opinion that various transactions were unauthorized by plaintiff [...] and, therefore, constituted misappropriations.  The trial court's decision to allow such testimony constituted an abuse of discretion, warranting reversal.
[brief] *Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg*, 736 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir.1984).  The burden of proof requires Respondents to show proximate cause between the municipal, practice or custom and the specific constitutional right being violated.  *Bielevicz v. Dubinion*, 915 F.2d 845, 830 (3d Cir., 1990).  A policy, practice or custom of the municipality must exist to hold it liable.  Obviously, a resolution passed by City Council or the implementation of City Ordinances would satisfy this requirement.  *Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati*, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1294 (1986); *Owen v. City of Independence*, 100 S.Ct. 1398 (1980); *Chambers v. City of Los Angeles*, 762 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1985).  It is important to note that the policy, ordinance, regulation or decision must be adopted or promulgated by the local entity.  A local government’s mere enforcement of state or federal law, as opposed to express incorporation or adoption of those laws into local regulations is insufficient to establish *Monell* liability.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE THE TESTIMONY OF THE DEFENSE LIABILITY EXPERT (6T48:9-16; 8T33:2-25)  ..............................................................................................26  A.  [...] Has Sufficient Expertise to Offer His Testimony...........29  B.  [...]’s Testimony Was Sufficiently Reliable..........................31  C.  [...]’s Testimony Concerns a Subject Matter that is Beyond the Ken of the Average Juror.................................................................36  POINT THREE ......................................................................................................................39
[brief] **28A.**  At the time the Defendant provided care and treatment to Plaintiff, Defendant was practicing in the specialties of pulmonology and critical care.  **22A.**  Following Defendant graduating from Medical School, she completed a residency in internal medicine and a pulmonary and critical care fellowship.  **28A.**  Given that [...] and Defendant did not share the same medical specialty, held different Board Certifications and otherwise, did not meet same the kind-for-kind requirement, by way of letter dated October 14, 2019, Defendant objected to [...]’s AOM.
[brief] *Achev v. Cellco Partnership*, 475 N.J. Super. 446, 454 (App. Div. 2023) (citing *Vasquez v. Glassboro Serv. Ass’n, Inc.*, 83 N.J. 86, 98 (1980)).  “An arbitration clause may be invalidated . . . if there is unconscionability. ”  Id. (citing Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289, 304 (2016); Rent-a-Ctr., W., Inc., v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010)).  The determination of unconscionability involves both procedural and substantive elements.
[brief] State v. Cuff, 239 N.J. 321 (2019).  However, the Court remanded the matter to the Law Division for re-sentencing, holding, “[i]n sentencing defendant to consecutive terms for offenses committed within a single Criminal episode…the trial court set forth findings that do not satisfy State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985) warranting a remand for resentencing with respect to those offenses. ”  Ibid.  The Court retained jurisdiction and specifically cautioned that in addition to reconsidering these consecutive sentences, the trial court’s “focus should be on the fairness of the overall sentence. ”  Id., at 352. (quoting State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 121 (1987).  Thus, the Supreme Court ordered that “[i]n re-sentencing defendant on remand, the trial court should consider the fairness of the aggregate sentence imposed for the eighteen offenses as to which defendant's convictions have been affirmed. ”  Ibid.  The Court noted further that it did "not foreclose the parties from making any argument on remand regarding the court's imposition of consecutive or concurrent sentences" on any of the charges.  Id. at 352 n.9.  D.
[directive] This Directive promulgates a revised Criminal Pretrial Memorandum form and of reissues the Written Acknowledgment (Notice Trial) form.  Both forms were originally promulgated 2002 by Directive #5-02 ("Pretrial Memorandum 3:9-1); Written in (R. Acknowledgment (R. 16)").  The attached forms supersede these earlier versions, and 3: should be used effective immediately.
[brief] The courtyard was not and has never been lined, marked, or signed as a parking area, nor are --- 2  In 1972, the [...] owned two nearby vacant parcels (Lot 6 and Lot 10) that were used for parking.  Lot 6 was later sold by the [...] and has been occupied by housing.  Lot 10 remains vacant and owned by [...].  there any drive aisles or fire lanes (Da5; Da13-22; Da31).  The Sixth Street courtyard is regularly used for assembly recreation and transversed by the students.  At the same time, the courtyard was regularly being driven into haphazardly by Lot 8 vehicles.  As there are no aisles or marked spaces, and the vehicles would park in all directions.  The situation was, and continues to be, chaotic and present obvious and continuing hazards and concerns as to the safety of the students and access for fire or emergency vehicles (1T11-4 to 20:1T30-8 to 34-14).  [...] efforts to block and/or control this parking resulted in the [...] filing a Complaint and Order to Show Cause in November 2012 in the Chancery Division in Docket No.: [...].
[brief] On March 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Amended Schedule A, B and C in the Bankruptcy.  *(Da146)*  Plaintiff listed an “Auto Accident claim from accident of 8/6/2015, valued at $45,000.00”.  *(Da226)*  Plaintiff claimed two exemptions of $9,041.00 and $25,150.00.  (Da227-228)  Plaintiff represented that she did not have any other claims against third parties.  (Da225)  On May 3, 2021, [...] prepared a Settlement Statement for the UIM Claim for $45,000.00 showing [...]’s lien was $12,067.91.  (Da233)  On May 25, 2021, Plaintiff filed Amended Schedules A, B and C listing the 8/6/2016 Accident as exempt property but did not list [...] when asked if she had any “Claims against third parties. ”  (Da240-241; Da225)  J. [...]’s Fee Application and [...]’s Claim
[brief] N.J.S.A. 58:11A-10; see also N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(a).  To satisfy this requirement, [...] relies on the process set forth in N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(a), which establishes a rebuttable presumption that when activities are located in a sewer service area, they are consistent with the Areawide WQM Plan.  N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(b).  [...]’s comprehensive and separate robust water quality programs allow a WQMP consistency determination under N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(b) to focus on whether the project is in the sewer service area.  Beyond this sewer service area inquiry, [...] also ensures there is no conflict with an Areawide WQM Plan through separate regulatory programs, including, relevant here, the NJPDES and Stormwater programs.
[brief] In that regard, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that “exclusions are presumptively valid and will be given effect if ‘specific, plain, clear, prominent, and not contrary to public policy. ’”  Princeton Ins. Co. v. Chunmuang, 151 N.J. 80, 95 (1997), quoting Doto v. Russo, 140 N.J. 544, 559 (1995).
[brief] While officers must scrupulously honor a suspect's invocation of his or her rights, they have no obligation to re-Mirandize if statements are made spontaneously by a defendant.  State v. Fuller, 118 N.J. 75, 85 (1990) (“[I]n defendant-initiated conversation following the exercise of the right to silence, the police need not readminister the Miranda warnings as an indispensable element of their duty scrupulously to honor that right. ”).
[brief] In an attempt to avoid the consequences of the Law Division’s analysis, Plaintiff raises theoretical and unsubstantiated concerns about the impact that such a provision may have on “efficient, cost effective, and prompt” judicial outcomes (Pb19).  Not only are Plaintiff’s parade of horribles entirely speculative, 3 but glaringly 2Plaintiff argues in his brief that [...] did not “precisely admit one way or the other if Respondent generally agreed” with the trial court’s interpretation.  (Pb19).  Not so.  (T38:21-24 (“[S]o I would agree with Your Honor, as to how you’re reading it.  Um, in a sense that that would eliminate the claims splitting concerns that were raised by the plaintiff. ”)).  3In his brief, Plaintiff argues that [...] could “toy” with Plaintiff, or even get a “sneak preview” of the arbitrator before deciding it wanted to “pull the plug” on the arbitration.  (Pb20).  But the Agreement does not give [...] the ability to “pull the plug” on an arbitration, only to file an action to “collect monies. ”  This strained and hypothetical example thus makes no sense and does nothing to advance Plaintiff’s policy arguments regarding efficiency or judicial burden.  absent from Plaintiff’s submission is any explanation of why the Agreement’s dispute resolution provision creates any threat necessitating Court intervention to invalidate the provisions of an arms-length private contract.
[brief] fees are not subject to the scrutiny required of fees sought via a fee application and are dwarfed by the at least $8.1+ million\textsuperscript{8} in fees [...] claims to have incurred since the 2016 judgment was awarded.  [...] also argues that both [...] and the Chancery Court had sufficient time and ability to review the Global Fee Application.  Obviously, that is false.  The Chancery Court could never have carefully and critically reviewed the 5,485.1 hours of legal work included in the Global Fee Application.  The Chancery Court’s short and conclusory oral opinion makes clear that no critical review took place, and it was unreasonable for Plaintiff to expect the Chancery Court would have sufficient time to properly review his prodigious submission.
[brief] The alleged disciplinary action as alleged by Plaintiff, is simply insufficient to establish a cause of action under the NJLAD.  The unpublished decisions cited by Plaintiff-Appellant do not support the argument that Plaintiff established an adverse employment action.  Plaintiff-Appellant mischaracterizes the holding in Roa v. Roa, in an effort to support Plaintiff-Appellant’s unfounded argument that the “scope of unlawful retaliatory conduct under the LAD is broader than the employment relates acts prohibited with regard to discrimination claims under the LAD. ” (Pb25).  Plaintiff-Appellant misstates the holding in Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555 (2010).  In the matter of Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 574 (2010), the New Jersey Supreme Court held the following:
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[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ..................................................  III  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................ IV  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ......................................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................................  4  I.  THE EVENTS OF OCTOBER 6, 2021 ........................................................................ 4  II.  THE [...] DEFENDANTS .....................................................................................  5  III.  [...] .......................................................................................................  7  IV.  DEFENDANTS’ DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS ....................................................  7  V.  THE [...] DEFENDANTS’ LACK OF INTEREST IN THE TRUTH ......................  13  VI.  AFTERMATH OF THE DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS ........................................  14  ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................  15  I.  [...] EXPLICITLY ENDORSED NEUWIRTH AS CONTROLLING AUTHORITY IN HARMONY WITH THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, CONTRARY TO DEFENDANTS’ MISDIRECTION ...........................................................................  15  II.  [...]  PROPERLY ANALYZED AND APPLIED  NEUWIRTH ..........  17  III.  THE AMENDED COMPLAINT  SUFFICIENTLY PLEADS ACTUAL MALICE  BECAUSE THE WILD STORY REPUBLISHED BY THE [...] DEFENDANTS WAS “WHOLLY UNBELIEVABLE” ...........................................................................  20  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................  26
[brief] ATTORNEY, ASSERTION THAT THE CHANCERY COURT DETERMINATION THAT AN EASEMENT FOR PARKING EXISTS IS DETERMINATIVE ON THE OFF-SITE PARKING USE BEING A LEGAL NONCONFORMING USE AND THE BOARD SHOULD HAVE DEFERRED ITS DECISION --- WAS WITHOUT MERIT (RAISED BEFORE ZONING BOARD  Da68 AND BEFORE TRIAL COURT  Da270)  [...] primary position at the Zoning Board hearing (Da62) and at Trial was that the determination by the Chancery Court --- that the 1963 Agreement created an easement allowing for Lot 8 staff/attendees to park on portions of Lot 5 and that use has not been abandoned (Da29) --- is somehow conclusive on the Zoning issue as to whether such off-site parking use/facility on Lot 5 is now a legal use, or a legally established nonconforming use.  There really should be no serious debate that an off-site parking use/facility for another property/use on a fully-occupied school property having about 400 students (operating under a 1972 Variance and Site Plan Approval because its own parking availability on site was deficient) is not a currently permitted second use on the School property (Da1, Da268).  That the school courtyard asserted as this off-site parking Lot does not have marked parking spaces, or drive aisles, no fire lanes, and is used chaotically by cars driving and parked in all directions, transversed by school children at the school building exit/entry, makes any claim of zoning authority or approval illogical and invalid.