ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See State v. Mendez, 252 N.J. Super. 155, 161-162 (App. Div. 1991) (spraying a machine gun into a crowd does not support an instruction on a lesser manslaughter offense); State v. Sanchez, 224 N.J. Super. 231, 242-243 (App. Div. 1991) (close-range maliciously-fired shotgun blast into face, neck and chest does not warrant aggravated manslaughter instruction, but court noted the “fine line” ordinarily present between the culpable mental states for murder and aggravated manslaughter).  In other words, it is the very rare homicide that charging a lesser included form of manslaughter is not the appropriate course of action.  This was not that rare homicide.
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[brief] She refers to the next of kin chart, Exhibit 4, which is referenced in her report (P-7, Pa208) (3T10).  Enclosed with her report is a Certification of Exhibits dated August 29, 2018.  She testifies that [...], [...], and [...] were shareholders of [...] (3T9).  The chart referenced in [...]’s Report as P-8 is also entered in evidence (3T10).  She was tasked with identifying the heirs of the three individuals who were identified in the 1908 Certificate of Incorporation as the shareholders of [...] (3T17:15).  [...] continues to testify as to title (3T42:24).
[brief] Second, the allegations regarding the [...]’ motives to “drum[] up support” without regard to the “harm” they might cause [...] say nothing about their knowledge of falsity but present a theory of “bad or corrupt motive” which does not support a theory of actual malice.  Neuwirth, 476 N.J. Super. at 392 (quoting Marchiano v. Sandman, 178 N.J. Super. 171, 174 (App. Div. 1981)).  See also Newton, 2014 WL 3928500, at *4 (“Mere conclusory allegations of ‘[s]pite, hostility, hatred, or the deliberate intent to harm demonstrate possible motives for making a statement, but not publication with a reckless disregard for its truth. ”) (quoting Lynch, 161 N.J. at 166–67).  Third, [...]’s bald characterization of the [...]’ statements as “likely false” and “unbelievable,” Da_023-25, are conclusory and insufficient.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 39:4-88, and reckless driving under N.J.S.A. 39:4-96.  (Da1-3\(^2\).)  Within a week of the arrest, on June 8, 2021, Defendant filed a motion to suppress based upon the stop, the arrest, and the Alcotest.  (Da4-5.)  The suppression motion was not heard until July 17, 2022.  (1T.)  The municipal court took testimony on the motion to suppress from [...] beginning on July 17, 2022.  (1T5:6.)  Officer Pittius had two years of experience with the [...], which meant at the time of [...]’s arrest, Officer Pittius was within his first year with [...].  (1T6:4-9; 1T8:17-19.)  Officer Pittius only briefly had training in standard field sobriety testing.  (1T7:16-21; 1T8:1-6.)  As of the day of the motion, Officer Pittius had been involved in about twenty DWI arrests.  (1T8:7-9.)  On the early morning hours of May 30, 2021, Officer Pittius’ attention was drawn to a pickup truck that “start[ed] to list over to the left over the solid yellow line in the left lane of Route nine. ”  (1T9:18-10:2; 10:11-14.)  He testified he decided to pull over the vehicle because, “[a]t one point it actually drifted into the grass median before it regained it’s lane in the far left lane. ”  (1T11:7- --- \(^2\)  The term “1T” refers to the Transcript of Proceedings, dated July 13, 2022; the term “2T” refers to the Transcript of Proceedings, dated August 17, 2022; the term “3T” refers to the transcript of Trial De Novo, dated June 19, 2023; and the term “Da” refers to Defendant [...]’s Appendix in Support of Appeal.
[brief] See Gennari v Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 NJ 582, 610 (1997).  As indicated in the Procedural History and Statement of Facts above, Plaintiff intentionally misrepresented a critical fact which Defendant relied upon and which led to the wrongful imposition of penalties on Defendant by the Courts.  It is undisputed that Plaintiff represented to Defendant in their Agreement, “As [...] does not have access to such funds then [...] shall front load the down payment required for closing. ”  Plaintiff admitted that she had access to the funds (and, in fact, had access to considerably more than the required funds).  Plaintiff knew that she had these funds, but intentionally lied and hid this fact for more than seven years.  There is no question that Plaintiff intended Defendant to rely upon her misrepresentation.  She admitted same in her testimony during trial.  Obviously, Defendant relied upon Plaintiff’s representation and, in fact, front loaded the deposit that Plaintiff stated that she did not have.  Further, Plaintiff admitted in testimony that Defendant relied upon that representation.  Last, but not least, the Defendant suffered damages as he was penalized by the Court in the amount of over $227,000.00 as the Court below ignored the fact that Plaintiff lied, cheated and deceived and was actually in possession of the monies she claimed she had not received from Defendant.  2.  THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE AS IT APPLIES TO THE INITIAL TRIAL COURT DECISION AND THE APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE INITIAL COURT
[brief] On June 15, 2022, Plaintiffs [...] and [...] (“Plaintiffs”) initiated this litigation through the filing of a Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause against [...], [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively the “Defendants”), asserting, among other things, that [...] does not have the authority to impose any building restrictions on Plaintiffs’ Property located in the [...] community.  (Da1-34).  Relevant here is Count 1, asserting *ultra vires* action by [...] in promulgating and enforcing a rule restricting the height of buildings in the [...] community.  On July 15, 2022, [...], [...], and [...] moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint.  On August 26, 2022, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Order to Show Cause, (Da329), and granted the motion to dismiss in part and without prejudice.  (Da331).  In doing so, the trial court dismissed all claims against [...] and [...], and Counts 4 through 6 against [...].  Following the decision on the motion to dismiss, the parties engaged in some limited written discovery.  On May 1, 2023, the trial court entered a case management order establishing deadlines for completion of written and expert discovery, but did not set a fact discovery end date.  (Da338).  Prior to the conclusion of fact discovery, and before the taking of a single fact or expert deposition, Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Counts 1 and 2 against [...].  (Da339).  On July 25, 2023, [...] filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the same counts, primarily raising procedural arguments that Plaintiffs had failed to name an indispensable party ([...]) as a defendant and that discovery was incomplete.  (Da508).  On August 17, 2023, after hearing argument,\(^1\) the trial court granted Plaintiffs partial summary judgment as to Count 1 and declared that only Plaintiffs’ Property “is not subject to the building height restrictions adopted by” [...] “or its predecessor-in-interest and therefore the height restriction is unenforceable as to” Plaintiffs’ Property.  (Da853-854).  In the next paragraph of the Order, however, the trial court confirmed that Plaintiffs remain subject to the restrictive covenants in the Genesis Deed.  (Da854).  The trial court also denied [...]’s cross-motion for summary judgment.  (Da856).  \(^{1}\) “1T” refers to the transcript of the August 3, 2023 oral argument on Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and [...]’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment.
[brief] This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Rule 4:14-2(c), which applies to depositions of organizations, states that an organization may be named in a deposition notice, but that the organization “must designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf[.]”  *R. 4:14-2(c).*  Neither [...] nor [...] has designated [...] as a corporate representative, further supporting that Plaintiff’s deposition notice for [...]’s deposition is improper.  Critically, Plaintiff has acknowledged that he is *not* seeking testimony from [...] as a director of the corporate Defendants, but rather in his individual capacity.
[brief] ”  Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 402.  “It also bears noting that reviewing courts do not employ a purely objective test when determining whether the State proved voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  Id.  The voluntariness of the juvenile’s confession must be evaluated from the juvenile’s perspective.  State in the Interest of Q.N., 179 N.J. 165 (2004).  Thus, the [...] court held “the motion court should have considered the unrebutted defense testimony regarding [...]’s personal intellectual, educational, and cognitive limitations.  Here, the uncontradicted testimony was that [...] went to a school for children with autism and multiple disabilities.
[brief] Pa72.  Plaintiff filed a third (3rd) motion to reconsider which was summarily denied by Order dated December 17, 2021.  Pa77.  This final motion was apparently filed for the express purpose of padding the record with a certification from a non-board-certified psychologist whose sense of professional ethics was flexible enough to permit him to perform DMEs with recording devices contrary to the recommendations of the governing bodies for his professed (although uncertified) field of practice.  [...], to the contrary, as one would expect from any board-certified practitioner in the field of Neuropsychology, adheres to the recommendations of his field of specialty and the literature supports his position.  Pa32, Pa47 & Da39.
[brief] Appellate Division Order and Decision .........................................................1221a 8/17/2022  Supreme Court of New Jersey Order and Decision.................................1252a 3/09/23  Amended Order Granting Defendants’ motion to bar the testimony of [...].............................................................................................................1280a 3/09/2023  Notice of Appeal.................................................................................................1297a POINT I THE TRIAL COURT MADE NUMEROUS ERRORS OF FACT ACTING AS A REBUTTAL EXPERT TO [...] AND CONTESTING THE FACTS ESTABLISHED BY [...] (1282a-1296a)
[brief] It is well-settled that appropriate and proper jury charges are essential in a criminal case to assure a fair trial.  *State v. Reddish*, 181 N.J. 553, 613, 859 A.2d 1173 (2004); *State v. Green*, 86 N.J. 281, 287, 430 A.2d 914 (1981).  When a defendant identifies an error in the charge, we must evaluate the charge in its entirety.  *State v. Figueroa*, 190 N.J. 219, 246, 919 A.2d 826 (2007); *State v. Wilbely*, 63 N.J. 420, 422, 307 A.2d 608 (1973).  Although a flawed jury charge is a poor candidate for rehabilitation or the application of the harmless error rule, *State v. Simon*, 79 N.J. 191, 206, 398 A.2d 861 (1979), a defendant must still demonstrate that the error affected the outcome of the jury's deliberations.  *State v. Jordan*, 147 N.J. 409, 422, 688 A.2d 97 (1997).  When a defendant fails to object to the alleged error at trial, we must apply the plain error standard of review.  Here, defendant failed to object to the charge; therefore, we must determine whether any error contributed to an unjust and unwarranted result.
[brief] This Appeal is scheduled to be heard in conjunction with the Appeal of the Chancery Easement Opinion/Order.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE SCHOOL’S APPLICATION/APPEAL TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF THE SYNAGOGUE’S OFF-SITE PARKING USE OF THE SCHOOL LOT 5 AS A NONCONFORMING USE WAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE ZONING BOARD AS PER N.J.S.A. 40:55-68 (RAISED BELOW BEFORE ZONING BOARD  Da1 AND TRIAL COURT  Da270)
[brief] In the initial complaint, plaintiff [...] alleged that her father [...] was admitted to [...] for rehabilitation after a hospitalization and surgery due to his sustaining a hip fracture from a fall at home, from February 27, 2020 through April 18, 2020, when he passed away as a consequence of contracting COVID-19.  (Da11-30.)  On December 6, 2022, defendants answered the complaint, enclosing a certification of good cause to change the track assignment from Track II, “Personal Injury” to Track III, Case Type 604 “Medical Malpractice” or Case Type 607 “Professional Malpractice”.  (Da35-57.)  By way of correspondence dated December 6, 2022, plaintiff’s counsel requested an extension of time to obtain an AOM.  (Da58-59.)  On January 17, 2023, a consent order was filed extending the time for plaintiff to serve an AOM to April 5, 2023.  (Da60-62.)  By order filed February 3, 2023, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint because plaintiff’s claims were barred by the immunity from civil liability for healthcare professionals and facilities providing medical services in response to the outbreak of COVID-19 during the public health emergency afforded by the New Jersey Governor’s Executive Orders and New Jersey’s Laws of 2020, ch. 18.
[brief] I, [...], came to New Jersey with a childhood friend to visit family and friends.  . . .  During the trip [...] and [...] went to the [...] to gamble.  As soon as we walked in, all I remember was the table slamming.  I had a gun on me which [...] didn't know about, and my P[...]D kicked in.\textsuperscript{[8]}  All I remember was . . . a loud bang, and a bunch of big men moving around.  I yelled for everyone not to move, but the victim, [...], charged for my weapon.  I let a shot off hitting him by accident.  I had no intention on killing the victim.  (Da 58; 10T 29-8 to 30-4)
[brief] And [...]’s testimony, that defendant called looking for .40 caliber and 9-millimeter bullets because he “empt[ied] the whole clip. ” (6T33-3 to 24; 6T61-2 to 5), was corroborated by the casings and projectiles recovered from the scene. (2T92-15 to 98-17; 6T215-20 to 216-8).  Notably, due to the ongoing investigation, the details of the shooting had not been made public at the time [...] spoke to police.  (6T23-3 to 25-9).  In regard to [...], her statement that defendant asked to borrow her car the night of the shooting was corroborated by the testimony that [...]’s vehicle observed on the surveillance had been lent out that night.  (3T37-20 to 25).  Moreover, defendant’s statements to [...] that the car he was in ran red lights and that the gun and his phone had been recovered by police, (6T83-9 to 14), aligned with [...]’s testimony that the vehicle did run a red light on surveillance, (6T167-1 to 13), the recovery of a phone from defendant, (6T167-1 to 169-11), and the recovery of the handgun from the beach in Seabreeze.  (2T144-10 to 145-13; 6T226-2 to 14).  Thus, while the presence or absence of corroboration is but one of fifteen Gross factors, here, this factor supported the reliability of both statements.
[brief] Under N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43, accidental disability retirement benefits may be conferred when a member of PERS “is permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the performance of his regular or assigned duties. ”  Ibid.  In Richardson v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen’s Retirement System, 192 N.J. 189 (2007), the Supreme Court set forth a five-prong test that an applicant must satisfy to qualify for accidental disability retirement benefits: 1. that he is permanently and totally disabled; 2. as a direct result of a traumatic event that is a. identifiable as to time and place, b. undesigned and unexpected, and c. caused by a circumstance external to the member (not the result of pre-existing disease that is aggravated or accelerated by the work); 3. that the traumatic event occurred during and as a result of the member’s regular or assigned duties; 4. that the disability was not the result of the member’s willful negligence; and 5. that the member is mentally or physically incapacitated from performing his usual or any other duty.
[brief] In this election, electronic voting machine ballots cast on Election Day were tallied by the Fire District staff whereas the results of mail-in ballot totals came from the Board of Elections.  (1T79:1-11; 1T80:15-17).  For the results of in-person votes cast via electronic voting machine, at the end of election night, “each polling location calls in their [vote] totals” to [...], the Financial Clerk of the Fire District, at the Fire District office.  (1T78:18-20; 1T79:8-9).  Halliwell then placed the called-in results into an Excel spreadsheet and added up the vote totals.  (1T79:8-11).  For in-person electronic voting machines, each machine keeps a physical record print out, “tapes,” of each ballot cast.  (1T79:12-17).  As [...], a Fire District Commissioner and the Clerk of the Board of Fire, testified, the final election results are obtained by machines that print out “. . . receipts at the end of the election. ” (1T59:7-8).  Those receipts have the number of votes with the candidates’ names.  (1T59:7-14).  Here, the machine printed three total receipts.  (1T62:2-7).  However, as Krohn testified, “the machines . . . only print the write-ins on the third receipt, not the first or the second. ” (1T62:2-5).  These print-out physical tapes from the polling site were delivered to the Halliwell at the Fire District.
[brief] Plaintiff’s initial Complaint against Defendants, filed on September 13, 2021 referenced the 2018 and 2019 Contracts, but not the 2016 Contract.  (AA001-032)  On January 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed the 5 Count First Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”): Count 1 – Consumer Finance Licensing Act - N.J.S.A. §17:11c-1 et. seq.; Usury - N.J.S.A. §17:11c-41 (Unlicensed Lender and Usury); Count 2 - (RICO - N.J.S.A. §2C:41-1); Count 3 - N.J. Truth in Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act N.J.S.A. §56:12-14 et. seq. (TCCWNA); Count 4 – N.J. Consumer Fraud Act N.J.S.A. §56:8-1 (CFA); and Count 5 (common law misrepresentation and fraud).  (AA033-065; Da092-100; Da020)  Each count seeks damages, costs, attorneys fees and other relief as is equitable and just.  The “Facts” and the 5 Counts of the Complaint reference the 2018 and 2019 Contracts but only mention the 2016 Contract in Count 5.  (Da090-100)  The Complaint alleged that, in January 2019, Plaintiff paid $7,043.92 to [...] for the 2018 and 2019 Contract and that after the second part of the case settled in 2021, Plaintiff was forced to incur costs and attorneys fees to defend against [...] asserting an additional lien of $12,067.91.  (Da003)  Although the Complaint claims Defendants charged 64% interest, there are no details about the 2016 Contract and the Complaint does not reference the accrual rates in any of the Contracts.  (Da094)  L.  The Parties File Multiple Motions for Summary Judgment
[brief] Aster v. Shoreline Behavioral Health 346 N.J. Super. 536 (App. Div. 2002).........................................................21  A.T. v. Cohen, 231 N.J. 337 (2017)..............................................14–16, 18 Barreiro v. Morais, 318 N.J. Super. 461 (App. Div. 1999)..........................23  Burns v. Belafsky 166 N.J. 466 (2001).............................................25  Conrad v. Michelle & John, Inc., 394 N.J. Super.1 (App. Div. 2017)...............7  Crews v. Garmoney, 141 N.J. Super. 93 (App. Div. 1976)..........................8  Dept. of Law Public Safety v. Bigham, 119 N.J.  646, 651 (1990)...................25 Douglass v. Obade, 359 N.J. Super. 159 (2003).......................................6 Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic, 178 N.J. 144 (2003)............................passim Galik v. Clara Maass Medical Center, 167 N. J. 341 (2001).......................5, 11 Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387 (2001)..............................................5 Mayfield v. Community Med. Assocs, P.A. 335 N.J. Super. 198 (App. Div. 2000).........................................................6 Meehan v. Antonellis, 226 N.J. 216 (2016)..........................................10 Moschella v. Hackensack Meridian Jersey Shore Univ. Med. Ctr., No. A-7-23 (N.J. Jul. 11, 2024)..............................................10, 14, 15 Office of the Governor, News Release 1 (June 29, 1995)............................5 Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J. 389 (2001)...............................5, 6 Paragon Contractors, Inc. v. Peachtree condo. Ass’n, 202 N.J. 415 (2010)........15 Saunders ex. rel. Saunders v. Capital Health Sys. At Mercer, 398 N.J. Super. 500, A.2d 142 (App. Div. 2008)...........................................14 Sheeran v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 80 N.J. 548 (1979).................................25 Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2005).........................7 Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245 (1982).........................................................8 STATUTES New Jersey Court Rule 4:5B-4 .................................................................13, 14 N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 ..............................................................................6, 8, 22 N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 .............................................................................13, 21–25 TABLE OF CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX New Jersey Department of Health Certificate of Death for [...], issued March 13, 2023………………………………………C1a State of New Jersey, Cumberland County Surrogate’s Court Letters of Administration Ad Prosequendum, filed March 21, 2023……………C2a Judgment Granting Administration Ad Prosequendum…………………………C3a
[brief] For example, our courts have found that a defendant’s “lengthy juvenile record, his adult record including violations of parole and probation, [and] his failure to respond to any rehabilitative programs” were proper factors for which to assess the applicability of aggravating factor three. ”  *Dunbar*, 108 N.J. at 96-97.  Moreover, “to support a finding of aggravating factor three, the record must contain evidence demonstrating a likelihood of re-offense – be it expert testimony, or the defendant's criminal history, lack of remorse, premeditation, or other competent evidence.
[brief] The public policy of this State to promote worker safety weighs against insurance coverage for claims like those in *Laidlow*, *Millison*, *Mull*, and *Crippen*.  With the “deterrence attributable to financial responsibility” removed, *Montes*, 76 N.J. at 483, employers are more likely to engage in actions that increase profits and efficiency and to disregard the substantial certainty that their actions will injure their employees.  Where insurance will indemnify the costs of the wrongful conduct, worker safety may take a back seat to productivity and profit.  On the other hand, the uninsured financial risk of failing to give adequate attention to worker safety is an incentive for employers to prevent employee injuries.