ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Aa461).  The motion should have been denied for that reason alone.  Additionally, [...] moved for a declaratory judgment arguing that same results in a forfeiture of all mines paid.  There was no case cited.  The remedy is for a jury and not a court on summary judgment.  [...] claimed unjust enrichment and that Plaintiff was entitled to nothing.  There was no precise description of the benefits, and any determination was to be made by a jury and not by the court.  Finally, [...] alleged breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Again, this is a jury question.  [...] claimed isolated incidents of fraud which a jury would need to evaluate to determine the remedy.  The court articulated no findings or conclusions.  It claimed the motion was unopposed.  It wasn’t and even it was unopposed there was no basis to decide the matter in defendant’s favor.  Conclusion
[brief] In Untermann v. Untermann, 19 N.J. 507 (1955), the Supreme Court provided the following guidance as to the doctrine’s applicability:  It is the effect of the inequitable conduct on the total transaction which is determinative whether the maxim shall or shall not be applied.  Facades of the problem should not be examined piecemeal.  Where fraudulent conduct vitiates in important particulars the situation in respect to which judicial redress is sought, a court should not hesitate to apply the maxim.  However, the maxim has its limitations, it is “not an arbitrary rule and calls for the exercise of just discretion” by the court.  Id. at 518.  The essence of that doctrine, which is “discretionary on the part of the court,” Heuer v. Heuer, 152 N.J. 226, 238, (1998), is that “[a] suitor in equity must come into court with clean hands and he must keep them clean after his entry and throughout the proceedings.
[brief] The published “interchange rates” referred to in Defendant’s Merchant Application are the upper limit that [...] can charge to Merchant Customers who opt for the “Interchange PLUS” pricing.  Otherwise, the Merchant Application Form, which is the only portion of the Agreement between [...] and its Merchant Customers including a specific agreement to the payment of specific consideration for [...]’s services, would be rendered effectively meaningless.  (Pa000122).  17.  Nevertheless, throughout the proposed Class Period, Defendants have unilaterally and arbitrarily increased the “Interchange PLUS” pricing model by arbitrarily increasing the rate far above the “interchange rates” published by the major credit card issuers, while at the same time arbitrarily increasing the “discount fees” they charge their Merchant Customers, through the use of surreptitious “bill stuffers.
[brief] There is really only one undisputed fact involved in the essential employee motion and Respondent has admitted this fact in its pleadings and throughout its briefing:  Decedent was a full-time school teacher for the Respondent during the period of occupational exposure, i.e. January 2021, until her death on May 18, 2021.  (See Ra, Vol. I, pages 1–3).  The balance of the essential employee motion involved statutory construction, evaluation of Executive Orders, and directives from the N.J. Department of Health, all properly the subject of judicial notice.  There are no genuine issues of material fact and no issues of fact have been alleged in Respondent’s subsequent filing for Motion for Leave and in Respondent’s current letter brief.  The determination by the Workers’ Compensation Judge of Petitioner’s motion was clearly decided as a matter of law.  The Judge of Compensation correctly decided the motion declaring that Decedent was an essential employee and this decision should be affirmed.
[brief] Pa822-Pa824.  They contend that [...] was not properly notified that it had been unenrolled from the [...], and therefore the [...] general liability coverage afforded by [...] should have covered [...].  Pa822-Pa824.  The trial court correctly ruled in favor of [...] and [...] on the coverage issue.  [...] and [...] sued [...] for (inter alia) professional negligence.  Pa11.  Generally speaking, [...] and [...] allege that [...] owed a duty to [...] to notify [...] that it had not been enrolled in the [...].  Pa11.  [...] and [...] produced the expert report of [...] to support their claims against [...].  Pa811-Pa829.  [...] produced the expert report of [...] to support their defenses to Plaintiffs’ claims.  Pa831-Pa842.  The trial court correctly found that “there is no theory under which [...] can be held responsible for the money [...] and [...] spent to defend and settle the [...]. ”  Pa2753.  **LEGAL STANDARD**
[brief] IV.  [...] Fails to Address its Unclean Hands in Manufacturing a “Deadlock” by Rejecting its Own Proposed Arbitrator After Securing [...]’s Agreement.  The second error [...] raised on appeal is the trial court finding that [...] had proven a deadlock existed that allowed for judicial intervention under Section 5 of the FAA and its New Jersey statutory equivalent.  See e.g. BP Expl. Libya Ltd. v. ExxonMobil Libya Ltd., 689 F.3d 481, 492 (5th Cir. 2012) (allowing court intention when the parties “have reached an impenetrable deadlock over the appointment of arbitrators to hear their dispute. ”); *Int'l Bancshares Corp. v. Ochoa*, 311 F. Supp. 3d 876, 878 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (allowing court to appoint arbitrator where “there is some mechanical breakdown in the arbitrator selection process.  A mechanical breakdown occurs when the arbitration agreement cannot be enforced at all. ”); *In re Salomon Inc.*, 68 F.3d at 544 (holding court may appoint arbitrator if there is a “mechanical breakdown in the arbitrator selection process. ”)  As [...] detailed in its initial submission, [...] had proposed *inter alia* retired Superior Court Judge [...] as an arbitrator, who [...] accepted, only for [...] to immediately backtrack, refuse to arbitrate before Judge Donio, and instead ultimately file the action giving rise to this appeal.  Pb21-22.  [...] contends that the trial court erred in finding that such inequitable conduct by [...] could constitute a true deadlock entitling [...] to judicial relief.
[brief] As [...] had retired, this case had been reassigned to [...].  After extensive oral argument, and in a detailed written decision analyzing the record, [...] focused on the timeline and whether the C-Section could have been accomplished within the 25-30 minute time period Plaintiffs’ experts testified would be necessary to prevent or lessen the infant’s injuries.  (Pa15-Pa20).  She concluded that, affording Plaintiff all legitimate favorable inferences, even assuming the C-Section was called at 9:48pm, there was no attending available to perform it before [...] finished his C-Section and made sure not to compromise his other patient.  (Pa19).  According to [...], the unavailability of [...] was a “key” fact on which the case hinged, especially where no one disputed [...] could not have arrived sooner, that [...] could not perform the C-Section herself as a resident, and no one alleged [...] was required to be in the hospital sooner to perform the surgery.  (Pa19).  [...] granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.  (Pa20; Da1).
[brief] (Pa0091-92).  As a result of summary judgment rulings and settlements, at the time of the trial, only three Defendants remained: [...], [...] (“[...]”), and [...] (“[...]”).  (Pa0091)  The trial testimony and opening and closing arguments encompassed 30 trial days.  (Pa0092).  Live testimony was taken from seven witnesses, including multiple experts.  (Id).  Extensive exhibits, deposition testimony and written submissions were also made part of the court record.  (Id).  During the trial, [...]’s primary defense was that despite heavy industrial operations during the 1950s and 1960s, none of the property damage at the site occurred until after 1973, when its policy expired.  (Pa0094).  On January 31, 2011, the trial court issued a Letter Opinion and Order in which its rejected [...]’s defense and found that property damage had occurred at the Site during [...]’s policy period.
[brief] Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. New Horizons, Inc., 28 N.J. 307, 314, 146 A.2d 466 (1958).  Jewish Ctr. of Sussex, 86 N.J. at 624–25.  While our discussion of fraud focusses on legal fraud and Plaintiff’s damages stemming therefrom, equitable fraud provides another legal basis for conferring title to the Property on Plaintiff. his family who are members of [...]), all knew that [...], not [...], was the owner of the Property.
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants-Appellants, [...], [...], and [...], respectfully request that this Court overturn the jury verdict because it was against the weight of the evidence presented at trial and grant a new trial on all issues.  **[...]**  [...] P.O. Box 2075  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants, [...], DISH Network Service, L.L.C., and DISH Network L.L.C  By:/s/ [...] [...]  (Atty. ID 021451996)  By:/s/ [...]  [...] (Atty. ID 381612021)  Dated: June 19, 2024  [...], INDIVIDUALLY, and on behalf of her minor daughter, [...], PLAINTIFFS, VS. [...], [...], RUSSELL KLINE, DISH NETWORK SERVICE, L.L.C., DISH NETWORK L.L.C., JOHN DOES MARY DOES, ABC PARTNERSHIPS, AND XYZ CORPORATIONS, JOINTLY, SEVERALLY AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE, DEFENDANTS.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET No. [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW
[brief] Id.  During this time when Plaintiff was in India with Defendant, Plaintiff testified that Defendant claimed that he “hit her” “dragged her by the neck” and “threw her across the wall. ” (1T94).  Plaintiff admitted that he pushed Defendant.  Id.  This was despite Defendant telling Plaintiff not to come close to her or touch her.  Id.  On May 2, 2022, Plaintiff escorted Defendant to the United States of America.
[brief] A party is entitled to summary judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  *Brill v. Guardian* Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 528 (1995) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).  The determination of whether issues of material fact exist requires the court to consider “whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  Kelsey v. Raymond, No. A-4511-12T2, 2015 WL 1781565, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 21, 2015) (citing Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 406 (2014)) (emphasis added).  “[A] non-moving party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely by pointing to any fact in dispute. ”  Brill, 142 N.J. at 529 (emphasis in original).  The New Jersey Supreme Court advises that “trial courts not [] refrain from granting summary judgment when the proper circumstances present themselves [,]” explaining:  It is critical that a trial court ruling on a summary judgment motion not shut a deserving litigant from his [or her] trial.  At the same time, we stress that it is just as important that the court not allow harassment of an equally deserving suitor for immediate relief by a long and worthless trial.  [Brill, 142 N.J. at 540-41 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). ]  Summary judgment “is designed to provide a prompt, businesslike and inexpensive method of disposing of any cause which . . . [does not] present any genuine issue of material fact requiring disposition at a trial. ”  Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954).  It serves “to avoid trials which would serve no useful purpose and to afford deserving litigants immediate relief. ”  Warthen v. Toms River Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 199 N.J. Super. 18, 23 (App. Div. 1985).  Summary judgment in a personal injury claim is appropriate where “no reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff’s injuries were proximately caused by” the facts alleged.  Vega by Muniz v. Piedilato, 154 N.J. 496, 509 (1998) (citing Brill).  Appellate courts review the trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court.  Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N. J. 73 (2022).  Here, the trial court properly granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment under the applicable Rule 4:46-2 standards.  Its decision should thus be affirmed.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY
[brief] First, the Board reviewed the 81 senior citizen apartments as inherently beneficial based upon the testimony that they were independent apartments where special services were offered but not required, that most occupants would have cars, and that they offered amenities such as meal services, but the use of the amenities was not required for occupancy.  Despite there being questions as to the senior apartments versus the label as “congregate care”, the Board determined to treat the entire application as if inherently beneficial and found in its Resolution:  21.  Since the inherently beneficial uses are to be considered under the less intensive Sica criteria, that will be addressed and will apply to both those uses [assisted living and memory care] as well as the 81 senior apartments, if they are to be considered part of an overall inherently beneficial use.  Da132.  (2.)
[brief] “[S]ince 1951, the right to a jury trial for newly created statutory causes of action has been denied unless the statute so provides. ”  *JCP&L*, 212 N.J. at 590 (quoting *State v. Sailor*, 355 N.J.Super. 315, 320 (App. Div. 2001)).  Indeed, [...] argued to the Appellate Division in the *Lajara* matter that the case was, “at its core, a reverse PIP suit” and that, “there is no right to a jury trial in a PIP suit such as this.
[brief] E.  The five-year parole disqualifier on Count Five should be amended to a four-year parole disqualifier.  Defendant correctly notes that, under the Graves Act, the maximum permissible parole disqualifier on Count Five, unlawful possession of a handgun, is one-half the sentence imposed or 42 months, whichever is greater.  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c).  Because defendant was sentenced to an eight-year term of imprisonment, the five year parole disqualifier must be amended to a four-year parole disqualifier.  This Court can amend the Judgment of Conviction accordingly; there is no need to remand to the trial court.  F.
[brief] ”  (Da 37-38)  Given that the State had been in contact with the other jurisdictions involved, even if it had somehow been unaware [...] was being housed at a New Jersey jail, the State could have discovered his whereabouts at any point, with just the tiniest amount of effort.  See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652-53 (“[T]he Government's investigators made no serious effort to test their progressively more questionable assumption that [the defendant] was living abroad, and, had they done so, they could have found him within minutes. ”).  Again, the State knew who to ask about [...]’s whereabouts.  Either the State knew where he was and did not bother to prosecute the case, or it did not bother to figure it out.  Either way, the State was negligent.
[brief] Here, the [...] admittedly did not provide *any* documentation to [...] to request financing approval, because the [...] never planned to build the [...] Garage.  2T90:15-22; see also Sections G-H, *supra*.  Rather, when specifically asked, [...] could not explain the factual basis for the [...]’s representation in Section 8.7(b) beyond a general recollection that [...] had informally advised the [...] that it “would love to take a look at [the application],” which the [...] falsely equated to a “willingness to support” the [...] Garage.  2T96:12-97-6.
[brief] C. [...]’s “Canon of Construction” Argument is Entirely Without Merit (Not Raised Below).  Unable to directly assail the Trial Court’s sound interpretation of Paragraphs 24(F) and (G), [...] conjures an argument that the Trial Court “invent[ed] a non-existent conflict” when it deemed [...]’s attempt to manipulate the reach of Paragraph 24(G) “illogical and contrary to the plain meaning of the Settlement Agreement.
[brief] R. 4:46-2(c); see also Rankin v. Sowinski, 119 N.J. Super. 393 (App. Div. 1972).  Under the facts and circumstances of this matter summary judgment was not appropriate, and the plaintiff should have been allowed a trial.  The trial court correctly makes reference to the standard that applies to summary judgment in its decision on the Motion - (Pa5) - but fails to appropriately apply it.
[brief] His testimony and other issues about the fingerprint evidence is the subject of Point I, infra.  [...] has no degree in biology, statistics, or forensic science, and he is not certified by the International Association of Identification.  (6T 19-5 to 21-6)  He compared the latent prints found at the scene after AFIS had returned a match and after [...] had already been indicted.  (6T 51-1 to 16, 76-13 to 21)  He was not asked to compare the latent prints to any other potential matches, including the other candidates suggested by AFIS.  (6T 110-3 to 19)  After explaining the ACE-V methodology he uses when undertaking fingerprint comparison, [...] testified the “science of fingerprints” allows him to “determine source identification[,] which in fingerprint examination language and identification means that it is your opinion that the two prints originated from the same source. ”  (6T 32-17, 44-8 to 14)  He went on to opine that “all four of these latent impressions were identified as originating from the same source as the known exemplars of French [...]. ”  (6T 55-24 to 56-1)  He repeated this “same source” conclusion multiple times.  (6T 55-24 to 56-1, 67-1 to 6, 72-1 to 5, 73-10 to 13)  [...] also testified that he identified each latent print as a specific finger “of French [...]. ”  (6T 74-1 to 24)  When asked by the prosecutor, “[D]id the defendant French [...] make the latent impressions contained on S-34(a) through S-34(d)?”, [...] said “yes. ”  (6T 56-17 to 21)  [...] also testified that his conclusions were reviewed independently by a verifier, that he has “never been involved in a situation where the verification process resulted in someone refuting the findings of the original examiner[,]” and that studies show that the verification process catches all false positive errors.  (6T 45-4 to 7, 74-74-25 to 75-1, 111-8 to 15)  No other evidence of the identity of either intruder was produced by the State.
[brief] 1T45:10-19 and 1T57:11-19.  [...] confirmed that, in that two-second period, he ([...]) ordered Defendant to stop, observed Defendant accelerate his pace, observed Defendant’s fanny pack swaying, and then wrapped his arms around Defendant.  1T58:1-8.  On June 28, 2024, [...] found that there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop and granted Defendant’s Motion.
[brief] She stated publicly that users’ “trust is sacred, that privacy is the most important thing we do,” and that [...] is “the most privacy-focused place for anyone to share anything. ”  [...], [...] Talks to [...] About [...], IPOs, And [...]’s “Little Version of [...]”, [...] (Nov. 7, 2011)  https://techcrunch.com/2011/11/07/zuckerberg-talks-to-charlie-rose-about-war-ipos-and-googles-little-version-of-facebook/, Ex. 26.
[brief] THE BOARD'S GRANT OF THE 2022 ZONING APPLICATION IS SUBSTANTIALLY IN CONFLICT WITH AND DEVIATES FROM THE [...] MASTER PLAN Pa33  The Board's approval of the 2022 Zoning Application with its variances, flies in the face of the purported goals, objectives and concerns set forth in the 2004 Township Master Plan and substantially impairs the intent and purpose of that plan.  The grant of the multiple variances must be voided as improperly granted.
[brief] Thus, there was ample evidence in the record for a jury to determine that defendant was guilty of this crime.  While it may be true that [...] would have died quickly anyway, even if help had been called right away, that is irrelevant.  Nothing in the statute states defendant must successfully save the life he endangered.  Indeed, it is an affirmative defense to show evidence that a defendant called for help, with no caveat that help must be successfully life-saving.  N.J.S.A. 2C: 12-1.2(c).  What matters is that defendant caused bodily injury to [...] that rendered him physically helpless and in need of help, that defendant knew [...] needed help, knew that he supposedly “aimed low” to avoid a fatal gunshot wound, and instead of rendering any aid or calling for help, left him lying on the porch for two hours while he watched baseball and drove around with his parents.  There is no basis for acquittal on this count because [...] would have died regardless of whether help had been called, be it in minutes or hours or days.
[brief] Meanwhile, "a homicide which would otherwise be murder under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 may be considered passion/provocation manslaughter when committed in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation," under N.J. S .A 2C: 11-4(b)(2).  Meanwhile, "passion/provocation manslaughter is considered a lesser-included offense of murder: the offense contains all the elements of murder except that the presence of reasonable provocation, coupled with the defendant's impassioned actions, establish a lesser culpability."  State v. Robinson, 136 N.J. 476, 482 (1994).  To be guilty of passion/provocation manslaughter, "an intentional homicide that would otherwise be murder may be mitigated to manslaughter when it is 'committed in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation.'"  State v. Funderberg, 225 N.J. 66, 80 (2016)(citing State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402, 411 (1990)); N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2).
[directive] Czy rozumie Pan(i), że musi Pan(i) dostarczyć właściwym organom ścigania informacje o d)  [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] swoim stałym dostępie do Internetu lub o korzystaniu z komputera lub urządzenia z (jeżeli przestępstwa zostało popełnione w dniu 25 lutego 2008 dostępem do Internetu? r. lub później)  Do you understand that you must provide the appropriate law enforcement agency with information about (if the offense was your routine access to or use of a computer or device with Internet capability? committed on or after February 25, 2008)
[brief] I.  PIVNICK V. BECK  DEALT WITH AN INSTRUMENT THAT THE COURT FOUND UNAMBIGUOUS; THE COURT HERE FOUND THE INSTRUMENT DRAFTED BY DEFENDANT WAS AMBIGUOUS  ........1  II.  THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THAT DEFENDANTS SUFFERED  SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE .........................1  III.  [...] IS IN PRIVITY WITH THE DEFENDANTS .................................................................................................3  CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................4  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] The State contends that defendant’s PCR petition was not converted to a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 3:21-10(b)(5).  Defendant acknowledges that his initial filing was an out-of-time PCR petition.  Yet, once counsel was assigned, counsel, acting in accordance with his obligations to his client, applied his professional training and criminal practice experience and changed defendant’s application to a motion to correct an illegal sentence under the aforementioned court rule.  Counsel’s oral argument before the lower court made ¹ "Db" refers to defendant's appellate merits brief on the denial of PCR.  "Da" refers to the appendix attached to defendant's appellate merits brief.  that conversion crystal clear.  (3T 3-21 to 4-20)  Hence, the lower court wrongly continued to view defendant’s pleadings as a PCR application and the State continues with this mischaracterization so as to argue that defendant’s pleadings are time-barred.