ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] At the trial court level, judges are afforded broad discretion to make findings of fact, conclusions of law, and (especially in the Chancery Division) to fashion remedies that favor equity in the interest of fairness and justice.  What equity does not permit, however, is a result that is contrary to the law.  And yet, that is precisely how this case concluded below.  The lengthy delay between the filing of Respondents’ verified complaint in January of 2018 and conclusion of the matter in the trial court some four-and-a-half years later undoubtedly contributed to a muddled record below.
[brief] As set forth above, the Defendant harbored and abandoned stray cats on the public sidewalk on Murray Avenue within the jurisdiction of the Township, creating a nuisance in doing so.  It is undeniable that the conduct of the Defendant established each element.  The Defendant placed the trap on the sidewalk on Murray Avenue and altered the trap so it could not function as a trap by tying the door open.  She wrapped the trap in plastic so as to harbor and protect any animals inside from inclement weather.  Clearly, she had no intention of removing these animals but rather wanted to construct a makeshift home for these stray cats on public property where the cats were to remain, abandoned and able to run at large as strays.  In leaving the stray animals to remain on the sidewalk on Murray Avenue, rather than taking the cats in to care for them herself or taking them to a local animal shelter, she abandoned them.  In fact, the term harboring is defined by Merriam-Webster as “to give shelter or refuge. ”  *Merriam-Webster Dictionary-Harbor.*  Accessed 16 May 2024.  In light of the foregoing, [...] properly found that by placing a trap, placing plastic wrap around it to prevent it from operating as a trap, the Defendant was harboring stray cats within a public place in the Township.  [...] also properly concluded that by altering the trap to not capture the cats, as previously set forth, allowing the cats to run at large is a form of abandonment.  Finally, [...] also properly found that the State provided sufficient evidence to link the trap placed on Murray Street in the Township to the Defendant and that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant placed the trap.  Furthermore, as it relates to the nuisance violations, nuisance is clearly defined under §201, in part, as leaving rubbish in a public place under §201-2C or placing any substance in a public place that could cause one to slip and fall under §201-2D.  Again, it is undeniable that placing the traps on a public sidewalk in the Township, attracting stray cats and leaving them the Defendant created a nuisance pursuant to §201.  Judge Jone properly so found.  Considering the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Law Division is based upon substantial credible evidence present in the record and therefore, must be affirmed in its entirety.  As such, it is respectfully requested that the Defendant’s appeal be dismissed.
[brief] *Ibid.*  Now, he was in long johns.  (10T:51-14 to 52-5).  [...] stated that defendant changed his clothes in the car to cover his tracks.  *Ibid.*  Defendant’s explanation for his new outfit, in his statement to police, was that someone stole his clothes.  (14T:33-11 to 21).  At trial, defendant claimed he changed his clothes earlier in the day, at his father’s house, because his clothes smelled bad, and he wanted to change before visiting his aunt.
[brief] “Considerable latitude is afforded a trial court in determining whether to admit evidence, and that determination will be reversed only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. ”  *State v. Feaster*, 156 N.J. 1, 82 (1998), cert. den., 532 U.S. 932 (2001).  Although subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review, a trial court’s discretion is not unlimited.  Where the court applies the wrong legal standard in deciding to exclude evidence, the decision to exclude evidence is subject to a *de novo* standard of review.
[brief] On April 29, 2011 at about 5:55 p.m., there was a robbery and homicide at the [...] in [...].  The two victims/eyewitnesses, who were also employees at the pharmacy gave statements to the police that a masked man came in, demanded narcotics, and engaged in a struggle with [...], during which the gun went off and the man fled the pharmacy.  [...] died as a result of his injury.  The two female victims/eyewitnesses stated that the suspect had "dread style hair" was brown skin, between 20–25 years of age.  A hair style (dread style hair) that [...] has never had, which is a main description factor to the suspect’s physical identity that [...] does not fit, and exculpates [...].
[brief] The Disqualification Order Has No Basis In Law Or Fact.  Disqualification of counsel is an extreme measure that can only be exacted after a careful balancing of the rights of the parties involved.  See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. at 218; see also Dental Health Assocs. S. Jersey, P.A. v. RRI Gibbsboro, LLC, 471 N.J. Super. 184, 192 (App. Div. 2002).  Unfortunately, here, the trial court did not undertake the required careful balancing of rights and instead took the self-serving and conclusory statements of Respondents about “concerns” without any actual legal or factual analysis.  In fact, the trial court admitted that it lacked certain factual predicates, namely, substantial similarities between past and current matters, which should have ended the trial court’s analysis immediately.  Still, the trial court incorrectly proceeded to disqualify [...] for little more than hypothetical concerns based on no law.  Accordingly, the trial court’s Disqualification Order should be reversed.  A lawyer’s duty to former clients is governed by RPC 1.9 which provides that:
[brief] Before this Court, defendant does the math, noting that $25 per month over the course of five years will lead to a total of $1,500 in probation supervision fees.  Db40.  However, defendant’s math stops there.  The State submits defendant does so, because further math applied to the totalities of his fines, fees and $12,443.56 restitution shows – as the lower court found – that this total financial obligation is well within the defendant’s conceded ability to pay over the course of five years of probation.  Over the course of five years, defendant’s per month financial obligation will be less than $250 per month and less than $3,000 per year – both of which are well within this defendant’s conceded and self-reported future ability to pay.
[brief] Third, the harm to the Debtor outweighs any potential harm to [...], as the loss of the Debtor’s home and rental income far surpasses any impact on [...], especially considering [...]’s claim is addressed in the Debtor’s chapter 13 plan and would be paid in full, with interest as provided for by the TSL.  [...] will receive, albeit delayed, the full benefit of its bargain.  This inconvenient delay in receiving full payment of its claim does not outweigh the immediate irreparable harm that would be incurred by the Debtor — loss of home and income.  This element favors the Debtor.  Lastly, granting the preliminary injunction serves the public interest rather than violates it by giving citizens like the Debtor the opportunity to save their homes through the bankruptcy process (another Constitutional right, Art. I., Sect. 8.) and by further safeguarding them from unlawful takings by the government and/or a third-party tax sale certificate holder in violation of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and under the New Jersey Constitution.  Roberto, 477 N.J. Super. at 366.  Clearly, protecting the Debtor’s rights at this stage does not violate public interest but rather promotes it.  This element favors the Debtor.
[brief] The decision actually compels the opposite conclusion.  The Court did observe that analysis of first-party coverage is generally “of limited relevance;” in context, however, that comment focused on the coverage provisions of first-party property policies that “are different from the ‘arising out of’ language that is central to this appeal” and that are commonly used in liability policies.  Id. at 447.  The Court then instructed that “first-party coverage decisions do, however, yield two generally applicable rules.  In situations in which multiple events, one of which is covered, occur sequentially in a chain of causation to produce a loss, we have adopted the approach known as ‘Appleman’s rule,’ pursuant to which the loss is covered if a covered cause starts or ends the sequence of events leading to the loss. ”  Id. (Emphasis added.)  See also [...]’s concurrence, quoting the “classic” form of ACC clause that a liability carrier must use to avoid Appleman’s Rule:  “[T]he instant policy did not unambiguously declare that coverage would be excluded for injuries arising out of the use of illegal drugs “regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss. ””  Id. at 461-62 (Emphasis in original; citation omitted).  Flomerfelt and other New Jersey cases compel the conclusion that under Appleman’s Rule an excluded cause (mold) does not bar coverage when the first event in the sequential chain of causation (water intrusion) is a covered cause of loss.
[brief] Illinois, assigning various shares to each of the primary insurers and 9.78% to [...]’s claims made Pollution Policy.  Da332.  [...] and [...] moved for reconsideration, which motion was denied by the trial court on April 30, 2021.  Da394-95.  Thereafter, [...] and [...] sought interlocutory appeals to this Court, which were denied on July 7, 2021.  Da384-86.  The parties next entered into a Joint Defense Agreement consistent with the lower court’s allocation ruling and proceeded with an arbitration/binding mediation before [...] in late 2022 to determine reasonable hourly rates applicable to services performed by counsel for [...].
[brief] Here, giving the State the benefit of all its favorable evidence and inferences therefrom, a rational jury could—and did—find that defendant recklessly caused [...]’s death.  The cell site data, video footage, statements from [...] and [...], and ballistics evidence collectively established that defendant was in the pursuing vehicle and possessed the .40 caliber handgun involved in the shooting.  While defendant maintains that “there was no allegation that [he] . . . engaged in conduct that was reckless,” (Db24), the applicable inquiry is not the State’s theory, but whether a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt “giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony and all the favorable inferences. ”  *State v. Reyes*, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967); see *State v. Feaster*, 156 N.J. 1, 65 (1998) (approving jury instruction that arguments of counsel “are not evidence”).  [...] properly found sufficient evidence supporting a reckless intent as opposed to the specific intent to kill.
[brief] *Olenowski*, 253 N.J. at 154.  Instead, as properly acknowledged by the trial court in its written and oral decisions, defendant “failed to meet their burden as they simply argue there is no scientific basis to support the use of the terms he seeks to bar. ” (Pa1-Pa2).  The trial court also emphasized this Court’s decisions in *Ghigliotty* and *McGuire* that specifically found that the same tool mark identification challenged by defendant was “generally accepted” in New Jersey under Frye.
[brief] Without any evidence, Plaintiffs assert [...] must have been in the operating room at 9:57pm and presumably would not have started that C-Section and would have instead come to deliver [...] if only he had been called at 9:48pm.  (Pa8; Pa589).  No one knows when [...]’ other C-Section began, but the evidence is clear he had just finished delivering the baby when the nurse came to ask if he could assist with [...]’s patient, suggesting more likely than not that he had been in the operating room well before 9:48pm.  The record simply does not support a legitimate inference that [...] would have been presented with a choice between two patients and delayed his own patient’s emergency C-Section in favor of [...].
[brief] See Boyle v Huff, 257 N.J. 468, 478 (2024); Caruso v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 136 N.J.L. 597, ***3 (E. & A. 1948).  Section 17.1 of the PSA reads, in its entirety, as follows:  **Section 17.1  Escrow.**  (a)  Escrow Agent will hold the Earnest Money Deposit in escrow in an interest bearing account of the type generally used by Escrow Agent for the holding of escrow funds until the earlier of (i) the Closing, or (ii) the termination of this Agreement in accordance with any right hereunder.  All interest earned on the Earnest Money Deposit shall be paid to the party entitled to the Earnest Money Deposit.  In the event the Closing occurs, the Earnest Money Deposit will be released to Seller, and Purchaser shall receive a credit against the Purchase Price in the amount of the Earnest Money Deposit.  In all other instances, Escrow Agent shall not release the Earnest Money Deposit to either party until Escrow Agent has been requested in writing by Seller or Purchaser to release the Earnest Money Deposit and has given the other party five (5) Business Days to dispute, or consent to, the release of the Earnest Money Deposit.  Purchaser and Seller each represents that its tax identification number, for purposes of reporting the interest earnings, is shown next to its signature below.  (b)  Escrow Agent shall not be liable to any party for any act or omission, except for bad faith, gross negligence or willful misconduct, and the parties agree to indemnify Escrow Agent and hold Escrow Agent harmless from any and all claims, damages, losses or expenses arising in connection herewith, except to the extent arising out of the bad faith, gross negligence or willful misconduct of Escrow Agent.  The parties acknowledge that Escrow Agent is acting solely as stakeholder for their mutual convenience.
[brief] R. 2:10-2.  On the second day of trial, before the State called its first witness for the day, [...] interrupted the proceedings by asserting that his lawyer had threatened him “with 15 years,” that he wanted to “press charges” and that he was “in fear of [his] life. ”  (4T 12-17 to 13-12)  After dismissing the jury, the court admonished [...] for his behavior.  The court stated, “[...], you’ve chosen this path.  You’ve been warned repeatedly, and as such you are now going to be removed from the courtroom for the rest of the matter. ”  (4T 13-21 to 24)  Trial continued after [...] was removed.
[brief] THE DECISION IN DUNBAR, WHILE NOT FACTUALLY SIMILAR TO THIS MATTER, SUPPORTS THE PLANNING BOARD’S APPLICATION OF THE TOA RULE | 11 | | IV.  THE PROPRIETY OF THE CITY’S DELEGATION OF LAND USE POWER IS NOT AT ISSUE | 14 | | CONCLUSION | 15 | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Cases** | | | 388 Route 22 Readington Realty Holdings, LLC v. Twp. of Readington, | 12 | | 221 N.J. 318 (2015) | | | Al Walker, Inc. v. Borough of Stanhope, | 2, 3 | | 23 N.J. 657 (1957) | | | Aurentz v. Plan Bd. of Little Egg Harbor Twp., | 5 | | 171 N.J. Super. 135 (Law Div. 1979) | | | In re Baby T., | 8 | | 160 N.J. 332 (1999) | | | Booth v. Bd.
[brief] In 2002, after a breakdown of discussions with the [...] to resolve the issues with the Shopping Center, and negotiations to purchase 3  The [...] did not challenge these findings at the meetings before the [...]. the Shopping Center, the [...] commenced a condemnation action to take the Shopping Center by eminent domain, which resulted in the published decision of [...] v. Berardi, 378 N.J. Super. 430, 434 (App. Div. 2005).
[brief] Nonetheless, “N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a) creates one offense that may be proved by alternate evidential methods. ”  State v. Kashi, 180 N.J. 45, 48 (2004).  One acceptable method is that which the prosecutor relied upon here: the officer’s “observation[s]” that defendant was “operat[ing] a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. ”  State v. Zeikel, 423 N.J. Super. 34, 48 (App. Div. 2011)(quoting N.J.S.A. 39:4-50)(listing the other evidential method for proving DWI beyond a reasonable doubt as proof of a BAC or “blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more”).
[brief] ” (2T 80:10-15).  In regards to the bulk variance for the reduction of parking spaces, [...] testified that the ordinance requires 1,148 spaces, when 604 are proposed.  (2T 81:1-3).  The 604 spaces would be “more than sufficient[,]” as the proposed state-of-the-art facility would be automated and have fewer employees.  (2T 81:8-20).  The reduction of spaces, which equates to about four (4) less acres of impervious coverage, will also reduce the stormwater runoff by 330,000 gallons for a 25-year storm.  (1T 37:1-13; 2T 82:18-23).  In addition, the reduction of spaces also reduces the permitted lot coverage ratio from seventy percent (70%) to twenty-six percent (26%).  (1T 35:8-13).  Plaintiff’s other witnesses also provided testimony in support of the positive and negative criteria.
[brief] Plaintiff's EEO complaint was marked as Runowicz-6 at her deposition (1T; 63:5).  Plaintiff contends that the treatment by [...], [...] and [...] are a result of her gender (1T; 65:4).  Whenever an incident arose, she discussed the matter with [...] (1T; 67:16).  Plaintiff’s job description was changed because she was supposed to go directly to the Intake Unit but that was changed to accommodate [...] and so she had to go instead to the Captain’s Office (1T; 69:18).  For the Plaintiff, by changing the procedure that applied to her job, it was stressful and created a hostile work environment (1T; 71:4).
[brief] In Vargas, the Appellate Division sets forth a framework for the acceptance of a guilty plea when the factual basis is reliant upon the alleged B.A.C. result in the within matter.  As the Appellate Division provides, “The critical point is that the acknowledgment of guilty with respect to the BAC element of the per se DWI offense should be explicit and not just inferred from the fact that a defendant seeks to enter a guilty plea. ”  (Vargas at page 15.)  In the within matter, wherein the factual basis was entirely dependent upon the admissibility of the alleged BAC result since there was no observational evidence relied upon during the plea proceeding, the lack of an acknowledgement from the Defendant regarding the accuracy of the alleged B.A.C. violates the framework of the unpublished opinion in State v. Vargas because the Appellate Division held that the Defendant has to explicitly agree that he or she is accepting the admissibility of the alleged BAC result.  Such an explicit agreement never took place in this matter.
[brief] POINT I ...............................................................................................................................19  STANDARD OF REVIEW POINT II ............................................................................................................................21  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT  [...]’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHERE THERE WERE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AND PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CLAIM OF BREACH OF CONTRACT (3T78 – 3T88)  i.  The Trial Court’s Oral Opinion to Grant Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s Breach of Contract Claim (3T1-3T89) ......................................................  22  ii.  The Trial Court Improperly Assumed the Role of the Factfinder  When Applying the Standard in Beukas v. Bd. of Trustees of Fairleigh Dickinson University (3T81-3T88) ................................................................. 24  iii.  Defendant Did Not Act in Good Faith When it Implemental the GPA Requirement  After the Inaugural Class Began the Fall Semester and Because it Utterly Failed to Explicitly State the Period to Select or Opt-Out of the Dual Degree Program to its Inaugural Class (3T81-3T88)  ...........................................................................................................  31  iv.  The Trial Court Improperly Relied Upon Mittra v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of New Jersey, 316 N.J. Super. 83, (App. Div. 1998) (3T81-3T88)  ...........................................................................................................  33 v. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................
[brief] The procedural history’s important dates/events are summarized below.  The initial appearance before the trial judge was on July 11 of 2022, Da34 which led to an 8/1/22 Order of dismissal.  Da58-67.  Briefs were filed by the parties.  The Township’s brief did not assert that the request itself was in any way improper or ambiguous.  P1-10.  It **only** argued that the document withheld was not a public document (*i.e.* a “government record”) and therefore wholly exempt from disclosure.  *Ibid.*  Indeed, even Appellant’s brief filed in this pending appeal does not state under its Point Headings that this issue was “Argued Below”.  The trial judge’s 8/1/22 order was appealed by the undersigned, and the Appellate Division vacated the judge’s order.
[brief] The New Jersey Appellate Division soundly rejected this argument, concluding that the indemnification clause in the contract related only to third-party claims against the plaintiff – and was not intended to apply to claims as between the parties to the contract.  See id., citing Hooper Assocs., Ltd. v. AGS Computers, Inc., 548 N.E.2d 903, 905 (N.Y. 1989); Oscar Gruss & Son, Inc. v. Hollander, 337 F.3d 186, 200 (2d Cir. 2003); JMD Holding Corp. v. Congress Fin. Corp., 828 N.E.2d 604, 613 (N.Y. 2005).  Notably, in the Allison-Williams case, the party seeking a fee award made the additional argument (just as [...] does here) that the duty to indemnify must be construed to extend to litigation between the parties to the contract, because the contractual provision included certain language limiting that party’s liability to bad faith or gross negligence; according to its argument, the clause must have been referring to litigation between the parties to the contract.  The party seeking fees also emphasized that there was no language expressly limiting the clause to disputes with third-parties.  See Allison-Williams Co., 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1260 at *29.  The Allison-Williams court rejected these arguments as well, stating:  “The sentence quoted, however, refers to a demand for indemnification or contribution … based on claims brought by third parties.  It does not establish plaintiffs' right to claim fees from defendant for litigation that they have initiated against defendant on the contract itself. ”  See id.  Thus, the court refused to read the indemnity clause as applying to disputes between parties to the contract.  So it is here.
[brief] (188a).  During the March 29, 2018 oral argument, [...], on behalf of the plaintiffs, argued:  [Now] we know that [...] is actually [...], and we only found out about this also recently, of concealment, and misrepresentation, and quite outright perjuries, now we know that [...] was the managing member and sole managing member of [...].  And [...] got over half the money, the million four was almost equally divided between [...] and [...].  [...] was [...] and [...] was [...].  And the money from [...] then was transferred, back to back transfers, into the personal bank account of [...] and [...].