ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Czy rozumie Pan(i), że z powodu przyznania się do:  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  1.  Do you understand that because of your plea of guilty to (Podać listę przestępstw pierwszego i drugiego stopnia objętych ustawą NERA) NERA (List First or Second Degree Violent Crime(s) to Which Applies) Formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11171-Polish strona 1 z 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11171-Polish page 1 of 2 będzie Pan(i) podlegać wymogowi odbycia 85% wyroku wydanego za takie przestępstwo(a) przed uzyskaniem możliwości ubiegania się o zwolnienie warunkowe w związku z takim(i) przestępstwem(ami)? you will be required to serve 85% of the sentence imposed for that offense(s) before you will be eligible for parole on that offense(s)?
[brief] [...] also made it clear at deposition that some light would have illuminated the driver’s path as he approached the crosswalk.  Therefore, because the tree branches were in the way, in addition to 0.0 foot candle lighting, the crosswalk could not be illuminated, thereby causing the backlight effect.  Plaintiff disputes [...]'s contention that it has no duty with regard to light design and placement.  Consistent with Weinberg, supra, and under the general negligence theory it espouses, [...] had the duty not to sell a hazardous 0.0 foot candle lamp to [...].  That duty trumps any opinion that a sales manager may hold or [...]'s attempt to avoid responsibility by relying on its Tariff.  In the end, the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment to [...].
[brief] --- 7  The Judge was well aware of previous (some felonious) “interventions” in my cases for retaliation.  He wished to make it clear, I guess, this was not the case – despite all appearances to the contrary.  He hinted that one explanation may be an incomplete file.  Cumberland allegedly looked for months and couldn’t find the Long experience has shown when I “push” the Judiciary to fix a mistake, it’s almost always followed by more retaliation.  We think the failure to address the “dirty trick”\(^8\) in the June Notice of Motion was, simply, the Judge forgot about it.  The complaint about the double dismissal was made to the Judge’s Law Clerk, [...], who’d obviously had left her appointment by mid-August and wasn’t available any longer to address the dirty trick dismissal.  I finally worked up the courage to file a motion to correct the Dismissal Order as “opposed,” due to the Opposition already being in the file.
[brief] Six years later, the Department issued [...] in In re Acquisition of Control of [...] and [...] by the [...] and [...] (the “2020 Order”), approving the acquisition of [...] and its attorney-in-fact, [...] by The [...] and [...].  (Ja16-21).  As with the earlier acquisition, this one was governed by N.J.S.A. 17:17A-2.  (Ja16).  The 2020 Order required [...] to comply with the Reciprocal Exchange Act and the Holding Company Act, along with regulations promulgated thereunder.
[brief] See also, Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 216 (App. Div. 2011)(finding attorney’s certification in foreclosure action that Plaintiff was holder of a note and mortgage, based on his review of Plaintiff’s computerized records, did not meet requirement of personal knowledge and thus provided an insufficient basis to grant bank’s motion for summary judgment).  Therefore, it was inappropriate and a basis for reversal for the second trial court judge to credit Plaintiff counsel’s argument that “decedent disputes that decedent received a copy of the arbitration agreement. ” (Da089).  There can be no dispute because, as decedent is unable to testify on her own behalf, [...]’s testimony regarding the formation of the Arbitration Agreement must be treated as uncontested by the Court.
[brief] The *Jones* Court further noted that neither the prosecutor’s comment acknowledging that “the defense never has any burden of proof,” *id.* at 382, nor the trial judge’s general instruction on the presumption of innocence could erase “[t]he prejudice inherent” in the State’s adverse-inference exhortation.  Id. at 383-84; accord State v. Cooke, 345 N.J. Super. 480 (App. Div. 2001).  In light of these bedrock principles of Due Process, our Supreme Court has held that adverse inference charges from the failure to produce evidence—so called “Clawans” charges, named after State v. Clawans, 38 N.J. 162 (1962)—“generally should not issue against criminal defendants.
[brief] (2)  [...] subdivided and deeded to Plaintiffs a 40’ x 90’ portion of Lot 3 as set forth in the recorded Subdivision Plan, Ja148; (3) [...] confirmed by the [...] Confirmatory Deed the occurrence of the subdivision under the Subdivision Plan and his ownership of only a “part/portion of” of what he had acquired by the 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed, Ja161 (emphasis original); and finally, (4) Defendants’ Deed specifically references all of these documents (the 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed, the Subdivision Plan, the [...] Confirmatory Deed) and specifically states that it is only transferring to Defendants that “part of the same premises” [...] acquired by the 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed left over after the subdivision and [...] Confirmatory Deed, i.e. the 105’ frontage less 40’.  Ja179-80 (emphasis added).  Applying the appropriate case law, the trial court found that the information revealed by those documents was sufficient to constitute constructive notice in Defendants.
[brief] At the time of the June 12 Orders that Defendants have appealed here, the [...]’s Answer had already been struck with prejudice and [...]’s Answer had been struck without prejudice.  Da29-30, Pa1-2.  Accordingly, Defendants were required to demonstrate that “fully responsive discovery [had] been provided” in accordance with R. 4:23-5(a)(2).  See Fik-Rymarkiewicz v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 430 N.J. Super. 469, 480-82 (App. Div.), certif. den., 214 N.J. 118 (2013) (affirming trial court’s dismissal of pleading where plaintiff refused to provide “fully and responsive” discovery).
[brief] Tynes v. St. Peters Univ. Med. Ctr., 408 N.J. Super. 159, 169, 973 A.2d 993 (App. Div. 2009).  Although this analysis is fact sensitive and decided on a case-by-case basis, exceptional circumstances in the discovery context of R. 4:24-1(c) include but are not limited to: the disruption of one’s office by partners or associates having health problems or leaving, especially if they had responsibilities for the matter before the court; a personal sudden health problem of counsel; death of counsel’s family member; and death or health problems of a key witness.  See O’Donnell v. Ahmed, 363 N.J. Super. 44, 51, 830 A.2d 924 (Law Div. 2003).  Notwithstanding, the interests of justice standard continues fully viable under Best Practices, and time constraints will yield to exceptional circumstances and fundamental litigation fairness.
[brief] Again, although the Practice had taken no action, on December 20, 2023 [...] filed a motion for reconsideration/second application for an order to show cause again seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Restrictive Covenant related to his potential employment at [...].  (Pa49-51).  Although not expressly styled as a motion for reconsideration, as set forth above, [...]’s application claimed that the October 17, 2023 letter constituted changed circumstances warranting reconsideration of the December 2023 Order.  (Ra137-138, ¶6-9).  Notably, [...] did not oppose/correct the Practice’s argument that he was seeking reconsideration (compare Ra159-166, Ra167-178), but the October 17, 2023 letter \(^5\)  Although it is not clear from [...]’s papers, [...] may have informally advised [...] of its intentions the week before. changed nothing with respect to the lack of merit in [...]’s application as set forth above.  Because [...] withdrew its offer of employment, the Chancery Court no longer had a live controversy to decide.  Judgment regarding enforcement of the Restrictive Covenant to [...]’s employment at [...] could have had no practical effect on the controversy; it would have been nothing more than an advisory opinion.  The issue was moot.
[brief] Initially, payments were deposited into and transferred from the [...], usually via wire transfers to [...].  786a–790a.  Subsequently, pursuant to the representations of [...] and [...], Plaintiffs were made to make payments via wire transfer and checks made payable to the [...], [...] and [...] (“[...]).  735a–757a.  Subsequently, said funds transferred or deposited in the [...], [...] bank accounts, or [...] bank account, were thereafter transferred via checks and account-to-account transfers to and among [...] and the co-conspirator Defendants.
[brief] At the time the Township’s Master Plan was adopted in 1997, its focus was on the preservation of farmland and promoting the Township’s agricultural character through a then-newly crafted “Transfer of Development Rights” (“TDR”) legislative program.  Commercial and industrial development were not priorities.  B.  [...] is the only municipality in the State of New Jersey to successfully implement TDR, and residential development in the “Receiving Area” is now more than eighty percent (80%) completed.  The limited commercial area in the Receiving Area has now also been built, but suffers from vacancy concerns.  C.  [...]’s tax revenues are disproportionately derived from its residential development and farms.  In fact, ninety-seven percent (97%) of [...]’s tax ratable base is farmland and residential: The Township Committee recognizes the fragility of such a reliance on residences and farms as the nearly sole source of tax revenue.  D.
[directive] A directive is an appropriate way to further advance transparency and promote the efficient release of qualifying records for several reasons.  First, directives provide clarity for agencies, officers, and the public; improve administrability; and promote uniformity.  They do so in this context by turning a multi-factor test that is appropriate for courts making case-by-case determinations into a clear set of bright-line requirements that are easier for law enforcement agencies to implement consistently.  Second, directives can specify in greater detail the content and form of a published report, so as to ensure all information disclosed is sufficient to provide transparency and accountability while maximizing the protection of particularly sensitive content.  And finally, the creation of directives involves a collaborative process, allowing for input from law enforcement executives at the state, county, and local levels, law enforcement officers and their representatives, advocates, stakeholders, and the public, all to better inform the Attorney General’s final decisions.
[brief] [...] claims that he advised [...] about the risks in the agreements, but [...] disputes this and indicates that he and his wife were present and [...] did not give such advice.  He never wrote to [...] and documented his supposed advice regarding the contract.  [...] does not recall any specific advice he gave to [...] regarding terminating the agreements and he does not recall giving any advice about lost profit or attorneys fees.  He does not recall discussing with [...] escrow management.  [...] does not recall discussing security for the payments to [...].  [...] does not recall discussing architectural malpractice with [...].  [...] does not recall if [...] was retained to determine zoning variances.  He claims he was unaware of zoning code feasibility study.  [...] does not recall discussing Article 2.1 with [...].  He does not recall any discussion with [...] other than conversations he claims took place about the risk in the up-front payment.  (Pa0204).
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................  ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS ..................................................  iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................................................  4 LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................  6 POINT I.  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW (Raised Below: Da60)  .........................  6 POINT II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AN OSTENSIBLE LACK OF A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE CFLA PRECLUDES ASSERTION OF THE CFLA AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Raised Below: Da61)  .....................  8 POINT III.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CFLA DOES NOT FURTHER INTERESTS OF PUBLIC POLICY (Raised Below: Da61) .................................................................................................  13  CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................
[brief] As explained below, none of these arguments has merit.  A.  Plaintiffs Have Mischaracterized The Trial Court’s Ruling Concerning The Absence of A Transaction Between [...] And [...].  Plaintiffs first contend the trial court erred by determining that a transaction between [...] and [...] was a “required element” of their tortious interference claim.  (Pb16-Pb20).  Plaintiffs have completely mischaracterized the trial court’s ruling.  The trial court never determined that a plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, pursue a tortious interference claim unless the alleged tortious interferer consummates a transaction with the party with whom the plaintiff allegedly had a relationship.
[brief] More importantly, Plaintiff repeatedly testified that she complained to numerous people about her mistreatment, including her supervisor [...], her union, and [...].  See id. at 130:5-7; 141:19-22.  While [...] disputed the nature of the complaints concerning [...]’s conduct, he nonetheless conceded that he received multiple complaints from Plaintiffs and others about her.  See id at 33:11-16; 50:8-12.  The Defendants knowledge of her condition can also be inferred from portions of their own testimony.  For example, [...] admitted during his testimony that it was his normal procedure to find out the reasons they were out on FMLA leave.
[brief] 1.  The Record Unequivocally Demonstrates Plaintiff Complained About What She Reasonably Believed To Be Defendants’ Violation Of Applicable Law and Regulation, Which Is Rooted In Firm Public Policy.  (PA000006-PA000008).  (PA000088).  In their Opposition Brief, Defendants [...]  (“Defendant Allies”), [...] (“Defendant Smullen”), [...] (“Defendant Wilson”), [...] (“Defendant Kreeger”), [...] (“Defendant Bogden”), and [...] (“Defendant Cocuso”) (collectively the “Defendants”) largely misconstrue Plaintiff’s Complaint to self-servingly assert the authority cited by Plaintiff does not “closely relate” to the complained of conduct, and does not create a “substantial nexus” between the complained of conduct and the law.
[brief] Density Variance**  The substantial credible evidence of record does not support the Board’s denial of Plaintiff’s application for density variance relief pursuant to *N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(5)*, thereby mandating reversal pursuant to the Municipal Land Use Law.  *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-70(d) provides that a board of adjustment shall have the power to:  In particular cases for special reasons, grant a variance to allow departure from regulations pursuant to article 8 of this act to permit:  (1)  A use or principal structure in a district restricted against such use or principal structure, (2) an expansion of a nonconforming use, (3) deviation from a specification or standard pursuant to section 54 of P.L. 1975, c.  291 (C.40:55D-67) pertaining solely to a conditional use, (4) an increase in the permitted floor area ratio as defined in section 3.1 of P.L. 1975, c. 291 (C.40:55D-4), (5) an increase in the permitted density as defined in section 3.1 of P.L. 1975, c. 291 (C.40:55D-4), except as applied to the required lot area for a lot or lots for detached one or two dwelling unit buildings, which lot or lots either an isolated undersized lot or lots resulting from a minor subdivision or (6) a height of a principal structure which exceeds by 10 feet or 10% the maximum height permitted in the district for a principal structure.  A variance under this subsection shall be granted only by affirmative vote of at least five members, in the case of a municipal board, or two-thirds of the full authorized membership, in the case of a regional board, pursuant to article 10 (C.40:55D-77 et seq.) of this act.  An application for a (d) variance can only be granted when both the positive and negative criteria of the statute are satisfied.
[brief] .................................................................  40  Malaker Corp. Stockholders Protective Comm. v. First Jersey Nat’l Bank, 163 N.J. Super. 497(App. Div. 1978), certif. denied, 79 N.J. 488, 401 A.2d 243 (1979)  ..............................................  30 Mitchell v. Charles P. Procini, D.D.S. P.A., 331 N.J. Super. 445 (App. Div. 2000) .......................................  39, 40 Mortgageling Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 336 (1995)  ..................................................................  35 Newmark v. Gimbel’s, Inc., 54 N.J. 585 (1969) ....................................................................  31 Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424 (1997)  ................................................................ passim Oltremare v. ESR Custom Rugs, Inc., 330 N.J. Super. 310 (App. Div. 2000) .......................................  35 Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546 (App. Div. 2017) .......................................  24 Thomas v.  Hargest, 363 N.J. Super. 589 (App. Div. 2013) ....................................... 35 Thorton v. Potamkin Chevrolet, 94 N.J. 1 (1983) ..................................................................... 27 Vacca v. Stika, 21 N.J. 471 (1956) .................................................................. 31 Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 220 N.J. 591 (2015) ................................................................ 26 Statutes & Other Authorities: Rule 4:5-1 ................................................................................ passim Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) ....................................................................... passim Rule 4:28 .................................................................................. 26 Rule 4:29-1(b) ......................................................................... 26 Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, R. 4:30A (2023) .............. 32 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This matter arises from an appeal of Defendants/Respondents', [...] and [...] (hereinafter "Respondent", “Defendant” or "[...]") Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 4:5-1 and the Entire Controversy Doctrine.
[brief] Indeed, Plaintiff admitted 27 of the 28 Statement of Facts proffered by Defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment.  (Pa217-218)  Plaintiff purported to deny the following single statement.  12.  In that [written] statement, Defendant [...] never uses the word misogynist.  However, Plaintiff did not and could not point to the written statement for his denial; instead he pointed to his Certification generally without reference to any particular paragraph and argued that “recorded pre and post commencement posted YouTube Milburn TC meeting videos provide a different historical context[.]”  Plaintiff’s response did not refute the proffered Statement of Fact No. 12 (Pa217)  Accordingly, SOF No. 12 was deemed admitted because it was not refuted by any evidence in the motion record.
[brief] Order of the U.S. District Court remanding action, filed September 27, 2022.................................................................Pa96  Order Staying Action, filed January 6, 2023 ..............................................Pa103  Plaintiff’s Submission of transcript and collection letter in *Stromberg v. [...]*, Case [...] (D.N.J.), filed March 3, 2023 .........................................................Pa104  Publications cited as Other Authorities in the Table of Authorities: National Consumer Law Center, *National Public Data Breach Shows Urgent Need for CFPB to Regulate Data Brokers* (Aug. 19, 2024)
[brief] Medical documentation provided by Plaintiff showed that Plaintiff lied about her exposure to mold as testing performed by [...] on or about February 7, 2019, was negative for mold exposure.  (Pa 133, 26)  The same test results did show that Plaintiff was highly allergic to dogs, cats, and dust mites.  (Pa133, 27).  That Plaintiff was suffering from an allergic reaction to dogs is not surprising considering she owned one at the time of the loss (Pa133, 28).  Moreover, Plaintiff’s modeling records that she produced demonstrate that Plaintiff did in fact secure various modeling jobs for which she received compensation from January 19, 2019, through December 27, 2022.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiff [...] (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against the [...] (“City” or “Defendant”) alleging that he suffered injury on March 26, 2015, when he drove his trailer into a railroad bridge on Avenue P in Newark.  Plaintiff alleges that he drove into the bridge because of a missing sign that warned of the bridge’s clearance.  The trial court erroneously allowed the case to proceed to trial despite the lack of notice to the City required to impose liability.  The City seeks to undo the manifest error by the trial court in denying summary judgment and not granting a directed verdict, ignoring controlling precedent, the plain language and spirit of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (“TCA”), and the absence of any facts suggesting that the City had notice of the missing sign.
[brief] The intervenor, [...] through its principal, [...] has and had a close personal and business relationship with the Plaintiff [...] and their tax portfolio manager [...].  Accordingly, 341 Connecticut LLC and their principal [...] are not bona fide purchasers for value without notice.  Clearly this statement was designed to mislead the Court into believing that [...] and [...] were simply an unknowing third party Buyer and that they should be afforded protection as a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value without notice.  The evidence clearly shows otherwise.  Plaintiff Poppy/Schwab’s Knowledge of [...]’s Desire to Redeem Prior to Their Sale of the Property to Frenkel/[...].
[brief] [...] had taken the firearm out of his gun safe because “the safe was starting to rust the weapon” and stored the rifle in his bedroom closet.  (6T123-16 to 125-10, 125-19 to 21, 126-10 to 16).  He owned two magazines for the rifle, each holding fifteen rounds of 7.62 millimeter caliber bullets.  (6T124-13 to 20).  He kept the rifle, the ammunition, and the magazines in separate areas.  (6T124-21 to 125-4).  To [...]’s knowledge, his brother had never handled the firearm before that night.  (6T124-7 to 12).  The trigger of the semi-automatic rifle required five pounds of pressure to release the firing mechanism.  (8T233-4 to 234-6).  A single bullet is fired each time the trigger is pulled.  (8T226-15 to 19).  As the bullet travels out of the barrel, the next cartridge in the magazine automatically loads and the weapon is ready to be fired by another pull of the trigger.  (8T225-7 to 21).  The rifle was equipped with a safety mechanism which required the user to manually push the lever all the way down before the rifle can be fired.  (8T226-20 to 227-8).
[brief] Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that "falsifying misconduct reports in retaliation for an inmate's resort to legal process is a violation of the First Amendment's guarantee of free access to the courts.").  Kadonsky v. N.J. Dep't of Corr. DOCKET NO. [...] (App. Div. Oct. 30, 2015) (Pa 459-470)