ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The issue goes to weight and not admissibility.  [...]'s opinion passes muster under the proper exercise of the court's gatekeeping rule.  By excluding [...]’s opinions as “net opinion,” the court substituted itself as the fact finder and deprived the owner of his right to have a jury decide the just compensation to which he was entitled.  The court had indicated that a Rule 104 hearing would be held and one should have been held.  Saddle River v. 66 East Allendale, 216 N.J. 115, 142-143 (2013)  Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the court below erred in excluding Mr. [...]’s opinion as net opinion.
[brief] Appellants claim that parents’ fundamental rights are infringed when the school “actively concealed” certain information from them, (Db20), but that runs into two bedrock limits.  First, while courts “recognized the parental liberty interest” has been infringed when “the state actor compelled interference in the parent-child relationship,” a failure to affirmatively provide information about their child does not violate a fundamental right.  Anspach, 504 F.3d at 262, 266.  After all, not providing information does not prevent parents from guiding or raising their children as they see fit; at most, the State failed to “assist … the parents or affirmatively foster the parent/child relationship,” assistance to which the parent has no fundamental right in the first place.  Id. at 266.  Federal courts have disposed of similar challenges on this basis.
[brief] Unpublished Decision, Puleo v. [...] (Exhibit L to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts) ………………Ja169-Ja173 17.  Trial Court’s Order Denying Plaintiff’s Relief, issued on March 18, 2024, considered Nunc Pro Tunc to February 9, 2024 ……………………………Ja174 18.  Notice of Appeal, filed March 22, 2024 ……………………………Ja175-Ja177 19.  Case Information Statement, filed March 22, 2024 ………………Ja178-Ja181 20.  Amended Notice of Appeal, filed March 26, 2024 ………………Ja182-Ja185 21.  Amended Case Information Statement, filed March 26, 2024 …………………………………………………Ja186-Ja189 22.  Certification of Transcript Completion and Delivery, filed April 2, 2024 ………………………………………………………Ja190 23.
[brief] One of the principal credibility calls that the jury had to make in this case was to decide if, in January 2016, defendant had falsely reported his NJSP wallet ID to be stolen, and then retained that ID when he surrendered all his other IDs at the time of his suspension in September 2016.  That was a tough thing for the State to prove.  In January 2016, defendant had no idea he was being investigated for criminal behavior, so his motive to have an extra ID on-hand was seemingly non-existent; moreover, despite a thorough search of defendant’s person, house, and car, that original wallet ID was never found.  The State’s response to that difficult dearth of actual proof was to figuratively put its thumb on the credibility scale with the introduction of inadmissible evidence: the lay opinion of [...], the NJSP Bureau Chief in charge of internal investigations who supervised the investigation into the allegations regarding the wallet ID.  Bureau Chief Barlow testified:  “What we came to realize was that once [defendant] turned over the credit card ID or the wallet ID, he now had a second one, which was inevitably the first one which he [had] reported stolen or missing.  So we knew he was in possession of one. ”  (12T 97-4 to 9)  (emphasis added)  Because the New Jersey Supreme Court has been very clear that such opinion testimony, from a lay witness, is utterly inadmissible when the topic is a matter, such as the characterization or interpretation of a particular person’s actions, that is exclusively within the province of the jury to decide based merely on the factual evidence it has heard, and because this particular improper lay opinion was offered to bolster the State’s case on the most critical factual dispute before this jury, not only was N.J.R.E. 701 clearly violated, but defendant was also denied due process and a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment and the state constitution.  Consequently, defendant’s convictions should be reversed, and the matter remanded for retrial.
[brief] The trial court properly sentenced defendant.  The trial court properly sentenced defendant, and defendant’s sentence is neither excessive nor should it shock the judicial conscience.  The court properly considered defendant’s prior arrests and convictions, found and balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors, and properly noted the need for deterrence.  Defendant was properly sentenced.  “It is well settled that when reviewing a trial court's sentencing decision, ‘[a]n appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. ’”  State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 386 (2003) (quoting State v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 10, 15 (1990); State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215 (1989)).  This Court may only modify a sentence when the trial court’s discretion was “clearly mistaken. ”  Ibid.; State v. Jabbour, 118 N.J. 1, 6 (1990); State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 401 (1989).  With this limitation in mind, an appellate court can: (a) review sentences to determine if the legislative policies, here the sentencing guidelines, were violated; (b) review the aggravating and mitigating factors found below to determine whether those factors were based upon competent credible evidence in the record; and (c) determine whether, even though the court sentenced in accordance with the guidelines, nevertheless the application of the guidelines to the facts of this case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience.  Evers, 175 N.J. at 387; Jabbour, 118 N.J. at 6 ; State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 364–65 (1984).  “[I]n sentencing, the Code ‘channel[s] the discretion of trial courts’ by focusing on the gravity of the offense rather than the offender's blameworthiness or capacity for rehabilitation.
[brief] **POINT I**  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT THE CONSENT ORDER BARS THE INSTANT LITIGATION  [Pa1 – Pa13]  New Jersey law is clear that a court lacks the authority to rewrite the express terms of a contract merely because it may be functionally desirable to draft it differently.  *Brick Tp. Municipal Utilities Authority v. Diversified R. B. & T. Const. Co., Inc.*, 171 N.J. Super. 397, 402 (App. Div. 1979).  In that same light, a court may not alter a contract for the benefit of one party and to the detriment of the other.  *James v. Federal Ins. Co.*, 5 N.J. 21, 24 (1950); *Trinity Church v. Lawson-Bell*, 394 N.J.  Super. 159, 170 (App. Div. 2007) (“Normally we will enforce a contract freely negotiated at arms' length and will not make a better contract for the parties than that for which they bargained”); *Kaur v. Assured Lending Corp.*, 405 N.J. Super. 468, 477 (App. Div. 2009) (explaining that courts will “‘not rewrite contracts in order to provide a better bargain than contained in [the parties] writing. ’”).  Certainly, the Consent Order cannot be “re-written,” so as to help [...] avoid liability for his clear and unabashed abuse of our legal system.
[brief] 46  TABLE OF APPENDIX  Motor-Vehicle Offenses .......................................................... Pa1 to 6 State v. Cantalupo, No. A-4142-16T2, 2019 WL 149654 (App. Div. Jan. 8, 2019) ......................... Pa7 to 16 State v. Mauro, No. A-2085-09T3, 2011 WL 2307256 (App. Div. May 31, 2011) ...................... Pa17 to 22 United States v. Jones, 260 Fed App’x 769, 772-74 (6th Cir. 2008) .... Pa23 to 28 United States v. Boyce, No. 1:10-CR-62-TLS, 2011 WL 1085792 (N.D. Ind. March 21, 2011) ................. Pa29 to 35 United States v. Burnett, No. 21-68-DLB-CJS, 2022 WL 17828325 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 23, 2022) ..................... Pa36 to 41 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).................................................................................. 28, 29, 30, 33 California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983).................................................................................... 27 District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577 (2018)....................................................................................... 15 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)....................................................................................... 39
[directive] All Municipal Prosecutors FROM: [...], Attorney General  SUBJECT: Attorney General Guidelines -- Prosecution of Shoplifting Offenses  DATE: January 16, 2001  I.  Introduction  On April 28, 2000, P.L. 2000, Ch. 16 was enacted amending statutes regarding shoplifting.  (Copy attached).  The Act created a grading system for shoplifting offenses, provided for mandatory terms of community service and a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 90 days for a third or subsequent shoplifting offense.  The Act also provides that the Attorney General shall develop guidelines for the prosecution of shoplifting offenses no later than the 120th day after the effective date of the Act.  The guidelines are intended to ensure that the prosecution of shoplifting offenses is conducted in a uniform manner throughout the State.  P.L. 2000, Ch. 16, § 2.  In accordance with this statutory mandate, the provisions contained herein shall govern the prosecution of shoplifting offenses throughout the State.  These guidelines shall apply to the prosecution of shoplifting offenses in Superior and Municipal Courts and shall also apply to the prosecution of juveniles for shoplifting in the Family Part, to the extent provided in paragraph V below.
[brief] Additionally, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2a(1), defendant need not have caused actual public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm to be found guilty of disorderly conduct.  The statute also encompasses a risk of “public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm,” by engaging in fighting, threatening or in violent or tumultuous behavior.  Defendant threatened [...] and used racial epithets at him while in an area of her father’s yard that was open to the street.  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(b) defines public as “affecting or likely to affect persons in a place to which the public or a substantial group has access; among the places included are highways… or any neighborhood.
[brief] To assess whether recusal is required, "[i]n DeNike, the Court stated the key question that must be answered when a claim is made challenging a judge's impartiality is, 'Would a reasonable, fully informed person have doubts about the judge's impartiality?'"  P.M. v. N.P., 441 N.J. Super. 127, 145 (App. Div. 2015) (second alteration in original) (quoting DeNike, 196 N.J. at 517.  See also In re Advisory Letter No. 7-11 of the Supreme Court Advisory Comm., 213 N.J. 63, 73 (2013) (finding that "the overarching objective of the Code of Judicial Conduct is to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.").
[brief] Da350.  In that Decision, the Trial Court found as a part of the “Salient and Undisputed/Undisputable Material Facts” portion of the “Statement of Reasons” that The Original PSA contained material misrepresentations regarding the agreements with [...].  For instance, Section 10(c) of the Original PSA, titled “No Other Contracts,” falsely states that “[t]o the best of Seller’s knowledge, there are no existing or claimed purchase contracts, rights of first refusal or special assessments affecting the Property. ”  This was a materially false term.  Ibid.  Da366.  Here, the Trial Court, in its statement of undisputed facts, includes the Trial Court’s finding of fact within the context of a Motion for Summary Judgment, or, alternatively, finds as a matter of law, that provision 10 (c) of the PSA was a “materially false term”.  Da366.  Reference to multiple misrepresentations is not expanded upon because nothing could possibly be characterized in the PSA as a “misrepresentation. ”  The statement that this provision of the Original PSA constituted a “materially false term” was the Trial Court’s conclusion, not an undisputed or undisputable fact.  Da366.
[brief] It is absurd to posit that because defendant's e-mails mention “[...]” or “[...] Montana,” instead of “[...]hur Montana,” that defendant did not have a duty to produce relevant e-mails between [...] and [...] that mentioned plaintiff.  Defendant should have undertaken a search for e-mails mentioning “[...]” or “[...] Montana” even if plaintiff did not specifically identify these precise terms.  If the search term “[...]hur Montana” was not sufficient to pick up references to “[...]” or “[...] Montana,” defendant should have known this and taken steps to expand its search.  It is stupefying that in December 2012, the Court had to Order defendant to conduct an ESI search for documents mentioning “[...]” and “[...] Montana,” and that the search identified relevant documents. at that late date that were not already produced.  The Court would be flabbergasted if plaintiff did not rightfully assume that his designation of the search term “[...]hur Montana” did not also subsume a search for “[...]”, “[...] Montana” and “Montana. ”  Defendant protests that “[e]lectronic discovery is not easy.
[directive] 1.  Você entende que deverá se submeter a um exame psicológico realizado pelo [Sim/Yes] [Não/No]  [...] ([...]), cuja finalidade é determinar se sua conduta ao cometer o crime caracterizou-se por um padrão de comportamento reincidente e compulsivo e, em caso afirmativo, se você aceita (se beneficiar de) um tratamento para agressores sexuais e se está disposto a participar deste tratamento?
[brief] *Downtown Residents for Sane Dev. v. City of Hoboken*, 242 N.J. Super. 329, 332 (App. Div. 1990).  In reviewing a redevelopment plan approval, “[i]t is wholly inappropriate for any court to substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body of the city in an area appropriate for legislative determination, or to interpose, without clear and convincing reason to do so[.]”  *Id.* at 340 (citation omitted).  To set aside an approved redevelopment plan, the challenger must prove that the “legislative decisions made must be more than debatable, they must be shown to be arbitrary or capricious, contrary to law, or unconstitutional. ”  *Downtown.*, 242 N.J. Super. at 332 (citing *Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of W. Orange*, 68 N.J. 543, 564 (1975)); *Powerhouse Arts Dist. Neighborhood Ass’n v. City Council of City of Jersey City* (“PADNA”), 413 N.J. Super. 322, 332 (App. Div. 2010) (citation omitted).  To that end, “[w]hen two actions are open to a municipal body, municipal action is not arbitrary and capricious if exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even if an erroneous conclusion is reached.
[brief] As His Honor explained:  I recognize that the sentence [from the 2018 Opinion] “We are convinced the court erred by finding that all of [...]’s and [...]’s claims rested on the same common core of operative facts,” taken in isolation, would tend to demonstrate otherwise.\textsuperscript{14}  However, once the context of the sentence is reintroduced, it demonstrates that the basis for that decision was the Trial Court’s \textsuperscript{14}  [...]’ assertion that “the Special Master disregarded the Court’s opinion” (Db34) obviously but characteristically is patently false.  failure to draw its conclusion with the correct statute of limitations for RICO damages in mind.  Defendants also argue that the Appellate Division’s decision not to affirm the attorney fee award demonstrates that the Appellate Division disagrees with this outcome.
[directive] Slip and Fall  1.  Is anyone a tenant?  2.  Is anyone a landlord? Commercial? Residential?  3.  Is anyone a homeowner?  4.  Have you or a family member or close personal friend ever been involved …as either a plaintiff or a defendant…in a slip and fall accident in which an injury resulted?  Type of accident? Location? Injuries? Lawsuit? Settled? Tried?  Was the resolution of the claim satisfactory?  Would it affect your ability to be fair and impartial?  5.  Have you or a family member or close personal friend ever been involved in litigation or filed a claim of any sort?  6.  Have you or a family member or close personal friend sustained an injury to the _______ or have chronic problems with __________?  Standards for Jury Selection Promulgated by Directive #21-06 (December 11, 2006)  Page 26 of 29
[brief] Our courts have found that the relationship between a student and his college (or university) is not to be analyzed in strict contractual terms.  Mittra v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey, 316 N.J. Super. 83 (App. Div. 1998).  Under New Jersey law, courts must give substantial deference to the principles of institutional integrity and independence, especially where the institution is a private institution, such as [...].  State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535 (1980); Napolitano v. Princeton Univ. Trustees, 186 N.J. Super. 548, 567 (App. Div. 1982); Clayton v. Trustees of Princeton Univ., 608 F. Supp. 413 (D.N.J. 1985).
[brief] vehicular and pedestrian traffic that can help mask any illicit activity. ”  (Sb 5)  - Defendant “leaned through the window” of a car “with at least one arm for a few seconds,” then the driver of that car, [...], drove to an isolated area of the parking lot, parked, and looked down, which [...]’s “experience” told him could be related to drug activity because “he is aware that users will often examine the CDS they have just purchased and believed that was what [...] was doing. ”  (Sb 5) - “[H]e noticed [...] was leaning down and then quickly picking his head up, which [...] testified to him to be ‘indicative of [[...]] snorting something. ’”  (Sb 5-6) - “Believing he had observed a CDS-transaction between defendant and [...] based on his training and experience,” [...] followed [...]’s car and “requested the team. . . approach defendant upon his leaving the [...].
[brief] ’” (2018 Op. at *25).  [...] improperly had tolled the SOL applicable to [...]’s RICO and non-RICO claims (its “SOL Ruling”).  Specifically and only as a result, this Court directed the Chancery Division to: (i) re-calculate the damages to be awarded to [...] on both his RICO and non-RICO claims; (ii) determine whether the Court’s SOL Ruling required recalculation of [...]’s NJRICO attorney’s fee award; and (iii) determine whether [...]’s decision to award punitive damages against [...] at a multiple of 2.5 times compensatory damages was still appropriate.  In sum, the prior panel of this Court did not question [...]’s entitlement to be awarded punitive damages based upon [...]’ malicious conduct; to the contrary, it confirmed same.
[brief] ”  *DiProspero v. Penn*, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (citing *Chasin v. Montclair State Univ.*, 159 N.J. 418, 426-27 (1999).  When determining legislative intent from a statute’s language, “words and phrases shall be read and construed with their context, and shall, unless inconsistent with the manifest intent of the [L]egislature or unless another of different meaning is expressly indicated, be given their generally accepted meaning, according to the approved usage of the language.
[brief] *Naffis v. Xerox Educ.Servs, LLC (In re Naffis)*, 2019 Bankr.LEXIS 323, *14, 2019 WL 470199.  Those cases clearly illustrated the concept that Plaintiff must prove damage sustained in addition to breach of duty in the underlying case, even if the Defendant attorney missed the statute of limitation.  \(^10\)
[brief] *Id.* at 241.  The *Vastano* Court explained that the accrual date is not governed by the date when the plaintiffs actually learned of the uncommunicated settlement offer if that information was reasonably discoverable at an earlier time.  *Id.* at 241-242.  Similar to the facts set forth in *Vastano*, here, Plaintiffs received the AG Notice in March of 2014, which notified Plaintiffs that [...] was not properly registered with the Charities Registration and Investigations Unit of the New Jersey Office of the Attorney General.  However, Plaintiffs did not initiate the within action until August of 2023, nine (9) years after receiving the AG Notice and three and a half (3 ½ ) years after the AG filed the AG Action.  Specifically, between 2014 and 2020, despite having been placed on notice, Plaintiffs did nothing.  As provided by the Trial Court in its reasoning, “it seems like they got the letter and did nothing about it. ” (T1 15:18).  Further, like in *Vastano*, Appellants “possessed all the information necessary to reveal [the] malpractice” when they received the AG Notice in March of 2014.
[directive] ...................................................................................................................80  VIOLATIONS ........................................................................................80  POLICY PLEA ESCALATING 12.  ...............................................................................80  Considerations  Policy General 12.1 ......................................................................83  Policies Plea Escalating of Issuance 12.2 .................................................................................................83 .  Features Required 12.3 ..........................................................................................84  Supervisors Designated 12.4 ..................................................................85  Rights Victims' with Adherence Strict 12.5 .................................................................................................85  Enforcement Strict 12.6 ........................................................................85 .  Offers Plea Judicial Unauthorized 12.7 ..........................................86  LAW REFORM BAIL OF INTERPRETATION