ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Images of fingerprints lifted from the countertop of the display case were delivered to the New Jersey State Police Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) Unit.  An analysis of those latent fingerprints produced a positive match with an inked impression of [...]'s left middle finger and left index finger.  The catalog, photocopy, and post-it were also delivered to the AFIS Unit where they were processed and analyzed.  A latent fingerprint image detected on one side of the photocopy revealed a positive match with an inked impression of [...]'s left middle finger.  Approximately one month after the robbery the police prepared a photo array for the victims' viewing, which included [...]'s image.  On August 22, 2007, [...] and [...] visited [...] and [...] at [...].  Each victim was separately shown a differently-arranged photo array book containing six photographs.  While neither [...] nor [...] were able to make a positive identification at that time, [...] did state that photograph number four in his photo array book resembled the taller robber.  Similarly, [...] stated that photograph number three in her photo array book looked like the taller robber, but that she could not be certain.  One week later, on August 30, 2007, [...] presented [...] with a second photo array book from which [...] identified [...] as “the one that had the gun.
[brief] Monroe v. Meeks, 584 F. Supp. 3d 643 (S.D. Ill. 2022) ..........................................................10  N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)  ..................................................................................7  New York Times Co.  v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ..................................................................................7  Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997) ..................................................................24  Ovando v. City of Los Angeles, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (C.D. Cal. 2000)  .......................................................19  Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979)  ................................................................. passim Patel v. Searles, 305 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2002)  .........................................................  19  Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)  ..................................................................  18, 19 Pinson v. Hadaway, No. 18-CV-3420-NEB-KMM, 2020 WL 6121357 (D. Minn. July 13, 2020)....10  Porter v. Allbaugh, No. 18-CV-0472-JED-FHM, 2019 WL 2167415 (N.D. Okla. May 17, 2019)  ...10  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) .................................................................. 21, 22 Ricard v. USD 475  Geary Cnty., KS Sch. Bd., No. 522CV04015HLTGEB, 2022 WL 1471372 (D. Kan. May 9, 2022).....  16, 28 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) ..................................................................  15  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) .................................................................. 20  Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000) .........................................................  23 T.F. v. Kettle Moraine School Dist., No. 2021CV1650, 2023 WL 6544917 (Wis. Cir. Oct. 03, 2023)
[brief] I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.  CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION  [...] AND [...], H/W, Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...], [...], [...] AND [...], Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION On Appeal
[brief] ”  Here, the expert’s conclusion that the infant’s death resulting from shaking could only be homicide merely reiterated and underscored his opinion that death in this case resulted from shaking, rather than by accident or by intentional causes.  We note [...] did not contend that he accidentally shook the baby to death.  Rather, his defense was that the baby fell and struck his head on the floor.  Under these circumstances, the expert’s testimony did not improperly invade the province of the jury.
[brief] (3T4:11-17; Aa14).  [...] then testified on behalf of the State and began his testimony where he left off during the pretrial hearing.  [...] testified that he is a certified Alcotest operator.  (3T7:4-19; Aa62-Aa63).  [...] then testified that he reviewed the implied consent law with defendant and that defendant agreed to provide samples.  (3T7:21 to 3T8:20; Aa64).  [...] originally attempted to complete the Alcotest in [...], but the Alcotest machine had a control test failure.
[brief] Defendant’s Brief does not dispute the Complaint alleged three of the four elements for a debt collector’s liability under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).  The fourth element is that Defendant’s conduct violates at least one FDCPA provision.  The two independent bases for Defendant’s liability are addressed in Points II and III but we first address Defendant’s standing challenge.  POINT I.  Plaintiff Has Standing to Seek Statutory Damages for Defendant’s Violation of the FDCPA.
[brief] “Db” refers to Defendant’s Brief.  “Da” refers to Defendant’s Appendix.  “Pa” refers to the State’s Appendix.  1T – transcript dated October 6, 2009, Volume I.  2T – transcript dated October 6, 2009, Volume II.  3T – transcript dated October 7, 2009.  4T – transcript dated October 14, 2009.  5T – transcript dated October 15, 2009, Volume I.  6T – transcript dated October 15, 2009, Volume II.  7T – transcript dated October 20, 2009.  8T – transcript dated October 20, 2009.  9T – transcript dated October 21, 2009.  10T – transcript dated October 22, 2009.  11T – transcript dated October 27, 2009.  12T – transcript dated October 28, 2009.  13T – transcript dated October 29, 2009.  14T – transcript dated January 12, 2010.  15T – transcript dated September 12, 2018.  16T – transcript dated March 21, 2019.  17T – transcript dated July 27, 2021.  18T – transcript dated May 5, 2023.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] all testified that they either had not made or received any complaints about [...] and that they were not aware of any complaints about [...] or [...] made to [...].  Pa252a-53a; Pa256a; Pa267a; Pa194a-95a, 196a-97a, 216a; Pa244a-45a; Pa284a.  In fact, only one [...] employee, [...], testified that he told anyone at [...] about concerns with [...] prior to the accident, and he only voiced his concerns approximately one week before the accident.  Pa223a-24a; Pa1473a-74a; Pa1536a.  Additionally, [...] had no control over [...]’s selection of sweeper operators/drivers; the Sweeping Vendors Agreement that [...] entered into with [...], on or about December 10, 2013, provided that “[t]he full cost and responsibility for recruiting, hiring, verifying compliance, training, terminating and compensating employees and/or operators/drivers shall be borne by [[...]].”
[brief] 1T 5:12-16.  A correct reading of the facts in the Complaint and Plaintiffs’ briefs clearly shows that the transaction at issue is no different than any other simple transaction – that is, there is a buyer (Plaintiffs) and there were sellers.  The [...] transaction is a simple transaction in which Plaintiffs were the buyer, there was a seller, and [...] in concert with non-attorney co-conspirator Defendants, by their fraudulent acts, wrongfully took transactional proceeds.  While Plaintiffs strongly oppose the Trial Court’s erroneous finding that the subject transaction was in fact a complex, multi-party transaction, the complexity or simplicity of the underlying transaction is actually not even relevant to the Tort Claims.  Even assuming arguendo the underlying transaction was complex, the only facts relevant to proving liability for Plaintiffs’ Tort Claims was the act of wrongfully taking Plaintiffs’ money.  This was the separate factual predicate for Plaintiffs’ Tort Claims which does not implicate a deviation from the professional standard of care.  [...]’s tortious acts in concert with non-attorney co-conspirator  Defendants are simply and completely estranged from anything resembling legal work.  In fact, non-attorneys participated in and perpetrated the same simple, wrongful acts, and those same Tort Claims against them survived and proceeded to trial where the parties reached a settlement.
[directive] 15  USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum B | December 2021  Vehicular Pursuit Policy (e) an analysis of all pursuits determined to not be in compliance with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, or agency policy, and the steps taken to address the non-compliance.  12.3  Based on that thorough review, the law enforcement executive shall determine whether changes in departmental structure, policy, training, or equipment are appropriate.
[brief] [...] found it unnecessary to make calculations to reach his conclusions related to the increased vulnerability from a low frequency (50 year) storm.  (Da460: 6-461:9; Da464: 1-21)  Plaintiff’s expert referred to the Owen Method but did not provide any calculations and assumed the waves hit the revetment at an exact perpendicular angle.  (Da484: 19-22; Da490: 3-9)  To quantify when overtopping would occur at the subject property depends on the accuracy required and could be a multi-months, very intense investigation.
[directive] The law enforcement executive’s decision, or the decision of the designee, shall be memorialized and retained in the use-of-force investigative file; and (f)  After the review is completed, supervisory and/or training officers should examine and analyze the use of force incident, including any body-worn or other video evidence, with the officer as a training tool.  This examination should analyze the circumstances that led to the use of force as well as the force that was used, so that the officer can gain insight into which tactics and decisions were effective and whether different tactics or decisions could have been used to improve the outcome.  7.6
[brief] 2T= September 27, 2022(motion)  3T= September 27, 2022 (jury selection)  4T= September 28, 2022 (preliminary jury selection)  5T= September 28, 2022 (jury selection)  6T= September 29, 2022 (preliminary jury selection)  7T= September 29, 2022 (jury selection volume 1)  8T= September 29, 2022 (jury selection volume 2)  9T= October 6, 2022 (jury selection and in limine rulings)  10T= October 6, 2022 (trial)  11T= October 12, 2022 (trial)  12T= October 13, 2022 (trial)  13T= October 18, 2022 (trial)  14T= October 19, 2022 (trial)  15T= October 20, 2022 (verdict)  16T= January 6, 2023 (sentencing)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[directive] Restraining Order  Bail on a disorderly persons contempt must also be set by a Superior Court Judge unless the Assignment Judge of the Vicinage has issued an order giving Municipal Court Judges the Disorderly Persons $500 to $2,500  No 10% authority to set bail if the contempt is a disorderly persons offense.  See footnote 1, page 16 herein.  Actor possesses or uses an electronic communication device or a battery or device to 2nd Degree $50,000 to $100,000 10% permissible recharge an electronic communication device while confined to a state correctional facility, Use of Certain 2C:29-10(b)(c)(d) secure juvenile facility, county correctional facility, or county juvenile detention facility, third Electronic Devices in degree; person, other than an employee of said facilities who knowingly sells, transfers, or Correctional Facilities otherwise gives an electronic communication device to a person who is confined in one of 3rd Degree $10,000 to $50,000 10% permissible said facilities, third degree; if the actor is an employee of said facilities, then second degree.
[brief] While there is no doubt but that an award of attorney's fees and sanctions was necessary, the Judge who ultimately heard the final application arbitrarily and without justification reduced the requested fees for the legal work covering the preceding 16 months based solely on the Court’s objection to the fees sought to prepare the final application to the Court.  That application was comprehensive and extensive in order to correct the distortions presented to the new Judge by [...] pertaining to the preceding two (2) years of complex litigation.  In those sixteen (16) months, legal fees in the amount of $125,716 were incurred of which only $34,768 was related to the final application presented to [...].  $90,948 was incurred in proceedings before [...] and prior to the final application.  Clearly, during the sixteen-month period [...] and the [...] were acting in bad faith.  [...] only awarded $44,000 in fees for the entire period.  Assuming arguendo that the entirety of the final application was unnecessary, a conclusion that is not be supported by the facts or law, then the award of fees should have been no less than $90,948 not $44,000.  With regard to the $34,768 incurred for the final application, those fees and costs were absolutely necessary and legally justifiable.  These fees were necessary not only because of the history and complexity of the case, but because of the extent of the misconduct and misleading filings by [...] and her legal team.  The motion Judge's reduction of the $125,716 was arbitrary and capricious.  There was no explanation provided at all for most of the $81,716 that was eliminated from the request.  The Court essentially discounted most of the prior 16 months of protracted litigation with no basis and thus the reduced order constitutes an abuse of discretion.  The fees sought were legally justifiable and necessary, due to the extensive misconduct of [...] and counsel set forth in [...]’s opinion, and thus there was no basis for a reduction.  D.
[brief] Rivers v. LSC Partnership, 378 N.J. Super. 68, 80 (App. Div.), certif. denied.  185 N.J. 296 (2005) (citation omitted).  Several cases have held “judicial discretion connotes conscientious judgment, not arbitrary action; it takes into account the law and the particular circumstances of the case before the court. ”  U.S. Bank National Association v. Williams, 415 N.J. Super. 358, 365 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Higgins v. Polk, 14 N.J. 490, 493 (1954); Devito v. Sheeran, 165 N.J. 167, 198 (2000)).  Such determinations should not be overturned unless the trial court “palpably abused its discretion, that is, its finding was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted. ”  Ibid. (quoting Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480, 492 (1999)).  The New Jersey Supreme Court firmly endorsed the trial Court’s broad discretion to enter this order: “We leave to the competent hands of the trial courts how to address the Policy Statement if a particular neuropsychologist raises it in a particular case.
[brief] The decision on appeal should be reversed, because the finding that the [...] (“[...]”) was an entity authorized to withdraw from Appellants [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively “Appellants”) pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a) was contrary to the explicit statutory language.  The opposition briefs filed by Respondents the [...] (“[...]”) and the [...] (“[...]”) (collectively “Respondents”) do not set forth a reasonable justification for expanding the class of entities enumerated in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a) to include an eliminated former non-operating school district.  The statute does not include the municipalities of eliminated former non-operating districts such as [...].  Respondents argue that the [...] is entitled to heightened deference in decisions interpreting educational statutes, and therefore the decision should only be reversed if it is plainly unreasonable.  Further, they claim that the [...] has interpreted the terms “merged” and “consolidated” to be synonymous.  However, the terms in the statute are not synonymous, and the [...]’s interpretation of N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a) conflicts with the plain statutory language.  That conflict renders the [...]’s interpretation of the statute plainly unreasonable and should therefore be reversed.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
[brief] Defendant also noted that the state never opposed the issue of defendant getting his plea back.  3T9:25-11:12; 3T15:24-17:24.  At oral argument, the State argued, in sum, that there did not appear to be any argument below, and that there were no findings of facts or conclusions of law by the municipal judge with respect to this issue, and therefore, the State could not respond when there wasn’t really anything to respond to.  3T12:20-14:8.  The State further argued that this issue might be something that would be appropriate to remand.  3T12:20-14:8.  The Court agreed the issue was not addressed below and posed the following question to both parties, “[d]o I have enough before me to address the issue regarding whether the defendant should be able to take his plea back?”  3T20:23-25  [...] rejecting the State’s position for a remand, then ruled she would decide the issue of whether defendant’s plea should be vacated and stated,  Regarding the standard of review and Point 2 raised in defendants brief, this Court is satisfied that there – it was raised to the Municipal Court, that the document submitted to the court did acc—both the Municipal court and this court – accurately briefed that issue, the court is satisfied that this court can make a ruling on that point for purposes of this appeal.
[brief] On January 30, 2018, [...] sent a preservation letter to [...] requesting information on a cell phone.  The results did not show the phone registered to [...] having been present in New Jersey.  (15T:46-24 to 47-21; 16T:167-20 to 168-4)  One day after the BB gun shooting on May 29, 2018, police located [...] in Virginia based on his phone “pinging in the area. ”  (16T:66-9 to 25)  No evidence indicated that the phone, which was with [...] at the time of his arrest, had ever been present in New Jersey.  (17T:102-1 to 3)  Police also subpoenaed records for a credit card used by [...] that showed purchases made at hotels and restaurants in Virginia, but did not show [...] ever having made any purchases in New Jersey.  (15T:49-15 to 21; 17T:173-19 to 175-12)  On November 8, 2017, [...] contacted the [...] and [...]’s EZ-Pass came back “negative” for toll violations in New Jersey.
[brief] Plaintiffs effectively waived the right to use them ‘at trial,’ where the ‘trial consisted – by stipulation -solely of trial briefs and oral arguments from the trial brief.  (Pa79; T 6.)  Accord Largoza v. FKM Real Estate Holdings, Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 61, 83-86 (App. Div. 2022) (“Waiver . . . involves the intentional relinquishment of a known right, and thus it must be shown that the party charged with the waiver knew of his or her legal rights and deliberately intended to relinquish them.
[brief] “A mistrial is an extraordinary remedy. ”  State v. Mance, 300 N.J.Super. 37, 57 (App.Div.1997).  It should be granted “only to prevent an obvious failure of justice. ”  State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 205 (1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1085, 120 S.Ct. 811, 145 L. Ed.2d 683 (2000).
[brief] The [...] Tariff, dated 10/30/18, Section 2.5, states the following:  “Selection of Lighting Options: [...] will assist in the selection of lighting options by making recommendations for the most appropriate option based on the customer’s defined illumination needs.  However, responsibility for the final selection shall, at all times, rest with the customer.  Any advice given by [...] will be based on the customer’s statements and by giving such advice, *[...] assumes no responsibility, nor shall it incur liability.*  [(Emphasis added). ]  There is no language in the Tariff setting or enforcing obligations onto [...] for lighting design.
[brief] The indemnity provisions in the contract are enforceable with regard to [...]'s own negligence because they are Azurak compliant.  (Raised below at 1T 15:16-25 to 16:1-11)  There exist precedented guidelines with regard to the interpretation of contract terms by a court in New Jersey.  "Contracts should be read "as a whole in a fair and common sense manner. ’”  *Manahawkin Convalescent v. O’Neill*, 217 N.J. 99,118 (2014).
[brief] Turning to Milltown Planning Objective Three of the Master Plan (“The Borough’s housing obligations should be satisfied through the provision of low and moderate affordable units. ”), [...] testified:  Objective three talks about ... satisfying the borough’s affordable housing obligation through the provision of low and moderate income house units.  [A]nd also the ... 2019 housing element and fair share plan identifies the Ford Avenue site as one of the ... primary mechanisms to accomplish that.  [C]alling for the provision of 70 units to satisfy the -- the borough’s second round obligation and a portion of the borough’s third round obligation.  So certainly the -- the plan is -- is consistent with both of those, both the objective and the reexamination report and the housing element and fair share plan.  [Pa 31, 75 (3:11-24), emphasis added].
[brief] The Eleventh Circuit’s en banc decision concluded there was no subject matter jurisdiction without undermining the panel decisions that the complaint stated a claim for violation of § 1692c(b).  Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., 48 F.4th 1236 (11th Cir. 2022).  Where a decision is vacated on other grounds, its undisturbed decision remains as precedential authority.  See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 870 F.2d 1292, 1298 (7th Cir. 1989) (“the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision on the ground that it was inappropriate for the Federal Circuit, in the interests of justice, to decide the merits of a case over which it did not have jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, there is no indication that the Supreme Court found any error in the Federal Circuit’s decision.  Thus, although vacated, the decision stands as the most comprehensive source of guidance available on the patent law questions at issue in this case.”), Action All. of Senior Citizens v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 77, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Although the Supreme Court vacated our prior opinion, […] it expressed no opinion on the merit of these holdings.  They therefore continue to have precedential weight, and in the absence of contrary authority, we do not disturb them. ”), United States v. Adewani, 467 F.3d 1340, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2006), and United States ex rel. Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117, 125 n.7 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Cty. of L.A. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 646 n.10 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).  Thus, although Hunstein I and II are not binding, they remain as precedential authority with respect to the sufficiency of the mail vendor claim.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Immediately following the dismissal of his federal claims by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, the Plaintiff filed the subject Complaint on April 11, 2024 (Pa004).  The Defendants then filed separate motions to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), based on the statute of limitations.  At the conclusion of oral argument on August 16, 2024, the trial court summarily entered orders granting both motions and dismissed the Complaint with prejudice as time-barred (Pa001-003).  On September 13, 2024, the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal (Pa123-131).
[brief] Attached to [...]'s property claim were documents in support (Aa1; Aa2; Aa7; Aa5; Aa6; Aa7).  [...]'s claim was partially investigated by DOC's personnel [...] (Aa8).  Mendoza recklessly disregarded the two attached Grievances (Aa1; Aa2).  DOC's property claim committee, unknown personnel listed at Social Services, Custody, classification, Business Office and Chairperson each independently reviewed [...]'s submitted with documents and denied the claim on 11-16-22 as no negligence (Aa9; Aa10).  Final review by administrator on Certification of Inmate Claim was also denied on 11-17-22 without reason (Aa11).  Having just cause [...] serviced a Notice of Appeal with papers dated 11-23-22, (Aa12).  See attached Certification (Aa16, Aa17).