ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] factor 12, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(12) (defendant’s willingness to cooperate with law enforcement), because although he gave a statement to the police, “defendant minimized his responsibility in the killings. ” (17T212-20 to 214-10).  He gave “some weight” to mitigating factor 14, N.J.S.A.  2C:44-1b(14) (defendant was under 26 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense), because “even though he’s young in age, which is a number, he’s not young in his evil intent on the day that he committed these offenses. ” (17T214-15 to 216-21).  [...] rejected mitigating factor one, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(1) (defendant’s conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm), because “it is without a doubt that defendant shot and killed four individuals, three of them were his family members.
[brief] Defendant asserts Plaintiff’s allegations of fraud are related to “unfulfilled promises” and “future events,” and therefore, a fraud claim cannot be based upon these allegations.  (Db49).  However, a false representation of an existing intention, i.e., a “false state of mind,” with respect to a future event or action has been held to constitute actionable misrepresentation. ”  Capano v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 530 F. Supp. 1254, 1264 (D.N.J. 1982) (citing Samatula v. Piechota, 142 N.J.Eq. 320, 323, (Ch.1948).  Regardless, Defendant’s statements related to matriculation were related to a present fact, which was that Plaintiff could not matriculate in the program at a later date, despite [...], [...], and [...]’s statements that he could.
[brief] (Pa318)  After extensive discovery, expert reports exchanged and depositions taken, [...] and [...] again renewed their motion to dismiss.  In its decision of July 26, 2019, the Trial Court again dismissed plaintiff’s complaint.  (Pa16)  In so holding, the trial court noted that [...] subcontracted the work for professional engineering services and that the work would be “under the direct supervision of a licensed professional consultant” (Pa19)  After reviewing all the evidence, the Trial Court noted:  “In examining these provisions as they apply to the work performed by [...] and [...], it is clear that their supervision of the project to ensure compliance with [...]’s contractual specifications falls within “professional engineering” …[and]  While it is not contested that [...] is not a licensed professional engineer, it remains exceptionally clear that he was supervised by two separate people, both whom are licenses by the state of New Jersey as professional engineers and that he was performing services that easily fall within “the practice of engineering””.  (Pa29-30)  Despite the fact that [...] was being supervised by two professional engineers and despite the fact that Appellant had previously argued that no affidavit of merit was required by claiming it was only suing [...] and [...], (Pa2317) Appellant, relying on Haviland v. Lourdes Medical Center, 250 N.J. 368 (2022) now claims that no affidavit of merit is needed as Appellant’s claim is against a non-licensed professional.
[brief] Having granted Plaintiff/Appellant [...]’s (“[...]” or “Appellant”) motion seeking leave to file interlocutory appeal, this Appellate Division recognizes the constitutional imperative of providing just compensation to the owner of real property acquired for public use.  For this reason, Appellant was forced to seek interlocutory review of the trial court’s rulings dated June 7, 2024 holding the zoning under the Morris Canal Redevelopment Plan controls the parties’ analysis of the just compensation for [...]’s acquisition of Defendant/Respondent [...]’s (“[...]” or “Respondent”) property via its power of condemnation.  [...] filed its motion seeking to strike Respondent’s appraisal report for failing to account for the risks and costs associated with obtaining multiple use variances based upon the Highest and Best Use, 8-story, mixed-use building containing 95 residential dwelling units and ground floor commercial space, as opined by Respondent’s appraiser.  In arriving at that conclusion, Respondent’s appraiser violated well-established condemnation law; including the Project Influence Doctrine; by applying the zoning under the Morris Canal Development Plan and failing to consider the underlying R-2 zoning in which Respondent’s Property is located.  Respondent’s appraiser testified during his deposition that the zoning under the Morris Canal Development Plan “supersedes” the zoning to which the Property is currently subject.  This methodology is simply incorrect and violates New Jersey condemnation law.  In addition, Respondent’s appraiser failed to make any adjustments for the Property’s lack of development approvals and variances that would need in accordance with the Respondent’s conclusion of the Property’s Highest and Best Use on the Date of Valuation.  Respondent’s experts admitted that several variances/approvals would be necessary based upon the Highest and best Use analysis of Respondent’s appraiser, yet Respondent’s appraiser failed in his analysis to reflect the cost and risk a hypothetical willing buyer would face should they purchase the subject Property without development approvals on the Date of Valuation.  This failure renders Respondent’s appraisal report unduly speculative and requires the court to engage in its gatekeeper role and bar Respondent’s appraisal report to prevent speculative evidence from being presented to the jury.  Rather than simply deny Appellant’s *in limine* motion, the trial court went a step further and made an overall ruling directly contradicting well established New Jersey condemnation law: that an appraiser is to use the zoning for the new redevelopment project or the redevelopment plan adopted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7 when arriving at its opinion of fair market value.
[brief] Thereafter, the Appellate Division exhaustively analyzed *Kane* in *Estate of D’Avila v. [...]*, 442 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 2015).  *D’Avila* was an enormous case involving numerous parties and claims, including negligence against the general contractor, subcontractors that were not plaintiff’s employer, and various medical providers, as well as coverage claims involving several insurance companies and brokers.  The trial took nearly 40 days.  *D’Avila*, 442 N.J. Super. at 86-87.  The *D’Avila* Court recognized the Supreme Court’s affirmation of *Kane* leaves *Kane* as controlling law.  *Id.* at 104, 106.  While the Court in *D’Avila* allowed the contractual indemnification issue to proceed alongside the personal injury claim, the Court specifically acknowledged that the *D’Avila* case was substantially distinguishable from *Kane*, as *Kane* was a straightforward, eight-day trial whereas *D’Avila* was a complex, forty-day trial.  *Id.* at 107.  And, while the *D’Avila* case modified *Kane* to allow employer participation in large, complex cases, involving numerous parties, complex issues, and multiple witnesses, the *D’Avila* Court specifically indicated that it did not overturn or modify *Kane* in less-complex cases.  Instead, the *D’Avila* Court urged the Supreme Court to address whether *Kane* “should be followed in less complex settings. ”  *D’Avila*, 442 N.J. Super. at 109-114 (App. Div. 2015).  The Court ultimately determined employers should participate at trial, but only “in a context such as the present one involving claims even more extensive than those in *Kane* and an unusually lengthy trial. ”  *Id.* at 111.
[brief] Under these fundamental principles, transmitting data to a service provider hired to perform a task—like a letter vendor printing a letter—would not be a third-party communication and would not implicate even the plain meaning of § 1692c(b).  This is particularly true here, because Appellant does not allege that any human being at the letter vendor actually saw his information.  *See Miller v. Americollect, Inc.*, 2022 WL 20470401, at *8 (finding that characterizing a transmission of data to a letter vendor a “communication” was a dubious proposition where the Appellant did not allege anyone saw the transmitted information.).
[brief] The constructive trust that it did impose, by defacto award of restitution, simply did not go far enough.  The way it stands, based upon the lower court’s decision, [...] has no equity, and the lower court decision calls for him to be evicted by May of 2024.  How can that possibly be a just result, and a result that doesn’t trumpet to all fraudsters to come and settle in New Jersey?  The illogic of this decision allows for that individual, in a position like [...] was in, to continually take money from the weaker party, meaning [...] Matos (as he did with $50,000, with money to pay off his car loan, and then with monthly increments of $1500 for many years, as detailed in the main brief).  Once the Court determined that it was not a gift, the Court then wrongly decided that only the $50,000.00 was unjust enrichment instead of all of the money taken by [...].  There is a reason that the burden of proof is shifted to the recipient of the money to prove by clear and convincing evidence, meaning [...].
[brief] (Pa404)  •  [...] recorded a running list of revisions on the corner plate of its Grading Plan, including:  3/14/08 "REV. PER EXISTING F.F.E. CHANGE."  (Pa127)  This stood for "revision per existing finished floor elevation change."  [...] has certified that he forwarded revisions to the site plans to [...] on a regular basis.  (Pa384 at ¶8)  Even if, as [...] maintains, "I do not have the professional qualifications to read a site plan," (Pa93 at ¶23), the fact that any revised grading plan sent by [...] had a large bold "5" rather than a "4" on the plate, should have given even a layperson notice that the plan had been revised.  Despite all this, on March 19, 2009 when [...] called [...] to seek a computerized version of the grading plan, [...] shuffled him off to [...].
[brief] Per SSAP No. 25, an Attorney-in-Fact for a reciprocal exchange is considered a related party to the Exchange,\(^{12}\) and transactions between the Exchange itself and the Attorney-in-Fact may be subject to SSAP No. 25.  However, as detailed above the payment of the AIF Fees does not involve any transaction between [...] and the Exchange itself.  There is no agreement between the Exchange \(^{12}\) [...]’s collective group of subscribers is referred to as the “Exchange.” and [...] related to the management fee, and the Exchange does not pay the AIF Fee to [...].
[brief] Now, insurers are empowered to investigate fraud without fear of a moral victory only, due to the significant deterrents and tools created by the IFPA to combat such abuse.  The Law Division’s decision in this case, if allowed to stand, will upend decades of well-settled New Jersey law and practice by forcing insurers to pursue IFPA claims in personal injury protection ("PIP") dispute resolution under the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act ("AICRA").  The dispute resolution forum is simply not designed for or capable of adjudicating IFPA claims.  Accordingly, [...] ("[...]") respectfully submits this brief as amicus curiae in support of the [...] Plaintiffs’ (“[...]”) Appeal of the Law Division’s October 27, 2023 orders and decision dismissing Plaintiffs’ case and remanding Plaintiffs’ IFPA claims to dispute resolution.
[brief] It is not absurd because restricting a debt collector’s dissemination of consumers’ nonpublic personal information promotes one of the FDCPA’s goals: protecting consumers’ personal privacy.  See, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) and Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2014).  As discussed at Pb28-Pb29, Congress knows how to permit disclosure of private information to service providers but did not do so in the FDCPA.  It is not for this Court to re-write the FDCPA.
[brief] Da36, ¶ 54.  During the January 22, 2023 call, Defendant [...] advised Plaintiff [...] that he, [...], expected Plaintiff to immediately stop working remotely and instead come to the Newark Office daily as he did prior to the start of the COVID pandemic.  [...] reminded [...] that he, the Plaintiff, was not only caring for his sick child but additionally that he, the Plaintiff, was immune-compromised due to a severe medical condition.  Plaintiff [...] reminded Defendant [...] that he, [...], had been well aware of [...]'s disability even before the pandemic.  [...] reminded [...] that he, the Plaintiff, was at an increased risk for developing severe respiratory infections and other serious medical conditions.  [...] stressed that a COVID infection could be fatal to him.  Plaintiff expressed concern that throughout the Firm’s Newark and satellite offices, several employees had tested positive in December 2022 and January 2023 coupled with the fact that Newark, New Jersey, the Firm’s central locale, was a high-risk area throughout the pandemic.
[brief] THE LIMITED ATTORNEY EXEMPTION AS APPLIED TO NEW JERSEY ATTORNEYS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.  The [...] urges this Court to hold that the Limited Attorney Exemption is unconstitutional as applied to New Jersey attorneys.  Enforcement of the NJDACCA against practicing attorneys violates public policy and significantly interferes with the Supreme Court’s authority to regulate the practice of law.  The nature and extent of the Limited Attorney Exemption’s encroachment upon the Supreme Court’s prerogatives and interests is substantial and deleterious.  Subjecting New Jersey licensed attorneys to the licensing and regulatory requirements imposed by the NJDACCA would, among other things, improperly: (1) give [...] the authority to restrict an attorney’s ability to provide debt adjustment services on behalf of clients during the course of a representation; (2) give the [...] Commissioner the authority to determine which attorneys in this state are “qualified to be licensed and possess[] the necessary financial resources to sustain [their] operation”\(^3\) to provide debt adjustment services in conjunction with their practice of law; (3) require that attorneys obtain additional licenses from and pay licensing fees to agencies outside the judicial branch in order to offer traditional legal services; and (4) impinge on the Supreme Court’s exclusive authority to suspend, disbar or otherwise discipline attorneys who have engaged in professional misconduct.
[brief] APPELLANTS’ COMPLAINT FAILED TO SET FORTH SUFFICIENT FACTS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A DANGEROUS CONDITION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY.  APPELLANTS’ Complaint failed to set forth sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the TCA for the existence of a dangerous condition of public property.  Not only did APPELLANTS’ Complaint fail to set forth sufficient facts to establish that RESPONDENTS owned, controlled or maintained the premises, it also failed to set forth the necessary facts to establish that [...]’s death was caused by the condition of the property itself, rather than its use by third persons with criminal intentions\(^2\).  As such, the Trial Court properly dismissed APPELLANTS’ Complaint with prejudice.
[brief] The first case Plaintiffs rely on is Foster v. [...].  Foster involved claims for *inter-alia* injuries caused to a Newark Police Detective while on duty escorting a victim of domestic violence to her home located in public housing controlled by the [...].  Foster 389 N.J. Super. at 63-64.  In his Complaint, the Detective alleged *inter-alia* that his injuries were the result of a “dangerous condition” of public property.  Ibid.  Specifically, it was alleged, and more importantly the Foster Court factually determined, as follows:  > ...the front doors of all the building had locks that the [Newark] Housing Authority installed to improve security but had not made operational...her ex-boyfriend had entered her building through its unlocked door and somehow also entered her apartment…and when she and [...] entered the apartment, her ex-boyfriend repeatedly shot [...] without provocation, causing him severe injuries…  *Id.* at 64.  The Foster Court after addressing various other issues appealed specifically addressed the allegation that a “dangerous condition” existed.  *Id.* at 68.  Before coming to a determination, the Court noted the long-held precedent in New Jersey as follows:  Of course, a dangerous condition of property is *not shown* by evidence that *only* indicates *foreseeable* criminal activities of a third party that injure plaintiff.  But “a dangerous condition of property may be found to exist when an unreasonable risk of harm is created by the combination of [(1)] a defect in the property and [(2)] the acts of third parties.  Id. at 68 (citing Setrin, 136 N.J. Super. at 333;, Roe, 317 N.J. Super. at 74-75; Saldana, 275 N.J. Super. at 33; Rodriguez, 193 N.J. at 44) (emphasis added).  With this long held precedent in mind the Foster Court determined that:  Unquestionably, a jury could find that the failure to provide a lock for the front entrance of a building was a dangerous condition of property.  Id. at 68.  The Court’s determination in Foster is in accord with precedent.  The combination of (1) the defect of public property (i.e., the non-working locks on the doors of the building) and (2) the foreseeable acts of third parties (i.e., the ex-boyfriend going through the door with the non-working lock) could be found to create a “dangerous condition” under the Tort Claims Act.
[brief] Galloway, 133 N.J. at 647-48.  Here, the trial court essentially did the opposite, creating per se hurdles for the defense that did not exist, and viewing the cumulative evidence in a light that was most favorable to the opposing viewpoint.  Any ordinary person would understand that an individual who behaved in the manner [...] did suffered from some kind of mental health problem.  Indeed, the State and trial court never even argued that [...] did not suffer from mental health problems, but only that expert testimony was necessary for the charge, which was legally erroneous.  Notably, there was no expert testimony as to the intoxicating effects of Adderall, but that did not preclude the trial court from giving a requested voluntary intoxication defense charge or prevent the State from arguing that Adderall intoxication caused [...] to commit the shooting.
[brief] Shockingly, with the assistance of the [...] the proceeds were then transferred the funds into a trust in Wyoming in an effort to put them beyond the reach of the Court in New Jersey.  When it came time to assessing fees and sanctions, the Court appointed Executrix, [...], fully supported [...]'s request.  She discussed difficulties in getting information, the need for weekly or bi-weekly hearings, hiding the decedent’s mail, and refusing to even give her a death certificate.  (22T 32, lines 9-23)  When the Court explained its reasoning behind the issuance of fees against [...], it provided a litany of reasons.  I mean, we could start with [[...]] had to be removed.  They wouldn't give the EIN number.  They lied in responses to discovery.  Outwardly lied about what insurance existed.  There was concerted effort to hide money, to hide assets.  There was a concerted effort by your client to make sure that money was hidden and the information about the 401k hidden, any information about life insurance policies hidden.
[directive] It is true that this aggravating factor is derived substantially verbatim from the aggravating circumstance defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(5) and that a sentencing court is authorized to consider the organized crime aggravating circumstance set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(5) in virtually any commercially-motivated drug case, and especially those involving substances such as cocaine and heroin that are produced abroad.  In State v. Toro, 227 N.J. Super. 215 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 215 (1989), for example, the court held:  The trial judge also properly identified the likelihood that defendant was involved in organized criminal activity as an aggravating factor.  As noted by the trial judge, most cocaine is grown in Central America and the importation, processing, and distribution of the drug in this country involves an elaborate criminal network.  The amount of cocaine found in defendant’s possession provides ample support for the trial judge’s finding that defendant was a participant in that organized distribution network.  [229 N.J. Super. at 227.]  See also State v. Varona, 242 N.J. Super. 474, 491-92 (App. Div. 1990), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 386 (1990); State v. Velez, 229 N.J. Super. 305, 316 (App. Div. 1988), modified and aff’d, 119 N.J. 185 (1990) (per curiam) (“It was abundantly clear to the trial judge, as it is to us, that [defendant] had to be obtaining the cocaine from other sources and was not manufacturing it himself.
[brief] (P-82)  Da948-967 (4)  [...], dated May 2000, between [...] and [...] (P-2)  Da935-947  The trial court’s decision did not include an explicit finding that the MIPA was breached.  As to the other agreements, the court did not identify any particular breach that supported the award of fees.  The thrust of the trial court’s findings was that there were certain transactions, “whether you call it a diversion or misappropriation, or just sloppy bookkeeping,” (24T33:11-5), during the years 2013 through 2015, that improperly favored [...] to [...]’s detriment:
[brief] See *State v. Bruzzese*, 94 N.J. 210, 219 (1983) consent search” without reasonable suspicion “is unconstitutional” because it prolongs the stop.  *Id.* at 647 (emphasis added).  The Court additionally noted that requiring reasonable suspicion before a consent search “serves the prophylactic purpose of preventing the police from turning a routine traffic stop into a fishing expedition. ”  *Id.*  Thus, “consent searches following a lawful stop of a motor vehicle should not be deemed” voluntary and knowing “unless there is reasonable and articulable suspicion. ”  *Id.*  In this case, unlike in *Carty*, the officer relied on the automobile exception to justify the search, thus the constitutional rule for consent searches does not apply.
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