ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] C.  The Reasonable Expectations Doctrine is Applicable to this Type of Insurance Policy.  [...] argues that the reasonable expectations doctrine does not apply here for several reasons.  (Rb38-39).  First, because [...] is claiming rescission based on equity and not based on the contract language.  Thus, [...] asserts, it did not need to communicate exclusionary language to [...].  This is a puzzling argument given that insurance is based on contract language.  However, the reasonable expectation of having insurance is also an equitable doctrine and, therefore, there is no reason for it not to apply here.  Secondly, [...] argues that the doctrine applies only to those who purchase insurance policies, citing Kievit, 34 NJ 482, and not to injured third parties.  (Rb38-39).  That is incorrect.  In Zacarias, 168 NJ at 595 (emphasis added), the Court said, "The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries" regarding the terms of insurance will be honored…"  Here, Intervenor [...] is an intended beneficiary and should be protected by the doctrine.
[brief] They -- we have a process, but I’ve never been denied when I’ve requested one in the past.  Q  Do you know whether or not you could – but you don’t know, in other words what I’m trying to get at, [...], you don’t know whether or not you could have obtained an expert opinion that would have undercut or contradicted in whole or in part what [...] had said, right?  A  No, I don’t.  Q  Cause you didn’t do that.  A
[brief] The PILOT differentiates between “Multi-family” and “Single-family” components of the Project.  For the Multi-family component, the annual PILOT will be: (i) for years one (1) through five (5), sixty-six percent (66%) of conventional real estate taxes; (ii) for years six (6) through ten (10), seventy-five percent (75%) of the conventional taxes; (iii) for years eleven (11) through thirty (30), ninety-nine and one-half percent (99.5%) of the conventional taxes.  Finance Agreement (FA), Sec 4.03, A,B,C, Pa614.  For the Single-family component, the annual PILOT will be: (i) for years one (1) through five (5), 75% of conventional taxes; (ii) for years six (6) through thirty (30), ninety-nine and one-half percent (99.5%) of conventional taxes.  FA, Sec 4.04, A,B, Pa615.  [...] will not pay the PILOT for units transferred to purchasers.  Instead, upon the sale of any unit, [...] will be relieved of any obligation for the unit, including payment of the PILOT.  FA, Sec 8.07, 8.08, Pa 623.  That responsibility transfers to the Unit Purchaser.  FA, Sec 1.02 (“Unit Purchaser’), Pa 610.  The developer will only pay taxes on the part of the land for which no certificate of occupancy has yet been issued, based on the then applicable assessment.  FA, Pa 615.  During the period of tax exemption, [...] limits the profits and dividends the Project owner can receive.
[brief] Exhibit U, NJ Turnpike Auth. Std. Specs. §§ 104.05, 104.06, 104.07, (6th Ed. 2004), filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit V, Report of [...], P.E., dated February 22, 2019, filed May 24, 2019 Exhibit W, Letter of [...], dated December 20, 2018, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit W, Report of [...], P.E., dated December 11, 2018, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit X, Letter of [...], dated December 24, 2018, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit X, Report of [...], P.E., dated December 22, 2018, filed May 24, 2019
[brief] ”  *Id.* (quoting *R. Jennings*, 286 N.J. Super. at 418) (cleaned up).  The *Avatar* court further cited another case where ‘we rejected a trial court determination that a post-judgment interest award is limited to the legal rate set forth in Rule 4:42-11(a).  We noted that ‘when the legal rate is less than the contract rate it may be equitable to allow interest to run on the judgment at the contract rate to avoid prejudice to a mortgagee caused by delays in satisfying the judgment. ’”  *Id.* (quoting *Interstate State Bank v. Rinaldi*, 303 N.J. Super. 239, 260-61 (App. Div. 1997)).
[brief] However, each respective case is readily distinguishable from the one at bar.  For example, the Court should give no weight to Appellants’ application of Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corp. for the following reasons.  First, the arbitration provision at issue in that case was contained in an employment agreement, not a consumer contract, as Appellants erroneously argued.  See 231 N.J. 234 (2017).  It being an employment agreement was a critical fact that the court focused on when analyzing whether the provision should be enforced.  Additionally, Appellants analogized Vitale to this case, calling the contract one of “adhesion” (Dr124).  As an initial matter, even assuming arguendo that the Contract here was one of adhesion, Vitale was clear that does not make it “per se unenforceable . . . .”  Id. at 246.  Instead, courts have discretion to decline such contracts if they deem them “unconscionable. ”  Id.  In so doing, there are “four factors that focus on procedural and substantive aspects of the contract to determine whether the contract is so oppressive, or inconsistent with the vindication of public policy, that it would be unconscionable to permit its enforcement. ”  Id., citing Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co., 225 N.J. 343, 367 (2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  Here, Appellants do not claim that the Contract is unconscionable.
[brief] Moreover, as expressed in the examples of construction set forth above, the third definition of "adjacent" would not apply to portions of real property.  It clearly applies to certain types of geographic areas and the nearest similar areas.  It is well settled that the term "adjacent" in the context of real property means "nearest in space or position" or "having a common boundary or edge."  See e.g., Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Leontarakis, 387 N.J. Super. 583, 587-588 (App. Div. 2006); Jock v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Wall, 182 N.J. 260 (2005)  The application of the third definition set forth herein to the terms of the lease agreement is clearly contrary to the intent of the parties as expressed above.  It also violates the foregoing principles of construction of a contract.
[directive] A person charged on a complaint-warrant for an indictable or disorderly persons offense issued prior to January 1, 2017 but not initially arrested on that charge until on or after January 1, 2017 also is an eligible defendant.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15.  Further, by December 6, 2016 order of the Supreme Court, for all complaint-warrants on indictable and disorderly persons charges issued prior to January 1, 2017 for which a monetary bail amount has been set but the defendant has not been arrested on these charges before January 1, 2017, the bail amount shall be voided as of January 1, 2017.  The voiding of the bail amounts will not otherwise affect the warrant itself.  Again, as set forth in the preceding paragraph, these are “eligible defendants” under the Criminal Justice Reform Law.  The advisory monetary ranges in the Bail Schedules promulgated by this directive will not apply to eligible defendants under the Criminal Justice Reform Law, even if the judge is considering monetary bail as a condition of pretrial release.
[brief] Third, [...] argues that the doctrine does not apply because the Questionnaire was not ambiguous, technical or contained hidden pitfalls.  (Rb39).  As discussed throughout this appeal, the Questionnaire and related documents were ambiguous and contained hidden pitfalls by, *inter alia*, contradicting each other.  Moreover, even if there is no ambiguity, this Court, taking into account the entire application process, can still reverse on equitable grounds.  *See Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co.*, 100 N.J. 325, 326 (1966) (noting in another insurance case “that the language in issue, while perhaps not ambiguous, was nevertheless insufficiently clear to justify depriving the insured of her reasonable expectations that coverage would be provided. ”)(quoting *Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Cos.*, 48 NJ 291 (1966)).  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] *Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm'n.*, 254 La. 160, 223 So. 2d 132, 136 (La. Sup. Ct. 1969).  This Appeal involves a discrete legal issue: whether an administrative agency can foreclose a petitioner’s ability to obtain relief from an unlawful FAD, as a consequence of the timelines attendant to appellate litigation.
[brief] For the next one, Factor #5 – Hiring, Supervising, and Paying Assistants, [...] answered in the Questionnaire that [...] had “no known assistants. ” (1T102:25-103:17; Pa48; Pa105; Pa110).  Such an answer indicated that [...] did not know if [...] had assistants or not, meaning that they were not exerting control.  (1T129:1-3).  Notably, [...] did not answer that [...] cannot have any assistants.  (1T128:1-2).  However, according to [...], any assistants she used were provided by [...], such as the liaison officers, the bailiff, and the court administrator.  (1T36:11-15).  For Factor #6 – Continuing Relationship, the ALJ noted that because the municipal prosecutor position required yearly re-appointment, [...] did not have an on-going employment relationship with [...].
[brief] Accordingly, the Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to reverse the Trial Court’s failure to enforce the statute and compel the Defendant to provide PIP benefits to the Plaintiff.  Upon reversal, the action will require a remand to a new judge to address the PIP benefits to which Plaintiff is entitled and the award of counsel fees and costs for the Defendant’s unlawful denial of PIP benefits.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff  Dated: May 21, 2024  /s/ [...]  By:_____________________________________  [...], Esq.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...] D/B/A [...]; [...] BRANDS, INC.; [...]; [...] DONUTS FRANCHISING, LLC; AND XYZ CORP. AND JOHN DOE, (FICTIONAL NAMES), AND [...], Defendants-Respondents.
[directive] When an agency can conduct an internal affairs investigation and file disciplinary charges within 45 days of the receipt of a complaint, the 45-day rule does not become an issue.  In many instances this will be possible.  However, if an agency cannot do so, the burden is on the investigator and ultimately the agency to identify the point at which "sufficient information" was developed to initiate disciplinary action.  Therefore, it is important that a detailed chronology be maintained of each investigation so that critical actions and decisions are documented.  6.1.10
[brief] (Pa255).  On April 18, 2023, Plaintiff submitted certification in opposition asserting the complaint lacks the particulars and the Counts were dismissed.  (Pa290).  Plaintiff further asserts that per [...] (2005), the Court may consider “allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim. ” (Pa290).  [...] certification included a list of documents forming the basis of his claims including trial transcripts, USB Memory stick with evidence from municipal court, certifications, depositions, and Court Orders.  (Pa295-Pa296).  Contrary to Defendants position, [...] did provide his version of events.
[brief] To ensure effective relief protecting the status quo, the court had to enjoin the Original Policy.  On this basis alone, the State’s challenge to the Original Policy was not moot.  Second, Appellants ignore the voluntary-cessation doctrine.  This doctrine makes clear that where the government claims mootness based on the repeal of its policy, it must show “the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. ”  West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 720 (2021); see Delanoy v. Twp. of Ocean, 245 N.J. 384, 402 n.5 (2021) (agreeing “voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case; if it did, the courts would be compelled to leave the defendant…free to return to his old ways” (citation omitted)).
[brief] His Will reflects that he made certain specific bequests to [...] and [...] and left the remainder of his Estate to his wife, [...].  In Article Third of his Will, [...] gifted the unpaid principal and accrued interest under the mortgage to [...] and directed that the debt be forgiven and the lien cancelled.  [...] did not leave any portion of his estate of his daughter-in-law, [...].  Defendant, [...], Esq. (“[...]”) prepared the mortgage and mortgage note.  (Pa000141, Pa000144).  He also prepared the deed, which transferred title from [...] individually to [...] and [...] as husband and wife as tenants by the entireties (Pa000197-Pa000198).  Mr. [...] used a form to prepare the mortgage note, which he modified.  He prepared the language that appears in the Payments Section of the mortgage note.  (Pa000195-000196).  The Payments Section of the mortgage note provided, “I will pay principal and interest on demand or in the event the property secured by the mortgage which is being executed simultaneously herewith is sold or in the event of a divorce of the above-named mortgagors. ”  That sentence was included in the mortgage note because [...] wanted to protect his investment in the property.  He wanted to be repaid in the event the property was sold or [...] and [...] divorced.  (Pa000145-00146).  Mr. [...] confirmed that the sentence imposed an obligation on the borrowers, i.e., husband and wife, to repay the loan in the event they divorced.  (Pa000195-000196).  [...] and [...] started having marital problems between 2010 and 2012.
[brief] SAC ¶ 72. Pa179.  Based upon repeated assurance of intention to purchase plaintiffs' solar rights by [...], plaintiffs understood that [...] were communicating with various persons and entities involved in plaintiffs' efforts including the [...], as part of their due diligence.  SAC ¶ 74. Pa179.  In fact, Plaintiffs had never authorized [...] to hold themselves out to third-parties that they and plaintiff [...] were "one and the same."  Yet, behind the backs of plaintiffs, they had been using their subterfuge entity [...] to act as "one and the same" with [...], and these defendants were holding themselves out to be "successor" to [...], having "acquired" Mill Road's Solar Rights, which was patently false.  SAC ¶ 75. Pa179.  After selling the subject solar-energy rights to plaintiffs, defendant [...] engaged in the oldest act of fraud recorded in the annals of history and in the case books of judicial decisions: [...] re-sold the same set of rights including the tradeable WMPA and S-recs to none other than [...].
[brief] *Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. P'ship v. Clark*, 581 U.S. 246, 248 (2017).  "The court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists . . ."  *N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6b*.  An agreement to arbitrate a claim must be a valid agreement.  *See Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, De.*, 189 N.J. 1, 12 (2006) (noting the existence of "a valid arbitration agreement" is a "gateway" question requiring "judicial resolution"; (internal quotations omitted)), *cert. denied*, 549 U.S. 1338 (2007).  Moreover, the court must decide whether there is a "ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract."  *N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6a*.  Our courts may decline to enforce an arbitration agreement “when well-established principles addressing the absence of a consensual agreement and unfairness in contracting and the agreement warrant relief,” including “fraud, duress, mistake, illegality, imposition, undue influence and unconscionability."  *Moore v. Woman To Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, L.L.C.*, 416 N.J. Super. 30, 38 (2010); see also, *Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n*, 127 N.J. 344, 353 (1990), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 871 (1992).
[brief] ”  Both the dismissal of the FAC without prejudice and the dismissal of the SAC were unfair because the statute of limitations for breach of agreement and fraud, both six years, had yet to run at all.  The motion judge’s consideration of the extensive extraneous materials, only permissible under Rule 4:46, tainted this entire process, and thus the orders relating to [...] are readily resolved as erroneous as a matter of law.
[brief] The adequacy budget is an estimate of what it costs a district to provide the CCCS according to the district’s enrollment and student characteristics.  It is not an approved school district budget.  Compare N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-51 (calculation of adequacy budget) with N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5(c) (requiring that each district adopt and submit to the Commissioner “a budget that provides for a thorough and efficient education”).  Contrary to [...]’s claims, it is not a mandatory level of funding the State must provide.  (Ab32).  Instead, the Department uses the adequacy budget calculation to determine each district’s State aid.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-51 and -53.  The adequacy budget was “designed to provide sufficient resources and at the same time to incentivize fiscal efficiency.
[brief] The laundry list cited by the Respondents is examined one by one.  It was claimed that the Appellant scored Developing in some areas of her Observation and this is meaningless because it is the overall score that must be viewed in making a determination as to whether the Appellant was performing her job satisfactorily.  As noted above, Observation scores were Effective and the Summative scores was Effective.  (Pa298, Pa314, Pa326, Pa327)  The claim that Appellant was not performing up to expectations was not true.  The Appellant received Effective scores which is consistent with the language Meeting Expectations.
[brief] In March of 1979, Plaintiff’s family bought a new construction home, located at [...], that had just been built by a developer (the “Property”).  (Pa35).  The Property was constructed on a cul-de-sac.  (Pa35).  Shortly after the family moved into the Property, they installed an underground pool and shed in the backyard.  (Pa37).  Plaintiff acknowledged that there have always been water problems on the Property, including accumulating water and poor drainage.  (Pa36).  There is testimony that the Property where the house is now located was once the site of some kind of underground stream.  (Pa35).  Even though Plaintiff admits that the Township has no control or ownership over the presence of naturally occurring water sources, Plaintiff seems to believe that all the problems caused by water damage to her Property are the Township’s fault.  (Pa35-36).  For approximately 30 years, snow would naturally accumulate in the cul-de-sac during the winter months, where it would be plowed and piled up.  (Pa36).  As the snow melted, water pooled around the area at the bottom of Plaintiff’s driveway, since the Plaintiff’s home was situated at the lowest point on the cul-de-sac.  (Pa36).  In 2015, after Plaintiff had complained for many years to the Township, the Township installed a system of storm drains in the cul-de-sac.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TOMS RIVER POLICE OFFICERS VIOLATED THE SCOPE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT  BECAUSE ITS TEXT SPECIFICALLY LIMITED ITS EXECUTION TO THE CAR WHILE IT WAS IN TOMS RIVER—NOT LAKEWOOD.  U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV; N.J. CONST. ART. I, ¶ 7.  (2T12-4 to 17-7; Da 65)  The scope of the warrant in this case was as clear as it was narrow: a search was authorized on a specific Jaguar S-Type car “within the TOWNSHIP OF TOMS RIVER[.]” (Dca 8-9)  That circumscribed scope mirrored [...]’s supporting affidavit, which purported to offer probable cause that [...] was selling drugs in Toms River.  [...] had no occasion to consider whether there was probable cause to search [...]’s car while it was traveling in Lakewood.  Nor is it clear the court would have found any, as there was no evidence in the supporting affidavit that [...] used his car to transport contraband in Lakewood.  And yet, [...] officers executed the warrant on [...]’s car while it was traveling in Lakewood.  Because the officers violated the warrant’s scope, suppression is required.  Appellate review of a suppression motion is governed by two distinct standards.
[brief] The jury found that [...] acted in self-defense, thereby necessarily acquitting her of all homicide offenses since “[s]elf-defense, if proven, is a justifiable homicide for which there is no criminal liability. ”  State v. Chavies, 345 N.J. Super. 254, 267 (App. Div. 2001) (emphasis added).  Thus, a judgment of acquittal should be entered by this Court for passion/provocation manslaughter.
[brief] In seeking insurance coverage for [...]  (“[...]”) for an underlying personal injury action (“Hood Lawsuit”), under a contractor controlled insurance program (“CCIP”), [...] (“[...]”) asks the Court to ignore the relevant facts, which [...] argues are virtually all “immaterial to the proper disposition of this matter[.]” (TRVb7.)  But facts matter.  Particularly here, where the facts show [...]: (1) was erroneously enrolled in a CCIP based on its misrepresentations; (2) was notified of its ineligibility for the CCIP hours after the erroneous enrollment; (3) increased its proposal based on removal from the CCIP; (4) acknowledged its unenrollment nine times; (5) never paid premiums toward the CCIP; and (6) maintained its insurance coverage outside the CCIP due to excluded demolition work.  The disposition of this appeal does not turn on “improper cancellation of insurance coverage without proper notice,” as [...] argues.  (TRVb1.)  Further, [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively, “[...]” where appropriate) are not attempting to overturn “sixty years of authority in New Jersey. ”  (TRVb2.)  Rather, [...] is applying New Jersey law to the facts regarding the unenrollment of a contractor from a CCIP.  The facts show that the plain language of the [...] CCIP policies for construction projects run by [...] and [...] (collectively, “[...]”), the general contractor and CCIP sponsor, did not include [...] as a Named Insured and, even assuming arguendo it did, [...] had the sole discretion to deem subcontractors ineligible from participating in, remove subcontractors from, or make modifications to, the CCIP.  [...] did just that when it unenrolled [...] from the CCIP, after which, [...] acknowledged and had no objection.  Further, the facts show that N.J.A.C. § 11:1-20 does not apply to this claim for coverage under the CCIP because the plain language of that Code excludes policies that cover multi-state location risks, like [...]’s construction projects located throughout the country.  Finally, the facts show that [...] initially declined to pursue coverage on behalf of [...], essentially conceding a lack of coverage under the CCIP.  [...]’ position changed only when [...] and [...] (“[...],” [...]’s excess carrier) named [...] a defendant in this coverage litigation, and [...] was forced to litigate the coverage issues to completion.  Its change of position speaks volumes.
[directive] The See 4.3.1. subsection to acomplaint-summons pursuant issuing of presumption a overcome to more or when one acomplaint-warrant application for an (requiring 4.6.11 subsection also necessary are acomplaint-warrant on only imposed be can that conditions release pretrial special any in Moreover, victim).  domestic violence a of safety immediate the assure to reasonably be shall oink circumstances the of fore and of presence the acomplaint-warrant, for application 5.1.2.