ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On May 20, 2014, [...] entered into the Lease with [...].  Ca30.  Among other provisions, the Lease required [...] to obtain a construction loan to fund the renovation of [...]’s building and to acquire diner fixtures.  *Id.*  Pursuant to the loan transaction, [...] granted [...] a security interest in the improvements and a mortgage on its leasehold interest.  Ca205.  [...] subsequently defaulted on its loan obligations and [...] obtained a default judgment in the amount of $1,271,155.83 against [...], [...], and [...].  Ca187.  Once the COVID-19 restrictions were lifted, the trial court appointed [...] as the statutory receiver and tasked him with taking “all necessary steps to take control over the business, liquor license, and personal assets of [[...]], [...], and [...]. ”  Ca22.  [...] made arrangements to take possession of the diner from the defendants.  *See* Ca139.  Once [...] had taken possession of the business, he attempted to set [...]’s affairs in order.  *See id.*  However, despite his efforts, the diner was never profitable.  See Ca328-340.  It lost money each month and there was no money for a final accounting.  Id.
[brief] As we discuss in Point II of our initial brief, Appellants assert several different claims for damages arising from the grading error caused by Respondents’ negligence.  Most are simple, straightforward, directly causally connected, and do not require expert testimony (e.g. the added cost of needlessly removing and carting away thousands of square feet of topsoil due to the grading error, which job was performed and billed by [...] itself), or the additional legal, engineering and land surveying fees caused by the reapplication for site plan approval, which the town required.  Respondents made the same false argument at page 8 of their brief in support of their second motion for summary judgement, filed on November 14, 2022 before [...].  (Respondents’ Motion Brief is not included in our Appendix herein due to the restrictions of R. 2:6-1(2). ).  In seeming reliance on Respondents’ distorted quotation of [...], [...] adopted Respondents’ specious version of what [...] said as his only cited support for his ruling that Appellants required expert testimony on all aspects of their damage claim.  (Pa12, paragraph 1).  [...] specifically cited the distorted transcript of [...]’s remarks, and nothing else, in support of this ruling.  But surgically removed by Respondents from their citation to [...]’s ruling were the lines where [...] said he would make no ruling on the need for an expert on most issues in this case.  To the extent that [...] relied on Respondents’ misrepresentation of [...]’s position, he was misled by counsel.  This Court should not be fooled by the same trick.  In fact, as argued in Point II of our original brief, most of the elements of damages we allege are straight-forward as to amount and proximate causation.  All professional service providers were named in plaintiffs’ disclosure filings.  Copies of all legal billings were supplied for the work of applying for a new variance due to the mis-grading of the property caused by Respondents’ negligence.  All the attorneys, engineers, land surveyors and contractors who did the work would be subject to cross examination.  Respondents could even present their own witnesses to question the reasonableness, necessity or costs of the work if they so wish.  Respondents cite no case law requiring that we present independent expert testimony to verify the reasonableness and necessity of construction and land development bills.  Therefore, this Court should conclude that no expert testimony beyond the testimony of the legal and construction industry professionals who performed the work should be required for Appellants to prove most, if not all of their damage claims in this case.  POINT II
[brief] “Express powers as well as those that arise by fair implication are given broad latitude, so long as they are not wielded in contravention of the overarching statutory grant of authority…”.  *Varsolona v. Breen Capital Services Corp.*, 180 N.J. 605, 625 (2004); *Timber Glen Phase III, LLC v. Township of Hamilton*, 441 N.J. Super. 514, 524 (App. Div. 2015).  Given that the Court is reviewing an ordinance, a word regarding the deference to be given to municipal governing body enactments within their statutory powers would be in place here.  “A municipal ordinance under review by a court enjoys a presumption of validity and reasonableness.  Municipal ordinances are liberally construed in favor of the municipality and are presumed valid.  It is the burden of the party seeking to overturn the ordinance to prove otherwise. ”  *State v. Clarksburg Inn*, 375 N.J. Super. 624, 632 (App. Div. 2005) (citations omitted).  “Anyone challenging an ordinance as arbitrary or unreasonable bears a heavy burden.  Accordingly, a court will sustain an ordinance if it is supported by a rational basis. ”  *First Peoples Bank v. Medford*, 126 N.J. 413, 418-19 (1991) (citations omitted).  Only a showing of “clear and convincing evidence” may overcome the presumption of validity.  *Spring Lake Hotel & Guest House Assoc. v. Spring Lake*, 199 N.J. Super. 201, 210 (App. Div. 1985).  “A municipality’s legislative exercise is not to be set aside if any basis may reasonably be conceived to justify the ordinance. ”  Mannie’s Cigarette Service, supra, 259 N.J. Super at 496 (citing Quick Chek Food Stores v. Springfield Twp., 83 N.J. 438, 447 (1980)).  Hence, a municipal ordinance is entitled to presumption of validity and deference in review.
[brief] The original complaint, as filed March 18, 2019, by plaintiffs’ predecessor attorneys, did not include [...].  [...] was originally omitted as plaintiffs had no reason to suspect [...] had committed any unlawful acts against plaintiffs; and plaintiffs simply could not fathom that a seller who received $700,000 for assignment of the rights in perpetuity (quite apart from the separate, six-figure land lease) would have the criminal audacity to re-sell those very same rights to a second purchaser.
[brief] [...] testified in front of the jury as to the statement she had given to State Police on March 29, 2016.  (4T27-10 to 18).  [...] claimed that she did not recall making most of the statements because she had “problems with memory loss. ” (4T29-3 to 32-24).  In 2015, she required inpatient treatment due to her daughter’s suicide attempt.  (4T33-25 to 34-12).  In 2016, she was taking various prescription mental-health medications “on and off. ” (4T34-15 to 35-2).  She testified that these conditions and medications affected her memory, causing her to doubt the accuracy of her statement.  (4T35-7 to 38-19; 4T40-3 to 19).  [...] testified at the Gross hearing that he and another officer went to [...]’s workplace to ask if she would speak with them regarding a separate homicide in which defendant was a suspect because she was dating him at the time.  (4T259-14 to 262-19).  [...] was cooperative and did not appear to be “emotionally disturbed. ” (4T262-20 to 263-22; 4T265-11 to 24).  She agreed to accompany the officers on the five-minute drive to the police station.  (4T262-20 to 263-22).  The officers made no threats, applied no coercion, and never indicated that she was the target of an investigation.  (4T264-11 to 14; 4T265-25 to 266-12).  After the interview ended, [...] was escorted back to her job.  (4T264-15 to 25).  B.
[brief] During the presentation of clip thirty, [...] noted the significance of this location to her investigation.  She highlighted the placement of the camera in other footage, the residences of witnesses interviewed by the police, and the recording location in relation to the crime scene.  (4T179-11 to 181-12; Da11: S-39).  Then, for clip forty, Rodriguez pointed out where the victim was found.  (4T181-18 to 23; Da11: S-40).  When clip forty-two was played, she directed the jury's attention to a new car that had not been featured in the preceding forty-one clips.  This car belonged to [...], who had earlier described for the jury both his vehicle and his attempt to follow the fleeing Chevy Malibu.  (4T183-2 to 9; Da11: S-42).  To provide context to the narration testimony in this case, within the State's case-in-chief, out of fifty clips presented, twenty-three were played without any narration or testimony from [...], except for indicating the camera's location or the source of the footage.
[brief] First, police did not have reasonable suspicion that [...] had been involved in a narcotics transaction because [...] had seen no such thing.  Second, there was not probable cause that [...]’s car contained contraband because [...]’s testimony that [...] spontaneously admitted to possessing cocaine was wholly incredible.  Third, and alternatively, any probable cause that the vehicle contained contraband developed from the [...]’s surveillance and observations of [...] engaging in what they believed to be a narcotics transaction.  Under these foreseeable and far from spontaneous circumstances, the warrantless search of [...]’s vehicle violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches.  The evidence found in the car should be suppressed.
[brief] “Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. ’”  *Olano*, supra, 507 U.S. at 733 (quoting *Johnson v. Zerbst*, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).  “To be a waiver, the failure to assert a right must be intentional, and the right relinquished must be known.  Anything less is mere forfeiture. ”  *Brito*, supra, 979 F.3d at 189.
[brief] ”  (1T 74-13 to 21)  [...] testified that he “believe[d]” he downloaded videos from “two locations,” but could not remember specifically.  (1T 75-1 to 11)  After a series of leading questions, [...] seemingly confirmed that he downloaded video from [...].  (1T 76-7 to 80-8)  [...] testified that when he downloaded the video he decided the “date and timestamp” were “inaccurate. ”  (1T 81-11 to 22)  [...] said that “it” was “off by” “approximately 12 hours. ”  (1T 81-22 to 25)  The defense objected to the admission of the videotape through [...], arguing that it was not authenticated.  (1T 69-23 to 69-6, 84-10 to 11)  The judge ruled that “the obtaining of consent” by the owner of the surveillance system and the “review and downloading of the video in close proximity to the events that it purports to depict is adequate authentication for admissibility purposes.
[brief] “In order to be decided by a court, an arbitrability challenge -- a challenge as to whether a particular matter is subject to arbitration or can be decided by a court must be directed at the delegation clause itself (which itself constitutes an arbitration agreement subject to enforcement); a general challenge to the validity of the agreement as a whole will not suffice to permit arbitration to be avoided…”  This is exactly what Plaintiff has done in the case, *sub judice*, as the word “Disputes” (which is part of the delegation clause in Paragraph 7.2 of [...]’s Membership Agreement) (Ja36) is specifically, not generally, included in the [...] Membership Agreement arbitration provision and, yet, Plaintiff’s damages (set forth in the Complaint) seeking injunctive relief (Ja27) is specifically excluded from the definition of “Disputes” at Paragraph 7.4 of [...]’s Membership Agreement.  (Ja37)  Accordingly, the trial court should determine whether the arbitration provision applies to the relief sought in Plaintiff’s Complaint and not an arbitrator.
[brief] 24 N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 175 N.J. 178 (2002) .............................................. 7, 15 Notte v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490 (2006) ............................................................ 9 Perri v. Kisselbach, 34 N.J. 84 (1961) .................................................................................. 10, 13 RAB Performance Recoveries, L.L.C. v. George, 419 N.J. Super. 81 (App. Div. 2011) ................................................................................................................................. 22 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) .................................................................................. 11 Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474 (1974) ..................................... 6 Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531 (2019) ..................................................................... 5 State v. Camey, 239 N.J. 282 (2019) ....................................................................................... 6 State v. Hemenway, 239 N.J. 111 (2019) .................................................................................. 5 State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256 (2019) ....................................................................... 6 State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71 (2016) .................................................................................. 6 Twp. of Holmdel v. Div. of Taxation, 12 N.J. Tax 112 (App. Div. 1991), aff’d o.b., 130 N.J. 522 (1992) ...........................................................................................................
[brief] ’ ”  *In re Remicade (Direct Purchaser) Antitrust Litig.*, 938 F.3d 515, 525 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing *Victory Entm’t, Inc. v. Schibell*, 2018 WL 3059696 at (App. Div. June 21, 2018)).  Its survey of New Jersey Supreme Court and Appellate Division precedent, led it to the conclusion that New Jersey “has applied [*Atalese*] thus far only in the context of employment and consumer contracts.
[brief] [...] and [...] had a perfectly equal opportunity to bid.  The June 10, 2022 Order set a July 14, 2022 deadline for [...] and [...] to submit bids by electronic mail to the [...].  (Da19, at ¶3).  [...] submitted a timely bid of $601,000, an amount $26,000 above the fair market value as determined by the appraisal, while [...] submitted a timely bid of only $501,000 (Da307, 310).  [...]’s bid of $601,000 was approved by the trial court on August 31, 2022, provided that he close by September 15, 2022.  (Da31, at ¶3).  The Defendants had opposed that approval (in fact the August 31, 2022 Order states that the matter had been opened to the Court by their own motion seeking to void [...]’s bid, among other relief).  (Da31).  In that Order, the trial court set September 15, 2022 as the deadline for [...] to close his purchase of the Boonton Property.
[brief] At that time, it was also argued that the arbitration agreement at issue was unenforceable because it was unconscionable and the product of undue influence and that the arbitration agreement should not be enforced as a matter of fairness and public policy.  These arguments were detailed in our August 24, 2023 opposition to Defendants/Appellants’ Motion to Stay Litigation, as well as our subsequent supplemental brief of January 11, 2024 in opposition to same.
[brief] It should be noted that this argument was not made by the Appellant either at the lower court nor in her brief.  Regardless, [...] goes on to argue that “insurance policies are contracts of adhesion and as such, are subject to special rules of interpretation. ”  Gibson v Callaghan, 158 N.J. 662, 669 (1999) (internal citations omitted).  [...] also argues “[w]hen there is ambiguity in an insurance contract, courts interpret the contract to comport with the reasonable expectations of the insured”.  Citing, Zacarias v Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590, 595 (1999) (internal citations omitted).  However, in Morrison v. American Intern. Ins. Co. of America, 381 N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div. 2005) this Court stated:  [N]otwithstanding the unequal bargaining power between an insurance company and an insured, "[i]f the policy language is clear, the policy should be interpreted as written."  . . .  Where the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, it is not the function of the courts to rewrite the policy "to make a better policy of insurance than the one purchased."  Id. at 538.
[brief] 42 State v. Slattery, 239 N.J. Super. 534 (App. Div. 1990) .................. 12 State v. Spivey, 122 N.J. Super. 249 (App. Div. 1973), certification granted, 65 N.J. 21 (1974) (reversed on other grounds) ..............20, 21 State v. Stuart, 2010 WL 1190538 (App. Div. 2010) .....................21, 22 State v. Tedesco, 214 N.J. 177 (2013)
[brief] The second Observation was scored a 3.10 which was effective.  (Pa314, Second Observation 2018-2019).  Appellant testified that the Observation scores were effective in school year 2018-2019.  (Pa211, Smith Transcript, T209:8-14, T209:25, T210:3-6)  [...] was required to conduct a third and admitted that he did not conduct a third Observation because he was told by the attorney for the district not to conduct any more Observations of the Appellant.
[brief] Page Table of Authorities  ........................................................ ii  Procedural History and Statement of Facts ......................... 1 Legal Argument:  I.  Plaintiff’s Motion For Entry Of Default Judgment Against [...] Was Properly Denied, Since The Summons And Complaint Were Not Properly Served And Default Was Not Previously Entered ...............  3  II.  The First Amended Complaint Was Properly Dismissed Against [...], Since It Fails To State A Claim On Which Relief Can Be Granted ...........................................5  Conclusion ........................................................................  7  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[directive] JUDGE’S Cash No No - 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% issue.  14  10% - should COURT 3:26-2 $50,000 $50,000 $25,000 $50,000 and $10,000 $15,000 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $1,000 $2,500 $1,000
[directive] The form shall also advise the applicant that a negative result is a condition of employment and that a positive result will result in the consequences outlined in Section III A of this policy.  Applicants are not required to complete a Drug Testing Medication Information form at this time, unless a positive test result requires an explanation by the prospective employee.  The Drug Testing Medication Information form shall be used if a conditional offer of employment has been made to the applicant.  3.
[brief] [...], a family friend, testified that she went to defendant’s home when she finished work that evening.  (9T154-23 to 155-2).  Defendant’s sister, [...], asked Carlson to drive her and defendant back to Bridgeton because defendant had been “jumped” and he wanted to fight “one-on-one. ” (9T155-5 to 17; 9T157-6 to 10).  Defendant’s father, [...], and his brothers, [...] and [...], also went to Bridgeton.  (9T155-18 to 22).  Defendant and Hyshonna drove in Carlson’s black Mitsubishi Lancer, while the other men drove in a minivan.
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esq. - Attorney I.D. 033311991  [...], Esq.  - Attorney I.D. 374522022  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF APPENDIX | ii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 1 | | STANDARD OF REVIEW | 1 | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 2 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 4 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | | | I.
[brief] Moreover, in one of the most significant New Jersey cases concerning variances pursuant to NJSA 40:55D-70(d), *Medici v. BPR Co.* 107 NJ. 1 (1987), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that successive applications for the same type of variances should become more difficult, not easier.  This is because each year the Zoning Board is obliged under NJSA 40:55D-70.1 to forward a report to the planning board and governing body summarizing variances granted by the Board and recommending amendments to the zoning ordinance.  Under *Medici*, the guidance this Zoning Board is obliged to take from the fact that the [...] governing body has not amended the SM Zone height standard to conform to evolving market standards in the years following the Board’s 2019 height variance grant is that the governing body does not desire to change the SM Zone height standard.
[brief] Affidavit of [...]......................................................................................Pa55  Wise Eligibility Registration Form...........................................................................Pa57  Wise Request for Amended Benefits Form.........................................................Pa59  WTC Health Program Certification of Illnesses 11/16/22.................................Pa60  WTC Health Program Certification of Illness 6/9/22.............................................Pa62  WTC Health Program Enrollment 4/14/17..........................................................Pa63  New Jersey State Police Incident Exposure Report..............................................Pa64  First Report of Accidental Injury or Occupational Disease.................................Pa69  Registration of Participation at WTC.................................................................Pa72  \(^1\) Per R.2:6-1(a)(2), Pa15, Pa23, Pa27, and Pa29 are included in the Appendix because they are germane to the appeal.
[brief] However, if the Court feels it is necessary then the Environmental Appellants present this Point II.  The [...]’s Water Quality Management Plan Consistency Determination was erroneously focused only on the number of gallons of wastewater which will be flushed down the drain as part of the proposed project.  [...] brief at 28, [...] brief at 26.  The Environmental Appellants assert that the broad policies of the Highlands Act and the Water Quality Management Act (“WQMA”) necessitate a wider and more complex Water Quality Management Plan Consistency Determination by the [...].  The legislature set forth its findings in the WQMA, as follows:
[brief] *Again, I know that counsel is at a disadvantage for not having that information.*  The Court has averred to the fact that the information provided was not just financial, but also personal in nature and would have the ability to affect -- and most likely would affect how litigation involving [...] himself, especially as an individual in this case, might be conducted, continued, prosecuted, defended, or ultimately resolved.  And for those reasons, although the Court is always reluctant to do so, and *I specifically am reluctant to do so*, I am finding for disqualification in this matter.  (T28:2-14) (emphasis added).  Permitting Respondents to present purportedly confidential information disclosed in connection with prior matters *in camera* completely undermined the stated purpose of the August 9, 2024 Order, which, as the trial court explained, was to “provide[] counsel an opportunity to brief and argue the issue [of the prior representations].” (T21:18-22:1).
[brief] BRIEF AND APPENDIX (DA1-47) OF RESPONDENT, HAROLD CHUNG-LOY, M.D., VINCENT MOSS, M.D. AND SURGICAL PRACTICES  ASSOCIATES, P.A. Of Counsel and on the Brief  THOMAS J. HEAVEY, ESQ.  NJ ATTORNEY ID 017931985  [...]  On the Brief  BRENDAN M. RUCKERT, ESQ.  NJ ATTORNEY ID 293832019  [...]  GROSSMAN, HEAVEY & HALPIN, P.C. [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant, [...]  BRIEF FILED ON DECEMBER 13, 2023  Table of Contents