ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] “Evidence is relevant if it tends ‘to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. ’”  State v. Covell, 157 N.J. 554, 564-65 (1999).  Relevance is based on the logical connection between the evidence offered as a prior bad act and a fact that was put at issue.  State v. Hutchins, 241 N.J. Super. 353, 358 (App.Div.1990).  “If the evidence offered makes the inference to be drawn more logical, then the evidence should be admitted unless otherwise excludable by a rule of law. ”  State v. Darby, 174 N.J. 509, 519 (2002).  Other crimes evidence, to be admissible, must be “relevant to a material issue in dispute. ”  *Cofield*, supra, 127 N.J. at 338.  Moreover, there must be no other substantial proof that would sufficiently establish the issue at hand.  *State v. Brown*, 138 N.J. 481 (1994).  As the courts have noted all evidence against a defendant is prejudicial, the question is whether the evidence is so prejudicial that it deprives defendant of a fair trial.  *State v. Outland*, 458 N.J. Super. 357, 371 (App. Div. 2019).
[brief] Confirming his intention to authenticate the video and photographs through [...], the prosecutor stated that “there [are] going to be photo arrays presented through the detective after the testimony. ” (1T66-1 to 3).  The prosecutor added, “There is nothing in caselaw or in our rules that requires the specific owner of the store or anything like that that [defense counsel] is suggesting to come here and to authenticate the video. ” (1T70-14 to 17).  Based on the prosecutor’s proffer of [...]’s testimony, [...] ruled that the video was admissible through the officer’s testimony.  (1T71-21 to 72-2).  It was after this that the prosecutor stated, “Oh, and Judge, we did confer with the lieutenant in my office, he is sending a team out right now to see if we can find one of the lay witnesses. ” (1T72-3 to 6).  It is not clear from the record who these witnesses were or their anticipated testimony; all four of the State’s witnesses were police officers.  But it is clear that these lay witnesses would not be authenticating the video, which [...] had just held was admissible through [...]’s testimony.
[brief] On November 15, when the PSA was signed, Plaintiff knew only:  The TLE lease would run through 2034 or 2044, with 4 scheduled rent increases; Defendant was required to request an estoppel certificate by November 25, well before the due diligence period ended on December 15; Defendant had to use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain the estoppel certificate and then “promptly deliver” it on receipt; to be an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate no default can be disclosed; and if there is no Acceptable Estoppel Certificate  Plaintiff’s sole remedy was to terminate.
[brief] 698a–700a; 718a–723a.  In addition, after continued obstructionist tactics by [...], in November 2019, Plaintiffs discovered an ² Pursuant to Rule 2:6-1(a)(2), [...]’s brief is permissible content for Appellants’ Appendix as it raises an issue which is germane to the appeal.  Namely, [...]’s brief, producing the Collateral Assignment for the first time in the 2015 Action, formed the basis of [...]’s argument that [...] was not the Sole Member of [...] despite the Mortgage.  As a result of [...]’s brief, and the Court’s reliance on said brief in the 2015 Action, Defendants succeeded in fraudulently concealing the fact that [...] was the Sole Member of [...].  Affidavit of Title related to the Mortgage, identifying [...] as the Sole Member of [...].  695a.  Thus, [...] executed the Mortgage and related required Affidavit of Title as the Sole Member of [...] because [...] was the Sole Member of [...], as the Collateral Assignment had been extinguished by January 10, 2008  643a; 695a; 698a–700a.  **[...]’s Role in [...]**
[directive] When used by a law enforcement agency, the entire content of the form must be on a single page.  Both versions of the form (American English & Spanish), in a single page format, and these Guidelines are available on the Division of Criminal Justice Internet website at www.njdcj.org, or www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj.  GUIDELINES: Purpose & General Overview of the Guidelines  Pursuant to Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2004-1, replacing Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2001-5, these Guidelines are established.  The purpose of these Guidelines is to assure the fullest cooperation and compliance, by the public, with the requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22.  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 requires that a person summoned by, or on behalf of, a person arrested for a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (DWI) and/or N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2 (Refusal to submit to chemical breath testing [hereafter "Refusal"]) shall be provided with a written statement [hereafter “POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22" (Rev. 2-20-2004)  Form] advising the summoned person of his or her "potential criminal and civil liability for permitting or facilitating the arrestee's operation of a motor vehicle while the arrestee remains intoxicated."  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22.  The provisions of this Guideline are to be implemented and made consistent with the existing policies and procedures of each law enforcement agency in this State:  -1-  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-1 - APPENDIX A - GUIDELINES FOR POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004)
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ......................................................  2 STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................  5  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  ONE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT RESULTED IN UNDUE PREJUDICE TO THE PROPERTY OWNER AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (Da80-85)  .....  19 POINT TWO  THE OWNER’S MOTION FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF HIS EXPERT FEES SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED BASED ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FAIRNESS, EQUITY, AND FULL INDEMNITY (Da154-155;160).  .............  22 POINT THREE  THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF AND DAMAGES FOR THE INCREASED VULNERABILITY OF THE PROPERTY TO WAVE OVERTOPPING AS A RESULT OF THE SEAWALL PROJECT (Da505; 6T23:1-24:8) .................. 25 POINT FOUR THE LAW DIVISION IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE OWNER’S COASTAL ENGINEERING EXPERT AS NET OPINION (Da505; 6T 23:1-24:8) .................... 34 POINT FIVE THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN EXCLUDING DAMAGES TO THE OWNER’S HOUSE AS A RESULT OF THE BOULDER VIBRATIONS FROM THE SEAWALL PROJECT CONSTRUCTION (Da390-400) ................................................. 39 POINT SIX THE COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF OCEAN VIEW FROM THE PROPERTY AND PRIVACY (Da446-447; 5T 36:19-38:10)........................................... 43 CONCLUSION.................................................................................. 45 Orders Subject to this Appeal: Order and Statement of Reasons Permitting the Filing of Amended Complaint Filed 03/27/20.............................................. Da80 Order In Part Denying Defendant’s Expert Fees and Statement of Reasons Filed 01/08/21 .............................................
[brief] THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS DE NOVO  This appeal seeks review of an order granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and therefore this Court should “apply the same Rule 4:46-2 standard that governs the trial court’s decision. ”  *H.C. Equities, LP v. Cty. of Union*, 247 N.J. 366, 380 (2021).  It should “construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and affirm the entry of summary judgment ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ’”  *Id.* (quoting *R. 4:46-2*).  “[A] party opposing a motion is not to be denied a trial unless the moving party sustains the burden of showing clearly the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. ”  *JPC Merger Sub LLC v. Tricon Enterprises, Inc.*, 474 N.J. Super. 145, 170 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting *Judson v. Peoples Bank & Tr. Co.*, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954)).  This Court’s “role in reviewing a motion for summary judgment is merely to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, but not to decide it. ”  *Id.* (quoting *Fielder v. Stonack*, 141 N.J. 101, 127 (1995)).  “In that inquiry, the ‘court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ’”  *H.C. Equities LP*, 247 N.J. at 381 (quoting *McDade v. Siazon*, 208 N.J. 463, 473 (2011)).  In other words, the summary judgment order is entitled to *de novo* review on appeal.
[brief] Plaintiff argued below that the Notice should have included “just something that said warehouse, some kind of indication other than we’re amending the redevelopment plan because arguably somebody gets a notice… [about a] redevelopment plan and they said if it doesn’t affect me, I don’t know what it’s about, I don’t really care. ” (T2, 44:20-25).  The specific blocks and lots affected by the Redevelopment Plan were identified in the title of the Ordinance.  (Pa89).  Had a member of the public viewed this notice and lived within proximity to the delineated properties or was curious as to the potential development of said properties, they were given not only the opportunity to, but also specific directions on how to obtain further information related to the Redevelopment Plan.  (Pa89).  The title of the Ordinance substantially complies with the statement of purpose required in N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(a) because it advises the public of the purpose of the Ordinance.
[brief] A.  Plaintiffs used the [...] Rides platform.  [...] is a technology company that uses its proprietary technology to develop and maintain digital multi-sided marketplace platforms.  (Da73 ¶ 4.)  On one side of the marketplace, businesses and individuals wishing to offer services to the public use [...]’s platforms to connect with users and obtain payment-processing services.  On the other side of the platforms are users who can connect with and obtain various services from businesses and individuals.  On the [...] Rides platform, for example, [...] enables users seeking transportation to connect with drivers willing to offer rides for a fee.  On the [...] Eats platform, users can connect with restaurants willing to provide meals and drivers willing to deliver meals to users.  (Da73 ¶4.)  [...] is a wholly owned subsidiary of [...], and is the registered transportation network company in New Jersey that sub-licenses [...]’s technology to, among others, independent drivers. \(^1\)  Plaintiffs allege that on March 31, 2022, they were riding as passengers in a car being driven by Defendant [...] that collided with a car being driven by Defendant [...].  (Da1–5.)  Plaintiffs had used [...]’s Rides platform to connect with [...].  (Da1–2; Da101.)  Plaintiffs allege that [...] was negligent in the operation of his vehicle, but they seek to hold [...] responsible for his actions.  (Da15 ¶¶ 8–9; Da17 ¶¶ 7–8.)  **B.
[brief] D.  [...]’ CROSS-APPEAL IS DISPOSITIVE.  For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ appeal should be dismissed.  The evidence at trial was so one-sided that Plaintiffs could not sustain the claim for negligent training and supervision.  Because the jury properly found that [...] acted outside the scope of his employment, granting Lowe’s’ cross-appeal moots the relief sought in Plaintiffs’ appeal.  II.
[brief] Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 64 (1993).  The Trial Court found that it did not abuse its discretion in admitted evidence regarding the prior medical history and falls because it determined that expert testimony is not required if the evidence is being offered as to the issue of causation of a fall.  (8T32:3-33:1).  The plaintiff respectfully disagrees and submits that the Trial Court abused its discretion in admitting evidence related to the plaintiff’s prior medical history, falls, and handicapped placard in the absence of any expert opinion establishing that the evidence was related to either the cause of the plaintiff’s fall or her injuries.  Furthermore, the admission of this evidence in the absence of any expert medical opinion had the clear capacity to result in a miscarriage of justice because it was utilized by the defendant as substantive evidence and allowed the jury to speculate that the plaintiff did not fall as a result of the wheel of her rollator striking the low-lying tripping hazard but rather fell as a result of a prior medical condition without any expert guidance.
[brief] To date, the Department has never required [...] to comply with the Holding Act nor has it ever attempted to apply SSAP No. 25 to the contract between [...] and its subscribers.  The pending legislation simply codifies this reality and confirms that the Department is not free to impose SSAP No. 25’s requirements on the [...] Fees because it is not a related party transaction.  (Related Party Transaction Bill).  The Department’s Bulletin cannot change this, particularly given that it is the product of improper rulemaking.  Despite this, contrary to all of the above law and precedent, the Department is arguing that [...] is subject to the Holding Act and that because [...] simply operates as a pass-through entity that collects fees on behalf of the [...], that collection is a related-party transaction.
[brief] Resolution  24-23 of the [...]  Approving the Denial of an Application for Minor Site Plan Approval with Variances  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c) to Permit the Operation of a Class 5 Dispensary for the Sale of Adult Use  Recreational Cannabis at the Subject Property  Located at [...], Block 158, Lot 3.01, in the City of [...]  Under Application [...]  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Aa236-245 | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Animal Prot. League of N.J. v. N.J. Dept. of Envtl.  Prot., 423 N.J. Super. 549 (App. Div. 2011) | 17 | | Barone v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 210 N.J. Super. 276 (App. Div. 1986) | 17 | | Bayshore Sewerage Co. v. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 122 N.J. Super. 184 (1973) | 8 | | Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197 (1997) | 8 | | Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74 (App. Div. 1985) | 8 | | Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589 (1965) | 8 | | Davis Enters. v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, (1987) | 9 | | Dunkin’ Donuts of N.J. Inc. v. Twp. of N. Brunswick Planning Bd., 193 N.J. Super. 513 (App. Div. 1984) | 9, 10, 14 | | Hamlin v. Matarazzo, 120 N.J. Super.
[brief] The Appellate Division “review[s] de novo [a] grant of summary judgment. ”  *Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy*, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021).  Similarly, where, as here, a trial court’s “decision . . . turns on its construction of a contract, appellate review of that determination is de novo. ”  *Manahawkin Convalescent v. O’Neill*, 217 N.J. 99, 115 (2014).  Summary judgment is proper if the record demonstrates “no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment . . . as a matter of law. ”  *Burnett v. Gloucester Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders*, 409 N.J. Super. 219, 228 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).  ARGUMENT
[directive] E.  The chief of the law enforcement agency where the officer is employed shall  1.  Conduct an investigation into the officer’s background and shall recommend to the appropriate County Prosecutor’s Office whether the officer should be permitted to carry weapons and what conditions, if any, should be imposed for the return of the weapons, consistent with any family or criminal or municipal court bail orders entered against the officer in the jurisdiction which the incident occurred.  2.  If necessary, re-assign the officer charged with committing an act of domestic violence or served with a restraining order so that the officer will not have contact with the domestic violence complainant.  3 (9/00)  Seizure of Weapons from Municipal and County Law Enforcement Officers
[brief] Order consolidating [...] v. [...], [...] with [...], et als. v. Atlantic City, et als., Docket No. [...] filed on September 21, 2020.............................................578a Order filed on June 8, 2021 granting in part Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.................................................................581a Memorandum of decision filed on June 8, 2021 granting in part Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim...............................583a Plaintiffs' Notice of Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's June 8, 2021 Order of Partial Dismissal of Claims..............................................623a Certification of [...] in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration.................................................................625a Defendants' Notice of Cross-Motion for Reconsideration.................................627a Order filed on October 25, 2021 granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration and denying Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration.................................................................629a Defendants' Answer filed on December 22, 2021...........................................631a Consent Order regarding discovery schedule filed on February 23, 2022…………………………………………………………………………………..649a Consent Case Management Order filed on April 28, 2023……………………………652a Plaintiffs' Notice of Motion for Leave to Amend filed on November 11, 2023………………………………………………………………………..658a Exhibit A
[brief] Before the car search, [...]’s search warrant affidavit made clear that police were focused on [...]’s car—not his home.  *(See Dca 1-7)*  [...] testified that, before the car \(^{15}\)  As courts have recognized, requests to search are plagued by power imbalances and discriminatory implementation.  *See Carty*, 170 N.J. at 645 (citing data that “nearly ninety-five percent of detained motorists granted a law enforcement officer’s request for consent to search”); [...], PhD, *New Jersey State Police Traffic Stops Analysis, 2009-21* (July 7, 2023) at 7, https://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases23/2023-0711_NJSP_Traffic_Stop_Analysis.pdf (concluding that recent car stop data “suggests that the New Jersey State Police apply a lower threshold for searching minority occupants which is indicative of potential discrimination”).  search, police were “not seeking a search warrant for—at this time for [...]’s residence” because “our probable cause had occurred in Toms River.
[brief] Latent print examination (like virtually all forensic techniques) is entirely subjective, and subjectivity inevitably introduces the potential for error and bias.  See AAAS Report at 96 (noting examiner’s judgments and analysis “are made subjectively based on experience rather than by consulting data on the specificity of features”).  The need to identify potential juror bias is particularly important in the context of forensic expert testimony like fingerprint examiner opinions.  As discussed in the brief of fellow amici, [...], most people have inaccurate pre-existing beliefs about forensic evidence that are difficult to shake.  The importance of jurors’ ability to properly weigh expert evidence is highlighted by New Jersey’s Model Criminal Jury instructions on expert testimony, in which jurors are instructed that “[y]ou are not bound by [the] expert’s opinion, but you should consider each opinion and give it the weight to which you deem it is entitled, whether that be great or slight, or you may reject it.
[brief] Plaintiff’s supervisor at [...] advised Plaintiff that he was being terminated because the school received an anonymous phone call advising that they were employing a racist, referring to Plaintiff.  (Plaintiff’s Dep. 76:18-22, 841a).  The Head of School at [...], [...], confirmed in his deposition that a call from an unidentified parent of a student expressing concern about what that parent supposedly read in the newspaper, specifically about the unsupported allegations of racism against Plaintiff by the Maplewood Defendants, is what caused [...] to terminate Plaintiff’s employment there.  (Caldwell Dep. 39:22-42:14, 916a-917a).  [...], the head of [...] security and Plaintiff’s supervisor, advised Caldwell that the issue against Plaintiff had “racial overtones” and involved “alleged racist behavior” by Plaintiff.  (Id. at 41:22-42:14, 916a-917a).  Caldwell also confirmed that the issue raised by an African American family whose child attended [...] arose out of a concern about [...]’ role during the police response to the July 5, 2016 incident.  (Id. at 46:15-20, 918a).  Caldwell’s understanding was that there was a “disruption” in Maplewood, [...] was part of the police response to “maintain control”, that there were “some interactions that were interpreted as untoward and that there was a complaint filed”, and there “were some arrests, some kind of spray used”.  (Id. at 51:22-52:18, 919a).  Caldwell’s recollection was that “it just didn’t look good for [...] to have members of our school community who felt uncomfortable” and the alleged behavior by Plaintiff, which as demonstrated at length, supra, did not actually occur and was instead manufactured by Defendants, “was interpreted by the black community as being racially motivated”, including “the black community of Maplewood of which we have members in our [[...]] community”.  (Id. at 55:6-56:10, 920a).  Caldwell testified that at the time [...] terminated Plaintiff’s employment, Plaintiff was performing his duties in a satisfactory manner and [...] had never cited him for any performance issues.  (Id. at 60:13-24, 921a; 82:3-11, 927a).  [...]’s decision to terminate Plaintiff “... was based on the news article in which ... there was some complaint by the Town of Maplewood ... ” about Plaintiff’s “... behavior, potentially allegedly racist behavior in this incident of July 4th ... ”.  (Id. at 89:14-90:2, 928a-929a) (emphasis added).  At the time of his termination in October 2018, Plaintiff’s annual salary at [...] was $45,400.  (Id. at 32:22-25, 914a; 38:21-39:1, 916a).
[brief] TPAF Enrollment Application dated August 16, 1991 ...........................................  Ra1 TPAF Report of Transfer Form dated July 30, 1997 ..............................................  Ra2 TPAF Estimate of Retirement Benefits dated April 4, 2011.................................  Ra3 TPAF Estimate of Retirement Benefits dated January 19, 2018............................  Ra6  [...] Resolution – Resignation dated April 12, 2021.......................  Ra9  [...]’s Application for Service Retirement Allowance ...........................................  Ra10 Notice of Retirement Approval dated June 3, 2021.............................................  Ra13  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] 7.  Court erred in Mar. 7, ‘23 Order, par. 2, for Trust payment of [...]’s requested $17,649.57 for [...] fees for Intermediate Accounting, since it contradicted my evidence that proved it should be $16,575, by disallowing $560.5 billed work in July 2022 for Accounting, which was finalized and issued in May 2022, & $514.07 admin fee (3% of billed work based on [...]’s signed retainer agreement, which [...] didn’t see/approve).  It should require Mr. [...] to pay back to Trust the $1,074.57 overpayment.
[brief] (Da124 pg. 28, Lines 3-11.)  [...] testified that his gross sales in 2021 were approximately $750,000.00, and in 2018 approximately $740,000.00.  (Da160-Da161 pg. 64, Line 16 through pg. 65, Line 5.)  [...] testified that he did not document any increases in electrical costs based upon the installation of the system, and while he testified that he would supply electrical bills from one year prior to installation through installation, such records were never produced.  (Da211 pg. 115, Lines 3-21.)  [...] also testified that he never determined, nor discussed with his management team, as to how or even if the environmental clean-up impacted business operations and does not possess any information evidencing how the building, either inside or outside, was adversely impacted by the activities occurring.