ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant owned a blue 1998 Jeep Wrangler (21T30-21 to 21T31-8).  He left the keys in the unlocked Jeep "most of the time" and he let other people borrow it (21T16 to 25; 21T58-1 to 15).  The last time that he had let [...] use the Jeep was around March 3 or 4 (21T78-1 to 21T79-25).  Defendant's clothes and a buccal swab were taken after the interview (21T146-1 to 21T150-19; 22T59-1 to 20).
[brief] Appellant also drafted and executed an intercompany loan agreement between [...] and [...] (“Arley Loan”) on December 31, 2016.  (Da824; Pa695:90:3-20).  Appellant negotiated the Arley Loan himself for [...] and for [...].  (Pa695: 91:3-9).  At the time of the Arley Loan, Appellant and his wife Defendant [...] were the only members of [...].  (Pa695:93:17- Appellant did not discuss the Arley Loan with anyone at [...] or [...] either before, or after it was executed.  (Pa695:91:10-25).  Appellant prepared financial statements for [...] never itemized any amount owed by [...] pursuant to the Arley Loan.  (Pa695:92:1-8).  According to the records maintained by Appellant, Respondent [...] transferred $48,295.18 to [...] prior to the execution of any loan agreement.  (Pa703:120:23-121:1).  Appellant never discussed these pre-loan agreement payments from [...] to [...] with amount at [...] or [...]; it was something he determined all on his own.  (Pa704:121:2-18).  Pursuant to the Arley Loan, interest was due to [...]; Arley Farms never made any interest payments to [...].  (Pa739:261: 7-12).  On January 17, 2020, a judgment was entered in favor of [...] and against Arley Farms for the outstanding amount under the Arley Loan, $294,653.90.  (Da829).
[brief] Article Second  Exclusions  No company shall be required, without its written consent, to arbitrate any claim or suit if: (a) it is not a signatory company nor has given written consent; or (b) it creates any cause of action or liabilities that do not currently exist in law or equity; or (c) its policy is written on a retrospective or experience-rated basis; or (d) any payment which such signatory company may be required to make under this Agreement is or may be in excess of its policy limits.  However, an Applicant may agree to accept an award not to exceed policy limits and waive their right to pursue the balance directly against the Respondent’s insured; or (e) it has asserted a denial of coverage; or (f) any claim for the enforcement of which a lawsuit was instituted prior to, and is pending at, the time this Agreement is signed; or (g) under the insurance policy, settlement can be made only with the insured’s consent; or (h) medical payment subrogation claims are prohibited by statute or judicial decision.  (Da118).  [...] has developed rules pursuant to the inter-company arbitration agreement which address the adjudication of claims where a party alleges that a claim is excluded from jurisdiction under Article Second.  Article Fifth: “[...], representing the signatory companies, is authorized to: (a) make appropriate Rules and Regulations for the presentation and determination of controversies under this Agreement;…”.  (Da119).  The arbitration awards in this matter are governed by the [...], Inc. rules.  (Da210 – Da220).  Those rules are interpreted by [...] in the [...], Inc. reference guide.  (Da221 – Da235).  The [...] Rules and Regulations, Rule 2-4 (Da212) require that a party asserting a bar to jurisdiction must do so in the affirmative defenses section of their answer or those defenses are waived.
[brief] (1T84-85).  Plaintiff advised the Court that a friend, [...], visited from Canada to attend his wedding.  [...] spent time with Plaintiff and his fiancée Defendant, between November 21st and November 28th, 2021, prior to their cultural wedding on November 28th, 2021.  [...] told Plaintiff something he overheard from Defendant, which caused him not to attend the wedding after expressing to Plaintiff his disapproval and concern over what he overheard.  Plaintiff conveyed that despite this incident and other concerns, he remained positive and committed to the marriage, notably because of Defendant’s father’s recent passing and his family telling him that everything was going to be fine.  (1T85-87).  **Cultural Marriage and aftermath**
[brief] Finally, the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine does not apply.  The *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine generally prevents parties from bringing claims in federal district courts when the plaintiff in federal court seeks to void the state court judgment.  *Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP*, 615 F.3d 159, 163–64 (3d Cir. 2010).  The Debtor is alleging independent federal claims — which he could not allege in the state court action — under Section 548 to avoid the foreclosure as a fraudulent transfer and the Takings Clause to show equity theft.  Although the Section 548 claim and the Takings Clause claim are closely related to the state foreclosure judgment, that by itself does not mean that *Rooker-Feldman* applies.  *Skinner v. Switzer*, 562 U.S. 521, 532 (2011) (presenting independent claims that are similar to state court claims is not an impediment to federal jurisdiction).  The court’s consideration of the Section 548 and Takings Clause claims is not a review and rejection of the state court foreclosure judgment because the court can assume the state court reached a proper foreclosure judgment, but then independently decide whether the foreclosure could be avoided as a fraudulent transfer under Section 548 or as an impermissible taking under the Fifth Amendment and/or the New Jersey Constitution.  *See In re Philadelphia Ent. & Dev. Partners*, 879 F.3d 492, 500-01 (3d Cir. 2018) (*Rooker-Feldman* does not apply to a fraudulent transfer action); *In re Lowry*, No. 20-1712, 2021 WL 6112972, at *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 27, 2021); *In re Isaacs*, 895 F.3d 904 (6th Cir. 2018) (*Rooker-Feldman* does not apply to causes of action brought under Code Section 544); *In re Sasson*, 424 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005) (*Rooker-Feldman* does not bar the exercise of federal bankruptcy power and bankruptcy courts may avoid state judgments in core bankruptcy proceedings, under Sections 544, 547, 548, 549, may modify judgments under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129, 1325, and, may discharge judgments under 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1141, 1328).
[brief] ........................................................................ 32  TABLE OF CITATIONS | Case Law | Brief Page Number | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | Bressman v. Gash, 131 N.J. 517, 526 (1993)  .................................. | 18, 26 | | Burbridge v. Mine Hill Twp., 117 NJ 376, 385 (1990)  ......................... | 13 | | Campus Assocs. V. Hillsborough Zoning Bd., 413 N.J. Super. 527, 538 (App Div. 2010).  | 20 | | CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. Borough of Lebanon Planning Bd., 414 N.J. Super. 563, 578-579 (App. Div. 2010).  | 15 | | Cell South of New Jersey, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment of West Windsor Twp., 172 N.J. 75, 81 (2002)  ............... | 14 | | Charlie Brown of Chatham, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment for Chatham Tp., 202 N.J. Super. 312, 321 (App. Div. 1985) .................................................. | 14, 16, 19 | | Committee for a Rickel Alternative and Linden Merchants Association v. City of Linden, 111 NJ 192, 201 (1988)  ... | 13, 14 | | Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 NJ 476, 485 (1987)  ...... | 13 | | Fine v. Galloway Township Committee, 190 N.J. Super. 432, 441 (Law Div. 1983)  .................................................. | 29 | Hawrylo v. Board of Adjustment, Harding Tp., 249 N.J. Super. 568, 578 (App. Div. 1991)  ...........................................  13  Mazza v. Linden Bd. of Adj., 83 N.J. Super. 494, 496 (App. Div. 1964) .........................................................  16  Mountain Hill, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Middletown, 403 N.J. Super. 210, 243 (App. Div. 2008) certif. denied, 197 N.J. 475 (2009) ...........................................  22 Nuckel v. Little Ferry Planning Bd., 208 N.J. 95 (2011)  .........  22 Pieretti v. Bloomfield, 35 N.J. 382 (1961) ............................  21 Russell v. Board of Adjustment of Borough of Tenafly, 31 N.J. 58 (1959) .......................................................  27 Smart SMR of N.Y. Inc. v. Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 152 N.J. 309, 327 (1998) ..............................................  13 Administrative Code Regulations N.J.A.C. 7:50-3.1 (a) .................................................. 29 N.J.A.C. 7:50-1.1 to -7:50-10.35 ........................................  29 Other Authorities  Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration Chapter 19-3.2 (Gann, 2022) .................. 17, 19 Estell Manor Ordinance 380-35 D ..................................  30 Estell Manor Ordinance 380-33 C. (6) and (7)  ............... 30, 31  [...] v. [...]  [...]  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Trial Court Order affirming the Planning Board Decision, Entered May 26, 2023 ...........................................  Ja12  Trial Court Memorandum of Decision ......................... Ja13-20 Order  Denying Reconsideration, July 7, 2023 ..............  Ja21 Resolution No. 3-2021, City of Estell Manor Planning/ Zoning Board, denying [...] application ...............  Ja224-233 Resolution No. 5-2021, City of Estell Manor Planning/ Zoning Board, denying [...] application .....................  Ja289-297  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] Prior to requesting payment of a lien to retain a forfeited vehicle for official use, the seizing agency in should ensure that there is at least net $5,000 equity in the vehicle.  The Director, will not EOAF, authorize payment of liens to retain vehicles for June 1999  7 , No. Directive 33 of Page 7  3 official use when there is less than in net $5,000 equity.  The Director, EOAF may approve limited exceptions to these dollar limits if the exceptions are determined be in the best interests of the to government.  B.
[brief] B.  The applicability of the entire controversy doctrine is an issue of arbitrability  The application of the entire controversy is a question of arbitrability, and the parties’ express incorporation of the AAA rules into its arbitration, including Rule 9(a), means that the parties have expressly agreed that the arbitrator must decide whether [...]’s claims are barred by this doctrine.  In determining that it must decide arbitrability, the Trial Court relied almost exclusively on Raritan Plaza I Assocs., L.P. v. Cushman & Wakefield of N.J., Inc., 273 N.J. Super. 64, 71 (App. Div. 1994).  Pa41.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW  A mixed standard of review applies to the Final Judgment.  “[F]or mixed questions of law and fact, [an appellate court] give[s] deference . . . to the supported factual findings of the trial court, but review[s] de novo the lower court’s application of any legal rules to such factual findings. ”  State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 577 (2015) (quoting State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 416 (2004)); Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 223 n.5 (2011) (“De novo review of a contract is predicated on the absence of a factual dispute at issue.  When there is such a factual dispute, the finder of fact must resolve it, and a deferential standard of review applies. ”); Jennings v. Pinto, 5 N.J. 562, 569-70 (1950).  Thus, the Court should defer to the trial court’s factual findings that are “supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record,” State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71, 88 (2016) (citation omitted), however, the trial court’s “interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  With respect to the Discovery Order, an abuse of discretion standard applies.  Capital Health Sys., Inc. v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc., 230 N.J. 73, 79-80 (2017).  Although a reviewing court will generally “defer to a trial court’s disposition of discovery matters, including the formulation of protective orders, unless the court has abused its discretion, deference is inappropriate if the court’s determination in drafting its order is based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law. ”  *Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth.*, 148 N.J. 524, 559 (1997) (citations omitted); *Capital Health Sys., Inc.*, 230 N.J. at 79-80 (“[A]ppellate courts . . . will defer to a trial judge’s discovery rulings absent an abuse of discretion or a judge’s misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. ”).  **POINT II**
[brief] For years, Appellants maintained a policy—consistent with guidance the [...] issued in 2018—to ensure a nondiscriminatory, safe, and supportive environment for all students, including all transgender students.  But on June 20, 2023, they changed course and adopted a blanket policy that required schools to affirmatively inform the parents of transgender, gender non-conforming, or non-binary students about the child’s gender identity.  Because the policy discriminated based on gender identity or expression, the [...] and [...] (“[...]”) (together, “the State”), filed an administrative complaint before [...] the next day alleging multiple LAD violations and sought relief in the Superior Court to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the policy—and thus maintain the status quo—pending resolution of that administrative action.
[brief] # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ##  State Cases  *Meridian Quality Care, Inc., v. Bd. Of Adjustment of the Twp. of Wall,* 355 N.J.  Super 328, 344 (App. Div. 2002) .........................................................  5  *Pizzo Mantin Grp. V. Twp. of Randolph,* 137 N.J. 216, 228 (1994) .....................  6  *Shim v. Washington Township Planning Board,* 298 N.J. Super. 395 (App. Div. 1997) ..............................................................  10  ## State Statutes *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-5 ..................................................................................................  8  *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-10a-e .......................................................................................  9  *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-38 .......................................................................................... 5, 6  *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-39 .......................................................................................... 5, 6  *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-40 ..........................................................................................  5  *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-48 ..........................................................................................  5  ## Robbinsville Land Development Ordinance  Robbinsville Land Development Ordinance § 142-77 ...........................................  5, 6, 8, 11, 15  Robbinsville Land Development Ordinance § 142-78 ............................................ 5, 6, 8, 11  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The Attorney General supplements the State’s Counterstatement of Facts, on which he relies, with the following.  Prior to the testimony of [...], defense counsel objected that the officer was not the proper witness to authenticate the surveillance video that he retrieved because he was not the owner of the video.  (1T69-2 to 6).  Observing that there is no requirement that the owner of surveillance video authenticate it, the prosecutor responded that [...] viewed the surveillance video when he downloaded it and in preparation for trial, and that the officer would testify that the scene as captured on the surveillance video accurately depicted the scene as he saw it when he downloaded the surveillance video soon after the shooting.  (1T69-18 to 70-17).  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., ruled that under the silent-witness theory of authentication, corroborative testimony of an eyewitness is not necessary to authenticate a video of the crime so long as the video is otherwise authenticated.  [...] held that because [...] downloaded and viewed the surveillance video at the scene close in time to the shooting, this was sufficient to establish that the surveillance video accurately depicts what it purports to represent.  Accordingly, [...] ruled that the surveillance video was admissible as evidence through the testimony of [...].  (1T70-21 to 72-2).  [...] proceeded to testify that he worked in the Technical Service Unit of the [...], where he assisted officers with technical issues regarding videos and cell phones.  In that assignment, which he had held for seven of his eighteen years with the department, he had received training on video retrieval, which was one of his job functions.  (1T73-18 to 74-12).  [...] recounted that on July 16, 2019, he was dispatched to the scene of the shooting to retrieve surveillance video.  (1T74-13 to 23).  With the consent of the owner of the grocery store at [...], where the surveillance system was maintained, [...] downloaded the surveillance video.  (1T76-7 to 25; 1T79-7 to 80-19).  He testified that the timestamps on the video were ahead by approximately twelve hours, indicating the morning of July 17 instead of the evening of July 16, which is when the shooting occurred and when he watched and downloaded the video.  (1T74-13 to 25; 1T81-7 to 82-8; 1T94-4 to 23).
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  The trial court’s decision should be reversed, and the matter remanded to the [...], because the trial court erroneously concluded a use variance was required, which the [...] lacked jurisdiction to grant, and thus, the [...] could not proceed with site plan approval.  In reaching this conclusion, the court overlooked the unrefuted facts that: two principal uses currently existed on the Property; that the proposed development sought to continue the cell tower use that was already permitted and along with a by right principal use as, set forth in Plaintiff’s site plan; and that two principle uses are specifically permitted on the Property by [...] Ordinances §250-4, §250- 20.  Considering these facts shows the [...] has jurisdiction as authorized by the Ordinances and the Municipal Land Use Law ("MLUL") to consider and grant site plan approval of the unified and comprehensive two principal uses on the industrially zoned lot as set forth in Plaintiff's Application without need of a use variance.  I.
[brief] Appellant Continued to Suffer Retaliation as a Result of Reporting the Sexual Harassment.  (Pa230, Pa351-55, Pa358-60, Pa998, Pa693-95)  Appellant was also subjected to further retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment.  (Pa230)  Specifically, on December 20, 2018, Appellant learned that Respondent [...] had met with another employee and bad-mouthed her, calling her “too immature” for her position and that she was like a “drunken prom date. ”  (Pa358-59)  135:21-138:20.  A female coworker overheard the meeting and told Appellant about this meeting, and Appellant said she did not want to know more details because it was making her feel worse.  Id.  There were other false rumors being spread that Appellant was sleeping with multiple people in the office, that she was terminated, and she was a “whore. ”  (Pa359-60)  141:1-143:4.  Appellant promptly sent an email to Respondent [...] detailing such comments, and she explained that she felt that comments were made because of her complaints of sexual harassment by [...].  Appellant pleaded for Respondents to take remedial action to provide a safe working environment free from harassment/retaliation.  (Pa998).  Respondent [...] recalled receiving the email but, once again, did not formally investigate, discuss the matter with Appellant, or take remedial action.  (Pa693-95) 151:14-158:3.  At this point, Appellant knew that Respondents’ retaliation would only persist, and her mental and emotional health was in jeopardy every single day that she entered the office.  Accordingly, Appellant’s physician placed her on medical leave, which was eventually extended through August 2019.
[brief] The mutual exchange of writings (and the parties’ intent to be bound by them) established in the Arbitration that the parties had a meeting of the minds and intended to formally update the Backlog and Pipeline lists.  See Da137-38 (“The fact that on some projects there were no formal amendments to the PTA or at times formal agreements as to EGP is overcome by the inclusion of the projects and EGP figures in the updates, and perhaps more importantly, the actual payment of more than 60% of the claimed EGP…These affirmative, voluntary actions by [...] are clear admissions of EGP calculation and monies owed. ”).
[directive] TO: LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVES FROM: [...] DEPUTY DIRECTOR DATE: MAY 21, 2001  SUBJECT: FIREARMS QUALIFICATION AND REQUALIFICATION STANDARDS FOR NEW JERSEY LAW ENFORCEMENT  Revisions have been made to the Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards for New Jersey Law Enforcement.  The changes are the result of recommendations and review by many rangemasters and firearms instructors throughout the state.  Revisions have been made in the courses of fire for handgun, subgun, service rifle and carbine qualification.  In addition, a quailfing course of fire has been developed for scoped rifles.  The statewide qualification protocol now includes standards for the entire range of firearms carried by law enforcement officers in the conduct of routine duties and specialized operation.  Of particular note is an increase in the number of qualification sessions required for shotguns.  Requalification will be required twice a year with any weapon carried on a regular basis as part of an officer’s equipment for performance of routine official duties.  Increases in the number of requalification sessions required per year for specified firearms, as well as modifications in the course of fire, will be effective January 1, 2002.  Police executives are encouraged, however, to augment their agency requalification procedures consistent with the attached revised standards at any time prior to that date.  If you have any questions concerning firearms qualification standards please call the Division of Criminal Justice State Rangemaster at (973) 599-5946 3 6/2003
[brief] A mitigating factor that is "suggested in the record or brought to the court's attention should not be ignored."  *State v. Rivera*, 249 N.J. 285, 298-99 (2021).  In short, "where the evidence supports a finding of a mitigating factor, [it] must be part of the court's 'deliberative process.'"  *Jaffe*, 220 N.J. at 121 n.1 (quoting *Dalziel*, 182 N.J. at 505).
[brief] 1  Procedural Posture ....................................................................................  2 Statement of Facts .....................................................................................  2 Legal Argument .......................................................................................  2  Point I ........................................................................................................  2  THE COURT’S CLARIFICATION OF THE SENTENCING REQUIREMENTS  PURSUANT TO STATE V. YARBOUGH IN STATE V. TORRES APPLIES TO DEFENDANT’S CASE.  Point II ......................................................................................................  3  THE INCORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE YARBOUGH FACTORS RESULTS IN AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE.  Point III .....................................................................................................  5  [...] INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE YARBOUGH FACTOR REQUIREMENTS WHEN SENTENCING [...].  Point IV .....................................................................................................  7  [...] FAILED TO PROVIDE A STATEMENT AS TO THE OVERALL FAIRNESS OF [...]’S SENTENCE AS REQUIRED BY LAW.  Conclusion ...................................................................................................