ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On 8/9/23, Bank sent [...] a letter, stated it had investigated an unauthorized online transfer from his savings to his checking account and reversed the unauthorized transfer from the savings account.  The Bank however did not deposit $45,000.00 of its own funds into [...]’s savings account, rather it transferred the funds from his checking account.  The Bank’s letter went on to state “that the online fraud claim regarding transaction totaling $18,900.00 was not related to an online fraud event and cannot be resolved by our team.  We’ve forwarded your claim to the correct department. ” (Pa 137, Par. 14).
[directive] N.J.S.A. under instrument 24 the by implicated may be that rights affords 52:4B-36, N.J.S.A. Rights, of Bill Victims' Crime  The right: including the Directive, this and Law Reform Bail of implementation the prosecutor's the confer with to disposition and final and progress case of advised be To (k) informed; adequately kept be may victim the that representative so to the crime of impact the about of time, amount reasonable a within statement, written a submit (m)
[brief] (Pa116).  Rather than allow the Court the decide this case based on the parties’ respective post trial briefs, on September 14, 2021, Tenant filed an additional six (6) page Sur-Reply Brief, which, for the first time\(^3\), argued that Tenant was not obligated to pay $16,659.25 in Common Area Maintenance (“CAM”)  --- \(^3\)  At trial, Tenant vaguely insinuated that Landlord’s calculation of the 2020 CAM, Real Estate Taxes and Utilities owed by Tenant under the Lease were “unaudited”.  (1T7-2 to 1T8-18, 1T26-7 to 1T26-18).  In its Sur-Reply, Tenant, for the first time, further alleged that Landlord’s calculation of these amounts was not properly supported by the record.  (Pa117).  This contention, which Tenant smartly does not raise on appeal, was nothing more than a red herring utilized by Tenant in a desperate attempt to escape its express contractual obligation to pay the Rent and Additional Rent due under the Lease.
[brief] And if a judge rules on a summary judgment motion, and also has to decide whether certain evidence is admissible on the motion, it must first decide whether the evidence is admissible, then decide whether the motion should be granted.  When the appellate court reviews those decisions, it also reviews the two decisions separately: the evidentiary ruling under the abuse of discretion standard, and the legal conclusions that support the summary judgment ruling de novo.  *Estate of Hanges v. Metro.  Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.*, 202 N.J. 369, 384-85 (2010).  **POINT I**
[brief] Notwithstanding this frivolous and meritless argument, this point was not raised in briefs submitted to the trial court below, has not properly raised or argued on this appeal, and should not be considered.  Under the New Jersey Rules of Court, “an appellant’s brief must include a statement in parentheses next to the point heading in the legal argument portion of the brief” that contains the “location of the relevant ruling or opinion of record, or if the issue was not raised previously. ”  R. 2:6-2(a)(6) (emphasis added).  While the Appellate Division may of course consider the argument in its discretion, it typically will not consider any argument raised for the first time on appeal unless it concerns jurisdictional matters or substantially implicates the public interest, or otherwise constitutes plain error.
[brief] The Supreme Court of New Jersey evaluated the standards by which a court determines whether there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding summary judgment motions.  Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Company.  142 N.J. 520 (1995).  The Court indicated that the focus should be placed on whether a disputed issue of fact is genuine or “of an insubstantial nature. ”  Brill, 142 N.J. at 529 (citing Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co. Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954)).  Thus, a moving party will only be successful in a motion for summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact.  Id.  Summary Judgment is only proper if “no rational fact-finder could render a judgment in favor of [the plaintiff]. ”  *Gilhooley v. County of Union*, 164 N.J. 533, 545 (2000).  Further, “only when the evidence is utterly one-sided may a Judge decide that a party may prevail as a matter of law. ”  *Id.*  In order to defeat a defendant’s motion for summary judgment the plaintiff only has to show that a jury could potentially find in his or her favor.  *Cavanaugh v. Morris*, 273 N.J. Super. 38, 41 (App. Div. 1994).  Our Supreme Court clarified the role of the court in a defendant’s summary judgment motion as being, “to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to a material fact, but not to decide the issue if he finds it to exist. ”  *Oswin v. Shaw*, 129 N.J. 290, 307 (1992) (citing *Judson v. People’s Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield*, 17 N.J. 67, 73 (1954)).  Furthermore, all favorable inferences must be granted to the plaintiff.  *Owens v. Kessler*, 272 N.J. Super. 225, 233 (App. Div. 1994).  “Only when the evidence is utterly one-sided may a judge decide that a party should prevail as a matter of law. ”  *Gilhooley v. County of Union*, 164 N.J. 533, 545 (2000).  It is plaintiff’s position that N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 B(5) was improperly applied as [...] was not using the property of the railroad at the time that she was struck and killed.
[brief] Staffing Coordinator Office Dynamics and the Impact of COVID-19.  The staffing coordinator office is relatively small, with only two or three staffing coordinators (out of six total) present on any given workday.  (Pa66-67).  The staffing coordinators sit in an open office suite, with four computers that sit atop an L-shaped desk.  [...]’s office is located to the left of that L-shaped desk and to the right of that desk lies the nursing supervisor’s office.  (Pa66-67).  Despite the friendliness of the group, [...] described the staffing coordinator office as a “very stressful environment. ” (Pa358 at 66:24-67:8).  Those already-high stress levels only amplified during the COVID-19 pandemic.  (Pa358-59).  The staffing coordinators were the gatekeepers of the personal protective equipment.  (Pa359).  Employees’ morale began to drop during the COVID-19 pandemic as employees became increasingly nervous about spending extra time working at the hospital.  (Pa166).  Unlike others in hospital administration, the staffing coordinators could not work from home during the COVID-19 pandemic, increasing frustrations.  (Pa359).  The stress also impacted [...].  [...], one of the nursing supervisors who worked with [...], described [...] as more anxious during the COVID-19 pandemic.  (Pa454 at 23:14-24).  [...], one of [...]’s staffing coordinators for years, testified that as the COVID-19 pandemic wore on, [...] grew “angry at the world it seemed like. ” (Pa433 at 17:3-18).  Plaintiffs testified that [...] sometimes “belittled” and “degraded” them during this time, and that her management style was not always “professional. ” (Pa175 at 67:13-68:6; Pa176 at 70:10-12; Pa184 at 101:22-102:3; Pa194 at 143:22-144:22; Pa240 at 61:18-62:12; Pa240 at 64:10-18; Pa241 at 65:6-17; Pa285 at 30:23-31:5; Pa286 at 35:1-7; Pa305 at 109:6-110:7).  [...] admitted that [...]’s treatment of the staffing coordinators was not targeted at anyone and “stemmed from frustration. ” (Pa243 at 75:3-76:18).  Plaintiffs routinely vented about [...]’s conduct to each other, as well as to others.  (Pa175; Pa176; Pa237-38; Pa240).  V.
[brief] 2  “Da” refers to Appellants’ appendix; “Db” refers to Appellants’ appellate brief; and “Pa” refers to [...]’s appendix filed herewith.  pay their rent under the terms of the Lease.  (Pa0016).  Specifically, Appellants agreed to “fulfill [their] obligations under the Lease through the entire term. ”  (Ibid.).  The Concession Recovery Provision contained in the Lease Rider stated in bold, conspicuous language that  This Concession/Discount Agreement will be immediately terminated, and you will be required to immediately repay to the Landlord the amounts of all concessions or discounts that you have actually received without further notice, which will hereinafter be deemed additional rent, if any of the following shall have occurred in Landlords sole opinion:  Your Lease is terminated early due to your default or one’s own discretion (for example, if you abandon the premises without paying rent, terminate your lease early for any reason or are evicted)  Your monthly rent was received late anytime throughout the lease term  You are not current in the payment of any additional rent that may have accrued over the period of the lease term, including late charges, insufficient funds fees, court costs, attorney’s fees, etc.  [Ibid. (emphasis in original)].  Despite these obligations to make full and timely rent payments, the Tenant defaulted three separate times under the Lease.  (Da112-Da113).  For the first two defaults, [...] agreed, as a courtesy, to not enforce the Concession Recovery Provision against the Tenant once she brought her rent current.  (Da113).  After receiving and utilizing the Concessions, Appellants first failed to make timely rent payments in April 2022.  (Ibid.).  [...] charged Appellants for the Concessions in accordance with the Concession Recovery Provision.  (Ibid.).  As a courtesy, [...] agreed to waive enforcement of the Concession Recovery Provision if Appellants brought their account current, which they eventually did.  (Ibid.).  On June 27, 2022, the Tenant desired to switch parking spaces, resulting in the execution of a revised lease.  (Da29-Da43).  Other than the parking space number, the revised lease incorporated all of the material terms and conditions of the Lease.  (Ibid.).  As part of executing the revised lease, Appellants re-executed the Lease Rider containing the Concession Recovery Provision.
[brief] Its post-appeal length and complication are directly correlated to the trial court’s October 2009 massive expansion of the case, all after the case had reached a prior final judgment, appeal, and limited remand in 2006.  After the trial court allowed all of Plaintiffs’ new claims in 2009, a bench trial lasted 220 days, and the trial court issued another final judgment in December 2013.  On appeal, this Court in 2018 remanded the case again to correct errors below.
[brief] Da953 Civil Case Information Statement filed by Defendant/Appellant, [...] on May 13, 2022: - February 21, 2019  Order Granting Award for Sanctions and for Counsel Fees executed by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. (Sixth Street Violation)  Da965 - February 21, 2019  Order Granting Award for Counsel Fees and Sanctions for violation of June 27, 2017  Judgment executed by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. (Fence Violation) Da967 - May 29, 2019  Order for Judgment Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs related to Installation of Fence relating to Order to Show Cause executed by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. (Fence Violation)  Da969 - May 29, 2019  Order for Judgment Award for Attorney’s Fees and Costs related to Sixth Street Violation executed by the Honorable [...], P.J. Ch. (Sixth Street Violation) Da971 – June 5, 2019  Order denying restraints executed by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. Da973 – August 26, 2019  Order Denying Recusal and Referral to a New Judge executed by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. Da974 – February 5, 2020  Order Denying Defendant’s Motion For Order Compelling Return of Monies executed by The Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. Da976 – March 29, 2022  Order Dismissing Defendant’s Complaint executed by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. Da978 – March 29, 2022  Trial Opinion decided by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. Da980 – April 26, 2022
[brief] 2  References to transcripts are as follows:  1T 8/27/21 (motion)  2T 11/12/21 (reconsideration)  3T 5/3/23 (trial)  4T 5/4/23 (trial)  5T 5/8/23 (trial)  6T 5/9/23 (trial)  7T 5/15/23 (trial)  8T 5/16/23 (trial)  9T 5/11/23 (trial) was primarily responsible for [...]’s wrongful death.
[brief] As indicated in its Engineering Report, [...]’s stormwater design included numerous stormwater BMP’s to help the proposed development meet NJDEP’s water quality standards:  As can be seen in detail in the Green Infrastructure section of this report below, several stormwater management best management practices (BMP’s) are proposed.  These consist of two constructed wetlands basins (to replace the incomplete stormwater management basins already on site), five bioretention basins, 20 green infrastructure, manufactured treatment devices (MTD’s), and nine infiltration basins.  (Aa0085).  The NJDEP properly concluded after its thorough review of the design that “stormwater quality was met” through the use of those BMP’s.
[brief] App. 1975) | 25 | | O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169 (1983) | 17 | | Cases | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Shanley & Fisher, P.C. v. Sisselman, | 12 | | 215 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 1987) | | | Soler v. Castmaster, Div. of H.P.M. Corp., 98 N.J. 137 (1984) | *passim* | | Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150 (1979) | 31 | | Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. V. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., | 10 | | 224 N.J. 189 (2016) | | | The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. den. sub nom., | 17 | | 287 U.S. 662 (1932) | | | Theer v. Philip Carey Co., 133 N.J. 610 (1993) | 23 | | Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015) | 13,23,24 | | United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen, 35 N.J. 193 (1961) | 12 | | Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 144 N.J. 34 (1996) | 16 | | Statutes | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Regulations | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Rules of Court | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | R. 1:7-4 | 11 | | R. 1:7-4(a) | 11 | | R. 4:46-2(c) | 11 | | R. 4:46-5 | 12 | | N.J.R.E. 703 | 24 | | Other Authorities | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Model Jury Charge (Civil) 5.40I
[brief] **A.  Attorneys’ Fees Were Calculated Incorrectly.**  [...] claims the trial court correctly calculated attorneys’ fees because it reduced the amount of fees originally sought by [...].  (Prb 15.)  This argument ignores the flaws in the amount sought by [...] in the first instance, and the bizarre calculation employed by the trial court.  The trial court began its calculation of attorneys’ fees by starting with the initial amount of fees claimed by [...] - $1,193,281.  (Pa54.)  This number was wrong to start.  [...] claimed that it calculated this number by deducting from its total fees for issues unrelated to [...] and for issues on which it was unsuccessful.  (Da0183.)  However, despite its present concession that [...] did not take a position on choice of law (Prb 9)², and that it failed on the issues of choice of law and allocation, [...] took no deductions for those issues.  (Da0189-190.)  Thus, the trial court’s starting figure for calculating attorneys’ fees was inconsistent with [...]’s own methodology.  The trial court also accepted this starting number without making any effort to scrutinize [...]’s bills.  The trial court did not address the rates charged, the amount recovered by [...], or the factors required by RPC 1.5(a).  (Pa0054.)
[brief] ”  That rule has been clearly interpreted in State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 457-458 (2011), to only allow a “narrow” category of lay opinion: that which will “assist the trier of fact by helping to explain the witness's testimony or by shedding light on the determination of the disputed factual issue”; moreover, such lay opinion is specifically “limit[ed] to the perceptions of the testifying witness.
[brief] Here, plaintiff was challenging the Ordinance adopting the Redevelopment Plan and the Redevelopment Plan itself as violating the Public Trust Doctrine.  To the extent that a “trigger” is necessary, the “trigger” was the enactment of the Redevelopment Plan.  In short, the Court held that a private citizen only has the right to bring a legal challenge to Government action that violates the Public Trust Doctrine when the Government action is either (1) the approval of a CAFRA permit or (2) the actual approval of a specific development application.  The Public Trust Doctrine statute was specifically designed and intended to codify and expand the 200+ year existing Common Law Public Trust Doctrine, not to place exclusive authority and jurisdiction to enforce the Common Law and now Statutory Doctrines only with the DEP.
[brief] Similarly, in *Alloway v. Bradlees, Inc.*, 157 N.J. 221 (1999), the Supreme Court considered the liability of prime or general contractors for the violation of construction safety requirements.  The Court held that per OSHA regulations that took the place of the Construction Safety Act, a prime contractor “may be liable for any of its subcontractor’s violations of OSHA regulations as well as its own. ”  *Id.* at 239 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1926.16).  “By contracting for full performance of a contract * * * the prime contractor assumes all obligations prescribed as employer obligations under the standards contained in this part, whether or not he subcontracts any part of the work. ”  29 C.F.R. § 1926.16(b).  Under the OPS with [...], [...] assumed the obligation for all work subsequently performed by its subconsultant, [...], and its employee, [...].  It had the authority to exert control over the job site and the duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid the risk of injury to workers on the site.  *Alloway*, supra, 157 N.J. at 232.
[directive] Drug Testing  7.6.1  The testing of law enforcement officers in New Jersey for the illegal use of drugs is strictly regulated by the Attorney General's Law Enforcement Drug Testing Policy.  This policy permits the testing of applicants and trainees for law enforcement positions.  It further specifies that veteran law enforcement officers may be tested for drugs if reasonable suspicion exists that they are using drugs or if they have been chosen as part of a random drug testing program.  In any case, drug testing is done through an analysis of urine samples by the State Toxicology Laboratory within the Department of Health.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 36 7.6.2  The Attorney General's Law Enforcement Drug Testing Policy identifies specific responsibilities that may be assigned to internal affairs.  These include the collection of specimens, the establishment of a chain of custody and the maintenance of drug testing records.  Every officer assigned to internal affairs should be familiar with the Attorney General's Law Enforcement Drug Testing Policy.  7.7
[directive] (a)  The meaningful command-level review of the incident shall be undertaken by at least two levels of supervisors.  These levels may include the immediate supervisor, internal affairs, training officers, or command staff.  At least one reviewer must be two levels or more above the officer who engaged in the vehicular pursuit; (b)  The review shall include an examination of all available sources of information about the incident, including any video of the incident, recordings of 911 calls and police radio transmissions, reports, officer or other witness statements, medical records, or records of injuries; (c)  The reviewing supervisors shall make a recommendation of what action, if any, should be undertaken, including policy changes, remedial training, disciplinary action, administrative action, or, if appropriate, referral for criminal prosecution; and (d)  The law enforcement executive, or a command level officer no more than one rank below the law enforcement executive for departments with more than 100 officers, shall review each vehicular pursuit investigation and approve or reject the recommendations of the supervisors who conducted the review.  The law enforcement executive’s decision, or the decision of the designee, shall be memorialized and retained in the vehicular pursuit investigative file.  (e)
[brief] (2T73:20-80:05).  With respect to [...]’s ballot, the court found that she did not fill out the inner certificate of her mail-in ballot and therefore, that the Board properly denied her attempt to cure the defect.  (2T75:2-24).  Turning to the remaining contested mail-in ballots, the court credited the mail-in voters’ testimonies that they mailed their ballots prior to the election.  But noting the uncontested fact that all seven ballots were postmarked after the election, the court found that the Board properly rejected them pursuant to N.J.S.A. 19:63-22(a).  (2T76:2-2T77:10).  The court then rejected [...]’s challenge to [...]’s mail-in ballot, finding no credible evidence indicating Gamble did not reside within [...].  (2T79:16-2T80:4).  In addressing the contested write-in ballot, the court acknowledged that Title 19 requires a ballot cast by a voter who writes in the name of a candidate already appearing on the ballot should not be counted.  (2T72:4-13).  The voter wrote in the last names of the candidates next to where each candidate’s name appeared rather than marking the circle next to each candidate’s name on the ballot.  (1T104:4-25; 2T27:17-28:19).  The court determined that the intent of the voter in this case was clear and that there was no indication of fraud, then held that the contested ballot was properly counted by the Fire District.  (2T80:6-83:16).  On April 16, 2025, the court issued a Final Order stating, in relevant part, that the write-in votes for “[...]” and “[...]” on Ballot Number 1157 were to be counted in favor of [...] and [...], that the seven mail-in ballots postmarked after Election Day should remain uncounted, and that Cross-Appellant [...] should be declared the winner of the February 15, 2015 Fire District Election.
[brief] 213 N.J. 398, 421 (2012).  (Db 19-21)  Here, the officers stopped [...] solely to determine if he was [...], the target of their investigation, and not because of any individualized suspicion of criminality.  (1T 41-18 to 43-4, 50-8 to 24; 2T 8-12 to 24, 19-25 to 20-5, 23-1 to 13, 24-6 to 7)  For this reason, and for those discussed in [...]’s initial brief, this factor also weighs in favor of suppression.
[directive] Why does the number of COVID-19 persons reported to First Responders change, have missing or invalid information, or not match the number of COVID-19 cases reported the day before?  There are many reasons why the number of COVID-19 persons reported to CPOs may change, may have missing or invalid addresses or may not match the number of COVID-19 persons reported the day before.  To understand these reasons, it is important to know how COVID-19 persons are reported to public health and what LHDs do when new cases are created.  New Jersey Administrative Code requires all laboratories to report COVID-19 test results to the LHD where the person resides.  Laboratories may report results electronically or by secure fax.  When new COVID-19 test results are reported, they are entered in the New Jersey Department of Health (NJDOH) secure, online Communicable Disease Reporting and Surveillance System (CDRSS) and assigned to LHDs.  LHDs call and interview new cases reported to their jurisdiction and conduct public health investigations to identify and advise high-risk contacts.  All of this occurs daily, and new information obtained from laboratories, healthcare providers, LHDs and COVID-19 cases is continuously updated in CDRSS.  Once a day, County LINCS Agencies compile reports from CDRSS to provide COVID-19 information to CPOs.