ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *State v. Smith*, 251 N.J. 244, 258–59 (2022); *DiProspero v. Penn*, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005).  The “best indicator” of that intent is to look at the statute’s plain language and words, which should be read as they are commonly used and ordinarily understood.  *Ibid.*  If the plain language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the process of statutory interpretation is over.  *Smith*, 251 N.J. at 259; *State v. Rodriguez*, 238 N.J. 105, 113 (2019).  When interpreting a statute, it is not the court’s function to rewrite a plainly written statute or to presume the Legislature meant something other than what it conveyed in its clearly expressed language.  *State v. Scriven*, 226 N.J. 20, 34–35 (2016).  The Legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial construction of its enactments and if the plain language chosen by the Legislature “leads to a clearly understood result” consistent with legislative objectives of the statute and its context, the law will be applied as written.  *State v. J.V.*, 242 N.J. 432, 445 (2020); *State v. Robinson*, 217 N.J. 594, 604 (2014).
[directive] October Directive No. 9 1, 1993 Page of 5  3  Transfers to State and Local Agencies 2.  The participating State or local law enforcement agency, or other governmental entity permitted by applicable laws to hold property for the benefit of the law enforcement agency, will receive the initial transfer of the real property.  The State or local agency will then, pursuant to prior agreement, transfer the property to the appropriate public or private non-profit organization for use in support of one of the programs described above.  The authority of the participating State or local investigative agency to transfer forfeited real property to other State or local public agencies may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
[brief] Plaintiff Has Presented No Basis To Attack  The Trial Court’s Finding That Both [...] And [...]’s Testimony Was Credible | 19 | | B.  The Trial Court Properly Found That Plaintiff Did Not Prove Her Claims Against [...] And [...] For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty | 22 | | C.  Plaintiff Has Not Proven Her Claim to Pierce the Corporate Veil to Assert a Claim Against [...] or [...] | 25 | | D.  Plaintiff Has No Basis For A Claim Against [...] Or [...] Asserting That Plaintiff Is An Oppressed Minority Shareholder | 27 | | IV.
[brief] It was not.  There was no discovery or briefing on the issue, nor did the trial court consider and/or actually reach a determination on the issue.  Instead, the issue was raised in competing post-judgment certifications – certifications that were summarily disregarded by the trial court when it elected to deny Plaintiff’s post-judgment motion for leave to amend out of hand on strictly procedural grounds.  Moreover, it is beyond dispute that this Court’s comments in the First Action were not essential to the judgment in that matter.  In the First Action, the trial court denied the motion for leave to amend on procedural grounds.
[brief] See Zahl, M.D. v. New Jersey Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety, No. 06-3749(JLL), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25327, 2009 WL 806540, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2009) aff'd sub nom., Zahl v. New Jersey Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety Div. of Consumer Affairs, 428 F. App'x 205 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Ross v. Celtron Int'l, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 2d 288, 303 (D.N.J. 2007); Banks v. Wolk, 918 F.2d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 1990).  Racketeering predicates must be "related, and . . . amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity," *H.J. Ins. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.*, 492 U.S. 175, 239 (1989) (emphasis added).  "Long-term racketeering activity or the threat thereof is the touchstone of the continuity concept."  *Swistock v. Jones*, 884 F.2d 755, 757 (3d Cir. 1989).
[brief] This defendant filed its initial motion for summary judgment in the hopes of saving the costs of defense of a claim that should have been time-barred.  It should not have been subject to a higher standard for the second motion than applied to the initial one.  Moreover, based upon the additional information set forth herein, it is abundantly clear that plaintiffs were not entitled to the benefit of either the “discovery rule” or the “relation back” doctrine.  Plaintiff knew or should have known of the identities of this and other tenant defendants well within the applicable statute of limitations.  He also believed he had viable claims against all defendants since the date of loss.  Under these circumstances, the second amended complaint should have been dismissed with prejudice for plaintiff’s failure to comply with the statute of limitations.  See e.g., The Palisades at Fort Lee Condominium Association v. 100 Old Palisade, LLC, 230 N.J. 427 (2017)  In the event that this Court decides the questions presented in plaintiffs’ appeal in their favor, it should still affirm the summary judgment in favor of this defendant for the reasons stated herein.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Defendant filed an Emergent Motion for Stay with the trial court on November 28, 2023 (Pa68-Pa69) and was denied without prejudice on December 6, 2023 (Pa30-Pa31).  December 1, 2023, a Notice of Appeal was filed and was dismissed by this court on February 1, 2024, without prejudice.  Defendant filed an Emergent Motion for Stay on February 26, 2024 (denied) along with a second Notice for Appeal upon receipt of trial court’s final order filed February 16, 2024 (Pa133).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] The lower court’s determination that [...] was properly served is unsupported, and deviates from the indulgent standard that should be employed on a motion to vacate a default judgment.  Without providing any explanation for how it reached that conclusion, it is impossible to determine whether the decision afforded [...] the benefit of reasonable doubts drawn from the record, or the handicap of a credibility determination drawn from conflicting papers.  For these reasons, the September 22, 2023 Order should be reversed.
[directive] 6.2  To be authorized for deployment and use under the vehicular pursuit policy, the tire deflation device must be capable of the following: (a) producing a controlled deflation of one or more tires of a pursued vehicle; (b) being deployed or activated immediately before the pursued vehicle drives over it, and removed or deactivated immediately after the pursued vehicle drives over it; and (c) allowing the officer to remain a safe distance from the roadway at the time of deployment or activation.  6.3  Prior to the deployment and use of an authorized tire deflation device, the law enforcement agency shall to the following: (a) modify its vehicular pursuit policy to provide for the proper use of the authorized tire deflation device; and (b) train all officers in the use of the authorized tire deflation device, which training must include practical, hands-on operation of the authorized tire deflation device.  6.4  The following are circumstances under which an authorized tire deflation device may be deployed: (a) an authorized tire deflation device may be utilized only after supervisory approval; (b) an authorized tire deflation device shall not be used to stop motorcycles, mopeds, or similar vehicles; (c) the authorized tire deflation device should not be used in locations where specific geographic features (e.g., sharp curves, alongside of rivers, steep embankments, etc.) increase the risk of serious injury to the officer, violator, or public; (d) deployment locations should have reasonably good sight distances to enable the officer to observe the pursuit and other traffic as it approaches; and (e) the officer deploying the authorized tire deflation device should not attempt to overtake and pass a high-speed pursuit in order to position the device.
[brief] See Inside Cover)  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO.: [...] ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, PASSAIC COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. HON.  [...], J.S.C. HON.  [...], J.S.C. REPLY  BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT-CROSS APPELLANT-[...]  I/P/A [...]  LAW  OFFICES OF [...]  ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT-CROSS APPELLANT, [...]  I/P/A [...]
[brief] ”  See [...], *Arbitrating “Just Cause” for Employee Discipline and Discharge in the Era of Covid-19*, 34 Georgetown J. Legal Ethics 1237, 1243 (2021) (citing [...]’s “Seven Tests of Just Cause”, as described in [...] & [...], *Just Cause: The Seven Tests* (revised by [...], 3d ed. 2006)). association with [...].  Simply put, [...] did what the CBA grants it the authority to do: it reviewed [...]’ doctor’s note prepared by an unaffiliated medical office, determined she no longer could perform her essential job duties -- a fact undisputed in the record -- and terminated her.
[brief] Pa313.  It is well settled that pursuant to the MLUL, an ordinance requiring approval by the planning board of either subdivisions or site plans, or both, shall include certain enumerated provisions for the processing of applications for development.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-38(a).  The MLUL also provides guidance regarding the discretionary contents of municipal ordinances related to subdivision and site plan review and approval.  See N.J.S.A 40:55D-39; N. J.S.A. 40:55D-40.  As indicated above, the Township ordinances §§ 142-77 and 142-78 serve these purposes.
[brief] THE BOARD’S DETERMINATION THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS IS SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND MUST BE AFFIRMED.  PFRS member eligibility for AD retirement benefits is governed by N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7, which requires that the member: is permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the performance of his regular or assigned duties and that such disability was not the result of the member’s willful negligence and that such member is mentally or physically incapacitated for the performance of his usual duty and of any other available duty in the department which his employer is willing to assign him.
[directive] 8.1.4  The confusion caused by these issues can be alleviated several ways.  One way is to separate the investigations by time—the criminal investigation is completed first and then the administrative investigation may follow.  Another way is to conduct bifurcated investigations.  In a bifurcated investigation, the responsibility for a criminal investigation is separated from that for an administrative investigation.  Thus, one investigator (typically from the prosecutor's office) is assigned the responsibility of gathering evidence of criminal wrongdoing while a second (typically the internal affairs investigator from the subject officer's agency) is assigned the responsibility of gathering evidence of a disciplinary infraction.  8.1.5
[brief] See, Matter of Farmers Mut. Fire Assurance Ass’n of N.J., 256 N.J. Super. 607, 619-20 (App. Div. 1992) (internal citations omitted).  because of its expertise.  The Council is delegated the right to formulate policies and regulations to govern the conduct of the public in general.  Although the Commissioner of the DEP has the right to approve the “overarching” policy governing the black bears (and other game), the Commissioner neither formulates the policy nor writes the regulations that govern all aspects of black bear management.  That authority to exercise legislative power rests solely with the Council, which cannot be said to be subordinate to the Commissioner for regulatory purposes.  See, e.g., National Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protection Ass’n v. Black, 53 F.4th 869, 881 (5th Cir. 2022).  The Legislature should not imbue a private organization or private individuals with the status to effectively control the Council with a majority of the members.  In essence, the Legislature has entrusted the entire regulatory scheme governing black bear and other game management to the Council fettered only by the Commissioner’s limited review of the general policies.  The delegation of such regulatory authority to an agency effectively controlled by a private interest or advocacy group violates Articles III and IV and the private non-delegation doctrine.
[brief] There was no claim at trial for anything other than an aggravation of pre-existing Ménière’s disease.  There were no sprains, strains, or any other soft tissue injuries alleged by the plaintiff.  The jury knew that there was no claim being presented for lost wages, or medical bills.  This was the very purpose of the pretrial agreement between counsel that the Court would mold any verdict to include the medical bills and lost wages paid for by the Worker’s Compensation Carrier.  The Court further determined that had the jury accepted the aggravation of the Ménière’s disease by the accident, the jury would have undeniably rendered an award exceeding $25,000.  Moreover, The Court further found that the award would have potentially been 10, 20 or even 30 times more than the jury’s actual award.  It is submitted that The Trial Court’s finding is inconsistent.  If the jury had clearly rejected the plaintiff’s argument that he had sustained pain and suffering damages as a result of this accident, they would not have found that he was entitled to anything.  The Trial Court further found that clearly this jury rejected plaintiff argument and chose to award a modest amount to the plaintiff and disputed the causal relationship of the aggravation of the Ménière’s disease and resulting surgeries to the subject accident.  (8T:9-14-18).
[brief] Appellants are not Required to Prove a Negative (not raised below)  Despite the fact that petitioners bear the burden of production and persuasion, the trial court (tacitly) and petitioners (explicitly) would require appellants to prove a negative.  For example, petitioners note "[...] has failed to show that he did not have confidential and prejudicial communications with [...]."  Pa179.  On many occasions, our Supreme Court has expressed "its inherent reluctance to place the burden of proving a negative fact on a litigant."  Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 154 N.J. 312, 330-31, citing Barbato v. Alsan Masonry & Concrete, Inc., 64 N.J. 514, 531 n.2 (1974); see also Williams v. Topps Appliance City, 239 N.J. Super. 528, 532-33 (App. Div. 1989) (the burden of establishing negative is "something the law rarely, if ever, imposes").  Thus, it remains petitioners' burden to prove that the appellants possess information significantly harmful and prejudicial to their case.  It is not appellants' burden to prove the lack of such information.  And again, since the trial court could only have considered emails, which "did not specifically detail any prejudicial information," and the Mueller Certification, and expressly did not consider the Knoll Certification, it is beyond peradventure that petitioners have failed to sustain their burden.  The result below can be affirmed only if the burden to prove a negative is placed on the [...] and the Mueller Certification is disregarded.  G.
[brief] \(^5\)  The case was transferred from the Honorable [...], J.S.C., to the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. shortly before this motion.  \(^6\)  5T means Transcript of Motion dated July 5, 2022. to Complaint.  (12T177:5 to 178:11; 191:15-22).  The Court found that the Petitioner failed to overcome the presumption for undue influence under the Will by clear and convincing evidence.
[directive] (Megan’s Law)  Actor fails to notify law enforcement of change of address or employment or school status; or Registration of Sex 2C:7-2d(1)(2), fails to provide law enforcement with information with respect to access or use of a computer  Offenders 4th Degree $2,500 to $7,500 10% permissible 7-2e or any other device with internet capability; or provides false information concerning his place (Megan’s Law) of residence or fails to verify his or her address with the appropriate law enforcement agency.  1st Degree $150,000 to $350,000  10% permissible  Actor causes death while recklessly driving a vehicle or vessel; first degree if driving while in Death by Auto or 2C:11-5 violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 or N.J.S.A. 39:4-50a while on or within 1000 feet of a school or Vessel driving through a school crossing; otherwise, second degree.
[brief] The Court held that there was clear voter intent and that not counting those ballots would be improper.  The Court further held that the polling site was required to provide adequate instructions because *N.J.S.A.* 19:50-3 “directs election officials to instruct voters on the proper use of voting machines. ”  *Id.* at 478 (*citing* *N.J.S.A.* 19:50-3).  Critically, the Court stated that “a citizen’s constitutional right to vote for the candidate of his or her choice necessarily includes the corollary right to have that --- \(^6\)
[brief] See Seigelstein, 464 N.J. Super. at 406 (reversing lower court’s reduction of hourly rates charged by plaintiffs’ counsel and paralegals where the reduction was based upon the lower court judge’s personal experience); Greco v. State Farm Ins. Co., A-4344-01T5, 2003 WL 1917318, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 14, 2003) (reversing lower court’s reduction of hourly rate in a fee award from $275 to $200 because the reduction was based solely on the lower court judge’s belief, without explanation, that $275 was “a little steep on this kind of matter for this kind of litigation. ”); In re Estate of Riordan, A-5286-12T1, 2014 WL 8810027, *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 13, 2015) (“a trial judge's award of counsel fees could not be based on the judge's personal policy. ”).  B.
[brief] The Fifth Amended Complaint (Da293-358) was the operative complaint.  (5/25/23 Transcript @ T4:20 to T23:18).  The Fifth Amended Complaint (Da293-358) was the operative complaint.  In his appellate brief, Plaintiff claims at the May 25, 2023, oral argument regarding the Absecon Defendants’ motion to dismiss he “objected that either the SAC [the Second Amended Complaint] [...] reviewed [in her 4/1/21 oral decision] or the revised SAC that took [...]’s critiques into account was the point of the Remand.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS..................................................ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS.............................iii  PROCEDURAL HISTORY..............................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS............................................................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT..................................................................................2  POINT I THE DECISION BELOW WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.  (Not Raised Below).................................................................2  POINT II  ADEQUATE  NOTICE OF THE RICCI ACT WAS NOT PROVIDED AND THEREFORE, [...] SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO RICCI ACT BENEFITS.  (Raised Below.  Pa20. Pa35.).......................................................6  CONCLUSION.........................................................................................11  REPLY APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS  VOLUME I  In re Yucht, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2188…………………………Pra1  In re State and Sch. Emples.  Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 2017  N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1938………………………………………Pra5  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  [...] Final Decision 11/29/23……………………………Pa9  [...] Initial Decision 6/13/23…………………………..Pa29
[brief] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that [...] was capable of physical labor because it was not only relevant to impeach his credibility, but also probative of whether he was lying about the altercation.  Meanwhile, the cases Plaintiffs cite are inapposite.\footnote{Johnson v. Dobrosky held that character evidence is not relevant to damages recoverable under the Wrongful Death Act, an issue that is not before this Court.  187 N.J. 594, 598 (2006).  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held in Diaz v. City of Anaheim that the evidence was highly prejudicial and irrelevant to any liability issue, 840 F.3d 592, 601-02 (9th Cir. 2016); whereas, in this case the evidence of [...]’s dishonesty about his injuries was relevant to the jury’s determination as to whether he was telling the truth about the altercation.}  In Redvanly v. ADP, 407 N.J. 395, 402 (App. Div. 2009), the Appellate Division barred evidence from the liability phase of trial that it found to be “relevant and admissible only on the issue of damages. ”  Redvanly is also distinguishable because the underlying facts brought into evidence were indeterminable.  There, the defendants introduced evidence of the plaintiff’s termination by a former employer to establish that she had lied on her job application.  However, the panel emphasized that the plaintiff had settled a wrongful termination claim against her former employer, therefore “we do not know the crucial fact of whether Redvanly was rightfully or wrongfully terminated. ”  Id. at 402.  As a result, the panel was unable to evaluate the plaintiff’s argument that she had answered truthfully on her employment application as well as the defendant’s argument that she had made inconsistent statements about the circumstances of her termination.  See id. at 400-401.  Here, however, there is no such ambiguity.  The texts and photographs speak for themselves and were authenticated by [...] during his trial testimony.  IV.
[brief] The Complaint against [...] was dismissed for lack of an AOM when no AOM was required, since [...]’s legal malpractice fits plainly under the “common knowledge exception. ”  In Bender v. Walgreen E. Co., 399 N.J. Super. 584, 590, 945 A.2d 120, 122-23 (App. Div. 2008) the Court stated:
[brief] [...] also cannot rely upon the [...] Aff. for the reasons set forth above.  Even if it could, [...]’s claim would still fail because the [...] Aff.’s claims lack a modicum of support in the record.  There is no evidence to corroborate the [...] Aff.’s claims about parishioners maintaining the Property.  Da126 at ¶ 9.  [...] did not produce one document or sworn statement from any parishioner in discovery testifying to these facts.  [...]’s claims about paying for lighting (Da126 at ¶ 10; App. Brf. at p. 11) also fail because there is no evidence in the record other than the illusory utility bills, which do not indicate whether they include lighting costs for the light pole on [...]’s Property.  [...]’s claims are threadbare.  [...] cannot satisfy the open and notorious prong, and the trial court’s Order must, respectfully, be upheld.