ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This notice was not buried or obscure, and could be found without any scrolling.  Indeed, when [...] (already a longtime [...] client) navigated to the SAM home page and clicked on “First Time User” under the sign-in button, she opened the “Account Registration” page by way of hyperlink.  (Da0081- Da0082; Da0083-Da0084).  Immediately upon this page opening—and before commencing any aspect of the registration process using [...]’s site—[...] could clearly see text on the center of the web page, without needing to scroll down, stating that Your use of this site signifies that you accept our Terms and Conditions of Use.  (Da0496 (blue text and hyperlink omitted)).  The font of the text setting forth this statement was the same size of the text [...] had just clicked (on the SAM home page) to open the Account Registration page.  The text was set off entirely on its own in the center of the page, unaccompanied by any other text or visual clutter.  (Id.)  The “Terms and Conditions of Use” explicitly referenced in the notice were identified by bright blue text evidencing a hyperlink, and could be opened by [...] instantaneously by simply clicking on that blue text.  (Id.)  At that point, [...] was able to read the entire SAM Terms of Use including the agreement to arbitrate.  [...] had the opportunity to apprise herself of these terms before proceeding to use of the SAM registration site.  The terms also appeared on each subsequent page comprising the registration process.  Indeed, the exact same notice and hyperlink quoted above appeared in the center-bottom (again without need to scroll) of each page.  (Da0496-Da0498).  [...] thus provided continuous notice during the entire registration process that [...] was agreeing to certain “Terms and Conditions of Use. ”  Simply stated, the trial court in this case, unlike this Court in *Racioppi* and *Vercammen*, failed to recognize that the design of [...]’s SAM Account Registration was materially different from the site in *Wollen*.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 27.  The classic test of voluntariness is whether the confession is "the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker. ”  *Colombe v. Connecticut*, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961); see *State v. Burris*, 145 N.J. 509, 525 (1996) ("ultimately, the question is whether the defendant's will was overborne"); *State v. Galloway*, 133 N.J. 631, 655 (1993) (“The real issue is whether the person's decision to confess results from a change of mind rather than from an overbearing of the suspect's will”).
[brief] [...] further testified regarding [...]'s driving of the sweeper, stating, “Basically, like, when [[...]] was behind me I just - - I see him but he's going too close to the back of the machine.  * * * he goes too close, which is not - - which is not safe to be too close to the machine because he don’t know how fast I’m going back, even if you see the machine in movement. ”  Pa1384.  [...] testified regarding the nature of [...]’s operation of the sweeper on other job sites.  [...] stated, “He was just a little fast.  * *  Faster than a normal operating speed should be.  * * *  I know that he had been asked to slow down.  You know, you got a lot of guys walking around.  You know, they could walk out from behind a truck and a lot of stuff can just happen fast. ”  Pa1410.  [...] also testified that he and other laborers had asked [...] to slow down a week or two before [...] got run over.
[brief] If at the time of sentencing the court determines that the interests of justice would not be served by effectuating the agreement reached by the prosecutor and defense counsel or by imposing sentence in accordance with the court's previous indications of sentence, the court may vacate the plea or the defendant shall be permitted to withdraw the plea.  (f)  Conditional Pleas.  With the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecuting attorney, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty reserving on the record the right to appeal from the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion.
[brief] See Doe v. Del. Valley Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Ed., No. 24-107, 2024 WL 706797, *6-8 (D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2024) (Ra99-100) (rejecting parent’s claim that schools must provide notification and seek parental consent before using a child’s preferred name and pronouns, and concluding that a parent’s demand for affirmative information about LGBTQ+ status lies outside “the scope of the familial liberty interest protected under the Constitution[,]” and was neither “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition ”or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” (citing Anspach)); see also Regino v. Staley, No. 23-32, 2023 WL 4464845, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2023) (rejecting argument that schools have “affirmative duty to inform parents of their child’s transgender identity” and finding claim reflects “an expansion of” “parental substantive due process rights that is not supported by precedent”); John & Jane Parents, 622 F.Supp.3d at 130 (rejecting claim that parents have “a fundamental right to be promptly informed of” child’s gender identity).  This dichotomy between interference and failure to provide information is fatal to Appellants’ challenge.  The trial court’s preliminary injunction does not interfere with parents’ right to direct the care, custody, and control of their own children.
[brief] (Da1381).  On February 21, 2023, the plaintiffs filed a notice of motion for reconsideration and to amend the Court’s order granting attorneys’ fees and costs.  (Da1407).  On March 31, 2023, the Court heard oral argument on plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider the counsel fee award.  The Court granted reconsideration on April 17, 2023 and increased the attorney fee award to plaintiffs’ counsel by approximately $300,000.  (Da1411).  On May 19, 2023, the Court filed an order entering final judgment pursuant to R. 4:42-1(c) in the amount of $1,668,423.88.  (Da1421).  On July 21, 2023, the Court stayed execution of final judgment pursuant to [...]’s $1,775,000 cash deposit pursuant to R. 2:9-5(a).  (Da1428).  On July 1, 2023, [...] filed its notice of appeal, case information statement and proof of service.  They were amended July 27, 2023.  (Da1430).  [...] sought an additional 30 days to file its appellate brief with the consent of the plaintiffs’ counsel and [...]’s brief follows.
[brief] In light of the modern trend in New Jersey case law exemplified by case law such as Mule and Manole, a fact-sensitive analysis should have been applied to the question of whether Defendant [...], who was still commuting at the time of the crash and not performing any functions that were inherently related to her work as a nurse, was entitled to co-employee immunity.  Under such a fact-sensitive analysis, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendant [...], as a jury could have determined that she was not acting in the course of her employment as a nurse at the time of the subject crash.
[brief] Plaintiffs filed a Complaint to appoint Boundary Commissioners pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:28-1, seeking to appoint three disinterested commissioners to fairly and impartially ascertain the true location of the boundary line separating the adjacent parcels identified as [...] (Lot 11) and [...] (Lot 10).  (Pa55) (See Mountville Tax Map, Pa102).  The Boundary Commissioners’ tremendous undertaking of nine months of physical field work, investigation of historical records and surveys, and preparation of mathematical surveying calculations, culminated in the Boundary Commissioners’ Report and supporting documentation and exhibits.  (Pa105).  The Report sought to reconcile the survey obtained by the [...] for their purchase of Lot 10 in 1994 (the [...] Survey referred to as the “Sweeney Survey”) with the survey obtained by the [...] in connection with their purchase of Lot 10 in 2005 (the [...] Survey referred to as the “Worley Survey”).  (Pa105).  The Commissioners compared these surveys with the historical deeds, surveys, and subdivision plats for the neighborhoods and concluded a 4.5-foot discrepancy existed between the Worley Survey and the Sweeney Survey and that this discrepancy formed the Disputed Boundary Line.  (Pa105).  Based upon the Boundary Commission’s extensive nine-month investigation, the Commissioners affirmed “the Commission has concluded, to a reasonable degree of professional certainty, for the reasons set forth at length in this report, that the Worley Survey (Exhibit D) [Ahmed survey] properly identifies the true location of the Boundary Line Dispute, and the Sweeney Survey (Exhibit B) [Patierno survey] does not. ” (Pa105).  Given the consequences of the Commissioners’ Report, i.e. the [...] loss of land to the [...], the [...] sought to set aside the Commissioners Report.  The Trial Court held an initial Trial, in which both parties had the opportunity to fully present their case-in-chief through exhibits, evidence, and witness testimony.  The Honorable [...] delivered an extensive opinion on the record and thereafter ordered the Plaintiffs to serve the neighboring lots with notice of the litigation and Boundary Commissioners’ Report.  After notice was duly served upon the neighboring lots, the Trial Court reconvened the parties and entertained the submission of the non-parties to determine whether there were any objections to the entry of the Commissioners’ Report.  Upon the determination that the neighboring parties did not object to the entry of the Report as to the [...] and [...], [...] ordered the entry and recordation of the Report.  In support of their Appeal, the [...] alleges that the Trial Court erred by (i) enforcing the Boundary Commissioners’ Report which affected parties not before the Court; (ii) failing to order the affected parties to be joined as parties to the litigation; (iii) deciding to enforce the Report which significantly impacts the property rights of both parties and non-parties; and (iv) failing to consider an alternative presented by the Plaintiffs/Appellants.
[brief] Thus, it was unreasonable to incur a total of $9,500.69 in fees, all just to “recover” (i.e. spare his client from) the mere $400 which we sought against his client in our small claims case.  The trial court opined that a defendant could spend $100,000 to defend against a $100 case, and then be able to recover $100,000 from the plaintiff.  (2T10:3)  However the foregoing cited authorities contradict such a contention.  Moreover, since the matter could have been resolved back on Aug 12, 2022 at no cost at all to [...] (i.e. by just going along with the same settlement offer that [...] had made to us on both June 29, 2022 as well as earlier that same day on Aug 12, 2022), this fact removes any doubt that it was completely unnecessary and unreasonable for [...] to incur such an excessive fee.
[brief] *National Horsemen’s Benevolent and Protective Association v. Black*, 107 F.4th 415 (5th Cir. 2024).  The private non-delegation doctrine was reinforced by the court after a rehearing en banc in *Consumers’ Research v. Federal Communications Commission*, ___ F.4th ___, 2024 WL 3517592 (5th Cir., July 24, 2024).
[directive] The [...] and the County Prosecutors have determined that crime victims and witnesses have the right to be advised of the status and outcome of the criminal case in which they are involved.  As a result, victims and witnesses are informed of the outcome of their case at each stage of the criminal justice process.  Survivors of homicide, which include manslaughter and death by auto, have now become a part of this notification procedure.  In addition, survivors are informed of their right to make a victim impact statement to the probation department regarding how the crime has affected their lives.  This statement will be considered by the Court prior to imposition of the sentence upon the defendant.  Also, it is now possible for survivors as well as other crime victims to make a victim input statement or give testimony at a parole hearing.  The role of the [...] and the [...] have been expanded due to recent enactment of the P.L. 1985 c. 404, effective April 9, 1986.
[brief] On July 1, 2009, the Commissioner announced the elimination of the initial thirteen non-operating districts that were in a sending-receiving relationship with a single school district. \(^3\)  Among the non-operating districts eliminated was the [...], which was merged and consolidated with the [...].  \textit{Ibid}.  Students residing in Sea Bright currently attend Oceanport for grades pre-K through eight, and the [...] for grades nine through twelve.  (Aa25).  Thirteen years later, in 2022, Sea Bright initiated efforts to withdraw from Oceanport and Shore Regional, and to form and join a new all-purpose regional school district – the [...] – which would also be comprised of students from the [...] and Atlantic [...] School Districts.
[brief] Indeed, his testimony went well beyond "logical implications" or even "inescapable inferences"; [...] implied that [...]'s, [...] and [...]'s version of events are corroborated by [...] -- [...]’s friend.  [...]' investigative work was vouched for by [...], even though Villano -- did not testify -- furthering the harm.  We can only speculate about what [...]'s testimony would have revealed about the veracity of [...] and [...]s testimony.  Especially considering defendant's attack on the veracity of [...] Hedgpeth and [...] Williams testimony surrounding defendant's alleged confessions.  Detective [...]s testimony suggests that the anonymous caller "[...]" was telling the truth.  This was patently unfair because defendant cannot confront an unknown accuser, thereby compounding the hearsay violation with a violation of defendant's right to confrontation.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The plaintiff was employed with [...]  Pa13.  The plaintiff’s supervisor at work was [...].  T17-7-9; Pa14.  The plaintiff’s employment was terminated by the defendants after he complained of the mislabeling and sale of pens alleged to have been “made in America”, where in fact they were made in China.  Pa17.  This matter now comes before the Appellate Division from the trial courts decisions on a Motion for Summary Judgment, and subsequent Proof Hearing, with the entry of Orders on each.  Pa1 and Pa11.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] (1T 35-20 to 36-7, 54-18 to 55-17)  Although the court initially imposed an extended term sentence of 50 years with an 85% parole bar on the first-degree kidnapping conviction (1T 49-14 to 18), the prosecutor alerted the court that that sentence would be improper as the presumptive extended term for a first-degree kidnapping where the jury found that the victim was harmed and not left in a safe place was life.  (1T 4-12 to 16, 54-18 to 55-17)  The court, in its discretion, instead made the extended term applicable to defendant’s armed robbery conviction stating: “I’m not inclined to give him life in prison on this” (1T 55-18 to 22; 2T 3-9 to 6-13)  Thus, on remand the resentencing court is precluded from making the extended term applicable to defendant’s first-degree kidnapping conviction.  It should be noted that sentencing on [...] occurred prior to the decision in State v. Thomas, 195 N.J. 431, 436 (2008), where the Court first held that if the court disagrees with the prosecutor as to which offense to apply the extended term, it must state the reason why it chose to impose it on a different count than selected by the prosecutor.}
[brief] See 233a (Subcommittee Chairperson explaining that the Subcommittee was guided by the Evaluation Sheets, the applications, interviews, and public hearing).  Specifically, the Application requested a litany of information that was unrelated to the Evaluation Sheet. \footnote{As explained below, the Application also requested information relating to each criterion listed on the Evaluation Sheets.  See Point II, infra.}  For example, the Application included questions about: 1. The applicant’s status as a veteran-owned, minority-owned, woman-owned, social equity, or [...] Resident business; 2. Whether the applicant would provide on-site parking; 3. Whether the applicant would commence operation of the business immediately upon issuance of a State license and all other approvals; 4. Whether the applicant owned or leased the proposed premises; 5.  Whether any person named in the application would fail to qualify for ownership of a cannabis license due to a criminal conviction or holding a prohibited interest in other licenses; 6.  Whether any person who has an ownership interest in the applicant’s business has a license in any other municipality in New Jersey or another state; 7.  Whether any person who has an ownership interest in the applicant’s business had any cannabis license or permitted suspended or revoked; 8.  The applicant’s plans to hire local residents; 9.  The applicant’s plans to provide employees with benefits; 10.  The applicant’s commitment to diversity at the proposed facility; 11.  The steps the applicant will take to provide security in and around its location; 12.  The steps the applicant will take to prevent minors from purchasing cannabis at its location; 13.  The applicant’s environmental impact and sustainability plan; 14.  The applicant’s nuisance mitigation plan that specifically addresses: (a) noise; (b) odor; (c) waste disposal; and (d) vehicular congestion mitigation; 15.  The applicant’s community impact plan; and 16.  Any additional information that the applicant would like to be considered in connection with its application.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(b).  2.  [...] Cannot Avoid the Tort Claims Act Bar by Recasting His Claims as Breach of an Implied Contract.  To avoid the Tort Claims Act bar against product liability and implied warranty claims, [...] attempted to portray his claims as “contractual” in nature.  However, [...]’s allegations clearly sound in products liability, and [...] cannot change the nature of his claims merely by changing the labels --- 3  [...] also failed to comply with the mandates in N.J.S.A. 59:8-8 that a plaintiff desiring to assert a claim against a public entity under the Tort Claims Act must first provide advance notice of the proposed claim within 90 days after its accrual, and then wait six months before filing suit.
[brief] *Id.* at 130.  Again, in reversing defendants’ grant of summary judgment, the *Roe* Court found that there were general factual issues regarding whether the defendant was liable under N.J.S.A 59:4-2 for a dangerous condition of property it owned.  Therein, the infant plaintiff was assaulted after proceeding through a gate in a fence on property controlled by the defendant, which was a commonly used entrance to a nearby park.  Since the gate had been opened for years and was continuously broken, the defendant bolted it open to prevent users from damaging it.  *Roe by M.J. v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc.*, 317 N.J. Super. 72, 721 A.2d 302 (App. Div. 1998).
[brief] *See*  15 U.S.C. § 6809(3)(A); 16 C.F.R. § 314.1(b).  To comply with the Safeguard Rule, debt collectors must oversee service providers by selecting and retaining service providers capable of maintaining appropriate safeguards for the consumer information at issue, requiring servicing providers to implement appropriate safeguards, and overseeing service providers to ensure continued maintenance.  *Id.*, at § 314.4(d)(1)-(2).  Similarly, per the CFPB, supervised non-banks, including many debt collectors, are permitted to “outsource certain functions to service providers due to resource constraints” and “rely on [the] expertise from service providers that would not otherwise be available without significant involvement.
[directive] Victim-Witness Resources.  Once a barricade situation has been determined to exist, Victim- Witness Assistance resources from the County Prosecutor’s Office or the New Jersey State Police should be notified and available to respond in the event the resources are needed.  This notification is especially important in situations when hostages or family members of the barricaded individual are present.  The decision to request a response from a victim-witness advocate shall be made by the Incident Commander or a representative of the County Prosecutor’s Office.  As with mental health professionals, while an in-person response to the barricaded individual incident is preferable, telephonic or virtual responses can add significant value.  14
[brief] This case does not present the typical winter fall-down personal injury case involving a fall on a residential property owner’s sidewalk because it involves some unusual facts.  We submit that the property involved in this case was not a “residence” at the time of the accident, and instead was an unoccupied commercial-like property under renovation.  In fact, the facts demonstrated that the property was unoccupied from October 2020 to August 2021.  (Pa129).
[brief] Throughout his 39-page statement, [...] expressed difficulty remembering details about the night because he had been partying and drinking heavily and was “fucked up. ”  (Da 22, 24-26, 30)  He remembered being in Newark and seeing his father and aunt, and being in Piscataway and seeing friends of [...]’s, but maintained that he never went with [...] to the barbershop in Franklin.  (Da 22, 26-28)  When told that cellphone records showed his phone in the vicinity of the barbershop, he told detectives that he could not remember whether he had his phone with him that night and that it was possible he had left the phone in the car or on the dresser in the hotel room.  (Da 34, 36, \textsuperscript{4}  According to the State’s expert in historical cellphone data analysis, cellphone records showed [...]’s and [...]’s cellphones in the vicinity of the barbershop around the time of the shooting.  (13T 34-7 to 34-13)  Unlike the records for [...]’s phone, which showed that a call was received in the vicinity of the barbershop around the time of the shooting, records for [...]’s phone did not show any calls placed or received in Franklin during the relevant timeframe; rather, the records showed “only a data transaction during that timeframe,” while the phone was in the vicinity of the barbershop.  (13T 28-21 to 29-6)  As the expert explained, a “data transaction” means only that the phone was using data at a particular time, and there are “one of a million” ways for a phone to use data, e.g., when a text or email is received, or an application is open.  (13T 14-4 to 14-20; 13T 37-6 to 38-1; 14T 37-22 to 37-25)  42)  When shown surveillance photos of the suspects, one of whom was dressed in the NASA jacket and red sneakers he had on earlier in the day, [...] steadfastly maintained that he was not the person wearing those clothes in the photos; all he remembered about those clothes was that he woke up on the morning of November 3, and realized they were missing.  (Da 32-34, 52)  He told the detectives:  “All my shit was gone, Like all of my shit was gone.  Like straight up, And I don't, I ain't even remember the night.  And I'm like, ‘yo, where's my shit?’  And nobody had an answer for me.  So, like I don't know. ”  (Da 32)  Surveillance footage from the hotel showed the Chrysler returning about an hour after the shooting, and [...] carrying [...], who appeared to be very drunk, into the hotel.  (Da 50; 9T 98-9 to 98-19; 9T 100-24 to 101-14; 9T 117-18 to 117-20)  [...] was not wearing the NASA jacket, red sneakers, or anything else that the shooting suspect had on.  (9T 113-3 to 113-6)  In his statement to police, given sometime in January 2021, [...] confirmed that [...] woke up the morning after he was carried into the hotel drunk and complained that his clothes, including his jacket and shoes, were missing.