ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa92 at 30:3-6; Pa116 at 127:19-128:12; Pa369 at 108:16-18; Pa91 at 29:19-25).  [...] had no choice other than to accept the decision.  (Pa370 at 109:12-110:10).  The trial court recognized same: “it doesn’t really seem that it would make a lot of sense for her to be the – that [[...]] was happy about this discipline that these parties received, because she lost three-quarters of – or at least 60% of her employees. ” (See 1T 31:7-12).  The trial court therefore did not draw any inferences in favor of Defendants, but merely recognized that no evidence exists in this record that could lead a reasonable jury to rule in [...]’s favor.  [...] has failed to present any facts to support her position that there is a genuine dispute as to [...]’s alleged derailment of [...]’s investigation into her June 24, 2020 conduct.
[brief] On August 17, 2015, [...] assigned its rights under the WMPA to [...], and [...] agreed “to be bound by the WMPA Agreement[.]” (Pa001033 – 001034).  On August 25, [...], [...], and [...] executed an Assignment Agreement under which [...] assumed [...]’s obligations and liabilities for the Interconnection Agreement and Construction Agreement between [...] and [...].  (Pa001035 – 001038).  [...] then entered into a land lease contract with [...] on or about September 1, 2015 (the “Lease”).  (Pa000207 - Pa000222).  The Lease also expressly stated that [...] was to “use the property solely to install and operate a Photovoltaic Energy Facility.
[brief] *Atalese* “simply requires a contract ‘to explain in some minimal way that arbitration is a substi- tute for a consumer’s right to pursue relief in a court of law. ””  *Id.* (quoting *Morgan*, 225 N.J. at 294).  (a)  This Court has repeatedly held that an arbitration agreement need not contain an express jury trial waiver.  New Jersey courts have repeatedly held that an arbitration agreement that informs a consumer that she is giving up the ability to bring a claim in court—without any reference to a waiver of the jury-trial right—satisfies *Atalese* and is enforceable.  *See, e.g.*, *Stutheit v. [...]*, No. A-4915-17T2, 2018 WL 6757030, at *3–4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 26, 2018) (unpublished opinion) (enforcing arbitration agreement that did not mention a jury trial but referred to the user giving up the right to “maintain a court action”); *Jaworski v. [...]*, 441 N.J. Super. 464, 480–481 (App. Div. 2015) (enforcing arbitration agreement that said “neither [party] will be able to sue in court,” and rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that the agreement needed to address jury issues); *Griffin v. [...]*, 411 N.J. Super. 515, 518 (App. Div. 2010) (enforcing arbitration clause stating that, by agreeing to arbitrate, the parties gave up “their rights to maintain other available resolution processes, such as a court action or administrative proceeding, to settle their disputes”).  The federal court in *Collazo v. [...]*, No. 19-cv-21312, 2020 WL 3958498 (D.N.J. July 13, 2020), observed that it was unaware of any case that “strikes down an agreement to arbitrate under *Atalese* because it waives a court trial, without mentioning a jury specifically. ”  No. 19-cv-21312, 2020 WL 3958498, at *7 (D.N.J. July 13, 2020).  This Court’s recent decision in *Drosos v. [...]*, No. A-3674-21, 2023 WL 7545067 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 14, 2023) (unpublished opinion) is directly on point.
[brief] 18  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page Counterstatement of Material Facts, dated March 7, 2024 .................................. Da1  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Celino v. General Accident Ins., 211 N.J. Super. 538 (App. Div. 1986) .................................................. 14-15  Hodges v. Pennsylvania Nat. Ins. Co.  on Behalf of NJAFIUA, 260 N.J. Super. 217 (App. Div. 1992)  .................................................  11, 12, 16  Munoz v. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 145 N.J. 377 (1996)  ..............................................................................  11  Needham v. New Jersey Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 230 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 1989)  ....................................................  15  Ward v. Merced, 277 N.J. Super. 590 (App. Div. 1994)  .....................................................  11  Weathers v. Hartford Ins. Group, 77 N.J. 228 (1978)  ...............................................................................  15, 16 Statute N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10 ...........................................................................  passim  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] (4T:7-1 to 12).  When he arrived on scene, he observed a male subject, he would later identify as [...], holding a baby in his arms, extremely frantic.  He also observed a female in the driver’s seat of a car – [...] – with what appeared to be a gunshot wound to the back-side of her head.  Inside the car, he observed blood and brain matter.  (4T:9-2 to 15).
[brief] Also, *Tully* explained that the general rule is to prohibit counterclaims in derivative actions.  Here, the defendants asserted counterclaims, which undermines their argument that Plaintiffs should have brought this suit derivatively.  *Tully*, 457 N.J. Super. at 125-26. would normally be derivative actions into direct actions when closely held entities are involved, but it gives trial courts wide discretion to treat the action as direct if the policy considerations enumerated above are satisfied.
[directive] Racially-Influenced Policing  No law enforcement officer shall at any time engage in conduct constituting racially- influenced policing as defined in Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2005-1.  II.  Enforcement of Federal Civil Immigration Law  A.  Use of immigration status in law enforcement activities.  Except pursuant to Sections II.C and III below, no state, county, or local law enforcement agency or official shall:  1.  Stop, question, arrest, search, or detain any individual based solely on: a) actual or suspected citizenship or immigration status; or b) actual or suspected violations of federal civil immigration law.  2.  Inquire about the immigration status of any individual, unless doing so is: a) necessary to the ongoing investigation of an indictable offense by that individual; and b) relevant to the offense under investigation.  B.  Limitations on assisting federal immigration authorities in enforcing federal civil immigration law.  Except pursuant to Sections II.C and III below, no state, county, or local law enforcement agency or official shall provide the following types of assistance to federal immigration authorities when the sole purpose of that assistance is to enforce federal civil immigration law:  Page 4
[brief] Finally, the detectives’ extreme coercion was not cured by [...]’s prior experience with police or the fact that he was provided basic necessities like water and bathroom breaks.  See O.D.A.-C., 250 N.J. at 424-25 (even where adult defendant has experience with police and demonstrates some familiarity with his rights, courts “cannot isolate and minimize [a] string of misrepresentations”); Puryear, 441 N.J. Super. at 297-98 (misleading Miranda comments were “not cured” by defendant’s prior experience with police because “the State showed only that [defendant] had been arrested in 2005 and pled guilty in 2008, but did not offer proof that such prior experience enabled him to \(^{18}\) The court again wrongly relied on Faucette, 439 N.J. Super. at 260-61.  That case does not hold that the police may credibly threaten a suspect with violence or death.  In fact, in Faucette, the Court found that the comment at issue was not a threat at all.  Id. at 259-60.  Here, the motion court found as fact that [...] was “threatened” -- a finding amply supported by the record -- so the only issue is its legal significance.  In any event, the controlling decision is the U.S. Supreme Court’s in Fulminante, which was not even cited by Faucette.
[brief] ”  Essex Cty. Voc. Schs. of Educ. v. [...], Nos. A-4402-11T2, A-1873-12T2, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 786, at *10-11 (App. Div. April 8, 2014) (citing N.J.S.A. 20:3-22 and 3-24).  “In such instances, and where condemnations are thereafter abandoned, the usual remedies sought by condemnees merely involve the reallocation of attorneys’ fees and expenses to make them whole. ”  Id., at *11.  “[U]nder the express legislative language, a condemnee that is restored to title because of a condemnor’s fatal gaffe is entitled to payment for (1) damages sustained . . . as a result of the action of the condemnor, (2) expenses, (3) reasonable costs, disbursements and expenses actually incurred, and (4) reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees. ”  Id. at *13 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In New United, the Law Division dismissed the condemnation after the filing of a declaration of taking, ordered the public entity to discharge its declaration of taking and notice of lis pendens, and provided for the return its deposit that was held in escrow by the Clerk of the Superior Court.
[brief] [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...] and PLANNING BOARD OF THE [...], Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  LAW  DIVISION: ESSEX COUNTY  DOCKET NO. [...]  SAT BELOW: HON. [...], J.S.C.  CIVIL ACTION  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
[brief] As the testimony at trial revealed, the [...]’ and [...]’s forensic accountants had agreed that in order to determine whether [...] had suffered NJRICO damages during any period of time including, but not limited to, the NJRICO SOL Period – that is, whether he had been denied his lawful share of partnership distributions by reason of the [...]’ commission of Predicate Acts – a “retrospective accounting” of the partnership’s revenues, loans, advances, payments and expenses (i.e., its cash flows) had to be performed and the partnership’s financial records had to be reconstructed from the commencement of [...]’s operations in 1985, through and including 2011.  (167T69:15-24; see also 167T69:70:18-71:14 and 72:3-9)  Thus, in order to determine [...]’s accounting damages (which constituted his NJRICO damages as both the Trial Court and this Court found), [...]’s counsel, assisted by Plaintiffs’ forensic accountant ([...]), was required to conduct extensive, tedious and time-consuming document discovery relating to the [...]’ “hide the ball accounting” (as characterized by [...]) and thereafter to examine multiple Wilf witnesses, both at depositions and at trial, in order to ferret out the relevant facts and documents required by [...] in order to perform his retrospective accounting.  Only once all of the [...]’ improper payments were uncovered and figuratively deposited back into the Partnership’s hypothetical bank account could [...] then perform a proper analysis of cash flows and ultimately determine the amount of money (i.e., damages) [...] should have received during the NJRICO SOL Period.
[brief] Ibid.  The services provided also did not fall within the definition of engineering set forth in the New Jersey Administrative Code, N.J.A.C. 13:40-1.3.  Pa2326; Pa2840.  [...] issued a report and was deposed.  Pa2365; Pa2185.  He also provided an affidavit.  Pa2333.  After a thorough review of all available information, he concluded that the on-site representatives of [...] and [...] were negligent but there was a deviation from the standard of engineering practices because those representatives were not performing professional engineering services and were not professional engineers.
[brief] Plaintiffs explain that the discoverable ESI that an individual Plaintiff possesses will likely be contained in his or her email, and be intermingled with wholly irrelevant and personal private information.  The Special Master agrees that the validation process described in section 12(a) may not be practicable to Plaintiffs as Plaintiffs are individuals with vastly smaller amounts of discoverable ESI than Defendants, who are large corporations.  Defendants also appear to agree that the validation terms need not be completely reciprocal.  However, Plaintiffs’ proposal does not articulate how it will perform appropriate sampling and quality control measures to achieve the appropriate level of validation.  As no articulate alternative process has been proposed by Plaintiffs, the Special Master will adopt Defendants’ protocol to the extent that it will require the parties, at Defendants’ request, to meet and confer concerning the application of validation procedures described in paragraph 12(a) to Plaintiffs, if the parties are unable to agree to a procedure.  The Special Master encourages the parties to work together to develop a reasonable procedure for the validation of Plaintiffs’ search terms, however, should the parties need to, they may seek a further order from the Court that will explicitly dictate which, if any, provisions described in paragraph 12(a) must be utilized by Plaintiffs in validating their search terms.
[brief] ” (Ia585)(emphasis added).  Additionally, the exclusion, if it can be called that, is on page 3 of the Quote hidden in normal print and, therefore, does not adequately warn the applicant that the vans are excluded.  Exclusions should be “conspicuous, plain and clear. ”  *Sosa v. Massachusetts Bay Insurance Co.*, 458 NJ. Super. 639, 652 (App. Div. 2019)(quotation omitted).  Further, a quote is insufficient to contain an exclusion.  Insureds use quotes to decide whether or not the premium is too expensive\(^1\) and not to determine the extent of coverage, especially the day the coverage is to begin.  To communicate to an insured’s broker last minute through a Quote that vehicles - rented weeks earlier and already on their way to camp with youngsters - had an exclusion for such vehicles, should not be condoned by this Court.  [...] should not prevail by arguing that a Quote sent last minute to a broker on the day camp opened was sufficient to warn [...] that the vans were not insured.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 251.  “It was the jury’s function, not to enlist in the war on drugs, but to listen to the evidence and decide in a dispassionate way the question of defendant’s guilt. ”  *Ibid.*  The assistant prosecutor at [...]’s trial invoked the national opioid crisis both to “enlist [the jurors] in the war on drugs,” *ibid.*, and to unfairly assert that the State had a special interest in prosecuting [...]:
[brief] Count I - Negligent, Reckless & Wanton Violation of Plaintiff's Rights  This Count states that the "Defendants negligently, recklessly and with wanton disregard for the rights and well-being of Plaintiff (over whom they had custody and control), failed to exercise high degree of case that was imposed in them causing Plaintiff having."  See Pl. Amend. Compl. Pg 6, ¶3.  Not only does the aforementioned sentence fail to qualify as a coherent, intelligible statement, but it also fails to identify what rights of Plaintiff have been allegedly violated or where these rights even came from.  It is, at most, a mere conclusion, and that of course is assuming that it is understandable, which it is not.  Glass, 317 N.J. Super. 574.  Plaintiff left out a whole litany of necessary facts to raise claims that can vault the motion to dismiss standard (see above).  The plaintiff did not identify who specifically owed any duty to her, what that duty was, how said duty was breached, nor does she identify a link between any alleged breach and any damages purportedly sustained.  Thus, the elements of this claim, to the extent that one even exists (which it does not) are not even pleaded and must be dismissed as a matter of law in accordance with R 4:6-2(e).
[brief] ”  *Schubert*, 212 N.J. at 312.  Legislature merely set maximum and minimum terms.  The court would impose a sentence within the range and the basic decision, as to release of the prisoner, was left to the correctional and parole authorities.  Concurrent sentencing increased the flexibility available to prison officials to determine prisoners' release dates based on rehabilitation.  By contrast: A system of just deserts with an objective of allocational fairness must take the opposite approach.
[brief] The jury should be given appropriate instructions about the presence of the employer’s counsel in the trial, explaining that he or she is participating solely with respect to certain factual issues that the jury might need to address.  The jury should not be given an “ultimate outcome” instruction divulging that the plaintiff cannot recover any damages from the employer, for we suspect such an instruction would likely engender confusion and speculation.  The judge must mold the verdict after it is issued, so that the plaintiff’s damages are not reduced by the employer’s percentage share of fault, if any.  Instead, the non-employer defendants must fully bear any liability owed to the plaintiff.
[brief] B.  Except for the County Portion, which will be paid to the County, the Township may use a minimum of the first 2% of each year’s Annual Service Charge revenue to pay debt service on bonds, or notes issued in anticipation thereof, issued to finance costs associated with the Community Center; provided, however, that this provision shall apply only to the extent there is such debt service outstanding at the time such revenue is received by the Township.  Pa630.
[brief] Q.  If a consumer needs an attorney in a debt-adjustment case, they can hire someone right out of law school that graduated and was licensed last week and that attorney can handle the case and be compliant with the statute, correct?  A.  Yes.  Q.  If that same consumer looking to hire [...], who graduated last year, or [...], who devotes her entire practice to debt-adjustment work, is considered by her peers to be an expert, that consumer, they hired the expert, that expert would run afoul of the statute; isn’t that correct?
[brief] 43 N.J.S.A. §§59:1-1 to 59:12-3 ............................................................  31 N.J.S.A. 59:2-2(a) ...........................................................................  31 N.J.S.A. 59:2-3 ...............................................................................  31 N.J.S.A. 59:2-3(a) ..........................................................................  33 N.J.S.A. 59:4-1(a) ..........................................................................  35 N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 ............................................................................. 29, 30, 34, 35, 40  Court Rules: R. 1:1-2 ..........................................................................................  47 R. 1:6-2(d) ......................................................................................  4 R. 4:26-4 ....................................................................................... 43-44, 46 R. 4:4-5 ..........................................................................................  43 R. 4:46-1 .......................................................................................  5  | Document Name | Date | Appendix Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|---------------| | Order denying Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment | 9/27/2019 | Pa1826 | | Order granting Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment | 4/10/2023 | Pa2133 | | Amended order granting Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment and dismissing the case as to all parties with prejudice | 6/14/2023 | Pa2171 | | Proceeding Type | Proceeding Date | Transcript Number | |-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------| | Oral Argument on Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment | 9/27/2019 | 1T | | Oral Argument on Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment | 3/18/2022 | 2T | | Rule 104 Hearing | 5/9/2022 | 3T | I.
[brief] ......................................................................................  3 Marino v. Marino, 200 N.J. 315 (2009)  .....................................................................................  1, 7 Med. Soc'y of N.J. v. N.J. Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety, 120 N.J. 18 (1990) .......................................................................................  2 Moore v. Moore, 114 N.J. 147 ..................................................................................................  7  Pine Belt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 132 N.J. 564 (1993)  ......................................................................................  7  Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 196 N.J. 251 (2008)  .....................................................................................  1 Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287 (1982) .......................................................................................  14 State v. Dalglish, 86 N.J. 503 (1991) .....................................................................................  6 United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996) ....................................................................................
[brief] ”  In re Att'y Gen.'s “Directive on Exit Polling: Media & Non-Partisan Pub. Int. Grps., 200 N.J. 283, 297-98 (2009).  Under the position taken by the State, if Applicants can only show that P.L. 2021, c. 375 was enacted contrary to “statutory provisions,” then the statute will not be void.  However, because that interpretation does not give effect to the clause “statutory provisions relating to the enactment and approval of laws,” this Court should reject it.  Furthermore, the State’s argument is inconsistent with case law that has voided statutes for only violating constitutional enactment provisions.  See e.g., In re Kornbluh, 134 N.J.L. 529, 530 (Sup. Ct. 1946)(invalidating statute because only constitutional requirements for enactment were violated).  In Kornbluh, court invalidated the statute because the two houses’ bills were not identical.  Id.  The Court voided the statute even though only the constitutional provisions for enactments was violated.  Id.  Thus, the Court may void a statute given either violation of constitutional or statutory requirement for enactment.  II.
[brief] Id. at 555.  Thus, the Global Fee Application should not have been filed as a “global” application at all; rather, [...] should have applied for fees in connection with specific motions he filed or other activities at or near the time that those motions or activities took place\(^8\).  In instead proceeding with a “global,” application going back six years, he deprived [...] of a meaningful ability to challenge the application, thus depriving him of due process.
[brief] (Pa031).  Plaintiff testified that a photograph produced in discovery (contained in the Appendix at Pa040; Pa172) appeared to be the subject U-boat that struck her.  Plaintiff testified that she had never been trained to push shopping carts at [...] or [...] and that she was unaware of any policies, procedures or signs related to customers pushing shopping carts at [...] or [...].  (Pa022-Pa023).  [...], [...]’s Regional Manager, testified that there are stickers posted on every U-boat which provide a “warning” to customers on how to push the U-boat and to have a clear view.  (Pa113).
[brief] See Polzo at 75-76.  The Polzo Court, citing the 1972 Task Force Comment on N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 (Dangerous Condition of Public Property), quoted the following:  This section recognizes the difficulties inherent in a public entity’s responsibility for maintaining its vast amounts of public property.  Thus it is specifically provided that when a public entity exercises or fails to exercise its discretion in determining what action should or should not be taken to protect against the dangerous condition that judgment should only be reversed where it is clear to the Court that it was palpably unreasonable.  Id. at 76 (emphasis added).  The Polzo Court continued by quoting with approval [...]’s concurrence in Garrison v. Twp. of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282 (1998) as follows: