ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Ibid.*  The court noted that it has found “equitable and countervailing considerations” in particular circumstances to allow a plaintiff to assert a claim.  *Id.* at 337 (quoting *SMB Assocs. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot.*, 264 N.J. Super. 38, 59 (App. Div. 1993)) (“[A]n “agency has inherent power to waive *de minimis* violations of objective standards. ”)).  The court concluded that under the circumstances presented, fairness and equity required [...] to be permitted to apply for Ordinary Disability.  *Id.* at 338.  Here there was no such legal impediment to [...] filing his Eligibility Registration Form nor would he have been sacrificing discrimination claims or other litigation positions by doing so.  [...] simply failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form until approximately one year and nine months past the statutory deadline, which is not a de minimis violation.  Contrary to [...]’s argument, the court’s decision in *[...]* did not turn on the timeliness or adequacy of the Division’s notice.
[brief] (Pa59-81)  Section 4.14 of Defendant's purchase order addresses governing law and dispute resolution.  (Pa 45)  The section specifically states when a dispute or other matter in controversy arises concerning services or the agreement, a representative from management of both parties shall meet and endeavor to resolve the claim.  The provision continues with a clause no proceeding shall be filed in the judicial forum prior to a dispute notice and/or mediation.  In this case, it is evident the parties undertook significant efforts to resolve the dispute through e-mail exchanges regarding release of retainage and payment of Plaintiff's claim.  The result was a credit from the original invoice (retainage) amount of $201,611.61 (Pa 57 and 58) to a revised invoice statement balance showing the credit, upon which suit is premised for $198,066.38 (Pa 10 and 11)  Thus, there was no need to mediate or participate in another formal dispute resolution proceeding.  By any measure, Plaintiff fulfilled its obligations under the purchase order agreement.  (Pa 45)  Defendant agreed to the revised payment.  (Pa 59)  All of the e-mail exchanges occurred before the within lawsuit was filed.  (Pa 59 to 81)  More importantly, the July 20, 2023 e-mail between the parties (Pa59) clearly reflects a resolution which was shown on the updated statement of account (Pa 10)  Thus, there was nothing further to mediate or arbitrate.  Defendant's continued refusal to make payment following agreement for the revised invoice/credit does not constitute a basis to "re-mediate."  Rather, it was proper to bring the within lawsuit and seek relief from the court to compel payment.  Not dismissal.  Plaintiff submits a de novo review of the pleadings before the trial court clearly demonstrates efforts to resolve the matter prior to filing a lawsuit.  The last e-mail exchange confirms resolution.  The lawsuit makes evident Defendant failed to pay.  The mediation clause at issue is not applicable.  Therefore, the Law Division committed plain error and the order under review should be reversed.
[brief] Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J.  67, 75 (1954).  To do so, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response by affidavits or as otherwise provided in the court rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.  R. 4:46-5(a); see also Sullivan v. Port Auth. of NY and NJ, 449 N.J. Super. 276, 279-80 (App. Div. 2017); Miller v. Bank of Am. Home Loan, 439 N.J. Super. 540, 551 (App. Div. 2015).  The role of the motion judge is to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact by considering whether the evidence presented, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, is sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the dispute in favor of the non-moving party.  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-252 (1986).
[brief] For the reasons expressed, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the defendant’s conviction, but remand for resentencing consistent with Point V.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  [...]  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT BY: s/[...]  [...]  [No. 023352002]  Section Chief [...] [No. 000531996]  Attorney  On the Brief August 27, 2024  [...]  Attorney ID No. 404382022  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Of Counsel and On the Letter-Brief REPLY
[brief] As the trial court subsequently wrote in its Statement of Reasons supporting the October 12, 2022 Order removing the Defendants from the Boonton Property, “[t]he parties have essentially been unable to agree on every detail relating to the sale of the Property from the outset of the litigation.  As such, it became necessary for the Court to establish the bidding procedure…”  Da53.  Further, while a trial court is unquestionably within its power to order the parties to attend a settlement conference, it is equally obvious that settlement itself may not be forced upon the parties.  A settlement of a lawsuit is a contract which “like all contracts, may be freely entered into …”  Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124 (App. Div. 1983).  It follows that a court cannot compel parties to settle a case.
[directive] Because there is no evidence-based data on how to triage children specifically for ventilator allocation based on these clinical factors, a triage officer/team must use best clinical judgment.  The triage Section 3.  Reassessment for ongoing provision of critical care/ventilation: team will conduct periodic reassessments of all patients receiving ICU/critical care services during times of crisis (i.e., not merely those initially triaged under the crisis standards).  The timing of reassessments should be based on evolving understanding of typical disease trajectories and of the severity of the crisis.  A multidimensional, individualized assessment should be used to quantify changes in patients’ conditions, such as recalculation of severity of illness scores, appraisal of new complications, and treating clinicians’ input.  Patients showing improvement will continue to receive ICU/critical care services until the next assessment.  Patients showing substantial clinical deterioration that portends a very low chance for survival will have critical care discontinued.  These patients will receive medical care including intensive symptom management and psychosocial support.  Where available, specialist palliative care teams will provide additional support and consultation.  2  Introduction & Ethical Considerations
[brief] | 28 | | Martindale v. Sandvik 173 N.J.76 (2002) | 19 | | Motorworld, Inc. v. Benkendorf 228 N.J. 311,329 (NJ 2017).  | 18,20 | | Ogunyemi v. Garden State Medical Center 478 N.J. Super. 310,324 (App. Div. 2024) | 27 | | Olivieri v. Stifel, Nicholaus & Company, Inc. 112 F.4th 74 (United States Court of Appeals, 8th Cir. 2024) | 27 | | Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics 116 N.J. 739 @ 746 (1999) | 28 | | Skuse v. Pizer 244 N.J. 30 (2020) | 19 | | Smith v. SBC Communications, Inc. 178 N.J. 265 @ 262 (2004) | 28 | | State v. K.W. 214 N.J. 449,507 (2013) | 18 | Walters v. Starbucks 623 F. Supp. 333 (U.S.D.C. S.D. New York 2022) ..............................................  27  Ziner v. Micro Tech Training Center, Inc.  Docket No. [...] ...........................................  7  COURT RULES AND STATUTES  New Jersey Law Against Discrimination  N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 .... 1,25,29 N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d) ..................................................  25  New Jersey Court Rule 4:46-2 ....................................  17 New Jersey Court Rule 4:6-2 ....................................  17 Model Civil Jury Instruction 2.25 ..................................  28  Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. §401............................. 13,26,27,29  Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. §401(4).......................  28,29 Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. §401(2) .......................  26  Ending Force Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 ........................................
[brief] The only authority that Complainants cite in support of their argument is Angus v. Bd. of Educ. of Boro. of Metuchen, 475 N.J. Super. 362 (App. Div. 2023).  Cb32-Cb33.  Angus holds that "[t]he standard governing agency determinations for a summary decision under N.J.A.C 1:1-12.5 is 'substantially the same as that governing a motion under Rule 4:46-2 for summary judgment in civil litigation'"  475 N.J. Super at 367.  The language was followed by a brief discussion regarding how evidence should be considered under the summary judgment standard.  Ibid.  Angus has nothing do with the issuer of whether an agency can dismiss a complaint upon a motion for a summary decision when the respondent does not file such a motion; in Angus, both parties move for a summary decision.  Id. at 366.  Thus, Complainant's contention that the Commission cannot dismiss a complaint in the absence of a motion or cross motion for a summary decision must be rejected.
[brief] [...]’s undisputed Prior Round Obligation is approximately 1,561 units.  The Township’s Third Round Obligation is approximately 1,026 units. \(^2\)  The Non-Compliance Order found that the Township is short its constitutional obligation by at least 602 units. \(^3\)  That [...] is constitutionally noncompliant by a minimum of at least 602 units is undisputed in this litigation.  On June 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause, seeking to enjoin [...] from (1) taking any condemnation related action with respect to the Property, (2) designating a redeveloper for the Property under the LRHL, and (3) granting any type of development approval for any land for any purpose other than for inclusionary housing.
[brief] There is no suggestion that Respondent encouraged other members of the Board, members of the public, teaching staff members (if they were present), or students (if they were present) to defy the Executive Order.  Instead, it was a personal decision made by Respondent, and Respondent alone...  Cal 72.  Indeed, Respondent's decision not to where a mask when she was sworn in as a Board member and at the January 20, 2022 Board meeting was a personal one.  Moreover, there is no evidence that Respondent, by her failing to wear a mask on both occasions, encouraged other to do so.  Complainants quote [...]' statement that "respondent led by example in refusing to wear a mask."  Cb45, quoting Ca35.  The record, however, does not support that statement.  Moreover, the statement was completely gratuitous as Counts 2 and 3 relating to Respondent's failure to wear a mask had already been dismissed before this matter was presented to [...].  Complainants cite three of Respondent's posts criticizing [...]'s masking mandate.  Cb45-Cb46.  Criticism of the Governor's masking policy, which every citizen had the right to engage in, does not create an inference that one "leads by example" in not wearing a mask.  Finally, Complainant's take issue with the Commission statement that Respondent "'could face consequences'" for not wearing a mask at Board meetings.  Cb46, citing Ca172.  They contend that a local board of education has no authority to impose discipline on a board member for violations of the School Ethics Act, citing N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22.  Cb46.  Nothing in N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22, however, precludes a local board of education from imposing discipline on its members.  For all these reasons, it is clear that the Commission did not err in dismissing Counts 2 and 3 of the Complaint.
[brief] [...]’s motion for leave to intervene – which was filed on the eve of trial and after all trial briefing was submitted – was untimely and pursued for an improper purpose.  The trial court’s decision to nevertheless grant [...]’s motion was plain error and should be reversed.  It is well settled that the making of a “timely” application to intervene is a prerequisite to gaining intervention as of right under R. 4:33-1.
[brief] The Court found that “[D]efendant has not established that reason existed that ‘might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so,’ in violation of Rule 1:12–1. ”  [...], at 435.  “The “evidence” presented in support of [[...]’s] motion depicts “at most, mere ministerial involvement by the Acting County Prosecutor.  That is not the sort of personal involvement that compels disqualification. ”  Although there was no question that the judge was involved, at least in some respect, in [...]’s case or criminal history, his involvement did not call for recusal.  _[...]_, at 511.  Compare _State v. Hill_, 110 N.J. Super. 370, 374–75 (App. Div. 1970), where the trial judge, who was formerly an assistant prosecutor, was not disqualified from presiding at the criminal trial of a defendant whose file had been pending in the prosecutor's office during the judge's employment, but the judge as an assistant prosecutor had no knowledge of the matter with _State v. Tucker_, 264 N.J. Super. 549, 555 (App. Div. 1993), which reversed the defendant's conviction because the judge, who previously served as assistant prosecutor and had presented evidence against the defendant to a grand jury, should have recused himself in a subsequent trial against the same defendant.
[brief] Both times, the court violated [...]’s constitutional rights by failing to engage in the process that is required.  It is beside the point what the results of that process might have been.  In sum, the State’s arguments completely disregard the safeguards established by law to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment.  This Court must reverse [...]’s conviction due to the trial court’s violation of his right to represent himself.  See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975); U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10.
[brief] [...] drove down from Newark with two friends to attend the party for his late cousin [...].  (13T 53-15 to 54-7, 56-2 to 6, 57-2 to 7)  Bryant was also cousins with [...].  (13T 58-25 to 59-4)  Bryant could not recall that he had said in his statement to police that Brown paid the admission for 20 to 30 people (13T 177-11 to 14) and denied that he had said Brown was buying drinks by the bottle for partygoers (13T 197-13 to 198-19).
[brief] You do now have a special place, because you are the representative of individuals, but that’s as I view the role of the builder’s remedy plaintiff,…  I don’t care if you client makes money, the concept is your client is saying I can build affordable housing… there that includes housing for people who are in need of affordable units, and that puts the builder in a special position.  I think the New Jersey Supreme Court recognizes that in having the DJ versus builder’s remedy structure set up.
[brief] It was not a "prior" consistent statement, because it was not made prior to the existence of a motive for [...] to fabricate defendant's involvement as the more culpable party.  To the contrary, it was made on the same day that he tendered his plea.  The November 15, 2019, statement was not relevant to the issue of [...]'s credibility, because it had no ability to refute defendant's allegation that it was fabricated in response to [...]'s improper motive of attempting to secure a favorable plea offer.  Furthermore, the introduction of [...]'s prior statement through the testimony of [...] was hearsay.
[brief] The Trial Court Properly Determined That The Ordinance Approving the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan Was Not Substantially Inconsistent with the Borough’s Master Plan .........................................................31  C.  Since the Ordinance Approving the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan Was Not Substantially Inconsistent with the Borough’s Master Plan, There Was No Requirement for the Borough Council to Follow the Statutory Procedures Necessary to Adopt an Inconsistent Ordinance
[brief] Appellant’s sole communications related to anxiety were to [...] in the form of joking and sarcastic text messages.  The messages stated: “def they are divas I’m having anxiety may need a donut” and “[...] is out of toilet paper, [...] and [...] just kinda pissed, [...] unbothered lol.  [...] just switched to panic mode everyone stocking up on Amazon I have this dull chest pain from my anxiety, I think, LOL. ”
[directive] 1.  Notification of death should be made in person by a law enforcement officer conducting the investigation.  2.  Where staffing levels permit, two officers should effectuate the notification, one of whom should be in uniform.  3.  Notification should occur as soon as the deceased's identity has been established and the next of kin located.  4.  An attempt should be made to ascertain pertinent medical information about surviving family members prior to their being notified so that the officers will be better able to react to potential medical emergencies.  5.  Upon arriving at the survivors' residence, the officers should introduce themselves, present their credentials and request admission.  6.  If a child answers the door, the officers should request to speak to the child's parents and ensure that notification is being made to the appropriate individual.  7.  Survivors should be informed of the death simply and directly.  8.  Upon the request of the survivors, the officer should provide as much information as possible regarding the circumstances of the death without jeopardizing a criminal investigation.  9.  The officers should ask the survivors if there is anyone they would like to have called to provide assistance or comfort.  The officers should not leave a survivor who resides alone until someone designated by him arrives.  10.  The survivors should be informed that it may be necessary for them to identify the deceased.  If identification is necessary, the officers should transport or arrange for the transportation of the survivors to and from the hospital or morgue.  11.  Survivors should be informed that state law may require an autopsy to establish the exact cause of death.  12.  Survivors should be informed that other law enforcement officers may need to question them at a future time.  If it is imperative that survivors be questioned immediately after notification, questioning should be conducted compassionately.  13.  Prior to departing the residence, the officers should provide the survivors with their names and telephone numbers.  14.  If surviving family members reside outside of the jurisdiction of the law enforcement agency responsible for investigating the death, the investigating officer should contact the appropriate law enforcement agency in the other jurisdiction.  That agency should be requested to make the in person notification as described herein.  15.  If a victim is brought to a hospital, care should be taken to preserve and label the package containing the victim's clothing and personal effects.  16.  Where it is hospital policy to prepare the body for identification, investigating law enforcement personnel should allow hospital staff adequate time for preparation.  17.  When possible, hospital staff should permit survivors sufficient time with the deceased or provide an explanation.  18.  All law enforcement agencies operating within a county shall notify the county prosecutor of the name, address, and telephone number of the victim's next of kin in all motor vehicle crashes/accidents involving death and of the victim in all motor vehicle crashes/accidents involving serious bodily injury.
[brief] While [...] repeatedly trumpets the “sound reasoning” and “thoughtful analysis,” Pb12, the “reasoning” and “analysis” consisted of two, entirely conclusory sentences that merely restate the River Vale test.  2014 WL 2131662, at *7 (Da456); Pb12.  Additionally, that reasoning is inconsistent with the binding case law indicating that a bidder’s refusal to provide required information about its qualification is a material defect that cannot be cured.
[brief] THE BOARD CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT [...] WAS INELIGIBLE FOR PANDEMIC UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE UNDER SECTION 2102 OF THE CARES ACT.  An appellate court’s review of an administrative agency’s decision is limited.  Brady v. Bd. of Rev., 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997).  “[I]n reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether an appellate court would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was its to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs. ”  Ibid. (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Rev., 200 N.J. Super 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)).  “If the factual findings of an administrative agency are supported by sufficient credible evidence, courts are obliged to accept them. ”  Self v. Bd. of Rev., 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982).  Unless the agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, the ruling of the agency should not be disturbed by the court.  Brady, 152 N.J. at 210.  The CARES Act expanded eligibility and payment for unemployment benefits for certain categories of individuals who may have been adversely affected by COVID-19.
[brief] Notice of Appeal | Pa0001 | | March 1, 2024  Case Information Statement | Pa0005 | | June 7, 2024  Proof of Service of Transcripts | Pa0011 | | January 16, 2024  Order of [...] | Pa0012 | | January 24, 2024  Amended Order of [...] | Pa0015 | | July 7, 2022  Verified Complaint to Quiet Title | Pa0018 | | September 26, 2022
[brief] “In *Hartsfield v. Fantini*, 149 N.J. 611, 615–16, (1997), we reviewed the legislatively required mandatory arbitration process for certain automobile accident claims with damages totaling less than $15,000.  See N.J.S.A.39:6A–24 to –35.  We approved the process in recognition that the Legislature intended for either party to the arbitration to petition the Superior Court and obtain a de novo jury trial on the legal issue presented to the arbitrator.  *Id.* at 615, 695 A.2d 259 (*citing* N.J.S.A.39:6A–31, authorizing trial de novo post arbitration).  *Id.* at 598.  . . .
[directive] Agent participation is essential to, but not the only measure of, federal participation in a joint operation.  The federal participation can be bolstered through the provision of intelligence data, informants, administrative support, and federally-owned equipment and/or space.  The operational activities of the joint operation must represent a significant and official part of the duties of the agents assigned to the operation.  This entails work beyond that of an advisory nature, and operational also beyond emergency or circumstantial assistance.  In situations where there is insufficient federal, state or local participation to stage a formal joint operation, the same analysis can be conducted on a case-by-case basis.
[directive] Active Resistor.  When dealing with an active resistor, in addition to the options available for passive resistors, officers may use physical strikes with hands or feet, OC spray, batons or asps applied with non-impact pressure, and taking the person to the ground.  Intentional strikes to the head or face, which are only allowed in an act of self-defense, are not permitted when dealing with an active resistor.  Police canines shall not be utilized against an active resistor.  (d)
[brief] - Appellant did not stop stealing and even withdrew funds on the day the verified complaint was filed, leaving [...] accounts with less than ten dollars total.  His total disregard for Respondents would have bankrupted Respondents but for their resilience and resolve.  (Da29).  -  Finally, Appellant had the opportunity to participate at trial and voluntarily absented himself from the proceedings, although he was made aware, having been denied a stay, he had the ability to assert his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  (Da29).