ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Importantly, here, New Jersey courts find that expert testimony is required—and circumstantial evidence is insufficient—to prove a defect in a complex product even in cases where the product has been recalled.  E.g., Schweiger, 2019 WL 5783478, at *4 (finding discontinuation of product did not dispense with need for expert to prove complex product is defective); Burbank v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 2022 WL 833608, at *9 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2022) (finding a recall “provides no evidence” that product is defective, as a recall is often “overinclusive” and “does not prove that any individual’s [product] actually contained a nonconformity”).\footnote{See also Garcia v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 2022 WL 2542291, at *9 (E.D. Va. July 7, 2022) (granting summary judgment, as “[t]hese district court cases make clear that even when a specific defect is alleged in a vehicle or other product, a recall notice is not evidence that demonstrates an individual plaintiff’s vehicle or product possesses that defect. ”); Bailey v. Monaco Coach Corp., 350 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1045 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (finding “the recall notice is insufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a defect” and granting summary judgment); Cascio v. Johnson & Johnson, 2024 WL 693489, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 20, 2024) (“[A] recall of a product is not evidence of a defect….Defendants’ recall notice alone cannot support a plausible inference that the sunscreen Plaintiff [...] used contained benzene. ”).}  An FDA-approved prescription drug injected into the vitreous of the eye with a single-use, silicone-sleeved needle applicator is nothing like a simple mechanical product with which average jurors have operational familiarity.  E.g., McMillan, 2005 WL 20000203, at *3 (finding circumstantial evidence not enough to prove defect in medical device; expert testimony is required).  No New Jersey appellate court has ever authorized using “circumstantial evidence” to find a manufacturing defect for a prescription drug or medical device.  This Court should not be the first to allow expansion of New Jersey law in such an unprincipled way.
[brief] 638a.  Its services were rendered under a contract that was awarded pursuant to public bidding conducted under N.J.S.A. 18A:18-1, *et. seq.*  638a.  The contract appears at 515a.  For the period under discussion, consistent with its bid, [...] was to be paid $620,250 per month for the provision of the services required under the specifications upon which [...] had bid, in addition to charges for any additional custodial services and supplies requested by [...] beyond those specified.  638-39a.  Through March 2020, payments were made by [...] consistent with its contractual obligations.  639a.  On March 25, 2020, consistent with the Governor’s executive orders pertaining to the coronavirus epidemic, [...] instructed [...] that it was to cease providing its services effective the next day.
[brief] Appellant prepared and executed an intercompany loan agreement between [...] and “[...] ” on September 1, 2016 (the “[...] Loan”).  (Pa718:179:10-18; Da842).  At the time of the [...] Loan, [...] did not exist.  (Pa720:187:9-16).  Appellant testified that he did not discuss the [...] Loan with anyone at [...] or [...].  (Pa721:190:14-191:4).  Pursuant to the terms of the [...] Loan, the maximum amount outstanding could not exceed $500,000.  (Da842, §1.1).  By December 15, 2017, Appellant directed additional transfers from [...] to [...] to increase the amount outstanding under the [...] Loan to $692,959.  (Pa732:234:1-22).  By December 29, 2018, Appellant directed additional transfers from [...] to [...] to increase the amount outstanding under the [...] Loan to $764,941.79.  (Pa733:238:6-9; 201:19-25).  Appellant did not discuss making these payments to [...] with anyone at [...] or [...].  (Pa724:202:1-9).  The [...] Loan required [...] to pay [...] interest on the loan.  Appellant never caused [...] to pay any interest to [...] in 2016, or 2017.  (Da842; Pa735:247:4-248:25).  Appellant caused transactions from [...] to, or on behalf of [...] totaling a net of $3,275,962.71.  (1T:133-188; see Pa037-249).  Appellant did not make an interest payment for [...] in 2018 because “That would involve me sending a check to [...], and it will be a cold day in hell before that happens at this rate. ” (Pa736:252:16-20).  **Appellant Transfers [...]’s Withholding Taxes to [...]**
[directive] Además, si durante el período de suspensión lo condenan de operar personalmente un vehículo motorizado, estará sujeto a las siguientes penalidades expuestas en 39:3-40: N.J.S.A.  This is to inform you that, as a person convicted of Eluding pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b, your driver’s license is suspended for a period of [6 months to 2 years], effective today.  In addition, if during the period of suspension you are convicted of personally operating a motor vehicle, you will be subject to the penalties set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:3-40:
[brief] 3T57:14-18.  [...] negotiated and agreed upon a settlement.  3T69:1-2.  The settlement proceeds of $1,028,000 were deposited initially in [...] counsel’s account.  From the settlement, [...] satisfied its attorneys’ fees, a settlement in another matter, the outstanding debt to [...] and [...] discussed above,\(^5\) and outstanding amounts found due to the former employees in the DOL matter, among other expenses.
[brief] See Woo-Padva 2, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550, at *13\(^{20}\) (holding plaintiff’s NJCFA claim against defendant debt buyer fails as a matter of law because plaintiff does not contend that defendant sold creditor induced her into purchasing credit, but, instead, that defendant merely purchased a charged off debt); Valentine, supra (Da35-Da57; Da50-Da55).  Importantly, the Courts in Woo-Padva 2 and Valentine, like the majority of courts before it, disagreed that the holding of Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 207 N.J. 557 (2011) had any application to these claims.  The Courts held that Gonzalez was not applicable in cases where the debt at issue had already been charged off.
[brief] Because the procedural history and facts are closely related, they are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience.  2  “Pa” refers to appellant’s appendix; “Pb” refers to his brief.  3  A Service Retirement is provided for by N.J.S.A. 53:5A-8 for any member who has established twenty years of service in SPRS and also for troopers who were members of the retirement system as of the effective date of L. 1985, c. 175 regardless of their years of service.
[brief] *McDaniel*, 419 N.J. Super. at 490 (quoting *Harris v. Branin Transport, Inc.*, 312 N.J. Super. 38, 46, certif. denied, 156 N.J. 408 (1998)).  The Act serves as the exclusive remedy for an employee who sustains an injury in an accident that arises out of and in the course of employment.
[brief] [...] attempted to restrain the patient’s leg and testified that he received several “strong kicks” and “knees pressured” [sic] to his shoulder.  (T14:12-23).  Specifically, [...] recalls being hit after they got the patient from a standing position to laying position on the bed, but while he was still out of control and resisting being put in the net restraints.  (T36:11-37:25).
[directive] EXECUTIVE  1.  Provide leadership by developing a clear and concise written order or directive based upon these standards and disseminating it to all law enforcement officers of the agency.  2.  Ensure that all law enforcement officers receive appropriate training in all operational areas relating to missing and unidentified persons investigations as set forth in the agencies missing/unidentified persons written order or directive.  3.  Ensure that an appropriate initial law enforcement response is provided to all reports of missing or unidentified persons and that an appropriate follow-up investigation is carried out.  4.  Effectively calm the families of missing persons and reduce their fear through direct ongoing official communication regarding the missing person incident.  5.  Reassure the family that appropriate investigative and enforcement methods will be utilized by the law enforcement agency in addressing the incident.  6.  Interact with concerned community organizations and civic groups regarding the missing persons incident as necessary.  7.  Ensure that appropriate and accurate media relations are maintained regarding missing and unidentified persons investigations.  8.  Ensure that referrals to the county prosecutor's victim/witness services coordinator are made as appropriate.  9.  Ensure that Crime Prevention and Personal Safety Programs are conducted regarding missing persons issues as appropriate.  MISSING AND UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS  INVESTIGATIVE STANDARDS  POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR NEW JERSEY LAW ENFORCEMENT
[brief] (5T18-4 to 10).  The knife was dropped on the stairs leading to the first floor.  (5T20-20 to 23).  [...] testified that she had brought [...] and [...] to the house approximately 30 minutes prior to the defendant returning.  (5T68-18 to 21).  [...], who was the named renter on the lease, did not want the defendant in her house.  (5T88-3 to 6).  [...] then went to her bedroom located on the third floor and was planning to go to sleep.
[brief] He also argues that the trial court improperly characterized that statement as hearsay.  *Ibid.*  He further claims that [...]’s purported admission is “a ‘party-opponent’s own statement,’ and is therefore not excluded by the hearsay rule. ”  *Ibid.*  However, the admissibility of a statement by a party opponent is irrelevant, because plaintiff never actually testified that [...] admitted that he placed tree branches on plaintiff’s plants.
[brief] See Lawson, 468 N.J. Super. at 135 (“If a prior judge has erred or entered an order that has ceased to promote a fair and efficient processing of a particular case, the new judge owes respect but not deference and should correct the error. ”).  This case falls squarely within the “interest of justice” standard.  Contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, defendants did not seek reconsideration from a different judge of a well-reasoned and properly supported interlocutory order.\(^{19}\) (See, e.g., Pb15).  Rather, as discussed above, [...] summarily rejected defendants’ comity, personal jurisdiction, and indispensable parties arguments without reasoned legal analysis premised on findings from the record.  (Pa770-775).  The numerous legal infirmities in how [...] handled and summarily decided defendants’ motions (which are not disputed by plaintiff) are more than sufficient to support reconsideration “in the interest of justice. ”  See Lawson, 468 N.J. Super. at 136 (“[S]ome reconsideration motions – those that argue in good faith a prior mistake, a change in circumstances, or the court’s misappreciation of what was previously argued – present the court with an opportunity to either reinforce or better explain why the prior order was appropriate or correct a prior erroneous order. ”).  Reconsideration was also appropriate given [...]’s need, as the new judge assigned to this case, \(^{19}\)  The court should reject plaintiff’s attempt to imply that defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration was their third bite at the apple.  The January 23 Orders were the first and only time that the trial court purported to rule on the merits of defendants’ personal jurisdiction, comity, and indispensable party arguments prior to the Motion for Reconsideration.  The trial court denied defendants’ initial motions to dismiss in 2017 without prejudice on the basis that the trial court required further facts before it could rule on personal jurisdiction.  (Pa505, Pa511).  to ensure that the January 23 Orders “promote[d] a fair and efficient processing of” the parties’ dispute given the pendency of the Missouri Action.  Id. at 135.  II.
[brief] [...]; [...]; and [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...]; [...]; [...]; JOHN/JANE DOES 1-X; ABC CORPORATION/ENTITIES 1-X; XYZ PARTNERSHIPS 1-X; and 123  TRUSTS, Defendants-Respondents.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT, LAW DIV. SUSSEX COUNTY  DOCKET NO. [...]  Honorable [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
[brief] In this case, we must determine whether reasonable and articulable suspicion existed when a police officer conducted an investigatory stop of the vehicle in which defendants were riding.  After the robbery of a 7-Eleven store in Hamilton, police dispatch alerted officers that the suspects were two Black males, one armed with a gun.  [...] heard the radio transmission and made his way to the scene.  While en route, Sergeant Horan  SYLLABUS  This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion.  It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader.  It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court.  In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.  State v. [...] ([...]) ([...])  State v. [...] ([...]) ([...])  Argued October 25, 2021 -- Decided January 25, 2022
[brief] By the time the trial commenced in November 2022, Appellant was the only direct defendant remaining in the case.  During a pre-trial conference, Plaintiff/Respondent again raised objection to the designation of [...] and [...] as so-called “Burt defendants. ” (3T19).  While acknowledging that Plaintiff/Respondent was bound by the court’s order from December 2017, Plaintiff/Respondent reiterated that Appellant had earlier asserted cross- and/or third-party contribution claims against [...] and [...], and had every ability to pursue them inasmuch as nothing Plaintiff/Respondent did or did not do had any bearing or preclusive effect on such claims.  (3T20-3T21).  As such, Plaintiff/Respondent argued those doctors should not have been designated as so-called “Burt defendants” because contribution claims against them pursuant to Mejia by Appellant would have been the proper procedure.  (3T21).  Unlike the facts in Burt and Jones, Appellant had viable contribution claims against [...] and [...] because Plaintiff/Respondent had done nothing that prevented Appellant from moving forward with claims against [...] and [...].  (3T22).  Even though Plaintiff/Respondent’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations, no such impediment applies to a defendant’s claims for contribution.  (3T36).  It was therefore still Plaintiff/Respondent’s position that putting [...] and [...] on the verdict sheet without any representation during the trial was an attempt from defense counsel to improperly exploit the ruling in Burt.  (3T23).  To rectify the error rather than compounding it, Plaintiff/Respondent thus argued that either only Appellant appear on the verdict sheet alone, or that the matter be adjourned to give [...] and [...] an opportunity to appear with counsel.
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[brief] However, as a result of the revised lot grade due to the mounding of the buildings, the added feet of elevation for each building from the original lot grade to the revised lot grade is as follows:  Building #1 – Total Elevation Increase – 5.63 feet  Building #2 – Total Elevation Increase – 4.83 feet  Building #3 – Total Elevation Increase – 2.37 feet  Building #4 – Total Elevation Increase – 4.60 feet  Building #5 – Total Elevation Increase – 0.77 feet  Building #6 – Total Elevation Increase – 2.37 feet  Thus, the proposed total height of each of the buildings when measured from the original grade to the top of the buildings are as follows:  Building #1 – Total Height – 40.36 feet - 15.3% over allowable height in Ordinance Building #2 – Total Height – 39.56 feet – 13.0% over allowable height in Ordinance Building #3 – Total Height – 35.26 feet – 0.7% over allowable height in Ordinance Building #4 – Total Height – 37.49 feet – 7.1% over allowable height in Ordinance Building #5 – Total Height – 35. 50 feet - 1.4% over allowable height in Ordinance  Building #6 – Total Height – 37.1 feet – 6.0% under allowable height in Ordinance  Please also see the table attached to the Appendix as to the building heights of each building.  The added elevations below were never challenged by the defendants.  (See Pa188).  The table shows that all the buildings, when measured from the original grade requires a Building Height Use Variance with Buildings #1 and #2 under N.J.S.A. 40:55D–70(d)(6), and a Building Height Bulk Variance for the remaining Buildings #3 - #6 under N.J.S.A. 40:55D–70(c).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO EXPLAIN OR JUSTIFY ITS DECISION TO DRASTICALLY REDUCE PLAINTIFF’S HOURS FROM 67.30 TO 6.20 HOURS AND REFUSE TO INCLUDE TIME FOR TIME COUNSEL WAS OBLIGATED TO INCUR.  As described in Plaintiff’s initial brief, the trial court was supposed to evaluate Plaintiff’s fee application for the reasonableness of the hours spent.  In reducing Counsel’s time from 67.30 hours to 6.20 hours, the only explanation the trial court gave was that Plaintiff was not entitled to time spent on research and that the court allowed 6.20 hours “based on the result obtained. ” (Pa21).  However, the trial court never explained what it thought of the result of the case.  Perhaps the trial court failed to consider that there is no requirement of proportionality between the Plaintiff’s award and the fees sought.  Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 295, 336 (1995).  Or perhaps it was hoodwinked by Defendant’s improper Offer of Judgment.
[brief] (5) first-degree felony murder of [...] in violation of 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count 5), (6) first-degree robbery upon [...] in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (count six), (7) first-degree robbery upon [...] in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (count seven), (8) second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count 8), (9) third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count 9)  (10) third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (count 10)  (11) fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (count 11)  (12) third-degree criminal mischief in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3a(1) (count 12); (13) fourth-degree false incrimination in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:28-4(a) (count 13 - [...] only), and (14) third-degree hindering apprehension in violation of N.J.S.A.2C:29-3(b) (count 14 – defendant only).  (Da1-5).  After [...] was found guilty by a jury, defendant pled guilty to counts 3 and 4.  (2T92; Pa4; 1T; Da6-12).  The parties’ plea agreement provided that defendant would serve 30 years to life for each count, that the State reserved the right to argue for consecutive terms, and that the remaining counts would be dismissed.  (Da6-9).  The Honorable [...], J.S.C. accepted defendant’s plea.  (1T).  On May 18, 1995, the Honorable [...] sentenced defendant to two consecutive life terms with a 30-year parole bar in each term.  (Da11).  Defendant filed an appeal, but the appeal was dismissed on October 27, 1997, and the Supreme Court subsequently denied certification on February 2, 1998.
[brief] NEITHER CONICELLO NOR LAMBRECHT RETALIATED AGAINST FORTY  There is no basis, and [...] has not articulated any to this Court, on which to hold [...] or [...] personally liable for his termination.  [...] convened a termination panel, as noted above, that concluded [...] should be terminated.  This particular terminal panel included [...], [...], in-house counsel, and the assistant-Vice Present of Human Resources.  Critically, no singular termination panel member has final, decision-making power, including [...].  [...]’s function was limited to consulting on underlying facts.  [...] testified that she knew she had to escalate the charge pay issue to Human Resources once she learned that [...] was entering the charge pay without authorization.  [...] “had to support the decision that was made” by the panel to terminate [...]’s employment.  (Pa369 at 109:12-110:10).  [...], meanwhile, merely acted as an arm of the Human Resources department.  [...] only investigates an employee when a manager contacts Human Resources.  She has no final, decision-making power.  [...] interviewed each and every staffing coordinator in connection with the allegations that [...] had stolen [...] time and money, and she participated in the termination panel that ultimately decided to terminate his employment—not as the decision maker, but as a Human Resources representative.  Finally, [...]’s brief is clear: [...]’s conduct was never the basis for his retaliation claims.  The trial court recognized the importance of the termination panel.  (See 1T 31:12-18) (“But in any event, she’s not the terminator anyway.  These people were brought up in front of – these three plaintiffs were brought up in front of the termination panel. ”).  On this record, there is no basis upon which either [...] or [...] can held to have personally retaliated against [...].  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] That is the approach required by this Court’s decisions in Molino and Sabato.  In Molino, the panel cautioned against reading the arbitration requirement “too narrowly” and noted that the statute’s requirement to arbitrate any dispute was “unqualified. ”  289 N.J. Super. at 409.  The panel held that the statute “must” be construed “liberally to harmonize the arbitration provision with our firm policy favoring prompt and efficient resolution of PIP disputes without resort to judicial process. ”  Id. at 410.  The panel noted that this policy would advance the “overwhelming goals” of the No-Fault Law by “reduc[ing] court congestion” and “comport[ing] with New Jersey’s long-standing and strong public policy favoring arbitration in general. ”  Ibid. (citing Roig v. Kelsey, 135 N.J. 500, 516 (N.J. 1994); Barcon Assocs v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 86 N.J. 179, 186 (N.J. 1981)).  The panel further stated that insurance carriers should not be allowed to “frustrate[] these salutary policies” and “should not be empowered to avoid arbitration simply by characterizing PIP disputes as questions of ‘entitlement’ or ‘coverage’ and then seeking judicial resolutions of those issues. ”  Ibid.  All disputes related to the payment of PIP Benefits are subject to arbitration with the arbitrator “charged with applying the PIP statute as a whole, guided by pertinent case law, and deciding both legal and factual questions in the process.
[brief] ‘Cause you didn’t have the actual -- A No, did not have -- and that was another part that was missing.  Q  Okay.  So in other words, the ability to give a complete opinion was a little compromised in 2022 because some of the physical evidence was no longer preserved?  A  That’s correct.  2T22-24  [...] also explained the problem with defendant’s clothing no longer available for testing for gunshot residue.
[directive] 9.6.2  In addition, the law enforcement executive may authorize access to a particular file or record for good cause.  The request and the authorization should be in writing, and the written authorization should specify who is being granted access, to which records access is being granted and for what time period access is permitted.  The authorization should also specify any conditions (i.e., the files may be reviewed only at the internal affairs office and may not be removed).  In addition, the law enforcement executive may order any redactions necessary to protect sensitive or privileged information, including an officer’s medical or mental health records or the details of an ongoing criminal investigation.  The 56  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021 law enforcement executive should grant such access sparingly, given the purpose of the internal affairs process and the nature of many of the allegations against officers.