ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Id., Pg. 13.  It is hard to fathom more egregious conduct than what has transpired in this case.  [...] withheld his notes because they contained an unfavorable version of events that would have resulted in suppression and then lied to the trial court at two separate testimonial hearings to try and save the improper search.  [...] and the State dragged Appellant and the trial court through years of litigation knowing [...] was lying and suppressing the evidence from Appellant that proved he was lying.  [...]’s deplorable conduct and blatant lies are imputed to the State and justify dismissal.  Dismissal with prejudice is a remedy this Court has affirmed as being within the sound discretion of the court under these facts and circumstances and, quite frankly, should be black letter law that will serve to extinguish this type of conduct.  *Id.*  In addition, as the State insisted in its own motion for leave to appeal that the trial court wrongfully “conclude[d], without support, that the door to the third floor was locked”, the only record the State relied on was [...]’s testimony.  On the other hand, [...]’s concealed notes directly discredit his testimony, and ultimately helped the trial court to grant Appellant’s independent motion to suppress on its own merits.  Clearly, the motion to suppress was granted because [...]’s testimony became untrustworthy and unreliable, not because the prosecutor violated *Brady*.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Putting aside whether those rulings were correct on discovery rule grounds, Plaintiff/Respondent’s effort to amend – in this context – is not proof or evidence of any fault by the so-called “[...]. ”  Any allegation in a complaint is nothing more than that – an allegation.  Moreover, the effort was made necessary due to Appellant’s assertions in discovery targeting [...] and [...].  If Appellant had been permitted to read the Amended Complaint to the jury without the added procedural context, it would have the clear capacity to mislead the jury to interpret Plaintiff/Respondent’s effort to amend as evidence of fault by the so-called “[...]. ”  If Appellant had been permitted to read the Amended Complaint to the jury, there would have been the potential for confusion about the issues because of the complicated procedural history that led to the effort to amend and the so-called “Burt defendant” designations.  If Appellant had been permitted to read the Amended Complaint to the jury, it would have been unduly prejudicial to Plaintiff/Respondent because the jury would not have the knowledge or understanding of the full procedural context, Court Rules and prevailing case law.  All these rulings are rational and logical, and certainly within the purview of the Trial Court’s discretion to determine.
[brief] Defendants’ Motion For Reconsideration.  Defendants did not delay in seeking reconsideration of the January 23 Orders.  On February 10, 2023, defendants timely filed their Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to R. 4:42-2.  The Motion for Reconsideration asked the trial court to revisit the issues of personal jurisdiction, indispensable parties, and comity in light of the record and in the interests of justice.  (See, e.g., Da137).  The only reason defendants’ motion was heard by [...] instead of [...] is because [...] retired days after he issued the January 23 Orders and this case was subsequently reassigned to [...].  (Pa059 at n.1).  Indeed, defendants took no action to have their Motion for Reconsideration heard by a different judge.  Had [...] not immediately retired after issuing his ruling, he would have heard and decided defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration.  Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration was heard on May 3, 2023.  After briefing, a multi-hour in-person hearing, and the receipt of supplemental materials [...] had requested regarding the Missouri Action, [...] issued the Judgment—a well-reasoned twenty-page written decision granting defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration and dismissing this case without prejudice on the basis of comity in favor of the Missouri Action.  (Pa056-077).  STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] such qualification was offered.  Then on cross-examination [...] testified that his vehicle was parked when making his observations (1T 11-9 through 12-8).  Again, [...] did not qualify his testimony.  Standing alone, this testimony is irreconcilable, rendering the balance of [...]’s testimony incredible (that word is overused, but applies with pinpoint accuracy here).  It is hard to imagine that any fact finder could conclude otherwise.  But it gets worse.
[directive] In addition to the above two lists, the County Prosecutor may invite a representative from other county or state agencies, institutions or groups, including, but not limited to, [...], local colleges and universities, and local child advocacy organizations to participate in the County SART Advisory Board meetings.  Duties  To maintain proper oversight of the SART and ensure its proper functioning, the following duties shall be carried out by the County SART Advisory Board:    Discuss any trending policy issues concerning the provision of services to victims of sexual violence;   Address complaints about the SART and/or violations of these Standards, fiscal and programmatic grant rules, or regulations, directives, guidelines, or State policy concerning the provision of services to victims of sexual violence made by the SART, as reported by victims or outside stakeholders, or identified by the County SART Advisory Board;   Address any reported or identified complaints, issues, or unusual occurrences concerning the SART program or a SART member pursuant to the complaint procedures contained in Standard 14; o  If the offending member is the SART Coordinator, an appropriate member of the County SART Advisory Board shall report the incident to the assistant prosecutor or detective supervising the County SART program.  If the matter cannot be handled at the county level, then it shall be referred to the Statewide SART Advisory Board.    Forward complaints and/or violations of program rules and requirements to the Statewide SART Advisory Board State, if warranted; and   Coordinate and conduct standardized SART training for all SART members and personnel assigned to respond during a SART activation.  -30-  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
[brief] The Board ignored the fact that [...] had been disabled for five years at the time of 11/16/22 making this issue moot.  The Board by implication and inference, now in 2022, grasped for any imagined reason to deny [...] from filing by now adding a new argument that [...] had an MOU that was a quid pro quo designed to avoid discipline.  The Board omitted from analysis: 1) the ALJs rejection of this frivolous argument; 2) the MOU was based on disability expressly; 3) the PPD agreed to the MOU solely because of the disability; 4) the Board without any analysis or synthesis blindly cited to case law that was wholly distinguishable and inapplicable factually and legally to the issues before it as to the [...] application for retirement disability; and 5) the PPD was cooperating with the disability process strictly concerned with [...]’s right to disability not any technical disciplinary charge of a minor nature; 6) as a result of the [...] disability, the MOU dismisses the disciplinary matters as a collateral moot process that was no longer needed due to the permanent disability of [...]; and 7) there was no acceptance to interpret this remedial law and statute to effectuate its purpose which is to protect seriously injured police officers and firemen as is required in precedent and super precedent as articulated in the Richardson case.  (Id.; Pa124-130, Pa137-145).  The Board’s 11/16/22 rejection of the ALJ’s Decision provides no analysis as to why it departs from the ALJ and is internally inconsistent in part with the reasons that were previously provided by the Board and the [...] back in 2020 before the ALJ hearing was approved.  (Id.).  An appeal was filed by [...] as to the Board’s ruling, and an Amended Notice of Appeal and Amended Case Information Sheet were filed on 1/9/23.
[brief] (15T 116:6 to 118:1; Da2802; 2816; 2740).  [...] insisted on this reallocation to ensure [...] could maintain its MBE/DBE status.  (15T 116:14-18).  According to the SPA, the closing to the transaction was delayed until December 31, 2017.  (Da2803).  [...] was to receive from [...] $400,000 upon execution of the SPA, an additional $300,000 on July 1, 2017, and a final $40,000 payment at the December 31, 2017 closing.  (Da2802-03).  [...] did not, however, receive the final $40,000 payment as anticipated by the original SPA.  (15T 120:11-15).  Instead, at [...]’s urging, and not long before he and [...] were scheduled to close the original SPA transaction, the two men unwound the deal and re-executed a modified SPA with the same terms, except that appellant Fariba [...], not [...], would serve as purchaser of [...]’s interest.
[brief] Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 153; (Aa5; Aa107\(^5\)).  The resources identified were based on “a series of hypothetical school scenarios and did not specifically examine any existing school or district in the state. ” (Aa107; Aa1104).  As the Department explained when introducing the funding formula, the adequacy budget is “perhaps best viewed simply in terms of identifying an \(^5\)  The Department’s Report on the Cost of Education was included in respondents’ motion for summary judgment, but was omitted from that portion of appellants’ appendix as duplicative.  (Aa1264).  overall level of funds which should be available to purchase personnel, resources, and programs as individual school or district leaders see fit. ” (Aa5; Aa107; Aa1104; Aa1871).  That approach “gives the flexibility to educators to decide how best to meet the specific needs of their students. ” (Aa6; Aa107; Aa1105; Aa1871).  It is not a necessary or required level of funding that the State must provide.  (Aa1105; Aa1233).  Instead, the Department uses the adequacy budget calculation in its formula for determining both a district’s local share, and its State aid.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-51 to -53; Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 152; (Aa6).
[directive] When the Investigation is Criminal and the Officer Is a Witness  8.3.1  When interviewing a law enforcement officer as a witness, he or she must be made aware of the differences between being a witness in a criminal investigation and being the subject of a criminal investigation.  The officer also shall be advised that he or she is not the subject of the investigation at this time.  Appendix I provides a model form that may be used for this purpose.  If at any time the officer becomes a subject of the investigation, he or she shall be advised of that fact and the appropriate procedures must be followed.  8.3.2
[brief] 1a.  Prior to filing the complaint, the requisite pre-foreclosure notice (19a) was sent per R. 4:42-9(a)(5) via regular and certified mail at the registered address for the property on file with the tax collector – which the owner [...] confirmed as a continuing valid address where he receives mail to this very date at [...].  See also 3a, It is a business location operated and maintained by him, as confirmed in both deposition testimony and at trial.  No redemption was made within 30 days of the pre-foreclosure notice; so the foreclosure complaint was filed and served.  1a; 16a; 14a.
[brief] .......................  39  A.  Liability Was Improperly Imposed Against [...] In Violation Of The Statute Of Frauds (Da1-69; Da84-98)  ........................................................................................................  39  B.  Defendants Did Not Waive Their Statute of Frauds Defense (Da1-69; Da84-98)  .................................................................  41  C.  The “Leading Object” Exception Does Not Bar Defendants’ Statute of Frauds Defense (Da1-69; Da84-98)  42  POINT VI  THE COURT IMPROPERLY AWARDED CONTRACT RATE POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST INSTEAD OF # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court recounted that “[r]etribution, which relates directly to the offender’s personal culpability,” cannot justify the worst punishments for juveniles because their innate shortcomings and vulnerabilities render them less culpable for their conduct.  Id. 442-43 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 71-72).  “Deterrence fails as a justification for a similar reason,” the Court noted, because juveniles “‘are less likely to take a possible punishment into consideration when making decisions. ’”  Id. at 443 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. 72).  The incapacitation rationale is also inadequate to justify such a lengthy sentence, [...] recognized, because it entails a judgment that the juvenile offender “forever will be a danger to society,” requiring sentencing courts to determine that the juvenile is “irreparably corrupt,” a predictive assessment that escapes “even experts at the outset. ”  Id. at 443 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 72).  Finally, rehabilitation plainly cannot justify a sentence of life without parole, since juveniles so sentenced “are denied the right to reenter society. ”  Id. at 443 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 74).  This is why, [...] noted, the United States Supreme Court forbade imposition of life without parole on a juvenile nonhomicide offender, highlighting “the twice diminished culpability” of “‘a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill. ”  Id. at 442 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 69).  With regard to juvenile homicide offenders, [...] explained that under Miller, the Eighth Amendment permits a sentence of life without parole only if, upon consideration of the mitigating factors of youth (i.e. the Miller factors, listed above), the sentencing court determines that the juvenile is incorrigible, or irreparably corrupt, a determination that should be “‘uncommon.
[brief] The Chancery Court skipped the crucial first step in the analysis in failing to address the absence of an arbitration provision in the 2022 Addendum or the 2017 Unexecuted Agreement it purports to amend.  1T38-51.  Instead, the Chancery Court improperly relied on arbitration provisions in the long since abandoned 2012 MOU and the unrelated Operating Agreements which govern management of the Property – not the proposed sale of same.  See Grover, 80 N.J. at 229; Hirsch, 215 N.J. at 192.
[brief] The disclosure of the e-mail addresses of individuals passively receiving local alerts through a third-party service does not maximize public knowledge about public affairs.  Additionally, this personal information was not created for [...] and the information used to sign up for [...] is not unique to [...]’s services, but rather an e-mail address of the individual that is likely also used for many other purposes.  People use their e-mail addresses now as one of the primary methods of communication for delivery and receipt for personal and business mail, and e-mail addresses are often used as user identification for online accounts, such as for online shopping and online banking.  Therefore, it is not accurate to characterize the “records” at issue as something that was “created” by [...], as the lower court did, and thereby ignore the uniquely personal nature of an e-mail address.  The potential for harm in the nonconsensual disclosure of this information includes citizens being spammed with unwanted communications and solicitations, citizens being unwilling to sign up for this service, and the potential that these individuals will be hacked, as e-mail addresses are often one half of the login information required for most online accounts.  There are also health and safety benefits to citizens participation in the [...] service.
[brief] THE COURT ERRED BY RELYING UPON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY, AND EVIDENCE WHICH IS IRRELEVANT, UNDULY PREJUDICIAL, AND LACKS ANY PROBATIVE VALUE PURSUANT TO N.J.R.E. 801, 802, 401 AND 403(A).  Under its disparate impact analysis, and notwithstanding Board Defendants’ objection, the Court specifically relied upon a number of studies and surveys the State submitted and erroneously concluded that “none of the School Board defendants refute the State’s data or presents alternate evidence to negate or call into that data or the methodology by which it was compiled.
[directive] 6.  Você entende que caso seja determinado que você é um agressor sexual reincidente e [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] compulsivo você poderá receber (se beneficiar de) tratamento para agressores sexuais, não mas se quiser participar deste tratamento e estiver preso em outra instituição que não seja o Centro de Diagnóstico e Tratamento para Adultos, você também estará sujeito aos mesmos termos de qualificação à liberdade condicional segundo as estipulações da cláusula 5 acima?  Do you understand that if you are determined to be a repetitive, compulsive sex offender who is not amenable to (will benefit from) sex offender treatment but you are willing to participate in such treatment and are confined to a facility other than [...], you will also be subject to the same parole eligibility terms as contained in section 5 above? no Formulário revisado promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081-Portuguese página 2 de 3 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081- Portuguese page 2 of 3 não 7.
[brief] The language of the CCIP Policy and Manual thus illustrate the intent of the parties to procure coverage for enrolled subcontractors as “named insureds,” making [...]’s Certificate of Liability Insurance clear evidence that [...] was an enrolled contractor and entitled to coverage under the CCIP.  Second, notice to the Ratings Bureau would be ineffective to cancel [...]’s insurance.  In 2018, [...] apparently learned that electronic notice had been sent by [...] to the Bureau that its CCIP Workers’ Compensation Policy had been canceled, but [...] of [...] did not know whether that notification to the Bureau would be forwarded to the insured, and reiterated that, in fact, [...] received no such notice.  Pa1066-68.  Further, it refers to the CCIP Workers’ Compensation Policy, \textit{not} the liability policy at issue here.  Moreover, [...]’s Enrollment Status Reports, which had no actual effect on [...]’s insurance, do not constitute evidence demonstrating that cancellation notice was sent to [...].
[brief] Lastly, [...] argues that [...] “waived its purported ability to compel arbitration” because [...] engaged in “affirmative litigation” and “motion practice . . . to have [[...]’] claims dismissed on the merits. ”  In support of her argument, [...] relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan v. Sundance, 142 S. Ct. 1708 (2022) and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Cole v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 215 N.J. 265 (2013).
[brief] Appellants should prevail on this Appeal, as the case was incorrectly decided on the law below at trial.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  Dated November 27, 2023  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  [...], [...], and [...], as ATTORNEY IN FACT, Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. [...] and [...], Defendants-Respondents.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT LAW  DIVISION  SUSSEX COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...] HON.  [...], J.S.C. Sat Below AMENDED  BRIEF AND APPENDIX FOR RESPONDENTS
[brief] ..................................................................................................................................................37  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Archbrook Laguna, LLC v. Marsh,** | 19, 20, 22, 24, 25 | | 414 N.J. Super. 97 (App. Div. 2010) | | | **DiTrolio v. Antiles,** | 19, 20, 27 | | 142 N.J. 253 (1995) | | | **Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway,** | 32 | | 168 N.J. 191 (2001) | | | **Hobart Bros. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.,** | 25 | | 354 N.J. Super.
[brief] That is especially clear here, where the reinstated Original Policy had simply sought to ensure the school could maintain a safe and inclusive school environment by empowering students to disclose gender identity without fear of discriminatory involuntary outing, while allowing disclosures to satisfy a compelling need, like “the health and safety of a student or an incident of bias-related crime. ” (Ra9).  Appellants have thus failed to show that the injunction violates parents’ fundamental rights, let alone that the trial court abused its discretion.
[brief] [...] suggests that [...] retaliated against him by interfering with his speaking engagements as a DEP employee and bringing unfounded disciplinary actions against him that resulted in the written warning and a one-day suspension.  (Pb9; Pb12).  Plaintiff claims he filed a discrimination complaint against [...] on February 10, 2015.  (Pb9).  [...] had initiated disciplinary actions seven days earlier on February 3, 2015, as a result of [...]’s actions at Rutgers.  (Pa738-743).  Plaintiff’s claims against [...] fail for two reasons.  First, plaintiff had not engaged in the protected activity of filing an EEO complaint against [...] on February 10, 2015, until after the “adverse action” was initiated against him for the Rutgers conference.  (Pa738-743).  [...] could not have known of protected activity that occurred seven days after the process had begun.  [...] fails on the initial prong of Woods-Pirozzi, 290 N.J. Super. at 274.  Second, plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact disputing any of the documented reasons for the written warning or the one-day suspension.  With regard to the Rutgers conference, he does not dispute: (1) he was advised by supervisors that he should replace two topics and get replacement speakers; (2) that he did not do so; (3) [...] herself had to complete the task she was directed to perform; and (4) he used the term “F-word” in front of the collective group attending the conference.  (Pa344-345; Pa378; Pa380; Pa382).  With this undisputed evidence, plaintiff cannot make a causal connection between the written warning and the February 10, 2015 EEO complaint as required in the third prong of Woods-Pirozzi.  The trial court saw no competent evidence cited by [...] connecting [...] to retaliation.  (3T31:16-19).  With regard to the one-day suspension for trying to speak at the 2016 AWWA conference as a “Section Chief” without approval, the record is undisputed that [...], not [...], was the person that raised the issue.  (Pa721-722).  It was [...], and not [...], who addressed the issue with [...] and advised him that [...] would be speaking at the conference for which [...] had not followed the established protocol.  (Pa723; Pa736).  Dismissal of retaliation claims against [...] should be affirmed.
[brief] (Da 1– Da27)  It is undisputed that both [...] and [...] are signatories to the Arbitration Forums Medical Payments Subrogation Arbitration Agreement.  Da118 to Da119 are copies of the Arbitration Forums Medical Payment Subrogation Agreement as well as a copy of the printouts confirming [...] is a signatory to the MedPay Arbitration Agreement.  (Da120 – Da122).  That arbitration agreement states in article first “Signatory companies must forego litigation and arbitrate any medical payment subrogation claims through [...]  (herein after referred to as [...]). ”  This agreement is applicable in all 50 states.  The arbitration agreement contains exclusions which would remove the matter from the jurisdiction of Arbitration Forums, which state: