ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As an administrative agency whose sole purpose is to enforce and adjudicate claims arising under the Act, the Commission’s expertise is entitled to a great deal of deference.  The Court must review the Commission’s decision under a heightened deferential standard, should disturb the decision only if it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and can disturb the Commission’s fact findings only if they are wholly unsupported by the record.  The Commission’s decision here readily meets this deferential standard.  The Commission’s written decision examines Petitioner’s claims in detail, applies the correct standard, and dismisses them through appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.
[brief] “[A] determination predicated on unsupported findings is the essence of arbitrary and capricious action. ”  *In re Application of Holy Name Hosp.*, 301 N.J. Super. 282, 295-96 (App. Div. 1997) (citation omitted).  Although a challenger must carry its high burden to overturn a variance denial, a reviewing Court should not act as a “rubber stamp” to the findings made by a zoning board.
[brief] .................................................................................................omitted Exhibit A-5 to Resolution of Denial (Colorized Site Plan, December 7, 2021)  ..........................................................omitted Exhibit A-6 to Resolution of Denial (Revised Plans)  ................................................................................................................omitted Amended Resolution of Denial (2023-37) by the [...], dated June 8, 2023 ..Pa16  Exhibit A-1 to Amended Resolution of Denial (Google Aerial Image)  .....................................................................................omitted Exhibit A-2 to Amended Resolution of Denial (C-4 Site Plan)  .............................................................................................omitted Exhibit A-4 to Amended Resolution of Denial (Unit and Parking Exhibit)  .........................................................................omitted Exhibit A-5 to Amended Resolution of Denial (Colorized Site Plan, December 7, 2021)  ................................................omitted Exhibit A-6 to Amended Resolution of Denial (Revised Plans)  .............................................................................................omitted [...] Site Plans, dated January 13, 2022 ...............Pa45  Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs, dated June 21, 2022 .................................................................................................Pa49  Answer to Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs, dated July 21, 2022 ......................................................................................Pa61  Pretrial Order, dated September 15, 2022 .................................................................Pa69  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] [...]’S JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE PROPER AND IN LANGUAGE APPROVED OF BY DEFENDANT DURING THE CHARGING CONFERENCE.  (NOT RAISED BELOW)  ......  26 POINT IV  THE STATE DID NOT COMMIT PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN ITS OPENING STATEMENT TO THE JURORS.  (NOT RAISED BELOW)  .............................................................................................................  30 POINT V  DEFENDANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL.  THE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S GUILT WAS OVERWHELMING AND ANY OF THE COMPLAINED OF ERRORS ARE WITHOUT MERIT SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT OVERTURNING DEFENDANT’S VALID CONVICTION.
[brief] The trial court scheduled the case for trial on October 25, 2022.  The only remaining cause of action at that time was the [...]’ claim for damages under Count 2 (implied easement appurtenant).  The [...] sought the following damages on Count 2: (1) compensatory damages, (2) punitive damages, and (3) attorney’s fees in excess of one million dollars.  The trial court had previously denied Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment on the attorney’s fee claim, noting “[w]ith regard to the attorney’s fees [cross-motion], the Court’s going to deny that.  I think I’m going to reserve on that to the conclusion of the case.
[directive] Body Cavity Search  1.  Visual inspection or manual search of a person's a. anal cavity b. vaginal cavity  II.  Search Requirements  A.  Detention or arrest without custodial confinement  1.  Strip Search a.  NO exigent circumstances: (1) Search warrant or consent, and (2) Authorized by officer in charge of the station house.  b.  Exigent circumstances: (7/95)  Strip Search and Body Cavity Search Requirements and Procedures  (1)  Probable cause to believe that the person is concealing a weapon, contraband or evidence of crime, and (2)  Exigent circumstances prevent obtaining a search warrant or approval of officer in charge.  2.  Body cavity search is not appropriate without custodial confinement  B.  Custodial Confinement  1.  Strip Search a. Officer in charge authorizes confinement in municipal detention facility or transfer to adult correctional facility, and b.  Officer in charge authorizes search, and c.  One of the following: (1)  Search warrant, or (2) Consent, or (3)  Reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is concealing a weapon, contraband or Controlled Dangerous Substances.  2.  Body Cavity Search  a.  Officer in charge authorizes confinement in municipal detention facility or transfer to adult correctional facility, and b.  Officer in charge authorizes search, and c.  One of the following:  (1)  Search warrant, or (2)  Consent III.
[brief] [254 N.J. at 581.]  Accordingly, *Watson* observed that “[t]he concerns outlined in *Henderson* therefore apply with even greater force to first-time in-court identifications than they do to showups. ”  254 N.J. at 585.  Because Watson’s substantive rule on first-time in-court identifications grew directly out of (1) Henderson’s call to courts to remain apprised of identification research and (2) research published before the time of [...]’s trial, Watson’s holding should not be considered “sudden and generally unanticipated. ”  Additionally, one would be hard pressed to characterize first-time in-court identifications as “long-standing practice.
[brief] Moreover, with respect to plaintiff’s civil rights act violations and invasion of privacy/defamation claims and causes of action, plaintiff clearly asserted these claims and causes of actions within the respective 1 and 2 year statutory limitations of actions.  (Pa1).  In fact, plaintiff sought distinct civil rights act violations monetary, declaratory and injunctive relief.  In January 2022, shortly after the trial court denied defendants’ first joint motion to dismiss, defendants changed course.  Defendants restored plaintiff’s prior right to be heard on agenda action items prior to consideration and official action.  (Pa295).  The [...] prerogative writ limitations of actions argument is a just another diversionary “deny, delay and deflect” litigation tactic.
[brief] Cedar Point, 594 U.S. at 154-156.  “[A] physical appropriation is a taking whether it is permanent or temporary….  The duration of an appropriation—just like the size of an appropriation—bears only on the amount of compensation. ”  *Id.* at 154 (citing *Loretto*, 458 U.S. at 436-437).  In granting summary judgment in favor of the [...], the trial court implied that the activities of the [...] were justified because the intrusions were “not for the benefit of itself or another, but for the benefit of the public, and more importantly, the plaintiff.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 433.  An internal affairs investigator testified at trial that based on the dashboard camera footage, the defendant’s actions “appeared to have been criminal. ”  *Id.* at 441-42.  Applying plain error review, the Supreme Court held that while the trial judge should have instructed the jury to disregard the internal affairs investigator’s statement that the defendant’s actions “appeared to have been criminal,” “[t]hose five words were not the sole basis of his testimony .
[brief] Consequently, the fact that [...] was not charged with conspiracy to possess or distribute the drugs found in [...]’s car does not negate his standing to challenge the seizure of that evidence. \(^2\)  The State also argues that [...] lacks a “contemporary connection” to the narcotics seized from [...]’s car because he was neither present at the storage unit nor in the car at the time of the stop.  (Sb 19-20)  The State analogizes this case to *Bruns*, but as explained in [...]’s initial brief, *Bruns* is easily distinguishable.  (Db 20-22)  In *Bruns*, the police seized evidence of a crime seven days after it was completed (during an unrelated traffic stop), and there was no indication of an ongoing criminal connection between the defendant and the person from whom the evidence was seized.  172 N.J. 40, 57-58 (2002).  Here, by contrast, police seized the relevant evidence just outside [...]’s storage unit before it was able to be delivered, and the reason for the car stop was a --- \(^2\)  It is noteworthy that the motion judge, in denying a motion to sever [...]’s case from [...]’s, reasoned that “[t]he criminal charges relating to the contraband recovered in [...]’s vehicle are connected to [...] and [] Mr. [...]’s jointly rented storage unit. ”  (2T 56-1 to 4) suspected ongoing criminal relationship between [...], [...], and [...].  Not only that, but [...] did in fact arrive at the scene of the traffic stop after [...] and [...] were arrested.  (2T 29-14 to 19)  Thus, while he was not present at the exact time of the stop, he was present shortly thereafter, further demonstrating his “contemporary connection” to the unlawful seizure of this evidence.  Finally, the State maintains that it is irrelevant to the standing analysis that the detectives relied on the narcotics found in [...]’s car in their affidavit to obtain a search warrant for [...]’s storage unit.  (Sb 20)  According to the State, the Supreme Court held in *State v. Arthur* that a defendant lacks standing where evidence is seized from someone other than the defendant and the evidence “is not sought to be used as evidence against the defendant to prove guilt, but only to justify an investigatory stop of [the] defendant. ”  149 N.J. 1, 13 (1997).  The State is mistaken about the holding of *Arthur*.  In fact, while the *Arthur* Court acknowledged that New Jersey’s broad standing rule had not been invoked in such a circumstance, it did not “reach or resolve the issue of defendant’s standing” because it concluded that police had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant independent of the incriminating evidence seized from the other individual.  *Ibid.*  Accordingly, *Arthur* did not hold that a defendant lacks standing where seized evidence is used against him not to prove guilt, but to support a finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause.  In sum, [...] has a participatory interest in the contraband seized from [...]’s car and therefore has standing to challenge the seizure of this evidence.  In addition, because the traffic stop of [...] was unlawful, the contraband seized during the stop cannot be used against [...].  (Db 22-29)  **POINT II**
[brief] (2T.8) cooperating with him to address the situation.  [...] testified that a few hours later that morning, [...] came over to his house and provided the vehicle’s insurance information.  According to [...], [...] monitored the progress of the insurance claim and his insurance “took care of everything” (2T.9).  The court erred by disregarding [...]’s testimony favorable to [...], including his letter to the municipal court judge stating that he disfavored [...]’s continued prosecution over the incident.  The State’s evidence leaves reasonable doubt of [...]’s guilt.
[brief] Appellant argues that although the use of telegrams and telephone operators is regulated and restricted by the FDCPA, the statute does not “imply allowing the use of mail vendors,” and so the plain (i.e., literal) reading of § 1692c(b) prohibiting any disclosure not expressly exempted by the statute must still apply.  Appellant’s Br., at 21.  But this ignores the rules of statutory construction set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court and Appellate Division.
[brief] \textit{Id.} at 610; see also \textit{id.} at 611 (“We are called upon to decide the narrow question whether Wisconsin, over the objection raised, can close the doors of its courts to the cause of action created by the Illinois wrongful death act. ”).  Fetter has no bearing on defendant’s conviction because, as just explained, there is no relevant Pennsylvania law that New Jersey courts have refused to apply.
[brief] ” (1T91-22 to 92-1).  The court further found that the warrantless stop of defendant was valid:  He has knowledge, he’s had a warrant a premises and he sees the people go in.  He sees the people come out.  He’s waiting for a warrant.  He knows who he’s looking for.  He’s familiar with this defendant.  So as a result of that he make a tactical decision . . . because they are under investigation he certainly has a reasonable suspicion that this is the individual and so he takes and follows and sees what occurs.
[brief] Separate parties agreeing to arbitrate separate claims in a separate action against separate parties does not, and cannot, change the fact that no agreement to arbitrate exists in *this case*.  This case is solely about [...] seeking to compel the sale of the subject property for $6 million from the current owner and [...]’s asserted “equitable ownership” right to do so under different contracts, which contracts are neither valid, enforceable, nor contain any reference whatsoever to arbitration.  The Chancery Court got it right the first time – these cases cannot be consolidated and, where no arbitration agreement exists, arbitration cannot be compelled to effectuate a backdoor to consolidation.  The smoke and mirrors put up by [...] should not have, and as a legal matter cannot, change the application of law to the facts in this case.  Arbitration cannot be compelled where, as here, (1) no arbitration agreement exists in the alleged “sale contracts” in dispute; and (2) neither the unrelated operating agreements, nor an abandoned memorandum of understanding, can be used to compel arbitration of [...]’s claims.
[brief] Pursuant to Rule 1:7-4, a trial court is required to “find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon . . . on every motion decided by a written order that is appealable as of right. ”  “Naked conclusions do not satisfy the purpose of Rule 1:7-4(a)”; a court's fact findings must be correlated “with the relevant legal conclusions. ”  Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980).  However, exactly how that is accomplished “is vested in the sound discretion of the trial judge. ”  *In re Trust Created by Agreement Dated Dec. 20, 1961*, 399 N.J. Super. 237, 253 (App. Div. 2006), *aff’d*, 194 N.J. 276 (2008).  In fact, a judge may even grant or deny a motion for the reasons set forth by the parties rather than issue an independent statement of reasons.  *Id.* at 254.  The purpose of the rule is to make sure that the court makes its own determination following careful consideration of the record and the law.  *Id.* at 254 (citation omitted).  On September 9, 2022, the trial court held oral argument on the Borough’s Motion for Summary Judgment, where the Parties were given ample opportunity to argue their points.
[brief] As a threshold matter, the appellant’s argument that Plaintiffs failed to make a pre-suit demand to establish their conversion claim fails on its face because the appellant never raised the issue below.  (Db26-27).  Liebling v. Garden State Indem., 337 N.J. Super. 447, 465 (App. Div. 2001) (an argument that one party failed to prove an element of a cause of action cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).
[directive] the opportunity to meet with an AP in person to so inform the victim and explain the basis for that determination.  A victim of sexual assault shall be afforded the services of a victim witness advocate and/or CSVA for accompaniment at any court proceeding.  In the event the offender is formally charged, indicted, convicted, or adjudicated a delinquent, the assistant prosecutor or the Victim Witness Coordinator shall ensure that the victim is advised of the right to obtain a court order requiring the defendant to submit to an approved serological test for HIV, or any other virus identified as a probable causative agent of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).  Additionally, the victim shall be offered assistance and a referral to obtain an approved serological test for infection with HIV, and appropriate counseling and medical care.  (See N.J.S.A. 52:4B-44(c)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2.2).  Under Nicole’s Law12 victims of certain sexual offenses should be advised that the prosecutor may apply for a Sexual Offense Restraining Order (SORO).  The SORO may be issued as a pretrial condition of release.  The order places prohibitions on the defendant, including, but not limited to, no contact with the victim.  The victim’s location remains confidential and shall not appear on any documents or records to which the defendant has access.  (See N.J.S.A. 2C:14-12).  If the defendant is found guilty of an enumerated crime, the court may order these conditions to remain after sentencing.  (See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-8).  Victims should also be apprised of their right to apply for a Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act (SASPA) Order pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-13.  *Please consult the Appendix XI, Protection Orders for Sexual Assault Victims for a list of protective orders for which the victim may apply.  N.J.S.A. 2C:14-12, et seq. and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-8.  12 -27-  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
[brief] An individual stockholder can assert a direct claim against another shareholder when the plaintiff suffers a “special injury. ”  *Tully v. Mirz*, 457 N.J. Super. 114, 124 (App. Div. 2018).  “A special injury exists where there is a wrong suffered by the plaintiff that was not suffered by all stockholders generally or where the wrong involves a contractual right of the stockholders such as the right to vote. ”  *Id.*  This difficult and fact sensitive inquiry in the context of larger entities is far simpler in the case of closely held companies like [...] and [...] because shareholders or members owe fiduciary duties not just to the entity but also their fellow shareholders or members.  *See N.J.S.A. 42:2C-11(g); Muellenberg v. Bikon Corp.*, 143 N.J. 168, 181 (1996).  Thus, it is far easier for members in closely held entities to establish a special injury than in much larger entities.
[brief] ”  Fla. Stat. § 810.02 (emphasis added); see also Williams v. Florida, 305 So. 3d 673, 676 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020).  In Louisiana, conduct that could otherwise constitute simple burglary can be prosecuted as a more serious looting offense “when normal security of property is not present by virtue of a hurricane, flood, fire, act of God, or force majeure of any kind, or by virtue of a riot, mob, or other human agency.
[brief] Indeed, the appellate brief and Plaintiff counsel’s conduct in this and the prior appeal is indicative of his longstanding pattern of deficient filings which require multiple correction attempts, nonconforming pleadings, endless extensions, delays and untimely filings, and overlength confusing briefs which are full of unnecessary digressions and commentary, and which barely touch on the substantive issues.  Here, Plaintiff’s Appellate brief is overlength and confusing.  As with all of Plaintiff’s briefs, it reads more like a stream of consciousness commentary than a legal brief and as such, is difficult to parse and for the Defendants to argue against.  For example, much of the brief appears to contain what can only described a Plaintiff counsel’s digressive “commentary” in bold interspersed with his legal arguments.  (Pb30-43).  As the Trial Court acknowledged in its oral decision, while the New Jersey state court pleading standard is not particularly onerous and there is a strong public interest in deciding matters on the merits, the Defendants are entitled to be fairly appraised of the causes of actions being asserted against them and an opportunity to meaningfully respond within a reasonable time period.
[brief] Clearly, the legislature, in enacting the IFPA and AICRA, did not intend to require piecemeal litigation/arbitration of IFPA claims involving numerous co-conspirators and overlapping, fact-specific allegations.  This would result in massive inefficiencies for insurers and other affected parties, requiring inextricably intertwined IFPA claims to be litigated simultaneously, but separately.  For a carrier such as [...], investigating and litigating fraud claims is already an expensive and time-consuming prospect.  If the Law Division’s decision is upheld, it would create a chilling effect on insurer’s ability to prosecute such claims.  Finally, the Defendants who obtained dismissal Orders do not comprise all of the Defendants in this litigation.  Defendants [...], [...], [...] d/b/a [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...], are all represented by other counsel who not only did not file Motions to Dismiss, but answered the Complaint and requested a trial by jury.  (Pa0152, Pa0215, Pa0257).  Thus, [...]’s case against those Defendants must continue to be litigated in the Superior Court.  Again, the legislature clearly did not intend for such claims to be litigated separately when doing so would lead to such absurd and inefficient results.
[brief] [...] then contacted [...], as a member of the “Fairness and Access” Committee, who served the Multi-Complaint on the new EEO Officer. \(^7\)  The EEO Officer acknowledged receipt but appeared fearful.  [...] confirmed via email that she did not have to process the complaint if she feared reprisal.  No response was received.  Wouldn’t you think a claim that a person is afraid to do their job would warrant an immediate denial?  [...] continues to file ADA/LAD complaints, as in [...]'s case, to document events, expecting no response.  \(^7\) [...] had retired a few months earlier.  He had always claimed my complaints were “above [his] pay grade. ”  I took this to mean he was afraid to process them.  IV.
[brief] On September 6, 2018, Plaintiff was in the parking lot connected to [...], in front of the [...] (the “Subject Property”), to patronize [...] as a business invitee.  [Pa66].  Upon arrival, Plaintiff parked in a [...]-assigned parking spot.  [Pa67].  Plaintiff was walking towards [...] to “get some coffee and a bagel. ”  [Pa67].  Plaintiff testified as she approached [...] that her foot got stuck in a pothole located in the lot, causing her fall.
[brief] R. 2:11-4; *Viceroy Equity Interests, LLC v. Mount Hope Dev. Associates*, 350 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 2002).  On appeal, a lower court’s legal fee award should be overturned where, as here, the trial judge clearly abused his discretion in lowering the award.  *Seigelstein v. Shrewsbury Motors, Inc.*, 464 N.J. Super. 393, 404 (App. Div. 2020).  Indeed, “where the trial court's determination of fees was based on irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear error in judgment, [the Appellate Division] should intervene. ”  *Seigelstein*, 464 N.J. Super. at 404.  Similarly, “where the methodology used by the judge is untethered to the standards adopted by [the New Jersey] Supreme Court for determining an award of counsel fees, the ultimate conclusions reached by the judge are thus arbitrary and reversible. ”  *Seigelstein*, 464 N.J. Super. at 404-405.  Here, [...], respectfully, abused his discretion by arbitrarily lowering Landlord’s contractually mandated fee award based upon his own, personal view that the hourly rates charged by Landlord’s counsel were “a little high.