ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In assessing whether the [...] met its burden of proof in finding that [...] engaged in misconduct and/or neglect of duty in violation of N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c), a review of the following relevant facts is necessary:  1.  On February 8, 2020, [...] logged into a chat room that consisted of members who were residents of [...] and included [...] Council members and at least one member of the [...] Board of Education.  At that time, he posted a revolting and misogynistic pornographic video.  Specifically, the video depicted a naked man defecating into a naked woman’s mouth and onto her face and ended with the words on the screen “Shit happens,” “Thug life,” “Dug life,” and “Bitch. ”  2.  Along with the video, [...] posted the caption, “Don’t say nothing.  Just keep it going lmao! [laughing emoticons]. ”  3.  The video was visible in the chat room for most of the day and accessible to all members in the chat room.  The courts have consistently held that public officials – whether elected or appointed – are held to a higher standard of conduct.  There is no reason to deviate from those rulings here.  [...] was a public official who had a fiduciary duty of honesty and integrity to the public as well as a duty to respect all individuals, including women.  That [...]’s misogynistic conduct was not in conformance with these requirements is an understatement.  It is of no moment that what [...] posted to various individuals was accomplished when not performing any sewerage commission duties.  An individual either has integrity and respect for others or doesn’t.  Such values don’t click on or off depending on whether official duties are being conducted.  The video distributed by [...], and the comment to it, makes clear that [...] lacks the integrity and respect to hold a public position.  For this reason, the [...]’s motion to remove [...] was not arbitrary or unreasonable.  The Trial Court’s ruling denying same must, therefore, be reversed.
[brief] POINT ONE (Addressing [...]’s Entire Controversy Doctrine and Prerogative Writ Arguments in Point I. A. and Point IV; Db23–Db25; Db40 – Db41)  [...]’s misplaced reliance on the Entire Controversy Doctrine does not save its Counterclaim from dismissal because the Doctrine: 1) does not supersede the Commissioner’s jurisdiction or the court’s lack of jurisdiction; 2) does not resurrect [...]’s Counterclaim’s dismissal for failure to comply with the statute of limitations; 3) does not excuse [...]’s requirement to exhaust administrative remedies; and 4) is inapplicable.  [...]’s entire controversy doctrine argument lacks merit for at least the following four reasons.
[brief] The trial court erred in applying New York law to the “substantive merits” of Appellants’ complaint because Respondents’ actions violate New Jersey public policy and the MBPA.  Rather, New Jersey law should apply, pursuant to the MBPA and the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 187 (1969) (the “Restatement”).  **A.  The MBPA Mandates That New Jersey Law Must Govern The Wholesaler Agreement (Pa5).**  Any choice of law analysis is “preempted” where the Legislature determines that New Jersey public policy requires the application of New Jersey law to a particular type of claim “regardless of the interest of another state. ”  *Fiarfax Fin. Holdings Ltd. v. S.A.C. Capital Mgmt., L.L.C*, 450 N.J. Super. 1, 43 (App. Div. 2017) (citation omitted); see also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(1).  The paramount expression of New Jersey public policy is the Legislature’s enactment, which can be “discerned by background circumstances revealing the evil sought to be remedied. ”  Turner v. Aldens, Inc., 179 N.J. Super. 596, 602 (App. Div. 1981) (citing Oxford Consumer dis. Co. of No. Phila. V. Stefanelli, 102 N.J. Super. 549 (App. Div. 1986)).  The MBPA states that the “terms and provisions” of a contract between brewer and wholesaler under the MBPA must “comply with and conform to State law and the terms of this act. ”  N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.15(a).³ (emphasis added).  Any provision that “directly or indirectly requires or amounts to a waiver of any provision of this act…shall be a violation of this act and shall be null, void and no effect. ”  Id.  In short, the MBPA requires strict compliance with both New Jersey law and the terms of the MBPA to “protect beer wholesalers from unreasonable demands and requirements by brewers…” and any provision that contradicts State law or the MBPA is “null, void and no effect. ”  N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.13(c).  The MBPA’s forceful language requiring strict compliance with both New Jersey State law and the MBPA underscores its intent to protect New Jersey wholesalers from unreasonable acts by brewers.  This includes the unreasonable Notice of Termination—which the trial court deemed unreasonable—the ³  The MBPA confirms that it “shall apply to all contracts, agreements and relationships among any brewers and wholesalers…”  N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.15(b).  discriminatory policies imposed by [...] on Appellants for decades, and the other abusive tactics detailed above.  Regardless of the Agreement’s choice-of-law provision, the Legislature has directed that all wholesaler agreements comply (and be governed by) with the laws of this State—not just the terms of the MBPA.  The application of New York law would necessarily amount to a “waiver” of this provision of the MBPA.  Thus, the Agreement’s choice of law provision prescribing New York law must be deemed null and void, particularly since the Agreement was renewed each year after the MBPA was enacted.  The trial court erred in ignoring the clear mandate by the Legislature, and this Court should instead apply New Jersey law to the Agreement and this matter without the need to engage in a choice of law analysis.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ENFORCED THE WHOLESALER AGREEMENT’S CHOICE-OF-LAW PROVISION  In arguing that the Wholesaler Agreement’s arbitration clause should not be enforced under the FAA, Appellants claim that state law applies to determine if a “valid” arbitration agreement exists and seek to apply New Jersey law to determine validity.  (Pb at 35.)  However, Section 11 of the Wholesaler Agreement states that New York law governs the agreement.  (Pa69) (“This Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of New York. ”).  Indeed, Appellants brought a claim under New York’s ABC Law.  (Pa50-51.)  The trial court correctly applied New York law because “no fundamental policy of New Jersey is contravened by applying New York law to the substantive claims. ”  (Pa5.)  That ruling should be affirmed.
[brief] Another speaker told the Committee, “the final version of the bill just came out a couple of hours ago.  And . . .  I’m not even sure if all you members had time to read it.  The people of New Jersey deserve better than a last minute political inspired bill drafted in the remaining days of the legislative session. ”  (Pa167-68 at 16:24-17:7.)  In questioning this person, [...] stated, “if you could comment on one section in the bill.  . . .  You might not have seen the text.  You were right to identify that this has been late in arriving to our desks. ”  (Pa171 at 20:10-23.)  Another speaker testified, “One of the things that we wanted to discuss about the bill, which we haven’t seen, we haven’t had a chance to look at, so I really don’t know what’s in the bill.
[brief] ................................................................. 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 45 Grasso v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights, 375 N.J. Super. 41 (App. Div. 2004) .................................................. 27, 28 Grubbs v. Slothower, 389 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 2007) ........................................... 28 In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 657 (1999) .................................................................................. 11 Jacoby v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 442 N.J. Super. 450, 464–65 (App. Div. 2015) ...................................................... 13 Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment of Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268 (1965) ......................... 11, 43 Lang v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 160 N.J. 41, 58 (1999) ........................................ 10, 11 Med. Ctr. at Princeton v. Twp. of Princeton Zoning Bd., 343 N.J. Super. 177, 199 (App. Div. 2001) ............................................................................. 11 Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1 (1987) ........................................ 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 31, 36, 46 N.Y. SMSA, L.P. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Weehawken, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 33 (App. Div. 2004) ...................................................... 9, 43 Nuckel v. Little Ferry Planning Bd., 208 N.J. 95, 103 (2011)
[directive] Protecting Tenants from Illegal Evictions  The COVID-19 pandemic has threatened not only the health of New Jersey’s residents, but also their livelihoods.  More than 1.8 million New Jerseyans have applied for unemployment since the pandemic began, and many households have found it increasingly difficult to cover their basic needs, including housing.  The state and federal governments have taken various steps to address housing insecurity created or exacerbated by the pandemic.  In March 2020, for example, Governor [...] issued Executive Order No. 106 (EO 106), which imposed a moratorium on the enforcement of eviction orders until the end of the public health emergency.  In September 2020, the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued its own nationwide eviction moratorium, which has since been extended to June 30, 2021.  Taken together, these actions have allowed untold New Jerseyans to remain in their homes during this health crisis.
[brief] 43.  Court's ruling (p. 14, 1st par.) that "Intermediate Account accurately details the assets, expenses, and liabilities of the [...]" disregards substantive inaccuracies and illegitimations based on my Exceptions (114a-128a) to figures for assets, expenses, deductions, distributions, payments, and liabilities of the [...] that I also identified in this Certification.  44.  Court's ruling (p. 14, 1st par.) that "co-trustees, [...] & [...], adequately answered the audit questions posed by [...]" disregards my detailed Exceptions w/substantiated facts in refuting their invalid & illegitimate answers (Exh. "L", Exceptions, p. 11-19, par. 9&10) (119a-127a).
[directive] In addition, the law enforcement executive may authorize access to a particular file or record for good cause.  The request and the authorization should be in writing, and the written authorization should specify who is being granted access, to which records access is being granted and for what time period access is permitted.  The authorization should also specify any conditions (i.e., the files may be reviewed only at the internal affairs office and may not be removed).  In addition, the law enforcement executive may order any redactions necessary to protect sensitive or privileged information, including an officer’s medical or mental health records or the details of an ongoing criminal investigation.  The 56 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 law enforcement executive should grant such access sparingly, given the purpose of the internal affairs process and the nature of many of the allegations against officers.
[brief] The lower court excluded any reference to the State of Emergency since it would not “impact” any decision by the jury as it would have photos and testimony about how significant the storm was and how high it was (1T 30:3- and since the potential for confusion or prejudice would outweigh any probative value.  (1T 30:12-19).  It is unclear what confusion would befall the jury or what prejudice would accrue to Plaintiff if the State of Emergency were referenced as the court did not explain same with any specificity.  Here, the State of Emergency explicitly noted that there would be hazardous travel conditions and that the storm would impede the normal operations of public and private entities.  (Da 36).  The Declaration was not only relevant to amount of snow anticipated, but also to the ability of the defendant’s to travel to and inspect the condition of the premises.  Moreover, the State of Emergency remained in effect until March 13, 2018 - 5 days after plaintiff’s accident.  In fact, the order terminating the State of Emergency expressly referenced the severity of the conditions necessitating the declaration of a State of Emergency.  (Da 41).  These facts clearly relate to and demonstrate the severity of the snow storm and Defendants should have been allowed to reference same, especially when the entire theory of defense is premised on the reasonableness of the defendants’ actions given the severity and significance of the snow storm.  Even if these specific portions of the State of Emergency are not referenced (hazardous travel, severity of the conditions, and impeding the normal operations), the court should have taken judicial notice of the fact that the State of Emergency was issued in and of itself on March 6, 2018 and lasted through the morning of March 13, 2018.
[brief] Contrary to Defendant’s implied assertion, there is no categorical proscription on representing a client who is accused of committing crimes against a former client.  The New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit an attorney from representing a client if the attorney has a “concurrent conflict of interest,” which exists if “1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client, or 2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
[brief] [...] ([...]) had a stellar career with the [...] (“[...]” or “employer”) for nearly three decades until he engaged in protective activity by opposing unlawful discrimination and retaliation.  This matter must be reversed and remanded because the motion judge dismissed [...]’s retaliation claim as a matter of law by applying the wrong legal standard.  Rather than considering whether the negative consequence of an employer’s retaliatory actions would dissuade a reasonable person from complaining about discrimination, the trial court applied a much more stringent standard requiring that the employer’s retaliation involve a “tangible adverse employment action” that must “alter an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, deprived future employment opportunities, or otherwise have a material adverse effect on his status as an employee. ”
[brief] *Elkouri & Elkouri*, *How Arbitrator Works*, 5th Ed. 484 (1997) states:  If the language of an agreement is clear and unequivocal, an arbitrator generally will not give it a meaning other than that expressed...  an arbitrator cannot "ignore clear-cut contractual language," and "may not legislate new language, since to do so would usurp the role of the labor organization and the employer."  Even though the parties to an agreement disagree as to its meaning, an arbitrator who finds the language to be unambiguous will enforce the clear meaning.  at 482-483.
[brief] To the contrary, *Morgan* merely stands for the proposition that federal courts may not “invent special, arbitration-preferring procedural rules” in favor of arbitration.  *Morgan*, 596 U.S. at 418; see also *White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.*, 61 F.4th 334, 339 (3d Cir. 2023).  Additionally, *Marmo* explicitly found that inclusion of prejudice as a non-dispositive consideration in Cole’s multi-factor test does not “unduly tilt the waiver analysis for or against arbitration. ”  Marmo, 478 N.J. Super. at 609.  In any case, determinations relating to prejudice necessarily flow from a fact-sensitive review of the Cole factors under the totality of the circumstances, and here, there is no prejudice to Plaintiff.  Defendants filed the instant motion to compel arbitration just two months after this matter’s transfer to the Law Division; any delay in seeking to compel arbitration was not a result of bad faith tactics or an attempt by Defendants to gain an unfair advantage.  No merits-based motion practice, aside from the motion to compel has taken place, and the parties have not exchanged any discovery or taken any depositions.  Moreover, the cited precedent does not support Plaintiff’s proposition that delay and incurring increased attorneys’ fees is sufficient to constitute prejudice.  As such, Plaintiff is hard pressed to identify any detriment to his legal position or any other measure of prejudice he will suffer by compelling arbitration of his partnership claims.
[brief] In the hearing of 1/6/17 I questioned the alleged mortgage assignment of 2/27/2009 (065a) and told the judge that [...] and [...] had faked that assignment.  [...] said because that alleged assignment was recorded in the Hall of Records she considered that valid.  She gave [...] another chance in that hearing and rescheduled another discovery; ending on 2/28/17.  On 1/6/2017 in my motion hearing in state court; [...], who is retired now, said the documents recorded in the [...] had nothing to do with my foreclosure case.
[brief] 6, 7 U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449 (2012)  2, 14 Venetsky v. West Essex Building Supply Co., Inc., 28 N.J.Super. 178 (App.Div. 1953)  12 Woglemuth v. 560 Ocean Club, 302 N.J.Super. 306 (App.Div. 1997)  23  TABLE OF STATUTES | Statute | Page | |------------------|------| | N.J.S. 46:10B-51 | 15 | | N.J.S. 52:27BBB-67 | 6 | | N.J.S. 54:5-3 | 7 | | N.J.S. 54:5-6 | 7 | | N.J.S. 54:5-7 | 7 | | N.J.S. 54:5-8 | 7 | | N.J.S. 54:5-9 | 7 | | N.J.S. 54:5-19 | 7 | | N.J.S. 54:5-30.1 | 7 | | N.J.S. 54:5-32 | 7 | | N.J.S. 54:5-34 | 7 | | N.J.S. 54:5-34.1 | 7 | | N.J.S. 54:5-46 | 7 | | N.J.S. 54:5-47 | 7 | | N.J.S. 54:5-54 | 8 | | N.J.S. 54:5-60 | 7 | | N.J.S. 54:5-85 | 7, 13| | N.J.S. 54:5-86 | 8, 15| | N.J.S. 54:5-87 | 8, 21| | N.J.S. 54:5-104.64 | 8, 18, 21, 24| | N.J.S. 54:5-104.65 | 24 | | N.J.S. 54:5-104.67 | 8, 19, 20| | N.J.S. 54:5-105 | 18 | | N.J.S. 55:19-78 | 15 | TABLE OF RULES Rule | Page ---|--- R.1:7-4 | 17 R1:36-3 | 24 R.4:62-2 (now R.4:50-1) | 19 R.4:50-1 | 10,13, 17, 19 R.4:50-2 | 21, 25
[brief] Thus, for the purposes of CEPA, it is sufficient that the Court will be able to identify the law or public policy that may have been violated by the conduct about which the plaintiff complains.  *Id.* at 193-96.  See also *Turner v.  Associated Humane Societies, Inc.*, 396 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 2007) (employee’s objectively reasonable belief that customer’s adoption of dog with a history of biting humans violated or was incompatible with law or clear mandate of public policy); *Abbamont*, 269 N.J. Super. at 24-25 (wherein the Court allowed a CEPA claim of an industrial arts teacher who made complaints about inadequate ventilation in classrooms which plaintiff reasonably believed put the health and safety of students at risk, even though the plaintiff-employee was not aware that safety guidelines he believed were being violated were based upon the state administrative code); *Regan v. City of New Brunswick*, 305 N.J. Super. 342, 353-55 (App. Div. 1997) (reinstating complaint, where employee did not identify until appeal the criminal statutes he believed were being violated, as those statutes were identifiable from the record and from the plaintiff-employee’s description of the nature of the illegal conduct alleged by the plaintiff); *Woods v. Township of Irvington*, 2009 WL 2475323 (App. Div. 2009) (wherein the Appellate Division reversed the ruling of the Trial Court granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s CEPA claim, holding that the plaintiff-police officer reasonably believed that her supervisor engaged in conduct in contravention of a criminal statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6, “tampering with or fabricating physical evidence”, by way of his violation of internal affairs procedures in mishandling and concealing evidence in an internal affairs investigation) (964a).
[brief] Accordingly, “offending rates of prison inmates . . . for the period immediately prior to their incarceration will tend to substantially overstate what their future offending rate will be, especially in their middle age and beyond. ”  National Research Council, *The Growth of Incarceration* at 145.  The age-crime curve holds true when looking specifically at rates of recidivism.  In other words, “recidivism rates decline markedly with age. ”  *Id.* at 155.
[directive] Czy rozumie Pan(i), że wyrok formalnego dożywotniego nadzoru (3) [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] [Nie dotyczy/NA] kuratorskiego znaczy, że po zwolnieniu z zakładu karnego albo natychmiast po wydaniu wyroku w zawieszeniu, przez co najmniej 15 lat będzie Pan(i) podlegać nadzorowi Wydziału Skorygowany formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Polish strona 5 z 8 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Polish page 5 of 8 Kuratorskiego oraz warunkom zwolnienia warunkowego, w tym warunkom właściwym dla zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa publicznego i sprzyjającym rehabilitacji, obejmującym między innymi poradnictwo psychologiczne, ograniczenia w dostępie i korzystaniu z Internetu i inne ograniczenia, włącznie z ograniczeniami dotyczącymi Pana(i) miejsca zamieszkania, pracy, podróży i kontaktów z innymi osobami? Do you understand that being sentenced to parole supervision for life means that upon release from incarceration or immediately upon imposition of a suspended sentence you will be supervised by the Division of Parole for at least 15 years and will be subject to provisions and conditions of parole, including conditions appropriate to protect the public and foster rehabilitation, such as, but not limited to, counseling, Internet access or use, and other restrictions which may include restrictions on where you can live, work, travel or persons you can contact?
[brief] It proves a consistent pattern of behavior on the part of [...], wherein he claims to have credible information against a defendant in a murder case and in exchange for his testimony he seeks favorable treatment.  After he gains said favorable treatment, it is later determined that [...] falsely claimed to have credible firsthand information against these defendants and they are either exonerated or found not guilty.  Here, defendant has satisfied the first prong of the Brady Test.  The Prosecuting Attorney was aware of this impeachment material and was obligated to disclose these three instances of [...]'s cooperation.  Instead, the prosecuting attorney either willfully or inadvertently suppressed it.  Thus satisfying the second prong of the Brady Test.  Dennis v. Sec., Penns. of Dept. of Corr. 834 F. 3d 263 (3rd Cir. 2016)  Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 119 S. Ct. 1936; The duty to disclose under Brady is absolute it does not depend on defense counsel's actions.  United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 96 S. Ct. 2392; Brady's mandate and its progeny are entirely focused on prosecution disclosure, not defense counsel's diligence.  Id.  Prosecutors have a special obligation to ensure that the testimony they elicit from witnesses is honest and accurate.  This includes a responsibility to disclose to the defendant any evidence that may be used to impeach a government witness.  State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 111 (1986); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
[brief] The trial court rejected plaintiffs’ “discovery rule” arguments and granted [...]’s motion.  In so doing, the trial court preserved the Burt defendant status of [...] vis-a-vis the remaining defendants.  (1T11).  The initial order preserved the crossclaims of certain other co-defendants against [...] in accordance with Burt, but omitted [...] due to oversight; thus, after a December 6, 2017 letter to the trial court noting the issue, the trial court entered a “revised” order of December 11, 2017, which corrected that oversight.