ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] This factor recognizes that New Jersey statutory law generally does not distinguish between a commercial drug sale and the non-commercial sharing of controlled substances, given the broad definition of the term “distribution” as used in the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act and State v. Roach, 222 N.J. Super. 122 (App. Div. 1987), certif. den. 110 N.J. 317 (1988).  This mitigating factor shall not apply if any person to whom the defendant distributed drugs was a minor, if the defendant is charged with a first-degree crime, or where the defendant received any renumeration above the actual costs that he or she expended in procuring the substance involved.  Note that this mitigating factor deals with a defendant who essentially is acting alone, whereas Mitigating Factor #2a addresses a lower-echelon, less culpable defendant who is operating within a commercial drug-distribution scheme involving other more culpable offenders.
[brief] On March 7th, 2023, plaintiff filed a verified complaint in lieu of prerogative writs Pa 27-29 pursuant to R.4:69-1 and asserting claims for relief under N.J.S. 10:6-2.  On March 7th, 2023, plaintiff filed a Motion For Stay (Pa 108-110, Pa 41-43, Pa 44-100) pursuant to R. 4:69-3 Pa 39-40 and For Adjournment of Real Estate Sale pursuant to N.J.S. 2A:17-36 and Common Law (Wells Fargo Home Mortg. v. Stull Pa 317-322).  On March 8th, 2023, plaintiff filed a Motion For Order to Show Cause.  (Pa 15-18, Pa 19-21, Pa 41-43, Pa 44-100).  On March 9th, 2023, [...], A.J.S.C. issued a track assignment notice under [...] and an Order to transfer this matter to Camden County for venue and disposition based on the conflict-of-interest Pa 12.  On March 15th, 2023, plaintiff filed a statement of reasons for Oral Argument pursuant to Rule 1:6-2(d) (Pa 129-134).  On March 21, 2023, Counsel [...] of [...] filed a Letter in opposition to plaintiff's Complaint and Motions (Pa 145).  On March 23, 2023, Chancery Division [...] issued an order dismissing plaintiffs complaint as “Moot” (Pa 13).
[brief] See R. 7:10-2(b)(2).  Moreover, there were no exemptions set forth to toll this time frame including the imposition of an illegal sentence or excusable neglect.  As such, this PCR application should have been denied as a matter of law.  Similarly, the Defendant does not benefit from a relaxation of the five (5) year time limitation based Laurick due to the fact that her conviction in 2014 was not uncounseled.  As such, Laurick has no applicability in this case.  Even if the Court were to ignore the procedural flaws in the Defendant’s case, the State argues that the Defendant’s appeal still must be denied as a matter of law.
[brief] Whether or not the court or defense counsel agree factually that the photos taken during the April 22, 2015 inspection show a “dangerous condition” is not the test.  What the Trial Court was required to accept, including the favorable inferences, was that those who performed that inspection took measurements and took photos and based on the findings recommended that the abutment be repaired.  Further, Plaintiff’s expert is permitted to rely on this information.  Despite the Trial Court’s insistence, there is no requirement that someone actually label the condition as “dangerous” in order to defeat the motions.  The settlement at the abutment joint had been well documented and it was recommended that it be repaired twice.  A reasonable inference from the information contained in the two inspection reports at issue is that settlement at the north approach abutment should be repaired “immediately” because it was “dangerous. ”  To this point, this exact condition was fixed on November 17, 2015, albeit too late, for the very reasons that were first outlined in the April 22, 2015 Biennial Bridge Report and reinforced by the June 26, 2015 memo.  (Pa1343) and (Pa1191).  Finally, it is important to note that the Trial Court’s reliance on Stewart v. New Jersey Transit Authority, 249 N.J. 642 (2022) is misplaced.
[brief] Churm v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 N.J. Super. 631, 632-33 (App. Div. 1994).  The purpose of the shift from the courts to arbitration was “to establish an informal system of settling tort claims arising out of automobile accidents in an expeditious and least costly manner, and to ease the burden and congestion of the State’s courts. ”  Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 39:6A-24).  The No-Fault Law contains the following arbitration provision:
[directive] EXPRESS AUTHORIZATION TO ESTABLISH A “PLEA CUT-OFF RULE. ”  At least one prosecutor’s office has established a general plea cut-off policy for all cases (not just those involving drug offenses).  This prosecutor-controlled cut- off is invoked before the formal, court-controlled cut-off rule is imposed pursuant to R. 3:9-3(g).  The “Brimage” Guidelines are hereby amended to authorize prosecu- tors to adopt a plea cut-off policy provided, however, that the prosecutor must afford a defendant a reasonable opportunity to accept a “final post-indictment offer” cal- culated pursuant to the “Brimage” Guidelines before that final offer expires and is withdrawn.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize a prosecutor to refrain from tendering a pre-indictment, initial post-indictment, or final post-in- dictment offer as may be required by the “Brimage” Guidelines.  III.
[brief] For example, in July 2022, the Corporate Defendants sent [...] to New York to (1) interview the outside candidates [...] had proposed as his replacement following the decision to pass plaintiff over for promotion and (2) meet with representatives of multiple law firms in New York concerning plaintiff’s lawsuit.  CPa3-6, Pa190, 196.  The trial court ignored these undisputed facts when it denied the motion to compel and when it denied the motion for reconsideration.  In an abuse of discretion, it simply accepted as true the bald assertions of counsel, belatedly made, that the corporate defendants lack control over [...].
[brief] This additional $600 was against me only, and was incurred because the U.S. Post Office had twice lost my mail (when I attempted to return my completed information subpoena back to [...]), and because I had a serious security concern about emailing my most sensitive information, as email is a notoriously unsecure method of transmission.  Although I believe the trial court erred by discounting my attempts and scoffing at my security concerns, I did not include this issue in the appeal.  This is because I was concerned that doing so would only increase the complexity of the appeal; and I have learned from past experience that it is best to limit the issues raised in any appeal.
[brief] (8T:32-15 to 17, 33-23 to 35-1)  [...] testified that [...] was visibly upset, but that he was neither aggressive nor disrespectful towards the --- ⁴  Video exhibit D-14 is the same video as S-3-3, and D-14A appears to refer to one portion of the same video played by defense counsel.  (8T:40-19 to 41-7)  ⁵  [...] could not recall [...]’s name, and described him as the “white or Hispanic officer. ” (8T:34-23 to 35-5, 46-16 to 21, 52-22 to 53-2) officer.  (8T:54-19 to 55-17)  She testified that when [...]\(^6\) first entered the restaurant, he came over to where she was standing to intervene in a dispute between her and another customer “who was yelling very unpleasant things” at her and her family.
[brief] This violated the Attorney General Guidelines, and [...]’s due process rights.  Moreover, [...] (the subject officer), [...] (the complainant), and [...] (a potential witness) were not interviewed.  This also violated the Attorney General Guidelines.  Respondent failed to notify [...] of the charges, and could not be bothered to conduct vitally important interviews.  As such, it is clear that Respondent did not “thoroughly, objectively, and promptly” investigate this matter to its “logical conclusion. ” (Attorney General, Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures 24 (June 2021)).  Based on the foregoing, Respondent’s removal of [...] must be reversed.
[brief] The Court should reverse the trial court’s granting of summary judgment to the Defendants and remand the case with instructions to conduct a full trial on the merits.  Dated: August 20, 2024  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  __________________________  [...]  [...], Esq., P.C. [...] [...]  Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE
[directive] Extraordinary any of conviction upon or 2C:11-3), (N.J.S.A. murder with charged is defendant  If the imprisonment,20 of term life extended or ordinary an for eligible be would offense charged other Assistant or First Prosecutor County the unless detention pretrial for apply shall prosecutor the cases in Criminal Justice of Division of Director the Deputy or a Director or the Prosecutor, seek to not reasons extraordinary and compelling are there that finds Division, the by prosecuted detention.
[brief] (Da95-116).  The preliminary injunction directed Appellants “to preserve the status quo ante prior to the adoption of Amended Policy 5756, until such time as the litigation before [[...]] arising from a separate administrative complaint filed on June 21, 2023 is resolved. ”  (Da95-  The trial court went no further than maintaining the status quo: the court emphasized that it was “not rendering any final judgments or determinations as to the merits of either the State or the School Boards’ claims,” which would “be left to the sound determination of the [...] after a full development of the factual and legal record in that matter.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d) guarantees protection of “any right granted" under the statute.  In that connection, plaintiffs properly plead a prima facie case of retaliation under the NJLAD.  First, (1) unit members engaged in a protected activity (requesting and taking medical leave) that was known to the employer; (2) that they were subjected to an adverse employment action as a result of the “no fault” attendance policies; and (3) that there is a clear causal link between the activity and the adverse action.
[brief] In contrast, in this case the defendant is seeking to withdraw from a plea by using the right to do so granted to him by the conditional plea rule.  He also pleaded guilty to all of the charges from both indictments on the same day, making a clear global resolution, in contrast to the two separate plea agreements in Dunn.  This Court has properly understood that when a defendant pleads guilty to multiple charges from separate indictments in order to resolve all of those indictments together, that decision is informed by an understanding of the totality of the evidence against him, including by adverse evidentiary rulings.  A defendant who prevails on one of those issues is now facing a materially different set of circumstances and can withdraw his plea if he so chooses.
[directive] The NGRI acquittee shall report to for supervision to 2. ensure compliance with all conditions; and ___________ (Any additional conditions as ordered by the court)  _ 3.  Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12559 (KROL Order 4) by ____  A review hearing shall be held on _ 4. of of  A copy this Order shall be forwarded to the Clinical and/ or Medical Director the 5. of [name mental health providers listed in the order]  The Court and counsel shall be informed promptly and in writing by the mental health 6.  if if provider the acquittee violates conditions or the program seeks modifications.  The if provider shall immediately contact the court and counsel the acquittee absconds from superv1s10n.  ____
[brief] Id. at 412-13.  If the trial court finds the first two elements are met under that “rational basis” test, the second two elements should “almost always” be left to a jury to decide.  Id. at 413; see also Carrero, 229 N.J. at 129.  Here, the testimony at the trial was that [...] was involved in a physical altercation with two men who were trying to get him to leave the house, one of whom was armed with a loaded handgun, and that he ultimately got control of the handgun during the altercation and shot the two victims in the heat of the moment.  Under such facts, there can be no serious dispute that there was no adequate cooling off period with respect to the second element of the passion/provocation test; the shooting happened in the course of the brief physical altercation between the two victims and the man alleged to be [...].  The only element reasonably in dispute, then, is the first: whether a reasonable person would have been provoked in [...]’s situation.
[directive] Policy requirements that the Attorney General has determined are critical and must be implemented by every law enforcement agency include the following:  General Practices  (a)  Each agency must establish by written policy an internal affairs function.  (b)  Each agency must accept reports of officer misconduct from any person, including anonymous sources, at any time.  (c)  Each agency must thoroughly, objectively, and promptly investigate all allegations against its officers.  (d)  Each agency must notify its officers in writing of complaints made against them, unless this notification would interfere with any investigation resulting from these complaints.  (e)  Each agency must notify its officers of the outcome of any Internal Affairs investigation involving them.  (f)  Each agency must notify complainants of the outcome of their complaints.  11  (g)  If an agency’s internal affairs investigators are unable to complete an investigation within 45 days of receiving a complaint, they must notify the executive,6 agency’s law enforcement who may take steps to ensure prompt resolution of the matter.  B. misconduct.
[brief] It is undisputed that [...] testified at trial that there had been rain that day and he experienced puddling or ponding of water without incident prior to this accident.  He testified that he was taking all due care and was operating his vehicle at an appropriate speed.  [...] also testified that as a result of his vehicle hydroplaning behind the rear of the Plaintiff/Respondent’s vehicle, he was unable to bring the vehicle to a complete stop prior to the time the front of his vehicle contacted the rear of the Plaintiff/Respondent’s vehicle.  [...]’ testimony regarding the happening of the accident, as well as the hydroplaning, is undisputed.  Plaintiff/Respondent offered no contrary version regarding the happening of the accident or any other evidence which would refute [...]’ account of the accident including the unexpected weather-related hydroplaning.
[brief] Where no record has been made or the record is deficient, a trial court may attempt to reconstruct the record with the aid of counsel.  *Scardigli v. Borough of Haddonfield Zoning Bd.*, 300 N.J. Super. 314, 322-23, (App. Div. 1997).  If, however, the court cannot resolve the matter by stipulation of the record or by reconstruction, it must remand the case to the board with an order that it reconstruct the record.  *Ibid.*  If the board is unable to do so, it must then hear the testimony on the application anew.
[brief] (Ca073); Ca085-087; Ca098-099).  Many students and parents spoke about how Respondent’s posts impacted their experience in the District.  (Ca193) (Asbury Park Press Article: “Several students - and parents - fought back tears as they told their stories. ”).  There was even a protest outside the school on March 17, 2022.  (Ca086) (Board minutes: “[...] stated that there was an organized protest outside the school. ”).  14.  As Respondent refused to take down her December 5, 2021 “Hate Crimes” Facebook post well into her membership as a sitting Board member, on March 17, 2022, a majority of the Board adopted a Resolution formally requesting that “[...]” remove specific Facebook posts which the Board stated were “racist and/or biased against African-Americans.
[brief] (Supra).  Despite the confusion on the record concerning what was ordered and by which judge, what the Appellate Panel will undoubtedly see from the record now before it is that the Plaintiffs in the action now on appeal failed to establish even the slightest of personal damages from the transactions they allege to be improper.  (1T and 2T)  In fact, the entirety of the trial transcript focuses on purported losses to [...], an entity which had never been made a party to this action.  (Supra.)  In their post-trial submission to the trial court judge, (Da33) Plaintiffs reference the judgments obtained by [...] against the various [...] companies (Da40 and Da56-57) and an additional, unproven (1T and 2T) $3,275,962.71 (Da56-57) purportedly owed by another [...]-affiliated company to [...] in calculating their personal damages.  Not only is the record devoid of evidence to support the additional $3,275,962.71, but it is also silent as to how the obligations of [...]’s companies under judgments entered in favor of [...] can somehow translate into personal obligations of [...] to the Plaintiffs in this action.  The trial court’s judgment following trial fails to set forth the legal basis for converting the monetary judgments against [...]’s companies and in favor of [...] into a new judgment against [...], personally, and in favor of the Plaintiffs.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] Appellant/plaintiff [...]’s (hereinafter referred to as “[...]”)  Appeal arises from the dismissal on summary judgment of his complaint for personal injury related to a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April 13, 2022, seeking payment of No-Fault benefits.  Appellant/plaintiff [...]’s complaint against both defendants was ultimately dismissed on motion for summary judgment when the trial court found that plaintiff failed to insured vehicles principally garaged in New Jersey required by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.
[brief] Plaintiff [...] reminded Defendant [...] of an incident that occurred in 2020 wherein [...] had advised [...] that a Firm attorney with whom they both had contact had tested negative for COVID when in truth the attorney had tested positive.  [...] asked for Defendant [...] and the Defendant firm to provide a reasonable accommodation, a transition period of continued at-home, remote work for a few weeks, noting that there would be no impact on Plaintiff performing his job responsibilities at the Firm.  Da36, ¶ 55.  During the January 22, 2023 telephone call, [...] further asked for [...] to view the requested weeks of continued at-home remote work as leave to care for his ailing 3-year-old son.  [...] reminded [...] that his 3-year-old child continued under active medical treatment due to a severe respiratory illness coupled with ongoing infections and had upcoming medical appointments.  [...] resisted the request for a reasonable accommodation and leave and told [...] that “everyone has personal issues but the law firm business came first. ”  [...] advised [...] that, based on his, the Plaintiff’s, personal history involving multiple miscarriages and his wife's personal history involving a prior child who experienced severe respiratory issues and eventually passed away, he, the Plaintiff, needed to be present for his family during the coming few weeks.  [...] said he would still be able to continue handling all of his assigned files and there would be no inconvenience to the law firm or its future success with him continuing to work remotely while transitioning back to the office.  Defendant [...] rejected Plaintiff’s request for accommodation/leave.
[brief] (I offered to keep other counsel in the background – just draft the complaint.  I offered between $500-$1000 and had no takers.)  I would add that the more complicated the history of the case is – like this Complaint\(^{12}\) – the less and less likely it is that the Complaint is “short” and it’s not likely to be “plain. ”  Federal Courts seem only to want “one incident” complaints.  Maybe for sex harassment, they will tolerate a recounting of a history, as in the Ruberton Complaint.  Is that going to be the NJ Rule too?  [...] has 10 major civil rights violations in a 6-hour period against [...], most importantly intentionally denying access to counsel, the AMA kidnapping and the Brady violation discovered later.
[brief] ”).  As [...] stated to Plaintiff during argument on summary judgment:  THE COURT:  No, you got the burden of proving the amount of damages so a jury doesn’t speculate.  How is the jury going to apportion what was owed in ‘11 if anything, in ‘12 if anything, in ‘13 if anything and almost all of ‘14 if anything if that’s all barred by the Statute of Limitations?  See T2 at 24:1-6.  By Plaintiff’s own admissions he is claiming damages that allegedly began in 2010 and ran all the way through 2017.  It would seem to be a simple enough exercise for Plaintiff to simply show what he was paid for each year and then subtract that amount from what he claims he was supposed to be paid.  However, for reasons known only to Plaintiff, he refused to produce his 1099’s (that he admitted he received from [...]), bank statements, or checks that would shed light on this issue and provide some level of clarity.  Instead, Plaintiff produced a handful of checks for 2016 and 2017, and now tries to reverse engineer his damages on appeal.  Aside from his own testimony, Plaintiff cannot point to a single proof to support his contention that any amounts are owed to him by the Defendants.  After nearly two years of discovery and ample opportunity for Plaintiff to provide a shred of evidence supporting his theory, the record is bereft of any documentary evidence that contradicts Defendants’ position – i.e. Plaintiff was paid in full for all of his work with [...].
[brief] Moreover, during the [...], Appellants specifically acknowledged the terms of the Consent Order when, on March 16, 2021, they explained that the Chancery Action was “dismissed without prejudice to allow this action to be adjudicated.  The litigation – we’re able to recommence it as soon as this litigation is adjudicated. ” (Da6 to Da7 (portion of Transcript of [...] proceedings, attached as Exhibit A to [...] Supp. Cert.)).  In addition, the Complaint references the Consent Order, acknowledging that the claims asserted in the Complaint were subject to re-filing after the adjudication of the [...] (referred to in the Complaint as “a tangentially related arbitration. ”)  (Pa27 at ¶¶73-74 (Complaint)).  While the Trial Court did not consider this parole evidence, it was free to do so.  “Evidence of the circumstances is always admissible in aid of the interpretation of an integrated agreement. ”  Conway v. 287 Corporate Ctr. Assocs., 187 N.J. 259, 269 (2006) (quoting Atl. N. Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 301–302 (1953)).  In Conway, the Supreme Court elaborated:  This is so even when the contract on its face is free from ambiguity.  The polestar of construction is the intention of the parties to the contract as revealed by the language used, taken as an entirety, and, in the quest for the intention, the situation of the parties, the attendant circumstances, and the objects they were thereby striving to attain are necessarily to be regarded.  The admission of evidence of extrinsic facts is not for the purpose of changing the writing, but to secure light by which to measure its actual significance.  Conway, 187 N.J. at 269.  This parole evidence readily supports the ruling below.  The parties indisputably agreed to a sixty-day refiling deadline for commencing a Refiled Action.
[directive] Investigators are required to provide further notice to the law enforcement executive every additional 45 days that the internal affairs investigation remains open (i.e., on or about the 90th, 135th, and 180th days from the receipt of the complaint), and the law enforcement executive should exercise increasing scrutiny of the investigators’ work the longer the case remains open.  The purpose of this notice is to facilitate prompt resolution of internal affairs investigations, not to create 3 an impediment to discipline in cases that take longer to resolve.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 24 6.1.6