ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In arguing that the defense should be entirely precluded from presenting third-party guilt, the prosecutor made the following proffer about the evidence that he understood the defense wished to present:  Now, I anticipate that there’s an individual by the name of [Derique] Ballard that is the father of the baby of the victim’s girlfriend.  There may have been a problem with him.  And there may have even been reference from a [...] that there was an incident involving a firearm in the past, and involving [...] and the victim.  However, there is no link to this date.  Nobody saw [Derique] Ballard in the area.  Nobody saw [Derique] Ballard with a firearm, nobody saw him stalking the victim.  No one could say that.  So to allege that he is the perpetrator in this case would be completely inappropriate.  There is no direct causal link.  The best we have is some incident that he, [...] in his statement doesn’t even know when that happened.  It was some weeks or months before; doesn’t even know the exact date.  [(9T65-18 to 66-10) (emphasis added).
[brief] When [...] told the responding officers that her husband and son were inside the main house, police asked her to call them and ask them to exit the home with their hands up.  [...] and defendant complied.  When defendant exited the home, officers observed that he was “very calm. ”  Defendant also told the responding officers that an intruder was in the backyard, by the carriage house, that he was still in possession of a weapon, and that the intruder was shot in the stomach.  Ibid.  Officers then proceeded to approach the carriage house.  (17T:198-18 to --- ¹ The State adopts defendant’s citation conventions (Dbiv-v, 1 n. 3).  ² [...], David, and [...] all share a last name.  Defendant [...] will hereinafter be referred to as “defendant” while [...] Keogh and [...] will be referred to via their first names to avoid confusion.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  IN RE-SENTENCING DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO STATE V. COMER, THE COURT COMMITTED FOUR INDEPENDENT LEGAL ERRORS.  IN SO DOING, THE COURT FAILED TO RULE ON THE BOTTOM-LINE ISSUE OF WHETHER DEFENDANT HAD MATURED AND REHABILITATED.  ACCORDINGLY, THE MATTER MUST BE REMANDED AGAIN FOR RESENTENCING.  (5T)  In State v. Comer, our Supreme Court held that the mandatory minimum sentence of thirty years imprisonment under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment when applied to juvenile offenders.  249 N.J. at 369-70.  Comer followed in a long line of cases from both the U.S. Supreme Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court which all recognize that juveniles are “constitutionally different” than adults, and thus “less deserving of the most severe punishments.”  Comer, 249 N.J. at 384-388 (summarizing holdings of Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005), Graham v. Florida 560 U.S. 48, 74-75 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012), and Zuber, 227 N.J. at 429, 446-47) (quotation omitted).  These cases all rely upon key developments in psychology and cognitive neuroscience that have identified fundamental differences between juvenile and adult brains.  Zuber, 227 N.J. at 438-39.  Without a fully developed brain, juveniles have “an underdeveloped sense of responsibility” leading to “recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk taking. ”  Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).  Juveniles “are more vulnerable...to negative influences and outside pressures”; they have “limited control over their own environment”; and their “character is not as well formed as an adult’s. ”  Ibid. (quotation omitted).  Their actions are “less likely to be evidence of irretrievable deprav[ity]” because they are “more capable of change than adults. ”  Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.  Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has prohibited juveniles from being sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without parole, no matter the offense, and no matter how heinous.  Graham, 560 U.S. at 74-75; Miller, 567 U.S. at 479.  Instead, a juvenile with a lengthy sentence must be provided “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. ”  Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.  It is against this backdrop that our Supreme Court in Comer addressed the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence of 30 years without parole ineligibility under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1) as applied to juveniles.
[brief] …  [...]'s testimony was factual in nature.  He described the method he used to extract data from the Apple cell phone that he had received from [...] and identified reports that were generated.  [...] did not provide any opinions requiring specialized knowledge, training, or experience.  The trial court did not err in permitting [...] to testify as a lay witness.  [...]'s testimony similarly was factual in nature.  *Jessup's testimony focused on the numbers of steps taken and the number of flights climbed, as reflected on the extraction report.*  The health application itself defined how the "step count" and "flights climbed" were calculated, and neither concept required a specialized understanding of the health application.  (See State's Ex. 144.)  *[...] did not conduct an analysis of the data, nor did he offer an opinion on the accuracy of the information.*  As with [...], the trial court reasonably permitted [...] to testify as a lay witness regarding the health app reports.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NOS. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, :  On Appeal from a Judgment of v. : Conviction of the Superior Court  Defendant-Appellant.  : Sat Below: : Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a Jury.  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED  Your Honors:  This letter is submitted in lieu of a formal brief pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b)
[brief] (Da621).  Respondents filed motions and oral applications for the QuickBooks file because Appellant did not produce it by January 29, 2018 as Ordered.  (2T: 47:12-48:6).  Counsel for Appellant provided a copy of the QuickBooks file in court in April of 2018.  (Pa367).  One of the QuickBooks functions is an “audit trail” that is a pre-loaded report that details every single transaction from day one made to the file.  (2T:52:17-53:3).  Respondents prepared an audit trail report on the version of [...]’s QuickBooks file that was provided by counsel for Appellant pursuant to the Court’s January 25, and 29, 2018 Order.
[brief] Romaine v. Kallinger, 109 N.J. 282 (1988) .............................................19  Rowe v. Mazel Thirty, LLC, 209 N.J. 35 (2012) ..............................................9  Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990) ...............................................15  Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) .............................................10  Smith v. Datla, 451 N.J. Super. 82 (App. Div. 2017) .......................19, 20, 22 Snitow v. Rutgers Univ., 103 N.J. 116 (1986) ...........................................14  State v. Marchiani, 336 N.J. Super. 541 (App. Div. 2001) ..........................11  Swan v. Boardwalk Regency Corp., 407 N.J. Super. 108 (App. Div. 2009) .........................20, 21 Talmadge Vill. LLC v. Wilson, 468 N.J. Super. 514 (App. Div. 2021) ..........................11  Wilbur v. Mahan, 3 F.3d 214(7th Cir. 1993) .......................................16, 18  Williams v. City of River Rouge, 909 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1990) ....................................16  Williams v. Civil Service Comm'n, 66 N.J. 152 (1974) ..................................................15  Winston v. South Plainfield Bd. of Ed., 64 N.J. 582 (1974) ..................................................15  Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3 .....................................................2, 19 Rules Rule 4:46-2(c) ..........................................................8
[brief] [...]'s designated deponent confirmed that "the policy language . . . controls."  (Dto854,T99-18 to -21.)  [...], which reserved the right to "terminate or modify the CCIP or any portion thereof," also promised in the manual that "subcontractors will be provided at least 30 days notice of cancellation” of enrollment in the CCIP, which is at odds with the 90 days offered by the [...] policy’s cancellation provision.  (Dta590, ¶4.4.)  The manual defines the term “Enrolled” to mean contractors that “have been accepted into the CCIP as evidenced by a Certificate of Insurance. ”  A “Certificate of Insurance” is, by definition, “evidence of coverage for a particular insurance policy or policies. ”  (Dta587, ¶3.0.)  “Insured” is defined to include “The Sponsor [[...]], Participating Subcontractors, and any other party so named in the insurance policy or policies. ”  The manual provides that “participating subcontractors will be issued a Workers’ Compensation policy,” and that they “will also provide a Certificate of Insurance evidencing General Liability, and Excess Liability Insurance to each Participating Subcontractor, each of whom will be a named insured on the policy. ”  (Dta590, ¶4.3.)  Section 4.5 provides that participating subcontractors “will be issued a separate Workers’ Compensation policy for their employees,” and that general liability and excess “[m]aster policies will be endorsed to include “the Subcontractors enrolled in the CCIP as a Named Insured. ”  (Dta590 (emphasis supplied). )  3.
[brief] The State also failed to address or present a valid exception to the “turn square corners doctrine” or the rule of lenity.  7  The government must 'turn square corners' in its dealings with the public."  See State v. Buczkowski, 395 N.J. Super. 40, 45 (App. Div. 2007).  One of the hallmarks of the "turn square corners" doctrine is that its application is not dependent upon a finding of bad faith.  Instead, it focuses the judicial inquiry upon whether government seeks an unfair "litigational advantage."  See CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. Borough of Lebanon Planning Bd./Bd. of Adjustment, 414 N.J. Super. 563, 586-587 (App. Div. 2010).  The balance of the State’s brief is comprised of what it wants the law to be or longs desires it was as opposed to what the law actually is and actually consists of.  As such, its lacks sufficient merit to warrant a response beyond what is set forth in this reply brief.
[directive] 4.11  Report When Application for a Complaint-Warrant Is Denied.  If a law enforcement agency applies for a complaint-warrant pursuant to this Directive and the judge or other court officer reviewing the application declines to issue a complaint- warrant but instead issues or directs the issuance of a complaint-summons, to facilitate evaluation of the system the officer or the assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general consulted in accordance with Section 3.2 shall document the circumstances of the denial on a form and in a manner as may be prescribed by the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice.
[brief] Therefore, Plaintiff had no viable claim for breach of contract, and still does not, nor any viable claim for breach of a fiduciary duty.  To that end, the Trial Court found:  As the party seeking the title insurance, the listed Proposed Insured . . . needed to comply with all requirements as a condition precedent to obtaining title insurance for its benefit.  As there was a condition precedent that was not satisfied for the Commitment of Title Insurance, namely providing Defendants with a “Deed from [...] and [...] to [...],” there was no binding contract between the parties and therefore no liability can arise for Defendants.
[brief] *State v. Hess*, 207 N.J. 123, 154 (2011).  Defense counsel’s lack of advocacy at sentencing through “failure to bring relevant information in his file to the attention of the [sentencing] court so that the court could independently and identify mitigating factors cannot be ascribed to strategy or reasonable professional judgment. ”  *Id.*, at 149-50.  Put another way, defense counsel owes an independent duty to present “mitigating evidence in support of a lesser sentence,” and a failure to honor that obligation denies a defendant of the “constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing.
[directive] 9-79  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards  Used for both daylight and night qualification  Range: 20 yards  Target: FBI “Q” type 10 rounds  Rounds  Position Course of fire Time Range  On command with the action forward, safety on and muzzle depressed, load the shotgun with 4 rounds into the magazine.  Standing Point 25  20 Yds 5  On command from a standing point shoulder  Shoulder sec. position, fire the 4 rounds; 5th 5th Combat load a round and fire that round.  Action open, safety on, muzzle depressed.  With the action open and safety on, on command combat load 1 round, load 2 rounds into the Standing Point magazine and fire those 3 rounds.  35  10 Yds 5  Shoulder Combat load 1 round and load 1 round into the sec. magazine; fire those 2 rounds.  Action open, safety on, muzzle depressed.  End course, score targets:  Score any hit on the paper or cardboard not just in the scoring silhouette.  9 pellet OO Buck - 72 hits = 80%  8 pellet OO Buck - 64 hits = 80%  Shotgun Slug Qualification Course
[brief] Further, the Respondents mischaracterize the facts by asserting that “the amount of development requested in 2019 was significant less than the development approved in 2016, when the traffic light was agreed to. ”  ROB page 58.  However, as indicated previously, the Respondents voluntarily agreed to the Route 33 Signal as condition of approval at the time of the hearing on the 2018 Amended Application.  Additionally, the Respondents further ignore the nature of the relevant analysis by asserting “[c]ircumstances have indeed changed, with traffic being reduced below what was envisioned in 2016. ”  Id.  However, to the extent that the Respondents agreed to the Route 33 Signal in 2019, the relevant analysis is a change between 2019 and time of the site plan application (subsequent to the 2020 Opinion).  Finally, the Respondents argue that the obligation to provide the Route 33 Signal in the VC-2 Zone is somehow unreasonable due to the absence of any obligation in the H-D Zone.  However, this simplistic argument ignores the Purpose and General Goals of the VC-2 Zone.  The VC-2 Zone was established to create a comprehensive, holistic plan for the development of the area it encompasses.  This is clear in the 75-acre minimum lot size.  The H-D Zone encompasses a greater area than the H-D Zone; and has a minimum lot size of 5-acres.  The Township clearly envisioned a town-center styled community for the area in the VC-2 Zone.  However, in order to avail themselves of the ability to develop in accordance with the VC-2 Zone requirements, a developer was required to supply the Route 33 Signal.  Based upon the foregoing, it is apparent that the Respondents failed to establish any basis for the elimination of the Route 33 Signal.  In light of this fact, this Court must reinstate the requirement that the Route 33 Signal be provided as a condition of any approval of the Respondents’ 2018 Amended Application.
[brief] (3T90-6 to 21).  When asked to give a description of the car, [...] initially said it was a white Malibu, but later stated that it was an Impala.  (3T97-15 to 98-22).  As [...] and [...] continued to drive, they passed a police officer, [...], near a gas station in Manalapan.  (3T119-17 to 122-22).  The officer did a license plate scan of their car but decided not to immediately pull them over, and [...] drove off.  (3T119-17 to 122-22).  However, once the dispatch about the shooting went out with the description of the car, [...] provided the other departments with [...]’s information obtained by the license plate scan.  (3T124-25 to 125-4, 135-21 to 25).  Police made contact shortly thereafter with [...]’s brother, who eventually told police he had heard [...] was parked outside of their cousin’s house, sleeping.  (4T65-3 to 66-11, 69-11 to 71-1, 72-15 to 73-20).  Officers responded to the home and found [...] parked partially behind a horse trailer on the large property.  (4T73-21 to 74-11).  Officers found [...] and [...] in the Impala and placed them under arrest.
[brief] [...] (Plaintiff), a young African American male while in the City of Edison was in the process of taking items out of one vehicle and putting them in another vehicle with keys to both cars in hand, when Edison police defendants, approached him attempted to take the keys out of his hands, and started questioning him, which caused him to sit on the ground and cry.  When on the ground, the police proceeded admittedly to strike him to get him to loosen his grips on the keys to vehicles owned by the party ([...]) that gave him a ride to that location and the party who was going to give him a ride home.  The police had no warrant or consent to search [...]’s car.  The police lifted plaintiff then threw him back to the ground, placed their knees into his ribs and choked him, causing him to sustain a dislocated jaw, multiple cuts and bruises warranting a trip to the Emergency room.  The police stated that they needed [...]’s key to determine whether [...] owned the car.  The police did not tell the plaintiff that he was under arrest at anytime.  A notice of claim was filed against Edison which resulted in the request to have Woodbridge Municipal court in Highland try the matter.  A review of the decision of the Highland Park judge would readily demonstrate that the judge in his decision was doing what was necessary to make the police look pristine in their actions.  The judge and the clerical staff of Highland Park failed to forward to Edison court or the plaintiff’s attorney the disposition judgment of guilt.  Thus, [...] had no signed and dated judgment of conviction from which could legally take an appeal.  [...] and his mom both went to the Edison court to attempt to obtain the documents prior to the Highland Park Judge of the Superior Court dismissal of the appeal.  [...]’s counsel was most concerned about having the judgment of conviction from which to take the appeal and the same day spoke to the Edison staff who confirmed there was no such signed order from [...] of highland park in Edison’s files.  It was not until a summary judgement (two years later) filed by Highland Park’s counsel that a copy of a signed (undated)judgment of disposition that was never presented to the plaintiff during the time frame when an appeal could be taken.  The court rules require the staff of a municipality to provide the Case disposition judgment of conviction.  Neither municipality did so.  This Violated the NJSA 10:1-2 et als and the place of Public Accommodation law which require that all services and accommodations must be given to each member of the public equally.
[brief] Under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150, an officer, if convicted of any disciplinary charge, is entitled to appeal such charges for the Superior Court's review.  If the disciplinary charges are appealed to the Superior Court, the standard of review is *de novo*, meaning the Superior Court must make an independent finding of fact through a "neutral and unbiased" review of the record.  *Ruroede v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights*, 214 N.J. 338, 355 (2013).  In its review, the Superior Court must give some deference to the original tribunal's findings of credibility; however, the original tribunal's findings are not controlling.
[brief] By signing, filing or advocating a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney . . . certifies that to the best of his or her knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:  (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; (3) the factual allegations have evidentiary support or, as to specifically identified allegations, they are either likely to have evidentiary support or they will be withdrawn or corrected if reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery indicates insufficient evidentiary support[.]  An assertion is deemed “frivolous” for purposes of R. 1:4-8(a) when “no rational argument can be advanced in its support, or it is not supported by any credible evidence, or it is completely untenable. ”  First Atl. Fed. Credit Union v. Perez, 391 N.J. Super. 419, 432 (App. Div. 2007).  Continued prosecution of a claim for relief despite knowledge of facts that it is unsupported is sanctionable as frivolous.  *Iannone v. McHale*, 245 N.J. Super. 17, 31 (App. Div. 1990).  Here, Appellants’ counsel signed and filed the Motion for Default Judgment, which violated R. 1:4-8(a) because (i) [...] was never served with the Amended Complaint, or any complaint; (ii) [...] had already been dismissed, and was therefore no longer a party, when the Motion was filed; and (iii) Appellants did not request the entry of default against [...] prior to seeking the entry of default judgment by way of the Motion.
[brief] Cnty. of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80, 105, 707 A.2d 958 (1998).  Our courts have long recognized that laches is not governed by fixed time limits, see Hinners v. Banville, 114 N.J. Eq. 348, 357, 168 A. 618 (E. & A.1933) ("Laches involves something more than mere delay, mere lapse of time."), but instead relies on analysis of time constraints that "are characteristically flexible," Lavin v. Bd. of Educ., 90 N.J. 145, 151, 447 A.2d 516 (1982).  Unlike the mechanical application of a fixed time prescribed by a statute of limitations, laches operates as do other equitable doctrines.  That is, "[w]hether laches should be applied depends upon the facts of the particular case and is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court."  Mancini v. Twp. of Teaneck, 179 N.J. 425, 436, 846 A.2d 596 (quoting Garrett v. Gen. Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 559, 562 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908, 109 S. Ct. 259, 102 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1988)).
[brief] (Da15 3:23:33 to 3:24:11; Da25; Da52).  Defendant said something inaudible in response.  (Da15 3:24:11 to 3:24:21; Da25).  [...] testified that defendant had queried what would happen if he refused consent.  (1T61-23 to 62-8; 1T63-17 to 20).  To answer this question, another officer told defendant:
[brief] (3T; 4T; 5T)  After ordering the requisite merger of counts, including felony murder with purposeful or knowing murder, the court resentenced [...] to a term of 30 years imprisonment with 30 years of parole ineligibility for murder, and a consecutive term of 15 years imprisonment subject to an 85% percent parole disqualifier for robbery, resulting in a new aggregate sentence of forty-five years with an approximately forty-three-year period of parole ineligibility.  (5T:24-24 to 27-15)  [...] filed a notice of appeal on May 18, 2023.
[directive] Definitions.  For the purposes of this Directive:  1.  “Law Enforcement Incident” (or “LE Incident”) means any incident described in Section I.A subject to the procedures outlined in this Directive.  Page 3  2.  “Principal of the Investigation” (or “Principal”) means any officer(s) described above in Section I.B. subject to investigation for their role in a LE Incident.  3.  “Independent Investigator” means the law enforcement entity tasked with primary responsibility for investigating a specified LE Incident and, where appropriate, determining whether to present a proposed indictment regarding the Principal(s) for their role(s) in an LE Incident.  4.  “Independent Supervisory Reviewer” means the official tasked with reviewing the factual findings, legal analysis, and charging recommendations prepared by the Independent Investigator at the conclusion of the investigation.  5.  “[...]” (or “[...]”) refers to an Office established pursuant to Attorney General Administrative Executive Directive 2019-8 to conduct sensitive investigations, including those involving allegations of misconduct by law enforcement officers.