ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Page(s)  Cases  California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970)  ..................................................................................................................19  Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) ..................................................................................................................19  Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895)  ...........................................................................................................  26  DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502 (2008) .................................................................................................................. 21, 22, 24 Goldfarb v. Solimine, 460 N.J. Super. 22 (App. Div. 2019) .........................................................................................  23  In re Reddin, 221 N.J. 221 (2015) ....................................................................................................................  23  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ....................................................................................................................  25 P.M. v. N.P., 441 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 2015) .........................................................................................  23 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) ....................................................................................................................  19 State ex rel. J.A., 195 N.J. 324 (2008) ....................................................................................................................  19 State v. Anderson, 127 N.J. 191 (1992) ....................................................................................................................  25 State v. Avena, 281 N.J. Super. 327 (App. Div. 1995) .......................................................................................
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the appellate division reverse the trial court’s Order entered November 30, 2018, which denied the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint to include a claim for spoliation of evidence.  It is further respectfully requested that the appellate division reverse the trial court’s Order entered January 11, 2019, which denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 30, 2018.
[directive] such instances, defense counsel In should refer to Rule 3:25A consolidated dispositions.  That rule states on that "when a defendant has charges pending more than one county at in any stage prior to sentencing, either the defendant, or the prosecutor in any such county with the consent of the defendant, may move before the presiding judge of the criminal part the county which consolidation is in in sought, or before any judge designated to hear such motion, for consolidation for purposes of entering a plea or for sentencing.  Written notice of such motion and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the an prosecutor each county which such a charge pending.  The motion is in in shall be supported by certification that includes the information the court required to consider under [that] Rule."
[brief] See State v. Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 143 (2009).  Accordingly, respondent’s reliance on Slater must be rejected.  **PRAYER FOR RELIEF:**  1.  Remand the matter and allow the parties to renegotiate the plea agreement in its entirety after all evidence is provided to defendant and his current counsel.  2.  If the parties are unwilling to reach a new plea agreement, then allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial.  Respectfully Submitted, /s/ [...]
[brief] [...] (“[...]”) graduated from [...] in May 2001 and served the [...] (the “[...]”) as a police officer for the next eighteen (18) years.  (T4 89:19-23).  In June 2014 he was involved in a motor vehicle accident while on duty and sustained severe injuries to his neck and back.  (T4 96:3-97:18).  [...] went out on medical leave for six (6) to eight (8) weeks and attended extensive physical therapy.  (T4 96:21-97:1).  Although he could have retired with a disability pension, [...] continued to work while in significant pain.  (T4 97:9-18).  The [...] terminated [...] via a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action (“FNDA”) dated April 18, 2019.
[brief] Here, the photographs of the cameras and of the yards and walkways plainly appear to be what they are “purported” to be -- photos taken in 2021 of those areas.  As defense counsel argued to the judge, the fact that no one can say for certain that in 2019 the cameras were there, or operational, or that the yards were exactly the same as they were in 2021 is not a matter of “authentication” or “relevance” but rather simply one of the appropriate weight to be ascribed to that evidence by the jury, not by the judge.  It is certainly logically relevant to - i.e., “having a tendency in reason to prove,” N.J.R.E. 401 -- a claim that a surveillance camera was present in 2019, or that a yard or walkway appeared a particular way in 2019, that that camera (or yard or walkway) appeared that way two years later in 2021.  It is not conclusive proof of that fact, but relevant evidence "need not be dispositive or even strongly probative in order to clear the relevancy bar."  State v. Cole, 229 N.J. 430, 447 (2017).  The decisions in Marroccelli and Hockett point directly to the correct result here.
[brief] Their testimony was not “rationally based on [their] perception” because they admitted to being unfamiliar with [...]’s appearance at the time of the offense, as none of them had seen him in over a decade beforehand.  Indeed, [...], the first witness to identify [...] in the BB gun video, had never seen [...] in person prior to trial.  (14T:202-20 to 203-7; 227-15 to 229-9)  [...] met [...] for the first time when he interrogated him after viewing the video.  (14T:227-6 to 229-6; 15T:20-20 to 22-7)  Three of [...]’s relatives who identified him in the surveillance footage from the BB gun incident all admitted to not having seen him since 2009 -- nearly a decade before the date of the footage and twelve years prior to trial.  (15T:161-12 to 162-18; 197-8 to 198-1; 208-22 to 209-8)  After identifying [...] in the video, his own mother [...] predicted she would not be able to identify him in the courtroom, before claiming she “vaguely” recognized him when the prosecutor asked him to remove his mask.  (15T:93-2 to 25)  After purporting to identify [...] in the video, his uncle [...] identified someone else in the courtroom as [...], before realizing his mistake after direct examination had concluded.  (15T:194-15 to 197-15)  Given the remote or nonexistent nature of these witnesses’ past interactions with [...], their testimony also could not “assist the jury” under the second prong of Rule 701.  Under the first Sanchez factor, “the nature, duration, and timing of the witness[es’] contacts” weighed overwhelmingly against admission of the identifications because none of the witnesses had contacts with [...] in the decade prior to the incident and [...] had no contact with [...] prior to trial.  Under the second Sanchez factor, none of the witnesses had knowledge of his appearance at the time of the offense.  Id. at 472.  The video was taken in 2018 -- much closer in time to the date of trial than to any of the witnesses’ prior interactions with [...].  The jury was fully capable of looking at [...] and determining if he resembled the person in the video.
[brief] Simonetti v. Selective Ins. Co., 372 N.J.Super. 421, 428 (App.  Div. 2004) (interpretation of an insurance policy “is a question of law which we decide independent of the trial court's conclusions”).  Finally, [...]’s application of a “manifestation” trigger of coverage to [...]’s claim, rather than the well-settled “continuous trigger” for cases involving continuous injurious exposure to harmful conditions, was an error of law and this Court’s review is, therefore, plenary.  Manalapan Realty, 140 N.J. at 378.  I.  The trial court erred as a matter of law by holding that “Appleman’s rule” regarding coverage for sequential causes of loss does not apply to GCL policies, such as the policies issued by [...].
[brief] THE DISMISSAL OF COUNT TWO SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE COURT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN ITS BASIS FOR DISMISSAL (T1, p. 17, Ins. 7-16).  Count Two alleged a violation of the CFA against the Developer for its leasing of Unit 74 from 1983 through April 7, 2016.  Its dismissal should be reversed because the lower court failed to explain its reasoning.  In this case, the Defendants admitted the Developer leased Unit 74 to the Association from June 1983 through April 7, 2016.  The Defendants also admitted that, during this time, the Developer knew Unit 74 was a common element and that it lacked marketable title.  Although the Court found that Section 8(e) authorized the sale of Unit 74, that does not necessarily speak to the issue of whether the Developer was authorized to lease Unit 74 to the Association.  According to the Condominium Act, the Plaintiff possesses the exclusive authority to manage and operate the common elements.  It is also permitted to the lease or license the common elements.  These rights belong only to the Association, and not to the Developer.  The Developer’s operation and leasing of Unit 74 to the Association is contrary to the Condominium Act.  The dismissal of Count Two should be reversed because the Developer lacked the authority to lease Unit 74, and the trial court did not provide any explanation justifying its dismissal.  III.
[brief] (T3).  The Defendant-Appellant had raised the issue of a *Mockler* charge prior to the trial and the court had held a decision on the request until after the trial.  (Da64-Da69).  Counsel for Defendant-Appellant argued:  The testimony was specifically that he was aware of the conditions of the roadway, he was taking his time, he was doing what a reasonably prudent person would have done in a situation that was presented to him.  And unfortunately he hit water, he hydroplaned, lost control of his car and hit the rear of her car.  (T3 303-2 through 303-8).  That’s exactly what *Mockler* is.  The court held that *Mockler* did not apply.  (T3 310-7 through T3 311-18).  The argument continued through T3 319.  (T3 311 through T3 319).  As a corollary, Plaintiff/Respondent argued in favor of a directed verdict on liability.  The court ultimately denied that motion.
[brief] ”  This is not “disparate impact” discrimination in which access to state benefits is unintentionally denied to people with particular protected characteristics.  Differential Discrimination involves following the law for “favored” minorities but blatantly ignoring statutory duties regarding other similarly situated (or worse off) “disfavored” minorities.  (As such, it can also be seen as a form of “hostile environment” or harassment toward the disfavored group.)  The Massachusetts Supreme Court has acknowledged in In Re McDonough, that judges don’t have enough training in mental disability issues to be “going it alone” on ADA issues.  Sometimes judges do have minimal expert reports but they may not comprehend the experts’ conclusions.  In this case, including prosecutors also, there should be some expert reports and/or training regarding “mental illness” before excluding people from PTI, even assuming that policy isn’t *per se* illegal.  The differential discrimination in this case has the following *prima facie* elements: 1) the relevant person with disabilities is a member of a historically under-served and derided minority; 2) persons with very similar disabilities\(^{14}\) can obtain numerous programs which give them efficient access to the Courts or programs; 3) the relevant person either receives little or no services or is put in an inappropriate program.  (Adapted from [...] elements for a hostile environment in *Victor v. State*, 203 N.J. 383, 409 (2010).
[brief] According to Webster’s dictionary, the word rummage means to make a thorough search or investigation or to engage in an undirected or haphazard search.  Why was the word RUMMAGE used in the police reports when it did not describe plaintiff’s act in transferring one bag from one car to another?  The word RUMMAGE was clearly used by the police officers in each report to mislead.  Furthermore, an officer's subjective, good-faith hunch does not justify an investigatory stop — even if that hunch proves correct.  See State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 8 (1997).  Plaintiff was not observed engaging in any illegal activity.
[directive] Attachments (Bail Schedules)  cc: Chief Justice [...] [...], Special Assistant Supreme Court Trial Court Administrators  Superior Court Judges Civil Division Managers Municipal Court Judges Municipal Division Managers  Attorney General [...]  Criminal Division Managers Public Defender [...] Family Division Managers [...], Chief of Staff Municipal Court Administrators and Deputy Administrators  AOC Directors and Assistant Directors [...], Chief Clerks of Court [...], Assistant Chief [...], Special Assistant [...]
[brief] 8  Vineland Constr. Co., Inc. v. Twp. of Pennsauken, 395 N.J. Super. 230, 256 (App. Div. 2007)...........................................................................  9  Woodlands Cmty. Ass'n v. Mitchell, 450 N.J. Super. 310, 319 (App. Div. 2017).........................................................................................  4 Statutes N.J.S.A. 10:4-6 et seq.................................................................................. 32 N.J.S.A. 40:49-2......................................................................................... 20, 31, 32 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 to -49 .......................................................................  5 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-6(b)(5)(c)....................................................................  14 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7 ............................................................................... 20, 32 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d)..........................................................................  21, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e)..........................................................................  7, 26, 31 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(f)..........................................................................  28, 29 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-14 ...........................................................................  14 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-14(a).......................................................................  6 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-15 ...........................................................................  7 Rules R. 4:46-2(c).............................................................................................  8  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] The Attorney General and the New Jersey Board of Nursing shall jointly establish a certification process for a forensic sexual assault nurse examiner.  a.  An applicant for certification as a forensic sexual assault nurse examiner shall be a registered professional nurse licensed in the State and in good standing with the New Jersey Board of Nursing, and shall have the following qualifications:  (1)  A minimum of two years of current nursing experience as defined by regulation of the Attorney General pursuant to section 17 of this act; (2) Certification verifying the completion of a forensic sexual assault nurse examiner training program that meets requirements established by the Attorney General and the New Jersey Board of Nursing; and (3)  Demonstrates clinical competence in performing a forensic sexual assault examination.  b.  The Attorney General and the New Jersey Board of Nursing shall certify an applicant who meets the requirements of subsection a. of this section as a certified forensic sexual assault nurse examiner.  A- 24  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
[brief] ** | 2015 WL 1181271 (App. Div. 2015) (unpublished) | 14 | | **Home Buyers Warranty vs. Roblyn Dev. Corp.** | 2006 WL 2190742 (App. Div. 2006) | 10, 13, 14 | | **Lawyers Guild Realty, Inc. vs. ICSD, L.L.C.** | 2009 WL 3429755 (App. Div. 2009) | 8, 9, 10 | Malick vs. Seaview Lincoln Mercury 398 N.J. Super. 182, 187 (App. Div. 2008) ..................................  6  Monmouth Lumber Co. vs. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. 21 N.J. 439, 452 (1956) .........................................................  4  Mount Holly State Bank vs. Mount Holly Washington Hotel, Inc.  220 N.J. Super. 506, 511 (App. Div. 1987) ...............................  27  Peoples Nat’l Bank vs. Fowler 73 N.J. 88, 101 (1977)  ............................................................  4  Salzman Sign Co. vs. Beck  10 N.Y. 2d, 63, 217 N.Y.S. 2d 55, 176 N.E. 2d 74, 76 (1961)  ...  10  Shelter System Group Corporation vs. Lanni Builders, Inc.  263 N.J. Super. 373, 376 (App. Div. 1993) ..............................  5, 6, 17 Swift & Co. vs. Smigel 115 N.J. Super. 391, 394 (App. Div. 1971) ............................... 26, 27 Rules R. 1:36-3 ................................................................................. 9, 10, 13 R. 4:46-1 ...............................................................................  17  APPENDIX
[brief] Plaintiff’s Chronic History of Serious Eye Disease Is an Independent Risk Factor for Blindness.  Plaintiff began treating with [...] in 2015 for a long list of eye problems going back years, including inadequately-controlled cystoid macular edema\(^7\) and non-infectious uveitis, all of which independently could lead to blindness.  (Da0045; Da0047, pp. 13, 60)  In addition to multiple Ozurdex® injections, Plaintiff had numerous eye surgeries and procedures, including: - an intraocular lens implant; - trabeculectomy (removing fluid to lower eye pressure); - two vitrectomies (to remove vitreous fluid in the back of her eye); and - implantation of a silicone-coated Retisert® tablet (that is 10 times the size of the 300-micron particulate).  (Da0346, ¶¶ 26, 81 n.3, 91)  Plaintiff also continued to smoke, despite consistent warnings over many years from her ophthalmologists that it worsened her chronic eye inflammation.  (Id., ¶ 91)  D.
[brief] 11 POINT I  DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF WAS IMPROPERLY DISMISSED WITHOUT THE APPROPRIATE INQUIRY.  HIS CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED.  (1T 33-13 to 34-5)  ..............................................................................................................  11 POINT II  DEFENDANT’S TWO STATEMENTS FOLLOWING HIS ARREST SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.  THEIR IMPROPER ADMISSION REQUIRES REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTION.  (8T 64-18 to 79-16; 5T 56-23 to 61-19; 11T 139-11 to 141-10, 160-2 to 22)  ..............................................................................................................  16  A.  The Detectives’ Questions Exceeded The Scope Of The Limited Booking Exception To Miranda  ..................................................  17  B.  Defendant Unambiguously Invoked His Right To Counsel.  ..............................................................................................................  20  C.  At Minimum, Repeated References To Defendant Contacting A Lawyer Should Not Have Been Played For The Jury.  ........................................................................  25  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[directive] Completion of the Order is detailed in step-by-step instructions listed on the Instructions page.  The Applicant must once more provide identifying · information and identify the date of the arrest/custody, the statute or ordinance the Applicant was charged with violating, and the complaint number of those charges for which expungement is sought.  The charge information will be identical to what the Applicant filled out on the Application.  The third step is for the Applicant to submit the Forms for Expungement of Arrest or Charge Records to the municipal court where those proceedings were adjudicated.  Submitted documents must include the completed Application, any available disposition printouts, and the completed Order.  The time period within which the Applicant must submit the completed documents is in the discretion of the municipal court.
[brief] “[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the [Fourteenth] Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)).  New Jersey courts have likewise held that all questions which must be determined by a petit jury under Apprendi must also be submitted to the grand jury and included in the indictment.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 1:1-1 4 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-2,(LRHL)  6  N.J.S.A. 40A:20-1, et seq.  (LTTEL)  5 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-2 5 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11 3, 4 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11a  10  N.J.S.A. 40A:20-12  5 RULES R.4:69-4 6  OTHER SOURCES
[brief] DEFENDANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO PLEAD RECOUPMENT OR SET-OFF (Not raised below)  Generally, an affirmative defense is required to be pleaded by a defendant.  However, when evidence is accepted by the court, which evidence contains defendant’s affirmative defense, courts have permitted a defendant to claim the affirmative defense, although not specifically initially pleaded.  Plaintiff’s Exhibits, which were accepted as evidence, contain proof that Defendant was entitled to the affirmative defense of recoupment or set-off.  Defendant’s proof is discussed in Section X herein, pages Db42 through Db49.
[brief] Further, it was not unreasonable for defendant to assume that the March 1, 2023 JOD order would be readily accessible to the trial court as the parties did not know in advance that the motion would be adjudicated by a judge who did not conduct the divorce trial.  It is inconceivable that the motion judge did not have the ability to retrieve the March 1, 2023 Judgement of Divorce order from the docket record.  Even if the judge believed that litigants had the responsibility to provide the court with a copy of the March 1 JOD order, he should have reserved his order, directed the parties to provide a copy of the March 1 order, and then adjudicated defendant’s request for distribution of marital assets as stipulated in the June 6, 2023 order.  Axiomatically, it is the responsibility of the judge, not the litigants, to ensure that trial court orders do not breach the jurisdictional limits imposed by Rule 2:9-1 during the pendency of an appeal.  The buck stops with the judge.
[brief] In the present action, the Concept Site Plans for the approved 2015 Application and the denied 2018 Amended Application offer even more.  The Concept Site Plan for the approved 2015 Application depicts a development which occupies the entirety of the Subject Property and advances the purposes of the VC-2 zone in which it is located.  See M103.  The Concept Site Plan for the denied 2018 Amended Application compresses all development and shoves it to the front portion of the Subject Property along State Highway 33.  See M014.  In the denied 2018 Amended Application, despite a reduction in the developable land on the Property, the Respondents did not reduce the number of proposed units from the approved 2015 Application; which necessitated countless variances not required in the approved 2015 Application.  Despite the readily apparent differences between these two Concept Site Plan, the Trial Court obligated the Board to equate the two applications and approve the 2018 Amended Application merely because it approved the first.