ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] However, the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to the discovery rule cannot occur unless and until a *Lopez* hearing is conducted.  A *Lopez* hearing provides an opportunity for plaintiffs, defendants, and trial courts to identify, evaluate, and weigh all equitable claims before determining the date upon which a plaintiff became aware of the facts giving rise to the cause of action.  *Lopez*, 62 N.J. at 274.  Moreover, even were the discovery rule applicable in deciding the Respondents’ motions to dismiss, the trial court additionally erred by failing to afford the Appellant an opportunity to demonstrate the equitable factors that would establish tolling the statute of limitations.
[directive] Konte Leta Noujèze Divizyon  Dwa State of New Jersey Law Division County  Nimewo Dosye Akizasyon Indictment No. kont versus Avi ba akize Konfòmeman a N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b  Defandè Revokasyon Egzijib Privilèj pou Kondwi
[directive] Você terá antecedentes criminais?  [Sim/Yes]  [Não/No]  You will have a criminal record?  b.  A menos que o acordo de declaração de culpa estipule outros termos, você poderá ser [Sim/Yes]  [Não/No] condenado a servir o tempo máximo de reclusão, a pagar a multa máxima e a pagar a taxa máxima referente ao Setor de Indenização às Vítimas de Crimes (VCCO)?  Unless the plea agreement provides otherwise, you could be sentenced to serve the maximum time in confinement, to pay the maximum fine and to pay the maximum [...] Assessment?  c.  Você deverá pagar a taxa mínima de $50 referente ao Setor de Indenização a Vítimas [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] (VCCO) (um mínimo de $100 caso seja condenado por crime de violência) para cada acusação para a qual se declarar culpado?  (A multa é de $30 se o crime ocorreu entre 9 de janeiro de 1986 e 22 de dezembro de 1991, inclusive.  Se o crime ocorreu antes de 1º de janeiro de 1986 a multa é de $25).  You must pay a minimum [...] Assessment of $50 ($100 minimum if you are convicted of a crime of violence) for each count to which you plead guilty?
[brief] [...] is wrong that the trial court specifically ordered the parties to produce materials that are not relevant because it determined that mandatory production of irrelevant materials is permitted in the ESI context.  (Db13-17, Db23-24.)  Not only does [...] mischaracterize the trial court’s thoughtful order, but it erroneously compares the present case to the extreme set of circumstances presented in Lipsky v. New Jersey Association of Health Plans, Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 447, 451-52 (App. Div. 2023), on which it principally relies.  As explained above, the trial court’s clearly expressed reason for ordering its discovery protocol was to ensure that all relevant documents are produced.
[brief] Similarly, the case law cited by Appellee in its summary judgment argument in the Court below is inapposite to this matter, as follows.  First, in support of its summary judgment argument below, Defendant cited the case of Cedeno v. Montclair State University for the proposition that there is a statutory bar to holding an employment position.  However, that case is distinguishable from the matter before the Court, in two ways.  In Cedeno, the plaintiff had been convicted of bribery in the course of public employment and was therefore barred from holding future government positions under the Forfeiture Statute.  Cedeno v. Montclair State Univ., 163 N.J. 473 (2000) (citing N.J.S.A. § 2C:52-2d).  Cedeno is distinguishable, as follows.
[brief] ”  Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 663 (10th ed. 2014)).  The buyer’s obligation to pay an agreed-upon price is “an essential element of all sales. ”  Associates Discount Corp. v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 183, 187 (1966); see also [...] v. [...], DOCKET NO. [...], 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 235, at *11 (App. Div. Feb. 10, 2021) (“The amount of compensation . . . is an essential term of any contract. ”); [...] v. [...], DOCKET NO. [...], 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 671, at *6 (App. Div. Mar. 18, 2011) (“Price is an essential term of a contract, as to which there must be a clear manifestation of mutual assent. ”).  In Rauch, the Appellate Division affirmed a decision in part by the Hon. [...] holding that an oral, tape-recorded agreement between parents and their son for the sale of equity in a business was unenforceable because there were essential terms missing, including the assumption of corporate liabilities and debts, as well as the treatment of preexisting encumbrances.
[brief] The dismissal was warranted in Fik-Rymarkiewicz, moreover, because the plaintiff literally refused to produce admittedly available and relevant discovery to the defendant.  The Appellate Division noted, “Plaintiff failed to respond to the defense's document demands for tax documents and the name of her immigration attorney. ”  Plaintiff “cancelled her fourth deposition date selected by the judge as well”; “she had failed to respond to defendant's document demands. ”  The trial court in Fik-Rymarkiewicz, supra, 430 N.J. Super. 469, had compelled plaintiff “to produce the three items referenced in the court's September 8, 2010 order (documents pertaining to her publications; tax returns for years 2005–2008; and the name of her immigration attorney),” yet the plaintiff refused to do so.  The Appellate Division stressed in affirming the dismissal sanction, “Plaintiff’s fourth deposition occurred on April 15, 2010.  At this proceeding, plaintiff testified for the first time that she shredded her 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 tax returns.  Plaintiff indicated that she did not shred her 2008 tax returns, but she refused to produce them because ‘2008 doesn't apply to the time I was working in [...]'s lab. ’  Plaintiff also refused to produce her 2009 tax returns for the same reason.  Plaintiff was adamant that even if the records existed, ‘I will never produce my tax returns for you. ’”  It was on that record evidence that the Appellate Division agreed “that plaintiff’s ‘refusal to comply [with the discovery demands]’ was ‘deliberate and contumacious,’ and that, under the totality of the circumstances of this case, the sanctions imposed were not unjust or unreasonable.
[brief] *Banco Popular No. Am. v. Gandi*, 184 N.J. 161, 175 (2005).  The precise definition of common-law fraud consists of five specific components: (1) a material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by defendant of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other person; (5) resulting damages or harm to the other person.  *Id.* at 172-173.  In the context of an application for annulment, there been very few reported opinions interpreting this statutory provision.  The decisional law of New Jersey has not specifically defined what is meant by the "essentials" of the marital relationship, and that there is an absence of judicial guidelines in this area.  *Costello v. Porzelt*, 116 N.J. Super 380, 383-384 (Ch. Div., 1971).
[directive] Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  (2)  Theft constitutes a crime of the third degree if: (a)  The amount involved exceeds $500.00 but is less than $75,000.00; (b)  The property stolen is a firearm, motor vehicle vessel, boat, horse, domestic companion animal or airplane; 2C:20-2  Grading of theft (continued) offenses  (c)  The property stolen is a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog (continued) as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-2 and the amount involved is less than $75,000.00 or is undetermined and the quantity is one kilogram or less; (d)  It is from the person of the victim; (e) It is in breach of an obligation by a person in his capacity as a fiduciary; (f) It is by threat not amounting to extortion; (g)  It is of a public record, writing or instrument kept, filed or deposited according to law with or in the keeping of any public office or public servant; 40  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] While the State has very ambitious climate policies for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and the Clean Energy Act of 2018 mandates energy use reduction by utilities’ customers,\(^9\) the exact timeline of when the State will transition away from natural gas is unknown, but it will certainly not happen overnight.  In fact, the [...] recently held a two-day technical conference concerning the implementation of Executive Order 317 to examine the reduction of emissions in the natural gas sector in the State. \(^10\)  The proceeding is the beginning of the formal stakeholder engagement that is expected to frame the policy and technical considerations of the future of natural gas.  \textit{Id.}  --- \(^8\)
[brief] The lease provided, in pertinent part, as follows:  1.  **Term and Rent.**  Lessor demises the above premises for a term of three years commencing on January 1, 2014 and terminating on December 31, 2016...[subject to extensions set forth on Pa507 and Pa872]  2.  **Use.**  Lessee shall use and occupy the premises for a real estate office.  The premises shall be used for no other purpose.  3.  **Care and Maintenance of Premises.**  Lessee acknowledges that the premises are in good order and repair, unless otherwise indicated herein.  Lessee shall, at his own expense and at all times, maintain the premises in good and safe condition, including plate glass, electrical wiring, plumbing and heating installations, and any other system or equipment upon the premises and shall surrender the same, at termination hereof, in as good condition as received, normal wear and tear excepted.  Lessee shall be responsible for all repairs required, excepting the roof, exterior walls, structural foundations, and: [blank] which shall be maintained by Lessor.  Lessee shall also maintain in good condition such portions adjacent to the premises, such as sidewalks, driveways, lawns and shrubbery, which would otherwise be required to be maintained by Lessor.
[brief] To allow some, but not all, of the information to be presented to the jury is irrational.  As in Hannah, “the issue is not whether the State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to return a guilty verdict, but whether [defendant] was denied the opportunity to present a full defense—to present evidence that would have allowed the jury to return a not-guilty verdict. ”  Hannah, 248 N.J. at 190.  Maybe, like the State and the trial court, the jury would reject the inference that two people who were selling two versions of the same drug in an area “well-known” for “drug trafficking” and “weapons offenses” would have a rivalry that lead to a shooting.  (9T 124-18 to 125-3)  But maybe the jury would credit it.  Maybe the jury would think that the presence of that person’s fingerprints on the getaway car suggested he was recently in that car, perhaps the day of the murder.  Maybe it wouldn’t.  But that was for the jury to decide.  By withholding this information from the jury, the trial court precluded [...] from presenting a complete defense and prevented the jury from a full and fair assessment of his guilt.  His convictions must be reversed.
[brief] 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................  7  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT ONE .............................................................  23  THE TRIAL JUDGE  ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO RECUSE HIMSELF ON THE REMAND TRIAL AFTER MAKING CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS ON THE CASE AND WITNESSES.  THE PREDISPOSITIONS WERE EVIDENCED IN THE REMAND DETERMINATION/OPINION, AND SHOULD INVALIDATE THAT OPINION/ORDER (APPEALS FROM ORDERS DENYING MOTION FOR RECUSAL Da974, AND FINAL ORDER Da978, Da1004)
[brief] The Second Count of the underlying complaint was entitled Assault, and alleged that [...] assaulted each of the individual underlying plaintiffs, again listing [...]’ specific conduct alleged to constitute assault:  a.  Defendant committed an assault against [...] by screaming at him approximately one foot from his face, pinning him against a truck and placing him in fear of imminent battery; b.  Defendant committed an assault against [...] by word and deed designed to scare her, placing her in fear of imminent battery.  The actions of the Defendant included, staring at her angrily, insulting her, leaning over her desk to put his face closer to hers, then standing up to tower over her, blocking her exit, and refusing to leave her office when [...] demanded that he do so, even after saying on 3 occasions that if he did not leave, she would call the police; c.  Defendant committed an assault against Board Members [...], [...] and [...] by, immediately after Defendant's release from arrest for creating a disturbance at the Association's Annual Meeting, and resisting arrest, returned to the Association clubhouse, driving at high speed, storming up to the clubhouse door, which [...] closed in front of them as he approached, and threatened the Board Members, placing them in fear of imminent battery.  (Pa188-Pa189, ¶¶ 17, 18, 19).
[brief] [...]’s argument misstates the facts: [...] did not, as [...] claims, file a declaratory judgment action in federal court in November 2021, “a month after [...] filed this suit[.]”  [...] filed suit in federal court on February 16, 2022 (020Da) – nearly three months after [...] had obtained its first “Final Judgment [sic] by Default” against [...] (PPCIa076-079).  In fact, [...] argued in the federal court action that it had been prejudiced, both by [...]’s failure to have notified [...] about the filing of the [...] lawsuit and by having allowed a final judgment by default to have been entered against it (012Da-013Da).  B.
[brief] The existing structures were electrified when in use by [...]’s predecessor, [...] (Da512 at ¶¶19-20).  The existing electrical lines run along the roadway in question, extending beyond Challenger Lot to the south (Da512 at ¶20).  The electric company maintains its easement to service those electrical lines via the same roadway (See id.).  Shortly after purchasing the Challenger Lot, [...] introduced himself to the [...] and informed them that he would be bringing in contractors via the roadway to perform percolation and other testing (Da512 at ¶18).  On the last day that [...]’s contractors were on site, [...] advised that they were not permitted to be on the roadway and that Respondent’s right to use the roadway had been extinguished in connection with a prior lawsuit brought by a previous owner of the Challenger Lot, [...] (“[...]”) (Da512 at ¶22).
[brief] After a brief divergence into a stricter exigency standard,\(^3\) the Court confirmed in State v. Witt that the Alston and Martin cases created the precedential automobile exception law in New Jersey.  223 N.J. 409, 447 (2015).  “[W]e return to the standard that governed automobile searches in Alston—a standard that is more in line with the jurisprudence of most other jurisdictions, yet still protective of the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches. ”  Id. at 415.  It recognized prior precedent, noting that the Alston case accepted the standard created by Carroll and Chambers and that the Martin case “affirmed that we were keeping faith with the Chambers paradigm. ”  Id. at 427, 429.  Nothing in Carroll, Chambers, Alston, or Martin supports defendant’s position that officers must stop and obtain a warrant because they have accurately suspected the evidence they will find.  Nor does Witt, in reaffirming the precedence of these cases, require this.  To the contrary, these cases confirm \(^3\) The Supreme Court in State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657, 670 (2000), and then again in State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), “imposed a full-blown exigency analysis” that eliminated the automobile exception in nearly every case.
[brief] (9/8/14 CCIP Manual, Pa582; 4/16/15 CCIP Manual, Pa510).  Further, it specifically addresses subcontractors performing work at the Project but who are “Parties Not Covered”, including certain vendors, suppliers, truckers, contractors, delivery services companies and “any subcontractor of any tier” which [...], “at their sole discretion,” opts to exclude.  (4/16/15 CCIP Manual, Pa516; 9/8/14 CCIP Manual, Pa588.)  The CCIP Manual also provides certain requirements for these “nonparticipating subcontractors” before working at the Project, including, as [...] did, providing “the Program Administrator [] the insurance certificate(s) and endorsement(s) as required in the Contract. ”  (4/16/15 version at Pa516; and 9/8/14 version at Pa588.)  Plaintiffs admit that “certain early work done on the Ritz Hotel retaining wall in August 2015” was excluded demolition work, however, Plaintiffs argue that [...] was enrolled in the CCIP going forward, including for demolition work on the date of the Accident, even though that work was a continuation of the August 2015 Ritz Hotel retaining wall work.
[brief] In reviewing the granting of [...]’s cross-motion for summary judgment under Rule 4:46, the Court employs a de novo standard.  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 59 (2015).  The Trial Court properly found that the “record demonstrates that Defendant [...] does not owe a duty to Plaintiff here. ”  Pa33.  “In New Jersey, as elsewhere, it is widely accepted that a negligence cause of action requires the establishment of four elements: (1) a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) actual and proximate causation, and (4) damages. ”  Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Util. Co., 212 N.J. 576, 594 (2013).  Generally, “the question of whether a duty exists is a matter of law properly decided by the court. ”  Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem’l Hosp., 109 N.J. 523, 529 (1988).  Furthermore, contractual interpretation is a legal matter ordinarily suitable for resolution on summary judgment.  Celanese Ltd. v. Essex Cty. Improvement Auth., 404 N.J. Super. 514, 528 (App. Div. 2009).  Thus, here, the issue of whether [...] owed plaintiffs a duty of care is a question of law.  Tarabokia, 429 N.J. Super. at 106 (stating that “the scope of the duty of care is a question of law”).  Because no material facts were genuinely in dispute, this matter was ripe for summary judgment.
[brief] The Unlawful Activity (PA00001-PA000015)............................24  b.  Plaintiff Engaged In Protected Activity (PA000006-PA000010)....30  c.  The Adverse Employment Action (PA000006-PA000011)............31 d. The Causal Connection (PA000009-PA000011)..........................33 C. The Pierce Claim (PA000006-PA000009).....................................35 V. CONCLUSION.............................................................................38 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. Of Educ., | | | 138 N.J. 405 (1994) | 20 | | Beasley v. Passaic County, | | | 377 N.J. Super. 585 (Sup. Ct. 2005) | 32 | | Calloway v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., | | | No. 98-669, 2000 WL 1251909 (D. Del. Aug. 8, 2000) | 31 | | Cortes v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., | | | 391 F. Supp. 2d 298 (D.N.J. 20015) | 31, 32 | | Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem'l Park, | | | 43 N.J. Super. 244, 128 A.2d 281 (App. Div. 1957) | 2, 19 | | DiProspero v. Penn, | | | 183 N.J. 477 (2005) | 20 | | Donelson v. DuPont Chambers Works, | | | 206 N.J. 243 (2011) | 20 | | Dzwonar v. McDevitt, | | | 177 N.J. 451 (2003) | passim | | Flinn v. Amboy Nat. Bank, | | | 436 N.J. Super. 274 (App. Div. 2014) | 18 | | Gonzalez v. State Apportionment Comm'n, | | | 428 N.J. Super. 333, 53 A.3d 1230 (App. Div. 2012) | 18 | | Green v. Morgan Properties, | | | 215 N.J. 431, 73 A.3d 478 (2013) | passim | | Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., | | | 129 N.J. 81 (1992) | 37 | | Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc., | | | 218 N.J. 8 (N.J. 2014) | 24, 27, 30 | Ivan v. County of Middlesex, 595 F. Supp. 2d 425 (Dist. Ct. 2009) ..................................................................................32
[brief] (Aa26).  DCF investigated the allegations in [...]’s complaint, which centered around [...]’s alleged gender identity discrimination on September 9, 2022, when [...] refused to refer to [...] by her preferred name even after she corrected him several times.  (Aa20; Aa26-28).  Specifically, [...] claimed that in August 2022, she agreed to help a friend run for [...] president against [...], which included obtaining signatures for her friend’s petition.  (Aa26).  On September 8, 2022, [...] obtained signatures—after work hours and outside of the [...] building—as petitions were due to [...] the next day.  Ibid.  Still short on signatures, [...] returned to the [...] property between 7:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. on September 9.  Ibid.  While [...] was collecting signatures, [...] approached her and said, “Hey, D[].”  Ibid.  [...] immediately corrected [...]: “Actually, it is D[a].”  Ibid.  After [...] corrected [...], he questioned what [...] was doing; [...] explained that she was obtaining signatures for the upcoming union election.  Ibid.  [...] then made comments about [...] being “anti-union” and being fired as a shop-steward; he also started yelling: “Don’t sign this, he is against the Union, he is not a member, and he was fired. ”  Ibid.  [...] repeatedly referred to D[a]. as D[.], and used masculine pronouns, which [...] corrected each time.  (Aa26-27).  At one point, [...] yelled, “D[], D[], D[], D[].” (Aa27).  [...] also physically put his hands over [...]’s papers so no one could sign the petition.  Ibid.  Because she felt “threatened and bullied” by [...], [...] contacted building security for assistance.  Ibid.  Building security advised that it would not get involved because it was a “union issue,” so [...] called the [...] ([...]).  Ibid.  Though [...] responded, they also recommended that [...] call the [...] ([...]) since they were on State property.  Ibid.  [...] arrived and diffused the situation by separating [...] and [...]
[brief] Appellant presented the testimony of numerous loved ones at his sentencing hearing, who all testified to [...]’s character and that this conduct does not represent who he is as a person.  (8T5:15-8:16).  [...] also spoke the sentencing, reiterating that while he maintains his version of events regarding what occurred that evening, he understands that what he did was wrong.  He further explained that he attempted to take responsibility for this conduct and told the State from the outset that he would plead guilty to any charges consistent with what actually occurred that evening, but the State was not interested.  (8T12:2-4).  The sentencing court did not feel these statements warranted addressing Mitigating Factors 9 and 12.  Ultimately, the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing [...] to a term of eight (8) years, which fell on the higher end of the sentencing range, without appropriate justification set forth on the record.  [...] had never before been incarcerated, and the “strong” need for deterrence was not present where he had never before been afforded the benefit of a lesser sentence.  The only other factor cited by the trial court in support of an aggravated sentence was [...]’s record of violating garbage collection ordinances.  There was no reason, absent abuse of discretion, why an individual with almost no criminal history, involved in an offense that did not result in any violence or physical harm, would deserve an aggravated sentence such as was imposed here.
[brief] ”  In Toxaway Hotel Co. v. J.L. Smathers & Co., 216 U.S. 439 (1910), the Court provided an overly simplistic analysis of this phrase included in a bankruptcy statute that did not consider any factors that [...] would need to consider in determining whether an attorney is “principally engaged” in performing debt adjustment services.  In Priolo v. Shorrock Garden Care Ctr., 2016 WL 4350133 (App. Div. Sept. 20, 2022), the court merely recited a statutory provision containing the phrase “engaged principally” without any analysis of the phrase.  Further demonstrating the lack of support these cases and statutes cited by Defendants provide is the decision in Securities Indus.