ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] I COMPLAINANT'S INITIATION OF AND CONTINUED PROSECUTION OF THESE PROCEEDINGS  CONSTITUTE A BLATANT ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMVENT THE ELECTION PROCESS AND TO CURTAIL RESPONDENT'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS.  At the outset, it is respectfully submitted that the Court must view this action in context.  It is obvious that Complainants have initiated these proceedings because they disagree with Respondent's views.  If Respondent's views make her unsuitable to serve as a member of the Board, the remedy lies in the election polls, not in proceedings before the Commission.  In its Final Decision, the Commission correctly grasped this reality.
[brief] (7)  Off-street parking shall not be provided for any use or to any party other than a resident or visitor of the site, nor shall parking areas be used for any purpose other than parking.  (8)  Signage shall be provided where parking spaces are to be reserved for residents.  Visitor parking shall be signed and painted for each space designated for such a purpose.  (9)  Loading shall be provided in accordance with § 230-204.  (10)  Overnight parking of commercial vehicles shall be prohibited.  D.
[brief] dated August 15, 1956, and recorded on August 16, 1956 in deed book 3429, page 161, the [...], conveyed land including what is now Lot 3 to [...], [...] and [...] (collectively, “[...]”).  Da51.  The description of the land conveyed in the 1956 Hrubec-to-[...] deed did not include the Strip.  By deed dated April 6, 1966, and recorded on the same day in deed book 4160, page 55, the [...] conveyed the greater part of what is now Lot 4, including the majority of the Strip, to [...]  (“[...]”).  Da55.  By deed dated March 26, 1966, and recorded on April 7, 1966 in deed book 4160, page 187, [...], husband and wife, conveyed the rest of what is now Lot 4, including the rest of the Strip, to [...].  Da58.  The stage was then set for the key development in this controversy.  II.  The 1967 Subdivision  In 1967, [...] apparently arranged with its neighbor, by this time [...] (“[...]”), [...]’s successor-in-title, to subdivide its Lot 4 to create the Strip and deed it to [...] Pa86.  Meanwhile, [...] would deed to [...] a roughly equal-sized parcel of land adjacent to Lot 4, which the parties in this matter took to calling the “Bump. ”  Id.  No documentation of that transaction has been located other than a June 26, 1967, map of what were at that time designated as Lots 1 and 2H of Block 84 (the “1967 Subdivision”). \(^2\)  Id.  The planning board and the Mayor of West Caldwell signed and approved that proposed subdivision.  Id.  Tellingly, the signed and approved 1967 Subdivision identifies the land corresponding to the Strip as land “to be subtracted from Lot 1 [now part of Lot 4] and added to Lot 1-A [now Lot 3]” and as land “to be subtracted from Lot 2H [the rest of Lot 4] and added to Lot 1-A [now Lot 3]. ”  Id.  The document also indicates that the parcel known as the Bump was “to be added to Lot 1 [now Lot 4]. ”  Id.  The signed and approved 1967 Subdivision therefore evinces the unequivocal intent of [...], predecessor-in-title to [...] as to Lot 4, and [...], predecessor-in-title to [...], to exchange the two parcels, the Strip in exchange for the Bump.
[brief] Even if the Appellate Division elects to rule on the sufficiency of the Plaintiff’s expert reports without the benefit of such a ruling from the Trial Court, and even if the expert reports were arguendo ruled to be deficient, the Defendants’ negligence is still properly presented to the jury under the common knowledge exception.  “This Court has fashioned an exception to the Affidavit of Merit requirement for cases in which the alleged conduct or failure to act, if accepted as true, would be readily cognizable, by a person of average intelligence, as a failure to exercise the appropriate standard of care. ”  Cowley v. Virtua Health System, 242 N.J. 1, 8 (2020).  The reason for the exception is that “in limited cases where a person of reasonable intelligence can use common knowledge to determine that there was a deviation from a standard of care, an expert is no more qualified to attest to the merit of a plaintiff’s malpractice claim than a non-expert. ”  Id. at 8-9.  In the instant matter, the Defendants’ negligence includes the disbursement of Plaintiff’s funds without securing title, and the issuance of title insurance to the wrong party.  Certainly no expert is required to explain to a jury that these fundamental errors are deviations from the relevant standard of care.  VI.
[brief] 10  Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 214 N.J. 384 (2013) .............................................................................  7,8  City of Ocean City v. Maffucci, 326 N.J. Super. 1, (App Div.1999) .......................................................  8  Creanga v. Jardal, 185 N.J. 345 (2005)  ............................................................................  9  Graziano v. Grant, 326 N.J. Super. 328(App. Div. 1999) ...................................................  7 Johnson v. Salem Corp., 92 N.J. 78 (1984) .................................................................  10  Manning Eng’g v. Hudson Cty. Park Comm’n, 74 N.J. 113 (1977) .................................................................. 5 Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. 385 (App. Div. 2002) ........................................ 10 Rubanik v. Witco Chem. Corp., 242 N.J. Super. 36 (App. Div. 1990) ....................................... 10 State v. Freeman, 223 N.J. Super. 92 (App. Div. 1988) ....................................... 9 State, by Com’r Of Transp. v. Carroll, 123 N.J. 308 (1991) .................................................................. 13,14 State. v. Silver, 92 N.J. 507 (1983) .................................................................. 13 State v. William G. Rohrer, Inc. 80 N.J. 462 (1979) .................................................................. 14 Constitution U.S. Const. amend. v; xiv .......................................................... 6 N.J. Const. art. 1, par. 20 .......................................................... 6 Court Rules R. 4:50-2 .................................................................................. 5 R. 4:50-1(f) .............................................................................. 5 INDEX TO THE AMENDED APPENDIX VOLUME I (Da1 to Da189) Verified Complaint Filed 09/05/18 ...........................................
[directive] Giving heightened priority to those who are central to the health care and public health response.  Individuals who perform tasks that are vital to the response, including those whose work directly supports the provision of acute care to others, should be given heightened priority.  The specifics of how to operationalize this consideration will depend on the exact nature of the heath care and public health emergency.  Options include subtracting points from the priority score for these individuals or using it as a tiebreaker criterion (see below).  This category should be broadly construed to include those individuals who play a critical role in the chain of treating patients and maintaining societal order.  However, it would not be appropriate to prioritize front- line and not prioritize other front-line clinicians (e.g., nurses and respiratory physicians therapists) and other key personnel (e.g., maintenance staff that disinfects hospital rooms).  Giving heightened priority to those who have had the least chance to live through life’s stages:
[brief] But the jury was never told that, alone, none of that evidence was sufficient to support a finding that defendant was guilty as an accomplice to robbery, because all of those events occurred after force had been used to obtain the victim's debit card. \(^2\)  Defendant's conviction as an accomplice to first-degree robbery must be reversed because, under the circumstances here, the omission of a Whitaker charge was plain error that had the capacity to bring about an unjust result.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) provides:  d.  No damages shall be awarded against a public entity or public employee for pain and suffering resulting from any injury; provided, however, that this limitation on the recovery of damages for pain and suffering shall not apply in cases of permanent loss of a bodily function, permanent disfigurement or dismemberment where the medical treatment expenses are in excess of $3,600.00.  For purposes of this section medical treatment expenses are defined as the reasonable value of services rendered for necessary surgical, medical and dental treatment of the claimant for such injury, sickness or disease, including prosthetic devices and ambulance, hospital or professional nursing service.  It is axiomatic that a claim for permanent loss of a bodily function under the Tort Claims Act (there is no issue of disfigurement or dismemberment) may be asserted and proven only through expert testimony and that claims for emotional distress, including such items as depression, fear and anxiety, are barred by the verbal threshold provisions of the TCA.
[brief] (1T26:17-9)  [...] testified as follows:  In fact, I am going to limit my comments to the fact that I am in attendance and listened to the testimony and I'm offering from experience, what I would recommend to my Boards and that is that in any case of use variance, the applicant is required to provide special reasons.  The applicant is required to provide testimony as to how the purposes of zoning are advanced by the grant of the variance that is being requested.  For a use variance, the applicant is also required to provide site suitability test; why is this use particularly well suited for this site.  I did not hear any of that testimony.  Perhaps the applicant put their qualifications on the record and give the Board a qualified professional testimony as to those aspects of the variance application before you or bring a professional with them to do that at another time.
[directive] Other Provisions  Non-enforceability by third parties.  A.  This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney General’s authority to supervise operations of the Department.  This Directive imposes limitations that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.  Severability.  B.  The provisions of this Directive shall be severable.  If any phrase, clause, sentence, or provision of this Directive is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of the document shall not be affected.  Questions.  C.  Any questions concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Directive shall be addressed to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or their designee.  Effective date.  D.  This Directive shall take effect immediately and shall be prospective in its effect, such that prosecutions for acts or omissions occurring during the period when Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2020-03 was in effect shall remain governed by its terms.
[directive] In the case of a DWI violation, case law has long held that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard can be met based exclusively upon the observational testimony of the arresting officer that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated or under the influence.  This last element, while intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol or drugs, can be based upon the officers testimony of his/her observations of the defendant, admissions by the defendant, field sobriety tests, and the training and/or experience of the officer in dealing with intoxicated persons.  State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 165-166 (1964); State v. Guerrido, 60 N.J. Super. 505, 510 (App. Div. 1960); State v. Hudes, 128 N.J. Super. 589, 608 (Bergen Cty. Ct. 1974).
[brief] Perth Amboy, N.J., Zoning and Land Dev. Code, c. 430 (2005).  Therefore, the trial judge ruled, defendants' notice identifying the "Municipal Clerk" as the office where their application was available for inspection, was improper under the statute.  This failure to comply with the statutory notice requirements deprived the Board of jurisdiction to hear defendants' application.  Pa95 * 1-2.  Affirming, the appellate panel quoted with approval the trial court's observation that "[a]ppropriate notice to the public . . . is jurisdictional.  Defective notice does not vest the [B]oard with jurisdiction to hear the application."  Pa95 * 2.  Thus, even though members of the public could have viewed the application at the municipal clerk's office (per the notice), and even though anyone going to the 'wrong' place could have been directed to the right 'place,' the fact remained that the applicants failed to identify the location as required by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11.  Whereas [...] did not seem concerned about the jurisdictional issue, counsel for [...] specially brought the defective notice to the attention of the Board and the Applicant.  Instead of adjourning the proceedings so that proper notice could issue, the defendants stubbornly proceeded in violation of a crucial MLUL requirement.  The trial court opinion does not address Pavlovsky.  Rather, at Pa55 n. 6, the judge cited Quick Plus Realty, LLC v. City of Bridgeton Zoning Bd., No. A- 4S09-17T4, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1360, at *8 (Super. Ct. App. Div. June 13, 2019).  Cf. Rule. 1:36-3.  Quick Plus Realty was not "attached" to the slip opinion (see Pa55 n. 6)⁸; the undersigned was unaware of the case.  Quick Plus is in any event distinguishable.
[brief] ”  (T24-8 to -11.)  In expressing their support for the court’s earlier directive, [...] once again stated their concern, based on past experience, that allowing [...] to perform a relevancy review would result in excessive redactions.  (E.g., T12-21 to 13-5, T20-6 to -17.)  One counsel for [...] noted that in other cases [...] had “redacted about sixty percent of what they’ve produced,” so that counsel did not “know what’s in [[...]’s documents].”  (T12-21 to 13-5.)  Another counsel for [...] noted that in a Pennsylvania case, [...]’s redactions left the documents produced “in large part . . . in virtually unusable form because there’s page after page that has been blacked out and it’s [impossible] for us to even present an argument about whether it’s relevant or not because no one can see what it is. ”  (T20-6 to -17.)  The trial court reaffirmed its earlier ruling that the search terms agreed to by the parties would be the basis for the discovery of the ESI in their possession.
[brief] [...] had called [...] into his office that evening and the two continued to discuss splitting the properties.  [...] mocked [...] during that conversation about not being “good at business” because he could not collect money – a criticism that [...] acknowledged.  At various points during the chat, [...] became dismissive and told [...] that [...] would not get anything from [...] as part of a deal.  (5T71:16 to 72:24).  --- 4
[brief] As in this case, the Defendant in Little relied heavily on the fact that plaintiff crossed the street outside of the crosswalk, violating N.J.S.A. 39:4-33.1.  The Court, however, reminded us that “a plaintiff uses property with due care when: 1) the condition of the property poses a danger to the general public when used in a reasonable and foreseeable manner; and 2) when the plaintiffs conduct is not "so unreasonable" that the property cannot reasonably be said to have caused the injury. ”  Id.  The Court stated that the fact that the Plaintiff was outside of the crosswalk did not preclude a finding of due care because the plaintiff was unaware of the existence of the defect and that plaintiffs actions were reasonable from a community perspective.
[brief] Plaintiff/Appellant filed a Complaint on August 4, 2021 bearing Docket NO.: [...] against Defendant/Respondent, [...].  Da01-Da07.  An Answer on behalf of Defendant/Respondent, [...] was filed on September 15, 2021.  Da08-Da15.  Discovery took place thereafter and expired on March 23, 2023.  On March 2, 2023, Defendant/Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that Plaintiff/Appellant failed to provide objective medical evidence of a permanent injury(ies) which would overcome the verbal threshold.  Da16-Da34.  Following Oral Argument, the Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on March 31, 2023.  Da35-Da36.  On April 19, 2023, Plaintiff/Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration.  Da37-Da47.  Same was denied on an Order dated July 3, 2023.  Da48-Da53.  The Order granting Summary Judgment and the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration are the basis of this Appeal.
[brief] The Borough and the Redevelopers executed a Redevelopment Agreement dated June 27, 2016.  [114A]  That redevelopment Agreement is the product of negotiations between the municipality and the Redeveloper.  Id.  Subsequently, the Redeveloper made applications to the [...] to permit the development of Block 419, Lots 1,2,3,4, 6.01, 6.02, 7, 8, 9, and 10 with a “mixed use” development consisting of ground floor retail, one hundred forty seven (147) residential units, a parking garage and other amenities.  Id.  The plan presented by the redeveloper was entirely consistent with the redevelopment plan that had previously been negotiated.
[brief] (9T115-16 to 9T116-9; 9T116-15 to 19; 9T116-22 to 25; 9T117-1 to 4; 9T134-12 to 17; 9T134-22 to 9T135-9; 9T135-18 to 9T136-2; 9T136-12 to 21; 9T138-2 to 12; 10T210-15 to 10T211-2).
[brief] B.  CEP  Defendants Should Be Reinstated On September 25, 2019, [...] filed their first motion for summary judgment, and relief was denied by Order filed November 22, 2019.  On July 30, 2021, [...] filed their second, impermissible summary judgment under Rule 4:46 while they also filed a motion for failure to state a valid claim under Rule 4:6-2(e) a week later on August 5, 2021.  Their “second bite of the apple” was procedurally unfair.  Substantively, the CEP defendants sought a “trial on the papers,” and sought to weasel out of their exposure to trial based upon their fraudulent intentions.  Because their fraudulent state of mind was implicated, any dismissal should have been denied as a fact issue.  Their intentions are stated cryptically in their repeated false representations to the [...], following their deliberate breach of the Non-Disclosure Agreement made with plaintiffs.
[brief] ”  *State v. Haskins*, -- N.J. Super. --, --, 2024 WL 461763, at *5 (App. Div. Feb. 7, 2024) (citing *State v. Jones*, 475 N.J. Super. 520, 534 (App. Div. 2023)); see also *State v. Jones*, 475 N.J. Super.  520, 534 (App. Div. 2023) (requiring suppression hearing be assigned to new judge as motion judge weighed evidence and made credibility findings).  At the new hearing, the court must determine, “based on [] application of the statutory requirements,” “whether [[...]] is entitled to the rebuttable presumption under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(q)(2), and whether the State can successfully rebut the presumption.
[brief] BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS’ APPEAL OF THE TRIAL COURT’S OCTOBER 17, 2023 AND JANUARY 30, 2024  ORDERS [...] [...]  Phone: [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff- Respondent, [...], Esq. Of Counsel and on the Brief: [...], ESQ. (ID No. 011891980)  On the Brief: [...], ESQ.  (ID No. 015321986)  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The Supreme Court reversed what the Appellate Division (citing the same cases that [...] relies upon) had termed the “rule in New Jersey” that municipal water supply was a proprietary function governed as if it was a commercial transaction.  The Supreme Court’s reversal of that ruling, and holding that municipal water supply is a governmental function, made clear that the proprietary function/implied contract line of cases is no longer good law.  [...] not only relies on that defunct line of cases, but seeks to expand its scope beyond collection of unpaid water charges.  [...] seeks to use the supposed implied contract created by Borough water service to enforce implied warranties as to the quality of the water being provided.  However, [...]’s fundamental premise that municipal water service created a commercial-type relationship between him and the Borough is meritless as a matter of law.  B.
[brief] [...], [...], [...], [...] & [...], *How do latent print examiners perceive proficiency testing?  An analysis of examiner perceptions, performance, and print quality*, 60 Sci. & Just. 120 (2020); see also [...] & [...], *Comparison of Latent Print Proficiency Tests with Latent Prints Obtained in Routine Casework Using Automated and Objective Quality Metrics*, 68 J. Forensic Identification 379 (2018).  Moreover, study participants know they are taking part in an experiment which is likely to change their decision strategy or \(^2\)
[brief] So now, [...], you have a copy of the plea papers in front of you?  A Yes.  Q  Is -- do you recognize what you're looking is a copy of plea papers that [...] reviewed with you?  A Yes.  Q  And did he review -- we'll begin with the plea form, all five pages of that plea form?  A Yes.  Q  And did you yourself read the plea form to yourself?  A Yes.  Q  And as you read every page, did you sign all by placing your initials, [...], at the bottom right corner of every page and signed your name on the last page?  A Yes.  Q  And are the circled yes or no answers following each question your truthful responses?  A Yes.  Q  And as [...] indicated, there's supplemental plea forms indicating that once you're released from State Prison you'll be under parole supervision for five years -- A Yes.  Q -- knowing that, do you still wish to plead guilty?  A Yes.  Q  Do you believe you've entered this guilty plea voluntarily?  A Yes.  Q  Do you believe you've entered this guilty plea with knowledge of the consequences including the 30 years -- 30 years in prison you're going to have to serve before you're eligible for parole?  A Yes.  Q  Are you asking the Court to accept your plea of guilty to first degree felony murder, first degree armed robbery and the three VOPs?  A Yes.  THE COURT:
[brief] :: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY :: APPELLATE DIVISION :: DOCKET NO.: [...]  Docket No. Below: :: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS’ BRIEF  [...]  [...], Esq.  (NJ ID#: 009192001)  [...], Esq. (NJ ID#: 009162010)  [...], Esq. (NJ ID#: 907732012)  [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants, [...]; [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] [...]'s Master Plan, along with other planning documents, consistently identifies the preservation of open space as a key objective.  The acquisition of the property owned by the Appellant aligns with these strategic priorities, providing clear evidence of the Township's long-term commitment to open space preservation.  The Master Plan highlights the need to protect natural resources, provide outdoor recreational activities, and manage growth in a sustainable manner, all of which are served by the proposed property acquisition.  The property in question has been identified as a critical area for conservation due to its ecological significance and potential for recreational use.  By acquiring this land, [...] aims to prevent overdevelopment, which poses risks to local ecosystems, contributes to urban sprawl, and diminishes the quality of life for residents.  The preservation of the parcel as open space is a proactive measure to ensure sustainable development patterns and protect the community's environmental health and recreational needs for generations to come.  The evidence supporting the public purpose behind the acquisition of the property is multi-faceted, drawing from environmental science, community engagement, strategic planning, and sustainability principles.  This comprehensive body of evidence not only justifies the Township's actions but also exemplifies the meticulous care and due diligence exercised to ensure that the public interest is served in the most effective and meaningful way.