ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Respondents’ argument, that the DOL’s decision in TAD Associates would have been decided differently if it was made after the PWCRA was amended to include N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51a, is baseless.  N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51a does not, as Respondents suggest, exempt those who do not perform certain work.  Rather, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51a exempts only those subcontractors who “do not perform work at any construction site. ”  Id.  [Emphasis added.]  For instance, fabricators, suppliers and professionals who perform no work on the construction site are exempt from the PWCRA.  Conversely, those same subcontractors who perform work on the construction site fall squarely within the PWCRA registration requirements.
[brief] On April 4, 2023, [...] filed an objection to confirmation of the Debtor’s plan arguing that the Debtor did not own the Property because it had obtained the Final Judgment in the state court.  [...] averred that as a result of the Final Judgment, the Debtor’s and the other defendant’s equity of redemption in the Property was debarred under the express terms of the Final Judgment.  See Main Case Doc. No. 23.  On May 16, 2023, the Debtor responded to the objection of [...] suggesting that the Final Judgment constituted a taking in line with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Tyler and also was a violation of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.7  Debtor’s counsel indicated that the Debtor was pursuing the setting aside of the Final Judgment on these grounds in the state court.  See Main Case Doc. No. 26.  Then, on August 29, 2023, the Debtor filed a Motion to Reduce the Claim of [...].  Main Case Doc. No 52.
[brief] Appellant did not socialize with [...] outside of work.  (Pa338) 56:7-9.  Appellant did not know [...] prior to working at the Burlington East office.  Id.  3  Appellant shared the sexually harassing text messages from [...] with [...].  She did this because [...] was the subject of some of the messages and Appellant was disturbed by the contents of [...]’s messages.  (Pa452) 134:3-9, (Pa431) 52:17-25; 53:1. ultimately refused.  (Pa342-44) 72:12-80:25; (Pa1001-3).
[brief] It had nothing to do with the approved height of the building, which is an entirely different dimension than the height of the façade and – to be specific to the complaint – the relative height of the building’s façade as presented in the Diagrammatic Rendering.  In other words, the Trial Court denied the admission of Appellant’s evidence based on an entirely different legal issue than the one for which the Appellant had filed a complaint.  For reasons perhaps best known to the Respondents, they have chosen to make the same, erroneous argument.  Appellant would argue that, for this reason, their argument is entirely irrelevant.  For a court to make a ruling based on a complaint that a plaintiff had not actually made while ignoring the actual complaint that the plaintiff did make is no small error.  Appellant would respectfully submit that the Trial Court’s “‘finding was so wide off the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted. ’” (Belmont Condominium Association, Inc. v. Geibel, 432 N.J. Super. 52 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Green v. N.J. Manufacturers Insurance Company, 160 N.J. 480 (1999)).  POINT II
[directive] If the determination is made to overcome the presumption of applying for pretrial detention, the supervisory prosecutor shall document the reason(s) for that decision in the case file.  7.5  Specifying Legal and Factual Basis for Pretrial Detention Application.  All motions for pretrial detention shall be filed electronically through the eCourts system.  When the prosecutor files a motion for pretrial detention, the prosecutor shall specify whether the application is based on the risk that (1) defendant will not appear in court when required; (2) defendant will endanger the safety of any other person or the community; ( 3) defendant will obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness or juror; or (4) any combination risks.27 of the foregoing specified 27
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DID NOT APPLY, WHICH IS THE ONLY CONCEIVABLE LEGAL BASIS ON WHICH THIS COURT’S COMMENTS IN A SEPARATE ACTION COULD HAVE BEEN BINDING IN THIS MATTER.  Throughout their opposition, Defendants summarily conclude that Plaintiff’s claims in this action must be barred by the entire controversy doctrine based on findings made by this Court in a different action (i.e., the First Action).
[brief] Appellate courts “review matters of statutory interpretation de novo. ”  Grillo v. State, 469 N.J. Super. 267, 274 (App. Div. 2021).  See also D’Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 182-83 (2013) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) (“A trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference”).  “The Legislature’s intent is the paramount goal when interpreting a statute and, generally, the best indicator of that intent is the statutory language. ”  Shaw v. Shand, 460 N.J. Super. 592, 606 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 187 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).  However, an appellate court’s review “is not limited to the words in a challenged provision. ”  Grillo, 469 N.J. Super. at 275 (quoting State v. Twiggs, “A court ‘can also draw inferences based on the statute’s overall structure and composition,’ and may consider ‘the legislative scheme of which [the statute] is a part. ’”  Id. at 275 (alterations in original) (quoting Twiggs, 233 N.J. at 532).  An appellate court does “not view [statutory] words and phrases in isolation but rather in their proper context and in relationship to other parts of [the] statute, so that meaning can be given to the whole of [the] enactment.
[brief] (20T27:21-23).  [...] offered no explanation with respect to some of largest transfers of [...] and [...] funds from those entities’ accounts into accounts owned or controlled by [...].  For instance, [...] testified that he was unaware of the $2 million that [...] deposited into his personal bank account.  (20T50:24-51:3).  Nor could [...] explain the $500,000 that [...] took.  (20T54:6-19).  Despite all of this, the trial court did accept some of [...]’ analysis and concluded that it would have been improper to adopt some of [...]’s opinions about taking certain funds and adding them to the value of the company to establish a damage figure.
[brief] As the Court noted in *Hayes v. Delamotte*, 231 N.J. 373 (2018) citing, *Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc.*, 206 N.J. 506, 521 (2011); *Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995), while an Appellate Court must give due deference to the trial court’s “feel of the case”, the Trial Court’s interpretation of the law and legal consequences, “are not entitled to any special deference. ”  Id.  The Court’s decision below also eliminated the Defendant/Appellant’s liable defense.  The Court’s below denial of the requested Mockler charge was harmful error warranting a new trial.
[brief] 5T 11:20-5T 12:10; 5T 52:24-5T 53:8.b  Their testimony was about Plaintiffs’ business needs, not about limitations imposed on development by the property itself, as required for a hardship under Grasso.  Just as in Grasso, where the court found that: “Plaintiffs' argument that there is a limited market for ranch-style or Cape Cod homes is beside the point [,]” Plaintiffs’ argument that there is a limited market for height-conforming warehouses is beside the point when assessing hardship.
[brief] Lastly, the trial court stated in the Decision that there is “no contravened matter of public policy between the treatment of arbitration clauses in New York and New Jersey. ” (Pa6).  This is incorrect.  New York does not have a comparable requirement of express waiver under Atalese or its applicability to commercial contracts pursuant to County of Passaic.  The trial court failed to recognize or address this Court’s ruling in County of Passaic in the Decision.  Rather, it relied on the unreported case of [...] v. [...], [...], 2019 WL 7183687 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. December 26, 2019), to claim that Atalese is inapplicable to commercial contracts.
[brief] See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. LA. No. 104-104, 110 Stat.  Moreover, the Town is authorized to regulate how [...] places new poles based upon the 1892 Agreement, which obligates [...], as a successor of [...], to abide by “such prudential rules and regulations as the said [Town Council] may from time to time prescribe by ordinance or otherwise. ”  DA at 65a.  While it is unclear whether any other municipality has the same rights as does [...], it is a right that has been repeatedly confirmed by courts in New Jersey as well as by the State Legislature.
[brief] In contrast to her trial testimony, [...]’s written report did not address the second prong of the insanity defense, that is, that defendant did not know his actions were wrong.  (11T120-2 to 123-10, 124-4 to 20).  [...] testified that it was implied in her report that defendant did not know that he was doing was wrong.  (11T122-18 to 123-4, 124-20 to 22).  The AP asked [...], “And you did not choose to spell out your findings in this report, as it relates to whether [defendant] knew right from wrong?” (11T123-11 to 13).  [...] replied, “I did not say whether he knew right from wrong.  That’s actually not the standard.  Whether he knew whether the specific actions that he was engaged in were right from wrong, not whether he in a broader sense knew right from wrong.  That’s not the standard. ” (11T123-14 to 20).  Defendant misinterprets this exchange between the AP and [...] to argue that the AP articulated the wrong standard for the insanity defense.
[brief] *See Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc.*, 244 N.J. 119, 137 (2020).13 --- 13  The cases cited by Appellants involve either consumer or employment contracts or are otherwise distinguishable.  *Est. of Noyes v. Morano*, No. A-1665-17T3, 2019 WL 149521, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 8, 2019) (Pa185-Pa190) (consumer contract); *Kenahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of Fla. Inc.*, 236 N.J. 301, 307 (2019) (same); *Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP*, 330 N.J. Super. 252, 273  By contrast, New Jersey courts have repeatedly declined to extend *Atalese* to commercial contracts.  For example, in *Tox Design Group, LLC v. RA Pain Services, PA*, this Court held that “[t]he *Atalese* standard has not been extended beyond consumer and employment contracts.
[brief] See Hill v. Middletown Bd. of Educ., 183 N.J. Super. 36, 40 (App. Div. 1982) (defendant waived ability to raise failure of Tort Claims Act notice when defendant “waited until over 2 1/2 years after the complaint was filed before bringing its motion for summary judgment” and “[i]n the interim, defendant obtained complete discovery in the form of answers to interrogatories, depositions and a physical examination”) (emphasis added); Henebema v. Raddi, 452 N.J. Super. 438, 450 --- \(^6\)  As [...] acknowledges, “[w]aiver is ‘the intentional relinquishment of a known right. ’”  County of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80, 104-05 (1998) (quoting West Jersey Title & Guar. Co. v. Industrial Trust Co., 27 N.J. 144, 152 (1958)) Pb 11.  Under the circumstances here, where (1) [...] has attempted to disguise his product liability/tort claims by pleading them based on a theory of implied contract; and (2) [...] filed its summary judgment motion just months into the action, there is no basis to conclude that [...] intentionally relinquished a known right.  (App. Div. 2017) (immunities defenses waived where “defendants raised them for the first time on remand, which occurred ten years after the accident; those ten years included three years of extensive pre-trial litigation, a lengthy and expensive trial, an appeal to [the Appellate Division], and an appeal to the Supreme Court”) (emphasis added).  The circumstances of the present matter could not be more different from those of the cases [...] has cited.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ Expert in Retail Operations was Unable to Establish that [...] Deviated from Internal Policies or that [...] Actually Demonstrated a Lack of Supervision or Training in his Interaction with [...].  Plaintiffs’ expert [...], proffered as a safety and operations expert in retail store operations, rendered an opinion as to the adequacy of Lowe's’ policies and procedures related to employee training and supervision.  [8T at 30:2-55:12].  Balian concluded that [...]’ failure to adhere to industry standards in the training and supervision of [...] caused the May 13, 2017 altercation with [...].  [8T 87:25-90:23]  Specifically, Balian testified that [...] failed to implement its training procedure and allowed [...] on the sales floor alone, without the supervision of a trained Red-Vest employee, before he had completed Flooring Department sales training.  Ibid.  Balian posited that this deviation caused the altercation because it “presented . . . a situation where there was a level of frustration. ”  [8T 90:11-20].  Nevertheless, Balian made a series of concessions that undermined this conclusion.
[brief] Id. at 44:3-6.  As an alternative, [...] argued that, at the very least, the equity should be $47,727 multiplied by 6.25%.  Id. at 112:25-26.  However, some of the Board members took issue with the calculation.  Specifically, Board Chairman [...] (“[...]”) put on the record that he believed that $47,727 was too high as a share of the value because he did not believe that 1/11th of the purchase price was attributable to a unit with a long-time tenant.  Id. at 101:21-32.  He further stated that half of the $47,727 was a reasonable number in the absence of any other information.  Id.  He suggested that equity be set at $47,727 divided in half but he proposed that other Board members comment and weigh his suggested approach.
[brief] Whether the City appropriately delegated that land use power to the [...] is of no moment.  Nevertheless, Plaintiffs’ argument is belied by the fact that the City’s delegation of land use power to the [...] was, in fact, appropriate.  It cannot be legitimately disputed that the New Jersey Legislature left room for other statutorily created boards within the definition of “municipal agency” in the MLUL.  See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-5.  The [...] was specifically established for the purpose of reviewing and opining on the general health and welfare implications of any cannabis site plan application, which is squarely a land use power under the MLUL.
[directive] -(1) a "government money market mutual fund" means an investment company or investment trust: -(a) which is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the "Investment 17 Company Act of 1940," 15 U.S.C. s.80a-1 et seq., and operated in accordance with C.F.R. s.270.2a- 7; U.S. -(b) the portfolio of which is limited to Government securities that meet the definition of an -- - - eligible security ptrsrant to 17 C.F.R. s.270.2a-7 aq$ repurchase agreements that are collateralized by US. such Government securities in which direct investment may be made pursuant to paragraphs (1) and of subsection a. of this section; and (3) -(c) which is rated by a nationally recognized statistical rating organization.
[brief] **  Da 33-36 is set forth in a confidential appendix submitted herewith.  ***  The pages submitted as Da 39-43 and Da 62-77 are the most legible documents available.  Phase 1 Examination/Evaluation report prepared by [...] dated October 8, 2021  Da 43  PCR judge’s order dated April 14, 2023  Da 61  Phase 1 Examination/Evaluation report prepared by [...] dated April 25, 2023  Da 62  PCR judge’s order dated June 27, 2023 denying defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief  Da 78  Notice of appeal filed September 5, 2023  Da 79  TABLE TO THE CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX
[brief] [...] then agreed that “severe presentation” was overdosing and could result in symptoms such as respiratory depression (depressed lung function) leading to cardiac issues.  (4T 64:19-25; 65:1-7).  Other symptoms could include hypoxemia (low oxygen/oxygen exchange), apnea (temporary cessation of breathing), and hypotension (low blood pressure).  (4T 65:25; 66:1-13).  She also agreed that other symptoms could include bradycardia (low heart rate), cardiac arrest, pulmonary aspiration (vomiting in the lungs), and prolonged unconsciousness.  (4T 66:24-25; 67:1-24).  When questioned about the defendant’s condition at the time of the accident, [...] acknowledged that he was not exhibiting slurred speech.  (4T 70:1-3).  She further acknowledged that the defendant’s medical records indicated that he was “alert and oriented times four,” that he had “clear speech and judgment,” and that there was no notation of any motor impairment.  (4T 71:8-20).  In addition, [...] testified that she was aware that the defendant did not have symptoms of cardiac arrest, pulmonary aspiration, or of going into a coma.  (4T 75:20-25).  Based upon this, [...] testified that, according to the medical records, there was no indication that the defendant was clonazepam toxic on June 4, 2019.
[brief] Finally, unlike the *Valley* plaintiff, [...] was aware and acknowledged its unenrollment numerous times and did not pay any premium, a key observation in the *Valley* decision.  *Valley*, 316 N.J. Super. at 159 (“Moreover, here the policy expressly provides a mortgagee can receive loss payment if it ‘[p]ays any premium due under [the policy's] Coverage Part at [the insurer's] request if [the insured mortgagee] fail[s] to do so. ’”).  [...] also cites *Harvester Chemical Corp.*, 277 N.J. Super. 421 (App. Div. 1994), a declaratory judgment action filed by an insured seeking coverage, under a policy cancelled mid-term, for an underlying lawsuit in which a claimant was seriously burned by the insured’s dangerous product, arguing that *Harvester* rejected the notion that technical inapplicability of the cancellation regulations allow insurers to effectuate a mid-term policy cancellation “for any reason.
[brief] This dispute concerns the terms of the Separation Agreement, not the outcome of the [...] case, a separate matter in a separate venue under a separate proceeding.  Next, as Appellant admitted in Point IV, the [...] has no authority to enforce any aspect of the Separation Agreement noted here (i.e. to strike terms).  Thirdly, Respondent appealed the May 26, 2021 and August 10, 2021 eligibility denial based on the terms of the parties Separation Agreement to the Office of Administrative Law (Da81, Da24-Da25) which is now moot (Pa5-Pa6); contrary to Appellant’s argument at Db39, there was no denial of the Disability Application itself, as the merits of the IOD never reached the Board of Trustees, [...].  The Trial Court made no determination on the pension laws either – it only enforced the terms of the Separation Agreement in light of Appellant’s continued breach as recognized in multiple points on the record at oral argument (1T 6:16-22, 1T17:6-21, 1T18:12 to 1T20: 21, 1T 22:7-25).
[brief] [...] testified that on January 19, 2022, at around 5:30 p.m., he was in the Chicken Shack when he was approached by three individuals.  (6T 27:23-30:19).  He identified two of the three men who approached him in the courtroom: [...] (“defendant”) and [...] (“codefendant Dolisca”).¹ (6T 30:20-22:12).  Looking at the surveillance footage, Mr. Alcius testified that the man in the black jacket was codefendant Dolisca, and that defendant was the man wearing the red jacket.  Mr. Alcius testified that when the three men entered the store, he was cornered by them and they began asking him to “give[] something up. ” (6T 34:15-36:1).  Then codefendant Dolisca took his phone and wallet, including his credit card, social security card, identification, cash-out card, and his ABT card.  (6T 36:2-40:14).  Then, Mr. Alcius was told to take off his clothes, and codefendant Dolisca told him he had a gun.  (6T 41:7-42:18).  The prosecutor asked about ¹  The third defendant in this case was [...] (“codefendant Willis”).  defendant’s actions, asking “we see this person in the red coat, he's starting to interact with you a bit more.  What's going on here?” (6T 43:4-6).  Mr. Alcius said he had been trying to ease the situation by talking with them, but defendant “told me to take all that off . . . they were yelling (indiscernible) my face and all that. ” (6T 43:7-14).  When he was asked if defendant had tried to stop the robbery in any way, he stated, “Nah.  No, no, no.  He was with it.  He wasn’t trying to stop nothing. ”  (6T 42:20-44:8).  After taking his wallet, jacket, hoodie, sneakers, pants, and his phone, codefendant Dolisca pointed a gun at him, slapped him a few times, and then all three took off.  (6T 46:1-47:2; 48:12-20; 49:12-14).  Officers were dispatched to the area on reports of a robbery, and [...] met with the victim, and communicated the description of the three men to the other officers.  (6T 5:22-7:18).  [...] received the description of three black makes, one in a red coat, one in a black coat, and one in a green coat, and one wearing white sneakers.  (5T 92:17-19).  He saw three men matching that description “to a tee,” and identified them as defendant, codefendant Dolisca, and codefendant Willis in the courtroom.  (5T 93:5-94-22).  All three men were detained and patted down, and a handgun was recovered from codefendant Dolisca.  (5T 96:11-97:3).  All three men were placed under arrest.  (5T 103:9-14).  A show-up identification was conducted, with Officer Brown driving Mr. Alcius past the highway median where all three suspects were “lined up right next to each other facing directly at the vehicle” (7:25-12:20).  Mr. Alcius positively identified all three suspects.  (6T 12:1-4).  After the identification, all three suspect were taken to headquarters and searched.  (5T 103:9-17).  They found Mr. Alcius’s phone and wallet on codefendant Dolisca.  (5T103:20-22).  **Point I**
[directive] Crime.  Violent a for Delinquent Adjudicated Recently  Defendant Was 4.5.7 the years ten last the within if acomplaint-warrant for apply shall agency enforcement law  A that crime a or firearm, involving a crime a for delinquent adjudicated was juvenile a as defendant an or 2C:43-7.2, N.J.S.A. Act, Early Release  No the to subject be would adult an by committed if attorney or deputy prosecutor assistant an unless offenses, foregoing the of any commit to attempt designated officer supervisory or a this Directive, of 3.2  Section with accordance in consulted general t9 complaint- charging by presumption of a is there where cases in that provides amended, as 3:3-1(d), Rule defendant the that believe reason to on based acomplaint-warrant for applies agency enforcement law a and summons will or community, or person other the any of safety the to danger a pose will summons, a to response in appear not will the consider must officer judicial or court the summons, a on released if process justice criminal the obstruct to attempt N.J.S.A. to pursuant Courts ofthe Director Administrative the by approved instrument the using assessment ofthe results 2A:162-25.
[brief] Just get in contact with [[...]] so I can get outta here. ”  (1T 95-19 to 98-20; 3T 21-22 to 22-3; Da 109, 03:52:32 to 03:55:31, 04:43:17 to 04:43:50)  But [...] continued, invoking their prior relationship and telling him to “look at me” as he sat silently and looked away; that their questions “have to be answered”; and \(^{12}\)  The HCPO transcript reported, “(Unintelligible) go home?” but the motion court found that he was asking “if he can go home. ”  (Da 126)  [...] also immediately clarified that he was asking to go home when the detective asked him, “You asking me?” and he responded, “Yeah. ”  (1T 95-12 to 14)  The trial transcript similarly reported that he asked, “Can I go home?” (9T 20-5) that the police wanted to help him, stating, “I’m not gonna treat you like I would treat other people”; “If we don’t get out in front of this now, [...], it’s gonna hurt you worse later on”; “we don’t only put people in jail . . . .