ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Evidences the Very Fraud They Argue Against  Rather than absolving Appellants of fraud, the Appellants’ admission in their opposition brief that they only became aware of the December 1998 Deed from [...], Esq. is *prima facie* proof that Appellants have acted in a malicious and fraudulent manner throughout.  See Appellants’ Reply Brief at Pg 14 (“Secondly, as the trial court pointed out, neither the estate nor [...] had knowledge regarding the creation of the two (2) problematic December 10, 1998 deeds…”)  By way of a recap, Appellants’ defense of this litigation from the outset, including through sworn testimony, has been that Appellants owned and personally cared for the property from 1986 to the present including by hiring [...] to manage the property.  (See e.g., 13T47:9-11) ([...] testifying [...] “was constantly involved in the management of the particular property up until 2019.  Prior to 2019 he was involved. ”); 13T75:10-23 ([...] explaining that her family has owned the property since 1986 and that [...] merely collected rents and paid expenses on their behalf); 3T84:13-17 ([...] agreeing that [...] was their property manager).  Appellants’ position that they became aware of the December 1998 deed and transferred the property to [...] with and through the advice of counsel (in 2016), as articulated in their opposition brief, is a complete “180” from the foregoing sworn testimony.
[directive] 2.12  Violator.  Any person who an officer reasonably believes (1) has committed, or is engaged in a conspiracy or attempt to commit, any crime of the first degree or one of the violent or serious crimes of the second degree enumerated in Section 3.2 of this policy, or (2) poses an imminent threat to the safety of the public or other police officers, as that threat is defined in Section 3.2 of this policy, set forth below.
[brief] It refers to Paragraph 43 of its Resolution, which identifies variances for combined side yard\(^9\), impervious coverage, number of stories, number and location of parking spaces, and signage.  [Da141].  With regard to the deviations from the requirements for single-family dwellings in the R-20A Zone for impervious coverage, and number of stories, the Supreme Court has held that an applicant seeking a use variance was proposing not to comply with the zoning ordinance, and that the bulk zoning --- \(^9\) The Resolution wrongly claims that [...]’s site plan showed a 178.6-foot combined side yard, which is 0.01 feet short of the requirement.
[directive] Actor receives income from pattern of racketeering activity, as defined in 2C:41-1, or through 1st Degree 100,000 to 400,000  No 10% collection of an unlawful debt, and uses or invests income or proceeds to acquire interest in or establish or operate any enterprise which is engaged in activities which affect trade or 2C:41-2  Racketeering commerce; or conspires to do so.
[brief] ”  See Brockwell & Carrington Contractors, Inc. v. Kearny Bd. of Educ., 420 N.J. Super. 273, 278-79 (App. Div. 2011) (failure to meet requirements for demonstration qualification is a material defect); P & A Const., Inc. v. Twp. of Woodbridge, 365 N.J. Super. 164, 172-73 (App. Div. 2004) (failure to provide documents demonstrating financial ability to perform project is a material defect).  It would only be through unlawful post-bid supplementation that the County could obtain the necessary assurance of performance.  On-Line Games, 279 N.J. Super. at 598.  In other words, as described in both Meadowbrook and Muirfield, not only was the document fundamental to [...] demonstrating its performance ability, [...]’s ability to refuse to supplement its bid with the NJDOT Notice gave it the ability walk away.  It does not matter that [...] eliminated its ability to walk away by subsequently providing the NJDOT Notice.  Moreover, as the trial court properly found, the County had no obligation to make an independent effort to obtain documents demonstrating [...] was qualified to perform; doing so would place a significant burden on public entities that is properly, both in practice and under the Solicitation, the burden of bidders.
[brief] The jury responded as follows to the NHA interrogatories:  B.  Nursing Home Act rights claim:  6)  Has the Plaintiff proven by a preponderance of the evidence that [...] violated [...]’s rights under the Nursing Home Act, specifically [...]’s right to a safe and decent living environment and considerate and respectful care that recognizes his dignity and individuality?  (Pa89.)  The jury responded “No”, with one juror responding “Yes”.  (See ibid.)  Based upon the “No” response, the jury did not answer the remaining questions, regarding proximate cause and damages.  (See Pa89-90.)
[brief] Defendant argues that the AP improperly expressed his personal opinion of defendant’s veracity during summation.  But when read in its proper context, as it must be, Morton, 155 N.J. at 416, it is evident that the AP was explaining why it would be wrong for the jurors to conclude that the reason why defendant’s stories changed over time was because he was lying:  The next area I want to talk about is, something I’m going to call rationalization.  [...] and [...] may have strong opinions about me using that word in this context, so I’m not using it medically, I’m using it to describe something.  The defendant understandably is looking for something to hang his hat on that makes it not his fault.  And the cynical part of me would say that that’s because he’s trying to become Scott Free.  That he’s trying to get over on the charges….  But [...] even said that that’s not necessarily so.  That it could be that he just honestly wants to believe that, despite the fact that [the shootings] were entirely within his control, that he might want to believe it was something else.  So he looks for something else to blame.  It's his tumor, it’s the pills, it’s schizophrenia, it’s whatever.  Again, my instinct as a Prosecutor might be to call it lying, but [...] gave you a more broad {sic} way to look at it.  That maybe it’s not.  That maybe [defendant] is just searching for that meaning, which is perfectly understandable for the defendant to do.  And we’ve seen examples of the defendant’s family even joining in that and encouraging that.  That’s perfectly natural and normal for them to do that, too.  Not faulting them for that.  (15T160-20 to 61-21).
[brief] For the reasons set forth herein, [...]’s sentence must be vacated and remanded for a new resentencing hearing.  Respectfully Submitted, [...]  Public Defender  Attorney for Defendant-Appellant  BY: s/ [...]  [...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender ID No. 404802022  Dated: June 30, 2024  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] (Da 17)  Again and again, detectives pressed [...] on what he knew; [...] repeatedly denied that he knew the identity of the faceless individual in the detectives’ photograph, denied that it was him, denied that he knew of anyone else who had come into his home, and denied that he knew anything at all about the homicide.  (Da 17; 25T 45-4 to 66-7; Da 40-57)  Specifically, over about 40 minutes after detectives confronted [...] with the photograph of their suspect in front of his house at 10:38 p.m. on Saturday night, [...] was forced to deny all knowledge at least twelve times.
[brief] ”  Id.  Traffic stops, by contrast, usually do not “exert[] upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights. ”  Id.  However, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[i]f a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. ”  Id. at 440.
[brief] Lastly, consistent with the argument set forth in Section III supra, the record below provides insufficient explanation of the interface between [...]’s imposition of public shoreline access on and across [...]’s property with the Public Trust Doctrine’s fundamental respect for the rights of individuals residing along tidalways and their property.  This is particularly true in light of the [...]’s cursory conclusion that the public access it endeavors to require at [...] would be reasonable.  Aa0009.  At best, the Department’s analysis can generously be said to interpret the creation of public shoreline access at [...]’s property as reasonable from the public’s perspective; however, the total absence of any discussion as to the reasonableness of new public shorelines access at [...]’s property from the perspective of [...]’s residence underscores [...]’s dereliction of its obligations under the Public Trust Doctrine and, thus, under the Public Access Law.  As such, given the paucity of findings in the administrative record that support NJ[...]’s determinations, the Court should remand this matter to NJ[...] with detailed instructions for further investigation and analysis concerning the shortcomings in the administrative record identified above.
[brief] "[A] fact finding or a legal determination cannot be based on hearsay alone," but “[h]earsay may be employed to corroborate competent proof, or competent proof may be supported or given added probative force by hearsay testimony."  Ibid.  [...] contends that the State failed to meet the residuum rule, arguing that it failed to produce “legally competent evidence about the August 16, 2019 incident. ” (Ab18-19).
[brief] 48 State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161 (2010) ....................................................  40 State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475 (2008) ....................................................  63  State v. Gentry, 183 N.J. 30 (2005) .......................................................  40 State v. Gonzalez, 444 N.J. Super. 61 (App. Div.), certif. den. 226 N.J. 209 (2016) ................................................................. 35, 42 State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281 (1981) .........................................................  32 State v. Grimes, 235 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 1979) ..............................  30 State v. Harris, 457 N.J. Super. 34l (App. Div. 2018) ..............................  23 State v. Hedgespeth, 249 N.J. 234 (2021) ............................................... 49, 53, 57 State v. Hernandez, 170 N.J. 106 (2001) ................................................ 48 State v. Horton, 242 N.J. 428 (2020) .................................................................  19 State v. Hyman, 451 N.J. Super. 429 (App. Div. 2017) ........................................  52 State v. Jackson, 326 N.J. Super. 276 (App. Div. 1999) .......................................  40 State v. Johnson, 436 N.J. Super. 406 (App. Div. 2014) .....................................  21 State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409 (1997) .................................................................. 34, 61 State v. Kately, 270 N.J. Super. 356 (App. Div. 1994) ...........................................  55 State v. Labrutto, 114 N.J. 187 (1989)  ..................................................................
[brief] Respondent argues the Court did not commit reversible error because plaintiffs did not file a motion to extend.  This argument must fail because there was no reason to extend discovery if [...]’s report was barred and there was no reason to extend discovery further if [...]’s report was permitted.  In both circumstances, [...] extended discovery to allow more time to have all parties depose the experts.  [...] had also made the parties aware that there was not going to be a trial until April or May in 2022.  (The trial ended up being an entire year later.)  See 2T24, Appellants’ Brief.
[brief] (Dca 1, clip four, 21:10 to 21:55).  Beckoned by another police officer, [...] and [...] moved back to the courtyard immediately outside the security office, where they encountered [...]. (1T10-2 to 5; Dca 1, clip four, 21:55 to 22:07).6  [...] handcuffed --- 6  A clock seen on the wall of the second woman’s apartment at the 14:09 mark of the video appeared to show the time to be between 4:20 a.m. and 4:25 a.m. (Dca 1, clip four).
[brief] Scrutinizing the depth of [...]’s knowledge regarding constricted pupils or his legal opinion of what gave rise to reasonable suspicion is not germane to this Court’s inquiry.  The question is whether [...]’s observations, viewed objectively, justified his actions.  This is because the “proper inquiry for determining the constitutionality of a search-and-seizure is whether the conduct of the law enforcement officer who undertook the search was objectively reasonable, without regard to his or her underlying motives or intent.
[brief] The Court denied the motion in part, finding that reasonable articulable suspicion existed to stop the Defendant’s vehicle, and granted the motion in part, finding that the search of the vehicle was unsupported by probable cause pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.  Id.  On July 10, 2023, the Defendant entered a plea of guilty to count one of [...] charging fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b).  Da23-Da25.  On January 8, 2024, the Defendant filed a motion for bail pending appeal, which was granted.  Da26.  On March 8, 2024, the Defendant was sentenced to one hundred and eighty (180) days in the [...] as well as monetary penalties.  Da23-Da25.  On or about April 19, 2024, a Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement were filed with the Superior Court, Appellate Division.
[brief] Unlike the tremendous public uproar that resulted from the filing of [...]’s application with the [...] only a few months later, the April 18, 2022 hearing conducted on Ordinance No. 13-2022 and the [...] drew no attention.  In fact, the reason why no one appeared at the hearing is because no one understood what Ordinance No. 13-2022 portended.  The Township published a notice prior to the hearing which failed to include the most essential statutorily-required component: a clear and concise statement from the clerk setting forth the purpose of the ordinance.  Consequently, when [...] published and served its notice for the subsequent site plan hearing premised on the new superseding zoning, that constituted the first occasion when the public, including [...]’s membership, was put on notice of the changes that Ordinance No. 13-2022 facilitated.
[brief] (Pa492-Pa494).  See also, N.J.R.E. 407 (subsequent remedial measures).  More importantly, it is a total mischaracterization of why that email was issued.  First, it is clear from the email that the overall construction project was continuing and employees were being advised of necessary changes to the traffic pattern in and around the hospital with a site map to further guide them.  (Pa493-Pa494).  Second, [...] testified that flaggers were not employed by the hospital and were not used in the parking lot.  Rather, they were used on the main roadway into and out of the parking lot to direct traffic during construction and often during lane closures on main roadways.  (Pa519:20-12-Pa 520:21:6).  See also, Pa528:29:20-Pa530:31:12.  That the accident occurred during a shift change is indeed an undisputed fact.  However, it is not proof of the fact that the defendant knew of the need for additional pedestrian safeguards in the non-management employee parking area.
[directive] Disengagement is the tactical decision to leave, delay contact, delay custody or plan to make contact at a different time and under different circumstances.  This tactic should be considered when an officer reasonably believes continued contact may result in an unreasonable risk to a person in crisis, the public or law enforcement officers.  A tactical disengagement strategy may include the utilization of the Attorney General’s ARRIVE Together program, a community crisis response team, or other community-based resources.  NOTE: Tactical Disengagement may be utilized as a de-escalation tool, providing a means to a safer outcome, when public safety concerns have been satisfied and the risk of further contact with the barricaded individual outweighs the risks associated with tactical disengagement.
[brief] ”  Id. quoting Kiefer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 223 (2011); see also Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)(holding a trial Court’s interpretation of law and legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to special deference).  POINT ONE:  APPELLANT’S APPEAL SHOULD BE DENIED AS THEY HAVE NOT EXHAUSTED ITS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
[brief] In *Dewey*, the Supreme Court instructed that, when construing federal statutes in the absence of binding precedent, judicial comity requires giving “due respect” for the decisions of the lower federal courts—particularly when the federal courts are in agreement.  Doing so helps “ensure uniformity” and “discourages forum shopping. ”  Dewey, 121 N.J. at 80.  Loigman v. Kings Landing Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 324 N.J. Super. 97 (Ch. Div. 1999) is an example of applying Dewey to the interpretation of the FDCPA.  Loigman explained that “a state court placed in the position of ascertaining the content of federal law should look for the view taken by a majority of the lower federal courts. ”  Loigman, at 105 n.7.  Consequently, in Loigman, the court rejected the minority view of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals notwithstanding that the Third Circuit encompasses New Jersey.  At the very least, Dewey requires consideration of the reasoning of the decisions from the lower federal courts.  And, if a New Jersey court chooses not to follow the view of those federal courts, it should articulate why it rejected that view—but it cannot ignore those federal court decisions.  POINT III.
[brief] Moreover, it is not just responsible for active, as opposed to passive, harm that is caused during its reign of title.  . . .  Failures to so act may expose the condemnor to significant damages if a condemnee can prove that the damage occurred during the condemnor’s ownership.  . . .  [Id. at *23-24.]  Because a defeasible title may revert back to a condemnee, the condemnor owes a special duty of care, including maintaining the status quo at the Property and avoiding any harm.  See ibid.  In light of the above, the trial court erred by finding irreparable harm as to an injunction against condemnation because any steps to be taken toward condemnation are reversible.
[brief] The underlying facts are not in dispute.  An Internal Affairs (“IA”) complaint was filed against the Deputy Chief of the [...] (“[...]”).  Pursuant to the Attorney General’s Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures (November 2022) (“IAPP”) and Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2022-14 (“Directive 22-14”) because the Deputy Chief was the subject of the IA complaint, it was referred to the [...] to conduct the investigation.  Following an investigation by the [...], the IA complaint was sustained and referred back to [...] for appropriate action.  Thereafter, the [...] (the “Township”) and the Deputy Chief reached an agreement whereby the Deputy Chief resigned in lieu of proceeding through the disciplinary process.  As a result of termination of the disciplinary process, in order to comply with its obligations under the IAPP and Directive 2022-14, at least one of the sustained charges required [...] to post details of the report and its findings, identifying the Deputy Chief by name, on the internet.  In an attempt to circumvent this requirement, the former Deputy Chief filed the underlying complaint seeking to compel the [...] to establish a procedure for him to challenge the findings of the Summary and Conclusions report.  The [...] had refused to defend and indemnify the [...] solely because plaintiff in the underlying case is not seeking monetary damages.  However, the gravamen of the lawsuit is a challenge to the [...]’s policies and procedures themselves.  Specifically, the lawsuit seeks to have the [...] supersede the authority of the [...] and re-write the [...] policies.  Accordingly, the decision of the [...] should be reversed and an Order entered requiring the State to reimburse the [...] Defendants for legal fees and expenses incurred to date, and requiring the [...] to provide a defense and indemnification to the [...] on the underlying complaint going forward.
[brief] For animal cruelty, [...] was sentenced to 180 days in county jail with “no probation to follow. ”  (4T 29-4 to 6)  He was subject to PSL for a 2006 offense, and the trial court used that status to impose restrictions on [...]’s post-release conduct.  Specifically, the court ordered that he have no contact with the dog in question, never own or care for any other animals, and attend anger management counseling, and that these conditions be incorporated into his existing PSL.  (4T 29-6 to 14)  Because a sentencing court lacks jurisdiction to impose parole conditions, a power allocated to the executive branch, these parole conditions are invalid.
[brief] Evans, slip op. at 1-4 (Pa123-124); Poosikian, slip op. at 1-6. (Pa127-128).  In both cases, this court asked the Board to reconsider and address the factual and legal issues in the context of the Correction of Errors statute, N.J.S.A. 43:15A-54.  Evans, slip op. at 8 (Pa125); Poosikian, slip op. at 9. (Pa129).  Thus, these cases do not support [...]’s plea for equitable relief in this case.
[brief] Instead, the [...] chose not to transfer the Share and chose to disrupt [...]’s religious observances for the next two (2) years.  The Trial Court accepted the premises that “[...] outbid [...] and the purchase price is $1,500,055.50.  That’s the basis between the $250,000 paid a few years earlier and this amount, that’s the basis of the claim for the plaintiff \(^1\)  In its initial Counterclaim, [...] demanded the transfer of the Share for $250,000 the same price [...] (through [...]) paid for it.  breach of…fiduciary duty.
[brief] Moreover, Plaintiffs were afforded ample opportunity to address the proximate cause issues, including [...]’s unavailability, and did address that point.  Plaintiffs have always taken the untenable position that [...]’ availability or unavailability was not material to the proximate cause issues.  (Pa374-Pa375).  They even argued before [...] that if [...] was unavailable, that was somehow an admission of liability or negligence on the part of [...], a theory of liability never pleaded or supported with appropriate expert testimony.
[brief] We begin our discussion by again noting that [...] has steadfastly refused to reconsider this proposal against the State's energy and climate change policy.  [...] made two motions to compel this reconsideration and the court denied both motions, quite erroneously.  No matter the precise procedural framing of those motions, the state's policies apply to this proceeding.  We will first examine each of these components of the state's energy policies, but then consider them as a whole, for that is how they are intended to function.  And so analyzed, those policies also mandate that the [...] petitions be denied.  The [...] and [...] ignored these extensive legal requirements.