ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Among those principles are that courts should discern and implement the intentions of the parties.  It is not the function of the court to rewrite or revise an agreement when the intent of the parties is clear.  Stated differently, the parties cannot expect a court to present to them a contract better than or different from the agreement they struck between themselves.  Thus, when the intent of the parties is plain and the language is clear and unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement as written, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result.  See Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 44–45 (2016).  A narrow exception to the general rule of enforcing settlement agreements as the parties intended is the need to reform a settlement agreement due to “unconscionability, fraud, or overreaching in the negotiations of the settlement[.]”
[brief] Committee Room 4, 1st Floor, State House Annex, Trenton, NJ Chair: [...]  The State House Annex has reopened to the general public.  Visitors to the State House Annex are required to show ID and proof of full vaccination or a negative COVID-19 PCR or rapid test conducted within the previous 72 hours.  All visitors are required to undergo a temperature screening prior to proceeding through security.  Masks are mandatory at all times inside the State House Annex, including in Committee Rooms and in the hallways and other facilities.  Please visit the NJ Legislature’s website at www.njleg.state.nj.us/JMC%20Rules.pdf for more information.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED WELL-SETTLED LAW THAT WRITE-IN VOTES FOR CANDIDATES WHO APPEAR ON THE BALLOT ARE VOID (Pa5)**  A.  *The Legislature Has Explicitly, and Repeatedly, Mandated that Personal Choice Votes are Void if Cast for a Candidate who Appears on the Ballot.*  The trial court misapplied well-settled law that explicitly mandates the voiding of personal choice write-in votes for candidates whose names already appear on the ballot.
[brief] Enforcement of the void debt would constitute enforcement of a contract entered into in violation of New Jersey’s licensing statute.  See Accountemps Div. of Robert Half, Inc. v. Birch Tree Grp., Ltd., 115 N.J. 614, 626 (1989) (holding “[o]ur courts have consistently held that public policy precludes enforcement of a contract entered into in violation of [the State's] licensing statute[s]”).  Similarly, in Insight Global, LLC v. Collabera, Inc., 446 N.J. Super. 525, 531-32 (Ch. Div. 2015), the Chancery Division examined the limit on the ability of an unlicensed entity to seek relief from a court.  Insight Global held that an unlicensed party has no right to bring claims before the court and public policy prohibits enforcement of a contract entered into in violation of a licensing statute.  Insight Global, LLC, 446 N.J. Super. at 531-32.  Courts in New Jersey and many other states have consistently refused to aid or ratify illegal activities.  Thus, the trial court’s May 24, 2024 Order must be reversed due to its “inexplicabl[e] depart[ing] from established policies. ”  See US Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012)  CONCLUSION
[brief] testified that he then waited an unspecified amount of time after the first test for the machine to clear and to take a second breath sample from Appellant.  (3T13:13-15).  [...] then performed a second test, achieving a sufficient body breath from Appellant to receive a reading.  (3T13:21-23).  [...] then again waited for an unspecified amount of time for the machine to clear before taking a third breath sample from Appellant.  (3T13:25-14:4).  The reading achieved from the second and third breath samples indicated Appellant had a .10 blood-alcohol content.  (3T14:25-15:1).  [...] then asked Appellant questions from the drinking/driving questionnaire.  (3T15:17-19; Aa079).  At that point, [...] could not recall whether he re-advised Appellant of his Miranda rights.  (3T15:13-15).  [...] could not recall how much time had elapsed from the time of Appellant’s arrest to the time [...] filled out the drinking/driving questionnaire, though the times indicated on the questionnaire and [...]’s police report indicated that approximately three hours had passed.  (3T17:8-14, 19:10-20:1).  C.
[brief] Similarly, the Supreme Court of the United States has made clear that “political viewpoint” is a “permissible employment criteria for positions involving . . . confidential employees. ”  *Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois*, 497 U.S. 62, 71 n. 5 (1990); see also *Branti v. Finkel*, 445 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1980).  The federal jurisprudence matters here because the Appellate Division has held that New Jersey courts “rely on federal constitutional principles in interpreting the free speech clause of the New Jersey Constitution, art. I, ¶ 6.
[brief] However, contrary to the trial court’s own disjunctive interpretation of “or”, the trial court elected to order both a temporary at the inception of the case and permanent injunction following the proof hearing.  Additional support for a conjunctive interpretation of “or” can be found in other nearby provisions, such as N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(b) which allows a court to “enjoin the issuance, sale, offer for sale, purchase, offer to purchase, promotion, negotiations, advertisement or distribution from or within this State of any securities .  . . .”  No court, including the trial court in this matter, has interpreted the “or” in the injunctive provision disjunctively because it would lead to absurd results.  For example, if the trial court’s disjunctive interpretation applied to the injunctive provision of the statute, the Bureau would need to choose whether to seek an injunction to stop a fraudulent actor from advertising their securities or selling their securities – but the injunction could not seek both.  This result is plainly not what the Legislature intended.  The legislative intent favors a broader reading of N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2), than that originally afforded by the trial court.  The remedial nature of the statute favors interpreting “or” in N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2) conjunctively.  Specifically, the trial court’s interpretation of “or” effectively grants a windfall to [...], a separate legal entity that benefited from the fraudulent conduct at the expense of investors and the investing public and, contrary to the intended purpose of the statute, unduly restricts the Bureau’s ability to take action against this fraudulent enterprise.
[brief] The primary factual dispute at trial concerned whether [...], the [...] employee, assaulted [...] or whether [...] initially assaulted Hassan by throwing a bag of grout while his back was turned, requiring Hassan to defend himself.  It is undisputed Hassan walked away from [...] prior to the altercation.  Objective, physical evidence established [...] threw the bag of grout.  For example, (a) a significant amount of grout was located on the back of Hassan’s head and neck; (b) a significant amount of grout was located on the shelving unit, indicating an impact point between the bag of grout and the shelving; (c) no grout was located on [...] other than near his left hand which he used to hold the grout; and (d) no grout was located on Plaintiff’s witness, [...], who was allegedly standing next to [...] and Hassan when Hassan allegedly broke the bag of grout by punching the bottom of the bag.  Hassan then allegedly punched [...].  The evidence established that [...] and Oganov were far away from Hassan when the bag of grout broke; not next to him.  The lack of grout on both [...] and Oganov refuted their testimony that they were covered in grout after the incident.  Oganov even admitted he could not explain why there was no grout on him upon reviewing the police bodycam video which captured Oganov in the store minutes after the incident.  When confronted with the fact that his trial testimony regarding the incident contradicted multiple other prior statements, [...] dramatically blurted out “it took us awhile to finally figure out what actually happened, for me to understand exactly what happened. ”  [...], [...] biomechanical expert, testified that [...]’s version of events was contradicted by the physical, scientific evidence.  Fisher concluded that had [...] been next to Hassan when the bag broke he would have been covered in grout.  Further, [...] opined it was impossible for Hassan’s alleged strike to the bag to lift the bag upward into the shelving.  Such force would have caused the bag to break upon impact, spilling the grout onto the front of both Hassan and [...].  Plaintiffs presented no expert testimony to rebut [...] and were left to argue that Hassan could have grabbed the bottom of the bag and flung it onto the shelving, a position unsupported by the record.  The jury concluded Hassan’s conduct was outside the scope of his assigned duties, precluding a finding of vicarious liability.  The jury’s conclusion was supported by ample, credible evidence given that Hassan’s intentional conduct – whether a battery or proper self-defense, was not within the scope of his job duties and was not expected by [...].
[brief] The State’s expert’s opinion that defendant did not meet the legal definition of insanity was properly admitted under the doctrine of curative admissibility.  Defendant argued in his motion for a new trial that it was improper for the State’s expert witness, [...], to offer a detailed explanation of the affirmative defense of insanity and to testify to the ultimate issue whether defendant did or did not meet the legal definition of insanity.  (17T22-8 to 24-1).
[brief] First, he maintained to [...] that the bag ripped after being pushed, but then claimed the bag went up when asked why the back of [...] was covered in grout.  [DLa 40].  [...] admitted that he smiled when he told police [...] “pushed me, and it ripped the grout  That’s what happened. ”  [DLa 40]; [7T 114:15 – 115:4].
[brief] See FlowRider Surf, Ltd. v. Pac. Surf Designs, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153563, at *27-28 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016) (“Plaintiffs’ agreement to run a search using the parties’ agreed-upon terms does not constitute Plaintiffs’ acquiescence to produce all resulting documents. ”); Willmore v. Savvas Learning Co. LLC, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166813, at *28 (D. Kan. Sep. 19, 2023) (rejecting an argument that “all hits are presumptively relevant and responsive” and holding that the plaintiff could not demand that the defendant “bypass a relevance review”).  This Court should adhere to its relevance precedent and to the policy interests underlying Rule 4:10-2 in reaching the same conclusion.
[directive] In Table 3 (Using a Juvenile in a Drug-Distribution Scheme), a prosecutor must use Row A if the defendant is less than three years older than the juvenile who the defendant used or employed in a drug-distribution scheme in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6.  Note that this Special Offense Characteristic applies only if the offense did not involve weapons.  If weapons were involved in the offense within the meaning of Special Offense Characteristic #1 or Special Application and Enhancement Factor D, then the age differential is irrelevant and the prosecutor must use either Row B or C, depending on whether the prosecutor elects (or is required) to use Special Offense Characteristic #1 (Row C) or Special Application and Enhancement Feature D (Row B).
[brief] DURING [...]’S EXPERT TESTIMONY (Not Raised Below)  a.  [...] was Prejudiced  During his Trial because during the Defense Expert’s testimony, the Court consistently interrupted the Defense Expert and did not Interrupt the State’s Expert in the Same Fashion (Not Raised Below)  “[A]n unwarranted comment by the judge can be as prejudicial, or more harmful, than one by [counsel].  After all, the judge is a ‘neutral magistrate,’ and not a mere adversary making a presentation to the jury.  The jury looks to the judge for guidance and advice[.]”  State v. Meneses, 219 N.J. Super. 483 (App. Div. 287).
[brief] Here, the issue is not the aggregate length of defendant’s sentence.  The issue concerns whether the sentencing court’s concurrent/consecutive decision was in accordance with the law.  Next the State takes the position that even though there is no documentary evidence to establish that the sentencing court made the findings necessary to escape the statutorily mandated presumptive consecutive sentence, this Court should do as the PCR court did and deduce such evidence from a perfunctory statement that can be found in most every other judgement of conviction.  Included in the statement of reasons contained in defendant’s judgement the following statement of the court is recorded:  “[the court] incorporates all other reasons stated on the record at the time of sentence. ”  (Da 45)  From these perfunctory words, the PCR court divined the necessary finding that rendered defendant’s sentence legal, and the State now asks this Court to do the same.  To do as the State requests, this Court must not only rely on what is absent from this record, but it must also ignore the incongruity between the sentence imposed and the sentencing court’s aggravating and mitigating findings.  Those findings do not support the sentence imposed.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h) provides in pertinent part that: the term of imprisonment shall run consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment imposed for the previous offense, unless the court, in consideration of the character and conditions of the defendant, finds that imposition of consecutive sentences would be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct by others.  Absent a finding based upon defendant’s “character and condition” that a consecutive sentence would amount to “a serious injustice,” the sentencing court was required by the Legislature to impose the seven years with a three-year parole bar on [...] consecutive to the five-year flat term imposed on [...].
[brief] Plaintiff’s Complaint also fails to allege that the [...] relied on an “informant of dubious veracity. ”  Plaintiff concedes that the [...] relied upon [...] as their source for the CAIR Statements.  See Opp. at 25 (the [...] “rel[ied] on [...] when making” the statements at issue).  See also Opp. at 3, 13, 20, 24.  The Complaint does not allege (because it cannot) that any of the [...] were familiar with the Student or her mother, making it irrelevant whether they were “dubious witness[es]” or “unverified and unidentified” as Plaintiff contends.  See Da_019, DA_023-24.  Da_035-36; Opp. at 25.  The sole question for this Court is whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pled that it was reckless for the [...] to rely upon [...].
[brief] (See Da277a.)  Rather, Section 3.6A(7) provides that 50% of any residuary assets that would have passed to [...] under [...]’s Revocable Trust pass to [...] or, if [...] is not then surviving, to [...],\(^{12}\) with the balance of the residuary assets (including [...]’s Estate’s ownership interest in the Palm Beach Property) passing to [...].  (See Da058a.)  Again, [...]’s Revocable Trust explicitly precluded [...] (or [...]) from receiving the Palm Beach Property in Section 3.3A.  (Da051a.)  Therefore, construing Section 3.6A(7) of [...]’s Revocable Trust as [...] desires—allowing the Palm Beach Property to nevertheless pass to [...] (as [...]’s heir) through the residuary despite the clear and unequivocal exclusion of same in Section 3.3A—would contravene [...]’s stated intent and circumvent her testamentary wishes as clearly expressed in Section 3.
[brief] (4T213:11-15; 4T214:3-23; 4T223:18-225:3; 4T225:16-20; 4T226:3-5; 4T226:9-12; 4T246:11-25; 4T247:15-249:7; 4T257:1-3).  The plaintiff also attended a defense medical examination with [...] who authored a single report that was served in discovery.
[brief] (Pa34).  The September Meeting was actually an ambush and pretext based on a false premise, setting the stage to execute [...]’s preconceived plan to terminate the Agreement with Appellants.  During that meeting, [...] insulted Appellants and their Japanese customs, used profane and insulting language, and falsely accused Appellants of generating poor sales numbers for 2022, using misleading data.  (Pa34-36).  Among other things, [...] told Appellants’ officers, including [...] (“[...]”), the Vice President of Appellants and the son of Appellants’ founder, that “you don’t know anything about [alcohol sales] data,” that Mr. [...] “wouldn’t understand [Sapporo’s] data,” and that he had come to Appellant’s offices to “tell you how to do your job. ” (Pa34-36).
[directive] 7.1.3  The complainant should be personally interviewed if circumstances permit.  If the complainant cannot travel to the investigator's office, the investigator should conduct the interview at the complainant's home or place of employment if feasible.  If not, a telephonic interview may be conducted.  All relevant identifying information concerning the complainant should be recorded, e.g., name (unless the complainant wishes to remain anonymous), complete address, telephone numbers and area codes, race or ethnic identity, sex, date of birth, place of employment, social security number if necessary and place of employment (name and address).  The investigator should grant reasonable requests for accommodations to protect the complainant’s identity, such as meeting the complainant at a place other than the investigator’s office if the complainant’s identity cannot be kept confidential at that location.  7.1.4
[brief] (3T 96-17 to 24)  Considering [...]’s testimony in its entirety, it is evident that the only statement made by the perpetrator with the goal of causing [...] to relinquish money was, “[g]ive me all your money. ”  This statement is not a threat, nor was it made with the purpose of putting [...] in fear of immediate bodily injury.  As this Court has recognized, “[a] mere request for money, without more, is not criminal.
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[brief] (Pa219-SJCS #61).  Defendant [...] was the prime proponent of the 911 Memorial Capital Bond Project.  (Pa1-Compl #101; Pa48-Answ #101).  But defendant [...] pledged that no public trust funds monies would be used to fund the 911 Memorial Project and the expanded appointed 5 district special improvement district.  (Pa48-Answ #102).  While this hybrid action was pending, defendant [...] abused her position of power.
[brief] First, the State contends that no specific unanimity instruction was necessary because, unlike in State v. Gentry, 183 N.J. 30 (2005), the evidence did not show that [...] committed different acts against different victims.  (Sb 40)  That is exactly what the evidence showed, however.  According to the testimony, [...] committed two separate thefts -- he obtained money unlawfully from both [...] and [...].  Moreover, he utilized different means to obtain that money; he first said, “give me all your money,” which prompted [...] to hand over her bait money, and then he said, “give me all your money or I’ll shoot. ”  (3T 95-8 to 16, 96-14 to 19)  [...] testified that this second statement was “directed to [...] because I had already given him money. ”  (3T 96-20 to 24)  [...] handed over her bait money after this second statement was made.  (3T 95-14 to 20)  The State’s argument that [...] did not commit different acts against different victims is undermined by its own indictment, which charged [...] with terroristic threats for threatening to kill [...].  (Da 3)  The State did not charge [...] with a second count of terroristic threats for threatening to kill [...].  Accordingly, the State itself apparently recognized that there was evidence that [...] made different statements to each of the victims.
[brief] If the Appellate Division identifies some manifest interest of justice meriting an extension of time that the Trial Court heretofore overlooked, the Appellate Division can, and should, exercise its original jurisdiction to review the more than three hundred (300) pages of transcripts for abuse of discretion because no useful purpose would be served in remanding the matter to the lower court for a review of a record that is subject to review by this Court.  Respectfully Submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents, [...] and [...]  By: [...], Esq.  Dated: July 2, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY - APPELLATE DIVISION  [...], [...]; [...]  Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARISHA SIROIS, ADAM SIROIS [...]  [...]  Defendant-Respondent