ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  [...]’s digital interface gave [...] reasonable notice of the contract’s terms.  [...] entered her agreement with [...] by affirmatively checking a box stating that she had reviewed and agreed to the Terms of Use.  Plaintiffs have never disputed that the [...] App’s clickwrap interface—which provided conspicuous notice of the new terms of use and required her to affirmatively assent to those terms by checking a box and clicking a button—provided reasonable notice of the contract terms and thus formed a valid agreement.  See Santana v. SmileDirectClub, LLC, 475 N.J. Super. 279, 288 (App. Div. 2023) (“In the context of clickwrap agreements … ‘the offeree will … be bound by the agreement if a reasonably prudent user would be on inquiry notice of the terms. ’”).  This Court has already held that an identical [...] clickwrap interface, whereby a user agreed to [...]’s January 2021 Terms, provided reasonable notice of the Terms of Use and created a valid contract.  Williams v. Ysabel, No. A-1391-22, 2023 WL 5768422, at *1, *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 7, 2023) (unpublished opinion).  (See Da73–74 ¶ 8; Da77; Da222–223 ¶¶ 6–10.)  The *Williams* decision is supported by decades of New Jersey precedent that has “routinely enforced” clickwrap agreements similar to the one at issue here.  *Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc.*, 244 N.J. 30, 55 n.2 (2020); see, e.g., *Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C.*, 323 N.J. Super. 118, 122, 125 (App. Div. 1999) (finding that plaintiffs had reasonable notice of forum-selection clause presented by clickwrap agreement because they “were free to scroll through the various computer screens that presented the terms of their contracts before clicking their agreement” and “ha[d] the option to click ‘I Agree’ or ‘I Don’t Agree’”); *Santana*, 475 N.J. Super. at 290; cf. *Wollen v. Gulf Stream Restoration & Cleaning, LLC*, 468 N.J. Super. 483, 502–503 (App. Div. 2021) (declining to enforce a different type of digital agreement because the “plaintiff was not required to … acknowledge the terms and conditions by ‘clicking to accept’ or checking a box that she viewed them before clicking the … submit button”).
[brief] The scope of judicial review in land use cases is limited.  It is well established that “the law presumes that boards of adjustment and municipal governing bodies will act fairly and with proper motives and for valid reasons [and] will be set aside only when it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. ”  Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965); see also Friends of Peapack-Gladstone v. Borough of Peapack-Gladstone Land Use Bd.; 407 N.J. Super. 404, 424 (App. Div. 2009) (affirming the “judiciary's limited standard of review of local land use decisions”).  A reviewing court, when considering an appeal from a planning board action, generally applies the “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable” standard.  Dowel Assocs. v. Harmony Twp. Land Use Bd., 403 N.J. Super. 1, 29 (App Div. 2008) (quotation marks omitted).  The purpose of the judicial review of the planning board’s decision is to determine whether “the board acted within the statutory guidelines and properly exercised its discretion. ”  See id. at 30 (quotation marks omitted).  Those who challenge the local board's actions, such as the Plaintiffs here, have the burden of proving the decision is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  See Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Franklin, 233 N.J. 546, 558 (2018).  A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment “for the proper exercise of the Board's discretion.
[brief] That is, in [...]’s Sep 29, 2022 affidavit of service, he states that he spent a total of 12.1 hours on the case, which at $400 per hour, equates to $4,840.  He then also added another $17.58 in expenses.  (Pa81).  This of course adds up to a grand total of $4,857.58.  However this was not the amount that he asked for; instead he asked for $4,860.49 (Pa76 ¶10), and the court awarded him that different number, which did not match the total from his own affidavit of services!
[brief] The question currently before us, however, concerns not so much the technology behind location tracking, but rather the understanding that a user may exercise some control over this feature and the data that it generates.  Even had location tracking technology — and the average person's familiarity with it — stood still over the past decade, this case is plainly closer to the simple recitation of the data exemplified in Johnson than it is to the interpretive process at issue in Payne.  The location tracking records introduced during [...]'s testimony were the data generated by [...]'s standard recordkeeping practices; it is evident that he used no specialized skill to reformat or translate any of the raw data.  [...] argues that the records were not self-explanatory, and that [...] had to decipher the categories of information in those records.  However, the gap in the chronological listing is obvious in the exhibit.  The more significant issue is whether [...] relied on specialized knowledge in explaining that a user has the ability to enable or disable the tracking of that data, thereby ascribing significance to that gap.  [...]'s location history tracking is a consumer feature designed to be understood and managed by accountholders.  When a court considers whether testimony is beyond the "ken" of the average layman, the question is not whether the average person is already knowledgeable about a given subject, but whether it is within the range of perception and understanding.  "Testimony elicited from an expert provides useful, relevant information when the trier of fact would not otherwise be able to reach a rational conclusion; such information 'is not likely to be part of the background knowledge of the judge or jurors themselves.'" Payne, 440 Md. at 699, quoting David H. Kaye, et al., The New Wigmore: Expert Evidence §1.1 (2d ed. 2010).
[brief] Plaintiffs cite several cases in their brief for the proposition that “negligence may be imposed for the same conduct as assault, but without the intent. ”  [Pb43].  This statement is misleading.  Firing a shotgun may be a battery if the shooter intended to strike the victim.  Alternatively, it may be negligence if the shooter intended to fire the shotgun, but had no intent to injure the victim.  That exact scenario is discussed in Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 390 (1970), a case relied upon by Plaintiffs.  Burd and the other cases cited by Plaintiffs do not stand for the proposition that the shooter may be held liable for battery if the evidence establishes he had no intent to strike the victim, nor does Burd allow the victim to recover in negligence if the evidence establishes the shooter intended to strike the victim.
[brief] The discovery that [...] was the sole member of [...] and operated [...] as a sham entity to perpetrate the conspiracy against Plaintiffs created new claims against [...].  The dismissal of prior, distinct claims, under distinct predicate facts, should not have any impact on Plaintiffs’ ability to state newly discovered claims supported by newly discovered predicate facts.  Finally, there is ample testimony and documentary evidence in the record to create a genuine issue of material fact as to [...]’s role in the conspiracy against Plaintiffs.  Testimony in the record, including [...]’s own testimony, raised serious doubts as to whether [...] was in fact the attorney of [...] or only acting as the attorney of [...] for the purpose of perpetrating Defendants’ conspiracy against Plaintiffs.  Similar to the dismissal of the claims against [...], the Trial Court’s holding essentially absolved [...] of their role in Defendants’ conspiracy by virtue of their status as attorneys who were not the attorneys of Plaintiffs.  While Plaintiffs’ claims survived against all the non-attorney co-conspirator Defendants, [...] obtained summary judgment because they were not Plaintiffs’ attorneys and therefore, in the Trial Court’s view, had no duty to refrain from conspiring to steal their money.  This notion is as disquieting as it is confounding, and this error must be reversed.  For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that Your Honors reverse the Orders of January 19, 2016, November 10, 2016, April 3, 2018, January 24, 2020, December 16, 2020, December 9, 2021, and January 21, 2022, reinstating the Complaint against [...] and [...], and granting Plaintiffs leave to amend the Complaint to state the newly discovered claims.
[brief] (Responding to Sb18)  The State Defendants argue that the private non-delegation doctrine raised by the Plaintiffs is grounded in due process principles, which was rejected in the Humane Society case.  (Sb18).  For that proposition, the State Defendants erroneously cite Ridgefield Park Ed. Ass’n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Ed., 78 N.J. 144, 163-64 (1978).  However, *Ridgefield Park* does not say that the private non-delegation doctrine is grounded in due process principles.  Indeed, numerous cases state that the private non-delegation doctrine is based on separation of powers principles, not due process.
[directive] In pretrial for shall apply prosecutor the 7.4.6, subsection to pursuant overcome is detention pretrial offenses: specified following the of any includes charge present the if detention as firearm firearm a (i.e., a involving offense  Any Offenses.  Firearms Act Graves (i) would 2C:39-1(r)) that N.J.S.A. by defined as "weapon" other any to opposed N.J.S.A.  Graves Act, under the sentence minimum a of imposition the require in vary and Act myriad are the Graves under offenses  Firearms (g). and 2C:43-6(c) a of possession unlawful "simple" from range can  Offenses severity. of degrees the during firearm of possession a the to -5(c), 2C:39-5(b), N.J.S.A. firearm, imperative it  Accordingly, is 2C:39-4.1(a).  N.J.S.A. crimes, certain of commission given in involved any circumstances relevant all evaluate closely prosecutors that complaint- apply fora whether to (e.g., determinations critical making when case presumption a whether assessing When detention).
[brief] 2.  **The State law here, the Health Act, is neither expressly or impliedly exclusive in the field of noise regulation. **  The Court below decided that the State law that the [...] acted under to adopt the model Public Health nuisance code ("The Model Nuisance Code") was a "specific grant of authority which preempts [...]’s general grant of authority under the Home Rule Act."  Da80.  Therefore, an examination of the legislative authority under which the [...] acted is in order.  The Court below notes, as has been examined, that each municipality must maintain a local Board of Health and that these Boards may, if they choose, form a Regional Health Commission.  (Da72 citing N.J.S.A. 26:3-1 et seq.; N.J.S.A. 26:3-84 et seq.).  The Court below notes that such a regional Health Commission would succeed the local Board of Health in its powers and duties.  Da72.  The only legislative powers, however, that the [...] has used, and the only ones that a regional Health Commission can use to regulate in the field of noise, are the abilities of the local Board of Health to declare and define nuisances, N.J.S.A. 26:3-45, and the ability to adopt a code by reference pursuant to the PHSCARA.  Neither the general power to declare and define nuisances, nor the ability to adopt a code by reference, are in any way specific to the regulation of noise.  In fact, none of these legislative provisions even mention noise.
[brief] 16  North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Tp. Of Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. 541 (2017)  ...........................................................  11  North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Bergen Cnty. Pros. Office, 447 N.J.Super. 182 (App.Div. 2016)  O'Shea v. Twp. of W. Milford, 410 N.J. Super. 371 (App.Div. 2009)  Paff v. Ocean Co. Pros. Office, 235 N.J. 1 (2018)
[brief] Defendant is facing a charge for second-degree vehicular homicide, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5, and a charge for third-degree strict liability vehicular homicide, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.3a.  To find defendant guilty of violating N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5, the jury will be required to consider defendant’s state of mind.  Specifically, the State has to prove that defendant caused the victim’s death by driving the vehicle recklessly.  In evaluating whether defendant is guilty of violating N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.3a, the State will have to prove that defendant caused the victim’s death by driving a vehicle while intoxicated in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.  The BZE evidence, and [...]’s testimony regarding same, directly relates to these elements.  Importantly, when considered in conjunction with the testimony of eye witnesses, the testimony of defendant’s co-worker, his text messages from earlier in the day, and the body worn camera video that will be admitted at trial, this evidence will enable the jury to properly evaluate whether defendant was driving the vehicle recklessly and/or whether he was driving his vehicle while intoxicated.  There is no other way about it, this evidence is relevant to the jury’s analysis.
[brief] (Pa276 at ¶9(b). )  Section 9(b) provides that:  Lender shall, if permitted by applicable law (including section 341(d) of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. 1701j-3(d)) and with the prior approval of the Secretary, require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument if:  (i)  All or part of the Property . . . is sold or otherwise transferred (other than by devise or descent), and (ii)  The Property is not occupied by the purchaser or grantee as his or her principal resident, or the purchaser or grantee does so occupy the Property, but his or her credit has not be approved in accordance with the requirements of the Secretary.  (Pa276)  In light of this transfer of interest, Appellant (and its predecessor and servicers) were obligated under the Mortgage to reject anything less than the full payoff.
[brief] (Pa001).  On June 24, 2022, plaintiff upon being sure that there was never any signed Order entered by any Judge finding him guilty of anything, filed another notice of claim against the [...].  (Pa505).  On 08/11/2023, more than two years after plaintiff filed his first complaint, Defense Counsel for [...] upon filing his motion for summary judgment, produced a copy of an undated order of conviction with a signature.  (Pa168).  The signature line where defendant is also required to sign, has no signature and the defendant’s date line has no date.  (Pa168).  Because plaintiff was certain that this sudden appearance of an undated Order with a signature was an act of misuse and abuse of process, on 9/26/2023, plaintiff filed another lawsuit adding the Criminal Trial Judge ([...]) who had failed to produce a properly signed order that was required for plaintiff to perfect his appeal, as a defendant.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Respondent, [...]  By: s/[...]  RICHARD G. SCOTT  Dated: January 10, 2025  SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENT  [...]  Date Submitted: January 13, 2025  [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  [...]  Attorney for Respondent  New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection [...]  [...]  [...]  Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel [...] (ID: 26251990)
[directive] In the event that a juvenile is waived to adult court pursuant to Juvenile waiver cases.  N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1 (involuntary waiver) or N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-27 (waiver at election of juvenile), the Assistant Prosecutor shall make certain that a new complaint-summons (CDR-1) or complaint-warrant (CDR-2) is filed with the adult court within twelve hours in accordance with 5:22-2(f).
[brief] ’”  *Id.* at *28 (quoting *Silva v. Autos of Amboy, Inc.*, 267 N.J. Super. 546, 556 (App. Div. 1993)).  The panel also noted that “[a] suit will not be considered a collection of discrete claims” for purposes of this analysis “if it rests on ‘a common core of facts’ or is ‘based on related legal theories. ’”  *Ibid.* (citation omitted) (emphases added).  Consistent with these well-established principles, the panel explained that on remand the trial court may “consider awarding counsel fees and costs for time spent establishing wrongful acts on the part of defendants that pre-dated the time for which the RICO claims could be asserted” if it finds “that the time devoted to presenting that evidence was reasonably required to establish the RICO claims.
[brief] As PERC recognized, it is well established that a labor organization’s right to freely choose its negotiation representatives includes the right to freely choose the number of negotiation representatives.  (Pa233-Pa235).  It is a long recognized bedrock of the NJEERA that neither side of collective bargaining may dictate the other’s choice of representatives for collective negotiations.  Yet, that is exactly what the Board tried to do here by insisting to exclude the Bargaining Council members of the [...]’s negotiations team.  Reframing the Board’s argument reveals how out of step it is with the law.  If instead of trying to exclude the Bargaining Council, what if the Board attempted to limit the [...]’s negotiations team from 10 to only 5 participants at bargaining sessions?  Or, what if the Board was instead insisting on excluding particular individuals, for example, the [...]’s bargaining chair or vice president from the negotiations sessions?  Absent a compelling reason for these requests, PERC would undoubtedly issue an unfair practice complaint.  The only difference between the current situation and the above hypothetical, which is clearly an unfair practice, is that the [...]’s right to determine the size of its negotiations team is newly recognized.  The law grants PERC, pursuant to its responsibility to safeguard and administer the NJEERA, the authority to direct a bargaining party to meet and negotiate with the opposing party’s choice of negotiation representatives.  Since the Board here did not provide any compelling reason in trying to dictate the size of the [...]’s negotiations team, PERC not only had the right but in fact the need to order the Board to negotiate with the [...]’s full negotiations team, including its Bargaining Council members.
[brief] “There was [a $50,000 transfer] on September 8, 2015 from [[...]’s] MRL line of credit to 0319 checking account, which was identified belonging to the [...]; 90,000 [from [...]’s MR Line of Credit] on October 7, 2015, again going into account 0319, which is identified as belonging to the [...]; 50,000 on October 28, 2015 from [...]’s account to [...] account ending 8309; 75,000 on August 22nd, 2014, which went from [[...]’s] MRL line of to credit account to [...] account ending in 8309.  And, again, in this Court’s mind, it wasn’t identified that a similar distribution went to [...]. ”
[brief] On October 18, 2022 and during a public TC meeting, plaintiff asked former Governor/State Senator [...] whether residents were entitled to know the final terms of the fair share housing settlement prior to consideration and official action.  Former Governor/State Senator [...] responded: "It's the Law."  (Pa219–SJCS#41).  Defendants continued to defame, to smear, to impugn and to stifle local dissenting voices.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW.  When error in a fact finding of a judge or an administrative agency is alleged, the scope of appellate review is limited.  The Court will only decide whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient or substantial credible evidence present in the record, considering the proofs as a whole.  The Court gives due regard to the ability of the fact finder to judge credibility and, where an agency’s expertise is a factor, to that expertise.  In re: Taylor, 158 N.J. 644 (1999); State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470-71 (1999) and Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965).
[brief] D.  Several amici support defendants’ positions.  [...] (collectively, Clergy members) argue that the other factors in this case -- proximity to the crime scene and the non-reaction to the spotlight -- fail to create reasonable and articulable suspicion.  The Clergy members also contend that race-based stops cause tremendous harm and are unreasonable because they fail to meaningfully limit the number of people subjected to them.  Furthermore, such stops involve an aggravated or uncomfortable response from Black motorists, which may result from a legitimate fear of potential violence from law enforcement.  The Clergy members recommend that this Court create a prophylactic rule preventing police officers from effectuating stops where the only or predominant basis for the stop is that the stopped individuals match the race and gender of the suspects.
[brief] 8, 9  New Century Fin. v. Trewin, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688 (Ch. Div. May 24, 2018) ...................... 4 North v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, No. 2:20-cv-20190 (BRM) (JSA), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184974 (D.N.J. Sep. 24, 2021) ................................................................. 2 R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 255 (2001) .................................................................................. 5 Valentine v. Unifund CCR, LLC, Docket No. [...] ........................................................................ 1 Veras v. LVNV Funding, LLC, No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) .................................................................................. 1, 4, 5 Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding LLC, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 96 (Law Div. Jan. 21, 2022) ....................... 4 Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding, No. [...], 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550 (App. Div. Sep. 21, 2023)  ..................................................................................
[brief] For all of the reasons discussed in this brief, the decision of the [...] to issue the FHA permit to [...] is supported by credible evidence in the record on the application, conforms fully with Stormwater Management Rules, and considered concerns regarding impacts to threatened and endangered species.  Therefore, the Flood Hazard Area Individual Permit was properly issued and should be upheld.  [...]  A Professional Corporation Attorneys for [...] Associates, Inc.  By:__________________________  [...], ESQUIRE  [...], ESQUIRE  [...], ESQUIRE  Dated: July 19, 2024  BRIEF OF RESPONDENT  [...] Date Submitted: July 19, 2024
[directive] 9.11.3  Agencies may not, as part of a plea or settlement agreement in an internal affairs investigation or otherwise, enter into any agreement concerning the content of a synopsis subject to public disclosure under Section 9.11.2, including any agreement regarding the identities of officers subject to final discipline, summaries of misconduct, or statements of the sanctions imposed.  No State, county, or municipal agency, law enforcement unit, or licensed law enforcement officer shall enter into any non-disclosure agreement which seeks to conceal or prevent public review of the circumstances under which the officer separated from or was terminated or fired from employment by the law enforcement unit or State, county, or municipal agency.