ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The doctrine of waiver should preclude [...] from asserting that the Superior court lacks jurisdiction to construe the COVID Statute.  After making payment to [...] in satisfaction of its May and June 2020 invoices, (in a manner fully consistent with the requirements of the COVID Statute), and then demanding the return of those funds, [...] filed suit in the Superior Court.  It did so well aware of the fact that [...] understandably relies on the Statute in taking the positions that the payments [...] seeks to recoup were properly made, and that [...] owes it for its April invoice and the remaining balance of its July 2020 invoice.  To the extent that [...] actually maintains that exclusive jurisdiction over all matters falling under Title 18A lies solely with the Commissioner, it could have petitioned the Commissioner for the relief that it sought in the Law Division.  But instead, [...] filed suit in the Law Division, and upon doing so, asserted the position that the COVID Statute could not be invoked in defense of the claims that it makes, and that [...]’s mandatory counterclaim could not raise it either.  If [...]’s position regarding jurisdiction over the COVID Statute had any merit, (and it does not), [...] should be deemed to have waived it by proceeding as it did.
[brief] Regardless, even if defendant can rebut 1.7(a)(1), a conflict still arises under 1.7(a)(2), because of a significant risk of representing more than one client [….]  Again, to be clear, however, I’ve already found there is an actual conflict.  [….]  While it’s undisputed that an employer/employee relationship exists, this does not necessarily permit counsel to represent both sides when there’s a significant risk as there is here.  [T36:1-9; 36:15-37:14; 37:25-38:3 (emphasis added). ]  [...] further found that, although [...] had not attempted to obtain written conflict waivers from Defendants, waiver of the conflict would be prohibited under RPC 1.7(b) because it involved the assertion “of a claim by one client against another” in the same litigation.  See T38:8-39:16.  [...]’s disqualification ruling was based on the substantial conflict presented by [...]’s joint representation of the Defendants and the need to protect the integrity of the litigation and the judicial system:
[brief] Under the circumstances, a review of the relevant statutory scheme demonstrates that the application to the [...] constituted an “application for development. ”  To that end, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.3, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  An application for development shall be complete for purposes of commencing the applicable time period for action by a municipal agency, when so certified by the municipal agency or its authorized committee or designee .  . . [emphasis added].  The MLUL defines “Municipal Agency” as:  [A] municipal planning board or board of adjustment, or a governing body of a municipality when acting pursuant to this act and any agency which is created by or responsible to one or more municipalities when such agency is acting pursuant to this act.  [N.J.S.A. 40:55D-5 (emphasis added); see also N.J.S.A. 40:55D-9 & 10 (prescribing the authority of a “municipal agency” to hold meetings and hearings).]  The primary purpose and function of the [...] is “to assure the public health, safety and general welfare of the [...] and its residents, business establishments and visitors” (Hoboken City Ordinance §36-2) – a land use responsibility well-contemplated by the MLUL.
[directive] Person sentenced to incarceration, care and custody of minor child.  1.  a.  In any case in which a person has been convicted of a crime for which the person will be incarcerated, the court shall order, as part of the presentence investigation required pursuant to N.J.S.2C:44-6, that a determination be made as to whether the person is the sole caretaker of a minor child and, if so, who will assume responsibility for the child's care and custody during the period the person is incarcerated.
[brief] As the complaint was filed by the Plaintiff in February and March of 2020, the Appellate Division had already determined that Plaintiff does not have “a legally cognizable stake in Newark's “tax abatement program” nor a substantial likelihood he (Plaintiff) will experience some harm if the court returns an unfavorable decision. ”  This was despite Appellant’s argument that his standing is derived from the real estate taxes he pays on property that he owns in Essex County.  *Feld v. [...], et al.*, A-1272-16T4, 2019 N.J.Super. Unpub. 2019 WL 2303248 (App. Div. 2019), cert. den. *Feld v [...], et al.*, 2020 N.J. WL 808315 (N.J, Feb. 6, 2020)(Pa143).  In the present case, the Appellant’s claims made against the [...] Defendants are based on the underlying premise that Newark and the [...] Defendants wrongfully approved a 30-year tax abatement under the [...] because the [...] had been repealed by the LTTEL.  Because the Appellate Division in Norman Towers (discussed below) determined that the LTTEL did not repeal the NJHFMA, Appellant’s claims must fail.
[brief] [Supreme] Court has ranked as of basic importance in our society, rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State’s unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect. ”  *Gruenke v. Seip*, 225 F.3d 290, 303 (3d Cir. 2000)  *citing*  *M.L.B. v. S.L.J.*, 519 U.S. 102 (1996).  Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognizes parental autonomy deriving from the “**fundamental right**” of parents to raise their children as they see fit. ”  *Moriarty v. Bradt*, 177 N.J. 84, 103, 115 (2003)(emphasis added).  Our State’s highest court held that “the entitlement to autonomous family privacy includes the fundamental right of parents to make decisions regarding custody, parenting time, health, education, and other child-welfare issues between themselves, without state interference.
[brief] (Da222)  R-1(a) of [...] Rules provides that, “the parties shall be deemed to have made these rules a part of their agreement whenever they have provided for arbitration by the [[...]] under its Commercial Arbitration Rules. ”  (Da197)  Under [...] Rule L-2, “if the parties are unable to agree upon the number of arbitrators and a claim or counterclaim involves at least $1,000,000, then three arbitrators shall hear and determine the case.
[brief] On March 19, 2018, [...] emailed [...] and explained the technical background of the installation of the Active Subsurface Depressurization System (ASDS) associated with the remediation.  (Da418-Da422.)  This March 19, 2018 email had also attached the sixty-day letter report again that was previously sent to the DEP as well as [...] on November 14, 2017.  While [...] testified that he never recalled “seeing” the letter, [...] was in receipt of this written remediation plan on both November 14, 2017 as well as March 19, 2018 and ultimately consented to [...]’s request posed on March 19, 2018 which attached said communication, as evidence by [...]’s text message to [...].  (Da18 pg. 68, Line 10 through pg. 69, Line 7; Da414-Da417; Da418-Da422.)  On April 2, 2018, [...] emailed [...] with regard to the installation of the sub slab depressurization system.  (Da423.)  [...] in response acknowledged that he received the April 2, 2018 email and that he had authorized [...] to proceed.  (Da213 pg. 117, Lines 1-12.)  On April 4, 2018, [...] emailed [...] again regarding a plumbing contractor who was scheduled to repair the pipe damage during installation of the system.  (Da424.)  [...] acknowledged that he received the April 4, 2018 email and that he had again authorized [...] to proceed.  (Da214 pg. 118, Lines 1-16.)
[brief] Id (emphasis added).  Relatives are clearly “such other person’s agents” but New Jersey also has strong familial anti-discrimination protections.  See, e.g., Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, Inc., 140 N.J. 623, 660 (1995) (Reprisals against "innocent victims," such as relatives and close friends who are co-workers, can be coercive).  As to retaliation, the LAD has additional protections that go beyond intentional discrimination to outlaw intimidation, coercion and threats.  N.J.A.C. 13:13-4.7(a) & (b) (based on N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(11)(c) & (d), respectively).  13
[brief] [...]  [...] (ID No. 23141991)  [...]  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs and current  Attorneys for [...] f/k/a [...]  [...]  (ID No. 103562014)  [...]  (ID No. 343242021)  On The Brief TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................ ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................. v TABLE OF JUDGMENTS ................................................................................................. ix STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................................................................................
[brief] (Tt88-17 to 18; 1T88-18 to 20; 1T89-4 to 6; 1T90-1 to 4).  The officer called for an ambulance.  (1T95-21 to 23).  The officer also spoke with defendant, who said that he had met a man online, went to his home, had consensual sex with him after which they had some drinks and watched a movie.
[brief] (15T45-24 to 46-9; 16T177-12 to 178-14).  Defendant claimed his own report inaccurately stated that the loss took place on January 4 because he still hoped the wallet would turn up.  (16T83-13 to 19).  If that were true, then his written report was false in that defendant wrote that when he called the morning after he realized his wallet was missing, which would have been New Year’s Day, and not January 5, the office “was open but they again advised they did not have the wallet. ” (Pa18).  At trial, defendant stated that he remembered “definitely calling the office” on New Year’s Day.  (16T178-11 to 14).  Defendant also identified a police report he filed with the [...].  (16T85-2 to 5; Pa57-61).  Defendant said the report was dated January 19, 2016, because he did not “initially report it to Brick Township,” and was told to do so by a NJSP lieutenant in his new unit.  (16T89-14 to 23; Pa57).
[brief] (6T74:24 to 75:7).  About two weeks later, on September 19, 2019, [...] issued a letter to the New Jersey Division of Taxation advising that a nearly $2 million distribution charged to [...] and [...] equally should have been charged solely to [...], as [...] did not actually receive any funds, and that this change would negate any tax due from [...] in the State’s tax deficiency notice.  (Da157-58).  Still, neither [...] nor [...] received any underlying documentation to explain this supposed error.  (6T76:21 to 77:2).  On October 1, 2019, [...] requested from [...] QuickBooks files up to January 2018.  (Pa121).  [...] refused to turn those over.  Instead, he provided a few additional [...] tax returns, but those tax returns raised more questions, because the 2017 return showed significant unexplained retained earnings on which [...] paid taxes but which [...] had refused to distribute.  (6T77:22 to 78:5; 78:6 to 79:6).  On October 29, 2019, [...] executed an affidavit purporting to memorialize the circumstances of the tax filing that erroneously allocated that nearly $2 million distribution to [...] and [...], instead of just to [...].  (Da160).  Initially, [...] prepared the affidavit for [...]’s signature, but [...] refused to sign.  In fact, by this time, [...] was so overtly hostile toward [...] that when [...] asked him to sign the affidavit, [...] responded in a series of text messages:  “NO fucking way . . .  No fucking way I sign anything for anyone . . .  File a fucking suit . . .  Never ever mention [[...]’s] fucking name to me again . . .  If you want to stay my CPA. ” (17T14:11-22; Pa157).  [...] ultimately prepared and signed the requested affidavit himself.  Despite the affidavit, the State still refused to refund any of the amounts [...] paid pursuant to the tax deficiency notice.  (6T80:7-20).  G.  Procedural History Through the Time of Trial
[brief] ”  T. at 25:21-23.  The trial court added that “Plaintiffs’ desire to [do] debt-adjustment services as licensed attorneys does not implicate a fundamental right, like the right to a particular job, the right to provide debt-adjustment services as licensed attorneys is not constitutionally protected .  . . .”  T. at 26:25-27:5.  The trial court ignored New Jersey law holding that an attorney’s performance of debt adjustment services constitutes the practice of law in this State.
[directive] 12:9  Use of A. MEA  Moneys AGLEFA, CLETA, MLETA or a shall only be used for law in a a All enforcement purposes, defined this standard operating procedure.  as in expenditures are subjec: certification availability by the entity, funding of to be which certification should not unreasonably and ultimately withheld. shall Forfeiture funds not be a sowce revenue to meet normal operating of [...]  Forfeiture S.O.P. Page Adminisi!ation
[brief] Indeed, as the Clarksburg Inn Court found, both the HRA and the NCA are different laws under which a municipality can act.  Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J. Super. 624, 638-639 (App. Div. 2005).  Setting the NCA aside, as it should be given it was not cross appealed, and looking solely at the lower court’s decision that the [...] ordinance preempted Ordinance 17-2017, the reasoning of the lower Court here would repeal provisions of the HRA and other stated powers of municipal governing bodies.  Db 35-36.  **POINT II**
[brief] “Under this standard, [the Appellate Division] do[es] not reverse in the absence of a ‘clear abuse of discretion. ’”  *Id.* (quoting *Ocwen Loan Servs., LLC v. Quinn*, 450 N.J. Super. 393, 397 (App. Div. 2016)); see also *Customers Bank v. Reitnour Inv. Properties, LP*, 453 N.J. Super. 338, 348 (App. Div. 2018) (“Because equitable remedies are largely left to the judgment of the court, which has to balance the equities and fashion a remedy, such a decision will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. ” (citing Sears Mortgage Corp. v. Rose, 134 N.J. 326, 353-54 (1993) (evaluating whether the trial court abused its discretion in applying an equitable remedy)); Kaye v. Rosefielde, 223 N.J. 218, 231 (2015) (describing the broad equitable powers and discretion of the Chancery judge).  While this Court generally applies the same summary judgment standard as the trial court and does not defer to the trial court on conclusions of law, Henry v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 330 (2010), the deference to trial court’s sitting in equity applies even on summary judgment motions,
[brief] The Court continued that “Indemnity provisions similar to those in this place, generally are held . . . not to apply, to a party through a contract to recover from it[]s fees from another party to the same contract and a dispute between them. ” (5T8:17-21).  The trial court also held that the fee shifting provision in the §18.2 of the Purchase and Sale Agreement was not applicable to [...].  (5T10:8-19).  The trial court’s decisions on [...]’s fee request was memorialized in an order dated September 27, 2023 (the “September 27 Order”).
[brief] Caicedo v. Caicedo, 439 N.J. Super. 615, 623 (App. Div. 2015).  As was explained by the Plaintiff at length in his initial brief, the Plaintiff has met all of the requirements to establish liability against the [...] under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.  The pothole constituted a “dangerous condition” under N.J.S.A. 59:4-1(a).  The overall size of the subject pothole was approximately 4-feet in length (measured perpendicular to the roadway) and 12-inches wide (measured parallel to the striping).  (Pa 609)
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | |-------| | **Carlucci v. Carlucci,**<br>265 N.J. Super. 333 (Ch. Div. 1993) | 9, 10 | | **McNair v. McNair,**<br>332 N.J. Super. 195 (App. Div. 2000) | 10 | | Other Authorities | |-------------------| | **N.J. Court Rules**, cmt. 1 | 10 | | Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982) | 6 | | R. 2:9-1 | 9, 10 | | R. 1:36-3 | 5 |
[brief] [...] & [...], *Juror Perceptions of Opposing Expert Forensic Psychologists: Preexisting Attitudes, Confirmation Bias, and Belief Perseverance*, 28 Psych., Pub. Pol’y, & L. 213 (2022).  Given the important role that preexisting knowledge plays in juror decision making, the Court should understand what misconceptions about forensic evidence jurors are likely to bring with them into a trial.
[brief] Similarly, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181 “requires [e]very law enforcement agency in this State to adopt and implement guidelines that are consistent with the guidelines that have been promulgated by the Attorney General. ”  O’Rourke v. City of Lambertville, 405 N.J. Super. 8, 19 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181) (internal quotations omitted).  In relevant part, the Attorney General Guidelines, state that:  5.1.14  Once a complaint has been received, the subject officer shall be notified in writing that a report has been made and that an investigation will commence.  Such notification shall not include the name of the complainant.  6.0.1  All allegations of officer misconduct shall be thoroughly, objectively, and promptly investigated to their logical conclusion in conformance with this policy, regardless of whether the officer resigns or otherwise separates from the agency.  6.2.3  The investigator should interview the complainant, all witnesses and the subject officer, and review relevant reports and documents, gather evidence and conduct any other investigation as appropriate.  6.3.5  Internal affairs shall notify the suspect officer in writing that an internal investigation has been started, unless the nature of the investigation requires secrecy.  The internal affairs investigator should interview the complainant, all witnesses and the subject officer, review relevant reports and documents, and obtain necessary information and materials.  7.1.3  The complainant should be personally interviewed if circumstances permit.  7.1.4  All relevant facts known to the complainant should be obtained during the interview.  8.1.6  In all cases where a subject officer is interviewed pursuant to an administrative or criminal investigation, the interview must be audio recorded by the investigator, and should be video recorded, if practical.  [Attorney General, Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures 22-48 (June 2021). ]  Here, [...] was not issued a target letter, and therefore, she did not receive proper notice of the charges.
[brief] But in his affidavit in support of the search warrant under oath, he swore that the Buick pulled into the parking lot of “[...] at 10:56am” and back into a parking space, two black males exited the Buick, pulled their hoods over their heads and entered the [...] located at [...].  (Da 36)  What's even more compelling is [...]'s affidavit was the surveillance observation of [...], which contradicts [...]'s grand jury testimony where he indicated that the two black males were dropped off at the intersection of Parsonage Road, and the two occupants exited the Buick.  (12T 15-16-3 to 5).  Det Ted [...] testified that he relies on [...] and [...] reports when making his affidavit.  (6T 87-1 to 12)  [...] police report indicates that he stopped defendant at [...] on “[...] at 10:53am” and placed defendant under arrest at 10:56am, (Da 36) but the C.A.D. incident report indicates that defendant was stopped on “[...] at 10:53am”.  (Da 52)
[brief] [...] relies on all the legal arguments raised in his opening brief and in his pro se brief.  He adds the following supplemental point.  SUPPLEMENTAL POINT  THE DETECTIVE IMPROPERLY TESTIFIED AS A LAY WITNESS REGARDING THE GPS LOCATION AND HEALTH ACTIVITY DATA OBTAINED FROM CELLPHONES.  (Not Raised Below)  [...]’s testimony about the GPS location and “health activity” information from [...]’s and [...]’s cellphones required “scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge. ”  N.J.R.E. 702.  Specifically, this testimony needed to be supported by specialized knowledge about how the technology, software, and algorithms used by these particular Apple iPhones reliably computes GPS location and health activity information.  As such, expert testimony was required under N.J.R.E. 702.  The State, however, did not offer [...] as an expert in these areas and instead improperly presented this technical testimony as lay testimony.3  3  Although [...] was later qualified as an expert in cell phone mapping and cell phone forensics, the training he discussed was limited to using “call detail records” and mapping software to create maps of historical cell site data, which provides a larger, general location in which a cellphone is located.  (12T163-24 to 168-7).  He did not testify about specialized training or knowledge in how the GPS location on an Apple iPhone is computed or the  Just like a lay police officer would not be allowed to read to a jury the numbers in the alleles and loci found in a DNA report, he cannot be allowed to read the latitude, longitude, and number of steps recorded by a cellphone when the State has not established that the officer has specialized knowledge or expertise in how the device came up with those numbers.  Because the State improperly offered this critical testimony through a lay officer rather than a qualified expert, [...] was deprived of due process and a fair trial.
[brief] These interests overcome the asserted parental right to affirmative notification of gender nonconformity, and the injunction the State seeks is narrowly tailored to achieve its objective of protecting students.  Moreover, the Court should defer to the State’s straightforward interpretation of the Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”) to prohibit a parental notification mandate that is triggered only when nonconforming students express their gender identities at school and not when cisgender students put their masculinity or femininity on display.  Mandatory notification policies that target gender-nonconforming students offend the New Jersey Constitution’s independent and broad protection for equal rights.  To avoid a constitutional problem, the Court should accept the State’s reading of the LAD and affirm the preliminary injunction entered by the trial court.
[brief] In April 2018, [...] of the [...] – the same attorney representing Appellant in this case at the same time – “filed a motion seeking to have the court treat [his client] as the defendants were treated in [Burt] and [Jones].”  Mejia v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., Nos. A-5708-17T2, A-0450-18T2, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 483, at *7 (App. Div. Mar.  4, 2019).  The Trial Court denied the motion because the third-party defendants in Burt and Jones were “dismissed meritoriously” from the contribution claims while there was “no basis for dismissal of movant here. ”  Id. at *8.
[directive] Step 3: Ensure Any Illegally Evicted Occupants Are Immediately Restored to  If officers conclude that any occupants were illegally evicted in a manner prohibited by Section 33-11.1, then the officers should ensure that the evicting party immediately allow premises.5 the occupants to reenter and reoccupy the Section 33-11.1 makes clear that reentry should occur “without delay,” and so the officers should ensure that the process take no longer than absolutely necessary to complete.  In addition, the law states that officers have an affirmative duty to “prevent the landlord or any other persons from obstructing or hindering” the reentry and reoccupancy of the dwelling.  If the evicting party effectuated a “forcible entry or detainer” in connection with the illegal eviction, then the officers should ensure that the evicting party has addressed any obstructions or hindrances arising from such actions, such as a padlock on the entrance or the removal of furniture from the residence.  Section 33-11.1 prohibits officers from charging an illegally evicted occupant with trespass or other offenses if the occupant reenters and reoccupies the dwelling while an officer is present.  The law includes no such prohibition on charging occupants who reenter a dwelling when an officer is present.