ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  *State v. Allen*, 254 N.J. Super. 62, 67 (App. Div. 1992).  Recently, in *State v. Marcellus*, this Court examined a situation where a tenant, the adult defendant’s aunt, lacked the authority to consent to a search of the defendant’s bag and shoebox located in his aunt’s bedroom.  472 N.J. Super. 269, 275-77 (App. Div. 2022).  This Court found no reason “for the police to believe either defendant’s aunt or defendant’s mother was authorized to consent to the search of defendant’s bag of clothing and shoebox. ”  *Id.* at 277.  Our case law is clear: “[t]here is no capacity to consent to a search of . . . possessions in which another person has or should be reasonably believed to have an exclusive right of control or a right of privacy. ”  *State v. Younger*, 305 N.J. Super. 250, 257 (App. Div. 1997); see also *Allen*, 254 N.J. at 67 (finding that “a third-person’s consent to a search is not valid as to a container over which the third-person disclaims ownership”); *Suazo*, 133 N.J. at 321 (holding that a driver’s authority to consent to a search of his car did not extend to the personal belongings of other passengers).  The State cannot prove that [...]’s father had common authority to consent to a search of the landlord’s surveillance cameras.
[brief] See supra Pt. IV.A; see also *Lloyd v. Retail Equation, Inc.*, No. 21-17057, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233637, at *17 n.2 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2022) (holding hyperlink to website sufficiently “clear and unambiguous” so as to be enforceable, and distinguishing *Wollen* given that “the placement of the hyperlink in this case was more closely approximated to ensure assent as it was not hidden below or ‘submerged’”) (Da0536-Da0549); see also generally *Mucciariello v. Viator, Inc.*, No. 18-14444 (FLW), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166696, at *9, *17 (D.N.J. Sep. 27, 2019) (finding hyperlinked terms sufficiently prominent and rejecting contention that hyperlinked terms were unenforceable because plaintiff never had to “check a box. ”) (Da0550-Da0558).  Had it done so, it would have reached the opposite result.  ii.  The “consumer context” and relationship with the site-user are also distinguishable from *Wollen*.  “‘The consumer context of the contract matter[s].’”  *Wollen*, 468 N.J. Super at 501-02 (quoting *Kernahan*, 236 N.J. at 320 (citing *Atalese*, 219 N.J. at 444)).  The *Wollen* court observed that “the parties in the present matter had no relationship,” which made certain cited precedent involving parties with a “relationship that was established” “inapposite” to the facts before it.  *Id.*  Likewise, the context and relationship between the parties here renders *Wollen*’s specific application of law to facts “inapposite” here.  Here, [...] had been a customer of [...] for years before she decided to proceed with SAM registration.  If she had not chosen to register for SAM access, she would have remained a [...] client fully able to communicate with [...] through regular channels like mail and telephone.  Whereas in *Wollen* the customer was required to use defendant’s website in order to receive any services whatsoever from the defendant—that is, to initiate any relationship with the defendant—here, [...] already had a years-long relationship with [...], and simply contemplated utilizing voluntary web access to view Respondents’ accounts at her leisure.
[brief] *Id.* at 267.  Indeed, in Torres, the court observed that the “no free crimes” factor was “often seized upon by sentencing courts searching for greater direction .  . . .”  *Id.* at 269.  But the court further clarified that the “no free crimes” factor is not “a blanket mandate that consecutive sentences be imposed. ”  *Id.*  And, indeed the existence of multiple victims does not mandate or presume such a result.  *Id.*  In *Torres*, an individual had been charged with committing several bank robberies.  *Id.* at 253-54.  Three occurred in 2010 and 2011.  *Id.*  When the defendant was arrested, he ultimately confessed to two other robberies in 2006 and 2009.  *Id.*  The earlier in time robberies were severed and tried separately.  *Id.*  Ultimately, the defendant was convicted in both trials.  *Id.*  After a remand for re-sentencing, he was sentenced to consecutive terms amounting to seventy five years of incarceration.  *Id.* at 258.
[brief] At her deposition, Plaintiff testified that she no longer has pain as a result of this accident.  Plaintiff has failed to establish the existence of a “displaced fracture” as required by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8a for a Category 4 injury.  Plaintiff has also failed to show an injury(ies) under Category 6, which provides that “[a]n injury shall be considered permanent when the body part or organ, or both, has \textit{not} healed to function normally and will not heal to function normally with further medical treatment. ”  (emphasis added)  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a).  It is clear from her testimony that any pain or discomfort from the accident has healed to function normally.  As a result, Respondent/Defendant, [...] was appropriately granted Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs claims for non-economic damages as a matter of law.  The Court discussed this during the March 3, 2023 oral argument.  [...] found:  The physician’s findings or notations, the Court finds is merely a parroting of the language of the statue.  And, as the Court has repeatedly help, that does not sustain a verbal threshold, or plaintiff’s ability to vault the verbal threshold as established under the state, The Court finds nothing in the record that indicates the plaintiff has any objective findings of permanent injury.  And, in fact, quite the opposite is what the record shows.  1T(T11:1-15)  Therefore, the objective credible evidence did not support a finding of permanency.  Here, within the four corners of the discovery at the time of the Motion, there is no sufficient evidence of a permanent injury as is required by the statute.  Therefore, granting Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant/Respondent, [...] was appropriate.  CONCLUSION  The Honorable [...] properly decided the Defendant/Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment, as the Plaintiff/Appellant’s injuries are simply not sufficient to establish “permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability” such that the “injury will not heal to function normally with further medical treatment” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a).  Plaintiff/Appellant has therefore failed to establish any Trial Court error (a)and therefore Judge [...]’s decision should be affirmed.
[brief] For example, in granting a motion in April 2022 for fees incurred in attempting to undo [...]’s surreptitious attachment of assets in his Connecticut divorce proceedings, the court observed that “[...] has some of the finest lawyers in the State.  . . .  And [Plaintiff] is entitled to the same. ”  3T41.  The rates charged by Plaintiff’s counsel were “[c]ertainly . . . in line with the rates being charged in this area. ”  3T42.  Although [...] has at times claimed otherwise, he has refused repeated invitations to disclose the rates being charge by his own attorneys.  See, e.g., 3T38 (“I’ve never been told, coincidentally . . . what fees are going on the other side”); 1T68.  The court thus granted the motion, awarding $3,570,357.70 in attorneys’ fees, and holding [...] and [...] jointly and severally liable for the fee award.  The court memorialized the judgment in a June 29, 2023 judgment.  (Da1-2).  This appeal by [...] followed. \(^{10}\) **ARGUMENT**
[brief] In Judson, the Court stated that the moving party has “the burden of clearly showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. ”  This required the moving party to “exclude any reasonable doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact[.]”  Id. at 74.  The standard was refined by the Supreme Court’s decision in Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., supra, 142 N.J. 520.  Brill shifted the standard for summary judgment motions somewhat in that the focus has moved from the moving party’s burden to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, to the opposing party’s burden to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact which would preclude summary judgment.  Id. at 529.  The summary judgment procedure, as explained in Judson, “is designed to provide a prompt, businesslike and inexpensive method of disposing of any cause which a discriminating search of the merits ... clearly shows not to present any genuine issue of material fact requiring disposition at trial. ”  Judson, 17 N.J. at 74.  R. 4:46-2(c) provides that summary judgment shall be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.
[directive] 3.  Severability.  The provisions of this Directive shall be severable.  If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this Directive is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Directive shall not be affected.  4.  Questions.  Any questions concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Directive shall be addressed to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice, or their designee.  5.  Effective date.  This Directive shall take effect immediately and shall remain in force and effect unless and until it is repealed, amended, or superseded by Order of the Attorney General.  [...]
[brief] ”  *See, e.g.*, *Herrera v. Paramount Freight Sys., Inc.*, No. A-0424-23, 2024 N.J. Super Unpub. LEXIS 951, *13 (App. Div. May 24, 2024) Pa73 (Cook Cert., Exh. F).  a.  **Futility Does Not Excuse [...]’s Six-Year Delay**
[brief] N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.3; R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  Appellant’s dock is adjacent to the dock of Respondent, [...] (“[...]”).  [Aa167; Aa297; Aa298; A372-Aa375.]  The 2017 WFD permit issued to [...] authorized the construction of a 167.3- foot extension to [...]’s already existing approximately 128-foot dock.  [Aa1-Aa5.]  The 2019 WFD permit modification legalized the as-built location of the dock.
[brief] 1.  In her first year of employment, Plaintiff admitted she received marks for only "Developing" in nearly all areas evaluated, and she received no marks for "Accomplished" or "Distinguished."  She also admitted that for her first year of employment, she received a rating of 2.8 which was at the "low end" of the range of effective, which is 2.65 to 3.49. (Pl. Tr. 192:8-20; Pl. Tr. 195:3 to 196:12; Da153-212; Pa326).
[brief] ”  Rb28.  [...], by offering this argument, takes the extraordinary step of asking this Court to allow [...] to begin enforcing its preferred interpretations of the statute without any prior notice to the regulated community or the public, even where the Legislature has explicitly articulated a specific timeline for the agency to do so.  \(^6\)  The Legislature most recently confirmed [...]’s authority and obligation to require public access as a condition of permits when and where appropriate in \textit{N.J.S.A.} 13:19-10, P.L. 2015, C.260, which it enacted in response to \textit{Hackensack Riverkeeper, Inc. v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection}, 443 N.J. Super. 293 (App. Div. 2015).  See Ab17-18.  Section 153(b) of the Public Access Law directs [...] to adopt rules establishing the types of permits that would and would not require public access, and the categories of projects that will not require public access.  See N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(b).  Despite [...]’s inevitable assurances to the contrary, [...]’s reconstruction of its failing bulkhead may very well have been the type of project that would have been addressed by the required rulemaking had [...] complied with the Legislature’s mandated timeline, rather than manufacturing an opportunity to enforce its preferred interpretation of the Law.
[brief] (b)  Use of Prior Conviction Evidence After Ten Years.  (1)  If, on the date the trial begins, more than ten years have passed since the witness’s conviction for a crime or release from confinement for it, whichever is later, then evidence of the conviction is admissible only if the court determines that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, with the proponent of that evidence having the burden of proof.  (2)  In determining whether the evidence of a conviction is admissible under subparagraph (b)(1) of this rule, the court may consider: (i) whether there are intervening convictions for crimes or offenses, and if so, the number, nature, and seriousness of those crimes or offenses, (ii) whether the conviction involved a crime of dishonesty, lack of veracity or fraud, (iii) how remote the conviction is in time, (iv) the seriousness of the crime.  The principal decision interpreting that amended rule is the recent one in State v. Higgs, 253 N.J. 333 (2023).
[brief] Da1  Verified Petition for Post Conviction Relief .................. Da2-5  Notice of Appeal to the Law Division ........................ Da7-10  Notice of Appeal to the Appellate Division .................. Da27-29  ## LIST OF PARTIES | Party Name | Appellate Party Designation | Trial Court Party Role | Trial Court Party Status | |---------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------| | [...] | Appellant | Defendant | Participated Below | | [...] | Respondent | Plaintiff | Participated Below |
[brief] CASES  In re Blair’s Estate, 4 N.J. Super. 343 (App. Div. 1949)  ...........................................  15  Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) .................................................................  27 State v. Brunson, 132 N.J. 377 (1993) ......................................................................  29 State v. Cole, 229 N.J. 430 (2017).  .............................................................................  17 State v. Fort, 101 N.J. 123 (1985) ..............................................................................  12 State v. Hedgespeth, 249 N.J. 234 (2021) ................................................................. 20, 25, 32 State v. Higgs, 253 N.J. 333 (2023) .............................................................................
[brief] ”  The trial court made only one factual finding of fact in its July 30, 2020 Order.  Previously, in his June 29, 2018 Letter Opinion overruling the objections of [...] and adopting the Report and Recommendation of [...] in its entirety, [...] described the SAM’s Report and Recommendation as “well-reasoned,” and finding that the [...]’s conclusions were not “clearly erroneous, contrary to the law or an abuse of discretion. ” (Pa 186-87).  In the July 30, 2020 Order, [...] reversed his earlier adoption of the [...]’s Report and Recommendation noting only that property damage is continuing at the [...].  (Pa 205-06).  Notably, this “continuing” damage was not a new issue or fact.  Indeed, [...], in his Letter Opinion adopting the [...]’s Report and Recommendation, noted that both [...] and the other remaining insurance company at that time, [...], objected to the Report and Recommendation because it did not address “continuing” passive property damage after operations at Plainville ceased.  (Pa 180, 182-83).11  Based only on the finding the property damage is continuing, the trial court determined that it was not possible to determine how much property damage took place during any period in the past.
[brief] Indeed, Defendant [...] acknowledged in her sworn deposition testimony that she was responsible for obtaining the RAO, a prerequisite to which is the submission of the RIR.  (4T249:18 to 250:14; 5T162:16 to 163:7.)  Moreover, after executing the PSA, Defendant [...] advised [...] that she was obligated to obtain the RAO for the Property, and [...]’s own review of the PSA confirmed that Defendant [...] was obligated to obtain the RAO.  (8T31:8-22, 61:5-10, 68:22 to 70:21.)  In fact, as recently as 2021, when Defendants re-engaged [...] as their LSRP, [...] understood that he was retained to obtain the RAO, and [...]’s retainer agreement clearly indicated that the purpose and ultimate goal of his engagement was to obtain a RAO for the Property.
[directive] Recordings.  BWC Stored to Access Documenting 10.3  BWC stored to access all of record maintain shall a BWC a deploys that department  Each 22 Page the shall document keeping system record Directive. this department's to The recordings pursuant information: following of time access; the and date a) accessed; that was/were recordings) BWC specific b) the recording; stored BWC the accessed who or employee civilian officer the c) applicable; and where approved access, who person d) the authorized access for purposes or purpose specifying the for access, reasons) e) the relevant the specifying 10.2, and section or 10.1 section to pursuant applicable.  number, where case/investigation  RECORDINGS  BWC OF DISCLOSURE  PUBLIC  11.  Request.  OPRA/Common Law Order, or Court Subpoena, of Prosecutor Notice to 11.1  Public  Open the to pursuant request or order, subpoena, court a receiving agency  Any day business one within shall, recording for BWC know, a law to common right or the Act, Records to notice provide it, with complying before and or request, order, court subpoena, of such receipt of a by made was recording the where Criminal Justice Division of the to or Prosecutor, County the response a which by deadline the clearly shall state  Such notice agency. enforcement law state-level made. be must ations.  Investi Criminal to Pertaining Recordings  BWC of Disclosure 11.2 encounter that or event an of recording a 10.1, BWC section in provided otherwise as
[brief] Plaintiff acknowledges conceptually that the court in the first instance is responsible to determine whether a legal duty exists.  See, e.g., Soler, supra, 98 N.J. at 153; Michalko, supra, 91 N.J. at 398.  Whether a duty exists, however, is not at issue here.  In this case, the recognition and imposition of such a duty founded in strict liability principles are clearly settled as a matter of law.  See Suter [v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co.], 81 N.J. [150,] 172 [(1979)].  That duty is to manufacture a machine that is suitably safe for its intended or anticipated purposes by foreseeable users under the risk-utility standard.  Ibid.  On the other hand, given the duty, it is the jury that must then determine whether that duty has been breached.  In making this determination the jury in effect resolves the issues so as to achieve the "just result between the parties."  Id. at 173.  Soler, supra, 98 N.J. at 153-54.  The questions presented on summary judgment – whether the product is defective and proximate causation – are properly considered jury questions.  “None as such calls for the creation, recognition and imposition of a basic duty as a matter of public policy. ”  Soler, supra, 98 N.J. at 153-54.  They are questions of fact, of reasonable conduct under the circumstances, of breach of a standard of care and of causation.  Those factual issues require reversal, remand and determination by a jury.  Respectfully submitted, [...] /s [...]
[brief] ”  [...], 2019 WL 1581430, at *3.  The car was pulled over following the 7-Eleven robbery, and a warrantless search of the car led to the recovery of clothing, money, and a gun allegedly linking the occupants to the robbery.  State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 515-18 (2022).  On October 4, 2013, the trial court granted the suppression motion in part, suppressing the gun but finding the clothing and money admissible.  (Da 26)  In the Pharmacy Case, the State filed a N.J.R.E. 404(b) motion seeking to admit the following evidence against [...]: the clothing and money deemed admissible in the 7-Eleven Case; surveillance footage from the 7-Eleven Case; surveillance footage from another robbery that took place in Pennsylvania; and a letter allegedly sent by [...] in which he appeared to threaten someone.
[brief] Parents have a fundamental right under the United States Constitution to direct the upbringing of their children.  Pursuant to that right, public schools are required to notify parents and obtain their consent before socially transitioning their children at school.  “Social transitioning” refers, primarily, to calling a transgender-identifying person by a new name and pronouns associated with their transgender identity.  See ACa14, Certification of [...] (“Anderson Cert.”) ¶ 9, attached to ACa1, Certification of [...], as Exhibit 1.  Social transitioning is a form of psychological treatment, with dramatic and potentially lifelong consequences, and the State may not perform this treatment on children without informing their parents.  Minor children are not capable of determining by themselves whether social transitioning is appropriate for them, and the healthcare consensus is that schools should not socially transition students without involving their parents in the process.  Here, the [...] and [...] (the “District”) adopted a policy that at least partially acknowledges parental rights by requiring schools to notify parents when the schools socially transition their children (the “Parental Notification Policy”).  Under the Parental Notification Policy, schools must accept a student’s asserted gender identity as decisive and socially transition the student if the student asks for it.  Upon socially transitioning the student, the school must notify the child’s parents, unless there is reason to believe that doing so would create a risk of harm to the child.  The Parental Notification Policy amended a prior policy under which schools were permitted to socially transition children in secret from their parents if the child asked that their parents not be informed (the “Parental Secrecy Policy”).  The Parental Secrecy Policy was based on a guidance document issued by the New Jersey Department of Education, called *Transgender Student Guidance for School Districts*, which provided that schools may socially transition children in secret from their parents if the child asks that their parents not be informed.  The court below entered an order preliminarily enjoining the Parental Notification Policy and requiring the District to reinstate the Parental Secrecy Policy.  This was erroneous.  An injunction may not violate constitutional rights, and the Parental Secrecy Policy violates the rights of parents whose children attend schools in the District.
[brief] Appellant alleges that, as a non-resident of the City of Newark, but taxpayer of the County of Essex, he should have standing to challenge statutes applied within the City of Newark.  This is a failure to allege a proper case or controversy and does not create standing to sue.  This is Plaintiffs’ third attempt to have this type of complaint heard.  Previously this Court rejected Plaintiff’s Complaints and dismissed the same due to the fact that the Court determined the Plaintiff does not have the requisite standing to sue.