ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY¹ (Pa1-45, Pa122-60, Pa46-105, Pa180-205, Pa161-79)  On January 18, 2019, Appellant and [...] filed their Complaint and Jury demand in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Burlington County, alleging violations of the NJLAD.  (Pa1-45).  Specifically, Appellant asserted claims for disparate treatment, sexual harassment, and hostile work environment discrimination due to gender and retaliation/improper reprisal under the NJLAD against [...], [...], and the [...] Individual Respondents.  Appellant and [...] also asserted a claim for declaratory judgment against the [...] Defendants, which was later transferred to the Appellate Division.  On February 21, 2019, [...] Respondents filed their Answer and Affirmative Defenses to the Complaint, followed by [...] on July 3, 2019.  (Pa122-60).  The First Amended Complaint was filed on February 20, 2020.  (Pa46-105).  [...] Respondents filed their Answer to the First Amended Complaint on February 27, 2020 (Pa180-205), followed by [...] and [...] on May 19, 2020 (Pa161-79).  After the completion of discovery and motion practice, on January 7, 2022, three (3) individual motions for summary judgment were filed by Respondents.  In turn, on March 16, 2022, Appellant and [...] filed their Opposition to the Motions.  ¹T Oral Argument on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (August 30, 2022)  ²T Oral Argument on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (August 31, 2022)  ³T Oral Argument on Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider (December 19, 2022) Pa Plaintiff/Appellant’s Appendix in Support of Appeal for Summary Judgment and filed Cross Motions for Summary Judgment.  Over the course of two (2) days, on August 30, 2022, and August 31, 2022, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. heard approximately four (4) total hours of oral argument from the parties on the multitude of summary judgment motions (2T, 3T).  [...] denied all motions for summary judgment, and subsequently entered an order on September 15, 2022, confirming his decision.  2T (58:21-88:22).  In its original decision, the Court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the allocation of control between [...] and [...], whether Respondents’ motive for transferring Appellant was retaliatory, and whether Appellant was constructively discharged from her employment.  After reviewing thousands of pages of arguments and documents, the Court specifically held:  “So I will find that in the totality of the circumstances and facts that have come before this Court in a three-plus-hour oral argument, inclusive of many, many, many filings and – and the documents put forward.  There are issues of facts for the Court – for the – for the – jury to decide this case.  I’m not going to dismiss the action on summary judgment for those reasons. ”  2T86:15-22.  Following [...]’s decision, the Respondents filed motions for reconsideration.
[brief] ”  (Da 12 (emphasis in original))  Here, in addition to issuing a ticket for Defendant’s violation of [the right-turn-on-red statute], [...] could have performed additional procedures while remaining within the scope of the officer’s initial traffic mission, such as checking the driver’s license, inspecting the vehicle registration and proof of insurance, and checking for warrants.  However, the officer’s decision to request a canine extended the mission of the traffic stop beyond the time required to issue a ticket for the traffic violation or the time required to conduct additional routine inquiries beyond issuing a ticket.
[brief] Pursuant to R. 4:6-2 (e), a complaint should be dismissed when a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a claim.  Claims subject to arbitration should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  See, Thompson v. Nienaber, 239 F. Supp.2d 478, 483-86 (D.N.J. 2002) (dismissing complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because claims were subject to arbitration).
[brief] .................................................. 36, 37  Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573 (2010)  ..............................................................................  33  Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370 (2016)  ...............................................................................  10  Jusino v. Lapenta, 442 N.J. Super. 248 (Law. Div. 2014)  ....................................................  8  Khimmat v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co, LPA, 585 F. Supp. 3d 707 (E.D. Pa. 2022) ..................................................... 16, 17, 18, 34 Lembo v. Marchese, 242 N.J. 477 (2020)
[brief] Prior to trial, the trial court dismissed respondent/third-party defendant, subcontractor, and [...]’s employer, [...] (“[...]”) from the case on summary judgment with [...]’s urging and consent.  On appeal, [...] seeks to overturn the verdict and undo the consented-to dismissal so that it may challenge the trial court’s finding that the [...]-[...] contract lacked language sufficient to require [...] to indemnify [...] for [...]’s own negligence.  However, in doing so, [...] admits: 1) the jury found [...] solely liable for plaintiff’s injuries and 2) New Jersey law bars indemnitees from obtaining contractual indemnification if they are the sole cause of a plaintiff’s injuries.  These admissions defeat [...]’s appeal outright, regardless of the contract’s language.  Recognizing this fatal flaw, [...] attempts to salvage appellate review by making an argument it claims the trial court failed to address.  Specifically, [...] asserts the trial court erred by depriving the jury the opportunity to assess [...]’s negligence.  This argument is baffling.  The jury did not assess [...]’s negligence because [...] urged and convinced the trial court to not allow [...] to participate at trial.  That [...] made this argument on the record conclusively shows the trial court addressed the issue.  But, to now turn around and cite [...]’s absence at trial as reversible error is nothing more than [...]’s attempt to manipulate the judicial process.  This invited error bars appellate review.  Even had [...] not convinced the trial court to disallow [...]’s participation at trial, that result was inevitable.  In non-complex personal injury matters involving third-party contractual indemnification claims, long-standing New Jersey law prohibits impleaded employers from participating in their employees’ personal injury trials.  [...]’s appeal falls short for several other reasons.  Initially, [...] failed to argue [...]’s absence at trial amounts to plain error.  As a result, [...] waived this argument in its entirety.  Moreover, [...] failed to preserve or perfect its appeal regarding the Order granting [...]’s outright dismissal.  After choosing not to oppose [...]’s motion seeking outright dismissal, [...] did not include the Order granting this request in either its Notice of Appeal or Civil Case information Statement.  Even if this Court overlooks these significant flaws to reach the indemnification issue, [...]’s appeal remains exceedingly inadequate.  As the drafting party and purported indemnitee, [...] failed to overcome the presumption against indemnification.  The clause, strictly construed against [...], does not contain bright line, unequivocal language sufficient to require [...] to indemnify [...] for [...]’s own negligence.  That Appellate Division and Law Division judges reached divergent conclusions in evaluating substantially similar clauses illustrates the ambiguous nature of the oft-used language.  Since courts can reach different findings examining essentially the same language, the language must be ambiguous.  Contractors and the public at large certainly cannot be bound by such ambiguous terms.  I.
[brief] (Aa1).  [...]’s claims that his alleged conduct was protected union activity as it reasoned that [...] was not investigating a union election dispute.  Ibid.  Regarding the merits, the Commission agreed with [...]’s credibility determination finding [...]’s version of events to be more credible than [...]’s.  (Aa10-11).  Specifically, the Commission noted that, according to [...], his initial interaction with [...] began with him congratulating her on her gender transition but that during this interaction he never learned [...]’s preferred name.  (Aa11).  The Commission additionally noted that, in [...]’s version of events, [...] was fraudulently collecting signatures but called the police to falsely report on [...] knowing that involving police in the matter would potentially expose her alleged fraudulent behavior.  Ibid.  Moreover, the Commission noted that [...] would have also had to send a false text message to [...] claiming that [...] was misnaming her.  Ibid.  As such, the Commission determined that [...]’s account was more credible than [...]’s.  Ibid.  The Commission also rejected S.
[brief] Content-neutral restrictions on speech “may not substantially burden more speech than necessary to further the government interest[.]”  E & J Equities, LLC v. Bd. of Adjustment of the Twp. of Franklin, 226 N.J. 549, 582 (2016).  “A vague or overbroad statute, however, is likely to have a deterrent effect which is beyond that necessary to fulfill the state's interests.  Rather than chance prosecution, people will tend to refrain from speech and assembly which might come within the statute's ambit. ”  State v. Profaci, 56 N.J. 346, 350-51 (1970).
[brief] This Rule 2:2-3 “As of Right”  Appeal arises from: (i) a Rule 4:69-4 Case Management Order filed May 17, 2023 (Pa79), (ii) a Dispositive Summary Judgment Dismissal Order filed September 22, 2023 (Pa80) and (iii) a Reconsideration, Amendment, Alteration and Vacation Denial Order dated March 5, 2024 (Pa82).
[directive] the to prior of disposed shall be not animal the that providing and animal the prohibiting order an enter may court offense. or The crime the of disposition subsection in enumerated weapon other or firearm any possessing from defendant in weapon such any of seizure and for search ordering the and 2C:39-1 N.J. S. of r. located. is weapon the believe to cause reasonable has judge the location where any and search the of scope for and reasons specificity the with state shall judge  The order.  the by authorized seizure forth (setting subsection 4.5.9 over precedence Directive take the of subsection of this provisions the that Note of goal the reflecting paramount acomplaint-summons), ofissuing presumption overcoming a for standard general the 43 Page and the apply for temporary or final restraining order, victim a the authority of the agency or the to subsection pursuant to this of pretrial release in the criminal prosecution sought special conditions restraining order.
[brief] [...], J.D. [...] [...]  Attorney ID Number 037231984  Attorney for Defendant [...], : SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  Plaintiff, : APPELLATE DIVISION v. : DOCKET NO. [...] [...], : ON APPEAL FROM: Defendant. : Superior Court, Law Division, Ocean County : Docket No. below [...] : Sat below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  DEFENDANT’S BRIEF To: Honorable Judges Superior Court, Appellate Division in care of [...], Clerk Hughes Justice Complex [...]
[brief] ” (1T19-4 to 7).  As [...]’s vehicle “swerve[d] over the center line with its two right side tires, the blinker came on and she finished the lane change.  (1T18-9 to 12).  [...] similarly testified that after the officers got behind [...], he observed her vehicle “steadily drove on the white line and then drifting over the white line, and then it moved into the right lane and then put the blinker on quick and then rushed over. ” (1T47-2 to 6).  [...]’s failure to maintain her lane by “steadily driving” over the white dividing line and eventually “drifting” into the adjacent lane could constitute a violation of the first clause of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b) even if the move presented no danger to other drivers.
[brief] ”  *State v. Singleton*, 211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012).  The burden rests on defendant to prove “that the error was clear and obvious and that it affected his substantial rights. ”  *State v. Koskovich*, 168 N.J. 448, 529 (2001).  When a defendant seeks reversal of his conviction on the grounds of alleged prosecutorial misconduct in summation, under the plain error standard the conviction will stand unless the prosecutor’s “misconduct was so egregious that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
[brief] # TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | APPENDIX—TABLE OF CONTENTS | III | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ON APPEAL | V | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | VI | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 2 | | COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS | 4 | | ARGUMENT | 15 | | I.  THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW | 15 | | II.  PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL SHOULD BE REJECTED AS IT WAS FILED OUT OF TIME, AS WAS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION | 16 | | III.  THE TRIAL PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT PLAINTIFF HAD NOT PROVEN HER CLAIMS AGAINST [...] AND [...] | 19 | | A.
[brief] ….  However, there is a large distance between the Appellate Division remanding an issue back to the trial court for reconsideration, and the Appellate Division barring the same decision from being made again.  The Appellate Division stated it was “not convinced” that, given the new statute of limitations period, an award of attorneys’ fees that accounted for time used to uncover “wrongful acts committed as far back as 1988” was “justifie[d]. ”
[brief] ”  R. 3:22–10(b).  Porter, supra.  (Emphasis added)  The respondent ignores the fact that the defendant has established a prima facie claim and has done more than make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.  Defendant has alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard performance.  Also, that his trial attorney inadequately investigated his case, which he has asserted facts that an investigation would have revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant or the person making the certification.
[brief] An Order dated March 1, 2021 addressed discovery issues.  The Trial Court properly ordered Mother to bear the costs of her deposition of the Estranged Wife, but in the first of many unreasonable orders, the Trial Court also ordered Mother to advance the costs of Estranged Wife’s taking of Mother’s deposition.  (MS-78)  The [...] was owned by Mother and her husband, [...].  The decedent, [...], had no ownership interest in it.  Even though the Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the [...], which was not a party to the lawsuit, on April 7, 2021, it entered a Receivership Order (although a Receiver was never appointed) for the funeral home, and compelled this non-party and those involved with the funeral home to provide the court-appointed Administratrix corporate records of several businesses, business tax returns, and governmental filings.
[brief] The appellant/plaintiff [...]’s PIP claim and defendant [...]’s Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment were temporarily settled under a confidentiality agreement when the trial court granted respondent/defendant [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  The trial court subsequently granted defendant [...]’s unopposed motion for summary judgment, concluding that, “plaintiff’s vehicles were garaged in New Jersey so there is no coverage under the North Carolina policy. ”  Accordingly, any claim that a fact dispute existed, or that discovery was required, to resolve appellant/plaintiff [...]’s failure to obtain coverage on his vehicles required by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 has been concluded.  The appellant/plaintiff [...]’s opposition to respondent/defendant [...]’s motion for summary judgment had no merit when the motion was decided on March 1, 2024 and has less merit now that the trial court found that the “vehicles were garaged in New Jersey…”  For the reasons set forth herein, respondent/defendant [...] respectfully requests the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment and dismissing appellant/plaintiff [...]’s complaint pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 be affirmed.
[brief] The following is the entirety of the Chancery Court’s substantive analysis of the RPC 1.5(a) factors and application of the legal standard:  Page 70 17  And so, you know, I reviewed all the entries, 18 and there was a lot of them, and I started looking at 19 them, and I came to the conclusion that of course you 20 have to look at the factors under RPC 1.5A in 21 evaluating the services rendered, the amount of the 22 allowance applied for the itemization, time and labor --- 2  Plaintiff incorrectly relies on the “abuse of discretion” standard in his opposition.  Due to the lack of critical analysis of the trial court, that is not the applicable standard, and this Court should review the matter de novo.
[brief] The jury deliberated over the course of two days and sent two notes to the court.  (16T 175-4 to 184-13; 17T 3-14 to 18-6)  In response to the first note, asking for a readback of [...]’s testimony (16T 178-7 to 178-10), the judge played [...]’s testimony in its entirety.  (17T 3-14 to 4-2)  In response to the jury’s second note, asking for clarification of the terms “knowingly” and “purposely” as they are used in the context of murder, the judge reread portions of the model charge on murder.  (17T 8-6 to 16-23)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO ENGAGE IN HANDWRITING COMPARISON, WHERE THE MATTER HAD NOT BEEN ADDRESSED PRETRIAL, THERE WAS NO RULING ON THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE HANDWRITING SAMPLE OFFERED BY THE STATE, AND THE JURORS WERE NOT INSTRUCTED ON HOW TO PROPERLY WEIGH THEIR COMPARISON.
[brief] ”); In re Somerset Reg'l Water Res., LLC, 949 F.3d 837, 848 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted) (rejecting “commercially unreasonable” interpretation of contract based on “‘prohibition of any interpretation’ of a contract ‘that leads to an absurd result. ’”).  But even setting that absurdity aside, if Landlord were forgiven from ever paying Tenant’s Allowance whenever any rent, utility, interest, or other related payment, however minimal, is late or outstanding, both the Rent Offset and Allowance Offset provisions would be rendered meaningless surplusage, an interpretation to be strenuously avoided.  DKM, 182 N.J. at 307.  Fifth, Landlord’s interpretation of § 4.02 is internally inconsistent to the point of being incomprehensible.  On one hand, Landlord contends that the Tenant’s Allowance is forfeited if Tenant is in “monetary default,” but yet, undisputedly, Landlord paid Tenant some portion of Tenant’s Allowance in 2022 and 2023; this despite the fact that Landlord had not yet received any rent from the Gym Closure period (which had been paid into court) nor had it received attorney’s fees.  Which is it?  Does the Lease provide that a one-time monetary default removes permanently Landlord’s obligation to ever pay Tenant’s Allowance during the period that the default is uncured or does it permit Landlord to withhold the Allowance until the default is cured?  Landlord does not seem sure, because on one hand it withheld Tenant’s Allowance entirely for years, suggesting Landlord may believe a one-time monetary default should result in permanent excusal of its contractual reimbursement obligations.  On the other hand, Landlord paid at least some portion of Tenant’s annual installment payments in 2022 and 2023 despite an alleged “monetary default” not having yet been cured.  Landlord’s position on the duration of its self-created atextual reimbursement obligation amnesty is, at best, inconsistent.  Seventh, as a matter of drafting intent, in constructing the simultaneous mutual payment structure with mutual offset mechanism, the parties appear to have chosen an arithmetically simple, indisputable, easy to implement method of resolving out of court delinquent payments among the two parties.  That choice by the parties who drafted the Agreement should be respected.
[brief] Id. at 413-14; see Taylor, 319 N.J. Super. at 184 (holding plaintiff's expert rendered a net opinion because he presented no authority to support his opinion that an architect had a duty to make a site inspection for small sites.).  Here, [...]'s opinion did not support the conclusion that the [...] breached their professional standard of care in the 2007 plan.  [...] made no reference to a written document, or an unwritten custom or practice, and did not buttress his opinion with any applicable regulations, codes or customs that illustrate that the [...] breached their standard of care in designing the 2007 plan.
[brief] **PLAINTIFF’S EXPERTS WERE QUALIFIED TO OPINE ON THE RESPIRATORY CARE PROVIDED TO MR. BOEHM.  (PA1-2)**  For the first time at trial, defendant objected to plaintiff’s expert witnesses giving any testimony on the respiratory care given [...] because they were not respiratory therapists.  Defendant brought a total of eight motions in limine and not one addressed that critical issue.  Rather, defendant waited until trial had begun to spring its objection on plaintiff.  The entire crux of plaintiff’s case was that the facility and its nursing staff failed to provide appropriate respiratory care to [...] resulting in his death due to respiratory failure.  If there were legitimate objections to their respiratory care opinions, they should have been raised well before trial in an appropriate motion.  See R. 4:25-8 Motions in Limine (“In general terms and subject to particular circumstances of a given claim or defense, a motion in limine is defined as an application returnable at trial for a ruling regarding the conduct of the trial, including admissibility of evidence, which motion, if granted, would not have a dispositive impact on a litigant's case.  A dispositive motion falling outside the purview of this rule would include, but not be limited to, an application to bar an expert's testimony in a matter in which such testimony is required as a matter of law to sustain a party's burden of proof.)  (emphasis supplied).  In Mellwig v. Kebalo, 264 N.J. Super. 168, 171 (App. Div. 1993), this Court held that "[i]t is inappropriate to treat objections to de bene esse deposition testimony as concealed weapons to brandish at a future trial."  In the context of this case, it is similarly inappropriate to treat unannounced objections to the competency of an expert witness as concealed weapons to brandish at trial to preclude the witness from offering critical testimony, particularly when the objections have been tactically delayed.
[brief] Pa1801-02.  Plaintiffs retained the services of two professional engineers, [...], P.E., and [...], P.E., to review this matter.  Neither professional engineer retained by plaintiff believed that [...]’s work constituted professional engineering services.  Pa2324-36.  In their expert opinion as professional engineers, neither [...] or [...] performed the act of engineering as it related to this project and the cause of [...]’s death.