ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] To buttress his claim, counsel persisted that the court review the “videos of Bodycams” taken in this matter.  (14T 3-17 to 12-9).  Counsel maintained:  And [...] does say she does not want to allow the search because it wasn’t her car.  And after that the officers continued to speak with her to obtain this consent.  And I would submit based on the King factors, Your Honor, that the consent was not lawfully obtained.  That factor stands out in No. 2 [sic].  Defendant was handcuffed at the time.  So there was really no reason and that’s one of the factors that’s looked at as to whether consent is valid.  And I set forth the law in my brief.  But that’s one of the factors that a Court can look at, defendant was already handcuffed at the time.  [...] already said that she wasn’t going to -- said no, and then the consent occurred after that.  And, yes, I agree that there is certainly a signed document for [...], indicating she does consent, but, again, that goes back to, you know, she originally said no. so that’s what will -- that’s what I will show.  [14T 12-18 to 13-12.]  The PCR court, not having reviewed the Bodycams, reserved decision.  (14T 4-15 to 8-13; 14T 37-7 to 8).  The court subsequently rejected defendant's claim, reasoning, in pertinent part:  Applying the King factors here, the court finds the consent to search was knowing and voluntary.
[brief] The New Jersey retroactivity doctrine does not support fully retroactive application of *Tyler*.**  Plaintiff believes that this court should “clarify its holding in *Roberto* to explain” that just compensation is mandatory for all takings whether or not they predate *Tyler*.  What Plaintiff really asks is for this court to disagree with *Roberto*, not “clarify” it.  The Roberto panel already employed the New Jersey retroactivity analysis enunciated in Coons v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 96 N.J. 419 (1984) and concluded it should result in pipeline retroactivity.  Roberto at 363.  That conclusion is sound and should not be disturbed.
[brief] com  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS.........................................................  i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.......................................................  iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.....................................................  1 INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE...............................................  3 STATEMENT OF THE CASE.................................................... 4 LEGAL ARGUMENT..............................................................  5  POINT I THE LAW DIVISION ERRED BY DISMISSING [...]’S IFPA COMPLAINT AND COMPELLING ARBITRATION OF THE IFPA ALLEGATIONS, AS THE PIP DISPUTE RESOLUTION FORUM (FORTHRIGHT) CAN NEVER HAVE JURISDICTION OVER: (1) THE NON-MEDICAL PROVIDER DEFENDANTS; AND (2) AN INSURANCE CARRIER’S IFPA CLAIMS....
[brief] It is well-settled in New Jersey that an attorney fee award is to be determined based on the “lodestar”, which equals the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.  *Seigelstein v. Shrewsbury Motors, Inc.*, 464 N.J. Super. 393, 404-405 (App. Div. 2020); *Walker v. Giuffre*, 209 N.J. 124, 130-131 (2012).  When making this determination, the trial court must consider the following factors outlined in New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct (“RPC”) 1.5(a): (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.  Seigelstein, 464 N.J. Super. at 406, n. 6; RPC 1.5(a).  It is axiomatic that a lower court’s fee award should be overturned on appeal where, as here, the trial judge abused his discretion by failing to apply the above-referenced standard and, instead, set the fee award based on irrelevant or inappropriate factors, such as the Judge’s personal experience.  Seigelstein, 464 N.J. Super. at 404-408; Walker, 209 N.J. at 147.
[brief] "Disability permanent in quality and total in character" means a physical or neuropsychiatric total permanent impairment caused by a compensable accident or compensable occupational disease, where no fundamental or marked improvement in such condition can be reasonably expected.  Factors other than physical and neuropsychiatric impairments may be considered in the determination of permanent total disability, where such physical and neuropsychiatric impairments constitute at least 75% or higher of total disability.  "Ridesharing" means the transportation of persons in a motor vehicle, with a maximum carrying capacity of not more than 15 passengers, including the driver, where such transportation is incidental to the purpose of the driver.
[brief] Da1763a.  [...]’s tests did not detect excessive growth of the sole mold capable of producing the mycotoxin to which [...] claims he was exposed – trichothecene – which can be produced by the mold species Stachybotrys Chartarum.  Indeed, [...] did not even test for Stachybotrys Chartarum.  It tested for the genus Stachybotrys, which has many species that do not produce trichothecene.  2T29-5 to 2T31-6.  In any event, [...] detected either no Stachybotrys or the bare minimum that could be detected.  The report states that these spores likely originated outside.  Da1763a.  2T43-22 to 2T46-22.  There were also serious flaws with [...] and its methodology.  First, no mold was detected outside, which is abnormal because mold is ubiquitous.  Second, a mold remediation company is typically conflicted out of collecting samples.
[brief] The Bulletin was issued in December 2022, more than fifty years after the passage of the New Jersey Insurance Holding Company Systems Act, N.J.S.A. 17:27A-1 to -14 (the “Holding Company Act”).  According to the Department, the Bulletin merely clarified what had always been the law: reciprocal exchanges are covered by the Holding Company Act.  Assuming that this is true, it raises a simple question: why did the Department wait more than half a century to issue the Bulletin and why issue it now?  Anticipating that there might be a question about a delay of more than fifty years in issuing the Bulletin, the Department claims that the Bulletin is “consistent with the Department’s past and current practice.
[directive] 4.5.3  A law enforcement agency shall apply for a complaint-warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed the offense of bail jumping in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-7, witness tampering/retaliation in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5, witness obstruction in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(3), or witness tampering in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(3), unless an assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general consulted in accordance with Section 3.2 of this Directive, or a supervisory officer designated pursuant to subsection 3.3.2 who is authorized by the County Prosecutor to overcome presumptions under Section 4 of this Directive, determines that the presumption of charging by complaint-warrant is overcome pursuant to subsection 4.5.9.  Defendant Is Charged with a Crime Specified in Rule 3:3-1(f).
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  Plaintiffs’ discussion of the standard of review and citations to relevant cases properly presents the applicable arbitrary and capricious standard, the presumption of validity that attaches to board decisions, and the heavy burden of a party attacking a board decision to overcome that presumption of validity in light of the deference to be accorded to boards’ decisions.  Plaintiffs also properly discuss boards’ obligation to base their decisions on substantial credible evidence in the record, and the courts' duty to determine whether challenged decisions are supported by the evidence and follow proper statutory guidelines.  Plaintiffs do acknowledge that board decisions which are supported by substantial evidence in the record and reflect a correct application of the relevant principles of land use law are proper exercises of the discretion vested in boards that should not ordinarily be disturbed.  Plaintiffs failed, however, to discuss that greater deference is accorded to denial of a variance than to a grant because of the preference in our law for “land use planning by ordinance rather than by variance.
[brief] Further, performance routinely supports a finding of a valid services contract.\textsuperscript{42}  The same was true in contracts for the sale of goods where there is \textsuperscript{41} \textit{Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan}, 128 N.J. 427, 435 (1992).  \textsuperscript{42}  See \textit{Smith v. Squibb Corp.}, 254 N.J. Super. 69 (App. Div. 1992)(oral employment contract); \textit{Edwards v. Wyckoff Elec. Supply Co.}, 42 N.J. Super. 236 (App. Div. 1956)(same); \textit{Klockner v. Green}, 54 N.J. 230 (1969)("Oral contracts which have been performed by one party are frequently enforced where to do acceptance of the goods and payment for same.\textsuperscript{43}  Private entities routinely sell water delivery services via contracts with residents, municipalities, authorities and public utilities:  "[...] provides water and sewer service to approximately 346,000 customers in 117 municipalities throughout New Jersey.  [...] also sells water for resale to various municipalities, authorities and public utilities."\textsuperscript{44}  There is no evidence before the court of confusion about what was being sold in this case – i.e., potable water at rates set by defendant.
[brief] . . . . . .  Aa105 SICRA #49 - May 4 - June 7, 2022 - email thread between [...], [...] and [...], [...] Re: Stormwater pond and response to NJ[...] comments.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Aa106 SICRA #61(a-b) - March 14, 2022 - Multi-Permit Application For: Freshwater Wetland General Permit Nos. 2, 6, 7, 10b & 11, Transition Area Averaging Plan Waiver, Flood Hazard Area Verification, And Flood Hazard Area Individual Permit.
[brief] Id. at 52 (quoting State v. Nantambu, 221 N.J. 390, 395 (2015)).  Whereas the cell-phone video was supported by eyewitness testimony, the apartment-building surveillance videos were not and, indeed, could not have been supported by eyewitness testimony inasmuch as only [...] was captured in those videos.  It was sufficient that the officer personally retrieved the surveillance videos from the apartment building and reviewed them.
[brief] [...] found that the Board’s acceptance of jurisdiction was reasonable as the change of address was clearly posted and there was no evidence of any member of the public being unable to inquire as to the correct address:  The record reflects that directions were available at the address noticed to the new location of the municipal buildings, which was close by.  The record reflects, and it is uncontested, that the change in address was posted on the door of the old location ([...]) directing people to the new municipal offices located at [...].  In addition, since the [...] address is a police department, inquiries could also be made as to the location of the municipal buildings – as counsel for Plaintiff, [...], apparently did.
[directive] I.  Law Enforcement Response to Reports of Illegal Evictions  A.  Eviction.  As soon as Step 1: Determine Facts Regarding Eviction or Threatened officers learn of a potential violation of Section 33-11.1, they should attempt to determine the basic facts regarding the eviction or threatened eviction.  In particular, officers should seek answers to the following questions:  To trigger Section 33-11.1, the property  What is the residential property in question?  • must be rented or owned for residential purposes, including any house, building, mobile home, or tenement.  N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1; N.J.A.C. 5:27-3.3(c)  See see also (extending eviction law to certain residents of rooming and boarding houses).  To be clear, this Directive addresses how law enforcement officers should respond to the illegal removal of 3 occupants from their premises, pursuant to Section 33-11.1.
[brief] Under the MLUL, an ordinance that requires subdivision or site plan approval, or both, by the planning board shall include submission and processing provisions that ensure: 1.) consistency of the layout with the requirements of the zoning; 2.) sufficiency of width and suitable grade for streets and suitability to accommodate traffic and provide access for firefighting and emergency equipment; 3.) adequate water supply, drainage, shade trees, sewage facilities and other utilities; 4.) regulation of land designated as subject to flooding; and 5.) protection and conservation of soil and other considerations.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-38(a)-(b).  Further, the ordinance shall contain provisions governing standards for grading, improvement and construction of streets or drives, for any required walkways, curbs, gutters, streetlights, shade trees, fire hydrants and water, and drainage and sewage facilities.
[brief] The pretrial judge abused his discretion – and violated plaintiffs’ right to present their wrongful death claim before the jury at trial – by denying plaintiffs’ motion to name [...] as their expert witness (A18), and by denying reconsideration of the unfairly prejudicial ruling (A16).  The Appellate Division reviews orders regarding discovery for abuse of discretion, including whether a court abused its discretion “in denying plaintiff's motion for an extension of the discovery period[.]”  Spinks v. Twp. of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 454, 459 (App. Div. 2008).  Abuse of discretion occurs when the lower court misapplied governing law, or when its decision “inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”  Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002); Customers Bank v. Reitnour Inv. Properties, LP, 453 N.J. Super. 338, 348 (App. Div. 2018).  A.  [...] abused his discretion in his August 27 ruling
[brief] Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 77 N.J. 267, 270 (1978).  See also DeSimone v. Springpoint Senior Living, Inc., 256 N.J. 172, 182, 306 A.3d 1276, 1282 (Jan 10, 2024)  In the instant matter Plaintiff does not suggest that [...] provided any services to her.  She does not allege that [...] provided her with credit nor that it attempted to sell her any merchandise.  As in Woo-Padva, Plaintiff concedes that [...] was "in the business of purchasing consumer debt" and that defendant merely had purchased her "charged-off" [...] account.  *Woo-Pava*, supra. at *14, Plaintiff’s Complaint, ¶¶’s 16 and 26.  This circumstance is fatal to Plaintiff’s claim regarding the CFA.  The alleged misrepresentation must be “in connection with" the sale of merchandise or services,” and it “has to be one which is material to the transaction … made to induce the buyer to make the purchase."  *Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors*, 148 N.J. 582, 607 (1997)  (emphasis added)  In *DepoLink*, the Appellate Division directly addressed whether debt collection activity fell within the ambit of the CFA.  It held that:  Here, the CFA is inapplicable to defendant’s claim against the collection agency because any misrepresentations by the collection agency, even if made, were not in connection with the sale of merchandise to defendant.  The alleged prohibited conduct occurred later on, when the debt collection agency was attempting to collect the debt from defendant.  The collection agency’s contacts with defendant were not an offer to sell merchandise, nor did defendant buy anything from the collection agency.  Debt collection activities on behalf of a third party who may have sold merchandise are not unconscionable activities “in connection with the sale” of merchandise.  *See, e.g.*, *Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, P.C.*, 777 F. Supp. 2d 823, 847 (D.N.J. 2011) (holding that the CFA does not cover the debt collection activities of a third party that purchases consumer debt); *Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Mills*, 567 F. Supp.2d 719, 723-24 (D.N.J. 2008) (finding that a letter demanding payment of a settlement did not fall within the CFA because plaintiff was not induced to purchase merchandise or real estate).  *DepoLink*, 430 N.J. Super at 339, cited in *Woo-Padva* at *12-14.  See also *Ogbin v. GE Money Bank*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64735, *9 (D.N.J. June 13, 2011) (the CFA does not apply to the collection of a debt) citing to an earlier unpublished opinion *Hoffman v. Encore Capital Group, Inc.*, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1627 (App. Div. Nov. 18, 2008), cert. denied, 2009 N.J. LEXIS 296 (2009).  See also *Browne v. Nat'l Collegiate Student Loan Tr.*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244537 (D.N.J. 2021).
[brief] (3T127:8-128:17; 3T148:23-149:6; 3T149:9-25; 3T150:20-151:6; 3T151:18-153:24; 3T154:13-24; 3T155:24-156:12; 3T167:15-168:24; 3T169:18-170:12; 3T172:8-173:4; 3T177:3-178:4).  The plaintiff’s daughters were also questioned in detail about the unrelated medical history and falls.  (5T13:11-15; 5T15:17-16:20; 5T17:5-24; 5T16:8-20; 5T17:5-20; 5T44:22-45:5; 5T45:10-46:6; 6T113-24;  The plaintiff’s deposition testimony about her prior use of a cane for balance issues, tingling and numbness in her legs, medication she took for the tingling in her legs, use of a handicapped placard, and falls was also presented to the jury.  (4T213:11-15; 4T214:3-23; 4T223:18-225:3; 4T225:16-20; 4T226:3-5; 4T226:9-12; 4T246:11-25; 4T247:15-249:7; 4T257:1-3).  Her deposition testimony on these subjects was presented twice during both the plaintiff’s case and the defendant’s case.  (5T69:21-70:12; 5T70:17-19; 5T71:15-72:10).  Although a Trial Court is granted discretion in its evidentiary rulings, its rulings are subject to appellate review under the abuse of discretion standard.
[directive] Drug Testing  7.6.1  The testing of law enforcement officers in New Jersey for the illegal use of drugs is strictly regulated by the Attorney General's Law Enforcement Drug Testing Policy.  This policy permits the testing of applicants and trainees for law enforcement positions.  It further specifies that veteran law enforcement officers may be tested for drugs if reasonable suspicion exists that they are using drugs or if they have been chosen as part of a random drug testing program.  In any case, drug testing is done through an analysis of urine samples by the State Toxicology Laboratory within the Department of Health.  36
[brief] Ca244-Ca245.  Complainants allege that the post “admits that she [i.e. Respondent] influenced her kids to flout New Jersey school mask mandate the entire time the mask mandate was in place...”  Ca245.  Complainants allege that the post “could be reasonably be seen as compromising the Board and as speaking for the Board as a member of the public” and that Respondent “held herself out as a member of” the Board on her Facebook page.  Ca245.  Count 9 through 12 of the amended complaint relates to Respondent’s posts regarding sex education including criticism what “she perceives to be as the way gender identity is taught in New Jersey schools.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  According to the Complaint, “[o]n December 12, 2022, [...] applied to the Board to erect a digital billboard at the Property of 36 feet in height, where 70 feet is permitted, and more than 800 feet away from any residential use (“Application”).  The Application required … variance relief: (i) distance from an intersection, 350 feet proposed and 1,000 feet required; (ii) change in messaging every 8 seconds between 10:00pm and 6:00am; (iii) front yard setback for utility easement; and (iv) distance from an existing structure (solar panels), 8 feet proposed and 50 feet required.  The Board granted every bulk variance except distinace [sic] to an intersection. ” (Pa26, para. 5).  The Complaint further alleges “[t]he 1,000-foot restriction for intersections only applies to digital billboards and other “off-premises advertising. ”  “On-premises advertising” and other signage can be within 1,000 feet of an intersection even though, by the Board’s and its professionals’ assertions, they would create the same “safety” concerns.  The subject intersection already has free-standing “[...]” and “[...]” signs that are as high or nearly as high as the proposed height for the digital billboard. ” (Pa27, para. 8).  Regarding Count Two, the NJCRA claim, the Complaint alleges “[t]he 1,000-foot restriction and the Board’s denial violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and its New Jersey analog. ” (Pa28, para. 15).  Specifically, the Complaint asserts “[t]he 1,000-foot restriction is constitutionally overbroad, unjustified content-based discrimination, and impermissible time, place, and manner regulation.  For example, under the 1,000-foot restriction, a wellness center at the subject intersection could advertise a particular form of therapy available at the center, but a business 500-feet away could not allow a sign of any kind advocating against such therapy. ” (Pa28-29, para. 17).
[brief] Exhibit 3, Agreement between [...] and [...], dated April 26, 2014, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 2280a) -- Exhibit 4, [...] Request for Expressions of Interest, dated December 16, 2013, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 1787a) -- Exhibit 5, Agreement between [...] Engineers, Architects and Land Surveyors, P.C., and [...], dated May 6, 2014, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 1778a) -- Exhibit 6, Deposition of [...], dated May 10, 2017, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 1577a) -- Exhibit 7, [...] bio, dated December 2013, filed June 27, 2019 Exhibit 8, Second Amended Complaint, dated January 26, 2016, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 64a) Exhibit 9, Civil Case Information Statement and Track Assignment Notice, dated October 10, 2014, filed June 27, 2019 Exhibit 10, [...]’s Answer to Second Amended Complaint, Case Information Statement and Stipulation, dated April 1, 2016, filed June 27, 2019  Exhibit 11, [...]’ Answer to Second Amended Complaint, Case Information Statement and Stipulation, dated April 21, 2016, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 1740a)  Exhibit 12, Affidavit of [...], P.E., dated August 23, 2017, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 2324a)  Exhibit 13, Affidavit of [...], P.E., dated August 22, 2017, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 2333a)  Exhibit 14, Deposition of [...], P.E., dated June 12, 2018, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 2185a)  Exhibit 15, Deposition of [...], P.E., dated September 10, 2018, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 2068a)  Exhibit 16, Deposition of [...], dated July 11, 2018, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 1947a)  Exhibit 17, Deposition of [...], P.E., dated April 26, 2019, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 2504a) Exhibit 18, Deposition of [...], P.E., dated April 10, 2019, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 2485a) Exhibit 19, Report of [...], P.E., dated April 19, 2018, filed June 27, 2019 Exhibit 20, Deposition of [...], P.E., dated April 9, 2019, filed June 27, 2019 Exhibit 21, Deposition of [...], dated April 12, 2017, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 1912a) Exhibit 22, Excerpt from N.J.A.C. 13:40 State Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, dated November 16, 2015, filed June 27, 2019 Exhibit 23, Estate of Alexander v. Northeast Sweepers, A-1123-17 (App. Div. Apr. 19, 2018) (unpublished), filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 2303a) Exhibit 24, Report of [...], P.E., dated February 22, 2019, filed June 27, 2019 (omitted here – see 2365a)