ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In *Willoughby v. Planning Board of Twp. of Deptford*, 332 N.J. Super. 223, 227 (App. Div. 2000), this Court examined the reasons why inconsistency determinations are so important and why governing bodies are required to explain their rationalization for adopting an inconsistent ordinance at the time of adopting resolutions:  By requiring contemporaneous passage, the law not only provides an avenue for public scrutiny of the action (including a record for judicial review) but, perhaps more importantly, ensures that the inconsistency is clearly recognized and rationalized when the action is taken.  There is a significant difference between contemporaneous debate and post hoc rationalization.
[brief] The statute only requires “adequate notice” to the public of a meeting; and N.J.S.A. 10:4–8(d) defines the term “adequate notice” as giving written notice to newspapers at least 48 hours before the meeting.  Unlike N.J.S.A. 40:55D–12(a) (required publication under the Municipal Land Use Law), and N.J.S.A. 40:53–2 (publication generally of public notice by municipalities), N.J.S.A. 10:4–9 and 10:4–8 do not require that notice be published by the newspapers, only that it be sent to the newspapers 48 hours before the meeting.
[directive] (n)  On an annual basis, each agency shall publish on its public website a report to the public summarizing the allegations received and the investigations concluded for that period.  These reports shall not contain the identities of officers or complainants.  (o)  On a periodic basis, and at least once a year, each agency shall submit to the County Prosecutor and publish on the agency’s public website a brief synopsis of all complaints where a fine or suspension of 10 days or more was assessed to an agency member.  The synopsis shall not contain the identities of the officers or complainants.  Training
[brief] Defendant’s claim that the State impermissibly elicited testimony that defendant was waived up from Family to Criminal Court skews the facts at trial.  First, defense counsel in his opening statement raised the fact that defendant was initially in juvenile court.  Regarding the psychiatric evaluations conducted for the juvenile waiver hearing, counsel told the jury, “When [...] was in juvenile court, the juvenile judge –. ” (6T41-7 to 11).  The AP immediately objected to defendant’s reference to the juvenile waiver process.  (6T41-16 to 42-1).  Defense counsel explained that, “[t]his is what happened, it’s why those evaluations were ordered.  It’s a fact. ” (6T42-2 to 5).  The judge gave a curative instruction to the jury to disregard any information dealing with the process of waiving defendant up from juvenile to adult court.  (6T49-17 to 50-13).  It is disingenuous for defendant to complain that the AP elicited “prejudicial and irrelevant” information about the juvenile waiver hearing when defendant himself brought it up in his opening statement.
[brief] Said decisions were used by trial court [...] to improperly influence the jury during deliberation in the malpractice trial.  Thus, this new evidence will probably change the result of the malpractice trial.  Second, this new evidence was unobtainable for use at the malpractice trial because Plaintiff’s attorney [...] made the confession after the end of the malpractice trial.  Third, the evidence is not merely cumulative, because this new evidence shows that the Defendant [...], a non-party attorney, was framed by the attorney [...], the opposing counsel, in the absence of [...]’s participation in the Family Court proceeding when Plaintiff made her motion to set aside PSA in September 2012 and before Appellate Division in July 2016.
[brief] THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE MOU ARE NOT ILLUSORY.  (Da7-8).  Next, Appellants argue that [...]’ obligations to attempt to achieve rezoning are illusory; this, too, is meritless.  Indeed, the fact that the payment related to zoning was *conditional* demonstrates without question Appellants’ knowledge and acceptance of uncertainty regarding the zoning.  Uncertainty and illusion are not synonymous.  A promise cannot be illusory if it is dependent on something outside the promisor’s control.  *Del Sontro v. Cendant Corp.*, 223 F. Supp. 2d 563, 578 (D.N.J. 2002) (quoting *RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS* § 2, cmt. e (1979)).  Indeed, an “implied obligation to use good faith is enough to avoid the finding of an illusory promise. ”  *In re Cendant Corp. Lit.*, 264 F.3d 286, 300 (3rd Cir. 2001).  Plaintiff is obviously powerless to compel [...] to rezone, and the most it could ever do, which it is in fact doing, is apply for zoning in good faith.  (Da47-53).  The trial court recognized that Plaintiff was able only to pursue zoning rights, and that the final determinations depended on the town of [...].  The trial court further noted Plaintiff’s good faith efforts and concluded that the promise was not illusory.
[brief] Before it separately addresses plaintiff's motions the Court will briefly summarize the applicable black letter law and discuss its findings regarding whether [...]'s document search and production was deficient.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “allow broad and liberal discovery. ”  Pacitti v. Macy's, 193 F.3d 766, 777 (3d Cir.1999).  Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1), “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense....  For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.  Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. ”  Courts have interpreted the federal rules to mean that discovery encompasses “any matter that bears on or reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on any issue that is or may be in the case. ”  Kopacz v. Del. River and Bay Auth., 225 F.R.D. 494, 496 (D.N.J.2004).  The discoverability of information is not determinative of its admissibility as evidence at trial.  See Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Civ. No. 89–1701 (CSF), 1990 WL 191922, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 19, 1990).  However, “[t]he fact that the information sought will be admissible at trial is a strong argument in favor of discovery. ”  Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2008, at 111 (2d ed.1994).  But the converse is not true.  Id.  “Admissibility at the trial is not the limit of discovery, and discovery may properly be had of inadmissible matter. ”  Id.  Thus, making a determination on the issue of admissibility is premature at the discovery phase.  See Nestle Foods Corp., 1990 WL 191922, at *4.  *6
[directive] 2.3  A group of officers who are specially selected, trained, and equipped to deal with high risk incidents involving individuals who are refusing law enforcement orders to surrender or comply, especially individuals dealing with behavioral or mental health crises; substance abuse crises; or intellectual, cognitive or developmental disabilities.  The Crisis Negotiation Team has primary responsibility for communicating with the barricaded individual and determines the manner in which others, such as mental health professionals, family members, friends or colleagues, will communicate directly or indirectly with the barricaded subject.  See generally New Jersey’s Mental Health Screening Law, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.1 et seq; and specifically, N.J.S.A. 1 30:4-27.6.  This policy does not apply to “active shooter” or “active killing” incidents, which require immediate action 2 by law enforcement to preserve life.
[brief] Green, supra, 215 N.J. at 452, 73 A.3d 478.  Specifically, Plaintiff’s complained of conduct, the continuous understaffing issue and Defendants’ lack of training, coupled with her reports to the [...], easily have a “substantial nexus… [to] a law of policy identified by the court or the plaintiff. ”  *Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc.*, 218 N.J. 8, 30 (N.J. 2014) (citing *Dzwonar*, 177 N.J. at 464).  (PA000001-PA000015).  To be sure, Plaintiff cites in her Complaint *N.J.A.C.* § 10:44A-2.8(b)(“’Reduction of staff coverage … shall be justified in writing and sent to the licensing agency and the appropriate Regional Assistant Director’s Office for approval.
[brief] (4T92-22 to 25).  In fact, the State began its own closing by advising the jury not to consider any evidence of that sort in its deliberations.  (4T150-1 to 18).  The Court then similarly enjoined the jury in its final instruction.  (5T11-7 to 16).  The doctrine of invited error forces defendants to accept the ill-outcomes of their trial strategy.  Here, defendant did not merely accept passively the admission of evidence barred by the Court, but actively pursued its exposure to the jury.  Given the frequency and repetition of its reliance on this evidence, it was by any measurement a deliberate, tactical play by defendant.  Yet, a “disappointed litigant cannot argue on appeal that a prior ruling was erroneous when that party urged the lower court to adopt the proposition now in error. ”  Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. at 342.  See also State v. Williams, 219 N.J. 89, 101 (2014) (“The doctrine of invited error does not permit a defendant to pursue a strategy…and when the strategy does not work out as planned, cry foul and win a new trial. ”)  Defendant gambled and lost.  That is not the State’s problem; it is not the Court’s problem.  Accordingly, reversal is inappropriate.
[brief] In Bruen, the Court reaffirmed that the Second Amendment grants the right to bear arms in self-defense and held that this right to bear arms in self-defense applies whether someone is in her own home or in public.  As the Court explained, “confining the right to ‘bear’ arms to the home would make little sense given that self-defense is ‘the central component of the [Second Amendment] right itself. ’”  Id. at 32-33 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599 (emphasis in original).  “After all, the Second Amendment guarantees an ‘individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,’ and confrontation can surely take place outside the home. ”  Ibid. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 592).  Thus, following Bruen, everyone has the right to possess a weapon in public for the purpose of self-defense, whether or not the need for self-defense is imminent.
[brief] However, it is clear that both (a) a defendant’s ability to pay and (b) the other financial obligations the court is imposing are factors that must be considered when imposing a probation supervision fee.  Our courts have repeatedly emphasized that “[t]he paramount goal of sentencing reform [enacted by the Criminal Code] was greater uniformity” and seeks to achieve this goal through “channel[ing] the discretion of sentencing judges in fixing the terms of sentences for offenses under that Code.
[brief] (Pa21).  It also reduced and/or eliminated, without explanation, 67.3 hours of counsel’s legal services, performed over a two-and-a-half-year period and concluded that only 6.2 hours of legal services were reasonably expended.  Ibid.  In support of these significant reductions, the court stated only that counsel was “not entitled” to fees for research due to his “18 years of experience” and involvement in “over 1,000 matters” and its award of “reasonable fees” was “based on the results obtained.
[directive] (These persons are hereinafter referred to in this Directive as “Designated Attorneys”).  This rule shall apply to applications for a search warrant made in person pursuant to R. 3:5-3a, as well as to applications for a search warrant that are communicated to a Superior Court Judge by telephone, radio or other means of electronic communication pursuant to R. 3:5-3b.  3.  Prosecutorial Assistance in Applying for Search Warrants  The Director of the Division of Criminal Justice and each County Prosecutor shall establish procedures to assist law enforcement officers and agencies operating within their jurisdiction to apply to an appropriate court for a search warrant.  The Division of Criminal Justice and each County Prosecutor shall maintain and make available to all appropriate law enforcement agencies a list of personnel who will be available on a 24-hour, seven days per week basis to assist in preparing and making search warrant applications, and who are designated pursuant to Section 5 of this Directive to review and approve search warrant applications prior to their submission to an appropriate court.
[brief] A “general warranty deed warrants the title conveyed against all claims of others, whether or not claiming through the grantor. ”  Fineberg, N.J. Title Practice, § 37.03 (4th Ed. 2016) (citing N.J.S.A. 46:4-7).  Under a covenant of warranty, the obligation of the grantor is to warrant and defend the property conveyed “against the claims and demands of all persons whomsoever. ”  Spiegle v. Seaman, 160 N.J. Super. 471, 482 (App. Div. 1978).  “[A] grantor who has conveyed by a deed containing warranty of title will not be suffered afterwards to acquire and assert adverse title. ”  Robinson-Shore Dev. Co. v. Gallagher, 43 N.J. Super. 430, 435 (Ch. Div. 1957).
[brief] THE MOTION JUDGE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH R. 1:6-2 (not raised below)  R. 1:6-2(d) provides for oral argument upon request by a party in its moving papers, in timely-filed answering papers, or reply papers.  “The right to oral argument is generally applicable to all non-discovery and non-calendar motions in civil cases . . . a request for oral argument by a party is required to be granted as of right. ”  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment R. 1:6-2(d), Sec. 5 (Gann 2024), citing Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J.Super. 301, 306 (App. Div. 1997)  (Additional citations omitted)  In this case, the Plaintiffs unconditionally requested oral argument in their Notice of Motion filed on May 10, 2024.  (Pa165)  [...] requested oral argument (Pa239).  [...] requested oral argument.  On May 10, 2024 (Pa209) and June 5, 2024 (Pa248), the Court Clerk issued Notices that mistakenly stated that oral argument had not been requested.  By letter to the Motion Court, Plaintiffs’ Co-Counsel again requested oral argument and appended the filed Notice of Motion with said request.  (Pa251)  Arguably, the contested nature and complex issues in this dispositive Motion could have warranted an evidentiary hearing.  Pressler, cmt. R. 1:6-2(d) at 64.  Certainly this Motion justified oral argument and would have produced a record with findings of fact and conclusions of law explaining the disposition pursuant to R. 1:6-2(f) and N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-7.
[brief] (Pa15).  As for the individual factors, for Factor #1 – Instruction, the ALJ found that [...] required that [...] prosecute on Wednesdays during the court sessions.  (1T13:19-14:5).  The court administrator set the docket, which [...] had no control over.  (1T14:5-20).  Every Wednesday, [...] would go to the court administrator in the morning to ask about that day’s docket and she left when court was adjourned.  (1T20:11-22).  She was not required to clock in or out when she arrives or leaves, nor was she required to keep a timesheet.  (1T62:13-63:4).  While [...] reported to the court administrator every Wednesday, the ALJ determined this was not equivalent of “punching in” or “signing in” as [...] did not keep any timekeeping records.  (Pa15).
[brief] N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 might limit the injured person’s cause of action for recovery if they were convicted of drunk driving at the time of the accident.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13.2 counsel for the injured party is entitled to receipt of the delineated policy information from the insurance company for defendant.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-14 requires that the injured party’s policy maintain uninsured motorist coverage as required by N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-15 is applicable to the loss in that either the injured party or defendant could suffer penalties for false or fraudulent representation in the course of the claim.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-25 and the subsequent sections of the statute the injured party’s cause of action in the Superior Court is subject to Superior Court arbitration.  Based on the above, the civil action for personal injury of the injured party is a claim governed by the provisions N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 et seq.
[brief] In doing so, it also clearly defined the parameters of its decision, as well as its reasonable expectations regarding the parties’ compliance with it, as follows:  At the outset, we acknowledge that historically there has been a practical basis for parties not using larger negotiation teams for collective negotiations.  The use of smaller teams may be more conducive to a process that often involves “numerous, informal exchanges of ideas and written data . . . during a series of negotiations sessions” in which “proposals and counter-proposals may be exchanged between the parties.
[brief] Claims of corporate waste are always to be derivative claims.  Stranseburgh v. Straubmuller, 146 N.J. 527, 551 (1996).  As such, any action to redress corporate waste referenced by the Trial Court in this action would have to be commenced on behalf of, and for the benefit of, [...].  Accordingly, a claim of alleged corporate waste such as that raised by the Trial Court should not be made to the detriment of [...] as occurred herein.  By refusing to award any damages to [...], much less those undisputedly suffered, the Trial Court ignored the law on corporate waste and damages.  By conflating [...]’s purchase of the Share and subsequent transfer of the Property to [...], the Trial Court erroneously held that [...] did not suffer damages when in fact [...] suffered significant damages at the moment the Closing of title to [...]’s Share occurred.
[brief] Once Plaintiff had notice that Mr.  Milov wished to redeem the tax Certificate, Plaintiff quickly transferred the subject property for $375,000 by Quitclaim Deed from [...] to [...] (Intervenor).  344a.  The Deed is dated March 3, 2022 but was recorded on April 6, 2022.  Id.  The Deed was recorded after the Order to Show Cause had already been filed by Defendants Milov.  A Mortgage was also recorded on April 6, 2022 between [...] (Mortgagee) and [...] (Intervenor) for $350,000.  351a.  [...]’s signature as to [...] on the Mortgage Note was notarized by [...].  352a.  [...] was paid cash by [...]/[...] to contact [...] (without revealing her affiliation with him) to try to buy the property from him as will be detailed herein.  The Process Server
[directive] of Order #1A - Order Mandating Evaluation  Defendant's Attachment  1  1.  Fitness to Proceed to Trial (Defendant not Detained)  This order is to be used for a defendant who is not detained when the court needs a psychiatric report pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-5 due to questions regarding the defendant's fitness to proceed to trial.  of Order B - Order Mandating Evaluation  Defendant's Attachment 2  2.  #1  Fitness to Proceed Trial (Defendant Detained) to  This order is to be used when the court needs a psychiatric report pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4- due to questions regarding incarcerated defendant's fitness to proceed to trial.  5a an Directive #17 -18 Revised Competency Orders Page 2
[brief] The court's order has created a conflict of laws and violated the plaintiff’s right to petition.  Since the administrator ad prosequendum is prohibited from bringing suit in court when unable to retain an attorney due to fraudulent concealment, the court's order has created a conflict of laws and violated the plaintiff’s right to petition.  In fact, there is a conflict between NJ Statute R. 1:21-1(a) and Kasharian v. Wilentz, 93 N.J. Super. 479, 482 (App. Div. 1967), with the U.S. Const. amend. I and N.J. Const. of 1947 art. I, § 18.  Pursuant to the U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2, the Supremacy Clause, the rights under U.S. Const. amend. I, prevail over conflicting state laws.  Therefore, if an attorney cannot be retained or designated by the court, the plaintiff should be allowed to proceed pro se.  Every case has community implications.  The court’s decision might embolden homecare providers and insurance companies to conceal malpractice by withholding critical medical documents from family members, thereby preventing injured parties from seeking legal recourse.  In homecare situations, families rely on providers to care for vulnerable individuals at home when they are unable to do so themselves.  Providers are often the sole witnesses to these events.  This case could establish a significant legal precedent, potentially shielding homecare providers and insurance companies from accountability for their misconduct.  This outcome risks diminishing the quality of homecare services within the community and encourages continued malpractice by these entities.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] A state defendant is convicted of and sentenced for the crime of resisting arrest, defined as intentionally preventing a peace officer from effecting a lawful arrest.  (This is a common definition of that offense.  See People v. Peacock, 68 N. Y. 2d 675, 496 N. E. 2d 683 (1986); 4 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 593, p. 307 (14th ed. 1981).)  He then brings a § 1983 action against the arresting officer, seeking damages for violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.
[directive] Therefore, it is important that a detailed chronology be maintained of each investigation so that critical actions and decisions are documented.  6.1.10  Along these same lines, it is important that there is no unreasonable delay between the conclusion of the investigation by the assigned investigator and the decision to file charges by the person who has that responsibility.  Although the 45-day clock begins at the time the person who has the responsibility to file charges has sufficient information, an agency would have a difficult time justifying an extensive bureaucratic delay once any member of that agency has established sufficient information.  The need to eliminate bureaucratic delay is one of the reasons that the internal affairs function should be closely aligned with the office of the law enforcement executive in the agency's organizational structure.
[brief] 309 N.J. Super. at 64-65.  Defendant misreads *State v. Simon* by arguing otherwise.  In *Simon*, the error was that the judge submitted the special interrogatories by themselves, and accepted the jury’s verdicts, before instructing the jury on the remaining elements of the various offenses.  79 N.J. at 197-98.  The jury therefore decided some elements before receiving “full and adequate” charges, producing the potential to “lead[] the jury to adverse findings on the ultimate issue of guilt,” which risk was “greatly aggravated by the submission to the jury of the special interrogatories wholly apart from its final deliberations in conjunction with complete instructions governing all aspects of the case. ”  Id. at 198, 203 (brackets added).  That circumstance simply was not present here, because the grading question was submitted to, and decided by, the jury at the same time as the question of guilt.  This claim too should be rejected.