ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”).  [...] also fails to cite a single case where a court denies access to relevant discovery based on an unsubstantiated threat of disclosure.  *Deffaa v. Pivotel Am., Inc.*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171321, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 9, 2021) (holding that moving party has “not met its burden of showing a substantial risk of harm that would result from disclosure” and noting lack of any cases “in which attorneys’ eyes only designation was upheld simply due to one party’s mistrust of another”).  Any concern about confidentiality can be mitigated by a stipulated confidentiality order.  *Hancock v. Credit Pros. Int’l Corp.*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131055, at *22 (D. N.J. Jul. 13, 2021) (denying motion for protective order as to subpoena based on claim of “confidential information” in light of “discovery confidentiality order”); *Aetrex Worldwide, Inc.*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172857, at *16 (denying motion to quash where “such information would be subject to the provisions of the DCO [Discovery Confidentiality Order]” and “it appears that [p]laintiff is willing to enter into a separate or supplemental agreement which would protect any such confidential information”).
[brief] The Trial Court’s Ruling on [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration:  Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the Court’s ruling on the Public Trust Doctrine issue.  The Trial Court clarified that at the appropriate time [...] surely would have “standing” to raise such a factual and legal claim, but that such time had not come yet.  The Court then held that the Public Trust Doctrine claims were not “ripe” for judicial review:  THE COURT:  ...[...] certainly only a development application such as a request for a CAFRA permit for example, triggers the ability to challenge the Public Trust Doctrine which now falls under the DEP’s purview.  A zoning ordinance or plan, as we have here, does not.  Of course a private remedy remains available under the Public Trust Doctrine.  I don’t think I said otherwise.  But there needs to be that trigger.  And the trigger under the newly adopted statute and DEP’s regulations as discussed in the prior written statement of reasons is a development application.  Nothing in the statute or regulation indicates that a zoning ordinance can serve as the development contemplated and the trigger for redress under the Public Trust Doctrine.  As the Borough I think correctly points out, myriad reasons could frustrate any potential development.  It may never come to fruition.  And then if the Court were to entertain this now we would be dealing with a hypothetical case in controversy (sic) which just violates all sorts of fundamental rationales undergirding the judicial function.  No development may ever occur.  Thus as to the Public trust Doctrine, there is no case or controversy, only a hypothetical one on a potential future development application.  The Court again is in no way, and I’m going to be clear on this, in no way is saying that [...] does not have standing to challenge a development application under the Public Trust Doctrine.  But there next so be that trigger, the development application (6T13:21 to 15:2).  F.  The Trial Court’s grant of [...]’s Motion In Limine Removed the Public Trust Doctrine Issues From This Case; and was in error:
[brief] List any other promises or representations that have been made by you, the prosecutor, your defense attorney, or anyone else as a part of this plea of guilty:  STATE ACTIVELY DEACUING OUT TO PA AUTHORITIES TO ENCOURAGE PA TO ALLOW DEFENDANT TO PLEDG GUILTY TO ARMED ROBBING THEN AND TO BE SENTENCED CONCURRENTLY.  22.  Have any promises other than those mentioned on this form, or any threats, been made in order to cause you to plead guilty?  [Yes]  [No]  23.  a.  Do you understand that the judge is not bound by any promises or recommendations of the prosecutor and that the judge has the right to reject the plea before sentencing you and the right to impose a more severe sentence?
[brief] a.  In the present action both parties agreed to a reinstatement provision (noted as 30 days) in the admittedly “unlikely” event that Respondent were found fit to return to duty (Da 18-Da19, Par. 17).  b.  This was designed so that the Respondent, in the unlikely event that the [...] would want to reinstate a mentally disabled 51-year-old officer (before he turned age 55 (N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8).  c.  This provision allows the Appellant to return Respondent to his employment under the law, a concern noted in *Cardinale*.  d.  The parties jointly believed that this provision would pass muster with the [...] but the corrective language of Par. 18 (Da 19) was jointly included in the event another legal forum determined otherwise.  e.  The parties had mutually recognized [...] as a legal forum in the Separation Agreement itself, and as Appellant admitted on the record (Noted in the Court’s Order at (Da199-Da200).
[brief] (1T62:8-15; Da331-332).  On February 9, 2022, the Trial Court entered an order which granted [...]’s order to show cause.  (Da333-334).  On March 1, 2022, [...] filed before the Trial Court for a stay of the February 9, 2022 Order.  (Da335-356).  Also on March 1, 2022, [...] filed a motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal from the February 9, 2022 Order.  (Da389-390).
[brief] Pa118-34.  [...] tested the responses of two (2) 2017 Honda CR-V’s, equipped with defendant [...]’s LDW and LKAS systems on February 20, 2020, April 22, 2022, and April 26, 2022.  Pa128.  [...] drove the CR-V’s at approximately 45 – 50 mph at the site of the collision with the LKAS system on.  Pa129.  [...] evaluated the Honda warning and safety systems’ responses to various parametric angles of attack, steering wheel angles, accelerator pedal percentages, and lateral velocities.  Pa132.  Of the 37 valid tests across the three (3) different test series, the LKAS successfully steered the CR-V back into the correct lane of travel 36 times.  Ibid.  According to [...], his testing accounted for the zero (0) to four (4) degrees of steering input possibly exerted by [...], consistent with the crash data that recorded zero.  Pa128; Pa516-18.  Based on the extensive testing, [...] concluded to a reasonable degree of certainty that “[h]ad the subject Honda been equipped with the available LKAS, the subject collision would not have occurred.
[brief] **E.  Mitigating Factor (3)**  Defense counsel requested mitigating factor (3) — that defendant acted under a strong provocation — because [...]’s agreement with [...] was provoked by [...]’s attack on [...].  (15T 14-2 to 20)  The court rejected this factor because [...] “was in control of his own conduct” and that [...]’s assault on [...] “doesn’t excuse” [...]’s conduct.  (15T 32-16 to 33-8)  Neither of these reasons was adequate to reject this mitigating factor.  If [...] had not been in control of his own conduct, as the court apparently suggested he would need to be for this factor to apply, then [...] could not have been convicted of conspiracy in the first instance, as conspiracy required him to act with purpose.  Similarly, provocation is not an excuse for criminal behavior.  It is, however, a mitigating factor that renders this offense less severe than a conspiracy to commit assault that was not provoked by the victim’s assault on a third-party.  As [...] testified, [...] had visible injuries to her face, and there was no dispute that [...] caused those injuries.  (9T 76-8 to 77-24, 78-7 to 9, 79-13 to 14; 10T 107-6 to 25)  While [...]’s conduct certainly does not relieve [...] of responsibility for his actions, it does constitute strong provocation such that the court should have found mitigating factor (3).
[brief] Upon receipt of a certification, an appointing authority shall take whichever of the following actions is appropriate when a permanent appointment is to be made:  3.  Appoint one of the top three interested eligibles (rule of three) from an open competitive or promotional list, provided that:  ii. if the eligible who ranks first on a promotional list is a veteran, then a non-veteran may not be appointed.  (AA0233; AA0002)  After being advised her Notice of Appeal was premature because the Respondent [...] had not yet returned the Certification to Civil Service, Appellant refiled her Notice of Appeal on February 10, 2023.  (AA0236-237)  In the interim, the Respondent [...] had completed and returned the Certification of Eligibles to the Respondent Commission, despite the fact it had been served with Appellant’s Notice of Appeal and the Certification improperly listed the recently demoted [...] as the first ranked eligible.
[brief] Indeed, the jury knew nothing about this interaction until defense counsel opened with an accusation that the investigating officers “insinuate[ed] [defendant] was a robber or burglar. ” (2T50-10 to 14).  The State, appropriately, objected and was overruled, though with admonition from the Court that defense counsel “be careful with that. ” (2T50-15 to 22).  Heedless of that warning, defendant insisted on continuing his parody of the officers’ exchange by paraphrasing: “Oh, [defendant] looks like he’s going to do a robbery. ” (2T51-2 to 3).  At no point during the State’s case-in-chief did it refer to an alleged robbery.  Defendant, however, was not so discreet.
[brief] Most compelling, and completely ignored by the Court is the affidavit and expert opinion of [...], Ph.D., dated February 3, 2023, submitted in T.F., et al., v. [...], Case No. [...] (Waukesha Cty. Wisconsin Cir. Ct. 2023), opining that “Parental Involvement is Essential at Every Stage of the [transition] Process,” See 200-207 at Para. 58-78, concluding that “a school policy that involves school adult personnel in socially transitioning a child or adolescent without the consent of parent or over their objection violates widely accepted mental health principles and practice,” See Da207 at Para. 78.
[directive] 7.4  The supervisor shall order the pursuit terminated if the suspect’s identity is established to the point where later apprehension may be accomplished and where there is no imminent threat to public safety.  7.5  In recognition of the overall population density and volume of vehicular traffic in this State, and the increased risk attendant to prolonged vehicular pursuits, a supervisor shall order the termination of any pursuit of protracted duration unless the supervisor determines that further pursuit is justified to respond to an imminent threat to public safety.
[brief] .................................................................  25, 26 Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co.  v. Manzo, 122 N.J. 104 (1991) .................. 27 Merchants Indemnity Corp. of New York v. Eggleston, 37 N.J. 114 (1962)  ...  23, 24 Pioneer National Title Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 155 N.J. Super. 332 (App. Div.), aff’d o.b., 78 N.J. 320 (1978)  ..............................................................................  16  President v. Jenkins, 180 N.J. 550 (2004) ...................................................  17, 35 Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hanna, 316 N.J. Super. 6 (App. Div. 1998) .......... 24 RLI Ins. Co. v. Klinsky, 771 F. Supp. 2d. 314 (D. Ver. 2011) .......................  32  Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Lacroix, 194 N.J. 515 (2008)  ....................................  37 Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73 (2022) .........................................................  15  Sellers v. Schonfeld, 270 N.J. Super. 424 (App. Div. 1993)..........................  30  Sosa v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 458 N.J. Super. 639 (App. Div. 2019) ...... 17 Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 100 N.J. 325 (1985) ........................................... 35 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 87 N.J. Super. 543 (1965) ............... 34 State Farm v. Wall, 92 N.J. Super. 92 (App. Div.1966).................................. 16,17 Taylor v. Continental Group Change in Control Severance Pay Plan, 933 F. 2d 1227 (3d. Cir. 1991) ................................................................................. 17 U.S. v. Pantelidis, 335 F.3d 226 (3d. Cir. 2003) .......................................... 17 Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 165 (1992) ............................. 17, 35 Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J.590 (2001) ........................................... 33 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Intervenor-Appellant, [...], a camper who was seriously injured in an automobile accident in August, 2019 while attending camp at [...], seeks to reverse the lower’s court’s decision granting Plaintiff [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment and rescinding Defendant [...], LLC’s insurance policy, finding it void ab initio as a result of the camp owner’s innocent misrepresentation when applying for supplemental insurance.
[directive] The County Offices of Victim-Witness Advocacy shall offer to provide assistance in preparing the statement.  K.  The Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy shall provide assistance to the victim with the victim input procedure to the Parole Board.  COMMENTARY  The State Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy within the Division of Criminal Justice shall provide limited funding to the County Offices of Victim-Witness Advocacy from the Victim-Witness Advocacy Fund pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.
[brief] BRIEF IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL  [...]  [...] [...] Freehold, New Jersey  07728 [...] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant, [...]  [...], ESQ. [...], NJ Attorney ID: 023642004  Of Counsel and On the Brief  [...], ESQ.  [...], NJ  Attorney ID: 003742005  Of Counsel  Dated submitted: June 3, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ........................................................................................................ ii  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................  1 POINT ONE ..................................................................................................................................  1  The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Entering a Protective Order Because Defendants Did Not Show Good Cause to Deny Recording of Plaintiff’s Defense Medical Examination (“DME”).  (Pa149-50.)  ...........................................  1 CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................................
[brief] ”  (Id. (citing [...] Decl. ¶¶ 7-8)).  At the hearing, the District Judge noted that “in the interest of thoroughness, I suppose the plaintiffs would want at some point to have some kind of verification that what you’re providing them is accurate so it seems to me that can be happening in stages. ”  ([...] Decl. Ex. 11 at 10).  The District Judge also specifically stated that she “expect[s] discovery to be resolved in a fast and efficient fashion. ” (Id. at 14).  On July 14, 2020, the parties agreed to a “final list of search terms for ESI custodians. ”  ([...] Decl. ¶ 15).  As of April 22, 2021, defendants had produced “custodial ESI” from 20 of the 23 agreed-upon custodians.
[brief] 6T 62-13 TO 72-25)  POINT FOUR ..........................................................  54  REVIEW OF THE TRIAL EVIDENCE CONFIRMS THE PROOFS PRESENTED  FAIL TO DEMONSTRATE  A PERMANENT EASEMENT WAS INTENDED AND CREATED, AND DEMONSTRATE  ONLY A LICENSE WAS INTENDED AND CREATED THAT HAS TERMINATED  (APPEALS FINAL OPINION/ORDER Da978, Da980, Da1004)
[directive] An Shooting Response Team, the state grand jury officer may use deadly force in New Jersey when the officer reasonably believes it is immediately necessary to protect the officer or another person from imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm.  A law enacted in January 2019 requires that the Attorney General’s Office conduct investigations of a person’s death that occurs during an encounter with a law enforcement officer acting in the officer’s official capacity or while the decedent is in custody.  This deadly force investigation preceded enactment of that law.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS  ........................................................................................................i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................. ii  JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ...........................................................................iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....................................................................................................3  STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................................3  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................4  I.  Standard of Review (Pa003) .........................................................................................4  II.  The Trial Court Erred By Not Finding The Arbitration Clause Unconscionable (Pa003)  ..........................................................5  III.  The Trial Court  Erred In Holding [...] Unequivocally Agreed to [...]’s Terms and Conditions  Because [...] Disproved the Affidavit from [...] (Pa003)  ......................................................11  CONCLUSION  ....................................................................................................................15
[brief] [...]'S AND/OR APPELLATE COUNSEL FAILED TO RAISE AN OBJECTION TO THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BECAUSE THE JURORS WERE PRECLUDED FROM CONSIDERING A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF SECOND DEGREE ROBBERY.  The defendant maintains that the jury believed that it was precluded from finding him guilty of second degree robbery, because the jury instructions created a substantial probability that it directed them to assess punishment equally for principles and accomplices.  The testimony of the State's key-witness [...] is evidence of itself that the jury could reasonably believe defendant was guilty of a lesser included offense of second degree robbery.  On direct examination concerning the January 12th, 2012 T-Mobile robbery, Bowers testified that there was no discussion about a robbery at all that morning.  (9T 81-82-25 to 4; 83 24-25)  In fact Bowers said he had no idea it was going to be a robbery until it started happening (9T 82-22-24).  Bowers testified that he freely and voluntarily signed an affidavit on January 9th, 2012 (Da 27-28) attesting that defendant had no knowledge and did not commit any robbery on January 12th, 2012.  (9T 156-157-23 to 7)  On cross examination concerning the January 12th, 2012 robbery:  Bowers reaffirmed that there was no discussion of a robbery prior to entering the T-Mobile and that the robbery was decided inside the store.  (9T 143-11 to 16)  The trial Court instructed the jury in relevant part: in order to find defendant guilty of robbery, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
[brief] Pa153.  In addition to its post hearing brief, the [...] provided a copy of Arbitrator [...]’s November 25, 2014 Opinion and Award in [...] and [...], P.E.R.C. Docket No. [...], which found that the PBA’s applicable contract language regarding overtime compensation was plain and unambiguous.  Pa61.  [...] also noted that “[n]otwithstanding any practices and customs, the plain language of the agreement controls in this case. ” (Emphasis added).  Pa182.  The decision in Newton held that the Town violated the collective bargaining agreement when it set an overtime rate different from the provision contained in the contract and ordered the Town to make the affected officers whole.  Pa185.  The Union proposed that the issue be framed as follows: Whether the Employer violated the collective bargaining agreement when it failed to calculate the overtime rate as base plus maintenance divided by 2080 times 1.5?  If so, what shall be the remedy?  Pa187.  The Division proposed the issue be framed as: Whether the state violated the collective bargaining agreement when it calculated the overtime rate consistent with the number of working days in a fiscal year?
[brief] (9T202:9-11).  [...] also stated that it occurs frequently and does not take a great deal of sophistication to appropriately reproduce signatures.  (9T197:12-22).  Indeed, Respondent’s counsel easily transposed signatures of Respondent and her attorney on a copy of the Photocopy using a simple copy machine.  (P560a; 9T201:19 to 202:11).  [...] stated it is possible to take signature from another source and affix it to another using digital technology and leave no evidence of what occurred.  (9T204:16-20. 9T203:20 to 204:1; 9T181:15 to 182:2).  That is why he cannot opine that the Photocopy has not been altered or fabricated.
[brief] **PLAINTIFF ALSO STATED A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AGAINST OLD REPUBLIC**  (*Pa*651-652; 4T)  Like [...], [...] challenged the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claim against [...] for breach of contract (Count III of the Complaint).  The familiar elements of a claim for breach of contract under New Jersey law are the existence of a valid contract between the parties; a breach of the contract by one of the parties; and resulting damages.  *See, e.g.*, *Murphy v.  Implicito*, 392 N.J. Super. 245, 265 (App. Div. 2007) (reciting elements).  Here, especially when viewed under the “generous and hospitable approach” applicable to a pre-answer Motion to Dismiss, each of these elements was sufficiently pleaded against [...] and the claim should have been sustained.  *See Printing Mart*, 116 N.J. at 746.  The trial court erred in dismissing this claim with prejudice.  (*Pa*651-652; 4T).  **A.
[brief] The Act Should Be Voided Because the Legislature Violated Its Laws Regarding Enacting Legislation.  This Court should reject the State’s unsupported hypothesis that the Legislature can ignore unrepealed laws passed in prior legislative sessions.  Ignoring Applicants’ analysis at Pb23 of *In re Miller's Petition*, 122 N.J.L. 176, 179 (Sup. Ct. 1939), the State erroneously says, “the Petitioners do not cite a single case in which a New Jersey court has invalidated a statute solely for failing to comply with statutory provisions. ”  (Sb18.)  In fact, this case is nearly identical to the one at bar— a statute was invalidated because the Legislature did not follow the procedure laid out in a different statute.  *Miller*, 122 N.J.L. at 178-79.  Although in *Miller*, the Court discussed the Constitution, it was only because the notice required by R.S. 1:6-4, applied to “special” legislation as defined in the Constitution.  *Id.* at 177-78.  Despite the State’s contentions, the Court invalidated a statute based upon the Legislature’s failure to follow the enactment procedure set forth in statute.  *Id.* at 178-79.  This is the relief that Applicants seek herein – by the Legislature failing to follow the statutes that apply to procedural prerequisites to enactment, P.L. 2021, c. 375 should be voided.  The State further argues, “it is black letter law that one legislature may not bind its successor by enacting procedural requirements and barriers to the enactment of future legislation,” but then provides no case that holds a Legislature can ignore laws passed by a prior group of legislators. ³ (Sb17.)  --- ³