ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See Quinn at 47.  A court's obligation to enforce marital settlement agreements applies to provisions regarding the parents' obligation to pay for their children's college expenses.  Accordingly, where parties to a divorce have reached an agreement regarding children attending college and how those college expenses should be divided, and no showing has been made that the agreement should be vacated or modified, the Family Part need not apply all twelve factors pertinent to college expenses as identified in Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529 (1982).
[brief] (Aa32).  As this implicates DEP’s Standards for Individual Subsurface Sewage Disposal Systems, N.J.A.C. 7:9A-1.2(a), [...] used those standards to calculate its estimated wastewater flow.  N.J.A.C. 7:38-3.4(b); N.J.A.C. 7:9A-2.1, -1.8, -7.4.
[directive] Jersey's New strengthens the upgrading for criteria statutory incorporating the By resistance. passive to response in only discharged may be CED a that clear makes policy revised the offense, resisting-arrest injury to physical of risk substantial a poses that fighting, (e.~., resistance active to response bystander.  innocent or victim, officer, a arresting the weapons  These policy. of this III Section in defined is device" energy "conducted term The of Code Jersey New in the defined is term that as guns," "stun of category broader the under fall "any means gun stun term the that provides 2C:39-1(t)
[brief] ”  *(Exhibit 3)*  My rebuttal to [...]’s comment above *(Exhibit 3)* is:  Did [...] ever think about the *Health, safety, and well-being* of his *two young children* as they grew up, *without extending  Any type of support from their absentee father, who disappeared from their lives?*  [...] is now concerned about his OWN well being to survive, But, had no conscience, walking away from his responsibilities as a parent.  Regarding the signed 2/26/2024 MOTION OF STAY paperwork
[directive] Table Contents of I  TABLE CONTENTS OF ...........................................................................................................................  i  Introduction .................. I: Chapter Strategic Objective and Goals of the Treasury Forfeiture Program  1 ........................................................................................................  Chapter Definitions 3 11: ..........................................................................................  5  Chapter General Provisions 111: .....................................................  IV: Chapter Overview ofthe Treasury Forfeiture Fund  7 ........................................................  Chapter V: Retention and Use of Forfeited Property  13 ......................................................................  VI: Chapter Transfer of Forfeited Property  15 ................ of Chapter VII: Transfer Real Property through the Weed and Seed Program 17 .............................................................  Chapter VIII: Adoptions of StateLocal Seizures 19 ..........................  IX: Chapter Equitable Sharing with Federal, State and Local Agencies 21 .....................................................  25  Chapter X: Equitable Sharing with Foreign Countries .................................................................................. XI: 27  Chapter Reverse Asset Sharing .....................................  Chapter XI: Discontinuance of Federal Forfeiture Proceedings 29 - . - ................................................................. ... .........................  Appendix: Policy Directives 31 -1 ~~ %$, Executive Office
[brief] (Sb 37-40)  Unpublished cases are not precedential, however, for the sake of completeness, undersigned counsel found three cases in which this Court suppressed evidence because the circumstances leading to probable cause were not unforeseeable and spontaneous. \(^5\)  In State v. Pittman, 2023 WL 6930025, at *4 (App. Div. Oct. 19, 2023), where a narcotics detective’s suspicions of defendant’s narcotics activity prompted the surveillance of defendant’s car and formed the basis of a stop, during which a drug dog alerted, “[p]robable cause . . . most certainly did not ‘aris[e] from unforeseeable and spontaneous circumstances.
[brief] The 2003 Amended Housing Element and Fair Share Plan, the 2007 Milltown Housing Element and Fair Share Plan, the April 2009 Housing Element and Fair Share Plan, the May, 2012 Housing Element and Fair Share Plan, the October 2011 Decision of [...], the July 20, 2018 Decision of [...], and the December 23, 2019 Amended Housing Element and Fair Share Plan all affirm that the [...] should be used to assist in meeting, alongside other measures, the Borough’s affordable housing obligation.
[brief] [...]:  Yeah, plaintiff had evidence in this case that went beyond those three witnesses.  Critical, essential, which really went to the heart of what [...] was saying through his witnesses.  That you couldn’t you could not slip and what was the basis of that evidence?  That evidence came from the party defendant, the representative, came from [...].  [...] was at the scene.  She is the defendant.  …  (5T7-17 to 25).  * * * * *  … she mopped it, she put the sign up.  She believed this was a dangerous, hazardous, slippery condition which we were never able to present to this jury.  The - - the second piece of evidence, Judge, with respect to the - - the incident report.  Once again, Judge, it was my intention as I said before, Judge, I don’t know how, even though they offered it, they said they were going to offer it in their case in chief, in their - - in their pretrial submission, I still wonder how did he intend to think that he could get it in.  I think I could get it in because it is an admission, and it has been authenticated.  They swore to the truth of it.  The party defendant on the answers to interrogatories swore to it by saying everything here is truthful … (5T14-25 to 15-16; emphasis added).
[brief] Turning to the first indemnity provision, the court ruled that the “regardless of” language did “not distinguish between allowing indemnification for the negligence of others and allowing indemnification for [...]’s own negligence. ”  *Id.* at 56.  The “regardless of” phrase could be read to eliminate the common-law requirement that an indemnitee be free from fault.  *Ibid.*  The Englert Court also ruled that the phrase “to the extent of” was ambiguous because it could require indemnity if [...] and [...] were both negligent or to require indemnity for only the fault of [...] and its subcontractor.
[brief] As a general rule in non-jury actions, appellate courts apply a deferential standard in reviewing factual findings by a judge.  Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020).  However, such deference is not without its limits and appellate courts may disturb such findings if “convinced that those findings and conclusions were so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant, and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ”  Grienpenburg v. Twp. Of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015).  However, “a trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. Of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  Accordingly, an appellate court’s review of rulings of law and issues same is de novo.  See Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corp., 231 N.J. 234, 246 (2017).
[brief] ”  Yarbough, 100 N.J. at 643-44.  The court concluded that defendant committed the certain persons crime at the time he obtained the handgun, knowing he was prohibited from possessing one as a convicted felon, and proceeding to carry it on his person, nonetheless.  (Da48).  The court then considered the legislative history of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7, finding that the legislative intent behind the certain persons statute viewed in the light of defendant’s criminal history and the facts of this case, weighs in favor of consecutive sentences.  (Da49).  The court properly noted “[t]he statute and case law show a legislative will to a) deter convicted felons from obtaining and possessing firearms and b) penalize those who would knowingly obtain and possess a firearm in defiance of their certain persons status. ” (Da49-50).  Finally, the court noted it did not find defendant’s argument that data suggests if he were to be resentenced concurrently, he would get out of prison around age fifty-eight – an age bracket correlated with a general downturn in recidivism unpersuasive because (1) defendant was 40 when he committed this offense, and (2) has a criminal record stretching back to 1983.  (Da50).  The court stated bluntly, “[t]he specific content contained within the Defendant’s record is alarming to the court. ”  (Da50).  The court’s opinion held that the previous sentence stands as imposed on March 2, 2018.
[brief] This Court recently affirmed that Rule 4:10-2’s standard applies with equal force to paper and ESI discovery.  *Estate of Lasiw v. Pereira*, 475 N.J. Super, 378 (App. Div. 2023).  As with paper discovery, relevance is the “touchstone” for e-discovery.  *Id.* at 405.  The Court also examined the requirement that trial courts assess burden, which arises to some degree in responding to any discovery request, in its Rule 4:10-2 analysis:
[brief] The purpose of requiring an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate in this case follows the same logic.  It is a confirmation of the lease, designed to protect [...] from future claims of breach by the tenant [...].  Its purpose is not to give [...] a pretext for terminating the PSA based on newly discovered adverse information, but to protect [...] from future claims.  In contrast to an estoppel certificate, due diligence here was completed within the first 30 days following the effective date of the PSA.  (Da195.)  However, the trial court’s interpretation suggests that the estoppel certificate was intended to act as a tool for [...] to terminate the PSA based on unfavorable information.  This runs contrary to the terms of the PSA and commercial reality as to the purpose of estoppel certificates.  In conflating the role of the estoppel certificate with due diligence, the trial court fundamentally misconstrued the estoppel certificate’s function.
[brief] The claims asserted by the members of the proposed [...] class do not relate to the claims brought by the [...] class members.  Nor do the claims of the proposed [...] class “relate to” the claims brought by the [...] class members.  The defendants themselves admitted in their briefing below—and [...] agreed—that the [...] class members are complaining about fees different from those at issue in *[...]*, see Def. [...]’s Br., p. 9 (“the Merchants complain about different fees in *[...]* than the ones disputed in [*[...]*]”).  In addition, the transactions involved in *[...]* took place long after entry of final judgment in *[...]*.  To that extent, Defendants’ arguments fall short of the basic principles of claim preclusion under New Jersey law: “1) the judgment in the prior action must be valid, final, and on the merits; (2) the parties in the later action must be identical to or in privity with those in the prior action; and (3) the claim in the later action must grow out of the *same transaction or occurrence* as the claim in the earlier one.
[brief] Focusing instead upon [...]’s unauthorized dumping, the trial court further erred in concluding that [...] “jumped the gun” when it took action to prevent the unauthorized dumping from continuing, as it was required to do, and that “[t]his alleged ‘property damage claim’ is better suited in a separate action” -- although the trial court was asked to consider the present breach of contract claim, and not a “property damage claim. ”  [Pa2].  While the trial court was correct that [...]’s “property damage claim” will indeed be the subject of a separate action once the damage has been quantified, that eventual action will involve new and entirely distinct causes of action (and damages) arising from [...]’s post-settlement dumping that are separate and distinct from the present breach of contract claim that arose from [...]’s breach of the Lease and Settlement Agreement for which the remedy – i.e., entry of the Consent Judgments – had previously been negotiated and agreed to by these commercial parties and their counsel.  [...] is entitled to the remedy for which the parties contracted upon [...]’s breach of the Settlement Agreement.  The fact that [...] will pursue a separate damage claim in the future for [...]’s post- settlement conduct should not have been a consideration – much less the dispositive consideration – when the trial court refused to enforce the Settlement Agreement as it was written.  The Order should be reversed and this matter should be remanded to the trial court for entry of the Money Judgment for the full Judgment Amount, together with attorneys’ fees and costs incurred to obtain that relief, as the parties agreed.
[brief] .......................................................................................................................  41  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS ON APPEAL  1.  Resolution 24-23 of the [...] Approving the Denial of an Application for Minor Site Plan Approval with Variances Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c) to Permit the Operation of a Class 5 Dispensary for the Sale of Adult Use Recreational Cannabis at the Subject Property  Located at [...], Block 158, Lot 3. 01, in the City of [...]  Under [...].  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellant Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex  P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625-006  Re: [...] (Plaintiff/Appellant) v. [...]  (Defendant/Respondent)  Appellate  Docket No.: [...]  Civil Action: On Appeal from a Final Judgment of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County.  Docket No.: [...] Sat  Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  To the Honorable Judges of the Appellate Division:
[brief] Likewise, in sentencing defendant to a consecutive term of imprisonment for Count Four – unlawful possession of a weapon, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), the trial court did not engage in the required Yarbough analysis as required when imposing consecutive sentences.  (See 9T:63-19 to 64-5); State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985).  The trial court also did not analyze the fairness of the consecutive term imposed under the required Torres analysis.  Therefore, a limited remand is required in order to analyze the consecutive sentence under the required factors.
[brief] The Objectors admit that the Homeowners’ December 2, 2022 publication of a Notice of Approval was fully disclosed to them in an email from the Board Secretary.  (Pa803-805; Pa850-851).  Objectors admit that the December 2, 2022 publication was not withheld from them or concealed from them.  (Pa803-805; Pa850-851).  Objectors admit that the December 2, 2022 Notice of Approval triggered the commencement of the forty-five (45) appeal period.  (Pa803-805; Pa850-851).  Though the Objectors possessed the Notice of Approval early enough to file a timely appeal, the Objectors admit that they failed to timely file the Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs.
[brief] **The Court Erred Granting Defendants’ Reconsideration Motions as to Appellant’s Claims After Properly Denying Respondents’ Motions for Summary Judgment.**  Under Rule 4:42-2, interlocutory orders “shall be subject to revision at any time before the entry of final judgment in the sound discretion of the court in the interest of justice. ”  The Court erred by granting Respondents’ reconsideration motions to entirely dismiss Appellant [...]’s claims.  In its original decision, the Court found that there were genuine issues of material fact with regard to the allocation of control between [...] and [...], whether Respondents’ motive for transferring Appellant was retaliatory, and whether Appellant was constructively discharged from her employment.  2T 86:15-22.  Upon reconsideration, Respondents failed to present the Court with *any* new evidence, case law, or arguments to support their claim that the Court’s original decision should be reversed in the interest of justice.  Respondents simply argued that the Court decided wrong.  In response, the Court completely dismissed Appellant’s claims of sexual harassment discrimination and hostile work environment against [...] and the [...] Respondents, and her retaliation claim against the [...] Respondents.  3T 90:4-92:11.  The Court incorrectly reasoned, with little to no explanation, that [...]’s actions were not taken within the control of [...], and therefore, all claims against [...] Respondents should be dismissed.
[directive] Czy rozumie Pan(i), że jeśli do przestępstwa doszło 26 kwietnia 2005 r. lub później, po przyznaniu się do winy będzie Pan(i) zobowiązany(a) do uiszczenia obowiązkowej kary [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] grzywny w wysokości podanej poniżej, za każde przestępstwo, do którego się Pan(i) przyzna, na fundusz leczenia ofiar wykroczeń seksualnych?  do 2000 USD w przypadku przestępstwa 1.  Stopnia (1) do 1000 USD w przypadku przestępstwa 2.  Stopnia (2) do 750 USD w przypadku przestępstwa 3.  Stopnia (3) przypadku przestępstwa 4.  stopnia (4) do 500 USD w łącznie S.C.V.T.F USD Kara  na  Do you understand that if the crime occurred on or after April 26, 2005, as a result of your guilty plea you will be required to pay a mandatory Sex Crime Victim Treatment Fund (S.C.V.T.F.) penalty as listed below for each offense for which you pled guilty?
[brief] See *Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc.*, 218 N.J. 8, 32 (2014) (“[A] pivotal component of a CEPA claim is the plaintiff’s identification of authority in one or more of the categories enumerated in the statute that bears a substantial nexus to his or her claim. ”).  As the Appellate Division has made clear, CEPA “is not intended to shield a constant complainer who simply disagrees with the manner in which [a] hospital is operating one of its medical departments, provided the operation is in accordance with lawful and ethical mandates. ”  *Klein*, 377 N.J. Super. at 42; see also *Young v. Schering Corp.*, 275 N.J. Super. 221, 237 (App. Div.1994) (noting CEPA “was not intended to provide a remedy for wrongful discharge for employees who simply disagree with an employer’s decision, where that decision is entirely lawful”); *Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.*, 214 N.J. 518, 559 (2013) (“Vague and conclusory complaints, complaints about trivial or minor matters, or generalized workplace unhappiness are not the sort of things that the Legislature intended to be protected by CEPA.
[brief] Clearly, contrary to the finding of the PCR court, the recorded judgement in question in no way indicates that the sentencing court “may have stated reasons on the record to justify the concurrent sentence. ”  (Da 45)  The State’s characterization of the issue in this case as an excessive sentence issue is flat wrong.  The aggregate length of defendant’s sentence is not at issue.  The only question before this Court is the legality of the sentence imposed on the second indictment which clearly was not “imposed in accordance with law.
[directive] Domestic Ontario 4.5.1.b 9 3 ....................................................................................................... Higher.  Violence Restraining a Domestic Violated Has Defendant 4.5.2 .........................39  Protection Order Act Survivor Sexual Assault a or Order Jumping Witness Bail or with Charged Is Defendant 4.5.3  Tampering.................................................................................................. 9 3 ................40  3:3-10 in Rule Specified with Crime a Charged Is Defendant 4.5.4.a ........................................40  Offense Specified a with Charged is Defendant 4.5.4.b  6  Page for on Release  While Committed Was Offense Present  The 4.5.5  Post-Conviction of Form on Any While or Offense
[brief] Under Rule 702, expert testimony will be admissible only if it is both relevant and reliable.  *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993).  “The proponent of expert evidence must demonstrate its admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence.  *Id.* at 592 n. 10.  To satisfy these elements of reliability and relevance, Rule 702 requires that: (1) the expert must be qualified to render his or her opinion; (2) the scientific process or methodology employed by the expert in rendering his opinion must be reliable; and (3) the expert's testimony must assist the trier of fact.  See *Pineda v. Ford Motor Co.*, 520 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2008).  In short, an expert's conclusion must meet the "trilogy of restrictions [*5] on expert testimony: qualification, reliability and fit."
[brief] State v. Washington, 453 N.J. Super. 164 (App. Div. 2018) .................... 33, 36 State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131 (2014) .................................................. 52  State v. Whitaker, 200 N.J. 444 (2009) ................................................ 19, 22 State v. White, 498 N.J. 122 (1984) .....................................................
[brief] The Furman court, however, reviewed the propriety of the predecessor statute -- the Debt Adjusters Law -- which exempted all attorneys from the statute’s regulation of the business of debt adjustment.  Moreover, its holding actually supports Plaintiffs’ position.  In Furman, the court reviewed the “classes of persons excepted from the statutory bar,” including all attorneys.  Id. at 143.  The issue there was not the regulation of attorneys, but rather the exclusion of all attorneys from the statute.  The court refused to strike the all attorney exemption for the same reasons that Plaintiffs seek the elimination of the Limited Attorney Exemption so that all attorneys are exempt from the Act: Attorneys do not advertise and are subject to a high ethical standard.
[brief] Premium income received from subscribers and expenses for AIF fees are separately reported on [...]’s financial statements as revenue and expense, respectively.  (Ra31, line 35, col. 1 (revenue); Ra32, footnote (a), and 33, § B, 1st paragraph (expenses)).  As an expense charged to [...], the cost of AIF fees must be reasonably related to the services and value provided to the exchange.  [...]’s claim that AIF fees need not be fair and reasonable pursuant to SSAP No. 25, (Ab48-49), is precisely the type of abuse that the principle was established to prevent and for the Department to regulate.  It is difficult to understand why an attorney-in-fact would oppose a rule that requires it to engage in financial transactions that are arm’s-length and fair and reasonable, unless it seeks to avoid compliance with this principle and potentially overcharge the Exchange regardless of the cost of the actual services performed by [...].