ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  (9T 92-1 to 8)  [...] ran back into his house, and [...] began walking away.  (9T 92-13 to 22; 10T 78-12 to 21)  A short time later, [...] ran back out of his house wielding a knife and another knife-like object and began chasing [...].  (9T 94-21 to 95-5; 10T 78-12 to 21, 79-4 to 5)  [...] and [...] began fighting [...], trying “[t]o get him away from” [...] because [...] had a knife.  (10T 79-10 to 15)  [...] grabbed a stick and hit [...], causing him to drop either the knife or the other object he had been holding.
[brief] THE MANNER IN WHICH OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT AND A PATTERN OF OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT WERE PRESENTED TO THE JURY IMPROPERLY ALLOWED THE JURY TO BE NON-UNANIMOUS REGARDING THE THEORY OF GUILT.  AS REQUESTED BY DEFENSE COUNSEL, THE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN A MANNER THAT DEMANDED INDIVIDUAL UNANIMOUS FINDINGS ON THE UNDERLYING ALLEGATIONS OF THOSE COUNTS.  (RULINGS AT 20T 110-16 TO 111-7; 20T 168-23 TO 184-20; DA 13 TO 14)  In State v. Gonzalez, 444 N.J. Super. 62, 70-78 (App. Div.), certif. den. 226 N.J. 209 (2016), this Court reversed verdicts for plain error when the jury was repeatedly told that jurors could reach unanimous verdicts as long as they were convinced that one “and/or” another version of events had occurred.  The Court concluded that the instructions were plain error because they:  Brady Court ruled that “the prosecutor must clearly and accurately explain the law to the grand jurors and not leave purely legal issues open to speculation by lay people who are simply performing their civic duty,” id., the judge must explain those same duties to a petit jury.  The failure to do so is necessarily fatal to the convictions.
[brief] To the contrary, both [...]’s and [...]’ strategies are directly aligned, that being to limit the apportionment of liability attributed to each of them, and to establish, instead, the comparative negligence of the Decedent.  A miscommunication, or factual discrepancy, between two employees of a company, about which cut-through was to be utilized prior to the crash, does not, in and of itself, establish a conflict between that company and one of the employees.  Accordingly, no direct, concurrent conflict exists between [...] and [...] which would warrant the disqualification of [...] from the joint representation of each.  Without such a conflict, [...] and [...] are entitled to their counsel of choice – that being [...] – to represent them in this litigation.  Accordingly, the trial court’s Order of February 28, 2024, disqualifying [...] should be reversed.
[brief] 28 State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525 (1995) ..................................................................  31 State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252 (1986) ...............................................................  13 State v. Hipplewith, 33 N.J. 300 (1960) ............................................................  32 State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 368 (2014) ..................................................................  14 State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440 (2008) .............................................................
[brief] A "by-right" subdivision is one where "the plan would comply with all governing ordinance standards and would not require variances."  Gandolfi v. Town of Hammonton, 367 N.J. Super. 527, 530 n. 1 (App. Div. 2004) (emphasis added) (citing Pizzo Mantin Group, 137 N.J. 216).  While plaintiff's application might not require variances, it does not comply with all governing ordinance standards in UDO Article VI.  At 4T44-8 to 4T44-12, the court noted that "off-street [sic] traffic conditions" cannot serve as a basis to deny an otherwise compliant application.  --- 5  And, again, it must comply with the design standards, unless waivers are justified by hardship.  See Point I.  To be sure, *Dunkin' Donuts of New Jersey, Inc. v. Twp. of North Brunswick Plan. Bd.*, 193 N.J. Super. 513, 515 (App. Div. 1984), holds that a board is "without authority to deny site plan approval because of off-site traffic conditions."  However, "[a] planning board should consider off-site traffic flow and safety in reviewing proposals for vehicular ingress to and egress from a site.]"  *Id.*  "[C]oncerns as to ingress and egress and concerns as to on-site conditions related to off-site traffic flow and safety are appropriate to be addressed at the site plan stage."  *Allocco and Luccarelli v. Twp. of Holmdel*, 299 N.J. Super. 491, 499 (Law Div. 1997) (citing *Dunkin' Donuts*, 193 N.J. Super. at 515).  Among the Board's concerns was "that there is no parking on [...], which will require that everyone park on the proposed street [[...]]."  Second resolution at paragraph C.  "The Board . . . found that a reduction in the number of units would offer more off-street parking and resolve some of the Board's concerns regarding parking safety."
[brief] (Ibid.)  In order to create a “third party” here, Plaintiffs contend that [...], “caused the Company to become involved in litigation with the Individual Plaintiffs. ”  (Pb68)  They say that “Plaintiffs were adverse to [...] and the Company during Phase I”.  They claim the award was to reimburse the Company for legal fees that [...] caused it to spend against the Plaintiffs when he was in control.  Thus, they really contend that [...] was fighting them and using the company as the instrument to do so when he had management authority.  That is no different than direct litigation between [...] and the Plaintiffs, involving their commonly owned entity.  [...] is not a ‘third party’ to any of them.  They all hold interests in that entity.  The Arbitrator certainly didn’t make any findings that showed he was reasoning his award that way.
[brief] Addressing the Bona Fide Purchaser for Value Without Notice Argument in the Reconsideration Motion  Notwithstanding being denied responses to discovery from [...] and [...] in [...]’s Sua Sponte Order, Appellants filed the Reconsideration Motion to present to the lower court the significant public record information which Appellants’ counsel had uncovered in seeking to establish the sophistication of [...] and its principal [...], and thereby complete the inquiry laid out by [...] in the April 3, 2023 Order.  [...] indicated he was inclined to vacate the Final Judgment under Rule 4:50-1(f), but for his reservations about [...]’s claim to the protection of bona fide purchaser for value status.  (19a-23a).  Appellants’ counsel inspected title records to ascertain instances where entities related to [...] appeared in tax lien foreclosures or purchased properties after judgment, which review it summarized in a chart of the public documents.(533a-534a).  That research, undertaken as independent discovery, revealed that in the three (3) prior years that [...], through either [...] or other entities he controlled ([...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”)) filed public record documents with County Clerks throughout the state related to pending tax lien foreclosures in forty-five (45) instances.  (525a-532a).  These are categorized as follows: (i) 28 instances in which [...], Peake Pointe or [...] acquired deeds within 60 days of the entry of Final Judgment; (525a-532a).  (ii) 7 instances in which [...] filed Notices of Lis Pendens, as plaintiff in a tax lien foreclosure; and (525a-532a).  (iii) 10 instances in which [...] acquired assignments of certificates.  (525a-532a).  According to public records obtained and attached to the attorney certification, [...] is the sole member of [...], LLC and [...] (See Exhibit “1” - 12/19/22 signature page of mortgage attached to Counsel Cert)(555a), and the managing member of [...] (See Exhibit “2” of Counsel Cert)(556a-558a).  Appellants contended that this extent of activity established the “sophistication” of [...] and its principal [...], a factor critical in [...]’s estimation.
[brief] Amended Case Summary, filed December 28, 2023  Tonnelle USA, Inc. v. Township of N. Bergen Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1574, 2015 WL 3966233  15 High St. v. Borough of Helmetta Planning Bd., 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 386, 2022 WL 710788 | Cases number | Brief page | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| | Kane Properties, LLC v. City of Hoboken, 214 N.J. 199 (1999) | 13 | | Perlmart of Lacey, Inc. v. Lacey Twp. Planning Bd., 295 N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 1996) | 15, 16, 17 | | Northgate Condo. Ass'n v. Borough of Hillsdale Planning Bd., 214 N.J. 120 (2013) | 15, 16 | | Rockaway Shoprite Assocs., Inc. v. City of Linden, 424 N.J. Super. 337 (App. Div. 2011) | 15, 16, 17 | | Tonnelle USA, Inc. v. Township of N. Bergen Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1574, 2015 WL 3966233.
[brief] The most relevant precedential case is *Mayes v. Jackson Township Rent Leveling Board*, 103 *N.J.* 362, 378 (1986), in which the NJ Supreme Court held that a rent control ordinance that appears to be identical to Hoboken’s is constitutional.  During the pendency of this matter, a similar case that took a less circuitous route was decided by the appellate division.  It is an unpublished opinion.
[brief] On February 8, 2017, the grand jury returned the first of two indictments against [...].  The Procedural History sets forth the rather complicated history of the charges brought against [...].  Suffice it to say, this appeal deals only with the [...] homicide.  Despite the fact that the original indictment, #[...] was superseded by indictment #[...], in which [...] was also charged with the murder of [...], [...] was eventually tried for the Butler murder alone.  Three witnesses, [...], [...] and [...] provided the most significant testimony against [...].  Beginning with [...], she was called by the State on May 13, 2022.  On direct examination, she testified that she had a “friendly” relationship with [...] and also acknowledged that the two of them had had a “mild affair”.  T4, 24:18-22.  [...] was questioned about a statement she had given to the New Jersey State Police on March 29, 2016.  T4, 27:10-18.  When questioned about some of the statements which she made at that time, 2016, [...] indicated that she did not recall making many of the statements attributed to her.  T4, 29:3-19; T4, 31:1-20.  After the direct testimony of [...], the State sought to introduce into evidence the statement [...] gave to the police on March 29, 2016.  The court conducted a Gross hearing to determine the admissibility of [...]’s prior statement.  After hearing testimony at the Gross hearing as to the admissibility of both [...]’s statement to law enforcement as well as to [...]’s statement to law enforcement, the trial court ruled that both prior statements, subject to some restrictions, were admissible.
[brief] Fair’s definition of the objective element of a true threat is also not a new rule.  Fair reached the Supreme Court as an appeal as of right under Rule 2:2-1(a)(1), which requires that the constitutional question presented be yet unsettled.  E. Windsor Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Shapiro, 57 N.J. 168, 170 (1970) (“[A]n appeal as of right is maintainable only where the record reveals a substantial rather than merely a colorable question arising under the federal or state constitutions that has not been the subject of a conclusive judicial determination.
[brief] 1 POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT ORDER IS A FINAL ORDER UNDER RULE 2:2-3A1 .........................................................  1 POINT II  PLAINTIFF PRESENTED  A VALID CLAIM OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE NEW JERSEY LAW OF DISCRIMINATION ("NJLAD") ...........................................  2 POINT III THE TRIAL COURT NEVER ASSESSED PLAINTIFF'S COUNT IV AND THEREFORE ITS DISMISSAL WAS IMPROPER ...................... 6 POINT IV THE TRIAL COURT MISCONSTRUED PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AND DID NOT CONSIDER PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS OF DIRECT OR FACIAL DISCRIMINATION ...........................................  7 POINT V PLAINTIFF HAS NO OBLIGATION TO EXHAUST ANY ALLEGED ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES ........................................... 7 POINT VI THERE ARE NO ADDITIONAL PARTIES WHICH ARE REQUIRED TO BE JOINED IN THIS ACTION ...........................................  8 POINT VII PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS MAY APPROPRIATELY BE RESOLVED AS A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CLAIM ........................................... 9 POINT VIII ASSOCIATION UNIT MEMBERS MAY NOT BE PENALIZED FOR LAWFULLY USING MEDICAL LEAVE..........................10 POINT IX THIS COURT MAY PROPERLY LOOK TO GUIDANCE FROM THE EEOC.....................................................12  CONCLUSION ..............................................................15
[brief] 1T – trial dated 1/18/23 2T – trial dated 1/19/23 (Vol. 1) 3T – trial dated 1/19/23 (Vol. 2)  4T – trial dated 1/20/23 5T – trial dated 1/24/23 6T – trial dated 1/25/23 7T – trial dated 1/26/23 8T – trial dated 1/27/23 9T – trial dated 1/31/23 10T – trial dated 2/1/23 11T – sentencing of defendant dated 3/21/23 12T – sentencing of codefendant [...] dated 3/21/23 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ..............................................
[brief] 440 N.J. Super. 458, 484-85 (App. Div. 2015) (citing Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 150 N.J. 255, 265 (1997)).  The court emphasized that, although the Act must be interpreted “‘broadly to protect consumers from a wide variety of abhorrent deceptive practices,’ it has meaningful limits. ”  Id. at 485 (quoting D’Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 187 (2013)).  In that case, the court determined that plaintiffs’ allegations were outside the scope of the Act where the complaint concerned whether they had established a claim for benefits under their policies; the plaintiffs alleged no facts that their agreement for coverage was fraudulently procured.  See id. at 485-86.  Other New Jersey state court decisions are in accord.  See, e.g., Lemelledo, 150 N.J. at 265 (noting that, whereas New Jersey state courts “have held that the payment of insurance benefits is not subject to the CFA,” the statute “encompass[es] the sale of insurance policies as goods and services that are marketed to consumers” (citations omitted)); Beaver v. Magellan Health Servs., Inc., 433 N.J. Super. 430, 443 n.1 (App. Div. 2013) (stating that, “while the CFA ‘encompass[es] the sale of insurance policies as goods and services that are marketed to consumers,’ ‘the payment of insurance benefits is not subject to the CFA’”); Pierzga v. Ohio Cas. Grp. of Ins. Cos., 208 N.J. Super. 40, 47 (App. Div. 1986) (“[E]xclusive regulatory jurisdiction of insurance companies, at least with respect to the payment of claims, is within the Department of Insurance.
[brief] ”  Id. at 205.  If so, joint representation is permitted “even if the positions may appear to be somewhat potentially conflicting. ”  Ibid.  The Court was further clear that “[j]oint representation will not automatically be prohibited due to an apparent divergence of interests on the face of the complaint. ”  Ibid.  The Court noted its ruling reflected the disfavor of *per se* rules governing conflicts of interest and that “[o]nly in the most sensitive circumstances ha[s the Court] imposed a *per se* rule of disqualification for potential conflicts of interest. ”  Id. at 206 n.3 (noting driver-passenger, husband-wife, and parent-child as only basis for *per se* conflict).  Whether an attorney could undertake joint representation “is best addressed by an evaluation by the individual attorney of the circumstances of each case. ”  *Id.* at 206.  The attorney must be satisfied that it is objectively reasonable that there is no direct adversity between the clients and that the joint representation would not materially limit the attorney’s responsibilities to each client.  *Ibid.*  The Court then observed that a blanket *per se* rule “would encourage plaintiffs to name numerous officials solely to improve their bargaining position with the government defendant by forcing defendants to engage separate independent counsel. ”  *Id.* at 207.  The “dispensation of justice” would be undermined by a *per se* rule that would bludgeon the defendants “into settling for reasons wholly unrelated to the merits of any liability claim. ”  *Ibid.*  Ultimately, if a conflict does arise in the joint representation during the case, the Court explained the attorney must bring it to the court’s attention, and it must be satisfactorily resolved on the record, which will encourage attorneys “to act reasonably and responsibly, the essential interests of clients will be protected, and the interests of justice will be secured. ”  *Id.* at 208.  The holding of *Opinion 552* is certainly not limited to § 1983 claims.  It applies more broadly.  See, e.g., *Hill v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corr. Com’r Fauver*, 342 N.J. Super. 273, 309 (App. Div. 2001) (applying decision to CEPA litigation), certif. denied, 171 N.J. 338 (2002); *ACPE Opinion 605*, 120 N.J.L.J. 317 (Aug. 13, 1987) (applying decision to multi-party environmental litigation involving both private and public co-defendants); ACPE Opinion 588, 118 N.J.L.J. 94 (July 24, 1986) (applying decision to environmental litigation).  Contrary to [...]’s position, “it is well established that an evaluation of whether a conflict exists in multiple representation cases is initially best addressed by the attorney or attorneys in each case,” G.S., 447 N.J. Super. at 579 (citing Opinion 552, 447 N.J. at 206; State v. Bell, 90 N.J. 163, 173-74 (1982)), not to the attorney’s adversary like [...].
[directive] 9 9 9 Yes No Unk or by escapee or parole absconder (add 12 months).  (See Feature E)  Defendant has violated a Drug Offender Restraining Order (add 3 to 9 months).  (See 9 9 9 Yes No Unk Feature F)  Offense involved 2C:35-7 while on school property.  (Mandatory minimum of 3 years unless 9 9 9 Yes No Unk less than 1 oz. of marijuana, or add 1 year if Extended Term).  (See Feature G)  Offense occurred on school property and involved 2C:35-6 (add 12 months) or involved 1st 9 9 9 Yes No Unk degree offense under 2C:35-5 (add 18 months).  (See Feature G)  Offense involved distribution to a minor or pregnant female (double the plea offer).  (See 9 9 9 Yes No Unk Feature H)  Offense occurred in a correctional facility or drug treatment facility or involved distribution 9 9 9 Yes No Unk to person entering or leaving a drug treatment facility (add 6 months).  (See Feature I)  9 9 9  Defendant is subject to Anti-Drug Profiteering Penalty.  (See Feature J)  Yes No Unk 9 9  Downward departure for trial proof issues? Yes No Extent of Reduction  Approval is required if adjustment is greater than 6 months (4th degree), 9 months (3rd degree), 12 months (2nd degree) or 24 months (1st degree).
[brief] We consider that the phrase ‘arising out of’ must be interpreted in a broad and comprehensive sense to mean ‘originating from’ or ‘growing out of’ the use of the automobile.  So interpreted, there need be shown only a substantial nexus between the injury and the use of the vehicle in order for the obligation to provide coverage to arise.  The inquiry should be whether the negligent act which caused the injury, although not foreseen or expected, was in the contemplation of the parties to the insurance contract a natural and reasonable incident or consequence of the use of the automobile, and thus a risk against which they might reasonably expect those insured under the policy would be protected.  See 7 Am.Jur.2d, s 82 at 387 (1963).  Whether the requisite connection or degree of relationship exists depends upon the circumstances of the particular case.  Westchester, supra. at Page 37-38.  A PIP carrier is not responsible for medical payments when an automobile is incidental to the injury claimed.  It is established that PIP coverage is not afforded to a person whose injury or death resulted from a condition unrelated to the motor vehicle, despite the fact that the person was inside the motor vehicle when the incident occurred.  In Kordell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 230 N.J. Super. 505, 509 (App. Div.), certify. Den. 117 N.J. 43 (1989), the Court held:
[brief] ”  *Id.* (emphasis added) (quoting *In re Resolution of State* Com. of Investigation, 108 N.J. 35, 41 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Indeed, “the primary goal in determining whether a statute implies a right of action has almost invariably been a search for the underlying legislative intent. ”  Veras, No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176, at *24 (quoting R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat’l Consumer Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 255, 272-73 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  With respect to the legislative intent of the NJCFLA, the NJCFLA’s intended mechanisms of enforcement, and the history of the same, the Court must certainly consider the NJCFLA’s predecessors, discussed supra, for context.  Despite the above, the court in Veras failed to analyze the statutory/legislative history or the legislative intent of the NJCFLA.
[brief] Second, while Appellant also contends that the letter fails to fully explain the potential consequences of a partial payment on the debt, the Superior Court took pains to explain why this is not the case.  For while the letter’s time-barred debt disclosure states that Respondent would not sue to enforce the debt because of its age, it also “accurately conveys that there are circumstances in which a payment or written promise to pay can renew the debt and restart the time period for the filing of a lawsuit.
[brief] **[...] Co-Managed [...] and [...]’s Finances**  [...] participated in all material aspects of [...] and [...]’s operations (including their affiliate entities) and approved of all significant transactions reflected on the company’s accounting records, including the Disputed Transactions that are the subject of this appeal.  16T:136-21 to 137-3; 17T26-6 to 27-2, 55-14 to -21, 71-3 to 91-22; 24T46-7 to 48-20; 25T25-9 to -3; Da02994, Da02865 – Da 02878, Da02900 – Da02912, Da02994, Da02994 – Da02997, Da03021 – Da03023, Da03054 – Da03058, Da07299 – Da07305.  Of note, [...] regularly reviewed reports generated from [...]’s QuickBooks, including balance sheets and profit and loss statements, which he retained for his personal records.  16T27-7 to 29-22; 17T39-11 to 51-18; Da02998 – Da03020, Da03025 to Da03029, Da03054 – Da03058.  On behalf of [...], [...] and [...] jointly made financial decisions and effected financial transactions, which [...] certified under penalty of perjury to in connection with [...]’s MBE and DBE applications.
[directive] iii.  The defendant must confirm that by residing at the address provided to the court, the defendant will not be in violation of any court ordered Temporary or Final Restraining Order, any Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCP&P) orders/agreements, a court order barring contact with any person or persons at that residence, any other court order, or any other agreements/orders entered into by the defendant with agencies which forbids or limits his contact with any person or persons at that residence.  iv.