ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Prosecutor Did Not Improperly Bolster the Credibility of its Key Witness During Summation.  Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly bolstered [...]’s testimony by commenting on the truthfulness of his statements.  (Db30 to 31; 5T;110-8 to 111-1).  As argued above, these statements were made in response to defense counsel’s sustained attacks on [...]’s credibility during trial and summation and were therefore harmless.  (See 2T:125-10 to 132-20 and 5T:77-3 to 79-3; Engel, 249 N.J. Super. at 379; see also State v. Di Paglia, 64 N.J. 288, 297 (1974)(finding that a prosecutor’s comments may be harmless if they are only a response to remarks by opposing counsel)).  Any potential prejudice to defendant was minimized by the trial court’s post-summation instruction that comments by counsel were “not controlling” and “summations . . . are not evidence and must not be treated as evidence. ” (5T:121-1 to 14).  Further, the prosecutor properly encouraged the jury to “[j]udge [[...]’s] credibility” for themselves by considering his attitude and potential motivations for testifying.  (5T:109-11 to 14).  D.
[brief] The DOJ issued this letter per appellant’s request, after the trial court disposed of his case on October 20, 2023.  Appellant obtained this letter from the DOJ for the trial judge, before whom the appellant’s R. 4:49-2 Motion To Alter Amend Judgment and R. 4:12-2 Motion For Recusal were pending.  This DOJ letter was intended to clarify material misunderstandings of the trial judge that (1) his court (the local courts) had jurisdiction over the matter and (2) the following statements certified to him by the respondents ([...]) via their October 02, 2023 Motion To Dismiss were misrepresentations: “this case is currently pending with HUD and there has been no final determination made by that department” (Pa68 –Pa71).
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Appellant shall rely on the procedural history incorporated in his counseled brief.  STATEMENT OF FACTS  Appellant shall rely on the statement of facts incorporated in his counseled brief.  1T – motion dated 6/28/21 2T – motion dated 7/13/21 3T – motion dated 7/14/21 4T – motion dated 7/26/21 5T – jury selection dated 7/28/21 6T – jury selection dated 7/29/21 7T – jury selection dated 7/30/21 8T – jury selection dated 8/2/21 9T – jury selection dated 8/4/21 10T – trial dated 8/5/21 11T – trial dated 8/6/21 12T – trial dated 8/9/21 13T – trial dated 8/10/21 14T – trial dated 8/11/21 15T – trial dated 8/12/21 16T – trial dated 8/13/21 17T – trial dated 2/10/22 18T – sentencing dated 2/17/22
[brief] INDEX TO APPENDIX (submitted under separate cover)  Ocean County Indictment No. [...] ........................................Da1-9  Ocean County Indictment No. [...] ........................................Da10-22  Order Severing [...] from Codefendants .......................................Da23  Ocean County Indictment No. [...] ........................................Da24-27 Verdict Sheet, Ind. No. [...]......................................................Da28-29  Judgment of Conviction, Ind. No. [...], [...] ........................................................................Da30-33 Notice of Appeal, [...].....................................................................Da34-37 Notice of Motion for a New Trial ............................................................Da38-44
[brief] [...]’s Standing for Declaratory Relief & Mootness (Not Addressed Below)  The State, and [...] to some degree, argue the case is moot because [...] eventually received the PTI.  The plaintiff eventually got what he wanted but, in the meanwhile, he was deprived of civil rights or discriminated against.  Standing is so liberal in NJ, all I could find was a case in which the voting referendum committee was continually refused a place on the ballot by the municipal clerk.  See Trumpson v. Farina 218 N.J. 450, 95 A.3d 210 (NJ 2014) (Issue of deprivation of rights was still valid as to determination of attorney’s fees under CRA; found there was a deprivation and ordered fees be calculated) which cited Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Roofing, Inc., 108 N.J. 59, 64, 527 A.2d 864 (1987) (Moot due to settlement, attorney’s fees still “live” and relevant).
[brief] The fact that the supplemental plea form states that the parties have agreed to provide “for a lesser sentence or period of parole ineligibility than would otherwise be required” changes nothing.  (Da 23)  The State here appropriately followed Attorney General Directive No. 2021-4, which bars the State from seeking a mandatory minimum sentence for certain non-violent drug offenses.  Thus, this supplemental form must necessarily refer to the State’s decision to recommend a flat sentence rather than one with a mandatory minimum, pursuant to the Directive.  This interpretation of the supplemental form — that it is referring to the flat sentence rather than the ordinary term – is demonstrated by: (1) the fact that the plea forms state that [...]’s maximum exposure is 10 years; (2) the fact that the plea forms state that [...] is not eligible for a mandatory extended term; and (3) the fact that the prosecutor made no mention at the plea hearing that [...] was mandatory extended term eligible or that its recommendation of a ten-year sentence was made pursuant to Section 12, as would be required if the State wanted to avail itself of that provision.
[directive] Any questions regarding procedures under the Act should be directed to your County Prosecutor’s Office.  Inquiries from County Prosecutor’s Offices should be directed to DAG [...], Prosecutors and Police Bureau, at [...].  enclosures (3)  c: [...], First Assistant Attorney General, Director, Division of Criminal Justice [...], First Deputy Director  All County Prosecutors Superintendent [...], New Jersey State Police AAG [...]  DAG [...], Acting Chief, Prosecutors and Police Bureau
[brief] According to the documents Plaintiff submitted, Plaintiff claims that Defendant made purchases in two separate accounts (Exhibit HH) (Da125).  Thus, Plaintiff’s billing actions as well as the amount of Defendant’s default ($21,432.55) are irregular, questionable and suspect.  Such account number discrepancies and double-billing for the period of April 27, 2017 to May 27, 2017 raise the issues of whether Defendant was properly billed, whether Plaintiff is alleging the correct amount in default and whether Plaintiff billed the correct account number.  Because the lower Court permitted Plaintiff to claim an alleged default in a void  Complaint based on irregular, questionable and suspect accounts, Defendant was denied due process.
[brief] See Johnson v. Glassman, 401 N.J. Super. 222, 229 (App. Div. 2008) (addressing pre-suit demand issue in the derivative suit context).  The trial court found that the defendants were not opening their books and saying to the Plaintiffs and the Court “we have nothing to hide;” rather, they fought “tooth and nail” against Plaintiffs’ efforts obtain their books and records.  (36T 15:23 to 17:6; 37T 75:22 to 76:3).  As a result of the defendants’ intransigence, the Plaintiffs were prevented from determining with particularity before the lawsuit the precise amount owed to them.  It would be inequitable for the defendants to defeat a conversion claim by refusing to turn over the information Plaintiffs needed to ascertain the precise amount of their demand.  B.
[brief] *A.S.*, 203 N.J. at 146 (quoting *State v. Presha*, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000); *State v. Miller*, 76 N.J. 392, 402 (1978)); *Nyhammer*, 197 N.J. at 402; *State v. Carpenter*, 268 N.J. Super. 378, 385 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 467 (1994).  Waiver of one’s *Miranda* rights is, of course, revocable.
[brief] Accordingly, plaintiffs’ appeal should be granted reversing the decision of the trial court below.  ---  \(^2\)  Revised lot grades which include mounding, terracing, or other devices with no building(s) atop such mounding, terracing, or other devices DO NOT allow increased building height and are often used for landscaping purposes.  Moreover, not all revised lot grades include mounding, terracing, or other devices and such revised lot grade may in fact reduce the original lot grade.  POINT III
[brief] This argument has been repeatedly rejected by the New Jersey Supreme Court and this Court.  Flanzman, supra; Skuse, supra; Kernahan, supra; Drosos, supra; Aguirre v. CDL Last Mile Solutions, LLC, 2024 WL 762467 (App. Div. 2024) (Pa 1), cert. den 257 N.J. 589 (2024).  Atalese itself rejected the FAA argument.
[directive] To conserve laboratory resources, in all cases - including those involving juveniles who are not detained - where the case is resolved prior to the completion of requested forensic testing, the Assistant Prosecutor shall within 24 hours of the resolution notify the Office of Forensic Science or other laboratory if no further testing is needed, or if testing is no longer needed on an expedited basis.  I.  In any case where a citizen seeks to file a formal complaint against a Citizen’s Complaint. juvenile, law enforcement should review the charge(s) for probable cause.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 569-71.  Likewise in *Miller*, the Court noted that the juvenile had “learned on the way” to participating in the fatal robbery “that his friend [...] was carrying a gun[.]”  567 U.S. at 478.  The juvenile thus did not act spontaneously, but consciously chose to participate in a planned armed robbery.  Nonetheless, the Court recognized that his immaturity made him less culpable: “age could well have affected his calculation of the risk that posed, as well as his willingness to walk away at that point. ”  *Ibid.*  The recognition that juveniles lack the capacity to “appreciate risks and consequences” thus does not mean that juveniles are incapable of deciding to undertake certain acts in the near future (i.e. to make a plan).  *Comer*, 249 N.J. at 270.  Rather, juveniles are simply bad at planning.  *Miller*, 567 U.S. at 472, n. 5.  (“It is increasingly clear that adolescent brains are not yet fully mature in regions and systems related to higher-order executive functions such as impulse control, planning ahead, and risk avoidance”) (emphasis added).  The original sentencing court’s finding bears this out: “[t]he Court has taken into consideration this was a planned burglary…they went in there, obviously, to commit a burglary, but a homicide ensued and the defendant, this defendant, did not leave. ”  (2T95-3 to 8)  [...]’s finding – that [...]’s immaturity should not be considered in mitigation because the burglary was planned – was thus erroneous in that it “contravene[d] Graham's [and] Roper'[s] foundational principle: that imposition of a State's most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children. ”  Miller, 567 U.S. at 474.
[directive] The Panel shall review and provide recommendations concerning the specifications and characteristics of CEDs that may be deployed and used pursuant to this policy.  Those specifications will include the following requirements: (a) the device must be capable of making a date- and time-stamped digital record of each occurrence when the darts/electrodes are fired, and of each occurrence when an electrical current is discharged; (b) the device must be capable of making a digital video recording of each such firing and electrical discharge, where the focus of the internal camera is centered on the person against whom the CED was targeted, except that an agency is authorized to purchase and deploy an approved CED that does not have the capability of making a digital video recording provided that such device may only be carried and used by an officer who is equipped with a BWC as defined in Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2015-1, and further provided that, notwithstanding any other provision of this policy, such device shall not be fired or discharged during an actual operation unless the officer has activated the body worn camera.  Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude the officer from firing or discharging the device in the event that the officer’s body worn camera malfunctions, or if the exigency of the situation made it unsafe or infeasible for the officer to activate the body worn camera before firing the device; and (c) the device must safeguard all such digital data and video recordings to ensure that they can be accessed or erased only by appropriate supervisory personnel in accordance with rules, regulations, standing operating procedures or orders promulgated pursuant to this policy.  9.2  No law enforcement agency shall purchase, possess, deploy, fire, or discharge any CED pursuant to this policy unless the device has been approved by the Attorney General.
[brief] The majority of discovery presented by Plaintiff, in an attempt to prove constructive notice, arose out of documents produced concerning a wholesale re-pavement of [...] Avenue, which was conceived in 2018 (the “[...] Roadway Project”).  This project clearly was done for and to inure to a public benefit.  This incident took place in 2020 and the pothole which allegedly caused Plaintiff’s fall was re-paved pursuant to that project in 2021.  Plaintiff argued that survey photographs taken by town engineers [...], as well as due diligence inspections performed during the conception and execution of the [...] Roadway Project were sufficient to place the [...] ("[...]") on notice of the pothole which allegedly caused Plaintiff’s fall (and, logically, all potholes on or along [...] Avenue).  Plaintiff’s argument, although creative, slaps against both public policy and the very purpose of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.
[brief] The Township asserts that the Appellant has failed to present any substantive issue or argument that the lower court's decision was in error, but instead attempts to present again and anew, its original case brought before the lower court.  The Township asserts that this constitutes a fatal error under the standard of review and fails to show or present an argument as to how the lower court's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  As such, the Appellant's appeal must fail, and the lower court's decision must be upheld.
[brief] Specifically, defendant claims that [...]’s answer why he chased the person running across the street was an inappropriate lay opinion.  Defendant’s claim is without merit.  Indeed, defendant’s claim would effectively preclude officers from ever offering lay opinion testimony and would limit an officer’s testimony to “fact testimony. ”  That is not what N.J.R.E. 701 or State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011), require.  As such, defendant’s claim must fail.
[brief] 2T34-35 (Tr. dated October 12, 2023, pp.34-35), citing, Marrin, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112988, at *15-16 (D.N.J. July 20, 2017) and R.M. v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 190 N.J. 1 (2007)).  Notably, in Marrin, the court stated “[p]laintiff’s deposition testimony [* * * ] actively shows the absence of [any] basis, militating in favor of an award of fees to [d]efendants in this case. ”  Marrin, supra.  Similarly, in Hennigan v. Merck & CO., Inc., 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2151, at *23-26 (App. Div. Sep. 28, 2016), the New Jersey Appellate Division awarded attorneys’ fees to a defendant in a New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”) case.
[brief] **[...]’s [...] provided adequate notice of its terms of use under the evolution of *Wollen* and its progeny. **  This Court has addressed whether hyperlinked website terms presented in a variety of website designs are enforceable, starting with *Wollen v. Gulf Stream Restoration*, 468 N.J. Super. 483 (App. Div. 2021).  “[T]he pertinent inquiry,” as the parties agree, “is whether [plaintiff] was provided with reasonable notice of the applicable terms, based on the design and layout of the website. ”  *Id.* at 496.  *Wollen* did not address whether such notice occurs where (as here) hyperlinked terms appear prominently on the first page of a website’s sign-up process and on every subsequent sign-up page.  Two more recent, unpublished Appellate Division cases build upon *Wollen* to address such circumstances and present applicable guidance.  *See Vercammen v. Linkedin Corp.*, No. A-0188-20, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 110 (App. Div. Jan. 26, 2022); *Racioppi v. Airbnb, Inc.*, No. A-0455-22, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1200 (App. Div. July 17, 2023).  These cases squarely apply here and confirm that the [...] provided Respondents more than adequate notice of the terms and conditions of its use.  Respondents incorrectly argue that *Wollen* controls while *Vercammen* and *Racioppi* are uninstructive.
[brief] By: ________________________________  [...]  Assistant Prosecutor Attorney No. 276692018  By: ________________________________  [...]  Assistant Prosecutor Attorney No. 071792014  Date: August 29, 2024  November 18, 2024  [...] ID. NO. 404802022  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Of Counsel and On the Letter-Brief REDACTED  LETTER-BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
[brief] With respect to this defendant’s claim of a Civil Rights Violation in regard to Procedural Due Process, if we consider the United States Supreme Court case of Armstrong v. Manzo, 85 S. Ct. 1187 it was affirmed:  ‘Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing (a key Underpinning element for this case before this court) appropriate to the nature of the case. ’
[directive] Subsequently, law enforcement agencies, funeral home directors, hospital emergency room personnel, county medical examiners, survivors who applied for death claims benefits through the Violent Crimes Compensation Board, as well as survivors who belong to various self-help groups within the State, were surveyed.  The result of the surveys indicated that there has been significant progress in the area of assisting survivors, but that we have not yet reached full implementation of the guidelines.  Since the original and revised reports are geared toward the law enforcement community and others who have contact with survivors, the Working Group agreed that survivors needed information specifically designed for themselves.  Therefore, the pamphlet entitled "Survivors Rights to Information and Property"was developed.  The Working Group also became sensitized to the issue of organ donations/transplants and the positive effect that making an anatomical gift can have on the surviving family members.  Therefore, a section was included in this report along with a resource list of the organ donations/transplant programs in the New Jersey area.  As a part of a public awareness effort, selected members of the Working Group served on a panel which was videotaped for the Health Information Network (HIN) on February 19, 1986.  The Health Information Network production entitled "Sudden Death Survivors" is another means of dissemination of the guidelines to doctors and nurses throughout the State by way of satellite TV.  The Working Group, through these Revised Homicide and Sudden Death Survivor Guidelines, has attempted to include all pertinent information regarding recent legislation that applies to survivors as well as every other crime victim.  II.
[brief] Db42  B.  Plaintiff did not comply with 45-day notice requirement.  Db46  C.  Cardholder Agreement violates TILA because it is “confusing” and not in logical sequence.  Db47  XI.  THE LOWER COURT MADE A MISTAKE IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT UNDER FBCA (Raised Below: Da15 and Da16)
[brief] For the incident of August 17, 2019, [...] was charged with N.J.A.C. 4A:2A-2.3(a)(6) “conduct unbecoming a public employee,” N.J.A.C. 4A:2A-2.3(a)(12) “other sufficient causes,” HRB 84-17, Section C8 “falsification: Intentional misstatement of material fact in connection with work, employment application, attendance, or in any record, report, investigation, or other proceeding,” HRB 84-17, Section C11 “conduct unbecoming of an employee,” HRB 84-17, Section C24 “threatening, intimidating, harassing, coercing or interfering with fellow employees on State [sic] Property” and HRB 84-17, Section E1, “violation of a rule, regulation, policy, procedure, order, or administrative decision.
[brief] [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], and [...], [...], and JOHN AND/OR JANE DOES 1-20 (Names Being Fictitious), in their individual and corporate capacities, and as aiders and abettors, Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  APPELLATE  DOCKET NO: [...]  DOCKET NO. BELOW: [...] SAT BELOW: Hon. [...], J.S.C. LAW DIVISION – CUMBERLAND COUNTY
[brief] Expert testimony can be adduced at a jury trial that will negate the requirement of an Affidavit of Merit in the matters at the bar, - the basis for the summary judgment order issued on January 7, 2010.  If the testimony was tried to be fact, then no Affidavit of Merit would be required as there would be no allegation of negligence, - i.e. the fact would have been proven.  As a result, the court is in error for dismissing a claim sounding in malpractice when evidence of the fact can be adduced at trial.  Further, the discovery rule via Szczuwelek v. Harborside Healthcare, 182 N.J. 275 reads in pertinent part as follows:
[brief] Defendant [...] is Board-Certified in the subspecialty of Pulmonary Medicine.  There is no separate Board of Pulmonary Medicine.  Rather, Pulmonary Medicine is a subspecialty of Internal Medicine., [...] does not practice Pulmonology.  However, this is irrelevant because the subject matter of [...]’s treatment of [...] did not involve Pulmonology.  The Plaintiff’s expert [...] is Board Certified in General Surgery and Vascular Surgery.  He is also certified in the subspecialty of Critical Care Medicine, just as [...] is.  This case does not involve General Surgery or Vascular surgery, and thus these specialties are also not involved in this lawsuit.  Rather, this case involves Critical Care medicine, and [...] is Board Certified in Critical Care medicine just as [...] is.  The description of Critical Care Medicine given by the American Board of Surgery as a subspecialty is as follows:
[brief] See State v. Copling, 326 N.J. Super. 417, 441-442 (App. Div. 1999) (holding that “[t]he conviction for unlawful possession [of a firearm] must be served concurrently to the conviction for murder. ”).  Requesting this Court find that the certain persons offense in this case does not meet the criteria for a consecutive sentence is distinct from asking the Court to exercise original jurisdiction and sentence [...] anew.  We recognize that “the exercise of appellate original jurisdiction over sentencing should not occur regularly or routinely; in the face of deficient sentences, a remand to the trial court for resentencing is strongly to be preferred. ”  *State v. Jarbath*, 114 N.J. 394, 411 (1989).  Trial courts are given discretion in choosing a sentence within the statutory range; so long as a trial court “appl[ies] correct legal principles in exercising its discretion” “based upon findings of fact that are grounded in competent, reasonably credible evidence,” appellate courts must “avoid the substitution of appellate judgment for trial court judgment.
[brief] The only admissible facts of record are the deposition testimony of [...] and the discovery responses submitted by the [...] that decedent was given a copy of the agreement.  As for the second point, the Court inappropriately suggests that the Estate had argued, or that the Court provided, analysis to find that the Arbitration Agreement “is not sufficiently clear. ”  The Estate, in any of its briefings or arguments, never argued that the contract was ambiguous.  The testimony of [...] is the only competent evidence in the record and is therefore controlling.