ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This attempt should be rejected.  In analyzing an exclusion nearly identical to the instant matter, the Appellate Division explicitly held that to enforce such an exclusion, the insurer could not merely rely on the allegations in the complaint, but had to prove, among other things, that the insured subjectively intended to cause the complained injury.  *Superior Integrated Sols.*, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2147, at *22.  This Appellate Division made clear the analysis is not limited to allegations in the complaint.  *Id.* at *14 (quoting *SL Indus., Inc.*, 128 N.J. at 198).  “Absent exceptional circumstances that objectively establish the insured's intent to injure, we will look to the insured’s subjective intent to determine intent to injure. ”  *Voorhees*, 128 N.J. at 185.\(^1\)  [...] submitted proof that the alleged conduct did not cause any injury to [...] or his practice.
[brief] Pullen v. S. Plainfield Planning Bd., 291 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div. 1996) (board factual conclusions “are entitled to great weight and like those of an administrative body should not be disturbed unless there is insufficient evidence to support them”); Davis Enterprises v Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 485 (1987).  (Pa1741).  While this could have been the end of the analysis, the Trial Court went on to address six alleged “inconsistencies” which [...] argued existed between the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan and the Borough’s master plan.  The Trial Court rejected all of these arguments, finding that these were not inconsistencies and that they certainly did not cause the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan to not be substantially consistent with the Borough’s master plan.  In reaching this determination, the Trial Court noted that the Appellate Division has recognized that the term “substantially consistent” permits some inconsistency provided that any inconsistency does not materially undermine the fundamental objectives of the master plan.
[brief] A.  STANDARD OF REVIEW OF FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY DECISION  The New Jersey Appellate Division’s standard of review for an administrative agency’s final decision is limited.  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482 (2007).  In conducting the limited review, appellate courts consider: (1)  Whether the agency’s action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is did the agency follow the law; (2) Whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings of which the agency based its action; and (3)  Whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.  Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995).  When reviewing administrative agency decisions, there is a strong presumption of reasonableness to the agency’s exercise of its statutorily delegated duties.  City of Newark v. Natural Resource Council in Dept. of Environmental Protection, 82 N.J. 530, 539 (1980).  The grounds for reversing an administrative agency decision are limited: A court may reverse only if it “conclude[s] that the decision of the administrative agency is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole."  *In re Adoption of Amendments to Water Quality Management Plans*, 435 N.J. Super. 571, 582 (App. Div. 2014), cert. denied, 219 N.J. 627 (2014) (quoting *J.D. v. N.J. Div. of Developmental Disabilities*, 329 N.J. Super. 516, 521 (App. Div. 2000)).  A court cannot vacate an agency determination if it merely doubts the agency’s decision or because the record may support more than one result.  *Id.* at 583.  This deferential standard has been applied to PERC decisions.
[brief] *Rova Farms* is also helpful to explain why both the defendants’ and the trial court’s reliance on R. 4:42-11(b) is misplaced in the context of this action.  [...] argued both here and below (and the trial court incorrectly held) that because conversion is a tort cause of action, Plaintiffs’ right to pre-judgment interest was limited by rule to the later of six months after the cause of action arose or the date the action was instituted.  R. 4:42-11(b).  However, the *Rova Farms* Court explained that rigid application of that Rule created a problem about determining the trigger date for the interest calculation in the context of the excess liability suit at issue in that case.  Critically, the Court explained, “it is unnecessary to resolve the issue since we do not think that compensation should be dependent on what label we place upon an action, but rather on the nature of the injury inflicted upon the plaintiff and the remedies requested by him. ”  *Rova Farms*, 65 N.J. at 504 (emphasis added).
[brief] Furthermore, following the Appellate decision of 6/5/2018 (DA131), Probation unfathomably and inexplicably resorted to posting support charges due on its audits as per the support awards of the FJOD, i.e., $2,458 per week for the period 7/16/1999 through 9/30/2000 (see audits, DA281, DA290, DA294, DA299, and DA304) without benefit of any court order returning the support award to the level originally awarded in the FJOD.  Please recall that the Appellate Remand Order of 1/17/2002 found the trial court’s support award excessive (DA113, line 25 to DA114, lines 1-7), and remanded the issue to the trial court for recalculation of the support award (DA130) and the trial court complied with the Order of 3/25/2004 with a schedule of reduced support payments.  The Appellate Order of 6/5/2018 did not vacate the Remand Order of 1/17/2002.  No court order vacated the Order of 3/25/20004 for the period up to 9/30/2000\(^7\).  No court order was issued requiring the support award to return to the original support award of the FJOD.  Thus, Probation arbitrarily and capriciously re-posted the support awards of the FJOD in its sole discretion without supporting court order - in violation of the Appellate Remand Order of 1/17/2002.  Neither Probation nor the trial Court is permitted to arbitrarily and capriciously disregard an Appellate Court’s Order (Pelow v. Pelow) nor enforce an alternative support award in an arbitrary and capricious manner in its own unauthorized discretion.  In this manner, Probation exceeded its authority under color of law and the trial court erred and abused its judicial discretion in failing to address Probation’s arbitrary and capricious enforcement of court orders.  6.
[brief] On October, 2022, Respondent filed an Answer which contained a one sentence blanket denial.  (Ca203-204).  Due to inadequacy of her initial Answer, Respondent filed an Amended Answer on January 3, 2023.  (Ca201-202).  No defenses were raised in the Amended Answer.  Id.; See N.J.A.C. 6A:28-7.2(a) (Answers before the Commission must “fully and completely advise the parties and the Commission as to the nature of respondent’s defenses for each allegation. ”).  In failing to raise this affirmative defense, Respondent waived it below.
[brief] Also, defendant sits in a slightly hunched over position during portions of the traffic stop.  (2T:59-11 to 59-14).  At times defendant appears hunched, and at other times although his back is still against the seat, he can be seen sticking his stomach out slightly as if to conceal something in his waistband.  Da25 at 2:15.  Defendant began speaking even more quickly and nervously after [...] pointed out that officers saw him “circling the block”, which defeated defendant’s statement that he was “on his way to work” at the time of the stop.  At that point, defendant began fiddling with the vest on his lap and with his waistband area in general, while still hunched over with his arms and hands tight to his body, as if he was hiding something.  (2T:41-16 to 41-23).  Da26 at 2:00-2:35.  Because of this, [...] [...], who was assisting [...] with the stop, ordered defendant out of the vehicle at that time.  (2T:18-24 to 19-8).  Detectives then escorted defendant to the rear of the Jeep, and he continued to hold the vest over his waist area while he walked there.  (2T:19-9 to 19-25).  Once all parties arrived at the rear of the vehicle, [...] noticed that defendant remained tense when given instructions to place his hands on the Jeep.  (2T:20-1 to 20-3).  [...] conducted a pat frisk on defendant.  (2T:20-4 to 20-18).  Defendant then tightened his abdomen and thrust his waist against the rear of the truck, restricting the detective’s ability to conduct the pat frisk.  (2T:20-19 to 21-3).  [...] pulled defendant’s body back towards him and immediately felt the handle of a gun.  (2T:21-4 to 21-8).  Detectives then secured the firearm, a Ruger P95 9mm handgun, from defendant’s person at that time, and placed defendant under arrest.  (2T:21-18 to 21-22).  A search of the vehicle following a K9 sniff revealed approximately 21 grams of C.D.S. crack cocaine located in the driver’s side door panel.  (2T:24-1 to 25-19).  At the conclusion of testimony, the trial court found that the testimony of [...] was credible and reliable.
[brief] Further, an act of legislation may be declared in violation of the Contract Clause if it is unreasonable.  An impairment “is not a reasonable one if the problem sought to be resolved by any impairment of the contract existed at the time the contractual obligation was incurred. ”  *Id.* at 213 (*quoting* Univ. of Haw. Prof’l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F. 3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)).  In this matter, the government is a contracting party, and as such, the Legislature’s judgment is subject to stricter scrutiny than when the legislation only affects private contracts.
[brief] 22T124-12 to 126-16; Da06789.  G.  [...] Failed To Establish Plaintiffs’ Conversion  Claims  Plaintiffs’ accounting expert, [...], provided Plaintiffs accounting and business advice prior to and following the 2014 transactions.  21T148-7 to 153-6; 22T104-23 to 110-12; Da02798 – Da02799, Da03287 – Da03289, Da03290 – Da03455, Da03458 – Da03462, Da03468 – Da03498, Da03501 – Da03563, Da03568 - Da04573.  Interestingly, despite [...]’s testimony that he did not review [...] or [...]’s QuickBooks prior to the 2014 sales, [...] could not say definitively whether or not he had discussions with [...] about the QuickBooks.  22T117-23 to 118-8.  Despite all of this, [...] authored an expert report for [...] (at a discounted rate) criticizing the same transactions and events that he advised [...] on 7 years earlier in 2014 and for several years thereafter.
[brief] However, this is contrary to the facts: [...] was erroneously enrolled in the CCIP for a brief window based on its misrepresentation; [...], [...] and [...] have asserted claims for [...]’s coverage; [...] has expended substantial resources defending such claims; and [...] could potentially be liable for such claims based on [...]’s misrepresentation.  Additionally, [...], [...] and [...] were unaware that [...] had worked at the Project doing anything other than the excluded demolition work.  ([...] Tr., 56:8-12 at TRVa1435; Enrollment Reports at TRVa2649-2669.)  Thus, if [...] is found to have been enrolled at the time of the Accident, the CCIP Policies should be rescinded with regard to [...].
[brief] Consequentially and ultimately, each of Plaintiff’s claims in the Complaint therefore necessarily failed as a matter of law because Plaintiff cannot assert any possible claims which are predicated upon a nonexistent contract and “non-”transaction.  The trial court correctly found that, in the absence of an enforceable contract to purchase the Property, none of Plaintiff’s claims arising out of the failed real estate transaction could be maintained against [...] or [...].  Nothing in the Plaintiff’s appeal identifies any possible error in this determination – and the trial court’s decision is in fact free of error.
[brief] The factual record demonstrates that [...]’s conduct occurred on election day—the day before his request.  Sg191-Sg201.  The timing of Appellant’s request is reasonable given that [...]’s conduct occurred the day before on election day.  There are no facts in the record that identify any connection between Appellant’s request and attempting an unwarranted advantage or benefit.  The [...] and the [...] never identify facts in support of that connection, other than to summarily conclude that Appellant and [...]’s prior negative political relationship supplies the requisite nexus to support a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b).
[brief] After the court denied defendant’s motion and scheduled the next hearing, defendant addressed the court directly, claiming that his attorney refused to submit video evidence of a witness’s inconsistent statements regarding the events.  (1T30-10 to 32-2).  After the court explained that defendant’s attorney may have strategically elected not to submit the video, defendant engaged his attorney and the court in the following exchange:  THE DEFENDANT: You didn’t present him my letter I asked you to give him.  Like, no one’s doing nothing they’re supposed to do here, and I’m supposed to just be quiet and let everyone lie on me, right?  Yeah, right.  It’s not going to happen.  I would like to represent myself from here on out, Your Honor.
[directive] Reporting.  Each law enforcement agency shall publish its first major discipline report in compliance with Section 9.11.2 no later than August 9, 2021, which is 60 days from the date of this Directive.  The first report shall cover those substantiated major disciplines in which a plea agreement was reached or final sanction was imposed from June 15, 2020 to Page 5 December 31, 2020.  In the future, reports corresponding to the substantiated major discipline in a calendar year shall be published no later than January 31 of the following year.  The relevant County Prosecutor shall be responsible for ensuring agencies timely comply with these public disclosure responsibilities.  Agencies shall electronically transmit a copy of each public report—formatted as provided in a revised Appendix L and submitted in a manner prescribed by the Attorney General or their designee—to the relevant County Prosecutor or their designee, as well as to the Executive Director of the Office of Public Integrity & Accountability (OPIA) or their designee.
[brief] The Family Court erred in denying an annulment to the plaintiff on ground of fraud by the defendant (A6; 2T42-43).  Respondent states that the Appellate Division grants “substantial deference to a trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law...."  Resp. Brief at 14.  That is not true regarding conclusions of law, which are reviewed de novo.  With respect to findings of fact, moreover, the appellate court will intervene where the lower court’s determinations are “manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant, and reasonably credible evidence,” Crespo v. Crespo, 395 N.J. Super. 190, 193–94 (App. Div. 2007), Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).
[brief] Cases  Baird v. Am. Med. Optics, 155 N.J. 54, 72 (1998)  ..............................................................................................................4  Capano v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 530 F. Supp. 1254, 1264 (D.N.J. 1982) ..................................................................................13  Caravaggio v. D'Agostini, 166 N.J. 237, 245 (2001)  .........................................................................................................4  Doe v. Emory Univ, 2021 WL 358391, (N.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2021) .............................................................................8 Dougherty v. Drew Univ., 534 F. Supp. 3d 363, ....................................................................................................................9, 11 Gourdine v. Felician Coll., A-5248-04T3, 2006 WL 2346278, (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 15, 2006) ...............................................................................10, 11 Mitelberg v. Stevens Inst. of Tech., No. CV211043SDWMAH, 2021 WL 2103265, at *1 (D.N.J. May 25, 2021) ...........................................................................................................11 Mittra v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey, 316 N.J. Super. 83 (App. Div. 1998 ..........................................................................................9, 11 Romeo v. Seton Hall Univ., 378 N.J. Super. 384, 395 (App. Div. 2005) ..............................................................................9, 10 Samatula v. Piechota, 142 N.J.Eq. 320, 323, (Ch.1948) ...............................................................................................13 Trustees of Columbia University v. Jacobsen, 53 N.J. Super. 574, (App. Div. 1959)
[brief] JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT  DA195  ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT, [...]’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT, FILED JULY 25, 2023  DA201  ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART  PLAINTIFF’S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT, FILED JULY 25, 2023 DA202 ORDER CLARIFYING JULY 25, 2023  ORDER AND DISMISSING MATTER, FILED AUGUST 14, 2023 DA204 | CASES | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---| | Abbot v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269 (1985) | 40| | Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) | 14| | Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park, 241 N.J. 595 (2020) | 16, 18, 27, 29, 33| | Bd. of Educ. of Upper Freehold Reg’l Sch. Dist. v. State Health Benefits Comm’n, 314 N.J. Super. 486 (App. Div. 1998) | 30| | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 13, 14, 18, | | Cardinale v. Board of Trustees, 458 N.J. Super. 260 (App. Div. 2019) | 21, 22, 23, 27| | Carr v. Borough of Glen Ridge, A-1124-20, 2022 WL 38864 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. January 5, 2022) (unpub.) | 23, 26, 27| | Celanese Ltd. v. Essex County Improvement Authority, 404 N.J. Super. 514 (App. Div. 2009) | 13| | Chasin v. Montclair State Univ., 159 N.J. 418 (1999) | 30| | Chopper Express, Inc. v. Department of Insurance, 293 N.J. Super. 536 (App. Div. 1996) | 30| | County of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80 (1998) | 37| | Coyle v. Englander’s, 199 N.J. Super. 212 (App. Div. 1985) | 15| DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 (2005)
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[brief] On or about July 20, 2020, a demand for med-pay arbitration was filed by [...] seeking recovery of $3,096.65 on behalf of [...] as a result of an automobile collision that reportedly occurred in New Jersey on October 25, 2019.  The demand was subsequently amended to increase the amount sought to $8,115.84.  This arbitration was assigned [...] (Da123-Da129).  3.  On December 22, 2021 the assigned arbitrator denied [...]’s affirmative defense that New Jersey law prohibits [...]’s Med-Pay subrogation claim and as a result, the dispute was outside the scope of the Agreement.  A full arbitration hearing was held on July 19, 2022, and by decision published July 23, 2022, the arbitrator found in favor of [...].  The arbitrator simply found that the [...] insured was fully responsible for the underlying loss.  As a result, the arbitrator directed [...] to reimburse [...] the $8,115.84 demanded (Da123-Da129).  4.
[brief] ([...]’s Deed] Da264-65.  This is precisely represented on the street map, e.g., 100ft (Lot 25) + 27ft (Lot 24) + 57.32ft (Lot 22) = 184.31 ft.  See Pa11 and [...] at Pa92.  The Deed then indicates that the metes and bounds of [...]’s Property creates a square around both Lots 20 and 19.
[brief] (2T:12-3 to 13-16).  [...] denied defendant’s application for PCR, stating that he found defendant’s guilty plea and waiver of counsel to be sufficient:  In this case, it is a novel argument and I respect -- (inaudible) – [...] that the indication of an AIR reading of .17 is of such critical importance to a decision whether to plead guilty or not that if – that – That is of such critical importance that if, that is not – that if the defendant is not aware of that critical importance or the effect that it might have both as to a guilty plea or subsequent sentencing considerations, that he could not – he, the defendant, the unrepresented or un-counseled defendant could not possibly provide a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of counsel.  Unfortunately, there is no State precedent that provides for that exception to the Laurick rule.  I’m not prepared to make an exception in this matter.  In the Court’s mind, there were sufficient, at least three opportunities, to secure either private counsel or – and there was acknowledge availability to apply for the public defender even up to the day that the -- that the plea was taken.  (2T:27-13 to 28-11) (emphasis added).  Defendant then addressed the motion to vacate his plea, arguing that the factual basis was insufficient, as defendant never acknowledged that his BAC was .17.  (2T:16-20 to 22-13).  However, [...] also denied that motion, stating:  In the papers that have been submitted, while there is an indication by the Court that the Court was going to sentence at a .17 reading supplied by the AIR, there is – the only response indicated on the transcript is an inaudible response, which does not mean that there was no response.  It unfortunately just was not transcribed.  I do not find that the circumstances arise to the level of appropriate vacation of the plea merely for that argument and the lack of enforceable precedent with which to grant that relief.  So I’m going to deny the motion to vacate as well.  (2T:29-17 to 30-3).  On February 13, 2023, defendant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Law Division.