ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Respondents’ primary argument in reply to the Constitutional infirmities of its current position is that the original policy has been “in place ‘uneventfully’ for four years without any suggestion that Appellants were in fact violating parents’ federal constitutional rights throughout that long period. ”  Pb30.  First, four years is not a “long period. ”  Secondly, a constitutional violation cannot be permitted to continue simply because it occurred “uneventfully for four years. ”  Surely, that is not the test for constitutionality.  The State further attempts to identify this as a “new federal substantive due process right” or a “new liberty interest.
[brief] Plaintiff [...]  (“Plaintiff”) or (“[...]”), motivated by its desire to exclude a competitor and maintain an economic advantage in the Beachfront South Sector of the Redevelopment Area, and upset that defendant [...] (the “City”) has allowed defendant [...] (“[...]”) to build a slightly taller building with more units than Plaintiff, has filed an “everything but the kitchen sink” complaint challenging the City’s adoption of amendments to the Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan (the “Amended Redevelopment Plan”) and in entering into a redevelopment agreement with [...] (the “Redevelopment Agreement”).  The trial court evaluated the numerous arguments asserted by Plaintiff and correctly found that none of them has any merit and entered summary judgment in favor of [...] and the City.  The Appellate Division, applying a de novo standard of review, while granting substantial deference to the City’s actions, should affirm in all respects.
[brief] See Neuwirth, 476 N.J. Super. at 390; Newton, 2014 WL 3928500, at *4 (“allegations “[t]hat an editor or reporter ‘should have known’ or ‘should have doubted [the] accuracy’ of an article before publishing it is insufficient to show reckless disregard for the truth. ”) (quoting Durando, 209 N.J. at 251–52)).  In fact, [...]’s own Complaint indicates the [...] had every reason to believe [...], the admitted source for their statements.  See Da_017.  It describes [...] as a highly respected public figure who, among other things, was “named by [...] to the President’s Council on Fitness, Sports, and Nutrition in 2017,” has “authored three books,” is “the subject of two biographies,” and who has a “role model Barbie[]” modeled after her.  Da_004-5.
[brief] All of the evidence supported a reasonable factfinder’s determination as to the amount of the damages.  Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for remittitur is DENIED.  [Da258; Da259]  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorably to plaintiff, there is no reason to disturb the amount of the jury’s verdict because this award does not shock the judicial conscience.  Defendants are not entitled to remittitur.  Defendants’ motion should be denied.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] C.  In counties where offenders may be released from custody by the municipal court judge, the county correctional facility will activate NJ VINE when an offender is released to the municipal court.  The system will notify the victim that the offender was released from the county correctional facility to the municipal court and that the offender may be released into the community.  In these counties, procedures for informing NJ VINE of an offender’s custody status following a municipal court appearance will be promulgated by the County Prosecutors.  D.  The county correctional facility will activate NJ VINE when an offender is transferred from a county correctional facility to a state prison.  NJ VINE will notify the victims of the transfer and advise as to whether they need to re-register with NJ VINE.  4.
[brief] (Aa2).  The SuSI program is multifaceted, but includes both an Administratively Determined Incentive (“ADI”) program meant for relatively smaller solar generation facilities and a Competitive Solar Incentive (“CSI”) program, which is intended for larger, “grid supply” solar generation projects.  Ibid.  --- \(^4\)  Net metered facilities are solar facilities that provide energy to the customer site.  [...] filed its petition with the Board on February 16, 2021, proposing a 22.5 megawatt (“MW”) grid supply floating solar project and requesting a TREC factor of 1.0.
[brief] CIVIL ACTION  On Appeal from the Final Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division  Docket No. [...] SAT BELOW: Hon. [...], A.J.S.C. BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], AND [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  December 13, 2023  [...], individually and in his official capacity as Committeeperson, [...], individually and in his official capacity as Committeeperson, [...], individually and in her official capacity as Committeeperson, [...], [...] d/b/a [...], and [...] 1-5 (fictitious entities including public entities) and [...] 1-5 (fictitious individuals), Defendants-Respondents.  Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], ESQ.  Attorney ID: 36471984  [...]  On the Brief: [...], ESQ.  Attorney ID: 336072021 [...] TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................ ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................. v TABLE OF APPENDIX ...................................................................................................... viii PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ......................................................................................... 1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................................................................................... 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................. 4 The Township’s Declaratory Judgment Action ............................................................. 4 The Fairness Hearings .................................................................................................... 5 [...] Concludes the [...] Litigation and Finds the Property in Question to be an Area in Need of Redevelopment .............................................................................................................. 5 The Redevelopment Plan Anticipates a Tax Exemption .............................................. 6 The Redevelopment Agreements Permit Lennar to Terminate the Agreement if a Tax Exemption is Not Granted .......................................................... 7 Lennar and Other Intervenors File Suit Against [...], Seeking Sewer Service at a Reasonable Cost .................................................................................. 8 Lennar Receives Site Plan Approval ............................................................................. 8 Lennar’s Application for a Tax Exemption ................................................................... 9 The Hopewell Township Committee Introduces an Ordinance to Approve a Financial Agreement with the Redeveloper .........................................................
[brief] Plaintiff’s CEPA Claim is Analyzed Under the McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework.  When employment cases, such as CEPA claims, rely on circumstantial evidence, this Court applies the McDonnell Douglas three-part burden-shifting test.  See Massarano v. N.J. Transit, 400 N.J. Super. 474, 492 (App. Div. 2008).  This test, established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and adopted by New Jersey courts in CEPA cases, provides a structured method for determining whether an employer’s action was motivated by retaliatory intent.  It operates in three stages: (1) the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case; (2) the defendant must articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action; and (3) the plaintiff must ultimately demonstrate that the reason given by the defendant is pretextual.  See Kolb, supra., 360 N.J. Super. at 478.  Plaintiff’s evidentiary burden at the prima facie stage is low, which acknowledges that requiring greater proof would prevent a plaintiff from accessing the tools – evidence of the employer’s motivation – necessary to even begin to assemble a case.  See Zive v. Stanley Roberts, 182 N.J. 436, 448 (2005).  “The prima facie case is to be evaluated solely on the basis of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, irrespective of defendants’ efforts to dispute that evidence. ”  See Zive, 182 N.J. at 448.  The matter then moves to the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis when the burden shifts to Defendants to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its action.  Id.  If Defendants satisfy that burden, then in the third stage the burden of production shifts back to Plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason articulated by Defendants is merely a pretext for discrimination or retaliation and not the true reason for the employment decision.  Id.  On the last prong of pretext, Plaintiff does not need to provide direct evidence.  Instead, a plaintiff proves retaliation by demonstrating “such weaknesses, implausibilities, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable fact-finder could rationally find them unworthy of credence” and is a pretext for discrimination.  See DeWees v. RCN Corp., 380 N.J. Super. 511, 528 (App. Div. 2005); see also Greenberg v. Camden County, 310 N.J. Super. 189 (App. Div. 1998) (evidence that employer who failed to hire a teacher was “not providing the whole story” and whose words were contradicted by its acts was sufficient to require reversal of summary judgment).  In response to a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff need not meet the ultimate burden of persuasion but must only cast such serious doubt on the veracity of the employer’s articulated legitimate reason as to allow a jury to reasonably conclude that the employer was motivated to act for the retaliatory reason alleged by plaintiff.  See Kelly v. Bally's Grand, Inc., 285 N.J. Super. 422, 432 (App. Div. 1995).  There are no “exclusive ways to show causation, as the proffered evidence, looked at as a whole, may suffice to raise the inference. ”  Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997).  B.
[brief] \(^9\)  Id.  Emphasis added.  newly created American states.  In New Jersey, the Doctrine was officially enshrined in the common law by the Supreme Court’s 1821 decision in Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).  The courts of our State have since affirmed and expanded the Doctrine's application.  The Doctrine, which originally protected the public's right of access to tidal waters and shorelines for fishing, navigation and commerce, has been expanded to protect recreational uses and to require equal access to municipally owned beaches and restroom facilities by residents and non-residents alike.
[brief] \footnote{In conflict with the governing law, Defendants argue on appeal that the parties could not have entered into a new loan agreement because “no new money was allegedly loaned by Plaintiff to Defendants in this so-called ‘Third Loan.  . . .”  Db 17.  Defendant also only generally references “the evidence and testimony} B.  The Trial Court Correctly Found That The New, Third Loan Was A Novation Of The First and Second Loans.
[brief] The trial court had already determined that the first prong of the builder’s remedy—that [...] was not in constitutional compliance—was met.  Nor does [...] suggest that Plaintiff’s project would not create “substantial” housing for lower-income individuals as required by the second prong.  [...] instead states that the trial court did not make an express finding as to the site suitability according to the third prong of the builder’s remedy test.  The trial court was not required to have a plenary hearing or mini-trial to find that there was a likelihood of success here.  Mount Laurel II is clear that “a builder’s remedy should be granted unless the municipality establishes that because of environmental or other substantial planning concerns, the plaintiff’s proposed project is clearly contrary to sound land use planning.
[brief] Page  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ...........................................  ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................  iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..............................................................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................  2 POINT I THE GLOBAL FEE APPLICATION AND THE CHANCERY COURT’S REVIEW OF IT WERE LEGALLY DEFICIENT (Da3-233; 1T68-72)  ........................................................................................................  2  POINT II  THE JUDGMENT IS AN UNNECESSARY DUPLICATIVE SANCTION (Da7-9, ¶¶5,7; Da20, ¶55; Da177; 1T68-72) .............................................  15 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................  15
[brief] For example:  •  The refusal to mask that is the subject of Count 3 took place on January 20, 2022.  (Ca200-201).  •  On January 10, 2022, only ten days prior, Respondent made a public post from her Facebook account calling [...] a “Tyrannical POS” for enacting New Jersey’s School Mask Mandate, and specifically telling members of the community that they could either oppose the Mask Mandate or “bend and repeat. ”  (Ca201).  Respondent demands, in the same post, that parents must “remember your rights and start to stand for them and your children. ”  Respondent cannot be speaking to anyone but school district parents here.  This was the same Facebook account she campaigned on, and the same account to which she posted a picture of herself swearing in as a Board member just 3 days prior.
[brief] [...], Esquire – ID 031762007  Of Counsel and on the Brief  June 15, 2024  Table of Contents  Table of Contents  ..................................................................................................................  i  Tables of Authorities  ..............................................................................................................  ii  Legal Argument ....................................................................................................................  1 POINT  I.  INTRAFAMILY LIABILITY  EXCLUSIONS SHOULD BE DEEMED UNENFORCEABLE AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY APPEAR IN PRIMARY OR EXCESS INSURANCE POLICIES
[brief] ”  Cf. Lechler, 452 N.J. Super. at 585-586.  The Defendants’ evidence they adduced in support of their motions for summary judgment consisted entirely of the weather report, including the undisputed “trace” of freezing rain, and [...]’s expert report.  The “trace” of freezing rain, though, is indicative of the underlying dangerous condition where the deteriorating steps allowed the infiltration of water and freezing over onto the surface of the landing, a condition not readily visible to an ordinary pedestrian upon a “very light” precipitation.
[brief] (11T164-11 to 165-18).  Three days later, [...] collected defendant’s uniforms, plus other equipment issued by [...], intending to collect all [...] property.  (11T165-24 to 166-6).  [...] identified the inventory of defendant’s gear he created on a [...] form.  (11T167-2 to 168-2; Pa26-27).  The inventory listed approximately 54 different categories of items collected; in some cases, there were multiple items in one category.  (Pa26-27).  While the form included a code for items that were “missing,” nothing was noted as missing.  (Ibid.)  The second page listed “Billfold ID and 2 Cards” and “Wallet ID Card,” a total of three items, as being returned in satisfactory condition.  (11T169-10 to 170-2; 11T170-12 to 17; Pa27).  [...] confirmed defendant surrendered only one wallet ID.  (11T174-11 to 13).  [...] identified S-28 as defendant’s wallet ID, and S-29 and S-30 as defendant’s two billfold IDs.  (11T171-1 to 23; 11T172-13 to 173-2; Pa28-29; Pa30-31; Pa 32-33).  [...] showed the wallet ID and one of the billfold IDs to the jury, remarking the billfold ID was “almost twice the size” of the wallet ID.  (11T173-9 to 23).  C.
[brief] Essentially, a motion under this rule is to determine if there is sufficient basis for the case to continue to move forward for an ultimate decision.  Defendants do not argue that this was appropriate analysis at that time.  The trial court committed reversible error, however, by applying the same analysis at the close of the case, in response to Defendants’ post-trial brief.  In the trial court’s memorandum decision, the court stated, “The court ruled in favor of Plaintiff [...] on the issue of Statute of Limitation for the Quiet Title Action by denying Defendant’s motion during trial. ” (Da072).  Apparently, the court completely dismissed Defendant’s post-trial argument under a standard that does not comport with the law.
[brief] The public and all interested parties shall be allowed to comment on and/or present evidence and testimony either for or against the [Respondents]’ site plan upon the conclusion of the Township’s presentation.  The Special Master shall participate in all hearings before the Special Hearing Officer and shall provide such planning review and testimony as may be deemed necessary by the Special Hearing Officer.  The [Respondents] shall identify all other Federal, State and ancillary governmental permits and approvals that are required for the [Respondents]’ project, and the satisfaction of these ancillary permit requirements shall be a condition of any Order approving the [Respondents]’ application; I.
[brief] Thus, in accord with the statutory canon of *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, the expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of another left unmentioned, this court should reject [...]'s request to create a requirement where the Legislature has chosen not to.  The Ricci Act simply required that the Board provide notice within thirty days of its enactment, without specifying in what manner.  The Board complied with this requirement when it posted information about the Ricci Act on its website, notified Certifying Officers about their obligation to disseminate information about the Ricci Act, and received confirmation from the Certifying Officer at the time that the information was disseminated.  [...] identifies no authority suggesting that the Division’s methods to fulfill this notice requirement were inadequate.
[brief] Most notably, Tucci prescribed clear precedent regarding failing to seek relief from the original discovery end date.  The Court made specific note of the oversight on the part of the plaintiff’s counsel, but went on to explain that countervailing considerations weighed so heavily the other way, that the trial judge’s dismissal with prejudice amounted to an abuse of discretion.  Id. at 51.  Here, Appellant’s counsel overlooked the original discovery end date due to staffing and calendar issues; however, the Appellant has made it clear that there are numerous countervailing considerations that weigh heavily against upholding the ultimate sanction of a dismissal with prejudice.  Furthermore, in Tucci, the discovery end date had already been extended once from the original end date and the trial date was adjourned to a later date before the plaintiffs’ counsel failed to seek relief.  Here, the original discovery end date has remained since the outset of this case, no prior discovery extension has been sought until now, and the trial date can be adjourned to accommodate a discovery extension and allow the Respondents time to respond to any new discovery.  Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial Court’s January 20, 2023, Orders dismissing this case with prejudice to accurately reflect New Jersey case precedent and in the interest of justice.  2.
[brief] At its inception, the defendant exchanged money in return for plaintiffs promise to repay, with the exception that if there was no recovery from the then unliquidated personal injury claim, the debt would be forgiven.  Unless and until that contingency arose, interest (“accrual rate” **AA016**) would accrue on the debt.  The existence of a contingency under which the debt would be forgiven does not except the transaction from its true nature as a loan.  The agreement accommodated nonpayment risk and time-value by enhancements as compensation for the defendant’s assuming the risk of nonpayment and the time value of money.  **AA017.**
[brief] Rather, they are events that can occur simultaneously.  [...], a judge of equal jurisdiction to [...], found just that – that those events occurred simultaneously – after reviewing the exact same surveillance video.  This was not the only time that [...]’s findings based on the video evidence were different from [...]’s.  For instance, [...] also found that [...]’s police car sped up so fast at the driveway that it came to an abrupt stop and jolted back and made “an abrupt turn into the driveway that would have startled anybody. ”  2T22:25-23:2 and 44:4-6.  Oppositely, [...] found that the police car’s entrance into the driveway at [...] was “not abrupt by any means” and that the shaking of the police car was caused by the front tire of the vehicle passing over the curb.  Pa035-Pa036.  In addition, [...] Stanton found that Defendant “took one hop” and then “two more steps” to avoid being hit by the police car.  2T49:5-7.  Differently, [...] found that Defendant “accelerated his pace to nearly double what his stride was initially. ”  Pa038.  An appellate court must defer to a trial court’s factual findings when those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.
[brief] *Ibid.*  The creditors argued that the hotel was a business “engaged principally” in trading and mercantile pursuits. ”  *Id.* at 440.  The United States Supreme Court held that the hotel was not “engaged principally” in trading and mercantile pursuits.  *Ibid.*  In doing so, the Court ruled that “‘engaged principally’ are plain words of no ambiguous meaning.  They need no construction. ”  *Ibid.*  C.