ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Thus, a police officer who views surveillance video from the surveillance system at the scene of the crime shortly after the crime occurred and testifies that the video played in court is a true and accurate copy of the video he viewed at the scene can establish the accuracy of the surveillance video, as in Tuncap and Dennis, as well as in Brown with respect to the apartment-building videos.  Under these circumstances, “there is little to no risk of tampering or editing the tape. ”  Tuncap, 2014 WL 235471, at *7.  The officer’s testimony that the scene depicted in the video corresponds to the scene as he witnessed it is likewise sufficient to establish that “the scene has not changed between the time of the incident in question and the time of the taking of the” surveillance video.  Wilson, 135 N.J. at 15.  Because authentication is ultimately for the jury to decide, “absolute certainty or conclusive proof” is not required.  Mays, 321 N.J. Super. at 628.  Thus, “the proponent of the evidence is not required to rule out all possibilities inconsistent with authenticity[.]”  United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 658 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Those possibilities can be explored on cross-examination as a means of influencing the weight ascribed to the video evidence by the jury.  “Any concerns that the defendant ha[s] regarding the surveillance procedures, and the method of storing and reproducing the video material, [are] properly the subject of cross-examination and affect[] the weight, not the admissibility, of the video.
[brief] The second important and relevant case on point is *Fieramosca v. Twp. of Barnegat*, 335 N.J. Super. 526 (Law Div. 2000).  In that case, plaintiffs obtained in 1996 site plan approval for the development of their marina, but the resolution of approval by the Planning Board failed to mention that, as a condition of approval, plaintiffs must install a drainage pipe.  In the prerogative writ action before the Assignment Judge of Ocean County, that Judge considered an exchange of letters in 1998 and 1999 between the plaintiffs’ engineer, the Board’s attorney, and the Township’s engineer.  *Id.*, at 530-531.  Obviously, none of those 1998-1999 letters appeared in the transcript of the planning board’s 1996 hearing.  Yet, at the prerogative writ trial, the trial judge considered those 1998-1999 letters to confirm that at the 1996 hearing, the plaintiffs had knowledge of the mandatory condition of the approval that plaintiffs must install a drainage pipe at their marina.  *Id.*, at 535.  Applying these cases to this appeal, this Court can determine that the [...] legal memo and Planning Board transcript were improperly excluded as part of the record and should be considered by this Court as part of the record to find that the legal conclusion of consistency between the plan and the master plan by both bodies was erroneous.
[brief] In his complaint, plaintiff set forth the history of the Long Term Tax Exemption Law ("LTTEL"), the repeal of the Limited-Dividend Nonprofit Housing Corporations or Association Law, the significance of the new "urban renewal entity" concept and its inclusion of State Constitution Blighted Area Clause income and profit limitations within the urban renewal entity’s formation documentation.  (Complaint, para. 284 to 358, Pa 37 to Pa50)  Plaintiff cited N.J.A.C. 5:13-1.1 requiring all post April 17, 1992 housing sponsors to comply with the Long Term Tax Exemption Law, P.L. 1991, c. 431.  Plaintiff also alleged that in 2003 our State Legislature required each municipality which entered into a long term tax exemption financial agreement to remit five percent of the annual service charge to the county upon receipt of that charge in accordance with N.J.S.A. 40A:20-12.  Plaintiff alleged that effective January 19, 2016, municipalities were now required to remit to the County five percent of the portion of the payment in lieu of taxes actually collected from an urban renewal entity during a tax quarter rather than five percent of the amount due and payable.  In addition, plaintiff alleged that effective January 19, 2016, a municipal clerk must transmit the long term tax exemption and financial agreement to the chief financial officer of the county and to the counsel for informational purposes.  [...] is not an aberration.
[brief] The case law guiding amendments provide that amendments shall be freely granted with liberality.  “Rule 4:9-1 requires that motions for leave to amend be granted liberally" and that "the granting of a motion to file an amended complaint always rests in the court's sound discretion. ”  Notte v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490, 500-01, 888 A.2d 464 (2006).  In exercising that discretion, a court must go through "a two-step process: whether the non-moving party will be prejudiced, and whether granting the amendment would nonetheless be futile."  Id. at 501.  The court determines whether the proposed amendment would be futile by asking “whether the amended claim will nonetheless fail and, hence, allowing the amendment would be a useless endeavor. ”  Id. at 501-02.  Before an amendment can be denied as futile, it must be so meritless that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 4:6-2(e) would be granted.  “Accordingly, the discretion to deny a motion to amend is not mistakenly exercised when it is clear that the amendment is so meritless that a motion to dismiss under R[ule] 4:6-2 would have to be granted, the so-called futility prong of the analysis."
[brief] Da111 Exh B (Email of [...] to [...] dated October 26, 2022).  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da112 Exh C (Branding Penalty Calculations Hand dated October 26, 2022)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da113 Exh D (Email of [...] to Defendant [...] dated November 18, 2022-Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] First, the public utility must demonstrate that the proposed project is reasonably—but not absolutely or indispensably—necessary for the service, convenience or welfare of the entire public served by the public utility, taking into account the affected municipalities' zone plans and zoning ordinances and the physical characteristics of the affected land and surrounding neighborhood (and the effect of the --- 3  The Appellate Division has held that while [...] and [...] analyzed a predecessor statute, the holdings and principles announced in those cases are applicable to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19, which contains the same standards.  In re Public Serv. Elec., 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 304 at *25-26. proposed use on that land and neighborhood).  **Second**, the public utility must demonstrate that the site, method or route chosen for the proposed project is the best available, and thus its use is reasonably necessary, based on consideration of alternative sites, methods and routes and their comparative advantages and disadvantages to all interests involved, including costs.  46.  Here, [...] has presented overwhelming evidence in this Petition satisfying both of these requirements.  VI.
[brief] As required by the Redevelopment Plan, on January 9, 2019, the [...] adopted Resolution No. 2018-105, which approved the “minor subdivision” of the [...] site into a “Residential Tract” and a “Commercial Tract. ”  (Da58; Da145-Da156).  This minor subdivision officially created what had already been memorialized in the Planned Development zone and the newly adopted Redevelopment Plan.  In 2019, [...] designated [...] as the redeveloper of the Residential Tract.  (Da159).  That residential development is comprised of 280 market rate townhouse units and 70 affordable rental units and is nearly complete.  Development of the Commercial Tract, however, stalled due to COVID-19, and [...] let the Property remain stagnant through 2023.
[brief] On October 11, 2021, [...] submitted an application for a Long Term Tax Exemption, under its urban renewal entity, [...].  (“PILOT Application”).  The application sought a thirty-year tax exemption for the Hopewell Parc development, which consisted of 108 low-income units, 108 moderate income units, 861 market rate units, for a total of 1,077 units.  Pa339; Pa344; Pa347.  18.  The application included a statement explaining the need for a tax exemption.  The tax exemption was needed:  Due to excessive off-site sewer and water infrastructure obligations as well as excessive sewer reservation fees.  Pa597.  The [...] Introduces an Ordinance to Approve a Financial Agreement with the Redeveloper 19.
[brief] The proposed section of the *Restatement*, quoted in *Petrillo* (Section 73) was adopted a few years later in Section 51 of the *Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers*. attorney-client relationship between [...] and [...]; and (b) there was no duty owed by [...] and his firm to [...].  This is not a case where John met with Rinaldi to discuss the claim.  John never met with Rinaldi.  This is not a case where John sent letters to Rinaldi asking for his opinion on the viability of the claim.  Likewise, this is not a case where Rinaldi offered an opinion letter to John on which John relied.  There was also an email of September 6, 2017 from [...] to [...], recommending that his long-term client retain him instead of the Rinaldi firm.  The Court found that email to be of significance because it was dated September 6, 2017, before Rinaldi’s letter was written.  Accordingly, beyond the letter that Rinaldi wrote, he did very little to invite John to rely on him.  John indicated in his Certification that he received the September 13, 2017 letter after he heard from [...].  However, there was the email from [...], and there was ongoing communication between [...] and John.  On September 6, 2017, [...] wrote the email talking about the phone call he received from [...], and telling him that [...] retained him and “will include you in the Will contest … [...] were his co-clients. ”  However, [...] then recommended to his long-term client that “I think you should have your own counsel,” and he explained why.  (Pa206).  Also, the Court noted that the retainer letter was not signed by John, it was only signed by [...].  There was an indication that John’s signature was “X’d out” and then it said “N/A”.  The only conclusion the Court could reach is that there is no definitive statement as to who crossed out the signature line and sent it back.  Those facts weighed in favor of finding that there was no duty.
[brief] [...] did not assist Plaintiff with respect to the design contract.  Plaintiff testified that he discussed the Purchase and Construction Agreements negotiations with [...].  (Da62-63).  Plaintiff further testified that he discussed his obligations under the Purchase and Construction Agreements before he signed them.  (Da65).  On May 8, 2009, Plaintiff entered into two separate contracts with [...], the Purchase Agreement and the Construction Agreement. (Pa0204).
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS Page(s) August 6, 2021 Order Granting [...]’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment .................................................................Pa1a November 19, 2021 Order Granting, in part, [...]’s Motion for Sanctions ..................................................................................Pa18a February 4, 2022  Order Denying, in part, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration of the August 6, 2021 and November 19, 2021  Orders ..............................................................................................................Pa35a TABLE OF APPENDIX Page(s) Borough of Englewood Cliffs v. Trautner, --- A.3d ---, 2024 WL 1708605, at *1 (App. Div. 2024) (approved for publication) .........................Da1 M. Spiegel & Sons Oil Corp. v. Amiel, No. A-1900-16T2, 2018 WL 1734035, at *1 (App. Div. Mar. 12, 2018)
[brief] But, by the same token, our courts have also recognized the importance of promoting the free flow of communications within an agency.  *Educ. Law Ctr.*, 198 N.J. at 300-01 (“If communication that formed part of an agency's pre-decisional process could be disclosed after the decision has been released, one of the major justifications for the [deliberative process] privilege in the first place—maintaining the free flow of communication within an agency—would be rendered meaningless.
[brief] N.J. --- \(^4\)  There was no hearing.  \(^5\)  Summary Judgment transcript submitted as 1T (12/08/2023).  Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Specialty Surgical Ctr. of N. Brunswick, 458 N.J. Super.  63, 70 (App. Div. 2019).  Appellate review is proper in situations involving misapplication of the New Jersey PIP fee schedule.  See, e.g., id. at 65 (wherein the Appellate Division affirmed the Law Division orders that held “the PIP medical fee schedule [did] not provide for payment to an ambulatory surgical center (ASC) for procedures not listed as reimbursable when performed at an ASC”) and Endo Surgi Ctr. v. NJM Ins. Grp., 459 N.J. Super. 289, 291 (App. Div. 2019) (wherein the Appellate Division reversed a Law Division order requiring reimbursement for an ASC procedure that was not listed on the PIP fee schedule).
[brief] ”  T4 100:22-23.  In an unambiguous and muscular ruling, [...] neutralized Appellant’s entire argument:  “What [...] wants me to believe is that the process server would have been at that location at approximately the right time of service and he didn't actually serve the documents.  That's just not credible..  I don't believe that for one minute.  And, certainly, if the standard is clear and convincing evidence, it's not clear and convincing evidence that process was not served. ”  T4 99:9-16.  (emphasis added).  Accordingly, the Trial Court correctly found that [...] was personally served at her home the morning of 8/23/2021.
[brief] I, [...], Appellant and Defendant Pro Se, certifies that service of 1 copy of 1)  Appeal Brief, revised has been provided this date to the following:  1.  Via US Express Mail, delivery confirmation:  [...], [...]  [...] in care of [...], Deputy Attorney General, [...], 25 Market St., Trenton, NJ.  08625  By: ___________________________  Date: 11/6/2023  [...], Defendant Pro Se Nov. 6, 2023  [...], Defendant/Appellant ProSe [...]  Clerk of the Appellate Court.  Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, Richard J Hughes Justice Complex, P O Box 006, Trenton, NJ 08625-0006  Re: Appeal Brief Superior Court Docket, Morris County.  [...] Appellate Division Docket No. [...]  Dear Clerk of the Appellate Court,
[directive] 3.1  Promulgation of Police Department Policies and Procedures.  To ensure an efficient and orderly transition to universal BWC implementation, every law enforcement agency shall promulgate and enforce a policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order, in a form as may be appropriate given the customs and practices of the agency, which shall comply with the policies, standards, and requirements of this Policy.  Any policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order promulgated by an agency pursuant to this Policy shall provide that: (a) a law enforcement officer employed by the agency may only use a BWC system that has been issued and approved by the agency; (b) an officer equipped with a BWC must comply at all times with the requirements established in this Policy and in the agency’s policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order issued pursuant to this Policy or by law; (c) a BWC shall be used only in performance of official police duties and not for personal purposes; (d) no BWC recording shall be accessed, viewed, copied, disseminated, or otherwise used by a sworn officer or civilian employee of the agency except for an official purpose specified in this Policy or by law; and (e) any sworn officer or civilian employee of the agency who knowingly violates the requirements of this Policy or the agency’s policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order, or applicable laws, shall be subject to discipline.  3.2  Officers Required to Wear BWCs.  The following officers shall be required to be equipped with BWCs and adhere to the provisions of this Policy when performing their duties:  (a)  All uniformed patrol officers while acting in the performance of official duties, as required by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.3 (P.L. 2020, c. 128).  This shall include uniformed officers assigned to traffic law enforcement, as well as Class II Special Law Enforcement Officers (SLEO IIs) assigned to patrol or traffic law enforcement duties.  (b)  All officers assigned to tactical teams as defined in this Policy.  Tactical Teams shall include S.W.A.T. (Special Weapons and Tactics), S.R.T. (Special Response Team), T.E.A.M.S. (Technical Emergency and Mission Specialists), Entry Teams, Rapid Deployment, Fugitive or similar units.  (c)  All officers assigned to proactive enforcement teams as defined in this Policy.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021
[brief] Recorded Statement of Representative of [...]..DR01-DR04  Order dated June 7, 2024  Granting [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgement……………………………DR05-DR06  TABLE OF AUTHORITY STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.................................................................1, 13 N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5...........................................................................4  CASE LAW
[brief] (2T:14-11 to 14-18).  The footage from [...]’s body-worn camera revealed defendant’s rear brake light to clearly be inoperable at the time of the stop.  Da25 at :35.  The heavy tint on defendant’s passenger’s side windows can be seen on this body-worn camera footage as well.  Da25 at :45.  It is impossible to see any occupants of the Jeep from this body-worn camera footage until the window is cracked.  (2T:11-6 to 11-18).  Da25 at :45 to :55.  Additionally, on [...] [...]’s body-worn camera footage from the incident, which captures the driver’s side of the Jeep, defendant’s passenger and driver side windows were visibly fully tinted.  Da26 at :35.  When [...] approached defendant, the tints on the passenger’s side window can be seen from \(^2\)  The trial court determined that, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is irrelevant whether or not defendant used his turn signal. inside the vehicle.
[brief] If they do not, then within 90 days after the effective date of the Amendments, the public agency may move for dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.  (N.J.S.A. 47:1A-7.1(a)).  Parties to any such complaints shall have leave to amend their complaints and answers within 90 days after the effective date of the Amendments.  (N.J.S.A. 47:1A-7.1(b)).  Thus, the Legislature made explicit its desire that OPRA complaints contain a requestor’s full name and mailing address, and intended that this change in the law have full pipeline retroactivity, meaning that the change applies to all future complaints, all pending complaints, and all appeals.  The Legislature also permitted parties to amend their complaints and answers within 90 days after the effective date of the Amendments.
[brief] Here, police office [...]’s report clearly states that his second reason for wanting the keys was to check the bag to determine if the bag contained proceeds from burglary after he had already stated that the bag was UNDER the floor board “where any knife or gun that were the proceeds of a robbery” [that could be used to HARM HIM], were in the bag, under the floor board out of the plaintiff’s reach.  (Pa022).  Officer [...] knew that the scope of the search without a warrant must be "strictly tied to and justified by" the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible. ”  Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 310 (1967).  Officer [...] knew that the scope of the investigatory detention must be “the least intrusive investigatory technique reasonably available to verify or dispel [the officer’s] suspicion in the shortest period of time possible.  State v. Davis, 104 N.J. at 504; See also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).  Officer [...] knew that the purpose of a search "is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence."  Adams v. Williams, supra, 407 U.S. at 146.  Thus, officer [...] clearly was not seeking to conduct a limited search that was confined to an intrusion designed to discover weapons that could be used to assault him as required under Terry.  Either way, this created a dispute that warranted that this matter be sent to a jury, or that summary judgment be awarded to the plaintiff.  (See Pa022)  Based on all this, the court should have concluded that Officer [...] was either lying about his interaction with the plaintiff, or it was his specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s rights under the New Jersey Constitution and the 4th Amendment, as well as [...]’s rights, with wanton disregard, warranting that plaintiff’s matter be sent to a jury.  Either way, this created a dispute that warranted that this matter be sent to a jury, or that summary judgment be awarded to the plaintiff.
[brief] In reply, [...] abandoned the interest calculations provided by [...], and provided a completely new set of interest calculations composed by [...] counsel.  (Da260-Da261.)  Those new calculations were the fourth different set of interest calculations provided by [...] in the course of this litigation.  Notably, the new interest calculations increased [...]’s claimed interest by more than $300,000 over the amount originally requested in the March 2021 Motion papers – with no new evidence.  (Cf. Pa213; Da261.)  The trial court granted [...]’s March 2021 Motion in an Order and Opinion dated February 10, 2023 (the “Final Judgment Order”).  (Pa0041-Pa0060.)
[brief] An Essential Worker  [...], Esq. Of Counsel & on the Brief Attorney ID # 020291980  Attorney for [...], Petitioner-Appellee  [...].  [...]  [...]  [...]  Tel.: [...]  Fax: [...]  E-Mail: [...] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Table of Authorities | iii | | Preliminary Statement | 1 | | • Purpose of the Covid Presumption Statute | 1 | | • The Statute Allows the Respondent to Rebut The Presumption | 2 | | Procedural History | 4 | | Statement of Facts | 5 | | Legal Argument | 6 | | Point I: Standard of Review | 6 | | Point II: Based on The Applicable Statutes, Executive Orders, | | | And Directives From The Board of Health, Decedent was Correctly | | | Determined To Be An Essential Employee | 8 | | A. The State of Emergency | 8 | | B.
[directive] (d) an analysis of the uses of force to ensure that force is being applied without discrimination based on race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, disability, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, or any other protected characteristic.  7.7  Based on that thorough review, the law enforcement executive shall determine whether changes in departmental structure, policy, training, or equipment are appropriate.  The law enforcement executive shall then provide a written report documenting the annual review to the County Prosecutor.  Each County Prosecutor’s Office and each statewide law enforcement agency shall make its report to the OPIA.  22  USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2021  Use of Force Policy Addendum
[brief] Promptly following Closing, [[...]] shall cause the Deed and the Improvements Deed to be duly recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds and Mortgages of Hudson County, New Jersey.  (Pa104-105 (emphases added)).  The PSA informed all parties of the existence of the [...] and required that the closing component of the transaction was to be “held concurrently with the closing under the [...]. ” (Pa110, §10.1).  The [...] provided that its closing was to be “sixty (60) days after the Effective Date” of the agreement, or at a later rescheduled date agreed to by both [...] and Plaintiff.  (Pa39, “Scheduled Closing Date”).  Regarding remedies for breach and default, Section 13.1 of the PSA provides in relevant part: