ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Court in Brown dealt with a highway maintenance decision, wherein the court held: “[i]t was the State’s burden to actually demonstrate that the items given higher priority were more critical…”.  Id.  In the instant case, the [...] provides no proof of actual resource allocation or high-level decision making.  Second, under our facts the resources were already allocated to ensure maintenance was performed.  The [...] has a maintenance department responsible for these tasks.  Also, the section of the Parkway where the condition existed was already under contract repairs; including incidental and miscellaneous repairs.  (Pa2227).  Simply, the [...] was told to fix the condition that caused Plaintiff’s crash months prior to the crash and failed to do so without explanation.  B)  Alternatively, Even Under the Heightened Standards of N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 the Plaintiffs have Met their Burden
[brief] *Rendine v. Pantzer*, 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995).  This is because the trial court is best positioned “to weigh the equities and arguments of the parties. ”  *Packard-Bamberger*, 167 N.J. at 447.  An appellate court should only reverse a trial court’s fee determination if it was “made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”  *C.E. v. Elizabeth Pub. Sch. Dist.*, 472 N.J. Super. 253, 262 (App. Div. 2022).  Here, the trial court correctly concluded that the contracts that the defendants breached authorized an award of legal fees and costs to the Plaintiffs, and the trial court’s fee award was reasonable.
[brief] In such situations, the court must look to when the case was “favorably terminated,” i.e., when “the prosecution terminate[d] without a conviction. ” (Aa54-55) (citations omitted).  Applying these principles, [...] held, by analogy, that the date of accrual for any malicious prosecution claim asserted by plaintiff would be March 6, 2018, when plaintiff’s rights were clarified by a New Jersey Supreme Court decision reversing plaintiff’s conviction, not by the formal amendment of his Judgment of Conviction.  (Aa55).  [...] rejected plaintiff’s argument that the continuing violations doctrine applied, noting that while continual unlawful acts can serve as the basis of a continuing violation, continual ill effects from an original violation (as here) cannot.  (Aa56).  [...] consequently dismissed plaintiff’s federal claims with respect to the [...] with prejudice, but declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining state claims.
[brief] [...] is the State’s leading public research university.  (Da126, Da134).  It has three main campuses in (1) New Brunswick, Middlesex County; (2) Newark, Essex County; and (3) Camden, Camden County.  (Da7 ¶ 7, Da135).  It was founded in 1766 as a private institution governed by the Board of Trustees (“BOT”).  (Db5).  In 1945, Rutgers was declared a public institution, and in 1956, the Rutgers Act transferred a majority of the BOT’s management, control, administration, and policy-making functions to the newly established BOG, a majority of whom --- 1  The Procedural History and Statement of Facts are presented together for the Court’s convenience and to avoid repetition.
[brief] “The arbitrary and capricious standard is analogous to the substantial evidence standard. ”  Id.  A court’s objective on review is “to determine if the Board properly exercised its discretion,” and is not to “substitute” its judgment for that of the board's.  *Id.* at 411-12 (citations omitted).  Here, the Borough Council referred the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan to the Planning Board to review the redevelopment plan’s consistency with the master plan.  The Planning Board reviewed the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan and made the determination, after reviewing the plan and hearing testimony about it at a public hearing, that the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan was substantially consistent with the Borough’s master plan.
[directive] Establishment of MLETA 4 - 2  Disburzements from MLETA W A or 4 - 3  Seized Asset Trust Account  3 4 - Maintenance Expenditures 2 - 2 2 3  Establishment Seized Asset Dedicated Account of a 7:3 7 - 3  Failure  Submit Form Prosecuting A Agency to to Federal State Forfeitures/Management of Funds and and 1 - 1 - Property Received SOP 01
[brief] Citing, Thurber v. Thurber, 2017 WL 164480 (App. Div. 2017); See also, In re Torres, 2017 WL 3316052 (Bankr. N.J. 2017).  See also, [...], [...], [...], Recent Developments in Title Insurance Law, 53 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 657, 669-671 (Winter, 2018).  In the present case, plaintiff does not possess a written CPL in a form approved by [...], evidence of the payment of a separate fee for a CPL, or evidence of providing written closing instructions to [...] in advance of the closing regarding the handling of plaintiff’s funds.  Plaintiff’s claim, therefore, of an “agreement” based on paragraph 3 of the “Important Notice and Disclosure” section of the commitment is meritless.  C.
[brief] (21T 22, lines 19-25 and 21T 23, lines 1-5).  The Court responded to [...].  THE COURT:  The problem is this: that the subpoena was sent a long time ago and the objection would have been appropriately made then, not today.  Today is the trial so she's entitled to ask for it.  She doesn't have it.  She asked for it before.  There was no objection received by the Court.  No motion to quash by [...], so I would say, yeah, it should have been produced.
[brief] ”  Pa96.  It further found that Plaintiff should have joined the Defendants in the preference action and that Plaintiff’s cross motion to amend the complaint was ‘futile’. ”  Pa96.  The trial court found that Plaintiff’s request to reinstate the [...] 2012 mortgage was untimely.  Pa96.  However, there is no statute of limitations issue and no prejudice resulting to the Defendants if the [...] mortgage was reinstated as sought in the complaint.  In fact, rather than being prejudiced, [...] was actually unjustly enriched by the claw back of the $60,000 mortgage payments made by [...] that should have been made by [...] personally.  The trial court’s Order failed to address Plaintiff’s claim for reinstatement of the 2012 mortgage as well as its arguments of equitable estoppel, unjust enrichment, and unclean hands.  The court’s finding that the “Plaintiff did not join Defendants in the preference litigation even though it was Plaintiff’s responsibility to join all parties with a material interest in the controversy” (Pa96) is contrary to established bankruptcy law.  The trial court further erred in refusing to allow Plaintiff to amend its complaint to set forth a claim for breach of contract is “futile”.  Pa97.
[brief] On August 1, 2019, Plaintiff/Appellant Plaintiff [...], individually and as Executor of the Estate of [...] (hereinafter ‘Plaintiff’) filed an Amended Complaint naming [...], MD (hereinafter ‘[...]’) [...], MD (hereinafter ‘[...]’), [...], M.D. (hereinafter ‘[...]’), [...], M.D. (hereinafter ‘[...]’), [...], M.D., [...], M.D. (hereinafter ‘[...]’), [...], M.D. (hereinafter ‘[...]’), [...], M.D. (hereinafter ‘[...]’), [...], [...] and fictitious parties as Defendants.
[brief] The Department Properly Interpreted The SRD Rule In The Context Of The CZM Rules In Their Entirety.**  Despite being faced with facts and a detailed explanation to the contrary, Appellant continues to claim that the Project does not comply with the SRD Rule, and raises the same arguments that were presented, considered, and ultimately rejected by the Department based on its specific expertise.  As asserted in its objection to [...]’s CAFRA Application, in its objection to the Settlement Agreement, and in its administrative appeal of the Permit, Appellant again argues that the Project violates the SRD Rule because it is not visually compatible with the surrounding area in accordance with Subsection C and does not comply with the 30% open view corridor and 2-to-1 setback requirements under Subsection D, and, therefore, the Department’s issuance of the Permit to [...] allowing for the construction of the Project was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  Ab12-16.  As an initial matter, Appellant misrepresents the facts in its attempt to argue that the Department’s decision to issue the Permit was unlawful.  Appellant incorrectly asserts that pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan Amendment, [...] “no longer require[d] adherence to the [SRD] Rule for the [...] location,” and because [...] “no longer required adherence to the [SRD] Rule,” the Department simply decided that “it would not either. ”  Ab10-11.  As discussed herein: under the [...] Rule, development within the Redevelopment Area must comply with the standards set forth in the Redevelopment Ordinances; the Redevelopment Ordinances do not require adherence to the provisions of the SRD Rule; the Redevelopment Plan Amendment did not “eliminate” the SRD Rule standards for the [...] Property, because no such standards existed to eliminate; and the only relevant consequence of the Redevelopment Plan Amendment in this case is the procedure subsequently followed by [...] to obtain approval from the Department for the Project under CAFRA.  The Department’s conclusion that the SRD Rule was not applicable to the Project was based its interpretation of the CZM Rules, including specifically, the [...] Rule, and is amply supported by the record on appeal.  Appellant fails to present any legitimate argument to challenge the threshold determination that the SRD Rule does not apply to the Project, and thus fails to meet its burden to demonstrate that the Department’s decision to issue the Permit to [...] was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in any way.
[brief] We are simply challenging the evidence in the court record from February of 2015 to the end of April of 2015, based on certifications by the Plaintiff’s Process Server, Attorney and his Legal Assistant, that misled the court to grant a Final Judgment by Default 5/4/2015.)  The Plaintiff’s-Respondent Brief DID NOT dispute the Statements of Facts for the defendants in the Defendants’-Appellant Brief, that matters of law were knowingly and willfully violated in the Affidavits of Service, in the Request to Enter Default and Proof of Mailing (Pa16), and in the Final Judgment by Default and Proof of Mailing (Pa17); respectively by the Process Server, and by the Plaintiff’s Attorney and his Legal Assistant.  That is, their acts MISLED the court into granting a Final Judgment by Default in May of 2015.  They CHEATED, denying the defendants their rights under the law.  The Plaintiff’s attorney knowingly and willfully VIOLATED the LAW, because once the case was in Post-Judgment mode, he had a very wide latitude of what he could do, and what he could require the defendants to do, all done with enforcement by the court.  The Plaintiff’s-Respondent Brief offers a July 2015 POST-JUDGMENT mail receipt, not signed by him, after the Final Judgment was granted by the court.  Why not offer signed PRE-JUDGMENT documents, received by the defendants of the Request to Enter the Default and of the Final Judgment by Default?  The Plaintiff’s attorneys CANNOT, if it existed, they would.  It DOES NOT exist!  Without that proof, this court has no choice, but to vacate the judgment.
[brief] Servs.*, 17 F.4th 1103 (11th Cir. 2021).  The Eleventh Circuit’s split *en banc* decision concluded there was no subject matter jurisdiction but did not undermine the panel decisions that the complaint stated a claim for violation of § 1692c(b).  *Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs.*, 48 F.4th 1236 (11th Cir. 2022).
[directive] When Appeal or Documentation 6.4 assistant the court, the by denied is condition release special of imposition a for request a If case file.  in denial the and request the document shall general attorney deputy prosecutor or only detention pretrial seeking from prosecutor refrains a where circumstances be may  There to pursuant conditions maximum release will impose court the that prosecutor assumes the because the If Framework."  Making "Decision AOC's the and results risk-assessment pretrial automated the be would monitoring of level and conditions maximum those only that determines prosecutor and 7.4.2, the 7.4.1 and subsections see release, defendant's by posed risks) the manage to sufficient release defendant's shall to object prosecutor the conditions, necessary such impose not does court necessary and if shall, and Justice, Criminal of Division notify the shall conditions, inadequate on appeal.
[brief] ” (2T21-3 to 10).  The court ultimately found that defendant failed to prove that the court originally acted in a “palpable incorrect” or “irrational” basis, nor did the court fail to consider relevant evidence, and denied defendant’s motion.  (2T19-3 to 22-11; Da7).  On July 10, 2023, defendant pled guilty to first-degree aggravated manslaughter, Count One of the Indictment, in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PREROGATIVE WRIT RELIEF TO PLAINTIFF.  Municipal ordinances are afforded a presumption of validity and reasonableness.  *Grabowsky*, supra, 221 N.J. Super. at 551.  An ordinance will not be overturned unless the objector can prove that the governing body’s action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  *Ibid.*  A municipality is free to exercise business judgment in making decisions that accomplish valid municipal objectives.  *Ott v. Township of West New York*, 92 N.J. Super. 184, 198 (Law Div. 1966).  The Court found no basis to set aside the Bond Ordinance and denied Plaintiff’s request for a prerogative writ because Plaintiff was heard on the Bond Ordinance and there was no conflict of interest.  Plaintiff suggests that he was entitled to prerogative writ relief in connection with the change in protocol for the Township Committee meetings, yet Plaintiff never filed any challenge to the Resolution adopted by the Township Committee on February 8, 2021, whether within 45 days as required or at any time before summary judgment was entered.  CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s appeal should be denied and the trial court’s orders granting summary judgment and denying Plaintiff’s motion for amendment should be affirmed.
[brief] *State v. Arthur*, 149 N.J. 1, 11 (1997).  At bottom, the reasonable suspicion standard is a “rather lenient test,” *United States v. Santana*, 485 F.2d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 1973), requiring a “significantly lower degree of objective evidentiary justification than does the probable cause test,” *State v. Davis*, 104 N.J. 490, 501 (1986), which itself does not even rise to a more-likely-than-not standard.  *Texas v. Brown*, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).
[brief] .........................................................  5, 14, 19, 21  INDEX FOR APPENDIX (Vol. 1 of 1, Pa1-Pa74)  Certification of [...] dated August 28, 2024 submitted To Motions Court and Appellate Court for In-Camera Review Order to Show Cause with Temporary Restraints filed May 12, 2023 . . . . . . . . .  Pa1  [...] Brief in Support of Order To Show Cause dated May 30, 20231  .............................  Pa8  [...] and [...]’ Opposition to [...]’s Motion and Cross Motion to Enforce Litigant’s Rights dated June 1, 2023.
[brief] THE MOTION JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS' MOTION TO ENLARGE PURSUANT TO R.  4:69-6(c) (Pa852 - Pa853)  The narrow issue that was before the motion judge was whether it was so manifest that the interest of justice required enlargement of the 45-day limitations period contained in R. 4:69-6 when, in fact, (i) Appellants were provided not with 45 days, but with only 22 days over the winter holiday period to file their Complaint, (ii) the Resolution approved variances to double the size and create the first new home in 20 years, which is an ultra-modern building, within a historic district found on the National Registry of Historical Places, and (iii) the Resolution was made without the ZBA making any of the legally-required analysis of impact on the historic aesthetic of the recognized historical site.
[brief] (13T 124-21 to 126-19)  [...] also admitted that police did not take any photos of the back yards of the houses at [...].  (13T 128-6 to 129-10)  [...] also claimed to be unaware of any pole cameras near [...].  (13T 136-16 to 18)  Police also did not knock on any doors on Ellsworth or Edgemere Avenues to find out if residents had observed anything -- such as a running suspect -- at the time of the shooting and arrest of defendant.  (13T 138-1 to 8)  Moreover, [...] admitted, police never tested defendant’s clothing for gunshot residue, bloodstains or DNA despite the close-range nature of the shooting, and never sought to enhance videos from the shooting.  (13T 141-9 to 142-24; 13T 154-2 to 6)  Additionally, despite [...] having denied being present at the crime scene (13T 97-5 to 10), [...] admitted that the crime-scene log showed that Peterson was at the scene.  (13T 156-1 to 157-10)  Additionally, New Jersey State Police forensic scientist [...], an expert in serology, testified that her lab never received any of defendant’s clothing, nor the sunglasses recovered at the scene, for testing.  (10T 145-2 to 22)  Moreover, the State’s DNA expert, forensic scientist [...], testified that no DNA was found on the ammunition magazine that was recovered, and that one swabbing from the gun revealed contributions from three different people, at least one of whom was male, but that swabbing was otherwise too small to test further.  (11T 24-19 to 23; 11T 26-9 to 11; 11T 31-15 to 19)  The defense presented only one witness, because of evidentiary rulings discussed in further detail in Points I and III, infra.
[brief] See in accord *Home Properties v. Ocino Inc.*, 341 N.J. Super. 604, 613 (App. Div. 2001).  Here Paragraph 10 has no express term as the duration of the “permission” to the synagogue staff/attendees to park vehicles on the Lot 5 property.  Therefore, that “permission” is certainly terminable either on notice, or a reasonable time after 1963, or upon a change of circumstances effectuating its termination.
[brief] In other words, certain legislators\(^6\) effectively responded to [...]’ application by attempting to change the law to frustrate the application.  Unfortunately, despite being on the CRB agenda for March 24, 2022, [...]’ application was not heard due to the length of the application hearings scheduled before them, and it was --- \(^6\)  By majority vote, the [...] ultimately approved a resolution of support for [...]’ application to the [...] in September 2022, substantiating the Planning Board’s decision to approve the application.  (Da463-464.) carried to the next CRB meeting scheduled for April 21, 2022.  During that time, on April 8, 2022, the Ordinance was formally adopted and subject to a 20-day estoppel period.  The CRB deemed [...]’ application complete and provided [...] its endorsement during the April 21, 2022 meeting – four (4) business days before the Ordinance became effective.  Simply put, the trial court’s decision has sanctioned the exact result the Legislature sought to avoid in passing the TOA Rule.  Rather than ensuring that [...]’ application proceeded without the unnecessary hurdle of constantly changing requirements, the trial court endorsed the City’s actions – i.e., changing the law to specifically frustrate [...]’ application – effectively signaling to New Jersey’s municipalities that they can easily avoid the TOA Rule by creating similarly time- and cost-intensive hurdles that must be satisfied prior to the subsequent submission to a planning board.  The trial court’s decision (if left undisturbed) will result in the total loss of the time, money and effort [...] expended.  Given that [...] is a small business with no more capital to expend, the trial court’s decision (if left undisturbed) will force [...]’ principals to abandon the project altogether – the exact harm the Legislature sought to avoid when enacting the TOA Rule.
[brief] This decision was a costly one because I needed to ensure that I maintained health coverage until my retirement and transfer to Medicare.  All of those working with me knew that at the age of 70, I was not planning on returning to work.  My retirement plans were not a secret and I was working toward the goal of 10 years of service.  The respondent brief states (Rb Pg 5) that “As stated in the quotation, she would have ten years and one month of service credit if she continued to work until January 28, 2022”.  It does not state that anywhere on the quotation.  It states that my Service Termination Date is January 28, 2022.  I am told at various points that I was an “active employee” until I retired and then I had 30 days to purchase service credits because I was still an “active employee”.  The terms seemed to be used only to my detriment.  The respondent states (Rb Pg 6) that the Certification of Service and Final Salary Retirement “indicated that [...] would continue to work until the end of January 2022”.  It does not stipulate that I “would continue to work”.  Respondent also state (Rb Pg 6,12) that I “stopped working” and fails to mention that I did not stop working voluntarily.  I was placed on disability.  It states that I would resign on January 31, 2022.  It also states that my last pension deduction was made on P/P# 4/2022! (This was admittedly a mistake by Human Resources.)  The respondent fails to mention this error.  I would also note that the respondent repeatedly refers to “pension contributions” (Rb pg 4,9,10).  Neither the Certification of Service and Final Salary Retirement nor the Quotation of Retirement Benefits stipulates “pension contributions”.  In the final phases of my retirement, I checked on the online PERS system that generated the Estimate of Retirement Benefits Public Employees’ Retirement System.  The system still reflected my inquiry related to retirement on September or October 1, 2021.  I contacted [...] in [...] and was advised that the PERS system was updated quarterly.  Ms. Tuttle-Alexander then went on to explain that the systems were all backlogged and the updates had not been made because the personnel was not in the office.  She said that due to the Omicron variant upsurge resources were not available for updating the system.  This was even more apparent to me by fact that I did not receive my state disability check for my 2021 disability until March of 2023.  The systems were all in chaos because of the impact of Covid on the operation of all institutions worldwide.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[directive] So while an agency may compel an officer to answer questions posed during the course of an administrative investigation, an officer cannot be forced to give answers that could be used against him or her in a criminal prosecution.  Officers who have been compelled by order to produce incriminating information, with the belief that a failure to do so will result in termination or other serious disciplinary action, cannot have that evidence used against them in a criminal prosecution.  However, an officer can be compelled to provide answers during an internal affairs investigation if those answers are to be used as evidence only in a disciplinary proceeding.
[brief] As the Court noted in Lionel’s Appliance Center v. Citta, 156 N.J. Super. 257, 268-269 (Law. Div. 1978), a land use agency may deny a site plan application “only if the ingress and egress proposed by the plan creates an unsafe and inefficient vehicular circulation. ”  Where land use agencies “‘should’ consider traffic flow and safety in reviewing proposals for vehicular ingress to and egress from a site,” the Court qualified its finding, stating that site plan approval may be conditioned upon a contribution to necessary off-street improvements to counter those concerns.  *Dunkin’ Donuts of N.J. v. Twp. of N Brunswick Planning Bd.*, 193 N.J. Super. 513, 515 (App. Div. 1984).  As discussed *infra*, there would be no measurable traffic entering and exiting the Property and therefore, there is no legitimate issue of “vehicular circulation” here.