ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Turning to the “merits” (such as they are) of the Defendants’ argument, they claim to have been somehow surprised by the fact that Plaintiff made claims during trial that she was discriminated against because of her disability, despite the fact that disability discrimination has been a part of this case since its inception.  See Db at pp. 10-17; see also, DA-001-DA012 (Plaintiff’s complaint, setting forth claims for both religion- and disability-based discrimination).  This argument is factually nonsensical.  Plaintiff has unequivocally stated since the pleading stage that she faced discrimination both because of her Jewish faith and because of her disability (i.e., her anxiety disorder).  See DA-001-DA012.  As for Plaintiff’s complaint, in that document she clearly made allegations of improper conduct directed at her by the Defendants on the basis of both religion and disability:  See DA-003-DA-006 (¶¶ 21-24 of Plaintiff’s Complaint).  More critically, the Complaint quite specifically states that the “allegations set forth above are not intended to be an exhaustive list of all the allegations against Defendants, but merely a representative sample. ”  Id. at DA-006 (¶ 25 of Plaintiff’s Complaint).  As for Plaintiff’s responses during discovery, those responses are consistent with the allegations of the complaint.  For example, Plaintiff’s answers to interrogatories mirror the allegations set forth above.  See DA-021-DA-023 (Plaintiff’s Answers Form A Interrogatories 2-3).  In short, it is nonsensical to claim that Plaintiff did not plead disability discrimination at the beginning of this --- 4
[brief] The trial court erred in holding that [...]’s contractual agreement to arbitrate this personal-injury dispute is unenforceable.  [...]’s in-app interface ensured that [...] had notice of the terms to which she was agreeing.  Those terms stated in plain, easy-to-understand language that “any dispute, claim or controversy” like this one would be “settled” “not in a court of law” but instead by “binding arbitration. ” (Da81–82 (emphasis added). )  Contrary to the trial court’s opinion, that language made it “clear to the parties that ‘arbitration is a substitute for the right to seek relief in our court system. ’” (Da304 (quoting Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289, 307–308 (2016). )  No reasonable user could have understood the December Terms any other way.  The December Terms’ plain text describing both the right that Plaintiffs were giving up (to bring their personal-injury claims in a court of law) and the substitute procedure to be used (binding arbitration), provided all the notice that New Jersey law requires.  The New Jersey Supreme Court in *Atalese* held that no magic words are required, 219 N.J. at 439, so the trial court erred by insisting that [...]’s Terms of Use were unenforceable unless they referred specifically to “waiver” of the “jury trial” right.  (*See* Da302.)  What’s more, this record demonstrates beyond dispute that the particular plaintiff here, [...], knew her agreement to arbitrate waived her jury-trial right, because she had previously agreed to the January Terms that stated that point expressly.  And the trial court erred for an additional reason as well: the court should not have even considered Plaintiffs’ challenge to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement because [...] and [...] agreed that only the arbitrator would have exclusive authority to determine that threshold question.
[brief] [...] also maintains the Board should have accepted mail-in ballots postmarked February 18, 2025.  However, that would directly contravene N.J.S.A. 19:63-22(a) which requires all mail-in ballots be considered valid and canvassed, assuming the ballot meets all other statutory requirements, provided they are postmarked by 8:00 p.m. on Election Day and received by mail no later than 144 hours (six days) after the close of the polls on the day of the election.  The rejected mail-in ballots at issue here were received by the Board on February 18, 2025, and all bear a postmark date of February 18, 2025.  (2T76:16-19; Da13-Da17).  As the polls closed on 8 p.m. on February 15, 2025, the Board properly rejected the contested ballots postmarked February 18, 2025.
[directive] I, 1, 2017, with comply and implement to Jersey New of State the of laws the of authority the under operating practices.  and standards, procedures, following policies, the 14 Page  AUTOMATED INITIATE THE TO REQUIRED FINGERPRINTING LIVE SCAN  2.  RISK-ASSESSMENT PROCESS PRETRIAL Scan Live Status.  Up-to-Date on Report  Statewide 2.1 an on depend Law Reform Bail the under system reforms criminal justice the of Many criminal new commit appear, might fail to might a that defendant risks the of assessment objective the 2A:162-25(c), N.J.S.A. to Pursuant released.  if crime violent a commit might or activity, process risk-assessment pretrial automated an approved Courts the has of Director  Administrative data objective on relies process That research.
[directive] I remind you of the importance of your duties.  In our [Standard Grand Jury Charge] [Promulgated by Directive #12-06 (July 20, 2006)] Page 5 of 7 country, where the stability of the court rests upon the approval of the people, it is essential that the system for dispensing justice be so conducted and maintained that the public has absolute confidence in its integrity, impartiality, and efficiency.  You need only to obey your oath of office to be certain your actions will inspire that confidence.  Please give careful and impartial consideration to every matter that is presented.  Every case is important.  It is important to the individual who may be involved and it is important to the community.  [Standard Grand Jury Charge]
[directive] (If yes, be sure to include in questions 12 and 13 above).  2.  ¿Entiende que si se declara culpable: Do you understand that if you plead guilty: [Sí/Yes] [No/No] a. se requerirá que usted pierda su licencia de conducir por un período de 6 a 24 meses, a menos que el juez determine que existen circunstancias apremiantes que justifiquen una excepción?
[brief] See Transcript of Planning Board Meeting *(Pa 73-89)*.  The Planning Board apparently accepted the conclusion of the Borough Planner that the Second Ordinance was consistent with the Master Plan because it provided for open space (and other generalized objectives of the Master Plan), and therefore in the view of the Board Planner, was consistent with at least some of the objectives of the Master Plan.  (Pa 73-89).  At the “second reading” of the Second Ordinance which took place on October 24, 2022, the Borough’s Town Council adopted the Second Ordinance which provided that “the Amended Development Plan is consistent with the Master Plan of the [...]. ” (Pa 91-92).  The Town Council, in stating that conclusion, simply accepted the conclusion stated in the Second Planning Board Resolution.  The transcript of the meeting confirms that there was no discussion, analysis or findings made by the Borough Council in adopting the Second Ordinance.
[brief] State v. Singh, DOCKET NO. [...], 7 (App. Div. Nov. 1, 2018) ("The Court has cautioned that "care should be taken to list . . . N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a, the exact statutory provision applicable to breathalyzer refusal cases" in documents charging a defendant with refusal to provide a breath sample.  The officer, prosecutor and judge erred in charging me with 39:4-50.2 instead of 39:4-50.4a.  This prejudiced my ability to provide a defense to the state's allegation that I refused to provide a breath sample for testing under 39:4-50.4a, which is the proper violation.
[brief] 34.  Judge stated that, after his rejections of $20,219.50 from requested $113,497.04, “So the total of fees and disbursements the Court will award is $93,277.54, which I think is fair under the circumstances.  There was a lot of work done.  But, again, given what we're talking about in terms of assets, what we're talking about in terms of what exactly occurred, and I know [...] pointed out that, you know, a lot of this could have been avoided or perhaps diminished, but again, we have to also consider the history of the case.  So I'll enter an order for that amount as well.
[brief] ”  See Sensient Colors, 193 N.J. at 386, 393; see also Century Indem. Co., 398 N.J. Super. at 426-27 (“the party seeking to preserve the second-filed action must demonstrate the existence of one or more special equities that overcome the presumption favoring the first-filed suit”).  Forum non conveniens factors may by relevant to one recognized special equity (whether the first-filed suit would cause “great hardship and inconvenience” to one party) but cannot, by themselves, overcome the presumption in favor of the first-filed action.  See Sensient Colors, 193 N.J. at 389 (citing Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 286 N.J. Super. 24, 39 (App. Div. 1995)).  Nor are “special equities” defined as broadly as Defendants suggest.  (Db29-30).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has described “special equities” as being “extenuating circumstances,” (Sensient Colors, 193 N.J. at 387) and has --- 3
[brief] The agreement is enforceable against [...].  (Da298–304.)**  Plaintiffs also argued below that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable as to [...]—[...]’s husband who was also a passenger in [...]’s car at the time of the accident.  But the parties delegated that threshold question of arbitrability to the arbitrator.  And in any event, Mr.  McGinty is required to arbitrate as a third-party beneficiary of [...]’s arbitration agreement.  First, this Court lacks authority to consider [...]’s challenge to the scope of the December Terms because the parties reserved that threshold question of arbitrability exclusively for the arbitrator.
[directive] One or more Assistant or Deputy Attorneys General, and such other staff as may be appropriate, shall be assigned to review and monitor compliance with the provisions of this Directive.  The Assistant or Deputy Attorney General in charge of the review function shall report directly to the Attorney General, or to such person as the Attorney General may designate, and shall be provided with complete access to all pertinent Office of Counter-Terrorism and Division of State Police intelligence information, files, and other materials and information as may be necessary to efficiently and effectively perform the compliance monitoring function.  The Assistant or Deputy Attorney General-In-Charge shall report to the Attorney General on not less than a quarterly basis as to the implementation of this Directive.
[brief] See 1991 [...] Report and 1994 [...] Report.  Moreover, in 2010, the [...] submitted written testimony to Congress to explain the role of the Holding Act to insurance providers and to answer questions regarding the insurers regulated by the Holding Act.  https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg56778/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg56778.pdf.  As a supplement to this testimony, the [...] attached a list of ---  6
[brief] New Jersey has also routinely applied the standards in Emmons, Phillips, and Karins, to non-law enforcement and firefighters.  See, Rinnier v. Department of Transp., 94 N.J.A.R.2d (Vol.2B) 440(CSV), 1994 WL 183662, Final Agency Decision (Feb. 22, 1994); Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4 (2017); In re Kellish, No. A-1445-18T1, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2082 (App. Div. Oct. 9, 2019); Somerset Cty. Vocational & Tech. Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Vingara, No. A-5456-16T4, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2825 (App. Div. Dec. 27, 2018); Spencer v. Dearborn (In re Spencer), Nos. A-0239-08T2, A-5344-08T3, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1006 (App. Div. May 7, 2010); In re Vena, No. A-4128-05T1, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1325 (App. Div. Oct. 26, 2007); and, In re Wilkinson, No. A-2355-11T1, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 353 (App. Div. Feb. 24, 2014).
[directive] The AG SAFE survey included specific questions on the implementation of policies and procedures governing sexual assault cases.  While the Standards and the 2018 Directive specify much of the process for these cases, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-245 specifically required agencies to indicate the existence of their own policies and procedures.  County Prosecutor’s Offices  To ensure compliance with the Standards, and pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:17B-245, County Prosecutors were asked about specific procedural elements “governing the submission of sexual assault examination kits to an approved forensic laboratory for testing, including specific submission criteria, timelines, and victim notifications; agency policies and procedures for logging, tracking, and storing sexual assault examination kits[.]”  The majority of County Prosecutors indicated the existence of policies regarding handling, logging, tracking kits, storing kits, test kits, and submission criteria and timelines.  KIT  SEXUAL  Victim POLICIES  Handling Notification  Logging Kits  Tracking Kits  Storing Kits  Testing Kits  Timelines  ASSAULT Kits of Testing 80.95% 71.43% 85.71% 57.14% 52.38% 80.95%  CPO 23.81%  Law Enforcement Agencies  In addition to County Prosecutors’ policies, law enforcement agencies were asked to indicate the presence of their own policies regarding SAFE kits.  The proportion of agencies indicating their own specific agency policy on SAFE kits was considerably smaller than that of the County Prosecutors.  Because these agencies operate under the purview of the County Prosecutor, the agencies must comply with the guidelines and/or directives identified at the county level regardless of their own policy.  KIT  SEXUAL Victim POLICIES  Handling ASSAULT  Notification Logging Kits  Tracking Kits  Storing Kits  Testing Kits  Timelines  Kits of Testing 46.76% 37.65% 42.10% 35.82% 29.95% 44.93%  LEA 19.23%  6
[directive] In recognition of this data and the substantial human costs associated with high-speed vehicular pursuits, this Policy further restricts the circumstances under which pursuits can be undertaken.  The offenses for which officers may pursue suspects has been limited to only the most serious crimes.  Significantly, most drug offenses have been removed from the list of crimes authorizing the initiation of a pursuit.  This Policy creates a strong presumption against the initiation of pursuits for traffic violations and prohibits continuation of a pursuit based on the risk created by the speed or evasive driving of the fleeing suspect during the pursuit itself.  It also requires greater oversight by supervisors, and mandates that a pursuit be terminated unless a supervisor affirmatively authorizes it to be continued.  1.4  Deciding whether to pursue a motor vehicle is among the most critical decisions made by law enforcement officers.  It is a decision which must be made quickly and under difficult, often unpredictable circumstances.  In recognition of the potential risk to public and officer safety created by vehicular pursuits, no officer or supervisor shall be criticized or disciplined for a decision not to engage in a vehicular pursuit or to terminate an ongoing vehicular pursuit based on the risk involved, even in circumstances where this Policy would permit the commencement or continuation of the pursuit.  Likewise, officers who conduct pursuits consistent with this Policy will be strongly supported by the law enforcement community in any subsequent review of such actions.  1
[brief] In light of the entire circumstances involved, the Court finds the Township established just cause and termination is appropriate and clearly within the appropriate range of discipline.  This Court considered Plaintiff's prior disciplinary record, the nature of the conduct, and the impact of the misconduct on the public interest, and public safety.  As required by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147, a police officer cannot be suspended, removed, fined, or reduced in rank without just cause.  The Court finds the Township met its burden of proof by a preponderance of all of the credible evidence.  The Court finds this record presents the type of case where progressive discipline should not be imposed even in light of the Court's consideration of the Plaintiff's past record.  The Court finds the nature of the violations displayed by the Plaintiff in his disregard of his duties and untruthfulness are serious and removal is appropriate.
[brief] “[...] certifies this change has been recorded. ”  (R-624)  None of these documents were provided for the 538-policy.  To date proof of receipt, acceptance and recording for the 538-policy has never been provided.  The March 29 letter also provided a breakdown of the value of the policies and how the [...] hid the increase in value of the 538-policy from the Court, the [...] and counsel for [...].
[brief] (Sa5-10).  The court ruled that defendant’s statement from March 11, 2013, while constitutionally obtained by police, was subject to exclusion under N.J.R.E. 403. (Sa10).  evidentiary record from the one at the first trial.  It was based on the various admissions defendant made to several witnesses who testified at the retrial, which lacked the detail that was before the first jury because of defendant’s statements to police and his own testimony from the witness stand.
[brief] *State v. Wilson*, 178 N.J. 7, 14 (2003) (“[T]he State on appeal cannot rely on factual testimony or other proof that was not submitted as part of the lower court’s record. ”).  Moreover, even if [...]’s PCR petitions had been the basis for the court’s holding, the arguments raised therein do not change the rehabilitative character of [...]’s prison conduct.  [...] has never denied that he shot [...], either in proceedings for his direct appeal or in his PCR petitions.  (Db33-34)  (Pa18, 23, 64, 136-137)  Likewise, [...] has denied, without exception, that he stabbed [...].  (Sb7)  The PCR petitions raised only legal arguments as to what consequences can properly follow from these two facts, assuming that the stab wounds – and not the gunshot wound from [...] – were ultimately the injuries that proved fatal.  (Pa9-155)  [...] was entitled to raise these arguments without negative consequence.
[brief] Appellant attempted to issue a “Safe Harbor” notice.  As Appellant failed to comply with R. 1:5-2 and demanded amounts above and beyond entitlement, the alleged “Safe Harbor” communication was defective on its face.  The purported “final order” alleged by Appellant was entered May 31, 2024.  Said Order merely related to the release of the funds on deposit with the Superior Court and had absolutely nothing to do with the issues of compounding post-judgment interest or the award of attorney’s fees.  Appellant commenced this appeal on July 1, 2024 (“Filing Date”).  As the Filing Date was greater than forty-five (45) days from either the April 1, 2024 or the April 29, 2024 underlying Orders, this appeal is untimely pursuant to R. 2:4-1.
[brief] Defendant also claimed in his statement to police that he was struggling with [...] when the gun went off, and was very close to him – within two feet.  (21T:194-15 to 195-9; 22T:208-7 to 21).  However, the medical examiner determined that this was not possible, as there was no soot or stippling on [...]’ clothes or on his body from the gunshots.  (19T:101-7 to 102-7, 119-12 to 120-7).  Moreover, there was a bullet hole in the decking of the carriage house porch, and that bullet hole, when analyzed, revealed that the shot was fired at or near a 90-degree angle – perpendicular to the ground.  (21T:94-5 to 22).  This was not a shot fired at an acute angle, but closer to straight down at [...].  Ibid.  After these acts of deception were revealed, defendant was subsequently arrested on February 14, 2019.
[brief] The record easily supports the conditions of subparagraph g(2).  Specifically, the records supports that the ditch is a man-made agricultural ditch that is less than five (5) feet wide, with little or no flowing water.  Aa155, 158-159; Aa134; Aa166.  The record also supports that the ditch is dominated by dense vegetation that offers little or no value to aquatic species, or fishery resources.  Aa155.  Similarly, the [...] concluded that no adverse impacts to fishery resources are expected from the development.  Aa035.  As a result of the revisions [...] made to its original plans, the [...] concluded that the “riparian zone disturbances have been significantly reduced[,]” and noted the proposed mitigation for the disturbance.  Aa031, Aa034.  The [...] concluded that [...] “demonstrated that compliance with all Federal, State, and local requirements governing roadways cannot be achieved, and that public safety cannot be adequately ensured, without exceeding the [permitted] limit. ”  Aa034.  Moreover, the [...] concluded that the Access Road will “cross a narrow portion of the stream corridor and will be aligned perpendicular to the orientation of the channel[,]” that “no other feasible opportunities for access to Route 1 exist that would avoid crossing a stream[,]” and “that all impacts have been minimized. ”  Aa034.  As such, [...] complied with the feasibility analysis in N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.1(c)(2)(ii) by satisfying the requirements in N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(g).
[brief] [...] (LOT 8)  OFF-SITE PARKING USE/FACILITY ON THE SCHOOL LOT 5 IS NOT A LEGAL ACCESSORY USE/FACILITY ON LOT 5.  THE TRIAL COURT DETERMINATION THAT THIS WAS A LEGAL ACCESSORY USE IS INCORRECT.  (IN SUPPORT OF Db Pt. II AND IN RESPONDING TO Pb Pt. II)  Probably the most illogical position asserted by the Sons of Israel --- and adopted by the Trial Court --- is that an off-site parking use/facility serving a different property is a permitted accessory use on the School Lot 5, because “parking” is a permitted accessory use to a School under Section 18-906 (Da268).  The Lakewood Zoning Regulations as to accessory uses --- as in most towns --- provides and requires that any accessory use be located on the same Lot as the principal use that it is supporting.  See Lakewood Section 18-200.  Almost every use --- be it residential, commercial, or a school/religious facility --- has an accessory parking requirement established and necessary to serve the parking needs of that particular use.  To assert that means that other third-party property or uses can legally commandeer or with the owner’s authorization take over and use portions of that Lot/use’s parking capacity for an off-site third party parking is patently absurd and illogical.  Such an analysis --- if found valid --- would render all accessory parking standards as useless, as the spaces could be rented or assigned to third parties at the Lot owner’s discretion.  Our Appeal Brief cites numerous cases holding that such off-site parking use on a Lot with its principal use is not permitted without variance and site plan approval (Db25-26).  That the Trial Court found that the “School submitted no proofs that the Plaintiff’s use of the Sixth Street Lot is not a permitted use on the property under current regulations or ordinances” (Da279) is simply unexplainable.  The Regulations clearly prohibit such third party parking on the School Lot, and logic dictates that such an off-site parking use cannot be a legal or conforming accessory use.  As support for its illogical claim, the Sons of Israel references the unreported [...] v. ZBA of Lakewood, Dkt A-1981-20, 2022 NJ Super. Lexis 1214 (App. Div. 2022) (Pb 30-31).  That case does not support the Sons’ position.  In Lakewood Realty the use of the easement across the car wash lot for access to the hotel lot/use had been approved by a Zoning Board Subdivision and Variance Approval in 2015.  The Court found that the 2015 Board Subdivision Approval of that access easement use removed the need for a second Board Approval.  In this case, there was no Board Site Plan/Variance Approval for this nonconforming off-site parking use/facility on the School Lot 5.  The Point remains as asserted by [...], without Board Approval of a variance/site plan the off-site parking use of Lot 5 is an illegal use by Zoning Law C.  THE BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO THE LEGALITY OF THE NON-CONFORMING USE WAS ON THE PROPONENT --- [...].