ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See Butler, 27 N.J. at 594-95.  “[A] jury charge is presumed to be proper when it tracks the model jury charge because the process to adopt model jury charges is ‘comprehensive and thorough. ’”  Cotto, 471 N.J. Super. at 583 (quoting State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 325 (2005)).  Indeed, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that “model jury charges should be followed and read in their entirety to the jury,” insofar as they are “consistent with and modified to meet the facts adduced at trial. ”  R.B., 183 N.J. at 325.
[brief] As recounted above, [...] acknowledged on cross-examination that defendant was 20 by the time the case went to trial and by then had had a two-year relationship with his experienced counsel, [...] (4T28-3 to 19).  [...] pointed out that defendant was unwilling to cooperate with the State, (4T43-22 to 44-21), and defendant told his presentence investigator that the State “made a big mistake” and “they have the wrong guy[,]” (4T31-10 to 32-8).  [...] even indicated that defendant wanted to make a plea offer that would have resulted in only 9 or 10 years in State Prison, but because he would not cooperate with prosecutors [...] never tendered the offer to the State.  (Da273).  So, while defendant points to some facts that may support a contrary conclusion, on appeal he can show no abuse of discretion by the judge going the other way.
[brief] ” (Da354).  Furthermore, [...] told the State’s expert:  There was a – remorse at what happened.  I felt upset.  I was wondering why I did it.  I don’t’ know, just thoughts came out of nowhere and I thought they were out to hurt and kill me.  That’s some of what crossed my mind.  [Da442].  [...] told the social worker [...] “I am sorry for what I did, I won’t do that again. ” (Da311).  Both experts at trial testified that [...]’s mental health issues impact his ability to properly display emotions.  Therefore, it was improper for the court to completely ignore [...]’s autism and/or schizophrenia diagnosis and simply State “I do not find mitigating factor number nine because this defendant shows no remorse for his actions and that lack of remorse is sufficient to preclude this application. ” (17T:211-12 to 15).
[directive] (a)  The Summary and Conclusions Report described in Section 9.1.1(b) shall be released in response to a request made under the common law right of access by any member of the public or press where it satisfies any of the following conditions: (1)  The Summary and Conclusions Report led to a result on or after January 1, 2023, that requires disclosure pursuant to Section 9.11.2; (2) The agency otherwise concludes that the Summary and Conclusions Report is subject to release pursuant to applicable law or court order; or (3)  Upon the request or at the direction of the County Prosecutor or Attorney General at any time.
[directive] 11.  Èske w konprann ke si w deja plede koupab, oswa yo dekare w koupab de lòt [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  [pa aplikab akizasyon, oswa wap pije yon tèm prizon aktyèlman, epi antant la pa mansyone /NA] kesyon sa a ditou, tribinal la ta kab mande pou pije santans yo youn aprè lòt?  Do you understand that if you have plead guilty to, or have been found guilty on other charges, or are presently serving a custodial term and the plea agreement is silent on the issue, the court may require that all sentences be made to run consecutively?
[brief] Jones, 230 N.J. at 148.  In Mejia, the Court was deciding the narrow question of “whether a third-party defendant, facing only claims for contribution and common-law indemnification from an original defendant that did not file an affidavit of merit against him, must participate in the trial establishing the underlying liability. ”  Mejia, 241 N.J. at 364.  The issue was the participation of a third party defendant,\(^8\) not the legal consequences of that third-party defendant’s invulnerability to liability to the plaintiff and the corresponding need to mold the verdict.  The Jones decision is particularly informative, in that it reinforced the logical underpinning of Burt.
[brief] [...] Parties’ Negotiations With Appellants**  In or about April 2017, [...] approached Appellant, [...], expressing an interest in acquiring the Solar Rights to the Solar Project.  To evaluate the Solar Project, [...] requested access to all the information relating to the Solar Project and the Property.  [...], two (2) years earlier, had entered into a --- \(^3\)  As found by the trial court in its Opinion granting summary judgment to the [...] Parties in the Prior Action:  “For any solar project in New Jersey that seeks to connect to the existing power grid, the approvals consist of a Wholesale Market Participation Agreement (“WMPA”) with PJM, an agreement with the utility power company, such as [...] (“[...]”), and registrations with the [...] (“[...]”).  However, to finalize and rely upon these approvals, the developer must have a recognized possessory interest in the land to be developed, as well as local land use approval.  If a developer does not have this land interest, its approvals to connect to the grid are voidable if the PJM, [...], or the [...] learn that the entity does not exercise control over that land.  Moreover, if a solar developer fails to obtain or loses one of the approvals comprising the bundle (as in this case), it cannot move forward with the solar project. ”  [Pa145].  “Non-Disclosure/Non-Circumvention Agreement” dated September 28, 2015 (the “NDA”).  This NDA was between [...] and [...], which along with [...], owned [...].  [Pa140].  As acknowledged by Appellants, after the NDA was executed, between September 2015 and late 2017, Appellants themselves “disclosed all aspects of its proprietary and confidential information pertaining to [Appellants’] ongoing establishment of a solar farm under the auspices of [...] Solar.  [Appellants’] confidential disclosures included plans, applications, contracts, negotiation histories, contact lists, and other proprietary records pertaining to the acquisition of the [...] SREC rights and the separate 20-year lease for the land, municipal and state filings and permit applications, and other proprietary materials.
[brief] Walmsley v. Philadelphia, 872 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1989).  (Pa304).  Only a legal seizure of an arrestee may justify the warrantless search of his person and the area within his immediate grasp *Chimel v. California*, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) and exigency above and beyond the mere mobility of the vehicle is required.  An officer must “articulable” reasons to believe that the evidence would be at risk if a search was delayed.
[brief] A motor vehicle stop by a police officer, no matter how brief or limited, is a " 'seizure' of 'persons' " under both the Federal and State Constitutions...To justify such a seizure, "a police officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle, or its occupants, is committing a motor-vehicle violation or a criminal or disorderly persons offense."  ..."The suspicion necessary to justify a stop must not only be reasonable, but also particularized."  ...An investigative stop "may not be based on arbitrary police practices, the officer's subjective good faith, or a mere hunch."  [Internal citations omitted by me]  I am not going to put a lot of weight on the argument revolving around the warrantless search of my mom’s car because it did not result in any findings.  On the other hand, I am going to mentions it here as it is another error from the officers which again violated my fourth amendment rights because they did not have "sufficient exigent circumstances" to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle, including opening the locked trunk, considering the vehicle was impounded.
[brief] To the contrary, its decision was unsupported by either the memorializing Resolution or the record and, instead, ascribed “undue weight to the residents’ unsubstantiated” and, at times, irrelevant testimony.  M31.  Consequently, the [...] acted “arbitrarily, capriciously, [and] unreasonably” since its findings of fact in support of the denial of the variance relief sought were not supported by the record and, thus, its decision must be reversed.
[brief] Db12-19.  Therefore the City will respond only as necessary to the points addressed by Plaintiffs’ brief.  One of the primary themes throughout Plaintiff’s brief is that the City did not “prove” harm under the third factor of the Doe test.  However, potential harm was clearly outlined in the City’s submissions despite Plaintiffs’ contentions.  Additionally, this factor addresses the “potential” for harm and does not require proof of actual harm.  Id.  The City’s moving brief clearly outlined the potential for harm, including citizens being spammed with unwanted communications and solicitations; citizens being unwilling to sign up for important governmental alerts because they do not want their e-mail address to become public record; and the potential for hacking given that e-mail addresses often double as the login information for various personal accounts.  Db16.  The City also proffered proof that citizens would be dissuaded from signing up for alerts if they knew their e-mail addresses would become public record, and that would prevent them from receiving potentially lifesaving communications.  See Da239-251; Db17.  Dissuading citizens from signing up for public safety alerts, such as traffic, weather, or other emergency communications clearly represents a potential harm.  Plaintiffs contend that the City only showed that there would be inconvenience and did not “prove” that there was no way to remedy the “inconvenience. ”  Pb12.  As to the possibility of remedying the potential “inconvenience”, Plaintiffs suggest things such as withdrawing an e-mail address from the list; creating a separate e-mail address just to sign up for alerts; and signing up for text alerts.  Pb12.  However, these suggestions all ignore the facts of this case, wherein the e-mail addresses have already been provided to [...].  If [...] is ordered to disclose the e-mail addresses that they have for individuals who signed up for their service, there is no way for those individuals to take their names off the list or utilize a different e-mail address or method.  The City has suggested previously, and now reiterates, that even if the Court were to find in favor of Plaintiffs, the determination should be only on a going-forward basis, and that citizens should be given the opportunity to remove themselves from the list or sign up with a different e-mail address or method of delivery.
[brief] Superior Court of New Jersey-Appellate Division  Hughes Justice Complex 25 Market St Trenton, NJ  [...] AND [...], CUST, [...] UNIF TRAN MIN ACT PA V. [...] A/K/A [...]; [...]; [...] AND [...], DEFENDANT/APPELLANT  Docket # [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], Law Div., Monmouth County Sept. 11, 2024
[brief] (T22:7-23:4.)  Instead, Plaintiffs sought to use the WARD Memo through a general, fleeting reference in their brief to try to prove alleged inconsistencies between the Redevelopment Plan and the Master Plan.  This attempted use, in addition to violating the Trial Court’s directions and the parties’ agreement, is hearsay and not admissible under the New Jersey Rules of Evidence.  (Id.)  [...] maintained that Plaintiffs were required to either make any such permissible arguments in their trial briefs or to have designated the appropriate witness(es), if qualified, to testify and be subject to cross-examination, as it was not required to defend against a hearsay document at trial.²
[brief] Court noted that if the court decided again that the sentences should run consecutively, the court should set forth its reasons as required by State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985).  (Da18).  At the resentencing, [...] again ran the certain persons offense consecutive to the robbery, stating: I ran the possession of a weapon concurrent to the first degree robbery because the weapon was used in the robbery and it should run concurrent.  However, a certain person is a separate and distinct offense apart from possession of a weapon.  Its own distinctive element of having a previous conviction, a felony conviction, which would not allow a person to have a gun.  And that being a separate crime, pursuant to State versus Yarborough,[sic] separate crime, separate instances deserve consecutive sentences which is why I imposed it.
[brief] THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY REQUIRE A REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT’S FEBRUARY 20, 2019  ORDER ESTABLISHING A VALUATION DATE OF JANUARY 27, 1994 (2T6:7-7:18).  The purpose of N.J.S.A. 20:3-30 is not to provide either the condemner or the property owner with a windfall.  Instead, the statute was intended to “equalize” the effects of any declaration of blight while giving due consideration to the actual circumstances surrounding the property itself in calculating just compensation.  Its primary consideration, first and foremost, is to ensure equity to all parties.  Although the statute enumerates several dates by which valuation of a property can be calculated, it remains a core principle of our judicial system that courts are not bound to enforce the literal effect of these statutes if doing so would result in an injustice or abrogation of the intent of the statute.  Here, the Legislature cannot have intended to provide the [...] with the market value of the Property as of January 27, 1994, yet permit them to reap the benefits of twenty-four years of surplus rental income until the Township actually took the property on May 4, 2018.  The facts unique to this case are likely a case of first impression.  The [...] maintained possession and control over the Property for decades after the declaration of blight as discussions to renovate the Property between the Township and the [...] stalled and resulted in litigation.  During this twenty-four year period, the [...] continued to rent the Property to tenants and reaped profit thereby.  Because of these unique facts, the valuation date should be fixed at the date the Township actually took possession of the Property rather than a rote application of the statute.
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE OLDER WORKERS BENEFIT PROTECTION ACT PERMITTED RESPONDENT TO**  ---  \(^3\)  Respondent’s reliance on the more than seventy-year-old decision in *Larsen & Fish, Inc. v. Schultz*, 5 N.J. Super. 403, 405 (App. Div. 1949) demonstrates the frivolity of this argument.  First, *Larsen* did not involve a settlement agreement.  Also, there was no contract reached, rather, the acceptance contained an additional term which was rejected.  Here, that is not the case.  Instead, all parties and counsel agreed to the terms of the settlement contract on the record.  Moreover, it is that contract, which is sought to be enforced in this matter, not the subsequent unexecuted draft Settlement Agreement which Respondent claims contained additional terms not agreed upon.  Finally, it should be noted that a settlement contract cannot be undone simply because a settling party seeks to change a term.  Rather, such AMENDMENT to the contract is only incorporated if subsequently agreed to by both the parties.  Simply proposing a change to the term of a settlement contract, which has been reached and agreed to does not, as noted by the trial court in rejecting this argument, invalidate the contract.
[brief] [...] EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY BY UNILATERALLY BINDING THE PARTIES TO A GROUND RULE REQUIRING THE BOARD TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE ASSOCIATION’S ENTIRE MEMBERSHIP AS A PRECONDITION TO NEGOTIATIONS (Pa245).  [...] essentially created a ground rule for negotiations by requiring the Board to negotiate with the Association’s entire membership as a precondition to negotiations (Ibid.).  [...] has held that “nothing in [the Act]…or any other statute that [[...] is] aware of would preclude…parties from agreeing to conduct their negotiations in open public session,” and that “[t]herefore, this is a permissive subject of negotiations.  Either party may propose it and the parties would be free to agree to it, but neither party can insist upon public negotiations as a precondition to negotiations. ”  I/M/O [...], supra (Pa271).  [...], through its Order, has done exactly that, by requiring the parties to engage in what the Association itself defines as “open collective negotiations (Pa232),” without the parties agreeing to same and as a precondition to negotiations.
[directive] The purpose of these Standards is to establish uniform law enforcement procedures for the response to, and investigation of, bias incidents.  Page 2 of 16  New Jersey law enforcement shall take an active role in promoting peace and harmony among the diverse groups living and working within the State and protect all citizens from bias incidents.  New Jersey law enforcement agencies shall conduct a thorough and complete investigation of all suspected or confirmed bias incidents and shall cooperate with prosecutors in the prompt and appropriate prosecution of these matters.  To accomplish these purposes, the chief executives of all law enforcement agencies shall apply the elements of these Standards to their individual agencies through a formal written order or directive which reflects the individual needs of each New Jersey law enforcement agency and the community it serves.  3.  DEFINITION OF BIAS INCIDENT AND RELATED CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS
[brief] The State monitors assigned to [...], whom the State’s brief goes out of its way to malign, have stated publicly numerous times that the district’s problem is a revenue problem not a spending problem.  The report of the [...]’s Office of State Auditor, and statements from the district’s professional auditors and a number of prominent state legislators from the area all attributed [...]’s educational problems to [...]’s shortcomings, not local mismanagement, and they join the student-appellants in urging that the statutory funding formula be modified.  As to [...]-related failures, the State would have this court ignore: (I) the State’s failure to periodically evaluate and adjust [...] to meet [...]’s concededly unique demographics and their enormous drain on the public school budget; and (ii) the Commissioner’s annual certifications that have generated hundreds of millions of dollars of repayable loans to [...], creating an unsustainable fiscal situation, because [...] otherwise would have insufficient funds for T&E (in other word, [...] doesn’t generate enough funding for the [...] to provide T&E).
[brief] It is the substance, the purpose, of a transaction that governs.  *Green v. Continental Rentals*, 292 N.J. Super. 241 (Law Div. 1994) (the substance of a transaction determines if it is usurious; finding rent-to-own transactions to be time sales, subject to state law interest limits); See *Zaman v. Felton*, 219 N.J. 299 (2014) (sale lease-back taken as a whole was an extension of credit).  Here, the agreements (**AA017**) should be considered together with the “Schedule of Amount Purchased” (**AA009**) and (**AA016**) and the lien sticker  Those facts indicate that despite the language of the agreement, the amounts tendered by defendant to plaintiff were a loan, meant to be repaid to the best of plaintiffs’ ability.  That the agreement between the parties was a “sale” is contradicted by the confusing nature of the contract, and all of the extrinsic circumstances which are properly considered when interpreting a contract.  In support of its position that the transaction is not a loan, the defendant cites Karns Prime & Fancy Food, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue., 494 F.3d. 404 (3rd Cir. 2007).
[brief] Defense counsel argued that the State's delay in providing the new information about [...]'s ability to identify defendant as his assailant was extremely prejudicial because in her opening to the jury she had emphasized that [...] would be the only witness to make an in-court identification.  Defense counsel reminded the court that she had specifically told the jury in her opening that [...] would be unable to do so.  After arguing that the resulting prejudice could not be cured, the defense moved for mistrial.
[brief] The ALJ completely ignored the import of the facts developed on the record.  [...] has a personnel file.  [...] is referred to in their employment and finance records as an Employee.  [...] has always been paid on a W-2.  [...] never signed a professional services contract until 2015 (which such agreement in paragraph 1 ironically defines scope of employment (emphasis added).  How can you have a scope of employment when you are not an employee?  It is simple, you don’t unless you’re a public entity and you do whatever you want.  The agreement was a rouse to check a box.  The proper reference would be listed as terms and conditions of the contract and not scope of employment.
[directive] Promulgated by Directive #21-06 (December 11, 2006)  Page 4 of 29  The use of written questionnaires – i.e., those answered in writing by prospective jurors – is a permitted practice but should be used only in exceptional circumstances.  This practice is routinely used in capital trials, where an extremely thorough voir dire is required to evaluate death-eligibility.  These trials are very lengthy and the voir dire process usually spans several weeks or months, with jurors scheduled to return for voir dire on a specific date.  The judge and attorneys typically receive and review the answered questionnaires in advance to enable them to prepare for the voir dire of each juror.  In non-capital criminal trials and in civil trials, the time required and administrative burdens attendant to this practice are not generally warranted.  If the process is rushed, without allowing the attorneys and judge time for advance review of the answered questionnaires, the process is inefficient and ineffective.  In addition, the effort involved can be made unnecessary if counsel still want to observe the jurors responding verbally to questions in order to get a better “feel” regarding the jurors.  The Special Committee did not receive a widespread request for the use of this practice in routine cases.  The practice should be used, in the judge's discretion, only in substantial, complex cases that require unusually probing voir dire and only where, in relation to the overall trial, the time and administrative burden are warranted.