ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  On September 13, 2022, just thirteen days after the entry of the August 31, 2022 order, the Administrator of the Estate, [...], Esq., contacted Defendant’s counsel, [...], Esq.  Mr. Reiser informed him that he would be filing a motion with the probate court to, among other things, be relieved of the responsibility for filing on behalf of the Estate a non-resident United States Tax Return; to have Defendant designated as the person responsible for the filing, if one was required; for an award of additional fees and disbursements; and to be discharged of any further duties as Administrator in the matter.  (Da2488-2490). ¹  Defendant’s counsel and the Administrator thereafter engaged in discussions, which were interrupted to a degree by the Administrator’s vacation, regarding whether counsel would object to the Administrator’s proposed motion and whether counsel would consent to the Administrator’s form of order.  Both the Administrator and Defendant’s counsel attempted, unsuccessfully, to speak with Plaintiff’s counsel, [...], Esq., to seek his consent also.  (Id., Paras. 4-6).  On February 1, 2023, the Administrator filed his Notice of Motion seeking the relief set forth above.
[directive] Home Detention with Electronic Monitoring  HDEM is the most restrictive level of monitoring and should only be considered for defendants who are just beneath the need for detention and pose a risk so significant that an immediate response it required for a violation of their confinement.  Generally, this risk will only arise in cases in which there is a victim.  a.  Cases in which there is a victim:  i.  The victim must be a person.  EM is not appropriate where the victim is a business, town, agency, etc.  ii.  The victim must have a known address.  Pretrial Services must be able to enter an identifiable exclusion zone.  Thus, a proper address is necessary.  Instructions  Promulgated via Directive #19-23 (10/17/2023), CN: 12972 page 6 of 8 b.  Other extraordinary circumstance:  i.  The defendant’s release recommendation is either “Release with condition – Weekly reporting + HD/EM” or “No Release Recommended. ”  ii.  The extraordinary circumstances must be explained on the form and the pretrial release order, including why EM is necessary in ensuring the defendant’s compliance pretrial and how EM satisfies this requirement.  c.  Residence parameters.  A defendant ordered to HDEM must meet all residence requirements of HDLE in addition to:  i.  Defendant’s residence must be no less than 2,500 feet from an identified victim.  This accounts for the recommended 1,500 ft. exclusion zone and 500-foot inclusion zone recommended by [...], along with an additional 500 feet in between the zones.  ii.  The defendant must confirm that they have access to an electrical outlet throughout the day, evening, and overnight hours to charge the EM equipment.  d.  Technology Parameters for HDEM.  Required technology will be provided to the defendant.  However, the defendant must care for the equipment including having access to electricity for charging.  e.  Employment.  A defendant ordered to HDEM may be permitted to work.  The defendant shall meet the same requirements listed in HDLE.  In addition: i.  Pretrial Services must be able to verify the employer’s name and address. to enter the work location as an inclusion zone in [...]  ii.  In addition, some physical labor jobs may not be conducive to using EM equipment such as being submerged in water or manual labor where there is a likelihood of breaking the EM bracelet.  f.  Medical Appointments.  A defendant ordered to HDEM may be permitted to attend regularly scheduled medical appointments.  The defendant shall meet the same requirements enumerated for HDLE.  Defendants on HDEM are monitored via GPS and as such will not be monitored via any random video checks.  IV.
[directive] Prior custodial sentence: The final disposition for an offense committed by the Defendant, handed down before the Index Assault.  The sentence itself must be for at least 30 days.  ✔  The Defendant must have been admitted to an adult or juvenile correctional facility, prison, or jail, but the Defendant need not have ✔ been in custody for the entire 30 days.  Count the sentence, not the time spent in custody.  Do not include a sentence given for the Index Assault.  ✘ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________
[brief] In Count 8, complainant alleges that the Board’s monthly newsletter published in October 2021 included untrue language meant to “scare the voters away from voting ‘no. ’”  Although Petitioner claims that the newsletter contains untrue assertions, he does not state with specificity which allegations are untrue, as the regulations require.  See N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.4 (a)(7) (stating that the complaint must “include evidence that substantiates the inaccuracy of the information provided by the respondent(s) and evidence that establishes that the inaccuracy was other than reasonable mistake or personal opinion or was not attributable to developing circumstances”).  The allegation therefore fails as a matter of law because it is devoid of any specific facts substantiating the inaccuracy of the provided information or otherwise supporting the claim that the newsletter is misleading.
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, I have proven that [...], upon behalf of [...], Respondent, has made absolutely NO valid claims nor legal arguments, all of which I have refuted based on previously substantiated evidence from my prior Appeal Brief and my prior Motions, for denying my Appeal, which should be granted.  Proposed Order (prior Brief, Exh. “AF”) (502a-507a), which consolidates the relevant issues that I am appealing, should be granted for issuance by [...].
[directive] Standard 7:  SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR VULNERABLE POPULATIONS  The special needs of vulnerable victims shall be recognized and addressed by law enforcement officers, healthcare providers, and CSVAs.  Several populations of adolescents and adults are especially vulnerable to sexual assault.  Individuals with physical, developmental, intellectual, sensory, mental, cognitive, and/or emotional disabilities are at a substantially higher risk of sexual assault victimization than individuals without disabilities.  These individuals may live independently, with family, or they may be residents of skilled nursing facilities/nursing homes, assisted living facilities, or community-based group homes.  In some cases, sexual assault can be perpetrated by those in caretaking positions.  Other individuals who may be vulnerable to sexual assault are those who do not believe they can access help due to cultural/religious norms, language barriers, and real and/or perceived fears related to immigration status, incarceration status, sexual orientation/gender identity, or being a victim of human trafficking.  Additionally, due to the unique structure of the military, victims of sexual assault in the armed services will face different hurdles than their civilian peers.  They will engage with a different system, with its own reporting options, investigative processes, and prosecutorial procedures.  Therefore, it is important to understand the differences and the sensitivities of this victim population when providing them services.  Please consult Appendix V, Sexual Assault of Military Personnel.
[brief] With regards to the materiality prong of [...]’s test, constitutional materiality means evidence that both possesses an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and that is of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.  *George v. City of Newark*, 384 N.J. Super. 232, 244 (App. Div. 2006) (referencing *California v. Trombetta*, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984)).  Neither of these conditions were met on the facts of this case.  Thermometers are used to measure axillary and ambient temperature for standard death investigations; they are basic equipment, the functionality of which is not typically at issue.  At the time the thermometer was presumably returned to circulation within the medical examiner’s office, there was no reason to expect that the thermometer, any more than a scale or a measuring tape, would have any evidentiary value.
[brief] (6T, 63:16-22).  [...] never saw any correspondence between [...] and [...]’s principal, [...], referring or relating to the fact that [...] wanted to partner up with him or joint venture with [...]/Ingerman for this particular Monroe project.  (6T, 68:18-23).  When asked if he read any of [...]’s deposition transcripts for purposes of his opinion, [...] conceded that there were no depositions cited in the report.  (6T, 69:13-19).  [...] did not know that [...] was the owner of a dry cleaning business in Staten Island.
[brief] Defendants rolled the dice going to trial.  They, like all parties who do so, accepted the risk that the jury could award more than they hoped for, or less, or even nothing at all.  Judges regularly rely on this refrain – more, less, or nothing at all – when speaking to litigants who choose to accept settlements.  Juries are unpredictable; settlements are tangible.  So when parties take that gamble and lose, they must face the consequences of their decision.  There are no do-overs, mulligans, or second chances.  To entertain such would be a waste of the time, resources, and emotional investment of the litigants and judiciary alike.
[brief] *Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs.* , 182 N.J. 210, 230 (2005) (internal markings omitted).  The parties to this transaction clearly allocated risks between themselves through the PSA, and the trial court’s attempt to impose additional protections for [...] is inconsistent with this principle.  The parties’ explicit allocation of risk as expressed in the PSA governs.  **CONCLUSION.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT [...] LACKS THE REQUISITE STANDING TO SUE, AND ITS FINDINGS SHOULD BE UPHELD.  Review of a legal question is de novo.  Grillo v. State, 469 N.J. Super. 267 (App. Div. 2021) (appellate courts review a dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) de novo).  Accordingly, review of the trial court's orders that dismissed claims for lack of standing are reviewed de novo.  Goldman v. Critter Control of New Jersey, 454 N.J. Super. 418 (App. Div. 2018).  In reviewing a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), the court must examine the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint.  Printing Mart v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989); Nostrame v. Santiago, 213 N.J. 109, 126-27 (2013).  The court “searches the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim .  . . .”  Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746 (1989) (internal quotation omitted).  “For purposes of analysis plaintiffs are entitled to every reasonable inference of fact. ”  Ibid.  Dismissal is appropriate where the plaintiff’s complaint fails to articulate a legal basis for relief and further discovery would not provide one.  *Camden Cnty. Energy Recovery Assoc., L.P. v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Prot.*, 320 N.J. Super. 59, 63-65 (App. Div. 1999).  Moreover, in order to be considered adequate, pleadings must contain “a statement of the facts on which the claim is based, showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader claims entitlement. ”  *R.* 4:5-2.  “It has long been established that pleadings reciting mere conclusions without facts . . . do not justify a lawsuit. ”  *Glass v. Suburban Restoration Co.*, 317 N.J. Super. 574, 582 (App. Div. 1998).  In dismissing the complaint with prejudice, the court made a correct, rational, and legally sound decision after considering all relevant facts, case law, and arguments.  As such, the trial court’s decision should be affirmed.
[directive] Do you understand that because you have pled guilty to these charges the court must impose a year term of parole supervision and that term will begin as soon as you complete the sentence of incarceration?  First Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 5 years  Second Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 3 years 3.  Èske w konprann ke si w ta dezobeyi kondisyon libète kondisyonèl sou sipèvizyon a yo [Wi/Yes]
[brief] While perhaps not a “classic” accident in the sense that he didn’t trip over something or fall because of something on the ground, it was an undesigned and unexpected traumatic event that resulted in [...]’s suffering a disabling injury while performing his job.  Viewed in context, the injury was caused by an event “external” to [...], Richardson, supra, 192 N.J. at 212-13, qualifying him to receive his Accidental Disability pension.  This Court on this legal issue isn’t required to afford the determining agency its normal discretion and as such may overturn the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) as affirmed by the Pension Board and grant [...] his Accidental Disability Pension Benefits.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Da84.  First, §146-7(c) specifically references “shouting”, “screaming” or “loud talking”, not conversation, or talking, or debate, and certainly not family members speaking to one another, but rather shouting which is in alignment with the purpose of the Ordinance, prohibiting noise nuisances.  Da111.  The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “shout” as a “loud cry or call” which is very different than the trial court’s concern that the Ordinance would reach family member conversations.  Further, the word “excessive” is utilized as a qualifying word in this section to explicitly set forth the extent of shouting, screaming or loud talking, that would be necessary to fall under the parameters of the Ordinance.  Excessiveness implies an amount or degree too great to be reasonable or acceptable.  The Ordinance puts a rational and reasonable limiting parameter on this section of the Ordinance in the use of the word “excessive.
[brief] The complaint was based on allegations that defendants misrepresented [...] as a top global tax preparation and business consulting firm that could provide investors with substantial returns on their investment in either: 1) membership units in [...]; or 2) promissory notes purporting to monetize standby letters of credit.  (Pa2-Pa3).  In connection with the offer and sale of the unregistered [...] membership units and promissory notes, [...] and [...] failed to inform investors that [...] and [...] were subject to judgments or were named as defendants in other litigation.  (Pa18-Pa20).  Those judgments included a court decision that found [...] had engaged in fraudulent conduct while working with an [...] mortgage modification client and “impermissibly and improperly held himself out as an attorney. ” (Pa18-Pa20; Pa916).  Additionally, [...] and [...] never told investors that: 1) the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) had assessed taxes, interest, and penalties against [...] and [...], and ordered them to pay unpaid taxes; and 2) [...] had been borrowing significant sums through factoring agreements with merchant cash advance companies, which would have access to and would withdraw a significant amount of investor funds from [...]’s and [...]’s bank accounts.  (Pa9-Pa10; Pa17-Pa18; Pa20).  The verified complaint also asserted [...] and [...] told investors their funds would be used to expand [...]’s business or to monetize standby letters of credit.  (Pa8).  Instead, [...] and [...], through [...], used those funds to pay [...]’s personal expenses, make other cash withdrawals, repay merchant cash lenders’ previous cash advances, and for other non-business-related purposes.  (Pa2-Pa3; Pa8; Pa10-Pa20).  To facilitate these personal and other non-business-related payments, [...] and [...] improperly transferred funds to a separate [...]-owned non-profit entity, [...].  (Pa3; Pa6; Pa9).  Investors did not invest in [...] and were not told their funds went there.  (Pa3; Pa9).  Following defendants’ repeated discovery defaults, on October 22, 2021, the court entered an order suppressing and striking defendants’ answer and affirmative defenses with prejudice, pursuant to Rule 4:23-5(a)(2).
[brief] At the time of the November 12, 2021, oral argument, the most recent order had set deadlines to finish expert depositions by December 30, 2021.  (Pa273).  This was an agreed upon date; however, the case management order was not yet signed by [...] at the time of oral argument before [...].  At the time of oral argument, depositions of several defense experts were pending or to be scheduled. \(^9\)  A constant theme throughout the matter was the difficulty meeting the expert deposition deadlines set by [...] due to the sheer number of experts and attorneys involved.  Eventually, on November 18, 2021, [...] signed an order extending discovery until December 30, 2021, which was ultimately the final discovery end date.  (Pa273).  The new deadline of December 30, 2021, was fewer than six weeks after oral argument.  [...] denied plaintiffs initial application to designate [...] as an expert and replace [...] for a host of reasons: the age of the case, the fact that plaintiff had a qualified expert who had already been deposed, and the resulting --- \(^8\)  Plaintiffs inexplicably waited almost two months before filing the motion for reconsideration on October 20, 2021.  (Pa209).  This fact was discussed at oral argument.  2T18-19 to 20-13.  \(^9\)  There were in fact twelve experts scheduled to be deposed.  (Pa274-275) complications and prejudice that allowing a new expert report would cause at such a late stage in the case when the court was trying to move cases forward.  1T9-1 to 11-25.  When plaintiffs filed their motion for reconsideration, the circumstances had not changed.  At the time the reconsideration motion was filed, the case had only gotten older, plaintiffs still had their qualified expert, and the discovery end date at the time was just under six weeks away.  [...] saw no reason to overturn his prior decision, because there was no good cause to do so.  2T31-15 to 33-22.  It was appropriate for [...] to deny plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of his August 27, 2021, order.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery and Granting Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Protective Order, filed February 2, 2023 ................................................................. Pa0190 Transcript of Motion, dated February 2, 2023 ........................................... 1T20-23 Final Judgment Pursuant to R. 4:42-2, filed August 24, 2023 ...................... Pa0192 Trial Opinion, filed August 24, 2023 .......................................................... Pa0194 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## CASES - **Alves v. Rosenberg**, 400 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 2008) .................................................9 - **Atl. N. Airlines v. Schwimmer**, 12 N.J. 293 (1953) .........................................................13, 14, 15 - **Capital Health Sys., Inc. v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc.**, 230 N.J. 73 (2017) ..................................................................................................................8, 21 - **Carbajal v. Patel**, 468 N.J. Super. 139 (App. Div. 2021) ......................................................9, 33 - **Conway v. 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs.**, 187 N.J. 259 (2006) .....................................................13, 14 - **Dolson v. Anastasia**, 55 N.J. 2 (1969)
[brief] In a pretrial hearing, the State moved to limit defense arguments and have certain defense witnesses ruled irrelevant.  (9T7-3 to 10).  One was [...], the attorney who represented defendant when he was suspended.  (9T55-22 to 25; Pa21).  In response, defense counsel argued the fact three search warrants “were executed and nothing was found is obviously an important fact for the [d]efense as far as this allegedly stolen ID.
[brief] Da268-269.  The primary distinguishing factor between the instant matter and the *Rise Against Hate* matter is that in this matter, [...] does not even have the information in its possession.  The information in this case is personal information which was provided to a third party by citizens when signing up for the service.  It is not even collected, made, maintained, or kept on file by the City.  On the contrary, Plaintiffs cite other privacy related OPRA matters, such as *Bozzi v. City of Jersey*, 248 N.J. 274, 287 (2021) and *Brennan v. Bergen County Prosecutor's Off.*, 185 A.3d 202, 203 (N.J. 2018).  *Brennan* and *Bozzi* are both clearly distinct from the issue at hand because they involved information contained on records related to a public endeavors, such as owning a dog or participating in a public auction.  Whereas in this instance, using an unlisted private e-mail address to sign up for passive alerts from the government is not an inherently public endeavor.  Plaintiffs also argue that in Brennan and Bozzi demonstrate that categorical exemptions should not be read into OPRA.  The City does not argue that a categorical exemption should be made for all e-mail addresses, but that the e-mail addresses in this specific instance should not be subject to disclosure due to the analysis of the Doe balancing test.
[brief] Finally, and crucially, he concluded that over the life of the Project the major result of the Financial agreement will be to “shift approximately $25 million in [...] costs away from [...] taxpayers, and shift that cost burden to the taxpayers of [...] and [...]. ”  Pa707, par 24.  In the case of a long-term tax exemption ordinance based only on conclusory “findings,” Plaintiffs arguably have a lesser burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of its validity since, by its terms, it does not satisfy the LTTEL as Plaintiffs construe the law.
[directive] Recognizing that pending of defendant a custody maintain to required are police delayed and is decision charging system Scan Live either 2.2.2, the if subsection of provisions the notwithstanding decision, that preliminary a of the results if or operational, not is system PSA automated  Judiciary's the or reasonable within a available will be not or not are otherwise risk-assessment pretrial automated or prosecutor assistant an defendant), the fingerprinting of hours within two (e.g., time of period or a Directive, of this 3.2 Section with accordance in consulted general attorney deputy complaint- the to make proceed may 3.3.2, subsection to pursuant designated officer supervisory set provisions/presumptions applying the determination by complaint-warrant versus summons See assessment. risk pretrial automated an of results the on depend not do that 4 Section forth in the to delay time of period reasonable a constitutes what to as determination