ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 2.  **There is no competent evidence that [...] abused his lawfully prescribed medication (Issue Raised at Pa46-Pa50, Pa54-Pa55; Raised In Exceptions Point II)**  The allegation that [...] abused his pain medication permeates this matter.  However, both [...] and [...] confirmed that there was nothing illegal or improper with [...] having been prescribed pain medication.  (T1 164:8-14; T2 52:3-6, 67:5-68:1).  There was no competent evidence proving that [...] improperly obtained prescriptions or abused his medication in any manner.  (T1 167:8-11; T5 102:20-103:17).  There is no competent evidence that [...] shared his medication with any other person.  (T1 164:8-165:5).  There is no competent evidence that [...] took his medication while on duty or was impaired while at work.  (T4 104:17-19).  [...] never tested positive for any Departmental drug tests be it scheduled or random.  (T1 161:19-23; T4 149:12-150:5).  [...] took his medication as prescribed.  (T4 184:9-11).  [...]’s attendance at rehab does not demonstrate abuse of the medication.  Instead, as confirmed by [...], anyone prescribed opioids for as long as [...] was would likely be required a “detox” program to wean off of the medication.  (T2 49:22-50:14).  Any part of the Decision predicated upon the finding or inference that [...] abused his pain medication must be disregarded.
[brief] | | | Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, Inc., | 35 | | 140 N.J. 623 (1995) | | | Crisitello v. St. Theresa School, | 34 | | 465 N.J. Super. 223 (App. Div. 2020) | | | Cutler v. Dorn, | 33 | | 196 N.J. 419 (2008) | | | El-Sioufi v. St. Peter's University Hosp., | 33 | | 382 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2005)  | | | In re Estate of DeFrank, | 31, 32 | | 433 N.J. Super. 258 (App. Div. 2013)  | | Fleming v. Corr. Healthcare Sols., Inc., 164 N.J. 90 (2000)  .................................................................35  Franek v. Tomahawk Lake Resort, 333 N.J. Super. 206 (App. Div. 2000)  ...........................................44  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994) .........................................................34  Grande v. St. Clare’s Health System, 230 N. J. 1 (2017) ......................................................................35  Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 177 N.J. 434 (2003) ..................................................................38  Hitesman v. Bridgeway, 218 N.J. 8 ..................................................................................30  Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587 (1993) ..................................................................3, 32, 42 Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. Of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995)  ..................................................................31  Marzano v. Computer Science Corp., Inc., 91 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 1996) .........................................................31  Muench v. Twp. of Haddon, 255 N.J. Super. 288 (App. Div. 1992) .......................................32, 41 Nardello v. Township of Voorhees, 377 N.J. Super. 428 (App. Div. 2005) .........................................38  Nuness v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 535 (D.N.J. 2018) .............................................41  Peper v. Princeton University Board of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55 (1978) ....................................................................35 Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 174 N.J. 1 (1993) ....................................................................33, 39 Thomas v. Cnty. of Camden, 386 N.J. Super. 582, 902 A.2d 327 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006).........................43 Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J. Super. 186 (App. Div. 2003)..........................................................44 Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 290 N.J. Super. 252 (App. Div. 1996)...........................................................passim Young v. Hobart W. Grp., 385 N.J. Super. 448 (App. Div. 2005)............................................................35 Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.N.J. 2005)...............................................................45 Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436 (2005) ......................................................................................35 Statutes N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq. .....................................................................................1 N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(l).............................................................................................43
[brief] Defendant is suspended.  1.  Three of defendant’s calibrations are questioned.  Defendant took scheduled vacation from the end of September 2015 to October 4, 2015.  (15T170-4 to 171-11).  While defendant was away, his --- 2  Use of the Alcotest instrument was approved by the Supreme Court, subject to certain conditions, in State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54 (2008).  3  “NIST” is the [...].  (11T22-12 to 15; see State v. Cassidy, 235 N.J. 482, 552 (2018)).
[brief] (Trial Tr., Jan. 23, 2023, Pg. 28, Ln. 8 – 11)  Appellants fail to understand how [...]’s forgery of his brother [...]’s name on the deed would not constitute unclean hands.  [...]’s any attempt to brush away the forgery issue, or otherwise claims it was an innocent error, must be rejected, under the clear and convincing evidence standard.  In his Opposition Brief, [...] conveniently claimed that he forged his brother’s signature because his lawyer [...] told him to do it.  [...] passed away, and the Court should not simply accept [...]’s convenient, self-serving, statement that his lawyer told him to sign someone else’s name so he did it.  Even assuming [...] indeed told him to fraudulently sign his brother’s name, clearly that is still no excuse for [...] to engage in such an egregious fraud.  With respect to the unclean hands argument, the issue presented to the Appellate Division is as follows: where [...] willfully engaged in a fraud by forging his brother [...]’s signature on the title transfer documents, thereby enabling [...] to transfer the title to others at a later time, whether [...] is entitled to seek relief as a result of [...]’s subsequent title transfer?
[brief] Chapter 13 of the BMP Manual further states that using the Hantush Spreadsheet, “Since the actual permeability rate may vary from soil testing results and may decrease over time, a factor of 2 must be applied to the slowest tested permeability rate to determine the design permeability rate. ”  (emphasis added)  BMP Manual, Chapter 13, Page 4.  It is unambiguously stated and required that a user must use the slowest tested permeability rate with a safety factor of two.
[brief] [...]  Attorney ID No. [...] [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent [...]  RLZ/cd cc: [...], Esquire  [...], Esquire  Mary Rose 22, LLC February 13, 2025  FILED VIA eCOURTS RE: Mary Rose 22, LLC v. Block 270, Lot 14 ([...])  Docket No. [...]  Dear Judges of the Appellate Division:
[brief] Da23  Exhibit A: August 5, 2022  Letter to [...] from [...] and Subpoena Duces Tecum .............................................  Da25  Exhibit B: Letter to [...] from [...] enclosing Subpoena.  ..........................................................  Da31  Dated: September 12, 2022 (Omitted - same as Pa92)  Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated: September 12, 2022 (Omitted - same as Pa93-96)  Exhibit C: State of NJ Government Records Council Statement of Information Form .................................................................  Da32  Dated: May 2, 2022 (Omitted - Same as Pa80-86)
[brief] Defendants, [...], [...], and [...], cite the case of City of Millville vs. Rock, 683 F. Supp. 2d. 319 (D.N.J. 2010).  That is a Federal case out of the District of New Jersey which is not technically binding on this court.  Of course, the Federal District Court attempts to predict how New Jersey Courts would rule.  The court states, at 326, that “the parties have not identified any New Jersey Supreme Court precedent directly on point”.  The court then goes to cite two unreported cases, Home Buyers Warranty vs. Roblyn Dev. Corp., 2006 WL 2190742 (App. Div. 2006) Pa157, and American Furniture Manufacturing Inc. vs. Value Furniture & Mattress Warehouse, 2009 WL 88922 (App. Div. 2008) Pa247 for the proposition that the contract had to have more than one signature line to impose individual liability.  However, clearly this court should not follow a Federal Court decision based on two unreported decisions that cannot be cited pursuant to R.1:36-3.  The Federal Court also relies on a New York case, Salzman Sign Co. vs. Beck, 10 N.Y. 2d. 63, 217 N.Y.S. 2d 55, 176 N.E. 2d 74, 76 (1961) which is not binding on this court.
[directive] I.  "Drug Court Expungement" (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(m))  A.  Graduation from Drug Court on or after April18, 2016  The new law provides that the Superior Court may order the expungement of all records and information relating to all prior arrests, detentions, convictions, and proceedings for any Title 2C offense upon a person's successful discharge from a term of special probation, regardless of whether the person was sentenced to special probation under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.2, or N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1, if the person satisfactorily completed a substance abuse treatment program as ordered by the court and was not convicted of any crime, or adjudged a disorderly person or petty disorderly person, during the term of special probation.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14m(1 ).  "Successful discharge" has been determined to be graduation from Drug Court.  Therefore, persons who did not graduate from Drug Court are not eligible for a "drug court expungement."  To be considered for an expungement upon graduation from Drug Court on or after April 18, 2016, the individual or his/her counsel should bring this matter to the attention of the Drug Court judge prior to graduation.  The regular procedural requirements for expungements in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-7 through N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14 do not apply to this "drug court expungement" (i.e., verified petition, service, denial),-and no fee  [...] • [...] • [...]  Directive# 02-16
[directive] Enacted H.R. 5578, 114  Enacted H.R. 5578.  6  This date was selected to prioritize the SAFE kits collected within the last five years (five years having been the retention 7 period up until March of 2023 when that timeframe was extended to twenty years).  CODIS is a national database of several indexes including DNA profiles from both known and unknown offenders and 8 arrestees.  Center ([...]), as soon as practicable, but no later than seven (7) business days from receipt of the result (this is in addition to notification to the submitting agency and any other notification procedure already in place).  Such centralized notification is vital to investigating serial offenders.
[brief] The Verified Complaint alleges four causes of action: Count I- Breach of Contract; Count II- Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealings; Count III- Promissory Estoppel; and Count IV- New Jersey Wage Payment and Collection Law.  The City filed an Answer with Crossclaims against the State on September 7, 2018.  Pa000213-230.¹  The State filed an Answer on November 12, 2018.  Pa000231.  Plaintiffs served discovery requests on August 29, 2019.  Pa000245-284.  The matter was transferred to the Honorable [...] and stayed pursuant to a September 4, 2019 request from counsel.  Pa000285.  The parties engaged in protracted negotiations regarding multiple matters during the pendency of this matter and companion litigation regarding promotional processes, disciplinary procedures and hiring procedures.  The Court entered a Consent Order on August 7, 2023, whereby case [...] would be dismissed without prejudice, Plaintiffs were permitted to refile the Complaint, Defendants would be precluded from raising time-based defenses, Defendants’ counsel would accept service, and the previously served written discovery would not have to be re-served.
[directive] Criminal investigations generally require the investigator to obtain a search warrant to conduct a search.  Search warrants require probable cause to believe that the search will reveal evidence of a crime.  In internal affairs investigations, a search warrant should be obtained before a search is conducted of a subject officer's personal property, including any home, personal car, bank accounts, safety deposit boxes, briefcases, etc.  A warrant also may be necessary where a search of the subject officer's workplace is conducted and it is determined that the officer has a high expectation of privacy in the place to be searched.  The internal affairs investigator should consult with the County Prosecutor’s Office before undertaking the search of any workplace area in a criminal investigation.
[brief] 4.  Assumptions of Risks.  By signing this Agreement, entering the Premises and/or participating in the Activities, Adult Participant, on behalf of himself, and on behalf of the child Participant(s), warrants that he/she has read this Agreement in its entirety, acknowledges that the Activities contain inherent risks which vary with the activity, understands the demands of the activities relative to a Participant's physical condition and skill level, appreciates the type of injuries that may occur as a result of the Activities and their potential impact on safety, well-being, and lifestyle and asserts that participation is voluntary and that Participant knowingly assumes all risks.
[brief] As noted by plaintiff’s own witness, [...], assignment to a trustee of a claimed trust is only recorded when the loan is in default or there is a foreclosure enforcement.  Declaring that the [...] are not in default but leaving the erroneous 2009 enforcement assignment in place, as the Chancery court’s July 21 order does, severely prejudices the [...] and leaves them in the erroneous position of being subjected to a renewed enforcement action at some point in the future – with the $250,000 in “advance fees” continuing to hang over their head.  For all these reasons, the Court should reverse and remand for a new bench trial on the [...]’ quiet title claim so that the [...] have a chance to present the additional evidence and testimony as outlined by the [...] in the relief portion of their motion for reconsideration filed below:
[brief] N.J.S.A. 52:13B-10 & -11.  As this Court has held, “a fiscal note” is “an essential component for the passage of any bill requiring a change in expenditures. ”  Harris v. Branin Transp., Inc., 312 N.J. Super. 38, 45–46 (App. Div. 1998) (citing Pine Belt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 132 N.J. 564, 579 (1993); Moore v. Moore, 114 N.J. 147, 164 n. 5 (1989); Barone v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 107 N.J. 355, 361 (1987)).
[brief] ”  The canon lists some circumstances, such as where the judge has “personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts involved in the proceeding,” but it is not exclusive.  *Ibid.*; see also *R. 1:12-1(g)* (mandating disqualification “when there is any other reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so. ”); *In Re Advisory Letter No. 7-11*, 213 N.J. 63, 73-74 (2013) (“Rule 1:12–1(g)—like Canon 3(C)(1) … is intended to apply to scenarios that cannot be neatly catalogued”).
[directive] A state grand jury has voted not to file any criminal charges at the conclusion of its deliberations regarding the death of [...], 24, of Passaic, N.J., who was fatally shot by an officer of the [...] last year.  According to police, civilian witnesses, and security video, Sanchez was standing over a woman and holding a gun when he was shot.  Pursuant to a law enacted in January 2019, the fatal officer-involved shooting was investigated by the AG’s Shooting Response Task Force and presented to the state grand jury.  The investigation included interviews of witnesses; collection of forensic evidence; review of security video; and autopsy results from the medical examiner.  After hearing testimony and evidence from the investigation, the state grand jury concluded its deliberations today and voted “no bill,” meaning they found that the actions of the police officer who shot Sanchez were justified and no charges should be filed against him.  The shooting occurred on January 31, 2019.
[brief] SINCE DEFENDANT NEVER PLED ANY AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE PREDICATED ON THE TCA, THE DEFENSE WAS WAIVED (931a-954a) | 1 | | II.  THE TCA DOESN’T APPLY TO THIS CONTRACT DISPUTE (931a-954a) | 9 | | III.  BY DENYING THE CLASS CERTIFICATION MOTION, THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR (931a-954a) | 14 | | CONCLUSION | 15 | ### TABLE PURSUANT TO R. 2:6-2(2)
[brief] As further evidence of no notice, [...] memo created for Contract P200.254 provided recommendations for actions to be taken in the Phase B of the Contract which did not recommend that the Authority make immediate repairs.  (Pa1191-Pa1200).  The memo included price quotes for addition construction under P200.254 (Pa0627).  Moreover, the recommendations listed in the memo were not for settlement repair specifically, but to replace the approach slabs and re-deck the bridge.  (Pa0627).  The memo in no way put the Authority on notice of a dangerous condition needing immediate repair.
[brief] The Standard of Review for Fraud**  The five elements of common law fraud are: (1) a material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) knowledge of belief by the defendant of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting damages.  *Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors*, 148 N.J. 582, 610 (1997).  The movant “must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence. ”  DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 336 (App. Div. 2013).  Further, “common law fraud requires proof of reliance. ”  Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 332 N.J. Super. 31, 43 (App. Div. 2000).  II.
[brief] TABLE OF ORDERS, JUDGMENT & RULINGS  Item  1a  Order Vacating Dismissal as to All Defendants, dated November 28, 2022  3a  Order  Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint as to Defendants, [...] and [...] with Consolidated Statement of Reasons, dated February 28, 2023  19a  Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint as to Defendants, [...] and [...] 21a  Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint as to Defendants, [...] and [...] 23a  Order  Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint as to Defendant, [...]  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE TRIAL COURT | Item | Description | |------|-------------| | T | Transcript of Motions to Dismiss Hearing, January 7, 2022 |  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[directive] Any statement made by the officer subject in connection with the EW System review process may used not be against the officer subject in any disciplinary or other proceeding.  Remedial/corrective action may but include is not limited to following: the 1.  Training or re-training; Page 4 2.  Counseling; 3. Intensive supervision; 4. Fitness-for-duty examination; 5. Employee Assistance Program (EAP) referral; and 6.  Any other appropriate remedial or corrective action.2  Notification  G.  Subsequent to Law Enforcement Employer  If any officer is who or has been subject an to EW System review process applies or to accepts employment at a different law enforcement agency than the one where he or she underwent EW the System review process, it is the responsibility of the- prior or current employing law enforcement agency notify to the subsequent employing law enforcement agency of officer's the System EW review process history and outcomes.
[brief] The underlying lawsuit against plaintiff, for which he sought defense and indemnity in this matter, was an action that was filed in the Chancery Division, and soon thereafter transferred to the Law Division under Docket No. [...] (Pa183-Pa193).  The underlying plaintiffs were the [...], four members of the Board of Trustees for the [...] ([...], [...], [...] and [...]), [...] (“[...]”), which is the [...]’s management company; and [...] employee [...], the on-site property manager for the [...] (Pa183-Pa193).  [...] was the sole defendant in the underlying lawsuit, which set forth three (3) counts against him (Pa183-Pa193).
[brief] 2.  The Questionnaire at issue did not inform [...] that the vans were excluded and, further, was misleading and unclear, especially in light of the Application, which stated that 12-15+ passenger vans could be insured in the amount of $150,000 or $500,000.  After filling out the online application which allows 12-15+ passenger vans to be insured for $150,000 or $500,000 without additional underwriting, [...] then completes the Questionnaire which also fails to state anywhere on it that 12-15+ passenger vans are excluded from coverage at any insurance limit.  (Ia143).
[brief] **Doe v. Poritz**, 142 N.J. 1 (1995) ........................................  16  **Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Mount Prospect Chiropractic Ctr., P.A.**, 98 F.4th 463 (3d Cir. Apr. 26, 2024) ................................. passim  **Goyco v. Progressive Ins. Co.**, 257 N.J. 313 (2024)  .............  12  **In re Adoption of Rules Concerning Conduct of Judges**, 244 N.J. Super. 683 (App. Div. 1990) .................................  13  **In re Comm'r's Failure to Adopt 861 CPT Codes**, 358 N.J. Super. 135 (App. Div. 2003) .................................  14  **Kavky v. Herbalife Int'l of Am.**, 359 N.J. Super. 497 (App. Div. 2003) ................................. 24  **Material Damage Adjustment Corp. v. Open MRI of Fairview**, 352 N.J. Super. 216 (Law Div. 2002) ................................. 21, 22 **Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land**, 186 N.J. 163 (2006)  ............  20  **Metromedia, Inc. v. Dir. Div. of Tax**, 97 N.J. 313 (1984)  ....................................................... 15, 16, 17 **Merin v. Maglaki**, 126 N.J. 430, 436 (1992)  ......................  3 N.J. Coalition of Health Care Professionals, Inc., et al., v. NJDOI, et al., 323 N.J. Super. 207 (App. Div. 1999)  ..................................  26  New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey, 403 N.J. Super. 518 (App. Div. 2008)  ............................... 7, 8 Palisades Ins. Co. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey, 469 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 2021)  ................................. 9  Price v. Himeji, 214 N.J. 263 (2013).................................  29 Small v. Dep't of Corr., 243 N.J. Super. 439 (App. Div. 1990).  24 Texter v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 88 N.J. 376 (1982) ..............  12  STATUTES AND RULES
[brief] B.  The police failed to seek or obtain an anticipatory search warrant for the “controlled delivery” in New Jersey of the marijuana seized in Illinois.  Following the formal arrest of [...] and [...], they, along with their vehicle, were taken to Illinois State Police headquarters, where, according to [...], the police threatened that if he didn’t cooperate in completing the delivery of the marijuana, they would have their own pet dog (who was traveling with them) euthanized, and that they would be sent to prison for “many, many years. ” (3T50-5 to 8).  Although no recording of the debriefing of these now “cooperating” witnesses was made, both the testimony of Lonnie [...] and [...] of the New Jersey State Police,\(^{11}\) who was assigned to the DEA field office in Newark New Jersey, made clear that much was learned about the identity of the individual to whom the marijuana was to be delivered in New Jersey through a “controlled delivery” being planned as a “cooperative investigation” with the Illinois state police and the DEA.  (2T33-19 to 2T36-21); and even more was learned about the location of the delivery, which was at all times under the control of the police.  As early as 10:37 A.M. they learned that the delivery was to be made at an apartment complex at [...] in [...] to someone known to Mr. [...] as “[...]” (2T49-9 to 12; 4T60-17 to 4T61-16).