ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The MLUL includes several accepted bases to satisfy the requirement of advancing the public good and evaluating these variances.  Some of these purposes are as follows, “(A) to encourage a municipal action to guide the appropriate use or development of all lands in this State, in a manner which will promote the public health, safety, morals and general welfare:  (E) to promote the establishment of appropriate population densities and concentrations that will contribute to the wellbeing of persons, neighborhoods, communities and regions and the preservation of the environment: (G) to provide sufficient space in appropriate locations for a variety of agricultural, residential, recreational, commercial and industrial uses and open space, both public and private, according to their respective environmental requirements in order to meet the needs of all New Jersey citizens:  (I) to promote a desirable visual environment through creative development techniques and good civic design and arrangement: (J) to promote the conservation of historic sites and districts, open space, energy resources and valuable natural resources in the State and to prevent urban sprawl and degradation of the environment through improper use of land.
[brief] [...]’s affidavit solely described events that took place in Toms River.  His sworn submission describes that he met with the C.I. “at a prearranged location in the Toms River, New Jersey area,” who told him “that he/she is familiar with an individual he/she identified as [...] who distributes controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in Toms River, New Jersey” and that “[...] operates a silver 2002 Jaguar S Type bearing registration [omitted] and utilizes this vehicle to distribute CDS. ”
[brief] The discovery period was lengthy (nearly 3 years) and contentious.  The parties completed “paper” discovery by way of notices to produce, interrogatories, requests for admissions\(^4\), subpoenas duces tecum (including Plaintiff’s out-of-state commissions to serve Delaware and Pennsylvania records subpoenas), as well as client authorizations for banking records.  Both parties filed Case Information Statements.  ---  \(^2\)  The motion would have included allegations concerning the Judge’s social relationship with defense counsel [...], including without limitation officiating and attending her wedding.  \(^3\)  [...] has argued that all Orders of the recused Judge were improvidently entered.  \(^4\)  See also Legal Argument, Point IV, subpoint D, *infra*, discussing the fee shifting requirement of this discovery tool per R. 4:23-3.  Discovery motions and issues were heard by Special Discovery Master [...], who effectively resolved the discovery disputes with useful discovery management orders (including a deposition plan) and proper rulings on paper discovery issues.
[brief] \(^6\)  On page 2, footnote 1, of her brief, [...] conveniently ignores that [...]’s suspension from the practice of law was unanimously overturned following a fair and impartial hearing by a panel of judges as noted in their April 7, 1992 written opinion.  (Pa28, Pl.’s. Trial Ex. P-1, Reinstatement to Practice Law).  (A229, Op. at 13).  Three years and eleven months later, he filed\(^7\) for bankruptcy (Chapter 11 Reorganization).  \textit{Id.}  Around that time, in the summer of 2013, [...] had an extramarital affair with her tennis playing partner.  \textit{Id.} at 35.  The parties signed a Mid-Marriage Agreement (CA1) on December 5, 2013, followed by the MSA on January 17, 2014 (Ca14).  The parties were divorced a year later on March 18, 2015.
[brief] According to the state’s ballistics examiner, the recovered casings were fired from the same nine-mm. caliber gun.  (11T 97-1 to 2, 98-16 to 17, 101-19 to 20, 121-14 to 17; 12T 48-12 to 15, 50-17 to 25, 71-15 to 17, 84-19 to 85-3)  Without the gun, which was not found, all the examiner could say was that the bullet removed from [...] could have come from a nine-mm. gun.
[brief] Conditioned on a timely complaint in lieu of prerogative writs, Rule 4:69-6 (b)(3) allows the Trial Court “to review a determination of a planning board or board of adjustment. ”  See N.J. Ct. R. 4:69-6 (a) and N.J. Ct. R. 4:69-6(b)(3).  A local zoning determination will be set aside only when it is “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. ”  See Kramer v. Board of Adjustment, 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965).  Even if doubts are entertained as to the wisdom of the action, there can be no judicial declaration of invalidity in the absence of clear abuse of discretion.  See id.  “...  [W]hether the action was unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious must be decided upon the basis of what was before the planning board and not on the basis of a trial de novo, by affidavit or otherwise, before the Law Division. ”  See Antonelli v. Planning Bd. of Waldwick, 79 N.J. Super. 433, 440-441 (App. Div. 1963); see also Kempner v. Edison, 54 N.J. Super. 408, 417 (App. Div. 1959) (stating, “... matters dehors the record of proceedings before the board of adjustment may not be considered by the appellate court. ”).  As the Antonelli case makes abundantly clear, the remedy in an action in lieu of prerogative writs is a review of the factual record developed before the board.  The remedy is not a roving, endless, inquiry into matters outside that record.  The ZBA’s decision cannot be reversed based upon speculation about future conditions not in existence at the time of the hearings (or even now).  The remedy is not to create a whole new record.  As such, the Trial Court followed the law and properly declined the Objectors’ motion to expand the record.
[brief] See also *Messick v.* Bd. of Rev., 420 N.J. Super 321, 325 (App. Div. 2011) (stating that appellate court must defer to an administrative agency’s “technical expertise, its superior knowledge of its subject matter area, and its fact-finding role”).  Relatedly, and of particular relevance here, appellate courts “defer to an agency’s interpretation of both a statute and implementing regulation, within the sphere of the agency’s authority, unless the interpretation is ‘plainly unreasonable. ’”  See E. Bay Drywall, 251 N.J. at 493 (quoting In re Election L. Enf’t Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010).  See also Reilly v. AAA Mid-Atl. Ins. Co. of N.J., 194 N.J. 474, 485 (2008) (noting same); In re N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Am. Fed’n of State, County, & Mun. Employees, Council 73, 150 N.J. 331, 351 (1997) (noting that interpretation of agency charged with enforcing statute is entitled to “substantial deference”).
[brief] The State moves before this Honorable Court for leave to appeal from an interlocutory order in the Superior Court, Law Division, granting, in part, defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.  Specifically, the State moves to appeal the portion of the order suppressing statements made by defendant during phone calls to his parents in the presence of [...].  The State may seek leave to appeal from an adverse ruling on an interlocutory order entered before trial.  R. 2:3-1(b)(5); State v. Sims, 65 N.J. 359, 372 (1974).  Leave to appeal is a “highly discretionary” extraordinary relief, granted in the interests of justice to consider a fundamental claim, which could infect a trial and would otherwise be irremediable in the ordinary course.  R. 2:2-4; State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. 187, 205 (1985); In re Pa. R.R. Co., 20 N.J. 398, 409 (1956); State v. Alfano, 305 N.J. Super. 178, 190 (App. Div. 1997).
[brief] 9.  Thus, the Court in its Order of 3/30/2023 appears to have failed to consider or by mistake failed to address Appellant’s claims and probative evidence of account error against an unsupported and generic opposition offered by Probation, i.e. “collateral estoppel” argument, without particularity.  No substantive rebuttal to Appellant’s evidence of account record error has been provided.  The Court failed to address the inadequate response.  In this manner Appellant was denied competent, probative adjudication of his requests for relief, and the Court erred and abused its judicial discretion in a manner offensive to the interests of justice and equity.
[brief] An indictment for official misconduct “may allege a series of acts spread across a considerable period of time. ”  *State v. Weleck*, 10 N.J. 355, 374 (1952).  That is, a “continuing offense. ”  *State v. Diorio*, 216 N.J. 598, 614-16 (2014) (discussing *Weleck*).  That is how the counts of official misconduct and pattern of official misconduct in the Second Superseding Indictment were styled, as the jury was told.  (Da4-7; 20T168-23 to 170-19; 20T178-12 to 180-8).  Ordinarily, the jury need not be unanimous on “preliminary factual issues” that underlay the verdict in such cases.  *State v. Parker*, 124 N.J. 628, 633-34 (1991) (internal quotation omitted), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 939 (1992).  However, because the crime in N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 “is necessarily broad so as to cover a wide variety of misbehavior by public officials,” *id.* at 647-48 (Pollock, J., dissenting) (internal quotation omitted), our Supreme Court has imposed additional scrutiny in such cases to determine if the jury need agree unanimously on the specific acts giving rise to the guilty verdict.  The Court has asked (1) whether the allegations of misconduct “were contradictory or only marginally related to each other,” or instead were “conceptually-similar acts,” and (2) whether there is “any tangible indication of jury confusion” in the record.  *Id.* at 639.  Here, the convictions of the two relevant counts were clearly based on “conceptually-similar acts,” and there was no tangible indication of jury confusion.  The acquittals all related to the counts concerning the calibrations, and the convictions all related to the counts concerning the retention and misuse of the stolen [...] ID.  Thus, as in Parker, there was no danger here of a “fragmented verdict,” or “genuine possibility of jury confusion about its responsibility unanimously to find defendant guilty of official misconduct” requiring specific unanimity.  124 N.J. at 641-42.
[brief] (11T 49-2 to 6; 11T 78-5 to 6)  Also on [...], he recovered a black and blue Nike Air Jordan sneaker for a left foot.  (11T 54-17 to 55-5)  Later a matching right-foot sneaker was given to him by [...], and neither had blood stains on them.  (11T 129-5 to 23; 11T 133-14 to 15)  While defendant’s clothing was seized, none of it was tested for blood despite the close-range nature of the shooting.
[directive] Release of Non-Officer Footage.  4.  If the Independent Investigator possesses footage recorded by anyone other than a law enforcement officer (e.g., witness footage, surveillance footage), the Independent Investigator should consult with the individuals or entities who provided the footage, unless that individual or entity has previously made it publicly available, and take into account any legitimate safety or privacy concerns they raise.  If the footage was obtained through legal process, the release must comply with any applicable laws and procedures for public dissemination of such material.  Delayed Release of Footage.
[brief] Both the United States and New Jersey constitutions grant defendants the right to represent themselves in criminal proceedings.  *Faretta*, 422 U.S. at 819-20; *U.S. Const.* amends. VI, XIV; *N.J. Const.* art. I, ¶ 10.  This right is premised on “respecting a defendant’s capacity to make choices for himself. ”  *State v. Reddish*, 181 N.J. 553, 585 (2004).  Because it is the defendant who will bear the consequences of a conviction, he “must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. ”  *Faretta*, 422 U.S. at 834.  “And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law. ’”  *Ibid.*, (quoting *Illinois v. Allen*, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (J. Brennan, concurring)).  ---
[brief] [...]’s argument expressly acknowledges that it is “[m]oving beyond the trial court’s reasoning[.]” (Db34); (Da304) (“As the Court has found the arbitration clause with the Agreement unenforceable, the Court finds it unnecessary to address the additional issues raised in the opposition and reply. ”).  [...] had the opportunity to ask the trial court to amplify its opinion and address this or other untouched issues.  R. 2:5-1(d).  [...]’s two case information statements indicate that [...] did not.  (Pa57-62; Pa63-68).  Second, the issue cannot even be reached on the basis of the non-existent record.
[brief] The documents [...] was required to deliver at closing are identified in Paragraph 4.2.  (P-82 at 4).  Plaintiffs did not claim that any representation, warranty, covenant or agreement in “this Agreement” was breached.  Plaintiffs also did not identify any “additional agreements, instruments, certificates [or] other documents that [...] requested [...] to deliver at the closing, let alone any material breach of such a document.  Similarly, the trial court did not identify any breach relevant to the indemnification provision.  (See 24T11:4-8).  To the extent the court relied upon this contract to enter a judgment that included an award of fees against all defendants, this was legal error.  3.
[brief] This renders the provision of the Home Rule Act dealing with disturbing noises meaningless and constitutes an implied repeal of same.  If the Health Act legislative scheme preempts the governing body’s prerogative under the Home Rule Act, then it applies in all municipalities, again, except for those limited exceptions.  The legislative scheme must apply uniformly or it is not truly a legislative scheme.  If, according to the lower Court’s logic, a local Board of Health’s power and authority to take these actions preempts, no action under N.J.S.A. 40:48-1(8) can occur.  Indeed, such a rule would apply outside the realm of noise and would apply wherever the health regulations of a Model Code adopted by a local Board of Health or a regional health commission touch.  The reasoning of the lower Court here would repeal provisions of the Home Rule Act and other stated powers of municipal governing bodies.  Specifically, as to N.J.S.A. 40:48-1(8), because this section has not been explicitly repealed, the Court’s reasoning would invoke an implied repealer.
[brief] # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | ADP, LLC v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., No. 16-8664, 2018 WL 1151713 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2018) | 19 | | Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C.  v. Quinn, 410 N.J. Super. 510 (App. Div. 2009) | 33, 34 | | Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22 (2014) | 16 | | Borough of Englewood Cliffs, v. Trautner, No. A-2765-21, __ N.J. Super. __, 2024 WL 1708605 (N.J. App. Div. Apr. 22, 2024) | 39 | | Bove v. AkPharma Inc., 460 N.J. Super. 123 (App. Div. 2019) | passim | | Brady v. Dep’t of Pers., 149 N.J. 244 (1997) | 24 | | Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567 (2021) | 16, 28 | | City of Englewood v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 406 N.J. Super. 110 (App. Div. 2009) | 34, 37 | | Daruwala v. Merchant, No. A-1310-13T3, 2015 WL 6829646 (N.J. App. Div. Nov. 9, 2015) | 19 | | DiMaria Constr., Inc. v. Interarch, 351 N.J. Super. 558 (App. Div. 2001) | 18, 19 | | Est. of Narleski v. Gomes, 244 N.J. 199 (2020) | 16 | Est. of Finnegan v. Finnegan, No. A-1589-13T2, 2014 WL 7506758 (N.J. App. Div. Jan. 12, 2015)
[brief] Defendants did not violate any court order; the schedule outlined in the March 8 Order was modified by way of a Consent Order.  [Pa16-18].  In particular, the Consent Order indicated that Defendants’ motion to compel would await disposition of Plaintiff’s motion to disqualify defense counsel.  Plaintiff never moved to disqualify counsel for the Defendants.  As such, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants violated the Order is a contrived attempt to present the brief delay in seeking arbitration in Plaintiff’s favor when the circumstances – which included a change in counsel - clearly tilt in favor of arbitration.
[brief] The plaintiff explained that she was walking along the aisle when the front wheel of her rollator came into contact with the bolt sticking up from the ground which caused the rollator to stop moving and her to fall to the ground.  (4T228:14-16; 4T232:3-5; 4T232:12-233:5; 4T235:23-236:1; 4T238:7-13; 4T260:24-261:1).  The plaintiff’s description of the incident was undisputed.  There was no testimony from any witnesses who claimed to have observed the plaintiff’s fall and contradicted the plaintiff’s description of how the fall occurred.  Although surveillance footage from the store was presented at trial, only the plaintiff’s head was shown on the video and it did not show how she fell.  (Pa157).  Nor was there any testimony from a medical or biomechanical expert offering an opinion that the plaintiff’s fall was caused by anything other than the wheel of her rollator making contact with the hazardous condition.  Contrary to the evidence before it, the jury unreasonably determined that the defendant’s negligence was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s fall.  This verdict defines what the New Jersey courts mean by a “pervading a sense of wrongness. ”  The only explanation for this shocking verdict is that the jury speculated that the plaintiff fell as a result of a prior medical condition as a result of the admission of evidence of the plaintiff’s prior medical history and falls without any expert guidance.
[brief] ”  DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005).  It is beyond dispute that [...], by virtue of its having been issued a certificate of authority under N.J.S.A. 17:50-11, is authorized to transact the business of insurance and is therefore an “insurer” within the Act’s scope.  Thus, it fits into the Holding Company Act’s definition of “insurer,” and the Holding Company Act’s applicability to reciprocal insurance exchanges is “clearly inferable” from the statute’s plain language.  [...]’s contention that the Bulletin is inconsistent with procedural due process is without merit.
[brief] As set forth therein, “New Jersey has long recognized, in a wide variety of contexts, the power of the judiciary to ‘prevent some threatening, irreparable mischief, which should be averted until opportunity is afforded for a full and deliberate investigation of the case. ’”  Id. at 132 (quoting Thompson v. Paterson, 9 N.J. Eq. 624-25 (1854)).  “Indeed, the point of temporary relief is to maintain the parties in substantially the same condition ‘when the final decree is entered as they were when the litigation began. ’”  Id. at 134 (quoting Peters v. Pub. Serv. Corp. of N.J., 132 N.J. Eq. 500, 511 (Ch. 1942), aff’d, 133 N.J. Eq. 283 (1943)).  To obtain a preliminary injunction, the Court must evaluate whether: (1) Plaintiff has a reasonable probability of success on the merits in accordance with well-settled legal principles; (2) Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction; and (3) the balance of the equities weighs in Plaintiff’s favor.
[brief] Finally, defendant failed to point to the record to show it was prejudiced by any failure by plaintiff to timely file a TCA notice:  Defendant does not assert that it did not have an opportunity to investigate the accident, prepare a defense or endeavor to negotiate a settlement before the action was commenced.  *Hill v. Board of Educ. of Middletown Tp.*, 183 N.J. Super. 36, 42 (App. Div. 1982), cert den., 81 N.J. 233 (1982).  II.
[brief] To be clear, the redevelopment plan is the public project.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7 states in relevant part:  “No redevelopment project shall be undertaken or carried out except in accordance with a redevelopment plan adopted by ordinance of the municipal governing body .  . . [emphasis added]. ”  Therefore, increases in value attributable to the benefits from the very public project for which a property is condemned, shall not be considered in determining just compensation for the taking of the property.
[brief] Eligibility for PIP benefits in the State of New Jersey is governed by the provisions of the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA) of 1996.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1, et seq. (hereinafter “the Act”).  The Act, in pertinent part, states that the following individuals are eligible for PIP benefits, regardless of liability:  “…the named insured and members of his family residing in his household who sustain bodily injury as a result of an accident while occupying, entering into, alighting from or using an automobile, or as a pedestrian, caused by an automobile or by an object propelled by or from an automobile, and to other persons sustaining bodily injury while occupying, entering into, alighting from or using the automobile of the named insured, with permission of the named insured. ”  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 (emphasis added).  Courts are to apply the Act liberally so as to afford victims the “broadest possible coverage. ”  Palisades Safety & Ins. Ass’n v. Bastein, 175 N.J. 144, 148 (2003).  Indeed, the Act itself requires that it be liberally construed by courts in an effort to promote “its intended remedial purpose of effecting broad protection for accident victims. ”  N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Hardy, 178 N.J. 327, 332 (2004); See also N.J.S.A. 39:6A-16.  A plain reading of the Act suffices to reveal that any named insured injured in an accident while occupying or using one’s vehicle is entitled to PIP benefits.  The Act does not require that the claimant’s injuries are caused by an automobile; rather that they are the “result of an accident while occupying…or using an automobile.
[brief] On September 22, 1992, more than four years after [...]’s last contribution, the Division of Pensions sent him a letter stating that he had to return to work by November 22, 1992, or his pension account would expire.  [...] never received the letter.  [...] was involved in protracted litigation against his employer to request accommodations for a disability, which he claimed he could still work as a police officer.  Upon being denied his LAD claim, [...] applied for ordinary disability benefits.  The Board denied [...]’s application for an ordinary disability retirement on the grounds it was untimely.  Under the applicable PFRS statutes, membership ceases after 2 years from the date of the member's last pension contribution.  The Board determined [...] ineligible because more than 2 years had elapsed since his last contribution and because he was not a member in service at the time of the application.  The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the time period should be relaxed:  Unswerving, ‘mechanistic’ application of statutes of limitations would at times inflict obvious and unnecessary harm upon individual plaintiffs without advancing … legislative purposes.  * * *  On numerous occasions we have found ‘such particular circumstances as to dictate not the hard approach of literally applying the statute of limitations but the application of the more equitable and countervailing considerations of individual justice. ’ ***  A ‘just accommodation’ of individual justice and public policy requires that ‘in each case the equitable claims of opposing parties must be identified, evaluated and weighed. ’  [...] v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 311 N.J Super 333, 337 (citations omitted).  The Court further noted that an “agency has inherent power to waive de minimis violations of objective standards. ”  Id., citing SMB Assocs v. Department of Envtl. Prot., 264 N.J. Super 38, 59 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 137 N.J. 58 (1994).  The Court reversed the decision of the Board, noting that even though the letter was never received by [...], even if it had been, the notice was improper and late.