ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (21T24-11 to 12, 27-15 to 20; Da138-152)  During the interrogation, the police asked Defendant for a timeline of when and where he was that evening, what clothing he was wearing that evening, a timeline of his phone calls with [...], and what car [...] was driving (21T31-22 to 33-20).  Under the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that [...] “would not have believed that he was free to leave,” O’Neal, 190 N.J. at 615 based on the “significant deprivation of the [his] freedom of action. ”  Stott, 171 N.J. at 365.  The police showed up at Defendant’s residence, Room 517, and told him they had [...]’s consent to search the room.
[brief] I  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS DE NOVO WHICH REQUIRES APPLICATION OF THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD, VIEWING THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE NON-MOVING PARTY, PRECLUDING DECIDING ISSUES OF FACT AND MAKING CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS AND REQUIRING SUBMISSION OF DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT TO A JURY (Pa837; 3T)  An Appellate Court reviews a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court.  Stewart v. N.J. Tpk. Auth./Garden State Parkway, 249 N.J. 642, 655 (2022); Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021).  Rule 4:46-2(c) provides that only if there is no “genuine issue as to any material fact challenged” should summary judgment be entered.  In considering a motion for summary judgement a court must “consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  In applying this standard, a motion judge may not abrogate the jury’s exclusive role as the finder of fact.  *Suarez v. E. Int’l Coll.*, 428 N.J. Super. 10, 27 (App. Div. 2012).  “The court’s function is not ‘to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. ’”  *Rios v. Meda Pharm., Inc.*, 247 N.J. 1, 13 (2021) (quoting *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 540).  “To decide whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the trial court must ‘draw[] all legitimate inferences from the facts in favor of the non-moving party. ’”  *Friedman v. Martinez*, 242 N.J. 450, 472 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting *Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev*, 225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016)).  The motion judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine only whether there is a genuine issue for trial.  *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 540.  For the reasons set forth below, the motion judge considering this case erred by applying the wrong standard for evaluating retaliation claims (Point II) and by making credibility determinations in favor of the employer and against [...] and by deciding disputed issues of fact in favor of the employer and against [...].
[brief] Richardson, 192 N.J. at 195 (first alteration in original) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).  “A court should ‘asccribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole. ’”  D’Ambrosio v. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 403 N.J. Super. 321, 334 (App. Div. 2008) (citing DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492).  Here, the Legislature clearly intended a limitation period of eligibility for the presumption or recalculation provided under the Ricci Act, as the plain language of the statute sets a two-year deadline ending July 8, 2021, after which a “retiree shall not be eligible” for such benefits.  N.J.S.A.  53:5A-10(e)(4).  Under [...]’s argument, any member of [...] who was unaware of the Ricci Act could apply at any arbitrarily distant point in the future.  This would nullify the two-year time limitation created by the Legislature, extend the presumption beyond its intended time frame, and diminish the ability of the Division and the Board to verify applicants’ dates and locations of service as witnesses and memories inevitably continue to become unavailable and fade.  Ignoring the plain language of the statute, which imposes a two-year deadline, would not further the Act’s legislative purpose.  Even if the statutory language were not clear, [...]’s position would lead to an absurd result which would render the two-year statutory limitation superfluous.  In this regard, “[w]hen construing a statute, ‘legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. ’”  State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 449 (2011) (quoting Franklin Tower One, LLC v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 613 (1999)).  Accordingly, the Board reasonably denied [...]’s request to apply for amended benefits under the Ricci Act because he failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the required statutory timeframe.
[brief] 1T13:5-12\(^1\), 1T20:17-22, 1T22:10-17, 1T26:23 to 27:4, 1T28:22 to 29:1, 1T30:2-7.  [...] was a manager for [...], 1T7:4-8, a property manager for [...], 1T11:8-16, and a one-third owner and manager for [...].
[brief] THE ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF MR. RHYMES’S REMOTE  PRIOR CONVICTIONS WAS CONTRARY TO N.J.RE. 609(b), PREVENTED MR. RHYMES FROM TESTIFYING ON HIS OWN BEHALF, AND REQUIRES REVERSAL BECAUSE HIS TESTIMONY COULD HAVE IMPACTED THE OUTCOME OF HIS TRIAL.  (6T:128-24 to 130-12)  [...] made the crucial decision not to testify in his own defense after the trial court erroneously ruled that the prosecutor could use his remote prior convictions to impeach his credibility.  Rule 609(b)(1) states:  If, on the date the trial begins, more than ten years have passed since the witness's conviction for a crime or release from confinement for it, whichever is later, then evidence of the conviction is admissible only if the court determines that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, with the proponent of that evidence having the burden of proof.  [N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1)].  At the time of his trial, [...]’s two prior third-degree convictions – one from 2011 and one from 2007 – were twelve and sixteen years old respectively.  The trial court found that both convictions were admissible based on its misinterpretations of Rule 609(b)(1).  First, the trial court found that the 2011 conviction was admissible by erroneously interpreting “release from probation” as the equivalent of “release from confinement” under the Rule.  Second, the court misapplied the Rule’s ten-year window to the amount of time that had elapsed between [...]’s two prior convictions, erroneously determining that the 2007 conviction was admissible because it had been entered less than ten years prior to the 2011 conviction.  Finally, the court did not weigh the prejudicial effect of admitting the convictions against their probative value.  See N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1), (2).  The court’s erroneous admission of [...]’s convictions was extremely harmful because he elected not to testify, and the jury did not hear his account of the events depicted on the silent surveillance video.  Had [...] testified, the outcome of his trial could have been different, requiring reversal.
[brief] (a)  The Board of Health shall establish a reasonable fee for permit applications, inspections and renewals.  (b)  Permits shall be in effect for a period of two (2) years from the date of issue, unless sooner revoked; provided, however, that permits shall automatically terminate upon transfer of ownership or occupancy of the subject property.  (c)  If the Board finds that the issuance of the requested permit may result in a nuisance or unsanitary conditions or that it will otherwise create a risk of harm to public health, safety or welfare, the Board may deny the application.  (d)
[brief] *See, e.g.*, *Bellotti*, 443 U.S. 622.  For one thing, those cases were predicated on a federal constitutional right to an abortion, which no longer exists.  *Dobbs*, 597 U.S. 215.  For another thing, the Supreme Court has only ever required a judicial bypass to a parental consent requirement in the unique context of abortion, where the (former) right must be exercised within the short window of human gestation or lost forever.
[brief] Smaul, 209 N.J. Super. at 595.  The Trial Court’s reasoning that the Plaintiff’s vehicle was not being operated, simply because it was not in motion, is illogical and incorrect.  Clearly, the Plaintiff was “operating” her vehicle when she drove to the drive-thru, arrived at the drive-thru window, and placed her foot on the brake while her vehicle was in drive, engine still running, as she waited to receive her beverages (Pa 060, Pa 062).  Notably, the negligent act of a [...] employee in serving hot beverages through a drive-thru window, although not foreseeable, is undoubtedly a “natural and reasonable incident or consequence of the use of [an] automobile” in this setting.
[brief] A.  The Respondents offer no relevant rebuttal to the fact that the process fashioned by the trial court was flawed and inconsistent with the purposes of the MLUL and OPMA.  (M1-64; M462-473).  In their opposition brief, the Respondents summarily suggest that because the process for the hearing before the Special Hearing Officer was detailed by the trial court and followed by the SHO and Respondents, there were no issues with the process itself.
[brief] [Pa435a, ¶ 45]  [...] explained that “[u]nbeknownst to [...] at the time each of the Policies was issued, the Insureds made material misrepresentations and omissions during the application process for the Policies – namely, that no attorney had been the subject of any [1] bar complaint, [2] investigation or [3] disciplinary proceeding within the past 5 years. ”  [Pa501a]  [...] thus determined that it was entitled to rescind because the Firm (with [...] signing) falsely stated that no attorney had been the subject of any (1) bar complaint or (2) investigation or (3) disciplinary proceeding in the past 5 years.  [Id.]  Because the Policies were rescinded, [...] declined to provide coverage for the [...] under the 2018 Policy.
[brief] ”  State v. Wright, 107 N.J. 488, 502 (1987) (citing Brewer v. Porch, 53 N.J. 167, 174 (1969)).  The signaling statute must—and does—do something more than N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b).  Defendant’s attempt to apply the meaning of “turn” from N.J.S.A. 39:4-88 to the signaling statute is without merit because the context in which the word is used in each statute is different.
[brief] The trial court agreed to stay the judgment pending appeal, conditioned on the posting of a bond.  (Da2695-99).  On September 14, 2022, the trial Court entered final judgment totaling $4,258,878.69, comprised of the principal award, attorneys’ fees, taxed costs, and pre-judgment interest.  (Da2690-93).  The defendants timely filed separate appeals: one by [...] ([...]), and one by [...] and the entity defendants ([...]).
[directive] ·  It should be noted that the law did not amend the expungement procedures for persons who have had charges dismissed pursuant to the Pretrial Intervention (PTI) program, a conditional discharge (N.J.S.A. 2C:36A-1), or Conditional Dismissal program (N.J.S.A.2C:43-13.1 et al.).  Such petitions shall be barred from expungement until six months after entry of the order of dismissal.  There will be no fee for these expungements.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6c.
[brief] .................................................................22  2.  The Parental Secrecy Policy is not narrowly tailored to prevent harm .................................................................................................................................27  a.  The Parental Secrecy Policy is not narrowly tailored to prevent parents from abusing their children .................................................................27  b.  The Parental Secrecy Policy is not narrowly tailored to prevent discrimination against transgender-identifying students at school.  II.  THE OTHER PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
[brief] **STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS**  As previously noted, this lawsuit in the Camden County Superior Court, Chancery Department, Probate Division, involves a Mother and Estranged Wife, each seeking to administer the decedent’s estate and divide probate assets.  I.  **The May Marriage And Divorce**  On April 13, 2020, [...] died after succumbing to COVID-19.  Since he was a teenager, and at all times relevant, Tyrone participated in the operations and workload of the family business, [...]  However, he never had any ownership interest in the family business.  Tyrone is survived by his mother, [...], and by his three adult children, [...], [...], and [...] (hereinafter, the “May Family”), who are all involved with the family funeral home business.  Tyrone married the Estranged Wife, [...], on August 27, 2006.
[directive] a.  Each county prosecutor should encourage the establishment of a program of short-term commitment, as authorized by the Code of Juvenile Justice, so as to have this disposition option available to be used as a special deterrent (sometimes referred to as "shock incarceration") in the hopes of discouraging certain appropriately chosen juveniles from becoming career criminals or "Impact Offenders."  Each county prosecutor should consider recommending this form of brief detention in those cases where a supervisory or probationary disposition is inadequate, but where long-term commitment to a state correctional institution is not necessary to protect the public safety and might actually prove to be counterproductive by allowing an impressionable juvenile to be negatively influenced by close, long-term contact with more serious, repetitive or hardened juvenile offenders.  b.  Where the option is available, each county prosecutor should consider recommending short-term commitments for the following categories  Of juvenile offenders, provided that commitment to a state correctional institution is not otherwise warranted: First-time offenders adjudicated delinquent for a first or second degree crime; Persistent offenders who have repeatedly been adjudicated delinquent for crimes or offenses that, considered in isolation, would not normally warrant commitment to a state correctional institution, e.g., persistent criminal mischief or joyriding; Juveniles who have committed a substantial violation of probation or have significantly violated non-custodial program requirements; First-time offenders involved in the distribution of controlled dangerous substances or anabolic steroids; Juveniles adjudicated delinquent for an offense committed while on suspended sentence to a state correctional institution; Juveniles adjudicated delinquent for offenses involving a deadly weapon.  c.  The county prosecutor should not necessarily request a full 60-day commitment.  Rather, the prosecutor's recommendation to the court with respect to the specific term of commitment should be based upon a careful consideration of all relevant factors, including the seriousness of the offense, the juvenile's age, prior history of delinquency, present participation in school or gainful employment and amenability to being positively influenced by this type of disposition.  14.
[brief] Indeed, [...] has disclaimed in its brief any application of constitutional requirements when it asserts that the “as applied” doctrine is limited to constitutional preemption and does not apply in the present matter.  Public Service Electric and Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 371 (1961), there actually was an express finding by the [...] (after extensive hearings) that the specific lines through [...] were reasonably necessary to provide adequate service.  Indeed, in In re Public Service Electric and Gas Co., 35 N. J. 358, 371 (1961), the [...] found that “no suitable alternative route” was available.  Id.  Here, [...] has failed to show that any public hearing was held on the necessity of the route through [...] or that the Board of Public Utilities issued any such order finding the route to be necessary.  at 368.  In the present matter, alternative routes are available.  Fifth, [...] was not subject to any agreement with [...] relating to erection of poles and placement of lines.
[directive] February 16, 2021 • Guidelines Showup Identification Procedures Worksheet • Photo Array Worksheet (February 16, 2021)  • Firearms Guidelines Regarding Reasonably Necessary Deviations in the Course of Travel • Exception for Transporting Firearms Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6g.  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards for New Jersey Law Enforcement (Revised May 2003 & Effective January 1, 2004)  Forfeiture of Public Deciding to Apply for a Waiver of Forfeiture of Public Office - Guidelines with Criteria • pdf  Office Waiver Forfeiture  SOPs and State of New Jersey-Forfeiture Program Administration Standard Operating • Forms Procedure  Graduated Drivers Attorney General Prohibits  Municipal Court Plea Offers to "No Point"  Violations for • Licenses - Graduated Drivers Licenses.  pdf  Plea offer Restrictions  Graves Act  Attorney General Directive to Ensure Uniform Enforcement of the "Graves Act" • (October 23, 2008, amended November 25, 2008)  Clarification of "Graves Act" 2008 Directive with Respect to Offenses • Committed by Out-of-State Visitors From States Where Their Gun-Possession Conduct Would Have Been Lawful Homicide and Homicide and Sudden Death Survivor Guidelines (Updated July 1985)
[brief] At oral argument, Counsel for the Borough absolutely argued that substantial credible evidence existed to support a finding that criterion (b) and criterion (d) were satisfied.  (T3, 13:24-14:16).  Lastly, as to the argument that remediation is not a use, the Borough argued below that all “use” has been discontinued for at least 6 months prior to the redevelopment designation, and that any use of the Property must be a legal use under the zoning ordinances.  (T3, 20:20-24 & Dsa11-Dsa13).  It is only ¹ References to “Dsa” are to Defendants’ Supplemental Appendix filed with this Reply Brief. because the Trial Court concluded that undertaking remediation prevented a finding of “discontinuance of use”, that the Borough was forced to argue that remediation is not a use.  (T3, 44:11-16).  Even at trial, Plaintiff acknowledged that the use was discontinued, stating, “[t]he test has to be what’s the credible evidence and the credible evidence says that the property was discontinued for six months…” (T3, 15:22-25).  Since all of the issues raised in the Borough’s Brief go directly to the heart of the decision of the Trial Court and all issues were actually decided and addressed by the Trial Court, it is appropriate for this Court to review the same.
[brief] Even one child who unnecessarily suffers these life-long impacts is one too many.  Third, the Parental Secrecy Policy creates a paradigm where students are socially transitioned at school but remain the gender associated with their natal sex at home.  This facilitation of a secret “double life” cuts children off from their primary support structure and is psychologically harmful.  ACa38-ACa39 ¶¶ 77–80.  The State acknowledges that transgender-identifying children are uniquely susceptible to mental-health challenges, ACa81, yet—remarkably—it concludes that this is reason to exclude parents from their lives.  The State has it exactly backwards—the fact that these children face unique challenges is a reason for parental disclosure, not secrecy.  Finally, the State has not demonstrated that transgender-identifying students will suffer harm due to the Parental Notification Policy.  The State argues that notifying parents can result in parents harming their children, ACa81–82, but, again, presuming that parents will harm their children based on nothing more than the child’s request to be socially transitioned in secret is constitutionally prohibited.  In any event, the Parental Notification Policy has an exception for the situation where parents are likely to harm their children, so the Parental Notification Policy adequately accounts for that concern.  The State also argues that the Parental Notification Policy compromises students’ “safe spaces” at school, State’s Br. at ACa83, but as pointed out, the District is free to continue to socially transition students under the Parental Notification Policy just as it has done in the past.  The only difference is that, under the Parental Notification Policy parents will be notified, and the State has not remotely demonstrated that the notification requirement will cause transgender-identifying students to be discriminated against at school.  Unlike the Parental Secrecy Policy’s “one size fits all” approach, the Parental Notification Policy’s case-by-case evaluation of the risk of parental harm interposes the State between parents and their children only when such interference is truly needed.  For these reasons, the balance of the equities tips dramatically in parents’ favor, and lifting the injunction is strongly in the interest of parents, their children, and the public.
[brief] See Lokar v. Church of the Sacred Heart, Mount Ephraim, 24 N.J. 549, 14-15 (1957) (holding that a business owner does not have a duty to warn against known dangers); see also Cotter v. United States, 2010 WL 2178958 UNPUB. (D.N.J. May 26, 2010) (granting summary judgment where the plaintiff was aware of the presence of wheel stops prior to her fall); Cunningham v. Briarwood Care and Rehabilitation Center, 2016 WL 958140 UNPUB.  (App. Div. Mar. 15, 2016) (holding that a rehabilitation facility did not breach its duty to the plaintiff who observed a mattress that caused her to fall prior to her fall); Khutorsky v. Macy’s, Inc., 2013 WL 163301 UNPUB. (App. Div. Jan. 16, 2013) (upholding the trial court’s decision that although a business owner has a duty to its customers to provide a reasonably safe premises, it has no duty to warn of dangers that are open, obvious and easily understood); Jimenez v. Applebee’s Neighborhood Grill & Bar, 2015 WL 893236 UNPUB.
[brief] CONCLUSION  Based on the above, it is respectfully submitted that the Plaintiff/Appellant's appeal must be dismissed as a matter of law.  Respectfully submitted, [...], Esq.  Dated: January 3, 2025  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...] AND [...]
[brief] As an initial matter, and as more fully set forth above, Plaintiff’s failure to brief whether the trial court erred in its finding as to Plaintiff’s sham affidavit constitutes Plaintiff’s waiver of same.  See, R. 2:6-2, cmt. 5.  Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s waiver, in holding Plaintiff’s Sham Certification violated the sham affidavit doctrine, the trial court found, Plaintiff’s Sham Certification was “submitted directly in contradiction to her testimony. ”  The Sham Affidavit Doctrine “calls for rejection of the affidavit where the contradiction is unexplained and unqualified by the affiant.”  Shelcusky v. Garjulo, 172 N.J. 185, 194 (2002).  Where, like here, a party submits an “offsetting affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary judgment when the affidavit contradicts the affiant’s prior deposition testimony. ”  Ibid.  “In such circumstances, the alleged factual issue in dispute can be perceived as a sham, and as such it is not an impediment to a grant of summary judgment. ”  Ibid.  Further, the trial court performed the requisite “evaluative function that is consistent with” Brill.  Shelcusky, 172 N.J. at 201.  A review of the trial court’s Order reveals the trial court thoroughly contrasted Plaintiff’s earlier deposition testimony with the contradictory statements in Plaintiff’s Sham Certification.  B.  The Trial Court Properly Determined No Dangerous Condition Existed and the Decision Should be Affirmed.