[brief] It is clear that the merits of Plaintiff’s dispute with Defendant [...] and [sic] bound up/intertwined with Plaintiff’s contract with Defendant [...].  December 12, 2023 Order 5 (Pa70).  Plaintiff does not dispute that her agreement with [...] is intertwined with her agreement with [...]; but as explained above, intertwinement alone is insufficient for an application of equitable estoppel.  Moreover, though [...] argues that the two agreements are essentially one and the same, [...]’s Brief acknowledges that “[...] was unaware that [...] entered into the Contract [with [...]], only becoming aware of [...] after she selected them as the neutral payment processor,” i.e., after [...] executed the EFT (Pa24) with [...].  See [...]’s Br. 11.  If [...] was unaware of [...] after her agreement with [...], but before the EFT was executed, [...] cannot argue that the agreement between [...] and [...] created the relationship between [...] and [...].  Thus, even if [...] could prove detrimental reliance (which they cannot), the existence of a separate agreement between [...] and [...] dictates that detrimental reliance alone is not dispositive of the trial court’s application of equitable estoppel.  [...] next argues that “because [...] brokers the agreements independently, [...] reasonably expects that the terms which govern the business relationship between [...] and its clients . . . would also govern [...] and those clients. ”  [...]’s Br 10.  However, [...]’s arguments ignore the privity between [...] and [...] shown by the EFT and the terms of the legal relationship created by the EFT—which [...] necessarily relied upon.  The terms of the EFT were drafted by [...], transmitted to [...], and then agreed upon—[...] cannot argue that there was no meeting of the minds or that they did not expressly agree to the terms of the EFT.  [...] next argues that the Court must ignore the EFT because “[t]he EFT has none of the characteristics of a contract.  First is [sic] does not contain or recite an agreement between the parties .  . . .  There is no exchange of consideration and no burden on either party to act. ”  [...] Br. 11.  However, the EFT explicitly states that “[[...]] hereby authorize[s] payments from the Account for the fees and charges provided for in this application . . . .” (Pa24).  The “Account” is defined by the EFT as “a non-interest bearing special purpose account (the “Account”) with a bank . . . selected by [...], LLC . . . for the purpose of accumulating funds to pay for such goods and services as [[...]] so direct[s] [...], LLC to perform. ”  Id.  The EFT provides a table of fees payable to [...] for their ‘services’ managing the Account and refers to [...] as a “service provider. ”  Id.  Thus, [...] cannot argue that the EFT “has none of the characteristics of a contract” or that “[t]here is no exchange of consideration and no burden on either party to act. ”  See [...]’s Br. 11.  The EFT shows the consent of [...] and [...] (and their privity in consenting to the terms of the EFT), explicitly describes their duties under the EFT and how each party is to be compensated.  Thus, the EFT does bear all the characteristics of a contract: mutual assent, offer, acceptance, and consideration.  Therefore, equitable estoppel was incorrectly applied by the trial court and the December 12, 2023 Order granting [...]’s Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration must be reversed.