ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Additionally, the Court failed to consider that [...], the elderly wife of [...] was never informed of the transactions involving her money to buy a home as well.  Elderly and uneducated, the immigrant [...] Matos entered into a relationship of trust and confidentiality with [...], holder of an MBA degree, and entrusted him with $50,000 to buy a house for [...] Matos.  [...] testified that he could only use the “gift” money to buy a house for [...] Matos to live in and rent it to him.  We believe that his renting of the home to [...] was in breach of his duties under a confidential relationship to [...] and [...] because [...] put his own name on the property instead.  [...] took ownership instead of the elderly [...] Matos.  [...] Matos paid all home costs for many years, such as taxes, mortgage and all utilities.  At some point [...] paid for a portion of the HOA fees.
[directive] c.  As part of the conflict review, the [...] may request from any local, county, or state law enforcement agency, and such agency shall provide, any  For the purposes of this provision, “any person who will supervise” includes all members of the agency’s 2 leadership team.  For a County Prosecutor’s Office, this includes the Prosecutor, First Assistant Prosecutor, Chief of Detectives, and any mid-level supervisors who will oversee the investigation.  Page 6 information that the [...] deems necessary to determine whether any law enforcement agency has a conflict of interest.  d.  To facilitate the conflict review process, the [...] may issue standardized statewide forms and other materials for use by law enforcement agencies.
[brief] ##  FEDERAL CASES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | 3 S Del., Inc. v. DataQuick Info. Svs., Inc., | 53 | | 492 F.3d 520 (4th Cir. 2007)  | | | Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., | 53 | | 489 F.3d 580 (3d Cir. 2007)  | | | Dockser v. Schwartzberg, | 53, 54| | 433 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2006) | | | Mandell v. Reeve, | 33, 34| | 2011 WL 4585248 (S.D.N.Y. October 4, 2011) | | | Shahmoon Indus., Inc. v. Steelworker, | 62 | | 263 F.Supp. 10 (D.N.J. 1966) | | ## STATE CASES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Associated Humane Societies, Inc. v. Lynch, | 63 | | No. A-0210-13T4, 2014 WL 5460721 (App. Div. Oct. 29, 2014) | | | Balsimides v. Protameen Chemicals, Inc., | 38, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46| | 160 N.J. 352 (1999) | | | Bd. of Ed., Twp. Of Middletown v. Middletown Twp. Educ. Ass’n, | 13 | | 352 N.J. Super. 501 (Ch. Div. 2001) | | | Borough of E. Rutherford v. PBA Local 275, | 60 | | 213 N.J. 190 | | | Brown v. Brown, | 37, 38, 41, 42| | 348 N.J. Super. 466 (App. Div. 2001) | | | Cohen ex rel. Perelman v. Booth Computers, | 72 | | 421 N.J. Super. 134 (App. Div. 2011) | | | Del Piano v. Merrill Lynch, | 62 | | 372 N.J. Super. 503 (App. Div. 2004) | | Heher v. Smith, Stratton, Wise, Heher and Brennan, 143 N.J. 448 (1996)
[brief] [...] reiterated that he thought he saw “a police ID from the state police. ”  (14T 97-24 to 25)  But he admitted that he saw the alleged ID for just “[a] second,” and also admitted that even if defendant had just shown a “PBA card” or courtesy “gold card,” he also would have let him go without a ticket.  (14T 83-11 to 85-19)  Cross-examination also focused on a comparison between defendant’s actual wallet ID, which he had turned in, and the card he seemed to be showing to [...] in the video and photos of the Marlboro stop, highlighting what seemed to be differences in color and details.  (14T 91-17 to 97-12)  Toms River Police Officer [...] testified that he stopped defendant for a minor traffic offense on March 27, 2018, and that defendant displayed what Westfall called a “New Jersey State Police ID” at “chest level,” after which Westfall released him without a ticket.
[brief] Appellant [...] is trying to cast doubt on the election results and impose a cloud over its legitimacy, despite the clear and unequivocal ruling from the trial court stating that there was no wrongdoing whatsoever.  At Appellant’s behest, the trial court recreated the vote counting and certification process and determined that there was no merit to claims that the election was not lawfully conducted.  Now, unhappy with these findings, Appellant is trying to find some technicality, any technicality really, that would allow him to overturn the will of the people.  Faced with a write-in ballot that expressly says the voter wanted to vote for “[...],” placed immediately next to Anthony [...]’s name on the ballot, Appellant is left arguing over an archaic law more than 120 years old.  As the Appellate Division has previously held, that law was meant for an entirely different purpose, one related to the prevention of voter fraud, which is not an issue here by Appellant’s own admission.  In the more than 150 years since 1874, when New Jersey’s election laws were codified largely as they are reflected today in Title 19, one thing has been clear: courts should seek to enfranchise voters rather than disenfranchise them, and the law itself must give way to the purpose of elections themselves, which is to reflect the will of the people.
[brief] However, the trial court’s original Order did not allocate the fee award to each attorney but rather awarded a lump sum.  Pa8.  [...] could not issue one check to two attorneys at separate law firms but instead had to issue two checks.  Pa218.  On September 6, 2022, Defendants were informed that the breakdown of the checks was $36,175.10 to [...] and $42,809.70 to [...].  The checks were then forwarded on September 13, 2022.  Pa218.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDERS DENYING PLAINTFFS’ REQUESTS FOR RELIEF UNDER RULE 1:10-3 & N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11(a) SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
[brief] 5/6/22  Transcript of Motion.................................................................T1 5/10/22  Transcript of Trial........................................................................T2 5/12/22  Transcript of Trial.......................................................................T3 05/13/22  Transcript of Trial.....................................................................T4 5/17/22  Transcript of Trial.......................................................................T5 5/19/22  Transcript of Trial.......................................................................T6 5/20/22  Transcript of Trial.......................................................................T7 5/24/22  Transcript of Trial.......................................................................T8 5/26/22  Transcript of Trial.......................................................................T9 8/5/22  Transcript of Motion and Sentencing............................................T10 5/17/22 Transcript of Motion...................................................................T11 2/8/17  Transcript of Grand Jury Proceedings..............................................GJT (attached as Exhibit to Appellant’s Brief and Appendix)  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS BEING APPEALED
[brief] [...] contends in his second point that when the court failed to excuse a juror (Juror No. 4) for cause, the court effectively deprived him of his right to exercise peremptory challenges.  Following a weekend recess, Juror No. 4 reported that he had contact with the victim's father.  When questioned by the court, Juror No. 4 described the incident:  Yeah, a gentleman came in for some jeans and I waited on him for a couple of minutes, gave him a couple of pairs to try on.  When he came out we were discussing alterations and that he didn't live in the area, and that he was up from North Carolina.  And I kind of said uh-oh, and I recognized him and he recognized me and he immediately left.  I tried to turn him over to somebody else but he—he just left, so—
[brief] Pa480 ¶ 25.  By defending the HCH Action, Ohio effectively acknowledged that the complaint in the HCH Action alleged breach of “the duty of care” (Pa327 ¶ 54) falling within the Policy’s definition of “Wrongful Act. ”  Pa787.  As the Trial Court in this coverage case has confirmed, “the allegations of breach as to the fiduciary care may be supported by a theory of negligence. ”  T83-6 to T83-8.  On January 6, 2020, during proceedings held in the Vermont Trial Court (before a different trial judge from the one which issued the Preliminary Injunction Order), [...] testified that, by having attorney [...] cast unit owner votes to support firing [...] and [...] and pressing the Derivative Action (see Pa454–56 ¶¶ 14–26; Pa1041–42 ¶¶ 14–25), [...] had acted in what he viewed as the best interests of the [...] in seeking redress from [...] for court order disobedience and for other wrongful conduct of [...]’s agent, [...]:
[brief] VIII.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AS IT PERTAINED TO THE $2,372.50 AWARD OF COUNSEL FEES.  Fee determinations by trial courts will be disturbed only on the rarest of occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion. ”  Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995).  That deferential standard of review must guide this Court’s analysis.  Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001).  The Plaintiff cites to no legal authority which required the trial court to provide a more detailed statement of reasons beyond what is contained in the 20 page trial court decision.  The trial court cited the authority it relied upon in order to make the award (R.P.C. 1.5, R. 4:42 – 9 and R. 5:3 – 5(c)) (Da24) and the specific factors it carefully considered and gave particular consideration to.  Plaintiff does not dispute that these laws are dispositive of the issue of whether and how attorney’s fees can be awarded to the Defendant.  Plaintiff does not make any arguments as to how or why the trial court committed a “clear abuse of discretion” when militating (c)(1), (c)(3) and (c)(7) of R. 5:3 – 5 in the Defendant’s favor.  Therefore, the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees must not be disturbed and it must be affirmed.
[brief] Id. at 338.  Here, there was no such letter informing [...] that he was eligible to file under the Ricci Act past the statutory deadline.  Thus, Ensslin does not support [...]’s proposition that untimely notice allows individuals to file at any time past the statutory deadline.  (Pb12).  Nor do the equities weigh in his favor.  The Board found on the basis of undisputed facts that notice was sent to [...], that information about the Ricci Act was available to him through the Division’s website and publications, and that he had sufficient time to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the statutory period.  Thus, contrary to [...]’s contention, (Pb13), there was ample evidence for the Board to reasonably conclude that he failed to demonstrate good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence to warrant consideration of his application well beyond the statutory deadline.  (Pa15).  Finally, [...]’s argument and reference to a different applicant is misplaced.  (Pb16).  That applicant asserts that he attempted to file his Eligibility Registration Form but was told he was ineligible because he was not currently sick.  (Pb17; Pa130).  But those facts are not in the record before this court.  And that applicant’s assertions are irrelevant to [...]’s appeal as they deal with an entirely different set of circumstances not alleged by [...], so they should be disregarded.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] It also ignores the litany of cases here and around the country holding recalls are not proof of defect.  (OB 28)  The determination of whether the specific Ozurdex® unit at issue had a manufacturing defect is far from a matter of common sense.  It involves complex issues concerning FDA-approved manufacturing specifications, what constitutes a deviation under the product’s regulatory submissions for approval, and biomedical principles that are unquestionably beyond the ken of an average juror.  Plaintiff’s Opposition concedes she has no expert to establish a manufacturing defect in the Ozurdex® at issue.  This alone dooms her entire case.
[brief] (9T 43-17 to 44-2)  The police obtained several surveillance videos from [...] and nearby properties.  (7T 74-19 to 122-4; 11T 20-8 to 32-18; Da 207)  Video from the bar showed that between 2:11 and 2:12 a.m., people in the crowd outside the bar “duck[ed]” and “ran in different directions. ”  (9T 45-16 to 47-2)  Just after the shooting, a man wearing a hooded sweatshirt could be seen running east on New Street away from the area near where [...]’s Lexus was parked; the police never identified that man.  (9T 47-3 to 49-10)  Also at 2:12 a.m., a different man ran east on New Street through an intersection towards the block on which the bar was located and, about fourteen seconds later, ran back west through the intersection and up New Street.  (8T 97-20 to 102-25; 10T 150-19 to 152-10)  At trial, the State introduced a Facebook post that [...] uploaded on September 5, 2018, which accused [...] of being a police informant and included photos of police records.
[brief] In deciding on the release of information as to the identity of a victim, the safety of the victim and the victim’s family, and the integrity of any ongoing investigation, shall be considered; if an arrest has been made, information as to the defendant’s name, age, residence, occupation, marital status and similar background information and, the identity of the complaining party unless the release of such information is contrary to existing law or Court Rule; information as to the text of any charges such as the complaint, accusation and indictment unless sealed by the court or unless the release of such information is contrary to existing law or court rule; information as to the identity of the investigating and arresting personnel and agency and the length of the investigation; information of the circumstances immediately surrounding the arrest, including but not limited to the time and place of the arrest, resistance, if any, pursuit, possession and nature and use of weapons and ammunition by the suspect and by the police; and information as to circumstances surrounding bail, whether it was posted and the amount thereof.  Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, where it shall appear that the information requested or to be examined will jeopardize the safety of any person or jeopardize any investigation in progress or may be otherwise inappropriate to release, such information may be withheld.
[brief] ’”  State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412, 430 (2021) (quoting State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397, 412 (2020)).  In the matter at bar the trial court by no means abused its discretion when admitting prior testimony of the investigating police officers, because the jury did in fact hear the investigating officer’s opinions during plaintiff’s own case in chief.
[brief] If there was a legal error during the trial, deference is accorded to the trial judge’s evaluation of the prejudice, and whether it contributed to an unjust result.  *Ibid.* (citing *Crawn*, 136 N.J. at 512).  A trial court must order a new trial “if, having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law. ”  *R.* 4:49-1(a); see *Caldwell v. Haynes*, 136 N.J. 422, 432 (1994).  The standard to be applied on a motion for a new trial under *R.* 4:49-1 is whether the jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence.  See *Dolson v. Anastasia*, 55 N.J. 2, 5 (1969).  [I]n ruling on a motion for a new trial, the trial judge takes into account, not only tangible factors relative to the proofs as shown by the record, but also appropriate matters of credibility, generally peculiarly within the jury’s domain, so-called “demeanor evidence,” and the intangible “feel of the case” which he has gained by presiding over the trial.  *Id.* at 6.  The object of a motion for a new trial is to correct clear error or mistake by the jury.  See *ibid.*  “[T]he judge may not,” however, “substitute his judgment for that of the jury merely because he would have reached the opposite conclusion; he is not a thirteenth and decisive juror.
[brief] Subsequently, Appellant produced an appraisal report and planner’s report based upon an obvious typographical error contained in one of the easement descriptions identifying the perpetual seawall repair easement at 117.65 and not at the correct location, or 177.65 feet from Ocean Avenue.  Pa40.  This was despite several other documents, the taking map attached to the Verified Complaint and Declaration of Taking, the extensive testimony and photographs from [...] at the Commissioners’ Hearing, all of which correctly identified the easement at 177.65 feet from Ocean Avenue.  Pa40-41.  Appellant was certainly aware his damaged seawall was not located in the middle of his Property, 117.65 feet from Ocean Avenue.  Based on the information Appellant knew to be inaccurate, Appellant’s appraiser opined the just compensation due to Appellant for the easement was $1,550,000.  Pa00034.  Appellant had no reasonable belief that the easement to repair his seawall was in the middle of the Property.  Appellant had actual knowledge where the damaged seawall was located and observed the repairs made in 2019; he had actual knowledge the repair work was limited to the area adjacent to the beach and no work have been performed sixty (60) feet to the west.
[brief] However, a sentence of noncustodial probation does not detract from the known outcome of the Essex case - that the defendant did, in fact, unlawfully possess a firearm on July 1, 2022.  As the defendant pleaded guilty to the firearm charges, he would have admitted to doing so during his factual basis for his plea to be accepted by the court.  As that firearm possession occurred while the Morris County charges were and still are pending, factor a(5) bars entry into Recovery Court.
[directive] 2C:33-14(a-e)  Transportation (continued) (continued)  b.  Interference with transportation is a disorderly persons offense.  c.  Interference with transportation is a crime of the fourth degree if the person purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another person or causes pecuniary loss in excess of $500 but less than $2,000.  d.  Interference with transportation is a crime of the third degree if the person purposely, Disorderly $500 to $1,000  10%  Permissible knowingly or recklessly causes significant bodily injury to another person or causes pecuniary loss of $2,000 or more, or if the person purposely or knowingly creates a risk of Persons significant bodily injury to another person.  e.  Interference with transportation is a crime of the second degree if the person purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another person.
[brief] (Not Raised Below)  One of the most basic principles of New Jersey criminal law is that “[a]ccurate and understandable jury instructions in criminal cases are essential to a defendant’s right to a fair trial. ”  State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373, 379  The charge must provide a “comprehensible explanation of the questions that the jury must determine, including the law of the case applicable to the facts that the jury may find. ”  Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).  “A charge is a road map to guide the jury, and without an appropriate charge a jury can take a wrong turn in its deliberations.  The court must explain the controlling legal principles and the questions the jury is to decide. ”  State v. Martin, 119 N.J 2, 15 (1990).  Therefore, instructional errors on essential matters, even in cases where those errors are not raised below, are traditionally deemed prejudicial and reversible error because they interfere with the jury’s proper assessment of the defendant’s culpability.  State v. Rhett, 127 N.J. 3, 5-7 (1992); State v. Vick, 117 N.J. 288, 293 (1989).
[brief] The site plan for [...] does not adhere to the Settlement Agreement.  The site plan call for significant increases in grade elevation of the roadway accessing [...], the roadway between buildings 1 through 4 and builders 1, 2 and 3.  One, buildings 1 and 2:  Elevations between the development roadway and the east side of the buildings will be raised between 4.9 feet and 1.7 feet depending on location, including 3.3 feet to 4.23 feet at the east walkway for these buildings fronting [...] .  . .  The [...] Elevation rendering below clearly does not contemplate the significant elevation increases included in the [...]’s proposed site plan for the [...] property.  The significant increase to elevations proposed by [...] for the property were not agreed to by the [...] when it signed the Settlement Agreement as seen below.
[brief] …………………………………………………………………11  Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163 (2014)  ………………………………………………………………..11  Matter of Crown/Vista Energy Project, 279 N.J. Super. 74 (App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 140 N.J. 277 (1995)  ………11  Metromedia v. Division of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313 (1984)  …………………………………………………………………35  New Jersey State League of Municipalities v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 158 N.J. 211 (1999)  ………………………………………………………………..12  Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 101 N.J. 95 (1985) …………………………………………………………………14 Twp. of Fairfield v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 440 N.J. Super. 310 (App. Div. 2015)……………………………………………13 United Hunters Ass’n of N. J., Inc. v. Adams, 36 N.J. 288 (1962) …………………………………………………………………12 US Bank, N.A. v. Hough, 210 N.J. 187 (2012) …………………………………………………………………23 Statutes & Other Authorities: 48 N.J.R. 2244(a) (Nov. 7, 2016) .................................................................................. 20 54 N.J.R. 2169(a) (Dec. 5, 2022) .................................................................................. 10, 31, 34 54 N.J.R. 2169(a) (July 17, 2023) .................................................................................. 10, 32, 33, 34 [...], Administrative Law (1976) ........................................................................... 14 N.J.A.C. 7:8-1 to -6.3 ...................................................................................................... 4, 10 N.J.A.C. 7:8-1.2 ..................................................................................................................
[directive] Rule or Statute Description  This statute provides that when a defendant charged with a sex offense, as defined in 2C:7-2, is released from custody before trial on bail or personal 2C:14-12 (Nicole’s Law) recognizance, the court authorizing the release may issue a written restraining order prohibiting the defendant from having any contact with the victim including, but Conditions Placed Upon Release of not limited to, restraining the defendant from entering the victim’s residence, place of employment or business, or school, or from harassing or stalking the victim or Certain Defendants the victim’s relatives.