ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The surveillance location was selected under a plan to address crimes within the City of Elizabeth.  (1T9-19 to 25).  The selected area was beset by quality-of-life issues, including open-air drug distribution.  Local residents and business owners complained about gang members loitering in the vicinity, crowding the sidewalk and street to gamble, drink, and use drugs in public.  (1T10-15 to 11-8; 1T11-23 to 12-8).  Violent crime also plagued the area, notably assaults with fists and other weapons, shootings, and even homicides.  (1T11-9 to 22).  Approximately 100 arrests for narcotics offenses had taken place and about five to ten guns had been recovered in the previous two years.  (1T13-13 to14-10).  There were also approximately sixteen shootings and two homicides reported.  (1T14-11 to 16).  The police would typically receive at least 100 complaints and fifty service calls for the area within a single year.  (1T12-9 to 17).  Trying to deter crime, Elizabeth police used a tactic known as “directed control,” whereby police administrators designated priority areas of the city in which to concentrate a police presence.
[brief] __________________________  4  Such as the clear (unlike [...]’s here) provision at issue in *Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson*, 561 U.S. 63,66 (2010), which will be relied on by [...]:  “[t]he Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of this Agreement including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable. ”  CONCLUSION
[brief] The 2020 Rate Increase Applications  In November 2020, [...] requested premium rate increases for both its rate stability and its pre-rate stability policies.  [...] sought a 142% premium rate increase for its rate stability policies and a 165% premium rate increase for its pre-rate stability policies (collectively, the “2020 Filings”). \(^4\) (Cra61-63 and Cra249).  The 2020 Filings were submitted less than three years after [...] requested its 2017 premium rate increases.  When combined with previously approved rate increases, [...]’s 2020 post-rate stability requested premium rate increase represented an aggregate increase of 175% from its original pricing.  Similarly, [...]’s 2020 pre-rate stability premium represented an aggregate increase of 174% from its original pricing.  [...] does not dispute these facts.  [...]’s 2020 Filings were part of its goal to achieve a 150% nationwide premium rate increase for its Choice 2 policies under MYRAP.  (T1 186:14 to 187:180).  If [...] did not achieve its goal, it warned the Department that it would need future significant additional rate increases.  \textit{Ibid.}  The ALJ and the Commissioner found that as of December 9, 2021, only \(^4\) Through the 2020 Filings, [...] pursued the balance of the portion of prior rate increase requests that were previously disapproved.  [...] disclosed that it had made material changes to several actuarial assumptions to support the magnitude of its requested rate increase.  (Cra61 and Cra249).  seventeen states had approved rates at or above this goal, and less than half had done so by November 2022.  *Ibid.*  In its 2020 Filings, [...] increased its MAE from 10% to 15%. (Cra81; Cra144; T1 209:7-9).
[directive] Is aComplaint-Warrant for Application When Report 4.11 and Directive this to pursuant acomplaint-warrant for applies agency enforcement law a If but acomplaint-warrant issue to declines application the reviewing officer court other or judge the 47 Page of system evaluation the facilitate to of acomplaint-summons, issuance or the issues directs instead Section with in accordance consulted general attorney or prosecutor deputy or assistant officer the the prescribed may as manner be in on and form a a of denial circumstances the the shall document 3.2 by automatically transmitted is report Justice.
[brief] Defendants’ statement that “the initial pre-purchaser meeting” was attended by [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] is not supported by the record.  (See Db11.)  Rather, the meeting to which Defendants refer was the third meeting between the parties.  5T88:12 to 90:23.  Defendants incorrectly state that Plaintiff required [...] to sign two (2) confidentiality agreements that required only Defendants, and not Plaintiff, to maintain confidentiality regarding the parties’ dealings.  (See Db12.)  To the contrary, the confidentiality agreements apply equally to both Plaintiff and Defendants and require both parties to maintain the same level of confidentiality.  (Da17-18 at Art. 1; Da24-25 at Art. 1.)  Defendants’ statement that the “[...] insisted on receiving all documentation and information related to any aspect of the property” is not supported by the record.  *(See Db12.)*  Rather, the exchange of documentation and information was an express requirement set forth in the PSA.  *(Pa0261 at Art. 11.2(ii).)*  Defendants statement that the “parties had ongoing and detailed discussions of both parties’ intentions for nearly eighteen (18) months prior to the signing of the PSA” is not supported by the record.  *(See Db13.)*  Rather, the parties’ discussions occurred over a period of approximately sixteen (16) months prior to the execution of the PSA.  *(7T4:25 to 6:10.)*  Defendants’ statement that Defendants were obligated to surrender and assign all prior insurance policies to Plaintiff is misleading and not supported by Defendants’ citation to the record.
[brief] (Pa71).  Thereafter, a Ferreira Conference was held before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on August 5, 2024.¹ (See e.g., 1TR).  While arguments were raised by the Plaintiffs concerning the Defendant’s objection, no decision was entered by [...] during the conference on the issue.  ¹  The transcript of the Ferreira Conference held on August 5, 2024 is designated as 1TR.  Instead, because other defense counsel were not in a position to determine whether they were objecting to the Affidavits of Merit, [...] provided an additional ten days for defense counsel to provide any additional objection.  (1TR18:2-11).  After the Ferreira Conference, an Order was entered on August 12, 2024, by the Trial Court indicating that within ten days of the Order, counsel for the defense was to notify counsel for the Plaintiffs of any objection to the sufficiency of the Affidavits of Merit, along with the basis for same.  (Pa61).  No additional objection from the Defendant was received, and only one additional objection was received by the defendant, [...], which is not at issue in this appeal.  (Pa65)  After the expiration of the ten-day period, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion on August 30, 2024, to Affirm the Sufficiency of the two Affidavits of Merit supplied or, in the alternative, to stay the time period from the Ferreira Conference to the motion hearing date in order to obtain an Affidavit of Merit that complies with the court’s ruling.
[brief] (Da0499-Da0500.)  In pertinent part, the court determined that, without any evidence or certifications disputing [...]’s sworn certification that neither she nor [...] “ever reviewed the arbitration—provisions with them or explained that they would be waiving their rights to a judicial forum” and the only witness to the potential execution—[...]—had not submitted a certification in support of defendants’ motions, there was insufficient evidence to find that Plaintiffs assented to the arbitration agreement.  (2T13:20-14:8.)  As to the “SAM Program registration,” the motion judge found that the matter was squarely within Wollen v. Gulf Stream Restoration & Cleaning, LLC’s holding and the only distinguishable fact was that Plaintiffs had a prior relationship with [...].  (2T16:19-17:18).  Most notably, “[l]ike the terms and conditions of Wo[l]len, [[...]] was not required to affirmatively assent to a review of the terms and conditions prior to registering for the SAM program. ”  This appeal followed.
[brief] These cases were both decided before *Roa* and should not have been used as a basis for the decision.  In *Burlington*, as recited by *Roa*, the U.S. Supreme Court held:  “in addressing the question of how harmful an act of retaliatory discrimination must be in order to fall within the provision’s scope, the Court held that a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. ”  See *Roa*, 200 N.J. at 574 (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added).  The *Roa* Court found that by that standard, the plaintiff’s claim that his health insurance was cancelled in retaliation for reporting the sexual harassment of female employees, thereby causing him to experience stress and anxiety, was sufficient to meet the threshold of an independent cause of action under the NJLAD.  Id. at 575-76.  More importantly, the *Roa* ruling was in response to an argument from the defendants that the cancellation of the plaintiff’s insurance was not actionable under the NJLAD given that it allegedly did not harm his actual employment.  As to the NJLAD, the *Roa* Court noted that the conduct of the retaliator under the NJLAD is generally referred to as “reprisals,” and that the Legislature specifically expressed an intention to construe the NJLAD liberally.  *Id.* at 573.  As to Title VII’s antiretaliation provision, the *Roa* Court analyzed numerous federal cases extending Title VII’s protections to retaliatory actions that are not materially adverse to employment and that fall short of ultimate employment decisions but that could support a retaliation claim.  *Id.* at 573-74.  “Context matters” because “an act that would be immaterial in some situations is material in others. ”  *Burlington*, 548 U.S. at 69 (internal citations omitted).  With the Injunction in place, context certainly mattered here, but the Court did not consider it at all.  The scope of actions that can support NJLAD retaliations claims is extremely broad and can include a pattern of retaliatory actions.
[brief] Further, [...] was not able to testify about any part of the investigation as he constantly reiterated that it was not his investigation.  (1T169.15-16; 1T174.24 to 175.1; 1T177.4-5; 1T178.16; 1T178.19-20; 1T186.16; 1T187.22; 1T194.4; 1T218.20).  Accordingly, although [...] was called to testify in a separate incident, it is clear that pre-requisites of Hill have been met for this Court to draw an adverse inference against the State for the August 16, 2019 incident.
[directive] Parole Supervision for Life  44  Bail Schedule 2 10%  Cash Bail Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range Option  Non-Compliance with Actor who is monitored under Sex Offender  Monitoring by the State Parole Board fails to N.J.S. 30:4-123.94  Sex Offender 3rd Degree $25,000 to $50,000 10% permissible comply with requirements.
[directive] 3rd Degree $5,000 to $10,000  10% permissible  Actor purposely prevents or attempts to prevent a law enforcement officer from effecting an arrest; if actor uses or threatens to use physical force or violence against a law enforcement 2C:29-2a  Resisting Arrest officer or another or uses any other means to create a substantial risk of causing physical injury to the public servant or another, third degree; if by flight, then fourth degree; otherwise 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible a disorderly persons offense.
[brief] The statute required the Board to promulgate rules to provide notice to active and retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  The Certifying Officer Letter is proof that the website posting is not sufficient notice.  Pa62.  The notice of the Ricci Act to the Certifying Officers advises the Certifying Officers that they must distribute the information to employees pursuant to N.J.A.C. 17:5-1.4.  It also required that the Certifying Officers to provide a certification that the information was distributed.  The Respondent claims that the mailing of the postcard to a correct address establishes a presumption that the postcard was received.  This presumption is rebutted by the fact that [...] and 98 others certified via affidavits that they did not receive said postcard.  Additionally, the claim that postcards were mailed out to all “200,647 SPRS retirees” is a misstatement of fact.  Rb12.
[brief] 9.  Following the hearing on Plaintiff’s First OTSC on February 14, 2018, and finding Defendant in violation of the 2017 Judgment, on March 6, 2018 an Order was entered awarding $1,000.00 in sanctions against Defendant and in favor of Plaintiff for Defendant’s post-judgment interference with Plaintiff’s easement rights.  (Da285-286)  In accordance with the March 6, 2018 Order, an affidavit of services was submitted to the Trial Court for an award of attorney’s fees.  Defendant submitted opposition to the application for fees and, on March 23, 2018, the Trial Court issued its Statement of Reasons for granting Plaintiff’s fee application (Da287)\(^2\).  On March 26, 2018, an Order was entered awarding $11,544.63 in attorney’s fees and costs to Plaintiff.  (Da292-293)  10.
[brief] ”  It is well established that under the rule, leave is to be liberally granted and without consideration of the ultimate merits of the amendment.  See, e.g., Kernan v. One Washington Park, 154 N.J. 437, 456-57 (1998).  Notably, pursuant to R. 4:9-2, the parties may even amend the pleadings to conform to evidence at trial.  The Trial Court erred in denying Plaintiffs' motion to amend as it should have been liberally granted without consideration of the ultimate merits of the amendment.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] ”  It (p. 18, par. 48, to p. 21, par. 55) (179a-182a) (see prior Brief, p. 16, par. 48, to p. 20, par. 55 for updated clarifications) also refuted Court’s “finding that Appellant did not have standing to challenge the IA but if he did, striking his exceptions”.  See prior Brief, p. 5, 6th par., for other relevant details/problems w/Oct. ’22 Order.  See remainder of my prior Procedural History (p. 5-7) for a more complete history, which is missing from his Faulty History, along w/more relevant details March 13, ‘23 Order corrected March 7th Order so that awarded $2029.53 is for Trust income/corpus commission fees, & NOT “accounting costs”.  Faulty History omits the most important action after my Notice of Appeal:
[directive] For example, the "45-day rule" does not apply to internal affairs investigations alleging incapacity.  In addition, members of the public are not required to make their complaint within 45 days of the incident.  But once the agency has received the individual's complaint, the 45-day rule applies.  6.1.8  Commencing a criminal investigation into the subject matter of an internal affairs complaint will suspend the 45-day rule pending the disposition of that investigation; such suspension remains until the disposition of the criminal investigation.  (Similarly, a criminal investigation will toll the notice requirements established in Sections 6.1.4 – 6.1.6.)  Upon disposition of the criminal investigation, agencies will once again be bound by the 45-day INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 25 rule, with the 45-day period starting anew upon termination of the criminal investigation.
[brief] Perhaps sensing that no one was buying his conflicting and irreconcilable testimony, upon being questioned by the trial court, [...] ultimately conceded that he could not recall where he was when allegedly making his observations (1T 29-12 through 30-5).  The State can try and candy coat [...]’s testimony all it wants, but what we have here is a Trooper who fabricated his testimony, not once, but twice.  And I do not use that term lightly.  Webster’s Dictionary defines “fabrication”: 1 (a) invent, create (b) to make up for the purpose of deception
[directive] 4.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  있고, 귀하는 심리에서 교정청의 검사결과에 대해 이의를 제기할 수 그 대질하고, 심리에서 귀하에게 불리한 증언을 하는 증인들을 그들에게 반대심문을 한 후에 귀하에게 유리한 증거를 제출할 권리가 있는 것을 아십니까?  Do you understand you will be able to challenge the findings of the [...] in a hearing and at that hearing you will have the right to confront the witnesses against you and to cross examine them and then present evidence on your own behalf?
[brief] (Da150-151).  The GRC also found that the January 26 and March 30, 2021 Interim Orders were enforceable in the Superior Court, and held [...] in contempt of the March 30, 2021 Interim Order and that the complaint should be referred to the Office of Administrative Law for a determination of whether his refusal to produce government records constituted a knowing and willful violation of the Open Public Records Act.  (Da150-151)  On June 22, 2021, [...] filed a verified complaint and order to show cause pursuant to Rule 4:67-7 seeking enforcement of the March 30, 2021 Interim Order entered by the GRC.  (Da001-060).  [...] requested that the Trial Court hold [...] in contempt for his failure to produce records, and ordering [...] to pay [...]’s attorneys’ fees and costs.
[brief] Investigation into Defendant [...]’s Conduct is Derailed By Defendant [...] Escalating An Issue That Leads to Plaintiff’s Termination.  Plaintiff reported the June 2020 incident to [...], the Chief People Officer, and Defendant [...], Defendant [...]’s Director of Labor Relations, complaining about Defendant [...]’s actions (Pa659).  He believed that Defendant [...]’s conduct violated both [...]’s policies and the law, citing her behavior as constituting harassment.  (Pa660).  [...] also reported the incident to [...].  (Pa247).  Defendant [...] was assigned to investigate the matter.  (Pa90, Pa101).  Defendant [...] told Plaintiff that she would need to get Defendant [...]’s statement, speak to other witnesses look at the facts involved, and then alert Defendant [...]’s boss who would make a decision as to discipline or coaching for Defendant [...].  (Pa101).  Defendant [...] informed Defendant [...] that there was going to be an investigation of her conduct.  (Pa667).  Defendant [...] responded by saying: “what now. ”  (Pa101).  On September 1, 2020, Defendant [...] sent an email to Defendant [...], initiating an investigation into Plaintiff, [...], and [...], for unauthorized receipt of what Defendants refer to as “charge pay. ”  (Pa661).
[directive] 2.  Before releasing any LE Incident Footage, the Independent Investigator shall consult with persons depicted in the footage, including law enforcement officers and civilians involved in the LE Incident, but excluding bystanders or those appearing only in the background of the footage.  In the case of decedents, the Independent Investigator shall consult with the decedent’s family or next of kin.  During these consultations, the Independent Investigator shall seek to learn whether the depicted persons believe that the release of the footage would threaten their safety or privacy.  Digital Blurring of Footage.  3.  The Independent Investigator may, in their discretion, authorize the digital blurring of footage to obscure the identity of any person, including a law enforcement officer, if the Independent Investigator concludes that the public release would substantially threaten the safety or privacy of that individual.  The editing shall be done in a way that does not conceal the of any person actions another.5 who is using physical force against  Any digital blurring shall be made to a of the recording intended for public release; under no circumstances may the copy Independent Investigator alter in any way the master copy of the recording.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 264.  This means evidence of a statutorily created contractual obligation must be “unmistakable” and “clear. ”  *Id.* at 263-264, 277.  As applied here, the competing arguments of Plaintiffs and Defendants demonstrate that the residency requirement is neither unmistakable nor clear.  \(^5\)  It is undisputed that the Rutgers Act embodies a consummated contract protected by like clauses found under our federal and state constitutions.  The Supreme Court further explained that in an ordinary interpretation case, when a statute is ambiguous, then it is appropriate to resort to legislative history for guidance.
[brief] The State relied on this inappropriate testimony at length to make its case against [...] in summation:  How do we know that the defendant caused [...]’s death?  Ladies and gentlemen, this is where we’re going in this case.  We know from fingerprint analysis, from DNA evidence, the cause and manner of death, the bloodstain pattern evidence, the defendant’s own confession to [...] and her flight.  [ . . . . ]  That’s the truth, ladies and gentlemen, supported by the evidence in this case.  What evidence?  Again, fingerprint evidence, DNA evidence, cause and manner of death, bloodstain pattern evidence, computer forensics, and ultimately this defendant’s flight.  [(8T 38-1 to 6, 54-9 to 14)  (emphasis added)]  In summation, the State repeated the rhetorical question multiple times, responding with the overstated forensic testimony that never should have been admitted:
[brief] ”  Pa787 ¶ 8 (emphasis added).  The complaint in the [...] Action alleged breach of a “duty of care” by [...] (Pa317–18 ¶ 19.e; Pa327 ¶¶ 54–56), which the Challenged Decision correctly states “may be supported by a theory of negligence. ”  T83-6 to T83-7.  [...]’s expressly pleaded negligence theory of liability was never waived, abandoned, released, or extinguished by judgment.  Pa484 ¶ 49.  Vacatur or reversal of the Vermont Trial Court’s summary judgment decision would have left the [...] Parties free to pursue their pleaded negligence theory (assuming it survived the appeal).  Id.  The [...] Action thus plainly remained a “suit” that [...] was duty-bound to continue to defend even if the Vermont Trial Court’s summary judgment decision had rested solely on the “duty of loyalty” prong of [...]’s claim for alleged breach of fiduciary duty (T83-8), which is debatable.  In short, unless and until an appeal from the Vermont Trial Court’s summary judgment decision was fully and finally resolved in favor of the [...] Parties, coverage potentially existed under the Policy because the Supreme Court of Vermont could have concluded, as the docketing statement in the appeal heralded, see Pa970–1012, that (a) [...] and his Vermont co-defendants did not owe the [...] Parties any duty to refrain from voting at the Association unit owners’ meeting held December 19, 2019, cf. Solomon v. Atl. Dev., Inc., 147 Vt. 349, 355, 516 A.2d 132, 136 (1986) (“A stockholder is not automatically disqualified from voting on matters affecting his self-interest”); or alternatively (b) [...] and his Vermont co-defendants were at worst negligent in believing that the unit owner votes cast on December 19, 2019, were valid and that the post-vote actions of the Association’s new President and [...] taken December 19, 2019, were in the best interests of the Association in seeking recovery from [...] for the cost of restoring damaged Association drainage systems and in holding [...] and former Association officers accountable for the wrongful acts alleged in the Derivative Action.