ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Petitioner, [...] ("Petitioner," "[...]" or the "Company"), respectfully petitions the [...] (the "Board" or "[...]"), pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19, as follows:  1.  [...] appeals to the Board from a decision of the [...] ("Zoning Board") denying the Company's application for the construction of a proposed regulator station (the "Regulator Station" or "Facility") at [...] in [...], New Jersey ("Holmdel").  The Company respectfully requests, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19 and N.J.S.A. 48:2-23, that the Board determine that the construction of the Facility for the benefit of the residents of Holmdel and neighboring municipalities in [...], as more fully described herein, is: (a) necessary to maintain system integrity and reliability; and (b) necessary for the service, convenience or welfare of the public, and that no alternative site or sites are reasonably available to achieve an equivalent public benefit.  Accordingly, [...] request that the Board issue an Order concluding that the zoning, site plan review and all other Municipal Land Use Ordinances or Regulations promulgated under the auspices of Title 40 of the New Jersey Statutes and the Municipal Land Use Law of the State of New Jersey (the "MLUL") shall not apply to the proposed Facility, and the Company may proceed with the construction of the Facility as described in this Petition and accompanying testimony and exhibits.
[directive] O : l 1  Source of Funding for Reallocations 102 10- 1 - - SOP of of State New Jersey Forfeiture Program Administration  Table Contents Page: 5 . .  Forms of Reallocations 10:3 10- 2  Direct Purchase of Equipment by Agency 2  10- Restrictions on Equipment Agency 10- 2 by Terms Acceptance  2 of 10- 10:5 - Reallocation of Property or Services (Form F)  10- 2 10:6  Record Keeping Requirements for Agency Purchase 10- 3 - F  Completion of Form 10 3-4  Removal of Reallocated Equipment From State Service 10:7 10- 4 - Attachment  Reallocation of Property  1 - Fund Dsibursement to a Non-Law SOP No. 11 Enforcement Apencv 11- 1 1
[brief] 50a-51a.  So far as may be discerned, [...] points to the indemnification provision of the parties’ agreement and contends that by asserting an entitlement to retain the payment made to it by [...] pursuant to the COVID Statute, [...] has made a claim against [...] for which it must indemnify [...] pursuant to that clause, by repaying [...] the amount of the payment.  Or something like that.  [...] asserted a counterclaim against [...] for the payments due it under the COVID Statute for the April and July 1-6, 2020, periods; it asserted three counts, including breach of contract, unjust enrichment and [...]’s failure to comply with the mandate of the COVID Statute.
[brief] Appellate courts apply a *de novo* standard of review to a trial court's grant of summary judgment and apply the same standard as the trial court in determining --- \(^8\)  [...] testified in her deposition that she was fully aware of the litigation her brother brought against [...] and the other neighboring property owners, and that [...] rejected her brother’s claims to an easement.  Deposition of [...] Roth, T:19-17 to T:25-14, Da664-Da665.  Roth told [...] about the litigation before he purchased the property, though she was unsure whether she disclosed [...]’s final decision or just that another judge who presided earlier in the case was no longer on the bench.  *Id.*, T:30-20 to T:32-3, Da667.  [...], in his deposition, denied any knowledge of those proceedings before purchasing the property.  Deposition of Jamie [...], T:16-5 to 11, Da692.  [...] decided the case based on the language of the 1966 deed alone and did not address whether [...] knew or should have known of the [...] litigation and its outcome.  whether summary judgment is appropriate.  *Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev*, 225 N.J. 469, 479 (2016).  Pursuant to Rule 4:46-2, a court shall grant summary judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, ... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  **Argument**
[brief] That broad purpose of the rules must be read in the light of the salutary admonition that the progressive judicial policy in permitting amendments, generally, is not intended to afford a refuge to languid or dilatory litigants.  See Welsh v. Bd. of Ed. of Tewksbury Tp., 7 N.J. Super. 141, 146 (App. Div. 1950).  Nor should a party ordinarily be permitted the luxury of liberal amendment because his lawyer was dilatory, solely on a general plea of substantial justice.  The court should not permit itself to be imposed upon.  A party seeking leave to effect a tardy amendment must show circumstances which will bring him within the scope of certain recognized factors, thus establishing a basis for the proper exercise of judicial discretion.  53 N.J. Super. 367, 375 (App. Div. 1958).  Likewise, a proposed amendment may be denied where it prejudices the non-moving party.  To assess prejudice, courts must weigh the interests of the amending party against the prejudice that a defendant would suffer from the late amendment.
[brief] And did you receive a 1099 for all of your different roles or was it a separate one for each different role?  A  No.  There was one with a total amount.  It -- Q  Do you know what those 1099s reflect, those payments?  A  Excuse me?  Q  Can you recall, let's say, for 2014, what your 1099 from [...], the total amount was?  A  No, I don't.  21-82\(^6\), and 76:1-10.  With the discovery end date passed, Plaintiff issued an out of time subpoena on [...], a month after the discovery end date and one month before the then scheduled trial date of August 15, 2022.
[brief] Just compensation is a mandatory remedy in takings claims and operates retroactively This case is a paradigmatic Tyler case.  Unlike Roberto, where foreclosure remained a live issue, the petitioner in Tyler did not seek to reopen or overturn that foreclosure.  Tyler, 598 U.S. at 635.  Rather, as here, she sought just compensation for the taking of equity interest which had already transpired.  But while courts have discretion in providing equitable relief in foreclosure cases like Roberto, there is no such discretion in takings cases.  The Constitution itself requires just compensation for a taking.  First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles Cnty., 482 U.S. 304, 315–16 (1987) (Supreme Court has “frequently repeated the view that, in the event of a taking, the compensation remedy is required by the Constitution.
[brief] A.  Criteria for “d”  Variances (Pa23-27, 30-32, 36-38) ......................19  1.  Special Reason/Positive Criteria .............................................20  2.  Negative Criteria ....................................................................21  B.  Plaintiff Failed to Establish Special Reasons/Positive Criteria for d(1)  Use Variance By Reason of “Particular Suitability” (Pa23-27, 30-32, 36-38)  .........................................................22  C.  Plaintiff Failed to Satisfy the Negative Criteria for a d(1)  Use Variance (Pa23-27, 30-32, 36-38)  .................................................35  1.  Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that variance relief could be granted “without substantial detriment to the public good” .................................................35  2.  Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that variance relief could be granted “without substantial impairment to the intent and purpose of the Master Plan and to the zoning ordinance in effect” .................................36  POINT III ..................................................................................................................43
[brief] [...] correctly considered the circumstances of the crime in assessing both the risk of re-offense and the need for specific deterrence.  Randolph, 210 N.J. at 349 (recognizing that aggravating factors three and nine, among others, relate to the crime while inviting consideration of the defendant’s individual qualities).  Indeed, “the severity of the crime is now the single most important factor in the sentencing process. ”  Torres, 246 N.J. at 262 (citation omitted).  Defendant’s willingness to pull the trigger while pointing a gun at another human being reasonably suggested to the judge that defendant was a risk to commit similar crimes in the future and needed to be deterred.  In any event, considering the fact that defendant pointed a gun at someone and pulled the trigger would not be double-counting.
[brief] *Anastasio v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of West Orange* certif. den., 107 N.J. 46 (1986).  “[T]he law presumes that boards of adjustment and municipal governing bodies will act fairly and with proper motives and for valid reasons. ”  *Fallone*, supra, 369 N.J. Super. at 562, 849 A.2d 1117 (quoting *Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt*, 45 N.J., supra, at 296) (internal quotations omitted).
[brief] By mid-2018, [...] stated that they had no need for plaintiffs because they had “already acquired” the solar-energy development assets owned by plaintiffs, from [...], in a high-risk move that wagered that their conduct would somehow pass judicial scrutiny.  [...] filed an answer on October 12, 2021, then filed an opposition to the SAC motion with a “cross-motion” that comprised a 187-page filing (including brief).
[brief] It had to be the direct access to the water. ” (T69:6-11).  Looking at the situation from a common-sense perspective, the trial court posited “[t]he idea that, if you were . . . to draw it out and have them walk down the street to the beach ends, it would be no . . . more benefit than someone who was living on the side street and walking to the beach. ” (T69:12-16).  The trial court further analogized the boardwalk reservation to the reservation of land in Lennig that “the idea that, while they — they reserve the right through the designation of a boardwalk — they didn’t build the boardwalk,” and that Lennig stood “for the proposition that there are certain rights that are conveyed with the property, appurtenant to the property that are implied.
[brief] For all those reasons set forth herein, the State respectfully urges this Court to affirm the ruling below denying defendant’s PCR petition.  Respectfully submitted, [...] CAMDEN COUNTY PROSECUTOR ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT  By: s/ [...]  MAURA MURPHY SULLIVAN ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR MOTIONS AND APPEALS UNIT MAURA MURPHY SULLIVAN [ID:038162011]  MOTIONS AND APPEALS UNIT [...] [...] [...]  EMAIL: [...] OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF DATED: March 8, 2024  [...] [...]  [...] [...]  Presently Confined SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CAMDEN COUNTY LAW DIVISION, CRIMINAL PART INDICTMENT NO.: [...]
[directive] Voce entende tambem que segundo este mesmo Pacto Interestadual a tranferencia da sua supervisao a outro estado pode ser negada ou restringida por aquele estado a qualquer momento ap6s a senten9a, ou ao se declarar culpado se a declara9iio de culpa e uma condi9iio de admissiio ao Programa de Interven9ao Pre-Julgamento, se aquele estado detenninar que voce e obrigado a se registrar como agressor sexual naquele estado ou se o estado de Nova Jersey exigiu seu registro como agressor sexual?  Have you discussed with your attorney the legal doctrine of merger?
[directive] Criminal investigations generally require the investigator to obtain a search warrant to conduct a search.  Search warrants require probable cause to believe that the search will reveal evidence of a crime.  In internal affairs investigations, a search warrant should be obtained before a search is conducted of a subject officer's personal property, including any home, personal car, bank accounts, safety deposit boxes, briefcases, etc.  A warrant also may be necessary where a search of the subject officer's workplace is conducted and it is determined that the officer has a high expectation of privacy in the place to be searched.  The internal affairs investigator should consult with the County Prosecutor’s Office before undertaking the search of any workplace area in a criminal investigation.  37
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reject plaintiffs’ argument and affirm the final judgment in favor of defendant.  Respectfully submitted, __________________________  [...], Esq. [...]  Attorneys for Respondent, [...], M.D.  January 4, 2024  Via eCourts  Appellate Clerks Office Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division PO Box 006 25 Market Street Trenton, NJ 08611  Attention: [...]
[brief] * * *  [...], Esq.  On the Brief  BRIEF  TABLE OF CONTENTS  COMBINED  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS  01  ARGUMENT  14  I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW  14  II.  PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS & COLLEGE CONTRIBUTIONS  GENERALLY.  17  III.  THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE GENERALLY.  20  IV.  UNCLEAN HANDS GENERALLY.  20  V.  THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES GENERALLY.  21  VI.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AS IT PERTAINED TO ITS RULING ON THE MERITS OF THE PLAINTIFF’S “COLLEGE CONTRIBUTION” CLAIM.  25  VII.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AS IT PERTAINED TO THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES TO MEDICAL CLAIMS  ACCRUED PRIOR TO 2014.  31  VIII.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AS IT PERTAINED TO THE $2,372.50  AWARD OF COUNSEL FEES.  33  CONCLUSION  34
[brief] In *Tompkins v. Selip & Stylianou, LLP*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21937, at *7-11* (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2019) (Pa248), the District Court held that defendant debt buyer’s attempts to collect an alleged debt while unlicensed under the NJCFLA supported claims under the FDCPA.  *See also Id.* at *2* (collecting cases within the District of New Jersey holding that “a debt collector's failure to obtain a license pursuant to the [NJCFLA] can constitute a violation of the FDCPA”).  In *Valentine v. Mullooly, Jeffrey, Rooney & Flynn LLP*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118399, at *13* (D.N.J. July 6, 2022) (Pa253), the District Court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FDCPA claims and held that “[c]ourts in this District have invoked that part of the NJCFLA—the part reading: “directly or indirectly engag[es] . . . in the business of buying, discounting or endorsing notes”—when classifying debt collection practices as falling within the ‘consumer loan business. ’”  In *Veras, supra*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176, at *18* (Pa259), the District Court denied defendant’s debt buyer’s motion to dismiss and stated that “it would strain logic to conclude that if a debt collector is prohibited from engaging in debt collection activity in a state, he avoids the risk of liability under the FDCPA so long as he conceals this fact and does not make any representation that he actually has debt collection authority. ”  As shown by the litany of cases above, courts in this state have generally reasoned (completely aside from the private right of action) that the NJCFLA’s licensure requirements apply to debt buyers as consumer lenders under the statute.
[brief] THE COURT SHOULD ACT EXPEDITIOUSLY RECOGNIZING THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE FOR THE STUDENT-APPELLANTS  There is no better way to make this point and conclude this reply brief than by quoting again [...]’s eloquent statement in Abbott XXI:  Children go to school for a finite number of years.  They have but one chance to receive a constitutionally adequate education.  That right, once lost, cannot be reclaimed.  The loss of that right will have irreparable consequences, particularly for the disadvantaged children to whom SFRA was intended to give a fair chance at a thorough and efficient education.  Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XXI), 206 N.J. 332, 478 (2011) (Albin, J., concurring opinion).  CONCLUSION
[brief] Like the small group of challengers in Rocky Hill who lived directly adjacent to the property and whose claims “revolve[d] around their own subjective displeasure with the size, scale and footprints” of a development project, here too [...] is a private homeowners association located directly adjacent to the Property that disapproves of the proposed development.  See Rocky Hill, 406 N.J. Super. at 399; Pb1.  Moreover, unlike Willoughby, the “adjoining neighborhood” that stands to be most substantially impacted by the proposed development is not the challenger [...], but non-party [...], which has fully approved its version of the Redevelopment Plan and has expended considerable sums already in preemptory excavation and sewer installation work.  (See 1T, 8:12-21).  That project, like its counterpart in [...], cannot be completed so long as [...] continues to pursue this untimely complaint.  Thus, the trial court correctly found [...]’s singular desire to not have a warehouse development adjacent to it represents only the private interests of a limited public, which is not the type of public interest contemplated under this limited exception.
[brief] Plaintiff sent correspondence to Defendant at that address in 2014, to which Defendant sent multiple responses (Pa25-Pa37). vacate the Default Judgment at the time of filing this second correspondence with the Law Division (Pa71-72).  On July 31, 2020, Plaintiff provided additional dates to Defendant for the previously ordered post-Judgment asset depositions (Pa74).  On August 6, 2020, Defendant sent a written response regarding [...]’s health and COVID-19 (Pa76-77).  Defendant filed the August 6, 2020 correspondence with the Law Division (Pa76-77).  Defendant’s third correspondence failed to dispute the validity of the Default Judgment (Pa76-77).  Defendant failed to seek to vacate the Default Judgment at the time of filing this correspondence with the Law Division (Pa76-77).  On September 25, 2023, [...] filed a pro se motion on behalf of Defendants moved to vacate the Default Judgment (Pa3-9).
[directive] To ensure that all citizens are treated uniformly order must limit directive, or standing operating procedure, encounter, department's policy, an the would warrant heightened (requiring and articulable facts that Smith, 134 (1994) "specific See State v. N_J. 599 see also note 1 passenger from lawfully detained vehicle); discretion remove a a caution" exercising police to before necessitating the use of When circumstances feature on some BWC models).  (discussing atime-delay or "buffering" may not be safe and of swiftly-developing events, it suddenly during the course authority or force arise constructive or force.  Nothing in this Directive employing constructive authority before for an officer to activate a BWC practicable attention from distracting the officer's the officer safety by or in a manner that jeopardizes should be construed applied where the need noted that in many circumstances authority or force.
[brief] Specifically, the PERS Correction of Errors statute requires in relevant part:  If any change or error results in an employee or beneficiary receiving from the retirement system more or less than he would have been entitled to receive, then on discovery of the error, the retirement system shall correct it and, so far as practicable, adjust the payments in such a manner that the actuarial equivalent of the benefit to which he was correctly entitled shall be paid.  It is undisputed that [...]’s retirement benefit was calculated as though she worked until the end of January 2022, but [...] actually stopped working in October 2021 and made no further pension contributions.  (Pa4; Pa42; Pa72).  Upon discovering this, the PERS was required to correct the error.  [...]’s actual service credit was nine years and ten months, and her actual final average salary was $47,796.66 (not the projected $48,342.98), resulting in the required recalculation of her retirement allowance and her ineligibility for group life insurance.
[brief] THE COURT:  …  The, first of all, the order that tenant’s counsel would like me to make adopt is something I really don’t have jurisdiction to adopt.  I can’t, in this court, I can’t make -- it’s almost the equivalent of a judgment for damages.  And I can’t – in landlord/tenant court I can’t do that.  There’s two results to an eviction complaint.  Either a judgment for possession or I dismiss the case.  Now if I agree with everything you say about that, well then case dismissed.  But, and maybe you get the 192,000 that’s in the bank.  But I can’t – that particular order I don’t have jurisdiction to adopt.  (3T14-3 to 3T14-14)  In connection with Landlord’s application for reimbursement of its legal fees and costs, however, [...] arbitrarily cut Landlord’s contractually mandated fee award by more than forty-percent (40%) based upon his own, personal opinion that the hourly rates charged by Landlord’s counsel were “a little high.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 11:1-20.2(d) requires that notice be sent to “the insured, and to any person entitled to notice under the policy” (emphasis added).  As the insured here, [...] was entitled to notice. \(^5\)  Even where a third party is empowered under the terms of the policy to cancel an insured’s insurance, it simply cannot cancel absent proper notice, in which case the policy will remain in effect.  See Kende Leasing Corp. v. A.I. Credit Corp., 217 N.J. Super. 101, 111-13 (App. Div. 1987) (even where a premium finance company was empowered under the policy to cancel the insured’s insurance, it could not cancel absent proper notice, so the policy remained in effect despite the insured’s nonpayment of premiums).
[brief] First, the Plaintiff is a member of the bar for nearly twenty (20) years and is by self-description a litigator.  He is not a consumer or an average member of the public.  He did not indicate in his opposition to the Trial Court that he did not know that an arbitration provision would divest him of his right to sue in Court.  How could he make such an assertion with a straight face?  While our Supreme Court has not definitively resolved the scope of the rule requiring statement of waiver in *Atalese*, it has been applied thus far only in the context of employment and consumer contracts.  See *Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of Fla., Inc.*, 236 N.J. 301, (2019) (consumer); *Atalese*, supra (N.J. 2014) (consumer); *Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc.*, 173 N.J. 76, (2002) (employment); *Garfinkel*, supra (employment); see also *Moon v. Breathless, Inc.*, 868 F.3d 204, 214–15 (3d. Cir. 2017) (employment).
[brief] Defendants next attempt to distinguish the case at bar from the supporting cases cited in Plaintiff’s Brief: *Cole v. Jersey City Med. Ctr.*, 215 N.J. 265 (2013); *Morgan v. Sundance, Inc.*, 596 U.S. 411 (2022); and *White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc.*, 61 F.4th 334 (3d Cir. 2023).  Defendants argue:  This case is not like *White* or *Cole*.  Rather, the Action is still in its infancy.  The Action is not on the eve of trial; instead, while Respondents filed a pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, which was granted in part, thereafter, Respondents only filed an Answer to the Complaint.  As the Lower Court rightly noted, the parties have not engaged in any substantive discovery, as Appellant served initial discovery demands and Respondents has not produced documents in response.  No depositions have taken place or have been scheduled.  No scheduling orders have been issued and, while Appellant sought an extension of time on Discovery, no trial date has been scheduled.  Defs.’ Br. 29-30.  Defendants’ arguments focus on only two of the seven *Cole* factors\(^1\) cited in Plaintiff’s opening Brief—the proximity of their Motion to trial and the extent of discovery conducted.