ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 15  POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT BY FINDING THAT THE MSRA PREVENTS THE POLICE UNIONS’ CLAIMS TO RECOVER UNPAID WAGES.  (Pa000017-18, 26-29)  ........................................................................................................  15 POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT AS PLAINTIFFS HAVE PLED PRIMA FACIE CAUSES OF ACTION.  (Pa000017-18, 26-29)  ........................................................................................................  23  POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT AS THE MSRA DOES NOT DEPRIVE PLAINTIFFS’ MEMBERS OF A VESTED BENEFIT.  (Pa000017-18, 26-29)  ...........................................................................  29  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................
[brief] 9.  Pursuant to a written agreement dated January 7, 1963 (the “1963 Agreement”), the [...] agreed to subdivide Block 69 described in the 1963 Agreement as “the southwest corner of Sixth Street and Madison Avenue” (what would later become Block 69, Lot 8) and convey that property on the condition that the Congregation erect the synagogue thereon.  *(Da13-18)*  10.  In exchange for the Congregation’s promise to construct the synagogue in accordance with plans approved by the [...] which plans provided no onsite parking, the [...] granted the Congregation an easement to utilize the Subject Property “for parking purposes the vacant lands it owns on Madison Avenue [Fifth Street Lot] and also on Sixth Street [Sixth Street Lot] and to permit use of lands on Sixth Street for boiler room use and for a water cooling tower. ”  *(Da13-18)*  The 1963 Agreement further provides:  [U]pon accepting the deed to the aforesaid tract of land described...[the Congregation] will undertake to enter into a contract to erect a sanctuary, lounge, daily chapel, social hall with stage, Rabbi’s study, offices, library, board room, bride’s preparation and powder rooms, kitchens and related rooms and facilities on the said lands and premises in accordance with plans [approved by the [...]]...  (Da13-18)  11.  The 1963 Agreement also provides “[i]t is further understood and agreed that the said New [...] sanctuary shall perpetually be maintained in accordance with Orthodox Jewish tenets and not otherwise. ”  (Da13-18)  12.  The 1963 Agreement also provides once the Congregation completed construction of the synagogue, the [...] would cease conducting religious services at its school.  (Da13-18)  13.  The 1963 Agreement was executed by authorized representatives of Plaintiff and the [...] and acknowledged by witnesses.  (Da13-18)  14.  In reliance upon and in accordance with the 1963 Agreement, the Congregation constructed the synagogue on the corner of Sixth Street and Madison Avenue with no onsite parking.  (Da123-143 and 7T 22:6-9; 33:16-17; 36:21-23)  Plaintiff’s Use of Subject Property Following Construction Pursuant to Easement for Parking and Boiler Room 15.
[directive] If a defendant is charged with more than one violation under Chapter 35 or 36 of the Code of Criminal Justice arising from the same factual transaction and the defendant pleads guilty to one charge or seeks a conditional discharge under N.J.S.A. 2C:36A-1, all remaining Chapter 35 or 36 charges arising from the same factual transaction may be dismissed by the judge on the recommendation of the prosecutor.  See Part VII Guideline 4.  Prosecutors should exercise their discretion on a case-by-case basis in evaluating whether to recommend dismissal in this context, and dismissal often will be appropriate.
[brief] ABA Litigation Section, Civil Procedure in the 21st Century (/file/document/civil-procedure-21st-century-some-proposals) (pdf)  ABA Section of Litigation, Comparison of Duke Conference Recommendations (/file/document/proposals-2010-duke-conference-regarding-federal-rules-civil-procedure) (pdf)  ABA Section of Litigation, Iqbal Chart (/file/document/aba-litigation-section-committee-pretrial-practice-discovery-iqbal) (pdf)  LCJ PROPOSES AMENDMENTS ON PRIVACY PROTECTION, CYBER RISK
[brief] *State v. Deutsch*, 34 N.J. 190, 206 (1961) (quoting *Offutt v. United States*, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).  That standard requires judges to "refrain ... from sitting in any causes where their objectivity and impartiality may fairly be brought into question."  Ibid.  In other words, judges must avoid acting in a biased way or in a manner that may be perceived as partial.  To demand any less would invite questions about the impartiality of the justice system and thereby "threaten[ ] the integrity of our judicial process."  *State v.  Tucker*, 264 N.J.Super. 549, 554 (App. Div. 1993), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 468 (1994).
[brief] ”  [372a].  [...] explained that the data he used to calculate the rainfall amounts for various types of storms in Essex County was sourced from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.  [267a at 19:4–12].  He used that rainfall data along with topographic data collected by [...] and soil survey data on the water absorption rate for Defendant’s Property to calculate the volume of stormwater runoff from Defendant’s Property to Plaintiff’s Property.  [267a (19:13–21:19), 271a–272a (37:16–38:4, 38:12–24), 274a–275a (49:24–50:13)].  [...]’s calculations were reflected on a spreadsheet given to Defendants, and the “end results” of his calculations appeared in his expert report.  [266a–267a (17:4–18:3)].  Defendants did not submit the documents reflecting [...]’s calculations to the Court on their motion for summary judgment, but merely submitted [...]’s report.  When asked at his deposition for a percentage to describe the amount of runoff that flows out of the rear northeast corner of Defendants’ driveway relative to the rear southeast corner, [...] estimated it was “between 85 and 90 percent. ”  [273a at 42:21–43:4].  He also estimated that 60 to 70 percent of runoff had flowed to Defendants’ backyard instead of onto Plaintiff’s Property before Defendants installed the driveway curb.  [Id. at 43:7–20].  [...] explained that he offered those roughly estimated percentages merely to clarify the opinion reflected in his report that most of the runoff from Defendants’ driveway flows through the rear northeast gap in the curb, rather than as a precise calculation of the relative flow rates.  [273a–274a (44:1–45:17, 46:14–47:1, 47:19–25, 48:12–49:7)].  II.
[brief] Plaintiff is seeking an order compelling Defendants to produce additional records pursuant to its requests for production (“RFP”) 1, 7, 19, 21, 24, 26, 27, 61, 63, 64, 68 and 69.  In support, Plaintiff argues that it is seeking information relevant to its claims, “including civil penalty liability under California’s [Song-Beverly Act].” (ECF No. 63-1 at 2, 15-17).  Plaintiff is under the impression that the remedies of the Song-Beverly Act are available to him despite the dismissal of all Song-Beverly claims.  The Court disagrees.  The Court will refer to pincites supplied by CM/ECF rather than original pagination throughout.
[brief] The Grand Jury heard [...] indicate that defendant was observed pulling into the parking lot ([...] at [...]) as [...] and [...] exited the Buick, put their hoods up and walk in the store.  (13T 17-17 to 21)  He indicated when [...] came into the area, defendant maneuvered around the parking lot, became suspicious of the police and drove out the parking lot.  (13T 19-13 to 24)
[brief] See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657 (“Although negligence is obviously to be weighed more lightly than a deliberate intent to harm the accused’s defense, it still falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution once it has begun. ”).  In addition, the State’s negligence should be given heavy weight because “the weight we assign to official negligence compounds over time as the presumption of evidentiary prejudice grows. ”  Id.  Even though [...] was in federal custody, the State was still obliged to provide him notice of the indictment and prosecute the case against him, which is what the State ended up doing, just four years late.  (See Da 57)  In United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 676, 680 (3d Cir. 2009), a case very similar to this one, the Third Circuit considered whether the Government had provided a good reason for a thirty-five month delay in a federal prosecution where the defendant was in state custody on serious state charges and the Federal Government explained it had been waiting for the resolution of a state proceeding “out of deference to state’s compelling interest in its case.
[directive] 15-1 3.  Every board, committee or commission of a local unit which by law is vested with power 40A to expend public moneys, other than by warrant upon its financial officer, shall, not later than 10 days after the close of the fiscal year, file with the said financial officer a statement showing in detail the of items moneys received and disbursed by it during the preceding fiscal year, and also the balance of unexpended funds at the end of the fiscal year.  Amended 1991 ,c.75,s.27. of cash management plan  Adoption 40A :5-14.
[brief] 4  On January 23, 2018, [...] was found not guilty of all criminal charges stemming from that September 12, 2014 arrest.  (Pa49).  conviction.  After the Appellate Division judgment was vacated, the [...] submitted a notice to the trial judge withdrawing the VOP charges as of May 7, 2018.  (Pa228).  2.  [...]’s First Request for an Amended Judgment of Conviction  On September 5, 2018, six months after the Court vacated [...]’s VOP conviction, Assistant Public Defender [...], then-counsel to [...] in the underlying criminal action, submitted a letter to the [...] of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Criminal Division, Middlesex Vicinage.  (Pa226-Pa227).  In that letter, Wagner acknowledged that Middlesex County Probation “had withdrawn the now-moot Violation of Probation. ” (Pa226) (emphasis added).  As such, Wagner requested relief through an amended judgment of conviction.  Ibid.  Wagner also submitted proposed language that she suggested would be appropriate for the amended judgment of conviction.  Ibid.  On October 17, 2018, Judge Nieves entered an amended judgment of conviction.  (Pa229-Pa231).  There is no evidence that Wagner ever filed any motions under Rule 1:13-1 to correct any clerical errors in the amended judgment of conviction.  Ibid.  3.
[brief] **  On June 10, 2022, the trial court issued an Order delineating procedures for the disposition of Boonton and Florida Properties.  (18a)  With this Order, [...] interpreted the Trust language to compel [...] to participate in a sealed bidding procedure with [...] to determine which brother would purchase the entire Boonton Property.  [...] was the winning bidder and ultimately purchased for $601,000.  Furthermore, the trial court compelled [...] to accept [...]’s purchase price of $360,000 for the entire Florida Property.  Both of these transactions were predicated on fair market value appraisals secured by the Trust.
[brief] [...] (“[...]”)) is a nonprofit organization based in Hoboken, NJ that works to maintain the strongest possible rent protections in Hoboken through active involvement and monitoring of Hoboken’s city government and exposing inequities as they arrive.  [...] organized a GoFundMe page in July 2022 to assist [...] with the extreme cost burden of the additional $1,717 monthly rental increase awarded by [...].  Without this support [...] would be unable to cover the rent.  At this time, the GoFundMe account funds will only last for 1-2 more months.  If permitted to appear as *amici*, [...], [...], [...], [...] can assist the court in understanding the legal context in which this appeal arises and the impacts the case is likely to have on low- and moderate-income residents in Hoboken and the state.
[brief] If the defendant has a right to and has demanded a trial by jury, the court, upon finding the existence of a genuine issue to a material fact, shall order the action to proceed as in a plenary action in accordance with R. 4:67-5.  (Emphasis added).  Comment 2 to Rule 4:67-5 expressly states that “[a] defendant having the right to trial by jury can defeat the motion for summary proceeding by demanding a jury trial in accordance with the time provision of the rule. ”  The Comment further states that “[i]f so demanded, the court must deny the order to proceed summarily if it finds a genuine issue as to a material fact, the standard of the summary judgment rule, R. 4:46-2. ” (Emphasis added).  In response to the Verified Complaint, [...] demanded a trial in accordance with Rule 4:35 and Rule 4:67-5 and demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue of material fact requiring that the Court order the action to proceed as in a plenary action.
[brief] Pa25.  As a courtesy to [...], and at no cost to her, [...] arranged for some of [...]’s damaged garments to be transported to and from a local dry cleaner.  When making a claim for reimbursement from [...], [...] certified that these garments were already damaged as the result of the incident at her home before they were taken to the dry cleaner.  Pa25.  [...] acknowledged in her deposition on September 22, 2022, that she did not enter into a contract with [...].  See Pa62, page 142; Pa94.  [...] understood that [...] was engaged by [...] to inventory and assess the items of personal property that [...] claimed were damaged as the result of the incident at her home.  Pa62, page 142.  [...] further acknowledged that [...] had no responsibility to clean any items of her personal property.  Pa65, page 155.  [...] later testified that she believed [...] was supposed to clean her personal property but ultimately conceded that she had no idea why she thought that.  Pa95.  [...] and her counsel understood that [...] was not retained and did not undertake to perform any restoration work at [...]’s home or with respect to any items of [...]’s personal property that were damaged as the result of the water leak.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], [...], [...], and [...], Defendants-Respondents.  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL ORDERS OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, HUDSON COUNTY  Docket No.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.
[brief] Reviewing additional applicable case law as in Paris v. Pennsauken School District.  United States District Court, D. N.J. August 09,2013, this instance case in Westlaw is not reported in F. Supp.2d, 2013 WL 4047638, however, it does exhibit relevance to established precedents set forward by the Third Circuit:  “…  Indeed, “entry of default judgement is a two-part process; default judgement may be entered only upon the entry of a default by the clerk of the court…”.
[directive] Special Restrictions When Undercover Officers or Confidential Informants May Be Recorded.  Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of this Policy, and except as otherwise required by Section 5.5, an officer shall not activate a BWC, or shall de- activate a BWC that has been activated, if the officer knows or reasonably believes that the BWC would risk revealing the identity of an undercover officer or confidential informant or otherwise would pose a risk to the safety of an undercover officer or confidential informant, unless such activation is expressly authorized by a supervisor, or unless the exigency of the situation and danger posed to an officer (e.g., active shooter, actual use of police force, officer in distress, etc.) require that the encounter/incident be recorded, in which event the officer shall inform his or her supervisor that the recording risks revealing the identity of an individual as an undercover officer or confidential informant.
[brief] The balance is that the employee’s speech on matters of public concern not be outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to “the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. ”  *Connick v. Myers*, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (quoting *Pickering*, 391 U.S. at 568).  The burden is on the government to justify restrictions on speech.  *United States v. National Treasury Employees Union*, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) (Government must show that the free speech interests are outweighed by the impact on the actual operation of the Government).
[brief] M822  Order for Partial Judgment & Other Related Relief of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. dated and entered October 15, 2020 .................................................................  M1 Order Designating the Honorable [...], P.J.Cv. to Appoint a Special Hearing officer of the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. dated and entered on October 14, 2020 .............................................................  M65  Memorandum of Honorable [...], P.J.Cv. dated October 14, 2020 granting permission to Judge McCloskey to Appoint [...], Esq. as Special Hearing Officer ..............................................................................  M66 Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. dated and entered June 16, 2021 .................................................................... M462 Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. dated and entered September 14, 2021 ..........................................................
[directive] In February 2021, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed the New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Modernization Act (CREAMMA).  April 21, 2022 marked the opening of the regulated HUGHES JUSTICE COMPLEX ∙ TELEPHONE: (609)292-9660  FAX: (609)292-4299  New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer ∙ Printed on Recycled Paper and Recyclable cannabis market in New Jersey after the [...] ([...]) approved applications from Alternative Treatment Centers to expand into recreational cannabis sales.  To ensure a safe drug-free workplace, the [...] was tasked, per the CREAMMA, with prescribing standards in regulation for a Workplace Impairment Recognition Expert (WIRE) to “perform services on behalf of an employer, based on education and training in detecting and identifying an employee’s usage of, or impairment from, a cannabis item or other intoxicating substance, and for assisting in the investigation of workplace accidents. ”  Because the regulated cannabis market opened prior to the establishment of a WIRE program or guidance from the [...], many significant questions arose surrounding employee drug testing, especially for those employers with safety-sensitive positions, such as law enforcement officers.  As a result, many law enforcement agencies delayed the random drug testing of officers under the AG Drug Testing Policy to allow time for additional guidance and clarity.
[brief] 410 N.J. Super. at The Court observed that when the defendant in *Williams I* pushed the officer and fled, he “posed a risk of physical injury to police officers,” so the taint from the initial illegal stop dissipated.  *Ibid.*  In contrast, the defendant in *Williams II* rode away on his bicycle after a plainclothes officer ordered him to stop, but did not “engage in any act of physical aggression” towards the officers.  *Ibid.*; cf. *State v. Herrera*, 211 N.J. 308, 313, 336 (2012) (denying application of the exclusionary rule to the fruits of a potentially illegal stop when defendants “tried to overpower” the officer by choking him and reaching for his firearm).  Thus, in *Williams II*, there were no intervening circumstances creating an independent danger to purge the taint from the illegal stop, compelling suppression of the subsequently seized evidence.  410 N.J. Super. at 563-64; cf. *State v. Seymour*, 289 N.J. Super. 80, 87-88 (App. Div. 1996) (holding that when defendant refused to stop his car for police and led officers on a mile-long car chase at up to fifty miles per hour, the chase constituted an intervening circumstance that put the defendant, officers, and public in danger); *State v. Battle*, 256 N.J. Super. 268, 273-74 (App. Div. 1992) (holding that there can be no exclusion of evidence found following defendant’s return to his stopped car and flight at forty miles per hour, during which he physically struggled with an officer in the passenger seat).  Here, unlike Williams I, Herrera, Seymour, or Battle, there were no intervening circumstances sufficient to dissipate the taint from the illegal stop.
[brief] If this --- \(^1\) “An insurance quote is an estimated cost provided by the insurance company for an insurance policy.  Insurance companies often provide a quote to prospective policyholders, so they have an idea of the cost of purchasing coverage from that particular insurer. ”  *See* https://www.insuranceopedia.com/definition/476/insurance-quote, visited on 11/10/2023.  Court were to permit such a document to contain exclusions, that would turn the insurance industry on its head.  Given the entirety of the circumstances, [...] had a reasonable expectation of coverage, particularly when he was not given the usual automobile policy that would have contained exclusions and, indeed, was never given any document that said the 12-15+ passenger vans were excluded and, further, received notice that the vans were covered after the vans were already in use.  This is literally too little too late.  4.
[brief] Because the CFA claim is wholly contingent upon the premise that the \(^5\) Notably, *Freeman* is an unpublished California decision.  Pursuant to Cal. R. Ct. 8.1115(a), an unpublished decision may “not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action. ”  Because *Freeman* cannot even be cited as an authority in its home state, it does not carry any weight in this appeal.  Provision is an unenforceable penalty, dismissal was appropriate and this Court should affirm the November 8, 2023 Order.  II.
[brief] General design requirements.  (1)  Design:  Building plans and elevations shall show a variation in design to be achieved by the types of roof, heights of eaves and peaks, building materials and architectural treatment of the building facade that is utilized.  The following design standards shall be utilized:  (a)  Architectural elements such as varied roof forms, articulation of the facade, breaks in the roof, and walls with texture materials and ornamental details should be incorporated to add visual interest.  (b)  Roof height, pitch, ridgelines and roof materials should be varied to create visual interest and avoid repetition.  (c)  Architectural elements such as fenestrations and recessed planes should be incorporated into façade design.  Architectural treatment shall be applied to all elevations of a building.
[brief] “The overall objective ‘of conflict-of-interest laws is to ensure that public officials provide disinterested service to their communities’ and to ‘promote confidence in the integrity of governmental operations. ’”  Piscitelli, 237 N.J. at 349 (quoting Thompson v. City of Atlantic City, 190 N.J. 359, 364 (2007)).  . . .[statutory citation omitted]  “We must construe N.J.S.A. 40A-9-22.5(d) to further the Legislature’s expressed intent that ‘[w]henever the public perceives a conflict between the private interests and the public duties of a government officer,’ ‘the public’s confidence in the integrity ‘of that officer is ‘imperiled. ’”  Piscitelli, 237 N.J. at 351 (alteration in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 40 A:9-22.2(b) to (c)).  Disqualification is required when a public official has (1) a direct pecuniary interest; (2) an indirect pecuniary interest; (3) a direct personal interest; or (4) an indirect personal interest.  Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 553 (quoting Wyzykowski v. Rizas, 132 N.J.509, 525 (1993)).  “‘[A] court’s determination “whether a particular interest is sufficient to disqualify is necessarily a factual one and depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. ”’”  Piscitelli, 237 N.J. at 353 (quoting Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 554).