ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On June 19, 2018, while conducting an unrelated investigation, State Police arrested [...] after he was found to be in possession of approximately 12 kilograms of heroin.  (Dca 5)  After his arrest, Nunez Vasquez provided information to police about an individual known to him as “[...],” whom police later determined was the defendant, [...].  (Dca 5)  Nunez Vasquez told police that Mr. Correa is a large-scale heroin distributor in Paterson.  (Dca 5)  According to Nunez Vasquez, Mr. Correa stored large amounts of heroin for street-level distribution inside a storage unit in Fair Lawn.  (Dca 5-6)  Nunez Vasquez further informed police that, on at least a few occasions, he delivered one kilogram or more of heroin from New York to Mr. Correa’s storage unit.  (Dca 5-6)  The warrant affidavit does not specify or approximate the dates on which he made these deliveries.  Nunez Vasquez accompanied police to [...], a storage unit facility located in Fair Lawn.  (Dca 6)  While there, Nunez Vasquez identified storage unit number 126 as the unit where he had delivered heroin to Mr. Correa.  (Dca _____________________  2  These facts are derived from the affidavit in support of a search warrant for the storage unit.  (Dca 1-17)  6)  Documents subpoenaed from [...] revealed that Mr. Correa was the principal tenant of unit 126 and had been for the last six years.  (Dca 6)  In addition, the telephone number on Mr. Correa’s account with [...] matched the cellphone number that Nunez Vasquez told police that he had used to contact Mr. Correa in the past.  (Dca 6)  The subpoenaed records also listed [...] as an alternate tenant for unit 126.  (Dca 6)  As a result of surveillance footage subpoenaed from [...] and physical surveillance conducted between July and August 2018, police learned that Mr. Correa and Watson accessed the storage unit over 40 times in a one-month period and occasionally multiple times a day.  (Dca 6-7)  When each of them accessed the unit, he remained inside for a short period of time.  (Dca 7)  Police did not observe either Mr. Correa or Watson bring any items either into the storage unit or out of it.  While conducting surveillance at [...] on August 23, 2018, police observed Mr. Correa drive into the facility and park his vehicle.  (Dca 7)  He walked to unit 126, remained inside for less than ten minutes, and then left in his car.  (Dca 7)  [...] and other officers followed Mr. Correa as he drove to Paterson.  (Dca 7)  Bonner observed Mr. Correa park his car and saw a man walk up to the passenger side of Mr. Correa’s vehicle.  (Dca 7)  The man leaned into the car with his hands.  (Dca 7)  Bonner circled the block to get a better view of the interaction, but Mr. Correa had departed by the time Bonner returned to the location.  (Dca 7)  B.
[brief] “Where the partnership agreement fails to set a fair value buyout formula, the UPA will "fill the gap" by requiring that the buyout price be fair value. ”  *Id.* at p. 156.  The relevant UPA provision, *N.J.S.A. 42:1A-34*, does require an express agreement to avoid fair value:  a.  If a partner is disassociated from a partnership without resulting in a dissolution and winding up of the partnership business . . . except as otherwise provided in the partnership agreement, the partnership shall cause the disassociated partner's interest in the partnership to be purchased for a buyout price as determined pursuant to subsection b. of this section.  b.  As used in subsection a. of this section, "buyout price" means the fair value as of the date of withdrawal based upon the right to share in distributions from the partnership unless the partnership agreement provides for another fair value formula.  (Emphasis added).  _Cohen_ therefore confirms that the UPA requires “fair value” absent express agreement, holding, where the partnership agreement fails to set a fair value buyout formula, the UPA will "fill the gap" by requiring that the buyout price be fair value.
[brief] . . .thus, renewal of the motion was procedurally proper. ”  *Johnson v. Benjamin Moore & Co.*, 347 N.J. Super. 71, 82 (App. Div.), certification granted, cause remanded, 172 N.J. 176 (2002).  Finally, in *Hart v. City of Jersey City*, 308 N.J. Super. 487 (App. Div. 1998), the Appellate Division determined that the trial judgment appropriately dismissed qualified immunity claims prior to trial after the motion judgment had denied summary judgement on the same issue.
[brief] The Arbitrator found, for example, that: “[...] sought to change the EGP that had either been agreed upon and/or shown on its updates, and in some cases paid in part or in full, because of unanticipated conditions encountered during the construction process. ”  Da135.  As established during the Arbitration, “[...] objected to most of these changes in EGP arguing that EGP was not ‘actual’ profits, and that it did not assume any ‘execution risk’”; and “that any difficulties or losses encountered during the prosecution of the work were to be borne by [...] with [...] still entitled to its 65% of the established EGP regardless of ‘actual’ gross profits earned by [...]. ”  Da135 (emphasis added).  The Arbitrator accordingly held “that [...] is entitled to the sums claimed for unpaid EGP for projects that have been awarded and/or performed. ”  Da137.5  5  Notably, despite [...]’s attempt to offset [...]’s Award herein with its unadjudicated claim on the [...], the Arbitrator awarded [...] $0 on the [...], finding “a credit [was] due back. ”  Da138.  The Arbitrator therefore did not award [...] the $899,051.20 remaining due from [...] to [...] on the [...], and yet [...] impermissibly seeks to blatantly violate the entire controversy doctrine and litigate the [...] both in a newly filed arbitration and in this Court.
[brief] There is undeniable tension between this Court’s holding in cases such as Mule and Manole, on one hand, and older cases such as Konitch v. Hartung, 81 N.J. Super. 376 (App. Div. 1963), the sole case relied upon by the trial court in dismissing Plaintiff’s claim against [...].  See Pa6.  More recent cases like Mule and Manole provide that whether a co-employee is acting “in the course of their employment” presents a fact sensitive issue that cannot be determined merely based on the ownership of the location where the injury occurred.
[brief] Under these factors, the Court did ultimately find that a duty of care did not exist under the facts present in Shield.  However, the facts present in Shield are hardly akin to those present here.  In conducting the duty of care analysis espoused in Hopkins, the Shields Court focused its analysis on the second and third Hopkins factor; respectively, the nature of the attendant risk and the opportunity and ability to exercise care.  Examining these factors, the Court explained that the transient nature of the hazards posed by winter weather weighed against imposing a duty on the lessor.  See Shields, 240 N.J. at 493.  The Court then found that it would be impractical to require the landlord to prevent the harm accompanying temporarily slippery conditions.  Id. at 494.  As opposed to the hazardous winter weather conditions present in Shields, the defective electrical panel was not a transient danger, and ameliorating this condition would have hardly been impractical for [...].
[brief] | | | Sonderman v. Remington Const. Co., | 23, 24 | | 127 N.J. 96 (1991) | | | Zaman v. Felton, | 8 | | 219 N.J. 199 (2014) | | | Statutes | | | N.J.S.A. 2A:14-30 | 35 | | N.J.S.A. 46:26A-1 | 10 | | N.J.S.A. 46:26A-1 and (2) | 8 |  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] 3T124:8-22.  [...] was asked by his attorney if he received receipts for [...]’ expenses, such as receipts for the $178,000.00 in travel expenses.  [...] stated that he was not given some receipts, and that the receipts he received were very limited.  3T125:6-22.  [...] also stated that [...] did not sign the tax returns, but if he had issues with them, he would have corrected them.  He stated “[o]h, yeah.  I -- I would, um -- if there were issues -- well, I always discussed with Mr. [...] the financial statements and the resulting tax returns. ”  When asked to confirm that “no tax returns went out without your [[...]’s] rubber stamp of approval,” he replied “[t]o the best of my knowledge, yeah. ”  3T 42:16-23.  When asked by Plaintiff “[h]ow -- so, if you rec-- if [...] received $134,000.00 in the year of 2014, and returned $90,000 to [...], leaving $44,000.00 as income, how is it that I was paid $49,200?
[brief] The Supreme Court in Mejia “agree[d] with the Appellate Division panel in Mejia that if the trier of fact determines [direct defendants] to be sixty percent or more at fault, then plaintiff can recover the full amount of damages from that party, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3(a).”  Mejia, 241 N.J. at 374.  This is because, when the trier of fact determines that a party is sixty percent (60%) or more responsible for the total damages, “[t]he claim is governed by the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law. ”  Id. at 372 (quoting Jones, 230 N.J. at 160).  This ruling by the Supreme Court resolves the Appellate Division’s split regarding application of the JTCL.  As such, Mejia controls the outcome of this matter – not Burt.  The Trial Court, then, properly executed Plaintiff/Respondent’s proposed Order of Judgment because the JTCL and Mejia mandate that Plaintiff/Respondent is entitled to recover the full amount of damages from Appellant.  II.
[brief] Second, Appellants’ position runs headlong into the equally established rule that “in certain circumstances the parental right to control the upbringing of a child must give way to a school’s ability to control curriculum and the school environment. ”  C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 182 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395-96 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that “[w]hile parents may have a fundamental right to decide whether to send their child to a public school, they do not have a fundamental right generally to direct how a public school teaches their child”).
[directive] [No/Nao] direito de permanecer em sil6ncio?  0  *Victims of Crime Compensation Office Assessment/Multa do Gabinete de Compensacao a Vitimas de Crime Revised Form Promulgated by 12/31/2019 Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Portuguese Defendant's Initials a Fonnulario Revisado Promulgado em 12/31/2019, Complemenlayio Diretriz no 01-18, CN 10079-Portuguese Reu lniciais do page 1 of7/pagina 1 de 7 4.
[directive] # Page 1 counsel shall represent that they have reviewed the form with the defendant, that all if questions, if any, have been addressed with the defendant, and advise the of defendant has signed the form.  The judge will advise the defendant the appellate If and PCR rights.  See 3:21-4(h).  defense counsel has not been previously able to R. have the defendant sign the form, defense counsel the record should elicit on permission from the defendant to print the defendant's name the defendant's in signature line the form.  Defense counsel should then submit the form soon as as on reasonably practical.
[brief] The Court should reverse the March 1, 2023 order denying post-conviction relief to defendant.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  Counsel for Appellant, [...]  Dated: September 4, 2023  October 27, 2023  [...] – No. 346432021  Special Deputy Attorney General/ Acting Assistant Prosecutor  [...] Of Counsel and on the Brief LETTER IN LIEU OF BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Re: State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...] (Defendant-Appellant)
[brief] If students say they are not ready to disclose this personal information to their parents, but schools disregard this decision, then parental notification may harm the students’ (1) physical safety, as this kind of notification exposes them to a high risk of familial rejection, leading to violence and homelessness, among other negative outcomes; (2) mental health, including increased risks of anxiety, depression, suicide, substance abuse, and self-injurious behaviors; and (3) educational outcomes, as discrimination against gender-nonconforming students is inversely correlated with academic success.  In addition to harming individual students, the Mandatory Notification Policies will subvert schoolwide goals of creating open, safe, and inclusive environments where gender-nonconforming students, like all other students, are able to live in accordance with their gender identity.
[directive] This includes approximately 500 of NJ's municipal lockups used for the temporary holding of individuals.  The vast majority of NJ's municipal lockup facilities are local police departments.  However, the list also includes lockups located in court holding facilities, colleges and universities, highway and bridge authorities, sports/entertainment complexes, and so on.  The following clarifies how these regulations apply to municipal lockups:  1.  Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders (DSO)  42 U.S.C. 5633  Section 223(a)(12)(a) of the JJDP Act states that status offenders and non- offenders are not to be detained or confined in secure detention or correctional facilities.  A status offender is a juvenile who is involved in behavior that would not constitute a crime for an adult - i.e. a runaway, truant, incorrigible, curfew violator, a youth charged with Possession/Consumption of Alcohol by a Minor, etc.  A non-offender would be a dependent or neglected youth.  In NJ, most status offenders and non-offenders are referred to as "juvenile- family crisis" cases.  (609)  530-5200  PROTECTING THE PUBLIC, SERVING YOUTH
[brief] If the defendant is found not guilty or for any other reason is entitled to be discharged judgment shall be entered accordingly.  The Criminal Division Manager shall forward a copy of the judgment forthwith to all parties and their counsel.  A judgment prepared by the clerk and signed by the judge provides “finality. ”  See R.3:21-5 (final judgment).  State v. Pratts, 145 N.J. Super. 79, 93-94 (App. Div. 1975), aff'd o.b. 71 N.J. 399 (1976).
[brief] *State v. J.V.*, 242 N.J. 432, 442 (2020).  In passing the 2023 amendments, including the 2023 Veto Amendment, the Legislature spoke plainly: the 2023 amendments “shall take effect immediately. ”  Pa31.  Thus, upon passage of the statute, a New Jersey court was required to dismiss an NJFCA “action or claim” if the requirements for application of the public disclosure bar were satisfied, “unless opposed by the Attorney General.
[brief] PLAINTIFF HAS PRESENTED EXTENSIVE EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY TO CREATE A TRIABLE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT ON CAUSATION.  [ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Pa047, ¶33 – Pa057, ¶71; Da0790-Da0792; Da0794-Da0798; Da0819-Da0829)]...........................................  35  A.  Plaintiff has Established General Causation  [ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Pa047, ¶33 – Pa057, ¶71; Da0790-Da0792; Da0794 Da0798; Da0819-Da0829)]...........  36  B.  Plaintiff Has Established Specific Causation.  [ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Pa047, ¶33 – Pa057, ¶71; Da0790-Da0792; Da0794 Da0798; Da0822-Da0829)]..........  40  C.  Neither of Plaintiff’s Experts Offer Net Opinions.[ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Pa047, ¶33 – Pa057, ¶71; Da0790-Da0792; Da0794-Da0798; Da0819-Da0829)]..........  44  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................
[brief] ”  *Kelly*, 97 N.J. at 198, quoting *Brown v. United States*, 256 N.J. 335, 343 (1921) (emphasis added); see also *State v. Bryant*, 288 N.J. Super. 27, 34 (App. Div. 1986) (same).  Indeed, the statute in question states that the use of force toward an intruder is “justifiable” when the actor merely “reasonably believes that the force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself . . . against the use of unlawful force by the intruder on the present occasion.
[brief] (See Pb35).  In Miller, the court cites to Rodriguez v. Torres, 60 F. Supp. 2d 334, 354 (D.N.J. 1999).  Miller, 114 Fed Appx. at 929.  The portion of the Rodriguez decision relied on by the Miller court merely states that the Rodriguez court’s qualified immunity analysis as set forth in Section B of the decision did not apply to the pendent state claims.  Rodriguez, 60 F. Supp. at 354.  Section B of the decision addressed the plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C §1983.  See Rodriguez, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 342.  The Rodriguez court’s analysis addressed the plaintiff’s contention of a pattern of retaliatory harassment.  See id. at 344.  The court’s qualified immunity analysis in Section B focused on whether the plaintiff could pursue a cause of action for retaliatory harassment under the First Amendment.  *Id.* at 350.  Following what it refers to as its “exhaustive analysis,” the *Rodriguez* court found that the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s claim of retaliatory harassment brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.  *Id.* at 352.  Addressing the plaintiff’s NJ LAD retaliation claims, the *Rodriguez* court held that its qualified immunity analysis of the plaintiff’s retaliation claims brought under the First Amendment did not apply to the LAD claim.  *Id.* at 354.  The *Rodriguez* court did not find that qualified immunity does not apply to LAD claims.  It merely found that its First Amendment qualified immunity analysis did not apply to the plaintiff’s LAD claims.  See id.  Appellant’s assertion that qualified immunity is not available to an LAD defendant is not supported by the law.
[brief] Successive claims constitute one controversy for purposes of the ECD where the claims “arise from related facts or the same transaction or series of transactions. ”  DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 267 (1995).  Here, [...]’s renewed claims in the Second Arbitration (a) relate to Project-specific facts already litigated in the First Arbitration, and (b) arise under the [...] (i.e., part of the same series of transactions subsumed within the [...]).
[directive] Interviewing the Complainant and Civilian Witnesses  7.1.1  The investigator assigned an internal investigations case should initially outline the case to determine the best investigative approach and identify those interviews immediately necessary.  The investigator should determine if any pending court action or ongoing criminal investigation might delay or impact upon the case at hand.  If it appears that the conduct under investigation may have violated the law or the investigation involves the 33 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 officer’s use of force that resulted in serious bodily injury or death, the County Prosecutor shall be immediately notified of the internal affairs investigation.
[brief] It is well settled that “the polestar of contractual interpretation is the intent of the parties. ”  Kearny PBA Local #21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J.208, 221 (1979), citing Atlantic N. Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 301 (1953); Basic Iron Ore Co. v. Dahlke, 103 N.J.L. 635, 638 (E. & A. 1927); Atlantic Northern Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. at 304.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PRECLUDED APPELLANT FROM READING PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT’S AMENDED COMPLAINT TO THE JURY BECAUSE DOING SO WOULD HAVE BEEN MISLEADING, CONFUSING, AND UNDULY PREJUDICIAL ..............................................................................................................  37  A.  The standard of review of the Trial Court’s evidential rulings is abuse of discretion.........................................................................................  37  B.  The exclusion of portions of Plaintiff/Respondent’s Amended Complaint was not an abuse of discretion because it would have been confusing, misleading and unduly prejudicial ......................... 38  CONCLUSION
[brief] In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div. 2001).  Therefore, the [...]’s decision in this case is owed substantial deference “even if the court would have reached a different result in the first instance. ”  *In re Herrmann*, 192 N.J. 19, 21 (2007).  In cases involving major discipline such as a removal, the appointing authority need “establish the truth of the charges by a preponderance of the believable evidence and not to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
[directive] rm  ADA ENSURING DOOR  AN OPEN TO JUSTICE with Americans Act Disabilities  In addition to completing the order, when a pro se or unrepresented litigant files a petition for post-conviction relief and the relief being sought is denied, the judge must provide written reasons.  The written reasons for such denial shall be included in the court’s order denying relief or attached to that order.  This inclusion of documented reasons for the denial will save the public the cost of ordering transcripts to determine the trial court’s reasons for its decision if there is an appeal from the order denying relief.  Any questions or comments regarding the form order may be directed to the [...] by phone at [...], or by email to [...].  Attachment: Order on Post-Conviction Applications on Indictable Offenses (CN:11151)
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On January 17, 2020, plaintiffs [...] and [...] filed a complaint against [...], [...], [...]  ([...]) [...] ([...]) and [...] ("[...]" or "[...]").  Da1-7.  On May 22, 2020, a consent order was entered, dismissing the complaint and granting plaintiffs "leave to re-file a Complaint no later than 60 days from the date of this Order (the Re-filing date)" and tolling the statutes of limitations through the Re-filing date.