ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Although Defendants argued, and the Court below accepted, that each Municipality has complete control over land use within its borders, the Legislature does not agree.  To reduce arbitrariness in land use decisions, the Legislature required that each municipality adopt a Master Plan which mandates them to consider land uses apart from who is the owner of any particular parcel of land.  In the process of adopting a Master Plan, various interest groups could debate what they believe to be in the best interest of the municipality as a whole.  Once a plan is adopted containing the views of the property owners and their elected representatives, and the likely give and take of various different interests, future land use decisions become significantly less arbitrary so long as such decisions have to be made in the context of the adopted plan.  The more specific the Plan, the more meaningful the Master Plan is to future land use decisions.  All land use decisions impact the distribution of wealth within the municipality – commercially owned land is probably more valuable than residentially owned land and small lot zoning is probably more valuable on a per acre basis than large lot zoning.  The “character” of each municipality is created in the Land Use Element of the Municipality’s Master Plan.  More importantly, the more difficult it is to change the Master Plan, the greater the stability of land use in the municipality and the more effort will go into the issues involved in the initial adoption of the Master Plan.  Further, the process of changing zoning is significant in prohibiting the next governing body from undoing what the prior governing body did to the benefit of a potentially whole group of new “friends” and, to the extent that change requires a rational basis, the Master Plan has some long run significance.  The lower court decision eliminated the intended purpose of the Master Plan to make land use decisions less arbitrary and more stable.
[brief] Second, in an exchange of e-mail correspondence between Plaintiff and [...] that took place in January, 2019 [...] clearly stated to Plaintiff that he and [...] had sold all of their interests in [...] --- 5  Plaintiff cites the case of Mount Holly State Bank v. Mount Holly Washington Hotel, Inc., 220 N.J. Super. 506 (App. Div. 1987) for the idea that knowledge that a guarantor has sold its interest in an entity does not automatically equate to a revocation.  The case is distinguishable from the case at bar because in Mount Holly the guarantor retained a financial interest in the corporate debtor after the sale of its interest (as a creditor of the corporate debtor) and therefor benefited from the continued advancement of funds by the Bank.  Here [...] and [...] retained absolutely no interest in [...] and received no benefit from the continuation of the month to month lease by Plaintiff. “several years ago” and that they had no further responsibility under any lease guaranty (if there ever was such a guaranty).
[brief] Materials sent to a sentencing judge prior to the sentencing hearing matter.  Our system of justice does not provide for sentencing immediately after a guilty verdict or plea.  Rather, trial courts schedule a later sentencing date, in order to allow the preparation of a mandatory pre-sentence report, N. J.S.A. 2C:44-6, and the opportunity for parties to advocate for their clients prior to the hearing by submitting memoranda and presenting relevant evidence in order to guide the court in deciding what sentence to impose.  Petitioner submits that such pre-hearing materials have the most impact in allowing the court to conduct a meaningful sentencing hearing, as most sentencing judges, guided by such materials, will have an initial sentence in mind by the start of the sentencing hearing.  The jury returned its verdict on December 17th 2015.
[brief] Notice of claim received from [...] (Attached at Pa282)  Letter sent March 16, 2020 from [...] (Third Party Administrator) requesting status on the hearing scheduled for March 2, 2020 (Attached at Pa283)  Letter from [...] dated April 22, 2022 to [...] advising that Order of that same date was enclosed in letter (Attached at Pa284)  Order dismissing Appeal by [...] dated 4/22/2022 (Attached at Pa285)
[directive] All such complaints shall be documented and referred to the County Prosecutor for review.  If the subject of the Internal Affairs investigation is the Police Chief, Police Director, Sheriff or Head of Internal Affairs, the County Prosecutor or the Attorney General’s Office shall handle the investigation.  The investigation may involve any type of alleged employee misconduct, as described in Section 4.1.3, and shall be conducted pursuant to Section 6 20 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021 (Investigation of Internal Complaints).  At the conclusion of the investigation, the internal affairs investigator and/or the investigating agency shall make factual findings, summarize the matter, and indicate the appropriate disposition (Sustained, Unfounded, Exonerated, or Not Sustained) as to each allegation of misconduct.  See Sections 6.2.3, 6.3.9.  In cases involving Police Chiefs, final dispositions and recommendations shall be forwarded to the appropriate authority.  While the appropriate authority must make the final decision regarding discipline, the County Prosecutor may make a non-binding recommendation regarding the discipline to be imposed by the appropriate authority.  The County Prosecutor or the Attorney General’s Office also may determine that it is appropriate to handle other internal affairs investigations of high-level officials in their discretion.
[brief] The Appeal Taken With [...]’s Then-Active Support and Authorization  On December 4, 2020, with [...]’s then-active support, [...] and his co-defendants filed a Notice of Appeal bringing up for appellate review and reversal the Vermont Trial Court’s summary judgment decision and prior rulings putting the Association into receivership despite its solvency.  Pa461 ¶ 53; Pa1044 ¶ 53; Pa479 ¶ 23; Pa969.  On January 4, 2021, [...] authorized and paid for the filing of an appellate Docketing Statement (Pa971–1016) which identified the following issues for appellate review and determination:  1.  Whether the trial court’s Preliminary Injunction Order and Order Appointing Litigation Receiver were based on an erroneous interpretation of 11B V.S.A. § 8.31(a) and Vermont law governing common owner voting rights.  2.  Whether the trial court’s Preliminary Injunction Order and Order Appointing Litigation Receiver were unconstitutional as effecting a private taking of property, as suppressing speech, and as compelling speech.  3.  Whether the trial court abused its equity power by granting the Litigation Receiver unprecedented powers, including the power to dismiss legal claims and pending actions.  4.  Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees.  5.  Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Appellants’ Counterclaims.  Pa462 ¶ 54; Pa1044 ¶ 54; Pa977–77.  In other words, after reviewing the Vermont Trial Court’s summary judgment decision, [...] authorized an appellate challenge to all of the substantive rulings that it contained.  [...] also supported [...]’s defense of a motion for an award of attorneys’ fees filed by the [...] on November 24, 2020, based on the Vermont Trial Court’s summary judgment ruling and the “voluntary” dismissal of the Derivative Action.  Pa480 ¶ 25.  V. [...]’s Abrupt Abandonment of [...] and Its Other Insureds.
[brief] See Ra100-Ra101, emphases added.  In the context of public employment termination cases, stays of such termination, pending litigation, are not the standard procedure.  Rather, where a termination is ultimately invalidated following subsequent litigation, the appropriate remedy is reinstatement with back pay.  See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10; N.J.S.A. 18A:6-14; N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10; Phillis Stilwell v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. of North Brunswick, Comm. of Ed. Dec. No. 333-17 (holding Petitioner entitled to back pay following unlawful termination from tenured position).  These are not the sort of complex remedies that cannot be efficiently and effectively implemented at the conclusion of proceedings on the merits\(^1\).  [...] further argues that [...]’s Appeal must be Dismissed because [...] was statutorily compelled, by the [...], to terminate his --- \(^1\)  See, e.g., Barrick v. State, Dept. of Treasury, 218 N.J. 247 (2014) (discussing the complexities that obtain where there is no stay of an appeal of the award of a public contract); Asbury Park Bd. of Ed. v. NJ Dept. of Ed., 369 N.J. Super. 481 (App. Div. 2004) (concerning the procedure that accompanied challenge to Department of Education regulations).  employment\(^2\).  See Db14, Db20-Db21.  [...] misses the point: the Appeal is not about what [...] was compelled to do; rather, it concerns [...]’s ability to meaningfully challenge the termination of his tenured employment as the result of the [...].  For all the reasons set forth in this, and [...]’s initial Brief, he must be afforded that opportunity.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] Amann egzijib yo make a la swit anba la a: (1) Jiska $2,000 nan ka yon zak klasifye 1ye degre (2)  Jiska $1,000 nan ka yon zak klasifye 2yèm degre (3)  Jiska $750 nan ka yon zak klasifye 3yèm degre (4)  Jiska $500 nan ka yon zak klasifye 4yèm degre (S.C.V.T.F) $ Total Sanksyon  Do you understand that if the crime occurred on or after April 26, 2005, as a result of your guilty plea you will be required to pay a mandatory Sex Crime Victim Treatment Fund (S.C.V.T.F.) penalty as listed below for each offense for which you pled guilty?
[brief] Owing to the lack of evidence in the record contradicting Plaintiffs’ proofs, and underscored by the Mayor’s statements, which the Trial Court characterized as “tantamount to direct, calculated interference with the independent, quasi-judicial processes contemplated by the MLUL for the fair hearing and consideration of [Plaintiffs’] Amended Application” (M47), the Trial Court correctly found that the Board’s denial of the Amended Application was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and properly reversed that denial.  POINT III
[brief] III.  Plaintiffs have not identified any reversible error under Rule 1:6-2 (not raised below).  Plaintiffs claim that the Trial Court failed to schedule oral argument for their Motion to Vacate.  While it is true that the Trial Court did not schedule oral argument for Plaintiffs’ motion, this in itself is not reversible error.  As explained in Raspantini v. Arocho, 364 N.J. Super. 528, 532 (App. Div. 2003), failure to set oral argument, without more, is not grounds for reversal.  Under Raspantini, a failure to set oral argument is reversible error if the motion judge “failed . . . to set forth his findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record. ”  Id.  Here, however, [...] clearly articulated the grounds for denying Plaintiffs’ motion.  [Pa255–57].  Moreover, Plaintiffs have not established that they were prejudiced by lack of oral argument.  See Spina Asphalt Paving Excavating Contractors, Inc. v. Borough of Fairview, 304 N.J. Super. 425, 427 n.1 (App. Div. 1997) (refusing to remand for failure to set oral argument); Finderne Heights Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Rabinowitz, 390 N.J. Super. 154, 165 (App. Div. 2007) (affirming trial court decision, despite trial court’s refusal to hold oral argument or justify its refusal to do so, because “we find no prejudice under the circumstances”); ConnectOne Bank v. Bergen Protective Sys., Inc., No. A-0468-20, 2021 WL 5045440, at *9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 1, 2021) (unpublished) (“The movant must show there was prejudice warranting reversal if the trial court denies a request for oral argument on a motion. ”).  Because Plaintiffs have not identified any reversible error or prejudice, the Trial Court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate should be affirmed.  IV.
[brief] By the mid-2000s, [...]’s walls were changing color and by December 2008, he saw mold, though he asserts that he did not know it was mold at the time.  j.  [...] first began to experience symptoms in 1991, which continued through his residency at the condo.  k.  In the early 1990s, his symptoms became so severe that they caused the collapse of his marriage.  Da408a-Da454a.
[brief] Defendant specifically complains of testimony from [...] and [...].  [...] permissively testified as to his investigative steps, as did [...].  Because defense counsel only objected to [...]’s remarks, the State addresses the objected to remarks first.  (Db32).  “[B]oth the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule are violated when, at trial, a police officer conveys, directly or by inference, information from a non-testifying declarant to incriminate the defendant in the crime charged. ”  *State v. Branch*, 182 N.J. 338, 350 (2005).  Our Supreme Court has explained that the “common thread” running through Confrontation Clause jurisprudence  Hence, it is illogical to assume jurors would disregard identification instructions when it came to different witnesses.  “is that a police officer may not imply to the jury that he [or she] possesses superior knowledge, outside the record, that incriminates the defendant. ”  Id. at 351.  In addition, “[w]hen the logical implication to be drawn from the testimony leads the jury to believe that a non-testifying witness has given the police evidence of the accused's guilt, the testimony should be disallowed as hearsay. ”  State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 271 (1973).  Here, [...] testified he was provided with the nickname, physical description, and ultimately the name of defendant after speaking with [...].  (8T34:9-17).  The logical inference to be drawn here is that [...] provided him with the information.  However, this was permissible, given [...] was a testifying witness, subject to cross-examination, and thus fully incongruent with the notion a jury would believe “a non-testifying witness has given the police evidence,” when in fact that purported witness testified, and was subject to cross-examination.  Ibid.; (8T151:1-25).
[brief] Appellant’s Claims are Encompassed by the Cardholder Agreement and Respondents are Entitled to Enforce it  The Cardholder Agreement, which was sent to Plaintiff, plainly applies to [...] and its successors or assignees.  (Pa136-Pa146).  The Resurgent Affidavit demonstrates proof of the assignment of Plaintiff’s Account and that [...] is an assignee of [...].  (Pa170-Pa171).  New Jersey Courts have consistently held assignees and non-signatories like [...] are entitled to enforce an arbitration agreement.  See Williams-Hopkins, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 957, at *4 (enforcing arbitration provision in favor of current owner of the debt, [...], pursuant to U.S. Supreme Court authority); Maisano, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2421, at *10 (same); Lyon v. Kull Auto Sales, Inc., 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 133, 2017 WL 344438 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017) (Da65-Da70) (arbitration agreement enforced by contract assignee); Jade Apparel, Inc. v. United Assurance, Inc., 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2250, 2016 WL 5939470, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016) (Da49-Da54) (arbitration compelled by non-signatory because of agency relationship with signatories and inclusion in language of agreement); Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc. v. Through Transport Mut. Ins. Assn., 108 Fed. Appx. 35, 40 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding “traditional principles of contract and agency law,” including third-party beneficiary principles, applied to arbitration agreements); Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1122 (3rd Cir. 1993); Holland v. [...] Funding, LLC, No. 5:16-CV-00069, 2016 WL 6156187, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 21, 2016) (Da38-Da48) (holding [...] Funding possessed the right to compel arbitration of an assigned [...] credit card agreement); Comrey v. Discover, 806 F. Supp. 2d 778 (M.D. Pa. 2011); Sweiger v. [...], 2012 WL 1940678 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (plain language of arbitration agreement “demonstrates that Defendant [...], is the valid, existing assignee of the contract by which Sweiger agreed to binding arbitration”); Borsack v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Ltd., 974 F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“Our Court of Appeals has rejected the proposition that only signatories to an Arbitration Agreement can be bound by its terms.
[brief] I know [...] has at least one client that is home sick with their baby or young child.  (inaudible)  [...]:  Okay.  Well we’re then recarrying it to the 12th, but I knew at least one of them wasn’t.  Okay, so that’s what we’re going to do today.  Hopefully crunch three hours into two hours and go from there.  And try to do the best we can to create the record.  Now Board members you’ve heard the testimony previously.  You’re going to hear it again.  What they presented is still viable, we’re just trying to recreate a record if it goes to Court.
[directive] 8.4.2  Conditions.  with Release on While Device Monitoring Electronic to cause where probable is there 8.4.5, subsection to pursuant authorized as Except disorderly or a (ii) indictable crime an (i) for release pretrial on while defendant, a that believe removed, 2C:25-19(a), N.J.S.A. in defined as violence domestic involving offense persons of condition a monitoring as device required electronic an inoperable rendered or with, tampered release revocation of motion seeking presumptively a file shall prosecutor the release, pretrial 2A:162-24.  N.J.S.A. to pursuant a Violates Defendant When Release Revocation of Seeking of Presumption 8.4.3
[directive] Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Portuguese  Defendant's Initials a Iniciais Ren F ormulario Revisado Promulgado em 12/31/2019, Complementa9ilo Diretriz no 0 1-18, CN 10079-Portuguese do page 4 of 7 /pagina 4 de 7 13.  Specify any sentence the prosecutor has agreed to recommend:
[brief] ¶26.  [...] was deposed during [...]’s lawsuit against the [...].  (Tr. II: 66; Ex. 14).  When asked whether he had accessed or disseminated [...]’s criminal record, he refused to answer based on his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  (Ex. 14 at *28-29).  He did so on the advice of the [...]’s counsel.  (Tr. II: 67-68, 72-73).  [...] was not individually represented by counsel at the deposition.
[brief] As a result, Plaintiff did not “appeal” the issues of unlicensed lender, usury and RICO.  Furthermore, because Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Count 5 and the claims against [...] and [...], Plaintiff cannot appeal dismissal of that count.  See Mack Auto Imports, Inc. v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 244 N.J. Super. 254, 258 (App. Div. 1990)  Count 5 is the only count that mentions the 2016 Contract and is the only count that seeks to void a contract based common law misrepresentation and fraud based upon a violation of the alleged policy against assignment of proceeds.  As a result, Plaintiff should not be permitted to argue as a separate cause of action, that the 2018 and 2019 Contracts violated the alleged prohibition against pre-settlement assignment of proceeds.  **POINT II**
[brief] 52, 53 State v. Szemple, 247 N.J. 82 (2021) ..................................................................  68 State v. Thomas, 187 N.J. 119 (2006) ..................................................................  21 State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425 (2020) .................................................................. 47, 48, 50 State v. Viera, 346 N.J. Super. 198 (App. Div. 2001) .......................................
[brief] Both describe the aggregate of the FDCPA’s regulatory scheme.  If that phrase were construed to limit the breadth of all FDCPA provisions, then the entire statute—except for § 1692d—would be surplusage _____________________ 2021); *Khimmat v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co, LPA*, 585 F. Supp. 3d 707 (E.D. Pa. 2022); and *Jackin v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC*, 606 F. Supp. 3d 1031 (E.D. Wash. 2022).  because that is the only section which prohibits abusive conduct.  That cannot be the case; instead, all of the FDCPA’s provisions inform and give content to what Congress meant by “abusive debt collection practices. ”
[brief] See Weiss, 482 F.3d at 266, 266 n. 8.  In Ryan v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88907 (D.N.J. July 8, 2015), the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ CFA claim.  Plaintiff alleged that its insurance provider did not merely underpay their benefits but acted deceptively and fraudulently when investigating their property damage.  Specifically, plaintiff accused defendant of telling it that the “losses were not covered despite evidence that they were” in “creating values and assigning them to the covered loss to increase its own profitability” and “in falsely misrepresenting what its responsibilities were under the policy. ”  Id., at *8-9.  As a result, the court stated that defendant’s conduct in performing its contract obligations distinguished the claim from a mere underpayment allegation.
[brief] [...] is a Massachusetts-based company “engaged in the construction business. ”  (Pa6.)  [...] is a Caterpillar dealer in New Jersey, which sells “business construction” equipment, including generators.  (Pa6.)  In September 2019, [...] was engaged in a construction project for [...] in New Jersey (the “Project”).  (Pa7.)  Around the same time, [...] sought from [...] a quotation for the sale, delivery, and installation of a commercial generator for the Project.  (Pa7.)  [...] and [...] agreed on a price and delivery schedule for the generator, the terms of which were governed by the Purchase Order, dated September 11, 2019.  (Pa7, 19-52.)  The Purchase Order sets out broad, detailed, and clear mandatory and escalating dispute resolution procedures for any --- 2  For the purposes of the Motion and this appeal only, [...], as it must, accepts the allegations in the Complaint as true.  See Santiago v. New York & New Jersey Port Auth., 429 N.J. Super. 150, 154-55 (App. Div. 2012).  “claim, dispute or other matter in controversy” arising from the services provided under the Purchase Order or the Purchase Order itself.  (Pa45-46.)  In particular, the mandatory dispute resolution provision requires that any dispute be mediated before “resort[ing] to litigation. ”  (Pa46.)  According to the Complaint, [...] proceeded with the delivery and installation of the generator, and [...] paid [...] a portion of the contract price.  (Pa7.)  After the generator was delivered and fully installed, [...] alleges that [...] wrongfully withheld $198,066.38 in retainage (the remaining balance on the contract price).  [...] alleges that it made “numerous attempts to obtain payment without result. ”  (Pa8.)  Without attempting to first mediate the dispute, as it was required to do, [...] instead initiated this action, asserting its single book account cause of action.  (Pa7-9.)  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.