ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The trial court found that there was no issue of fact suggesting a nexus between Plaintiff’s alleged whistleblowing activity and his resignation.  Specifically, the trial court found the following: (1) there was no evidence suggesting that [...] or anyone else disconnected Plaintiff from the scheduling software; and (2) even if Plaintiff had been barred from the high school, his tirade against [...], and not any protected whistleblowing activity on Plaintiff’s part, was the source of that instruction.  Plaintiff’s challenge of those findings of fact is thoroughly unconvincing.  Plaintiff’s core argument on appeal is that [...]’s statement that he hoped Plaintiff would continue to work for the District actually meant that the Board wanted Plaintiff to quit.  In other words, sometimes up is down and down is up.  Plaintiff contends that the trial court’s rejection of his illogical theory is reversible error.  This argument fails on several grounds.  First, the trial court’s findings of fact are subject to a deferential standard of review and should not be disturbed absent a clearly incorrect or unsupportable result.  The motion record supporting Defendants’ successful motion for summary judgment establishes that the Court’s factual conclusions were well-supported, credible, and deserving of deference.  Second, Plaintiff’s argument that his CEPA claim is entitled to a “liberal” construction and that he is entitled to all favorable inferences of fact misstates the law.  Nothing in CEPA or the standard of review for summary judgment motions requires the trial court to contort the factual record or abandon common sense in order to salvage a clearly deficient claim.  The trial court’s grant of summary judgment in Defendants’ favor and denial of Plaintiffs’ motions for reconsideration should be upheld, and Plaintiff’s appeal should be denied.
[brief] ................................................................................................................11  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order Enforcing Settlement (January 4, 2024)  Da15  Oral Decision (January 4, 2024)  1T:48  #  TABLE OF RESPONDENT’S APPENDIX | Appendix Document | Appendix Page Number | |--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| | Notice of Motion to Enforce Settlement, Filed Nov. 29, 2023 | Da1 | | Certification in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement | Da3 | | Exhibit A to Motion to Enforce Settlement | Da8 | | Exhibit B to Motion to Enforce Settlement | Da10 | | Exhibit C to Motion to Enforce Settlement | Da12 | | Order Enforcing Settlement, Filed Jan. 4, 2024 | Da15 | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1 (2009) .................................................................................................35, 43 State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390 (2019) .............................................................................................34, 43 State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425 (2020) .............................................................................................45  Stewart v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 249 N.J. 642 (2022) .............................................................................................43  Statutes N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 to -49 ....................................................................................17  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163 ...................................................................................16, 40 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-28 .............................................................................................28  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5 .............................................................................................36, 48 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-6 .................................................................27, 33 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7 ................................................................passim Rules N.J.R.E. 802 ........................................................................50  R. 4:69-6 ..................................................................................33  R. 2:5-1 ....................................................................................42  R. 4:69-1 ..................................................................................27, 45  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED BY APPELLANT  Decision and Judgment  Dismissing Action With Prejudice..........................Pa0098  Order Denying Intervenor’s Motion to Settle the Record........................... Pa0072  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The Instant Appeal on the Aggravation Charge Issue Fails  The instant Appeal relative to the Aggravation Charge fails both procedurally and upon the merits.  Appellant failed to object to evidence of aggravation coming into the case and as such, waived any objection to said evidence to be raised at the Appellate level.  The jury, who had been given evidence of aggravation in the form of an explicit expert opinion, required the Aggravation charge to be read, to understand how to treat such evidence.  There was no surprise relative to the Charge’s request, which was made months prior to trial in Appellant’s pre-trial submission statement.  The timing of the Court’s agreeing to read the charge is of no consequence, as the parties were provided additional opportunity to address the charge in supplemental closing; but moreover, it did not change the evidential record which was already closed at that point.  Rather, the decision to read the charge was necessitated by the evidential record.  Moreover, the appeal upon meritorious grounds lacks merit, in that Appellant is arguing that Respondent needed to prove a negative to warrant the Aggravation Charge.  The evidence established that Respondent had no relevant past medical history relative to the injuries alleged in this matter, nor did she re-injure herself in any subsequent incidents.  Appellant’s medical expert even reviewed primary care records that predated the subject collision and confirmed they were devoid of any similar complaints.  There was simply nothing for Respondent’s physicians and/or experts to compare, other than the undisputed medical history of no prior relevant problems.  Accordingly, not only was the issue of Aggravation not properly preserved for appeal; even a determination upon the merits establishes that the instant Appeal must be denied, and the jury’s verdict affirmed.
[brief] As [...]’s opening brief explained, the Supreme Court in *Peloso v. Hartford Fire Ins.* intended to strike a balance between enforcing a policy’s limitations period and ensuring an insured has enough time to sue if the insurer denies coverage.  56 N.J. 514, 521 (1970).  The Court thus held that a policy’s limitations period is tolled from the time an insured gives notice of loss until the insurer formally denies coverage.
[brief] ”  However, the Circular predates the adoption of the Collateral Source Rule, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 (1987).  It also predates various cases involving extended medical benefits, the relation to PIP benefits and whether the benefits could be recovered via subrogation.  In *Ingersoll v. Aetna Casualty & Surety-Company*, 138 N.J. 236 (1994), the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed whether or not extended medical expense benefits coverage was included within traditional PIP benefits.  The Court held that extended medical benefits “are a creature...of regulation promulgated under the legislative authority by the Commissioner of Insurance. ”  *Id.* at 239.  Med-pay benefits represented a very narrow window of coverage to a limited class of persons who are ineligible for PIP Benefits.  In *Ingersoll*, the plaintiff was riding a motorcycle and sustained significant injuries that were not covered under his motorcycle policy but had coverage available under two personal lines automobile policies.
[brief] ”  See N.J.S.A. 34:19-5.  Finally, “[t]he statute further provides that ‘[t]he court shall also order, where appropriate and to the fullest extent possible[,] ... compensation for all lost wages, benefits and other remuneration. ’”  Donelson v. DuPont Chambers Works, 206 N.J. 243, 258 (2011), quoting N.J.S.A. 34:19-5.
[brief] In the kind for kind analysis set forth in the statute, the first requirement is that the treatment given to the patient fall within the physician specialty.  If the medical care given actually falls outside that specialty, there is no requirement that the challenging expert have equivalent credentials.  [...] is also Board-Certified in “Critical Care Medicine” by the American Board Of Medical Specialties (ABMS).  This involves “… expertise in the diagnosis, treatment and support of critically ill and injured patients, particularly trauma patients and patients with multiple organ dysfunction.  This physician also coordinates patient care among the primary physicians, critical staff and other specialties. ”  The treatment at issue in this case clearly falls within the rubric of Critical Care Medicine.
[directive] Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option d.  Possesses any other weapon under circumstances not manifestly appropriate, fourth degree.  2C:39-5(a-j)  Unlawful  Possession  2nd Degree $25,000 to $100,000  10% permissible (continued) of  Weapons  e.  Possesses a firearm or other weapon in educational institution, third degree.  (continued)  (1)  Possesses a firearm in or on grounds of educational institution, without prior authorization, third degree, irrespective of whether he possesses a permit to carry or a firearms purchaser identification card.  3rd Degree  $7,500 to $20,000  10% permissible  (2)  Possesses weapon or components which can be readily assembled into firearm or other weapon described in 2C:39-1, or any other weapon under circumstances not manifestly 76  Updated December 2, 2013
[directive] PROMIS Number ----------- CAPS ID Number -----------  Probation Officer  Defendant I of tr Pre i a Intervention Order R. 3:28-7(b)(l)  Under Dismissal of  Upon application the Vicinage Chief Probation Officer for an Order to Dismiss the above captioned Complaint(s)/Indictment(s)/Accusation(s) pursuant to 3:28-7(b)(l) and with the R. of consent the Prosecutor and defendant; of The Court having considered the report the Pretrial Intervention Program concerning the defendant's participation and noting that the defendant has released the complainant from any claims which might arise from failure to prosecute this matter in the ordinary course; ____ __ 20_, of
[brief] ......................................................................................4  Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 135 N.J. 126 (1994)  ..................................................................................................................13  In re City of Newark, 469 N.J. Super 366 (App. Div. 2021)  .....................................................................................12, 23 Interactive Brokers, LLC v. Barry, 457 N.J. Super. 357 (App. Div. 2018)  .....................................................................................13  John & Jane Parents 1 v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 622 F. Supp. 3d 118 (D. Md. 2022)  ....................................................................................... passim L.W.  ex rel. L.G. v. Toms River Reg’l Sch. Bd. of Educ., 189 N.J. 38 (2007)
[brief] Reply to [...] 7/18/23¹....................................................Pa16  [...] Initial Decision 6/13/23..........................................Pa24  Correspondence to [...] 3/23/23.................................Pa28  Petition for Ricci Action Registration 3/3/23..........................................................Pa30  Affidavit of [...].......................................................................................Pa56  [...] Eligibility Registration Form........................................................................Pa58  [...] Request for Amended Benefits Form..........................................................Pa60  Medical Progress Notes 5/11/21.............................................................................Pa61  Medical Documentation 4/21/21..............................................................................Pa67  Medical Documentation 9/21/22..............................................................................Pa70  Photographs at Ground Zero...................................................................................Pa74  Administrative Denial of Ricci Benefits.................................................................Pa79  Legislative Notice August 2019...............................................................................Pa80  Postage Statement..................................................................................................Pa82 ¹  Per R.2:6-1(a)(2), Pa16, Pa24, Pa28, and Pa30 are included in the Appendix because they are germane to the appeal.
[brief] In addition, the State intentionally insinuated to the jury that the defense was somehow hiding this report.  Lockett, 249 N.J. Super at 435.  This suggestion was unjustified aspersions on defense counsel before the jury.  Id.  The State was aware that the [...]/[...] report was specifically used for the waiver hearing and was not introduced in the trial.  Specifically, the Prosecutor stated “Okay, but they didn’t choose to give it to you?” (12T:119-25
[brief] [...]’s monetary counterclaims against [...]—most specifically those related to the Hackensack Project—were compulsory and, if not asserted in the First Arbitration, were waived.  One of the following must be true with respect to the First Arbitration: (a) [...] knew it had a $2.1M offsetting Hackensack claim, presented evidence, and effectively won that issue ([...] received $0 on this profit-sharing claim); (b) [...] knew it had a $2.1M Hackensack claim but strategically did not litigate it, instead waiting to spring it at a later date; or (c) [...] incorrectly believed its $2.1M claim was not ripe and failed to bring it.  The record clearly supports (a), and [...] has cited record evidence and [...]’s own testimony to that end.  [...]’s opposition brief indicates both (b) and (c), which are both barred by the ECD.  As to (b), [...] cannot surreptitiously hold back a known claim (compulsory counterclaim) and spring it at a later date in a new matter against the same party.  That would be unfair and inequitable piecemeal litigation, and defy the ECD’s basic goals.  And as to (c), the Hackensack Project had been completed years earlier and the claim was obviously ripe and known (the exact amount ($2. 1M) was discussed in [...]’s own pleading).  At bottom, the parties already had their day in court.  [...]’s attempts to search for additional offsets against the $4 million judgment must be laid to rest.  For these reasons, [...] respectfully requests that this Court reverse the August 30 Orders and enter permanent injunctive relief against [...].
[brief] (Responding to [...]’s Point I-V).  ........  6  A.  These Private Nondelegation Challenges Fail Because Precedent Confirms That The Council is a State Regulatory Agency, Not a Private Entity (Responding to [...]’s Point II-V)..........................  8  B.  Even If The Council Was Effectively A Private Entity, [...] Still Fails To State A Claim.  (Responding to [...]’s Point II-V).  ...  13  CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................
[brief] There is a need for greater scrutiny of \textsuperscript{11}  The State defendants argued below that Count III of the Complaint based on the private non-delegation doctrine should have been brought in the Appellate Division under R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  However, that count is inextricably interwoven with the two constitutional causes of action.  It would make no sense to transfer that count to the Appellate Division.  Furthermore, the allocation of cases among the various divisions of the Superior Court is a matter of the business of the court.  It is not a question of jurisdiction that prevented the court below from deciding the non-constitutional count of the complaint.  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment 2:2-3[3.2.1].  ([...]).  the constitutionality of the activities of a quasi-legislative body controlled by a private organization than an agency comprised of only public members.\textsuperscript{12}
[brief] Notably absent from [...]’s observations are any specific facts to support a belief that [...] had done anything criminal.  He did not recognize [...] or have any prior knowledge that [...] was involved in any criminal activity.  (1T 17-13 to 18)  He made no mention of seeing [...] exchange anything with either the woman in the sedan or the man in the truck.  He did not see [...] retrieving any objects from his Jeep or his pockets, nor did he see [...] holding any objects.  He did not see any money change hands, nor did he even see any money at all.  Talking to two different people in two different cars in a parking lot before driving closer to the store is, at most, odd.  It is not criminal nor is it indicative of any criminal activity.  Patrolman [...]’s observations fall far short of other cases where courts have upheld a finding of reasonable suspicion that someone was engaged in a narcotics transaction.
[brief] **IT WAS NOT REASONABLE FOR THE ARBITRATOR TO REFUSE TO COMBINE THE THREE UNITS INTO ONE UNIFIED CONTRACT.**  In the Award, the Arbitrator left it to the parties to prepare a unified Agreement combining the three negotiations units into one contract.  The Commission found that the Arbitrator was justified in refusing to perform a “ministerial task” that the parties could perform.  However, even the Arbitrator acknowledged that this “ministerial task” may not be as simple as the Commission believes.  In the Award, the Arbitrator recognized that the task may be of a certain level of difficulty that it would require a mediator to assist the parties in performing this task.  (Aa160, fn. 17).  There is simply no credible argument to support the claim that the task of unifying the three contracts is ministerial when the Arbitrator acknowledged that the parties may need assistance to perform the task.  The Commission’s denial of the PFOA appeal on these grounds was arbitrary and must be reversed.  **POINT VI**
[brief] 35  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Berg v. Christie,** | passim | | 225 N.J. 245 (2016) | | | **Branch v. Pitts,** | 14 | | 110 N.E.3d 87 (Ohio. Ct. App. 2018) | | | **Brunetti v. New Milford,** | 18 | | 68 N.J. 576 (1975) | | | **In re Christie’s Appointment of Perez,** | 9, 10, 34| | 436 N.J. Super. 575 (App. Div. 2014) | | | **City and County of Denver v. Industrial Comm’n of State of Colo.,** | 28 | | 666 P.2d 160 (Co. App. Ct. 1983) | | | **City of Newark v. PBA Local 3,** | 27 | | 272 N.J. Super. 31 (App. Div. 1994) | | | **Civilian Personnel Div. v. Board of Police Com’rs,** | 27 | | 914 S.W.2d 23 (Mo. App. 1995) | | | **County of Shelby v. Tompkins,** | 28 | | 241 S.W.2d 500 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) | | | **In re Fichner,** | 10 | | 144 N.J. 459 (1996) | | | **Fredericks v. Bd. of Health,** | 10 | | 82 N.J.L. 200 (1912) | | | **Appeal of Gagliardi,** | 27 | | 163 A.2d 418 (Pa. 1960) | | | **Jones v. MacDonald,** | 16, 17 | | 33 N.J. 132 (1960) | | Joseph Hilton and Assoc., Inc. v. Evans, 201 N.J. Super. 156 (App. Div. 1985) .........................................................
[brief] .................................................................  20 Baird v. Am. Med. Optics, 155 N.J. 54 (1998)  ..................................................................  43 Berman v. Gurwicz, 178 N.J. Super. 611 (Ch. Div. 1981), (citing Restatement, Torts 2d, s 540 (1977)  ...........................................  41  Beukas v. Bd. of Trustees of Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 255 N.J. Super. 552 (Law. Div. 1991), aff'd, 255 N.J. Super. 420, 605 A.2d 708 (App. Div. 1992) ....................... 22, 25 Borough of West Caldwell v. Borough of Caldwell, 26 N.
[brief] The terms are clear.  The ability to revoke applies to the Agreement, not to just a waiver of any ADEA claims she may have.  Had Appellant sought this ability to revoke to be limited insofar as they contend it is now, the Appellant was free to construct the language in such way.  However, the revocation ability provided for in the proposed Settlement Agreement unambiguously applies to the Agreement as a whole.  Under New Jersey law, when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation or construction and the Courts must enforce those terms as written.  Karl’s Sales & Serv. V. Gimbel Bros., 249 N.J. Super. 487, 493 (App. Div. 1991).  Accordingly, pursuant to the terms proposed by Appellant, the Agreement provides that Respondent had a right to either revoke the Agreement as a whole within 21 days or within 7 days after delivering an executed agreement.
[brief] More than 50% of the individuals exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing were convicted based at least in part on expert forensic evidence that turned out to be wrong.  This research demonstrates the threat that unreliable or exaggerated forensic evidence poses to the truth-seeking function of criminal trials.  As a result, the [...] has consistently urged courts to ensure that forensic evidence be admitted only to the extent it has been shown to be scientifically supported.  Additionally, to ensure that factfinders have the tools necessary to evaluate potentially unreliable forensic evidence, the [...] has a compelling interest in advocating for the proper introduction of such evidence, beginning with identifying potential jurors’ inaccurate beliefs concerning the capabilities of forensic sciences, through accurate presentation at trial and, finally, appropriate jury instructions.
[brief] First, while Plaintiffs cite case law supporting the continued application of an expired CNA, none of the cases arise under the MSRA, which specifically allows the State to unilaterally modify expired CNAs.  Compare Matter of County of Atlantic, 230 N.J. 237, 255–56 (2017) (finding contractual language in specific CNAs at issue required the CNA to remain in effect after expiration), with Superior Officers, 2022 WL 2352376, at *8 (“MSRA permits the Director to unilaterally modify this contract term.
[brief] More importantly, the proposed right at issue is not some abstract privacy right.  Rather, it is a proposed privacy right in children against their parents.  But minor children generally “lack . . . rights vis-à-vis [their] parents. ”  Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 944–45 (9th Cir. 1997).  Indeed, considering “the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing,” the Court should be highly skeptical of arguments that seek to interpose the United States Constitution between parents and their children.
[brief] Instead, the governing body freely admitted that “it’s subjective.  But there’s no way for it not to be subjective”, “the police are going to make a subjective decision as to whether it is a noise.  But there’s no other way to do it”, “it is subjective, so, you, I mean, if, if it’s – you know, if – I don’t know how to put it”, and “it’s a subjective noise, unfortunately.