ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  The trial evidence presented by the State, including the testimony of co-conspirator [...], established the following facts.  [...] and [...] were twenty-eight and twenty-one years old, respectively, in September 2006.  People knew them as brothers, but they may have been step-brothers.  [...]'s on-again-off-again girlfriend, [...], was an exotic dancer at a Bronx club named Sin City.  One of the victim's attraction to Conway precipitated the events that culminated in another victim's homicide.  Two of the victims, [...] and [...], were partners in criminal enterprises that included mortgage, real estate, and credit card fraud.  They drove expensive cars around New York City, and Plowden often carried a Louis Vuitton bag containing cash, sometimes as much as $40,000.  On September 19, 2006, while in the Bronx, Plowden noticed Conway standing across a street.  He introduced himself then took her to a bar where they had a drink.  Later, he took her to a hotel in Mahwah, New Jersey, where he unsuccessfully tried to seduce her.  Conway left the hotel room at approximately 4:00 a.m. and took a taxi to Sin City where she met [...] and gave him money, then met a bouncer named [...],\(^1\) with whom she left.  Two days later, on September 21, the day before the homicide, Plowden phoned Conway, picked her up, and took her shopping in Bergen County.  He was carrying the Louis Vuitton bag.  During the shopping trip, Conway telephoned [...] to make him jealous, and told him what she was doing.  After shopping, Conway accompanied Plowden to a hotel in Fort Lee.  Plowden gave Conway a room key card.  During their stay, Plowden opened the designer bag several times to impress Conway, who thought it contained approximately $50,000.  Later that night, Plowden drove Conway to Manhattan where he dropped her off.  After dropping Conway off, Plowden met [...] and two women, spent the night in a club, and eventually returned to the Fort Lee Holiday Inn where he shared a room with one of the women, [...].
[brief] The graphic showed the location of the cell phone tower that the phone pinged off the GPS coordinates, and the azimuth, which he explained that the direction that the middle of the base that the call was placed off faces, which was 210 degrees for this call.  [12T171-4 to -11; 12T173-21 to -24].  [...] testified that the “pink area” depicted in the graphic is the area where the call would have originated from, while also noting that the picture only displays the angle and that the measurements were approximate.  [12T175-4 to -15].  [...] further explained that the call did not originate from the area outside the outlined pink area because it would have hit off another tower.  [12T175-16 to -25].  He summarized that the mapping program he used indicates that the call placed at 11:04 p.m. places defendant’s cell phone in the area of [...].
[brief] N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.5(e); (Aa89; As835).  TSS include sediment and other pollutants that can be removed from water through filtration. \(^8\)  Rather than challenge the TSS removal rates, [...] instead contends that the proposed water quality management system does not satisfy Chapter 10.4 of the BMP Manual which governs standard constructed wetlands.
[directive] Notice that BWCs are Deployed and Activated 4.1  Public Notice.  Every department or agency shall take reasonable steps to inform the citizenry of the agency’s use of this technology.  The department shall publish a statement that it deploys BWCs on its internet website or, if the department does not have its own website, then on the municipality’s website when feasible.  The County Prosecutor may assist departments in providing general public notice of their deployment of BWCs pursuant to this section.  The website posting shall include a picture showing what the device looks like, and how it is to be worn by uniformed officers or plainclothes detectives so that citizens will be able to determine whether an officer is equipped with the device.  Notwithstanding the above general public notice requirement, officers wearing BWCs must comply with all relevant laws regarding notice to any subject of a BWC recording, pursuant to P.L. 2020, c. 129, section 1d-e, discussed in section 4.2, infra. 4.2
[brief] Dismissal via R. 4:5-2, R. 4:6-4 or R. 4:46 et seq. (summary judgment) is illegal in the absence of a jury confirmation of the court’s finding of fact, or a jury confirmation of R. 4:5-2, R. 4:6-4 or R. 4:46 et seq. being written into law.  POINT 19:
[brief] (Ra6.)  On January 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed his fifth Motion to Extend the Discovery Period (his Cross-Motion was deemed improper under the Court Rules).  (Ra6.)  Specifically, Plaintiff sought to reopen discovery for 120 more days in order to cure his failure to timely produce his expert reports.  (Ra45-49.)  On February 8, 2024, [...] filed Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend, and Plaintiff filed for reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment.  (Ra6.)  On February 21, 2024, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen/Extend Discovery.
[brief] E. District Court – Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint and submission of a “corrected Fourth Amended Complaint.  Plaintiff continued his pattern of requesting numerous extensions of time to file his motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint.  On April 15, 2019, the day the motion to amend was due, Plaintiff requested an extension.  (Da017, District Court Docket Report, ECF #75).  This request was granted, and the new deadline was set at April 29, 2019.  (Da018, District Court Docket Report, ECF #77).  On April 29, 2019, Plaintiff submitted yet another motion for an extension until May 13, 2019.  (Da018, District Court Docket Report, ECF #78).  On May 13, 2019, Plaintiff again submitted a motion requesting an extension.  (Da018, District Court Docket Report, ECF #82).  Plaintiff’s request was granted, and Plaintiff was given until May 31, 2019, to file his motion to amend.  (Da019, District Court Docket Report, ECF #83).  Despite this new deadline, Plaintiff submitted another request for an extension, likely mistakenly, given that Plaintiff requested an extension to May 27, 2019.  (Da019, District Court Docket Report, ECF #84).  Finally, on May 28, 2019, Plaintiff submitted his motion for leave to file the Fourth Amended Complaint.  (Da019, District Court Docket Report, ECF #85).  On June 28, 2019, Defendants filed their opposition.  (Da020, District Court Docket Report, ECF #90).  On July 12, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a motion for an extension of time to file his reply brief.  (Da020, District Court Docket Report, ECF #92).  Plaintiff’s motion was granted.  (Da020, District Court Docket Report, ECF #93).  On July 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed his reply brief which contained a “corrected” Fourth Amended Complaint.  (Da020-21, District Court Docket Report, ECF #94).  Oral argument on Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint was held on July 26, 2019.  (Da025, 7/29/19 Order; Da021, District Court Docket Report, ECF #98).
[brief] (8T31:19-32:2).  Here, the defendant presented evidence of the plaintiff’s prior falls, medical conditions, and use of a handicapped placard to demonstrate that her fall was not caused by any alleged dangerous condition at the [...].  The defendant did not contend that plaintiff’s accident-related injuries were caused by a pre-existing condition or some other event.  The evidence went to cause of the accident, not the cause of the injuries.  In support of her argument that the trial court improperly permitted the admission of evidence related to the plaintiff’s prior medical history, falls, and use of a handicapped placard, in the absence of any expert opinion establishing that the evidence was related to the cause of the plaintiff’s fall, the plaintiff relies upon three reported decisions - *Allendorf v. Kaiserman Enterprises*, 266 N.J. Super. 662, 672 (App. Div. 1993), *Oppedisano v. Utz*, 2012 WL 2360125 (App. Div. 2012)⁵ and --- ⁵
[directive] Order  The Prosecutor's Office shall immediately forward all discoverable materials, including but 3. not limited to the current charges against the defendant and the reasons why counsel is of seeking an evaluation and a copy this order, to this Judge's team leader-for submission to of of the evaluating expert with two (2) days the date this order; and, ______________ [Any additional conditions as ordered by the court]  _ 4.  ------  The next court date this matter shall be in 5. of of  A copy this Order will be forwarded the County Adjuster's Office by the Clerk the to of Court within two (2) days its signing.  Date  Judge Prosecutor's Office: Defendant's Attorney: --------------- ---------------  Name Name -------------- ---------------  Address Address ----------- -----------  Telephone Number Telephone Number ---------------- ---------------- Fax Fax ---------------  Em ail Em ail --------------- _________  If D Yes D No yes, language _ Interpreter needed? _________  If ADA accommodation needed?  D Yes D  No yes, describe _ Directive #17-18(11/01/2018), (Sanity by Published 12333 1)  CN: Order 2 of2 page Attachment 11  Order #S2 - Order Mandating a Psychiatric of Evaluation  Defendant's Criminal of Responsibility at the Time the Crime (Sanity Evaluation) - (Defendant Detained) of Order #S2 - Order Mandating a Psychiatric Evaluation  Defendant's Criminal Responsibility at the Time of the Crime (Sanity Evaluation) - (Defendant Detained)  The text of the following proposed order has been drafted for use when the court needs expert report pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1 due to questions regarding a defendant's an criminal responsibility at the time of the offense.
[brief] Ca251.  Although there was no Judgment of Possession, etc., the next month, on October 22, 2021, according to the Receiver’s own assertions to the Court, the diner was taken over pursuant to actions of [...], the Bank and counsel for the Bank.  The Receiver referred to “all of the people that are necessary for the take over of the restaurant. ”  Ca19.  [...] indicates that management was immediately relieved, and that [...] arrived, and was escorted from the diner with the assistance of the police, who had he apparently contacted ahead of \(^7\) [...] has asserted in this matter that [...] was being represented by the Bank’s counsel based upon eCourts information/filings.  [...] has stated that at no point has he retained an attorney to represent him.  Ca141.  He stated “My relationship with [...] was that we were in agreement with certain issues and in order to reduce the costs, we filed jointly and we were successful as we moved forward. ”  Ca141.  [...] does not elaborate on what he means by “we were successful”, including relative to his position as appointed Statutory Receiver.  Based on [...]’s own certifications and representations, he did nothing or has not provided anything suggesting that he made any efforts with someone as integral to [...] as [...] to interact with him, interview him, obtain information from him, etc.
[directive] b)  Do you understand that if you provide false information concerning your residence or fail [Yes] [No] to verify your address you may be charged with a third degree crime and receive a (if the offense was committed on or after July 1, sentence of imprisonment up to 5 years 2014) or a fourth degree crime and receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 18 months (if the offense was committed on or after March 7, 2007)?
[brief] (“[...]”) respectfully submits this brief in opposition to Plaintiff-Appellant [...]’s (“Plaintiff”) interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s Orders, (i) dated March 25, 2024 (the “March 25 Order”), which denied Plaintiff’s motion to compel the deposition of [...]; and (ii) April 29, 2024, which denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (the “April 29 Order” and together with the March 25 Order, the “Trial Court Orders”).  **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**  In the instant appeal, Plaintiff challenges two interlocutory discovery orders issued by the trial court, the first of which denied Plaintiff’s motion to compel [...] and two other defendants—[...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]” and together with [...], the “German Entity Defendants”)—to produce a non-party German resident named [...], for a deposition, and the second of which denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  As the trial court correctly held after considering the clear New Jersey Court Rules and the parties’ respective positions, while Plaintiff is entitled to depose [...] in his individual capacity, he cannot seek the non-party deposition by serving a simple deposition notice upon counsel to [...] and the German Entity Defendants who have no control over [...].  Instead, per Rule 4:14-1, Plaintiff must seek the deposition through a subpoena.  Because [...] does not control [...], it is of no moment that he is on [...]’s Board of Directors.  By its very terms, Rule 4:14-2(c) does not permit a party to notice the deposition of a specific director—it instead provides that, in response to a deposition notice to the organization, the organization may designate the “officers, directors, or managing agents, or other persons who consent to testify on its behalf....”  R. 4:14-2(c).  The trial court’s holding was therefore correct: if Plaintiff wishes to depose [...], it cannot do so by serving [...] with a deposition notice.  Plaintiff must serve him with a subpoena.  Accordingly, the Trial Court Orders should be affirmed, and Plaintiff’s appeal should be denied.
[brief] (Da21) (¶¶ 22-23); (Da28-33).  [...] has fully performed its obligations under the MOU.  (Da21) (¶ 27).  In reliance on the MOU and with the reasonable expectation that Appellants would perform their obligations thereunder in good faith, [...] has incurred, and continues to incur, substantial costs and expenditures of resources in furtherance of developing the Property.  Id. (¶ 28).  **Appellants Repudiate the MOU**
[brief] Indeed, under the federal FCA, “news media” includes not just sources providing news articles and commentary, but also information and data sources like searchable online databases, journals publishing scholarly studies, government websites, a crowd-sourced online encyclopedia, and a union website promoting a fund for training and educational opportunities.  See Kraxberger, 756 F.3d at 1079 (state public service commission’s “‘media center’ hosting press releases, webcasts of public meetings, and . . . news and promotions related to public utilities”); Patriarca, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 197–202 (studies published in scholarly/scientific journals); Staples, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 40 (subscription source of shipping-manifest data), aff’d, 773 F.3d 83; Green, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 32–33 (promotional webpage on union’s external website); Repko, 2011 WL 3875987, at *8 (free and subscription online databases concerning information on non-profits and [...] website offering “credit ratings, indices, investment research and risk evaluations and solutions” (quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, 490 F. App’x 502; U.S. ex rel. Brown v. [...], No. 6:06-cv-1943-ORL-22KRS, 2008 WL 2561975, at *4 & n.7 (M.D. Fla. June 24, 2008) (Wikipedia website), aff’d, 361 F. App’x 66 (11th Cir. 2010); Alcohol Found., 186 F. Supp. 2d at 463 (scientific and scholarly articles), aff’d, 53 F. App’x 153.  E.
[brief] *Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co.*, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016).  As only a legal issue is involved in the absence of a genuine factual dispute, that standard is *de novo*, and the trial court rulings are not entitled to any deference.  *Inv'rs Bank v. Torres*, 243 N.J. 25, 50 (2020); *Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Manalapan Twp. Comm.*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  Thus, the appellate court should first decide whether there was a genuine issue of material fact, and if none exists, then decide whether the trial court’s ruling on the law was correct.  *Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan*, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998).  Here, a review of the record reveals that there is no actual dispute as to the material statements of fact that support the dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s claims.
[brief] Further, Plaintiffs assert that even if Defendant did not waive this issue, Plaintiffs attempted to make a pre-suit demand and that the demand requirement should nonetheless be excused here as futile (Pb65).  These arguments fail for several reasons.  First, Defendant raised the pre-suit demand issue below.  In her Amended Answer to Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Defendant asserted several affirmative defenses to Plaintiffs’ conversion claim regarding their inability to make a prima facie case against Defendant (Da506-16 at Aff. Def. #’s 1, 24, 25 and 44.)  Further, on her summary judgment motion and her R. 4:40-1 dismissal application made at trial, Defendant argued that Plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case for conversion against her, which indubitably included the pre-suit demand element of the cause of action (13T51-21 to 56-22, 64-9 to 66-8; 23T96-3 to 99-1).
[directive] Dodatkowy formularz oświadczenia w odpowiedzi na zarzuty dotyczące przestępstw związanych z narkotykami Supplemental Plea Form for Drug Offenses (Polish)  Na poniższe pytania dodatkowe powinny odpowiedzieć tylko osoby przyznające się do popełnienia przestępstwa z art. 2C:35-1 lub art. 2C:36-1 kolejnych.
[directive] Consolidations handled the attorneys the teams, not the by by are on court staff.  recommended that pending cases consolidated prior It be is to E. disposition.  However, there may instances when a prosecutor be 1 Page New Jersey Adult Drug Court Consolidation Policy and Procedures Case Promulgated May 21, 2018 approved by the Judicial Council) (as chooses to retain jurisdiction a case rather than consent to a transfer on to another county for disposition.
[brief] At no time did Defendants act as if waiting for a prerequisite to be completed – this concept was created during litigation and approbated by the Court in wholesale contradiction of the Defendants’ actions.  Those actions included the Defendants’ distribution of tax sale and closing funds without securing conveyancing documents in favor of their client, and issuing title insurance to the Property’s seller rather than its own client.  Both of these acts are perplexing violations of the industry’s standard of care.
[brief] *See State v. King,* 164 N.J.Super. 330, 336 n.1 (App.Div.1978) (“Rather than the terminology of ‘price or value’ the grades of indictable theft offenses are defined in terms of ‘the amount involved. ’ ”), certif. denied, 81 N.J. 54 (1979).  Price is probative, but not conclusive of fair market value and a party may prove that the sales price is not the fair market value by producing evidence showing that the list price of the article in question exceeds the sales price posted by other shops in the vicinity for similar articles or that the victim retailer customarily offers discounts of the posted sales price of the article in question.  *Ibid.*  [...], *New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated,* comment 5 on *N.J.S.A. 2C:20–11* (2011), also notes “[t]he phrase ‘full retail value’ is used in an entirely different context” than “amount” under the general theft provision.
[brief] 16  I.  The Law Division erred in holding that AICRA requires PIP arbitration of Plaintiffs’ affirmative claims.  (Decided below, Pa0001-Pa0022) .................. 16  A.  AICRA’s dispute-resolution clause would be unconstitutional if it required arbitration of Plaintiffs’ fraud claims ...............................................................  18  B.  The language of AICRA’s dispute-resolution provision, in light of its context and purpose, encompasses only disputes regarding whether an insurer must pay unpaid PIP benefits ...........................................................................  22  C.  To harmonize the statutes, Plaintiffs must be permitted to litigate their claims ................................................................................................................................. 32  D.  Canons of statutory interpretation confirm that Plaintiffs’ claims are not subject to AICRA arbitration ................................................................. 39  1.  Defendants’ interpretation violates the canon against absurd or unreasonable results ...................................................................................... 39  2.  Defendants’ interpretation violates the canon that the Legislature is presumed to make significant changes only explicitly ......................... 48 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 49 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Allstate Insurance Co. v. Mun,** | | | 751 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2014) | 26, 45 | | **Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Lajara,** | | | 222 N.J. 129 (2015) | 16, 18, 19, 40 | | **Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. N.J. Div. of Tax'n,** | | | 189 N.J. 65 (2006) | 32 | | **Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Bryan,** | | | 388 N.J. Super. 550 (App. Div. 2006) | 33, 49 | | **Coal. for Quality Health Care v. DOBI,** | | | 348 N.J. Super. 272 (App. Div. 2002) | 28 | | **DiProspero v. Penn,** | | | 183 N.J. 477 (2005) | 17, 37 | | **Endo Surgi Ctr. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,** | | | 391 N.J. Super. 588 (App. Div. 2007) | 19, 21, 27, 41 | | **Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc.,** | | | 244 N.J. 119 (2020) | 16 | | **Gambino v. Royal Globe Ins. Cos.,** | | | 86 N.J. 100 (App. Div. 1981) | 27 | | **Grandvue Manor, LLC v. Cornerstone Contracting Corp.,** | | | 471 N.J. Super. 135 (App. Div. 2022) | 19 | | **Grey v. Trump Castle Assocs., L.P.,** | | | 367 N.J. Super. 443 (App. Div. 2004) | 21 | In re Grant of Charter Sch. Application of Englewood on Palisades Charter Sch., 164 N.J. 316 (2000) ........................................................................................................... 45 In re H.D., 241 N.J. 412 (2020) ............................................................................................................. 28 In re N.J. Ass’n For Justice, Order No. A12-118, 2012 WL 6927765 (Dep’t of Banking & Ins. Dec. 21, 2012)
[directive] note  See 53:1-18.1.  N.J.S.A. and 53:1-15 system, Scan Live of the means by fingerprinted been have not will therefore and offense for this the inform process to risk-assessment pretrial automated the run to possible be not may it acomplaint-warrant. for apply or acomplaint-summons issue to whether decision a for apply or issue prosecutor to a by made is determination the where case any In other the apply shall instead prosecutor the indictment, or arrest before complaint the of results the upon on depend not do that Section 4 in forth set provisions/presumptions feasible when shall prosecutor the addition, In 8.
[brief] Those sections include an enumeration of the reasons why the Board determined the small 0.59 acre Property could not accommodate the intensity and mass of the development being proposed and why a variance for the same could not be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and without substantially impairing the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.  Defendant supplements that reasoning with the following.  It cannot be over emphasized that Plaintiff sought a variance to allow a FAR of 1.77, when the maximum FAR permitted in the B-3 Zone is only 0.35.  The deviation of 1.42 is five times greater than what is allowed and, by any form of rational measurement and evaluation, an extreme deviation from the zoning requirements.  As applied to the intensity of the actual development for which approval was sought, Plaintiff sought to develop a project consisting of 45,039 sq. ft. when only 8,930 sq. ft. was permitted under zone criteria.  Pa111 at ¶4; Pa113 at ¶2; Pa 140 at ¶14; Pa142 at ¶16.