ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Da0065 (aware relationship involved “necessary paperwork” which they trusted [...] to “take care of”); Pb8).  Further, as in *Schwartz*, Respondents indisputably could access their Client Agreements (with its clear arbitration provision) online any time, at the website address provided in the New Account Confirmation sent to Respondents after they opened each account.  (Da0076-77; Da0084-85).  *Schwartz* instructs that it would be unreasonable for Respondents to believe that their substantial multi-year [...] relationship was not subject to binding terms.  *See* 256 Fed. App’x at 516-18.  Respondents attempt to distinguish *Schwartz* with a single, fundamentally flawed argument— that in *Schwartz*, “the party opposing arbitration received and could review the arbitration agreement[.]” (Pb23).
[directive] Remedial and Violations 10. be shall Prosecutor, County a and Justice, Criminal of Division the of Director  The disciplinary or remedial such take and to Directive, this of violation a investigate to authorized violations repetitive or Wilful Directive. this with compliance ensure to necessary may be actions as designee. her or General his or Attorney the to reported be shall Directive this of Directive.  Deconfliction Earlier of Implementation Continued 11.
[brief] (1T88-7 to 90-12; 1T97-8 to 98-9; 1T100-13 to 101-9; 2T37-15 to 38-6; 2T74-16 to 75-9; 5T12-15 to 17; 5T82-2 to 7).  There was also an unnumbered exterior door, with a deadbolt, that exited to the property’s back porch and yard.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 48.  The second indemnity clause required [...] to indemnify [...] against all claims “arising out of injury or death” of any person, “caused in whole or in part by the acts or omission of” [...], its employees, or agents, “while engaged in the performance of the Work or any activity associated therewith or relative thereto. ”  *Ibid.*  After a liability trial, the jury found [...] twenty-five percent liable, [...] fifteen percent liable, and the plaintiff’s employer sixty percent liable.
[brief] *Schneider v. Fried*, 320 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2003).*”  *Gonzalez-Lopez v. Perfect Trading, Inc.*, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60277, *4-5.  Plaintiff’s expert arborist [...] provided an admissible narrative report regarding the tree which caused plaintiff’s injuries.
[directive] Proportional Force.  The minimum amount of force, of both type (e.g., physical, mechanical, enhanced mechanical, or deadly) and intensity, that is necessary to control a situation and achieve a legitimate law enforcement objective.  The law permits officers to overcome unlawful force or resistance; thus, the term proportional force is not intended to mean a type and intensity of force that is exactly equal to the type and intensity of force being used by the subject.  The term proportional force is intended to highlight that the level of force a law enforcement officer utilizes shall be no more than is necessary to overcome the unlawful force or resistance being confronted by the officer.
[brief] Indeed, [...]’s decision to vacate the fee-shifting in this case was exactly what the Supreme Court in Weiss v. Carpenter required.  (Da3178-82)  The fee award was not remotely a “debatable” effort to uphold or “vindicate” public policy for which a Court might grant deference under Weiss.  This fee award was wildly inaccurate in its reliance on a third-party tort litigation exception for estate fiduciary liability which in no way existed here, and where no separate litigation with a stranger existed.  Plaintiffs’ argument that the fee award was “reasonably debatable” simply because the Arbitrator found [...] caused “significant unjustifiable fees” again misstates the standard.  (Pb66)  The factual justification for the fee award was irrelevant.  A so-called “equitable” fee award, not within any exception, was recently reversed.  In Tarta Luna Properties, LLC v. Harvest Restaurants Group LLC, 466 N. J. Super. 137, 155 (App. Div. 2021), the Chancery Court shifted legal fees in a complex and lengthy lease dispute litigation where it had agreed that no statute, rule or agreement existed to permit doing so.  The Court utilized “equitable principles” to support the award:  Although the Chancery judge also concluded there was no established basis to support a fee award, she nevertheless found that equitable principles demanded the remedy, because "the safety of the public had been compromised by the decision to open [the restaurant]."  The general concept of public safety has not previously been recognized as an exception to the policy preventing fee-shifting, and although it might support an award under certain egregious circumstances, those circumstances were not present here.  [Id. at 155].  The Appellate Division vacated that ruling because it was not strictly within an exception recognized by the law and R. 4:42-9.  “The Chancery court's award of attorneys' and expert fees was a mistaken exercise of discretion as it departed from well-established precedent and was not founded on any statute, court rule, or contract provision. ”  Id. at 158.  In all, to reverse [...] in this regard and as Plaintiffs have requested is to overrule the Supreme Court’s instructions in Weiss that arbitrator’s violations of public policy must be prevented through judicial intervention.
[brief] Plaintiffs acknowledge that they allowed [...]’s contractor, [...], access to install the ASDS, but that permission was given based upon the threats and representation that the disturbance to the business would be minimal.  (Pa000619; Pa000777 at ¶ 19-20; Pa000333, page 80, line 2 to line 15; Pa000339, page 103, line 3 to line 14; Pa000371, page 232, line 4 to line 22).  [...] also certified that he would not have permitted access had the actual scope of the ASDS work been accurately and fairly represented.  (Pa000778-Pa000779 at ¶ 21-30).  [...] was the proposed contractor for the installation of the system.  [...]’s proposed scope of work for the installation of the ASDS was never provided to the Plaintiffs in connection with obtaining Plaintiffs’ consent for the installation of the system.  (Pa000370, page 229, line 8 to line 15; Pa000804).  Plaintiffs were instead only provided [...]’s softened, less informative, proposed ASDS mitigation plan which [...] submitted to [...] (“[...]”), as part of a voluminous submittal.  [...] was only copied on that submittal and testified that he had no expertise in engineering or environmental remediation.  (Pa000371-Pa000372, pg. 233 line 3 to page 234, line 1; Pa000615).  The ASDS was installed on and through the walls of [...] and remains on site to date.  (Pa000822).
[brief] Similarly, in [...] v. [...], 446 N.J. Super. 525, 531-32 (Ch. Div. 2015), the Chancery Division examined the limit on the ability of an unlicensed entity to seek relief from a court.  Insight Global held that an unlicensed party has no right to bring claims before the court and public policy prohibits enforcement of a contract entered into in violation of a licensing statute.  [...], 446 N.J. Super. at 531-32.  Courts in New Jersey and many other states have consistently refused to aid or ratify illegal activities.  Thus, the trial court’s April 8, 2024 Order must be reversed due to its “inexplicabl[e] depart[ing] from established policies. ”  US Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012)  CONCLUSION
[brief] Plaintiffs’ complaint in this case failed to state a viable claim for relief because the premise on which the claims were based -- that the Will [...] drafted “was contrary to [...]’s intent” -- had been conclusively rejected.  Whether or not the Will was ambiguous was irrelevant except insofar as it opened the door for plaintiffs to persuade the trial judge of their interpretation of the Will.  But, they failed.  The trial judge’s final judgment on this issue precludes plaintiffs’ current claims no matter how they may be recrafted to make it appear otherwise.  The fact pattern of this case mirrors that presented in Pivnick, supra, in all material respects.
[brief] After the expiration of the ten-day period, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Affirm the Sufficiency of the Affidavits of Merit.  In the Motion, the Plaintiffs argued that the Affidavits of Merit were statutorily sufficient, that the issue of vicarious liability is beyond the scope of whether the Affidavits comply with the Affidavit of Merit Statute, and that no discovery has taken place on whether the Defendant is in fact vicariously liable for the actions of any of the co-defendants.  The motion was opposed by the Defendant on the same basis that they felt they cannot be vicariously liable.  After oral argument on October 2 and October 11, 2024, [...] determined - without any evidence in the record - that the Affidavits of Merit were insufficient based upon the opinion that the Defendant cannot be vicariously liable in this case.  The Trial Court also denied the Plaintiffs: (1) the ability to conduct any discovery on the issue of vicarious liability as to the Defendant; and (2) the ability to obtain a new Affidavit of Merit that complied with the Court’s ruling.  Instead, the Trial Court dismissed the Defendant outright from the case, with prejudice.  [...] failed to appreciate that the determination of whether an entity is ultimately vicariously liable is a factual and legal inquiry that is beyond the scope of whether an Affidavit of Merit is statutorily sufficient.  In this case, the Affidavits of Merit contained all of the applicable language set forth in the Affidavit of Merit Statute and properly placed the Defendant on notice of the medical providers and entities that they may be held vicariously liable for in this case.  Furthermore, there was no objection by the Defendant to the affiants’ qualifications or their ability to author an Affidavit of Merit.  Therefore, the Affidavits of Merit should have been found to be statutorily sufficient.  Furthermore, no evidence was presented by the Defendant in the motion record to substantiate their claim that they are not vicariously liable.  At a minimum, the Plaintiffs should have been able to explore through discovery whether the Defendant is in fact vicariously liable in this case through means of a direct employment relationship or apparent authority.  Instead, the Defendant was dismissed with prejudice before discovery even began to take place.  This appeal follows to answer the question of whether the Affidavits of Merit in this case are statutorily sufficient such that the Defendant should remain as a party in this case.
[brief] In Ocean County, which involved a recheck and not an election contest, the Appellate Division declined to count a write-in vote for the plaintiff whose name appeared on the ballot as a candidate for the same office.  See Ocean County, 379 N.J. Super. at 472.  Unlike Gray-Sadler, the Court in Ocean County took a strict reading of the statute and did not recognize an exception.  The Court in Ocean County specifically held that the language in the statute was unambiguous and mandatory.  The Court noted that the purpose of N.J.S.A. 19:49-5 “is to prevent a voter from casting two votes for the same candidate—once by marking the printed name and a second time by writing in the same name. ”  Id. at 473 (emphasis added).  That was the fundamental problem in Ocean County: there was no way to tell whether the individual had cast a double vote because there was no way to “know for certain whether the same voter also cast a proper vote” for the candidate they had written in.
[brief] [...] appears to claim that [...], by having sued [...] as an “interested party” (as it was required to do by N.J.S. 2A:16-56, Parties Interested as Parties to Proceeding), “invited” [...] to seek a money judgment against it; that [...], by having named [...] as an “interested party,” should have intuited that [...] would seek a money judgment against it.  Such argument turns the rules of pleading practice and law of due process on their heads.  [...]’s having been a party “interested in” [...]’s counterclaim for declaratory judgment did not excuse [...] from having had to plead an affirmative claim against [...] for a money judgment.  See R. 4:5-2, Claim for Relief (“...a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief...shall contain a statement of the facts on which the claim is based, showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader claims entitlement”).  It is axiomatic that an “interested party” cannot recover a judgment on a claim it has never asserted in a pleading.
[brief] She does not deny, however, this would be the first time a New Jersey appellate court would allow a plaintiff in a prescription drug case to prove a manufacturing defect through circumstantial evidence alone.  Plaintiff cites no precedent.  Even if New Jersey law allowed Plaintiff to prove a defect in this complex product through circumstantial evidence without experts (it does not), Plaintiff’s proof falls well short.  Plaintiff generally refers the Court to her 71-paragraph statement of facts filed below without identifying what the evidence is or how it proves her case.  (Opp 17)  The Court should not do that work for Plaintiff because, \(^7\) Plaintiff does not deny that [...]’ opinion is based on his flawed belief that 22-25% of units developed silicone particulates (OB 11), establishing his opinions should be excluded as based on incorrect facts and data under NJRE 703.  as [...] once observed, “[j]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in” the record.  *United States v. Dunkel*, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991); accord *Besada v. Attara*, 2016 WL 1387143, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 8, 2016) (quoting *Dunkel*).  At bottom, Plaintiff’s theory is that injury in temporal proximity to use of a product from a recalled lot is sufficient to establish a defect.
[brief] On November 10, 2021, [...] filed a complaint against [...] and its employee, [...], arising out of the fall down incident that occurred on November 4, 2020.  [...] filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, with Docket Number: [...] (the “Underlying Lawsuit”).  On December 1, 2021, the liability carrier for [...], [...] (“[...]”) formally tendered the defense of the Underlying Lawsuit to [...] or its insurance carrier, and demanded that [...] hold harmless and indemnify [...] and [...] on a primary and non-contributory basis.  (Da160-162).  On or about December 12, 2021, [...], claims adjuster on behalf of [...] denied [...]’s tender demand, claiming that there was no independent liability on or against [...].  (Da163-164).  On or about December 16, 2021, [...] filed a third-party complaint against [...], seeking contribution, indemnification, and insurance coverage from the third-party defendant, [...], pursuant to paragraph M of the Subcontract, which provides, in relevant part: to the fullest extent permitted by law, the subcontractor shall indemnify and hold harmless the contractor ([...])...from and against all claims, damages, losses and expenses including, but not limited to attorney’s fees, arising out of or resulting from the performance of the Work provided that such claim, damage, loss or expense is attributable to bodily injury…sustained by anyone, including employees of subcontractor ([...])...caused in whole or in part by negligent acts or omissions of the subcontractor...regardless of whether or not such claim, damage, loss or expense is caused in whole or in part by negligent acts or omissions of the subcontractor ([...])...regardless of whether or not such claim, damage, loss or expense is caused in part by a party indemnified hereunder.
[brief] Indeed, as alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff reached out to [...] after the Deposit had been returned for the very purpose of ensuring that Plaintiff would be kept apprised if [...] planned to close on the property with the Fee Owner.  (Pa11, Complaint ¶¶ 42-44).  By her own admission in an email in October 2022 (after the surreptitious closing had taken place), [...] intentionally withheld the information from Plaintiff because she was told by [...] not to communicate with Plaintiff.  (Pa12, Complaint ¶ 47).  Likewise, [...] (also a principal of [...]) admitted that [...] should have kept Plaintiff apprised of the facts – but that [...] felt “spooked” because she was pressured by [...]’s principal not to provide any information to Plaintiff about the transaction.  (Pa155-157, ¶¶ 14-20).  These admissions from two of the principals of [...] reflect that [...] intentionally breached its contractual obligations to Plaintiff when it chose to remain silent to accommodate [...] and serve their own financial interests.  These admissions are also inconsistent with the notion that Defendants believed they were free to proceed to the closing without Plaintiff’s knowledge or participation.
[brief] The least sophisticated debtor standard is more lenient than a “reasonable debtor” standard “because a communication that would not deceive or mislead a reasonable debtor might still deceive or mislead the least sophisticated debtor. ”  Id.  But while Appellant is correct to note the relative leniency of the least sophisticated debtor standard protects naïve consumers, he fails to explain that the standard still assumes that an unsophisticated debtor is capable of reading and comprehending the contents of a debt collection communication, and charges the debtor with the obligation to read the entire notice.  *Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Credit Mgmt.*, 550 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2008).  The standard “also prevents liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices by preserving a quotient of reasonableness and presuming a basic level of understanding and willingness to read with care. ”  *Riccio v. Sentry Credit, Inc.*, 954 F.3d 582, 594 (3d Cir. 2020) (quotation and citation omitted).  See *Rosenau v. Unifund Corp.*, 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that the least sophisticated debtor standard “prevents liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices. ”).  The “least sophisticated debtor” analysis also incorporates a requirement that a false statement be “material” in order to be actionable under the FDCPA.
[directive] (If the offense occurred on or after January 14, 2004, the defendant should complete Question 4b, Parole Supervision for Life).  (1)  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of [Yes] [No] [NA] aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child pursuant to 2C:24-4a, luring, or an attempt to commit any such offense, the court, in addition to any other sentence, will impose a special sentence of community supervision for life?
[brief] Here the bank’s arbitration agreement was not highlighted in any manner and buried at the back of the agreement where the ordinary consumer would not look.  AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 US 333 (2011) noted  States remain free to take steps addressing the concerns that attend contracts of adhesion for example requiring class action waivers to be highlighted as long as they don’t conflict with the FAA.  Id. at 347 n.6.  A contract of adhesion is a contract presented on a take it or leave it basis, commonly on a standardized form, without the opportunity of the adhering party to negotiate, except perhaps on a few particulars Martindale v. Sandvik, 173 NJ 76, 89 (2002).
[brief] Pa79-88.  Third, in case there remained any doubt about revocation, on March 27, 2019 counsel for [...] and [...] issued correspondence to Plaintiff that discussed the prior termination of the lease and included the following unequivocal statement:  “It is my understanding that you have previously been advised that [...] and [...] no longer have any interest in [...] or in the leased premises.  This is additional notice of such facts.  Further this is notice that [...] and [...] have previously revoked (by reason of the lease termination described above) and hereby revoke again any personal guarantees that they have issued in the past that pertain to any lease obligations owed by [...] for the leased premises.  Accordingly, if you decide to continue to lease the leased premises to [...] in the future and do not exercise your right to terminate the lease you shall do so without the benefit of any personal guarantees by either [...] or [...]. ”  Since Plaintiff’s rent damages are based entirely on the April 17, 2019 Consent to Enter Judgment, [...] and [...] are not responsible for any such amounts due since the revocation took place before the entry of the Consent Judgment.  CONCLUSION
[brief] (Pa15).  Aside from requiring [...] to appear in court on specific days, [...] did not give her any instructions or directions in how to perform her duties.  There is no evidence in the record that [...] instructed [...] on how she should prosecute cases, whether she should try to settle certain cases, or what kind of dispositions she should seek.  Contrary to [...]’s assertions that [...] exerted a significant amount of control over her by controlling the docket and types of cases assigned (Pb36-37), [...] required the bare minimum that would be required of any municipal prosecutor – be present and prosecute the assigned cases.  The ALJ did not give weight to [...]’s testimony that her work is supervised by the Judge – because she worked as a prosecutor in other municipalities, with other judges, performing the same duties that she does for [...] – but was not considered an employee in those municipalities.
[brief] New Jersey’s judicial policy of encouraging broad pretrial discovery is embodied in Rule 4:10-2(a).  It is understood that “[t]he question of relevancy is to be more loosely construed at the discovery stage than at the trial” and that “it is important to distinguish the right to obtain information by discovery from the right to use it at trial. ”  Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 135 F.R.D. 101, 104 (D.N.J. 1990) (citations omitted) (addressing corollary federal discovery rule).
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellant next argues that the holding of Weinroth v New Jersey Mfrs. Ass’n Fire Ins. 117 N.J.L. 436 (1937) is “incongruous with our modern rules of interpretation for insurance contracts”.  (Pb12).  Plaintiff-Appellant argues that “no court has ever applied, much less endorsed, Weinroth’s test for determining whether a policy provision conflicts with a statute under a conformity-to-law clause. ” (Pb13).  However, as set forth above, at length, for the past 87 years since Weinroth was decided, the Courts have held that the six-year statute of limitations applicable to a suit on a policy of insurance, including underinsured motorist claims, is only applicable if the policy is silent as to the time within which suit may be brought against it.  See, Walkowitz v Royal Globe Ins. Co., 149 N.J. Super. 442 (App. Div. 1977); Azze v Hanover Ins. Co., 336 N.J. Super. 630 (App. Div. 2001), certif. den’d 168 N.J. 292 (2001).  The lower court correctly determined that New Jersey law is clear and unambiguous; and the policy terms and conditions are clear and unambiguous and should be enforced as written.
[brief] State v. Cuff, 239 N.J. 321, 349 (2019).  ²The PCR petition is tantamount to a complaint and thus is required to be included in the appendix pursuant to R. 2:6-1a(1)(a),(b).  ³This document is included in the appendix as it falls within one or both of the "exception to the general prohibition against including trial briefs in the appendix" R. 2:6-1(a)(2), because it was referred to in the trial court's decision and is part of the PCR record, and germane as to whether an issue was raised in the trial court.  Order Denying Petition for PCR.........................................................  Da 254  Amended Order Denying Petition for PCR..........................................................  Da 255 Letter Amendment to Oral Opinion Denying PCR........................................  Da 256 Notice of Appeal......................................................................................