ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Examples of assignments that could be subject to may avoid the following tasks at the request of the pregnant officer, so long as it does not cause an undue hardship to the agency.  This list is not meant to be exhaustive.  4  1.  Alternating shift work  2.  Defensive tactics or defensive tactics training 3.  Firearms training, except simulated training 4.  Patrol duties  5.  Extensive exposure to automobile exhaust fumes such as may be experienced with intensive control/toll plaza/tunnel duty 6.  Standing for more than a certain duration 7.  Lifting more than a certain weight 8.  Exposure to high concentrations of toxins, chemical or infectious agents, or controlled dangerous substances 9.  Detainee contact  E. duty.  If, after applying generally applicable medical clearance for Medical clearance for duty requirements, including any physican opinion, a pregnant officer is determined unable to perform the essential functions of full duty status with reasonable accommodation and a temporary waiver of the essential functions would pose an undue hardship, the officer may be reassigned to a modified duty assignment.
[brief] In doing so, the court noted that the oppression statute authorizes the court to adjust value equitably “in cases of oppression—fraud, illegality, mismanagement. ”  Lawson, 160 N.J. at 400. courts must consider “fairness and equity in deciding whether to apply a discount to the value of a dissenting shareholder’s stock. ”  *Id.* at 400.  In deciding *not* to apply discounts in dissenters’ rights cases, the *Lawson* court noted that the “standard of valuation employed in any given context should reflect the purpose served by the law in that context. ”  *Id.* at 399-400.  The entire purpose of the dissenters’ rights statute was to “afford a simple and expeditious remedy to the dissenting shareholder. ”  *Id.* at 400 (emphasis added).  This “remedy... deters insiders from engaging in wrongful transactions... providing a remedy to minority shareholders who are subjected to such transactions. ”  *Ibid.*  Discounting share value in a dissenters’ rights case would “encourage[] corporate squeeze outs” and would “penalize[] the minority for taking advantage of the protection afforded by the appraisal statute. ”  *Id.* at 402.  The court then stated the obvious, that such results “clearly are undesirable. ”  *Ibid.*  The *Brown* court reached a similar conclusion in valuing a closely-held business for equitable distribution: “the very purpose of the appraisal remedy... would be undermined by application of a minority discount to the value of their shares.
[brief] ”  Following an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing, in which both sides questioned [...] as to his reason for not identifying defendant earlier, the court permitted the State to recall [...], stating, “I'm satisfied[.]  [W]e're going to bring the jury back and we're going to open the direct....  I'm going to permit this witness to continue to testify. ”  On recall, [...] testified he was “[one] hundred percent” sure he recognized defendant as the perpetrator, but mistakenly believed the counsel table was reserved for government officials who could not be implicated in crimes.
[brief] See, e.g., Carlucci v. Carlucci, 265 N.J. Super. 333, 339 (Ch. Div. 1993), disapproved of by, Kiernan v. Kiernan, 355 N. J. Super. 89, 89 (App. Div. 2002).  The Court in Carlucci analyzed the interplay between R. 2:9-1 and subsequent actions, stating:  The logic which underlies this rule, of course, recognizes that an application which does not seek to modify the order or judgment appealed is, for all practical purposes, a new case and should be so treated for all legal purposes.  This is clear when two litigants involved on an appeal become embroiled in a separate and distinct controversy.  In such a situation, no one would suggest that the pending appeal would preclude the filing of a new case.  [Carlucci, 265 N.J. Super. at 339 (emphasis added). ]  Defendants have not cited a single authority to support their tenuous argument that an appeal in one action can act as a jurisdictional bar in a completely separate action.
[directive] These General Attorney the to thesf~ reports in included be to data of Much the Offices.  Prosecutor's 88 Page Other the AOC. by maintained and generated be will electronically and stored already are periodic ongoing an on or electronically, Division the been to sent have will information relevant Section denied), complaint-warrant for application when (report 4.11 Section e.~., See, basis. when (notification Section 8.8 denied), detention pretrial for motion when (notification 7.10 provide will Director the necessary, be may As denied).  release of revocation for application empirical collection any of the facilitate Prosecutors to County the to forms reporting electronic not is that Section to this pursuant analyzed and compiled be to information other data and or databases electronic from available otherwise or Judiciary the by maintained and generated reports/notifications.
[brief] (Pa56-Pa57).  It is respectfully submitted that the trial court’s reasoning effectively inverted the Printing Mart standard of review.  As an initial matter, the measure of public interest attendant to this situation does not require a geographic census and no published opinions suggest to the contrary.  A reasonable inference of fact, however, would be that the people who appeared to oppose [...]’s site plan application were [...] residents and not residents of other municipalities as the trial court seemed to speculate.  Regarding the number of people who opposed [...]’s development proposal, again, no requirement exists to surpass a certain threshold.  On the other hand, the trial court’s opinion conspicuously omits mention of the fact that the site plan hearing had to be relocated to larger venue in order to accommodate the number of objectors.  Finally, as to the trial court’s rationale that those who attended the site plan hearing were not challenging Ordinance No. 13-2022, the same unreasonably ignores the effect of the defective notice published prior to Ordinance No. 13-2022’s passage.  That notice left the public completely uninformed as to what Ordinance No. 13-2022 portended.  It was not until [...] filed its subsequent site plan application which manifested the specific development that Ordinance No. 13-2022 made possible with the adoption of the [...] did the legislation’s essence and scope become clear, most particularly with the superseding zoning which eliminated any square footage limitation for individual buildings and nearly doubled the permissible building height.
[brief] In 2013, [...] awarded $19,435,326 in prejudgment interest to [...], and $10,100,950 in prejudgment interest to [...] based on an interest rate of 8.875%. (126a-127a).  The trial court compounded the interest as set forth in the schedule attached to the December 20, 2013 Final Judgment.  (135a-140a).  In 2018, this Court affirmed the prejudgment interest awarded to [...] but vacated entirely the award as to [...].
[brief] Defendant was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment on the robbery count based on the court's finding of aggravating factors three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1a(3); six, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1a(6); nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1a(9); and eleven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1a(11); and mitigating factor eleven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1b(11), and the court's declaration that the “aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors. ”
[brief] Thereafter, on May 22, 2021 the [...] filed a joint answer (Pa23 – Pa36).  On May 25, 2021, Defendant [...] filed a separate answer through their attorney (Pa39).  On February 17, 2022 [...] filed a Motion seeking Summary Judgment in their favor on the Public Trust Doctrine claims asserted in the Fourth Count (Pa224-Pa425).  On March 24, 2022, Defendant [...] filed opposition and a Cross-Motion seeking dismissal of the Fourth Count on procedural grounds (Pa426-Pa500).  After oral argument on April 7, 2022 (5T), the Trial Court issued an Order and Statement of Reasons that denied [...]’s Motion and granted the Defendant’s Cross-Motion and dismissed Count Four of the Complaint “with prejudice” (Pa1718, 1720).
[directive] Thus, each County Prosecutor has the option to either centralize their county’s evidence tracking system for all SAFE kits collected within the county, or provide direct oversight of the county’s individual law enforcement agencies’ tracking systems for compliance with this Directive.  If individual law enforcement agencies track their own SAFE kits collected, the County Prosecutor’s Offices shall review and approve all procedures used by their law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this Directive.  Individual law enforcement agencies must report to the Office of the Attorney General an inventory of all kits in its custody biannually utilizing the standardized reporting mechanism established by DCJ.  The reporting requirement will be biannual and submitted January 31 and July 31 of each year.  The purpose of the biannual report is to ensure ongoing accountability for all kits collected and to accurately evaluate the timeline for SAFE kit processing in New Jersey.  The specific reporting requirements will be provided by DCJ.  Using a standardized evidence tracking system in each county will ensure efficiency, credibility, and confidence, in the storage of SAFE/DFSA kits in New Jersey.
[brief] In contrast, in K.S., the prosecutor used dismissed charges to deny a defendant’s entry into Pretrial Intervention (“PTI”), where the preparation and review of a PSR were not required.  220 N.J. at 198.  Thus, K.S. is not analogous to defendant’s case.  The Supreme Court ruled in K.S. that a prosecutor may not infer guilt in denying a defendant’s PTI application from the “sole fact that a defendant was charged, where the charges were dismissed.  For the prior dismissed charges to be considered properly by a prosecutor in connection” with a PTI application, the “reason for consideration must be supported by undisputed facts of record or facts found at a hearing. ”  220 N.J. at 199.
[brief] In those cases, New Jersey courts analyze whether there was a "substantial nexus between the claim and the subject matter of the subcontractor's work duties."  In *Leitao*, the indemnification clause provided in pertinent part:  "The subcontractor/vendor shall indemnify and hold harmless [...] and all of its agents and employees from and against all claims, damages, losses, and expenses, including attorney's fees, arising out of or resulting from the performance of the subcontractor/vendor's work under this purchase order, regardless of whether they are caused in part by the contractor".  *Leitao*, supra, at 191.  In *Leitao*, this Honorable Court applied the standards set forth in *Vitty* in holding an indemnification clause in a contract between a contractor and its subcontractor to be enforceable.
[brief] In the Second Count of the Complaint  Plaintiff alleges violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1.  Count One of the Complaint seeking ______________________ the NJCFLA against debt buyers, not once has the [...] intervened in any cases or moved against any of the debt buyers involved.  a Declaratory Judgment, discussed below, is based on the alleged violation of the NJCFLA.  The CFA makes the following acts unlawful, in connection with the sale or advertisement of merchandise or real estate:  The act, use or employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing, concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate, or with the subsequent performance of such person as aforesaid, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby, is declared to be an unlawful practice.  [N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.]  DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 337, 64 A.3d 579, 587 (App. Div. 2013)(emphasis added)  The CFA was established to address the legislative concern regarding “over sharp practices and dealings in the marketing of merchandise and real estate whereby the consumer could be victimized by being lured into a purchase through fraudulent, deceptive or other similar kind of selling or advertising practices."
[brief] (Ra356 59:1 through Ra357 61:11.)  That raises the effective height of the structure because the home or building is sitting on top of a “mound. ”  (Id.)  It is typically seen with single-family homes where from the street one can see that a home sits on top of a mound compared to the rest of the property.  As [...] testified, there were no such mounds on the Property.  (Id.)  First, the grading for this Property was part of a comprehensive grading plan for the entire development to address stormwater management, sanitary sewer, utilities and internal roads.
[brief] 1.  Plaintiff Lacks Standing To Bring This Action.  As the Trial Court below aptly observed, since the plaintiff neither resides in [...] nor pays real estate taxes to [...] or owns property in [...], he lacks standing to bring this suit as he does not have a legally cognizable stake in [...]’s decision to award the tax abatement at issue, nor is there a substantial likelihood that he will experience some harm if the Court returns an unfavorable decision.  (T40-10 to 13; T41-3 to 6)  Standing is a threshold determination a trial court must make to determine a plaintiff’s legal ability to maintain and prosecute a civil action.  In re Adoption of Baby T., 160 N.J. 332, 340 (1999).  To establish standing plaintiffs must have “a sufficient stake and real adverseness with respect to the subject matter of the litigation (and a) substantial likelihood of some harm … in the event of an unfavorable decision. ”  Adoption of Baby T., supra at 340 (citation omitted).  While the Complaint states plaintiffs “questioned the validity of all post 1991 [...] long term tax exemptions” (Compl. Par. 186), this is not sufficient to confer standing, as underscored by the Appellate Division in its determination that plaintiffs do not have “a legally cognizable stake in [...]’s” tax abatement program “nor a substantial likelihood he will experience some harm if the court returns an unfavorable decision,” despite plaintiff’s argument “his standing is derived from the real estate taxes he pays on property he owns in [...]. ”  Feld v. City of [...], et al., supra.  The Appellate Court in Feld v. City of [...], et al., while acknowledging New Jersey’s expansive view of a plaintiff’s standing to sue, explained that New Jersey courts will not “entertain proceedings by plaintiffs who are ‘mere intermeddlers’ or are merely interlopers or strangers to the dispute,” citing Crescent Park Tenants Ass’n v. Realty Equities Corp. of N.Y., 58 N.J. 98, 107 (citation omitted).  The Appellate Court in Feld v. City of [...], et. al., described plaintiff to be “the quintessential interloper courts have historically found lack standing to challenge an action taken by a municipality. ”  In light of the above decision of the Appellate Court which, while unpublished, is both instructive and binding on the parties for purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel pursuant to R. 1:36-3, it follows that [...], the remaining plaintiff-appellant in the instant matter is precluded from relitigating the issue of standing based on these considerations of collateral estoppel and issue preclusion.
[brief] Model Civil Jury Charge 5.60B (Jury Charge 5.60B) provides that an owner of an animal is liable for the harm caused by that animal if: the animal had a vicious or dangerous trait or propensity; and, the animal’s owner knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the particular vicious or dangerous trait or propensity.  Jury Charge 5.60B explains that a “[v]icious or dangerous trait or propensity means a natural inclination or habitual tendency to do and act endangering a person/property. ” (emphasis added).  Notably, Footnote 1 of Jury Charge 5.60B states that a “[n]egligence charge” should be used for “injuries by animals other than with vicious propensities. ”  Thus, New Jersey law provides a strict liability cause of action, other than “negligence,” stemming from injuries caused by an animal alleged to have vicious propensities.
[brief] The [...] also had constructive notice of the dangerous condition.  While it is true that the mere existence of a dangerous condition does not demonstrate constructive notice of it, there is sufficient evidence demonstrating the length of the time that the condition existed.  The Defendant attempts to distinguish this case from Chatman v. Hall, by mentioning that the hole in question covered the entire roadway and that there were affidavits by neighbors.  However, the Defendant omits the fact that in Chatman, the Supreme Court assumed the validity of the neighbor's complaints but found those complaints could not "serve as notice to defendant in respect of plaintiff's defective curb."  Chatman v. Hall, 128 N.J. 394 (1992).  The Court observed: (1) the complaints did not specify dates; (2) the neighbor's property was on a different side of the street; and (3) plaintiff stated, "the condition of curbing on the street varied from home to home, with most of it 'pretty bad,' although '[n]ot all.'"  Id.  The Court also noted a neighbor's "complaints about his own curb cannot serve as notice of a defective curb at a different location."  Id. at 447-48.  In spite of this, the Court still found that the Plaintiff had satisfied the notice requirement because that “the length of time during which the hole existed as well as its alleged size created a reasonable inference that the defendant employees had either actual or constructive notice of the hole. ”  The Court also noted that, whether notice and a failure to act would give rise to liability again depends on the standard practice in the City in responding to that type of condition and that “the evidence reveals a sufficient basis for a triable issue relating to whether the failure to repair the hole was the result of the determination of policy or the carrying out of policy decisions already made, and, respectively, whether such failure was palpably unreasonable or merely unreasonable. ”  Id.  As in Chatman, the evidence in this case reveals a sufficient basis for a triable issue relating to whether the failure to repair the hole was the result of the determination of policy or the carrying out of policy decisions already made, and, respectively, whether such failure was palpably unreasonable or merely unreasonable.  While the Defendants have stated that they were under no obligation to inspect the roadway, the Plaintiff’s contention is that the Defendants had constructive notice of the dangerous condition, not a failure to inspect.  Given the size of the pothole, the length of time that it existed, the gradual deterioration of the pothole, the location of the pothole and the fact that town officials were aware that the area was problematic in terms of potholes, this raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Defendant has constructive notice and even actual notice of the dangerous condition.  As such, the Motion for Summary Judgment should have been denied.
[brief] *Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Orders Entering Default against both Defendants)………………………………………………………52a, 53a *Exhibit B to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Consent Order Vacating Default against both Defendants)…………………………………………………………..55a *Exhibit C to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Plaintiff’s Affidavit of Merit)…………………………61a Exhibit D to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Complete Log of Email Correspondence Between Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ Counsel)……………………………………75a Exhibit E to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Pre-suit Notice to Defendants of Plaintiff’s Personal Injury Claim)……………………………………………………83a *Exhibit F to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Record of [...], indicating that Defendants were failing to take Plaintiff to the hospital for treatment of his infection)………………………………………………C17a  *Exhibit G to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Sworn Statement of [...], pursuant to 2A:53A-28)…………………………………………………………59a  Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed May 10, 2024…………………………………………………………84a  Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Answer, filed May 10, 2024…………………………………………………………86a  Notice of Appeal, filed May 20, 2024………………………………………………87a  Certification of Transcript Completion and Delivery, filed June 24, 2024……………………………………………………………91a  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] LETTER REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT DEFENDANT IS CONFINED  Honorable Judges: Please accept this Letter Reply Brief on behalf of the Appellant [...] in lieu of a more formal brief pursuant to Rule 2:6-2(b)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................. 1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....................................................................................4 STATEMENT OF FACTS .....................................................................................4 LEGAL ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................4 POINT I THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE CO-DEFENDANTS AND PETITIONER’S CASES DO NOT JUSTIFY THE MORE THAN 50 YEAR DIFFERENCE IN THEIR SENTENCES FOR LIKE CONDUCT; THIS GROSS DISPARITY HAS NEVER BEEN CONSIDERED BY A COURT THAT DID NOT ALREADY PREJUDGE PETITIONER AS DESERVING AN EFFECTIVE LIFE SENTENCE FOR CRIMES IN WHICH NO ONE WAS KILLED OR SERIOUSLY INJURED, AND PCR RULES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED TO DENY PETITIONER A REMEDY ..............................................4 POINT II TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO ADVOCATE FOR HIS CLIENT TO OBTAIN A FAIR SENTENCE, AS HE MADE NO ARGUMENT TO REFUTE THE STATE’S REQUEST FOR MORE THAN NINETY YEARS PAROLE INELIGIBILITY BUT INSTEAD “OFFERED” HIS CLIENT FOR SENTENCING; FURTHER, THIS COURT SHOULD FIND THAT IT IS PER-SE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE FOR TRIAL  COUNSEL NOT TO SUBMIT A MEMORANDUM PRIOR TO SENTENCING IN A CONTESTED SENTENCING MATTER WHERE THE STATE IS SEEKING A TERM ON THE EXTREME END OF THE SCALE AND THE COURT HAS DISCRETION TO IMPOSE A LESSER SENTENCE ........................................................................7  CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................10
[directive] TREASURY GOALS AND THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE OF FORFEITURE PROGRAM  T he mission of the Treasury Forfeiture Fund is to affirmatively influence the consistent and strategic use of asset forfeiture by Treasury law enforcement bureaus to disrupt and dismantle criminal enterprises.  Within the context of the strategic objective identified above, the Department of the Treasury Asset Forfeiture Program has four primary goals:  1.  Deprive criminals of property used in or acquired through illegal activities.  2. Encourage joint operations among federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, as well as foreign countries.  3.  Strengthen law enforcement.  4.  Protect the rights of the individual.  To achieve these goals, the program must be administered in a fiscally responsible manner that seeks to minimize the administrative costs incurred, thereby maximizing the benefits for law enforcement and the society it protects.