ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Appellant makes the argument that because Respondent has taken his car without payment, Respondent is unjustly enriched because there is potential for him to receive a windfall benefit by selling the parts.  First, it is important to note that Respondent did not actively seek possession of the car – the police required them to tow it to their shop.  Respondent has also asked Appellant many times to come pick up the car, which Appellant has refused to do claiming he has no way of knowing what parts Respondent has sold.  That being said, Appellant tries to draw the comparison that in Haylett, the court ruled Baladi received a windfall benefit by taking the car without payment.  However, in Haylett, the defendant had actual possession and was making actual use of the car.  As stated in Pb at p. 21, “to demonstrate unjust enrichment, [‘]a plaintiff must show both that defendant received a benefit and that retention of that benefit without payment would be unjust[‘].  VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539, 554, 641 A.2d 519 (1994) (emphasis added). ”  Here, Appellant is merely speculating that Respondent can potentially receive a windfall benefit by selling his car for parts but offers no actual proof that the shop has made use of the car in this way.  The only proof is that the Appellant abandoned the car and refused to come get it.  Generally, if a car is towed to a shop by the police, there is a commonsense presumption that the owner of the vehicle will eventually come to redeem the car.
[brief] (Pa50-89).  At trial, [...]’s Director of Sales [...] boasted of writing the company’s training manual (Da666- 718) which directs salesmen to say things like: "Isn’t it nice to know you’ll have a place just like home you can use 365 days a year close to home." (14T38:6, 79:2-83:18).  [...] admitted (through its corporate designee [...]) that it was aware of salesmen referring to the timeshare as an “investment” and “like conventional real estate. ” (12T223:21-225:22).  After being worn down by a long sales presentation, [...] rushed the Plaintiffs through hundreds of pages of purchase documents by a “deeder. ” (Pa53 ¶18).  These purchase documents contained numerous clauses that contradicted the promises made by [...]’s employees, material omissions, acknowledgments [...] had Plaintiffs execute knowing they were false, and disclaimers designed to insulate [...] from the misrepresentations it knew its employees were telling the Plaintiffs.  (Pa50-89).
[brief] Statement of Facts ......................................................................................................3 Standard of Review  ....................................................................................................9  Argument Point  I  [...] erred by finding a reservation of an easement in favor of strangers to the deed (Da809).  .................................................................10  Point II  [...]’s claim was precluded by res judicata, collateral estoppel and the entire controversy doctrine (Da809)  ...........................................19  Point III  In the alternative, the Court should remand the matter for consideration of relevant issues not addressed by the trial court (Da845, Da846, Da849)  .................................................................38  Conclusion ..................................................................................................................40
[directive] Czy rozwnie Pan(i), i:e s¥dzia nie jest zwiqzany jakimikolwiek obietnicami lub zaleceniami prokuratora i ma prawo odrzucenia oswiadczenia o winie przed wydaniem wyroku, a taki:e ma prawo do wydania surowszego wyroku?  23. b.  [Yes/Tak]  Do you understand that if the judge decides to impose a more severe sentence than [No/Nie] recommended by the prosecutor, that you may take back your plea?  Pan(i), Czy rozwnie i:e jesli s¥dzia zdecyduje o wydaniu surowszego wyroku niz wyrok zalecony przez prokuratora, moi:e Pan(i) wycofac swoje oswiadczenie o przyznaniu si¥ do winy?
[brief] Cf. Miscoski v. Local Finance Board, 2008 WL 2788225 *5 (App. Div. 2008) (Da18) (reversing finding that deputy mayor violated the LEGL when voting on a bond ordinance to purchase open farmland because his mother and business partner benefitted thereby because, if there was any benefit, all farmland property owners enjoyed the benefit, not just the deputy mayor’s relations).  Plaintiff argues that an unpublished Appellate Division decision and dicta in a published Appellate Division decision supports his claims that [...] was disqualified.  (Pb34)  Plaintiff completely misrepresents the holding of the unpublished case and fails to recognize that the statement by the Appellate Division in the published decision was dicta.  In Seaview Harbor Realignment Committee LLC v. Township Committee of Egg Harbor, 470 N.J. Super. 71 (App. Div. 2021), certif. denied, 252 N.J. 189 (2022)
[directive] ”  See N.J.S.A. 2B:25-5(c); R. 7:8-5 (dismissal); see also N.J.S.A. 2B:25-12 (amendment); R. 7:14-2 (amendment).  A municipal prosecutor’s well-founded determination that the State lacks sufficient evidence to proceed ordinarily will constitute “good cause” to amend or dismiss a charge.  The Commentary to the Part VII Guidelines states that “a prosecutor should not prosecute when the evidence does not support the State’s charges. ”  Therefore, insufficient evidence “usually” will be the “cause” for a motion to dismiss a pending charge, and that “the prosecutor should have the ability to amend the charges to conform to the proofs. ”  Dismissal and amendment on these grounds are the examples of appropriate uses of prosecutorial discretion recognized in the Justice.4
[brief] In addition, the language of AICRA’s dispute-resolution provision in the context of its purpose and the legislative scheme as a whole demonstrates that an insurer’s effort to claw back fraudulently obtained insurance benefits via the IFPA’s specialized provisions and remedies is not subject to AICRA’s equally specialized and limited dispute-resolution procedures.  See infra Point I.B.  Further, to reconcile AICRA and the statutes under which Plaintiffs sue, the court must permit Plaintiffs to litigate their claims.
[brief] Defendants assert that Defendant [...] promptly reported the charge pay to HR after learning about it from another employee (Rb38).  However, if Defendant [...] had prior knowledge of, or explicitly approved, the charge pay, this purported "discovery" is a charade.  The charge pay issue was elevated to HR by Defendant [...] shortly after the June incident and while complaints about her behavior were pending.  (CITE).  The timing of the elevation, after she learned of the pending investigation into her harassment, becomes a pretext — a calculated move by Defendant [...] to deflect attention from her own misconduct and to derail further investigation into her harassment.
[brief] The affirmative causes of action against [...] fail as a matter of law.  (29)  .........................................................................................................................  42  A.  [...] did not breach its contract with [...] and [...].  (31)  .................................................................................................................................  43  B.  [...] did not breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  (31)  ......................................................................................................................... 44  C.  [...] did not violate the Consumer Fraud Act.  (33)  .................. 44  1.  The Consumer Fraud Act applies only to the sale of insurance – not the denial of insurance benefits.  (32)  ...............................................................  45  2.  [...] did not violate the Consumer Fraud Act, and plaintiffs did not sustain any ascertainable loss.  (33)  .....................................................  47  D.  The trial court correctly dismissed the claim for punitive damages.  (36)  .........................................................................................................................  49  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................  50
[directive] Any person who is employed as a sworn member of any state, county, or municipal law enforcement agency, department, or division of those governments who is statutorily empowered to act for the detection, investigation, arrest, conviction, detention, or rehabilitation of persons violating the criminal laws of this State.  The term law enforcement officer shall include sworn members of the New Jersey State Police, the Division of Criminal Justice and the Juvenile Justice Commission.  It shall include State Correctional Police Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-4, County Correctional Police Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-3, Special Law Enforcement Officers of all classes pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-146.8 et seq., Humane Law Enforcement Officers appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 4:22-14.1 or 4:22-14.4, Auxiliary Police Officers appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. App.A:9-45(c), and Constables appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:9-120.
[brief] However, it needs be pointed out that in October, 2015 Appellant had to choose between filing a motion before the same judge who readily acknowledged his inability and unwillingness to properly adjudicate my claims of account error (see Point V, paragraph 3), or pursue an appeal.  Appellant therefore chose to pursue an appeal.  His appeal was denied on procedural grounds, and denial of Appellant’s claims of Probation account error were found to lack merit\(^5\) – a decision which now has been shown to be unfortunate given Probation’s implicit acknowledgment of material account errors which support Appellant’s claims of account error which were denied by that Court!  Thus, it is evident that Law of the Case and “collateral estoppel” doctrine have been misapplied, and the Court’s generic reliance upon those doctrines in denying Appellant’s motions for relief must be revisited as the rationale for denial has been shown to be inapplicable and no longer controlling.
[brief] [...] was properly granted summary judgment because he was unlawfully removed from the [...] by the Carlstadt’s arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable conduct.  To prevail in an action in lieu of prerogative writs, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged action by the government body was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unreasonable.  Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Planning Board of Borough of Freehold, 244 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 1990).  The trial court looks to the record below for factual context.  Roth v. Rutherford Rent Bd., 239 N.J. Super. 378 (Law Div. 1989).  A local authority’s resolution of factual issues will stand if supported by credible evidence in the record.  Resolution of a legal issue is “entitled to no particular deference since the courts are equipped to resolve issues of law. ”  Urban v. Planning Bd. Of Borough of Manasquan, 238 N.J. Super. 105, 111-12 (App. Div. 1990) (citations omitted).  This appeal presents a legal issue: whether an appointed public official’s *private conduct* can constitute misconduct in office under N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c) (Da 357-358).
[brief] (Db at 37-39).  At the same time, she finally concedes that she was equitably distributed a Mercedes and that she “received $200,000 lump sum payment for her share of the equitable distribution. ”  (Db. at 38).  In the underlying litigation, she provided 3 different versions regarding the $200,000: (1) She never received it; (2) she received it but it was her money to begin with; and (3) she received it but it was poker money.  She also alleged that the Mercedes was sold.  [...] wrongly claimed she is the owner of [...] and [...] in this and other litigation in contravention of paragraph 16 of the PSA and the parties’ Mid-marriage agreement.
[brief] (31a)  Thus, [...]’s improper conduct persisted for over eight (8) months.  During this time, [...] used Trust funds to cover legal expenses aimed at furthering her objectives.  On November 28, 2022, [...] provided notice that his family vacated the Boonton Property.  On December 5, 2022, a deed was recorded with the Morris County Clerk dated September 1, 2022 transferring ownership of the Boonton Property from the Trust to [...] for the sum of $601,000.
[brief] Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980)..............................8  In re Issuance of Permit by DEP, 120 N.J. 164 (1990)..........................9  Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85 (1973)......................7, 8  Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22 (1995)........................................9  N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. State, 88 N.J. 605 (1982)..............................7  N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., 196 N.J. 366 (2008)..............................................8  SMB Assocs v. Department of Envtl. Prot., 264 N.J. Super 38 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 137 N.J. 58 (1994)..................12  State v. Atley, 157 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 1978)...............................9  In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions’ Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267 (2018)...............9, 10  Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011)..................................7  In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees, 194 N.J. 413 (2008)......................................................................................8  Williams v. Department of Corrections, 330 N.J. Super. 197 (App. Div. 2000)  .................................................7, 8  ##
[brief] 12 POINT I THE TRIAL JUDGE UNDULY RESTRICTED DEFENDANT’S DUE-PROCESS AND SIXTH-AMENDMENT-BASED RIGHT TO PRESENT A COMPLETE DEFENSE WHEN SHE: (1) EXCLUDED DEFENSE PHOTOS OF MUNICIPAL SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS ON ELLSWORTH AVENUE THAT POLICE SHOULD HAVE CHECKED IN THEIR INVESTIGATION, BECAUSE THE JUDGE INCORRECTLY BELIEVED  THE PHOTOS WERE NOT PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED AND LACKED RELEVANCE, AND (2)  PREVENTED DEFENSE COUNSEL FROM INTRODUCING PHOTOS OF ADJACENT PROPERTIES ON EDGEMERE AVENUE AND FROM ARGUING THAT THE ACTUAL PERPETRATOR COULD HAVE RUN THROUGH THOSE PROPERTIES ON THE WAY FROM ELLSWORTH TO EDGEMERE WHEN POLICE BRIEFLY LOST SIGHT OF HIM.  (RULINGS AT 14T 115-3 TO 14; 14T 142-4 TO 6; 15T 11-4 TO 9; 15T 51-7 TO 53-19; 14T 142-6 TO 161-20)
[brief] Filing/Order August 26, 2021, Appellant’s Brief in Opposition to [...]’s Motion to Dismiss ......RA0001-3 September 2, 2021, [...]’s Letter Opposition to Appellant’s Motion to Amend Complaint ........................................................................................................RA0004-12 October 11, 2021, Appellant’s Additional Letter Opposition to [...]’s Motion to Dismiss ........................................................................................................RA0013-20 October 13, 2021, Appellant’s Letter Brief in Further Support of her Motion to Amend and in Further Opposition to [...]’s Motion to Dismiss ......................RA0021-24 November 4, 2021, [...]’s Letter Opposition to Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration ........................................................................................................RA0025-33 November 17, 2021, Appellant’s Letter Reply in Support of Motion for Reconsideration .....RA0034-35 March 3, 2023, Order Granting [...]’s Motion to Set Date Certain for Compliance with Appellate Division Order .........................................................RA0036-37 March 31, 2023, Appellant’s Letter Reply in Support of Motion for Documents ...............RA0038-44 March 31, 2023, Order Denying Appellant’s Motion for Documents and Extending Deadline to Comply with Appellate Division Order .................................RA0045-46 | Judgment/Order/Ruling | Cite | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------| | October 22, 2021, Order Denying Appellant’s Motion to Amend and Granting [...]’s Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice | PA44-48 | | December 2, 2022, Appellate Division Order Reversing and Remanding
[brief] There was little direct evidence in the case: no eyewitnesses, no recorded confession, no surveillance footage that captured the crime.  The State sought to make its case largely through the testimony of four forensic experts.  Each of these forensic experts testified inappropriately, bolstering their findings through false claims that their field has “zero error rate” or opining on matters beyond their expertise.  Because this inaccurate and unreliable testimony unfairly bolstered the State’s case against [...], her convictions must be reversed.
[brief] After [...] waived his rights, [...] began asking [...] about the arrest that brought him into custody:  [...]: So what’s up [...]?  What happened today?  Buddy, what you just need money or something?  Like what was going on?  What -- MR. MASON: Yeah.  I bought some drugs.  I get high, you know?  [...]: All right.  MR. MASON: I bought some dope, coke, and you know, got to go get high.  I seen some people [I] knew and they talked to me and then they pulled up.  [...]: The cops pulled up?  MR. MASON: Uh-huh.  [...]: You down on your luck lately or something?  [(1T 28-13 to 25)]
[brief] (TRVb33.)  As noted above, the trial court’s finding was primarily based on the fact that the CCIP Policies covered “multi-state location risks. ”  However, the trial court observed, as an additional basis for finding the Code inapplicable, that the CCIP Policies had an inseparable workers’ compensation element, one so intertwined that it was mandatory for all enrolled contractors, a fact that remains undisputed.
[brief] In her Initial Decision, however, [...] failed to actually rule on the merits of [...]’s claims.  She offered no determination as to whether the OOS was, in fact, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or contrary to law.  Rather, instead of addressing the issue specifically presented by paragraph 4 of the Verified Petition, [...] opined:  The question here is not whether the action of the State Board was legal, it is whether the action of respondent in November 2021, made in reliance on the decision of the State Board, was legal.  Pa44.  Indeed, [...] specifically rejected the premise that she had to weigh the legality of the DOE’s action in issuing inconsistent FADs.  Pa44.  In making this ruling, she failed to address the legal claims, and substantive merits of [...]’s Verified Petition.
[brief] Charging defendant with driving while suspended was thus a ministerial act independently compelled by his pre-existing license suspension.  See ibid. (noting Strieff’s arrest was ministerial act independently compelled by pre-existing warrant).  “Highway and officer safety are interests different in kind from the government’s endeavor to detect crime in general or drug trafficking in particular. ”  Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 357 (2015).  Therefore, like a warrant check, running a license check during a traffic stop is a “negligibly burdensome precaution” taken for officer and traffic safety and police learning of the license suspension essentially intervened in the investigative stop for drug activity.  See Strieff, 579 U.S. at 241 (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356).  It was thus an intervening circumstance.  The flagrancy factor also “strongly” favored the State; the officer’s conduct in stopping Strieff was “at most negligent” and any error in judgment did not rise to purposeful or flagrant Fourth Amendment violation.  Id. at 241.  The warrant check was negligibly burdensome precaution for officer safety.  Ibid.  Nothing indicated the unlawful stop was more than isolated negligence and not “part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct. ”  Rather, it was incident to a “bona fide” drug investigation.  Id. at 242.  The license check here was similarly part of bona fide drug investigation and not in any part of systemic police misconduct.  The State urges this Court to apply this well-established attenuation doctrine, which both the New Jersey and United States Supreme Courts have applied to the discovery of an arrest warrant during an investigative stop for drug activity to the discovery of a driver being on the suspended list during a traffic stop for drug activity.
[brief] Specifically, the Lower Court analyzed:  [...], in the absence of a case here, I would think that your motions to transfer and consolidate are moot and or withdrawn because there is no case to consolidate them into.  The – what I would think is that, if there is a reason for your client to vacate, to pursue vacating the default, that it probably goes back to [...] int eh Special Civil Part because I haven’t transferred the matter here.  Do you have any thoughts on that, any concerns about that approach, any disagreement with that conclusion?
[brief] THE ORDER SETTING THE DATE OF VALUATION AS JANUARY 27, 1994 IS CONSISTANT WITH THE CONTROLLING STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 20: 3-30(d) AND 20:3-38.(Da102)  The controlling statutes on this issue are set forth below:  N.J.S.A. 20:3-30(d):  Just compensation shall be determined as of the earliest of the following events....(d)  The date of the Declaration of Blight by the governing body upon a report by the planning board pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 20:3-30]  N.J.S.A. 20:3-38:  The value of any land or other property being acquired in connection with a development or redevelopment of a blighted area shall be no less than the value as of the Declaration of Blight by the governing body upon a report by a planning board.  In spite of the above statutory mandate, Plaintiff argues that the statutes should not apply “especially when there is a twenty-four-year time period between the area in need designation and the date of taking. ”  Plaintiff’s persistence in raising this argument should get some kind of negative recognition for chutzpah!  The Plaintiff not only was the party who waited twenty-four years, but eight years after the designation filed an eminent domain action on September 30, 2002 naming all the tenants as defendants to condemn the fee simple estate before taking a voluntary dismissal on the eve of Trial, three years later after an Appellate Division ruling that the Township had to file a Declaration of Taking before the actual trial.