ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] I.  [...] IGNORES BOTH LEGAL PRECEDENT AND THE FACTS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT TO ARGUE THAT EASTERN OUTDOOR CANNOT ESTABLISH, AS A MATTER OF LAW, A “WRITTEN ARRANGEMENT” EXISTED BETWEEN EASTERN OUTDOOR AND [...].  In [...]’s Brief, [...] asserts that the NJFPA requires “evidence of a written arrangement between the parties transferring a license. ” (Db2).  [...] subsequently claims that [...] did not present such a document before the Trial Court, and instead “all [...] demonstrated to the trial court was advertisements and emails pertaining to nonparties and unrelated companies from over 10 years ago. ” (Db22).  Neither of these assertions have any merit.  First, [...] wholly ignores – as did the Trial Court – that multiple courts, relying on the direction of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 614 A.2d 124, 352 (1992), have held that the NJFPA’s “written arrangement” does not need to grant the “license” required by the Act.  (See Pb26-Pb27).  Instead, as explained at length in [...]’s Opening Brief, the grant of a “license” can be inferred simply through analyzing the parties’ conduct.  (See id.).  Second, [...], tellingly, fails to address that the current federal franchise framework – enacted during the same time period as the NJFPA – provides that a “written…arrangement” between a franchisor and franchisee can simply consist of a “price list” or “sales receipt. ” (Pb28-Pb29).  [...] presented evidence of both documents (see e.g., Pa51a, Pa785-789, 792), as well as several other written documents establishing, in even greater detailer, the relationship between [...] and [...].  (See Pb9-Pb16).  Third, [...] entirely ignores that [...] presented to the Trial Court a document that satisfies even [...]’s narrow definition of a writing that granted a license.  Specifically, in January 2013, the “[...]” sent an email to [...], which provided “[...] Direct” Summerset images and express permission to use such images for the sale of Summerset products, and designated [...] as part of the “Summerset . . . Family” who assists with the “creat[ion] and distribut[ion]” of Summerset product.  (P749-P750).  Fourth, [...] attempts to discount the voluminous documents evidencing that [...] was the holding company of all of the “Summerset” sub-brands and entities in the early years of the development of the Summerset brand, and that [...] was, therefore, an agent of [...] and [...] when communicating with [...]’s then-owners, [...] and [...].  (See Pb7-Pb16).
[brief] ”  The Third Circuit, providing a statement of New Jersey law, held that “[a]n assignment of a right is a manifestation of the assignor's intention to transfer it by virtue of which the assignor's right to performance by the obligor is extinguished in whole or in part and the assignee acquires right to such performance. ”  In re Jason Realty, L.P., 59 F.3d 423, 427 (3d Cir.1995) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 317 (1981) and Aronsohn v. Mandara, 98 N.J. 92, 98 (1984)).  According to the leading treatise on contract law, “the elements of an effective assignment include a sufficient description of the subject matter to render it capable of identification, and delivery of the subject matter, with the intent to make an immediate and complete transfer of all right, title, and interest in and to the subject matter to the assignee.
[brief] (768a).  Therein, [...] sought to prevent the unilateral imposition of the modifications to the collective bargaining agreement.  Ibid.  Pursuant to [...]'s Order, all --- \(^8\) [...], who retired on February 1, 2017 (28a), was separated from [...] for more than a month before [...] issued his Notice of Implementation memorandum on March 13, 2017 to be effective March 15, 2017.  (31a ¶103); (212a).  temporary restraints issued on March 15, 2017 remained in effect until the close of business June 6, 2017.  (263a).  On June 7, 2017, the State issued a new notice of implementation date of June 7, 2017.  (31a ¶105); (217a).  While the Trial Court's temporary restraints remained in effect, four additional Plaintiffs retired from their employment with the city: [...] (4/1/17, 27a ¶83), [...] (4/12/17, 838a), [...] (5/1/17, 19a ¶21), and [...] (6/1/17, 26a ¶77).  All four of these Plaintiffs had vested property rights to their terminal leave before the Defendants' new June 7, 2017 implementation date.  As such, it was a constitutional violation when they were denied their terminal leave.  Based upon the foregoing, the Trial Court erred when it reconsidered Defendants' R. 4:6-2e motion.
[brief] He stated: “I wasn’t going to render opinions as to the altercations and who did what. ” (8T102:6-7).  [...]'s claims, second, that [...] is impeached by evidence of the police opinions and conclusions because he "acknowledged that he did not consider [...]'s version of events in forming his opinions" (Db40), citing [...]'s testimony at 8T101:20-102:7.  Yet, if one were to actually look to the record at that location, one sees that [...] acknowledged no such thing.  In fact, he states the opposite: "I saw two different points of view after I reviewed the material, yes."  (101:23-25).  Thus, rather than testifying that he did not consider [...]'s version, in fact he testified that he DID consider it (because he "saw two different points of view"), only that it is not in his report because it is not relevant.  B. [...]'s Fails to Address the Issues of Prejudice and The Officers' Unqualified Expert Opinions.
[directive] First, under the longstanding IAPP, while internal affairs information and records are by default confidential, Section 9.6. 1 establishes that a County Prosecutor or Attorney General may direct their disclosure.  During the litigation challenging both Directive 2020-5 and Administrative Executive Directive No. 2020-6, the question arose whether law enforcement agencies may enter into binding confidentiality agreements with officers that preclude a County Prosecutor and/or the Attorney General from later exercising their authority to direct disclosure.  This Directive clarifies that agencies have no such authority.  As IAPP’s language makes clear, the power to direct sharing or release of internal affairs information is possessed by the relevant County Prosecutor and the Attorney General—and that power cannot be nullified by individual law enforcement agencies.  Agencies, including those housed within the Department of Law and Public Safety, thus may not enter into agreements limiting the authority of the County Prosecutor or Attorney General to direct disclosure at a later date, even where that information is not currently subject to publication.  Were the rule otherwise, a law enforcement agency would be able to shield disciplinary records from disclosure simply by stipulating to do so in a settlement agreement, in turn subverting the important ends the Major Discipline Directive seeks to achieve.  As a result, this Directive adds a provision, Section 9.6.6, to expressly codify that law enforcement agencies cannot waive, restrict, or otherwise limit the power of the County Prosecutor or the Attorney General to subsequently request or direct the disclosure of internal affairs related information.
[brief] The “excessiveness” ruling cannot stand even if the Department’s post-hoc rationalization was permitted under law.  Even if the Department’s actual disapproval of [...]’s applications were based on “excessive” rates, any such ruling also would violate cardinal principles of administrative law.  The Department has not provided any guidance to regulated entities regarding what that unadorned statutory term means and how it is to be applied to applications for rate increases.  See Pa56 (“considerations outside the regulations, expressed within the enabling statute, form the disapprovals’ basis”); Pa74 (“I FIND that the Commissioner based her disapproval of [...]’s rate-increase applications on considerations outside the loss ratio and rate stability regulatory formulas for such increases. ”).  If the Final Decision is affirmed, it would upset more than a half-century of this State’s administrative law precedents.  It also would give the Department license to do exactly what such decisions repeatedly have held is unlawful—namely, make ad hoc decisions regarding the applicability of undefined, broad statutory terms without providing any prior guidance or notice to regulated entities.  Moreover, allowing the Department to regulate using a black box, despite that the Legislature sought the utmost transparency and thus decreed that the Department act through rulemaking, would be perverse.  For all these reasons, the Court should reject this outcome.
[brief] On November 3, 2021, [...] ("Plaintiff") applied to the [...] ("Board") for a Major Subdivision for the purpose of creating nine (9) residential lots from three (3) existing lots.  (Ia18 and Ia23)  After two hearings on April 5, 2022 and June 14, 2022, the Board denied Plaintiff’s application, citing concerns with off-site traffic and purported conflicts with N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2.  The Board then heard and denied Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration on August 2, 2022.  (Ia 64)  On September 23, 2022, Plaintiff filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs, challenging the Board’s denial.  On December 21, 2022, a consent order was entered allowing objector [...] ("[...]") to intervene.  (Ia1)  The Court heard oral argument on July 31, 2023.  Following the hearing, [...] ordered the Board to submit an amended Resolution to clarify its reasons for denying the application.  (Ia236)  After significant delay by the Board, a new Resolution was finally adopted on September 19, 2023.  (Ia242)  A trial was then held on December 20, 2023, where the Court found that the Board arbitrarily denied Plaintiff’s application.  The Board then entered an Order reversing the Board’s denial.  (Ia269)  Statement of Facts
[brief] [...], a Limited Liability Company of the State of Delaware, Plaintiff, v. [...]; MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE [...]; and [...]  ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, Defendants-Appellant, And [...], a New Jersey Limited Liability Company, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...]; MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE [...]; and [...]  ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, Defendants-Appellant.
[brief] Contract claims  Plaintiffs alleged a breach of contract claim against [...] and [...] based upon the [...] Operating Agreement in Count 7 and sought a judgment against those entities "of not less than $7,500,000.00."  Da43-44.  Count 8 alleged that [...] and [...] breached their obligations under the [...] Shareholders Agreement and also sought a judgment against those defendants "of not less than $7,500,000.00."  Da44-45.  Although a defendant must be a party to a contract to be liable for damages in a contract action, See, Globe Motor, 225 N.J. at 482; Model Jury Charge (Civil), § 4.10A  "The Contract Claim—Generally" (May 1998), the judgment was not so limited.  The same fatal flaw exists regarding the judgment based on Count 11.  Plaintiffs alleged that the [...] Stockholder Agreement and the [...] Operating Agreement each included implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing that were breached by defendants [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...].  Only parties to a contract may be held liable for a breach of this covenant.  The Model Jury Charge explains, “it is implied or understood that each party to the contract must act in good faith and deal fairly with the other party in performing or enforcing the terms of the contract. ”  Model Jury Charge (Civil), §4.10J “Implied Terms – Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (December 2011) (emphasis added).  Yet, the judgment lumped in defendants who are not parties to the contracts allegedly breached and held them liable for damages plaintiffs claimed they suffered in Count 11.  Finally, Counts 12 and 13 allege claims of unjust enrichment that are closely tied to the fraudulent inducement claims asserted in Counts 9 and 10 rejected by the trial court.  (24T28:13-31:10).  The premise for the counts is that the named defendant entities derived a benefit form certain transfers and that, as a result, [...] and [...] did not receive “full and complete remuneration for the sale of” their interests.  Da52.  To prove these claims, [...] and [...] were required to prove “both that defendant received a benefit and that retention of that benefit without payment would be unjust. ”  VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539, 554 (1994).  As a result, even if proven, liability on these counts must be limited to those business entities that plaintiffs alleged received a unjust benefit.  The wholesale inclusion of all defendants in the judgment, making each jointly and severally liable without regard to whether they were named in a count and what the proofs were against them was clearly error, warranting reversal.  POINT VII
[brief] The trial court in the action at bar recognized Plaintiff’s wasteful litigation.  In his opinion with respect to his first legal fee award that was vacated, the court had found that Plaintiff had “vehemently opposed” the Administrator’s application that sought approval of the Administrator’s Report.  The court ruled that Plaintiff’s filing of a cross-motion seeking to keep the investigation open, was “directly adverse to the best interests of the Estate. ” (Da 212-218, at 218).  Unfortunately, based upon its August 31, 2022 opinion, the trial court had not reviewed the earlier time entries of Plaintiff’s counsel with the rigor required by case law and Rule 4:42-9(a)(2), and did not properly assess the overall equities in the case to determine whether the equities supported Plaintiff’s application for fee shifting.  H.
[directive] Implementation of Directive  A.  Appointment of Chief Resiliency Officer.  Within 60 days of the issuance of this Directive, the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice shall appoint a Chief Resiliency Officer, who shall ensure implementation of this Directive and oversee the Division’s efforts to strengthen resiliency among state, county, and local law enforcement officers in New Jersey.  B.  Appointment of Resiliency Program Officers (RPOs).  Within 60 days of the issuance of this Directive, the head of each law enforcement agency in New Jersey shall appoint one or more RPOs for their agency.  The selection of the RPO is critical to the well-being of our State’s law enforcement officers and the success of the NJRP-LE.  In making these selections, the appointing official shall consider the specific needs and circumstances of the agency, as well as the qualifications of the RPO candidates, including years of law enforcement experience, past and current work assignments, interest in the position, and any relevant training.  The appointing official shall ensure that all officers in their agency are provided with the name and contact information of the appointed RPO(s).
[brief] In the absence of an evidentiary hearing, the factual inferences drawn from the documentary record by the PCR judge as well as the judge's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.  State v. Aburoumi, 464 N.J. Super. 326, 338-39 (App. Div. 2020); see State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 421 (2004) (holding that an appellate court's has the authority “to conduct a de novo review of both the factual findings and legal conclusions of the PCR court. ”)
[directive] 질문 4b(2)의 경우, 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(iii)에 의한 아동의  복지를 위태롭게 하는 행위가 검사의  신청에 따라 종신 가석방 감독에 적용될 수 있는 동안, 이 범죄가 2C:7-2b(2)에 따라 메건법이 적용되는 범죄들에 대한 년 월 일의 개정에 포함되지 않았다는 것에 유의해 주십시오.  또한, 질문 2018  2  1  은 근원  범죄가 성폭행일 경우의 중범 모살죄, 그리고 사건의 정황을 근거로 그 범죄가 성적으로 난폭한 7 범죄, 또는 그러한 범행의 미수로 간주되어야 한다고 공식적으로 판사가 명백한 결정을 내리는 범죄를 포함한다는 점에 유의하십시오.  These additional questions need to be answered if you are pleading guilty to the offense of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping under 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child under 2C:24-4a, endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(3), (4) or (5)(a), endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(i) or (ii) (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018), leader of a child pornography network pursuant to 2C:24-4.1 (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018), luring or enticing a child pursuant to 2C:13-6, criminal sexual contact pursuant to 2C:14-3b if the victim is a minor; kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1, criminal restraint pursuant to 2C:13-2 or false imprisonment pursuant to 2C:13-3 if the victim is a minor and the offender is not the parent, promoting child prostitution pursuant to Please note for Question 4b(2) that while endangering the welfare of a child 2C:34-1b(3), (4), or any attempt to commit any such offense.
[brief] ”  (6T 123-25 to 124-4) (emphasis added).  Similarly, again, with respect to all charged crimes, the jury was incorrectly told that the presumption of innocence disappears merely if the State has proven those ordinary elements of the crimes, again with no reference to the State’s duty to disprove self-defense as well.  (6T 114-7 to 11)  Then, specifically with regard to aggravated manslaughter, the jurors were told:
[brief] “[W]hether there is good cause for an officer to make a protective search incident to an investigatory stop is a question separate from whether it was permissible to stop the suspect in the first place. ”  Thomas, 110 N.J. at 678-79.  An officer may not conduct a search for weapons unless he has “an objectively reasonable suspicion that a suspect was armed and dangerous. ”  Id. at 683.  That is, a protective frisk is permitted when a reasonably prudent officer would be justified in the belief, based on “specific and articulable facts[,]” and not “his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’” that an individual is armed and dangerous.  State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 29 (2010) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 27).  As discussed in Subsection C, that standard was not met in this case.  C.  The Alleged “Blading” Did Not Provide Reasonable Suspicion To Believe That Any Of The Four Men Were Armed And Dangerous.  In this case, the officers had no particularized reason to believe that [...] or the men he was with were armed and dangerous: the officers were not investigating a report of a violent crime and had no information that any of the four men were armed; the officers did not see a bulge in Cutt’s clothing or the clothing of the other men; and the officers did not know [...] or the other men from prior encounters, let alone prior encounters involving weapons.  See e.g., Roach, 172 N.J. at 27-29 (upholding weapons search where officers observed an unusual bulge in the groin area of defendant’s pants); State v. Valentine, 134 N.J. 536, 547-49 (1994)(upholding weapons search where officer had personal knowledge that suspect carried weapons on previous occasions); Thomas, 110 N.J. at 680 (“in situations where the suspect is not thought to be involved in violent criminal conduct and the officers have no prior indication that the suspect is armed, more is required to justify a protective search”).
[brief] I, ¶ 1 | 10, 28, 33, 40 | | N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 10 | 10, 28, 33, 40 | | N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 9 | 10, 28, 33, 40 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV | 10, 28, 33, 40 | | OTHER AUTHORITIES | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners, | | | AFTE Theory of Identification As it Relates to Toolmarks | 15, 18, 19| | American Statistical Association, ASA Board Policy Statement | | | on Forensic Science Reform (April 17, 2010) | 20 | | [...], Building Criminal Capital vs Specific Deterrence: | | | The Effect of Incarceration Length on Recidivism | | | (Working Paper Dec. 2011) | 50 | | [...], Forensic Science: Oxymoron? | | | 302 Science 1625 (2003) | 20 | | Model Penal Code: Sentencing (American Law Inst., | | | Proposed Final Draft, 2017) | 49 | | National Academy of Sciences, Organization, | | | (Last Visited April 17, 2023) | 17 | | National Research Council, Ballistics Imaging (2008) | 16-18 | | National Research Council, Forensic Science in the United States: | | | A Path Forward (2009) | 13, 15, 18| | National Research Council, The Growth of Incarceration in the | | | United States: Exploring Causes And Consequences (2014) | 49, 50 | | President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, | | | Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Validity of | | | Feature-Comparison Methods (2016) | 14-16, 19 | | [...], Firearms Identification in the Forensic Laboratory | | | (2010) | 12 | | [...] and [...], Age and the | | | Explanation of Crime, 89 Am. J. Soc. 552 (1983) | 49 | TRANSCRIPT
[brief] Although contamination on the Property was first discovered in 1991, Plaintiff missed the first remediation deadline that required completion of a remedial investigation by May 7, 2014.  (Da26, ¶6).  Plaintiff took absolutely no action until July 2014 when it hired its first LSRP, which prompted NJDEP to take direct oversight.  (Da144).  After hiring the LSRP, Plaintiff had until May 6, 2019, to file a final remedial action report.  (Da26, ¶7).  Again, Plaintiff failed to take timely action to submit a Remedial Investigation Report to the NJDEP, resulting in NJDEP filing a Complaint in [...] on September 16, 2020.
[brief] A business invitee is owed a higher degree of care by an owner or possessor of property because that person has been invited on the premises for purposes of the owner which are often commercial or business related.  Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 434 (1993).  Business owners owe to invitees a duty of reasonable or due care to provide a safe environment for doing that which is within the scope of the invitations.  Nisivoccia v. Glass Gardens, Inc., 175 N.J. 559, 563 (2003); See also Butler, supra, 89 N.J. at 275.
[brief] Notably, the Trial Court in its final judgment disregarded otherwise relevant information based on the previous summary judgment dismissal.  Pa170.  In this case, the record reflects countless representations boasting about the performance of the system, subsequent attempts by the defendants to later disclaim, qualify, and walk-back those representations after performance became an issue, and testimony from an expert witness that the estimated cost of removing the system and replacing it with a new fixed roof would involve demolition, removal, and replacement and the cost would exceed the amount of the balance of payment claimed by [...].  If the trier of fact were to determine the defendants misled [...], it can hardly be a surprise to the defendants that [...] would then be entitled to damages to repair, replace, or otherwise address a failed system.  The Trial Court erroneously dismissed the entirety of [...]’s complaint on the perceived lack of damages where that issue should have remained for trial in connection with the Trial Court’s finding that there were genuine issues of material fact pertaining to the Consumer Fraud Act.
[brief] *Ibid.* (Pa12).  [...], like defendant, (Db43), relied on *Kelly*, 97 N.J. 178 (1984).  *Kelly*, however, does not support defendant’s claim here either.  *Kelly*, too, noted the distinction between an honestly held belief and a reasonable one, noting that “even when the defendant’s belief in the need to kill in self-defense is conceded to be sincere, if it is found to have been unreasonable under the circumstances, such a belief cannot be held to constitute complete justification for a homicide…  the question of the reasonableness of this belief “is to be determined by the jury, not the defendant, in light of the circumstances existing at the time of the homicide. ”  *Id.* at 199-200.  Again, the jury charge does not contradict this despite the use of the circumstances existing at the time.  The Model Charge correctly alerts the jury to the fact that its analysis is not limited to what the defendant would have perceived and honestly believed at the time—that is only part of the analysis.  The jury’s assessment must be objective and detached from defendant’s honest belief in order to satisfy both aspects of the Legislature’s intent in drafting the Code as they did.