ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] \(^5\)  Despite [...]’s plans to escape, she was housed in a dormitory that had an --- \(^3\)A review of [...]’s investigative report reveals that [...] served as [...]’s and [...]’s union representative during their respective interviews with [...].  \(^4\)The window had been in disrepair since March 2, 2017.  \(^5\)Based on the discovery that was provided to [...], but not presented at the hearing, on or before August 15, 2019, Inmate [...], had had discussions with inmates and others, including during her monitored phone calls with persons outside of the correctional facility, that she had intentions of escape.  [...] wanted to escape in an effort to be able to reunite with her boyfriend who allegedly worked as a contractor at the [...].  unsecured window that could have been opened by any inmate at any time.  (Pa122a).  On August 16, 2019, [...] returned to [...] from his sanctioned break.  (1T50.13-16).  In the video, [...] and [...] were seen in [...].  (1T187.1-15; 1T191.20-23).  [...] and/or [...] left [...] completely unattended.
[brief] The central issue in this case is whether a mortgage that has been cancelled under the mistaken belief that it was paid in full should be reinstated.  It has been historically held that, as a matter of equity, where “no one is injured by the mistake but the party himself, and no one has changed his position by reason of the act executed through the influence of the alleged mistake,” the mistake should be corrected.  *Seeley v. Bacon*, 34 A. 139, 141 (Ch. 1896).  “That courts will reinstate a mortgage, the cancellation of which occurred through a mistake of facts, is entirely settled. ”  *Id.*  See, also, *Banta v. Vreeland*, 15 N.J. Eq. 103 (Ch.1862) (a mortgage cancelled under the mistaken notion that it had been paid was restored); *Heyder v. Excelsior Bldg.Loan Ass’n*, 42 N.J. Eq. 403 (Ch.1886) (“cancellation of a mortgage of record is only prima facie evidence of its discharge, and it is left to the owner making the allegation to prove the cancelling to have been done by fraud, accident or mistake”.  *Id.*, at 407); *Dubois v. Schaffer*, 23 N.J. Eq. 401, 402 (Ch. 1873)(Complainant canceled a mortgage believing it was paid in full when in fact there was a $400 balance due on it).  The *Dubois* Court affirmed the decision and holding in *Dudley v. Bergen*, 23 N.J. Eq. 397, 400 (Ch. 1873) that: “When the cancellation of a mortgage is procured by fraud, or made by mistake, or without authority, and without actual payment and satisfaction, the canceling will be set aside and the mortgage enforced. ”  *Id.*  The *Dudley* Court cited as authority: *Miller v. Wact*, Saxt 214; *Trenton Banking Co. v. Woodruff*, 1 Green’s Ch. 117; *Banta v. Vreeland*,15 N.J. Eq. 103 (Ch.1862); Harrison v. Johnson, 3 C. E. Green 420; S.C., on appeal, 4 C.E. Green 488.  For additional authority, see 29 N.J. Prac., Law of Mortgages §13.10 (2d ed.), fn.35, providing that reinstatement of a cancelled mortgage will be granted provided ‘no one is injured by the mistake but the party himself and no one has changed his position by reason of the act executed through the influence of the alleged mistake. ”  §8b of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (2011) is also persuasive.  It provides that “the mistaken discharge by an obligee of an obligation or the security therefor gives rise to a claim in restitution against the mistakenly discharged obligor to the extent of the benefit conferred. ”  Id.  “Mistaken discharge of an obligation or a security interest is most simply remedied by treating the discharge as ineffective. ”  Id.  In this case, there are no subsequent lenders, bona fide purchasers or other third parties who have relied to their detriment on the cancelled mortgage.  It was [...]’s own conduct in using [...] funds to pay his personal mortgage obligation that misled [...] into believing that the Note was paid in full, and [...] discharged the mortgage securing the Note in reliance on those payments.  As a result, the Note is in default and the mortgage should be reinstated.
[brief] Geller v. Department of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, 597-598.  In Geller v. Department of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, the Court evaluated a “preponderance of the equities” and “all of the circumstances” to achieve a “just result. ”  Id. at 600.  This Court is not bound by an agency's determination of a purely legal issue.  Francois v. Board of Trustees, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 348 citing Utley v. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Labor, 194 N.J. 534, 551 (2008); see Krayniak v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 412 N.J. Super. 232, 237 (App. Div. 2010).  As a form of legislation aimed at remedying a social problem, pension statutes "should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited."  Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 199 N.J. 14, 34 (2009) (quoting Geller, supra, 53 N.J. at 597-598, 597).
[brief] He cannot, because Plaintiff fully acknowledged the existence of the Partnership Agreement and assented to the terms therein by signing the 2007 Addendum.  Equally unavailing, Plaintiff’s assertion that “there is nothing in the 2007 Addendum to alert Plaintiff that he was agreeing to any of the provisions in the 1991 Agreement, let alone the arbitration provision,” [Pb46], is belied by the Addendum’s contents.  See [Da220].  To that end, New Jersey permits contract ---  2  Far from being disguised, the document is titled “Addendum to the 1991 Partnership Agreement” and prominently identifies the Partnership Agreement dated November 8, 1991 as the agreement it is amending, which acknowledges that Article 22 of the original Agreement permits amendments.
[brief] J. 383 (1998) | | | **Pivnick v. Beck** | passim | | 326 N.J. Super. 474 (App.Div. 1999), aff’d 165 N.J. 670 (2000) | | | **Schindel v. Feitlin** | passim | | No. A-2888-19, N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1119 | | | (Super. Ct. App. Div. June 11, 2021) | | | **Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co.** | 20 | | 220 N.J. 591 (2015) | | Zavodnick v. Leven 340 N.J.Super. 94 (App.Div. 2001) ......................................................... 24 Rules New Jersey R. 4:5-1.............................................................................. 18-19, 22-23 New Jersey R. 4:7-1.................................................................................. 17 New Jersey R. 4:30A ............................................................................. 17 Preliminary Statement We represent defendant-respondent, [...], Esq. (“Balsamo”), and respectfully submit this brief in opposition to the appeal of plaintiff, [...] (“Anthony”), Executor of the Estate of [...], and [...], Individually (collectively, “plaintiffs”), from an adverse Law Division order dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint on summary judgment.
[brief] Defendants simply did not prove their case.  Presumably, if the benefits of signing up for email alerts outweigh the inconveniences, then the public will sign up for the alerts.  Defendants also never proved that anyone would be dissuaded from using the [...] alert system.  The Trial Court made the specific finding that “The idea that users will be deterred from registering for public service notifications is unsubstantiated.  Nothing in the record demonstrates that receiving unsolicited e-mails would cause someone to unsubscribe from this service.
[brief] (3/20/23 Transcript @T54-T57).  Further into the initial presentation, the speaker for Plaintiff again discussed and acknowledged that the Distance Regulation’s purpose was traffic safety:  So the 1000 foot separation ornament what is the presumed focus for that?  Some places don't have that kind of distance of time.  What is the presumed rationale.  The engineer gave you a good set up as to the location of the sign with those pictures that you were provided.  It shows a rendering of the sign with its location on the roadway.  From a traffic perspective, these signalized intersections are the concern that a motorist on the roadway would be distracted by a sign.  And in this case, we've already indicated that the sign is not 70 feet high.  It's not 1000 feet square feet of image.  It's lower.  It's only 378 feet on each side.  So it's much less than what the DOT would allow for a sign for the location from a traffic standpoint.  Again, I'm looking at the signalized intersection.  As you've seen in the pictures, the view is from beyond the intersection.  We wanted to get the view, looking through the intersection, what the sign would look like behind the intersection.  The sign is located 350 feet from the [...] intersection and it's almost 400 feet from the driveway.  I think it's 390 feet from the driveway.  We actually took the light up.  We took the pictures back further so that you would get a perspective of what the driver would see as they approach the intersection.  Not just at the intersection, but at the intersection.  **The point of seeing the billboard is as a distraction.  It's no longer an issue.  They've already gone through the traffic signal.  It's not one or the other.  They're beyond traffic signal.  We've done their movement through the intersection. **  (3/20/23 Transcript @ T69:13-T70:15)  *(emphasis added)*.  The discussion of the purpose of the ordinance began because the Planning Board Chairman correctly observed that Plaintiff’s entire presentation up to that point had operated under the explicit presumption that traffic safety was the only concern underlying the ordinance:
[brief] Da 25-33 Judgment of Conviction ([...])  ...........................................  Da 42-45 Judgment of Conviction ([...])  ...........................................  Da 46-48 | Cases | PAGE NOS | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------| | Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) | 12, 18, 19, 21 | | State ex rel. J.M., 339 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div. 2001) | 13 | | State in Int. of M.P., 476 N.J. Super. 242 (App. Div. 2023) | 12 | | State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592 (2021) | 12 | | State v. Alexander, 170 N.J. Super. 298 (Law Div. 1979) | 16 | | State v. Atwood, 232 N.J. 433 (2018) | 10 | | State v. Bacome, 440 N.J. Super. 228 (App. Div. 2015) | 14 | | State v. Bindhammer, 44 N.J. 372 (1965) | 20 | | State v. Boone, 479 N.J. Super. 193 (App. Div. 2024) | 11, 22 | | State v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595 (1990) | 13 | | State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, modified, 174 N.J. 351 (2002) | 11, 18, 22 | | State v. Chapman, 332 N.J. Super. 452 (App. Div. 2000) | 19 | | State v. Dolly, 255 N.J. Super. 278 (App. Div. 1991) | 16 | | State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224 (2007) | 10 | | State v. Gibson, 218 N.J. 277 (2014) | 10, 13, 14 | | State v. Hagans, 233 N.J. 30 (2018) | 9, 12, 13, 14, 19 | | State v. Hladun, 234 N.J. Super. 518 (Law Div. 1989) | 16 | | State v. Jefferson, 413 N.J.
[brief] (Pa000086).  Plaintiffs opposed this Motion on August 15, 2023 and improperly argued, among other things, that [...] was “per se” negligent for not obtaining Plaintiffs’ consent prior to preparing the preliminary site plan for the redevelopment project.  (Pa000195).  [...] filed a Reply Brief in further support of the Motion on August 21, 2023.  (Pa000383).  The second Motion for Summary Judgment was granted in [...]’s favor on August 25, 2023, dismissing Plaintiffs’ remaining claims against [...].
[brief] The Trial Court improperly assigned a *de minimus* value to Plaintiff’s membership interest in [...] because it failed to appoint an expert in accordance with *Borodinsky v. Borodinsky*, 162 N.J. Super. 437, 445 (App. Div. 1978) and *Torres v. Schripps, Inc.*, 342 N.J. Super. 419, 436 (App. Div. 2001) when the Trial Court rejected Plaintiff’s proposed valuation of her interest.
[brief] The New Jersey case law that is most relevant to the issue of the discerning the Legislature’s intent to abrogate the common law is Peterson v. Ballard, 292 N.J. 575 (App. Div. 1996).  In Peterson, the Appellate Division considered an argument that the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d), abrogated a common law litigation privilege on the basis that abrogation was “implicit in the language and the intent of the statute. ”  Id. at 584.  The Court rejected that argument, and instead explicitly agreed with the trial court’s refusal to read an implicit abrogation of common law into the statute on the basis that “[i]f the Legislature intended to have N.J.S.A. 10:5-12d override common law privileges, it did not explicitly say so.
[brief] (Aa5; Aa10-11; Aa16-17).  [...]’s own statements also lend credence to [...]’s allegations: (1) [...] claimed that he congratulated [...] on her transition during the morning incident; (2) [...] admitted that during the union office exchange that afternoon, [...] yelled at him, “[[...]], I just want you to know I’m in a protected class, my name is [...] and you will respect me;” and (3) [...] acknowledged he could not recall whether he has called [...] by any name but if he had it would have been “[...]” as it was her legal name.  (Aa11; Aa28).  As to whether [...] was engaged in a misleading signature-gathering effort, [...]’s argument (Ab21) fails in two respects.  First, as the Commission aptly noted, [...]’s claim that [...] engaged in a scheme to obtain signatures for the union election under false pretenses was a mere allegation without any supporting evidence.  (Aa16-17).  Having failed to produce any evidence to bolster his position below, he is not now entitled to a “mulligan. ”  Second and more importantly, even if true, [...]’s claim is not dispositive to the core issue here: whether [...] violated the State Policy by purposely misnaming [...] despite being informed of her preferred name.
[directive] For internal affairs investigations that may result in a criminal prosecution, physical tests should be conducted pursuant to a court order or an investigative detention under Rule 3:5A.  Officers that refuse to perform or participate in a court-ordered physical test may be subject to a contempt of court sanction and agency discipline for failing to comply with the order.  7.5.4  For internal affairs investigations that may result in an administrative disciplinary proceeding, the internal affairs investigator or the appropriate supervisor may order subject officers to perform or participate in a physical test.  The order must be reasonable and relevant to the investigation at hand.  Officers that refuse to perform or participate in a lawfully ordered physical test can be disciplined for their refusal.  7.6
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................4  STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................4  A. The Parties.........................................................................................................................4  B.  2011 Lease Agreement......................................................................................................5  C.  [...]’s Fatal Electrocution Occurred While He was Trying to Replace an Emergency Light Fixture Ahead of an Annual Fire Inspection ..................................................................................................................6  D.  The Illegible/Unclear Panelboard Housing the Circuit Breaker ........................................7  E. [...]..........................................................................................................8  F.  Plaintiff’s Expert’s Opinion .................................................................................................9  LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................10
[brief] But the duty of a New Jersey hotel owner is not “to insure the safety of guests but only to exercise reasonable care to discover and correct dangerous conditions. ”  *Ranalli v. Edro Motel Corp.*, 298 N.J. Super. 621, 627 (App. Div. 1997); accord *Shafer v. H.V. Thomas Co.*, 53 N.J. Super. 19, 22 (App. Div. 1958).  Plaintiff does not set forth evidence disputing that 1) the bathtub met industry standards, 2) there was no legal requirement or industry standard requiring defendant to install stairs or a grab bar by the bathtub, 3) there was no legal requirement or industry standard governing the placement or load- bearing requirements of a towel rack, 4) there was no legal requirement or industry standard requiring defendant to warn patrons that the towel rack was not load-bearing, or 5) neither the floor nor lighting created a dangerous condition.  As such, there is no evidence that defendant breached its duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable care to ensure its patrons’ safety while using the bathtub.
[brief] Appellant submits that the Appellate Court’s reliance upon [...]’s judicial discretion in denying Appellant’s appeal (DA139-140) is inconsistent with the trial court’s self-admitted lack of diligent investigation of account discrepancies and disputed facts of the case.  The very rationale of the Appellate Court’s decision of 6/5/2018 must be questioned, the finding needs be reconsidered as to the merit of Appellant’s argument of Probation account errors given Probation’s acknowledgment of material account error.  Appellant further submits that the Appellate Decision of 6/5/2018 cannot be deemed controlling as the underlying rationale has now been shown to be incorrect.  *Pelow v. Pelow* 300 NJ Super 634, 646-647, 693, (CH. Div. 1996).
[brief] Rule 2:5-4(a) mandates that ‘[t]he record on appeal shall consist of . . . papers on file I the court or courts . . . below . . . .  “  Appellate courts will generally not “consider evidentiary material which is not in the record below . . . . “  [...] and [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1 on R. 2:5-4(a) (2022).  On September 19, 2024, the appellate division entered an Order denying the plaintiff’s motion to strike.
[brief] 31  Id. 32 Id. 33 Id. 34 Pa841.  | Date | Description | Hours | Rate | Total | |--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|------|---------| | 3/25/22|  Motion to extend discovery | 2 hrs.| $760.00 | $18,658.00 | | 3/30/22|  Emails with counsel regarding motion.  Edit to motion and prepare the same for filing.  File the motion to extend discovery.
[brief] The foyer had a door in the back to an office, and a door on the left that led to his warehouse.  (9T87-1 to 17).  That morning, [...] was in his warehouse alone, sitting in a chair sorting tools.  (9T87-18 to 22).  Suddenly, he saw two men enter the front door and then warehouse area with baseball bats.  (9T87-24 to 25).  One man wore a green and white track suit, and the other wore a dark colored hoodie sweatshirt.  (9T89-21 to 23).  Both men began immediately to beat him with the bats, hitting him seven or eight times in the head, face, side, and leg, as he tried to get up and away.  (9T90-9 to 22).  He bled profusely.  (9T91-8 to 11).  The men did not hesitate in any way, and they said nothing during the attack.  (9T88-19 to 22).  [...] was coherent the entire time, never losing consciousness, as he watched them hit him.  (9T89-9 to 11, 91-2 to 3).  He told the jury he was “100 percent” sure that both men beat him with bats.  “I watched him do it[,]” he insisted.  (9T95-25 to 96-2).  During the attack, the man in the track suit went into [...]’s pocket and retrieved a wad of cash totaling $1,800 in U.S. currency, while the other man continued to hit him with his bat.  (9T91-15 to 92-8).  The money was in denominations of 5’s and 20’s.  (9T91-23 to 24).  After they took the money, the two men left the same way they entered, through the front door of [...].  [...] called the police, who after arriving immediately took him to the hospital.  (9T95-2 to 9).  [...], a six-year veteran of the [...], received the 9-1-1 dispatch call that morning.
[brief] A)  The CFA “merchandise” definition, as it relates to the tournament entry  The trial court’s repeated, sole basis for denying the Consumer Fraud claim was because of his ruling of law, that the paid entry into the tournament did not qualify as “merchandise” as defined in the Consumer Fraud statute, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2:  THE COURT: “Well, let me let me see if I can make the interpretation a little bit easier.  On your claim, plaintiff, that it's consumer fraud, under 56:8-2.1, this does not fit the definition of merchandise.  So it's not consumer fraud”.  (1T12:9-12)  And even at the very end of the case, the trial court again reiterated this basis:  THE COURT: “Now, you may think you're entitled to consumer fraud damages, but you don't, because it's not the definition of merchandise. ”  (1T23:24-1T23:2)  However, as argued in my opening / principal brief, and as the Respondents do not even attempt to refute, this ruling of law was unquestionably in error.
[brief] ..................................................................................................................  8  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................  8  POINT I THE [...]’S CLAIM THAT THE PLAINTIFFS BENEFITTED FROM THE UNAUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES OF THE [...] AND ITS AUTHORIZED AGENTS  LACKS MERIT.  ........................................................................................................  8  POINT II FRALINGER’S ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFFS’ LITIGATION WAS FRIVOLOUS DUE TO THEIR “PRE-SUIT” KNOWLEDGE LACKS MERITS.  (2T Hearing, 10/20/23) (Pa000637) (Pa000926).  ........................................  11  PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO THE CROSS APPEAL OF FRALINGER ENGINEERING, PA.  .........................................................................................................................  20 LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................  20  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REDUCING THE AWARD OF SANCTIONS BASED UPON THE UNREASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME SPENT ON THE MATTER (Pa000637) (Pa000926).  ...........................................  20 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................
[brief] Last, this Court must reject the State’s tautological argument that the jury was properly told that the wine chiller was a deadly weapon and that it could infer intent to kill from its use.  In supporting this position, the State asserts that “[t]he definition of a deadly weapon includes a class of objects that have an ordinary proper use but may become deadly in how it is used. ”  (Sb 30)  If that were the case, any object that was used to kill someone would be a deadly weapon for the purposes of the inference: because someone died the object would necessarily be a deadly weapon, and because a deadly weapon was used, intent to kill could be inferred.  That means intent could be inferred in literally every case in which someone died.  This would render the inference nonsensical and dilute the jury’s role in determining intent in a homicide to unacceptable levels.  Telling the jury that it could infer that [...] meant to kill merely because a wine chiller was the object that led to [...]’s death—or, in the alternative, failing to tell the jury that it could not infer [...]’s intent merely from the weapon used without first finding it was a deadly weapon under the appropriate definition—requires reversal of [...]’s convictions.