ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Rule 7:6-2(a)(1) requires that before accepting a plea, a court must determine “by inquiry of defendant” that the plea is being made voluntarily, with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.  As found by the De Novo Court, the Trial Court engaged in a “lengthy colloquy” with Defendant and advised him of the penalties on a sentence on a third or subsequent DUI conviction.  (3T46-1 to 46-14)  Indeed, upon being questioned by the Trial Court  Defendant confirmed he had ample opportunity to review his case with counsel; was satisfied with counsel’s advice; understood he had a right to trial and was waiving his rights; was entering the plea freely and voluntarily; and that nobody was forcing him to do so.  (1T7-16 to 8-2)  The Trial Court also confirmed that Defendant was pleading guilty to DWI with the understanding that the balance of the charges against him would be dismissed before explaining the fines and penalties Defendant faced as a result of his plea.  (1T8-3 to 8-8; 8-9 to 11-5; 9-9 to 9-10)  Defendant argues the De Novo Court erred by “seemingly trying to defend the utter absence of any mention of consecutive sentencing exposure” by relying on the “single word ‘more’. ”  Defendant’s argument ignores the obvious.  When Defendant entered his plea on February 8, 2013, his driving privileges had been suspended for multiple reasons including, but not limited to, his third DWI conviction of September 27, 2011.  (Ra1-Ra12)  When he entered his plea, Defendant admitted he knew that his driving privileges had already been suspended.  (1T14-6 to 14-12)  As already found by both the Trial and De Novo Courts, it is inarguable that the clear and unambiguous language of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3) delayed commencement of the suspension imposed on February 8, 2013 until such time as the suspension Defendant was already serving had terminated.
[brief] The Board then scheduled its next hearing on April 14, 2021, eleven months later.  Hearings followed on June 9, 2021, June 23, 2021, and August 11, 2021, four years and one month from the filing date of the application.  The Board heard testimony that [...] had been subsidizing the Unit for several years, but that did not matter in determining a rent increase of only $154.99.
[brief] ’” (Ca166 at Requests for Admission [RQA] 4; Ca169 at Response to RQA 4).  Respondent also admitted that, “[a]s a result of [her] campaigning for the Board from [her] personal Facebook account, and announcing that [she] won a seat on the Board from that account, some of [her] Facebook friends became aware that [she is] a member of the Board. ” (Ca166 at RQA 3; Ca169 at Response to RQA 3).  It was common knowledge to those viewing her posts from this account that Respondent was a member of the Board.  This was undisputed below.  ALJ [...] ([...]), in issuing her Initial Decision, repeatedly held that, since Respondent had held herself out as a member of the Board, and because she has failed to post any sort of disclaimer which might have clarified in what capacity she was speaking when she told teachers to drop out of their unions, stated that transgender students have no place in New Jersey schools, encouraged others to flout Executive Order 251 (EO 251), and made light of the Holocaust, she compromised the Board.
[brief] [...] & [...], as Co-Trustees, decided around Nov. ‘21 that they could not serve together, as they had since Trust funding in Jan. 2019.  They agreed he would resign, but did not agree on needed Settlement for his resignation.  *I was not party to any of this.* (111a, par. 11) (122a, last. par., to 123a).  She wanted him to resign due to her disputes in 2021 over Trustee decisions by [...], CPA professional, who had final say for Trust actions (187a-189a, par. 68-74).
[directive] In cases of potential criminal conduct, interviews of subject officers should be recorded consistent with AG Directives 2006-2 and 2006-4.  As to serious disciplinary infractions, the agency should audio or video record the interview.  A transcript or copy of the recording shall be made available to the officer, if applicable, at the appropriate stage of a criminal or disciplinary proceeding.  If the subject officer wishes to record the interview, he or she may do so, and a copy of the recording shall be made available to the agency upon request, at the agency's expense.  Agencies should consider adopting a policy requiring officers to inform the agency or internal affairs investigator if the officer plans to record the interview.
[brief] In Edwards v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co., 357 N.J. Super. 196, 202 (App. Div. 2003), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 278 (2003), the Court succinctly stated that “the motion should be granted if even a generous reading of the allegations does not reveal a legal basis for recovery,” citing Camden County Energy Recovery Assocs. v. N.J. Dep’t of Environmental Protection, 320 N.J. Super. 59, 64-65 (App. Div. 1999), aff’d o.b., 170 N.J. 246 (2001), and further noted that “[t]he motion may not be denied based on the possibility that discovery may establish the requisite claim; rather, the legal requisites for plaintiff’s claim must be apparent from the complaint itself. ”  It is well-settled that for the purposes of the early-stage analysis of whether a complaint contains sufficient legal requisites to warrant denial of a motion to dismiss filed in lieu of answer, plaintiffs are to be given “every reasonable inference of fact.
[brief] However, on September 6, 2023, counsel for [...] and the [...] wrote a “Hail Mary” type letter to the Commissioner seeking to renew their request for the relief requested in the original Joint Petition, specifically recognition of the right of [...] to withdraw from [...] and [...] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11.  (Aa779 – Aa784).  While the letter was framed as a “formal motion” [...] and [...] were not copied on this correspondence.  The September 6, 2023, submission claimed there was “confusion” in the relief sought by all the parties to the original Joint Petition, and that in reality all the parties continued to want [...] to join in the new PK-12 regional district and to withdraw from [...] and [...].  Interestingly, the [...], which were parties to the original Joint Petition, were not consulted and took no position on [...]/Highlands September 6, 2023, application.  (Aa785 – Aa786).  The September 6, 2023, letter/formal motion also sought relief in the form of approval for future referendum questions involving [...] joining in the newly formed [...] (assuming the September 26, 2023, referendum passed), as well as a potential tax allocation formula.  The September 6, 2023, letter/motion requested a decision by September 13, 2023 “in order for the voters to be fully informed of the potential new configuration when they vote on the previously approved September 26 referendum .  . . .” (Aa779).  On their own initiative and after learning of the September 6, 2023, letter through informal sources, [...] and [...] objected to the relief requested via a joint letter to the Commissioner dated September 8, 2023.  [...] and [...] also requested that the original Joint Petition of July 15, 2022, be dismissed as moot given the advancement of the [...]’ referendum that did not include [...].  Finally, the Appellants asserted that the issue of whether [...] is even eligible to seek withdraw from [...] and [...] was specifically avoided by the Commissioner in her April 3, 2023 decision granting the Motion to Dismiss the consolidated Petitions of Appeal, and that the issue be resolved only after full briefing by the parties (with [...] and [...] being copied) as opposed to unilateral letters self-described as formal motions submitted on the fly.
[brief] See 13a (“Plaintiff complains of a pattern of retaliatory activity comprised of ‘disparate treatment from her Principal, disproportionate discipline related to the application of a vague Covid-19 policy, and a sham investigation related to another employee’s unfounded complaints’ …  The District’s application of the Covid-19 policy, the continued rotation of Plaintiff’s grade-level partners, and her involuntary reassignment, have not resulted in an adverse employment action, even if they were not to Plaintiff’s liking”).  Further, contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, there is no contradiction in the trial court’s opinion.  Pb19-20.  Rather, the court unequivocally found, in no uncertain terms, that “Plaintiff has not established the second prong, that she suffered an adverse employment action. ”  8a.  In doing so, the trial court highlighted the following:  Plaintiff cannot show that her wages or benefits were affected.  Nor can she show that a significant, non- temporary adverse change in her employment status or terms of her employment were affected.  [8a]  **********  [B]eing reprimanded for failing to comply with the District Covid-19 mask policy, specifically, for allowing her students to take their masks off while seated, does not rise to the level of “materially adverse” because the entire school district, and its teachers, were provided with the mask regulations far in advance of the alleged violation.  [9a]  **********  Plaintiff likewise fails to establish how the reprimand itself materially affects or alters her employment status, compensation, benefits, or otherwise.  Therefore, the aggrieved conduct was not retaliatory.  [9a]  **********  Plaintiff also complains that the Board’s investigation ‘following an unfounded complaint based on four separate incidents’ was retaliatory ...  Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation as to this act because Plaintiff was not cited, reprimanded, or otherwise affected by the investigation as those results are outstanding and her employment status remains unperturbed.  [9a]  **********  A generous reading of the Complaint fails to establish that Plaintiff was retaliated against because she has not, objectively, suffered a materially adverse employment decision.  [10a]  **********  Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that she suffered an adverse employment action pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a).  [17a]  In accordance with the well-settled law of this State, the facts pled by Plaintiff are simply insufficient to state a claim for retaliation under the NJLAD.
[brief] (Da11-Da16.)  Pursuant to R. 4:46-2(b), a party opposing a summary judgment motion must file a responding statement either admitting or disputing each of the facts in the movant’s statement of material facts.  “Subject to R. 4:46-5(a), all material facts in the movant’s statement which are sufficiently supported will be admitted for purposes of the motion only, unless specifically disputed by citation conforming to the requirements of paragraph (a) demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue as to the fact. ”  Ibid.  Subsection (a) of R. 4:46 requires that each fact shall be supported by a citation which “shall identify the document and shall specify the pages and paragraphs or lines thereof or the specific portion of exhibits relied on. ”  Here, all of the facts set forth in Plaintiffs’ statement of material facts in support of the Motion (the “Facts Statement”) must be deemed to be admitted for purposes of the Motion.  (Da575-Da580.)  There are forty-eight separately numbered paragraphs in the Facts Statement, and [...] expressly or essentially admitted twenty of those paragraphs (1-6, 19, 21, 27, 31-32, 34-37, 41, and 43-46).  The Borough’s other responses consist of seventeen statements to the effect that [...] “neither admits nor denies and leaves Plaintiff to its proofs” (11-14, 16-18, 22, 24-26, 28-30, and 38-40), four statements containing an admission but then supplementing it with additional “facts” without any supporting citation (10, 23, 42, and 47), and seven statements asserting some type of denial without any supporting citation whatsoever (7-9, 15, 20, 33, and 48).  (Da575-Da580.)  Accordingly, [...]’s responses to the Facts Statement (and its so-called “Counterstatement of Material Facts”) should be rejected by this court, just as they were rejected by the trial court.  See Housel v. Theodoridis, 314 N.J. Super. 597, 604 (App. Div. 1998) (“The nonmovant cannot sit on [their] hands and still prevail. ”)  As shown, all of [...]’s responses that were not admissions were not sufficient to constitute a valid denial, and must therefore be deemed admitted for purposes of the Motion.  (Da575-Da580.)  IV.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 1846.  The defendant in *Erlinger* was federally charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm.  *Id.*  Due to the defendant’s criminal history, he was also charged under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which provides for enhanced sentencing if a defendant “has three previous convictions…for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another[.]”  18 U.S.C.S. § 924(e)(1); *Id.*  The ACCA imposes a minimum term of imprisonment as well as a maximum term of life in prison.  *Erlinger*, 144 S. Ct. at 1846.  After the defendant pled guilty, “the judge [ ] found it more likely than not that [the defendant’s] past included three ACCA-qualifying offenses committed on three different occasions. ”  *Id.*  Based on that finding, the sentencing judge imposed a 15-year sentence under the ACCA.  *Id.*  In reaching its decision in *Erlinger*, the Supreme Court relied on *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which involved a New Jersey statute permitting enhanced sentencing if a judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s crime was motivated by racial bias.
[brief] 190 N.J. Super. at 118.  In Pascarella, the parties entered into a settlement on the day of trial and advised the judge that the case was settled.  *Id.* at 120.  While the case was marked settled by the clerk, the settlement was not placed on the record.  *Id.* at 120-21.  When defense counsel prepared settlement papers, plaintiff expressed that she had second thoughts the following day.  *Id.* at 121.  Nonetheless, the Court made it clear that even when a settlement is not placed on the record, parties cannot change their minds once they enter into a binding settlement agreement.  *Id.* at 124-25.  Specifically, the Court stated:  This was a settlement agreement made between competent adults.  There is no legal requirement that there be court approval in such a case . . . and the practice of spreading the terms of the agreement upon the record, although a familiar practice, is not a procedure requisite to enforcement.  That the agreement to settlement was orally made is of no consequence, and the failure to do no more than as here, inform the court of settlement and have the clerk mark the case as settled has no effect on the validity of a compromised disposition.  *[Id. at 124.]*  Here, not only was the settlement reached between competent parties, but unlike the *Pascarella* agreement, it was even memorialized and placed on the record.
[brief] The entire report arises out of a singular statement from defendant [...] that he contracted for work to be performed on the sidewalk “about 25 years ago. ”  Derivative of that one statement is [...]’s report which rests entirely on ¹  And the reason why I say 25 years ago was because 25 years ago is after 1995.  See?  If -- if --if -- I’m finding that the 1995 design manual certainly would have applied to anything -- even if we assume, for the purposes of this motion, for purposes of the motion only, that would apply to anything that the defendant did 25 years ago in 1999 because it would have been a new sidewalk.  Even assuming that, your expert doesn’t know what he did or didn’t do years ago.  So, how could he have been found to be in violation of the design manual?  T6:14-25 inapplicable standards and baseless assumptions, which the Court below relied upon in its decision to exclude this evidence.
[directive] 1.1  The primary purpose of this policy is to secure a balance between the protection of the lives and safety of the public and police officers, and law enforcement's duty to enforce the law and apprehend violators.  This Policy is intended to guide the circumstances under which officers may engage in vehicular pursuits.  High-speed vehicular pursuits create a substantial risk of injury and fatalities.  Over 10% of vehicular pursuits end up in accidents resulting in injuries or fatalities, including to officers, innocent third parties in vehicles unrelated to the pursuit, and pedestrians.  1.2  The pursuit policy was last updated in 2009.  The policy succeeded initially in reducing the number of pursuits, injuries, and fatalities associated with them.  However, after an initial decline, the number of pursuits has been increasing steadily since 2014.  Since the policy was updated there have been almost 4,200 accidents during pursuits that resulted in over 2,800 injuries, including injuries to 625 law enforcement officers, 682 victims in third party vehicles, and 52 pedestrians.  In that same period, there have been 59 fatalities associated with pursuits, including an officer, four third-party drivers, and eight pedestrians.  1.3  In recognition of this data and the substantial human costs associated with high-speed vehicular pursuits, this Policy further restricts the circumstances under which pursuits can be undertaken.  The offenses for which officers may pursue suspects has been limited to only the most serious crimes.  Significantly, most drug offenses have been removed from the list of crimes authorizing the initiation of a pursuit.  This Policy creates a strong presumption against the initiation of pursuits for traffic violations and prohibits continuation of a pursuit based on the risk created by the speed or evasive driving of the fleeing suspect during the pursuit itself.  It also requires greater oversight by supervisors, and mandates that a pursuit be terminated unless a supervisor affirmatively authorizes it to be continued.  1.4  Deciding whether to pursue a motor vehicle is among the most critical decisions made by law enforcement officers.  It is a decision which must be made quickly and under difficult, often unpredictable circumstances.  In recognition of the potential risk to public and officer safety created by vehicular pursuits, no officer or supervisor shall be criticized or disciplined for a decision not to engage in a vehicular pursuit or to terminate an ongoing vehicular pursuit based on the risk involved, even in circumstances where this Policy would permit the commencement or continuation of the pursuit.  Likewise, officers who conduct pursuits consistent with this Policy will be strongly supported by the law enforcement community in any subsequent review of such actions.  1  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] Evidence of Appellant’s violative behavior is further found in the note from his sinus doctor dated October 16, 2018, advising that Appellant would be able to return to work on November 15, 2018, and the note from [...] advising that Appellant would be able to return to work on November 20, 2018.  [Pa148, Pa150].  However, instead of being at home recovering from surgery, Appellant instead attended [...].  [Pa155].  Therefore, it is immaterial that Appellant told [...] about [...] well after completing his treatment, because the record evidence shows Appellant violated the Sick Leave Policy and concealed his actions through the use of doctor’s notes.
[brief] ”  No. 22-6122, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116807, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2023).  The court aptly explained:  [T]he plaintiff bought an expensive new car from [the dealership,] [...].  He knew that he needed to sign a contract in connection with that purchase, particularly because he needed to finance part of the purchase price and wanted the benefits of warranty.  He expected the financing terms to be set forth in the written contract.  On the day of the purchase, before he drove away with the car, he was asked to sign an iPad as he sat at the salesman’s desk.  He had not yet been given any contract of sale or financing agreement, and therefore asked, before he entered his signature on the iPad, where the documents were.  The salesman told him not to worry and that the documents would be emailed to him afterwards.  He then signed the iPad in two locations.  He did not see any document on the iPad screen but nonetheless signed twice.  His electronic signature appears in two places on the Contract.  Accepting each of the plaintiff’s representations . . . as true, his actions and inaction on the day of purchase constitute admissions sufficient to show that he chose to sign the contract for sale of the automobile without reading it.  The plaintiff has not identified a material fact in dispute that requires a trial to determine whether he signed the Contract.  He knew that the transaction would be governed by a written agreement with the dealership for the purchase of the car and the financing of the purchase, but chose to sign the iPad twice without requesting that its contents be displayed to him or otherwise demanding a hard copy of the Contract before he gave the dealership his signature on the iPad.  _Id._ at *9-10.  Finally, in _[...]_, the plaintiff decided to finance a home improvement project.
[directive] The juvenile has no prior history of juvenile adjudications or stationhouse adjustments; 2.  The juvenile’s conduct constituted a petty disorderly persons offense, a disorderly persons offense, or a fourth-degree crime if committed by an adult; and 3.  The juvenile’s unlawful conduct did not constitute an act of bias, sexual misconduct, or violence, and did not involve controlled dangerous substances (CDS) or CDS paraphernalia.
[brief] Plaintiff [...] is the contract purchaser of real property located at [...], known as Lot 12 of Block 804 on the official tax map of [...], [...] (the “Property” or the “Pew Farm”).  (Pa329).  [...], Trustee Of The Remainder Trust UWO [...]; [...] And [...], Co-Executors Of The Estate Of [...], --- “1T” shall refer to the August 4, 2021 Westampton Land Development Board Hearing.  “2T” shall refer to the September 1, 2021 Westampton Land Development Board Hearing.  “3T” shall refer to the December 1, 2021 Westampton Land Development Board Hearing.  “4T” shall refer to the April 6, 2022 Westampton Land Development Board Hearing.  “5T” shall refer to the Transcript of Prerogative Writs Oral Argument held on December 8, 2022.  And Co-Trustees Of The [...]., Revocable Trust  Dated February 1, 2013 (collectively, “[...]”) are the current owners of the Property.  (Pa329).  The Property is a 44.2 acre parcel located east of Irick Road and the New Jersey Turnpike, with frontage on Irick Road (County Route 637), Woodlane Road (County Route 630) and the New Jersey Turnpike.  (Pa329; Pa191-199; Pa231-244).  It is located in [...]’s I-Industrial Zone District (“I-Zone”).  (Pa329; Pa191-199; Pa231-244).  There are presently two principal uses of the Property: agriculture and a cellular communications tower (“Cell Tower”).  (Pa231-244).  The agricultural use is permitted in the I-Zone and occupies nearly the entire 44.2 +/- acre Property.  The Cell Tower occupies 900 square feet, less than 0.1% of the 1,925,325 total square feet of the Property.  (Pa138; Pa139-185; Pa186).  The Cell Tower was approved by the [...] Zoning Board of Adjustment by way of a Resolution of Approval dated December 16, 1997 that granted use and height variances pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d), and site plan approval pursuant to the Zoning Board’s ancillary jurisdiction under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-76(2)(b).  (Pa280-282).  Upon its grant of variance and site plan approvals for the Cell Tower in 1997, the Zoning Board’s jurisdiction over the Property concluded.  On or about February 17, 2021, [...] filed the present Application before the Land Development Board, a combined planning and zoning board, requesting preliminary and final site plan approval with bulk variances to construct on the Property two industrial warehouse/distribution buildings totaling approximately 520,320 square feet, and associated site improvements.