ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Americans with Act Disabilities Page 1 of 3  2.  Court staff will immediately notify the Department of Corrections and the State Parole Board that a Petition of Compassionate Release has been filed by email until electronic notifications can be generated by the Judiciary’s system.  3.  Court staff will also schedule the hearing to be held no later than 30 days after the filing.  Notice of the hearing shall be provided electronically to the parties.  Court staff will also provide notice of the hearing to the Department of Corrections and to the State Parole Board by email.  4.  The prosecutor must immediately notify the victim or member of the victim’s family of the petition in accordance with N.J. S.A. 30:4-123.51e(e).  The prosecutor will also notify the victim or family member of the court’s decision pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(f)(3).
[brief] This bill provides that, for purposes of coverage under workers’ compensation law, R.S.34:15-1 et seq., if an employer provides or designates a parking area for use by an employee, then employment is deemed to commence when an employee arrives at the parking area prior to reporting for work and ends when an employee leaves the parking area at the end of a work period.  The bill further provides that, if the site of the parking area is separate from the place of employment, an employee is deemed to be in the course of employment while traveling directly from the parking area to the place of employment prior to reporting for work and while traveling directly from the place of employment to the parking area at the end of a work period.  Therefore, the bill provides that an injury is compensable under the workers’ compensation law if it occurs in a parking area provided or designated by the employer, or it occurs when an employee is traveling directly between the parking area and the place of employment.  Currently, the workers’ compensation law provides that employment commences when an employee arrives at the place of employment and ends when an employee leaves the place of employment.  The law excludes any travel to or from the place of employment and the site of any parking area separate from the place of employment provided by an employer.  Therefore, an injury occurring when an employee is traveling between the parking area and the place of employment is not now covered by workers’ compensation.
[brief] A consumer lender who violates or participates in the violation of any provision of section 3 . . . of this act, shall be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.  A contract of a loan not invalid for any other reason, in the making or collection of which any act shall have been done which constitutes a crime of the fourth degree under this section, shall be void and the lender shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest or charges.  . . .”  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) (emphasis added).  It is undisputed that Plaintiff [...] (“[...]”) was not licensed pursuant to the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (“NJCFLA”) when they attempted to take assignment of the [...]/[...] credit account allegedly belonging to Defendant [...].
[brief] | | | Charlie Brown of Chatham, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment for Chatham Twp., | 7 | | 202 N.J. Super. 312, 330 (App. Div. 1985) | | | Coventry Square v. Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, | 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 35 | | 138 N.J. 285 (1994) | | | D. Lobi Enters. v. Planning./Zoning Bd. of Borough of Sea Bright, | 7 | | 408 N.J. Super. 345, 360 (App. Div. 2009)
[brief] Petitioners have – but have not Sustained – the Burden of Production and Persuasion (Pa6)  The burdens of production and persuasion rested with petitioners: the initial burden of going forward or of production – that is, that the two matters are the same or substantially related and that the information imparted in the consultation is significantly harmful to the former prospective client – rests on the party seeking disqualification.  If that burden is satisfied, the lawyer for whom disqualification is sought may seek to rebut those allegations.  In the end, however, the burden of persuasion and proof remains on the party seeking disqualification.  O Builders, 206 N.J. at 114; see also Trupos, 201 N.J. at 462-63 (the burden of persuasion on all elements remains with the moving party, as it bears the burden of proving that disqualification is justified).  The trial court's only mention of burden was in its recitation of appellants' position.  Pa6.  The trial court never stated that petitioners sustained their burden – his finding that the communications "may be" prejudicial perforce suggests they did not.  The court also set forth no reason for not crediting the rebuttal set forth in the [...].  O Builders requires disqualification to be "well-grounded in the written record…"  206 N.J. at 127.  In O Builders, where the Court upheld the denial of the disqualification motion, the record contained evidence that the attorney and prospective client had discussed business and legal matters for three hours.  Id. at 116.  The prospective client filed a Certification addressing her alleged contacts with the attorney.  The attorney responded, largely denying those contentions.  In contrast, in the instant matter, the record contains evidence of a phone call on July 28, 2023 and an unspecified number of unidentified, but admittedly innocuous, emails.  Just as the trial court mistakenly applied the wrong standards in deciding the motion, petitioners now admit that the court's purported reliance on the emails petitioners provided was insufficient to justify disqualifying the [...].  In opposing the motion for leave to appeal, petitioners expressly conceded that those emails "d[o] not specifically detail any prejudicial information."  Rather, "[t]hey were supplied to provide full context to [...]'s discussions with [...]."  Pa180 n.14.  Thus, petitioners here admitted that these communications were neither prejudicial nor more importantly, significantly harmful.  Accordingly, by petitioners' admission, the only "evidence" on which the trial court supposedly relied does not support the relief granted.  Petitioners will likely claim that the fact that the Trial Court did not consider [...]'s Certification does not mean Petitioners have not satisfied their burden.  But petitioners cite no facts or law in support of this claim.  The fact is the only "evidence" the trial court possibly considered are the [...] and the unspecified emails, which petitioners admit prove nothing.  The trial court's claim that it did not rely on the [...] Certification means that petitioners could not and did not sustain their burden as a matter of law.  C.
[brief] Pop’s Cones, Inc. v. Resorts Intern. Hotel Inc., 307 N.J. Super. 461 (App. Div. 1998) ..................................................  41  R.M. v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 190 N.J. 1 (2007) ..............................................................................  44  Reynolds Offset Co. v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super. 542 (App. Div. 1959) ....................................................  48  Ripp v. Cnty. of Hudson, 472 N.J. Super. 600 (App. Div. 2022) ..................................................  43  Ross v. M.A.C. Cosmetics, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82492 (D.N.J., June 17, 2014)  .........................  30  Ruccolo v. Ardsley W. Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 518 (App. Div. Mar. 28, 2024)  .............  16  Shelcusky v. Garjulio, 172 N.J. 185 (2002)  ...........................................................................  31  Shelcusky v. Garjulio, 343 N.J. Super. 504 (App. Div. 2001) .................................................. 37, 38 Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648 (App. Div. 2011) ..................................................
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  [...] Letter of October 31, 2024  ..................................................  SA1  Blue Diamond Disposal, Inc. v. City of Vineland, 2010 WL 3419192 (App. Div. 2010) .........................................................  SA2 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  CASES  Blue Diamond Disposal, Inc. v. City of Vineland, 2010 WL 3419192 (App. Div. 2010)  .................................................. 14, 15, 16  De Sapio Construction, Inc. v. Township of Clinton, 276 N.J. Super. 216 (Law. Div. 1994) .............................................. 13, 16 Hirsch v. Amper Financial Services, LLC, 215 N.J. 174 (2013)  .............................................................................  7  L. Pucillo & Sons, Inc. v. Township of Belleville, 249 N.J. Super. 536 (App. Div. 1991)  .................................................  13, 14, 16  Lesniewski v. W.B. Furze Corp., 308 N.J. Super. 270 (App. Div. 1998)  ...................................................  7  Mayo, Lynch & Associates, Inc. v. Pollack, 351 N.J. Super. 486 (App. Div. 2002)  ..................................................  13  Meadowbrook Carting Co. v. Borough of Island Heights, 138 N.J. 307 (1994)  ..............................................................................  12, 16  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] (Pa131).  LEGAL ARGUMENT  [...] asserts two issues on appeal: (1) the Trial Court erred as a matter of law dismissing all counts of [...]’s Complaint on summary judgment where there were genuine issues of material fact as to the application of the Consumer Fraud Act and the Trial Court afforded no deference to [...] on the issue of damages; and (2) the Trial Court abused its discretion by entering judgment against the weight of the evidence at the time of trial.
[brief] Appellants filed their original Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Burlington County, on June 11, 2015.  Venue was transferred to Monmouth County on September 29, 2015.  Appellants filed an Amended Complaint filed on December 21, 2016 and a Second Amended Complaint filed on February 17, 2017.  Appellants filed their Third Amended Complaint (mis-designated as the “Second Amended Complaint”) on August 8, 2018.  The Tenth and Eleventh Counts of the Third Amended Complaint allege legal malpractice against [...] and [...].  The Third Amended Complaint lumps [...] and [...] in with all of the other defendants in the headers of several other counts (see First Count (fraud), Second Count (Tortious Interference), Third Count (Conversion), Fourth and Fifth Counts (RICO), and Seventh Count (conspiracy to commit fraud, conversion, tortious interference)) but then does not mention them in any of the substantive factual allegations under those headers.  For example, Appellants name [...] and [...] in the header of the Seventh Count (conspiracy), but then do not identify [...] or [...] as being among the alleged co-conspirators.  Hamilton).  The Third Amended Complaint is replete with slipshod and mostly unintelligible allegations.  [...] and [...] moved for summary judgment on August 8, 2020.  766a-767a.  By that time, Appellants had enjoyed the benefit of an extremely long discovery period (1839 days) to attempt to support their claims.  The trial court heard oral argument on December 3, 2021 and issued an order and written decision on December 9, 2021 granting [...] and [...] summary judgment.  381a-382a.  Appellants then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was heard by the trial court and denied on January 21, 2022.  463a-465a.
[brief] ”  Id.  “[A]n agent could deprive her principal of an “adjudication by judge or jury” only if the power of attorney “expressly so provide[d].”  And that clear-statement rule—so said the court—complied with the FAA’s demands.  True enough that the Act precludes “singl[ing] out arbitration agreements. ”  . . . the court asserted, because its rule would apply not just to those agreements, but also to some other contracts implicating “fundamental constitutional rights. ”  In the future, for example, the court would bar the holder of a “non-specific” power of attorney from entering into a contract “bind[ing] the principal to personal servitude. ”  [Kindred Nursing, 581 U.S. at 250-251.]  While the Court affirmed this “clear statement” rule, it was not unanimous.  [...] who authored the dissent emphasized that the rule “ran afoul of the FAA. ”  Id.  Upon evaluation of the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision, [...] confirmed the “clear statement” rule “fails to put arbitration agreements on an equal plane with other contracts.
[directive] The statute provides that the judge, for good cause shown, may impose bail in excess of $2,500 but the reasons must be set forth on the record.  But see Offenses State v. Steele, 430 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 2013), which prohibits the consideration of danger as a factor when setting the monetary amount of bail.  Danger may be considered when setting forth other conditions of bail, for example, no victim contact.  Note – the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification on this case on May 23, 2013, 213 N.J. 569 (2013), but subsequently dismissed the appeal, 223 N.J. 284 (2014).  This Rule provides for a custodial arrest without a warrant that:
[brief] The decision was not in violation of the Seaside Heights Master Plan.  The board heard testimony from [...] that the proposed height variance of 48.13 feet requested wherein 41 is the maximum height will not be a detriment to the surrounding properties.  [...] noted that the lot is directly across the street from the Boardwalk which is elevated 5 feet above the subject property.  [...] testified as follows:  When looking at a height variance in context of the (D)(6) variance relief, we turn to the standards outlined in the Coventry Square versus Westwood.  The issue is whether or not the lot can accommodate the noted deviation.  Under Coventry we must demonstrate that the deviation can be reasonably accommodated and that the detrimental impacts can be mitigated.  In essence, the Coventry standard shifts the focus of the negative criteria from the impact of the use to the impact of the deviation.  The applicant must again demonstrate that the variance can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and that the variance will not impair the intent or purpose of the zone plan or zoning ordinance.
[brief] [...], [...]’s physician assistant, recalled seeing [...] in December 2019 and discussing a plan with [...] regarding [...]’s recovery.  (Pa33-34)  She did not, however, recall authorizing the second doctor’s note issued in January 2020.  (Pa34)  As with [...]’s testimony, [...] recounted Suri’s testimony without discrediting it.  After recounting the evidence and testimony in his written interim award, [...] issued a decision that relied neither on the evidence in the record, nor on his determination of the witnesses’ credibility, nor on his interpretation of the CBA.
[brief] The State claims that that police trickery was “not improper” and “not enough to outweigh” [...] purported waiver, (Pb 7), but the State fails to engage with any of our state’s modern cases on affirmative police deception, which make clear that affirmative lies by the police at the critical waiver moment are improper.  See, e.g., State v. Bullock, 253 N.J. 512, 539 (2023) (invalidating waiver where police “affirmative[ly] misrepresent[ed]” defendant’s status as a suspect); State v. Diaz, 470 N.J. Super. 495, 503, 518-27 (App. Div. 2022) (invalidating waiver where police “affirmatively misled defendant as to his ‘true status’” as a suspect, which “strikes at the heart of the waiver decision”); State v. Cotto, 471 N.J. Super. 489, 521 n.11 (App. Div. 2022) (“[A]ffirmatively and deliberately misleading an interrogee as to why he or she is being interrogated, as occurred in Diaz, would fall under the rubric of bad faith conduct .  . . .”).  Thus, although the police are not required to preemptively disclose an interrogee’s suspect status, they cannot affirmatively mislead him into believing that he is merely a witness to trick him into waiving his constitutional rights.  State v. Sims, 250 N.J. 189, 212-17 (2022); Diaz, 470 N.J. Super. at 525 (“[A]ny evidence that the accused was . . . tricked . . . into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his [or her] privilege. ” (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476)).  Here, the detectives affirmatively lied by saying that [...] was “[j]ust like . . . anybody else” when the exact opposite was true, and then they proceeded to aggressively interrogate him for two and a half hours to try to pressure him into admitting his guilt to murder.  That kind of affirmative police deception is not lawful in New Jersey.  Therefore, his purported Miranda waiver was not voluntary, and suppression was required.
[brief] [...] is critically important to the underlying action and thus Defendants' defense of the legal malpractice action.  [...], as a representative of Plaintiff, was involved with the lease negotiations and subsequent termination from approximately March 2016 to November 2016.  [...]’s role during the lease negotiation period was described in [...]' Certification as follows:  During negotiations for the Lease, Option and Rider that are at issue in [the Lease Litigation], [Russo], a non-member of Plaintiff, was appointed as primary contact person between Plaintiff, [...], and Plaintiff’s Counsel, [...].  As such, with very few exceptions, Russo handled all communications on behalf of Plaintiff relative to the above entities and people insofar as negotiations for the Lease, Option and Rider at issue in this litigation was concerned.  (Pa1126-Pa1127).  [...]'s role cannot be understated, as he gathered information and shared it with the Plaintiff as well as handled all communications on behalf of Plaintiff.  (Pa 1314 ¶ 27)(Pa 1126-Pa1128).  Most importantly it was [...], on behalf of Plaintiffs, who instructed [...] to terminate the Lease due to the lack of a sewer connection to the Property. (Pa1022).  Without [...]’s testimony regarding his position within Plaintiff and his authority to act, Defendants are severely prejudiced in the defense relating to the elements of duty and breach.
[brief] CS 327 IS CONSISTENT WITH THE GOALS AND PURPOSES OF THE HIGHLANDS ACT (RESPONDING TO APPELLANTS’ POINT  I)  A.  The Highlands Act and Implementing Rules Do Not Require An Analysis of Air Pollution and Climate Change Considerations  B.  Appellants’ Reliance On Irrelevant And Non-Binding Authorities Should Be Rejected  C.  Appellants’ Arguments are an impermissible collateral attack on the Certificate Order D.  The Highlands Act and Implementing Regulations are Preempted II.
[directive] For the following reasons, sports pools operated by casinos or racetracks continue to be criminal exempted from liability under New Jersey law long so as no wagering occurs on a college sport or athletic event that takes place in New Jersey or in which any New Jersey college team participates regardless of where the event takes place.  See N.J. Const., 4, art. sec. 7, par. 2E and F.  Accordingly, or prosecution officer no law enforcement agency or shall, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:37- 1 -9, make an arrest, file a complaint against, or prosecute person' to any involved in the operation or racetrack to the of a sports pool by a casino extent that such activity takes place with consistent this Law Enforcement Directive. expressly provides that "no an Title 2C conduct constitutes offense unless the offense is or another statute N.J.S.A. 2C:1-5, Criminal by this of this State."
[brief] Plaintiff alleged that “[...]” was “placed on sick/injury leave” but did not identify any condition suffered from or that same qualified as a disability under the LAD.  (Pa11 at ¶12-14).  Plaintiff did not specify for what period/dates “[...]” was allegedly in need of reasonable accommodation, that he made a request for accommodation to his employer, to whom, when and the type of accommodation sought, or that such request was denied, by whom, when and the details of same.  (Pa8-Pa55).  “[...]” is City Fire Captain [...].
[brief] On April 8, 2021, Applicants submitted plans for a 2,941 square foot ultra-modern “Addition” that would more than double their 2,314 square foot home located in the Monmouth Hills.  (Pa180-Pa187; Pa362-Pa371; Pa377-Pa378)  On April 21, 2021, without any meeting of the Board of Directors, notice to shareholders, and without following any process at all, Applicants, including [...]—an officer and a director of [...]  (“[...]”), purportedly obtained [...]’s “approval” to modify the property, which was submitted to the ZBA.  (Pa186)  On May 20, 2021, Applicants purportedly obtain a Certificate of Appropriateness from the [...] (the “Landmarks Commission”), however there is no record of when the requisite application was made or whether any meeting was held to consider the same.  (Pa190)  After various revisions to its plans, the [...] (“[...]”) denied Applicants’ application for reasons stated within a Technical Memorandum dated December 3, 2021, which required Applicants to obtain variances from the ZBA.  (Pa180-Pa187)  The first hearing was scheduled for December 13, 2021, however Applicants requested that the application be carried to the next meeting on January 24, 2022 and Appellants consented.
[brief] ”  Butler v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 283 (1982).  Plaintiffs argued that [...]’s creation of a plan that incorporated site improvements on Plaintiffs’ Property and to which other parties relied upon in entering Plaintiffs’ property without authorization or consent was negligent and that an expert was not needed for a jury to find [...]’s conduct was negligent.  For reasons that remain unclear, the Court did not agree, but that finding is far from making Plaintiffs’ argument frivolous.
[brief] B.  The Order dismissing [...]’s claim for adverse possession must be upheld as a matter of law as [...] cannot satisfy the required elements to sustain its claim.  Perhaps recognizing the infirmity of its claims of record ownership of the Property, [...] argues (or at least attempts to argue) in the alternative that it owns the subject parcel according to the ancient doctrine of adverse possession, but that argument also fails with merely a whisper of scrutiny.  Ironically, [...]’s argument in support of its first three Counterclaim counts emphasizes the impropriety of its adverse possession Counterclaim.  [...] argues in its first three counts that it is the deeded record owner of the Property, but reverses course in its Fourth Count and concedes that it is \textit{not} the record owner of the Property, but that it obtained possession of the Property by operation of the adverse possession doctrine.  [...]’s adverse possession claim collapses under its one weight not only as a matter of common sense, but also as a matter of fact and law.  Under New Jersey law, adverse possession requires entry and possession of the property for the entire statutory period of thirty years, and must be actual, exclusive, continuous, open, notorious and hostile.