ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Da188.  On February 14, 2024, plaintiff filed its motion to dissolve the stay unless the [...] file a $2,500,000 supersedeas bond within one business day and [...]’s certification.  Da190 and Da193, respectively.  On February 22, 2024, the [...] filed their cross motion for a stay (a) extending the stay of post-sale proceedings from the date they file their notice of appeal until the final resolution of their appeal, (b) fixing the amount of their supersedeas bond at $645,000, and (c) granting them 60 days to post their supersedeas bond, and [...] and [...]’s certifications.  Da198, Da201 and Da205, respectively.  ---  1  References to motion briefs, forms of orders and other motion documents that are not essential to the proper consideration of the issues have been omitted from this Procedural History and copies have been omitted from the [...]’ Appendix.  On March 1, 2024, [...] entered orders granting both motions, except that she reduced the amount of the supersedeas bond sought by plaintiff to $645,000.
[directive] Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division – Criminal Part Chancery Division - Family Part - Select County - State/In the Interest of County Ind./Acc. Number: v.  Docket Number: Order to Dissolve the Prohibition Against Victim Contact  Defendant/Juvenile  This matter having been opened to the court by way of a petition filed by to dissolve the prohibition against victim contact imposed pursuant to L. 2020, c. 111.  The court having considered the petition, any testimony, and any related information, having conducted a hearing, and for the reasons set forth on the record, , 20 that the petition to dissolve IT IS HEREBY ORDERED on this day of the prohibition against contacting , the victim of the crime committed by the defendant/juvenile is ☐
[brief] Disputes regarding performance of work under the multitude of separate contracts and subcontracts for the performance of work on the projects transferred to [...] under the PTA (all of which had separate dispute resolution provisions) were decidedly not within the purview of the PTA Arbitration.  The evidentiary hearing in the PTA Arbitration took place over eight days: June 19, 20, 21, and 22 and August 21, 22, 23, and 24, 2023.  Pa568.  Following post-hearing briefing and oral argument, the hearings were deemed closed on November 28, 2023, and the Arbitrator entered a Final Award for the Arbitration on January 19, 2024 (the “Final Award”).  Pa568-Pa569; see also Pa377-Pa429 ([...]’s Post-Hearing Brief); Da5-Da7 (excerpts of [...]’s Post-Hearing Brief).  The Final Award contained several computational and technical errors.  Following several rounds of post–Final Award briefing, the Arbitrator issued a corrected Final Award on April 12, 2024, which incorporated the January 19, 2024 Final Award and the Arbitrator’s rulings on the parties’ claims for and defenses to modification of the Final Award.  Pa923-Pa931.  C.
[brief] But the source of that deficiency is contested by the parties and is at the heart of this appeal.  Pursuant to this court’s prior opinion, the [...] has undertaken a comprehensive review of [...]’s operations, which establishes that the failure to provide T&E is due to problems occurring at the district level.  In contrast, Appellants claim that the court’s finding is attributable to the School Funding Reform Act of 2008 (SFRA), N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-43 to -71, arguing that the statute is therefore unconstitutional as applied to the District.  But Appellants’ claim is unsustainable because they have failed — and, in fact, have refused — to examine the root cause of the District’s failings.  Essentially, Appellants wholly disregard the real issue affecting students in [...]: the District is plagued by decades of mismanagement and poor decision-making.  These deficiencies, rather than the SFRA, have led to the inefficient use of substantial State aid and, worse still, resulted in public school students receiving a sub-par education.
[brief] The first is the irrelevant and prejudicial discussion of [...] having affairs, visiting sex stores, and other assorted references made by [...] to denigrate him.  Clearly that discussion bore no relevance to any material issue in the case, and its only function was to improperly make [...] look like generally disreputable.  Second, the statements in the call that [...] was a liar were inadmissible and should have been redacted or stricken with a limiting instruction.  As noted by this Court, a statement by a witness calling a defendant a “liar” “should never [be] admitted.  It is within the sole and exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility of the testimony of a witness.  We do not allow one witness to comment upon the veracity of another witness. ”  State v. Vandeweaghe, 351 N.J. Super. 467, 481-82 (App. Div. 2002).  The prejudicial aspects of the jail call compounded with the rest of the errors discussed in this point to create a substantial risk that the jury would render a conviction based on a generally negative perception of [...] as a disturbed or “bad” person rather than dispassionately reviewing the evidence presented.
[brief] See, e.g., Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp., 150 N.J. 255, 271-72 (1997) (The New Jersey Consumer Loan Act, “which prohibit[ed] deceptive lending practices generally,” “as incorporated in the --- 2  The October 4, 2023 Opinion in [...], docket number [...], was originally attached as Exhibit G (Pa59) to [...]’s Motion to Dismiss.  3  See In re Resolution, supra, 108 N.J. at 44, 46.  Licensed Lenders Act . . . allow[ed] for treble damages by aggrieved consumers, N.J.S.A. 17:11C33b . . . .”  *Id.* at 271-72.  Though the “typical remedy” was a “voiding of the contract” by “individual consumers. ”  *Ibid.*).  [...] has provided no explanation or argument as to why the excision of the New Jersey Residential Mortgage Lending Act (“NJRMLA”) from the NJCFLA meant that the private right of action was also abrogated, nor for that matter has any court.  Instead, [...]’s arguments mischaracterize a quote from *Family Fin. Corp. v. Gough*, 10 N.J. Super. 13, 19 (App. Div. 1950), being: “New Jersey was one of the five large industrial states which early adopted general acts designed to *regulate and control the business of making small loans*.”  *See* [...]’s Br. 24 (emphasis in original).  [...] argues that “[i]t may easily be deduced from the aforementioned discussion that the NJCFLA was concerned with the formation of loans made by local entities.
[brief] A.  Statutory Background.  The New Jersey Legislature enacted the LAD in 1945, making it one of the oldest civil rights laws in the Nation.  *C.V. v. Waterford Twp. Bd. of Educ.*, 255 N.J. 289, 306 (2023).  Its purpose, our Supreme Court has held, “is nothing less than the eradication of the cancer of discrimination. ”  *Id.* at 306-07; see also *L.W. ex rel. L.G. v. Toms River Reg’l Sch. Bd. of Educ.*, 189 N.J. 381, 400 (2007) (agreeing that the LAD must be “liberally construed” to effectuate “the Legislature’s broad remedial objectives” to eradicate discrimination); *Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co.*, 225 N.J. 343, 354 (2016) (“The LAD occupies a privileged place among statutory enactments in New Jersey. ”).  The LAD has prohibited unlawful discrimination in all places of public accommodation since 1949, Pub. L. 1949, c. 11—a prohibition that covers unlawful discrimination in “any kindergarten, primary and secondary school ... [or] high school,” N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(1); see also, e.g., *C.V.*, 255 N.J. at 307.  And since 2006, the LAD has expressly barred discrimination on the basis of “gender identity or expression. ”  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f); Pub. L. 2006, ch. 100; see also, e.g., *Holmes v. Jersey City Police Dep’t*, 449 N.J. Super. 600, 601 (App. Div. 2017).  This prohibition on --- 1
[brief] As a general principle of law, the Appellate Court will give deference to an agency’s decision and will not disturb its decision unless the agency acts in a manner that is “‘arbitrary or unreasonable’ or is unsupported ‘by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole. ’”  Berta v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 473 N.J. Super. 284, 302 (App. Div. 2022) quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980) and citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civ. Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963).  An agency’s expertise and decision making is not absolute.  Blanchard v. N.J. Dep't of Corrs., 461 N.J. Super. 231, 237-38 (App. Div. 2019).  See also, Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973); Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corrs., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 191 (App. Div. 2010).  “[The Appellate Court is] constrained to engage in a ‘careful and principled consideration of the agency record and findings’ .  . . .  While [the Appellate] scope of review is limited, [the Appellate Court] cannot be relegated to a mere rubber-stamp of agency action.
[directive] The revised Guidelines retain the current rules set forth in the 1999 Supplemental Directive that provide that escalation to a final post- indictment plea offer occurs automatically on the date when the State’s pretrial motion brief is filed or is required to be filed.  See Section 4.8.  The [...] have nonetheless been modified to authorize a prosecutor to suspend the automatic escalation to the next plea offer when the tolling of the automatic escalation is necessary to afford the defendant a reasonable opportunity to accept or reject an outstanding plea offer.
[brief] Unlike Gonzalez, where the defendant asked “But now what do I do about an attorney and everything?” a question that could be viewed as a request for an attorney at that moment, here, the question posed by defendant was about the process as a whole:  I understand that I have a right to an attorney, but will I need to find an attorney or do you appoint one.  The question could not be viewed as asking for an attorney at that moment, but rather was a question about the process of obtaining an attorney when he elects to have one.  Therefore, the cases are distinguishable because the questions are not analogous.
[brief] THE MEMORIALIZATION OF THE SETTLEMENT CONTRACT ON THE RECORD BEFORE THE HEARING OFFICER SATISFIES WILLINGBORO TO THE EXTENT SUCH COMPLIANCE IS EVEN REQUIRED IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THIS MATTER WAS SETTLED AT HEARING AND NOT AT MEDIATION.  Respondent argues in her brief that the settlement contract reached and memorialized on the record is insufficient to satisfy Willingboro either because a transcript is an insufficient writing, or because, only a formal Settlement Agreement was sufficient in this matter.  (Rb15-Rb20).  Both arguments must be rejected.  First and foremost, as argued in Appellant’s initial brief, this matter was settled during an administrative hearing, not at mediation, and so, the Willingboro writing requirement is arguably inapposite.
[brief] The Court determined that because a video was shown at trial showing the officer requesting identification upon approaching the car, and not only for the first time after arresting the defendant, his passenger, and waiting for the defendant’s children to be retrieved, as he had testified at the suppression hearing, the suppression hearing should therefore have been reopened.  In *Boston*, the court was viewing a situation in which irrefutable evidence directly contradicted the officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing on the very fact at issue, whether the timing of the demand for identification and the defendant’s subsequent actions rendered the seizure lawful.  The testimony at the suppression hearing indicated that the evidence need not be suppressed, while the video indisputably demonstrated facts that invariably would lead to the opposite outcome.  This situation is not analogous.
[brief] FILING OF THE REPLY-BRIEF  This Reply-Brief is being filed with this court on June 17, 2024 under protest based on the last-minute notice from this court on June 11, 2024 (Rb-1) that an attorney for the business defendant, [...], is required based on New Jersey Court Rule 1:21-1(c).  A Notice of Motion for an Extension of Time (Rb-5) of 30 Days was filed with this court on June 12, 2024 (Rb-7).  On June 14, 20204 the MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME was confirmed by this court (Rb-8), but NO action was taken to grant or to deny the motion; despite several calls to the Appellate Court Clerk Office with no answer.  Consequently, this Reply-Brief is being filed with the court by the defendant, [...], who was the Guarantor on the Business Line of Credit by the Borrower, [...].  The same Process Server and the same Plaintiff Attorney served the defendants, their bad/improper acts denied each defendant of his rights under the law!  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT:  PLAINTIFF’S-RESPONDENT BRIEF
[brief] What we have here is that the Plaintiff followed the rules and regulations and participated in the promotional process to the point where he was no. 1 on the promotion list.  The Chief of Police, by changing the process from one year to five months, automatically removed the Plaintiff from the position he had worked his way through to achieve.  The Plaintiff had a right to be considered as the no. 1 on the list.  As soon as it became known that there would be a vacancy, the Chief changed the procedure from one year to five months which just happened to coincide with an upcoming retirement.  This is not a case to be resolved according to the rules and regulations dealing with failure to promote.  This is a change in the procedure which eliminated the Plaintiff.  The Plaintiff had achieved a goal i.e. no. 1, and he was removed from that goal, not by the usual procedure, but by a procedure manufactured so as to eliminate the Plaintiff.  Those are constitutional implications.
[brief] 226 N.J. 549,146 A.3d 623 (2016).  1.  The Defendants sufficiently identified the substantial government interests for the Distance Regulation.  The Defendants have sufficiently identified the substantial government interests concerning the Distance Regulation, Plaintiff simply miscomprehends and misrepresents *E & J Equities, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Bd. of Adjustment of the Tp. of Franklin*, 226 N.J. 549,146 A.3d 623 (2016).  Essentially, Plaintiff asserts that in *E & J Equities* the New Jersey Supreme Court set forth a new evidential standard for local planning board hearings.  Plaintiff is incorrect.  Plaintiff’s reliance on *E & J Equities* is misplaced because that case concerned the evidential standard for adopting a new ordinance whereas the instant case concerns an existing ordinance.  *Id.* at 556.  Indeed, Plaintiff’s own quotation from *E & J Equities* makes this clear: “A governing body *seeking* to restrict expression cannot simply invoke those interests with scant factual support informing its decision-making and expect to withstand a constitutional challenge. ” (Pb15-16; quoting, E & J Equities, supra, at 585.) (emphasis added).  Plaintiff simply ignores that “seeking” aspect of the quotation.  In the instant case, Defendants were not “seeking” anything; rather, it was Plaintiff who was “seeking” a variance from an already existing ordinance.  Thus, Plaintiff is incorrect in arguing that based on E & J Equities, the [...] failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish the substantial government interests for the Distance Regulation at the variance hearings.
[brief] “Besides being an imposition on this [C]ourt, such deficiencies are patently unfair to other litigants whose equally legitimate demands on the court’s time are presented in a manner conforming in all respects to the requirements of the rules. ”  Miraph Ents., Inc. v. Bd. of Alcoholic Beverage Control of Paterson, 150 N.J. Super. 504, 508 (App. Div. 1977).
[brief] 4T21:24-22:7.  Similarly, the trial court stated:  “The evidence demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that for 30 years defendants – at least 30 years, defendants possession of the strip was continuous, and interrupted, actual and exclusive, open and notorious and actual and hostile. ”  4T21:7-12.  Contrary to the trial court’s statement, the evidence presented did not show that Defendant had been in possession of the Strip for 30 years.  [...], a limited partner of Defendant limited partnership, testified at trial.  Ms. Toner stated that her parents personally purchased the property in 1999.  Her parents conveyed the property to the current Defendant limited partnership in 2000.  1T141:4-9.  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-30 requires thirty years of actual possession of the property to qualify for adverse possession ownership.  However, the Defendant and Defendant’s predecessor in title parents have only owned their property for twenty-five years.  During cross-examination, Ms. Toner was asked if she had “any discussions with anybody about who owned or used The Strip” prior to her parents’ buying Lot 3.  Ms. Toner replied: “I had never heard of The Strip until [...] said that our parking lot was on his property. ”  1T164:6-10.  As the burden was on the Defendant to prove the elements of adverse possession, Defendant needed to provide testimony regarding the use of the Strip for the 5 years prior to their purchase of the Property.  Defendant did not provide this proof.  Plaintiff maintained that Defendant was using the Strip with his permission.  Amongst other things, Plaintiff testified that he spoke to [...] in 2021 and told her that they could use the Strip property.  2T31:8-32:5.  Defendant’s predecessor in interest could have also been using the Strip with Plaintiff’s permission.  Defendant did not elicit any testimony regarding the conditions surrounding the use of the Strip by the prior owners.  Accordingly, Defendant did not satisfy its burden of proof for adverse possession.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] R. 4:46-2(c).  “[A] party opposing a motion for summary judgment must ‘file a responding statement either admitting or disputing each of the facts in the movant’s statement. ’”  *Claypotch v. Heller, Inc.*, 460 N.J. Super. 472, 488 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting R. 4:46-2(b)).  If a party fails to file such a statement then “all material facts in the movant’s statement which are sufficiently supported will be deemed admitted for purposes of the motion[.]”  R. 4:46-2(b).  Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Order because Defendant failed to file proper opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion.  Plaintiff filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on or about October 6, 2022.  See PA – 19 to 224.
[brief] In addition, the Certification of [...], Esq. attaches an email dated August 22, 2017 from then Borough Administrator [...] to the then Borough Attorney in which the Administrator states “I spoke with [...] this afternoon (Tuesday, August 22, 2017).  Luciano told me that he had sent [...] and [...] a letter of intent to buy [...].  He referred to it as a LOI.  Luciano also stated that he has called [...] and [...] three (3) times and probably four (4).  They have not returned his calls or emailed him.  Luciano is interested in purchasing their property to build affordable housing units.  …"
[brief] ”  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish a broad scope for discovery:  Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows:  *Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense* and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.
[brief] THE COURT: All right.  You were operating a motor vehicle here in Middletown on August 11th, of 2016 while under the influence of alcohol, is that correct?  [...]: Yes.  THE COURT: And how much have you had to drink?  [...]: I think it was a half a pint of vodka.  THE COURT: And that was just prior to your operation?  [...]: Yes.  THE COURT: Have you ever plead guilty to the 3-40 violation before?  [...]: No.  THE COURT: I’m sorry, to the 4-50, the operating a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol?  [...]: No.  THE COURT:  All right.  I’m looking at your abstract, and it does appear that this would be a first offense.  I do have in the file an alcohol influence report, which indicates a .17 blood alcohol concentration as a result of the three readings that were taken on that night.  That would trigger the imposition of an interlock device as well, you understand?  [...]: (No audible response) (1T:5-18 to 6-20).  To be sure that defendant understood the seriousness of the penalties and to confirm, yet again, that he did not want the assistance of counsel, the court continued:  THE COURT:  Luckily, it’s a first offense, but it’s at a higher tier level.  So there will be a mandatory fine from – up to $500, loss of driving privileges, the imposition of the DWI surcharge, the VCCB and the safe neighborhood surcharge, optional imposition of jail, and imposition of the interlock device.  Do you understand that these are serious penalties, even today you have the right to apply the appointment of public defender.  Knowing all this you want to waive your right and proceed, is that correct?  [...]: Yes.  (1T:7-5 to 7-17).  [...] continued to ensure that defendant’s waiver of counsel and plea was voluntarily, stating, “We want to make sure that your decision to plead is a voluntary one.  Again because of the severity of the penalties that are imposed. ” (1T:8-19 to 8-20).  After multiple occasions informing defendant of the seriousness of the charges and his right to counsel, and after defendant repeatedly waived his right to any counsel prior to his decision to plead guilty, defendant pleaded guilty to DWI, to which the lower court then found:
[brief] See Endo Surgi Ctr., 391 N.J. Super. at 594.  But if insurers and medical providers were prohibited from litigating damages claims before a jury under the IFPA or RICO, there would be a serious constitutional flaw in AICRA that the Legislature clearly did not intend, and which this court should avoid by holding that Plaintiffs’ IFPA and RICO claims are not subject to mandatory arbitration.  See Whirlpool Props., 208 N.J. at 172.  B.
[brief] If there was any doubt about the importance of Shaw and its requirement that courts narrowly construe the “learned professional” exemption for CFA liability, this Court should look to its recent decision in [...] v. [...], [...], 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 569 (App. Div. Apr. 5, 2024)², which revisited the applicability of the CFA to learned professionals and semi-professionals.  The Court in [...] upheld Shaw and left no doubt that Plemmons was overruled:
[brief] POINT III  [...] DID NOT IMPROPERLY EXPAND THE EXISTING NON- CONFORMING USE  When [...] applied to the [...] in 1984 to be allowed to install a pizza oven and to sell pizzas from 4 p.m. to 10 p.m., with the store to close by 11 p.m., the Board followed the advice of its attorney who said: “[T]he sale and making of pizzas is not necessarily a change in the type of business it is still food. ”  The Board then voted unanimously that no variance was needed.  The installation of a pizza oven with a stainless-steel hood exhausting to the street (Pa-70) that [...] brought into the shop in 1984, was a far more significant change than [...] bringing into Gigi’s induction cook tops to boil water, an air fryer, a steam table, a slicer and a microwave oven.  (T.1 at 152:20 – 155:6).  Just as [...] wanted to make and sell pizzas in 1984 to keep up with the times, Gigi’s menu similarly evolved to keep up with the times.  Nothing in the Board of Adjustment’s 1984 decision focused upon the type of food served, but merely that sale of food is a continuous non-conforming use.  Appellants disingenuously claim that catering occurs out of the Gigi’s facility, as if it is or could be a catering hall.  [...] testified that he may take orders for catering from Oceanport customers, but the cooking occurs at his much larger facility in Sea Bright.  (T.1 at 129:13-24).  There has been no illegal increase in Gigi’s use of the pizzeria facility.