ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The defendants’ arguments concerning an alleged need for repose in this case similarly lack a basis in fact and are rife with hyperbole.  For example, [...] claims that following Ordinance No. 13-2022’s passage it entered into agreements with the Township and “in turn expended millions in crafting a site plan application based thereon”.  ([...]b20).  Notwithstanding the complete absence of any proof for this alleged expenditure of “millions,” the feasibility studies, engineering and design work for this project were conducted and completed years prior to this time.  As [...] itself points out in its brief, the project spans two municipalities – [...] and [...] – and [...] obtained site plan approval in [...] “after…numerous hearings over the three-year period of 2019 through 2021. ” ([...]b5; [...]A13-25).
[directive] ”  •  The Relationship between CBVI and Law Enforcement Is Reciprocal (Report section II.2.C).  “CBVI groups and law enforcement have responsibilities that are very different.  However, in a productive collaboration, these differing responsibilities can coalesce into a reciprocal—and complementary—relationship based on mutual support and respect.  For example, for CBVI, that means not interfering with law enforcement operations and/or criminal investigations.  For law enforcement, that means recognizing the legitimacy of CBVI organizations’ work, and not interfering with their operations to the extent that they do not interfere with criminal investigations.
[brief] [...] specifically was the location of [...], which was once owned by [...] and her ex-husband [...], and was currently owned by Lorraine’s brother, [...].  When [...] arrived, the building was engulfed in flames.  No one was inside the business as it was a Saturday evening.  Fire trucks responded minutes after [...]’s arrival and --- 2  Because defendant was found not guilty on County One, the sole charge related to events occurring in August 2017, the State has omitted any reference to those events from its Counterstatement of Facts.
[brief] (4T237:6-12.)  Defendant [...]’s son referred her to the [...] as potential buyers, and in mid-2018, after an introductory phone call, the parties arranged for an initial meeting at a nearby diner.  (4T237:17 to 238:13; 5T88:4-8.)  At the initial meeting, Defendant [...] informed the [...] as to her understanding of the environmental issues at the Property and also introduced the [...] to her representative, [...].  [...] had been involved with the Defendants’ family and the Property since approximately 2011, assuming various roles in connection with the Property, including that of an environmental consultant.  [...] is not, however, a licensed LSRP with the NJDEP.  2.
[brief] ”  The New Jersey Supreme Court has observed that it is “shortsighted and unwise for courts to reject out of hand consensual solutions to vexatious personal matrimonial problems that have been advanced by the parties themselves. ”  Therefore, “fair and definitive arrangements arrived at by mutual consent should not be unnecessarily or lightly disturbed. ”  Moreover, a court should not rewrite a contract or grant a better deal than that for which the parties expressly bargained.  A settlement agreement is governed by basic contract principles.
[directive] Please select the answer that best describes your experience with the Confidential Sexual Violence Advocate, the Forensic Nurse Examiner, and/or the Law Enforcement Officer of the Sexual Assault Response Team.  1.  The options for reporting to Law Enforcement, obtaining the services of the local Sexual Violence program, and receiving a medical forensic examination and treatment were explained to me.      Yes No Comments:  2.  I was treated with respect and fairness by (check all that apply):        Law Enforcement: N/A Yes No  __________________________________________________________________      Forensic Nursing: N/A Yes No  __________________________________________________________________      Advocacy: N/A Yes No  __________________________________________________________________  Comments: 3.  Was the level of privacy provided to you acceptable?    Yes No  Comments: 4.  My options regarding additional follow-up by law enforcement, the local sexual violence program, and medical care/treatment were explained to me.      Law Enforcement: N/A Yes No  __________________________________________________________________      Forensic Nursing: N/A Yes No  __________________________________________________________________       Advocacy: N/A Yes No  __________________________________________________________________  Comments: A- 39  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT  Additional Feedback:  If you have any additional feedback regarding your interaction with the members of the Sexual Assault Response Team (SART), please provide below.  Description  If you would like a member of the Statewide SART Advisory Board or the County SART Advisory Board to follow-up with you via phone or email regarding the above issues, please provide your contact information below.  Name Address Phone Number Cell Phone Number Email Address Preferred Method of Text Email Contact (Circle one)  A- 40  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT XV.
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE NEGATIVE CRITERIA IN SICA AND NOT GIVING DUE DEFERENCE TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MASTER PLAN TO MUNICIPAL ZONING. **  *(Statement of Reasons Da356, Zoning Board Brief in Prerogative Writ Da319.)*  Although the trial court cited the Sica case as the reason for the remand to consider conditions, the outright granting of the application with a prohibition on reducing the number of units did not leave much, if anything, for the Board to consider under Sica.  The trial court reasoned that the Board’s decision should be overturned because the Board based its decision on a conclusion that “essentially the project is too big, too noisy and will create too much traffic. ”  Da355.  First, this over-simplifies the concerns of the Board as clearly identified in the hearing and in its resolution.  As to size, it was related to the zone and surroundings.  As to traffic impacts due to inadequate parking, that was a significant safety and zone concern, and the applicant failed to address the concern.  Since there is no parking permitted on [...], all overflow parking would either illegally park on that road or end up on the neighboring residential streets.  The lack of adequate parking would create a significant impact on the town, the neighborhood, and the police.
[brief] The standard of review of the admissibility of prior bad acts or other-crimes evidence is under the abuse of discretion standard.  *State v. Darby*, 174 N.J. 509, 518 (2002) (citing *State v. Marrero*, 148 N.J. 469, 483 (1997)).  Except as otherwise provided by Rule 608(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the disposition of a person in order to --- \(^7\)
[brief] Email between [...] officer and in house counsel regarding debt restructuring side for presentation.  [...] now states that this document is not responsive to any Request for Production and that it previously produced a redacted version of this document and its attached slide (9895-10122) to [...].  [...] has provided the Special Master with an unredacted version of this document.  However, the Special Master agrees that this document does not appear to be responsive to any Request for Production.  Additionally, it is likely that it contains attorney-client privileged information, which [...] already redacted from the version provided to [...].  As such, the Special Master finds no reason for an unreleased version of this document to be produced to [...].
[brief] On May 11, 2012, Plaintiff extended a loan to Defendants in the amount of $134,000.  (Pa1).  The loan was secured by a first mortgage (the “First Mortgage”) on the residence of the Defendants located at [...] (the “Defendants’ Residence”).  (Pa2; Pa18).  At the time the First Mortgage was extended and thereafter, Defendant [...] was the sole shareholder of [...].  (Pa2).  Plaintiff accepted mortgage payments on the First Mortgage from [...] for years, despite the fact that [...] was not a mortgagor.  (Pa2).  Once the First Mortgage was paid in full, Plaintiff prepared and recorded a discharge of mortgage.  (Pa2).  The discharge was recorded at the Bergen County Register’s Office on January 29, 2018.  (Pa2).  --- 1  Due to the intertwining of the procedural history and statement of facts, Defendants have combined the two sections into one to avoid unnecessary duplication.
[brief] Id.  Here, Plaintiff could not demonstrate any harm from the letter contained in her file.  She did not allege that the letter contained a threat of further discipline if violations continued.  Therefore, the letter, even if considered to be a “written reprimand”, without more, is insufficient as a matter of law to establish an adverse employment action.  Although Plaintiff may have found the letter to be upsetting, “her subjective response” is simply not legally sufficient.  Plaintiff has attempted to portray the written letter as a “disciplinary action”.  However, even if the action was a disciplinary action, and it was not, that alone does not constitute an adverse employment action.  An “employer’s filing of a disciplinary action cannot form the basis of a LAD complaint because an employee who has complained about discrimination does not thereafter obtain ‘immunity from…basic employment policies or disciplinary procedures. ’”  Coward v. Englewood, 2019 WL 570080 (App. Div. 2019) at *4 citing Shepherd v. Hunterdon Development Ctr., 174 N.J. 1 (2002).  The filing of her first lawsuit did not cloak Plaintiff in a blanket of immunity in which she could not be reprimanded, disciplined or, as here, fail to comply with basic district-wide policies, and then attempt to use the NJLAD as a dagger.
[brief] I.  Youth should receive a careful professional assessment before socially transitioning.  Transgender persons experience a “mismatch between [their] natal sex and [their] felt, perceived, or desired gender identity. ”  ACa15 ¶ 10.  Having a transgender identity is not, standing alone, a psychological condition.  ACa15 ¶ 10.  Nevertheless, transgender-identifying persons can experience gender dysphoria, which refers to “clinically significant distress .  . . related to gender incongruence. ”  ACa15 ¶ 10.  Not everyone who has a transgender identity suffers from gender dysphoria, but a young person’s desire to undergo a social transition is a sign that may indicate the presence of gender dysphoria or related mental-health conditions.  ACa11-ACa12 ¶ 8.b.  1  This background discussion is based on the certification of [...].  ACa7-ACa57.  [...], a transgender woman, is an expert in the field of the treatment of youth dealing with gender-identity related issues.  ACa10-ACa11, Anderson Cert. ¶¶ 3–6.  [...]’s certification starts on page ACa6 of the attached appendix.  Minors who want to undergo a social transition should thus receive a “careful evaluation by an appropriately trained mental health professional” to determine whether gender dysphoria or other related conditions exist.
[brief] First, the Court ignored that the prior award from 2016 was one that [...] challenged based it not being arbitrable at all, because the arbitration was limited expressly to claims arising out of [...]’s operating agreement.  In 2016 [...] had argued (although not as cogently as a practicing attorney might have) that:  The Loan Contracts which are now nearly four years in performance, never contained an arbitral provision, but held instead a selection of court clause, which under federal and supreme court law is just as favored, as an obligation or not to submit to arbitration on a given issue, here the Loan, stems only from the contract that might contain it.  [Pa1090-91].  He stated, “Here, in the 2014 Loan Contract there never was an arbitral agreement between the two parties. ” (Pal100).  He argued, “the absence of an arbitration claims means the arbitrator could not have any jurisdiction on the Loan Contracts. ”  (Da1157)  The only consent to arbitration that exists is for disputes arising out of the 1995 Operating Agreement, which states, “13. Arbitration.  Any material dispute hereunder shall be decided in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association which award shall be final. ” [Pa648 (emph. added)].  Thus, the Court’s ruling imposed on [...] a duty to make alternative arguments that were contrary to those that he did make.
[brief] The United States Supreme Court in *Burlington Northern and Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White*, resolved issues between Circuits and determined that the “anti-retaliation provision protects in individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces injury or harm. ”  548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006)(emphasis added).  In Burlington, the Supreme Court agreed with the “formulation set forth by the Seventh and the District of Columbia Circuits” and held that “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse...”.  Id. at 68.  The Supreme Court stated specifically that “[w]e speak of material adversity because we believe it is important to separate significant from trivial harms.
[brief] ”).  Such a desire may be particularly prevalent among individuals of color, given this country’s sordid history of race-based policing.  See Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S.  232, 254 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims” of police scrutiny); Commonwealth v. Warren, 475 Mass. 530, 540 (2016) (explaining that, because Black men are disproportionally targeted for police-civilian encounters such as stops, frisks, and searches, a Black male approached by police “might just as easily be motivated by the desire to avoid the recurring indignity of being racially profiled as by the desire to hide criminal activity”).
[brief] On Apr 10, 2023, the motion was denied in part, and granted in part (Pa171).  On Apr 19, 2023 I then filed an amended Notice of Appeal and an amended Case Information Statement.  (Pa173)  On this same date, I also sought stay relief and indigent status from this Court.  On Apr 28, 2023, [...] opposed this motion (Pa 177).  On May 11, 2023 this Court denied the relief I sought (Pa179).  I then raised those issues in a motion to the N.J. Supreme Court, which was unopposed.  On June 23, 2023, our case manager stayed these proceedings until the issues pending before the N.J. Supreme Court were resolved (Pa182).  The N.J. Supreme Court rendered its initial ruling on Jul 13, 2023 (filed on Jul 19, 2023) (Pa183), and then rendered its final ruling on Jan 23, 2024 (filed on Jan 29, 2024) (Pa184).  After receiving this final N.J. Supreme Court motion order, I then attempted to contact my case manager again, but then I learned that she had since retired.  After making a few inquiries, on Feb 13, 2024 the appeal was reactivated (and assigned to a new case manager), and on that same date the parties were sent a new briefing schedule (Pa185).  Statement of Facts
[brief] (Da114-117)  [...]’s attorney \(^5\)  The record does not indicate whether the video was ever obtained. filed a motion for leave to appeal but Defendant’s attorney did not; on June 12, 2018, the Appellate Division denied leave to appeal.  (Da118)  On June 21, 2018, the parties appeared before [...], who vacated [...]’s orders staying the order compelling the defendants to submit to buccal swabs and case prints reinstating these orders to compel.
[brief] State v. Roach, 219 N.J. 58, 74 (2014).  In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004), the United State Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits the “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. ”
[brief] **III.  [...] conflates responsiveness and responsibility, makes illogical assertions regarding its ability to walk away, and overstates a statute** authorizing bidders to seek withdrawal of bids.  (1T55-24; 3T31-15)  [...]’s conflation of responsiveness and responsibility, Pb17-18, is flawed.  The issue in this case is not whether [...] is responsible; the issue is whether [...] timely submitted the documents necessary to be responsive.  As discussed above on page 10, a government body may require, and bidders must provide, information regarding the bidder’s capacity to perform.  Bidder responsiveness is determined by the information submitted at the time of bid, not the universe of facts known to others.  That is, even if the information sought relates to responsibility, the proper submission of that information is a question of responsiveness.  Additionally, there is no support for the proposition that a responsibility hearing is necessary where a bidder fails to demonstrate it has the necessary legal qualifications for performing.  See, e.g., Muirfield, 336 N.J. Super. at 135-36 (discussing disqualification for failure to have proper licensing); Advance Elec., 351 N.J. Super. at 171-72 (discussing disqualification for naming subcontractors without required NJDPC prequalification).  [...] indicates that it could not walk away from its bid because it was [...] classified.
[directive] Judge Date  Defendant's Attorney: Prosecutor's Office: --------------- Name Name --------------- Address Address ________  Telephone Number Telephone Number _ ---------- ---------------  Fax Fax ---------------- Em ail Em ail --------------- --------------- ________  Ifyes, language _  Interpreter needed? Yes No ________ ADA accommodation needed?  If Yes No yes, describe _ D  Contact List attached Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12635 (KROL Order 3A) by Jersey Courts New - . , - .- New Jersey Judiciary List Contact  Krol Order lrld~~e• lntegfity F1lmtu • Qu1HtyServke of In the Matter - Select County - County Defendant's Attorney: Prosecutor: Name Name --------- --------- Telephone Number Telephone Number Em Em ail ail Provider Agency: Name --------------------------- Provider Agency CEO ---------------------------- Telephone Number Em ail Court Contact: Name Title ----------------------------  Telephone Number Em ail by Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12635 (KROL Order 3A)  Attachment E of Order 4 - Mandating Conditional Release the NGRI Acquittee to a Specified Community Placement
[brief] The Defendants HIPAA authorization requests were overbroad, seeking irrelevant material and may have been subpoenaed without HIPAA authorization(s).  See Crescenzo v. Crane, 350 N.J. Super. 531, 796 A.2d 283 (N.J. Super. 2002)  \(^4\)  Defendants’ Counsel forwarded their discovery demand to Plaintiff upon receipt from her former and/or past physicians; attached is one example of the Defendants prepared HIPAA request packet for Plaintiff’s medical record for her discrimination complaint.  Plaintiff complies with five (5) day order; submission to Defendants’ Counsel commenced via email, then USPS, and with final submission to the trial court via NJ JEDS submission on October 28, 2022.  Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Failure to Make Discovery was denied on November 2, 2022, along with Plaintiff’s request to amend order on November 6, 2022.  Defendants’ Counsel submits Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Failure to Make Discovery on December 21, 2022, with Plaintiff entering in objection on January 4, 2023; Defendants’ Counsel submits reply brief on January 5, 2023, with Plaintiff objecting on January 6, 2023 (oral argument is heard on same day).  The trial court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Make Discovery on January 6, 2023, without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4:23-4 and 4:23-5(c) (AP 46 – AP 48).  On March 15, 2023, Defendants’ Counsel submits another Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Make Discovery for the same reasons with Plaintiff submitting same objections March 23, 2023, referencing the same documents to support Plaintiff has fulfilled their discovery requests; Defendants’ Counsel submitted her Certification in Support of Motion on March 24, 2024.  Plaintiff enters in objection to Counsel’s Certification on March 27, 2023, with Defendants’ Counsel immediate reply brief submitted on same day; Plaintiff immediately returned opposition reply on same day as well with Court calendaring oral arguments via zoom on April 28, 2023, from the initial date of March 15, 2023.  Oral arguments were rescheduled to May 8, 2023; Plaintiff’s request to have oral arguments heard on papers was granted based on her ADA Title II (“ADA”) accommodation request.  Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss was re-granted under Rule 4:23-5(a)(2), however with prejudice (AP 1 – AP 2).  ISSUES & LEGAL ARGUMENTS
[brief] On April 26, 2023, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. issued an Order and Statement of Reasons in a case venued in the Law Division of Essex County Superior Court, *McQueen v. [...]*, [...], 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 640 (Law Div. April 26, 2023) (Pa228), which analyzed the NJCFLA’s licensure requirements in great depth.  In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss [...] opined:  [The NJCFLA] captures within the definitions of “consumer lender” and “consumer loan business” a wide range of other participants in consumer lending.  As a result of the second sentence of the definition, the statutory coverage extends not only to those making or extending loans, but those that solicit such loans, those that assist in the procurement or negotiation of the same and those that purchase or acquire “notes. ”  The purpose of the second sentence of the definition is pellucid – to expand the scope of the statute and its licensure and other requirements well beyond the entities that actually provide the credit ab initio.  It is in this context that one must examine the explicit text that the statutory scheme encompasses those in the business of “buying, discounting or endorsing notes. ”  Because the statutory definition includes (i) those that initiate consumer loans by issuing credit cards and credit card agreements; and (ii) via the second sentence, intended to broaden the coverage, those engaged in purchasing “notes,” there is no reason to suppose that the Legislature intended by use of that term to limit the same to negotiable promissory notes.  . . .  Put differently, as the statute and licensing requirement apply to original credit card issuers, there is ample reason to suppose that the Legislature intended to include purchasers of credit card accounts within the scope of a provision – the second sentence – that brings within its reach the purchasers of consumer loans.  *McQueen*, [...], 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 640, at *13-14.
[brief] (4T 130-19 to 23; 132-7 to 21)  She stated that when she asked for heroin, [...] would “break off a piece and put it on the scale and then he would give it to me.  And he had a little book that he wrote everything down in. ”  (4T 133-1 to 4)  [...] was asked to identify specific entries in the book but she could not, saying, “this is just a bunch of numbers so I wouldn’t know what they really mean. ”  (4T 144-20 to 23; 145-3 to 4; 146-4 to 7)  [...] acknowledged that she had pled guilty to a lesser offense in exchange for her testimony against [...].  (4T 136-25 to 137-7; 147-3 to 22)