ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Atl. City Superior Officers’ Ass’n v. City of Atl. City, | | | No. A-3117-20, 2022 WL 2352376 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June | passim | | 30, 2022)  | | | Banco Popular North America v. Gandi, | 20 | | 184 N.J. 161 (2005) | | | Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park, | 30 | | 241 N.J. 595 (2020) | | | Bridgewater-Raritan Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of Bridgewater-Raritan Sch. Dist., Somerset Cty., | 22 | | 221 N.J. 349 (2015) | | | Camden County Energy Recovery Assocs., L.P. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envntl. Prot., | 19 | | 320 N.J. Super. 59 (App. Div. 1999) | | | D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., | 22 | | 192 N.J. 110 (2007) | | | Donato v. Moldow, | 20 | | 374 N.J. Super. 475 (App. Div. 2005) | | | Edwards v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co., | 19 | | 357 N.J. Super. 196 (App. Div. 2003) | | | Goldfarb v. Solimine, | 28 | | 245 N.J. 326 (2021) | | | Hardwicke v. Am. Boychoir Sch., | 23 | | 188 N.J. 69 (2006) | | | Matter of Morris School Dist. Bd. of Educ., | 29 | | 310 N.J. Super. 332 (App. Div. 1998)  | | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Authority | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Portillo v. Nat’l Frieght, Inc., | 28 | | 2022 U.S. District. LEXIS 103186 (D.N.J. June 9, 2022)  | | | Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., | 20 | | 116 N.J. 739 (1989) | | | Sauter v. Colts Neck Volunteer Fire Co. No. 2, | 23 | | 451 N.J. Super 581,600 (App. Div. 2017) | | | Sickles v. Cabot Corp., | 19, 20| | 379 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2005), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 297 | | | (2005) | | | Wade v. Kessler Inst., | 28 | | 343 N.J. Super. 338 (App. Div. 2001) | | ## Statutes Municipal Stabilization and Recovery Act, (“MSRA”), N.J.S.A. 52:27 BBBB-1, *et seq.*
[brief] 36 - **Fleuhr v. City of Cape May**, 159 N.J. 532 (1999) ..............................................  36 - **Furey v. Ocean Cty.**, 273 N.J. Super. 300 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 138 N.J. 272 (1994) ..............................................  24 - **Golden v. N.W. Mutual Life Ins. Co.**, 229 N.J. Super. 405 (App. Div. 1988) ....................... 12 - **Guerriero v. Palmer**, 175 N.J. Super. 1 (Law Div. 1979) ..........................  31 - **Guzzi v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co.**, 36 N.J. Super. 255 (App. Div. 1955) ....................... 42 Ross v. Lowitz, 222 N. J. 494 (2015) ........................................ passim Russi v. City of Newark, Docket No. [...], (App. Div. Feb. 17), certif. denied, 252 N.J. 125 (2022) ......................... 27 Saldana v. Camden, 252 N.J. Super. 188 (App. Div. 1991) ....................... 31 Sims v. City of Newark, 244 N.J. Super. 32 (Law Div. 1990) ......................... 29, 32 Southern Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel Tp., 92 N.J. 158 (1983) .................................................. 34 State v. Moran, 202 N.J. 311 (2010) ............................................... 41 State v. Walker, 216 N.J. Super. 39 (App. Div. 1987) ......................... 42 Szalontal v. Yazbo’s Sports Café, 183 N.J. 386 (2005) ............................................... 38 Vincitore v. New Jersey Sports & Expo. Auth., 169 N.J. 119 (2001) ............................................... 25, 33 Vuocolo v. Diamond Shamrock Chem., 240 N.J. Super. 289 (App. Div., certif. denied, 122 N.J. 333 (1990) ............................................... 7 Willis v. Department of Conserv’n & Eco. Dev., 55 N.J. 534 (1970) ............................................... 1 Wilson v. Jacobs, 334 N.J. Super. 640 (App. Div. 2000) ....................... 22 Williams v. Phillipsburg, 171 N.J. Super. 278 (App. Div. 1979) ....................... 24, 31 Wooley v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 218 N.J. Super. 56 (App. Div. 1987) ....................... 25 Wymbs v. Wayne Tp., 163 N.J. 523 (200) ............................................... 21 Statutes N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 ...................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 59:1-2 ...................................................... 1, 15 N.J.S.A. 59:2-1 ...................................................... passim N.J.S.A. 59:2-1b ..................................................... 19, 34 N.J.S.A. 59:2-3 ...................................................... passim N.J.S.A. 59:2-3d .....................................................
[brief] To the extent this Court chooses to assess the enforceability of the Contract, the Contract’s arbitration clause is enforceable under New Jersey law.  (June Order [Pa253–57]; January Consent Order [Pa162–63]).  As discussed above, this Court is not tasked with a de novo review of the Contract’s arbitration provisions; it is rather tasked with reviewing whether the Superior Court abused its discretion when it denied Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate.  Nevertheless, even under a de novo standard of review, Plaintiffs have failed to show that the Contract’s arbitration provisions are unenforceable.
[brief] Reference to same is made in the Hearing Officer's Decision and the Memorandum of Decision of the Superior Court Judge.* level, N.J.S.A. 40A:14–150 was enacted for the benefit of public employees not subject to civil service to provide them with protection from arbitrary, unreasonable, biased or prejudicial action of the municipal officials by providing a right to a *de novo* hearing on the conviction of the charges of breach of discipline and sentence imposed.
[brief] B.  The Trial Court properly found that the Zoning Board's denial was improperly tainted by the Mayor's conduct  In the October 15, 2020 Opinion, the Trial Court correctly criticized the actions of the Mayor prior to the Zoning Board hearing.  M58.  The Trial Court determined that the Board's 2019 Resolution denying the 2018 Amended Application, "dressed-up" a predetermined outcome, with no evidence in the record to support that outcome.
[brief] Order of Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated January 20, 2023 denying Defendants’ renewed motion to dismiss for failure to join indispensible parties and on comity grounds  .........................Pa770-71  Order of Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated January 20, 2023 denying Defendants’ motion to stay on comity grounds .................Pa774-75  Oral Decision of Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated January 20, 2023 ..................................................................................2T1
[brief] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Date of Submission: July 1, 2024  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT  [...]  [...]  [...]  Tel.: [...] Fax: [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent  [...] Of Counsel & On the Brief  [...], Esq. Attorney ID# 03532-2006  On the Brief  [...], Esq.  Attorney ID# 03108-2011  [...], Esq.  Attorney ID# 31987-2020  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Page  Light v. U.S. Liab. Ins. Group, 2006 WL 2042303 (N.J. Super. App. Div. July 24, 2006) .................................................................Da1 Dela Vega v. Travelers Ins. Co., A-2272-19, 2022 WL 1436461 (App. Div. May 6, 2022), cert. denied, 284 A. 3d 426 (N.J. 2022) ......................Da5 Shah v. Geico Ins. Co., 2011 WL 3444269 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Aug. 9, 2011) ...............................................................Da14 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases: | Page(s) | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **AC Ocean Walk, LLC v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co.,** | 10, 12, 30 | | 256 N.J. 294 (2024) | | | **AstenJohnson, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co.,** | 25 | | 562 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2009) | | | **Aubrey v. Harleysville Ins. Companies,** | 19, 24 | | 140 N.J. 397 (N.J. 1995) | | | **Cassilli v. Soussou,** | 29 | | 408 N.J. Super. 147 (App. Div. 2009) | | | **Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,** | 11, 30 | | 195 N.J. 231 (2008) | | | **Dela Vega v. Travelers Ins. Co.,** | passim | | A-2272-19, 2022 WL 1436461 (App. Div. May 6, 2022), *cert. denied,* | | | 284 A.3d 426 (N.J. 2022) | | | **Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C.,** | 9, 10 | | 237 N.J. 91 (2019) | | | **Foley v. Foley,** | 13, 20 | | 173 N.J. Super. 256 (App. Div. 1980) | | | **French v. New Jersey Sch. Bd. Ass’n Ins. Group,** | 24 | | 149 N.J. 478 (1997) | | | **Hampton Med. Group, P.A. v. Princeton Ins. Co.,** | 11, 12 | | 366 N.J. Super. 165 (App. Div. 2004) | | | **Hanko v. Sisoukraj,** | 19 | | 364 N.J. Super. 41 (App. Div. 2003) | | | **Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co.,** | 29 | | 54 N.J. 287 (1969) | | | **Horesh v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,** | 18 | | 265 N.J. Super. 32, 625 A.2d 541 (App. Div. 1993) | | Kieffer v. High Point Ins. Co., 422 N.J. Super. 38 (App. Div. 2011)
[directive] Investigative personnel shall respond to the scene of a suspected or confirmed bias incident as directed by supervisory personnel.  When the investigator arrives on the scene and determines that the situation may be a bias incident, he or she shall:  1.  Assume control of the bias incident follow-up investigation.  2.  Ensure that the scene of the bias incident is properly protected and preserved.  3.  Conduct a thorough and comprehensive follow-up criminal investigation.  Continue bias incident verification procedures following the guidelines for confirming bias incidents contained in these Standards, as necessary.  4.  Ensure that the scene of the bias incident is properly documented and searched and evidence is gathered for analysis, as required.  Documenting the crime scene should include taking samples of physical evidence, securing and transporting into custody related movable evidence, and photographing the crime scene, as appropriate.  5.  Interview all victims and witnesses.  6.  Canvass the community to identify other victims and witnesses.  Conduct additional interviews, as necessary.  7.  Determine the primary elements of the incident and obtain information necessary to complete the data elements of the Uniform Crime Supplementary Bias Incident Offense Report.  Primary elements of the investigation include:
[brief] Should the dispute not be resolved by mediation, [...] and the Participant agree that all disputes, controversies, or claims arising out of the Participant’s use of the Premises or participation in the Activities shall be submitted to binding arbitration before and in accordance with the Commercial Rules of the [...] then in effect.  It is acknowledged, understood, and agreed that any such arbitration will be final and binding, and that by agreeing to arbitration, the parties are waiving their respective rights to seek remedies in court, including the right to a jury trial.
[brief] The Sentencing Court Did Not Give Sufficient Weight To Mitigating Factor Four, Despite The Credible Evidence That Mr.  Bell’s Conduct Was Motivated By A Severe Substance Abuse Disorder.  Defense counsel presented evidence that [...]’s conduct, both in this case and in his prior case in which he was convicted of first-degree robbery, was highly motivated by a substance abuse disorder.  (6T 6-18 to 24)  Defense counsel stated that both robberies “were meant to fuel and to fund . . . a heroin habit that had altered his decision making. ”  (6T 7-2 to 4)  Counsel noted that the facts of this case—particularly the fact that a dirty bottle was used to mimic a weapon—indicate that [...] had no intention of actually hurting anyone.  (6T 7-5 to 14)  Instead, the facts show that he was “so drugged out, so driven by his desire for drugs he wanted any amount of money to fuel that. ”  (6T 7-14 to 16)  What’s more, counsel informed the court that [...] was awaiting a spot at [...] at the time this incident occurred.  (6T 6-25 to 7-2)  When addressing the court directly, [...] reiterated that he was “waiting for a bed at Maryville” when this incident occurred and that he “just didn’t get the bed fast enough. ”  (6T 10-8 to 12)  Based on this evidence, which the court found to be credible, the court noted that “perhaps, one of the main motivating factors here and in the prior instance was attempting to secure funds to, uh, continue to use in the context of the, uh, substance abuse issue. ”  (6T 12-9 to 12)  The court concluded as a result that there were substantial grounds tending to excuse the defendant’s conduct.  (6T 12-13 to 16)  However, the court stated that it would not “weigh that particularly heavily. ”  (6T 12-17 to 18)  The court’s failure to give due weight to this mitigating factor renders [...]’s sentence excessive.
[brief] *E. Bay Drywall, LLC. v. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Dev.* , 251 N.J. 477, 493 (2022).  “This deference comes from the understanding that a state agency brings experience and specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating a legislative enactment within its field of expertise. ”  *In re Election Law Enf’t Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008*, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010).  See also *Murray v. State Health Benefits Comm'n*, 337 N.J. Super. 435, 442 (App. Div. 2001) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting *In re Vineland Chem. Co.*, 243 N.J. Super. 285, 307 (App. Div. 1990)).  “Particularly in the insurance field, the expertise and judgment of the Commissioner may be allowed great weight. ”  *N.J. Healthcare Coal. v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking and Ins.*, 440 N.J. Super. 129, 135-36 (App. Div. 2015).  A.  Neither the ALJ nor the Commissioner Rewrote the Rationale for the Department’s Disapproval.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ allegations of unjust enrichment relate to [...] property and monies, with the Plaintiffs only suffering alleged losses by way of diminution in value of shares \(^{38}\) *Tully* at 126.  \(^{39}\) Da672-718.  \(^{40}\) 1T and 2T.  \(^{41}\)  This count was dismissed by the trial court in its June 23, 2022 order, though the trial court did not specify its reasons for dismissing this specific count.
[brief] THE “AMERICAN RULE” SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED BECAUSE OF THE APPLICABLE EXCEPTIONS.  There are eight recognized exceptions to “The American Rule,” which provides that litigants must bear the cost of their own attorneys’ fees.  *Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich*, 224 N.J. 584, 592 (2016).  Many of those exceptions are codified in R. 4:42-9(a), which states in applicable part that there may be fee awards in family actions:  (a)
[brief] The State Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on February 26, 2020.  Pa116.  Defendants, the [...], Newark Mayor [...], the [...] City Council, Newark City Clerk [...], Newark Corporation Counsel [...], Esq., Newark Business Administrator [...], Esq., Newark Director of Finance [...], Newark Division of Tax Abatement and Special Taxes Manager [...], CTC, and Newark Tax Assessor [...], Esq. (collectively, the “City Defendants”), filed their Motion to Dismiss on March 16, 2020.  Pa120.  Defendants, the [...], Essex County Executive [...], and the [...] (collectively, the “County Defendants”) filed their Motion to Dismiss on March 17, 2020.  Pa144.  On the same date, [...] filed its Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of an Answer.  Pa153.  On April 17, 2020, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed their opposition to the Motions to Dismiss, and on April 29, 2020, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a Motion to Designate Trial Counsel, seeking to disqualify counsels for the City Defendants, the County Defendants, and the State Defendants from representing certain named defendants.
[brief] “Ultimately it is up to the Court whether [the defendants’ conduct] was done intentionally or it is a fraud or whatever, but those are objections that come up when certain questions are asked. ” (13T 35:9-12).  Furthermore, the trial court made clear that [...]’s testimony on the subject of intent could not just be based in conjecture and speculation; it must be tied to some other evidence supportive of that opinion.  (13T 56:8-25).  See Borough of Saddle River v. 66 E. Allendale, LLC, 216 N.J. 115, 144, (2013) (expert must “give the why and wherefore that supports the opinion, rather than a mere conclusion. ”); Johnson v. Salem Corp., 97 N.J. 78 (1984) (weight of expert opinion can rise no higher than the strength of the facts and reasoning supporting it).  Likewise, the trial court was well within its discretion to allow [...]’s trial testimony.
[brief] Dated: September 12, 2024  Table of Contents  TABLE OF RULINGS ON APPEAL ......................................................... v  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS ................................................................ vi  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................  vii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...................................................................  4  STATEMENT OF FACT ......................................................................  4  Plaintiffs’ Acquisition of Lot 2 and Part of Lot 3 ............................  6  Defendants’ Acquisition of the Remainder of Lot 3 .......................  8  Defendants’ Deed ...........................................................................  9  The Subdivision Plan ....................................................................  9  The 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed ...............................................  10  The [...]n Confirmatory Deed ...................................................  11  The Tax Maps ................................................................................  11  The Subdivision Deed, [...] Consolidation Deed, Historical Deeds and Planning Board Resolution ...........................................  11  Defendants’ Appointment of an Attorney-in-Fact & Acquisition of Title Work ...........................................................................  12  Defendants’ Acknowledgment of the Error & Their Plan to Correct  13  LEGAL ARGUMENT ........................................................................
[brief] \(^1\)  As part of those efforts, the [...] required New Jersey to obtain Deeds of Dedication and Perpetual Storm Damage Reduction Easements (“PSDREs”) from some property owners, including plaintiffs and [...], for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the sand dune project.  (Da514, Da520)  However, the PSDREs do not require the private property owners to grant any public access, nor did the PSDREs take property away from anyone.  (Da1115, Da1275-Da1276)  Thus, the [...] were not given any rights to, or over, the [...] Property as a result of the Westerhold PSDRE.  (Da514, Da1115)  Likewise, the [...] were not granted any rights to, or over, the [...] Property by the [...] PSDRE.  (Da514, Da520, Da1115, Da1275-1276)  Moreover, there are no provisions in the [...] PSDRE that require [...] to provide private dune overwalk structures to parties (such as plaintiffs) demanding private access to the MWHL, and \(^1\)  State and local authorities have also acted to protect the integrity and effectiveness of these dunes; for example, [...] put up signs telling all people to stay off the dunes and [...] has ordinances enforced by fines warning people to stay off the dunes.  the [...] PSDRE expressly provides that “[s]tructures not part of the project are not authorized. ”  (Da520)  In 2018, plaintiffs constructed a private dune walkover directly from their property to the beach, traversing the protective dunes built by the [...] on the [...] Property.  (Da1370)  [...] Township issued violation notices to plaintiffs and to [...] because the plaintiffs had constructed their walkover without first securing the required permit and demanded that the walkover be removed from their respective properties.  (Da784-Da786)  Plaintiffs’ subsequent permit application was denied because plaintiffs did not have [...]’s consent\(^2\) to build the walkover across [...] Property, and [...] removed that portion of plaintiffs’ walkover from its property as directed.  (Da783-Da787, Da543-Da545)  Following the trial court’s ruling in their favor on their motion for summary judgment that granted them an implied easement across the [...] Property, plaintiffs again built a private dune walkover from their property over [...]’s Property to the beach.  **The Trial Court’s Erroneous Decision**
[brief] Aronberg, supra, 207 N.J. at 598 (quoting DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492-93).  We are convinced that because it was undisputed that plaintiff was uninsured at the time of the accident, the court correctly concluded that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) required the dismissal of plaintiff's claims.  We are not persuaded by plaintiff's argument that we should ignore the unambiguous language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4. 5(a) in favor of an interpretation that provides an exemption for individuals who acted in good faith to obtain insurance but failed to do so.  Although we may consider extrinsic evidence if a strict [*7] application of the statute "leads to an absurd result or if the overall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language," Hardy, supra, 198 N.J. at 101 (quoting DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 493), application of the statutory bar under the circumstances presented here is consistent with the statute's purpose.
[directive] The essential key, is that the legislative mandate requires that the police officer be the person who reads the Standard Statement to the defendant.  Giving or handing the Standard Statement to the defendant to read for him or herself will not suffice as complying with the statutory mandate that the officer read it to the defendant.  State v. Widmaier, 157 N.J. at 489.  In addition, the Standard Statement contains a recitation of the range of the statutory penalties which a court will impose, if the defendant is found guilty.  Therefore, police and law enforcement officers must strictly comply with the statutory requirements that the Standard Statement, as approved by the [...], be read, as written, to the defendant.
[brief] Thus, [...] did not satisfy the first element for a breach of contract.  B.  “second, that plaintiffs did what the contract required them to do”  [...] does not plead or establish that it performed the work and was therefore entitled to payment.  (Argued at Pa389)  \textsuperscript{42} \textit{Goldfarb v. Solimine}, 245 N.J. 326, 338 (2021)  Without identifying a contract that authorized payment for not working, it is impossible to satisfy this second element.  Regardless, Count One of the Counterclaim does not establish that [...] “did what the contract required them to do”.  The 2019-2020 or 2020-2021 contract required [...] to actually perform custodial or janitorial services as a condition of payment.  [...] admits that it did not actually perform work in April 2020, and did not begin work on the 2020-2021 contract until July 6, 2020.  Thus, without establishing that [...] performed the work required to obtain payment, the court order does not establish that [...] satisfied the second element of a breach of contract claim, requiring the dismissal of Count One.
[brief] ”  *Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme*, 227 N.J. 269, 288 (2016).  This is why “cases must ultimately be decided on facts” and “rules of law are not applied in the abstract but must be considered in light of the facts in individual cases. ”  *Hanover Ins. Co. v. Franke*, 75 N.J. Super. 68, 74 (App. Div. 1962); *A.W. v. T.D.*, 433 N.J. Super. 365, 370 (Ch. Div. 2013).  That is what the trial court did here.  The defendants acted inequitably for the reasons already set out above, including that they took funds from the companies without paying out an equal amount to the Plaintiffs.  (36T 51:22 to 52:23).  [...] controlled the defendant entities and moved money among them as instrumentalities of their broader scheme.  (37T 79:7-12).  It would have been inequitable to force the Plaintiffs to chase those funds from defendant to defendant and account to account to be made whole.  (37T 79:7 to 80:8).  Given the “full picture” and the circumstances here, the trial court was well within its power to hold each defendant liable, jointly and severally, for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith.  But even if the Court were to disagree, that error would be harmless, because the trial court had the equitable power to extend liability to all defendants under an unjust enrichment theory based on the movement of money between and among Emanuel and [...] and the defendant entities.