ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] State officers are named in their official (non-immune) capacities under the "Officer Suit Fiction" to facilitate Declaratory Judgment implementation.  [...]'s issue is not PTI law/rules, but the discriminatory "Mental Illness Probation" program.  If statewide, the AG is a proper party; if limited to Atlantic County, the Prosecutor is.  Halting this illegal, mental disability exclusion from PTI would likely also involve the Assignment Judge(s) (local) or [...] (multi-vicinage).  [...] merely seeks to end discriminatory exclusion.  Stopping the PTI Exclusion Policy is analogous to Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127 (2006), where the "program or activity" of jailing parents without counsel was terminated.
[brief] ”  Spaeth, 403 N.J. Super at 515.  Therefore, [...] cannot be heard to argue that by being compelled to arbitration it will have wasted time and money with respect to responding to [...]’s discovery demands or by otherwise having had to participate in the very litigation that it initiated.  Moreover, in light the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411, 142 S. Ct. 1708 (2022), [...] urges this Court to place very little emphasis on this particular Cole factor.  In Morgan the U.S. Supreme Court held that prejudice to an opposing party is not to be part of a waiver analysis under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C §§1-16, because the focus when considering waiver under the FAA is on the party holding the right to arbitration and whether that person intentionally relinquished or abandoned a known right.
[directive] State of New Jersey Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division – Criminal v. County Indictment Number Defendant Case/PROMIS Number Order on Post Conviction Applications on Indictable Offenses  This matter being opened on the application of defendant, , by: ☐ Petition for Post-Conviction Relief determined to be defendant’s ☐ first petition ☐ second or subsequent petition ☐ Motion for and the defendant having been represented by: ☐ Assistant Deputy Public Defender ☐ ☐ ☐ , Retained or Designated Counsel or ☐ The court having concluded that there was no good cause entitling the assignment of counsel on the application, and the State having been represented by: Assistant Prosecutor; and ☐ There having been proceedings conducted on the record on , 20 or ☐ The matter having been disposed of on the papers; It is on this day of , 20 ORDERED that hereby: defendant’s application is ☐ Granted ☐ Denied ☐ Other Form Reissued by Directive #09-23 (06/13/2023), CN:11151 page 1 of 2  For the reasons: ☐ Expressed in the court’s written opinion of ☐ Expressed orally on the record on s/ Date , J.S.C. ORIGINAL: Office of the Public Defender c: Judge Criminal Division Manager’s Office Prosecutor’s Office Defendant Form Reissued by Directive #09-23 (06/13/2023), CN:11151 page
[brief] Executive Order No. 110 (Byrne 1981).  In response to its continued significance to New Jersey’s history, [...] directed the Superintendent of NJSP to make the Lindbergh case’s “investigative files, records and exhibits” available to the public and “subject to inspection and examination and available for copying. ”  \textit{Id.} at Section 1.  But [...] also acknowledged that by giving the public access to the historical items of the Lindbergh case, reasonable measures needed to be implemented to ensure their preservation.  \textit{Id.} at Section 2.  Accordingly, E.O. 110 empowered the Superintendent to: establish procedures to insure that there is no risk of damage or mutilation of such files, records, and exhibits and to insure that the public access and right to copy such files, records and exhibits shall be during regular business hours to the extent that such access is compatible with the economic and efficient operation of [the] division and the transaction of its public business and to provide and assure payment of such costs as permitted by law.
[brief] The trial court also properly dismissed the civil RICO claim.  Appellants cannot prevail on a RICO claim based on a single transaction that did not damage Appellants because they had already lost the land and development agreements.  Appellants seek to recover damages and relief provided for in 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).  Section 1964(c) provides a civil remedy to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 .  . . ."  18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).  Under this section, a "plaintiff only has standing if, and can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation."  Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985) (emphasis added).  To establish standing under section 1964(c), "a RICO plaintiff [must] make two related but analytically distinct threshold showings . . . : (1) that the plaintiff suffered an injury to business or property; and (2) that the plaintiff's injury was proximately caused by the defendant's violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962."
[directive] Cause. of Probable Submission of Affidavit  Electronic 5.1 implement to develop and shall work with the AOC Criminal Justice Division of  The electronically of Probable Cause to be filed an Affidavit that allow procedures and practices supplement for acomplaint-warrant and to an application system to support eCDR through the complaint- officer applying for the enforcement under oath by the law statements made any oral Page 47 officer to allowing the acheck-box include shall Cause Probable of Affidavit  The warrant. aware is affiant the acknowledging that and true, are Affidavit in the statements the certify that punishment.  her to or him subject would statements willfully false filing that facts and relevant of description concise a include shall Cause Probable of Affidavit  The that committed and offenses) was the that believe cause to probable support that circumstances as statement to concise include shall a Affidavit it.  The committed who one the is defendant the officer's the (e.g., offenses) the committed defendant the believing that for basis officer's the shall etc.), and admission, defendant's eyewitnesses, of statements observations, personal officer the known to injury of the extent the so, if and, injured victim was a whether indicate and circumstances and relevant facts of description foregoing The Affidavit. submitting the or established, be may exists cause probable believing that for basis officer's the to as statement Section to pursuant prepared Report Incident Enforcement Preliminary Law a by supplemented, Report Incident Enforcement Preliminary Law the event, In that 3:4-2(c)(1)(A).  R. also 5.2.  See of Affidavit in the reference by incorporated expressly and with to/transmitted appended shall be Cause.  Probable Directive. this of issuance upon immediately operational become shall Section This Report.  Incident Enforcement PreliminarX Law
[brief] CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................................................36  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX | Appendix Document | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Notice of Removal to United States District Court | Da1-3| | Mosley v. State, et al., [...] (Dec. 14, 2020) | | | Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts on Motion for Summary Judgment | Da4-8| | Mosley v. State, et al., [...] (Oct. 16, 2023) | | | Certification of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment | Da9-163| | Mosley v. State, et al., [...] (Oct. 16, 2023) | | | Ex. A: Plaintiff's Complaint filed on October 13, 2020 | Da12-55| | Ex. B: District Court [...]'s Order dated August 31, 2022 | Da56-58| | Ex. C: District Court [...]'s Opinion dated August 31, 2022 | Da59-77| | Ex. D: Defendants' Answer and Separate Defenses dated October 27, 2022 | Da78-102| | Ex. E: [...]'s Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice dated January 9, 2023 | Da103-105| | Ex. F: [...]'s Statement of Reasons supporting the dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint dated January 9, 2023 | Da106-134| | Ex. G: Transcript of [...]'s decision as placed on the record on February 15, 2023 | Da135-160| | Ex. H: [...]'s Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration | Da161-163| Amended Certification of Counsel in Response to Plaintiff's Appeal Mosley v. State, et al., [...] (Sept. 5, 2024) Ex. A: Silver Enters., Inc. v. Twp. of Freehold, 2008 WL 260791 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2008)
[brief] Mt. Hill v. Zoning Bd. of Middletown, 403 N.J. Super. 210 (App. Div. 2008), certif. den. 197 N.J. 475 (2009)  ...... 46 Ne. Towers v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of W. Paterson, 327 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div. 2000)  .....................................................
[brief] (C.C.Da.1-100).  Specifically, plaintiff’s complaint sounds in the following causes of action:  ---  1 C.C.Da. refers to the Carteret Comprehensive Defendants’ Appendix per R. 2:6-8 for multiple defendants.  Count One: Declaratory Judgment that [...] is Structured, Organized and Operated in Violation of the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine and N.J.A.C. §13:35-6.16 and Practices Medicine Without a License in Violation of N.J.S.A. §2C:21-20.
[brief] Hrymoc was a products liability matter involving “pelvic mesh” medical devices.  See id. at 452.  The trial court, ruling on the parties’ motions in limine, barred all evidence of “Section 510(k) clearance” allowing the devices to be marketed without premarket clinical trials, because the 510(k) process determines substantial equivalency only, not safety and efficacy.  See id. at 452-453.  The Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a new trial, and the Supreme Court affirmed that ruling, holding that the exclusion of any 510(k) evidence deprived the defendant of a fair trial on the issue of negligence, particularly on the issue of the reasonableness of the manufacture’s conduct in not performing clinical trials or studies.  See id. at 453.  In reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court confirmed that evidence relating to the 510(k) process normally is not admissible because that [...], however, the NJDOH investigator’s conclusion that no regulatory violations were found may be viewed as a statement of fact rather than a complex expert opinion.
[directive] b.  Co-Defendant Status: 15.  16.  Unique Evidential Issues: D  No brief required a.  _________________  D  Brief by required _ b.  Defendant's Initials of3  Pretrial Memorandum - Revised Form Promulgated Directive# 23-17 (8/21/2017), [...] page 2 by Stipulations: 17.  Estimated trial time: State's case: 18.  Defense case: Interpreter needed?  [Yes]  19.  [No]  If yes, please provide the following information:  If the defendant, what language?  If a witness, what language?  Defendant and all counsel are hereby directed to return to court on the following date at 9:00 AM ready for 20.  trial.  There will further notices required.  no be of  Any problems with witness availability must brought to the Court's attention within ten (10) days the be of if signing this Memorandum, or discovered thereafter, promptly known.  as as Trial Date: -----------------------------------  Defense Counsel: --------------------------------- Assistant Prosecutor: Judge:------------------------------------
[brief] DelVicchio v. Hemberger, 388 N.J. Super. 179, 188-89 (App. Div. 2006).  Additionally, a motion for reconsideration is not warranted where the apparent purpose of the motion is for the movant to express disagreement with the Court’s initial decision.  D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. at 401-02 (“A litigant should not seek reconsideration merely because of dissatisfaction with a decision of the Court. ”).  Here, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration because it correctly realized that defendant could not prove that its decision was based on a palpably incorrect or illegal basis, nor that the trial court failed to consider all relevant evidence.
[brief] The motion court refused to consider [...]’s certification asserting that he relied on promises to be paid after the sale of the hospital because of the conclusion that the certification was barred by the Sham Affidavit doctrine (Volume III, Pa. 394-396; TR-2 12-8 to 13; TR 2 16-6 to 19).  The sham affidavit doctrine provides that a party cannot defeat summary judgment by presenting a certification which contains unexplained contradictions with the party’s prior testimony.  Shelcusky v. Garjulio, 172 N.J. 183 (2002)(plaintiff’s certification in products liability action that he knew he was working with flammable materials not barred by deposition testimony stating he did not know what he was unloading because (1) the deposition testimony and prior certification was not inconsistent with the applicable certification; and (2) plaintiff had a plausible explanation for any perceived inconsistency in his representations to the court.
[brief] The District Has Failed to Take Steps to Reduce Its Special Education Costs.  As this court previously found, a significant portion of [...]’s school funding is spent on special education.  *Alcantara*, 475 N.J. Super. at 63.  But the record demonstrates that the District has not taken steps to reduce its expenditures, despite repeated warnings to do so.  In the 2009 Needs Assessment, the Department found that [...] “could do significantly more with the funds currently available to it” and “find ways to ensure that its resources are directed to meet the instructional needs of its students. ” (Ra74).  In terms of special education, the assessment recommended that the District “develop strategies to educate more of its special education students in-district. ”  *Ibid.*  Five years later, [...]’s audit report found “a lack of proper approval, tuition documents, and attendance records . . . for students placed in unapproved nonpublic schools. ” (Ra76).
[brief] (Da12).  Counts one through four arose from a robbery of a [...] store in [...] on December 3, 2009.  (Da12).  Counts five through eight stemmed from a robbery of an [...] store on December 5, 2009.  (Da12).  Defendant also was charged under [...] with two counts of second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm by a person convicted of certain crimes.  (Da12).
[brief] Shutka v. Pennsylvania \(^3\)  Comparative negligence is an affirmative defense that the defendants are saddled with the burden of proving.  R. 4:5-4; see also; Heimbach v. Mueller, 229 N.J. Super. 17, 26 (App. Div. 1988); see also; Renz v. Penn Cent. Corp., 87 N.J. 437, 460 (1981).
[brief] Chapter 68: Amendments to the Local Tax Authorization Act.  The Legislature also amended the Local Tax Authorization Act (LTAA), N.J.S.A. 40:48C-1 to -42, to make population the lone qualification requirement for imposition of a payroll tax.  L. 2018, c. 68, § 1 (Chapter 68); (Aa12).  But it also added a sub-classification, whereby eligible municipalities with “a median household income of $55,000 or greater” shall deposit the revenue from any payroll tax “into a trust fund to be used exclusively for school purposes. ”  Ibid.; (Aa12).  Because [...] meets the statutory population threshold (200,000), it is eligible to impose a payroll tax.  Ibid.  And because [...] has a median household income over $55,000, the proceeds from any payroll tax must be used for school purposes.  *Ibid.*; see also Assembly Budget Comm. Statement to A. 4163 (June 18, 2018) (explaining the purpose of Chapter 68 was to give [...] another method for raising “revenues for school purposes”).  As a result, on November 20, 2018, [...] enacted Ordinance 18-133, establishing an employer payroll tax under the LTAA.  (Aa208-18; Aa1116; Aa1874).  On May 31, 2022, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and the corresponding portion of the LTAA, finding that it did not violate the State and federal Constitutions.  *Mack-Cali Realty Corp. v. State*, 466 N.J Super. 402 (App. Div. 2021), aff’d o.b., 250 N.J. 550 (2022).  The City initiated collection of the payroll tax in April 2019.  Since the payroll tax was enacted, [...] has made payments to [...] of $3,500,000 in FY2019; $30,692,633 in FY2020; $86,010,956.00 in both FY2021 and FY2022; and [...] received $65,000,000 to supplement its FY2023 budget.  (Aa13; Aa1117-18; Aa1345; Aa1608; Aa1538; Aa1642; Aa1875).
[brief] Similarly, the State also acknowledges that there was no overall-fairness analysis as required by *State v. Torres*, 246 N.J. 246, 268 (2021), but instead argues that the “analysis can be gleaned from the transcript and the sentence imposed was fundamentally fair. ” (Sb22).  *Torres* explicitly states, however, that “[a]n explicit statement, explaining the overall fairness of a sentence imposed on a defendant for multiple offenses in a single proceeding or in multiple sentencing proceedings, is essential to a proper *Yarbough* sentencing assessment. ”  246 N.J. at 268 (emphasis added).  Moreover, [...] was functionally sentenced to the most severe sentence a person can receive in our state: life without the possibility of parole.  Accordingly, it is imperative that the trial court make an “explicit” assessment of this “essential” issue.  As to the more heavily disputed error, although it did not request aggravating factor one at the sentencing, the State nonetheless asserts on appeal it was not error for the trial court to sua sponte apply that extraordinary and rarely applied aggravating factor.
[brief] [...] has been Board-Certified in Ophthalmology by the American Board of Ophthalmology since 2012.  He has written twelve peer reviewed published articles and two book chapters and has lectured extensively in the field of ophthalmology.  (Da0340-Da0343)  [...] has been administering Ozurdex to patients regularly every three to four months since 2010.  (Pa115-Pa117)  Accordingly, based upon his education, training, research and experience, [...] knows and understands the “mechanisms and issues with regard to causation as it pertains to [...]’s left eye injury, including, but not limited to her loss of vision in her left eye.
[brief] The prematurity of [...]’s Public Trust Doctrine claims is further underscored by a review of the language of the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan.  The Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan does not require that development of properties located within the Redevelopment Area must comply with the redevelopment standards set forth within the redevelopment plan.  To the contrary, the redevelopment plan creates an “optional development alternative” to the existing underlying Zoning Districts (Pa550).  Thus, someone wishing to develop property located within this Redevelopment Area has the option of either developing the property in accordance with the standards of the underlying zoning or in accordance with the redevelopment overlay zoning standards.  [...]’s arguments regarding the alleged violation of the Public Trust Doctrine focus only upon the development authorized within the redevelopment overlay zoning, without recognizing that it is an option that may never be pursued by a redeveloper.  Moreover, the Public Access Doctrine Laws establish the [...] as the entity responsible for protecting and expanding public access, not private actors such as [...].
[directive] Si ha contestado que “no” a esta pregunta, debe contestar las Preguntas 17b a 17F.  Si ha contestado que “sí” a esta pregunta, siga a la pregunta 18.  If you have answered “No” to this question, you must answer Questions 17b – 17f.  If you have answered “Yes” to this question, proceed to Question 18 b.  ¿Entiende que si usted no es ciudadano de los Estados Unidos, esta declaración de culpabilidad [Sí/Yes] [No/No] puede resultar en su expulsión de los Estados Unidos o impedir que pueda entrar o volver a entrar legalmente en los Estados Unidos?  Do you understand that if you are not a citizen of the United States, this guilty plea may result in your removal from the United States and/or stop you from being able to legally enter or re-enter the United States?
[brief] . . .  To be enforced, an arbitration award must draw its essence from the terms of the agreement executed between the parties. ”) (citing *Cnty. Coll. of Morris Staff Assoc.*, 100 N.J. at 391) (other internal citations omitted) [Da558]; *Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC*, 675 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2012), as amended (Apr. 4, 2012) (“[W]hen the arbitrator strays from interpretation and application of the agreement and effectively ‘dispenses his own brand of industrial justice, he exceeds his powers and his award will be unenforceable. ”) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.*, 559 U.S. 662, 671 (2010)); see also id. at 219-20 (“An arbitrator . . . subjects his award to judicial vacatur . . . when he . . . issues an award that is so completely irrational that it lacks support altogether. ”), aff’d, 569 U.S. 564 (2013).
[brief] If the Legislature had wanted the residency requirement to be a continuing obligation, the statute would have described that obligation explicitly. \(^6\)  That is what the drafters of New Jersey statutes and municipal ordinances have done in \(^6\)  Presumably, the Legislature also would have included a change in residency as a ground for removing a BOG member but, as already noted, that ground does not appear.  other instances.  See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 18A:12-3 (providing for immediate cessation of membership on local board of education when members “cease to be a bona fide resident of the district”); N.J.S.A. 40:41A-33 and -35 (declaring “the county executive shall be a qualified voter of the county residing in the county” and deeming such office “vacant if the incumbent moves his residence from the county”); City of Newark v. PBA Local 3, 272 N.J. Super. 31, 35 (App. Div. 1994) (“All officers and employees of the city who shall hereafter become employees of the city are hereby required as a condition of their continued employment to have their place of abode in the city and to be bona fide residents therein.  . . .”); Salem Blue Collar Workers Ass’n v. City of Salem, 33 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 1994) (all “officers and employees hereinafter to be employed by the City of Salem are hereby required as a condition of their employment to have their place of abode in the City of Salem.  . . .”).  Lawmakers in other jurisdictions have likewise spoken clearly and definitively when intending a residency requirement to be continuing in nature.
[brief] This means “neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract. ”  Sons of Thunder, supra, 148 N.J. at 420.  The “breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not create an independent cause of action when it is based on the same underlying conduct as the breach of contract claim. ”  Hills v. Bank of Am., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32502, *8 (D.N.J March 17, 2015) (citations omitted); Tredo v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145731, *15 (D.N.J. Oct. 10, 2014).  Rather, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be an independent cause of action only under three limited circumstances: (1) to allow the inclusion of additional terms and conditions not expressly set forth in the contract, but consistent with the parties’ contractual expectations; (2) to allow redress for a contracting party’s bad-faith performance of an agreement, when it is a pretext for the exercise of a contractual right to terminate, even where the defendant has not breached any express term; and (3) to rectify a party’s unfair exercise of discretion regarding its contract performance.