ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 222 (2011).  In that setting, the failure of the trial court to construe and interpret all relevant provisions of the lease that was before it, along with the failure to cite a single case, and the failure to grapple in any meaningful way with Tenant’s arguments or its contractually-based entitlement to an offset dooms the court’s ruling under Rule 1:7-4(a).
[brief] [...]’s July 30, \(^{12}\) Again, the so-called continuing property damage results only from the government directed remediation, whereby CVOCS are pulled from bedrock and into groundwater for treatment.  (Pb, pp. 34-35).  2020 Order does not address this factual inquiry and, instead, [...] strays from *Boston Gas* completely by using [...]’s recommendations as to “fact-based” start dates at different operational locations at the Plainville facility, as well as the quantity of CVOC releases at these locations during these same periods, but then applying a singular and arbitrary “end” date.
[directive] 2.3.3  To provide such direction and control, supervisory personnel must be granted the proper authority to carry out their responsibilities.  To properly exercise this authority, supervisory personnel must be fully familiar with applicable agency rules and regulations.  Based on the size and needs of the individual agency, supervisory personnel may be permitted to impose specific disciplinary measures (subject to approval of the law enforcement executive) including oral reprimands or performance notices, written reprimands and suspensions.  In addition, the supervisor should be permitted to make written recommendations for other disciplinary actions.  The extent of this authority must be clearly stated in the agency's disciplinary rules and regulations.  9
[brief] ”  *State v. Phillips*, 166 N.J. Super. 153, 159-160 (App. Div. 1979) It is certainly true that the Supreme Court has held that a drunk-driving suspect's refusal to take a blood-alcohol test, after a police officer had lawfully requested it, was not testimony coerced by the officer and was therefore not protected by the suspect's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
[brief] Furthermore, the applicant testified that it would comply with the engineer’s recommendations for shade trees near the stormwater management system and would plant as many street trees as could fit to comply with the engineer’s request.  In fact, the testimony reflected that the number of street trees would not change, only the placement of same.  As such, it is curious that the Board would seek to argue that waivers, which their own engineer took no issue with, would somehow create a safety hazard.  Finally, despite the fact that [...] clearly presented testimony that the location of the lot lines are most practical in a non-radial fashion due to the location of the drainage basin, he, as noted above, testified that the applicant was willing to re-work the lines to conform and that same would not affect the number of houses in the subdivision.
[brief] DATED MARCH 15, 1999 ........................................Da165  [...] ORDINANCE FOR ACQUISITION OF [...] DATED DECEMBER 18, 1997 ................................Da168  [...] LISTING AGREEMENT  [...] RENT ROLL; OFFER TO PURCHASE BY [...]  DATED FEBRUARY 4, 1988........................................Da171  [...] APPRAISAL OF [...] AND [...] DATED APRIL 14, 1988 ........................................Da174  CONTRACT OF SALE FOR [...] DATED 1988........................................................Da178 ASSIGNMENT FROM [...] TO ANTONIA [...] DATED AUGUST 3, 1988 ........................................Da179  ROCCO [...] CHECK NO.:296 FOR PURCHASE OF [...] DATED MAY 20, 1988 ........................................Da181  SETTLEMENT STATEMENT BETWEEN [...] AND [...] BY ASSIGNMENT 100 DOLLAR REALTY DATED 08/05/1988 ................Da182 INDEX TO APPENDIX VOLUME II(Da184-Da214)
[brief] The Court finds that that is the correct date of the commencement of the statute of limitations for purposes of instituting suit.  Now, the plaintiff has sought to distinguish the holding of the federal court in this matter from [...] when the federal court essentially dismissed with prejudice the federal claims on -- based -- indicating that they were time barred.  I -- this Court is not bound by [...]'s or the federal court's ruling in any way, shape or form.
[brief] Much like in Rodriguez, supra, the facts of the matter at bar, as pled by Plaintiffs, additionally and unequivocally show that [...] was the victim of a third-party who clearly intended grievous harm.  The mere presence of this third-party upon public property, who ultimately had “criminal intent or purpose” to do harm to [...], does not create a “dangerous condition” of public property.  The Court Below, in accordance with longstanding caselaw in New Jersey, correctly determined that no defect of the physical property was plead nor existed which in conjunction with the alleged (illegal) activity could equate to a “dangerous condition” of public property.  The Court Below did not ignore the activity (i.e., the illegal makeshift liquor stand) as argued by Plaintiff, but rather --- 2 Pursuant to R. 1:36-3, a copy of the unpublished opinion Pagan v. Newark Housing Authority, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2485 (App. Div. 2017), is available beginning at HHA_Da007. simply placed it appropriately within the second prong of the test.  The Trial Court’s determination was contingent on Plaintiffs’ failure to plead a defect of the physical public property itself, nothing more, nothing less.  Any reference by Plaintiffs to the Trial Court’s inadvertent mischaracterization of the shooting is a red herring intended only to confuse this Court and the issues before it.  Further, whether or not the Court Below mischaracterized the shooting itself is irrelevant to the “dangerous condition” analysis and not the issue before this Court.  The issue before the Court is whether or not Plaintiffs sufficiently plead a meritorious cause of action (i.e., a defect of the property itself in addition to an activity).  And the answer is that Plaintiffs failed to plead such a defect and no amount of discovery will make up for Plaintiffs’ failure.
[brief] *Id.*  As articulated in Points I and III, *supra*, Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that the defendants exercised unauthorized control and ownership over identifiable funds that rightfully belonged to [...] and [...] by manipulating the books and records to take distributions without making equal payments to the Plaintiffs.  (*See* III.C, *supra*).  [...] engaged in the aforesaid conduct without authorization from [...], [...], or the Plaintiffs, all to the detriment of the defendant companies from which they stole, and from [...] and [...], as anticipated beneficiaries of their equitable share of those funds.  *See Brown*, 323 N.J. Super. at 37.  Compounding matters, they deposited the funds into their joint account or the [...] account, outside of the Plaintiffs’ knowledge and control.  (23T 9:23 to 29:9).  Appellant’s dispute as to the trial court’s factual findings and weighing of the evidence (Db29-30) is not a sufficient reason to reverse the trial court’s well-founded conclusions.  *Rova Farms*, 65 N.J. at 484.  VI.
[brief] Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...], BOTH INDIVIDUALLY, AS SURVIVING BENEFICIARY, AND ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF [...], AND [...], INDIVIDUALLY AS SURVIVING BENEFICIARY, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], MEDICAL GROUP DOES 1-10 (FICTION NAMES) AND DR. JOHN DOES 1-10 (FICTION NAMES), DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
[brief] 2.  On November 9, 2023, the Court entered an Order instructing the parties to submit their final discovery punch list as it relates to outstanding discovery being requested.  3.  The Defendants’ answered the Plaintiffs’ requested punch list on November 20, 2023.  4.  The Court instructed me to produce o the Plaintiffs all of the documents that are also in possession of the Plaintiffs, which were 1) Purchase Agreement; 2) Transfer Documents that include Deed and HUD; and 3) OPRA documents.
[brief] B. [...] Should Prevail Even Under The Minority Rule  Even in jurisdictions where transactions granting interests to strangers are viewed with skepticism, courts have sometimes given effect to the grantor’s intent where it “is clearly shown[.]”  See, e.g., Medhus v. Dutter, 184 Mont. 437, 603 P.2d 669, 673 (1979)(citing Cushman v. Davis, 80 Cal. App.3d 731, 735, 145 Cal. Rptr. 791, 793 (1978))(emphasis in original)  To determine that intent, courts have considered the express language of the deed, testimony by grantors stating their intent, the fact that the grantor received less value for the property conveyed because of the existence of an easement, and, the sufficiency of the description of the location of the easement and whether or not the reservation names a dominant tenement.  (citations omitted).  [Medhus, 184 Mont. at 444, 603 P.2d at 673.]  The sole evidential basis for the trial court’s ruling in our case was the recital in the 1966 [...]-to-[...] deed in the [...]s’ chain of title:  Excepting and reserving from the above the rights of the public or owners of property lying westerly and southerly of [...] farm to use a roadway or driftway running thru this tract to reach their properties from the public road mentioned in the description above.  We submit that this language does not evince the grantor’s intent with sufficient clarity to deviate from the common law rule.
[brief] [...] also inappropriately relayed the opinion of the non-testifying verifier.  Before [...]’s testimony, the defense objected in advance to any testimony by [...] that his opinion was verified by an independent examiner, arguing that such testimony would be “a major confrontation issue. ”  (6T 5-1 to 6-15)  The trial court ruled that “if there was an independent verification or analysis, I think that person should be here to testify because obviously [the defense attorney] would have the right to question what did he do, how did he do it. ”  (6T 6-6 to 20)  [...] nonetheless testified that a verifier independently reviewed his conclusion and implied that this verifier agreed with him, given that he has “never been involved” in a situation where a verifier did not.  (6T 45-1 to 7, 111-6 to 18)
[brief] ” (Da182).  A similarly worded exclusion was discussed by the Appellate Division in Superior Integrated Solutions v. Mercer Ins. Co. of N.J., No. A-1027-18T4, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2147, *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 2020).  In that case, the Appellate Division held that an exclusion for the publication of materials made “with knowledge of its falsity” will apply where the claimant alleges that the insured acted with intent to injure the claimant.  *Id.* at *22*.
[brief] Cases  B.D. v. Carley, 307 N.J. Super. 259 (App. Div. 1998) .................  Devito v. Sheeran, 165 N.J. 167, 198 (2000) ..........................  12 DiFiore v. Pezic, [...], (N.J. June 15, 2023)  ...................  Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480, 492 (1999)  ............  12 Higgins v. Polk, 14 N.J. 490, 493 (1954)  ..............................  12 Rivers v. LSC Partnership, 378 N.J. Super. 68, 80 (App. Div.), certif. denied.  185 N.J. 296 (2005) ..........................  12 U.S. Bank National Association v. Williams, 415 N.J. Super. 358.  365 (App. Div. 2010)  ...........................................  12 New Jersey Court Rules R. 4:10-3 ......................................................... 8, 10, 11, 13 R. 4:19 ..........................................................
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................... 9  The Borough's Designated Newspapers ...............................  10  The Borough’s Efforts to Reorganize for the 2022 Calendar Year .......  10  The Borough’s Redevelopment Process ..............................  13  The Lane Avenue Development .......................................  19  The Substantive Challenge to the Redevelopment Plan ...............  21  The Borough Effectuated a Policy Designed to Operate in Secret ......  22  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  AN APPELLATE COURT REVIEWS A TRIAL COURT’S GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT DE NOVO .................. 23  (Not Raised Below)  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT’S STATEMENT OF REASONS DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 1:7-4 AND IS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO NO DEFERENCE (Pa82)  .....  25  A. First Count ............................................................ 26 B. Second Count ........................................................ 30 C. Third Count ............................................................  35  POINT III ORDINANCE 1423-21 IS VOID BECAUSE IT WAS ENACTED IN VIOLATION OF THE LRHL AND N.J.S.A. 40:42-9 (Pa82) .......... 37 POINT IV THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE DICTATE THAT THE TIME FOR FILING PLAINTIFF’S CHALLENGE BE EXTENDED .......... 41 (Not Raised Below) POINT V THE BOROUGH’S NOTICES VIOLATED THE OPEN PUBLIC MEETINGS ACT (Pa82) ......................... 43 CONCLUSION ................................................................. 50  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ENTERED JANUARY 24, 2022 .............. 23a ORDER VACATING TEMPORARY RESTRAINTS ENTERED JANUARY 27, 2022 ............................................. 29a ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ENTERED MARCH 4, 2022 ........................................... 31a ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ENFORCE LITIGANT’S RIGHTS ENTERED MARCH 4, 2022 ......................... 37a ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED SEPTEMBER 9, 2022 .................................................. 80a TRIAL COURT’S STATEMENT OF REASONS IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ............................................ 82a TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Accardi v. North Wildwood, 145 N.J. Super. 532, 545 (Law Div. 1976) .......
[brief] Indeed, documents that contain both irrelevant and relevant information are commonly produced in discovery, and a party generally may not redact the irrelevant portions of those documents.  See, e.g., Target Corp. v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 576 F. Supp. 3d 609, 620 (D. Minn. 2021) (“Redaction is an inappropriate tool for excluding alleged irrelevant information from documents that are otherwise responsive to a discovery request. ”); Coe v. Cross-Lines Ret. Ctr., Inc., 342 F.R.D. 539, 548 (D. Kan. 2022) (holding same “because parties are not ordinarily harmed by producing irrelevant or sensitive information that is already subject to a protective order restricting its dissemination and use”).  That recognition is built into the rule governing depositions.  An objection on the ground of relevance is not permissible during a deposition.  R. 4:14-3(c).  The right to object on the basis of relevance “is preserved and may be asserted at the time the deposition testimony is proffered at trial. ”  Ibid.  These Rules clearly establish that broad discovery serves the truth-seeking purpose of the civil justice system and that to ensure that parties can obtain all relevant, admissible evidence, the discovery process must tolerate the production of some irrelevant evidence as well.  As detailed below, the trial court applied these principles in light of this case’s particular and perhaps unusual record, taking an approach that was reasonable, pragmatic, and supported by caselaw in other jurisdictions.  The court acted well within the scope of its discretion, and thus its Order should be affirmed.
[brief] He formally requested a redemption statement for April 6, 2023.  (Aa312)  [...], emailed a redemption statement, and advised that the figures may be subject to additional costs.  She informed [...] that the tax sale certificate was foreclosed and had not received any documents to vacate the final judgment.  (Aa317 to 318)  The Defendant produced a [...], cashier’s check, from in the amount of $19,003.92 to redeem the tax sale certificate.
[brief] Contrary to Plaintiff’s disingenuous assertion, the Trial Court relied upon the language of the Commitment for Title Insurance as written and made no attempt to “rewrite” the contract, thereby correctly finding that the contract’s terms dictated the precise requirements to form a valid and enforceable contract, which Plaintiff did not follow.  Specifically, Plaintiff never procured the required conveyance documents to satisfy its obligations to form a valid contract – nor could he satisfy these conditions since the underlying real estate contract was blatantly illegal under the Tax Sale Law.  As such, all of Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law since there was no binding contract upon which any such claim can be maintained due to the failure of conditions precedent.
[directive] g.  Subguns having only semi-automatic capabilities will fire “full auto” stages with semi-automatic double taps.  3 yard line 6 rounds, standing 1.5 seconds each command •  From a standing ready position, on command fire a 2 round burst or semi-automatic double tap •  Repeat twice for a total of 6 rounds •  Place weapon on safe and move to the 5 yard line 5 yard line 6 rounds, standing 1.5 seconds each command •  From a standing ready position, on command fire a 2 round burst or semi-automatic double tap •  Repeat twice for a total of 6 rounds •  Place weapon on safe and move to the 7 yard line 7 yard line 10 rounds, standing - alternative threat areas; standing to kneeling •  From a standing ready position, on command fire a 2 round burst or semi-automatic double tap to the body, then one round to the head.  (2 seconds)  •  Repeat once for a total of 6 rounds •  From a standing ready position, on command fire a 2 round burst or semi-automatic double tap, assume a kneeling position and fire a 2 round burst or semi-automatic double tap.  (6 seconds)  •  Place the weapon on safe and move to the 10 yard line 10 yard line 6 rounds, standing 9-56  Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards
[brief] While the underlying motion was pending, [...] filed a baseless complaint against [...], and other defendants, in Florida State Court alleging that these parties made defamatory statements, tortiously interfered with business relations and conspired to make the alleged defamatory statements.  The complaint was later dismissed.  In direct response to [...]’s continued abuse of the legal system and attempts to harass and intimidate [...], [...] filed a Complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that [...] did not defame [...], tortiously interfere with [...]’s business relations or conspire to defame and tortiously interfere and that [...] cannot bring a lawsuit in any forum related to these claims.  This Complaint was filed to protect [...] from further baseless litigations.  [...] has since amended the Complaint in Florida State Court to add [...] as a defendant asserting the same allegations related to defamation as the original Florida State Court action.
[brief] As discussed above, upon reconsideration, the Trial Court did not alter the amount of the sanction or the basis therefor, but determined that the sanction should be directed at Plaintiffs only, and not at their attorneys.  (3T 22:15-23:17).  Although the Trial Court never spelled it out, because the Frivolous Litigation Statute is directed to parties, and Rule 1:4-8 is directed only to attorneys, the sanctions award must have been made pursuant to the Frivolous Litigation Statute.
[brief] *Ibid.*  He denied [...]’s allegations.  *Ibid.*  According to his account, he spoke to [...] about several members who told him that [...] had been “falsely obtaining signatures” by claiming that the signatures were for [...] when they were really for her friend (his opponent).  *Ibid.*  [...] also reported approaching [...] outside the NJDOL building, inquiring, “[h]ey, how are you making out?” and congratulating [...] about her gender transition.  *Ibid.*  [...] denied knowing her “new name” or saying: “[h]ey D[];” he also denied that [...] corrected him to call her D[a].  (Aa28-29).  [...] denied yelling “D[], D[], D[], D[]” or stating “[t]hat’s not true D[]” when they were separated by the [...] and [...]. (Aa29).  After the morning incident, [...] left the area, but [...] stayed behind to “try and calm members down. ”  Ibid.  [...] agreed that there were other people around, but he could not identify anyone.  Ibid.  [...] eventually returned to his union office.  Ibid.  [...] appeared at the office later that afternoon to drop off her union petition, and explained to “someone” on the election committee—Witness 4 or Witness 5—that she wanted to change her name on the petition from D[] to D[a]; despite D[a]. not being her legal name, the election committee approved the request.  Ibid.  [...] reiterated that he was not aware of D.[a].’s new name preference prior to seeing [...] at the union office that afternoon.  Ibid.  [...] also claimed that he heard [...] tell Witness 5 that she was thinking about pressing harassment charges against him, to which he responded, “[y]ou can do whatever you want.
[directive] An individual under the age of eighteen (18) who operates these vehicles shall complete a safety education and training course.  N.J.S.A. 39:3C-9(b).  2  Not all ORVs are required to adhere to these mandates.  See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 39:3C-6 (operation for use on farms); N.J.S.A. 39:3C-7 (nonresident exceptions).  3  In addition to those lands under the jurisdiction of the Department of Environmental Protection or used for conservation purposes, public lands include “any land so designated by municipal or county ordinance. ”  N.J.S.A. 39:3C-1; N.J.S.A. 39:3C-32.  For example, public lands designated by a municipal ordinance may include sidewalks, bicycle paths, conservation easements, open spaces, parks or any other public lands within a particular city or township.  See, e.g., Passaic, N.J., Code, ch. 203, Art. II, § 17 (rev. Apr. 12, 2022) (Passaic County Parks and Playgrounds); Holmdel, N.J., Ordinances, ch. 3, § 3-3.2(b)(3).  Municipal ordinances may also include specific days and times when ORVs may be operated.  See, e.g., id. at § 3-3.2(b)(7).  ORVs operated on these public lands will also be subject to the requirements of Title 39:3C-1 et seq., outlined in Section I.
[brief] See Crawn, 136 N.J. at 511-12 (1994); see discussion in Pellicer v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 200 N.J. 22, 51-57 (2009).  Counsel’s merely enumerating a large number of inconsequential mistakes or repeating the same objection is not, however, equivalent to cumulative and prejudicial error.  See Pellicer, 200 N.J at 55.  A trial court’s exercise of its broad discretion in making evidentiary determinations as to relevance and admissibility will not be disturbed absent a manifest denial of justice.
[brief] State v. Combariati, 186 N.J. Super. 375 (Law Div. 1982), aff’d mem., 192 N.J. Super. 131 (App. Div. 1983), certif. denied, 97 N.J. 694 (1984)  ....................................................................................................66-67  State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339 (1987) .......................................................................52  State v. Cuff, 239 N.J. 321 (2019) ..............................................................................33  State v. Czachor, 82 N.J. 392 (1980) .......................................................................25, 26, 27, 28 State v. D.G.M., 439 N.J. Super. 630 (App. Div. 2015) ...........................................68
[brief] *Id.* at 367–68.  This civil conversation quickly escalated into a full-scale brawl, where all three defendants were physically fighting each other.  *Ibid.*  The brawl reached its climax when [...] got into his car and fatally struck [...] with his vehicle.  *Ibid.*  Nonetheless, despite the heightened romantic emotions at play and the physical brawl in which [...] punched and kicked [...] prior to the killing, the Court held that “[n]either of these factors supports passion/provocation mitigation in this case. ”  *Id.* at 385.