ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (1T12-21 to 14-22)  The following colloquy occurred:  THE COURT: Do you have a driver’s license?  DEFENDANT: No.  THE COURT: Suspended already?  DEFENDANT: Yeah.  THE COURT: Yes?  DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.  THE COURT: Well as a result of your plea of guilty here today, sir, it’s suspended for **10 more years** from today’s date, you understand that?  DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.  (emphasis added)  (1T14-6 to 14-16)  On December 12, 2022, Defendant filed a notice of motion to modify his sentence “and, in the alternative, vacating [his] plea.
[brief] As depicted in the Plaintiffs’ own exhibit, the accessory structure is at least 300 feet from the Plaintiffs’ residence, which contradicts the Plaintiffs’ testimony.  There is a large natural barrier of trees between the accessory structure and the Plaintiffs’ residence.  The accessory structure is placed and constructed in a visually attractive manner as depicted in the photographs.  The Property already contains a residential structure and, therefore, the addition of an accessory garage is a natural and expected improvement to the Property.  Moreover, the surrounding parcels and those across from the Property contain a mix of residential and commercial uses, as well as undeveloped land.  The parcel immediately to the south of the Property contains an advertising billboard.  Taking these neighboring uses into consideration, the accessory structure does not present a “substantial detriment” to the neighboring properties; and 6.
[brief] 21T refers to the PCR motion transcript dated July 21, 2023 PSR refers to the pre-sentence report # Table of Authorities  ## Cases - **State v. Acevedo**, 205 N.J. 40 (2011) ...........................................  19 - **State v. Briggs**, 349 N.J. Super. 496 (App. Div. 2002) ......................... 30 - **State v. Brimage**, 153 N.J. 1 (1998) ..............................................  22 - **State v. Case**, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) .................................................. 20 - **State v. Cuff**, 239 N.J. 321 (2019) .................................................. 1, 8, 35 - **State v. Cummings**, 321 N.J. Super. 154 (App. Div.), certif denied, 162 N.J. 199 (1999) .................................................................................................. 45 - **State v. Fritz**, 105 N.J. 42 (1987) .................................................... 25, 26, 31 - **State v. Gerns**, 145 N.J. 216 (1996) .................................................. 22 - **State v. Gonzalez**, 223 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 1988) ............... 22, 23 - **State v. Hess**, 207 N.J. 123 (2011) .................................................. 27, 28, 31, 34, 35 - **State v. Hicks**, 54 N.J. 390 (1969) .................................................... 21 - **State v. Harris**, 181 N.J. 391(2004) .................................................. 18, 26 - **State v. Hodge**, 95 N.J. 369 (1984) .................................................. 22 - **State v. Hubbard**, 176 N.J. Super. 174 (Resent. Panel 1980) .......... 20 - **State v. Jones**, 219 N.J. 298 (2014) .................................................. 45, 46, 47, 48 - **State v. Jones**, 475 N.J. Super. 520 (App. Div. 2023) ....................... 39 - **State v. Marshall**, 148 N.J. 89 (1997) .............................................. 47 - **State v. Preciose**, 129 N.J. 451(1992) .............................................. 25, 26, 47 State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208 (1996) ........................................... 19, 20, 21, 23 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1986).
[brief] The City provided a comprehensive statement of the operative facts of this matter in its post-hearing brief to [...], which is in the record and incorporated herein.  The Fire Officers wish to ignore the fact that [...] is not a wealthy City.  The average median household income is $47,373.00 and the average individual income is only $22,000.  (October 26, 2023 Tr., 17:11-14, 25:13-15)  This is in stark contrast to the fire officers, most of whom earn in excess of $120,000 a year, and some earn $213,000 a year (October 26, 2023, Tr., 16:10-15.)  Fire Officers also receive health insurance benefits from the City, which continue when they retire.  The health insurance coverage that the City provides to its employees is considered a “Cadillac Plan” because it is very generous.  (October 26, 2023 Tr., 42:10-13)  The cost to the City for the plan is approximately $12,000 per individual, and $25,000 per family.  (October 26, 2023 Tr., 42:14-19)  This is an additional benefit and expense to the City beyond the employee’s salary.  (October 26, 2023 Tr., 42:20-22)  When the Fire Officers retire, the City still has to contribute to their health insurance coverage as provided by the State, as well as their pensions.  (October 26, 2023 Tr., 20:9-17, 42:23-43.3)  The Fire Officers can retire with 65% of their base pay, and they can collect their pension benefit until their death.  (October 26, 2023 Tr., 20:18-24)  The Fire Officers are not required to have a college degree, and they are the highest paid employees in the City.  In stark contrast, the average DPW employee only earns $35,000 to $45,000 per year.  (October 26, 2023 Tr., 17:3-6)  In fact, the Fire Officers earn even more than the police supervisors.  (October 26, 2023 Tr., 17:7-10)  At the time of the hearing, the salaries for the fire officers were almost fifteen million dollars.  (September 21, 2023 Tr., 74: 19-21)  The City has a population in excess of 150,000, making the City a municipality of the first class by law, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:6-4a.
[directive] d.  Si la infracción ocurrió el primero de febrero de 1993 o después de dicha fecha pero antes del [Sí/Yes] [No/No] 13 de marzo de 1995 y se le sentencia a libertad a prueba o a un instituto correccional del estado, usted tendrá que pagar un gasto de transacción de hasta $1.00 dólar en cada ocasión en que se haga un pago o en que se abone una cuota?  Si la infracción ocurrió el 13 de marzo de 1995 o después de dicha fecha, y se le sentencia a libertad a prueba, o si la sentencia por otro motivo requiere pagos de obligaciones económicas a la división de libertad a prueba, usted tendrá que pagar un gasto de transacción de hasta $2.00 dólares en cada ocasión en que se haga un pago o se abone una cuota?  If the offense occurred on or after February 1, 1993 but was before March 13, 1995, and you are being sentenced to probation or a State correctional facility, you must pay a transaction fee of up to $1.00 for each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made?  If the offense occurred on or after March 13, 1995 and the sentence is to probation, or the sentence otherwise requires payments of financial obligations to the probation division, you must pay a transaction fee of up to $2.00 for each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made?
[brief] ERETC, L.L.C. v. City of Perth Amboy, 381 N.J. Super. 268, 277, 885 A.2d 512 (App. Div. 2005).  "Judicial deference does not mean that a court is a rubber stamp."  62-64 Main St., 221 N.J. at 157, 110 A.3d 877.  Courts "must review the complete record" to assess whether it contains substantial evidence to support a redevelopment designation.  Hirth v. City of Hoboken, 337 N.J. Super. 149, 157, 766 A.2d 803 (App. Div. 2001).  Id. at 314.  \(^{11}\) N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(d) reads, in pertinent part, that the “delineated area may be determined to be in need of redevelopment if…the governing body…concludes that within the delineated area any of the following conditions is found:  d.  Areas with buildings or improvements which by reason of …obsolescence [or other factors]..faulty arrangement…obsolete layout [or other factors], are detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the community. ”  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(d)  The Court concluded that the record lacked credible substantial evidence to support the designation.  It reasoned that even if proof of the condition relied upon (in this case obsolescence) was arguably sufficient, there was insufficient proof that the library site - still in active use by the community - was detrimental to the community’s welfare.
[brief] In May of 2019, [...], along with his wife, formed [...] (hereinafter referred to interchangeably as “[...]” or “[...]”).  (Ia344; Ia085).  The summer camp was modeled after [...], but was intended for high-school aged youths, and was scheduled to operate in Virginia from August 6, 2019, through August 26, 2019.  (Ia101).  According to the camp’s application, transportation for certain activities would be arranged by the camp.  (Ia101).  To effectuate the camp’s transportation needs, [...] rented four twelve (12) to fifteen (15) seat “Ford Transit vans” and one “Full-size Sedan”.  (Ia332; 334; Ia114-117).  They were to be driven by camp staff.  (Ia338; Ia012).  On May 30, 2019, [...] communicated by phone and by email with a representative from [...] to procure insurance coverage for the 2019 summer camp operations.  (Ia331-332; Ia335-336; Ia276-280).  In the email, [...] wrote that “per our conversation earlier today, [l]ast summer we had a camp policy under the name [...]” and that “[w]e would like to renew our summer policy under the name [...] Of Richmond LLC[.]” (Ia276).
[brief] The Doctrine Of Fundamental Fairness Cannot Save [...].  Finally, [...] argues that the ALJ and Commissioner’s decision violates the doctrine of fundamental fairness.  (Pb24).  The doctrine of fundamental fairness “serves to protect citizens generally against unjust and arbitrary governmental action, and specifically against governmental procedures that tend to operate arbitrarily. ”  Constantine v. Twp. of Bass River, 406 N.J. Super. 305, 320 (App. Div. 2009)(quotations and citations omitted).  “Although the doctrine of fundamental fairness has been applied in many contexts, ‘there is [always] one common denominator[,] ‘a determination that someone was being subjected to potentially unfair treatment and there was no explicit statutory or constitutional protection to be invoked. ’”  Id. (citing Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 108 (1995))(alterations in original).  Here, the Court should reject [...]’s argument that his “ability to protect and preserve his tenured teaching position were (sic) caught between the timeliness requirements of N.J.A.C. § 6A:3-1.3(i) and the appellate litigation process. ” (Pb25).  There is nothing fundamentally or even remotely unfair about the circumstances faced by [...] here.  Contrary to [...]’s position, he had available legal procedures—most notably, the stay provisions of N.J.A. C. § 6A:9B-4.160 and Rule 2:9-7—that would have allowed him to try and avoid the statutory consequences compelled by the suspension of his certificate.  He failed to avail himself of those procedures in a timely fashion.  The subsequent events, including his termination, are traceable to that failure, not some fundamental unfairness inherent within N.J.A.C. § 6A:3-1.3(i), the appellate litigation process, or the statutory scheme governing teachers and their certificates.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] ”  R. 4:49-1.  The “judgment of the initial factfinder . . . whether it be a jury . . . or a judge as in a non-jury case, is entitled to very considerable respect.  It should not be overthrown except upon the basis of a carefully reasoned and factually supported (and articulated) determination, after canvassing the record and weighing the evidence, that the continued viability of the judgment would constitute a manifest denial of justice. ”  *Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co.*, 74 N.J. 588, 596 (1977).
[brief] Moreover, services encompassed by the statutory definition of debt adjuster are often an integral and essential part of an attorney’s job when he represents a debt-ridden client.  *The exemption of attorneys bears a rational relation to the legislative aim.*  It is quite logical for the Legislature to exempt from the operation of this statute those groups whose activities are not likely to harm the segment of society the statute seeks to protect.  These exemptions bear a reasonable relation to the end to be achieved and they operate without arbitrary discrimination upon all those similarly situated.
[brief] (*Id*).  As the record stands, it is unclear whether the proceedings on September 21 and 23, 2020 constituted a “trial” or a “proof hearing. ”  (*See* [...]’s opening statements in 1T).  Plaintiffs submitted a post-trial brief on October 21, 2020.  (Da33).  At approximately the same point in time, the court’s docket was updated to indicate that the case had been “closed” and “dismissed by the court with prejudice. ”  (*See* Da154; *See also* Da59 and Da85).  Nearly two years elapsed before Plaintiffs filed a motion to re-open the case and request reassignment of the case to a new judge.
[brief] See Emmons v Stevane, 64 A. 1014, 73 N.J. L. 349, 351-352 (1906) holding that a dog should be lauded for protecting its property.  [...]  Defendant and [...] told similar stories.  [...] held up her hand to stop and he saw her do so.  They made eye contact.  She told him to wait until she put the dogs away and although he couldn’t hear her, he admitted he saw her point to a dog.
[directive] August 2020  5, Page 3 of - Order 3A  Mandating Continued Commitment  NGRI Acquittee Who Has Been Found Dangerous to Self, Others, or Property as a Result of Mental Illness (Attachment D)  This court order would be used when, following a periodic review hearing, the commitment continued is by the court upon finding that the person cannot be released into the community, either with or without conditions, without posing a danger to self, others, or property pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(3).  - Order 4  Mandating Conditional Release of the NGRI Acquittee to a Specified Community Placement (Attachment E)  This court order would be used when the NGRI acquittee found to not so dangerous to self, others, be is or property as to require institutionalization, but will require release upon certain conditions pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(2).  The court may order the NGRI acquittee to be placed a supervised community in setting, if available, and establish conditions.  Periodic review hearings will be scheduled while the person under supervision the community pursuant to State Ortiz, 193 N.J. 278 (2008).  is in v. - Order 5  Mandating Release of NGRI Acquittee (Attachment F)  This court order would be used when the court finds pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(1) that the NGRI acquittee not so dangerous to self, others, or property as to require institutionalization or release is upon conditions.  accordance with State Ortiz, the court no longer has jurisdiction and there are In v. no further hearings or reviews required under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8.
[brief] [Da88 at p. 30-24 to 31-15].  The absence of these documents, for example, is why the Board’s planner referenced, on page 2 of his May 9, 2022 review memo [Da396], §44-304C of the LUPO, which states in pertinent part as follows:  “the Secretary of the Planning Board . . . shall certify an application as complete . . . only if the application, checklist, all documents required by the checklist, application fee, and escrow fees have been received.  If the application lacks the required information, documents, or fees, or requires referral pursuant to § 44-304, the applicant shall be so notified, in writing, of the deficiency, and the application shall be deemed incomplete. ”  [Pa12; emphasis added]  [...]’ “application” to the CRB could not be deemed a complete application for development because, as noted above, it did not contain the application form required by the LUPO, the checklist attached to the application form, all documents required by the checklist, the application fee or the escrow fees required for the application.
[brief] [...] does not cite industry standards that require a grab bar to be placed near the jacuzzi that [...] attempted to enter.  The Trial Court places great emphasis on this fact.  (T.33, 11-19)  However, what [...] does state in his testimony is that due to the location of a towel bar, said location does violate Section 504.1 of the IPMC since he considered the towel bar a plumbing fixture given its location relative to the jacuzzi where [...] fell. \(^1\) (Pa99, Deposition of [...], 44:25 and 45:1)  Additionally, [...] opined that pursuant to Section 305.5 of the IMPC, since the towel bar was positioned near the jacuzzi rather than a guard rail, it should be capable of supporting normally imposed loads. \(^2\) (Pa114, Deposition of [...],101:1-23)  \(^{1}\) **504.1
[brief] On August 31, 2020, Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Union Vicinage, bearing docket number [...].  [Pa35-Pa47].  On October 13, 2020, [...] filed an Answer and Crossclaim.  [Pa48-Pa63].  The Township filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on November 4, 2020, which was withdrawn on April 20, 2021.  On November 6, 2020, in lieu of an Answer, [...] filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment, which was denied by the trial court on December 18, 2020.  On March 19, 2021, [...] filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which was denied by the trial court on April 30, 2021.  On May 10, 2021, [...] filed an Answer and Crossclaim.  [Pa278-Pa295].  On September 9, 2022, [...] filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”).  [Pa64-Pa227].  On September 27, 2022, [...] filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (the “First Cross-Motion”).  On October 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed Opposition to the Motion and the First Cross-Motion.  On October 17, 2023, [...] filed a Reply Brief in further support of the Motion.
[brief] [...] testified two men entered the store wearing clothing he thought was too warm for the weather.  [...] stated he immediately dialed 9–1–1 on his phone, but did not place the call.  The men asked about phone accessories, and [...] helped the taller man at the front of the store.  [...] stated the taller man was on his phone and he could hear his conversation, including the person on the phone who stated, “I circled the store a couple of times. ”  The shorter man then pulled a gun on [...], and directed both [...] and [...] to the rear of the store, where both were instructed to lie on the floor with their hands at their sides.  The two men then emptied a secure storage cage of cell phones, mobile modems, accessories, and $10,000 in cash from the safe.  [...] stated the men were wearing black gloves.  Following defendant’s arrest, he was read his Miranda rights.
[brief] The [...] instead rely on a single unpublished federal case *Dantinne v. Brown*, No. 17-0486, 2017 WL 2766167 (D.N.J. June 3, 2017), whose facts are inapposite.  CCDb15.  The asserted conflicts in *Dantinne*, a defamation case, depended on an unresolved issue of whether defendant acted in his official or individual capacity.  Here, however, the conflict is inherent and ripe since multiple defendants face joint liability under the IFPA and RICO that must be apportioned under the CNA.
[brief] On January 7, 2022, Plaintiff-Appellant [...] (hereafter referred to “the Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against the Defendant-Respondents [...] and [...] (hereafter referred to as “the Defendants”).  (Pa1).  The Defendants filed an Answer on February 18, 2022.  (Pa9-Pa17).  Discovery concluded on January 11, 2024 and trial was scheduled for April 1, 2024.  On January 26, 2024 the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.  (Pa20).  The Plaintiff filed their opposition on February 20, 2024.  (Pa139).  The Defendants filed their reply brief on February 27, 2024.  (Pa298).  Oral argument before the Honorable [...] in Hudson County occurred on March 1, 2024 (1T) and an Order granting summary judgment dated March 1, 2024 was entered into e-courts on March 8, 2024.  (Pa303).  On March 19, 2024, the Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration.  (Pa304-313).  The Defendants filed their opposition on April 8, 2024.  (Pa314).  Oral argument, again before [...] in Hudson County, took place on April 12, 2024.  (2T).  The Order denying the Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was dated April 12, 2024 and was entered into e-courts on April 16, 2024.  (Pa318-320).
[brief] For these reasons, and the reasons set forth in [...]’s Opening Brief, the Court should REVERSE the Trial Court’s orders: (1) granting [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) denying as “moot”, rather than with prejudice, of [...]’s Motion to Bar, and (3) denying [...]’s Motion to Amend pursuant to R. 4:49-2.  Respectfully submitted, By: s/ [...] MARISA RAUCHWAY SVERDLOV [...]  Attorneys for Appellant [...] Furnishings a.k.a. [...]
[brief] 22  POINT I...................................................................................................................  22  THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS WERE NOT TIME-BARRED SHOULD BE AFFIRMED (Da46-51, 53-56) (Responsive to Defendant’s Points II and III.A, B, and D) ..........  22  A.  The Trial Court Correctly Found That The Parties Entered Into A New, Pay-When-Able Loan .........................................................  23  1.  Meeting of the Minds ................................................................................. 24  2.  Offer, Acceptance, and Consideration.  ....................................................  26  B.  The Trial Court Correctly Found That The New, Third Loan Was A Novation Of The First and Second Loans.  ......................... 28  C.  The Trial Court Correctly Found That Pay-When-Able Loans Are Enforceable In New Jersey And, Therefore, The Statute of Limitations Did Not Bar Plaintiff’s Claim.  ...........................................  29  1.  Pay-When-Able Loans Are Enforceable In New Jersey.  ........  30  2.  The Statute Of Limitations Did Not Bar [...]’ Claims....  33  3.  The Trial Court Properly Concluded That The Parties Entered Into A Pay-When-Able Loan on April 26, 2013.  .......  34  D.  The Trial Court Correctly Found That Defendants Are Equitably Estopped From Asserting A Statute of Limitations Defense.  ......  35  POINT II .................................................................................................................. 37
[brief] The Creation of [...] to Hide [...]’s Eventual Ownership of the Property  As noted above, after discovering [...]’s name on the December 1998 Deed, the Defendants took no actions with respect to the Property until October 2019.  In contemplation of the transfer in October 2019, however, in 2018, [...] and his wife hired lawyers to structure a complex estate and business plan that, among other things, would attempt to hide the theft of the Property in October 2019.  On January 17, 2018, [...] and his wife, with assistance of their lawyer, signed two trust instruments, setting up two trusts “[...]” and “[...]. ” (Pa 1958-2212).  Under the two trusts, [...] and his wife were both settlors and beneficiaries.  On March 20, 2019, [...] and his wife, with assistance of their lawyer, signed the operating agreement of [...].  (Pa 2213-2233).  The two grantor trusts each had 50% membership interest in [...].  [...] was the owner of [...] at the time of [...]’s death in 2020.
[brief] Counsel for [...] characterizes the email from [...] on May 8th as the “final offer” repeatedly in their Brief, thereby labeling the email as the legal instrument that they wish it to be to achieve their ends.  It was not a “final offer”.  It was [...]’s acquiescence to the demands of [...] to obtain an affirmative waiver (something that was not provided for in the MFSA).  It was an affirmation of the existence of [...]’s ROFR submitted to [...] at [...]’s request even though all had already acknowledged that a ROFR had existed at some point but did not necessarily continue to exist.  The explicit reference that was demanded by Plaintiff [...] in order to obtain a written waiver of their ROFR caused an addendum to be created by Defendant [...]’s attorney which was then signed and delivered to Plaintiff [...], thereby demonstrating that all were aware of the existence of the ROFR regardless of the legal impact on [...]’s rights, which was none at all.