ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pa1356.  He did nothing about it.  Ibid.  [...], [...]’s project superintendent, testified that he did not perform an inspection of the sweeper or the backup alarm on [...] sweeping machine prior to work beginning on the date of the incident.  Pa1349; Pa1356.  OSHA regulation requires that “[a]ll vehicles in use shall be checked at the beginning of each shift, including “safety devices. ”  Pa786; CFR §1926.601(b)(14).  “All defects shall be corrected before the vehicle is placed in service. ”  Ibid.  [...], the operator of the sweeper that ran over [...], testified that no one from [...] or any other entity performed an inspection of his vehicle on the night of the incident prior to him beginning work.  Pa1476.  He testified that on the night of the incident no one from the Turnpike or [...] asked him to test the backup alarm on the sweeper.  Pa1478.  The safety rules, regulations and specifications also require functioning mirrors on equipment.  Pa786.  According to Mr. Hackett, the mirrors on the sweeper were not securely attached to the sweeper.  The mirrors were duct taped to the body of the sweeper.  Pa1493.  He described the taped mirrors as a “bandage” to stop the mirrors from shaking.  Ibid.  OSHA regulations and ANSI/ASSE A10.47-2009 standards require that if a reverse signal alarm is inaudible above the surrounding noise level, the “vehicle is backed up only when an observer signals that it is safe to do so.
[brief] There was only one term, which was a non-essential term, that was added to the offer different from that initially presented to the ROFR holder.  In *H&G Hardware*, *supra*, the Appellate Division took special note of the fact that the existence of a ROFR by the tenant was not mentioned in the contract between the property owner and the third-party buyer.  Other than making mention of the ROFR not being a written term of the offer, no further discussion regarding that issue is contained in the opinion of the Court.  Da335.  It had no place in the Trial Court’s decision nor, despite it being explicitly mentioned by the Appellate Division, did it have any influence on the decision of the Appellate Court.  One can only conclude that this is because it was not a material term that was necessary to make it a valid, good faith offer.  In the case at bar, a non-essential term of the contract was added only at the ROFR holder’s behest and under the duress of the seller ([...]) and the third party buyer, ([...]).  The non-essential term is non-essential (As in H&G Hardware v. Cohen A0667-04T2 2006 WL 27624 (App.Div. Jan 6, 2006)), because in the event that the ROFR holder ([...]) were to exercise its ROFR, the ROFR would have virtually no impact on the manner by which the ROFR holder can acquire the property.  The ROFR holder already has the right by way of the prior contract between [...] and [...].  Because of that one non-essential term being missing, the ROFR holder refused to acknowledge it as a bona fide offer.  The Trial Court agreed with the Plaintiff/ROFR holder’s assessment.  This is clear error.
[brief] Dear Honorable Judges of the Appellate Division:  This firm serves as Redevelopment Counsel to the [...] and is co-counsel to Defendant/Respondent [...].  Please accept this Letter Brief in lieu of a more formal Memorandum of Law in opposition to Appellant’s Brief.  In lieu of submitting a separate Brief and Appendix, the Town joins and adopts the Brief and Appendix filed by Respondent/Intervenor [...] (“[...]”).  This Letter Brief is respectfully submitted to summarize the Town’s position in this matter and amplify certain points in [...]’s Brief.
[brief] As discussed supra, Respondent’s appraiser confirmed he applied the incorrect zoning when arriving at his valuation conclusion.  Pa106; Pa108.  Respondent’s appraiser confirmed during his deposition that an 8-story mixed use building would only be permitted under the Morris Canal Redevelopment Plan zoning and not permitted under the R-2 zoning:  Q:  Do you agree that under the R-2 zoning class that eight stories was not permitted?  A: 20 years ago, that’s correct.  Yes.  It was four stories or less.  Q: And do you agree that under the form of R-2 zoning classification that a mid-rise, multi-family residential development was not a permitted use in the R-2 zoning?  A: Yes.  Pa167-168 [emphasis added].  During his deposition, it became clear that Respondent’s appraiser failed to properly account for the risk and costs associated with obtaining such variances/approvals to construct the proposed eight-story multi-purpose building on the subject Property which Respondent argues constitutes the Property’s Highest and Best Use.  Respondent’s appraiser effectively valued the Property as already having developmental approvals for the hypothetical 8-story development on the Date of Valuation contrary to established condemnation law which requires Respondent’s appraisal report from being barred from presentation to the jury.
[brief] Merriam-Webster, Definition of Loan, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/loan (last visited Apr. 6, 2016). ”  Moche v. Levy, April 2022, 2016, UNPUBLISHED (App. Div. No. [...].)  AA 297.  There is no requirement in the definition that the promise to repay cannot be subject to contingencies.
[brief] While Appellant is correct that a planning board may not consider off-site traffic conditions, it is well-established that “[a] planning board should consider off-site traffic flow and safety in reviewing proposals for vehicular ingress to and egress from a site. ”  Dunkin’ Donuts, 193 N.J. Super. at 515 (citing N.J.S.A. 40:55D-7 (definition of “site plan” includes “means of ingress and egress”) and N.J.S.A. 40:55D-41(b) (authorizing municipalities to adopt site plan ordinances that include the “[s]afe and efficient vehicular and pedestrian circulation, parking and loading”)).  Indeed, it is well-settled that site plan review “typically encompasses such issues as location of structures, vehicular and pedestrian circulation, parking, loading and unloading, lighting, screening and landscaping.
[brief] On June 3, 2021, [...] sent another letter to [...] to advise [...] of the metes and bounds of the Property in an effort to further demonstrate that its placement of the debris piles was on [...]’s Property.  Pa6, at ¶ 7.  As [...] articulated in that letter, the edge of the [...]’s Property comes within “one to two feet from the side of [[...]’s] church building. ”  Pa15.  That letter also represented that [...] was in the process of retaining a surveyor to survey the Property in order to clearly delineate the property lines.  Ibid.  Unfortunately, [...]’s placement of the debris piles on [...]’s Property impeded the surveyor’s ability to survey the Property.  Pa2 at ¶ 9.  By letter dated July 19, 2021, [...] advised [...] of the surveyor’s inability to perform its survey due to the debris piles [...] placed on [...]’s Property and demanded [...] remove the piles.  Pa10.  [...] included with that letter an excerpt from the tax map which indicates [...]’s Property at Lot 22 and [...]’s property at Lots 20 and 19.  Pa11.  [...] reiterated to [...] that the front of [...]’s Property spans 57.31 feet across Lot 22 along [...], which is clearly represented on the map, and that it comes within one to two feet of [...]’s Property at Lot 20.  Ibid.  That letter also asked [...] to contact [...]’s attorneys to dispute [...]’s assessment that the debris piles were placed by [...] on [...]’s Property.  Pa10.  Before filing its lawsuit, and as a final effort to avoid litigation, on August 17, 2021 [...] sent a draft of the Complaint to [...] via e-mail and Certified Mail.  Pa186.  Neither [...] nor any other representative of [...] ever responded to that communication.  D. Discovery confirmed [...] owns the Property.
[brief] 6 State v Penna Flores 198 N.J. 6, 20 (2009)  9 State v Perlstein, 206 NJ Super. 246 (App. Div. 1985)  10  State v. Perlstein, 206 N.J. Super. 246 (App.Div.1985)  10  State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004)  5, 6 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)  18  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)  1, 2, 6
[brief] The Two Prior DEP HADs that [...] Cites in Its HAD Request as Precedents Were not “Routine Upgrades” and Have not been Upheld by New Jersey Courts (Aa0001)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23  E.  Interpreting Exemption #11 as Only Allowing for “Routine Upgrades” Makes Sense in Light of the Highlands Act’s Overall Statutory Scheme (Aa0001)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
[brief] ”  The State insists that “there are situations in which these movements fall within the meaning of a turn,” such as when a driver pulled over on the side of the road “activates their turn signal upon entering the stream of traffic. ”  (Sb 18)  But the statute does not indicate that its use of the word “start” is limited to such a specific circumstance.  Instead, the statute plainly applies to whenever a vehicle “start[s]” from a stopped position, including when the vehicle is simply moving forward without any rotation of the wheel.  The statute prohibits a motorist from making such a movement “unless and until [it] can be made with safety,” but it does not require a motorist to signal the movement.  N.J.S.A. 39:4-126.  This is a sensible construction, given that the statute offers no guidance as to how to signal a movement forward from a stopped position.  When one considers a vehicle stopped in traffic on a highway that starts again once traffic clears, it becomes obvious that no motorist believes that a signal is required in those circumstances.  The State’s construction of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 leads to the absurd conclusion that a signal is required in those circumstances and that motorists across the State are unwittingly committing traffic infractions every time they fail to signal such a movement.
[brief] [...]  Public Defender [...]  Appellate Section [...]  [...]  [...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID: 390232021  Of Counsel and On the Brief  [...]  Dated: August 31, 2023  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | PAGE NOS. | |-----------| | PROCEDURAL HISTORY ................................................................. 1 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS ...........................................................................
[directive] 43  Bail Schedule 2  10%  Cash Bail Statute Charge Description Degree  Bail Range Option  a.  Actor previously convicted in this state or elsewhere of a designated offense in the statute, or who has previously been committed for a mental disorder to any hospital, mental 2nd Degree  $25,000 to $100,000 10% permissible institution or sanitarium or who has previously been convicted for indictable use, possession or sale of CDS who purchases, owns, possesses or controls a weapon other Certain Persons  Not to than a firearm, fourth degree.
[brief] Midland Credit Mgmt., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48237, 2011 WL 1691323 (S.D. Cal. 2011).......................................................... 23-24 Borsack v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Ltd., 974 F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ................................................................................................. 23 Brown v. 5101 N. Park Drive Operations, LLC, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 920, 2014 WL 1613648 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) .................................................................................. 21 Clarke v. Alltran Fin., LP, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29011, 2018 WL 1036951 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2018) ................................................................. 15 Cole v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 215 N.J. 265 (2013) ........................................ 27, 29 Comrey v. Discover, 806 F. Supp. 2d 778 (M.D. Pa. 2011) ............................. 23 Com-Tech Assoc. v. Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc., 938 F.2d 1574, 1576-78 (2d Cir. 1991)
[brief] Specifically, [...] sought variances (a) to construct the Regulator Station as an additional principal use on the Proposed Site; and (b) to install a twelve-foot high fence with wooden slats in a portion of the front and side yards of the Facility, an eight-foot high fence around other portions of the Facility, along with an eight-foot high solid sound wall (also partially in the front and side yards), where only eight-foot high open wire fencing is permitted); and (c) to install a 16" x 22" metal facility identification sign to the proposed fence, where signs are permitted to be attached to a building.  In addition, to the extent deemed necessary by the [...], [...] sought variances from building setback requirements (where only structures, but not buildings are proposed) to (a) a property line (37.5’ proposed from equipment, whereas 200’ is required from a building), (b) a public street (186.4’ proposed from equipment, whereas 400’ is required from a building), and (c) a residential zone (266.4’ proposed from equipment, whereas 600’ is required from a building).  Also to the extent deemed necessary by the [...], [...] sought variances from (a) the 5% maximum building coverage requirement, where no buildings are proposed but equipment pads are proposed, totaling a *de minimis* 328 square feet, (b) the 20% maximum lot coverage requirement, where no buildings or paved surfaces are proposed but a *de minimis* 328 square feet of equipment pads are proposed, and (c) the minimum lot area requirement of 30 acres, where the existing site is 16.51 acres but a variance was previously granted for the site from this condition.
[brief] On July 2, 2021, Plaintiff commenced the current action by filing a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs and for Other Related Claims and Relief (the “Complaint”).  (Pa5.)  Plaintiff’s Complaint initially alleged four causes of action: (i) bad faith in connection with the adoption of Resolution 20-103, (ii) bad faith in connection with the adoption of Resolution 21-05-12, (iii) civil conspiracy, and (iv) declaratory judgment as to the illegality of the Redevelopment Agreement.  (Id.)  In September 2021, Defendants filed motions to dismiss.  (See Pa63-282.)  In those motions, Defendants raised the following arguments: (i) res judicata, (ii) collateral estoppel, (iii) entire controversy doctrine, (iv) lack of jurisdiction, and (v) failure to state a claim for civil conspiracy.  (See id.)  By Orders dated November 18, 2021, the trial court denied Defendants’ motions to dismiss.  (Pa364-367.)  In reaching that decision, the trial court (correctly) held that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel were inapplicable and did not act as a bar to Plaintiff’s claims.  (Id.)  Specifically, the trial court made the following rulings:
[brief] The Court Gave Improper Weight to Events that Occurred After the Statute of Limitations Expired (T 11:23-17:16).  Even assuming arguendo that the lower court acted appropriately in weighing the evidence, its analysis is critically flawed.  The relevant time period for determining whether the Law Firm represented [...] commenced on August 7, 2017, when [...]’s Will was submitted to probate.  The Law Firm had four months, or until approximately December 7, 2018, from that date to file a complaint on behalf of [...] and [...] contesting the Will.  During this time period, the Law Firm took affirmative actions which could lead a reasonable jury to infer the Law Firm invited [...] to rely on its provision of legal services and thus, represented [...].  On September 6, 2017, [...] had a telephone call with [...]’s long-time attorney, [...] (“[...]”), wherein [...] informed [...] that he will be including [...] in the contest of [...]’s Will.  Rather than focusing on this phone call from [...], the lower court significantly relies on [...]’s email response to [...] wherein [...] advised [...] that he would recommend [...] retain him rather [...].  Further, the lower court find significance in [...]’s recommendation that [...] retain him rather than [...].  This email and recommendation, however, is immaterial to the determination of whether [...] invited [...] to rely on his provision of legal services.  The issue before the court is not whether [...] invited [...] to rely on his services; the issue is whether [...] invited [...] to do so.  The significance of [...]’s email and recommendation is further diminished when [...] sent [...] a fee agreement on September 13, 2017, after receiving [...]’s email.  In other words, [...] was still inviting [...] to rely on his legal services despite [...]’s recommendations.  While it is true that an “X" was placed on the line for [...]’s signature, the very next day, [...] sent the letter to the [...] stating that he represented both [...] and [...].  After the Law Firm sent the letter to Morris County, the Law Firm did not reach out to Morris County until after the statute of limitations expired.  In the meantime, [...], who clearly demonstrated his intention to challenge the will, did not take any further action through [...] once the letter was sent.  Thus, a reasonable jury could infer that from September 13, 2017 through December 7, 2017, the Law Firm represented [...] in the contest of [...]’s Will.
[brief] Trial commenced before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on October 3, 2023.  (T1).  A charge conference was conducted on October 5, 2023 wherein Appellant requested a charge pursuant to Mockler v. Russman, 102 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1968).  (T3 297-25 through T3 319-24).  In addition to declining to grant a request for a specific charge consistent with Mockler, the court essentially shifted the burden to the Defendant to disprove negligence.  (T3 319-8 through 319-24).  At trial, the Appellant testified that he observed ponding and accumulated water with unexpected road surface conditions and that his vehicle hydroplaned.  As a result of the hydroplaning and unexpected weather conditions, he was unable to fully stop his vehicle before it made contact with the rear of the Respondent’s vehicle, resulting in the subject accident.  (T2 871-22 through T2 191-15).  The court declined to grant Appellant’s charge request and thus the Appellant was denied the opportunity to effectively pursue the Mockler defense.  Respondent initially submitted her pre-trial exchange requesting an aggravation charge under Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F. (Da14-Da19).  As discussed substantively below, such charge was not warranted under the facts and the record in this matter.  The charge conference took place on October 5, 2023.  (T3).  Closing arguments, first on behalf of the Respondent and second on behalf of the Appellant, went forward on October 6, 2023.  After closing arguments were completed, counsel for Respondent requested an aggravation charge.  Over the objection of Appellant, the court granted Respondent’s request for the additional charge, and provided an opportunity for a brief supplemental closing as to both sides.  (T4 95-8 through T4 101-23).  Appellant objected as the parties had already closed and as the charge was not warranted on the record before the court.  The jury subsequently returned a verdict in favor of the Respondent in the amount of $240,000.
[brief] This revenge came at approximately 3:37 a.m. on Monday, February 1, 2016, only five months after defendant was fired, when [...] was burglarized.  The only people that had permission to be in the tavern at the time of the burglary were [...], a [...] cleaner, and [...], an employee of [...] there to clean the draft beer lines.  Mr. Dunn would clean these lines at [...] every two to three weeks at around 3:30 a.m.  As per his usual process, on February 1, 2016, the cleaner let Mr. Dunn into the tavern, where he set up his equipment on the bar top in the main tavern room.  Mr. Dunn’s attention was drawn when the defendant, a man he recognized as a Kelly’s employee despite not knowing his name, walked into the tavern.  Mr. Dunn had seen defendant in the tavern at least “twice before … in the past years” and recognized him because of two distinctive features: he had red hair and “some tattoos,” most notably “on his chest. ”  Thinking nothing amiss because he believed defendant to be a [...] employee, Mr. Dunn greeted defendant and went back to work.  (7T:54-6 to 54-21; 60-19 to 82-4; 8T:5-2 to 18-12; 92-7 to 96-13).  Mr. Dunn again saw defendant in the basement of the tavern.  When defendant saw Mr. Dunn in the basement, defendant “stopped to tell that me didn’t think they cleaned the beer lines there,” a “comment that [Mr. Dunn] normally do[es]n’t get,” but one he recognized as a comment defendant had said to him before.  Mr. Dunn saw the defendant a total of four separate times that morning, three times upstairs and one time in the basement of the tavern.  Mr. Dunn only realized something was amiss when the [...] chef, [...], arrived and it became clear the defendant was not supposed to have been at the tavern.
[brief] Plaintiffs also claim there was sufficient evidence to support a judgment in their favor as to “Misappropriations” #6, 7, and 8, which relate to the following: • $50,000 transfer from [...]’s line of credit account on September 8, 2015 • $50,000 transfer from [...]’s bank account on October 28, 2015 • $75,500 transfer from [...]’s line of credit on August 22, 2014 (Pb46-47.)
[directive] An immediate suspension is necessary to maintain safety, health, order or effective direction of public services; or ______  You have been formally charged with a first, second or third degree crime.  ______  You have been formally charged with a first, second, third or fourth degree crime or a disorderly persons offense while on-duty, or the act is directly related to your employment.  The facts in support of the above reason are:  ________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________  Supervisor making suspension  I hereby acknowledge receipt of this notice.  Signature: ______________________________  Date: _____________________  Print Name: ______________________________  Appendix E
[brief] 23a  Appellant’s Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint in Docket No. [...] filed February 27, 2020 .............................................  55a  [...]’s Answer to Appellant’s Counterclaim in Docket No. [...] ............................................  77a  Third Party Defendants Answer to Third-Party Complaint in Docket No. [...] filed June 8, 2020 .........................................................  87a  ORDERS Order and Statement of Reasons in Docket No. [...] filed June 8, 2021 .................................................................