ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] a.  New Jersey does not have a materially greater interest than New York in determining the issues in this dispute  In arguing that New Jersey has the materially greater interest in this dispute than New York, Appellants again minimize the parties’ contacts and relationships with New York.  For example, Appellants contend that “[w]hile Appellants make sales in New York, that is of little import. ” (Pb at 34.)  However, they do not explain why these sales are “of little import” especially when 90% are in New York.  The principal case cited by Appellants again undermines their position.  In Diversant, the agreement at issue contained a New Jersey choice-of-law provision.  The defendant argued that provision should not be enforced because it “was part of a contract of adhesion and because California has a materially greater interest in this dispute, pursuant to New Jersey’s approach to conflict of laws, California law governs. ”  Diversant, 2018 WL 1610957, at *1 (Pa155-Pa159).  The court analyzed whether the second of the Restatement § 187(2) prongs exceptions applied, held it did not, and enforced the choice-of-law clause.  Id. at *4.  As in *Diversant*, one state (New Jersey) has a relationship to this dispute and a material interest in enforcing its public policies.  However, another state (New York) has a more substantial relationship to this dispute and a material interest in enforcing its public policies.  Given that 90% of the beer sales at issue are in New York, Appellants have not established here that New Jersey possesses a “materially greater” interest than New York. \(^8\)  For that reason alone, the second Restatement exception does not apply.
[brief] ......  2 ARGUMENT POINT I THE BOARD’S DENIAL OF [...]’S UNTIMELY ELIGIBILITY REGISTRATION FORM FILED OVER ONE YEAR AND SIX MONTHS PAST THE STATUTORY DEADLINE WAS REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.  .........................................................  8  POINT II  CONSIDERATIONS OF ADEQUATE OR ACTUAL NOTICE  DO NOT COMPEL A DIFFERENT RESULT.................................................................12  CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................22
[brief] ”  Ja717.  Moreover, the trial court pointed out that Defendants’ Deed “explicitly informed” Defendants “that their lot was the subject of a prior subdivision, obtained approximately two years before Defendants purchased the lot” and that “placed [Defendants] and their professionals on notice of the necessity of performing a thorough title search [as the] recording of a subdivision shortly before the conveyance suggest that a third party may have an outstanding title or claim to portions of the subject property.
[brief] Ordinance Sec. 605 sets forth the HPC’s powers and responsibilities, which include “E.  To provide written reports and Certificates of Appropriateness, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-111, in a manner herein described, on the application of the Zoning Ordinance provision concerning historic preservation to applications for the issuance of permits pertaining to properties in a historic district. ”  Pa 58a.  Ordinance Sec. 900, “establishes the circumstances, conditions and procedures to obtain a Certificate of Appropriateness from the Historic Preservation Commission as it pertains to exterior architectural features…”  Sec. 900B of the Ordinance tasks the Zoning Officer with the duty to submit to the HPC “all plans for the construction, alteration, repair, restoration or demolition of structures located in any Historic District Zone…”  Pa 63a.  Ordinance Sec. 905A provides a Certificate of Appropriateness constitutes a final approval under Article IX of the Ordinance.  A denial of a CofA precludes an applicant from undertaking the activity that was the subject of the application.  Ordinance Sec. 905B.  Pa 65a.  In 2002, the Township adopted Ordinance 02-41 which amended Ordinance Sec. 900B and 902A to require HPC review for CofA approval of “any exterior alteration on existing structures or buildings or other improvements on their sites…” that did not otherwise require the issuance of a construction or demolition permit.  Pa 63a and Pa 64a.  The expansion of the HPC’s CofA review procedures to include exterior alterations not requiring construction or demolition permits runs contrary to the mandatory language of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-111.
[brief] The limiting instruction essentially told the jury that they could determine what is true or not.  (10T:67-1 to 68-23).  However, because the Court did not read this instruction every time hearsay was elicited, it became confusing for the jury and allowed them to choose what hearsay evidence they wanted to believe.  This was further compounded by the State arguing hearsay as substantive evidence in summation.  ((15T:193-14 to 195-2).
[brief] This research has caused the leading experts in adolescent development to advocate that late adolescents be protected against severe adult sentences, just as juveniles are.  See McCaffrey and Reynolds (2021), supra, at 7; Scott et al.  (2016), supra, at 659, 661-62.  As an authoritative review of the science put it:  There is no clear way to differentiate in clinically or practically meaningful ways the functioning of the brains of 17-year-olds from those aged 18, 19, and 20 in terms of risk-taking behaviors, the ability to anticipate the consequences of their actions (i.e., engage in a real time cost-benefit analysis in the context of a crime, as well as being able to engage in what some states define as deliberateness in committing a homicide during another felony act), to evaluate and avoid negative influences of others, and to demonstrate fully formed characterological traits not subject to substantive change over the next decade of their lives.
[brief] CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION - HUDSON COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...]  JUDGE BELOW:  HON.  [...], J.S.C. COMBINED  BRIEF IN REPLY ON APPEAL AND IN OPPOSITION TO CROSS-APPEAL  [...] (ATTORNEY ID PHV043695)  [...] (ATTORNEY ID PHV003919)  [...] (ATTORNEY ID 227872017)  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent  [...] [...]  [...] [...] [...]  Submitted: August 21, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] [...] testified that he would not normally process a civilian stop so quickly and would not accept a business card as valid proof of law-enforcement status, but would normally “send them on their way” if he was shown some type of law-enforcement ID.  (14T 47-4 to 12; 14T 44-16 to 45-6)  Office [...] stopped defendant on January 20, 2018 in Marlboro, and, he testified that defendant showed what [...] believed to be an NJSP ID, leading [...] to say out loud that defendant was “on the job” -- which [...] testified was shorthand for the fact “[t]hat you’re a police officer,” which was accurate.
[brief] APPELLANT’S CONTENTION THAT THE ANNESES’ PROPERTY WAS A COMMERCIAL PROPERTY IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND SHOULD BE REJECTED  In her appellate brief, plaintiff-appellant wants this Court to find that the [...]’ property adjoining the public sidewalk on which plaintiff-appellant purportedly slipped and fell is a commercial property, an argument that was flatly rejected by the Motion Court.  The reason behind this argument by plaintiff-appellant is obvious.  If the [...]’ property is found to be commercial in nature, the [...] would be subject to a common-law duty to clear snow and ice from the public sidewalk abutting their property, and the failure to do so would expose them to liability in this case.  So, it is very clear why plaintiff-appellant would want this Appellate Court to reverse the Motion Court and find that the [...]’ property was a commercial property as such a finding would inure to her benefit in this case.  However, plaintiff-appellant’s claim that the [...]’ property should be seen as commercial was wholly misplaced when presented to the Motion Court and it remains wholly misplaced in this appeal.  Indeed, not only is this claim without legal precedent, it runs contrary to pure common sense.  Since our Supreme Court’s holding in Stewart, courts in New Jersey have addressed the distinction between residential and commercial properties.  In Grijalba v. Florio, 431 N.J.Super. 47 (App. Div. 2013), the Appellate Division started its analysis of the distinction by looking at the common definitions of “residential” and “commercial.
[brief] This prerequisite cannot be dispensed with due to officer safety concerns: “a motorist is not ‘unable’ to produce a registration certificate within the meaning of the exception when the sole reason for that inability is a police officer's discretionary decision to prevent reentry. ”  *Ibid.*  While these concerns may allow the officer to prevent a defendant from reentering a parked vehicle, the decision to prevent reentry “ha[s] the effect of foreclosing a warrantless registration search, requiring the detectives instead to use other methods to investigate whether defendant was in lawful possession of the vehicle, such as an MVC database look-up. ”  Ibid.  [...] controls this case.
[brief] (2T 42-15 to 67-4; Da 67)  Without having been shown any surveillance videos, [...] freely admitted that he knew [...]; they both attended [...] earlier that night; and they left together, walking along East 16th Street.  (2T 100-22 to 101-7; Da 67 at 4:08 to 8:12)  However, [...] explained that they split up at the intersection of East 16th and Governor Street and that he turned left.  \(^2\)  Indeed, [...] testified that based on [...]’s report, she believed that the shooter fled east on Putnam and kept heading east, crossed over Madison, and perhaps encountered [...] on 22nd. (2T 81-6 to 82-18) onto Governor where he lived, while [...] stayed on East 16th and was talking to some people in a black car.
[brief] The record supports the Trial Court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, and to dismiss Plaintiff-Appellant’s Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs.  Accordingly, Appellant’s argument that Ordinance 2022-17 was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable must be rejected, and the Trial Court’s ruling should be upheld herein.  **CONCLUSION**  For all of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that this Court affirm the Trial Court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Respondents herein.
[brief] The NJCFLA requires a “consumer lender” to obtain a license and defines a “consumer lender” as (in relevant part) a person who should be licensed to engage in the “consumer loan business”.  . . .  The Court must interpret and apply statutory text according to the plain, ordinary meaning of its terms.  It must also construe such text in the context of relevant definitions or other provisions of the statute examined in their entirety.  It is required to interpret in a manner that is consonant with the statutory purpose and that does not produce an absurd or nonsensical result.
[brief] In both the SPAs and the MIPA, the defendants represented that they would indemnify the Plaintiffs for any “material inaccuracy . . . contained in this Agreement. ” (Da910, 952, 925).  In the SPAs, both of the [...] and [...] also warranted that consummation of the purchase transaction would not result in a breach of any other agreement, contract, or arrangement to which either Hedvat or [...] were bound.  (Da908-09; P-80 § 3.2(b)(ii) & 4.2(ii) and (iii); Da923-24).  This necessarily included the [...] Stockholder Agreement.
[directive] Attorney General [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  Factor #1c applies where the offense occurred in a designated “Quality of Life” Special Enforcement Zone.  The Attorney General has established a Model Quality of Life Program designed to focus law enforcement and prosecutorial resources to eradicate, displace, and deter all forms of crime, including drug trafficking, at specified locations that are especially vulnerable and that face an especially acute drug problem.  Too many street corners and neighborhoods, especially in the State’s urban centers, are plagued with open and notorious drug-distribution activities that adversely affect the lives and well-being of law-abiding residents, many of whom are virtual prisoners within their own homes by reason of the violence associated with and attracted to brazen drug dealers.  Children, senior citizens, and other law-abiding residents in these drug-infested communities are often forced to run the gauntlet of drug dealers.  These drug “hot spots” also attract out-of-town residents who come for the sole purpose to purchase illicit drugs.  The myriad of criminal activities occurring in these open-air marketplaces significantly erode the quality of life, interfere with legitimate commerce and business activities, and contribute to the economic and social decline of these neighborhoods.  The Attorney General’s Model Quality of Life Program includes procedures to ensure that crimes committed in Special Enforcement Zones are subject to especially strict scrutiny, full prosecution, and stern punishment.  Because offenses committed in these targeted areas cause proportionately more harm to law-abiding residents and legitimate businesses, it is appropriate that this conduct result in especially stern punishment.  This approach is consistent with State law and policy that recognizes the vulnerability of victims as a legitimate factor to be considered at sentencing, and that soundly rejects the notion that drug trafficking is a “victimless” crime.  For Aggravating Factor 1c to apply, the county prosecutor must have designated the specific area constituting the Special Enforcement Zone.
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail  Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree
[brief] [...] was the only one armed with information necessary to determine whether [...]’s coverage obligation was actually triggered at any time before suit was filed – and it did not share this information with [...] until after the Complaint in this action was filed in 2005.  Indeed, [...] did not even demand payment from [...] until after suit was filed.  [...] was an excess carrier without information indicating the limits underlying the [...] policy had been, or ever would be, exhausted.  [...] did not make a demand for payment to [...]; it could not because there was no proof of exhaustion of the limits underlying the [...] Policy.  [...] only noticed the claim to [...] and then provided claim updates on a sporadic and infrequent basis.  (Pa0353-Pa0362; Pa0435-Pa0463).  In point of fact, [...] did not deny coverage pre-suit; [...] only reserved its rights in connection with this claim.  (Pa0368-Pa0379).  At this point, in order to trigger coverage, it was [...]’s obligation to supply information regarding the status of remediation, costs incurred, and exhaustion of primary layer policies to [...].  That information was not forthcoming.  To be clear [...], and [...] alone, had the information enabling it to identify its remediation costs, and the insurers it needed to contact and seek coverage for those costs.  Yet, it did not share that information, did not demand payment from [...], and waited 20 years to initiate litigation.  [...] sat on its hands for 20 years, and now the trial court has permitted [...] to recover interest (at an inflated rate) for those 20 years.  [...] should not be rewarded for its dilatory conduct by allowing interest to run prior to the filing of this case.
[brief] (Pa21-Pa25).  The Commissioner affirmed the State Board’s decision.  (Id.).  [...] then appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the Appellate Division, where it remains pending.  (Pa26-Pa29).  Critically, [...] did not file a timely motion to stay the State Board’s decision under N.J.A.C. § 6A:9B–4.16.  That provision requires parties to make a motion for stay within 30 days of the “mailing date of the [State Board’s] decision that is at issue. ”  N.J.A.C. § 6A:9B–4.16.  [...] failed to make such a motion until December 6, 2021, which was 33 days after the State Board mailed him the decision.  (Ra40).  The State Board then refused to consider his motion because it was untimely.  (Id.).  [...] then renewed his motion for a stay before the Commissioner, who subsequently rejected it as both untimely and without merit.  (Ra100-Ra101).  It does not appear [...] made any subsequent motion to appeal the denial of a stay to the Appellate Division under Rule 2:9-7.  D.  The State Board’s Decision Forced The [...] To Summarily Dismiss [...].
[brief] \textbf{LEGAL ARGUMENT} \textbf{POINT I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW (Raised Below: T1)}  On appeal, the Court applies a plenary standard or review from a trial court’s granting of a motion to dismiss.  \textit{Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone}, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div. 2011); \textit{Bacon v. N.J. State Dep't of Educ.}, 443 N.J. Super. 24, 33 (App. Div. 2015).  On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff is “entitled to every reasonable inference of fact. ”  \textit{Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C.}, 237 N.J. 91, 107 (2018) (quoting \textit{Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp.}, 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)).  And “if a generous reading of the allegations merely suggests a cause of action, the complaint will withstand the motion. ”  *F.G. v. MacDonell*, 150 N.J. 550, 556 (1997).  The Court “searches the complaint *in depth and with liberality* to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary. ”  *Printing Mart-Morristown*, 116 N.J. at 746 (quoting *Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem’l Park*, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957) (internal quotation marks omitted).  **POINT II.
[brief] In sum, “the challenger must show that the Board engaged in willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of circumstances.  Where there is room for two opinions, action is valid when exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been reached.  Northgate Condo v. Borough of Hilldsale Planning Bd. 214 NJ 120, 145 (2013).  Here as required by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(g) the Board reduced the decision to writing in the form of a resolution that includes findings of fact and conclusions of law.
[brief] The [...] controls the GSP and has a strong policy and practice of refusing to encumber its property with easements.  The GSP property is also zoned as Public Land, which does not permit public utilities.  Thus, the GSP property was not an option.  After the GSP, the transmission line corridor continues along South Holland Road before turning onto Crawfords Corner Road.  That entire area is zoned for and has developed residential properties.  Also, [...] is located at [...].  There are wetlands throughout the High School property, and the non-wetland section is developed with a football field, making it unusable.  The High School property is also zoned as Public Land, which does not permit public utilities.  Next along the corridor is Longstreet Road, which borders [...] on the entire north side; the park is Green Acres encumbered and zoned as Public Land, thereby Holmdel Road includes an office/laboratory zone that has been developed with office complexes, the [...] and a dense business district.  The Proposed Site of the Regulator Station is on a portion of the solar farm property located within that office/laboratory zone.  Q.  Please describe why [...] chose the subject location in Holmdel for the Facility and why it is the best suited location for that use?
[brief] E. Standard of Review.  The trial of this matter did not involve a disputed issue of material fact.  The [...] maintain that the issue for trial should have been the appropriate remedy for the boundary dispute between them and the [...].  The trial court saw the issue for trial as being whether the Boundary Commissioners’ Report contained surveying defects.  In short the trial raised issues of the interpretation and applicability of N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3, along with the procedural issue of what to do about the affected non-parties.
[brief] Applying the same contract interpretation principals of Barila, supra, and Schenck, supra, up until the Chancery [...]’s decision, no legal forum had opined that Plaintiff’s 30-day unpaid reinstatement violated or was preempted by state or federal law or was otherwise unenforceable or ineffective under common law or as a matter of public policy.  Rather, the [...]’s regulations require that an applicant for disability retirement benefits must show that he or she retired “due to a total and permanent disability that renders the applicant physically or mentally incapacitated from performing normal or assigned job duties at the time the member left employment. ”  N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4(a).  A member cannot apply if their employment ended pursuant to a “settlement agreement reached due to pending administrative or criminal charges, unless the underlying charges relate to the disability. ”  N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4(b)(2).  Likewise, a member who “voluntarily separated from service for reasons other than a disability” cannot apply.  N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4(b)(4).  Thus, both the [...] and [...] determinations pertained to Plaintiff’s eligibility for IOD, not the validity of the actual Agreement or provisions therein.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32  ###  TABLE OF CITATIONS | Case law: | PAGE | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Azurak v. Corp. Prop. Inv.**, 175 N.J. 110 (2003) | 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 18, 21, 24, 25, 27, 29 | | **Borough of Princeton v. Bd of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer**, 333 N.J. Super 310 (App. Div. 2000) | 13 | | **Di Filippi v. Target Corp.**, 2008 N.J. Super Unpub. LEXIS 1549 (App. Div. January 16, 2008) | 19 | | **Dorsey v. Cobblestone Village Equities, LLC**, 2009 N.J. Super Unpub. LEXIS 584 (App. Div. March 25, 2009) | 19 | | **Englert v. The Home Depot**, 192 N.J. 70 (2007) | 18, 22, 23, 24 | | **Estate of D’Avila v. Hugo Neu Schnitzer East**, 442 N.J. Super 80 (App. Div. 2015) | 11, 12, 23, 24, 25 | | **George M. Brewster & Son, Inc. v. Catalytic Constr. Co.**, 17 N.J. 20 (1954) | 20 | | **Leitao v. Damon G. Douglas Co.**, 301 N.J. Super 187 App. Div. 1997) | 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 | | **Manahawkin Convalescent v. O’Neill**, 217 N.J. 99 (2014) | 13 | | **Mantilla v. NC Mall Associates**, 167 N.J. 262 (2001) | 24, 27 | Minkov v. Reliance Ins. Co, 54 N.J. Super 509 App. Div. 1959)
[brief] That statute limits the Court’s jurisdiction to determining whether an agreement to arbitration exists or if a controversy subject to an agreement to arbitrate.  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6.b.  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-7.d states that “the court may not refuse to order arbitration because the claim subject to arbitration lacks merit or grounds for the claim have not been established. ”  Clearly that statutory section mandates that simple legal issues regarding the merit of the claim are no longer to be addressed by the court but are required to be determined by an arbitrator.  Legal issues should not be decided by the Court as the Court does not have jurisdiction to bar arbitration for claims that lack merit or for which the grounds for the claim have not been established.