ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Yengo, supra at *6 and N.J.S.A. 46:2B-8.2(a).  [...]’s reliance upon Greenwood in this regard is simply misplaced as that Court was quite clear that its decision was within the confines of “the employment context. ”  Greenwood, supra, 127 N.J. at 509.  That issue and the legal authority used by the Court to make its findings had nothing to do with public bidding and absolutely nothing to do with the enforceability of a Consent of Surety (or any other document) signed by an attorney-in-fact without a POA.
[brief] The trial court’s determination as to Appellant [...]’s liability is fully justified.  [...] is and always has been the 100% shareholder in defendant [...]  (“[...]”).  [...], from inception, was Plaintiff [...]’s sole co-member in defendant [...] (“[...]”).  [...] signed the [...] operating agreement on behalf of [...], and signed all of [...]’s tax returns.  Additionally, [...], [...], and [...]  (“[...]”) entered into the [...] Stock Purchase Agreement from which, together with the [...]-related claims, the entire subject matter of this action arises.  All of the sums as to which the trial court held the defendants liable for conversion were deposited either into [...]’s account or [...]’s joint account with her husband.  To assert, as [...] does, that she was not involved in the conversion transaction is simply false.  [...], no less than her husband, received and benefited from the converted sums.  She presented no separate defense at trial.  [...]’s liability for conversion and contract-related claims are inseparable from the liability of her husband and their related business entities.
[brief] Yes, [...] found that [...] “knew of the divorce complaint in January 2015 and knew there was a final hearing on March 10, 2015” (A247, sic), but that does not mean that [...] and his lawyer obtained the Final Judgment in accordance with [...]'s due process rights – particularly stressed by New Jersey courts for divorce cases (as stressed).  [...] said that [...] “has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff committed fraud upon her under these circumstances”  A247.
[brief] The Ordinance also provides that since it pertains to a redevelopment area, it states that:  “Deviation Requests.  The Borough may grant deviations from the regulations in the within Ordinance where permitted by the provisions of the Municipal Land Use Law.  Notwithstanding the above, any changes to be uses permitted in the within Redevelopment Plan Ordinance shall only be permitted by an amendment to this Ordinance by the Mayor and Council upon a finding that such deviation would be consistent with and in furtherance of the goals and objectives of this Ordinance.
[directive] 2.10  Secondary police action geared toward resolving a barricaded individual situation and involving the use of intrusive tactics such as window clearing, mechanized entry tools, chemical agents and related munitions, less lethal munitions, breach, hold and call-out procedures, or use of K-9.  4  USE OF FORCE POLICY Addendum C | August 2024  Barricaded Individuals Supervisor.  2.11  A police officer who, by virtue of rank or assignment, is responsible for the direction or supervision of the activities of other police officers.  Tactical Team.  2.12  A group of officers who are specially selected, trained, and equipped to handle high risk incidents, including, but not limited to, those involving snipers, barricaded persons, warrant services, apprehensions, acts of terrorism, and other situations or activities as deemed necessary by command leadership.
[directive] (1) refi yo te pa vie ou bay petisyon pou siprime prev fizik la oswa (2) le fet ke yo te refize aksepte w nan yon pwogram (R.3:5-7(d)) entevansyon anvan pwose a (PTI) (R. 3:28(d))?  e.  Do you further understand that by pleading guilty your right to appeal the [Yes/Wi] you are waiving [No/Non] denial of all other pretrial motions except the following:
[brief] I did write I cannot allege, at this point, is that [...] has a policy of hiding evidence (Brady violations).  Pa24, ¶98 & Pa276, ¶132.  I did allege hiding the Registration was a part of their cover up policy.  Id.  But Her Honor did not address that.  Ironically, Her Honor did think there was a policy of not allowing arrestees to call family members.  1T-52-3-5.  (This is a point of agreement.  The entire Complaint has been redrafted around this point of agreement.  Mainly, where the Complaint alleges denial of counsel, family has been added.  In addition to the already numerous mentions of “dad/counsel,” [...] has converted all mentions of “counsel” to “dad/counsel. ”)  Finally, I did allege, in bold print, there is a policy of “breaking down” prisoners by lying about “Constitutional issues” (including the “right to counsel”) and about “relatives. ”  I even claimed these serious lies were intentional psychological torture.  Pa49, ¶210 & Rev. SAC, Pa268, ¶57 (“to soften [...] up”).  At 1T-53-1-3, Her Honor states, “I think the plaintiff could set forth a cause of action under the LAD.
[brief] On or about March 3, 2023, [...], along with many others, filed his Eligibility Registration Form to register his presence at Ground Zero under the Ricci Act, along with a Request for Amended Benefits Form, Affidavit, and a Petition.  Pa30.  Pa56.  Pa58.  Pa60.  On or about May 2, 2023, the [...] administratively denied Lennon’s appeal and the matter was transmitted to the [...].  Pa61.  On or about June 13, 2023, the [...] issued an initial decision to deny Lennon’s request to register for the Ricci Act.  Pa24.  On or about July 18, 2023, Lennon appealed the Board’s initial decision and requested an administrative hearing.  Pa16.  The Board denied an administrative hearing and issued a Final Agency Decision on September 27, 2023.  Pa9.  This appeal ensued.  Pa1.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Based on the foregoing, it is submitted that this Court should reverse the orders under review and enter summary judgment in favor of [...], declaring that the [...] and [...] policies covered [...] for the underlying action and awarding [...] reimbursement of the settlement it paid on behalf of [...], the costs incurred in defending [...], declaratory judgment fees, costs and interest.  Respectfully Submitted, s/ [...]  FRANK E. BOROWSKY, JR.  [...] ID No.: 01828198  Member of the Firm  Dated: December 21, 2023  BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
[brief] Defendants assert the trial court improperly relied on [...]’s subjective belief regarding his beach access.  Actually, the trial court analyzed what a reasonable purchaser would have thought as to his beach access, stating:  If they’re purchasing it, . . . the backyard . . . was essentially the beach . . . clearly they walked directly to the water.  There is no indication . . . there’s no common-sense argument that can be made that would indicate that they would somehow feel obligated to walk along what was initially a paper street, not even an actual road, to a street end and then walk to the beach or the water.  [(T67:8-15). ]  7.
[directive] Sąd I Instancji New Jersey Superior Court of New Jersey  Dział Prawny Stan New Jersey Hrabstwo State of New Jersey Law Division County Numer oskarżenia przeciwko Indictment No. versus Informacja dla pozwanego zgodna z N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b Oskarżonemu/Oskarżonej Obowiązkowe zawieszeni prawa jazdy Defendant Notice to Defendant N.J.S.A. Pursuant to 2C:29-2b Mandatory Suspension of Driving Privileges (Polish) Niniejszym informujemy Pana(Panią), że ponieważ został(a) Pan(i) skazany(a) za próbę ucieczki przed policją, [6 miesięcy do 2 zgodnie z 2C:29-2b, Pana(i) prawo jazdy zostaje zawieszone na okres N.J.S.A. lat], począwszy od dnia dzisiejszego.
[brief] At the January 2024 conference the court directed that the arbitration issue be postponed until all pleadings were finalized.  Once the court granted [...]’s motion to amend its answer to assert a cross-claim against [...] seeking recovery of its defense cost settlement with [...] and [...] responded to the cross-claim, the court lifted its stay in June 2024.  On August 1, 2024, [...] moved to compel arbitration.  Da387-90.  Immediately after oral argument on September 13, 2024, the court read into the record its denial of [...]’s motion (the “September 13th Order”).  T1 63:22 – 79:18.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ CROSS-MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER (Pa0190; 1T20-23)**  With respect to the Discovery Order, the trial court abused its discretion and misapplied the law in denying Plaintiff’s motion to compel the deposition of a representative of the [...] and granting Defendants’ cross-motion for a protective order.  For the reasons explained below, if the Final Judgment is not reversed consistent with the foregoing, the Discovery Order had a profound impact on this litigation and poisoned the Final Judgment, and thus the Final Judgment should be reversed to afford Plaintiff the opportunity for limited additional discovery, and the case remanded for re-trial on a full record.  When reviewing a discovery order, “appellate courts must start from the premise that discovery rules ‘are to be construed liberally in favor of broad pretrial discovery. ’”  *Capital Health Sys., Inc.*, 230 N.J. at 80 (quoting *Payton*, 148 N.J. at 535).  Indeed, New Jersey courts have “long been committed to the view that essential justice is better achieved when there has been full disclosure so that the parties [may become] conversant with all available facts. ”  *Ibid.* (quoting *Jenkins v. Rainner*, 69 N.J. 50, 56 (1976)).
[brief] To justify such a seizure, “a police officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle, or its occupants, is committing a motor-vehicle violation or a criminal or disorderly persons offense. ”  Id. 226 N.J. at 33-34.  “The suspicion necessary to justify a stop must not only be reasonable, but also particularized. ”  Id. 226 N.J. at 37.  An investigative stop “may not be based on arbitrary police practices, the officer’s subjective good faith, or a mere hunch. ”  *State v. Chisum*, 236 N.J. 530, 546 (2019) (quoting *State v. Coles*, 218 N.J. 322, 343 (2014)).  To determine whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists, a court must evaluate the totality of the circumstances and “assess whether ‘the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure . . . warrant[ed] a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate. ’”  *State v. Alessi*, 240 N.J. 501, 518 (2020) (alterations and omission in original) (quoting *State v. Mann*, 203 N.J. 328, 338 (2010)).  A motor vehicle stop that is not based on a “reasonable and articulable suspicion is an ‘unlawful seizure,’ and evidence discovered during the course of an unconstitutional detention is subject to the exclusionary rule. ”  *Chisum*, 236 N.J. at 546 (quoting *State v. Elders*, 192 N.J. 224, 247 (2007)).  Here, as the trial court properly found, the motor vehicle stop at issue was lawfully based on the officer’s reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver of the Toyota had an active warrant for her arrest.
[brief] See Dela Vega v. Travelers Ins. Co., A-2272-19 (App. Div. 2022), certif. denied, 252 N.J. 234 (2022).  Intrafamily liability exclusions harm defendants who are deprived of insurance coverage and are exposed to personal liability simply because the person asserting the claim against them is a family member/resident relative and not an unrelated party.  Intrafamily liability exclusions harm plaintiffs who sustain injuries due to the negligence of an otherwise-insured party but against whom collecting a judgment personally may be difficult or impossible.  In short, exclusions that disclaim a whole class of drivers from coverage for no reason other than the mere happenstance of a familial relationship so contravenes our State’s public policy that same should be deemed unenforceable as a matter of law.
[brief] Where a property owner has engaged in unlawful, self-help eviction, the statutes provide for damages even after the property has been sold to another owner.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:39-8, Truesdell v. Carr, 351 N.J. Super. 317, 320, 798 A.2d 153 (Law Div. 2002) (treble damages may be awarded in lieu of possession); McNeill v. Estate of Lachmann, 285 N.J. Super. 212, 219, 666 A.2d 996 (App. Div. 1995).
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellant [...] is the owner of property at [...], adjacent to the subject property.  Notably, [...] did not provide any evidence in the record to rebut the testimony of the applicant’s experts.  [...] did not provide his own expert testimony, nor did he present such evidence as a traffic study, which would challenge the evidence presented by the applicant that the proposed development would negatively impact the surrounding neighborhood.  The Board, after carefully considering the testimony of all witnesses and exhibits contained in the Board file and marked into evidence, approved the variance application.
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2021  (1) when there is imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another person, created by a person in the vehicle using means other than the vehicle, such as when shots are being fired from the vehicle; or (2) when the suspect is driving their vehicle toward persons other than the officer in a manner creating an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, such as in a terrorist attack; or (3) when the officer is being dragged or carried by the vehicle, cannot disengage from the vehicle, and is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.  4.7
[brief] \(^{53}\)  Pa267 – Pa272  Also note Par. 18 of [...]’s Undisputed Statement of Material Facts, where [...] admits that the Board indeed paid $60,800 in the month of April 2020:  18.  In August 2020, [...] paid for three of the five invoices above, in particular, Invoice nos. 7020000137 [April 2020 invoice for $60,800], -226, and –230, for a total of $1,301,300.18.
[brief] They CHEATED, denying the defendants their right to due process of: (1) notice; (2) an opportunity to be heard; and, (3) an impartial tribunal.  The Plaintiff’s certifications submitted to the court, prior to the Final Judgment being granted, should have been checked and verified by the Plaintiff’s attorney as well as the Court Clerk, who is also an attorney—not just rubber stamped.  [...], a Collection Agency, their attorneys as Officers of the Court, know the law.  It is their legal obligation to due diligence, to check and to verify the Process Server certifications as well as their Legal Assistants certifications to ensure that they fully and completely vetted and comply with the law prior to submitting to the Court Clerk.  The trial court CANNOT assume, take for granted, that they are valid and credible.
[brief] ## Cases | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Bd. of Educ. of City of Clifton v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Clifton, 409 N.J.Super. 515, 536 (Law Div. 2006) | 17 | | Bell v. Stafford, 110 N.J. 384, 395-96 (1988) | 10, 12, 13, 15, 17 | | Bressman v. Gash, 131 N.J. 517, 530 (1993) | 23 | | Burbridge v. Mine Hill, 117 N.J. 376, 386 (1990) | 20 | | Cell S. of N.J. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 172 N.J. 75, 89 (2002) | 9, 25 | | City of Austin v. Reagan Nat’l Adver. of Austin, LLC, 142 S. Ct. 1464 (2022) | 11 | | Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 289 (1984) | 11 | | Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71, 78-79 (2014)| 10 | | E & J Equities, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Bd. of Adjustment of the Tp. of Franklin, 226 N. J. 549, 565 (2016) | 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 26 | | Edison Bd. of Educ. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Edison, 464 N.J.Super. 298, 308 (App. Div. 2020) | 19 | | Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 191 N.J. 344, 373 (2007) | 22, 26 | | Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1, 21 (1987) | 24 | | MHA, LLC v. Brach Eichler, LLC, 2018 N.J.Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2111 at *7 (App. Div. Sep. 24, 2018) | 18 | | Nash v. Bd. of Adjustment, 96 N.J. 97, 122 (1984) | 24 | | N.Y. SMSA, Ltd.  P'ship v. Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. of Weehawken, 370 N.J.Super. 319, 334 (App. Div. 2004) | 22, 25 | Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 300 (2013)..............................................9  Pullen v. Twp. of S. Plainfield Planning Bd., 291 N.J.Super. 1, 7-8 (App. Div. 1996).................................................................19, 20, 21, 23, 24  State v. DeAngelo, 197 N.J. 478, 486 (2009).......................................................12  State v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402, 416 (1980).............................................................11, 13  Ten Stary Dom P'ship v. Mauro, 216 N.J. 16, 33 (2013)........................................19  Twp. of Cinnaminson v. Bertino, 405 N.J.Super. 521, 536 (App. Div. 2009).................................................................15, 16  Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 176 (1999)........................................10  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784 (1989)....................................11  Yahnel v. Bd. of Adjustment, 79 N.J.Super. 509, 518 (App. Div. 1963)..................20
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  The Highlands Water Protection and Planning Act of New Jersey ("Highlands Act") was signed into law in 2004.  According to the Highlands Act, amongst other things:  The Legislature...determine[d]...that it is in the public interest of all the citizens of the State of New Jersey to enact legislation setting forth a comprehensive approach to the protection of the water and other natural resources of the New Jersey Highlands; that this comprehensive approach should consist of the identification of a preservation area of the New Jersey Highlands that would be subjected to stringent water and natural resource protection standards, policies, planning, and regulation; that this comprehensive approach should also consist of the establishment of a Highlands Water Protection and Planning Council charged with the preparation of a regional master plan for the preservation area in the New Jersey Highlands as well as for the region in general; that this comprehensive approach should also include the adoption by the Department of Environmental Protection of stringent standards governing major development in the Highlands preservation area.  The Highlands Act itself included a number of “exempt[ions] from the provisions of [the] [A]ct, the regional master plan, [and] any rules or regulations adopted by the Department of Environmental Protection pursuant to [the] [A]ct. ”  One of these exemptions is Exemption #11 under N.J.S.A. § 13:20-28(11), which applies to “the routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, --- 1
[brief] FACTUAL BACKGROUND  A.  Plaintiff’s Complaint.  (PA000001-PA000058).  i.  Plaintiff Was A Competent and Diligent Employee, Loyally Dedicated to Defendant [...] and the Patients They Serve.  (PA000001-PA000058).  This matter involves an action brought by Plaintiff against Defendant [...], Defendant [...], Defendant [...], Defendant [...], Defendant [...], Defendant [...], and Defendant [...].
[directive] This Directive imposes limitations on law enforcement agencies and officials that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.  B.  Severability.  The provisions of this Directive shall be severable.  If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this Directive is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of the document shall not be affected.
[brief] [Prospective Application of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)] (Argued at Pa402 – Pa407)  The effective date of the amendment authorizing [...] to pay its employees from the Board’s money is June 29, 2020.  As with all statutes, N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) must be given prospective application, which negates all of [...]’s claims for payment on its April / May / June 2020 invoices.  The Legislature undisputedly did not express retroactive application of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  Under the two-prong implied retroactive application test, the court cannot apply retroactive application of the statute because 1) the Legislature never intended to give the statute retroactive application; and 2) the retroactive application will result in either an unconstitutional interference with vested rights or a manifest injustice.  [...]’s claims, which are based on the retroactive application of the statute, thus fails, thus requiring a denial of its motion for summary judgment.
[brief] It is also incorrect to state that the exclusion of this evidence had no impact on the jury’s verdict.  While it is true that the jury rejected [...]’s version of the accident, that was likely due to the jury’s acceptance of the Plaintiff’s version of the accident, which was supported by the physical evidence.  Had the jury known that [...] lied at his deposition about prior criminal convictions, it is very likely that the jury would have had a very different view of [...] and [...] and their respective versions of the accident.  It would seem that the jury understood that [...] represented the deep pocket and that allocating some percentage of fault to [...] was necessary to ensure that Plaintiff received a meaningful recovery.  That is not a proper basis for a verdict and constitutes a miscarriage of justice.
[brief] In Tucci v. [...], the plaintiffs brought a negligence action against the defendant casino and defendant elevator company for injuries suffered in the casino’s elevator.  364 N.J.Super. 48, 50 (App. Div. 2003).  The complaint was filed just short of two years after the accident occurred.  Id.  The case was assigned a 300-day discovery period, but thereafter extended to December 14, 2021, and trial scheduled for May 20, 2002.  Id.  The plaintiffs were not provided with the elevator maintenance records sought until just short of the discovery end date.  Id.  The plaintiffs asserted that their expert could not provide the expert report until they received all of the relevant elevator maintenance records.  Id. at 50-51.  After a case management conference, the Court gave the plaintiffs until May 14, 2022, to serve their expert’s report, gave the defendants leave to depose the plaintiff’s expert and serve rebuttal expert reports, and rescheduled trial for September 9, 2002.  Id. at 51.  The plaintiffs did not end up serving their expert report until 39 days after the May 14 deadline.  Id.  The trial court granted the defendant’s motion barring testimony by the plaintiff’s expert and dismissed the case with prejudice.
[brief] Assignment of a named insured’s or eligible injured person’s rights to receive benefits for medically necessary treatment, durable medical equipment tests or other services is prohibited except to a licensed health care provider who agrees to:  (a)  Fully comply with [...] Decision Point Review Plan, including precertification requirements, (b)  Comply with the terms and conditions of the [...] policy (c)  Provide complete and legible medical records or other pertinent information when requested by us, (d)  Utilize the “internal appeals process” which shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a demand for alternative dispute resolution for any issue related to bill payment, bill processing, Decision Point Review Request or Precertification request, (e)  Submit disputes to alternative dispute resolution pursuant to N.J.A. C. 11:3 (f)  Submit to statements or examinations under oath as often as deemed reasonable and necessary[.]