ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] After quoting from Panko, the Appellate Division in Barber v. ShopRite of Englewood & Associates, Inc., 966 A. 2d 93 (App. Div. 2009) stated “the trial judge must make a probing inquiry into the possible prejudice caused by any jury irregularity, relying on his or her own objective evaluation of the potential for prejudice rather than on the jurors' subjective evaluation of their own impartiality. ”  *Id*, at 107.  It is particularly noteworthy that as stated above in the first section, it is highly questionable, in light of the [...]’s allegations to the FBI 2 months prior to trial, whether [...] could possibly make such an “objective evaluation” in fact whether she could remain objective at all.
[brief] (zero court records (Pa6; Pa10; Pa21; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa41) to validate service of process occurred to which IF service of process is NOT established a default judgement will be VOID as cited by numerous cases in this appeal (Pressler, supra, comment 4 on R. 4:50-1).  In regard to the court ignoring critical evidence, we will once again focus on the plaintiff’s failure to Respond (Pa1) to the challenge of personal jurisdiction once asserted by this defendant clearly ignoring the plaintiff’s burden to assume the obligation to provide proof to validity of service, as established in cited case law (Kilinc v. [...]
[brief] On February 17, 2022, this Court affirmed his convictions but remanded for resentencing pursuant to State v.  Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021).  (Da7-48).  On February 1, 2023, [...] resentenced defendant on Count One, second-degree manslaughter, to ten years’ imprisonment with an 85% parole disqualifier followed by three years of parole supervision, under NERA.  (18T106-25 to 107-5; Da49).  He imposed a consecutive sentence of eight years’ imprisonment on Count Three, unlawful possession of a weapon.  (18T107-16 to 24; Da8).  The remaining counts merged into Count One.  (18T107-6 to 12; 17T108-17 to 25; Da8).
[brief] Although the Court in Beseler and Delta Plastics required the insurer to provide a defense against claims that the employer’s conduct created a substantial certainty of injury, the Court’s holdings make clear that the exclusion for intentional wrongs contained in the Policy was a legally valid exclusion insofar as it excluded claims of intentional wrong based on an employer’s subjective intent to injure.  188 N.J. at 548.  Nowhere in either the Beseler or Delta Plastics decisions did the Court state that such an exclusion was contrary to or inconsistent with New Jersey public policy or the compulsory insurance provisions of the Act.  The Court’s analysis is limited exclusively to the meaning of the exclusionary language and the perceived ambiguity of that language in light of the common-law definition of an intentional wrong.  Significantly, this Court has recently decided the very issue presented by this appeal and concluded that there is no coverage for a claim of intentional wrongdoing under Part Two of the Policy.
[brief] Date Submitted: August 28, 2023  [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  R.J. Hughes Justice Complex  P.O. Box 112 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Attorney for [...] (609) 376-3378  Matko.Ilic@law.njoag.gov  [...] Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel  [...] Deputy Attorney General Attorney ID No. 274332018 On the Brief TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS........  1  ARGUMENTS ..................................................................................................................
[directive] Brady  1.  Material.  In developing its policy, each County Prosecutor’s Office shall use the following non-exhaustive list of material as examples for guidance:  Brady a.  Evidence linking a State witness to the crime for which defendant is being charged.  Landano, 271 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div.), 137 N.J. State v. certif. denied 164 (1994); Page 4 b.  Evidence related to defendant’s theory of third-party guilt.  Smith, 224 N.J. State v. 36, 50 (2016); c.  Potentially exculpatory polygraph test of State’s witness.  Carter, 85 N.J. State v. 300 (1981); and d.  Prior inconsistent and exculpatory statements made by a State’s witness.  State v. Cahill, 125 N.J. Super. 492 (Law Div. 1973).  Giglio 2.  Material.  “Evidence impeaching the testimony of a government witness falls when the reliability of the witness may be determinative of a within the Brady rule criminal defendant’s guilt or innocence. ”  Carter, 91 N.J. at 111 (citing State v. Giglio at 150) (emphasis added).  The New Jersey Supreme Court in held that “the Carter State’s obligation to disclose is not limited to evidence that affirmatively tends to establish a defendant’s innocence but would include any information material and favorable to a defendant’s cause even where the evidence concerns only the credibility of a State’s witness. ”  Id.  This includes material on civilian and Giglio investigative State witnesses.  Thus, in developing its and policy, each County Prosecutor’s Office Brady Giglio shall use the following non-exhaustive list of potential material as it relates to Giglio civilian and investigative State witnesses for guidance on the type of material that must be gathered.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................18  I.  This Court Should Dismiss This Matter Because Defendant’s Right to a Speedy Trial Was Violated [Da19a-23a, 10T10-22/11-6] .........................................................................................................................  18  II.  This Court Should Acquit Defendant of DWI Because the Proofs Fail to Establish that He Was Under the Influence of Alcohol Beyond a Reasonable Doubt [Da24a-25a, 10T4-1/4]  .........................  21 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................27
[brief] [...] testified that people in the hall threatened to shoot him, that they followed him out to the parking and continued to threaten to shoot him, that he saw some of them with guns, and that he felt surrounded.  When he heard gunfire, he “felt like my life was on the line. ”  (23T 116-5 to 11, 163-14 to 168-1, 169-12 to 170-4, 172-4 to 6, 196-21 to 197-3, 198-23 to 199-12; 24T 203-7 to 8)  He stated, no less than three times, that when he heard the gunfire, he “fired once up in the air just to get them to back off” and then he ran.  (23T 173-13 to 14, 174-6 to 7; 24T 203-8 to 10)  As he ran, he encountered [...] who pointed a gun at him.  [...] fully admitted that he fired at [...] and wounded him.  (24T 203-8 to 10, 204-9 to 18, 217-20 to 22)  But he insisted that his first shot was fired up in the air and that he did not shoot [...].  (24T 203-14 to 21, 232-25 to 233-3).  The court instructed on the use of deadly and non-deadly force in self-defense.
[brief] The Appraisal Standards Set Forth by the [...] are an Appropriate Authority Upon Which to Rely for Evidence of Appraisal Standards.  The next staggering revelation from plaintiff is that “any reliance on ‘appraisal standards’ from the Treatise the Appraisal of Real Estate is also misplaced…,” because the 15th Ed. makes a distinction between the appraisal definition of fee simple and the legal definition.  Plaintiff cites to a discussion of the “fee simple estate” at (Pa164-165).  We could probably all agree that the [...] would not be an appropriate authority upon which to rely for a legal opinion.
[brief] The trial court erred in ruling that defendant’s trial counsel acted reasonably in not cross examining the State's ballistics expert and in failing to consult a ballistics expert on defendant’s behalf to counter the State expert opinion.  Da82.  This was not a matter of reasonable trial strategy because, the record showed, counsel did not investigate or assess the State’s ballistics opinion in any manner.  Counsel did not subject this opinion evidence to any confrontation at all.  Failing to sufficiently investigate dooms a claim of “trial strategy” Strickland emphasizes: strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.  In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.  In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments.  [Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 668]
[brief] Both Courts indicated it was owed so why should there be an additional penalty after the Order indicated that Plaintiff owed Defendant the $70,000.00?  (d).  Contrary to what the Court said in the motion hearing, Defendant was the only one that proceeded in good faith having made 72 consecutive payments while Plaintiff never once attempted to address the money that she owed to Defendant and while she continued to hide behind her LIES.  AT NO TIME DID THE DEFENDANT ACTUALLY OWE MONEY TO THE PLAINTIFF (If the setoff of Defendant is considered or the LIE is recognized by this Court).
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs have not met their heavy burden to establish that the Board’s use variance determination below was in any way arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or otherwise unlawful.  Defendant respectfully requests that the Court affirm the trial court’s order and Board decision below and dismiss the entirety of Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Respondent, [...] Dated: January 4, 2024  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esquire  [...]; Plaintiff, v. THE LAND DEVELOPMENT BOARD OF THE TOWNSHIP OF WESTAMPTON, Defendant.
[brief] POINT ONE DID THE STATE PROVE BEYOND A DOUBT THAT DEFENDANT KNEW AND POSSESSED A WEAPON FOR UNLAWFUL PURPOSE AGAINST THE PERSON.  POINT TWO DID THE STATE PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT DEFENDANT KNEW OF A WEAPON INVOLVING A[N] ALLEGED CONSPIRACY–ROBBERY.  Lastly, in his supplemental brief, [...] argues:  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THEFT AS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF ROBBERY (NOT RAISED BELOW).  A.  We first address [...]'s contention that the trial court misapplied its discretion by denying the motion to sever his trial from [...]'s trial.
[brief] Appellant also alleges in its brief that the Township has “exceeded its statutory authorization” and is “operating in bad faith”.  Attached hereto are numerous letters (Pa35) that were forwarded to initially the property owner, and thereafter to the Appellant’s attorney, attempting to acquire the property without need of instituting eminent domain proceedings.  There is no allegation that the Plaintiff failed to follow the statutory requirements which permit the acquisition of the property through eminent domain proceedings.  Therefore, the allegation that the Township was “exceeding its statutory authorization” or “operating in bad faith” is simply not true.
[brief] Lastly, the [...] observe the curiosity and inconsistency in [...]’s position.  [...] was silent below and remains silent here on appeal about its New Jersey RICO claim that it asserted in this case.  Pa91-97.  But RICO claims have long been subject to the CNA.  See Techdan, 253 N.J. at 108 (“The CNA thus governs a broad range of civil causes of action, including statutory and common-law claims premised on intentional conduct as well as those based on negligence. ” (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2(c), -5.3); Blazovic v. Andrich, 124 N.J. 90, 106-08 (1991) (applying the CNA to intentional torts even before the CNA was amended in 1995 to include them).
[brief] But even more to the point, Defendant offers no authority for the claim that Plaintiff’s counsel had a duty to independently verify information provided by Defendant as to the Diner’s being listed for sale, let alone to discover the information Defendant had concealed; i.e., that the Diner would not be sold as he had represented, and that it was already subject to eminent domain.  Defendant’s claim in this regard is an obvious red herring.  As the Trial Court pointed out, Defendant could have removed any ambiguity in the PSA by specifically excluding any proceeds from the eminent domain, but he failed to do so.  3T22.  Now he argues, essentially, “It’s their fault for believing me. ”
[brief] ”  State v. Watson, 254 N.J. 558, 577 (2023) (quoting State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 218 (2011)); see also State v. Delgado, 188 N.J. 48, 60 (2006) (“Misidentification is widely recognized as the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions in this country.
[brief] In re [...], 719 A. 2d 652 - NJ: Appellate Div. 1998  "Before addressing the substance of petitioner's constitutional arguments, we question petitioner's standing to raise the issues presented.  In order to have standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, the injury must be "fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court," and it must be likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351, 364 (1992)."  Those case laws from the US Supreme Court and from the NJ Appellate Division are applications of the Article III Injury In Fact to Federal claims and state claims.
[brief] (Pa48).  However, certain important facts were revealed by the exhibits presented by Plaintiffs.  The garage is approximately 300 feet from Plaintiffs’ residence as depicted in the photos produced by Plaintiffs using the scale of the photos.  (Pa36).  The garage is surrounded on three sides by a natural barrier of trees and is placed and constructed in a visually attractive manner.  (Pa36).  The Board did not find the testimony of [...] to add anything to the analysis of the issues before the Board.
[brief] | 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) | 11 | | Brown v. Muhlenberg Township | 269 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2001) | 11,12| | Buckley V. Trenton Sav. Fund Soc'y. | 111 N.J. 355, 366 (1988) | 20 | | Bocchino v City of Atlantic City | 179 F. Supp 3d, 387, 400 (DNJ 2016) | 11 | | Cannon v Commission on Judicial Performance | 33 Cal 3d, 359, 371, 374.  (1983) | 18 | | Chimel v. California | 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) | 9 | | Cortez v. McCauley | 478 F.3d 1108, 1127 (10th Cir. 2007) | 11 | | Davis v Burris | 51 Ariz, 220 75 P2d 689 (1938) | 18 | | Doe v. Luzerne County | 660 F.3d 169, 180(3d Cir. 2011) | 12 | | [...] v. State of Maryland | Pa655 | 2 | | Florida v. Royer | 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) | 5 | Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988)
[brief] Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688; State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).  The first or deficiency prong of the Strickland/Fritz test is satisfied when a defendant demonstrates that a trial attorney’s acts or omissions fall outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance considered in light of all the circumstances of the case.  Pierre, 223 N.J. at 578.  Before all else, a strong presumption exists that a trial attorney’s conduct falls reasonably within the wide range of professionally competent assistance.  Id. at 578-579.  To rebut the strong presumption that a trial attorney’s conduct falls reasonably within the wide range of professionally competent assistance, a defendant who raises a claim of ineffectiveness must establish that the trial attorney’s acts or omissions did not equate to sound trial strategy.  Id. at 579.  The second or prejudice prong of the Strickland/Fritz test is satisfied by showing that but for counsel’s deficient performance, a reasonable probability exists that the result of the proceeding would have been different.  Pierre, 223 N.J. at 583.  The error committed must be so serious that the reviewing court’s confidence in the jury’s verdict is undermined.  Ibid.  To put it another way, a “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.  Ibid.  1.
[brief] (T2, 10:19-14:14)  The Trial Court properly concluded that this case is akin to Rocky Hill.  (Pa57).  Like the Plaintiff in this case, the plaintiffs in Rocky Hill did not have a valid reason for their delay.  In Rocky Hill, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims that they did not understand the planning board’s decision, finding that the plaintiffs had adopted a “‘wait and see’” attitude.  Rocky Hill, supra, 406 N.J. Super. at 402.  “To suggest that the right to challenge should accrue when the interpretation is contrary to one's view subordinates the public interest in repose to the private interests of the objectors.  That is what is suggested here, and it is unacceptable as an appropriate outcome. ”  Id. at 403.  Here too, Plaintiff sat on its rights by failing to at least review the Redevelopment Plan that was on file with [...] and waited until it saw the proposed development before it was motivated to action.  Another similarity between Rocky Hill and this case is that they both have only limited public interest.  In Rocky Hill, the Court rejected a claim of public interest despite the plaintiffs’ allegations that there were diverse individual plaintiffs, there was a significant turnout at the public meetings on the subject and that “the number of units in the application, represent[ed] a significant percentage of the Borough’s housing stock. ”  Id. at 398-399.  Instead, the Court concluded that the arguments raised by the plaintiffs all pertained to the “permissible scale, size, mass and arrangement of future construction in the District” and while these things were of an interest to a “limited public,” it was not the type of public interest sufficient to justify enlargement.  Id. at 401.  Finally, in Rocky Hill, the Court found that the interest in repose was strong and outweighed any limited public interests held by the plaintiffs, because the developer and the municipality had assumed significant costs and the municipality lost an opportunity to timely make changes to the ordinance.  Id. at 402-403.  Similarly, in this case, both the Redeveloper and [...] expended time and money and made contractual commitments in reliance on the validity of the Redevelopment Plan.  (T2, 8:8-16 & 19:20-25).  The interest in repose is strong in this case, just as it was in the Rocky Hill case.  The Trial Court properly concluded that Rocky Hill was the proper framework for analyzing this case.
[brief] **  In order to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, Plaintiff must allege that a breach of duty caused it to incur damages.  Namerow v. Pediatricare Assocs., LLC, 461 N.J. Super. 133, 146 (Ch. Div. 2018).  Here, Plaintiff’s fiduciary duty claim demonstrates that its viability depends on Plaintiff’s continued ability to enforce the PSA when it alleges that [...] “breached its duty through the deceptive misconduct alleged above,” i.e., its failure to inform Plaintiff about the closing of the Mack-Cali transaction.  As with the other causes of action, this cannot be said to have caused Plaintiff any damages because Plaintiff no longer had the right to purchase the Property at the time of the Mack-Cali transaction.  Moreover because the PSA (and [...]’s obligations as an escrow agent) had terminated, it cannot be said that [...] owed any duty to Plaintiff.  Consequently, as a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot state a claim against [...] and it would be futile to allow Plaintiff to amend the Complaint.  Notte v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490, 501 (2006) (finding amendment is “futile” when “the amended claim will nonetheless fail and, hence, allowing the amendment would be a useless endeavor”); Johnson v. Glassman, 401 N.J. Super. 222, 247 (App. Div. 2008) (finding a motion to dismiss under R. 4:6-2(e) should be with prejudice if any further attempts at amendment of the complaint would be futile).
[brief] 1.  Section 1:1-2 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:  2  1:1-2.  Unless it be otherwise expressly provided or there is something in 3 the subject or context repugnant to such construction, the following words 4 and phrases, when used in any statute and in the Revised Statutes, shall have 5 the meaning herein given to them.
[brief] First, plaintiffs conspicuously conceal that they never raised this legal issue below, in any manner whatsoever, during any portion of the remand, particularly in opposition to the motion for frivolous litigation fees.  Da  192  Consequently, the lower court did not address this issue in its decision denying frivolous litigation fees.  In Point II of their brief, plaintiffs erroneously contend that this Court should affirm the lower court’s decision to deny fees from the fund in court because Appellant allegedly did not raise below that third parties benefited from this action.  Yet plaintiffs undisputedly are now seeking to improperly raise an issue for the first time.
[brief] The Property, which was previously contaminated by the prior use, requires significant remediation to itself as well as some of the neighboring properties.  Pa174-Pa175, at 5:10-9:6.  As part of the approval, [...] would not only remediate the Property but would also provide an environmental escrow of $375,000 to remediate the surrounding neighborhood and adjoining properties.  Id., at 5:10-9:6.  Indeed, the physical building will serve as a cap to the Property, preventing the neighboring properties from being affected by the site.  Pa394.  Finally, the Zoning Board’s own planning consultant did not refute or rebut any of the credible testimony provided by [...] and [...]’s other experts supporting the positive criteria.
[brief] This matter arises from damage that occurred to plaintiff, [...]’s (“Plaintiff”), property located at [...] in the [...].  The damage that occurred was a result of significant drainage issues in the backyard.  Plaintiff tried for several years to have defendant, (“Defendant” or “Township”) address the drainage issues without success.  Finally, in 2018, the Township performed work in the Plaintiff’s backyard, including the installation of a drainage pipe.  During the installation of the drainage pipe, it was revealed that Plaintiff’s swimming pool had been so severely damaged as a result of the drainage issues that Plaintiff was advised to bury the swimming pool in the ground to assist with drainage.  Additionally, while the Defendant was performing the drainage work the Plaintiff’s landscaping in her backyard was destroyed and her driveway damaged by one of the Defendant’s vehicles.  Despite being a lifelong resident of the [...], Plaintiff’s property rights were damaged by the Township.  Plaintiff, however, was not provided with her day in court because the trial court improperly dismissed her complaint via Summary Judgment for reasons that are addressed in this submission.  Plaintiff is now requesting the opportunity to return back to the trial court so that she may pursue her damages, and have her property put back to the condition that it was prior to the Township’s neglect.
[brief] In this appeal, Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to additional monies.  Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to attorney’s fees related to their motions to enforce litigant’s rights.  They further argue that they are entitled to attorney’s fees as a prevailing party pursuant to Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51 (2008).  Finally, they argue that the trial court did not award enough post-judgment interest.
[brief] The Appellate Division reviews the trial court’s grant or denial of summary judgment de novo, and applies the same standard used by the trial court.  Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 72 (2022).  Under New Jersey law, summary judgment is warranted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.