[brief] “[A]n appellate court reviews agency decisions under an arbitrary and capricious standard. ”  Zimmerman v. Sussex Cnty. Educ. Servs. Comm’n, 237 N.J. 465, 475 (2019).  The “scope of review of an administrative decision is the same as that [for] an appeal in any non-jury case, i.e., whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record considering the proofs as a whole. ”  *In re Taylor*, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999) (internal quotations omitted).  “An administrative agency’s final quasi-judicial decision will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record. ”  *In re Herrmann*, 192 N.J. 19, 27–28 (2007).  However, such review “is ‘not simply a pro forma exercise in which [the court] rubber stamp[s] findings that are not reasonably supported by the evidence. ’”  *In re Taylor*, 158 N.J. at 657 (*emphasis added*).  An appellate court’s role in reviewing a final agency action is limited to three inquiries: “(1) whether the agency’s action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors. ”  *Allstars Auto. Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n*, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) (*quoting In re Stallworth*, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)).  The court only owes “substantial deference to the agency’s expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field” if the agency’s decision passes this analysis.  *In re Herrmann*, 192 N.J. at 28.  The Court is, however, “in no way bound by the agency’s interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue,” *Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec.*, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973).  The Courts “will intercede if the agency’s action exceeds the bounds of its discretion. ”  *In re Taylor*, 158 N.J. at 657; see also, *L.M. v. State Div. of Med. Assistance and Health Servs.*, 140 N.J. 480, 490 (1995) (“When an agency’s decision is manifestly mistaken . . . the interests of justice authorize a reviewing court to shed its traditional deference to agency decisions. ”).  Indeed, “[i]f the act of an administrative agency is found to be so ‘clearly against the logic and effect’ of the facts as to demonstrate that it is ‘unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious,’ [the court’s] duty is to reverse that action. ”  *Elizabeth Lodge No. 289 v. Legalized Games of Chance Control Commission*, 67 N.J. Super. 239, 246 (App. Div. 1961).  “Arbitrary and capricious action of administrative bodies means willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of circumstances. ”  *Bayshore*.  --- 5  It is noteworthy that in the recent matter of *Loper Bright Enters. V. Raimondo*, No. 22-451, 2023 U.S. LEXIS 1847 (May 1, 2023), the United States Supreme Court expressly reversed its ruling in *Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), providing for deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute.  Sewage Co. v. Dep’t. of Env. Prot., 122 N.J. Super. 184, 189 (Ch. Div. 1973), aff’d, 131 N.J. Super. 37 (App. Div. 1974).  In the present matter, the [...]’s actions in denying the Application were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.