ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Appellant filed a reply to Respondent’s cross-motion on June 30, 2023.  The Trial Court heard oral argument on July 7, 2023 (1T) and entered its Order and opinion on July 25, 2023, denying Appellant’s motion, but partially granting Respondent’s cross-motion for summary judgment (Da195-Da203)\(^1\).  Respondent withdrew the claim for monetary damages at a case management conference held on August 7, 2023, and on August 14, 2023 the Court entered its subsequent Order clarifying the July 25, 2023 Order (Da 204-Da205) as final.
[brief] They are reproduced in color in Defendant/Respondent’s Appendix to allow the Court to properly view the area in question. accident; instead, he was focused on his pastries out in front of him.  (Pa104, 37:3-15).  During the course of discovery, Plaintiff made no allegation that [...] had actual notice of the pothole in question; at his deposition, he testified that he did not know of anyone who complained to [...] with regard to the pothole where he tripped.  (Pa104-05, 39:25-40:3).  [...] (“[...]”), is and was the Acting Superintendent of Public Works for [...] at the time of the incident.
[brief] educational requirements for insurance producers are limited to completing a State-approved education course of 20 hours of education for each type of insurance license being sought.  N.J.A.C. 11:17-3.4.  They also have to pay a fee, pass a test for the lines of insurance (i.e., life, health, property, casualty and personal) for which they seek a license, complete an application and pass a background check.  N.J.S.A. 17:22A-32.  A review of the NJIPL Act and the regulations shows that there is no requirement for a high school diploma, a GED, or any level of formal education whatsoever in order to obtain an insurance producer license in New Jersey.
[brief] As with the Board’s other arguments, the [...] supports [...]’s rebuttal of the Board’s claims.  (Rb15-Rb16).  In addition, the [...] maintains the Board’s claim is defective in multiple respects.  To start, the Board’s argument relies upon a definition of “open bargaining” which differs from the use of the term in the matter before this Court.  Throughout the proceedings before [...], the [...] was consistent that its Bargaining Council was open to any member of the [...], but that the negotiations sessions would be closed to the public.  The Board, however, continues to define “open bargaining” as discussed in Brielle Bd. of Ed. and to assert that the facts here are substantially similar to Brielle Bd. of Ed..  In doing so, the Board continues to ignore that [...] correctly distinguished *Brielle Bd. of Ed.*’s concerns about the public attending negotiations as observers from the instant situation in which the negotiation session would be closed to everyone except the Board and the [...]’s negotiations team.  (Pa239-Pa240).
[brief] Whether that failure is the result of [...]'s unawareness of that body of law, or because of its awareness that the law does not support its position, cannot be discerned from [...]'s brief.  Hopefully it is the former.  In conclusory terms, [...] states that under the parties' contract, [...] is required to perform services in order to receive payment from [...], and that under the COVID Statute, as construed by the lower court, (employing the only possible construction of its plain language), [...] is entitled to payment without the performance of services during the period that schools are closed due to a public health emergency.  Its analysis stops there, and it concludes that since there is an "impairment" to its contractual rights, the Statute effecting that impairment is per se unconstitutional.
[brief] The 1928 version of the statute provided, in relevant part: The driver of any vehicle, upon a highway, before starting, stopping, backing or turning from a direct line, shall first see that such movement can be made in safety, and if any pedestrian may be affected by such movement, shall give a clearly audible signal by sounding the horn, and whenever the operation of any other vehicle may be affected by such movement, shall give a signal, as required in this section, plainly visible to the driver of such other vehicle or pedestrian of the intention to make such a movement.  Laws of 1928, Chapter 281, Article XIV, Sec. 4.
[directive] Any questions asked of officers during an internal investigation must be "narrowly and directly" related to performance of their duties and the ongoing investigation.10  Officers must answer questions directly and narrowly related to that performance.  All answers must be complete and truthful, but officers cannot be compelled to answer questions having nothing to do with their performance as law enforcement officers, that do not implicate a rule or regulation violation, or that are unrelated to the investigation.  8.6.5
[brief] This action was first brought by Plaintiff on November 24, 2020, by his filing of a Complaint and Jury Demand, which included [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) as a defendant.  See Pa1-6.  Before Defendants filed any responsive pleading, Plaintiff voluntarily removed [...] as a defendant in this lawsuit by filing a “Notice of Dismissal Without Prejudice as To Defendants [...]” on January 7, 2021.  See Da1.  On January 11, 2021, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, captioned “Second Amended Complaint Removing Defendant [...] and Adding Back [...]”, which was the subject of a motion to dismiss and resulted in the necessity of a third amended complaint.  See Pa12-17.  Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint was filed on April 6, 2021 and Defendants answered on April 16, 2021.¹  See Pa19-24, and 26-34.
[brief] [...] testified that [...] and [...] saw one of the surveilling officers’ vehicles and were “caught off guard” by the police presence, which prompted them to bypass the storage unit and head towards the facility exit.  (4T 18-17 to 24)  Even if [...]’s interpretation of the pair’s behavior was correct -- which is not a certainty -- a desire to avoid contact with police is not uncommon.  See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 169 (1994) (“That some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true.
[brief] (Pa922 [271:16-19]).  [...]\(^4\) testified that she expected PL  Landscaping to apply salt to all the parking spaces and the parking lot, to remove the snow from the sidewalk in front of the building and apply salt to that area, (Id. [271:20-22; 271:23-272:5])  As it was the landlord’s obligation to remove snow and ice from the sidewalk and apply salt to the sidewalk, [...] testified that she did not expect the tenants to shovel snow from the sidewalk nor to hire another contractor to remove snow from the sidewalk in front of their property.  (Pa925 [285:7-15; 286:3-8]).  \(^4\)  When referring to her, specifically, [...] will be referred to as “[...]” to eliminate confusion between her and her company, which will be referred to as “[...]. ”  [...] further recognized that she maintained exclusive control and management of the common areas of the shopping center, which included the parking lots, parking spaces, sidewalks and all other common areas.  (Pa927 [292:12-19]).  On March 16, 2017, Plaintiff and members of his family were customers at [...].
[brief] State v. Cole, 229 N.J. 430, 454 (2017) (quoting State v. Williams, 190 N.J. 114 (2007)); see also Cofield, 127 N.J. at 341 (“[B]ecause the inherently prejudicial nature of [404(b)] evidence casts doubt on a jury’s ability to follow even the most precise limiting instruction,” the instruction must be carefully crafted in order to “explain precisely the permitted and prohibited” use of the evidence.) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court gave no such limiting instruction in this case.6  (39T)
[brief] For these reasons alone, the company has not met its burden of demonstrating that the proposed combustion regulator is reasonably necessary for the provision of service.  The ID ignored all of this, as did the [...].  Since reliability and safety are not in any way compromised, the company's case, therefore, depends entirely on its claim that the alleged "icing" problems with the current regulator must translate into a legal finding that the proposed regulator is otherwise "reasonably necessary."  This claim falls apart on elementary scrutiny, and again the company's own evidence on cross-examination does the damage.
[brief] To achieve justice and equity, the amount of the provisional offset must be the amount sought by [...] in the ongoing Hackensack Arbitration, which is $2,084,220.03 based on indisputable accounting of amounts of the adjusted subcontract price less the payments made by [...].  Da207-208; Da493.  While ordinarily, the Court will exercise its equitable discretion to set off one judgment against another judgment, the same rationale in those cases applies under the facts here.
[brief] Moreover, Appellant fails to assert any credible argument to support its position that the retroactive use of the Cornell Studies on permit decisions does not amount to an administrative rule requiring formal notice and stakeholder comment.\textsuperscript{18}  After public notice and comment, the IFPR was enacted on July 17, 2023.  Ra0196, 54 N.J.R. 2169(a) (July 17, 2023).  The New Jersey Administrative Procedures Act defines an “administrative rule” to include an “agency statement of general applicability and continuing effect that implements or interprets law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure or practice requirements of any agency.
[brief] In this appeal, the [...] (“Board”) seeks to reinstate its arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable denial of a site plan and use variance application for a multi-level senior living facility, an inherently beneficial use, located between a school bus depot, a townhouse development, and a residential neighborhood.  The reason: it believed the proposed building that the applicant, [...], sought to develop, which complied with all building setbacks, the building coverage, and the building height (in feet) required for single-family development in Montville’s R-20A Zone, was too big for the neighborhood, had too many units, and was in the wrong location.  The trial court rejected the Board’s baseless reasons for denial, and this Court should too.  In support of its wrongful decision, the Board points to made-up detriments, such as claims that the building proposed by [...] (“[...]”) was too tall, but it fails to alert the Court to the fact that what it really means is that [...]’s building complies with the height restriction in the zoning district, but there would be 3 stories inside [...]’s building rather than the 2.5 stories Montville allows inside single-family dwellings.  Likewise, the Board argues that [...]’s site plan did not have enough parking under the Borough’s ordinance, even its own engineer determined [...] proposed more parking spaces than it actually needs and the Borough’s ordinances are preempted by State law.  The Board claimed that [...]’s plan had too much impervious coverage even though Montville’s ordinance allowed more coverage for other uses here.  But the Board’s biggest error was its decision that senior housing in this location was a detriment.  In doing so, the Board engrafted a legal standard that is inapplicable to inherently beneficial uses into its analysis of the use variance that [...] sought.  This was a fundamental and fatal flaw in its decision-making process, and one that rendered its denial arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  The Court should affirm the Law Division’s decision.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT No. [...] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, : On Appeal from a Judgment of v. : Conviction of the Superior Defendant-Appellant.  : Court of New Jersey, Law Sat Below: : Hon. [...], J.S.C., : Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Your Honors:  This letter is submitted in lieu of a formal brief pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b).  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PAGE NOS.  REPLY PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................1  POINT I THE CAR SEARCH WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE ANY PROBABLE CAUSE DID NOT ARISE FROM UNFORESEEABLE AND SPONTANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES ...........................................................................1  POINT II  DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE AND SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING..................11  CONCLUSION .................................................................................................15
[directive] Those release). of revocation or detention pretrial Page 15 on prosecutors in Directive depend police and  The systems and policies established this automated pretrial risk-assessment process. of steps to initiate the following the correct sequence between the Live an interface subsection 2.2.1.  The State Police and AOC have established See also the interface transmits confirmed Live Scan records to system and eCDR.  The Scan fingerprint automatically will Scan record data eCDR system when police generate a complaint, Live so that the time needed on eCDR.  The interface in this way reduces of required fields the populate many the identification of defendants.  positive enter data, enhances data quality, and ensures to obtaining an objective fingerprinting as the initial step in of Live Scan
[brief] Pa16; Pa24.  [...] first moved before the trial court for a stay pending appeal pursuant to the Part II Rules (*R.* 2:9-5).  That application was denied on February 8, 2024, Da3, and [...] renewed that application to the Appellate Division.  That application to stay was also denied on March 25, 2024.  Da13.  Merits briefing then ensued.
[brief] During briefing and oral argument, the Parties extensively argued over the applicability of several Appellate Division decisions concerning the impact of settlement agreement provisions on disability eligibility.  See e.g. DA69-DA79.  Yet, the Chancery Division’s opinion fails to reference, let alone distinguish, these decisions, let alone why such decisions do not apply.  The Chancery Division determined the Township breached the Agreement despite the record demonstrating the Parties were both aware of and appreciated the impact two published Appellate Division decisions which undercut the chances of Plaintiff’s IOD application being granted.  See e.g., DA69-DA79.
[brief] The court also observed that [...] appeared to show no remorse despite substantial evidence pointing to his guilt.  Nevertheless, the court also found two mitigating factors, defendant's lack of a prior criminal record, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1(b)(7), and that incarceration would impose a significant hardship on him, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1(b)(11).  Concluding that the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating factors, the court imposed a sentence just two years longer than the statutory minimum.
[directive] 8.5.1  When interviewing a law enforcement officer as a witness, he or she must be made aware of the differences between being a witness in an administrative investigation and being the subject of an administrative investigation.  The officer also should be advised that he or she is not the subject of the investigation at this time.  Appendix I provides a model form that may be used for this purpose.  If at any time the officer becomes a subject of the investigation, he or she should be advised of that fact and the appropriate procedures followed.  8.5.2
[brief] Proponents seeking relief under the relaxation provisions of Rule 1:1-2 bear a heavy burden . . .”  Romagnola v. Gillespie, Inc., 194 N.J. 596, 606 (2008).  Plaintiff seeks to invoke the rule as cure-all to their procedural deficits but have not met the heavy burden necessary to justify invocation of this rule.  Plaintiff failure to properly plead their cause of action is a result of solely their own actions and is not a sufficient justification for the relaxation of procedural requirements.  Plaintiff has not shown that [...] has engaged in any bad faith or other tactics to delay or hinder plaintiff’s litigation of this matter.
[brief] ...........................................................................................................  20  Driscoll Constr. Co. v. State of N.J., Dep't of Transp. 371 N.J. Super. 304 (App. Div. 2014)  .............................................................................................................  46 Farris v. Cnty. of Camden  61 F. Supp. 2d 307 (D.N.J. 1999) ..................................................................................................................  43  First Nat'l Bank v. North Jersey Trust Co. 18 N.J. Misc. 449 (1940) .................................................................................................................................
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The New Jersey Legislature, in both the Municipal Land Use Law and the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, has elevated the significance of a municipality’s Master Plan (particularly the Land Use Element) in guiding local land use decisions.  Municipalities in New Jersey have no inherent power to enact land use regulations.  Such authority is delegated to the municipalities through enabling legislation such as the MLUL and the LRHL which constrain how municipalities exercise land use power.
[brief] In *Morris & E.R. Co. v. Comm'r of R.R. Taxation*, 37 N.J.L. 228, 228 (Sup. Ct. 1874), aff'd, 38 N.J.L. 472 (1875), the Court found that:  In construing a statute containing a general enactment, and also a particular enactment, the effort must be, in the first instance, to harmonize all the provisions of the statute, by construing all parts together, and it is only when on such construction, the repugnancy of specific provisions to the general language is plainly manifested, that the intent of the legislature, as declared in the general enacting part, is superseded.  The Home Rule Act’s general language permitting municipalities to “Regulate the ringing of bells and the crying of goods and other commodities for sale at auction or otherwise, and to prevent disturbing noises” found in N.J.S.A. 40:48-1 dates back to 1917.  As to that provision, the Appellate Division in *State v. Krause*, 399 N.J. Super. 579, 582 (App. Div. 2008) stated “That general authorization was further refined in the Noise Control Act of 1971[.]”  Certainly, this single sentence of general authority can be read in conjunction with both the NCA and the noise nuisance provisions of Title 26.  The Home Rule Act is not repealed by the trial court’s finding of preemption here, as municipalities can still enact ordinances addressing noise; they simply must do so in accordance with the State’s requirements under the NCA.  Alternatively, municipalities can act through their local health boards to adopt noise nuisance ordinances.  While both add procedural nuance to the adoption of noise regulation, neither prohibits what the Home Rule Act permits.  The trial court’s finding that Defendants did not comply with those statutory requirements therefore does not serve as an implied repealer of the Home Rule Act.  POINT II
[brief] *Atalese* does not require express jury-trial-waiver language in every arbitration agreement.  Plaintiffs instead improperly raise a host of new arguments for the first time on appeal, some of which mischaracterize the record.  There was no duress:  The record clearly shows that [...] (or her agent) confirmed her agreement to the December Terms before she ordered her food, not after, so there was no “pressure” to preserve her order. \(^1\)  Nor did [...] waive arbitration:  [...] never requested any discovery from Plaintiffs or noticed any depositions.  Application of settled New Jersey law to the record before this Court requires that the trial court be reversed.  Argument I.
[brief] Relator satisfies all three of these criteria.  First, Relator is substantially like the original source in Springfield Terminal.  In that seminal case, the relator analyzed documents obtained in discovery that “did not themselves suffice to indicate fraud. ”  *Springfield Terminal*, 14 F.3d at 657.  The relator was an original source because it “bridged the gap by its own efforts and experience. ”  Id.  The relator in *Springfield Terminal* “started with innocuous public information; it completed the \[X + Y = Z\] equation with information independent of any preexisting public disclosure. ”  Id.  This aptly describes Relator’s activity.  Prior to Relator’s activities, there was not a single allegation anywhere of fraudulent conduct by [...].  Relator started with innocuous data about transactions -- millions of rate resets for more than 15,000 VRDOs, see Ja2283, 2291 -- and bridged the gap between the data and the fraud by its own efforts and experience.  This included Relator’s years of experience in the municipal bond industry, the development of software to analyze rate data, the methodology that [...] invented, and the many analyses in the 4AC.  See Ja2155-59, 2173-75.  Relator was able to discover the fraud, in part, by inventing a methodology and applying it to the data.
[brief] ENTERED BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, CIVIL PART, OCEAN COUNTY ([...])  CIVIL ACTION SAT BELOW: HON. [...], P.J.C.v. BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT  [...] AND [...], INDIVIDUALLY  [...] I.D. 021011979  [...] [...]  [...], Esq., Of Counsel and on the Brief ([...])  [...], Esq, On the Brief ([...])  – ID 302562019  Dated: August 19, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................................................................i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................................  ii STATUTES.......................................................................................................................  iii  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................................................................1
[brief] [...]’s iPhone  [...] contends that the first deficiencies in production occurred in violation of paragraph 3 of the protocol, which provided that “any computer, handheld device (like BlackBerries, iPhones, and iPads), external hard drive, and any other storage device utilized by [...], [...], or [...] after July 1, 2013, (collectively, the “Computers and Devices”) are subject to the Protocol.
[brief] That is why the State’s extensive reference to the legislative intent for passing the statute is completely irrelevant to this case.  The relevant part of the statute as to its scope, i.e. N.J.S.A. 23:4-16(d)(3), reads “For the purposes of this subsection, "occupied building" means any building constructed or adapted for overnight accommodation of a person, or for operating a business or engaging in an activity therein, whether or not a person is actually present. ”  Read in the context of the entire subsection, as a court must under relevant statutory interpretation, i.e. ejusdem generis canon of statutory construction (applied in State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 584, 695 A.2d 236 (1997)), it is far from clear that a pumphouse is an occupied building.  Overnight accommodations for guests and operating a business involves constant ingress and egress of individuals, pumphouses do not, even though they may at some point have an individual occupy it.  Based on the rule of lenity, there is sufficient ambiguity in that subsection as applied to [...] for this prosecution against him to be overturned.  *State v. Gelman*, 950 A.2d 879, 883, 886, 195 N.J. 475 (2008).
[directive] Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash  Bail Option  A public servant, with purpose to obtain a benefit for himself or another or to injure or to 2nd Degree $35,000 to $100,000 10% permissible deprive another of a benefit, commits an act relating to his office knowing such act is unauthorized or commits such act in an unauthorized manner, or knowingly refrains from 2C:30-2(a)(b)