ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See State v. Washington, 453 N.J. Super. 164, 186-87 (App. Div. 2018) (holding that a court may grant reconsideration in the interests of justice based on new or additional information).  Of course, in order to prevail, he will have to justify not raising this issue earlier and convince the court that the officer’s purported attendance at this conference compromised his testimony so gravely that the court’s credibility determination was “palpably incorrect. ”  Id.  The State stresses that because defendant has pleaded guilty, he is not entitled to move for reconsideration on remand without withdrawing his guilty inclusive.
[brief] As a brief summary, the relevant similarities between these cases are as follows: (1) the cases were dismissed with prejudice for failure to serve a timely expert report; (2) a discovery end date and a trial date were set prior to dismissal; (3) the plaintiff/appellants’ experts could not provide an expert report until they received additional records regarding the damages/injuries, causing the failure to meet the discovery end date; (4) the plaintiff/appellants’ failed to seek relief from the discovery end date before it lapsed; and (5) the plaintiffs/appellants’ motions for reconsideration were denied.
[brief] This Reply Brief has been submitted on behalf of the Defendant-Respondent [...] (the “Board”), in response to the Amended Brief filed on behalf of the Plaintiffs-Appellants [...], and [...] (“Plaintiffs”).  Plaintiffs have appealed the decision of the Trial Court upholding the denial by the [...] of Plaintiffs’ application for a height variance under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(6) to permit construction of two 48 ft. tall warehouses where buildings with a maximum height of only 30 ft. are permitted.  The Board found that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof with regard to both the positive and negative criteria applicable to such a variance and denied the application for the reasons stated in the Board’s [...].  Ja012-036.  Under the applicable standard of review, Plaintiffs have the heavy burden of overcoming the presumed validity of the Board’s variance denial decision and of the Trial Court’s decision upholding the Board.  Plaintiffs cannot meet their heavy burden because, as found by the Trial Court, the Board’s decision is consistent with applicable statutory and decisional law, and with the record.  The recitation in Plaintiffs’ Brief of the applicable standard of judicial review does not discuss the additional deference due to the Board’s decision because it is a variance denial.  Nor do Plaintiffs discuss the substantial deference due to Boards’ factual determinations, including the credibility of witnesses and probative value of evidence.  At the core of Plaintiffs’ argument is a fundamental misunderstanding of the proper and limited role of zoning boards weighing variance requests.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d) allows zoning boards to grant variances only in “particular cases”.  The changed market conditions calling for taller buildings proffered by Plaintiffs as the central reason they should receive a variance affect all properties throughout the SM Zone.  It is for the planning board and the governing body, not the Board, to make such sweeping policy choices.  The relief requested by Plaintiffs upon the proofs they presented would be an impermissible rezoning by variance and exceed the powers of the Board.  This Court should affirm the decision of the Trial Court that the Board’s height variance denial was proper because, as found by the Trial Court, the Board’s denial decision is in accord with applicable law concerning variances, is well-supported by the record, is fully explained in the Board’s Resolution, and should, as a valid exercise of the Board’s discretion and limited powers, be accorded substantial deference by the Court.
[brief] First, as the court noted, aside from general nervousness and avoiding eye contact, [...] did not engage in any suspicious behavior.  (Pa 17-18)  And with respect to [...]’ responses regarding his itinerary, not only were they not contradictory, they were verifiably truthful, as the court correctly found.  Compare Nelson, 237 N.J. at 547.  (“At first, Nelson told the detective he had been in the Bronx to visit his aunt and was now on his way to Philadelphia to visit his cousin, but later Nelson stated he had been visiting his cousin in New York and was heading to Philadelphia to visit a friend.  Nelson failed to give exact addresses of the individuals whom he visited, in both instances. ”).  On appeal, the State argues that the court improperly gave “uncritical acceptance to defendant’s innocent explanation” that he went to the Bronx to buy meat patties.
[directive] SAMPLE QUESTIONS:  Is he/she violent toward people other than you and the children?  Does he/she fight with or hit others?  Prior violence against a non-domestic victim:  Defendant assaulted any person who is not a Partner or Partner's child.  ✔A specific incident is required, but unlike Item 11, presence in a police report or criminal record is not required.  ✔The incident must include physical contact, the use or attempted use of a weapon to contact the person’s body, or a threat of harm made while displaying a weapon.  ✔The violent incident must have occurred on a separate occasion, before the Index Assault.  Information can come from sources other than criminal justice documentation, and the incident does not need to be known to the police.  3
[brief] Cases Adams v. Camden Safe Deposit & Tr. Co., 121 N.J.L. 389 (1938) ................................................................. 29, 30, 31 Bak-A-Lum Corp. v. Alcoa Building Prods., 69 N.J. 123 (1976) ........................................................................ 44 Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161 .................................................................................. 20 Barila v Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park, 241 N.J. 595 (2020) ....................................................................... 28 Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 182 N.J. 210 (2005) ..................................................................... 44, 45 C.L. Div. of Medical Assistance & Health Services, 473 N.J. Super 591 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2022) .............................. 25 Caruso v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 136 N.J.L. 597 (E. & A. 1948) ....................................................... 25, 26 Coco v. Hamilton, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1047; 2010 WL 2011003 (App Div. 2010) .............................................. 43 Connell v. Parlavecchio, 255 N.J. Super 45 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) ..............................
[directive] Training and Qualification 2016]2  [Amended June 3, 2014, June 4, 2014 and March 3, 2  Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of Section VII were first announced in the June 3, 2014 Directive Revising the Attorney General’s Policy on Conducted Energy Devices.  They have been added verbatim to section VII of this document.  Paragraphs 7 and 8 of section VII were first announced in a June 4, 2014 Memorandum from the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice.  They also have been added verbatim to section VII of this document.  -7-
[brief] 66  [...] also erroneously contends that the Board did not properly consider the testimony of its witnesses.  Nowhere does the law mandate that a municipal board accept face value all the evidence presented by an applicant.  "A board is free to accept or reject the opinions of a planner proffered by an applicant or objector."  Hawrylo v. Bd. of Adj., Harding Tp., 249 N.J. Super. 568 (App. Div. 1991); El Shaer v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of Lawrence, 249 N.J. Super. 323, 329 (App.Div. 1991).
[brief] --- **LEGAL ARGUMENT**  I.  **THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IGNORING LONG-STANDING LEGAL STANDARDS FOR AWARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES IN FEE-SHIFTING CASES AND BY ISSUING AN UNEXPLAINED AND INADEQUATELY LOW FEE AWARD.  (Pa9-21). **  The trial court abused its discretion by ignoring our Supreme Court’s --- \(^8\)  The Court mistakenly attributed 18 years of experience and being involved in over 1,000 matters to the experience of Plaintiff’s counsel.  Defendant’s counsel certified to that amount of experience.  (Pa172).  standards set forth in *Rendine v. Pantzer*, 141 N.J. at 317, 345, “that inform the exercise of discretion by trial courts called on to determine [attorney’s] fees” in fee-shifting cases.  *Ibid.*  The failure to follow these standards constitutes an abuse of discretion.  *Ibid.*  Also, as [...] explained in *Hensley v. Eckerhart*, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), a trial court abuses its discretion in federal fee-shifting cases when it fails to “articulate a fair explanation for its fee award” and the award is “so low as to provide clearly inadequate compensation to the attorney on the case.
[brief] (4T58:13 to 59:18; Pa2277-79.)  For example, the RIR that was submitted referenced a 2013 NJDEP Policy Statement regarding completeness that was superseded in 2020.  (4T13:3 to 15:18, 75:2 to 76:2; Pa0406, § 3.8; Pa2371.)  The 2020 NJDEP Policy Statement provides, in relevant part, as follows:  [A] remedial investigation can be considered complete when the [LRSP] . . . can conclude: (1) there is sufficient information to know the nature and extent[, both horizontally and vertically,] of a discharge of a contaminant both on-site and off-site; (2) there is sufficient information to know which, if any, receptors may have been or may be impacted by the discharge being remediated; and (3) additional delineation is not necessary in order to select an appropriate remedial action to protect public health and the environment.
[brief] As a result, the Company is obligated to, and does, maintain its public utility infrastructure in such condition as to enable it to meet its regulatory obligations to provide the requisite service.  That infrastructure consists of the property, plant, facilities and equipment within [...]’s natural gas distribution and transmission system throughout its service territory.  7.  [...] is committed to providing safe, adequate and proper service in accordance with N.J.S.A. 48:2-23.  Consistent with industry practice and its ordinary capital spending planning cycle, [...] engages continuously in the construction, operation and maintenance of its public utility infrastructure, including the property, plant, facilities and equipment that comprise the natural gas distribution and transmission system utilized to serve the approximately 538,000 customers throughout the [...] service territory.  This effort includes the replacement, reinforcement and expansion of the Company’s infrastructure, (i.e., its property, plant, facilities and equipment) to maintain the reliability of its distribution and transmission system and to ensure the continuation of safe, adequate and proper service.  8.  In furtherance of its commitment to maintain the reliability and safety of its transmission and distribution system, [...] seeks with this Petition Board authorization pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19, and thus requests that the Board determine that the construction and installation of the proposed Facility is necessary for the service, convenience or welfare of the public, and that no alternative site or sites are reasonably available to achieve an equivalent public benefit.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, [...] respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Commissions decision to dismiss his complaint, and that the Court require the Commission to allow [...] the opportunity to amend his complaint based on the OPRA request dump documents.  Contrary to the Commission’s conclusion, the Complaint sufficiently alleged the enumerated violations of the School Ethics Act, and the case should have proceeded to hearings where [...] could be given an opportunity to prove his claim.  Respectfully submitted, ________________________  [...]  Dated: November 29, 2023  MICHAEL SPILLE, Appellant, v. [...]  MEMBERS: [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] AND [...], Appellees.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] *Motorworld, Inc. v. Benkendorf*, 228 N.J. 311, 329 (N.J. 2017).  The issues in this appeal turned entirely on the factual findings of the trial court.  The Courts decision was well supported in the record and therefore should be reviewed pursuant to a deferential standard  *D'Agostino v. Maldonado*  216 N.J. 168, 182, 78 A. 3d 527 (2013)  *Motorworld, Inc. v. Benkendorf* 228 N.J. 311, 156 A.3d 1061 (N.J. 2017)
[brief] See Pfaus, 97 N.J. Super. at 8.  Strikingly, Appellants do not contest the court’s factual finding that the Original Policy had been in effect “uneventfully since at least 2019,” (Da137), nor do Appellants show that they were subject to liability during those four-plus years under any of the federal constitutional and statutory provisions on which they now rely.  To the contrary, as a long line of cases instructs, Appellants’ vague assertions of “abstract harms” and inconvenience are insufficient.  See Garden State Equality v. Dow, 216 N.J. 314, 327-28 (2013); N.J. State Policeman’s Benevolent Ass’n v. Murphy, 470 N.J. Super. 568, 594 (App. Div. 2022).
[brief] (8T 78-5 to 10; 79-22 to 80-1)  The Court employed the same reasoning for rejecting [...]’s argument that evidence of his rehabilitation and positive conduct in prison reduced the need to deter him.  The Court stated, “I don’t know whether or not an increased level of maturity has lessened your particular need for deterrence, because again, you’re in that controlled environment. ”  (8T 80-15 to 19)  The Court stated, “there’s secondary gain here,” and then seemed to suggest that it believed that rehabilitative evidence from an inmate’s time in prison could never reduce a court’s assessment of the need for deterrence:  [S]econdary gain can lead to good things, but the problem with secondary gain is it’s hard to assess what’s permanent and what’s not.  And the only way we will ever know that is when your sentence is done.  That’s the only time we’ll ever really know.  And as I say to individuals at sentencing all the time, words are great, but actions are everything.  And unfortunately, until a sentence is complete we don’t really know what the actions really are because you’re not back in society where it counts.  [(8T 81-4 to 13)]  Thus, the Court also placed the same weight on aggravating factor nine as it had during the original sentencing—substantial weight.
[directive] c.  ¿Entiende que usted tiene el derecho de buscar consejos individualizados de un abogado sobre [Sí/Yes] [No/No] el efecto que tendrá su declaración de culpabilidad sobre su situación como inmigrante?  Do you understand that you have the right to seek individualized advice from an attorney about the effect your guilty plea will have on your immigration status?
[brief] There is good reason why the Appellate Division’s prior decision is silent on the standards the [...] present on this appeal.  As the trial court observed, under New Jersey law, “in cases such as this, ‘when the plaintiff’s claims for relief involve a common core of facts or will be based on related legal theories, such a suit cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims. ’” (Da39997 (quoting Silva, 267 N.J. Super. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).)  That is because breaking down attorneys’ fees by claim in a fee-shifting case is often not possible.  “Much of counsel’s work will be devoted generally to the litigation \(^3\)  Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp., relied on by the [...], supports the trial court’s fee award decision.  253 N.J. 191 (2023).  Hansen affirmed a fee award on the grounds that the trial judge performed a “meticulous analysis” of the legal work that was included in the fee application.  Id. at 221.  The trial court here similarly engaged in a “meticulous analysis” of [...]’s fee application, including by carefully reviewing the billing records and time entries submitted to render its conclusions. as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis. ”
[brief] In order for [...] to comply with the GRC’s Orders, all that he was required to do was turn over the records.  He was not required to expend money, take time off of work, enter a defense, or participate in the proceedings in any manner.  Compliance with the Interim Order did not require separate legal representation and [...] was advised of this.  There were no arguments to be made at that time, the only required submissions were the documents.  [...] was advised on numerous occasions that nothing personal or confidential would be released.  He was advised that his privacy would be protected by the review, that nothing personal would be released, and that redaction of the documents would be made by an attorney for the Board at no cost to him.  While the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq. mandates indemnification for certain officials, it is permissive for non-State public entities:
[brief] *O Builders & Associates, Inc. v. Yuna Corp. of N.J.*, 206 N.J. 109, 114 (2011) (emphasis added.)  Appellants do not contest the applicability of the first prong.  The issue before the court is whether the [...] has information "significantly harmful" to petitioners.  *O Builders* defined "significantly harmful": in order for information to be deemed "significantly harmful" within the context of RPC 1.18, disclosure of that information cannot be simply detrimental in general to the former prospective client, but the harm suffered must be prejudicial in fact to the former prospective client within the confines of the specific matter in which disqualification is sought, a determination that is exquisitely fact-sensitive and specific.
[brief] This contention is also without merit.  The statutory process to adopt a redevelopment plan requires several procedural steps.  Compliance with those procedural steps is not, however, sufficient, as the plan must also meet with the substantive standards set forth in Sections 3, 5, 7 and 14 of the LRHL.  In the redevelopment plan here at issue, only one site, the abandoned [...] (“[...]”) department store, satisfies the substantive criteria of the LRHL.  The other parcels included within a redevelopment plan can still be redeveloped, but only if they are necessary for or otherwise connected to the qualified parcel under Section 5.  The [...] site is in one zone of the plan, but the remainder of the structures to be created in the two other zones in the plan are neither necessary for, nor connected to the redevelopment of the abandoned department store.  The other two zones are part of the redevelopment plan because the Town Council also created an “overlay” zone.  Under Section 14 of the LRHL, if more than half of the housing stock is at least 50 years old or a majority of the water and sewer structures are at least 50 years old, then the entire area of the municipality can be declared in need of redevelopment or rehabilitation.  The statutory purpose of Section 14 is “to prevent further deterioration” of the housing stock or the water and sewer infrastructure.  Neither consideration is present in the other two zones of this redevelopment plan.  There are no houses being rehabilitated or removed and there are no sewers or water mains in need of repair or replacement in those other two zones.  The arguments of defense counsel to the proposition that because the procedural steps were strictly followed, the plan must be upheld without regard to whether the substantive criteria required by the statutes are met.  Defense counsel further argue that these statutes do not apply.  These contentions are without merit.
[brief] On August 6, 2019, the Firm and [...] requested coverage under the 2018 Policy for the claims asserted against them in the lawsuit captioned, *[...] v. Richard D. [...], Esq.*, Case No. [...] (Monmouth Cty., N.J. Super. Ct.) (the “Kentos Lawsuit”).  [See Pa434a, ¶ 39]  The Kentos Lawsuit asserts numerous claims in connection with [...]’s alleged fraud in converting life insurance policy proceeds intended for the benefit of his former partner’s estate.  [Pa381a]  F. [...]’s Decision to Rescind the Policies
[brief] AA6.  In light of the Commission’s subsequent determination regarding [...]’s removal, the Commission considered whether [...] should be removed from the eligible list as requested by the [...] in opposition to her appeal given its own determination that she was unsuitable for promotion to the lieutenant rank when promoting [...]  Ibid.  The Commission concluded that the record contained sufficient basis for removing [...] from the list due to her prior employment history.  Ibid.  It emphasized that “the record indicates that [[...]] received major discipline which involved untruthfulness among other charges” and that such “employment record is adverse to the position sought due to the high standards for law enforcement officers. ”  AA6-7 (citing Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560, 566 (App. Div. 1965), cert. denied, 47 N.J. 80 (1966)).  The Commission further emphasized that “the standard in this case is even higher because [[...]] seeks promotion to a higher-level law enforcement position, Sheriffs [sic] Officer Lieutenant, where incumbents supervise, evaluate, train and provide guidance to subordinate Sheriff Officer personnel.
[brief] See, *Davidson v. Slater*, 189 N.J. 166, 185 (2007).  Failure to produce a comparative analysis can be fatal to a Plaintiff/Respondent’s case and it is always the Plaintiff/Respondent who bears the burden of production with respect to demonstrating that an accident was the proximate cause of any aggravation.  See, *Davidson* at 185 citing *O’Brien Cogeneration, Inc. v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am.*, 361 N.J. Super. 264, 274-75 (App. Div. 2003); *Reichert v. Vegholm*, 366 N.J. 209, 213-14, (App. Div. 2004).  Where the subject matter is fundamental or essential, an erroneous jury charge is almost always considered prejudicial.  See, *State v. Maloney*, 216 N.J. 91, 104-05 (2013).  Similarly, “erroneous instructions are poor candidates for rehabilitation as harmless, and are ordinarily presumed to be reversible error. ”  See, *State v. McKinney*, 223 N.J. 475, 495-96 (2015) citing, *State v. Afanador*, 151 N.J. 41, 54 (1997).  In addition to the Court’s error in permitting the instruction and the resulting elimination of Plaintiff/Respondent’s burden on a key issue in the case, the Court’s attempt to remedy the situation through allowing supplemental closings was improper, harmful error, and unduly prejudicial to the Defendant/Appellant.