ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] TO: All Law Enforcement Chief Executives  FROM: [...], Attorney General DATE: October 25, 2022  SUBJECT: Directive  Adjusting the Timeframe and Reporting Requirements of Mandatory Random Law Enforcement Drug Testing Program for 2022.  The state’s mandatory random drug testing program is governed by Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive (“AG Directive”) 2018-2, and the Attorney General’s Law Enforcement Drug Testing Policy (“AG Drug Testing Policy”), which was most recently revised in December 2020.  Pursuant to Section II.C of AG Directive 2018-2, law enforcement agencies are required to conduct random drug testing at least twice in each calendar year and to test at least 10 percent of the total number of sworn officers within the agency each time.  In March 2020, at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic response, the Attorney General issued AG Directive No. 2020-2, which sought to ease the administrative burden on New Jersey’s law enforcement agencies by suspending or delaying certain statewide reporting, training, and certification deadlines.  Modifications to the AG Drug Testing Policy were not made at that time, but later became necessary as the New Jersey State Toxicology Laboratory faced significant backlog after it was forced to suspend collection of urine samples between March 23, 2020 and July 1, 2020.  Therefore, in August, the Attorney General issued AG Directive 2020-8, modifying the random drug testing deadlines for 2020 and 2021, while still requiring that an equal number of drug tests be performed.  A similar modification to that of AG Directive 2020-8 must again be implemented.
[brief] Passim State v. Moore, 158 N.J. 292 (1984) .................................................... 38, 40 State v. Mount, 73 N.J.L. 582 (E. & A. 1905) ........................................... 43 State v. Muniz, 228 N.J. Super. 492 (App. Div. 1988) ............................. 21 State v. Nelson, 330 N.J. Super. 206 (App. Div. 2000) .............................  68 State v. Nero, 195 N.J. 397 (2008) ....................................................  35 State v. O’Donnell, 117 N.J. 210 (1989) ....................................................  79  State v. Oglesby, 122 N.J. 522 (1991) ....................................................  30, 31 State v. Orji, 277 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1994) .............................  84 State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128 (1991) .................................................... 80, 82, 83 State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305 (1980) ....................................................
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT .................................................................................................4  I.  [...]’s Argument, That Any Plan To Meet Court- Ordered Affordable Housing Obligations Must Comply With The Municipal Zoning Ordinance, Has Been Rejected By The Courts ..............................................................................................................4  II.  There Exists An Undisputed Violation Of The Court’s Judgment Compelling [...] To Provide A Realistic Opportunity For Construction Of The 29 Affordable Units (Including With Respect To The Seven Off-Site Units)  Regardless of Whether The Contemplated Property, Block 610, Lot 1 Was Itself Identified In The Court’s Order...............................6  III.  The Borough’s Evidentiary Objections, Never Endorsed By The Trial Court, Are Without Merit .............................................................10  IV. The Requested Relief Was Before The Trial Court .........................12 CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................13
[brief] The Geotime analysis and [...]’s expert report were appended to defendant’s motion in limine brief filed in the trial court, (Pa30-40; 1T71-16 to 72-3; 1T74-7 to 77-11; 1T50-11 to 154-18) and is thus part of the appellate record.  See R. 2:5-4(a).  [...] would be able to provide a report consistent with precedent in providing a general sector rather than a particular location, the prosecutor expeditiously obtained a report from [...].  (1T79-19 to 80-21).  In denying defendant’s motion to exclude [...], [...] found that the 2019 pretrial memorandum specifically indicated that cell-site location was an issue to be developed after the case was placed on the trial list.  (1T93-20 to 94-1).  The judge further noted that the State was prepared to proceed on its original report, but the Appellate Division decision in Burney clarified the law with respect to cell-phone-location data.  (1T91-24 to 92-8).  The judge recognized that the discovery rule did not mandate exclusion for late production of an expert report and observed that defendant already had an expert report who understood the issue.  (1T90-5 to 18; 1T94-14 to 21).  The judge afforded counsel an opportunity to consult with his expert and provide a proffer to the State by the time of [...]’s anticipated testimony, which defense counsel believed he could accomplish.  (1T94-24 to 97-20).  The judge’s discovery ruling should be affirmed.
[directive] Therefore, pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution; the Law and Public Safety Act of 1948, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-1, seq., which provides for general responsibility et of DLPS’s operations and the supervision of the organization of DLPS; and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97, seq., which provides for the general supervision of criminal et justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I have determined that the organization described herein is necessary for the efficient and effective operation of DLPS and its law enforcement functions and hereby direct all DLPS personnel to implement and comply with the following directives.  I.  Office of Alternative and Community Responses  A.  There is established in the Department of Law and Public Safety the Office Establishment. of Alternative and Community Responses (the Office, or OACR).
[brief] Thus, as [...] clearly represents other State employees in his position as an officer of the union, the Commission reasonably concluded that the union office was a qualifying off-site location where State business was being conducted.  See also Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 164 N.J. 38, 57 (2000) (“[C]onduct that takes place outside the workplace has a tendency to permeate the workplace. ”).
[brief] The Settlement Agreement employs clear, specific, and unambiguous language in the limited instance in which the parties chose to limit the scope of the exclusions in Paragraph 24.  For example, Paragraph 24(B) provides:  Any purported Claims arising from, related to or concerning the administration of [...]’s Estate, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, *with the exception of* any and all Claims based upon conduct, actions or omissions occurring from July 5, 2020 to August 9, 2021, which is the period of administration covered by the interim informal accounting for [...]’s Estate that has been supplied to [...] and is attached hereto as Exhibit H.  *The Parties acknowledge that [...] is releasing* any and all such excepted Claims based upon conduct, actions, or omissions occurring from July 5, 2020 to August 9, 2021 and arising from, related to or concerning [...]’s Estate, but is not releasing any Claims against [...]’s Estate based on conduct, actions or omissions occurring after August 9, 2021.  (Da95, at ¶ 24(B) (emphasis added); see also id. at ¶ 24(C) (containing similar language)).  These paragraphs are notable for the separate and express acknowledgment of waiver and release.  Likewise, when the parties intended one clause to modify another, they stated as much.  Paragraph 24(J), which relates to [...]’s Estate Plan and Marital Trust, begins with the phrase, “[i]n addition to the exceptions set forth in Paragraphs 24 D, E and F of this Agreement . . .” (Da96).  Paragraph 24(F) and 24(G) contain no such language limiting the scope of the respective exclusions from the general release and waiver or providing that one of those provisions modifies the other.  (See Da95-96).  The Probate Court’s reading renders Paragraph 24(F) unlike any other clause in the Settlement Agreement by creating an implied, unexpressed, general waiver and release in what is otherwise a section dedicated to the preservation of rights.  It also redrafts Paragraph 24(G) to limit an otherwise unlimited and expressly acknowledged reservation of rights.
[brief] ”  Chippero, 201 N.J. at 28.  [...] failed to give due regard to that determination, which was made not merely by another Judge of the Superior Court but by the Presiding Judge of the Criminal Division in the same county, and reversed the Presiding Judge’s decision on the basis of a flawed legal analysis and misinterpretation of facts.  “When the truth is suppressed and the criminal is set free, the pain of suppression is felt, not by the inanimate State or by some penitent policeman, but by the offender’s next victims for whose protection we hold office. ”  State v. Presley, 436 N.J. Super. 440, 459 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting State v. Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586, 590 (1971)).  Because the trial court’s suppression of evidence in this case is based on a misapplication of the law, in the interest of justice, the order suppressing evidence must be reversed.
[brief] \(^1\)  As a general proposition, an appellate court is “in no way bound by [an] agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue. ”  Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973).  And while a directive from the Attorney General is not a statute or an administrative rule, our courts have held that such directives do have “the force of law for police entities. ”  O'Shea v. Twp. of W. Milford, 410 N.J. Super. 371, 382–83 (App. Div. 2009).  The Court in O’Shea went on to hold that:  ... the Attorney General's “Use of Force Policy”, issued in 1985 and revised in 2000, that requires the completion of UFRs and their maintenance in the files of police departments, has the force of law for police entities.  \(^1\)  Even if the applicable standard of review were abuse of discretion, Respondent’s failure to defend its own Directive and IAPP, is arbitrary, capacious and unreasonable and Appellate had met its burden.
[brief] Plaintiff would have this court believe that he and/or counsel were acting diligently by failing to move to amend the complaint until after receipt of some of the tenants’ leases.  In fact, the exact opposite is true.  Plaintiff and/or counsel are using the fact that they didn’t obtain the leases prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations as a smokescreen to disguise the fact that they knew or certainly should have known of the identities of the strip mall’s tenants prior to the statute of limitations.  As previously stated, they were neither obligated nor permitted to delay amending their complaint until they ascertained a potential legal theory upon which to justify the amendment.  See e.g., Burd v. N. J Telephone Company, 76 N.J. 284, 292 (1978); Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 273 (1973); Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434 (1961)
[brief] (Pra120; 6T207:15-23; 6T218:13-219:12; 8T61:5-12; 9T84:17-20).  But [...] was not tested on anything; not along the way and not at what would have been, but was not, the "end."  (8T85:6-10).  Additionally, the testimony at trial from the [...] corporate executive was that [...] issued name tags to its trainees that said "In Training" on them.  (9T86:7-87:4).  The name tag is supposed to be worn on the chest so that it is visible from the front.  (Ibid.)  However, [...], the HR manager who urged [...] to apply for the flooring department, issued [...] a regular name tag that did not say "In Training."  (Pra138).  Instead of wearing his name tag on his chest facing the front, [...] wore his name tag at the bottom of his untucked t-shirt, at hip-level, facing to the right.  (Pa252; 4T104:1-21).  Despite not having completed his training, not having earned his red vest, not wearing a red vest, not wearing a name tag that said "In Training," and not wearing a name tag in a place where a customer could actually see it, [...] was "alone in the department" on a busy Saturday.  (8T210:21-24).  As a result, the plaintiff did not see the name tag (7T62:21-23) and had to ask [...] for his name, repeatedly, so as to report him to the manager for the way he had "cursed out" the plaintiff and the plaintiff's client.  (7T64:2-65:5; 7T63:3-24; 7T65:18-25; 7T67:3-68:10).  The incident happened at approximately 10:00 a.m. (Pa253), but [...]’s direct supervisor, [...], was not scheduled to work that day until 1:30 p.m. (Pra36), and [...] did not see him in the store from the time he [[...]] arrived that day until the police finished their investigation and left.  (8T:194:20-196:6).  [...] never came back to work after that day.  (Pa280-281; 5T41:6-8).
[brief] Between 2 and 3pm, [...] exchanged texts with [...] about the shooting, revealing [...] was initially mistaken about who had been shot, just as he later told police.  At 4:29pm, [...] made a call that connected a tower in Egg Harbor Township, and from 4:44pm on he made and received calls connected to the Mays Landing tower.  (13T119-11 to 120-10; Da94-95, 99-101)  After [...] was arrested, [...] came home and found his phone.
[directive] (c)  Each agency must thoroughly, objectively, and promptly investigate all allegations against its officers.  (d)  Each agency must notify its officers in writing of complaints made against them, unless this notification would interfere with any investigation resulting from these complaints.  (e)  Each agency must notify its officers of the outcome of any Internal Affairs investigation involving them.  (f)  Each agency must notify complainants of the outcome of their complaints.  (g)  If an agency’s internal affairs investigators are unable to complete an investigation within 45 days of receiving a complaint, they must notify the agency’s law enforcement executive,1 who may take steps to ensure prompt resolution of the matter.  Notifications to the County Prosecutor (h)  Where a preliminary investigation indicates the possibility of a criminal act on the part of the subject officer, the County Prosecutor must be notified immediately.  No further action should be taken, including the interviewing of, or the filing of charges against the officer, until the County Prosecutor so directs.  (i)  Pursuant to AG Directive 2019-4, the agency must notify the County Prosecutor immediately of any use of deadly force, any use of force by an officer that results in death or serious bodily injury, or any death in custody that occurs within its jurisdiction.  (j)  In the rare cases where the agency has not made a charging decision within 180 days of receiving a complaint, the agency must notify the County Prosecutor, who may take whatever steps he or she deems appropriate, including supersession of the investigation, to ensure prompt resolution of the matter.  Recordkeeping & Data Reporting  (k)  Pursuant to AG Directive 2018-3, each agency shall establish an “early warning” protocol for monitoring and tracking the conduct of all officers.  (l)  Each agency must establish and maintain an internal affairs records system which, at a minimum, will consist of an internal affairs index system and a filing system for all documents and records.  (m)  On a quarterly basis, each agency shall submit to the County Prosecutor a report summarizing the allegations received and the investigations concluded for that period.  The Attorney General shall establish a schedule for the submission of the reports.
[brief] 14  Appellants incorrectly identify the date of this transaction as December 6, 2008 and the destination as [...]’s Capital One account.  (Db7).  •  The defense theory would mean [...] took $2 million from [...], and then, rather than repaying that full amount himself, he facilitated repayment by putting in $1 million of his own money and $1 million from [...].  In other words, [...] would still owe the company $1 million from what he took.  (24T67:15 to 70:3).  [...] did not even know that [...] wrote that $2 million check to his own personal account.  (20T49:5-7).  •  The explanation about using the $2 million to acquire the Jersey City property doesn’t make sense because the Jersey City property was acquired via the [...] line of credit and an assumption of an existing mortgage, which resulted in a net payment by [...] of far less than $2 million.  [...] then used a series of corrective journal entries to cover his taking of the $2 million for which no supporting documentation is provided.
[brief] ”  State v. Merlino, 153 N.J. Super. 12, 17 (App. Div. 1977).  “However, no such deference is owed to the Law Division . . . with respect to legal determinations or conclusions reached on the basis of the facts. ”  State v. Stas, 212 N.J. 37, 49 (2012).  As to the first factor, the trial court correctly acknowledged that the nearly four-year delay between arrest and indictment was sufficient to trigger analysis of the remaining Barker factors.  See Cahill, 213 N.J. at 265-266 (“[O]nce the delay exceeds one year, it is appropriate to engage in analysis of the remaining Barker factors. ”).  This four-year delay was especially atypical for a relatively straightforward eluding and aggravated assault case.  See Cahill, 213 N.J. at 265 ("The Court thus recognized that the lapse of time that might trigger a violation of the constitutionally guaranteed speedy trial right depends on the nature of the charges lodged against the defendant.").  But the court was mistaken in measuring the length of delay as the time between arrest and arraignment, as the "delay is measured from the date of arrest or indictment, whichever is earlier, until the start of trial."  United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 2009) (emphasis added); see also Cahill, 213 N.J. at 272 ("We measure the length of the delay from the date of filing of the driving-while-intoxicated charge to the notice of trial in the municipal court of the remanded charge.").  The delay, from the date of arrest in June of 2014 until the taking of the plea in June of 2019, was five years.  Although the trial court found that the delays after arraignment at the end of April of 2018 were due to the defendant’s own conduct, discovery would not have been completed and the State surely could not have commenced trial immediately after arraignment.  In fact, defense counsel argued to the court that discovery was still incomplete in May of 2019.  (1T 4-4 to 7-1)  Therefore, the delay is even longer than that contemplated by the trial court.  This substantial length of delay is significant because analysis of the first factor involves "a double inquiry."
[brief] THE COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN DISQUALIFYING A PROSPECTIVE JUROR BASED ON HIS CONVICTION FOR AN INDICTABLE OFFENSE AND HAD NO AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER OR NOT AN OLD CONVICTION HAD BEEN EXPUNGED WHERE THE JUROR MADE NO REPRESENTATION THAT HE HAD SOUGHT OR RECEIVED AN EXPUNGEMENT.  In her brief, the appellant argues that the trial court’s disqualification of [...], who admitted to the court that he had been convicted of an indictable offense and, as a result, served prison time, deprived the defendant of due process and a fair trial.  The defendant here imagines that the disqualifying conviction could have been expunged, despite the fact that the juror himself offered no indication that he had sought or received expungement for this past criminal conduct.  The defendant claims the remote possibility that the conviction that disqualified this juror had been, without the juror’s knowledge, removed from his record, and because the court did not take additional steps after the juror himself informed the court of his disqualifying conviction, the defendant was thereby robbed of an opportunity for a fair trial.  Though the defendant argues that there may have been some possibility that the conviction referred to could have been expunged, she has offered no evidence that this ever happened and the juror made no indication that this had ever happened.  Under R. 2B:20-1(e), every person summoned as a juror, “shall not have been convicted of any indictable offense under the laws of this State, another state, or the United States.
[brief] B.  Eyewitness Identification.  [...] conducted out-of-court identifications with [...], [...], and [...], showing them only [...]’s photo.  At the February 25, 2014 Wade hearing, she testified Ceasar identified the shooter as “[...] and [...],” and had yelled his name in earshot of others.  [...] thought Caesar seemed confident, since she and [...] “used to talk,” meaning dated.  [...] thought Jones, who “had known [...] for about eight years, she knew personal information about him, where his mother’s daughter was, and where she lived,” also seemed confident.  Brown told police he had known [...] for 10 years.  Though all the witnesses revealed they had spoken to others about whether [...] was the shooter (with Ceasar and Jones calling around since they did not even know his real name), [...] did not ask follow-up questions.  (6T49-15 to 51-17, 54-7 to 55-23, 60-6 to 61-5, 62-13 to 23, 82-18 to 83-10, 85-21 to 89-2, 90-23 to 91-2)  [...] admitted not following the Attorney General guidelines, failing to use a photo array, instructions, or blind administrator.  The State justified this based on witnesses’ prior familiarity with [...].  [...] denied the motion to suppress the identifications.
[brief] (Pa001-Pa055; Pa078-Pa090).  The subdivision plan submitted for approval by [...] depicted the location and configuration of the three (3) lots, and indicated that access to all three lots was to be provided by the existing internal road known as [...].  (1T29).  The subdivision was also necessary because, while [...] granted an additional use variance to allow more than one principal use on the un-subdivided single lot, a condition of that approval was that the use variance would be temporary.  (Pa120-Pa149).  The grant of subdivision approval would allow each new warehouse-distribution-office use to be located on its own lot, thereby eliminating the need for that use variance.  (Pa120-Pa149).  No new variances were requested or determined to be necessary by the Zoning Board for the subdivision and no land disturbance or other development activities were proposed or approved pursuant to the Subdivision Approval granted by the Zoning Board.  (1T30-17 to 1T31-4; 1T48-9 to 1T48-22).  Because the Corporate Drive roadway already exists, the subdivision merely provided for the drawing of additional lot lines on the [...] Tax Maps.  (Pa312).  The overall submission by [...] for the Subdivision Approval, at the same time, also included a companion Application for Site Plan Approval.
[brief] (Pa548-49).  [...] further admitted that she, [...], and [...] schemed to enter charge pay for each other because she heard from [...] that they earned the least of the five staffing coordinators.\(^2\) (Pa548-49).  During her interview, [...] never claimed that [...] had directly approved her receipt of charge pay.\(^3\) (Pa548-49).  [...] admitted that he was aware he was receiving hourly charge pay.