ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Bank’s motion contended (1)  Plaintiff signed Bank’s application to open an account and by doing so entered into a binding arbitration agreement since the application stated customer’s use of the deposit account confirms customer’s receipt of and agreement to be bound by the bank’s applicable account agreement which included the arbitration clause, (2) Plaintiff’s claims fell within its scope, and (3) there was no dispute Plaintiff signed the application.  In opposition, Plaintiff denied (1) signing the application, (2) receiving a copy of the deposit agreement or application, and (3) being advised where these documents could be found.  Rather, bank employee questioned him at the local bank branch, inserted information into and asked him to sign an ipad, did not advise him he was signing an application or entering into a deposit agreement, and did not offer or give him the opportunity to read what he was signing.  Plaintiff did not sign, see or enter into any agreement which included an arbitration clause.  While its undisputed Plaintiff signed the iPad, it is equally undisputed [...] (1) did not know nor did the Bank’s representative advise or explain to him what he was signing and (2) did not see nor was he presented with any contract with an arbitration clause.  Nothing the Bank representative did or said complied, triggered or generated inquiry notice by the Plaintiff.  In spite of these facts, the trial court held since Plaintiff knew he was opening a bank account, which common sense and experience teach is governed by contract, he was obligated to investigate the terms of the relationship into which he was entering, made no effort to do so, and could not avoid the consequences of his inattention.  The court placed the complete burden and responsibility on the Plaintiff to ascertain what was on the iPad, relieving the Bank of any duty or responsibility of advising the customer of the nature of the transaction.  No case, common or statutory law was cited by the court or the Bank to support such a conclusion.  Plaintiff contends it was the Bank’s duty to clearly and conspicuously inform him he was signing a contract with an arbitration clause, allow him to read it and provide copies of the documents and the location where they could be found.  Absent that, there was no enforceable contract or arbitration clause.  **Procedural History**
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff-Appellant [...] respectfully requests that the October 20, 2023 Orders granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and denying Diana’s Cross Motion to Vacate, Transfer, and Consolidate be reversed.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  [...]  [...] [...] Tel. & Fax: [...]  Dated: February 2, 2024  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant  Superior Court of New Jersey  APPELLATE
[brief] The State and the [...] admitted that anthropogenic climate change is adversely impacting New Jersey’s environment and its natural resources.  [...] issued Executive Order 100 (“EO100”), on January 27, 2020, which provided, in part, as follows: WHEREAS, the international scientific community has reached an overwhelming consensus that the Earth is warming due to increasing atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases; and WHEREAS, there is also overwhelming consensus that such temperature increases are contributing to rising sea levels, an increase in the frequency and intensity of severe weather events, and numerous other adverse environmental impacts that have threatened and will continue to threaten our communities, economies, and public health; and ⁴[...]’s appendix, filed with brief on October 31, 2022.
[brief] Defendant bears the burden of pleading and proving a failure to comply with the TCA's notice requirements. 12  A defense based on the TCA's notice 8 Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J. 606, 629 (1999) (citation omitted).  9  Wymbs v. Twp. of Wayne, 163 N.J. 523, 539 (2000).  10  Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485, 497 (1985)(citation omitted).  11  Hill v. Middletown Bd. of Educ., 183 N.J. Super. 36, 40 (App. Div. 1982).  12  See Hill v. Board of Educ. of Middletown Tp., 183 N.J. Super. 36, 40-41 (App. Div. 1982); Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485, 497 (1985) ("the burden is on the public entity both to plead and prove its immunity under [the TCA] . . . ").  requirements is subject to waiver. \textsuperscript{13}  Waiver negates the affirmative defense and our courts must determine if defendant waived the TCA notice defense before they are being entitled to prosecute that defense on summary judgment, “because waiver negates reliance on the defenses”.
[brief] Initially, the indemnification clauses in every case outlined above contain these two phrases.  Only Leitao – decided prior to Azurak – even considered the “arising out of” language.  However, Leitao did not find that this phrase addressed anything approaching the required “bright line” language pertaining to an indemnitee’s own negligence.  The reason for this is simple.  The phrase “arising out of” performance of the work does not address the indemnitee’s own negligence.  D’Avila relied solely on the phrase “regardless of” to satisfy the bright line requirement.  In doing so, the D’Avila court entirely ignored the Englert Court’s determination that the “regardless of” language is ambiguous and fails to answer the question whether such indemnification would include and indemnitee’s own negligence.  Englert, 389 N.J. Super. at 56.  Clearly, the D’Avila Court reached a finding at odds with prior decisions and only served to further muddy the waters on whether indemnification clauses such as [...]’s are clear and unambiguous and meet the “bright line” requirement.
[brief] Exhibit 17, Deposition Transcript of Director [...].  Exhibit 18, Deposition Transcript of Deputy Chief [...].  Exhibit 19, Deposition Transcript of Battalion Chief [...].  Exhibit 20, draft letter of reprimand prepared, but never signed or presented to Defendant [...].  Exhibit 21, October 6, 2020 written statement of Battalion Chief [...].  Exhibit 22, written statements [...], [...], and [...] submitted to Director Childress on September 29, 2020.  Exhibit 23, Supreme Court of New Jersey’s opinion in Taylor v. Metzger.
[brief] Palombi, supra, 414 N.J. Super. at 288.  Defendant [...] failed to explicitly identify the grounds for the motion to fit within that “narrow corridor” in which reconsideration is appropriate:  “The motion shall state with specificity the basis on which it is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred. ”  Ibid.  The lower court did not overlook anything in law or fact that would require or support a modification of the Order.  Defendant’s argument for reconsideration simply does not fall within the narrow corridor in which reconsideration is appropriate.  Appellate courts “will not disturb a trial judge’s reconsideration decision ‘unless it represents a clear abuse of discretion. ’”  Kornbleuth, supra, 241 N.J. at 301 (2020) (quoting Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283 (1994)).  “An abuse of discretion ‘arises when a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”  Id. at 302 (quoting Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015)).  Defendant [...] failed to provide any meaningful support for the specificity required under Rule 4:49.  Palombi, supra, 414 N.J. Super. at 288.  Defendant [...] failed to establish that [...]’s denial of reconsideration “represents a clear abuse of discretion. ”  Kornbleuth, supra, 241 N.J. at 301.  Moreover, the record is bereft of any evidence that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying reconsideration.  [...] considered the motion, opposition and reply and correctly applied the pertinent court rule and case law.  Therefore, Defendant [...] failed to establish the trial judge abused his discretion in denying reconsideration, and the trial court’s ruling must be affirmed.
[brief] I.  **RESPONDENT CLEARLY HELD HERSELF OUT AS A MEMBER OF THE BOARD (Ca014-019)**  Respondent repeatedly used her public Facebook account to post campaign banners and garner support for her Board campaign.  (Ca263, Ca265, Ca267-268, Ca270).  She specifically shared campaign banners which contained the words:  Respondent shared campaign endorsements from her public Facebook account.  (Ca272, Ca299-300).  She shared election results which made clear she had won her seat on the Board.  (Ca276) (election results showing 40/40 districts reporting with the words “we won [celebratory emojis]”).  Respondent admitted that, “‘at the time [she] made the January 17, 2022 post that is the subject of Count 5 of the Complaint’ which compared the treatment of Jews during WWII to the treatment of unvaccinated individuals, ‘some of [her] Facebook friends were members of the [...] community, including but not limited to parents, teachers, students, and staff.
[brief] 8 Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2005)  8  Smith v. Palisades Collection, LLC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28348 (N.D. Ohio 2007)  23 State v Kyles, 132 N.J. Super. 121 (App Div. 1977) aff’d in part and rev’d in part 78 N.J. 342 (1978)  17 State v. Lopez-Carrera, 245 N.J. 596 (2021)  6  Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234 (2005)  12, 20 Veras v LVNV Funding, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176 (D.N.J. 2014)  7, 21 Weinberg v. Sprint Corp., 173 N.J. 233 (2002)
[brief] ”  Ford v. Weisman, 188 N.J. Super. 614, 619 (App. Div. 1983).  In the context of judicial proceedings, a final order is one that disposes of all issues as to all parties.  An order that does not resolve all claims or requires further steps to adjudicate the cause on the merits is considered interlocutory and not final.  See, e.g., New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Services v. L.A., 357 N.J. Super. 155 (App. Div. 2003); Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546 (App. Div. 2017); Kattoura v. Patel, 262 N.J. Super. 34.
[brief] Cf. Jackson, 43 N.J. at 160 (The juror’s “close relationship with members of the Elizabeth police department, particularly [...], suggests inability to deal with the evidence with the measure of impartiality required by the law. ”).  Finally, even if the error in failing to sua sponte excuse Juror 12 did not, by itself, rise to the level of reversable error, reversal is required when the court’s failure to excuse Juror 12 is considered in the context of the court’s additional failure to ascertain the “specific nature of the extraneous information” that Juror 12 learned from her husband.  R.D. 169 N.J. at 560.
[directive] In light of the extended stay of the Major Discipline Directive, additional guidance is now warranted.  As an initial matter, Directive 2020-5 instructed law enforcement agencies to publish their first reports identifying the officers subject to major discipline “no later than December 31, 2020. ”  However, the stay prevented law enforcement from complying with that publication date.  As a result, this Directive establishes a new date for initial reports: law enforcement agencies must publish their first public report required under IAPP no later than August 9, 2021, which is 60 days after the date of this Directive.  Because the Major Discipline Directive applies prospectively, this initial report should cover those complaints where a plea or settlement was reached or a sanction imposed from June 15, 2020—the date the Major Discipline Directive was issued—until December 31, 2020.  In the future, reports detailing all major discipline should be published no later than January 31 of the following calendar year.  This supplemental Directive also makes revisions to IAPP in order to clarify the scope of law enforcement agencies’ authority regarding the confidentiality and publication of internal affairs information and records.
[brief] | | | **Josefowicz v. Porter,** | 10, 27 | | 32 N.J. Super. 585 (App. Div. 1954) | | | **Mackey v. Lanier Coll. Agency & Serv., Inc.,** | 17 | | 486 U.S. 825 (1988) | | TABLE OF CITATIONS (continued)  Page(s)  Monaco v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of Am., Inc., 34 F. App’x 43 (3d Cir. 2002).................................................................23 N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. K.M., 444 N.J. Super. 325 (App. Div. 2016)......................................................9, 15 O’Brien v. Two W. Hanover Co., 350 N.J. Super. 441 (App. Div. 2002).....................................................16, 17
[brief] [...] declines to quantify the hours or amounts he disputes.  Any such hours were \textit{de minimis} or in connection with the successful motions, and all work advanced was in connection with efforts to collect on the judgment, which efforts have been overwhelming successful, collecting $21.5 million in the face of unrelenting opposition and frauds on the court.  [...] is correct that “[i]f a ‘prevailing’ plaintiff has succeeded on only some of his claims for relief, ‘the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount. ’”  \textit{Singer v. State}, 95 N.J. 487, 499-500 (1984) (quoting \textit{Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)).  However, and overlooked by [...], “if a plaintiff’s unsuccessful claims are related to the successful claims, either by a ‘common core of facts’ or ‘related legal theories,’ the court must consider the significance of the overall relief obtained to determine whether those hours devoted to the unsuccessful claims should be compensated.
[brief] [...] moved to suppress numerous statements from November 16, 2022; the State appeals on a motion for reconsideration that upheld suppression of the statements recorded by [...] during [...]’s calls to his parents.  (2T 11-1 to 7; Pb 1)  [...] concluded that the statements should be suppressed because officers did not re-warn [...] after he had invoked his rights, and the phone call process used by law enforcement was the functional equivalent of interrogation.
[directive] The issuance Bail under the statute. defendants" of so-called "eligible new defining the universe of the law provisions Reform Bail used throughout the defendant" as (defining the term "eligible N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15  See practical significant One of the whom acomplaint-warrant is issued").  "for Law as a person a judge acomplaint-warrant issued by decision that when is charging is consequences of the initial will or she taken counfiy jail, where he be to a judicial officer, the defendant must or other authorized statutorily-mandated of 2A:162-16(a).  During that period N.J.S.A. 48 hours.'  See for up to beheld recommendation prepare a an opportunity to pretrial services program will have new confinement, the monitoring court should the pretrial release and the level of of appropriate conditions to to the court as defendant's first appearance.  at the time of impose complaint-summons has complaint-warrant rather then decision whether to chaxge by The pending incarceration of the defendant initial consequences besides the other legally-significant prosecutor program.  A conducted by the pretrial services recommendation process completion of the defendant the pending trial unless preventively detained the defendant motion have cannot file a to complaint-summons charged by if the defendant is complaint-warrant.  So too, charged by has been release, the pretrial crime while on commits a new thereafter complaint-warrant and rather than defendant release and hold revoke N.J.S.A. 2A:162-24 to move pursuant to prosecutor cannot initial charge.  Cf. note 30.  preventively on that on the least restrictive released defendant should be Reform Law provides that a Bail  The defendant proceedings and to prevent court or her appearance at his necessary to assure conditions under legislative policy, with that Consistent N.J.S.A. 2A:162-17.  crimes.  See committing new from condition some release complaint-warrant only when charged by defendant need be Directive a this community, the safety of the risk to risk of flight, the manage the appropriate to are or conditions process.  Thus, criminal will obstruct the justice defendant and/or risk that the victims, witnesses, and "on released defendant being not object to the State would where the in any case for example, charge by means appropriate to be just as it might S.A. 2A:162-17(a), see N.J. personal recognizance," delay, decision "without unnecessary make the pretrial release must provides that a court 2A:162-17 N.J.S.A. when preparing for a Prosecutors commitment to jail."  defendants after the eligible hours later then 48 in no case but indicated Courts has Administrative Director ofthe be advised that the cases should incomplaint-warrant first appearance to recommendations as program prepare its pretrial services have the Judiciary's goal is to stakeholders that the to acomplaint-warrant is jail after being taken to county defendant of a within 24 hours conditions release appropriate 48-hour statutory expiration of the well the appearance before first schedule a court may Accordingly, the issued. deadline.
[brief] (2T43-12 to 46-18).  Counsel also argued that [...] was not credible, asserting that his testimony about knowing [...] was inconsistent, that [...] wore a green army jacket and thus was dressed differently from the others, and that, on cross-examination, the detective often answered, “I don’t recall. ” (2T46-19 to 47-12).  The court engaged defense counsel in a colloquy having to do with whether a police officer must “turn a blind eye to individuals who immediately take flight in a situation where they are associating with an individual who was just observed selling drugs?” (2T50-14 to 21).  Counsel responded that Little’s drug sales predated his time with the defendants and that no overtly suspicious conduct, except for the flight, was observed.  (2T50-22 to 52-16).  Defendant’s attorney also argued that defendant and codefendant were merely in Little’s presence and that firearms were often possessed in that area because of concerns that people would be targeted by criminals, and that the police did not sufficiently identify themselves.
[brief] [Id. at 54].  Therefore, Franklin would only have allowed a monetary penalty in addition to the legal fees connected to the November 2017 motion, if that penalty was intended to run only “until” there was compliance with the June 7th Order.  An example might have been to sanction [...] daily until he withdrew the SDNY pleading.  In reality, the limits to R. 1:10-3, as stated in Franklin, precluded both aspects of the Chancery Judge’s sanctions here.  He was not permitted to award legal fees beyond those connected to the November 2017 R. 1:10-3 motion and reimbursement of costs for Plaintiffs to defend the SDNY and DNJ filings that the Court found improper.  He was not permitted to sanction as a consequence but only to compel.  However, the vast majority of his $503,000 award was related to a motion 17 months earlier and was held to be an award as ‘consequence’.  (Da3155-3156)(2T4:18-20)(2T13:7-19:14)  What the Chancery Court did here was exceed the bounds of R. 1:10-3 and convert Plaintiff’s motion to a de facto contempt proceeding under R. 1:10-2 wherein the Court punished [...] for violating the June 7, 2016 restraint, in addition to ordering remediation.
[brief] 2.  On October 1, 2024, copies of Appellant’s Reply Brief was forward by regular, United States Mail to the following:  Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division, Clerk’s Office P.O. Box 006 Trenton, NJ 08625  3.  On October 1, 2024, copies of Appellant’s Reply Brief was forward by regular, United States Mail to the following:  [...]  [...] [...]  I hereby certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true.
[directive] See Question 22.  New Jersey law requires the “blind” administration of photo arrays.  This means that the officer(s) administering the procedure either should not know the identity of the suspect, or at a minimum, should shield themselves from knowing where the suspect is located in the photo array.  If for any reason the administrator or other attendee knows the identity of the suspect or knows which photo depicts the suspect, precautions should be taken to avoid knowing which photo the witness is looking at during the procedure itself.  See Questions 6-8.
[brief] **  In 2010, [...] had a budget surplus of $5,000,000.  (Aa13).  However, from 2011 to 2014, the District chose not to raise its tax levy to the cap.  *Ibid.*  As a result, [...] was not taxing up to its LFS from 2014-2018.  (Aa13; Ra71).  Altogether, [...] taxed $31,501,523 less than its LFS from 2014-2018.  (Ra71; Aa13).  The District also chose not to exercise its authority under N.J.S.A. 18A:22-40 and N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-39 to present voters with a referendum to increase the school tax levy in any year except 2016, when the voters rejected it.  (Ra98; Aa13).  At the same time it was failing to increase its LFS, the District was also making significant expenditures for special education and transportation costs for both public and private students.  (Ra72-73).  From the 2014-2015 to 2018-2019 school years, [...]’s special education tuition expenditures rose from $21,122,137 to $33,305,378.  (Ra72).  Over that same time period, its total transportation costs for non-special education students rose from $23,235,597 to $31,155,570.  (Ra73).  Because of [...]’s ballooning expenses and lack of action to increase revenues, it had a budget deficit of approximately $6,000,000 in 2013-2014.  (Ra65-66).  Annually, the amount of State aid a district receives is determined by the Legislature’s annual Appropriations Act.  N.J.S.A. 52:27B-20; N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5.  From fiscal year (FY) 2010 through the enactment of L. 2018, c. 67, State aid was not allocated according to the provisions of the SFRA; instead, “it was calculated based on provisions included in the State budget, with underlying funding policy changing every year.
[brief] The pertinent facts are set forth in the Initial Decision of Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) [...] dated August 15, 2022 (Aa9-Aa22), which was adopted by the Board (Aa23).  On October 8, 2019, the Board denied Petitioner’s application for AD based on its finding that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving that the September 22, 2017 incident was undesigned and unexpected (Aa4-Aa6; Aa11).  The Board granted him ordinary Disability Retirement Benefits (Aa4; Aa11; IT46:20-24).  Petitioner appealed the Board’s denial of AD (Aa7; Aa11).  At its meeting on December 9, 2019, the Board approved Petitioner’s request for a hearing to appeal.  ---
[brief] That is because the Court in that case (same court, different judge) had twice denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on April 5 and October 15, 2019 on Plaintiff’s NJLAD retaliation claims.  But then, on December 2, 2021, over two years later, with no change in law and no change in facts, the Court granted summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s NJLAD retaliation claim on a motion to reconsider.
[brief] The Township in Points V & VI of its brief alleges “contractual obligations” to [...]” but does not cite to any provision in the contract regarding the alleged “obligation. ”  (Pb35)  Instead, the Township reverts back to the alleged “public benefit” arguments without any citation to the record in support thereof.  For example, the Township argues the contract, “which includes the acquisition of open space and the reduction of traffic congestion, clearly serves the public good. ”  (Pb35)  The Township also offers potential public benefits such as: “decreas[ing] traffic, school bus expenses and congestion. ”  (Pb36)  But once again, there is no citation to the appendix in support, presumably because neither the contract nor ordinances that authorized the swap address such claims.  The Township also introduces the concept of “legal and financial implications” (Pb36) that are not cited in the record because they were not before the trial court.