ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (2T19-6 to 9).  [...] and defendant exited their respective vehicles and began unloading the duffel bags from the pick-up truck into the back of defendant's BMW.  (2T19-9 to 12).  Because only six of the duffel bags fit into defendant's car, he locked the car and carried two duffel bags to [...].  (2T19-19 to 23).  After [...] and [...] drove away, defendant unlocked the BMW and removed a small silver and black box.  (2T30-7 to 11).  As defendant walked back towards Apartment B, police officers apprehended and searched him and gave him his Miranda rights.
[brief] Bryant, supra, 309 N.J. Super. at 610.  Consistent with the presumption of validity, courts can overturn municipal actions only if they are “arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. ”  Bryant, supra, 309 N.J. Super. at 610.  A hallmark of this standard is the principle that a court should not disturb a considered legislative judgment because the “court would have done differently”:  It is commonplace in municipal planning and zoning that there is frequently, and certainly here, a variety of possible zoning plans, districts, boundaries, and use restriction classifications, any of which would represent a defensible exercise of the municipal legislative intent.  It is not the function of the court to rewrite or annul a particular zoning scheme duly adopted by a governing body merely because the court would have done it differently or because the preponderance of the weight of expert testimony adduced at a trial is at variance with the local legislative judgment.
[directive] A law enforcement officer may only pursue under the circumstances described in subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (b):  (a) when the officer reasonably believes that the violator has committed, or is engaged in a conspiracy or attempt to commit: (1) any crime of the first degree, or (2) one of the following violent or serious crimes of the second degree: a.  Manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4; b. Vehicular Homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5; c. Aggravated Assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b); d. Disarming a Law Enforcement Officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-11; e. Kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1; f. Luring/Enticing a Child, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6; g. Human Trafficking, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-8; h. Sexual Assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2; i. Robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; j. Arson, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1; k. Burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2; l. Escape, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5; m. Possession of a Firearm, Explosive or Destructive Device for an Unlawful Purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) through (c); n. Unlawful Possession of a Weapon (Machine Guns and Handguns), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(a) and (b); or (3) one of the following other crimes: a.  Burglary of a Dwelling, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2.  Vehicular pursuits are authorized for the burglary of a dwelling.  Vehicular pursuits are not authorized for the burglary of a commercial building, 4
[brief] THE BOARD REASONABLY DETERMINED THAT [...] IS NOT ELIGIBLE TO APPLY FOR AD BENEFITS.  On judicial review of an administrative agency determination, courts have a limited role to perform.  Gerba v. Bd. Of Trs., PERS, 83 N.J. 174, 189 (1980) (citations omitted).  An administrative agency’s determination is presumptively correct, and on review of the facts, this Court will not substitute its own judgment for the agency’s where the agency’s findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence.
[brief] Pa 1733-1746  Respectfully, the applicable standard of review provide that the Appellate Court should not modify / reverse the Trial Court Decision, unless the same is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  The Trial Court Decision, and the reasons / bases justifying the same were, respectfully, well-founded, appropriately cited, and well documented.  As such, the Respondent Planning Board submits that there is no basis to disturb the underlying Trial Court Opinion.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Respondent alleges there were multiple extended periods of time when the Petitioner was not living in the Decedent’s home.  Db at 13.  Respondent contends that they did not live together between 2005 to 2007.  Db at 13.  There is no citation to the record for these contentions.  That is because there are no facts to support Respondent’s self-serving portrayal.  [...] testified that throughout the Petitioner’s marriage to Decedent, the Petitioner lived in Brigantine, and he went to their house every few weeks for dinner.
[brief] This court and the district court have both previously held that the accrual date for Plaintiff’s cause of action, with exception to the libel and slander claims, was March 6, 2018.  This is the date that the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed Plaintiff’s violation of probation charge, and which he should have known or discovered an actionable claim.  Plaintiff filed the Complaint for this matter on October 13, 2020.  The cause of action became untimely on March 6, 2020.  The court here respects the decisions made by [...] and [...] and finds that Plaintiff’s current causes of action accrued on March 6, 2018, for all of the same reasons stated in their respective orders.  Aa272; Op. at p. 8.  (Emphasis added).  To the contrary, Judge [...] found the following in pertinent part: Plaintiff’s cause of action for the “State Conspiracy” claim (Count X), “Abuse of Process” claim (Count XIII), “Conspiracy to Violate Plaintiff’s Civil Rights” claim (Count XIV), and “Negligent Failure to Prevent Civil Rights Violation” (Count XV) accrued upon the state trial court’s alleged failure to correctly amend Plaintiff’s Judgment of Conviction; as such, they accrued on October 17, 2018 and thus were timely by the date filing the complaint, October 13, 2020.  Aa55-56; Op. at p. 9-10.  (Emphasis added).  And, finally, [...] found, contrary to [...] and Shanahan, that malicious prosecution claims have a six-year statute of limitations—and, again, contrary to both Judges, found that Appellant did not file a malicious prosecution claim, commenting: The tort of malicious prosecution has a six-year statute of limitations.  Earl v. Winne, 14 N.J. 119, 132 (1953).  A cause of action for malicious prosecution does not accrue until there has been “a favorable termination of the criminal proceeding. ”  Muller Fuel Oil Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 95 N.J. Super. 564, 577 (App. Div. 1967) (addressing the accrual for “statute of limitations [purposes and finding that it] does not begin until such termination”).  In the complaint currently pending, Plaintiff has not filed a separate malicious prosecution claim.  Thus, Plaintiff’s reliance on this standard fails.  Aa271; Op. at p. 7.  (Emphasis added).  As indicated above, both the federal and state court erroneously determined that the statute of limitations for malicious prosecution was two-years.  Aa55-56; Aa78-81.  In essence, [...]’s ruling was confusing and contradictory, not only with respects to her own rulings but also with respects to the ruling of the federal court as well as Judge Shanahan, a co-equal on the bench in State Court.  For the above reasons, the Court’s order granting the [...]’ motion for summary judgment should be reversed.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases Borough of East Rutherford v. East Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190 (2013) ...........................................................................................................12 City of Atlantic City v. Atlantic City Firefighters Local, 198, IAFF, 234 N.J. Super. 596 (Ch. Div. 1989) ..................................................................................14 City of Jersey City v. Jersey City of Police Officers Benevolent Ass’n., 154 N.J. 555 (1998) ..............................................................................................................17 Daly v. Komline-Sanderson Engineering Corp., 40 N.J. 175 (1963) .................................................................................................................14 Heffner v. Jacobson, 185 N.J. Super. 524 (Ch. Div. 1982) ....................................................................................13 Hillsdale PBA Local 207 v. Borough of Hillsdale, 137 N.J. 71 (1994) ...............................................................................................................17, 30, 33 In re Borough of Bergenfield, 2021 N.J. Super Unpub. LEXIS 2398 (App. Div. October 5, 2021) 46, 47, 48 In re Bridgewater, 95 N.J. 235 (1984) .................................................................................................................29 In re City of Camden, 429 N.J. Super. 309 (App. Div.) .............................................................................................17
[brief] Legally they absolutely can, assuming that they do for -- do so for sound business purposes.  And this Court would have to find that it is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable – that their action to award it to [...] was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable and not based upon sound business purposes.  The Count was, again, provided a fully compliant bid.  They were provided this document on the 20th of August that showed that they, being the plaintiffs, could properly perform under this contract.  I don’t see anything that would suggest valid, sound business judgment by paying whatever -- we used $50,000, I know that’s an estimate -- by paying $50,000 more.  The rationale seems to be that they were unsatisfied they being [...] -- were not happy that they did not receive the appropriate documentation at the bid -- the notice of classification at the bid, buy they received it August 20th.
[brief] [...]’s role during the lease negotiation period was described by [...] in the Lease Litigation as follows:  During negotiations for the Lease, Option and Rider that are at issue in [the Lease Litigation], [[...]], a non-member of Plaintiff, was appointed as primary contact person between Plaintiff, [...], and Plaintiff’s Counsel, [...].  As such, with very few exceptions, [...] handled all communications on behalf of Plaintiff relative to the above entities and people insofar as negotiations for the Lease, Option and Rider at issue in this litigation was concerned.  (Pa 1126-Pa1127).  [...] handled all communications on behalf of Plaintiff relative to the above entities and people insofar as negotiations for the Lease, Option and Rider at issue in this litigation and the subsequent termination of same.  (Pa1126-Pa1128).  [...] was similarly described, in Plaintiff's Answers to Supplemental Interrogatories in the Lease Litigation, as someone “who was utilized to gather information and submit the same to Plaintiff. ” (Pa1314 ¶27).  [...] was involved in providing Defendants with Plaintiff’s corporate documents, including the Certificate of Formation, a corporate resolution authorizing Plaintiff to sign the lease, and the Operating Agreement.  (Pa1132).  [...] provided the corporate documents to [...] on behalf of Plaintiff on June 27, 2016.  (Pa1132).  On October 27, 2016, [...], once again, acted on behalf of Plaintiff and instructed Mr.  Mazawey, to terminate the Lease due to the lack of a sewer connection to the Property.  (Pa1022).  Plaintiff took control of the Property after the execution of the Lease on July 1, 2016.  (Pa0017 ¶11).  The Lease Rider contains several provisions which are at issue in this matter and were the focus of the Lease Litigation.
[directive] Promulgated by 19-19 (August 12, 2019)  Page4  Guideline 3.  Hearing on Petition for Temporary Extreme Risk Protective Order 00  Timing.  The court shall hear the petition an expedited manner.  For in emergent relief requested on weekdays after standard court hours, weekends, holidays or any other special circumstance when the Superior Court is not session, Municipal in Court judges or emergent duty
[directive] Included here would be squad rooms, lobby areas, dispatch areas, government- provided vehicles (patrol cars), general filing cabinets, etc.  7.8.5  However, employees may have a greater expectation of privacy in their own lockers, assigned desks or possibly in a vehicle assigned to them solely for their use.  If an agency intends to retain the right to search property it assigns to officers for their use, including lockers and desks, it should put officers on notice of that fact.  This notification will help defeat an assertion of an expectation of privacy in the assigned property.  The agency should issue a directive regarding this matter and provide notice of the policy in any employee handbook or personnel manual (including the rules and regulations) the agency provides.
[directive] Multiple Counties  COMPLAINT'-SUMMONS OR CHARGE BY WHETHER TO DETERMINING 4.  ...............................................  25  COMPLAINT-WARRANT  25 .......................................  Considerations  4.1  General Policy and Risk Assessment  Pretrial Automated Decisions Informed by Charging 4.2  26 ..........................................  Sources Information Other ........................ 26  Values and Flags Score 4.2.1  Risk-Assessment  Relevant Obligation Consider Known to Enforcement Law 4.2.2  Risk Automated Pretrial for in the Accounted Information  Not Assessment................................................28
[brief] ”  Porreca v. City of Millville, 419 N.J. Super. 212,233 (App. Div. 2011)(quoting Cumberland County Improvement Auth. v. GSP Recycling Co., Inc., 358 N.J. Super. 484, 497 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 177 N.J. 222 (2003)).  Appellants’ position was rejected below, and should be rejected again now, because it would render meaningless the sixty-day refiling deadline set forth in paragraphs 1-4 and the preservation terms of the beginning of paragraph 5.
[brief] See id.  A Special Adjudicator is best situated to consider deliberation among interested parties and develop a comprehensive jury charge about evaluating fingerprint comparison evidence.  See, e.g., In re Proportionality Rev. Project, 161 N.J. 71, 81-82, 95-96 (1999) (approving model jury instructions recommended by a special master and ordering trial courts to give an instruction generally in that form while formal model charges were formulated).  This Court should remand to the trial court to appoint a Special Adjudicator to conduct hearings and develop a jury charge on fingerprint evidence to be recommended to the Committee on Model Criminal Jury Charges.  A model criminal jury charge about evaluating fingerprint comparison evidence will promote consistent and proper jury instruction in New Jersey cases where fingerprint evidence is at issue and reduce the burden on the trial and appellate courts.
[brief] April 3, 2023 Order, pp. 12-15.  (20a-23a).  Those conclusions were: (i) That the “extent of delay” favored Appellants, as Appellants had moved promptly to vacate the Final Judgment; (ii) That the “underlying reason or cause,” favored Appellants; and (iii) That the “fault or blamelessness of the litigant,” favored Plaintiff and [...].
[brief] The Court did not err, as Plaintiff alleges, and the Trial Court’s findings should be affirmed.  There was no fraud in this case.  Defendant did not marry Plaintiff to get a green card and did not misrepresent regarding her character.  Defendant was herself during the marriage, as she had always been.  Plaintiff just did not like her and wanted her to be somebody other than her.  He wanted her to fit a narrative that would align with his family and would follow their views.  Someone who would never talk back, not have an opinion, not be allowed to speak her mind and unfortunately, that’s not what she agreed to.  That was not what Defendant was promised as part of this marriage, which is why she chose to leave.  However, just because the marriage did not work out, it does not mean there was fraud.
[brief] Regardless of whether the Judge of Compensation treated petitioner's motion to declare the decedent to be an essential employee as an "other motion" under Workers Compensation Rule N.J.A.C. 12:235-3.5, or as a motion for summary judgment under R. 4:46-2, petitioner failed to satisfy his burden to establish that he was entitled to a judgment on the issue as a matter of law and that there were no genuine issues of disputed material facts.  If treated as an "other motion" under the Workers Compensation Rules, N.J.A.C. 12:235-3.5(b) required petitioner's motion to "be supported by affidavit made on personal knowledge setting forth facts which are admissible in evidence to which the affiant is competent to testify."  If treated as a motion for summary judgment, R. 4:46-2(a) required petitioner's motion to be supported by a statement of material facts, which "set forth in separately numbered paragraphs a concise statement of each material fact as to which the movant contends there is no genuine issue together with a citation to the portion of the motion record establishing the fact or demonstrating that it is uncontroverted.  The citation shall identify the document and shall specify the pages and paragraphs or lines thereof or the specific portion of exhibits relied on."  Petitioner did not provide the requisite support for his motion for the Judge of Compensation to even consider the motion, regardless of which of the foregoing Rules applied.  These are not mere technicalities that may be so cursorily dispensed with as urged by petitioner by simply arguing that the Judge of Compensation was permitted to take judicial notice of the documentation attached to petitioner's motion to satisfy his burden.  (Pb14-17).  The foregoing Rules must be enforced to afford respondent its basic right to due process, which includes the right to a full hearing to litigate the issue of whether the decedent in this case fell within the purview of the definition of essential employees under N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11.  Workers compensation claims proceed by way of summary proceedings.  The parties are afforded limited discovery and limited rights to depositions.  See N.J.A.C. 12:235-3.8 and 3.9.  To permit the finding below to stand based on a summary decision that did not even follow the basic requirements of the Workers Compensation Rules or the New Jersey Court Rules would deny respondent its right to due process.
[brief] ---  3  Inexplicably although [...] verbally acknowledged Probation’s erroneous account record during court proceedings by stating “They (Probation) dropped the ball. ” and “… because I’m confident that it’s more like the system failed you, which I’ve stated from day one, than anything I’ve done personally to malign or criticize you, …,” and referring to Probation’s improper levy of my income, “They have no Additionally, when the Court stated in its Statement of Reasons of 3/30/2022 (DA29, p. 10, lines 6-9)  “In other words, the court found the submitted accounting to properly comply with the Order dated July 20, 2012, as a ‘full accounting’ once it included all the Defendant’s payments records from the period commencing on October 1, 1998” the Court erred by omitting the Order’s critical requirement to hold a “hearing ... on the record”.  4.  The Court failed to acknowledge that Defendant’s payment record were NOT included but ignored (See [...] letter of 10/8/1999, DA414) for 25 years now.  Further, provision of an “accounting,” whether partial or full, cannot substitute for a hearing before the court (see Tancredi v. Tancredi, Harrington v. Harrington).  No hearing has ever held in this case wherein Probation was subject to cross-examination or had to justify its account record and audits before the Court, and Appellant has been denied his day in court to present proofs before the Court supporting his claims of Probation account error.  Thus, the Court erred and abused its judicial discretion in overlooking or failing to consider the material import of the Order’s requirement for a hearing to be held on the record, and in failing to enforce the Order of 7/20/2012 to hold a hearing on the record.
[brief] See, e.g., Conrad v. Michelle & John, Inc., 394 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 2007) (“A jury has the power to accept or reject, in whole or in part, a witness’s testimony. ”)  Plaintiff further argues that “there was absolutely no support in the record for the jury’s finding that the defendant’s negligence was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s accident. ”  (Pb49)  To the contrary, there was a significant amount of evidence presented to the jury which could have reasonably led the jury to the conclusion that the cause of the plaintiff’s fall was due to her own balance/unsteady gait issues as opposed to a dangerous condition at the [...] store.
[brief] [...] WAS ENROLLED IN THE CCIP AT THE TIME OF THE HOOD [...]IDENT  [...] was enrolled in the CCIP in July 2015 and remained enrolled at the time of the accident.  In its Opinion, the trial court concluded that [...] had no insurance contract with [...] and [...] at the time of the accident, as it was “undisputed” that [...] had been “erroneously enrolled” and was “immediately unenrolled. ”  Pa2739-Pa2746.  The trial court reasoned that [...] was immediately and unilaterally removed from the CCIP’s coverage, despite its receipt of a Certificate of Liability Insurance and further acknowledgment of enrollment in the ensuing months.  As discussed below, [...] was indisputably enrolled in the CCIP in July 2015, and while it understood that certain August 2015 work was excluded from CCIP coverage as it was deemed to be “demolition” work, [...] was still enrolled in the CCIP and entitled to its coverage going forward.  On July 29, 2015, [...] completed a Contractor Enrollment Form to perform work at the Project as a sub-subcontractor of [...].  On July 30, 2015, [...] received a Certificate of Liability Insurance and enclosing letter from [...] confirming [...]’s enrollment in the CCIP, which plainly stated that [...] was enrolled in the CCIP and covered under the CCIP Policy:  “Your enrollment into the Contractor Controlled Insurance Program for your work performed under Contract Number 1441-103-04 has been completed.  The attached insurance certificate is provided to evidence your coverage for Workers’ Compensation, General Liability, and Excess/Umbrella while working at the 1441 Chestnut project site….”  Pa618.  That certificate named [...] as “Producer,” with [...] as its contact; [...] as “insured”; and [...] and [...] as “insurer(s) affording coverage. ”  Pa619-Pa620.  Upon issuance of the Certificate of Insurance, [...] was enrolled in the CCIP and covered for policy period August 3, 2015 to December 23, 2018 under [...]’s and [...]’s CCIP Policy, as well as [...]’s Workers Compensation Policy.  Pa619.  The CCIP Policy provided liability coverage for enrolled insureds under the CCIP for those sums Named  Insureds/enrolled contractors, such as [...], were legally required to pay because of “bodily --- 2  In an internal July 31, 2015 email, [...] of [...] confirmed that [...]’s CCIP enrollment was complete.  Pa864. injury” caused by an “occurrence” during the policy period on a “designated project. ”  Pa77-Pa221.  The dispute here was not whether the Hood accident and ensuing litigation was of the type for which a CCIP insurer would have a duty to defend an enrolled insured.  Rather, it was [...]’s status as an enrolled insured.  Under the plain language of the documents cited above, as of its receipt of the Certificate of Liability Insurance, [...] was a “contractor of any tier” enrolled in the CCIP and performing operations at a “designated project,” and was thus a “named insured” subject to the CCIP Policy’s liability coverage.