ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Therefore, in the event a County Prosecutor has initiated a criminal investigation of an internal affairs matter, the internal affairs function must remain in contact with the County Prosecutor on a regular basis to determine the investigation’s progress.  Where a County Prosecutor has decided to terminate a criminal investigation and return the matter to the agency for appropriate disciplinary action, the internal affairs investigator and County Prosecutor must be able to document the date on which the County Prosecutor disposed of the criminal investigation.  6.1.9
[brief] *Ibid.*  The New Jersey Supreme Court subsequently affirmed, finding the “combined circumstances” of that case “can hardly be characterized as unforeseeable. ”  *Id.* at 172.  It noted the officers had months-old information about [...]’s vehicle, his description, and the residence where he stopped, and multiple officers were involved in the interaction and they followed the defendant around for a long time.  *Ibid.*  Then, the police called the canine unit out to conduct a sniff “to establish probable cause to search the vehicle for drugs. ”  *Ibid.*  This sniff was entirely controlled by the officers and “was just another step in a multi-step effort to gain access to the vehicle to search for the suspected drugs. ”  *Id.* at 173.  In contrast, here, the probable cause arose unforeseeably and spontaneously.
[brief] [...] served as [...]’s Training Officer when [...] was hired.  (14T219:12).  [...] testified that [...] did not need remediation on anything when [...] trained him over seventeen (17) years ago.  (14T220:7).  [...] responded well to training and came to the job with experience from a couple of other Police Departments.  (14T220:10).  Officers for [...] have to do a certain amount of property checks per shift.  (14T221:1; 14T222:18 - 223:7; 14T223:11-25).  [...] has performed property checks of the mall by walking in and around the mall on foot.  (14T224:4,10).  [...] confirmed that around the April 2017 through December 2017 time period there were burglaries in that area of [...]’s property checks and Officers would perform foot patrols to identify motor vehicle burglaries.  (14T229:3-14).  [...] also confirmed that foot patrols were common "about everywhere in the Township. ” (14T229:25 - 230:1).  [...] also testified that there are times when driving down a road an Officer will call out a property check with the intent of going in there and something else happens where somebody needs backup or something and the Officer does not go in there.  (14T245:1).  [...] estimated the farthest he ever walked on a foot patrol was two (2) miles.  (14T254:14,18).  [...] would do that in the dark, and most of the time at night.  (14T254:21,23).  [...] also would go out on foot patrol by himself.  (14T255:19).  [...] testified that when he would go out on foot patrol, he would generally call out to dispatch to let them know he was doing that.  (14T262:20).  However, in 2017, there were a couple of years where they had a lot of problems with the radio systems.  (14T263:19; 14T263:22 - 264:6; 14T267:20 - 268:20).  [...] personally performed property checks by parking his car in one location and walking to another location calling out the property check many times.  (14T264:15).  In 2017, there were no mobile GPS units on the Officers' persons.  (14T264:22).  Even [...] testified that he was not aware of any rules or regulations which informed Officers of [...]'s Police Department how to conduct a property check.  (2T57:2-3).  [...] testified that he was not aware of any written directives advising Officers the proper or preferred way to conduct a property check.  (2T57:5).  [...] testified that there was no specific standardized method that [...]'s Police Department demonstrates how to perform a property check other than an Officer's initial FTO training where they follow another Officer around to learn the ropes.  (2T57:9).  Technology with [...]’s Police Department
[brief] For one, Rule 4:14-1—cited by Plaintiff—provides that the “attendance of witnesses may be compelled *by subpoena* as provided in R. 4:14-7. ” (emphasis added).  [...] is a potential witness, not a party, to this action, and therefore the trial court’s order directing Plaintiff to serve a subpoena on [...] is not, in and of itself, an abuse of discretion.
[brief] ”  [...] identified [...] and [...] as the management people to whom he complained.  Ibid.  [...] testified that did not feel comfortable around [...].  He stayed in his truck whenever he was not “tacking” while [...] was operating on the job site.  Ibid.  [...], stated, “A couple of days after this accident I spoke to [...].  Mike told me that on July 10, 2014, [...] had yelled at the same driver that ran him over on Friday (July 11, 2014) for driving carelessly and too fast.  [...] told me the sweeper driver was laughing when [...] yelled at him and [...] told him he was not laughing and it was not a joke. ”  Pa1382.
[brief] Under N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1), statements by party-opponents may fall into a hearsay exception if it is the party-opponent’s own statement, made in an individual capacity.  Clearly, the statements made during [...]’ SID interview fit this hearsay exception.  [...] made each of these statements himself in an individual capacity during his interview.  Accordingly, the ALJ properly considered [...]’ statements during his SID interview when rendering the decision in this matter.
[brief] A planning board "is not obligated to approve a subdivision merely because it does not violate any express provision of the zoning ordinance."  *Popular Refreshments, Inc. v. Fuller's Milk Bar & Recreation Center, Inc.*, 85 N.J. Super. 528, 537 (App. Div. 1964), certif. denied, 44 N.J. 409 (1965).  It may require that all of the lots proposed on the development plat are shown to be adaptable for the intended purposes and without danger to the general welfare.  Ibid.  It is also duty-bound to protect the public and future owners of the property in the subdivision by requiring adequate road and drainage facilities.  Ibid. at 327-28.  The scope of El Shaer was qualified in Pizzo Mantin Group v. Twp. of Randolph, 261 N.J. Super. 659 (App. Div. 1993), aff'd as modified, 137 N.J. 216 (1994).
[brief] I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW ....................................................................................................20  II.  THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY DISMISSED FORTY’S RETALIATION CLAIMS ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT.................................22  A.  [...] failed to establish a prima facie case of CEPA retaliation  ......................24  1.  [...] did not have an objectively reasonable belief that [...]’s conduct violated N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.  .................................................................24  2.  [...]’s “complaints” cannot constitute “whistle-blowing activity. ”  ......28  3.  [...] has failed to show any genuine issues of material fact capable of supporting any causal connection between his “complaints” and his termination.  .........................................................................................................................30  B.  The Trial Court Correctly Found that [...] Possessed a Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason for Terminating [...].................................37  C.  [...] Cannot Show that Defendants’ Legitimate, Non-Retalatory Reason for Terminating Him was Pretext.................................................................39  III.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MISAPPLY THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD .........................................................42  IV.  NEITHER CONICELLO NOR LAMBRECHT RETALIATED AGAINST FORTY ...........................................................................48
[brief] They even include real estate holding companies in the complaint as somehow conspiring to commit insurance fraud.  Further, [...] makes these fraud allegations based on its lay opinion, with no medical background, regulatory background on the corporate practice of medicine, and no supporting information provided in the Complaint.  (C.C.Da.1-100).  [...], as a tactical matter, with the intended purpose of driving up costs of defense and fabricating a conflict of interest amongst the defendants, filed a motion to disqualify counsel based upon a speculative conflict of interest.
[brief] The defendant was tried for multiple burglaries, one of which occurred at a restaurant.  2014 WL 235471, at *1-2.  The only evidence connecting the defendant with that burglary was a surveillance video, which the investigating officer viewed from the surveillance system at the restaurant the same day that the burglary occurred.  The officer testified that the scene depicted in the surveillance video was the same as he saw it on the day of the burglary, and that the surveillance video played in court was the same one he had viewed at the restaurant.  Id. at *2.  The court held that in the absence of evidence regarding the surveillance system, “the trial court should look to when and where the video was first viewed by the testifying witness” in assessing the authenticity of the video.
[directive] 11  Training and Qualification for CEDs and Less-Lethal Devices  11.1  No officer shall be authorized to carry or use a CED or less-lethal device during an actual operation until having completed a training course and qualification procedure approved by the Police Training Commission (or DCJ) in the proper use and deployment of CEDs or less-lethal devices.  The training program shall include a component on techniques to de- escalate a confrontation with a person from a different culture or background.  The training program also shall include a component on how to interact with a person in emotional or mental health crisis, including de-escalation techniques.  11.2  All law enforcement officers authorized to carry and use a CED or less-lethal device pursuant to this policy shall qualify, and thereafter re-qualify annually, in a training course and qualification procedure approved by the Police Training Commission (or DCJ).  11.3  CED and Less-Lethal training programs in each county shall operate under the direct control of the County Prosecutor’s Office.  For statewide law enforcement agencies, with the approval of the Director of DCJ, the CED and Less-Lethal training programs shall operate under the control of the law enforcement executive.  The number of certified CED Instructors and Less-Lethal Instructors, who shall be responsible for the initial training and qualification of officers authorized to carry a CED or Less-Lethal Device, shall be determined by the appropriate County Prosecutor or statewide law enforcement agency executive.
[brief] These distinctions include that petitioner was convicted of multiple first and second degree crimes, some with mandatory periods of parole ineligibility.  While factually correct, the State fails to take into account the pivotal role the prosecution has in effectuating these differences through its exercise of discretion in the charging and plea-bargaining process.  As a result, the State can choose to grant a defendant immunity in exchange for their truthful testimony, as was done with co-defendant [...].  (8T91-8 to 16).  Or it can dismiss numerous charges, including those with mandatory periods of parole ineligibility, as part of a negotiated plea, as was done with co-defendant [...].  (Da 286-89).  In particular, the State, in its discretion, dismissed counts one through 32 and 34 through 57 against co-defendant [...].  Ibid.  Pursuant to the plea deal he received from the State, he plead guilty to a single count of third-degree conspiracy to commit theft.  (8T25-15 to 24, Da 222)  Co-defendant [...] obtained a significant benefit from testifying.  He was initially facing an exposure of life imprisonment - through his negotiation with the State - he avoided multiple first-degree kidnaping convictions and instead plead guilty to a single third-degree charge of conspiracy to commit theft.  The State recommended a five-year sentence.  (8T25-10 to 26-2; 8T74-3 to 13).  Thus, the State effectuated the distinctions it now relies upon to explain the colossal difference between the sentences.
[brief] “An agency must give notice that it intends to adopt or amend any rule at least thirty days before the adoption of the regulation. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a)(1).  “The notice must include a statement of the terms or substance of the intended action and the time, place and manner in which comments may be presented, and must be published in the New Jersey Register along with other means of public notice required by law. ”  Ibid.; N.J.A.C. 1:30-5.1(b)(9); N.J.A.C. 1:30-5.2(2).  “The agency must prepare a report for public distribution which provides a set of analyses of the expected impact of the proposed rule. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a)(2).  “Interested persons must be given a reasonable opportunity to submit either orally or in writing ‘data, views, or arguments,’ and the agency must ‘consider fully all written and oral submissions respecting the proposed rule. ’”  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a)(3).  The agency also must “[p]repare for public distribution, and make available for public viewing through publication on the agency's Internet website, a report listing all parties offering written or oral submissions concerning the rule, summarizing the content of the submissions and providing the agency's response to the data, views, comments, and arguments contained in the submissions. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a)(4).  And no agency rule is valid with complying with those statutory requirements.  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(d).  What an agency cannot do is what [...] is trying to do here, namely, adopt broad regulations and then narrow and substantially alter them in practice.  Put simply, the Court should not interpret the statutes and regulations to fit [...]’s plan where [...]’s plan does not comply with the statutes and regulations.  Cf. E.B. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 431 N.J. Super. 183, 206-07 (App. Div. 2013) (stating “an agency may not use its power to interpret its own regulations as a means of amending those regulations or adopting new regulations”).  [...] should require [...] to amend its plan to be consistent with the regulations [...] already adopted.  3)
[brief] ”  Sun at 329-331 (citations omitted).  The Court then went on to reaffirm the principles it had laid out in Lemeldeo v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America, 150 N.J. 255 (1997).  There the Court found a presumption that the CFA applies to a covered activity and that that presumption can only be overcome if the court finds “a direct and unavoidable conflict” between the CFA and another regulatory scheme.
[brief] 1.  DEP properly found that Exemption #11 applies to [...]’s Project and accords with the statute and case law.  (Responds to Appellants’ Brief Point II A, B, C, D, and E)..............................................................................  15  2.  [...]’s Project is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act.  (Responds to Appellants’ Brief Point II F).................................................................  24  B.  DEP correctly determined that [...]’s Project is consistent with the Areawide WQMP.  (Responds to Appellants’ Brief Point III)
[brief] Under *N.J.S.A.* 18A:7F-9(e)(3), the obligation of the Board is to “make all reasonable efforts to renegotiate a contract in good faith”.  If [...] believed that the Board was violating the statute, then it could petition the Commissioner for relief, and the Commissioner can enforce the Board to comply with the statute and withhold State aid.  However, [...]’s Counterclaim and summary judgment motion, in reliance on *N.J.S.A.* 18A:7F-9(e)(3), demands a “remedy” that requires the Board to pay a for-profit company $697,391.\(^{49}\) without a renegotiated contract for work that was never performed.
[brief] Plaintiffs seek to construct two 48 ft. tall warehouse and distribution buildings, along with accessory uses and structures, such as parking and loading areas, stormwater management basins, a septic system and access driveways at a 133-acre parcel located in Florence and Mansfield Townships that is commonly referred to as the “[...]” (the “Property”).  Ja191-Ja218.  All but 7 acres of the property lie in Florence Township.  Building 1 is proposed to have an area of 870,000 sq. ft., and Building 2 is proposed to have an area of 523,644 sq. ft.  All of Building 2 is proposed to be in Florence Township, along with the bulk of Building 1, but 3,928 sq. ft. of Building 1 would be in Mansfield Township along with some of the site improvements.  The Mansfield Township part of the property was in Mansfield Township’s ODL Office, Distribution, Laboratory Zone District in which the proposed use and structures were permitted, and the [...] approved the Mansfield Township elements of the proposed development in that board’s [...].  Ja 018.  At the time of submission of its application to the Board, the subject property was in Florence Township’s SM Special Manufacturing Zone District in which the proposed warehouse distribution use was permitted.  Ja018.  Both Mansfield and Florence subsequently rezoned their respective parts of subject property to prohibit the proposed warehouse distribution use.
[brief] SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  The Township asserts that the lower court fully considered evidence and testimony presented by the parties regarding the 45-Day Rule (N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147).  The lower court applied the standard(s) established in McElwee v. Borough of Fieldsboro, 400 N.J. Super. 388 (App. Div. 2008) and Aristizibal v. City of Atlantic City, 380 N.J. Super. 405 (Law Div. 2005) in reaching its decision that the 45-day rule was not violated.  While the Appellant raises the issue on appeal, they offer no proofs or arguments that the lower court's decision was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by substantial credible evidence.  As such, the lower court's de novo findings should not be disturbed.
[brief] In fact, several courts have held that “tag” or “transient” jurisdiction does not extend to business entities.  See, e.g., Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Burnham does not apply to corporations. ”); Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 607 F. Supp. 3d 323, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (“Burnham[...] only applies to individuals. ”).  Plaintiff’s suggestion that Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 600 U.S. 122 (2023), approved of the exercise of transient jurisdiction over entities and individuals alike is inaccurate.
[directive] A public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school within this State offering education in grades kindergarten through 12, or any combination of grades, at which a child may legally fulfill compulsory school attendance requirements.  Serious bodily injury.  Serious bodily injury means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.  Serious bodily injury and serious bodily harm have the same definition for purposes of this Policy.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(b); N.J.S.A. 2C:3-11(d).  Significant bodily injury.  Significant bodily injury means bodily injury which creates a temporary loss of the function of any bodily member or organ or temporary loss of any one of the five senses.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(d).  Subject of the video footage.  Any law enforcement officer, suspect, victim, detainee, conversant, injured party, or other similarly situated person who appears on the BWC recording, and shall not include a person who only incidentally appears on the recording.  Substantive report.  A substantive report shall mean a report that includes a detailed accounting of the incident.  It does not include a report, for example, which simply refers to other reports or to the existence of BWC or other camera recordings.  Tactical team.  A group of officers who are specially selected, trained, and equipped to handle high- risk incidents, including, but not limited to, those involving snipers, barricaded persons, warrant services, apprehensions, acts of terrorism, and other situations or activities as deemed necessary by command leadership.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022
[brief] In point VI, Appellant alleges that the trial court erred by ruling that the Board lacked jurisdiction to decide the issue before it when the Board was “the proper forum . . . to make the findings and determination as to a use being currently nonconforming and its ‘pre-existing’ legal status” (Ab49).  Because Appellant’s Point VI simply restates under slightly different formulations the very same arguments raised in its Points I and IV, Point VI fails for the same reasons already discussed herein.  Unlike Appellant, Respondent will not burden the Court’s resources and patience by presenting duplicative arguments to those already covered in other portions of this brief.  Instead, Respondent will briefly address only those portions of Point VI that raise issues or arguments differing from those Appellant raises elsewhere in its brief.  To the extent Appellant seems to contend in Point VI that the Board had the statutory power and authority to “adjudicat[e] that the off-site parking use on Lot 5 is not a ‘legal pre-existing nonconforming use’” because no other municipal authority had the power to do so, this process-of-elimination theory of governmental power has no purchase.  As has already been explained, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 sets forth limited powers for zoning boards of adjustments.  The Legislature did not see fit to imbue the Board with a catch-all, residual authority to police nonconforming uses that the Board deems “chaotic and unsafe” in the subjective opinion of its members (Ab48).  Rather, the Board is empowered only to “decide appeals” regarding alleged enforcement errors pertaining to enforcement of zoning ordinances under subpart (a), to “hear and decide requests for interpretation . . . upon which such board is authorized to pass by any zoning or official map ordinance” under subpart (b), and to grant or deny applications for variances under subparts (c) or (d).  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.  Appellant has pointed to no errors in the enforcement of any existing ordinance nor has Appellant pointed to any ordinance authorizing the Board to interpret a site plan before a different municipal body that there is no record evidence about.  Nor was Appellant seeking a variance.  Accordingly, and for reasons already discussed, the Board lacked statutory authority to entertain the application brought by Appellant and the arguments Appellant raises in Point VI are without merit.
[brief] Bad practice is bad practice – full stop.  As stated above and in similar detail in [...]'s certifications and in the submissions by the [...] on behalf of the [...], not only are there insurmountable issues with testing validity and security if a recording is allowed, but these practical impediments coupled with the ethical challenges facing [...] will force [...] and any similarly conscientious experts to bow out of litigated matters if the Court orders a recording device be permitted during his IME of the Plaintiff.
[brief] \(^3\)  On May 29, 2020, the [...] moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint with prejudice.  (Da1-566)  Plaintiffs opposed the motion, and the [...] filed a reply to that opposition.  (Da567-643)  After oral argument, [...] granted the motion to dismiss, and a similar motion filed by co-Defendants, [...], and [...].  (Pa148-185)  [...] held that the Entire Controversy Doctrine and the principal of *res judicata* barred the claims asserting fraudulent concealment.