ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The court specifically rejected the argument that an affidavit of merit was not required merely because the employees “who performed the activities giving rise to the negligence claim were not ‘licensed persons’ under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A–26. ”  Id. at *3.  In focusing on the “nature of the legal inquiry,” in accordance with Couri, the court concluded that an affidavit of merit was necessary where the resolution of the plaintiff’s claims required the jury to evaluate whether defendant breached “the professional duty owed by it. ”  Id. at *5.  Accord Carter & Burgess v. Sardari, 355 S.W.3d 804, 811 (Tex. App. 2011) (applying Texas’ analogous affidavit of merit statute; “So long as the action arises out of the provision of professional services, the statute permits no exception for an action alleging a firm’s vicarious liability for the negligence of an unlicensed employee”).  The same result is warranted here.  Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that [...] “negligently, carelessly and/or recklessly operated, designed, controlled, supervised, maintained, inspected and/or created a system of oversight” with regard to the Turnpike project and that this alleged negligence directly and proximately caused decedent’s death (Pa64 at ¶¶ 147-148; see also ¶ 154 discussing [...]’s vicarious liability).  [...]’s utilization of [...], a certified engineer technician, in the role of Resident Engineer, does not nullify the nature of the services for which [...] was contracted to perform – professional engineering services.  Nor does it alter the fact that plaintiffs’ claims rise and fall on their ability to demonstrate that [...] deviated from their contractual responsibilities, which again fall within the statutory definition of professional engineering.  Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court’s rejection of plaintiffs’ effort to circumvent the Affidavit of Merit Statute’s requirements.
[brief] On June 3, 2019, the New Jersey Court confirmed in part, and vacated in part, the December 13, 2018 Phase II Partial Final Award.  (Da3161-3184)  The trial court vacated that portion of the December 13, 2018 Partial Final Award that required [...] to reimburse 40% of the legal fees [...] caused the Company—which he fully controlled throughout Phase I—to incur by litigating [...]’s individual issues and claims.
[brief] In State v. Mallozzi, 246 N.J. Super. 509, 511 (App. Div. 1991), the defendant made incriminating statements during the booking process prior to being read the Miranda warnings.  Ibid.  On appeal from the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress, this Court held “there was clearly no questioning, nor can it be fairly concluded that [the] defendant was subjected to the functional equivalent of questioning. ”  Id. at 516.  It further concluded that “informing [the] defendant of the charges against him was not designed or done to elicit any type of response from defendant .  . . .”  Ibid.  Here, the only questions defendant challenges at booking in the [...] were: (1) [...] asked, “[h]aven’t I always been straight with you?”; (2) [...] asked if defendant “want[ed] to give [the detectives] a statement”; and (3) [...] asked if defendant was “friends with [...], right?”
[brief] But in North Carolina, the Supreme Court found that testimony regarding the non-testifying analyst’s opinion, though hearsay, was admissible under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 703, which is substantively identical to N.J.R.E. 703.  *State v. Jones*, 368 S.E.2d 844, 846 (N.C. 1988).  The court highlighted that the rule “permits an expert witness to base an opinion on the out-of-court opinion of an expert who does not testify. ”  *Ibid.*  Because the witness in that case testified his identification “has to be verified and initialed before it can be typed and mailed out” the court found that “without verification of his own opinion by another examiner, the witness could not have arrived at, and testified to, a final conclusion regarding the fingerprint. ”  *Ibid.*  Thus, the court found, “[t]he opinion of the other examiner ... necessarily forms a part of the basis for the opinion to which the witness testified, and it clearly was reasonable for an expert in the field of fingerprint identification to rely upon such a procedure. ”  *Ibid.*  Further the court noted that because the “challenged testimony was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but as a part of the basis for [the] opinion, it was not hearsay” and therefore it was properly admitted.  *Id.* at 849.  But other states, including the Massachusetts Supreme Court, caution against allowing testimony about the ACE-V analysis verification step, because “‘verifying’ suggests that a nontestifying expert concurs with the testifying expert’s conclusion” and that testimony “would be improper hearsay testimony. ”  *Fulgiam*, 73 N.E.3d at 821-22 (citing *Commonwealth v. Chappell*, 40 N.E.3d 1031 (2015)); see, e.g., *State v. Connor*, 937 A.2d 928, 930 (N.H. 2007); *People v. Pearson*, 116 N.E.3d 304, 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019); *State v. Smith*, 628 N.E.2d 1176, 1181 (Ill. 1994).  This Court should adopt the same reasoning as North Carolina.
[brief] ”  •  RFP 15:  “All pleadings, submissions, administrative records, documents that Plaintiffs (or their representative) obtained or produced through discovery or subpoena, expert reports, orders, and decisions relating to any proceeding in which Plaintiffs (or anyone acting by, though, or on behalf of Plaintiffs) protested or otherwise challenged in any manner [...] for the FY08 Recompete KC-135 PDM Contract, or the award of the FY08 Recompete KC-135 PDM Contract.
[brief] (Complaint, para. 284 to 358, Pa 37 to Pa50).  Plaintiff alleged that the [...] long term tax exemption did not comply with post April 17, 1992 long term tax exemption laws, rules and regulations.  Plaintiff alleged that MEPT Journal Square Urban Renewal, LLC v. The City of Jersey City, 455 N.J. Super. 608 (App. Div. 2018) cert denied 263 N.J. 356 (2019) resolved and governed this statutory interpretation dispute.
[brief] ”  The trial court judge ERRED when he said that the defendant, [...], produced no credible evidence.  The defendant, [...], did identify existing evidence in the court record, from February of 2015 to the end of April of 2015, that he was denied due process of law before the judgment is issued.  For the trial court judge to say that the [...] provided no credible evidence that he was not served confirms to this court that he ERRED only focusing on the individual defendant’s Affidavit of Service.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 8-9.  Pra7.  The Supreme Court reversed, holding:  2.  Whenever an administrative agency acts, be that act mandatory or strictly voluntary, it must do so reasonably and in a manner calculated to achieve the policies expressed in the agency's organic statute.  Therefore, because the Commissions determined to reimburse affected members, they were necessarily required to do so reasonably and in a non-arbitrary manner.  Here, that means that the Commissions were required to provide reasonable notice in order that the retroactive benefit would fairly be made known and, thus, made available in a non-arbitrary manner to affected members.
[brief] left open the possibility that some jurors could have found defendant conspired in or was an accomplice in the robbery but not the assault, while other jurors could have found he conspired in or was an accomplice in the assault but not the robbery.  In short, these instructions did not necessarily require that the jury unanimously conclude that defendant conspired to commit or was an accomplice in the same crime.  Such a verdict cannot stand.  Id. at 76 (emphasis added).  Unable to determine that the jury “actually found defendant guilty based on a shared vision of the evidence and through the application of clear and correct legal principles,” this Court reversed in Gonzalez.  Id. at 78 (emphasis added).  The same result should occur here with respect to Counts Two and Three -- official misconduct and a pattern of misconduct.  Defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process, his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, and his corresponding state-constitutional rights were all violated by instructions that left open the possibility of non-unanimous jury decisions on Counts Two and Three.  Consequently, his convictions on those counts should be reversed and the matter remanded for retrial of those counts.
[brief] [...] DID NOT ABUSE HER DISCRETION IN “MAINTAINING” THE DEFAULT AGAINST DEFENDANTS AS DEFENDANTS HAD ALREADY BEEN PROVIDED WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE FULLY RESPONSIVE ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFFS’ “PUNCH LIST” (A3, 4-5, 6-11, 3T15-19).  Ignoring the plain language of R. 4:23-5(b) that required Defendants to demonstrate that they had provided “fully responsive discovery” in order to have their pleadings restored, Defendants claim that Judge Weiner should have declined to “maintain” their defaults, and instead have ordered some unspecified “lesser sanction” given their selective and incomplete responses.
[brief] CERTIFICATION  I, [...], the assigned transcriber, do hereby certify the foregoing transcript of proceedings on CD, playback number 10:02:56 to 10:11:14, is prepared in full compliance with the current Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings and is a true and accurate non-compressed transcript of the proceedings as recorded, and to the best of my ability.  /s/  Elaine Howell  [...] AOC #189  [...]  DATE: April 17, 2024  STATE OF NEW JERSEY V [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE
[brief] Redeveloper prepared revised site plans to conform to the requirements of the Redevelopment Plan and, on or about August 22, 2022, submitted the same to the [...] (“JLUB”) (Pa118, ¶2b).  In addition, [...] and Redeveloper negotiated and executed a Redevelopment Agreement before the November 17, 2022 JLUB Hearing. (Pa145 & Pa116).  On November 14, 2022, [...] adopted Ordinance 36-2022 approving a financial agreement with the Redeveloper.  [https://ecode360.com/HA1928/laws/LF1788981.pdf](https://ecode360.com/HA1928/laws/LF1788981.pdf).  Redeveloper’s project consists of a combined 2,182,101 square foot warehouse complex consisting of four (4) buildings, 1,385 passenger vehicle parking spaces and 629 trailer parking spaces (“Warehouse Project”).  (Pa117, ¶1).  Building A contains 963,316 s.f. and is located partially in [...] and partially in [...].  (Pa117, ¶1.a. & Pa118, ¶1.c.i).  Building C is likewise located partially in [...] and partially in [...] and consists of 312,317 s.f. (Pa117, ¶1.b.i. & Pa118, ¶1.c.i).  Buildings B and D are located entirely in [...], with Building B consisting of 639,578 s.f. and Building D consisting of 266,890 s.f. (Pa117-Pa118, ¶1.b.ii, ¶1.b.iii and ¶1.c.ii).  Collectively, over half of the Warehouse Project is located in [...].
[brief] The court denied the motion, concluding that [...] was not permitted to withdraw under State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009) (Da 60-73).  The lower court improperly used the wrong law State v. Slater, 198 to govern Jamar [...] motion to withdraw his plea.  [...] did not file a motion to withdraw his plea before his sentence, or after his sentence.  Which are both governed by State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009), and the prongs Slater holds.  Defendants who enter into conditional pleas, who succeed on appeal his/her Right to withdraw is governed under Court R. 3:9-3(f), As in the above case with [...].  Slater has no standing here.
[brief] In addition to causing individual harms, the district policies will also disrupt schools’ attempts to foster an inclusive culture, to the detriment of all students.  Schools create a safe and inclusive learning environment by accepting and engaging all students, and, in so doing, model respect as the standard for participating in civil society.  Conversely, schools that treat some students as unworthy of respect or full acceptance can expect other students to take notice and follow suit, targeting peers whom they come to view as fair game.  By singling out gender-nonconforming students under the challenged policies, the districts in effect mark them for further discrimination.  Students who seek to avoid these consequences, or who refuse to risk disclosure to their parents, will be unable to participate fully in the school environment and their education, increasing their exposure to the harms described above.  iii.
[brief] On February 1, 2020, the next morning, Plaintiff asked [...] if Plaintiff could call her attorney.  She said, “[w]hy? It’s Saturday.  Your attorney is not in his office. ”  Plaintiff said she had her attorney’s cell phone number and that she can call him 24/7; 365.  [...] said, “[d]on’t get smart with me. ”  She never allowed Plaintiff to call Plaintiff’s attorney that day.  On February 2, 2020, the next day, Plaintiff asked again if she could call her attorney.  Plaintiff asked [...] if Plaintiff could please call Plaintiff’s attorney.  [...] said Plaintiff could call his office and not his cell phone.  Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Office does not take collect calls.  The Inmate Handbook Plaintiff was given when Plaintiff was processed in intake, dated 2018, states, “[a]n inmate housed in any classification unit has the right to communicate with their attorney. ”  Said right was breached as stated above.
[brief] Db35.  Defendant overlooks that the Act and its regulations prohibit sharing “nonpublic personal information” with “a nonaffiliated third party” until after providing the consumer with a certain notice.  15 U.S.C. § 6802; 16 CFR § 313.4(a)(2).  Among other things, that notice must (i) specify the type of nonpublic personal information collected, (ii) the categories of nonaffiliated --- 2  Defendant’s letter (Pa25) appears to use the CFPB’s validation notice form.  From the letter, Defendant accepts disputes and information requests addressed to a PO box in [...] where Defendant is located.  The Pennsylvania return address is presumed to be that of the mail vendor and is not the address at which Defendant accepts disputes or information requests.  third parties to whom such information is disclosed, and (iii) the consumer’s right to opt out of the disclosure of nonpublic personal information to nonaffiliated third parties.  16 CFR § 313.6.  There is nothing in the record demonstrating that Defendant provided an Act-compliant notice.
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[brief] The common law Public Trust Doctrine affords the citizens of New Jersey longstanding and inviolable rights of access to the tidal waters and adjacent shorelines of the State.  Public access is generally understood to mean the ability of the public to pass physically and visually to, from and along public trust lands and waters (i.e., those lands that are now or formerly flowed by the tide).  N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(a).  The Doctrine is an ancient principle that was first articulated by the Institutes --- 7  The coastal permit programs to which the Public Access Law applies are the Coastal Area Facility Review Act, N.J.S.A. 13:19-1 et seq., the Waterfront Development Law, N.J.S.A. 12:5-3, the Wetlands Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 13:9A-1 et seq. and the Flood Hazard Area Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:16A-50 et seq.
[brief] N.J.S.A. § 17:33A-7 expressly provides that:  a.  Any insurance company damaged as the result of a violation of any provision of this act may sue therefor in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover compensatory damages, which shall include reasonable investigation expenses, costs of suit and attorneys fees.  (emphasis added)  b.  A successful claimant under subsection a. shall recover treble damages if the court determines that the defendant has engaged in a pattern of violating this Act.  (emphasis added)  The Legislature made it clear that to pursue IFPA violations, a court of competent jurisdiction is the proper forum for addressing IFPA violations.  The Legislature also used the word “court” when addressing damages in subsection b. thereby expressly providing for the court to be the proper forum to bring IFPA actions.  Therefore, following the basic tenets of statutory interpretation, if the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous the courts are not to engage in statutory construction, and because the language in the IFPA is clear without varying plausible interpretation, it is abundantly evident that the trial court’s analysis going beyond plain language statutory interpretation and delving into statutory construction was unnecessary and incorrect.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING [...]’S MOTION TO AMEND THE TRIAL COURT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER BECAUSE THE NEW EVIDENCE SUBMITTED AND ACCEPTED BY THE TRIAL COURT REQUIRED THE DENIAL OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT (PA10-PA11; 4T 5:4-7:7)  The standard for reviewing a Trial Court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration is abuse of discretion.  Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 389 (App. Div. 1996) (“[T]he standard of review where there is a denial of a motion for reconsideration ... is ‘abuse of discretion. ’”)  Under the “abuse of discretion” standard, the Court “may find an abuse of discretion when a decision ‘rest[s] on an impermissible basis’ or was ‘based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors. ’”  State v. Steele, 430 N.J. Super. 24, 34–35 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has instructed that “a functional approach to abuse of discretion examines whether there are good reasons for an appellate court to defer to the particular decision at issue.”
[brief] See Da160.  The Arbitrator rejected [...]’s request and found “the Award dated January 19, 2024 is reaffirmed and remains in full force and effect including [...]’s obligation to pay all amounts awarded to [...]. ”  Da236.  He did, however, ask the parties to recalculate [...]’s award of interest based on a different start date, “which interest shall be paid when calculated by the parties.
[brief] [...] of the [...] testified that because of the robberies in the area, the police department decided to set up surveillance at the three stores in the area, along Route 1 corridor.  (9T 154-10 to 19)  [...] testified that he was working the day shift on January 12, 2012, surveilling the [...] store at [...].  (9T 157-22 to 158-13)  [...] testified that after about a half hour of surveillance, he observed a black Buick drive up.  [...] testified that the black Buick never entered the parking lot of the [...] store.  The passengers sat in the car for a few minutes.  The first passenger who got out of the car was a black male of about 5'11", wearing a black baseball hat and a black hooded sweatshirt and black gloves.  The second man who got out of the rear passenger seat was a black man about 5'8", wearing a black baseball cap, a black hooded sweatshirt and grey jacket.  (9T 161-11 to 162-5)  Frank Todd testified that one of the men appeared to be talking on his cell phone the same time as the driver, leading [...] to speculate that they were in communication with each other.  (9T 162-8 to 10)  According to [...], the black Buick pulled into the drive way adjacent to a building at [...].  (9T 162-17 to 21)  Inside the store, [...] saw the taller man of the two walk towards the cash register, still on his cell phone.  The shorter man remained in the front.  [...] eventually lost sight of the men in the store.  (9T 163-2 to 9, 165-20 to 23)  He contacted [...] from the [...] to trail the Buick.  (9T 163-10 to 14)  [...] testified that when he first saw the Buick, it was parked in the back of the office building at [...].  (9T 204-15 to 19)  [...] was wearing plain clothing and was driving an unmarked Taurus.  (9T 156-23 to 157-8)  [...] testified that as he approached the Buick, the car started backing out of the parking space; the two cars passed each other; the Buick continued to back down the street into the driveway of the [...].  (9T 207-13 to 208-9)  The car then made a right onto Parsonage Road.  (9T 208-10)  The driver was on his cell phone.  [...] followed him.  (9T 209-12 to 15)  The car pulled into the parking lot of [...].  (9T 212-14 to 22)  At that point, [...] parked directly parallel behind the car, blocking it.  He activated his lights and approached the driver.  (9T 214-5 to 215-4)  The driver complied with [...]’s request to put the phone down and hang up.  (9T 215-23 to 216-1)  The driver provided his Pennsylvania driver’s license identifying himself as [...] and an envelope with paperwork pertaining to the car.  Although the tag on the car was not on file, the police eventually determined that the car was validly registered to [...], Michael's mother.  (9T 216-7 to 19)  Michael was immediately arrested.
[brief] THE MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR A NEW SENTENCING HEARING  BECAUSE THE SENTENCING PROCEEDING WAS RIDDLED WITH ERROR, BOTH LEGAL AND FACTUAL, AND BECAUSE THE 20-YEAR TERM THE COURT IMPOSED, WHICH IS GREATER THAN THE SENTENCE THE STATE REQUESTED, IS EXCESSIVE.  (30T 59-22 to 61-24; Da 9-14)  [...] had just turned 26 at the time of the offense.  He lived in his parents’ home with his girlfriend and their young son.  (23T 98-23 to 99-5; 30T 48-5 to 6; PSR 1)  [...] is a high-school graduate with two years of community college (PSR 13-14) and was employed as a truck helper while working to establish himself as a musical performer.  (23T 103-7 to 9, 109-9 to 13; 24T 292-4 to 7; PSR 13)  His only prior brush with the law consisted of a disorderly persons offense for possession of drug paraphernalia.