ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 3T13-14, 20.  Defendant was well aware of his fact when he signed the PSA.  3T20.  There was “no credible evidence that the property was listed for private sale” when the PSA was signed.  3T20.  The Court specifically found that Defendant’s testimony that the property was for sale when the PSA was entered into “was not credible. ”  3T21.  Plaintiff testified “that she did not know about the status of the discussions with the [...],” and the Court found this testimony to be “credible, especially compared to the defendant’s testimony. ”  3T20.  “Plaintiff didn’t even know there was an eminent domain proceeding going on. ”  3T21.  Defendant did not share any of the proceeds he received from [...] with Plaintiff.  When Plaintiff first learned about the proceeds, Defendant told her she was not entitled to anything.  3T14.  There was no evidence that the parties intended to limit Plaintiff’s entitlement to the diner proceeds to situations involving a traditional, voluntary sale.  It was Defendant’s position that, even though the property was in the midst of eminent domain proceedings at the time the parties signed the PSA (which he knew about but did not tell Plaintiff), he should not have to pay Plaintiff from the proceeds because the property was not “transferred away from the [...] by a traditional sale. ”  3T21.  The Court found that to construe the agreement as urged by Defendant would lead to an “absurd” and “grossly unfair” result.  3T21-22.  Sitting in equity, the Court held that in this case, where the property was already involved in an eminent domain proceeding, the term “sale” is broad enough to include an involuntary sale, such as through eminent domain.  3T22.  The Court found that it was the intention of the parties “to provide plaintiff with consideration in the form of money from the business...[and] the source of the money was not intended to be limited to a traditional sale versus a forced sale, through eminent domain proceedings or through condemnation, or inverse condemnation, or even a settlement of the legal action. ”  3T22-23, 25.  Having found that there was a sale under the PSA, the Court found Plaintiff was entitled to fifty percent of the proceeds Defendant received.  In withholding those proceeds from Plaintiff, Defendant breached the PSA.  3T28.  Accordingly, the Court awarded Plaintiff $91,250.  Having found for Plaintiff on her contract claim, the Court did not consider Plaintiff’s claim in the alternative for reformation of the contract, which the Court interpreted as falling under Rule 4:50.  3T29.
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, plaintiff [...], Esq. respectfully requests this appellate tribunal to reverse the six final post-remand pre-answer pre-discovery orders, to remand this hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights act violations action back to another trial court judge and to grant such other relief that this appellate tribunal deems just and equitable.  Dated: November 2, 2023  /s/[...]  [...], Esq. (018711983)  JEFFREY S. FELD, ESQ., [...]  d/b/a [...], and [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...], [...], NEWARK MAYOR [...], [...], NEWARK CITY CLERK [...], NEWARK CORPORATION  COUNSEL [...], ESQ., NEWARK BUSINESS ADMINISTRATOR ERIC S.  PENNINGTON, ESQ., NEWARK DIRECTOR OF ECONOMIC AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT  [...], NEWARK DIRECTOR OF FINANCE  [...], NEWARK DIVISION OF TAX ABATEMENT AND SPECIAL TAXES  MANAGER  [...], CTC, NEWARK TAX ASSESSOR  [...], ESQ., [...], ESSEX COUNTY  EXECUTIVE  [...], [...], ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  [...], [...], [...], AND [...], Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] Cases  Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Cherry Hill Pain & Rehab. Institute, 389 N.J. Super. 130 (App. Div. 2006).  .................................................................-  25 - Berman v. Gurwicz, 189 N.J. Super. 89, 102-103 (Ch. Div. 1981)  ...............- 44 - Bondi v. Citigroup, Inc. 423 N.J. Super. 377 (App Div. 2011)  .....................- 46 - Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567 (2021)  ..................................- 47 - Brown v. Brown, 323 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 1999)  ...............................- 23 - Cajoeco Llc v. Bensi Enters., 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1150 (App. Div.  June 17, 2021).  ......................................................................................-  23 - Caputo v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 300 N.J. Super. 498 (App. Div. 1997)  ......- 47 - Central Jersey Freightliner, Inc. v. Freightliner Corp., 987 F.Supp. 289 (D.N.J. 1997)  ...........................................................................................................-  23 - Cherokee LCP Land, LLC v. City of Linden Planning Bd., 234 N.J. 403 (2018)  ...........................................................................................................-  23 - DSK Enterprises, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 189 N.J. Super. 242, 251 (App. Div. 1983)  ...........................................................................................................-  44 - Estate of F.W. v. State of N.J., Div. of Youth and Family Servs., 398 N.J. Super. 344 (App. Div. 2008)  .................................................................-  22 - FDIC Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850 (3d Cir. 1994)  ...............-35- First National Bank v. North Jersey Trust Co., 18 N.J. Misc. 449 (N.J. 1940) ...........................................................................................................- 27 - Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 483 (2016)  .................................- 35 - Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239 (2015)  .................................-  20 -, - 21 - Hills v. Bank of Am., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32502 (D.N.J March 17, 2015)  ..........................................................- 38 - Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 224 N.J. 584 (2016)..............................................- 49 - Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transportation Auth., 836 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1987).........................................................- 23 - Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970)...........- 23 -, - 25 - Kendall v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 209 N.J. 173 (2012)...............................- 44 - Lapka v. Porter Hayden Co., 162 N.J. 545 (2000)
[directive] Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option (h)  The property stolen is a person’s benefits under federal or State law, or from any other source, which the Department of Human Services or an agency acting on its behalf has budgeted for the person’s health care and the amount involved is less than $75,000.00; 2C:20-2  Grading of theft  (i)  The property stolen is any real or personal property related to, necessary for, or deprived (continued) offenses from research, regardless of value, including, but not limited to, any sample, specimens and (continued) components thereof, research subject, including any warm-blooded or cold-blooded animals being used for research or intended for use in research, supplies, records, data or test other type of information related to research; (j)  The property stolen is a New Jersey Prescription Blank as referred to in R.S.45:14-14; (k)  The property stolen consists of an access device or a defaced access device; or (l)  The property stolen consists of anhydrous ammonia and the actor intends it to be used to manufacture methamphetamine.  (3)Theft constitutes a crime of the fourth degree if the amount involved is at least $200.00 but does not exceed $500.00.  41  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] Forthright is not a forum intended to resolve, or capable of resolving, complex affirmative fraud allegations like those here.  The Second Circuit made a similar commonsense point about no-fault arbitration under New York law:  “New York’s arbitration process for no-fault coverage is an expedited, simplified affair meant to work as quickly and efficiently as possible.  Discovery is limited or non-existent.  Complex fraud and RICO claims, maturing years after the initial claimants were fully reimbursed, cannot be shoehorned into this system.”
[brief] Sa = SOA appendix  1T = plea transcript dated November 29, 2016  2T = sentencing transcript dated July 7, 2017  3T = motion transcript dated March 3, 2023  The conditional plea rule reflects the "basic principles of contract law" that govern plea agreements.  *State v. Means*, 191 N.J. 610, 622 (2007); see also id. at 618 (noting that plea bargaining affords a "mutuality of advantage" to both defendant and the State).  If the parties' bargaining positions changes—which is what happens when a defendant successfully appeals from a pretrial ruling—then the defendant has a right to reconsider his options and decide whether he still wishes to plead guilty or would prefer to go to trial.  Our courts have made clear that if "misinformation imparted to the defendant could have directly induced him to enter the plea, he should be allowed to withdraw from the bargain."  *State v. Taylor*, 80 N.J. 353, 365 (1979).  A defendant who pleads guilty based on an erroneously decided pretrial ruling has always pleaded guilty based on "misinformation," as the defendant did not have an accurate picture of the State's leverage against him when he agreed to plead guilty.  The conditional plea rule recognizes that it would be "manifestly unjust to hold the defendant to his plea" after such a change in circumstances.  *State v. Kovack*, 91 N.J. 476, 482 (1982) (citation omitted).  Applying the law above to [...]'s case, he has a right to withdraw from his guilty plea under the conditional plea rule because he successfully appealed from the pretrial denial of his suppression motion.  *State v. Nyema*, 249 N.J. 509 (2022).  As background, in 2016, [...] entered into a global plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to a felony murder charge in one indictment ([...]) and an armed robbery charge in another indictment ([...]).
[brief] The Plaintiff is the owner of premises located at [...], [...], [...], a shopping center commonly known as [...].  (“Premises”)  (P2a)  On or about August 27, 2015, Plaintiff, entered into written lease agreement with the PB [...] LLC, later assigned to Defendants, to lease them the Premises.  (“Lease”).  (P35a).  In addition to base rent, the tenant was responsible for CAM, charges, taxes, insurance, late fees, legal fees and costs.  (P35a)  There was also a personal guaranty.  Defendants defaulted in the payment of rents, insurance, real estate taxes, late fees and counsel fees with regard to the subject lease.  The court entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $74,519.37 plus legal fees and costs.  (P14a and P16a),  Certain issues were appealed, and the matter was remanded to resolve Defendants’ liability as to an insurance payment.  The parties agreed as to the amount owed but could not agree as to the language of the release.  Defendants sent a check for the amount owed to Plaintiff which was held in escrow.  Ultimately, the court advised Plaintiff to cash the check and entered an Order that Plaintiff could not file any further claims as to Defendants pertaining to the landlord/tenant relationship.  This includes any claims that arose after this matter was adjudicated.  The corporate defendant was a franchisee and after it vacated the property, in an attempt to mitigate their damages, Plaintiff/landlord entered into a temporary occupancy agreement with the franchisor wherein the franchisor would pay rent for a certain time period while the parties searched for a new tenant.  (P81a)  The term of the agreement expired and Plaintiff suffered new damages as the subject leasehold remained vacant and Defendants again did not pay rent.  The extent of Plaintiff’s new damages was unknown until recently when the property was finally leased to a new tenant.  Under the Court’s Order of May 10, 2024 (P1a), Plaintiff is improperly barred from bringing a new claim for the new damages in direct contradiction to applicable law.  Plaintiff appeals to vacate this Order.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING A BAR ON ANY FUTURE CLAIMS BETWEEN THE PARTIES PERTAINING TO THE LANDLORD/TENANT RELATIONSHIP(P1a; 1T9:3-19:11)
[brief] N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f.a.(1).  On June 25, 2021, Plaintiff [...] sent Defendant [...] as well as the [...], the [...], and the [...] a notice pursuant to the Environmental Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:35A-1 et seq. (“ERA”) demanding that Defendant [...] conduct the remediation required by the June 2021 Directive.
[brief] Plaintiffs simply allege that within the context of a well-structured transaction, [...] received Plaintiffs’ money for the transaction, sent said money to certain Defendants, and said Defendants divided said money among all Defendants, unbeknownst to Plaintiffs.  *Lemoine* is only relevant to show that the facts of the present matter are completely different from the facts in *Lemoine* which implicated a professional standard of care and therefore required legal expert testimony, because in *Lemoine* the issue was whether the attorney structured the transaction negligently.  Here, this is not the case.  No expert testimony is required to demonstrate that the scheme devised and implemented by [...] with the other co-conspirator Defendants intended and resulted in Defendants wrongfully taking approximately $1,400,000.00, and also generating legal fees for [...] for hundreds of thousands of dollars.  No AOM is required because no legal expert is necessary to explain that this was a fraudulent scheme no different from any fraudulent scheme structured and perpetrated by anyone, attorney or otherwise.  There was no legal work, complex or otherwise, in the structure and perpetrating of this fraudulent scheme that requires an expert to explain to a juror a professional standard of care, because the quality of that legal work in structuring the transaction is not and was never at issue in the case.
[brief] Pa00034.  The initial easement description dated July 13, 2018 was prepared by Respondent’s engineer, [...] of [...].  Pa4.  Unfortunately, Ms. Hurd was subsequently diagnosed with a brain tumor and had since passed away.  Ibid.  The initial easement description contained a metes and bounds description and a map showing the location of the proposed easement on Appellant’s Property.  Pa17-19.  The metes and bound description stated, the easement begins at “a distance of 117.65 feet from the intersection of the northerly R.O.W. line of Valentine Street with the easterly R.O.W. line of Ocean Avenue. ”  Pa17 [emphasis added].  However, the metes and bounds distance of “117.65” was a typographical error as the existing seawall on Appellant’s Property is actually located an additional sixty (60) feet to the east; the correct distance should have been identified at 177.65 feet in the metes and bound description.
[brief] Such a remedy can only be achieved by filing an Order to Show Cause with the Superior Court.  At oral argument at the second hearing, the Plaintiff, [...], noted the limited authority of a local ethics board, stating:  It’s my understanding that the Ethics Committee can only punish, they can not necessarily stop the action that is taken place or the votes that have taken place in violation of your order.  And it just seems kind of unrealistic to me that they’re going to say that this should be before the Ethics Board when the Ethics Board has no ability to prevent the vote, to overturn a vote, or to -- to enforce standing New Jersey Law.  This assessment by the Plaintiff is accurate, as reflected by N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.7 cited above.  In addition, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.10, entitled “Penalties,” provides that a local government employee “found guilty” by an ethics board can be fined in amounts from $100 to $500.  Subsection (c) of the statute states: “The remedies provided herein are in addition to all other criminal and civil remedies provided under the law. ” (emphasis added).  Thus, the LGEL expressly acknowledges its limited scope, and the fact that aggrieved parties have ready recourse to civil remedies available in courts of law.
[brief] Q. Okay.  Now, you said you were finishing up the other C-section?  A. Yes.  Q.  Does that mean the baby was out already?  A. Yes.  * * * * *  Q.  Did this nurse have with her a strip?  A.  No.  In the OR you have an electronic monitoring system that you can click on different rooms so I asked her to pull up that room and look at the tracing.  Q. Okay.  Did she come in alone?  A.  I don't remember the circumstances, but I assume she came alone, correct.  Q. Okay.  After she came in and she told you to look at the tracing, how soon was it before you looked at the tracing?  A.  I looked at it right ahead, because also she wanted me to come through and meet her so she came in, look at the tracing and if you could come in the room.  Q. Okay.  So was it within seconds that you looked at the tracing?  A. Yes.  It takes like five seconds, ten seconds.  Q.  So was it within seconds that you looked to at the tracing in the OR you were in on the screen?  A.  I think so, yeah.  [...] became alarmed by the deceleration he observed on the screen [Pa285-286; Balazs Deposition, 42:23 to 45:5].
[brief] In their affidavit, [...] and [...] affirmed hearing the four large dogs growling while upon the property.  However, without offering any support, the court found that growling could not evidence a vicious propensity.  We are not aware of any authority to support that bold proposition.  In fact, "[k]nowledge of a domestic animal's vicious propensities . . . may be established by proof of prior acts of a similar kind of which the [landlord] had notice, by evidence that it had been known to growl, snap, or bare its teeth[.]"  4 Am. Jur. 2d Animals § 70 (2008) (emphasis [*10] added).  In addition, "[a] vicious or dangerous disposition or propensity may consist of mere mischiefousness or playfulness of the animal, which, because of its size or nature, might lead to injury."  Id. at § 69 (emphasis added).  We conclude that the court erred in granting the motions for summary judgment.
[brief] Rather, in connection with this appeal, Plaintiff had a statutory right thereunder to file a *lis pendens*.  *N.J.S.A.* 2A:15-14 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  Whenever a final judgment is made in favor of the defendant or defendants in any action . . . the real estate described in the notice shall be discharged of all equities or claims set up in the complaint in the action, unless the plaintiff takes an appeal or institutes proceedings for relief from the judgment and files a similar notice of lis pendens in said office, stating in the notice the object of the appeal or proceedings.  Such notice shall, during the pendency of such appeal or proceedings, have the effect of the notice first filed . . . . (emphasis added).  Thus, *N.J.S.A.* 2A:15-14 provides that a plaintiff may file (i) a notice of appeal; and (ii) “a similar notice of lis pendens . . . stating in the notice the object of the appeal .  . . .”  Plaintiff properly exercised its statutory right under *N.J.S.A.* 2A:15-14.
[brief] In this case, there was a single criminal act—an armed robbery.  (Da12)  [...]’s objective in possessing the handgun was to accomplish the robbery, and the fact that he possessed the handgun is what made the robbery a first-degree robbery.  This was not a case where the two crimes happened at different times, involved separate and distinct acts or multiple victims, or had distinct motives formulated at separate times.  [...] was not arrested at a later time or date with the handgun, nor were there any surveillance videos or witnesses to establish that he possessed the firearm at any time other than during the [...] robbery.  Had he been convicted of possessing the handgun at a different time and or place, the court could have certainly found Yarbough factor 3C.  But that is not the record in this case.  It is no surprise that the sentencing court’s analysis of the Yarbough factors was erroneous and does not justify a consecutive sentence.  The court revealed on September 30 that the court believed the Yarbough factors— especially factor 3A—supported a concurrent sentence, but that the court found it hard to accept that it was bound by the *Yarbough* factors:
[brief] In *French*, plaintiff was operating a school bus when injured in an automobile accident by a tortfeasor insured under a $25,000 liability policy.  *Id.* at 480-81.  At the time of the accident, the school bus was covered under a policy issued to the school board that provided $1,000,000 in UM/UIM coverage.  *Id.* at 481.  Plaintiff was insured under her own personal policy that provided $25,000 in UM/UIM coverage.  *Ibid.*  Plaintiff sought UIM benefits under the $1,000,000 school policy and was denied coverage.  The trial court and Appellate Division granted defendant’s summary judgment motion finding that plaintiff was not entitled to benefits under the $1,000,000 school board UIM policy.  In doing so, the lower courts concluded that plaintiff’s UIM recovery was limited to the $25,000 available under her personal policy.  *Id.* at 481.  In departing from the Court’s decision in *Aubrey*, the Court in *French* concluded that plaintiff had a valid UIM claim against the school’s $1,000,000 UIM policy.  *Id.* at 495.  The decision in *French*, therefore, expanded the rights of plaintiffs to seek UIM coverage under multiple policies.  But, again, this case has nothing to do with the definitional exclusion involved in the current matter.
[directive] Complaint- of Presumption a Issuing Overcoming for Standard 4.3.1 .................................................32  Summons by of Presumption Charging Overcoming for Reasons Specifying 4.3.2  34 ........................................  Complaint-Summons aComplaint-Warrant for Apply Must Enforcement Law Where 4.4 Cases ................................................34  Exception without 34 ...... Complaint-Warrant by Be Charged Must That Crimes Specified 4.4.1  Out-of-State or Federal, Jersey, New Extradition and Cases 4.4.2  35 ....................................:...........  Detainers  Applying a for of Presumption Rebuttable a Is There Where Cases 4.5 ...............................................36  Complaint-Warrant High or Moderate a Indicates Risk Assessment  Pretrial Automated 4.5.1  36 ................ or Violence Criminal Activity, New Flight, of Risk or Order Restraining Violence  Domestic a Violated Has Defendant 4. 5.2  36 ...................  Order Protection Act Survivor Sexual Assault a 36 ...... Tampering Witness or Jumping Bail with Charged Defendant Is 4.5.3  37 ........ 3:3-1(~ Rule in Specified Crime a with Charged Is Defendant 4.5.4  Another for Release on While Committed Was Offense Present  The 4.5.5  38 ...... Supervision Post-Conviction of Form Any or on While Offense Not Are Results Risk Assessment  Pretrial Automated Preliminary 4.5.6  Charging Making in Delay in Undue Result Would or Available .................................................38  Decisions  Violent a for Delinquent Adjudicated Recently Was Defendant 4.5.7 ....................................................39  Crime 40 ..............................  Convictions/Chazges Out-of-State 4.5.8  40 ... aComplaint-Warrant for Applying of Presumption the Overcoming 4.5.9 in Domestic Procedures and Notifications, Considerations, Special 4.6 41 ...................................
[brief] See, e.g., Northfield, 228 N.J. at 600 (“[I]n light of the broad anti-fraud liability imposed under the IFPA, holding defendants responsible for promoting and assisting in the formation of an ineligible medical practice—created for the obvious purpose of seeking reimbursement for medical care delivered by that practice—was not a novel or unanticipated application of [the IFPA].”).