ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] If [...] wanted to challenge [...]’s jurisdiction under the Act then it ought to have filed a separate appeal to pursue any assertions of federal preemption claims.  This Court should not make a ruling in this appeal based on federal preemption claims, as that was never an issue raised by the Appellants.  It appears, and may very likely be the case, that [...] was threatened and pressured by [...] into granting it the instant exemption based on threats that [...] would file a federal lawsuit to assert federal preemption if the [...] refused the exemption request.  The [...] may have preferred to take its chances defending this appeal rather than facing a federal preemption suit.  But [...]’s federal preemption arguments are not a valid or logical reason for this Court to affirm the [...]’s exercise of its jurisdiction under the Highlands Act in granting the exemption in the first place.
[brief] Whether this evidence does in fact show defendant and [...] engaged in a conspiracy is for you, the jury, to decide.  You may decide that the evidence does not demonstrate or support a conspiracy and therefore is not helpful to you.  In that case, you must disregard the evidence.  On the other hand, you may decide that the evidence does assist you in determining whether the defendant and [...] engaged in a conspiracy and you may use it for that specific purpose.  The defense may, but is not required, to offer an alternative explanation for the Loyalty is Royalty tattoo.  So before you give any weight to this evidence, you must be satisfied that the State has proven, one, defendant and [...] obtained the matching Loyalty is Royalty tattoos after the alleged murder; and, two, the defendant and [...] obtained the matching tattoos for the purpose of solidifying their conspiracy or perpetuating their agreement to keep the alleged killing a secret.  If you find the State has not proven these two things, then you may not consider the matching tattoos for any purpose and you shall completely disregard them in your deliberations.
[brief] The standard of law advocated by [...] on appeal is inapplicable.  i.  [...] did not move for summary judgment on the grounds that the Ordinance was unconstitutional, so the trial court did not need to conduct a “facial” or “as applied” analysis.  Even assuming that this Court chooses to assess Point I in [...]’s brief – which, as set forth above, it should not – the standard of law upon which [...] predicates its argument is inapplicable here.
[brief] IT WAS UNFAIR AND VIOLATED RES JUDICATA FOR THE COURT TO IMPOSE A DISCOUNT TO FAIR VALUE BASED ON MISCONDUCT THAT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN THE SUBJECT OF FINAL MONEY PAMAGE AWARDS BY THE ARBITRATOR (Da3202-3204)(12T7:2-8:11)  Res judicata, or claim preclusion, insulates courts from the inefficiency of relitigating claims that have already been resolved, thereby protecting the integrity of judgments and preventing the harassment of parties.
[brief] Hard and fast percentages would destabilize the rate review process by turning a blind eye to the claims paying ability experienced by different carriers.  That was precisely the point [...] argued recently to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in *[...] Life Ins. Co. v. the State of N.H. Dept. of Ins.*, 174 N.H. 78 (2021).  (Ra527).  In its opening brief to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, [...] argued as being constitutionally invalid New Hampshire’s insurance regulations, which superimpose on the expected loss ratio standards mandatory rate caps that limit the magnitude of any increase over a three-year period.
[directive] 치료 감호 7.  Civil Commitment  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하가 가중 성폭행, 성폭행, 가중 범죄적 성접촉, 2C:13-1dd(2)(6)에 의한 유괴, 범죄적 성접촉, 근원 범죄가 성폭행일 경우의 중죄 모살, 이런 범행의 미수, 또는 판사가 사건의 정황을 근거로 그 범죄가 성적으로  난폭한  범죄로 간주되어야 한다고 공식적으로 특별히 판정한 성적으로  난폭한 범죄로 유죄판결을 받는 경우, 판사는 심리 후 귀하에게 강제적 치료 감호가 필요하다고 판단하면 귀하는 수감 기간이 끝나는 즉시 평생 동안 다른 시설에 치료 감호될수있다는 것을 아십니까?  Do you understand that if you are convicted of a sexually violent offense, such as aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping under 2C:13-1c(2)(b), criminal sexual contact, felony murder if the underlying crime is sexual assault, an attempt to commit any of these offenses, or any offense for which the court makes a specific finding on the record that, based on the circumstances of offense, you may upon completion of your term the case, the offense should be considered a sexually violent of incarceration, be civilly committed to another facility for up to life if the court finds, after a hearing, that you are in need of involuntary civil commitment?
[brief] On September 18, 2024, the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion to amend the August 2, 2024 Order to permit plaintiff to depose [...], who is subject to deposition, in his capacity as the Chief Executive Officer of [...], on the merits of the CEPA claim.  Pa374.  On September 23, 2024, plaintiff offered to withdraw the appeal if [...], [...] and [...] agreed to produce [...] in his capacity as their director before December 15, 2024, as [...] has not been served and plaintiff wanted to ensure that [...]’s testimony binds those defendants.  The defendants once again refused to produce [...].  3  [...] merged with [...] Beteiligungs, AG in or about September 2023.  [...] is the CEO of [...].  See also, n.5, infra. Executive Officer of [...], the sole director of [...], the Managing Director of [...], and the President, Secretary and Treasurer of [...].  Pa30, 56, 157.  [...] was an employee of both [...] and [...] and served as a member of [...] AG’s Advisory Board.  Pa156, 179.  During his employment as [...]’s Managing Director, and at all times relevant to this action, [...] reported to: (1) Heinz [...], the Chair of the Supervisory Boards of [...] AG and [...] and a member of [...]’s Board of Directors; and, (2) defendant [...], the Chief Executive Officer of both [...] AG and [...], a member of [...] AG’s Management Board and the Chair of [...]’s Management Board.  Pa30-31,142, 157, 158, 176, 211, 229.4  [...] and Ubelacker reside in Germany.  B.  Plaintiff’s Allegations
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum C | April 2025  Barricaded Individuals 2.3  Crisis Negotiation Team.  A group of officers who are specially selected, trained, and equipped to deal with high risk incidents involving individuals who are refusing law enforcement orders to surrender or comply, especially individuals dealing with behavioral or mental health crises; substance abuse crises; or intellectual, cognitive or developmental disabilities.  The Crisis Negotiation Team has primary responsibility for communicating with the barricaded individual and determines the manner in which others, such as mental health professionals, family members, friends or colleagues, will communicate directly or indirectly with the barricaded subject.  2.4  Hostage Situation.  A barricaded individual who unlawfully restrains another for the purposes of holding that person for a ransom, reward, as shield, or as a hostage.  This includes, but is not limited to, holding the individual in order to facilitate the commission of a crime, inflict bodily injury, terrorize the victim, or interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function.  Commanders must determine whether a hostage situation exists whenever: 1) it is determined that another person is present in the location, but the barricaded person may not be presently aware of the presence of the other person; or 2) a third-party is present and consents to stay or refuses to leave the area of the barricaded individual, despite the increased risk associated with remaining.  2.5  Incident Command System (ICS).  A management system designed to enable effective and efficient domestic incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure.  2.6  Inner Perimeter.  An area encompassing the incident location that is sufficient to isolate and contain the barricaded person.  Law enforcement officers should establish an inner perimeter that contains the barricaded person in a manner that eliminates the barricaded individual’s access to innocent parties, prevents a hostage situation, and provides safety and security for all present.  The inner perimeter should be established to permit effective communication but not limit law enforcement’s response options in the event of aggressive action by the barricaded person.  No one is permitted into the inner perimeter without authorization.  Only those personnel who are appropriately equipped (e.g. ballistic protection, PPE, etc.) and necessary to resolve the situation should be permitted within the inner perimeter.  2.7  Outer Perimeter.  A secure area removed from the incident location that excludes public access, is outside the crime scene or critical area defined by the inner perimeter, and allows law enforcement to operate effectively.  4  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] Livery of seisin is defined to be:  The appropriate ceremony, at common law, for transferring the corporal possession of lands or tenements by a grantor to his grantee.  Black’s Law Dictionary, (4th Ed. 1951); see also Micheau v. Crawford, 8 N.J.L. 108 (1825) (emphasis supplied), Livery of seisin was achieved through physical delivery, often by way of a shovel of dirt or a branch from a tree to confirm the grantor’s intent to deliver seisin to the grantee.
[brief] The court below created a system by which the Planning Board and the governing body can avoid the work of analyzing and acknowledging the Ordinance’s actual inconsistencies with the Master Plan, as well as the requirement of giving clear reasons why such inconsistencies are acceptable which helps inform the municipal residents as to whether their wishes are being carried out by their elected representatives.  In addition, this procedure allows for judicial review—not abdication.  The Court’s opinion in the case at bar encourages *ad hoc* action not planning.
[brief] 44 State v. Weber, 220 N.J. Super. 420 (App. Div. 1987) ............................................................  32 State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409 (2015) ......................................................................................... 9, 17, 37, 40  State v. Wright, 38 N.E.3d 485 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) ............................................................... 16, 19 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)  ...........................................................................................  14 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) ...........................................................................................................15  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015) ..................................................................................................................43  United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002)  ...............................................................................................................15  United States v. Boyce, No. 1:10-CR-62-TLS, 2011 WL 1085792 (N.D. Ind. March 21, 2011) .........................17 United States v. Burnett, No. 21-68-DLB-CJS, 2022 WL 17828325 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 23, 2022) .........................17  United States v. Butler, 249 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2001) ...............................................................................................33 United States v. Jones, 260 Fed App’x 769 (6th Cir. 2008) ......................................................................................17 United States v. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2011) ...............................................................................................32 United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) ................................................................................................................38, 39 United States v. Santana, 485 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1973) .................................................................................................15 STATUTES N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 .........................................................................................................................8, 13 N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2 ..........................................................................................................................13 N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5 .............................................................................................................20, 41, 42, 43 COURT RULES Rule 3:5-7 ..................................................................................................................................41, 42, 45 Rule 3:9-3(f) .............................................................................................................................35, 45 COUNTER-STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | Item | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Table of Authorities | 3 | | Table of Judgment being appealed | 3 | | Procedural History | 4 | | Statement of Facts | 4 | | ARGUMENT | 20 | | A.  [...] should have recused herself due to bias | 20 | | stemming from an FBI complaint made by [...] against | | | [...].  (Raised below, Tr. 12/5, Pg. 215) | | | B.  Mistrial should have been Granted Due to Jude Grasso-Jones | 28 | | precipitating an Altercation between [...] and Sheriff’s officers | | | within earshot of the Jury.  (Raised below, Tr.12/1, pg. 70)  | | | C. [...] Prejudiced the jury by allowing them to look at | 32 | | 21 Bankers Boxes and piles of documents which should | | | never have been admitted into evidence; the sheer volume of | | | which was prejudicial to [...].  (Raised below multiples times, | | | including Tr.11/29, pg. 15; and Tr.12/2, pg. 30) | | | D. [...] Erred in Barring [...]’s Expert’s Testimony | 38 | | even though [...]’s expert had the same deficiency.  (Raised below, | | | Tr.11/30, pg. 5) | | | E. [...]’s expert should have been precluded from testifying as not | 41 | | disclosed in discovery (not raised below) | | | F. Mistrial should have been Ordered in light of [...]’s highly | 42 | | prejudicial summation. (not raised below)  | | | G. [...] Admonished [...] in the presence of the Jury.  | 44 | | (Not raised below)  | | | H. [...] Admitted highly prejudicial character evidence | 46 | | over repeated objections.  (raised below Tr. 11/30, Pg. 194)  | | | CONCLUSION | 48 |
[brief] Instead, the State waited five years to ask [...] to identify the suspect in the most suggestive procedure possible—at a trial in which the State was prosecuting [...] and there was only one option for [...] to choose.  This impermissibly suggestive procedure was clearly error.  Moreover, this error was harmful.  [...] was the only eyewitness to the crime to make an identification of the suspect.  The other witnesses who made identifications did so only from the surveillance video and only after [...] found the red hair that made him think the perpetrator was [...].  (7T 92-18 to 21)  Furthermore, the four witnesses who identified [...] from the surveillance video all had some form of feedback.  See Point III, infra. (8T 82-23 to 83-4) (2T 74-21 to 75-1) (2T 46-11 to 13)  They were also all long-time employees of [...] and considered [...] to be very close friends or family, so they had a motive to agree with [...]’ identification.  Because [...] was the only witness to make an identification from actually seeing the perpetrator in person as well as the only identification witness who was not an employee of [...], [...]’s identification was certainly given the greatest weight by the jury.  Thus, the erroneous admission of [...]’s identification deprived [...] of due process and a fair trial and requires reversal.
[brief] *State v. Buonadonna*, 122 N.J. 22, 44 (1991).  *16  Second, it cannot reasonably be said that the admission of [...]'s in-court identification resulted in a “manifest injustice. ”  *State v. Harris*, 181 N.J. 391, 518 (2004), *cert. denied*, 545 U.S. 1145, 125 S.Ct. 2973, 162 L. Ed.2d 898 (2005).  As we have already noted, the trial court's decision as how to best proceed was informed by its first-hand experiences during the trial.
[brief] 1.  Petitioner’s COUNT ONE of the Amended Complaint requesting appointment as Administrator of the Estate is DENIED.  2.  Petitioner’s COUNT TWO of the Amended Complaint requesting a declaration that Petitioner has an equitable ownership interest in the Home and that a constructive trust be imposed upon same is GRANTED IN PART.  Petitioner’s request that a constructive trust be imposed upon one-half the assets titled in the name of Decedent is DENIED.  a.  Petitioner is GRANTED a life tenancy in the Home located at [...].  3.  Petitioner’s COUNT THREE of the Amended Complaint requesting that the Will dated October 16, 2014, is null and void as being the subject of undue influence or duress is DENIED.  4.  Petitioner’s COUNT FOUR of the Amended Complaint requesting that Petitioner be awarded one-third of Decedent’s augmented Estate is DENIED.  5.  Petitioner’s COUNT FIVE of the Amended Complaint requesting that the “Ante-Nutial” [sic] Agreement, dated November 21, 1992, be declared null and void is DENIED.  6.  Respondent’s CROSS-CLAIM requesting admission of the Will to Probate and her appointment as Executrix of the Estate of [...] is GRANTED.  (Pa 7-8).  The Court filed an accompanying Trial Decision and Final Judgment.  (Pa 9-49).  The Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the Superior Court, Appellate Division.  (Pa 1-3).  COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] I.  THE COURT SHOULD ENFORCE THE NOTICE OF DEPOSITION THAT PLAINTIFF SERVED ON THE DEFENDANTS (Pa4, 9)  Defendants argue that a CEPA plaintiff has no right to secure the deposition of a director-decisionmaker unless either (1) he subpoenas that director or (2) the corporate defendant designates the director as a “corporate representative. ”  The argument makes a mockery of the Court Rules.  If the trial court’s ruling stands, plaintiff will be deprived of fundamental evidence necessary to prove his case.  If other courts follow the trial court’s ruling, that precedent would not only wreak havoc in employment cases, as other plaintiffs would lack the evidence necessary to vindicate their civil rights, but also would impede all other plaintiffs seeking to depose a director of a corporate defendant who resides outside of New Jersey.
[brief] I.  The lower court’s refusal to charge the jury with Model Civil Jury Charge 5.20B(2)(b) was reversible error (7T 90:9-91:14).  ......................... 22-35 II.  The lower court’s denial of Defendants’ motion in limine to bar reference to the snow removal agreements was an abuse of discretion and expanded the duty of care beyond what was required by common law (1T 37:13-19; 42:23-43:2; 46:3-11) (Da 3-4).  ................................. 36-42 III.  The lower court’s denial of Defendant’s motion in limine to take judicial notice of the weather related State of Emergency and converse grant of Plaintiff’s motion in limine to bar any reference to the State of Emergency was harmful error and an abuse of discretion.  (1T 29:6-30:19) (Da 1-2).  ........................................................................................................ 43-46 IV.  The lower court’s permitting of Plaintiff to introduce evidence related Defendants’ snow removal services provided in April 2018 for an unrelated and subsequent storm was harmful error (1T 58:11-59:1; 4T 45:4-14; 5T 89:15-90:8).  ................................................................................................. 47-48 V.  The lower court’s exclusion of a photograph depicting the accident location on the date of loss (Marino-3) was an abuse of discretion.  (7T 57:12-16; 70:21-22)  ...........................................................................................................  49-51  VI.  All of the lower court’s errors as set forth above in Points I through V constitute cumulative error which denied Defendants a fair trial.  ...52-57
[brief] 1.  The incident site was in a hazardous condition on the day of this incident.  2.  **The hazardous condition was the lack of proper traffic control devices to maintain the [...] in a safe condition. **  The employees/team members were directed by their employer to park in a lot that was unsafe and inconsistently maintained with diminishing traffic control devices from the south to the north.  The area where this incident occurred was a “T” intersection no different than the “T” intersection at the east west travel way at the rear of the hospital where it intersected the north south center travel way.  The many safety devices that were used at that location were diminished at the center of the parking lot where the north south center travel way intersected the east west center travel way and then further diminished to nothing at the east and west ends of the east west travel way where it intersected the north south travel ways located on the east and west perimeters of the property to the point where there were no pedestrian crossing safeguards in place at all.  3.
[brief] In doing so, the Commission carefully weighed the First Amendment rights school board members enjoy as individuals alongside the State’s compelling interest in ensuring school boards maintain the public’s trust.  The Commission has long held that when school board members make social media posts from accounts they used to campaign for their seats, those school board members have a duty to affirmatively disclaim their school board membership to mitigate the risk of compromising the Board.  In fact, the Commission reaffirmed this line of cases in an opinion it published only six days before the filing of the underlying Complaint in this matter.
[brief] Moreover, even if the jury was confused by the prosecution’s comment in summation about defendant’s liability for [...], the court’s extensive jury charges on accomplice liability was corrective and would not have changed the outcome of the trial.  The court explained how an individual could become liable for another person’s conduct, the requisite legal intent for each alleged accomplice, that an accomplice’s mindset can be different from another accomplice which can affect the level of guilt for each accomplice, how accomplice liability can be formed, and how and why a person can be found guilty for offenses that an accomplice committed.  See (14T162-11 to 170-21).  Importantly, the court specifically identified the elements that the jury was to find beyond a reasonable doubt if the jury believed [...] was the principal:
[brief] Pa0922.  [...] subsequently conveyed the following tract of these subdivided lots to [...], who at the time was an employee of [...] and was its registered agent, through a deed dated April 6, 1920:  All those certain lots, tracts or parcels of land or premises . . . which on a certain map entitled, “Map of Keansburg Heights, N.J. ” made by [...], Surveyor, dated June 3, 1909 and filed in the office of the Clerk of Monmouth County on June 25, 1909, are known and designated as Blocks “D” and “G”, and all right, title, and interest of party of first part in the streets, roads and avenues of said map and including the property marked beach on said above mentioned map, extending from the Raritan Bay back to the lot lines and extending the entire width of the map from lot no. 35 in Block E on the east to Lot No. 30 in Block G on the west.
[brief] The common thread running through all three statutes is that they seek to prevent, penalize, and deter the “massive” problem of insurance fraud, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 186 N.J. at 172 (internal quotation marks omitted), in furtherance of the “strong public policy in New Jersey to curb and deter” such fraud, Selective Ins. Co., 416 N.J. Super. at 432, and to protect “[a]ll New Jerseyans” from “the societal burdens and costs” that insurance fraud presents, P.L. 2003, c. 89, § 71.  The Legislature would not have intended AICRA’s arbitration provision to take away potent antifraud tools like the IFPA and RICO, and force insurers to arbitrate when medical providers obtained insurance benefits through fraud, particularly given the limitations of PIP arbitration and the lack of express intent to do so, as discussed in more detail below.