ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] These Guidelines describe the process by which each agency shall establish a program to (1) identify underrepresented groups and (2) take action to address any underrepresentation.  Additionally, in accordance with the Act, these Guidelines set forth procedures for the collection and reporting of demographic data regarding recruiting, hiring, promoting, and other personnel Jersey.1 actions concerning law enforcement officers in New  It is important to note that most large law enforcement agencies in New Jersey are governed by civil service statutes and regulations.  See N.J.S.A. 11A:1-1 et seq.; N.J.A.C. 4A: 1-1.1 et seq.  This system requires the agency to hire police officer candidates from certified lists supplied by the [...] (“[...]”) following a state-administered testing process.  The [...] typically administers this testing process every two to three years, and the [...] uses the results to compile a ranked list of qualified law enforcement candidates.  For agencies that utilize this process, they are limited to the list of qualified candidates provided by [...]—only candidates who fail background checks, medical/psychological exams, residency requirements (or similar, non-discretionary factors), may be removed from or bypassed on the lists.  1  Nothing in these Guidelines shall impair a law enforcement agency’s otherwise legally permitted recruiting and hiring practices.  More specifically, pursuant to the [...]’s “rule of three,” the [...] provides an agency seeking to hire a new officer with the top three candidates from the [...]’s certified list.  The hiring agency is then limited to those three candidates to fill the vacancy.  Veterans of military service who pass the exam are given preference and placed at the top of the certified list.  As a result, agencies governed by civil service will face additional processes in their efforts to address underrepresentation.  These Guidelines provide suggestions for actions to be taken in that regard, including making [...] test preparation courses widely available.  In addition, agencies should be aware of and become familiar with 2021 legislation, P.L.2021, c.234, 235, 236, which aim to address various barriers to diversity that arise in [...] jurisdictions and contain certain [...] data collection requirements.
[brief] See 2T47:8-19.  [...] failed to consider or acknowledge the argument raised by the State in its May 5, 2022 letter-brief that “(t)he fact that the call was placed through the 911 system enhances reliability of the tip. ”  Pa015.  Rather, [...] simply found that the 9-1-1 call, which she acknowledged was “specific and detailed”, was not “enough to justify the stop. ”  2T47:9-10 and Pa065-Pa066.  [...] addressed what she characterized as [...]’s testimony that Defendant “scurried away at a fast pace. ”  2T48:24-25.  [...] found that Defendant took one hop to avoid being hit by the police car, and then two steps.  2T48:25-49:7.  [...] did not “find credible that (Defendant) attempted to flee based on the surveillance video. ”  2T50:7-9.  This was contrary to [...]’s earlier finding, made based on a review of the same surveillance video, that Defendant “did in fact pick up his pace in the two steps he took” after the police car pulled into the driveway, and that Defendant “accelerated his pace to nearly double what his stride was initially”.
[brief] 8.  [...] Has Not Established the Existence of Any Order by the [...] Requiring [...] to Route the Lines through [...]  [...] filed to establish that the requirements for the application of N.J.S.A. 48:2-23 as the legislative basis that required preemption have been met.  That statute provides “[t]he board may, after public hearing, upon notice, by order in writing, require any public utility to furnish safe, adequate and proper service .  . . .”  The record in this action is devoid of any order by the [...] to sustain any invocation of N.J.S.A. 48:2-23 as a ground for preemption.
[brief] That exception does not apply unless a claimant can identify an ongoing violation of the law and must request relief that can be properly characterized as “prospective. ”  *Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md.*, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002).  A request for a declaratory judgment as to past conduct does not fall within this exception.  *Gruntal & Co., Inc. v. Steinberg*, 837 F. Supp. 85, 89 (D.N.J. 1993); see also *Summit Medical Associates, P.C. v. Pryor*, 180 F.3d 1326, 1337 (11th Cir.1999) (“[A] plaintiff may not use the [*Ex parte Young*] doctrine to adjudicate the legality of past conduct.
[brief] (Da694)  This exact language is found at page 3 of the March 23, 2018 Statement of Reasons.  (Da289)  However, in the Sixth Street violation it was undisputed that Defendant did comply with the Court’s Order by “directing the buses to Fifth Street;” even [...] conceded this.  To find intentional and willful conduct based on a mistake of fact certainly warrants an abuse of discretion.  Not only was the basis for the Court's decisions- the June 27, 2017 Order -ultimately vacated by the Appellate Division along with the Sanctions Order previously appealed by [...], but the evidence in the record clearly did not show any willful or intentional violation by Defendant; the Court’s decision rests without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.
[brief] [...]’ Crossclaim did not assert any theories based on conventional subrogation, rather it asserted an unjust enrichment claim, and to date no subrogation agreement has been produced.  (TRVa706.)  Further, in subrogation cases, the insured’s right to recovery against a third-party tortfeasor vests in the insurer, and the insurer steps into the shoes of the insured pursues the tortfeasor.  *City of Asbury Park v. Star Ins. Co.*, 242 N.J. 596 (2020).  Here, [...] does not seek recovery against a third-party tortfeasor.  Because [...] does not allege fraud, duress or extortion, and there was no mistake of fact in the payment, [...]’ payment remains subject to the VPD.
[brief] The urgency in this matter for the [...] remains clear.  Reformation of the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement consistent with the terms of the Order will have a substantial negative impact on the [...]’s statutory purpose,\(^1\) pursuant to the Parking [...] Law, \textit{N.J.S.A.}  40:11A-1, \textit{et seq.}, of maintaining a public parking system, as well as its ability to pay its existing bondholders.  Pursuant to the Order, [...] and the [...] are required to meet \textbf{within thirty (30) days} “to jointly reform the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement consistent with the Court’s ruling.
[brief] The trial court abused its discretion in rejecting the “historical text” that was over thirty years old (1969).  The pamphlet was on display in the [...].  It was a series of articles by residents setting forth Borough history and was produced by Defendants.  One of the articles was by [...], the person who bought the PQ in 1944 and built the commercial building where GG is now located.  He wrote in 1969 that the use of the building at that time was not a “food store” use, but a television sales and repair shop.  The article was marked into evidence as a joint exhibit.  Thus, it went into evidence without the need for authentication under N.J.R.E. 803.  Even if it had required authentication, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(16) would have allowed its admission as an “ancient document. ”  The fact that it went in as a joint exhibit amounts to a “stipulated fact” under N.J.R.E. 101(a)(5).  Parties are bound by their stipulations.  Kurak v. A.P. Green Refractories Co., 298 N.J. Super. 304, 325 (App. Div.), certif. den., 152 N.J. 10 (1997).  There was no legitimate basis to ignore this evidence.  Defendants misrepresent that the only expansion of the food use is the change in menu.  First, a change in menu alone, it is submitted, could support the finding of an illegal expansion of a non-conforming use.  Here, the prior use was a takeout shop that only sold pizza and subs.  (T3 at 27:5-34:24).  Now, the menu looks like a complete Italian restaurant, with appetizers, soups, pasta, entrees, sandwiches, and desserts.  (Pa 106-117; T1 at 102:1-106:11, 144:8-149:10).  Clearly, the reason for such a change is to have more business, and more business will change the character of the business and the number of pickups and deliveries, thus negatively impacting the very quiet residential neighborhood of the Plaintiffs.  However, here, the expansion is not just the menu, the expansion includes the hours of operation, the days of the week operating, the addition of a catering business, deliveries of food product beginning at 5:00 a.m., deliveries by eighteen-wheel tractor-trailers, delivery vehicles that use the Plaintiffs’ and another neighbor’s driveways to make K-turns and U-turns and an increase in traffic.  (T2 at 143:22-144:1; T3 at 33:19-34:1, 31:21-32:9; T1 at 101:6-12; Pa 145-148; 150-152; T1 at 56:6-57:20, 59:3-5, 60:6-9, 61:9-25, 63:25-64:3, 102:1-106:11, 187:19-189:8; T3 at 20:24-31:14, 60:5-  As such, the Defendants’ Preliminary Statement seeks to misdirect and misconstrue the nature of this appeal.  **RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’-RESPONDENTS’ STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] The Authority Failed To Credit [...] With Revenue Generated From All Parking In The Project Area**  The Authority currently operates surface parking lots that compete for parkers with the Project Garage on the parcels where the Authority Garage, retail/office building, and residential building were to be built.  1T84:14-24.  [...] confirmed that, for purposes of the parking revenue threshold, all parking revenues from the Project area were to be included in the calculation, including those surface lots adjacent to the Mall that were to be the sites of the residential building, the retail/office building, and the Authority Garage.  2T70:9-71:17.  The Authority, however, never credited [...] for those revenues.  For example, the 2018 Year End Reconciliation Report included an analysis of all sources of revenue credited to [...].  Pa418.  [...] was asked directly where the revenues generated from the surface parking lots located in the Project area were reflected in that breakdown, and he testified that he did not see them reflected in the reconciliation.  See 2T70:9-71:17.  Instead, the Authority retained all revenue from the Project Garage and all revenue from the surface parking lots.  N.
[directive] Training and Partnerships  The Statewide HWC Program is just one tool in a more comprehensive toolkit for trauma informed policing, which is a set of practices designed to enable law enforcement to better understand trauma and address victim needs.  This program will better equip officers both mentally and physically when responding to traumatic incidents where children are present.  In this way, it builds on the New Jersey Resiliency Program for Law Enforcement (NJRP-LE), which is intended to create a supportive culture for law enforcement officers, acknowledging that protecting an officer’s mental health is just as important as guarding their physical safety.  To implement the Statewide HWC Program, a virtual symposium will be held on November 17, 2020, and will focus on how the Program fits within the larger trauma informed policing initiative.  The virtual symposium will undoubtedly help police-youth relations and will encourage all local law enforcement agencies to partner with the Department of Education, district school boards, and private school administrations within the agency’s AOR.  Coordination with schools is essential to implement the Statewide HWC Program and to better serve the needs of the State’s youth.  All law enforcement officers are required to attend the December 31, 2020. symposium or view its recording by VI.
[brief] The Key Man Policy And The Estate’s Legal Malpractice Claim Triggered Coverage Under the Allied World Policy.  In 2008, the Firm purchased a key man life insurance policy from [...].  [...] was the insured on the policy, but the policy was owned by the Firm and the Firm was the sole designated beneficiary.  Unbeknownst to the Firm, [...], and the insurance broker who arranged for the policy, inserted into the policy application a reference to a non-existent buy-sell agreement between [...] and the Firm.  On information and belief, [...] and the broker did so to obtain the coverage of $1.5 million, which was not available by underwriting standards applicable to [...] solely for a key-man policy.  Following [...]’ death, on November 6, 2016, his mother, Defendant Mary [...], was appointed the executrix of his estate.  On or about November 15, 2016, Mary [...] sought advice from [...] regarding Estate issues.  As a result, the Estate alleged that, for a short period of time, [...] represented the Estate of Mark D. [...].  Such alleged representation ended no later than February 2017.  [Pa571]  In August 2017, the Estate commenced an action against the Firm and [...] alleging, in part, that the key man policy owned by the Firm was intended to fund a buy-sell agreement for the benefit of [...].  The complaint stated claims for breach of contract, conversion and unjust enrichment.  The Firm and [...] denied the allegations.  [Pa571]  On May 30, 2019, counsel for the Estate advised of its intention to file a motion for leave to amend the complaint to allege legal malpractice by the Firm.  [Pa571]  Therefore, on June 4, 2019, the Firm sent a Notice of Loss to Defendants.  [Pa645]  On June 5, 2019, the Estate filed its motion for leave to amend the complaint to add claims for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty.  These claims alleged that the Firm committed malpractice by not taking steps to protect the “buy-sell portion” of the key-man insurance policy during a period that it was allegedly representing the Estate as counsel.  The Estate’s motion was granted by Order dated July 29, 2019.  [Pa571]  E.
[brief] While the trial judge did not address the preliminary question whether a search implicating defendant occurred in these circumstances, this Court may, as “appeals are taken from orders and judgments and not from opinions . . . or reasons given for the ultimate conclusion. ”  *State v. Scott*, 229 N.J. 469, 479 (2017) (internal quotation omitted); see *State v. Heisler*, 422 N.J. Super. 399, 416 (App. Div. 2011) (noting appellate court may affirm decision “on grounds different from those relied upon by the trial court”).
[brief] The jury is presumed to have understood and followed those instructions, State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 65 (1998); See also State v. T.J.M., 220 N.J. 220, 237 (2015) (appellate courts "act on the belief and expectation that jurors will follow the instructions given them by the court").  The jury rejected manslaughter and convicted defendant of purposeful murder.  His displeasure does not now amount to reversible error.  POINT VI
[brief] The Substantive Challenge to the Redevelopment Plan  The Verified Complaint was filed on January 20, 2022, well within the 45-day limitation established by Rule 4:69-6 to challenge the December 16, 2021, Planning Board special meeting and the adoption of Ordinance 1423-21 on December 28, 2021.  (Pa1.)  In addition to the inconsistencies identified by the Planning Board at its December 16th meeting, the Verified Complaint alleged multiple other inconsistencies applicable not just to the amendments but to the original Redevelopment Plan.
[brief] (9T 10-24 to 11-6)  [...] of the [...] testified that both [...] and [...] were suspected of dealing drugs in the area of the shooting.  (12T 238-12 to 21)  Shell casings and a suspected bullet specimen were found at the scene; other bullet specimens were recovered at the autopsy.  (8T 18-9 to 31-14, 9T 106-7 to 9)  The police investigation initially centered on recovering video footage from many locations around the area of the shooting.
[brief] And it appears her contacts with these family members were more numerous than the contacts of the *Fortin* juror with the victim’s family members in that case.  Moreover, the Fortin juror did not actually deliberate—the juror was ultimately excused via a peremptory challenge.  In contrast, [...] was a deliberating juror in this case.  Because [...] was a deliberating juror (41T11-11), her connection to the victim’s family, witness [...], and [...] had the capacity of influencing the jury in reaching its verdict.  See Panko v. Flintkote Co., 7 N.J. 55, 61 (1951) (holding the test for whether a new trial should be granted because of an irregular influence is “not whether the irregular matter actually influenced the result, but whether it had the capacity of doing so”).  Accordingly, this Court should reverse and remand for a new trial.
[brief] Evidence of mutual assent is further augmented where the Respondents were represented by competent real estate counsel who is assumed to be familiar with these rules and the procedural differences from a court setting.  Those Rules are also available online to the public and the Respondents made no claim they were unable to access them.  See Roach v. BM Motoring, LLC, 228 N.J. 163, 172-73 (2017) (enforcing incorporated AAA rules as binding) (emphasis added); Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746, 763 (3d Cir. 2016); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 362–63 (2008).  Without prior mention or reliance below, Respondents seize onto a line in an unverified Answer filed in the AAA case, which the trial court did not cite in the context of the Atalese analysis, to establish a critical and absent fact from any verified statement in the record below – that Respondents did not “understand” the meaning of the binding arbitration provisions.  (Da129).  The sworn submissions of Respondents do not refute that they are highly educated/sophisticated, English-proficient individuals.  See Stamato v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, 2020 N.J. Super. LEXIS 322 (App. Div. Feb. 13, 2020) (granting motion to compel arbitration based on the finding that the plaintiff – a former VP former VP executive was a sophisticated party within the meaning of Leodori and Atalese).  Respondents had ample notice of the contract terms and gave their written, objective assent to them, any question about the enforceability of one term in the contract does not, and cannot, defeat the formation of the contract as a whole.  See, e.g., Gras v. Assocs. First Cap. Corp., 346 N.J. Super. 42, 57 (App. Div. 2001).
[brief] This matter arises out of Plaintiffs’ Complaint for legal malpractice against Defendants/Respondents, [...], Esq. and [...], Levenson, April, --- 1  “Pa” denotes the Plaintiff/Appellant’s Appendix.  Niedelman & Wagenheim, P.A. (“[...]”) (collectively “[...] Defendants”).  Pa 1.  Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, inter alia, joining Defendants/Respondents [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (collectively, the “[...] Defendants”), and others, seeking damages based on an alleged tortious interference and conspiracy to commit tortious interference.
[brief] 36 State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631 (1993) ............................................................................. 24, 25, 28 State v. Hockett, 443 N.J. Super. 605 (App. Div. 2016) ...................................................  44 State v. Hutchins, 241 N.J. Super. 353 (App. Div. 1990) ...................................................  31 State v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427 (1989) .............................................................................
[brief] 135a Certification of [...], Esq. in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Filed October 17, 2023 ……………………………………………………..  138a Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Summary Judgment ([...]’s February 24, 2023 Settlement Offer Letter) ………………  140a Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Summary Judgment ([...]’s April 5, 2023 Settlement Offer Letter) ……………………..  143a Exhibit 3 to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Summary Judgment ([...]’s May 23, 2023 Settlement Offer Letter) ……………………..  146a Exhibit 4 to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Summary Judgment (Defendant’s Answer with Written Discovery Requests) …………..  149a Exhibit 5 to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Summary Judgment (Plaintiff’s August 16, 2023 Letter Enclosing Discovery) …………  172a Plaintiff’s Supplemental Letter Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Filed November 17, 2023¹  ……………………………………………………..  174a Rule 2:6-1(a)(1)  Statement of All Items Submitted on Summary Judgment Motion  …………………………………………………..  176a  Notice of Appeal, Filed December 20, 2023………………………………….  178a ¹  Footnote 2 of the Court’s November 17, 2023  Memorandum Decision refers to Plaintiff’s Supplemental Letter Brief (Pa5).  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] Medical Payment Subrogation Arbitration Agreement ........................................ Da118  Printout confirming that the [...] group of companies involved in this litigation are signatories to the med-pay arbitration agreement.  ........................................  Da120 July 22, 2022, arbitration award for Docket Number [...] ........................................  Da123 August 1, 2022, arbitration award for Docket Number [...] ........................................  Da130 August 23, 2022, arbitration award for Docket Summary Judgment Motion, [...] ................................Da269  Exhibit “1”  Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint ........................................Da279 Exhibit “2”  Certification of Counsel in Support of Verified Complaint .........................................................Da285 Exhibit “3”  Certification of [...] ......................................Da362 Exhibit “4”  Documents produced by [...] in response to Defendant [...] Subpoena ................Da365 Summary Judgment Motion, [...] .................................Da489  Exhibit “1”  Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint ........................................Da495  Exhibit “2”  Certification of Counsel in Support of Verified Complaint .........................................................Da506  Exhibit “A” to October 17, 2023  Letter Brief nine police reports which formed the basis for the nine inter-company arbitration awards .........................................................Da586  Exhibit “B” list of 17 arbitration awards in which [...] allowed the matter to proceed to a hearing and then accepted the arbitration award as binding and made payment ..........Da624  Exhibit “C” list of 19 matters in which upon filing of a Medpay Arbitration, [...] recognized the validity of the Medpay subrogation claim in New Jersey and made payment without allowing or requiring the matter to proceed to arbitration  ........................................Da785  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Third, based upon the evidence, if there is no other cause of the accident other than a manufacturing defect, a jury may find that a defect existed.  See *Myrlak v. Port Authority of New York, et al.*, 157 N.J. 84 (1999).  Clearly, a plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence to prove manufacturing defect.  Direct evidence of a product defect is not required under the PLA to demonstrate existence of a product defect.  Here, the testimony of [...]’s 30(b)(6) witness, [...], by itself, establishes the presence of a manufacturing defect by admitting that any Ozurdex applicator that dispenses a silicone particulate, deviates from [...]’s own performance standards.