ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] It was acquired by defendant [...] after it was designated as an “area in need of redevelopment” by the Township pursuant to the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40:12A-1.  Through the subsequent redevelopment process, the Township entered into redevelopment agreements authorizing [...] to apply--through its urban renewal entities--for a long-term tax exemption under the Long Term Tax Exemption Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:20-1 et seq.  (“LTTEL”)  The issues arising from the exemption center on the return [...] is projected to make, whether the exemption was at all necessary to make the project financially feasible, and the lawfulness of making exemption decisions for reasons unrelated to the needs of the redevelopment project.
[brief] The Superior Court rightly exercised its authority when denying Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate.  (June Order [Pa253–54]).  The Superior Court rightly applied Rule 4:50-1 to Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate.  It pointed out that Plaintiffs’ motion “only provides the conclusions that they are entitled to relief . . . not why they are entitled to relief. ”  [Pa. 255].  In addition to Plaintiffs’ lack of argument, the Superior Court also found: Plaintiffs signed a Consent Order after not filing an opposition to defendant [...]’s motion to compel arbitration.  Now, plaintiffs seek relief from this consent order and do not provide a cognizable reason for relief aside from conclusory statements.  [Pa. 256].  The Superior Court also explained that, despite Plaintiffs’ insistence that the Contract’s arbitration agreement violated New Jersey law, “Plaintiffs have not identified how this arbitration contract is unenforceable. ”  [Pa. 256].  Plaintiffs have failed to show (or even argue) that the Superior Court abused its discretion when refusing to vacate the January Consent Order.  Nowhere in Plaintiffs’ brief do they argue that the Trial Court abused its discretion under Rule 4:50-1, nor do they even mention the applicable legal standard.  As such, Plaintiffs failed to provide any grounds for reversal.  C.
[directive] b.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  위의  주제협약에 따라 귀하의 감독을 다른 주로 이전하는 문제는 선고 이후 만약 그 주가 그 주 내에서 귀하를 성범죄자로 등록하도록 결정하거나  또는 뉴저지 주가 귀하를 성범죄자로  등록하도록  규정했으면 언제라도 그 주로의 이전이 거부되거나  있습니까?  제한될 수 있다는 것을 알고  Do you also understand that pursuant to the same Interstate Compact transfer of your supervision to another state may be denied or restricted by that state at any time after sentencing if that state determines you are required to register as a sex offender in that state or if New Jersey has required you to register as a sex offender?
[brief] There are No Misrepresentations, Material or Otherwise, Upon Which the Court Below Relied.  (Pb23-Pb25).  Point Four of Plaintiff’s brief appears to be arguing that counsel for [...] made misrepresentations to the Court.  Simply put, this is not true and patently offensive.  Communications between counsel’s office and [...] officials confirm that the matter of [...]’s complaint seeking a handicap parking space was still pending before [...].  (See Da061-Da064).  These communications further indicate that the [...] had determined not to pursue this matter and thus it was transferred back to [...] for disposition regarding “Section 504 (Rehabilitation Act of 1973)”.  (See Da063).  In fact, shortly after the aforementioned communications [...] restarted the Conciliation process, which had been languishing, by contacting Plaintiff and proposing a “new” Conciliation Agreement.  (See Da061).  Therefore, the statements complained of by Plaintiff and made by counsel for [...] are true.  Furthermore, these statements have no bearing upon the underlying legal issues in this matter, i.e., whether or not Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint was time barred.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument lacks any basis in fact and is therefore without merit.  E.
[brief] **Litigation and Redo of the Reorganization Meeting**  On January 20, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs against the Defendants, alleging violations of OPMA and the LRHL.  (Pa1).  On January 24, 2022, the Hon. [...], J.S.C., entered Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause restraining the Defendant [...] from, among other things, “Implementing any actions taken at its January 11, 2022, Council Reorganization Meeting. ” (Pa24).  Given these restraints and circumstances that substantially inhibited the Borough’s ability to function, the Borough determined the prudent course of action would be to follow Para. 2 of the Order, and promptly hold a plenary Reorganization Meeting to re-adopt all agenda items from the January 11, 2022, Reorganization Meeting.  (Pa165).  It was thought that a redo would also remedy any potential OPMA violation that may have occurred.  (Pa165).  Accordingly, on January 26, 2022, [...] sent notice to the [...] of a Special Meeting, designated as the “Plenary Reorganization Meeting of the Caldwell Mayor and Borough Council,” to “be held via Zoom on Tuesday, February 1, 2022 at 6:15pm”.  (Pa173).  On January 28, 2022, [...] sent notice of the plenary Reorganization Meeting to the other of the Borough’s designated newspapers.  (Pa165, Pa175).  As of that date, [...] also posted the notice on the Borough’s website and on the bulletin board in Borough Hall.  (Pa166).  The [...] published the notice of the plenary Reorganization Meeting on January 29, 2022.  (Pa189).  In accordance with the notice, [...] held a plenary Reorganization Meeting on February 1, 2022, where the governing body again heard, adopted, and ratified all agenda items, resolutions, and appointments that were on the agenda for the January 11, 2022, annual Reorganization Meeting.  (Pa166, Pa192, Pa198).  In the meanwhile, on January 27, 2024, the Hon. [...], P.J.Cv., entered an Order vacating the restraints imposed upon the Borough.
[brief] This failure is particularly noteworthy as [...] expressly testified that such written authority exists.  On this topic, [...] presented similar testimony during the Rule 104 evidentiary hearing.  [...] agreed the referenced NJDOT standard specification is directed to the project general contractor rather than the resident engineer as the general contractor and not the resident engineer is responsible for assigning the TCC.  (3T200:24-201:11).  Upon making this concession, [...] attempted to justify his reliance on the standard specification by testifying that it is the resident engineer’s responsibility to make sure that a Traffic Control Coordinator is assigned and performs his job correctly.  (3T201:12-18).  [...], however, was unable to provide any facts in support of the conclusion that [...] failed to satisfy this obligation.  (3T202:3-209:19).  He simply had never investigated the issue.  [...] then testified about requirement No. 9 within the same standard specification, which he identified as having particular relevance to his opinion.  That requirement for the general contractor provides as follows:  Ensuring that excavation and lateral drop-offs greater than 2 inches in depth are eliminated or protected by barrier or emergency escape ramps during non-working periods.  (3T209:22-210:9) (underline added).  On cross-examination, [...] conceded that the subject settlement that caused plaintiff’s accident was not longitudinal as included within requirement No. 9 but was rather transverse or perpendicular to the direction of travel.  (3T210:13-211:24).  With further regard to requirement No. 9, [...] conceded that he is unaware of any support for the position that the roadway condition at issue involved a settlement of greater than 2 inches.  (3T211:25-212:12).  Further, after considerable testimony concerning the substance of the MUTCD on direct examination, [...] appropriately recognized on cross-examination that the document does not provide any guidance in determining whether a dangerous condition exists in any specific setting.  As this is the core standard of care issue in this litigation, the MUTCD does not contribute to [...]’s standard of care opinion as related to [...].  Accordingly, [...] was compelled to recognize that he was unable to identify any documentary support for his standard of care opinion.  C. [...]’s has Acknowledged that [...] was not on Notice of the Condition Prior to the Date of Plaintiff’s Accident.
[brief] On May 8, 2019, a State Grand Jury returned Indictment No. [...], charging defendant [...] with one count of second-degree theft by deception, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4. (Sa1-3).  On April 20, 2023, following a seven-day trial, a jury sitting before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., found defendant guilty of theft by deception of property valued over $75,000.  (7T110-14 to 19; Sa4).  Sentencing was scheduled for June 16, 2023.  (7T112-14 to 113-1).  However, on April 28, 2023, defendant filed a motion for a new trial and a judgment of acquittal.  (Sa5-12).
[directive] Failure to appear at court proceedings or to remain where placed by the court is deemed recent if it occurred 23 within the 12 months immediately preceding the detention hearing, or if it occurred 12 to 24 months preceding the detention hearing and the juvenile cannot demonstrate a record of voluntary compliance with subsequent court appearance and placement requirements.  N.J.S.A. 2A-4A-34(h).  See 19 juvenile.24 25 of the [N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-34(c).  5:21-5.]  See also R. B.  In making this finding, the court will consider the following factors, so Assistant Prosecutors should be prepared to address each factor in their applications for detention: 1. Nature and circumstances of the offense charged; 2. Age of the juvenile; 3. Juvenile’s ties to the community; 4. Juvenile’s record of prior adjudications, if any; and 5.
[brief] [...] issued his expert report on January 18, 2018, Pa289, and he was deposed on September 10, 2018.  Pa2068.  [...] testified that [...] and [...] failed to make sure, among other things, that the proper machinery was used in the milling work, that they failed to check the lighting, the backup alarms and ensure that OSHA requirements were met.  Pa2092.  In fact, [...], the resident engineer, acknowledged that he was not familiar with the OSHA standards.  Ibid.  Per [...], neither [...] nor [...] were performing any engineering tasks at the time of the fatality.  Specifically, he testified:  Q.  And is it your opinion that the defendant [...] and [...] in this matter were not only negligent but negligence was basically disregarding health and safety of [...]?  A.  Not as it relates to engineering.  They weren’t performing any engineering tasks at the time of the incident.  The people in the field weren’t engineers under the law.  They were negligent in the fact that they failed to ensure that the safety provisions of the specifications and the Turnpike’s Health & Safety Program were followed, but it wasn’t engineering negligence.  They weren’t performing any engineering functions.  Pa2094.  [...] testified that the person responsible for ensuring compliance with the plans and specifications had to be the resident engineer.  Pa2115.  In this particular case, [...] failed to fulfill the obligations for his job, including failing to check whether or not there was a backup alarms, lighting, etcetera.  Pa2113.
[brief] Public access to email communications has made many important news stories possible.  Emails have revealed that government officials warned nursing home staff not to wear masks in the early days of the COVID-19 virus or that government officials have sent homophobic or racist emails.  And there is, of course, the most notorious email sent by government officials in New Jersey—“time for some traffic problems in Fort Lee”—which sparked the Bridgegate investigation  Reporters and the public must be able to easily access emails to hold the government accountable.  The standard [...] advocates is not supported by case law and should be rejected.  The trial court correctly concluded that Plaintiff’s request sufficiently identified the records he seeks and rightly compelled [...] to comply with the request by producing those emails it has already located, subject to any redaction or claimed exemption.
[brief] This office represents the Appellant, [...], in the above captioned matter.  Please accept this reply letter brief in lieu of a more formal brief on behalf of the Appellant, retired Trooper [...].  TABLE OF CONTENTS  REPLY APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS..................................................ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS.............................iii  PROCEDURAL HISTORY..............................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS............................................................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT..................................................................................2  POINT I  THE DECISION BELOW WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.  (Not Raised Below) .................................................................2  POINT II  ADEQUATE  NOTICE OF THE RICCI ACT WAS NOT PROVIDED AND THEREFORE, BROBST SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO RICCI ACT BENEFITS.  (Raised Below.  Pa16. Pa30.) .......................................................6  CONCLUSION..........................................................................................11
[brief] First, the trial court, while “certainly concerned by the apparent failure of the timely development of affordable housing,” held the four-year delay in compliance did not appear to amount to “exclusionary zoning. ”  While that is the wrong standard for enforcement of an existing order, it also overlooks defiance by [...] of affordable housing obligations spanning more than twenty years.  In 2001, [...] held that “[...], New Jersey persists as a bastion of exclusionary zoning.  It has steadfastly resisted taking affirmative steps to provide realistic opportunities for affordable housing within its borders.  . .  The time has come to end this constitutional breakdown.
[brief] “We’re not suggesting that you did anything ….  [W]hat we’re trying to do is narrow it down.  If that’s not you then what we’re trying to see is if you know this individual cause he clearly goes into your driveway like he knows the place. ”  (Da 42; 25T 47-4 to 16: Da 17 at 28:06 to 28:28)  [...] responded, “I swear, I swear I [would] help.  I come from a[n] era, you got a code ….  I done been in stuff in my lifetime …. I haven’t been in no trouble since ’93 ….  Nothing at all …. Nothing at all ….  I swear if I could help you [I would].  I swear. ”  (Da 42-43; 25T 47-17 to 48-2; Da 17 at 28:34 to 29:18)  Detectives again emphasized their suspicion that the suspect was [...] on a fifth push:
[brief] •  Plaintiff relayed “I have this dull chest pain from the anxiety I think lol. ”  Id.  •  Plaintiff relayed, “so stressed and I know a lot of it is irrational”  Id.  •  In response [...] stated, “I understand.  I mean all the public schools are still open in the city.  That has to mean something, right?  I don’t know. ”  Id.  •  Plaintiff stated in this text communication, “if the cases increase like they are, I think the rational to not work from home has to be more convincing. ”  Id.  •  In this text communication [...] encouraged Plaintiff to be more communicative about her concerns regarding COVID 19.  Id. • Plaintiff stated, “It’s rising stress and anxiety. ”  Id. •  Plaintiff stated, “we will be more communicative and proactive and encourage others to do so as well” to which [...] responded, “I think that is a good idea. ”  Id.  Plaintiff considered her communications with her direct supervisor, [...], as an official request for an accommodation to work from home in light of the Covid-19 pandemic\(^3\).
[brief] Plaintiffs [...], [...], and [...], are developers of solar energy rights.  While "solar energy" is often associated with "solar panels," solar panels are merely the physical manifestation of all the non-physical assets that have been compiled over a long process involving significant expense and efforts.  One of the assets involved in the solar energy filed is known as Solar Renewable Energy Credits (SRECs) (pronounced s-recs).  Pa6-7, Pa394 (CEP admission), Pa1055, Pa1128-29, Pa1407-26, Pa1471, Pa1487 (page 121), Pa1663, Pa1674-80, Pa1684, Pa1757, Pa2507-2575, Pa2776-92, Pa2816-17, Pa2839-41, Pa2876, Pa2925, Pa2931, Pa3091 (SAC, passim).
[directive] This order to used committing a defendant to the custody of the Commissioner of be in is the Department of Health when the defendant been found by the court to has be incompetent dangerous to self, others, or property a result of mental illness.  See, and as N.J.S.A. 2C:4-6.  This order sets a review period of three (3) months, during which up time the defendant civilly committed for treatment observations.  The court shall is and hold a hearing three months after the defendant has been committed the and (3) professional staff shall report the condition of the defendant regarding both on competency and dangerousness as a result of mental illness.  At the hearing, the court shall determine whether or not the criminal charges should held abeyance or be in dismissed with prejudice.
[brief] 11T7:1-25.  Law Division [...] entered a November 9, 2022 Order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim (A1159, A1161), and, on June 22, 2023, ruled that plaintiff was entitled to recover $188,029 in fees and costs from the [...] under Section 9 of the mortgage agreement.  “[D]efendants have claimed throughout the litigation that the plaintiff did not own and could not enforce [its] security interest in their property.  Under the plain language in the mortgage contract … plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees for protecting its security interest,” [...] said, then determining that $188,029 was the reasonable amount.  12T11:1-25.
[directive] If the offense occurred on or after August 2, 1993 you must pay a $75 Safe [Yes] [No] e. Neighborhood Services Fund assessment for each conviction?  If the offense occurred on or after January 5, 1994 and you are being sentenced to [Yes] [No] f. probation, you must pay a fee of up to $25 per month for the term of probation?  If the crime occurred on or after January 9, 1997 you must pay a Law Enforcement [Yes] [No] g. Officers Training and Equipment Fund penalty of $30?  You will be required to provide a DNA sample, which could be used by law enforcement [Yes] [No] h. for the investigation of criminal activity, and pay for the cost of testing?
[brief] This included discussion of an apparent “major redevelopment” in town unrelated to this application.  (Pa294 to Pa287).  This also included concerns about traffic from a Veterans Affairs clinic potentially being developed in the area.  (Pa489).  It also included further concerns about “horrendous traffic” that was completely contrary to the evidence presented.  (Pa491).  In addition, there were unsubstantiated concerns about the drainage system potentially failing at some point that was cited as support for voting against the Application.  (4T23-9 to 25).  Furthermore, Board members inaccurately referred to the Application as an expansion of a non-conforming use and cited that as a reason for voting against the Application.
[brief] A bidder’s failure to provide a required document demonstrating its legal qualification to perform does not become immaterial merely because the information is objectively factual and might be learned from a post-bid opening public records request.  (1T63-6 – 1T63-9)  [...] argues that the failure to submit the [...] Notice is not material because: (1) [...] was classified by [...] at the time of the bid; and (2) that information was publicly available.  Pb12-13.  [...]’s support for that argument is centered on Suburban Disposal, Inc. v. Twp. of Aberdeen, A-3176-12T3, 2014 WL 2131662 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 23, 2014) (Da453) and overstating the public availability of information about [...] classification.  Pb12-15.  a.  [...]’s efforts to prop up Suburban Disposal (Aberdeen) must fail.  Suburban Disposal (Aberdeen) was extensively discussed in the SSI Brief.  Db33-36.  In addition to being an unreported, ten-year-old, never-cited decision, it does not stand for the proposition asserted, and it does not even purport to address a public entity’s ability to waive a non-material defect.
[brief] [...]’s absence as a party in this matter further underscores the need for additional discovery in this matter and the prematurity of the trial court’s summary judgment decision.  While [...] presented some evidence to the trial court regarding its constant coordination with [...] dating as far back as the 1940’s, there is more evidence to uncover.  Indeed, the Certification of [...] underscores the need for additional discovery.  Mr. McDonough certified that, for the last 35 years, he assisted [...], [...], and [...] in reviewing and passing upon all building plans in the [...] community pursuant to the Genesis Deed. (Da881-886).  Given the lengthy history and the statements in Mr. McDonough’s certification, there must be additional documentary evidence supporting [...]’s exercise of authority pursuant to the Genesis Deed, but [...] was precluded from exploring this discovery because of the premature grant of partial summary judgment.
[brief] [...] did not file her own OPRA complaints because she believed interested party [...] had filed an OPRA request in July.  When the Verified Complaint was written and submitted, Appellant and interested parties genuinely believed [...] submitted an OPRA request which was never responded to and genuinely believed the State violated OPRA by not responding within seven business days.  (Pa63).  Upon reading the Respondent’s response and cross-checking [...]’s e-mails and records, Appellant learned that it was possible [...] had not actually submitted an OPRA request in July.  (Pa63).  When the Respondents argued in their response that the Statute of Limitations had prohibited [...]’s OPRA denials from being adjudicated, [...] timely filed her OPRA requests on December 15, 2022 prior to the court hearing scheduled on January 5, 2023.  (Pa77).  Respondent [...] and Respondent [...] denied both of [...]’s OPRA requests on December 27, 2022.  (Pa77).  This was slightly more than one week prior to her matter being adjudicated before the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. of the Superior Court on January 5, 2023.
[brief] The SHO’s Elimination of the obligation to install the Route 33 traffic signal was proper and based on substantial evidence in the record  In its brief, the [...] argues that the SHO should have continued to require a traffic signal on Route 33 (a State highway, which means that only the [...] could approve such a signal regardless of what the [...] may want).  As noted above, the applicable zoning does not require a signal if development is undertaken pursuant to the HD ordinance standards, such as for warehouses, but there is language in the VC-2 Overlay provisions suggesting a traffic signal, but not providing who should provide a signal.  As the SHO was advised, there have been numerous applications for different property owners using the VC-2 Overlay standards and none of them were required to provide a traffic signal.  Nevertheless, the [...], desirous of preventing Plaintiffs’ inclusionary development, argues that the development cannot proceed without a traffic signal.  The SHO’s Resolution eliminated any obligation for Plaintiffs to provide a traffic signal at Route 33.  The provision of this traffic light was not among the conditions of approval attached in the Prior Approval Resolution governing the Subject Property, but the Resolution does mention a traffic light, since a light was then proposed and supported by the [...], and it was treated below as a condition of approval.  M87.