ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] INDEX OF APPENDIX  Indictment [...] dated October 22, 2019........................................Pa1  Letter enclosing enlarged version of profile picture dated March 6, 2023.......Pa6  Order granting motion to dismiss indictment dated January 22, 2024..............Pa8  Notice of Appeal dated March 4, 2024..............................................................Pa9  [...] incident report dated April 12, 2019...............Pa13  Defendant’s statement dated April 11, 2019....................................................Pa16  Extraction report for detective’s cellphone dated April 11, 2019...................Pa32  Follow-up email dated March 25, 2024.............................................................Pa39  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Celino v. General Acc. Ins., 211 N.J. Super. 538, 542-44 (App. Div. 1986).  The Appellate Division in Celino noted “a substantial burden on the carrier in attempting to prove, in the \(^6\) The trial court, like [...] and [...], briefly refers to notice of cancellation sent to the [...], which referred to the [...], not the liability coverage, and which did not result in notice to [...].  Pa1066-Pa1068.  It also referred to [...]’s Enrollment Status Reports, which had no actual effect on [...]’s insurance, and which provide no evidence showing they resulted in any notice to [...].  Pa2729-Pa2730.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW (NOT ADDRESSED BELOW)  On appeal, summary judgment orders are reviewed under the same standard that governs trial courts.  DeWees v. RCN Corp., 380 N.J. Super. 511, 522 (App Div. 2005).  Summary judgment shall be granted if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged…”  R. 4:46-2(c).  Although genuine issues of material fact preclude the granting of summary judgment, those that are of an insubstantial nature do not.  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  In a motion for summary judgment, all favorable inferences are to be granted to the non-movant.  Id. at 536.  When a question presented is solely a question of law, review is de novo.  Mejia v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 241 N.J. 360, 370-71 (2020).  II.
[brief] In addition, water quality near the property is also addressed through the Stormwater Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.1 to -5.9, which are part of the suite of water quality measure identified in the CPP.  See New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Water Resources Management New Jersey’s Continuing Planning Process (January 18, 2024, 10:41AM), https://www.nj.gov/dep/wqmp/docs/cpp.pdf, page 28 (identifying the FHACA riparian zones as one of the measures DEP relies upon to ensure protection of the State’s waters from stormwater runoff).  The Stormwater Rules set water quality standards for stormwater runoff.  N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.5.  These water quality standards are met using BMPs that reduce, to the maximum extent feasible, the post-construction nutrient load from a developed site.  N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.5(f).  The Stormwater BMP Manual sets forth BMP measures and the percentage of suspended solids those measures remove from stormwater.
[brief] ”).  Moreover, the [...] failed to vote in favor of adopting the ALJ’s second decision.  (Pa208).  Specifically, in its final agency decision, the [...] stated:  The matter came before the [[...]] at its November 1, 2023 meeting.  At that meeting, one of the five members was not in attendance.  A motion was made to modify the removal to a 60 calendar day suspension.  Two Commission members voted for this motion while the remaining two members voted to adopt the ALJ’s recommendation in full.  Since there was a tie vote, the motion was defeated, and no further motions were made, therefore, no decision was rendered by the [[...]].  Under these circumstances, the ALJ’s recommended decision will be deemed adopted as the final decision in this matter.  [(Pa208) (citations omitted). ]  As stated above, it is fundamentally unfair for [...] to be removed from her position based on the above record.
[brief] Their failure to supervise the staff and have policies showed wanton disregard for the rights of the plaintiff.  The failure to supervise the staff created a dangerous condition for the plaintiff.  The custom of not supervising staff proximately caused the plaintiff’s severe emotional distress and denial of her substantive and procedural due process rights.  The injuries to the plaintiff were foreseeable.  In *Nardello v. Township of Voorhees*, 377 N.J. Super. 428 (2005), the court found that a combination of multiple acts may make up a pattern of retaliatory conduct that may cause a public employee to lose protection under the Tort Claim Act.
[directive] This Directive promulgates revised Statewide Bail Schedules and sets forth the permissible use of Bail Schedules when setting monetary bail.  It is effective January 1, 2017 and supersedes Directive # 9-05 and all subsequent supplements to that directive.  The following summarizes the use of Bail Schedules if monetary bail is being considered on or after January 1, 2017:  will not 1.  The Bail Schedules be used to impose monetary bail for an “eligible defendant” as a condition of pretrial release.  will only continue 2.  For indictable offenses, the Bail Schedules to be used for defendants arrested on or prior to December 31, 2016 at bail reduction/bail review hearings conducted thereafter in Superior Court.  3.  For disorderly persons offenses/petty disorderly persons offenses, the Bail will continue Schedules to be used for the following non-eligible defendants if monetary bail is being considered for:  a.  A defendant initially arrested on a complaint-warrant or charged on a complaint-summons for a disorderly persons offense/petty disorderly persons offense prior to January 1, 2017 and the defendant later fails to appear in court and is arrested on or after January 1, 2017 for that failure to appear.  Monetary bail may be set upon issuance of the bench warrant or upon arrest for that failure to appear.  [...] • [...] • [...]  [...]
[brief] As part of this appeal, Appellant argues the Trial Court erred in concluding that Appellant’s predecessor and servicer was required to accept and apply the First Wire Transfer in accordance with the terms of the Note and Mortgage.  (See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 14-17).  However, this argument is at odds with the plain language of the Note and Mortgage and underscores Appellant’s predecessor, and its servicer, breached the terms of the Note and Mortgage by refusing to accept and credit the First Wire Transfer to the balance of the Loan.  The terms of the Note and Mortgage are governed by general contract law principles.  “[T]he terms of an agreement are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning.
[brief] (Pa147).  On June 1, 2023, Plaintiff-Appellant’s Counsel was notified of representation on behalf of Defendant-Appellant, [...].  (Da049).  No additional settlement offers were made by defense counsel on behalf of Defendant-Respondent, [...].  In addition, although calls were made to Defendant-Respondent, [...], directly, by counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], after counsel was assigned for Defendant-Respondent, [...]; those calls were referred to Defendant-Respondent, [...]’s counsel and did not produce any additional settlement offers.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS  A.  December 11, 2017 order deeming [...] a [...] defendant................................................Da235-26 B.  December 13, 2022 order precluding impeachment with pleadings..........................................................11T65  C. February 28, 2023  Order denying Motion for new trial.......Da351 D. February 28, 2023  Order of Judgment..............................Da347-50 E. March 31, 2023  Order denying Motion to Amend Judgment.................................................................Da354-55  TABLE OF CITATIONS
[brief] (7)  Mobile retail food establishments shall provide trash and recycling receptacles within ten (10) feet of their site and shall collect all trash and debris within twenty-five (25) feet before leaving their site.  Collected trash must not be deposited in public trash receptacles.  (8)  No mobile retail food establishment shall provide in-truck dining services or sidewalk tables and chairs.  (9)  Mobile retail food establishments shall not be used as overflow and/or accessory kitchens for a fixed retail food establishment.  (10)  Mobile retail food establishments shall be subject to Chapter 255, “Noise,” Chapter 281, “Peddling and Soliciting,” and Chapter 419, “Food and Beverages.
[brief] \(^2\)  A defendant compelled to pay more than his or her percentage of damages may seek contribution from the other joint tortfeasors under the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law (JTCL).  N.J.S.A. 2A:15–5.3(e).  That position is amply supported by jurisprudence requiring liability insurers who defend multiple insureds to appoint independent counsel to represent each insured where conflicts are foreseeable.  See Wolpaw v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co.  v. Parker, McCay & Criscuolo, 272 N.J. Super. 41, 45 (1994) (holding that a liability insurer violates its contractual duty and must retain separate counsel for insured’s co-defendant where interests conflict in “maximizing the percentage of the other insured’s fault and minimizing their own”); Yeomans v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 N.J. Super. 48, 54 (App. Div. 1974) (“[W]here the same company covers codefendants whose interests are antagonistic, retention of separate and independent counsel for each will ordinarily suffice to fulfill the carrier's duty. ”); see also, e.g., Univ. of Miami v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 112 So. 3d 504, 508 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (“[I]n defense of both co-defendants, Great American’s counsel would have had to argue conflicting legal positions, that each of its clients was not at fault, and the other was, even to the extent of claiming indemnification and contribution for the other’s fault . . .  [T]his legal dilemma clearly created a conflict of interest . . . sufficient to qualify for indemnification for attorney’s fees and costs for independent counsel. ”); Williams v. Am. Country Ins. Co., 833 N.E.2d 971, 980 (Ill. App. 2005) (holding that a policy exclusion for intentional acts of an agent under the doctrine of respondeat superior creates a conflict of interest with co- defendants requiring separate counsel where “it would be in [one co-defendant’s] best interest to present a defense that he was an agent of [the other co-defendant], while it would be in [the other co-defendant’s] best interest to establish the exact opposite”); Bituminous Ins. Cos. v. Pa. Mfrs.’ Ass’n Ins. Co., 427 F. Supp. 539, 555 (E.D.Pa.1976) (holding that an insured is entitled to reimbursement from its insurer based on its duty to defend because of the insured’s conflict with its co-defendant, reasoning that each defendant may attempt to absolve itself from liability by alleging the damage was caused solely by the negligence of the other).
[brief] While the Krause Court specifically discussed preemption in the context of the NCA, which is not applicable here, it is important to note the Krause Court reiterated the presumption of validity when it comes to municipal ordinances and found the ordinance in question was not preempted by the NCA.  Respondents’ citation to Krause and discussion of the NCA is once again misplaced as preemption pursuant to the NCA was decided below and not cross appealed; however, it is also not on point as Ordinance 17-2017 was enacted pursuant to the HRA and did not include specific decibel standards.  Respondents also contend that the [...], by virtue of being part of the [...], “surrendered” its authority to enact noise nuisance ordinances such as Ordinance 17-2017; however, the [...] did not cede the ability to regulate where it has explicit statutory authority, via the HRA, to regulate.
[brief] On September 23, 2020, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint alleging that Plaintiff’s claims were time-barred by the six-year statute of limitations provided by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.  In opposition, Plaintiff established that, on April 26, 2013, the parties entered into a “pay-when-able” loan, cognizable under New Jersey law, and that the limitations period did not begin to run until late 2019 when [...] first became aware that [...] would soon be able to pay the loan.  On November 13, 2020, the Hon. [...], P.J.Ch., denied Defendants’ motion without prejudice.  Da1.  _____________________  1  Pursuant to R. 2:6-8, and consistent with Appellants’ defined abbreviations, abbreviations used herein are as follows:
[directive] If Special Application and Enhancement Feature D is to be invoked based on the discovery of a firearm at the time of the defendant’s arrest, the prosecutor before using this feature should be aware of facts constituting a reasonable basis to establish a “temporal and spacial link” between the possession of the firearm and the drugs that the defendant intended to distribute.  See State v. Spivey, 179 N.J. 229 (2004).  This link will invariably be established when the possession of drugs and a firearm is simultaneous, but may also be established if at the time of arrest the defendant is found to be in possession of a firearm but not drugs (many dealers carry firearms at all times, even when not carrying drugs), considering the ongoing nature of defendant’s involvement in drug distribution 11(...continued) of a firearm other than an assault firearm or machine gun.
[brief] 9  POINT I THIS LAW WAS ENACTED IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CONSTITUTION.  .........................................................  9  POINT II  PETITIONERS’ STATUTORY CLAIMS FAIL ............................................................... 17 POINT III PETITIONERS’ APPLICATION SHOULD BE DISMISSED AND NOT REMANDED .................................................................................................................. 30 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 32 TABLE OF APPENDIX Page New Jersey Legislative Calendar, Vol. XLV No. 54, Internet Update II, prepared December 21, 2021 and posted on December 29, 2021 .............. Ra1 New Jersey Legislative Calendar, Vol. XLV No. 57, Internet Update I, prepared and posted on January 7, 2022 ........................................... Ra3 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## CASES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Application of Forsythe, | | | 185 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1982), | | | aff’d 91 N.J. 141 (1982) | passim | | Berg v. Christie, | 18, 19 | | 225 N.J. 245 (2016) | | | Bd. of Educ. v. Maas, | 30 | | 56 N.J. Super. 245 (App. Div. 1959) | | | Bruck v. Credit Corp., | 20 | | 3 N.J. 401 (1950) | | | Camden v. Byrne, | 19 | | 82 N.J. 133 (1980) | | | Delaware & Raritan Canal Co. v. Camden & Atl. R.R. Co., | 19 | | 16 N.J. Eq. 321 (Ch. 1863) | | | Dep’t of Transp. V. PSC Resources, Inc., | 20 | | 159 N.J. Super. 154 (Law Div. 1978) | | | Fletcher v. Peck, | 18 | | 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) | | | In re “An Act to Amend an Act Entitled ‘An Act Governing Public Utilities’”, | 10 | | 83 N.J.L. 303 (Sup. Ct. 1912) | | | In re Application of Lamb, | 9, 10 | | 67 N.J. Super. 39 (App. Div. 1961), | | | aff’d o.b. 34 N.J. 448 (1961) | | | In re Borg, | 11, 22 | | 123 N.J.L. 104 (Sup. Ct. 1939) | | In re Camden Cty., 170 N.J. 439 (2002) ................................................................. 30 In re Freygang, 46 N.J. Super. 14 (App. Div. 1957), aff’d 25 N.J. 357 (1957) ....................................................... 10 In re Gilmore, 340 N.J. Super. 303 (App. Div. 2001) ........................................ 10 In re Low, 88 N.J.L. 28, 30 (Sup. Ct. 1915) .............................................. 11 In re Martin, 90 N.J. 295 (1982) .................................................................. 31 In re McCabe, 81 N.J. 462 (1980) ................................................................. 10, 17, 22, 31 In re McGlynn, 58 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1959) ............................................. 11, 18 In re Miller, 122 N.J.L. 176 (Sup. Ct. 1939) .................................................. 21, 22 In re Reilly, 364 N.J. Super. 519 (App. Div. 2003) ....................................... 16, 17, 28 New Jersey Ass’n on Corrections v. Lan, 80 N.J. 199 (1979) .................................................................... 9 New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. v. [...], 453 N.J. Super. 272 (2018) ..........................................................
[brief] Trinity Church v. Lawson-[...], 394 N.J. Super. 159, 166 (App. Div. 2007).  Appellant/plaintiff argues that summary judgment was improperly granted because further discovery was needed.  [...] lists the need for additional depositions of respondent/defendant [...] and depositions of [...] representatives.  The appellant/plaintiff failed to express with specificity why he needs further depositions and how they could further help decide this action.  Prior to defendant/respondent [...]’s motion for Summary Judgment on May 8, 2024.  Plaintiff/respondent could have conducted additional depositions but failed to do so.
[brief] [...]  (Id #144661978)  On The Brief #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Pages | |----------------------------------------------|-------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | ii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 3 | | COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS | 6 | | STANDARD OF REVIEW | 8 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | | | POINT I | | | Plaintiff lacks Standing to Bring this Action | 9 | | POINT II | | | Plaintiff’s Complaint Is Legally Insufficient To Bring A Viable Cause Of Action Against The County Defendants | 15 | | CONCLUSION | 23 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] But that is not how it works.  While some considerations may certainly overlap, the positive and negative criteria are distinct, then balanced.  Under the trial court’s recreation of the negative criteria, any variance denial could be upheld by citing a “purpose” under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2, even if the cited purpose was in contradiction to the purpose the actual ordinance was adopted or, as here, the cited purpose (morals or congestion for example) has absolutely no relation to the variance whatsoever.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Comer, 249 N.J. at 401 (emphasis added).  The only evidence in the record specific to [...]’s childhood provided the unequivocal conclusion that his childhood trauma made him prone to reckless, and ultimately criminal, behavior.  The court had no evidentiary basis to conclude that [...]’s trauma was not significant enough to warrant substantial mitigation, and its reliance upon non-individualized facts from outside the record was improper.  Case, 220 N.J. at 64.  Secondly, the court was prohibited from letting the nature of the incident impact its consideration of the mitigating effect of [...]’s youth.  As to the heinous nature of the incident, courts are prohibited from letting the “brutal nature of an offense [] overpower mitigating arguments based on youth. ”  Comer, 249 N.J. at 403.  And as to the planned nature of the incident, the court ran afoul of Miller when it held that the mitigating effect of [...]’s childhood was undermined by the fact that the incident was not a crime of opportunity.  In Miller, the Court noted that [...], one of the juveniles sentenced to life without parole, had “learned on the way” to participating in the fatal robbery “that his friend [...] was carrying a gun[.]”  567 U.S. at 478.  Despite this knowledge, the Court concluded that Jackson’s “age could well have affected his calculation of the risk that posed, as well as his willingness to walk away at that point. ”  Ibid.  Accordingly, Jackson’s youth reduced his “culpability for the offense” even though he was aware of the plan to commit armed robbery.  Ibid.  The same is true for [...].  All of his immature characteristics – including his vulnerability to coercion that was borne of environmental trauma – were present when the boys hatched the plan.  Teenage [...] lacked the capacity to understand the risk that the plan entailed, or to resist the pressure to go along with it.  The court thus erred in ignoring the mitigating effect of [...]’s childhood trauma just because the incident was not a crime of opportunity.  iv.
[brief] On November 1, 2016, a Hudson County Grand Jury returned [...], which accused [...] of eleven counts: first-degree murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and (2) (count eleven); first-degree felony murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3) (counts three and six); first- and second-degree robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1b (counts four and five); second- and third-degree burglary, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2b(1) (counts one and two); and third- and fourth-degree weapons offenses, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d and 5d (counts seven, eight, nine, and ten).
[brief] 9  A.  The Fingerprint Examiner’s Testimony Violated N.J.R.E. 702 and the Confrontation Clause ...........................................................................  10  B.  The Bloodstain Pattern Analyst’s Testimony Violated N.J.R.E. 702 ..................................................................................................  17  C.  The DNA Expert’s Testimony Violated N.J.R.E. 702 And 403 ..................................................................................................  19  D.  The Pathologist’s Testimony Violated N.J.R.E. 702 .................................................................................................. 20 E.  The Inappropriate Testimony From Four Forensic Experts Requires Reversal Of Defendant’s Convictions  ...........................................................................  21  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Notwithstanding the existence of the injunction, the district and its administrators are authorized to take action in furtherance of the orderly operations and management of the school district.  Stated otherwise, Plaintiff is still subject to investigation, corrective action and/or discipline where appropriate, particularly where there are concerns involving the health, safety and welfare of students and staff in the midst of an unprecedented global pandemic.  To that end, the injunction does not render plaintiff bulletproof nor the district paralyzed.  Irrespective of the existence of the injunction, none of the alleged acts of wrongdoing constitute an adverse employment action.  The trial court agreed and ruled accordingly.  Such ruling should be affirmed.
[brief] \(^2\)  “[A] decision that ignores the elephant in the room is a decision with diminished authority. ”  Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 377, 129 S.Ct. 1093, 1109 (2009) (Souter, J. dissenting).  A brief that does so shares that same fate.  CONCLUSION
[brief] The same day, Plaintiff filed, and the court entered, a notice of voluntary dismissal.  Da58–59.  Plaintiff explained in an email to Defendants’ counsel that he was “dropping all claims against [...], [...], and [...]” because “[i]t is clear once the judge grants orders that have no basis that this will be going nowhere. ”  Da66.  On March 12, 2024, Defendants filed a motion for relief from the trial court’s order of dismissal pursuant to R.4:50-1(f).  Da60–61.