ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (24T7-5 to 15)  Juror 12 stated did not feel this connection prevented her from being fair and impartial, that she did not disclose it to her fellow jurors, and that it would not prevent her from voting not guilty if the State failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.  (24T9-13, 10-6 to 24)  Some of [...]’s family members were in the audience that day, but Juror 12 did not recognize any of the people in the audience that day.  (24T11-4 to 24)  Defense counsel did not object to Juror 12 continuing to sit for the trial, and the court declined to excuse her.  (24T13-3 to 14)  Later that same day, after the State’s first witness, [...], testified, Juror 12 then revealed that she knew Cooper because he attended Juror 12’s church when Cooper was younger, that she knew his mother, and that one of his cousins worked closely in Juror 12’s ministry.  (24T111-19 to 112-8)  Juror 12 said told the court that this did not change the answers to her prior questions about whether she could be fair and impartial to both sides.  (24T112-12)  Defense counsel did not voice any objection, and the court allowed Juror 12 to continue sitting for the trial.  (24T114-6 to 14)
[brief] (1T89-1 to - 1T91-1).  The putative reason for this, according to [...], was so he could conduct his search while a “back-up” could issue the equipment warning “so we don’t have to fight the reasonable suspicion or the time frame when we’re waiting on the response from” dispatch on the license and registration check.  (1T143-12 to 15).  But [...] did not, at the same time that he requested back-up to “walk his dog”, provide dispatch with credentials information necessary for the issuance of the flash-guard “warning. ” (1T90-14 to 24).  --- 5
[brief] [...]’s complete unfamiliarity with the status of construction as of the date of plaintiff’s accident is also a major red flag.  [...] specifically admitted that he was unaware as to whether any work had been performed in the direct vicinity of plaintiff’s accident prior to the date of the accident.  (Pa0291 – Pa0293 at 53:9-55:12).  This concession dovetails with [...]’s recognition that [...] had no actual notice of the subject roadway condition prior to the date of plaintiff’s accident.  (Pa0349 and Pa0350 at 111:20-112:5).  Collectively, this complete lack of substantive awareness and analysis resulted in an inadmissible net opinion.
[brief] Fleming Companies, Inc. v. Thriftway Medford Lakes, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 837, 842-43 (D.N.J. 1995) (citing Wade v. Park View, Inc., 25 N.J. Super. 433, 439-40 (Law Div.), aff’d, 27 N.J. Super. 469 (App. Div. 1953)).
[brief] 1.  The FJOD (Da32 - excerpts) was issued 7/16/1999, revised 9/8/1999, Nunc Pro Tunc to 7/16/1999.  2.  The FJOD was appealed, docket No. [...].  An Appellate Remand Order was issued on Jan. 17, 2002 (Da95).  Interlocutory orders were issued by the trial court to correct FJOD errors (Orders of 3/7/2001, 9/24/2001, 9/12/2002) and a final corrective Order was issued by the trial court on March 25, 2004 (Da41).  4.  The Court’s support Order of Feb. 6, 2012 (Da50) provided Appellant credits in the amount of $12,390 – which were never posted on Probation’s account record.  5.  The Court issued two Orders requiring Probation to hold a hearing to correct Probation’s account record on 6/28/2012 and 7/20/2012 (DA52).  Probation refused to comply with the Orders and the court declined to enforce its own Orders.  6.  The trial court issued its Order dated 12/10/2014 pursuant to Appellant’s Motion of 9/21/2009 (DA58).  7.  Respondent filed a Motion for Enforcement of the 12/10/2014 Order.  Oral argument heard on Oct. 23, 2015 (Transcript T1)  The Order of Oct. 27, 2015 was issued (Da60).  8.  Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the Order of 10/27/2015.  Appellant’s appeal [...] was denied by way of Appellant order of 6/5/2018 (Da131).
[directive] In such cases it is suggested that the officers inquire of a neighbor if the next of kin is expected home and at what time.  If a survivor is at his place of employment, the notifying officers should proceed there, contact the survivor's supervisor, and request to speak to the survivor privately so that notification can be made.  In other cases where survivors are unavailable and the neighbor is able to provide an expected time of arrival, the officers should return at such time to make the notification.  If the neighbor is unable to provide a time when the next of kin should be expected home, the officers should explain to the neighbor that there has been a "medical emergency" involving the deceased, and they should request that the neighbor contact one of them when the survivors return home.
[brief] *Id.* at 18.  Yet the Court recognized that the standard for authenticating video recordings was no longer as stringent as in the past.  “As motion pictures have become less of a novelty, a trend has developed away from the more exacting method used to introduce motion pictures towards a simpler method much like that used for photographs[.]”  *Id.* at 15.  The question is whether “the motion picture accurately reproduces phenomena actually perceived by the witness. ”  *Ibid.* (quoting II McCormick on Evidence § 214, at 17 (4th ed. 1992)).  Authentication of photographs thus requires that testimony establish that “(1) the photograph is an accurate reproduction of what it purports to represent; and (2) the reproduction is of the scene at the time of the incident in question, or, in the alternative, the scene has not changed between the time of the incident in question and the time of the taking of the photograph. ”  Ibid.
[brief] | Oral Opinion at 5T-4-1 to 7-10 -- Again, all of which is relevant.  His Honor seems to have totally misunderstood the Motion.  Doesn't address entering corrected State Not of Mot for Dismissal -- to which State had consented.  States Mot is "stream of consciousness."  May be partly accurate as I was presenting several different "fixes" together.  Also, asked for investigation into "Lost" & LoP improprieties for which I'd do the depositions if necessary.  At end, states, "[the case] is over.  He needs to move on."  5T-7-9-10.  So I appealed.
[brief] ”  This argument is specious, of course, because it ignores the valid and repeated efforts used by Plaintiffs to try to obtain the identity of the tenants on the date of the accident.  In fact, eighteen months into the case, the docket to that point reveals this case had all been about Plaintiffs trying to obtain the identity of the tenants.  No reasonable person would have gone to the mall in the months after the accident to create such a list of tenants.  Even if the Plaintiffs did so, they would have had no way of being sure whether any tenant they identified was a tenant on the day of the accident – or a new tenant since the date of the accident.
[brief] ...........................................................................................................  35  POINT V THE PROSECUTOR’S DECISION TO CROSS-EXAMINE DEFENDANT -- AND THEN ARGUE TO THE JURY IN SUMMATION -- ABOUT THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DEFENDANT’S PERSONAL BUSINESS CARD FAILED TO COMPLY WITH INTERNAL REGULATIONS OF THE STATE POLICE WAS A BRAZEN ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE THE VERDICT WITH INADMISSIBLE “PRIOR BAD ACTS” EVIDENCE THAT HAD NO ACTUAL RELEVANCE TO THE CASE; ALTERNATIVELY, NO JURY INSTRUCTION WAS DELIVERED REGARDING THAT EVIDENCE.  (NOT RAISED BELOW)  .........................................................  42  POINT VI  THE STATE IMPROPERLY ELICITED A LAY OPINION FROM THE BUREAU CHIEF IN CHARGE OF INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS IN THE STATE POLICE THAT DEFENDANT HAD DONE EXACTLY WHAT THE STATE WAS ACCUSING DEFENDANT OF DOING: THAT HE IMPROPERLY RETAINED HIS OFFICIAL STATE-POLICE WALLET IDENTIFICATION CARD AFTER FALSELY REPORTING IT TO BE STOLEN.  (NOT RAISED BELOW).................................................................
[brief] With respect to the implied private right of action under the NJCFLA, [...] cites to dicta in Francavilla v. Absolute Resols. VI LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 171 (App. Div. 2024) (a case analyzing an application of the entire controversy doctrine) to assert that two Maryland cases are dispositive in the Court’s analysis of a New Jersey statute.  See [...]’s Br. 19-20.  But [...] again fails to address the arguments in [...]’s opening brief, i.e., 1) allowing for private enforcement of the NJCFLA furthers (and does not frustrate) the manifest purpose of the statute to police the consumer credit industry, and 2) the statutory history of the NJCFLA shows that its predecessors provided for an implied private right of action and, thusly, that the legislature intended to provide for private enforcement.
[brief] [6T 17-16 to 17-24].  The impacts from this use on adjacent properties was entirely benign, because most of the activities associated with the community are not visible, and the amenities and residents themselves are generally confined to the inside of the building.  [6T 18-11 to 18-21].  The project would not generate substantial traffic, noise, odors or glare, nor be obnoxious to surrounding uses.  [6T 18-21 to 19-10, 24-2 to 25-9].  The building was well-screened, and would serve as a good transition between the single-family uses to the south and the townhouses west of the Property and the bus depot located on the north side of the Property.  [6T 19-11 to 19-22].  He noted that the building was designed to be compatible with the character of the surrounding properties and that in addition to the substantial setbacks [...] was proposing an extensive landscape buffer so that there were no visual or other aesthetic impacts from the project.  [6T 20-24 to 23-19; Pa256].  Based on these facts, [...] opined that there would be no substantial impact to the public good.  [6T 28-6 to 28-11].  After determining that there would not be substantial detriments to the public good, [...] turned to the second prong of the negative criteria – whether the relief [...] sought would cause substantial impairment to the intent and purposes of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.
[brief] The Court Abused Its Discretion in Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Pa4, 9)  Judges should not view reconsideration motions as hostile gestures.  *Lawson v. Dewar*, 468 N.J.Super. 128, 136 (App.Div. 2021).  “Judges should view well-reasoned motions based on Rule 4:42-2 as an invitation to ‘apply Cromwell's rule: “I beseech you ... think it possible you may be mistaken. ”’”  Id.  “The fair and efficient administration of justice is better served when reconsideration motions are viewed in that spirit and not as nuisances to be swatted aside. ”  Id.  Rule 4:42-2 declares interlocutory orders “shall be subject to revision at any time before the entry of final judgment in the sound discretion of the court in the interest of justice. ”  Although plaintiff respectfully views the trial court’s Orders as palpably incorrect and based on a misapprehension of the law and facts of record, such a showing is unnecessary.  See *Lawson*, 468 N.J.Super. at 134 (A motion for reconsideration does not require a showing that the challenged order was “palpably incorrect,” “irrational,” or based on a misapprehension or overlooking of significant material presented on the earlier application”).  Until entry of final judgment, only “sound discretion” and the “interest of justice” guides the trial court, as Rule 4:42-2 expressly states.  Id.  See also Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 536 (2011).  In his motion for reconsideration, plaintiff demonstrated that reconsideration was in the interest of justice.  The trial court’s order denying the motion to compel unjustly deprived plaintiff of the opportunity to depose a director of multiple corporate defendants who participated in the decision to terminate his employment and pass him over for promotion to a job he had been promised in violation of CEPA.  Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was not a “simple disagreement” with the outcome of the motion to compel.  The Order denying plaintiff’s motion to compel was legally flawed, and overlooked the undisputed record evidence of the corporate defendants’ control over [...].  The motion for reconsideration was brought in good faith and provided the trial court with the “opportunity to . . . correct a prior erroneous order. ”  The trial court’s failure to do so was an abuse of discretion.
[brief] [[...]] has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that [[...]] engaged in unconscionable commercial practices in violation of the CFA.  To recover, however, [[...]] must establish more than the unlawful conduct of [[...]].  [[...]] must also demonstrate an ascertainable loss on the part of [[...]]; and a causal relationship between [[...]’S] unlawful conduct and [[...]'s] ascertainable loss.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT COHEN WAS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS UNDER THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (Da280a-81a).  [...] has abandoned her appeal from the Trial Court’s order setting the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs awarded to [...] via the March 8, 2024 Order.  Nonetheless, [...] maintains that the Trial Court ultimately came to the wrong conclusion as to its interpretation of the parties’ rights and obligations under the Settlement Agreement, and thus erred in awarding [...] any amount for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Paragraph 35 of the Settlement Agreement.
[brief] No canon of statutory interpretation, for example, would support Appellant’s contention that the “‘owner of the nonconforming use or structure’ de facto becomes the ‘applicant’” under the MLUL for the certificate certifying the use preceded the ordinance (Sb28).  First, as a sheerly factual matter, this is a claim of astonishingly recent origin.  Again, in both of its 2018 applications to the Board, the Appellant referred to itself as the “applicant,” not Respondent.  Nor did Appellant claim that Respondent was the “de facto applicant” at either Board hearing or at any point in the action in lieu of prerogative writ proceedings that took place between 2019 and 2022.  This argument arose for the first time in Appellant’s appellate brief.  It is meritless, but even if it were not, Appellant cannot benefit from it now on appeal, having pressed repeatedly in the proceedings below that the burden of proof was on the “proponent” of the use but never having once asked the Board or the Court to consider its novel “de facto applicant” theory of statutory interpretation.
[brief] ..................................................5  Raspantini v. Arocho, 364 N.J. Super. 528 (App. Div. 2003) ..................................................14  Sanderhoff v. Miller, No. A-1314-08T1, 2009 WL 4724274 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2009) (unpublished)  .............................................................6  Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30 (2020)  ..........................................................................10  Spina Asphalt Paving Excavating Contractors, Inc. v. Borough of Fairview, 304 N.J. Super. 425 (App. Div. 1997) ..................................................14  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015) ..........................................................................12  Triffin v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. A-0297-16T4, 2018 WL 636703 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 31, 2018) (unpublished)  .............................................................5  Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corp., 231 N.J. 234 (2017) ..........................................................................11 Wallhauser v. Rummel, 25 N.J. Super. 358 (Ch. Div. 1953) .................................................................7 Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240 (1950) .........................................................................................7 State Statutes N.J.S.A. § 2A:23B-7(g) ....................................................................................7, 16 N.J.S.A. § 2A23B-7 ..........................................................................................16 Federal Statutes 9 U.S.C. § 3 ........................................................................................................7, 15, 16 Worker’s Compensation Act § 39.....................................................................11 Worker’s Compensation Act § 40.....................................................................11 State Rules N.J. Ct. R. 1:6-2 .................................................................................................14 N.J. Ct. R. 2:2-3(b) ...........................................................................................2, 5 N.J. Ct. R. 2:2-3(b)(8) ......................................................................................5 N.J. Ct. R. 2:4-1(a) ..........................................................................................6, 7 N.J. Ct. R. 2:5-4(a) ..........................................................................................12 N.J. Ct. R. 2:5-6(a) ..........................................................................................5  N.J. Ct. R. 4:50-1 ...............................................................................................8, 9  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Defendant cites the Staff Commentary.  As stated in the Commentary’s “Introduction,” it “is a guideline intended to clarify the staff interpretations of the statute, but does not have the force or effect of statutory provisions. ”  Defendant points to the Staff Commentary’s approval of the use of an agent to send validation notices.  A validation notice is a writing required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) to be sent to the consumer either with or within five days after each debt collector’s initial communication.  *Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC*, 829 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2016).  The Staff Commentary requires the agent to disclose the agency relationship.  That Staff Commentary is inapposite.  The letter here (Pa9) is not a validation notice.  In addition, it does not disclose any agency relationship and there is nothing in the record suggesting the mail vendor is Defendant’s agent.
[brief] There is no suggestion that any of these coworkers were in a position to take adverse job action against him.  [...] provides no citation to policy, or legal authority, as to why a victim of a bizarre workplace incident, such as a report of another manager being under her desk, would prohibit [...] discussing such an allegation with her husband (Steve [...]) or another supervisor who reported it to her ([...]).  (Trial court’s analysis at 3T11:12-17).  Plaintiff does not argue how a husband being updated by his spouse about an investigation into a coworker being under her desk is a violation of any legal standard.  Similarly, [...] presents no suggestion of a causal connection between the actions of these defendants and complaints he had made about [...] or [...] in February 2015.  The trial court noted that not only were these defendants unaware of the EEO complaint, they had no authority to affect [...]’s employment or ability to take adverse job action against him.  (3T29:22–3T30:12).  [...] and [...]
[brief] (SOICR p. 12)  ...........................................................................  H568a Holm-53: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-50, asking about the “temporary” regulator: when installed, useful life when installed; objected to in part (SOICR p. 12)........................................  H569a Holm-54: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-51 seeking details about ice buildup incidents, with (SOICR p.  12)  ...........  H570a Attachment A: incident response records, .........................  H572a Holm-55: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-52, on icing incidents elsewhere (SOICR p. 12)
[brief] Q.  So [...], this is September of 2018, and I do not see a pothole.  A.  No, but there are several cracks, I could clearly see them.  Plaintiff subsequently contradicted herself regarding the existence of a pothole:  Q.  [Y]ou said you saw the pothole?  A.  I -- when I smashed down to the ground, I saw -- I saw a hole.  As a matter of law, the Township cannot be held liable for a “dangerous” condition that Plaintiff cannot identify or describe and is unsure of the existence of after claiming to have been injured by it.  See, Sawruk v. Twp. of Lacey, Docket No. A-0636-11T1, 2012 WL 1948648 at *3 (N.J. App. Div. May 30, 2012) (finding no dangerous condition where “plaintiff was unable to identify the cause of his fall and that any purported connection between an alleged “depression in the landing and his fall was “mere speculation”).
[brief] F/K/A  [...], AND JOHN DOES 1-10; [...] AND [...], FICTIONAL PARTIES, Defendants-Respondents.  Docket No. [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM: Order and Final Decisions  Entered on April 4, 2022, September 14, 2023, and October 27, 2023 in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. [...]  SAT BELOW: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, [...]
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S “ATTEMPTS” TO “CHANGE” HIS AUTOMOBILE POLICY DOES NOT EXCUSE HIS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH NEW JERSEY INSURANCE LAWS  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 provides as follows:  Except as provided by section 45 of P.L.2003, c.89 (C.39:6A-3.3) and section 4 of P.L.1998, c.21 (C.39:6A-3.1), every standard automobile liability insurance policy issued or renewed on or after the effective date of P.L.1998, c.21 (C.39:6A-1.1 et al.) shall contain personal injury protection benefits for the payment of benefits without regard to negligence, liability or fault of any kind, to the named insured and members of his family residing in his household who sustain bodily injury as a result of an accident while occupying, entering into, alighting from or using an automobile, or as a pedestrian, caused by an automobile or by an object propelled by or from an automobile, and to other persons sustaining bodily injury while occupying, entering into, alighting from or using the automobile of the named insured, with permission of the named insured.
[brief] (1T9:1-3; 4-5.)  The trial court acknowledged that whether this was a short sale was “really important for [the trial court] to distinguish,” and that the trial court did not see this argument in the record.  (1T9:8-12.)  The trial court furthered that “if this was presented as a short sale, there’s a lot of things that has to happen before the lender accepts that,” but that the trial court did not believe that factually this was a short sale.  (1T9:13-13-20.)  The trial court identified this genuine issue of material fact, yet, Appellant had no opportunity to establish a record on this point.  Second, pursuant to 9(b) Appellant was also entitled (and in fact, required) to accelerate the debt because Borrowers sold the Property to [...], and [...] – an LLC – clearly did not occupy the Property as its principal residence.
[brief] **Point III.  [...] did not actively participate in the closing.  (34a)**  Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against [...] claiming “Defendants breached their Commitment by failing to attend to the receipt of the conveyancing documents necessary to convey Title to Plaintiff.  Defendants are in breach of their Title Commitment and the Contract entered into with Plaintiff, causing plaintiff to suffer damages. ” (2a-2b, Amended Complaint, Count One).  Plaintiff, failing to prove liability under the Commitment, now argues for the first time on appeal, in a reply brief, there exists an implied contract between the parties.  (Prb9), citing *Troy v. Rutgers*, 168 N.J. 354, 365 (2001).  Plaintiff ignores the terms of the title commitment which state [...]’s liability must be based on the commitment.  303a, ¶6b.  Moreover, [...] is not liable for the conduct of the closing.  “The issuing agent is the Company’s agent only for the limited purpose of issuing the title insurance commitments and policies.  The issuing agent is not the Company’s agent for the purpose of providing closing or settlement services. ”  Id., ¶7.  The new argument regarding an implied contract, therefore, fails as a matter of law.  Moreover, plaintiff’s negligence claim is barred because of the same terms and conditions of the commitment.  Plaintiff’s new claims must be dismissed.  **Point IV.