ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Punitive relief is an extraordinary remedy and may only be awarded where a defendant's offending conduct was wanton, malicious, or especially egregious.  *Herman v. Sunshine Chem. Specialties, Inc.*, 133 N.J. 329, 337 (1993); *Cavuoti v. N.J. Transit Corp.*, 161 N.J. 107 (1999).  In *Rendine v. Pantzer*, 141 N.J. 292, 313-14 (1995), the Court described the conduct that is sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages as "wantonly reckless or malicious," and "an intentional wrongdoing in the sense of an ‘evil-minded act’ or an act accompanied by a wanton and wil[1]ful disregard of the rights of another[.]”  The court added, “the key to the right to punitive damages is the wrongfulness of the intentional act. ”  Id.  Here, if the Court somehow finds there to be a triable issue of fact as to any of Plaintiff’s claims, the record evidence demonstrates that there are no facts that could possibly warrant the extraordinary relief of punitive damages.
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE  No. 1990-1:  Whereas, it is decidedly in the public interest that the entire New Jersey law enforcement community should respond fairly, predictably and uniformly to acts of juvenile delinquency; and Whereas, the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17b-98, states that it is the public policy of this State: to provide for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State, in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State.
[brief] ”).  Permission to use a manufacturer’s name to market products does not turn a potential distributorship relationship into a franchise or as the New Jersey Supreme Court held, “then any business selling a name brand product would, under New Jersey law, necessarily be considered as holding a license. ”  Id.  Further, [...] routinely gave its logo to dealers and distributors for marketing purposes, but [...] never gave [...] a license to its intellectual property.  As stated above, simply sharing marketing and advertising materials, which is what [...] did, will not suffice as the basis for the transfer of a license.  See Finlay, 146 N.J.Super. at 219–20.
[brief] On February 8, 2024, the Court held on the record [a] hearing in reference to all Plaintiffs’ outstanding discovery demands as it relates to the Punch List pursuant to Court’s Order of November 9, 2023.  3.  In accordance with the Court’s instructions, further due diligence was conducted by the representative of the Defendant, [...] and a proper certification was executed by the Defendant, [...].  4.  Attached to this Certification is the Defendants’ Amended Answers to the Plaintiffs’ Punch List demands.  5.  Based on the aforesaid, I request for the Motion to Reinstate be granted, NO discovery is outstanding on behalf of the Defendants.  ***
[brief] 15  REPLY TO COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS  This litigation arises from a 1963 Agreement between then aligned Religious entities and differing interpretations of its vague provisions.  This lawsuit commenced in 2012, primarily seeking a Court determination that the [...] has been granted a permanent easement in 1963 to use the School Lot for Synagogue parking and to have a connection to the School heating system.  The School’s Brief accurately summarized the litigation history, dating back to the 1963 Agreement, and the testimony/evidence in the Remand Trial before [...] (Db7 to 23).  The Sons of Israel Brief also summarized the litigation history and Remand testimony/evidence (Pb20 to 36).  With some differences in interpretation of events and characterizations, the 1963 Agreement and the evidence have been summarized in the Briefs.
[brief] State v. Medina, 349 N.J. Super. 108, 129, 793 A.2d 68 (App. Div. 2002).............47  Tara Enterprises, Inc. v. Daribar Management Corp., 369 N.J.Super. 45, 52, 848 A.2d 27 (2004)..............................................................................................................41  Thompson v. Kerr-McGee Ref. Corp., 660 F.2d 1380, 1384-85 (10th Cir. 1981).....9  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 53-54, 110 A.3d 52 (2015)  ...........................................
[brief] Smith, 155 N.J. at 92-93.  Tips cannot be deemed reliable based only on bald allegations, they must be shown to be “reliable in [their] assertion of illegality,” and the State must produce evidence to establish that “the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity. ”  Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000).  While “[t]he veracity factor may be satisfied by demonstrating that the informant has proven reliable in the past, such as providing dependable information in previous police investigations,” neither a “conclusory statement that the affidavit is based on information the police received from a confidential reliable informer” nor “a statement that the police believe the informant is reliable because he did a job for an officer in the past” is sufficient to establish the informant’s veracity.  *State v. Keyes*, 184 N.J. 541, 555 (2005) (quoting *State v. Sullivan*, 169 N.J. 204, 213 (2001), *State v. Zutic*, 155 N.J. 103, 111 (1998), *State v. Smith*, 155 N.J. 83, 96-97 (1998)) (internal quotations omitted).
[brief] Pa0088.  At the time of his injury, Appellant, [...], was using the ProZone attraction.  2T32:11-38:24.  Appellant, [...], was an Adult Participant, and Appellants’ son was a Child Participant, per the terms of the Agreement.  Appellant, a “Participant” per the terms of the Agreement, was injured while participating in activities on the Premises.  The plain language of the Agreement clearly applies to Appellants’ claims.
[brief] [...] owned the rifle that was used in the case, called 911, had the gun turned on him and witnessed three of his family members brutally murdered by the defendant two hours prior to the interrogation.  (1T:33-1 to 13);(1T:24-1 to 25-8).  Furthermore, the State is still arguing the absurd notion that it is legal to leave an unsecured assault rifle in a house with a mentally ill child.  Specifically, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2), states “any person having a legal duty for the car of a child or has assumed responsibility for the car of a child who causes the child harm that would make the child abused or neglected … is guilty of a crime of a second degree. ”  However, the State ignores the second sentence which states “any other person who engages in conduct or who causes harm as described in this paragraph to a child is guilty of a crime of the third degree. ”  Therefore, the “legal duty” only pertains to the grading of the offense.  If [...] would’ve shot himself with the rifle instead of his family, the State would not argue that [...] Jr. was not guilty of endangering because he didn’t have a legal duty to care for [...].
[brief] Since the outset of this lawsuit, Plaintiff has failed to provide any support for his allegations, which served as the source of numerous discovery-related motions, including motions to compel and dismiss due to Plaintiff’s failure to provide ¹  In Plaintiff’s Appellate Brief, Plaintiff incorrectly states that Defendants filed their answer on April 26, 2022.  See Plaintiff’s Brief and Table of Contents to Plaintiff’s Appendix at page 001.  Defendants with proper discovery.  On June 18, 2021, Defendants served Plaintiff with Defendants’ First Set of Interrogatories and Defendants’ First Notice to Produce Documents.  See Da2-24.  Also on June 18, 2021, Defendants wrote to Plaintiff notifying him that despite due demand for damages and documents relied on in the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff had not provided such information.  See Pa41.  On July 22, 2021, Defendants served Plaintiff with another correspondence that yet again identified Plaintiff’s failure to provide discovery in response to the demand for damages and documents relied on in the Third Amended Complaint, which Plaintiff ignored.  See Da25-26.  Defendants timely responded to all of Plaintiff’s written discovery on July 16, 2021, including providing Plaintiff with Defendant [...]’s (“[...]) answers to interrogatories.  See Da27-39.  On September 10, 2021, Plaintiff inexplicably filed a motion for summary judgment.  At the time Plaintiff filed his motion, the time for Plaintiff to respond to Defendants’ Interrogatories, Notice to Produce Documents, and Requests for Admission had all expired and no discovery had been provided to the Defendants.  On September 14, 2021, Defendants served Plaintiff with a letter pursuant to R. 1:4-8, highlighting Plaintiff’s breach of his discovery obligations and that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was premature at such an early stage of the litigation.
[directive] There is a presumption of full cash bail under some specific circumstances.  This presumption exists, unless the court finds on the record that another form of bail (Amended on November 7, 2011 as to authorized in subsection (b), surety bond or property bond, will ensure the defendant’s presence in court when required, if the actor was already subject to a domestic violence cases where the temporary or permanent restraining order, pursuant to 2C:25-17, and is charged with a crime committed against a person protected under that order, including a defendant was already subject to a charge of contempt pursuant to 2C:29-9; and either (a) is charged with the commission of a domestic violence crime that resulted in serious bodily injury to the temporary or permanent restraining victim; or (b) has at least one prior conviction for a crime or offense involving domestic violence against the same victim or has previously violated a final restraining order under the Prevention of Domestic order protecting the same victim.  Violence Act – 2C:25-17) Section (e), does give the judge the discretion to impose an R.O.R. bail “when the court determines that such person is deserving.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 17:11C-40 states:  The payment of $50,000 or less in money, credit, goods or things in action as consideration for any sale of personal property which is made on condition that the property be sold back at a greater price shall, for the purposes of this act, be deemed to be a loan secured by the property and the amount by which the repurchase price exceeds the original payment actually paid shall be deemed interest or charges upon the loan from the date the original payment is made until the date the repurchase price is paid.
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  Therefore, it was not error to present both theories to the jury but conditioned on the preliminary finding of whether [...] acted inside/outside the scope of employment.  The trial court properly instructed the jury that it could find [...] vicariously liable for [...]’s conduct that was inside the scope of his employment, or alternatively, that [...] could be directly liable for negligent training and supervision if [...] was acting outside the scope of his employment.\textsuperscript{16} [11T 169:12-170:25].
[brief] There's a couple of motions that I need to address before the jury is brought over but once, you know, I start proceeding then I'm not going to accept any negotiated plea.  I know [...] has been working very hard, him and [...], to try to resolve the case, you know, I know you're facing a very serious charge on this first degree murder and jury will determine your guilt or innocence.  I have nothing to do with it and believe me you're going to get a fair trial.  However, I think, you know, perhaps we were scheduled to have the voir dire conference a couple of weeks ago.  [...] was on trial outside of Mercer and that's the only reason that conference did not take place but what you would have heard two weeks ago, and you probably have heard already but I'll repeat it, if a jury finds you guilty you're exposed to 75 years NERA, which means you would have to serve approximately 64 years before you're eligible for parole.  If in fact the jury finds you innocent of this first degree murder, then I'm going to move on to the armed robbery at the 7-Eleven in Hamilton.  You already have a trial date of January 2017, you and [...], and with that armed robbery, I know you're somewhat familiar your prior criminal record, you probably could be found as a persistent offender.  And you could be facing, I want to say, [...], life in prison for that armed robbery given [...]'s prior criminal history?  MR. GRILLO:  Yes, Your Honor, that's correct.  Given his status as a persistent offender it would be the State's intention to move for an extended term should he be convicted by a jury.  THE COURT:  And tell me once again, [...], what is the State's final offer to resolve this murder case as well as any other pending charges against [...]?
[brief] Conversion is a common law tort that applies to the “unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of an owner’s rights. ”  LaPlace v. Briere, 404 N.J. Super. 585, 595 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 199 N.J. 133 (2009).
[brief] Plaintiffs [...] admitted they knew they were attending a timeshare presentation at [...].  Da96, ¶76.  Plaintiffs [...] admitted they knew they were attending a timeshare presentation at [...] and knew they were purchasing a timeshare.  Da105, ¶106.  Plaintiffs [...] admitted they knew they agreed to attend a presentation at [...] and understood they were purchasing a timeshare.  Da109, ¶116 & 119.  Plaintiff [...] knew she agreed to attend a presentation but had “zero thoughts” about the content and just wanted to receive the rewards she was promised, which she did.  Da113, ¶127. timeshare intervals and they admitted in their complaint that they purchased the timeshares for personal, family or household purposes.  (Da4, ¶27; Da25, ¶28).
[brief] For example, if the physical possession of the firearm occurred during the burglary of [...], then the defendant is barred from Recovery Court under the first prong of factor a(5).  If the physical possession of the firearm occurred before the Morris County offenses, then the defendant could not have possessed it “at the time of any pending criminal charge,” and is not barred from Recovery Court.  However, as presented in these facts, if the physical possession of the firearm occurred during the pendency of the Morris County case, as the defendant had on July 1, 2022, then the defendant is barred from Recovery Court under the second prong of factor a(5).  Defendant cites to sentencing statutes, namely N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h) and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1, to bolster his argument and asserts, “if the Legislature intended to target possession of a firearm while on pretrial release, the second clause of subsection (a)(5) would read, ‘and did not possess a firearm while released on any pending charge.
[brief] A co-tenant who has paid operating and maintenance expenses of the property is entitled to an accounting for a pro-rata share from the other co-tenants, regardless of who is in possession.  *Esteves v. Esteves*, 341 N.J. Super. 197, 201-02, 775 A.2d 163 (App. Div. 2001).  Operating and maintenance expenses include, but are not limited to, charges such as taxes, mortgage, interest, and necessary repairs essential to the maintenance of the capital value of the property.  *Baird v. Moore*, 50 N.J. Super. 156, 169 (App. Div. 1958) (emphasis added).  "[O]n principle, the mere fact of possession by the cotenant making advances for the benefit of the common estate should not preclude reimbursement by contribution from the cotenants sharing in the benefits by the preservation of the common property."  *Id.* at 165-66.  In the instant case, [...] was not “in possession” of [...] because it continued the operations of [...] in the same manner as [...] had maintained the Property prior to [...]’s incorporation.  The trial record establishes that 606 Birch has been used as a mosque since at least 1988, when [...] and [...] became co-owners of the Property.  (Da 177).  As such, neither [...] nor [...] was “in possession” of the Property because it was used as a religious center from the beginning.  Alternatively, both [...] and [...] were “in possession” of [...] because both used the Property for its intended purpose: as a mosque for the Boonton Muslim community.  This status quo was maintained when [...] replaced [...] as co-owner of [...], with both co-owners having full and uninterrupted use of the Property as a mosque for the Boonton Muslim community.
[brief] Nineteen-year-old [...] was charged with murder after [...] was shot.  The State had no physical evidence and no motive for the crime, instead resting their case on two compelling yet unreliable pieces of evidence: a dying declaration and an eyewitness identification.  But multiple errors prevented the jury from properly evaluating the weaknesses of the State’s case.  First, the court failed to recognize the suggestive police conduct during the identification procedure — suggesting that the witness look at the photos a second time rather than accepting that he did not recognize anyone and demanding that he provide a conclusive yes/no answer rather than asking for his confidence.  This evidence of suggestiveness was sufficient to require a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of the identification, and the case must be remanded for such a hearing.  Moreover, although the witness was never asked about his confidence at the time, at trial, he told the jury he was 100% confident that Moore was the shooter.  But our caselaw precludes confidence statements after-the-fact, recognizing that years of confirmatory feedback irreparably distort confidence.  The State’s heavy reliance on the witness’s inadmissible confidence statement deprived Moore of his right to a fair trial.  Second, the dying declaration was too unreliable to be admissible.  McCullum’s father, [...], testified that his son’s dying words were that “[...]” shot him; Moore’s nickname is [...].  But [...] failed to mention this to any of the multiple police detectives he spoke to in the days after his son’s death, notifying police about the alleged dying declaration only after he had seen a news story about Moore being arrested and charged with murdering McCullum.  The court, acting as gatekeeper, was obliged to keep this unreliable evidence from the jury.  Alternatively, the court was required to instruct the jury that McCullum’s dying declaration was an identification and thus affected by all the same estimator variables as any other identification.  The failure to instruct the jury on this identification in a misidentification case was clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  Third, the court erred in permitting two police detectives to testify that unnamed, unknown witnesses implicated Moore in the shooting — by name, nickname, and physical description.  Moreover, in clear violation of well-established caselaw, a detective testified that he relied on this hearsay to assemble the photo array, further unduly corroborating the State’s case.  These errors, along with name-calling and burden-shifting prosecutorial misconduct and the failure to instruct the jury on an element of gun possession, deprived Moore of his right to a fair trial.  His convictions must be reversed.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] [...]’ BRIEF IN REPLY TO PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT’S OPPOSITION TO THE APPEAL TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE  DIVISION ON THE BRIEF: [...], Esquire 026091980  [...], Esquire 016331998  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant, [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  Dated: July 9, 2024
[brief] Therefore, Plaintiff’s arguments in that regard (especially pertaining to credibility findings) are completely without merit.  The trial court found both parties to be credible (Da14) and absolutely no reversible error was committed in that regard.  The trial court judge made her decision based on the evidence in the record, the testimony of the parties, what ¶25 of the JOD actually says and the law which applies to the foregoing (in the most generous sense to the Plaintiff).
[brief] As the municipal record indicates here, the Borough engaged in a detailed process to decide which applicant should be granted a Resolution of Support.  The process included creation of a cannabis Subcommittee consisting of two members of the local governing body and the Borough Chief of Police to provide a recommendation to the full Borough governing body.  The trial court correctly found that the Borough's review process and the Resolution of Support adopted by the Borough do not violate any requirement of *N.J.S.A. 24:61-36*.  The statute does not contain any specific requirements concerning the process to be engaged in by a municipality, and the process engaged in by the Borough here does not fail to comply with any provision of the statute in any way.
[directive] If the crime occurred on or after January 9, 1997 you must pay a Law Enforcement Officers [Yes/Si] g. [No/No] Training and Equipment Fund penalty of $30?  Si el delito ocurri6 el 9 de enero de 1997 o despues de esa fecha, usted tendra que pagar una multa de $30 d6lares al Fondo de Capacitaci6n y Equipo de Oficiales de! Orden Publico?
[directive] Upon a finding that there has been a material change in Rule 7:4-9 circumstance that necessitates a change in conditions, the judge may set new conditions of release.  Changes in Conditions of Release for Defendants Charged on an Initial (c) Violations of Conditions of Release.  A judge may impose new conditions of release, including monetary bail, when a defendant charged with a disorderly Complaint-Warrant (CDR-2) on persons offense and released on an initial Complaint-Warrant (CDR-2) violates a restraining order or condition of release.
[brief] Here, the enforcement of the New York choice-of-law provision in the Agreement would potentially enable Defendants to avoid the MBPA by the stroke of a pen.  See Instructional Sys., Inc., 130 N.J. at 345 (declining to apply contractual choice-of-law because otherwise “any large franchisor by insertion of a choice of law provision requiring the application of the franchisor’s home state’s law, could with a stroke of a pen remove the beneficial effect of the franchisee’s state’s remedial legislation”).  Indeed, Defendants admitted and argued before the trial court that the choice-of-law provision entitles them to circumvent the MBPA’s protections for New Jersey malt beverage distributors, which protect distributors to a greater degree than New York’s ABC Law.
[brief] Id. at 264-65.  The contract between the mall owner and the janitorial service contained three paragraphs governing indemnification.  *Id.* at 266.  The first indemnity provision required the janitorial service to indemnify the mall owner for any loss that the mall owner might incur “as the result of a failure of material and workmanship to be as warranted. ”  *Ibid.*  The second indemnity provision required the janitorial service to indemnify and save the mall owner harmless for all claims and liability “occurring in and about the Shopping Center as a result of the work performed and material and equipment installed or furnished by” the janitorial service.  *Ibid.*  The third indemnity provision required the janitorial service to indemnify the mall owner for all claims and liability “caused by or arising from the negligence of” the janitorial service.  *Id.* at 267.  The Supreme Court reiterated that a contract will not be construed to require indemnity for the indemnitee’s own negligence unless the contract specifies that intent unequivocally.  *Id.* at 273-74.  On the contrary, courts construe any ambiguity in such a clause strictly against the indemnitee.  *Id.* at 273.  The Supreme Court ruled that the indemnity clauses in the contract required indemnity only to the extent that the janitorial service was found to be at fault.  *Id.* at 269-70.  Because the multiple indemnity clauses did not unambiguously require the janitorial service to indemnify the mall owner for the mall owner’s own liability, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment in favor of the mall owner.  *Id.* at 273-74, 275.