[brief] Plaintiffs do not quibble with the overall legislative purpose of the Act, but do contend that because the Limited Attorney Exemption violates numerous constitutional doctrines, the trial court’s orders should be reversed.  Defendants contend that a presumption of constitutionality attaches to the Act because it does not infringe upon the right to practice law, and even if it did, the practice of law is not a fundamental right.  Plaintiffs have demonstrated, however, that an attorney’s advice to a client in performing debt adjustment services regulated by the Act implicates not only the Supreme Court’s constitutional grant of exclusive jurisdiction over the practice of law, but also an individual’s constitutional right to free speech.  Moreover, Defendants’ newly-pled argument that the Limited Attorney Exemption applies only to debt adjustment services outside of litigation has no support in the text of the Act, is an improper attempt to fundamentally alter the text, and fails to recognize that attorneys performing services outside of litigation are still engaged in the practice of law upon which Defendants have no right to encroach.  The Limited Attorney Exemption violates the separation of powers doctrine.  Defendants refuse to acknowledge that the Supreme Court has completely regulated the conduct of attorneys through various sets of rules, judicial opinions, committees and otherwise, leaving no area for the Legislature to address without encroaching upon its exclusive jurisdiction.  Even setting that aside, the Legislature had no legitimate purpose in enacting the *Limited Attorney Exemption* – it only frustrates the Act’s purpose by preventing consumers from contracting with the most experienced and productive attorneys who could best perform services for them.  Defendants’ argument that the Limited Attorney Exemption is not vague ignores the deposition testimony of Defendants’ witness that the terms “principally engaged” and “attorney-at-law of this State,” *in the context of the Act*, are undefined, and not even explained by Defendants.  No matter how many cases or statutes that Defendants cite using a similar term in different contexts, if the very agency responsible for enforcing the Act cannot identify the factors to determine whether an attorney is “principally engaged” in debt adjustment services, surely no person of “common understanding” can do so.  Defendants attempt to defeat Plaintiffs’ overbreadth argument by spinning the Limited Attorney Exemption as “protection” and a “safe harbor to attorneys” performing debt adjustment services.  The Legislature amended the Act from allowing attorneys to perform *any* amount of debt adjustment services to allowing them to perform only *some*, *undefined* amount of such services.  How this *limitation* on an attorney, including the most experienced debt adjustment attorney, can be characterized as “protection” is inexplicable and shows that the Limited Attorney Exemption reaches farther than necessary to advance the legislative purpose.  Lastly, the Limited Attorney Exemption impinges upon an attorney’s First Amendment rights; an attorney performing debt adjustment services for a client necessarily must communicate with that client and provide advice to that client, speech that is protected under the First Amendment.  Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court’s Orders.