ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] GUIDANCE ON HANDLING FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE CHARGES  (2)  Whenever charges brought pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:160-10 (Fugitive from Justice) are transferred to another jurisdiction and the underlying records and information must be preserved pending federal or out-of-state litigation, prosecutorial and clerical staff must appropriately designate the case disposition as "transferred" rather than "dismissed."  The proper disposition is imperative to prevent inadvertent dismissals as a result of automatic expedited expungements.  Effective June 15, 2020, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6 was amended to require the court to order an expungement of all related records and information at the time of the dismissal, acquittal, or discharge without a conviction or adjudication of delinquency (including juvenile diversion).  The defendant or juvenile is no longer required to apply for an expungement of these matters.  The court is now responsible for identifying matters eligible for an expedited expungement and in dismissing the charge or acquitting the defendant, the court is to order eligible matters expunged.  Stakeholders have raised concerns regarding the automatic expedited expungement of fugitive from justice charges when such matters have been dismissed when they in fact are actually being transferred to another jurisdiction.  Cases with a "transferred" disposition are not subject to an automatic expedited expungement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6.  Therefore, provided these matters 'are correctly designated by staff as "transferred" and not "dismissed," all underlying records and information will be appropriately preserved.
[brief] Id. at 370.  At that time, judges will assess the factors set forth in Miller.  Ibid.  "After evaluating all the evidence, the trial court would have discretion to affirm or reduce the original base sentence within the statutory range, and to reduce the parole bar to no less than [twenty] years."  Ibid.  The Comer Court did not extend this right of review to offenders who were eighteen or older at the time of their crimes.
[brief] Basically, the conditional plea rule here recognizes that it would be unfair to bind [...] to a plea agreement after such a drastic change in circumstances and so his decision to plead guilty or go to trial, it's now up to him to decide how he wants to move forward given that the circumstances are significantly different.  So, [...] just respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision below so he can exercise his right to withdraw from his plea agreement.  Thank you.
[brief] Ruling 87-41 concerns offering professional services to the public, which [...] does as she offers her services as an attorney to the public.  Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, at *18.  With respect to Factor #15 – Significant Investment, Factor #16 – Realization of Profit or Loss, Factor #19 – Right to Discharge, and Factor #20 – Right to Terminate, the record supports the finding that [...] met the definition for employee.
[brief] “Finally, we have reviewed the balance of defendant’s arguments, including: … probation’s calculation of arrears…  The trial judge found these arguments lacked merit, and based on our review of the record we also find they lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. ”  1/17/2002 and corrected in response by the trial court’s Order of 3/25/2004 without benefit of any court Order reinstituting the support awards of the FJOD.  The trial court erred and abused its judicial discretion in overlooking Probation’s failure to comply with the Law of the Case as controlled by the Appellate Remand Order of 1/17/2002.  Additionally, the Appellate Order of 6/15/2023 must now also be reconsidered given Probation’s withdrawal of fabricated arrearage charges and acknowledgment of material credits due Defendant.
[brief] (18T94:3-20).  Fifth, the trial court weighed [...]’s analysis against the testimony offered by the defense’s accounting expert, [...].  *In re Guardianship of D.M.H.*, 161 N.J. 365, 382 (1999) (reviewing courts defer to trial court determinations as to expert witness credibility).  As discussed, [...] was the only expert in the case to review the financial records; [...] did not.
[directive] Rule 2C:13-3  2C:14-4 2C:17-3  Statute 2C:5-5  Option  THE permissable permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible ABSENCE, Bail 19 issue.  Cash 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%  should JUDGE’S and summons bail $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $500 COURT  Range setting 3:26-2 to to to to to to $100 or Bail crime.
[brief] An excerpt from defendant’s motion to dismiss brief is appended to the State’s respondent’s brief because the question of whether this issue was raised in the trial court is germane to the appeal.  See R. 2:6-1(a)(2).  the indictment immediately” upon discovering the error.  See ibid.  Second, “a guilty verdict is universally considered to render error in the grand jury process harmless. ”  Simon, 421 N.J. Super. at 551-52 (citing Lee, 211 N.J. Super. at 599).  Thus, even if the alleged misconduct now raised for the first time warranted further consideration, it would not compel reversal of defendant’s conviction because the guilty verdict obviates his claim.  Third, defendant’s claim falls on the merits.
[brief] PROGRESSIVE GARDEN STATE : ON APPEAL FROM INSURANCE COMPANY, DRIVE NJ : SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY INSURANCE COMPANY AND : LAW DIVISION – MORRIS COUNTY PROGRESSIVE SPECIALTY  INSURANCE : Docket No. [...]  COMPANY : : SAT BELOW Plaintiff-Respondents, : HON. [...], J.S.C. v. : ALLSTATE  NJ INSURANCE COMPANY : Defendant-Appellant :  APPELLATE  BRIEF AND APPENDIX
[brief] Sullivan v. Bd. of Rev., Dep’t of Labor, 471 N.J. Super. 147, 153 (App. Div. 2022).  Under the CARES Act, an individual is eligible for PUA if they are ineligible for regular unemployment compensation or pandemic emergency unemployment.  Ibid.  If true, an individual then must provide self-certification that they are unavailable or unable to work because of one of the following COVID-19 qualifying reasons identified in Section 2102(a)(3)(A)(ii)(I): (aa) the individual has been diagnosed with COVID-19 or is experiencing symptoms of COVID-19 and seeking a medical diagnosis; (bb) a member of the individual’s household has been diagnosed with COVID-19; (cc) the individual is providing care for a family member or a member of the individual’s household who has been diagnosed with COVID-19; (dd) a child or other person in the household for which the individual has primary caregiving responsibility is unable to attend school or another facility that is closed as a direct result of the COVID-19 public health emergency and such school or facility care is required for the individual to work; (ee) the individual is unable to reach the place of employment because of a quarantine imposed as a direct result of the COVID-19 public health emergency; (ff) the individual is unable to reach the place of employment because the individual has been advised by a health care provider to self-quarantine due to concerns related to COVID-19; (gg) the individual was scheduled to commence employment and does not have a job or is unable to reach the job as a direct result of the COVID-19 public health emergency; (hh) the individual has become the breadwinner or major support for a household because the head of the household has died as a direct result of COVID-19; (ii) the individual has to quit his or her job as a direct result of COVID-19; (jj) the individual’s place of employment is closed as a direct result of the COVID-19 public health emergency; or (kk) the individual meets any additional criteria established by the Secretary for unemployment assistance under this section; . . . .  [15 U.S.C. § 9021(a)(3)(A)(ii)(I). ]  The Board correctly interpreted and applied the above provisions in this case.
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellant filed his Verified Complaint on March 14, 2023.(PA-1)  The Order to Show Cause was signed on March 15, 2023.(PA-5)  The Defendants filed their Answer on May 16, 2023.(PA-7)  The parties resolved all issues except those surrounding the use of private email accounts to conduct government business shortly thereafter, memorializing their agreement by Consent Order on July 19, 2023.(PA-14)  Oral argument entertained on August 18, 2023.  The trial court order and opinion issued December 4, 2023.  (PA-19, PA-21)  This appeal followed on January 18, 2024 (PA-36) and the transcript was filed February 2, 2024.(PA-52)  --- 3 T= transcript of August 18, 2023
[brief] 4  Also available at: https://www.nj.gov/treasury/pensions/ricci-ch157.shtml. (Pa10).  Certifying Officers of the SPRS, the Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, and the Public Employees’ Retirement System.  (Pa82).  The subject of the letter was “New Legislation Notice – P.L. 2019, c. 157” and it served to notify active employees of the newly enacted law.  (Pa82).  All Certifying Officers were advised of their responsibilities to distribute the information and to certify that they had done so.  (Pa83).  On August 16, 2019, [...], then-Certifying Officer for [...], acknowledged receipt and distribution of the information pertaining to the Ricci Act.  (Pa12; Pa85).  The Division hired [...] to mail postcards to all 200,647 SPRS retirees at their home addresses on file with the Division.  (Pa11).  These postcards included notice of the enactment of L. 2019, c. 157, how to file for Accidental Disability retirement benefits under the new law, the deadline for filing for such benefits, and the ramifications for missing the deadline.  (Pa11).  On June 10, 2021, the Division posted a news item on its website advising members that the statutory eligibility period to register under the Ricci Act was expiring soon and that members must submit the Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.  (Pa11).  The website further advised that failure to do so by that date would render the member ineligible to apply at a later date.  (Pa11).  On March 3, 2023, the Board received [...]’s Eligibility Registration Form and Request for Amended Benefits Form, both completed on August 29, 2022, as well as a sworn affidavit from [...] dated August 29, 2022.
[brief] 1.  On or about December 29, 2019, the Plaintiff was incarcerated at the [...], on a 90-day County sentence for shoplifting.  (Pa001, pg2, ¶2).  2.  On or about January 6, 2020, Plaintiff alleges that she signed up for church services, but was denied entry or permission to attend.  (Pa001, pg2, ¶3).  3.  On or about January 15, 2020, Plaintiff alleges that she signed up for church services, but was denied entry or permission to attend¹.  (Pa001, ¶5).  --- ¹  For the first time ever, Appellant includes unsupported statements that detail how and why she was denied access to church visitations, which were never pled in the Complaint or the Amended Complaint.
[brief] See N.J. Ct. R. 4:7-1 (identifying mandatory and permissive claims).  Specifically, Rule 4:30A states: "Non-joinder of claims required to be joined by the entire controversy doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims to the extent required by the entire controversy doctrine[.]"  The ECD respects "our long-held preference that related claims and matters arising among related parties be adjudicated together rather than in separate, successive, fragmented, or piecemeal litigation."  Kent Motor Cars, Inc. v. Reynolds and Reynolds, Co., 207 N.J. 428, 443 (2011).  See also Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 23 (1989) (noting "[f]ragmented and multiple litigation" is detrimental to the parties, the judicial system, and the public).  Our Supreme Court has stated:
[brief] 4 Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169 (2003) ..............................................................................................................  4 KPH Healthcare Servs. v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., No. 20-cv-05901 (KM) (ESK), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196095 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2021) ............................................................................................................  5 Marmo & Sons Gen. Contracting, LLC v. Biagi Farms, LLC, No. A-3120-22, 2024 N.J. Super. LEXIS 43 (App. Div. May 24, 2024) .....  11 Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411 (2022) ............................................................................................................. 9, 10 State v. Kouvatas, 292 N.J. Super. 417 (App. Div. 1996) .................................................................................. 4 Statutes
[brief] I.  The Trial Court issues a final Order dismissing the Absecon Defendants with prejudice.  Upon remand to the Trial Court, the Absecon Defendants promptly moved for a formal with prejudice dismissal Order of all claims and counts against them.  (Da034, Transaction ID: [...]).  On May 30, 2023, the Trial Court issued an Order granting the Absecon Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice.  (Da035, Transaction ID: [...]).  On July 8, 2023, a dismissal Order for lack of prosecution was filed, apparently in error, and this Order was later vacated on August 21, 2023.  (Da035, Transaction ID: [...]).  On July 10, 2023, the Trial Court issued an Order granting the State’s motion to dismiss and dismissing the operative complaint with prejudice.  (Da035, Transaction ID: [...]).  There is additional procedural history regarding the formal dismissal of the State Defendants that does not concern the Absecon Defendant in which Plaintiff alleges the State used a “dirty trick” because there was an error in the heading of the State’s notice of motion for dismissal.  (Da035-36; Pb68-73).  Ultimately, Plaintiff’s motion to “correct” the Order dismissing the State was denied as was Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the initial denial on December 1, 2023.  (Da036, Transaction ID: [...], Transaction ID: [...]).  J.
[brief] [...]’s testimony included a question-and-answer period in which the assistant prosecutor asked him to rely upon his personal observations of [...], made during the investigation of the burglary, and apply it to clips and stills taken from the tavern’s 64, 10-year-old surveillance cameras during the burglary, which the sergeant had previously reviewed.  Much of this testimony helped orient jurors to where on the tavern’s three floors the clip/still was taken and which of the undisputed occupants of the tavern – e.g., [...], the burglar – were depicted therein.  (9T:28-9 to 49-2).  Some questions asked the sergeant to draw the jurors’ attention to details that could be missed, e.g., an unidentifiable object in the burglar’s hand, a backpack in the burglar’s hand, a backpack-sized bulge under the burglar’s coat.  (9T:33-23 to 34-2; 42-8 to 47-21).  Others asked the sergeant to opine as to the burglar’s conduct as designed to hide his face from the surveillance cameras.  (9T:34-3 to 34-8).  Interspersed within this narration testimony were times when the assistant prosecutor asked the sergeant to provide the jury with more information about what was depicted in the still/clip based upon his own personal knowledge of the tavern and his investigation, e.g., (9T:32-1 to 32-21)(describing the state of the tool room based upon having seen the room when the sergeant “initially responded”); (9T:34-15 to 34-25)(explaining how his “investigation” had revealed that “only … employees” knew the location of the manager’s key behind the cash register); (9T:35-13 to 38-11)(testimony regarding the color of the tavern’s chairs in person compared to on video).  Admissibility of this type of lay opinion narration testimony, see N.J.R.E. 701, is dependent on it being 1. “rationally based on the witness’ perception,” and 2. assisting the jury “in understanding the witness’ testimony or determining a fact in issue.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I AUTHENTICATION IS A LOW BURDEN, THE REQUIREMENTS OF WHICH DEPEND ON THE FACTS OF THE CASE.  To authenticate evidence, the proponent need only make a prima facie showing that the evidence is what he claims.  The proofs vary with the facts of each case, for video evidence as for any other evidence.  This standard as applied to video recordings finds formal expression in the silent-witness theory of authentication adopted by other state and federal courts.
[brief] 2.  Counsel for Defendants [...] and [...] agree that the Affidavit(s) of Merit served in this matter as to their clients satisfies the requirements of, N.J.S.A. 2A: 53A-26-29.  3.  The date on which Plaintiff must file and serve an Affidavit of Merit as to Defendants [...] and [...] be and hereby is extended pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 for a period of sixty (60) days up to March 7, 2020; 4.  Within seven (7) days of receipt of the Affidavit of Merit, the parties shall meet and confer to address the substance of any alleged inadequacies in the Affidavit of Merit; 5.  Absent resolution of any issues regarding the adequacy of the Affidavit of Merit, Counsel for Defendant shall file a motion regarding the alleged inadequacies of the Affidavit of Merit within fourteen (14) days of receipt of the Affidavit of Merit, or any objections shall be deemed waived.  6.  To the extent any party files a pleading that names additional professional(s), that party shall serve a copy of this order on the newly added defendant(s), serve timely the Affidavit(s) of Merit on any such party, and contact the court to schedule the necessary Ferreira Conference(s).  7.  A true copy of this Order shall be deemed served upon being upload to eCourts.  [...]- Attorney for Plaintiffs [...]- Attorney for Defendant [...] [...]- Attorney for Defendant [...] [...]- Attorney for Defendant [...] [...]- Attorney for Defendants [...] and [...] [...], individually and as Executor of the [...], deceased, Plaintiff, vs. [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; OVERLOOK MEDICAL CENTER; [...] and DR. JOHN DOE 1-5 (being fictitious designations) SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY- LAW DIVISION - MORRIS COUNTY CIVIL ACTION Docket No. [...]
[brief] Da189.  In his reply certifications on the Sale Objections, [...] claimed that a refinance closing would occur by February 9, 2024.  Consistent with the record of futility until then, that did not happen.  Da196.  Plaintiff moved to dissolve the stay contained in the Sale Objection Order and also asked that any supersedeas bond not be less than $2,500,000.00.  In response to that motion, the Court issued an order dated March 1, 2024 (the “First Stay Continuation Order”).  The First Stay Continuation Order required a supersedeas bond of only $645,000 within one business day of the Stay Continuation Order and provided that its posting would preserve the “stay” (quotes of the court below) granted in the Sale Confirmation Order.  In addition, on the same date, the Court issued a separate order (the “Second Stay Continuation Order”) that (a) set the supersedeas bond amount at $645,000; (b) gave Borrower and [...] sixty days to post the $645,000 supersedeas bond; and (c) stated that “The stay pending the filing by Defendants of their notice of appeal is hereby extended from the date they file their notice of appeal until the final resolution of Defendants' appeal.
[brief] 242 NJ Super 421 (App. Div.); cert. den. 122 NJ 404 (1990).  32 NJSA. 40:55D-65-1 20 NJSA 40:55D-70 (b) 27, 28, 37, 38 NJSA 40:55D-109 26 NJSA 40:55-D-111 20, 32 NLDO 412.22 (C) NLDO 413.06 (F)  “  NLDO §900A 19, 21 NLDO §902, 19, 22  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] THE BOARD’S DENIAL OF WISE’S APPLICATION MADE OVER ONE YEAR AND ONE MONTH PAST THE STATUTORY DEADLINE TO FILE FOR AMENDED BENEFITS IS REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.  The Board’s decision denying [...]’s Eligibility Registration Form under the Ricci Act should be affirmed because it is reasonable and supported by the plain language of N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10, and thus not arbitrary nor capricious.  “On judicial review of an administrative agency determination, courts have but a limited role to perform.
[brief] (Da 31-42).  He found that [...] admitted to posting the video, which was visible to everyone in the chat room, but claimed it was transmitted mistakenly and was intended to be sent to just one person.  (Da 87).  [...] saw the video in the chat room and was disgusted and offended by the "misogynistic" video.  Id.  He stated that "There is no room to doubt that this pornographic video would be regarded as highly offensive, misogynistic, and demeaning to women, to any person of ordinary sensibilities who had the misfortune to view it."
[directive] warrant  PURSUANT when THE substantive considered Degree  Degree Degree IN Degree Degree Degree Degree Degree Degree Disorderly Disorderly Disorderly a Persons Persons Persons Degree whether OR, 2nd 2nd 2nd ADMINISTRATOR, 3rd 3rd 3rd 4th 4th 4th JUDGE actual be regarding degree whether engaging order; to assists promoting force appropriate.
[brief] We are satisfied that none of the arguments raised by defendants warrant an outright reversal of their respective convictions.  Despite this, we are compelled to comment on the trial court's decision to remove the public from the courtroom at the commencement of jury selection.  Defendant [...] argues in Point I of his supplemental pro se brief that the trial court's instructions in this regard violated his right to a public trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article 1, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution.  Before commenting on the rest of the arguments raised by defendants, we are compelled to address this threshold issue.
[brief] Pa84.  Nonetheless, Plaintiffs filed an Order to Show Cause on September 13, 2022.  Pa68.  In the Order to Show Cause, Plaintiffs asserted that they had not yet been paid the amount owed for attorney’s fees plus interest.  However, the checks for same were sent via overnight mail that same day.  Pa239.  Defendants opposed the Order Show Cause, and it was denied by the trial court on November 10, 2022 as being procedurally improper.
[brief] 12  I.  THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IGNORING LONG-STANDING LEGAL STANDARDS FOR AWARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES IN FEE-SHIFTING CASES AND BY ISSUING AN UNEXPLAINED AND INADEQUATELY LOW FEE AWARD.  (Pa9-21)  ........................................  12  A.  The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Apply The Standards For Determining The Lodestar In Fee-Shifting Cases Pursuant To Rendine And Its Progeny And By Flouting State And National Public Policy In So Doing.  (Pa9-21)  ........................................  13  (i)  The trial court failed to set forth a statement of reasons as to how it calculated the lodestar.  (Pa21)  .........................................................  18 (ii)  The trial court’s extremely low and inadequate fee award violates the public policy underlying fee shifting statutes that provide litigants equal access to the courts.  (Pa21)  ........................................  22  B.  The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Its Apparent Embrace Of Defendant’s Argument, In Breach Of The Parties’ Settlement Agreement, That The MMWA Gave It The Discretion To Ignore The Rendine Standards And Reduce Or Eliminate To Almost Nothing The Counsel Fees Requested In Plaintiff's Counsel's Fee Application.  (Pa16-21)  ........................................  24  C.  The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion To The Extent It Embraced Defendant’s Arguments That An Award Of Counsel Fees Under The MMWA Was Governed, Not By The Rendine Standards, But By Defense Counsel’s Subjective Beliefs.  (Pa9-10; Pa16-21; Pa160-175)  .................................................. 31  II.  THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING AND/OR REFUSING TO HOLD ORAL ARGUMENT, DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL’S REQUEST FOR SAME. (Pa9-21; Pa23).