ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] In addition, officers should consider the barricaded individual’s primary language and, if communication is difficult, take reasonable steps to establish communication via the person’s primary language, such as utilizing bi-lingual officers, interpreters, telephonic interpretation/translation services, or community crisis response teams,4 if feasible and appropriate.  Of particular importance is determining whether the subject is wanted for a criminal offense.  If the person is not a wanted person, the officer should consider whether the person is experiencing a behavioral health episode caused by a mental health, substance use or similar crisis.
[brief] Finally, the Court did not make any “ability to pay” determination before entering the Order for fee reimbursement.  Manalapan Realty, L.P., supra, 140 N.J. at 392.  It noted [...]’s opposition that stated he was disabled and on Medicaid.  (3T17)  However, it did not make any findings that he was able to pay.  For these reasons, this Court should vacate the May 23, 2018, and July 13, 2018, Orders related to the fee award.
[brief] As this Court can read in the “First Count” of Plaintiffs’ complaint in the 2015 Action which was dismissed by [...], the prior, dismissed legal malpractice claim alleged that [...] committed malpractice by failing to: a.) timely advise Plaintiffs, in advance of being retained as legal counsel and entering into any negotiations or transactions related to the Pork Chop Hill and Duncan Farms, of Defendants’ past and/or concurrent representation of all the other parties involved in each and every agreement related to the said real estate; b.) timely advise Plaintiffs that the real intended use and beneficiaries of the rezoning and pursued conveyances of Pork Chop Hill and Duncan Farms were not Plaintiffs, but [...], [...], and/or others; c.) timely and properly advise Plaintiffs of the true nature, status, and events of the Duncan Farms and Pork Chop Hill transactions prior to terminating its Agreements with [...] and [...]; d.) timely advise Plaintiffs that they structured, negotiated, and drafted all the contracts pertaining to the pursuit of the purchase, sale, rezoning, and approvals for Pork Chop Hill and Duncan Farms and served as legal counsel to most, if not all, of the other persons and entities involved in the pursuit of said transactions; e.) advise Plaintiffs that [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...] had an interest in the aforesaid real estate transactions and that said individuals and entities would ultimately receive moneys paid by Plaintiffs in pursuit of the aforesaid transactions and developments.  On the other hand, as this Court can read in the Ninth Count of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint in this matter, Plaintiffs allege that [...] committed malpractice by failing to: a) advise Plaintiffs that Defendant Nicholas [...] was the sole member of Defendant [...]; b) advise Plaintiffs that Defendant Nicholas [...] solely, or with Defendant [...], operated Defendant [...], the sham entity to which Plaintiffs were directed by Defendants Nicholas [...] and [...] to make payments in pursuit of the [...]-MTDC Assignment and Releases.  It is self-evident that the previously dismissed claim for legal malpractice in the 2015 Action had absolutely none of the factual predicates of the legal malpractice claim in the Amended Complaint in this matter, and for obvious reason: Plaintiffs did not know and could not have known at the time of the filing of the complaint in the 2015 Action that [...] was Sole Member of [...] and controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity.
[directive] such any concerning information limited with apply may enforcement agency apply, law a otherwise would that acomplaint-summons issuing conviction or pending charge out-of-state an that appears reasonably it if acomplaint-warrant for event, that In firearm. a of use or possession unlawful or violence threatened or actual involves or prosecutor assistant an unless acomplaint-warrant for applying of presumption a be shall there a or Directive, this of 3.2 Section with accordance in consulted general attorney deputy the by authorized is who subsection 3.3.2 to pursuant designated specially officer supervisory that determines Directive, 4 this Section of under presumptions overcome to Prosecutor County In 4.5.9. subsection to pursuant overcome is complaint-warrant by charging of presumption the or violence involve to appear not do convictions or charges pending out-of-state that the event the 4.3, Section to pursuant applies acomplaint-summons issuing of presumption a firearms and in circumstances the of totality the of as part offense out-of-state an consider may prosecutor presumption. that overcome whether to deciding juvenile defendant's of a importance potential the recognize expressly Rules Court recently-amended 20 The a that presumption a overcome to deciding from judge a prohibits 3:3-1(g)
[directive] the [Yes/Si] (L. i. [No/No] crime involves a violation ofN.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(3) (causes or permits child to engage in sexual act that is to be photographed or exhibited), if the crime was committed on or after February I, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4) (photographs or films a child in sexual act), if the crime was committed on or after February I, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(b) (knowingly possessing or knowingly viewing child pornography), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.  I (leader of a child pornography network), if the crime was committed on or after February I, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:34-3 (selling, distributing or exhibiting obscene material to a person under age 18) or an offense involving computer criminal activity in violation of any provision of Title 2C, chapter 20, you will be assessed a mandatory penalty as listed below for each offense for which you pied guilty?
[brief] As a result, the trial court correctly determined, “[Appellants’] arguments that imposing restraints will compel them to violate state and federal law are not persuasive. ” (Da114).  Appellants’ claim that the preliminary injunction would somehow require them to violate the terms of FERPA and NJPRA is particularly weak given that it simply restores the status quo ante—the Original Policy that has been in place since 2019.  (Da99).  Appellants have not pointed to any instance where the Original Policy exposed them to any liability or claim under FERPA or NJPRA.  (Da115).  The State confirmed at oral argument that under the State’s requested relief, Appellants would still be required to supply school records to a parent making a valid request under state or federal law, just as they had presumably been doing prior to the pre-2023 amendment. (Da105; 1T12:18-14:5; 1T58:23-60:1).  In other words, the preliminary injunction does not preclude Appellants from complying with federal and state recordkeeping laws, but rather requires compliance with the LAD.  Appellants can and must do both.  POINT II
[brief] N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c)(2).  The Attorney General and DOBI recognize that being an attorney does not grant a blanket exception from the DACCA; instead, it requires attorney-provided debt adjustment services be provided within the context of a broader attorney-client relationship to fall outside the statutory purview.  Indeed, the [...]’s argument that the statute purports to regulate attorneys’ representation of clients in foreclosure, bankruptcy and collection proceedings, or the conduct of the courts in adjudicating these proceedings does nothing to further their position.  Instead, it demonstrates the wide scope of the exception.  Such debt adjustment activities as part of a representation of a client in a foreclosure, bankruptcy or collections matter fall squarely within the DACCA attorney exception.  Nor do the Attorney General and DOBI dispute the [...]’s contention that, litigation of any dispute in a state or federal court that includes among other things the adjustment of debt, is governed exclusively by the state or federal Rules of Court, respectively.  The DACCA does regulate an attorney whose primary activity is debt adjustment, but as noted in Respondents’ brief and above, this regulation of attorney conduct does not prevent or preclude judicial oversight of attorney conduct.  For these reasons, the DACCA does not regulate debt adjustment services performed by an attorney representing a client in an attorney-client relationship.
[brief] The tax foreclosure  The City filed a large *in rem* tax foreclosure complaint in September 2017.  (Ja97-118).  R. 4:64-7(c) requires the notice of foreclosure to be served on the owner at their address as appears on the last municipal tax duplicate, so the City: (a) reviewed the last municipal tax duplicate; (b) reviewed the vesting deed to the subject property; and (c) ran Lexis searches.  (Ja76¶¶4-7, Ja80-86, Ja87-88, Ja89-91, Ja92-96).  All of these documents and searches revealed that Plaintiff was located at the subject property.  (Ja76¶¶4-7, Ja80-86, Ja87-88, Ja89-91, Ja92-96).  The City thus sent the notice of foreclosure to Plaintiff at the subject property by simultaneous regular and certified mail on October 27, 2017.  (Ja119-127, Ja27- ³ Plaintiff failed to appear, and a bench warrant was issued in October 2016.  (Ja287¶4).  Notice went not only to Plaintiff, but also to Plaintiff’s attorney as appeared on the deed.  (Ja76¶8, Ja28).  The regular and certified mailings addressed to Plaintiff and sent to the subject property were returned marked “vac” for vacant.\(^4\) (Ja77¶9, Ja30-32).  The regular mailing sent to Plaintiff’s attorney was not returned and was presumed delivered.  (Ja77¶9).  The certified mailing to Plaintiff’s attorney was claimed and signed for.  (Ja77¶9, Ja30-32).  In addition, the notice of foreclosure was published and posted in accordance with the relevant Court Rules.  (Ja128-131, Ja132-134, Ja135-140, Ja141-147).  The notice of foreclosure was also physically posted on the subject property.  (Ja148-153).  The schedule of the complaint affecting Plaintiff’s property was uncontested.  (Ja77¶13).  The City applied for final judgment and provided the required proofs.  (Ja77¶13).  Final judgment entered on February 13, 2018, and was served thereafter.  (Ja77¶13, Ja43-62).  On March 16, 2018, and several times thereafter, Plaintiff’s children asked the City whether Plaintiff could pay the back taxes and recover her property; the City declined.  (Ja162#12, Ja167#19).  On June 7, 2018, the City sold the subject property at a public land sale for --- \(^4\)  In discovery, Plaintiff admitted that: (a) she did not set up a mailbox at the property (Ja160#8), (b) she did not set up mail forwarding so that mail addressed to the subject property would be sent to her home address (Ja173#7), and (c) she did not identify her home address as the tax mailing address in the deed to the subject property (Ja174#10).  In fact, Plaintiff never provided the City Tax Office with a tax mailing address different from what was on the vesting deed to the subject property.  (Ja288¶8).  $101,000.  (Ja288¶5, Ja290-296).  The property was in such poor condition that the buyers had to demolish it; the property is currently a vacant lot.  (Ja288¶6).  At the time the final judgment entered, Plaintiff’s delinquency included: $44,300.08 in property taxes, $1,435.03 in unpaid water bills, and $10,000 in vacant property registration fees.  (Ja288¶7, Ja216-17).  C.
[brief] .........................................................................................32  Mathews v. Bay Head Improvement Assoc., 95 N.J. 306 (1984) .........................................................................................15, 16, 20, 21  In re N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination, [...], 433 N.J. Super. 223 (App. Div. 2013) ...............................................................13
[brief] ”  *Ring v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Rutherford*, 110 N.J. Super. 441, 445 (App. Div. 1970); *Bern v. Borough of Fair Lawn*, 65 N.J. Super. 435, 450 (App. Div. 1961).  “If the argument is that a building of smaller dimensions or fewer apartments would not be as profitable, it is fundamental that mere economic hardship is not a sufficient special circumstance upon which to ground a variance. ”  *Hill Homeowners Ass’n v. Zoning Bd. of Adj. of City of Passaic*, 129 N.J. Super. 170, 175 (L. Div. 1974).  In the affordable housing context, the Supreme Court in *Mount Laurel II*, *Southern Burlington County* N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Tp., 92 N.J. 158 (1983), opined “[z]oning does not require that land be used for maximum profitability, and on occasion the goals of zoning may require something less.
[brief] The court instructed the jury on the State’s burden to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew he could have retreated with complete safety.  (6T133-24 to 6T135-2).  If the State did not carry its burden and the jury had reasonable doubt, the court instructed the jury that it was required to resolve the case in defendant’s favor and allow the claim of self-defense and acquit him.  (6T134-4 to 7).  The verdict sheet submitted to the jury contained possible verdicts of guilty or not guilty for aggravated manslaughter, reckless manslaughter, and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose.
[brief] THE VERDICT SHEET MADE MATTERS WORSE, PERMITTING AN ARMED ROBBERY CONVICTION EVEN IF JURORS FAILED TO FIND THAT DAVIS WAS ARMED.  (Not Raised Below)  A.  The Judge Should Have Instructed Jurors That They Could Convict [...] of Second–Degree Robbery  B.  The Judge Erroneously Informed Jurors That [...] Was Guilty of Robbery if He Committed a Theft in the Course of Committing a Theft C.  The Robbery Charge Was Confusing, Because it Was Not Tailored to the Evidence and Created the Possibility that Jurors Determined that [...]' Mother, Rather than [...], Was the Victim D.  The Portion of the Charge Addressing the Issue of “Armed” Robbery was Flawed Because it Did Not Address the Fact That Jurors Were to Consider a Defendant's Intent in Determining Whether a Kitchen Knife Is a Deadly Weapon  E.  The Verdict Sheet Was Deficient Because it Permitted a First–Degree Conviction in the Absence of a Finding That [...] Was Armed with a Deadly Weapon  F.  The Aforementioned Errors Require a Reversal of the Robbery and Conspiracy–to–Rob Convictions
[brief] Consideration of the impact to the public (i.e., the policyholders) should not be dismissed as some intellectual or academic consideration.  Inasmuch as [...] has the right to raise premiums, there must be the backstop to protect the policyholders.  That is why the LTCI Act and rules give the policyholders an important voice in the analysis through the Department’s painstaking task of reviewing premium rate increase requests.
[brief] .............................................................  11  N.J.S.A. 46:8B-1 et seq. ...............................................................  10  N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 ...........................................................................  5 N.J.A.C. 5:26–1.1 et seq.  .............................................................  11 N.J.A.C. 5:26-4.2 .......................................................................  7 N.J.A.C. 11:5-9.5 .......................................................................  12  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Da370.  On April 14, 2023, the trial court (Hon. [...], P.J.Cv.) granted the motion and struck the [...]’s answer without prejudice for failure to make discovery, as it failed to take action to provide the delinquent discovery.  Da18-19.  On June 14, 2023, after having filed their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs served Defendant [...] and Rocco [...]\(^2\) with interrogatories and requests for the production of documents.
[directive] The Barricaded Individual Policy contains provisions requiring that tactical teams and crisis negotiation teams called to respond to barricade situations meet the highest standards for leadership, staffing, capabilities, specialized equipment, initial and ongoing training, and oversight.  The County Prosecutors will play an integral role in ensuring that only teams meeting these high standards will be responding to address the complex issues created by situations involving barricaded individuals.  In addition, the Barricaded Individual Policy will require the inclusion of a consequential new tool in the law enforcement response to barricaded individuals.  Every tactical team responding to a barricade situation, in addition to the inclusion of highly trained crisis negotiators, must include mental health professionals.  These experienced mental health professionals will be selected from mental health screening centers and other providers across the state.  In addition to training with law enforcement, they will be available around the clock to respond along with the tactical teams and crisis negotiators to monitor communications with the barricaded individual and provide advice and assistance designed to resolve the situation peacefully.  The Attorney General’s Office, utilizing part of the recent budget allocation by the state legislature and [...] for expanding the ARRIVE Together program, will be making funds available to support the integration of mental health professionals into tactical and crisis negotiation team responses across the state.
[brief] Strict compliance was not made with the Affidavit of Merit statute because (a) due to Plaintiff having to consent to vacate Defendants’ default, Plaintiff’s Counsel lost track of the timeline for submitting a timely affidavit of merit; (b) Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with requested medical records per N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28; and (c) a Ferreira Conference for this matter was not held and was required to be held per New Jersey Court Rule 4:5B-4 and Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic, 178 N.J. 144, 154 (2003).  Plaintiff has substantially complied with the purpose of the affidavit of merit statute by submitting an untimely Affidavit, which asserts that Plaintiff’s claims are meritorious.
[directive] County Prosecutor’s Offices may also assist with the identification of ARRIVE  Together teams within the county, community crisis response teams or other community-based resources for potential utilization section 4.8.  in Tactical Disengagement situations pursuant to 4.7 Decision to Utilize Resolution Tactics.  Absent exigent circumstances, a decision to employ resolution tactics and/or to enter a structure or area occupied by a barricaded individual, shall be made by the Incident Commander, who shall be designated in accordance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS)7 and Incident Command System (ICS).
[brief] In the case of the latter statute, the Legislature allows the sentencing court some discretion, but the court must make specific findings in order to exercise that discretion.  Where the sentencing court fails to make the necessary findings on the record in support of deviating from the statutorily mandated sentence, this Court has deemed the sentence illegal.  State v. Njango, 463 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2020).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANT FOR THE FULL MEASURE OF THE VERDICT AS MANDATED BY THE JOINT TORTFEASORS CONTRIBUTION LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN MEJIA V. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, INC.  A.  This Court’s review of the Order of Judgment is de novo.  “When no issue of fact exists, and only a question of law remains, [appellate courts afford] no special deference to the legal determinations of the Trial Court. ”  Mejia v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 241 N.J. 360, 370-71 (2020) (quoting Cypress Point Cono. Ass’n, Inc. v. Adria Towers L.L.C., 226 N.J. 403, 415 (2016)).  Because there is no genuine issue of material fact before this Court, de novo review applies to the Trial Court’s ruling executing the Order of Judgment.
[brief] (3T14-15 to 25)  [...] testified that while they were on the porch, “some guy randomly walked down and asked ‘why are you running? Why is everybody running?’  And then he just pulled a weapon out.  So I ran. ”  (3T16-1 to 4)  After hearing shots, [...] returned to the porch and called 9-1-1.  (3T16-5 to 6)  During the 9-1-1 call, which was played to the jury, [...] described the person she saw as a male, “wearing all gray” who “was walking” towards 5th Street, and she noted “[h]e was black.
[brief] Moreover, it is impossible to understand from the record how the Department arrived at its decision to require new public access at [...]’s property, especially in light of (1) the absence of any objective criteria as to what constitutes “unreasonable interference” with the use of the upland area, and (2) the safety and privacy concerns expressed by [...] during the permit application process.  The apparent disregard for the safety and privacy concerns expressed by [...] residents is particularly troubling because, as noted above, the public’s right to access the shoreline under the Public Trust Doctrine is explicitly conditioned on respecting the habitations situated adjacent to tidalways subject to the principle.  By requiring onsite public shoreline access onto, through and across [...]’s residential community, [...] is necessarily infringing upon [...] residents’ quiet enjoyment of and privacy within their homes, and the Department must explain how it reached the conclusion that such access is “reasonable” given this apparent contravention of the Public Trust Doctrine’s most basic tenets.
[brief] (*See* 39135a, 39149a-50a, 39171a-72a).  [...]’s citations purporting to illustrate the Special Master’s granular analysis include exactly **one** citation to the Special Master’s first 2022 report reconsidering the fee award that this Court vacated, and that citation is to the Special Master’s summary of his prior report.  (39036a-37a).  In short, [...] makes the [...]’ point, that the Special Master’s 2022 report essentially affirmed his prior recommendations, vacated by this Court, and did not include the kind of analysis this Court mandated. \(^4\) --- \(^4\)  [...] also makes much of the fact that in the Special Master’s 2013 fee recommendation, the Special Master reduced [...]’s fee award by $100,000 in  Both [...] and [...] take issue with this Court’s prior ruling, arguing that it is inappropriate to limit the fee award to the fees devoted to the RICO claims – the only fee shifting claims in the case.  [...], inexplicably, goes so far as to deny that this Court even held that “compensable work must be limited to that which was ‘reasonably devoted to [[...]’s] pursuit of [his] … RICO claims. ’” ([...]_Pb 68 n.24 (alterations in original)).  [...] seeks application of the Silva rule that would inquire into “the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended in the litigation” ([...]_Pb 32), a different standard from (as the prior remand required) focusing specifically on the “fees and costs reasonably devoted to plaintiffs’ pursuit of their respective RICO claims.
[brief] A director or officer of a corporation does not incur personal liability for its torts merely by reason of his official character, but a director or officer who commits the tort or who directs the tortious act to be done, or participates or cooperates therein, is liable to third persons injured thereby, even though liability may also attach to the corporation for tort.  McGlynn v. Schultz, 95 N.J. Super. 412, 416 (App. Div. 1967); Charles Bloom & Co. v. Echo Jewelers, 279 N.J. Super. 372, 381 (App. Div. 1995) (“Any corporate officer, or director who participates by aid, instigation, or assistance in a conversion, is liable. ”).  This is true even when the conversion was for the benefit of the corporation and directors did not receive the misappropriated funds.  See id.  The trial court found that the [...] received misappropriated monies, either directly or through the other defendant entities.  Under McGlynn, there is little question that both [...] must be liable for the entire judgment amount.