ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] DEFENDANT CITY OF PASSAIC IS NOT SHIELDED BY DISCRETIONARY IMMUNITY (Pa1-7)  Defendant [...] argues that they are shielded by discretionary immunity to allocate their resources as it deems best.  In Sims v. City of Newark, 244 N.J. Super.  32, 36, 581 A.2d 524 (1990), the Sims, plaintiffs “were sitting in a car parked at the curb on the southwest side of Nairn Place near the intersection of Clinton Avenue in Newark when a tree limb fell onto the roof of the car owned by Sarah Sims, damaging the car and causing personal injuries to both plaintiffs. ”  Sims v. City of Newark, 244 N.J. Super. 32, 36, 581 A.2d 524 (1990).  This case centered on whether the defendant City was palpably unreasonable in not inspecting every tree in its city.  However, the case sets forth the steps a plaintiff must undergo to prove liability should be imposed upon a municipality.  In the Sims case, the plaintiff was unsuccessful in their claim and the decision was based upon the fact that “the city does not have financial resources or the manpower to inspect every tree bordering every street in the city.  The city is allowed to fund and use its resources as it deems best in the face of competing demands. ”  Id.  The plaintiff must show that the City acted in a palpably unreasonable manner.  “Specifically, that section provides that a municipality may be held liable for a dangerous condition on its public property, regardless of the cause, but only if the failure to correct that condition is palpably unreasonable. ”  Norris v. Borough of Leonia, 160 N.J. 427, 441, 734 A.2d 762 (N.J. 1999).  Defendant [...], has asserted that the Department of Public Works does not handle mere sidewalk repairs, [...] established the fact that when a sidewalk repair involved a tree root, the Department of Public Works is involved.  (Pa172-193, Tr 22:2-3).  The tree root was shaved down, the only entity to admit they shave tree roots is the defendant [...].  [...] furthered explained “But to me, that looks like a main root, and the whole tree – I would have took the whole tree down before they did the sidewalk. ” (Pa172-193, Tr 48:23-25-49:1).  To shave a main tree root and fail to correct the condition or remove the tree was palpably unreasonable and therefore, no discretionary immunity should be applied to the actions of the defendant [...].
[brief] [...] made statements during his interrogation like, “Ah, well let’s not talk about that part,” “Like I said, we’ll forget about that part,” and “I really can’t talk about stuff like that,” but never stopped talking with police or answering other questions.  *Id.* at 608-10.  The Court found that, “considered in context, defendant’s refusal to answer certain questions was not an attempt to end the dialogue, but rather was ‘part of an ongoing stream of speech,’ which included information” about the crime and the defendant’s familial relationship with the victim.  *Id.* at 623 (quoting *Bradley v. Meachum*, 918 F.2d 338, 342 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1221 (1991)).  “If defendant elects to speak to the police and offers an account of what happened, then he has not remained silent – he has spoken. ”  *Id.* at 624 (citing *State v. Tucker*, 190 N.J. 183, 189 (2007)).  Because defendant had not remained silent, the *[...]* Court found it wholly appropriate that the defendant be questioned about, and the jury consider, facts “omitted” from the defendant’s statement to police.  *Id.* at 623.  In *Feaster*, 156 N.J. at 73-77, our Court addressed how a trial court should address an actual invocation of a constitutional right in a recorded statement to be played before a jury.
[brief] (Addressing Appellant’s Arguments at Ab8-28; Ab53-61.)  There is substantial evidence in the record supporting the [...]’s finding that the proposed Project is reasonably necessary for the service, convenience, and welfare of the public.  The [...]’s determination is entitled to deference and its Order should be affirmed.  The judicial capacity to review administrative agency decisions is limited.  Pub. Serv. Elec. v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’tl. Prot., 101 N.J. 95, 103 (1985).  [...] orders are presumptively valid and should “not be disturbed unless” the court finds “a lack of reasonable support in the evidence.
[brief] . . .  [W]hen you talk about those kinds of things and you talk about say a mitigating factor, how much weight to give a mitigating factor, you look at the totality of it.  How involved has the justice system been in one way, shape, or form with this individual?  And of course we’re talking about Mitigating Factor Seven when we’re talking about that.  Here’s the difference between a person who has never, ever, ever gone afoul of the law even to the point of an accusation to a person who’s dancing through the raindrops, okay, and then finally has one hit.  Okay.  Those are different people, okay.  [(8T73-10 to 75-1)]  The court’s interpretation of [...] is incorrect.
[directive] to with  On an basis, review annual Budget meetings budgets budget which the for Department documents technical budget the Operations creates the develops year.  office fiscal Division for This of the FTE funding subsequent levels each and needs with divisions executive to all of management ensure the Department's and works closely 2 provide guidance initiatives, and of so that availability funding, support Department the Act.  with Appropriations in annual all the accordance funds are spent 2.  which unit.  Facilities shall Management Facilities Management.
[brief] (14T9-9 to 14).  When asked who shot the gun, [...] said “[...]”, defendant’s name.  (6T73-25 to 74-1; 14T5-10 to -11).  He explained that he had known defendant since seventh grade, for approximately six to seven years.  (14T5-12 to 19).  [...] further explained that he saw defendant stick his hand out of the car while holding a gun.  [...] answered “yes” when asked if he got a very good look at defendant.  (14T8-3 to 9-19).  He also stated that he knew defendant by the nickname “[...]. ” (14T12-14 to-18; 14T23-7 to 18).  [...] showed [...] a single photograph of defendant and asked him if he recognized that person.  (6T74-2 to 25; 6T104-22 to 105-3; 14T13-25 to 14-15).  [...] responded by stating “That’s [...]”, and said his real name was “[...]”.  (14T14-3 to 8).  He signed and dated the photo of defendant using the name “[...]”.  (6T73-25 to 74-25; 14T14-9 to -15; 14T23-2 to -19).  Additionally, [...] named “[...]”, later identified as co-defendant [...], as the driver of the Audi. (6T79-24 to 80-11; 14T7-12 to 8-1, 14T20-7 to 21-7; 14T23-20 to -23).  He stated that “[...]” is always with [...].  (14T6-16 to 22).  [...] identified “[...]” as photograph number four from an array shown to him by ECPO [...].  (8T14-4 to 15-24; 14T15-6 to 21-13).  He signed and dated the photo using the name “[...]”.  (8T14-4 to 15-24; 14T17-5 to 21-13).  [...] did not mention face masks during the interview.  (6T80-12 to -16).
[brief] First, an estoppel certificate’s primary function is to affirm certain facts for the purpose of preventing the certifying party from later contradicting those facts.  Estoppel certificate.  1.  A signed statement by a party (such as a tenant or a mortgagee) certifying for another’s benefit that certain facts are correct, such as that the lease exists, that there are no defaults, and that rent is paid to a certain date.  A party’s delivery of this statement estops that party from later claiming a different state of facts.  Black’s Law Dictionary (Abridged Eight ed. 2005).  Unlike due diligence, which involves investigating potential risks or obligations prior to a transaction, the estoppel certificate provides certainty and protection after specific facts are confirmed, safeguarding the recipient against future legal claims by the maker of the certificate.
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[directive] Persons  Actor attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes serious bodily injury, or under 2C:12-1b(1)  Aggravated Assault circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, recklessly causes 2nd Degree $35,000 to $100,000 10% permissible such injury.  18  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.
[brief] See Pa535 at 147:17-148:2.  In fact, [...] stiffed [...]’s retirees on $5,209,900.68 in total EGP payments across thirteen (13) construction projects that [...] transferred to [...].  Pa186 ¶ 111.  Stated differently, [...] not only knew it had a damages claim against [...] on the Hackensack Project years before the parties’ first arbitration (a ripe claim), but [...] weaponized its alleged damages against [...] to avoid paying [...] millions.  B.
[directive] Release  No Domestic Violence or Custody Matters and May 2020 22, 2 of 2  Page restraining order (FRO) including no-contact provisions.  The Family court also of or FN may order visitation in an FD matter.  The absence clear communication in these concurrent matters can negatively affect defendants, victims, families, and It the courts.  potentially causes defendants to violate other orders inadvertently and creates confusion with victims who are unsure what protections are in place.  Judicial fairness dictates that there must be clear and direct instruction in the order restricting contact among parties, especially when a defendant is subject to more than one protection order involving the same victim.  To ensure clear communication, the court shall ensure the following items or are addressed before entering, modifying, vacating a no-contact order:  Court staff has checked available systems, including the Party Court 1. History (PCH) and the CIC-Court Document Search, for co-occurring of of matters with the parties, and informed the judge the results those searches.
[brief] ”).  If not to [...] through the Residuary Clause, then to whom?  There is also an evidentiary point.  [...]’s decision to not specifically bequeath an asset pursuant to other provisions of the Trust is powerful evidence that it should pass through the Residuary Clause.  What happens if there is no clear answer as to [...]’s probable intent?  This just creates an orphaned asset, ironically the very evil a Residuary Clause exists to avoid.  No doubt, [...] has a plan.  With the interest removed from the Residuary Clause, the way will be clear for him to press his own claim, no matter how weak.  He will, after all, be able to argue that the asset must go somewhere.  With [...] precluded from asserting a claim, he probably will not even need to present his case to a judge.  This is a situation ripe for abuse.  [...]’s intent from the face of the Trust is clear.
[brief] Plain error must be ‘sufficient [to raise] a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result that it otherwise might not have reached. ’”  State v. Feal, 194 N.J. 293, 312 (2008) (quoting *State v. Daniels*, 182 N.J. 80, 102 (2004); *State v. Macon*, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971)); *State v. Papasavvas*, 163 N.J. 565, 625 (2000) (“Generally, if no objection was made to the [purportedly] improper remarks, the remarks will not be deemed prejudicial.
[directive] Thus, if there 2  The text of this subsection of the statute refers to an arrest for a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a.  That statute, however, is only the penalty enforcement provisions, imposed upon conviction for refusal to submit to chemical breath testing, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2.  Refusal to submit to chemical breath testing is a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2.  -3-  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-1 - APPENDIX B - GUIDELINES
[brief] The United States Supreme Court has held that prisoners have the right to petition for redress of grievances, which includes access to the courts for purposes of presenting their complaints.  *Ex parte Hull*, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); *White v. Ragen*, 324 U.S. 760 (1945).  *Bounds v. Smith*, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).  Here, plaintiff was clearly denied access to the Courts while incarcerated.
[brief] Given that [...] had misinformed and deceived Plaintiff by claiming it was unable to close and unambiguously signaled its intention not to perform under the PSA, Plaintiff had a right to demand the immediate return of its deposit, while preserving its express right under the PSA, to also demand specific performance, if and when [...] ultimately closed on the transaction with the Fee Owner (which it did).  The trial court’s construction incorrectly gave [...] supremacy and unilateral control, and nullified Plaintiff’s contractual right to compel [...]’s specific performance of the PSA, even though [...] is the party who reneged upon its contractual obligations under the PSA by announcing its intention not to perform.  (Pa7-8, Complaint, ¶¶ 27-30).  Once again, this is an untenable construction of the parties’ contract.  See Russell, 50 N.J. at 38.
[brief] 33  LONG BRANCH CITY ORDINANCE § 345-98  LAWFULLY REQUIRES THE CONSENT OF ALL REDEVELOPERS WITHIN THE REDEVELOPMENT AREA BEFORE THE REDEVELOPMENT PLAN CAN BE AMENDED (Pa59 to Pa61)  A.  Section 345-98  Appropriately Requires the Consent of All Designated Developers Within the Redevelopment Plan Area..........................................................................................................................  33  B.  The Lower Court  Erred .................................................................................  35 POINT III .................................................................................................................. 38  THE REDEVELOPMENT PLAN AMENDMENT, INsofar AS IT ELIMINATES ANY DENSITY REQUIREMENT AND RELIEVES  290  OCEAN OF RESTRICTIONS APPLICABLE TO EVERY OTHER PROPERTY IN THE REDEVELOPMENT AREA, IS SPOT ZONING (Pa61 to Pa64)  A.  There is No Reason to Immunize a Land Use Decision With Regard to Property Within a Redevelopment Area From a Spot Zoning Analysis..............................................................................  39  B.  The Court Erred When It Declined to Consider Plaintiff’s Expert Testimony.................................................................................................  42  C.  The Evidence Viewed in a Light Most Favorable to Plaintiff Reveals that the Elimination of the Density Limitation and the Increase in Allowable Height Constitutes Spot Zoning .....................................................................................  43  CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................
[directive] 5.  Divulgación en el Internet Internet Posting  a)  ¿Entiende usted que como resultado de su condena, pueden estar públicamente disponibles en [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  Internet su nombre y apellido, edad, raza, sexo, fecha de nacimiento, estatura, peso, color de los ojos, cualquier cicatriz o tatuaje distintivo que tenga, su fotografía, la marca, el modelo, el color, año y número de la placa de cualquier vehículo que opere, la dirección, código postal, municipio y condado en que reside y una descripción del delito del que se está declarando culpable?
[brief] *Ibid.* at 21.  Other proof may relate to substantial changes to the character of the neighborhood since the adoption of the ordinance or a demand for a use not anticipated when the ordinance was last revised.  *Ibid.* fn 11.  See also *Saddle Brook Realty, LLC v. Township of Saddle Brook Zoning Bd. of Adj.*, 388 N.J. Super. 67, 79 (App. Div. 2006).  9.  As has been noted, when a use variance is sought, an enhanced qualify of proof is required that the use is not inconsistent with the Master Plan and Zoning Ordinance, which must reconcile the proposed use with the Ordinance’s omission of the use as being permitted in the zone.
[brief] One denied the application for attorney’s fees.  The Law Division erroneously found that plaintiffs & their counsel did not engage in frivolous litigation by attempting to invalidate Appellant’s judgment or subordinate it to their previously merged & discharged mortgage.  However, the record abundantly shows that when such judgment was to be paid, in 2022, from the sale proceeds of the subject property, this Court had held that the judgment lien had not been extinguished or invalidated.  The record also showed that, at that time, plaintiffs no longer had a mortgage as it had merged into their 2008 foreclosure judgment & 2016 Deed in lieu of Foreclosure (“DIL”).  Moreover, Plaintiffs had executed & recorded, in 2016, a Discharge of their mortgage.  Plaintiffs surreptitiously concealed this Discharge from all courts below & even this Court during the 2022 appeal—the fourth of five appeals for plaintiffs in this case.  Below  Plaintiffs did not cite any authority whatsoever to overcome these undisputed facts & long-standing legal principles or even to make a good faith argument for an extension of the law.  What plaintiffs did instead was to seek the sympathy of the court by asserting that they elected not to proceed with a sheriff sale but instead accepted a Deed in lieu of Foreclosure.  Then the private sale of the property did not yield a payoff of the amount due under the foreclosure judgment.  In other words, plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to punish an innocent judgment creditor for plaintiffs’ own business decisions.  The primary basis of the judge denying fees was that Appellant was pro se.  Nevertheless, there is no reported decision denying statutory fees to a pro se who prevails over frivolous litigation.  To deny fees will send the wrong message that a party &/or his counsel can litigate, in utter bad faith, without consequence.  There should have been some consequence imposed below, which could have included the imposition of compounding the interest due to satisfy Appellant’s 2005 judgment.  In this later regard, another order that should be reversed is the denial of compounded interest.  Had it been granted it would have produced a recovery of about $10,000 more than simple interest did.  This still would have been substantially less than the approximate $40,000 in time Appellant spent litigating this case, of which amount neither the court nor plaintiffs challenged.  However, the court did not express a reason or rationale or a correct one in its decision denying compounded interest.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] APPELLANT PLED  THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF RETALIATION  WHICH RESULTED FROM APPELLANT ENGAGING IN PROTECTED ACTIVITY WHICH INVOLVED VIOLATION OF THE SCHOOL POLICY WHICH PROHIBITS DISCRIMINATION, YET THE TRIAL COURT SPENT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME REJECTING THIS CAUSE OF ACTION  Pa294, Pa385, Pa394  The prima facie elements under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination for retaliation are: (1) The Plaintiff was in a protected class; (2) The Plaintiff engaged in protected activity known to the employer; (3) The Plaintiff thereafter was subjected to an adverse employment action; (4) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment consequence.  Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 409 (N.J. 2010)  See also Carmona v. Resorts Int’l. Hotel, Inc. 189 N.J. 354, 371-373 (2007).  See also Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 284 N.J. Super. 543, 548-49 (App. Div. 1995).  Plaintiff only needs to show that retaliation could be the reason for the employer’s actions which requires only a modest showing by the Plaintiff.  Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 447 (2005).  Appellant engaged in protected activity because she was involved as was [...] in addressing the issue where [...] repeatedly uttered the N word in her classroom to the objection of the students and her behavior was recorded by the students and presented to Appellant and [...].  Appellant met with the students and another teacher, [...] who presented the issue to Appellant along with the students.
[brief] In addition, the Court has recognized that a passion/provocation charge can be an appropriate complement to an instruction on self-defense.  It has explained that where, as here, a jury rejects self-defense, it might well find that the decedent’s conduct nevertheless constituted adequate provocation to satisfy the lesser passion/provocation-manslaughter offense.  See *State v. Bowens*, 108 N.J. 622, 634, 641 (1987) (where jury finds “shooting to ______________________ passion/provocation had been instructed at the first trial.  (5T 101-6 to 12)  The judge then immediately (and correctly) abandoned that line of reasoning/inquiry and moved on to the question of whether the evidence contained a rational basis for an instruction on passion/provocation manslaughter.  As argued here in this point, she then resolved that latter question erroneously.  (5T 115-18 to 118-24) kill an unarmed attacker who has fallen to the ground” was not self-defense, it may find passion/provocation).  Indeed, in Carrero, the Court upheld the reversal of a murder conviction for just that reason, in circumstances very close to the instant matter.  In that case, the defense was self-defense, but the trial judge improperly refused a request to charge passion/provocation manslaughter, and the Court held that the jury could have returned a passion/provocation-manslaughter verdict under either of two theories: (1) that the decedent drew a gun, after which there was a tussle over the gun and the defendant shot the decedent, or (2) that there simply was “a physical struggle” between the two men and defendant over-responded to that struggle -- which itself constituted a “battery” -- and shot the decedent.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT .........................................................................................22  POINT I ..............................................................................................................22  THE SUPERIOR COURT APPLIED  THE PROPER STANDARD BELOW (Pa001024–1031)  .................................................................22  POINT II ..........................................................................................................24  THE MSRA EXPLICITLY AUTHORIZES THE UNILATERAL MODIFICATION OF CONTRACTS AND THE SUPERIOR COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO ALLEGE ANY ACTIONABLE CONDUCT  POINT III ..................................................................................................................28  THE SUPERIOR COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED  PLAINTIFFS’ CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS AFTER FINDING THE MSRA PRECLUDES THE RELIEF SOUGHT (Pa001028–1031) .................................................................28
[brief] (Da 7-9)  On the same day, defendant pleaded guilty to Count Six of [...], second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, pursuant to a plea agreement.  (Da 10-11)  On June 30, 1997, defendant was sentenced on [...] to a term of 7 years with a 3-year parole bar concurrent to the sentence imposed on [...].  (Da 10-11)  On March 29, 2002, defendant was again arrested.
[brief] See, e.g., Savage v. Twp. of Neptune, 472 N.J. Super. 291, 306 (App. Div. 2022), rev’d on other grounds, 2024 WL 2002418 (N.J. May 7, 2024) (citation omitted).  [See also Db8].  While the parties also agree that “[s]trong public policy favors settlement of litigation in New Jersey,” [...] relies upon Borough of Haledon v. Borough of N. Haledon, 358 N.J. Super. 289, 305 (App. Div. 2003) for the ostensible proposition that “[c]ompelling circumstances can preclude the denial of a motion to enforce a settlement agreement.