ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Id.* at 522.  Based upon the foregoing, all elements of collateral estoppel have been satisfied here.  First, the issue as to the allegedly forged assignments and allegedly forged Affidavit of Lost Note was raised, considered and rejected by the state court prior to entering judgment.  Second, this issue was actually litigated below as can be seen from the fact that Plaintiff obtained an Order for Summary Judgment which struck Defendant’s Answer, Counterclaim and Separate Defenses (Pa 18-19).  Third, a Final Judgment of Foreclosure was entered by the Superior Court of New Jersey on September 3, 2019 (Pa 22-24).
[brief] (Sa234-292).  At the time, [...] and his partners had opened [...] locations in New Brunswick, New Jersey; Syracuse, New York; Albany, New York; and in Chelsea in Manhattan.  In each of these prior agreements, [...] had either an equal ownership interest or an interest slightly reduced due to the number of partners.  In no instance was [...] a five percent (5%) partner.  In New Jersey, he acknowledged that his interest had to be less than the managing partner, [...], due to conflicts created by [...] owning other bars, so it was always his understanding that the split would be 40/30/30 in New Brunswick and Hoboken split between [...], [...], and [...] respectively.  That arrangement was memorialized in a Principal Owner’s Guaranty.  (Sa294-296).
[brief] (Pl. Tr. 142:4-9; 44:1-15).  Furthermore, Plaintiff testified that when she felt [...] made changes to the schedule that affected her, Plaintiff did not tie that action to her age or race; rather, she believed that the changes “might have been just pertaining to [the] grades” that she was in charge of, (Pl. Tr. 145:1-14).  With regard to scheduling changes for which Plaintiff was not provided advance notice, she testified she complained to [...] that she disagreed with the decisions made, but she denied ever advising him that she felt [...] was singling her out in any way.  (Pl. Tr. 148:25 to 150:2).  With regard to allegations that [...] gave her increased assignments, Plaintiff admitted that her workload and responsibilities increased the longer she was employed with [...] after she had a chance to acclimate, as would be expected with any position.  (Pl. Tr. 106:17 to 107:1).  As for [...] asking her to complete observations on additional staff and reassigning work to Plaintiff that were either his or others’ responsibilities, she admitted that the job description for her position as Vice Principal indicated that one of her duties would be to “complete additional assignments as directed by the principal” and that she would also be responsible for “[p]erforming other duties which may be assigned by his/her superior(s) under authority of the Board of Education.
[brief] the [...].  There was no such genuine vacancy prior to the expiration date of Appellant’s eligibility, so the eligibility expired.  In its February 2, 2023 letter, [...] advised the City that anticipated vacancies were not considered “genuine” for purposes of extending the expiration of the eligibility list.  (Pa. 66).  Until that point, the City had a genuine, good-faith past practice of initiating the promotion process for Fire Captains one (1) to two (2) months in advance of “expected vacancies,” since that is how long its internal screening, promotion, and interview process took.  (Pa. 71).  The City undertook this practice to ensure that there were no gaps in service wherein they would be understaffed of Fire Captains, and/or incur significant financial obligations by staffing fire captain openings with officers on overtime.  Once notified that it was not permitted to promote Fire Captains to fill anticipated vacancies by way of [...]’s February 2, 2023 letter, the City advised [...] that the Certification was requested in order to fill vacancies which were expected to be created on February 1, 2023 and March 1, 2023, and that no “genuine vacancies” existed prior to January 16, 2023.  (Pa. 71).  The City then returned the Certification without making any appointments, and on February 16, 2023, a new eligibility list for Fire Captain for the [...] was promulgated.  (Id.)  The City then met with each effected fire fighter from the expired eligibility list and explained the situation and that they would not be promoted, as their eligibility for promotion had expired and the City was not permitted to extend it.  In denying Appellant’s appeal, the [...] determine that N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b) was not unfairly enforced against Appellant by distinguishing the situation concerning [...] and [...].
[brief] Develop a transition plan to a fully electrified building sector.  [Ha442, HOLM-18 at 6.  (emphasis added)]  ***  5.4  Maintain existing gas pipeline system reliability and safety while planning for future reductions in natural gas consumption 5.4.1  Develop a planning process to quantify and analytically assess the need for future expansion of the gas system and take appropriate action 5.4.2  Instruct gas public utilities to propose and adopt non-pipeline solutions when seeking expansion or upgrade of the distribution system 5.4.3  Evaluate and support innovative efforts to decarbonizes the state's energy system, and perform a study of regulatory and programmatic mechanisms that support, incentivize, or otherwise bolster the natural gas industry to determine if continued support aligns with state goals 5.4.4
[brief] The admitted three-hour in-person meeting in *O Builders*, which addressed the prospective client's business history and pending legal disputes, was insufficient to support a disqualification.  Similarly, the phone call(s), documents of public record and innocuous emails at issue here cannot either.  Simply put, [...] contested the veracity of what he believed to be [...]'s claims.  The trial court purported not to consider the [...] Certification.
[brief] Respondent is the owner of Block 27, Lot 45 in the Township of East Amwell, New Jersey (the “Challenger Lot”), having acquired it from [...] (the “[...]”) in December 2020 for $202,000.00 (Da509 at ¶2).  Challenger Lot has no frontage to a public street and is completely landlocked (Da511 at ¶16).  Respondent’s sole owner is [...] (“[...]”) (Da508).  At the time Respondent acquired Challenger Lot, [...] inquired of the [...] as to how they accessed the property and was told by way of an existing roadway across the lands owned by the defendants (Da511 at ¶14).  The roadway can be seen from the street, appears on surveys, and has been used consistently, albeit sparingly, by the owners of the Challenger Lot over the years (Da511-512 at ¶¶ 15, 16, 17).  Mr. [...] is a lifelong resident of Hunterdon County (Da510 at ¶13).  He purchased Challenger Lot with the intention of demolishing the existing structures and constructing a new single family home to serve as his family’s primary residence (Da510 at ¶13).
[brief] [PA514; Pa118-133].  On that same day, Plaintiffs’ counsel served and docketed a letter asking the Landlord to provide Plaintiffs with a list of all tenants at the strip mall as of March 16, 2017, along with copies of their leases.  [Pa514; 206-208].  When the Landlord did not respond to that letter, Plaintiffs formalized their demand through written interrogatories and document demands.  [Pa514; 209-213].  As the Court can see by a review of the docket, the Landlord repeatedly thumbed its nose at these demands for the leases and a list of tenants -- requiring an enormous amount of effort on the part of the Plaintiffs, and a number of motions, in order to obtain this information.  In response to a written interrogatory asking the identity of any other potentially liable party, the Landlord identified a single party: [...] (the “Landscaper”), which was identified as the snow and ice removal contractor.  [Pa514-515; 214-226]  On October 15, 2018, Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to add the Landscaper.  [Pa214-226].  It turns out, however, that this answer provided in discovery by the Landlord was materially incorrect.
[directive] Clarifies that investigations of firearm discharges are subject to the Independent • Prosecutor Directive (AG Directive 2019-4).  The revised codifies the existing IAPP requirement that all initial investigations of firearms discharges are generally conducted by County Prosecutors or, in cases of discharges resulting in fatalities, the Attorney General.  § 7.11.4.  Any public statements by a law enforcement agency regarding the conduct of officers involved in such discharges must be approved by the County Prosecutor or Attorney General.  § 7.11.3.
[brief] An appellate court has “no jurisdiction to decide the merits” of an untimely appeal.  Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 565 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting In re Hill, 241 N.J. Super. 367, 372 (App. Div. 1990)).  Final agency action must be appealed within forty-five days of service or notice of a decision.  R. 2:4-1(b).  Only a motion to extend the time to appeal by thirty days can enlarge the 45-day period.  R. 2:4-4(a).  With the extension, the “outer limit for filing the appeal” is seventy-five days from notice of the decision.  In re Hill, 241 N.J. Super. at 371.  Alternatively, a reconsideration application tolls the time to appeal.  R. 2:4-3(b).  [...] correctly determined that [...]’s “request for an adjudicatory hearing on the May 19, 2017 Permit is time barred by N.J.A.C. 7:7-28.1(b) and thus mandatorily denied. ” (Aa134).  The [...] Initial Extension WFD Permit decision was final on or about June 3, 2017 and yet [...] took no steps to challenge the decision at that time.  Accordingly, this court does not have jurisdiction to hear [...]’s challenge to [...]’s 2017 Permit Modification WD Permit.
[directive] Trainin~quirements.  In-Service That Other Courses C.  Qualifying Satisfy may be used to satisfy the in-service education course also qualifying continuing in a Participation 1, re-qualification see note semiannual firearms process, associated with the training requirements police use of or techniques or course to the force continuing education relates the provided that course instruction also may Participation in a qualifying of use force.  strategies to avoid the need to in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-20a(2), see note 1, provided forth training requirements set satisfy the be used to violence duping domestic relates to interactions with persons education course the continuing that involving of the elderly or disabled the abuse investigations, or events or investigations or incidents training the in-service shall construed to excuse or reduce paragraph be persons.
[brief] 1 v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 622 F.Supp.3d 118 (D. Md. 2022)  ........................................................ passim  [...]  1 v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 78 F.4th 622 (4th Cir. 2023)  ..................................................................  25 L.W. ex rel. L.G. v. Toms River Reg’l Sch. Bd. of Educ., 189 N.J. 381 (2007)  ..............................................................................  4, 17 McKenzie v. Corzine, 396 N.J. Super. 405 (App. Div. 2007)  ....................................................  28 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) ............................................................................. 34  Mirabelli v. Olson, No., 23-768, __ F.Supp.3d __, 2023 WL 5976992 (S.D. Cal., Sept. 14, 2023) ..................................................................... 35 N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Boro Auto Wrecking Co., No. A-4920-04T3, 2006 WL 3007394 (App. Div. Oct. 24, 2006)..................43  N.J. State Policeman’s Benevolent Ass’n v. Murphy, 470 N.J. Super. 568 (App. Div. 2022).................................................49  Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 2000)....................................................................30  Nini v. Mercer Cnty. Cmty. Coll., 202 N.J. 98 (2010).....................................................................................41  Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 77 N.J. 55 (1978)....................................................................................... passim Pfaus v. Palermo, 97 N.J. Super. 4 (App. Div. 1967).............................................................. passim Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).....................................................................................34
[brief] [W]e try to save some people too”; and “I wanna help you.  Like, that’s 100 percent man to man, no cop sh*t.  . . .  I wanna help you.  We all wanna help you. ”  (1T 98-21 to 100-4; Da 109, 04:43:30 to 04:50:00)  [...] said he was “t[ir]ed as hell.  Ready to go the f**k home,” prompting another break; indeed, during every break, he rested his head in his hands and on the table.  (1T 101-15 to 22; Da 109, 01:31:28 to 07:11:25)
[brief] If CAS is unable to arbitrate a particular claim, then that claim shall be resolved by binding arbitration pursuant to the Construction Rules of Arbitration of the American Arbitration Association or its successor or an equivalent organization selected by Seller.  In addition, Buyer agrees that Buyer may not initiate any arbitration proceeding for any Claim(s) unless and until Buyer has first given Seller specific written notice of each claim (at [...], Attn: Warranty Dispute Resolution) and given Seller a reasonable opportunity after such notice to cure any default, including the repair of the Unit, in accordance with the Unit warranty.  The provisions of this section shall be governed by the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, et seq. and shall survive settlement.
[brief] The instructions told the jury: there was nothing unlawful about either tattoo; having either tattoo in general is not evidence of guilt by itself and did not mean Defendant was a bad person or likely to commit crime; the State alleged the Loyalty is Royalty tattoo was evidence that Defendant and [...] engaged in a conspiracy and that the teardrops tattoo was evidence of Defendant’s consciousness of guilt; that Defendant “may, but is not required, to offer an alternative explanation for the” tattoos; and “if you accept any alternative explanation offered by the defense for the [tattoos], then you may not consider said tattoo for any purpose and you shall completely disregard it in your deliberations. ”  (30T254-3 to 259-18; 39T32-1 to 37-7)  Defendant did not testify or present any evidence to offer any alternative explanation for the tattoos.  The court made both an evidentiary and an instructional error with respect to the tattoo testimony.  First, the court’s instructions to the jury to weigh the credibility of the State’s proffered inculpatory explanation for the tattoos against Defendant’s non-existent counter-explanation invited the jury to ask why Defendant has not offered a counter-explanation and made it more likely they would accept the State’s explanation, thereby violating due process by diluting the State’s burden of proof, shifting the burden to Defendant, and burdening Defendant’s choice to remain silent at trial.
[brief] Again, this is not a basis on which the Borough relied for the designation.  Plaintiff focuses on this portion of criterion (b) because it requires the vacancies to be for two years, allowing it to argue that because the Property had been used for illegal storage less than two years ago, criterion (b) cannot be met.  (T3, 7:7-8:5).  The Borough, however, found that there was a discontinuance of use, not significant vacancies.
[brief] 1T123:3-20.  [...] affirmed in her testimony that she owes a lot of people a lot of money (1T123:19-24), attorneys, family, and friends (1T124:1-2).  She owes her friend [...] approximately $30,000.  She owes [...] $200,000; [...] $6,000; [...] $5,000; [...], her brother, $30,000; her parents $20,000 to $30,000.  1T124:20-126:4.  [...] is “maxed out” on her credit cards.  She owes [...] $50,000; [...] $20,000, and [...] Mastercard $5,000.  1T124:3-4; 1T126:15-25.  All of this record \(^{10}\)  [...] said “defendant did receive support from plaintiff on a de facto basis for the two- and one-half years” the parties continued living together in their home after the Final Judgment of Divorce was entered.  That was not support for a separated spouse qualifying as pendente lite relief, and did not remedy the substantive inequity of the denial of even limited duration alimony.  evidence shows the substantive unfairness of the equitable distribution and alimony provisions effectuated by the divorce judgment, see, e.g., D.M.C. v. K.H.G., 471 N.J. Super. 10, 30 (App. Div. 2022) (noting equitable distribution is “designed to advance the policy of promoting equity and fair dealing between divorcing spouses”) (citing Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18, 45 (App. Div. 2011)).  C.  [...]’s Errors
[brief] [...] denied coverage of the fee award by letter dated March 5, 2021, stating:  Based on the information now known to us, including plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of the damages claims and the Court’s orders and decisions sets forth above, we have determined that there is no obligation to defend Defendants in the Lawsuit or the associated appeal, and that there is no coverage for the Lawsuit and, in turn, the Award.  As set forth below, there is no longer a “suit” seeking “those damages” set forth in the insuring agreement.  Therefore, please be advised that we are ceasing reimbursement for defense costs and expenses incurred by independent defense counsel in the Lawsuit at this time.  We request that independent defense counsel submit a final invoice for costs of defending the Lawsuit as of March 15, 2021.  We confirm our understanding that defense counsel will remain counsel of record for Defendants and will direct further requests for payment to Defendants.
[directive] 4.  b.  El derecho a guardar silencio?  [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  The right to remain silent?  [Sí/Yes]  [No/No] c.  El derecho a carearse con los testigos en su contra?  The right to confront the witnesses against you?  usted no renuncia d.  ¿Entiende que al declararse culpable a su derecho a apelar (1) la denegación [Sí/Yes] [No/No] de un pedimento para excluir pruebas físicas (R. 3:5-7(d)) o (2) la denegación de admisión a un programa de intervención antes del juicio (PTI) (R. 3:28(g))?  you are not waiving  Do you understand that by pleading your right to appeal (1) the denial of a motion to suppress physical evidence (R. 3:5-7(d)) or (2) the denial of acceptance into a pretrial intervention program (PTI) (R. 3:28(g))?  usted renuncia a e.
[brief] Counsel for Defendant [...] took the position that such questioning was not permitted based upon the holding in State v. Lavrik, 472 N.J. Super. 192, 215-217 (App. Div. 2022), which held the conviction is “inactive” and “non-evidential” pending defendant’s completion of his pre-trial term and does not constitute a judgment of conviction or an adjudication, and, thus, plaintiffs’ counsel should not be permitted to question him about the same unless he violates his PTI terms and the conviction gets entered.  [Da306- Da324]  The trial court disagreed, interpreting Lavrik to mean defendant [...]’s guilty plea and plea allocution was not evidential until after he completes PTI and his criminal charge is dismissed.
[brief] The DACCA does not license, regulate nor supervise attorneys.  Under the DACCA, only non-profit entities can obtain a license and thus be subject to the Department’s supervision.  See N.J.S.A. 17:16G-2(a) (“No person other than a nonprofit social service agency or a nonprofit consumer credit counseling agency shall act as a debt adjuster”) and -2(b) (“It shall be unlawful for any nonprofit social service agency or nonprofit consumer credit counseling agency to act as a debt adjuster without first obtaining a license from the Commissioner of the Department of Banking pursuant to this Act.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM: Superior Court-Chancery Division, Warren County [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], A.J.S.C.  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT [...] Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq.  (ID# 029861991)  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (ID# 379222021)  Date of Submission: September 6, 2023 #
[directive] Accepting Reports of Officer Misconduct 5.0.1  Every law enforcement agency shall establish a policy providing that any complaint from a member of the public is readily accepted and fully and promptly investigated.  Allegations of officer misconduct or complaints of inappropriate behavior can alert the law enforcement executive to problems that require disciplinary action or identify the need for remedial training.  In addition, executives must also recognize that complaints from the public provide them with an invaluable source of feedback.  Such complaints, whether substantiated or not, increase the executive's awareness of both actual or potential problems and the community's perceptions and attitudes about police practices and procedures.  The executive should use complaints from the public as one means of determining whether the agency is falling short of its intended goals.  5.1  Accepting Reports  Alleging Officer Misconduct  5.1.1  All complaints of officer misconduct shall be accepted from all persons who wish to file a complaint, regardless of the hour or day of the week.  This includes reports from anonymous sources, juveniles, undocumented immigrants, and persons under arrest or in custody.  Internal affairs personnel, if available, should accept complaints.  If internal affairs personnel are not available, supervisory personnel should accept reports of officer misconduct, and if no supervisory personnel are available, complaints should be accepted by any law enforcement officer.  At no time should a complainant be told to return at a later time to file their report.  5.1.2  Members of the public should be encouraged to submit their complaints as soon after the incident as possible.  If the complainant cannot personally appear at the agency to file the complaint, a member of the agency, preferably a member of the internal affairs function, should visit the complainant at their home, place of business or other location if necessary to complete the report.  Law enforcement agencies are encouraged to establish systems to enable complaints to be accepted by telephone or by email if a complainant does not wish to be interviewed in person or wishes to remain anonymous.  Under no circumstances shall it be necessary for a complainant to make a sworn statement to initiate the internal affairs process.  Furthermore, every police agency shall accept and investigate anonymous complaints.  5.1.3  The internal affairs investigator, supervisor or other officer receiving the complaint will explain the agency's disciplinary procedures to the person making the complaint.  The officer shall advise the complainant that he or she will be kept informed of the status of the complaint, if requested, and its ultimate disposition.  To best accomplish this, the agency shall prepare a fact sheet or brochure that includes information on the agency's internal affairs process and what role the complainant can expect to play.  If feasible, the fact sheet or brochure should be provided to the complainant at the time the complaint is made.  A sample fact sheet is found in Appendix A.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 19 5.1.4
[directive] Training of Internal Affairs Personnel  4.3.1  Each agency shall ensure that officers assigned to the internal affairs function complete training as mandated by the Division of Criminal Justice.  4.3.2  Each County Prosecutor shall ensure that each agency within the Prosecutor’s jurisdiction implement and maintain a system of ensuring appropriate training for all personnel involved in the agency’s internal affairs function.  4.3.3  The Division of Criminal Justice shall conduct periodic “train-the-trainer” courses for all persons assigned responsibility for internal affairs training within the County Prosecutor’s Offices.  These trainers shall be responsible to train the internal affairs officers of agencies within their jurisdiction of the County Prosecutor.  18  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021  5