ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...], Plaintiff/Respondent, v. [...], its agents, servants, employees, [...], [...], [...], [...], "ABC CORP. 1-5" and/or "JOHN DOE" 1-5 and/or "JANE DOE 1-5" (the last three being fictitious designations), Defendants/Appellants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION CIVIL ACTION  DOCKET NO.: [...]
[directive] Compliance Verification: ☐ ☐  1.  Does defendant have the ability to verify they are located at their residence Yes No upon request?  This may be done using a device capable of video calling, or sending a picture through email or text message.  ☐ ☐  2.  Is the defendant willing to comply with requests to verify their location, Yes No including random remote video/telephone checks?  Employment Information (only to be used for HDLE):
[brief] The trial court’s decision admitting [...]’s statement must be reversed.  The trial court’s error in failing to suppress the statement was not harmless.  Although [...] did not confess, his statement was critical to the State’s circumstantial case.  The State failed to present any evidence showing [...] was ever present in New Jersey on or near the dates of the incidents; in fact, all credit card, cell phone, and toll records collected by the State established [...] was not present in New Jersey during this time.  The State’s case rested entirely on the claim that [...] had a motive to commit the crimes because of his anger at his mother and her family, although the State’s own witnesses established that [...]’s father and brother -- who actually lived in New Jersey at the time -- both shared this motive.  The video of the statement, which showed [...] discussing his estrangement from his mother’s family and his belief that they owed him money, was a critical piece of the State’s tenuous case.  (17T:84-14 to 88-24)  Because detectives did not answer [...]’s questions about the availability of counsel or clarify if he wished to invoke his right to counsel, his statement “should have been excluded at trial” and his convictions must be reversed.  Gonzalez, 249 N.J. at 632.
[brief] That was not part of the parties’ historical practices and was clearly a wrongful action on the part of [...].  [...] testified that his checking account # 4330 was opened at the [...] office with ownership, check writing privileges, money transfers all belonging exclusively to [...]:  Q  All right.  Is Exhibit 26 a set of Bank of America statements for your account ending in 4330?  A  That is correct.  And account 4330 has and is and has always been in my name alone as the user of that account.  Only me always.  Q  And when you say user, do you mean the owner of that account?  A  I'm the owner, I'm the one that writes checks, I'm the one that puts in deposits.  I am everything on that account, nobody else.  Nobody but nobody, regardless of what [...] has to say as to the ownership of this account, ever.  [16T74-4-1].
[brief] Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not even allege that her request to take PTO was ultimately denied, instead alleging that Defendants [...] and [...] mistakenly conveyed to Plaintiff that she did not have any PTO and that this mistake was later corrected by [...].  (See PA000009-10 at ¶¶ 45-47)  As suggested in *Robinson* and its supporting case law, even if Plaintiff alleged that her PTO denial was in some way motivated by protected activity, that would not be sufficient to support a CEPA claim.  Ultimately, the alleged facts do not demonstrate conduct “sufficiently severe or pervasive to have altered plaintiff's conditions of employment in an important and material manner” and Plaintiff’s allegations cannot form the basis of an adverse employment action.
[brief] Further, when the Hood Lawsuit settled in September 2019, the DJ Action was in suit and the issue of [...]’s alleged CCIP enrollment remained in dispute.  [...] may attempt to distinguish *Palisades*, 469 N.J. Super. 30, arguing there was no mistake of fact (only a mistake of law) in that case.  But, like the paying insurer in *Palisades*, [...] had no mistake of fact when it made a settlement payment because it knew [...] had disclaimed coverage to [...] under the CCIP based on [...]’s unenrolled status.  *See Palisades*, 469 N.J. Super. at 40 (no mistake of fact because paying insurer was provided “with notice that it was not obligated to pay the subject claims”).  Further, [...] also failed to reserve its rights when it paid to settle the Hood Lawsuit without asserting a reservation based on its Wrap-Up Exclusion.  (TRVa2933-2934.)  [...] may further claim that it pursued coverage in the DJ Action to obtain a ruling that the CCIP should have covered the claim in the Hood Lawsuit, but [...] did not initiate the DJ Action, neither did it file suit against [...] seeking a declaration of no coverage based on its Wrap-Up Endorsement.  [...]’ Crossclaim in the DJ Action does not belatedly create a reservation of rights where one never existed.
[brief] This case epitomizes the reasons for the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule.  It also explains why the New Jersey legislature expressly outlawed exculpatory waivers of consumer rights in timeshare sales.  The Defendant below, [...] (“[...]”), purposefully inserts disclaimers of the exact misrepresentations it knows its salespeople will use to defraud consumers into signing its contract documents.  These disclaimers serve no contractual purpose in that they do not identify any rights or responsibilities under the contract.  Rather, they serve only to attempt to trigger the parol evidence rule in an effort to insulate [...] from its fraud scheme.  [...] admitted this at trial.  If the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule is not applied here, serious problematic unintended consequences could follow: The Court will unwittingly provide a template for every deceitful business to use against unsuspecting consumers.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT AS PLAINTIFFS HAVE PLED PRIMA FACIE CAUSES OF ACTION.  (Pa000017-18, 26-29)  Both the Defendants and Trial Court incorrectly rely on the supposition that the MOAs at issue required an unrealized contingency necessary for the promoted officers to get paid.  Pa000027-28, 49, 51; Db25-28.
[brief] *McIlhenny*, *supra*.  The PCR court should have substantively reviewed the merits of defendant’s PCR petition even if it ultimately decided to apply a procedural bar.  In *State v. McQuaid*, the Supreme Court stated that “notwithstanding the arguments advanced by the State for imposing a procedural bar to defendant's second PCR petition, we elect to address the petition on the merits. ”  *State v. McQuaid*, 147 N.J. 464, 495 (1997).  (See also *State v. Johns*, 111 N.J. Super. 574, 576 (App. Div. 1970) (where the procedural bar, “bar of ground expressly adjudicated,” applied, the court found “that the constitutional problem presented is of sufficient import to call for relaxation of the rules so that we may consider the question on its merits. ”)  PCRs must be given full and substantial consideration.
[brief] *(Decided below, Pa0001-Pa0022)*  The No-Fault Act was passed in 1972.  See the Laws of 1972, Chapter 70.  The act “encompassed the recommendations of the Automobile Insurance Study Commission, created under Joint Resolution 4 of 1970. ”  See Sponsor’s Statement to Laws of 1972, c.70.  The Commission addressed four major concerns in its recommendations.  They are “The Reparation objective; the Cost Objective; The Availability Objective; and the Judicial Objective.  See *Gambino v. Royal Globe Insurance Companies*, 86 N.J. 100, 105-106 (1981), citing the Automobile Insurance Study Commission, Reparation Reform for New Jersey Motorists at 7 (December 1971).  The Gambino court noted that “the failure of many automobile accident victims to receive any, or adequate, reimbursement for their injuries was considered a major deficiency in the tort liability system that existed prior to the institution of the no-fault law and an unwarranted hardship upon unfortunate victims. ”  86 N.J. at 106.  The court in Amiano v. The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, 85 N.J. 85, 90 (1981), similarly stated that “the No-Fault Act is social legislation intended to provide insureds with the prompt payment of medical bills, lost wages and other such expenses without making them await the outcome of protracted litigation. ”  Section 4 of the No-Fault Act defines the benefits available under the act.  They are medical expenses benefits, income continuation benefits, essential services benefits, survivor benefits and funeral expense benefits.  See the Laws of 1972, Chapter 70.  Section 4.  Section 5 of the statute established when the above benefits were to be paid.  It states, “Personal Injury Protection coverage benefits shall be overdue if not paid within 30 days after the insurer is furnished written notice of the fact of a covered loss and of the amount of same. ”  Id. at section 5\(^1\).  Significantly, the act did not establish a procedure for resolving --- \(^1\)  This was later expanded to 60 days.  The carrier is allowed a 45 day extension.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5. disputes that arose under the act.  *Ibid.*  Therefore, personal injury protection ("PIP") suits were filed in the Superior Court to resolve same.
[brief] (Pa505)  Plaintiff timely filed documents through JEDS and even through the superior Court in support of and Appel of his conviction abut had no Order of conviction from which to appeal.  (Pa218, Pa309)  The Court of the Clerk never forwarded the Order to the plaintiff or his attorney as required by the rules of Court.  (Pa469-Pa471).  Plaintiff and his mother went to Edison and could not obtain the order which disallowed Plaintiff to perfect the appeal of his criminal matter.  (Pa469-Pa471).  On February 14, 2022, plaintiff filed a complaint against the [...], the Township [...] and [...].
[brief] See Cert. par. 27-29,32-35,&39-41(170a-176a).  See Rider p. 9-10 (26a-27a)  Court’s Rulings in the Oct. 2022 Order Rider (Exh. “B”)  42.  Court's ruling (p. 14, 1st par.) (31a) that it "has reviewed exceptions by [...] & [...] & is satisfied with Intermediate Account & that "exceptions" raise no genuine disputes" is overwhelmingly contradicted by presented facts & substantive mistaken figures for genuine disputes related to Trust Accounting based on my Aug. 8, ’22 Exceptions (114a-128a) that are also addressed in this Certification.
[brief] Finally, the Defendants contend (in conclusory fashion) that the Jury’s liability and damages findings are against the weight of the evidence.  See Db at pp. 18-21; 24-33.  As will be set forth below, these arguments largely repeat the same process over and over: 1) state in conclusory fashion that the record contains no evidence to support the jury’s findings, 2) occasionally cite to some self-serving and out of context testimony, and then 3) hope the Court doesn’t actually examine the record.
[brief] He found it improbable that the cabbie only remembered defendant’s fare among the seven or eight other passengers he escorted on the night of the shooting.  (19T 10-21 to 11-6).  Be that as it may, [...] recalled the Spanish man who he dropped off on High Street because he was “really drunk” and “very funny. ” (15T 22-16 to 23-2).  Presumably, the others were less memorable.  Likewise, the PCR judge found [...]’s testimony not to be credible because she appeared to be coached.
[brief] 29 N.J.R. 3920(a).  The Design Guidelines Ordinance “contains a new approach to ensuring that the visual and physical access to the waterfront is not compromised and that the redevelopment benefits associated with oceanfront orientation are shared throughout the City's redevelopment area. ”  Ibid.  This Ordinance thus “contains setback, bulk, height and building line requirements which all contribute to addressing the objective of providing visual and physical access to the waterfront from several vantage points without reducing the presence of the shoreline. ”  Ibid.  Projects outside the [...] follows the CZM Scenic Resources and Design Rule, if not specifically excluded otherwise by that rule within [...], the [...] and [...].
[brief] (4T150-10 to 151-8)  In nearly all the videos, the detective identified a location on the screen that she believed depicted either the Chevy or the shooter.  (4T156-22 to 184-25)  Of the 50 videos, some of them have clear images, while others are blurry.  (Da11 at S-19, S-30, S-42, S-20, S-22)  Some depict the identified car from an angle where only the side is visible, and the license plate cannot be seen.  (Da11 at S-3, S-8, S-16)  Others were recorded from a long-distance away, from poor vantage points, or depict cars moving at a high rate of speed, making the cars difficult to see.  (Da11 at S-4, S-14, S-29)  The first video, S-1, depicts a car pulling into the toll booth at Exit 13 of the NJ Turnpike, and a person paying the toll.  (Da11 at S-1, S-2)  The parties stipulated that on July 6, 2019, a Chevy Malibu with Vermont plates [...] entered the NJ turnpike at Exit 14C and departed at Exit 13.
[brief] In another discretionary ruling that was neither an abuse of discretion nor incorrect, the trial judge correctly found that Plaintiffs’ proffered evidence – even if presumed to be true – fell well short of the threshold to consider punitive damages under New Jersey law and thus ruled that Plaintiffs could not offer such evidence at trial.  As the trial court succinctly explained:  Now this does – as counsel has alluded to, this does match up nicely with the assertion with regard to punitive damages.  The same facts that are alleged for an argument for attorneys’ fees should be had are also alleged for punitive damages.  Under our Punitive Damages Act, generally similar things are required as are required for the common-law attorneys’ fees application.  There has to be a higher level of proof.  First of all, there has to be some malicious, wanton act that results in some serious harm.  And again, it has to be an aggravation beyond a simple tort.  It’s can’t be something that is ordinary between parties addressed as a simple tort.  And the court just doesn’t find it here.  I don’t find the serious harm that is necessary.  I don’t find it by the level of proof that is necessary that, you know, whether the actual wanton behavior that is required to cause harm that is outside of what is the normal bounds of a tort, I just don’t find in this action between parties over a property right.  And so for those reasons, I’m going to grant the motion in limine, denying all evidence with regard to attorneys’ fees or punitive damages.
[brief] By this holding, the Commission implies, for example, that if an elected school board member holds up a sign that says “Black People Lie!” – the apparent message of Respondent’s “Hate Crimes” posts – that Board member could then continue to hold that sign up at a meeting of the Board while a seated member because the conduct began prior to his/her swearing in.  This is an absurd result that is contrary to public policy.  This decision must be reversed.
[brief] ”  (Ab33; Ab36-37; Aa458; Aa474); see (Aa453) (outlining EMP Strategy 5 and describing the State’s goal to “reduc[e] the need for gas distribution system expansion”); (Aa490) (describing EMP sub-goals 5.4.1 and 5.4.2, which aim to formulate a process for future expansions of the distribution system).  In particular, [...] argues that [...] improperly seeks to “lock in decades of continued emissions” arising from the utility’s proposed “expansion” of the gas distribution system, which is inconsistent with the EMP.  (Ab37; Aa458; Aa474).  However, as already addressed in [...]’s Order, the record indicates that the [...]’s proposed regulator station, a reliability project that reduces gas pressure on a transmission line, does not increase system capacity.  (Aa55; Aa838-39; Aa931; 6T62:17-63:4).  As such, the Project is not an expansion or upgrade of the utility’s gas distribution system as described in the EMP.  Ibid.  Therefore, the Project does not conflict with EMP Strategies 4 and 5, including the sub-goals of EMP Goal 5.4, pertaining to expansions or upgrades of the gas distribution system.  (Aa56).
[brief] In the instant case, [...] was [...]’ divorce attorney and drafted the Property Settlement Agreement entered into between the parties on April 10, 2009.  (Da 282).  [...] has been certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Attorney.  By definition, a New Jersey Certified Matrimonial Law Attorney is an official designation given by the New Jersey Supreme Court to attorneys who have demonstrated a specific skill set in the areas of family and matrimonial law and whose experience meets the highest standard of client care.  Like any certification process, this one is offered to individuals who have mastered this subject area and possess the ability to demonstrate superior knowledge in a number of diverse practice issues.  With such distinguished credentials, [...] should have performed his due diligence and investigated the status of [...] prior to the execution of the Property Settlement Agreement by both his client and [...], who was a Pro Se litigant at the time.
[brief] The court held that it did, after determining that “the language of both N.J.S.A. 40:55C-65c and N.J.S.A. 40A:20-12b(1) is ‘clear and unambiguous on its face. ’  The annual service charge is limited to 2% of total project cost, no more and no less. ”  *Id.* at 34.  In the case at bar, the annual service charge complies with the law.
[brief] i.  [...]’ Sworn Statement Was Not Discoverable at the Time of [...]’s Trial or Appeal  The Superior Court incorrectly found that [...]’s claim was procedurally barred under Rule 3:22-4(b)(2)(B), concluding that [...]’ Sworn Statement was “discoverable” sooner.  (Da163; Da186).  This finding is clearly erroneous.  The Sworn Statement was discovered by current counsel in preparation for the examination of [...] at an evidentiary hearing by searching a number of databases, including PACER, a catalogue of Federal cases requiring subscription.  Seventeen years ago, [...], a pretrial detainee in a county jail, did not have access to PACER and could not, under any circumstance, access the PACER catalogue.  This is particularly true where the Habeas Petition was filed under the name “[...]” not “[...],” as [...] identified himself in court.  (Da074).  Although [...]’ Sworn Statement may be discoverable today by a simple search on the PACER filing system utilized by federal courts, seventeen years ago, PACER was not readily available or used prominently.
[brief] PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A TURN-OVER & THEIR OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT WERE FRIVOLOUS ENTITLING THE PRO SE APPELLANT TO FEES  Plaintiffs’ challenge of the effectiveness of the Safe Harbor Notice, required under 1:4-8, as a prerequisite for an aggrieved party to obtain sanctions, is just another instance of plaintiffs’ vexatious & baseless litigation for several reasons.
[brief] [...]’s system also includes two liquefied natural gas peak shaving facilities that provide important pressure support to the local distribution system.  The configuration of [...]’s system varies depending on a number of factors, including customer demand, population density and pipe vintage.  Some segments of [...]’s system operate at a maximum allowable operating pressure (“MAOP”) of 722 psig, while others (e.g., distribution mains and service lines) operate at various lower pressures.  [...] designed the system based on engineering requirements and design day criteria in order to provide safe, adequate and reliable service to [...] customers throughout the entire year.  Q.
[brief] II.  APPELLANT TIMELY APPEALED  THE 2019 WATERFRONT DEVELOPMENT PERMIT MODIFICATION....................5  III.  THE [...]’S ISSUANCE OF THE WATERFRONT DEVELOPMENT PERMIT MODIFICATION WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, LACKS SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE DECISION, AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.  [Aa89-Aa91.]...............................9
[brief] Generally, contract interpretation is “a purely legal question that is particularly suitable for decision on a motion for summary judgment. ”  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 5 on R. 4:46-2 (2024).  Accord EQR-LPC Urb. Renewal N. Pier, LLC v. City of Jersey City, 452 N.J. Super. 309, 319 (App. Div. 2016) [“Contractual interpretation is a legal matter ordinarily suitable for resolution on summary judgment” quoting Celanese Ltd. v. Essex Cnty. Improvement Auth., 404 N.J. Super. 514, 528 (App. Div. 2009)]; Khandelwal v. Zurich Ins. Co., 427 N.J. Super. 577, 585 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 212 N.J. 430 (2012).
[brief] Applying Settled New Jersey Law, The Trial Court Properly Rejected An Attribution Requirement**  Just like the claimants in *Polarome* and *Air Master*, [...] argues that because he did not know that his injuries were caused by mold, and no doctor told him such, this somehow changes the manifestation date.  Db45.  Applying *Polarome* and *Air Master*, the trial court correctly rejected this contention.  In *Polarome*, the policyholder argued that one of the underlying plaintiffs, [...], did not know his injuries were caused by exposure to a harmful substance until long after his symptoms manifested.  Specifically, the “claimant did not learn that his condition may have been caused by diacetyl exposure until viewing a March 2004 news program…”  404 N.J. Super at 254.  But because the date the claimant learned his symptoms were attributed to his exposure is irrelevant to the trigger analysis, the court determined that the last pull of the trigger occurred more than a decade earlier.  *Id.* at 257  In *Air Master*, the policyholder, just like [...], sought to graft onto the “initial manifestation” rule a requirement that the damage be attributed to the fault of a specific insured before the “last pull” could take place.  *Air Master* --- \(^3\)  [...] does not argue in his brief that his property damage did not manifest before the [...] and so we do not address that here.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  ...........................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................  1 POINT  I  DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE MEANING AND VALIDITY OF N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 WARRANT CONSIDERATION BY THIS COURT.  IN ADDITION, NEITHER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE NOR THE EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE RELIED ON BY THE STATE INDICATES THAT A MOTORIST MUST SIGNAL PRIOR TO CHANGING LANES .........................................................................................................................  1 POINT II  THE COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER WHETHER THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS INDEPENDENTLY JUSTIFIED UNDER N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b)  BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RULE ON THIS ISSUE.  ON THE OTHER HAND, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 REQUIRES SOME LANE CHANGES TO BE SIGNALED, THE COURT SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER A SIGNAL WAS REQUIRED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES  BECAUSE THERE IS A FULL RECORD AND A TRIAL COURT RULING ON THIS ISSUE.........................................................................................................................  12  CONCLUSION  ..................................................................................................................