ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Parents have a fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their children.  Parents have a fundamental right under the United States Constitution to direct the “care, custody, and control” of their minor children.  *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality op.); see also *Gruenke v. Seip*, 225 F.3d 290, 304 (3d Cir. 2000) (same).  This right rests on the constitutionally mandated common-law presumptions of parental fitness and affection—*i.e.*, that (1) “parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment” and (2) the “natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. ”  *Parham v. J.R.*, 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
[brief] Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 199 N.J. 14, 34 (2009) (quoting Geller, supra, 53 N.J. at 597-598, 597).  Such a liberal construction "resolves all reasonable doubts in favor of the applicability of the statute to the particular case."  Kochen v. Consol. Police & Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 71 N.J. Super. 463, 478, (App. Div. 1962).  See Duignan v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 223 N.J. Super. 208, 216 (App. Div. 1988) (same); Hillman v. Bd. Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 109 N.J. Super. 449, 455 (App. Div. 1970) (same).  Francois v. Board of Trustees, 415 N.J. Super.  335, 349.  A person that is eligible for certain pension benefits is entitled to a liberal interpretation of the pension statute.  The determination below is unreasonable because [...] would otherwise be eligible for accidental disability benefits under the Ricci Act.
[brief] In [...] I, “the sole question before us is whether [...]’s communication with [...] was ‘in connection with the collection of any debt,’ such that it violates §1692c(b). ”  [...] I, 994 F.3d at 1349.  The court noted that, like Defendant’s conveyance of information about Plaintiff’s debt, the debt collector’s transmitted [...]’s status as a debtor, the amount of the debt, the identity of the creditor, and the fact that the debt arose from medical treatment.  Therefore, “[i]t seems to us inescapable that [...]’s communication to [...] at least ‘concerned,’ was ‘with reference to,’ and bore a ‘relationship [or] association’ to its collection of [...]’s debt [and, therefore,] [...] has alleged a communication ‘in connection with the collection of any debt’ as that phrase is commonly understood. ”  Id. Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 614 F.3d 380, 385 (7th Cir. 2010), reviewed existing precedent which “establish that the absence of a demand for payment is just one of several factors that come into play in the commonsense inquiry of whether a communication from a debt collector is made in connection with the collection of any debt.
[brief] An eyewitness to the fatal crash, [...] employee [...], also testified as to the lack of pedestrian crossing safety measures in the distant parking lot:  Q: Now, in order for you to get to the hospital, is it true that there is no crosswalk between your car and the sidewalk?  There is no crosswalk for you to take?  A: Correct.  Q: Is there a sidewalk that goes around the exterior of the perimeter from where you parked?  A: No.  Q: So, you have to walk across the area where cars are pulling in, yes?  A: Yes.  [Pa815-6 (25:16-26:1) (emphasis added). ]  C.  Pedestrian Safeguards Would Have Alerted Drivers Such As [...] For The Safety Of Pedestrians Such As [...]  Significantly, Defendant [...] has admitted that the presence of pedestrian crosswalks would have focused her attention toward pedestrians crossing in the distant area of the expansive parking lot designated for employee parking where she struck [...].
[brief] STANDARD TO REOPEN (Pa1)  US Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 38 A. 3d 570 (2012) is a foreclosure action in which a default judgment was entered.  Defendants were unsuccessful in obtaining a modification and took no action for a year resulting in the issuance of a default judgment.  There was no showing of excusable neglect entitling them for relief pursuant to R 4:50-1 and the judgment was affirmed.  R. 4:50-1 governs an applicant's motion for relief from default when the case has proceeded to judgment.  The New Jersey Rules prescribe a two-step default process, and there is a significant difference between the burdens imposed at each stage.  When nothing more than an entry of default pursuant to R. 4:43-1 has occurred, relief from that default may be granted on a showing of good cause.  R. 4:43-3.  The required good-cause showing for setting aside an entry of default pursuant to that rule is clearly a less stringent standard than that imposed by R. 4:50-1 for setting aside a default judgment.  When the matter has proceeded to the second stage and the court has entered a default judgment pursuant to R. 4:43-2, the party seeking to vacate the judgment must meet the standard of 4:50-1.  R. 4:50-1 is designed to reconcile the strong interests in finality of judgments and judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should have authority to avoid an unjust result in any given case.  The trial court's determination under the rule warrants substantial deference, and should not be reversed unless it results in a clear abuse of discretion.  The court finds an abuse of discretion when a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.  Excusable neglect may be found when the default was attributable to an honest mistake that is compatible with due diligence or reasonable prudence.  Mere carelessness or lack of proper diligence on the part of an attorney is ordinarily not sufficient to entitle an attorney's clients to relief from an adverse judgment.  In this instance I reached out without success to my client to have her confirm the revised complaint.  I had also presented the revised complaint to [...] who declined to take responsibility.  A defendant seeking to reopen a default judgment must generally show a meritorious defense is available.  As the Supreme Court of New Jersey has held in Schulwitz v. Shuster, it would create a rather anomalous situation if a judgment were to be vacated on the ground of mistake, accident, surprise or excusable neglect, only to discover later that the defendant had no meritorious defense.  The time of the courts, counsel and litigants should not be taken up by such a futile proceeding.
[brief] On March 7, 2019, Defendant [...]  (“[...]”) issued a Commitment for Title Insurance, which reflected that there were outstanding municipal taxes due on the Property in the amount of $38,943.94.  Schedule B, Part 1 of the Commitment provided that the Commitment only would become a binding contract upon conveyance of title to the prospective purchaser, specifically requiring an executed “Deed from [...] and [...] to [...]. ”  The Commitment also reflected that the Property’s assessed value at the time was $262,500. ”  38a-39a.
[directive] Jersey New of General Attorney the and right ofher/his victim the advise and Registry, Central Violence Domestic the check violence, domestic involves offense order).  protective a seek to 10  Page conviction and criminal court- New adult Jersey present and defendant's charge the of nature pertaining the to circumstances and all for relevant facts history, may account it not appearance is therefore It committed. was offense in the manner which current specific or the defendant feasible when so gaps information fill the to for and prosecutors police and appropriate necessary of interests the serve best will that release decisions pretrial fully-informed make can courts that safety. and justice public Resources. and Enforcement Practices Law on Reform of Imbacts
[directive] If any individual or organization sends a written request to the Independent Investigator seeking the release of LE Incident footage, the Independent Investigator shall authorize the release of such footage once they have concluded that the initial investigation is substantially complete, subject to the conditions described in Sections II.E.2 to II.E.5 below and any other legal restrictions that would limit public release.  Generally speaking, the initial investigation shall be deemed substantially complete once all available material witnesses have been interviewed and the physical and documentary evidence most relevant to the case has been gathered.  Typically, these steps take no more than 20 days to complete.
[brief] (Aa2; Ra4).  Despite the Project’s compliance with the applicable rules, once again, Appellants attempt to cast a wide net by faulting [...] for not considering the Project’s impacts that they claim will be “the proximate cause of dramatic changes in precipitation and stormwater runoff in the Highlands preservation areas in contravention of the goals and policies of the Highlands Act and the Water Quality Management Act. ” (Ab18-19).
[brief] It is true that counsel for the State and the defendant’s trial counsel considered whether this old conviction could possibly have been expunged or that [...] could have been mistaken about the nature of the offense he had been convicted of.  The trial court sought clarification and asked [...], “This is only to make sure that we’re clear that this was an indictable offense and not something that was downgraded in any way to like a municipal offense.  Do you remember what – what you were convicted of back then?” (29T:25-1 to5).  [...] answered, “It was a CDS charge where I had to go to prison for it. ” (29T:25-6 to 7).  This clear indication was sufficient proof that [...] was not qualified to serve on this jury and the trial court asked counsel if they had “any issues” to which both the prosecution and defense stated “No, Judge” (29T25).  As a result, [...] was excused.
[brief] N.J.R.E. 701; Watson, 254 N.J. at 569; State v. Higgs, 253 N.J. 333 (2023); State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 17 (2021); State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9 (2012); State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011).  Because [...]’s testimony improperly bolstered the State’s central theory of the case, its erroneous admission deprived Defendant of due process and of a fair trial, and was clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  U.S. Const. amends.  VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, 10; R. 2:10-2.
[brief] Loscalzo v. Pini, 228 N.J. Super. 291 (App. Div. 1988)............................7,8  New York SMSA v.  Weehawken Bd. Of Adj. 370 N.J. Super. 319 (App. Div. 2004).................................................................8 Pagano v. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment, 257 N.J. Super. 382 (Law Div. 1992).....12 Powerhouse Arts Dist. Neighborhood Ass'n v. City Council of City of Jersey City, 413 N.J. Super. 322 (App. Div. 2010)..............................................7, 9 Riggs v. Long Beach, 109 N.J. 601 (1988)..............................................Passim Saadala v. E. Brunswick Zoning Bd., 412 N.J. Super. 541 (App. Div. 2010)....8 Speakman v. North Plainfield, 8 N.J. 250, 259 (1951).............................5 Taxpayers Ass'n of Weymouth Twp. v. Weymouth Twp., 80 N.J. 6 (1978).....1, 5 388 Route 22 Readington Realty Holdings, LLC v. Township of Readington, 221 N.J. 318 (2015).................................................................4 Vineland Constr. Co., Inc. v. Township of Pennsauken, 395 N.J. Super. 230 (App. Div. 2007)...........................................4
[brief] ”  State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 325 (2005) (emphasis added).  Identification is a key issue when “it is the major thrust of the defense,” particularly in cases where the State relies on a single victim-eyewitness.  Id. at 325-26 (internal alterations omitted) (citing State v. Frey, 194 N.J. Super. 326, 329 (App. Div. 1984)) (“The absence of any eyewitness other than the victim and defendant’s denial of guilt, made it essential for the court to instruct the jury on identification. ”); see also State v. Davis, 363 N.J. Super. 556, 562 (App. Div. 2003) (“[T]rial courts are not at liberty to withhold an instruction, particularly when that instruction addresses the sole basis for defendant’s claim of innocence and it goes to an essential element of the State’s case. ”).  The key issue in this case was identification.  The State’s case hinged on two identifications: (1) [...]’s identification of [...] from a photo array at the police station; and (2) [...]’s identification of [...], as evidenced by his alleged dying declaration.  In both opening and closing arguments, the State emphasized the importance of [...]’s identification, arguing “[t]here’s only one final word that matters in this entire case; [...].
[brief] In so doing, the Appellate Division uses “the same standard as the trial court in determining whether a judgment of acquittal was warranted. ”  *State v. Ellis*, 424 N.J. Super. 267, 273 (App. Div. 2012).  That standard assesses “whether the State presented sufficient evidence to defeat an acquittal motion. ”  Dekowski, 218 N.J. at 608; Cruz-Pena, 459 N.J. Super. at 520.  Like the trial court, this Court must determine whether the State's evidence, both direct and circumstantial, “viewed in its entirety, and giving the State the benefit of all of its favorable testimony and all of the favorable inferences which can reasonably be drawn therefrom, is such that a jury could properly find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged. ”  State v. D.A., 191 N.J. 158, 163 (2007) (citing State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458–59 (1967)); State v. Horne, 376 N.J. Super. 201, 208 (App. Div.), certif.  denied, 185 N.J. 264 (2005).  The court should not be concerned with the “worth, nature or extent (beyond a scintilla) of the evidence, but only with its existence, viewed most favorably to the State. ”  State v. DeRoxtro, 327 N.J. Super. 212, 224 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting State v. Kluber, 130 N.J. Super. 336, 342 (App. Div. 1974), certif. denied, 67 N.J. 72 (1975)).  If the evidence satisfies that standard, the motion was properly denied.  State v. Spivey, 179 N.J. 229, 236 (2004).  Defendant was charged with Animal Cruelty in violation of N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1).
[directive] (a)  Investigative report.  The first part of the report will be an objective recounting of all the relevant information the investigation disclosed, including statements, documents and other evidence.  This part of the report is similar in all respects to a standard law enforcement investigative report, and should contain a complete account of the investigation.  (b)  Summary and Conclusions.  The investigator should summarize the case and provide conclusions of fact for each allegation.  These conclusions of fact should be recorded as exonerated, sustained, not sustained or unfounded.  9.1.2  If the conduct of an officer was found to be improper, the report must cite the agency rule, regulation, or SOP violated.  Any aggravating or mitigating circumstances surrounding the situation, such as unclear or poorly drafted agency policy, inadequate training or lack of proper supervision, shall also be noted.  9.1.3  If the investigation reveals evidence of misconduct not based on the original complaint, this too must be reported.  An investigation concerning this secondary misconduct should be conducted.  9.2
[brief] 28 Morris Cty. Fair Hous. Council v. Boonton Tp., 228 N.J. Super. 635, 646 (Law Div.1988) ..................................................................................................................  39  New York SMSA v. Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. of Weehawken, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 332-333 ..................................................................................  38  Pizzo Mantin Group v. Township of Randolph, 137 N.J. 216, 229 (1994) .................................................. 22, 23, 24 PRB Enters., Inc. v. S. Brunswick Planning Bd., 105 N.J. 1, 7 (1987) .................................................. 22, 29 Sartoga v. Borough of W. Paterson, 346 N.J. Super. 569, 581 (App. Div. 2002) .................................................. 22  Shim v. Wash. Tp. Planning Bd., 298 N.J. Super. 395, 411 (App. Div. 1997) .................................................. 22, 24 Smith v. Fair Haven Zoning Bd., 335 N.J. Super. 111, 122 (App. Div. 2000) .................................................. 35 Tennis Club Assocs. v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of Teaneck, 262 N.J. Super. 422 (App. Div. 1993) .................................................. 29  W.L. Goodfellows & Co. of Turnersville, Inc. v. Wash. Tp. Planning Bd., 345 N.J. Super. 109, 116 (App. Div. 2001) .................................................. 22 Zimmerman v. Sussex Cnty. Educ.  Servs. Comm’n, 237 N.J. 465, 475 (2019) ..................................................................................................................  18  Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et seq.  ...........................................................................................................
[brief] **POINT IV**  **BECAUSE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY AGREEMENT, A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL MUST BE ENTERED ON THE CHARGE OF CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER.  (Not Raised Below)**  The existence of an agreement is necessary to support a conviction of conspiracy.  Because there was no evidence of such an agreement presented at --- \(^8\)  Contrary to the trial court’s reasoning, [...] did not fail to comply with Rule 3:12-2, because he was not relying on any witnesses to establish his alibi, which his what the rule governs.  Regardless, “trial courts are not at liberty to withhold an instruction, particularly when that instruction addresses the sole basis for defendant’s claim of innocence and it goes to an essential element of the State’s case. ”  *State v. Davis*, 363 N.J. Super. 556, 562 (App. Div. 2003).  The defense was that [...] was not at the scene, on the bicycle, shooting in the car.  The trial court was required to instruct the jury fully on that defense.  trial, [...]’s conviction for conspiracy to commit murder violates his due process rights and must be reversed.
[brief] Background on collective negotiations and the bargaining council.  The [...] represents *inter alia* the Board’s professional staff members, which has been approximately 225 employees over the past several years.  (Pa066).  Job titles covered by the [...] include teachers, secretaries, paraprofessionals, bus drivers, nurses, security personnel, child study team members, counselors, and buildings, ground and maintenance staff.  (Pa066).  The most recently expired CNA between the Board and Association was in effect from July 1, 2019 through June 30, 2022 (hereinafter “2019-2022 CNA”).  (Pa066).  The [...] began utilizing a “Bargaining Council” during the negotiations for the 2019-2022 CNA.  Any [...] member is eligible to join the Bargaining Council.  However, non-[...] members are ineligible to join the Bargaining Council.  (Pa066).  The [...]’s Bargaining Council participated in at least one of the bargaining sessions resulting in the 2019-2022 CNA.  Subsequently, representatives from the Board and [...] agreed to meet in a smaller setting.  (Pa067).  Before the smaller-scale meeting, the Board and [...] agreed to pull back all proposals aside from salary and health benefits.  The Parties also agreed to exclude legal representatives from this particular meeting.  (Pa067).  Ultimately, the [...] and Board executed the 2019-2022 CNA in or around Fall 2019.  (Pa067).  The [...] has consistently stated that, consistent with its bylaws, its Bargaining Council is part of the [...]’s negotiations team.  There are two parts to the [...]’s negotiations team: those individuals who are directly across from the Board at bargaining sessions (“Negotiators”) and the Bargaining Council.  (Pa153-Pa154, Pa169-Pa170).  Any member of the Bargaining Council has the same rights as any other member of the [...]’s negotiations team, including the [...]’s lead negotiators.  These rights include the right to vote on any matter before the [...]’s negotiations team, the ability to address offers from the Board and to propose contractual language.  (Pa066).  Although Bargaining Council members do not talk directly with the Board at the bargaining sessions, these members are still actively involved during these sessions.  For example, they research and analyze Board offers and arguments presented during face-to-face sessions and provide written responses for the Negotiators to state to the Board.  (Pa155).  Initial Association attempts to schedule bargaining sessions on successor CNA.
[brief] However, [...] did not seek to validate that reduction in his Appeal.  Rather, [...] merely argued (improperly for the first time in this Appeal) that the condominium fees paid by [...] are “duplicative” of [...]’s management fees charged to him without stating how such fees were duplicative and which ones.  See Db33 (“Condo fees should not have been included at all if management fees were included.  They are duplicative of the management fees [...]’s company, [...], claimed to incur from [...]’s other company, [...]. ”)
[directive] (See also discussion of “procedural safeguards,” § F, infra.)  The decision whether to tender a reduced offer using the complex/protracted litigation downward adjustment is necessarily vested in the reasoned discretion of the prosecutor.  Accordingly, a prosecutor is not required to employ this downward adjustment in any case where the prosecutor believes in good faith that the defen- dant would ultimately be convicted at trial, notwithstanding that prosecution of the case will involve a significant expenditure of resources.  -4-
[brief] When asked on cross-examination to identify five (5) specific traditions that were important to Plaintiff, he struggled to identify more than two.  (1T102-22;1T125-22; 1T126-7).  Of those beliefs, one was that he did not believe in divorce.  Plaintiff testified that there had never been a divorce in his family.  (2T40-13).  Specifically, in his “whole family of 304 people, nobody got divorced” and he would be the first one to get divorced (1T64-17; 1T69-5).  However, on cross-examination, it was revealed that his uncle (i.e., mother’s brother) had been divorced three times.  (2T53-17; 2T54-1).  Additionally, the plaintiff knew that differences existed between the parties before the civil and religious ceremony, but he still married Defendant.
[brief] Da446.  [...]’s counsel argued that a stay was warranted because [...] may lose his insurance coverage if he is required to testify at his deposition regarding the sworn statements he made when he pled guilty to assault.  2T12:5-13:6.  [...] rejected this argument, stating: [You can’t be saying to me, okay he lied when he was in criminal court and so he’s committing a fraud on the insurance carrier and, Judge, I want you to be in lockstep with that.  I’m committing fraud on the insurance carrier so don’t make him testify the stuff that’s going to show that he’s committing a fraud on the insurance carrier.  […] you’re asking me to like engage in a coverup of something which feels pretty uncomfortable and it’s not appropriate.  [2T13:7-23.]
[directive] [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  [해당없음/NA] (범죄가 년 월 일 이후에 발생한 경우에만 (b)  2018  2  1  작성하십시오)  귀하가  2C:24-4b(5)(b)(iii)에 의한 아동의  N.J.S.A.  복지를 위태롭게 하는 범죄 행위 또는N.J.S.A. 2C:24- 에 의한 아동 음란물 조직망의 두목, 또는 이러한 4.1  범죄들과 관련된 범행 미수, 또한 그 범죄가 및 년 2018 월 일 이후에 발생했으며, 유죄 인정을 하는 경우, 2 1 법정은 다른 선고에 추가하고, 검사의 요청에 따라서, 기록상으로 지역사회를 보호하거나 귀하의 장래의  범죄 행위를  저지하기 위하여 종신 가석방 감독이 필요하지 않다고 판결하지 않는 한, 귀하에게 종신 가석방 감독에 대한 특별 선고를 부과할 것이라는 것을 아십니까?