ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Pa5  [...] ([...])  Final Administrative Action, issued August 23, 2023 | Page | Document | |------|----------| | Pa1 | Appellant’s Notice of Appeal, filed October 4, 2023 | | Pa5 | [...] ([...])  Final Administrative Action, issued August 23, 2023 | | Pa11 | Appellant’s Civil Case Information Statement, filed October 4, 2023 | | Pa15 | Certification of Counsel in support of Appellant’s [...] Appeal | | Pa17 | Exhibit A – Notification of Certification, 12/28/22, PL221817 | | Pa19 | Exhibit B – PFRS Order of Business, August 8, 2022 | | Pa31 | Exhibit C – PFRS Order of Business, September 12, 2022 | | Pa42 | Exhibit D – PFRS Order of Business, December 12, 2022 | | Pa54 | Exhibit E – Emails between Appellant and [...], 5/2023 | | Pa57 | Exhibit F – Email from [...] to Appellant 5/18/2023 | | Pa59 | Exhibit G – Email exchange, Appellant and [...], May 1, 2023 | | Pa61 | Exhibit H – City’s submission to [...], April 24, 2023 with exhibits | | Pa74 | Exhibit I – Letter from Appellant to [...], March 29, 2023 | | Pa78 | Exhibit J – Letter from [...] to [...], February 2, 2023 | | Pa80 | Exhibit K – Memo from [...] to Appellant, April 17, 2022 (error: date is April 17, 2023) | | Pa83 | Exhibit L – Letter from the [...] to Appellant, March 7, 2023 | | Pa86 | Exhibit M – Notice of Eligibility, 2/16/23, PM2330C | | Pa88 | Exhibit N – Email from Appellant to [...], February 15, 2023 | | Pa91 | Statement of Items Comprising the Record, December 11, 2023 | | Pa94 | Email to Appellant from [...] of [...], dated February 27, 2023 | | Pa95 | Email from Appellant to [...], dated March 6, 2023 | | Pa96 | Email from [...] to Appellant, dated March 23, 2023 | | Pa99 | Email from Appellant to [...], dated April 14, 2023 | | Pa100 | Email from [...] to [...], Esq., dated May 23, 2023 |
[brief] The State introduced surveillance stills and a receipt from a gas station showing that [...] bought cigarettes and coffee for $12.75 a little after 3:15 a.m.  (4T 159-2 to 10; 6T 31-3 to 13, 32-7 to 34-13)  After leaving the gas station, she “didn’t know what to do” so she started driving around.  (6T 142-12 to 13)  She followed a garbage truck into a parking lot that looked well-lit and parked in the back of the lot.  (6T 142-13 to 17)  The parking lot was behind a [...] restaurant on [...] in [...].  (4T 89-8 to 14)  Surveillance cameras captured much of what happened after [...] parked the car, and [...] explained what the video showed as it was played for the jury.
[brief] In its redirect, the State mentioned this conversation with the sole and explicit purpose of refocusing the jury and emphasizing that defendant was never charged in any robbery.  (3T137-17 to 138-12).  The Court then provided its instruction on the limited use of that evidence.  (3T137-22 to 138-6).  Nowhere during this exchange did defendant object, nor did defendant express any dissatisfaction with the Court’s instruction.  Instead, seemingly despite that instruction, defendant revived the subject in his recross.  (3T152-6 to 12; 153-21 to 24; 154-3 to 7).  During closing argument, defendant actually mocked the assistant prosecutor for attempting to restrain the use of the very statement defendant now argues on appeal was prejudicial to its interests.
[directive] Kits  A.  Kit Tracking System  All law enforcement agencies in New Jersey are responsible for the custody and tracking of SAFE kits, and therefore, all agencies must have a standardized system for tracking the kits.  All law enforcement agencies are responsible for documenting their role in processing the SAFE kit.  Documentation of each agency’s role in processing the SAFE kit must be retained to show chain of custody.  The County Prosecutor is responsible for ensuring the agencies within their county document their role in processing the SAFE kits and must incorporate the following minimum requirements for their county’s kit tracking system:
[brief] In the documents he submitted in support of Plaintiff's non-renewal, [...] stated that Plaintiff (a) "[d]oes not communicate information related to programs and initiatives she April 2019 between Plaintiff and [...] shows she was well aware she was responsible for ordering the AP testing materials.  (Da449). is in charge of"; (b) "[d]oes not communicate testing information with the principal"; (c) "has not made me aware of any issues or irregularities during AP testing" and that he "[h]as asked without receiving a response" from her; (d) "[d]oes not communicate important information related to students and families related to academics and discipline," and that "[t]his has been addressed during Administrative Team Meetings and privately" with Plaintiff.  (Da286-287).  14.  [...]'s concern regarding Plaintiff's failure to communicate was also documented in her evaluations—all of which were completed by him—which Plaintiff acknowledged during her deposition.
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  These Statement of Facts are as they appeared before [...] in 2020.  On May 17, 2018, Plaintiff became a Lieutenant in the Management Review Unit (1T; 7:13).  In reference to the Complaint filed in this case, she stated that it was an accurate version of her belief about what happened (1T; 15:14).  In 2015, after returning from vacation, Plaintiff was told by civilian employees of the New Jersey State Police that they were being harassed and abused by certain members of the OPS Unit.  The Complaint was made by a group of civilians, two of which were [...] and [...] (1T; 16:9).  At the time, she was the Administrative Officer and was in a supervisory position (1T; 16:19).  While Plaintiff was the Admin Officer, she was a Sergeant First Class because the Lieutenant's position had been removed from OPS to another area for a promotion (1T; 17:1).  Plaintiff was told by several Lieutenants that she was working out of title (1T; 17:21).  Plaintiff challenged that (1T; 18:3).  As the Admin Officer, it was her job to work with everybody and she worked on a daily basis with the civilian employees (1T; 19:23).  One of the complaints involved [...] and [...] and [...] that if she stopped eating, she would lose weight and further, if she exercised, she would also lose weight (1T; 21:20).  Further, the civilians were told that they couldn't eat in the kitchen area when the Intake Unit was in there (1T; 22:12).  Actually, the area where they were prohibited from was an area available to all members, uniformed and civilian (1T; 22:14).  Plaintiff reported the incident to Lieutenant [...] (1T; 27:17).  The same that the day Plaintiff spoke to the civilians, she reported it (1T; 28:7).  In between the relevant timeframe, there was an incident that occurred between [...] and Plaintiff in reference to a couple of emails that went back and forth with [...] (1T; 28:23).
[brief] (See Pa152 at ¶5).  Specifically, the Consent Order states:  With respect to a Refiled Action or Responsive Pleadings in a Refiled Action, the parties hereby preserve and will be able to assert all rights, remedies, defenses, and claims for relief that he, she or it asserted, were seeking to obtain, or could have obtained in this action, including but not limited to requests for sanctions and/or attorneys’ fees (“Claims, Relief or Defenses”), and any and all applicable statutes of limitation, repose, or other defenses on limitations of actions, including, but not limited to laches, waiver, estoppel, res judicata, collateral estoppel, entire controversy, or any claim issue preclusion doctrine, or other time-based doctrine or defense, rule, law or statute otherwise limiting the parties’ rights to reserve, assert, and/or prosecute any of the Claims, Relief, or Defenses that may applied to a Refiled Action or Responsive Pleadings in a Refiled Action, shall be tolled and suspended until sixty (60) days after the adjudication of the [...] or, with respect to Responsive Pleadings in a Refiled Action, until thirty (30) days after the time for responsive pleadings in a Refiled Action are due to be filed per the New Jersey Rules of Court.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-2.  Superior Officers, 2022 WL 2352376, at *9; (Pa000677).  The Appellate Division further favorably cited [...]’s decision in the First Police Matter, in which [...] noted that:  _____________________  5  We note that Plaintiffs did not brief their constitutional claims below in connection with Defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss and any such argument are waived on appeal.
[brief] *17  We also conclude that [...]'s in-court identification of [...] was properly admitted.  Our Supreme Court has addressed the issue of in-court identification in a similar context:  Notwithstanding that [the witness] identified defendant for the first time in court, her identification was constitutionally valid.  Although undercut by the long delay between the crime and the trial, the reliability of the identification is supported by other considerations....  [The witness] had ample opportunity to view the assailants under circumstances in which she was seeking to establish their identities.  The courtroom atmosphere was suggestive, but not so much so as to outweigh the reliability of the identification.  Defense counsel had ample chance to challenge the accuracy of the identification on cross-examination, and the jury was free to discount its value based on [the witness's] inability to identify anyone on earlier occasions.  [State v. Clausell, 121 N.J. 298, 327–28 (1990) (internal citation omitted).
[brief] In their attempts to navigate around this imposition of liability, we respectfully submit that the defendant heavily, and improperly relied upon the unreported Appellate Division decision of Nunez v. [...], 2018 WL 6836109 (App. Div. 2015).  In that decision, the Court cites precisely what we have cited above; a residential homeowner will be liable for dangerous abutting sidewalks where they “create or exacerbate a dangerous condition. ”  *Luchejko v. Hoboken*, 207 NJ 191, 210 (2011).  *Luchejko* also made clear that where a property owner removes snow, the property owner will be liable for a pedestrian’s injury if they create a hazard or exacerbate a condition that does not exist as a result of “natural forces. ”  *Id.*  At 201.  That is precisely what occurred here – failed snow removal efforts are not “natural forces. ”  As we argued in our previous submission, the facts in *Nunez* are readily distinguishable from the case currently before the Court.  In *Nunez*, there was a continuing snowfall that did not end until after the plaintiff’s fall.  The defendant [...] removed the snow that had accumulated up and until 7:15 a.m., but then left his residence for work at approximately 8:45 a.m.  The significant snowfall continued (an intervening natural event), and the plaintiff fell at approximately 10:00 a.m.  Here, in the case before the Court, the snowfall ended two days prior to plaintiff’s fall, and if the defendant/respondent is believed by a jury, two days after the respondent’s failed attempt to remove the snow, which dangerously changed the condition of the walking surface.  New snow in the case before this Court did not fall until after her injury, and the new snowfall had no bearing on the plaintiff's injury, like what occurred in Nunez.  We submit that in consideration of all of the facts viewed in a light most favorably to the plaintiff, the appellant can establish all of the necessary elements to sustain her burden of proof, and there are material questions of fact that must be resolved by a jury.  Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995).  Here, we respectfully submit that the issue of whether or not the condition of the property was caused and created by the defendant’s failure to properly remove the snow is a material factual dispute, and that dispute must be resolved by a jury.  This is true whether or not the Court determines that the subject property would be deemed a residential, commercial property, or some kind of hybrid.  The manner in which the snow removal occurred, whether or not it was completed in a reasonable manner, or whether or not the conduct created a new hazard or worsened an existing hazard are also factual issues that would need to be resolved by a jury.  It is for these reasons and the reasons outlined above that the appellant respectfully submits that the Order entering summary judgment should be reversed and this matter should respectfully be remanded for trial.
[directive] or witness prospective a intimidate, or injure, 67 Page Com~ellin~ and Absent Be Filed Detention  Must Pretrial Seek Motion to a Where Cases  7.3  Circumstances.  Extraordinary any of conviction upon or 2C:11-3), (N.J.S.A. murder with charged is defendant the  If imprisonment,25 of life term extended or ordinary an for eligible be would offense charged other Assistant or First Prosecutor County the unless detention pretrial for apply shall prosecutor the cases in Justice Criminal of Division the of Director Deputy a or Director the or Prosecutor, seek to not reasons extraordinary compelling and are there that finds Division, the by prosecuted detention.  pretrial Detention.  Pretrial Seek to Presumed Prosecutor Is the Where Cases 7.4 4A(b)(5).
[directive] Do you understand that if you violate a condition of parole supervision for life on or after July 1, 2014, and you are indicted and convicted for that violation, you will receive a sentence of imprisonment up to 5 years or if the violation July 1, 2014, you will receive a sentence of imprisonment of up occurred before to 18 months and that the sentence you receive could be in addition to any prison term you may receive from the Parole Board for a violation of parole supervision for life?  5.  Publicação na internet Internet  Posting a)  Você entende que, em decorrência da sua condenação, seu nome, idade, raça, sexo, data de [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] nascimento, altura, peso, cor dos olhos, suas cicatrizes ou tatuagens, sua fotografia, marca, modelo, cor, ano e número da placa de qualquer veículo que conduzir, endereço, código postal, municipalidade e condado da sua residência e a descrição do crime para o qual você está se declarando culpado podem ser disponibilizados ao público na internet?
[brief] Exhibit 1- Judgments of Conviction for co-defendants..............  Da 285 Exhibit 2 – Attorney General Press Release of Sentences in Multiple Robberies and Shootings................................................ Da 306 Exhibit 3 – JOC for [...], defendant in Attorney General Press Release.................................................................  Da 310 Exhibit 4 – Department of Corrections Inmate Information Sheet for [...].................................................................  Da 315 Exhibit 5 – JOC for [...], defendant in Attorney General Press Release.................................................................  Da 317 Exhibit 6 – DOC Inmate Information Sheet for [...].................................................................  Da 322 Exhibit 7 – DOC Redacted Facesheet for [...]........Da 324 4 These two sentencing memoranda are included in the appendix as they fall within the “exception to the general prohibition against including trial briefs in the appendix” R. 2:6-1(a)(2), because they are part of the PCR record and are germane to the ineffective assistance of original counsel at sentencing claim as set forth in Point II.  5  The Exhibits to the Re-Sentencing Brief, Da 285 to 345, are included herein as a Confidential Appendix.  All documents in this confidential appendix are the most complete and legible available.  Exhibit 8 – DOC Redacted Progress Notes Report for [...]........................................  Da 329  Exhibit 9 – [...] reference for [...].........  Da 334  Exhibit 10- Affidavit of [...] in support of [...]..................................................  Da 336  Exhibit 11 – Reference letters for [...].....................  Da 339  Exhibit 12 – Letter from [...]’s partner......................  Da 342  Exhibit 13 - Letter from [...]’s child.........................  Da 344  Index to Transcripts
[brief] Invoking Rule 4:6-2(e), [...] sought summary judgment under 4:46 with almost 200 pages of materials (187 pages, to be precise), and its papers sought relief inartfully as a motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e), which should have been overruled, and the SAC permitted.  The order on the motion clearly stated that plaintiff’s motion for leave to file SAC was “denied without prejudice. ”  It is settled that a motion invoking Rule 4:6-2(e) must address the facial sufficiency of the pleading, here, the proposed second amended complaint since [...]’s motion was made after plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file their second amended complaint was filed.  Where, as here, extraneous materials outside the pleadings are relied upon, as [...] did with its presentation of a 187 page submission, [...]’s motion to dismiss for alleged failure to state a claim may not be granted, unless it is converted to a summary judgment motion.
[brief] At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was diagnosed with and treated for generalized anxiety.  She informed Defendant of this, and expressly reported that the Covid-19 pandemic triggered this anxiety.  To find Plaintiff’s anxiety does not qualify as a “disability” is against the weight of the law and the evidence.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(q), there are two specific categories of handicap: physical and non-physical.  To establish a psychological disability, the plain language of the NJLAD requires a party to prove that he or she is suffering from "any mental" or "psychological . . . disability" that is a result of a "psychological, physiological, or neurological condition[]" that either "prevents the typical exercise of any bodily or mental functions or is demonstrable, medically or psychologically, by accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques."
[brief] [...] is a former United States Olympic fencer who gained national and international fame because she wore a hijab while winning a bronze medal at the 2016 Summer Olympics.  Am. Compl. ¶ 3 (Da 004-06).  Muhammad has also authored children’s books about wearing hijab.  Id.  Muhammad and [...] knew each other from the local community and maintained a friendly relationship with each other prior to the events giving rise to this lawsuit.  Id. ¶ 4 (Da 006-07).  Muhammad maintain a substantial online social media presence.  Id. ¶ 3 (Da 004-06).  IV.
[brief] As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to consider the application on the basis of notice.  Specifically, counsel for Plaintiff represented to the Board the following:  [...]:  Just listening to that called my attention to the fact that I went to the corner of Sherman Avenue and Boulevard today and I couldn’t find the Planning Board office.  That was in a different spot.  So, that, again, you have to be specific in these notices and that’s the one thing which is not specific here.  It gives the wrong address to go looking for plans.  People go looking for plans who are from out of this area, who are not familiar with the recent changes in [...].  They may do what I did, I look and see the police headquarters took over the whole building.  I had to go in and ask at the police headquarters where the other building was.  [1T 10:16-25; 11:1-4]  The Board considered that the notice of the new location was currently posted for any member of the public who went to the [...] location and accepted that jurisdiction was proper over the application:
[brief] Id. at 275, 300 A.2d 563.]  Thus, HN5 it is necessary to identify the equitable claims of each party and evaluate and weigh those claims in determining whether it is appropriate to apply the discovery rule.  The crucial inquiry is "whether the facts presented would alert a reasonable person exercising ordinary diligence that he or she was injured due to the fault of another.  The standard is basically an objective one—whether plaintiff 'knew or should have known' of sufficient facts to start the statute of limitations running."  Martinez, supra, 163 N.J. at 52, 747 A.2d 266....  As an issue of fact regarding malpractice, or negligence in one’s profession, is beyond the ken of the typical citizen, a cause of action sounding in malpractice must be established via expert testimony.  Therefore, via the discovery rule, an instance of malpractice cannot accrue in a malpractice claim until, without more, expert testimony is given at a jury trial.  POINT 6:
[brief] This appeal, arising from a condemnation case involves a very narrow issue, i.e., whether the condemnor’s appraisal of a property taken in fee simple estate, based on the capitalization of income, requires valuation based on market rents, when the actual rent of the anchor supermarket of the subject shopping center is a, below market, thirty-year-old lease negotiated before the existence of any improvements on the property?  Both New Jersey case law and generally accepted appraisal practice would answer “yes”.  But, the law division judge and an arbitrator disagreed with that conclusion.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  This case involves the taking of a shopping center (Lot 19 and adjoining vacant property Lot 18) located in the town center of [...], [...] in New Jersey under the local redevelopment act.  (N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 et seq.)  The Complaint, filed May 4, 2018, in paragraph seven provides that “the township is acquiring a fee simple interest in the properties.  (Da-1)  Notwithstanding that May 4, 2018 is the date of taking, pursuant to defendants’ motion, an Order was entered by the Hon. [...], J.S.C. on February 20, 2019, (Da10) designating January 27, 1994 as the date of valuation pursuant to N.J.S.A 20:3-30(d) as that was the date of the designation of the property as\(^1\) within an area “in need of redevelopment. ”  See Housing Authority of City of Newark v. Ricciardi 175 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1980).  The controlling statute as to the date of valuation in this case is based upon a finding by the legislature that after a declaration of blight there is a natural --- \(^1\)T Motion 02/20/2019 2T Motion 10/14/2020  3T Motion 08/18/2021  4T Arbitration Hrg.02/07/2022  5T Arbitration Hrg.02/08/2022  6T Arbitration Hrg.02/10/2022  7T Arbitration Hrg.02/18/2022 decline in property values.  In this case, the natural decline was aggravated by the filing of a prior eminent domain action condemning the subject property.
[brief] Upon cross-examination, [...] made the astounding admission that he had never done a comparison of his renderings with an actual post-construction photo of a development rendered through his processes.  5T 96:17-23.  Plaintiffs’ Planner, [...] testified with regard to height variance proofs under the standards set forth in Grasso v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights, 375 N.J. Super. 41 (App. Div. 2004).
[brief] State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 219, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1021 (1996).  Whether a prosecutor's misconduct denied defendant a fair trial requires consideration of both the "tenor of the trial and the responsiveness of counsel and the court to the improprieties when they occurred."  Timmendequas, 161 N.J. at 575.  A reviewing court will consider: (1) whether defense counsel made time and proper objections to the improper remarks; (2) whether the remarks were withdrawn promptly; and (3) whether the court ordered the remarks stricken from the record and instructed the jury to disregard them.  Id. at 575-76.  Prosecutors must confine their comments to evidence revealed during the trial and reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence.  State v. Mahoney, 188 N.J. 359, 376, (2006), cert denied, 549 U.S. 995 (2006); State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 330 (2005); State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 178 (2001).