ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Every one of them conclude that alleging a debt collector’s conveyance of information about a debt to a mail vendor states a claim for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).  The motion court’s decision never mentions those decisions.  Instead, the motion court—ignoring *R. 1:36-3*’s prohibition against citing an unpublished decision—cited and heavily relied on four unpublished decisions from other Law Division judges.  T17:1-T22:9 (those unpublished decisions, having been presented to the motion court by Defendant, are reproduced beginning at Pa34, Pa47, Pa56, and Pa81).  Notably, with one exception, those unpublished decisions also ignored the contrary federal court decisions.  The lone exception is the *Miller* decision which, at Pa75, acknowledged an Eleventh Circuit decision but noted that the decision had been vacated pending an *en banc* rehearing.  *Miller* never addressed the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning or the reasoning from the other federal decisions upholding the validity of the mail vendor theory.
[brief] *Rendine*, 141 N.J. at 337.  That evidence is then used by the judge in comparing “the rate of the prevailing attorney in comparison to rates ‘for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation’ in the community. ”  *Furst*, 182 N.J. at 22 (citation omitted).  Landlord did not come close to meeting its burden.  Rather, in support of its fee application, Landlord simply submitted a certification in which counsel attested that the fee arrangement was in accordance with the firm’s own “prevailing hourly rate,” not the market rate in the relevant community as is required.
[brief] (Pa000066).  [...] filed its first Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of the Complaint on April 1, 2022.  (Pa000043).  The basis for filing this motion was that:  (1)  Plaintiffs had not served an Affidavit of Merit with respect to [...]’s engineering services and site plans, as required under N.J.S.A. § 2A:53A-27, et seq.; and (2) Plaintiffs conceded that they were unaware of whether [...] actually trespassed onto the Property.  (Pa000046-47).  [...] further argued that the Affidavit of Merit statute was designed to weed out frivolous claims and applied to claims of “professional malpractice or negligence. ”  Id. (emphasis added).  On May 27, 2022, the trial court, recognizing that the case was early in discovery, granted the motion in part, dismissing with prejudice “any claims alleging professional negligence.
[directive] Meeting Schedule  The [...] shall meet, as a minimum, quarterly at the [...] in Trenton, New Jersey, but may meet at other times, as needed, if an emergent matter presents itself.  Mandatory Members  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:4B-55, the [...] is comprised of the following members or their designees:  the Attorney General;  the Director of the [...];  the Chief of the [...];  the Executive Director of the [...];  the Executive Director of the [...];  a representative from the [...]; and  a representative from the [...].
[brief] From there, it follows that there would be an easement right to directly travel to the ocean from the Premises.  Therefore, because the 1925 Plan shows the beach, which [...] marketed as an amenity for “Surf Fishing” and “Surf Bathing,” and the [...]’ property abuts and is contiguous to that beach there is a “strong” “inference that [a] servitude [was] created to implement [that] planned use. ”  Restatement, § 2.13, cmt. b.  6.
[brief] ”  Hb at p.10.\(^7\)  However, the Company’s “access” to ratepayer funds is not without limits and is subject to Board approval.  Indeed, the utility’s funds are far from unlimited as every dollar spent by a utility is --- \(^6\)  I/M/O the Petition of [...] for a Determination Pursuant to the Provisions of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19 Re: North Central Reliability Project, [...] (June 18, 2012).  \(^7\)  This statement is made in an attempt to shift the burden of proof.  While Rate Counsel does not address the burden of proof issue, Rate Counsel notes first that financial status does not impact burden of proof and second, as explained below, ratepayers are not a source of unlimited funds. recovered from ratepayers with the addition of a return on investment.  Ratepayers are not an endless source of funding and the Board’s review will at some point limit the utility’s access to funds.  Below the Board properly considered the cost of the combustion heater purchased by the Company, in comparison to the more expensive catalytic heater, when it determined that the Regulator was reasonably necessary.  H38a at p. 18.  The Board was well aware that those additional costs would be borne by ratepayers and that the additional cost was not required for safe and adequate service to [...]’s customers.  Therefore, the Board properly considered the cost of the project and the Court should affirm the Board’s decision.  POINT II
[brief] N.J.R.E. 607 provides that for the purpose of attacking or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party may examine the witness and introduce extrinsic evidence relevant to the issue of credibility.  N.J.R.E. 607 embodies the right to cross examination which has been referred to as the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth. ”  State v. Silva, 131 NJ 438, 444 (1993)  Any witness may be cross examined “with a view of demonstrating the improbability or even fabrication of his testimony. ”  State v. Silva, 131 NJ at 445.  The issue of a witness’ credibility transcends whether the credibility is related to liability or damages.  Although this matter was bifurcated for the purposes of trial the jury during plaintiff’s case in chief was apprised of plaintiff’s damages claims.  Testimony demonstrated that plaintiff was alleging injury to his neck for which he underwent two (2) surgeries; that he has not worked since the incident at [...] and that it is his position in this litigation that he cannot work because of the injuries from the incident at [...].  With this testimony from plaintiff, the defense was well within its right to cross examine plaintiff with extrinsic evidence of his ability to work and his ability to engage in strenuous physical activity.  At the close of trial, by virtue of the “False in One-False in All” charge, jurors were instructed they could disregard [...]’s version of the incident at [...] if they believed that [...] deliberately lied about a material fact.
[directive] The original pursuing jurisdiction shall provide timely notification of a pursuit in progress to any other jurisdiction into which the pursuit enters.  Notifying another jurisdiction that a pursuit is in progress is not a request to join the pursuit.  The pursuing agency shall advise if assistance is necessary.  Whenever the pursuing officers are unfamiliar with the roadways and terrain of the jurisdiction into which the pursuit has entered, the pursuing agency shall, when possible, seek the assistance of, and be prepared to relinquish the pursuit to, the other agency.  13
[brief] [...] entered Appellant’s residence and located [...], who was laying on the floor unresponsive and suffering from an apparent overdose.  [Pa104].  [...] attempted to question Appellant about what caused [...]’s overdose, but Appellant was evasive and gave inconsistent answers.  [Pa104-Pa105].  At first, Appellant told [...] that [...] had only been drinking.  [4T68:11-23].  Appellant changed his story, eventually stating that [...] may have taken pills, then conclusively stated that [...] took oxycodone.  [Pa104; 4T68:11-23].  It is important to note that Appellant specifically referenced oxycodone, not any general opioid, because this coincides with Appellant refilling his oxycodone prescription on July 16, 2018, a mere five (5) days before the Incident.
[brief] II.  APPLICANT FOR THE THIRD TIME MISCONSTRUES PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENTS REGARDING BIFURCATION.  A.  Applicant misconstrues Plaintiffs’ arguments relating to the bifurcation.  Despite being corrected by Plaintiffs’ reply brief before the trial court and by Plaintiffs’ opposition to Applicant’s motion to strike filed in the Appellate Division, the Applicant simply repeats its opposition brief before the trial court and ignores the real argument.  Plaintiffs are not arguing that the bifurcation of the use variance application and the site plan application was inappropriate.  Plaintiffs are arguing that even though the application has been bifurcated, the Applicant still must meet the requirements under the MLUL, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-38, and the Robbinsville Ordinances §§ 142-77 and 142-78, for applications for subdivisions.  (Pb25-Pb26).  Plaintiffs’ citations to cases relating to bifurcation of use variance and site plan applications, were explicitly identified as analogous situations, and not as the primary argument.  (Pb25-Pb26).  Nowhere in this appeal are Plaintiffs allege that bifurcation, as the term of art under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-76b relating to use variances and site plan applications, was improper.
[brief] [3T36]  [...], [...] (D.N.J.).  That case was dismissed on procedural grounds in favor of all issues being litigated in this case.  4 [...] adopts the same references to the transcripts that the Firm and Schibell designated in their opening brief.  [Pb4 n. 1 (“1T refers to the transcript dated October 22, 2021; 2T refers to the transcript dated November 18, 2021; and 3T refers to the transcript dated March 31, 2022. ”)]  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] *Cicchetti* directly supports Defendant’s position because it is undisputed that Defendant would *not* have hired Plaintiff had she disclosed her criminal convictions during the application process.  (Appx 195-96 ¶¶1, 8-11; Appx 527-28 ¶¶31-36).  The Trial Court distinguished *Cicchetti* during oral argument: > [w]e’re *not talking an expungement* that happened 20 years ago.  . . .  That’s why it’s a little different.  But this -- *this woman went to jail for drug dealing for five years*.  And it’s clear from the statute that you just handed me that *she should’ve never had this job*.  (Appx 572 at 23:1-6 (emphasis added)).  The sheer importance of whether or not Plaintiff had disqualifying criminal convictions is demonstrated by the fact that Defendant asked Plaintiff about past criminal convictions *three separate times* during the application process, and had her sign three separate documents as part of her application — to confirm that she had no prior convictions – including one she completed under oath.
[brief] ACa80.  As with the prevention of child abuse, the prevention of discrimination is certainly a compelling governmental interest in the abstract.  But the Parental Secrecy Policy is not narrowly tailored to serve that goal.  Under both the Parental Notification Policy and the Parental Secrecy Policy, schools are required to socially transition students upon their request.  The only substantive difference is that under the Parental Notification Policy, schools must inform parents of their actions, while under the Parental Secrecy Policy, schools are not required to inform parents.  Because social transitioning is required under both policies, to justify the Parental Secrecy Policy, it is not enough for the State to demonstrate that *socially transitioning* students prevents discrimination.
[brief] 15 - **Daniel v. State, Dept. of Transp.**, 239 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 589 (App.  Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 325 (1990) .......................... 17 - **Ferlise v. Eiler**, 202 N.J. Super. 330 (App. Div. 1985) ....................... 42 - **Fielder v. Stonack**, 141 N.J. 101 (1995) ..............................................
[brief] Rule 4:50-1 permits a court to relieve a party from a final judgment on the following grounds: "(a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . (d)" the judgment or order is void; . . . or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order."  It is "designed to reconcile the strong interests in finality of judgments and judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should have the authority to avoid an unjust result in any given case."  Mancini v. EDS ex rel N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 132 N.J. 330, 334 (1993)).
[brief] To the extent that Complainants believe that language from Advisory Opinion A36-17 (A36-17), specifically, "Similar to all other newly elected, as well as currently seated, Board members," stands for the proposition that school officials are bound by the standards enumerated in the Act prior to the start of their term, such reliance is misplaced.  The language in A36-17 was written to ensure that all new Board members understand that, once their term begins, they, like their currently seated colleagues, are immediately bound by the provisions of the Act.  Moreover, A36-17 details the Commission's advice regarding the subject school official's prospective behavior and did not in any way suggest that the Commission had the authority to find a violation of the Act and/or recommend a sanction for conduct that occurred prior to the start of a school official's term.  *Id.* at 9 (Ra20), Certainly, the Commission is in the best position to interpret its own opinions.  Complainants argue that their "due process" rights were violated by the Commission's ruling that it had no jurisdiction over alleged violations of the School Ethics Act that occurred before Respondent was sworn in as a member of the Board because they had no notice that the jurisdictional issue would be addressed by the Commission.  Cb39, citing *Silveira-Francisco v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Elizabeth*, 154N.J. 126, 141 (1998).  Respondent, however, raised the issue of the application of the Act to posts that predate her membership in the Board in her brief in support of her motion to dismiss.  Ra24.  In their opposition brief, Complainants responded to this contention.  Cb194.  Since Complainants had ample notice that the issue would be raised and responded accordingly, their due process argument is baseless.
[brief] [...], a Sheriff’s Officer Sergeant employed by the [...] (“[...]”) filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission challenging the [...]’s decision not to promote her to the position of Sheriff’s Officer Lieutenant from the PC1557A eligible list.  AA1-7.  On June 7, 2023, the Commission denied her appeal.  Ibid.  Zirrith requested that the Commission reconsider that decision and award her attorneys’ fees.  AA9-16.  The Commission denied her request for reconsideration.  Ibid.  This appeal followed.
[brief] 34 - Fid. Union Tr. Co. v. Union Cemetery Ass'n, 138 N.J. Eq. 50, 52 (1946)....- 30 - Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Rosa, 399 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir. 2005)  ........- 7 - Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239 (2015)  ...........................................-  10 - Guerriero v. U-Drive-It Co., 22 N.J. Super. 588, 592 (Cnty. Ct. 1952)......-  12 - Hassan v. Williams, 467 N.J. Super. 190 (App. Div. 2021)  ...............................-
[brief] See Engines, Inc. v. MAN Engines & Components, Inc., 2010 WL 3021871, at *7 (D.N.J. July 29, 2010) (holding, “Business relationships evolve and are not necessarily fully captured by their foundational contract. ”).  Further, [...]’s reference to a “distributor arrangement” in the March 2019 termination letter does not itself constitute a retroactive written arrangement.  Even if there was a distribution arrangement between the parties, it must be reduced to writing during the course of the relationship to create a franchise.
[brief] See 0912a-0913a § 3.09.  In fact, the only “work” upon the Project that the registered archaeologist is expected to perform is to “request that work be temporarily stopped to allow sufficient time for investigation, recordation, and data recovery. ”  See 0912a § 3.09C.  The words used in the bid documents to describe the registered archaeologist’s activities are: monitor, identify, inspect, consult, investigate, record, recover data, be “on call”, retrieve, photograph, report, and deliver.  See 0912a-0913 § 3.09.  Furthermore, the technical specifications refer to the registered archaeologist as “he/she”, and not as an entity, contractor, subcontractor, business, etc.
[directive] 23.  b.  Do you understand that if the judge decides to impose a more severe sentence than [Yes/Sim] [No/Nao] recommended by the prosecutor, that you may take back your plea?  Voce entende que se o juiz decidir impor uma sentenc;:a mais severa do que a recomendada pela promotoria voe€: podera retirar sua declarac;:ao de culpa?
[brief] If the Court wishes to consider the merits of Plaintiff’s evidentiary arguments on this Appeal, [...] respectfully submits that the Trial Court’s determination of the evidentiary issues was unassailably correct.  N.J.R.E. 401 defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action."  To be relevant, the evidence must bear directly upon the issues as set forth in the pleadings.  As this Court noted in State v. Hutchins, 241 N.J. Super. 353, 358 (App. Div. 1990), "irrelevant evidence is inadmissible.  Relevancy is tested by the probative value the evidence has with respect to the points at issue.  The true test is the logical connection between the evidence and a fact in issue."  Evidence is irrelevant if it does not have a "sufficient relationship to any material fact actually in issue in the case."  State v. Jones, 346 N.J. Super. 391, 405 (App. Div. 2002).  In Hutchins, supra, the Court stated, The rule speaks in terms of a "material" fact which is logically probative evidence .
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020  8.6.4  Any questions asked of officers during an internal investigation must be "narrowly and directly" related to performance of their duties and the ongoing investigation.10  Officers must answer questions directly and narrowly related to that performance.  All answers must be complete and truthful, but officers cannot be compelled to answer questions having nothing to do with their performance as law enforcement officers, that do not implicate a rule or regulation violation, or that are unrelated to the investigation.  8.6.5  At the interview’s conclusion, the investigator should review with the subject officer all the information obtained during the interview to alleviate any misunderstandings and to prevent any controversies during a later proceeding.  Gardner v Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968).  10  53  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020  9
[brief] PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO EXCESS UIM COVERAGE IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,000,000 AS PURCHASED FROM DEFENDANT [...] BECAUSE THE DEFINITIONAL EXCLUSION [...] RELIED UPON TO DENY COVERAGE AS CONTAINED IN THE UNDERLYING [...] POLICY WAS AMBIGUOUS AS APPLIED TO [...] AND FURTHER RESULTED IN A DENIAL THAT FAILED TO MEET PLAINTIFFS’ REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF COVERAGE (2T20:16-25:22)
[brief] ”  R. 4:4-3(a).  Neither the company [...] nor the process server [...] is part of the undersigned attorney’s law office, but even if [...] was my employee the Court Rule allows it because service can be made by me or my agent.  But most importantly, the Trial Judge addressed it.  The conclusion was specific, direct and unequivocal.  The Court transcript reads as follows as stated by the trial judge:  The entire issue that this hearing was to determine is whether or not service of process upon the defendant was effectuated.  What we have is a proof of service that indicates that service was effectuated.  The issue -- I think that service was on August -- August 23rd of 2021.
[brief] Dodson v. Cook Cnty. Jail, No. 16 CV 0345, 2019 WL 764041 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2019).  [Emphasis added.]  Under applicable standards, a plaintiff must prove two things.  First, he or she must make an objective showing that his medical need was serious.  See, e.g., Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).  [Emphasis added.]  Second, a plaintiff must make a subjective showing that officials were deliberately indifferent to his or her serious medical need.
[brief] That presumption of validity is deeply rooted in the Constitution of New Jersey:  [A]ny law concerning municipal corporations formed for local governments . . . shall be liberally construed in their favor.  The powers of . . . such municipal corporations shall include not only those granted in express terms but also those of necessary or fair implication, or incident to the powers expressly conferred, or essential thereto . . .  N.J. Const., Art. IV, § VII, ¶ 11.  In fact, the presumption is so strong it may only be overturned by a court if it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
[brief] ”).  The purpose of requiring a driver to signal is to alert other drivers of movements that could affect them so they can react accordingly.  See Williamson, 138 N.J. at 304 (“Motorists in the vicinity whose movements may be affected must be made aware of a driver’s intentions. ”).  It would be an absurdity for the Legislature to require a lane change be made with safety under the first sentence, but not require a signal under the second sentence even if “other traffic may be affected by such movement.
[brief] Relating such a question to age discrimination in this context is not evidential, it is purely plaintiff’s “feeling. ”  Puder, 183 N.J. at 441.  The trial court recognized that plaintiff’s reliance on his own self-serving statement (Pa665) does not constitute competent evidence.  (3T18:12 – 3T:19:6).  Second, while it is possible for a single incident to be “severe” enough to constitute a hostile work environment, “it will be a rare and extreme case in which a single incident will be so severe that it would, from the perspective of a reasonable [person situated as the claimant], make the working environment hostile.
[brief] The first sentence is inaccurate.  The Decedent’s Will was no secret.  It was carefully drafted after the Decedent met with a trusted long-time friend, [...], Esq., at which time Maguire was convinced of the Decedent’s honest and open intentions.  The Will was witnessed by two persons, and it’s existence was made known to various of the Decedent’s friends.  In addition, the Chancery Division aptly states: Respondent did not participate nor was she present for the creation or signing of the Will.  The Will was made years before Decedent's passing and was not changed after its execution.  Decedent affirmed her testamentary intent from the hospital before her death.  Further, the Will is consistent with the terms of the Antenuptial Agreement, Ex. RM2, and the letter Petitioner sent Decedent in the Summer of 2005.  Ex. P-28.  This Court finds that there were no suspicious circumstances surrounding the drafting and execution of Decedent's 2014 Will. (Pa 35).
[brief] 1T69:23-70:8; 77:1-3; 79:21-25; 80:1-82:35; 83:1-25.  Yet Defendant would have the Court believe that the alienation of his children, particularly [...], is solely because Defendant will not pay for college, and not because of the years of emotional abuse and neglect that he inflicted upon them after remarrying.  New Jersey law should not reward a parent who engages in such behavior, when the lack of a relationship with the child is a result of the parent’s own doing.