ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] "[When] an employee is afflicted with an underlying physical disease bearing causally upon [a] resulting disability . . . the traumatic event need not be the sole or exclusive cause of the disability."  Gerba v. Bd. of Trs., PERS, 83 N.J. 174, 187 (1980).  In such cases, "[a]s long as the traumatic event is the direct cause, i.e., the essential significant or substantial contributing cause of the disability, it is sufficient to satisfy the statutory standard of an accidental disability even though it acts in combination with an underlying physical disease."
[brief] Another independent basis to reverse the Court’s Order that enforced the Photocopy is that it does not conform to the law.  Specifically, in 1989, New Jersey adopted the Uniform Pre-Marital Agreement Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 37:2-31 to -41, which expressly applies to agreements "executed on or after" 1989.  The Act is applicable to the Photocopy which is dated November 22, 1991.  The Act renders the Photocopy unenforceable because it lacks an itemized list of the parties' assets as required under the Act.  see N.J.S.A. 37:2-33.  Specifically, NJSA 37:2-33 titled “Formalities” mandates that a statement of assets be annexed to a prenuptial agreement for it to be enforceable.  That statute was enacted after the Court in DeLorean v. DeLorean, 211 N.J.Super. 432, 439 (Ch. Div. 1986) suggested that the Court, by rule, require that an itemized list be attached to prenuptial agreements to discourage a plethora of plenary hearings:  A conflict arose as to precisely what financial information was disclosed by Mr. DeLorean.  …  But we should address the question of how to avoid disputes of this nature in the future.  It is clear that we can ascertain with complete certainty whether there was a full and complete disclosure only by requiring a written list of assets and income be attached to the antinuptial agreement.  Anything less will encourage a plethora of plenary hearings which would frequently be complicated by contradictory and conflicting testimony, often tainted by memory lapses.  In Orgler v. Orgler, 237 N.J. Super. 342 (App. Div. 1989) the court again noted that the "'easiest device' to evidence" of knowledge of a party's financial condition "is by annexing to the agreement a list of assets and their approximate values."
[brief] The Commissioner’s Decision to Affirm the Commission’s Penalty Recommendation of Censure was Reasonable and Supported by Precedent.  The Commissioner’s decision to impose a penalty of censure for [...]’s conduct is consistent with his own prior rulings, and should be affirmed.  In IMO [...], [...], Bergen County, Commissioner No. 15-12/23A (April 22, 2024), the school official remained present during a board executive discussion over whether it should appoint her husband or another candidate to an open seat on the board.  In assessing the appropriate penalty for her violations of the Act, the Commissioner found the penalty of censure was “commensurate with those recommended by the SEC and affirmed by the Commissioner in similar matters” where board members violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b) by creating a justifiable impression among the public that they were attempting to use their official position to secure unwarranted benefits for themselves or others.  See also IMO [...], Bergen County, Commissioner No. 65-2/22 (April 14, 2022) (censuring board member who violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b) by making comments during a public meeting that a reasonable person could believe were intended to secure an unwarranted advantage for certain candidates in the upcoming board election over the candidate who had filed an OPRA lawsuit against the board).  Because [...]’s actions had the potential to compromise the Board by creating a justifiable impression among the public that he was using his position as Board President in order to secure an advantage over an adversary at the Board’s expense, the Commissioner rightly affirmed the Commission’s assessment that censure is the appropriate penalty for such behavior.  (Aa232, Aa235).  As the Commission explained, [...]’s “blatant use of board resources for his own motivations was not de minimis[.]” (Aa5).  An examination of the record developed below demonstrates that the Commissioner’s decision is reasonable and consistent with applicable statutes, regulations, and administrative precedents.  Therefore, the decision finding that [...] should be censured for violating N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) and (f) should be accorded deference and affirmed.
[brief] BASIS FOR APPELLATE  JURISDICTION  This Rule 2:2-3 “As of Right”  Appeal arises from six final Superior Court trial court orders: (i)  Four April 27, 2023 post-remand pre-answer pre-discovery lack of standing jurisdictional dismissals with prejudice orders in favor of defendants (Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86); (ii) An April 27, 2023 denial of plaintiff’s disqualifying conflict of interest cross-motion on the grounds of mootness (Pa88); and (iii) A July 10, 2023 denial of plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, alteration, amendment and clarification of the five April 27, 2023 Final Orders (Pa89).
[brief] Instead, there exists, to this day, a series of continuing duties noted in the Agreement that did not appear in [...].  f.  In [...] the employer offered a 30-day provision as noted here.  [...] rejected the option.  Instead, he settled his case for $645,000.00 under a general release absolutely and forever.  The thirty-day provision never reached the [...] in [...].  g.  In [...] there was no expressed intent to move [...] towards involuntary disability, nor any agreement that he was medically disabled; the employer acquiesced that they wouldn't stand in his way.  h.  Respondent does not present a fraud argument as found in [...]; rather the parties reached the final agreement in October 2020 (ratified November 2020) believing that it would work and included the Par. 18 safeguard to ensure the agreement was effective.
[directive] As noted in Section 7.1, these Guidelines afford two distinct options by which a prosecutor may account for the use or possession of firearms at the time of arrest or during the course of the underlying Brimage-eligible offense.  (In some cases, both options may or must be used to fully account for defendant’s relevant conduct.)  In the following enumerated circumstances, unless the prosecutor determines that there is insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction for violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1, and except as otherwise provided in Section 13 (Cooperation Agreement), a prosecutor shall be required to tender a plea offer that provides that the defendant will plead guilty to the most serious Brimage-eligible offense and also to an offense charging a violation of a second-degree crime defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a), which would thereby require the court to impose consecutive sentences.
[brief] Dated: October 17, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................  1 COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...... 2 ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................  7  I.  THE AUTHORITY PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT’S APPLICATION AND ITS DECISION IS ENTITLED DEFERENCE (Aa236-45).  .................................................................  7  A.  The Authority Properly Denied Appellant’s Application Based On Valid On-Site Considerations.  (Aa236-45)......................................................................................  8  B.  The Authority Was Not Required to Approve Appellant’s Application.  (Aa236-45).................................................................  12  C.  [...] Had the Authority to Review Appellant’s Proposed Loading Operations Without Rulemaking.  (Aa236-45)......................................................................................  13  II.  [...] DID NOT REACH THE QUESTION OF WHETHER APPELLANT JUSTIFIED ANY PARKING VARIANCE.  (Aa236-45)......................................................................................  14  III.  THE HEARING OFFICER’S REPORT AND RESOLUTION 24-23 ARE BASED ON SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. (Aa236-45).  ......................................................................................  14  CONCLUSION  .............................................................................................................
[brief] He agrees that the property described as upland on P-2 (Pa202) would be that land which is upland of the mean high-water line (6T65:24).  He also agrees that the Riparian Grant would in fact be going from the shoreline out to the sea or out to the water and the land line beneath that water would be the Riparian Grant (6T66).  That is all of the properties which are located south of Ocean Avenue would be the upland (6T66:8).  Ocean Avenue as well as the beach would be referred to as the upland.  He agrees it is possible that the area north of the beach which is the heavy line would be the mean high-water line (6T67:20) (Pa26).  He generally agree that the Riparian Grant will always be adjacent to the upland property (6T74:18).  When asked if he has a drawing that shows the mean high-water line other than what it is shown on the 1980 Tax Map (Pa201) [...] replies that he does but that it is “back at the office” (6T80:5).  He claims he did not bring it with him because it was not one of the marked Exhibits.  The hearing concludes (6T80).
[brief] The Township and Board shall expedite review and approval of all necessary governmental approvals, within its jurisdiction. ”  Pa058 (emphasis added).  Section 18 of the Settlement Agreement provides that the “Township and the Board shall work diligently, in good faith, and shall undertake all commercially reasonable efforts, including expediting reviews of [...]’s submissions and scheduling of special meetings, as necessary to effectuate the terms of this Agreement. ”  Pa062.  Here, the Board clearly breached Sections 8(g), 10, and 18 of the Settlement Agreement.
[brief] INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT .................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................................................  2 STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................  5  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO BAR EVIDENCE OF THE THIRTY-YEAR-OLD [...] LEASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED AS A MATTER OF LAW(Da108) ......................  8  POINT II  THE ARBITRATOR SHOULD NEVER HAVE USED THE [...] LEASE FOR ANY PURPOSE(Da115;Da116) ..........................  13  POINT III  THE AWARD CANNOT BE CURED BY SIMPLY REDOING THE MATH AND ADDING TWO DOLLARS  A SQUARE FOOT TO THE ARBITRATORS’ CALCULATIONS(Da115;Da116) ...............................................................  15 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................
[brief] *State v. Gioe*, 401 N.J. Super. 331, 339 (App. Div. 2008), certif. denied, 199 N.J. 129 (2009).  The rule is designed to prevent, rather than repair, by removing any incentive by police to disregard a civilian’s Fourth Amendment rights.  *Hamlett*, 449 N.J. Super. at 175-76.
[brief] The Order and Decision Appealed From [...] renewed its motion to dismiss after extensive discovery took place.  Expert reports were exchanged, and all experts were deposed.  All of Appellant’s experts acknowledged that the services provided were professional engineering services.  While Appellant, in their brief, selected certain portion of their experts’ testimony to attack the finding of the trial court, said experts, when deposed, Appellants experts, as noted below agreed that the services which by [...] and [...] contracted for, were professional engineering services.  G. Plaintiff’s Experts Testimony
[directive] 4.  Serve as a resource center and hub of technical assistance and training for the State with respect to victim assistance and violence intervention and prevention services with the goal of improving access to available services, promoting awareness of available resources and models of services, expanding such services, and developing new preventative strategies.  5.  Coordinate among, build partnerships between, and support initiatives involving law enforcement entities and victim assistance and violence intervention and prevention service providers to improve public health and public safety.
[brief] The trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying the belated request for leave to amend, noting that discovery was long closed, most other defendants had been dismissed and Appellants knew of the predicate facts underlying their claims years earlier, yet inexplicably chose not to assert them earlier and thus the amendment was prejudicial to [...].  There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court and its exercise of discretion should not be disturbed on appeal.  Beyond the obvious prejudice relied upon below, the denial was warranted as the amendment was futile.  The trial court had already made significant, correct conclusions of law based on undisputed facts in dismissing similar claims against the [...], namely, that the direct and proximate cause of Appellants’ losses was their failure to pay rent to [...].  The same rationale applied equally to [...] - Appellants’ alleged losses were caused by their failure to pay rent to [...], not because of any alleged representations made when the subject lease was entered, the purported breach of confidentiality, or termination of the lease.  As to the dismissal, it is clear that the First Amended Complaint – the pleading Appellants were left with after leave to amend again was properly denied – did not set forth any claims against, or seek any relief from, [...].
[brief] *State v. Brown*, 80 N.J. 587, 600 (1979), (quoting *Latta v. Caulfield*, 79 N.J. 128, 135 (1979)).  To determine whether a charge was correct, the court must examine the charge as a whole.  *State v. Jordan*, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997), (citing *State v. Wilbely*, 63 N.J. 420, 422 (1973)).
[brief] Indeed, [...] specifically stated:  “And so again, and that is by no way should be interpreted as in -- as an indication that the Court is casting any type of critique against the plaintiffs.  The case evolved as the case evolved.  And to the extent that new claims are discovered during discovery, well, they are discovered. ” (885a; 1T, 80:19-24).  A plain reading of the plain language of the transcript demonstrates that [...] denied Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint solely because she was swayed by the finding that there would be no prejudice to Plaintiffs as they would not lose, under any doctrine, case law, or court rule, their right to bring these newly discovered claims in a new action.
[brief] On October 13, 2021, a Union County Grand Jury returned Indictment Number [...] charging defendant [...] and co-defendants [...],¹ [...], and [...] with second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (Count 1); and fourth-degree possession of a large capacity ammunition magazine, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j) (Count 2).  (Da1-2)²  Barptelus was also charged in a disorderly persons complaint for possession of a controlled dangerous substance, less than fifty grams of marijuana, 2C:35-10(a)(4).  (Da3)  On February 28, 2022, [...] filed a motion to suppress evidence seized by police following a warrantless search of [...]’s vehicle.  (Da11)  Barptelus joined the motion on March 5, 2022.  (Da15)  On July 12, 2022, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. held an evidentiary hearing.  (1T)  On August 23, --- ¹  We refer to co-defendants by their initials in the interest of privacy, as it appears their charges were dismissed and records related to the incident expunged.  See R. 2:6-1(a)(3); R. 1:38-3(c)(7).  ²  “Da” – Defendant's confidential appendix “1T” – July 12, 2022 (motion to suppress hearing)  “2T” – July 6, 2023 (motion to compel buccal swab hearing)  “3T” – December 11, 2023 (plea)  “4T” – April 12, 2024 (sentence)  2022, the court issued a written opinion and order denying defendants’ motion to suppress.  (Da13; Da14-40)  On January 13, 2023, the State filed a motion to compel buccal swabs from defendants.  (Da41-58)  On July 6, 2023, the court heard oral argument and the same day granted the State’s motion.  (2T; Da59-68).  On December 11, 2023, Barptelus pled guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (Count 1).  (3T; Da6-12)  On April 12, 2024, Barptelus was sentenced pursuant to the plea agreement to a term of five years imprisonment with forty-two months of parole ineligibility.  (4T; Da3-5)  Count 2 of the indictment and the disorderly persons complaint were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement.  (Da3-5; Da9)  As a condition of the plea agreement, Barptelus preserved the right to appeal the court’s order compelling a buccal swab.  (Da7); See R. 3:9-3(f).  Barptelus filed a Notice of Appeal on May 16, 2024.  (Da69-73)
[brief] Where the U.S. Supreme Court decides a case and applies the legal ruling to the parties before it, then other courts must treat the same rule as retroactive, applying it "to all pending cases, whether or not those cases involve predecision events."  Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 752 (1995).  Appellants also note that separate from Tyler, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed two cases following Tyler.  These cases raised takings claims seeking just compensation after a tax sale and were not direct appeals from foreclosure.  See Fair v. Continental Resources, 143 S. Ct. 2580 (2023) (vacating Cont’l Res. v. Fair, 971 N. W. 2d. 313, 316-317 (N.E. 2022)); see also Nieveen v. Tax 106, No. 22-237 (U.S. 2023).  What is clear from this case law is that the Tyler/Roberto “pipeline” is not limited to cases on direct appeal, as Appellees posit.  Appellants’ case is a direct analog to Roberto in that is presents a timely and continuously open and prosecuted motion to vacate a final judgment, the adjudication of which was itself appealed.  Fair and Nieveen, by way of examples, interpret the pipeline far more expansively.  On this basis, this Court should determine that Appellants’ takings claim is entitled to retroactive consideration under Tyler and Roberto and overrule the lower court.
[brief] Pb18.  In *Lajara*, the Supreme Court held that the defendants in a private-party New Jersey Insurance Fraud Prevention Act claim have the right to a trial by jury.  *Lajara*, 222 N.J. at 134-35. \(^1\)  [...] also cites *Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Utility Co.*, 212 N.J. 576 (2013) (“*JCP&L*”), which held that it is impermissible for the legislature to require mandatory binding arbitration if doing so would deny a private party its constitutional right to a jury trial of a common-law cause of action.
[brief] ”  Williams, 113 N.J. at 453.  Moreover, Defendant again is unable to meet his burden of showing that this alleged error was “so egregious that it deprived [him] of a fair trial. ”  Cordero, 438 N.J. Super. at 490.  Defendant has not shown how these generalized, fleeting comments about the victim were “clearly capable of producing an unjust result,” Singh, 245 N.J. at 13.  C.  The Prosecutor did not denigrate the defense.
[brief] According to [...], “this would have resulted in a gain for [...] of between $4,900,450 and $8,167,416. ”  [Id.]  [emphasis in original].  Thus, the difference between the high range and the low range of profits is at least $3,266,966 (assuming a low range of 60%), with that delta increasing if [...]’s negotiated share in an “development team” is less than 60%.  Such a wide range of possible profits falls far short of “reasonable certainty. ”  At base, [...]’s blind assumptions based on [...]’s speculative testimony to support a range of profits “up to 60%” is objectively insufficient.  [...]’s testimony (and thus [...]’s opinion based on Bershtein’s testimony) that the [...] would have awarded low-income tax credits to an unidentified “development team led by [...]” is rank speculation.
[brief] See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 62 N.J. 473, 493-94 (1973) (describing “signal feature” of home rule as residents of political subdivision, within substantial limits, deciding how much to raise for services).  Imposing a set budget on school districts would effectively strip educators from applying their expertise in determining the best, most efficient manner to ensure that the needs of their students are met.  As the Department acknowledged below, some districts in the State are able to provide T&E while \textsuperscript{16}  Notably, several provisions in the SFRA contemplate a district spending above or below adequacy.  See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-70 (defining data comparison to determine whether a district is spending above or below adequacy); N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-68 (considering whether a district is spending above or below adequacy in determining the amount of reductions in state aid); N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5d (considering whether a district is spending above or below adequacy in determining its required local share). spending below adequacy.  (Aa1105; Aa1258).  Some districts choose to spend above.  *Ibid.*  Either way, districts are not absolved of their obligation to take appropriate steps toward locally contributing at a level sufficient to meet their educational needs and budget priorities.  Indeed, the statute entrusts districts with the ultimate responsibility to adopt “a budget that provides for [T&E].”
[brief] Pa42 to Pa43.  Before being so notified by the [...], I did not know that there was a distinction between service time and service credit.  As a lay person, how was I supposed to know of such a technical distinction?  h)  **Improper use of N.J.S.A. 43:15A-54.**  The Correction of Errors Act, N.J.S.A. 43:15A-54, has been improperly used by the [...] against me based on an error by my former employer.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Final Order Denying Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.  Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County Indictment Nos. [...]; [...]; [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Letter Reply Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant  This letter is submitted in lieu of a formal reply brief pursuant to R. 2: 6-2 (b).  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  ........................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................1  POINT I THE STATE’S ARGUMENT THAT DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE AND CONVICTIONS UNDER HUDSON COUNTY INDICTMENT NOS. [...] AND [...]  MUST BE AFFIRMED  WRONGLY IGNORES BOTH THE FACTS AND THE CASE LAW RELEVANT TO THIS CASE.  THE MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS  .................................................................1  CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................7
[directive] 6  IMPLEMENTATION QUESTIONNAIRE -- GRAND JURY STANDARDS: Standard 7.  Oath of Secrecy  A uniform oath of secrecy shall be required of anyone, other than witnesses, who is permitted into the grand jury room.  Those taking the oath of secrecy shall be informed of the statutes prohibiting unauthorized disclosure of grand jury proceedings, including the penalties that may be imposed.  Judiciary staff required to take an oath of secrecy shall have the oath re-administered annually.  A.