[brief] Courts must therefore “construe the statute sensibly and consistent with the objectives that the Legislature sought to achieve. ”  *Mynster*, at 480 (citation omitted).  To this end, Appellant cites to a Senate Report’s findings as to the “general prohibition on contacting *any* third parties” and then prohibiting the use of letter vendors to assist in the mailing of collection letters comports with the FDCPA’s legislative history.  *See* Appellant’s Br., at 18 (citing S. Rep. No. 95–382, at 7 (1977) [emphasis added]); 223a.  But any reading of the full Senate Report shows this is simply incorrect.  The Senate Report on the FDCPA lays out the type of conduct Congress was attempting to curtail through § 1692c(b), namely: “*disclosing a consumer’s personal affairs to friends, neighbors, or an employer.*”  S. Rep. No. 95–382, at 2 (1977) (emphasis added); 224a.  The Report goes on to state: “[The FDCPA] *prohibits disclosing the consumer’s personal affairs to third persons.*  Other than to obtain location information a debt collector may not contact *third persons such as a consumer’s friends, neighbors, relatives, or employer.*  Such contacts are not legitimate collection practices and result in serious invasions of privacy, as well as loss of jobs. ”  *Id.* at 4 (emphasis added).  Thus, Appellant’s letter vendor theory of liability, far from comporting with FDCPA legislative history, is at odds with clear Congressional intent to prevent disclosures *only* to friends, neighbors, relatives, or employers, which may cause reputational or professional harm.  There is no reason to believe that Congress ever intended to outlaw the innocuous act of using a letter vendor for business efficiency.  Courts, including the Superior Court in this matter, have repeatedly relied on the Senate Report in concluding that Congress did not intend to prohibit the use of a letter vendor through § 1692c(b).  See Appx., at 35a; Miller v. [...], 2022 WL 20470401 at *10 (noting that § 1692c(b) was meant to protect consumers from the embarrassment and reputational harm from having their debts disclosed to friends, family, neighbors, etc., and that a consumer is threatened with no such harm by a letter vendor assimilating transmitted information into a letter that is sent only to the consumer); [...] Decision at p.12 (“The facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint simply do not implicate the purpose for which the statutory protection exists.  No facts are presently alleged that would permit a conclusion that the alleged supplying of information by the debt collector to the letter vendor was in any way intended to, or had or could have had the effect of, harassing, embarrassing, or humiliating the debtor or was otherwise undertaken for any reason other than legitimate collection activities directed to the debtor. ”); Cavazzini v. [...], 574 F. Supp. 3d 134, 142 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (noting that “Congress intended to target certain especially harmful debt collection practices—not all communications by debt collectors to third parties,” and certainly not the mere transmission of data to a letter vendor); *Barclift v. [...]*, 2022 WL 444267, *9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2022) (noting that Congress’s intent in including § 1692c(b) was to prevent disclosures to those who know the consumer and affect his or her reputation, not to companies hired to perform rote tasks like printing and sending a letter); *Quaglia v. [...]*, 2021 WL 7179621, *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2021) (same); *Nyanjom v. [...]*, 2022 WL 168222, *5 (D. Kan. Jan. 19, 2022) (same).