ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This matter arises from the death of [...] while working on a repaving project on the New Jersey Turnpike.  While working in an active uncontrolled construction zone for his employer, defendant [...] a/k/a [...]  ([...]), [...] was run over and dragged by a street sweeper, causing fatal injuries.  His surviving spouse, [...], filed suit on behalf of the Estate and individually (Plaintiffs).  Defendants are parties involved with the milling and repaving project who failed to ensure a safe workplace, including the employer, [...], the construction supervisor, defendant [...] ([...]), its subconsultant, defendant [...] ([...]), and [...] and [...], the owner and operator of the sweeper, respectively.  In June 2018, the trial court dismissed with prejudice plaintiffs’ claims against [...], holding that the claims were barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA).  In July 2019, the trial court dismissed with prejudice plaintiffs’ claims against [...] and [...], holding that plaintiffs’ claims were for professional negligence and required an Affidavit of Merit.  Plaintiffs now appeal those orders dismissing [...], [...], and [...].  Plaintiffs contend that the evidence submitted on [...]’s motion for summary judgment was sufficient for a jury to find that [...] was liable for an intentional wrong as that term has been defined under the WCA.  [...]’s many documented failures to comply with laws, regulatory standards, contract and safety requirements and its own company protocols created a work environment in which the exact harm that occurred was substantially certain to occur.  [...]’s failings were so numerous and pervasive that the work site was an accident waiting to happen, the only question was when.  The dismissal of [...] and [...] is contrary to Supreme Court precedent.  The negligent conduct for which plaintiffs claim those defendants are liable was committed by an employee who is not a “licensed person” as that term is used in the Affidavit of Merit (AOM) statute.  Plaintiffs’ claim against [...] and [...] is for vicarious liability for the negligence of that employee.  Pursuant to controlling precedent, therefore, plaintiff did not and does not require an AOM.  For those reasons, the motions granting summary judgment to [...], [...] and [...] must be reversed and the matter remanded.
[brief] (Aa66).  On June 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed another Motion for Reconsideration requesting that the Court require [...] to provide both Plaintiff and other member, [...], access to specific bank accounts listed, in addition to requiring all three of the individuals above to take part in the winding down of the company.  Plaintiff requested that the Court reinstate [...] and require Defendants Fischer and Caprow to return the funds that were withdrawn while Plaintiff’s request for a receiver was pending.  The motion further requested the Court to amend [...]’ Articles of Formation to include the only remaining members in accordance with the Court’s ruling, [...] and Fischer, as only they bore the joint responsibility to dissolve [...].  4T6:21-9:24.
[brief] Defendants Violate The MBPA And Anticipatorily Breached The Agreement By Falsely Accusing Appellants Of Violating The “Best Efforts”  Provision Of The Agreement In Bad Faith And Threatening Termination Without Good Cause.  These abusive tactics by [...] continued into 2022 and extended to personal and cultural insults against Appellants.  On September 29, 2022, Defendants met at Appellants’ offices in New Jersey (the “September Meeting”) for the purported purpose of introducing Appellants to [...]’s new Vice President of Sales, Defendant [...] (“[...]”).
[brief] Nor is defendant's claim supported by his own words or actions during the interview.  He did not startle or cower; he did not weep or plead with the detective to calm down or let him go.  Indeed, he did not react at all.  And when he said he was "tired as hell" and "[r]eady to go the f**k home," (Da104), shortly after the only time he said he has "nothing else to say" (Da101), the interview ended.  The detectives did not press on in an attempt to overbear his will.  Likewise, defendant's behavior and responses showed that he was in no way coerced by what he now claims were the detective's threats against his life and relationship with his children.  As the judge properly found, the detectives were not threatening to harm defendant, and their reference to the risk to his safety back out on the street did not even rise to the level of the references to a defendant's safety this court found permissible in *State v. Faucette*, 439 N.J. Super. 241, 260-61 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 221 N.J. 492 (2015), and fell far short of the "'very substantial psychological pressure' necessary for finding a defendant's will was overborne."
[brief] The reviewing court may "not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the sentencing court," *State v. Lawless*, 214 N.J. 594, 606 (2013), and must affirm the sentence unless (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the sentencing court were not based upon competent and credible evidence in the record; or (3) "the application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience."  *[State v. Miller*, 237 N.J. 15, 28 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting *State v. Fuentes*, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014))]. Therefore, even if a reviewing court "would have arrived at a different result," it is "bound to affirm a sentence . . . as long as the trial court properly identifies and balances aggravating and mitigating factors that are supported by competent credible evidence in the record."
[brief] ---  2  At summary judgment, the Guidelines were submitted by [...] under seal.  Intervenor did not see the Guidelines until they were submitted as an exhibit to [...]’s brief on appeal.  Further, …that while there is a large approximate 475 page master policy issued by [...] that governs the coverage [that] is available to [...], there is no exclusion in that master policy related to 12 or 15 passenger vans and automobile accidents.  [Ia576].  Because [...] was never provided with the Guidelines, his broker was not even aware of the exclusion in the Guidelines, and because the exclusion in the Guidelines conflict with the information provided in the Application and the Quote regarding the vans, [...] had a reasonable expectation of coverage.
[brief] (Aa41).  This number was based on wages only, and not unpaid member distributions owed to Plaintiff as a fully vested 10% member of [...].  The Court was silent on the status of the unpaid distributions to Plaintiff, which should have been calculated as part of the dissolution process, from which Plaintiff was ultimately excluded.  The Court found that it had no reliable means to value her interest, and that Plaintiff did not provide the Court with a reasonable formula to do the same.  (Aa41).  Further, the Court found that Plaintiff did not utilize cognizable valuation techniques to value [...] shares or provide proof as to the equitable date of the valuation other than the commencement of the lawsuit.  (Aa41).  The Trial Court found that “[w]ithout an expert report or other reliable means of evaluating [...], the court finds plaintiff has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to $250,000 for her 10% share of [...]. ” (Aa42).  The Court made no effort to determine payment of back annual distributions owed to Plaintiff, which are separate from and not based on corporate share valuation.  In addition, the Trial Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants [...] and [...], finding that Plaintiff did not prove a “duty or breach of that duty. ” (Aa45).  This included the Court finding that Plaintiff failed to prove facts as to [...] and [...] sufficient to pierce the corporate veil, citing State v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 501 (1983) (finding that the purpose of piercing the corporate veil “is to prevent an independent corporation from being used to defeat the ends of justice, to perpetrate fraud, to accomplish a crime, or otherwise evade the law.
[brief] APPELLANT DID GENERALLY PLEAD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN ANSWER  Appellant stated in the Answer that the amount sought by Respondent was “not correct. ”  Respondent was thereby put on fair notice that the amount owed to Respondent was to be reduced or eliminated.  “The key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense. ”  *Wyshack v. City Nat’l Bank*, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979), citing *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).  “[T]he ‘fair notice’ required by the pleading standards only requires describing... [an affirmative] defense in ‘general terms. ’”  *Kohler v. Flava Enters., Inc.*, 779 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 2015).  Respondent was given fair notice of Appellant’s recoupment and set-off defense in the Answer.
[brief] Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990).  For example, it is well-established that “a landlord generally does not have authority to consent to a search of a tenant’s premises. ”  State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194, 215 (1990) (citing Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961)).  This is true even if the rental agreement is not reduced to writing.  Coyle, 119 N.J. at 217.  And, even if a person has authority to consent to entry into another person’s room, they do not necessarily have the authority to consent to a search of that person’s personal effects.  Id. at 217-18.  While the situation here is inverted, the fundamental principle still applies: a tenant cannot consent to a search of a landlord’s personal effects either.
[brief] ***  Q: [] am I right – this answer is that [...] did not submit any payroll records or payroll reports to [...], right?  A: Yeah.  Q: Ever? A. Yeah.  (Morris Tr., 73:14-75:12 at TRVa2707-2708.)  The trial court undoubtedly found this evidence compelling in correctly ruling that [...] was not a Named Insured as a matter of law.  (SSR p. 28 at TRVa1358.)
[brief] Defendant received a 10-year sentence for first-degree robbery in 2022.  [...] held that defendant’s crimes were predominantly independent of each other and were committed in separate places against separate victims.  He held that the crimes each involved separate acts of violence.  Defendant’s --- 4  The Legislature added N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5a, which states “[t]here shall be no overall limitation on the cumulation of consecutive sentences for multiple offenses. ”  *Abdullah*, 184 N.J. at 513. crimes were not committed closely in time or in a single period of aberrant behavior.  [6T12-20 to 14-19].  There is nothing in the record that would justify concurrent sentences.
[brief] (8T 20-15 to 18, 66-15 to 21; Dca2-3, 5, 9-11)  [...]’s high school coach [...] wrote that at the time of the offense, [...] “was a misguided teenager that needed true guidance from the right person, but that over the course of [...]’s five years in prison Schofield had seen [...] “learn to control himself whenever he gets upset, express himself more,” and that “he has grown, matured, and developed into a completely different person from the last time he stood in the court room. ”  (Da79-80)  [...] spoke at his resentencing, taking responsibility for his conduct, expressing remorse, and stating that more than anything he wishes he could take back his actions on the day of the offense.  (8T 65-23 to 66-23)  [...] expressed his goal to become a youth mentor when he is released from prison to help steer kids away from making the same bad decisions that he made.  (8T 66-15 to 67-8)  After hearing this evidence, the Court acknowledged that [...] was “different today than you were before,” and that the Court could “see that being part of the maturation process.
[brief] Almost all the Profaci factors compel a finding of overbreadth.  First, the trial court identified its concern that free speech, clearly a substantial interest worthy of protection, is impacted by the language of the Noise Ordinance.  While Defendants argue that it “does not differ in any material way to the Millstone Ordinance” (Db40), they fail to recognize that the Noise Ordinance specifically prohibits “excessive…loud talking” which is noticeably absent from Millstone’s ordinance at issue in State v. Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J. Super. 624 (2005).  Without question, free speech merits protection from the unnecessary intrusion of this penal ordinance.  Next, significant concerns were raised with the complete lack of ability to measure potential violations of the Noise Ordinance objectively.  During [...]’s April 4, 2017 public hearing on the adoption of the Noise Ordinance, the governing body did not even try to provide a means of objective measurement when asked about it by the public.
[brief] Rule 4:6-2(e) provides an opportunity for a litigant to file a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."  A court must examine the legal sufficiency of the facts asserted in the complaint and determine whether a cause of action is "suggested" by the facts.  *Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.*, 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989).  The court must "search[] the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned."  Ibid.  (quoting *DiCristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem'l Park*, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 253 (App. Div. 1957)).  Although plaintiffs are afforded reasonable inferences of fact, the court cannot credit mere conclusory allegations.  *Teamsters Local 97 v. State*, 434 N.J. Super. 393, 413 (App. Div. 2013).  An appellate court's review of the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss is a question of law that is reviewed de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court.  *Save Camden Pub. Schs. v. Camden City Bd. of Educ.*, 454 N.J. Super. 478, 487 (App. Div. 2018).  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**
[brief] Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that [...] is correct that the holding in Kane is applicable to the instant matter, the analysis in Kane nonetheless bolsters [...]’s position.  In ruling on the employer’s participation at trial, the Kane court held:  Nothing in the Act precludes an employer from assuming a contractual duty to indemnify a third party through an express agreement.  Employers, who have agreed to indemnify a party sued by a plaintiff-employee, may be joined as third-party defendants in the employee’s suit against the indemnitee.  [Kane, 278 N.J. Super at 145].  In this matter, [...]’s negligence was placed at issue during the trial of plaintiff’s suit.  In fact, [...] was brought in by [...] as a third-party defendant specifically to enforce [...]’ indemnification obligations.  Thus, pursuant to the holding in Kane, which reaffirms long-held New Jersey Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Workers’ Compensation Act does not preclude an employer from assuming a contractual duty to indemnify a third party.
[brief] [...] fails to identify any authority to suggest that the Division’s use of its website to fulfill this notice requirement was inadequate.  Even though the Division satisfied the only notice requirement under the Ricci Act through the website posting, it went above and beyond to provide additional notice to its members through other means.  On August 8, 2019, the Division provided a letter regarding the Ricci Act to all Certifying Officers and advised them of their responsibility to make the letter available to all members at their respective locations.  (Pa11).  On August 9, 2019, a postcard with information regarding the Ricci Act was mailed to [...]’s home address (as well as the home addresses of over 200,000 other retirees).  (Pa11; Pa73; Pa75).  And, on June 10, 2021, the Division posted a news item on its website advising members and retirees that the statutory eligibility period to register under the Ricci Act was expiring soon and that they must submit the Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.  (Pa11).  Despite these additional methods not being required under the Ricci Act, [...] makes much of the fact that the Division’s postcard was not mailed to him by August 7, 2021.  (Pb10; Pb13).  The record demonstrates that the postcard was mailed on August 9, 2021.  (Pa73-75).  That slight delay in mailing the postcard is immaterial, as postcard notification was not required under the Ricci Act, and information about the Ricci Act was prominently posted on the Division’s website and publicly available for two years from the effective date of the statute.
[brief] Under R.4:50-1, a court may “relieve a party or the party’s legal representative from a final judgment or order,” R.4:50-1, to “prevent a manifest denial of justice,” Manning Eng’g, 74 N.J. at 120.  Pursuant to subsection (f) of R.4:50-1, a court may set aside a judgment “in ‘exceptional situations,’” Nowosleska, 400 N.J. Super. at 303 (quoting Mancini v. EDS, 132 N.J. 330, 336 (1993)), as long as the motion is made “within a reasonable time,” R.4:50-2.  Here, Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of his complaint to avoid liability for attorneys’ fees under UPEPA was an exceptional circumstance warranting relief from the trial court’s order of dismissal.
[brief] [...]  Plaintiffs’ expert [...] recognized that any claim against [...] arises from its alleged negligence in determining the contractor’s compliance with the governing plans and specifications.  In this regard, [...] testified as to [...]:  [I]f you are the resident engineer on the site, which is what they were, you are gonna have a understanding of the contract documents, as you pointed out, the prime contract, the requirements of those documents, the applicable standards, safety standards, OSHA and ANSI specifically being mentioned in those documents, the health and safety plans, and the requirements of all those documents, and that's your responsibility, to make sure all those things, okay, are complied with (Pa2046 at T100:4-13).  [...] testified that he was offering an opinion not simply on whether defendants were negligent, but whether there was a deviation from a standard of care.  Id. at T82:4-13.  4.
[brief] According to the undisputed evidence submitted and referenced with the State’s brief in opposition to the defendant’s suppression motion, on December 3, 2020, members of the [...] (SORT) arrived and executed a no-knock search warrant at [...] in [...].  (Pa6).  This search warrant execution was months in the making; (Pca8).  (Pca8).  (Pca8).  (Pca8).  (Pca10-14).  (Pca10).  The search warrants were executed at approximately 2:52 p.m. on December 3, 2020, by members of the Middlesex County SORT, who were the first to arrive on scene.  (Pa6, 9).  When they arrived, defendant and an individual later identified as [...] were located inside the Benz, parked immediately outside of defendant’s residence at [...].  (Pa6).  SORT members then approached the front door of the residence, which was unlocked.  (Pa9).  Officers then entered the residence without force and announced their presence.  (Pa9).  Upon entering the home, SORT encountered one adult female, identified as [...], located inside her bedroom on the left side of the second floor.  (Pa6, 9).  No other individuals were present at [...], and the residence was deemed clear at 2:54 p.m. (Pa9).  A search was then conducted pursuant to the written and judicially approved warrant where several items of evidentiary value were recovered, including but not limited to a quantity of marijuana and handgun, recovered after searching the defendant’s vehicle and residence.  (Pa11-20).  The various items of evidentiary value were placed in evidence.  (Pa8).  Investigation revealed that [...] did not have any ownership of the contraband that was found.  (Pa7).  Defendant was thus processed and charged accordingly.  (Pa7).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I
[brief] Second, the inquiries prior to defendant’s admission that his car contained drugs consisted of permissible routine questions attendant to traffic stops, see Baum, 199 N.J. at 424, and broader questions reasonably addressing suspicions raised by defendant’s answers and the officer’s observations, see Dickey, 152 N.J. at 479-80.  Specifically, during the first forty-eight seconds after defendant exited the car, the officer asked defendant about where he was traveling and what he was doing in the area.  The officer also confronted defendant about his constricted pupils (based on observations) and asked about the trouble that he got into in Montana (as evidenced by the outstanding warrant).  (V:16:57:57 to 58:45).  Once defendant explained his troubles in Montana involved “stupid choices” and “drugs,” the combination of facts known to the officer plainly supported questioning defendant for the next forty-two seconds prior to his admission that the car contained drugs.  (V:16:58:45 to 59:27).  That is, defendant’s reckless U-turn on a major thoroughfare, excessive nervousness, and constricted pupils, combined with his admission to criminal conduct involving drugs back in Montana, all justified the officer asking additional questions about defendant’s recent use and possession of narcotics.  Third, though the officer did not require reasonable suspicion beyond that needed to justify the original stop, the officer’s observations did establish reasonable suspicion.
[brief] In September 2019, Plaintiff received a request from Defendant, [...] on the marriage app, [...], and they began communicating.  1T56.  Plaintiff was able to review her profile which included her first name, last name, and date of birth.  Additional details about her were shared separately later.  1T101.  Plaintiff shared aspects of his cultural and traditional values with Defendant, to which she initially agreed.  [...] highlighted traits such as honesty, optimism, a blend of modern and traditional cultural values, a love for traveling, and shared views on marriage.  1T102.  Around mid-October 2019, Plaintiff discovered discrepancies in Defendant’s stated birth date; her profile initially indicated July 1, 1995, but he later learned it was July 26, 1995.  1T56.  Plaintiff stressed the importance of accurate birth dates in his culture for horoscope matching, noting that the different birth dates suggested vastly different compatibility outcomes.  1T57.  Despite the birth date discrepancy and initial misrepresentation, Defendant reassured him that compatibility and personal connection were more important.  1T57.  Plaintiff and Defendant continued communicating, and in October 2019, Plaintiff emphasized that divorce was not an option for him except in extreme circumstances.  Despite this, Plaintiff noted further misrepresentations by Defendant regarding her views on marriage and divorce, which differed from his expectations.  1T57-58.  Plaintiff asked Defendant about her views on potential reasons for divorce and she stated that while small fights and issues were normal, cheating was unacceptable.  Plaintiff agreed with her stance on cheating, determining that it aligned with his own beliefs about marriage.  1T58.  In or around October 22, 2019, Defendant’s father passed away, which was a significant emotional shock for her.  Plaintiff felt a sense of guilt and responsibility towards Defendant following her father’s death, feeling compelled to support her despite their short relationship at that point.  1T58  Plaintiff communicated to Defendant that he was also talking to five or six other women around that time to better understand different perspectives.  1T58.  Marriage Discussions