ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa0001).  B.  The Lease Litigation And The Legal Malpractice Action Claims Arise From Related Facts Or Series Of Transactions  The Amended Complaint in the Instant Action contains the same factual basis presented in the Lease Litigation, oftentimes using the exact same language.  On February 2, 2018, Plaintiff brought the Lease Litigation suit against [...], for constructive eviction, breach of lease, fraud in the inducement, unjust enrichment, breach of the covenant of good faith, and violations of the Consumer Fraud Act.  (Pa0957).  Plaintiff commenced the Instant Action with the filing of the Complaint on September 8, 2020, and a subsequently filed an Amended Complaint on October 22, 2020.  (Pa001)(Pa0015).  A comparison of both complaints clearly shows that both complaints emanate from a single larger controversy with interrelated and at times identical facts.  In fact, the alleged claims under both complaints accrue at the same time from the same series of events.  There are striking similarities between the Lease Litigation Complaint and the Instant Action Complaint.  Instant Action: 5.
[brief] To be sure, the State of New Jersey owns in fee simple all lands under tidewater below the high-water mark.  *In re Tideland’s License 96-0114-T*, 326 N.J. Super. 209, 212 (App. Div. 1999).  However, Tidelands licenses are at issue in this matter, which convey to licensees the right to use land under the water contained within the area set forth in the license.  [Ara32.]  While not property ownership, this right clearly provides the licensee with a property interest.  For the reasons set forth herein, Appellant submits that it has a particularized property interest sufficient to entitle it to an adjudicatory hearing.  As such, the [...]’s decision to deny Appellant’s adjudicatory hearing request was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and should be reversed.
[brief] On January 24, 2020, [...], who presided over defendant’s jury trial and imposed the original sentence, presided over defendant’s resentencing.  (20T).  The court analyzed the aggravating factors, finding applicable aggravating factor (3), (6), and (9), and weighed them heavily.  (20T44-2 to 48-12); see N.J.S.A. 2C:44- 1a(3), (6), (9).  It did not find any applicable mitigating factors.  (20T49-4 to 55-4).  In weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors on a qualitative and quantitative basis, the trial court found “the aggravating factors clearly and convincingly substantially [sic] outweigh[ed] the lack of mitigating factors. ” (20T55-5 to 9).  The trial court reconsidered the sentence and ran some of the sentences concurrent, rather than consecutive, and reduced the sentence on unlawful possession of a weapon (Count Seven) to six years with forty-two months without parole.  (20T57-19 to 61-25).  In rendering defendant’s sentence, the trial court ruled that contrary to defendant’s contention, the sentence imposed was not a life sentence.  (20T62-7 to 21).  It also rejected defendant’s arguments regarding proportionality and the co-defendants, explaining that the co-defendants either pleaded guilty or were acquitted and defendant was not in the same position as the co-defendants.  (20T62-22 to 63-4).  The court further found that defendant’s argument regarding the disparity of the sentence was not addressed by the Supreme Court and that the sole issue on remand was for the court to reconsider the consecutive sentences pursuant to Yarbough.  (20T63-5 to 11).
[brief] See Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133 (noting “the underlying legal claim … was settled as a matter of law” and that “mere doubt as to the validity of the claim is not an adequate basis for refusing to maintain the status quo”); Waste Mgmt., 399 N.J. Super. at 528 (same).  The rule could hardly be otherwise.  Were Appellants correct in their interpretation of the “well-settled right” prong, a movant would have to establish its exact claims had been decided with certainty—rendering the “reasonable probability of success” inquiry superfluous.  Moreover, under Appellants’ approach, no case of first impression would ever meet the preliminary injunction standard—no matter how troubling the statutory violation or how compelling the need to protect the status quo.  There would never be a well-settled right to apply established legal rights to new facts.  Applying Appellants’ interpretation would create perverse incentives: a policy so clearly unlawful that no other school district has adopted it could avoid preliminary relief merely because no court had previously addressed its validity.  That has never been the law.
[brief] (Da64-Da71, ¶ 11; Da27; Pa35-Pa44, ¶ 37; Pa53-Pa62, ¶ 23).  [...], on behalf of Respondent, sent Appellant a letter dated April 25, 2017 by first class mail to the NJ Address, informing Appellant that the Judgment was entered against him on April 19, 2016 in the Action and attached a copy of the Judgment to the letter.  (Pa35-Pa44, ¶ 38; Pa49-Pa52).  Again, the April 25, 2017 letter was not returned as undeliverable or otherwise because, as conceded by Appellant, he accepted mail at the NJ Address.  (Pa35-Pa44, ¶ 40; 2T30-17-25; 2T31-1-25; 2T32-1-11).  Again, Appellant did not contact [...] after the April 25, 2017 letter that the address was delivered to his presumptive relative, [...], at the very least, and advise that the NJ Address was not his address, advise that he moved, nor provide a new address.  (Pa35-Pa44, ¶ 41).  Appellant did not contact [...] regarding the entered Judgment, questioning its entry or otherwise.  (Pa35-Pa44, ¶ 43).  Appellant never attempted to appear in the Action, appeal the Judgment, or timely set it aside.  (Da64-Da71, ¶ 12; Pa19-Pa21; Pa35-Pa44, ¶ 44).  Indeed, Appellant has taken no action in respect to the Judgment until now, six years later.  After entry of the Judgment, Respondent provided constant notice of the entered Judgment to Appellant both by written mail to his address of record and electronic mail to Appellant’s email address [...].
[brief] **Step Three:**  In step 3, [...] evaluated whether it was likely that Stachybotrys Chartarum and trichothecene were in the air in an appreciable quantity because the fewer spores, the less likely they are to settle on food.  2T54-24 to 2T56-14.  Since mold spores are microscopic and airborne tests detected either no Stachybotrys or the bare minimum, [...] concluded that there was insufficient evidence to meet the third step in his exposure pathway analysis, i.e., there was no evidence mycotoxins and Stachybotrys Chartarum got into the air in appreciable quantities.
[brief] While in litigation, state and federal, for over a decade, Plaintiff could have removed the wrongful assignment that is only done in foreclosure.  Instead, Plaintiff continued the false assignment by filing an action to reinstate the wrongful assignment that is only done in foreclosure.  The Third Circuit, Schiano v. Homeq Servicing, et. al, Docket 19-1956, and the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), A177-A178 had already determined and stated that Schianos’ loan was in default dating back to 1992.  The loan was already in wrongful default by the time [...] became servicer in 2010.  The Chancery Court and Law Division ignored the Third Circuit and OCC, and failed to give full faith and credit to said already decided determination(s) of default.  This is major procedural error which mandates reversal.
[brief] On April 14, 2023, the Court denied Appellant’s request for reconsideration, commenting in pertinent part:  Defend -- plaintiff argues that their reconsideration is warranted because in the Court's original opinion they used an incorrect standard to determine the accrual date for plaintiff's malicious type prosecution claims and be they -- that the Court incorrectly supplied it to your statute of limitations.  And the Court dismissal of the plaintiff's claim based upon failure to file a notice of tort claim was improper.  A review of the moving papers indicate that the same arguments are being made here are the arguments that were made in the Court's first opinion.  The standard of review for reconsideration of motions is whether or not the court based its decision on palpably indirect or irrational basis or didn't -- or failed to consider or appreciate significance of probative component evidence.  See Cummings versus Bahr, 295 N.J. Super., 374 at 385 (Appellate Division, 19 1996).  Defendant argues, Court agrees that the plaintiff's two main arguments the State claims that are presented in the Complaint misstate the law for the reasons contained in the Court's original finding of fact and conclusion of law which I adopt and incorporate here.  Appellant agreed with the federal court and state trial court that his state claims are, in essence, malicious prosecution claims.  Major v. Maguire, 224 N.J. 1, 26 (2016) (“[A] reviewing court ‘searches the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundamentals of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of the claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary.
[brief] Plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty must be dismissed because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting the existence of a fiduciary relationship between it and [...].  A fiduciary relationship is one in which a “party places trust and confidence in another who is in a dominant or superior position” and arises “when one person is under a duty to act for or give advice for the benefit of another on matters within the scope of their relationship. ”  *F.G. v. MacDonell*, 150 N.J. 550, 563 (1997).  Plaintiff alleges no facts that establish that [...] was “in a dominant or superior position” to Plaintiff or had a duty to give advice within the scope of an existing relationship.  Indeed, the only basis that Plaintiff asserts for a fiduciary relationship is “a longstanding business relationship” pursuant to which “Plaintiff retained Defendant [...] to provide title insurance and related services” for “multiple prior real estate transactions” (Pa19, ¶96) and that “Plaintiff selected Defendant [...] Title as the title insurance company to be involved in the [this] transaction”.  (Pa19, ¶97).  However, these allegations are insufficient to plead a fiduciary relationship.
[brief] Under Appellant’s letter vendor theory, §§ 1692c(b), 1692d(3), and 1692f of the FDCPA permit a debt collector to transmit information about a debt only to its attorneys, the creditor (or its attorneys), and the consumer (and his or her attorney)—period.  Appellant’s theory fails because this interpretation is at odds with other provisions in the FDCPA, and a Court must consider the statute as a whole in determining Congress’s intent.  *Robinson*, 519 U.S. at 341.
[brief] Additionally, the policy requires the principal or designee to “have a discussion with the student and parent/guardian to ascertain the student’s preference on matters such as chosen name and chosen pronoun (Ibid.).”  The policy further provides that “[w]here there is disagreement between the student and the family, the Administration shall consult with the student and parent/guardian and develop a plan for how the student will be referred to at school (Ibid.).”  In such situations, the policy requires the school to “provide resource information regarding family counseling and support services outside of the school district (Da046). ”
[brief] Clients rely on them not only for legal advice but also for emotional support, financial guidance and common sense.  They do not often come to their attorneys with their deals all made, save only the limited contributions of the scrivener.  For those reasons, there is nothing surprising about a contract provision that effectively creates a timeout period for discussion and advice from a trusted counsellor.  That advice can be on details or on price and, to be effective, has to be uncontrolled.  [Id.]  Plaintiffs had a fair opportunity to review the terms of the SPA, including any legal-imbued terminology, and protect their interests by consulting with an attorney of their own choosing before the SPA became binding.  Therefore, the agreement at issue is distinct from the contracts of adhesion discussed in Atalese.  See Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 83-84 (2002) (declining to find that plaintiff was forced to sign without an opportunity for attorney review or discussion, and rejecting the notion the arbitration agreement was “oppressive or unconscionable).  See also Rose v. Shore Customs Homes Corp., 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2091 (App. Div. Sept. 3, 2024) (finding that home renovation agreement was not a contract of adhesion, where plaintiff had the express right to retain counsel to review the contract terms and a right to cancel the contract within three days).
[directive] (Example: a search warrant application reviewed by an Assistant Prosecutor of county A involves an intended search of multiple premises, one of which is located in county B.  The search of the premises located in county B shall not be conducted without first notifying and consulting with a representative from the County B Prosecutor’s Office.)  In addition, the local police department having patrol jurisdiction over each and every place or premises to be searched shall be notified of the operation prior to execution of the search unless a Designated Attorney, for good cause shown, determines that notification to the local police department shall only be provided during the execution of the search, or at some later time.  23.
[brief] Plaintiff has argued that the appointment of an Administrator was not fruitless, because Defendant paid $1,200,000 into the [...] general account.  First, it should be noted, the Estate’s potential financial interest in this payment was 40.8% of that amount, or $489,600, not $1,200,000, as the latter amount was paid into [...]’s general account in accordance with the agreement and findings of the Administrator.  Second, the Administrator explained in his Report, at Exhibits F and G, the $1,200,000 capital contribution was an accounting adjustment.  The adjustment was not based upon the discovery of any new transfers or gifts from the Decedent into New Jersey or any malfeasance by Defendant.  As was stated in Exhibit G to the Administrator’s Report, “Narrative to Proposed Adjusting Journal Entries”:  [T]he initial $900,000 credit to the Estate’s capital account is the starting point that should appear in [...]’s books and records as this was determined to be the amount of the capital contribution that was made by the Decedent in November 2001.  This entry, in turn, also requires that adjustments be made to [...]’s capital account as the books and records of [...] had historically treated him as the 100% owner of the entity.  Exhibit G., “Narrative to Proposed Adjusting Journal Entries,” Para. A. (Da371).  And as important, the payment was made by Defendant, who, on the date he agreed to pay the $1,200,000 capital contribution to [...], owned all of the 40.8% minority interest.  It cannot be said that the Plaintiff’s lawsuit benefited beneficiaries other than the Plaintiff; Defendant cannot be said to have benefited if he funded the capital contribution.  Therefore, a critical essential element for fee shifting under R. 4:42-9(a)(2) was not met, and the Plaintiff’s fee application should have been dismissed.
[brief] Deputy [...] of [...] in Virginia arrested defendant on May 30, 2018 at a [...] in connection with a warrant issued for defendant’s arrest in connection with the May 29th shooting incident.  Following the arrest, Deputy Plunkett searched defendant’s hotel room and located, among other things, two BB guns and cellular telephones.  Testing on these two guns by Lieutenant [...] of the [...] determined both were operable.  (16T:5-18 to 62-18; 120-10 to 128-9).  Following defendant’s arrest, he provided a statement to detectives from the [...] and the [...].  During the statement, defendant declined to answer some questions about his family and Holmdel, but nonetheless, he did acknowledge previously living in Holmdel with his father and brother, driving a red Hyundai Elantra, being familiar with the Holmdel location of [...], being owed $25,000 by [...] in connection with the sale of a Main Street building that had been rented to [...] as part of a “real estate scam,” knowing about the fire at [...] from Facebook, to being in possession of numerous cell phones and electronics, and to owing the business Also following defendant’s arrest, [...] was again called upon to take photographs and process a scene, though this time it was defendant’s person, bags, and his red Hyundai Elantra.
[brief] *See In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation*, 108 N.J. 35, 36-37 (1987).  *In re Resolution* did not analyze an implied private right of action because there was no need to—improper disclosures of information related to investigations into crime by the [...] (“[...]”) were and are explicitly within the purview of the [...], as per the black letter language of the statute.  *In re Resolution* supports *Veras*’s reasoning that, generally, when there are extensive state enforcement mechanisms included in a statute, that statute rarely also includes a private right of action.  But *Veras* failed to acknowledge that the NJCFLA’s predecessors all contained enforcement mechanisms by the Commissioner *and* an implied private right of action.
[brief] In a November 10, 2022 ruling, [...] issued a forty-six-page oral opinion examining all of the parties’ various motions and arguments.  (3T:5:5-3T46:22)  The essential holding was that plaintiff could not produce any materials suggesting a genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to the issues at the heart of the case.  (3T:9:1-3T46:22).  First, plaintiff could not refute that he disregarded instructions of his supervisors about topics at the Rutgers Safe Drinking Water Update and made a profane reference in his public speech.  (3T31:20-3T32:22).  Second, it was uncontroverted that [...] willfully ignored the policy on seeking approval for public speeches with regard to the AWWA conference.  (3T37:16–3T38:9).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT ONE THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF SUMMARY
[directive] B.  Severability.  The provisions of this Directive shall be severable.  If any phrase, clause, sentence, or provision of this Directive is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of the document shall not be affected.  C.  Any questions concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Questions.  Directive or the Major Discipline Directive shall be addressed to the Executive Director of the [...] ([...]), or their designee.  D.  This Directive shall take effect immediately and remain in force and effect  Effective date.  unless and until it is repealed, amended, or superseded by Order of the Attorney General. E. Appeal.
[brief] A.  The State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] drove and crashed into the parked car.  Initially, both charged statutes require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] drove a motor vehicle and crashed into the parked car.  Here, the State failed to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] drove the motor vehicle involved in the accident.  As a result, the judge below erred in finding [...] guilty of the charges.  Foremost in considering the State’s failure to establish this element of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt is that no one saw [...] driving the car.\(^6\)  [...] made no admissions constituting proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he drove either.  The court below found that “circumstantial evidence” showed that [...] drove and crashed.  However, the court erred by relying heavily on the “permissive inference” to find that the registered owner of the involved vehicle drove.  (5a-6a).  In fact, this is a fact-sensitive inquiry, and the cases cited by the --- \(^6\)  The municipal court judge recognized the lack of any witness to [...] driving as the basis to find him not guilty of Careless Driving.  (3T. 10-6 to 13) court contain facts pointing to those defendants as the driver that are not present in [...]’s situation. \(^7\)  The courts further erred in emphasizing [...]’s “intoxication” in arriving at the guilty verdict (10a; 11a-12a; 14a).  Intoxication is not an element of the charges against [...].  Intoxication was not an issue contested at trial.  No definitive proof - such as a breath test result or field sobriety tests - showed [...] to be intoxicated.  It was unfairly prejudicial to consider possible intoxication in assessing [...]’s culpability under the charged statutes.  References to [...]’s alleged intoxication suggest a motive to prosecute and convict [...] because of a perception of him “getting away” with driving while intoxicated.  In this way, consideration of [...]’s alleged intoxication tainted the evaluation of the evidence of whether he was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges that he was on trial for.  Therefore, the State’s case did not meet the standard of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” that [...] was driving the car involved in the accident.
[brief] (25T 25-19 to 23; 29-8 to 11; Da 27; Da 29)  The bartender made a mistake and gave him a different type of liquor from what he had ordered.  (25T 26-3 to 4; Da 27-28)  [...] spoke to other people in the bar.  (25T 26-5; Da 28)  After half-an-hour (25T 26-22 to 23; Da 28), he walked north up West Side Avenue (west of his home on Lexington Avenue) and was on the intersection of Lexington Avenue and West Side Avenue when he saw a Guyanese neighbor, and invited the neighbor back to the same bar on Clendenny Avenue.
[brief] Finally, this Court can swiftly reject [...]’s argument that she “never ‘signed’ the Arbitration Agreement and never did anything more than ‘acknowledge’ it by simply opening up the link to the policy through the employee portal” because “the Agreement does not contain [her] physical signature. ” (Pb2, 24, 38, 39; Pa000216.)  The validity of electronic signatures and acknowledgments, including in the context of employment-related documents have been well-recognized by this Court and others.  See, e.g., Antonucci, 470 N.J. Super. at 559 (finding a signature valid wherein the plaintiff “did not sign the Arbitration Agreement in the space provided” but instead “electronically clicked on an ‘I Accept’ check box acknowledging that he had ‘received and reviewed the policies and procedures’ outlined in the Codes and Handbook”); see also Forsyth, 2010 WL 2195996, at *7 (“We have also recognized that a party may manifest assent to a contract by clicking a link on a website. ”)(Ra20-Ra26).  Here, the Agreement unambiguously bears [...]’s electronic signature and acknowledgement, along with the time-stamp of 8:30 a.m. EST, January 4, 2022: (Pa000094.)  Despite claiming that her electronic signature and acknowledgement “required virtually no affirmative action by” her (Pb31), notably, [...] does not deny that she did in fact affirmatively act to provide her electronic signature and acknowledgement.  [...] is silent as to what more she believes was or should have been required of her to affirm her assent, nor does she offer support that anything more is or should be required.  The argument that [...] did not, in fact, sign the Agreement must fail.  There is no legitimate basis to negate the conclusive presumption that accompanies [...]’s acknowledgement and signature on the Agreement and her assent to its terms.