ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] During the hearing, [...], the Board’s planner testified that the highest density permitted in Montville is 14 units per acre and the proposed facility is 20 units per acre.  6T 127:4-14.  Board should have been permitted to consider a density reduction as an appropriate mitigating factor after the trial court mandated the approval of the use variance.  A reduction in density would have also achieved a reduction in impervious coverage and lessened or removed the setback and parking variances required.  The removal or lessening of these variances would have mitigated the impact on the zone and zone plan, but again the Board was barred by the trial court from considering these issues on remand.  In reviewing the ability of courts to remand matters to a land use board, having additional findings by the Board is generally appropriate.
[brief] Plaintiffs seek to exclude parents from situations adversely impacting their children whenever LGBTQ+ status is incidentally involved thus advocating a double standard whereby non-LGBTQ+ children enjoy the school’s coordination with parents in situations presenting adverse impacts while LGBTQ+ children do not because the State would bar their parents from knowledge of such situations.  Instead of facilitating a transparent, cooperative relationship between schools and parents, Plaintiffs distort the LAD to endorse State-enabled secrecy, mistrust and parental exclusion from matters adversely impacting their children.  Plaintiffs’ position is not clearly and convincingly based upon a settled legal right to exclude parents from knowledge of matters adversely impacting their LGBTQ+ children and lacks a clear and convincing likelihood of success under the law.  Plaintiffs do not, and cannot, adduce any precedent barring schools from alerting parents of matters adversely impacting their LGBTQ+ children.  Any such precedent would uproot an entrenched tradition and constitutional right of parental autonomy.
[brief] On Db13, [...] goes further to suggest that the authorities I cited, which pertain to undocumented immigrants being able to enforce their employment contracts, are inapplicable - therein stating that these cases are not about lacking a necessary physical document.  However, this argument is clearly meritless, as it is clear that in order for these non-US-citizens to legally work in our country, they would first need to obtain “work visas” – which of course are physical documents. \(^1\)  His attack on my “defacto executor” argument really only supports my position.  Lastly, his attack on my assertion of different legal theories is also meritless.
[brief] THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS ENFORCEABLE AND REQUIRES THE ARBITRATION OF ALL CLAIMS  In order to determine whether arbitration should be compelled, the court must first determine whether the arbitration provision of a contract is valid and enforceable.  Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 83, 92 (2002).  Arbitration agreements are to be read liberally and in favor of arbitration.  Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynocology Assocs., P.A., §§168 N.J. 124,132 (2006) (quoting *Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc.*, 134 N.J. 275, 282 (1993)).
[brief] [...] found,  Unfortunately, the court finds the events that occurred in August 2017 with defendant filing a complaint against plaintiff under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act which resulted in a domestic violence TRO being issued against plaintiff seemed to put an end to any reunification.  The court is unable to make findings as to what occurred that night as both parties presented viable factual assertions as to what happened.  Neither has proven their version of the story by a preponderance of the evidence.  The bottom line is that this event caused the final separation of the parties, a separation that occurred two years and eight months after the PSA was executed and two years and eight months after the Final Judgment of Divorce was entered.
[brief] *Id.* at 432-33.  Appellants’ loss of land control resulted in a concomitant loss of municipal and state land use approvals.  Furthermore, loss of site control amounted to a breach of the obligations undertaken by Appellants in their WMPA and Interconnection Agreements.  As a result of these breaches, the Appellants lost the right to develop the land.  All of these losses flowed directly from Appellants’ own refusal or inability to simply make the payment due under their Lease.
[brief] ”  *Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc.*, 218 N.J. 8, 30 (N.J. 2014) (citing *Dzwonar*, 177 N.J. at 464).  Critically, once this initial inquiry is satisfied, it is a question for the jury to determine “whether the plaintiff actually held such a belief and, if so, whether it was reasonable. ”  *Id.*  Courts have construed a “substantial nexus” to mean “closely relates” and find that a judgment for a defendant should be entered when “no such law or policy is forthcoming. ”  *Dzwonar*, 177 N.J. at 463.  Moreover, in *Dzwonar*, it is important to note that plaintiff, an arbitration officer who was discharged for mishandling executive board meeting minutes and for insubordination, asserted retaliation for expressing her opinion that by failing to read minutes at general membership meetings, the board denied members the right to participate, deliberate, and vote in union matters as prescribed by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA).
[directive] 23  (b) captures the image of a child; (c) was made in a residential premises (e.g., a home, apartment, college dormitory room, hotel/motel room, etc.), a school or youth facility, a healthcare facility or medical office, a substance abuse or mental health treatment facility, or a place of worship; (d) captures a conversation with a person whose request to de-activate the BWC was declined; (e) captures a special operations event or execution of an arrest and/or search warrant where confidential tactical information (e.g., verbal codes and hand signals used to give direction to officers, techniques for interior movements and clearing rooms during execution of a warrant, techniques for convincing persons to open doors during warrant execution, etc.) may have been recorded; (f) captures the image of an undercover officer or confidential informant; or (g) captures the screen of a police computer monitor that is displaying confidential personal or law enforcement sensitive information.  See also Section 7.1 (requiring notice to the prosecutor when a BWC captures the image of a patient at a substance abuse treatment facility).  Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Policy, an agency’s policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order issued pursuant to Section 3.1 may specify additional circumstances when a BWC recording will be “tagged. ”  9.4  Approval for Access to “Tagged” BWC Recordings.  A BWC recording tagged pursuant to Section 9.3 shall not be accessed, viewed, copied, disseminated, or otherwise used without first obtaining the permission of the County Prosecutor or designee, or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee.
[brief] (1T32-25 to 33-7; 1T90-2 to 8).  As [...] walked his K-9 counter-clockwise around the truck's exterior, the dog first alerted to the driver’s side door, then jumped onto the truck’s rear bumper and froze.  (1T31-10 to 32-3).  Upon [...]’s command to again “seek, find, dope,” unprompted, the K-9 sat down, which was the “confirmation” that an odor of narcotics was emanating from within the truck.  (1T31-22 to 32-8).  The sniff test took less than a minute to conduct.  (1T33-24 to 25).  After the sniff test, [...] returned to his vehicle and advised [...] of the K-9 alert and that he had probable cause to search the truck for drugs.
[brief] B.  [...] WAS NOT PERFORMING INELIGIBLE DEMOLITION WORK ON THE DATE OF THE [...]IDENT  [...] and [...] next argue that [...] was working on the project as an excluded demolition contractor.  [...] Db30.  They also refer to the usual communications referencing the work as excluded, which, as explained above in Section I.A. and in Plaintiffs’ initial brief, Pb22-Pb27, referenced certain early excluded work, along with the Hood litigation deposition testimony of [...], [...], and [...] employees who described [...]’s work as demolishing certain elements.
[brief] (Ab18; Ab24).  Consequently, the record reflects the benefits of installing a CWT heater along with the new regulator station.  (Aa71-72; Aa830-31; Aa836).  In particular, the CWT heaters, which [...] utilized since 2011 with “no system outages,” would lessen the icing issues associated with significant drops in pressure and assist [...] in providing safe, adequate, and reliable service to customers in [...] and surrounding municipalities.  (Aa71-72; Aa830-31; As substantial evidence supports the [...]’s finding that the proposed regulator station with the CWT heater is reasonably necessary to provide safe, adequate, and reliable natural gas services and reasonably necessary for the service, convenience, and welfare of the public, the [...]’s Order should be affirmed.
[brief] Id.  (Pa10 to Pa12).  Count II of the FAC alleged that because Plaintiff did not provide its written --- 1  The following abbreviations are used in this brief:  “Pa” refers to the Amended Appendix filed by Plaintiff-Appellant on May 17, 2024.  “Pb” refers to the Brief filed by Plaintiff-Appellant on April 19, 2024.  consent as a “designated developer” to amend the Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan (the “Plan Amendments”) in connection with [...]’s property, the amendments are unlawful.  Id. (Pa12 to Pa13).  Count IV of the FAC alleges that the Plan Amendment constitutes illegal spot zoning insofar as it extended significant benefits to the owner of the [...] Property unavailable to others.  Id. (Pa15 to Pa16).  The lower court’s dismissal of Counts III, V, and VI were not appealed by Plaintiff and, thus, not relevant to this appeal.
[brief] Id.  There was abundant evidence of this.  The Commission’s well-established caselaw states clearly that school board members who use their Facebook account to campaign for their seat on a school board must make clear in which capacity they are speaking, and explains why:  The Commission notes that board members do not surrender the rights they have as citizens such as freedom of speech when they become members of a school board.  However, as discussed in [...] v. [...], [...], Camden County, [...] ([...]), and in light of the social media posts by Respondent, the Commission echoes its decision in [...], specifically that “when a sitting Board member makes such a judgmental proclamation, it is likely to be credited far more than a statement offered by an ordinary citizen.
[brief] Watson, 254 N.J. at 589; Burney, 255 N.J. at 26.  On the point of future applicability, the Watson Court could not have been clearer:  “We apply the above standard here and provide clearer rules ² This POINT is responsive to POINT I and POINT III of defendant’s brief.  Db15-20, 30-33. going forward.  Today’s holding applies to this and future cases, and to … Burney …, filed today. ”
[brief] (Aa76; Aa347; Aa1049-58).  As such, the ALJ reasonably found that the paired sales analysis was “a reasonable and accurate method for calculating the impact of a regulator station on nearby property values. ” (Aa76).  Additionally, the ALJ recognized that both witnesses testified regarding the “subjective nature of real-estate valuation and appraisal” and the socioeconomic impact on the real estate market.  (Aa76; Aa347-48; Aa1039).  Based on the comprehensive data in [...]’s testimony and research, [...] and the [...] reasonably found [...]’s testimony to be credible and concluded that the paired sales technique was a “reasonable and accurate method” for measuring the Project’s impact on nearby property values.
[brief] For the above-stated reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  Chief Assistant Prosecutor Attorney  I.D. No. 002462012  [...]  Dated: September 20, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Movant, v. [...], Defendant-Respondent.  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Motion for Leave to Appeal From an Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
[brief] An LoP Dismissal dated July 8th (a Saturday) (Pa328) and a Dismissal of the [...]’s case against the State, marked “unopposed. ”  I immediately called the Judge’s law clerk to complain.  Pa357.  I also called the DAG who stated she had no objection to correcting the record (she was well aware [...]’s Opposition to Dismissal was already in the file from May 3, 2023).  Id.  I also called the Chief Clerk in Trenton, per instructions to report “irregularities” due to past retaliations.  Id.  On August 21, 2023, we received an Order to Vacate the LoP Order dated August 15th.
[brief] Defendants are medical professionals, administrative laypersons and entities treating, among others, patients suffering from injuries sustained in automobile accidents.  (C.C.Da.1-10).  At its core, the theory of [...]’s complaint is that Defendants fraudulently billed [...] for medical services that were not necessary or appropriate, not provided, or were forced to be provided by doctors of lower licensure or no licensure or the product of illegal referrals.
[brief] 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a ............................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5c ............................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 ............................................................................. 2 Rules Cited Rule 3:22-4(a) ..................................................................................... 19, 34 N.J.R.E. 703 .......................................................................................... 32 Counterstatement of Procedural History
[brief] State v. Hightower, 120 N.J. 378 (1990) .........................................................................................43 State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146 (1964) .........................................................................................24, 36 State v. LaBrutto, 114 N.J. 187 (1989) ...........................................................................................................40, 41 State v. Russo, 333 N.J. Super. 119 (2000).................................................................................................23 State v. Sands 76 N.J. 127 (1978) ..................................................................................................................29 State v. Sinclair, 57 N.J. 56 (1970) ....................................................................................................................30  State v. T.J.M., 220 N.J. 220 (2015) ..................................................................................................................29  State v. Thompson, 59 N.J. 396 (1971) ....................................................................................................................45  T.L. v. Goldberg, 238 N.J. 218 (2019) ..................................................................................................................23  Villanueva v. Zimmer, 431 N.J. Super. 301 (App. Div.), certif. den., 216 N.J. 430 (2013) ........................................32, 34, 40, 44  STATUTES N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1 et seq..............................................................................................................15
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2a imposes second-degree and third-degree felonies against public servants who commit an act relating to his or her office but constituting an unauthorized exercise of his or her official functions, knowing that such act is unauthorized or he or she is committing such act in an unauthorized manner.  Further, the statute creates criminal liability for public servants who knowingly refrain from performing a duty that is imposed upon him or her by law or is clearly inherent in the nature of his or her office.  N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2b.  See State v. Gleitsmann, 62 N.J. Super. 15 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 33 N.J. 386 (1960) (sufficient evidence of official misconduct where captain of detectives improperly used municipal telephone and police car in effort to intercede on behalf of defendant charged with a traffic violation in another state).  Police officers are held to a higher standard than other public employees.
[brief] The Amended Complaint in the 2020 Action also failed on its face to meet the fifth element for establishing a fraudulent concealment claim, namely, that Plaintiffs-Appellants were damaged in the 2015 Action “by having to rely on an evidential record that did not contain the evidence the defendants [allegedly] concealed. ”  Rosenblit at 407.  If, and as they alleged in the 2020 Action, Plaintiffs-Appellants had other evidence to refute [...]’s deposition testimony and prove that [...] was in fact the true owner of [...] and [...], then, whatever that evidence was, it would have necessarily been available to Plaintiffs-Appellants in the 2015 Action because the 2015 Action was still pending.  The Amended Complaint therefore failed to state a claim for fraudulent concealment of evidence against [...] and [...], and the trial court’s dismissal of the 2020 Action against these Respondents should be affirmed.
[brief] (DA223-224).  On October 20, 2023, [...] heard oral argument on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration.  [2T].  In arguing for reconsideration of the court’s decision on Plaintiffs’ OTSC application, counsel for Plaintiffs declined to reach the Atalese arguments.  (2T:20-23 to 21:5).  [...] entered an Order denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration on October 24, 2023.  (DA256-260).
[brief] In 2009, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) issued a report called Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward, which discussed criticisms of how certain forensic testing was introduced at trial.  In regard to latent fingerprint testimony, “courts have . . . concluded the NAS Report insufficient to warrant changes to the status of latent fingerprint identification evidence. ”  *State v. Lizarraga*, 364 P.3d 810, 830 n.20 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (collecting cases).  This Court noted, “the purpose of the NAS report is to highlight deficiencies in a forensic field and to propose improvements to existing protocols, not to recommend against admission of evidence. ”  *State v. McGuire*, 419 N.J. Super. 88, 132 (App. Div. 2011) (citing Hon. [...] [committee co-chair], *Statement Before U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee* (March 18, 2009) (“nothing in the [NAS] Report was intended to answer the ‘question whether forensic evidence in a particular case is admissible under applicable law’”)).  A California Court of Appeals, addressing a claim based on the NAS report, noted the ways a defendant can diminish the weight of any fingerprint evidence, including “challenging the training of the fingerprint expert . . . the process by which the fingerprint expert made the comparison, . . . or by showing that the fingerprints do not match, either by calling the defense’s own expert or simply showing the jury where they do not match[.]”  *People v. Rivas*, 190 Cal. Rptr. 3d 43, 51 (Ct. App. 2015).  Courts have acknowledged that the proper place for defendant’s alleged errors about the overstatement of a fingerprint expert’s analysis was at trial in front of the jury.
[brief] ”  Id. at 25.  The [...] substantiated its consistency determination by relying entirely on its finding that “The record demonstrates that ‘[...] has avoided and minimized impacts to Highlands resources in the siting and design of the facilities. ’” (Aa330).  Ibid.  However, the [...]’s finding that the environmental impacts have been “avoided and minimized” simply cannot be taken seriously by anyone who believes in the overwhelming scientific consensus that increased GHG emissions will exacerbate climate change and be the proximate cause of associated environmental degradation to the Highlands resources.
[directive] THIS COURT having found that the defendant has regained his/her fitness to proceed to trial [ or has been determined to be fit to stand trial] and that the defendant not dangerous to self, is of others, or property as a result mental illness, __ ______ 20 of ORDERED  It is on the day , that:  ______ I.  The defendant shall be transferred to the Correctional Facility to await a [ detention hearing/trial]. and __ IT IS FURTHER ORDERED  [any additional conditions as ordered by the _ 2. court._.__ _____ will 3.
[brief] [...] hopped on his crutches to avoid being hit.  (2T 43-24)  These are reasonable findings.  The fact that they are different than what a judge who had predetermined the case before hearing from the officer or from the defense attorney—having denied oral argument on the motion to suppress as well as an evidentiary hearing—does not make this trial court’s findings unreasonable. \(^5\)  Unfavorable to the State and unreasonable are two different things. \(^6\)  **B.  There was insufficient cause to justify the warrantless police action even if the officer’s testimony is not considered.
[brief] THE STATE CONCEDES THAT DEFENDANT’S ROBBERY AND CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY CONVICTIONS SHOULD MERGE.  Defendant’s second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery formed the preparation to commit the first-degree robbery only.  The State concurs with defendant that, despite his consent at sentencing, these convictions should merge.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8a(2).  CONCLUSION
[brief] Defendant [...] and his codefendant -- defendant’s nephew, [...] -- were tried and convicted for murder and weapons offenses for the shooting death of [...] on the night of January 22, 2020, in Elizabeth.  The State presented the following evidence at trial.  [...] testified that he is a barber who works at a barbershop at the corner of Jackson and Bond in Elizabeth.  (2T 26-10 to 14)  Between 6:30 and 7:30 p.m. on January 22, 2020, Williams claimed, there were four people inside the barbershop, including [...] and himself.  (2T 29-10 to 21)  Kearney had been there for 15 minutes or so talking to Williams when they heard a “loud noise” outside the shop and Kearney went outside to investigate.  (2T 30-10 to 31-25)  Then over the next five to ten seconds, Williams estimated, he heard five gunshots of two different types.  (2T 32-5 to 21; 2T 35-2 to 5)  Everyone inside “[r]an for cover,” and, when the shooting stopped, Kearney walked back into the shop and collapsed, causing Williams to call 911.  (2T 35-10 to 36-19)  Police appeared to arrive in “seconds,” Williams claimed, which was “startling” to him.  (2T 39-13 to 19)  Williams never saw a shooter, but when he went outside, he saw a black Honda that he associated with Kearney, and that Honda had a “smashed out” window.  (2T 39-7 to 41-7)  [...], a responding EMT, testified that Kearney was neither conscious nor responsive before being transported to the hospital, and that Kearney had suffered multiple gunshot wounds.  (2T 169-17 to 24)  At the hospital, Detective [...] testified, Kearney was pronounced dead at 7:19 p.m., and she collected his clothing and personal items and also retrieved one spent bullet that hospital staff had retrieved from his body.  (5T 58-11 to 21)  The medical examiner testified that the cause of Kearney’s death was “multiple gunshot wounds.
[brief] IF A CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO RECALL AN FDA APPROVED PRODUCT EXISTED UNDER THE COMMON LAW, IT WOULD BE PREEMPTED BY THE FDA’S PRODUCT APPROVAL AND RECALL AUTHORITY.  Even if plaintiff’s claim were otherwise viable, federal law would preempt it.  A “duty to recall” claim is simply another way of asserting that the defendant should “stop selling” its product.  Bartlett, supra, 2010 WL 3659789, at *10.  [T]here is no common law duty to recall products from the market, even if they are unreasonably dangerous....  Strict products liability requires that manufacturers compensate consumers ... not necessarily that they remove such products from the market.  Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).