ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] “The term ‘res judicata’ refers broadly to the common-law doctrine barring relitigation of claims or issues that have already been adjudicated. ”  *Velasquez v.* Frank, 123 N.J. 498, 505 (1991).  The doctrine “provides that a cause of action between parties that has been finally determined on the merits by a tribunal having jurisdiction cannot be relitigated by those parties or their privies in a new proceeding. ”  Ibid.  “By insulating courts from the relitigation of claims, res judicata prevents the judicial inefficiency inherent in multiplicitous litigation[,]” ensures the finality of judgments, and advances the interest of fairness “[b]y preventing harassment of parties[.]”  Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398, 409 (1991).  The elements of res judicata have been summarized as follows: (1) the judgment in the prior action must be valid, final, and on the merits; (2) the parties in the later action must be identical to or in privity with those in the prior action; and (3) the claim in the later action must grow out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in the earlier one.
[directive] A.  Dismissal, Acquittal, or Discharge without a Conviction or Finding of Guilt on or after April18, 2016  1.  Municipal Court Proceedings  Where the proceedings were dismissed, the person was acquitted, or the person guilt on or after April 18, 2016 in was discharged without a conviction or finding of Municipal Court, that court must provide the person, upon request, with appropriate  [...] • PO Box 037 • [...]
[brief] *Pico v. State*, 116 N.J. 55, 59 (1989).  Not surprisingly, the case law that has developed over the years has reiterated and reaffirmed the above legislature declaration.  See *Ball v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.*, 207 N.J. Super. 100, 107, 108 (App. Div. 1986)(...the plainly expressed legislative mandate...is to immunize public bodies except where there is a statutory declaration to the contrary. ); Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 193 N.J. Super. 540, 546 (App. Div. 1984) aff'd 100 N.J. 485 (1985)(immunity is the rule except as expressly provided for in N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq. ); Guerriero v. Palmer, 175 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1979)("the act proceeds from an assumption of immunity subject to any liability provided in the act"); McGowen v. Borough of Eatontown, 151 N.J. Super. 440, 446 (App. Div. 1977) ("there is no liability except as provided by the act"); and Tower Marine, Inc. v. New Brunswick, 175 N.J. Super. 526, 531 (Chan. Div. 1980) ("The act purports to circumscribe all governmental tort liability").
[brief] [...] had been a police officer for over seven years, and he had been involved with many arrests involving narcotics. (1T14-3 to 10).  At approximately 4:50 p.m. on April 16, 2022, [...] was on routine patrol near Phillips Avenue and Route 46 in South Hackensack.  (1T14-24 to 15-16).  He saw a white Chevrolet Equinox with a temporary New Jersey license plate driving east on Route 46 perform an illegal U-turn and drive west on Route 46.  (1T15-22 to 25, 178-23; Da65).  [...] activated his lights and stopped the vehicle in a parking lot along Route 46.  (1T16-5 to 6, 23-19 to 24).  [...] walked to the vehicle and asked the driver, later identified as defendant, to produce his license, registration, and proof of insurance.  (1T25-1 to 15).
[brief] ” (Pa860-Pa867; Pa662).  A flawed and partial investigation, found [...]’s charges to be “unsubstantiated. ”  (Pa860-Pa867; Pa664).  A review of the underlying investigation reveals there was corroboration which was ignored by [...] and much to substantiate Alan [...]’s report of discrimination and retaliation, none of which [...] presented in her report such as:  a)  The finding in 2012 substantiating Alan [...]’s claim that [...] was engaged in harassing conduct against him; The statement of [...], an employee of the [...] taken on March 9, 2015 substantiating that Alan [...] had told him about the derogatory age and gender related comments and that he agreed that the workplace had become “a more female dominated environment. ” (Pa874).  b)  The statement of [...], an employee of the [...] taken on February 24, 2015 reporting to [...] that he has “observed a lot of women being promoted and many of the new hires are women”; that “[m]any of the promotions involve employees more than 10 years younger (in their 40s)”, that there “appears to be a bias” and “Fell does attempt to intimidate employees. ” (Pa876).  c)  The statement of [...], an employee of the [...], [...] taken on February 24, 2015 reporting that “most promotional opportunities had been given to young women. ” (Pa879).  d)  The statement of [...], the Director of the Department, describing [...] as a “bulldog” meaning “aggressive” and “very thorough.
[brief] [...] also appropriately found aggravating factor 3 - that there was a risk defendant would reoffend, even though she found mitigating factor 7 – that defendant had no prior criminal record.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3); -(b)(7).  (15T29-5 to 14).  Accord Rivera, 249 N.J. at 300.  [...] afforded minimal weight to mitigating factor 7 because she noted that the trial testimony clearly supported a finding that defendant’s offense “was not just a one-off, one-time.  This was a carefully, planned out operation.  And so, while there is no criminal conviction, he has not necessarily led a law-abiding life for a significant period of time. ” (15T32-21 to 33-3).
[brief] 2  A [...] advertisement from this period was published in [...]’s booklet Normandy Beach, A Brief History 1916-2016, (2d ed.). (Da425-Da445; Pa265-Pa285).  The advertisement included in Defendants’ Appendix does not contain the full advertisement.  Plaintiffs included the full advertisement in their Appendix.  (Pa270).  3  See [...] Indenture to [...] 1929 (Da447-Da449); [...] to [...], via 1949 Final Judgment (Da507-Da513); [...] by Indenture to [...] 1967 (Da502-Da505); [...] by Deed to [...] 1985 (Da497-Da500); [...] by Deed to [...] 2000 (Da406-Da409).  right was never modified, abandoned, relinquished, or extinguished in any way and presently resides with the [...]s.  (Da532-Da539).  C.  Historic Use of Implied Easement Access
[brief] See Pa 92.  The Plaintiffs have not established why, in light of all the facts, not simply those they choose to highlight, such deference is not appropriate.  Second, the speculative, forward-looking language of this provision “anticipates” that the Redevelopment Plan is not finalized and could be revised.  It merely acknowledges that no further changes were recommended “at this time. ”  The drafters of the 2019 Master Plan Reexamination Report would not have been aware of the 2021 County Agreement (to the extent the agreement is not referenced in the Master Plan) and could not have anticipated any changes to the Redevelopment Plan that would have been prudent in light of that agreement.
[directive] Addendum A | December 2020  CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  8  Handling of Injured Suspects Following CED Use  8.1  Subjects against whom a CED has been deployed shall be transported to a medical facility for examination if any of the following circumstances exist: (a) the subject requests medical attention; (b) the subject had been rendered unconscious or unresponsive; (c) the subject, after being subjected to a discharge, does not appear to have recovered normally, as described in CED training; (d) the subject has exhibited signs of excited delirium, as described in CED training, prior to, during, or after the discharge of the CED; (e) the subject has suffered bodily injury requiring medical attention as a result of a fall, or otherwise reasonably appears to need medical attention; (f) the subject was exposed to three or more discharges from a CED during the encounter; (g) the subject has been exposed to a continuous discharge lasting 15 seconds or longer; (h) no personnel at the scene are qualified or authorized to remove the CED darts/electrodes from the subject’s person; (i) an officer trained and authorized to remove darts/electrodes experiences difficulty in removing a dart/electrode; or (j) any part of a CED dart/electrode has broken off and remains imbedded.  8.2  An officer is authorized to remove a CED dart/electrode from a subject only if the officer has received training on dart/electrode removal, provided, however, that an officer is not authorized to remove a CED dart/electrode from any part of the person’s head or neck, or where the dart/electrode is located in the area of the subject’s genitalia, or female breast.  In the absence of exigent circumstances requiring immediate action, a CED dart/electrode may only be removed from these areas of the subject’s body by qualified medical personnel.  11
[brief] CONCLUSION  The determination below was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and therefore must be reversed.  It is also against the substantial weight of the evidence.  For all the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that the decision below be reversed, and that [...] be permitted to register his presence at September 11th under the Ricci Act and amend his benefits thereunder.  Respectfully, [...], Esq.  [...], Petitioner-Appellant, v. [...], Respondent-Respondent.
[directive] a defendant will appear for a court proceeding as required.  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1).  Their impact on the risk of danger or obstruction, which are also critical, is less clear, particularly for defendants charged with more serious offenses who pose a continuing public safety concern or have a long record of criminal behavior.  Nonetheless, we do not rule out that certain defendants may be able to show material changes in those risk areas as well.  We note that a court’s decision on pretrial release reflects an overall evaluation of the level of risk of non-appearance, danger, and obstruction.  A change in any one area might -- or might not -- affect the overall calculus.  [Id. at 24.]  Therefore, the Court held that defendants have the right to apply to reopen their pretrial detention hearings under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f) if they (1) have been detained for at least six months and (2) can make a preliminary showing that, based on one or more of the above factors, relief.4 they are entitled to Those threshold requirements are meant to limit hearings to defendants who are better able to show a material change in the level of risk they present, in the context of the pandemic and the delays it has caused.  Defendants subject to a presumption of detention -- those charged with murder or facing a sentence of life imprisonment -- will likely not be eligible for new decision.5 hearings because the seriousness of the offense charged weighs heavily in the release
[brief] Rather, the Court acknowledged that PCR counsel’s practice of having his client sign a verification to the Statement of Facts in the brief did not comply with R. 3:22-10(c).  The Court chose “not to visit on defendant the failings of counsel” because the substance of the witness’ testimony was known, had been provided to the Prosecutor’s office, and the defense had filed a notice of alibi, thus alerting the State about the substance of the witness’ testimony.
[brief] On May 17, 2024, the court entered an Order holding that [...] is not constitutionally compliant with its Mount Laurel Third Round obligation under *In re N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5.97*, 221 N.J. 1 (2015).  (Da1-Da3).  On June 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause, seeking to enjoin [...] from (1) taking any condemnation-related action with respect to the Property, (2) designating a redeveloper for the Property under the LRHL, and (3) granting any type of development approval for any land for any purpose other than for inclusionary housing.
[brief] The opinions were based on the ambiguity of the exclusionary language in the policies, not on statutory requirements of the Workers Compensation Act.  This Court’s unpublished decision cited in Plaintiff’s brief, Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Interstate Racking & Shelving, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2072 (App. Div. Sept. 3, 2021), certif. denied, 249 N.J. 90 (2021), Ja475-82, does not decide the issue Plaintiff presents on this appeal.
[brief] On January 8, 2022, Plaintiff was presented with a pop-up blocking screen in her [...] app presenting those updated Terms of Use.  A depiction of the pop-up screen appears on page Da77 of the record.  [...]’s app was designed so that [...] could not continue using her account to access [...]’s services unless and until she agreed to the updated Terms of Use.  (Da74 ¶ 9; Da222 ¶ 10.)
[brief] It is a violation of a defendant’s 14th Amendment due process rights to be sentenced under a materially false apprehension of fact or law.  See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972).  In Tucker, the defendant had been tried and convicted of armed bank robbery.  404 U.S. at 450 (J. Blackmun dissenting).  At sentencing, in fashioning a lengthy sentence, the court relied upon several prior convictions that had been obtained without the defendant having the benefit of counsel in accordance with the Sixth Amendment and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  Id. at 447.  The court held that to be sentenced under a misapprehension of the correct factual circumstances resulted in a violation of due process, and vacated the sentence.  Id. at 448-49.  In the present circumstances, the sentencing court incorrectly interpreted and applied the *Yarbough* factors as requiring a consecutive sentence because there were two victims, when *Yarbough*, in fact, requires a weighing of all factors, without a bias towards either consecutive or concurrent sentences.  *State v. Torres*, 246 N.J. 246, 270-71 (2021).  Additionally, any sentencing court must provide a statement of the overall fairness of a sentence, rather than a rote listing of the presence or absence of *Yarbough* factors.  *Id.* at 271.  The failure to properly follow the *Yarbough* rules results in a sentence that denies a defendant their due process rights under the 14th Amendment, and is consequently, an illegal sentence.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY RESTRICTED THE DEFENSE FROM ARGUING THIRD-PARTY GUILT.  Contrary to the State’s argument that trial court was unable to assess whether [...]’s statement would have been admissible under the rules of evidence (Sb21), the trial prosecutor’s own proffer as to the substance of [...]’s statement established its admissibility.  On appeal, the State paraphrases the prosecutor’s proffer as follows:  “The State hypothesized that defendant would argue that Derique\(^1\) Ballard, the father of [...]’s child, had problems with the couple and that a non-testifying relative of [...]’s [i.e. --- \(^1\) [...] retains the abbreviations and transcript designations used in his opening brief and adds the following:  Db = defendant’s appellant brief Sb = State’s respondent brief Willie Hargove] stated that Ballard had shot at him and [...] on a prior occasion. ” (Sb19; see also full quotation of prosecutor’s proffer at Db17-18).  Regardless of exactly when or where this prior shooting took place,\(^2\) Hargrove had first-hand knowledge of this shooting and could have testified about it without offering any inadmissible hearsay.  Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the defense thus had a good-faith basis to refer Hargrove’s statement during opening statements and to present Hargrove’s testimony about the previous shooting.  See State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 442 (2007) (“The scope of . . . opening statement is limited to the facts [counsel] intends in good faith to prove by competent evidence.
[brief] DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE.  [...] was sentenced to the most he could be under the plea agreement with the prosecutor: 15 years with 7.5 years of parole ineligibility.  The cursory analysis supporting this sentence is insufficient.  Specifically, the trial court failed to find a sufficient basis to justify the imposition of aggravating factor (5), failed to consider evidence of [...]’s rehabilitation, failed to consider the applicability of mitigating factor (11), and failed to justify the imposition of a discretionary parole disqualifier.  The sentence must be vacated, and the matter remanded for resentencing.
[brief] Our courts have frequently found plain error where the jury was permitted to hear that the defendant invoked his Miranda rights when confronted by the police -- particularly through the defendant’s own words in a recorded interview.  E.g., Clark, 251 N.J. at 278-79, 293-94 (reversing conviction where jury saw recorded interview in which defendant asked for counsel three times); State v. Tung, 460 N.J. Super. 75, 93-95 (App. Div. 2019) (reversing conviction in part because jury twice heard that defendant requested counsel -- once in his own words in recorded interview); State v. Hyde, 292 N.J. Super. 159, 162-67 (App. Div. 1996) (reversing conviction where officer testified that defendant invoked his right to silence, on which prosecutor commented); cf. Feaster, 156 N.J. at 73-77 (finding error but not plain error where single reference to invocation during officer’s testimony was fleeting and not commented on by prosecutor).
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  ......  iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................4  I.  The Special Undertaking Contract.  ..............................................................................4  II.  Plaintiff Surreptitiously Filed This Case Against Defendants .....................6  III.  The Missouri Action And Jurisdictional Discovery In This Case .........................................................................................................................8  IV.  The First Amended Petition In The Missouri Action.  ........................................9  V.
[brief] (2T 67-5 to 77-22; Da 67 at 7:58 to 8:43)  [...] thought he had been wearing blue pants, a black hoodie, and a black jacket, and he later identified himself in a video still-shot from the [...] bar wearing a blue coat, a black hoodie, and black pants.  (2T 70-16 to 72-19; 3T 120-13 to 121-18; Da 67 at 6:40 to 9:50)  Despite other redactions, the interrogation video still showed [...] assert that [...] was lying about his alibi and repeatedly ask why he killed [...].  (Da 67 at 17:34 to 20:39)  In support of [...]’s alibi, the defense admitted a series of video still-shots from an electric company at [...], which depicted the intersection of East 16th and Governor and showed two people walking along East 16th toward a truck, then neither person present, and then only one person reappear from behind the truck.
[brief] The D&O Form provides in pertinent part:  PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART  CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM  * * *  Throughout this policy the words “you” and “your” refer to the Named Insured shown in the Declarations.  The words “we,” “us” and “our” refer to the Company providing this insurance.  The word “insured” means any person or organization qualifying as such under Section II – Who Is An Insured.  * * *  SECTION I – COVERAGE
[brief] On November 2, 2020, plaintiff was driving on Passaic Avenue, Passaic, New Jersey when the subject tree toppled over and landed on plaintiff’s vehicle and driver side.  (Pa58-59).  The tree destroyed the car and plaintiff was severely injured.  (Pa58-59).  Plaintiff was transported to the hospital and suffered a spinal injury which resulted in paralysis from the chest down which left plaintiff confined to a bed.  (Pa58-59,491-507).  Plaintiff suffers from quadriplegia and is no longer independent.  (Pa491-507).  He can no longer maintain regular care of himself including, but not limited to, washing, bathing, eating, walking, using the restroom.  (Pa491-507).  Plaintiff is unable to move himself from the bed to his wheelchair.  (Pa491-507).  On the day the plaintiff sustained his injuries, he underwent spinal fusion surgery.
[brief] (4T 26-8 to 28-8)  She testified that on the day of the shooting, defendant -- who did not normally message her -- sent an Instagram message to her asking her to call him, after which she spoke to him on the phone between 1 and 2 p.m.  (4T 37-9 to 40-15)  In that call, [...] testified, defendant said he “was trying to flag [[...]] down,” and she replied that she was “out of the area right now,” because she was driving on Route 22.  (4T 40-14 to 24)  Defendant replied, “Oh ok.  I’ll see you later,” [...] testified, and “that was it.
[brief] 35  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS AT ISSUE  Transcript of Motion Hearing, dated January 7, 2022………………………………………T  Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice Pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e) as Against Defendants [...] and [...], Filed February 28, 2023………………………………………………………………………………….. 19a Consolidated Statement of Reasons, dated February 28, 2023 ………………….. 5a | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------| | Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, | 23, 24 | | 548 U.S. 53 (2006) | | | Camden County Energy Recovery Assocs., L.P. v. New Jersey Dep't | 10 | | of Envtl. Prot., | | | 320 N.J. Super. 59 (App.Div.1999) | | | Cicchetti v. Morris County Sheriff’s Office, | 18 | | 194 N.J. 563 (2008) | | | Edwards v. Prudential Prop. and Cas. Co., | 14 | | 357 N.J. Super. 196 (App. Div. 2003) | | | El-Sioufi v. St. Peter’s Univ. Hosp., | 21, 27 | | 382 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2005) | | | Failla v. City of Passaic, | 18 | | 146 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 1998) | | | Frederick v. Smith, | 9 | | 416 N.J. Super. 594 (App. Div. 2010) | | | Glass v. Suburban Restoration Co., | 14 | | 317 N.J. Super. 574 (App. Div. 1998) | | | Herman v. Coastal Corp., | 15 | | 348 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2002) | | | Ivan v. County of Middlesex, | 11, 18 | | 595 F.Supp.2d 425 (D.N.J. 2009) | | | Ivan v. County of Middlesex, | 15 | | 612 F.Supp.2d 546 (D.N.J. 2009) | | | Justiano v. G4S Secure Solutions, Inc., | 14 | | 291 F.R.D. 80 (D.N.J. 2013) | | Lehmann v. Toys R Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587 (1993) ...........................................................................................................21 Muniz v. United Hsps. Med. Ctr. Pres. Hsp., 153 N.J. Super. 79 (App. Div. 1977) ..................................................................................9 Onukogu v. New Jersey State Judiciary Essex Vicinage, 2023 WL 3162175 (App. Div. May 1, 2023) ....................................................................22 Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989) ...............................................................................................................9 Rieder v. Dep’t of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547 (App. Div. 1987) ..................................................................................9, 15 Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555 (2010) .............................................................................................................22, 23, 24, 28 Schuster v. State, 2023 WL 2994239 (App. Div. April 19, 2023) .................................................................22 Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 336 N.J. Super. 395 (App. Div. 2001) ................................................................................18, 27 Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2005) ..................................................................................9 Smerling v. Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc., 389 N.J. Super. 181 (App. Div. 2006)