ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] A copy this order shall be provided to any treating psychiatrist the NGRI acquittee by 5. the provider agency.  ____  A report by the treating psychiatrist will be due on _ 6. by Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12563 (KROL Order 8) of The NGRI committee's maximum period commitment or supervision under N.J.S.A. 7.  __ __ of 2C:4-8 years and months terminates on [fill in the date] of of  A copy this Order will be forwarded to the County Adjuster's Office by the Clerk the Court of within two (2) days its signing.
[brief] On November 12, 2012, Plaintiff [...], ("[...]", also "[...]") filed an Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint (Da1 to 33) against Defendant [...] ("[...]", also "[...]") seeking to have the Court declare and enforce a purported easement for vehicles from plaintiff's synagogue on Lot 8 to park on the [...]'s adjacent Lot 5 - upon which a private grade school was located.  [...] filed Responsive papers and Answer and Counterclaim (Da36 to 105).  By Order dated January 8, 2013 [...] entered a Temporary Order pending further proceedings.  (Da106)  [...] filed an Amended Complaint on April 1, 2013 with Exhibits (Da123); [...] filed its Answer.  (Da144)  An unsuccessful Mediation effort and discovery followed.  On April 28, 2016, [...] filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the Second, Third, and Fifth Counts (Da160) seeking a determination that an easement for the [...] to park vehicles on the [...] property (the Sixth Street Courtyard and the Fifth Street Lot) was created by a 1963 Agreement and remained in place, [...] filed a Cross-Motion with Exhibits (Da162) seeking a determination that the 1963 Agreement did not establish an easement.
[brief] It is, of course, true that “[w]here the terms of an agreement are clear, [courts] ordinarily will not make a better contract for the parties than they have voluntarily made for themselves, nor alter their contract for the benefit or detriment of either, particularly in a commercial, arms-length setting."  *Carroll v. United Airlines, Inc.*, 325 N.J. Super. 353, 358-59 (App. Div. 1999) (first alteration added).
[brief] ”  Id. 205 N.J. at 445.  The Court concluded that the officer’s testimony in McLean went beyond the bounds of acceptable fact testimony and was improper as lay opinion testimony.  In reaching its conclusion, the McLean Court stated:  In this appeal, the State suggests, and the appellate panel agreed, that there is a category of testimony that lies between those two spheres, governed by the lay opinion rule, that authorizes a police officer, after giving a factual recitation, to testify about a belief that the transaction he or she saw was a narcotics sale.  We do not agree.  Were we to adopt that approach, we would be transforming testimony about an individual’s observation of a series of events, the significance of which we have previously held does not fall outside the ken of the jury, see Nesbitt, supra, 185 N.J. at 514-15, 888 A.2d 472, into an opportunity for police officers to offer opinions on defendants’ guilt.  To permit the lay opinion rule to operate in that fashion would be to authorize every arresting officer to opine on guilt in every case.  Our decisions describing the permitted realm of expert testimony in narcotics prosecutions are careful to caution that experts may not intrude on the province of the jury by offering, in the guise of opinions, views on the meaning of facts that the jury is fully able to sort out without expert assistance and that expert opinions may not be used to express a view on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence.  See Reeds, supra, 197 N.J. at 300, 962 A.2d 1087; Odom, supra, 116 N.J. at 80, 560 A.2d 1198.  Applying those clear rules to the testimony in this matter, we cannot escape the conclusion that were we to authorize the testimony challenged in this appeal, we would allow, as a lay opinion, testimony that we have found is otherwise impermissible.
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[brief] For these reasons, the dismissal for lack of standing should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  [...], Esq. (018711983)  11 Alexander Lane Short Hills, New Jersey  07078 [...] (tele) [...] (email)  Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET #[...] ______________________________
[brief] *Estate of Chin v. Saint Barnabas Med. Ctr.*, 160 N.J. 454, 470 (1999).  However, the common knowledge exception simply provides that expert testimony is not required to sustain a cause of action against any professional where a reasonable juror could determine that the conduct of a party was negligent without the need for expert assistance.  *Hubbard v. Reed*, 168 N.J. 387, 390 (2001) (holding that an affidavit of merit is not required in “common knowledge” cases when an expert will not be called to testify “‘that the care skill or knowledge ... [of the defendant] fell outside acceptable professional or occupational standards or treatment practices’”) (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27)).  When deciding whether expert testimony is necessary, a court properly considers "whether the matter to be dealt with is so esoteric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid judgment as to whether the conduct of the [defendant] was reasonable," Butler v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 283 (1982).
[brief] [...] found that [...]’s experiences with “unreliable, inconsistent parental figures left him with an exceptionally strong desire to assimilate and to be accepted. ”  (3T:50-18 to 51-7)  (Da 95)  She testified that [...]’s desire for peer acceptance influenced his decision to participate in the robbery, and that the presence of those peers during the robbery made him more likely to act impulsively.  (3T:58-4 to 24; 4T:54-1 to 5)  She found the participation of [...]’s twenty-year-old codefendant, [...], particularly significant.  Not only was [...] older, but “he was considered to be revered by his community,” “commanded authority”, and had a prior criminal record – much like [...]’s absent biological father, who [...] and his friends looked up to.
[brief] In fact, in its implementing regulations, [...] specifically construed the foregoing provisions and stated that "the purpose of this subchapter is to establish procedures for the resolution of disputes concerning the payment of medical expense and other benefits provided by the personal injury protection coverage in policies of automobile insurance."  N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1(a).  [...]’s interpretation of AICRA as a system that resolves disputes concerning the payment of No-Fault benefits to claimants or their assignees (and nothing else) is entitled to deference.  In Merin v. Maglaki, 126 N.J. 430, 436 (1992), the court gave deference to [...]’s interpretation of the Fraud Act.  It stated, “We give substantial deference to the interpretation of the agency charged with enforcing an act.  The agency's interpretation will prevail provided it is not plainly unreasonable. ”  citing Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 327, 478 A.2d 742 (1984).  Similarly, in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(c), the Legislature specifically outlined the various issues that could constitute a “PIP dispute” subject to the NFADR process.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS OF APPENDIX | Description | Page | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs, filed January 20, 2023 | Pa001 | | Defendant [...]’ Answer to Complaint, dated February 7, 2023 | Pa022 | | Defendant [...]’s Answer to Complaint, dated February 8, 2023 | Pa045 | | Notice of Pre-Trial Conference, dated February 17, 2023 | Pa058 | | Defendant [...]’ Pre-Trial Memorandum, dated May 11, 2023 | Pa060 | | Defendant [...]’s Pre-Trial Memorandum, dated May 11, 2023 | Pa081 | | Plaintiffs’ Pre-Trial Memorandum, dated May 16, 2023 | Pa086 | | Exhibit A- [...] Resolution, dated November 22, 2022 | Pa098 | | Notice of Motion, dated July 27, 2023 | Pa113 | | Certification of [...], dated July 27, 2023 | Pa115 | | Certification of [...], dated July 27, 2023 | Pa117 | | Certification of [...], dated July 27, 2023 | Pa119 | | Exhibit A- Survey of Lot 1 in Block 768, dated March 14, 2022 | Pa125 | | Exhibit B- Engineer’s Report, dated November 18, 2022 | Pa411 | | Exhibit C- Excerpt from Engineer’s Report, dated November 18, 2022 | Pa166 | | Exhibit D- NJDEP Official Statements, dated February 6, 2023 | Pa168 | | Exhibit E- Public Hearing Presentation, dated October 19, 2022 | Pa170 | | Certification of [...], dated July 27, 2023 | Pa172 | | Exhibit A- Plaintiffs’ Hearing Exhibit List | Pa177 | | Exhibit A, Exhibit G-01- [...] Technical Memo from Planning | Pa180 | Exhibit A, Exhibit G-02- Certificate of Appropriateness Application & [...] Property Modification Approval, dated April 21, 2021
[brief] They are defendants in the matter Dynamic Solutions Group v. [...] and [...].  For purposes of this motion, [...] and [...] Appendix will be numbered as “Pa” for Plaintiff’s Appendix.  ⁴ 1T represents the transcript from oral arguments of August 2, 2024. that he did not waive any conflict of interest.  (Pa39; 1T19:18).  The [...] also directed a letter to [...] advising that they believed it had a conflict of interest pursuant to RPC 1.9 and that it had represented [...] in a "substantially related" matter.
[brief] The Court did not reverse because the trial court properly presented the factual dispute to the jury.  Liu, supra, at 493.  The jury in that case simply reached the wrong conclusion because of conflicting evidence regarding relocation benefits and the admission of a video taken after the City had taken possession of the building showing damaged equipment.  The Liu property was a multi-use building on the Long Branch boardwalk housing different units including a café, a pizza stand, a night club, and a restaurant among other uses, the Supreme Court held that, “the jury was free to conclude, as it did, that at least some of the FF&E formed a single functional unit with the building and was equally free to conclude that a reasonably willing purchaser would not have paid “substantially more for that property with the FF&E”.  Liu supra at 491.  The proofs in the Liu trial were substantially the same as in this case.
[brief] (Ibid.)  [...], familiar with the NJSP insignia, opined, with the assistance of the video, that defendant displayed a NJSP ID to him, but he was unsure.  (14T19-12 to 15; 14T24-15 to 23; 14T28-1 to 3).  The entire encounter took under one minute.  (14T27-13 to 15; S-43).  --- \(^8\)  The four videos, S-38 (Toms River); S-43 (Lakehurst); S-48 (Berkeley Township), and S-52 (Marlboro) were previously delivered to this Court.  (Da24-26).  Additional copies can be supplied on request.  \(^9\)  An earlier witness, [...], an NJSP forensic photographer, testified that S-36A, S-36B, and S-36C were still photographs taken from [...]’s video, that she enhanced through a software program.  (13T36-9 to 37-18; 13T44-19 to 48-1; Pa34-39).  The process did not allow anything to be added to what appeared, rather it only made the image easier to see.  (13T45-22 to 46-6).  \(^10\) [...] identified S-58A, S-58B, and S-58C as still images taken from his bodycam video.  (14T14-12 to 15-6; Pa50-52).  All six photographs were admitted into evidence.  (14T18-17 to 18).
[brief] Both jurists also found that the work [...]’s counsel undertook to establish the pre-SOL facts was critical to debunking the [...]’ “claim of right” and “true-up” defenses which, if proven, would have sounded the death knell of [...]’s NJRICO causes of action.  Finally, both jurists determined that in order to prove the damages incurred by [...] during the RICO SOL Period, a retrospective accounting of the facts and finances back to “day one” of the partnership was required.  See 14510a-11a, 39035a, 390337a-38a, 39062a.  See also Bingham v. Zolt, 823 F. Supp. 1126, 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff’d, 66 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 1995).  The record facts, as detailed by [...] and [...] and set forth at length \textit{supra}, also refute the [...]’ assertion that [...] improperly recommended an award of fees to [...] in connection with his counsel’s procurement of evidence from witnesses who possessed personal \textsuperscript{25}
[brief] D.  The Multiple Violations by the Legislature in Enacting the Act of Reproductive Freedom Should Void the Statute.  As explained in Point One and Two, the Legislature committed a series of errors in enacting a statute affecting one of the most controversially legislated topics – abortion.  If N.J.S.A. 1:7-1, *et seq.* is to have any meaning, this Court should use it to void the statute at issue.  The Legislature’s failures were not singular.  Nor were they meaningless.  The Legislature acted within a penumbra of secrecy to pass a controversial bill.  This action was after a bill on the same topic had been pending for over a year.  This action was done while access to the State House was limited due to the pandemic.  The action was done without the proper notice to the public of the text of the pending bill.  Here, the Petitioners were harmed because [...], provided testimony on what she thought was A. 4848 (2021) and S. 3030 (2021).  (Pa66.)  But S. 49 and A. 6260 were radically different, and [...] was not given notice or the opportunity to express her concerns on the actual bill’s text.  (*Id.*  See also Pa378-472.)  As more fully explained in Point Two, the legislation was adopted in violation of the procedure for second and third readings on the bill.  The purpose for such readings is to permit the public to participate under Paragraph 18 of the Constitution.  N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 18.  Moreover, the statutory need that fiscal impacts be obtained before enactment were violated.  Finally, the public participation was violated due to lack of advance notice.  Because “the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the enactment and approval of laws... have not been complied with,” this Court should “adjudge the law... to be void. ”  N.J.S.A. 1:7-3.  On such a controversial topic, this Court should abide by the constitutional and statutory protections that exist and declare the law void.
[brief] (2T141:7 to 142:5; 5T46:21 to 47:6; 6T92:2-8; 8T100:14 to 101:11.)  Plaintiff and [...] received a copy of the RIR a few days after it was filed, and upon review, it was clear that other than a few minor additions, the RIR submitted by [...] to the [...] in December 2021 was essentially the same as the 2018 RI Summary Report.  (4T59:19 to 60:2; 6T92:13 to 93:11; see generally Pa0292; Pa0388.)  After reviewing the RIR, [...] determined that the remedial investigation had not been properly completed and drafted a letter to Defendants’ representatives explaining the deficiencies.
[brief] Appellant was required to comply with all terms of the Agreement.  They did not, and this is a breach of the agreement as noted in the Trial Court’s order at (Da202).  Since “the polestar of construction is to discover the intention of the parties as revealed by the language used by them” then Appellant’s argument fails as interpretation of the Separation Agreement is in Respondent’s favor (EQR-LPC Urban Renewal North Pier, LLC V. City of New Jersey City, 452 N.J. Super. 309, 319 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Karl’s Sales and Service Inc. v Gimbel Bros., Inc. 249, N.J. Super. 487, 493 (App. Div. 2016) certification denied 127 N.J. 548 (1991), 249 N.J. Super at 487, 492.)  There is also no basis in the record below for Appellant’s contention that the Chancery Division derived the whole of its determination from a breach of Par. 6 of the Agreement, nor deviated from the plain and ordinary language of the term “effectuate” to reach the determination on breach of the Agreement\(^2\).
[brief] Although the [...] cite to the Legislature’s intent in passing N.J.S.A. 20:3-30(d), they engage in no discussion of what such “compensation” truly encapsulates.  New Jersey courts have defined “just compensation” as “the fair market value of the property…determined by what a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree to, neither being under any compulsion to act. ”  City of Asbury Park v. Asbury Park Towers, 388 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div.2006).  This Court has repeatedly emphasized that there is no hard or fast rule in determining market value, so as to preserve the inherent flexibility of equitable principles underlying condemnation.  Contrary to the [...]’ insistence that the Trial Court’s ruling should have been dictated by the treatise The Appraisal of Real Estate, it is New Jersey case law that continues to define just compensation in the event of a taking.  The Trial Court recognized these precepts when it denied the [...]’ motion to bar the [...]’s analysis of the [...] lease.  Ultimately, the [...] seek to have their cake and eat it too; they ask this Court to eviscerate the Trial Court’s Order permitting the factfinder to take the [...] lease into account, on the grounds that a “fee simple” was taken as of January 27, 1994.  However, the [...] did not take the property, whether by fee simple or otherwise, until May of 2018.  During the period of twenty-four years, the [...] continued to possess the Property, collect rent, and generate profit, which they refuse to disgorge to the [...] after the declaration of blight.  If the [...] had truly taken a “fee simple” of the Property on January 27, 1994, why shouldn’t the [...] have the rights to the excess rent as of the date of valuation?  Furthermore, the [...] have persisted in this fallacy that the FF&E that existed at the Property in 2018 need to be valued as of January 27, 1994.  There is zero legal basis for this novel proposition.  The evidence adduced at [...]’s and [...]’s depositions clearly establish that there is no credible evidence that the FF&E existed at the Property on January 27, 1994.  Therefore, the FF&E report constituted an impermissible net opinion.  This Court should affirm the inclusion of the [...] lease in the calculation of Market Value, reverse the Trial Court’s February 20, 2019 Order setting the date of valuation as of January 27, 1994, and reverse the Trial Court’s August 24, 2021 Order denying the [...]’s motion to bar the testimony and expert report of [...].
[brief] As an initial matter, Ordinance No. 13-2022 clearly implicated both public funds as well as significant tax ratables.  In fact, during the hearing conducted immediately prior to Ordinance No. 13-2022’s passage, [...] confirmed that the creation of the latter was the Township’s primary motivating factor with the enactment of this legislation, to wit:  And this is a precursor.  This goes to our – our overall fiscal plan, and the future fiscal solvency plan where we have designed several sites….  (1T, 2:23-25).  *****  [T]he reality is as we look at our overall fiscal situation, and the future, and what is left on the table for any substantial commercial ratable, it’s the only place that that ratable’s going to come from in the foreseeable future.  (1T, 3:15-20).  This will be a roughly $1.6 million PILOT paid to the town from day one, which would go up in increments every five years based on the new assessment, if they should actually move forward and build this thing.  (1T, 9:19-24).  [...] correctly observed that the PILOT (Payment in Lieu of Taxes) Agreement facilitated by the [...] would generate substantial revenue for the municipality once effectuated.  A PILOT Agreement incentivizes development which might not otherwise occur by essentially eliminating the property taxes that would be due for the new improvements in exchange for smaller negotiated payments from the redeveloper.  A PILOT also effectively constitutes a choice with the direction of public funds because, unlike real estate taxes, school districts do not share in this revenue.  In other words, this matter implicates both public funds and ratables.  Contrary to the trial court’s determination, this matter also involves political upheaval.
[brief] On or about February 19, 2021, March 1, 2021 and March 10, 2021, Plaintiff requested that Defendant’s former counsel accept service of process via email.  He did not respond.  -  On February 23 and 28, 2021, after counsel did not initially respond, Plaintiff’s process server attempted to personally serve Defendant at [...].  (Pa140 to 146).  o  Defendant has admitted that 39 Shore Drive is his address.  (Def.’s Br. at 3-4).  -  On March 19, 2021, Plaintiff’s process server attempted to personally serve Defendant with the aforementioned documents at [...], which was an address Plaintiff’s private investigation firm, [...], confirmed.  (Pa16).  - Defendant has admitted that he is the owner of this property, which he sometimes allows his sister to occupy.  (Def.’s Br. at 4).  - Defendant’s former attorney, [...], confirmed that B5 Oceanview Terrace was Defendant’s address.  (Da163).  In that same email thread, Defendant himself confirmed that B5 Oceanview Terrace was his address.  (Da165 to 166).  -  On or about March 11, 2021, Plaintiff attempted to personally serve Defendant at [...], which was another address that [...] confirmed as a recent address for Defendant.  (Pa11).  - On March 16 and 17, 2021, Plaintiff’s process server attempted to personally serve Defendant with the aforementioned documents at the [...], which is one of the properties at issue in the Complaint.  (Pa13).  -  On August 7, 8, and 15, 2021, [...] of [...] attempted to personally serve Defendant with the aforementioned documents at [...] and B5 Oceanview Terrace as well as three (3) other addresses.  See id.  -  As previously stated, Defendant has admitted that 39 Shore Drive is his address.  (Def.’s Br. at 3-4).  - Mr. Rusin also made telephonic contact with an individual who is believed to be Defendant’s daughter [...].  She agreed to forward a message to Defendant.  (Pa146).  - Moreover, Mr. Rusin also left a telephonic message on Defendant’s voicemail machine.  (See id.)  Accordingly, two different process servers ([...] and [...]) made no less than three attempts to serve Defendant at his admitted home address (39 Shore Drive).  Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff’s process server “must have misread the address or knocked on the wrong door” is, therefore, entirely unconvincing.  (Def.’s Br. at 3-4).  Furthermore, the September 24, 2021 order authorized substitute service on [...].  Defendant now admits that he owns that address that is “sometimes occupied by his sister. ” (Def.’s Br. at 4).  However, this is contradicted by an email exchange with Defendant’s former attorney, [...], wherein Defendant and the prior attorney each confirmed that B5 Oceanview Terrace was Defendant’s address.  (Da163, Da165 to 166).  Indeed, Defendant has a history of flouting court processes.  Defendant, a former police officer, was previously indicted for using a vacant property as his own address and collect FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) funds as a result.  (Pa151 to 153).  Hence, this is not the Defendant’s first time using his ownership of multiple properties to obstruct the fair administration of our judicial system.  LEGAL ARGUMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW