ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] For disputes like this one arising elsewhere, users are confronted with a near-indecipherable paragraph requiring collaboration between the parties from the start, invoking Federal statute, apparently assigning some powers to courts of law, and which is in any event contradicted two paragraphs down by the statement that “[a]ny dispute, claim, or controversy arising out of or relating to incidents or accidents resulting in personal injury . . . shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the state in which the incident or accident occurred” without any limitation.  (Da86).  That the factfinder and rules of arbitration might be different, and that it might be initiated by mail, is not curative as [...] suggests.  (Da84-86); (Db22-23).  First, it must be highlighted that the argument itself is a step beyond even *Drosos*.  If providing the arbitration provider’s rules is requiring the user to self-assemble the pieces of what arbitration is, [...]’s agreement requires them to undertake the initial step of carving those pieces out of wood.  It is just as likely the user determines these facets make arbitration either similar enough to or distinct from litigation, not mutually exclusive with it, such as the involvement of a judge.  And, please keep in mind, this is all apparently taking place on an iPhone, in a food delivery app, by surprise pop-up after the purchase of perishable goods, already en route via stranger.  Or in other situations just like that.  It’s absurd to expect a member of the public to draw these connections.  And, even if they did, these are secondary considerations that are not even made relevant in the mind of [...]’s users because [...] fails to posit arbitration as exclusive.
[brief] The legislation does not guarantee approval of a land-use application, but instead allows for the application process to move forward without the unnecessary hurdle of constantly changing requirements while the application is pending.  New Jersey’s business and entrepreneurs – the job creators of our state – invest considerable amounts of financial and human resources in navigating a vast landscape of rules and regulations at the state and local level . . .  Prior to the signing of this legislation, the system allowed for those rules to be changed in the middle of the process, even after an application has been submitted.
[brief] Simply put, residents would be subject to having their confidential contact information obtained by any number of individuals or groups who could then use private e-mail addresses and other contact information to distribute unwanted communications.  Not only would this violate those terms expressed to the users, but it could hamper the City's ability to communicate emergency and other important information to residents by discouraging usage.  Finally, the information input by residents known as “recipient information” is expressly owned by [...] and therefore is not the City's information to which it is entitled.  Da227.
[brief] The Appellate Division reviews a trial court’s grant of summary judgment “de novo,” and affords no special deference to the trial court’s ruling on the law.  Rios v. Meda Pharm., Inc., 247 N.J. 1, 13 (2021); see also, Worthy v. Kennedy Health System, 446 N.J. Super 71, 86 (App. Div. 2016) (trial court’s conclusion of law on summary judgment motion is “a determination [] ‘not entitled to any special deference’ and is subject to de novo review”).  To that end, the Appellate Division applies the same standard for summary judgment as the Trial Court.  Id.  Specifically, the Appellate Division must review and determine: “[1] whether there are genuine issues of material fact and, if not, [2] whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. ”  Worthy, 446 N.J. Super at 85 (quoting Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)).  Indeed, as instructed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, “[i]t is only when the evidence is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law, the trial court should not hesitate to grant summary judgment. ”  Worthy, 446 N.J. Super at 86 (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)).  A.
[brief] The record supports Appellant’s *prima facie* claim arising under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”).  The Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”) was enacted by the State Legislature to “protect and encourage employees to report illegal or unethical workplace activities and to discourage public and private sector employers from engaging in such conduct. ”  Abbamont v. Piscataway Township Bd. of Education, 138 N.J. 405, 431 (1994).  To state a cause of action under CEPA, a plaintiff must show that she reasonably believed that the conduct of the defendant violated law, rule, or regulation, that she performed whistleblowing activity, that adverse action was taken against her, and that there is a causal connection between the whistleblowing activity and the adverse action.  See Dzwoner v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451 (2003).  In the matter before this Court, the record clearly establishes that Appellant has a *prima facie* claim under CEPA.  It is undisputed that Appellant engaged in whistleblowing activity to multiple supervisors, both orally and in writing.  Appellant was then subjected to retaliation, and a hostile work environment that became so severe that Appellant had to go to the emergency room for anxiety.  In January of 2020, Appellant continued to engage in the same protected activity, resulting in documented incident reports.  Shortly thereafter, Appellant was temporarily from the work schedule along with other employees, purportedly due to an issue with her paperwork.  However, Appellee never contacted Appellant to be restored to the work schedule, and never contacted Appellant or assigned her any more work, even though she was eligible to be restored to the work schedule.  In the fact of the foregoing undisputed facts, Appellee nevertheless argued for summary judgment purporting there was a lack of adverse employment action or causal connection.  Appellee’s argument is simply contradicted by the facts in the record.  Accordingly, the lower Court’s decision, in granting summary judgment, should be reversed, and this matter remanded.
[brief] The FDCPA is a federal statute that was passed by Congress “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to ensure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses. ”  *Greco v. Trauner, Cohen & Thomas, L.L.P.*, 412 F.3d 360, 363 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)).
[brief] The plea papers show, as I said earlier, that the defendant would be pleading guilty to Count 3 of one indictment which charged him with felony murder, he would be pleading guilty to Count 1 of a second indictment which charged him with first degree armed robbery.  There's an acknowledgment here completed into the form that he was looking at life as the maximum sentence on the murder charge and 20 years as a maximum sentence on the armed robbery charge.  Without specificity it notes also that [...] was going to plead guilty to three violations of probation.  The plea form and its standard answers contains the defendant's acknowledgment that he was pleading guilty because he committed the offenses, he understood that he had to give a factual basis, he understood what the charges meant and he understood that he was giving up the right to a jury trial during which the State had to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to remain silent and the right to confront witnesses against you.  Now, Question 4(d) contains a question that relates to whether the defendant is or is not waiving any right to appeal and the defendant expressly Court's role in accepting the plea, understood that the Court was not bound by the State's recommendation and the Court had the right to reject the plea.  [...] signed the form.  He initialed it on each page.  He also completed the supplemental plea form for No Early Release Act cases as regards both the felony murder charge and the robbery charge.  So it's important for the Court to note the plea agreement and what the plea agreement says.
[brief] The [...] Excess Policy follows form and is excess to the primary [...] Policy.  It is objectively unreasonable to expect a follow form excess policy to provide coverage when the underlying primary policy does not, particularly when the same operative provision is used in both policies.  Appellants also assert that their expectation of coverage was reasonable because of the structure of the declarations page in the [...] Policy and because the Injury to an Insured exclusion in the excess liability coverage part states that it does not apply to UIM coverage.  These arguments too are meritless.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT..................................................................................................................2  POINT I RESPONDENT'S EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES  ARGUMENT SHOULD BE REJECTED  BECAUSE SHE DID NOT CROSS-APPEAL ON THIS ISSUE AND THE MATTER WAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT..............................2  A.  Respondent is barred from arguing that Appellant has not exhausted administrative remedies due to her failure to cross-appeal.  .................................................................................................................................2  B.  Alternatively, Appellant has not failed to exhaust administrative remedies because the trial court had jurisdiction over this matter .........................................................................................................................3  POINT II  RESPONDENT IS PRECLUDED FROM ARGUING THAT THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AFTER FAILING TO RAISE THIS ISSUE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND AFFIRMATIVELY REPRESENTING IN THE TRIAL COURT THAT NO MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT REQUIRED  A PLENARY HEARING AND THE MATTER WAS APPROPRIATE FOR RESOLUTION BY THE TRIAL COURT ON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS IN THE RECORD AS A MATTER OF LAW.  ........................................................................................................................................................................6  POINT III  THE MEMORIALIZATION OF THE SETTLEMENT CONTRACT ON THE RECORD BEFORE THE HEARING OFFICER SATISFIES [...] TO THE EXTENT SUCH COMPLIANCE IS EVEN REQUIRED IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THIS MATTER WAS SETTLED AT HEARING AND NOT AT MEDIATION.  ..................................8  POINT IV  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE OLDER WORKERS  BENEFIT PROTECTION ACT PERMITTED RESPONDENT TO REPUDIATE THE SETTLEMENT CONTRACT  MEMORIALIZED ON THE HEARING RECORD  ........................................11 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................................................15  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Blum v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 2005 WL 4044579 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 30, 2006) ......................................................................................................................................................13 Berardo v. City of Jersey City, 476 N.J. Super. 341 (App. Div. 2023) .......................7 Chimes v. Oritani Motor Hotel, Inc., 195 N.J. Super. 435 (App. Div. 1984) .......2 Larsen & Fish, Inc. v. Schultz, 5 N.J. Super. 403 (App. Div. 1949) .......................11 Monek v. Borough of South River, 354 N.J. Super. 442 (App. Div. 2002) ............7 New Jersey Civil Service Ass’n v. State, 88 N.J. 605 (1982) ...............................4 Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973) .............................................7 Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422 (1998) .....................................12 Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118 (App. Div. 1983) .................................9
[brief] (3T67:8-10)(3T10:5-10)  Once they obtained the injunctive relief they wanted, they “disclosed” large monetary damage claims which a single arbitrator could not have heard if disclosed initially.  Arguably, it was as a result of the Plaintiffs’ strategic phasing of their claims that they had 1 arbitrator decide millions of dollars of damages, which was against AAA rules.  Plaintiffs also apparently concede that the line of cases [...] cited for vacating awards made contrary to the parties’ arbitration agreement do require vacatur.
[brief] Da42 Order granting motion to bar evidence of citations/summons issued to [...], dated September 26, 2023 ................................................ Da43 Order granting motion to bar evidence of a defense independent medical examination at trial, dated October 2, 2023 ....................................................  Da44 Order denying motion for reconsideration of Court’s September 26, 2023, Order barring evidence of Defendant [...]’s criminal convictions, dated October 3, 2023 ......................................................... Da45 Order addressing evidence that may be used during opening statements, dated October 2, 2023 .......................................................................................
[brief] Our File No.: 180724E DJD  [...], Esq.  (ATTY. Id. # 040591990)  On the Brief TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS ..........................................................  i  SUMMARY  JUDGMENT LISTING FOR R. 2:6-1(A) ......................... iii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDER AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED ..v  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....................................................  vi TABLE OF APPENDIX ......................................................... ix  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................
[directive] knock • no-knock will the a every execution Third, undergo subsequent review of warrant by Prosecutor's relevant a approving County appropriate including when Office, review of camera execution.  body-worn warrant during the created footage ~ • track for County Prosecutors number Fourth, must no-knock the the of applied warrants jurisdiction, their courts law authorized requesting enforcement agency, the and in and by Director well as any circumstances, entries exigent no-knock as justified and by the DCJ same the information track to the must response in in applications sought attorneys by Criminal Justice.  Division of Directive general
[brief] (Pa25)  [...] claimed that sick leave may only be utilized for illness or injury pursuant to state regulation and that therefore such leave is ipso facto protected activity under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination which provides that perceived disabilities trigger the protection of the NJLAD.  (Pa25).  [...] asserted that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 11A:6-5, Firefighters are entitled to fifteen (15) sick days per year on an accumulating basis to be used for illness or injury.  (Pa25-Pa26).  [...] asserted that such Firefighters therefore have a right to utilize sick leave which may be used for illness or injury as a matter of law.  (Pa27).  [...] challenged the General Order which penalizes employees simply for taking medical leave for illness or injury and claim that such actions violate the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.
[directive] This Addendum was drafted in consultation with law enforcement officers from across the State, including the leaders of numerous tactical and Crisis Negotiation Teams.  Mental health professionals and community stakeholders were also consulted in drafting the addendum.  During the discussions, these professionals demonstrated a genuine commitment to developing progressive ideas, techniques and training designed to minimize the creation of barricade incidents and to peacefully resolve these challenging scenarios whenever they do develop.  The inclusion of mental health professionals during certain law enforcement responses, as further evidenced by the positive results of the ARRIVE Together program, demonstrates law enforcement’s continuing commitment to making New Jersey a safer place for all of our residents.
[brief] [...], : CIVIL ACTION  Plaintiff-Appellant, : ON APPEAL FROM THE vs. : FINAL ORDER OF THE [...], STEVE : SUPERIOR COURT  SJEKSTAD and STEVE : OF NEW JERSEY, SJEKSTAD, jointly, severally or in : LAW DIVISION, the alternative, PERSONS OR : PASSAIC COUNTY ENTITIES 1-10 (said names being : DOCKET NO. [...] fictitious and unknown), : Sat Below: Defendants-Respondents.  : HON. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
[brief] See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (statute barring the teaching of foreign languages to children); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (law obligating parents to send children to public school); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (same); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality) (ordering visitation rights for non- parents over parent’s objections); Anspach, 503 F.3d at 263-64 (summarizing these precedents).  Conversely, Appellants cannot cite a single decision from the United States Supreme Court, our Supreme Court, the Third Circuit, or this court finding a fundamental right to affirmatively provide parents such information, let alone to adopt a blanket policy in violation of the LAD.
[brief] H1035a Attachment: [...] Curriculum Vitae .................................  H1046a  Attachment JO1: [...] Market Study Report submitted to [...] September 12, 2018, is included in this Appendix at pages Ha375 tot Ha401.  Attachment JO2: [...] letter to [...] October 17, 2018 submitting analytics for paired sales analysis requested by [...] ...  H1048a P-13: Cover letter enclosing Holmdel responses to [...] data requests [...]-HOLM-BLM-1 to -30 (see also S-16) (SOICR p. 11) is part of Staff Exhibit 16 and is included in this Appendix at Ha1709 to Ha1729.
[brief] 1.  Respondents misinterpret Massa v Laing, 160 N.J. Super. 443; 390 A.2d 624; 1977 N.J. Super. (App. Div. 1977) which cites the standard for contesting a will, while here we are dealing with an alleged *inter vivos* gift that the Court found did not exist and awarded unjust enrichment and restitution; Additionally, the Massa court did not have a finding of a confidential relationship, as we have a finding in the present case, rendering that case inapposite.  (Pa1, Pa8, Pa10, 6T31-42)  The Respondents reliance on *Massa* is misplaced.  That case deals with a will, and there was neither a finding, nor a discussion of whether a confidential relationship altered the analysis, as the lower court found here.  Whether one existed in that case, or should have been argued and considered, we can only speculate.  The reality is that the Court in *Massa* spent no time analyzing that issue.  Therefore, we again point to *Pascale*.
[brief] Troubled Marriage  Instead of addressing his 2005 letter to the Decedent, which constitutes powerful evidence of a failed marriage coming directly from the Petitioner, the Petitioner accuses the Respondent of “taking the testimony of her own witnesses out of context and by interjecting innuendo, conjecture and speculation. ” (Pb 12).  He nitpicks the testimony of [...] and [...], to no avail.  (Pb 12-14).  Snyder’s testimony was found to be “reasonable, well-founded and credible. ” (Pa 28).  As to Whelan, the Chancery Division stated:  Ms. Whelan was a friend of Decedent’s since 1963.  [...] testified at length concerning the relationship between Decedent and Petitioner, the existence of the Antenuptial Agreement, and Decedent’s final days.  This court finds [...] credible.  (Pa 27).  In attempting to explain his need to “slip away” from the Decedent at parties to “check his emails” (Pb 15), the Petitioner ignores the fact that such a task is easily accomplished by phone.
[brief] In Garden Howe, a professional negligence action against an architect, this Court reversed a trial court's determination that an engineer was not qualified to give expert opinions in areas where the two professions overlapped.  Garden Howe, supra, 439 N.J. Super. at 457.  In this case, plaintiff’s experts proffered opinions as experts in respiratory care based on extensive personal experience dealing with patients requiring respiratory care in a long-term care facility environment.  Notwithstanding the fact they were not respiratory therapists, those experts had sufficient expertise to testify on the respiratory care or lack thereof provided [...].
[brief] (5T:21-6 to 15)  The court also found that despite [...]’s father’s absence, his stepfather, or mother’s boyfriend, “has been involved in [his life]. ”  (5T:20-15 to 21-15)  The court rejected Miller factor three – concerning the circumstances of the offense and the effect of familial and peer pressure – based on its acceptance of the State’s theory that [...] had ordered the shooting and its finding that “the youngest [co]defendant arguably succumbed to the pressure exerted by this defendant to stop the fleeing victim”.
[brief] See *County of Ocean v. Stockhold*, 129 N.J. Super. 286, 289 (App.Div.1974); *State v. Buck*, 94 N.J. Super. 84, 88 (App.Div.1967) (holding that although private interests may be served by condemnation, overarching question is whether purpose of taking is in public interest).  Courts will generally not inquire into a public body’s motive concerning the necessity of the taking or the amount of property to be apportioned for public use.
[brief] I.  FINDINGS OF FACT  1.  [...] produced its first privilege log to [...] on January 19, 2016 and supplemental privilege logs on January 13, 2017 and May 11, 2017.  2.  On February 29, 2016, [...] completed its document production to [...].  [...] submitted its supplemental privilege logs to [...] on March 21, 2016 and June 3, 2016.  3.  Subsequently, [...] compared [...]’s privilege logs against [...]’s production and privilege logs.  [...] found that some documents on [...]’s privilege log that were withheld from production based on [...]’s privilege were either not identified on [...]’s privilege logs or not included in [...]’s document production.  4.  On June 6, 2016, [...] notified [...] that it believed certain documents from [...]’s privilege log were absent from [...]’s privilege log or production.
[brief] 11  Sw. Nat. Bank v. Simpson & Son, Inc., 799 P.2d 512 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990) ..................................................................  14  United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203 ....................................................................................................  Passim White v. Newark Morning Star Ledger, 245 N.J.Super. 606 (Law Div. 1990)
[brief] (Pb44-47).  Upon review, the fourth count of plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleging violation of free speech rights (the only count listing “free speech”) makes no mention of “prior restraint,” the existence of a DEP “regulation,” or suggests that it is challenging any policy at all.  (Pa272-Pa273).  The second amended complaint basically pleads that plaintiff should not be punished for using the term “f-word” at the Rutgers conference and that he should be free to speak at the AWWA conference as a “section chief” without advising anyone at the DEP.