ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Confirmed By Expert Testimony  [...] ("[...]"), with a Master's degree in Police Administration, graduate of the FBI National Academy, manager of Professional Criminal Justice at the College of Saint Elizabeth serving as an adjunct professor for around ten (10) years, and former Police Officer for twenty-three (23) years (retiring with the title of Deputy Chief) served as [...]'s expert in the area of the proper way to conduct IA investigations.  (5T9:24 - 10:4, 7; 11:4; 18:12-14; Pa278-Pa287).  [...] reviewed the IA file in this matter as well as listened to the interviews and reviewed the IA report.  (5T18:24-25; 19:1-5; Pa278-Pa287).  [...] concluded that 18 months for an investigation to be undertaken from the date of the event to completion was "unacceptable" and did not meet the New Jersey AG IA Guidelines' requirements.
[directive] This Rule provides that every defendant shall have a right to bail before conviction on such terms as, in the judgment of the court, will insure the defendant’s Right to Bail Before Conviction.  presence when required, having regard for the defendant’s background, residence, employment and family status and, particularly, the general policy against (Includes Option of R.O.R. Bail) unnecessary sureties and detentions.  In its discretion, the court may order the defendant’s release on the defendant’s own recognizance and may impose terms or conditions appropriate to such release.  This Rule provides that conditions of pre-trial release, including bail, may be set by a judge sitting regularly in or acting as a temporary judge of the jurisdiction in which the offense was allegedly committed or by a vicinage Presiding Judge of the Municipal Courts.
[brief] (Id.).  On April 28, 2023, the Trust appealed that decision. \(^5\) --- \(^5\)  The Trust brought a separate appeal to challenge the [...]’s (“[...]’s”) licensing determination regarding the same structure in “In the Matter of [...]  [...], [...]. ”  On May 8, 2024, the Appellate Division rejected that appeal and affirmed the licensing determination of the [...].
[brief] (Ca223).  •  On January 9, 2022, one day before she called [...] a “Tyrannical POS” for extending New Jersey’s School Mask Mandate, Respondent posted on Facebook comparing pandemic safety measures to domestic violence.  (Ca230)  •  On December 9, Respondent posted a picture of [...] from a website clearly identified as “unmasknjschools.com” which stated that “Murphy’s pandemic response on children” “needs to end NOW!” (Ca228).  •
[brief] ”  *Accutane*, 234 N.J. at 389.  “The danger of prejudice through introduction of unreliable expert evidence is clear”:  “While juries would not always accord excessive weight to unreliable expert testimony, there is substantial danger that they would do so, precisely because the evidence --- ⁶ Available at: [https://www.nist. gov/system/files/documents/2024/01/05/OSAC%202022-S-0030%20Standard%20for%20Methodology%20in%20Bloodstain%20Pattern%20Analysis_CLEAN%20REGISTRY%20VERSION%202.0.pdf](https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2024/01/05/OSAC%202022-S-0030%20Standard%20for%20Methodology%20in%20Bloodstain%20Pattern%20Analysis_CLEAN%20REGISTRY%20VERSION%202.0.pdf) (last accessed February 14, 2024).  is labeled ‘scientific’ and ‘expert. ’”  Id. at 389-90 (quoting State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 518 (1982)).  The State understood the importance of this aspect of [...]’s testimony, repeatedly referring to it in summation as a reason to discredit [...]’s defense.
[brief] The City’s entire argument rests on eliding the distinction between a foreclosure action and a takings claim.  That is how, for example, it can argue that ruling for [...] in this case would “afford Tyler full retroactivity, rather than the pipeline retroactivity called for by Roberto,” (Resp. Br. 10), even though this action was indisputably filed before Tyler was issued—and therefore in the “pipeline. ”  That is also how the City can argue that the takings claim here is barred by the entire controversy doctrine, even though the claim did not accrue until the City failed to compensate [...] for her equity interest following the foreclosure judgment.  These arguments all fail because they rest on the same flawed premise—the conflation of a foreclosure action with the failure to pay just compensation for a taking.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] Revival Discovery Requests  Defendant seeks information and documents concerning the abandonment and expiration of Plaintiffs’ Asserted Patents (“revival discovery”).  Id. at 2.  Defendant asserts that the revival discovery is relevant to the inequitable conduct and revival counterclaims and defenses that it seeks to add [see ECF No. 50], and to the laches and equitable estoppel defenses asserted in its Answer and Counterclaims.  Mot. at 2, 6-7; see also ECF No. 13 at 1, 7-8.  Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs intentionally permitted the Asserted Patents to expire, and that the revival discovery is thus relevant to its laches defense element that “patentee does not intend to enforce its patent against the alleged infringer,” and could establish that Plaintiffs’ delay was “unreasonable and inexcusable,” which is required to establish its equitable estoppel defense.  See Mot. at 6-7 (citing A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).  Defendant further argues that whether or not Plaintiffs intentionally allowed the Asserted Patents to expire is relevant to the “misleading conduct” showing of its defense.  Id. at 7.  Defendant also states that Plaintiffs refused to disclose the revival discovery on the basis of privilege, but have not produced a privilege log, thereby foreclosing Defendant’s ability to challenge Plaintiffs’ assertion of privilege.  Id.  Finally, Defendant asks the Court, in case it compels the production of the revival discovery, to also compel Plaintiffs to conduct ESI searches for the following terms: “reviv*,” “abandon*,” “expire*,” “maintenance fee,” “late fee,” and “patent fee.
[brief] [Weiss v. Carpenter, supra, 143 N.J. at 442-443 (emph. added)].  In Heher v. Smith Stratton, 143 N.J. 448 (1996), decided the same day as Weiss, the Supreme Court ruled that a law firm’s partnership agreement could compel arbitration even if the arbitrator was required, “to address and resolve issues that affect public policy....”
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY  April 2022  Version  Office of the Attorney General | State of New Jersey  Contents  Core Principles ...................................................................................................................................... ii  Definitions ............................................................................................................................................ iii  Core Principle One ................................................................................................................................  1  Core Principle Two ................................................................................................................................ 2  Core Principle Three .............................................................................................................................  6  Core Principle Four .............................................................................................................................  14  Core Principle Five ..............................................................................................................................  18  Core Principle Six ................................................................................................................................  19  Core Principle Seven ...........................................................................................................................  20  Appendices  Addendum  A  Conducted Energy Devices and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  Addendum  B  Vehicular Pursuit Policy i  USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................................................  2 LEGAL ARGUMENT  ..................................................................................................................  7 POINT I  [...]’S CONVICTION FOR PURPOSEFUL MURDER MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE JURY ALSO RENDERED  UNANIMOUS VERDICTS ON EACH OF THE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSES OF MURDER.  (Not Raised Below)  ......................................................................................  7 POINT II  THE JUDGE REVERSIBLY ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON DIMINISHED CAPACITY WHERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD EXISTED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT [...] SUFFERED FROM SIGNIFICANT MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS.  (9T18-22 to 22-1)  .......................  16 POINT III  [...]’S CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE STATE PRESENTED  A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE DESIGNED TO DENIGRATE  [...] AND ADVANCED NUMEROUS IMPROPER ARGUMENTS SIMILARLY DESIGNED TO PORTRAY HIM AS A DISTURBED LONER.  (6T78-24 TO 81-5; 7T73-12 TO 74-25, 172-4 TO 180-11)  .................................................................  25  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT o  Provides a variety of services to individuals with developmental disabilities11 (onset before age 21), operates state-run developmental centers and provides funding for community-based group homes throughout the state.  This agency investigates instances of abuse and neglect in state-run, state-funded, or state- licensed facilities.    Bureau of Guardianship Services (BGS), New Jersey Department of Human Services o  Responsible for processing and tracking guardianship actions for people served by the DDD who have been evaluated according to state law and determined to require a guardian.  BGS is only able to serve individuals who have been determined by DDD, through its application process, to be eligible for its services.    New Jersey Department of Human Services, Office of the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly o  Investigates allegations of abuse and neglect of people, age 60 and older, living in nursing homes and other long-term healthcare facilities.    New Jersey Department of Human Services, Division of Aging, Office of the Public Guardian for Elderly Adults o  Acts as a surrogate decision-maker for residents sixty years of age and older who have been deemed incapacitated by the Superior Court of New Jersey.  The Public Guardian does not petition to become guardian, but rather accepts judicial appointments on a discretionary basis.  See Definitions section for the definition of developmental disability.  11 -23-  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
[brief] More than six (6) of the Report’s eight (8) pages contains nothing more than a summary of the Application and the testimony presented at both public hearings – which, despite being entitled “Findings of Fact” – contain none.  See, *Loscalzo*, 228 N.J. Super. at 305; Cox & Koenig, at § 19-7.2, p. 300 (mere recitals of testimony are not “findings”).  These deficiencies certainly do not “reflect the deliberative and specific findings of fact necessary to support the board’s conclusions that the statutory requirements for relief are or were not met.  [Citations omitted]. ”  *Lincoln* Heights v. Cranford Planning Bd., 314 N.J. Super. 366, 386 (Law Div. 1998), aff’d o.b., 321 N.J. Super. 355 (App. Div.), certif. den., 162 N.J. 131 (1999).  Moreover, the Report’s “Conclusions of Law” failed to address any actual legal arguments, including whether the Applicant met its burden of proof regarding the requested (c)(1) variance.  Instead, the Hearing Officer referenced the Board’s “established practices” of reviewing loading operations for all cannabis operations within the Tourism District, and the need for “heightened scrutiny,” yet how those practices and standards came to be are unknown and therefore, could never be met.  (Aa234).  As noted herein, this is contrary to both the Land Development Rules and the APA.  The Board also claims in the Resolution that no reasonable condition could be imposed on the Appellant to sufficiently mitigate proposed loading procedures, which occur at other businesses throughout the City on a daily basis, yet the record contains evidence of numerous conditions that the Appellant was willing to self-impose, none of which were adequately considered by either the hearing officer or the Board. (See, e.g., T2/69:21-70:2).  Not to mention, whether the proposed loading zone is “practical” or “convenient” is of no moment, because it is not a requirement.  (Aa14).  It is evident that the Board merely rubber-stamped the Hearing Officer’s deficient Report and Recommendations.  Resultantly, this Court should find that [...] acted in an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable manner and contrary to law in denying the Application, and that decision should be reversed.
[brief] ”  That governs canvassing ballots by the district board at the polling location on election night.  This section has been cited in some cases as applying to “paper” ballots separate than machine ballots, although no explanation for that distinction has been provided, and N.J.S.A. 19:47-2 states that all laws relating to elections apply to elections where voting machines are used.  Further, N.J.S.A. 19:53A-3(i)(1) provides that in the event of a recount, the paper ballots serve as the official record.  Whether this statute is directly applicable or not, it is another example of a consistent legislative scheme. whose name is printed upon the ballot as a candidate under the same title of office … his ballot shall not be counted for that office. ”  The prohibition on casting votes for candidates who appear on the ballot using the personal choice column applies to other forms of balloting as well.  N.J.S.A. 19:53B-8, governing emergency ballots, reaffirms a voter who uses an emergency ballot from using the personal choice column to write the “names or names of any person or persons for whom the voter desires to vote whose name or names are not printed upon the emergency ballot for the same office. ” (emphasis added).  When emergency ballots are canvased, N.J.S.A. 19:53B-13(f) mandates that “[i]f a voter … writes the name of any person in the column designated personal choice, whose name is printed upon the emergency ballot as a candidate under the same office… that emergency ballot shall not be counted for that office…”  The legislature has equally mandated that votes cast by provisional ballots for a candidate whose name appears on the ballot are void.  N.J.S.A. 19:53C-8, states that a voter may use a provisional ballot to vote for a personal choice for a person or persons “whose name or names are not printed upon the provisional ballot for the same office. ”  If nevertheless, “a voter … writes the name of any person in the column designated personal choice, whose name is printed upon the provisional ballot as a candidate under the same title of office … that provisional ballot shall not be counted for that office…”  N.J.S.A. 53C-14.  These statutes are clear and unequivocal about how “personal choice” or “write-in” votes are to be treated for candidates who already appear on the ballot.  They are void.  Period.  The very right to use the personal choice column is reserved to vote for someone who does not appear on the ballot for that office.  N.J.S.A. 19:58-5.  The statutes do not provide for a specific factual inquiry, require a balancing of factors, or provide any room for discretion whatsoever.  Ballots cast by personal choice for candidates on the ballot are void as a matter of law.  That interpretation has been upheld in both appellate cases – published and binding on the trial court – which have addressed this issue, with one coming from Ocean County itself.  B.  The Appellate Division Has Upheld the Legislative Mandates that Personal Choice Votes are Void if Cast for Candidates on the Ballot
[brief] ⁴  This “Index” was submitted by [...] and attached to the Certification of Attorney [...] (Da179) to the Court in April 2019 in support of the School’s Motion to Limit Exhibits to the Record before the Zoning Board (Da177).  At that time, the plaintiff [...] had noted in the Pretrial Orders, an intent to submit numerous documents outside the Board Record (Da171, Paragraph 8).  denying the School’s Motion “without prejudice”, and allowed the plaintiff to submit a number additional exhibits marked for identification (Da174).
[brief] Regardless of the [...]’s apparent face-turn on what an appellant can/should submit in support of an appeal, [...] must have the opportunity to present evidence in a fact-finding hearing on a question the [...] determined to be material - the veracity of [...]’s reason for being at the [...].  On the other hand, the [...] adopts [...]’s reliance upon arguably self-serving text messages Complainant allegedly sent to the individual for whom she was gathering signatures, i.e., [...]’s political opponent.  Again, the [...] did not review the actual text messages, and instead faulted [...] for not providing “preponderating” information on an issue that no one ever contended to [...] was in dispute.  The Commission also excuses the [...] investigator’s admitted abandonment of any effort to interview witnesses at the union’s office, even though [...]’s determination about the morning incident was expressly based on its credibility determinations about the afternoon incident.  Instead, the Commission found that the “he-said, she-said” allegations about the morning incident alone constitute “sufficient evidence to find that [...] violated the State Policy in the morning. ” (Aa10-Aa11 (emphasis added)).  The bare record of what allegedly happened in the morning, and why, simply does not support the Commission’s resolution of this material fact question.  Even the [...] EEO investigator did not appear to believe that substantial credible evidence existed about what happened in the morning incident, which is why it relied on its conclusion about the allegations in the afternoon incident.  Where nothing more was presented to the [...], its bald conclusion that “sufficient evidence [existed] to find that [...] violated the State Policy in the morning” was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
[brief] As such, the critical question becomes, not only whether the design waivers should have been granted, but further, if those design waivers were truly the reason for the denial of the entire application.  The waiver regarding lot lines was recommended by the Township’s own engineer both on the record, and in his review letter dated May 3, 2022.  Specifically, the Board Engineer stated:  The non-radial lot lines have been designed such that proposed Lots 24.06 and 24.07 will meet the minimum area and width requirements, while keeping stormwater management facilities entirely on new Lot 24.05.  Therefore, we recommend the Board grant the required design waiver.
[brief] Rule 4:9-1; Du-Wel Products v. U.S., 270 N.J. Super. 458, 465 (App. Div. 1989).  In the unpublished case Moche v. Levy, the Appellate Division reviewed the denial of a motion to amend the complaint finding that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Plaintiffs’ motion based on the lateness of the request to amend, the prejudice that would result if allowed and the proposed amendment was futile.  Moche v. Levy, [...], 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 928, at *17 (App. Div. Apr. 22, 2016).  (Da39 at Da43).
[brief] The Statement of Facts and Procedural History have been combined for the Court’s convenience, as the two are inextricably linked in this case.  employed by the Authority until it terminated her employment in January 2020.  (Pa 20-21).  On March 19, 2019, [...] was involved in an automobile accident while at work, and was treated for a right knee injury on site and at a nearby hospital.  [...] underwent a surgical procedure to repair a resulting tear in her ACL, for which her recovery time was projected at six months.  (Pa 20).  [...] undertook a course of physical therapy to help her regain her functionality and return to work.  (Pa 20).  In November 2019, [...] saw a doctor who advised her to remain out of work through the end of the year.  On December 30, 2019, [...] was cleared to return to work subject to some recommended restrictions.  (Pa 20).  [...] presented her December 30, 2019 doctor’s note to the Authority, clearing her to return to work on January 7, 2020, but with a six month period without squatting, heavy lifting, climbing, kneeling, or prolonged standing.  (Pa 21).  On January 6, 2020, the Authority advised [...] that because she had produced a doctor’s note with restrictions and because the Authority did “not have light duty” and “due to business need,” it was terminating her employment effective immediately.  (Pa 21).  Upon receipt of the Authority’s January 6 termination notice, [...] contacted her doctor’s office and obtained a new doctor’s note, dated January 22, 2020.  Under that note, [...] was cleared to “return to work on 01/22/20” with no restrictions.  (Pa 21).  While the Authority asserted that it “did not trust the doctor’s note” provided on January 22, 2020, there was no evidence that the Authority ever made any effort to investigate its concerns as to the note’s trustworthiness and refused to reconsider [...]’ termination.  B.
[brief] Because the 2016 MOAs were subject to contingencies that never occurred, Defendants did not deprive Plaintiffs of earned wages.  Further, the terms of the June 7, 2017 Notice of Implementation are clear and should be interpreted to encompass all prior salary agreements.  The Notice of Implementation “provided for an updated salary scale ... indicating that the revised compensation scale would be the ‘entire compensation’ for each employee. ”  This language demonstrates the intent of the Implementation to supersede all prior agreements relating to compensation and salary, including the 2016 MOAs.  This language, coupled with the broad authority under the MSRA to modify and terminate existing agreements, is enough to persuade the Court that the Notice of Implementation was not silent on the issue of Plaintiffs’ earned wages.  Rather, the Implementation modified the prior MOAs’ terms and provided entire compensation pay to Plaintiffs.  The Court further finds the MSRA specifically vests authority in Defendants to act in this manner.  The Defendants’ decision to modify the 2016 MOAs via the 2017 Notice of Implementation was “reasonable and directly related to stabilizing the finances or assisting with the fiscal rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery. ”  N.J.S.A. § 52:27BBBB.  Defendants’ actions are also protected under The Municipal Stabilization and Recovery Act “to the extent any inconsistency exists between the terms of P.L.2016,c.4 (C.52.27BBBB-1 et al) and other applicable laws, the terms of P.L.2016,c.4 (C.52.27BBBB-1 et al) shall prevail. ”  N.J.S.A. § 52:27BBBB-14.  Thus, the claims by Plaintiffs relating to the New Jersey Wage Payment and Collection Law are futile under the plain language of the MSRA.  (Pa000027-28).  The Superior Court’s Order and Decision should be affirmed on appeal.