ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiffs did not commit a mere technical defect, while complying with the underlying purpose of the discovery rules concerning expert opinions.  Rather, Plaintiff is citing the doctrine in an attempt to excuse a complete and wholesale failure to fulfill her discovery obligations in a timely fashion.  The substantial compliance simply does not apply in that circumstance.  The substantial compliance doctrine has five requirements, all of which must be met in order for substantial compliance to be found.  The plaintiff seeking to invoke the doctrine must demonstrate: (1) A lack of prejudice to the defendant; (2) A series of steps taken by the plaintiff to comply with rules regarding expert discovery; (3) A general compliance with the purpose of the rules regarding expert discovery; (4) A reasonable notice of the plaintiff’s claim; and (5) A reasonable explanation why there was not a strict compliance with the rules regarding expert discovery.
[brief] Appellants/plaintiffs respectfully submit this reply brief in further support of their appeal from the Law Division’s Order granting pre-answer dismissal of the respondent under Rule 4:6-2(e).  Respondent essentially concedes that, while the Law Division motion judge couched the dismissal under the “entire controversy doctrine,” under Rule 4:30A, the essential reason for dismissal was for the court’s perception that Appellants “failed to state a claim,” under Rule 4:6-2(e).  A review of the case law shows that the two concepts of “entire controversy doctrine” and “failure to state a claim” are not only grounded in different Rules and policy rationale but that the two principles are not to be commingled as was done below.  REPLY ARGUMENT
[directive] Offense Information  Last Name  First Name  Middle Name  Indictment/ Accusation/ Complaint Number  PROMIS Number SBI Number  Summary of State's Allegations  Disclaimer for Use in Post-Sentence Proceedings:  This summary of the State's Allegations includes descriptions of charges of which the defendant may not have been found guilty by a jury or may not have pied guilty to.  No inference of guilt or wrongdoing should be drawn from dismissed charges.  This section must be read in conjunction with the final charges and the "Defendant's Version."
[brief] Based on the foregoing arguments of counsel Defendants [...], d/b/a [...], [...] and [...] request that the Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff entered by the Trial Court in this matter be reversed and that the denial of the Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment be granted.  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants, Amrit Inc. d/b/a [...], [...] and [...] /s/ [...] By: ________________________________  PATRICIA M. LOVE, ESQ.  DATED: May 20, 2024  BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
[brief] In Stuart, the defendant was removed from the courtroom after a prolonged exchange with the judge just as the judge began to charge the jury.  [Da13].  After the exchange and repeated warnings, the judge removed the defendant from the courtroom.  [Da13-14].  Although defense counsel asked to have defendant return initially, the judge did not speak to the defendant nor did he have counsel consult his client.  Instead, the judge relied upon statements from the Sheriff’s Officers that the defendant did not want to return and had threatened more disruption if he was forced to return.  [Da14].  The Appellate Division reversed the defendant’s conviction.
[brief] 2.  **Arbitration Clause**  The arbitration clause contained in the Wholesaler Agreement does not contain any express waiver language and is unenforceable under *Atalese v.  U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P.*, 219 N.J. 430 (2014), and its application to commercial contracts under *County of Passaic v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc.*, 474 N.J. Super. 498 (App. Div. 2023).  Moreover, the trial court’s additional reliance on the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) is misguided because the FAA is inapplicable when there is no valid arbitration clause to enforce.  Finally, any application of the FAA to enforce arbitration violates the Twenty-First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  Finally, the court again failed to consider precedent arising under the NJFPA supporting Appellants position that the arbitration clause is unenforceable.
[directive] A civilian complainant alleges that on December 20, 2022, in the late evening, New Jersey State Trooper (name) conducted an improper automobile stop on Interstate 78 in the area of Clinton, NJ.  Specifically, complainant alleges that [...] stopped her car for speeding based on racial profiling, was rude and unprofessional in speaking with complainant, arrested her without probable cause and used excessive force in subduing her.  Summary of Factual Findings
[brief] The trial court had an obligation to conduct a de novo review of all reasonable factual bases for the conclusions drawn by the [...], both in the Mitchell application and in the Cole application.  It then needed to review the legal conclusions derived from these facts and principles.  The trial court erred by not performing this analysis.  The legal conclusions rendered or incorporated by the Planning Board are not entitled to any special deference, just as the trial court’s interpretation of the law and legal consequences of the facts are not entitled to any special deference.
[brief] 6.  As a result of the foregoing, the Board finds that Use Variance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1), the two (2) Height Variances pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(6), and the Bulk Variances do not advance the purposes of the Municipal Land Use Law contained in N.J.S.A 40:55D-2 as follows:
[brief] Moreover, [...]’s motion for summary judgment should further have been granted on the basis that [...]’s claims against [...] were barred by the six-year statute of limitations.  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant, [...] (mispled as [...] and [...] School of Pharmacy)  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  Dated: September 19, 2024  REPLY BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
[brief] At the outset, it bears repeating that the No-Fault Law requires arbitration, at either party’s request, of any dispute related to the “recovery of medical expense benefits or other benefits” provided under the No-Fault Law.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1.  (emphasis added).  Notably, the statute does not preclude an insurer from bringing a claim in arbitration, and the statute does not preclude who may be required to appear to answer to a claim in arbitration, whether a health care provider or an employee or agent of a health care provider as either a licensed professional or layperson.
[brief] “Pa” refers to appellant’s appendix; “Pb” refers to his brief.  A Service Retirement is provided for by N.J.S.A. 53:5A-8 for any member who has established twenty years of service in SPRS and also for troopers who were members of the retirement system as of the effective date of L. 1985, c. 175 regardless of their years of service.  A Special Retirement provides enhanced benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 53:5A-27 and is available to any SPRS member who has established twenty-five years of creditable service.  On August 7, 2019, the [...] added information about the Ricci Act to its website.  (Pa10).  The webpage included information for active members, retirees, and employers about qualifying dates, locations, health conditions and impairments, the Eligibility Registration Form, the Request for Amended Benefits Form, a sample postcard to be mailed to retirees, and materials for employers regarding dissemination of information to employees.  (Pa10-11).  On August 8, 2019, the Division sent a letter to the Certifying Officers of the SPRS, the Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, and the Public Employees’ Retirement System.  (Pa66-67).  The subject of the letter was “New Legislation Notice – P.L. 2019, c. 157” and it served to notify active employees of the newly enacted law.  (Pa66).  All Certifying Officers were advised of their responsibilities to distribute the information and to certify that they had done so.  (Pa67).  The Division hired [...] to mail postcards to all 200,647 SPRS retirees at their home addresses on file with the Division.  (Pa68-69).  These postcards included notice of the enactment of L. 2019, c. 157, how to file for Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits under the new law, the deadline for filing for such benefits, and the ramifications for missing the deadline.  (Pa70).  A postcard with this information was sent to --- 4  Also available at: https://www.nj.gov/treasury/pensions/ricci-ch157.shtml.  (Pa10).  [...]’s home address on August 9, 2019.
[brief] ”  _State v. Case_, 220 N.J. 49, 64 (2014).  When a sentencing court has “faithfully paired the _Yarbough_ factors with the facts as found by the jury, there is no basis upon which to upend its reasoning supporting the imposition of consecutive sentences. ”  _State v. Cassady_, 198 N.J. 165, 182 (2009); see also _State v. Miller_, 205 N.J. 109, 129 (2011) (“When a sentencing court properly evaluates the _Yarbough_ factors in light of the record, the court’s decision will not normally be disturbed on appeal.
[brief] New Jersey Rule of Evidence 703 sets forth the criteria for determining when an expert’s opinion can be admitted into evidence.  The Rule provides as follows:  The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the proceeding.  If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.  By its express terms, the Rule requires that expert conclusions be founded in “facts or data. ”  See *Harte v. Hand*, 433 N.J. Super. 457, 464 (App. Div. 2013).  As stated in *Harte*, “An expert must ‘give the why and the wherefore’ that supports his or her opinion in order for a court to consider the expert’s report. ”  Id. at 464-65.  The opinion must be more than “a mere conclusion” and the “net opinion rule is succinctly defined as ‘a prohibition against speculative testimony. ’”  Id. (quoting *Grzanka v. Pfeifer*, 301 N.J. Super. 563, 580 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 607 (1998).  See also *Riley v. Keenan*, 406 N.J. Super. 281, 296-97 (App. Div. 2009) (“To support a causal connection between the act complained of and the resulting injury or damage, experts must be able to identify the factual bases for their conclusions”; *Jimenez v. GNOC, Corp.*, 286 N.J. Super. 533, 542-43 (App. Div. 1996) (striking expert’s testimony as a net opinion where expert “conceded he could only speculate as to what actually occurred” to cause plaintiff’s injuries and could not specify any conduct of a defendant which caused the incident).  Here, [...]’s deposition testimony demonstrated that Plaintiff could not state what caused his alleged fall.  In fact, Plaintiff testified that he did not even remember if he did fall.  See Pa220; Pa221.  All Plaintiff could state was that when he awoke from being allegedly unconscious, he was lying on top of a piece of plywood at the premises.  Pa230.  Plaintiff never stated he tripped or slipped on the plywood – just that he was lying on top of it.  If Plaintiff could not state what caused the alleged incident, then his expert, who was not an eyewitness to the incident, could only be speculating when he concluded that materials shown in photographs taken a day after the alleged incident caused [...] to fall.  See Pa159; Pa161.  There is, however, no competent evidence to prove what caused the alleged incident and the expert’s attempt to fabricate facts from pure speculation cannot, as the trial court held, provide a basis for establishing proximate cause in this matter.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] The division may provide for a grace period of time to permit local administrators flexibility in transferring funds between accounts and for variances from the rules and regulations for the handling of small amounts of money as defined by the division.  - - L.1979, c. 315, eff. Jan. 1,1981.  s. 2, -- - - - i t of3  Document Page 1  New Jersey  Permanent Statutes  TITLE 40A  MUNICIPALITIES AND COUNTIES  local 40A:5-15.  Deposit of funds paid the unit to  Deposit of funds paid to local unit :5-15.  the 40-4  All moneys, including moneys collected by taxation, received from any source by or on behalf of any local unit or any board or department thereof shall, within 48 hours after the receipt thereof, either a. be paid to the officer charged with the custody of the general fimds of the local unit, who shall deposit all such fimds within 48 hours after the receipt thereof to the credit of the local unit in its designated legal depository, or b. be deposited the credit of the local unit in its designated legal depository. to 1, Jan. L.1960, c. 169, s. 1, eff. 1962.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 1:7-3.  The State cites no case that the Legislature is above the law and can just ignore requirements it put in place for enactment of laws.  See Sb19-20.  In fact, “[i]n the absence of a clear manifestation to the contrary, [courts] shall not impute to the Legislature an intention to change established law. ”  State v. Dalglish, 86 N.J. 503, 512 (1991).  The State’s position amounts to both anarchy and violations of at least four separate statutes.
[directive] Placement of BWC.  A BWC used by a law enforcement officer shall be placed so that it maximizes the camera’s ability to capture video footage of the officer’s activities.  This may include placement on helmets, vests or other such location so long as the device is secured properly and will maximize the device’s recordation function.  3.6  Duty to Inspect and Report Malfunction.  An officer equipped with a BWC shall be responsible for determining that the device is fully functional and that its battery is adequately charged at the start of the officer’s duty shift and before going into the field.  If a malfunction is detected, the officer shall report the malfunction to a supervisor before going into the field.  If the BWC malfunctions while out in the field, the malfunction upon its discovery shall be reported to the officer’s supervisor as soon as it is safe and practicable to do so.  3.7  Applicability of and Compliance with Attorney General Directive No. 2005-1.
[brief] ”  Pa8.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that "[r]esidential homeowners . . . will not be liable unless they create or exacerbate a dangerous condition."  Luchejko v. Hoboken, 207 NJ 191, 210 (2011).  It is also clear that where a property owner removes snow, they will be liable for a pedestrian’s injury if they create a hazard that does not exist as a result of “natural forces. ”  Id. At 201.  We know from the testimony outlined above, no “natural forces” occurred between the attempt by the defendant to clear snow and the plaintiff’s fall.  Our Model Jury Charges make clear that where a hazard is created or made more hazardous by a residential property owner, the residential property owner will be liable “where … the owner attempts to make repairs or correct some defect therein for which she/she is not responsible, he/she becomes responsible if he/she makes the repairs negligently and thereby causes the sidewalk, after the repairs, to be more dangerous than before or if he/she causes a new hazard from the old.
[brief] The Legislature is well aware of how to create specific notice requirements and has done so with other statutes.  See N.J.S.A. 43:15A-50(a) (“Notification shall be by certified mail to the spouse’s address as provided on the form by the member. ”); e.g., Hammond v. City of Paterson, 145 N.J. Super. 452, 456 (App. Div. 1976) (holding that the Legislature, in requiring “actual receipt” of notice in the Tort Claims Act when certified mail is not used, “clearly did not mean to leave proof of actual receipt to a presumption. ”).  When “the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.
[directive] Pre-Charge Juvenile Case Screening A. system.  Each County Prosecutor’s Office  On-call prosecutorial screening/approval already has an established system of on-call Assistant Prosecutors available on a 24/7 basis officers.14 15 to provide real-time legal advice and charging approvals to law enforcement  Those assigned on-call duty shall have sufficient experience to perform the functions  For purposes of this Directive and as related to supervisory approval, the term “Assistant Prosecutor,” just like 14 “designee,” may include an employee of the County Prosecutor’s Office who has been specifically designated in writing by the County Prosecutor to perform on-call legal advice, review, and/or approval functions pursuant to this Directive.  When the Division of Criminal Justice handles a case that requires guidance by way of this Directive, “County 15 Prosecutor” shall refer to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice and “Assistant Prosecutor” or “designee” shall refer to the Deputy Attorney General, Assistant Attorney General, or employee of the Division of Criminal Justice, specifically designated in writing to perform on-call legal advice, review, and/or approval functions pursuant to this Directive.
[brief] She held that the lease between [...] and [...] did not impose a contractual obligation upon the former to have remediated the parking lot prior to plaintiff’s accident or to have notified the landlord that the parking lot required attention.  She further held that [...] had no common law obligation to have remediated the parking lot prior to plaintiff’s accident.  She characterized [...]’ arguments based upon the statute of limitations as seeking reconsideration of the trial court’s prior ruling under R. 4:49-2, and ruled that defendant had not met the standard for relief under that rule.  Following the disposition of the case as to the remaining defendants, plaintiffs filed the instant appeal from the summary judgment in favor of [...].  They argue, inter alia, that the trial court misconstrued applicable provisions of defendant’s lease with [...] when it absolved [...] of any contractual obligation to have remediated the parking lot and that the trial court incorrectly held that the tenant defendants did not have a common law duty to have remediated the parking lot.  For the reasons stated infra., these arguments must fail.  However, in the event that this Court disagrees with defendant, the summary judgment in its favor should still be affirmed based upon plaintiff’s noncompliance with N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] (Pa139).  One of the core purposes of the [...] is “To appoint and consecrate the faith of Mohammed in America. ” (Pa 139; Pa148).  According to a letter from the [...], dated September 15, 2016, Defendant [...], Inc. has the “legal right to the **sole use** of the corporate name ‘[...]. ’” (emphasis added).  (Pa150).  Defendant is a hierarchical religious organization.
[brief] At Pb19, plaintiffs deny that they are challenging the validity of a Township Ordinance.  At minimum, the street tree requirement can only waived upon a showing of peculiar conditions/hardship under § 18-601.  Plaintiffs arguments are tantamount to challenging the Township's authority to restrict major subdivision waivers as per § 18-601.  That would require joinder of the [...] as a party Defendant which Plaintiff failed to do.  At Pb20 to Pb21, plaintiffs criticize the language of the resolution.  As the Board's brief makes clear, the inability to find grounds to justify waiver relief on this record is understandable.  "Where the applicant fails to fulfill his responsibility in setting before the local agency the evidence necessary for it to exercise a seasoned discretion the failure is fatal .  . . ."  Tomko v. Vissers, 21 N.J. 226, 239 (1956).  If "[j]ustice will best be served by remanding the case to the Zoning Board for reconsideration and specific findings," Smith v. Fair Haven Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 335 N.J. Super. 111, 123 (App. Div. 2000), the matter can be remanded for a supplement to the record.  At Pb21 to Pb26, the plaintiffs are simply repeating themselves.  II.
[brief] On February 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion to reinstate its Complaint in this action.  (Pa758.)  On March 23, 2023, the trial court conducted oral argument on Plaintiff’s motion.  (4T.)  During oral argument, the trial court erroneously (i) substituted this Court’s limited remarks in place of its own (directly contradictory) factual and credibility determinations, and (ii) found that Plaintiff was “stopped” from asserting its claims.  (Id.)  To that end, the trial court stated:  I think [the Appellate Court decision] stopped your party.  I think it’s binding on your party, and all the other parties who participated in that other case, who fully litigated that question, when the question was squarely presented on the same record that I have to the Appellate Division.  I think the findings of the Appellate Division in that unreported case are binding on [Plaintiff], and I’m not going to disagree with that Appellate Division whether it is reported or not.  [4T8:3-11.]  6  Citations to the March 23, 2023 Oral Argument are designated with the prefix “4T”.  In reaching that “conclusion,” the trial court erroneously found that its factual findings and credibility determinations were “irrelevant. ”  Specifically, the trial court held:  If the Appellate Division says this issue should have been raised in the original complaint, and when you first brought it up on the motion to amend in front of [...] it was too late, then my findings of fact are irrelevant, because the Appellate Division is saying in their ruling, that this whole issue, the whole reason why you should amend the complaint, should’ve been – it should’ve been filed in that first lawsuit, not on a motion to amend[.]  * * *  I’ve summarized the Appellate Division opinion.  . .  The only thing is this whole bad faith claim.  The Appellate Division specifically said that the motion to amend the complaint lacked merit.  It should’ve been brought earlier.  That’s what they ruled.  Despite what I may have said on the record in this case, I was waiting for them to decide those issues.  The Appellate Division has decided that issue.  [4T15:17-25; 17:18-18:4]  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] Next, Defendants argue Plaintiffs objections are “boilerplate” and that a boilerplate objection is inadequate to preserve an objection.  Legally, Defendants are correct that boilerplate objections do not preserve an objection.  See Blemaster v. Sabo, No. 2:16-CV-04557 JWS, 2017 WL 4843241, at *4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 25, 2017).  Factually, Defendants are correct that Plaintiffs’ March-2023 objection, quoted at Doc. 186-1 at 4, as applied to 28 distinct search terms is a boilerplate objection.
[brief] Receive and review subpoenas from [...]’s attorney.  Begin drafting responses to request for production of documents.  | 2.5 | $950.00 | $9,329.00 | | 14| 1/5/22 | Draft Certificate of Service.  Research law on Motion to Quash and begin brief.  Finalize [...]’s certification with exhibits.  | 4 | $1,520.00 | $10,849.00 | | 15| 1/6/22 | Finalize Brief.
[brief] However, the trial Court, as a fact finder after trial, held that [...] never intended to make a gift, despite the Defendants claiming it was a gift.  Clearly the Court did not believe the Defendants, regardless of who it stated was more credible.  Considering that the Court did not believe a major component of the Defendants’ story, that the money ($50,000.00 from Francisco) was given to them as a gift, how could any court believe that the Defendants carried the day by “clear and convincing” evidence, when the heart of the Defendants’ story was rejected?