ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] | 27 | | Rule 1:23-1 et seq. | 27 | | Rule 1:27-1 | 32 | | Rule 1:28-1 et seq. | 27 | | Rule 1:39-1 et seq. | 27 | | Rule 1:42-1 et seq. | 27 | | Rule 4:14-2(c) | 3, 9, 40 | | REGULATIONS | | | N.J.A.C. 3:25-1.1 | 7, 11 | | N.J.A.C. 3:25-1.1(d) | 7 | | N.J.A.C. 3:25-3.1(c) | 7 | | OTHER AUTHORITIES | | | In re Supreme Court Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics Op. No. 697, 188 N.J. 549 (2006) | 23 | | [...], New Jersey Attorney Ethics, § 1:2 (2023) | 26 | | [...], New Jersey Attorney Ethics, § 1:2-2 (2023) | 27 | | [...], New Jersey Attorney Ethics, § 1:2-3 (2023) | 27 | | [...], New Jersey Attorney Ethics, § 1:2-6 (2023) | 27 | | N.J. State Const. art. VI, § II, ¶ 3 | 23, 28 | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont’d) New Jersey Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, Providing Debt Resolution Services to Litigants, N.J. Eth. Op. 36 (2001)
[brief] C.  The [...]’s denial of the 1.0 TREC Factor based upon unrefuted submissions is arbitrary and capricious and should be reversed.  The Board’s decision to deny the 1.0 TREC valuation has no foundation and should be reversed.  The Board simply stated that it “does not believe that a 1.0 TREC factor is appropriate. ”  Order, at 6.  This, despite an explicit recognition that the generic modeling used by the Board in developing the solar program did reflect a higher value being required than the 0.6 TREC default.  Yet the Board’s response was simply “no. ”  Despite this prior modeling, which shows a 19% greater cost than a typical ground-mount system, the Board not only denied the 1.0 TREC value, but refused to even allow the 19% that its own data provided.  Even if the information provided by the Petitioner was “unbelievable,” the Board’s own information justifies a 19% increase.  Again, the Board then acknowledges that the costs provided by developer – one of the few entities in the United States building such a floating project – are not the same as the model, and do reflect actual costs and actual construction and not simply a hypothetical installation.  In response, the Board just waved its hand and dismissed it based upon no evidence at all; the Board simply decided to not believe them.  Without reason, without cause, and without justification.  Based upon this “gut reaction”, the Board not only denied the 1.0 TREC, but it denies even the 19% its own prior and incomplete review showed for floating solar.  This remains a textbook example of arbitrary and capricious behavior.
[brief] The Trial Court abused its discretion by discharging the Receiver and denying the motion to intervene despite the following violations of the Rules of Court:  (a)  Rule 4:53-3 - Employment of Attorney or Accountant  Similar to the Statute, Court Rule 4:53-3 provides for the need for Court approval prior to a receiver’s employment of an attorney or accountant.  The Rule provides that an Order authorizing employment will not be entered until after a hearing based on the receiver’s sworn affidavit setting forth facts to support the need thereof.  Notice of the application must be provided to all creditors.  The Receiver did not make any application to the Court for approval, although he retained “the services of an accountant, [...], CPA, to file necessary returns and reports in connection with the operation of the [...]. ”  Ca20.  Although disputed by the Receiver, Docket No. [...] reflects that he was represented by the [...] for a period of time.  Ca123.  The Court erred in discharging the Receiver despite and without scrutinizing or further scrutinizing the foregoing.
[brief] In their pleading, Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract (Count One), prerogative writ (Count Two), violations of the New Jersey Constitution and the CRA, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1, et seq. (Count Three), unjust enrichment (Count Four), and quantum meruit (County Five).  (34a-39a).  On January 11, 2019, Defendants filed a notice of motion to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e).  (254a).  In their motion papers, Defendants attached and relied upon the unpublished decision of the Atlantic County Superior Court in the prior litigation, *[...], et al. v. [...], et al.*, docket no. [...].
[brief] The SHO Resolution further ignores the intent and purpose of the VC-2 Zone, as well as the prior history of development in the VC-2 Zone.  M503.  The development “middle property” in the VC-2 Zone was undertaken by a related entity of the Respondents.  See 6T298 to 6T304.  The design of the project for the “middle property” included the connector roadway contemplated by the VC-2 Zone linking Applegarth Road and Route 33.  The roadway was dedicated to and accepted by the Township in anticipation of the Route 33 Signal.  The development of the “middle property” included an obligation to construct a traffic signal at the intersection of the connector roadway and Applegarth Road; an obligation borne entirely by the developer of the “middle property.
[brief] ”  First Atlantic Federal Credit Union v. Perez, 391 N.J. Super. 419, 425 (App. Div. 2007).  There is a “strong public policy disfavoring shifting of attorneys’ fees. ”  North Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co., 158 N.J. 561, 569, 730 A.2d 843 (1999).
[brief] *In re Estate of Balk*, 445 N.J. Super. 395, 400 (App. Div. 2016) (citing *Kieffer v. Best Buy*, 205 N.J. 213, 223 (2011)); see *Kaur v. Assured Lending Corp.*, 405 N.J. Super. 468, 474 (App. Div. 2009).  Moreover, a trial court’s interpretation of the law and legal conclusions that flow therefrom are not entitled to particular deference.  *Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  As will be demonstrated below, the trial court erred in denying Plaintiff’s OTSC and declining to enforce the agreed-upon and memorialized settlement.
[brief] On February 1, 2019, Plaintiff sold to [...] the proceeds from her UIM Claim and Plaintiff received $5,500.00.  *(Da052; Da073; Da 208-2016)*  On July 19, 2019, [...] filed the UIM Complaint  *[...] v. [...]*, [...].  (the “UIM Complaint”)  *(Da218-220)*  I.  **Plaintiff files Amended Schedules and settles her UIM Claim**
[brief] “If a party challenges an expert opinion pursuant to N.J.R.E. 702, the “trial court should conduct a hearing under N.J.R.E. 104 concerning the admissibility of the proposed expert testimony. ”  State v. J.R., 227 N.J. 393, 409 (2017) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).  “In that setting, the proponent of the expert testimony may demonstrate that the expert’s methodology meets the benchmark of N.J.R.E. 702, and the opposing party may challenge the reliability of the expert’s opinion. ”  Ibid.  Denying the motion without assessing the scientific basis of the State’s evidence was error requiring reversal or, at the very least, a remand to develop an evidentiary record about the reliability of the field.
[brief] 16  A.  The Appellant’s Predecessor Had a Contractual Obligation to Accept and Apply the First Wire Transfer Under the Loan Documents .........................................................  16  B.  Appellant Is Responsible Under Applicable Law for The Consequences That Flowed from Its Predecessor’s Imprudent Business Decision to Reject and Return the First Wire Transfer .........................................................  22  I.  Appellant’s Servicer Failed to Both Credit the First Wire Transfer Within Five Days Receipt and Thereafter Hold the Funds in A Suspense Count in Violation of the Truth in Lending Act .........................................................  22  II.  Acceptance of Completed Funds Transfers Under Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code and this Court’s Unpublished Decision in Deustche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Vezeriannis .........................................................  23  III.  Appellant’s Receipt of First Wire Transfer Constituted Acceptance of the Funds Requiring Discharge of the Mortgage Under the UCC and this Court’s Unpublished Decision in Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. v. Omar..................  26  POINT II :  APPELLANT SHOULD BE BARRED FROM ARGUING THAT FURTHER DISCOVERY IS WARRANTED AND THIS MATTER IS NOT RIPE FOR SUMMARY
[brief] The Act added similar language to the false public alarm statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-3, upgrading the offense by one degree if the violation “occurs during a declared period of national, State or county emergency. ”  L. 2002, c. 26, § 16.  The Act did not add an emergency enhancement to subsection (b) of the terroristic threats statute, which criminalizes threats to kill.  N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b).
[brief] 1T 39:2-7.  In addition to the issues relating to the system’s inability to capture and protect from rainfall, the louvers themselves began to fail to properly open and close leading to a disjointed and non-flush appearance.  Pa65-67; 1T 191:13-22; 193:1-24; 194:4-18; 223:15-23.  These additional concerns were expressed in writing and continued into July of 2019 the following summer.  Pa73; 1T 234:1-25.  Since the time of installation, the system has failed to capture and redirect rainfall during seasonal storms and regular rainfall and causes interruption to the planned use of the veranda space.  1T 195:1-23.  [...] routinely must relocate events that were planned to incorporate the veranda into the preexisting interior portions which disrupts planned operations, flow of events, and leads to additional customer service efforts on their part.  Id.  When the space is not being used for events, it serves as a location for additional dining.  However, [...] is forced to limit the location of tables to areas that will be less impacted by the leaks experienced from the louver system, which effectively cuts the usable space in half.  1T 210:17-25; 211:1-21.  At present, the space is largely enclosed with louvers in the closed position which functions as a leaky roof and prevents utilization of the space during adverse weather conditions as marketed and as planned by [...].  1T 233:13-17.  In addition to the failures of the system delivered by [...], the cost of removing that system and replacing it with a new fixed roof would involve demolition, removal, and replacement and the cost would exceed the amount of the balance of payment claimed by [...].  1T 232:5-24.  III.
[brief] Defendants do not explain why November 9, 2016 should be the trigger date instead of March 15, 2017, the date that [...] announced that terminal leave payments would be eliminated.  Presumably, it is because the revocation of terminal leave benefits did not go forward on March 15, 2017 because the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. executed an Order to Show Cause why an emergent temporary injunction restraining the continued violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights should not be barred.  (Pa864-Pa871).  In fact, while Defendants initially sought to completely eliminate terminal leave payments, that never happened.
[brief] Despite the plain meaning of “so turn,” defendant maintains that this phrase only refers to “the types of turns listed in the first sentence. ” (Db16).  But changing lanes is a type of “turn” listed in the first sentence.  The phrase “otherwise turn[ing] a vehicle from a direct course” is broadly written to contemplate not only turns onto another roadway, but also turning movements right or left in the third sentence as to require a signal.
[brief] Section 9 upon which plaintiff relies in this case refers, moreover, to “a legal proceeding that might significantly affect Lender’s interest in the Property and/or rights under this Security Instrument” then provides “such as a proceeding in bankruptcy, probate, for condemnation or forfeiture, or enforcement of a lien which may attain priority over this Security Instrument or to enforce laws or regulations” (A359).  This lawsuit is none of those identified matters and is not comparable to any of them.  This lawsuit was brought by plaintiff to reinstate a mortgage that it claimed was accidentally discharged – it had nothing to do with plaintiff moving to protect its interest in the secured property that arose out of something the debtors had done as would be the case with respect to bankruptcy, condemnation, or similar proceedings.  Though the [...] filed counterclaims for fraud, slander of title, and emotional distress, those claims are not comparable to the “legal proceedings” that Section 9 identifies as illustrative of the type of the matter in which the lender may add reasonable attorney’s fees to the secured debt.  [...] erred in ruling that this provision under Section 9 gave plaintiff a right to recover attorney’s fees and costs from the [...] in this case.
[directive] Any weapon with present or historical military value that has been forfeited pursuant to the provisions of chapter 64 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes may be donated to the [...] by the law enforcement agency retaining it.  -- L.1981, c. 112,3.4, eff. April 2, 1981.  - - < & Procedure to be followed by law enforcement agencies when stolen property is taken 2C:65-1. into custody  TABNO.  3 _.  ...  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] ...........................................................................................................  18 - **Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment**, 45 N.J. 268 (1965).  ..............................................................................  12 - **Price v. Himeji, LLC**, 214 N.J. 263 (2013)  .............................................................................................  11 - **Reich v. Borough of Fort Lee Bd. of Adjustment**, 414 N.J. Super. 483 (App. Div. 2010)  ........................................................................................................................................  13 - **Rocky Hill Citizens for Responsible Growth v. Planning Bd. of Rocky Hill**, 406 N.J. Super. 384 (App. Div. 2009)  ........................................................................................................  12 - **Rowatti v. Gonchar**, 101 N.J. 46 (1985)  ...............................................................................................  12 - **Stolz v. Ellenstein**, 7 N.J. 291 (1951).  ....................................................................................................  12 - **Ward v. Scott**, 16 N.J. 16 (1954) ..........................................................................................................  12 - **Witt v. Gloucester County Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders**, 94 N.J. 422 (1983)  ........................................................................................................................................  11  ### Statutes - **N.J.S.A. 24:61-36, et seq.** .................................................................................................................. 5, 13, 14, 17 - **N.J.S.A. 24:61-36(d)(1)(c)(iv)** ...........................................................................................................  5, 9, 14 - **N.J.S.A. 40A:11-1 et seq. ** ..................................................................................................................  16  ### Rules - **R. 2:9-5** ...............................................................................................................................................  10  TABLE OF ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS  December 12, 2023  Final Order and Opinion………………………………………..Pa1  TABLE OF CONTENTS OF APPENDIX BOUND HEREWITH  December 7, 2022  Order Denying Order to Show Cause  ………………………………Da1 February 8, 2024  Trial Court Order and Decision Denying Stay ……………………Da3  March 25, 2024  App. Div. Order Denying Stay ………………………………………Da13  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This firm represents Defendant Respondent [...] (the “Borough” or “Defendant”), with respect to the instant appeal.  Please accept this merits brief on behalf of the Borough, in opposition to Plaintiff Appellant [...]’s (“Plaintiff” or “[...]”) appeal seeking to reverse the trial court’s December 12, 2023 Order which is the subject of this appeal and which, among other things, dismissed the instant action below, and upheld the Borough’s award resolution which is the subject of this case.
[brief] S.A. 18A:64M-2 ...........................................................................................................  17, 19, 32 N.J.S.A. 18A:65-2.................................................................................................................. 18  N.J.S.A. 18A:65-12...............................................................................................................  17, 18 N.J.S.A. 18A:65-14............................................................................................................. passim N.J.S.A. 18A:65-14.13.........................................................................................................  31 Rules R. 4:69-6............................................................................................................................... 8, 10, 11, 33
[brief] In cases involving alleged omissions, a fiduciary relationship is “necessarily implied” only where “the advantage taken of the plaintiff’s ignorance is so shocking to the ethical sense of the community, and is so extreme and unfair, as to amount to a form of swindling .  . . .”  Kensey, 306 N.J. Super. at 554 (citation and quotation marks omitted).  In Kensey, this Court held that such a case must involve “egregious breaches of the [defendant bank’s] duty of good faith and fair dealing,” where a fiduciary duty existed because the defendant “acted no better than common swindlers. ”  Id. at 557.  As examples, the Court cited (among other cases) *Barnett Bank of West Florida v. Hooper*, 498 So.2d 923 (Fla. 1986), and *Capital Bank v. MVB, Inc.*, 644 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1994), where each defendant bank “actively encouraged the plaintiff to rely upon its advice and concealed its self-interest in promoting the transactions involved. ”  *Id.* at 557; see also *id.* at 555-57.6  The facts held to be critical in *Kensey* do not exist here.
[brief] [Ha447-448, Holm-18 at 11-12, emphasis added.]  Here are the specific goals that apply to natural gas usage:  Reduce Energy Consumption and Emissions from the Building Sector  4.1  Start the transition for new construction to be net zero carbon 4.1.1  Electrify state facilities 4.1.2  Partner with private industry to establish electrified building demonstration projects 4.1.3  Expand and accelerate the current statewide net zero carbon homes incentive programs for both new construction and existing homes 4.1.4  Study and develop mechanisms and regulations to support net zero carbon new construction 4.1.5  Develop electric vehicle-ready and demand response-ready building codes for new multi-unit dwellings and commercial construction 4.2  Start the transition to electrify existing oil-and propane-fueled buildings 4.2.1  Incentivize transition to electrified heat pumps, hot water heaters, and other appliances 4.2.2
[brief] #  Table of Contents | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Table of Judgments | iii | | Table of Authorities | iv | | Preliminary Statement | 1 | | Procedural History | 3 | | Statement of Facts | 4 | | I.  The Relevant Insurance Policy Language | 4 | | II.  Nature and Background of the Underlying Action | 6 | | III.  The Vermont Trial Court’s Rulings | 12 | | IV.  The Appeal Taken With Ohio’s Then-Active Support and Authorization | 13 | | V.  Ohio’s Abrupt Abandonment of [...] and Its Other Insureds | 15 | | VI.  [...]’s Reasonable Settlement of the [...] | 17 | | VII.  The Challenged Decision in This Case | 18 | | Argument | 19 | | I.
[brief] As [...]’s contracts with defendant established his entitlement to $306,000 of total compensation for 2016 and 2017, [...] has produced unrebutted documentation that at a minimum $210,635 of his claim for $255,000.00 asserted in his lawsuit filed on November 24, 2020 was within the six year statute of limitation of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.  Defendant’s Statement of Procedural History devotes a page to the two adjournments of the summary judgment motion based on [...]’s counsel’s affliction with Covid 19 which was documented by a physician’s note.
[brief] For example, in Lithuanian Commerce Corp. v. Sara Lee Hosiery, 179 F.R.D. 450, 470 (D.N.J. 1998), the Court expressly rejected the notion that the “license” must be provided in a writing, and instead recognized that the term “license” as used in the NJFPA is vastly different than the traditional use of the term.  Specifically, the Court noted that that New Jersey Supreme Court has instructed courts to use the following standard for when a “license” has been granted under the NJFPA:  At a minimum, the term ‘license’ means that the alleged franchisee must use the name of the franchisor in such a manner as to create a reasonable belief on the part of the consuming public that there is a connection between the ... licensor and licensee by which the licensor vouches, as it were, for the activity of the licensee.  *Lithuaninan Commerce Corp.*, 179 F.R.D. at 471 (quoting *Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp.*, 614 A.2d 124, 352 (1992)).  Critically, the Lithuanian court explained as follows:  The statutory definition of a franchise would appear to require that the license appear in the written arrangement.  See N.J.S.A. 56:10–3a (defining franchise as “a written arrangement ... in which a person grants ... a license”) . . .
[brief] **Appellant Never Disclosed His Multiple Opioid Prescriptions**  In June of 2014, Appellant was involved in a car accident that Appellant alleges caused him ongoing back pain.  [4T96:5 - 4T97:11].  Appellant began receiving prescriptions for opioids from [...], a pain management specialist, in March of 2015.  [5T162:13-15].  TPD Rules and Regulations section 4:6.8 (the “Medication Policy”) states:
[brief] (Aa78-80).  [...] submitted substantial information about Highlands open waters and other water resources, steep slopes, rare, threatened, and endangered plant and animal species, forests, unique and irreplaceable land types, and historic and archaeological areas on the Property to demonstrate consistency with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act.  (Aa64-77; Aa79-84).  [...] also submitted calculations of its estimated wastewater flow to illustrate the Project’s consistency with the areawide WQMP.  (Aa31).  c.  [...] Reviews [...]’s HAD Application and Determines the Project is Exempt from the Highlands Act.
[brief] “Pbx” - plaintiff’s brief, page x.  “Pax” - plaintiff’s appendix, page x.  “1Tx-y” – transcript of June 20, 2023, page x, line y.  “2Tx-y” – transcript of July 18, 2023, page x, line y.  “3Tx-y” – transcript of December 8, 2023, page x, line y.  CoPlaintiff/Petitioner [...] – “Township” or “Twp”  CoPlaintiff/Petitioner Planning Board of the [...] – “Planning Board” or “Board”  Intervenor [...]  - “Avalon” or “AvalonBay”  [...] – ‘VNB’  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT