ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In September 2018 (more than a year after the Hood Lawsuit was filed), [...]’s broker, [...], devised a scheme to “steer the claim” from [...]’s direct liability carriers to the CCIP Policies asserting a lack of a formal notice of cancellation sent to [...].  (Pa2564.)  However, this scheme was based on [...]’s mistaken assumption that [...] was the “First Named Insured” under the [...] Policy.  (Pa2567.)  Plaintiffs proceeded with this scheme despite: (1) the broker’s acknowledgment that [...] was “excluded from the CCIP since they were doing demo”; and (2) the [...] advising that it had received notice from [...] that the CCIP had been cancelled because [...]’s coverage was placed elsewhere (i.e., with its direct liability carriers).
[brief] From the time [...] and [...] purchased the Property from [...] and [...] in 1997, [...] maintained and controlled the Property in accordance with his then-vested ownership interest.  (Pa0045-473; Pa474-505)  This included the following undisputed facts: • [...] paid off the [...] mortgage and received the check for the overage in 1998 (Pa0014-18); • [...] maintained keys for the Property (4T 60:8-61:3,67:3-68:15 Jan. 10, 2023). ; • [...] secured tenants for the Property and collected rent from them (P0019-40; Pa41-44); • [...] paid maintenance persons to take care of maintenance issues at the Property (4T 69:2-70:7, Jan. 10, 2023).  (Pa0377, by way of example)); • [...] paid the utilities at the Property (Pa0338; 0409, by way of example); • [...] paid the Property taxes at the Property (Pa0317, 409, by way of example); • [...] paid the insurance for the Property (Pa0319, by way of example); • Hired/utilized the services of a local realtor to manage the Property (9T 8:16-12:16, Jan. 24, 2023).
[brief] The Board filed its exceptions (PA131-PA136), and Petitioner filed a Reply and Objection to the Board’s exceptions (PA137-PA145).  The Board rejected [...]’s Initial Decision and affirmed its prior decision that [...] is ineligible for AD (PA150).  [...]’s inability to return to work for [...] is fatal to his AD application under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2) (PA148-PA149).  Under the statute, the Board may require any disability retiree to undergo a medical examination to determine whether the disability which existed at the time of retirement has materially diminished or ceased.  If the medical report indicates that the beneficiary is able to perform any available duty, the beneficiary must report for duty (PA148-PA149, citing the statute).  The Board noted that [...] is unable to comply with N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2) because he is forever barred from future employment with [...] under the Settlement Agreement (PA148).
[brief] Id.; Tully, 457 N.J. Super. at 125-26.\(^{14}\) Section 7.01(d) does not go so far as to convert all intracompany disputes that would normally be derivative actions into direct actions when closely held entities are involved, but it gives trial courts wide discretion to treat the action as direct if the policy considerations enumerated above are satisfied.  When a direct action is brought on behalf of the entire class of injured shareholders and the company’s solvency is not in question, there is less reason to insist that the action be brought \(^{14}\)  Tully further explained that the pre-suit demand requirement is almost always futile in the context of closely held entities.  Also, Tully explained that the general rule is to prohibit counterclaims in derivative actions.  Here, the defendants asserted counterclaims, which undermines their argument that Plaintiffs should have brought this suit derivatively.  Tully, 457 N.J. Super. at 125-26. derivatively.  *Brown*, 323 N.J. Super. at 37.  Indeed, one of the main reasons to abandon the distinction between a direct and derivative action in a context like this – a closely held entity with few shareholders – is that even if a minority owner overcomes the procedural hurdles to bring a derivative suit, “any recovery accrues to the corporation and hence remains under the control of the very parties who may have been defendants in the litigation.
[brief] (Db, pp, 73-74).  However, the five years of discovery that the trial court is referring to are the five years between the filing of the complaint in 2005 and the initial liability trial, five years later, in 2010.  During that time, [...] and the other insurance companies engaged in a scorched earth discovery campaign that included countless interrogatories, voluminous document productions and more than 100 depositions of current and former [...] employees and consultants.  (Da 180-81).  [...] also attempts to lay blame for delays at [...]’s feet based on [...]’s position taken during the allocation phase of the case, describing it as “meritless from the outset” and “contrary to binding precedent. ”  (Db, p. 74).  [...]’s position is anything but meritless.  Importantly, [...] agreed, writing as follows:
[brief] The record evidence is devoid of any fact which suggests that [...] somehow encouraged or facilitated any aspect of the alleged harassment by [...], that he was present when the conduct occurred, or that he could have somehow foreseen and prevented it.  There is no record evidence that Plaintiff or anyone brought it to [...]’s attention that Plaintiff believed she was being harassed in any way.  Indeed, Plaintiff conceded at her deposition that she did not speak to anyone in administration, including [...]—whom she perceived to be Hispanic (Pl. Tr. 133:3-4)—about any perceived discrimination or retaliation, nor did she make any complaint about [...] during her employment.
[brief] You’re not allowed to have any tint on the front . . . driver’s side or front passenger side window. ”  (1T 47-5 to 17)  Defense counsel asked, “Even if the car comes from the manufacturers with the tint, you’re not allowed to have that?” (1T 47-18 to 20)  [...] replied, “No, sir. ”  (1T 47-20)  [...] reiterated that it is illegal to drive a car with the front two windows tinted “to any degree. ” (1T 48-25 to 49-4); see also (1T 52-9 to 21) (testifying that unlike the front windows, the back windows can be tinted).
[brief] Since N.J.S.A. 19:29-5 requires matters to be tried within 30 days (with moderate extensions permitted), amendments to a petition may come during the trial based upon the evidence uncovered at trial.  An election trial is, again, not like a traditional civil action where discovery may go on for years and where the parties have a full opportunity to explore every avenue and issue with a fine-tooth comb.  Instead, Title 19 requires the parties to move quickly, with the best information they have, recognizing that not all information may be obtained at the time of filing, and the Court is specifically empowered to amend the petition at any point.
[brief] | SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  Docket No.: [...]  On Appeal from the Final Decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Civil Part, Camden County  Docket Below: [...] | | --- | --- | |  ASIAN HATE CRIMES  TASK FORCE, a non-profit organization, PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, v. [...], and [...], in his official capacity as records custodian, DEFENDANTS/CROSS APPELLANTS/RESPONDENTS.
[brief] In fact, Plaintiffs admit they cannot cite a single case applying N.J.A.C. § 11:1-20 to a CCIP, OCIP or Wrap-Up Program policy.  (Pb31.)  No such case law exists because the code was never intended to apply to such programs.  The cases cited by Plaintiffs largely include non-renewal or cancellations under different statutes covering different types of insurance policies, including automobile, workers compensation, property, and truck cargo liability insurance policies.
[brief] The court’s opinion considered the factors set forth in *Crowe v. DeGioia*, 90 N.J. 126 (1982), and found that the State had carried its burden on each one.  (Da403-13).  As to the State’s reasonable probability of success, the trial court noted that the Revised Policy requires staff to make a “subjective” decision as to whether a student is suffering an “adverse impact” that requires notification to parents, and recognized that there was “a strong argument” that the Revised Policy is “flawed by a fundamental and impermissible presumption—that LAD-protected characteristics may have an adverse impact on the student’s physical and/or mental health, safety and/or social/emotional well-being.
[brief] ” (5T40-7 to 11).  She remembered what “she wanted to remember,” yet had “no memories of things she didn’t want to remember. ” (5T40-21 to 24).  Having viewed her 2016 statement, the judge observed none of the mental and emotional problems she claimed to be experiencing at the time.  (5T40-12 to 16; 5T41-6 to 11).  In her statement, [...] did not demonstrate any inability to recall, but rather “had clear recollections. ” (5T40-17 to 20).  She did not want to be involved, but “wanted to be truthful” and “come clean” with what she knew.  (5T42-13 to 20).  The judge found she had no reason to fabricate.  (5T43-12 to 14).  [...] was neither in custody nor a target of the investigation when she gave her statement.  (5T40-3 to 4; 5T41-2 to 5).  The judge did not find the absence of corroborating evidence in the phone records to be significant.  (5T46-4 to 7).  There were “plenty of possibly explanations” as to why the records would not contain evidence of the phone call that [...] overheard between [...] and [...] or the calls [...] and [...] received from defendant.  (5T45-3 to 6).  Other applications or burner phones could have been used.  (5T45-7 to 46-3).  And with respect to the call between [...] and [...], [...]’s phone was never recovered, and the call could have been made on [...]’s phone, which she had wiped.  (5T45-7 to 25).  [...] ruled that both statements were sufficiently reliable, and it was the jury’s duty to decide on their credibility.
[brief] Since the Revised Policy is neutral on its face, Plaintiffs interpolate language absent from the plain text of the Policy.  Plaintiffs concede that there are circumstances “in which parents of LGBTQ+ and non-LGBTQ+ students must be notified about an issue that requires the disclosure even of any relevant LAD-protected characteristics. ” (Pb22, 3, 48-49).  Similarly, the Revised Policy recognizes that a protected characteristic can be incidental to a situation involving adverse impact hence its prohibition on notification based solely on a protected characteristic.  Plaintiffs choose to ignore the plain text of the Revised Policy which triggers parental notification upon an adverse impact on health, safety or well-being and specifically bars the so-called “outing” of students (Da110).  Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding disparate impact also fail as plaintiffs have not clearly and convincingly shown that the Revised Policy “resulted in a significantly disproportionate or adverse impact on” more than “a few” LGBTQ+ students.
[brief] The Requirements for Liability Against the [...] have been Met  In its opposition, the [...] argues that the trial court correctly held that the [...]’s failure to fix the settlement in the roadway was not ministerial in nature and that the Plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements to establish liability under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.  However, under either analysis the Plaintiffs prevail.  A)  Under N.J.S.A. 59:2-2(a), the [...] is Liable for Injury Proximately Caused by the Act or Omission of an Employee just as a Private Individual  Defendants argue that N.J.S.A. 59:2-3 provides immunity in this case because the [...]’s actions were discretionary in nature.  However, the [...]’s argument is fundamentally flawed.  A public entity is liable for an injury which is proximately caused by the act or omission of an employee in the same manner as a private individual.  N.J.S.A. 59:2-2a.  Simply put, the [...] was told to fix the condition; twice.  (Pa1350); (Pa1193).
[brief] In fact, the State cited to *United States v. Winstar Corp.*, 518 U.S. 839, 873 (1996)(plurality), but failed to address that the United States Supreme Court recognized a legislature may “place effective limits on its successors. ”  N.J.S.A. 1:7-3 limits its successive legislatures because the New Jersey Legislature gave this Court the power to void legislation passed contrary to the laws setting forth requirements for enactment.  any law, rule, regulation, ordinance, or order, in effect on or adopted after the effective date of this act, that is determined to have the effect of limiting the constitutional right to freedom of reproductive choice and that does not conform with the provisions and the express or implied purposes of this act, shall be deemed invalid and shall have no force or effect.
[brief] Whereas owners of wild animals were presumed to have knowledge of their vicious propensities, “in the case of animals which had been domesticated a presumption arose that they were not of a vicious nature, and hence their keeper was liable only in case the animal was vicious and he had knowledge of its vicious propensities. ”  Emmons v. Stevane, 77 N.J.L. 570, 572 (E&A 1909).  Thus, in order to hold the owner of a domesticated animal liable, the plaintiff had to provide in their keeping.  Therefore, the law has not regarded bulls, stallions and rams as being abnormally dangerous animals to be kept under the strict liability stated in this Section.
[brief] To establish a prima facie claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must prove four elements: first, that “the parties entered into a contract containing certain terms”; second, that “plaintiff did what the contract required them to do”; third, that “defendant did not do what the contract required them to do,” defined as a “breach of the contract”; and fourth, that “defendant’s breach, or failure to do what the contract required, caused a loss to the plaintiff. ”  Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 482 (2016) (quoting Model Jury Charge (Civil), § 4.10A “The Contract Claim-Generally” (May 1998); see also Coyle v. Englander’s, 199 N.J. Super. 212, 223 (App. Div. 1985) (identifying essential elements for breach of contract claim as “a valid contract, defective performance by the defendant, and resulting damages”).  Each element must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.  See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163, 169 (2006) (citing State v. Seven Thousand Dollars, 136 N.J. 223, 238 (1994).  Under the preponderance standard “a litigant must establish that a desired inference is more probable than not.  If the evidence is in equipoise, the burden has not been met. ”  Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 186 N.J. at 169 (2006).  B.
[brief] The Rule’s use of “refuses” must contemplate an affirmative act on the part of an individual to whom process service is directed, as the alternative would encourage gutter service.  It is also pertinent that the Rule specifies registered mail rather than mail with a return receipt requested.  Regular mail delivered to vacant homes is not going to be returned because there is no one to receive it in the first place, whereas the same vacant condition will ensure the return of an envelope that requires a signature.  In this case, the mail returned to Plaintiff does not show any indication of being “refused” as would be necessary to establish service under R. 4:4-3.  The mailings are simply “unclaimed” (see Da101, Returned Mail).
[brief] In addition, [...] was not qualified as a nursing expert, in accordance with [...]’s ruling on the motions in limine.  (See, e.g., 5T51:10-60:25, 5T143:13-145:19, 5T151:4-208:7, 6T102:10-141:13; 6T178:1-184:22, 6T188:6-192:3, 6T199:16-205:10, 6T214:15-221:5, 6T254:23-270:21.)  The jury, having heard this evidence, found that [...] was negligent in deviating from the standard of care applicable to a long term care facility.  (See Pa87.)  Plaintiff never obtained a respiratory therapist’s opinion against the respiratory therapist directly or vicariously against the facility.
[brief] Da370.  Plaintiffs did not receive the requested \(^2\)[...] is one of the principals of the [...] and is a relative of [...] and Defendants’ counsel in the proceedings below, [...] Pa123, 15:2-4.  [...] was dismissed from the case on September 8, 2023 on a motion for summary judgment.  Da20. discovery in the timeframe outlined by the Rules of Court, and otherwise did not respond to deficiency letters.  Da370-71.  Therefore, on August 23, 2023, Plaintiffs moved to compel [...] to produce discovery.  Da371.  On September 8, 2023, [...] entered an Order granting Plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery.
[brief] ####  Other Authorities - **Black’s Law Dictionary** 1491 (11th ed. 2019) ........................................  11 - **N.J. Ct. R. 4:37-2(b)** ..............................................................................  8 - **N.J. Ct. R. 4:46-2** .................................................................................. 7, 8 - **29 N.J. Prac., Law of Mortgages § 5.10 (2d ed.)** ..................................  14, 15  I.  Preliminary Statement
[brief] (raised below, Da379,394)  The Trial Court seems to agree that only a change in "material" terms of the offer would cause the seller to have to re-present an offer to the ROFR holder.  Da355.  Whether the third-party buyer was advised of the existence of the Plaintiff’s ROFR is not material to the ROFR holder.  The third party buyer’s knowledge of the ROFR has no impact on the ROFR holder’s rights.  Yet, the Trial Court found that it was a material term, as a matter of law and that once that term was added to the offer and presented to the Plaintiff on May 4th, 2023, it materially changed the contract terms such that a new presentation of the offer to the Plaintiff was necessary.
[brief] The court below determined that the underlying contract for sale of real estate upon which all Plaintiff’s claims were predicated was unenforceable.  The trial court ultimately decided – and its necessarily follows – that in the absence of an enforceable contract, there existed no legal foundation upon which Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants could be sustained as a matter of law.  Critically, the crux of the trial court’s decision - that the contract for sale was unenforceable - is unassailable under the clearly controlling precedent and a single plain and uncontroverted fact.
[brief] ..............................................29  MZM Constr. Co. v. N.J. Bldg. Laborers Statewide Benefit Funds, 974 F.3d 386 (3d Cir. 2020)  .................15  New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. K.M., 444 N.J. Super. 325 (App. Div. 2016)
[brief] This Court has observed:  “The common law’s progression should not stop because of the labels adopted by the parties in defining their relationship when an innocent individual, not a party to that relationship, is injured by the condition of—or the failure to warn of the condition of—abutting property or nearby areas that an invitee might foreseeably encounter. ”  Nielsen v. Walmart Store #2, 2171, 429 N.J.Super. 251, 260 (App. Div. 2013).  Each of these tenants were aware of the conditions of the premises; were situated to at least warn any visitor of those conditions and, at the very least, give notice to the Landlord; and were even contractually obligated to maintain the walkways nearby the premises.  A deeper read of Kandrac compels the grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.
[brief] staffing coordinators); Pa361 at 78:14-21 ([...] previously sought extra pay for her staffing coordinators during the COVID-19 pandemic, but was rejected by senior management); Pa364 at 90:5-91:1; Pa475; Pa482-528 (Plaintiffs suspiciously entered charge pay for each other after [...] reviewed their time cards for pay periods).  As such, no reasonable juror could find that [...] approved the charge pay.  Especially since [...] admitted that he did not possess a single piece of documentation suggesting he was terminated for anything but his entry and receipt of unauthorized charge pay.  (Pa191 at 130:3-17; Pa362 at 84:2-9; Pa103-04 at 81:20-82:18 ([...]’s single instance of approved charge pay was retroactively approved only because of the administrative difficulties in correcting it).  The trial court considered this exact argument, and properly found it insufficient: “after all three were confronted and interviewed about it, all three admitted that they shouldn’t have been getting this charge pay, that it wasn’t authorized.
[brief] Plaintiffs assert that [...]’s negligence was not at issue in the Chancery action.  This argument is entirely unavailing.  The procedural posture of this case and *Pivnick* are identical.  In neither case was attorney negligence at issue in the Probate/Chancery actions.  The relevant and controlling issue was that of testamentary intent.  Pivnick precludes re-litigation of the issue of testamentary intent, and by extension also precludes any legal malpractice claim premised on the assertion that the testator had a different intent than that determined in the first action.  Given the Chancery Judge’s final judgment finding that [...]’s testamentary intent was fulfilled, there can be no malpractice claim because the ultimate outcome was correct as a matter of law.  Stated differently, plaintiffs cannot claim they were damaged by the total forgiveness of the mortgage because they are precluded from arguing that this was not [...]’s true wish.  Plaintiffs already fought and lost that fight.
[brief] Therefore, both were in violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:17-34.  These accidents, irregularities, improprieties and/or mistakes may have negatively affected prospective bidders and resulted in a sale for less than the premises’ highest and best price as of that date.  See Burger v. Dumas, 25 N.J. Super. 473, 476 (Law Div. 1953) (sheriff sale set aside because sheriff erroneously announced existence of a judgment lien and failed to disclose amount due on mortgage, thereby “thwarting competitive bidding”); In re Ryker, 301 B.R. 156, 167 (D.N.J. 2003) (citing Burger).  Pursuant to R. 4:65-5, the court cannot confirm a sale if it is not “satisfied that the real estate was sold at its highest and best price at the time of the sale”.  Instead of applying the statutory “approximate” mandate, [...] created her own statutory criteria, i.e., even though the published amounts were not approximately the correct amounts, they were not such “egregious variation[s] from the actual number[s] that it put a chilling effect on bids. ”  T27-1 to 2.  That however, is not the statutory mandate of N.J.S.A. 2A:17-34.  “[T]he Legislature understood and understands its obligations for the notice from which the selling officer may not depart….”  Fidelity Union Bank v. Trim, 210 N.J. Super. 476, 478-79 (App. Div. 1986).  [...] was required to apply the law as written, not as she wished it to be, and her application of the wrong criteria was reversible error as a matter of law.  See Frugis v. Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250, 280 (2003) (citing Cornblatt v. Barrow, 153 N.J. 218, 231 (1998) (“If the language is plain and clearly reveals the statute’s meaning, the Court’s sole function is to enforce the statute according to its terms. ”).  Nor was there any factual basis in the record for her to conclude that the excessive amounts in the notices did not put a chilling effect on the bids.  Therefore, this Court should reverse [...]’s order; confirm that for purposes of [...]’s exercise of its right of redemption of the mortgaged premises, the postjudgment interest rate is the rate prescribed in R. 4:42-11; and direct that a new sheriff’s sale be conducted if [...] has not already redeemed the mortgaged premises.  III.
[brief] This case is not unusual:  People with disabilities are given very poor treatment by the Police, the Courts and the State all the time.  The Congress knew of the “oversights,” “shunting” and “invisibility” of the “handicapped,” (as they were referred to then) in the early 1970s when passing the RA.  Following Congress’ lead, the Supreme Court has recognized that “benign neglect” is the main modality of disability discrimination since at least 1985:  Discrimination … [is not from animus] but rather of **thoughtlessness and indifference**— of **benign neglect**.[12]