ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The legal impact of [...] having signed the PSA in October of 2022 instead of first presenting an unsigned, unaccepted offer to [...] “promptly” was simply that [...]’s ROFR continued to remain viable until the terms and conditions were presented to them.  Those terms and conditions were, in fact, presented no later than January 17, 2023.  If [...] had, during the 30 days that followed the presentation on January 17, 2023, exercised their ROFR, that exercise of their ROFR would certainly have been enforceable.  Even with a signed contract with [...], [...] would have been legally obligated to sell to [...].  The fact that the terms and conditions did not list the ROFR as a term or condition did not invalidate the offer, nor did it have any effect on the rights of [...] to exercise its ROFR.  The emphasis placed on *H&G Hardware* by [...] (the principle that there is more to an offer than the purchase price) ignores the very clear fact that *H&G Hardware* involved an offer that also failed to explicitly include language regarding the ROFR holder’s right of first refusal.  *H&G Hardware v. Cohen A0667-04T2 2006 WL 27624 (App.Div. Jan 6, 2006).*
[directive] eCourts through the electronically filed be shall detention pretrial for motions  All whether specify shall prosecutor detention, the pretrial for motion files a prosecutor the When (2) required; when court in appear not will defendant (1) that risk the on based is application the will defendant (3) community; the or person other any of safety endanger the will defendant or intimidate, or injure, threaten, or process, justice criminal the obstruct to attempt or obstruct combination (4) any or juror; or witness prospective a intimidate, or injure, threaten, to attempt risks.27 specified foregoing of the Circumstances. and Facts Relevant 7.6 Rule.  General 7.6.1
[directive] N.J.S.A.  Pursuant to 2C:35-14.2  “Drug Court” (Korean)  2C:35-14(“마약 다음 질문들은 귀하가 법정”)에  의해 특별 보호관찰에 대한 의무적 선고를 받을 N.J.S.A. 합니다.  자격이 있는 경우에만  답변해야  The following questions need to be answered only if you are eligible for a mandatory sentence of special probation pursuant to 2C:35-14 (“Drug Court”).
[brief] Essex County Ind. No. [...] charged [...] with second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1) (Count 1) and first-degree robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1) (Count 2).  (Da 1-7)  Mr. Rhymes was tried together with two co-defendants, [...] and [...], in October and November 2023, before the Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a jury.  At the close of the State’s case, the court denied Mr. Rhymes’s motion for a judgement of acquittal.  (6T:122-8 to 126-19)  Prior to deciding whether he would testify in his own defense, Mr. Rhymes requested a Sands/Brunson hearing.  (6T:126-20 to 127-4)  The court ruled that both of Mr. Rhymes’s prior convictions were admissible as impeachment evidence should --- 1  Da: Defendant’s appendix  1T: Transcript of 10/3/2023 (Pretrial)  2T: Transcript of 10/4/2023 (Pretrial)  3T: Transcript of 10/17/2023 (Trial)  4T: Transcript of 10/18/2023 (Trial)  5T: Transcript of 11/14/2023 (Trial)  6T: Transcript of 11/15/2023 (Trial)  7T: Transcript of 11/16/2023 (Trial)  8T: Transcript of 11/17/2023 (Trial)  9T: Transcript of 1/26/2024 (Sentencing)  2  State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127 (1978); State v. Brunson, 132 N.J. 377 (1993).  he elect to testify.  (6T:132-11 to 133-2)  Mr. Rhymes ultimately elected not to testify, and the defense presented no witnesses.  (6T:136-13 to 137-18)  On November 17, 2023, the jury convicted Mr. Rhymes of second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery (Count 1) and first-degree robbery (Count 2).³ (8T:6-11 to 9-4) (Da 8-9)  On January 26, 2024, after merger, the court sentenced Mr. Rhymes to 12 years in prison with an 85% parole bar.  (9T:16-22 to 17-5)  (Da 10-12)  A timely notice of appeal was filed on February 12, 2024.  (Da 13-15)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] The Appellate Division applied the “remedial goals” of TILA to permit the affirmative defense of recoupment in a foreclosure case.  In Associates Home Equity Services v. Troup, 343 N.J. Super. 254, 273 (App. Div. 2001), the court permitted the affirmative defense of recoupment under TILA in a foreclosure case even though barred by the statute of limitations because “it would be fundamentally unfair and contrary to the remedial goals expressed by [TILA] to preclude the recoupment remedy....”  iv.
[brief] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying defendant a United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), hearing, due to the alleged possibility of witness misidentification, and that the trial court erred in allowing the witness to provide a confidence statement as to identification of the defendant.  (Db11).  These contentions are wholly without merit.  The State addresses each contention in turn.  A.  The Trial Court Was Within Its Discretion In Denying a Wade Hearing  Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by not granting a Wade hearing, alleging [...] was somehow swayed by [...] asking [...] if he would like to see the photographs again.  (Db12).  Defendant pronounces that [...] was “demanded” to make a conclusive identification, which is wholly unsupported by the record, which shows no such demand.  Thus, defendant’s argument is without merit.  A trial court may hold a Wade hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104(a) to determine whether a pretrial identification of a criminal defendant was properly conducted and therefore admissible under N.J.R.E. 803(a)(3).  However, the right to a Wade hearing is not absolute, and a hearing is not required in every case involving an out-of-court identification.
[directive] b.  For purposes of this section, "crime" includes any of the following: (1) murder pursuant to N.J.S.2C:11-3 or manslaughter pursuant to N.J.S.2C:11-4; (2) simple assault or aggravated assault pursuant to N.J.S.2C:12-1; (3) stalking pursuant to P.L.1992, c.209 (C.2C:12-10); (4) terrorist threats pursuant to N.J.S.2C:12-3; (5) kidnaping and related offenses including criminal restraint; false imprisonment; interference with custody; criminal coercion; or enticing a child into a motor vehicle, structure, or isolated area pursuant to N.J.S.2C:13-1 through 2C:13-6; (6) sexual assault, criminal sexual contact or lewdness pursuant to N.J.S.2C:14-2 through N.J.S.2C:14-4; (7) arson pursuant to N.J.S.2C:17-1, or causing or risking widespread injury or damage which would constitute a crime of the second degree pursuant to N.J.S.2C:17-2; (8) a crime against a child, including endangering the welfare of a child and child pornography pursuant to N.J.S.2C:24-4; or child abuse, neglect, or abandonment pursuant to R.S.9:6-3; (9) endangering the welfare of an incompetent person pursuant to N.J.S.2C:24-7 or endangering the welfare of an elderly or disabled person pursuant to N.J.S.2C:24-8; (10) domestic violence pursuant to P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-17 et seq.); or (11) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense listed in paragraphs (1) through (10) of this subsection.
[brief] Main Street, L.L.C. v. Mayor and Council of City of Hackensack, 221 N.J. 129 (2015)  .................................................................  15  Docteroff v. Barra Corp. of Am., Inc., 282 N.J. Super. 230 (App. Div. 1995)  ..................................................................................  2  Hoover v. Wetzler, 472 N.J. Super. 230 (App. Div. 2022)  ...........................................  6  Kinderkamack Rd. Assocs., LLC v. Mayor & Council of the Borough of Oradell, 421 N.J. Super. 8 (App. Div. 2011)  .............................................  15  Malanga v. Twp. of W. Orange, 253 N.J. 291 (2023)  ...........................................  6, 12, 13 Murphy v. Luongo, 338 N.J. Super. 260 (App. Div. 2001)  ........................................  2  Regan v. City of New Brunswick, 305 N.J. Super. 342 (App. Div. 1997).  ........  2
[brief] (“Defendant” or “[...]”) and non-party [...], to discuss working together to launch a new brand that brought outdoor furnishings ([...]’s background) and grill products ([...]’s background) under one brand: “[...]. ”  At this meeting, these four individuals not only discussed the formation of the new “[...]” brand – selling both furniture and grills – but also specifically that [...] would be the distributor back east and develop the “[...]” brand awareness out of nothing.
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  First, adopting general acts to control the consumer loan business indicates that the NJCFLA’s purpose would be furthered by private enforcement.  Second, applying principles of statutory construction, if the legislate intended *only* state regulation, then the phrase “and control” would be rendered superfluous.  [...]’s inferred message is simply not supported by *Gough* or the other cases cited in [...]’s opening Brief.
[brief] The right to the effective assistance of counsel is constitutionally guaranteed under both the United States and New Jersey constitutions and is premised on the need “to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial. ”  Pierre, 223 N.J. at 577-578 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984)).  A “fair trial” is achieved where “evidence subject to an adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding. ”  Ibid. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685).  Bearing in mind the constitutional mandate to a fair trial, “[t]he benchmark for finding any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. ”  Ibid. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686).  In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that the attorney’s performance was deficient as measured by an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
[brief] Generally, a witness’s prior conviction is admissible for credibility purposes so long as its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  N.J.R.E. 609(a)(1); N.J.R.E. 403.  However, Rule 609 “creates a presumption that a conviction more remote than ten years is inadmissible for impeachment purposes, unless the State carries the burden of proving that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.
[brief] *Davis v Burris*, 51 Ariz, 220 75 P2d 689 (1938).  Acts in excess of judicial authority constitute misconduct, particularly when a judge deliberately disregards the requirements of due process.  *Cannon v Commission on Judicial Performance*, 33 Cal 3d, 359, 371, 374.  (1983).  The [...] Judge and staff, by not filing a judgment, blocked plaintiff from appealing his criminal matter in violation of Art 1 para 1 and *Morrisey v Brewer*, 408 US 471 (1972) for filing a NOC against the sister [...].  (Pa052; Pa91, Pa41).  [...] causing [...]’s signature to appear on an undated Order, over one year after it was lawfully required, that misleads others into believing that an order was signed all along, is an act, although judicial in nature, outside of a judge’s jurisdiction and does not allow immunity.  (Pa654; Pa533).  Point X: [...] is liable for Constitutional, NJCRA, NJLAD and other Violations Under Counts I, II, IV, & Reckless Intentional Infliction of Extreme Emotional Distress (Pa21-23; Pa41, Pa96, Pa54, Pa303-304, Pa470-471, Pa653)
[brief] Defendants actually acknowledged that necessity and obtained an additional title search from [...], Ja352, Ja472, which provided, in addition to the documents Defendants claim to rely on: the 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed; tax maps depicting Lot 3 as 105’ on 21st Street South and 110.69’ along the public alley; and reviewer notes specifically referencing the 40’ x 90’ transfer.  Ja494; Ja504-11, Ja551.  However, none of those materials were reviewed or relied on by Defendants.  Db16; Ja679.  Had they been, as Defendant [...] acknowledged in his deposition, the mistake would have been seen.  Ja463-66.  To add to the materials the trial court specifically referenced in finding constructive notice based on Defendants’ obligation to inquire further, and to the content of the documents described in the prior Argument section, supra at pages 28, 30, which already demonstrate the error and Plaintiffs’ title or claim with clarity, Plaintiffs note the following to demonstrate the overwhelming indicators that further investigation by Defendants was necessary and such investigation would have revealed with remarkable clarity of record that the subdivision contained a mistake:
[brief] [...]’ property consists of two separate parcels, Lots 43 and 44, in Block 27 on the Official Tax Map for [...], New Jersey (Da502).  However, the lots were not always under common ownership.  During the time the two parcels were owned by different people, the southerly portion (referred to herein as the “South Baxter Parcel”) consisted of approximately .51 acres while the northern parcel (referred to herein as the “North Baxter Parcel”) consisted of approximately .88 acres (Da397 at ¶16).  The Baxter’s home sits on the North Baxter Parcel and the roadway easement at issue traverses the South Baxter Parcel (Da517 at ¶¶48-49).  The North Baxter Parcel was created by Deed dated June 6, 1955 and recorded on July 1, 1955 from [...] to [...] and [...] (“[...]”) (Da398; Da471).
[brief] Furthermore, the jury was able to consider the other relevant testimony on the issue of road conditions; specifically, it was admitted and undisputed that no rainfall had occurred at least from the time Appellant began his drive through the time of the collision and that Appellant was coming upon multiple stopped vehicles, including that of Respondent, who had absolutely no issue bringing her vehicle to a complete stop while traversing the same exact area of roadway.  The jury was able to consider Appellant’s conscious decision to switch from the right lane to the left lane due to a shorter line of traffic, as opposed to coming to a stop behind traffic in the right lane; in light of Appellant’s testimony he was taking *extra care* due to the wet roadways.  The jury was able to weigh Appellant’s testimony regarding a complete loss of control of his vehicle, against Appellant’s testimony that the collision with the rear of Respondent’s vehicle was a mere “tap”.  The jury was able to consider Appellant’s admission that he cannot describe a condition within the roadway, other than they were generally wet from previous rainfall, that caused his vehicle to slide and/or skid at the precise location of the subject collision.
[directive] Order.  Restraining Violence to pursuant authorized as 8.3, except Section under covered otherwise case not  In any violence involving domestic offense an for released been has defendant a where subsection 8.4.5, has defendant the (1) that believe to cause probable is there and acomplaint-warrant by charged imposed an or Act Violence of Domestic Prevention the to pursuant issued order restraining a violated bodily injury cause to threatened or caused has (2) and Law Reform Bail the under condition release file presumptively shall prosecutor the of release, condition or order the by protected person any to 70 Page 2A:162-24.  N.J.S.A. of to release pursuant motion revocation seeking a Sexual a Defendant When Violates of Release Revocation Seeking of Presumption 8.4.4
[directive] 8  5  The Directive adopts the short-term storage standards from the National Best Practices for Sexual Kits,9 Assault which provides storage conditions for the type of evidence included in the SAFE/DFSA kit as noted in the following table.  The following conditions will apply to all kits – reported and unreported – in an agency’s custody:  Type of Frozen Refrigerated Temp. Controlled Room Evidence Temp.  Below - Between 2°C and 8°C  Between 15.5°C and 10°C (36°F and 75°F)  24°C (14°F) with less than 25% (60°F and 75°F) humidity with less than 60% humidity  Liquid blood Never Best Less than 24 hours* not ideal  Urine  Less than 24 hours, or Best not ideal not ideal as soon as possible*  Dry biological not ideal not ideal  Best Acceptable stained item  Wet items (if they can’t be Best Acceptable  Less than 24 hours* not ideal dried)  Hair not ideal not ideal  Best Acceptable Swabs with biological not ideal  Best (wet)  Best (dried) not ideal material  Buccal swabs  Less than not ideal not ideal Best 24 hours*  *If operational requirements prevent submission of DFSA kits within 24 hours, specimens must be refrigerated and submitted as soon as possible, but no later than ten (10) calendar days from the date of collection, unless the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or his/her/their attorney designee, or the County Prosecutor or his/her/their attorney designee determines there is good cause to delay submission to the lab and provides written approval of an extension in time to the agency.  Justice,10
[brief] No different than *Maisano* and *William-Hopkins*, here, the Cardholder Agreement mandates that the matter be referred to arbitration, including for determination of “gateway” issues like whether the Arbitration Agreement is enforceable — Claims subject to arbitration include the application, enforceability, or interpretation of the Cardholder Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement.  (Pa141-Pa143).  This necessarily includes the NJCFA, NJCFLA, and declaratory relief claims raised here.  Thus, Appellant’s attempts to argue that the Cardholder Agreement is unenforceable are misplaced because such attempts may only be made before an arbitrator.  In any event, Plaintiff cannot dispute that he entered into the Agreement, nor that he used and benefitted from it.  (Pa132-Pa133).  *See Novack v. Cities Serv. Oil Co.*, 149 N.J. Super. 542, 548, 374 A.2d 89 (Law Div. 1977) (use of a credit card constitutes acceptance of the offer of credit in accordance with its terms), *aff’d*, 159 N.J. Super. 400, 388 A.2d 264 (App. Div.), *cert. denied*, 78 N.J. 396, 396 A.2d 583 (1978).
[brief] However, no such scientific or technical subject matter is involved here—only a simple matter of measuring the dimensions of a proposed building and its location vis-à-vis the Long Branch boardwalk.  These measurements are set forth on the plans in [...]’s permit application.  There is no dispute about them.  When reviewing an agency action or determination, appellate courts must reverse an agency determination that is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or beyond the agency's delegated powers.  *In re Implementation of L. 2012, C. 24, N.J.S.A. 48:3-* 87(t), 443 N.J. Super. 73, 78 (App. Div. 2012).  An agency determination is arbitrary and capricious if it "violates express or implied legislative policies."  *Seigel v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.*, 395 N.J. Super. 604, 613 (App. Div. 2007).  As stated by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, an agency determination is arbitrary and capricious when a court is satisfied that the agency has “mistakenly exercised its discretion or misperceived its own statutory authority."  *In re Polk*, 90 N.J. 550, 578 (1982).
[brief] [...] Sues [...] for Nonpayment (Pa77) On July 5, 2022, [...] filed a Demand for Arbitration with the [...] pursuant to its Construction Arbitration Rules (the “First Arbitration”) that put [...]’s performance on the projects—most significantly the Hackensack Project—squarely at issue.  Pa77 ¶ 18.  [...]’s Demand for Arbitration from the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract—which was at issue in the First Arbitration.  stated:  [...] has a claim for breach of contract against ARC, which includes (but is not limited to) claims regarding: - ARC’s failure to complete the Backlog Projects in accordance with the terms and conditions of the construction agreements governing such Backlog Projects [e.g., the Hackensack Project], which includes (but is not limited to) ARC’s ineffective project management, poor quality control, and lack of transparency, which has caused costly delays and estrangement of long-time [...] clients; - ARC’s obligation to indemnify [...] for certain claims caused by ARC’s above-referenced breaches of the PTA and construction agreements;3 - ARC’s failure to pay [...] the required 65% of the estimated gross profit (“EGP”) on the Backlog Projects…  [Pa77 ¶ 19 (emphases added). ]  Thus, there was no question that [...]’s performance (or lack thereof) was a factual issue before the Arbitrator.  In fact, the Arbitrator heard eight full days’ worth of testimony about [...]’s actual construction management performance across the many transferred construction projects.  Pa210, 300, 705, 785, 430, 3  It is critical to this appeal to highlight that [...] initiated the First Arbitration not as some “limited-issue arbitration,” but rather as a general dispute under the PTA “and” under the construction agreements subsumed therein.  497, 617, 842.  The Hackensack Project was the single-most disputed project, spanning across seven of the eight trial hearing days, and encompassing testimony on not just EGP, but also [...]’s work as a subcontractor, which further included a bulk submission of [...]’s business records at, specifically, Hackensack (the only project for which [...] mass-submitted business records into evidence).
[brief] ..................................................................................................................30  | Description | Page | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Order of Judgment - October 17, 2023 | Da29 | | Order in Support of Motion for a New Trial - December 8, 2023 | Da45 | | Honorable [...], JSC’s Opinion on Motion for New Trial - | | | December 8, 2023 | Da31 | | Order of Judgment - December 15, 2023 | Da75 | | Order - January 19, 2024 | Da47 | | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Bennett v. Lugo, 368 N.J. Super. 466, 473 (App. Div. 2004) | 24 | | Blanks v. Murphy, 268 N.J. Super. 152, 162, 632 A.2d 1264 (App. Div. 1993) | 25 | | Boryszewski v. Burke, 380 N.J. Super. 361, 375 (App. Div. 2005) | 25 | | Campione v. Soden, 150 N.J. 163, 184 (1997), cert. denied, 186 N.J. 242 (2006) | 25 | | Calabree v. DiCristino, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2548 | 17 | | Davidson v. Slater, 189 N.J. 166, 185 (2007) | 23 | | Dziedzic v. St. John’s Cleaners & Shirt Launderers, Inc., 53 N.J. Super. 157, 161 (1969) | 25 | | Hansen v. Eagle-Picher Lead Co., 8 N.J. 133, 141, 84 A.2d 281, 285 (1951) | 17 | | Hing Lee v. Gray, 456 F.2d 1276, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 10847 (3d Cir. 1972) | 19 | | Mockler v. Russman, 102 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1968) | 1, 2, 8, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19 | | O’Brien Cogeneration, Inc. v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am., 361 N.J. Super. 264, 274-75 (App. Div. 2003) | 23 | | O’Brien (Newark) Congregation, Inc. v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of America, 361 N.J. Super. 274, 825 A.2d 524 | 25 | | Paramel v. Martinez, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1701 | 27 | | Polk v. Daconceicao, 268 N.J. Super. 568, 575 (App. Div. 1993) | 9, 21, 24 | Raritan Trucking Corp. v. Aero Commander, Inc., 458 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir.1972) .................................................. 18 Reichert v. Vegholm, 366 N.J. 209, 213-14, (App. Div. 2004)
[brief] Specifically, [...]’s ex-girlfriend claimed that he asked her to bribe the alleged victim in the original matter to drop the charges, and when the girlfriend said no, he asked her to find someone to kill the woman.  Of course, [...]’s ex-girlfriend did not provide any evidence to corroborate this bizarre story, and law enforcement made no documented effort to investigate these accusations, but the State nonetheless elected to charge [...] with witness tampering.  The Defense attempted to argue that the original allegations should be tried separately from the later-made accusations of witness tampering, but the trial court denied this request and allowed the original charges to be tried together with the fabricated allegations promulgated by [...]’s scorned ex-girlfriend.