ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Notably, Defendant also lied about his age during the text chat, telling the UC that he was twenty-nine (29) when in fact he was forty-three (43).  (Pa14).  Defendant further lied about the make and model of the car he would be driving to the encounter.  (Pa15; Pa26).  Defendant told the detectives that although he used the “[...]” application for several years, he had never met anyone through the application who was under the age of eighteen (18) years before. (Pa26).  Defendant told the detectives that users of the application frequently lied about their ages.  (Pa22).  For example, Defendant conveyed to the detectives that he previously met a user who said he was twenty-nine (29) years old but was actually fifty (50) years old.  (Pa22).  During his interview, Defendant granted the detectives permission to search his mobile phone and vehicle.  (Pa23; Pa26).  Nothing illegal was found on or in either.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE DISCOVERY AT ISSUE HAD A TENDENCY IN REASON TO PROVE A MATERIAL FACT AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN PRESERVED BY THE STATE AND PRODUCED TO THE DEFENSE.
[brief] The final point raised by Appellants on appeal is that the trial court erred when, after entering final judgment, it denied Appellants’ request to consider brand new issues such as what uses and what improvements Respondent may conduct on the easement (Db38).  Those issues have never been part of this case (Da1; Da87; Da117; Da193; Da214; Da849).  It is nothing if not ironic that the Appellants now argue that issues remain unresolved.  The fact remains that New Jersey law addresses the duties of both the dominant and servient tenements in the easement context.  The parties are bound to conduct themselves in conformance with applicable law.  Appellants’ know full well that the purpose of the easement is to provide Respondent (and its successors) with a means of access to and from the [...] (Da826; Da462; Da482).  Without the access, the [...] is completely landlocked – a result abhorred by the courts and one never intended by the [...], who are the [...]’ predecessors in title (Da826; Da462; Da482).
[directive] Investigation of Firearm Discharges  7.11.1  An agency’s internal affairs function shall receive notice of any incidents involving:  (a)  Any firearm discharge by agency personnel, whether on-duty or off-duty, unless the discharge occurred during the course of (1) a law enforcement training exercise; (2) routine target practice at a firing range; (3) a lawful animal hunt; or (4) the humane killing of an injured animal; or (b)  Any discharge of an agency-owned firearm by anyone other than agency personnel.  7.11.2  Upon receiving notice, the internal affairs function shall determine whether additional investigation is necessary and whether information must be reported to the County Biehunik v. Felicetta, 441 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971).  5  41  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021
[brief] The Department’s issuance of the Bulletin has left [...]–and every other reciprocal exchange/AIF in this state–with no recourse but to seek intervention to ensure a full and accurate record on this important issue of general applicability.  Indeed, in the Department’s November 6, 2023, opposition brief, and again in its January 16, 2024 opposition to [...]’s Motion for Leave to appear as Amicus Curiae, the Department squarely placed non-party [...]’s history of dealings with the Department at issue when opposing [...]’s legal challenge to the Bulletin, with no meaningful way for any party to rebut the Department’s factual assertions absent a supplementation of the record.  In fact, at footnote 3 of its November 6, 2023 brief, the Department observed that [...] and [...] “are not parties to this appeal,” but nevertheless relied upon its Order approving an acquisition of [...], which provided, “among other provisions, that the applicants comply with the Reciprocal Exchange Act and the Holding Company Act, along with regulations promulgated thereunder. ”  (Db. 22)  The Department then implied that overlapping ownership between [...] and [...] imputed tacit acceptance of its position by [...].  (Db. 22-23)  As there was no proceeding below in which [...] could have intervened, [...] is acting promptly on review of the Department’s recent submissions to this Court.  [...] is concerned that it may well be bound by this Court’s decision in future, separate proceedings, without having been heard in this matter, and without the benefit of a full and accurate record.  Accordingly, [...] respectfully requests that this Court grant its motion to intervene, as the failure to do so would set a dangerous precedent incentivizing governmental agencies to bypass the APA’s due process requirements in future proceedings.
[brief] (20T 72:4-8; 73:4 to 74:2).  Over several days, [...] testified about dozens of transactions that represented diversions of funds from [...] and [...].  In some cases, he was unable to trace the funds to a particular destination.  In other cases, [...] was able to identify specific funds diverted on specific dates and the precise destination of those funds.  In total, [...] identified about $10 million that he believed was diverted from [...] and [...] into accounts controlled by the [...].
[directive] Specifying Reasons for Overcoming Presumption of Charging by Complaint-  4.3.2  Summons.  If the decision is made to apply for a complaint-warrant notwithstanding the presumption of issuing a complaint-summons pursuant to subsection 4.3.1, the court or judicial officer to (1) the defendant has been served with a summons for any prior indictable offense and has failed to appear; (2) there is reason to believe that the defendant is dangerous to self, or will pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released on a summons; (3) there are one or more outstanding warrants for the defendant; (4) the defendant’s identity or address is not known and a warrant is necessary to subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court; (5) there is reason to believe that the defendant will obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process if released on a summons; (6) there is reason to believe that the defendant will not appear in response to a summons; or (7) there is reason to believe that the monitoring of pretrial release conditions by the pretrial services program established pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-25 is necessary to protect any victim, witness, other specified person, or the community.
[directive] 6Entiende que antes de que el juez pueda determinar que usted es culpable, tendra que decirle juez que es lo al que usted hizo que lo hace culpable de la infraccion particular (de las infracciones particulares)?  [Yes/Si]  [No/No]  3.  Do you understand what the charges mean?  6Entiende lo que significan los cargos?  4.  Do you understand that by pleading guilty you are giving up certain rights?
[directive] For the criminal justice system in particular, the consequences of the pandemic have been substantial.  Consistent with guidance from public health officials, the Judiciary for more than a year was unable to summon jurors, 1 Copies of Court orders, notices, and press releases related to COVID-19 are available on the Judiciary’s website at https://www.njcourts.gov/public/ covid19.html.  6 witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and the parties for in-person jury trials.  As a result, the Court on its own entered fourteen omnibus orders that tolled the clock for the start of criminal trials for a total of 461 days.  See COVID-19 Updates, N.J. Cts., https://www.njcourts.gov/public/covid19.html (listing all fourteen omnibus orders); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(a)(2)(a).  Those developments inevitably led to an increase in the number of pending cases.  In March 2020, a large group of defendants already awaited trial on pending charges.  With each passing day, more people were arrested and charged with crimes, but for an extended period, most could not be assigned a trial date and have a jury hear their case.  Today, according to the AOC, there are approximately 6,000 cases in which defendants are held in custody pursuant to an order of pretrial detention as they await trial.  On any given day, hundreds more are in custody as they wait for an initial appearance or detention hearing.  III.
[brief] **A.  Defendant’s redacted interview played for the jury did not include any impermissible opinions concerning defendant’s credibility or guilt. **  It is axiomatic that witnesses may “not intrude on the province of the jury by offering, in the guise of opinions, views on the meaning of facts that the jury is fully able to sort out” or “express a view on the ultimate question of guilty or innocence. ”  *State v. McLean*, 205 N.J. 438, 461 (2011) (internal citations omitted).  For example, in *State v. Tung*, this Court held that an “[officer’s] opinions as to defendant’s truthfulness and guilt . . .[are] not admissible as either demeanor evidence or lay opinion.
[brief] The SFRA requires the State, every three years, to review and evaluate the formula’s education costs, weights, aid amounts and other elements and make adjustments and modifications as may be necessary to deliver funding adequate for students to achieve the NJSLS.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-46(b).  The “adequacy review” is undertaken by the Governor, in consultation with the Commissioner of Education, through the preparation and submission of an “Educational Adequacy Report,” with recommendations for formula adjustments, to the Legislature.  Id.; see also Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 146-47.  From its enactment through 2019-20, the State issued three Educational Adequacy Reports (“Reports”) on the SFRA’s operation – FY2014, FY2017 and FY2020.  (Pa2256-Pa2278; Pa2279-Pa2292; Pa2293-Pa2306.)  On their face, the Reports are perfunctory, yielding no evaluation, analysis or recommendations for adjustment or modification of the formula’s education cost, weights and aid amounts, other than increases for the CPI and in statewide average wages and benefits.
[brief] ”  § 1692(e).  The federal courts’ construction of § 1692c(b) protects against invasions of individual privacy, prevents collection practices which place consumers’ privacy at risk, and ensures that those debt collectors who refrain from using mail vendors are not competitively disadvantage.  Hence, there is no legitimate argument that the federal courts’ interpretation is inconsistent with the FDCPA overall scheme, frustrates the FDCPA’s purposes, or yields an absurd result.  Structurally, the FDCPA imposes a Code of Conduct which, among other things, requires debt collectors to treat consumers respectfully (by prohibiting harassing, oppressive, and abusive conduct), honestly (by banning “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means”), and fairly (by prohibiting the use of “unfair or unconscionable means”).  15 U.S.C. § 1692d, § 1692e, and § 1692f.  Each of those three provisions states a broad limitation on debt collector’s conduct and then provides a non-limiting, non-exhaustive list of specific conduct which violates the general proscription.  In 15 U.S.C. § 1692b, which is not specifically relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims but helps explain the statutory structure, the Act restricts communications with those who might have contact information (called “location information”) about a consumer.  Generally, the provision allows a debt collector to contact neighbors, relatives, and employers once to obtain the consumer’s address or telephone number provided the debt collector never discloses that it is attempting to collect a debt.  In addition to prohibiting third-party communications under subsection (b), 15 U.S.C. § 1692c addresses debt collectors’ communications with the consumer during certain hours, while at work, and when represented by counsel.  It also provides how a consumer can require a debt collector to cease further communications.  Under § 1692g, a debt collector is obligated to provide a consumer notice of certain information including the right to dispute the debt.  The written notice must be sent with or within five days after each collector’s initial communication.  Under § 1692i, a debt collector is barred from suing a consumer in an inconvenient forum.  Generally, a lawsuit must be commenced in the venue where the consumer lives.  **B.
[brief] Further, in accordance with N.J.R. 4:41-5(b), the SHO’s recommendation was not binding until so ordered by the Trial Court, which may “adopt the report, [or] modify or reject it in whole or in part”.  Id.  In this case, the Trial Court correctly adopted the SHO’s recommendations, which, as discussed herein, were based on substantial and credible evidence.  Additionally, as set forth in the Eminent Domain Act (N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 et seq) and the case law, the Trial Court has the authority to compel the exercise of eminent domain.  See N.J.S.A. 20:3–5; Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n, 98 N.J. 258, 265, 486 A.2d 330 (1985), Magliochetti v. State by Com’r of Transp., 276 N.J. Super 361, 371 (Law. Div., 1994).
[brief] 18 Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., Inc., 109 N.J. 189, 192, 536 A.2d 237 (1988).  .........................................  16  Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 387 (E.&A. 1906)  ...........................................  25 Wells Fargo Bank v. NJ Prop. Group, 2020 N.J. Super., Unpub., LEXIS 1130; 2020 WL 3124679 ((Pa46).
[brief] Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.4(a)(6), factual evidence of a violation of section (f) shall include evidence that a respondent took action on behalf of, or at the request of, a special interest group or persons organized and voluntarily united in opinion and who adhere to a particular political party or cause; or evidence that a respondent used the schools in order to acquire some benefit for the respondent, a member of her immediate family, or a friend.  In *Albanese v. Kazan*, No. C33-16 (SEC Oct. 31, 2017) (Ra1-21), the Commission noted that a board member is not expected “to leave her opinions at the door notwithstanding he or she campaigned on specific concerns and issues, and notwithstanding the retention of free speech rights under the First Amendment. ”  *Id.* at 5.
[directive] Theft of a Motor Vehicle, 4.  N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3; N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b).  The Policy authorizes vehicular pursuits for theft of a motor vehicle until at least December 31, 2022.  I have directed [...] to review the available data as of that date, including stolen vehicle trends, effectiveness of pursuits, and resulting accidents, and determine whether this provision should remain or be modified.  Absent additional action, this provision will remain in force after December 31, 2022.
[brief] More than six months later, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated a new rule, adding an objective component to the subjective mens rea inquiry of recklessness.  Fair, 256 N.J. at 237.  The rule in Fair was premised on a new United States Supreme Court opinion in *Counterman v. Colorado*, 600 U.S. 66 (2023), also decided after the instant trial, which established the federal constitutional requirements for a true threats prosecution, affirming that a mens rea of recklessness sufficed.  *Fair*, 256 N.J. at 226-33.  In *Fair*, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that it departed from *Counterman* and from New Jersey’s existing Model Jury Charge “in one minor respect. ”  *Id.* at 237.  The *Fair* Court held that, in addition to a subjective mens rea of at least recklessness, an objective component was necessary.
[brief] (Da2469).  The only substantive addition to Plaintiff’s submission was his statement: “We believe that each and every legal work that was undertaken was wholly justified and necessary....”  There was no submission that addressed individual time entries on the invoices, or even an attempt to comply with the Appellate Division’s instructions as to how the legal fee issue should be analyzed on the remand.  Plaintiff also failed to respond to Defendant’s submission, as was required by the court’s July 13, 2021 order.  (Da261).  Defendant’s detailed analysis of the time records specified all the time that was improperly included in the fee application, and the reasons why each time entry should not have been included in the attorney fee award.
[directive] *Scores range from 1-8, and persons with the lowest score would be given the highest priority to receive critical care beds and services.  Points are assigned according to the patient’s SOFA score (range from 1 to 4 points) plus the determination that a patient has a severely limited life expectancy even if they survived to 8 highest discharge.  (2 points if life expectancy predicted to be less than five years, 4 points for life expectancy less than one year (Table 1)).  These points are then added together to produce a total priority score, which ranges from 1 to 8.  Lower scores indicate higher likelihood of benefiting from critical care, and priority will be given to those with lower scores.  Other scoring considerations:
[brief] The Third Circuit’s statement that an insurer’s affirmative IFPA claims are an “effort to recover medical expense claims” is an incorrect holding based on an incomplete and flawed analysis of New Jersey law.  GEICO, 98 F.4th at 467.  The Third Circuit further oversimplified the alleged fraud underpinning the IFPA claims as “billing for fictitious or unnecessary care. ”  Id. at 469-70.  For these reasons, the Third Circuit’s decision in GEICO should be completely rejected here.
[brief] Respondent’s lengthy discussion of IE’s also ignores that the property was still occupied by the foreclosed owner, placing everyone on inquiry notice that something might be amiss:  Further, and most significantly, the bona fide purchaser for value took title to the property knowing that the defendant family in the tax sale foreclosure action was still in possession of the premises.  New Jersey law has long recognized that a bona fide purchaser for value of real estate who purchases the property knowing others are in possession of the property has a duty to make reasonable and diligent inquiry of the rights to the property by those in possession.  [Id. at 534-535].  It also warrants mention that the IE’s decision addressed the purchaser’s motion for reconsideration of a decision already made to vacate the judgment.  Id. at 524.  Thus, the arguments of being a bonafide purchaser were made after a decision had already been made, attempting to make a new argument on reconsideration that had not been made previously.  That decision has no bearing nor relationship to this case as this case is no comparison with cases addressing due process or a lack of notice.
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Authority | Reply Brief page number | |------------------------------------------------|-------------------------| | **U.S. Constitution, Statutes:** | | | U.S. Const. amend. I | 4,11 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 | 4 | | 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2002) | 7,8 | | **NJ Constitution, Statutes:** | | | N.J. Const. of 1947 art. I, § 18 | 4,11 | | N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(a) | 4 | | N.J.S.A. 45:9-22 to -27 | 7,8 | | N.J.A.C. 8:43G-15.3 | 7,8 | | **NJ Court Rules:** | | | R. 1:21-1(a) | 8,10 | | R. 2:2-3 | 7 | | R. 4:37-2 | 1,2,4 | | **Case laws:** | | | North Haledon Fire Co. No. 1 v. Borough of North Haledon, 425 N.J. Super. 615, 631 (App. Div. 2012) | 6 | | Soc’y Hill Condo Ass’n v. Soc’y Hill Assocs., 347 N.J. Super. 163, 177-78 (App. Div. 2002) | 6 | | Johnson v. Grayce Tighe, Inc., 365 N.J. Super. 237 (App. Div. 2003) | 7 | | Liberty Mutual v. Borgata Hotel, 456 N.J. Super. 471 (Law Div. 2017) | 7 | | Kasharian v. Wilentz, 93 N.J. Super. 479, 482 (App. Div. 1967) | 10 |
[brief] But on September 6, 2023, [...] and [...] submitted correspondence clarifying the relief they requested – i.e., that in the event the voters of [...] and Atlantic [...] Appellants’ appendix includes items that are not a part of the statement of items comprising the record on appeal, and therefore should not be considered.  approve the creation of a regional pre-K through twelve district, the Commissioner approve [...]’s withdrawal from [...] and [...] so that it may join the newly regional school district.  (Aa779-84).  The Commissioner treated the September 6, 2023 correspondence as another amended petition, and issued a decision on September 22, 2023, holding that the Tri-Districts’ first joint petition – which was filed July 15, 2022, and included [...] – was moot in light of her July 21, 2023 decision permitting Atlantic [...] and [...] to proceed to referendum on forming a regional school district.  (Aa19-21).  Turning next to [...]’s September 6, 2023 amended petition, the Commissioner found that N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.1 to -47.11 permits a board of education or municipality to request permission to form or enlarge a regional school district.  Ibid.  In particular, the Commissioner determined that [...] has standing to seek withdrawal from [...] and [...] in accordance with N.J.S.A. 18:13-47.11.  (Aa20).  In doing so, the Commissioner rejected [...] and [...]’s argument that because they are “responsible for the education [of] the students of [...]. . . only they have standing to seek withdrawal. ” (Aa20).  The Commissioner found “this reading of the statute clearly belies its clear language[,]” and that the “statute contemplated that a municipality, such as [...], may seek withdrawal from a regional or consolidated school district. ”  Ibid.  However, the Commissioner found that [...]’s requested relief was premature in light of the pending September 26, 2023 referendum.  Ibid.  The Commissioner advised that if the referendum passed, [...] and the newly formed [...] could refile a joint request to form an enlarged regional school district.  (Aa20-21).  This appeal followed.
[brief] ”); United States v. Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1180 (D. N.M. 2009) (“[B]ecause of the limitations on the reliability of firearms identification evidence discussed above, [...] will not be permitted to testify that his methodology allows him to reach this conclusion as a matter of scientific certainty . . . or that there is a match to the exclusion, either practical or absolute, of all other guns. ”); United States v. Diaz, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13152, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007) (holding that the record did not support the firearm expert’s conclusion that an identification could be made to the exclusion of all other firearms in the world and limited the expert’s testimony accordingly).  the field to establish an error rate, the absence of an objective standard for identification, and the lack of acceptance of the discipline’s foundational validity outside of the community of firearms and toolmark examiners.
[brief] Plaintiffs communicated not only with their counsel, but continuously with [...]’s Counsel.  Nothing in the record demonstrates that Plaintiffs were of limited intelligence, sophistication, or could not understand the English language.  Notably, in correspondence from [...]’s counsel sent to them more than a year before the AAA case was commenced, Plaintiffs were informed that if they failed to agree to close title, the Seller will seek to declare them in default and enforce the right to retain the deposit by way of filing a complaint in arbitration.  Plaintiffs’ response is telling.  They never objected to the asserted right of the Sellers in those letters to file for arbitration or expressed any comment or question regarding the meaning of the Arbitration Provision in Section 13.  Yet, Plaintiffs did, for example, speak out when they felt an incorrect statement was made as to a different section of the SPA.  The most meaningful evidence signifying Plaintiffs’ intent can be gleaned from the filing of an Answer and distinct Counterclaims in the Arbitration on March 28, 2023.  This was done despite the plain language of the AAA Rules that would bind Plaintiffs to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and prevent them from withdrawing those Counterclaims unilaterally.