ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  (25T 37-5 to 10)  defendant and [...] were in those posts.  (25T 30-23 to 25; 25T 31-22 to 32-1)  But the judge overruled the objections, holding that it was a proper line of inquiry (25T 31-1 to 4), and that he was not going to “instruct counsel how to present [his] case and tell him what to do and not to do.
[brief] “Substantial prejudice” can include the loss of evidence or other proofs needed to defend a suit, or an increase in damages occasioned by a separate action.  *Kent Motor Cars, Inc. v Reynolds and Reynolds*, Co. 207 N.J. 428, 446-447 (2011); *Mitchell v Charles P. Procini*, D.D.S. P.A., 331 N.J. Super 445, 454 (App. Div. 2000) (finding "the loss of witnesses, the loss of evidence, and fading memories and the like" can create substantial prejudice).  Courts look to “fairness to the parties and fairness to the system of judicial administration. ”  *Gelber v. Zito P'ship*, 147 N.J. 561, 565 (1997).
[brief] ”) (quoting *Rent-A-Center*).  Thus, the failure to “lodge a specific challenge to the delegation clause” will “require that the issue of arbitrability be determined by the arbitrator. ”  *Morgan*, 225 N.J. at 311.  Plaintiffs here never challenged the enforceability of the delegation clause—much less did so *specifically*.  Thus, once the trial court found the *existence* of a contract between [...] and [...] containing a delegation clause, it should have held Plaintiffs to their agreement and required Plaintiffs to present their arbitrability challenges to the arbitrator.
[brief] Defendant [...] then approached Plaintiff, squinted his eyes in a caricature of Asian facial features, and asked Plaintiff if he had just returned from Wuhan.  Nineteen (19) firefighters were in attendance and witnessed this conduct.  Among the firefighters in attendance was [...]; a battalion chief who was not merely a coworker to Plaintiff but had rank and authority over him.  Also in attendance were five Lieutenants.  Plaintiff advised his union president, [...], and vice president, [...], between the date of the incident and his next shirt, which was four days after the incident.  (Pa 50, at 74:1-5 and 75:4-13)  During this time, [...] and [...] spoke with [...].
[directive] 1.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하는 범죄를 저지르는 귀하의 행위가 반복적이고 충동적인 행동 양식을 나타내는 특성이 있는지  또 그렇게 판명된 경우, 귀하가 성범죄자 치료를 잘 받을 수 있는지(혜택을 받을지)  또한 이러한 치료에 자발적으로 참여할 의사가 있는지의 여부를 판정하기 위한 목적으로 교정청에서  실시하는 심리검사를 받아야 하는 것을 아십니까?  Do you understand you will be required to submit to a psychological examination by the Department of Corrections the purpose of which is to determine if your conduct in committing the offense was characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior and if it was, whether you are amenable to (will benefit from) sex offender treatment and you are willing to participate in such treatment?
[brief] N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22(a).  The Legislature specifically tasked the Commission with doing so by mandating that it issue discipline in a “uniform” manner when a school board member takes action that may compromise the board.  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22(b); N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e).  Here it was unequivocal from the record before the Commission that Respondent engaged in conduct that created a justifiable impression among the public that the public trust was being violated, and that she did so by taking action which may have – and actually did – compromise the Board.  This was plainly evidenced by news articles stating that she had compromised the Board, by Board minutes which showed that she had compromised the Board, and by two Board Resolutions which directly found that she had compromised the Board.  (Ca075-076, Ca86, Ca098-099, Ca100-105).  As a result [...]’ Initial Decision stated, in the section of her Initial Decision entitled “UNDISPUTED FINDINGS OF FACT”:
[directive] Any such card or permit issued to the respondent shall be immediately revoked pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(f) . of Duration Order.  The final extreme risk protective order shall remain in .(ru. effect until a court issues a further order.  of  If @ Search Warrant. the court determines, based upon consideration all information pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-20 et seq., such as the petition filed pursuant to Guideline information presented during the hearings conducted pursuant to Guideline 2, 3 and Guideline and any other information presented that probable cause exists to 5, Guidelines for Extreme Risk Protective Orders Directive# Promulgated by 19-19 (August 12, 2019)  Page 12 believe that (1) the respondent owns or possesses any firearms or ammunition, (2) the of or or respondent poses a significant danger bodily injury to self others by owning possessing any such firearms or ammunition, and (3) such firearms or ammunition are presently at a specifically described location, then the court, conjunction with the final in extreme risk protective order, shall issue a search warrant for any firearms and or ammunition which the respondent possesses owns at that specified location.
[brief] [The NJCFLA] captures within the definitions of “consumer lender” and “consumer loan business” a wide range of other participants in consumer lending . . . the statutory coverage extends not only to those making or extending loans, but those that solicit such loans, those that assist in the procurement or negotiation of the same and those that purchase or acquire “notes. ”  The purpose of the second sentence of the definition [of consumer loan business] is pellucid—to expand the scope of the statute and its licensure and other requirements well beyond the entities that actually provide the credit ab initio.  Indeed, a contrary interpretation of the term “notes”—for example, an interpretation that would limit the scope of the term to negotiable promissory notes subject to the Uniform Commercial Code — would produce an absurd, and the Court finds, unintended result .  . .  In light of the breadth of the definition as a whole, to hold that the term “notes” does not encompass a debt obligation arising from breach of a credit card agreement would not only limit the scope of “notes” in a manner that is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the term.  Such a conclusion would also frustrate the manifest purpose of the statute to require licensure of, and to impose certain substantive requirements on, all essential participants in the “consumer loan business.
[brief] In Point VI of its appeal brief, the Union complains that [...] did not provide six appendices that belonged in [...]’s award when the award was issued to the parties.  (Ab42)  The Union admits:  “At the time, the parties were unaware of this error. ”  (Ab43)  The appendices were referred to in the Award, but not sought by the Union.  It could have contacted [...] at any time to obtain them, but did not.  The Union vaguely contends that it was prejudiced in pursuing its appeal before [...].  The Union asserts that it disagrees with the calculation.  The Union has possession of the six missing appendices (Aa557), yet fails to assert any specifics, as it must.  Vague assertions may not rule the day.  Moreover, [...] has repeatedly ruled that mathematical exactitude is not required and where it has been shown not to exist does not require a reversal and remand back to the arbitrator, stating/explaining:  Arriving at an economic award is not a precise mathematical process.  The treatment of the parties’ proposals involves judgment and discretion, and an arbitrator will rarely be able to demonstrate that an award is the only “correct” one.  Some of the evidence may be conflicting and an arbitrator’s award is not necessarily flawed because some pieces of evidence, standing alone, might point to a different result.  [In the Matter of [...] and [...] and [...] and [...], [...], 2016 N.J. [...] Lexis 83 (N.J. Admin. Sept. 8, 2016) (citations omitted).  For all of the reasons set forth above, the Union’s appeal regarding this issue must be dismissed.
[brief] 20 State v. Harris, 466 N.J. Super 502 (App. Div. 2021) .................................. 25 State v. Jones, 198 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 1985) .................................. 18, 19 State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190 (2015) .............................................................. 15, 16 State v. Liepe, 239 N.J. 359, 377-78 (2019) ..............................................  16 State v. Lopez, 417 N.J. Super 34 (App. Div. 2010) ...................................  21 State v. Molina, 168 N.J. 436, 442-43 (2001) ..........................................  16 State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985) ..................................................... 4, 8, 13, 23 State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021) .......................................................... 6, 14, 15, 23 State v. Wright, 155 N.J. Super. 549 (App. Div. 1978) ..................................
[directive] Indictment Number: NG RI  Docket Number: Criminal Action Order Revoking Conditional Release Status ofNGRI Acquittee ______  This Matter having been opened to the Court by Assistant Prosecutor , on ________ of of of behalf , Prosecutor - County, in the presence Select County - _______ ________ of on , Esq., appearing behalf and the Court having __ ________ of , dated and considered the report __, of Having Found that the NGRJ acquittee has been noncompliant with clinical conditions --~ of release, and failed to meet the conditions the discharge plan and/ or Court Order dated and of Having Found previously that the acquittee is dangerous to self, others, or property as a result mental illness, and ________ Having Found screening service that the NGRJ acquittee was evaluated at ___ or and the screening service treating psychiatrist having certified that the acquittee on of of poses a substantial risk danger to self, others, or property by reason mental illness and is no longer considered appropriate for treatment in the community, and of Having Found by a preponderance evidence the NORI acquittee currently meets criteria for of inpatient hospitalization due to their dangerousness as a result mental illness, __ of Ordered day - 20 _ that: It is on the Select Month -, of of The conditional release the NGRJ acquittee is revoked and the status the NGRJ 1. acquittee is converted from conditional release under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b )(2) to commitment by Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12562 (KROL Order 7)
[brief] Moreover, "a complaint should not be dismissed under R. 4:6-2(e) where a cause of action is suggested by the facts and the theory of action-ability may be articulated by amendment of the complaint.  *Carfax v.* Payless Auto Wholesale, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3801, *7 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).  Requests for such amendments shall be granted liberally, pursuant to R. 4:9-1.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  In his Complaint, Appellant alleged that he incurred a debt, which was assigned to Respondent for collection.  Appx., at 6a.  On February 4, 2022, Respondent sent Appellant a collection letter which included his name and basic information about the account (i.e., the balance due, account number, and name of the creditor).  *Id.*, at 7a-8a, 25a.  Respondent used a letter vendor to print and send the letter, which required Respondent to transmit to the vendor the above-referenced information.  *Id.*, at 7a-8a.  From these mundane allegations, Appellant asserted that Respondent violated the FDCPA and CFA, and committed the torts of “invasion of privacy” and negligence.  *Id.*, at 12a-17a.  Appellant, however, did not allege that any human being at the letter vendor (or elsewhere) ever viewed his private or account information.  More generally, as the Superior Court noted, Appellant did not allege that Respondent engaged in any disclosure of information which Congress sought to curtail, or that he suffered any past or present tangible harm or ascertainable loss – whether physical, financial, or reputational.  *Id.*, at 35a-36a.  The Superior Court found that Appellant’s allegations and asserted letter vendor theory of liability could not support his claims under the FDCPA, CFA, or common law and dismissed the case on those grounds.  *Id.*, at 33a-40a.  **IV.
[brief] See also Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988).  The standard in establishing a probable cause defense in the context of a false arrest claim is “objective reasonableness. ”  Hayes v. Mercer County, 217 N.J. Super. 614, 622-23 (App. Div. 1987), certif. den. 108 N.J. 643 (1987).  A police officer can defeat a claim by establishing probable cause, or even absent same, if a reasonable officer similarly situated would have believed in its existence.  See Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 386 (2000); Kirk v. City of Newark, 109 N.J. 173, 184 (1988); Malley v.  Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 337 (1986).  Although it eludes precise definition, probable cause “is not a technical concept but rather one having to do with ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life’ upon which reasonable men, not constitutional lawyers, act. ”  State v. Waltz, 61 N.J. 83, 87 (1972)(quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).  Thus, “the common and specialized experience and work-a-day knowledge of police [officers] must be taken into account. ”  State v. Contursi, 44 N.J. 422, 431 (1965).  Moreover, “[a]bstract contemplation will not suffice because the decisions of police officers must be made on the spur of the moment and cannot be viewed fairly from the vantage point of twenty-twenty hindsight. ”  Sanducci v. City of Hoboken, 315 N.J. Super. 475, 481 (1998).  C.  The False Arrest Claim Should be Dismissed because the Underlying Conviction has not been Reversed as Required by Heck v. Humphrey According to U.S.
[directive] 18.  Would your verdict in this case be influenced in any way by any factors other than the evidence in the courtroom such as friendships or family relationships or the type of work you do?  19.  Have you ever been a witness in a civil matter, regardless of whether it went to trial?  20.  Have you ever testified in any court proceeding?  21.  New Jersey law requires that a plaintiff has to prove fault of a defendant before he or she is entitled to recover money damages from that defendant.
[brief] And [...] agreed to accept the car with the vehicle title “as is” (in its existing form, which was still in my mom’s name), and to pay me $400 for the car when I brought that title to them.  So even assuming that the contract with [...] was made on my mother’s behalf, it was clearly made for our benefit.  And as one of my cited authorities clearly held, “third-party beneficiaries may sue upon a contract made for their benefit without privity of contract."  *Rieder Cmty. v. N. Brunswick*, 227 N.J. Super. 214, 221-22 (App. Div.1988).  Another authority held that the threshold to prove a party's standing in New Jersey is "fairly low."  *Reaves v. Egg Harbor Twp.*, 277 N.J.Super. 360, 366, 649 A.2d 904 (Ch.1994).  While yet another authority held that having a "financial interest in the outcome ordinarily is sufficient to confer standing."  *Strulowitz v. Provident Life & Cas. Ins. Co.*, 357 N.J.Super. 454, 459, 815 A.2d 993 (App. Div. 2003).  [emphasis added]  [...] was not able to challenge, let alone refute, any of those authorities.
[brief] Under the February 20, 2015 Lease  1.  The Month to Month Lease Drafted by [...] is Ambiguous as to Whether It Created a Personal Guaranty by [...], [...] and [...] and Therefore the Strict Rules of Construction Against the Finding of a Guaranty Apply.  [...]’s position that there are enforceable personal guaranties against [...] [...] and [...] hinges on the contention that the lease language that is asserted to create the personal guaranties was “clear and unequivocal. ”  Plaintiff Reply Brief at 2.  This assertion is not correct.  Rather, the language is ambiguous and because it is ambiguous the rules of construction that apply to enforcement of guaranties and to construing documents against the drafter, dictate that this Court make a ruling that there was no personal guaranty.
[directive] Recent judicial decisions are also relevant to IAPP.  Section 9.7 authorizes law enforcement agencies to share internal affairs files with civilian review boards under certain conditions.  In its decision earlier this month in [...] v. [...], A-15-19, Slip Op. at 43 n.14 (Aug. 19, 2020), the New Jersey Supreme Court provided further guidance on the authority of civilian review boards under current law.  Although the Court did not specifically discuss Section 9.7, its guidance may prompt additional revisions to IAPP in the future.  Conversations on the subject remain ongoing, reflecting our commitment to promoting transparency, accountability, and professionalism in law enforcement.  Any such revisions will be addressed in a later AG Directive or other document.  The August 2020 IAPP supersedes all prior versions of IAPP and shall become effective on August 31, 2020.
[brief] To address skyrocketing premiums and to address a faulty statutory scheme to date to combat fraud, “ . . . AICRA substantially revised the process for resolving disputed PIP claims and amended the mandatory PIP coverages to provide for treatment in accordance with protocols, or care paths, and for the precertification of certain medical procedures, treatments, tests or other services”.  *Id citing* N.J.S.A.§39:6A-3.1, -4, and -5.1.
[brief] (Ca21).  [...] explained in his certification that he made numerous attempts to contact counsel for the landlord and the owner of the land upon which the diner sits.  However, there was no resolution at the time of his certification in support of the motion since there was no agreement to have a discussion about anything concerning the operation or the land.  (Ca21).  [...] explained in his certification that upon the sale and transfer of the assets under the control of the receiver, it was obvious that the receiver had no duties other than as an employee of the bank’s entity, [...].
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On May 4, 2018, the Township commenced the present condemnation action and deposited the sum of $920,000 with the Clerk of the Superior Court, which represented its estimate of fair market value as of 2018.  Da1.  On June 14, 2018, the Court entered an order that recognized the Township’s entitlement to immediate and exclusive possession of the Shopping Center.  Pa58.  On July 19, 2018, the Court entered a final order declaring that the Township properly exercised its power of eminent domain to acquire the Property and appointed three disinterested commissioners to appraise the Property.  Pa59.  On October 1, 2018, [...] filed their motion to set January 27, 1994 as the valuation date.  Pa62.  On February 20, 2019, the Court entered an Order granting [...]’ motion, over the Township’s opposition, entering an order establishing the date of valuation in this action as January 27, 1994, the date when the Township initially designated the Property as an “area in need of redevelopment”, and ordered the Township to provide a new appraisal and offer to [...] based on that date.  Da102.¹  On July 31, 2019, the Township’s expert [...], MAI ¹  The Parties were provided with [...]’s tentative written opinion prior to the oral argument, but this tentative opinion was apparently never filed by the Court.  The Township cannot locate a clean copy of the tentative opinion in their records.  (McHale”) issued a new written appraisal valuing the Property at $2,260,000 as of January 27, 1994.  Da012.  Because the Property’s anchor tenant, [...], was still in possession of a below-market leasehold for another twenty-five years as of January 27, 1994, McHale factored the lease into his calculation of the market value of the Property.  Ibid.  [...] had vacated the premises as of May 4, 2018, so McHale’s prior valuation did not include same in its analysis.  Ibid.  After a hearing on October 31, 2019 at which McHale provided testimony, the Commissioners agreed with the Township’s updated appraisal based upon the January 27, 1994 valuation date.
[brief] On November 16, 2022, defendants filed their Answer to plaintiffs’ Complaint.  On January 4, 2023, plaintiffs filed their Motion for Summary Judgment.  On March 23, 2023, defendants filed their Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.  On April 11, 2023, both plaintiffs’ Motion and defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment were heard before the Honorable [...], J.S.C.  On April 28, 2023, [...] entered an Order denying both Summary Judgment Motions and setting May 31, 2023 as the date for trial of this matter.
[brief] Defendant’s argument that [...]’s allegation that [...] shot at him and [...] was “clearly sufficient” to raise a reasonable doubt that defendant was the shooter is a bald and unsupported assertion.  The assertion is a strong example of an unsupported claim that courts worry will infect the criminal justice process and, contrary to case law, be used to suggest a prior hostile event and leave its connection with the case to mere conjecture.  Here, there is no evidence in the record that a prior hostile event even occurred.  Instead, the State presented extensive evidence that defendant and co-defendant [...] orchestrated and committed the crime, and thus his argument regarding third-party guilt was correctly prohibited.
[brief] In late September 2017, one of the pieces of proprietary information plaintiffs disclosed to [...] was the fact that the $200,000 annual rent payment which became due for September 1, 2017, was in arrearage.  This disclosure was made in good faith during the “discussions” contemplated by the NDA so indicate that [...] was interested in being acquired but instead of using the disclosure for such “discussion,” [...] schemed to steal the [...] Solar Rights.  FAC ¶ 60, Pa174.  While plaintiffs were so engaged, the [...] and [...] were “negotiating” for Fiberville to “re-sell” its Solar Rights that it had already, previously sold to plaintiffs and confirmed in the Assignments and Bill of Sale.  In the land lease, prepared by [...], the following confidentiality covenant was incorporated to govern the parties’ trade secrets and information in Section 10.9: 10.9.  Confidentiality.  Lessor shall maintain the strictest confidence (a) the terms of (including the amounts payable under) this Agreement; (b) any information regarding Lessee’s operations; and (c) any other information that is proprietary or that Lessee requests be held confidential, in each such case whether disclosed by Lessee or discovered by Lessor (“Lessee Confidential Information”).  . . .  Lessor shall not use any Lessee Confidential Information for its own benefit or publish or otherwise disclose it to others; provided, however, that Lessor may disclose Lessee Confidential Information to (I) Lessor’s personal advisors, (ii) any prospective purchase of the Property, (iii) in any legal proceeding to enforce Lessor’s rights under this Agreement, or (iv) pursuant to lawful process, subpoena or court order; so long as in making such disclosure Lessor advises the person receiving the Lessee Confidential Information of the confidentiality thereof and obtains the agreement of said person not to disclose such Confidential Information.  . . .  The parties shall consult each other and use all reasonable efforts to agree on the content and manner of any public disclosure.  [Emphasis added.]  Pa5-6.