[brief] (e)  [...] WAS INEFFECTIVE BY FAILING TO HAVE THE COURT ISSUE A CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION AS TO DETECTIVE  FRANK TODD'S TESTIMONY  [...] argues detective Frank Todd's repeated testimony that the first suspect whom exited the black Buick on January 12th, 2012, had gotten on the phone with the defendant, (9T 162-8 to 10; 173-22 to 25; 189-5 to 6; 13 to 15) was unduly prejudicial and gave the jury the impression that he had personal knowledge that defendant and one of the suspects were on the phone with each other prior to and during the robbery.  His testimony was speculative because there was no evidence offered of him possessing any personal knowledge of defendant's and/or [...]'s phone number, call records or cell tower pings at the time of his observations, he testified that he had no prior knowledge of suspects being on the phone while committing a robbery, (9T 174-1 to 13) he also testified that he was across the street with his windows rolled up and couldn't hear any of the suspects conversations.  (9T 190-1 to 9)  Detective Todd gave an inappropriate lay opinion because he lacked personal knowledge of what the phone records revealed, in violation of N.J.R.E. 404 (b).  "Lay witnesses are permitted to describe "what [they] did and saw, "but not about what they believe, thought or suspected."  State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 460 (2011).  The Court has cautioned that "if the lay opinion is a police officer, courts should exercise discretion to prevent the jurors from unduly relying on the views of that law enforcement official.  "State v. Gerena, 465 N.J. Super 548, 568 (App. Div. 2021)."  The lay witness should not cross into the realm of an expert opinion that entails... specialized knowledge.  "Ibid.  A witness testifying about his belief as to what happen "strongly suggests" that the witness is providing an expert opinion subjected to N.J.R.E. 702.  McLean, 205 N.J. at 462.  [...]'s testimony on this issue was highly improper.  His opinion that he knew defendant and one of the suspects were on the phone with each other exceeded the bounds of an appropriate lay opinion, see McLean, 205 N.J. at 460, and his insinuations that the first guy whom got out the car, paused and looked back to make sure they were on the phone together was speculative.  (9T 174-11 to 14)  When considered in combination with detective Frank Todd's lack of knowledge of the T-Mobile call detail records at the time of his observations, detective Frank Todd's comments that he could "tell it was a black male on the phone with the first guy that got out the car, (9T 174-5 to 6; 162-8 to 10; 173-22 to 25; 189-5 to 6; 13 to 15) suggested that he knew defendant was on the phone with one of the suspects and that he had personal knowledge of the call details records prior to obtaining any warrants for the phones, clearly implied that defendant was on the phone with one of the suspects and likely committed the robbery.  Ms. Marshall's failure to ask the court to issue a cautionary instruction constitutes a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to the Strickland's two-prong test and/or the Cronic/Davis per se analyses.  This matter should be remanded to the court for a new trial.