ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As correctly pointed out by the motion court, the agreements made here took place in a commercial setting with commercial parties.  (1T47:8-13).  Unlike the *Atalese* plaintiff, the parties in this case were experienced in commercial transactions, and the language of the arbitration provision in the 2012 MOU was sufficiently clear to signal to them that they were waiving their judicial rights.  Accordingly, the motion court’s rejection of *Atalese* in this context was correct.  (1T47:8-18; 1T13:24-2).  Thus, not only does an arbitration agreement exist within the 2012 MOU, these commercial parties had an understanding of the terms to which they agreed.  The parties’ intent to engage in this rescue plan and arbitrate any claims arising out of it began with the MOU, and continued with each and every agreement that was made after it.  (1T49:5-9).  Therefore, the motion court’s ruling was correct and should be affirmed.
[brief] Id. at 64.  The suspect need not make an “‘explicit statement’” indicating a willingness to reinitiate conversation; rather, “‘[a]ny clear manifestation of a desire to waive is sufficient,’ and . . . we look for a ‘showing of knowing intent. ’”  A.M., 237 N.J. at 397 (citation omitted).  Each time defendant mentioned a lawyer at booking, the detectives either stopped talking or attempted to clarify his request, but he continued to volunteer statements.  First, defendant stated that he had “a lawyer coming. ” [...] replied, “[t]hat’s fine. ”
[brief] [...], vs. [...], DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action On Appeal From: Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division  Mercer County Docket No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. REPLY  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT [...]  [...], Esq. (Attorney Id.  No. 036902003)  [...]  [...], [...]  Main: [...]  Direct: [...]  Fax: [...]  Email: [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff Ahmet Derya
[brief] [...] testified that he initially estimated that he was about 200 feet from the intersection when the traffic light controlling traffic on Route 54 changed from green to yellow.  3T:147-1 to 7.  He estimated his speed to be about 60 miles per hour.  3T:147-8 to 10.  [...] denied that he increased his speed as he approached the intersection and after the light turned yellow.  3T:150-15 to 21.  [...] also testified that he attempted to avoid the impact with the [...] vehicle by turning to his left.  3T:157-16 to 24; 3T:162-12 to 18.  It cannot simultaneously be true that, when the light turned yellow, Plaintiff was “very close” to the intersection traveling 55 miles per hour southbound but did not even reach the intersection, and that [...] traveled 200 feet going 60 miles per hour northbound and made it all the way through the intersection — unless Plaintiff’s “very close” proximity to the intersection was roughly equal to [...]’s.  In assigning her 0% fault, the jury obviously accepted that Plaintiff (and, necessarily, [...]) had a yellow light.  Therefore, since the jury concluded that Plaintiff bore no fault — and [...] got further through the intersection than Plaintiff — the jury could not have logically concluded that [...] bore any fault.  Additionally, [...]’s testimony about the accident was directly contradicted by both Plaintiff’s and [...]’s accounts and was clearly rejected by the jury.  [...] testified that he was stopped at the red light on Jackson Road and he observed the Plaintiff’s vehicle slowing down as she approached the intersection.  3T:123-3 to 21.  He claimed that the light turned green for traffic on Jackson Road and he then proceeded into the intersection.  3T:123-19 to 24.  He also testified that he never saw the [...] vehicle before the impact.  3T:115-5 to 7.  He claims he saw some vehicles in the distance south of the intersection and that he proceeded to enter the intersection once the light changed to green.  3T:114-19 to 25.  This testimony is directly contrary to Plaintiff’s account and was clearly rejected by the jury in light of allocating 0% fault to plaintiff and 60% to [...].
[brief] POINT I ALL EVIDENCE, BOTH PHYSICAL AND VERBAL, SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED AS IT WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF MR. RODRIGUEZ’S RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS, AND NEW JERSEY’S BROADER FIFTH AMENDMENT ANALOGUE (Da6 – Da43).  .........................................................................................................................14  A.  The motion court erred in failing to suppress the evidence obtained from the illegal stop and search of the vehicle being operated by [...] in the State of Illinois.........................................................................................................................14  B.  The police failed to seek or obtain an anticipatory search warrant for the “controlled delivery” in New Jersey of the marijuana seized in Illinois...........24  C.  The trial judge, who found that the police had violated [...]’s Miranda rights at the time of his arrest, erred in failing to consider and apply the “fruit of the poisonous doctrine” in her denial of [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration by failing to suppress all evidence derived from the evidential taint of that violation.  .........................................................................................................................30  POINT II
[brief] This court rule applies to the appellant, which in this case is me.  The court rule is literally called “Contents of Appellants brief”.  I listed the relevant court rule subsections here.  **2:6-2-Contents of Appellant’s Brief**  2:6-2(a)  *Formal Brief.*  Except as otherwise provided by R. 2:6-4(c)(1) (statement in lieu of brief), by R. 2:9-11 (sentencing appeals), and by paragraph (b) of this rule, the brief of the appellant shall contain the following material, under distinctive titles, arranged in the following order:  2:6-2(b)  Letter Brief.  In lieu of filing a formal brief in accordance with paragraph (a) of this rule and except as otherwise provided by R. 2:9-11 (sentencing appeals), the appellant may file a letter brief.  Letter briefs shall not exceed 20 pages and shall conform with the requirements of subparagraphs (1), (2), (4), (5) and (6) of paragraph (a).  As to any point not presented below a statement to that effect shall be included in parenthesis in the point heading.  No cover need be annexed provided that the information required by R. 2:6-6 is included in the heading of the letter.  The court rule the prosecutor wanted to cite is Court rule 2:6-4.  This court rule is literally called “Contents of Respondent's Brief; Statement in Lieu of Brief; Responsibility to File. ”  But here is where the irony comes into play.
[brief] Plaintiff, [...], suffered from Meniere’s disease for many years prior to the incident involving Defendant, [...], that occurred in the course of his duties as a police officer on July 29, 2013.  Plaintiff’s claim that he struck his head during the altercation and that the head injury caused an aggravation of his pre-existing Meniere’s disease, ultimately resulting in surgical removal of the inner ear mechanism and total hearing loss in his right ear was the central contention in this case.
[brief] (Ra4-Ra48.)  The RR Zone incorporates the terms set forth in the YB Settlement Agreement by reference, and both the RR Zone and the YB Settlement Agreement include elevations, renderings, and floor plans for the proposed Market Development.  (Pa50-Pa54; Ra49-Ra93; Ra94-Ra175.)  The elevations, renderings, and floor plans of the residential townhomes and carriage homes that were exhibits to the approved YB Settlement Agreement and RR Ordinance are practically identical to the plans presented to the Board by [...] in connection with the Project, including with respect to height.  (Ra176-Ra184; Ra185-Ra195; Ra196-Ra206.)  There has been no increase in the height of dwellings in the architectural plans since the conception of the Project; the architectural plans for the townhouses and the carriage houses that are in the RR Zone Ordinance and that were presented to the Board are the same.  On or about February 3, 2021, [...] filed an application with the Board requesting preliminary and final major site plan approval to construct the Project, in substantial compliance with the approved Market Concept Plans attached to the YB Settlement Agreement and RR Zone.
[brief] (Pa7).  In carefully considering the parties’ positions, the Trial Court properly summarized (and considered) Respondent’s argument – that Appellant [...] “is barred from bringing this action since he filed the instant complaint nearly two years after the September 13, 2021 deadline. ” (Pa7).  The Trial Court also properly summarized (and considered) Appellants’ argument – that “since the Consent Order dismissed the claims ‘without prejudice,’ ‘nothing in the Consent Order bars the parties from asserting claims after the date identified in the Consent Order. ’” (Pa8 (citing Appellants’ opposition brief below at p. 1).  The Trial Court also acknowledged Appellant’s position “that the sixty-day deadline related only to the statute of limitations tolling. ” (Pa8).  The Trial Court carefully considered each of Appellants’ arguments and properly rejected them in concluding that Appellants were required to file the Complaint within sixty days of the Nacirema Award:  “[Appellants’] argument is unpersuasive.  If taken as true, any deadline would have no meaning.  The Consent Order is clear that the sixty-day deadline applied to both the tolling of the statute of limitations and to the opportunity to re-file ‘any of the affirmative claims, counterclaims, and/or third party claims. ’”
[brief] O'Shea v. Township of West Milford, 410 N.J.Super. 371 (App. Div. 2009) . . . . . . . . .  34  Quaglietta v. Haledon, 182 N.J.Super. 136 (Law Div. 1981).  . . . . . . . .  36  Ruroede v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 214 N.J. 338 (2013).  . . . . . . . . . . 31, 32, 38 Sabia v. City of Elizabeth, 132 N.J.Super. 6 (App. Div. 1975).  . . . . . . . . .  36  Spagnuolo v. Bonnet, 16 N.J. 546 (1954)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43  State ex rel Oarmout v. Calvallo, 340 N.J.Super. 365 (App. Div. 2001).  . . . .  31  State v. Baumann, 340 N.J.Super. 553 (App. Div. 2001)  . . . . . . . . . . .  31  State v. Lewis, 67 N.J. 47 (1975).  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42  State. v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156 (1999).  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40  West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962).  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45  New Jersey Statutes  Annotated N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29, 32 N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2, 29, 30 N.J.S.A. 40A:14-151 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29 N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] At no time prior to Aug 11, 2022 (i.e. just one day before trial), was the name on the title (or being an estate executor) ever an issue.  But then all of the sudden on Aug 11, 2022, [...]’ legal position then became that I have no rights to the vehicle, (nor to benefit from the sale of it, in part or in whole), without being an official estate executor or administrator.
[brief] As a matter of substance, it was clear that the arbitration agreement would only serve Defendant [...] at his patients’ expense, and the Trial Court took issue with its unfair and rogue terms (Da090-91).  In sum, the Court’s decision was expressed in a factual, reasonable, and sound manner and in consideration of all of the facts.  Defense counsel admitted that no new facts were brought to bear as a part of his motion for reconsideration and instead simply disagreed with the result.  Meanwhile, justice clearly demands that this case be heard in court, rather than in arbitration, given the unconscionable facts and circumstances surrounding the Arbitration Agreement.  As stated above, up until the end of suit, the Trial Court was able to revise its interlocutory orders.  Determining the validity of an arbitration agreement is the purview of the trial court, not the arbitration panel.  The Trial Court’s order to stay litigation was an interlocutory order, as it had left Plaintiff/Respondent’s wrongful death claim open to litigation, which was the subject of Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint.  As per this issue, the Trial Court determined that the stay order and decision had lacked analysis of the jurisdictional discovery which it had ordered, nor did it evince an application of the law to same (Da092).  “Without such an analysis, this court was left to determine the issue based upon the facts and law presented in the application. ” (Da092).  Ultimately, it should be clear that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion.  However, if this Court should be inclined to review this appeal *de novo*, then the Trial Court’s decision or discretion is of no moment, as it would be given no deference.
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[brief] (8T134-12 to 22).  He said he dropped off the gift and left.  (8T144-21 to 22).  When [...] told defendant that police had spoken to defendant’s father, defendant admitted that [...] had driven him to the trailer park, and that his brother [...] was also with them.  (8T142-4 to 143-13).  Defendant told [...] that he took the gift to the [...]’ trailer, the family told him [...] was not there, and her uncle called him crazy.  (8T144-9 to 145-12).  According to defendant, as he was walking away down the street, a black car pulled up and someone in the car talked to [...] then started shooting, so defendant ran.  (8T147-8 to 19).  Defendant claimed he borrowed a phone from someone on the street to call [...] to pick him up after the shooting, but he also told [...] that he did not know [...]’s phone number.  (8T150-1 to 2; 8T151-5 to 9).  Eventually, defendant admitted that he and [...] argued.
[brief] The [...] has made clear that “[a]n examiner shall not assert that a source identification is the conclusion that two impressions were made by the same source or imply an individualization to the exclusion of all other sources. ”  [...], Proposed Standard for Friction Ridge Examination Conclusions 3 (2018) (Da 171-177). ¹  [...] went further, recommending that opinions regarding source attribution by examiners should be given in conjunction with information on the limitations of latent print analysis.
[brief] The parties to the Declaratory Action have always taken the position that to conserve resources, including judicial resources, the trial of the Underlying Action should proceed first as it may impact the Declaratory Action.  For instance, [...] \(^3\)  It should be noted that even officials from [...] stated that its relationship with [...] was not determined by [...]’s letters to St. Mary.  (See Da242 at 18:3-23; Da246 at 34:24 to 35:3.)  It is thus unclear what “right” [...] is asserting was violated in the Underlying Action which would have purportedly been violated by any of [...]’s conduct.  Indeed, reporting misconduct was an expected function of medical professionals at [...].  (See Da245 at 31:10-20.) is fully confident that a jury in the Underlying Action will find that he did not commit tortious interference and, such a finding, would terminate the Declaratory Action.  Where a fact finder in the underlying action can, but has not, made findings that would so impact a declaratory action, summary judgment is inappropriate.
[brief] The Probate Court’s disturbance of the unambiguous language of the document without any basis at all was error.  C.  The Probate Court modified the Trust without clear and convincing evidence (or any evidence) of [...]’s probable intent.  Notwithstanding the lack of any ambiguity or evidence of contrary intent, the Probate Court modified the Trust.  It did not interpret or give meaning to specific language or phrases.  Rather, it drafted an exclusion into the Residuary Clause, based on the Probate Court’s belief that the Residuary Clause failed to capture of [...]’s unexpressed intention to exclude the Palm Beach Property from the residue of the Trust.  This is a modification and requires a showing of [...]’s probable intent by clear and convincing evidence.
[brief] This obligation is satisfied where the landlord makes reasonable efforts to re-let the property.  *Fanarjian*, 237 N.J. Super. at 402; *Harrison Riverside*, 309 N.J. Super. at 472-475; *McGuire v. City of Jersey City*, 125 N.J. 310, 320 (1991).  In recognition of this well-settled tenet of New Jersey landlord-tenant law, the Lease expressly provides that upon retaking possession of the Premises “Landlord shall use reasonable efforts to mitigate damages and relet the Premises, but Landlord shall not be liable for failure to relet the Premises. ” (Da52, Lease at § 17.01).  As detailed above, the Underling Action is a summary disposition proceeding, pursuant to which Landlord sought only possession of the Premises (Da88-101).  Indeed, as discussed more fully below, Landlord was precluded from seeking money damages in the Underlying Action, which proceeded before the Landlord-Tenant Division.
[brief] Appellant was not subject to bypass, as the Respondent [...] marked on the completed Certification, and there was no proper relevance or reason for the ¹¹ Included in the Civil Service Commission Items Comprising the Record.  Respondent Commission’s DARA to request the appointing authority to submit the reasons why the non-veteran [...] was appointed instead of the disabled veteran Appellant.  Pursuant to the preference granted to veterans, Appellant deserved to be evaluated on her own merit.  The comparison to the non-veteran [...] was both inappropriate and prejudicial.  The [...]’s failure to request the removal of Appellant’s name when it returned the completed Certification required her appointment to the position by operation of N.J.A.C. 4A:5-2.2(c).
[brief] A  Again, that would be -- I would have to talk to the accountant.  Q  Okay.  If I were to tell you that if we were to go through the years 2012, '13, '14, '15, '16 and '17, it would be the same; would that surprise you?  A  Yeah.  Of course.  Q  Would you like to go through each one?  A  No.  I would, again, refer to the accountant.  Q  Right.  But you're the plaintiff in this case.
[brief] About eighteen months later, [...] learned that defendant, who was still- suspended, had identified himself as a member of [...] to a local police officer who stopped defendant for a traffic moving violation.  [...] investigated further and discovered multiple instances in which defendant avoided potential traffic tickets.  [...] obtained videos of some of these encounters, and saw from them that on two separate occasions, defendant displayed what looked like the wallet ID that he had reported as stolen in January 2016.  Defendant was indicted, and the Superseding Indictment on which he was tried included three counts related to the allegedly unlawful calibrations, while the remaining three counts concerned his post-suspension avoidance of traffic tickets.
[brief] While not resolving the question of law of whether the adjective “routine” modifies the term “upgrade” in the statutory and regulatory language of Exemption #11, the Appellate Division in *Highlands Applicability* --- 5 N.J.S.A. § 13:20-28(11)  6 N.J.A.C. 7:38-2.3(a)11 did outline what type of project would qualify as a “routine upgrade” (described below under “Legal Argument”).  On August 28, 2020, [...] (“[...]”) submitted to the [...] (“[...]”) its Highland Applicability Determination – Highlands Exemption Request regarding its East 300 Upgrade Project (“HAD Request”).  Aa0026.  [...] asserted that “the portion of its Project within the [Highlands] Preservation Area” – the construction, operation, and maintenance of a new compressor station (“Compressor Station 327”) and appurtenant structures – “qualifies for Exemption #11 and is therefore exempt from the Highlands Act. ”  Aa0052.  In its HAD Request, [...] made no mention of the 2013 Appellate Division case, Highlands Applicability (though it later made a brief reference in its own response to public comments, Aa1329), and did not attempt to justify the construction, operation, and maintenance of new Compressor Station 327 as a “routine upgrade” and therefore qualified for Exemption #11.  Instead, [...] asserted that “the construction, operation, and maintenance of [new Compressor Station] 327 is an ‘upgrade’ to [[...]’s] existing 300 Line gas pipeline system. ”  Aa0052.  (emphasis added).  In doing so, [...] cited as precedent two prior [...] Highlands Applicability Determinations – from 2010 and 2012 – that preceded the 2013 Appellate Division case, Highlands Applicability.
[brief] Repeatedly grimacing in pain in front of potential jurors and stretching as if in pain while standing next to a juror ultimately chosen to hear the case have such a clear capacity to improperly influence decisions made in the jury room that if the trial court had accepted the adjuster’s certification as an accurate description of Plaintiff’s behavior, it would have been duty bound to assume prejudice to the defense and order a new trial.  Unfortunately, despite the absence of any statement from Plaintiff or any Sheriff’s officer contradicting the adjuster’s descriptions of either the officers’ location during voir dire or Plaintiff’s behavior, the Court rejected it out of hand based upon its belief that there were two Sheriff’s Officers in the courtroom at all times and neither reported the behavior described by the adjuster.  Id., 26:17 to 27:9.  Thus, without anything in the record to support its conclusion that the adjuster’s certification was “not exactly correct,” the trial court rejected the only first-hand account of the Plaintiff’s behavior it had.  In doing so, it also relied upon the absence of any objection at trial based upon the adjuster’s observations and the lack of any report from Court personnel indicating that Plaintiff was “attempting to influence these jurors. ”  Id., at 27:10 to 28:4.  In each instance, such reliance was misplaced.  In support of the defense’s motion for reconsideration, Defendants’ trial counsel submitted a certification in which he certified that the information contained in the insurance adjuster’s certification was not known to him until after the motion for new trial was decided.