ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In its written memorandum, the Trial Court acknowledged that it based its June 8, 2021 decision on there being a settlement of the First Police Matter on June 7, 2017.  (745a).  However, ratification of the agreement took place on December 14, 2017.  Ibid.  Further, the Trial Court denied Defendants' motion for reconsideration without prejudice.  (630a).  Following motion practice, the parties engaged in discovery, including responding to document demands, interrogatories, and admissions.  (769a-863a); (872a-986a).  On February 23, 2022, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. entered a case management order outlining due dates for various aspects of discovery.  (649a).  [...] entered additional case management orders extending the discovery end date on April 28, 2023 (652a), October 5, 2023 (655a), and October 5, 2023 (655a).  Since the case moved into discovery, the parties have exchanged thousands of pages of written discovery.
[directive] Division on Civil Rights Branch Offices  [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  Page 14 of 16  [...] [...]  [...] [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  1325 Boardwalk, 1st floor Tennessee Ave & Boardwalk  Atlantic City, NJ 08401  Additional information about the Division on Civil Rights is available at www.njcivilrights.gov.
[brief] And that record showed that, as the court itself put it, the search terms would identify “a lot of irrelevant documents. ”  T20-21.  As a result, it is beside the point whether the parties attempted to negotiate search terms that were “well-defined. ”  Pb2.  What matters is that the agreed-upon terms will indisputably require production of thousands of irrelevant documents.  Pb22.  Because Rule 4:10-2(a) does not permit discovery of irrelevant documents, it is of no moment when the trial court announced its intention to order discovery contravening that rule.  The important point is that it did so, and Plaintiffs cannot defend that legally flawed Order.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  APPELLANTS’ Complaint was filed on June 22, 2023 (P1).  [...] filed an Answer on July 12, 2023 (P42) and RESPONDENTS filed their Answer on July 28, 2023.  (P15).  Thereafter, on September 29, 2023, RESPONDENTS filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e).  (P8-P35).  On October 13, 2023, [...] filed a similar Motion to Dismiss.  (P36-P58).  Both Motions were opposed by APPELLANTS and oral argument was conducted before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on November 17, 2023 (T1)  An Order dismissing APPELLANTS’ Complaint with prejudice as to RESPONDENTS was entered on November 22, 2023 (P59-P60).  The present appeal follows.
[brief] Even the trial court recognized that a request for “all emails” sent to or from the Provost “does not contain a subject. ” (Da53).  But its justification of this lapse by reference to the short time period in question and identification of the Provost as the sender or recipient is misplaced.  Ibid.  By deeming [...]’s request proper, the trial court opinion upholds a request directly at odds with the circuitous approach this court struck down in MAG—and has continued to strike down since—which is to allow requestors to circumvent the identification of a record with “reasonable clarity” by requesting “all of an agency’s documents” instead.  Burke, 429 N.J. Super. at 174, 177.  Through this lens, a request for all emails sent or received during any time period by a particular person is no different—and is in fact worse—than a request for all records in a particular drawer in a filing cabinet or for an agency’s entire project file, the latter of which this court has clearly rejected as improper.
[brief] Similarly, “legal conclusions draped in the guise of factual allegations do not benefit from the presumption of truthfulness. ”  Jones v. Intelli-Check, Inc., 274 F. Supp.2d 615, 625 (D.N.J. 2003).  Here, plaintiff filed a complaint that, with respect to [...], was based entirely on a legal conclusion – that his condo owners insurance policy entitled him to defense and indemnification for a lawsuit against him.
[brief] .............................  ICAa  62  Allstate v. Lajara Final Order of Judgement Against [...], et al.  .......................................  ICAa 063  Allstate v. Lajara Final Order of Judgement Against [...], et al. .........................  ICAa 064  Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Garzon-Cardenas, et al., Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, Docket No. [...] (Dec’d July 15, 2005).  ......  ICAa 065 | Authority | Page(s) | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Allstate v. Lajara, 433 N.J. Super 20, 29 (App. Div. 2013) | 17, 18 | | Allstate v. Lajara, 222 N.J. 129, 134-135 (2015) | 18, 19 | | Amiano v. The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, 85 N.J. 85, 90 (1981) | 3 | | Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 553 (2009) | 9 | | Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 182 N.J. 64, 75 (2004) | 10 | | Cohen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 231 N.J. Super. 97, 101 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 117 N.J. 87 (1989) | 27 | | Daidone v. Buterick Bulkheading, 191 N.J. 557, 565 (2007) | 9 | | D'Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 192 N.J. 110, 119 (2007) | 9 | | Gabin v. Skyline Cabana Club, 54 N.J. 550, 555, 258 A.2d 6 (1969) | 12 | | Gambino v. Royal Globe Insurance Companies, 86 N.J. 100, 105-106 (1981) | 2, 3, 17| | Goff v. Hunt, 6 N.J. 600, 606 (1951) | 13 | | Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269-270 (1970) | 27 | | Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-497 (1959) | 26 | | Grover v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 80 N.J. 221, 228 (1979) | 27 | Hartman v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 127 N.J.L. 170, 21 A.2d 351 (Sup.Ct.1941) .................. 13 Hubbard ex rel. Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392-93 (2001)
[brief] 1T28-30.  THE COURT:  …it is -- it does not fall on deaf ears that there are some statutory requirements in this regard, but the point is this is an entity without assets…  [...] has filed the paperwork.  The bank has filed the paperwork.  He filed it with the court.  Formalities to follow the statute would have to be paid by someone.  There is no money left to do it.  It becomes an impossibility.  The court is not paying for it.  [...] is not obligated to pay for it.  The bank is not obligated to pay for it.  If the creditors want it and the creditors want to hire somebody -- they certainly don’t.  Otherwise, I would have entertained it happening.  So the motion is denied and I am discharging [...] as the receiver.
[brief] Notwithstanding [...]’s repetitive and conclusory statements to the contrary, and as demonstrated in greater detail above, the plain language of both the Holding Company Act and SSAP No. 25 leaves no doubt that they both apply to reciprocal exchanges and their attorneys-in-fact.  That is “clearly inferable” from the Holding Company Act and SSAP No. 25.  Furthermore, the Bulletin does not change past agency practice.  The Holding Company Act and SSAP No. 25 have both been “previously expressed in [an] official and explicit agency determination, adjudication or rule,” and do not “constitute[] a material and significant change from a clear, past agency position on the identical subject matter”  Metromedia, 97 N.J. at 331-32.  The Bulletin’s failure to satisfy those Metromedia factors means that it is not a de facto rule, and the Department appropriately issued the Bulletin to remind reciprocal exchanges that they are required to follow the Holding Company Act and SSAP No. 25.  The Bulletin should be upheld.
[directive] This factor, which is worth -2 points, is patterned after the mitigating circumstance defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(13).  For this factor to apply, the prosecutor must be aware of the specific identity of the more culpable co-defendant(s).  (Note that those persons would be subject to Aggravating Factor #4d.)  As with Mitigating Factor #2a, this factor is intended to apply to defendants who are plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group, and the defendant’s lack of knowledge or understanding of the scope and structure of the criminal enterprise and the activities of others is highly relevant.  10.2.3  Voluntary Renunciation (Mitigating Factor #3)
[brief] The Trial continued on February 3, 2020 with the School's Traffic Engineer, [...] (out of turn).  He testified that any parking in the Sixth Street Courtyard is inconsistent with and not valid under the 1972 School Site Plan.  (Da934)  The Sixth Street curb line in that 1972 Plan has no curb cut for vehicle access shown.  On his site visit in 2013, he observed that a portion of the curb in front of Lot 8 had been chiseled out to form an informal curb cut.  The Sixth Street courtyard has no fire lanes or parking lines and is unsafe and unsuitable for parking next to a school.  (9T3-20 to 34-15).  On cross-examination, Litwornia opined that the Sixth Street courtyard was not a legal parking area because the 1972 Site Plan (Da934) showed a walkway through it, no fire lanes, and no approved parking spaces or plan.  (9T34-19 to 80-3)  Cross-examination continued on February 4, 2020.  Litwornia reiterated that the 1972 School Site Plan showed no parking in the Sixth Street courtyard and no curb cut.  Litwornia discussed the processes for Site Plan approvals and curb cuts (10T3-15 to 54-17).  In his opinion, the absence of any evidence of a Board approval for the 1963 synagogue raises legal issues as to its validity (10T54-19 to 67-1).  On February 5, 2020, Planner [...] appeared as the School's witness (out-of-turn).
[brief] *Gill*, 11 N.J. Super. at 15.  The Trial Court’s ruling delegates this duty directly to the plaintiff by making her fully responsible for the dangerous condition of the means of ingress and egress resulting from the raised feet of the barricades erected at the entrance of the store.  The ruling essentially provides that the owner/operator of a commercial establishment does not have to take any steps to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition when an invitee notices a condition of the premises at an earlier time or is generally aware of the condition of the property.
[brief] FINAL AGENCY DECISION.................................................................1a  PROJECTED 2023-24 STATE SCHOOL AID...........................................22a  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Hon. [...], ALJ, order granting [...]’s motion to participate, March 11, 2015.  ALJ Kennedy’s order denying Respondent’s motion to dismiss, July 24, 2015.  Hon. [...], ALJ, order denying Petitioners’ motion for summary decision, July 19, 2016.  ALJ Metzger’s order granting [...]’s motion to participate, October 4, 2016.  Hon. [...], ALJ, order denying Respondents’ motion to adjourn; denying [...]’s motion for summary judgment; and denying Respondents’ motion to bar Petitioners’ expert witnesses, January 22, 2018.  ALJ Scarola’s order granting Petitioners’ motion to reopen the record; denying the BOE’s second motion to intervene; ordering Petitioners to file an amended petition and ordering Respondents to file an answer, August 20, 2018.  ALJ Scarola’s order denying [...] third motion to intervene, October 9, 2018.  ALJ Scarola’s order denying Respondents’ second motion to dismiss, January 8, 2019.  ALJ Scarola’s order asking the parties to stipulate to matters in the public record, July 29, 2019.  Initial Decision, Administrative Law Judge, March 1, 2021.  Final Decision, Commissioner of Education, July 16, 2021.  Appellate Division Decision reversing the Final Decision and remanding to the Commissioner of Education “with instructions for the agency to consider the substantive arguments pertaining to the SFRA,” March 6, 2023.  Appellate Division Decision granting Petitioners' Motion in Aid of Litigants' Rights and ordering Final Decision ontheremand by April1,2024, November 27, 2023.  Final Decision, Commissioner of Education, April 1, 2024.
[brief] ”).  A.  Because the purposeful nature of conspiracy refers to the agreement, not to the underlying offense, the trial court’s jury instruction complied with prevailing law.  Defendant’s contention that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on the mens rea for conspiracy fails.  Other than factual tailoring, the court read verbatim Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Conspiracy (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2),” to the jury, which is presumptively valid.  See R.B., 183 N.J. at 325.  There was nevertheless no risk for jury confusion because the judge made clear that conspiracy required a purpose to further an aggravated assault and that the inchoate crime of conspiracy is separate and distinct from the substantive crime of aggravated assault.  There is no plain error in such an instruction.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court in Crowe stated that “temporary relief should not be withheld when the legal right underlying plaintiff’s claim is unsettled [emphasis added]. ”  Crowe, supra, at 133 (internal citation omitted).  Accordingly, the Court was required to conduct an analysis regarding the specific facts claimed by Plaintiffs, rather than to mechanically find that they have satisfied this requirement simply because of a law which permits the State to request injunctive relief.
[brief] *Id.* at 475.  Regarding the issue of whether the arbitrator’s decision was “reasonably debatable,” the Court explained:  [T]he arbitrator’s award should have been consonant with the subject matter submitted, *i.e.*, the arbitrator should have simply decided whether or not [...] had “sent” [the officer] to a township doctor.  Instead, he made a determination contrary to the authority vested in him when he awarded overtime compensation for off-duty visits to doctors made by [the officer] on his own volition.  *As the arbitration award failed to draw its essence from the collective negotiations of the parties, and because the arbitrator exceeded the authority granted him in the contract and was not free to disregard the contractual obligation that [the officer] be “sent” to a township doctor, we are constrained to vacate the arbitration award.*
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing [...]’s Complaint.  First, he has failed to present any genuine issues of material fact capable of supporting a *prima facie* case of CEPA retaliation.  Second, even if he could, Defendants have proffered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for their termination: [...]’s theft of hospital funds.  And, even providing [...] with all reasonable inferences of fact, he cannot point to any disputed facts capable of supporting a finding of pretext.  Finally, even if this Court disagrees with all of the above, there is no evidence that [...] and [...], individually, retaliated against [...].  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents  Dated: December 6, 2024  /s/  [...]  [...]  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], and [...], [...], and JOHN AND/OR JANE DOES 1-20 (Names Being Fictitious), in their individual and corporate capacities, and as aiders and abettors, Defendants-Respondents.
[directive] Bail Schedule 2 STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  (2)  Actor drives a vehicle or vessel while in violation of R.S. 39:4-50 (DWI) or 10% permissible 3rd Degree $5,000 to $15,000  2C:12-1c(1)(2)(3)  Aggravated Assault  R.S. 39:4-50.4a (Refusal to Submit to Breath Sample); third degree if serious bodily (continued) by Auto or Vessel injury results; fourth degree if bodily injury results.  (continued)  (3)  Actor drives a vehicle or vessel in violation of R.S. 39:4-50 (DWI) or R.S. 39:4- 50.4a (Refusal to Submit to Breath Sample) and serious bodily injury results while on or 10% permissible within 1000 feet of school property or while driving through school crossing or while 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 driving through non-designated school crossing, and knowing that juveniles are present; second degree if serious bodily injury results; third degree if bodily injury results.  Aggravated Assault 2C:12-1c(4) by Auto or Vessel  Actor purposely drives a vehicle in an aggressive manner directed at another vehicle; third 3rd Degree $15,000 to $35,000 10% permissible degree if serious bodily injury results; fourth degree if bodily injury results.  21  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] The trial court also correctly held that “no fundamental policy of New Jersey is contravened by applying New York law to the substantive claims”.  (Pa5.)  In arguing that the trial court erred, Appellants exaggerate any differences between the MBPA and the ABC Law.  --- \(^8\)  Appellants’ cited cases do not involve the alcoholic beverage industry and are distinguishable.  In *Networld Communications Corp. v. Croatia Airlines, D.D.*, No. 13-4770 (SDW), 2014 WL 4662223, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2014) (Pa254-58), an agreement contained a Croatia choice-of-law provision, but the contract was executed in New Jersey (here, the Wholesaler Agreement was executed by Appellants in New Jersey and by [...] in New York) and the plaintiff performed its obligations in New Jersey (here, 90% of Appellants sales are in New York).  In *Newcomb v. Daniels, Saltz, Mongeluzzi & Barrett, Ltd.*, 847 F. Supp. 1244 (D.N.J. April 4, 1994), a personal injury client challenged the validity of a contingent attorney fees agreement with no choice-of-law provision.  Both statutes allow a beer supplier to terminate a distributor for good cause.  N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 55-c(4); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 33:1-93:15(c).  If the supplier terminates without good cause, the supplier must pay the distributor the fair market value of its lost distribution rights.  N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 55-c(7)(b); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 33:1-93:15(d).
[brief] The Legislature Failed to Submit the Bill For Fiscal Evaluation.  The Legislature further violated additional statutory requirements by failing to obtain a fiscal estimate prior to enactment.  N.J.S.A. 52:13B-6 requires the following:  Whenever any bill is introduced in either the Senate or General Assembly, and that bill receives first reading pursuant to the rules of the House in which it is introduced, the bill shall be immediately reviewed by the Legislative Budget and Finance Officer in the Office of Legislative Services.  If, upon that review, the Legislative Budget and Finance Officer determines that the bill may increase or decrease expenditures or increase or decrease revenues of the State or any political subdivision thereof, the Officer shall immediately forward a request for a fiscal note to the Director of the Division of Budget and Accounting in the Department of the Treasury.  Id.  Here, the Senate and Assembly Minutes do not show that this occurred after the first readings.  (Pa226-267.)  The legislative history shows the estimate was not obtained until over a week after enactment.  (Pa473.)  Moreover, the Open Public Records Act request to the Department of Treasury also confirm that no records were received.  (Pa364.)  Therefore, the legislation failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of N.J.S.A. 52:13B-6, and should be voided as the Court did in Miller, supra.
[brief] On August 28, 2023, [...] (“Reck”) filed a civil action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, captioned *[...] v. [...]*, Docket No. [...].  That Complaint was fashioned as an “Action in Lieu of Prerogative Writ,”.  (Pa2-9).  The Complaint was served on the [...] on September 6, 2023.  By letter dated October 2, 2023, [...], First Assistant Prosecutor for the [...], forwarded a copy of the Complaint to Assistant Attorney General [...] and requested that the [...] provide a defense to the [...] pursuant to *Wright v. State*, 169 N.J. 422 (2001).  (Pa1-9).  By letter dated October 16, 2023, AAG Vannella responded denying the [...]’s request for defense and indemnification under *Wright*.  (Pa10-13).  This appeal, which was timely filed, follows.  (Pa81-89).  STATEMENT OF FACTS¹ Reck was employed as the Deputy Chief of the [...].  (Pa 3, Complaint ¶¶ 1,5).  On or about September 15, 2022, Sgt. [...] notified the [...] of an IA complaint against Reck.  (Pa4, Complaint ¶ 6).  --- ¹  Given the nature of the appeal, the Statement of Facts is taken from the allegations contain in the Complaint in *[...] v. [...]*, [...].  Reliance on these facts in the context of this appeal should not be seen as adoption or endorsement of those facts for purposes other than this appeal.
[brief] (Pa881-872; Za206.)  Proposal Three described the identical work set forth in Proposals One and Two, but added back the $100 per day for each type of work, an upward adjustment based on [...]’s unenrollment.  (Id.)  With Proposal Three, which increased to $22,900 to account for [...]’s insurance costs, [...] also sent an e-mail to [...] stating, “attached is the updated proposal to reflect the change in CCIP status. ” (Pa1011.)  (Empasis added.).  Later on August 5, 2015, [...], Controller for [...], who was copied on the e-mail sending Proposal Three to [...], responded stating “I am confused.  Are we switching to a CCIP or they are (sic) removing us from it?” (Pa2416.)  Moments later, after grasping the situation, she followed up with another e-mail stating “Now I see that there is no CCIP” and instructed [...] (also cc’d) “if we filled out the CCIP forms, disregard and issue them a certificate and let [T.C.] Irons\(^7\) know that it has switched please. ”  (Pa2419.)  [...] of [...] responded one minute later, stating, “the owners are excluding all structural foundation demolition work from their CCIP, which applies to our work this time. ” (Italics added.)  (Pa2422.)  [...] then sent another e-mail seconds later to Morris and [...] confirming “this contract with C. \(^7\) [...] was [...]’s insurance broker at the time.  [...] that has been excluded. ” (Italics added.)  (Pa2427.)  Accordingly, as of August 5, 2015, all parties involved in the CCIP, including [...], knew that [...] was not enrolled in the CCIP.
[brief] As such, [...] requests that this Court order Defendants, [...] and [...] to comply with the ESI protocol as follows: (a)  Provide a time/place for [...], to conduct forensic examinations of [...]’s and [...]’s iPhones within five days of this Court’s order; (b) Produce all non-privileged files from [...]’s devices within 5 days of this Court’s order; (c) Produce all non-privileged files from the email accounts of [...], [...], and [...] that pre-date July 1, 2013 within five days of this Court’s order; (d) Produce all files withheld for relevance within five days of this Court’s order; (e) Produce all outstanding privilege logs within five days of this Court’s order; and (f) Amend the current privilege logs to provide adequate descriptions within 5 days of this Court’s order and further ensure that any outstanding privilege logs contain sufficient descriptions.  II.