ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  State v. Pickett, 466 N.J. Super. 270, 278-79 (App. Div. 2021) (holding that the defendant was entitled to discovery of “software’s source code and supporting software development and related documentation” in advance of a Frye hearing to challenge the software’s reliability).  Even under plain error review, reversal is required because State relied heavily on this improper lay testimony to corroborate its theory of the case as to [...] and [...]’s locations at relevant time frames.  See State v. Nesbitt, 185 N.J. 504, 515 (2006) (“The failure of a defendant to object to expert testimony does not relieve the trial court of its gatekeeper responsibilities .  . . .”).  As quoted above in the statement of facts, the prosecutor relied on this testimony extensively in summation, specifically contending that the GPS location data corroborated the suspect testimony of [...] and [...].  Indeed, no eyewitness placed [...] or [...] at the murder scene; the surveillance videos from [...] did not reveal the occupant or occupants in the car that [...] got into; and videos from outside of [...]’s grandmother’s house are not clear enough to identify the two individuals who went into the house.  Critically, the State used the testimony about [...] walking 122 steps, his phone’s display turning off for a period of time, and then [...] ascending steps – all while his phone was located at his grandmother’s house – to corroborate his actions at the time of the murder.  Given the lack of other evidence as to [...] and [...]’s locations, there is a reasonable probability that the jury relied on [...]’s improper lay testimony about [...]’s precise locations and movements to credit the State’s theory of the case and convict [...].  Especially considering the cumulative impact of other issues raised in [...]’s previously briefs in conjunction with the prejudicial effect of this improper lay testimony, [...]’s convictions should be reversed.
[brief] The State bears the burden of proving the exceptions by a preponderance of the evidence.  Randolph, 228 N.J. at 585; Brown, 216 N.J. at 527-29.  “Ultimately, the focus must be whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, a police officer had an objectively reasonable basis to conclude that a building was abandoned, or a defendant was a trespasser before the officer entered or searched the home.
[brief] (5T90-8 to 9; 91-21 to 23).  [...] saw the defendant pull the butcher knife on [...].  This occurred while they were standing at the front door.  (5T86-12 to 20).  [...] had a gun tucked into his pants in the small of his back and had begun to descend the stairs.  As the defendant began to stab at [...], [...] began backing up the stairs and at some point the gun falls to the ground and the defendant began reaching for it.  The defendant gained possession of the gun and began shooting as [...] and [...] fled up the stairs.  (5T115-3 to 124-7).  [...] never pointed the gun at anyone.  (5T124-19 to 21).  [...] indicated that she was standing at the top of the stairs when she suffered a gunshot wound in the left leg.  (5T66-23 to 67-9).  When she was shot, she observed the defendant with the handgun.  He was inside the residence on about the third step from the bottom.  (5T78-15 to 79-2).  The defendant was the only individual with a gun.  (5T78-21 to 23).  [...] was attempting to run into [...]'s room.  (5T79-20 to 80-1).  [...] was in the second-floor hallway.  (5T80-2 to 4).  At this point, the defendant begins to climb the stairs.  He forces his way into [...]'s room and shoots [...].  (5T809 to 14).  [...] runs past [...] into another room.  She hears more shots and subsequently looks out the door as she closes it and sees [...] and [...] laying in the hallway.  (5T81-20 to 82-1).  The medical examiner determined that both [...] and [...]'s deaths were homicides by multiple gunshot wounds.  (4T64-8 to 14; 79-10 to 12; 66-1; 104-12 to 22).  Ballistics determined the bullets were fired from the same gun.  (4T214-1 to 8).  LEGAL ARGUMENT Point I:
[directive] The internal affairs investigator may use any lawful investigative techniques including inspecting public records, questioning witnesses, interviewing the subject officer, questioning agency employees and surveillance.  The investigator therefore must understand the use and limitations of such techniques.  7.0.6  It is generally recommended that the complainant and other lay witnesses be interviewed prior to interviewing sworn members of the agency.  This will often eliminate the need to do repeated interviews with agency members.  However, this procedure does not have to be strictly adhered to if circumstances and the nature of the investigation dictate otherwise.  7.1
[brief] The doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes Appellant from reversing this position.  *Knorr v. Smeal*, 178 N.J. 169, 178 (2003).  “Estoppel is an equitable doctrine, founded in the fundamental duty of fair dealing imposed by law. ”  *Casamasino v. City of Jersey City*, 158 N.J. 333, 354 (1999).  The doctrine is designed to prevent injustice by not permitting a party to repudiate a course of action on which another party has relied to his detriment.
[brief] Id. at 303.  And in *Titan Construction*, the Supreme Court made clear that the necessity for establishing standards, limits, and procedures to govern the agency’s decision-making prospectively—as opposed to *ad hoc* and after-the-fact decision-making—is so ingrained in administrative law that it will strike down agency actions premised on statutory language despite the general principle that courts should defer to agency discretion.  See 102 N.J. at 18.  There, the Supreme Court reversed agency action for failing to heed the “critical role” rulemaking plays in the administrative process.  Id. at 13–14.  The Court concluded “that the Legislature’s authorization to the Commissioner . . . to adopt the rules and regulations necessary for the administration and enforcement of the Act imposed on the Department the duty to act initially by rulemaking.
[brief] For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs respectfully request reversal of the Order for Summary Judgment in favor of [...].  [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  Attorneys for Appellant  Dated: July 26, 2023  [...] AND [...], INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX AD PROSEQUENDUM ON BEHALF OF [...], v. [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; and/or JOHN DOES 1-15 and/or JANE DOES 1-15 (fictitious individuals); and ABC CORPORATIONS 1-15 (fictitious business entities); SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] For example, the case law does not provide that the entire controversy doctrine --- 1 T1= Transcript of Decision dated June 9, 2023 located at Pa1417. requires the joinder of legal malpractice claim if “the legal malpractice claims occurs before the prior litigation such as transactional malpractice. ”  As set forth below this is directly contrary to the holding it holds.  The black letter law permitted the Plaintiff to do exactly what they did in the landlord/tenant lawsuit as they attempted to litigate their damages by recovering against the landlord and should they prove unsuccessful they could then sue their negligent attorney for the damages for while his malpractice caused.
[brief] Rule 1:8-7 [9.2].  In this case, the judge was not present at the June 9th, 2012 or April 24, 2014 grand jury proceedings to overcome the prejudicial misleading testimony that the state and [...] presented.  However, while the Grand Jury heard testimony that [...] and [...] admitted their involvement in some or all robberies, but they did not hear the same implicating defendant to the same.  The omission of an element cannot be supplied by inference, implication or left to intendment.  State v. Newell, 152 N.J. Super. 460, 466 (App. Div. 1977).
[brief] Implicit in defendants’ motion was the claim that they have no duty to keep the public sidewalk on their residential property clear of ice and snow.  Again, neither the law nor the facts support that claim.  A local municipal ordinance imposes a mandatory duty on defendants to clear snow and ice from sidewalks abutting any street in the [...].  Under the common law, moreover, defendants may be held liable for defects and dangerous conditions of their property that they create.  The testimony in the record is that there was snow earlier in the day that had stopped before plaintiff fell and that the location where plaintiff fell was covered in ice and snow.  The existence of ice, therefore, allows for the reasonable conclusion that it was not from the storm earlier that day but from a prior weather event and that the sidewalk had been improperly maintained by defendants.  That the defects and dangerous conditions caused and created by defendants were obscured by the snow fall from earlier in the day does not absolve them of responsibility for the hazardous conditions.  The motion for summary judgment should have been denied, and so the Order below must be reversed.
[brief] However, this reading would create absolute liability for any injury caused by an inherent trait or propensity common to a class of domesticated animal.  This conclusion is not supported by this State’s case law and is inconsistent with the body of common law from which the Model Jury Charge derives.  To the contrary, the Model Jury Charge expressly states that liability arises only where there is evidence of past behavior that would give rise to a reasonable belief that the offending animal was dangerous:  You may find that the (animal) had vicious or dangerous propensities **only if the nature and frequency of its acts furnished reasonable ground to believe that it might cause an injury by biting/overzealousness/mischievousness/playfulness/over-demonstrated affection.**  *Id.* (emphasis added).  Thus, Plaintiffs’ “strict liability” claim requires proof of Defendants’ actual or constructive notice of behavior by [...] that posed a foreseeable danger.  The absence of such evidence is fatal to Plaintiffs’ claims here.  This reading of Model Jury Charge § 5.60B is consistent with the common law standard set forth in § 509 of the *Restatement (Second) of Torts*, which limits strict liability to injuries caused by an animal’s dangerous propensities that are *abnormal to its class*.
[brief] As provided for explicitly by the governing statute, N.J.S.A. 43:16A-11.2, Petitioner is barred from being able to elect his deferred retirement  Petitioner cites *State v. Hupka*, 203 N.J. 222 (2010) and *In re Hess*, 422 N.J. Super. 27 (App. Div. 2011) as examples in which the Courts in each matter failed to find a nexus between the employment position and the conduct at issue.
[brief] It is undisputed by Defendants both that: (i) Plaintiffs had obtained a policy in 2012 from Defendants’ related entity, [...]; and (ii) the definitions in the 2012 [...] policy mirror those in the 2016 [...] policy.  This undermines Defendants’ argument that reliance on the 2012 policy definitions in responding to the 2016 Application questions was misplaced.  Plaintiffs properly understood that the term investigate should be applied consistent with its use in the term Disciplinary Proceeding.  To find otherwise is to expand the scope of the term beyond its reasonable application—and to improperly give the insurer, not the insured, the benefit of such ambiguity.
[directive] 1.  Participating in civil immigration enforcement operations.  2.  Providing any non-public personally identifying information regarding individual.1 any  3.  Providing access to any state, county, or local law enforcement equipment, office space, database, or property not available to the general public.  4.  Providing access to a detained individual for an interview, unless the detainee signs a written consent form that explains: a) the purpose of the interview; b) that the interview is voluntary; c) that the individual may decline to be interviewed; and d) that the individual may choose to be interviewed only with his or her legal counsel present.
[brief] While the judge did define that element for the jury, the instructions misleadingly suggested that it was the second element of robbery rather than the element that distinguishes a first-degree robbery from a second-degree robbery.  The misleading nature of this omission was exacerbated by the failure of the judge to define the actual second element of robbery.  Errors in a jury instruction “on matters or issues that are material to the jury’s deliberation are presumed to be reversible. ”  Jordan, 147 N.J. at 422 (citing State v. Warren, 104 N.J. 571, 579 (1986)).  As the Supreme Court has observed, “it is speculative to forecast what verdict a jury would have returned if properly instructed on the basis of the verdict that a jury returned after an incomplete instruction. ”  Vick, 117 N.J. at 292.  Thus, erroneous instructions on material issues, such as the elements of a crime, are “poor candidates for rehabilitation under the plain error theory. ”  Jordan, 147 N.J. at 422-23 (quotation omitted).  Here, the omissions in the jury instructions were crucial to the deliberations because they related to the elements of robbery.  The court failed to instruct on the use-of-force element of robbery and further failed to explain how a second-degree robbery could be elevated to a first-degree robbery.  These omissions constituted plain error, and [...]’s conviction must be reversed.
[brief] (Aa1 – Aa9).  Following the Commissioner’s dismissal of the original Joint Petition, on September 22, 2023, Respondents \(^5\)  Ultimately the referendum passed by a margin of 64.35% to 35.65.  See Results – September 26, 2023 Special School Election, available at https://results.enr.clarityelections. com/NJ/Monmouth/118568/web.317647/#/summary (last visited April 15, 2024).  filed a motion to dismiss the appeal bearing docket number [...].  That motion was granted on December 15, 2023.  (Aa796 – Aa798).  **STANDARD OF REVIEW**
[brief] DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE AND SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.  (3T 10-3 to 14-5; Da 25-28)  [...] pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to a seven-year term of imprisonment.  (2T 8-10 to 9-9; 3T 10-3 to 14-5; Da 25-28)  In imposing this sentence, the court found aggravating factors 6, defendant’s prior criminal history, and 9, the need to deter, while also finding mitigating factors 8, conduct unlikely to recur, and 9, defendant’s character and attitude indicate he is unlikely to reoffend.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6), (9); 2C:44-1(b)(8), (9).  (3T 12-11 to 13-1, 13-8 to 13)  In weighing these factors, the court found that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors, particularly in light of [...]’s conduct in the four years between the offense and the sentencing date.  (3T 13-14 to 18)  Although the court imposed a lower sentence than the maximum sentence recommended by the State, as the court had full authorization to do, State v. Warren, 115 N.J. 433, 442 (1989), the seven-year sentence remains excessive.  This Court should remand for resentencing.
[brief] Attorneys and Law Firms [...], Pro Hac Vice, [...], Pro Hac Vice, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], for [...], et al.  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], for [...], et al.  PROCEEDINGS: (IN CHAMBERS)  Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Discovery (ECF No. 149)  [...], UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
[brief] Appellants were never the clients of [...] or [...].  Their attempted legal malpractice claim against [...] and [...] flies in the face of New Jersey jurisprudence refusing to recognize any duty to third-party non-clients unless the attorney knows or should know that the non-clients are relying upon information, work, or legal advice provided by the attorney.  Appellants’ own admissions during their deposition made it impossible for any rational factfinder to conclude that any such fact pattern existed here.
[brief] After weighing the factors and considering Plaintiff’s claims and Defendants’ defenses, and the burdens on [...], a non-party with respect to this case, the Court finds the following custodian list and concomitant time frames to constitute a reasonable scope for collection of documents for purposes of Requests 1 and 3 in the Document Subpoena, and insofar as the 30(b)(6) Subpoena request documents.  Although the Court found at the hearing that, as a general matter, January 1, 2017 is an appropriate starting date for discovery, as applied to some of the custodians, for document collection purposes and as specifically noted below, the Court concludes that time frame is unnecessarily long:
[brief] (1T3-8 to 3-14)  On April 12, 2022, Defendant appeared with counsel who advised [...] that he had submitted a written request for additional discovery which the State needed time to review.  As a result, Defendant requested and received ---  1  The State adopts Appellant’s appendix designations noted at Db3-Db4; “1T” refers to transcript of proceedings dated March 8, 2022; “2T” refers to transcript of proceedings dated April 12, 2022; “3T” refers to transcript of proceedings dated June 7, 2022; “4T” refers to transcript of proceedings dated September 6, 2022; “5T” refers to transcript of proceedings dated October 18, 2022; “6T” refers to transcript of proceedings dated December 6, 2022; “7T” refers to transcript of proceedings dated August 3, 2023; “8T” refers to transcript of proceedings dated September 12, 2023; “9T” refers to transcript of proceedings dated March 6, 2024; “10T” refers to transcript of proceedings dated April 19, 2024.
[brief] Regardless of the form of advertisement, it is the consumer alone who decides to schedule a presentation and visit the resort for a tour.  (Da72, ¶9).  Every one of the plaintiffs here scheduled to attend the [...] on a particular day and time for a presentation.  (Da73, ¶14; Da79, ¶28; Da85, ¶42; Da90, ¶55; Da95, ¶72; Da100, ¶89; Da105, ¶103; Da109, ¶116; Da113, ¶127; Da118, ¶144; Da124, ¶163).  After nine of the plaintiffs scheduled, they received a follow-up confirmation email memorializing the scheduled presentation and which disclosed that the presentation was for “THE PURPOSE OF SOLICITING TIMESHARE SALES”.  (Da170, 182, 186 & 189; Da90, ¶56; Da100, ¶90; Da105, ¶104; Da118, ¶145; Da123, ¶162).  They all attended the presentations that they voluntarily scheduled.  At the conclusion of each of the plaintiffs’ presentations, they agreed to purchase timeshare intervals and they reviewed, initialed and signed multiple contractual agreements memorializing their purchases.  (Da193-246; Da943-1078).  Throughout the course of discovery, the plaintiffs admitted that nobody at the [...] forced them to execute the contractual documents for the purchase of their --- 1
[brief] Under New Jersey’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”), a transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent if done with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.  N.J.S.A. 25:2-25(a).  The Act addresses fraudulent transfers, not solely as to present creditors, but also as to future creditors—i.e., creditors whose claims arose after the transfer was made but not \(^{11}\)  In that the quantum of Plaintiff’s damages could not be known until the Court issues a ruling in this matter, Plaintiff’s attorneys will provide a certification of services in accordance with RPC 1.5 following a ruling on these issues by the Court or can otherwise participate in a proof hearing with respect to the quantum of damages.  necessarily before judgment in an underlying matter is entered.  N.J.S.A. 25:2–25 states:
[brief] In the court below, [...] also argued that Plaintiff had “elected” its remedy when it demanded the return of the Earnest Money Deposit and that the trial court should enforce this remedy election by dismissing all claims against [...].  This argument, too, fails as a matter of law, based upon the plain terms of the PSA.  The doctrine of “election of remedies” has no bearing on this case because, in seeking to enforce the PSA and demanding specific performance, Plaintiff was merely exercising a contractual right.  ---
[brief] (Aa39-40).  He also argued that [...] lacked jurisdiction because the alleged violation “arose out of, and involved exclusively, activity in connection with a union election campaign”—a protected union activity.  (Aa40-41).  And, though he conceded that the State may have authority to enforce the State Policy against State employees whose conduct occurs in front of a State building, he disagreed that its jurisdiction extended to conduct at a union office in the context of a union election campaign.
[brief] Indeed, the Supreme Court has “rejected the premise of ‘approv[ing] the exercise of general jurisdiction in every [s]tate in which a [defendant] ‘engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business. ’”\(^2\) Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, 462 N.J. Super. 594, 616–17 (App. Div. 2020), rev’d on other grounds, 246 N.J. 157 (2021) (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138); Dutch Run, 450 N.J. Super at 601.  After all, a business “that operates in many places \(^2\) [...] v. [...], is clearly inapplicable, as the attorneys there were granted pro hac vice admission in the District of New Jersey to represent the plaintiff, the plaintiff named those attorneys as defendants in that same lawsuit, and the Court exercised jurisdiction based on their ongoing attorney-client relationship.
[brief] The notice must state the time, date and location of the meeting, the agenda to the extent known, and “whether formal action may or may not be taken,” with the latter stated “accurately. ”  The notice must be prominently posted in a public place, must be provided to “at least two newspapers which newspapers shall be designated by the public body to receive such notices because they have the greatest likelihood of informing the public,” and must be filed with the clerk of the municipality.
[brief] They claim she misrepresented her health when she asked for alternate living arrangements; That she could not work due to mold exposure; claimed that certain items were a total loss when they were not; misrepresented the value of certain items including an I Phone and claimed she was an expert in oriental rugs.  (Aa168).  They sought a judgment against her.  (Aa169).  At the close of discovery both defendants moved for summary judgment.
[brief] After [...] was formed, [...] and [...] executed an operating agreement (the “[...] Operating Agreement”) drafted by [...]’s attorney.  16T164-11 to 165-7; 25T47-8 to -22; Da02701.  [...] was materially involved in, and authorized, [...]’s purchase, lease, financing and refinancing of its properties (the “[...] Properties. ”)  16T169-17 to 180-4; 24T19-8 to 24-5, 48-9 to -19; 25T45-22 to 48-19.  [...] and [...] regularly discussed the amount of income the [...] Properties were generating, corporate expenses, building repairs, and tenant issues.  25T10-24 to 11-21, 37-23 to 38-24.  Further, [...] regularly provided [...] rental rolls for the [...] Properties and he and [...] split cash rents.  15T148-15 to 151-18; 25T52-25 to 55-4; Da03040.  D.  [...]’s Material Involvement in [...] and [...]’s Finances
[brief] The Court seemingly ignored page three (3) of the pre-sentence report which clearly stated “he reported he is sorry for what happened. ” (Da463).  The Court also put an inappropriate emphasis on the notion that [...] was going to write a tell all book called “[...] Free.” (17T:181-16 to 23).  The only testimony in the trial was that “[...] Free” was a joke.  (7T:206-18 to 22).  His brother [...] testified that [...] Free was “completely absurd and ridiculous” and that he “didn’t take it seriously at all. ” (9T:218-23 to 219-2).  The State’s own expert did not put significant weight on this.  (14T:50-17 to 51).  However, at sentencing, this insignificant joke became the focal point of the courts analysis as to why [...] Kologi cannot be rehabilitated.  (17T:181-16 to 23).  Based on the foregoing, the Court misapplied the Miller factors.