ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In State v. K.P.S.,supra, 221 NJ 266 the Court cited Zirger 144 NJ at 338, “In short, collateral estoppel will not apply if a party did not have a “full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue”.  The Court then went on to say (quoting [...] in “Rebalancing Fairness”) “EVERY LITIGANT IS ENTITLED TO A DAY IN COURT.  TO ENSURE THIS BASIC RIGHT TO BE HEARD, COURTS DO NOT APPLY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL WHEN IT WOULD BE INEQUITABLE OR CONTRARY TO THE INTERESTS OF FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE”.  In this case Defendant was not heard on this issue (the wrongful imposition of a penalty without consideration of the misrepresentation of Plaintiff and the withholding of monies due upon the signing of the agreement) in the initial Trial Court or in the Appellate Division.
[brief] It is more than a statutorily-designated instrumentality of the State.  See N.J.S.A. 18A:65-2.  Instead, [...] is a hybrid of a private corporation and State entity, embodied by a “consummated contract” enacted in 1956.  [...], the State University v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 154-56 (1982); see also L. 1956, c. 61; Montclair Univ. v. City of Passaic, 234 N.J. 434, 454 (2018) (recognizing the “broadly autonomous” authority of [...]).  [...] has two governing bodies, the [...] and the [...] (Trustees).  N.J.S.A. 18A:65-12, -13.  The [...] is the governing body with general authority over the University, its funds and its property.  N.J.S.A. 18A:65-25.  Among other powers, the Trustees control [...]’ property as of 1956 and certain subsequent donations, appoint almost half the [...] and have the right of consent to the appointment of the [...] President.  N.J.S.A. 18A:65-26, -31; N.J.S.A. 18A:65-14.  The relevant governing body here, the [...], consists of sixteen members, namely, the [...] President (as ex officio) and fifteen voting members.  Those fifteen members serve without compensation and are appointed as follows: seven are appointed by the Governor of New Jersey with the advice and consent of the state Senate, one is appointed by the Governor of New Jersey with the recommendation of the Senate President and Speaker of the General Assembly, and seven are appointed by the Trustees from among its members.  N.J.S.A. 18A:65-14(b).  B.
[brief] State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016); State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015).  An appellate court also must not “engage in an independent assessment of the evidence as if it were the court of first instance. ”  Locurto, 157 N.J. at 471.  Once the reviewing court is satisfied the judge’s findings were based on sufficient credible evidence in the record, “its task is complete and it should not disturb the result[.]”  Ibid.  This is true even if the case is “a close one” or the appellate court may have reached a different conclusion were it independently deciding the case.  Ibid.  As our Supreme Court has frequently reaffirmed, “A trial court’s findings should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction. ”  State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007) (citations and punctuation omitted).  Only if the appellate court is “thoroughly satisfied” that the trial court erred and made a decision that was “so plainly unwarranted” may it step in and “make its own findings and conclusions. ”  State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964), modified on other grounds, State v. Olenowski, 253 N.J. 133 (2023).  Here, after carefully weighing the conflicting testimony before him, [...] denied defendant’s motion to suppress.  He determined [...] was credible, “forthright in his answers,” and “readily conceded” unfavorable information or when he could not recall a detail.  (Da9).  He also found [...]’s testimony credible for many of the same reasons.  (Da9).  On the other hand, [...] ruled, “[t]he Court cannot reach the same conclusions regarding Defendant’s credibility[.]” (Da10).  He found defendant was not credible and his testimony was inconsistent and illogical.  (Da10; Da11).  Judge Collin’s determinations thus rested squarely on his ability to observe the testifying witnesses and judge their credibility.  His careful analysis, which was based on sufficient credible evidence in the record, is entitled to substantial deference and should be upheld on appeal.
[directive] B.  In cases where immediate custody of the Request for complaint-warrant and detention. juvenile is required, a law enforcement officer may apply for a complaint-warrant.  5:20- R.  3.  A complaint-warrant may only be issued pursuant to 5:21-1(a) where detention is Rule 14 authorized by Court Intake Services (Juvenile Intake) or a judge.  5:20-3(a)(1).  Thus, R. when applying for a warrant, the officer is required to contact Juvenile Intake.  Juvenile complaints will be reviewed by Juvenile Intake in eCDR.  Juvenile Intake will (RST)16 complete the juvenile detention Risk Screening Tool to preliminarily determine if a juvenile should be detained.  The RST assists Juvenile Intake with their recommendation for detention, however law enforcement and/or the Assistant Prosecutor can request recommendation.17 detention or additional monitoring services, notwithstanding the Further, the RST does not restrict a judge’s discretion to order the juvenile’s detention at a future court appearance.  If Juvenile Intake declines detention, law enforcement may ask for an override of that decision.  If the request is still denied, an Assistant Prosecutor can appear before the Family Court to apply for a complaint-warrant pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-34(b).  5:20-  See also R. 3.  Accordingly, when making the decision to apply for a complaint-warrant, it is important to consider any relevant facts or circumstances known or reasonably believed to exist that are not accounted for in Juvenile Intake’s initial detention decision.  If detention is authorized by Juvenile Intake or a judge, a complaint-warrant shall immediately be filed as provided by 5:20-1.
[brief] Background  This dispute began over the removal of some dead trees on the [...]’ Property in 2018.  They argued that the trees were on the [...]’ Property.  The [...] paid to remove the trees although they were determined to be on the [...]’ Property.  See e.g., Pa2, ¶6, ¶4 & ¶17; Pa20-41; 2T80, l.18-82, l.5 & Pa149.
[brief] ”  194 N.J. 6, 10 (2008).  The Court held:  The narrow issue in this appeal is whether the Appellate Division overstepped its bounds when reviewing the trial court's admission of [...]'s expert testimony.  In reviewing a trial court's evidential ruling, an appellate court is limited to examining the decision for abuse of discretion.  See Brenman v. Demello, 191 N.J. 18, 31, 921 A.2d 1110 (2007).  A reviewing court is not permitted to create anew the record on which the trial court's admissibility determination was based.  See ibid.  Defendant claims that instead of adhering to the proper scope of review, the Appellate Division essentially undertook its own examination of the foundation for [...]'s testimony and erroneously substituted its judgment for that of the trial court.  And, further, in doing so, the panel effectively allowed plaintiff to create a whole new case against the admissibility of [...]'s testimony than that which was presented to the trial court.  Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 12-13.  [emphasis added]  Abuse of discretion amounts to a manifest error resulting in an injustice.  Although the ordinary "abuse of discretion" standard defies precise definition, it arises when a decision is "made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis."  Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005), quoting Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571, 796 A.2d 182 (2002).  In other words, a functional approach to abuse of discretion examines whether there are good reasons for an appellate court to defer to the particular decision at issue.  Abuse of discretion may be "arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment."  Ibid.  Here, the question for this Court is only whether the trial judge pursued a manifestly unjust course.  See Gittleman v. Cent. Jersey Bank & Tr. Co., supra.  Plaintiffs’ brief fails to cite one instance where the opinions of the Trial Court were arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.  Plaintiffs instead only reiterate the same arguments made in Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial.  However, not once does Plaintiffs’ brief argue that the Court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial, or in its evidentiary rulings.  This is because the Court’s reasoning was reasonable, and based on the Rules of Evidence.  CONCLUSION
[brief] “Search terms are an important tool parties may use to identify potentially responsive documents in cases involving substantial amounts of ESI.  Search terms do not, however, replace a party’s requests for production. ”  *Id.* (citing *In re Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust Litig.*, No. 13MD02420, 2015 WL 833681 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2015) (keyword searches “often are over-inclusive,” producing large numbers of “irrelevant documents”).  Protecting the privacy of employee data is increasingly important for companies and others.
[brief] [...]  [...], Esq.  (No. 024862005)  [...]  [...], Esq. (No. 308782019)  [...]  [...] [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents  [...], [...], and [...]  Of Counsel: [...], Esq.  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..........................................................  ii LEGAL ARGUMENT...........................................................................  1  I.  THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SHOWS THAT IT CAN APPLY AT RAILROAD CROSSING.........................................................  1  II.  [...] MISTATES THE DUTY OF A TRAIN OPERATOR APPROACHING A RAILROAD CROSSING.............................................  5 CONCLUSION....................................................................................
[brief] From 1993 to 2002, [...] worked for the [...] (“[...]”).  1005a, 8:6-9:8.  At first, [...] worked in the [...]’s Multi-Family Development and Tax Division.  1005a, 8:6-14.  Eventually, [...] became the Director of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Division and the Legal Division.  1005a, 9:9-13.  In said capacity, [...] recommended the projects to the Commissioner for approval.  1006a, 11:3-5.  Thus, [...] selected the projects that would go forward, and assisted in getting said projects financed and developed.  1005a-1006a, 9:25-10:6.  [...] left the [...] and from 2003 to 2004 worked for [...], in its Affordable Housing Department which financed affordable housing developments.  1006a, 12:11-18.  At [...], [...] oversaw the financing of all affordable housing developments in which [...] decided to participate, through [...]’s participation in the tax credit scheme in accordance with the IRS code.  1006a, 12:17-3:4.  In 2005, [...] went into private practice as an affordable housing development financial advisor, starting the firm of [...].  1007a, 14:1-4; 14:20.  In 2006, [...] commenced simultaneously working also for [...], starting, and overseeing its national affordable housing division.  1007a, 14:4-19.  [...]’s expertise and reputation as an affordable housing development financial advisor is widely revered by all in the affordable housing industry, both in the public and private sector.  4T, 150:15-23.
[brief] The current circumstances are similar to the facts in Vill. of Ridgewood, supra.  In Ridgewood, a settling defendant acquired the right to the litigation from the plaintiff and sought to continue prosecution of the matter against the remaining defendants under plaintiff’s name.  Id., at 195.  The Court held that this procedural posture was impermissible as a plaintiff cannot assign a tort claim and because the defendants who purchased the claim were not the injured parties.  Id., at 196.  Similarly here, [...] contractually possesses all the “rights, title and interest, in and to” Plaintiff’s claim in this litigation.  The assignments in this case are similar to the Ridgewood matter as the parties who are seeking redress from [...] are [...] and [...], not Plaintiff.  C.  The Trial Court correctly held that [...] lacked Standing to bring this lawsuit.
[brief] ”  *State v. Robertson*, 228 N.J. 138, 148 (2017); (quoting *State v. Johnson*, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964) (internal quotations omitted); *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 472 (1999).  In addition, when the Law Division concurs with the municipal court, the two-court rule applies.  "Under the two-court rule, appellate courts should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of error."  *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999).  However, the legal rulings of a trial court are considered *de novo*.  *Robertson*, 228 N.J. at 148.  Under R. 7:8-10:  In all cases other than parking cases, a request by a defendant to proceed to a trial without an attorney shall not be granted until the judge is satisfied from an inquiry on the record that the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to counsel following an explanation by the judge of the range of penal consequences and an advisement that the defendant may have defenses and that there are dangers and disadvantages inherent in defending oneself.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.1.  Objectors must first overcome the threshold question of whether the objector is a “third-party” or whether the objector has a statutory or constitutional right to a hearing, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.2, otherwise the Legislature forbids such appeals in the interest of maintaining the efficient function of the government, and to reduce administrative burdens.
[brief] THAT [...] SOLD 10 OUT OF 11 UNITS IN THE BUILDING UPON CONVERTING IT TO A CONDOMINIUM PROPERTY DOES NOT BAR IT FROM EARNING A FAIR RETURN ON ITS INVESTMENT IN TRUPIANO’S UNSOLD UNIT.  [...] challenges [...]’s right to a rent increase premised upon a “fair return” on its equity in the Unit by contending that [...] has no equity in the Unit (not even the $12,804.88 equity value held by the Board).  [...] argues that [...] (i) is limited to its “return” in 2003 when, ten (10) years after purchasing the 11-unit Property, it converted the Property to a condominium property and sold every unit except the subject Unit; and (ii) must continue to suffer financial losses until [...]’s protected tenancy ends (which may last another twenty (20) years during a protected forty (40) year period).  These arguments, in nullifying any “fair return”, turn both law and logic upside down.  [...] ignores that his Unit was part of an 11-unit building that [...] purchased in 1993 and was necessarily part of its then investment entitling [...] to a specific return on the Unit.  Preliminarily, that [...]’s right to convert the Property into a condominium property was subject to [...]’s protected status under the Tenant Protection Act (the “Act”) does not bar a hardship application for a rent increase for that Unit.  The Act enables [...] to remain a tenant in the Unit, but it does not immunize him from a hardship application for a rent increase during that period.  The Act does not in any way thwart a landlord’s right to earn a “fair return” under the Ordinance, provided the rent increase is not based upon increased fees from converting to a condominium.  The Act states in relevant part:  In the case of a municipality subject to the provisions of this act that has a rent control ordinance in effect, a rent increase for a qualified tenant with a protected tenancy status…shall not exceed the increase authorized by the ordinance for rent-controlled units.  Increased costs that are solely the result of a conversion, including but not limited to any increase in financing or carrying costs, and do not add services or amenities not previously provided shall not be used as a basis for an increase in a fair-return or hardship hearing before a municipal rent board or any appeal from such a determination.
[brief] Motion Records | Cases | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Alloway v. Bradlees, Inc., 157 N.J. 221 (1999) | 13,14 | | Bennett v. T. & F. Distributing Co., 117 N.J. Super. 439 | | | (App. Div. 1971), certif. denied, 60 N.J. 350 (1972) | 11 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 4 | | Carter v. Reynolds, 175 N.
[brief] The entire controversy doctrine requires that a party "litigate all aspects of a controversy in a single legal proceeding."  Kaselaan & D'Angelo Assocs. v. Soffian, 290 N.J. Super. 293, 298 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting Leisure Tech.-Ne., Inc. v. Klingbeil Holding Co., 137 N.J. Super. 353, 357 (App. Div. 1975)).  "[A]ll claims arising from a particular transaction or series of transactions should be joined in a single action."  Archbrook Laguna, LLC v. Marsh, 414 N.J. Super. 97, 105 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Brennan v. Orban, 145 N.J. 282, 290 (1996)).  "Non- joinder of claims required to be joined by the entire controversy doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims .  . . ."  R. 4:30A.  The objectives of the entire controversy doctrine are: (1) to encourage the comprehensive and conclusive determination of a legal controversy; (2) to achieve party fairness, including both parties before the court as well as prospective parties; and (3) to promote judicial economy and efficiency by avoiding fragmented, multiple and duplicative litigation.
[brief] Further, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit undertook an “applied to” analysis in Range v. Attorney Gen. United States, 69 ¹ Defendant-Appellant’s Letter Brief, filed July 12, 2024 ² Plaintiff-Respondent’s Brief, filed September 11, 2024.  F.4th 96, 103 (3d. Cir. 2023) (en banc).  In that case, the defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal felon in possession statute.  Id. at 98.  The Third Circuit undertook a Bruen analysis as “applied to him,” and determined that he could not be disarmed.  Id. at 103-106.  It is clear from these decisions that the Second Amendment applies to the instant case.  Addressing the Bruen framework, the State argues that states “requiring permits to carry firearms is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition” Sb12 (citations omitted).  Defendant does not challenge this.  The State then posits that “[h]istory shows that States may use licensing regimes to ensure that those carrying arms within the State do not pose a safety threat.  Sb13 (citations omitted).  The State has never argued that [...] poses a safety threat.  These arguments do not address the Second Amendment issue in this case, which is whether it is in the historical tradition of the United States for states to not recognize valid carry permits issued by another state.
[brief] Thank you very much, again, for all of your time and consideration.  [...]:  Thank you very I agree the project itself is beneficial.  The way you are approaching it, to me, is not beneficial to the residents.  You know, if the question is, are you going to be sued, if we say, no, you are probably going to sue us.  But if we say, yes, these people, down at that end of Town, are paying a lot of taxes, and their property value is going to go down, and they will probably pull their funds and they are going to sue us.  The question is, who would we rather be sued by?
[directive] SEXUAL ASSAULT  Any conduct proscribed by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1) through (7), N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b), and N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1) through (4) of the New Jersey Criminal Code, including any act of penetration performed or perpetrated on one person by another under circumstances indicating a lack of consent, either due to force, or an inability of one party to consent due to age, relationship, mental defect, or physical incapacitation.  SEXUAL ASSAULT EXAMINER (SAE)  A physician licensed in the State of New Jersey, who is specially trained to provide comprehensive care to sexual assault victims, demonstrates competency in conducting a sexual assault medical forensic examination, and has successfully completed a course of education in treating sexual assault victims.  SEXUAL ASSAULT MEDICAL FORENSIC EXAMINATION  A comprehensive assessment of a sexual assault victim consisting of a history, physical examination, diagnosis, treatment by medical protocol, and the collection of evidence.  Within the context of the SART activation, these exams will be conducted by a FNE or SAE.  -3-
[brief] While a First Assistant County Prosecutor may have the legal acumen to utilize the Idaho “cockfighting” statute (\textbf{Pb10}) when trying to interpret and understand \textit{N.J.S.A.}  4:22 – 24, a person of ordinary intelligence does not.  A person of ordinary intelligence would not know how to or be expected to acquire a copy of \textit{Idaho Code} §25 – 3506 in order to fully understand how to comply with a New Jersey law within the jurisdiction of the State of New Jersey).  \textit{N.J.S.A.}  4:22 – 24(a)(2) prohibits being present and witnessing, paying admission to, encouraging or assisting anything whatsoever and without one single limitation or exception.  It literally criminalizes going to the movies, attending a state sanctioned horse race or boxing match or \(^1\) They are people of extraordinary intelligence.  assisting or encouraging a child to study or eat broccoli.  N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 17(c)(3) literally criminalizes state sanctioned horse races, boxing matches or fishing under the authority of a state issued fishing license.  It even criminalizes parental medical judgment for their own child (i.e. waiting to take a child with a 100 degree fever at 9:00 pm to the pediatrician at 9:00 am the following morning instead of rushing him or her to the emergency room\(^2\)) or supervisory judgment (i.e. removing the training wheels from a bicycle and the child falls off the bike while learning how to ride the 2 wheel bike and scrapes their elbow).  N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 17(c)(3) (and N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 24(a)(2)) do not contain one single exception or exclusion.  It punishes and encroaches upon lawful conduct and allows arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement based on the whims of each and every county prosecutor in this State.  As such, a “vegetarian” county prosecutor can prosecute veal farmers.  A “vegan” county prosecutor can prosecute anyone having a direct or indirect involvement in the creation, transportation or use of leather.