ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In *J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District*, the Third Circuit held that “[a] conflict with the parents’ liberty interest will not be lightly found, and, indeed, only occurs when there is some ‘manipulative, coercive, or restraining conduct by the State. ’”  650 F.3d 915, 933–34 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting *Anspach ex rel. Anspach v. City of Phila., Dep’t of Pub. Health*, 503 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2007)).  The court further explained that “parents’ liberty interest will only be implicated if the state’s action ‘deprived them of their right to make decisions concerning their child,’ and not when the action merely ‘complicated the making and implementation of those decisions. ’”  Id. at 934 (quoting C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 184 (3d Cir. 2005)).  Applying these factors, the court held that a school’s decision to suspend a student did not violate her parents’ fundamental rights because it did not interfere with their “ability to make decisions concerning their daughter’s upbringing.
[brief] [N.J.S.A. 46:8B-3(d)]  [*377]  It should be noted that under subsection (d)(viii) above, the common elements may be expanded to include other "elements and facilities" designated in the master deed.  The association has a right of access to each unit "as may be necessary for the maintenance, repair or replacement of any common elements therein or accessible therefrom."  N.J.S.A. 46:8B-15(b).  The association is empowered to assess and collect funds from unit owners for common expenses, to maintain accounting records, and to obtain insurance against loss by fire or other casualties damaging the common elements and all structural portions of the condominium. property.
[directive] SUBJ: NICOLE’S LAW (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-12 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-8) – RESTRAINING AND ORDER NOTIFICATION  PROCEDURES AND  This directive promulgates a model restraining order and notification procedures to be used in situations involving “Nicole’s Law,” N.J.S.A. 2C:14-12 and N.J.S.A. 2C:44- 8.  The model order and the procedures were jointly developed by the Conferences of Criminal Presiding Judges, Family Presiding Judges, and Municipal Court Presiding Judges and were approved by the Judicial Council.  Nicole’s Law permits the court to issue an order as a condition of bail or to continue a prior order or issue a new order upon conviction, prohibiting a defendant charged with or convicted of a sex offense from having any contact with a victim, including restraining the defendant from entering a victim’s residence, place of employment, business or school and from harassing or stalking the victim or victim’s relatives.  The law defines “sex offense” by referencing Megan’s Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2.  Nicole's Law restraining orders are similar to domestic violence restraining orders, except that there need not be a domestic relationship between the defendant and the victim for a Nicole’s Law restraining order to be entered if a defendant has been charged with or convicted of certain sex offenses.  This Directive defines the distribution procedure for the Criminal Division and municipal courts to use in order to provide notification of the issuance of a Nicole’s Law restraining order to parties and entities having an interest in the matter.  This Directive also provides a mechanism to avoid the issuance of conflicting orders by a Criminal Division or Municipal Court judge and a Family Division judge.  Conflicting orders might arise, for example, when (a) a parent is charged with a sex offense as so defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2, such as endangering the welfare of a child, (b) the Criminal Division or Directive # 01-10
[directive] Grading of theft as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-2 and the quantity is in excess of one kilogram; (continued) offenses (continued)  (d)  The property stolen is a person’s benefits under federal or State law, or from any other source, which the Department of Human Services or an agency acting on its behalf has budgeted for the person’s health care and the amount involved is $75,000.00 or more; or (e)  The property stolen is human remains or any part thereof; except that, if the human remains are stolen by deception or falsification of a document by which a gift of all or part of a human body may be made pursuant to P.L.2008, c.50 (C.26:6-77 et al.), the theft constitutes a crime of the first degree.  39  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2
[brief] Beginning with *Roper v. Simmons*, 534 U.S. 551 (2005), the United States Supreme Court held that offenders cannot be sentenced to death for crimes committed before they turned eighteen.  The Court reasoned that while "the qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns [eighteen]," there are also some individuals under eighteen who "have already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach."  *Ibid.*  Acknowledging the need for a bright line, the Court drew it at age eighteen, emphasizing that point is "where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood."  *Id.* at 574.  Then, in *Graham v. Florida*, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), the Court barred sentences of life without parole for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses.
[brief] Possible Responses to the ACTL/IAALS Report: The Arizona Experience (/file/document/possible-responses-actliaals-report-arizona-experience) (pdf)  Survey of Arizona Bench and Bar (/file/document/survey-arizona-bench-and-bar) (pdf)  Survey of Oregon Bench and Bar (/file/document/survey-oregon-bench-and-bar).  (pdf)  Civil Case Processing in the Oregon Courts (/file/document/civil-case-processing-oregon-courts) (pdf)  What Federal Rulemakers Can Learn from State Procedural Innovations (/file/document/civil-case-processing-oregon-courts) (pdf)  The Necessity of Tradeoffs in a Properly Functioning Civil Procedure System (/file/document/what-federal-rulemakers-can-learn-state-procedural-innovations).
[brief] ...................................................  24 Pace v. Hamilton Cove, 258 N.J. 82 (2024)  ...............................................................................  7 Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989)  ...............................................................................  7  Romine v. Diversified Collection Servs., 155 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 1998) ...............................................................  30 Rutgers-The State Univ. v. Fogel, 403 N.J. Super. 389 (App. Div. 2008) ...................................................  20  [...] v. [...]
[brief] Nor is the archaeologist included in the list of licensed professionals under the Construction Lien Law.  Rather, the archaeologist’s scope of services on this Project, as referenced in Section 3.09 of the Bid Solicitation, includes activities described as “monitor(ing)”, “identify and inspect”, “evaluate”, “report”, “photograph” and “recordation and data recovery”, and preparing a summary monitoring report that meets the standards for such report established by the [...] ([...])” 1527a -1528a.  The bottom line is that the archaeologist’s scope of services set forth in the Bid Solicitation do not include any “work or services” as contemplated by this State’s lien laws.
[brief] (“[...]”) opposition “merits brief” shows that [...] has not meaningfully refuted the facts presented or the legal arguments of the [...] (“[...]”).  In its opposition, [...] does not and cannot present any finding(s) of bad faith or default of the terms of the Settlement Agreement but instead relies upon a nebulous idea that because the trial court had, temporarily, concluded that the Township had acted in bad faith during the pre settlement agreement negotiations with [...], every action thereafter, by either the Township or the [...] should be looked upon as being in “bad faith” and therefore concluded as ‘wrong’.  To support its argument, in its opposition brief Avalon Bay ignored, and sidestepped, important facts and took wide liberties with other facts.  [...] has not refuted that the trial court erroneously granted prerogative writ relief to [...] without a proper record.  Thus, the trial court’s orders of August 8, 2023, and December 19, 2023, must be reversed.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] The statement by a member of the Borough to [...] that the council has selected the off-site property and instructing [...] to purchase same, are not hearsay.  Contrary to [...]’s contention, [...] does not offer this undisputed testimony concerning the selection of Block 610 for the off-site units to establish a “back room deal” as [...] claims.  [...] does not claim “estoppel” in this action, that because the former mayor told [...] to use Block 610 for the seven affordable units, the municipality is bound.  Rather, the uncontested facts demonstrate a selection process by the former council, an analysis of vacant land, and a decision: in short, a concrete plan.
[brief] The situation escalated after the Trust’s disposal of the Boonton and Florida Properties.  Upon [...]’s formal petition to the Trustee and trial court for relief, Plaintiff persisted in using Trust funds to finance legal defenses, aimed at safeguarding the unjust advantages she and [...] had improperly secured.  (158a)  This continued misuse of Trust funds underscores a sustained breach of fiduciary duty as these monies were expended not in the interest of the Trust or all its beneficiaries, but to protect personal gains obtained through wrongful means.  Plaintiff’s misappropriation of Trust funds also extended to litigation costs for discovery and trial.  In this context, [...] was seeking over $50,000 in unpaid rent from Defendants for the Boonton Property along with over $100,000 in legal fees and costs.  (157a)  Meanwhile, [...] permitted [...] to rent the entire Florida Property for just $2,500 total.  (108a)  Therefore, Plaintiff was appropriating Trust funds for litigation to potentially benefit herself and [...], at [...]’s expense, which violated her fiduciary duties of loyalty and impartiality.  Finally, upon conclusion of trial, having expensed over $100,000 for litigation, the Trustee was awarded just $2,500 for Defendants’ occupancy.  (91a)  The trial court’s decision explained that “[t]he Court finds it equitable that the Defendants pay the same below market rental payment that [...] paid. ”  (108a)  This Order confirms the Plaintiff’s improper and wasteful misappropriation of Trust funds for adversarial litigation to gain advantage at [...]’s expense.
[brief] The Act’s concept of exclusivity of representation has been held by the Supreme Court of this State to be analogous to the similar provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.  Commenting upon this concept, the Court found it to be at the very core of our national labor relations policy and ruled that its inclusion in the Act was a valid legislative vehicle to discourage rivalries among individual employees and employee groups and to avoid the diffusion of negotiating strength which results from multiple representation.  [...] found “that the right of negotiations attaches only to the majority representative and that public employers are prohibited from negotiating terms and conditions of employment or processing grievances presented by a minority employee organization, when there is a majority representative (N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3)” [emphasis added].
[brief] 351 N.J. Super. 467 (2002).  In criminal cases, a trial court must be sensitive to the Confrontation Clause problems created by an over-reliance on hearsay evidence.  Vandeweaghe, 351 N.J. Super. at 13.  Thus, in State v. Vandeweaghe, the court concluded that a State psychiatric expert should not have been permitted to include in his testimony a series of anecdotes related to him by a number of former acquaintances of the defendant, detailing the defendant's prior crimes and antisocial behavior.
[brief] Further, the [...] did not review any witness statements; rather, it reviewed the letter submitted by [...]’s counsel outlining the alleged witness statements and the purported evidence it received in its investigation.  These are all indicia, as this court has repeatedly observed, that the [...]’s review of the appeal was made without any credibility determinations by an independent factfinder.  See J.L. at *2.  Instead, the [...] upheld [...]’s determination in which the Department attempted to buttress its credibility determinations by misrepresenting, and inappropriately citing to, its own prior investigations of him under the label “Prior Discipline,” that were either dismissed or are on appeal in a separate proceeding.  That is not fact-finding the [...] could reasonably rely upon.  The magnitude of the allegations required an independent assessment of credibility.
[brief] (145)  On January 11, 2023, a deed was recorded with the [...] dated December 20, 2022 transferring ownership of the Boonton Property from [...] to [...] for the sum of $750,000.  (151)  Thus, 22 days after taking possession of the Boonton Property and 15 days after recording the deed, [...] sold the Boonton Property for a profit of $149,000.
[brief] (Da24-25, at ¶¶41-44 (SMF 12)).  Plaintiff does not offer, directly nor by implication, any factual support in his Complaint for the thesis that defendants, [...], Police Officer [...] or Detective [...] had any involvement whatsoever after he asserts that he was acquitted of all charges formalized in the August 11, 2015 Indictment.  (See Da12-55 (SMF 13)).  ***
[brief] SUBSECTION (b)(5) IS CONCERNED WITH AFFIRMATIVE MISUSE OF TANGIBLE RAILROAD PROPERTY  The trial court presumed without analysis that “property” as used in N.J.S.A. 48:12-152(b)(5) applied to the railroad’s crossing.  It does not.  While the term “property” can refer to both personal and real property, the term must be “restricted or limited by the context” in which it is found.  See Db32 (quoting N.J.S.A. 1:1-2).  Here, a comparison of the current and former text of the Act demonstrates that “property” was not intended to include the railroad crossing itself.¹
[brief] The court’s finding of my being "creative" (with arguing my position of enforcing a settlement agreement) does not warrant sanctions.  35  E)  The R. 1:4-8 letter was defective.  36 F)  I also had valid arguments as to the technical defects of the motions to dismiss.  36  G)  In a recent unrelated matter, [...] acted in the same manner as I did.  39  3.  The amount of sanctions was wholly unjustified (Pa87-88; Pa133-138; Pa143-145)
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPELLING ARBITRATION  BECAUSE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT WAIVED THE RIGHT, IF ANY, TO COMPEL ARBITRATION (1T40:20-42:14).  The Chancery Court did not analyze the Cole factors, nevermind reach \(^2\)  As [...]’s signature is undated and unwitnessed, Appellants contest the authenticity of his purported signature.  [...]’s proffered conclusion that she did not waive her right to arbitrate.  Pb3.  However, as this Court’s review is *de novo*, a fresh look at this matter reveals that [...] unequivocally waived any right she may have had to compel arbitration.  See *Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp.*, 238 N.J. 191, 207 (2019); *Cole v. Jersey City Med. Ctr.*, 215 N.J. 265, 276 (2013).  [...] claims the first three *Cole* factors weigh in favor of arbitration because of the “chain of events” while ignoring that she set off that chain of events.  Pb36.  It was [...] who selected the Chancery Division to file her claims (Da3-23), sought and obtained temporary restraints against Appellants (Da2, 24-28, 104-08, 259-62), engaged in mediation ordered by the Chancery Court (Da249-51, 263-64), filed and lost a motion to consolidate\(^3\) (Da275-77, 299-300), and waited nine --- \(^3\) [...]’s arguments (including Point III) that this matter is “highly related” to the Law Division Case and should be arbitrated together must be disregarded.
[brief] The State’s expert [...] wrote “his grandfather and mother – two trusted people in whom he confided such thoughts – instructed him not to share such thoughts or the thoughts of harming others with his therapist or anyone else, depriving him of the opportunity to receive useful feedback or intervention and depriving others of the opportunity to explore and assess his fears, thoughts, risk and access to weapons to avert tragedy. ” (Da455).  While nobody is debating that [...] was loved or didn’t have a caring home life, the fact that he was expressing concerns to his mother that he was having thoughts of killing his entire family and was never given help is dysfunctional.  (8T:241-5 to 18).  Furthermore, [...] tried to talk to his grandfather about it who also ignored it.  (8T:40-8 to 17).  [...] testified that she was so concerned that she confronted [...]’s mother.  (7T:245-8 to 15).  [...] also testified that she was afraid that if she told anybody that [...]’s mother was going to kick her out of the house.  (7T:245-8 to 19).  Therefore, the [...] household may have not been dysfunctional in the traditional sense but failing to provide help for a mentally ill sixteen-year-old boy who was desperately requesting it, is brutal and dysfunctional.
[directive] If you are pleading guilty to such a charge, the minimum mandatory extended term is __ b. years and __ months (fill in the number of years/months) and the maximum mandatory extended term can be __ years and __ months (fill in the number of years/months).  Se voce esta se declarando culpado portal crime, o periodo prolongado minimo obrigat6rio e de __ anos e __ meses (inserir o numero de anos/meses) e o periodo prolongado maximo obrigat6rio pode ser de __ anos e __ meses (inserir o numero de anos/meses).  8.
[brief] However, pursuant to R. 1:36-3, which provides such decisions are not precedent, this opinion is not referenced herein.  It should be noted that the [...]’s position is distinguishable from the situation in said decision and the [...] further believes said decision was incorrectly decided. of L. & Pub. Safety, supra at 312 (2020) (quoting Wright, supra, at 454).  The [...]’s action in the underlying case, meets that test.  [...]’s argument that there are no potential monetary damages, rings hollow because as a result of [...]’s denial of coverage, the [...] is being forced to incur legal fees and costs to defend the litigation.  Our Supreme Court has held that with regard to the duty to defend “the potential merit of the claim is immaterial: the duty to defend ‘is not abrogated by the fact that the cause of action stated cannot be maintained against the insured either in law or in fact—in other words, because the cause is groundless, false or fraudulent. ’  Moreover, the duty to defend remains even if the asserted claims are ‘poorly developed and almost sure to fail. ’”  Abouzaid v. Mansard Gardens Associates, LLC, 207 N.J. 67, 81 (2011).  (Internal citations omitted).  For all of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the [...] erred as a matter of law in its position that the state’s obligation to defend county prosecutor’s offices, when those offices are acting in a law enforcement capacity pursuant to the dictates of the [...], is limited to only those instances when they are sued for damages pursuant to he TCA.  Accordingly, the determination of the [...] not to defend the [...] in the underlying lawsuit should be reversed and the [...] should be required to defend the [...] in said action going forward and reimburse the county for all fees and expenses incurred to date in defending said action.  CONCLUSION
[brief] First, while courts “recognize the parental liberty interest” has been infringed when “the state actor compel[s] interference in the parent-child relationship,” a failure to affirmatively provide information with parents about their child—even sensitive or important information—does not violate parents’ fundamental rights.  Id. at 263, 266 (emphasis added).  For good reason: parents “cannot maintain a due process violation when the conduct complained of was devoid of any form of constraint or compulsion. ”  Id. at 264.  After all, failing to provide information does not actually prevent parents from guiding or raising their children as they see fit; at most, it means the State failed to “assist … the parents or affirmatively foster the parent/child relationship,” to which they have no fundamental right in the first place.  Id. at 266 (emphases added).  The facts of [...] are also instructive.  In that case, the complained-of conduct involved city health center personnel’s failure to affirmatively advise a minor’s parents that she sought reproductive care or “encourage” the minor to do so.  *Id.* at 261-62.  The parents’ claim failed because the minor was not “in any way compelled, constrained or coerced into” taking the pills, *id.* at 266, and “no one prevented [her] from calling her parents” first, *id.* at 264.  The parents’ “real problem” was “not that the state actors interfered with the [...]s as parents,” but that the government defendant “did not assist [them] as parents or affirmatively foster the parent/child relationship.
[brief] [...]’s subsequent observations of [...] in his truck after his conversation with [...] similarly do not provide reasonable suspicion that [...] did anything criminal for two reasons.  First, [...] did not see [...] do anything criminal or suspicious.  [...] testified that he saw [...] drive his truck to a secluded area of the parking lot, look down at his lap, and then bend down and back up, before driving away.  (1T 19-16 to 19, 20-5, 20-15 to 24)  As [...] conceded on cross-examination, he did not see what [...] was looking at in his lap.  While [...] suspected [...] was looking at drugs, [...] equally could have been looking at his phone or his wallet.  (1T 38-3 to 22)  All [...] observed was that [...] was looking down — a wholly ordinary thing to do.  Similarly, although [...] believed [...] had “snorted” something, what [...] actually saw was that [...] bent down and then sat back up.  He did not see [...] use any drugs nor did he see any drugs.  (1T 39-9 to 19)  These benign observations do not provide reasonable, articulable suspicion that [...] was using drugs in his truck.  Second, even if [...] did have reasonable suspicion that [...] was using drugs in his truck, those observations could not support reasonable suspicion that [...] had done anything criminal.
[brief] CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX (Pca1-10)  Exhibit 3 to Certification of [...], Psychological Evaluation by [...], M.D. dated April 22, 2021 .........................................................Pca1  Exhibit 4 to Certification of [...], Esq., Psychiatric Evaluation by [...], M.D., dated February 26, 2020 ........................................Pca9  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT