ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] We note that a court’s decision on pretrial release reflects an overall evaluation of the level of risk of non-appearance, danger, and obstruction.  A change in any one area might -- or might not -- affect the overall calculus.  Movants focused their application on defendants who have been detained for six months or longer.  We agree with that approach.  It is far less likely courts would find material changes in the case of defendants detained for less time.  24  We therefore hold that defendants have the right to reopen their detention hearings under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f) if they (1) have been detained for at least six months and (2) can make a preliminary showing that, based on relief.5 one or more of the above factors, they are entitled to
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  I.  Case Law  Harrington v. Harrington, 281 N.J. Super, 39, 46, (App. Div. (1995) 16, 20, 26, 27, 29  Pelow v. Pelow 300 NJ Super 634, 646-647, 693, (CH. Div. 1996) 38, 39  Tancredi v. Tancredi, 101 N.J. Super, 259, 262 (App. Div. 1968)  16, 20, 26, 29 II.  Rules of Court  R1:6-2 46 R 1:7-4b 44  [...], Plaintiff/Respondent v. [...], Defendant/Appellant Pro Se Superior Court of NJ Appellate Division.
[brief] An insurer’s obligation to convey proper notice to insureds of policy changes predates the regulations and has been reiterated in various contexts for decades.  In Bauman v. Royal Indem. Co., supra, 36 N.J. 12, 21-26, an insurer sought to enforce a coverage exclusion that it placed in a renewal policy, without providing notice of that limitation to the insured.  The Supreme Court reversed summary judgment entered in favor of the insurer.  It cited a veritable legion of cases from other jurisdictions which hold that, where an insurance company purports to change coverage “without fairly calling the insured's attention to a reduction in the policy coverage, it remains bound” to provide the prior coverage to the insured.
[brief] Table of Judgments, Orders & Rulings ................................................................. vi  I.  Preliminary Statement .........................................................................................1  II.  Procedural History (Pa1-45, Pa122-60, Pa46-105, Pa180-205, Pa161-79)  ...........4  III.  Factual Background .............................................................................................6  A.  The Parties (Pa330-31, Pa333, Pa274-99, Pa487-88, Pa815-16, Pa570-71, Pa795-98, Pa230, Pa510, Pa431, Pa668) ..............................................................6  B.  March 2018-November 2018: [...] Repeatedly Sexually Harasses Appellant (Pa55, Pa230, Pa274-99, Pa338, Pa340-49, Pa372-74, Pa378, Pa379- 80, Pa381-82, Pa431, Pa452, Pa734-35, Pa739, Pa753-54, Pa993-97, Pa1000, Pa1001-3)  ............................................................................................................8  C. November 2018:  Due to [...]'s Harrassment and Retaliation, Appellant and [...] Report the Matter to Human Resources/EEO; They Are Met With Immediate Retaliation (Pa230, Pa274-99, Pa341-43, Pa345-46, Pa349-51, Pa353-55, Pa359, Pa382, Pa977-79, Pa895-96)  ..................................................16  D. November 2018: Appellant Is Transferred In Retaliation For Her Complaints And So [...] Could Protect Its Business Relationship With [...] (Pa230, Pa324-417, Pa367-68, Pa675, Pa655-722, Pa678-79, Pa681, Pa981, Pa999)  ..................................................................................................................19  E. December 2018-January 2019: Appellant Continued to Suffer Retaliation as a Result of Reporting the Sexual Harassment (Pa230, Pa351-55, Pa358-60, Pa998, Pa693-95)  ..................................................................................................21  F. January 2019-April 2019: Plaintiffs Continue to be Subjected to Retaliation  Even After This Lawsuit Was Filed and the EEO Substatiated The Complaints (Pa1-45, Pa106-21, Pa591, Pa595-96, Pa746-53, Pa895-965, Pa908-09, Pa991-92, Pa966-76)  ............................................................................................22  G.  April 2019-November 2019:  Appellant is Continually Subjected to Retaliation, And Respondents' Retaliation  Ultimately Culminates In The Unlawful Termination Of Appellant's Employment (Pa97-98, Pa230, Pa358-60, Pa374-77, Pa984-89, Pa990-92, Pa999, Pa1022-23)  ............................24  IV.  The Motions For Summary Judgment(Pa1230-1253, Pa1255-1334) ..................26
[brief] Pa19.  In Morales, the plaintiff’s lack of English literacy differed greatly from that of [...].  Before employing the plaintiff, he had passed a written exam entirely in English.  Morales, 541 F.3d at 220.  To pass a written exam in English, the plaintiff in Morales had to understand the English language.  However, here, [...] was not required to prove that she could understand English prior to utilizing the [...] application, in fact, [...] needed to rely on her [...] application settings to be in Spanish to be able to order a ride.  Pa431.  The *Morales* case differs from this case because it applied to an employment setting as opposed to this “ride share” situation.  Moreover, the arbitration provision in *Morales* was 8 out of 13 pages of the Employment Agreement.  541 F.3d 218, 220.  In *Morales*, the plaintiff also attended a 2 ½ hour orientation conducted entirely in English.  *Id.*  It is also important to note that in *Morales*, since the arbitration agreement were within an employment agreement, the plaintiff could have tried to negotiate the terms and did not do so.  Here, [...] asserts [...] would have had to either accept the terms or have no means of transportation.  Pa599; 1T18:4-9.  This is a contract of adhesion as opposed to the *Morales* matter.  Therefore, the trial court erred both when it relied on a non-binding opinion over binding opinions, and when it did not consider the distinguishable facts between *Morales* and the case before this Court.  Pa19.
[brief] [...] never made an out-of-court identification.  In his first statement—given to [...] around 4:48 a.m. before he left [...] for his next job—[...] did not tell Morgan that he recognized the suspect, that he thought the suspect used to work there, that the suspect had a chest tattoo, or that the suspect had red hair.  (Da9; 8T 21-8 to 24, 39-16 to 40-12)  [...] told the Kellys and police that he believed he recognized the suspect only after: (1) [...] and [...] watched the surveillance video and decided that the suspect was [...]; (2) [...] signed a complaint warrant charging [...] with the burglary; (3) the Kellys called [...] to return to [...]; and (4) [...] watched the surveillance video.  (Da11; 8T 82-25 to 84-8)  [...] then went to the [...], where he told [...] he recognized the suspect from having seen him on three previous occasions while he was cleaning the beer lines.  (Da11-13)  [...] said the last time he had seen the suspect was the previous summer.  (Da13)  [...] did not know the name of the man he believed the suspect to be but knew that the man worked for Kelly’s and had red hair and a tattoo.  (Da13-14)  [...] told [...] he first believed he recognized the suspect when the suspect said to him, “I don’t think they get the lines cleaned here,” because the Kelly’s employee with red hair and a tattoo had previously said that to [...].  (Da11)  [...] did not present [...] with a photo array, and [...] never identified a photo of [...] as the man he believed the suspect to be.  (Da12-15)  The first time [...] ever identified [...] as the man he saw in [...] on February 1, 2016 was during trial.
[brief] The advance state aid loan statutory provision has two explicit preconditions for a district to be eligible for such payments: (i) it must have a State monitor in place; and (ii) the Commissioner must recommend that “the payment is necessary to ensure the provision of a thorough and efficient education. ”\(^9\)  In the case of [...], a succession of commissioners have certified the district’s need for such advance state aid loans for eight of the last 10 years.  Student-petitioners have argued almost from the start of this case, that those certifications are acknowledgements that SFRA funding for [...] is insufficient for the district to be able to provide its students with T&E and, effectively, prove their case without more.  Instead of seeking to refute that legal assertion, the State has ignored it.
[brief] He raised the bad faith allegations in the Second Action under the pretense that he did not know the basis for a bad faith claim until after the First Action was dismissed.  No court has bought this argument.  [...] cannot restyle claims by using words that are interchangeable, such as “bad faith” and “illicit agreement” to evade the entire controversy doctrine.  [...] cannot escape the fact that he expressed his suspicions of this purported “illicit” or illegal activity and favoritism between the [...] and [...] no less than five times before the First Action was dismissed.
[brief] THE COURT GRANTS DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO AMEND R.4:5-1 STATEMENT IN THE BERGEN COUNTY CASE  As set forth above, the Court granted the Motion to dismiss and in doing so the Court stated:  Most legal malpractice claims are exempt from the entire controversy doctrine where the prior litigation itself gave rise to the malpractice claim.  However, legal malpractice claims are not exempt where the alleges malpractice accrues before the prior litigation, such as with transactional malpractice.  From the motion record, the competent evidence shows Plaintiff had already decided to sue Defendants for legal malpractice prior to the settlement of the prior lease litigation.  Thus, Plaintiff’s malpractice claims against the Defendants are not exempt from the entire controversy doctrine.  The entire controversy doctrine bars all claims that had accrued at the time of the original action.
[directive] i. Computer Crime Prevention Fund Penalty, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.8 2009, c. 143).  If the (L. [Yes/Sim] [No/Nilo] crime involves a violation ofN.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(3) (causes or permits child to engage in sexual act that is to be photographed or exhibited), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4) (photographs or films a child in sexual act), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(b) (knowingly possessing or knowingly viewing child pornography), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1 (leader of a child pornography network), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:34-3 (selling, distributing or exhibiting obscene material to a person under age 18) or an 2C, offense involving computer criminal activity in violation of any provision of Title chapter 20, you will be assessed a mandatory penalty as listed below for each offense for which you pied guilty?
[brief] [...] & [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2 on R. 4:49-2 (2022) ..................................................................................  11  RULES R. 1:12-1 ....................................................................................................  20 R. 1:12-1(e) ...............................................................................................  19 R. 1:12-2 ....................................................................................................  19 R. 1:40-6(a) ..............................................................................................  25 R. 1:6-2(d) ...............................................................................................  30 R. 1:6-3(a) ...............................................................................................  30 R. 1:6-5 ....................................................................................................  30 R. 4:49-2 ..................................................................................................  11, 16 R. 4:52 ......................................................................................................  3  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] (8T34-13 to 19).  [...] had stopped [...] because, under Illinois law, the pick-up truck was a Division 2 class vehicle, which required but did not have any mudflaps or splash guards to prevent water, mud, and rocks from being flung onto a vehicle behind the truck.  (8T34-20 to 35-15).  Using his flashlight, [...] peered into the right back window of the truck’s topper to ensure no one else was in the truck.  (8T39-14 to 19; 8T43-15 to 21).  The officer “clearly” saw some brand-new duffel bags underneath a piece of plywood and broken-down cardboard boxes.  (8T39-19 to 40-5).  During the traffic stop, [...] deployed his drug-sniffing K-9 dog, which alerted him to the presence of drugs in the truck.  (8T43-15 to 21; 11T45-24 to 46-9).  As a result, the truck was searched, and the search resulted in the discovery of eight large duffel bags containing approximately 175 pounds of raw marijuana.
[brief] APPELLANTS allege therein that the dangerous condition was the open and obvious illegal sale of alcohol at a large makeshift stand (P4 at ¶21).  Count One further alleges that [...] failed to terminate the illegal sale of alcohol on the property which had been going on for months prior to the shooting (P4 at ¶22).  Count Two of APPELLANTS’ Complaint alleges that RESPONDENTS’ “aforesaid acts and omissions, resulting in Decedent’s death, Plaintiffs lost the pecuniary value of Decedent’s financial support, love, affection, guidance, wisdom and companionship. ”  (P4 at ¶26)  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[directive] przysługiwać prawo do zwolnienia warunkowego będzie Panu [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] b. w przypadku, gdy Stanowa Rada ds. Zwolnień Warunkowych, po otrzymaniu zaleceń specjalnej komisji rewizyjnej ds. klasyfikacji orzeknie, że poczynił Pan zadowalające postępy w terapii dla przestępców seksualnych i że chyba że zostanie Pan następnie zwolniony warunkowo, Stanowa Rada ds.  Zwolnień Warunkowych uzna, na podstawie przytłaczających dowodów, że nie współpracował Pan w procesie resocjalizacji że istnieją uzasadnione lub obawy, że naruszy Pan warunki takiego zwolnienia? eligible that you will be for release when the State Parole Board, after receiving a recommendation from a special classification review board, finds you have achieved a satisfactory level of progress in sex offender treatment and that you will then be released Skorygowany formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081-Polish strona 2 z 3 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081-Polish page 2 of 3 unless on parole the State Parole Board determines by a preponderance of the evidence or that you have failed to cooperate in your rehabilitation there is reasonable expectation that you will violate conditions of parole? istnieje możliwość, że okres terapii może być dłuższy niż okres, jaki [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] c. musiałby Pan spędzić w stanowym więzieniu w razie wydania wyroku pozbawienia wolności? that you could spend more time in treatment than you would spend if sentenced to state prison?
[brief] She wanted the residue of her Trust to go to [...].  To modify that Residuary Clause to exclude a specific asset, [...] had to present clear and convincing evidence that the unlimited Residuary Clause was contrary to [...]’s intent.  [...] produced no evidence.  The textual reading proffered by [...] and adopted by the Probate Court is logically faulty, as evidenced by the myriad problems the interpretation creates.  It certainly does not rise to clear and convincing evidence of [...]’s probable intent to exclude her interest in the Palm Beach Property from [...] from any source.  The Probate Court erred in its interpretation of the Trust and [...] failed to present evidence supporting his claim.
[brief] Citing the language in Mount Laurel II providing the trial courts with vast remedial flexibility, the Appellate Division, in Cranford Development Associates, LLC v. Tp. of Cranford, 445 N.J. Super. 220 (App. Div. 2016), upheld the trial court’s decision to appoint a special hearing examiner to consider the development application submitted by that builder.  In this regard, the Appellate Division held as follows:  The court’s authority to appoint Special Masters in Mount Laurel cases is well established.  See Mount Laurel II, supra, 92 N.J. at 282–85, 456 A.2d 390.  Given the Township’s record of obstructing affordable housing projects, and the Planning Board’s past hostility to a much more limited affordable housing plan, the court’s decision to appoint the hearing examiner was justified in this case.  The motion practice which occurred after the appointment further confirmed the wisdom of the court’s action.  In addition to opposing the Township’s reconsideration motion, [...] filed a cross-motion to have the hearing examiner, instead of the Township, review soil removal permits because the Township had unreasonably delayed the permit approvals.  In fact, it appeared undisputed that Township officials had publicly stated that they would not issue the approvals and would issue a stop work order instead.  Consequently, the judge gave the hearing examiner authority to hear any soil permit application that the Township unduly delayed.  As the judge noted, the [...] project would face various municipal regulatory “hurdles” and the hearing examiner’s participation would likely be needed to resolve them.  We recognize that a “trial court (and the master, if one is appointed) should make sure that the municipal planning board is closely involved in the formulation of the builder’s remedy[,]” and “should make as much use as they can of the planning board’s expertise and experience so that the proposed project is suitable for the municipality.
[brief] (6T).  Following summations, the jury was excused for its lunch break.  (6T92-9 to 15).  When the jury was back from lunch, the judge instructed the jury.  (6T112-13 to 6T149-21).  After commencing deliberations at 4:07 p.m., the jury requested the playback of testimony, which the court provided from 5:11 p.m.  to 5:23 p.m. (6T155-8 to 6T156-21; 6T156-23 to 6T157-11; 6T157-18; 6T167-13).  The jury deliberated until 5:35 p.m. without reaching a verdict.  (6T167-16 to 21).
[brief] 29  Winters v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 212 N.J. 67(2012)  44  Wyzykowski v. Rizas, 132 N.J. 509 (1992)  34 Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011)  47 Persuasive Botteon v. Borough of Highland Park, [...] (App. Div. May 1, 2024)
[brief] Against this backdrop, the trial court on remand did not abuse its discretion in applying compound interest to [...]’s prejudgment interest award.  The paramount consideration in determining whether and how to award prejudgment interest is that “the defendant has had the use, and the plaintiff has not, of the amount in question; and the interest factor simply covers the value of the sum awarded for the prejudgment period during which the defendant had the benefit of monies to which the plaintiff is found to have been earlier entitled. ”  *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am.*, 65 N.J. 474, 506 (1974).  The trial court relied on this equitable purpose to determine the appropriate amount of interest that would compensate [...] “for the loss of [the] monies” [...] “would presumably have earned if payment was not delayed. ”  (Da40003.)  The trial court concluded that compound interest at two different interest rates would best serve to indemnify [...] for its losses: 8.875% from the date of the December 20, 2013 final judgment through and including July 9, 2014 -- the date the [...] property at issue was sold; and the average prime interest rate of 3.935% from the date of that sale through and including November 16, 2022.  (40079a-40080a.)  Contrary to the [...]’ assertion, the trial court’s decision to award compound interest was not “harsh and oppressive” or “punitive. ”  (Db59-60.)  If anything in this case is “harsh and oppressive” or “punitive” it is the [...]’ withholding, and having the exclusive benefit of, [...]’s monies for nearly thirty years while persisting in taking every opportunity to further delay this matter’s resolution.
[brief] As noted in Rose, while a defendant need not “persist in asserting the right to proceed pro se . . . absent a clear denial,” inaction may constitute waiver under the circumstances.  458 N.J. Super. at 633.  “The critical question here is whether,” under the totality of the circumstances, “defendant clearly intended to relinquish a known right. ”  Id. at 637 (citation omitted).  This Court in Rose remanded for a hearing on whether defendant waived his right to represent himself after several timely written and oral attempts to invoke that right went unanswered by the trial court.  Id. at 638.  Here, a remand would be unnecessary because defendant relinquished any right to self-representation.
[brief] Unpublished (App. Div. [...], February 10, 2023,) | | Coryell, L. L.C. v. Curry | 391 N.J.Super.72............ 29 79 (App. Div. 2006) | | Court Invest. Co v. Perillo | ............................................. 28,31 48 NJ.334, 341 (1966) | | Cummings v. Bahr | 295 N.J.Super....................... 6 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) | | D’Atria v. D’Atria | 242 N.J. Super....................... 6 392, 401-02 (App. Div. 1990) | | Del Vecchio v. Hemberger | ............................................. 32,33 388 N.J.Super.179 (App. Div 2006) | | Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co v. Russo | ............................................. 4 429 N.J. Super. 91, 98 (App. Div. 2012) | | DiProspero v. Penn | 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) ...................... 43 | | In reFernandez | 468 N.J.Super................................. 5 377, 391 (App. Div. 2021) | | Fiduccia v. Intercont. Restaurant | ............................................. 36 310 N. J. Super 52 (App. Div 1998) | Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, ...................... 5 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) Housing Authority of Morristown v. Little, ........... 29 135 N. J. 274, 283 (1994)  Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ....................... 4 91N.J. 88,. 123 (2007)  Jameson v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 363 N.J.Super.419........................................ 24 428 (App. Div.2003)  Johnson v. Johnson, 320 N.J.Super. 371.................. 30 378 (App. Div. 1999)  Landa v. Adams, 162 N.J.Super.......................... 17,18 318, 320-321 (App. Div 1978)
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .........................................................................................1  RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................................4  A.  Abbott Violation of T&E in the [...] .............4  B.  The Supreme Court’s Funding Remedy for the T&E Violation in Jersey City ..................................................................................................................6  C.  The State’s SFRA Funding Remedy for the T&E  Violation in Jersey City .........................................................................................................................8  1.  Adequacy Budget .........................................................................................8  2.  Funding the Adequacy Budget ....................................................................9  3.  Adjustment Aid and Education  Adequacy Aid ..........................................12  D.  SFRA’s Implementation in Jersey City .........................................................13  1.  Underfunding of Jersey City’s Adequacy Budget .................................13  2.