ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Although defendant had automatic standing to challenge the gun’s seizure by virtue of being charged with a possessory offense, *State v. Randolph*, 228 N.J. 566, 581-82 (2017), whether he possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in [...]’s apartment is a separate issue, which is defendant’s burden to establish.  *State v. Hinton*, 216 N.J. 211, 230, 235 (2013).  Because the merits of the suppression motion “rest on whether defendant possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy, the court must address that issue as part of the substantive constitutional analysis. ”  *Id.* at 234.  Absent a finding defendant met his burden to show society is willing to recognize his subjective expectation as objectively reasonable, he “cannot challenge” the admissibility of the gun into evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, or equivalent rights under Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, for the police action was not a “search” under either the federal or State Constitution.
[brief] We would monitor that.  If we saw the feed, which is feeding the 125-pound system, if we saw an absent normal swing, either low or high, then that would trigger – that would trigger our response based on the – based on our controller's judgment.  Obviously, a 125-pound system, there's a maximum pressure allowed.  But the judgment would be on the controller if it does not reach that alarm mode.  Q.  I'm just using your term.  You used the term "set point."  I'm just trying to find out what the set point is.  A.  It varies.  It will vary depending on the period of time.  And, again, a set point on a 125-pound system, depending on the time of the year, it could vary.  It could be 80 pounds, it could be 115 pounds, it could be – you know, it varies depending on demand.  Q.  In the wintertime, what is the set point?
[brief] [...] was in a dating relationship with [...] in July 2007.  She testified that in June and July 2007, she was employed by the [...] at the [...] in [...].  Because she and [...] were living in [...], approximately five to six miles away from [...], [...] would regularly drop her off at work in the morning and pick her up at the end of her shift in the afternoon.  She would typically call him prior to the end of her workday to let him know when she was free to go home.  [...] testified that the couple went shopping for an engagement ring on July 15, 2007.  Three days later, on July 18, 2007 (the day of the robbery), she spoke to [...] for approximately two minutes around 3:50 p.m.  [...] clocked out of work at 4:38 p.m. that day, but could not “exactly recall” if [...] picked her up.  The [...] Post Office is a three to four minute drive from [...].
[brief] [...], AND [...]  [...], Esq. 029721976  [...], Esq. 035071987  [...] 5 Becker Farm Road Roseland, New Jersey  07068  Attorneys for Defendants- Appellants/Cross Respondents  [...], and [...] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Title | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................... | ii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ......................................................................... | 1 | | REPLY STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................... | 2 | |
[brief] As her only evidence concerning the operation of the bus, [...] relies on her own, self-serving characterization of the bus’s movement and that of her friend.  Notably, [...] herself was not certain whether that movement was even a sudden stop, stating, “Well, I think bus [sic] made a sudden stop, I think. ” (Pa47) (emphasis added).  [...] also admitted that the bus was moving slowly prior to this incident, negating any suggestion that the deceleration of the bus was substantial or unusual.  (Pa47).  [...] also explained that she took about five or six steps backward before she fell, demonstrating that she was not thrown by the bus’s movement but rather lost her balance.  (Pa47).  Although [...]’s friend offered a statement that the bus “violently and abruptly made a sudden stop,” she likewise provided no explanation or factual basis as to how that movement was “violent” or beyond that which is to be expected.  (Pa60).  As noted by the trial judge, the parroting of the word “violent,” without more, does not suffice to demonstrate that the stopping of the bus was beyond the ordinary “jerking and jolting” to be expected, particularly when that statement was inconsistent with the other evidence.  (1T11:17-12:4).  Furthermore, [...]’s friend did not dispute [...]’s characterization of the slow rate of speed of the bus, again negating the possibility that the bus’s movement was of an extreme nature.  (Pa60).  Moreover, there is no evidence that [...]’s friend or any other passenger was caused to fall or become injured as a result of the bus’s motion.  Thus, unlike in *Cohn*, where the plaintiff-passenger offered evidence that he was thrown with such force to break a window, evincing a highly unusual motion, [...] here did not present any comparable evidence supporting her allegation of negligence.  Rather, she admitted that she took a number of steps backward before she fell, losing her balance as opposed to being violently thrown by the bus’s movement.  (Pa47).  Just as the court in *Raeuber* found the plaintiff-passenger’s unsupported assertions of unusual jerking to be insufficient there, [...]’s characterization here of a sudden “violent” stop without corroborative proofs, and with contradictory evidence, should also be rejected.  Without more, the alleged movement of this [...] bus amounts to nothing more than an event incidental to the normal operation of a bus along an urban Hudson County roadway, where sudden bus movements and braking are reasonably foreseeable and certainly expected.  Absent unique, egregious facts like those catalogued in *Cohn*, the trial court rightly adjudicated and dismissed [...]’s negligence claims on summary judgment, supporting affirmance of the trial court’s decision.
[directive] Designated 12.4 designate shall Criminal Justice Division of the of Director the and Prosecutor County  Each to authorized are who general attorneys or prosecutors deputy supervisor-level assistant more or one justify to sufficient circumstances in material change been a has determination there that a approve term longer a for offer call must plea subsequent or second a that rule general the from departure a offer. plea previous the than imprisonment of immediately.  operational shall become Section This Rights• with Victims' Adherence Strict 12.5 with comply shall Directive this to pursuant implemented and policy issued plea escalating An Jersey New the of 22 paragraph 1, Article to pursuant victims to guaranteed rights all protect and policy or General Directive or Attorney statute other any and 52:4B-36,33 N.J.S.A. Constitution, 32 offer a include plea post-indictment initial or apre-indictment that (requiring §4.3 BrimaQe Guidelines, See pretrial motions). any litigate further or file to right the waive defendant the that condition 33 amount a reasonable within statement, written a submit "[t]o victim a entitles expressly 52:4B-36(m) N.J.S.A. prior considered shall to be which prosecuting agency the of representative a to crime the of impact the of about time, N.J.S.A. plea." negotiated or a to agree make will prosecutor ...whether the concerning decision final prosecutor's the prior prosecuting authority the with opportunity consult to the have "[t]o right victim's a further guarantees 52:4B-36(o) and victim's consultation the of the court the advise prosecutor the have to and negotiations, plea any of conclusion the to ...." agreement plea regarding the position Page 79 crime victims. the of concerning rights immediately.
[brief] - On April 7, 2021, appellant/plaintiff was charged with “driving or parking [an] unregistered motor vehicle” in the jurisdiction of Orange City, New Jersey.  (PA087-088); - In August of 2021, appellant/plaintiff obtained a lease agreement in his name for residence located at [...] in [...].  (PA089); - At the scene of the accident, when police asked whether appellant/plaintiff lived in North Carolina, plaintiff replied “No, I just moved up here last year. ” (PA085, 18:23-18:30); and, - Investigation reports show that appellant/plaintiff’s vehicle was present in the City of Orange, New Jersey consistently: dates include May 18, 2021, September 6, 2021, November 7, 2021, January 22, 2022, and February 8, 2022.  (PA096-120).
[directive] In order to ensure evidence collected in sexual assault cases is preserved and processed in a victim- centered and efficient manner, the State Auditor from the Office of Legislative Services issued a report to evaluate whether there was a Sexual Assault Forensic Examination (SAFE) kit testing backlog in New Jersey in 2019.  While no backlog was identified, the report recommended changes to policies for handling and kits.2 tracking SAFE  In response to this report, the Division of Criminal Justice created a SAFE Kit Working Group whose goal was to assess the feasibility of implementing a statewide tracking system and explore options for standardizing the tracking of SAFE kits.  The recommendations of this working group were reviewed by the leadership within the Division of Criminal Justice, the Office of Violence Intervention and Victim Assistance, and the Office of the Attorney General, and that collective expertise, as well as the results of the Attorney General’s SAFE kit survey, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:17B-245, informed this Directive.  This Directive is intended to modify and build upon the Standards in the areas of collection, tracking, storage, testing, retention, and destruction of evidence and information gathered in the aftermath of an act of sexual assault victimization.  The Standards combined with, and modified by, the requirements included in this Directive, will protect the rights of victims and enhance the potential to prosecute offenders.
[brief] [...] further asserted that she paid for water and the roof collapsed and Plaintiff failed to pay for it, and that is when he came to her with a lease and she refused to sign the lease.  Moreover, she asserted that Defendants were paying the Mortgage and even paid extra.  2T54-19  Defendant cross examined Plaintiff regarding roof repairs.  Plaintiff asserted that Defendant called the city of Newark and was willing to do the repairs but Defendant did not allow him inside the house.  Once Defendant was permitted inside the house, the repairs were completed to the City of Newark’s satisfaction and to the inspector’s satisfaction.  2T58-3.  Defendant direct examined [...] only as the case relates to a collapsed roof that allegedly was never repaired by Plaintiff.
[brief] By statute, the NJFCA precludes an action if it is “based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions” in certain enumerated channels.  N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-9(c).  Courts have equated the term “based upon” to mean whether the allegations in the operative pleading are “substantially similar” to what has been publicly disclosed.  *United States ex rel. CKD Project, LLC v. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc.*, 551 F. Supp. 3d 27, 40 (E.D.N.Y. 2021), aff’d, 2022 WL 17818587 (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2022).
[brief] ”  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 173.  Those resources are estimated based on actual salaries and other data from districts across the State.  Abbott XIX, 196 N.J. at 554.  The formula was fashioned with the goal of generating adequacy budgets that would “‘exceed the requirements necessary’ to provide an adequate education according to the CCCS to all students[.]”  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 164.  But neither Abbott XX nor Abbott XXI required the State to ensure that districts operate at their adequacy budgets.
[brief] 32 Willoughby v. Planning Board of Township of Deptford, 326 N.J. Super. 158 (App.Div. 1999).  ............................................ 38, 39, 46 Willoughby v. Planning Board of Township of Deptford, 332 N.J. Super. 223 (App. Div.), cert. den. 165 N.J. 603 (2000) .............  42, 48 Zaehring v. Long Beach, 56 N.J. Super. 26, 33 (Law Div. 1959) ..............  32 Statutes 386 N.J. Super. 255 (Law Div. 2006) .............................................  40 394 N.J. Super. 303 (App. Div. 2007) .............................................  40 N.J.S.A. 2A:16-53 ........................................................................ 26 N.J.S.A. 12:3-1 et seq.  – “New Jersey Tidelands Act” .........................  12 N.J.S.A. 13:1D-150 to 156 ...............................................................  6 N.J.S.A. 13:1D-151(a) .................................................................. 14 ??N.J.S.A. -1 et seq.  ..................................................................... 5, 39 N.J.S.A. 40A:12-7 ........................................................................ 36, 46 N.J.S.A. 40A:12-7 (d) ...................................................................
[brief] 13  1.  The Standard of Review .......................................  13  Point  1.  The Trial Court Properly Held That The Board's Invocation of Res Judicata Was Not Arbitrary, Capricious Or Unreasonable And Sufficient Evidence Exists To Support Denial Of The [...] Application On The Merits .................. 15 (Ja45 L. 4-9; Ja54 L. 9-15, 20-23; Ja60 L. 11-20; Ja61 L. 21-25; Ja63 L.19-Ja64 L.2; Ja73 L. 5-19; Ja76 L. 25-Ja77 L. 4; Ja77 L.14-22; Ja78 L. 2-5; Ja87 L. 13-19; Ja87 L. 25-Ja88 L. 3; Ja94 L. 15-19; Ja107 L.19-Ja108 L. 17; Ja123 L. 12-25; Ja124 L. 8-11; Ja127 L. 11-Ja128 L. 4; Ja129 L. 6-15; Ja130 L. 1-6; Ja130 L. 22-Ja131 L. 8; Ja134 L. 11-16; Ja135 L. 7-20; Ja135 L. 22-Ja136 L. 1; Ja138 L. 6-17; Ja148; Ja156-157; Ja167; Ja169-172; Ja176-178; Ja181-184; Ja190; Ja200-203; Ja208; Ja214; Ja216-218; Ja220; Ja224; Ja227-229; Ja238; Ja240-241; Ja245; Ja247-250; Ja253; Ja269; Ja274-275; Ja285; Ja289, Ja293)
[brief] (Pa341-43, Pa345-46, Pa353-55)  68:12-72:9, 75:1-19, 82:9-85:22, 86:23-88:1, 115:6-117:25, 121:1-125:14 (explaining he never spoke to [...] after her initial complaint, nor did he ask for the text messages, despite having an obligation to investigate such matters).  Due to his failure to investigate, [...] learned for the first time at his deposition that the state conducted its own investigation and made findings of fact.  [...] was shocked that the state never shared the results with [...]’s HR Director.  (Pa359)  139:1-145:13.  D.
[brief] Specifically:  -  In response to Appellant’s report of sexual harassment, [...] yelled at Appellant that the predicament was her fault for speaking with caseworkers in the office.  Immediately after blaming Appellant – the victim – for the sexual harassment she endured, [...] told her that she would be transferred to the Camden location, giving rise to an inference of retaliation.  (Pa234).  -  The Camden location was well known as the worst [...] office in the area due to its abundance of difficult cases.  Appellant was “hysterical” when Respondents notified her of the transfer to the Camden location because of Camden’s bad reputation regarding work conditions.  Appellant told Respondents she felt that this transfer was punishment.  (Pa 324) 102:17-104:10; 106:16-24; 234:6-10.
[brief] *Rauch*, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2177, at *16.  The Appellate Division agreed, noting that these “were not issues these parties would have overlooked. ”  *Id.* at *18.  As to the corporate liabilities in particular, the Court noted:  [The son] acknowledged that his parents had “personal guarantees” on the companies, and if the companies failed “it would have meant the end of them. ”  With no discussion of assets and liabilities, the agreement lacked terms “normal to an obligation of this magnitude.
[brief] The sentencing court found defendant’s representations with regard to his future ability to pay restitution to be supported by the information he self-reported with regard to his employment history during preparation of his Presentence Report.  While defendant was unemployed at the time of sentencing, this unemployment was related to the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic; his pre-pandemic employment “was a front house manager at an establishment in Asbury Park” and with a “tree service. ”  Defendant also reported having “approximately 15 to 16 years in the restaurant … or bar industry” and construction.  (13T:11-23 to 12-24).  Without objection from defendant or counsel, the sentencing court found “the defendant is not challenging the amount of the restitution, and that [he] is willing to pay restitution.
[brief] Indeed, the court found that, “[n]one of the cases that were cited to me were directly on point on this, and the cases that were cited to have very big differences. ” (1T51:17-52:3).  The court did not specifically address the likelihood of success on the merits and recognized that the outcome of Plaintiff’s builder’s remedy claim was uncertain, stating that “with reference to the builder’s remedy . . . “the developer doesn’t get everything they want.  They may not get anything that they want.  It may not be that this property can be developed for affordable housing, but the determination made that [...] isn’t constitutionally compliant . . . sort of gets you over that hump to the next stage. ” (1T53:25-54:7).  The court further stated that there was no argument from [...] that the Property is “environmentally not appropriate [or] that nothing can be built there. ”  (1T53:10-22).  Finally, the court held that the balance of the relative hardships weighed in favor of Plaintiff, holding that if [...] were to move forward with condemnation, it will potentially negatively affect Plaintiff’s ability to secure financing and to proceed with their builder’s remedy claim.  (1T54:8-55:7).  On July 8, 2024, the court entered an Order consistent with its oral decision.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.1 et seq ..........................................................................................  1 N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.1(c) ............................................................................................... 22, 31 N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.1(c)(1) .........................................................................................  22 N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.1(c)(3) .........................................................................................  22 N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.1(c)(5) .........................................................................................  22 N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.1(c)(6) .........................................................................................  22 18 N.J.R. 314(a) (February 3, 1986) .................................................................  25  22 N.J.R. 1188(a) (April 16, 1990) ..................................................................  25  22 N.J.R. 2542(b) (August 20, 1990) ...............................................................  25 26 N.J.R. 943(a) (February 22, 1994) ...............................................................  25  26 N.J.R. 1561(c) (April 18, 1994) ...................................................................  25  29 N.J.R. 3920(a) (September 15, 1997) ......................................................... 27, 28  30  N.J.R. 645(a) (February 17, 1998)  ...............................................................  27  32 N.J.R. 864(a) (March 20, 2000) ..................................................................  27  32 N.J.R. 3784(b) (October 16, 2000)  ..............................................................  27  34 N.J.R. 74(a) (January 7, 2002)  ....................................................................  27  35 N.J.R. 632(a) (February 3, 2003)  .................................................................  27  46 N.J.R. 1051(a) (June 2, 2014)  .....................................................................  27  47 N.J.R. 1392(a) (July 6, 2015)  .....................................................................  27  COURT RULES
[brief] Rather, the “criminal action” element of malicious prosecution “is committed ordinarily by the filing of a criminal complaint with malice and without probable cause” and that “the ‘essence’ of the tort is the wrongful conduct in making the criminal charge. ”  Muller Fuel Oil Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 95 N.J. Super. 564, 576 (App. Div. 1967) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
[brief] The test for whether an enactment is invalid on its face has been described as follow:  When examining a facial challenge to legislation, "the effects [of the statute] on particular participants in an industry are not dispositive; rather, the question is whether the 'mere enactment' of a statute offends constitutional rights."  *State Farm*, supra, 124 N.J. at 46, 590 A.2d 191.  Holding a statute facially unconstitutional is "exceedingly rare."  *Id.*  "A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score."  *United States v. Jin Fuey Moy*, 241 U.S. 394, 401, 36 S. Ct. 658, 60 L. Ed. 1061, (1916); see also, *Rust v. Sullivan*, 500 U.S. 173, 191, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 114 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1991).  Thus, where a statute is capable of two constructions, one of which would render it unconstitutional and the other valid, that which will uphold its validity must be adopted by the reviewing court.  *Ahto v. Weaver*, 39 N.J. 418, 428, 189 A.2d 27 (1963).  *N.J. Ass'n of Health Plans v. Farmer*, 342 N.J. Super. 536, 552-53 (Ch. Div. 2000).
[directive] #GA  Release from the Care and Custody of the Commissioner of Health (Defendant not Detained) of Order #6A is to be used when a defendant has previously been placed the care the in of Commissioner of the Department Health and now deemed competent to proceed.  is Order #6A may be used where there has been a previous determination that the defendant may be released to the community.  It would be used to discharge him/her from the hospital under the previous competency order.  Directive #17-18 Revised Competency Orders Page 3 #68 - of Order Order Mandating the Transfer the Defendant Attachment 8 8. of of from the Care and Custody the Commissioner Health to a Correctional Facility (Defendant Detained) of Order #6B is also to be used when a defendant has previously been placed the care in of of the Commissioner the Department Health and is now deemed competent to proceed.
[directive] 1.  Familiarization Requirements for Each Participant.  a.  Demonstrate the safe handling of the weapon.  b. Demonstrate proper loading and unloading techniques.  c.  Demonstrate the techniques of proper physical stance.  d.  Demonstrate the techniques of good marksmanship.  2.  Range - 15 yards.  3.  Target - FBI type Q target, either paper or cardboard.  Multiple targets may be used at the discretion of the agency of the agency (sic) executive or supervising firearms instructor.  4.  Course.  a.  Total of 40 rounds per participant.  b.  Double action is required for revolvers for all phases.  Semi-automatics are to be fired in the manner in which the individual weapon functions normally and are to be decocked when changing positions or hands.  c.  Reloading may take place at the discretion of the supervising firearms instructor.  Additionally, discretion may be used as to the number of rounds with which the magazines are loaded to accomplish reloading exercises during the course.  Similarly, the sequence of rounds fired at a given distance may be altered to accommodate a reloading exercise.  d.  To achieve a passing score of 80%, the participant must place a minimum of 32 shots within the border of the Q-target silhouette.  e.  Night firing conditions may be artificially created.  However, if light dimming goggles are used, handheld light must still be deployed were directed.  f.  Some ambient light may be provided 9-45 Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards