ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The estoppel doctrine may be invoked against a municipality “where the interests of justice, morality and common fairness clearly dictate that course. ”  Gruber v. Mayor & Tp. Comm., 39 N.J. 1, 13 (1962).  always properly understood.  *Id.* at 61.  The court noted that it was only after further legal review that a determination was made that [...] did not meet these requirements thereby attesting to the complex determinations involving compliance with the enrollment criteria.  The court held, People accepting public employment should be able to do so without hiring lawyers to assure that they qualify for the position.  *See Kyer v. City of East Orange*, supra, 315 N.J. Super. at 534, 719 A.2d 184, [315 N.J. Super. 524 (1998)] (stating that “persons employed by civil service municipalities ought not to have to retain counsel for advice as to their job rights”).  People accepting the firefighter positions in good faith should not be putting their careers and the financial well-being of their families in jeopardy by giving up their current jobs and accepting public employment only to find out later that they do not meet the age requirements for the positions, particularly when all of the relevant information was available to the State and municipality before the commencement of employment.  *[...] v. Bd. of Trustees of Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys.*, 399 N.J. Super. at 62.  Here, even if the City’s argument that it was “ignorant of any laws or regulations” of the necessity of having “actual” vacancies in order to promote, *(City Brief-1)*, is accepted by this Court, for reasons set forth in *[...], supra*, the resultant harm to Appellant should not be.
[brief] First, [...] said the following:  Q.  And when you were on that couch in an effort to try and cajole her back to sleep, you laid with her in a – in a manner that you knew would cause – could be very dangerous to her.  Is that correct?  A. Yes.  Q.  And you knew that there was a risk to you rolling over on her or suffocating her by her being on the couch?  A. Yes.  Q. And laying with you.  Is that right?  A. Yes.  Q.  At some point you realized that she was not okay and rather than render aid, you put her in an in the ExerSaucer.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BINDING JULIEN COPPI TO THE AGREEMENT, AS HE IS NOT THE "PARTICIPANT" REFERENCED IN ITS TERMS (1T:11:1-21).  The Agreement’s language makes clear that Julien’s participation in activities at [...]’s property does not automatically bind him to the Arbitration Agreement intended solely for [...]’s (“Isaac”) use of [...]’s attractions.  In New Jersey, when parties have not expressly agreed to arbitrate their disputes – as is the case here – careful scrutiny is necessary to determine whether arbitration is still appropriate.  Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 196 (2013).  This is because, “absent express contractual language signaling an agreement to arbitrate, a court has little to interpret in favor of compelling arbitration. ”  Ibid. (citing Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001)).  Further, as has been repeatedly reaffirmed by our Supreme Court, “[i]n the absence of a consensual understanding, neither party is entitled to force the other to arbitrate their dispute.  Subsumed in this principle is the proposition that only those issues may be arbitrated which the parties have agreed shall be. ”  *In re Arbitration Between Grover & Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.*, 80 N.J. 221, 228 (1979).  If the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation or construction and the courts must enforce those terms as written.  The court should not look outside the four corners of the contract to determine the parties' intent, and parol evidence should not be used to alter the plain meaning of the contract.  *Namerow v. PediatriCare Associates, LLC*, 461 N.J. Super. 133, 140 (2018).  [...] argues that Coppi’s signature and purchase of socks and use of the trampoline automatically makes him a “participant” under the Arbitration Agreement.
[brief] (DA1078).  The Appellate Division’s Order dismissing Plaintiffs’ appeal, stated as follows:  The trial court's September 26, 2023 order denying plaintiffs' application for preliminary injunctive relief, and October 24, 2023 order denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the September 26, 2023 order, do not compel arbitration within the meaning of R. 2:2-3(b)(8) because the trial court did not make a substantive decision on the enforceability of the arbitration clause at issue.  Those orders, therefore, are interlocutory and may not be appealed as of right.  The parties have represented to this court that presently pending in the trial court are plaintiffs’ motion for a stay of arbitration and defendants’ motion to dismiss or to compel arbitration.  We are confident that those motions will result in a determination by the trial court of whether the arbitration clause at issue is enforceable and orders either compelling or denying arbitration, which can be appealed pursuant to R. 2:2-3(b)(8).  [Id.]  Thereafter Defendants filed a Motion seeking Summary Disposition on the enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement and to stay all claims pending completion of the AAA proceeding, or, in the Alternative to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to Rules 4:6-2(a) and 4:6-2(e) on February 6, 2024.  Upon receipt of the parties’ briefing, the Honorable [...] heard oral argument on April 26, 2024.  (3T).  On or about June 12, 2024, the Court efiled an Order denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in its entirety.  (DA1540-1550).  While the Order on eCourts is effectively dated April 26, 2024, the date of the oral argument, the parties were not in receipt of the actual Order and more importantly, the Court’s decision as to whether the relief was granted or denied, until it was served on the parties through eCourts on June 12, 2024.  (Id.).  This appeal now follows.
[brief] 1T24:1-9.  The trial court was limited in its reference to *Schmidt v. Celgene Corp.*, 425 N.J. Super. 600 (App. Div. 2012), a decision which the Appellant had already cited in support of the substantial compliance doctrine, with the trial court offering no statute, court rule, or decision to support its holding that the Appellant’s cause of action accrued when he knew or should have known of his injury, rather than the date of favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceeding.  1T26:5-19.  The trial court further undertook no analysis of any of the Appellant’s arguments, including *Rule* 3:21-5, the final judgment rule, *Rogers v. Cape May County Office of Public Defender*, 208 N.J. 414 (2011), or any other applicable caselaw pertaining to the accrual of a cause of action of an acquitted or wrongfully convicted plaintiff.  **STANDARD OF REVIEW**
[brief] This section they’re talking about which we knew as the old Clickio (phonetic) tract, the Sigmund pool (phonetic), that’s the section at the end of Laurel Avenue, right, not the section you’re talking about getting first done?  [...]: That’s Pizzo, Pizzo, right, [...] ([...])?  BOARD MEMBER:  No, it’s the parking lot, that’s the Borough’s parking lot.  BOARD MEMBER FLYNN:  I know but they don’t want to do this one first?  [...] (Board Engineer):  (Board Member) Flynn, this is [...] (Board Engineer).  Depending on how the developer’s come in, they can develop whichever piece that they want but right now we have a developer, the [...] who is interested in developing the actual gravel parking lot which is known as Lot 3.02 now.  So as part of their redevelopment vision, we needed to amend the existing redevelopment, the waterfront redevelopment plan and that’s why we’re here this evening.  If [...] wants to come in and develop Lot 1, which I believe is the old Calian (phonetic) tract, by all means he can prepare a site plan and make his submission to the Board but we have not heard from [...] in several years.
[brief] During the public hearings, the Board and [...] discussed inclusion of ambulance stretcher compliant passenger elevators in buildings “C”, “D” and “E” and the Board received testimony and commentary from various Township personnel recommending and otherwise requesting that such elevators be included in building “C", “D“ and “E” for the benefit, health, safety and welfare of the residents and of the first responders; the Board shared such concerns.  When the public hearings ended, the Board believed that the Project was to have elevators in all the multi-story buildings, including Building E.  See [...] Email of June 12, 2022, Pa148:  To follow up, Avalon accepts the proposal discussed on Friday.  To sum up, Avalon will agree to install an elevator in Building E if (i) the Planning Board and the governing body approve one additional story with no more than 10 total units only 1 of which is affordable and (ii) contingent upon the Planning Board approving the [...] project on Monday, 6/13 (see below).  As a result, the total number of units at the [...] project will equal 483 including 72 affordable units.  Immediately following the June 13 Board hearing, the Board’s attorney, the Township’s attorney and the Township’s planners began the process of drafting the needed amendments to the zoning code, the amendments needed for the Settlement Agreement and the Board’s project approval resolution.
[brief] ”).  Here, [...] was awarded more than $12 million in compensatory damages and more than $33 million in prejudgment interest.  (40008a-40010a).  [...] was awarded more than $3 million in compensatory damages and more than $5 million prejudgment interest.  (40005a-40007a).  It is undisputed that the compensatory damages are substantial.  Plaintiffs are more than sufficiently compensated and have been made whole for their purely economic injuries by the award of compensatory damages.  Additional punitive damages, especially 2.5 times the amount of compensatory damages, are inequitable and contrary to New Jersey law and Due Process principles.
[brief] Aronberg, supra, 207 N.J. at 599, 601.  Harsh consequences, however, do not permit a departure from the express language in the statute because "[i]t is not within [the Court's] province to second guess the policymaking decisions of the Legislature when no constitutional principle is at issue."  Id. at 602.  Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, our decision in Jendrzejewski v. Allstate Insurance Co., 341 N.J. Super. 460, 775 A.2d 583 (App. Div. 2001), did not recognize a good faith exception to the statutory bar in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a).
[brief] The court also dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint for the following reasons: (a) “Plaintiff did not join Defendants in the preference litigation even though it was Plaintiff’s responsibility to join all parties with a material interest in the controversy” (Pa96); (b) “Plaintiff also did not seek to vacate the discharge of mortgage or reinstate the note at any time prior to the filing of the preference action, the settlement of the preference action or the filing of this action” (Pa96); (c) “Plaintiff could have litigated the preference action to conclusion but did not” (Pa97).  On January 22, 2024, an Order was entered denying Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion to amend its Complaint to add a cause of action for breach of contract.
[brief] See, e.g., In re [...], Bayonne, [...], Civil Serv. Comm’n, Civil Serv. Comm’n, List Removal Appeal, Final Decision, (July 11, 2019), Ra96 (denying list removal appeal for law enforcement position based on “totality of the appellant’s background, which includes false and misleading statements”).  It is well-settled that law enforcement officers are held to a higher standard of required conduct than other public employees.  See In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567, 577  In fact, even more than entry level law enforcement positions, a lieutenant law enforcement position is “a high-level law enforcement title that is reserved for employees who exhibit leadership skills, a positive work ethic, and respect for the rules and policies of the appointing authority. ”
[brief] Whether a curative or limiting instruction will suffice to remedy an error, as opposed to granting a request for a mistrial, requires the assessment of the following three factors: (1) the nature of the inadmissible evidence heard by the jury, and its prejudicial effect; (2) assessment of whether the instruction’s timing and substance will affect its likelihood of success; and (3) the court’s tolerance for the risk of imperfect compliance by the jury.  *Herbert*, 457 N.J.Super. at 505-07.  With respect to the first factor, it is relevant whether the curative or limiting instruction would be intended to remedy a single, only slightly improper remark, or whether it would be intended to cure the prejudice resulting from multiple cumulative errors at trial.  *Id.* at 505.  It is also relevant whether the inadmissible evidence bears directly on the ultimate issue before the jury, as such evidence may be less suitable for a curative or limiting instruction.  *Id.*  The second factor identified in *Herbert* acknowledges that the timing and substance of an instruction affect its likelihood of success.  *Herbert*, 457 N.J.Super. at 505.  Curative and limiting instructions should be made swiftly and firmly, without delay which may allow prejudicial evidence to become cemented into the storyline created by jurors during the course of trial.  *Id.* at 506.  Curative and limiting instructions should also be specific and explanatory, as opposed to general and conclusory.  *Id.*  “An instruction can be curative only if the judicial medicine suits the ailment. ”  *Id.* at 508.  Due to the inherently prejudicial nature of the evidence sought to be struck from the juror’s minds, the court’s instruction must be formulated carefully to explain precisely the prohibited purposes of the evidence.  *Id.* at 506.  The instruction should also explain itself, and trial courts should refrain from “because I said so” instructions.  *Id.*  Finally, the trial court must consider its tolerance for the risk that the jury will not comply with its instruction.  *Id.* at 507.  It is generally presumed that juries follow instructions.  *Id.* at 503.  However, “[t]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instruction is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. ”  *Id.* (quoting *Bruton v. United States*, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968)).  The relevant inquiry is whether there is a real possibility that the inadmissible evidence heard by the jury could produce an unjust result.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET No. [...]  Civil Action On Appeal from the Law Division – Monmouth County Docket No.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, [...]’S BRIEF AND APPENDIX  Of Counsel and on the Brief: [...] Esq.  (Atty ID: 021451996)  [...]  [...] P.O. Box 2075  [...], [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent, [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................  ii  TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX .................................................................................. ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................  iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY............................................................................................................3  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................................................4
[brief] Indeed, looking at the Legislative scheme as a whole, it is clear, as this Court reasoned in *Sitkowski* more than thirty years ago, the purpose of the twenty-day limit in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-72(a) was “to provide a degree of assurance that the recipient” of a favorable disposition on a proposed land use from an administrative office “could rely on the decision of the administrative officer” to “obtain some measure of protection against direct and collateral attacks upon his rights.
[brief] The reported cases deal with the issue of spoliation under circumstances that deal with a product that was destroyed in some manner by one of the parties that resulted in damages to the other party.  The cases dealing with spoliation involve a product that had an alleged defect, which is not the subject matter of our case.  The issues here involve whether there was a valid Will, whether there was undue influence, whether there was a valid Antenuptial Agreement, whether Petitioner is entitled to an elective share, and finally whether Petitioner is entitled to an equitable interest in the estate.
[brief] [3T77-18 to -22].  [...] heard defendant demand money while he was in the bank.  \(^3\)  Another description stated defendant’s sweatshirt was blue.  [4T27-18 to -21].  [3T116-19 to -25].  [...] was afraid that defendant could injure or kill her.  [3T97-1 to -6].  After [...] placed her bait pack on the counter, defendant attempted to leave the bank by the back doors that opened to the parking lot.
[directive] Report of persons convicted of certain crimes residing with minor children.  3.  a.  In any case in which a person has been convicted of a crime enumerated in subsection b. of this section and: (1) the victim of the crime was a person under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the crime; and (2) the person convicted of the crime resides in a household with other minor children or is a parent of a minor child, the court, based on an interview with the defendant, shall make a referral to the Division of Youth and Family Services in the Department of Human Services and provide the division with the name and address of the person convicted of the crime, information on the person's criminal history and the name and address of each child referred to in paragraph (2) of this subsection.
[brief] The [...] present the following issues for the Court’s balanced, careful review in this limited appeal.  II.  Special Master [...] Had a Disqualifying Conflict of Interest.  (39680a).  While Plaintiffs’ fee applications were pending before the Special Master — fee applications that required him to evaluate the reasonableness of fees of [...]’s counsel, [...] and [...] — the Special Master was selected by [...] and Himmel to serve as a paid mediator in another action.  (38995a; 38998a).  Thus, [...] created a financial benefit for the Special Master while he was simultaneously, on behalf of the trial court, evaluating the reasonableness of [...]’s fee application in this case.  This dual role represented a disqualifying conflict of interest.  Any judge would have known that a financial benefit provided by a party or attorneys appearing in the judge’s courtroom is strictly forbidden by the Code of Judicial Conduct.
[brief] *Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc.*, 218 N.J. 8, 30 (N.J. 2014).  As such, the Motion Judge failed to appreciate same based on the above-mentioned case law, especially considering the "cause of action [was] 'suggested' by the facts" and Plaintiff was “entitled to every reasonable inference of fact” in the Complaint.  *Printing Mart*, supra, 116 N.J. at 746, 563 A.2d 31.  See also *Green*, supra, 215 N.J. at 452, 73 A.3d 478.  **b.
[brief] Federal law does not support a distinction between the date of the verdict and the judgment of acquittal to determine the date of the favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceeding.  Consideration and interpretation of federal law may be given persuasive weight in an analogous state court case and should be accorded due respect.  See Young v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 297 N.J. Super. 605, 622 (App. Div. 1997).  While blindly ratifying the erroneous claim accrual analysis (under federal law), as was previously adopted by the United States District Court to dismiss the Appellant’s § 1983 claims as time-barred, the trial court proceeded with a similarly flawed analysis to dismiss the Appellant’s State law claims, even though the District Court expressly preserved the State law claims to be decided under State law.  Federal courts undoubtedly address the accrual of § 1983 claims by analogizing them to their most closely related common law torts.  *McDonough v. Smith*, 588 U.S. 109, 116 (2019).  Such principles, however, are intended to guide rather than control the definition of § 1983 claims, as comparing constitutional and common law torts is not a “one-to-one matching exercise. ”  *Id.* at 117 (citing *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477, 479 (1994).  The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and others have continually addressed the question of when a cause of action for malicious prosecution accrues, while consistently and necessarily focusing on the date of the favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceeding.  “A 1983 claim sounding in malicious prosecution accrues when ‘the prosecution terminate[s] without a conviction. ’”  *Coello v. Dileo*, 43 F.4th 346, 354-55 (2022).  Rather than distinguish between a verdict and judgment of acquittal in assessing the timeliness of a § 1983 claim, federal jurisprudence instead emphasizes due process and pragmatic concerns in applying the “deferred accrual” rule to determine the date of favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceeding.
[brief] [...]’s claims against [...] and its deputy executive director [...] arise from a series of statements made on October 8 and 9, 2021, after [...] had “seen [...]’s social media posts,”  Da_017:  On October 8 at 12:41 AM, [...] reacted on Twitter to Muhammad’s social media posts, stating, “Absolutely unacceptable.  Teacher pulls off 7 year old’s hijab . . . in front of the class.  Our @CAIRNJ office is calling for immediate termination.  Racist teachers like this cannot be trusted around our children. ”  Da_117; Da_125.  Later that morning at 7:34 AM, [...] appeared on an ABC network Good Morning America segment, entitled “[...] Director on ABC Amid Calls for Firing of Teacher Who Allegedly Pulled Off Student’s Hijab” (the “GMA Report”)¹, where he stated, “The hijab, you know, is much like any other article of clothing for a Muslim woman.  To remove that publicly can be very humiliating.  Anyone who thinks it’s OK to do this to a student clearly is not fit to be a teacher. ”  Da_019.  That same day, [...] was quoted by CBS News New York, stating, “The teacher not only put her hands on her, removed her headscarf.  And this is, of course, humiliating for any Muslim woman to be exposed this way, in public. ”  Da_023; Da_029.  In an interview with WCBS NEWSRADIO 880 that day, [...] stated, “Clearly she’s demonstrated she cannot be trusted around students. ”  Da_023.  [...] stated in a phone interview with NBC’s Today Show that “Anything less than removing her from the classroom would be unacceptable.  If she can’t respect the religious practices of her students, then she shouldn’t be teaching. ”  Da_023.  At 2:13 PM on October 8, [...] replied to his own original tweet, stating, “Call and email the Superintendent, [...], today, and let him know Tamar Wyner [...] is unfit to be a teacher,” and providing the phone number and ¹  Available at https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=az-6Xr44bfI (last visited Nov. 13, 2023).  email address of the superintendent.  Da_017-18; Da_127-28.  This tweet was later deleted.  Da_018.  On October 8 at 11:49 AM, [...] posted twice on Twitter, with both posts containing [...]’s quote from the [...] Press Release, described below.  Da_022; Da_053; Da_146-50.  [...] also posted the [...] quote on Facebook at 11:34 AM.  Da_022.  On October 9 at 10:56 AM, [...] posted a clip of the GMA Report to its Facebook account.  Da_020.  D.  [...]’s Statements about the Incident