ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1.  Trial Court  Standard of Motions Practice Review  Defendant [...] was dismissed on a preliminary motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer.  Unlike a summary judgment motion, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) is based on the pleadings themselves.  See Rider v. State Department of Transportation, 221 N. J. Super. 547 (App. Div. 1987).  On a motion brought pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), the Complaint should be searched with depth to determine if a cause of action exists, even if only based on further discovery.  See Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 772 (1989).  The court must examine the “legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint,” giving the plaintiff the benefit of “every reasonable inference of fact. ”  Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 107 (2019).  All allegations pled in a complaint are assumed true and Plaintiff is entitled to “all reasonable actual inferences that those allegations support. ”  F.G. v. MacDonell, 150 N.J. 550, 556 (1997).  Furthermore, where all allegations are assumed to be true, a complaint should not be dismissed under this rule where a cause of action is suggested by the facts.  Id.  A motion to dismiss brought under Rule 4:6-2(e) at the onset of litigation has an “extraordinarily limited range” and “is granted only in the rarest instances. ”  *Geyer v. Faielle*, 279 N.J. Super. 386, 389 (App. Div. 1995) certif. denied, 141 N.J. 95, (1995) (emphasis added); see also *Lieberman v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey*, 132 N.J. 76 (1993); *Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp.*, 116 N.J. 739, 772 (1989).  For instance, in *Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp.*, 116 N.J. 739, 772 (1989), the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s Order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer and Appellate Division’s subsequent affirmance of same as a way to “signal to trial courts to approach with great caution applications for dismissal under Rule 4:6-2(e). ”  Id. at 772.  2.  **Appellate Review Standard**
[brief] State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374, 388 (2002) (citing State v. Weeks, 107 N.J. 396, 410 (1987)).  In Weeks, our Supreme Court held that where a defendant is charged with first-degree armed robbery as an accomplice, the accomplice liability jury instructions must “clearly require the jury to find that defendant had shared the [principal’s] purpose to commit a robbery with a weapon. ”  107 N.J. at 405.  At trial, the defendant was found guilty of robbery as an accomplice, which was elevated to the first degree because the principal was armed with a deadly weapon.  Id. at 400.  The trial court’s accomplice liability charge “recited the statutory premise of N.J.S.A. 2C:2–6c(1)(b) that a person is an accomplice of another in the commission of an offense if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he aids or agrees or attempts to aid the other person, and if he is found to share the same intent required to be proven against the person who actually committed the act. ”  Ibid. (internal quotations omitted).  The Court held that these instructions were inadequate, despite being practically identical to the text of the accomplice liability statute, because they “failed to convey to the jury that in order to convict the defendant as an accomplice to robbery in the first degree,” it was required to specifically find that the defendant shared the principal’s purpose of committing the robbery with a weapon.  *Id.* at 403-05; see also *Bowser*, 297 N.J. Super. at 601-03 (holding court erroneously failed to instruct jury that “defendant must have shared co-defendant’s specific purpose to use weapon in order for defendant to be convicted of first-degree robbery”).  Furthermore, our courts have consistently noted the importance of tailoring accomplice liability jury instructions to the facts of the case.
[brief] With regards to findings of fact, "[T]he general rule is that findings by a trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence."  *Gnall v. Gnall*, 222 *N.J.* 414, 428 (2015) (*quoting Cesare v. Cesare*, 154 *N.J.* 394, 411-12 (1998)).  See, *State v. Camey*, 239 *N.J.* 282, 306 (2019) ("[w]e will not disturb the trial court's findings; in an appeal, we defer to findings that are supported in the record and find roots in credibility assessments by the trial court"); *Motorworld, Inc. v. Benkendorf*, 228 *N.J.* 311, 329 (2017) ("[w]e review the trial court's factual findings under a deferential standard: those findings must be upheld if they are based on credible evidence in the record"); *Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme*, 227 *N.J.* 269, 283 (2016) (findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence); *State v. K.W.*, 214 *N.J.* 499, 507 (2013) ("[w]e defer to the trial court's factual findings 'so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record").  However, many issues on appeal present mixed questions of law and fact.  Under those circumstances the appellate court gives deference to the supported factual findings of the trial court but reviews *de novo* the trial court's application of legal rules to the factual findings.  *State v. Pierre*, 223 N.J. 560, 576 (2015); *State v. Nantambu*, 221 N.J. 390, 404 (2015); *State v. Harris*, 181 N.J. 391, 416 (2004).  In the present matter, the underlying determination that the dispute at issue constituted a “coverage dispute” subject to arbitration was a finding of fact by the trial judge while the interpretation of the New Jersey No-Fault laws as they interplay with the NJIFPA and NJRICO laws was a question of law, warranting the hybrid standard review of mixed questions of fact and law.
[brief] [I]t is the opinion of [...] that the revisions contained in the Amended Redevelopment Plan are necessary to facilitate the redevelopment of the Ford Avenue Redevelopment Area; and [I]t is the further opinion of [...] that the Amended Redevelopment Plan is generally consistent with, and certainly not inconsistent with any of the goals and objectives of the Master Plan of the [...]; the Master Plan of any municipality contiguous to the [...]; as well as the [...] Master Plan; and the State Development and Redevelopment Guide Plan; as set forth in the Amended Redevelopment Plan[.]
[brief] On or about March 28, 2017, [...], P.E. (“Lindstrom”) on behalf of [...], applied to the NJDEP for a WFD individual permit for a 185-foot pier dock extension and two open type boat lifts at [...] (“[...] Property”).  [Aa22-Aa87.]  On the same day, Lindstrom sent notices to neighbors within 200 feet of the project and applied to the NJDEP Bureau of Tidelands Management for a modified riparian license.  [Aa41.]  Appellant owns the property at [...], which is immediately adjacent to the [...] Property.  [Aa48.]  On or about April 3, 2017, Appellant submitted a public comment to the NJDEP opposing the installation of the 185-foot pier dock at 83 Pershing ---  1  The Procedural History and Statement of Facts are inextricably interwoven and, therefore, are presented together herein.
[brief] **Clay v. Jie-Davis**, No. 16-45, 2016 US Dist. LEXIS 182536 ...................... 18  **Connors v. Fawn Mis. Corp.**, 30 F.3d 483 (3d. Cir. 1994) ......................... 23  **Curtis v. Celco Ptnr.**, 413 NJ Super 26 (App. Div. 2010) ......................... 35  **Cwiklinski v. Burton**, 217 NJ Super 506 (App. Div. 1987) ......................... 16  **Delaney v. Dickey**, 244 NJ 456 (2020) .................................................. 46  **Delta Funding v. Harris**, 189 NJ 28 (2006) ..............................................
[brief] 7  W.J.A. v. D.A., 210 N.J. 229, 237–38 (2012)  ...........................................  7  Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 330 (2010)  ....................  7  Judson v. People's Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954) ...... 7, 9 Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520 (1995)
[brief] At the time of his request for indemnification, he was not a defendant in any action or proceeding.  The proceeding only came to be because for whatever his reasons, he did willfully ignore the advice of counsel of the District by defying the interim order of the GRC.  Right or wrong, he made that choice.  And the Court finds that one, he’s not a named defendant, but that based on his actions, the Fire District was not required to appoint a personal attorney for him to investigate whether or not he should comply with an order of a state agency.  (1T89:24 – 90:14)  [...] was not engaged in the good faith execution of his duties imposed or authorized by law.  At the time of [...]’s request for indemnification, he was not a defendant in any action or proceeding.  There is no basis to compel the District to pay the sought after legal fees under these circumstances.  The Board exercised its discretion and determined not to expend public funds for the appointment of an attorney, particularly for a matter which did not require a personal attorney or for an action that was contrary to and divergent from the District’s interests.  There are no extraordinary circumstances in this matter that would warrant the reversal of this determination.
[brief] Instead, as [...] argued in his initial brief, the officers stopped him prior to his flight and without reasonable suspicion that he was involved in criminal activity—rather, they stopped him because of his proximity to the target of their investigation, [...].  (Db 10-14)  The officers did not see [...] exchange items with [...] or conduct any transaction with him, they did not recognize [...] from prior arrests or as someone previously involved in drug sales,\(^2\) and they did not see [...] approach [...]’s stash \(^2\)  In several cases the State relied on, officers recognized suspects who were fleeing from police as those with previous drug offenses or arrests, or those known to have previously interacted with drug dealers.  See Ruiz, 286 N.J. Super. at 157; Morrison, 322 N.J. Super. at 151, 154; see also Doss, 254 N.J. Super. at 126.  (Pb 20-27, 30-31)  Here, [...] did not flee prior to being stopped and no officer recognized him. location or interact with either individual who bought drugs from [...] that afternoon.  (1T 40-25 to 43-4; 2T 16-2 to 21, 34-11 to 25)  The only reason that [...] was stopped is because the officers were trying to arrest [...] and, despite following [...] throughout the day, they could not identify him among [...] and [...].  (1T 43-2 to 4; 2T 24-6 to 14)  Because there was no objectively reasonable basis to suspect [...] of criminality, the police violated [...]’s constitutional rights when they stopped him.
[directive] Nor shall any law enforcement civilian witness without such such information from any including principal, receive any use-of-force incident, a witness to the obtaining authorization from without first civilian of a law enforcement agency sworn or employee investigation, or his or general supervising the prosecutor or assistant/deputy attorney the assistant her designee.  authorization information without prior as of investigative  Any dissemination or receipt assistant/deputy assistant prosecutor or shall reported promptly to the by this section be required shall investigate the investigation, or his or her designee, who supervising the attorney general dissemination or receipt of investigative potential of any unauthorized  The effects circumstances. of would be served by determining whether the interests justice considered in information may be 5
[brief] (Pa286.)  Plaintiff asserted three causes of action in the First Action: (Count I) that the City’s adoption of Resolution No. 20-103 pertaining to the Laurel-Saddlewood Block was an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable act; (Count II) that the City’s adoption of Resolution No. 20-103 pertaining to Plaintiff’s property (the “Saddlewood Property”) was an arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable act; and (Count III) that the Laurel-Saddlewood Block and Saddlewood Property were not properly blighted as required for a public taking under Article 8, Section 3 of the New Jersey Constitution.  (Pa298-300.)  Plaintiff’s challenges to the City’s blight designation were solely based on allegations that the City lacked  1  As explained herein, the Procedural History in this matter is material to the issues on appeal.  Accordingly, Plaintiff has combined the Procedural History and the Statement of Facts.  2  Citations to Plaintiff’s Appendix will be designated as “Pa__. ”  “substantial credible evidence” required to legally determine that an area is “blighted” under New Jersey’s statutory criteria.  (Id.)  On January 8, 2021, the trial court in the First Action entered a decision finding that the City’s designation of the Laurel-Saddlewood Block as an area in need of redevelopment was supported by credible evidence.  (Pa135.)  That decision provided, in relevant part, as follows:  The evidence credibly shows that redevelopment is not only what the area needs but also what the community wants.  The specific facts proffered in the sworn testimony of the homeowners coupled with the [...] constitutes substantial credible evidence which satisfies the statutory criteria under N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5 to support and warrant the designation concerning Block 11501.  [Pa145.]  By Order dated March 4, 2021, the trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint in the First Action.  Significantly, absent from the complaint in the First Action or the trial court’s decision was any reference, whatsoever, to any bad faith claims or any of the other claims asserted in the current action.  (See, e.g., Pa286-300; Pa135-145.)  **[...] Advises Plaintiff of its Illicit Agreement With the City**
[brief] Indeed, as even the plurality decision acknowledged, a violation of the _Miranda_ rule “creates a presumption of coercion…that is generally irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecutor’s case in chief. ”  _Id._ at 639.  A coerced statement is never voluntary, and any evidence derived from it is tainted and the prosecutor should not be given an evidentiary advantage for the misconduct of its agents.  As [...] bluntly put it, where there is a _Miranda_ taint, and physical evidence discovered as an unattenuated result of that coercion, “[t]hat should be the end of the case.
[brief] Viewed from [...]’s perspective, he would have little reason to believe that, even if provided instruction, the judge would be capable of setting aside the credibility determination he previously reached that [...]’s allocution testimony, and [...] himself, were insincere.  See Freedman v. Freedman, 474 N.J. Super. 291, 308 (App. Div. 2023) (ordering a different judge on remand “because the judge expressed comments regarding credibility” and “may have a commitment to her prior findings”). \(^4\)  Finally, as discussed above (in Point I.B.i) the judge indicated that his review of the record was limited – “[n]ow I didn’t spend a lot of time [reviewing the record]”– and he made factual errors in his findings as a result.  (5T74-10 to 11; 14-8 to 10)  In one instance not previously discussed, the judge contradicted his own finding concerning [...]’s childhood environment.  The judge first held at [...]’s 2019 sentencing that [...]’s home environment was “perceptively better” than [...]’s home environment, and then later found the opposite in 2023 – that [...] “had a far more acrimonious childhood” than [...].  (4T68-5 to 17) (5T81-19-22).  Relatedly, despite [...]’s reassurances that he was not unduly influenced by the heinous nature of the incident, he recurringly considered the brutality of the facts, including when considering [...]’s maturity, his prison conduct, his susceptibility to peer pressure, and his likelihood of reoffending.
[directive] RELEASE  REVOKE TO MOTIONS  8.  Release.3o  Revoke to Authority General 8.1  defendant's a revoke prosecutor to of a motion on court a authorizes 2A:162-24 N.J.S.A. from released been has defendant when the trial pending detained defendant the order and release while defendant -22, and the or 2A:162-17 N.J.S.A. to pursuant acomplaint-warrant on custody probable finding of upon a or release, of condition or order restraining a violated release on revocation order
[brief] In NAACP v. Foulke Mgt., 421 NJ Super 404 (App. Div. 2011) the court, citing the above Concepcion footnote, acknowledged an arbitration clause could be found unenforceable for reasons other than public policy or unconsonability, under laws governing formation and interpretation of agreements.  Id at 427.  See Rockel v. Cherry Hill Dodge, 368 NJ Super 577, 585-586 (App. Div. 2004) arbitration clause unenforceable due to placement, size and language.  Kernahan v. Home Warranty, 236 NJ 301 (2019) - there is a lack of mutual assent if the language is debatable, confusing, contradictory, or misleading.
[brief] THE LAW DIVISION SHOULD HAVE GRANTED NAMKOONG MOTION TO DISMISS IN LIEU OF ANSWER AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, BOTH, ON STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS  GROUNDS  [Raised at Pa530-542; Decided at Pa11-12 and Raised at Pa590-1172; Decided at Pa1-2]  The facts set out in statement of facts above, [Db at 4-15] support reversal of the Law Division’s denial of [...]’s motion to dismiss in lieu of answer and motion for summary judgment, both, on statute of limitations grounds, and, upon reversal, the Court should grant [...] summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds.
[directive] The New Jersey VINE System is designed to provide notifications to registered victims concerning an offender’s release from custody or the offender’s transfer from one correctional facility to another.  All other required notifications to crime victims, such as a change in case status, will continue to be done pursuant to procedures promulgated by the County Prosecutors.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed to limit or preempt the authority of a County Prosecutor to establish procedures to ensure that crime victims are promptly notified of scheduled court hearings and events as may be required by Article 1, paragraph 22 of the New Jersey Constitution, N.J.S.A. 52:4B-44, N.J.S.A. 2C:25- 26.1, N.J.S.A. 30:4-6.1, N.J.S.A. 39:5-52, N.J.S.A. 30:123.53a or any other law, and as may be required by the Attorney General Standards to Ensure the Rights of Crime Victims.
[brief] ”  State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265, 280 (2018).  Since then, our courts have moved to a standard that stems from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  State v. Olenowski, 2023 N.J. LEXIS 206 (2023).  Under Olenowski, trial courts must assess new factors to determine whether a scientific theory is sufficiently reliable to be admitted.  Olenowski, 2023 N.J. LEXIS at *27 (the factors are (1) whether the scientific theory can be or has been tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known and potential rate of error as well as the existence of standards governing the operation of the  As explained below, the premise that a firearm examiner can conclusively determine that ammunition came from a single gun has never been established.  Therefore, the preeminent scientific reviews of firearm examination have concluded that such assertions are unsubstantiated.  When confronted with a motion to limit the firearm examination testimony to that which has actually been proven to be true, the trial court erred in denying that motion out of hand.  In so doing, it allowed unreliable and very compelling expert evidence to come before the jury.  The convictions must be reversed.
[brief] Respondent similarly attempts to draw far more meaning from State v. Ryan, 249 N.J. 581 (2022), than that precedent will bear.  (Pb 15-16)  Ryan was not a juvenile and was not even younger than twenty-one.  Rather, he was a twenty-three-year-old offender who argued that a prior juvenile offense should not count as one of three “strikes” subjecting him to a life sentence.  Ryan, 249 N.J. at 587-88, 590.  In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court emphasized that it was only judging the “penalty for the latest crime” of the twenty-three-year-old; the Court viewed cases protecting younger offenders against long sentences as irrelevant.  See id. at 600-01.  Thus, Ryan had nothing to do with extending Comer to a nineteen-year-old like [...].  The language of Ryan should not be taken out of its narrow context.  In short, the issue of extending constitutional protection beyond age seventeen remains open.
[brief] Indeed, the Due Process Clause forbids an agency to use evidence in a way that forecloses an opportunity to offer a contrary presentation. ”  *Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas–Best Freight Sys., Inc.*, 419 U.S. 281, 288 n.4 (1974); see also, e.g., *Moore v. Dep’t of Corr.*, 335 N.J. Super. 103, 108 (App. Div. 2000) (“Administrative due process is generally satisfied if ‘the parties had adequate notice, a chance to know opposing evidence, and the opportunity to present evidence and argument in response.
[directive] No law enforcement officer shall share, either directly or indirectly (i.e., through another person), any information learned in the course of the use-of-force investigation with any witness without authorization.  Nor shall any law enforcement officer who was a witness to the use-of-force incident receive any such information from any sworn or civilian employee of a law enforcement agency without first obtaining authorization from the authority in charge of the investigation or their designee.  If any law enforcement officer learns of such an unauthorized dissemination or receipt of information, then they must immediately report that to the authority in charge of the investigation or their designee.
[brief] The Statutes Under Which Plaintiff Asserts Claims Do Not Authorize Claims of “Public Injunctive Relief”  Indeed, the statutes under which plaintiff is asserting her claims do not even expressly authorize her to assert a claim for “public injunctive relief”—a fact that courts across the country have repeatedly cited in rejecting assertions by plaintiffs that they were seeking “public injunctive relief. ”  See e.g. Cunningham v. Lyft, Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48037, * 5 (D. Mass. March 20, 2020) (“[u]nlike the consumer protection statutes at issue in McGill, the Massachusetts Wage Act includes no provisions for public injunctive relief”); Bodie v. Cricket Wireless, LLC, 350 So.3d 480, 481 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (rejecting assertion that arbitration agreement’s prohibition on representative actions on behalf of the public violated public policy, stating in pertinent part that “[plaintiff] identifies no provision of FDUTPA giving him the right to seek public injunctive relief”) (quotations omitted).  Here, the HCSA, the CFA, the RISA, and the TCCWNA likewise contain no provisions authorizing plaintiff to assert a “public injunctive relief” claim on behalf of the general public.  Ja11 (“[t]he statutes under which plaintiff is seeking relief…do not authorize plaintiff to act as a private attorney general and assert a ‘public injunctive relief’ claim on behalf of the general public”).
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