ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Da95-96).  Paragraph 24(F) reads:  [...]’s rights and interest in the Palm Beach Property as set forth in Section 3.3(A)(4)(d) of Robert’s Revocable Trust including, without limiting any other rights, interests or obligations that [...] may have as expressly provided by Section 3.3(A)(4)(d), the following: (i) her right to make use of the Palm Beach Property for a period of not more than twenty-one (21) days per year; and (ii) her right to receive a portion of the sale proceeds in the event of a sale of the Palm Beach Property as provided therein.  The Parties acknowledge that [...]’s portion of the proceeds of any sale shall be reduced by the amount of any and all legal fees, other professional fees and expenses described more fully in Section 3.3(A)(4)(d) of Robert’s Revocable Trust and the Parties acknowledge that such fees and expenses total fifty-three million, seven-hundred forty-nine thousand, eight hundred and three dollars ($53,749,803).  For the avoidance of doubt, [...] agrees to comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon her by Section 3.3(A)(4)(d) and to refrain from asserting any Claims, rights or interests with respect to the Palm Beach Property other than as may be necessary to enforce the rights and interests provided to her by Section 3.3(A)(4)(d); (Id., at ¶ 24(F)) (white space added for clarity).  Paragraph 24(G) excludes from [...]’s waiver and release and preserves all of her rights to any property from [...]’s Estate or Trust.  It even has an express statement by both parties acknowledging that [...] preserves all rights to any asset passing from [...]: [...]’s right to receive any remaining amount of the Reserve or any other assets that are distributable to [...] from [...]’s Estate and [...]’s Revocable Trust pursuant to this Agreement.  The Parties acknowledge that [...] is not releasing her right to receive any property to which she is entitled as a beneficiary of [...]’s Estate or [...]’s Revocable Trust; (Da96, at ¶ 24(G)) (white space added for clarity).
[brief] 2.  The Arbitrator improperly relied on forecasts submitted by [...] that were not prepared or identified as amendments to the PTA.  In the Award, the Arbitrator held that ten non-Backlog projects at issue were subject to the PTA’s EGP-sharing and adopted [...]’s alleged EGP amounts for those projects based on his conclusion that “[t]he EGP for these projects . . . . were included time and time again in the update calculations provided by ARC to [...] which set forth the EGP, amounts paid, and amounts owed. ”  Da137.  The Arbitrator acknowledged that there were “no formal amendments to the PTA” or “at times formal agreements as to EGP,” but disregard of the parties’ contractual obligations was of no consequences because, as the Arbitrator concluded, the projects and “EGP figures” were included in the updates and [...] made payments toward these “claimed EGP[s].”
[brief] More specifically, the scope of coverage under Part Two is designed to cover those limited circumstances in which an employer may be legally liable for damages to an injured employee in lieu of the statutory benefits provided by the traditional workers’ compensation system.  It is also important to note that the [...] is a national form policy written by the [...].  As such, the [...] applies in many different states, some of which permit different types of third-party claims for contribution against an employer for which Part Two sometimes provides coverage.  The point is that coverage under Part Two of the [...] is limited insurance that is designed to insure a very specific category of liability.  Furthermore, Part Two of the Policy expressly excludes coverage for certain types of claims, including intentional wrongs and conduct that is substantially certain to result in injury.  In New Jersey, unless the employee or employer has opted out of the Article 2 system, the only claim an adult employee may legally assert against his or her employer outside the statutory system governed by Article 2 of the Act is an intentional wrong claim.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-8.  However, a claim of intentional wrong, no matter how it is pleaded, is expressly excluded from coverage under Part Two of the Policy.  Pa76.
[brief] [...] joined in the application.  The Motion Certification observed that the relief the Receiver requested was granted notwithstanding the violations and/or non-compliance demonstrated.  Ca404.  The Motion raised that the motions were decided as they were even though the Statute at N.J.S.A. 14A:14-18 addresses procedural rights of aggrieved persons.  Ca405.  The Motion raised that one of the Orders entered states there were no objections, when in fact there was vigorous objection.  Ca405.  The Motion questioned any underpinnings or support for the Order, prepared by the Receiver and granted by the Court exactly as proposed, stating that the Receiver “has acted in the best interest of this matter and has otherwise fulfilled his fiduciary duties as Receiver. ”  Ca405.  The Motion raised that the Receiver had provided no explanation “with regard to any actions taken relative to the August 2, 2021 preservation letter, including requested video. ”  Ca406.  The Certification further raised that while the Order appointing the Receiver purported to appoint him not only as to [...], but to [...] and [...], that nothing about this was addressed relative to these individuals.  Ca407-08.  The Certification expressed that “The Receiver’s application and the resulting outcome to date has invited and created confusion and uncertainty through no fault of parties such as the [...], whose rights and position must be properly weighed and taken into account. ”  Ca408.  The Motion Certification raised other issues, including particulars regarding Statutory and Rule violations.  Ca404-09.  On November 17, 2023, the Court denied the Motion without oral argument and/or a written statement of reasons.
[brief] ”  An illegal sentence “exceed[s] the penalties authorized by statute for a specific offense. ”  State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246 (2000).  “A sentence may also be illegal because it was not imposed in accordance with law.  This category includes sentences that, although not in excess of the statutory maximum penalty,” are not authorized by statute.  Id. at 247.  “In addition, a sentence may not be in accordance with law because it fails to satisfy required presentencing conditions” or “include a legislatively mandated term of parole ineligibility. ”  Ibid.  In an attempt to receive a reduced sentence, the defendant simply claims his sentence was illegal because the original sentence court relied upon two prior convictions that were subsequently vacated when it imposed aggravating factor six, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6).
[brief] Defendant [...] witnessed a man in a blue Mercedes get into a minivan with another suspect and then get out.  Defendant [...] reported that he instructed the man in the minivan to stop when the blue Mercedes sped away from the altercation.  Defendant [...] reported he discovered two bundles of suspected narcotics in plain view of the minivan suspect’s driver side floor.  Defendant [...] subsequently arrested the suspect and upon questioning him discovered that the suspect was purchasing heroin from an individual named “[...]. ”  Defendant [...] identified Plaintiff as the driver of the Mercedes after an observation of a DMV photo, which Plaintiff alleged was a false identification.  Plaintiff further alleges that on September 8, 2014, Defendant [...] prepared reports and drafted a criminal complaint against Plaintiff, implicating him as a criminal suspect in the drug transaction.  Defendant [...], relying on information from the self-prepared reports, is alleged to have subsequently obtained a warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest.  Plaintiff was arrested on September 12, 2014.  Importantly, Defendant [...] did not witness the underlying incident himself.  Plaintiff’s Complaint further alleges that between September 19, 2014, and January 15, 2015, the [...] commenced an action that resulted in the finding that Plaintiff was violated his probation terms due to this incident, which resulted in Plaintiff being sentenced to a term of imprisonment for five years.  Defendant [...]’s testimony was admitted at Plaintiff’s trial over Plaintiff’s hearsay objections, even though Defendant [...] had no personal knowledge of the allegations.
[directive] Vehicular Pursuit Review  12.1  Thorough and meaningful review of vehicular pursuit incidents is vital to ensuring the safety of law enforcement officers and the public.  Every vehicular pursuit must undergo the following procedures for a meaningful command-level review pursuant to a written policy established by the law enforcement executive:  (a)  The meaningful command-level review of the incident shall be undertaken by at least two levels of supervisors.  These levels may include the immediate supervisor, internal affairs, training officers, or command staff.  At least one reviewer must be two levels or more above the officer who engaged in the vehicular pursuit; (b)  The review shall include an examination of all available sources of information about the incident, including any video of the incident, recordings of 911 calls and police radio transmissions, reports, officer or other witness statements, medical records, or records of injuries; (c)  The reviewing supervisors shall make a recommendation of what action, if any, should be undertaken, including policy changes, remedial training, disciplinary action, administrative action, or, if appropriate, referral for criminal prosecution; and (d)  The law enforcement executive, or a command level officer no more than one rank below the law enforcement executive for departments with more than 100 officers, shall review each vehicular pursuit investigation and approve or reject the recommendations of the supervisors who conducted the review.  The law enforcement executive’s decision, or the decision of the designee, shall be memorialized and retained in the vehicular pursuit investigative file.  12.2
[brief] $50,000 transferred from [...]’s MR line of credit account on September 8, 2015 to the [...]’ bank account #0319.  (36T 37:5-7).  - [...] was shown extracts of the [...] MR line of credit account from the company’s QuickBooks software and was able to tie the transfer of $50,000 from that account to a September 2015 bank statement for the company, which showed the funds were transferred to an account ending in 0319, which Plaintiffs established belonged to the [...].  (23T 15:21 to 22:15; Da2836).  **Misappropriation #6:**
[brief] (12T99-1 to 100-8).  The email was sent about two months before the fruitless searches took place.  (12T102-3 to 4; 12T104-4 to 7).  [...]’s statement—that [...] had concluded defendant had the wallet ID he reportedly lost—was made to explain the purpose for the email to defendant’s attorney; [...] did not mention on direct that he had reviewed video or photographic evidence.  (12T95-16 to 97-10).  Only on cross-examination, when counsel demanded to know the basis for [...]’s statement --- 25  On direct, [...] testified he was a Captain at the relevant time.  (12T93-20 to 94-2).  He clarified on cross-examination that he was a Lieutenant when he sent the email, in June 2018.  (12T105-25 to 106-12).  in the email that [...] “was aware” defendant presented his wallet ID when stopped, did [...] state that he had watched the videos.  (12T111-19 to 112-3).  Answering counsel’s question, without prompting, [...] qualified that what he saw “resembled a credit card [[...]] ID. ” (12T111-25 to 112-3).  Highlighting the answer, counsel had [...] repeat that the item “resembled” the wallet ID.  (12T112-4 to 5).  Counsel did not request the judge to re-instruct the jurors that it was for their determination as to what appeared in the videos and photographs.  (12T112-6 to 118-19).
[directive] 16.  Você entende que se você ocupa um cargo público ou se é funcionário público, você [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] [NC/NA] poderá ser obrigado a deixar seu cargo ou emprego em virtude da sua declaração de culpa?  Do you understand that if you are a public office holder or employee, you can be required to forfeit your office or job by virtue of your plea of guilty?
[brief] [...] maintains a Tariff for Service with [...], which requires that [...] maintain regular and uninterrupted electric service to its customers.  The Department does not have the expertise to assess statements concerning the need to expand existing electrical systems, and defers to the [...] or other appropriate agency, to make a final determination in this regard. ’”  Id. (quoting DEP’s July 15, 2009 Amended HAD) (emphasis added).  37  See DEP’s February 11, 2010 HAD for [...]’s 300 Line Project (“The Department of Environmental Protection does not possess the required expertise in regional energy demand and delivery systems to conclusively determine the need for the proposed project.  The Department notes that the [...] ([...]) is the agency responsible to determine the necessity of this and other natural gas conveyance projects.  Therefore, the Department’s determination is issued subject to and result, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 202(b) and N.J.R.E. 201(b)(3), this Court should take judicial notice of [...]’s April 21, 2022 Certificate for the East 300 Upgrade Project.  At the very least, DEP’s June 23, 2021 HAD should be declared arbitrary and capricious for failing to follow DEP’s own prior precedent of including a stipulation that DEP would be deferring to the appropriate expert agency (here, [...]) to make a final determination regarding the need for Compressor Station 327.
[brief] ...............................................................Da86-95  State v. Fontanez, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 150, 2017 WL 371471 (App. Div. Jan. 26, 2017) ...............................................................Da96-107 State v. Bridges, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1573, 2014 WL 2957443 (App. Div. July 2, 2014) ...............................................................Da108-121 INDEX TO CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX (Submitted Under Separate Cover)
[brief] (Da1-6).  On May 23, 2022, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained following a search of his apartment pursuant to a warrant.  (Da7-8).  On March 8, 2023, the trial court conducted a testimonial hearing on defendant’s motion.  (T).  On April 26, 2023, oral arguments were conducted.  (2T).  On May 31, 2023, the trial court denied defendant’s motion and set forth its reasons in a written opinion.  (Da15-26).
[brief] [...]’ decision also failed to consider that the Defendant may also be vicariously liable under the theory of apparent authority.  (2TR45:16-19).  Since the defendant, [...] appears to be one of the residences of the Defendant, vicarious liability can attach through apparent authority.  Namely, “when, by its actions or the totality of the circumstances, a principal creates in a third party the impression of apparent authority, the principal will be held vicariously liable for the negligence of its apparent agent because the principal’s actions “somehow mislead [] the public into believing that the relationship or the authority exists. ”  Estate of Cordero. ex rel. Cordero v. Christ Hosp., 403 N.J. Super. 306, 312 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Basil v. Wolf, 193 N.J. 38, 67 (2007)).  Apparent authority is established if the principal’s conduct “would lead a person to reasonably believe that another person acts on the principal’s behalf,” and the agent’s service is accepted “by one who reasonably believes the service is rendered on behalf of the principal. ”  Id. at 315.  The following facts should be considered when determining whether a principal’s conduct would lead a similarly-situated patient to reasonably believe that the doctor acted on the principal’s behalf: “[1]) whether the hospital supplied the doctor; [(2)] the nature of the medical care and whether the specialty is typically provided in and an integral part of the medical treatment received in a hospital; [(3)] any notice of the doctor’s independence from the hospital or disclaimers of responsibility; [(4)] the patient’s opportunity to reject the care or select a different doctor; [(5)] the patient’s contacts with the doctor prior to the incident at issue; and [(6)] any special knowledge about the doctor’s contractual arrangement with the hospital. ”  _Cordero_, 403 N.J. Super. at 318-19.  Furthermore, “[a]ctive or explicit misrepresentations of agency by the principal are not required. ”  _Id._ at 315.  It is enough if the principal places “a person in a position from which third parties will infer that the principal assents to acts necessary to fulfill the responsibilities of that position. ”  _Id._ at 316.  As the _Cordero_ case makes clear, it is not necessary that the Defendant directly employ any of the providers at issue or that the treatment occur at their facility in order for the entity to be found vicariously liable.  Rather, it is a multitude of factors that must be analyzed and if the Defendant had some level of control over the other defendants and created an appearance of agency to the public, that will suffice.
[brief] Similarly, in *Racioppi v. Airbnb, Inc.*, No. A0455-22, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1200, at *4-7* (App. Div. July 17, 2023), the Terms and Services necessitating arbitration was contained on the first page of the Terms and Services language stating that the agreement has a binding arbitration provision located within the agreement.  Thus, the motion judge in *Racioppi* found that the terms of services contained sufficient notice to a consumer.  In both of these cases, however, the plaintiffs’ claims were premised upon allegations related to the access and use of the defendants’ websites.  This is not the case here.  There is no evidence that the Plaintiffs ever used, accessed, or registered for the [...] website.  And even if [...] could have established that in the trial court or on the record before this Court (they do not), [...] fails to explain how that action demonstrates that Plaintiffs assented to arbitrate claims that arose *before* the registration occurred.
[brief] State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383 (2009).  N.J.R.E. 503 states “every natural person has a right to refuse to disclose in an action or to a police officer or other official any matter that will incriminate him or expose him to a penalty or a forfeiture of his estate. ”  In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that before law enforcement subjects a suspect to custodial interrogation, the suspect must be advised: (1) “that he has the right to remain silent”; (2) “that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law”; (3) “that he has the right to the presence of an attorney”; and (4) “that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. ”  Miranda imposes a fifth requirement: “that a person must be told that he can exercise his rights at any time during the interrogation. ”  State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293 (2019)(citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 346 (1966).  The burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant waived his Miranda rights.  O.C.A. – C, 250 N.J. 408, 420 (2022).  In determining whether the State has proven the defendant waived his Miranda rights beyond a reasonable doubt, courts assess the totality of the circumstances concerning the interrogation, including, the suspect’s age, education and intelligence, advice as to constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature and whether physical punishment or mental exhaustion was involved and prior experience with the criminal justice system.
[brief] Defendants Ignore Key Record Evidence Linking Plaintiff’s Termination to Protected Activity.  Given that, as set forth in Plaintiff’s initial Brief, there is evidence of unlawful conduct and protected activity, the remaining issue is whether a jury could find that Plaintiff’s termination was retaliatory.  There is significant overlap between the causation prong of the prima facie case and the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, as the same evidence used to demonstrate pretext can also establish a causal link between the protected characteristic and the adverse employment action.
[brief] Thus, the court instructed the jury that “if the State prove[d] defendant] used, or threatened to use force upon [...],” it was defendant’s claim that the use of force was “justifiably used” for defendant’s self-protection.  (6T129-10 to 13).  In short, he committed a crime, but it was justified.  After outlining the elements for the use of force or deadly force, the trial court instructed the jury that it was the State’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that self-defense was untrue.  (6T133-12 to 13).
[brief] Entry A.2. to Exhibit A – Scope of Work states “[[...]] acknowledges that for the work of this Subcontract, it is an excluded party under the Contractor Controlled Insurance Program (“CCIP”) for this Project[]” and Entry B.6. states “[[...]] acknowledges that [...] is also an excluded party under the CCIP[,]” and must “comply with all insurance requirements set forth in the CCIP Insurance [] Manual and Schedule ‘B’ as an excluded party. ”  (Pa2396 and Pa2398.)  On August 3, 2015, after receiving the Project Requirements from [...] of [...], Peter [...] forwarded them to [...] of [...] confirming [...]’s unenrollment and stating, “I just got this from [...], you need to revise your proposal and add for the insurance.
[brief] A.D.P. v. Exxonmobil Research & Eng’g Co., 428 N.J. Super. 518, 531 (N.J. Super. 2012).  When an employee attempts to prove discrimination by direct evidence, the quality of evidence required to survive a motion for summary judgment is that 'which if believed, proves [the] existence of [a] fact in issue without inference or presumption.  Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 208 (N.J. 1999); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989).  A court must consider whether a statement made by a decisionmaker associated with the decision-making process actually bore on the employment decision at issue and communicated proscribed animus.  *McDevitt v. Bill Good Builders, Inc.*, 175 N.J. 519, 528 (N.J. 2003).  A Plaintiff must produce evidence that an employer based substantial reliance on a proscribed discriminatory factor in making its decision to take the adverse employment action.  *Id.* at 527.  Once established, the burden of persuasion shifts to the Defendant.  *Id.*  If the employee does produce direct evidence of discriminatory animus, the employer must then produce evidence sufficient to show that it would have made the same decision if illegal bias had played no role in the employment decision.  *Fleming v. Correctional Healthcare*, 164 N.J. 90, 100 (N.J. 2000).  In short, direct proof of discriminatory animus leaves the employer only an affirmative defense on the question of "but for" cause or cause in fact.  *Id.*  Under the *McDonnell-Douglas* test, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by satisfying a four-pronged test that our courts have modified to suit particular forms of discrimination in particular settings.