ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As reference sources contemporaneous to the TCCWNA's enactment reflect, the term "aggrieved consumer" denotes a consumer who has suffered some form of harm as a result of the defendant's conduct.  See Black's Law Dictionary 60 (5th ed. 1979) (defining "aggrieved party" as "[o]ne whose legal right is invaded by an act complained of, or whose pecuniary interest is directly affected by a degree or judgment," and "aggrieved" to denote "[h]aving suffered loss or injury; damned; injured"); Oxford English Dictionary 255 (2d ed. 1989) (observing that "aggrieve" was "rarely used" except "[i]n the passive to be aggrieved: to be injuriously affected, to have a grievance or cause of grief[;] 2. [t]o afflict oneself, to grieve, to feel grief, 3. [t]o make more grave or serious; to aggravate, exaggerate"); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 41 (3d ed. 1981) (defining "aggrieved" to mean "1. troubled or distressed in spirit[;] 2. showing grief, injury, offense, having a grievance, specifically suffering from an infringement or denial of legal rights").  Thus, an "aggrieved consumer" is a consumer who has been harmed by a violation of N.J.S.A. 56:12-15  In this case, the plaintiff is an aggrieved consumer because she suffered identifiable harm.  She paid money to the defendants in connection with a pre-judgment assignment of the proceeds of her personal injury suit.  The trial court asserts that plaintiffs chapter 7 bankruptcy filing nullified all of the transactions between these parties.  But two , with fees paid to [...], had been completed before the Chapter 7 filing.  They no longer existed to be nullified.  The plaintiff spent money she shouldn't have had to spend, and in amounts, even if the transaction were permitted that exceeded the amounts permitted by New Jersey law.  The transaction fall under the coverage of the act, and the plaintiff satisfies the elements set forth in the case law for standing under the act.  The court below should be reversed.
[brief] The Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s appeal because he did virtually nothing to show how the trial court abused its discretion.  Rather, Plaintiff argues once again that the [...] claims are “future claims” that he could not have asserted in [...].  Pb16–Pb23.  In other words, he disagrees with the trial court’s conclusion that they are not “future claims. ”  See Pa000108–Pa000110.  But he never identifies any abuse of discretion in the trial court’s reopening decision or any legal flaw in its contractual analysis.¹ ¹  Plaintiff does not even identify the relevant standards of review because he largely copied and pasted his trial court brief.  Compare Pb16–Pb29 with Pa000092–Pa000098.  That is not a proper appeal.  See Sackman v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 445 N.J. Super. 278, 298 (App. Div. 2016) (concluding a brief showed “lack of effort,” including because it did not cite the relevant standard of review); Conboy v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 992 F.3d 153, 157–58 (3d Cir. 2021) (admonishing counsel for “fil[ing] a copy-and-paste appeal without bothering to Plaintiff’s mere declaration that the court’s order should be reversed does not frame the issues for the Court or advance his appeal.
[brief] Similarly, per the CFPB, supervised non-banks, including many debt collectors, are permitted to “outsource certain functions to service providers due to resource constraints” and “rely on [the] expertise from service providers that would not otherwise be available without significant involvement. ”  The CFPB has performed hundreds of supervisory examinations of supervised debt collectors that consist of in-depth assessments of compliance with the FDCPA, management of service providers, and safeguarding of consumer information and data.  Tellingly, and despite these countless examinations and enforcement actions, the CFPB has never acted against a debt collector for using a letter vendor.
[brief] By letters April 28, 2020 and June 8, 2020 (together the “Default Notices”), Landlord notified Tenant of its payment defaults and demanded that Tenant cure the same.  (Da194-199).  Notably, in the Default Notices, Landlord recognized the economic strain COVID-19 placed on both Landlord and Tenant and requested that Tenant respond to the Landlord’s correspondence so that the parties could amicably resolve Tenant’s defaults and avoid an unnecessary eviction proceeding.  (Da194-199).  The April 28, 2020 Default Notice provides the following, in relevant part:  [...] recognizes the economic strain that many business are facing as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, and we are committed to working with our tenants to the extent we are able.  We value our tenants and our thoughts are with you, your family, and employees during these difficult times.  While we are sympathetic to the current hardship, these events do not excuse the full payment of rent under your lease.
[brief] Defendants [...], Esquire, [...], Esquire, and Marshall Dennehey  Warner Coleman & Goggin (“[...]”) submit this brief and ask this Court to affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e).  The Hon. [...], J.S.C. properly dismissed the Amended Complaint asserting claims for fraudulent concealment and legal malpractice.  She concluded that the Amended Complaint was an improper attempt to re-litigate issues which could have been brought in Plaintiffs’ previous action filed at Docket No. [...] (the “2015 action”), and determined that no duty existed to support the legal malpractice claims.  In the 2015 action, the [...] acted as counsel of record for [...], Esquire and [...] (“[...]”)  In that capacity, the [...] obtained a dismissal of their clients, as Plaintiffs failed to file and serve Affidavits of Merit.  As a result of the early dismissal, neither Menas and [...] nor the [...] participated in any way in discovery during the 2015 action.  Since that dismissal, Plaintiffs sought to bring Menas and [...] back into the 2015 action on several occasions, under different, alternative theories, including a motion for reconsideration, a motion to vacate, a motion to amend, a motion to consolidate, and a motion for leave to appeal to this Court.  Plaintiffs further sought to subpoena [...]’ personal bank records.  The [...] successfully fought each of these attempts.  When all such efforts were exhausted, Plaintiffs then filed the present suit, which not only asserted claims against Menas and [...], but also alleged baseless claims against the [...] for fraudulent concealment and legal malpractice, among other claims.  [...] dismissed the Amended Complaint, concluding that the entire controversy doctrine, claim preclusion, and law of the case doctrine barred Plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment claims.  Alternatively, that dismissal was proper because of the lack of discovery in the 2015 action means that the [...] never had a duty to Plaintiffs upon which a fraudulent concealment action could be based, and because the litigation privilege applies to them.  Further, the legal malpractice theories against the [...] were also untenable, as no attorney-client relationship ever existed between Plaintiffs and the [...], nor did the [...] take any action upon which a legal malpractice claim may rest.  Consequently, the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint was proper and the [...] ask this Court to affirm that decision.
[brief] Defendants also assert that, while “technically not residing in the Property, they were in fact in possession, having just obtained the Site Plan Approval from the . . . Planning Board, having paid real property taxes through . . . the third quarter of 2021, and having reasonably maintained the Property in anticipation of their own intended renovation[.]” (Db44-45).  Most of this is false or misleading.  Defendants did not “just” obtain site approval.  They bought the property in April 2020 and obtained land use approval in February 2022, then sat on the property --- \(^{15}\)  This is not factually accurate.  The firm that represented Plaintiff did not represent [...]; it merely recorded the deed.  (3T69:21-70:3).  Defendants seek to impugn the law firm that conducted the foreclosure, but they cannot effectively do so given that they took no discovery.  (3T70:4-8).  The [...] did nothing wrong.
[brief] In May 2020, Defendant told Plaintiff that they would marry, legally, in December 2020, in India, where defendant continued to live; this would be done just so the defendant could file with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS); later, the couple would have their “real” with all the traditions and customs of the culture.  Plaintiff testified, "Then we go to May of 2020 where she's telling me that -- because I was a little worried about this -- all this thing going on.  So she's saying that, oh, don't worry, [...].  That our marriage that's going on in December that's not real.  It's just for so that we can file for the USCIS.  So don't worry about the traditions and all that.  We will get to do that in our real marriage, which would be done at the traditional marriage, like all our customs and traditions and all"  (1T69).  Plaintiff testified that during this time, Defendant was more concerned about the status of their United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) filing rather than developing their personal relationship.
[brief] ”  (Pb24; State v. Dabas, 215 N.J. 114, 140 (2013)).  Further, defense counsel attacked [...]’s credibility and implied that the lack of additional evidence tying defendant to the crime scene indicated his innocence.  (5T:72-18 to 75-14).  A lack of an adverse inference charge under these circumstances was not “clearly capable of producing an unjust result” warranting the reversal of defendant’s conviction.  (R. 2:10-2).  Defendant again argues that the State withheld exculpatory evidence.
[brief] The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Improperly Determining That the Opinions of Plaintiffs’ Expert are “Net Opinions” and Barring His Testimony (Raised below, Pa2160, Pa2170)  The New Jersey Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of expert testimony at trial.  Testimony from a qualified expert is admissible to assist the jury, provided there is a factual and scientific basis for an expert’s opinion.  N.J.R.E. 702; Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 242 N.J. Super. 36, 45 (App. Div. 1990), modified on other grounds, 125 N.J. 421 (1991).  Similarly, the facts or data relied upon by the expert may be inadmissible so long as they are of a type “reasonably relied upon by experts” in the field.  N.J.R.E. 703.  On the other hand, an opinion lacking in foundation is worthless.  See Stanley Co. of America v. Hercules Powder Co., 16 N.J. 295, 305 (1954).  Further, an expert’s bare conclusion unsupported by factual evidence is an inadmissible “net opinion. ”  Matter of Yaccarino, 117 N.J. 175, 196 (1989).  Accordingly, an expert witness must give the “why and wherefore” of his expert opinion, not just a mere conclusion.  Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. 385, 401 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting Jimenez v. GNOC, Corp., 286 N.J. Super. 533, 540 (App. Div. 1996)).  When there is a “net opinion” claim, the focus is on the alleged failure of the expert to explain a causal connection between the act or incident complained of and the injury or damage allegedly resulting therefrom.  Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 524 (1981).  In this case, when one considers the content of the Plaintiff’s expert report, the extensive explanations which he provided during his two days of deposition testimony and finally the testimony he gave during the Rule 104 Hearing, there should be little doubt that the expert provided the “why and wherefore” necessary to support his opinion.  See Jimenez v. GNOC. Corp., supra.  Thus, it is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court erred when it abused its discretion by isolating limited portions of the testimony from Plaintiff’s expert, then making improper credibility determinations regarding the persuasiveness of certain testimony, while at the same time overlooking and ignoring other positive aspect, of the testimony.  That said, at the outset, it is important to note that the Trial Court did not question [...]’s qualifications.
[brief] In the context of the frivolous litigation statute, one court cited concerns that ‘the attorney appearing pro se and requesting a fee is taking advantage of a remedy designed to offset the burden of obtaining such representation, especially for the poor. ”  Segal v. Lynch, 211 N.J. 261, citing Asaadi v. Meltzer, 280 N.J. Super. at 73 (Law.Div. 1994).  Moreover, to allow pro se attorneys the ability to seek fee awards “would in effect create two separate classes of pro se litigants – those who are attorneys and those who are not – and grant different rights and remedies to each.  Such a result, the court reasoned, would undermine the public confidence in the judicial system.
[directive] Disclosure of personal identifying information concerning any vehicle plate scanned by the ALPR is authorized by a grand jury subpoena.  c.  Nothing in this Section shall be construed to prohibit a computer program from accessing and comparing personal identifying information of one or more individuals who are associated with a scanned vehicle as part of the process of analyzing stored non-alert data, provided that such personal identifying information is not disclosed to a person unless the "specific and articulable facts that warrant further investigation" standard is satisfied.  The "specific and articulable facts that warrant further investigation" standard set forth in this Section applies only to the crime trend analysis of non-alert data, and nothing in this Section shall be construed to limit disclosure of personal identifying information of a person who is the registered owner of a vehicle that is on an initial or post-scan BOLO list (i. e., alert data).
[brief] On March 29, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs against [...] to invalidate its adoption of the Ordinance.  (Pa1-7.)  On May 3, 2023, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”) that added two individual Plaintiffs, but did not otherwise substantively amend their claims.  The Complaint does not name the Planning Board and did not challenge the Planning Board’s recommendation to approve the Ordinance or its finding that the Redevelopment Plan is not inconsistent with the Master Plan.  (Pa126 at ¶9; Pa90; see gen. Pa46-53.)  The Complaint set forth a single count substantially claiming that the Governing Body’s approval of the Ordinance was “arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. ”  (Pa50 at ¶26; Pa90.)  The Complaint did not challenge the 2020 decisions designating the redevelopment areas in need of redevelopment and rehabilitation (nor could it have, as any such challenged were time-barred).  (Pa126 at ¶¶11-16; Pa90; see gen. Pa46-53.)  The parties agreed that there was no need for discovery, witnesses, or experts and that the trial would move forward based on the record below as presented in trial briefs and oral argument.  (Pa75.)  The parties submitted Joint Exhibits and Stipulations of Fact.  (Pa125-128; Pa76-79.)  During the pretrial period, Plaintiffs had identified potential additional documents (outside of the Joint Exhibits) that they may want to use at trial (“Proposed Exhibits”).  (Pa73-74.)  [...] disputed that the Proposed Exhibits should be used at trial and filed a pretrial motion to settle the record, asking the Trial Court to confirm that Plaintiffs’ Proposed Exhibits were not, in fact, part of the Governing Body’s record and should not be considered in any judicial review thereof.  (Pa75.)  On October 6, 2023, the Trial Court denied [...]’s motion to settle the record without prejudice and deferred its determination until the trial.  (Pa75.)  This decision was consistent with Plaintiffs’ opposition to [...]’s motion, arguing that the motion was procedurally improper and should be postponed until trial.  (Pa75 at n.2; Pa79.)  Further, “as a matter of record, all exhibits that any party intended to be used at trial, whether included as Joint Exhibits or any of Plaintiffs’ proposed and disputed exhibits [i.e., Proposed Exhibits], had to be included in the trials briefs as the trial briefs and oral arguments highlighting the arguments in the trial briefs were the stipulated form, scope and content of the record for trial. ” (Pa79 (emphasis added). )  Thus, all the parties had sufficient “notice and opportunity that the January 26, 202[4] trial would address all arguments regarding exclusion of any proposed and disputed [Plaintiffs’ Proposed Exhibits] before commencing oral argument that was stipulated as being the form of hearing, i.e., the trial was stipulated as being limited to trial briefs and oral argument. ” (Pa75 at n.2 (emphasis added). )  B.
[brief] Lawson Mardon, Wheaton v. Smith, 160 N.J. 383 (1999).  In Lawson, there was a buyout offered to shareholders based on a restructuring of the company and the sole question was fair value.  Lawson, 160 N.J. at 389.  The selling shareholders did not ask to be bought out and objected to discounts.  The Supreme Court held none should apply:  We find most persuasive those cases holding that marketability discounts should not be applied in determining the "fair value" of a dissenting shareholder's share in an appraisal action....  A rule that imposes a discount on the exiting dissenting shareholder "fail[s] to accord to a minority shareholder the full proportionate value of his shares . . . [and] enriches the majority shareholder who may reap a windfall from the appraisal process by cashing out a dissenting shareholder.  . . ."  Cavalier, supra, 564 A.2d at 1145.  Such a rule also penalizes the minority for taking advantage of the protection afforded by the appraisal statute....  "Any rule of law that [gives] the shareholders less than their proportionate share of the whole firm's fair value would produce a transfer of wealth from the minority shareholders to the shareholders in control.  Such a rule [also] would inevitably encourage corporate squeeze-outs[,]”….  Those results are clearly undesirable.  The history and policies behind dissenters' rights and appraisal statutes lead us to conclude that marketability discounts generally should not be applied when determining the "fair value" of dissenters' shares in a statutory appraisal action.  Of course, there may be situations where equity compels another result.  Those situations are best resolved by resort to the "extraordinary circumstances" exception in 2 ALI Principles, P7.22(a).  [Lawson Mardon Wheaton v. Smith, 160 N.J. at 402 (emph. added)].  It held ‘extraordinary circumstances’, require more than the absence of a trading market in the shares; rather, the court should apply this exception only when it finds that the dissenting shareholder has held out in order to exploit the transaction giving rise to appraisal so as to divert value to itself that could not be made available proportionately to other shareholders.  . . .  [Id. at 403].  On the same day, the Supreme Court decided Balsamides v. Protameen Chems., 160 N.J. 352 (1999) in which they did allow a discount based on the “equities” of that particular case.
[brief] B.  The Fee Award to [...] is Proper and Should Stand  As this Court previously recognized, where, as at bar, a plaintiff presents claims for which fees can be awarded along with claims for which such fees cannot be awarded, attorneys’ fees for all of the time devoted by counsel to the case can be awarded if the work on the unrelated claims “can[] be deemed to be part of the pursuit of the ultimate result achieved. ”  ….  A suit will not be considered a collection of separate discrete claims if it rests on “a common core of facts” or is “based on related legal theories. ”  …  Moreover, “[i]f a plaintiff achieves excellent results in a lawsuit, counsel fees should not be reduced on the ground that the plaintiff did not prevail on each claim advanced. ”  ….  Litigants may in good faith raise alternative legal theories for relief, and the court’s “rejection of or failure to reach certain grounds is not a sufficient reason for reducing a fee. ”  See 2018 Op. at *28.24  Following Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983).  Accord Silva v. Autos of Amboy, Inc., 267 N.J. Super. 546, 558-59 (App. Div. 1993); Singer v. State, 95 N.J. 487, 500 (1984); DePalma v. Bldg. Inspection Underwriters, 350 N.J.Super. 195, 218-19 (App. Div. 2002); and Northeast Women’s Ctr. v. McMonagle, 889 F.2d 466, 476-77 (3d Cir. 1989).
[brief] RESPONDENTS MANIFESTED THEIR ASSENT TO ARBITRATE THROUGH THEIR COURSE OF CONDUCT.  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Schwartz v. Comcast Corp., 256 Fed. App’x 515 (3d Cir. 2007), and this Court in Parrella v. Sirius Xm Holdings, No. A-4283-19, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 59 (App. Div. Jan. 18, 2022), each found “mutual assent” to arbitrate based upon a party’s course of conduct, despite that party having never seen, let alone signed, any pre-dispute arbitration agreement.
[brief] Ibid.; see Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chemical Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 397-398 (1982); Freund v. Cellofilm Props., 87 N.J. 229, 242-243 (1981) (duty to provide sufficient warnings is one that includes directions, communications and information essential to make the use of a product safe, regardless of prevailing industry standards).  To prove the existence of a defect, a plaintiff may rely on the testimony of an expert who has examined the product and offers an opinion on the product’s design.  See Soler, supra, 98 N.J. at 146 (testimony of the plaintiff’s expert that the absence of available and feasible safety features (an interlock and safety gate) rendered the product (a die-casting machine) defective was sufficient to overcome summary judgment); Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 248 N.J. Super. 540, 560 (App. Div. 1991) (expert testimony that manufacturer could have improved structural strength of seat by using steel alloys at minimal increased cost established that safer, alternative design was feasible in design defect/failure to warn strict liability case involving safety of vehicle seat in collision).  Plaintiff retained [...] and [...], P.E., to test, to research and to investigate whether there was a safer and feasible alternative to the CR-V as marketed and sold to the [...] and, if so, whether it would have prevented the fatal collision.
[brief] (a)  The [...] application sought greater variance relief than the [...] application for a front yard setback; Ja73 Line 5 to Line 19, Ja87 Line 13 to Line 19, Ja87 Line 25 to Ja88 Line 3, Ja76 Line 25 to Ja77 Line 4, Ja78 Line 2 to Line 5.  (b)  Both applications proposed bringing 10 feet of fill on to the property causing concerns for flooding on to the neighboring [...] property and [...]; Ja94 Line 15 to Line 19, Ja228, Ja229, Ja293 (c)  Both applications failed to delineate by measurement the location of freshwater wetlands on the subject property; Ja169, Ja170, Ja245, Ja253 (d)  Both applications proposed substantial clear cutting along [...]; Ja218, Ja63 Line 19 to Ja64 Line 2.  (e)  Both applications proposed placement of a septic system within 10 feet of [...]. Ja60 Line 11 to Line 20, Ja61 Line 21 to Line 25, Ja167, Ja245  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[directive] Do you understand that if you violate a condition of parole supervision for life, your parole may be revoked and you can be sent to prison for 12 to 18 months for each revocation that occurs while you are being supervised and that the prison term you receive cannot be reduced by commutation or work credits?  (6)  ¿Entiende que si usted infringe una condición de la supervisión bajo [Sí/Yes] [No/No] [NC/NA] libertad condicional de por vida el primero de julio del 2014 o después de esa fecha y se le acusa formalmente y se le condena por dicha infracción, recibirá una condena de encarcelamiento de hasta 5 años o si la infracción ocurrió antes del primero de julio del 2014, recibirá una condena de encarcelamiento de hasta 18 meses y que la condena que reciba puede ser agregada a cualquier término de encarcelamiento que pueda recibir de la Junta de Libertad Condicional por una infracción de la supervisión bajo libertad condicional de por vida?