ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Appellate Division addressed the significance of a pattern of retaliatory treatment in *Nardello v. Township of Voorhees*, a CEPA case, which also stemmed from the plaintiff’s involvement in an internal investigation.  See *Nardello v. Township of Voorhees*, 377 N.J. Super. 428, 431 (App. Div. 2005).  The lower court did not consider the findings in *Nardello*, where this Court reversed the trial court’s summary judgment dismissing a complaint brought under CEPA, finding that “while plaintiff was not discharged, suspended or demoted, when the facts are viewed in a light most favorable to him, a jury could draw an inference that he suffered a series of adverse retaliatory actions by his employer. ”  *Id.* at 435; see also *Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ.*, 177 N.J. 434, 448 (2003) (“‘Retaliation,’ as defined by CEPA, need not be a single discrete action.  Rather, adverse employment action taken against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment . . . can include, as it did in this case, many separate but relatively minor instances of behavior directed against an employee that may not be actionable individually but that combine to make up a pattern of retaliatory conduct’); see also O’Keefe v. State, 2007 WL 1975603 (N.J. App. Div., July 10, 2007) (reversing the summary judgment dismissal of a CEPA claim and holding that the jury could find that a pattern of retaliatory conduct, including filing of groundless EEO complaints, constituted an adverse employment action).  And the Nardello case was decided before the New Jersey Supreme Court’s Roa decision and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Burlington decision, both of which made clear the wide scope of actions that constitute retaliation under the NJLAD and Title VII.  When considering the retaliatory actions pled by Plaintiff, against the backdrop of the Injunction mandating that Defendants maintain the status quo, and factoring in the Roa standard, it is clear that Plaintiff successfully pled the second prong of an NJLAD action.  As such, the Court’s dismissal of Count One as to Defendant [...] should be reversed.
[brief] 3.  [...] has failed to show any genuine issues of material fact capable of supporting any causal connection between her “complaints” and her termination.  Even if [...] could present evidence capable of supporting a finding that she engaged in whistle-blowing activity, which she cannot, [...] fails to present any genuine issues of material fact connecting her alleged whistle-blowing activity to her termination.  On appeal, [...] argues four allegedly genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment: (1) [...]’s deposition testimony that [...] approved the charge pay; (2) [...]’s alleged dismissiveness of [...]’s “complaints” could allow jurors to infer a pattern of antagonism toward him; (3) a jury could allegedly infer that [...] derailed [...]’s investigation of her June 24, 2020 behavior given her “discovery” of the charge pay issue; and (4) [...]’s alleged selective application of policy.
[brief] Notwithstanding any other law, rule, or regulation to the contrary, a board of education of a local school district or of a local school district constituting part of a limited purpose regional district, the board of education or governing body of a non-operating school district, or the governing body of a municipality constituting a constituent district of a limited purpose regional district, part of an all purpose regional district, or part of a consolidated school district may, by resolution, withdraw from a limited purpose or all purpose regional district or consolidated school district in order to form or enlarge a limited purpose or all purpose regional district provided that the withdrawal: (1) is approved by the Commissioner of Education . . . as meeting the criteria set forth in paragraphs (2) through (8) of this subsection, which approval shall be obtained prior to any election held to determine whether to form or enlarge a limited purpose or all purpose regional district that the withdrawing . . . governing body will join.
[brief] The Defendants knew full-well that they lost all interest in the Property when they sold it to [...] in 1997.  Nonetheless, after [...]’s “research” uncovered the error/mistake in the December 1998 Deed, and after waiting three-plus years without notifying Plaintiff, the Defendants set up a sham company, [...], for the sole purpose of stealing and then selling the Property before [...] uncovered the Plot.  The Defendants’ conduct was actuated by actual malice\(^{12}\) and accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard of the Plaintiff who would foreseeably be harmed by their acts.  The plaintiff has further proved the factors under section “c” of N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.12.  The property has value exceeding $1.1 million.  Additionally, Defendants did not/would not stop the theft unless and until they were stopped by this Court.  The defendants are wealthy -- through [...], the [...] owned several real properties in NYC with significant value.  Pa799-819; Pa1958-2233.  Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that Defendants’ willful and wanton conduct warrants an award of punitive damages.
[brief] [N.J.S.A. 58:11A-2(a), emphasis added.]  And in the next subsection, the legislature declared as follows:  The Legislature declares that the objective of this act is, wherever attainable, to restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the waters of the State, including groundwaters, and the public trust therein….  [N.J.S.A. 58:11A-2(b), emphasis added.]  Thus, the legislature’s declarations make it clear that the [...] ought not to myopically focus on only wastewater to determine consistency with and/or to achieve the objectives of the WQMA and the Highlands Act.
[brief] 33 Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347 (1993) ...............................................................................................  15 Triffin v. American Intern., 372 N.J. Super. 517 (App. Div. 2004) ..................................................................  36 Vincitore ex rel. Vincitore v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 169 N.J. 119 (2001) ............................................................................................... 14, 17 Williams v. Town of Phillipsburg, 171 N.J. Super. 278 (App. Div. 1979) ..................................................................
[brief] Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Druz, No. A-0076-10T1, 2013 WL 68712 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 8, 2013) [Da571-Da578] ..................................................18, 20 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. A.G., 724 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013) .....................................................................................5, 7, 16 Raritan Plaza I Assocs., L.P. v. Cushman & Wakefield of N.J., Inc., 273 N.J. Super. 64 (App. Div. 1994) ....................................................................................18, 19, 20 Santana v. SmileDirectClub, LLC, 475 N.J. Super. 279 (App. Div. 2023) ....................................................................................15 Schmidt v. Laub as trustee for Carol L. Glatstian Living Tr., No. A-0620-19T1, 2020 WL 2130931, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 5, 2020) [Da546-Da551] ..............................................................................16 Sheppard v. Twp. of Frankford, 261 N.J. Super. 5 (App. Div. 1992) .........................................................23, 43  Spolitback v. Cyr Corp., 295 N.J. Super. 264 (App. Div. 1996) ......................................................24, 34  Stoney v. Maple Shade Twp., 426 N.J. Super. 297 (App. Div. 2012) .......................................................14  Sweeney v. Sweeney, 405 N.J. Super. 586 (App. Div. 2009) .....................................................20
[brief] Pa88 to Pa90.  I appealed the Board’s determination, Pa91 to Pa92, but the Board denied my appeal in an August 17, 2023 decision, affirming its prior decision and refusing my request for an administrative hearing.  Pa93 to Pa97.  My Notice of Appeal was filed on September 26, 2023 and my Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on October 26, 2023.  Pa98 to Pa113.
[brief] THE RECORD APPEARS TO CONTAIN NO FINDING OF GUILT ON THE CHARGE OF SECOND-DEGREE POSSESSION OF A WEAPON BY “CERTAIN PERSONS. ”  A TRIAL WAS NOT HELD ON THAT COUNT AND THE TRANSCRIPTS CONTAIN NO GUILTY PLEA TO THAT CHARGE.  (NOT RAISED BELOW).  Defendant has raised three points in this brief that address all of his convictions, but one of those convictions requires an additional legal point.
[brief] [...]’s Operations at the [...]  The Site is a former metal fabrication, processing, and finishing plant located on about 22 acres of land abutting Massachusetts State Route 152, also known as Taunton Street, in Plainville, Massachusetts.  (Pa0420).  The Site is bounded on the east by Route 152, on the south and west by a man-made lake known as Turnpike Lake, and on the north by a forested and wetland area owned by the [...].  (Id).  On the other side of Route 152 are five vacant, formerly residential lots and a wetland/swampy area.  (Id).  Operations at the [...] began in 1957 and originally consisted of “form roll” operations, which rolled and shaped metals such as steel and titanium; and nuclear operations, which fabricated uranium fuel elements for the civilian nuclear industry under licenses from the Atomic Energy Commission.  (Pa0093).  The early operations were conducted in two separate buildings, known as Building 1 and Building 2.  (Id).  Over time, the operations conducted changed and the Site was expanded by the construction of additional, adjoining buildings, eventually covering a contiguous area of approximately 300,000 square feet, and consisting of twelve sequentially numbered buildings.  (Id).  All operations at the [...] ended in 1993.  (Pa0092).  III.
[brief] Meritoriously, The Court was within its Discretion and Correctly Declined to Charge the Jury as to [...], based upon the Factual Record made at Trial  The cases cited by Appellant can be easily differentiated from the instant matter.  Most notably, the instant matter deals with rain that by all accounts, had occurred overnight and was stopped for some time, prior to Appellant’s alleged skid.  To the contrary, [...] dealt with snow and corroborating evidence from an independent witness that established reasonable and careful action on the part of the driver.  Universal Underwriters v. Heibel, 386 N.J. Super. 307 (App. Div. 2006) dealt with gravel in the roadway that was unnoticed by the motorcycle operator who slid but recognized and identified after the fact by the driver.  Calabree v. DiCristino, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2548, dealt with antifreeze that was unnoticed prior to the slid, but recognized by both drivers after the fact.  Finally, Paramel v. Martinez, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1701, dealt with sewage sludge that had been discharged upon the roadway, ultimately resulting in the roadway’s closure for clean-up, due to the hazard.  All of these conditions are transient, but this Court must recognize the foreseeability factor in weighing the unexpected or unanticipated natures of the condition(s); gravel, sewage and antifreeze not expected to be within the roadway, snow that occurs in our State sporadically over an approximate three (3) to four (4) month period per year, versus rainfall that occurs much more frequently and regularly.  However, even more importantly than the condition alleged is that in the cases cited by Appellant, the defendants were able to establish a condition of the roadway they alleged to be responsible for the skid; as opposed to conclusory testimony about wet roadway conditions.
[brief] DEP argued that “…sending the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) would give Appellants, who are third parties to [...]’s application, an administrative hearing contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act’s prohibition on that, as well as extensive case law. ”  DEP at 10.  But the Appellants do not need to be given full party status at the OAL and, instead, can be authorized to participate in the proceedings as would be helpful and constructive to a sound outcome.  N.J.A.C. 1:1-16.6.  Clearly, DEP has not yet made a credible record of the totality of the potential adverse environmental impacts from this Project on the Highlands resources.  Therefore, an appropriate remedy (short of invalidating the HAD entirely) would be an order from this Court requiring public hearings (whether at the OAL or not) as a basis for the DEP to make these requisite adjudicative determinations on remand, to support an assessment of whether the reasonably foreseeable extent of damage from this Project is consistent with the Act.
[brief] Defendant did not do so.  ‘Excusable neglect’ is that “which might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances. ”  *Tradesman National Bank & Trust Co. v. Cummings*, 38 N.J.Super. 1, 5 (App.Div. 1955).  "Carelessness may be excusable when attributable to an honest mistake that is compatible with due diligence or reasonable prudence."  *Mancini v. EDS*, 132 N.J. 330, 335 (1993), *Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Russo*, 429 N.J. Super. 91, 98 (App. Div. 2012).  But the type of mistake entitled to relief under the rule is *one the party could not have protected itself against*.  *DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield*, 198 N.J. 242, 263 (2009).  A business’ failure to read or respond to a lawsuit is not excusable neglect.
[brief] (Pa102-03 at 77:23-78:1; Pa362 at 83:3-21; Pa479-80).  [...] informed [...] that none of them should have been receiving the charge pay.  (Pa362 at 83:10-21; Pa479-80).  Upon investigating, [...] learned that Plaintiffs entered the charge pay on each other’s behalf at approximately 11:00 am each Monday before payroll closed.  Critically, this was after [...] had reviewed their time cards.  (Pa364 at 90:5-91:1; Pa475; Pa482-528).  [...] normally reviewed the staffing coordinators’ time cards Sunday night.  (Pa352 at 41:3-12).  The staffing coordinators would then finalize those time cards, and the time cards would be sent to payroll for processing.  (Pa532; Pa105 at 86:19-87:8).  The Kronos Time Card Audit Trail establishes that [...] entered “hourly charge” pay on [...]’s behalf thirty-two times over a period of two months, comprising five pay periods, from May 30, 2020 to July 25, 2020.  (Pa482-528; Pa530).  It further shows that [...] entered “hourly charge” pay on [...]’s behalf fifteen times over a period of two pay periods, from July 11, 2020 to July 25, 2020.  (Pa482-528).  [...] does not dispute that she entered “hourly charge” for [...] and [...].  (Pa248 at 94:13-15; Pa249 at 97:8-10).
[directive] All Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies are encouraged to take all recommended steps under II.2.E.3, and II.2.E.4 of the Report, and take trainings identified by the Department under II.2.E.2: a.  II.2.E.3.  Where there are multiple Qualified CBIV Organizations within their jurisdiction, it is recommended that Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies coordinate among these entities to streamline partnership and engagement.  b.  II.2.E.4.  All Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies are encouraged to provide training and opportunities to officers in the areas of wellness and in dealing with exposure to direct and vicarious trauma.  c. II.2.E.2.  Where specialized CBVI trainings are made available by the DLPS, Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies are encouraged to makes these trainings available to interested law enforcement officers (this includes problem-solving, cognitive behavioral interventions, motivational interviewing, or trauma- informed approaches or programs such as Trauma to Trust).  C.  All Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies are encouraged to take all recommended actions under II.3.1 and II.3.2 in relation to HVIP providers:
[brief] Rather, it served as a clear example of a “functional equivalent of interrogation” that runs afoul of *Miranda*.  *Ibid.* (quoting *A.A.*, 240 N.J. at 344-45).  Applying the plain meaning of the *Innis* test, the Court found that “[t]he police should have known it was reasonably likely that A.A.’s mother would elicit incriminating responses from him,” making the statements inadmissible.  *Id.* at 44 (quoting *A.A.*, 240 N.J. at 357-58).  [...] recognized that the *A.A.* decision’s use of the *Innis* standard was “equally applicable here. ”  (2T 49-1 to 5)  Thus, it was no abuse of discretion for [...] to find the rationale for suppression in *A.A.* compelling when the police conduct in that case so closely matched what had happened to [...].  (2T 47-1 to 49-5; 3T 15-15 to 22)  The State takes issue with [...]’s citations to *A.A.*, arguing it has no bearing here because [...] is an adult.  (Pb 19)  But our Supreme Court’s analysis in *Tiwana* makes it clear that *A.A.* is a relevant demonstration of the “functional equivalent of interrogation” outside of juvenile cases.  See *Tiwana*, 256 N.J. at 44 (comparing to unwarned but spontaneous statements of adult defendant).
[brief] understand his *Miranda* rights”).  Here, the State submitted even less evidence than in *Puryear*.  At the *Miranda* hearing, the State offered no official record of arrests or convictions and failed to establish the recency of any encounters.  [...] testified only that [...] had been “arrested in the past”; that at some point he had “given a statement” (evidently when he cooperated as a witness in 2015); and that [...] “believe[d]” he had been Mirandized before that statement.  (3T 22-4 to 19)  But the court found only that he had previously “talk[ed] to police as a witness” and made no finding on whether he had been Mirandized then.  (Da 114, 125 (emphasis added))  That vague experience was insufficient to cure the vastly coercive and manipulative tactics employed here. \(^{19}\)  In sum, the State failed to carry its heavy burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt the voluntariness of both [...]’s waiver and his statement as a whole.  Because his statement “began with a misleading remark” -- the affirmative lie that he was “[j]ust like . . . anybody else” -- “and that error was reinforced by yet more misrepresentations throughout the questioning,” his “statement must be suppressed in full. ”  *O.D.A.-C.*, 250 N.J. at 425.  \(^{19}\)  In fact, his prior experience as a witness actually undermined the voluntariness of his waiver because the detectives knew that, this time, he was not merely a witness, but they exploited his experience by falsely assuring him that he was “[j]ust like . . . anybody else. ”  Indeed, the State even recognized that the “last time” he provided a statement “[h]e ended up being just a witness,” so this time “[h]e probably thought he was going to be able to do the same thing . . . which was why he voluntarily agreed to speak with the detectives. ”  (3T 58-21 to 59-4)  E.  The Erroneous Admission of Defendant’s Statement Was Not Harmless.
[brief] This shall apply regardless of the severity of the offense and reckoning period, and regardless of whether the violations are of the same type.  [...] failed to properly conduct nineteen (19) property checks that he called into dispatch.  In 2017, [...] was investigated and plead guilty to the violation of departmental rules and regulations, "neglect of duty" for inaccurately recording statistical data which affected his bi-annual evaluations, which he failed five (5) out of seven (7) times from January 2014 to the end of 2017.
[directive] 1 - 1  Federal laws and regulations 1 - 1 State and regulations laws  1  1 - Administration of Funds and Property Resulting from Federal Forfeiture Actions  1 - 1:3  2 to Guide Equitable Sharing of Federallv Forfeited Propertv for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies (March 1994 or US. current edition): Department Justice of 1 - 2 -_ - Guide to EsuiZsable Sharing for Foreim Countries  Federal, & - State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies (October or 1996 US. current edition): Department of the Treasury  1 - 2  Separate Accounting for State and Federal Forfeitures 1:4 2 1 - Designated Chief Executive/Law Enforcement Agency 1- 2 1:5  Attorney General 2  1 - County Prosecutor 1 - 3  Public Safety Director Chief of Police 3  1- - Contents  Table of Jet Sew Forfeiture Program Adminisri-ation SOP sey Page: 5;rilre of 1 . ~ Noncompliance 1:6 1- 3 Barred from participation 3 1 - 1 - 3 Offsets from future sharing Civil enforcement actions 3 1 - Prosecution for violations of applicable criminal laws 1- 3 SOP No. 1 Administration of State Forfeiture Program 2 - 02 - Applicability: State County Programs 1 2 - & Policy Statement 2 - 1 2:l Establishment of the Attorney General's Law Enforcement Forfeiture Account (AGLEFA) 2 - 1 2:2 1 Department of the Treasury 2 - 2 - 1 Office of Attorney General Forfeited Property 2 - 1 Forfeited Funds 2 - 1 2 - Division State Police of 1 Alcoholic Beverage Control 2 - 1 2 - Division of Criminal Justice 1 Interest Generated by AGLEFA 2 - 1 2 - State General Treasury 1 2 - 2 Attorney GeneraUDisbursements from AGLEFA 2 Director of Office of Management and Budget 2 - 2 Establishment of a Seized Asset Dedicated Account 2 - 2:3 DL&PS Cash Management Fund Seized Asset Dedicated 2 - Account 2 (SADA) 2 Seized Asset Trust Account (SATA) 2 - 2 Seizures 2 - $50,000 -_ - - Limitations-oir
[brief] ”  1T34:9-19.  \(^3\)  It should be noted that Plaintiffs subpoenaed each of the three banks and all three advised that [...] did not have a bank account there within the relevant time period.  [...] similarly instructed Defendants’ counsel that their response of “superintended” [sic] to Request No. 11 which asked them to identify who was responsible for communicating with the tenants at the Property (Da79) was unacceptable.  Instead, [...] made clear that both the [...] and [...] were required to “clarify who the superintendent is. ”  1T37:18-20.  The trial court later pointed out that Defendants’ response to Request No. 19 for lease agreements with tenants residing at the Property from January 1, 2024 through September 27, 2019 of “no recollection at this time” (Da72) was unacceptable, and instructed Defendants to certify their efforts as to efforts made to locate the lease agreements.
[brief] On February 3, 2023, Defendant-Respondent, [...], forwarded correspondence to advise counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], that the claim was still under review.  (Da041).  On February 24, 2023, Defendant-Respondent, [...], forwarded correspondence to counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], offering $85,000.00 to settle her underinsured motorist claim.  (Pa141).  On February 24, 2023, counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], sent an email to Defendant-Respondent, [...], rejecting the offer and supplying outstanding medical bills asking Defendant-Respondent, [...], to “let me know if this brings us closer to my demand. ”  (Da043).  On March 10, 2023, Defendant-Respondent, [...], sent correspondence reiterating the settlement offer of $85,000.00 noting that the unpaid medical expenses would not be included in its review of the underinsured motorist bodily injury claim.
[brief] Statutes: N.J.S.A.18A:7A-56 .........................................................................................12  Case Law: Abbott v. Burke, EDU5581-85 (initial decision), August 24, 1988.....................15  Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 119 N.J. 287 (1990)..............................................11  Abbott v. Burke (Abbott III), 136 N.J. 444 (1994)..........................................11  Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XX), 199 N.J. 140 (2009) .......................................5, 11, 15  Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XXI), 206 N.J. 332 (2011)........................................20  Alcantara v. Allen-McMillan, 475 N.J.Super. 56 (App.Div. 2023)....................5, 15 Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473 (1973)..............................................................16  Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133 (1975).............................................................16  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT