ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pb7; Pa1152 at 16:35:28/29 on the head end video.  When [...] sounded the horn at this time, [...] was walking forward (north) on the sidewalk adjacent to the right of way where Track 1 is located.  Approximately 5 seconds before the collision (16:33:30 on the head end video), the train was travelling approximately 24.5 mph and [...] was still walking forward (north) on the sidewalk adjacent to the right of way where Track 1 is located.  Compare Pa160, ¶56 with Pa764, ¶56.  About 2 to 2.5 seconds before the collision, [...] changed directions and began to walk towards the pedestrian railroad crossing that was to her left.  Pa1152 at 16:35:28/29 on the head end video; Pa521 (Plaintiffs’ expert’s analysis of the video evidence: “16:33:33 – [...] turns toward the crossing to cross over the tracks . . . 16:33:35 – LRV strikes [...].
[brief] *State v. Mellody*, 479 N.J. Super. 90, 108–09 (App. Div. 2024)(citing *State v. Gamble*, 218 N.J. 412, 425 (2014)).  Under both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, ordinarily, a police officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle, or its occupants, is committing a motor-vehicle violation or a criminal or disorderly persons offense to justify a stop.  *State v. Scriven*, 226 N.J. 20, 33-34 (2016)(citing *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999)).  A motor vehicle stop by a police officer, no matter how brief or limited, is a seizure of persons under both the Federal and State Constitutions.  *State v. Smith*, 251 N.J. 244, 258 (2022)(internal citations omitted).  The “reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop is a lower standard than the probable cause necessary to sustain an arrest. ”  *State v. Amelio*, 197 N.J. 207, 211 (2008)(internal citations omitted).  “The standard requires ‘some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.
[brief] \(^9\) --- \(^9\)  The [...] submit to the Court that the complete prejudgment interest award is subject to review for such error, as the affirmance of the $19,435,326 prejudgment interest to [...] did not address the interest compounded by the trial court without findings.  However, to the extent the Court declines to address that subset of $19,435,326 of prejudgment interest, which was affirmed, the Court should rectify the trial court’s error for the remainder of the prejudgment interest award that was not at issue in the prior appeal.  Yet, on remand, the trial court continued the compounded 8.875% interest rate from the date of the December 20, 2013 Final Judgment, through and including the date of the sale of the property at issue, July 9, 2014.  (40077a-40080a).  Additionally, the trial court imposed a new *compounded* interest rate of 3.935% from the date of the sale of [...] through and including November 16, 2022.  (40079a-40080a).  The award of prejudgment interest, which now is $22 million more than the compensatory damages in this case, is not compensatory.  It is punitive.
[brief] As [...] noted:  “An average member of the public may not know-without some explanatory comment-that arbitration is a substitute for the right to have one's claim adjudicated in a court of law. ”  *Atalese* at 432.  “The requirement that a contractual provision be sufficiently clear to place a consumer on notice that he or she is waiving a constitutional or statutory right is not specific to arbitration provisions. ”  *Id.* at 443.  The Court relied upon a statute that require that “every consumer contract” in New Jersey “must be written in a simple, understandable, and easily readable way. ”  *Id.* citing *N.J.S.A.* 56:12-2 (emphasis added).  Thus, *Atalese* holding can be summarized as requiring an explicit notification in the contract that indicates that a consumer or employee has been informed that they are waiving their right to sue in Court.  Application of that principle to the sophisticated parties to the shareholders’ agreement in this context makes absolutely no sense.
[brief] (Pa0598).  One is the Rides platform, which connects individuals who need a ride with drivers who are willing to give a ride.  Ibid.  Users generally access the Rides platform through the [...] App.  Ibid.  [...] offers access to its Apps and the Rides platform subject to terms of service.  Ibid.  At all times relevant to this case, [...]’s terms of service contained an arbitration provision requiring disputes like Plaintiffs’ to be settled through binding arbitration.
[brief] The decision whether to default is left to the court's discretion.  *Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc.*, 322 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir.2003).  No particular *Poulis* factor is controlling and dismissal or default can be granted even when Montana v. County of Cape May Board of Freeholders, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2013) 2013 WL 11233748 some of the factors are not met.  Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir.1988).  As noted, the Court does not find that defendant acted egregiously, willfully, vexatiously or in bad faith.
[brief] Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully submits that Defendant is now estopped from raising that issue before this Court.  R. 1:7-2; Waterson v. GM Corp., 111 N.J. at 250; Kargman, 85 N.J.L. at 635; Andriotis, 30 N.J. Super. at 265; Golden, 30 N.J. Super. at 247.  As discussed further below, the admissibility of the account statements and cardmember agreement is not simply limited to the business records exception of the hearsay rule.  Notwithstanding this issue, Plaintiff respectfully submits that the account statements were still admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule because a) the account statements qualified for the adoptive admission exception to the hearsay rule (N.J.R.E. 803(b)(2)) and/or there was no bona fide dispute regarding the facts --- 5
[brief] ”  *Id.*, at 86.  The Court then examined the policy reasons for extending liability, as set forth in *Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc.*, 87 N.J. 146 (1981), including: (1) a recognition of the “considerable interest in and rights” the commercial landowner had regarding the property in question, (2) whether imposing a duty associated with those rights would be arbitrary, (3) whether a failure to impose the duty would leave innocent victims without recourse, (4) a recognition that the imposition of liability would give an incentive to landowners to care for the property, (5) whether the proximity of the place where the injury occurred to the business establishment would render a failure to impose a duty arbitrary, and (6) a recognition that the commercial landowner would treat the costs associated with additional insurance premiums and maintenance as one of the necessary costs of doing business.  *Kandrac*, 429 N.J. Super. at 87-88.  The *Kandrac* Court then rejected the plaintiff’s argument that this was a question of ingress and egress, noting that the location where the plaintiff fell was not a sidewalk abutting the premises or a marked walkway, but was the parking lot, part of the common areas of the shopping center, with “no defined route” to her vehicle.
[directive] REQUIREMENT TO CONDUCT PROMPT AND THOROUGH INVESTIGATIONS III.  OR TO PROMPTLY REFER MATTERS FOR INVESTIGATION BY ANOTHER AGENCY  A.  Investigation or Referral of Possible Human Trafficking Violations  Whenever a law enforcement officer: a) develops reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that the crime of human trafficking is being or has been committed; b) receives any information from an anonymous or confidential source concerning a possible human trafficking violation under circumstances where the information does not on its face constitute reasonable articulable suspicion; or c) determines, while in the course of investigating a prostitution-related offense pursuant to Section IV(B) of this Directive, that any of the relevant circumstances that are specified in the Page 3 investigation standards and protocols promulgated by the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice pursuant to paragraph (1) of Section IV(A) of this Directive exist; the officer or another member of the officer’s agency shall either: (1) promptly investigate the possible human trafficking violation in accordance with the provisions of this Directive; or (2) promptly refer the matter to the appropriate County Prosecutor’s Office, or to the Division of Criminal Justice, for investigation by the County Prosecutor or the Division.
[brief] [...] did neither.  The Trial Court ignored the change in policy language that eliminated the restrictive ACC clause, did not cite *Cypress Point*, and ignored well-established principles of policy interpretation in cases involving a policy exclusion.  “It is well-established that the coverage sections of an insurance policy are to be liberally construed in favor of the insured, exclusions are to be read narrowly, and ambiguities are to be construed against the insurer. ”
[brief] 42  1)  The Honorable [...] Correctly Permitted Plaintiffs to File a Fourth Amended Complaint in order to Add [...] as a Named Defendant.................................................. 43 (Raised below, Pa1550, Pa1763, Pa1698)  2)  Plaintiffs’ Fictitious Party Pleading Preserved the Claim Against [...] ................................................................. 46 (Raised below, Pa1550)  C. Conclusion ....................................................................................... 48
[brief] The statute explicitly provides for several disclosure exemptions, but mail vendors are not included in those exemption [sic].  We are aware of at least one unpublished federal court decision addressing the same issue and it is in accord with *Hunstein I* and *II*, *Khimmat*, and *Jackin*.  We have found no contrary unpublished federal decisions, but --- 2 *Ali v. Credit Corp. Sols., Inc.*, No. 21-cv-5790, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59126, 2022 WL 986166 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2022).  Plaintiff does not rely on unpublished decisions.  *Cf.*  R. 1:36-3.  Here, the motion court never acknowledged any federal court decisions and did not address the reasoning in those decisions.  Instead, the motion court expressly cited and relied on four unpublished Law Division decisions provided by Defendant.  T17:1-T22:9 (those decisions appear at Pa34-Pa88).  Of those, only two mention “Hunstein” (see Pa50, Pa68, Pa75) but none of them discussed the reasoning behind any of the federal decisions.  Instead, one case does not consider *Hunstein II* because it was vacated for rehearing *en banc*.  Pa75.  But, as explained earlier in this Point III, being vacated for other reasons does not justify ignoring the decision’s reasoning.  **POINT IV.
[brief] The *Lajara* Court addressed whether the defendant (health care provider) had a right to demand a jury trial under the NJIFPA.  Relying heavily on the *Jersey Central & Light* decision\(^3\) (distinguished above), [...] found that a defendant did have such a right if they so choose.  He did not hold that an insurance company as the plaintiff had any such right:  “The issue before us is whether defendants in a private action brought under the IFPA have a right to trial by jury.
[brief] If evidence is produced raising a debatable question among reasonable people, the presumption is overcome.  In Cappuccio, supra, the court stated if a consumer signs a written acknowledgment of receipt the signature does no more than create a rebuttable presumption thereof.  Id at 189.  However, [...] produced no affidavits based on personal knowledge supporting its contention that [...] signed or knew he signed the account application or received a copy of the account application or deposit agreement.
[brief] (Pa1, Complaint)  The Answer was filed on February 11, 2021.  (Pa27, Answer).  The Parties were notified on May 27, 2021 that the case was listed for Mediation.  (Pa44)  A Motion to Compel Discovery was filed on the date of October 10, 2021.  (Pa47)  Opposition to the Motion to Compel Discovery was filed on October 27, 2022.  (Pa57).  A Cross Motion to Compel Discovery was filed on October 27, 2021 and was opposed.  (Pa72)  All motions were decided on the date of November 4, 2022.  (Pa82, Pa85)  On November 30, 2022, A Motion was filed to extend discovery.  (Pa87).  On December 8, 2022, A Cross Motion was filed to Compel Continuation of the Deposition of Plaintiff.  (Pa93)  On December 16, 2022, the Court granted the Extension of Discovery.  (Pa113)  On December 16, 2022, the Court Denied the Motion to Compel the Continuation of Deposition of Plaintiff.  (Pa115)  On the date of March 31, 2023, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  (Pa117)  Appellant filed Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment on May 2, 2023 (Pa144)  The Court heard oral argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment and the Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment on May 12, 2023 and the Court entered a decision on the Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment on January 5, 2024.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff, [...] (“[...]”) submits this brief in support of its appeal seeking reversal of the trial court’s October 20, 2023  Order denying [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, October 20, 2023  Order granting [...]’s (“[...]”) Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and January 5, 2024  Order denying reconsideration.  This appeal involves the interpretation of a contractual indemnity provision entered into between [...], a general contractor, and [...], a subcontractor, relating to injuries suffered by plaintiff, [...] (“Plaintiff” or “[...]”), during his employment with [...].
[brief] On June 26, 2020, the Plaintiff was occupying and using her vehicle at a Dunkin’ Donuts drive-thru owned and managed by [...] (hereafter “[...]”), located in Hillside, NJ (Pa 001).  The Plaintiff drove her vehicle up to the drive-thru window to receive her order (Pa 060, 062).  She had her foot on the brake while the vehicle remained fully operational with its engine engaged (Pa 060, 062).  She grabbed the tray containing two beverages with both hands and as she was bringing the tray into the vehicle, the lid on the hot tea came off, and the cup spilled (Pa 060, 062).  The Plaintiff was burned when the hot tea spilled between her legs, to her buttocks area, and directly to her perineal area, between her vagina and anus (Pa 062, 094).  At the time of the spill, the Plaintiff was sitting in the driver’s seat, the vehicle was “in drive”, engine was running, and her foot was on the brake (Pa 060, 062).  The driver’s seat had a seat cover on it, made partially of metal, which became very hot when the tea spilled (Pa 108).  She lifted her foot from the brake at the moment the hot tea hit her, but quickly placed her foot back on the brake to prevent the vehicle from moving forward (Pa 062, 094-95).  The Plaintiff was forced to sit in the hot tea, tried to move her body forward (“scoot”), and was only able to move a couple of inches, by holding herself up on the steering wheel until she stopped the vehicle and got out.
[brief] N.Y. SMSA, Ltd.  P'ship v. Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. of Weehawken, 370 N.J.Super. 319, 334 (App. Div. 2004).  The resolution does not make any real “finding” at all.  It recites the statements of Board members and professionals, much of which was in conflict, and then says “denied” by an improper and invalid “bland recitation of applicable statutory criteria.
[brief] 4T, 116:14-23.  Third, even if Plaintiff [...] in 2007 desired or deemed it warranted to enter into a partnership with an affordable housing developer or for whatever reasons waited until after the aforesaid NJHMFA rule change actually became effective and then entered into partnership with an affordable housing developer having already participated in two prior affordable housing projects, it would still have no effect on [...]’s expert report.  4T, 139:16-142:24.  As [...] opined, also confirming [...]’s deposition testimony, whether before or after the rule change became effective, Plaintiff [...] could have easily entered into a 60%-40% partnership with an affordable housing developer.
[brief] On August 26, 2020, [...] purchased a 2015 tax certificate by assignment, knowing the property was abandoned and that it could foreclose ¹Combined for brevity. immediately.  Ia151-154.  But after filing foreclosure on November 30, 2020, Ia236, averring that the property had been declared abandoned by the City, Ia237, it paid no more taxes and left the property abandoned and unsecured.  [...] completed its foreclosure 193 days later, June 10, 2021.  Ia162.  Despite having purchased its lien in the third-quarter of 2020, [...] didn’t bother paying the 2020 open taxes, nor 2021-2023 either.  As a result, another tax sale took place December 29, 2020.  Ia17.  The property was still abandoned more than a year later and Plaintiff filed this foreclosure August 17, 2022.
[brief] ”).  The appellate court “owe[s] the trial court’s evidentiary findings reasoned deference, not blind deference. ”  State in Int. of A.R., 234 N.J. 82, 106 (2018).  [...] made the following factual findings:  [T]he Court finds that based on [...]’s observations that the Defendant appeared to “hunch over” in his seat attempting to conceal view of his waistline coupled with the use of the Defendant’s safety vest to cover his waist that there was sufficient reason to ask the Defendant to step out of the vehicle.  This finding is supported by the fact that [...] testified that the Defendant appeared to be nervous and reluctant to answer officer’s questions.  [(Da20-21)]  However, the video disproves two of the court’s critical factual findings.  First, [...] never hunched over in his seat or attempted to conceal the view of his waistline.  At one point, [...] slightly leaned to his right when opening the glove compartment to retrieve his car’s registration.  (Da26 at 00:44 to 00:51)  At all other points in the video, [...] sat upright in his seat.  (Da26 at 00:35 to 02:07)  Second, [...] displayed neither nervous behavior nor any reluctance to answer the detectives’ questions.  [...] spoke at a normal cadence and speed, made direct eye contact, volunteered information to the detectives regarding where he was heading and why, and answered all the detectives’ questions directly.  (Da26 at 00:35 to 02:07)  The trial court erred in finding that [...] hunched in his seat, attempted to conceal his waist, appeared nervous, and was reluctant to answer the detectives’ questions; the court’s legal conclusions flowing from these erroneous factual findings must be reversed.
[brief] Given the proximity of the two garages, the Authority cannot justify its decision to build the Ward Street Garage as opposed to the Authority Garage.  The Trial Court directly questioned [...] on this point: “if you are going to knock [the Ward Street Garage] down, it is gone.  So why not build [the Authority Garage] on the other spot?”  2T119:11-21.  [...] testified in response that “[i]f you knock it down, then we have to rebui[ld] it.
[brief] agency is controlled by a private interest group like the [...] that is not adequately accountable to the public. \footnote{The State Defendants suggest in a footnote that the Plaintiffs’ Complaint is procedurally defective under Rule 2:2-3 to the extent that the Plaintiffs are effectively appealing agency rulemaking.  (Sb8, n. 4).  The State Defendants’ suggestion totally misses the point.  The Plaintiffs are challenging the constitutionality of the underlying statutes governing the composition of and the delegation of regulatory authority to the Council, as distinguished from the validity of agency rulemaking \textit{per se}.  Consequently, the lawsuit was properly filed in the Trial Court instead of the Appellate Division.
[brief] [...], one of [...]’s treating physicians, described [...] as being “well until 1991” after which he “experienced progressively severe symptoms that have led to his current disability” resulting from mold exposure.  Da635a.  [...], another of [...]’s treating physicians, recounted similar medical problems for [...] beginning in 1991 and continuing afterward.  Da2243a.  Among other things, he stated that [...] “began experiencing the gradual onset of stomach pains, sneezing, coughing-up blood, deteriorating eyesight, headaches and increasing difficulty with calculations. ”
[brief] The Collapsing of The Timeline  The New Motion Judge also wrote that while [...] was *en route* to the hospital, [...] was shown the [...] readings.  As discussed previously, that occurred at about 10:12 p.m., long after the 9:48 p.m. readings.  From this, the court claims that [...] could not have performed the delivery within the applicable standard of care.  Plaintiff has already addressed this point.  In fact, the court acknowledged that the procedure that [...] was completing around 10:12 p.m. likely did not start until about 9:57 p.m. [Pa8: “this places the initiation of this other procedure at about 9:57 p.m. ”].  Accordingly, as briefed earlier, [...] was not in that other procedure at 9:48 p.m., when the [...]’ emergency C-section should have been called.  Again, Plaintiff addresses this point without conceding the materiality of it.  The [...]’ C-section was not called until 10:12 p.m. and, for this reason alone, could not have been completed in a timely fashion, as required by the standard of care.
[brief] The full text of the COVID Statute in its amended form appears below.  The language of the June 29, 2020 amendment is highlighted.  If the schools of a school district are subject to a health-related closure for a period longer than three consecutive school days, which is the result of a declared state of emergency, declared public health emergency, or a directive by the appropriate health agency or officer, then the school district shall continue to make payments of benefits, compensation, and emoluments pursuant to the terms of a contract with a contracted service provider in effect on the date of the closure as if the services for such benefits, compensation, and emoluments had been provided, and as if the school facilities had remained open.  Payments received by a contracted service provider pursuant to this paragraph shall be used to meet the payroll and fixed costs obligations of the contracted service provider, and employees of the contracted service provider shall be paid as if the school facilities had remained open and in full operation.  A school district shall make all reasonable efforts to renegotiate a contract in good faith subject to this paragraph and may direct contracted service providers, who are a party to a contract and receive payments from the school district under this paragraph, to provide services on behalf of the school district which may reasonably be provided and are within the general expertise or service provision of the original contract.
[brief] . .”  N.J.S.A. 48:17-8 (emphasis added).6 -  “No pole, conduit, wire or other fixture, except such as are a part of a through line of any such telegraph or telephone company as distinguished from a local line, shall be constructed or erected in, upon, along, over or under any public road, street or highway of any municipality without first obtaining permission by ordinance or resolution from the governing body of the municipality, nor in, upon, along, over or under any public road, street or highway of any county without first obtaining permission by resolution from the board of freeholders of the county. ”  N.J.S.A. 48:17-10 (emphasis added).  --- 6  Since the Ordinance was created primarily to regulate small wireless 5G facilities, the Town’s authority under these statutes to regulate and provide consent for such actions are especially relevant.