ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In addition, a mortgage contract merges into a final judgment and no additional fees can be assessed thereafter.  *Hatch v. T & L Associates*, 319 N.J. Super. 644 (App. Div. 1999).  In *Hatch*, the plaintiff brought an action to enforce the mortgage note in the Law Division instead of a foreclosure in general equity on the mortgage.  Thus, since the mortgage still remained as only enforcement of the note was pursued, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of additional fees on other grounds.  Here, the Chancery Division’s Final Judgment included the mortgage, left the 2009 foreclosure assignment in place, specifically stated amount due via pay-off letter, specifically stated that no litigation fees were charged to the defendants, and mandated that the Final Judgment be recorded.  Acting upon that recorded Final Judgment, [...] refinanced in October 2022.  The prior 2004 loan that was at issue in this case was closed and paid off in full, *Valencia v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88886, U.S.D.C. Hawaii, June 25, 2013 (citing Section 9 of the mortgage contract and stating litigation/attorney fees can only be additional secured debt that must be included in the final judgment; cannot be separate awards); Chacker v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 27 Cal. App. 5th 351, 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 921, 2018 Cal. App. LEXIS 832, 2018 WL 4474732 (A.D. 2018) (provision authorizing attorney fees to be added to loan amount did not authorize separate fee award to the lender but only allowed fees to be added to outstanding balance due under promissory note); Hart v. Clear Recon. Corp., 27 Cal App. 5th 322, 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 907, 2018 Cal. App. LEXIS 829, 2018 WL 4443242 (A.D. 2018) (under same provision, attorney fees can only be added to secured debt).
[brief] Specifically, when [...] asked, “I come from another, another country to here I do not know if you guys assign an attorney to me or I have to look for an attorney on my own?”, [...] responded:  [...]: So parte de esto yo tengo explicar yo lo yo solo estoy leyendo, pero está en español.  (So part of this I have to explain I, I am only reading, but this is Spanish).  [...]: Mm-hmm.  [...]: Yo no puedo darle eh ningún tipo de aviso legal ok umm este es muy simple si usted quiere tener un abogado presente eso es su derecho.  Si usted quiere hablar conmigo y consultar con un abogado después es algo usted, pero yo no puedo darle ningún tipo de-de-de ósea de con, de consultación.  *(I cannot give you any type of legal advice ok umm this is very simple if you want to have an attorney present that is your right.  If you want to talk with me and then consult with an attorney that is something that you, but I cannot give you any type of-like of advice).*  [...]: Oh ya.  *(Oh ok).*
[brief] Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Jersey City, 103 N.J.L. 574 (1927), aff’d, 104 N.J.L. 437, 140 A. 920 (E. & A. 1928) .................................................................24, 25 Leimbach v. Regner, 70 N.J.L. 608 (Sup. Ct. 1904) ...............................................................39  Mayor and Mun. Council of City of Clifton v. Passaic Valley Water Comm’n, 224 N.J. Super. 53 (Law Div. 1987) ....................................................18, 21 McCann v. Biss, 65 N.J. 301 (1974) .................................................................39, 40 Mina L. Smith, Inc. v. Cyprus Indus. Mins. Co., 178 N.J. Super. 7 (App. Div. 1981) ..............................................40
[directive] Prosecutor's County the of employee other this of 4 and 3 Sections to pursuant functions approval review, and advice, legal on-call perform  Prosecutor to attorneys assistant includes general" attorneys  "deputy term the Directive, this throughout used As Directive. Justice. Criminal of Division general the in 19 Page operating all agencies available to procedures information and contact snake shall Prosecutor law a when circumstances specify the may Director  The jurisdiction. prosecutor's the within rather Justice Criminal of Division the contact directly should officer or agency enforcement Office.  Prosecutor's County than a 2017.
[brief] Thus, even if appellant/plaintiff [...]’s claims against his insurance carrier were relevant to the application of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4, the litigation of those claims was concluded in favor of [...] on an unopposed motion for summary judgment.  The trial court found that “plaintiff’s vehicles were garaged in New Jersey so there is no coverage under the North Carolina policy” and dismissed with prejudice.  Summary judgment is granted as a matter of law.  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 528-529 (1995).  Interpretations and application of statutes are the province of law for the Court to decide – not a jury.  See e.g., State v. S.B., 230 N.J. 62, 67 (2017); State v. Cagno, 211 N.J. 488, 505 (2012).  Here, there was no “fact” question as to whether appellant/plaintiff [...] failed to comply with the law, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.  The appellant/plaintiff [...]’s Complaint was properly dismissed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5.
[directive] Specifically, Rule 3:3-1(g) prohibits a judge from deciding to overcome a presumption that a complaint-warrant be issued without considering “whether within the preceding ten years the defendant as a juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for escape, a crime involving a firearm, or a crime that if committed by an adult would be subject to the No Early Release Act . . . or an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses. ”  Page 40 deputy attorney general consulted in accordance with Section 3.2 of this Directive, or a supervisory officer specially designated pursuant to subsection 3.3.2 who is authorized by the County Prosecutor to overcome presumptions under Section 4 of this Directive, determines that the presumption of charging by complaint-warrant is overcome pursuant to subsection 4.5.9.  In the event that out-of-state pending charges or convictions do not appear to involve violence or firearms and a presumption of issuing a complaint-summons applies pursuant to Section 4.3, the prosecutor may consider an out-of-state offense as part of the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether to overcome that presumption.  Overcoming the Presumption of Applying for a Complaint-Warrant.
[brief] Overview  At 16:33:33 (4:33:33 p.m.), [...], impermissibly entered onto [...]’s (“[...]”) railroad right of way at its York Street pedestrian crossing for the Hudson Bergen Light Rail (“HBLR”).  T8:4-9:1; Compare Pa163, ¶73 with Pa765, ¶73; Pa361, ¶5 and 9; Pa582:20-23; Pa679:16-682:21.  Two seconds later, she collided with an HBLR Train that was imminently approaching the crossing on Track 1.  Compare Pa154, ¶17 with Pa762, ¶17; Pa222-235, 281-319³; Pa1152 at 16:33:30 to :35; Da51 at 4:33:10 to 4:33:14.  Tragically [...] died as a result of the collision.
[brief] ”  (27T 198-23 to 200-5)  The prosecutor told the jury that the flight charge was “important,” that if it found that [...] fled “because he was worried about getting arrested or prosecuted for that offense, you can presume that he was guilty. ”  (27T 122-23 to 123-1)  For good measure, the prosecutor reminded the jury of the proverb, “Only the guilty flee when no one pursues,”\(^{16}\) which, he explained, “understands the human condition.  …  If you didn’t do anything wrong, you don't run away.  But he ran away.  We saw him sprint off. ”  (27T 123-1 to 9)  \(^{16}\)  Proverbs 28:1 – “The wicked flee when no man pursueth[.]”  [...] fully admitted that he fled the scene.
[brief] LEGAL STANDARDS  “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case. ”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).  Relevance is “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case. ”  Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978); see also Booth v. Davis, No. 10-4010-RDR, 2011 WL 2008284, at *6 (D. Kan. May 23, 2011) (“Relevance is broadly construed, and a request for discovery should be allowed unless it is clear that the information sought can have no possible bearing on the claim or defense of a party. ” (internal quotations and citation omitted)).  “Courts should lean towards resolving any doubt as to relevance in favor of discovery. ”  Foreclosure Mgmt. Co. v. Asset Mgmt. Holdings, LLC, No. 07-2388-DJW, 2008 WL 3822773, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 13, 2008).
[brief] Rather, as noted by the trial judge, “[a]lthough Plaintiff feels the alleged wrongs to have negatively altered her employment, her subjective assessment of the facts is not legally significant to determine whether she was retaliated against. ”  9a.  Indeed, “[t]he Complaint is rife with allegations that rise only to the level of an employee that is dissatisfied with her employer,” (10a), which is insufficient to satisfy the materially adverse pleading standard.  Roa, 200 N.J. at 575; Burlington, 548 U.S. at 61.  Put directly, being required to attend a meeting to address a policy violation and being the subject of an investigation of an administrative complaint is not materially adverse and does not automatically satisfy the standard regardless of how broad it is to be interpreted.  Given Plaintiff’s failure to show an adverse employment action, her claim for retaliation under the NJLAD fails as a matter of law.
[brief] Appellant, contrary to this straightforward reading of the statute, insists that Respondent, as “proponent” of the “non-permitted” use carries the burden of proof on an application by an objector to that use brought decades after the use came into existence.  Appellant has not offered any theory as to how this interpretation comports with either the plain meaning or the purpose of the statute or any reason why, in this instance, the applicable interpretive principles should be disregarded.  In many cases, the property owner, or a prospective property owner, is both the proponent of the use and the party applying for issuance of the certificate.  In such cases, the property owner, as the applicant seeking the certificate, will carry and bear the burden of proof that the use pre-existed the ordinance.  See, eg., S&S Auto Sales, 373 N.J. Super. at 613 (App. Div. 2004) (“It is the burden of the property owner to establish the existence of a nonconforming use as of the commencement of the changed zoning regulation and its continuation afterward. ”).  But that does not mean that the property owner will bear the burden of proof even when a neighbor asks the Board for relief.
[brief] See Viacom, 2003 WL 402792, at *6 (holding that an insurer’s failure to specifically reference arbitration in its answer or certification did not support a finding of waiver of its arbitration rights).10  Similarly, [...]’s Rule 4:5-1(B)(2) certification, which stated that [...] did not “presently” contemplate arbitration was accurate when filed; based on the posture of the case at that time, arbitration was not yet a viable option.  D398a-400a.  While [...] accuses [...] of “hid[ing] the ball” (Pb23), [...] should have understood that not “presently” contemplating arbitration did not foreclose future arbitration.11  Finally, while [...] (and other parties) demanded a jury trial, 10  [...]’s contention that this Court should disregard the Viacom decision because it is a New York federal decision does not comport with Cole.  Infra at 7.  11  [...]’s reliance on Herrera v. Paramount Freight Sys. Inc , No. A-0424-23, 2024 N.J.Super. Unpub. LEXIS 951 (App. Div. May 24, 2024) is misplaced, as that case involves a two-party dispute in which there were no allegations of futility.  this reflected the case status in 2019 when arbitration would have been futile.  It was not until [...]’s settlements that arbitration became a viable dispute resolution mechanism.  Based upon the case’s unique circumstances, this factor should be given little weight as arbitration is justified under the totality of the circumstances.
[brief] [...] ("[...]") works in [...] ("IT") Unit.  (3T4:9-10).  [...] testified that the police cars have GPS systems, and the Officers can see one another on the GPS systems.  (3T6:14).  Officers cannot see supervisory personnel on the GPS.  (3T6:17).  Dispatch can see everyone.  (3T23:19).  If an MDT is turned off, it also turns off the GPS.  (3T6:23).  The GPS system of [...] was four or five years old when [...] testified.  (3T15:25).  Officers' portable radios did not have GPS capability.  (3T18:20).  Officers on November 20, 2017 were not equipped with body worn cameras.  (3T18:23-24).  [...] could not recall whether there were any directives speaking to or governing the use of GPS within [...]’s Police Department.  (3T19:11).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE SEIZURE OF THE PHONE WAS PURSUANT TO THE CONSENT EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT  The trial court judge determined that the defendant consented to the seizure of the phone, obviating the need for a warrant and probable cause.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).  It appears that Defendant does not contest the consent he gave for the original seizure of the phone.  Da22-23.  Defendant’s complaint arises from what he contends was a withdrawal of consent as opposed to a denial that he consented initially.  As probable cause to search existed prior to the request for consent and one or more warrant exceptions applied, the search and seizure of the phone was lawful even assuming arguendo that the defendant at some point revoked his consent to search the phone.  However, regardless, the State contends that the defendant did not revoke his consent to the search.  The trial court judge found that this did not occur based on the testimony of the detectives and [...] in particular, who could recall no request by the defendant to return his phone (2T).  Da24.  The trial court judge weighed and judged unconvincing the “incredible” testimony of the defendant on that point.  Da24.  As discussed supra, appellate courts reviewing a grant or denial of a motion to suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.
[brief] Defendant’s animal cruelty conviction should not be reversed because the jury instruction did not fail to define the central element of the offense.  Defense argues that the Court’s failure to define the words “unnecessarily” and “cruelly” to the jury denied the Defendant a fair trial.  (Db7).  Defendant contends that because the statute under which he was indicted does not prohibit beating or abusing, but only “unnecessarily” or “cruelly” beating and abusing, the trial judge was required to define “unnecessary” and “cruelly. ”  Defendant claims that the jurors were unable to make the determination of whether the Defendant unnecessarily or cruelly beat [...], because the jury was given no guidance as to whether a particular act was legally unnecessary or cruel.  Defendant is clearly mistaken.  The model jury charge for N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1), does not require the trial judge to define the words “unnecessarily” or “cruelly. ”  It also does not require the trial judge to give guidance as to what particular acts are legally unnecessary or cruel, because these are typical colloquial terms that are commonly understood, not legal terms of art.  Thus, the Defendant’s right to a fair trial has not been violated and his conviction should be upheld.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................................................................................................3  STATEMENT OF FACTS  ..........................................................................................................4  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................11  POINT I  BOTH POLICE OFFICERS TESTIFIED THAT MR. DUA COMMITTED THE CHARGED CRIME OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON A POLICE OFFICER, DENYING MR. DUA  A FAIR TRIAL AND REQUIRING REVERSAL.  (NOT RAISED BELOW)  ..................................................................................11  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON SELF-DEFENSE DEPRIVED  MR. DUA OF A FAIR TRIAL.  (NOT RAISED BELOW)  ..................................................................................15  POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY INSTRUCT THE JURY ON CAUSATION WAS PLAIN ERROR  WHERE THERE WAS A FACTUAL DISPUTE OVER WHETHER MR. DUA ACTUALLY CAUSED OFC. ENRIQUEZ’S WRIST FRACTURE.  (NOT RAISED BELOW)  ..................................................................................................................27  POINT IV  THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE ERRORS DENIED MR. DUA A FAIR TRIAL (NOT RAISED BELOW)  ..................................................................................................................32  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................33
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On November 10, 2020, [...] (“[...]”) submitted two applications to the [...] (the “Department”) for premium rate increases on its long-term care insurance policies written in New Jersey between 2005 and 2012 (a/k/a Choice 2 and Choice 2.1 policies).  See Pa2.  On December 22, 2021, the Department issued a letter disapproving the requested rate increases.  See Pa120; see also Pa123.  [...] sought administrative review of the disapproval before an ALJ, and on June 6, 2023, the ALJ affirmed the Department’s disapproval of [...]’s rate applications.  See Pa86.¹  The Commissioner issued a Final Decision on November 9, 2023, affirming the ALJ’s ruling.  See Pa1.  [...] timely appealed.
[brief] (5T49-11 to 13).  [...] was not present when defendant made this statement.  (5T57-22 to 24).  [...] testified that defendant was not wearing a shirt and was shaking.  (5T48-21 to 24; 5T49-9 to 10).  The officer also testified that the State had issued him a subpoena to appear on April 18, 2022.  (5T587-13 to 18).  Finally, the defense called defendant’s father as a witness, who testified that it was 28 degrees outside when he saw defendant come out from some trees and defendant had no shirt on and looked “scared as hell.
[brief] Here, officers had sufficient probable cause to believe that defendant’s home may have contained contraband or weapons and thus, a judge likely would have issued a warrant to search the residence.  In informing defendant of such likelihood, the police expressed an accurate view of future events.  To that end, it was indeed true that officers would return to his house “either with [his] cooperation or without[.]” (Db42; Da18).  And importantly, defendant knew that, if he refused consent, the police would have to “write a search warrant” and then petition a court for issuance before they could search his home.  (Da15 3:24:13 to 3:25:10; Da18; Da25; Da26).  While informing defendant that police had enough evidence to “write a search warrant” was perhaps a bit ambiguous, it certainly did not coerce defendant into agreeing to a consent search.  And whatever confusion that wording may have caused, an officer later clarified it by informing defendant that police would “petition the court for a search warrant. ” (Da15 3:25:05 to 3:25:10).  Thus, defendant was correctly informed of the process before he consented to the search.
[brief] First, Respondent repeatedly campaigned for her seat on the Board from her Facebook account.  Attached to the Amended Complaint was a series of posts Respondent [...] made from her account which asked [...] community members to vote for her and her running mate [...].\(^2\) (Ca263, Ca265, Ca267-268, Ca270, Ca272, Ca274, Ca276).  The Amended Complaint itself clearly stated that at the time each post was made, “[...]’s page was public as indicated by the earth-shaped symbol in the top left corner of the post, just below [...]’s name,” that “[...] Repeatedly used this Facebook account to campaign for her position on the Board (Exhibit 2, Exhibit 3, and Exhibit 4, Exhibit 5, Exhibit 6, and Exhibit 7) and posted election results when she won her Board position (Exhibit 8),” and that “[...] held herself out as a member of the [...] on her Facebook page.
[directive] By contrast, broad-based relief for large categories of defendants could sweep in cases in which release from detention would not be appropriate.  We decline to grant relief on a categorical basis for other reasons as well.  Movants argue that prolonged detention before trial could render the CJRA punitive, rather than regulatory, and thereby raise serious due process 3 concerns.  But they do not contend the statutory scheme is unconstitutional at this time.  As a result, the doctrine of judicial surgery, which is designed to save an otherwise unconstitutional statute, see State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 485-86 (2005), is not available.  Nor can the Court exercise its rulemaking authority to amend the substance of the Act.  See N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3; Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 247-48 (1950).
[brief] (Pa 514).  [...] also confirmed in his deposition testimony that on or about September 17th and September 21st of 2020, DPW workers were doing work in the area where the Plaintiffs injury occurred.  (Pa 519).  He also confirmed that on September 17, 2020, there was a damaged pole reported at [...] that was assigned to the [...].  (Pa 519: Deposition of [...] at 30:21-31:5.).  He further confirmed that when working in the area, he typically makes inspections of the roadway.  (Pa 519)  He also stated that if one of his employees noticed the pothole, he would expect them to report it.  (Pa 519).  Moreover, [...] also testified that street sweepers pass by the area four times per week and sweep each side of the street twice per week (Pa 520).  Finally, an email from [...], who was the Town Administrator to [...] and [...] from [...], dated July 16, 2020, indicates that the Town Administrator had been travelling Kearny Avenue in 2020 to observe for paver defects and thus, had an opportunity to observe the pothole existing at the accident location.  (Pa 386).  Also, another email from [...] to [...], dated October 2, 2020, states, “Stephen . . .as previously requested we have an item for resetting pavers included in the Kearny Avenue Roadway Improvements project.  I have the Town’s DPW list for the paver problem areas and our office also has walked the streetscape and generated a list. ” (Pa 400).  Given the size of the pothole, the length of time that it existed, the gradual deterioration of the pothole, the location of the pothole and the fact that town officials were aware that the area was problematic in terms of potholes, this raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Defendant has constructive notice and even actual notice of the dangerous condition.