ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Finally, the Court must reject the defendants’ attempts to exculpate [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].  Appellant argues that the Court should not appropriation joint and several liability to these entities because they were not direct parties to the transactions in which the defendants misappropriated funds.  However, this is not a case in which multiple unconnected defendant parties are separately liable for harm to the Plaintiffs.  Here, [...] (in concert with [...]) controls the entities.  He freely moved money among them.  Establishing a complex regime of several liability would allow [...] and the other defendants to move money, file for bankruptcy, or make mischief in ways detrimental to the Plaintiffs’ interests as judgment creditors.  Put simply, the defendants advocate for a several liability regime that would allow them to engage in the same bad faith conduct the lower court found they engaged in to begin with.  The trial court’s judgment should therefore be affirmed.
[brief] All of the elements of fraud are present here.  First, Defendants made a number of material misrepresentation and omissions, all with the intent of defrauding and/or deceiving [...].  To begin, in executing the October 2019 Deed, Defendants materially misrepresented a claim of ownership with respect to the Property.  Moreover, in transferring the Property without notifying [...], they committed a material omission by transferring title without notice to the title holder.  Additionally, Defendants jointly made material misrepresentations in the Affidavit of Title for the October 2019 Deed when [...], signing as [...], certified that [...] did not go by any other names.  As outlined at length above, with the exception of the October 2019 Deed, [...] never used the name [...].  This was all done with the express intent of hiding the transfer of the Property from [...].  Second, Defendants at all times had knowledge as to the falsity of all of their actions related to the Property.  As of October 2019, Defendants ([...], [...], and The elements of scienter, that is, knowledge of the falsity and an intention to obtain an undue advantage therefrom, see Pomeroy, supra at 422; Gordon v. Schellhorn, 95 N.J.Eq. 563, 573-74, 123 A. 549 (Ch.1924), are not essential if plaintiff seeks to prove that a misrepresentation constituted only equitable fraud.
[directive] Direct-Indictment Cases Where Automated Pretrial Risk-Assessment Results Are 4.9.2  Not Available.  Except as otherwise expressly provided in this subsection, all of the provisions and presumptions set forth in Section 4 of this Directive shall apply to the prosecutor’s determination whether to request the court to issue a complaint-warrant following the return of a direct indictment.  Because the defendant in a direct-indictment case will not have been arrested for this offense and therefore will not have been fingerprinted by means of the Live Scan system, it may will not be possible to run the automated pretrial risk-assessment software to inform the complaint-warrant versus complaint-summons determination.  When practicable, a prosecutor should ask the judge before whom a direct indictment is returned to order that the defendant be fingerprinted by Live Scan prior to the court making the complaint-warrant versus complaint-summons determination so that this decision can be informed by the automated pretrial risk-assessment process.  If  Since  Because it is not feasible to have the defendant fingerprinted through the Live Scan system before the decision must be made whether to issue a complaint-summons or complaint-warrant, the prosecutor in making a recommendation to the judge before whom the indictment is returned shall apply the provisions/presumptions set forth in Section 4 that do not depend upon the results of the automated pretrial risk assessment.  See note 8; see also subsection 4.2.6 (discussing the authority to seek a superseding complaint-warrant based on new information bearing on pretrial release risks).  In addition, the prosecutor shall when feasible ascertain the defendant’s criminal history by making an NCIC/CCH or Interstate Identification Index query that does not require fingerprint verification.  4.10
[brief] According to the this Court’s synopsis of the facts in that case, [...] (“[...]”) filed a “legal malpractice claim against [attorney] [...] and his firm from which this appeal emanates.  The crux of [...]'s complaint was that [...]'s negligence in preparing the Trust Agreement yielded an outcome directly contrary to [his father’s] [...]'s intent, which was allegedly to disinherit [his sister] [...] and leave his entire estate to [...]. ”  Pivnick, supra, 326 N.J. Super. at 480.  The Court first addressed [...]’s argument that [...] could not proceed with his claims at all because of the absence of privity between him and [...].  The Court declined to preclude all actions by unhappy beneficiaries but held that public policy would be “satisfactorily protected by enhancing the applicable burden of proof in this type of legal malpractice action. ”  Id. at 483.  Specifically, where a purported beneficiary asserts that an attorney failed to capture a testator’s intent, a “clear and convincing burden of proof shall be required[.]”
[brief] The gravamen of the offense of conspiracy is the unlawful agreement between the parties.  State v. Carbone, 10 N.J. 329, 336-337 (1952); State v. Abrams, 256 N.J. Super. 390, 401 (App. Div. 1992).  “The offense depends on the unlawful agreement and not on the act which follows it; the latter is not evidence of the former. ”  Carbone, 10 N.J. at 337.  Further, “[t]he mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of the substantive offense, without an agreement to cooperate, is not enough to establish one as a participant in a conspiracy. ”  Abrams, 256 N.J. Super. at 401.  While circumstantial proof may be used to prove conspiracy, it must nevertheless be proof which demonstrates an agreement, and not merely proof of the completed crime.
[brief] **Standards of Review:**  On this appeal there are several:  This Court reviews rulings of law & issues regarding & the interpretation of rules de novo.  Meehan v Antonellis, 226 N.J. 216,230 (2016).; Occhifinto v Olivo Constr. Co,Llc, 221 N. J. 443,453 (2015).  A trial court’s interpretation of the law & the consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.  Rowe v Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N. J. 531, 552 (2019).  Further, if a judge makes a discretionary decision, but acts under a misconception of the applicable law or misapplies it, the exercise of legal discretion lacks a foundation & it becomes an arbitrary act, not subject to the usual deference.  Then the appellate court adjudicates the controversy in light of the applicable law in order to avoid a manifest denial of justice..  Summit Plaza Assoc. v. Kolta, 462 N.J. Super. 401, 409 (App. Div. 2020): State v. Steele, 92 N.J. Super. 498, 07 (App. Div. 1966).  In the specific context of a motion for frivolous lawsuit sanctions, this Court reviews a trial judge’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard.  See, McDaniel v. Man Wai Lee, 419 N.J. Super. 482,498 (App. Div. 2011).  This Court will reverse the decision if not premised upon consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, olr amounts to a or amounts to a clear error in judgment.  Id.; See also, Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181,193 ( App Div. 2005).  POINT I: The Lower Court Erred By Not Awarding Fees From The Fund In Court, By Not Finding That Plaintiffs Engaged In Frivolous Litigation & By Disqualifying Appellant From Receiving Sanctions As A Pro Se Litigant (Da 221-229; 236-244)
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020  7.12.3  The identification and examination of collateral issues is critically important to the internal affairs process.  Internal affairs investigators are in the unique position of examining law enforcement operations from the inside.  Their insight, if properly used, can be extremely helpful to management.  In contrast, the failure to use this resource can deprive the law enforcement agency of the ability to identify and correct problems with personnel and procedures through self-critical analysis.  It can also lead to an erosion of community support for the agency.  An internal affairs process that is objective and complete is critical to the credibility and reputation of the law enforcement agency within the community.  44  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 8
[brief] As this Court explained, “once a trial court has pronounced sentence and entered a judgment of conviction, it relinquishes jurisdiction over the matter to the executive branch. ”  Beauchamp, 262 N.J. Super. at 537.  “Just as the executive branch of government may not intrude unduly on the judiciary’s discharge of its responsibilities in the sentencing process, . . . so is the judicial branch limited in its role thereafter as the sentence is executed.
[brief] The [...] takes the opportunity here to address several of the misstatements set forth in the Respondents’ brief on the issue of overbreadth.  First, the [...] disagrees with Respondents’ assertion that the issue of overbreadth was raised below in Respondents’ Amended Complaint.  Indeed, the Fifth Count of Respondents’ Amended Complaint is entitled “Void For Vagueness. ”  Da42.  A reference to Ordinance 17-2017 being “overly inclusive” in paragraph 52 does not raise a new cause of action for overbreadth which is an entirely separate issue.  Da42.  Respondents use of the word “over-broad” in its arguments below also does not create a separate cause of action.  Case law clearly requires a cause of action to be specifically plead with a statement of facts on which a claim is based, showing the pleader is entitled to relief and a demand for judgment of that relief.  R. 4:5-2.  “Pleadings must fairly apprise the adverse party to the claims and issues to be raised at trial. ”  Jardine Estates, Inc. v. Koppel, 24 N.J. 536, 542 (1957).  Here, Respondents’ Amended Complaint fails to plead overbreadth and it was not listed in the Pre-trial Order or briefed below.  As such, the [...] relies on its argument that Respondents never properly raised the over broad cause of action and that it was raised sua sponte by the trial court, which was prejudicial to the [...].  Respondents go on to argue that Ordinance 17-2017 is over broad, failing to recognize the limiting criteria within the ordinance to assure its reasonableness and Constitutional application.  Indeed, Respondents give short shrift to the Clarksburg Inn case wherein this Court notably found the municipal ordinance in question, nearly identical to Ordinance 17-2017, was neither overbroad nor vague.  Respondents only argue that the Millstone Ordinance in the Clarksburg Inn case did not include Ordinance 17-2017’s “excessive . . . loud talking” parameter under the definition of noise nuisances.  First, Respondents misstate Ordinance 17-2017’s definition.  Ordinance 17-2017 clearly limits and defines what constitutes a noise nuisance regarding “shouting”:  Shouting.  The excessive shouting, screaming or loud talking of peddlers, hawkers, vendors, patrons, or others who disturb the peace and quiet of the neighborhood.  Da111.  When read in context, the word “of” qualifies who this is directed towards, i.e. those who “disturb the peace and quiet of the neighborhood”.  It’s a subset of “noise nuisances” which are categorized as “any unnecessary and unreasonable loud, disturbing noise which is plainly audible and either annoys, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, health or welfare of others within the limits of the [...]. ”  Da110.  There is no guessing here, the ordinance is as clear, if not more defined, than the Millstone Ordinance in Clarksburg Inn.  Ordinance 17, 2017, much like the Millstone Ordinance, is neither vague nor overboard when read in its clear context.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Thus, a stay may be granted where necessary to prevent irreparable harm, where the legal right underlying the movant’s claim is settled, where there is a likelihood of success on the merits and where the relative hardship to the moving party favors granting such relief.  *Id.* at 132-134.  Upon review of the parties’ submissions, I find that appellant has failed to meet this standard.  *Specifically, appellant has failed to demonstrate that the legal right underlying his claim is settled.*  Appellant argues that it is settled law that the Board does not have the authority to take action against a teacher’s certificates after the arbitrator in a tenure proceeding chose not to order the teacher’s termination.  *Based on such a novel argument, the Commissioner can in no way find that the right underlying appellant’s claim is settled in his favor.*  In light of the fact that all of the Crowe prongs must be met in order for a stay to be granted, it is not necessary to analyze the three remaining factors.  Accordingly, appellant’s request for a stay of the [...]’s October 28, 2021 Order of Suspension is hereby DENIED.
[brief] “[O]ur jurisprudence has long ago set boundaries for advocacy, and unequivocally defined conduct that, by its potential to cause injustice will not be tolerated. ”  Geler v. Akawie, 358 N.J. Super. 437, 463 (App. Div. 2003).  Other than the private redeveloper, all other defendants were fiduciaries of a public trust subject to a heightened duty of care.  These public defendants were required to turn square corners.  The Judiciary can no longer condone such behavior by officers of the court with a sworn duty to enforce and to uphold State law.
[brief] [...] also misleadingly implies that an additional or perhaps alternate standard for a court to vacate an arbitrator’s award is that the arbitrator’s “‘errors of law’ had to be so egregious that one need only look at the cover page, at the award, to know that a horrible mistake had been made. ”  Opp. at 15, 19, 30.  [...] fails to note that this convenient quote is lifted from the concurring opinion of [...] in Perini and is the only time the phrase appears in New Jersey jurisprudence.  _ 129 N.J. at 542.  This language is not even used or cited by the Tretina Court, and it should not be swept into some overarching impossible-to-meet standard that [...] created by stitching together convenient quotes from a variety of opinions.  In sum, under New Jersey law, an award must be vacated when an arbitrator exceeds his powers by disregarding the terms of the parties’ agreement, which is exactly the case here when the Arbitrator improperly transformed projects into Backlog Projects subject to EGP-sharing and supposedly determined the amount of those EGPs from documents that did not qualify as amendments to the PTA.
[brief] 5  LEGAL ARGUMENT: POINT  1.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ............ 7 POINT  2.  BREACH OF DUTY BY PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY .....................................  11 POINT  3.  ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE ..........................  15 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................  18  | Document Name | Date | Page Number | |-------------------------------|------------|-------------| | Vacate Judgment Order | 10-19-2023 | Pa60 | | Reconsider to Vacate Judgment Order | 12-1-2023 | Pa61 | | Traverse Hearing Order | 12-1-2023 | Pa62 | ###
[brief] Secondary to the Department’s brief, on December 4, 2023, [...] sought leave to appear as amicus in this matter.  In connection with its application, [...] appended numerous exhibits to its application.  Those exhibits included extensive pre-Bulletin documents reflecting the Department’s course of conduct (See Filing I.D. 1600341), all of which would have been available for submission in connection with a proper notice-and-comment period under the APA had such a procedure been followed.  [...] also included certain documents created post-Bulletin, including a November 2023 certification from the former Chief Insurance Examiner of the Office of Solvency Regulation with the Department, confirming that he had not previously encountered a situation “where the Department insisted on applying SSAP No. 25 to the AIF  Fees paid by the individual subscribers to the AIF. ”  ---  6  In its January 23, 2024 order denying [...]’s Motion for Leave to Appear as Amicus Curie, this Court held:
[brief] Such allocation is non-waivable.  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2(a)(2) (The “trier of fact shall make . . . as findings of fact: [t]he extent, in the form of a percentage, of each party’s negligence or fault. ” (emphasis added)); Liberty Ins. Corp. v. Techdan, 253 N.J. 87, 95-96, 100 (2023)⁵ (holding that “trial court’s failure to apply the CNA ⁵
[brief] (20T64-4 to 5; 71-2 to 22; Da192 to 196).  For the reasons set forth in its merits brief, (Db19 to 25) the PCR court wrongly found that the disparate sentencing claim was procedurally barred, and failed to properly analyze the relevant factors under State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 233 (1996).  This Court should remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing on disparity, before a different sentencing judge - one who has not already determined that this worst act in petitioner’s history is the sole defining moment for his future.
[brief] Moreover and relevant to this appeal, the Amended Resolution specifically stated that the Board’s Commissioners did not rely on the Sketch nor gave it any weight in approving the Application.  The Amended Resolution specified that [...] was to construct the Approved Building according to the height shown on the [...] architectural plans, not the Sketch.  (Pa25).  See Amended Resolution Paragraph 46 which states in part:  During deliberation, none of the Commissioners expressed reliance on the [...] rendering, nor mentioned same or gave it any weight on the record and during deliberation.  [...] took exception to the [...] rendering during the hearings.  The architectural plan prepared by [...] contained the height of the proposed building, in terms of number of stores and height and the Applicant is bound by same unless additional relief is requested by way of an amended application to the Board.  (Pa25) (emphasis added).  4.
[directive] a.  An actor is guilty of aggravated sexual assault if he commits an act of sexual penetration with another person under any one of the following circumstances: (1) The victim is less than 13 years old; (2) The victim is at least 13, but less than 16 years old; and (a) The actor is related to the victim by blood or affinity to the third degree, or (b) The actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over the victim by virtue of the actor’s legal, professional, or occupational status, or (c)  The actor is a resource family parent, a guardian, or stands in loco parentis within the household; (3)  The act is committed during the commission, or attempted commission, whether alone or with one or more other persons, of robbery, kidnapping, homicide, aggravated assault on another, burglary, arson, or criminal escape; (4)  The actor is armed with a weapon or any object fashioned in such a manner as to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon and threatens by word or gesture to use the weapon or object; (5)  The actor is aided or abetted by one or more other persons and the actor uses physical force or coercion; (6)  The actor uses physical force or coercion and severe personal injury is sustained by the victim; (7)  The victim is one whom the actor knew or should have known was physically helpless or incapacitated, intellectually or mentally incapacitated, or had a mental disease or defect which rendered the victim temporarily or permanently incapable of understanding the nature of his conduct, including, but not limited to, being incapable of providing consent.  Aggravated Sexual Assault is a crime of the first degree.
[brief] “seeking to alter or amend a judgment or order shall be served not later than 20 days after service of the judgment or order upon all parties by the party obtaining it [and] shall state with specificity the basis on which it is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred. ”  “Reconsideration is a matter within the sound discretion of the court, to be exercised in the interest of justice.
[directive] As ações, petições e outros documentos entregues ao tribunal deverão estar em inglês Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English  Poder Judiciário de Nova Jersey  New Jersey Judiciary Formulário complementar para declaração judicial em crimes sujeitos à (N.J.S.A. Lei Graves 2C:43-6c) (N.J.S.A. Supplemental Plea Form for Graves Act Offenses 2C:43-6c)  (Portuguese)  NOTA  Você não está sujeito a um período obrigatório que o desqualifica à liberdade condicional nos termos da Lei Graves se estiver se declarando culpado por porte ilegal de pistola que seja uma arma de pressão de ar, arma de pressão por mola ou arma de chumbinho nos termos da lei 2C:39-5b(2); porte ilegal de rifle ou N.J.S.A. espingarda descarregada, 2C:39-5c(1); ou porte ilegal de rifle ou espingarda que seja uma arma de N.J.SA. pressão de ar, arma de pressão por mola ou arma de chumbinho, 2C:39-5c(2).  N.J.S.A.  NOTE  You are not subject to a mandatory Graves Act parole ineligibility term if you are pleading guilty to unlawful possession of a handgun that is an air gun, spring gun, or BB gun pursuant to 2C:39-5b(2); unlawful possession of an unloaded rifle or shotgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5c(1); or unlawful possession of a rifle or shotgun that is an air gun, spring gun, or BB gun, 2C:39-5c(2).
[brief] What is more, [...] further testified that in addition to his personal knowledge, the Department’s Record Management System contained records of arrests in this area.  Based on all this knowledge of the area and to protect the residential community trying to live peacefully there, this area was chosen for surveillance.  (1T9-4 to 6).  This testimony is much more than “buzz words” or “conclusory” statements about the area.  [...] knew this area, and in his short time as a Narcotics officer had personally conducted numerous arrests.  Unlike the officer in Goldsmith who had made five to ten arrests in that area during his 20-year career, [...] had made numerous arrests in just a year or two.  While this factor alone certainly could never justify stopping individuals in this area, its character and prevalence for crime must be part of the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.  Within the context of this high crime area, [...]’s articulated observations, based on his training and experience, reasonably added to his suspicions of criminal activity.
[brief] The Honorable [...], J.S.C., January 10, 2024  Statement of Reasons Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Denying Plaintiff’s Opposition and Cross Motion to Amend the Complaint........................................................................................................PA000088  The Honorable [...], J.S.C, January 10, 2024  Order Denying Plaintiff’s Cross Motion to Amend the Complaint........................................................................................................PA000093  I.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Appellees, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] (collectively, “Appellees”), file this Brief in Opposition to Appellant, [...]’s (“Appellant”) appeal of the Superior Court of New Jersey’s dismissal with prejudice of Appellant’s Complaint.