ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Sometime prior to the initiation of this action—and without being licensed under the NJCFLA—[...] allegedly purchased a pool of defaulted consumer debts for a fraction of their face value, including [...]’s purported [...] account.  See Class Action Compl. ¶ 21 (Pa51); Collection Compl. ¶ 4 (Pa1).  [...]’s alleged account was then assigned from [...] to [...], [...], and [...], respectively, before being assigned, transferred, or sold to [...].  *Id.*  However, none of the Assignor Defendants were licensed under the NJCFLA and, by purchasing or otherwise taking assignment of [...]’s alleged account, the Assignor Defendants engaged in the “consumer loan business” as defined at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2.  As a result of the Assignor Defendants’ violations of the NJCFLA’s licensure requirements at subsection 3 of the NJCFLA,\(^1\) the contract governing [...]’s alleged account was made void as of the date [...] purchased and/or took assignment of the same, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b). \(^2\)  After [...]’s void account was transferred to [...], [...] commenced the Collection Lawsuit on January 26, 2022.  (Pa1).  As explained above, [...] responded by filing his Class Action Counterclaim (Pa3), the Class Action Complaint (Pa48), and then moving to consolidate the two actions.
[brief] Plaintiff, [...], individually and as Administrator for the Estate of [...], his wife, alleges that the 2016 Honda CR-V that crossed the center line and caused the collision was defective because defendant, [...] ([...]), failed to install available technology that would have warned the driver her CR-V was crossing the center line and that would have avoided the accident.  [...] failed to incorporate in the design technologically and economically feasible safety systems that were indisputably available at the time of manufacture.  Despite both affirmative evidence to support plaintiff’s contentions and the inferences to be afforded plaintiff on summary judgment and under the applicable product liability laws, the trial court took from the jury the determination whether the failure to include the safety systems was reasonable and whether their absence rendered the vehicle not reasonably fit, suitable and safe under the circumstances.  The trial court’s decision, as a matter of law on summary judgment, that the vehicle was not defective usurped the jury’s responsibility and violated plaintiff’s constitutional right to trial by a jury.  In determining whether a product is defective, a jury must assess the risks and alternatives known to the manufacturer and then determine whether the manufacturer discharged its duty to provide a reasonably fit, suitable and safe product.  A driver’s responsibility to drive safely does not insulate a vehicle manufacturer from that risk/utility analysis.  Nor does the known risk that a vehicle that fails to stay in its lane could cause harm negate the manufacturer’s responsibility to produce a reasonably safe product.  Plaintiff produced evidence that the technology was available – in fact, it was made available by defendant at the time of manufacture on other models of the same vehicle – and that defendant failed to notify the owner of the subject vehicle of its availability.  Plaintiff produced evidence that the driver was a cautious driver and would have used the technology if available.  Plaintiff produced evidence and expert testimony that had the necessary safety systems been in place and operating that they would have avoided the head-on collision by keeping the vehicle in its lane and by alerting the driver.  Based on the proofs and the applicable law, plaintiff was entitled to have a jury determine whether the vehicle was defective.  Defendant denied responsibility by claiming a manufacturer is not under the duty to produce an accident-proof product or to provide every safety device.  A manufacturer is, however, subject to a duty to produce a product that is fit, suitable and safe for its intended purpose as assessed by a jury applying the risk-utility analysis required by New Jersey caselaw and the Product Liability Act.  On the record presented, determining whether the product was defective, as a matter of law on summary judgment, was erroneous and requires reversal.
[brief] On August 16, 2020, the Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the Defendants [...] and [...] for claims of Fraud, Conspiracy to Commit Fraud, Unjust Enrichment, Fraudulent Conveyance and Quiet Title.  The Plaintiff sought relief for quieting title and awarding compensatory and actual damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees and costs, and prejudgment and post judgment interests against the Defendants jointly and severally.  (Da001-17).  On December 18, 2020, upon a Consent Order, the Estate of Sam [...] was substituted as one of the defendants in place of [...].  (Pa2993-2994).  On January 6, 2021, the Defendants filed their answer with counterclaims against the Plaintiff for claims of Fraud, Estoppel/Unclean Hands, Equitable Estoppel, Promissory Estoppel, Breach of Contract, Declaratory Judgment, Quiet Title, Slander of Title and Tortious Interference of Contract.  (Da018-39).  On February 11, 2021, the Plaintiff filed his answer to the Defendant’s counterclaims.  (Da040-47).  On January 26, 2023, after the plaintiff rested in his case in chief, the defendant moved for judgment pursuant to R. 4:40-1 on the ground of Statute of Limitations.  The trial court denied the motion on January 27, 2023.  (12T, Jan. 27, 2023).  On May 22, 2023, the trial court entered an Order of Judgment and Memorandum Decision in favor of the plaintiff on his quiet title claim and dismissing the Plaintiff’s all other claims, and dismissing the Defendants’ all counterclaims against the Plaintiff.  (Da50-74).  On July 3, 2023, the Defendants filed the Notice of Appeal appealing the Trial Court’s decision quieting title in favor of the Plaintiff.  (Da75-78)  On July 12, 2023, the Plaintiff cross-appealed appealing the Trial Court’s decision dismissing the Plaintiff’s fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud and fraudulent conveyance against the Defendants.  (Pa0001-4).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS** --- 1
[brief] DOBI regulations incorporate “care paths” “as the standard course of medically necessary treatment, including diagnostic tests” for identified injuries from automobile accidents.  N.J.A.C. 11:3-4.6(a).  The care paths contain “decision points” at which providers can request coverage for further treatment from insurers.  See N.J.A.C. 11:3-4.6(b).  “Decision point review occurs at certain junctures during the treatment, as designated in the care paths, and may require a second opinion, development of a treatment plan, or case management. ”  Coal. for Quality Health Care v. DOBI, 348 N.J. Super. 272, 286 (App. Div. 2002) (Coalition II).  Insurers’ DPRPs relate to precertification requests and the decision points on the care paths.  The regulations require insurers to include in their DPRPs the treatments that must be precertified, procedures for the prompt review of treatment requests based on medical necessity, an internal appeals process for medical providers to submit additional information if the insurer denies reimbursement for a treatment, and procedures for conducting medical examinations of insureds to determine the medical necessity of a treatment.
[brief] The Amendment set forth the area, bulk and off-street parking standards applicable to the [...].  (Pa291).  Specifically, the Amendment provided that there would not be any maximum density limit and that the maximum building height would be 100 feet (excluding roof-top mechanical equipment and screening).  *Ibid.*  The Amendment further provided that “[a]ll projects shall be subject to all required fees from the [...] unless otherwise waived or amended by --- 3
[brief] The case at hand operates in an entirely different universe from Mipro.  Mipro was concerned with a municipality’s power to condemn property for open space even when its true goal was to slow down residential development in the municipality.  Crucially, there is absolutely no indication in Mipro that [...] was noncompliant in its constitutional obligations toward affordable housing; indeed, there are factual findings to the contrary, noting that [...]’s desire to purchase open space stemmed in large part from its compliance with its constitutional obligations (379 N.J. Super. at 362, noting that the town’s overlay zoning as a result of its exclusionary zoning litigation, as well as the town’s limited financial resources, “prevented the municipality from preserving a significant amount of land for open space from the mid 1980s to the late 1990s”).  The court’s recitation of the specific facts of that case, and differentiation of it from the facts of [...], demonstrates the importance of carefully examining the facts of each matter when determining the appropriateness of a town’s condemnation efforts.
[brief] ”  Slip op. at 17 (Pa480) (emphasis supplied).  For our purposes, the relevant part of Rodriguez-Ortiz is the discussion that concludes that:  “This broad view of the scope of mandated coverage may well override the [the insurer’s] exclusion of claims for intentional wrongs or actions substantially certain to cause injury. ” Slip Op at 20-21 (Pa481).  Although the court did not have to decide that issue in that case, its analysis is compelling.
[directive] Pursuant to 2C:4-4(b), the qualified psychiatrist licensed psychologist shall render the an opinion as to whether defendant has the mental capacity to appreciate their presence in relation to time, place and things and whether the defendant's elementary mental processes are such that he/she comprehends: of That (a) he/she is in a court justice charged with a criminal offense; on judge That (b) there is a the bench; That ( c) there is a prosecutor present who will try to convict him/her; That (d) he/she has a lawyer who will undertake to defend him/her of That (e) he/she will be expected to tell to the best his/her mental ability the facts if surrounding him/her at the time and place where the alleged violation was committed he/she chooses to testify and understand his/her legal right not to testify; of jury or That (f) there is a present to pass upon evidence that adduced as to guilt innocence if or such charge or, that he/she should choose to enter into plea negotiations to plead of guilty, that he/she comprehend the consequences a guilty plea and that he/she be able to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights which are waived upon of such entry a guilty plea; and of That (g) he/she have the ability to patticipate in an adequate presentation his/her defense. of 4.
[brief] a.  To the Governor, Attorney-General, Secretary of State and treasurer, each one set.  b.  To each member of the Legislature, one set. c.  To the Secretary of the Senate, for the use of the Senate, two sets; and to the Clerk of the General Assembly for the use of the General Assembly, four sets.  d.  To the Chief Justice, the justices of the Supreme Court and the judges of the Superior Court, each one set. e.  To the Clerk of the Supreme Court and the Clerk of the Superior Court, each one set. f.  To each county prosecutor, one set. g.  To the librarians of [...] and of the two literary societies in that college, to the librarians of [...] and of the two literary societies at that college, and to the librarians of [...] and of the two literary societies of that college, one set. h.  To the librarian of the [...], one s i.  The remainder to be distributed among the several counties in proportion to their quota of State taxes, the same to be transmitted to the treasurer of each county, to be by him distributed in his county to the following persons in the order named:
[brief] (3T11:12-12:4; see 1T29:10-31:17; 2T9:23-10:9.)  Moreover, just because the trial court did not consider the police report does not mean that other items were not considered.  For instance, the Alcotest report was discussed at the trial de novo even though it was never moved and should not have been discussed at all because the only issues occurred prior to Defendant’s arrest and the Alcotest was administered after the arrest.  (Da17; 3T7:12-20.)  The trial de novo court’s inquiry into the Alcotest report was improper because Defendant had no right to cross-examine [...], who authored the report. (3T5:4-11:19.)  Because the trial court raised the issue, and given the concern for a pattern as mentioned in the Case Information Statement\(^2\), this Court should review whether R. 3:23-8(a)(2) was followed in terms of what was considered through a remand.  Considering documents beyond the scope of the municipal court’s record violates [...]’s rights to confrontation protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.  The State argues that any Sixth Amendment violation is irrelevant if there was sufficient evidence to convict (Sb9), but the Court has explained that Defendant has a right to know what was considered for the conviction.  *State v. Gibson*, 219 N.J. 227, 249 (2014).  Because the trial court did consider issues regarding the Alcotest that exceeded the scope of the appeal, and there is a question about whether the trial court considered reports that the clerk requested, under *Gibson*, this Court should reverse and remand for review by a different judge.  \(^2\)  Defendant referenced *State v. [...]*, [...], and docketed and pending in this Court under [...].
[brief] **THE FULL-DAY HEARING CONDUCTED BY JUDGE PICKERING PURSUANT TO N.J. RULE OF EVIDENCE 104 FOCUSED COMPLETELY ON WHETHER PLAINTIFFS CAN ESTABLISH A CAUSE OF ACTION AND VITIATED ANY NEED FOR THE COURT TO RECONVENE FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ON RESPONDENTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT**  The full-day 104 hearing conducted by [...] vitiated any need for the court to reconvene for oral argument.  Courts in New Jersey have found oral argument, though encouraged, is not required, and if summary judgment was appropriate there is no reason to remand the case for oral argument.  Plaintiff fails show how the lack of oral argument prejudiced the Plaintiff or impacted their rights or the outcome of the motion which must be shown on appeal.  The record supports the opinion of the trial court and without the necessary proof, Plaintiffs arguments are insufficient and must be denied.
[brief] Cases  Antonelli v. Plan. Bd. of Waldwick, 79 N.J. Super. 433 (App. Div. 1963) .................................................. Pb21 Chicalese v. Monroe Twp. Plan. Bd., 334 N.J. Super. 413 (Law Div. 2000) .............................................. Pb26 Cicchino v. Township of Berkeley Heights Plan. Bd., 237 N.J. Super. 175 (App. Div. 1989).............................................. Pb14 Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., Twp. of Franklin, 233 N.J. 546 (2018) ........................................................................ Pb26 Grasso v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights, 375 N.J. Super. 41 (App. Div. 2004) .................................................. Pb23 Green Meadows at Montville, L.L.C. v. Plan. Bd. of Twp. of Montville, 329 NJ. Super. 12 (App. Div. 2000) .................................................. Pb14 Grubbs v. Slothower, 389 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 2007).............................................. Pb19 Jacoby v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 442 N.J. Super. 450 (App. Div. 2015)..............................................
[brief] Villanueva, 431 N.J. Super. 301.  The trial court further attempted to justify its ruling based on several factual findings.  First, the court noted that [...] never personally answered interrogatories, and therefore, the answers to form C interrogatories did not include a sworn statement by [...] concerning any criminal convictions.  2T:28-20 to 23.  Second, the court noted that [...] acknowledged in his deposition that he did have drug-related felony convictions, but that he could not recall how many there were or when they occurred.  2T:28-24 to 29-4.  The court also observed that the conviction that was presented to the court, while only four years before [...]’s deposition, did not involve a crime of moral turpitude.  2T:29-5 to 25.  The court even acknowledged that a jury could conclude that [...] was “misleading the questioner during the deposition” when he stated he did not know how old the convictions were.  2T:29-10 to 13.  The court then concluded as follows:  In my mind hearing somebody has been convicted of a drug related charge is just so prejudicial to our laypeople jurors that I have a significant concern that that potential prejudice would outweigh the probative value.  Which in my mind is small.  I agree its there.  Could a jury find that to have been inconsistent with the examiner at the time of the deposition?  Possibly.  B[ut] in my mind that prejudice just so significantly outweighs them hearing about a criminal conviction that I’m still going to bar that and its use as impeachment testimony.  [2T:30-25 to 31-11.]  The trial court’s decision is premised on an incorrect application of the law and the incorrect legal standard.
[brief] (Pa 536; 9T222-24 to 223-17).  The Decedent also brought a copy of the signed Antenuptial Agreement to her appointment with [...].  The Decedent informed him that [...] had prepared this Agreement.  (9T223-18 to 224-19).  [...] had a “specific recollection” of being given this document by the Decedent.  (9T272-24 to 273-7).  [...] testified that the Respondent was not present at the meetings where the Will was discussed and drafted, and was not present when the Will was signed by the Decedent.  (9T226-14 to 227-6).
[brief] Id at 807-809  Therefore, in the instant case, when [...] gave a check for $50,000.00 to [...], it was for the purpose of buying a house for [...] and his wife, [...].  Even [...] admitted as such, with his testimony that the $50,000.00 was a gift, but the only thing he could do with it was to buy a house for Francisco.  supra.  As the Court concluded that 1) there was a confidential relationship, 2) that there was no gift of $50,000.00, and that 3) unjust enrichment had to be returned, the court only failed to cloak the entire property with a constructive trust, and give all of the equity and title to the rightful owner, [...].
[brief] The trial court also erroneously based its ruling on public policy grounds, stating “[i]f an arbitrator’s decision on a question of public policy… plainly would violate a clear mandate of public policy, it is the duty of the Court to prevent the enforcement of the arbitration award. ” (citing Weiss v. Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey, 143 N.J. 420, 443 (1996); Heher v. Smith, Stratton, Wise, Heher and Brennan, 143 N.J. 448 (1996)).  (Da3182)  Neither case supports vacatur of the awarded legal fees in this matter.  Neither Weiss nor Heher involved an award of attorney’s fees.  Both cases involved the enforceability of certain provisions in law firms’ partnership agreements and, more specifically, public-policy considerations implicated by the conduct of the litigants.  Indeed, the trial court here observed the holding in Weiss that “arbitrators cannot be permitted to authorize litigants to violate either the law or… public policy....”(Da3182)  Here, the dispute itself did not implicate public policy.  Nor did the arbitration award authorize the conduct of any litigant.  Instead, the Arbitrator awarded the Company the fees [...] caused it to expend while he was in control as damages flowing from [...]’s breaches of his fiduciary duties, which breaches the Arbitrator, [...], and the trial court agreed were egregious.
[brief] On February 16, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant suit alleging a claim under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act ("CEPA") and other unspecified retaliation claims.  Pa1.  By way of discovery, Defendants served written discovery requests on Plaintiff and took Plaintiff’s deposition.  Plaintiff did not serve any written discovery demands on Defendants or notice any witness’s deposition.  The discovery period expired on August 30, 2023 without either party seeking an extension.  Defendants moved for summary judgment on August 31, 2023.  Pa6.  Plaintiff filed his opposition to summary judgment on October 10, 2023.  Da1.  Plaintiff’s opposition relied on his CEPA claims to the exclusion of all other claims, thereby electing CEPA as his exclusive remedy.  See Da1.  After hearing oral argument, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment and filed an order and written statement of reasons.  Pa65.  On November 15, 2023, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.  Pa75.  Plaintiff again relied on CEPA as his sole cause of action.  See Da2.  On December 1, 2023, the trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration without entertaining oral argument.  Pa76.  The court’s order was supported by a written statement of reasons.  Pa77-Pa78.  Plaintiff made a renewed motion on December 14, 2023.  Pa79.  While styled as a motion to reinstate the case, the motion was in essence a request to hold oral argument on Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  Oral argument was held on Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on January 19, 2024.  See Pa86.  The trial court issued an order and written statement of reasons again denying Plaintiff’s motion on January 22, 2024.  Pa85.  Plaintiff submitted his notice of appeal on January 29, 2024.
[brief] Where the controversy involved the review of x-rays and the diagnosis of physical conditions, a medical doctor was held competent as an expert in a malpractice claim against a chiropractor because our Supreme Court recognized that a medical professional can provide an expert opinion where the professional has sufficient knowledge of the professional standard relevant to the situation under scrutiny.  Cahill, supra, 99 N.J. at 334; see Khan v. Singh, 200 N.J. 82, 101 (2009); Sanzari, supra, 34 N.J. at 136-37 (noting overlap between fields of medicine and dentistry).
[brief] These cases consist of the violation of a regulation promulgated under the act, a per se violation.  Here, there was no inducement to violate a regulation.  The defendant engaged in an unlawful business practice, not a regulatory violation, that caused plaintiff to suffer an ascertainable loss.  Defendant asserts but for plaintiffs’ bankruptcy filing, defendant would not have offered her a loan that violated New Jersey law.  Plaintiff doesn’t complain defendant offered loans.  Plaintiff complains the loans violated New Jersey law.  Plaintiff did not beseech defendant to violate a consumer fraud regulation.  In this case, defendant asserts that plaintiff perpetrated a common law fraud on defendant, relieving defendant of liability.
[brief] If roots are shaved, it is minimal and no more, so the sidewalk repair can be done, and the tree can be saved.  (Pa182, p.36-37; Pa185, p.47.)  If shaving the roots would need to be more extensive, the tree would be taken down.  (Pa182, p.37-Pa183, p.38.)  If root shaving was necessary, [...] made it clear that root shaving would involve the spider roots only and would be minimal shaving, and the main structured roots would not be disturbed.  (Pa185, p46-47.)  Plaintiff proffered no evidence to dispute [...]’ testimony.
[brief] As found:  “Both [...] and [...] was tasked with ensuring that [...]’s work adhered to the specifications of the project as set forth in [...]’s contract, and [...] provided engineering services on the project, at the direction and supervision of two licensed professional engineers.  Accordingly, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 applies to this litigation, rendering Plaintiff’s failure to file an affidavit of merit fatal to his case against [...] and [...] for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” (Pa31)
[directive] Revised Form Promulgated 12/31/2019 Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Portuguese by Defendant's Initials a Fonnulario Revisado Promulgado em 12/31/20 I 9, Complementa9fto Diretriz no 0 1-18, CN 10079-Portuguese Iniciais do Reu page 2 of7/pagina 2 de 7