ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001) (quoting Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc., 134 N.J. 275, 282 (1993)).  Our jurisprudence recognizes there is a particular gravity inherent in referring to someone’s constitutional rights and the risk of their waiver.  It’s a mercy we’re bestowed at our lowest.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Yet, [...] deliberately deleted all language referencing “the right to trial by jury” and “waiver” from an earlier version of its terms and conditions, intentionally weakening the consumer protection they offer and undercutting the gravity of the December agreement.
[brief] Further, contrary to [...]’s misrepresentations (Pb2, 15), Appellants did not counterclaim in the Chancery Court for any damages related to [...]’s mismanagement of the property nor did they seek rescission based upon her mismanagement.  Instead, Appellants’ counterclaims seek rescission of the 2022 Addendum – to the extent same is valid, which it is not – based upon [...]’s equitable fraud, fraud, and negligent misrepresentations in making material misrepresentations in order to improperly induce [...] to sign\(^2\) the 2022 Addendum.  Da243-45.  Thus, the 2022 Addendum and [...]’s claims arising thereunder cannot be bootstrapped to the arbitration provisions in different agreements involving different parties and providing for arbitration of wholly different disputes.  III.
[brief] Further, any attempt to distinguish this case with hyper-technical distinctions from the regulations and caselaw cited above as dealing with different areas of insurance is also meritless, as they still provide the groundwork for assessing proof of effective policy cancellation.  See Valley Nat. Bancorporation v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 316 N.J. Super. 152, 157-58 (App. Div. 1998) (“Defendant distinguishes statutory law, Insurance Department regulations, and certain case law from this appeal because they deal with automobile or commercial liability policy cancellations …
[brief] Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWebber Inc., 197 N.J. 81 (2008) ........................................ 25, 30 United States v. Ellis, 57 M.J. 375 (C.A.A.F. 2002) ..............................................  26 Washington v. Perez, 219 N.J. 338 (2014) .........................................................  25  STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(a) ..................................................................................................  3 N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c) ..................................................................................................  3 N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) ............................................................................................  3 N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 .......................................................................................................  3 OTHER AUTHORITIES
[brief] *In re Ambroise*, *supra.*, at 197-198 (citations omitted).  In reviewing an interest arbitration award, the Commission’s role is to determine whether: (1) the arbitrator failed to give due weight to the [statutory] factors he deemed relevant to the resolution of the specific dispute; (2) the arbitrator violated the standards in N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 and - 9; or (3) the award is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.
[brief] Had the Court applied the correct standard of proof, the presumption of validity would not have applied and the burden of proof of service would have shifted to the Plaintiffs.  In that case, default judgment would have been overturned as the Court found merely that it was “possible” for the defendants to have been served at their home address.  A mere possibility of service is not enough to prove service of process by clear and convincing evidence which should have been the standard.  In addition to the lack of service of process and the enumerated irregularities, the Court will see that the close knit business relationship and partnership between the Plaintiff tax foreclosure business, the process server, the alleged subsequent purchaser for value (who was nothing more than a business partner with knowledge of Defendant property owners desire to redeem) provides evidence of tax foreclosure collusion and fraud in a scheme designed to divest the defendants of their property which they owned outright without a mortgage.
[brief] (See Pa178; Pa184; Pa185; Pa190; Pa194; Pa240; Pa237-38; Pa242; Pa243; Pa285-291).  As the trial court appropriately recognized, “those events in and of themselves don’t give rise to – to criminal conduct as alleged her in this harassment. ” (See 1T 23:19-21).  [...] argues that the trial court failed to analyze [...]’s actions under the harassment statute.
[brief] A.  Trial Scheduling  Upon remand, plaintiffs' counsel requested that the clerk set a trial date.  Experience in Middlesex and other counties indicates that the trial calendar is called before the assignment judge in the county of venue.  The assignment judge then randomly assigns those cases out to the various trial judges for conference and trial.  In this case, the presiding judge, [...], P.J.S.C., had entered an order setting a firm trial date of January 9, 2023.  (Pa96).  Then, as to be expected, the clerk sent notices to counsel on September 2, 2022 stating that the parties were to appear before the Middlesex County assignment judge, [...], J.S.C., in courtroom 201 on January 9, 2023 for trial.  (Pa97).  In this case, however, no appearance was made before the assignment judge as noticed.  As indicated above, [...] was the pre-trial motion judge assigned to this case and had previously granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment, (Pa91), since reversed.  (Pa7).  He also bifurcated the trial, sua sponte.  (Pa93).  Subsequently, in a motion hearing concerning a set of admissions [...]’s served on the plaintiffs, held on October 21, 2022, [...] stated “[l]ooking forward to seeing you guys in January. ” (Pa108²).  Then, on January 5, 2023, the clerk uploaded a message to Ecourts requiring the parties to appear for trial before [...] (Pa98), not the assignment judge as had been previously noticed.  (Pa97).  ²References to “[...]” between pages 5 and 9 of the motion transcript should read “[...].”
[brief] Da109.  The order specified that the dismissal was as to the Complaint only, and that Defendants’ Counterclaim would remain pending for independent adjudication.  Da109.  On October 20, 2023, oral argument was held on Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the counterclaim and strike class action allegations, and on November 8, 2023, the trial court placed an oral decision on the record, granting [...]’s motion to dismiss. \(^2\)  On November 8, 2023, the trial court filed a final order dismissing the counterclaims with prejudice.  Da120.  The Defendants timely appealed on December 19, 2023.  Da122.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] In *State v. Shaw*, this Court determined that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop when law enforcement arrived at a multi-unit apartment building to execute an arrest warrant for a Black, male fugitive.  213 N.J. 398, 401, 403 (2012).  There, the police saw the defendant, also a Black male, exit the building with a friend and immediately separate, seemingly because he saw the officers.  *Id.* at 403.
[brief] Indeed, the [...] court was confronted with two (2) separate issues: (i) whether the bid submitted by the lowest bidder ([...]) was defective for reasons unrelated to this Appeal; and (ii) whether the bid submitted by the second lowest bidder ([...]) was defective for failing to submit an up-to-date registration certificate Id. *2-17.  The court ultimately held that the lowest bidder’s ([...]) bid was defective.  Id. at *8-15.  To determine whether the public entity’s award to the second lowest bidder ([...]) was proper, the court needed to consider whether that bidder’s bid was defective.  Id. *15-17.  Ultimately, after careful analysis, the court upheld the award to the second lowest bidder, finding that the alleged defect (failing to submit an up-to-date registration certificate) was waivable.  *Ibid.*  Given that the court could not uphold the award to the second lowest bidder ([...]) without finding that its bid was not materially defective, such conclusion is clearly not “dicta” because it was “necessary” to uphold the award.  *Bandler v. Melillo*, 443 N.J. Super. 203, 210 (App. Div. 2015)(defining “dictum” as “a statement by a judge not necessary to the decision then being made”).  Even if such holding is dicta (though it is not), such thoughtful analysis is entitled to great weight.  *Herschberg. v. Director, Division of Taxation*, 2 N.J. Tax 121, 129 (Tax. Ct. 1981)(holding that dictum is “entitled to great weight”).  Moreover, for the reasons set forth herein, the *[...]* decision is entirely consistent with the law and should be followed by the Court in this nearly identical circumstance (as the trial court repeatedly did when rendering its thoughtful decisions).
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(3):  The State’s evidence of defendant’s admissions was sufficient to meet its constitutional burden to establish identity, however, it was insufficient to satisfy the rational basis test for submitting passion/provocation manslaughter to the jury as a possible verdict.  Defendant posits that the evidence produced below supported the jury finding that after defendant and the victim had consensual sex, they had drinks and watched a movie; that the victim wanted to have more sex but defendant refused; that the victim then attacked defendant with fists and the two men struggled whereupon defendant realized that the victim was brandishing a knife; they struggled some more and defendant got hold of the knife and stabbed the victim.
[brief] First the plaintiff asserts that the defendant negligently failed to maintain control of his vehicle when the defendant failed to hold his turn and keep to the left and go into the left lane of Route 280 W.  The defendant went wide, he crossed over into the right-hand lane, where the plaintiff already was, striking her with the right front bumper of his vehicle.  The point of impact on the plaintiff’s car was “on my left-hand side, on my driver's side, from the tire to my front door of the left side or the driver’s side. ”
[brief] (Pa157; 4T228:14-16; 6T115:24-116:2).  She used the rollator when she was going to be around a lot of people because she afraid that somebody would bump into her and it made her feel secure.  (4T212:17-21; 4T239:3-6; 4T247:5-8).  The rollator was twenty-four inches wide and twenty-six inches long from the front of the handlebars to the back.  (4T108:23-109:6; 4T 169:19-170:3).  [...] testified that a customer walking with a rollator is something to be expected in a retail setting.  (4T105:15-20; 4T108:8-17).  The plaintiff was walking towards her daughter and did not see the column or the raised base plate and bolts.  (4T260:19-21).  The front wheel of the plaintiff’s rollator came into contact with a bolt protruding up from the base plate of the roof support column as she was walking along the aisle.  (4T228:14-16; 4T232:3-5; 4T232:12-233:5; 4T235:23-236:1; 4T238:7-13; 4T260:24-261:1).  The contact with the protruding bolt stopped her movement and caused her to fall to the ground.  (4T228:14-16; 4T234:1-12).  The plaintiff explained that she would not have fallen if the wheel of her rollator had not hit the bolt protruding from the top of the baseplate.  (4T229:19-21; 4T233:15-21; 4T249:22-25).  There were no witnesses to the plaintiff’s fall other than the plaintiff herself.
[brief] (15T 28-11 to 29-24, 33-23 to 34-13)  In making these findings, the court primarily relied on [...]’s “history of contacts with the criminal justice system. ”  (15T 28-11 to 29-24, 31-15 to 32-2)  However, this “history” involved only municipal court offenses, with no prior felony convictions, providing an insufficient basis for finding that it was likely that 46-year-old [...] would reoffend.  Moreover, the court improperly discounted the fact that [...] had successfully been on pretrial release for approximately four years during the pendency of the case.  The court reasoned that “being on pre-trial services is not a punishment” and that [...]’s compliance “is really not of any great moment. ”  (15T 28-11 to 29-24)  Yet compliance with pre-trial services for four years provides concrete, credible evidence that [...] is unlikely to reoffend, particularly if he received the probationary sentence requested by defense counsel.  (15T, 13-13 to 14-1, 15-11 to 16)  The court should not have ignored this competent, credible evidence, and should have used this evidence to support finding mitigating factor (9).  C.
[brief] (5T126-11 to 127-18).  The trial court noted that defendant’s argument was reviewed, and rejected, by this Court in McGuire, 419 N.J. at 132-133.  The trial court also acknowledged that the McGuire Court reviewed, and rejected, the same 2009 NAS study (Da102-Da247) on which defendant relies.  419 N.J. at 131-132.
[brief] “[B]ecause the crime of murder has no presumptive term, defendant, like every murderer, knows he is risking life in prison. ”  Id. at 508.  A sentencing court has the authority to consider a defendant’s criminal history as an aggravating factor.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6); see also State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 328 (2019) (“defendant's prior record is central to aggravating factor six, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6), and may be relevant to other aggravating and mitigating factors as well”).
[directive] Page 73  [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  Aggravating Factor #3a is meant to address circumstances involving the threatened use of violence by the defendant or by another person acting in concert with the defendant where such specific conduct is not otherwise subject to Special Application and Enhancement Features C1, C2 or D.  The point value for this factor ranges from +3 to +4, which should reflect the seriousness and immediacy of the threatened use of violence.  Note that this factor is in addition to, not in lieu of, Special Offense Characteristic #1 (possessing a firearm during the course of committing the drug distribution-type offense), since it is possible to possess a firearm without actually threatening to use it.  However, this Aggravating Factor should not be used in addition to Special Offense Characteristic #1 if the basis for applying that characteristic is the same conduct, incident or episode involving the use or threatened use of a weapon other than a firearm that was used to establish the basis for the Special Offense Characteristic.  In that event, the prosecutor must apply the Special Offense Characteristic rather than this Aggravating Factor.  (Note that it is possible to threaten future violence without possessing or brandishing a weapon.  Some drug traffickers or organizations repeatedly and consistently threaten to use violence to protect their turf on an ongoing basis.  In those circumstances, the prosecutor must use both Special Offense Characteristic #1 and this Aggravating Factor.)  Similarly, Aggravating Factor #3a may not be used where the specific conduct constituting the basis for applying this factor also constitutes the basis for applying Special Application and Enhancement Feature D, which takes precedence.
[brief] See Francois v. Bd. of Trs. Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys., 415 N.J. Super. 335, 349 (App. Div. 2010).  This Court should weigh heavily against the Board its inability to or refusal to rebut in its decision the findings of the ALJ.  This Court should reverse arbitrary and capricious decisions that foreclose all applicants for permanent disability when they’re settlement agreement is protected by N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.41(2) and the disability sought involves an undisputed permanent injury.  Public policy does not support the blanket preclusion noted in Cardinale to our specific facts.  Public policy and law enforcement resources would be adversely affected if permanently disabled police officers were forced to litigate administrative matters related to their disability where the employer and the officer charged both agree that the officer is permanently disabled never to regain fitness.
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible  False Reports to Law  Actor gives false information to law enforcement officer with purpose to implicate another; 2C:28-4(a)(b)  Enforcement fourth degree.  Actor otherwise gives false information to law enforcement; disorderly Authority persons offense.  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible  2nd Degree $50,000 to $100,000  10% permissible  Tampering with Actor, knowing an official investigation is proceeding or is about to be instituted, attempts to 2C:28-5a(1-5)  Witnesses and induce witness to testify falsely, or withhold evidence or elude legal subpoenas or absent self  Informants from proceeding or investigation; second degree if actor uses threats of force; otherwise third degree.  3rd Degree $20,000 to $50,000 10% permissible 54  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2
[brief] In *Salomon*, we concluded that the parties' agreement to arbitrate ‘in accordance with the Constitution and rules then obtaining of the [...]’ evinced their intent to ‘designat[e] ... an exclusive arbitral forum. ’  *Id.* at 558, 561 (alteration omitted).  The same is true here.  The arbitration agreement in this case contains numerous indicators that the parties contemplated one thing: arbitration before [...].
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, and in accordance with all courts who have considered this issue, Defendant [...]’s Appeal should be granted in its entirety, and a new trial should be granted.  [...], Attorneys [...]  *Attorneys for Defendant [...]*  /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  Dated: November 27, 2023  Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  DOCKET NO. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : On Appeal from an Order Denying Post-Conviction Relief  Entered in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County.  Plaintiff-Respondent, : vs. : AFRIM TAIRI, : Defendant-Appellant.
[brief] ” (Pa17, Pa90).  In support of this assertion, Appellant testified that in or around 2018—two years prior to his termination—[...] was sourcing pens from China and changing the marketing materials on the pen to give customers the impression that pens were made in America.  (Id.; Pa54, dep. tr. p. 77).  Appellant admitted he did nothing to stop this alleged production issue in 2018.  (Pa91 at paragraph 52; Pa56, dep. tr. p.83).  Appellant further alleged that he raised concerns in 2018—again, two years prior to his termination—that the Company violated the California Clean Water Act.  (Pa91, at ¶53).  Appellant conceded that he was not terminated when he raised concerns to the Company about the issues concerning the pens or California’s Clean Water Act.  (Pa91, at ¶54).  Appellant further testified that by the time he informed Respondent [...] and Ms.  Vazquez in 2020 of [...]’s alleged misconduct in 2018, the Company was already aware of the purported issues and had stopped engaging in any illegal activity.  (Id.).  The decision to terminate Appellant for his misuse of the Company PCard was made by Dan [...] and was solely related to the Appellant’s admitted conduct.
[brief] [...] determined after careful review that Appellant’s concern over the ability to safely navigate to and from Appellant’s property and dock was without merit.  Based on a review of the submitted information and field observations, [...] made the determination that [...]’s dock met the CZM Rules and specifically, did not interfere with navigation or access.  This determination was based on the rules in effect, the site conditions, and the proposed activities as of the date of issuance of the 2017 WFD Permit and 2019 Permit Modification.  The [...] also did not identify any issues related to navigability and concurred.  In light of the foregoing, [...]’s determination to issue the 2017 WFD Permit and 2019 Permit Modification to [...] was correct based on the facts and evidence in the record confirming that [...]’s dock met the Waterfront Development Law and the CZM Rules.  Appellant has not established that the 2017 WFD Permit or 2019 Permit Modification violate any [...] rule or that the issuance of those decisions was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  The 2017 WFD Permit and 2019 Permit Modification were sufficiently and soundly grounded and both of those decisions should be affirmed.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] On February 28, 2023, a Hudson County grand jury returned Indictment [...], charging defendant [...] (“defendant”) with (1) first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2) (Count One); (2) first-degree conspiracy to commit armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1)/2C:15-1(a)(2) (Count Two); (3) second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (Count Three); and second-degree possession of a firearm with an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1).  (Pa5-6).  In August 2022, a Union County grand jury returned Indictment [...], charging defendant with first-degree carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a), and related offenses.  (Pa39; Pa63-64).  On or about October 1, 2023, defendant moved to suppress evidence in his Union County case.² (Pa7).  After both parties filed briefs, (Pa8-19), the Union County court heard testimony on April 19, 2024, (Pa39).  On May 7, 2024, the Union County court denied defendant’s motion to suppress and set forth its reasons for the denial in a written opinion.  (Pa38-53).  ¹  The State designates the following abbreviation: Pa – State’s appendix ²  There is a scrivener’s error on the notice of motion.  The body of the order indicates defendant is seeking to dismiss the indictment, but the briefs all relate to a motion to suppress physical evidence.  (Pa7; Pa61).  On October 30, 2024, defendant moved to suppress the same evidence in his Hudson County case.
[directive] L.1983,c.56S7s.l; amended 1987, c.82; 1996, c.113, s.14.  1  1  Document Page of New Jersey Permanent Statutes  TITLE MUNICIPALITIES AND COUNTIES  40A of  Public recording approved claims 4OA:5-18.  r of :5-18.  Public recording approved claims  40A  All claims approved for payment by the local unit shall be recorded by the local unit, either in its minutes or in a manner prescribed by the director.
[brief] (1T73-9 to 1T74-4)  [...] was not present at the shooting and was not in the bodega, the barbershop or any other nearby business; rather, he was dispatched to the scene because an unidentified detective was having trouble downloading video footage.  (1T74-13 to 1T74-23)  [...] did not review the video before downloading it.  (1T80-24 to 1T81-3)  At the time of trial he had only reviewed a portion of same.  (1T82-7 to 1T82-8)  It should be noted that the timestamp on the video does not coincide with the time of the shooting; [...] assumed that the camera was off by twelve hours because it was set to military time.  (1T81-14 to 1T82-2)  Exhibit S-23 (Da 17) is a portion of the video footage played for the jury from three different vantage points from two different locations.