ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]’s brief mischaracterizes the circumstances surrounding the submission to the jury of whether it violated N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.80(c)’s prohibition against a timeshare resort inserting clauses in its contracts that waive compliance of any provision of the RETA. \(^5\)  [...] erroneously claims that the Court first ruled as a matter of law that [...] had not violated these “anti-waiver” provisions, then reversed itself and submitted the issue to the jury.  (Db34-35).  It is this alleged reversal by the Court that is the gravamen of [...]’s argument.  In reality, the Court never reversed itself.  What actually happened was that Plaintiffs moved for a directed verdict on this issue following the close of evidence pursuant to R. 4:40-1.  (Da1142).  During oral argument on September 28, 2022, [...] argued against the motion on the grounds that this should be decided by the jury, not the Court.  [...] argued, “the Court is really not in a position to make that determination,” and, “it’s a jury question,” and “these provisions would be argued to the jury. ” (15T101:25-102:15).  The Court agreed and denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a directed verdict.  (Da1146).
[brief] At the conclusion of oral arguments, the Court gave the parties the opportunity to submit Supplemental briefs and stated:  THE COURT:  As defense counsel has correctly pointed out, the issues that you have raised here, specifically with regard to litigation tactics, ability to settle, compromising your client’s ability to represent – or prosecute their case efficiently and properly because of knowledge that may be held by the [...] was not raised in the papers, admittedly, right and counsel did not have an opportunity to refute that or in any way combat that, and [...] is not here.  (1T45:23 to 1T46:1-6).  In their Reply Brief, Respondent again raised the issue stating: "A client's financial information and attitudes about litigation and settlement are confidential and grounds for disqualification.  (301a).  Appellant clearly knew to address the issue as [...] submitted a Certification wherein he stated:  "20.  [...]' claim that [...] is privy to [...]' 'attitude' toward settlement or litigation based on the prior representation is also materially false."  (340a; See also T14:13-19).  Thus, the Court did not err in permitting an *in-camera* review.
[brief] All right, thank you, [...].  All right as I’ve said I’ve read counsel’s extensive briefing on it and the Court does appreciate the good briefing on both sides on this particular case.  Although I appreciate [...]’s position, I don’t agree.  I think the Court to take the defendant’s position in this case basically vitiates the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Liability Law which I think I have to read all the laws in --there was a verdict in this case.  It was for more than 60 percent in this particular case or more which by the way triggers that statute which says that the plaintiff can recover the 100 percent of the amount from the 60 percent defendant.  And the defendant obviously has further rights to pursue the contribution from the -- from the other defendants in the case.  That’s for another day.  But in this particular day in reading [...] [sic] which I believe [...] is quoted as saying that I think – I think that’s how the system has to work in order to have make otherwise I have to ignore or not apply the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Liability Act which is clear I have to.  So that being the case the Court will deny the application to amend the judgement and will file an appropriate order later today.
[brief] On April 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed its Complaint (the “Complaint”) against Defendants asserting claims for breach of contract and specific performance (Count One), reformation (Count Two), and breach of the implied covenant of good faith ---  1  In accordance with R. 2:6-8, the dates and designations of each volume of transcript are as follows:  | TRANSCRIPT | DESIGNATION | |------------------------------------|-------------| | Transcript of Motion – February 2, 2023 | 1T | | Transcript of Trial Vol. 1 – July 12, 2023 | 2T | | Transcript of Trial Vol. 1 – July 13, 2023 | 3T | | Transcript of Trial Vol. 1 – July 18, 2023 | 4T | | Transcript of Trial Vol. 1 – July 19, 2023 | 5T | | Transcript of Trial Vol. 1 – July 20, 2023 | 6T | | Transcript of Trial Vol. 1 – July 24, 2023 | 7T | | Transcript of Trial Vol. 1 – July 25, 2023 | 8T | and fair dealing (Count Three).  (Pa0001-08.)  On September 12, 2022, Defendants filed an Answer to Complaint, Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaim, Notice to Produce and Jury Demand (the “Answer”), which asserted counterclaims against Plaintiff for breach of contract (Count One) and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count Two).  (Pa0009-21.)  On October 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed its Answer and Separate Defenses to Defendants’ Counterclaim.  (Pa0022-27.)  On January 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery (the “Discovery Motion”).  (Pa0028-0114.)  The Discovery Motion sought, as pertinent here, to compel the deposition of a representative of Defendants’ transactional counsel, the [...], to testify as to the negotiation and meaning of terms contained in the PSA.  (Ibid.)  On January 26, 2023, Defendants opposed the Discovery Motion and cross-moved for a protective order in connection with Plaintiff’s Notice of Deposition for a representative of Defendants’ counsel.  (Pa0115-21.)  By Order dated February 2, 2023, the trial court denied Plaintiff’s Discovery Motion in its entirety and granted Defendants’ cross-motion for a protective order.  (Pa0190-91.)  Beginning on July 12, 2023, and continuing on July 13, 18, 19, 20, 24, and 25, the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch., presided over a bench trial in this matter.  (See generally 2T, 3T, 4T, 5T, 6T, 7T and 8T.)  On August 24, 2023, [...] issued his trial opinion (the “Trial Opinion”) (Pa0194-0234) as well as the Final Judgment (i) granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff’s claim for specific performance; (ii) dismissing Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract, reformation and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (iii) dismissing Defendants’ counterclaims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
[brief] Although the trial court did not engage in a painstaking analysis of the likelihood of success prong, it found, “I haven’t heard anything indicating, other than that the town wants this to be commercial, that it’s environmentally not appropriate, that nothing can be built here.  Obviously, the town wants something to be built here of a commercial nature, and I think the legal right and the legal obligations under the Mount Laurel doctrine are pretty clear. ” (1T53:19-25).  In denying reconsideration, the trial court squarely recognized that [...] has the obligation to prove that the Property is not suitable: The municipality has the burden, and the burden shifts over to the municipality, to show that the property is for either environmental reasons or otherwise developing it substantial planning concerns.  The municipality needs to show that the plaintiff’s proposed project is clearly contrary to sound land use planning.  (2T9:23-10:4).  Now, the Special Adjudicator must evaluate the parties’ submissions, meet with the parties, and eventually provide a recommendation on suitability to the trial court, as required by Mount Laurel II.
[brief] First, the court’s failure to redact the mentions of arrest in the interrogation video—as well as its failure to issue an appropriate limiting instruction—were not invited by the defense.  The invited error doctrine applies “when a defendant in some way has led the court into error. ”  *State v. Jenkins*, 178 N.J. 347, 359 (2004).  Consequently, “[s]ome measure of reliance by the court is necessary for the invited error doctrine to come into play. ”  *Ibid.*  Accordingly, defense counsel’s mere failure to object to an error warrants plain error review but does not constitute invited error.  See generally *State v. Bailey*, 231 N.J. 474, 490 (2018) (confirming that the invited error doctrine applies when a party “urged the lower court to adopt the proposition now alleged to be error”) (emphasis added and citations omitted); *State v. Corsaro*, 107 N.J. 339, 345 (1987) (quoting *State v. Pontery*, 19 N.J. 457, 471 (1955)) (“The defendant cannot beseech and request the trial court to take a course of action, and . . . then condemn the very procedure he sought and urged.
[brief] In other words, at the moment a Tenant’s Allowance installment payment becomes due, any overdue rent is automatically deducted from the installment owed by operation of the Lease, and Tenant is no longer in default by virtue of the deduction.  The delta between the overdue rent amount and the amount of the Tenant’s Allowance installment payment that would have been due but for the missed rent is the amount the Landlord pays.  Landlord does not deny that the court in its oral decision made no explicit reference to any Lease provision and no reference to a single case, statute, regulation, treatise, or any legal authority whatsoever, though it did cite approvingly a reflection on “equity” uttered by the villain of *The Maltese Falcon* to support of its ruling (3T15-20 to 3T15-22).
[brief] The Chancery Court’s Order Confirming the Arbitrator’s Award  Rather than comply with the Arbitrator’s Award, the Authority instead filed a Complaint to Vacate the Award on December 2, 2022, which it amended on March 10, 2023.  (Pa 4-18, 41-57).  Before the Chancery Court, the Authority argued that [...]’s Award should be vacated.  The Authority argued before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., that while [...] was duly authorized and empowered to define and interpret “just cause” under the CNA, he did not consider “intent, custom, or practice” in the parties’ negotiations to define the term, and that the arbitrator’s definition of the term imposed “new work rules” rather than adhere to the CNA's terms as the parties had agreed.
[brief] The motion court, without addressing the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning, was dismissive of those decisions because they were subsequently vacated on other ground.  That was error.  Turning to the other lower federal court decisions, Khimmat v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co, LPA, 585 F. Supp. 3d 707 (E.D. Pa. 2022) enforced the FDCPA’s plain meaning.
[brief] (Db 10 – Db12)  Both experts had access to the Performance Logs and Security Logs for review and analysis regarding whether there was playback of digital content (commercial ads) on the movie screen at the time of the plaintiff’s fall in Auditorium 5 of the defendant’s movie theater.  The conclusion reached by [...] was that the Security Logs indicated that there was flawless playback of digital content on the movie screen at the time of the plaintiff’s fall.  (Pa234 – Pa256)  The conclusion reached by [...], however, was that the Performance Logs indicated that there were severe problems with the playback of digital content on the movie screen at the time of the plaintiff’s fall.  (Pa264 – Pa392)  The TMS logs that the defendant failed to preserve for review might have reconciled the conflicting opinions of [...] and [...] or served as a “tie breaker” regarding whether the Security Logs or the Performance Logs accurately reflected what occurred during the playback of digital content on the movie screen when the plaintiff fell and injured herself.  REPLY TO POINT I OF DEFENDANT’S LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] (2T:56-18 to 21).  Defense counsel advised the trial court that there was “one line” included in the video that the parties had agreed to edit out.  (2T:57-24).  Defense counsel explained that the line contained discussion about, “who got shot, who got stabbed, and you’re an OG out there. ”  (2T:56-17 to 57:7).  The prosecutor was surprised to see that portion was left in the video, and attributed its inclusion to an error in editing.  (2T:57-8 to 17).  The prosecutor then suggested that the jury be given their lunch break, and the trial judge suggested that he tell the jurors that they are working out a technical issue.  (2T:58-19 to 59-3).  Both attorneys agreed to this approach.  (2T:59-4 to 5).  Defense counsel suggested that, once the video was properly edited, they could restart it from the beginning and “blame it on the audio. ” (2T:59-6 to 21).  Consistent with the agreement of the parties, the trial court advised the jurors that there was a technical issue and sent them to lunch.
[brief] Given [...]’ unavailability and [...]’s testimony, which assumed that even if everything went perfectly within the standard of care, the earliest the baby could have been delivered would have been between 10:05pm (22 minutes earlier) and 10:10pm (17 minutes earlier), which is outside [...]’s window of opportunity.  (Pa233).  Defendants therefore moved for summary judgment.  In response to the motions, [...] issued a certification that attempted to change his deposition testimony to say that he actually testified the 25 to 30 minute period referenced in his report and deposition started from the abnormal strips at 9:48pm rather than the time of birth at 10:27pm.
[brief] As outlined in the Appellant’s Certification submitted below, the September 6, 2022 incident was a false entry as counselings are required to be presented on a form to and signed by the employee and Appellant was never presented with, nor signed any form for the alleged September 6, 2022 counseling.  (AA0054; AA0156-57)  Indeed, Appellant reviewed her file following review of the Undersheriff’s Certification and her personal file did not include any documents regarding this allegation.  (AA0157)  This allegation should not have been considered in any decision to promote by the Respondent [...] or on appeal by the Respondent [...].
[brief] N.J. Const. Art. VI, §5, ¶ 4 ...................................................................................... 10 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This appeal arises out of the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Education’s (“the Commissioner”) final agency decision upholding the School Ethics Commission’s (“SEC”) factual findings and conclusions of law that Appellant [...] (“Appellant”) violated certain provisions of the School Ethics Act: N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(c), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f).  Appellant exhausted his administrative appeals, filing a Motion for Summary Decision with the Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”), and a subsequent appeal of the OAL’s February 27, 2023 and April 27, 2023 Initial Decisions to the SEC, and ultimately, an appeal of the SEC’s Final Decision to the Commissioner, which decision was upheld and constitutes a final agency action or decision.  The Commissioner’s final agency decision upholding the SEC’s finding that Appellant violated certain provisions of the School Ethics Act was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable for the following reasons.  Sg232-236.  First, this final agency action lacks fair support in the record.  There is no evidence in support of the Commissioner’s conclusion that the public could infer the Appellant requested research against Complainant [...] (“Complainant”) to secure an advantage for himself or for his own personal gain.  The timing of Complainant’s actions during the recent election process precipitated Appellant’s concerns of ethics violations committed by Complainant.  The timing of Appellant’s request to the Board Attorney to investigate Complainant’s conduct during the election explains the contemporaneity of his request and election day.  Second, the Commissioner’s final agency decision lacks fair support for his conclusion that the availability of other options to address concerns of Complainant’s ethic violations during the election means *ipso facto* that Appellant improperly used the Board Attorney or school resources for personal advantage or gain, despite the plain and clear language of the [...] Policy 0174 (“Policy 0174”), which does not prohibit Appellant in his position as Board President from requesting services or advice from contracted legal counsel.  Sg202-204.
[brief] **Election Contests Warrant Special Considerations**  Under Title 19, election contests stand apart from other cases in that they are not civil actions and therefore cannot be adjudicated according to the same rules.  See N.J.S.A. 19:29-5; In re Contest of the November 8, 2005 Gen. Election for Office of Mayor of Tp. of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 192 N.J. 546 (2007).  It is well-established in the State of New Jersey that, absent extraordinary circumstances demonstrating that the free expression of the popular will has been thwarted, the results of an election will be maintained.  See Wene v. Meyner, 13 N.J. 185, 196 (1953).  Under our form of representative democracy, there can be no principle more important for the judiciary to protect than ensuring that the people’s voice is heard to the maximum extent possible.
[brief] The Board listened to the arguments, reviewed the underlying ordinances, the provision of documents from the HPC and testimony of the appellant as well as the HPC Chair to understand the process and rationale for determination of denial and to investigate whether or not “error” had occurred in the decision.  The Board, based upon the discussion and review of all documentation and testimony, could not find error and upheld the determination of the HPC for all of the reasons set forth in the Zoning Resolution.  Since the appellant failed to request alternative relief, there was no opportunity to take additional testimony for a variance or other potential relief.
[directive] Do you understand that before the judge can find you guilty, you will have to tell the judge b.  [Yes/Sim] [No/Nao] what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s)?  Voc6 entende que antes de o juiz poder considera-lo culpado voc6 tera que dizer a ele(a) os atos que cometeu os quais o tomam culpado deste(s) crime(s) especifico(s)?
[brief] A second plausible explanation, recognized by [...] and accepted by defendant as a “rational inference” (Db21), is that defendant acted as an accomplice.  In rejecting defendant’s similar argument about inconsistency below, the judge considered that the jury could have found that defendant was the driver.  (10T27-5 to 16).  This was supported by the fact that two guns were used yet the jury acquitted defendant of the weapons offenses.  (10T18-23 to 19-3).  As the driver, defendant may not have necessarily shared the intent of the shooters, but could have “created this reckless situation that eventually resulted in people shooting at the vehicle. ”  (10T27-13 to 16; 10T28-13 to 24; 10T29-20 to 30-1).  That defendant aided unknown shooters by driving is certainly a rational inference because, while there was substantial evidence that defendant was in the pursuing vehicle, there was no eyewitness, video, or forensic evidence demonstrating that defendant was one of the shooters, let alone that he fired the fatal shot.
[brief] The Sketch (Pa5) | 6 | | 2.  [...] Side Elevation Plan (Da5) | 6 | | 3.  The Amended Resolution (Pa10) | 7 | | 4.  Appellant’s Knowledge of the Height Approved by the Board | 8 | | C.  The Trial Court’s March 27, 2024 Hearing (2T) | 10 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 12 | | POINT I | 12 | | STANDARD OF REVIEW | 12 | | POINT II | 13 | | THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RELIED UPON THE BOARD’S AMENDED RESOLUTION.
[brief] Conference Agenda (/file/conferenceagenda-finalpdf) (pdf)  Empirical Research  ABA Litigation Section, Committee on Pretrial Practice & Discovery - Iqbal (2010) (/file/document/aba-litigation-section-committee-pretrial-practice-discovery-iqbal) (pdf)  ABA Litigation Section, Special Committee on the Future of Civil Litigation (/file/document/aba-litigation-section-special-committee-future-civil-litigation-2010) (2010) (pdf)  ACTL/Institute Advancement Amer. Legal System - Final Report (2010) (/file/document/actlinstitute-advancement-amer-legal-system-final-report-2010) (pdf)  ACTL/Institute Advancement Amer. Legal System - Roadmap for Reform - Caseflow (2009) (/file/document/actlinstitute-advancement-amer-legal-system-roadmap-reform-caseflow-2009) (pdf)  ACTL/Institute Advancement Amer. Legal System - Roadmap for Reform - Pilot (2009) (/file/document/actlinstitute-advancement-amer-legal-system-roadmap-reform-pilot-2009) (pdf) American Bar Association - Standards re Pretrial Submissions and Orders (2008) (/file/document/american-bar-association-standards-re-pretrial-submissions-and-orders-2008) (pdf)
[brief] Cases  Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567 (2021)  ...........................................  15 Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995)  ....................................  15 Cell S. of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 172 N.J. 75 (2002)  ...............  15 Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536 (2015)  .........................................  15  Jacoby v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 442 N.J. Super. 450 (App. Div. 2015) ..................................................................................  16  Lang v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of N. Caldwell, 160 N.J. 41 (1999) .....  15, 21 Loscalzo v. Pini, 228 N.J. Super. 291 (App. Div. 1988) ........................................  16  Malanga v. Twp. of W. Orange, 253 N.J. 291 (2023) ................................. 16, 21, 22 Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263 (2013) .............................................................  15, 21 N.Y. SMSA, Ltd.  P'ship v. Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. of Weehawken, 370 N.J. Super. 319 (App. Div. 2004) ..................................................................................  22  Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 .................................................................................................. 10, 11 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-15 ..............................................................................................  13 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-3 ..............................................................................................  13 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7 ............................................................................................. passim N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8 ..............................................................................................  13 Rules Rule 4:46-2(c) .........................................................................................................................  15  TABLE OF DECISIONS/RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] A party’s conduct is a highly relevant consideration in the interpretation of a contract.  See Jacobs v. Great Pacific Century Corp., 104 N.J. 580 (1986) (“The polestar of construction of a contract is to discover the intention of the parties.  Any number of interpretive devices have been used to discover the parties’ intent.  These include...the interpretation placed on the disputed provision by the parties’ conduct. ”) quoting Kearny PBA Local No. 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 221 (1979).  The parties’ understanding of the contract should supersede any other interpretive rule.
[brief] The Plaintiff in Taylor was an African American Burlington County sheriff’s officer.  Id. at 495.  The individually named Defendant was the Sheriff of Burlington County.  Id.  Defendant Sheriff, in the presence of an Undersheriff, called Plaintiff a “jungle bunny. ”  Id.  Defendant testified that he was not aware “jungle bunny” was an offensive slur, and that it was not his intention in using the term “jungle bunny” to harass Plaintiff on the basis of her race.  Id. at 496.  Rather, “jungle bunny” was a phrase that he had heard while in the Marine Corp and that he believed referred to persons wearing camouflage fatigues.  Id.  Plaintiff did not lose any income, her job duties remained unchanged, and no further incidents of racial slurs were alleged.  _Id._ at 497.  The trial court initially entered summary judgment for the defendants, citing the “insufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations.