ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Standard of Review  The Appellate Division’s review of summary judgment is de novo.  See Oyola v. Xing Lan Liu, 431 N.J.Super. 493, 497 (App.Div. 2013) (“Our standard of review is well-established.  Appellate review of a trial judge’s conclusions of law is de novo. ”)  Using this standard, summary judgment is only to be granted when “‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.’”  Woytas c. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc., 237 N.J. 501, 512 (2019) quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 528-29, (1995) quoting R. 4:46-2.  In the instant matter, the Trial Court erred in its legal conclusions that the agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendants was unenforceable and in finding in Defendants’ favor that there were no issues of material fact in dispute, when it is the Defendants’ negligence and breach of contract which are undisputed.  There is no dispute between the parties that Defendants: a) disbursed their client’s funds without a valid conveyancing document in Plaintiff’s favor, and b) issued title insurance to an entity other than their client -- to whom they owed a fiduciary duty.  Defendants’ justifications for these acts, admitted by [...] to be highly irregular, at best create an issue of fact sufficient to deny their motions for summary judgment and proceed to trial.  **CONCLUSION**  For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Court’s Order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and denying Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment should be reversed.
[brief] Bulk variances “represent a discretionary weighing function by the board wherein the zoning benefits [positive criteria] from the variance are balanced against the zoning harm [negative criteria].  If on adequate proofs the board without arbitrariness concludes that the harms, if any, are not substantial, and impliedly determines that the benefits preponderate, the variance stands. ”  Id.  The trial court’s recreation of the negative criteria creates a self-proving feedback loop: the purported lack of zoning benefit is, for the same reason, an existence of zoning harm.
[brief] (Da31; 6T3-10 to 26-20).  Having an opportunity to see and hear both [...] and [...] testify, [...] found both officers to be credible witnesses.  (6T19-17 to 20-22).  She, however, found that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had been given his Miranda rights at the arrest scene and during his second interview.  (6T20-10 to 15).  Consequently, [...] suppressed defendant’s arrest scene statements.  (6T21-10 to 15).  Citing to State v. Pillar, 359 N.J. Super. 249, 268 (App. Div.), certif. denied 177 N.J. 572 (2003), the judge also suppressed defendant's unrecorded second interview statements because they were “off-the-record. ” (5T23-22 to 25-17).  Accord State v. Bullock, 253 N.J. 512, 535 (2023) (quoting Pillar, 359 N.J. Super. at 268).  A police “officer's assurance that the defendant's statement could be made ‘off-the-record’ following the administration of Miranda warnings ‘totally undermine[d] and eviscerate[d]’” the Miranda warnings.  Ibid.  Since [...] did not readminister Miranda warnings to defendant, [...] suppressed his second interview statements.  (6T23-22 to 24-24).
[brief] Within a span of 9 years there are now 3 Appellate Division decisions addressing the issue squarely.  The last disagrees with the earlier 2.  Since the Supreme Court has yet to address the precise issue, this Court can & should follow the earlier decisions.  Otherwise, the devious & litigious plaintiffs & their counsel will not be sanctioned for clear frivolous litigation, if not defrauding the Chancery, Appellate & Law Divisions into ruling that their mortgage should still be paid ahead of the judgment lien despite the uncontroverted facts & law that their mortgage merged into their foreclosure judgment & that was also voided by their DIL & Satisfaction recordings.
[brief] Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Farmland Dairy Farms, Inc., 282 N.J. Super. 140, 199 (App. Div. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Leslie Blau Co. v. Alfieri, 157 N.J. Super. 173, 186 (App. Div. 1978).  “Lastly, there must be proof that the injury caused the plaintiff damage. ”
[brief] At 4T39-12 to 4T39-15, the Trial Court opined the waivers represent 'better alternatives.'  That is not the standard.  The Governing Body believes that street trees and compliant lot lines are the better alternatives for subdivisions.  The Governing Body allows waivers, not when there are so-called better alternatives, but when the applicant demonstrates hardship.  There was no challenge to the standard for waivers in UDO Sec. 18-601.
[brief] Any individual reading the Notice would clearly be aware of the property in question, the date, time and place of the hearing along with the plans for this property.  The application specifically states,  The applicant is seeking Board approval of this major preliminary and final site plan with variances.  The site plan includes three structures which will house a total of 17 residential townhouses.  The applicant seeks the following variances: - Front yard setback on [...]; - Front yard setback on [...]; - Height - Lot area per unit.  At the meeting, the plaintiff argued that this information was insufficient because, for example, it did not detail the size of the front yard setback variance sought, the overall height of the proposed structure or the discrepancy between the lot area per unit that is permitted and the lot area per unit that was being sought.  Respectfully, the case law including the Perlmart case and the Pont Run Water Shed Association case specifically indicate that it is not necessary to provide those types of details in the notice.  Certainly, those details are provided in the application.  In addition in [...] vs. [...], 2019 WL 2480152 is an unpublished Appellate Division opinion from June 13, 2019.  A portion of this opinion deals with the notice requirements under the MLUL.  In the [...] the notice indicated that the application and documents were on file with the Board and maybe inspected during business hours by all interested parties prior to the meeting.  Effectively, the notice directed interested parties to the Board office without providing an address.  The Appellate Panel in that case indicated, “the MLUL only requires ‘a common sense description of the nature of the application, such that the ordinary lay person could understand its potential impact on him or her…(Perlmart 295 N.J. Super. @ 239)”
[brief] During the entire course of the Subject Hearing, the Applicants and their Counsel argued that the Addition would not negatively impact Appellants because of the “dense mature wooded area” that sits between the Subject Structure and Appellants’ homes.  (Pa098-Pa112)  What neither Appellants or the ZBA knew was that Defendant [...] and the other officers and directors had long been negotiating that acquisition of Lot 1 in Block 768 from [...], so that it could be clearcut of all its trees and dug out to serve as basin for stormwater runoff.  (Pa812-Pa846)  As should be noted, all of the [...] directors and officers were present at all four of the meetings oddly passionate about allowing an ultra-modern 45-foot three story structure to be built for all to see upon entry into [...].  The videos show the level of attendance and participation.  (Pa588-589)  It is no surprise that once the protracted hearing was completed, Applicant [...] and the other directors went to work to finalize their plans around Lot 1 in Block 768 and finally announced the plans months after actions had been taken secretly.  (Pa119-Pa171)  On July 20, 2023, Applicant [...] and the other directors called a snap meeting of the [...] Board of Directors with inadequate notice and she voted to assess homeowners over $200,000 to fund [...]’s commitments to the Highlands & [...] Storm Water Mitigation & Green Infrastructure Project (the “Plan”).
[brief] The Arbitration Agreement is Enforceable under Both Federal and New Jersey Law**  Regardless of Appellant’s misguided challenge to Respondents’ ability to enforce the Cardholder Agreement and its Arbitration Agreement, the Cardholder Agreement is enforceable under both federal and New Jersey law.  New Jersey courts enforce contracts where there is “a bargained for exchange of promises or performance that may consist of an act, a forbearance, or the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation. ”  *Martindale v. Sandvik*, 173 N.J. 76, 88 (2002).  Under both federal and New Jersey law, a written agreement to arbitrate is presumed valid and enforceable.  *See* 9 U.S.C. § 2 (“A written provision in . . . a contract . . . to settle by arbitration a controversy . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.  . . .”); *N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6* (a) (“An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract. ”).  Thus, the Agreement is presumptively valid under New Jersey and federal law.  Even setting aside the presumption of validity and the mandatory referral to arbitration, there is no legitimate dispute regarding the Cardholder Agreement’s enforceability.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 6A:28-1.2 defines “benefit” “as used in the Act, as “direct or indirect advantage, profit, privilege, or gain, whether financial, personal, or otherwise. ”  Id.  In the instant matter, there are no facts in the record that demonstrate that what, if any, direct or indirect advantage, profit, privilege, or gain, whether financial, personal, or political, would redound to Appellant’s benefit from making his request to the Board Attorney.  The record shows that the election was already over, and the outcome of Appellant’s election to the Board was already a fait accompli.  There is no evidence of anything to be gained by Appellant for making such a request.  Assuming, arguendo, the claim is that Appellant sought to damage [...] politically, there is no evidence of such attempt and her election to the Board was not in jeopardy or at issue.
[directive] Anonymous reports of improper conduct by an officer shall be accepted.  All efforts will be made to encourage full cooperation by the complainant.  The investigation of anonymous complaints can be troublesome.  However, accurate information about officer wrongdoing may be provided by someone who, for any number of reasons, does not want to be identified.  Therefore, an anonymous report must be accepted and investigated as fully as possible.  In the event an agency receives an anonymous complaint, the officer accepting it should complete as much of the internal affairs report form as he or she can given the information received.  5.1.8
[brief] .........................................................................................................................  27  | Document | Appendix Page Number | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| | Order granting Defendants’ Motion to Stay, filed | Da027 | | September 8, 2023 | | | Order and Statement of Reasons granting Defendants’ Motion to Stay, filed| Da070 | | March 22, 2024 | | | Order and Statement of Reasons on Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File | Da080 | | an Amended Complaint, filed | | | May 14, 2024 | | | Order on Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration, filed | Da162 | | June 20, 2024 | | | Transcript of Oral Argument, May 10, 2024 | 1T | | Transcript of Oral Argument, June 20, 2024 | 2T | | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Akhtar v. JDN Props.
[brief] 15.  Motion for Leave to Appeal an Interlocutory Decision, filed by Appellants on August 25, 2022.  16.  Opposition to Motion/or Leave to Appeal an Interlocutory Decision, filed by Appellee on August 28, 2022.  17.  Cross-Motion for Leave to Appeal an Interlocutory Decision, filed by Appellee on August 28, 2022.  18.  Response to Appellee’s Cross-Motion for Leave to Appeal an Interlocutory Decision, filed by Appellants on August 30, 2022.  19.  Decision on Interlocutory Review, decided by the [...] on September 6, 2022.
[brief] 15  I. STANDARD OF REVIEW ........................................................................................................  15  A. Appeals of Municipal Court Decisions to the Law Division .................................................. 15 B.  Appeals of Law Division Trials  De Novo to the Appellate Division  .......................................  16  C. Appeals of Sentencing  ..........................................................................................................  16  II.  THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN FINDING THAT [...] HAD A REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE SUSPICION SUFFICIENT TO EFFECT A STOP OF APPELLANT (Aa033-035).  ....  17  III.  THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE STATE PROVED OPERATION OF THE VEHICLE BY APPELLANT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT (Aa035-040)  ..............................................  19  IV.  THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN FINDING THAT [...] HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST DEFENDANT (Aa041-049).  ........................................................................................................  22  V.  THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE STATE PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT APPELLANT OPERATED A VEHICLE WHILE INTOXICATED BASED ON THE TESTIMONY OF [...] (Aa037)  .................................................. 26  VI.  THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE STATE PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT APPELLANT OPERATED A VEHICLE WHILE INTOXICATED UNDER THE PER SE STANDARD (Aa041-049)  ...........................................................................................................  27  VII.  THE LAW DIVISION JUDGE ERRED BY SENTENCING APPELLANT UNDER THE CURRENT VERSION OF N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (6T5:3-20).  .................................................................  29  VIII.  [...] ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY SENTENCING APPELLANT, AN INDIGENT INDIVIDUAL, TO AN UNREASONABLE MONTHLY PAYMENT PLAN (NOT RAISED BELOW).  .................................................................  31  IX.  THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE STATE DID NOT COMMIT VIOLATIONS OF THE DISCOVERY RULES (Aa050)  ..............................................................................  33  CONCLUSION
[brief] Just before [...]’s death, the [...] (“[...]’s Estate”) held a 21.5 percent interest in the Palm Beach Property.  (Da11, at ¶ 22).  [...] held a separate 21.5 percent interest in the Palm Beach Property, making her a tenant in common with [...]’s Estate and the owner of the remaining interest in the Palm Beach Property (not relevant to this appeal).  (Id., at ¶ 21).  Each of [...] and [...]’s respective interests in the Palm Beach Property is divisible and freely assignable.  See Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 207 N.J. 557, 564 n.2 (2011) (noting that, “absent some contractual undertaking,” the interest of a tenant in common can be transferred without the consent of the other tenants) (quoting Cap. Fin. Co. of Del. Valley, Inc. v. Asterbadi, 389 N.J. Super. 219, 225 (Ch. Div. 2006)).
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The contract dispute before this Court can be reduced to an equation – in a “Separation Agreement” (Da13-Da22), the parties agreed as follows:  If “A”, then “B”  Presently, the “A” has occurred, and the Court appropriately ordered that “B” must follow as contemplated by the Separation Agreement itself.  “A” occurred when an outside third party, the [...], determined certain language in the parties’ mutual Separation Agreement to be illegal, ineffective, and unenforceable.  This required “B” to take place (severing of certain words in the Agreement as required by the Agreement.  Appellant refused and breached its contractual obligation to sever the terms (“B”) under the severance clause in that document.  The Court’s July 25, 2023 (Da 202-203, Da195-200,) correctly ordered that severance, but now Appellant appeals the matter.  Appellant has written much on the subject to justify its refusal to meet its obligation under the Agreement.  The matter, as stated above, is not complicated, the Court’s determination was sound, and Appellant’s appeal should be denied.
[directive] a. 18.  Do you understand that pursuant to the rules of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender [Yes/wi] [No/Non] Supervision if you are residing outside the State of New Jersey at the time of sentencing, or upon entry of a guilty plea if a guilty plea is a condition of admission to the Pretrial Intervention Program, that return to your residence may be delayed pending acceptance of the transfer of your supervision by your state ofresidence?  Eske w konprann ke konfom ak regleman  Ako Sipevizyon Delenkan Granmoun ant  Eta yo/the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision si w abite andeyo !eta New Jersey omoman yo pwononse santans la, oswa osito yo afime pledwari kilpabilite w an se youn nan kondisyon admisyon nan Pwogram Entevansyon anvan Jijman, w kab gen yon ti reta pou tounnen lakay w annatandan eta kote w abite a aksepte fe transfe sipevizyon ou?  b.  Do you also understand that pursuant to the same Interstate Compact transfer of your [Yes/wi] [No/Non] supervision to another state may be denied or restricted by that state at any time after sentencing, or upon entry of a guilty plea if a guilty plea is a condition of admission to the Pretrial Intervention Program, if that state determines you are required to register as a sex offender in that state or if New Jersey has required you to register as a sex offender?  Eske w konprann tou, ke dapre menm ako transfe ki rele Interstate Compact la transfe sipevizyon ou a yon lot eta kab jwenn refi oswa restriksyon pa !eta sa a, a nenpot ki moman apre yo fm pwononse santans la oswa osito yo afime pledwari kilpabilite w an se youn nan kondisyon admisyon nan Pwogram Entevansyon anvan Jijman si !eta sa a ta detemine ke w oblije enskri w antan ke delenkan seksyel nan !eta sa a oubyen si New Jersey mande w pou enskri w antan ke delenkan seksyel?  19.
[brief] In denying this Project for [...]’s pursuant to the solar floating program, the Board’s primary foundation was that the program was never designed to allow for grid supply projects.  See Order, at 4-5.  (004a-005a.)  The major problem with this is that the statement is not true.  As even the Board acknowledges in the Order, a waiver was available.  At no time did the Board indicate that being grid supply was an absolute bar for the approval of the project.  In fact, the Board said nothing of the sort, despite having 2 years and multiple rounds of discovery on the process.  No information was hidden, no surprises were sprung, no attempt to hide or even disguise the project was attempted.  The Project was clear and, on its face, exactly what it was – a grid-supply project seeking approval from the Board for a [...] award.
[brief] ”  *Horton v. California*, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990); see *United States v. Heldt*, 668 F.2d 1238, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“The authority to search granted by any warrant is limited to the specific places described in it and does not extend to additional or different places. ”).  In the end, “[t]he terms of the warrant must be strictly respected. ”  *Rockford*, 213 N.J. at 441.  Here, the warrant’s terms were precise: [...] was the specific location at which probable cause arose and the jurisdiction within which the car could be searched.  And because the officers violated the explicit terms of the warrant, the fruits of the search must be suppressed.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-7.  Here, the sentencing court completely rejected [...]’s spotless prison record and programming as having any bearing on [...]’s likelihood of reoffending or need for deterrence and did not discuss the age-crime curve or the science of adolescent brain development at all in its discussion of aggravating factors three and nine or mitigating factors nine and fourteen.  (8T 76-19 to 82-6, 85-8 to 23, 87-12 to 88-12, 92-4 to 93-16) (discounted age-crime curve/juvenile brain science).  Importantly, in rejecting [...]’s arguments, the sentencing court did not point to anything specific about [...]; the Court did not, for example, find that it had evaluated [...]’s character and attitude during his appearances and statements in court and on that basis determined he was likely to commit another offense and needed deterrence.  Compare *State v. O’Donnell*, 117 N.J. 210, 216 (1989).  All the court cited were that the facts of the offense included [...]’s action of purposefully going to get his gun before returning to the [...] and that he ultimately pulled the trigger.  (8T 79-1 to 21, 92-22 to 93-16)  The court even explicitly stated that its consideration of the fact that [...] “pulled the trigger” was “not an indictment of [[...]] personally, it’s an assessment of risk and when a person can reach that point that they can do that, they can reach that point again. ”  (8T79-1 to 21)  While appellate courts “should defer to trial courts’ findings that are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record,” State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999), the same deference is not owed when a court relies on assertions about, for example, what is or is not predictive of recidivism in general.  The questions of whether and how specific factors—the fact that defendant retrieved a gun, the act of pulling a trigger, an infraction-free prison record, rehabilitative programming, the age-crime curve, and adolescent brain development—are related to recidivism are empirical, objective questions that this Court is able to evaluate de novo.
[brief] ”  (1T 30-5 to 7)  [...] confirmed that the person in the photo was him.  (1T 30-8 to 11; Da 10)  [...] next showed [...] the second still photo from the RT-TOIC video, and [...] identified the person in that photograph as [...].  (1T 30-19 to 24; Da 11)  Immediately after, [...] pivoted away from discussing the drug charges, asking [...] to tell him about the last time he was with [...].
[brief] 7  I.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR OR ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF MOTION  PURSUANT TO ASSIGNMENT  [...]’S 2012 INJUNCTIVE ORDER  [Issue raised below at AB17a – AB18a; AB19a – AB30a; and Da31 – Da35].  .........................................................................................................................................................................................  7  II.  PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO FILE HIS SECOND OR THIRD APPEAL AFTER EXHAUSTING HIS INITIAL APPEAL IN THIS SAME MATTER.  [Issue not raised below]  ........................................................................................................  11  CONCLUSION
[directive] [Nie/No]  2.  Czy rozumie Pan*, element powtarzalnego i kompulsywnego zachowania i że może Pan odnieść korzyść z terapii dla przestępców seksualnych i że jest Pan skłonny poddać się tego rodzaju terapii, sędzia, po otrzymaniu odpowiednich zaleceń z Zarząd Służby Więziennej, skaże Pana na osadzenie w Centrum Diagnostyki i Skorygowany formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081-Polish strona 1 z 3 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081-Polish page 1 of 3