ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A. [...] did not demonstrate a need for the WFD permit and modification that cannot be satisfied by existing waterfront facilities.  [Aa89-Aa91.]  The Recreational Docks and Piers Rule within the CZM rules at N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5 requires that the applicant demonstrate a “need that cannot be satisfied by existing facilities. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5(b)1.  In its March 27, 2017 policy compliance statement, which was part of its WFD permit application, [...] attempts to satisfy this requirement by summarily stating that “[i]n this case, this is a private lot and the proposed construction will allow the property owner mooring and access for the use of pleasure crafts. ”  [Aa36.]  This analysis is continued in [...]’s October 23, 2018 policy compliance statement, which was part of its WFD permit modification application, where [...] states that the demonstrated need is satisfied because “[i]n this case, this is a private lot and the two proposed boat lifts will allow the property owner mooring and access for the use of pleasure crafts. ”  [Aa106.]  This analysis is fatal for the following reasons.  First, it appears that the record for the 2017 WFD permit and 2019 WFD permit modification is barren of any further demonstration of need besides the summary conclusion that the approvals will allow [...] to use its vessels.
[brief] On May 5, 2016 [...] and [...] agreed that the termination notice was rescinded and the existing Lease rental terms would be modified.  This modification went into effect immediately such that the summer months of May, June, July and August were immediately discounted by $3,000.00.  So the Trial Court erred.  It was not a termination and attempt at reinstatement, it was a notice of termination and before the termination could take effect, the termination was rescinded and the rental terms of the Lease were modified.  The bottom line is that the Statute of Frauds is not applicable because it was not the guarantee that was being modified, it was the Lease terms involving the rent that was modified.  The guarantee language remained the same.  Thus, N.J.S.A. 25:1-15 was simply not applicable.
[brief] Appellants waived the right to pursue the claims set forth in Complaint due to their file to refile the Chancery Action claims before September 13, 2021.  The Consent Order (and the negotiations leading to its entry) clearly and unequivocally establish that the parties each voluntarily and intentionally waived the known right of refiling their respective claims or filing claims they could have asserted in the Chancery Action following the September 13, 2021 expiration of the Consent Order’s mandatory sixty-day filing deadline.  Waiver “involves the intentional relinquishment of a known right and thus it must be shown that the party charged with the waiver knew of his or her legal rights and deliberately intended to relinquish them. ”  Spaeth v. Srinivasan, 403 N.J. Super. 508, 514 (App. Div. 2008)(quotation omitted).  It “must be supported by either an agreement with adequate consideration, or by such conduct as to estop the waiving party from denying the intent to waive.
[brief] It is undisputed that [...] made certain loans to various entities owned by Appellant and to a joint venture between [...], [...], and [...].  See generally Pa010/Da225 (re: [...]); Pa017/Da228 (re: [...]); Pa025/Da231 (re: [...]); Da235 (re: [...]); and Da157 (re: [...]/Ursa Major).  It is similarly undisputed that certain funds remain due and owing to [...] from these various loans.  But, because the institution of the AAA proceedings against the various borrowing entities by [...] – and [...]’s subsequent confirmation of those AAA awards in the Superior Court – are dispositive on the issue of the loans, the court below erred in attempting to fashion a remedy for [...] when a remedy had already been selected and prosecuted to completion.
[brief] Napoleon v. Colicchio, Docket No.: [...].  ……………………………………………………………………………………(omitted)  Exhibit HH, 5/3/2017  Deposition of [...]  ……………………(omitted see 361a)  Exhibit II, 3/10/2011  Unpublished Opinion  [...] v. [...], [...] (App. Div. March 10, 2011).  …………………(omitted)  5/28/2018
[brief] (See Decision, I/M/O [...]) (Pa252).  It was alleged that [...] lied on a search warrant and a federal judge ruled that his testimony was not credible.  [...] was designated a “Brady cop” and, essentially, became unable to testify in court because his trustworthiness was in doubt.  There was significant media coverage related to [...]’s disciplinary matter.  Articles can be found at: https://www.trentonian.com/news/trenton-cop-facing-dismissal-for-lying-on-search-warrant-in-federal-drug-case/article_095ae374-dacd-11ea-8850-2fccc3e64879.html, (last visited April 30, 2021); see https://www.trentonian. com/news/trenton-councilwoman-asks-ag-to-keep-trenton-cop-who-lied-in-warrant-from-getting-job/article_36e81d0a-4ba4-11eb-a94b-178b441ca2c2.html, (last visited April 30, 2021).  A hearing officer sustained 16 out of the 17 departmental charges issued against [...], notwithstanding pleading guilty to 16 charges, [...] was not terminated but suspended for six months and is currently back at work with the department.  See id.  The penalty of termination is disproportionate to the conduct for which [...] has been charged.
[brief] J. 383, 392-93, 705 A.2d 742 (1998).  [*Kent Motor Cars*, supra, 207 N.J. at 443.]  As such, the ECD "requires joinder in one action of all legal and equitable claims related to a single underlying transaction[]"  *Manhattan Woods Golf Club, Inc. v. Arai*, 312 N.J. Super. 573, 577 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 411(1998).  In support of the ECD, Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) requires a party to certify in his initial pleading "the names of any non-party who should be joined in the action . . . or who is subject to joinder . . . because of potential liability to any party on the basis of the same transactional facts."  *Schindel v. Feitlin*, No. A-2888-19, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1119, at *6 (Super. Ct. App. Div. June 11, 2021) (emphasis in original) (citing N.J. Ct. R. 4:5-1(b)(2)).
[brief] State v. Dabas, 215 N.J. 114, 123–24 (2013).  “The pre-interview was followed by a brief recorded inculpatory interview consisting of short answers to leading questions. ”  Id.  The Court explained:  The potential for unconscious, innocent self-editing in transferring words, sentence fragments, or full sentences into a final report is a real possibility.  So is the potential for human error in the transposition of words from notes into a report.  The meaning and context of [the defendant's] words as recorded in the notes may have been subject to differing interpretations where [the investigator] saw only one.  Language nuances may have been lost as [the investigator] translated them into the final report.  The slightest variation of a word or a phrase can either illuminate or obscure the meaning of a communication.  [Id. at 138–39.]  As the Court held in W.B. and Dabas, neither proof of bad faith, nor a showing that evidence is exculpatory, is essential to demonstrate a discovery violation or to justify an adverse inference charge.
[brief] (1T139:1-21)  For whatever reason, they built a landfill in that area and then this grant was given and that is where they located the high-water mark line.  It shows the width of the grant is 316 feet and it shows the length of the grant extending into the Bay to the bulkhead is 1,465 feet and then from the bulkhead out to the pier head is 833 feet (1T144:1-4).  A bulkhead line was established by the State so they could still develop the property in the bulkhead by putting buildings on it, but they could not go beyond the bulkhead out to the pier head.  There could be a pier out there.  One could bring a boat in and so forth, but one could not fill in the property out to the pier head (1T144:7-13).  The only person who would have legal authority to fill in that line up to the bulkhead would be the owner of the Riparian Grant which would be the land under the water.  [...] had the right and if [...] sold that right to someone that right would go along with that person who could develop the property (1T144:21).  He confirms that when [...] acquired the property, only he had the right to fill in up to the bulkhead line (1T144:25).  The significance of this being the establishment of a pier headline is that in his opinion it is a sort of survey or engineering way to identify where the Riparian Grant actually was given.
[brief] Pa11.  The Division filed an Answer and Counterclaim to confirm the Kendellen Award.  Pa213.  Pa219.  At the Order to Show Cause hearing, the Court questioned whether it was improper for the Arbitrator to address the Treasury Circulars when framing the issue presented:  THE COURT:  In reviewing the arbitrator’s decision, again, there was no meeting of the minds as to the issue presented, but it’s the arbitrator that actually ties it into Treasury circulars, is that an error?  [...]: I believe so, Your Honor.  My apologies.  I intersponded (sic) to (indiscernible).  Could Your Honor finish your sentence?  THE COURT:  ***  I think I finished the – I think I did finish the question and you answered it, so you can move on.  T11-17.\(^1\)  The Court also acknowledged that “it’s not the job of anyone to rewrite the contract” noting that it would “be better if instead of 2,080 they put – an award of value for what that number should be, which could change?”  T17-14.  The Division argued that the contractual equation “was just an actual example of one of the divisors that can be used with the time and a half rate. ”  T18-6.  The Division claimed that the language “emphasizes time and one half the regular rate,” and that the “regular rate changes every year. ”  T17-1.  And yet, the phrase “regular rate” does not exist anywhere in the collective bargaining agreement.  Pa23.  The Division further asserted that “time and a half is time and a half is time and a half” or “time and a half is time and a half. ”  T16-19.  T18-13.  However, time and a half \textit{is not just} time and a half; under the contract, time and a half, or overtime, is actually “base plus maintenance divided by 2,080 x 1.5. ”  Pa27.  --- \(^1\)
[brief] As discussed by the Court in Plaintiff’s First Lawsuit, “the transfer from one school or grade level is not automatically adverse” and “the Court must consider the totality of the Circumstances. ” (See Pa84a at p.12 (citing Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 71 (2006)).  The Court in the First Lawsuit explained that Plaintiff in the First Lawsuit “does not allege any diminution in salary or benefits.  “While it may be inconvenient, the transfer alone does not qualify as an adverse employment action. ” (Pa89a at pp. 22-23).  The Court in the First Lawsuit therefore ruled that the transfer did not support a claim that an adverse employment action was taken against Plaintiff.  (Pa92a at pp. 28-29).  With regard to the letter of reprimand, though not relevant to Plaintiff’s allegations concerning the authorization into the investigation of Defendant [...]’s complaints, the Appellate Division expressly holds that written letters of reprimand do not constitute adverse employment actions as a matter of law.
[brief] A 2004 "Developer's Agreement" was authored for the next phase of the property development.  The Developer's Agreement indicated as follows at p.4:  "all municipal/county improvements, if any, lying within the bed of the existing streets and the improvements therein, and such other aforesaid areas, if any, shall be and are to be dedicated by the deed, if required to public use, provided, however, this agreement shall not constitute an acceptance by the [...] or the [...] of such improvement until formally accepted as provided hereinafter and the [...] and the [...] shall accept said dedication of the required curbing, drainage pavement etc. upon the completion of the improvements required in the site plan by ordinance or resolution”.
[brief] Case Information Statement, filed May 25, 2023  Statement of Summary Judgment Motion Record CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX (Volume 1 of 1 – Ca1 to Ca15)  Exhibit O to Certification, Autopsy Report, filed October 25, 2022  Exhibit O to Certification, Toxicology Report, filed October 25, 2022  Exhibit O to Certification, M.E. Investigative Data Sheet, filed October 25, 2022 Exhibit O to Certification, Report of Investigation by M.E., filed October 25, 2022 Exhibit O to Certification, M.E. Evidence/Property Record, filed October 25, 2022 Exhibit O to Certification, Release of Remains Authorization Form, filed October 25, 2022 Exhibit O to Certification, Morgue Check-In/Out Form, filed October 25, 2022 | Cases | Pages | |-------------------------------------------|-------| | Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) | 12 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 12 | | Coffman v. Keene Corp., 133 N.J. 581 (1993) | 23,25,29 | | Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 248 N.J. Super. 540 (App. Div. 1991) | 18,20 | | Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 97 N.J. 429 (1984) | 17 | | Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15 (1981) | 29 | | Freund v. Cellofilm Props., 87 N.J. 229 (1981) | 18 | | Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449 (2020) | 12 | | Green v. General Motors Corp., 310 N.J. Super. 507 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 381 (1998) | 30 | | Hake v. Manchester Twp., 98 N.J. 302 (1985) | 29 | | Johansen v. Makita USA, Inc., 128 N.J. 86 (1992) | 30 | | Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67 (1954) | 12 | | Komlodi v. Picciano, 217 N.J. 387 (2014) | 24 | | Lewis v. American Cyanamid Co., 155 N.J. 544 (1998) | 13,16,23 | | Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chemical Corp., 91 N.J. 386 (1982) | 18,24,31 | | Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nati’l Bank, 332 N.E. 2d 820 (Ind. Ct.
[brief] To establish a loss under the fourth element, [...] would have to identify a contractual clause that it was entitled to receive payment even though it did not work – [...] and the court failed to do so.  As even more evidence that the breach of contract claim is a thinly veiled action for statutory compliance, rather than cite to an actual contract, [...]’s purported “loss” stems only from a claim for payment under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  Thus, [...] \textsuperscript{44}  Goldfarb v. Solimine, 245 N.J. 326, 338 (2021) failed to establish the requisite “loss” under the fourth element, requiring dismissal of Count One to the Counterclaim.  E.  All four elements are required to establish a prima facie case for breach of contract – [...] has none, requiring a dismissal of Count One of the Counterclaim.
[brief] ”  Id. at 503; accord State v. Hai Kim Nguyen, 419 N.J. Super. 413, 428-29 (App. Div. 2011) (citing Gadsden); see R. 3:5-7(g) (technical insufficiency or irregularity in a warrant, the procedures to obtain it, or in its execution does not invalidate warrant).  But over two decades later, it is now unmistakable that violations of jurisdictional mandates—including those raised by the facts of this case—infringe on rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7.  That is to say, if a search performed by federal law enforcement officers outside the territorial jurisdiction of either the authorizing judge or executing officers violates the Federal Constitution, the same must be true for state actors under the New Jersey Constitution.  Indeed, multiple federal and state courts have thus held that jurisdictional transgressions related to search warrants are not mere “technical” infractions—but instead are fundamental constitutional violations.  See, e.g., Henderson, 906 F.3d at 1116-17; United States v. Werdene, 883 F.3d 204, 212-14 (3d Cir. 2018); United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1048-49 (8th Cir. 2017); United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 241 (6th Cir. 2010); States v. Baker, 894 F.2d 1144, 1146-47 (10th Cir. 1990); State v. Frazier, 558 S.W.3d 145, 155-56 (Tenn. 2018); State v. Rupnick, 125 P.3d 541, 551-52 (Kan. 2005); State v. Wilson, 618 N.W.2d 513, 519-20 (S.D. 2000); Commonwealth v. Shelton, 766 S.W.2d 628, 629-30 (Ky. 1989); Crayton v. State, 485 S.W.3d 488, 504-05 (Tex. App. 2016); State v. Dulaney, 997 N.E.2d 560, 568-69 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013); State v. Kirkland, 442 S.E.2d 491, 491-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).  With its central premise washed away by the tide of newly uncovered constitutional history, Gadsden cannot apply.
[brief] In reviewing a motion for summary judgment granted by the trial court pursuant to R. 4:46-2, the appellate court must determine whether the evidence, along with the inferences, could have sustained a judgment in favor of the party opposing the motion.  Thus, the appellate court applies the same standard as the trial court in respect of the motion record, i.e. de novo.  R. 2:10-2; Allen v. Cape May Cty., 246 N.J. 275 (2021).  That standard requires the court to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, here plaintiff [...].  Id. at 289.
[brief] The appraisal report should clearly state any encumbrances affecting the property.  The underlying premises of the valuation, including any expectations about occupancy, must be identified by the appraiser and clearly stated in the appraisal report.  The methods applied to arrive at the value opinion must reflect the presumed conditions.  In some cases, "what is to be valued"—particularly the interest to be appraised and the definition of that interest—is dictated by applicable law or regulation.  Appraisers are responsible for knowing which laws or regulations apply and for complying with those laws and regulations.  Pa165.  These excerpts are included to demonstrate that even appraisal standards do not control what is being valued in this instance.  It remains the [...]’s contention that the Appraisal of Real Estate, and any other treatises relied upon by the [...], are ultimately irrelevant as New Jersey case law is the sole authority on the issue of this valuation.
[brief] While the Chancery Court indicated it was satisfied that it had reviewed the Global Fee Application carefully enough to determine there were no entries included that are not subject to payment under New Jersey law, it simultaneously expressed frustration at [...]’s insistence that a critical analysis of the application was legally required.  (1T68:18-22) (“But now I guess the Court should spend, you know, hundreds of hours and whatever.  But I looked at this carefully, and I agree, I think this [sic] items that shouldn’t have been billed for, weren’t billed for. ”).  [...] now seeks to benefit from submitting an application that was truly incapable of proper review.  Obviously, neither the Chancery Court nor this Court had or has any real ability to conduct the legally mandated critical analysis of the Global Fee Application given its presentation as a single massive submission.
[directive] In the rare cases where the agency has not filed disciplinary charges (or decided not to do so) within 180 days of receipt of the complaint, the agency must notify the County Prosecutor.  The County Prosecutor, or their designee, shall investigate the reasons for the extended investigation and shall also examine whether the agency’s internal affairs function faces any systemic issues that require additional resources or oversight.  The County Prosecutor may take any steps necessary to ensure prompt resolution of the pending matter, including supersession of the agency’s investigation.  The agency shall provide further notice to the County Prosecutor every additional 90 days that the investigation remains open (i.e., on or about the 270th and 360th days from the receipt of the complaint).  The chart in Figure 1 provides an overview of that information.  Figure 1.
[brief] The carrier may then promptly offer its insured that sum in exchange for assignment to it by the insured of the claim against the tortfeasor.  3.  Regardless of the settlement amount, the policyholder’s recovery against her UIM carrier is reduced by the tortfeasor’s full liability limits.  Id. at 194–95.  The Supreme Court adopted these procedures in Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Vassas, 139 N.J. 163, 171 (1995).
[brief] ”  Ferolito v. Park Hill Ass’n, Inc., 408 N.J. Super. 401, 407–08 (App. Div. 2009).  The statute requires evidence of bad faith because “clients generally rely on their attorneys to evaluate the basis in law or equity of a claim or defenses, and a client who relies in good faith on the advice of counsel cannot be found to have known that his or her claim or defense was baseless. ”  Id. at 408 (cleaned up).  Here, the trial court appeared to be under the misimpression that the likelihood of Defendants’ success on their forthcoming motion for attorneys’ fees was predicated on a successful showing that Plaintiff’s lawsuit was “frivolous” within the meaning of the Frivolous Litigation Statute, despite the fact that Defendants expressly disclaimed any reliance on the frivolous litigation statute.
[brief] On June 22, 2021, [...] filed a verified complaint and order to show cause pursuant to Rule 4:67-7 seeking enforcement of the March 30, 2021 Interim Order entered by the [...].  (Da1-60).  [...] requested that the Trial Court hold [...] in contempt for his failure to produce records, and further ordering Mr. [...] to pay [...]’s attorneys’ fees and costs.  (Da6).  Also --- 5  As of the date of the oral argument before the Trial Court, the OAL had not yet taken any action on the referral from the [...].  named in [...]’s verified complaint was the [...].  (Da1-6).  On June 28, 2021, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., entered the order to show cause requested by [...], requiring Mr. [...] to appear and show cause on August 6, 2021 why he should not be compelled to produce the requested records and pay [...]’s attorneys’ fees and costs.  (Da61-64).  Mr. [...] was given until July 19, 2021 to file his opposition to the requested relief, and then [...] was to file any reply by July 28, 2021.  (Da62).  On July 9, 2021, the undersigned firm appeared on behalf of Mr. [...] in the Trial Court.  (Da65).  On August 2, 2021, the [...] filed an answer to the verified complaint.  (Da66-71).  On August 2, 2021, Mr. [...] filed an answer to the verified complaint.  (Da72-78).  In his answer, Mr. [...] asserted deprivation of due process and lack of jurisdiction as affirmative defenses, and also included a claim for indemnity against the [...] for “all of his legal fees, costs and expenses incurred in relation to this matter and all matters that relate to or arise out of [[...]’s] July 3, 2019 OPRA request. ” (Da74-75).  Mr. [...] also filed an affidavit in opposition, setting forth the history of the [...] Complaint which had led to the filing of the verified complaint.  (Da79-129).  On October 4, 2021, [...] filed a reply in further support of his order to show cause.  (Da236-325).  On October 4, 2021, the [...] filed an amended answer to the verified complaint which included an answer denying any cross-claims asserted against it.  (Da326-330).  Ultimately, after several adjournments, the Trial Court held oral argument on [...]’s order to show cause and on Mr. [...]’s request for indemnification on January 28, 2022.
[brief] N.J.R.E. 702.  For a witness to be qualified as an expert, it must be shown that the witness has certain skills, knowledge or training in a technical area or one that is not common to the world.  Scully v. Fitzgerald, 179 N.J. 114, 129 (2004); Hake v. Manchester Tp., 98 N.J. 302, 314 (1985).