ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] RESPONDENT HAS NOT CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED IT IS “REAL PARTY IN INTEREST”  R. 4:26-1 specifies that every action may be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.  It is Respondent’s responsibility to clearly allege “facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute…”  *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975); *DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno*, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006) (Respondent must establish Court’s jurisdiction).  The issue of standing under R. 4:26-1 is a legal question subject to the Court’s de novo review.  *Courier-Post Newspaper v. County of Camden*, 413 N.J. Super. 372, 381 (App. Div. 2010).  Declarant’s, [...] (“[...]”), Certification demonstrates that [...] ("[...]") is the real party in interest.  Da116.  Respondent and [...] are separately incorporated entities.  Respondent’s Complaint asserts that [...] is the Plaintiff.  Da2.  [...] states that [...] is the plaintiff.  Da116.  [...] does not certify nor establish that Respondent is the owner of the statements of account.  [...]’s Certification was accepted in order to receive Respondent’s account statements as competent evidence.  Respondent has not clearly demonstrated that it was the party that allegedly suffered an injury.  Respondent, thus, lacks standing.  Jen Electric, Inc. v. County of Essex, 197 N.J. 627, 645 (N.J. 2009).  [...]’s Certification presents a material factual issue as to the identity of the real party in interest in this case.  Because there is a material factual issue, it was plain error for the trial Court to grant the motion for summary judgment.  VII.
[brief] 7  [...] also obtained an “American Express Premium Rental Protection Insurance Policy”.  (Ia108).  It is not clear if [...] ever noticed the Accident under this Policy.  Similarly, in Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co. v. LaCroix, 194 N.J. 515, 523 (2008), the Supreme Court did allow for PIP benefits despite the rescission of a policy, but it did so based on New Jersey’s no-fault financial responsibility laws, which are, again, limited to “standard automobile liability insurance polic[ies]” and vehicle owners.
[brief] In finding that [...] had violated the State Policy, both agencies acted in furtherance of their duties and obligations under the State Policy to provide State employees with a workplace free from discrimination and harassment.  N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(a).  And most importantly, the Commission’s decision was supported by ample evidence and consistent with applicable law.  The State Policy prohibits employment discrimination or harassment based on gender identity and other protected categories.  N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(a).  A State employee violates the State Policy when he or she makes a derogatory or demeaning reference about another’s race, gender, age, religion, disability, affectional or sexual orientation, ethnic background, or any other protected category set forth therein.  N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(b).  Examples of such prohibited activity include “[u]sing derogatory references with regard to any protected categories in any communication,” N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(b)1.v.; and “[e]ngaging in threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts towards another individual in the workplace because that individual belongs to, or is associated with, any protected categories. ”  N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(b)1.vi.  See also In re K.R., Dep’t of Military & Veteran Affairs, 2017 N.J. CSC LEXIS 339 (May 5, 2017) (denying appeal of employee who was found to violate the State Policy by referring to another employee as “Madame Africa” and telling that employee to “go back to where [she] belong[ed].”); In re B.G., Dep’t of Human Servs., 2017 N.J. CSC LEXIS 220 (Mar. 24, 2017) (determination that employee violated the State Policy by using the “N word” was sustained, even though the employee who used the epithet was also African-American).  And even though here [...] was found to have deliberately violated the State Policy when he repeatedly and intentionally misnamed [...], it is worth emphasizing that because it is a zero-tolerance policy, an individual can violate the State Policy even if he or she did not intend to harass or demean another.
[brief] ...  But you have basic requirements asked of the defendant here.  Number one, being able to even just follow directions.  He was completely unable to.  He didn’t do heel to toe at all.  He didn’t look down as demonstrated, which is very important direction that isn’t always adhered to.  And it was in fact a direction given to him.  And he clearly was unable to do the leg raise test in any sufficient fashion.  And then the walk and turn…the walk and turn he wasn’t able to do well.  The leg raise test he wasn’t able to do at all.  The directions though on both were poor.
[brief] The opinion below does not even advert to the common law and public policy underpinnings of those regulations despite extensive briefing addressing them.  (Dta1144,1183,1259.)  Instead, the Law Division's analysis focused almost exclusively on [...]'s contractual right to "exclude [...] from the CCIP program."  However, once [...] became "an insured under the CCIP Policies," even for a "short a window of time" (SSR 25), [...]'s contractual right to control the CCIP became immaterial to [...]'s obligations to its insureds.  The court below erred in relying upon the various contract documents, instead of [...]'s obligations to [...] as its insurer.  It is hornbook law that "[a]n insurer's duties are defined by what it contracted to do, not by what the insured contracted to do."
[brief] THERE WAS NOTHING IMPROPER REGARDING THE TRIAL JUDGE’S RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT OF POSSESSION BASED ON THE COURT’S BELIEF THAT SHE WAS OWED OUTSTANDING RENT OF AT LEAST $8,000.00.  (Db Da25-Da27).  A Court’s ruling regarding a Complaint for Possession is reviewed by our Appellant Court’s based on an abuse of discretion standard.  Cmty Realty Mgmt. V. Harris, 155 NJ 212, 236 (1998).  As such, the Court’s review does not consist of weighing the evidence anew and otherwise making independent factual findings regarding the submissions below.  The Court’s role is rather to determine whether there existed adequate evidence to support the judgment (decision) rendered by the Court below.  Cannuscio v Claridge Hotel & Casino, 319 N J super 342, 347 (App Div 1999).  The lower Court’s factual findings following a bench trial are accorded a high deference by the Appellate tribunal and will be otherwise left undisturbed as long as those findings are substantially supported by the credible evidence gleaned from the record.  Reilly v Weiss, 406 N J Super 71, 77 (App Div 2009).  It is not the higher Court’s function to weight the evidence, assess the credibility of witness testimony or make conclusions about the evidenciary submissions.  Manalapan Realty, L P v Twp Comm. Of Manalapan, 140 N J 360, 378 (1995).  And while the Appellate Court owes absolutely no deference to the lower Court’s interpretations of the law or the legal consequences that flow from the trial Judge’s factual findings, the higher Court has no justifiable grounds to formulate new rulings regarding such evidence which lead to the factual findings of the trial Court.  *D’Agostino v Maldanado*, 140 N J 366, 378 (1995).
[brief] This result is untenable.  Defendants also largely address each of the retaliatory actions pled by Plaintiff individually, disregarding the significance of a pattern.  See, e.g., Nardello v. Township of Voorhees, 377 N.J. Super. 428, 435 (App. Div. 2005); see also Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 177 N.J. 434, 448 (2003); see also O’Keefe v. State, 2007 WL 1975603 (N.J. App. Div., July 10, 2007).  Defendants repeatedly emphasize that El-Sioufi v. St. Peter’s Univ. Hosp., 382 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2005) and Spinks v. Township of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 465 (App. Div. 2008) are good law, and have not been overturned.  See, e.g, Def.’s [...] and [...] Br., pg. 22.  But Defendants cannot deny that these cases were decided before Roa v. Roa, which sets forth the prevailing standard for NJLAD retaliation actions.  Critically missing from the lower court’s analysis is any application of the principals set forth in Roa to the facts of Plaintiff’s case.
[brief] [...] Knew of the Bad Faith Claim When He Caused [...] to Bring the First Action.  Although the entire controversy doctrine does not “apply to bar component claims that are unknown, unarisen, or unaccrued at the time of the original action,” Archbrook Laguna, 414 N.J. Super. at 105 (quoting Mystic Isle Dev. Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310, 323 (1995)), the basis for [...]’s purported bad faith claim was known to [...] when he filed the First Action and that is why the trial court barred his post-judgment motion to amend his complaint and why the Appellate Division affirmed.
[brief] On June 14, 2022, defendant [...] was charged in [...] with second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count one).  (Da 1-2)  On September 7, 2023, two other indictments were returned.  [...] charged second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) (count one); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (count two); third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count three); third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count four); third-degree possession with intent to distribute CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), (b)(3) (count five); second-degree possession with intent to distribute CDS within 500 feet of a public facility, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1(a) (count six); and fourth-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2) (count seven).  (Da 3-10)  [...] charged second-degree certain persons not to possess a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) --- 2  “Da” refers to defendant’s appendix, “Dca” refers to defendant’s confidential appendix.  “PSR” refers to the presentence report.  “BWC” 1, 2, 3, 4-A, and 4-B refer to the five video clips from [...]’s body-worn camera, which are appended at Dca 1.  The transcripts are abbreviated as follows:  1T -- May 2, 2023 (suppression motion)  2T -- March 1, 2024 (plea)  3T -- April 19, 2024 (sentencing) (count one).  (Da 11-12)  On March 6, 2023, [...] moved to suppress the handgun underlying Indictments 22-06-01428-I and 23-09-01765-I.
[brief] THE PARTIES STIPULATED AS TO HOW THE REMAND TRIAL WOULD PROCEED AND THE REMAND TRIAL WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE APPELLATE DIVISION’S OPINION.  (Da886-890; 980-1005)  Defendant contends that the Trial Court “erroneously tried and decided the issues as a continuation of the 2017 trial and decision. ”  (Db66-68)  The Appellate Division remanded the within matter “for further proceedings. ”  It did not order a new trial.  Rather, it gave specific direction as to what issues had to be resolved and what facts should be considered in determining those issues.  Additionally, on remand, the Trial Court denied Plaintiff’s request to rely upon the prior trial testimony of the witnesses who previously testified in the 2017 trial, requiring all prior witnesses be recalled and permitting any new witnesses to be added to the extent required to establish proofs for the Trial Court’s consideration of the issues to be resolved on remand.  (6T 62:5-65:10)  The Trial Court ruled, without objection from Defendant, that the Appellate Division did not order a new trial.  (6T 63:17-25)  More importantly, Defendant consented to the way the remand proceedings would be tried and never raised an objection to the manner in which the remand proceedings were conducted.  (Da890)  Finally, the Trial Court’s March 29, 2022 Opinion and April 26, 2022 First Amended Order only incorporate prior factual findings and conclusions of law consistent with the determinations following the remand proceedings.
[brief] A.  At sentencing, the judge first denied the State's application to sentence defendant to a discretionary extended term as a persistent offender under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a), on the second-degree robbery count.  The judge then found aggravating factors three (the risk that defendant will commit another offense), six (the extent of defendant's prior record and the seriousness of the offenses), and nine (the need to deter), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), (6), (9), and no mitigating factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b). 9  The presentence report considered by the judge in support of her findings revealed defendant's extensive criminal record.  Defendant had two juvenile adjudications, and five adult indictable convictions for third-degree eluding, second-degree aggravated assault, second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), and fourth-degree resisting arrest.  He received a five-year term for his conviction for aggravated assault and unlawful possession of a weapon, and was sentenced to probationary terms on the other convictions, which he violated in three cases and was sent to State prison.  He also had nine disorderly person convictions for drug-related offenses, and was granted conditional discharge twice, with an extension of the program in one case, and discharged as absconded in the other.  At the time of his arrest in this case, there was an active bench warrant for his arrest in New York for possession of CDS and he was on probation in Union County.  Thus, as the trial judge found, defendant had “what appears to be ... a continuous period of being involved” in the justice system.  *19  In making her determination, the trial judge did not apply aggravating factor two, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2), (“gravity and seriousness of harm inflicted on the victim”) explaining as follows:  Having presided over the case, I note that it is clear, and it's very rare that I would ever use ... the serious gravity, seriousness of harm inflicted on the victim, including whether the victim knew or reasonably should have known that the victim of the offense -- I don't think ... it doesn't quite amount to the second ... aggravating factor, but it is clear that this incident has had a devastating impact on this family.  They are not quite functioning the same way because of this incident that took place in front of their children, and they will never function in the same way.  And that's between them and their [G]lod to figure out how they will work through it.  But it has had a devastating impact on the family and the family dynamics, of which I don't think there's a way that that's really going to be fixed except probably through counseling and through many other things.  But the impact was beyond the point of significant to the victims in this matter.  The judge concluded “the aggravating factors do outweigh the mitigating factors” and sentenced defendant to a term of ten years, subject to an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant to NERA, on count one.  Count nine merged with count one.  B.
[directive] The Court also asked the Special Committee for recommendations as to whether the number of peremptory challenges presently allowed should be changed.  After careful consideration of the issue and much discussion and debate, the Committee recommended substantial reductions, especially in criminal trials.  While the Court in its September 15, 2006 Administrative Determinations specifically did not act on that particular recommendation, instead holding it in abeyance for a year, a significant factor informing that recommendation was the anticipated improvement of the quality of the voir dire process that will be achieved by the implementation of these standards.  The two work hand-in-hand.
[brief] [...] argued, only, that the provisions simply did not utilize the word “own” but expressed unequivocally that it was entitled to indemnification for its negligence, if any, pursuant to Azurak.  1T 11:21-25 and 12:1-13.  [...] contended that the two indemnification paragraphs when read together show the intent of the parties, which was to have [...] defend [...].  1T 15:16-25 to 16:1-24.  The court below granted the motion.  1T 21:24-25 to 23:1-9.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] [...], together with its various corporate affiliates (collectively, “[...]”), argues that the Trial Court’s dismissal of this action in favor of mandatory arbitration violates the New Jersey Constitution.  Specifically, [...] claims that compelling the parties to arbitrate the fraud claims in this action will deprive [...] of its right to have those claims tried to a jury.  [...] ignores, however, that its own insurance policies require submission to mandatory arbitration of all disputes involving the payment of PIP benefits.  It is, of course, the settled law of New Jersey that a party may waive its right to a jury trial.  Since there is no legitimate dispute that [...] waived its right to a trial by jury in this case, its claim that the Trial Court’s decision was unconstitutional lacks merit.  Procedural History and Statement of Facts
[brief] “To overcome the presumption, the State has the burden of demonstrating the search fell within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. ”  Ibid.  In addressing a constitutional challenge to a warrantless search and seizure, courts consider whether the defendant has standing to pursue the challenge, and if he has standing, whether the search or seizure was justified by an exception to the warrant requirement.  Randolph, 228 N.J. at 581.
[brief] As noted by the Court in Port Authority of New York v Ingram, 232 N.J. Super. 401 (App. Div. 1989) “[n]o New Jersey statute creates a limitation period specifically applicable to UM claims. ”  Id. at 404.  Therefore, the general rule is that the limitations period is N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 where there is neither an express provision in the contract nor an express statute providing otherwise.  In the instant matter, the policy is not silent.  The policy clearly and unambiguously provides:  LEGAL ACTION AGAINST US ...  C.  Under Part C – Uninsured Motorists Coverage ...  2.  No action can be brought against us for any claim involving an uninsured motor vehicle unless the action is brought within: a.  Four years from the date of the accident; or b.  One year from the date that the covered person is aware or should have been aware of a claim for which coverage would apply; whichever is later.  D.  Unless we agree otherwise, any legal action against us must be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction in the county and state where the covered person lived at the time of the accident.  (See Pa102).  Therefore, not only is the New Jersey law clear and unambiguous, the suit limitation clause is clear and unambiguous.  Thus, Appellant failed to file her claim within the time limits set forth in her policy of insurance and was properly dismissed.
[brief] The plaintiff testified as follows:  Q: Do you still experience any pain?  A: No.  Q: You have no more pain?  A: No more pain from my chest.  No. and my back, no.  Q: Okay.  So as we sit here right now, you have no more pain as a result of the accident?  A: No, not that I can say.  Q: When was the last time you had chest pain?  A: From the accident?  I don’t remember.  Q: Have you had any pain as a result of this accident in 2022?  A: Not that I can say, no.  Q: Okay.  And no back pain either?  A: No.  No.  Q: Okay.  Anything that’s difficult to do because of the accident now?  A: No.  Only when I pass that area, but otherwise.  No.  I get – (Simultaneous Speaking)  Q: Sorry.  I didn’t understand.  A: It’s okay.  Q: You were saying?  A: don’t have any physical that I can say it’s because of the accident.  Q: Okay.  A: No.  It’s been three years almost.  Q: Okay.  And the chiropractic care seems to have helped you.  A: Yes Da86(50:2-25 and 51:1-20)  This testimony alone establishes that any injury suffered by the plaintiff has resolved such that the plaintiff can function normally in all aspects of her life.
[brief] ”  Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 177 N.J. 434, 448 (2003).  In determining whether an actionable hostile work environment claim exists, [our courts] look to all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. ”  [Id. at 447 (quotation omitted)].  Plaintiff cannot establish as a matter of law that he suffered a “discharge, suspension, or demotion” or was “terminated.
[brief] [7T 25-1 to 27-23].  The effect of this, as was confirmed by [...]’s earlier testimony was a large (and growing) unmet need for the services that [...] sought to provide.  Nevertheless, when asked if [...] would make the building smaller, [...] indicated that [...] was willing to listen to consider such requests if [...] could articulate why the size of the building was a problem as it had done with other issues that [...] identified (such as the height of the building).
[brief] Dated: September 5, 2024  THE ATLANTIC CITY POLICEMEN’S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION  LOCAL 24, [...], Appellants/Plaintiffs, vs.  [...], [...], NEW JERSEY  DIVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, [...], Director of the Division of Local Government Services in the Department of Community Affairs in her official capacity, Respondents/Defendants.
[brief] In Point I of her brief, [...] argues that she should have been appointed because she was a veteran and should have been ranked first on the November 4, 2022 Certification (AA118) instead of [...] Ab23-29.  In Point II of her brief, she argues that the Commission “erred” by removing her name from the eligible list.  Ab30-34.  [...] fails to meet her burden on appeal.  [...] fails to satisfy her burden of establishing that the Commission’s decisions were arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported in any respect.  The decisions must be affirmed.