ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S at 802.  Not surprisingly given the unavailing nature of [...]’s purported employer/employee relationship with [...], there was no evidence at summary judgment demonstrating that any of the State Respondents took any adverse employment action (termination, suspension, demotion, etc.) against her – because they in fact had no authority to do so.  (Da607, at §5.14).  [...] also stipulated to dismissal of Count I of her Amended Complaint\(^{11}\) at oral argument on State Respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration.  (3T48:1-22).  Consequently, the trial court’s order dismissing [...]’s discrete NJLAD discrimination claim on reconsideration should be affirmed.  \(^{11}\)  Count I alleged disparate treatment, sexual harassment, and hostile work environment due to gender in violation of the NJLAD.  B.
[brief] ”  In re Nelson, 454 N.J. Super. 151, 161 (App. Div. 2018) (citing Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 387–88, 140 A.2d 199 (1958)).  Therefore, Defendants argue the trial court erred by not conducting an evidentiary hearing to resolve these ambiguities and factual disputes.
[brief] Moreover, Plaintiff-Appellant also affirmatively agreed to the University’s right to change programs and requirements on a separate occasion.  The following language was included in the written form that Plaintiff-Appellant signed upon accepting admission into the pharmacy school on March 1, 2012:  Students who accept enrollment at the University agree to abide by all the rules or regulations now or hereinafter promulgated by the University.  Any student failing to comply with such rule and regulation may be dismissed by the University.  (Plaintiff Dep. T64:12-24 at Pa. 155; [...]’s document production, Bates stamps D02393-20394, D02485 at Pa. 66-67, 82.)  In addition, the University’s policies and procedures include its right, “in its sole judgment, to change academic programs. ”  It also “reserves its right to shift colleges, schools, institutes, programs, departments or courses,” including, “without limitation, the elimination of colleges, schools . . . departments or courses. ”  ([...]’s document production, Bates stamps D2393-94 at Pa. 66-67.)  [...], as it had at the time of the Beukas case referred to above, continues to maintain a graduate student bulletin, which provides:
[directive] ¿Entiende usted que si lo sentencian al [...]  Do you understand if you are sentenced to the [...]  [Sí/Yes]  [No/No] a. las pautas normales de libertad condicional no regirán para cualquier libertad condicional en el futuro that any future parole will not be guided by the normal parole guidelines?  [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  b. usted reunirá las condiciones necesarias para que lo pongan en libertad cuando la Junta Estatal de Libertad Condicional, una vez que reciba la recomendación de una junta especial de revisión de c1asificaciones, encuentre que usted es capaz de una adaptación social aceptable en la comunidad?  that you will be eligible for release when the State Parole Board, after receiving a recommendation from a special classification review board, finds that you are capable of making an acceptable social adjustment in the community?  [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  c. usted podría pasar más tiempo bajo tratamiento que el que pasaría si lo sentenciaran a una prisión estatal? that you could spend more time in treatment than you would spend if sentenced to state prison?  Fecha/Date: Acusado/Defendant: Abogado  Defensor/Defense Attorney: Fiscal/Prosecutor: Formulario enmendado promulgado por la directriz #01-18, (02/23/2018), [...] página 2 de 2 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), [...] page 2 of 2
[brief] [...] recognized the natural instincts of a dog to protect his family and his property from a threat:  The affection of a dog for his master, and for the members of the household in which he dwells, is proverbial.  Not only is he their friend, but often he is their protector.  His resenting an intrusion by a stranger upon the premises of which he conceives himself to be the guardian is an evidence of his loyalty to those to whom he owes allegiance.
[directive] Whenever an officer determines that one of the above listed factors exists and is influencing the person’s failure to comply with an officer’s command, when feasible, the officer shall consider whether specific techniques or resources would help resolve the situation without the need to utilize force.  Techniques for responding include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) obtaining information about the person from available sources including family members, caregivers or others who know the individual; (b) decreasing exposure to the potential threat by moving to a safer position.  This may involve creating distance, seeking cover, tactical repositioning, concealment, and/or placing barriers between an uncooperative person and the officer; (c) slowing down the pace of the incident by the officer slowing their speech, taking deep breaths, and/or applying strategic and critical thinking; (d) keeping the non-compliant person confined to a limited area and calling for a supervisor, back-up officers, and specially-trained resources to assist in resolving the incident.  These specially-trained resources may include Crisis Intervention Team- trained officers, behavioral or mental health care providers, negotiators, qualified bi- lingual officers, or officers equipped with less-lethal devices; (e) using time as a de-escalation strategy, thereby creating an opportunity to calm the non-compliant person; (f) using simplified speech and shorter verbal directions or instructions; (g) eliminating or reducing sensory distractions (bright flashing lights, sirens, or other loud noises); and 4
[brief] First, the court erred as a matter of law in denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment to dismiss the Amended Complaint against her.  Indeed, the trial court provided no findings of fact or conclusions of law explaining what disputed facts the plaintiffs raised against Defendant (as opposed to her spouse) that required the court to deny summary judgment.  Second, with respect to plaintiffs’ conversion claims, the court erred as a matter of law at the summary judgment stage and at trial by failing to dismiss these claims for lack of derivative standing.  Third, plaintiffs’ failure to make a demand to return the “converted” funds was fatal to their conversion claims and the court’s failure to recognize this requirement constitutes reversible error as a matter of law.  Lastly, the court ignored material evidence that undermined plaintiffs’ conversion claims and improperly shifted the burden of proof to Defendant to disprove the claims despite the plaintiffs’ failure to establish a prima facie case against her, including the absence of any evidence that the Disputed Transactions were unauthorized or otherwise wrongful.  Similarly, there was no factual or legal basis for the court to hold Defendant liable for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing or unjust enrichment (Counts 7-8 and 11-13 of Amended Complaint).  First, the court erred by holding Defendant liable for breaching contracts and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing for agreements that she was not a party to.  Second, the evidential record did not support a finding that Defendant breached any contract or covenant thereunder.  Third, plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claims were barred as a matter of law because there were no express contracts between Defendant and plaintiffs that were breached.  Moreover, plaintiffs failed to prove that Defendant converted any money or that she received an unjust benefit belonging to plaintiffs.  For the reasons above, the court also erred by holding Defendant jointly and severally liable for the Judgment by finding her personally liable for purported actions committed by the defendant corporations.  Further, the court erred by including transactions in the damage award that were barred by the statute of limitations, requiring, at a minimum, a substantial reduction in the damage award.  Lastly, the court erred by granting plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs because there was no statute, court rule or contract entitling plaintiffs to such an award.  For the foregoing reasons, and those set forth below, this Court should reverse the Judgment and dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety against Defendant.
[brief] This Court has to, at least, review the first question regarding the legality of barring people with mental disabilities from the PTI program.  Otherwise, as is probably the case here, the State can always take away “standing” by granting PTI to those whom they know will raise significant arguments, whether in the criminal or civil courts, against their “pet” discriminatory “programs” of the Drug Court (regarding differential discrimination) and “Mental Illness Probation.
[brief] As to Count II and IV, the only remaining dismissed Counts for which the instant Appeal was filed, Plaintiff shifts its aim from the City’s Redevelopment Agreement.  Instead, at Count II, Plaintiff asserts that the City could not amend the Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan (the “Redevelopment Plan”) without first obtaining Plaintiff’s blessing by way of written consent.  However, the lower court was correct to conclude that Plaintiff was no longer a redeveloper and to reject the argument that Plaintiff had veto power over any amendments.
[brief] Docket No. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER ENTERED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY - LAW DIVISION, UNION COUNTY  DENYING A PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION  RELIEF  PRO-SE SUPPLEMENTAL LETTER-BRIEF  Dear Your Honorable Justices:  Please accept defendant's pro-se supplemental letter-brief in lieu of a more formal brief in support of his appeal from a final order entered in the Superior Court of New Jersey - Union County, Law Division denying a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (PCR) to be filed on his behalf.
[directive] This 7.4.3. and 7.4.2.b, 7.4.2.a, subsections  See detention.  clear-and-convincing meeting the for basis facie prima a recognizes 3:4A(b)(5)  Rule new pretrial where the cases those that is, detention, pretrial order to required standard evidence recommendation That released. not be defendant the that is recommendation program's services risk-assessment pretrial objective of the results the on based is program services pretrial the by research. empirical on based turn, is in which, AOC, the by approved process to Failure high either a in results PSA the where cases to applies also category third The Criminal New high or moderate or a score, (NCA) Activity Criminal New or (FTA) Appear and 9 note score, see (FTA) Appear to Failure the of regardless score (NCA) Activity subsection higher, see or of score 5 a in results ODARA if the or 7.4.2.b, and 7.4.2.a subsections or 7.4.S.a, subsection see raised, flag is (NVCA) Activity Criminal Violent New a if or 7.4.2.c, 7.4.S.b, subsection see scores, PSA of the regardless charged are offenses specified certain where and Activity Criminal New or Appear to Failure of risk moderate in a results PSA the where or charged is defendant a when Law Reform Bail under the established detention of presumption statutory or the 17, 2A:162-19(b).
[brief] PLAINTIFF  IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTS TO SHIFT BLAME ONTO THE DEFENDANT FOR PLAINTIFF’S OWN CARELESSNESS (Da80-85).  Plaintiff’s professional land surveyor, its business administrator and its attorney reviewed and approved the complaint in this matter.  (Da8-12).  Plaintiff obtained title to and possession of the easement by the declaration of taking and deposit of its estimate of compensation into court.  (Da16;19).  Plaintiff obtained entry of final judgment of proper exercise of eminent domain for the easement as described.  (Da29).  Plaintiff has submitted no authority or reasonable argument for the proposition that the Defendant, as opposed to Plaintiff, should be held responsible for Plaintiff’s own mistake and carelessness.  Defendant is not a land surveyor and is not qualified or able to assess a 60-foot difference simply based upon a map or observation of the construction area without the benefit of a survey, deed description, or expert analysis.  The Defendant cannot assume that the easement only includes the visible site improvement of the seawall, as argued by the Plaintiff.  The description in the complaint provides for an area to maintain and replace the seawall. \(^1\)  This disparity was only recognized when Defendant’s planner prepared his report acknowledging the inconsistency.  Nonetheless, it was not the Defendant’s legal duty to ensure the taking was accurately described; it was the duty of the Plaintiff.
[brief] In September 2017, plaintiffs were in the midst of negotiating an outright purchase of the brownfield land from [...].  Pa2471-72; Pa2536.  During these negotiations, plaintiffs learned that the [...] had approached [...] directly, as early as June 2017, and induced [...] to sell to [...], the same set of solar rights that plaintiffs had already acquired in perpetuity as well as the land-leased of the brownfield from [...].
[brief] This inordinate delay had no effective impact on Appellant as it had, functionally, already obtained the result it desired.  It presented a much different circumstance for Appellant who had already been separated from his career and sole means of supporting his family for over two years by the trial’s conclusion.  As a result, it was left to Appellant’s counsel to repeatedly contact the trial court seeking a status on the delayed Decision.  Upon receiving no response, Appellant’s counsel was compelled to contact [...] as to the inordinate delay.  Ultimately, [...] entered an Order of Extension Nunc Pro Tunc extending the time for decision for fifteen (15) forty-five (45) periods (i.e. 675 days).  The Order of Extension stated the ALJ’s failure to request an extension (for almost two years) resulted from “inadvertent oversight” and that the almost two year delay was justified due to the ALJ’s “voluminous caseload”.  Pa034.
[brief] Distinguishable, for example, is Watley v. Watley, A-2545-19T2, 2015 WL 9467244, at *2 (App. Div. Dec. 29, 2015), where the court rejected the defendant’s claim that plaintiff signed a prenuptial Antenuptial Agreement, on the basis that a copy of which was never produced.  (Ra 1-3).  Noteworthy is the Petitioner’s failure to acknowledge N.J.R.E. 1004, entitled “Admissibility of other evidence of contents,” which states in relevant part:  The original is not required and other evidence of the contents of a writing or photograph is admissible if: (a) Originals lost or destroyed.  All originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith; or (b) Original not obtainable.  No original can be obtained by any available judicial process or procedure or by other available means; or (c) Original in possession of opponent.  At a time when an original was under the control of the party against whom offered, that party was put on notice by the pleadings or otherwise that the contents would be a subject of proof at the hearing, and that party does not produce the original at the hearing; Here, all three sections apply, for the reasons outlined above.
[brief] Db24  SEC Form 8-K, filed February 22, 2022  Db7  Commentary: Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules (2016)  Db11, Db23  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Defendant respectfully requests that the Court vacate the grant of Summary Judgment by the lower Court on November 9, 2022.  Defendant was denied due process because of insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process.  The lower Court made a mistake when it granted summary judgment because Plaintiff did not satisfy the business records exception to the hearsay rule.  Documents submitted by Plaintiff clearly demonstrated that there are material issues of fact as to place and time.  Plaintiff misled the lower Court and Defendant as to “principal place of business” and Defendant’s right to oral argument.  The lower Court made a mistake when it denied Defendant’s affirmative defense of recoupment or set-off.  The instant case involves several issues of public interest, especially a cardholder’s right to the affirmative defense of recoupment or set-off.  Plaintiff violated Defendant’s rights under FBCA, TILA, Regulation Z, CARD and TCCWNA.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[directive] 9.6.4  Agencies may receive law enforcement or judicially sanctioned subpoenas directing the production of internal affairs investigative records.  Before responding to the subpoena, the law enforcement executive or internal affairs investigator should consult with the agency's legal counsel to determine whether the subpoena is valid and reasonable.  Courts may modify or quash invalid or unreasonable subpoenas, but will require the agency seeking to so modify or quash to file an appropriate motion.  Similar considerations may provide grounds for opposing a records request from a Civilian Review Board that otherwise satisfies the minimum requirements described below.
[brief] Another, separate issue is that among the items that [...] specifically stated in his report is that the invoices were not descriptive.  “None of the billing is descriptive at all. ”  Pa38.  “An area of concern is the substantial amount of time spent reviewing the file and documents.  92.25 Hours were spent reviewing the file and 161 hours were spent reviewing documents.  This type of general file review is very suspicious because it doesn’t describe what was done or why it was done. ”  Pa38.  “When questioned at depositions, the Firms attorneys could not recreate what files or documents were reviewed or indicate what work was performed on any specific date. ”  Thus if the invoices do not show for instance that the contents of box “x” for the purpose of “y”, and if [...]’s own attorneys could not figure out what was reviewed and why on any given date, for any given invoice entry, then what good would it have done for [...] to have reviewed the 21 boxes himself?  The time that would be reasonable to review of a complex document to find internal inconsistencies for the purpose of basing a summary judgment motion on it might very different than the time that would be reasonable to review the exact same document for simply creating a chronological history of the case.  A review of the 21 boxes in the vacuum created by the non-detailed billing would not have been productive.  E.
[directive] The pending incarceration defendant the of initial the besides consequences legally-significant other A program. pretrial services the by conducted process recommendation the of completion unless trial pending preventively detained defendant the have to motion a file cannot prosecutor by charged defendant if is the too, So complaint-warrant.  by charged been has defendant the on while new crime a thereafter commits and complaint-warrant than rather complaint-summons release to revoke 2A:162-24 N.J.S.A. pursuant to move cannot prosecutor the release, pretrial 30.  Cf. note initial charge. that on preventively defendant and hold restrictive on least released the be defendant should a that provides Law Reform Bail
[directive] 2)  When interviewing a defendant for a presentence investigation report and there is the possibility the defendant will be incarcerated, the Criminal Division Probation Officer must inquire whether the defendant is the sole caretaker of a minor child and, if so, who will assume responsibility for the child’s care and custody during the period the defendant is incarcerated.  3)  If the determination is made that the person is the sole caretaker of the child, the Criminal Division probation officer shall complete the Report On Alternate Care For the Dependents of Detainees.  4)  The Criminal Division Probation Officer shall attempt to contact the person identified by the defendant by phone or mail to verify that the person has agreed to assume responsibility for the child’s care and custody during the period of incarceration.  The probation officer will obtain all the information about the caregiver required in section III of the Report on Alternative Care for Dependents of Detainees.  The officer will document their efforts and information.  5)  If the defendant can not provide the name of a caregiver the Probation Officer shall follow the procedures outlined in Directive #8-95 “Judiciary Guidelines - Alternate Care for Dependants of Persons Detained as a Part of the Judicial Process.
[brief] Although the Legislature could have incorporated into the LRHL the rational nexus requirement that governs off-tract infrastructure fees in the non-redevelopment context, the Legislature did not do so.  See \textit{N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f)}.  However, this is not to say that the LRHL is silent on whether a connection must exist between negotiated revenues and municipal redevelopment.  As the lower court recognized, Defendants did not argue otherwise.  (Pa079 to Pa080).  The standard is simply not as narrow as Plaintiff wishes.  Before enumerating the various authorized \textsuperscript{4}  Pursuant to \textit{N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-11}, a municipality may elect to create a redevelopment agency to effectuate a redevelopment plan.  However, to the extent this is optional, where a municipality does not choose to do so, the municipality acts in place of a redevelopment agency to effectuate the redevelopment plan.  See \textit{N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8} (using “municipality” and “redevelopment entity” interchangeably.  It follows that a municipality’s redevelopment costs are one and the same with the “costs of the redevelopment entity. ”  (emphasis added)) actions a municipality may take, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8 conditions that any authorized action must “carry out and effectuate the purposes of [the LRHL] and the terms of the redevelopment plan. ”  Id.  By the very language of the LRHL, the power to negotiate and collect revenue needs to be connected to a redevelopment plan itself and is not limited to a single redevelopment project.
[directive] Czy po uzyskaniu informacji dotyczących możliwych konsekwencji imigracyjnych i f.  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No] przysługującego Panu(i) prawa do uzyskania indywidualnej porady prawnej na temat takich Pan(i) przyznać się do winy?  konsekwencji nadal chce Having been advised of the possible immigration consequences and of your right to seek individualized legal advice on your immigration consequences, do you still wish to plead guilty?
[directive] Under our law an indictment is not official until it is presented in open court to me or to my designee.  Normally, indictments are returned only by the foreperson or the deputy foreperson.  If the Grand Jury votes not to indict in a particular case, the “No Bill” is also returned to the court, so that the person charged may be so informed and, if necessary, may be released immediately from custody or bail.
[brief] The zoning of the property was established by a duly enacted ordinance of the Mayor and Council of [...].  In a borough form of government, such as [...], the authority to enact ordinances is vested in the Council pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:60-6 which states:  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:60-6.  Powers of the council:  a.  The council shall be the legislative body of the municipality.  b.  The council may, subject to general law and the provisions of this act: (1) pass, adopt, amend and repeal any ordinance or, where permitted, any resolution for any purpose required for the government of the municipality or for the accomplishment of any public purpose for which the municipality is authorized to act under general law;  Therefore, the Redeveloper is also requesting that the Court disregard the statutory authority of the Borough to adopt ordinances.