ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 6  Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997)  ...................................................................................17, 22 Ross v. Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int'l Union, 266 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2001) ........................................................................ 16  Rubin v. Transworld Systems, Inc., Case No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. Jan. 20, 2023) ............................... 9, 31 Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2005) .......................................................... 7 State v. A.L., 440 N.J. Super. 400 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2015) .....................................35, 36 State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16 (1965) ..................................................................................... 31 State v. Santa-Mella, 2022 WL 2309245 (N.J. Super. App. Div. June 28, 2022) .........................7, 33, 34 TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) .................................................................36, 37 United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529 (1993) ........................................................................... 20 Young v. Schering Corp., 141 N.J. 16 (1995) .............................................................................. 13 Statutes and Other Authorities: 15 U.S.C. § 1692 .................................................................................. 1, 2, 7 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) ............................................................................. 10 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) ............................................................................. 1, 8, 10
[brief] (DA1540-1550)  Under an assessment of the totality of circumstances, Plaintiffs are foreclosed from commencing a lawsuit in the New Jersey Superior as their actions constitute a waiver, or alternatively demonstrate knowing consent to be bound to the Arbitration forum.  [P]arties may waive their right to have a court determine the issue by their conduct or by their agreement to proceed in arbitration.  Wein v. Morris, 194 N.J. 364, 381 (2008) (citing N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Franklin, 160 N.J. Super. 292, 300, (App. Div. 1978)).  The court should consider the totality of circumstances to evaluate whether a party has waived the right to object to arbitration after the matter has been ordered to arbitration and arbitration is held.  Some of the factors to be considered in determining the waiver issue are whether the party sought to enjoin arbitration or sought interlocutory review, whether the party challenged the jurisdiction of the arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding, and whether the party included a claim or cross-claim in the arbitration proceeding that was fully adjudicated.  [Wein, 194 N.J. at 383-384 (emphasis added). ]  Yet, “[a] court will consider an agreement to arbitrate waived, however, if arbitration is simply asserted in the answer and no other measures are taken to preserve the affirmative defense. ”  Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center, 215 N.J. 265, 281 (2013).  “The relevant question . . . is not only whether the objecting party intentionally relinquished his objection to the arbitration, but whether he so conducted himself that he should be held to have made a binding election. ”  Highgate Development Corp. v. Kirsh, 223 N.J. Super. 328, 333-34 (App. Div. 1998); see also Wein, 194 N.J. 364.  A comprehensive review of the totality of the communications demonstrates there is no basis for any presumption that Plaintiffs did not intend to be bound to the SPA, and the arbitration agreement.
[directive] Rule or Statute Description  This Rule provides that the defendant, after conviction, shall be admitted to bail on motion and notice to the county prosecutor pending the prosecution of an Rule 2:9-4 appeal or proceedings for certification only if it appears that the case involves a substantial question that should be determined by the appellate court, that the Bail After Conviction safety of any person or of the community will not be seriously threatened if the defendant remains on bail, and that there is no significant risk of defendant’s flight.
[brief] T23-24 (rejecting Appellant’s “hyper-technical argument” as an exercise in “uncritical literalism. ”).  First, to find that Respondent’s use of a letter vendor violated the FDCPA would go against Congress’ intent to prohibit only certain especially harmful debt related disclosures to those within a debtor’s close circle (e.g., friend, neighbors, employers) — not all communications by debt collectors to third parties, particularly where individuals are not alleged to have seen the debt information.  *Id*; *Cavazzini v. MRS Associates*, 574 F. Supp. 3d at 142.  Second, such a statutory reading would be inconsistent with other FDCPA provisions and general statutory scheme which permit the use of service providers.  Third, prohibiting the use of letter vendors as an illegal communication, publication, or unconscionable debt practice under the FDCPA (§§ 1692c(b), 1692d(3), 1692f) would lead to an absurd result, preventing an “innocuous” business practice which promotes efficiency and causes no harm to consumers.  *Id*.  For these reasons and more, dismissal of Appellant’s FDCPA claim should be upheld.
[brief] In *Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co.*, 138 N.J. 437, 455 (1994), the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the continuous trigger theory in an asbestos bodily injury case.  In *Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Insurance Co.*, 154 N.J. 312, 321 (1998), the Court applied the continuous trigger theory in an environmental property damage case.  Under the continuous trigger theory, the years between the date of the first exposure to the injurious condition and the date the property damage manifests, or is discovered, are “triggered years. ”  *See Owens-Illinois, Inc.*, 138 N.J. at 450.  The date that property damage manifests is the last date of the triggered period.  *Id.*  In this case, the date of first exposure to harmful conditions at the Site was 1958.  (Pa0211).  It is undisputed that the property damage was discovered, and [...] notified its insurance companies in 1986.  (Pa0336-52).  [...] also confirmed that the CVOC plume stabilized in 1986.  (Pa0260).  Because 1986 was when the property damage manifested and the CVOC plume stabilized, 1986 is the last triggered year and should be the last year of a time-on-the-risk allocation period.
[brief] A.  The entire controversy doctrine requires that this matter be decided in a single proceeding.  The entire controversy doctrine is an equitable doctrine that is meant “to encourage comprehensive and conclusive determinations, to avoid fragmentation and to promote party fairness and judicial economy. ”  Bonaventure Int’l, Inc. v. Spring Lake, 350 N.J. Super. 420, 440 (App. Div. 2002) (citing Falcone v. Middlesex County Med. Soc., 47 N.J. 92 (1966)).  The doctrine encompasses “virtually all causes, claims, and defenses relating to a controversy,” and “all parties to a suit should assert affirmative claims and defenses arising out of the underlying controversy. ”  Prevratil v. Mohr, 145 N.J. 180, 187 (1996); Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 16 (1989).
[brief] Plaintiff also had full access to the pharmacy’s only email account.  (3T43:12-19).  In addition to the one business account, the parties also used credit cards.  On each credit card the parties used (AMEX, Chase, and Discover), Plaintiff and Defendant were charging personal expenses along with expenses for [...].  (2T31:24-32:19; 3T50:24-51:5).  The credit card bills that contained the personal expense charges of each of the parties were paid by Plaintiff directly from the pharmacy’s checking account.  (2T32:19-23; 3T51:6-9; 3T143:16-23; 3T144:6-10).  The credit cards—AMEX, Chase, and Discover—that were paid by the pharmacy were all accounts of the Plaintiff, with Plaintiff having authorized cards for each card to also be issued in Defendant’s name.
[brief] Id. at 7(c).  However, given that the [...] is not a party to an insurance contract, it is not a party who can be joined to an NFADR proceeding under N.J.A.C.11:3-5.6.  It also cannot initiate an NFADR case.  Thus, compelling Fraud Act claims to be resolved through NFADR proceedings deprives the Commissioner of its ability to intervene.
[brief] issue the policy and cancel the policy. ”  (Dta842, T19-25 to 10-3; T52-17 to -25.)  Following [...]’s tender, [...] employee [...], an employee in [...]’s “Wrap Up Department” was tasked by [...]’s underwriting department – “because of the complexity” of the program – with looking into [...]’s coverage status in the CCIP.  (Dta1310, T8-16 to 9-20; T15-13 to -19.)  Vogt located a cancellation endorsement only for [...]’s separate workers compensation policy, but not for [...]’s coverage under the liability policies:  Q.  Did you see any documents that related to a cancellation of coverage under the GL policy?
[brief] *Austin v. Sneed*, No. M2006-00083-COA-R3-CV, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 688, 2007 WL 3375335, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting *Mikhailovich v. Laatsch*, 359 F.3d 892, 904-05 (7th Cir. 2004)).  Second, “the plaintiff must prove that [he] had a meritorious claim or remedy that [he] lost . . . due to [the] attorney’s negligence. ”
[brief] 3T37:16-23.  [...] denied [...]’s prayer for relief in Point II ruling,  As to the second point raised in the defendant's briefing, the withdrawal of the guilty plea, for a Court to accept a plea of guilty to a criminal or quasi-criminal charge, the Court must make reasonable efforts to make the defendant aware of the ramifications of such a plea and a plea of guilty must be entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.
[brief] See [...], *Rent Concessions and Illegal Contract Penalties in Texas*, 48 S. Tex. L. Rev. 645, 662 (2007); [...], *Reimposable Discounts and Medieval Contract Penalties*, 20 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 50 (2007).  the $1,225 free rent concession would become due in the event of any breach of the lease, was an unlawful liquidated damages provision. ”)
[brief] On remand, the only charge defendant could possibly be convicted of which would not result in a greater term than that which defendant has already served would be on Count Five, a fourth-degree offense.  The maximum possible sentence on a fourth-degree crime would be an 18-month term with a nine-month parole bar consecutive to the flat five imposed on [...].  In that case, defendant’s aggregate sentence on [...] and #2 would be 6 and ½ years with a nine-month parole bar.  Roughly six months less than the outer term defendant has already served.  On the other hand, all other charges contained in [...] are of the second and third-degree and even the minimum sentence imposed on those charges, consecutive as they must be to the flat 5 years on [...], would result in a sentence greater than the 7 years with a 3-year parole bar defendant has already served.  Thus, by virtue of the Double Jeopardy Clause contained in both the federal and state constitutions, on remand the only charge subject to reinstatement would be limited to Count Five (fourth-degree aggravated assault).
[brief] 1)  [...]' GRANT OF SUMMARY  JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR MUST BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF SET FORTH A FACTUALLY SUPPORTED, PRIMA FACIE, CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT ON HIS CHARGED-OFF DISCOVER ACCOUNT TO WHICH DEFENDANT RAISED NEITHER A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT NOR CREDIBLE LEGAL CHALLENGE TO DENY THE RELIEF THAT PLAINTIFF  SOUGHT  Plaintiff respectfully submits that this Court should affirm the Order because Judge Jones correctly determined that Plaintiff set forth a prima facie case for collection on this charged-off credit card account.
[directive] Examples of Confidential Police Records  1 (6/00)  Shared Municipal and Police Computer Systems  The following table contains examples of Police records that must remain confidential:  Examples of Confidential Police Records  Abuse of 52:27G-13 – provides that it is a disorderly persons N.J.S.A. Institutionalized offense to disclose confidential information developed during an Elderly Ombudsman investigation.  Autopsy and 13:49-3.1 may only be disclosed by County N.J.A.C. Medical Prosecutor or Attorney General once a death is referred for Examiner Reports criminal investigation.  Child Abuse and 2A:82:46a the name, address and identity of a victim N.J.S.A.  Child under the age of 18 shall not appear on the indictment, complaint Sexual Assault or any other public record.  Victims.  2A:82-46b it is a disorderly persons offense to N.J.S.A. disclose a report containing a child victim’s name, address or identity.  9:6-8.10a requires that all DYFS reports released to N.J.S.A. law enforcement be kept confidential.  Criminal Executive Orders 123 and 69 – provide that these records are Investigation not subject to public disclosure.  Records Domestic Violence  N.J.S.A. 2C:25-33 – provides all records maintained pursuant to this act shall be confidential and shall not be made available to any individual or institution except as otherwise provided by law.  Electronic 2A:156A-19 – provides that it is a third-degree crime to N.J.S.A.  Surveillance knowingly use or disclose the existence of an intercept order or the contents of an intercept, except as authorized by statute or court order.  Grand Jury 3:6-7 provides that Grand Jury proceedings are Rule Information secret.N.J.S.A. 2B:21-10 – provides that any person who, with the intent to injure another, makes an unauthorized disclosure of Grand Jury information commits a fourth degree crime.  Internal Affairs Attorney General’s Internal Affairs Policy and Procedures – Investigations provides that contents of internal investigation case files are confidential.
[brief] # TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | ii | | TABLE OF JUDGEMENT, ORDER AND RULINGS | iii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 3 | | COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS | 4 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 8 | | POINT I | 8 | | THE STANDARD OF REVIEW | 8 | | POINT II | 9 | | THE APPELLATE DIVISION SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO ARTICULATE ANY COGNIZABLE BASIS FOR RECONSIDERATION.  | 9 | | CONCLUSION | 16 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] T1 72:9 - 73:2.  [...] has not had an opportunity to depose any witness on the coverage issues, which were not at issue in the Utilities Litigation.  T1 9:25 - 10:4.  certain of the same facts that relate to the duty to indemnify, certain of the discovery overlapped and relates to both defense and indemnity.  This overlapping is immaterial as discovery specific to the indemnity claim has yet to commence.  Here, while limited document and written discovery has been conducted in this case, it has not been completed.  **There have been no depositions.
[brief] [...]’s work does not even attempt to accomplish a “fact-based” analysis as defined by Boston Gas.  Not one word in his reports or testimony is directed to quantifying the amount of property damage during any particular policy period.  In fact, [...] expressly testified that he “was not trying to do an allocation to individual policies.  That was beyond the scope of what I was doing. ” (1T403:6-8.)  The critical distinction that must be appreciated is that [...] performed a weighted analysis that supposedly identifies how much contamination can be attributed to each AOC.  In other words, X% at AOC1, Y% at AOC2, etc.  This analysis is pure speculation.  [...] has no idea how much contamination can be attributed to any particular AOC, because there is no factual record for him to rely on.  He does not know, for example: - which operations used more or less of a contaminant; - if the amount of contaminants used changed over time; - the quantity of contaminants that were released; - the dates contaminants were released; - if the quantity of contaminants released changed over time; - whether there were any unusual weather events affecting how contaminants moved through the Site; and - whether the volume of groundwater flowing through the Site changed over time.
[brief] The issue is whether a mortgage once cancelled can be reinstated upon learning that the loan was not paid off and that the mortgage was cancelled in error.  The trial court held that a mortgage once cancelled cannot be foreclosed and granted Defendants-Respondents’ motion to dismiss pursuant Rule 4:6-2(e).  Since the mortgage was cancelled the court ruled that Plaintiff-Appellant had no standing to foreclose.  The court ignored the established law that a mortgage cancelled by mistake, fraud, or misrepresentation can be reinstated provided no third party, grantee, or mortgagee, have relied upon the cancelled mortgage to their detriment.  This is the case at bar.  Additionally, the trial court ignored the equitable arguments made by Plaintiff-Appellant of equitable estoppel, unjust enrichment and unclean hands.  Here, the mortgagor chose to make his personal mortgage payments using corporate funds.  Soon after the mortgage was paid off, his business, [...], filed a Chapter 7 Petition in Bankruptcy.  The Trustee in Bankruptcy thereupon filed a separate lawsuit against Plaintiff-Appellant to disgorge the last four years of mortgage payments in the amount of $105,697.90 made by Defendant-Respondent.  Plaintiff-Appellant contested the lawsuit and eventually settled with the Trustee in Bankruptcy for the sum of $60,000.  Legal fees and court costs were also incurred by Plaintiff-Appellant to defend the lawsuit.  Plaintiff-Appellant contends that it is entitled to restitution, to reinstatement of its mortgage, and to foreclose the now delinquent mortgage.  It contends that Defendant-Respondent is obligated to reimburse Plaintiff-Appellant for the amount of the mortgage payments returned to the Bankruptcy Trustee, together with its legal fees and costs to defend.  The trial court also erred in denying Plaintiff-Appellant’s motion to amend its Complaint to state a cause of action for breach of contract.  The court erroneously ruled that such amendment would be “futile. ”  This Court should reverse, order reinstatement of the mortgage, restitution to Plaintiff-Appellant, and remand this case to the Foreclosure Unit for further proceedings.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] VOLUME II  Affidavit of [...]......................................................Pa70  Affidavit of [...]........................................................................Pa72  Affidavit of [...].......................................................................Pa74  Affidavit of [...].....................................................................Pa76  Affidavit of [...]............................................................................Pa78  Affidavit of [...].........................................................................Pa80  New Jersey State Police Incident Exposure Report.................................Pa82  Affidavit of [...].....................................................................Pa86  Affidavit of [...].....................................................................Pa88  Affidavit of [...]....................................................................Pa91  Affidavit of [...].........................................................................Pa93  Affidavit of [...].....................................................................Pa95  Affidavit of [...]......................................................................Pa97  Affidavit of [...].........................................................................Pa99  Affidavit of [...].......................................................................Pa101  Affidavit of [...]..........................................................................Pa103  Affidavit of [...]........................................................................Pa105  Affidavit of [...]...................................................................Pa107  Affidavit of [...].................................................................Pa148  Affidavit of [...]..............................................................Pa150  Affidavit of [...]..................................................................Pa152  Affidavit of [...]...............................................................Pa154  Affidavit of [...]...................................................................Pa156  Affidavit of [...].............................................................Pa158  Affidavit of [...].................................................................Pa160  Affidavit of [...]............................................Pa162  Affidavit of [...]...................................................................Pa164  Affidavit of [...]................................................................Pa166  VOLUME III
[brief] Defendant’s Second PCR Petition is Barred Under Rule 3:22-4(b)(2)(B)  Because [...]’ Habeas Petition was Discovered at the Time Defendant Filed His First PCR Petition and was Discoverable Earlier.  This Court Has Also Already Determined that the Factual Predicate is Insufficient to Warrant Relief.  The State submits that defendant’s second PCR petition is barred under Rule 3:22-4(b)(2)(B) because [...]’ habeas petition was discoverable years earlier by reasonable diligence and, in fact, was discovered earlier.  Under Rule 3:22-4(b)(2)(B), a second or subsequent PCR petition “shall be dismissed” unless it alleges a “factual predicate for the relief sought” which could not have been discoverable earlier by “reasonable diligence. ”  First, as [...] found, [...]’ habeas petition could have been discovered prior to defendant’s trial through a simple search of the PACER filing system.  PACER is ubiquitous in federal litigation:  Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) is a service of the federal Judiciary.  Its mission is to provide the public with the broadest possible access to court records and to foster greater public understanding of the court system.  PACER users include court staff; members of the bar; city, state, and federal employees; the news media; and the general public.  The PACER system was established by the Judicial Conference in 1988 as a way to improve public access to court information, which then typically required a trip to the local courthouse.  Today, PACER provides the public with instantaneous access to more than 1 billion documents filed at more than 200 federal courts – nearly all the documents filed by a judge or the parties in any case.  [About Us, PACER, https://pacer.uscourts.gov/about-us (last visited Jan. 24, 2024). ]
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