ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **POINT I** **THE TRIAL COURT  CORRECTLY APPLIED  THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS AS SET FORTH IN THE NEW JERSEY TORT CLAIMS ACT IN GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT**  The Legislature passed the TCA after the New Jersey Supreme Court abolished the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity in *Willis v. Department of Conservation & Economic Development*, 55 N.J. 534, 540-41 (1970).  *Vincitore ex rel. Vincitore v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth.*, 169 N.J. 119, 124 (2001).  In doing so, the Legislature provided that public entities could only be held liable for negligence “within the limitations of [the TCA].”  N.J.S.A. 59:1-2.  Application of the summary judgment standard must therefore account for the fact that under the TCA, “immunity [of public entities] from tort liability is the general rule and liability is the exception. ”  Coyne v. Dep't of Transp., 182 N.J. 481, 488 (2005) (quoting Garrison v. Township of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282 (1998)); see N.J.S.A. 59:1-2.  Thus, “[w]hen both liability and immunity appear to exist, the latter trumps the former. ”  Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347, 356 (1993).  Pursuant to the TCA, N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, a public entity may be held liable for an “injury caused by a condition of its property” if (but, only if) the plaintiff establishes each of the following elements: 1) the property was in a “dangerous condition” at the time of the injury; 2) that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition; 3) the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred; 4) the dangerous condition was either created by “a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment,” or the “public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition … a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect” against the dangerous condition; and 5) the conduct of the entity in acting “to protect against the condition” or in failing “to take such action” was “palpably unreasonable.
[directive] In cases of potential criminal conduct, interviews of subject officers should be recorded consistent with AG Directives 2006-2 and 2006-4.  As to serious disciplinary infractions, the agency should audio or video record the interview.  A transcript or copy of the recording shall be made available to the officer, if applicable, at the appropriate stage of a criminal or disciplinary proceeding.  If the subject officer wishes to record the interview, he or she may do so, and a copy of the recording shall be made available to the agency upon request, at INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 52 the agency's expense.  Agencies should consider adopting a policy requiring officers to inform the agency or internal affairs investigator if the officer plans to record the interview.  8.6.4
[brief] As with every trial, civil or criminal, the jury was instructed to notify the Court if any party or counsel tried to communicate with or influence them in any way (7T, at 9:25-10:10).  Jury selection was then conducted by having each prospective juror join [...] and counsel in the jury deliberation room connected to the courtroom, where they would be screened for selection (6T, at 54:5-16; 7T, at 24:21-25:20).  At some point during this process, after [...] and counsel emerged from the deliberation room after questioning a potential juror, one of the in-court sheriff’s officers notified Her Honor that Plaintiff had walked in and out of the courtroom a number of times (6T, at 54:17-23; 7T, at 24:21-25:20).  [...]’s courtroom is one of the largest in the county, with the door located at the rear behind the gallery (6T, at 54:5-16; 7T, at 24:21-25:20).  The sheriff’s officer did not inform Her Honor that Plaintiff had “circulated” the array; only that he left and came back, which entailed walking down the aisle to get to the door (6T, at 6:11-21).  [...] told Plaintiff that he was free to stretch his legs or get up to move around if he needed, but if he did, he should either do so at his seat at counsel table, or out in the hallway, rather than going back and forth (7T, at 25:21-26:4).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S RULINGS ON ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL DO NOT WARRANT A NEW TRIAL.......................................................68  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW.............................................................68  B.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN PERMITTING COMMENT ON THE LACK OF A BATTERY CLAIM IN CLOSING ARGUMENT BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS COULD NOT HAVE RECOVERED FOR NEGLIGENCE BASED ON AN INTENTIONAL ASSAULT..............................................69  C.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN PRECLUDING COMMENT ON [...]'S ABSENCE DURING SUMMATION BECAUSE THE JURY HEARD HIS TESTIMONY...........................................................................71  CONCLUSION....................................................................................73
[brief] Despite acknowledging [...] arrived as soon as he could and delivered the baby at 10:27pm, [...] nevertheless testified that if the C-Section would have been called at 9:48pm, it would have been started shortly after 10:00pm with delivery occurring within 5 to 10 minutes, or by 10:05pm or 10:10pm (17 to 22 minutes earlier than what took place).  (Pa233).  [...]’s opinion assumed that everything ran perfectly after 9:48pm.
[brief] As the Michigan Court of Appeals observed, when interpreting the similarly-worded phrase “turning from a direct line” in its signaling statute, [w]hile rotating a vehicle may result in moving the vehicle from a roadway (as in a left turn onto a different roadway), there is nothing in this definition that limits a vehicle “turn” to such a movement.  Indeed, a partial rotation would constitute movement around “a central or focal point,” and it would constitute a change in direction or course.  The fact that a rotation can be terminated and followed by another movement—for example, straightening out the vehicle once a given point is reached—does not mean that the movement was not a turn.  [People v. Hrlic, 744 N.W.2d 221, 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).]
[brief] TABLE OF CITATIONS  Burbridge vs. Mine Hill Township, 117 N.J. 376, 385 (1990)  ...............  17 Kramer vs. Board of Adj., Sea Girt 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965) ...............  17  Kaufmann vs. Planning Board for Warren Township 110 N.J. 551, 558 (1988)  ........................................  18  New Brunswick Cellular Telephone Company 270 N.J. Super. 122, 134, (Law Div. 1992) ..........................................  39  Pullen vs. South Plainfield Planning Board 291 N.J. Super. 303, 312 (Law Div. 1955), Aff’d 291, N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 1996) ...........................................  39  Rexon vs. Board of Adjustment, Haddonfield 10 N.J. 1, 7 (1952)  ............  17  Rowatti vs. Gonchar 101 N.J. 46, 51 (1885) ................................. 17, 18 Tirpac vs. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach Bd. of Adjustment and Borough of Point Pleasant Beach L-002 918-17)  .......................  18 Ward vs. Scott 16 N.J. 16, 23 (1954)  ...........................................  18, 39  Weiner vs. Board of Adjustment of Glassboro 144 N.J. Super. 509, 516, (App. Div. 1976)  Cert. denied, 73 N.J. 55 (1977)  ...............  39  Other Authorities: N.J.S.A. 40:A-12A-7 .................................................. 35, 36, 42  TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX  The Respondent Land Use Board incorporates the Appendix of the Appellant.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT (Pertaining to Respondent, [...])
[brief] # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Bank Leumi USA v. Kloss,** | 4 | | 243 N.J. 218 (2020) | | | **Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC,** | 13 | | 809 F.3d 746 (3d Cir. 2016) | | | **DCK N. Am., LLC v. Burns & Roe Servs. Corp.,** | 15 | | 218 F. Supp. 3d 465 (W.D. Pa. 2016) | | | **HealthplanCRM, LLC v. AvMed, Inc.,** | 13, 14 | | 458 F. Supp. 3d 308 (W.D. Pa. 2020) | | | **In re Hill,** | 12 | | 241 N.J. Super. 367 (App. Div. 1990) | | | **JPC Merger Sub LLC v. Tricon Enters., Inc.,** | 10 | | 474 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2022) | | | **Mansour v. Chiacchio,** | 4 | | 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 330 (App. Div. Mar. 2, 2022) | | | **Metromedia Co. v. Hartz Mountain Assocs.,** | 10 | | 139 N.J. 532 (1995) | | | **Morgan v. Sanford Brown Institute,** | 12, 13 | | 225 N.J. 289 (2016) | | | **Raritan Plaza I Assocs., L.P. v. Cushman & Wakefield of N.J., Inc.**| 4, 12 | | 273 N.J. Super. 64 (App. Div. 1994) | | | **Stockling v. Evicore Healthcare MSI, LLC,** | 14, 15 | | 2024 WL 3409444 (D.N.J. 2024) | | | Statutes | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Federal Arbitration Act** | 12 |
[brief] The collective bargaining agreement states in Article V that:  All overtime shall be compensated as paid compensation at the time and one-half (1-1/2) rate, *(the overtime rate shall be base plus maintenance divided by $2,080 \times 1.5$)*, unless the employee, at said employee's sole option, elects to take compensation for overtime in compensatory time off (C.T.O.) which shall accumulate in a C.T.O. bank.  Compensatory time compensation in the C.T.O. bank shall accumulate at time and one-half (one and one-half hours banked for each hour of overtime worked in quarter hour units).  *(Emphasis added).*
[brief] Instead, he raises two arguments concerning the quantum of damages, neither of which has merit, and neither of which constitutes a meritorious defense:  1.  Defendant has alleged counterclaims and/or claims for offsets regarding monies he allegedly advanced to the Plaintiff to pay for building repairs, which he asserts overly inflates the value of the default judgment entered against him.  2.  That the March 19, 2022 default judgment allegedly included attorneys’ fees that the Court denied for failure to provide the required certification addressing the RPC 1.5(a) factors.  The underlying dispute in this case concerns Defendant’s failure to pay over $200,000 in his fees to the Association.
[brief] To this point, [...] did not file the motion to disqualify until after the [...] first moved to dismiss and compel arbitration.  Realizing that the doctors were aligned and prepared to defend themselves, [...] developed a ploy to disqualify the lawyers defending them in an attempt disrupt their unified defense.  However, [...] has no cognizable stake in the attorney-client relationship, and depriving an adversary of efficient, unified representation is not a legal basis for disqualification.  The alleged conflict under RPC 1.7 stemming from the [...]’s joint representation of [...] and [...] does not prejudice, harm, or otherwise impact [...].  [...] admitted below—although it is obvious even absent [...]’s express admission—that its motive for seeking to disqualify counsel is its self-interest.
[brief] Pa23-122; N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1; N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.6; In its Complaint, [...] asserts claims for declaratory judgments (Counts 1-2, 4-7), for violation of the IFPA, N.J.S.A. 17:33A-4 (Counts 3, 8), and for violation of the New Jersey RICO statute (Count 9).  Pa76-119.  Through some of its declaratory judgment claims, [...] seeks to declarations that the defendants were not eligible to be paid any of the PIP benefits payments and to disgorge all of the PIP benefits that it paid to the [...] and other defendants on eight-hundred-plus PIP claims totaling $1.737 million.  Pa77-82, 106-09.  These hundreds of PIP claims date to as far back as 2009 and to as recent as 2022.  Pa123-149; see also Pa67 ¶ 306; Pa69 ¶ 315.
[directive] Re-Ot~enin~ and Detention Seek Decision to Re-Considering 7.7 on based detention pretrial seek decision to the reconsider time any at prosecutor may A the known to not was and that Directive this to pursuant relevant be would that information if Furthermore, detention. pretrial seek to not made was decision initial an time the prosecutor at re-open seek to may prosecutor the detention, pretrial for motion prosecutor's a denies the court material a has hearing that initial the of time the at known information not on based hearing the 2A:162-19(x. N.J.S.A. issue.
[brief] For that reason, we reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial, which shall be bifurcated into a liability phase followed by a damages phase.  . . .  In the liability phase, there should be no proof, or even mention, of the" damages evidence.  Redvanly, at 402.  Similarly in Johnson v. Dobrosky, 187 N.J. 594 (2006) a new trial was warranted as the admission of character evidence relevant only to damages may have unduly prejudiced the plaintiff in the eyes of the jury.  See also Diaz v. City of Anaheim, 840 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2016), where evidence that the plaintiff was in a gang should not have been admitted unless the trial had been bifurcated and the gang evidence used only in the damages phase.  Accordingly, it is requested that a new trial be granted before a different trial judge and if evidence of the plaintiff's physical condition after the incident is to be admitted, it be admitted only in the damages phase of a bifurcated trial.
[brief] [...]’s reliance on Ensslin v. [...], 311 N.J. Super. 333 (App. Div. 1998), is misplaced.  (Pb10).  In Ensslin, a police officer had been terminated from service and the subsequent action he brought against his employer under the Law Against Discrimination was ultimately dismissed.  Ensslin, 311 N.J. Super. at 334.  After the LAD litigation, Ensslin applied for Ordinary Disability Retirement Benefits but the [...], determined he was ineligible as he was not a member in service at the time.  Ibid.  The [...] found that under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3), PFRS membership ceases “if more than 2 years have elapsed from the date of [the member’s] last contributions,” and under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6(1) an application must be made “by a member in service” or on his behalf.  Ensslin, 311 N.J. Super. at 335.  This court reversed the Board, holding “that the two-year standard of N.J.S.A.43:16A-3(3) is not jurisdictional, especially in the circumstances presented” in the particular matter.
[brief] Similarly, [...] was exposed to [...]’s theory on February 9, 2016 that the faceless person “resemble[d]” [...], even though [...] was “unable to conclusively identify” the faceless person, and in fact did not identify the faceless person as [...] until March 8.  Fourth, the Court wrote:  “Multiple viewings.  Did the witness view the suspect more than once as part of multiple identification procedures …. [or] initially make no choice…?”  Ibid.  [...] viewed the suspect more than once; he viewed the [...] video on February 9, 2016 and again on March 8, 2016.  That he was “unable to conclusively identify” the faceless person the first time cuts against the admission of an identification made during the second viewing, one month later.
[brief] ” (slip op. at p. 3n.2).  Although [...] found that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert claims on behalf of others, the appellate panel closely scrutinized the fourth amended complaint and found that plaintiff had alleged sufficient injury and harm to himself to survive the dismissal.  That is not to say plaintiff’s reference to the alleged unlawful conduct of defendants allegedly directed toward or affecting others should be stricken from the complaint are of no import in determining whether the complaint otherwise suggests a fundament of a cause of action for purposes of analyzing whether the complaint should be dismissed under Rule 4:6-2.  See Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746.  Fairly read, plaintiff’s complaint includes references to the alleged unlawful conduct of defendants directed to others not only to support putative claims for which plaintiff lacks standing, but also to provide context for the fundament of a claim the motion court recognized exists in plaintiff’s favor and for which he clearly has standing.  (slip op. at p. 12).  In addition, the [...] appellate panel instructed plaintiff “to identify the legal cause of action asserted, including specific citations to any alleged statutory provision he contends was violated, such that defendants and the court shall have no difficulty determining on the face of the pleading the claims asserted. ” (slip op at p.15).  Here, unlike [...], plaintiff’s dismissed hybrid Eight Counts Complaint (Pal) set forth and alleged various specific constitutional and statutory provision violations.
[brief] On appeal, Appellant argued that the PCR Judge erroneously refused to consider Giglio in conjunction with his Brady analysis.  Specifically, in denying [...]’s petition for post-conviction relief, the Court incorrectly concluded that [...] raised his Giglio claim for the first time in a reply brief and thus, found that the Giglio argument was procedurally barred.  (Da178-79).  This determination was rendered, notwithstanding the fact that Appellant’s Petition for Post-Conviction relief cited Brady, in addition to other authority, including Giglio.  The State does not oppose Appellant’s argument that the failure to consider his Giglio arguments was erroneous, warranting reversal.  Furthermore, the State concedes that Giglio is encompassed in Brady.  See State Br. at 26-29.  Reversal is warranted for this reason alone.
[brief] At the start of the interrogation, after briefly collecting biographical information, [...] said, “All right.  Just like, you know, anybody else that come down here, we gotta read you your rights and things like that. ”  (1T 3-20 to 21)  However, [...] admitted at the Miranda hearing that they do not read the Miranda rights to every witness at the station; they did not do so in this case for the eyewitness [...]; and their particular interest in [...] was “a little bit different than if he were simply brought in as a witness. ”  (3T 41-15 to 45-8)  [...] denied that [...] was a “target” and claimed that they did not decide to arrest him until later that evening when [...] did not confirm his alibi and Reid said she recognized the shooter on surveillance video, but [...] conceded that [...] was already a “person of interest as a shooter.
[directive] This and Law Reform Bail the with accordance in made be decision to is enforcement every law police on how guidance policy general provide rather, to intended, is It Rules.  Court amended e.~., See, Law.  Reform Bail the applying discretion in their exercise should prosecutors and law when a on guidelines issue to General Attorney the (requiring 2A:162-16(c) N.J.S.A. acomplaint-warrant).  for apply officer may enforcement statutory implementation and every address to attempt not does Directive This relevant every for account to attempt it does Nor arise. to likely issue interpretation decisions.  case-specific making consider in should prosecutors and police that circumstance requiring prosecutors, police and for responsibilities general the forth sets Directive the Rather, Law Reform Bail implementing the for procedures and policies, systems, establish them to case- which within framework general a establishes words, other in Directive, This efficiently. or legal specific more understanding that the with done is This made. will be decisions specific to appropriate necessary and becomes that if future the in provided be may guidance policy recent the and statute new of the administration efficient and uniform a of benefits the achieve Constitution.
[brief] It may provide investigative machinery for that purpose and has done so in adopting N.J.S.A. 40A:5-22.  In re Burlington Cty. Freeholders Bd., 188 N.J. Super. 343, 351 (Law Div. 1983)  Nevertheless, and for purposes of completeness, we note that the County Sheriff "and his [or her] office are part of county government."
[brief] A CONFLICT OF INTEREST PREVENTING DEFENDANTS FROM VOTING ON MATTERS RELATING TO ALBERT WUNSCH DOES NOT EXIST.  (Da89)  Plaintiffs falsely assert that defendants never claimed a lack of conflict of interest in voting on matters related to [...].  (Pb at 7).  This is inaccurate.  This issue was briefed by defendants in the court below.  (Da89)².  At no time did a conflict of interest arise that would have prevented the three defendant members of the seven-member governing body from voting on issues concerning [...].  Determining whether a specific interest is sufficient to disqualify a public official is highly fact-sensitive, relying on the unique circumstances of each case.  Care of Tenafly, Inc. v. Tenafly Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 307 N.J. Super. 362, 366 (App. Div. 1998).  A conflict arises when a public official holds an interest that is not shared with the public.  Id. at 370.  The central issue is whether the individual’s interest creates a scenario where the public official is inclined to prioritize personal interests over the interests of those, they are legally obligated to serve.  S & L Assocs., Inc. v. Washington, 61 N.J. Super. 312, 329 (App. Div. 1960).  In this case, the facts demonstrate that no conflict of interest existed that would have prevented the defendants from voting on matters relating to Borough’s ²
[brief] The United States Supreme Court and New Jersey Courts Mandate that an Arbitrator Determine the Arbitration Agreement’s Enforceability  The United States Supreme Court definitively stated “[w]hen the parties’ contract delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, the courts must respect the parties' decision as embodied in the contract. ”  Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archis & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 528, 202 L. Ed. 2d 480 (January 8, 2019).  In Henry Schein, the Court reversed the lower court’s improper review of an arbitration agreement and reemphasized the Court’s longstanding precedent: when parties agree to arbitration, an arbitrator (not the court) decides the merits of a dispute and “gateway” questions of arbitrability, “such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate and whether their agreement covers a particular controversy.  *Id.* at *3*  (citations omitted) (emphasis added); *see also Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson*, 561 U.S. 63, 70, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778, 177 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2010) (when an agreement contains a delegation clause, challenges to its enforceability must be referred to the arbitrator); *Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst.*, 225 N.J. 289, 303, 137 A.3d 1168, 1177 (2016) (“a delegation clause in an arbitration agreement can provide that an arbitrator, rather than a judge, will decide such ‘threshold issues’ as whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a legal claim brought by a plaintiff.