ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Notificação Notification  Você entende que a exigência do registro poderá resultar na notificação a órgãos policiais, [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] entidades comunitárias ou ao público em geral quando da sua liberação da prisão ou presença na comunidade?  Do you understand that the requirement of registration may result in notification to law enforcement, community organizations, or the public at large, of your release from incarceration or presence in the community?
[brief] “As recent as September 26, 2023 our office confirmed the HUD matter is still open pending the agencies final findings“ (Pa71).  You see___ in granting the respondents’ *Motion To Dismiss*, the trial judge had accepted the aforesaid statements toward controlling decisions, i.e., the trial judge had formed the belief that there was a genuine compromise at work on the matter under federal jurisdiction (HUD), which offered the appellant the same relief, which he was seeking from the trial court.  This belief by the trial judge defied the reality, since on October 02, 2023 when the aforesaid statements were certified to him, there was NO such compromise at work and further there was no legally viable prospect thereof under *Title VIII*.  The proof that factual misunderstanding of the trial judge impacted his controlling decisions come by way of the following:
[brief] Defendant here, like the defendant in Orji, did not object to the restitution-related concessions made by his counsel.  In fact, rather than object, defendant here supported his attorney’s concessions with the specifics as to how he would work to fulfill his restitution obligations, “whatever [the court] determine[d] they are. ”  Defendant told the sentencing court about his future schooling and job plans and how both would work within his familial obligations.  The defendant ended this by assuring that he “could see a real – a way forward, getting everything paid, fulfilling all the obligations. ”  Compare (13T:8-17 to 9-8) with Orji, 277 N.J. Super. at 589.  Like the Orji Court, the lower court here reviewed the defendant’s presentence report and found support therein for his and his attorney’s concessions as to his ability to pay restitution over a five-year probationary period.  While defendant was at that time unemployed, the lower court correctly found that unemployment to be related to the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic.  Defendant’s employment history was in the food and beverage service industry and construction, two sectors hard hit by the early stages of the pandemic, but which the court appropriately noted were, along with the rest of the economy, rebounding by the time of sentencing.  The lower court appropriately noted that defendant had a wealth of employment experience (over 15 years in the food and beverage industry), which when coupled with defendant’s trucking-related schooling provided every assurance that defendant had “future earning power and potential expectations of” earning power such that he would have the ability to pay restitution, as he had assured the court.
[brief] New Jersey Courts have held that “CEPA does not require any magic words in communicating an employee’s reasonable belief of illegal activity. ”  Beasley v. Passaic Cty., 377 N.J. Super. 585, 605 (App. Div. 2005).  Plaintiff here is properly afforded a remedy under CEPA and the case law interpreting the statute, including our Supreme Court’s decisions in Lippman and Maimone, supra.
[brief] Defendants’ retaliatory motive, more specifically, whether Plaintiff’s whistle-blowing activity was a motivating factor for Defendants’ adverse employment actions against him, is an issue for a jury.  Causation is a highly context specific inquiry into the motives of an employer.  Kachmar v. Sungard Data Systems, Inc., 109 F. 3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1997).
[brief] There may not be a rule for Monday, another rule for Tuesday, a rule for general application, but denied outright in a specific case. ”); *I/M/O Treston, [...]*, [...] (2021) (Ca236) (p. 9 “there is a robust body of decisions and advisory opinions which school officials can utilize to determine when, and how, a disclaimer must be used on social media when speaking in their personal/private capacity in order to avoid running afoul of the Act. ”)  Abandoning its carefully-developed and well-established caselaw on social media posts by school board members in the present matter clearly violates the Legislature’s mandate as set out in the Act:  To ensure and preserve public confidence, school board members and local school administrators should have the benefit of specific standards to guide their conduct and of some disciplinary mechanism *to ensure uniform maintenance of those standards* among them.  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22(b) (emphasis added).  The Commission was created with an express legislative purpose – to uniformly and consistently apply the Act to school board members.
[brief] The complained of conduct, the adverse treatment in the workplace would not have happened but for Appellant’s race, the treatment subjected to by [...] in 2019 was severe and pervasive and another African-American person in her place would believe that the workplace was hostile and abusive.  The claim that Appellant did not establish that the complained of conduct had to do with race or age based on her deposition testimony must be disregarded by the Appellate Court.  This is because the deposition testimony was not complete because Appellant’s Counsel did not have the opportunity to question Appellant.  The Respondent was supposed to reschedule the deposition for continuation but failed to do so.  This appears to be a strategy employed which results in no questions by this Counsel appearing in the deposition record.  It is interesting that the deposition lasted until about 5:30 P.M. and was to be rescheduled so that the testimony could be completed and it was never rescheduled.  Reliance on the one-sided deposition testimony should not be countenanced by this Court.
[brief] There is no significant risk that the [...] is materially limited in its course of action for any of the [...].  For a significant risk of a material limitation to exist, there “must be a significant risk that a lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer’s other responsibilities or interests. ”  *In re Opinion No. 17-2012 of Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics*, 220 N.J. 468, 478 (2014).  To determine this, an attorney must ask whether “the likelihood that a difference in interests will --- \(^4\)  Despite acknowledging the different standards under Rule 1.7(a)(1) and (a)(2), [...] is still advocating for a *per se* conflict under (a)(2).
[brief] ..................................................  20  a.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE OPRA STATUTE INCLUDES ENTITIES ACTING UNDER THE “AUTHORITY” OF A STATE ENTITY (Da097)  ...........................................  21 b.  THE INFORMATION REQUESTED IS NOT A PUBLIC DOCUMENT OR RECORD, BUT PERSONAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO A PRIVATE ENTITY (Da099)  .........................  26  IV.  THE INFORMATION SOUGHT BY THE REQUESTOR IS NOT DISCLOSABLE UNDER THE COMMON LAW RIGHT TO ACCESS PUBLIC DOCUMENTS (Da122)  .................................................................  27  V.  THE [...] SHOULD NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR COUNSEL FEES UNDER THE OPEN PUBLIC RECORDS ACT (Da207)  ..................................................................................................
[brief] [...] incredibly questions the “truth” of what Petitioners’ brief and what [...]’s Certification asserts.  He states:  It strains credulity to claim that petitioners knew, much less advised Mueller, “in depth” of their claims, settlement positions and amounts, and decedent’s testamentary intent on an initial phone call.  Pa178.  Indeed, at that point, they did not know of the January 2022 Will, and apparently could and/or did not then even identify non-New Jersey potential petitioners.  One cannot set forth one’s settlement position without knowing how many people would potentially take under any of the three Wills (much less the value of the estate).  “The specific details of those communications are contained in the Certification of [...].  . .”  Ibid.  But the trial court did not consider that Certification.  RB14-15.  This is nonsensical.  The January 2022 Will, Pa155, which, as admitted to by Respondents, is identical to the October 2022 Will, Pa66, except the October Will eliminates $100,000 in charitable bequests in favor of Respondents.  This would not materially change Petitioners’ settlement position.  Further, the number of litigants seeking to overturn the Will(s) also would have no bearing on Petitioners’ settlement position.  Additionally, [...] accused Petitioners of “misleading” by stating, “Petitioners assert that the scrivener of the October 2022 Will is (or was) counsel for Appellants. ”  Such statement by Petitioners is totally correct.  [...], who drafted the October 2022 Will, id., prepared a deed for one of the Respondents, [...], on February 7, 2005.  PPa46.  Additionally, [...] states that such claim regarding [...]’s counsel somehow shows that Petitioners’ “can twist the facts when it is believed to be to their benefit” and implies that [...] is being untruthful in her Certification,” RB8, and indeed states Mr. “Mueller contested [in the Trial Court] the veracity of what he believed to be Knoll’s claims. ”  RB21.  Further, [...] called Petitioners’ disqualification of him a “desperate and disfavored tactic,” because Petitioners would have to overturn two Wills instead of one.  RB1.  *[...]’s disqualification was sought because he had obtained confidential, prejudicial and substantially harmful information from Petitioners.*  Nothing more, nothing less.  In any event, the disqualification of [...] does not allow for Petitioners’ action to go unchallenged – the Respondents would just obtain new counsel.  It is not like [...] performed any high-level work for Respondents in this matter and is therefore, irreplaceable.  In fact, [...] filed no opposition, no motions or any other substantive documents - the only “substantive” act he performed was to subpoena the file of the scrivener of Decedent’s Will,\(^{20}\) an act that could have been performed by any attorney retained by Respondents.  Therefore, [...]’s statements that this is a “desperate” “tactic,” RB1, by Petitioners has no basis in law or fact.  **POINT VI**
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS Post-Judgment Order Approving Judgment Credit Allocation and Calculation, entered by the Hon. [...], P.J.Ch. on August 26, 2022................................................................................Da1 ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES: | Page | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Copeland v. Marshall,** | 4 | | 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980) | | | **Distefano v. Greenstone,** | 13 | | 357 N.J. Super. 352 (App. Div.), | | | certif. denied, 176 N.J. 278 (2003) | | | **Ginsberg v. Bistricer,** | 13 | | 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 497 | | | (Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 7, 2012) | | | **Hensley v. Eckerhart,** | 9 | | 461 U.S. 424 (1983) | | | **JHC Indus. Servs., LLC v. Centurion Cos., Inc.,** | 14 | | 469 N.J. Super. 306 (App. Div. 2021) | | | **Litton Industries, Inc. v. IMO Industries, Inc.,** | 3 | | 200 N.J. 372 (2009) | | | **New Jerseyans for Death Penalty Moratorium v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corr.,** | 14 | | 185 N.J. 137 (2005) | | | **Rendine v. Pantzer,** | passim | | 141 N.J. 292 (1995) | | | **Rode v. Dellarciprete,** | 9 | | 892 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1990) | | | **Seigelstein v. Shrewsbury Motors, Inc.,** | 9 | | 464 N.J. Super. 393 (App. Div. 2020) | | | **Singer v. State,** | 5 | | 95 N.J. 487 cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984) | | S.N. Golden Estates, Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 317 N.J. Super. 82 (App. Div. 1998) .........................................................
[brief] [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent [...] d/b/a [...] i/p/a [...], [...], [...], [...]  By: [...]  [...]  [...]  Dated: August 23, 2024  [...], DECEASED, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. [...], [...], [...], [...] BRICK PLAZA 10, JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendant-Respondent.
[brief] None of these items are credible evidence of a dangerous condition.  The Video.  Echoing his deposition testimony, [...] admitted at the Rule 104 hearing that the video was meaningless.  Specifically, he testified that it was impossible for anyone, including him, to know whether the condition seen in the video was the same condition encountered by Plaintiff [...] on the date of his accident.  (T161:5-161:16 and T142:10-142:25).  [...] also admitted that he did not know the model or year of the truck in the video; what the condition it was in; what the condition of the vehicle’s shocks and struts were; or what condition the vehicle’s tires were at the time of the recording.  (T143:3-144:10).  He further testified that he had no knowledge of what type of camera was used to record the video or whether it was handheld or dash mounted.  (T144:11-144:18).  Based on Plaintiffs’ expert testimony, the trial court properly concluded that the video was not credible evidence of a dangerous condition.  The T&M Memo.  The T&M memo was prepared during construction by a third-party consultant.  The consultant mistakenly identified settlement on the southbound Garden State Parkway.  As [...] testified during his deposition and the Rule 104 hearing, the memo was contemporaneously corrected to identify settlement on the northbound side of the Parkway and was therefore useless in assessing road conditions in the area of Mr. [...]’s accident.  (T166:19-170:10).  Here again, the trial court properly concluded that the T&M memo was not a reliable source of support for [...]’s opinion.  **The [...] Report.**  [...] also admitted that the [...] bridge inspection report did not identify any dangerous condition at the subject bridge joint, but rather ranked the joint as being in fair condition.  (T135:7-139:5).  The court concluded that the bridge inspection report was also not a reliable source of support for [...]’s opinion.  In addition, the report is hearsay opinion of another expert -- the [...] bridge inspector -- who himself concluded the bridge was not in a dangerous condition.  **Photographic Evidence.**  Finally, at his deposition and the Rule 104 hearing, [...] admitted that there was not a sudden change in elevation “without any tapering. ”  Rather, he testified that the best photographic evidence of the subject bridge joint showed a degree of tapering and that he was relying solely on a photo of the barriers in the background to conclude that there was a change in elevation.  (T139:6-140:2).  When challenged on this conclusion, (i.e., asked how he could differentiate between a sudden change and a tapered change), [...] deflected and failed to answer the question.  (T129:7-133:16).  Accordingly, neither Plaintiffs nor their expert offered credible evidence of a dangerous condition in the roadway on the date of Mr. [...]’s accident.  The trial court thus properly held a reasonable fact finder could not conclude that such a condition existed.
[brief] *Montrose Med. Grp. Participating Sav. Plan v. Bulger*, 243 F.3d 773, 777-78 (3d Cir. 2001).  Here, Plaintiff failed to adequately disclose the claims she raises in this case in her bankruptcy petition, misleading the bankruptcy Trustee and her creditors into believing that she possessed only a single unspecified claim valued at $1,000.
[brief] THE DOCTRINE OF PROGRESSIVE DISCIPLINE DICTATES A LESSER PENALTY THAN TERMINATION FOR [...] AS TO ANY CHARGE WHICH CAN BE PROPERLY SUSTAINED (ISSUE RAISED AT Pa55-Pa59; RAISED IN INITIAL HEARING BRIEF POINT I(b) AND EXCEPTIONS POINT IV).  Termination, as to any sustained charge in this matter, would constitute an excessive form of discipline. \(^5\)  For example, in *In the Matter of [...]*, \(^5\)  Notably, the most serious charge levied against [...] in the FNDA, charge no. 4, and related charges 52 through 54 – relating to impairment while on duty – were abandoned by the City prior to trial due to lack of evidence.
[brief] This is an appeal of the decision of the [...] ([...]) concerning the denial of [...]’ request to be re-enrolled as a multi-pension member in [...] after he returned to work for the [...] at the conclusion of a six-month COVID 19 shut down.  [Pa38-40,54]  On September 7, 2023, the appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal with the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division.  [Pa58]  The appellant filed a brief and appendix on February 21, 2024.  The respondents filed an opposition to the appellants brief on May 22, 2024.  The respondent’s brief contains factual assertions that are not supported by an objective review of the record.  Appellant also disagrees with the legal arguments of the respondents regarding the relevant issues on this appeal.  It is important to note, the respondent’s brief seems to concede that South Plainfield did not follow the proper Civil Service procedural requirements with respect to the temporary separation of the appellant from his position.  Despite this acknowledgment they take the position the appellant should be penalized and lose his pension rights.  This position fails to consider critical facts, and the emergent events of March 2020.  We are requesting that this court rule that as a direct result of a national emergency, the temporary closure of a municipal office is not a break in service as defined by the legislature.  *N.J.S.A. 43:15A-25.2 (c); N.J.A.C. 17:2-1A.1*  While Appellant’s initial brief and appendix set forth a clear record and demonstrated the decision of the [...] ([...]) was in error, Appellant will briefly respond to some of the issues raised by the Respondents.  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**
[brief] [...] answer and counterclaim, filed 1/28/2………………………………Da87 --- 1  Several entries included voluminous exhibits found elsewhere in the record.  To avoid unnecessary duplication, this Index incorporates by reference those earlier-filed exhibits.  2  The original complaint was filed on December 8, 2021, but was superseded by an Amended Complaint with no intervening pleadings.  Exhibit A: Order and memorandum of decision of [...] in *[...] v. Trust for Harrison* ........................................Da99  Exhibit B: [...] to [...] Deed, dated 10/24/03 ..........Da108  [...] answer to counterclaim, filed 3/1/22 ........................................Da111  [...] answer, filed 3/15/22 ........................................................................Da117  [...] answer, filed 5/17/22 ......................................................................Da119  [...] amended answer, filed 5/18/22 .........................................................Da130  [...] amended answer, filed 6/28/22 .......................................................Da132  [...] notice of motion for summary judgment, filed 11/11/22 .............Da143
[directive] A motor vehicle impounded pursuant to the provisions of this subsection shall be removed to a storage space or garage.  The registrant shall be responsible for the cost of the removal and storage of the impounded motor vehicle.  b.  (1)  If the registrant fails to claim a motor vehicle impounded pursuant to subsection a. of this section and pay the reasonable costs of removal and storage by midnight of the 30th day following impoundment, along with a fine of $100 to cover the administrative costs of the municipality wherein the violation occurred, and after a hearing, the municipality may sell the motor vehicle at public auction.
[brief] Specifically, [...] Ordinances 142-77 and 142-78 set forth the development application review procedures for the submission of preliminary and final plans for subdivisions and those development proposals requiring site plan review.  (Pa254-Pa265; Pa266-Pa269).  [...] claims that the November 1, 2022, decision of the [...] to grant Subdivision Approval was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable because insufficient proofs were submitted by [...] necessary for the Board to decide the Subdivision Application.
[brief] In *Garber*, a lawyer had a long-time relationship with a client who was accused of murder.  95 N.J. at 603-04.  The lawyer also was retained to represent a key material witness to the murder at the same time.  95 N.J. at 608-09.  Because of that relationship, and nexus with the facts of both representations, the Court concluded that an actual conflict prevented the dual representation of the key witness in the murder prosecution and the defendant who was accused of committing the murder.  *Ibid.*  Here, there is no actual conflict.
[brief] Thus, there is nothing pending before DEP for its action and, accordingly, there is nothing for DEP to do to “ensure that any approval, permit, administrative order, or consent decree” is consistent with the Public Trust Doctrine.  [...]’s entire thesis is, thus, academic and theoretical.  Such a theoretical concern does not comport with Section 151(a)’s clear, express, unambiguous language which contemplates actual, tangible applications that require DEP activity.  Put simply, Section 151(a) has not been triggered by the Ordinance and Plan.  [...]’s contention here is premature.
[brief] In this day, when patients go to the doctor’s office, they are immediately met with a mountain of documents to sign and review.  This applies to patients of all educational and linguistic backgrounds.  While the courts have accepted a physician’s right to arbitrate medical malpractice claims, the Court should also acknowledge the patients’ need for clear and honest communication.  Most forms which a patient completes at the doctor’s office involve their medical care and form of payment for same.  Most patients do not suspect that they would be signing their constitutional rights away while waiting for the doctor to examine them.  Given the complexity of the insurance system, many patients will sign any form that a physician places in front of them because they believe it is required in order to receive medical care.  In this case, we have a patient who did not have a sufficient chance to review and ask her doctor questions regarding an arbitration agreement form, which the doctor himself would not have been able to explain.  While no one should expect a lawyer-level understanding of contracts from a physician, it should stand to reason that, given the current volume of paperwork which patients are expected to complete before seeing a doctor, the law should not hold the patient to an even higher standard of legal analysis.  In the public interest, physicians should be responsible to clearly explain the general exchange induced by an arbitration agreement and to document same in the medical record.
[brief] ”  Pa785.  Crisdel laborer [...] testified "We try to keep a lane open * * * if somebody is backing up.  Try and have a spotter."  Pa1440.  The responsibilities of a spotter are “keeping an eye * * *.  Waving them on.  Making sure they’re not going to run somebody over or run into something else. ”  Ibid.  [...], the designated “resident engineer,” testified he could not recall making any comment or suggestion to [...] or [...] about the need for spotters or flagmen.