ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380 (1984)  Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)  Db11, Db12  Briley v. Hidalgo, 981 F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1993)  Db4  Carmona v. Resorts, Int’l, 189 N.J. 354 (N.J. 2007)  Db30, Db32  Celino v. Gen. Acc. Ins., 512 A.2d 496 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986)  Db24 Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Serv., 460 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2006)  Db15 Cooper v. Finke, 376 S.W. 2d 225 (Mo. 1964)  Db4  Cowen v.  Bank United of Texas, FSB, 70 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1995)  Db42  Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24 (2017)  Db50  Dunlap v. Credit Protection Ass’n, L.P., 419 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2005)  Db14  Easy Living v. Whitehead, 417 N.E. 2d 591 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979)  Db38  Gibbins v. Kosuga, 121 N.J. Super. 252 (Law Div. 1972)  Db38  Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc., 550 U.S. 45 (2007)  Db42  Great Atl. & Pac. Tea v. Checchio, 335 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 2000)  Db14  Greisz v. Household Bank (Illinois), 8 F.Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1998)  Db47, Db48  HSBC Bank United States, Nat’l Ass’n v. Buset, 241 So. 3d 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018)  Db31  Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Dudnick, 292 N.J. Super. 11 (App. Div. 1996)  Db29  Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995)  Db14, Db15  Herrera v. First Northern Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 805 F.2d 896 (10th Cir. 1986)  Db44  Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 599 U.S. 77 (2010)  Db7, Db8  In re [...], [...] (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Sep. 27, 2001)  Db13  In re Jones, 122 B.R. 246 (W.D. Pa. 1990)  Db38  Irwin v. Dept. of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1980)  Db36  J B Pool Mgmt., LLC v. Four Seasons, 431 N.J. Super. 233 (App. Div. 2013)  Db39, Db40  Jacobs v. N.J. State Highway Authority, 54 N.J. 393 (N.J. 1969)  Db34  Jeter v. Stevenson, 284 N.J. Super. 229 (App. Div. 1995)  Db27  Joyce v. L.P. Stewart, 227 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1955)  Db40  Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67 (1954)  Db4  Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589 (7th Cir. 1998)  Db15  Kemp v. United States, No. 21-5726, 142 S. Ct. 1107 (2022)
[brief] [...]’S INTERLOCUTORY  APPEAL  [...]  219 Broad Street Red Bank, New Jersey  07701 [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, Jersey City Redevelopment Agency  [...]  Of Counsel [...]  On the Brief TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS .................................................................  iii  TABLE OF APPENDIX ................................................................ iv  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................. vi  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .......................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .............................................................
[brief] **EXHIBIT K ................................................................................................................................. 381**  **EXHIBIT L ................................................................................................................................. 386**  **EXHIBIT M ................................................................................................................................. 391**  **EXHIBIT N ................................................................................................................................. 396**  **EXHIBIT O ................................................................................................................................. 402**  **EXHIBIT P ................................................................................................................................. 406**  **EXHIBIT Q ................................................................................................................................. 410**  **EXHIBIT R ................................................................................................................................. 417**  **EXHIBIT S ................................................................................................................................. 421**  III.
[brief] U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10.  During voir dire, Juror 12 disclosed that her husband has a relationship with [...], the Chief of the [...].  (16T92-1 to 16)  She stated that she had met [...] a few times but that she did not have a relationship with him.  (16T92-10 to 12)  Juror 12 was seated without objection.
[brief] ”).  Guided by the Suburban Disposal court’s reasoning, the County was not without “assurance of performance on the bid date” because [...] was “unquestionably registered throughout the bidding process” and this fact could not be altered.  Accordingly, unlike the litany of decisions cited by [...] (where the omitted facts were not objectively discernable and could be altered after bid opening), [...]’s assurance of its classification status was objectively discernable, publicly available and could not be altered, irrespective of whether the omitted copy of the existing Notice of Classification was originally submitted.
[brief] (Da277).  To reach this conclusion, the Probate Court relied on Section 3.3(A) of the Trust.  (Id.).  As noted above, Section 3.3(A) of the Trust places certain real property in a marital trust for [...]’s benefit.  (Da51).  The real property to be placed in the marital trust is identified as “all of my residences located in Englewood, New Jersey and New York, New York, and any other property used or occupied by me as my residence, other than Palm Beach, Florida.  . .” (Id.).  [...] is the contingent beneficiary and was to take the property in the marital trust only if [...] died before [...], as came to pass.  (Id.).  The Probate Court reasoned that because Section 3.3(A) excluded the Palm Beach Property from the real property placed in the marital trust, it evinced [...]’s intention to exclude the “Palm Beach Property” from any direct bequest to [...].  (Da277 (“The Palm Beach Property was excluded from the other properties bequeathed to Defendant which were specifically stated in Section 3.3(A) of [...]’s [] Trust. ”).  The Probate Court thus modified the Residuary Clause at Section 3.6(A)(7) to exclude [...]’s interest in the Palm Beach Property from the residue of [...]’s Trust.  The Probate Court’s analysis was not prompted by any extrinsic evidence revealing a latent ambiguity.  Nor did the Probate Court identify any patent ambiguity or contrary intent.  This was error.
[brief] ”  This would tend to indicate that the Plaintiff was nowhere near a crosswalk.  On the other hand, on page 24 of its brief, the Defendant also says “Kearny Avenue has crosswalks at every intersection and in fact, a crosswalk can be seen at (Da 6) which is attached to the Plaintiff’s expert report. ”  This indicates that the crosswalk seemed to be nearby the location of the accident,  If this is true, the Court must also consider that at the time of the accident, the Plaintiff was returning to his vehicle with a box in his hands.
[brief] ” (Db48).  The “issue was [not, as [...] suggests] whether a group of sophisticated and wealthy business people were compensated properly” by him.  (Db48)  Rather, “this case involved a massive accounting fraud” in which the [...] “cheated [[...]] out of millions of dollars by engaging in wide-scale fraud and deception over the course of many years” (14480a; 14581a); and it was “[...] who described himself as the master chef.  He was the conductor.  He was the overseer of the enterprise …. ” (225T66:20-67:4).  That the harm [...] caused [...] was “purely economic” or that [...] might not have been “financially vulnerable” (Db49) does not detract from the reprehensibility of his conduct.  In all events, this Court has upheld an award of punitive damages where the harm was purely economic and vulnerability was not an issue.
[brief] Published cases which have met this standard under APDRA include - Jignyasa Desai, D.O., LLC v. New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co., 473 N.J. Super. 582, 585 (App. Div. 2022) (resolving a split in authority in the interpretation of the governing regulation is subject to supervisory review.) - Specialty Surgical, supra, 458 N.J. Super. at 69 (resolving a split in authority in the interpretation of the governing regulation is subject to supervisory review) - Kimba Med. Supply v. Allstate Ins. Co. of NJ, 431 N.J. Super. 463, 481 (App. Div. 2013) (review of whether Law Division had authority to remand a matter to the DRP for additional findings is subject to supervisory review) - Open MRI & Imaging of Rochelle Park v. Mercury Ins. Grp., 421 N.J. Super. 160, 166 (App. Div. 2011) (review of Law Division action on subject matter beyond the jurisdiction of the DRP is subject to supervisory review) - Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garden State Surgical Ctr., L.L.C., 413 N.J. Super. 513, 521 (App. Div. 2010) (review of denial of leave to file an amended complaint or the order dismissing the complaint as untimely subject to supervisory review) - Sabato, supra, 380 N.J. Super. at 473 (because the award of attorney’s fees is governed by Court Rules and Rules of Professional Conduct, dispute concerning attorney’s fees subject to supervisory review.) Contrarywise, published cases which have found no cause to invoke supervisory review include: - **Monmouth Med. Ctr.,** supra, 460 N.J. Super. at 588 (remand to DRP because application was improperly denied based on the billing format used was not subject to supervisory review.) - **Fort Lee Surgery Ctr.,** supra, 412 N.J. Super. at 104 (Law Division’s articulation as to how arbitrator applied too restrictive a view of what treatments were medically necessary not subject to supervisory review) - **Riverside Chiropractic Grp. v. Mercury Ins. Co.,** 404 N.J. Super. 228, 240 (App. Div. 2008) (Law Division correctly applying the statute’s standards, and lack of any public policy warranting further review, supervisory review denied.)
[brief] The Legislature requires that a municipality’s zoning ordinances (and any amendments thereto) to be substantially consistent with the Land Use Element of the Master Plan.  A municipality is not prohibited from adopting an ordinance that is inconsistent with the Master Plan, provided that the governing body identifies the inconsistencies and explains its reasons for deviating from the Master Plan.  All proposed zoning ordinances must first be reviewed by the municipal Planning Board to advise the governing body whether such Ordinances are consistent with the Land Use Element of the Master Plan.
[brief] [...] and [...], Plaintiffs, vs. [...], [...], and JOHN DOES  1 through 100 (fictitious names), Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  On Appeal From: Superior Court/Middlesex  Sat Below: Jury trial before Hon. [...]  CIVIL ACTION  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS
[brief] (Pa69-72, 85-89, 129-130).  Thereafter, Appellant used the Account to make purchases and made payments on the Account until February 21, 2011.  (Pa85-89).  On or about February 21, 2011, Appellant defaulted on the Account by failing to pay amounts owed as they became due (the “Debt”).  (Pa70 & 87).  On June 26, 2011, the Account and Debt were charged-off.  (Pa70 & 87).  At that time, the agreement attached to the Citi Affidavit at Exhibit A was the Updated Governing Cardholder Agreement.  (Pa70).  Appellant never opted out of any of the terms and conditions of the Governing Cardholder Agreement.  (Pa69-72, 85-89).  Thereafter, all right, title, and interest in the Account, Debt, and Governing Cardholder Agreement were ultimately sold, assigned, and conveyed to Plaintiff-Respondent, [...] (“Respondent”), on July 15, 2011. (Pa1-6, 83, 135-136).  Appellant has never disputed the Debt or her default.  **B.
[directive] The force. deadly use brought [brings] executives, enforcement law local and county State, with consultation in developed policy with the in line closely more devices energy conducted of use the governing rules the revised] [following Under the 2008). March 19, (dated ammunition lethal less of use governing the ammunition, less-lethal like devices, energy conducted policy, supplemental the to revisions 2010 force. mechanical "enhanced" of form a to be considered are with community consultation in developed policy, supplemental revised following The have that problems practical the addresses executives, enforcement law to addition in leaders that of degree injury the on speculate to officers required policy previous the because arisen issued policy the Under arrest. lawful a resists actively she or when he cause might person a resisting was who actively person a against CED a fire/discharge not could officer an 2010, in suspect's the that believed reasonably officer the unless biting) or kicking, striking, (e.~., arrest thus; boldfaced, and underlined material is New [thus] bracketed, are Deletions this made by revisions incorporating the entirety, its in policy supplemental the of copy A appended. is Directive, 5 Page law, Jersey New Under officer. the injury to serious or bodily death cause would resistance substantial creates a which injury "bodily mean to defined is injury" "serious term bodily the or loss protracted or disfigurement, permanent serious, causes which or death of risk that (Note 2C:11-1(b).
[brief] \(^{11}\)  Here, there have been no depositions at all, no rulings on [...]’s Indemnity Claim, and a trial date has not been set (although it will be over a year from now under the current CMO which provides for dispositive motions in October of 2025).  Da391-93.  Indeed, the current CMO contemplates written discovery, document discovery, depositions, expert discovery, and dispositive motions between now and the date of any trial.  It is effectively a new case in its infancy and all of the material tasks attendant with litigation have yet to be undertaken.  Thus, the passage of time is a result of [...]’s strategy in seeking multiple stays and the fact that the duty to defend and the Indemnity Claim are distinct and were to be litigated on separate tracks.  The motion to compel arbitration was filed less than six weeks after the most recent stay was lifted and is timely.  ii.  **Filing of Dispositive Motions (T1 71:21 - 72:3)**
[brief] Plaintiff has had so many “bites at the apple” that he’s eaten the entire orchard.  Respectfully, [...] is a nice man and a concerned father who believes he is seeking justice for his son; however, he has displayed an astounding level of incompetence in litigating this matter.  As such, based on the specific circumstances of the instant action, the Trial Court did not err in denying Plaintiff’s motion to amend with prejudice.
[brief] \(^6\)  Indeed, just last month, the District of New Jersey declined to issue a temporary restraining order against a school board policy that is substantively identical to the Original Policies here.  *Doe v. Del. Valley Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ.*, No. 24-cv-00107 (GC) (JBD), 2024 WL 706797, at *2, 13 (D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2024) (Aa17).  Relying on the precedents reviewed above, the court held that “Board Policy 5756 does not impose the kind of ‘constraint or compulsion’ that the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit have found violative of parental rights.
[brief] ”  [...] then explained, “for example, if we wanted to just completely sell out for tax ratables we’d be building warehouses all over the place like you see in Logan [Township]. ”  He added “we have been resistant to that because we have a different sense of community here and what we want the makeup of our town to be. ”  A significant part of [...]’s constituency (including [...]’s members) shared this sentiment and were heartened to hear it voiced by their elected leader.  In fact, despite outwardly expressing opposition to warehouse development, at or around this same time [...] and the Committee was actually working toward precisely that.
[brief] Again, the unamplified human voice was not explicitly prohibited and was not at issue.  While those cases all upheld the ordinances in question, none dealt specifically with the facts or issues seen in the present matter.  None dealt with a specific prohibition on the unamplified human voice as [...] seeks to now regulate.  And none addressed an argument that the ordinances were preempted.  Plaintiffs submit that those matters which all stem from municipal court decisions, based on limited facts and limited legal issues, should not inhibit this court’s review and rejection of [...]’s Noise Ordinance.
[brief] *Id.* at 210.  In so doing, the Court stated that the “initial” allocation step is the jury’s apportionment to each causative event:  Among other evidence, the defendant may rely on the plaintiff’s previous assertions in pleadings or discovery about the alleged fault of the initial tortfeasor and the damages resulting from the first causative event.  A plaintiff who previously asserted in pleadings or discovery that the initial tortfeasor was negligent may not take the opposite position at trial.  [Id. at 231 (emphasis added) (citation omitted)].  More recently, in Adams v. Yang, 475 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2023), a panel of this Court held that Glassman does not apply to joint tortfeasor situations.
[brief] On December 1, 2023, the court granted [...]’s motion for intervention and to file Cross Claims in the [...].  [...] subsequently filed an accompanying Answer with Cross Claims in the Adoni matter on December 11, 2023.  After the court granted [...] intervention by consent in the [...] on February 8, 2024, [...] again filed an Answer with Cross Claims, which was amended and filed most recently on April 17, 2024.  The Non-Compliance Order was entered in both the AAMHMT and [...]s.  Although this court denied [...]’s motion for leave to appeal in the Adoni matter, [...] maintains that the Adoni case, inasmuch as it is referenced in the trial court’s oral decision, is properly part of the record in the instant matter.  Thus, [...] respectfully submits that this court can consider [...]’s strategy of using condemnation to subvert its affordable housing obligations as part of a larger pattern.
[brief] Page CONCLUSION  ...........................................................................................................  31  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Order and Decision of Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Dated July 17, 2024……………………………………………………………..  Pa001  Statement of Reasons Under R. 1:6-2(f)…………………………………….. Pa003 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Applebaum v. Lyft, Inc.,** | 27 | | 263 F. Supp. 3d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) | | | **Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P.,** | 20 | | 219 N.J. 430 (2014) | | | **Baymont Franchise Sys. v. SB Hosp. Palm Springs, LLC,** | 25 | | No. 19-06954 (KM) (MAH), 2022 WL 2063623 | | | (D.N.J. June 8, 2022) | | | **D.M.C. v. K.H.G.,** | 19 | | 471 N.J. Super. 10 (App. Div. 2022) | | | **Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris,** | 18 | | 189 N.J. 28 (2006) | | | **Est. of Cohen ex rel. Perelman v. Booth Comput.,** | 19 | | 421 N.J. Super. 10 (App. Div. 2011) | | | **Fazio v. Altice USA,** | 21 | | No. A-2102-22, 2024 WL 3354563 | | | (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 10, 2024) | | | **Fivey v. Pa. R.R. Co.,** | 27 | | 67 N.J.L. 627 (1902) | | | **Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp.,** | 14, 15, 16, 17 | | 238 N.J. 191 (2019) | | | **Harrington v. Atl. Sounding Co., Inc.,** | 18 | | 602 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2010) | | | **Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park,** | 11, 20 | | 187 N.J. 323 (2006) | | | **Kleine v. Emeritus at Emerson,** | 30, 31 | | 445 N.J. Super. 545 (App. Div. 2016) | | | Authority | Page(s) | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | MacDonald v. CashCall, Inc., | 14 | | 883 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2018) | | | Maity v. Tata Consultancy Servs., Ltd., | 25 | | No. 19-cv-19861 (KSH) (CLW), 2021 WL 6135939 | | | (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2021) | | | McGinty v. Zheng, | 12, 15, 16, 17 | | No. A-1368-23, 2024 WL 4248446 | | | (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 20, 2024) | | | Morales v. Sun Constructors, Inc., | 26, 27 | | 541 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2008) | | | Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., | 13 | | 225 N.J. 289 (2016) | | | Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, | 19, 23 | | 189 N.J. 1 (2006) | | | Pace v. Hamilton Cove, | 18, 21, 22, 23 | | 258 N.J. 82 (2024) | | | Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, | passim | | 561 U.S. 63 (2010) | | | Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co., Inc., | 20 | | 225 N.J. 343 (2016) | | | Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, | 20, 22, 27 | | 127 N.J. 344 (1992) | | | Santana v. SmileDirectClub, LLC, | 12, 27 | | 475 N.J. Super. 279 (App. Div. 2023)
[brief] ); and N.J.S.A. 17:48F-5 (changes to charges under any contract shall be established in accordance with sound actuarial principles and shall not be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory).  On the administrative side, the adjective “excessive” itself has not been separately defined, which makes sense given that its ordinary meaning is easily ascertainable.  Separate definitions have only been created for specialized terms that incorporate the qualifier “excessive” as part of a specific concept.  See N.J.A.C. 7:9A-2.1 (defining “excessively course horizon”); N.J.A.C. 11:3-20.3 (defining “excess liability and non-excessive subsidization”); N.J.A.C. 7:22-6.4 (defining “excessive infiltration/inflow”); N.J.A.C. 13:45A-26F.2 (defining “excessive wear and tear”).  Certainly, if the Legislature saw the need to define the term “excessive,” it could have done so, but here it chose not to.
[brief] Before turning to the other federal decisions, we address that *Hunstein I* --- \(^1\) *See, e.g.*, *Shiyang Huang v. Equifax Inc.* (*In re Equifax Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.*), 999 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2021); *In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig.*, 846 F.3d 625 (3d Cir. 2017); *Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.*, 663 F. App'x 384 (6th Cir. 2016); *Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc.*, 819 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2016). and *Hunstein II* were vacated for reasons having nothing to do with whether alleging that a debt collector conveyed information about a debt to a mail vendor states a claim for the violation of § 1692c(b).  Addressing the threshold question of jurisdiction, *Hunstein I* concluded the plaintiff had standing which is necessary for an action to be a case-or-controversy over which a federal court can exercise subject matter jurisdiction.  *Hunstein II* vacated *Hunstein I* to consider the jurisdictional question following a U.S. Supreme Court decision on standing which was issued shortly after *Hunstein I*.
[directive] After having been served with process or having actual knowledge of an action affecting marriage or custody but prior to the issuance of a temporary or final order determining custody 2nd Degree $35,000 to $100,000 10% permissible and parenting time rights to a minor child, takes, detains, entices or conceals the child within or outside the State for the purpose of depriving the child’s other parent of custody or parenting time, or to evade the jurisdiction of the courts of the State; or 3.  After being served with process or having actual knowledge of an action affecting the Interference with 2C:13-4a(1-4) protective services needs of a child pursuant to Title 9 in an action affecting custody, but prior Custody to the issuance of a temporary or final order determining custody rights of a minor child, takes, detains, entices or conceals the child within or outside the State for the purpose of evading the jurisdiction of the courts of this State; or 4.
[brief] (Pb10-11).  He highlights that both he and [...] understood that his separation from employment in April 2020 was a “temporary layoff,” and that [...] advised the Division that [...] was laid off.  Ibid.  He further claims the Board erred in stating “[...] clarified there was no actual layoff” because [...] only communicated that there was “no actual layoff notice. ” (Pb13).  In any case, he claims there is no legal basis for the Board’s reliance on the fact that there was no layoff notice.  (Pb15).  [...]’s arguments fail to recognize that layoffs involve a formal process with several procedural requirements as per the Administrative Code.