ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  .................................................................................. i  LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................  1 POINT I  THE OAL INAPPROPRIATELY ADOPTED AN OAL DECISION BEYOND THE STATUTORY FORTY-FIVE DAY PERIOD IN VIOLATION OF N.J.A.C.  1:1-18.1 (OAL DECISION AT PAGE 1; Pa2a) (CSC OPINION AT PAGE 1; Pa33a)  .................................................  1 POINT II  RESPONDENT REAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF BECAUSE IT SOLELY RELIED UPON HEARSAY EVIDENCE WITHOUT THE REQUIRED RESIDUUM OF ANY COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE ULTIMATE FACTS.  (OAL DECISION AT PAGES 12, 14-16, 29; Pa12a; Pa14-16; Pa29a)  ..................................................................................................................  3  POINT III  APPELLANT’S ADMISSIONS CANNOT BE USED  SUPPLY THE REQUISITE RESIDUUM OF COMPETENT PROOF SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE DISCIPLINARY CHARGES.  (OAL DECISION AT PAGES 12, 14-16, 29; Pa12a; Pa14-16; Pa29a)  ..................................................................................................................  7  POINT IV  THE COURT FAILED TO TAKE AN ADVERSE INFERENCE AGAINST THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS FOR FAILING TO CALL THE ONLY WITNESS WHO COULD HAVE PROVIDED THE REQUISITE RESIDUUM OF COMPETENT PROOF.  (OAL DECISION AT PAGE 19; PA19A)  ...........................................9  POINT V  MR. GALES’S DISCIPLINE WAS OVERLY SEVERE AND NOT CONSISTENT WITH HIS DISCIPLINARY RECORD.  (OAL INITIAL DECISION AT PAGES 25-29; PA25A-29A)........12  CONCLUSION
[brief] *McDonough*, 588 U.S. at 118 (citing *Heck*, 512 U.S. at 484-85).  In the wake of *Heck*, courts have applied *Heck’s* deferred-accrual rule, and permitted malicious-prosecution analogous § 1983 claims to be timely filed by plaintiffs after their convictions were overturned.  *McDonough* addressed a factual scenario closely identical to this Appellant and clarified the issue of accrual of § 1983 claims by plaintiffs who had been *acquitted* in the underlying criminal proceedings, rather than *convicted* (*Heck*).  *McDonough* extended the deferred-accrual rule to the latter category, and held that, for plaintiffs who were acquitted in the underlying criminal proceeding, the statute of limitations similarly began to run. at the conclusion of the case, not its inception.
[brief] Nor can one infer from this suggestion that [...] who gave the aforementioned testimony that she felt unsafe when walking or driving through the parking lot.  This is because that direct question - whether she felt unsafe walking through the parking lot - was never posed to her.  (Pa790-Pa900).  Notably too, that direct question was never put to defendant [...] who also parked in the --- 3Conveniently, this objection to the form of the question was omitted by plaintiff in their brief at page 13 when eliciting the lay opinion testimony of eyewitness [...]. non-management employee parking area, and also had to walk that same greater distance through the lot as [...] to enter the hospital than physicians, administrators, patients visitors.  D)  **Defendant [...] Took No Action To Alter the Design of the Parking Lot.
[brief] (Pa232; Pa234; Pa530).  [...] agreed it was appropriate and within the standard of care for [...] to call [...] to discuss the strips and the patient during this telephone call between 9:58pm-10:03pm.  (Pa232).  [...], who also reviewed the strips from home during the call, did not tell [...] to arrange for an emergency C-Section at that point, but left for the hospital.  (Pa228; Pa232).  According to [...], [...] should have told the resident to move the patient to the Operating Room (OR) and expedite the delivery with anybody that was around, while [...] was on the way to the hospital.  (Pa228).  Obviously that process could not have started until after [...] and [...] concluded their telephone call at 10:03pm.  A few moments after hanging up the phone with [...], [...] noted another deceleration and told the nurse to find [...], the in house attending present in the hospital, for assistance.(Pa527; Pa232; Pa530).
[brief] (1T3-6)  After the parties had been sworn, the court began an examination of the Plaintiff.  (1T3-18)  Asked by the court whether there was a written lease, Plaintiff’s testimony was “no,” that it was an oral month-to-month lease at the rate of $1,500 per month.  (1T5-5)  Asked by the court whether from the filing of the complaint to the present, the tenant had ever “reached a zero balance,” Plaintiff’s testimony was “Nope, and she hasn’t paid since.”  (1T5-11)  Asked by the court if Plaintiff received rental assistance on Defendant’s behalf, Plaintiff admitted to having received a DCA payment in November 2022 but characterized the payment as being for “backed up rent” dating back to 2020.  (1T6-25)  Asked by the court if what was due and owing amounted to $12,000, Plaintiff’s testimony was “yes. ”  (1T7-25)  With that the court then turned to [...] for an explanation.
[brief] Rule 1:10-3 provides a “means for securing relief and allows[s] for judicial discretion in fashioning relief to litigants when a party does not comply with a judgment or order. ”  In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 221 N.J. 1, 17 (2015).  “Relief under Rule 1:10-3 . . . is not for the purpose of punishment, but as a coercive measure to facilitate the enforcement of a Court order. ”  Ridley v. Dennison, 298 N.J. Super. 373, 381 (App. Div. 1997).  The particular manner in which compliance is sought is left to the Court’s sound discretion.  Board of Education of Middletown v. Middletown Township Education Ass’n., 352 N.J. Super. 501, 509 (Ch. Div. 2001).  The Appellate Division reviews an order entered under Rule 1:10-3 under an abuse of discretion standard.  N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. State, Off. of Governor, 451 N.J. Super. 282, 296 (App. Div. 2017).
[brief] The Court issued a written opinion in conjunction with its Order.  *(Pa3-16)*.  The trial court held that the interpretation of the language of the Building Height Ordinance, specifically the meaning of the word “designed” as contained within the ordinance, ultimately rests on a legal determination by the Planning Board which is not subject to the “arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable” standard, but rather is subject to “de novo” review by the Court.
[brief] [...] argues that false testimony does not constitute fraudulent concealment.  First, this erroneous argument is irrelevant because Plaintiffs do not claim that [...] fraudulently concealed evidence by way of false testimony only.  Instead, Plaintiffs allege that [...] fraudulently concealed that [...] was a sham entity by way of letters, notices in Releases, the meeting with Plaintiff [...] in their law office, and by their failure to produce their file in discovery.  Second, [...]’s mischaracterization of the holding of Viviano is fatal to their argument.
[brief] The Trial Court also asserted that:  Plaintiff failed to provide that those named in the Amended Complaint: (i) are qualified to perform the essential function of the job (ii) were terminated or otherwise suffered an adverse employment action due to disability; and (4) that the employer thereafter sought similarly qualified individuals for that job.  Plaintiff’s complaint is silent regarding these matters. ”  (Trial Court decision, pg. 4)  (Pa6)  It is clear that the Trial Court missed the following paragraphs in Plaintiff’s amended complaint.
[directive] Americans with Act Disabilities Directive #02-24 Page 3 II.  Limitations  The Certificate only relieves the petitioner from disabilities, forfeitures, or of bars that were the result a criminal conviction.  An employer, or a licensing or regulatory entity, may have another basis or other bases for barring a petitioner from obtaining a license or certification, or from employment in a specific profession, occupation or business.  Further, the mandates in N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-7 through -12 do not apply to private employers.  III.
[directive] Juvenile's Name: Date of Order: DISPOSITION: Commitment  Juvenile committed to the JJC for a term of commanded to deliver □  Juvenile to the appropriate Reception Center to which the Juvenile committed to approved Juvenile Detention Center  Juvenile is hereby committed for the indeterminate period for not to exceed the maximum, pursuant to the provisions of until Stayed for N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44 and that this order shall be sufficient  Extended term warrant for such commitment.  days  Mandatory  N.J.S.A. DNA sample ordered pursuant to 53:1-20.20 □ days suspended  Suspended sentence  All but Violation of Deferred Disposition of
[directive] Questions regarding the Monitoring Program should be directed to the Juvenile Justice Commission’s JJDP Monitoring Unit at (609) 530-5005.  Questions regarding the content of this Directive should be addressed to the Prosecutors and Police Bureau, Division of Criminal Justice, at (609) 984- 2814.  enclosures  (2)  c: [...], Director, Division of Criminal Justice Chief of Staff  [...], Deputy Director, Operations  All County Prosecutors  [...], Superintendent, New Jersey State Police  [...], Executive Director, Juvenile Justice Commission  AAG [...], Chief, Prosecutors and Police Bureau  DAG [...], Acting Chief, Prosecutors and Police Bureau  State of New Jersey
[brief] It is wholly illogical for Plaintiff to claim that [...] transmitted “highly offensive” information to its mailing vendor when Plaintiff has disseminated this very same information to the public.  See e.g., *Bush v. Optio Solutions, LLC*, No. CV 21-1880 (GRB)(ARL), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140835, at * 7 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2021) (“More to the point, however, in this case, where plaintiff has rendered public information about the very same debt in her bankruptcy petition, it cannot be said that she was injured in any appreciable way by the communication of this information to a mailing vendor. ”).  The Trial Court thus did not err when it dismissed Plaintiff’s claim based on Public Disclosure.  **C.
[brief] To be clear, however, the court’s award of fees was proper even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiffs did not become aware of the absence of a transaction until November 2020, when [...] produced discovery.  Specifically, at that time, [...] provided Plaintiffs with: (i) a copy of the Draft LOI that [...] never signed; (ii) contemporaneous emails exchanged between [...] (or his representatives) and [...] regarding their potential transaction; and (iii) additional sworn statements confirming once again that [...] did not enter into a transaction with [...] and had nothing to do with Plaintiffs’ dispute with him.  (Pa430a ¶ 16).  Still, Plaintiffs still refused to dismiss [...] from the case.  From the time period after [...] produced discovery through the trial court’s decision on [...]’s fee motion, [...] incurred approximately $74,000 in attorneys’ fees -- an amount more than the court awarded.  Thus, under all circumstances, the court’s award of fees was proper and, in fact, it afforded Plaintiffs a substantial discount to which they were not entitled.
[brief] Counts One and Two of the Indictment charged defendant with third-degree Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1).  Count Three of the Indictment charged defendant with first-degree Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance with Intent to Distribute, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and 2C:35-5b(1).  Count Four charged defendant with second-degree Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance with Intent to Distribute, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and 2C:35-5b(9)(a).  Count Five charged defendant with fourth-degree Possession with Intent to Distribute Drug Paraphernalia, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:36-3.  [Da1-5].  Defendant appeared before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., on October 7, 2022, on a motion to suppress the warrantless search of defendant’s car pursuant to a motor vehicle stop.
[directive] Defendant Name Complaint/Indictment Number  SBI Number  Medical Information: (Please do not provide specific medical information.  Information must be limited to frequency/date of appointment only.  The nature and type of appointment should not be included.)  ☐ ☐  1.  Will the defendant need to leave the residence for regularly scheduled Yes No medical appointments/treatment?  If Yes, what is the current schedule?  ☐ ☐  2.  Will the defendant need to leave the residence for frequent medical Yes No appointments?  If Yes, what is the frequency?  ☐ ☐  3.  Does the defendant have a medical condition that may require frequent Yes No visits to the hospital emergency room?  ☐ ☐  4.  Does the defendant understand requests to leave the home to attend any Yes No medical appointments, not specified in the release order, must be made by formal application to the Court at least 5 business days prior to change, and may require documentation of proof of attendance?  Attorney Visits: ☐ ☐  1.  Does the defendant currently have any scheduled appointments to meet Yes No with his/her attorney?  If Yes, please specify:  ☐ ☐  2.  Does the defendant understand requests to leave the home to meet with Yes No his/her attorney, not specified in the release order, must be made to Pretrial Services Staff and approved at least 48 hours prior to the scheduled appointment?  Additionally, does the defendant and counsel understand that defense counsel must verify the appointment with Pretrial Services?  If Yes, defense counsel, please provide your contact information so that Pretrial Services can verify attorney visits prior to approval.  Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #19-23 (10/17/2023), CN: 12220 page 4 of 5
[brief] However, the record clearly shows that the sentencing court carefully reviewed all applicable statutory factors and properly applied them to defendant’s sentence.  Defendant first argues mitigating factors (1) and (2) – the defendant’s conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm, and the defendant did not contemplate that the defendant’s conduct would cause or threaten serious harm – should have applied.  Defendant argues that his conduct was “non-violent, and no victims were identified”, and that the sentencing court “did not consider arguments that [defendant] did not contemplate that his conduct would cause harm due to the fact that he was in the throes of an ongoing substance abuse issue. ” (Db14).  His arguments lack merit.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b).  Thus, even in the context of parole decisions, an inmate’s prison record is not the end of the inquiry, but merely a factor to be considered, as [...] did here.  The sentencing judge found that, even with the new evidence presented by defendant, the evidence as a whole supported aggravating factors three and nine.  In addressing aggravating factor three—the risk that defendant will commit another offense—[...] stressed that he had listened to the evidence, including defendant’s allocution, and could see that defendant had matured, but nonetheless felt that the risk of re-offense was not significantly different because defendant’s compliance in prison would not necessarily translate into the outside world.
[brief] (Da. 007).  Plaintiff-Appellant claims that the website did not change until September 22, 2012, some four weeks after he started his course work on August 26, 2012\(^4\).  (Plaintiff Dep. T93:2-7; T94:2-7 at Pa.93-94).  Although [...] presented evidence in discovery that the website was, in fact, updated in May 2012, for purposes of this motion, [...] accepts Plaintiff’s date of September 22, 2012 because it is not a material to the dispute.  Moreover, in addition to the website, the Graduate Student Handbook, open houses, and the mandatory first-year course “Beyond the Curriculum” all informed pharmacy students of the 3.0 GPA requirement ([...] Dep. T108:19-T109:2 at Pa. 366-67).
[brief] In this case, any data set that a New Jersey government official could have obtained would be a virtual sea of data.  There is no reason to believe that, floating in a sea of data, a New Jersey government official would “know[] on a general level that fraud is taking place and that it, and the taxpayers, are losing money. ”  *Cooper*, 19 F.3d at 942.  This is especially the case where, as Defendants must concede, there has never been a public allegation of fraud.  But, even if a New Jersey government official knew where to go in the sea of data (and they would not), they would “have difficulty identifying all of the individual actors engaged in the fraudulent activity. ”  Id.; see United States ex rel. Dig. Healthcare, Inc. v. Affiliated Comp. Servs., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 37, 49-51 (D.D.C. 2011).  Given the sheer number of RMAs and the difficulties associated with obtaining and analyzing the data, a New Jersey government official would need Relator’s help “to catch all the misbehaving parties” and identify individual wrongdoers.  Cooper, 19 F.3d at 566; see, e.g., Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 2019 WL 13039126, at *7-10 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 1, 2019), aff’d, 11 F.4th 934 (8th Cir. 2021) (public disclosure bar did not apply where audit related to isolated incident and did not identify defendant).  Relator’s complaint is not based upon or substantially similar to any rate reset data that was publicly disclosed in the news media.  4.  **Relator Is An Original Source (Ja1-3; 4T)**
[brief] The court having found she signed the PSA, the PSA included language at paragraph 40 concerning her right to be represented by counsel in reviewing and signing the agreement as well as her knowingly waiving her right to counsel.  Although the court finds that [...] did not represent her in a review of the PSA or other documents challenged, the court does find that defendant with reasonable diligence could have requested [...] to review the agreement or could have requested a referral from her to an attorney who had specialized knowledge of matrimonial law and could review it for her.  She also, with reasonable diligence, could have contacted an attorney to review the PSA directly.  [A229, Op. at 24(emphasis added)].
[brief] It is incumbent upon the Township council to draft a zoning ordinance, to create appropriate densities throughout the Township, and the Township has every right to look at an undeveloped piece of property or a developed piece of property and say what the appropriate future development of the site should be.  (T4: p38, ln 2-8)  The trial court recognized that the off-site issues cited to by the Board were, by law, outside the scope of the Board’s power.  The Township Council, not the Board, has the power to adopt zoning regulations governing appropriate densities and parking requirements.
[brief] 82 N.J. at 406.  Czachor represents a state-law departure from the federal rule.  That federal rule approves of a so-called “dynamite” instruction, first sanctioned in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), which focuses on the need to return a verdict and further directs its attention to the weak links in the chain -- the holdout juror(s) in the minority -- and questions whether the holdout(s) ought not to knuckle under, in effect, and accept the view of the majority.  Despite prior New Jersey case law to the contrary, Czachor deemed the Allen instruction to be too coercive to be used in New Jersey and mandated that a new instruction be used in future cases.
[brief] See SOMF at ¶ 13 (relying on allegation set forth in Amended Complaint and Defendants’ failure to deny).  The Unit has been used to house the superintendent ever since its original designation as a common element.  See SOMF at ¶¶ 14-15 (relying on allegations set forth in Amended Complaint and Defendants’ failure to deny).  The uncontroverted facts established by the pleadings certainly shows that notwithstanding its original designation as a ‘condominium unit,’ Unit 74 was re-designated as a ‘common element’ for housing the Condominium’s superintendent.  This use also falls within the statutory definition of ‘common element. ’  For instance, the common elements include any improvements or appurtenances exclusively reserved for “...the management, operation or maintenance of the common elements or of the condominium property. ”  See N.J.S.A. 46:8B-3d(iv).  It also includes all other improvements necessary or convenient to the existence, management or operation of the condominium property.  Id. at 8B-3d(vii).  A housing unit reserved for the condominium’s superintendent certainly falls within the scope of these definitions.  Finally, the common elements also include: “such other elements and facilities as are designated in the master deed as common elements. ”  Id. at 8B-3d(viii).  Although Section 8(e) of the Master Deed does not expressly designate Unit 74 as a common element, the uncontroverted facts show that: (1) Section 8(e) does require at least one condominium unit be designated as a common element; and (2) the Developer designated Unit 74 as a common element pursuant to Section 8(e).  All things considered, the record unquestionably demonstrates that Unit 74 is part of the Condominium’s common elements.
[brief] N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 18.  First, the legislative calendar did not list either bill in advance of committee action.  (Pa99 at ¶ 9 to Pa100).  Next, access to the State House was limited due to the pandemic.  (Pa99 at ¶ 8.)  The legislative notice regarding the Assembly committee calendar – which did, in fact, consider A. 6260 on January 6, 2022, stated: “The public may not attend the Committee meeting in person [but may participate online],” and further instructed, “If you are interested in registering your position with the Committee, please fill out the Registration Form . . . [which] must be submitted by 5:00 PM on Wednesday, January 5, 2022.
[brief] ”  Washington Const. Co. v. Spinella, 8 N.J. 212, 217–18 (1951) (internal citation omitted).  In its totality, Section 13.1 of the PSA provided as follows:  Section 13.1  **Default by Seller**.  In the event the Closing and the transactions contemplated hereby do not occur as herein provided by reason of any default of Seller, Purchaser may, as Purchaser's sole and exclusive remedy, elect by notice to Seller within ten (10) Business Days following the Scheduled Closing Date, terminate this Agreement, in which event Purchaser will receive from the Escrow Agent the Earnest Money Deposit, whereupon Seller and Purchaser will have no further rights or obligations under this Agreement, except with respect to the Termination Surviving Obligations.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event Seller closes title under, the [...], and thereupon Seller defaults in its obligation to close title under this Agreement, Purchaser shall, in addition to its termination right, shall have the right of specific performance.  Purchaser expressly waives its rights to seek damages in the event of Seller's default hereunder.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing contained in this Section 13.1 will limit Purchaser’s remedies at law, in equity or as herein provided in pursuing remedies for any breach by Seller of any of the Termination Surviving Obligations.  (Pa115).
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Helmsley v. Fort Lee, 78 N.J. 200 (1978)  ...........................................12, 17, 18  Hutton Park Gardens v. West Orange Town Council, 68 N.J. 543 (1975)  ....12  Inganamort v. Fort Lee, 62 N.J. 521(1973)  .............................................12  In re N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 221 N.J. 1 (2015) (Mount Laurel IV)  ...............1
[brief] He found that there was a public purpose for the adoption of those Ordinances.  As can be seen by reviewing the Appellant’s trial brief to [...] (Pa43), Appellant was aware that the litigation before [...] was still then pending and was aware that the issue of the “proposed exchanges” was “even legal”.  Appellant, however, chose not to intercede or participate in that litigation.  As a result, we respectfully suggest that it is estopped from attempting to allege that collateral estoppel does not apply, for the reasoning detailed herein.