ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The following questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty to one of the following first on or after or second degree crimes, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such crime, that occurred June 29, 2001: murder, aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter, vehicular homicide, aggravated assault, disarming a law enforcement officer, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, robbery, carjacking, aggravated arson by placing another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury, burglary, theft by extortion by obtaining property of another by threatening to inflict bodily injury on, or physically confine or restrain anyone or commit another offense, booby traps in manufacturing or distributing of CDS facilities, or strict liability for drug induced deaths; or that occurred on or after June 18, 2002: terrorism, or producing or possessing chemical weapons, occurred on or after January 13, 2008: biological agents or nuclear or radiological devices; or that occurred on or after August 14, 2013: first degree racketeering; or that child pornography; or that occurred on or after November 1, 2013: firearms trafficking;  1.  Do you understand that because of your plea of guilty to [Yes] [No] (List First or Second Degree Violent Crime(s) to Which Applies) NERA you will be required to serve 85% of the sentence imposed for that offense(s) before you will be eligible for parole on that offense(s)?  2.  Do you understand that because you have pled guilty to these charges the court [Yes] [No] must impose a year term of parole supervision and that term will begin as soon as you complete the sentence of incarceration?  First Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 5 years  Second Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 3 years  3.  Do you understand that if you violate the conditions of your parole supervision  [Yes]  [No] that your parole may be revoked and you may be subject to return to prison to serve all or any portion of the remaining period of parole supervision, even if you have completed serving the term of imprisonment previously imposed?  Date: Defendant: Defense Attorney: Prosecutor: Revised Form Effective 01/08/2018, Promulgated by Supplement to Directive #04-14, CN 11171
[brief] But applying Rule 4:10-2(a)’s relevancy standard to resolve disputes between the parties is precisely a trial court’s function.  This Court has clearly delineated the standard’s bounds, which are “congruent” with the standards a court must apply under New Jersey Rule of Evidence 401.  Payton, 148 N.J. at 535; see supra at 14-15.  And resolving evidentiary disputes is “an exercise that trial judges perform every day,” Schaefer v. Cedar Fair, 348 N.J. Super. 223, 239-40 (App. Div. 2002); see State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 266 (1987) (“[t]he trial court, because of its intimate knowledge of the case, is in the best position” to resolve evidentiary disputes).
[brief] If the Court decides to reach the merits of the issue notwithstanding the improper inclusion, the analysis should be conducted from the viewpoint of whether Respondent can meet his burden to show that the ballot at issue is a legal ballot and was improperly excluded, bearing the legal burdens accompanying that analysis.  E.  The Complete Lack of Compliance with Statutory Requirements by the Clerk is So Egregious it Warrants Overturning the Entire Election  Under N.J.S.A. 19:29-1(a) an election may be overturned where the misconduct shown is a result from a “degree of gross negligence or inattention to duty tantamount to purposeful conduct such as fraud or corruption.  Isolated acts of negligence or omission do not rise to the level of official misconduct.  *In re Mallon*, 232 N.J. Super. at 272.  The complete abandonment of the responsibilities by the Clerk has resulted in an election conducted without any semblance of the statutory requirements, checks and balances, or oversight mandated in fire district elections.  The Clerk, a statutory figure given specific responsibilities for conducting and overseeing elections testified that the only thing he does is “sign the paper at the end. ”  He appointed no poll workers, he conducted no canvassing with anyone, he reviewed no documents at all, and took no steps to ensure any oversight whatsoever occurred.  The example of the changed results only highlights the gross misconduct and malfeasance where the Clerk authorizes the change of results without talking to anyone, reviewing any documents, and in contravention to the advice of the attorney which he learned about by email later that day.  The entire election should be overturned and this Court should appoint a monitor to ensure that the election is properly conducted.
[brief] The State argued that [...] had demonstrated a “complete lack of remorse” through his refusal to come to court on a few occasions and “through the way he’s just sitting there, um, his body language and the fact that while the family was speaking, he even stood up and turned his back. ”  (9T13-13 to 14-4)  The court adopted the State’s argument, finding that [...] lacked remorse because he did not provide an allocution statement at sentencing and because the victim-impact testimony did not elicit the correct emotional response:
[brief] The Trial Court Erred by Awarding Punitive Damages to Plaintiffs.  (39970a-39989a).  .................................................................  45  A.  The record before the trial court did not warrant punitive damages.  (39970a-39989a).  .........................................................  46  1.  [...]’s conduct does not permit an award of punitive damages.  (39970a-39982a)..............................................  48  2.  [...]’s and [...]’s inaction does not permit an award of punitive damages.  (39982a-39989a).  .................................................................  50  B.  The award of punitive damages was excessive.  (39970a-39989a).................................................................................. 52  V.
[brief] **[...]’S D[...]GES WERE QUANTIFIED WHEN IT PAID THE PURCHASE PRICE AT THE CLOSING.  (RAISED BELOW 4T 46:22 TO 47:24). **  While [...] suffered immeasurable damages during the two (2) years that [...] and [...] shared the Property as [...] disrupted [...]’s peaceful practice of its religious observances, [...]’s monetary damages could not be quantified until [...] purchased the Share at the closing on July 7, 2022.  As with most real estate transactions, the purchase of the Property was funded by an outside source on behalf of the buyer.  In this transaction, the Purchase Price was donated by [...] and remitted on behalf of [...] to the closing agent instead of routing it through [...]’s bank account.  The Trial Court initially held that [...] did not suffer damages on the grounds that [...]’s bank statements did not show the deposit of the donation by the congregant.  While [...]’s bank statements did not reflect the donation, the Trial Court erroneously overlooked that the Closing Statement reflected this amount being paid **on behalf of** [...].  Furthermore, the Trial Court overlooked under law, a donation may be made **on behalf of** the charitable organization and does not need to be directly deposited into the charitable organization’s bank account.  Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §170(c)(2)(B), a charitable contribution is a donation or gift to, or for the use of, a qualified organization.  See 26 U.S.C. §170(c)(2)(B) (“the term “charitable contribution” means a contribution or gift to or for the use of a corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation organized and operated exclusively for religious…purposes. ”  It is undisputed that [...] directly paid the Purchase Price on behalf of [...] to the closing agent instead of routing it through [...]’s bank account.  The donation was made by way of transferring funds to the title company acting as the escrow agent for the closing\(^2\).  The Closing Statement clearly shows that it was [...], not [...], making payment to [...]. (Da 199).  The Internal Revenue Code therefore considers said payment of the Purchase Price as a donation from [...] to [...].  As such, it was [...]’s funds, not [...]’s funds, that were used to pay the Purchase Price.  E.
[brief] ....................................................................  8  St. Paul’s Missionary Baptist Church v. City of Vineland, Docket No. A-4945-06, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 839, (N.J. Sup. Ct., App. Div., July 15, 2008)  .........................................................  13  Temploy Fuedte De Vida Corp v. National Union First Ins. Co of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189 (2016)  .......................................................................................  1 Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360 (1958) .........................................................................................
[brief] He is the individual who provided the testimony in 1984 before the Board of Adjustment and he is also the individual in 1969 who wrote the article.  (Pa 66-68).  It would certainly be logical to conclude that [...] recalled facts from the 1930s more clearly in 1969 than he did in 1984.  In addition, in his 1969 article, he states that the commercial structure was then being used for a TV sales and repair shop.  Obviously, his article written contemporaneously with the then-use of the building should be given greater credence than [...]’s testimony some fifteen years later in 1984.  Somehow, in 1984, when [...] had a motive because he had a tenant that wanted to rent his building, he forgot about the interruption of the food use in 1969 and, we would submit, falsely testified under oath to the Board that the structure was always used for a food use.  (T4 at 25:4-7; 25:23-26:19; Pa 66-68; Pa 69-75).  The Court erred in accepting the 1984 testimony and in ignoring the 1969 article by the same individual that contradicted that which was testified to.  It should also be noted that the minutes do not reflect that [...] was placed under oath.  And, finally, since [...] was deceased the Court did not make these fact-findings based upon observations of a witness.  These defective findings of fact have caused the Court to make erroneous conclusions of law with regards to the issues before it.
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[brief] (Da260).  The Appellate Division reviews motions for reconsideration under the abuse of discretion standard.  *Fusco*, 349 N.J. Super. 462.  The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to “bring new or additional information to the Court’s attention which it could not have provided on the first application” not to give a dissatisfied litigant “repetitive bites at the apple. ”  *D’Atria*, 242 N.J. Super. at 401-402.  Here, Appellant voluntarily refused to appear at trial.  He declined to submit any pre-trial briefings, identify any exhibits, call, or cross-examine any witnesses.  As the Court Below made clear to Appellant, he was free to participate in the trial and could assert his Fifth Amendment rights as appropriate.  Instead, Appellant waited until after the trial he refused to appear for had concluded to list all the things that he could have raised if he bothered to appear at the trial.  Appellant raises the same list of conceptual cross-examination items on this appeal.  However, nothing presented by Appellant either on the reconsideration motion or here was something overlooked by the Court Below because Appellant never asked these questions or raised those arguments.  As such, the motion for reconsideration was properly denied.
[directive] [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  [Nie dotyczy/NA] odszkodowanie jeśli sąd stwierdzi, że osoba pokrzywdzona poniosła straty, a Pan(i) jest lub będzie w stanie wypłacić odszkodowanie?  Are you aware that you must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution?  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że jeśli pełni Pan(i) funkcję publiczną lub jest 16.  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  [Nie dotyczy/NA] urzędu publicznego, może Pan(i) być zmuszony(a) do pracownikiem rezygnacji z tej funkcji lub pracy w związku z przyznaniem się do winy?
[brief] 4.  A reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would understand that N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 requires a driver to signal a lane change when other traffic may be affected.  Defendant’s challenge to the statute as constitutionally vague as applied to changing lanes is without merit for similar reasons; namely, a person of common intelligence reading N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 in its entirety does not have to guess to understand that it applies the signaling requirement to lane changes.
[brief] 43  NEW JERSEY RULES OF EVIDENCE CITED N. J.R.E. 104 ........................................................................................................... 45 N.J.R.E. 104(c) ...................................................................................................... 43 N.J.R.E. 701 .................................................................................................................. 32, 34, 35, 39 N.J.R.E. 702 .................................................................................................................. 20 N.J.R.E. 703 .................................................................................................................. 20, 21 NEW JERSEY STATUTES CITED N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) ................................................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1) ................................................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) ................................................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) ................................................................................................. 1, 47 COUNTER-STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] The Trial Court’s Misinterpretation of the Condition Precedent and [...]’s Obligations Regarding the Estoppel Certificate.  (Raised Below: Da11-13)  The trial court’s failure to recognize the estoppel certificate’s role as a condition precedent to [...]’s obligation to close led to it conflating the purpose of an estoppel certificate with the broader concept of [...]’s due diligence rights under the PSA.  As set forth above, §13.10(a) clearly establish the provision of an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate as a condition precedent to [...]’s obligation to close under the PSA.  “Purchaser’s obligation to close title hereunder is conditioned upon any commercial tenant under the Leases delivering to Purchaser an estoppel certificate. ”  (Da211.)  The trial court, however, incongruously looked to whether the PSA provided [...] with a “right to cure” an initial non-compliant estoppel certificate.  (Da12.)  “If the parties had intended to permit the Seller to cure an initially deficient Estoppel Certificate prior to the closing date ... they could have and surely would have provided explicitly the right to cure. ”  (Id.)  In doing so, the trial court fundamentally misinterpreted the nature of [...]’s obligations, failing to recognize that no breach occurs if an estoppel certificate provided before closing is deemed non-compliant — without a breach, there is nothing to “cure” and therefore no contractual right to cure on part of [...] was necessary.  As discussed above, the PSA directly provides that [...]’s failure to deliver an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate does not constitute a default.  Instead, it is merely the absence of a condition precedent to [...]’s obligation to close under the PSA.  The PSA further underscores this point by specifying that the only remedy available to [...] in such an event is termination of the PSA and a refund of the down payment, rather than any recourse related to breach.  The trial court’s assertion that [...] had no “right to cure” a non-compliant estoppel certificate prior to the closing date is meaningless concept.  When a non-compliant estoppel certificate is produced, there is no breach to cure.  All there is, is a condition precedent that remains unfulfilled.  William no more needs to “cure” following the submission of a non-compliant estoppel certificate than it needs to “cure” prior to the submission of no estoppel certificate at all.  In both cases, there is simply a condition precedent that has not yet been met.
[brief] (Db29-30).  The second Miller factor requires courts to “take into account the family and home environment that surrounds [the offender] – and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. ”  Zuber, 227 N.J. at 445.  Here, [...] and [...] described defendant’s home environment as supportive.  Although he suffered some difficulty with his biological father, by the time of his crime, he had lived for at least ten years with his loving stepfather.  Nothing suggests any brutality from which defendant needed to extricate himself when he murdered the victims.  Thus, it is not true that “unrebutted” expert testimony shows that his actions resulted from his environment.  Defendant argues that his childhood made him “impulsive” and vulnerable to coercion, but those qualities are not related to his crime.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The Trial Court erroneously dismissed Plaintiff’s case by misapplying the discovery rule and misconstruing the facts of the case.  Plaintiffs became aware of a problem with their non-registration as a New Jersey charity when they learned of the Attorney General’s complaint on December 18, 2020.  The Plaintiffs’ first notice of harm or damage attributable to the registration problem was on April 27, 2022, when the court granted partial summary judgment in an underlying case.  Suit here was filed on August 29, 2023, or within six years of the said notice.  Therefore, the court should have never dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
[brief] ............................................................  16  **I/M/O [...], (“Belmont I”)** 2019 WL 3072695 (MA LRC) .............................................. 12, 24 **I/M/O [...], (“Belmont II”)** 2021 WL 6883936 (MA LRC) .............................................. 12-13, 24 **I/M/O [...] and [...],** 3 NJPER ¶ 323 (1977) .......................................................... 18-19 **In re Adoption of Amendments to Water Quality Management Plans,** 435 N.J. Super. 571 (App. Div. 2014), cert. denied, 219 N.J. 627 (2014) ........ 16 **In re Carter,** 191 N.J. 474 (2007) ........................................................... 15 **J.D. v. N.J. Div. of Developmental Disabilities,** 329 N.J. Super. 516 (App. Div. 2000) .................................... 16 **Lullo v. International Ass’n of Fire Fighters,** 55 N.J. 409 (1970) ............................................................. 11 Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22 (1995) .................................................. 15 [...], California P.E.R.B. Decision No. 2,485 (2016)
[brief] Exhibit A - [...] Policy............................................................Dta234  Exhibit B - [...] Policy............................................................Dta24  Exhibit C - Contractor Enrollment Form..........................................Dta946  Exhibit D - Letter Enclosing Certificate of Liability Insurance.............Dta949  Exhibit E - Certificate of Liability Insurance.....................................Dta951  Exhibit F - July 31, 2015  Email from [...]...............................Dta954  Exhibit G - CCIP Policy .................................................. Dta75  Exhibit H - CCIP Manual ..................................................
[brief] A.  KIELY PRESENTED A MERITORIOUS CHALLENGE TO THE CALCULATION OF THE WILLOW’S DAMAGES, BASED UPON PREVIOUSLY ACKNOWLEDGED CREDITS  [...] explains that the instant dispute over association dues tracks back to the allocation of credits for payments made by the Defendant, in reliance upon the association’s prior approval, for the repair of common facilities (Da154, Second [...] Cert., ¶4).  Defendant advanced $13,200.00 that the association required to replace a main sewer line serving its condominiums.  Ibid.  In addition, the Defendant advanced $500.00 for masonry repairs to the stoop outside the building.  Ibid.  These unreimbursed advances, which total $13,700.00, would have a dramatic impact upon balance as calculated by the Plaintiff.  As [...] incurred expenses on behalf of the association to repair common elements of the condominium property several years prior to the commencement of this action, his defense is not just a simple offset to the total damages calculation provided by the Plaintiff.  The allowance of credits would drastically reduce the interest charges claimed by the Plaintiff; accounting for compounded interest charged on that sum, the appropriate reduction would be of an amount greater than $60,000.00.  The Defendant should be allowed to challenge the Plaintiff’s calculation of damages based upon the credits he claims are due to him by the association.