ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff moved to dismiss the original Petition filed in the Missouri Action and that motion was heard during COVID and taken under submission by the Missouri state court.  Plaintiff never took action to notice a hearing, submit on the briefs, or otherwise seek a conference with the Missouri court, as would be customary under Missouri procedure to prompt a ruling.  Defendants later filed the First Amended Petition, (Pa105-175) and plaintiff then filed a renewed motion to dismiss on September 2, 2022.  (Pa083).  The Missouri court heard plaintiff’s renewed motion on October 7, 2022 where it promptly denied plaintiff’s motion.  (Pa177).  the opportunity to litigate its claims in the Missouri Action by (1) asserting the claims animating this case as defenses in the Missouri Action (Pa085, Pa242-247), (2) asserting cross-claims for contribution against the other five defendants in the Missouri Action (Pa085, Pa247),\textsuperscript{25} and (3) moving forward with discovery by serving comprehensive deposition notices on [...], [...], and [...].  (Pa085, Da106-123).  Allowing this case to proceed in parallel with the more comprehensive and coercive Missouri Action would place the parties in the untenable position of litigating two substantially similar lawsuits in multiple jurisdictions and cause the New Jersey judiciary to unnecessarily expend judicial resources on a complex case lacking New Jersey connections or local interest.
[brief] [...], Esq.  ID# 001711988  [...] [...] [...], [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Appellants, [...] a/k/a [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq. ID# 001711988  [...], Esq. ID# 412112023  Date of Original Submission: July 18, 2024  Date of Revised Submission: August 2, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On July 23, 2020, Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], filed a complaint (“Complaint”) against the [...] (“City”) and [...] (“[...]”) alleging violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”) through a race-based hostile work environment.  Pa1.  The City filed its answer denying Appellant’s allegations and setting forth several affirmative defenses including: affirmative defense 17 which provides “Defendant at all times conducted a diligent and prompt investigation of any claims of discrimination, harassment, hostile work environment or retaliation made by Plaintiff” and affirmative defense 21, which provides “[t]he City, at all relevant times, maintained an effective anti-harassment/discrimination policy. ”  Pa8-12.  Following discovery, the City and [...] each filed their respective motions for summary judgment to dismiss Appellant’s Complaint.  Pa13.  On March 13, 2023, the Court granted [...]’s summary judgment, but denied the City’s motion for summary judgment.  Pa254.  On April 20, 2023, the City filed its motion for reconsideration on the grounds that the trial court improperly and erroneously failed to consider the City’s affirmative defense against vicarious liability based on its anti-harassment and anti-discrimination policies enacted and enforced at the time of the incident.  Pa265.  Following oral argument on the matter, on May 19, 2023, the trial court granted reconsideration and reversed its denial of summary judgment from March 13, 2020 in favor of granting summary judgment to the City.  Pa271.  Then on June 21, 2023, Appellant filed his notice of appeal with this court.  Pa283.  **COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, RULINGS, & ORDERS BEING APPEALED  Denial of request to instruct on aggravated assault ..................  7T 106-7 to 107-6  Overruling objection to medical examiner’s testimony ...............  5T 139-4 to 7, 139-14 to 23; 7T 92-8 to 97-11  Judgment of Conviction .................................................................  Da 23-26  Sentence ......................................................................................  12T 31-15 to 38-19  INDEX TO APPENDIX
[directive] that inform the See also Section might 9 of the Deconfliction Directive (authorizing County Prosecutors to issue supplemental directives and guidelines for conducting automated  Any such deconfliction query following an deconfliction queries).  unplanned arrest but before the decision is made or for acomplaint-summons apply acomplaint-warrant may whether to issue lead to information known by another to the dangers that defendant's release might agency that is relevant pose (e.g., involvement in a gang or other Accordingly, agencies are organized criminal activities).
[directive] 1.  A criminal justice agency shall disseminate criminal intelligence information only to law enforcement or criminal investigative authorities with a right to know and a need to know the information in the performance of law enforcement duties.  2.  A criminal justice agency shall disseminate criminal intelligence information only to those agencies who have adopted these guidelines or are in another state and have adopted 28 CFR Part 23 policies or are consistent with 28 CFR Part 23.  3.  An audit trail or dissemination record is required when information is disseminated.
[brief] Scully v. Fitzgerald, 179 N.J. 114, 129 (2004) ..........................................31  State v. Dalal, 221 N.J. 601, 606 (2015) ....................................................42 State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 279 (1997) ................................................42  Town of West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962) ...............................37, 43  Administrative Cases In the Matter of [...], [...], OAL DKT. NO. [...], 2009 WL 1425165, at p.4-5 (May 15, 2009)
[brief] The second day of testimony in this action commenced with cross-examination at about 9:15am on November 30, 2022.  (3T. Pg. 13, lines 9 and 20-21).  Very quickly, [...] began to feel that Counsel for [...] was badgering him and [...] was not doing anything to prevent it.  Specifically, [...] stated to [...], he’s being badgered by [...]’s counsel and she’s allowing it.  (3T Pg. 29, line 12).  He pleaded, “[D]on’t let him badger me” (3T, pg. 29, line 23).  He stood up for himself, since she wouldn’t, saying, “I will not be badgered on this witness stand, ma’am. ” (3T, pg. 30, lines 1-2).  And he repeated that she is allowing the badgering.  (3T, pg. 30, lines 5-8).  And he pointed out that she even overruled his attorney’s objections regarding the badgering and it is happening again (3T, pg. 32, lines 10-11).  After more back and forth of this nature, [...] finally asked the Jury to leave the courtroom at about 9:35, after only about 20 minutes of testimony, (Tr. 3T, Pg. 34, line 3) and [...] made it clear to Judge Grass-Jones that he again felt that she was biased against him; he stated, “you’re allowing him to badger me.  You’re biased against me, and you’re continuing to allow it. ” (3T, Pg. 34, lines 19-21).  And in case he wasn’t clear the first time, [...] repeated the allegation just a short time later, telling [...], “you’re biased. ”  3T, Pg. 35, line 21).  Not long after, [...] told the Judge that he was being “harassed. ”  (3T, Pg. 41, line 15).  The following day, following the event with the sheriff, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section, [...] again informed [...] that he was being “harassed constantly” in her courtroom.  (4T, Pg. 107, lines 23-24).  After the weekend, on December 5, 2022, [...] formally requested a mistrial because [...] had not recused herself.
[brief] ”  Pb16 (quoting Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 135 F.R.D. 101, 104 (D.N.J. 1990)).  That statement is not the law in New Jersey, which treats relevance under Rule 4:10-2(a) as “congruent” with the standard under Rule of Evidence 401, i.e., “a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. ”  R.L. v. Voytac, 402 N.J. Super. 392, 408 (App. Div. 2008), rev’d on other grounds 199 N.J. 285 (2009); see Db14-15.  Plaintiffs’ proposition is not even the law in federal courts.
[brief] Here, plaintiff was stopped without probable cause, severely beaten and arrested.  The choking and kneeling in the plaintiff’s rib were sadistic acts inflicted with malice to cause harm.  [...] stated in his report (but failed to provide the body cam) that the Plaintiff was on the ground who then “tightened his body and put his arms under himself, making it difficult to pull his arms behind his back” to avoid being handcuffed.  (Pa022).  [...] then claims that despite plaintiff allegedly trying to hide his arms under himself to prevent the handcuffs, plaintiff somehow used the ground to push his body up and that each hand had a key that was sticking out that could be used as a weapon, causing the Officer to punch plaintiff in the left side to “soften up” the plaintiff.  (Pa023).  Really?  How did the plaintiff manage to raise his body without placing his hands on the ground?  Based on [...]’s report that did not add up, plaintiff who posed no threat and was already on the ground when he was choked and beaten, was subjected to excessive force.
[brief] 7.  The Board finds that if the variances were granted that they would create a substantial detriment to the public good.  The variances would create a use that is more intense than permitted under the VC-2 Overlay standards which are applicable to this Property.  There is a presence of nonresidential uses in this area, and those properties would suffer a substantial detriment due to the more intense proposed use of the Property.  Therefore, the Board finds that the Applicant has not shown that the variances can be granted without a substantial detriment to the public good and finds that the variances if granted would cause a substantial detriment to the public good.
[directive] Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option appropriate for such lawful use that it may have, while on or in educational institution without prior written authorization, fourth degree.  2C:39-5(a-j)  Unlawful Possession (continued) of Weapons (continued)  (3)  Possesses any imitation firearms while on or in educational institution without prior written authorization, or while on any school bus, irrespective of whether he possesses a carry permit or a firearms purchaser identification card, disorderly persons.  4th Degree  $1,000 to $2,500  10% permissible f.  Possesses an assault firearm without a license, second degree.  j.  A violation of subsections a., b., c. or f. by a person who has a prior conviction under 2C:43-7.2 (No Early Release Act), first degree.  77  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] This fact supports that he does in fact have a substance abuse issue.  The trial’s conclusion is also legally incorrect: it cannot be that any drug deal that is undertaken for profit satisfies the finding of this factor.  If so, almost every drug distribution charge would allow for a finding of this factor, as, by definition, money is made by the dealer.  This outcome would undermine the purposes of aggravating factors, which is identify "individual circumstances which distinguish the particular offense from other crimes of the same nature."  State v. Yarbough, 195 N.J. Super. 135, 143 (App. Div. 1984), mod. 100 N.J. 627 (1985).
[brief] STATUTES:  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1,2,4,6 7,9,10 17,18 N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1,7,18 N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2,8,12 N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10,11 N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10  N.J.S.A. 47:1-3(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(g) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] New Jersey also recognizes joint-employer liability.  “As held in Carrier Corp. v. N.L. R.B., 768 F.2d 778, 781 (6 Cir.1985), when two or more employers exert significant control over the same employees, that is, where they share in the determination of matters governing essential terms and conditions of employment, they are considered ‘joint employers’ within the meaning of the NLRB. ”  Commc'ns Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Atl. Cty. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 250 N.J. Super. 403, 415-17, (Ch. Div. 1991) (citing Note, “Joint Employer,” 18 Rutgers L.J. 863 (1987)).  “Whether that kind of joint control is actually being exercised is usually a factual question. ”  Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481, (1964); see also, Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295, 329 (D.N.J. 2005) (“whether a person or corporation is an employer or joint employer is essentially a question of fact”).  In this case, not only did [...] reserve a contractual right to set a specific term or condition of employment for [...] workers, it also retained the ultimate authority on all conditions/terms of employment of [...] workers.
[brief] ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------| | **313  Jefferson Tr., LLC v. Mercer Ins. Cos.,** | 17 | | 2018 WL 316972 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 8, 2018) | | | **Allstate Ins. Co. v. Meloni,** | 22 | | 98 N.J. Super. 154 (App. Div. 1967) | | | **Am. Policyholders' Ins. Co. v. Portale,** | 29 | | 88 N.J. Super. 429 (App. Div. 1965) | | | **Am. Wrecking Corp. v. Burlington Ins. Co,** | 37 | | 400 N.J. Super. 276 (App. Div. 2008) | | | **Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein,** | 21 | | 115 N.J. 599 (1989) | | | **Caldwell Trucking PRP Grp. v. Spaulding Composites, Co,** | 18 | | 890 F. Supp. 1247 (D.N.J. 1995) | | | **Chen v. Vigilant Ins. Co.,** | 20 | | 2009 WL 2341444 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 31, 2009) | | | **Cruz-Mendez v. ISU/Ins. Servs.,** | 17 | | 156 N.J. 556 (1999) | | | **Crystal Point Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Kinsale Ins. Co.,** | 17, 18 | | 251 N.J. 437 (2022) | | | **Ferguson v. Travelers Indem. Co.,** | 18 | | 2014 WL 3798524 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 4, 2014) | | | **First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lawson,** | 20, 22, 24, 29 | | 177 N.J. 125 (2003) | | | **First State Underwriters v. Travelers Ins. Co,** | 27 | | 803 F.2d 1308 (3d Cir. 1986) | | | **Fisher v. N.J. Auto Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n,** | 21 | | 224 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 1988) | | | **Formosa v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S.,** | 29 | | 166 N.J. Super. 8 (App. Div. 1979) | | | **Guilford v. First Am. Title Ins. Co.,** | 28 | | 2012 WL 3030250 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 26, 2012) | | | **Hoffman v. Asseenontv.Com, Inc.,** | 35 | | 404 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 2009) | | | **Huggins v. Aquilar,** | 40 | | 246 N.J. 75 (2021) | | | **In re Tri-State Armored Servs., Inc,** | 20, 23, 24, 30 | | 332 B.R. 690 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2005) | | Indem. Ins. Co. v. Caltagirone, 119 N.J. Eq. 491 (1936)
[brief] **  In 2018, [...] became ill and sought to sell his Share in the Property instead of donating it to [...].  [...] commenced negotiations with [...] in August 2018 to purchase his Share.  [...] made a demand in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000) for his Share.  (1T 25:13-23).  In furtherance of its desire to purchase the Share, [...] orders a Title Report in August 2018 which indicates that a lien existed on the Property.  (Da145) (1T 26:1-13).  While [...] was addressing the issue with the lien, the [...] began secret negotiations with [...] in November 2018.  (2T 184:7-18).  For the next nine (9) months, the [...] act in direct contravention to their fiduciary duties as directors of [...]:
[brief] The detectives also noticed that there was powder residue, believed to be CDS, coating the floor and other surfaces of the apartment.  (9T90-1 to 4).  In the kitchen, the detectives observed: baking soda, Pyrex containers with a powder substance, a scale with a powdery substance on it, knives and razor blades covered with a white powdery substance, zip-lock bags, plastic bags, and rubber gloves.  (9T90-19 to 22).  A search of the kitchen cupboards revealed large rock-like substances in plastic bags, which the officers suspected to be cocaine.  (9T91-6 to 13).  The kitchen did not contain any food or silverware.  (9T91-14 to 92-1).  Additionally, when detectives first entered the apartment, they observed a rifle and a handgun in the closets.  (9T92-6 to 9).  The detectives completed the search at approximately 2:15 a.m. on April 22, 2009.  (9T101-5 to 9).  Approximately eleven hours later, at 1:53 p.m., the hallway camera recorded defendant exiting the apartment.
[brief] Dear Judges:  Pursuant to R.2:6-2(b), please accept this letter brief in support of my appeal in this matter.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..........................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..............................................................  2 STATEMENT OF FACTS ...............................................................  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  1  THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT TERRI BAIRD PLACED A TRAP ON MURRAY ROAD - A REQUIRED ELEMENT OF THE EACH OF THE VIOLATIONS OF WHICH THE COURT CONVICTED HER (RAISED BELOW DA 7A)  POINT 2 .........................................................................................  6  EACH OF THE FIVE SUMMONSES  THE CONVICTIONS OF WHICH FORM THE BASIS OF THIS APPEAL ALLEGE  A VIOLATION OF EITHER CHAPTER 173 OR CHAPTER 201 OF THE CODE OF THE TOWNSHIP OF EAST HANOVER AND CEASED TO BE VIABLE DUE TO THE SUNSET PROVISION CONTAINED IN CHAPTER 44 OF THE CODE (RAISED BELOW DA 6A)
[brief] “Da” refers to defendant’s appendix.  “PSR” refers to the presentence report.  The transcript volumes correspond to the following dates:  1T -- September 15, 2022 (trial)  2T -- September 19, 2022 (trial)  3T -- September 20, 2022 (trial)  4T -- September 21, 2022 (trial)  5T -- September 22, 2022 (trial)  6T -- September 26, 2022 (trial)  7T -- September 27, 2022 (trial)  8T -- October 27, 2022 (motion)  9T -- December 15, 2022 (sentencing) detective, which opined on [...]’s guilt and credibility.  (Da 21-35)  In particular, this Court held that it was error to permit the jury to hear the detective’s opinions that (1) [...] was guilty of the shooting death of the victim and had an obligation to explain himself; (2) [...] was lying about his alibi; and (3) surveillance video contradicted [...]’s alibi.  (Da 21-35)  Between September 15 and 27, 2022, a second jury trial was held again before [...], after which the jury found [...] guilty of counts one and two.  (1T to 7T; 7T 7-1 to 23; Da 46)  The jury acquitted of count three, and count four was again dismissed.  (7T 7-24 to 8-1; Da 46, 62)  On October 27, 2022, [...] heard and denied defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial.  (8T)  On December 15, 2022, [...] merged count two into count one and sentenced [...] on count one to life in prison with a period of parole ineligibility of sixty-three years and nine months pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.  (9T 36-15 to 56-20; Da 59-62)  On January 18, 2023, [...] filed a timely notice of appeal.  (Da 63-66)  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Because the Court Properly Found that [...] Owed No Duty to [...] Arising Out of the Underlying Litigation, [...] Cannot Succeed with His Bad-Faith-Based Counterclaims  For similar reasons, [...] cannot show that he can succeed with his bad-faith-related counterclaims.  The basis for bad faith claim is that [...] lacked a reasonable basis for refusing to provide a defense and indemnity.  (Pb29-30).  As discussed above, [...]’s basis for refusing to continue to defend [...] is supported by the facts and law of this case.  POINT 8 - The Trial Court Adequately Stated Its Reasons for Granting Summary Judgment  [...] also asks this Court to remand this matter to the trial court so that it can provide a more comprehensive statement of the reasons for its decision.  (Db, p. 32).  Specifically, [...] is critical of the trial court’s failure to address all of [...]’s contentions and further contends the trial court did not make clear which allegations in the underlying complaint were found to fall within which exclusion of the Policy.  (Db, p. 32).  While the trial court’s opinion may not be comprehensive, it provides adequate notice of the basis for relief.  The trial court held that allegations in the pleadings fall within the exclusions in the Policy.  1T:22:21-23:6.  While the trial court did not call out a specific allegation that brings the allegations within the exclusion, the pleadings are replete with allegations that [...] intended to injure the [...].  Moreover, the only remaining claim in the underlying action requires a showing of intent to injure.  Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 751.  Put another way, if the trial court’s order is deficient, it in no way hampers this Court’s ruling on appeal.  These issues are thoroughly briefed, and it would waste judicial resources to remand.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Ibid.  Based on the changes in the FY2018 Appropriations Act, and because [...]’s original proposed aid amount was greater than its uncapped amount under the SFRA — in essence overfunding — [...]’s FY2018 actual K-12 State aid was $8.4 million less than the actual aid it received in FY2017.\(^{11}\) (Aa1108-09; Aa1459; Aa1872).  The FY2019 budget included an overall increase in K-12 aid of $351 million over FY2018.  (Aa1118; Aa1460; Aa1875).  As part of the ongoing effort to address funding inequities, the FY2019 Appropriations Act established a comparison between the actual formula aid that a district received in the prior year and the amount that it should have received before aid growth caps were applied or adjustment aid calculated (uncapped aid).
[directive] Complaints against a law enforcement executive, or a member of the executive’s senior management team, may originate from a member of the public or from an employee of the agency.  All such complaints shall be documented and referred to the County Prosecutor for review.  If the subject of the Internal Affairs investigation is the Police Chief, Police Director, Sheriff or Head of Internal Affairs, either the County Prosecutor or the Attorney General’s Office shall handle the investigation.  The investigation may involve any type of alleged employee misconduct, as described in Section 4.1.3, and shall be conducted pursuant to INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 20 Section 6 (Investigation of Internal Complaints).
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  THE ISSUE ON APPEAL IS WHETHER DEFENDANT BREACHED ITS DUTY, NOT WHETHER A DUTY EXISTS.  The trial court erred – and defendant’s argument errs – by relying on Sanner v. Ford Motor Company and Huddell v. Levin for the immaterial proposition that a manufacturer is not “under a duty” to provide every safety device or to produce an accident-proof product.  The controlling issue is whether the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product – here a motor vehicle – could have been reduced or avoided by adoption of a reasonably safer design and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe.  *Green v. General Motors Corp.*, 310 N.J. Super. 507, 517 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 381 (1998); Model Jury Charge (Civil) 5.40D-3 “Design Defect” (Apr. 1999).
[brief] 11  POINT I BECAUSE THE JURY WAS NOT INSTRUCTED ON THE OBJECTIVE “REASONABLE VICTIM” STANDARD, WHICH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED IN TERRORISTIC THREATS  PROSECUTIONS  UNDER STATE V. FAIR, THE DEFENDANT’S TERRORISTIC THREATS CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below)  ...........................................................................................................  11  TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D)