ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Part of the URL included by this Court in Martinez has been redacted per the case manager’s deficiency notice. returned to his car, so the subsequent probable cause did not develop under unforeseeable and spontaneous circumstances.  In *State v. Gilliard*, 2024 WL 502337 (App. Div. Feb. 9, 2024), an officer was monitoring an area where a shooting had occurred the night before, saw the defendant engaged in “suspicious behavior,” including appearing to be “gripping” something, and then get into a car, which another officer stopped.  *Id.* at *1-2*.  The circumstances were not unforeseeable and spontaneous but were instead “‘deliberate,’ and ‘orchestrated[,]’” “based on the ‘sequence of interconnected events’ that began” when the officer who had seen the defendant get into the car radioed other officers so that they could stop the car.  *Id.* at *7-8* (quoting *Smart*, 253 N.J. at 172).  Here, as in *Gillard*, the investigatory stop of [...] next to his car leading to probable cause was deliberate and orchestrated by police because of their suspicions from their observations earlier that evening.  Finally, in *State v. Martinez*, 2023 WL 6460945 (App. Div. Oct. 4, 2023), police got a tip describing the defendant’s drug-sale activity and his car, surveilled the location, saw what they believed to be a drug transaction by the defendant, and searched the car.  *Id.* at *6*.  This Court wrote that the tip, surveillance, and suspected drug transaction “demonstrate the circumstances that gave rise to probable cause were foreseeable. ”  *Ibid.*  The circumstances were also not spontaneous, “but rather show police reasonably anticipated finding drugs in defendant’s vehicle. ”  Ibid.  Here, as in Martinez, the officers saw what they believed to be a narcotics transaction involving [...] and his car, so they surveilled the car and ultimately searched it because they anticipated finding evidence of narcotics distribution.  So, as in Martinez, the circumstances giving rise to probable cause were not unforeseeable or spontaneous.  These cases show that where police have suspicions about potential contraband in a car before the stop and search, courts have applied the unforeseeable and spontaneous requirement and suppressed evidence.  Here, as explained above and in [...]’s initial brief, the circumstances giving rise to probable cause were foreseeable and not spontaneous.  An experienced narcotics officer was surveilling a parking lot known for narcotics activity, saw what he believed to be narcotics activity, and radioed his partners to surveil [...]’s car and stop [...] for involvement in narcotics activity.  The only constitutionally permissible reason to undertake these actions would be because the police had reasonable suspicion that [...] was involved in narcotics distribution using his car.  But given those suspicions that pre-dated the search of [...]’s car, the State cannot now claim that the circumstances giving rise to probable cause were unforeseeable and spontaneous.  This Court should reverse the denial of the motion to suppress.
[brief] The compelling interest in eradicating discrimination is particularly clear in cases involving discrimination against transgender students, especially when the action involves “notification” that they “specifically request[ed]” not occur.  (Da132).  The State always has a “compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors,” Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 528 (3d Cir. 2018), which includes transgender students, who are already facing “extraordinary social, psychological, and medical risks,” id. at 529-29; see also N.J. Pub. L. 2018, c.60 § 1 (a), 1(g) (noting that transgender individuals “face considerable challenges in society, including discrimination, harassment, physical abuse, and social isolation,” and are at heightened risk of “mistreatment, including physical or sexual assault, between kindergarten and grade 12, due to their being out or perceived as transgender”).
[brief] THE MOTION JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY GRANTING DEFENDANT’S FEE ON ISSUES DEFENDANT DID NOT PREVAIL ON (Pa667-68).  A trial court should decrease a requested fee award if the prevailing party achieved limited success in comparison to the relief sought in the litigation.  Walker v. Giuffre, 209 N.J. 124, 130-33 (2012).  In determining the reasonableness of an attorneys' fee award, the threshold issue "is whether the party seeking the fee prevailed in the litigation."  N. Bergen, supra, 158 N.J. at 570.  In that regard, the party must establish that the "'lawsuit was causally related to securing the relief obtained; a fee award is justified if [the party's] efforts are a necessary and important factor in obtaining the relief.'"  Ibid. (quoting Singer v. State, 95 N.J. 487, 494, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984).  Here, Defendant’s Fee Application sought an award of fees in the amount of: $6,897.00 for unsuccessfully moving to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint (Pa887-88); $33,291.22 for engaging in discovery and providing Plaintiff with financial information relating to [...] to which he was entitled pursuant to the Operating Agreement and LLC Act (Pa889-93); and $5,263.00 in fees and costs for unsuccessfully opposing Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint (Pa894).  If the trial court was inclined to grant Defendant’s Fee Application, any award should be reduced by $45,451.22 for fees and costs that Defendant purportedly incurred relating to issues she did not prevail on.  Therefore, the trial court’s decision to grant Defendant’s Fee Application in the amount of $119,256.40 should be reversed.
[brief] ” (Pa001-023).  Plaintiff did not immediately serve defendants with the Complaint and Jury Demand in this case.  (Pa082).  Nor did plaintiff advise defendants or their counsel of the New Jersey Action.  Id.  Instead, counsel for plaintiff arrived in St. Louis on May 16, 2017 and attempted to attend the scheduled informational and settlement meeting under the guise of accepting defendants’ invitation to work towards a potential resolution in good-faith and without resort to formal litigation.  *Id.*  When confronted by defendants’ counsel prior to the start of the meeting, plaintiff’s counsel confirmed that this case had been filed, stating that it was a “placeholder. ”  *Id.*  Plaintiff’s counsel ultimately did not attend the May 16, 2017 meeting.  (Pa082).  On June 21, 2017, plaintiff served defendants with the Complaint.  *Id.*  Plaintiff was and still is the only company to file a lawsuit against defendants relating to the Special Undertaking Contracts.  **III.
[directive] Reporting to County Prosecutor  9.10.1  On a quarterly basis, every law enforcement agency shall report internal affairs activity to the County Prosecutor on an internal affairs summary report form attached as Appendix K (The fillable form may be found on the Attorney General’s website).  Each County Prosecutor will provide those law enforcement agencies—including municipal police departments—in their jurisdiction with instructions on completing the forms, and a reporting schedule.  9.10.2
[brief] *Zuber*, 227 N.J. at 439 (quoting *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 569).  *Zuber* also adopted the Supreme Court’s holding that a sentence of life without parole is a particularly harsh punishment for a juvenile because it “‘means denial of hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial,’” and because “‘[u]nder this sentence a juvenile offender will on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender. ’”  Id. at 442 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 70-71).  Zuber then discussed how, under Supreme Court precedent, the inherent developmental shortcomings of youth undermine the purposes of punishment (retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), making life without parole for a juvenile offender permissible only in extremely limited circumstances.
[brief] It has been providing "safe, proper and adequate service" with salutary environmental effects for over a decade, and is capable of continuing for many more years.  It is, in fact, capable of providing that quality of service for [...]'s anticipated demand on its system in this area.  It can do that without any emissions at all.  But its defect as far as [...] is concerned is that it will not serve the higher transportation pressures that would allow the 16-inch pipe to transport more gas, and it is thus acting as a capacity limitation.
[directive] EARLY WARNING AND INTERVENTION RESPONSIBILITIES  A.  Department Responsibilities  1.  This Department will, either in response to observed warning signs of domestic violence behavior or at the request of an officer, provide non-punitive avenues of assistance to officers, their partners, and other family members.  2.  This Department will encourage officers to take personal responsibility in seeking referrals and assistance, confidential or otherwise, and assistance from the Department or on their own initiative to prevent a problem from escalating to the level of criminal conduct.  -3-  3.  When this Department is aware that an officer is undergoing a separation or divorce, or that an officer is otherwise undergoing a high conflict period with a spouse or intimate partner, and the officer is exhibiting any of the warning signs of domestic violence behavior, the Department will encourage the officer to seek individual counseling.  4.  This Department will investigate reports of domestic violence reported by family members or other officers.  5.  The Department, either in response to observed signs of domestic violence behavior or at the request of an officer, will refer the officer to Employee Assistance.
[brief] In State v Smith, 251 N.J. 244, 263-264, 276 A. 3rd 1114 (2022) the court stated that: a statute must “give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden.  A defendant should not be obliged to guess whether his conduct is criminal.  Nor should the statute provide so little guidance to the police that law enforcement is so uncertain as to become arbitrary. ”  Brown v. Newark, 113 N.J. 565, 577, 552 A.2d 125 (1989) (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Lee, 96 N.J. 156,  That principle holds true for motor vehicle laws like N.J.S.A. 39:3-74, which, again, we presume to be written "in language that can be easily grasped by the public so that every motorist can obey the rules of the road."  Scriven, 226 N.J. at 34, 140 A.3d 535.  The law is unconstitutionally vague because a person of ordinary intelligence must guess at the meaning of the word, “prominent. ”  In the event this Court overturns the verdict and finds that [...] is not potentially dangerous, the tattoo issue technically could become moot.  Normally, due to the need to conserve judicial resources, courts are reluctant to render decisions in the abstract.  Matter of J.I.S. Indus. Serv. Co. Landfill, 110 N.J. 101, 104-05, 539 A.2d 1197, 1199 (1988).  However, this Court has authority to resolve issues concerning “important matters of public interest,” Reilly v. AAA Mid-Atl. Ins. Co. of N.J., 194 N.J. 474, 484, 946 A.2d 564 (2008), or matters that are "likely to reoccur but capable of evading review," Zirger v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 144 N.J. 327, 330, 676 A.2d 1065 (1996).
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[brief] ”  (1T31-21, 1T32-6)  Expressing its uncertainty as to which of the two figures was correct, the court ruled that it would give [...] the opportunity to repay the lower figure.  (1T32-23)  It then entered Judgment for Possession in the amount of $8,000.00.  (1T32-24, Da25)  On April 2, 2024, [...], on a motion for reconsideration, appeared before the court prepared with additional rent receipts which she hoped would show that even without accounting for cash payments she not only had a zero balance but that Plaintiff still owed her a rent credit.  (2T9-18)  The court summarily refused to entertain the motion, reasoning that “a full blown trial” had already been conducted.
[brief] (Pa478).  Staffing coordinators could not assign charge pay to themselves, meaning that [...] needed others to participate in this scheme for her to obtain the extra pay.  (Pa233 at 29:13-21).  [...] agreed to add charge pay, despite never having received direct approval from [...].  (Pa478).  Indeed, [...] never even spoke to [...] about charge pay.  (Pa363 at 84:15-17).  On September 1, 2020, [...] discovered the unauthorized charge pay and alerted [...] that [...], [...], and [...] were receiving charge pay.
[brief] Respondents’ Dilatory Conduct Should Have Precluded Disqualification (220a – 222a). **  The unexplained and unreasonable delay in filing the Disqualification Motion should have precluded disqualification pursuant to the doctrine of laches and waiver.  Respondents waited to disqualify [...] after significant discovery was exchanged and *after* arbitration and trial dates were set.  Clearly, Respondents had no issue with this purported conflict until it suited their strategic needs.  The doctrine of laches is invoked to deny a party enforcement of a known right when the party engages in an inexcusable and unexplained delay in exercising that right to the prejudice of the other party.
[brief] As set forth in Plaintiffs’ initial Brief and the Certification of [...], [...] has a much higher percentage of single-family homes than other communities in Middlesex County and in New Jersey.  Because minorities (specifically African-American and Hispanic) comprise a disproportionate percentage of residents in low-income multi-family housing, it follows that the number of minority residents in Monroe would be disproportionately low.  By failing to allow the development of a multi-family residential development with an affordable housing component, the Defendants have taken actions resulting in discrimination against classes protected by the NJLAD.
[brief] That legislative judgment, codified in Chapter 375, provided that the Commissioner of the Department of Banking and Insurance could promulgate regulations mandating such benefits for reproductive health, so long as he first conducted a study and issued a report to the Legislature and Governor demonstrating that such regulations are necessary.  In that way, the 219th Legislature revised the previous requirements in a way that reflected its own policy priorities.  Put another way, so long as it complied with the constitutional requirements for enacting legislation – which it did – the 219th Legislature was free to enact this landmark statute unimpeded by any procedural restrictions purportedly imposed by its predecessors. \(^{12}\)  Petitioners point to *In re Miller*, 122 N.J.L. 176 (Sup. Ct. 1939), but that case does not help them here.
[brief] 2C:11-3a(3) (count three); first-degree robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1), (2) and (3) (count four); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (count five); and second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 and N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (count six).  (Da 1-3)¹  Codefendant [...] was charged separately with an additional count of unlawful possession of a handgun (count seven).  (Da 3)
[brief] The Supreme Court provided that “In determining whether construction of [...] is consistent with the Highlands Act’s ‘goals and purposes,’ see N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11), it will be necessary to consider the circumstances of the project…”  In re Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station (CS327), 258 N.J. 312 (2024), emphasis added.  Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court intended for the [...] and this Court to fully consider and account for the totality of the circumstances surrounding the project, including its contribution to the ongoing climate crisis.  The [...] erred when it issued the HAD without any consideration or accounting of the project’s impact to Highlands resources due to its emissions of air pollutants and contributions to global climate change.  The legislative intent evinced by the term “consistent with the goals and purposes of this act” was to broadly cast a wide net over all of the project’s impacts to the environmental resources in the Highlands, including impacts attributable to sprawling development and global warming.
[brief] Da36, ¶ 102.  More egregious, on the evening of Saturday, February 18, 2023, while Plaintiff was home with his wife and son, [...] sent an armed guard to Plaintiff’s house to hand deliver a packet of these letters, purporting to be a list of clients who had “chosen” to stay with the Firm, and threatening Plaintiff not to contact any of them.  Id., ¶ 103, with Da153.  Defendant [...] took this action to intimidate and threaten Plaintiff, and Plaintiff’s wife was alarmed by the presence of an armed guard at their home.  Da36, ¶ 104.  Plaintiff also learned that [...] sent an internal email to Defendants’ employees after Plaintiff’s termination instructing them not to provide any information to Plaintiff regarding his clients, including their contact info and case status.
[brief] Whether that information is credible or not, and -- one might infer, as the defense does, perhaps, that this is -- that there is connivance on the part of the detective in this situation or not, whether it is or it isn’t again, it is such an egregious mis -- egregious carelessness.  And not only that.  Even if not deliberate, certainly that information, that assertion that he simply forgot the login information, it’s simply not reliable.  I don’t find it to be reliable.  And why is that?  Because the cell phone extraction of [...], the phone with which [...] maintains that he used to create the profile, none of the information used to create the profile, including the email address purportedly used, was recovered from the phone.  That illustrates and demonstrates the significance of this evidence, and the significant extreme prejudice to [...] to go to trial without having the benefit of this profile information to cross-examine [...].
[brief] Under a series of landmark decisions, beginning with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment requires that children be treated differently than adults at sentencing.  Most recently, the Court held that children may not receive a sentence of life without parole except in the rarest of cases where the juvenile offender is found to be incorrigible.  Miller, 567 U.S. 460.  This decision was made retroactive, requiring a resentencing for any juvenile offender serving a mandatory life-without-parole sentence for homicide.  Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016).
[brief] A.  The Orders Did Not Resolve All Claims as to All Parties .......................34  B.  The Trial Court Failed to Analyze Whether Either Order Should Be Certified as a “Final Judgment” .................................................................36  C.  The MCS-90 Endorsement Obligates an Insurer Only to Pay a “Final Judgment,” which the April 6, 2023 Order Granting Summary Judgment against [...] Was Not .................................................................37  CONCLUSION
[brief] The testimony regarding the text message exchange was presented in support of the charges against [...].  The facts presented to the grand jury before and after the contested testimony gave rise to a reasonable inference that [...] had lured [...], given the fact that she lied to police on numerous occasions and had reset her phone in an effort to subvert the investigation.  (GJT20-15 to 28-9).  Regardless, the contested testimony did not lead the grand jury to a determination it would not otherwise have reached.  In addition to the evidence linking defendant to the crime—e.g., the GPS location of his phone matching the surveillance, [...]’s and [...]’s statements, and the recovery of the .40 caliber handgun that matched the ballistics evidence at the scene (GJT29-14 to 42-13)—[...] testified that multiple shots were fired from two guns, (GJT14-9 to 15-23; GJT42-22 to 43-4), a pursuit preceded the shooting, (GJT18-14 to 20), and defendant would always say “I have a .40 for you,” (GJT39-24 to 40-4).
[brief] Almost none of them had any material relation to the case, but many were significantly prejudicial.  Specifically, the State elicited the following evidence: that [...] had a flare gun on his lap when he was discovered, (4T99-24 to 100-6, 101-16 to 20); that police found shotgun shells, a speed loader, brass knuckles, knives, and “assorted other items” in the trunk of his car, (5T103-8 to 25); and that a mask, security badge, gun holster, marijuana, and a firearm purchaser identification card in someone else’s name were also recovered from the car, (6T55-9 to 18, 57-25 to 58-1, 74-15 to 20).
[brief] See generally Miller v. Americollect, Inc., 2022 WL 20470401 at *8-10; [...] Decision and [...] Transcript.  It ignores that Congress wrote those provisions of the FDCPA into the statute out of concern for communications that would embarrass a consumer or harm his or her reputation—not to prohibit the use of service providers.  It ignores other provisions in the statute that permit the use of service _____________________  [...], [...] (Sup. Ct. June 15, 2023), at pp.23-24 (rejecting the FDCPA claim under letter vendor theory of liability, finding that deciding that the use of a letter vendor as a violation of the FDCPA is a “hypercritical analysis, …, of the statute, and, therefore, it does not constitute a violation of the statute on its face. ”); [...] v. [...], et.al., [...] (Sup. Ct. June 26, 2023), at pp.5-13 (“to ignore the reality that debt collectors employ letter vendors to prepare correspondence necessary for their lawful operations and, in effect, to require such debt collectors to conduct business on a fully integrated basis with the need for an outside letter vendor, period.  …  It would basically be illogical to read the statute the way the Appellant wants to read it. ”).  providers, like letter vendors.  The letter vendor theory further reads out of the statute common law principles under which communications with service providers are not “third-party” communications at all.  It is also contrary to decades of guidance from the CFPB and FTC.  And it would lead to a myriad of absurd results.  Dismissal should therefore be upheld.
[brief] I, ¶¶ 1 | 10, 24, 42| | N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶¶ 9 | 10, 24, 42| | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 10 | 10, 24, 42| | U.S. Const. amend. XIV | 10, 24, 42| | U.S. Const. amend. VI | 42 | | **Other Authorities** | | | [...], Building Criminal Capital vs Specific Deterrence: The Effect of Incarceration Length on Recidivism 21 (Working Paper Dec. 2011) | 50 | | [...], Approved Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports for the Forensic Latent Print Discipline | 13 | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D)