ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Under principles of contract law, rescission is an equitable remedy and only available in limited circumstances. \(^{88}\)  Ordinarily, contracts may only be rescinded where there is original invalidity, fraud, failure of consideration or a material breach. \(^{89}\)  And even where the grounds for rescission exist, the remedy is discretionary and will not be granted where the claimant has not acted within a reasonable time or where there has been substantial performance. \(^{90}\)  Moreover, to grant rescission, the court must be able to return the parties to their original position. \(^{91}\)  “[A] court must apply rescission only in circumstances where it is clear that the court can return the parties to the ground upon which they originally stood. ”\(^{92}\)  Here, the trial court has failed to appreciate the consequences of rescission and, in so doing, has essentially resolved – albeit inadvertently – the --- \(^{88}\) Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Piper Co., 214 N.J. Super. 328, 336, 519 A.2d 368 (Ch.Div. 1986).  \(^{89}\)  17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 539, 567.  See Herbtstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 N.J. 1, 9, 342 A.2d 181 (1975); Merchants Indem. Corp. v. Eggleston, 37 N.J. 114, 130, 179 A.2d 505 (1962); Giumarra v. Harrington Heights, 33 N.J. Super. 178, 190, 109 A.2d 695 (App.Div. 1955), aff’d 18 N.J. 548, 114 A.2d 720.  \(^{90}\)  Hilton at 336.  Jones v. Gabrielson, 52 N.J. Super. 563, 576, 146 A.2d 495 (App.Div. 1958).  \(^{91}\)  Ibid.  Driscoll v. Burlington Bridge Co., 28 N.J. Super. 1, 4, 99 A.2d 829 (App.Div. 1953).  \(^{92}\)  See Mercedes-Benz USA LLC v. Coast Auto. Group, Ltd., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71953 (D.N.J. 2006)(Emphasis added).  entirety of the disputes in this case.  That is, if the Stock Sale Agreement with Right to Repurchase is void \textit{ab initio}, then [...] never owned [...] – ownership of [...] reverts to where it was prior to the sale to [...].
[brief] Ignoring Plaintiff’s contradictions, Plaintiff’s latest argument highlights the need for Plaintiff’s 1099’s and tax information that he refused to produce and was the subject of lengthy discovery motions (one of which resulted in the case being dismissed with prejudice).  Plaintiff has not asserted that the checks he produced constitutes a complete record of all the amounts he received in 2016 and 2017, just that those are the checks he was able to “dig up”.  While Plaintiff’s checks for 2016 and 2017 paint a picture of sporadic payments by [...], Plaintiff did not produce the check he received in 2018 that we know was received and cashed by him.
[brief] The Borough’s Noise Ordinance was formerly codified at Chapter 144 of the Code of the [...].  That section was repealed on July 5, 2016 by Ordinance No. 20-2016.  On April 30, 2015, the Borough Clerk emailed a proposed Noise Ordinance 06-2015 to [...], Noise Coordinator for the [...], for review.  (Pa29-37)  By way of letter dated May 13, 2015, Triggs notified Sea Bright that “[a]ny noise ordinance submitted to the Department must be identical to the most recent [DEP Model Noise Ordinance.]”  He further noted that Ordinance 06-2015 was not approved as it “significantly varie[d] from the [DEP Model Noise Ordinance.]”  (Pa38)  On March 21, 2017, the Borough introduced Ordinance No. 05-2017, entitled “An Ordinance Amending Chapter 146, Nuisances, Article II, Noise Nuisances of the Code of the [...]. ”  On April 4, 2017, the Borough adopted Ordinance No. 05-2017.  In light of the repeal of the Borough’s Chapter 144, Ordinance No. 05-2017 then provided the entire noise code of the [...].  (Da116-124)  Plaintiffs filed the instant Complaint challenging the Noise Ordinance on May 18, 2017.
[brief] Pa111.  In the fall of 2017, [...] developed an interest in converting an existing outdoor space into a covered area and to be used in connection with major events conducted on site such as weddings, life celebratory events, and other gatherings.  Pa49-62; 1T 160-161.  During the fall and into the winter of 2017, [...] was in contact with both [...] and the regional sales director for [...] regarding the specifications of the louver roof system and provided an architectural binder to [...] associated with the product.  Pa49-62; 1T 160-161; Pa1.  The materials and representations provide by [...] and [...] include the following:
[brief] An evaluation of the evidence led the trial court to conclude not only that [...] was on notice of [...]’s claim, but also that it was [...], and not [...], who had a superior equitable claim to the Strip.  Moreover, the uncontroverted evidence is that [...] has used and occupied the Strip for more than 30 years, and, having met all of the elements for an adverse possession claim, should be awarded title by adverse possession.  The trial court’s decision below examined those issues thoroughly, and sided with [...].
[brief] "[I]n considering such applications, zoning boards of adjustment should focus their attention on whether the applicant's proofs demonstrate 'that the site will accommodate the problems associated with a proposed use with [a greater density] than permitted by the ordinance.'"  Ibid. (quoting Randolph Town Center Assocs., L.P. v. Twp. of Randolph, 324 N.J. Super. 412, 417 (App. Div. 1999)).  This requires an examination of "purpose of restricting density in a particular zone."  Id. at 389.  "The MLUL explicitly recognizes the regulation of the density of development as a general purpose of zoning that contributes to 'the well-being of persons, neighborhoods, communities and regions and preservation of the environment.'"  Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(e)).  "Density restrictions . . . serve to limit the intensity of the use of the land to be developed."  Ibid.  "A successful applicant for a density variance therefore must show that despite the proposed increase in density above the zone's restrictions, and, thus, the increased intensity in the use of the site, the project nonetheless served one or more of the purposes of zoning and was consistent with the overall goals of the MLUL."
[brief] Ja3999- _____________________ therefore, were found to have created a new cause of action and attached new liability to past conduct. *Id.* at 948-50.  The 2023 Veto Amendment does neither.  The addition of the veto authority in 2023 “does not alter [the Attorney General’s] substantive power” or Defendants’ exposure to liability.  4T 15:16-16:1.  “[W]hether the relator or the State bears the prosecutorial burden is of no practical effect on the rights of the defendant. ”  4T 19:13-18.  4003; Ja11, 121, 125 (¶¶ 11, 319, 332).  In no event can the Court grant Defendants judgment in the manner that they seek.  Db49.  II.
[brief] "If defendant possessed the knife for purposes of self-defense and was attempting to defend himself at the time he used the knife, albeit in an honest but unreasonable belief that he needed to use deadly force, he should have been acquitted of unlawful weapons possession and possession for an unlawful purpose."  Since the determination of the defendant's guilt on the weapons offenses in *Rodriguez* had a direct bearing on whether he was guilty of reckless manslaughter in that case, the convictions for all three offenses were reversed by the court.  With regard to the causation prong, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in *State v. Campfield*, 213 N.J. 218 (2013) is instructive.
[brief] The State Police personnel at the Academy told the Plaintiff that [...] was texting admin work to [...] which was supposed to be Plaintiff's work (1T; 93:21).  Actually, [...] was supposed to be doing work for the Unit but instead was doing the admin work for the captain (1T; 94:4).  Plaintiff stated, “Being in that position, not given any work to do as an Admin Officer is unheard of” (1T; 95:16).
[brief] Base Salary | Correct Base Salary as of 7/31/2019 | Notes 1 | Notes 2 | |------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------| | [...] | 8/1/2018 | $121,016.97 | $102,281.00 | In 6 months Step as of 7/31/2019 | | | | | | See Note 2 below | | [...] | 8/1/2018 | $118,820.00 | $102,281.00 | In 6 months Step as of 7/31/2019 | | | | | | See Note 2 below | | [...] | 8/1/2018 | $121,016.97 | $102,281.00 | In 6 months Step as of 7/31/2019 | | | | | | See Note 2 below | | [...] | 8/1/2018 | $118,820.00 | $102,281.00 | In 6 months Step as of 7/31/2019 | | | | | | See Note 2 below | | [...] | 8/1/2018 | $118,820.00 | $102,281.00 | In 6 months Step as of 7/31/2019 | | | | | | See Note 2 below | | [...] | 4/30/2019 | $118,820.00 | $98,147.00 | In Upon Promotion Step as of 7/31/2019 | | | | | | See Note 2 below | | [...] | 4/30/2019 | $118,820.00 | $98,147.00 | In Upon Promotion Step as of 7/31/2019 | | | | | | See Note 2 below | | [...] | 4/30/2019 | $118,820.00 | $98,147.00 | In Upon Promotion Step as of 7/31/2019 | | | | | | See Note 2 below | | [...] | 4/30/2019 | $118,820.00 | $98,147.00 | In Upon Promotion Step as of 7/31/2019 | | | | | | See Note 2 below | | Name | Date | Current Salary | Promotion Step | Notes | |----------|------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------------------------------| | [...] | 4/30/2019 | $121,016.97 | $98,147.00 | In Upon Promotion Step as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 4/30/2019 | $121,016.97 | $98,147.00 | In Upon Promotion Step as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 4/30/2019 | $121,016.97 | $98,147.00 | In Upon Promotion Step as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 6/11/2019 | $118,820.00 | $98,147.00 | In Upon Promotion Step as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 6/11/2019 | $118,820.00 | $98,147.00 | In Upon Promotion Step as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 6/11/2019 | $118,820.00 | $98,147.00 | In Upon Promotion Step as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 6/11/2019 | $118,820.00 | $98,147.00 | In Upon Promotion Step as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 6/11/2019 | $118,820.00 | $98,147.00 | In Upon Promotion Step as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 6/11/2019 | $121,016.97 | $98,147.00 | In Upon Promotion Step as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 6/11/2019 | $121,016.97 | $98,147.00 | In Upon Promotion Step as of 7/31/2019 | | [...] | 6/11/2019 | $118,820.
[brief] In the context of a summary judgment motion, a Trial Court must disallow the admission of hearsay statements.  See Hanges v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 202 N.J. 369 (2010).  Only admissible evidence may defeat summary judgment.  See Claypotch v. Heller, Inc., 360 N.J. Super. 472, 488-89 (App. Div. 2003); Sellers v. Schonfeld, 270 N.J. Super. 424, 427-29 (App. Div. 1993).
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 383.  The Court concluded that a thirty-year parole bar for juveniles fails all three tests.  *Id.* at 394-400.  First, current trends in the law show that the punishment does not conform to contemporary standards of decency.  *Id.* at 394-96.  The analysis of the second and third tests was based on the characteristics summarized in the *Miller* factors.  That is, given the immaturity and diminished culpability of juveniles, the punishment is in many cases grossly disproportionate to the offense.  *Id.* at 397-98.  Given these same characteristics -- plus juveniles’ likelihood of reform with maturity -- the punishment goes beyond what is necessary for retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.  *Id.* at 398-400.  The main constitutional concerns, explained the Court, were (1) the mandatory imposition of a “decades-long” sentence without consideration of individualized circumstances and (2) the lack of a provision for the sentencing court to review the sentence after the youth has likely matured and reformed.
[brief] Id. at 541.  The Court’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine what the truth of the matter is but instead to determine if there is a genuine issue for trial.  Rios v. Meda Pharm., Inc., 247 N.J. 1, 13 (2021)  The Trial Court cited in the Summary Judgment decision the following by citing to *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, “a determination whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the nonmoving party.  The judge’s function is not himself (or herself) to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellant obtained his undergraduate degree from the [...] (Plaintiff Dep. T27:17-T28:13 at Pa. 146) in June 2012.  He graduated with a 2.986 GPA.  (Plaintiff Dep. T52:5-11 at Pa. 152).  At his deposition, Plaintiff-Appellant stated that in February 2011 (his junior year), he was researching graduate degree opportunities when he came across the [...] website,\(^1\) which stated:  All students who are accepted to the [...]\(^2\) [[...]] School of Pharmacy with a baccalaureate degree will be provided the opportunity to complete a masters degree in conjunction with the Doctor of Pharmacy .  . . .  Students will be asked to select or opt-out of a masters pathway at the end of their first professional year.  [emphasis added].\(^3\) (Paragraph 2, to Plaintiff’s Cert. in opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, dated October 12, 2019 (the “[...] Cert.”) at Pa.96).  At his deposition, Plaintiff-Appellant admitted that the website did not use the word “guarantee,” but rather “opportunity,” when referring to the dual --- 1
[brief] R. 12A:3-305(3) states:  “a.  Except as stated in subsection b. of this section, the right to enforce the obligation of a party to pay an instrument is subject to the following: (3) a claim in recoupment of the obligor against the original payee of the instrument if the claim arose from the transaction that gave rise to the instrument....”  In its letter of June 24, 2022 to Defendant, Plaintiff states: “[...] is the original creditor on this account and has not sold the account” (Exhibit DD) (Da111)  Thus, [...] is the original payee.  Plaintiff is suing Defendant to collect a debt.  Defendant has the right to claim a defense of recoupment or set-off.  15 U.S.C. Section 1640(e).  R. 12A:3-305(3) gives Defendant the right to claim recoupment or set-off against Plaintiff as the original payee.  “In the case sub judice, [Defendant’s] Truth in Lending claims arose from the same contract on which [Plaintiff’s] suit was based.  …  Both claims arose out of the same contract.  [Plaintiff] sued to recover a debt owing on the contract, and [Defendant] is alleging the illegality of certain terms of the contract.  …  [Defendant’s] defense is in the nature of a recoupment ….  Easy Living v. Whitehead, 417 N.E.2d 591, 596-597 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).
[brief] The Defendant alleges that the Decision of the superior Court was not a “final order” pursuant to Rule 2:2-3A1.  This is incorrect.  All claims as they relate to Appellant have been dismissed.  Any amendment would be futile and duplicative.  The cases is relied upon by the Defendant, Kwiatkowski v. Gruber, 390 N.J. Super (App. Div. 2007), Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. Chemical and Pollution Sciences, Inc., 105 N.J. 464 (1987), and Malhame v. Borough of Demarest, were all cases which were either dismissed without prejudice because of a failure to comply with discovery rules or a case in which the Appellant sought only review of the trial Judges’ decision which sought review of “only portions” of the opinion of the Trial Judge.
[brief] PLAINTIFF CANNOT ESTABLISH THAT THE 2012 MORTGAGE WAS CANCELLED BY MISTAKE  Plaintiff now seeks, for the first time, to argue that the mortgage was cancelled by mistake.  This argument was not presented in the Foreclosure Court and therefore should not be considered by this Court.  (Da001 to Da007).  “Appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available .  . ."  J.K. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 247 N.J. 120, 138 n.6 (2021) (quotations omitted).  If this Court is inclined to consider Plaintiff’s newly raised argument of a mortgage being mistakenly cancelled, the Court should also consider Plaintiff’s position that the mortgage that was discharged on January 29, 2018 was not in default prior to the bankruptcy preference action on January 30, 2020.  (Pb13).  This is not a case where there was an accounting error that Plaintiff discovered after discharging the mortgage that there were monies still due.  Here there was no mistake: Plaintiff does not dispute receiving all the money due under the mortgage.  At the time the mortgage was satisfied and the discharge of mortgage was prepared and recorded, neither party was aware that two years in the future there would be a bankruptcy preference action.  This is not a mistake but an unforeseen event that neither party anticipated.  For this reason all the cases cited by Plaintiff as to a mortgage being mistakenly cancelled are not applicable to the case sub judice.
[directive] Except as otherwise required by law or Court Rule, the nature and terms of a defendant’s past work and anticipated future cooperation with law enforcement authorities should not be disclosed to the public or any person who might further disclose that information to others who might then attempt to intimidate the cooperating witness or to retaliate against the witness or his or her family.  All written documentation concerning the cooperation agreement, including the Plea Negotiation Worksheet indicating that the prosecutor has made a Downward Departure for Substantial Cooperation, see Appendix IC, should therefore be deemed confidential.  (Note that the sample worksheet reproduced in Appendix IC bears a “confidential” watermark.  The Brimage software provided by the Division of Criminal Justice will automatically include a “confidential” watermark on the computer-generated worksheet whenever a Downward Departure for Substantial Cooperation is made.)  The written memorialization of the terms of the cooperation agreement should nonetheless be kept on file to allow for review upon request by the Division of Criminal Justice, or to enable the terms of the agreement to be enforced by a court where necessary.  The requirement that the cooperation agreement be in writing and be kept on file will also help to ensure that the State complies with any discovery obligations that may arise from the use of the cooperating defendant as a witness in the prosecution of another defendant.
[brief] In addition to incorrectly holding that arbitration is not required under the [...] Policies, the trial court erroneously ruled that [...] waived its right to arbitrate.  (T1 77:4-8).  The New Jersey Supreme Court, in *Cole v. Jersey Medical Center*, 215 N.J. 265, 280-281 (2013), set forth seven factors to be analyzed in evaluating whether a party waived its right to arbitrate:  [i]n deciding whether a party to an arbitration agreement waived its right to arbitrate, we concentrate on the party's litigation conduct to determine if it is consistent with its reserved right to arbitrate the dispute.  Among other factors, courts should evaluate: (1) the delay in making the arbitration request; (2) the filing of any motions, particularly dispositive motions, and their outcomes; (3) whether the delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party's litigation strategy; (4) the extent of discovery conducted; (5) whether the party raised the arbitration issue in its pleadings, particularly as an affirmative defense, or provided other notification of its intent to seek arbitration; (6) the proximity of the date on which the party sought arbitration to the date of trial; and (7) the resulting prejudice suffered by the other party, if any.  No one factor is dispositive ...  *Id.*  While *Cole* provides this list to assist in the waiver analysis, it is non-exhaustive and the waiver analysis must be based upon the totality of the circumstances – which must establish that there is clear and convincing evidence that the party voluntarily and intentionally relinquished the right to arbitration.  *Cole*, 215 N.J. at 276-277 and 280-281.
[brief] State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245, 257 (2021).  "[A] functional approach to abuse of discretion examines whether there are good reasons for an appellate court to defer to the particular decision at issue."  State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).  There are no rational explanations, or impermissible basis, or good reasons to support a finding that the Board has complied with the August 20, 2020 Final Order because they have failed to provide the documents they were ordered to provide.  This decision inexplicably departs from established policy and ignores the facts of this matter.  It is an undisputed material fact the Board has failed to give [...] access to the 11 student records as ordered on 8/28/20 and affirmed by this Court on 5/18/22.
[directive] This Directive supplements Directive #21-06 (issued December 11, 2006).  That earlier Directive promulgated the Jury Selection Standards (Standards), including model jury voir dire questions, as approved by the Supreme Court.  This Directive provides additional explanation or further direction from the Court with regard to juror questioning at voir dire.  Where this Directive modifies voir dire procedures set forth in Directive #21-06, it supersedes the relevant portions of that Directive.  The standard voir dire questions approved by the Court and promulgated by the earlier Directive – as stated in the underlying Report by the Supreme Court Special Committee on Peremptory Challenges and Jury Voir Dire (Special Committee) and in the promulgated Standards – are intended to provide for a full and complete voir dire of prospective jurors so that reasons for any appropriate challenges for cause can be discovered and so that counsel is provided with information that may be relevant to their lawful exercise of peremptory challenges.  The use of the standard voir dire questions required certain new procedures, as provided for in the Standards and the earlier Directive.  The explanations discussed and modifications set forth in this Directive are reflections of the complexity of the jury selection process and of those procedures.  Following implementation of the procedures required by Directive #21-06, trial judges reported regarding their experience with the application of the Standards, incorporating comments from attorneys and jurors in some instances.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ABE’S REQUEST FOR THE REIMBURSEMENT OF HIS BANK OF AMERICA ACCOUNT FUNDS TAKEN BY SALEENA.  (A229; A427).  The trial court’s July 22, 2022 reimbursement order should be reversed in light of the bedrock “equitable principle that a court should not grant relief to one who is a wrongdoer with respect to the subject matter in suit. ”  Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135, 158 (2001).  [...] did not dispute that [...] previously found after a full investigation that [...]’s payment to her credit card was from [...]’s solely owned [...].
[brief] See R. 4:23-4 (emphasis added).  But as stated above, the explicit language of Rule 4:14-2(c) provides that the \textbf{corporate party} designates the individual that will testify, \textbf{not} the noticing party.  See R. 4:14-2(c).  Significantly, here, no corporate party has designated [...] as a corporate witness pursuant to a deposition notice under Rule 4:14-2(c).  Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when, after reviewing these unambiguous court rules, it held that Plaintiff was required to subpoena [...] instead of attempting to compel the deposition via a notice of deposition, as neither the [...] nor [...] have control over [...], who is not a party to this action and resides in Germany.