ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The defense relied on U.S. v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609 (D.C. Cir. 2004) to support the argument that they were permitted to use evidence of [...]’ untruthfulness.  In Whitmore, the court held, the district court erred in prohibiting defendant from cross-examining the officer about certain instances of past conduct under Fed. R. Evid. 608 (b).  In doing so, the court deprived the defendant of any realistic opportunity to challenge the credibility of the witness.  Fed. R.Evid. 608 (b) is closely related to N.J.R.E.  608 (B), which says:  “(b)  The credibility of a witness in a criminal case may be attacked by evidence that the witness made a prior false accusation against any person of a crime .
[brief] The conduct continued … through to 2000 -- it was August of 2011 I believe, which was two years after I started presiding over this case, and it was during the pendency of this trial.  …  And during the pendency of this litigation, this trial that took place here in my courtroom, when it should have been obvious to the [...] that we were trying this case, we were getting to the bottom of it, they just continued.  (235T75:13-25 and 248T20:16-21:17; 490a)  I believe, even after I have entered an order [in 2011], and reeled off … payments that were no longer to be made by [...] [to the [...]] so that I could have a still [i.e., non-moving] target in this litigation, there was still expenses that were paid to the [...] during the very course of this trial, just a few weeks after I entered the order….  (224T20:3-21)  C.  The Trial Court’s NJRICO Findings
[brief] plenary hearing.  You agree?” (1T23:7).  Appellant’s counsel agreed, and notably, Respondent’s counsel responded, “No, Your Honor. ” (1T23:8-10) (emphasis added).  Thus, Respondent had every opportunity during the argument to contend that a plenary hearing was necessary, as initially suggested by the court because there were genuine issues of material fact precluding the judge’s ruling as a matter of law, yet Respondent’s counsel declined to do so, instead, affirmatively acknowledging on the record that the matter was ready for a ruling by the court based upon the undisputed facts in the record and the applicable law.  Accordingly, Respondent’s late interposed objection that material questions of fact preclude enforcement of the settlement contract memorialized on the record is without merit and must be rejected as untimely to the extent it was not raised below, and more importantly, is inconsistent with counsel’s own representation to the trial court that no plenary hearing was necessary, and instead, the court could properly rule on the undisputed facts in the record and applicable law.
[brief] Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, Respondents would argue that Appellants’ appeal has no merit, and the trial court’s order in this matter should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, **[...]**  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esquire  [...], Esquire  Attorneys for Defendant [...]  Dated: January 13, 2025  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...] and [...] (h/w), Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs.  FAMILY ADVENTURES  NORTH JERSEY, LLC d/b/a [...], [...], ABC COMPANIES 1-10 (fictitious designations) and JOHN DOES 1-10 (fictitious designations), Defendants-Respondents.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, BERGEN COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  Sat Below: HON. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
[brief] While the plain language of the statute is ordinarily the best indicator of legislative intent, New Jersey courts “do not follow that rule when to do so would produce an absurd result, at odds with the clear purpose of the legislation. ”  *Jai Sai Ram, LLC v. Planning/Zoning Bd. of Borough of Toms River*, 446 N.J. Super. 338, 345 (App. Div. 2016) (citing *Perrelli v. Pastorelle*, 206 N.J. 193, 200-01 (2011)).
[brief] Under the mode-of-operation doctrine, a business invitee who is injured is entitled to an inference of negligence and is relieved from the obligation to prove that the business owner had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition that caused the accident.  *Prioleau v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, Inc.*, 223 N.J. 245, 248 (2015).  The doctrine is not a general rule of premises liability, but a special application of foreseeability principles in recognition of the extraordinary risks that arise when a defendant chooses a customer self-service business model.  Id. at 262.  The “rule is a very limited exception” to the traditional rules of business premises liability.  *Carroll v. New Jersey Transit*, 366 N.J. Super. 380, 389 (App. Div. 2004)(emphasis supplied).  The doctrine is limited to businesses which provide a “self-service environment,” meaning one in which customers independently handle and/or come in direct contact with merchandise that may pose an “increased risk” of injury.  *Prioleau, supra*, at 262.
[brief] Pa574-575 (discussing the impact of [...]’s performance on the amount of [...] owed [...] for the Hackensack Project).  The PTA Arbitration was not about [...]’s performance or [...]’s liability for nonpayment in its role as general contractor for the subcontracts it held with [...] on various projects.  The estimated gross profit on a project had nothing to do with the amount [...] must pay its subcontractor ([...]) for the work it performed on the project.
[brief] Indeed, the vital regulatory interest the State has in the manner of use of dangerous weapons in the State cannot be questioned.  Further, if the Legislature intended to limit or qualify the reach of this statute, it certainly would have known how to do so.  This statute is obviously a protective statute.  It regulates a particularly dangerous instrumentality – loaded firearms designed and meant for killing – and it regulates them at a particular time – during hunting season when killing is expected.  The statute serves to shield the public not from potential mere injury – but also from potential death.  It must be construed accordingly.  Hence, its reach should not be curtailed in an unnecessary manner.  Rather, the protective purpose behind the statute should be given its full reach.
[brief] | Project Name | EGP Proposed by [...] (Jan. 4, 2022 email) | |-----------------------|-----------------------------------------| | 1 Englewood | $2,700,000.00 | | 2 [...] | 2,984,202.00 | | 3 E’Port | $1,000,000.00 | | 4 [...] | $1,404,371.00 | | 5 [...] | $501,000.00 | | 6 [...] | $976,424.00 | | 7 [...] (Phase II)| $122,000.00 | | 8 [...] | $8,000.00 | | 9 [...] | $53,000.00 | | 10  [...]\(^9\) | N/A | Da343.  \(^9\)  Note the “Bayonne” listed in CCG Exhibit Nos. 5-12 is actually [...] and not [...], a project at issue in the arbitration.  4.  The Arbitrator improperly found the [...] project was subject to the PTA despite the parties never agreeing to an EGP for this project
[brief] The Petitioner was living in the house during this time.  As per the Decedent’s instructions, [...] went to the former’s walk-in closet to obtain the Rubbermaid box.  It was missing.  (11T16-13 to 17-22).  However, a copy of the Antenuptial Agreement was found by Gail [...] in a random box in the Decedent’s house.  (11T51-1 to 3).  The Petitioner was the only person living in the Decedent’s house from the time she went into the hospital up until the present time, and was the only one who had access and control of the Decedent’s possessions in the house, including the Rubbermaid box.
[brief] Plaintiff now also contends that it suffered additional monetary damages as a result of the delay in action.  In addition to the damages in the Lease Litigation and the Instant Action, Plaintiff has added categories of damages to include the $125,000.00 settlement and $63,557.05 in legal fees and costs incurred in the Lease Litigation, and a claim that Plaintiff was unable to sell $134,223.00 in products that have decreased in value.  (Pa0015).  Defendants are prejudiced in that the additional damages would have never occurred if Defendants were party to the Lease Litigation.  Defendants could have been a party to the settlement and now are being looked to for the entire amount.  If Defendants were litigants in the Lease Litigation, these expenses would not have occurred.  The Trial Court reviewed these damages and found that "Plaintiff has not offered any sanction, short of a dismissal, which could possibly cure the prejudice to the Defendants."
[brief] The topography is such that the [[...]’] house itself is at a higher elevation and the driveway area looks down on the pool on [plaintiff’s] property.  Therefore, some natural flooding of water would necessarily occur by the height alone.  However, there is a claim that the driveway was extended with a “ramp” not of structural material but rather by filling in of soil [,] effectively creating a new elevation that did not previously exist before [the [...]] took title.  [The [...]] testified that the ramp was always there and that it was never artificially enhanced.  I believe this.  The existing natural swale between the properties that seems to have been created by Mother Nature and assists both properties in channeling some water to Canoe Brook.  [...] accepted the testimony that the [...] had altered the rear of the property, which disturbed the flow of water on [...]’s property flowing to Canoe Brook.
[brief] Are you trained to observe dog behavior or is this just your lay opinion?  A:  I’m not professionally trained but I work with folks who have been professionally trained, so I’ve gleaned much of experience and information from them.  But I’m not an expert.  3T56:23-57:10.  [...] observed that [...] did not chase squirrels and other small animals and has no prey drive:  Q  Did you ever observe him in the backyard when small animals such as squirrels or rabbits came through?  A Yes.  \(^3\)Transcript says “Thumper” but it should read “Tamil. ”  Q  And did he display any prey drive?  A No.  Q  Can you tell the judge what prey drive is in your opinion?  A  Yes.  It is in my opinion it is the behavior of a dog to treat any small object as a prey and go towards it aggressively in an attack mode.  What I observed from [...] was he would get slightly distracted by the moving object and it would take a quick command for recall saying, [...], back, and he would come back.  3T58:20-25; 59:1-8.  The Court disregarded this as opinion testimony.
[brief] In 2006, [...] provided [...] the [...]-MTDC Assignment.  803a (167:20–168:23).  [...] collaborated with [...] on the preparation of the Releases.  452a (20:16–21:7); 454a (35:20–36:10).  Said Releases listed [...] as the attorney for [...] and set forth that all notices to [...] were to be sent to [...] and/or [...].  637a–642a; 664a–668a; 684a–688a.  [...] never conveyed any of his interest in [...] to anyone other than the 99% he conveyed to [...] pursuant to the instructions and direction of [...] and [...].  426a (34:15 – 35:4); 427a–428a (49:22 – 51:1); 438a (202:16-19); 439a (213:20-25); 440a (216:20–217:25).  [...] testified that he never heard of, knew, or communicated with [...].  433a (179:18–180:21).  [...] testified that prior to being served with the complaint in the 2015 Action, he never heard of, knew, or communicated with [...] despite claiming to be the attorney for [...] and despite the fact that [...]’ name appeared in the [...]-MTDC Assignment and Releases.  458a (143:1-6); 637a–642a; 664a–668a; Similarly, [...] never heard of, knew, or communicated with [...] despite claiming to be the attorney for [...] and [...] owning 99% of [...].  832a–833a (45:22–46:4); 458a (143:7-22); 375a; 379a.  Finally, [...] never recalled ever meeting [...], and [...] “stipulated” that he never spoke or communicated with [...] despite claiming to be the attorney for [...] and Defendants claiming, with a forged and unexecuted document, that after the death of Teddy [...] [...] was owned by [...].  836a–837a (164:3–167:1); 525a (770:12–773: 11); 689a.
[brief] ’”  Da48 (citing and quoting Wells Reit II-80 Park Plaza, LLC v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 414 N.J. Super. 453, 467, 566 (App. Div. 2010)).  Since intent is the primary inquiry, the question of whether there has been a novation is one of fact (Wells Reit II, 414 N.J. Super. at 467) and, therefore, presented at trial,” without a single citation to the record, to any particular finding of the trial court, or to any competent evidence alleged to have been overlooked by the trial court.  Db17.  Defendants have failed to undermine the trial court’s detailed findings concerning the creation and fact of the Third Loan.  The trial court’s findings are unassailable and fully supported by the record.  the trial court’s factual conclusions must be given deference.  The trial court found that both parties’ actions at the Closing and their communications thereafter “convinced this Court of their intent to extinguish the first and second loans, and to replace those agreements entirely with the third loan. ”  Da49.  Therefore, the trial court held that the Third Loan was a novation of the First and Second Loans.  Da49.  Accordingly, upon the extinguishment of the First and Second Loans, any limitations periods previously applicable to the First and Second Loans no longer governed.  Again, the trial court’s finding should be affirmed.  C.
[brief] (Da053).  In its appeal, [...] conceded that the condition of the policy which required the insured to bring a claim within one year was unenforceable pursuant to Indiana Code section 27-1-13-17(b).  However, [...] argued that the policy’s provision clearly expressed “the intent of the contracting parties to limit the time period during which an insured . . . could bring a lawsuit against [...]”.  Therefore, it argued the Appellate Division should "honor the parties' intent by construing the Policy as providing a two-year limitation period on lawsuits, as set forth in Indiana Code section 27-1-13-17(b) against [...] from the date of the loss or damage” instead of the longer 10 year limitation for breach of contract.
[directive] 1.  Every law enforcement agency should designate an appropriate staff member to coordinate the dissemination of information pertaining to all sudden and unexpected deaths.  2.  All information pertaining to a death which has been determined to be a suicide or otherwise accidental should be made available to the victim's next of kin upon their request.  Discretion should be exercised so that the survivors are not provided details which might produce additional trauma.  3.  In homicides, including death by auto, and cases involving suspicious death, information which will not jeopardize a criminal investigation should be provided by the county prosecutor's office to the survivors upon their request.  Discretion should be utilized when providing details regarding the circumstances of the death which might further traumatize the survivors.  4.  The state or county medical examiner shall provide a copy of the autopsy report upon the written request of the next of kin except in homicides, death by auto or suspicious deaths, whereupon the medical examiner should consult with the county prosecutor prior to its release.  5.  Executive Order No. 123 shall govern the release of information to the media.  Information should be provided to survivors prior to its being released to the media.
[brief] The fact that the Court in Krause, which did not find the ordinance at issue to be preempted, recognized the potential preemption power of the NCA in defined circumstances does not mean the Krause case is applicable herein.  In fact, Krause referenced the State v. Clarksburg Inn case, and notes that it sustained a “virtually identical noise ordinance, rejecting defendant’s claim that it was unconstitutionally vague. ”  Krause, 399 N.J.Super. 579, 584 (App. Div. 2008).  Respondents go on to attack the omission of the unamplified voice in the [...], [...] and [...] ordinances; however, this has nothing to do with whether MCRHC preempts the field.
[brief] To accept this argument, this Appellate Court would have to acknowledge that snow and ice are not natural forces or natural elements.  Of course, not only is that argument contrary to common sense, it is directly contrary to the very contentions made by plaintiff-appellant herself throughout this case.  In particular, in the First Count of her Complaint, plaintiff-appellant alleged that “a dangerous condition existed, wherein snow and ice was not properly removed and/or remediated. ”  (Pa21, First Count, ¶4.)  Similarly, in her answers to interrogatories, plaintiff-appellant described her fall and the cause of her fall as follows:  On the date of the accident, February 18, 2021, I slipped and fell on an accumulation of snow and ice that was improperly cleared on the sidewalk located at the corner of [...] and [...], [...].  The sidewalk was inadequately cleared, was unsafe, was not properly cleared for pedestrian traffic, nor was it covered with snow melting products, sand or salt.  Furthermore, there were no warnings of any type in place.  There was a layer of partially shoveled and packed snow and ice creating a hazard for pedestrians, such as myself.  (Pa53, answer to Form A Interrogatory No. 2.)  Likewise, in response to Supplemental Interrogatory No. 5, plaintiff-appellant stated, in part:  An incomplete attempt had been made to remove the snow and ice, but the job was not complete, and no ice melt product, salt or sand was spread in the area.  (Pa62, answer to Supplemental Interrogatory No. 5.  Clearly, at no time did plaintiff-appellant allege that the [...] had created a new hazard or exacerbated an existing hazard that caused her to fall.  Instead, she has always contended that the [...] essentially did a bad job clearing the sidewalk, and that her fall was caused by the presence of snow and ice on the sidewalk.
[brief] The trial court’s October 7, 2022 Order related to the “increased overtopping” analysis is addressed in Point IV. construction of a new rock and concrete seawall and vehicular access ramp on and immediately south of the Subject Property .  . .”  Ibid.  [emphasis added].  From the outset, it is clear the Watermen Report it is based on conditions outside of the subject Property on land not owned by Appellant, but by Respondent.
[brief] But to say such a statement is "totally correct," Rb30, is again misleading.  First, appellants have never denied that [...] had done legal work for them.  But petitioners do not address what appellants pointed out: that [...] had drafted three Wills for decedent, including the one that respondents hope to probate.  Pb7.  [...] was no stranger to decedent; the implication that appellants steered decedent to him is unsupported.  Similarly, petitioners never explain why it would not strain credulity for [...] to lay out her entire case when, at that point, she had a much more immediate concern: timely filing a challenge.  There were only a couple of days left to file a challenge to the probate.  At that point, she could neither identify nor recruit any out of state potential beneficiaries, which would extend the time to challenge.  That was the primary focus: stopping the clock.  Coincidentally, that is exactly what is reflected in the emails the trial court cited: locating non-New Jersey challengers and whether non-probate assets were subject to the four-month limitation set forth in R. 4:85-1. Pa10.
[brief] - Disturbing incident one night involving the Respondent when she was sixteen years old, while the Decedent was away on a business trip, causing the Petitioner to leave the house for a year - Petitioner’s groundless filing of complaint with Adult Protective Services - Petitioner’s groundless filing of complaint with Child Protective Services, utilizing the name of deceased “[...],” a person Petitioner falsely denied knowing - Petitioner’s unlawful termination of the Respondent’s phone accounts - the Petitioner’s apparent destruction/concealment of the Antenuptial Agreement - the Petitioner would often leave Decedent alone at a party and “sneak out,” thinking it “funny” - the Petitioner would abandon Decedent and their relationship for long periods of time - the Decedent on multiple occasions told [...] that the Petitioner was involved with another woman • the Petitioner did not assist Decedent around the house, including one occasion where during a snowstorm where the Decedent shoveled the snow while Petitioner remained inside • the Decedent told Snyder that the Petitioner never paid any of the bills and wasted money, and that this conduct “pissed her off. ”  • the Petitioner had a habit of lying to the Decedent • the Petitioner, in front of Snyder referred to the Decedent as a “whale” on more than one occasion  Such conduct, standing alone, provides a basis for denying the equitable relief sought by the Petitioner.
[brief] 1.  On or about September 19, 2022, the Township filed a Complaint for, among other things, breach of contract as a result of sewer connection fees.  Da16.  2.  On or about October 21, 2022, the Borough filed an Answer.  Da158.  3.  The parties engaged in discovery through October 4, 2023.  4.  On October 6, 2023, the Township filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  Da1.  5.  On October 24, 2023, the Borough filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.  Da146.  6.  Oral argument on the Motions was heard by the Honorable [...], J.S.C, on December 8, 2023.  Da170.  7.  On December 8, 2023, the Court granted the Township’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denied the Borough’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.  Da166.  8.  On January 17, 2024, the Borough filed the subject Notice of Appeal.  Da168.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE BOROUGH IS ENTITLED TO THE CONNECTION FEES AND DID NOT BREACH ITS CONTRACT WITH THE TOWNSHIP
[brief] \(^1\)  Contrast this with scenarios where the Court’s requirements are much more stringent when other significant rights are impacted.  R. 1:40-4(i)(requiring a settlement reached at mediation to be reduced to writing and signed by each party) and R. 4:37-1(a)(requiring a written stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action to dismiss an action where an Answer has been filed).  A.  **New Jersey Precedent Addressing Waiver of Arbitration Through Implied Conduct Supports Defendants’ Position.
[brief] **Fourth**, other courts have held that the absence of advanced driver assistance features is insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish that a vehicle was defectively designed.  For example, in *Butler v. Daimler Trucks North America, LLC*, No. 19-CV-2377-JAR, 2022 WL 2191755, at *12 (D. Kan. June 16, 2022), aff’d, 74 F.4th 1131 (10th Cir. 2023) (attached at Pa286, cited at 2T --- \(^8\)  Plaintiff also claims that [...] made the decision not to include LKAS and LDW for “financial” reasons.  Pb16, 20.  Plaintiff provides no evidence to support this statement.  Indeed, this is nothing but an emotional ploy to distract from the fact that Plaintiff has presented no evidence that the subject vehicle was unreasonably dangerous.
[brief] Conway v. 287 Corporate Ctr. Assocs., 187 N.J. 259, 269 (2006) (emphasis added) (quoting Atl. N. Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 301-02 (1953)).  As noted in the [...]’ opening papers, the MOU expressly contemplated that “the parties shall negotiate in good faith” a purchase and sale agreement.  (Da29).  Indeed, it stands to reason that the purchase and sale of a $45 million property is not done on the back of an envelope.  Thus, the MOU was simply an “agreement to agree” to a more comprehensive contract in which the parties would set forth meaningful parameters for the zoning issue and deal with indemnification.