ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
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[brief] In all these cases the appellants unilaterally abbreviated transcripts without consent or a trial court order in contravention of Rule 2:5-3(c), yet this court not only allowed the appellants to submit their brief and appendices but also adjudicated the appeal on merits rightly recognizing that a complete transcript is not always indispensable.  The doctrine of stare decisis requires that this court apply the same standard in Docket # [...].  Further, this court has the authority to do so under Rule 1:1-2(a).  “In our judicial system, justice is the polestar and our procedures must ever be moulded and applied with that in mind. ”  Salazar v. MKGC Design, 458 N.J. Super. 551, 557 (App. Div. 2019) (internal quotes and citations omitted).
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY BARRED [...]’S EXPERT REPORT BY CREATING ITS OWN STANDARD AND FAILING TO CORRECTLY APPLY THE STANDARD SET FORTH BY THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY (1282a-1296a)**  The Supreme Court of New Jersey in *Schwartz v. Menas*, 251 N.J. 556, 577 (2022), overturned the New Business Rule, and reiterated “the general rule under New Jersey law that lost profits may be recoverable if they can be established with a reasonable degree of certainty .
[brief] On June 23, 2021, after deposing several of [...]’s employees and learning their standard sales practices violated the CFA and the RETA by violating several statutes and code provisions, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint a second time.  (Da547).  On July 8, 2021, Plaintiffs’ motion to amend was denied by [...] after oral argument.  [...] ruled that the Second Amended Complaint was not necessary because it merely specified which sections of the Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”) and the Real Estate Timeshare Act (“RETA”) Plaintiffs were alleging [...] had violated.  (21T13:19-15:17).  Since [...] was already on notice that Plaintiffs were alleging violations of the CFA and the RETA, no further clarification by way of amendment was necessary.  At the time of the July 8, 2021 oral argument, [...] had filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment based on the then-operative First Amended Complaint.  (Da67).  Plaintiffs stated their intent to file a Motion for Summary Judgment based on the factual allegations in the Second Amended Complaint.  [...] delayed hearing [...]’s motion and set a briefing schedule for Plaintiffs to file their summary judgment motion and for [...] to respond.  [...] suggested that [...]’s response could include lack of notice of the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, could substantively address the more specific allegations, or both.  (21T18:5-19:10).  At oral argument on the motions on December 14, 2021, [...] chose to not argue lack of notice and instead addressed the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint substantively.  (2T9:20-16:9).  [...], who had been asked to rule on the motions because of the voluminous pleadings involved, denied both parties’ motions.  (Da1096).  It is these denials of [...]’s summary judgment motions that [...] is appealing.  Pointedly, [...] is not appealing the later admission at trial of what it calls parol evidence.
[brief] First, it is notable that the State essentially concedes that the trial court’s consideration of offenses [...] was charged with but that were about to be dismissed in assigning significant weight to aggravating factor three was improper.  (Sb16).  The State instead largely arguing that the error was harmless.  However, [...] is entitled to a sentence imposed by consideration of appropriate factors under the Code regardless of whether the State or this Court believes that the ultimate outcome was not excessively unjust.  See *State v. Sutton*, 132 N.J. 471, 486 (1993) (holding, although it did not regard sentence as abuse of discretion, new sentencing was nonetheless required because “confidence in the ultimate sentencing determination will be enhanced substantially by a sentencing proceeding that incorporates the deliberation and exercise of reasoned discretion . . .”).  These dismissed offenses were used to give aggravating factor three “significant weight. ”  It is imperative that the trial court’s assessment of the aggravating factors is not improperly tilted by factors the court is not permitted to consider.
[directive] The CJRA states that “[t]he time from the filing to the final disposition made before trial by the prosecutor or the eligible defendant” of a motion “shall be excluded in computing time in which a case shall be indicted or tried. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(b)(1)(c) (emphasis added).  Motions for leave to “motions” appeal an order excluding time qualify as under the CJRA, and the statute provides no exception for them.  State v. Washington, 453 N.J. Super. 164, 203 (App. Div. 2018) (citing the statute and a recommendation contained in the 2014 report of the Supreme Court’s Joint Committee on Criminal  We therefore decline defendant’s request to craft Justice). a rule that would conflict with the statute.
[brief] Police and fire unions must resolve collective negotiations impasses pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16(g) (“Police and Fire Public Interest Arbitration Reform Act”).  The public policy of the State pursuant to the Act is as follows:  Recognizing the unique and essential duties which law enforcement officers and firefighters perform for the benefit and protection of the people of this State, cognizant of the life threatening dangers these public servants regularly confront in the daily pursuit of their public mission, and fully conscious of the fact that these public employees, by legal and moral precept, do not enjoy the right to strike, it is the public policy of this State that it is requisite to the high morale of such employees, the efficient operation of such departments, and to the general well-being and benefit of the citizens of this State to afford an alternate, expeditious, effective and binding procedure for the resolution of disputes.
[brief] A.  The Commencement Of The Underlying Action In 2019 ...........................................4  B.  The CEP Parties Are Granted Summary Judgment ....................................................6  C.  Leave To File  A Second Amended Complaint Is Denied ..........................................9  D.  Appellants’ Second Action Against [...] And The Dismissal .......................11  E.  Appellants’ Appeals In This Action And The Second Action ..............................13  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PERTINENT FACTS ......................................................13
[brief] The lower court ruled in error that Defendant [...] could not be individually liable under the NJLAD as an aider and abettor.  The NJLAD also makes it unlawful “for any person, whether an employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this Act. ”  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e).  Plaintiff must show that the party whom the defendant aids performed a wrongful act that causes injury, the defendant was generally aware of his role as part of the overall illegal or tortious activity at the time assistance is provided, and the defendant knowingly and substantially assists the principal violation.  Id.  First, reversal is warranted because the lower court relied on many of the same justifications that led to the dismissal of Count One against Defendant [...], including that issuance of the Disciplinary Letter was not materially adverse.  This was error for the same reasons that Plaintiff as already articulated, and are incorporated herein by reference.  Second, reversal is warranted because the lower court found that Plaintiff did not establish an underlying claim of retaliation by Defendant [...].  However, should this Court find that the dismissal of Count One warrants reversal, this justification would fail.  Finally, the lower court erroneously found that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendant [...] was aware of having a part in any illegal activity.  Even a cursory review of the Amended Complaint refutes this finding, given that Defendant [...] is the individual behind many of the Plaintiff’s alleged retaliatory actions, and Plaintiff alleges that she knowingly and substantially assisted in various retaliatory actions, including the rotation of grade-level teaching partners, as well as the Disciplinary Meeting and resulting Disciplinary Letter.  219a-231a, 245a.  Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Defendant [...] must be accepted as true for the purposes of evaluating the motion to dismiss.  For all of these reasons, the lower court’s dismissal of Count Four as to Defendant [...] should be reversed.
[directive] If multiple qualifying warrants exist, a separate bail recognizance must be issued for each warrant.  1.  Officers should complete a N.J. bail recognizance form (attached and available in NCR paper (four copies) at the municipal courts), with copies issued to the individual and the relevant court, that includes:  i.  Updated address and contact information for the individual.  ii.  Date and time on which the individual must appear before the municipal court that issued the warrant.  iii.  Notice to the individual that a failure to appear may reinstate the warrant.  iv.  Individual’s signature.  2.  Officers should set appearance dates two weeks from the date of the encounter (or if the court is not sitting on that date, the first available court date following the two-week period), or as otherwise provided by the procedures of the jurisdiction issuing the warrant.  A list of sitting dates and telephone numbers for New Jersey’s municipal courts is available at njcourts.gov/courts and by clicking the link for “Municipal Court Session Schedules” or “Municipal Court Directory”.  3.  If an individual refuses to provide information for or sign the bail recognizance form, the individual may be taken into custody on the outstanding warrant.  3 H. warrant.
[brief] As [...] affirmed, “While the Court correctly found that [...] and I did not separate until August of 2017, the Court failed to appreciate same when determining the reasonableness of my request to vacate the divorce documents, or the witness testimony regarding what actions I took immediately after [...] and I actually separated.  Upon my actual separation with [...], within two (2) months I filed the Motion to Vacate the divorce documents. ”  A301.  A court considering Rule 4:50 relief has discretion to consider the circumstances of the particular case in deciding whether the party filed her motion within a reasonable time.
[brief] Unlawful conduct under the CFA includes one of the prescribed acts made “in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate. ”  N.J.S.A. 56:8- 2.  The statute defines unlawful conduct as follows:  The act, use or employment by any person of any commercial practice that is unconscionable or abusive, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing, concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment suppression, or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate, or with the subsequent performance of such person as aforesaid, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby, is declared to be an unlawful practice.  (Emphasis added.)  A “sale” means “any sale, rental or distribution, offer for sale, rental or distribution or attempt directly or indirectly to sell, rent or distribute. ”  N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(e).  “Merchandise” includes “any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale. ”  N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c).  Under the statute, “[t]he misrepresentation has to be one which is material to the transaction … made to induce the buyer to make the purchase. ”  *Castro v. NYT Television*, 370 N.J. Super 282, 294 (App. Div. 2004) (internal citations omitted).  Although the CFA applies to sales involving credit, it does not apply to the activities of debt buyers or collectors, such as Respondents, who only purchase or collect the debt after it was incurred.  *DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman*, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 341 (App. Div. 2013) (“Debt collection activities on behalf of a third party who may have sold merchandise are not unconscionable activities ‘in connection with the sale’ of merchandise”); *Gomez v. Forster & Garbus LLP*, Civil Action No. 2:17-13708 (MCA) (MAH), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183099, at *13-14 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2019) (involving Appellant’s counsel, the court states “it is well-settled that the activities of debt buyers such as [defendants] do not fall within the purview of the CFA”).
[directive] Investigation and Adjudication of Minor Complaints  6.2.1  Following the principle that the primary goal of internal affairs and discipline is to correct problems and improve performance, management in the subject officer's chain of command should handle relatively minor complaints.  Complaints of demeanor and minor rule infractions should be forwarded to the commanding officer of the subject officer's unit because it is often difficult for an immediate supervisor to objectively investigate a subordinate.  In addition, that arrangement might obscure the possibility that part of the inappropriate conduct was the result of poor supervision by the immediate supervisor.  While the structure of each law enforcement agency is different, it is recommended that minor complaints be assigned to and handled by a commanding officer at least one step
[brief] [L. 2019, c. 157 (codified at N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4)).]  Thus, under the plain language of the statute [...] is ineligible for the presumption or recalculation provided under the Ricci Act because he failed to file by July 8, 2021.  Further, while New Jersey pension statutes are construed liberally because of their remedial character, *Geller v. Dep’t of Treasury*, 53 N.J. 591, 597-98 (1969), “an employee has only such rights and benefits as are based upon and within the scope of the provisions of the statute. ”  *Francois v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys.*, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 349 (App. Div. 2010) (citation omitted).  Here, the statute provides for the benefit if a retiree files for it within two years of the effective date of the Ricci Act, i.e., by July 8, 2021.
[brief] See Ewell v. NBA Props., 94 F. Supp. 3d 612, 624 (D.N.J. 2015).  To the extent that Plaintiff points exclusively to the fact that [...] has not been terminated as evidence of discrimination, her comparison is inapposite because [...] is not similarly situated.  "[T]o be considered similarly situated, comparator employees must be similarly situated in all relevant respects."  Wilcher v. Postmaster Gen., 441 F. App'x 879, 881-82 (3d Cir. 2011).  A court considers whether the plaintiff and the comparator had similar job responsibilities, were subject to the same standards, worked for the same supervisors, and engaged in comparable misconduct.  Id. at 882; McCullers v. Napolitano, 427 F. App'x 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2011).  [...] was not similarly situated to Plaintiff for several reasons: (1) [...] did not engage in the same conduct as Plaintiff; (2) [...] was tenured, Plaintiff was not; (3) [...] had no other complaints before or since the [...] Incident, whereas Plaintiff repeatedly engaged in the same inappropriate conduct with multiple students on separate occasions; and (4) [...] is neither an administrator nor Vice Principal like Plaintiff.
[brief] ...........................................- 46 - Save Camden Pub. Schs. v. Camden City Bd.  of Educ., 454 N.J. Super. 478 (App. Div. 2018).........................................................................................- 42 - Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 148 N.J. 396, 420 (1997)  ......- 37 -, - 38 - State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560 (2015).................................................................- 20 - Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller, 146 N.J. 527 (1996)................................. - 23 -, - 24 - Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189 (2016)  ......................................................................................- 21 - Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015).............................................................- 31 - Tredo v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145731, *15 (D.N.J. Oct. 10, 2014)  .......................................................................................- 38 -, - 39 - Tully v. Mirz, 457 N.J. Super. 114 (App. Div. 2018)  ................................. - 23 -, - 24 - Van Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301 (3rd Cir.1982)........... - 40 -, - 41 - Verni v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 160 (App. Div. 2006) .....- 46 - VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539, 554 (1994).................... - 40 - Wade v. Kessler Inst., 343 N.J. Super. 338 (App. Div. 2001), aff’d as modified, 172 N.J. 327 (2002)...........................................................................- 38 - Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398 (1991)...........- 22 - Statutes N.J.S.A. 14A:3-6.3 ......................................................................................- 23 - N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 .......................................................................................- 40 - TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND DECISIONS BEING APPEALED December 20, 2021 Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint with Prejudice……Da02683
[brief] [...] and [...] entered into a commercial lease agreement on or about May 5, 2014.  (Pa973-989)  [...] leased a unit in the shopping center located at [...].  (Id.)  The location is a strip mall which contains several businesses side-by-side in a single building.  (Id.; Pa732; Pa1151)  The lease contained several provisions concerning the responsibility which each party to the lease would have concerning the maintenance and upkeep of the property.
[brief] C.  [...]’s harmful (and illegal) efforts to loot the company and to avoid the arbitration altogether.  Although the bifurcation was intended to save time, Phase I lasted over five years.  During that time, [...] remained in control of [...].  The lengths to which [...] went to retain control were innumerable.  The most egregious were (a) issuing himself retroactive bonuses, a/k/a the “AMF,” to increase his ownership in [...] by over 8%, (Pa246); (b) “loaning” himself nearly $1M, some of which he used to allegedly purchase additional shares, (Da999-1000); (c) redomiciling [...] to Belize without notice to the members and then suing some of them there, (Pa16)(Pa51); and (d) unilaterally amending the operating agreement to remove the arbitration clause—during the arbitration—and claiming it removed the Court and Arbitrator’s jurisdiction to continue.
[brief] Exhibit 1.  FAC ¶ 26, Pa1613-14; Pa2550-59 ([...] Cert Opp SJ).  The Sale/Purchase Agreement provided for consideration of $600,000 plus reimbursement “all of the costs and expenses incurred by Seller in bringing the Project to date, . . . .”  Having tendered payment of the contract price, plaintiffs became the owner of the Wholesale Market Participation Agreement (WMPA).
[brief] Rule 2:10-2.  If [...] acted as plaintiff claimed, by hitting him in the head, then the jury was entitled to conclude that [...] was negligent, regardless of whether such conduct also constituted the intentional tort of assault and battery.  The only count then pending against [...] was negligence and the trial judge should have stuck to his original ruling because plaintiff was "only bringing a negligence claim."  (3T18:13-20).  Negligence is defined as "failure to exercise, in the given circumstances, that degree of care for the safety of others which a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under similar circumstances."  Model Jury Charge 5.10A(1).  Plaintiff's version of the events, which the jury was entitled to believe, was that [...] was walking away while plaintiff was asking for his name, at which time [...] suddenly wheeled around and hit him in the head with a broom.  This conduct was something that a person of ordinary prudence under similar circumstances would not have done, and was therefore negligent.  To prove negligence, "a plaintiff must establish the following elements: (1) duty of care, (2) breach of that duty, (3) proximate cause, and (4) damages.
[brief] On November 7, 2024, at the start of oral arguments, the Court stated that it had reviewed the caselaw on the submission of [...]’ Certification for in-camera review and found the submission to be appropriate and in conformity with O Builders.  (T4:9-25).  At oral arguments, Appellant argued that “There could be at least a disclosure of the categories of information, for instance, right, Your Honor. ” (T8:14-16).  In response, Respondent stated:  “We – you know, we had given them general categories and the Court, in fact, also gave them general categories as to what the Court wanted to address.  Litigation strategies, settlement conferences, their ability to pay. ” (T14:2-8).  There is no question Appellant was given the categories of information to be addressed in the Supplemental brief.  Respondents identified the categories at oral arguments in August.  (1T13:23 to 1T14:1-12; 1T18:6-25).  The Court identified the categories in August).  (1T19:1-8; 1T30:2-16).  When ordering supplemental briefs, the Court identified the categories.  (1T45:21 to 1T46:1-6).