ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Auto  1.  How many of you are licensed drivers?  2.  Have you or any family member or close personal friend ever been involved in a motor vehicle accident in which an injury resulted?  What type of accident? Injuries? Lawsuit? Settled? Tried?  Was the resolution of the claim satisfactory?  Would it affect your ability to be fair and impartial?  3.  (a)  Have you or a family member or close personal friend ever been involved in litigation or filed a claim of any sort?  (b)  Has anyone ever filed a claim or lawsuit against you or a family member or close personal friend?  4.  Have you or a family member or close personal friend sustained an injury to the _______ or have chronic problems with __________?  5.  Ask if applicable:  Have you or a family member or close personal friend utilized the services of a chiropractor?  Standards for Jury Selection
[brief] Petitioner argues that the Board erroneously denied him an “honorable service” analysis pursuant to *Uricoli v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System*, 91 N.J. 62 (1982).  The *Uricoli* decision set forth a balancing test and analysis to be applied when an applicant for accidental disability retirement has also engaged in employment misconduct that threatens forfeiture of the applicant’s pension rights.  See *Uricoli* at 78.  In accordance with the *Uricoli* balancing test, a pension could also be partially forfeited instead of wholly forfeited due to the misconduct.  In adopting the balancing test, the Court stated that it was “striving to effectuate the intention of the Legislature” at the time.  Nevertheless, Petitioner’s reliance on the *Uricoli* case as justification for his entitlement to an “honorable service” analysis is flawed for several reasons.  First, the *Uricoli* case concerns an application for accidental disability retirement benefits, and is inapplicable to the matter at hand, which concerns an application for deferred retirement.  See *Uricoli* at 73.  There are differing legal standards that govern accidental disability benefits as opposed to deferred retirement benefits.  See *Uricoli* at 73-4.  In fact, the *Uricoli* Court mentions this difference, and references the fact that the Petitioner, Uricoli, would not have been permitted to obtain deferred retirement benefits utilizing the “honorable service” analysis as he was able to do for his accidental disability retirement application.  *Id.*  The *Uricoli* Court specifies more thoroughly in a footnote to its analysis and states:  It is therefore evident, in light of this express provision for forfeiture in the case of an employee who seeks early retirement benefits and who was removed for “cause of charges of misconduct or delinquency,” that Uricoli is ineligible to obtain pension benefits under this provision.  *Id.* at 74 n.4.  The Petitioner in this current matter was evidently removed from employment “for cause” as the direct result of misconduct related to his employment.  As such, he is not entitled to an analysis within the purview of the *Uricoli* decision because he is not seeking accidental disability benefits but deferred retirement benefits.  See also *J.A.W. v. Bd. of Trs.*, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 331 (App. Div. Mar. 2, 2022)⁵ (Ra2)
[brief] JUDGMENT ENTERED IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS  BECAUSE DR. BELLIFEMINE PROVED THAT HIS COMPLAINT WAS TIMELY AND DEFENDANTS FAILED TO MEET THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF ON THEIR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE (Volume I, Pa. 150-184; Vol III Pa. 405-15)  The motion court’s conclusion that [...]’s complaint was untimely ignored the evidence presented regarding defendant’s partial payments to [...].
[brief] In Boyle, the Supreme Court held that the American Rule will generally apply to require parties to bear their own expenses, in the absence of a clear, unambiguous language to the contrary – and that any ambiguity in the language must be interpreted against the indemnitee (here, [...]).  Section 17.1 of the PSA does not contain any language that expressly and unambiguously encompasses indemnity for first-party claims.  Thus, it is clear that the trial court in the instant action reached the right result, in refusing to award [...] its attorneys’ fees under Section 17.1 of the PSA.
[brief] Yet, it acknowledged that, “relief available” under that rule “is limited to remediation of the violation of a court order, thus sanctions available are intended to be coercive not punitive. ”  (1T3718-25)  It ruled that monetary sanctions unrelated to an applicant’s damages are only permitted, “if they are intended to compel compliance with the court’s order,” citing Franklin Twp v. Quakertown Ed. Assn. 274 N.J. Super, 47, 55 (App. Div., 1994).
[brief] **Location of Parking:**  In the VC-2 Overlay Zone, pursuant to Ordinance Section 108-6.18(K)(13)(a) and Section 108-9.1(A)(13), parking shall be located in side and rear yards.  The Applicant proposes parking in front yards throughout the site.  The Applicant submits that there is not a substantial detriment associated with parking in the front yard.  Parking is going to be screened by landscaping.  Also, the parking is set back 90 feet from Route 33 and in part because it's lined up with parking on the Shared Property site to the east and it allows connectivity between the two parcels.  The Board rejects these reasons for this variance.  The connectivity with the Shared Properties project to the east does not impact the ability to design this Property to avoid this variance.  Further, not all parking areas have landscaping and/or sufficient landscaping, specifically the lack of landscaped islands which is another variance required for the Application.  6.
[brief] [...], GOLD & AGRAWAL  P.C.  ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT BY: [...], ESQUIRE  ATTORNEY ID (002912003)  [...]  [...]  [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Table of Contents ........................................................................................................i  Table of Citation of Cases, Statutes, and Rules ..................................................iii  Counter-Statement of Procedural History ..............................................................1  Counter-Statement of Facts .....................................................................................12  Legal Argument .........................................................................................................16
[brief] ”  Caldwell v. Rochelle Park Twp., 135 N.J. Super. 66, 76 (Law Div. 1975).  According to this directive, a trial court cannot just ignore a published decision of the Appellate Division that is directly on point – even if it is the only opinion to examine that particular issue.  Twp. of Bernards is directly on point and is dispositive of a majority of the legal issues raised by Plaintiff.  In Twp. of Bernards, the Court examined the obligations that OPMA imposes on public entities to provide “adequate notice” of public of a meeting.  233 N.J. Super. at 25-26.  At issue was whether the act of transmitting written notice to newspapers at least 48 hours before the meeting --- 5  Plaintiff has not appealed the Court’s Order and decision dated March 4, 2022, and therefore he cannot challenge the trial court’s finding that Count One of the Verified Complaint is moot. constitutes “adequate notice”, or whether the notice must be published in the newspapers before it becomes “adequate notice”.  *Id.*  The Court held that merely transmitting the notice to newspapers at least 48 hours in advance of the meeting satisfies the “adequate notice” requirements under OPMA.  *Id.*
[brief] The trial court noted that the T&M memo prepared by project consultant initially referenced settlement at the north abutment; however, the project engineer for [...], [...], followed up with an email that stated it was not the north approach but the south approach.  The court further noted that [...] testified that he had no reason to question the veracity of the Matthews email.  (Pa2133).  Moreover, [...] testified that as to settlement at the north abutment, the T&M report does not provide any support.  (Pa2133).  As such, the trial court appropriately found that the T&M memo did not provide a factual basis for [...] to conclude that settlement at the abutment joint created a dangerous condition that caused the accident.
[brief] The State presented one witness at the suppression hearing, [...].  (1T 5-1 to 74-19)  Soulias testified that he is a patrolman with the [...], and that on January 1, 2020, he was patrolling Route 18.  (1T 5-10 to 16, 7-7 to 19)  Soulias stated that he was in an unmarked vehicle at the intersection of Route 18 and Eggers Street, perpendicular to the traffic on Route 18.  (1T 7-20 to 9-2)  At around 10:50pm, he pulled over a Chevy Suburban.
[brief] On cross-examination, [...] acknowledged that the 1972 Site Plan (Da934) had no fire lane in the Sixth Street courtyard and no curb cut on Sixth Street for access to the courtyard.  The curb cut that now existed on Sixth Street was in front of Lot 8.  He also acknowledged that the 1972 Site Plan depicted a walkway from Sixth Street across the courtyard to the School entry (13T65-3 to 96-20).  On re-direct, there was further inquiry as to the 1972 Site Plan and a 1993 proposed Site Plan (Da934) that apparently was not filed or approved (13T97-3 to 104-24).
[brief] Because the language is permissive, Plaintiffs / Respondents were not barred from filing a Complaint, and did so on 6 April 2023.  (Appellants’ Pa001).  The presiding Civil Judge in Somerset County, [...], P.J.Cv., tried to settle the case but ultimately did not.  It was then transferred to Mercer County (Appellants’ Pa018) to be handled by [...], J.S.C. who heard and denied a Motion to Dismiss Complaint in Lieu of Filing an filed by Appellants in an effort to avoid litigation in the Superior Court (Appellants’ Pa019).  Then, instead of engaging in the litigation process, Appellants chose to file this Appeal (Appellants’ Pa061) with the foreseeable consequence of further delaying same.  Appellants requested a transcript of Judge McLaughlin’s decision, a Certification of Transcript Completion and Delivery was filed confirming it was uploaded and has been or will be included in Appellants’ Appendix per R.2:6-1(a)(1)(G).  As a result, litigation of the underlying matter regarding the financial obligations of the parties and requirements to pay debts of Respondent [...] and the personally liable individual parties involved continue to be on hold until this issue is resolved by the Appellate Division.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] [...]’s Professional Relationship with [...]  In 1993, [...] enrolled into PERS.  (1T10:19-20).  From 2003 to the present, with the exception of 2008, [...] served as Municipal Prosecutor for [...].  (1T9:22-10:2).  From 2009 through 2014, [...] solicited [...]’s services through the Request for Proposals process under the LPCL.  (1T11:10-11:12).  Her job duties and responsibilities as Municipal Prosecutor for [...] remained the same since the beginning of her service in 2003.  (1T12:1-9).  [...] has also been the Municipal Prosecutor for [...] (2008-present), [...] (2008-2010), [...] (2010-2012), [...] (2018-present), and [...] (2023).  (1T10:2-7).
[brief] Witt v. Gloucester County Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders, 94 N.J. 422, 429-30 (1983).  An ordinance will not be overturned by a reviewing court, unless the objector challenging the ordinance can prove that the governing body's action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536, 551 (2015).  On a review in court, the factual determination of a governing body is presumed to be valid.  The burden of proof rests with the plaintiff who challenges the municipal action.  Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 284 (2013).  The arbitrary and capricious standard, although it "may sound harsh", is simply a standard of appellate review.
[brief] The arbitrator looked at \(^4\) [...] and [...] are related entities. every single line item and awarded those dates of service where the Plaintiff proved medical necessity, causation and the level of reimbursement to which they were entitled.  To ask the court to award lump sums paid by [...] without knowing which CPT codes were being reimbursed by the health insurer would be to set aside the New Jersey Fee Schedule and issue an award based upon speculation.  Moreover, it should be noted that Plaintiff repeated notes that he “adopted” [...]’s chart of services alleged in its Arbitration Summary (Pca5-6), and argues that therefore the Fee Schedule should have been paid based on that chart.  However, the inclusion of the chart in the Arbitration Summary was not a concession that those entries were all reimbursable, did not establish the information the arbitrator found missing, nor did it establish that Plaintiff was somehow relieved of his burden of proof to prove his claim as to each entry.  Rather, it was, as it specifically indicates, merely a summary statement of “the dates of service and amounts alleged at issue. ”  (Pca5)  Even with the “adoption” of this chart, Plaintiffs still did not produce the Explanation of Benefits (“EOB”) from Plaintiff’s health insurer, [...], upon which the reimbursement was sought, which presumably would have differentiated the payments for each of the CPT codes on each date of service.  Because Plaintiff failed to present that evidence, the arbitrator’s decision was proper.  Furthermore, Plaintiff’s argument simply ignores the fact that this is a reimbursement claim for bills which were already paid by [...], so he cannot simply seek PIP benefits pursuant to the Fee Schedule as if the bills had never been paid.  (See, Pa14, on Demand for Arbitration, noting that the provider is “[...] Lien”)  Further, [...] committed no error nor overstepped his bounds in reviewing the umpire’s decision and confirming it.
[brief] Following the close of discovery, Defendants filed respective Motions for Summary Judgment on December 4, 2022, oral argument for which was heard by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on December 16, 2022.  (Pa48 to Pa93).  Following argument, the lower court announced it would reserve and issue a written opinion, which it did on December 16, 2022.  (Pa71 to Pa93).  Therein, the motion judge dismissed the First Amended Complaint in full with prejudice.
[brief] 9  1.  The Court Below failed to impose a Constructive trust on the home property for the benefit of Plaintiffs after determining that there was a Confidential relationship and that Unjust Enrichment must be returned as no Gift was ever made by [...] to [...] (Pa1-7) (6T 31-42) ...........................................................................................................................................  9  a.  Elements of a Confidential Relationship were met (Pa1-7) (6T 31-42) .................................................................  9  b.  The Court Below improperly failed to shift the burden of proof to the Defendants, even after finding that there was a Confidential Relationship, such that the Defendants had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that they were supposed to benefit from the house purchase and not the Elderly Parents, (Pa-1-7 ) (6T- 31-42) (Pa 28).  ...........................................15  2.  The Trial Court Below erred in awarding the incorrect amount of Unjust Enrichment, and wrongly allowed the Defendants to keep the equity of the home (Pa1-7) (6T 31-42)  ...........................................................................................................................................20  3.  The Court Below improperly determined that there was a joint venture, when neither party claimed or argued that there was a joint venture, and it makes no sense considering that the Court did find unjust enrichment.  In fact it could never be a joint venture because the Court had ruled no contract existed on summary judgment, and even if there had been one, improperly divided the equity (Pa1-7) (6T 31-42) (Pa31-31) .........................................................21  4.  The Court erred when it dismissed Plaintiff’s Count for Breach of Fiduciary on the Summary Judgment Cross Motion (Pa36-38)  .................................................................25  CONCLUSION  ...........................................................................................................26
[brief] *Dzwonar*, supra, 177 N.J. at 464; *Maimone v. City of Atlantic City*, 188 N.J. 221, 230 (2006) (“These requirements must be liberally construed to effectuate CEPA’s important social goals. ”).  “The evidentiary burden at the prima facie stage is ‘rather modest. ’”  *Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc.*, 182 N.J. 436, 447 (2005)(emphasis added).  As the New Jersey Supreme Court aptly explained, “consistent reaffirmance of the plaintiff’s light evidentiary burden acknowledges that requiring greater proof would generally prevent a plaintiff from accessing the tools, i.e., evidence of the employer’s motivation, necessary to even begin to assemble a case. ”  *Id.* at 436.  a.  **The Unlawful Activity.  (PA000001-PA000015). **  As to the first requirement of a CEPA claim, it has consistently been held that as a legal inquiry, the court must determine if there is a “substantial nexus between the complained-of conduct and a law of policy identified by the court or the plaintiff.
[directive] Confidentiality  9.6.1  The nature and source of internal allegations, the progress of internal affairs investigations, and the resulting materials are confidential information and remain exempt from access under the New Jersey Open Public Records Act, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 to -13.  The contents of an internal investigation case file, including the original complaint, shall be retained in the internal affairs function and clearly marked as confidential.  The information and records of an internal investigation shall only be released or shared under the following limited circumstances:  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022
[brief] Id; Bergen County PBA Loc. 134 v. Donovan, 436 N.J. Super. at 197.  Here, it is beyond cavil that Appellant’s expansive reading of prohibited third-party disclosures, which in his view includes letter vendors and telegram operators, is at odds with the rest of the FDCPA statutory scheme which regulates the use of telegrams for permitted use under law.  As such, Appellant’s “plain” reading of the statue must be set aside in favor of an interpretation which renders the FDCPA internally consistent and in line with Congressional intent and legislative history.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 19:63-22.  Thus, the statute imagines only the first two scenarios below, not the third: | Scenario | Postmarked | Received by Board on Time | Explanation | |----------|------------|---------------------------|-------------| | 1 | Yes | Yes |  Ballot is postmarked on a date prior to or on the date of the election and is received within six days of the closing of the polls.  This is unquestionably accepted.  | | 2 | No | Yes |  Ballot does not contain a postmarked date at all, but it is still received within two days of the closing of the polls.  | | 3 | Yes (late) | Yes |  Ballot is postmarked late but is still received within 48 or 144 hours of the closing of the polls.  |  It defies logic that had these ballots simply not been postmarked by the USPS at all, their vote would be counted, as Scenario 2 would take effect.  But the act of having a delayed postmark, through no fault of their own, resulted in the Board rejecting their ballot.  In most instances, the ballot should be rejected because there is no evidence it was cast prior to the closing of the polls—although the Legislature apparently seemed willing to risk that by accepting ballots received after the polls closed despite not having a postmark at all.
[brief] (2T44-19 to 23; 2T45-14 to 20).  At 6:54 p.m., they were stopped at a red traffic signal located at Magnolia Avenue and Jackson Avenue, when they heard gunshots within a very close distance to their location, in the direction of Jackson Avenue and Bond Street.  (2T46-1 to 3; 2T51-16 to 52-4).  They immediately proceeded in the direction of Bond Street and, as they turned onto Jackson Avenue, [...] observed an individual wearing a light-colored hoody darting away from the right side of the street, where [...] is located, and towards backyards that were located across the street from the barbershop.  (2T52-23 to 53-9).  The person in the hoody was the only person that [...] saw running across the street.  (2T54-9 to 12).  In response, Detectives Gonzalez and Nicholas proceeded down Jackson Avenue, whereupon [...]’s attention was drawn to what appeared to be gun smoke underneath one of the lampposts closer to the intersection of Jackson Avenue and Bond Street.  (2T54-21 to 55-3).  [...] notified police headquarters via his police radio that he was in pursuit of someone as a result of hearing shots fired, and then he pulled over his police vehicle, exited the car, and gave chase after the individual.  (2T56-21 to 57-1; 2T58-1 to 7; 2T61-3 to 66-7).  [...] also exited the vehicle, but he proceeded to the right side of Jackson Avenue, towards the barbershop.  (2T57-2 to 6).  Surveillance video captured the detectives’ arrival, the suspect [...] described, and [...]’s initial pursuit.  (2T70-17 to 74-2).  [...] eventually stopped his chase and returned to the barbershop.  (2T74-4 to 76-2).  Meanwhile, Elizabeth Police Officer [...], who was working in the community services division as a patrolman, also responded to the scene.
[brief] THE COURT: -- '18, occurred sometime in '18.  And this case started with a complaint, an amended complaint.  It was taken up to -- remanded -- or, I'm sorry, removed from State Court up to the District Court.  It results in this fifth amended complaint that we're all assuming for today's purposes is the one that came back on remand.  And it's just -- it's incomprehensible.  It's impossible, impossible for a defendant to respond appropriately to the complaint because it's not concise.  It's not -- it's not sensible at times.  It's just a stream of consciousness of different legal theories, different facts all mingled together to be an incomprehensible mess.  (5/25/23 Transcript @ T48:4 to T49:7).  The Trial Court went on to conclude:
[brief] (Da2154)  The Arbitrator denied the postponement request immediately and did not even await Plaintiffs’ response as to consent or not.  (Da2508)  He then considered Plaintiffs’ motion for final relief as unopposed and did not consider [...]’s pro se, “out of time” opposition, or [...]’s September 8, 2018 “cross motion”.  (Da2160)(Da2210)  He later based some of his rulings for Plaintiffs on being “uncontroverted”, ignoring that his refusal was the reason.  (Da2211)  While their final relief motion was pending, Plaintiffs moved to confirm the Partial Final Award that stripped [...] of $1,000,019 in [...] interests.  (Da1299)  [...]’s new counsel opposed and cross-moved for vacatur on the basis that the parties’ arbitration agreement, and the AAA rules, had required a panel of 3 arbitrators for all “Phase II” claims because more than $1,000,000 was at stake.
[brief] In declining to provide --- 4See Fidelity Asset Management, LLC v. Lore Smith, A-1982-22, (N.J. App. Div. March 4, 2024); US Bank Cust for PC7 Firstrust v. Block 5.04, Lot 16, A-2384-21, (N.J. App. Div. Dec. 15, 2023); US Bank Cust/Procap8/MgtII v. Block 268, Lot 7, No. A-2193-21 (N.J. App. Div. Jan. 18, 2024)(The Appellate Division did not upend the final judgment of tax foreclosure because of [...] in the post-[...] pipeline case).
[brief] *Saddle River*, *supra* at 137.  Just compensation is the fair market value of the property acquired as of the date of taking; which is determined by “what a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree to, neither being under any compulsion to act. ”  *State v. Silver*, 92 N.J. 507, 513 (1983).  The fair market value is the “value that would be assigned to the acquired property by knowledgeable parties freely negotiating for its sale under normal market conditions based on all surrounding circumstances at the time of the taking.