ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 11,18 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-20  11  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-25.a.(2)  11  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-60.a.  12  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70  12 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-76.b.  12  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.d.  10,12,29  ORDINANCES 20-014D 9 21-004D 9 22-2.4 10,20,29
[brief] Table of Judgments and Order .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii Preliminary Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Procedural History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Legal Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 POINT ONE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 THERE WAS NOT AN IMPROPER DENIAL OF ACCESS UNDER N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b) BECAUSE A REQUEST FOR INFORMATION WAS NOT MADE TO THE CUSTODIAN.  (Da85; Da108)  POINT TWO  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9  A CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS IS NOT REQUIRED TO AUTONOMOUSLY PROVIDE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(B)  WHEN DENYING ACCESS TO AN EXEMPT CRIMINAL INVESTIGATORY RECORD UNDER THE OPEN PUBLIC RECORDS ACT IN RESPONDING TO A RECORDS REQUEST.  (Da85; Da108)  POINT THREE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17  IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO FIND PLAINTIFF  A PREVAILING PARTY AND AWARD  ATTORNEY’S FEES  BECAUSE THERE THE TOWNSHIP CUSTODIAN COMPLIED WITH OPRA AND THERE WAS NO IMPROPER DENIAL OF ACCESS.  (Da85; Da108)  Conclusion .................................................
[brief] [...] and [...] later stipulated that “…the alleged acts and/or omissions of [...] (referred to in the original complaint as “[...]”) were done within the scope of his employment with O.A. [...]…”  See Da214.  [...] failed to close the hatch and warn me that it was still open as I was approaching.  He apologized to me multiple times and said that he forgot to close it.  (Da126-Da127, Plaintiffs’ Answers to Interrogatories, Form C, #2).
[brief] “I wanna make 110% clear to you …  I don’t want you to think that we’re certainly not railroading anything here but we want you to be aware that if you know who this is because it looks like he’s going into your house. ”  (Da 47; 25T 53-21 to 54-5; Da 17 at 32:56 to 33:15)  [...] responded, “I swear, I swear to my life …. I got[] a mother.  I got[] a mother ….  It’s not a good thing you know, like silent treatment; don’t speak to ya’ll whatever, whatever ….  I would not cause that can be my mother. ”  (Da 47-48; 25T 54-9 to 25; Da 17 at 33:16 to 33:41)  On an eighth attempt, detectives again tried a minimization tactic:
[brief] •  On Monday, the locks to the building had been changed.  Plaintiffs were all locked out.  When the complex's manager gave them access to their building, [...] had cleaned out all paper files and equipment, including his computer, from his office and his mother's office, who served as bookkeeper.  [...] refused to give them access to the books and records of the company, even after the court entered the temporary restraining order requiring him to do so.
[brief] 1T16:3–9.  However, in addition to Paragraphs 9 and 13 of the Verified Complaint, (Pa2 ¶¶ 9, 13), Defendant’s Certification contains numerous references and exhibits supporting Plaintiff’s claims, in, e.g., Paragraph 24 (Pa66 ¶ 24); Paragraph 36 (Pa69 ¶ 36); Paragraph 51 (Pa72 ¶ 51); and, more particularly, Exhibit I thereto (Pa297-98).  The trial court then accepted evidence provided by Defendant that refuted Plaintiff’s allegations that framed [...] lyrics were hung in the guest room of the Englewood Property.  1T18:12–17.
[brief] [...] was in custody once [...] made clear that he was not going to let [...] leave even after completing the tasks related to the motor vehicle stop, or alternatively, after [...] obtained probable cause for an arrest.  Because [...] was in custody, [...] was required to read [...] his Miranda rights.  Because he failed to do so, this Court should suppress [...]’ responses to [...]’s questions.  U.S. Const. amends.  V, XIV; N.J. Const. art. 1, paras. 7; N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19.  “Miranda ‘warnings must be given before a suspect’s statement made during custodial interrogation may be admitted in evidence.
[brief] Fourth, [...] is a sophisticated insurer that should have known at the time it entered into the Policy that there would or could likely be other insurers involved in a subsequent claim by [...] who would not be subject to the bilateral arbitration clause in [...]’s Policy with [...].  See generally, Hearing Tr. 68:20-69:4 (noting the insurance sophistication of [...] and its attorneys).  So entering into a Policy with an arbitration clause that carries the risk of waiver if not exercised in the company of a multi-party insurance litigation should not come as a surprise to [...].  Fifth, [...]’s efficiency argument is not compelling here.  [...] complains that the arbitration would still require litigation afterward with respect to contribution.  However, [...] would have six years of litigation, interrupted by an arbitration, with additional litigation among the insurers without [...] thereafter.  Two proceedings are likely necessary either way (unless an arbitrator and court reached the exact same percentages).  Accordingly, [...]’s quixotic efficiency through delay is illusory.  [...] cites to the Chassen case to support its argument, even though it is a federal case that is not controlling authority here.  However, the Chassen case actually supports [...]’s position.  As mentioned above, defendants in Chassen timely raised the arbitration within three months of a change in the law that permitted those claims to be arbitrated.  There has been no change in the law here, so there is a significant factual distinction.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO RESPONDENT AND DISCHARGING THE MORTGAGE BECAUSE THERE EXISTS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHETHER APPELLANT WAS REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE PARTIAL PAYMENT (Pa416-17).  The trial court erred by identifying and then subsequently ignoring genuine issues of material fact regarding whether, under the terms of the loan, Appellant was required to accept or reject the partial payment, making summary judgment both premature and inappropriate.  As such, the Court should remand for further discovery on the factual issues raised by the trial court pertaining to whether Appellant was required to accept or reject the partial payment under the terms of the Loan.
[brief] The allegations asserted in the Complaint, Plaintiff’s proffered Affidavit of Merit, and the Legislature and the courts’ recognition of the licensing strictures for insurance brokers evidence that the professionals acting in their professional capacity here are on par with other types of professionals excluded from liability under the CFA.  While such an analysis is unnecessary, undertaking it supports affirming the trial court’s decision.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**  Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on February 27, 2024.  (Pa004 – Pa052).  Defendants then filed pre-answer motions to dismiss certain Counts within the Complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), including Count VII relative to Plaintiff’s CFA claims.  (Pa001-Pa003).  On July 19, 2024, following oral argument and a well-reasoned decision, the Hon. [...], P.J.Cv., granted, in relevant part, Defendants’ motions on the CFA claims and dismissed Count VII with prejudice.
[brief] The upshot of these studies on deterrence, as outlined by the heralded National Academies of Sciences report on mass incarceration, is that the relationship between sentence length and crime rate is nonlinear, but rather decreases in slope as the sentence length increases.  National Research Council, The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences 138-39 (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western, & Steve Radburn eds., 2014).  That means that as sentences get longer, the deterrent effect of extending the sentence decreases—for each additional month or year added to a long sentence, the marginal increased deterrent value of that additional month or year becomes less and less, approaching zero.  Id. at 139.  The report concluded that “increasing already long sentences has no material deterrent effect. ”  Id. at 140.  Here, [...] is already serving a twenty-year NERA sentence for the robbery.  To assess whether a consecutive certain persons offense sentence is necessary for deterrence, we must start from the deterrent value of the twenty-year sentence.  This is by far the longest sentence [...] has ever served in his life; previously, the longest sentence [...] had served in custody was a six year sentence with three years of parole ineligibility on Essex Indictment  Thus, this court must inquire whether imposing the sentence on the certain persons offense consecutive to the sentence on the robbery would further deter [...] from committing future crimes.  While the social science presented above does not yield a formula for determining the marginal increase in deterrence for each additional year, depending on the length of the initial sentence, the social science does lead to the conclusion that [...]’s twenty-year sentence qualifies as a long sentence and increasing it would have no material deterrent effect.  The Growth of Incarceration in the United States at 140.
[brief] [...] testified that his lawyer was [...] of the [...] firm.  (Da109).  [...] testified that [...] wrote correspondence for him in the underlying matter of August 2, 2017, sending a letter to [...]’s brother, [...], and his sister, [...].  (Da109).  [...] testified that he has been represented by [...] for the last 23 years.  (Da109).  [...] testified that he never would have signed a Retainer Agreement with anyone other than [...].  (Da109).  [...] testified that his lawyers at the [...] firm were [...] and [...].
[brief] 8.  On or about March 01, 2023, Plaintiff visited the [...] seeking adjournments.  Plaintiff provided defendant [...] the December 1st, 2017, order (Pa 1-10) in Docket No. [...] vacating and setting aside the Sheriff's Sale and any deed recorded in the matter as void ab initio.  Defendant [...] responded by stating that plaintiff had no more adjournments, that Plaintiff had used all his adjournments and refused to grant plaintiff adjournment request contrary to his civil right under N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36 (Pa 165).  At this point, plaintiff was deprived of a right at the point defendants denied plaintiff request and statutory right for adjournments and denied the plaintiff free exercise of the right without any interruption.
[brief] The Administrator’s suggestion that Plaintiff was cooperating with him prior to January 5, 2017 was based primarily upon the nature of the interactions between them during that time.  During that period, Plaintiff’s activity consisted of explaining his allegations to the Administrator, and Plaintiff was more than happy to expound upon them.  As was later explained by the Administrator, however, Plaintiff had produced no evidence in support of his allegations.  At the end of the day, after years of a highly labor-intensive investigation, which began as far back as May 14, 2014, the Administrator, in hindsight, concluded that:  Plaintiff appeared to want to turn this ancillary proceeding into a “never-ending circular chase to prove a construct/thesis of his own creation so that he can continue to strategically exert pressure on his family and stepmother in the probate proceedings pending in the Republic of Korea; and plaintiff failed to take into consideration the substantial costs the estate would incur if the investigation were to continue.
[brief] Indeed, she testified that she wrote that [...] was “calmer” because he previously had not been able to ejaculate, [Pa 531-32], and that [...]’s difficulty ejaculating was not a sign of aggression, [Pa 482-83].6  The same reasoning applies to [...]’s email to Defendants stating that [...] “gave us some trouble. ”  [...] testified that “trouble” was in reference to difficulty ejaculating.  [Pa855].  However, she too confirmed that difficulty ejaculating was not a sign of aggression in [...].  [Pa 874-75 879].  The intended recipient of these communications, Defendant [...], similarly testified that a stallion’s inability to ejaculate and need for breaks from collection is not a sign of aggression.  [Pa 216-17].  Plaintiffs cannot create a disputed fact by imputing a meaning to [...]’s communications that is 6  Plaintiffs’ brief cites the fact that [...] interpreted [...]’s email to mean that [...] “would kind of act up when he did not want to be collected .  . . .” [Pb 22-23].  However, [...] testified that this behavior was not a sign that [...] might attack.  [Pa 874-75 879].  contrary to the understanding of the interlocutors unless an expert can testify that, based on what they should have known about stallions, their understanding was somehow flawed or mistaken.
[directive] Na poniższe dodatkowe pytania powinny odpowiedzieć tylko osoby przyznające się do popełnienia niektórych przestępstw związanych z narkotykami, które przyznają się również do posiadania broni popełniania, usiłowania popełnienia, lub zmowy przestępczej w celu palnej lub innej broni podczas popełnienia któregokolwiek z tych przestępstw.  Jeżeli był(a) Pan(i) w posiadaniu broni palnej, należy odpowiedzieć na pytania 1 a, b i c.  Jeżeli nie był(a) Pan(i) w posiadaniu broni palnej, należy zaznaczyć, że pytanie 1a Pana(i) nie dotyczy i odpowiedzieć na pytania 1b i c.  The following questions need to be answered if you are pleading guilty to certain drug offenses and also are pleading guilty to possession of a firearm or other weapon while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of the following offenses.
[brief] [...] testified that she did have an employment agreement but neither of the documents presented in court were the correct document.  [1T P52:L17-19]  [...] explained that at the end of 2019, as a result of a lawsuit filed by the former President [...], there was an effort to update employment agreements to include proper arbitration language.  [1T P48-49]  Appellant admitted this was true.  [2T P38:L11-13]  [...] agreed the March 7th signature page on the various agreements presented by the Appellants was her signature.  She denied, however, that either document was her actual employment agreement.  QUESTION: “Is this the same document that you signed in March of 2029?”  ANSWER: “No”  [1T 52 L17-19]  She contended the signature page was simply attached to various documents created by the Appellants designed to compel her to proceed to arbitration subsequent to her termination.  [1T P51-58]  She also provided detailed testimony concerning the second alleged employment agreement which was consistent with her earlier deposition testimony.  [1T P55-56]  For example, she indicated the initials on page 6 were not her initials.  [1T P55-56]  She also questioned the authenticity of page 7 as well as her initials on that page.  [1T P55]  She then explained to the court, consistent with her deposition, various problems with the document led her to believe this was simply a second cut and paste effort to create a fraudulent document.  [1T P55-58, 212a, 276a]  The Respondent also testified at the hearing her personal email was still linked to her work email and as a result she received a series of security alerts indicating someone accessed her former work email.  [1T P75-79]  The Respondent showed the court and counsel, from her cell phone the security alerts that began on July 25, 2023.  These alerts came months before the Appellants claim that found her agreement in an email and only six weeks after the Respondent opposed the Appellant motion to compel.  The trial court had the opportunity to review the evidence and more importantly hear and observe the witnesses and ask questions.
[brief] By Order entered and filed on February 4, 2022, the municipal appeal, which had been filed in the (wrong) Civil Division, was transferred to the Criminal Division.  (Pa312).  By letter dated March 17, 2022, from the Criminal Division Manager’s Office, Plaintiff’s counsel, [...], Esq., was advised that [...] (Hon. [...], J.S.C.) granted Plaintiff’s application to accept the previously filed notice of municipal appeal out of time.  In the same letter, however, Plaintiff’s attorney was advised that the application for indigency was denied and that additional documents were required to complete the request (Pa314).  By email dated April 12, 2022, [...] was again advised by the court staff that the additional information requested to consider the application for indigency had not been received, that the application was already out of time and that the appeal was not considered filed until the indigency request was decided by [...] and/or Plaintiff decided to pay the fee and order the transcripts.  (Pa317).
[directive] Step 3.  Choose the 3a.  Sanction/Punishment Response , -------- Level1 Level2 Level 5 Community s 4 hrs s 24 hrs s 32 hrs s 8 hrs s 16 hrs  Service Curfew s 3 days s 5 days s 7 days s 10 days s 15 days s 7 days s 15 days s 7 days s 3 days  Review  Termination Placement 3b.  Therapeutic Response Levels Level 1 plus: Level 1, 2, plus: Level 1, 2, 3, plus: • Behavior chain • LOC review • Referral medication • Re-assessment • Cost/benefit analysis eval • Skill development • Referral for MAT • Thought restructuring • Treatment team • Homework/practice review/round table • Thinking report 3c.
[brief] ”  Appendix A, p. 7-8.  In both this action and the *Lajara* action, [...] cited *Manetti v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co.*, 196 N.J.Super. 317 (1984) and *Endo Surgi Center, P.C. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.*, 391 N.J.Super. 588 (2007), two cases that, in fact, found that there is no right to a jury trial in PIP matters.  Pb19-20; Appendix A, p. 7-8.  [...] observed in its brief on appeal to this Court in *Lajara*:  “Defendants [that is, the providers] do not argue that they are entitled to a jury trial on Plaintiffs’ [[...]’s and the Attorney General’s] PIP Declaratory Judgment counts. ”  Appendix A, p. 8.  The same is true here.  [...], no doubt, would respond that it lost the jury-trial argument in *Lajara* and that, therefore, the *Lajara* decision supports its position on this appeal.  The problem with this response is that the --- 2
[brief] (App. Div. Mar. 4, 2015) (holding that a business owner had no duty to warn of a sizzling hot plate of food as the plate presented an open and obvious condition).  In her Appeal, Plaintiff argues that viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party, there was a sufficient question of fact as to whether Defendants maintained a reasonably safe premises such that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment should have been denied.
[brief] [...] and his wife, [...], operated [...] in [...].  The store served a predominantly Hispanic clientele and Navarrete and Aguilar's English skills were limited.  On July 18, 2007, at 9:00 a.m., Navarrete and Aguilar arrived at [...] with their infant son.  At approximately 4:00 p.m., two young men entered the store.  Aguilar emerged from the back office to assist them, but upon realizing that the men spoke only English, she called for Navarrete, who had a greater mastery of the language.  At trial, Navarrete and Aguilar described both men as young black males: one man was tall and thin and wore a black rag on his head; the other was shorter and wore a hat.  Navarrete and Aguilar distinguished between the two by referring to their comparative heights.  Their in-court identifications reflected that the “taller,” “thinner” man was defendant [...] and the “shorter” man was defendant [...].  The afternoon of the incident, as the men perused a jewelry catalog, Livingston told Navarrete that he wanted to purchase a necklace with a name plaque that read “Erica” and wrote the name on a post-it.  Livingston then asked Navarrete to make a photocopy of a particular catalog page to show his girlfriend the necklace.  Navarrete produced the photocopy and gave it to the men.  The customers then departed, taking the photocopy with them but leaving the catalog and post-it on the counter of the display case.  Five minutes later, they re-entered the store.
[brief] 1T 180-181.  [...] provided notice of these issues after paying $130,000.00 toward a failed system.  [...] and [...] then sought to rely on after-the-fact “disclaimers” that were not communicated during the sales, contracting, or design phase (or any documents provided to [...] during the sales phase).  1T 149-151.  On November 12, 2019, [...] filed their complaint against [...] and [...] as defendants and alleging violations of the Consumer Fraud Act (Count I), Breach of Contract (Count II), Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Count III), Unjust Enrichment (Count IV), and Breach of Warranty (Count V).
[brief] (Pa121-22).  He will have no further involvement in this matter.  Second, [...] was not indicted.  (Pa9-119).  Nothing in the indictment against [...] in his personal capacity will cause [...] and the attorneys handling the representation, [...] and [...], to advocate any positions in the course of this representation or any other representation that will conflict with or be adverse to the interests of their clients in this case—[...], [...], [...], [...], and the individual defendants employed in therein—or the State as a whole.
[brief] The court began with an extensive exposition on how to apply the law on statutory construction, summed up by "the language [the statute], and its statutory context, as well as the history of the [statute]...."  *Compressor Station*, slip op. at 4; Hra4.  The court noted that "although we ordinarily accord substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute the agency is charged with enforcing, no deference is required when 'an agency's interpretation is contrary to the statutory language or if the agency's interpretation undermines Legislature's intent.'"  *Id.* at 10.  The operative words are "no deference," not some form of reduced deference.  The [...] Decision is contrary to the statutory language quoted above and undermines the Legislature’s intention expressed in several statutes, by resorting to an absurd de minimis test, as discussed below.
[brief] POINT  2.  PLAINTIFF SUSTAINED SERIOUS INJURIES, INCLUDING MULTIPLE DISC HERNIATIONS AND CHRONIC DEPRESSION, AND HER FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO HAVE A JURY OF HER PEERS  DETERMINE THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THOSE PERMANENT INJURIES THAT WERE CAUSED BY THE BUS DRIVER’S NEGLIGENT DRIVING MUST BE SAFEGUARDED (1T9:13-23; 1T12:10-13; 1T13:18-23)
[brief] 6T144:7-15.  [...] testified that in his voir dire of [...], [...] should have asked her if she actually read and understood the English PSA, which was not in her native language, but he failed to do that.  6T144:12-15.  In addition to the deviation from standards represented by the Rules of Professional Conduct, [...] also opined that [...] failed to comply with Court Rule 5:3-5 which requires a written retainer including a description of services to be rendered in matrimonial actions.
[brief] For example, plaintiff cites no basis to attack [...]’s credibility except by saying that he paid his personal credit card from [...] assets.  Pb21,30.  Of course, if that were true, it would not undermine [...]’s credibility, and that is not what he testified.  His testimony was that he allowed his personal credit card to be used to pay [...] expenses and then was reimbursed for that credit card debt.  2T132:9-133:7.  In fact, he testified that he largely exhausted his savings due to lack of compensation from [...].  2T131:17-132:8.  As to [...], plaintiff alleges that his credibility should be questioned because [...]’s trial testimony differed from his deposition testimony.