ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] “Erroneous instructions on material points are presumed to be reversible error. ”  *State v. Robinson*, 165 N.J. 32, 53 (2000).  Jury charges are a “road map to guide the guy, and without an appropriate charge a jury can take a wrong turn. ”  *Ibid.*  “Erroneous instructions in a criminal case are poor candidates for rehabilitation under the plain error theory. ”  *State v. Jordan*, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997).  The “trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on identification constituted plain error,” “requir[ing] a reversal of defendant’s judgment of conviction. ”  *Davis*, 363 N.J. Super. at 559.
[brief] [11T45-6 to -23].  [...] testified that he had a close relationship with his sister and that he would see and communicate with her daily.  [10T75-7 to -25].  On September 17, 2019, [...] saw [...] at their sister [...]’s home.  [10T76-4 to -9].  The two made plans to pick up her Dodge Durango in [...], where [...] resided with [...], and bring it to [...] so she could work on fixing the vehicle’s brakes.  [10T76-13 to -24].  However, the plans never came to fruition.
[brief] By stopping plaintiff without probable cause, assaulting and battering him, searching him unlawfully arresting him and attempting to violate [...]’s privacy by trying to enter her car without her consent without reasonable suspicion, and without a warrant, the police acted with intent and violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.  Plaintiff was racially profiled due to his black race, stopped then searched which violates his civil rights in violation of NJSA 10:6-2 (c ) and rights under Article 1 para 1, 5, 7 of the New Jersey Constitution.  Based on this, the police were not eligible to qualified immunity.
[brief] [T]he Legislature has not defined “bad faith” as used in N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1.  “An act in bad faith is an act by one person or entity that affects another, failing to accord a reasonable duty of care toward the other, unjustifiably harming the other's interests by an act of a quality or form that would not occur if the person or entity had acted with good faith. ”  [...], The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier Law Dictionary Desk Edition, 2012.  Other New Jersey courts have noted sister state definitions that “[b]ad faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence, rather it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.  It is different from the negative idea of negligence in that it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. ”  Borzillo v. Borzillo, 259 N.J. Super. 286, 292 (Ch. Div. 1992) (citations omitted).  While the court is not bound by these definitions, case law and the absence of a statutory definition support the view that the court is required to make a determination of whether bad faith exists on a case-by-case basis.
[brief] **PROCEDURAL HISTORY** ..................................................................................................................  1  **STATEMENT OF FACTS** ..............................................................................................................  2  A.  The Application ..........................................................................................................................  2  B.  The 2018 Rezoning Request, the 2019 Township Master Plan Re-Examination and 2019 Land Use Element Update .........................................................................................................................  4  C.  The Hearing ..................................................................................................................................  8  D.  Trial Court Decision ....................................................................................................................  19  **LEGAL ARGUMENT** ...................................................................................................................
[brief] [...] subsequently acquired title to the adjacent riparian lands which were then underwater through purchasing a riparian grant from the State of New Jersey on May 10, 1879.  Pa0911-Pa0916.  Thus, as of May 10, 1879, [...] owned both the uplands and the adjoining riparian lands of what is now collectively the Property.  Id.  On January 15, 1909, [...] conveyed certain lands, including the lands that are now the Property, to [...].  Pa0917-Pa0921.  Notably, the deed from [...] to [...] included a legal description which was limited to the upland property that was being conveyed.
[brief] (Da 67 at 17:34 to 20:39)  In support of [...]’s alibi, the defense admitted a series of video still-shots from electric company at [...], which depicted the intersection of east 16th and Governor and showed two people walking along East 16th toward a truck, then neither person present, and then only one person reappeared from behind truck.  (2T 95-17 to 100-15; #t 84-8 to 13)  In addition to the video from [...], [...], and the electric company, the State admitted videos (mostly without testimony as to what they depicted, aside from the streets) from a car wash and pizzeria, both on 12th Avenue near alto Rango; a moving company on east 16th near its intersection with Lafayette Street, corner of East 16th and Lafayette; a car dealership further north along East 16th; and a day under 100 yards from [...].
[directive] 01~ .:::1.itl ~AaWil. ;zj-8}7} ~-&oJl 91¥-~ £1-8} '?f~J-7Jzl-.g.  __ 1d __ 1H-%l (1d, -%l 1?!QJ= %~~ 3i) 'T ?: 7]'?JW 91¥-~ '?17c}7]Z}-~ __ 7H-%l(1d/-%l ?~ 7]AHW ~) '.U~l-]tj-, ~7c} lj_ __ ~ 0 ]  Are you pleading guilty to a crime that contains a presumption of imprisonment which means that [Yes/"11] [No/0 }i...J.ll.]
[brief] [O]ne of the major purposes of the provision is to guard against inordinate delay between public charge and trial, which, wholly aside from possible prejudice to a defense on the merits, may “seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends. ”  [Barker v. Wingo, supra at 537 (White, J., concurring), quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971). ]  Prejudice caused by pretrial delay “intensifies over time. ”  Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992).  The asserted right to a speedy trial “should prevail if the only countervailing considerations offered by the State are those connected with crowded dockets and prosecutorial caseloads. ”  Barker v. Wingo, supra at 537 (White, J., concurring).  “[U]nreasonable delay in run-of-the-mill criminal cases cannot be justified by simply asserting that the public resources provided by the State's criminal-justice system are limited and that each case must await its turn. ”  Ibid.  These appear to be the only justifications for delay here.  This delay approaches or exceeds that described in other reported cases.  See, e.g.: State v. Cahill, supra (16 months); State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J.Super. 1 (App.Div. 2009) (344 days); State v. Farrell, 320 N.J.Super. 425 (App.Div. 1999) (633 days); Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973) (10 months).
[brief] ”  *Stat v. Frost*, supra, 158 N.J. 76, 82 (1999).  “[P]rosecutors must limit their remarks to the evidence... and refrain from unfairly inflaming the jury.  State v. Johnson, 31 N.J. 489, 511 (1960). ”  *State v. Atwater*, 400 N.J. Super. 319, 335 (App. Div. 2008).  a.  **The Trial Court Erred by Not Granting a Mistrial when the Prosecutor said “This is Murder” in her Opening Statement**
[brief] It just doesn’t. ” (5T92-4 to 10).  As discussed in Defendant’s appellant briefing, this ruling failed to afford sufficient mitigation to the culpability-reducing characteristics of [...]’s youth, and failed to properly apply any of the five Miller factors.  (Db18-36)  In support of the court’s decision, the State now relies on only two facts: that the incident was heinous, and that it was planned.
[brief] ”  Jones v. Dish Network LLC, [...], 2013 WL 6169215, at *4 (App. Div. Nov. 26, 2013) (unpublished) (“Plaintiff’s contention that, on her first day of employment she was handed a stack of documents and told to sign them, without further explanation of their contents, falls far short of alleging either fraud or an unenforceable adhesion contract.
[directive] Directive 10-20 April I, 2020  3  Page  Any questions regarding Directive #10-20 may be directed to Assistant Director [...] (Criminal Practice Division) via email at [...] or by phone at [...].  Attachment (Supreme Court Order) of cc: Chief Justice [...]  Clerks Courts  Attorney General [...] Trial Court Administrators  S. Special Assistants to the Administrative Director  Public Defender [...]  Criminal Division Judges Criminal Division Managers Family Division Managers Family Division Judges Municipal Division Managers Municipal Court Judges  [...], Director, DCJ  [...], Chief of Chief Chief [...], Staff [...], AOC Directors and Assistant Directors  COURT  JERSEY SUPREME OF NEW  In response to the unprecedented public health clisis resulting from the New COVID-19 coronavirus, the Jersey Judiciary continues to implement all possible measures to avoid in-person contact as recommended by the New Jersey of Department Health ("NJ DOH") and the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC").
[brief] Order Correcting Name of Defendant (10a) .................. 7, 11  Order Setting Time, Date and Amount (30a) ................. 7, 17  Order Substituting Plaintiff (39a) ......................... 7, 17  Final Judgment (48a) .....................................  8, 17  Order denying Motion to Vacate (353a) ...................... 9, 17-18  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] C.  The Legislature’s Intent with Factor a(5) is to Exclude Applicants Who Possess Firearms from the Recovery Court Program.  Defendant states the Legislature’s goal for factor a(5), “was to target pending firearm offenses rather than the commission of a firearms offense while on bail or pretrial release for another offense. ” (Db9).  Defendant further claims that permitting his entry into Recovery Court would not create an “absurd and unreasonable result. ” (Db14).  With regard to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a(5), the intent of the Legislature is clear.  Those who unlawfully possess firearms, either during the underlying offense or at the time of any pending criminal charge, shall not be permitted into Recovery Court.  This subsection does not include defendants with prior firearm convictions.
[brief] Sentences for homicide, robbery, burglary, and possession should have been concurrent.  The sentencing court merely offered a bare conclusion in lieu of analysis: “Court finds that consecutive sentences imposed upon this defendant is appropriate because the defendant’s distinct, independent offenses had separate criminal objectives.  Thus, separate crimes deserve separate punishments. ”  (29T 55-1 to 5)  The record does not support this conclusion: there was a single act of violence against one victim during one period.  In addition to failing to qualitatively apply the Yarbough factors, the court failed to give an “overall assessment of the fairness” of four maximum consecutive terms, as required by Torres, 246 N.J. at 270-71.  There was no “explicit explanation for the overall fairness” of requiring a man in his fifties to serve a minimum of a century in prison.  The court certainly did not explain, as per Miller, 108 N.J. at 122, why it was not “inappropriate to sentence [[...]] to the maximum term for [four] offense[s] and also require that those sentences be served consecutively. ”  [...] is entitled to a resentencing.
[brief] Appellants next refer to a hypothetical intended to show that the [...] Excess Policy does not provide excess UIM coverage in all circumstances when certain underlying UIM coverage is at issue.  See Appellants’ Opening Brief, at 32 (“[I]f [...] is correct and there is no ambiguity in its application of the \(^3\)  Although not the subject of this appeal, the [...] Excess Policy provides only *excess* UIM coverage.
[brief] The applicable standard is firmly established: the factual determinations of a board are presumed to be valid and will not be overturned unless the challenger demonstrates them to be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adj. of Twp. of Franklin, 233 N.J. 546, 558 (2018); Grabowski v. Tp. of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536, 551 (2015).  Such deference is afforded to a Planning Board because local citizens, rather than courts, are in the best position to review the merits of zoning decisions.
[brief] Some are listed (NOT CITATIONS) in the Revised AAC at Pa290, ¶246.  Causation is a jury question and [...] has enough proof of LAD retaliation.  With Absecon, looking at [...]’s case in isolation, [...] appears to have been retaliated against because he asked for a lawyer and refused to sign a search permission.  Lying is also a form of retaliation – especially when it involves a Constitutional Right.  In this case lying had a double effect that it retaliated or discriminated against both [...] and [...] at the same time.  Also pulling a patient out of a hospital is discriminatory.
[brief] THE PRIMA FACIE LACK OF DUTY OF CANDOR UPON WHICH THE RESPONDENTS’ RESPONSE IS GROUNDED.  Prima facie proof of the Disingenuousness of the Response can come from Hon. [...], P.J.A.D.(retired), who conducted the April 11, 2024 and May 02, 2024 mediation hearings, who offered the respondents the bare-bones terms of (1) to install a reserved a handicapped parking space and (2) to pay the filing fees, which the respondents categorically rejected.
[brief] During his deposition, [...] from [...] testified that it was [...]’s understanding that Plaintiffs’ Property was part of the Project based upon SP 3, which incorporated Plaintiffs’ Property into the Project.  (Pa000227, page 78, line 20 to line 25; pg. 79, line 5 to pg. 82, line 11; Pa000253, page 17, line 4 to line 11\(^8\); Pa000378).  [...] from [...] also testified that the Project originally contemplated portions of Plaintiffs’ Property.  (Pa000277, page 36, line 25 to pg. 37, line 22; pg. 41, line 12 to page 42, line 7).  Furthermore, in January of 2020, a full year before [...] modified the site plan to remove Plaintiffs’ Property from the project, [...], which was in the process of purchasing the project, wrote to several of the Defendants, including [...], informing them that there was no written agreement of “any type between [...] and [...] regarding the development” of the Project depicted on SP 3.
[brief] Notice of Appeal Amended, filed August 25, 2023 | Cases | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Barber v. ShopRite of Englewood & Assocs., Inc., 406 N.J. Super. | 44 | | 32 (App. Div. 2009), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 210 (2009) | | | Bellardini v. Krikorian, 222 N.J. Super. 457 (App. Div. 1988) | 27 | | Brown v. Mortimer, 100 N.J. Super. 395 (App. Div. 1968) | 23 | | Diakamopoulos v. Monmouth Med. Ctr., | 10,46 | | 312 N.J. Super. 20 (App. Div. 1998) | | | Eden v. Conrail, 175 N.J. Super. 263 (App. Div. 1980), modified and affirmed, 87 N.J. 467 (1981) | 44 | | Estate of Hanges v. Met. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369 (2010) | 8 | | Garden Howe Urban Renewal Assocs., L.L.C. v. HACBM Architects Eng'rs Planners, L.L.C., 439 N.J. Super. 446 (App. Div. 2015) | 27,28 | | Gillman v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 286 N.J. Super. 523 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 174 (1996) | 10 | | Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480 (1999) | 9 | | Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6 (2008) | 8 | | Khan v. Singh, 200 N.J. 82 (2009) | 28 | | Lindenmuth v. Holden, 296 N.J. Super. 42 (App. Div. 1996) | 9 | | Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, | 9 | | 140 N.J. 366 (1995) | | | Manata v. Pereira, 436 N.J. Super. 330 (App. Div. 2014) | 21,22,23,24 | | Mellwig v. Kebalo, 264 N.J. Super. 168 (App. Div. 1993) | 25 | | Pellicer v St. Barnabas Hosp., 200 N.J. 22 (2009) | 44,45,46 | | Cases | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Ptaszynski v. Atlantic Health Systems, Inc., 440 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 2015) | 35,41 | | Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506 (2011) | 9 | | Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318 (1985) | 28,32 | | Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. 385 (App. Div. 2002) | 27 | | Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 28 (1961) | 28 | | State v. Bowser, 297 N.J. Super. 588 (App. Div. 1997) | 23 | | State ex rel. J.A., 195 N.J. 324 (2008) | 8 | | State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440 (2008) | 44 | | State v. Kemp, 195 N.J. 136 (2008) | 8,9 | | State v. Silva, 131 N.J. 438 (1993) | 8 | | State v. Spencer, 319 N.J. Super. 284 (App. Div. 1999) | 23 | | State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473 (2006) | 27 | | United States v. Check, 582 F.2d 668 (2d Cir.1978) | 23 | | United States v. Hall, 989 F.2d 711 (4th Cir.1993) | 23 | | United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir.1999) | 23 | | Wacht v. Farooqui, 312 N.J. Super. 184 (App. Div. 1998) | 28 | | Statutes | Pages | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | N.J.S.A. 30:13-5 | 41 | | N.J.S.A. 30:13-5(j) | 35 | | Statutes | Pages | |----------|-------| | N.J.S.A. 30:13-5(j)(2) | 40 | | N.J.S.A. 30:13-8(a) | 41 | | Regulations | Pages | |-------------|-------| | Rules of Court | Pages | |----------------|-------| | R. 2:10–1 | 9 | | R. 2:10–2 | 9 | | R. 4:25-8 | 25 | | N.J.R.E. 404(b)| 8,9 | | Other Authorities | Pages | |-------------------|-------| | [...], Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, comment 4 on N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) (2013) | 24 | | [...], Phantom Impeachment, 77 A.B.A.J. 82 (Nov. 1991) | 21 | | Model Jury Charge (Civil)
[brief] A.  The PCR Court’s Discovery Decisions Must Be Reversed.  [...] spoliated hundreds of hours of potentially exculpatory evidence.  A late revelation showed the hard drive containing this video footage may not, in fact have been “wiped” as previously claimed.  There is also every indication that that 6’1” [...] was misidentified as a much shorter man, who was only visible for two seconds under very suboptimal viewing conditions, coupled with the confession of a much shorter man who was at liberty at the time of the crime and had been in the midst of a rash of similar shootings.  [...] sought discovery of: (1) the hard drive that was the only source of the spoliated evidence; and (2) evidence relevant to his viable third-party defense that only came to light post-conviction.  PCR [...] granted [...]’s discovery request as to the hard drive, but [...] later denied a subsequent motion to enforce the order and sua sponte vacated the prior discovery orders.  The PCR court also denied [...]’s request for discovery on the confession of another person to this crime.  The PCR court’s handling of each of these issues requires reversal.
[brief] (Pa002047 – 002065).  For any solar project in New Jersey that seeks to connect to the existing power grid, the approvals consist of an agreement with [...] (“[...]”) known as a Wholesale Market Participation Agreement (“WMPA”), an agreement with the utility power company, such as [...] (“[...]”), and registrations with the [...] (“[...]”).  However, to finalize and rely upon these approvals, the developer must have a recognized possessory interest in the land, as well as local land use approval.
[brief] Literalism must . . . give way to context. ”  Schenck v. HJI Associates, 295 N.J. Super 445, 452-453 (App. Div. 1996) certif. denied, 149 N.J. 35 (1997).  See also Lederman v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., 385 N.J. Super. 324, 339 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 353 (2006).
[directive] However, employees may have a greater expectation of privacy in their own lockers, assigned desks or possibly in a vehicle assigned to them solely for their use.  If an agency intends to retain the right to search property it assigns to officers for their use, including lockers and desks, it should put officers on notice of that fact.  This notification will help defeat an assertion of an expectation of privacy in the assigned property.  The agency should issue a directive regarding this matter and provide notice of the policy in any employee handbook or personnel manual (including the rules and regulations) the agency provides.  Notice should also be posted in the locker area and on any bulletin boards.  The following is a sample of what such a notice should contain:  The agency may assign to its members and employees agency-owned vehicles, lockers, desks, cabinets, etc., for the mutual convenience of the agency and its personnel.  Such equipment is and remains the property of the agency.  Personnel are reminded that storage of personal items in this property is at the employee's own risk.  This property is subject to entry and inspection without notice.  7.8.6  In addition, if the agency permits officers to use personally owned locks on assigned lockers and other property, it should be conditioned on the officer providing the agency with a duplicate key or the lock combination.  7.8.7
[brief] THE GUARANTEE WAS NOT REVOKED BEFORE PLAINTIFF AND [...] ENTERED INTO A CONSENT JUDGMENT FOR PAYMENTS OF AMOUNTS DUE.  Defendants [...] and [...] next argue that even if the guarantee was not terminated with the alleged termination of the lease in 2016, such guarantee was revoked before Plaintiff and [...] Enterprises, LLC entered into a Consent Judgment for payment of amounts due.  Defendants begin their argument by stating that the guarantee in this case is a continuing guarantee, not limited to a particular transaction but intended to cover future transactions citing Swift & Co. vs. Smigel, 115 N.J. Super. 391, 394 (App. Div. 1971) and Fidelity Union Trust Co. vs. Galm, 109 N.J.L. 111, 116 (E. & A. 1932).  Defendants go on to state “Typically a conditional guaranty reserves in the guarantor the power to revoke it unilaterally prior to action by way of acceptance by the creditor”, again citing Swift & Co., supra.  First of all, the guarantee in this case guarantees all of Tenant’s obligations set forth in the lease.  Not only does this include the rent it includes Tenant’s obligation to surrender the premises at the end of the term (Paragraph 3) to maintain, repair the premises and building and keep same in good repair and condition (Paragraph 6), payment of water and sewer rents, municipal improvement assessments, and any other charges made by any public authority (Paragraph 7), payment of utilities (Paragraph 8), and maintenance of insurance (Paragraph 9), among other things.  It is a much broader guarantee than the typical continuing loan guaranty.  With respect to termination of a continuing guarantee, Swift & Co. states that "typically", a conditional guarantee may reserve in the guarantor the power to revoke it unilaterally.  In the two cases cited, Swift & Co. supra., and Fidelity Union Trust Co, supra, the continuing guarantees in those cases contained language that specifically provided a power to revoke unilaterally as to future advances.  However, in the present case, no such power to revoke the guarantee is provided within the four corners of the Lease.  The guarantee unconditionally guarantees the "obligations of the Tenant herein".  There is no provision allowing for the termination of the guarantee.  As long as there are "obligations of the Tenant herein", the guarantors are liable.  As set forth above, the lease was terminated as of April 19, 2020.