ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Da1217.  The decision held that allowing [...] to pursue a declaratory judgment on coverage before he had established the insureds’ liability (whether by settlement or judgment) “put the cart before the horse. ”  Da1223.  Following remand, the parties commenced and completed detailed discovery, including the exchange of documents, interrogatories, requests for admissions, and numerous fact and expert witness depositions.  [...] was deposed twice.  Da1649, Da1737.  Much of the discovery and factual record of the underlying case, together with [...]’s trial exhibits, is included in the Appendix.  The parties to this action postponed expert witness discovery pending a court-ordered mediation, which was attended by the insurers that were defending [...] and by a [...] representative.
[brief] ”  (23T 121-25 to 122-8, 126-21 to 127-2; 24T 221-19 to 223-10, 224-12 to 21)  [...] and [...], who had driven to the party together (23T 104-15 to 105-1), headed to [...]’s car in the restaurant parking lot where they waited for [...] and the two women.  (7T129-11 to 20, 141-23 to 142-12, 143-14 to 144-4)  The parking lot was filling with people leaving the party, including, [...] said, “Some of those same guys from inside [who] just kept continuing to send threats.
[brief] separate drug charge.  (Pa8-Pa9).  As a result of that arrest, [...] was charged with a violation of probation (VOP).  (Pa9).  Defendants, assistant prosecutors [...] and [...], represented the State of New Jersey during the VOP proceeding.  Ibid.  On January 15, 2015, the trial court found [...] guilty of the VOP charge and sentenced [...] to a term of five years’ imprisonment, with a two-and-a-half-year period of parole ineligibility.
[brief] Respondent fundamentally ignores the central points of [...]’s legal argument in their opposition Appellant’s interlocutory appeal.  Respondent concedes its appraiser applied the zoning under the Morris Canal Redevelopment Plan and failed to consider the underlying R-2 zoning in which the subject Property is located when forming his opinion of the Property’s highest and best use.  In addition, Respondent concedes its appraiser failed to make any negative adjustments for the multiple variances that would be needed in accordance with the Respondent appraiser’s conclusion of the Property’s Highest and Best Use.  Respondent’s planner testified that several variances would be necessary for a mixed-use residential development of the Property.  However, Respondent’s appraiser ignored well established condemnation law when he failed to make a negative adjustment to his comparable sales to reflect the cost and risk a hypothetical willing buyer would face when purchasing the Property without development approvals on June 3, 2019; the Date of Valuation.  Ignoring the fundamentally flawed methodology of its appraiser, Respondent instead relies on dicta at the very end of the Appellate Division’s opinion in Bellardini v. Krikorian, 222 N.J. Super. 457 (App. Div. 1988) in support of its argument that Appellant’s motion in limine is improperly brought at this time.
[directive] Mandatory Arrest.  A police officer must arrest and take into custody a domestic violence suspect and must sign the criminal complaint against that person if A.  The victim exhibits signs of injury caused by an act of domestic violence.  N.J.S.A. 2C:25-21a(1).  1.  The word, "exhibits," is to be liberally construed to mean any indication that a victim has suffered bodily injury, which shall include physical pain or any impairment of physical condition.  Probable cause to arrest also may be established when the police officer observes manifestations of an internal injury suffered by the victim.  2.  Where the victim exhibits no visible sign of injury, but states that an injury has occurred, the officer should consider other relevant factors in determining whether there is probable cause to make an arrest.  3.  In determining which party in a domestic violence incident is the victim where both parties exhibit signs of injury, the officer should consider: a. the comparative extent of injuries suffered; b. the history of domestic violence between the parties, if any, or c. other relevant factors.
[brief] ………………………………………………………………………………….- 27 - A.  The Evidence Did Not Support Piercing [...]’s Corporate Veil ……….- 28 - B.  Defendant Cannot Be Jointly And Severally Liable For Conversion Or Unjust Enrichment Relating To Funds That She Neither Diverted Nor Received …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..- 29 - C.  Defendant Cannot Be Jointly And Severally Liable For Breach Of Contract Or Breach Of The Covenant Of Good Faith For Agreements She Was Not A Party To ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..-  31 - VI.  THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY AWARDED LEGALS FEES AND COSTS AGAINST DEFENDNAT (36T26-10 to 32-10, 50-10 to 52-6; 37T88-13 to 92-18)  ……………………………………………………………………………………..-  32 - VII.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY LIMITED  PLAINTIFFS’ PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST CLAIM BASED ON R. 4:42-11(b) (Not Raised Below; 37T8-1 to -12, 26-13 to 29-11, 52-9 to 53-4, 77-7 to 78-23)  …….- 37 - A.  Plaintiffs Waived Their Liquidated Damages Argument  ……………….- 37 - B.  The Trial Court Correctly Applied R. 4:42-11(b) To Calculate Pre-Judgment Interest  ……………………………………………………………………………………..- 38 - CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………………………………………..-
[brief] Under the LRHL, the adoption of a redevelopment plan is essentially a legislative function of a municipal government, “akin to the adoption of a master plan or a zoning ordinance. ”  Milford Mill 128, LLC v. Borough of Milford, 400 N.J. Super. 96, 110 (N.J. Super. A.D., 2008); see also N.J.S.A. 40A:12A–7.
[brief] (Pa0001-21).  [...]’s Complaint alleged claims of breach of contract and declaratory judgment arising out of its insurance companies’ failure to fulfill their obligations under general liability insurance policies that [...] bought and paid for.  (Id).  After an extended initial discovery period, in late 2009 and early 2010, the parties filed and briefed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of choice of law.  [...] and certain of the insurance company Defendants moved for the application of New Jersey law.  (Pa0088-89).  Certain other insurance company Defendants moved for the application of Massachusetts law.  (Pa0088).  [...] did not file a motion on choice of law, nor did it join or oppose any of the other choice of law motions.  (Pa0088-89).  On March 23, 2010, the trial court delivered a decision from the bench holding that Massachusetts law would apply to the interpretation of the “sudden and accidental” pollution exclusion contained in certain insurance policies involved in the case, and to the allocation of [...]’s recoverable damages.  (Pa0061-86).  The trial court’s choice of law decision is memorialized in a written Order dated April 7, 2010.  (Pa0087-90).  A bench trial on the issue of liability was conducted between October 19, 2010, and January 6, 2011, with the Hon. [...], J.S.C., presiding (the “2010 Liability Trial”).
[brief] New Jersey Courts have repeatedly confirmed that the burden to overcome the factual presumption accorded a governing body’s approval of a redevelopment plan is equally high: Legislative bodies are presumed to act on the basis of adequate factual support and, absent a sufficient showing to the contrary, it will be assumed that their enactments rest upon some rational basis within their knowledge and experience.  This presumption can be overcome only by proofs that preclude the possibility that there could have been any set of facts known to the legislative body … [that] would rationally support a conclusion that the enactment is in the public interest.  Bryant, 309 N.J. Super. at 610 (emphasis added) (quoting Hutton Park, 68 N.J. at 564-65); see also Infinity, 377 N.J. Super. at 225 (same); Downtown, 242 N.J. Super. at 338 (municipality need only show “some reasonable basis for its legislative action”).
[directive] Guide to Equitable Sharinq of Federally Forfeited Property for State and A.  A U.S. 1994 Local Law Enforcement Aqencies (March or current edition); Department of Justice; Local Guide to Equitable Sharinq for Foreiqn countries and Federal.  State B. - or U S Law Enforcement Aqencies (October 1996 currep' edition); Department of the Treasury; C.  All other applicable State and federal laws, regulations, directives, ,- guidchnes and standard operating procedures.  for 1:4
[brief] Thus, it appears the instant FHACA permit is based only on what the DEP referred to as “outdated” and “obsolete” precipitation data that was collected through 1999, and does not provide an accurate representation of the potential for flooding from a massive development such as this.  This failure, if true, means that DEP violated the legislative purpose of the FHACA to protect the public from flooding due to development, and violated its own regulations which require that the flood hazard area design flood must include additional water sufficient to protect the public safety.  In addition, the failure to create any record on this issue is an error that must be fixed on remand.  The DEP ought to have recognized that the permit it issued in this matter represents a uniquely dangerous situation that required a corresponding amount of scrutiny, and that an appropriate record be made, because it is the single largest warehouse development proposed in the State.  The development of 400 acres of a 650 acre site, with an addition of 241 acres of impervious surfaces amongst numerous wetlands and tributaries should not be based on what the DEP has admitted is “obsolete data [that] will inadequately protect against the adverse impacts of flooding due to increasing precipitation resulting from climate change.
[brief] During that time, [...] was well informed and highly complementary of [...]'s efforts.  After testifying on two occasions, [...]’s third deposition was scheduled for February 15, 2018.  For the time period from June 2017 until February 2018, [...] was billed 443 hours in legal fees, in the amount of $163,460.00, and reimbursable disbursements in the amount of $9,408.60.
[directive] 6.  Authority and Effective Date.  This Directive is issued pursuant to the authority set forth in N.J.S.A. 52:17B-101, which provides that the powers of the Attorney General relating to Page 5 the enforcement and prosecution of the criminal business of the State and of any county shall be exercised by the Attorney General through the Division of Criminal Justice.  This Directive shall take effect immediately and shall remain in force until such time as it may be modified or rescinded by the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice.
[directive] Range bail MUNICIPAL to to to to to to to to to RULE setting $100 $1,000 $1,000 $35,000 $10,000 $35,000  Bail $5,000 $500 $500 or crime.  TO warrant when PURSUANT  THE substantive considered  Disorderly a Degree Degree IN Degree Degree Degree Degree  Disorderly Disorderly whether Persons Persons Persons Degree OR, 2nd 2nd ADMINISTRATOR, 3rd 3rd 4th 4th  Petty JUDGE actual be regarding to appropriate. offense.  explosives an disorderly the other secured factors COURT or where commit dwelling, firearm victim. hazardous as offense. or factors the persons remains.
[brief] (PSR 10-12, 16-17)  In addition, both [...] and defense counsel stated that [...] was struggling with serious mental health and anger issues at the time of the offense.  (PSR 16-17; 2T 27-20 to 31-12, 32-12 to 25)  The support letters state the same and suggest that his actions could be attributed to his PTSD and mental illnesses, which resulted from childhood abuse.  (Da 40-43)  Yet, even in the face of all of this evidence, the sentencing court failed to order a psychological report.
[brief] ” (See Db25.); Hewitt v. Allen Canning Co., 321 N.J. Super. 178, 184 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 161 N.J. 335 (1999) (“It is clear that an attorney acts as an agent for his client. ”); Jennings v. Reed, 381 N.J. Super. 217, 231 (App. Div. 2005) (noting that “an attorney is presumed to possess authority to act on behalf of the client”).  Notwithstanding [...]’s attempt to distance herself from the e-mail (and her prior counsel) in the settlement negotiations, [...]’s counsel twice confirmed therein that [...] would receive [...]’s 21.5% interest in the [...], first noting that “there is a certain amount of time required to get . . . the [[...]] transferred to [[...]],” and then stating that the [...] “was specifically devised to [[...]].” (Da137a-38a.)  In fact, [...]’s counsel was so adamant on that point that she even went so far as to seek confirmation that [...] would not be required to absorb any future expenses relating to the [...], noting that [...] should not “bear[] the expenses associated with [the [...]] that was not specifically devised to her. ”  (Da138a.)  [...]’s unwillingness to pay those expenses is entirely inconsistent with her present claim that she is entitled to [...]’s interest in the [...].  That said, just as consideration of the August 26, 2021 e-mail was not crucial to the Trial Court’s determination, the record likewise provides an ample basis for this Court to affirm without considering the email.  (Da273a.)  Because the Parties agree the Settlement Agreement is unambiguous, there is no need for this Court to rely on extrinsic evidence, such as the e-mail, to interpret its meaning.  (1T:35:4-7; 44:13-16.)  IV.
[brief] ”  Printing Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. at 751-52 (citations omitted).  Under a tortious interference claim, whether an act was done “intentionally and without justification or excuse” does not require subjective ill will, but rather requires “an evaluation of the nature of and motive behind the conduct, the interests advanced and interfered with, societal interests that bear on the rights of each party, the proximate relationship between the conduct and the interference, and the relationship between the parties. ”  Main St. at Woolwich, LLC v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., 451 N.J. Super. 135, 152 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Nostrame v. Santiago, 213 N.J. 109, 122 (2013)).  Here, the facts support the existence of each element of the tort: It was, in the trial court’s words “undisputed that plaintiffs and that [...] had a business relationship that was mutually beneficial since 2002” (1T 25:5-8); there was every reason to believe (and there still is)\(^{13}\) that, having made a multimillion dollar offer to purchase the Notis Defendants’ business, a sophisticated party such as [...] did so knowing about the existence of the optical that was on the premises; and the offer unquestionably caused the rupture of that nearly 20-year “mutually beneficial” relationship, thereby damaging plaintiffs.
[brief] ”  (9T38-7 to 9).  She therefore sentenced defendant to forty-five years for first-degree murder.  (9T39-5 to 9).  [...] properly weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors and came up with an appropriate sentence.  In doing so, she considered defendant’s age when finding mitigating factor seven, noting that she was forty-nine years old when she committed the crime, but it was her first offense.  Thus, the sentence properly considered the heinous nature of the murder while recognizing defendant’s age.  CONCLUSION
[brief] B.  The Statute of Frauds, N.J.S.A. 25:1-15, does not apply.  N.J.S.A. 25:1-12 applies to leases.  That statute does not apply to leases less than three (3) years.  Therefore, in this case the Statute of Frauds does not apply to the limited modification of the lease that occurred on May 5, 2016, memorialized in the letter of May 6, 2016.
[brief] This is the only just result in this matter.  [...]’s mistake in realizing the court’s oversight sooner should be forgiven.  It is not surprising that there was an oversight when the Tyler decision was entered only days before the appellate court entered its order in [...]’s case affirming the foreclosure judgment.  It is likely that the matter was reviewed, and the opinion was prepared prior to the entry of the decision in Tyler.  As such, the Court would not have addressed same in review of the case.  This is understandable but still must be corrected.  Further it is not surprising and should be forgiven that [...] also did not realize the decision in Tyler permitted him grounds to vacate judgment and declaring the confiscation of his equity to be unconstitutional.  It would not be a just result for the court to permit the unconstitutional judgment to stand because [...] did not know about the Tyler case when in fact, even the appellate court overlooked same.  This is evidenced by the fact that the appellate opinion in [...]’s case did not mention Tyler or a reason as to why Tyler was not applied to [...]’s case and there was not even an address by the Court in the appellate decision as to how to protect [...]’s surplus equity when the judgment was entered or a remand related to same and there was no procedure in place until July 10, 2024 addressing said constitutional rights.  As stated above, the foreclosure judgment in [...]’s case was unconstitutional equity theft and was unlawful and void.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] The offense occurred while on school property used for school purposes ! owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property, or driving through a school crossing designated as such by ordinance, or driving through a school crossing, knowing that juveniles are present.  The elements of a violation of the DWI refusal offenses are:  A person !  Was operating a motor vehicle on a public highway, or vessel !  The person was arrested, on probable cause, for a DWI violation !  The person refused to submit to chemical breath testing, after the law !  Attorney General Guideline: Page 5  Prosecution of DWI & Refusal Violations enforcement officer read the Standard New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission [NJ MVC] (Refusal) Statement for that offense to that person.  The elements of a violation of a DWI refusal “school zone” offense are the same as a DWI refusal offense with the additional requirement to prove:
[brief] In *State v. Caldwell*, police acting on a tip from an informant conducted an investigatory stop of the defendant based on a description that the individual sought was a Black man standing in front of a building.  158 N.J. 452, 454-55 (1999).  In invalidating the stop, this Court found that the "description of the suspect . . . was clearly inadequate" and explained that "police must have a sufficiently detailed description of the person to be able to identify that person as the suspect named by the informant."  *Id.* at 460.
[directive] See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(b); N.J.S.A. 2C:3-11(d).  Strategic Redeployment.  Repositioning by an officer to increase space and time to react to a subject.  It includes gaining time to de-escalate by withdrawing from the immediate vicinity of the subject if doing so will not create a threat to the safety of the public or the officer in doing so.
[brief] IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION INDICTMENT NO. [...] APPELLATE DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, v. [...], DEFENDANT/APPELLANT ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ENTERED BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION-CRIMINAL THE HONORABLE [...], J.S.C. APPELLANT'S REPLY
[directive] Pursuant to 2C: 4-4(b the qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist shall ), render an opinion as to whether the defendant has the mental capacity to appreciate his/her presence in relation to time, place and things and whether the defendant's elementary mental processes are such that he/she comprehend:  of (a)  That he/she a court justice charged with a criminal offense; in is (b) That there is a judge on the bench; ( c) That there is a prosecutor present who will try to convict him/her; (d) That he/she has a lawyer who will undertake to defend him/her; of (e) That he/she will be expected to tell to the best his/her mental ability the facts if surrounding him/her at the time and place where the alleged violation was committed he/she chooses testify and understand his/her legal right not to testify; to of (f) That there is a jury present to pass upon evidence that adduced as to guilt or innocence if such charge or, that he/she should choose to enter into plea negotiations or to plead of guilty, that he/she comprehends the consequences a guilty plea and that he/she be able to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights which are waived upon of such entry a guilty plea; and of (g)  That he/she has the ability to participate an adequate presentation his/her defense.  in  The Prosecutor's Office shall forward all discoverable materials, to the [...] 5.
[brief] Each party received specific considerations in furtherance of this purpose for agreeing to forego a disciplinary hearing and potential termination: The [...] received Plaintiff’s valid, binding and irrevocable resignation and Plaintiff received the opportunity to separate in good standing without the cloud of disciplinary charges hanging over his head.  See DA017-DA018 at ¶¶ 10 and 12-13.  In contrast, the Parties never bargained as to a specific outcome for Plaintiff’s disability retirement claim, instead, the Parties’ bargained for exchange merely allowed Plaintiff to roll the dice by attempting to file an IOD application.  Crucially, Plaintiff received the opportunity to separate in good standing regardless of the outcome of his IOD application.  Further, the fundamental aspect of Plaintiff’s binding and irrevocable resignation was on display at oral argument, where the [...] reiterated that it desired to proceed with termination if the Court severed or otherwise amended the provision at issue.  See 1T8:8-1T9:2; 1T23:24-1T25:17.  A contract “should not be interpreted to render one of its terms meaningless. ”  Porreca v. City of Millville, 419 N.J. Super. 212, 233 (App. Div. 2011).  Permitting a party to “repudiate the unfavorable parts of a contract and claim the benefit of the residue” constitutes unjust enrichment, binding the parties “to a contract which they did not contemplate. ”  County of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80, 97 (1998).  Yet, the Chancery Division’s severing of the return to work provisions precisely defies Porreca, supra and Fauver, supra, by allowing Plaintiff to retain the benefit of separating in good standing, while rendering his resignation neither valid, binding, nor irrevocable.  In doing so, the Chancery Division, without any reference or explanation in its decision, rendered the [...]’s fundamental consideration meaningless and bound the [...] to an agreement that it did not contemplate.  Historically, courts have been unwilling to invalidate an entire contract if doing so would be unfair because the parties have partially performed their bargain and are no longer in a position to revert to their former status.  See e.g. Jones v. Gabrielan, 52 N.J. Super. 563, 573 (App. Div. 1958).  The instant matter uniquely obviates these concerns because the Agreement requires that Plaintiff’s resignation letter be held in escrow.  Nor do the [...]’s regulations prevent Plaintiff from filing a new IOD application at a later date.  Thus, the Parties can easily be restored to their former positions, the [...] can proceed with termination proceedings, or, alternatively, negotiate a new settlement agreement.  Accordingly, the Chancery Division’s decision to grant severance defeated the essential purpose of the Agreement; therefore, the Chancery Division’s decision must be reversed and Plaintiff’s complaint dismissed with prejudice.  POINT VI
[brief] (4T258-6 to 16).  On June 27, 2014, after defendant had received and spent the investors’ money, he sent a proposed operating agreement for [...] to [...] and [...], their attorney, stating that they should add the investors and “not delay the funding. ” (Sa125).  [...] responded that they needed to identify their shares and contributions, and defendant agreed; defendant did not mention that he had already received the contribution.