ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 2  See also *S.K.I. Beer Corp. v. Baltika Brewery*, 443 F.Supp.2d 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (ABC Law did not apply to wholesaler agreement because “physical delivery” to the wholesaler was in St. Petersburg, Russia, and “neither sale nor delivery” of product to wholesaler occurred in New York).  3  Focusing on the locale of the parties’ relationships, rather than the destination of goods, is also consistent with the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act (“NJFPA”), whose precedents the Court must consider under the MBPA.  See N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.15(e); see also *Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp.*, 130 N.J. 324 (1992) (the NJFPA protects franchisees “geographically ‘situated’ in a forum state since they are the ‘desired beneficiaries’”).  b.
[brief] (Da10-24)  The trial court erred when it denied [...]’s suppression motion, both in its findings of fact and its conclusions of law.  First, the court’s factual findings that [...] “hunched over” concealing his waistband and that he behaved nervously are directly contradicted by BWC footage played at the suppression hearing.  Second and alternatively, even if this Court adopts the trial court’s factual findings, the trial court’s legal conclusion that [...]’s behavior amounted to reasonable suspicion he had a gun was erroneous, because nervousness and ambiguous “furtive” movements cannot establish reasonable suspicion on their own.  Lastly, the court erred when it relied on [...]’s conduct after [...] had already decided to frisk [...] in determining the frisk was reasonable, because that conduct was equally ambiguous.
[brief] [4T126; 4T137-1 to -10].  [...] began abusing heroin when she was 18 years old.  [4T127-10 to -14].  She met defendant approximately three to four months before the car stop and arrest in Florence Township in a trailer park in Rochester, New Hampshire.  [4T129-16 to -25].  [...] bought heroin from defendant.  Sometimes defendant would just give her heroin.  [4T130-1 to -10].  In the days leading up to the motor vehicle stop, defendant asked [...] if she wanted to drive to Virginia Beach, Virginia, with him to look at a Corvette that defendant wanted to buy.
[brief] *THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT THAT IN ANALYZING [...]’S DISQUALIFICATION, THERE BE AN ANALYSIS OF PETITIONERS’ LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS (T3:1-12:16)*  Respondents cite to no controlling law regarding whether a party seeking to disqualify counsel in a matter must show a likelihood of success on the merits.  In any event, it would make no sense that counsel should not be disqualified because he might win the case.  As discussed supra, the invalidation of the two wills, as opposed to one in this case, where both wills are almost identical (as also admitted by Respondents), leaving the bulk of Decedent’s Estate to Respondents, would have little, if any, effect on Petitioners’ ability to prevail.\textsuperscript{22}  Therefore, Respondents’ claim that an analysis of Petitioners’ likelihood of success on the merits regarding Petitioners’ Motion to Disqualify is totally devoid of merit and should be given no consideration.
[brief] him.  (4T37-1 to 6).  They knew [...]’s phone number, and that he had another residence in Queens, New York, where he lived with his wife and children.  As shown by the numerous conversations between [...] and the [...], the police – by way of their captive co-operators -- both knew and essentially controlled the date, time, place and manner of the controlled delivery, as well as the vehicle containing the contraband to be delivered, more than 24-hours before the delivery occurred.  Yet at no time in those 24-hours did the police seek a warrant from any court in New Jersey for the search and seizure they anticipated occurring in New Jersey.
[brief] And therefore, [...]’s motion for reconsideration is denied. ” (1T26:25-27:15).  Regarding [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the [...] MCS-90 surety, the trial court noted that “[...] admits the [...] insurance policy included the MCS-90 surety endorsement as required by the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, to protect the public from damages caused by motor carriers,” that the MCS-90 surety endorsement “will pay up to $750,000 as surety for the final judgment against [...] for public liability related to environmental restoration costs, whether the underlying [...] insurance policy to [...] provides coverage for the accident are not;” that the insurance policy requires [...] “to reimburse [...] in the event [...] must pay on the surety endorsement;” that “to backstop the MCS-90 reimbursement obligation, [...] made [...] and its principals sign an indemnity and personal guarantee agreement to [...];” and that “[...]’s counterclaim and third-party complaint names [...] as a necessary party to the relief that [...] seeks.
[brief] [...] testified Plaintiff’s injuries are permanent and significant.  4T216.  The jury saw one anatomic drawing depicting Plaintiff’s injuries, Da167, and two anatomic drawings depicting Plaintiff’s surgeries, Da168; Da169.  [...] testified that these surgeries, as well as all of Plaintiff’s accident-related medical treatment, was reasonable, necessary and causally related to the subject accident.  4T216.  [...] also testified at length about Plaintiff’s poor prognosis.  4T220-224.
[brief] ## INDEX TO APPENDIX | Document/Exhibit Title or Description | Date | Appendix | Pg. # | |---------------------------------------|------------|----------|-------| | Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Reinstate, Seal, and For Summary Judgement | 02.03.2023 | Pa4 | | Order Denying Order to Amend | 03.29.2023 | Pa5 | | Order Denying Order to Vacate | 05.25.2023 | Pa6 | | Order Denying Order for Reconsideration | 08.15.2023 | Pa7 | | Plaintiff's Motion to Reinstate the Case | 09.06.2022 | Pa8 | | Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order | 09.19.2022 | Pa37 | | 9.19.22
[brief] In consideration of [...]’s demonstrated maturity, the State concedes that an expert witness “concluded that defendant’s level of emotional maturity was somewhere between 9 and 10 years of age, that he was easily coerced, and that he had been negatively influenced by [the codefendants].”  (Sb9)  Despite this undisputed evidence, the trial court found that [...]’s “youthfulness doesn’t rise to a level that would not make this an offense punishable by life.
[brief] (19T 69-17 to 23; 19T 74-22 to 24)  [...], a fingerprint expert, testified that, in addition to the first shell casing that was found, there was a second one found under the porch.  (20T 95-21 to 96-12; 20T 98-19 to 101-8)  The gun that was discovered near [...] was a 9-mm, with 16-round capacity and six rounds inside.  (20T 115-1 to 5)  Two fingerprints were found on the magazine, one matching defendant and one from someone other than defendant or [...], and none were found on the gun itself, the shell casings, or the live rounds.
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  The court added that because the defendant made no “colorable claim that the recording is not authentic or accurate . . . the State need only establish a probability that tampering, substitution, or contamination did not occur.  Any deficiencies go to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence. ”  *Ibid.* (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  *Ibid.*  The fact-sensitive nature of authentication exemplified in Tuncap and Dennis was displayed in this Court’s opinion in Hannah, which involved authentication of a post on Twitter (now known as X).
[directive] Paragraph Nos. 6 and 8 have been revised and are self-explanatory.  jak  Attachment c  Attorney General [...]  First Assistant [...] Administrator  [...] Director of State Police Affairs  [...] Chief of Staff [...] Chief State Investigator [...] Deputy Director [...] Deputy Director [...]  Chief [...], Pros. & Police Bureau New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2000-1 Revised November 2000
[brief] [...]  By: ___s/[...]______________  [...], Esq.  Dated: February 15, 2024  Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL ORDERS OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, BERGEN COUNTY  DOCKET NO.: [...]  Sat Below: HON.  [...], J.S.C.  REPLY  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT  [...]
[directive] Penalty Fòm Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11168-Haitian Creole Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11168-Haitian Creole [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  3.  Èske w konprann ke si w plede koupab a plis de yon vòl machinn oswa pran machinn ilegalman ke revokasyon lisans ou ansanm ak tout amann obligatwa yo ta enpoze yo kab fèt yon fason konsekitif youn aprè lòt?  Do you understand that if you plead guilty to more than one theft of an automobile or unlawful taking of a motor vehicle that the license forfeitures and mandatory penalties imposed can be consecutive to each other?  Dat/Date Akize a/Defendant Avoka LaDefans/Defense Attorney Komisè Gouvènman/Prosecutor Fòm Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11168-Haitian Creole Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11168-Haitian Creole UWAGA:
[brief] State v. R.D., 169 N.J. 551, 560 (2001).  Moreover, while it is true that [...] did not recognize anyone in the audience on March 11, 2020, the date of the aforementioned colloquy, the record does not reveal: (1) whether any of [...]’s family members were actually present at the time [...] was asked whether she recognized anyone in the audience or (2) whether [...] recognized any audience members on any future dates as members of the Freehold church with which she had fellowshipped.  (24T11-4 to 24)
[brief] (1T48-1 to 51-17; 1T62-9 to 14; 1T86-6 to 20).  He stated there were no locked doors or obstructions as he moved along from the front door to the third floor.  (1T51-18 to 52-11; 1T65-23 to 25; 1T90-20 to 91-2).  In conducting the search authorized by the warrant, defendant’s laptop was found turned on, running, and accessible (i.e., unlocked) in his bedroom on the third floor; and at that time, detectives were able to “pretty quickly” ascertain that it contained the same BitTorrent software that was sharing CSAEM, as well as CSAEM files.9 (1T54-17 to 56-5; 1T60-3 to 10; 1T72-25 to 74-7; 2T67-4 to 69-12).
[brief] 12  The Operating Agreement between [...] and [...] stipulated that [...]’s zero-tolerance anti-discrimination/harassment/retaliation policy controlled within [...]’s workplace environment and, therefore [...] undertook the investigation of [...] and [...]’s companion EEO complaints.  (Da120, Da601).  13  [...]’s EEO complaint against [...] was not substantiated, as indicated in a separate report and letter dated August 10, 2019.  (Da61-Da62, Da517-Da519).  [...]’s argument that [...] somehow conceded to NJLAD liability when it substantiated [...] for violating its anti-sexual harassment workplace policy inappropriately conflates the *prima facie* standard for an NJLAD sexual harassment claim with the [...]’s much higher zero-tolerance anti-sexual harassment workplace policy.  See Ab36-38.  The trial court rightly dismissed this argument since, if this were true, no employer would ever substantiate one of its employees for violating its anti-sexual harassment workplace policy, which is the exact opposite of the NJLAD’s purpose – nothing less than to root out the cancer of sexual harassment from their workplaces.
[brief] Appellate review of a motion to suppress is limited.  State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009).  “[A]n appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court’s decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007) (quotation omitted).  See also State v. Slockbower, 79 N.J. 1, 13 (1979) (concluding that “there was substantial credible evidence to support the findings of the motion judge that the . . . investigatory search [was] not based on probable cause”); State v. Alvarez, 238 N.J. Super. 560, 562-64 (App. Div. 1990) (stating that standard of review on appeal from motion to suppress is whether “the findings made by the judge could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record” (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 164 (1964))).
[brief] On September 11, 2023, the Union filed a petition to initiate compulsory interest arbitration at PERC for a successor labor agreement with the City, as the prior agreement for August 1, 2010 through July 31, 2019 had expired.  PERC docketed the matter as [...].  (Aa175)  On September 18, 2023, PERC selected from its special panel of interest arbitrators, [...], Esq. (“[...]” or “Arbitrator”) for the matter.  (Aa181)  PERC’s correspondence to the parties indicated that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16f(5), [...]’s Award had to be rendered within 90 calendar days from PERC’s assignment to him, which is an expedited basis for a highly technical matter.  Ibid.  The City submitted its Final offer on September 11, 2023.  (Aa259-364)  In September 12, 2023, the Union submitted its Final Offer.  (Aa245-246)  In accordance with the Arbitrator’s directions, on October 26, 2023, the City submitted a revised Final Offer.  On October 26, 2023 and November 2, 2023, the Union submitted revised Final Offers.  (Aa 247-250, Aa251-279)  On November 2, 2023, the City objected to the Union’s revised Final Offers because, contrary to the Arbitrator’s direction, it did not only contain proposed contract language for changes to the contract sought in its September 12, 2023 Final Offer as instructed by the arbitrator, but instead sought new and additional contract changes.  (Aa374)  [...] conducted hearings on September 21, October 26, and November 3, 2023, to elicit testimony and documents regarding the facts of the matter in an informal, but adversarial, setting.  (Aa69)  Only the first two dates were transcribed by a court reporter.  Ibid.  On December 18, 2023, [...] issued his 96-page decision and award regarding the content for the parties’ new/successor labor agreement for the period of August 1, 2019, through December 31, 2023.  (Aa145-161)  Ibid.  On January 2, 2024, the Union appealed [...]’s Award to PERC (Aa560), and PERC issued its decision on February 29, 2024, affirming [...]’s decision and award in all respects.  (Aa36-64)  Being manifestly displeased with the outcome in the matter, the Union retained its present counsel, [...], Esq., to pursue an appeal to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.  [...] filed the Union’s amended notice of appeal on April 15, 2024.  (Aa003)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] (Da327)  He advised that the [...] could not ignore its own rules because of expediency, and that is why L-2 was mandatory and required an express agreement not to use 3 arbitrators.  (Da327-328)  Significantly, [...] had even confirmed the timeline of events in the case from 2011 and that no monetary value was set to Plaintiffs’ “Phase I” claim in 2011.  (Da354-55)  Its own summary confirmed it started the case with a “non-monetary filing fee”, which meant the LCC Rules were never effectuated such that a knowing waiver under Rule 37 could not have been expressed in 2011.  (Ibid.)  [...] refused to reconsider.  (Da332)(Da356)
[brief] [...] entered into the Lease with [...], which contained a material term requiring Respondent [...] to make an annual rental payment to [...] on September 1 of each year.  (Pa001008 – 001009).  On September 1, 2017, [...] failed to make this annual rent payment due under the Lease in the amount of $206,045.00.  (Pa001009).  On September 5, 2017, counsel for [...] sent a notice of default to [...] stating that [...] was in default of its payment obligations under Section 1.2 of the Lease.  (Pa001009 – 001010; Pa001020).  The notice further informed [...] that it was required to make payment in the amount of $206,045.00 within ten (10) days from the date of the notice, in accordance with Section 8(a) of the Lease.  The notice further informed [...] that [...] had the right to terminate the Lease under Section 8 of same if payment were not received within the timeframe indicated.  In the event of termination, [...] would be required to surrender and return the Property to [...].  *(Id.)*  **[...] Solar Project, LLC never made the payment under the Lease.  As a result, [...] terminated the Lease with [...] on October 17, 2017. **  *(Pa001010; Pa001022 – 001021).*  Therefore, the Appellants’ failure to cure their own default under the Lease with [...] was admittedly the direct and proximate result of their damages.  Appellants have not pled a cause of action that links the [...] to this default, nor could they.  No amount of discovery will cure the fatal defect at the heart of Appellants’ case -- Appellants lost the solar project due to their own failures.
[brief] ........- 33 - Oravsky v. Encompass Ins. Co., 804 F. Supp. 2d 228 (D.N.J. 2011)  ......................- 30 - Perf. Leasing Corp. v. Irwin Lincoln, 262 N.J. Super. 23 (App. Div. 1993)  ......- 24 - Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989)  .............- 23 - Raffel v. Medallion Kitchens, 139 F.3d 1142 (7th Cir. 1998) ...............................- 16 - Riley v. New Rapids Cartr., 61 N.J. 218(1972) .................................................... - 29 -, - 30 - River Rd. Associates v. Chesapeake Display & Packaging Co., 104 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D.N.J. 2000) .........................................................................................- 9 -, - 10 -, - 11 -, - 14 - Rosen v. Smith Barney, Inc., 195 N.J. 423 (2008) ......................................................- 7 - Ryan v. Gina Marie, L.L.C., 420 N.J.Super. 215 (App.Div.2011) .......................- 19 - Spialter v. Testa, 162 N.J.Super. 421 (D. Ct.1978) .............................................- 11 - Wasserman's Inc. v. Middletown, 137 N.J. 238 (1994) ....................................... passim Westmount Country Club v. Kameny, 82 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 1964) ... - 7 -, - 14 -, - 15 - Statutes Consumer Fraud Act ("CFA"), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 et seq........................................ passim Other Authorities [...], Reimposable Discounts and Medieval Contract Penalties, 20 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 50 (2007) ..............................................................................- 16 - [...], Rent Concessions and Illegal Contract Penalties in Texas, 48 S. Tex. L. Rev. 645, 662 (2007) .........................................................................................- 16 - Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356, comment c (1981) ....................... - 14 -, - 15 - Rules R. 4:32-(b)(2) ..............................................................................................................- 30 - R. 4:32(b)(3) ..............................................................................................................- 30 - R. 4:6-2(e) ................................................................................................................- 23 - R. 4:6–2(e) ................................................................................................................- 19 - Regulations 16 CFR 251.1, Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Guide Concerning Use of the Word “Free” and Similar Representations ......................................................- 22 - PROCEDURAL HISTORY On March 28, 2023, Plaintiff [...] (“[...]”) filed its Complaint below (Da1), seeking of $23,042.52 allegedly due under a residential lease, including $17,920 charged pursuant to a lease rider, under which any late payment of rent entitled [...] to “charge-back” and recover the cash equivalent of several months of promotional “free rent” concessions and discounts offered as an incentive prior to lease signing and applied at the commencement of the lease in 2021.
[brief] As to the C.I.’s basis of knowledge, the State’s evidence was equally deficient.  [...] had no idea how the C.I. learned the information.  When the C.I.’s basis of knowledge is unknown, “it is especially important that the tip describe the accused's criminal activity in sufficient detail that the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation. ”  *State v. Smith*, 155 N.J. 83, 94 (1998)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  “By providing sufficient detail in the tip or recounting information that could not otherwise be attributed to circulating rumors or be easily gleaned by a casual observer, an informant can implicitly disclose a reliable basis of knowledge as the foundation of the information related to the police. ”  *Id.* at 95.  Similarly, “[p]redicting hard-to-know future events” can also imply “that the informant derived that information directly as a witness or as one privy to a reliable witness or source. ”  *Ibid.* (emphasis in original).  *State v. Birkenmeier*, 185 N.J. 552 (2006), provides an example of the type of detail and predictive events that give rise to reasonable suspicion.  In that case, a C.I. with demonstrated veracity provided particularized information concerning defendant: defendant's name; defendant's address; defendant's physical description; the make, model and license tag number of defendant's car; the fact that defendant would be leaving his home at 4:30 p.m. to make a marijuana delivery; and the fact that defendant would be carrying the drugs in a laundry tote bag.  *[Id. at 561.]*  The Court found that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant when, “[a]s the [C.I.] predicted, the police observed defendant leaving his home at 4:30 p.m., carrying a laundry tote bag, and driving away in the car identified by the confidential informant. ”  *Ibid.*  In this case, the tip contained no predictive events or hard-to-know details suggesting intimate familiarity with [...]’s possession of the gun.  The license plate number and location of the Kia were details available to any casual observer on the street, and the description of the gun as a .44 magnum concealed in a fanny pack does not imply that the C.I. “derived that information directly as a witness or as one privy to a reliable witness,” *id.* at 95, when the C.I. provided absolutely no description of [...] beyond “male. ”  Surely, if the C.I. had been privy to [...]’s possession of the gun that day, the C.I. would have been able to provide some description of [...].  Because [...]’s testimony did not sufficiently establish the C.I.’s veracity or basis of knowledge, the trial court’s order denying suppression must be reversed.
[brief] Finally, Defendant argues the Prosecutor’s summation “improperly denigrated the defense” by using “disparaging language to refer to defense counsel’s arguments and [Defendant’s] testimony. ” (Db37-38).  This Court should reject this argument because at no point did the Prosecutor use disparaging language and his summation properly questioned the credibility of Defendant’s theory of the case.  Defendant cites State v. Munoz, 340 N.J. Super. 204, 218 (App. Div. 2001), which held “[i]t is improper for a prosecutor during summation to demean the role of defense counsel or cast unjust aspersions upon a lawyer's motives. ”  The prosecutor in summation argued that a defense witness’ testimony showed “that the alibi was concocted by [the witness] and [the defendant’s counsel] after she goes to hire him. ”  Id. at 217.  Although the Court in Munoz agreed with the defendant that “[i]t was improper for the prosecutor to imply that defense counsel played a role in distorting the facts,” the Court also held “It is, however, not improper for a prosecutor to comment on the credibility of a defense witness's testimony. ”  Id. at 217-18 (citing State v. Robinson, 157 N.J. Super. 118, 120 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 77 N.J. 484 (1978)).  Accordingly, even though defense counsel objected at trial to the prosecutor’s comments in summation, no reversible error occurred because “the prosecutor's dereliction was isolated” and because the comments “essentially question the credibility” of a defense witness.