ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Substantial evidence and the 1972 Site Plan support the common sense point that the courtyard was designed and used for access/assembly for the School students and has never been legally or physically designed or intended for parking.  The plaintiff’s use and control of these two areas (Fifth Street lot and Sixth Street courtyard) began to expand by the early 2010's far beyond and in excess of any neighborly “permission” to Synagogue staff/attendees to be incidentally parked on “the vacant lands” of the School.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, the [...] respectfully requests that the Court reverse the decision below and hold that a record custodian or other official need not examine an exempt criminal investigatory record and release information available under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b) absent a specific request for such information.  We thank the Court for granting us the opportunity to share its viewpoint and for its attention and consideration of these important issues that will affect our municipal clerk members.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]
[brief] POINT I - [...]’ QUIET TITLE CLAIM WAS NEVER HEARD.  QUIET TITLE IS OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY AND NOT ABOUT WHO POSSESSES THE NOTE ........................................................................................................9  POINT II - THE LAW DIVISION ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF ON [...]’ REMAINING CLAIMS .........  12 POINT III - THE LAW DIVISION HAD THE WRONG PARTY AND SHOULD HAVE PERMITTED [...] TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT ............  13 POINT IV - THE LAW DIVISION ERRONEOUSLY AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES TO PLAINTIFF .........................................................................................14 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................15
[directive] Limitations:  II.  The Certificate only relieves the petitioner from disabilities, forfeitures or bars that were the result of a criminal conviction.  An employer, or a licensing or regulatory entity, may have another basis or other bases for barring a petitioner from obtaining a license or certification, or from employment in a specific profession, occupation or business.  Further, the mandates in N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-7 through -12 do not apply to private employers.
[brief] Da386.  Thus, to determine if a contractor failing to submit a [...] Notice was classified on the bid date, the County would need to check the [...] website contemporaneously with the bid opening.  Moreover, the search tool does not give detailed information on the work types for which the contractor is classified or the dollar amount of work they are permitted to perform.  Da386.  In sum, to obtain the timing of classification, details on work type, and amount of qualification (all necessary for determining qualification to perform a project and all present on the [...] Notice), the County would need to submit a records request to [...].
[brief] [...] testified, The EMP is a long-range planning document that sets a vision, strategies and goals to achieve by 2050 a transition to a 100% carbon-neutral electric grid, and a 80% reduction in the State's carbon emissions, including a 75% reduction in natural gas consumption, with many important implementation details still to be worked out in future proceedings."  Ha923-924, P-10 at 4:21-22, -5:1-3."The EMP's strategies and goals make it clear that the envisioned reduction in natural gas consumption will occur in a very gradual manner over several decades….  [Ha924, P-10 at 5:7-8.]  [...] essentially repeats these claims at Ha928-930, P-10 at 9:1-11:5.  He also implies that this EMP is in substance no different from previous plans, and that the current EMP will change overtime, in part because of changes in gubernatorial administrations.  Ha928-929, P-10 at 9:16-10:14.  Our discussion above shows why this is patently untrue.  Described this way, the 231+ page EMP seems to have been hardly worth the trouble, according to [...].  Of course, this is wrong, and [...]'s contempt for New Jersey's energy and environmental policies is unfortunate, to put it politely.  An expert is not permitted to offer an opinion on any question of law, and such an opinion is inadmissible.
[brief] (Pa345).  At the time, [...] looked at how to ensure that the students in the Pharm.D program met the requirements for being admitted into the MBA program, and considered undergraduate GPA, standardized test scores, and the PCAT or the GRE as a substitute for the GMAT.  (Pa345)  The MBA program, which was 42 credits, was a three-year period of curriculum and coincided with the last three years of the pharmacy degree program.  (Pa398).  In the MBA program, admission was based upon an undergraduate CGPA and GRE score.  (Pa400).  The [...] School of Pharmacy’s website advertised the dual degree program, and explicitly provided, “All students who are accepted to the School of Pharmacy with a baccalaureate degree will be provided the opportunity to complete a master’s degree in conjunction with the Doctor of Pharmacy.
[brief] The Supreme Court roundly rejected similar arguments made in *Martindale*, the very case on which [...] attempted to rely just one page earlier.  In *Martindale*, the plaintiff also argued that the arbitration agreement contained within her employment application was unenforceable as a contract of adhesion.  173 N.J. at 89–92.  The Supreme Court began by noting that even “if the Application for Employment in this case, including the arbitration provision, was found to constitute a contract of adhesion, that does not render the contract automatically void,” adding: “The observation that a contract falls within the definition of a contract of adhesion is not dispositive of the issue of enforceability.
[brief] The regulations also provide that "no nonrenewal or cancellation shall be valid unless the notice contains the standard or reason upon which the termination is premised and specifies in detail the factual basis upon which the insurer relies," and that "no . . . cancellation shall be valid unless notice thereof is sent; 1. By certified mail or 2. By first class mail," and the insurer retains the requisite proof of mailing.  *N.J.A.C. 11:1-20.2(g), (i).*  The cancellation statutes and regulations "reflect a public policy" -governing coverage termination.
[brief] *See: State v. Cain*, 224 N.J. 410, 427 (2016).  In other words, expert testimony is not needed when the matter is within the competence of the jury.  *Sowell*, 213 N.J. at 99.  The proponent of expert testimony must, therefore, demonstrate that the proposed testimony will enhance the knowledge and understanding of lay jurors with respect to other testimony of a special nature that is normally outside the usual lay sphere.  *Kelly*, 97 N.J. at 209.  In the present matter, while [...] is a forensic engineer, he did not offer any testimony or an opinion based upon his experience as an engineer or provide any type of engineering analysis.
[brief] See N.J.A.C. 6A:8-1.1 to -3.3; N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-4.1 to -4.7.  it is not an approved school district budget.  Compare N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-51 (providing formula for calculating adequacy budget) with N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5(c) (requiring each district to adopt and submit to the Commissioner “a budget that provides for [T&E]”); (Aa5).  The adequacy budget is calculated on a per-pupil base cost that reflects the cost of educating an elementary school student with no special needs — with the addition of weighted adjustments to reflect the additional costs of educating middle and high school students, at-risk and Limited English Proficient pupils, and students requiring special education.  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 153; N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-51; (Aa5).  These per-pupil base costs and associated weights were established by the Department after years of study and consultation with experts to ascertain the set of school district resources adequate to enable students to meet New Jersey’s academic performance expectations.
[brief] Dismissing the Complaint with Prejudice pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 4:46-2 Pa48 - Defendant Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment  Pa51 - Certification of [...], Esq. in Support of Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment  Pa59 - Exhibit A, Pertinent portions of Defendant’s Production of Document served upon Plaintiff, which includes: - A true copy of the 2011-2013 [...] Graduate Studies bulletin (D02131-D02132); b.  A true copy the [...] Policies and Procedures (D02392-D02394, D02397)  c.  A true copy of the May 21, 2012 letter from [...] to [...] (D02447-D02458)  d.  A true copy of the School of Pharmacy concurrent degrees (D02484-D02497) o Exhibit E, Certification of [...] in support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice Pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e) Pa95 o Exhibit G, True copy of Defendant’s Expert Report of [...] Pa100 o Exhibit H, true copies of the Certification of [...] of the Wayback Machine Pa110 o Exhibit L, True copies of Plaintiff’s Deposition, Exhibit P32, the “academic probation Spring 14: Report Pa115 o Exhibit M, True copy of Plaintiff’s Deposition, Exhibit P33, the June 23, 2014 letter advising Plaintiff of his probation Pa117 o Plaintiff’s Responses to Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment Pa119 o Plaintiff [...]’s Counterstatement of Material Facts Pursuant to Rule 4:46-2(b) Pa125 o Exhibit A, Transcript of Volumes I and II of deposition of Plaintiff o Exhibit B, Transcript of deposition of [...], Ph.D. o Exhibit C, Transcript of deposition of [...], Ph.D. o Exhibit D, Transcript of deposition of [...], Ph.D. o Exhibit E, Defendant, [...]’s School of Pharmacy Website Page advertising the dual degree program, posted on February 15, 2011 o Exhibit F, Defendant, [...]’s email response to Plaintiff’s inquiry submission clarifying eligibility for the dual degree program from Dean, Dr. [...] dated February 28, 2011 o Exhibit G, Plaintiff’s Application for Admission to Doctor of Pharmacy Program o Exhibit H, January 9, 2012 email from Defendant, [...] advising Plaintiff he was selected to interview for the [...] School of Pharmacy 2012 Inaugural Class to take place on January 31, 2012
[brief] Berger v. Paterson Veterans Taxi, 244 N.J. Super. 200, 205-06 (App. Div. 1990)  The defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the person, insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process are words of art taken from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), 28 U.S.C.A.  See Rules Governing All of the Courts of N.J., Comment on Rule 3:12-2 (Tent. Draft 1948).  Lack of jurisdiction over the person speaks for itself while "insufficient process or insufficient service of process precludes acquisition of jurisdiction over the person."  Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433 (1952).  Either one or all of these defenses abate the action because the court is powerless to render an effective judgment against one of the parties due to failure to obtain jurisdiction over the person.  See Messenger v. United States, 231 F.2d 328 (2 Cir. 1956); Bucholz v. Hutton, 153 F. Supp. 62 (D.C. Mont. 1957); Fistel v. Christman, 13 F.R.D. 245 (D.C.W.D. Pa. 1952); Rogers v. Dubac, 52 N.J. Super. 360, 363 (Law Div. 1958)
[brief] ”  Pa674-Pa675.  Meanwhile, on July 31, 2018, [...] of [...] acknowledged in an email that, despite [...]’s belief that [...] was not enrolled in the CCIP, they had “enrollment documents for [...] effective 8/1/15.  We issued a policy so, we would need to have received a request to cancel flat to unenroll them.  We don’t have a copy of any request. ”  Pa913.  [...], [...]’s Customer Service Team Lead in the [...] Wrap Up Department, testified that she was asked to provide evidence of a cancellation request and the related policy endorsement.  Pa2444.  She did not locate any documents that related to a cancellation of coverage under a general liability policy.  Pa2444.  When [...] was asked to determine if [...] was enrolled under the CCIP, she “looked at a report and then [she] sent an e-mail to the underwriter telling her that we have them enrolled. ”  Pa2443.  As [...] explained, in 2018 she reviewed the WrapUp list, which is a cumulative list of all of the subcontractors enrolled in the CCIP, and from reviewing the WrapUp list she concluded that [...] had been enrolled in the CCIP.
[brief] *Id.* at 403 (citing *DiTrolio v. Antiles*, 142 N.J. 253, 278 (1995)).  Considerations of fairness, in our case, weigh heavily in [...]’s favor.  He endured 21 months of litigation in the *[...]* case and prevailed. \(^{12}\)  His reasonable reliance on [...]’s 2006 ruling was reinforced by her subsequent decision in 2008, two years later, when [...] reactivated the litigation against the \(^{12}\) [...] filed his complaint on January 11, 2005.
[brief] Consequently, no irreparable harm exists because the alleged harm is not in the record, is speculative, and can be redressed by monetary damages.  See Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126, 132-133 (1982).  If [...] begins the --- \(^2\) A copy of this unpublished opinion is included with Defendant-Appellant’s Appendix at Da213-Da226. condemnation process, Plaintiff can raise all of its objections in that proceeding.  If [...] files a declaration of taking, and if the condemnation court then holds the taking is invalid, then the taking will be voided, title will revert to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff will receive its escrowed funds as well as any permitted damages.
[brief] This appeal arises out of an incident that occurred on or about January 29, 2021.  At the aforesaid time, Plaintiff, [...] was crossing the street near [...] in [...].  As he was returning to his vehicle, he was suddenly caused to trip, lose his balance and fall down to the pavement by a pothole, thereby causing the Plaintiff to sustain serious personal injuries.  At the time of the accident, visibility was dark and there was no street lighting in the area where the Plaintiff fell and sustained his injuries.  The location of the pothole was in the center of town, within close proximity to [...] and the [...].  The overall size and depth of the pothole was large enough to have posed a danger to motor vehicles and pedestrians alike.  Moreover, there is evidence that the pothole existed at least three years prior to the accident and may have existed as far back as 2012.  Finally, there is also evidence that a Town Administrator and members of the Department of Public Works was aware of pothole issues on this particular roadway prior to the time of the Plaintiff's accident.
[brief] (Pa0430-31).  The purpose of the GSM is to ensure that contaminated groundwater does not migrate from the Site.  (Pa0313-14).  The GSM relies on the flow of groundwater under the Site, which originates in Turnpike Lake, to operate.  (Pa0313-15).  As the water passes under the Site, it flushes the DNAPL solvent that has become trapped in the soil and bedrock.  *(Id)*.  That groundwater is then captured by extraction wells that pump it to an on-site groundwater treatment facility where the CVOCs are stripped from the water.  *(Pa0430-31)*.  After treatment, the GSM discharges the clean groundwater back into Turnpike Lake under a permit to do so from the [...], where it begins the cycle again.  *(Id)*.  After approximately five years of operating the GSM, [...] commissioned an evaluation of its performance and shared that evaluation with the [...].  *(Pa0432-33)*.  As a result of the evaluation, in 2005, [...] made certain modifications to the GSM, resulting in further improvements to the control and migration of CVOCs.  *(Id)*.  [...] made additional modifications in 2010.  *(Pa0251-54)*.  As a result of the 2005 and 2010 modifications, the GSM is exceeding the performance standards set by the 1993 Administrative Order.  *(Pa0306-311)*.  The GSM remains in operation and continues to treat groundwater at the Site.  It is uncertain how much longer the GSM will be required to operate, but it has been estimated that it may continue in operation for another twenty years or more because of the presence of DNAPL solvents at the Site.
[brief] 9, 14  Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 440-441 (2005)  20  Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474 (1974)  8  State v. Cagno, 211 N.J. 488 (2012)  20 State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249 (2015)  8 State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412 (2014)  8 State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71 (2016)  8  State v. S.B., 230 N.J. 62, 67 (2017)
[brief] See, e.g., State v. Ramsey, 415 N.J. Super. 257, 271 (App. Div. 2010) (“it cannot reasonably be said that shooting a victim in the abdomen upon discharge of a firearm four times, in close range (within five to ten feet of the defendant), involved mere reckless conduct or a conscious disregard of a substantial risk of death. ”) (footnote omitted), certif. denied, 205 N.J. 77 (2011); Mendez, 252 N.J. Super. at 160-62 (finding no rational basis for reckless manslaughter where the defendant fired a machine gun into a crowd); Sanchez, 224 N.J. Super. at 243 (finding no basis to charge on reckless manslaughter where the perpetrator “brutally shot” the victim in the face, neck, and chest with a sawed-off shotgun inside an apartment kitchen); State v. Hammond, 338 N.J. Super. 330, 338-39 (App. Div. 2001) (finding no credible evidence to support anything other than an intentional murder where the defendant “stood over the victim with the barrel of the gun pointed directly at him, and discharged two shots in succession at close range directly at the victim”).
[brief] The parties agreed to arbitrate before a specifically identified arbitrator uniquely qualified to adjudicate their dispute—the enforcement of a contract that the arbitrator wrote himself.  The agreement to arbitrate only extended to arbitration before that arbitrator and the trial court erred by finding it could force the parties to arbitrate with a substitute arbitrator selected by the court.  Moreover, before seeking a court appointed arbitrator, [...] did not act in good faith.  Rather, [...] selected an arbitrator, secured [...]’s agreement, then rejected its own selected arbitrator and refused to consider any further proposals from [...] for a mutually agreeable replacement arbitrator.  Such conduct cannot constitute the “impenetrable deadlock” between the parties necessary to secure judicial intervention (when such intervention is even authorized).  Rather, it is [...] manipulating the system by deadlocking with itself rather than [...].  Finally, this matter was stayed as matter of law by N.J.S.A. 2A:15-67 et seq. on November 1, 2023, when [...] filed a demand that [...] post a statutory security bond.  The trial court ignored the stay and [...] never posted that security.  As such, the trial court proceeding to decide the matter on the merits violated the automatic statutory stay.  For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s decision must be reversed and the parties left to either mutually agree upon a substitute arbitrator or litigate in their claims in court rather than through arbitration.  [...]
[brief] In safeguarding this right and establishing the soundness of the jury’s verdict, the need for “clear verdict sheets” is as important as clear jury instructions.  State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417, 449 (2002).  When the oral instructions are over, the jury is left in a room with the verdict sheet that is “the primary road map [it] will use to direct [its] deliberative path. ”  Ibid.  Accordingly, “[t]he completed verdict sheet” is understood to “evidence[] the jury’s understanding” of the law governing the case and its reasoned decision in accordance with that law.  *State v. DiFrisco*, 137 N.J. 434, 492 (1994).
[brief] *State v. R.B.*, 183 N.J. 308, 324 (2005) (quoting *State v. Hipplewith*, 33 N.J. 300, 317 (1960)), or was “clearly capable of producing an unjust result,” *R. 2:10–2; State v. Macon*, 57 N.J. 325, 335 (1971) (“[T]he question whether an error is reason for reversal depends finally upon some degree of possibility that it led to an unjust verdict. ”), or “whether there is reasonable doubt that the jury would have ruled other than as it did. ”  *State v. Branch*, 182 N.J. 338, 353 (2005) (quoting *State v. Irving*, 114 N.J. 427, 447 (1989)).  *[State v. Thomas*, 187 N.J. 119, 134 (2006). ]
[brief] Clearly, then, in Phase II, even though [...] (a licensed attorney) acted pro se, he knew exactly what to do if there was a fundamental problem with the powers of the Arbitrator.  And the analogy is apt—in Phase I he argued that the single arbitrator had no authority to act because of an Operating Agreement amendment that deprived him of authority to act at all, and only after receiving an adverse ruling in Phase I did [...] argue the single arbitrator had no authority.  Yet despite the similarities of [...]’s arguments, his actions could not have been any more different.  [...] obsessively told the Arbitrator and [...] that he believed the Arbitrator lacked authority under the [...] rules, but made no motion to enjoin the arbitration in Phase II, despite employing this very strategy in Phase I.  Moreover, [...] failed to make the three-arbitrator argument in an earlier motion to confirm an earlier Phase II Partial Final Award, which alone should be fatal to his arguments.  On January 5, 2018, the Arbitrator voided a $970,000 self-dealing “loan,” awarding the Company a $700,000 judgment and reversal of $270,000 in interests issued to [...].
[brief] [...]’s Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment is Adequately Pled  With respect to the counterclaim for declaratory judgment, such a pleading was appropriate and should have been sustained.  [...] argued below that the claim for declaratory relief should be dismissed as “redundant and unnecessary,” but provided no legal authority for this argument.  Declaratory Judgment actions are appropriate when there is an actual controversy regarding the rights of a party under a contract.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:16-51, et. seq.; Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC v. Cty. of Bergen, 450 N.J. Super. 286, 294 (App. Div. 2017).  Here, [...] sought a declaration that [...] is obligated to defend him in the Underlying Action, which [...] had attempted to deny.  Thus, the counterclaim contains an adequately pled cause of action for declaratory judgment, and the dismissal of same was error, especially in light of the fact that no statement of reasons or statement on the record provided a basis for dismissal.  B.  Material Issues of Fact Preclude  Summary Judgment on [...]’s Counterclaim for Breach of Contract  The sole argument put forward below in support of dismissal of the counterclaim for breach of contract is that, because [...] is not obligated to defend [...], there can be no breach of contract.  Accordingly, for all the reasons set forth above regarding [...]’s duty to defend [...] in the Underlying Action, as well as all the issues of disputed material fact, the trial court erred as a matter of law by dismissing [...]’s counterclaim for breach of contract.  C.
[brief] The Employee Complaint Policy provides that the City “has a no tolerance policy towards workplace wrongdoing. ”  It further provides that:  [e]mployees desiring to file a complaint regarding any of the above mentioned terms and conditions of employment should utilize the grievance procedures outlined in their union contract, or the Municipal Code (whichever is applicable); or the appeal process/procedures in accordance with the provisions of the New Jersey Administrative Code, Titla 4A.