ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  [...] charged defendant [...] with: second-degree conspiracy to possess a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, 2C:2-6, and 2C:35-5 and/or 2C:35-10a (Count One); two counts of third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a (Counts Two and Four); two counts of second-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 (Counts Three and Five); second-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute within 400 feet of certain public police, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 and 2C:35-7.1 (Count Six); and third-degree financial facilitation of criminal activity, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25(a) (Count Seven).  (Da 1-2)¹  Two co-defendants, [...] and [...], were charged in various counts.  ¹  The following abbreviations will be used:  Da - appendix to defendant-appellant’s brief  1T – October 27, 2015  2T – December 23, 2015  3T – August 24, 2018  4T – June 24, 2019  5T – May 12, 2020  6T – October 17, 2022  PSR – Presentence Report  Jackson moved to suppress the physical evidence retrieved by police.  A hearing was held before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., on October 27 and December 23, 2015.  (1T, 2T)  Judge Weisberg denied the motion on January 20, 2016.  (Da 5-20)  Jackson filed two subsequent motions for reconsideration, both of which were denied by the Honorable [...], J.S.C., on August 24, 2016, and June 24, 2019.  (Da 21-22)  On May 12, 2020, Jackson pleaded guilty to Counts Three, Five, and Seven before Judge Paone.  (5T 4-12 to 16-21)  On October 17, 2022, Judge Paone sentenced Jackson to two concurrent, extended-term sentences of 15 years with a 7.5-year period of parole ineligibility.  (6T 19-16 to 20-11)  The remaining indictable offenses were dismissed, as was Count Seven, on the State’s motion.  (6T 21-17 to 22-8)  A notice of appeal was filed on March 13, 2023, as within time.  (Da 48-52)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] (Pa571-Pa572; at T29:20-30:14, Pa685 at T121:14-17; Pa795 at T41:12-42:8, 51:5-52:2; Da122; Da681 at T32:9-19).  [...] alleges no sexual harassment by [...], or any other [...] employee, after she filed her EEO complaint against [...].  (Pa366-Pa370; T169:23-T182:8; Da122).  Although [...] alleged that she suffered a “hostile work environment” at the [...]’s Camden office, she did not indicate that the alleged harassment had anything to do with her EEO complaint.  (Pa366 at T170:11-171:6, T172:3-7; Pa367 at T174:23-25; Pa369 at T178:16-T179:5; Da123).  Instead, [...] testified that she felt uncomfortable because employees were spreading rumors about why she was transferred to the Camden office.
[brief] iv  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................  v-x LEGAL ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................  1 POINT  I .........................................................................................................................  1  THE MLUL AND CASE LAW  DO NOT AUTHORIZE THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL HEARING OFFICER WITHOUT A MT. LAUREL VIOLATION.  (M38-57; M477-513).  ...........................................  1  A.  The Respondents offer no relevant rebuttal to the fact that the process fashioned by the trial court was flawed and inconsistent with the purposes of the MLUL and OPMA.  (M1-64; M462-473).......8  B.  The adoption of the SHO’s recommendations was procedurally flawed.  (M1-64; M462-473)..................................................  10  POINT II .......................................................................................................................  11  THE TRIAL COURT’S APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL HEARING OFFICER WAS IMPROPER AND WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS AS THERE WAS NO MT. LAUREL VIOLATION FOUND.
[directive] The revised includes a number of new policies to ensure that IAPP County Prosecutors exercise appropriate oversight of the Internal Affairs functions of all law enforcement agencies based in their respective counties.  Among other things, the revised requires that County Prosecutors closely review summary Internal Affairs IAPP reports, investigate troubling patterns in specific agencies, and conduct random reviews of Internal Affairs functions at all agencies within the county.  §§ 10.0.1-10.0.4.  To facilitate this enhanced oversight, the revised strengthens reporting requirements IAPP from police departments to their respective county prosecutors, and includes an updated standard reporting form for this purpose.  § 9.10.1.  In addition, if an officer subject to an administrative investigation has a good-faith basis to question the impartiality or independence of an investigation being conducted within their agency, the officer may report their concerns to the County Prosecutor.  § 6.3.6.  II.
[brief] Another is known as the "interconnection" which is the right to distribute (sell) solar energy from a particular field through the regional "power grid" so that the solar energy that is cultivated on a particular solar farm can be sold throughout the region, locality, or even nationally.  The process of obtaining SRECs and interconnection are complex, lengthy, and costly.  The process of building a solar farm, to deploy those assets to the physical solar panels, is but a final stage in this lengthy and costly process.  Pa6-7, Pa394 (CEP admission), Pa643, Pa681, Pa1004, Pa1025, Pa1040-43, Pa1128, Pa1135, Pa1409-12, Pa2915
[brief] At trial, [...]’s counsel eviscerated plaintiffs’ expert, [...], before the jury about the same credentialing and qualification issues that defendant had raised pretrial and which plaintiffs had retained [...] to address.  Stuck without the expert they wanted and believed most qualified to explain [...]’s negligent care of [...], plaintiffs lost their case, with the jury returning a “no cause” verdict in [...]’s favor.  A14.  Plaintiffs now appeal [...]’s erroneous and unfairly prejudicial pretrial orders and ask the Court to grant them a new trial where they can present to the jury the expert witness they wanted to explain the most critical aspect of their wrongful death claim.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................ ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................. iii PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...............................................................................................  1 RESPONDENT’S COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................  3 LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 7 STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................................................................. 7 Point one ............................................................................................................................ 9 PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS .................. 9 POINT TWO ......................................................................................................................  13 PLAINTIFF CANNOT PROVE NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW ............................. 13 POINT THREE .................................................................................................................. 17 PLAINTIFF CANNOT PROVE THAT ANY CONTRACT EXISTED, AND EVEN IF IT DID, IT WAS NEVER RATIFIED BY THE TOWNSHIP’S GOVERNING BODY .................................................. 17 POINT FOUR ..................................................................................................................... 18 PLAINTIFF CANNOT IDENTIFY ANY MISREPRESENTATIONS MADE BY THE TOWNSHIP .................................................................................................................. 18  CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................
[directive] This law establishes and delineates the responsibilities of the newly created Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy within the Division of Criminal Justice as well as the County Offices of Victim-Witness Advocacy within the 21 County Prosecutors' Offices.  The statute provides for the Attorney General, through the State Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy and in consultation with the County Prosecutors, to promulgate standards for all law enforcement agencies to make sure that crime victims' rights are enforced.  The standards will require the State and County offices of Victim-Witness Advocacy to provide 16 statutorily mandated services to victims and witnesses.  These will include orientation information about the criminal justice process and crime prevention, social services and available compensation.  In addition, this statute created an Office of Victim-Witness Assistance within the Violent Crimes Compensation Board which will develop and coordinate a statewide victim-rights information program.
[brief] First, as noted above, Plaintiff’s allegations as to [...]’s knowledge of [...], the Student, or the Student’s mother does not in any manner evidence knowledge of falsity by the [...].  Second, the Complaint fails to point to any reason that any, much less each, of the [...] should each have doubted the truth of their statements.  Indeed, the Complaint does not even distinguish among the [...] in alleging (in a conclusory fashion) that they acted with actual malice.  See Da_023-026.  Faced with her own pleading deficiencies, Plaintiff’s Opposition repeatedly calls the [...] “antisemitic” and transparently attempts to inflame this Court by invoking the Israel-Palestine conflict.  See Opp. at 6-7.  Putting aside the flagrant impropriety of referencing the events of October 7, 2023 in the context of a lawsuit concerning statements made two years prior, Plaintiff’s attacks have no logical place in this matter either.  The Complaint does not allege that the [...] knew Plaintiff was Jewish when they made their statements, much less that they were motivated to lie about Plaintiff by virtue of their supposed “antisemitic viewpoints. ”  This Court should reject Plaintiff’s attempt to weaponize a polarizing international conflict to distract from her failure to plead actual malice as to each defendant.  CONCLUSION
[brief] the Receiver opposed the Motion.  The Receiver’s April 11, 2022 letter response in opposition refers to his appointment as Special Master in the Foreclosure Action and a “sale of the property”, in apparent reference to the January 18, 2022 sale.  The Receiver’s response states “I will continue to serve as Receiver until such time as the sale has been approved and the deed has been executed and sent for recording. ”\(^3\)  On April 29, 2022, the Court denied [...]’s motion.
[directive] b)  (1)  Èske w konprann ke si w ta chanje adrès ou fèt pou notifye ofisye chèf ajans [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No] fòsdelòd kote w anrejistre a, epi w fèt pou re-anrejistre ak chèf fòsdelòd nan minisipalite kote ou abite a, oswa Direktè Polis Leta si minisipalite a pa gen yon ofisye chèf fòsdelòd pa mwens ke 10 jou anvan ou al abite nan nouvo adrès la?
[brief] The Judge was correct.  The Plaintiff has not identified the correct standard, let alone argued it.  Regardless, he cannot meet that standard.  “It has otherwise been stated that our Appellate function is a limited one: we do not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interest of justice."  Rova Resort, Inc. v. Investors Inc. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).  II.
[brief] The policy language states as follows:  2.  Concealment, Misrepresentation Or Fraud  This Coverage Form is void in any case of fraud by you at any time as it relates to this Coverage Form.  It is also void if you or any other “insured”, at any time, intentionally conceals or misrepresents a material fact concerning:  a.  This Coverage Form; b. The covered “auto”; c. Your interest in the covered “auto”; or d.  A claim under this Coverage Form.  This policy language provides that coverage is void due to an intentional misrepresentation.  There is no evidence in this case of an intentional misrepresentation and no dispute here that [...]’s misrepresentation on the application was an innocent one.  Thus, he should not lose $1 million in auto coverage because the court applied a lesser standard than the one dictated by its own insurance policy.  See, e.g., Clarendon National Ins. Co. v. The Insurance Company of the West, 442 F. Supp. 2d. 914 (E.D. Cal. 2006) and RLI Ins. Co. v. Klinsky, 771 F. Supp. 2d. 314 (D. Ver. 2011) (finding that despite insureds’ misrepresentations, there was coverage as the broader language in the policy trumped the insurer’s common law or statutory right.).  The clause in the [...] policy should trump the supplemental application.  The court erred by granting the motion and, at the very least, by not holding a bench trial on all the issues herein.
[brief] This is disingenuous, at best.  As discussed in Appellant’s opening brief, the Trial Court ultimately made no findings based on the terms of the Loan Documents.  (App. Br. at 15-17.)  While the Trial Court inquired during oral argument about certain provisions of the Mortgage, the Trial Court ultimately concluded that facts were missing from the record relating to these provisions.  (1T55:17-18, 11:15-14:6.)  Respondent never raised any issues with these provisions (and in particular Paragraph 9 of the Mortgage) in its papers, and therefore Appellant had no opportunity to supplement the record to address and rectify the Trial Court’s concerns. \(^1\)  Ignoring that “material facts” were missing from the record, the Trial Court determined that, in line with *Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Omar*, No. A-5187-06T3, 2008 WL 2050834 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 15, 2008) (which the Trial Court deemed analogous to the facts here), Appellant was in the best position to have avoided the loss and therefore should bear the risk.
[brief] N.J.S.A.§39:6A-13 further permits specific discovery to be exchanged related to no-fault claims subject to arbitration, which includes conducting an Independent Medical Examination, disclosure of all pertinent medical records or history, the signing of all forms, authorizations or releases for information, which may be necessary to the discovery of the above facts, in order to reasonably prove the injured person's losses.  See, N.J.S.A. §39:6A-13.  If the claims at issue exceed $1,000, the parties have a right to an in-person hearing before the arbitrator and can call live witnesses who testify under oath.  (R. 43).  If less than $1,000 is at issue, the matter is decided “on the papers,” but [...] has carved out exceptions permitting an in-person hearing for various disputes even when the claimed amount does not exceed $1,000.
[brief] (Ra1-2).  On May 14, 2024, [...] filed an Amended Notice of Appeal insisting that although the Chancery Court had dismissed his Complaint without prejudice, the Order was still final.  (Pa63-66).  He claimed that the Order disposed of all the issues between the parties, when in fact it expressly did not.  (Id.)  On May 21, 2024, [...] filed a new Complaint in the Law Division alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud and conspiracy related to his allegedly forfeit incentive bonus ("Law Division Complaint").  See [...].  On the same day, the Practice and [...] and [...] filed a motion in the Appellate Division to dismiss [...]’s appeal because the Orders that are the subject of the appeal are not final.
[brief] See Defendants’ Brief at Exhibit F6, 29:16-84:25.  [...] testified extensively as to where he agreed/disagreed with Plaintiff’s psychological expert concerning his diagnosis.  See id. at 36:1-8; 38:8-39:4; 40:4-15; 41:1-42:16.  More importantly, he described his alleged conversation with Plaintiff, and how he concluded that she was suffering from psychosis.  See id. at 44:8-47:22.  This is critical because he opined that plaintiff’s psychosis could not be produced by any stressor at work but was rather a biological condition.  Id. at 50:6-11; 51:19-52:5.  In other words, Plaintiff’s allegations concerning the reasons for and/or sources of mistreatment/stress—and any supposed “changes” thereto at trial—were entirely irrelevant to his opinion.  This is in stark contrast to the extreme prejudice faced by the Plaintiff in McKenney, who’s entire expert report presented at trial turned on the timing testified to by the offending doctors which was suddenly changed at trial.  See McKenney, 167 N.J. at 373-76.  In short, even if Plaintiff’s testimony materially deviated from prior pleadings/discovery (which again, it did not), the Defendants have not established the kind of prejudice which would warrant a new trial under McKenney and its progeny.  In the absence of said prejudice, the Defendants’ argument for reversal on this ground must be disregarded, and the verdict affirmed.  See T.L., 238 N.J. at 231.  POINT II: The Defendants Have Not Preserved or Presented a Valid Challenge to the Jury Charge as Read (RAISED BELOW Pa40-Pa43)
[brief] 18 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et. seq.  ....................................................................................................  5 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 .............................................................................................................  3 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-3 .............................................................................................................  19, 21 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7 .............................................................................................................  20, 21, 28 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d) .......................................................................................................  32, 33 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e) .......................................................................................................  28 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f) .......................................................................................................  22 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-13 ..........................................................................................................  22 N.J.S.A. 40A:55D-3 .............................................................................................................  19 N.J.S.A. 40A:55D-4 .............................................................................................................  19  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Exemption #11 Must Be Strictly and Narrowly Construed to Only Allow for a “Routine Upgrade”  Rather than Simply an “Upgrade” (Aa0001)  Exemption #11 is both in the Highlands Act statute [see N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11)] and DEP’s Highlands Rules [see N.J.A.C. 7:38-2.3(a)(11)].
[directive] Trial judges are not required to reassess all of them anew at a reopened hearing.  In some instances, for 23 example, the nature and seriousness of the offense will remain the same.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(a).  But other factors might have changed with the passage the State’s case. of time, such as the strength of See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(b).  It might be weaker if a witness is no longer available, or stronger as a result of additional evidence gathered during an expanded investigation.  A number of the above five factors might well have an effect on whether a defendant will appear for a court proceeding as required.  N.J.S.A. 2A:162- 18(a)(1).  Their impact on the risk of danger or obstruction, which are also critical, is less clear, particularly for defendants charged with more serious offenses who pose a continuing public safety concern or have a long record of criminal behavior.  Nonetheless, we do not rule out that certain defendants may be able to show material changes in those risk areas as well.
[brief] The Municipal Judge Finds Appellant Guilty of Driving While Intoxicated  At the municipal trial on April 29, 2022, the State called [...] as its lone witness to support the State’s case in chief.  (3T5:9-21:4).  [...] then heard the parties’ summations.  (3T21:13-25:25).  Following summations, [...] orally gave his decision on the issue of operation, finding that the State proved Appellant’s operation of the vehicle on the morning of November 5, 2019 beyond a reasonable doubt.  (3T26:16-27:1).  [...] reserved his decision on the remaining issues.  (3T27:3-12).  [...] orally gave the rest of his decision at a hearing on May 27, 2022.  (4T).  [...] reiterated his finding that the State proved operation of the vehicle by Appellant beyond a reasonable doubt.  (4T10:4-6).  [...] also found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was under the influence of alcohol on the morning of November 5, 2019.  (4T13:8-13).  In so finding, [...] noted that he found [...]’s testimony credible.  (4T13:6-7).  As such, [...] found Appellant guilty of driving while intoxicated under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.6 (4T13:8-13).  E.
[brief] Pb9.  The Board did not apply the more stringent standards of Medici.  Had the Board done so, it would have required proofs of the peculiar suitability of the site for the proposed use as the “special reasons”, and, in addition to the usual positive and negative criteria, the Board would have required “an enhanced quality of proof” to explain the omission of the proposed use from the list of permitted uses in the applicable ordinance.  Instead, the Board analyzed the proposed height variance under the criteria set forth in Grasso, which establishes two paths for establishing special reasons: hardship, or, alternatively, an inquiry into the effect of the proposed deviation on the purposes of the height restriction.
[directive] Juveniles who are 14 or older and charged with a crime will be fingerprinted and ! photographed.  All juveniles, regardless of age, who are adjudicated delinquent for an offense that would ! be a crime if committed by an adult will be fingerprinted and will have to provide a DNA sample.  Both the fingerprints and DNA will be maintained in state and federal databases.  Serious juvenile offenses will require adjudication by the Family Court.  Adjudication is ! the process by which a judge decides whether a juvenile should be found to have committed a delinquent offense.  Juveniles do not have a right to a jury trial but they do have a right to an attorney.  If a family is not indigent, the judge may order the family to pay for an attorney to represent their child in serious cases.  If a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent, the court then must order a disposition.  A ! disposition is similar to the sentence that is imposed on an adult criminal.  Some of the most common dispositions are incarceration, short-term incarceration, probation, fines, restitution, driver’s license suspension or postponement, community service, or mandatory attendance at some type of treatment program.  In some circumstances the judge may also order parents or guardians to participate in the disposition or to pay for the juvenile’s treatment.
[brief] ”  Accordingly, our Supreme Court held that, because N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1 mandates the OAG to defend state employees against “civil actions for damages based upon an employee’s tortious conduct,” and N.J.S.A. 59:10A-2 specifies the three instances when representation of tort cases may be refused, N.J.S.A. 59:10A-3 merely preserves the “discretionary authority” of the OAG to defend a State employee in cases seeking a remedy other than tort damages.  Chasin, 159 N.J. at 428.  Here, [...] contends that the decision in Wright, 169 N.J. at 444-48 -- which describes the circumstances under which a prosecutor’s office may be entitled to a defense by the OAG -- requires OAG to defend [...] with respect to [...]’s claims for injunctive relief because [...] was engaging in a “State law enforcement function” when applying OAG’s directives, so that [...]’s employees would be considered “State employees” in that action.