ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)  .................................................................................................................  7, 37 Dennis v. Sec’y, Penn. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2016)  .................................................................................................  30 Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003)  .......................................................................................................  31  Flores-Rivera v. United States, 2021 WL 5027508 (1st Cir. 2021)  ......................................................................................... 49, 50 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957)  ...............................................................................................................  39  Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2013) ..................................................................................................... 31 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 115 S.Ct ...................................................................................................................... 28 Nicolas v. Att’y Gen. of Md., 820 F.3d 124 (4th Cir. 2016) .................................................................................................... 31 Smith v. Sec’y of N.M. Dep’t of Corr., 50 F.3d 801 (10th Cir. 1995) .................................................................................................... 27 Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996) ..................................................................................................... 31 State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41 (1997) ................................................................................................................... 47 State v. Baker, 2019 WL 7187443 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 26, 2019) .............................................. 45 State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497 (2019) .................................................................................................................. 27 State v. Cahill, 125 N.J. Super. 492 (Law Div. 1973) .................................................................................... 26 State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86 (1982) ..................................................................................................................... 37 State Farmer, 48 N.J.145 (1966) .................................................................................................................... 37, 40
[brief] (5T48-8 to 56-6).  In his recorded statement, (Pa50), [...] stated that around midnight or 1:00 a.m. on August 11, 2015, he was walking to the [...] apartment complex (the “Ville”), when he saw defendant—who he knew as “[...]”—riding down Cottage Avenue as the front passenger in [...]’s red car.  (4T121-16 to 18; 6T39-3 to 11; 6T41-25 to 42-2; 6T44-9 to 45-5; 6T52-7 to 23; 6T57-8 to 58-10).  A “young boy” he could not identify was driving and he could not tell if anyone else was in the car.
[brief] (7T61;10-18; 7T37:16-20;7T39:1-20; 7T39:2-13; 11T82:20 to 83:4).  Petitioner and Decedent had a good marital relationship, frequently traveling together for vacations, attending dancing lessons, attending showers, weddings, receptions, shows, and often dined out together.  (7T119:8 to 121:7; 7T137:5-11; 9T92:1-6; P484a, P709a to P735a).  Respondent stated that Decedent told her that she was happy to be married to Petitioner, he helped her with what she needed around the house.  (12T15:1-7; 12T16:4-14; 11T83:15 to 84:10).  Decedent repeatedly demonstrated her love and affection for Petitioner.  (P375a to P467a).  Decedent organized a 75th Birthday Party for Petitioner in 2016 with 60 of his friends.  (P599a, 12T16:18-25; 12T17:1-11).  When Petitioner retired from the Department of Defense in December 2020, Decedent put together an electronic video file for Petitioner with testimonials from his coworkers.
[brief] [...], in an email exchange with fellow Committee members [...] and [...] in March 2017, characterized the July 5, 2016 incident as a “the big sword hanging over our heads” in the context of a discussion about alleged racial bias by the [...].  (406a-407a).  However, [...] testified that he “didn’t recall there being specific allegations against [...] from the public.  Just that there were demands, you know, from the public that we take action against [...] leadership”.  ([...] Dep. 101:19-23, 641a).  Township Committee Member [...] also made extensive and racially charged public comments at the August 1, 2017 meeting during which Defendants suspended Plaintiff, suggesting that the actions of the police on the night of July 5, 2016 were based upon race and that the officers used excessive force against “black children” who were supposedly “herded like cattle out of Maplewood … simply because of the color of [their] skin”, and that “being black is not a crime”.
[brief] Da – Appendix Dca – Confidential  Appendix 1T – February 15, 2012 (plea)  2T – March 23, 2012 (sentencing)  3T – July 3, 2013 (status conference)  4T – February 11, 2014 (pre-trial motions)  5T – February 24, 2014 (pre-trial motions)  6T – February 25, 2014 (pre-trial motions)  7T – February 26, 2014 (jury selection)  8T – February 27, 2014 (jury selection)  9T – February 27, 2014 (trial)  10T – February 28, 2014 (trial)  11T – March 4, 2014 (trial)  12T – March 5, 2014 (trial)  13T – March 6, 2014 (trial)  14T – March 10, 2014 (trial)  15 T – March 11, 2014 (trial)  16T – March 12, 2014 (trial)  17T – March 13, 2014 (trial)  18T – March 14, 2014 (trial)  19T – May 6, 2014 (sentencing)  20T – March 11, 2021 (PCR)  21T – December 21, 2021 (PCR)  22T – April 12, 2022 (PCR)  23T – March 15, 2023 (PCR)  24T – June 21, 2023 (PCR)  25T – June 28, 2023 (PCR)  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] (Pa168).  In response to the motion judge’s request, defendants’ counsel provided nearly identical Certifications from two attorneys serving as litigation liaisons.  (Pa172-Pa173; Pa175-Pa177).  At oral argument, the motion judge requested additional evidence.  Defendants’ counsel then provided a four (4) paragraph Certification from an Assistant Attorney General stating “[t]he Defendants have not requested that [...] withdraw as their counsel” and “[t]he [...] has not terminated [...]’s representation. ” (Pa180-Pa181).  First, the certifications provided do not establish that the defendants are aware that their former Designated Trial Counsel has been indicted by the State of New Jersey.  Second, the certifications do not establish that the defendants want Brown and Connery, LLP to continue representing them.  Nevertheless, the Court denied the plaintiff’s motion. D.
[brief] Id., citing Holmes, supra., at 524.  Such uncertainty would also make it difficult to reasonably predict appropriate additional insurance premiums and maintenance costs the tenant would assume, making it less feasible for the tenant to spread the burden of liability as part of the costs of doing business. ”  Id., citing Stewart v. Wallace Street, 87 N.J. 146, 160 (1981)  Those same considerations mandate the affirmance of the summary judgment in favor of [...].
[brief] C.  The judge has no legal basis when determining when plaintiff should reopen the case.  Since the judge’s order issued on May 12, 2023 (Pa114 – Pa115), did not specify any date for plaintiff to reopen the case, there was no legal basis for the judge to claim that “over one year” is sufficient time for plaintiff to retain an attorney.  D.  The order issued on May 12, 2023, does not affect the statute of limitations for the causes of actions in the case.
[brief] At bottom, the cases cited by defendant addressing the validity of consent are inapplicable because this is not a consent search.  The officer’s representation that, “I can get a canine to come here and it can hit on the car,” (V:16:59:15 to 59:25), came nowhere close to the sorts of investigative tactics that could call a suspect’s confession into question.  See State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 450-51 (1998) (holding that defendant’s confession during a nine-and-a-half hour custodial interrogation was voluntary despite the police feigning the destruction of a prior taped confession and subjecting the defendant to polygraph tests).  For all these reasons, this Court should reject --- 6  Defendant also relies on this Court’s decision in State v. Baum, 393 N.J. Super. 275, 291-92 (App.  Div.), aff’d as modified, 199 N.J. 407 (2009), which justified a vehicular search based on the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.  That case supports the State’s position because the panel reasoned that the officer’s threat to use a drug-sniffing dog “can hardly be considered the type of remark that would have overwhelmed [the suspect’s] free will. ”  Id. at 290.  To the extent that the panel suggested that reasonable suspicion was always necessary to conduct (or threaten to conduct) a dog sniff of a vehicle, our Supreme Court has subsequently “disapprove[d] of that reading. ”  Dunbar, 229 N.J. at 539.  defendant’s arguments in this point.  The court certainly did not abuse its discretion in finding that defendant’s statements were voluntary.
[brief] ”  253 N.J. at 366.  In that case, a detective testified as to his opinion that the video “showed a gun in defendant’s back waistband. ”  Id. at 365.  The Court held that this testimony “was impermissible under N.J.R.E. 701” because the detective “was not on the scene during the relevant time and had no prior interaction or familiarity with either defendant or the firearm in question.
[directive] Agency LETA: of Beginning balance  1)  Total RECElVED funds forfeited in Quarter: 2)  Offenses: Narcotics  Gambling Offenses: Racketeering: Public Indecency: Official Corruption: Theft Offenses: $  Other Offenses: $  Sources': Income from her 0  1  $ of Includes, but is not limited interest income.  reimbursements asset to, share maintenance costs and miscellaneous contributive distributions.  0  Page 5  NJiL8PSiOCJ C of Form 31998  1  Proaram MuniciDal Forfeiture ReDort that I. 1, were descn'be indivkibJe funds List and forfeited property, excluding reported in Part line 3) law period. its offense. use.
[brief] Moreover, Plaintiff’s claim that there was no judgment of conviction in the Edison Municipal Court file cannot be considered by the Court.  Plaintiff’s proofs in this regard consist solely of Plaintiff’s statement about the alleged statement of unnamed Edison Court “staff” that “there was no such signed order from [...]” (Pb2, Pb6-7).  That statement is clearly inadmissible hearsay as to the Borough.  It is clearly hearsay as to Highland Park under N.J.R.E. 803 and does not fall under any exception in N.J.R.E. 803.  Additionally, Plaintiff apparently failed to make a formal, proper request to the Edison Municipal Court for documents.
[brief] …  So here's why I support the PILOT.  Simply put, running a Township costs money.  We all drive in Township roads, rely on our Township police depend on our Township public works too, benefit from Township parks and recreation opportunities and need our Township employees to provide vital services.  …  So based on everything I've learned, I believe this PILOT will be a critical part of ensuring the Township can continue to provide necessary services without increasing taxes.  And for those reasons, I will vote yes.  T1.143:6-25 to 144:1-15.
[brief] On top of that, Merriam Webster defines “may” as “1(b). to have permission to” or “be free to” or “4. shall, must. ”  Thus, under the Dispute Resolution provision, the parties either had permission to, or were required to submit this dispute to arbitration.  In accordance with the Arbitration Act, if a party has permission to commence arbitration that becomes the exclusive remedy for the party’s suit.  N.J.S.A 2A:23B-1 to -32.
[brief] See, e.g., Battis, 589 F.3d at 683 (dismissing a gun possession charge and “hold[ing] that prejudice will be presumed when there is a forty-five-month delay in bringing a defendant to trial, even when it could be argued that only thirty-five months of that delay is attributable to the Government”); Cahill, 213 N.J. at 273-76 (dismissing based on a twenty-nine-month delay in prosecuting a DWI charge even though the defendant did “not identify any particular prejudice to him” other than seeking employment opportunities that did not require a driver’s license); Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. at 11-14 (dismissing based on a 344-day delay even though “the delay caused no prejudice affecting defendant’s liberty interest or his ability to defend on the merits”); Farrell, 320 N.J. Super. at 428, 553 (dismissing because the 663-day delay and “prosecution's clear inattention to its responsibilities . . . were so egregious that no showing of prejudice is required in order for this defendant to succeed on his argument that, in fundamental fairness terms, he was denied his adequately asserted right to a speedy trial”).  In the present matter, the trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to apply the presumption of prejudice where a four-year delay was due to the State’s negligence.  The court also erred in weighing this factor for another reason – [...] is actually able to identify and prove specific prejudice.  As [...] argued below, because he did not know about the indictment and was not provided with an attorney, he was unable to take steps to preserve evidence in the case, including the car identified in the indictment, which was ultimately destroyed in the State’s custody, and surveillance footage.  (Da 36-38, 49; 2T 11-11 to 18)  See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532) (explaining that the possibility of impairment to the defense is the “most serious” form of prejudice “because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system”).  Finally, [...] also pointed out the anxiety that he suffered as a result of learning about the unresolved charges close to four years after his arrest.  (Da 35-36)  Contrary to the trial court’s finding that [...] was minimally prejudiced, [...] was substantially prejudiced by the delay and this factor weighs heavily in [...]’s favor.  Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, each of the Barker factors weighs in favor of dismissal of the indictment and the related motor vehicle violations.  Thus, the trial court’s order denying [...]’s speedy trial motion should be reversed and the indictment and motor vehicle infractions should be dismissed with prejudice.
[brief] This argument begs the question: why does the market demand taller buildings?  The answer to this question is in the testimony of Plaintiffs’ Chief Development Officer, [...], and the commercial leasing industry testimony from Plaintiffs’ expert, [...] of [...].  Mr. Landsburg testified in response to a question from counsel about the purposes of taller buildings:  A:  So some of the reasons that they've – these buildings have been built to these higher building heights is mainly for advancements in the racking and material handling, the technology, the processes.  **All of those things have enabled companies to store more products in a smaller footprint. **  And so, you know, the design of a 30-foot-high building is just antiquated and doesn't -- hasn't kept up with what current use cases and current operations are in these buildings.  A side benefit is you need less land to do it.  So, you know, if you think about all that product, instead of going out, you're going up, and so it consumes less land, less impervious coverage.  And that's been part of how these buildings have advanced over time.  5T 11:20- 5T 12:10 (Emphasis added).  Mr. Terkanian echoed Mr. Landsburg’s statement that taller buildings enable companies “…to store more product on a smaller footprint. ” when Mr. Terkanian testified in response to a question from counsel:  Q: Why are they going higher?  Why do you need -- one of the questions was, why do you need to go higher, from a previous hearing?  A: Yeah.  I guess a couple of different factors.  One is land's precious and it's become more difficult to source, more expensive to build.  The entitlements have become more difficult to achieve.  And users and developers are looking at ways to densify their storage, increase capacity with less space utilization.  And that includes less land.  And it's driving the buildings higher.  5T 52:13-23 (Emphasis added)  Mr. Terkanian later added in response to counsel’s query about the implementation of automated material handling systems:  Q  And is there -- what about material handling systems, the picking systems, racking systems?  How do they factor into this?  A  Sure.  Yeah.  The whole industry has been evolving over time, and the evolution is speed and height predominantly.  Speeds to move the product faster, height to increase density of capacity.  So the entire industry has been stretched vertically, and we continue to see that trend over time.  5T 52:24- 5T 53:8 (Emphasis added)  From the foregoing testimony, there can be no doubt that taller buildings will allow the storage of more goods and allow those goods to be handled faster.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS’ VIOLATIONS OF THE NJCFLA DO NOT GIVE RISE TO VIOLATIONS OF THE CFA (Raised Below: T1; Pa44-Pa50)**  *i.  The Private Right of Action Under the NJCFLA*  Much of the trial court’s reasoning was based on the premise that the NJCFLA “does not confer a private right of action. ”  See SoR p. 11 (Pa43).  In granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the trial court reasoned that “[o]nly the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance has the authority to pursue claims for violations of the NJCFLA.  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18. ”  *Id.*  The trial court’s citation to subsection 18 is illustrative in that it shows the court’s reasoning is based entirely on the existence of enforcement remedies by the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance; however, nothing in N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 precludes a private right of action.  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 merely provides for the Commissioner’s authority and available remedies under the NJCFLA.  And notably, the NJCFLA’s statutory predecessors (discussed *infra*) provided for enforcement by the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance *in addition to an implied private right of action for aggrieved consumers.*
[brief] [...], New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, (GANN 2024) .......................................................... 24, 35, 39 N.J.A.C. 17:30-14 .......................................................................................................................  25 N.J.A.C. 19:66-1.1 et seq ..........................................................................................................  4 N.J.A.C. 19:66-12.1 ...................................................................................................................  35 N.J.A.C. 19:66-17.2(a) ............................................................................................................. 18  I.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This is an appeal from the arbitrary and capricious denial of an application to develop property with a permitted use.
[brief] 1.  To Vacate Judgment Denied 10-19-2023 .................................................  60  2.  Reconsider to Vacate Judgment Denied 12-1-2023 .......................................  61  3.  For a Traverse Hearing Denied 12-1-2023 .................................................. 62  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case Law | Brief Page | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| | Lampe v Xouth, Inc.
[brief] Appellant was Not Required to Present a Comparative Analysis Given No Prior or Subsequent Issues of Relevance; and the Claim of a Previously Asymptomatic Condition Becoming Symptomatic  New Jersey Model Civil Jury instruction 8.11F, reads in relevant part, “If you find that [plaintiff's] preexisting illness/injury(ies)/condition was not causing him/her any harm or symptoms at the time of the accident, but that the preexisting condition combined with injuries incurred in the accident to cause him/her damage, then [plaintiff] is entitled to recover for the full extent of the damages he/she sustained. ”  Where the plaintiff is making a specific claim for an aggravation/exacerbation of a pre-existing condition, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving what portion of his/her condition is attributable to the underlying incident; and in cases involving the verbal threshold, an opinion as to permanent aggravation being offered to vault the threshold must be based upon objective credible medical evidence.  See Davidson v. Slater, 189 N.J. 166 (2007); Polk, 268 N.J. Super. 568 (App. Div. 1993).
[directive] Sworn law enforcement officers who refuse to submit to a drug test ordered in response to reasonable suspicion or random selection shall be immediately suspended from employment.  Upon a finding that the officer did in fact refuse to submit a sample, the 14 officer shall be terminated from law enforcement employment and permanently barred from future law enforcement employment in New Jersey.  In addition, the appointing authority shall forward the officer's name to the Central Drug Registry and note that the individual refused to submit to a drug test.  Please note that if there is no valid reason why an officer cannot produce a specimen, the officer's actions will be treated as a refusal.  In addition, a sworn law enforcement officer who resigns or retires after receiving a lawful order to submit a urine specimen for drug testing and who does not provide the specimen shall be deemed to have refused to submit to the drug test.  X.
[directive] Planned Narcotics Surveillance  1.  Notice and Consultation.  In the absence of compelling or exigent circumstances, as shall be determined by the county prosecutor or the Attorney General or his designee, no planned narcotics surveillance operation as defined in this Executive Directive shall be conducted during operating school hours without first providing notice to and consulting with the building principal or local superintendent of the school involved.  2.  Limitations; Targeted Subjects.  Nothing in this Executive Directive shall be construed to prevent any law enforcement officer from making any observations from any place or property not owned by a school or school board, except that a planned narcotics surveillance or any other form of observation should, wherever possible, be limited to observing 1) those specific individuals or groups of individuals who are believed to be involved in drug trafficking activities, or 2) those specific areas or places on school property where drug use or trafficking activity is believed to occur frequently.  D.