ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] If information learned during the course of the prostitution investigation indicates that any of those specified relevant circumstances exist, the agency conducting the prostitution investigation shall comply with the investigation, referral, and reporting requirements set forth in Section III (A) of this Directive.  2.  Where the prostitution offense involves a "house of prostitution" as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1(a)(3) or is otherwise associated with a specific commercial premises (e.g., a massage parlor, "strip club," bar, restaurant, etc.), the agency or officer shall, whenever feasible and lawful, examine the physical premises to determine whether it is being used for residential purposes.  If the prostitution investigation reveals that persons may have used a commercial premises as a place of residence, the agency conducting the prostitution investigation shall comply with the investigation, referral, and reporting requirements set forth in Section III (A) of this Directive.  3.  Nothing in this subsection should be construed to suggest that the obligation to be watchful for indications of human trafficking is limited to circumstances where an agency or officer is investigating the offense of prostitution.
[brief] Teamsters Local 560 v. Eazor Express, Inc., supra. 227; Collingswood Hosiery Mills, 31 N.J. Super. at 473.  The highly deferential standard of review accorded public sector labor arbitration awards has been repeatedly reiterated by the New Jersey Supreme Court.  In New Jersey Transit Bus Operations v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 187 N.J. 546 (2006), the Court upheld an arbitrator’s weaving together of numerous contract provisions bearing on compensation as a reasonably debatable interpretation of the parties’ agreement, despite the Appellate Division’s contrary conclusion that the arbitrator did not follow the clear language of the parties’ agreement.
[brief] When [...] asked to go home, one detective directly told him that he could do so only if he cooperated, stating, “Nah.  You ain’t give me a reason for you to go home.  I haven’t heard one thing.  I heard a bunch of lies earlier.  That’s not enough for you to go home.  Give me a reason. ”  (1T 95-12 to 17)  Another time that he asked to go home, they told him, “you don’t wanna help yourself.  So you may not be going home. ”  (1T 93-11 to 15)  Those statements, considered together with their disregard for his other invocations, clearly communicated that they were not going to relent until he cooperated.
[brief] As the result of the DOE’s timeliness requirements, specifically N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i), [...] was compelled to initiate a challenge to [...]’s termination of his employment before his challenge to the License FAD could be considered by the Commissioner of Education (the “Commissioner”), or the License Appeal heard by this Court.  Now, adding insult to injury, the DOE has issued a third FAD (the “Job FAD”) that forecloses [...]’s ability to return to his teaching position in [...], even if this Court ultimately vacates the License FAD.  Essentially, [...] is “out of luck,” and loses his job, even if the FAD which removed him from his job was incorrectly decided and unlawful.
[brief] Notwithstanding the foregoing, the trial court relied exclusively upon the testimony and schedules prepared by Plaintiffs’ expert in computing the Judgment amount, which included transactions ranging from December 6, 2008 to November 7, 2013 (36T34-20 to 26-10) totaling $2,751,066.50.  P-238 (schedule 15).  Utilizing the same methodology as the trial court, half of the amounts of these time-barred transactions (approximately $1,375,533.25) were erroneously included in the $2,872,358.93 compensatory damage award.  Thus, time-barred transactions represented nearly one-half of the award.  In its decision, the trial court acknowledged the application of a six-year statute of limitations but failed to apply the law correctly.  That error is rooted in a misapplication of the discovery rule.  The judge stated, “As far as any kind of statute of limitations claim, on the discovery rule, when you find something out, conversion has a six-year statute of limitation, as does the contract claim. ”  36T52-7 to -10.  However, the discovery rule does not toll the statute of limitations until the date “when you find something out. ”  Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 274-75 (1973) (the discovery principle “modifies the conventional limitations rule only to the extent of postponing the . . . accrual of the cause of action” date until the plaintiff “discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered[,] that he may have a basis for an actionable claim.)  Because “legal certainty” is not required, a plaintiff does not need “to understand the legal significance of the facts” or “be informed by an attorney that a viable cause of action exists” before the claim will accrue.  Kendall v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 209 N.J. 173, 193 (2012) (citing Lopez, 62 N.J. at 273-74).  “Likewise, a plaintiff may not delay his filing until he obtains an expert to support his cause of action,” Kendall, 209 N.J. at 193, which is what occurred here.  see also DSK Enterprises, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 189 N.J. Super. 242, 251 (App. Div. 1983); Berman v. Gurwicz, 189 N.J. Super. 89, 102-103 (Ch. Div. 1981); Lapka v. Porter Hayden Co., 162 N.J. 545, 555-56 (2000).
[brief] (Pa0151; Pa0157.)  To start, the SAM attempted to define an “allocation period” across which the damages sought by [...] could be allocated.  The SAM determined that the relevant allocation period would be January 1, 1958, to December 31, 2009.  (Pa0146.)  As detailed below, the SAM did not actually allocate through December 31, 2009.  Also, that date had nothing to do with allocation; rather, it was the date through which [...] had submitted invoices related to its incurred costs.  The SAM then provided a short, one paragraph holding assigning percentages against [...] (not a party to this appeal due to liquidation) and [...], without citation to any testimony, case law, or facts:
[brief] Cf. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (a defendant’s testimony at a suppression hearing is not admissible at trial to prove his guilt); State v. Elkwisni, 384 N.J. Super. 351, 392 (App. Div. 2006) (a defendant’s testimony at a Miranda hearing would not be admissible in the State’s case-in-chief to prove guilt); Commonwealth v. Chapman, 136 A.3d 126, 131 (Pa. 2016) (“[T]he admission of evidence of a refusal to consent to a warrantless search to demonstrate consciousness of guilt is problematic. ”)  Even when a post-offense statement is deemed admissible to prove consciousness of guilt, “the Court has mandated "a strong limiting instruction . . . informing the jury that it should not draw any inference of consciousness of guilt by defendant from his post-crime conduct unless it believes that defendant acted to cover up a crime."
[brief] The sketch plan submitted in the file is crude, inaccurate and amateurish.  The prior applications in the file were misleading and inconsistent as they pertained to the actual square footage of the pole barn/garage.  A letter dated September 3, 2020 from Zoning Officer [...] refers to the addition as being 24’ by 28’.  (Pa8)  The [...] shows the proposed addition to be permitted by the Zoning Ordinance, when it was not.  (Pa3)  Nowhere in the 2022 is Zoning Application there any reference to the Property being a nonconforming use which would be greatly expanded by the additional structure.  Only a lawyer would recognize what the term “use variance” meant in the context of this Application and the Notices.  The Notices clearly do not meet the common sense definition.  Perlmart supra.  It is so general as to be meaningless to the ordinary person.  Rockaway supra.at 347.  It asks for a use variance.  It does not tell the reader what the use is or why there is a need for a variance.  None of the Board’s professionals nor the Zoning Officer pointed out in any of their reviews and reports that the 2022 Zoning Application was for the expansion of a nonconforming use.  There was no review or commentary regarding lot coverage requirements nor whether the 2022 Zoning Application complied with the Zone RD3 Zone lot coverage or setback requirements.  There is a lot grading review dated June 9, 2017, but it is based on faulty information submitted by the applicant in that Applicant apparently did not tell the reviewing engineer or Zoning Officer that the driveway would be extended around the side of the newly added garage, requiring grading.  (Pa6-7)  Appropriate public notice is a jurisdictional requirement.  Twp. Of Stafford v. Stafford Twp. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment, 154 N.J. 62, 79 (1998); Oliva v. City of Garfield, 1 N.J. 184, 190 (1948).  Unless proper notice is given the Board does not have jurisdiction to hear the Application.  Twp. Of Stafford v. Stafford Twp. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment, supra at 78.  Without proper notice the Board’s decision can have no effect.  The Notice being defective, the Board’s approval of the [...]’ “use variance” is null and void for want of jurisdiction.
[directive] The new law provides that for any person convicted of a crime for which he or she will be incarcerated, the court must order that, as part of the presentence investigation, a determination must be made as to whether the person being incarcerated is the sole caretaker of any minor child and, if so, who will assume responsibility for the child’s care and custody during the period the person is incarcerated.  The law also provides that in those situations the presentence investigation must include: (1) an inquiry and verification that the person who will be responsible for the child’s care and custody during the period of the sole caretaker’s incarceration has agreed to assume responsibility for the child’s care and custody; and (b) a PROMIS/GAVEL network check, juvenile central registry check and domestic violence central registry check on the person who will be responsible for the child’s care and custody during the period of the sole caretaker’s incarceration as well as any other adult or juvenile over twelve years of age who is a member of that person’s household.  The law further provides that the court shall provide DYFS with the information resulting from these inquiries.  Upon receiving this information collected by the court, DYFS must conduct a child abuse record information check to ascertain whether there have been any substantiated incidents of child abuse or neglect against the person who will be responsible for the child’s care and custody or any adult or juvenile over twelve years of age who is a member of that person’s household.  If, based on the information provided by the court and the check of its child abuse records, DYFS determines that the incarcerated person’s minor child may be at risk of abuse or neglect or that the child’s emotional, physical, health care, and educational needs will not be met during the period of the sole caretaker’s incarceration, DYFS must take appropriate action to ensure the safety of the child.  (b)  Conviction of Enumerated Offense Where Victim Was Under Age 18 L. 2003, c. 301 also addresses the separate situation where an individual has been convicted of any of a list of specifically enumerated offenses and the victim of the offense was under the age of 18 at the time.
[brief] The assertions below by the [...] was that (1) the Zoning Board had no jurisdiction to consider the School’s Application for that determination under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68; (2) that regular parking on the School Lot 5 by a third party Lot 8 was currently a permitted accessory use/facility on the School Lot, (3) that the burden of proof as to the validity of that non-conforming off-site parking use was on the School, and that the proponent [...] had no burden, and (4) that the claim/finding by the Chancery Court in separate litigation that an “easement” had been established in 1963 on the School Lot 5 permitting the Lot 8 [...] attendee/staff vehicles to park at will rendered the non-conforming use issue moot or irrelevant.  All those issues were presented to the Court below ([...]), and the Trial Court ruled incorrectly on each issue.  Part of the reason for its incorrect determination was that the Trial Court did not limit the record in its review to the record/documents presented to the Zoning Board.  The Trial Court denied the School’s Motion to Limit the Record to the Record before the Board and allowed the [...] to submit 57 additional documents, exhibits, or transcript excerpts mainly from the separate “easement” litigation between the parties in Chancery Court before [...].  As a consequence, the Trial Court did not decide the case in the proper context of determining on the record sent to the Board whether the Board determination was arbitrary and unfounded.  Instead, the Trial Court misunderstood the relevant legal principles and burdens of proof as to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 non-conforming use appeal/determination, and then vaguely allowed and relied upon exhibits or claimed facts not presented to the Zoning Board, improperly submitted by the [...] and allowed, and inaccurate on facts deemed relevant by the Court.  (Da179-194; Da215-218)  The various legal issues that were incorrectly asserted by the [...] --- and incorrectly adopted by the Trial Court --- have been properly detailed in the School’s Appellate Brief; the [...] Brief continues to assert its legally incorrect and illogical analysis on those issues.
[brief] The overarching theme of the Defendant’s conduct in this matter since 2018 is delay.  This case comes before the Appellate Division for a second time by the Defendant, who seeks relief from a four (4) year old final judgment of tax foreclosure.  This Court previously affirmed the trial court’s order denying the Defendant’s motion to vacate final judgment and denying the Defendant’s motion for reconsideration of the same, finding that the Defendant failed to articulate a cognizable basis for relief from the final judgment, and that he did not suffer a forfeiture of equity.  The Appellate Division order and opinion was issued after the United States Supreme Court decided Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty.  598 U.S. 631 (2023).  Nearly one (1) year after the Appellate Division denied the Defendant’s first appeal, he filed a second motion for reconsideration before the trial court wherein he requested entry of an order vacating the final judgment to bootstrap this case back to the Appellate Division for a second time on the exact same record.  The Defendant’s frivolous prosecution of the instant appeal for the second time was commenced to impede closure of this protracted case, to thwart the Plaintiff’s pending sale of the subject property, to exploit the Court’s resources, and to further the Defendant’s abusive practice of harrassing the Plaintiff and its employees.  As such, the trial court’s order denying the second motion for reconsideration should be affirmed, and sanctions should be imposed against the Defendant and his attorney to firmly discourage and avert further frivolous litigation in this matter.
[brief] The proposed front setback variance is to an open deck on the side of the home facing away from the Objectors’ homes.  (Pa559).  Objectors’ homes are not contributing to the Monmouth Hills District.  (P9).  Objectors’ homes are located 260’ from the Homeowners’ home.  (Pa507; Pa107; SDa028).  There is a roadway between the Homeowners’ home and the Objectors’ homes.
[brief] If the defendant reserves the right to appeal one or more adverse determinations but does not specify another issue or issues, then the latter issue or issues are waived.  State v. Szemple, 332 N.J.Super. 322, 758 A.2d 782 (App.Div.2000).  October 11, 2024  [...] Acting Assistant Prosecutor  Special Deputy Attorney General N.J. Attorney ID 410042022  Of Counsel and On the Letter Brief e-mail: [...]  The Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex  Post Office Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08626  Re State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...] (Defendant-Appellant)
[brief] (Pa4).  In that regard, and further highlighting Plaintiff’s own confusion during the underlying motion practice, Plaintiff’s counsel defended the Second Amended Complaint by asserting that he did not have to prove (or seemingly specifically allege) that any individual has a disability.  (T13-14).  In so doing, Plaintiff completely confused its own claims, the prima facie elements of its asserted claims, and the “perceived as” concept under the LAD.  In this case, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged unspecified individuals were disabled and were subject to discrimination/failure to accommodate based on same.  To defend its failure and inability to set forth the who/what/when/how of any such instance by claiming such failures are excused because such unidentified persons/instances "could have been" perceived as disabled only highlights the deficiencies in Plaintiff's pleading.  First, that argument is contrary to Plaintiff's own Complaint.
[brief] D.  The Clerk’s Actions Are Ultra Vires and Void  The Clerk’s actions are *ultra vires* and void for any and all of the above-discussed reasons: he has no authority to act unilaterally but only with the tellers, he cannot act outside of the statutory time frame, he cannot change certified results held out as final after such certification, and the authority may be ultimately vested with the board of county canvassers/board of elections.  Actions which exceed the scope of authority are *ultra vires*, and if the entity acting did so without having the power at all, then the actions are *ultra vires* in the primary sense and void in their entirety.  See, e.g., *Bauer v. Newark*, 7 N.J. 426 (1951); *N.J. Builders Assoc. v. Coleman*, 227 N.J. Super. 23, 25-26 (App. Div. --- \(^3\) [https://www.nj.gov/state/elections/assets/pdf/chrons/2025-chron-annual-school-board-election.pdf](https://www.nj.gov/state/elections/assets/pdf/chrons/2025-chron-annual-school-board-election.pdf) 1988); Verna v. Links at Valley Brook Neighborhood Ass’n, 371 N.J. Super. 77, 92-93 (App Div. 2004)  There is no statutory basis or legal precedent to find that the Clerk of the Board of Fire Commissioner, acting alone, is the sole and unilateral authority on conducting fire district elections, deciding which votes to count or reject, and being the sole and final decision maker on certifying election results.  Here, the Clerk’s unilateral actions are outside of his statutory power to act and are void.
[brief] Prior to the aforementioned Release of Claims, on May 23, 2019, Appellant filed a Class Action Complaint against Respondent by filing a Summons and Complaint entitled [...] v. [...], et al.in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Essex County, under Docket No. [...] (“Class Action Complaint”).  (Pa47-67).  In relation to the collection of this Debt, Appellant alleges violations of the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (N.J.S.A. 17:11C–1, et seq.) (the “CFLA”) (under the guise of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Law, N.J.S.A. 2A: 16-53) (Count I), the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (N.J.S.A. 56:8-1, et seq.) (the “NJCFA”) (Count II) and Unjust Enrichment (Count III) in connection with the acquisition and collection of a credit card debt she incurred with [...] (a/k/a [...]) (“[...]”), through [...]’s Sears Premier Card label.  (Pa55).  The Class Action remains pending an arbitration proceeding is scheduled for December 17, 2025.
[brief] N.J.A.C. § 11:1-20 ................................................................................passim N.J.A.C. § 11:1-20.1 .............................................................................37, 38 N.J.A.C. § 11:1-20.2 .............................................................................37, 39, 40, 43 N.J.A.C. § 11:1-20.2(d) .......................................................................37 N.J.S.A. § 17:16D-1 .............................................................................40 N.J.S.A. § 17:29C-10 ..........................................................................39 N.J.S.A. § 34:15-81 .............................................................................39 R. 4:42-9(a)(6) .....................................................................................45, 46 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This appeal examines whether a subcontractor should be entitled to an extraordinary relief - forced coverage under a contractors controlled insurance program (“CCIP”) - pursuant to a facially inapplicable regulatory code where the subcontractor: (1) was erroneously enrolled in the CCIP based on its misrepresentations; (2) was notified of its ineligibility for the CCIP just hours after the erroneous enrollment; (3) acknowledged its unenrollment nine times; (4) never paid premiums toward the CCIP and instead increased its proposal based on removal from the CCIP; and (5) maintained its own insurance coverage outside the CCIP given its ineligibility due to excluded demolition work.
[brief] THE COURT'S CHARGE FOR ROBBERY MISSTATED THE PROOF NECESSARY FOR THEFT, DILUTING THE STATE'S BURDEN OF PROOF AND NECESSITATING REVERSAL.  U.S. CONST., AMEND.  XIV; N.J. CONST., ART.  I, ¶ 10.  POINT  III  THE SENTENCE IMPOSED ON [...] IS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE, AND VIOLATED HIS FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND A JURY TRIAL.
[brief] This entire case legal foundation is based on the relationship between the two defendants, that is, the borrower and the guarantor.  When the borrower is denied Due Process under the Law, it directly effects the legal standing of the case against the guarantor.  TABLE OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY from Appellant Brief filed 4/22/2024 | Date | Event/Proceeding | Filed by | Result Number | |------------|-----------------------------------|--------------|---------------| | 2-6-2015 | Complaint | Plaintiff | Pa8-12 | | 2-11-2015 | Summons | Plaintiff | Pa13 | | 2-13-2015 | Affidavits of Service | Plaintiff | Pa6 & Pa7 | | 3-23-2015 | Request to Enter Default | Plaintiff | Pa16 | | 4-29-2015 | Final Judgment by Default | Plaintiff | Pa17 | | 5-4-2015 | Final Judgement Order | Court Clerk | Entered | | 8-10-2023 | Request of Court Records | Defendant | Pa1 | | 9-15-2023 | PDF of Court Records | Defendant | Pa4 | | 9-18-2023 | Motion to Vacate Judgment | Defendant | Pa19 | | 10-19-2023 | Court Hearing on Motion | Judge | Held | | 10-19-2023 | Vacate Judgment Order | Judge | Denied | | 11-2-2023 | Motion to Reconsider | Defendant | Pa60 | | 11-8-2023 | Motion for Travers Hearing | Defendant | Pa39 | | 11-14-2023 | Affidavit for Hearing | Defendant | Pa43-45 | | 11-29-2023 | Brief for Traverse Hearing | Defendant | Pa40-42 | | 12-1-2023 | Traverse Hearing Order | Judge | Pa61 | | 12-1-2023 | Reconsideration Order | Judge | Pa62 |