ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] \(^9\) --- \(^9\)  The parties agreed to exclude [...]’s payment claims on the Hackensack Project from the PTA Arbitration because they did not desire to have multiple Therefore, even if [...]’s claims regarding the Hackensack Project was ripe for adjudication, which it was not (see supra Point II.A.2), [...] could not pursue its Hackensack Project claims in the PTA Arbitration.  arbitrations under multiple contracts within the larger PTA Arbitration.  Da2 ¶ 5.
[brief] (Ca036-037).  \(^2\) [...], et. al. v. [...], Appellate Division Docket No. [...].  The Commission’s long history of applying a censure regarding school board member social media use which tends to compromise the school board obviously passes constitutional muster.  While Respondent has failed to make a coherent First Amendment argument or to identify the standard of scrutiny that applies, a mere censure is clearly the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling government interest (the Legislature called it “essential”) in upholding the public trust placed in boards of education.
[directive] b.  Actor hinders own apprehension or investigation by suppressing evidence or by giving Prosecution false information to police; a disorderly persons offense if the conduct which the actor has been charged with or is liable to be charged against him would constitute a crime of the fourth degree or less.  Contempt of Actor purposely or knowingly violates any provision of Domestic Violence  Restraining Order 2C:29-9b  Domestic Violence  Disorderly Persons $500 to $2,500  No 10% and conduct does not constitute a crime or disorderly persons offense.
[brief] Once [...] receives an executed estoppel certificate from any commercial tenant, it is obligated to promptly provide a copy to [...].  This is a separate requirement from [...]’s substantive requirement to provide an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate at the closing as a condition precedent to [...]’s obligation to close.  Notably, the provision does not suggest that [...] has a right to terminate the PSA based on the quality of a timely delivered non-compliant estoppel certificate.
[brief] However, when sued, [...] became required to assert its germane crossclaim against [...].  *R.4:7-5(a); R.4:30A*.  The “*bona fides,*” *Enright v. Lubow*, 215 N.J.Super. 306, 313 (App.Div.1987), clearly favor [...] and frown upon [...].\(^{14}\) ([...] also joins in all applicable arguments asserted in plaintiffs’ reply brief in [...].)  \(^{14}\)  Speaking of “*bona fides,*” in attempting to compensate for the weaknesses of its own arguments, [...] engages in multiple instances of dissembling in an improper effort to undermine the credibility of [...]’ arguments.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT 66 KINDERKAMACK DID NOT SATISFY THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CRITERIA FOR A D(1)  USE VARIANCE (Pa35-38)  The Second Application sought the construction of a mixed-use development in the Borough’s B-3 Zone, which permits business, professional and governmental offices, retail stores, as well as radio and television repair, furniture repair, and other similar service establishments furnishing services other than that of a personal nature.  See Borough Code, §240-6.5I(1)(a).  While the B-3 Zone permits multifamily housing, it only permits efficiency apartments and garden apartments housing four (4) or more dwelling units.  See Borough Code, §240-6.5I(1)(a) and (b), and §240-6.5G(1)(e).  While the Borough Code does not define “efficiency apartments,” the Borough required [...] to seek a use variance because it sought the construction of twenty-nine (29) residential units, which contain largely all one-bedroom apartments which were comparable to efficiency apartments, except for the required set aside for two and three bedroom units mandated under UHAC as well as the Borough’s own conflicting ordinances.  An applicant seeking a “d” variance has the burden to “prove both positive and negative criteria” to a zoning board.  Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 152 N.J. at 309, 323 (1998).
[brief] Pa173-74.  During September to December 2017, under a Non-Disclosure Agreement/Non-Circumvention Agreement, plaintiffs were engaged in multiple discussions with a competitor, the so-called CEP Defendants in the first action, to sell them plaintiffs’ Solar Rights.  Plaintiffs’ [...] and CEP Defendants’ [...] agreed to continue working towards such mutual goal of sale and purchase.  Several offers to buy from Cicero to Lemus were rejected by plaintiffs as grossly inadequate.  THE CONFIDENTIALITY COVENANT IN THE LAND-LEASE
[brief] See Levin v. County of Salem, 133 N.J. 35, 44-46 (1993); Garrison v Township of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282, 294 (1998).  However, the due care standard does not refer to the actual behavior of the parties but is instead focused on whether a reasonable person using the property with due care would face a substantial risk of injury.  Garrison v Township of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282, 292 (1998); Furey v. County of Ocean, 273 N.J. Super. 300, 311-312 (App. Div.) certify. denied. 138 N.J. 272 (1994).  In evaluating the trial judge’s rulings, this court must begin with the fundamental principal that, whether or not the property was in a dangerous condition is generally a question for the finder of fact.  Vincitore v. Sports & Expo. Authority, 169 N.J. 119, 123 (2001) (Emphasis Added).
[brief] STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  This appeal stems from the December 23, 2022 entry of the Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint AA088 and February 03, 2023 entry of the Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider Prior Order AA110 in the matter styled [...] v [...] et als., being case number [...]  Appellant has appealed the entry of that final order, and this Honorable Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 2:2-3.  This Dismissal Order was a final order.  Appellant filed the instant appeal on February 15, 2023 and there the appeal as timely filed.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] (Pa11-16).  In addition to the foregoing, the trial court, in its written opinion, also summarized defendant’s arguments.  (Pa16-21).  The court stated that defendant argued (a) the court determines the reasonableness of attorney’s fees; (b) fee awards are discretionary under the MMWA; (c) plaintiff’s counsel’s fees were unreasonably high “under the lodestar accounting method,” RPC 1.5 and the Rendine factors; (d) plaintiff achieved limited success compared to the relief sought; (e) the hourly rates were unreasonably high compared to prevailing rates in the community; (f) the fees requested were disproportionate (i.e., five times) the $7,500 awarded plaintiff; (g) the matter was a “routine breach of warranty” case; (h) counsel billed at the top rate for paraprofessional services; and (i) counsel was “resistant” to defendant’s OOJ and to settlement.  (Pa16-21) (emphasis in original).  The court set forth examples of what defendant perceived as overbilling regarding preliminary investigation, review of service and repair records and drafting plaintiff’s Complaint, given counsel’s 12 years of experience in his field.  (Pa17-18).  Defendant’s counsel also opined that he has been an attorney for eighteen years and “has personally defended or been involved with thousands of matters…” (Pa172).  Thus, the Court should award at most $250 per hour.  Ibid.; (Pa172).  The court cited Sullivan and Stitsworth,\(^7\) cases cited by defendant for the argument that plaintiff’s counsel’s fee award, including time spent on fee petitions, may be “drastically” reduced.  (Pa16-19; Pa232-242; Pa285-289).  The court then re-stated defendant’s conclusion that plaintiff’s counsel’s \(^7\)  Under Rule 1:36-3, with certain exceptions that are inapplicable here, “no unpublished opinion may be cited by any court. ”  alleged overbilling should not be “rewarded” and that his counsel fees should be reduced to, at most, 6 hours.  (Pa20-21).
[directive] Do you understand that if you change residence you must notify the law enforcement agency where you are registered, and must re-register with the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality in Fòm Revize Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Haitian Creole paj 1 nan 7 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Haitian Creole page 1 of 7 which you will reside, or the Superintendent of State Police if the municipality does not have a chief law enforcement officer, no less than 10 days before you intend to reside at the new address?
[brief] Unpublished Slip Opinion in Walsh v. [...], [...] dated January 25, 2008  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa42 | CASES | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Cohen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 231 N.J.Super. 97, 100-01, (App.Div.), certif. denied, 117 N.J. 87 (1989) | 19 | | County of Bergen Employee Benefit Plan v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey, 412 N.J.Super. 126 (App.Div. 2010) | 25, 26 | | Fawzy v. Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456 (2009) | 13 | | High Voltage Engineering Corp. v. Pride Solvents & Chem. Co. of N.J., Inc., 326 N.J.Super. 356, 361-62, (App.Div.1999) | 13 | | In re Arbitration Between Grover & Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 80 N.J. 221 (1979) | 13 | | Ingersoll v. Aetna Casualty & Surety-Company, 138 N.J. 236 (1994) | 23, 24, 25, 30, 32 | | Kimm v. Blisset, LLC, 388 N.J.Super. 14 (App.Div. 2006), cert. denied 189 N.J. 478) | 19 | | Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Freeman, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1127 (Law Div. 2016) | 29, 30, 31, 32 | | Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach Delaware, 189 N.J. 1 (2006), cert. denied 127 S.Ct. 2032, 549 U.S. 1338, on remand 2007 WL 6449326) | 20 | | Palisades Safety and Insurance Association v. Drive New Jersey Insurance Company, et al., (Unpublished) No. [...] (Law Div. February 13, 2015) | 28, 29 | | Perreira v. Rediger, 169 N.J. 399 (2001) | 24, 26, 30, 34 | | St. Paul Protective Insurance Company v. Drive New Jersey Insurance Company, (Unpublished), No. [...] (Law Div. April 12, 2019) | 31, 33 | | Singer v. Commodities Corp., 292 N.J.Super. 391 (App.Div.1996) | 19 | The Automobile Insurance Company of Hartford, CT v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company, (Unpublished), No. [...] (Law Div. June 24, 2019).
[brief] Id. at 405.  The [...] view has been echoed by our Supreme Court in Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 224 N.J. 584 (2016), a case where the defendants’ attorneys were entrusted with holding a child’s passport in escrow during a divorce and custody matter.  There, the defendants’ attorneys impermissibly turned over the child’s passport to defendant, who subsequently fled the country.  Id. at 586.  In discussing the unique role of an escrow agent, the court stated the attorneys acting as escrow agents “were fiduciaries for the benefit of both [the defendant] and [the plaintiff].”  Id. at 598.  As a result of the attorneys’ actions in breaching their fiduciary duties, the plaintiff, who was not the attorneys’ principal, could be entitled to relief in the form of counsel fees.
[brief] In rejecting defendants’ argument, the trial court stated, “The fact of the matter is, joint and several liability is presumed in the law.  Several liability is the exception generally, not the rule. ”  25T63:23-25.  This is a patently erroneous statement of the law. \(^{17}\)  So, too, is the justification the court provided for imposing joint and several liability.  The court stated that, because all the corporate entities were “controlled by the same person,” it would be “inequitable to the plaintiff” to “apportion percentages to people and then lo and behold when the music stops playing, the money won’t be there, it will be somewhere else. ”  25T79:13-80:13.  \(^{17}\)  The apparent source for the court’s misstatement is a passage taken out of context from Bendar v. Rosen, 247 N.J. Super. 219 (App. Div. 1991), in which the court discredited the trial court’s reliance upon Hill v. Macomber, 103 N.J. Super. 127, 232 (App.Div.1968) (“[Hill] does not stand for the proposition that an indivisible injury cannot be allocated between tortfeasors.
[brief] (Pa1-Pa4).  In support of their motion, Appellants argued that the DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor violates: 1) the doctrine of separation of powers in the State Constitution; 2) plaintiffs’ due process rights because it is unconstitutional vague and overbroad; 3) plaintiffs’ first amendment rights and their ability to represent their clients; and 4) plaintiffs’ rights under the federal and New Jersey Civil Rights Acts.  (2T4:12-23).  On July 27, 2023, the trial judge issued two orders from the bench that denied Appellants’ motion and granted Respondents’ motion in full, dismissing the Appellants’ Complaint with prejudice.  (Pa1-Pa4).  On July 27, 2023, the trial judge put his oral decision on the record.  (2T3:1-32:23).  \(^5\)  “1T” refers to the transcript of the February 15, 2023 deposition of [...].  “2T” refers to the transcript of the July 27, 2023 decision of the Honorable [...], J.S.C.  First, the trial judge correctly concluded that the DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor does not violate the separation of powers doctrine because the law effectuated a legitimate legislative purpose and did not encroach upon judicial prerogatives and interests.  Second, he found that the DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor was not unconstitutionally overbroad because there is no constitutional right to engage in a particular business, including debt adjustment or the practice of law, such that the enactment need only be supported by a rational basis.  Third, the DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor is not unconstitutionally vague because it is not impermissibly vague in all applications, and it is also not substantially incomprehensible.  Fourth, the DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor does not violate attorneys’ First Amendment rights because it does not restrict people’s access to the court, nor attorneys’ solicitation of clients, nor does it regulate any aspects of the attorney-client relation.  And, finally, Appellants are not entitled to relief under the federal and New Jersey Civil Rights Acts because they were not deprived of any due process right.  This appeal followed.
[brief] The indictment named employees of the [...] and patrons.  Defendant entered a bank, demanded money, gestured with his hand and announced that he had a firearm.  [3T58-13; 3T77-18 to -22; 3T95-16 to -19].  In response to defendant’s demands and gestures, the two tellers gave defendant “bait packs” of money.  [3T95-11 to -14].  The elements of the charge of Robbery were met as defendant, in the course of committing a theft, threatened immediate bodily injury by simulating a weapon and demanding the money from the bank.  [...] testified that the events unfolded rapidly.  [3T116-16 to -23].  He saw defendant drop a beer bottle as defendant attempted to exit the bank.  [3T117-7 to -13].  The beer bottle was recovered by the police and submitted to the New Jersey State Police Forensics Laboratory for testing.  DNA testing on the bottle yielded a positive match for defendant when compared against his control sample.  [4T34-22 to 35-4; 4T88-22 to 89-5].  Clearly, given all rational inferences to the State, there was more than sufficient evidence to survive defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.  [...] properly denied defendant’s motion.
[directive] Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the state to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and administration of criminal justice throughout the state, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the state of New Jersey to implement and comply with the (IAPP) as revised by this Directive below and to take any Internal Affairs Policies & Procedures additional measures necessary to update their guidelines consistent with IAPP, as required by N.J.S.A 40A:14-181.
[brief] “Once again, we reiterated that the standard of review of the applicant's “special reasons” for a variance depends on the type of variance at issue. ”  Grubbs at 388 (citing Coventry Square at 49).  “[S]pecial reasons necessary to establish a height variance must be tailored to the purpose for imposing height restrictions in the zoning ordinance. ”  Grubbs v. Slothower, 389 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Coventry Square at 52).
[brief] (Aa142)  •  A consideration of the Private Sector/Military Comparison in terms of pay scale.  (Aa142-143)  • Stipulations made by the Parties.  (Aa143-145)  •  Unlike the City, which presented the testimony of its CFO, who the Arbitrator found to have expert status, the [...] “did not have an expert witness or an audit of the 2023 budget. ”  Thus, the Arbitrator “credited [the CFO] with respect to establishing the financial condition of the City” as unchallenged by opposing expert testimony.  (Aa116)  As required by N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16f(5), the Arbitrator then explained how he took the nine statutory factors into account in rendering his Award.
[directive] See generally Section 1.1 (providing that these Guidelines do not limit the plea negotiation authority of prosecutors with respect to non-Brimage-eligible offenses).  See also State v. Spivey, 179 N.J. 229 (2004) (Court reaffirmed the well-established principle that an individual can constructively possess an object even though he lacks physical or manual control provided he has knowledge of the object’s presence and has the capacity to exercise either physical control or dominion over the object).  Nothing in this Section shall preclude a Downward Departure for Substantial Cooperation in accordance with Section13, and a cooperation agreement may provide that the defendant need not plead guilty to an additional, nonBrimage-eligible offense under this Section.  11.5
[brief] This Court’s prior ruling that the Plaintiff had sustained no actual damages other than incurring legal fees to re-open the case for a different amended judgment of divorce because of the alleged Defendants’ breach of duties during the representation, thereby Defendants are liable for the legal fees incurred by the Plaintiff.  This ruling is the result of misapplying the law and introducing “new law” into our jurisprudence that may well come back to haunt the citizen of the State of New Jersey.  Plaintiff cannot find any case law to rebut Defendants’ proposition that this ruling is unsupported by existing case law in New [...]’s specific wrongdoing, and, thus, are recoverable as damages.  But the Shareholders may not recover as special damages attorney’s fees incurred in asserting claims against [...] and [...]. ”  See Gefre, 306 P.3d 1264.  Jersey or perhaps across the entire nation and the result is also fundamentally unfair.  Under the circumstances, the trial court should have dismissed the complaint when at the end of the trial, the Plaintiff could not establish that she suffered any actual damage in the underlying matrimonial action.
[brief] COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS  The Appellant submits the following with respect to the Respondent’s Counterstatement of Facts:\(^1\) (1)  The [...] acknowledges that a loading space is not required for Appellant’s intended use.  (Rb2).  (2)  Notwithstanding the fact that a loading space is not required for Appellant’s intended use, the [...]’s line of questioning at the Initial Hearing prompted the Appellant to appease the [...] by proposing alternatives to how its product would be loaded and unloaded.  (T2/50:1-23).  Specifically, the Appellant amended the Application to create a loading space on the northeast corner of the Property along Atlantic Avenue, which would be gated to discourage customers looking for on-site parking and therefore limit the intensity of ingress and egress that might occur from the Property.  (T2/18:3-14; T2/29:9-21).  The Appellant also offered expert testimony confirming that it would have security officers assist with deliveries, by having that individual --- \(^1\) Respondents’ brief is hereafter referred to as (“Rb”); Respondents’ appendix is hereafter referred to as (“Ra”); and Appellant’s Appendix is hereafter referred to as (“Aa”).  stop pedestrians, and allow the delivery vehicle to turn into its driveway safely and efficiently.  (T2/25:4-24, 69:19-70:4).  (3)  Proposed deliveries to the Property would occur via small loading vehicles (e.g., vans) and would occur less frequently than other businesses that utilize the existing delivery corridor (i.e., two to three times per week, with a maximum of once per day, occurring before or after business hours), resulting in an improvement over existing conditions.  (T2/18:14-19:17, 51:16-24, 52:25-53:13).  (4)  The Property’s current configuration, with numerous pre-existing conditions that do not meet current development standards, necessarily limits how invitees access the Property – including a need to possibly utilize a “back-in loading” procedure.  (T1/69:10-70:10).  (5)  A “back-in loading” procedure may be inconvenient, but inconvenience is not the standard by which the [...] must make its decisions.  (T2/86:8-14).  III.
[brief] I do believe that several goals of planning would be advanced by the granting of these variances, specifically goals G and I.  Goal G of the MLUL is to provide sufficient space in appropriate locations for a variety of uses, including residential.  Based on the Borough’s Master Plan, zoning plan, this is where development like this should be located.  Goal I is to promote a desirable, visual environment through good civic design and arrangement.  Parking lots are, they serve a purpose.  They leave a lot to be desired from an architectural or aesthetic standpoint.  I believe the building that’s being proposed this evening is an absolute benefit to the aesthetics of this area.  Again, when I talked about the property and where it exists, this is a very highly visible and highly seen property by both motorists and pedestrians.  As to the height variance, [...] testified that a special reasons variance for height of 48.13 feet is being requested wherein 41 is the maximum height.
[directive] You have 5 years from today's date to file a  Usted tiene 5 a nos a partir de Ia fecha de hoy petition for post-conviction relief, unless an para presentar una peticion de reparacion exception to this general rule applies as set despues de Ia condena, a me nos que R. correspond a una excepcion a esta regia general forth in 3:22-12.  segun se expone en 3:22-12.
[brief] (c.)  Plaintiff was given a suspension of her obligation to pay the $70,000.00 to Defendant because she represented to Defendant in the agreement that she did not have the $70,000.00 at the time that she signed the agreement (DA1, page A3, Paragraph 1).  (d.)  Plaintiff admitted in testimony that Defendant relied upon Plaintiff’s false representation.  (e.)  Defendant, in his testimony on the issue of reliance, indicated that he relied upon Plaintiff’s representation.  Plaintiff did not contest this fact.  (f.)  Plaintiff lied.  She admitted that she had significantly more than $70,000.00 in available funds when she signed the agreement.  This lie was not disclosed to [...] until almost seven (7) years after the signing of the agreement.  (g.)  Plaintiff actually had the money that she indicates was not paid to her and even though she had the money it was her position that Defendant [...] should have to pay a penalty, because it was ok for her to LIE AND CHEAT.  This begs the question:  Why is it equitable or fair or okay for Plaintiff to lie, cheat and deceive Defendant for seven (7) years, make false representations and retain monies that [...] should never have been required to pay to [...]? paid to [...]?  If the $70,000.00 had been initially paid by [...], the issue does not arise and there would have been no penalties.  Since equity treats as done that which ought to have been done, the Judgments of the Courts below must be reversed.