ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Following the deaths of [...] and [...], there were multiple lawsuits filed in New York and New Jersey between Appellant and [...].  (Pa89-Pa93).  Appellant and [...] disputed ownership of the entities owned by [...] and [...] and accused each other of misappropriating assets including personal property allegedly stored at the Englewood Home.  *Id.*  These lawsuits resulted in the appointment of [...] in January 2021.  *Id.*  As part of the administration of the Estate, [...] retained [...] to prepare a report (the “Bernards Report”) of [...]’s personal property contained in the Englewood Home and the value of those items.  (Pa65, ¶17).  The 135-page report listed 350 items with a total value of $61,245.  (Pa97-Pa231).  The report was provided to Appellant and [...] prior to August 12, 2021.  (Pa297-Pa298).  Throughout the course of this matter Appellant has constantly expanded the list of items he claims he owned and stored at the Englewood Home, that do not appear in the Bernards Report.  (Pa70, ¶39-Pa73, ¶55).  He continued to do that in his Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint for an accounting as well as his Motion for Reconsideration.  (Pa1-Pa6); (Pa458-Pa465); (Pa473-Pa482).  Appellant further demands an accounting of the value and status of all accounts and properties owned by the Estate.  Appellant clearly knows that the Estate has been forced to commence multiple lawsuits in New York for removal of Appellant from the UES Property and the Long Beach Property and has had to defend against the within action, a foreclosure action on the UES Property where Appellant has been unlawfully converting rents from tenants, and the UES Contract Case.  (Pa77, ¶85); (Pa84, ¶127); (Pa84, ¶129); (Pa84, ¶130); (Pa84, ¶131).  The Plaintiff in the UES Contract Case asserts that he gave Appellant a $100,000.00 deposit in connection with the purchase.  (Pa85, ¶132).  Instead of the purported “deposit” funds being placed in an account in the name of [...] (the entity that owns the UES Property), Appellant had the funds deposited into an account in the joint names of [...] (who died 3 months prior to the deposit) and his adult son [...], who lives in Israel and has never had any ownership interest in the UES Property or Treasures & Gems, Ltd.  Id.  Not only has Appellant misappropriated Estate assets, but he continues to deplete the little that remains by preventing the Estate from collecting rents for the UES Property (1T11:6-1T11:8), preventing the Estate from selling the UES Property and the Long Beach Property and requiring the Estate to engage in otherwise unnecessary litigation.
[brief] In In re Langbaum, 201 N.J. Super. 484, 493 (App. Div. 1985), the Appellate Division held that an absentee ballot should not be invalidated solely because the voter had not sealed the inside envelope in conformity with N.J.S.A. 19:57-23, when the voter had sealed the outer envelope thereby preserving “the integrity of the electoral process. ”  Id. at 490, 493.  The Langbaum Court indicated that “[v]oiding the ballot and thus disenfranchising the voter is too harsh a remedy where the deficiency does not affect the integrity of the electoral process. ”  Id.  When a voter’s intent on a ballot can be reasonably determined, that intent should be overriding given considerable weight.
[brief] …………………………………………………………………………………………………………  12  INDEX TO REPLY APPENDIX  TABLE OF FALSE STATEMENTS FROM RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF………………Da1110 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## CASES - *Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors*, 691 A.2d 350 (N.J. 1997) ................................................. 3 - *Lawson v. Dewar*, 2021 WL 2148885 (App. Div. May 27, 2021).............................................. 9 - *Raspantini v. Arocho*, 364 N.J.Super. 528 (App.Div.2003) ..................................................... 5, 6, 8 ## STATUTES - N.J.S.A. 42:2C-37(c)1 .................................................................................................................. 8 ## RULES - Rule 1:6–2 ........................................................................................................................................ 5 - Rule 4:42-11(b) ............................................................................................................................... 11 - Rule 4:42-2 ....................................................................................................................................... 9 - Rule 4:49-2 ....................................................................................................................................... 9 - Rule 4:9 ........................................................................................................................................... 10 ## OTHER AUTHORITIES - *Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules* (2011) ................................................................. 5 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Creative storytelling is the cornerstone of Respondents’ strategy to lead the Court down a long road paved with baseless allegations, misleading information, altered timelines, unsupported "facts" and, not surprisingly, blatant lies.
[brief] The Court: Right.  [...]: -- any change in the ownership, I sent letters, emails, phone calls out to [...].  I sent letters, emails, phone calls out to the manager from [...], [...].  I don't- I'll be candid with you, Your Honor, I don't have a good reason why those things haven't been produced.  (5T 6, 15-25)  [...] reacted to the seven-month period of time that [...] had refused to respond to any discovery pertaining to the ownership of the business by stating it was a simple question and if [...]'s lack of cooperation continued, she would consider appointing a receiver.
[directive] Rule or Statute Description  This Rule provides that all persons except those charged with crimes punishable by death where the prosecutor presents proof that there is a likelihood of conviction and reasonable grounds to believe that the death penalty may be imposed, shall be bailable before conviction on such terms as, in the judgment of the court, will ensure their presence in court when required.  The Rule lays out the factors to be considered in setting bail which are the seriousness of the crime charged, the apparent likelihood of conviction and the extent of punishment permitted; the defendant’s prior criminal record, if any, and previous record on bail, if any; the defendant’s reputation and mental condition; the length of defendant’s residence in the community; the defendant’s family ties and relationships; the defendant’s employment status; record of employment and financial condition; the identity of responsible members of the community who would vouch for Rule 3:26-1 defendant’s reliability; any other factor indicating defendant’s mode of life, or ties to the community or bearing on the risk of failure to appear and, particularly, the Right to Bail Before Conviction.
[brief] [IT Lines 15- 25Pg. 16]  "you have or claim that you were denied the opportunity to pay your mortgage is a claim that is to be brought against the mortgage company, not the [...].  They are not parties to that private transaction.  They are not participants in that private action.  So, sir, any and all claims -- further claims you have for statutory adjournments or further delays are to be brought under the foreclosure action, not against the [...].
[brief] Appellants further argue that “[t]he Town, through the mechanism of the overlay zone, avoids the usual statutory requirements of disposing of its municipally owned property. ” (Pb2.)  There was no such attempt to shirk the Town’s statutory obligations and the suggestion that the Town would engage in such nefarious misconduct is offensive.  Once an area is designated as an area in need of redevelopment under the LRHL, the municipality has the powers afforded under the LRHL.
[brief] Defendants explicitly asked the court to exclude [...]'s opinion regarding the intent of the defendants, a subject generally ill-suited for expert opinion testimony.  1T34:24-36:2.  The motion was denied.  1T51:21-56:22.a  Defendants continued to press their objections to [...]’s net opinion testimony at trial.  8T69:24-25, 70:7-10, 71:9-12, 102:4-6, 119:25-120:5; 9T18:20-22, 21:17-19, 35:2-4.  The trial court ultimately rejected [...]’s premise that a value could be ascertained by merely adding the amounts of the transactions he questioned to the sale price agreed upon by the parties, ending plaintiffs’ quest for a $10 million recovery on their fraudulent inducement claims.
[brief] With respect to a diminished capacity defense, the "understanding" from everyone – the jurors, the parties and the court – at the outset and to which the record makes clear, was that jurors might hear about, and be presented with, evidence of diminished capacity.  And while they were put on notice of this, defendant made a strategic decision to forego any expert testimony or admit any documentary evidence to support the assertion that he suffered from a mental illness, or a mental disease or defect.  Rather, defendant rested his case and then argued that information of his mental illness was "organically" within the record and that was sufficient to support a diminished capacity charge to the jury.  (9T:14-17 to 15-1).
[brief] See, e.g., Muirfield Const. Co. v. Essex Cnty. Improvement Auth. 336 N.J. Super. 126, 136–37 (App. Div. 2000); P & A Const., Inc. v. Twp. of Woodbridge, 365 N.J. Super. 164, 172-73 (App. Div. 2004); Brockwell & Carrington Contractors, Inc. v. Kearny Bd. of Educ., 420 N.J. Super. 273, 278-79, 283 (App. Div. 2011); Tufano v. Bor. of Cliffside Park in Bergen Cnty., 110 N.J.L. 370, 372-73 (Sup. Ct. 1933).  Finally, the relevant aspects of [...] are dicta.
[directive] When an EW System review process is initiated, personnel assigned to EW oversee the System (1) formally notify the subject officer, in writing; should (2) conference with subject the officer supervisory personnel; and appropriate (3) develop and administer a remedial program including the appropriate remedial/corrective actions listed below; (4) continue to monitor the subject officer for at months, or until supervisor least three the concludes that the officer's behavior has been remediated (whichever is longer); (5) document and report findings to the appropriate supervisory personnel and, if internal warranted, the affairs unit.  Any statement made by the subject officer in connection with the EW System review process may not used be against the subject officer in any disciplinary or other proceeding.
[brief] The doctrine of invited error operates to bar a disappointed litigant from arguing on appeal that an adverse decision below was the product of error, when the party urged the lower court to adopt the proposition now alleged to be error.  The rule is based on considerations of fairness and preservation of the integrity of the litigation process.  “Elementary justice in reviewing the action of a trial court requires that that court should not be reversed for an error committed at the instance of a party alleging it. ”  Bahrey v. Poniatishin, 95 N.J.L. 128, 133 (E. & A. 1920).  Thus, where error was advanced to secure a tactical advantage at trial, the party responsible will not be permitted to complain on appeal.  “The defendant cannot beseech and request the trial court to take a certain course of action, and upon adoption by the court, take his chance on the outcome of the trial, and if unfavorable, then condemn the very procedure he sought and urged, claiming it to be error and prejudicial. ”  State v. Posntery, 19 N.J. 457, 471 (1955) see Carrino v. Novotny, 78 N.J. 355, 369 (1979) (holding that defendant who induced erroneous involuntary dismissal was bound by error and could not later contest amount of co-defendant's liability).
[brief] _Campbell v. Hastings_, 348 N.J. Super. 264, 270 (App. Div. 2002) (citation omitted).  See also _Mayer v.  Once Upon A Rose, Inc._, 429 N.J. Super. 365, 376-77 (App. Div. 2013) (holding that a liability expert on glass was not needed to opine about the inherent nature of glass to shatter if held too tightly).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RECOGNIZING THE CONDITION OF BOROUGH APPROVAL ACKNOWLEDGED BY PLAINTIFF(Pa17)(not addressed by final decision)  Each Agreement and Resolution for the development of the tract of land at issue made roadway dedication and acceptance conditional upon formal approval by the Borough through ordinance of resolution.  The Developer’s Agreements are formal contracts which should have been recognized by the trial court.  Developer’s Agreements have been used for a substantial period of time in the State of New Jersey to address the terms and conditions of an approval and to allocate responsibilities, obligations, privileges and rights during construction.  Developer’s Agreements have been upheld by the Courts as contracts between parties and given the same plain and ordinary meaning that is ascribed to all contracts.  See, East Brunswick Sewerage Authority v. East Mill, 365 N.J. Super. 120, 125, 838 A.2d 494 (App. Div.2004).  The Court should assume the validity of the provisions of these agreements as the parties are sufficiently counseled and experienced to express their intentions in clear contractual terms.  Id. at 126-127, 838 A.2d 494.  Talcott Fromkin Freehold Assocs. v. Freehold Tp., 383 N.J. Super. 298, 314 (Super. Ct. 2005)  In 2002, the Developer's Agreement made the approval "subject to any required resolution or establishment of utilities easements (existing or to be established) and the ownership and maintenance of the internal roadway".  (Pa91, par "L")  A 2004 "Developer's Agreement" was authored for the next phase of the property development.  The Developer's Agreement indicated; "all municipal/county improvements, if any, lying within the bed of the existing streets and the improvements therein, and such other aforesaid areas, if any, shall be and are to be dedicated by the deed, if required to public use, provided, however, this agreement shall not constitute an acceptance by the Borough or the [...] of such improvement until formally accepted as provided hereinafter and the Borough and the [...] shall accept said dedication of the required curbing, drainage pavement etc. upon the completion of the improvements required in the site plan by ordinance or resolution".  (Pa115-116 par.2)  This agreement made it clear that the parties agreed that in order for any dedication to occur there must first be a deed, and then "formal acceptance" by "ordinance or resolution".  No such deed was prepared by Plaintiff, nor was any resolution or ordinance sought to conclude formal acceptance.  This are formal conditions of contract which cannot be abrogated.  Fourteen years later, in 2018, Plaintiff filed for an additional application for an amended site plan approval to construct four (4) multifamily apartment buildings on Lot 2.01.
[brief] ”  *Witt*, 328 N.J. Super. at 454.  Here, the Board Attorney made the decision that “tonight just so everyone understands is just the subdivision.  It’s the drawing of lines on the property, where those lines will be drawn and so forth…  So if you want to come up and talk about many of the issues that were spoken about during the use variance portion of this, remember a use variance was already granted. ” (1T6-3 to 1T6- 5; 1T6-25 to 1T7-12).
[brief] Short, 131 N.J. at 61.  Third, defense counsel, in his opening statement, asserted it was impossible for defendant to have fired the shot that killed [...], so the fatal shot could only have come from the other person in the vehicle – [...].  (3T:52-19 to 54-11).  So, as the trial court properly decided, the fact that there are additional firearms and ammunition attributed to the defendant, including the flare gun found in defendant’s lap when he was extracted from his vehicle by police, was relevant to disprove the assertion that [...] was the shooter.  (6T:66-1 to 5; 81-17 to 82-5).  As to the evidence of marijuana, defense counsel also used his opening statement to speak directly to defendant’s mental capacity while also accusing [...] of being a drug addict.  (3T:50-19 to 51-2).  As such, the admission of the marijuana found in the car was probative and relevant to the combat those assertions made by the defense.  Likewise, the firearms purchaser identification card in someone else’s name went specifically to support the stipulation that defendant did not have, nor did he ever have, his own permit to carry a handgun, a permit to purchase a handgun, a purchaser identification card, or a permit for an assault weapon in the State of New Jersey.  (8T:54-7 to 17).  In sum, the items recovered from defendant’s vehicle were not improper evidence; therefore, did not facilitate improper arguments by the State.  They were relevant and probative to material issues regarding state of mind and defendant’s purposeful actions – like hiding the guns so they would not be in plain view and in the hopes that no one would find them, as well as proper evidence necessary to refute defendant’s third-party guilt allegations.  The fact that the evidence has the possibility to be prejudicial does not require its exclusion especially when the evidence was necessary for the jury to determine the culpability of the defendant.  Accordingly, there is no reversible error.
[brief] Toms River, March 27, 2018.  Officer [...] of the Toms River Police Department encountered defendant on March 27, 2018.  (13T72-1 to 7; 13T73-2 to 11; 13T74-7 to 20; 13T78-19 to 20; 13T82-8 to 20; 13T83-8 to 84-7; S-38).  Video from Westfall’s car showed that when he came up to the open driver’s side window, he was approximately a foot to eighteen inches from defendant.  (13T83-8 to 12; 13T84-23 to 85-3; 13T94-23 to 95-17; 13T101-2 to 11; S-38).  The audio revealed that --- 12 [...] confirmed that S-37A through S-37D were enhancements she made from [...]’s video, again without altering or changing the images in any way.  (13T49-19 to 50-6; 13T52-2 to 5; Pa40-47).  defendant disputed the facts and chuckled dismissively.  (13T85-14 to 22; S-38.)  At that point, defendant “held up his ID.  It was a [NJSP] ID. ” (13T85-22 to 24).  Westfall read “New Jersey State Police,” and saw the “golden triangle” on it.  (13T86-19 to 23; 13T87-15 to 17).  He recognized the NJSP ID because he had seen it more than once before that night.  (13T88-24 to 89-9).  Westfall characterized what he saw as a bifold wallet.  (13T87-10 to 13).  Based on seeing the ID, Westfall addressed defendant as “Trooper. ” (13T85-22 to 86-1).  Westfall let defendant go with a warning.  (13T88-5 to 23).  D.
[directive] The defendant has been arrested and charged with one or both of the motor vehicle violations checked in the box above.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22, this WARNING is to advise you that if you accept responsibility to transport or accompany the defendant, and you permit or facilitate the operation of a motor vehicle by the defendant while the defendant is intoxicated or has a blood alcohol concentration at, or above, that permitted by law (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), then you are potentially subject to criminal penalties and civil liability.  Permitting a person who is intoxicated or who has a blood alcohol concentration at, or above, that permitted by law, to operate a motor vehicle is a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a).  If you are charged and convicted under that statute: your driving privilege will be suspended; fines and monetary penalties will be imposed; and you may be incarcerated.  If you permit or facilitate the defendant to operate a motor vehicle while the defendant remains intoxicated or has a blood alcohol concentration at, or above, that permitted by law, and the defendant becomes involved in a motor vehicle collision where other persons are injured or killed, then you may be subject to indictment and criminal prosecution.  If you are prosecuted and found guilty, the court can impose fines and mandatory penalties, and a prison sentence.  In addition to any criminal liability, if you permit or facilitate the defendant to operate a motor vehicle while the defendant remains intoxicated or has a blood alcohol concentration at, or above, that permitted by law, and the defendant becomes involved in a motor vehicle collision where there is property damage, or personal injury or death, then you may be held liable for civil damages, and those damages may not be covered by insurance.
[brief] Further, as to the distinction between merger and consolidation, in drafting N.J.S.A. 18A:8-44 the Legislature did not instruct the executive county superintendent ("ECS") to consolidate an eliminated non-operating district with its former send-receive partner pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:8-25 *et seq.*  Rather, it instructed the ECS to "merge" the eliminated non-operating district with its former send-receive partner.  Likewise, in framing N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 the Legislature set forth specific enumerated entities that were applicable.  It could have included, for example, "the governing body of a municipality constituting a former non-operating district eliminated pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:8-44."  But the Legislature did not do so.  The Commissioner cannot read ambiguity into plain statutory language to support a decision that was otherwise erroneously made.  2.  The Legislature did not authorize municipalities, such as [...], to submit a question regarding regional school district enlargement to voters.  (Aa19 – Aa21)  The fact that Legislature did not include municipalities governing former non-operating districts in the enumerated entities listed in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 is further supported by the fact that the Legislature has only authorized boards of education to submit a question regarding regional school district enlargement to the voters.  N.J.S.A. 18A:13-43, as amended by P.L. 2021 c. 402.  When it passed P.L. 2021 c. 402, the Legislature had the opportunity to add municipalities to the list of entities who may submit a question on the enlargement of a regional school district to the voters.  The Legislature did not amend N.J.S.A. 18A:13-43 in this regard.  POINT II
[brief] (Da34).  In her 11-page decision, [...] addressed defendant’s contention that the consent search of his apartment, car and residence, resulting in the police seizure of 175 pounds of marijuana in eight duffel bags, a box containing cocaine, and cash, were allegedly the “fruit of his illegal interrogations. ”  (Da34; Da39).  Contrary to defendant’s claims in his brief, [...] did address his “fruit of the poisonous tree” claim.  (Compare Da34; Da39 with Db30-32).  On December 10, 2021, [...] denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration in an 11-page written decision.
[brief] [...] and [...] waived any conflict under RPC 1.7(b).  Regardless, as the trial court explained, [...] and [...] exercised their right to waive any potential conflict under RPC 1.7(b) both when they retained the [...] and again when they signed another conflict waiver in August 2023 in response to [...]’s motion.  Pa316; SDa36-45; SDa47-52.
[brief] energy of the bullet fractured [...]’s skull and the bones in his face.  (9T33-15 to 17, 37-10 to 20).  A second bullet sliced through [...]’s upper back, traveled through his right scapula and right fifth rib, entered his right chest cavity, and injured the upper lobe of his right lung, the arch of his aorta – the main artery supplying blood to the heart – and his trachea, before exiting the front of his chest.  (9T37-21 to 39-8).  A third bullet entered through the left side of [...]’s mid-back, striking his left posterior rib, the top of his left kidney, his stomach, and the left side of his liver before exiting.  (9T39-9 to 40-8).  A fourth bullet went through [...]’s upper left arm, entered his right chest, struck his right ribs, the middle of his right lung, the right ventricle of his heart, and his anterior ribs before exiting.  (9T40-9 to 41-4).  [...] died from multiple gunshot wounds, although any one of the wounds would be fatal by itself.