ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PUBLIC ACCESS LAW PROVIDES THE DEPARTMENT WITH EXPANDED AUTHORITY INDEPENDENT OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, THE DEPARTMENT FAILED TO APPLY THE PUBLIC ACCESS LAW CORRECTLY.  (Aa0131-132.)  [...] maintains that the Public Access Law codified, but did not in any way expand, the scope of Public Trust Doctrine, meaning that the Department could only conduct an analysis under Matthews and Raleigh Avenue or its own regulations when it reviewed [...]'s application to repair and replace the bulkheads at the Property.  However, because the Department is claiming expanded authority under the Public Access Law that is independent of the Public Trust Doctrine, the basis on which the Department reached its position requires analysis.  Section 4 of the Public Access Law says that, in determining whether and to what degree public access is required as a condition of a coastal permit, the Department must consider four factors: (i) the scale of the changes to the footprint of any structures; (ii) any proposed change in use; (iii) the demand for public access in the vicinity of the Property; and (iv) the provisions of any Department-approved municipal access plan or public access element of a municipal master plan.
[brief] These facts question the complicity of the [...] in the various ways in which [...]’s rights were violated.  The Judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth, but to determine whether there is a “genuine issue” for trial.  *Brill* at 540.  Therefore, it is indisputable that questions exist necessitating this matter be sent to trial.  Thus, the Trial Court erred in deciding as a matter of law questions that are reserved for the jury.  Intent, state of mind and bad faith are at the corner stone of this case and as such, only a jury can weigh the credibility of the witnesses and determine whether Defendants violated [...]’s rights.  Supra.  Thus, the “genuine issues” of material facts in dispute herein cannot be decided as a matter of law.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] Mori v. Hartz Mountain Dev. Corp., 193 N.J. Super. 47, 56 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting, Malaker Corp. v. First Jersey National Bank, 163 N.J. Super. 463, 496 (App. Div. 1978), certif. denied, 79 N.J. 488 (1979)).  In that regard, “[t]he essential consideration is whether distinct claims are aspects of a single larger controversy because they arise from interrelated facts. ”  1707 Realty, supra, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2381, at *12 (quoting, Hobart Bros. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 354 N.J. Super. 229, 244 (App. Div. 2002)).  “[T]he entire controversy doctrine applies not only to matters actually litigated, but to all aspects of a controversy that might have been thus litigated and determined. ”  Vision Mtge., supra, 307 N.J. Super. at 52, (quoting, Mori, supra, 193 N.J. Super. at 56).  In the instant matter, as both the Complaint herein and the record in the Prior Action establish, the facts and controversy that form the basis of this action and the Prior Action are not only “interrelated,” but are identical.
[brief] It is further noted in this instance case of Peralta, heard by the Supreme Court to which mirrored this defendant’s case (zero records for service of process had been established) now before the Third Circuit Court whereby, appellant denied that he had been personally served and that he had notice of the judgement.  “The case proceeded through the **899 Texas courts on that basis, and it is not denied by APPELLEE that under our cases, A judgement entered without notice or service is constitutionally infirm” as stated by [...].  The facts are that both [...] and this Defendant denied having been served or notified as both defendants had demonstrated with facts and evidence, that neither of the appellees in these two similar cases OBJECTED (Pa1).  The trial court neglected to recognize the evidence that the Courts do not have records demonstrating validity of Service of Process (Pa6; P10; Pa21; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa41) and that Plaintiff [...], upon her own behest failed to prove validity of service (Pa1) as established by Third Circuit case law; “once a defendant challenges a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over it, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction”, *Kilinc v. Tracfone Wireless Inc.*  U.S. District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania, Dec. 27, 2010 757 Supp. 2d 535 as this **relevant** case will be cited further in this appeal.  The court’s failure to acknowledge this precedent was attributed to its **misapplication** of case law to erroneously deny this defendant’s claim that proper service was not executed.
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[brief] [...]’s motion demonstrated that [...]’ menacing, frightening, intimidating conduct towards the individual plaintiffs described throughout the underlying complaint – conduct [...] did not dispute occurred as described – simply does not fall within the insuring agreement of the personal liability section of the policy, because these action did not amount to “occurrences” under the policy definition of which an intrinsic element is that the event be an accident.  Further, [...] demonstrated that [...]’ actions were done on purpose, rather than accidentally, and that they further allegedly resulted in harm to the underlying plaintiffs that was neither plainly bodily injury nor property damage.  In addition, the [...] policy included a valid and enforceable exclusion for expected and intended injury that would further apply to bar coverage.  The lower court heard oral argument\(^4\) on May 26, 2023 and reserved decision.  Thereafter, on August 7, 2023, the lower court issued an order granting [...]’s motion, dismissing plaintiff’s complaint against it with prejudice (Pa378-Pa379).  The lower court’s Statement of Reasons (Pa380-Pa397) made clear that plaintiff’s conduct as alleged in the underlying complaint “does not constitute an ‘accidental occurrence’” and thus is not covered by plaintiff’s [...] policy (Pa394).  The lower court further rejected plaintiff’s claim that the [...] policy is an “all-risks” policy entitling him to coverage, and held that the policy exclusion for expected and intended injury applied (Pa395).
[brief] As in Tyler, the medical examiner’s conclusion about the manner of death was not based on his expertise, but on his view of other evidence before the jury.  [...] concluded that it was unlikely that [redacted] body would have been burned and disposed in this manner if his death been an accident.  But whether the manner in which [...] disposed of the body proved that the death was intentional rather than accidental was not a matter of science or medicine.  It was a factual question that should have been resolved by “the sound judgment of jurors, who rely on their life experiences, common sense, and collective reasoning in rendering a verdict. ”  Cain, 224 N.J. at 414.
[brief] i.  **Appellants’ Proposed Fraud Claim**  Count 16 of the proposed Second Amended Complaint sought to add a fraudulent inducement claim against [...].  This claim is generally predicated on Appellants’ baseless allegation that [...] misrepresented that when Appellants purchased the Solar Rights from [...] in 2015, [...] would assure that no competitor would be able to “set up shop” at the Property and that even if Appellants defaulted under the Lease, Appellants would retain the Solar Rights.  However, Appellants cannot establish damages by clear and convincing evidence as the trial court expressly determined that Appellants’ alleged losses were “the direct and proximate result of [Appellants’] failure to cure the default under the Lease with [...].
[brief] Aggravating and mitigating factors  Defendant concedes that the judge properly found aggravating factors one (nature of offense) and twelve (elderly victim).  (Db39).  However, he contends that the judge should not have found aggravating factor three (risk of reoffending) or aggravating factor nine (deterrence) (Db38-39).  According to defendant, aggravating factor three is not applicable because [...] found that he was unlikely to reoffend and he has demonstrated good conduct in prison.  (Db38-39).  Aggravating factor nine is not applicable because there is no longer a need to deter him and general deterrence is also not served because “the threat of a lengthy jail sentence is less of a deterrent for juveniles than adults. ”  (Db39).  Defendant also contends that the judge should have found mitigating factors seven (prior delinquency or criminal activity), eight (crime resulted from circumstances unlikely to occur), and nine (lack of likelihood to reoffend).
[brief] “No party is entitled to have the jury charged in his or her own words; all that is necessary is that the charge as a whole be accurate. ”  *Jordan*, 147 N.J. at 422, (citing *Large v. Rothman*, 110 N.J. 201 (1988); *State v. Thompson*, 59 N.J. 396 (1971)).  “Our courts have consistently placed an extraordinarily high value on the importance of appropriate and proper jury charges to the right to trial by jury. ”  *State v. Allen*, 308 N.J. Super. 421, 431 (App. Div. 1998).  “Erroneous instructions on matters material to the juror’s deliberations are presumed to be reversible error. ”  *Id.*; citing *State v. Grunow*, 102 N.J. 133, 148 (1986).  See also *State v. Brown*, 138 N.J. 481, 522 (1984), overruled on other grounds by *State v. Cooper*, 151 N.J. 326 (1996)(clear and correct jury instructions are essential for a fair trial.)
[brief] In Sonderman v. Remington Const. Co., 127 N.J. 96 (1991), the Court considered whether Sonderman, a bona fide purchaser at a foreclosure sale, was entitled to quiet title against the original property owner who had no notice of the foreclosure action, had obtained an order vacating the tax foreclosure judgment, but had failed to properly record the vacation order prior to purchase of the property.  The Court first declared its commitment to supporting and maintaining the recording system, quoting Palmarg Realty Co. v. Rehac., 80 N.J. 446 (1979).  The Court then noted that “the integrity of record title can bend to accommodate compelling equities. ”  Sonderman, at 108.  The Court found that “the case presents an exceptional set of facts” which included a municipal ordinance that provided the sole remedy to a purchaser at tax foreclosure sale in the event of defects in title and the ability to return the parties to their prior positions.  Based on those circumstances, the Court found that the equitable result was to deny Sonderman’s quiet title action.  Nevertheless, the Court added: “For the future, however, we affirm our commitment to the proposition that ‘a purchaser should be charged with such notice from the records as can be ascertained by a reasonable search of those records***. ’”  Sonderman, at 109, quoting [...], “The New Jersey Recording Act – A Study of Its Policy,” 12 Rutgers L. Rev. 328, 335 (1957).  The trial court’s reliance on Sonderman to justify its decision is misplaced.  4T15:6-16:9.  The Sonderman court not only recognized the “exceptional set of facts” presented, but also distinctly provided remedy through an ordinance, which would allow the parties to be returned to their positions prior to the improper foreclosure sale.  In comparison, no such remedy exists here.  Plaintiff purchased his property with the Strip.
[brief] Id. (quoting the act of March 3, 1873 (Comp. Stat. p. 4978)). not use ‘any unnecessary or meaningless language. ’”  Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Util. Co., 212 N.J. 576, 587 (2013) (citation omitted).  The court “must presume that every word in a statute has meaning and is not mere surplusage.
[brief] Plaintiffs refer to certain media comments made by one of the sponsors of the Restructuring Act, describing them as an “expression of legislative intent. ”  (Pb30; Da76-77.)  That is not an accurate description.  An isolated comment by a former legislator, a decade after the fact, is not considered an indication of legislative intent.  It is entitled to little, if any, weight.  See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991) (observing that “statements of individual legislators” are not generally considered to be a reliable guide to legislative intent); accord Perez, 436 N.J. Super. 575 at 591 (same).
[brief] The Court in Navarette acknowledged that a “contemporaneous report has long been treated as especially reliable. ”  Id. at 399.  In this case, the trial court’s mistaken evidentiary ruling precluded the State from presenting evidence related to the response time of the police.  However the fact that Defendant was leaving the scene upon the arrival of police suggests that he was not at the scene for very long.  As such, the 9-1-1 report was likely made contemporaneously and, thus, is entitled to enhanced reliability.  Given that the initial report in this case was made contemporaneously and through the 9-1-1 system – both indicators of veracity as identified by the Navarette Court – it follows that it established reasonable suspicion.
[directive] County Prosecutors' staff should make themselves aware of the victim-witness services that are available and ensure that victims are informed of them.  Ill.  PROTECTION  A.  Appropriate attention shall be given to investigating victim or witness reports of threats or intimidation.  1.  Victims and witnesses shall be encouraged to report any incident of intimidation and harassment.  2.  Victims should be informed of potential responses to intimidation including bail revocation, restraining orders, additional charges and escort to court.  3.  When applicable, restraining orders should be sought as a condition of bail and prepared with the complaint.  4.  Transportation and court accompaniment shall be provided for fearful or intimidated victims.  COMMENTARY
[directive] A  The Performance Objective System of Training  An Overview  Performance objectives are explicit statements of the action or task the trainee is expected to achieve after instruction.  Performance objectives are stated in terms of what the trainee is expected to do in order to demonstrate understanding and competency.  The performance objective system of training relates specific training lessons to actual duties and tasks to be performed on the job.  In general, performance objectives prescribe the curriculum, serve as a resource document, and provide a comprehensive view of the course.  Closely related performance objectives are grouped to form instructional units.  Instructional units are then grouped into major subject categories called functional areas.  A decimal numbering system is used to identify functional areas, instructional units, and performance objectives.  Functional areas are identified by the first number; instructional units are identified by the second number; and performance objectives are identified by the third number (eg., 1.2.3).  15 7/2002 K-9 Training Standards and Qualification Requirements
[brief] She had been a public school teacher for thirty years, was divorced and lived alone.  Since her retirement she had experienced a number of health challenges, but had always been able to live an independent, active, rewarding life.  In 2015 she had undergone arthroscopic back surgery, and had also been treated for heart disease and rheumatoid arthritis.  She acknowledged having suffered four separate falling incidents during an approximately ten year period prior to her fall at [...], none of which she testified had ever caused her any serious or permanent injury.  Along with her friend, [...], and other friends she enjoyed an active social life, vacationing, seeing plays and movies, and eating at restaurants.  All of that had changed since this accident.  Her lack of mobility and ever-increasing pain and discomfort to her lower back was life altering.  She now depends on the assistance of others, and often requires a walker to get around.  (2T65-10 to 71-1; 2T78-12 to 82-9).
[brief] In each injured party’s civil action for personal injury, it is governed by the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 et seq.  The definition of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2 would define whether either of the vehicles met the definition of a motor vehicle or an automobile.  Those definitions would further delineate whether the injured parties’ damages were economic loss or noneconomic loss.  Those definitions also set forth the definitions of a standard automobile insurance policy and a basic automobile insurance policy.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3 sets forth the statutory minimums in liability coverage required by defendant.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1 and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.3 delineate the coverages required if defendant maintained a basic or special automobile insurance policy respectively.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8, the verbal threshold, and the selection made regarding the threshold required by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8.1 may bar the injury party’s claim if defendant’s vehicle is an automobile and injured party elected the verbal threshold on their personal insurance policy.
[brief] Like the Trial Court, Plaintiff disregards the rigorous requirement that non-resident defendants be “essentially at home” in the forum for general jurisdiction to attach.  Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, see Pb21, the general jurisdiction inquiry “is not whether a foreign [entity’s] in-forum contacts can be said to be in some sense ‘continuous and systematic,’” it is whether an entity’s “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State. ”  Dutch Run, 450 N.J. Super. at 602 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138–39 (2014)).  The Supreme Court has “made clear that only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction there. ”  Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137.  For a business entity, the paradigm forum is “where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business. ”  Dutch Run, 450 N.J. Super. at 602.  Here, it is undisputed that [...] was formed under --- 1  Because [...] is a limited liability partnership with no general partners, the two partners who were served in New Jersey are also not “general partners” of [...], as contemplated by Rule 4:4-4(a)(5).  Delaware law and has its principal place of business in Texas.  Pb4, 21; Db18; Da3, 195.  Accordingly, general jurisdiction over [...] could be sustained only if, at the time of the Complaint, it had sufficiently “continuous and systematic” contacts with New Jersey such that it is “essentially at home” in the State.
[brief] Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.  STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], a/k/a [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...], Defendant-Appellant.  DOCKET NO. [...]  Argued February 6, 2024  Decided February 23, 2024  On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Salem County, Indictment No. [...].  Attorneys and Law Firms  [...], Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant ([...], Public Defender, attorney; [...], and [...], Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).  [...], Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent ([...], Attorney General, attorney; [...], Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).  Before Judges [...] and [...].  Opinion  PER CURIAM  *1  Defendant [...] appeals from a September 9, 2021 judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2), possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1), and unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1), and the consecutive sentences imposed.
[directive] Materiality on a defendant’s individual presents a separate issue and depends circumstances.  To assess whether delays caused by the pandemic are material to the level of risk a defendant poses, trial judges can consider the following factors: (1) the length of detention to date as well as the projected length of ongoing detention; (2) whether a defendant has been or will be in detention longer than the likely amount of time the person would actually spend in jail if 4 defendant’s convicted; (3) the existence and nature of a plea offer; (4) a particularized health risks, if any, and whether they present a heightened risk the individual will contract COVID-19; and (5) other factors relevant to pretrial detention that are outlined in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20.  Defendants who have been detained for at least six months, and can make a preliminary showing that they are entitled to relief based on one or more of the above factors, have the right to reopen their detention hearings under section 19(f).
[brief] Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269 (1985) (“Abbott I”).  .................................................................  5 Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287 (1990) (“Abbott II”) .................................................................. 5, 6 Abbott v. Burke, 136 N.J. 444 (1994) (“Abbott III”) .................................................................  7  Abbott v. Burke, 149 N.J. 145 (1997) (“Abbott IV”) ...............................................................  5, 7, 9 Abbott v. Burke, 153 N.J. 480 (1998) (“Abbott V”) ................................................................... 7, 23 Abbott v. Burke, 164 N.J. 84 (2000) (“Abbott VII”) ................................................................. 7 Abbott v. Burke, 177 N.J. 578 (2003) (“Abbott X”) ..................................................................  21 Abbott v. Burke, 196 N.J. 544 (2008) (“Abbott XIX”)  .............................................................. 8, 27, 29, 38, 40  Abbott v. Burke, 199 N.J. 140 (2009) (“Abbott XX”)  .........................................................  1, 9, 10, 11, 12, 19, 21, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 37, 38  Abbott v. Burke, 206 N.J. 332 (2011) (“Abbott XXI”) .................................................... 14, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 38, 40  Abbott v. Burke, 249 N.J. 346 (2021).  .....................................................................................  23 Abbott v. Burke, 253 N.J. 591 (2023) .................................................................  23 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) ...........................................................................
[brief] For allegedly failing to properly conduct nineteen (19) property checks called into dispatch coupled with allegedly misrepresenting his location and failing to conduct an additional eight (8) property checks, Respondent [...] ("[...]") charged Appellant [...] ("[...]"), one of its police officers with fifteen (15) years of law enforcement service, with violations of Conduct Unbecoming a Police Officer, violations of Untruthfulness, and violations of Neglect of Duty for which it sought the penalty of removal.  Unfortunately, the Internal Affairs ("IA") investigation undertaken by [...] was flawed.  It was so flawed that the charges filed against [...] were not brought within the statutorily required time limit and should be procedurally dismissed.  Assuming, arguendo, this Court does not procedurally dismiss the charges, [...] is confident this Court will find that [...] failed to meet its burden of proof on some or all of the levied charges.  Additionally, [...] is confident that this Court will find that removal is inappropriate under the totality of circumstance given the concept of progressive discipline underlying New Jersey jurisprudence.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY