ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] \(^2\)  Plaintiff makes these claims about being unable to appeal in Points Four, Five, Seven and Eight of his brief.  In Point Four, New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq., Public Accommodations, Plaintiff asserts that he could not appeal his conviction because R. 3:23-4(a), R. 3:23-7, and/or R. 3:24 required him to attach a copy of the judgment of conviction to his municipal appeal.  (Pa27-28)  All of those claims are incorrect as there is no such requirement in any of those Rules. \(^3\)  Plaintiff makes the same claim in Point Five (N.J. Constitution-Procedural Due Process and Equal Protection)\(^4\) (Pb31-32).  Plaintiff states, “An appeal from a criminal conviction specifically requires a judgment order from which an appeal may be taken” (Pb32).  That may be the case, pursuant to Part II of the Court Rules, pertaining to appeals from criminal convictions.  Plaintiff’s appeal, however, was from a disorderly persons conviction in a court of limited jurisdiction governed by R. 3:23, and a judgment of conviction was not required to be included in the notice of appeal.  Plaintiff makes similar claims in Point Seven (Class of One --- \(^2\)  A proper records request is found at: Chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.njcourts.gov/sites/default/files/forms/10200_records_req.pdf  \(^3\)  R. 3:24 requires attaching the order appealed from for an interlocutory appeal from a court of limited jurisdiction.  \(^4\)  Procedural due process and procedural equal protection claims are not cognizable under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2.  Equal Protection) (Pb35-36) and Point Eight (again, Procedural Due Process) (Pb48-50).  At the risk of being unduly repetitious, Plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed after it was accepted by the Court as filed because Plaintiff did not file transcripts or a proper indigency application or an application for an extension to do so.  (Pa319-321).
[brief] Similarly, on April 2, 1971, counsel to [...] wrote [...]’s President threatening reversion of the “private bathing beach” back to [...] if [...] did not take steps to further regulate construction in the [...] community.  According to this correspondence, [...], “both as a Developer of [...] and as an owner of property therein,” learned that other proper owners “erected storage sheds in violation of the general restrictions. ”  (Da573).  As a result, [...] directed [...]’s President to review “the applicable deeds and restrictions” because “it is the duty of your Club to enforce these general deed restrictions and that failing in that responsibility [[...]] will incur forfeiture of the” private bathing beach.  (Id.).  The letter demanded [...] take “immediate effective action” to ensure “compliance with the general restrictions,” or [...] would “take immediate legal action to protect his interest as Developer and the interest of all other residents of [...]. ” (Id.).  [...] responded to [...]’s counsel by letter dated April 23, 1971.  (Da575).  In doing so, [...] represented that it would form a committee “to visit those homes which have violations. ” (Id.).  [...] further represented that those “who have violated the building codes will be asked to comply as soon as possible to correct violations” and that “[i]nsofar as possible [[...]] will comply with the instructions in your letter as soon as we possibly can. ”  (Id.).  Finally, in April 2020, the [...]’ daughter executed an agreement waiving the right of reverter to the beachfront property conveyed to [...].
[directive] Wednesdays [...] 0504 [...] Wednesdays [...] 0505 [...]  Tuesday [...] 0506 [...]  Thursday [...] 0507 [...]  2nd/3rd/4th Tuesday [...] 0508 [...]  Tuesday/Thursday [...] 0509 [...]  Thursdays  [...] 0510 [...]  Mondays [...] 0511 [...]  Wednesdays [...] 0512 [...]  1st/3rd Tuesday [...] 0513 [...] 3rd  Wednesday [...] 0514 [...]  Wednesdays [...] Crest 0515 [...]  2nd/4th Tuesday [...] 0516 [...]  Thursday  [...] 0601 [...]
[brief] A.  The Parties  [...] owns and operates two private health clubs in New Jersey—a club in Summit, New Jersey (the “[...] Summit Club”) and a club in Paramus, New Jersey (the “[...] Paramus Club”).  Ja30-43.  Plaintiff became a member of the [...] Summit Club in September 2023.  Ja30.  B.  The Parties’ Arbitration Agreement  When plaintiff joined the [...] Summit Club as a member, she agreed to arbitrate any disputes regarding her [...] membership, including any disputes relating to the terms and conditions of her membership agreement, on a single-claimant basis.  Ja36-37.  In particular, plaintiff agreed as follows:  7.2  Arbitration:  You agree to submit any and all Disputes (as defined in Section 7.4) to binding arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (Title 9 of the United States Code), which will govern the interpretation and enforcement of this arbitration agreement (“Arbitration Agreement”).  Arbitration will be before either (1) JAMS (formerly known as Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services), jamsadr.com, or (2) the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), adr.org.  If you initiate arbitration, you may choose between these two arbitration forums; if [...] initiates arbitration, it will have the choice as between these two arbitration forums.  YOU AND EQUINOX AGREE THAT, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 7.4, ANY AND ALL DISPUTES WHICH ARISE AFTER YOU ENTER INTO THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE RESOLVED EXCLUSIVELY AND FINALLY BY BINDING ARBITRATION RATHER THAN IN COURT BY A JUDGE OR JURY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS ARBITRATION AGREEMENT.  7.3  Class Action Waiver:  You agree that the arbitration of any Dispute will be conducted on an individual, not a class-wide, basis, and that no arbitration proceeding may be consolidated with any other arbitration or other legal proceeding involving [...] or any other person.  You further agree that you, and anyone asserting a claim through you, will not be a class representative, class member, or otherwise participate in a class, representative, or consolidated proceeding against [...], and that the arbitrator of any Dispute between you and [...] may not consolidate more than one person's claims, and may not otherwise preside over any form of a class or representative proceeding or claim (such as a class action, representative action, consolidated action or private attorney general action).  If the foregoing class action waiver ("Class Action Waiver") or any portion thereof is found to be invalid, illegal, unenforceable, unconscionable, void or voidable, then the Arbitration Agreement will be unenforceable and the Dispute will be decided by a court of competent jurisdiction.
[brief] In his decision, issued on October 5, 2022 (“Initial Decision”), the ALJ found that [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] appeared credible based on their mannerisms, tone, and the substantive information they provided.  (Pa011a-Pa012a).  The ALJ also found [...]’s testimony credible, noting he testified in a calm manner without hesitation.  (Pa011a).  On the other hand, the ALJ found [...], [...], and [...] to not be credible.  (Pa011a-Pa012a).  Based on the credible testimony and evidence presented, the ALJ ultimately substantiated all charges issued against [...].  (Pa017a-Pa025a).  i.  August 16, 2019 Escape
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS .................................................. iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................  2 STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................  5  LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................  23  POINT I. ..................................................................................................................................  23  THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION ERRED BY DISREGARDING CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS AND DEPRIVING A DISABLED VETERAN OF HER VETERAN’S PREFERENCE WITHOUT PROPER BASIS (AA0001-8; AA0009-16)  POINT II ..............................................................................................................................  30  THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION ERRED BY REMOVING APPELLANT’S NAME BASED UPON A FALSE, INACCURATE AND MISLEADING DISCIPLINARY HISTORY (AA0001-8; AA0009-16)  CONCLUSION
[brief] “In any case founded upon negligence, proofs ultimately must establish that the defendant breached a duty of reasonable care which constituted a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. ”  *Id.* at 288.  To prevail, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition that caused the accident.  *Nisivoccia v. Glass Gardens, Inc.*, 175 N.J. 559, 563 (2003).
[brief] (Pa115; Pa118).  On February 20, 2017, the matter was removed to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey based on federal question jurisdiction.  (Da6).  [...] filed a second amended complaint, and both the [...] and the [...] moved to dismiss this amended complaint in July 2017.  (Da8-9).  The district court granted the motions to dismiss on July 12, 2018, but gave [...] twenty-one days to file a motion to amend.  (Da13).  On August 2, 2018, [...] moved to file a third amended complaint.  (Da13).  [...] and [...] opposed the motion.  (Da13-14).  The district court denied [...]’s motion to file a third amended complaint and ordered him to file a new Motion to Amend with a revised Third-Amended Complaint by April 15, 2019, but when that date came, he requested an extension.  (Da17; Da170-72).  After two additional requests for an extension of time were granted, he was given until May 31, 2019, to file his motion to amend. (Da18-Da19).  On May 28, 2019, [...] submitted his motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint which Defendants opposed.  (Da19; Da20).  On July 22, 2019, [...] filed his reply brief, which contained a “corrected” fourth amended complaint.  (Da20-21).  At oral argument on July 26, 2019, [...] “indicat[ed] he may elect to voluntar[ily] dismiss his federal claims[.]” (Da21; Da25).  The district court ordered [...] to submit a letter by August 15, 2019 “unequivocally” stating his intention to dismiss the federal claims if he wished to do so.  (Da25).  On August 15, 2019, [...] submitted a motion to amend with a proposed amended complaint, purportedly removing all federal claims.  (Da21).  In that pleading, as to [...], [...] asserted claims under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (NJCRA), N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2, the New Jersey Constitution, the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50, and also sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief under the New Jersey Declaratory Judgment Act (NJDJA), N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50 to -62.
[brief] 564a–569a; 591a–595a; 611a–615a.  In total, as a result of this conspiracy, [...] and the other co-conspirator Defendants transferred and divided among themselves approximately $1.4 million.  662a–684a.  In accordance with the conditions of the PCHA-MTDC Assignment and Releases, and pursuant to the representations of [...] and [...], at certain times Plaintiffs were made to make payments.
[brief] ”  *Tcherepnin v. Knight*, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (finding that the Securities Exchange Act is remedial and should be construed broadly).  Specifically, the United States Supreme Court has consistently found that “federal securities laws, ‘enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds’ must be construed ‘not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate remedial purposes. ’”  *SEC v. R. J. Allen & Assocs., Inc.*, 386 F. Supp. 866, 875 (S.D. Fla. 1974)(citations omitted); see also *SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.*, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (finding that the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, like other securities legislation, was “‘enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds,’ [and thus should be construed] not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.
[brief] Furthermore, it is well-settled law that local officials, because of their familiarity with their community’s characteristics and interests, be allowed wide latitude in the exercise of their delegated discretion.  Kramer v. Board of Adj., Sea Girt, supra, 45 N.J. at 296; Hawrylo v. Board of Adj., Harding Twp., 249 N.J. Super. 568, 579 (App. Div. 1991); Pullen, supra, 91 N.J. Super. 6, 7.  Because variances tend to impair sound zoning, a court should give “greater deference to variance denials than to grants of variances. ”  Medical Ctr. at Princeton v. Tp. of Princeton Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 343 N.J. Super. 177, 199, 778 A.2d 482 (App. Div. 2001).  The court does not have the authority to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the planning board.  The role of the Court is to look at the Board’s action and determine if the action was arbitrary or capricious.  The Board, on the other hand, is vested with the responsibility to do what is best for its community, and to apply the community’s ordinances.  Here, the Board did nothing illegal, nor did it make a careless, reckless or baseless decision.  Rather, the Board cited well-grounded concerns regarding the safety and well-being of the neighborhood and good civic design arrangement and as such, the decision to deny the application was not arbitrary and capricious and the trial Court exceeded its authority in remanding the matter back to the Board for approval.
[brief] *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America*, 142 N.J. 520, 528-29 (1995).  An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.  Rule 4:46-2(c); *Coyne v. State, Dep’t of Trans.*, 182 N.J. 481, 490 (2005).  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**
[brief] ”  Id. at 468.  The Court held the government was unable to justify the regulation “on the grounds of immediate workplace disruption. ”  Id. at 470.  The Court held: “The speculative benefits the *honoraria* ban may provide the Government are not sufficient to justify this crudely crafted burden on respondents’ freedom to engage in expressive activities. ”  *Id.* at 477.  The precedent established by the *National Treasury* decision is that, to justify a prior restraint on speech – such as requiring authorization before speaking at a professional event at issue here – the government must demonstrate that unrestrained speech will concretely produce serious harm and that the restraint “will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.
[brief] Generally speaking, it means a substantial deterioration or diminution of the mental faculties or physical capabilities of a person whether it be due to intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drugs,” State v. Tamburro, 68 N.J. 414, 420-21 (1975); “a condition which so affects the judgment or control of a motor vehicle operator as to make it improper for him to drive on the highway,” State v. Johnson, supra at 165; see State v. Bealor, 187 N.J. 574 (2006).  However, as the Hon. [...], J.M.C. (Retired), put it in the context of a DWI prosecution:  All the facts creating probable cause for the police stopping, interrogating, observing and eventually arresting the defendant may be perhaps the most important elements in the eventual determination of guilt or innocence of a defendant.  A judge, after a detailed hearing of the facts surrounding this probable cause or overt act of the defendant, should ask the question, "Would the totality of these overt acts have occurred even if the defendant had not been drinking?"  If the answer to this question is "yes", then a reasonable doubt may exist as to a defendant's guilt.  [Kirsch, Nathan S., Guide to Hearing Drunk Driving Cases, N.J. Dept. of Health, Div. of Alcoholism, Intoxicated Driving Programs Unit (1988) at p.1.]  Whether [...] was impaired by alcohol rather than nervousness, stress, distraction, or other cause is a question which the evidence presented fails to resolve beyond reasonable doubt.  As in State v. Morton, 74 N.J.Super. 528 (App.Div. 1962), aff'd 39 N.J. 512 (1963):
[brief] Petitioner was responding to a fire and in the course of responding to that fire he twisted his ankle (IT16:1-20; IT28:9-13).  Petitioner did not know why he twisted his ankle, but thought there might have been “something” on the driveway (IT22:12-23).  Petitioner, a full-time firefighter with seven years of experience and training, testified at the hearing that it was among his job duties to unload equipment, lay and connect fire hoses, perform preparatory operations for the delivery of water and transport tools and equipment (Aa32-Aa36; IT11:13-25; IT12:1-25; IT13:1-6; IT34:3-25; IT35:1-9).  He testified that he had responded to many fire calls in his seven-year career, and had previous experience in “stretching” fire hoses to burning buildings (IT11:25; IT12:1-13; IT16:7-25; IT17:1-20).  He had training and prior experience in handling these types of fires, and was trained to and had previously traversed uneven inclines when carrying equipment and fire hoses (IT32:5-12; IT35:17-22; IT36:9-16).  As noted by the ALJ, given Petitioner’s prior experience in performing his usual work as he admitted in his testimony, it was not undesigned and unexpected that Petitioner would have to deal with a situation as occurred on the date of the incident (Aa17; Aa19-Aa20).  The simple act of having to go back to the fire truck to retrieve a longer hose because a bookcase was blocking the basement doorway cannot qualify as an undesigned and unexpected event.  Indeed, the presence of the longer hose on the fire truck demonstrates that similar situations, where the shorter hose does not suffice and a longer hose is needed, were expected.  Petitioner’s reliance on Moran v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen’s Retirement System, 438 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 2014), is unavailing.
[brief] At that time, when a personal choice button was selected, a paper portion would permit a voter to physically write-in the choice or use a sticker, as opposed to an electronic machine now.  vote counted at full value without dilution or discount. ”  *Id.* at 474.  “That principle also encompasses ‘the right of all qualified electors to vote for [a write-in candidate] by such means. ’”  *Id.* at 474-75 (*citing* Sadloch v. Allan, 25 N.J. 118, 128 (1957)).  “[I]t is our duty to construe elections laws liberally. ”  *Id.* at 475 (internal citations omitted).  The Court in *Gray-Sadler* noted that there were no instructions to warn a voter that if they did not properly cast their write-in ballot consistent with the specific instructions, that the ballot could be rejected.  The *Gray-Sadler* Court found that *N.J.S.A.* 19:50-3 requires the Board of Elections to provide instructions to voters and where no instructions are provided, or the instructions are unclear, the voter should not have his or her ballot voided.
[brief] See Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, 149 N.J. 496, 503 (1997) (citation omitted).  The risk as viewed here is actually foreseeability, that is, a duty of care imposed based on a defendant’s knowledge.  See Robinson v. Vivirito, 217 N.J. 199, 208-209 (2014).  In the seminal case of Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469 (1987), the owner of an apartment building brought suit against a water company for failing to provide enough water pressure to abate a fire.
[brief] However, Appellant’s allegations pertaining to the Project Plans are that “[...] and [...] breached their professional and ethical duties to Plaintiffs by selling the engineering site plans and drawings to [...]. ” (Pa19).  Clearly, these allegations relate to the proper use and determination of the ownership rights of the Project Plans and drawings, which are outside of the realm of a lay juror and would require a factual determination by an engineering professional.  See Pa972.  Moreover, Appellants’ Brief cites to the New Jersey Code of Ethics for Engineers, which evidences that the legal/factual inquiry of the professional duties owed by a professional engineer with respect to Project Plans is outside the scope of experience of an average juror.  An average juror with no knowledge of the New Jersey Code of Ethics for Engineers or engineering practices generally could not be reasonably expected to determine the professional responsibilities and standard of care applicable to a professional engineer from their common knowledge.  Therefore, the limited common knowledge exception to obtaining an Affidavit of Merit is inapplicable because the average lay juror does not have knowledge of the duties of professional engineers’ code of ethics or their professional standard of care.
[directive] Page 2  It is instructive to note that federal regulations recently promulgated pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) expressly authorize hospitals to disclose patient records pursuant to a grand jury subpoena and without first obtaining a release from or providing notice to a patient.  See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(B).  These regulations represent the latest and most comprehensive statement of patient privacy rights.  It is nonetheless necessary and appropriate to make certain that county prosecutors and the [...] take additional steps to safeguard the privacy rights of patients, and especially those patients who are crime victims.  See New Jersey Constitution, Art. 1, para. 22 (requiring victims of crime to be treated with fairness, compassion, and respect by the criminal justice system).  Accordingly, county prosecutors and the [...] are hereby directed to observe the following procedures and confidentiality safeguards.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION NOT TO MOLD THE VERDICT TO INCLUDE MEDICAL BILLS AND TEMPORARY DISABILITY PAYMENTS WAS CORRECT AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED  Plaintiff argues on appeal that counsel for both sides had agreed before trial that the Court would mold the verdict to include medical bills and disability benefits paid by Workers Compensation.  Plaintiff asserts that the trial Court’s decision not to mold the jury verdict to include those sums was contrary to the agreement of counsel; inconsistent with the jury verdict as to liability and its award of $25,000 damages; and that the trial Court erred in substituting its opinion for the jury’s.  However, the facts of the case belie those assertions.  Plaintiff mis-states the nature of the “agreement. ”  Between counsel.  The trial Court made it clear on the record that Defense counsel agreed only to mold the verdict to include the amount of medical bills and temporary disability benefits paid by Workers Compensation if – but only if – the jury found that the incident of July 29, 2018 caused an aggravation of Plaintiff’s pre-existing Meniere’s disease.  (5T18 to 19; 5T42 to 43;9T10; 9T16; 9T24 to 25)  The trial Court observed, accurately, that issue of causal relationship between the July 29, 2013 incident and the alleged aggravation of Plaintiff’s Meniere’s disease was ever present in this case.
[brief] Cumberland County Prosecutor’s Office Detective [...] was familiar with the route from Bridgeton to Seabreeze, and stated the most direct route goes by the Sunoco in Fairton, south of Bridgeton.  (4T127-17 to 129-1; 4T135-1 to 24; Pa23-25).  Surveillance from the Fairton Sunoco showed the maroon sedan going by at 3:45 a.m. on the morning of the shooting.
[brief] The fourth *Cole* factor to consider is the extent of discovery conducted in the litigation.  Here, the parties have essentially concluded document discovery.  [...] contends that only “limited discovery” has taken place.  [...] Br. at 16.  However, the parties have exchanged extensive discovery, including over 266,000 pages of documents (the equivalent of over 88 boxes of documents) and 183 gigabytes of electronic information from [...] alone.