ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiffs own [...], designated as Lot 2, Block 1801 on the Tax Map of Brigantine (hereinafter referred to as “Lot 2”).  Ja272, Ja710.  Defendants own the adjacent lot, [...], designated as Lot 3, Block 1801 on the Tax Map of Brigantine (hereinafter referred to as “Lot 3”).  Ja291, Ja712.  Based on an inaccurate subdivision plan and subsequent deeds that contained the same error, Defendants claim approximately 1.33’ of frontage on one side of Lot 2 (along 21st Street South) and 1.37’ of frontage on the other side of Lot 2 (along the public alley parallel to 21st Street South) (hereinafter referred to as the “Disputed Area”). \(^1/\)^2  The deed records dating back approximately 100 years reflect a combined frontage of Lots 2 and 3 of 185’ along 21st Street South and a combined 190.69’ along the parallel public alley.  Ja29-68.  The same deeds, dating back approximately 100 years, reflect Lot 2 as having 80’ of frontage along 21st Street South and along the public alley, and Lot 3 having 105’ of frontage along 21st Street South and 110.69’ of frontage along the public alley.  Ja29-68.  The Brigantine Tax Maps from 1986 and 1996, which are referenced in the deeds that have existed since those dates, reflect the same measurements.  Ja303, Ja306.  Similarly, the deeds for Lot 1, Block 1801, which sits on the other side of Lot 2, from 1990-2021 show Lot 1 begins 185’ along 21st Street South from the beginning of Lot 3.  Ja70-102.  \(^1\)  For ease of reference, we occasionally discuss the 1.33’ discrepancy without referencing the 1.37’ discrepancy along the public alleyway, but the errors go hand in hand.  \(^2\)  Plaintiffs kindly direct the Court to Ja303 and Ja306 for a visual representation of Lots 2 and 3 prior to relevant subdivision.  Plaintiffs’  Acquisition of Lot 2 and Part of Lot 3  In September 2015, Plaintiffs’ purchased Lot 2 with 80’ of frontage along 21st Street South, consistent with the historical deeds.
[brief] Defendant [...] is an obstetrician-gynecologist who spends roughly 40% of his professional time performing cosmetic operations (Pa17, Pa38).  He is not board-certified in surgery but began doing liposuction procedures in 2004 upon attending training and seminars (Pa16).  Under these circumstances, since 2005, he has opted, upon recommendation from lecturers at seminars, to have his elective cosmetic surgery patients sign an arbitration agreement form at their initial visit (Pa4, Pa12, Pa34-35).  He only uses arbitration agreements in his cosmetic elective surgical cases, such as for liposuction procedures (Pa8).  Defendant [...] does not use arbitration agreements with his ob/gyn patients (Pa5, Pa10).  He has never been to arbitration (Pa10-11).  In or around 2016, after a lawsuit regarding a liposuction with a bad outcome, he chose to switch to the current and subject arbitration form, which was used with [...], which he was advised was “stronger,” and which he uses today (Pa3-5, Pa15, Pa30).
[brief] What happened to plaintiff-appellant [...] is exactly what happened to the plaintiff in *Foley*.  Here, there is no evidence that any of the exceptions to the well-established law of New Jersey apply in this case.  More particularly, the [...] did not construct the sidewalk, they did nothing to create the snowy and icy condition, they never performed any maintenance or repairs to the sidewalk, and they did not utilize the sidewalk for any particular or improper use.  The only thing they did to the sidewalk was clear snow and/or ice off it.  Most importantly, there is no evidence demonstrating that the [...] created a new element of danger or hazard on the sidewalk as a result of any actions that they undertook when they shoveled the sidewalk.  For example, when they shoveled, they did not cause the concrete slabs to become uneven, they did not remove any portion of a concrete sidewalk slab, they did not create or enlarge a hole in the sidewalk, and they did not drain water from their property onto the sidewalk creating a new icy condition.  Likewise, there is no evidence that the [...] did anything to exacerbate any such pre-existing hazardous conditions when they shoveled the sidewalk.  Certainly, plaintiff-appellant did not allege this type of affirmative conduct on the part of the [...].  Nothing demonstrates this better than plaintiff-appellant’s answers to interrogatories, where she contended that the [...] “improperly” and “inadequately” cleared the sidewalk, did not use “snow melting products, sand or salt,” failed to “clear the sidewalk of snow and ice,” and made “an incomplete attempt . . . to remove the snow and ice. ”  By her own Complaint and answers to interrogatories, plaintiff-appellant did not contend that the [...] somehow created a new element of hazard or danger.  Rather, she alleged that they simply did a bad job of clearing snow and/or ice from the sidewalk.  As made patently clear in Foley, plaintiff-appellant’s assertions in this regard are not enough to establish liability on the part of a residential property owner like the [...] under the well-established law of this State.
[brief] In fact, Plaintiff admits in her appeal that “Plaintiff was unaware whether such requirements were fulfilled by Defendants…” (App. Br. at 27)  Rather, Plaintiff alleges that this provision requires a group home to maintain certain staffing levels and that moving employees from one home to another is a “direct violation” of its provisions.  (App. Br. at ¶ 24)²  Clearly, the authority provided by Plaintiff --- ²Note that in her Appeal Brief, Plaintiff references N.J.A.C. § 10:33A-2.8(b) rather than N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b).  However, this appears to be a typographical error as the language referenced in ¶ 25 of the Appeal Brief is found at N.J.A.C. § does not “closely relate” to the complained-of conduct in her Complaint, nor does a “substantial nexus” exist between the complained-of conduct and the law.  Rather, Plaintiff appears to have grabbed the nearest regulation mentioning staffing in a post-hoc attempt to attack her lawful termination.  [...] correctly applied the regulation cited by Appellant to the conduct alleged by Appellant, noting N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b) stipulates that any reduction in staff coverage should be accompanied by a written justification and subsequent approval from the relevant authorities.
[brief] [...] saw right through this and based on the evidence before her, said:  Plaintiff’s counsel obtained via subpoena from DCIP the security log, performance log, and event log, and if defendant’s expert is able to offer an opinion that there were no errors in the playback based on a review of these documents, then plaintiff’s expert who didn’t review the TMS logs and neither did the defense expert review the TMS logs would be put in the same footing if they reviewed the DCIP, the security log, the performance and event logs, as well.  So basically, both experts would be put in the same footing because neither of them reviewed the TMS logs, and so, therefore there would be undue prejudice to the plaintiff because the playing field is fair and even in this regard. ” (T56-57-6).  [...] went on to state that “if there are these documents that can provide essentially the same information sought by the plaintiff, it does not appear that the TMS logs, their probative value would outweigh the undue prejudice that would be done if I were to grant the amended complaint. ” (T57-7-16).  It is again salient to mention that this motion practice was taking place at the end of 2018 and into early 2019 with a discovery end date of November 20, 2018, an arbitration hearing scheduled for November 27, 2018, and a trial date of January 7, 2018.
[brief] See Brun v. Cardoso, 390 N.J. Super. 409, 419, 915 A.2d 1053 (App. Div. 2006).  As such, the death or other unavoidable and unanticipated unavailability of an expert whose report and testimony are relied on will continue to constitute an exceptional circumstance warranting relief.  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, (GANN 2019), Comment 1.1 to Rule 4:17-7.  While the January 19, 2024 Order and January 12, 2024 Oral arguments denied hearing the initial Cross-Motion to Reopen Discovery, plaintiff claims that extending discovery directly related to defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment and the current appeal.
[brief] [...]  ______________________  By: [...], Esq.  Attorney for Plaintiff / Appellant / Cross-Respondent  [...]  Dated: June 24, 2024 (as amended July 30, 2024)  [...], Plaintiff, vs. [...], d/b/a [...]  (PA) and [...], Defendants.  [...], Third-party plaintiff, vs. [...], DECEASED, [...], [...], [...], A MINOR, [...], A MINOR AND WARD OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND JOHN DOES 1- 10, THE UNKNOWN HEIRS OF [...], Third-party defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE
[brief] Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 102 S.Ct. 1148 (1982)...........22 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)..................8  Matter of Carberry, 114 N.J. 574 (1989)..............................................22  Matter of Wolf, 231 N.J. Super. 365 (App. Div. 1989), certif. denied, 117 N.J. 138 (1989).....................................................22 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976)............................22 State v. Martini, 187 N.J. 469 (2006)..................................................24 State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565 (1992)..................................................24  The Banyan School v. NJ State Dept. of Ed., Office of School Finance, Comm. of Ed. Dec.  No. 108-17..........................................................17 Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 191 N.J. 38 (2007) .................................................................15-16 Virginia Bush v. Bd. of Ed. of Warren County Voc. Schl. Dist., Comm. of Ed. Dec. No. 164-09 .........................................................23 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) ..............................................22 N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9 .............................................................................9 N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 ...........................................................................7,12 N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.1 .......................................................................11 N.J.S.A. 18A:28-5 .........................................................................12 N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3 ...........................................................................7,9,16,17,25 N.J.A.C. 6A:4-1.3 .........................................................................9 TABLE OF ORDERS BEING APPEALED Final Administrative Decision of Commissioner of Education Upholding Termination of [...]’s Tenure Employment by [...] (the “Job FAD”)
[brief] The Court Rules contain a very clear and comprehensive protocol regarding the taking of discovery in civil matters.  See Chapter 3 of the Court Rules, R. 4:10-1 to R. 4:25-7.  In this regard, the Court Rules explain when litigants in a case can consent to extend the discovery deadlines.  Except for a 60-day extension at the outset of the case, any consent thereafter is not binding on the Court, but merely a factor to be considered.  However, once an arbitration or trial date is set, consent by the litigants is no longer an issue or factor.  Here, because Plaintiff moved to reopen discovery after his case was no-caused at arbitration, Plaintiff had to meet the requirement of exceptional circumstances.  See R. 4:24-1.  The Court Rules further make clear that litigants in a civil case cannot simply disregard Court discovery orders with impunity, and doing so can come with a variety of very negative consequences for those who do, including an award of attorney’s fees caused by the failure to comply or worse.  See R. 4:23-2; see also R. 1:10-1 to -3.  For unknown reasons, Plaintiff, at the very least, is guilty of laches and blatant neglect in his failure to properly prosecute his case in discovery by timely providing the [...] with his expert reports, and then seek a fifth (5th) discovery extension to cure these deficiencies after he was no-caused at arbitration and the [...] had moved for summary judgment.
[brief] (Pa93).  [...] "checked the area for hazards, none were present.  Aisle lights and step lights were all in working order.  Mid-level trailer lights were also in working order."  (Pa93-94).  The AMC Incident Report was provided with discovery responses served on Plaintiff’s second attorney, [...] of [...] by letter dated July 11, 2017.  (Da55, Da67).  Both [...] and [...] were subjected to detailed and lengthy depositions as exemplified from the portions of their depositions referenced throughout Plaintiff/Appellants papers (Puff at Pa80 to Pa86, PaDa53 to 54 and Owen at Pa87 to Pa92, Pa172, Pa184 and Da69).
[brief] PSOF 25  On March 13, 2020, the President of the United States declared a national state of emergency.  Pa203, PSOF ¶26.  On March 16, 2020, [...] issued Executive Order 104 which suspended in-person K-12 education, suspended operations of certain business “where large numbers of individuals gather in close proximity” and put into place certain social distancing measures.  Id., PSOF ¶27.  This Executive Order provided in part, “WHEREAS, social mitigation strategies for combatting COVID-19 requires every effort to reduce the rate of community spread of the disease; and *** WHEREAS, to mitigate community spread of COVID-19, it is necessary to limit the unnecessary movement of individuals in and around their communities and person-to-person interactions in accordance with CDC and DOH guidance. ”  Id.  On March 19, 2020, [...] issued two more Executive Orders, announcing changes to upcoming elections due to Covid-19 and enacting a moratorium on removal of individuals due to evictions or foreclosures, directly relating to the Covid-19 pandemic.  Id., PSOF 28.  On March 21, 2020, one week after Plaintiff was terminated, [...] issued his stay-at-home Executive Order (referred to herein as the “Stay at Home Order”).
[brief] As to the fifth and twelfth factors, ‘the length of time in which the individual has worked,’ and ‘the manner of termination of the work relationship,’ the Court finds that Plaintiff’s role as County Counsel was meant to be a part-time position, under the clear terms of the agreement and the RFP, such to provide services to the Board of County Commissioners on an as-needed basis.  Further, it is worthy of mentioning that the County Counsel is expressly authorized to maintain a private law practice.  Lastly, Plaintiff’s role is a statutory one with a term of office of three years.  See N.J.S.A. 40A:9-43.  Based on these findings, factors five and seven weigh against Plaintiff.
[brief] P.L. 2019, c. 157.  Under the Ricci Act, the [...] was required to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the new law.  The Ricci Act states that the [...] “shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L. 2019, c. 157, within 30 days of enactment. ”  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  (Emphasis added).  The Board was required to notify all members of the [...] of the Ricci Act by August 7, 2019, including the requirement to “register” by filing a form indicating the dates and locations of service within two (2) years.  On August 8, 2019, more than 30 days after the Ricci Act’s passage, the [...] distributed an email to all Certifying Officers “advising them of their responsibilities under the Ricci Act. ”  However, while this is cited in the Final Agency Decision, no actual email dated August 8, 2019, was ever produced, only a Memorandum dated “August 2019. ”  On or about August 9, 2019, more than 30 days after the passage of the Ricci Act, the [...] contracted [...] to mail postcards to retirees.  No “close date” appears on the document.  On or about August 9, 2019, a postcard was allegedly sent to [...].  In support of his request for amended benefits under the Ricci Act, [...] submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the [...] or the [...] with respect to the passage of P.L. 2019, c.157 (Chapter 157), the Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act.  [...] was present and involved in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks which took place on September 11, 2001.  [...] certified that he participated in the rescue, recovery, and/or cleanup at the World Trade Center site between September 11, 2001, and October 11, 2001, or September 11, 2001, and/or September 12, 2001.  [...] submitted the Ricci Act Eligibility Registration Form and Request for Amended Benefits Form with his affidavit.
[brief] As is customary in the industry, [...] will address the pressure-reduction icing effect at the Regulator Station—as it does at approximately 35 other similar stations—by pre-heating the transmission-line natural gas with a heater located at the Regulator Station prior to the pressure reduction.  The heater will allow [...] to heat the natural gas to approximately 80 to 90 degrees Fahrenheit, so the gas temperature after the pressure reduction stays above freezing, preventing ice from encasing the equipment and ensuring reliable operation of the Facility and the and Holmdel Road).  Second, the site had to be large enough to accommodate all of the Facility’s related equipment (most notably, the heating unit).  Third, the Regulator Station should be located in close proximity to the transmission line for efficiency and security reasons.  Fourth, there are several types of properties that [...] either avoids or cannot use for its gas delivery facilities.  Most significantly, [...] makes every effort to avoid residential areas, and instead focuses on properties with commercial, industrial or utility zoning.  The Company likewise avoids wetlands and low lying areas because they present a heightened risk of flooding and, more importantly, freezing during the winter months.  Further, [...] looks for sites with no environmental or contamination issues, and prefers sites with little or no required tree clearing to further minimize any environmental impact.  And, again to minimize any environmental impact, [...] prefers to build its facilities on already developed land, as it typically only requires a relatively small parcel.  Also, [...] is prohibited from locating its facilities on Farmland Preserved properties under any circumstances, and on properties purchased with Green Acres funding without first getting difficult to obtain authorization from the State.  21.
[brief] Many cases have similarly held that it is reversible error for the prosecutor to comment during summation on the defendant’s silence.  E.g., Muhammad, 182 N.J. at 563, 572-74; State v. Lyle, 73 N.J. 403, 409-11 (1977); State v. Pierce, 330 N.J. Super. 479, 491-92 (App. Div. 2000); Hyde, 292 N.J. Super. at 162-67; State v. Aceta, 223 N.J. Super. 21, 26-32 (App. Div. 1988); accord State v. Black, 380 N.J. Super. 581, 592-95 (App. Div. 2005) (cumulative error).  Here, both errors occurred.
[brief] ”  Hyun Na Seo v. Yozgadlian, 32 N.J. Super. 68, 72 (App. Div. 1999).  Defendants’ Brief, however, then misrepresents the Appellate Division’s opinion in Casatelli v. Dressler, Docket No. [...], 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1683 (App. Div. June 27, 2011).  The Defendants’ Brief mischaracterizes the decision in Casatelli as saying the opinion “contemplate[ed]” the “possibility” that an animal’s natural inclination for dangerous or vicious behavior could be proven through expert opinion.  Defendants’ Brief, p. 22 (emphasis included).  The Appellate Division actually wrote, however, an unequivocal declarative sentence that a natural propensity for vicious or dangerous behavior “is a subject provable by expert opinion. ”  Casatelli, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS at *7 (emphasis added).  Ironically, by emphasizing its own misrepresentation, the Defendants’ Brief emphasizes the centrality of that statement to the Casatelli decision.  Finally, Defendants’ Brief advocates for an interpretation of Jury Charge 5.60B that would place New Jersey law in conflict with the current scientific understanding of stallion reproductive behavior.
[brief] (61a).  Furthermore, Defendants have suffered no prejudice, were on notice of Plaintiff’s claims prior to litigation being instituted, were provided with any medical records that Plaintiff had in her possession and Defendants have not responded to any of Plaintiff’s discovery requests, including requests for medical records.  Lastly, a Ferreira Conference was never held as is mandated by New Jersey Court Rule 4:5B-4 and Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic, 178 N.J. 144, 154 (2003).  In consideration of these facts, it would be entirely antithetical to the purpose of the Affidavit of Merit statute, which was solely promulgated to weed out frivolous claims, to allow the Trial Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims which have been proven to have merit by Plaintiff’s untimely submitted Affidavit of Merit.
[brief] (Aa17).  [...]’s reliance on non-precedential decisions—F.P., 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1375; In re T.M., No. A-4628-11T1, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1283 (App. Div. May 28, 2013); In re M.M., No. A-5949-12T1, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1086 (App. Div. May 12, 2015); and In re J.L., No. A-2501-13T4, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. 292 (App. Div. Feb. 10, 2016)⁵—does not compel a different result.
[directive] 2.  Do you understand that by pleading guilty and admitting that you used or were in possession of a [Yes] [No] firearm that is a , (type of firearm) while in the course of committing or attempting to commit one of the crimes, you are waiving your right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that you used or possessed a firearm during the course of committing or attempting to commit one of the crimes?  3.  Does any other mandatory sentencing provision apply to the Graves Act count that [Yes] [No] [NA] provides for a greater period of parole ineligibility (e.g., NERA, Three Strikes, Murder)?
[brief] The Settlement Agreement included a concept plan (Pa72) depicting low-rise townhomes on Lot 19 and midrise apartment-style buildings on Lot 16.  As recited in the Settlement Agreement, *inter alia*, “[t]he purpose and intent of this Agreement is to . . . resolve [...]’s intervention in the DJ Action and to settle the Builder’s Remedy Action and/or claims therefor” (Pa47), and to “control the development of the Property as set [in the agreement]” (Pa48).
[brief] 1T 12:7 – 13:2.  As the Nicholas Court made clear “’When a physician is a specialist and the basis of the malpractice involves the physician’s specialty, the challenging expert must practice in the same specialty. ’”  1T 12:18 – 12:22, quoting Nicholas at 481 – 482.  The Trial Court then engaged in the necessary analysis of whether (i) [...] was a specialist or a general practitioner; and (ii) whether the treatment that is the basis of the malpractice action involves that specialty.  **1T 12:23 - 13:2.**  This analysis confirmed that [...] could not serve as a qualified affiant as to Defendant.  The Trial Court’s decision was consistent with a plain reading of the AMS and the Nicholas Court’s explicitly holding.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3 provides that on a prosecutor’s application, a court may sentence a person who has been convicted of a first-, second-, or third-degree crime to an extended term of imprisonment if one of the statutory grounds are satisfied.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) provides one such ground, where a defendant has committed a first-, second-, or third-degree crime “and is a persistent offender.