ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Ja023-Ja046  2.  Trial Court Order Denying Plaintiff’s Relief, dated October 27, 2023 ........................................................................................................  Ja222 | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------| | Medici v. BPR Company, 107 N.J. 1 (1987) | 7, 22, 24, 25, 28, 31 | | Funeral Home Mgmt., Inc. v. Basralian, 319 N.J. Super. 200, 208 | .................................................................. 9 | | Ten Stary Dom Ptp. v. Mauro, 216 NJ 16, 30 (2013) | .................................................................. 9 | | New Brunswick Tel. v. South Plainfield, 305 N.J. Super. 151 | .................................................................. 9 | | Toll Bros., Inc. v. Burlington County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, | .................................................................. 9 | | 194 N.J. 16, 30 (2013) | | | Tomko v. Vissers, 21 N.J. 226, 238 (1956) | .................................................................. 9 | | Chirichello v. Zoning Bd. Of Adj. Monmouth Park, 78 N.J. 544 (1979)
[brief] 78  POINT VIII  THE SENTENCING COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING  THREE CONSECUTIVE CUSTODIAL TERMS OF FIFTY YEARS EACH FOLLOWING DEFENDANT’S CONVICTIONS FOR FOUR SEPARATE FIRST-DEGREE MURDERS ..................................................  81  A.  Defendant’s sentence is legal ...........................................  81  B.  The lower court’s analysis of the sentencing factors was based on competent and credible evidence .................................................................  82  C.  The lower court properly applied the Miller factors .................................................................................. 89  D.  The lower court properly applied the Yarbough factors .................................................................................. 96  CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 100
[brief] The defense also used the hearsay documents to impugn plaintiff by claiming plaintiff hid those hearsay documents from the jury.  And what else weren't you shown by plaintiff?  Forget the half of the charting that was missing, but the complaint to the State of New Jersey and the response back was never mentioned to you by plaintiff ever.  Never ever, ever, ever, ever.  11T92:7-11.  The defense used it to appeal to the jurors’ common sense and hammer home that if defendant was liable for the death of [...], the DOH would have so found but they did not.
[brief] See id.  In State v. Ramos, 282 N.J. Super. 19 (App. Div. 1995), an officer was patrolling a high narcotics area when he observed the defendant standing on a corner in the rain, then observed the codefendant hand currency to the defendant.  The defendant then reached toward the codefendant with a closed fist.  Based on these observations, the officer stopped the defendant.  The Appellate Division held that the stop was justified reasoning that the officer’s observations, considered in light of his training and experience, supported a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaging in a drug transaction.
[brief] RESPONDENT [...] IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE LEASED PREMISES, WHICH INCLUDES THE DESIGNATED PARKING SPOTS, AND THEREFORE THEY OWE A DUTY TO APPELLANT  (2T, Pa20-34)  Contrary to the allegations of Respondent [...] in their brief, the subject lease does not clearly place the obligation to maintain the common area of the premises on the landlord.  (Pa206-225)  In fact, Respondent does not point to any part in the lease to support their allegation because there is nowhere in the lease that designates such responsibility.  The trial Court in the March 28, 2023 Order even states that "Here, the Lease between Defendant [...] and Defendant [...] does not assign express responsibilities as to the duty to maintain the parking lot."  (Pa31)  The lease does state that the maintenance of the lease premises, which includes 10 specifically allocated parking spots for Respondent [...], is the tenant's responsibility.  And [...], owner of the subject [...], testified during his deposition that when the lease was entered into, Respondent [...] was responsible for the maintenance of those spots that were designated as [...] spots in the lease as they were responsible for maintaining everything inside of the shaded area.  (Pa543; Pa542)  There has not been any determination as to whether the area Appellant fell was an area designated as part of the lease premises or a common area and therefore, it should be a question for a jury.  All of the cases cited by Respondent NACT have one major different to the case as bar.  The cases of Kandrac, Holmes and Spano all had contracts where the landlord was contractually obligated to maintain the common areas of the center and there were no specific spaces or areas that were designated as areas for the use of a specific tenant and the tenant's business invitees.  Here, this case can be easily distinguished because the lease does not state who is responsible for maintenance of the common areas, but it does state that the responsibility for the maintenance of the lease premises is on the tenant.  (Pa206-225)  It is not just a multi-use parking lot, it also has bargained for and designated parking spots for Respondent [...] which makes it a completely different situation than any of the cases relied upon by Respondent [...] in their brief.  It is not Appellant's fault, nor responsibility, that the maintenance set forth in the lease contract and the maintenance of the rest of the parking lot may overlap.  That should not give immunity to Respondent [...] for the maintenance that it is contractually obligated to perform nor the duty that it owes to Appellant.  Since the lease is clear on the responsibility of the maintenance of the leased premises, the trial Court's determination as to duty should be reversed.
[brief] (Db 53-54.) coverage.  The trial court rejected the insurer’s arguments, finding the carrier had a duty to defend and “to provide indemnification in the event that there is a finding of liability at trial. ”  Id. at 447-48.  After a finding of no liability in the underlying action the trial court denied fees, but the Supreme Court reversed.  The Supreme Court held the “successful claimant” standard was met “because the trial court required [the insurer] to defend and, if necessary, indemnify[.]”  Id. at 448.  In no way does Occhifinto support the position that an insured is “successful” when it must bear 85% of its costs.  In fact, the majority of cases to consider the “successful claimant” standard in the context of such limited “success” have held that the standard is not met.
[brief] ☐  Transcript in possession of attorney or pro se litigant (four copies of the transcript must be submitted along with an electronic copy).  List the date(s) of the trial or hearing:  ☐ Motion for abbreviation of transcript filed with the court or agency below.  Attach copy.  ☐  Motion for transcripts at public expense filed with the court below.  Attach copy.  I certify that the foregoing statements are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.
[directive] A department also notation in the officer's make a circumstances specified (excluding officer's entire duty shift during a uniformed B WCs be activated specify circumstances department may In that event, the 5.1 of this Directive).  in sections and 7 authorize de- department's policy does not provided that the BWC may be de-activated, when the remain activated.  that BWC Directive requires the activation in circumstances where this electronically decide to record when officers
[brief] [...], not unlike [...], took the position below that the streetlight was operating at time of the accident.  As seen, this statement was disputed by [...] that the light was likely not operating at the time of the accident, for the reasons he gave and enumerated above.  [...] and its experts speculate that it was the sensor that caused the subject streetlight to be turned off.  Both [...] and [...] disputed this contention since, after studying the photograph DL1-K (Pa730), they could see that the floodlight mounted on the truck was below the streetlight and was meant to be pointed down to light up the investigation scene.  The experiment conducted by the [...] likewise is disputed by [...] and [...] in that they trained the flashlight beam directly at the sensor tricking it into turning itself off.  [...] explained that, in real life, it is the sun from above hitting the sensor from the top and sides that trigger the deactivation of the sensor.  In the end, the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment to [...].
[brief] The Union’s attorney below never contended otherwise to [...] prior to or during the proceedings, in the Union’s post-hearing brief, or in the Union’s appeal to PERC.  The Union’s financial position was presented to [...] by its vice president, [...] (“[...]”).  [...]’s testimony occurred on the third and final hearing day, and it was not recorded.  Nevertheless, [...] explained that he attended Montclair State College and was a college graduate.  He explained that while a union official, he was required to review and analyze the labor contracts for other fire departments throughout the State to see what they provided on pay and benefits, so the Union was in a position to properly advocate its position to the City.  [...] stated that he prepared the Union’s salary grids, and they were for either a 2% or a 3% salary increase.  [...] claimed the Union’s salary grids were on par with other municipalities, but none of those were receiving transitional aid from the State.  He admitted that his pay had been frozen at $118,000 when the prior contract expired, and that it might go up to $146,000 if the Union prevailed on its position of a 3% wage increase.  The Arbitrator elected to award salary increases greater than those proposed by the City.
[brief] ”\(^{65}\)  “[...] did lock us out of our offices, including my own office and, you know, I probably had corporate documents in [there]. ”\(^{66}\)  “He also took the keys to the \(^{61}\) 1T and 2T.  \(^{62}\) 2T89-90.  \(^{63}\) 2T91.  \(^{64}\)  Id. \(^{65}\) 2T104.  \(^{66}\) 2T105.  company vans and trucks so he pretty much ended operation of our company like immediately. ”67  “Our clients were completely freaked out. ”68  “Obviously it’s a huge financial impact on our clients if we go even one day without having guys on site or managing our projects properly. ”69  “So, on a professional and personal level this had obviously major, major impacts across the board and still to this day. ”70  “You know, everybody’s salaries were cut.  The stress and everything was very crazy.  I was pregnant at the time and, you know, there’s a lot that goes, you know, into all the – in every emotional part so that was really something, to say the least. ”71  Once again, a plaintiff offers no quantifiable damages to support the claims raised in this action.
[brief] “A contract should not be read to vest a party or his nominee with the power virtually to make his promise illusory.  Especially must this be so when a forfeiture will follow. ”  See Russell v. Princeton Labs., Inc., 50 N.J. 30, 38 (1967).  Here, the trial court’s construction of Section 13.1 not only prevented Plaintiff from obtaining the benefit of its bargain and deprived Plaintiff of the opportunity to recoup millions of dollars in damages, it also creates a dangerous precedent for other similarly structured transactions in the State of New Jersey, allowing parties to breach contracts with impunity.
[directive] 75 yard line 2 rounds, prone 6 seconds  •  In the prone position chamber 1 round •  On command fire 1 round on sub-target # 1 and 1 round into sub- target # 2 (6 seconds)  •  Clear the rifle’s chamber and close and lock the bolt on an empty chamber or chamber the next round and leave the bolt handle up (unlocked) with the safety “off”.  Carrying all equipment, the shooter will jog to and • touch the target, then jog back to the 50 yard line 50 yard line 3 rounds  shooter’s choice of position(no prone), rifle may be supported (rifle on top of bench or other object)  10 seconds •  Assume position, chamber 1 round •  On command fire 1 shot on each sub-target “A”, “B”,and “C” (10 seconds)  9-72
[brief] ”  SSI Medical Servs. v. HHS, Div. of Medical Assistance & Health Servs., 146 N.J. 614 (1996).  Here, the postcard was undisputedly mailed to [...]’s home address.  (Pa14).  The Division went so far as to hire a company, [...], to mail out postcards to all 200,647 SPRS retirees at their home addresses on file with the Division.  (Pa73).  And a postcard was indeed mailed to [...]’s last home address home on August 9, 2019.  (Pa13; Pa75).  Nonetheless, [...] asserts, without providing any legal authority, that his affidavit declaring that he never received a postcard should overcome the mailbox presumption that he received it.  (Pb15).  And despite the Board having satisfied the notice requirement under the Ricci Act, it nevertheless considered [...]’s request pursuant to its inherent equitable power.
[brief] [...]  [...] (028821989)  240  CEDAR KNOLLS ROAD, SUITE 104 CEDAR KNOLLS, NJ 07927 [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent, [...]  Our File No. 9050.05166  [...] Of Counsel [...]  On the Brief TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .........................................................  1 STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................  4  STANDARD OF REVIEW ..............................................................  10  LEGAL ARGUMENT ........................................................................  12  POINT I .......................................................................................  12  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED  PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILING TO PROVIDE AN APPROPRIATE AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT AS REQUIRED UNDER N.J.S.A. 2A: 53A-27, et. seq.  CONCLUSION  .................................................................................. 25
[brief] The Board questioned the densities permitted in [...] and how to determine what is too dense.  [...] advised that the highest density permitted in [...] is 14 units per acre, but [...]’s proposed facility is over 20 units per acre.  6T 127:4-14.  The Board questioned the burden on community services and requested more detail on emergency responder services and weather disaster planning.  6T 131:10-25.  At the final hearing, [...] reduced the footprint of the building very slightly, 7T 3:1-3, 7T 3-4; however, there was no change in the number of stories, the setbacks from [...] or from the building to parking, or the number of units or density.
[brief] For instance, in Vercammen, the plaintiff was, in fact, a lawyer who was challenging [...]’s forum selection clause.  Vercammen v. Linkedin Corp., No. A-0188-20, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 110, *1-2 (App. Div. Jan. 18, 2022).  Further, the plaintiff accessed a “sign-in-wrap,” which, unlike the hyperlink here, informs a consumer that upon signing up for a website or account, the consumer agrees to the terms and conditions.  *Id.* at *8*.  Here, however, the hyperlink applied to anyone simply using [...]’s website.  This squarely puts the arbitration agreement at issue in the purview of a “browsewrap agreement” and the same principles detailed in *Wollen*.
[brief] .................................................................3  Holmes v. Kimco Realty Corp., 598 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2010) .......................7  Kandrac v. Marrazzo's Mkt., 429 N.J. Super. 79 (App. Div. 2012)  ..............7  Sklodowsky v Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648 (App. Div. 2011)  .....................3  Spano v. SuperValu, Inc., A-2361-14T3 (App. Div. July 22, 2016)  ............7  State v. Amboy Nat. Bank, 447 N.J. Super 142 (App. Div.), certif. denied 288 N.J. 249 (2016)  .................................................................3  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] To accept that [...] had no Site Plan Ordinance/Review until 1984 is indicative of how erroneous the Court’s analysis was.  Recognizing the inaccuracy of some of these new documents allowed by the Court, the School did submit with its Trial Brief documents attempting to show this assertion is to no Zoning/Site Plan requirements were in place was false (See Da215-218; Da219-261).  The Trial Court apparently disregarded those rebuttal documents.  As detailed in those documents, [...] re-codified its Code in the 1971 Code Book --- being the recodification of Ordinances previously adopted into the new 1971 Code Book, by “[...]” (that later became [...]) (Da220-260).
[brief] In re Approval of Financing Commitment for the Project Known as [...], [...] Docket No. [...] (App. Div. May 31, 2022) (“[...] I”) (Pa267).  [...]  I involved deferential administrative judicial review.  [...]  I involved a direct appeal of an administrative final decision regarding State executive branch public funding via the issuance of non-recourse tax exempt revenue bonds and 9% competitive low income tax credits.
[directive] Clerk to the Grand Jury  The Jury Manager shall supervise the clerk(s) to the grand jury, and grand jury staff shall be located in the Operations Division.  The clerk(s) to the grand jury shall perform uniform duties consistent with constitutional and statutory requirements, the Rules of Court, and Judiciary policies.  Comment:  New Jersey statutes and the Rules of Court set specific duties for the clerk to the grand jury.  Jury Managers shall supervise the grand jury clerks as they perform those duties.  In order to be able to function as a member of the Jury Management Office, the grand jury clerk shall be trained in, and capable of operating the Judiciary’s automated jury management system (JAS).  The uniform duties and responsibilities of grand jury clerks are listed below.  The grand jury clerks shall not perform non-Judiciary functions.  Grand Jury Clerk  Duties  Grand jury is a Judiciary proceeding and the grand jury clerk, or Judiciary staff person performing that role, is responsible for the tasks noted below.  The responsibilities listed below refer specifically to the grand jury clerk and do not include the Jury Manager responsibilities relating to summoning, qualifying, and communicating with grand jurors during that phase and also do not include the duties relating to the first day selection process at which the twenty-three grand jurors are selected to serve.
[brief] *Id.*  However, Defendants, as well as the Trial Court, mistakenly assert, “Plaintiff fails to establish a mandate of public policy that is clearly identified and firmly grounded. ”  Resp. Br. 16. (PA000091-PA000092).  To the contrary, Plaintiff has cited numerous laws, regulations, and public policy, in particular *N.J.A.C.* § 10:44A-2.8(b), *N.J.A.C.* § 10:44 A-2.7(a), *N.J.S.A.* § 30:1AA-1.1(j), and *N.J.S.A.* § 30:1AA-1.2(i), which all demonstrate her reasonable belief that Defendants violated law and regulation regarding understaffing and proper staff training for competency at Defendants’ group homes.  These authorities are firmly grounded in New Jersey law and regulation and directly address Plaintiff’s complaints to Defendants.  (PA000006-PA000008).  Following Plaintiff’s whistleblowing complaints concerning the regulations/public policy, Defendants retaliated and terminated Plaintiff’s employment.  (PA000001-PA000058), this Court must reverse the Trial Court’s decision in dismissing Plaintiff’s *Pierce* claim.  4.
[brief] [...] argues that the Board failed to provide conditions to ameliorate the negative impacts.  [...]’s architect had testified that less units would make the project unviable (without explanation); therefore, even if the Board could redesign the project, a significantly smaller project was not an option according to applicant.  2T 62:24 to 63:6.  Moreover, when the negative impact is substantial impairment of the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance, the only remedy is to locate the use where it fits the zone plan, or at least a --- \(^9\)
[brief] Ja025, paragraph 18.  (Emphasis added).  The Board’s Resolution weighs evidence about the intensity of the taller buildings proposed by Plaintiffs, the potential visual impact of the increased height, and the potential effect of the buildings’ height on the intensity of the use, especially the amount of traffic generated.  These concerns are entirely consistent with the recognition stated in the above-quoted language from Grasso that “Height restrictions like restrictions on density, bulk or building size, can also be a technique for limiting the intensity of the property's use[,]”, and “Very early on, courts recognized the relationship between height restrictions and the public welfare because the height of a building could impact traffic congestion, fire hazards, public health, adequate light and air, and population density. ”  Grasso, *supra* at 53-53.  With regard to the testimony of Plaintiffs’ Planner, [...], the Board found:  “Mr. Philips testimony concerning the negative criteria correctly seeks to focus the Board on the effects of the proposed height variance on light, air, noise and the intensity of development. ”  Ja032, paragraph 30.  In the Resolution’s Conclusions of Law, the Board says:  “The [...] and governing body have pointedly chosen uses and standards with an anticipated level of intensity and have explained why they have done so.  The application before the Board contemplates development that is substantially more intense than anticipated by the governing body, and, therefore, allowed in the SM Zone District. ”  Ja034  These are the considerations which Grasso tells us to weigh when considering a height variance under NJSA40:55D-70(d)(6).
[brief] (Pa361- Staffing coordinators were ineligible for charge pay.  (Pa103 at 80:8-13; Pa292 at 60:2-6).  [...] had once mistakenly received charge pay for a single pay period.  It was discovered by [...] after payroll had already been processed.  When [...] advised [...] of her discovery, [...] indicated “we will let it go this time,” because the administrative effort to correct the error was immense.  (Pa362 at 84:2-9; Pa103-04 at 81:20-82:18).  [...] would have approved any ongoing prospective charge pay in writing.  (Pa473).  [...] approached [...] about whether the staffing coordinators could receive charge pay in lieu of their ineligibility for the PIP.  (Pa362 at 83:22-84:9).  [...] expressly denied [...]’s request for prospective staffing coordinator charge pay.  (Pa362 at 83:7-21-84:14; Pa475).  Undeterred, [...] decided she, [...], and [...] were going to take charge pay anyway.  (Pa477).  Staffing coordinators could not assign charge pay to themselves, meaning that [...] needed others to participate in this scheme for her to obtain the extra pay.  (Pa232 at 29:13-21).  [...] agreed to add charge pay, despite never having received direct approval from [...].  (Pa477).  Indeed, [...] never even spoke to [...] about charge pay.  (Pa362 at 84:15-17).  On September 1, 2020, [...] discovered the unauthorized charge pay and alerted [...] that [...], [...], and [...] were receiving charge pay.
[directive] Seized property; statute of limitations on claims 2C:64-8.  owns  Any person who could not with due diligence have discovered that property which he was seized as contraband may file a claim for its return or the value thereof at the time of seizure within 3 of years the seizure if he can demonstrate that he did not consent to, and had no knowledge of its unlawfil use.  If the property has been sold, the claimant receives a claim against proceeds.  s. 2C:64-8, eff. Sept. 1,1979.  Amended by L.1979, c. 344, 8, eff. Jan. 1980.  L.1978, c. 95, 23, s.  Forfeited weapons with military value; donation to National Guard Militia Museum 2C:64-9.