ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Not once did [...] make a single promise to defendant.  To the contrary, when defendant asked if his charges would “go away” if he cooperated and asked what the detectives “need from [him] to make this go away,” [...] explained:  So, whatever you say today, does that change th[ose] charges right this second?  No[,] it doesn’t .  . . .  [Y]ou still have these charges.  There’s still a complaint[.]  [B]ut what I can say is that if you give us the truth and the whole truth, there’s questions that we still have with the investigation[,] and you might be able to answer those questions[,] and those questions might lead us to other defendants or what I just read in there might help us with those cases.  So I can’t make any promises . . . with you with your charges[,] but all I can say is the truth is what it is and the truth can only help your case.8  [(11T170-10 to 171-6; Sa2 at 11:05:57 to 11:06:24; Da72 to Da73) (emphasis added)].
[brief] [...] and the Trial Court Have Ignored Important Principles Relied Upon in City of Millville v. Rock.  The City of Millville case has been cited by both [...] and the Defendants in both trial and appeal briefs and was discussed at length at the oral argument in the cross motions for summary judgment before the Trial Court.  Both [...] and the Trial Court, however, have improperly discounted the significance of the case by attempting to distinguish the case on its facts.  What [...] and the Trial Court have ignored is that in the City of Millville case, as part of its analysis of New Jersey law, the Court sets forth two important factors that must be considered when determining whether there is a binding personal guaranty: (1) whether the individual sought to be held personally liable signed the document a second time in their individual capacity and (2) whether there was evidence that the individuals sought to be found personally liable intended to be personally liable.  683 F. Supp. 2nd at 327-28.  The Court found that neither of these factors were satisfied which was an alternate basis for the Court’s finding of no personal guaranty.  As set forth in the initial appeal brief of [...] and [...], here there is no separate signature line and there is absolutely no evidence that any of the individual defendants intended to be personally bound.  Accordingly, the finding of the Trial Court that there is personal liability must be reversed.  4.
[directive] De-Activation at the Request of a Person Seeking Emergency Medical Assistance.  Notwithstanding Section 5.3, an officer may de-activate a BWC when a person, other than an arrestee, is seeking emergency medical services for him or herself or another and requests that the BWC be de-activated.  In deciding whether to de-activate the BWC, the officer shall consider the privacy interests of the person requesting de-activation and the person in need of medical assistance.
[brief] Id. at 13.  That was because, defendant was provided constitutionally adequate notice that he was being charged with second-degree robbery.  The police reports and witness statements that were provided to defendant in discovery unequivocally put him on notice that the State's proofs included not only using force against his victims, as charged in the indictment, but also threatening them with immediate bodily injury.  Thus, defendant knew "that against which he must defend" and he was not convicted by the jury "of an offense for which the grand jury has not indicted."  Spano, supra, 128 N.J. Super. at 92.  [Id. at 13-14.]
[brief] [...] Does Not Dispute That Its Unauthorized Dumping Constituted A Fourth Breach Of The Settlement Agreement, Regardless Of The Volume Dumped, That Should Have Resulted In The Entry Of The Money Judgment.  [...] does not dispute that unauthorized and unsourced solid waste was imported and dispersed across the Leased Premises, or that such activity constituted an express breach of Paragraphs 16, 17 and 20 of the Lease.  [Pa77, Pa79].  Instead, [...] disputes the volume of material that it wrongfully deposited and its motivation in doing so.  [Pa175 at ¶ 9].  But because a breach is a breach, it is irrelevant whether the breach resulted from unauthorized truckloads or 6,000 – the remedy is the same.  See Verbal v. Tiva Healthcare, Inc., 2021 WL 9527858, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2021) (“Simply put, ‘[a] breach is a breach is a breach’”).  The trial court therefore also erred when it failed to enforce the consequences of this fourth breach, too.  II.
[brief] The relationship between [...] as Tenant and [...] as Landlord has been fraught and [...] feels that [...] has been hostile to him since 1994.  5T72:1-12.  Unit 11 appears to be completely unique due to being unrenovated and rented to a long-time tenant, which has limited rent increases to be in line with inflation rather than the local real estate market.  The landlord’s expert testified that it was impossible to find even a single other unit like it in Hoboken.  1T54:22-25.  (landlord’s expert testifying that “[i]t’s very difficult in Hoboken to estimate the market value of an un-renovated apartment.  In my analysis and it’s in my report, I did look for sales of un-renovated apartments.  Finding none, I had no other choice but to value it as though [it were renovated]”).  The Unit is also unique because it may not have a deed as it has never been sold.  No deed for the unit was ever produced by [...].  The only deed [...] provided was for the building.  DA57-59.  **The Hardship Application filed in 2017 that is the subject of this litigation**
[brief] From 1948 thru 1989 [...] Never Passed Any Rules Govern Construction.  The Defendant’s claim that “[w]ith one stroke of a pen, the trial court upended over 75 years of past practice and declared that [...] has no authority to enforce its rules, including the construction rules at issue herein. ”  (Db2)  First, the decision below only prevents the club from imposing “construction” restrictions.  Second, it is important to note that the Defendant is disingenuously claiming that the club has been imposing construction rules for 75 years.  (Db8,9,13,16,23,24,28,30).  They have not.  The Defense’s reference to 75 years is a red herring.  [...] never drafted nor imposed any construction rules or restrictions from 1948 thru 1989.
[brief] a340-341a (23:22-24:11); 337a (20:10-20:21).  They intended to build the affordable housing units as the [...] (“[...]”) developer.  337a (20:10-20:21); 340a-341a (23:22-24:11); 343a-345a (26:3-28:5).  In October 2007, Defendant [...] told Plaintiff [...] that he had filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writ against [...] on behalf of [...].  335a (18:3-15).  Defendant [...] filed that lawsuit without Plaintiff [...] or [...]’s knowledge.
[brief] Beyond Defendants’ baseless attack on the trial court’s finding that New Jersey recognizes the enforceability of pay-when-able loans, Defendants declare, in the face of the record, that the facts do not support the conclusion that the parties entered into a pay-when-able loan on April 26, 2013.  The record facts, however, fully support the trial court’s finding that “[...] has proven [that] the parties’ [sic] agreed [...] would not have to repay the third loan until he was able to do so. ”  Da53.  The testimony established that, on April 26, 2013, as an accommodation to Defendants, the parties entered into the Third Loan, and [...] would repay the Third Loan as soon as he was able to do so.  1T147-13 to 17; 3T55-1 to 9, 65-25 to 66-20, 67-2 to 5, 68-13 to 17.  The trial court found that the evidence, including [...]’s August 7, 2013 email and Schedule and the admissions he made during the October 2019 meeting in Las Vegas, proved that the parties entered into the Third Loan and that [...] committed to repay the Third Loan.
[brief] THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED IN COMPELLING ARBITRATION BECAUSE THE CONTRACT UPON WHICH PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT’S CLAIM IS BASED DOES NOT CONTAIN AN ARBITRATION PROVISION (1T38:16-40:19; 1T42:15-46:16; 1T48:7-51:8).  The Chancery Court failed to address or give credence to the uncontroverted fact that the 2022 Addendum upon which [...] bases her case, and for which she seeks specific performance, does not have an arbitration agreement thereby precluding the Chancery Court from compelling arbitration of this case.  “The first step in considering [a] challenge to enforcement of an arbitration requirement must be to determine whether a valid agreement exists. ”  Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 83 (2002).  Only if a valid agreement to arbitrate is found to exist, then the Court must determine if the subject dispute falls within the scope of the agreement.  Id. at 93.  “A legally enforceable agreement requires a meeting of the minds. ”  Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “Parties are not required to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so. ”  Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001) (“only those issues may be arbitrated which the parties have agreed shall be”).  An “arbitrator’s authority is circumscribed by whatever provisions and conditions have been mutually agreed upon.  Any action taken beyond that authority is impeachable. ”  Grover v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 80 N.J. 221, 229 (1979).  “[A] ‘court may not rewrite a contract to broaden the scope of arbitration[.]’”  Ibid. (quoting Yale Materials Handling Corp. v. White Storage & Retrieval Sys., Inc., 240 N.J. Super. 370, 374 (App. Div. 1990)) (second alteration in original).  An arbitration provision in one contract cannot be used to compel arbitration of another contract.  See Grover, 80 N.J. at 229; see also Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 192 (2013) (“we reject intertwinement as a theory for compelling arbitration”); Bacon v. Bob Ciasulli Auto Grp., Inc., A-0789-14T1 (App. Div. May 7, 2015) (holding that arbitration provision in contract to purchase car did not subsume disputes under the extended service agreement executed ten days later); Phoenix Motor Co. v. Desert Diamond Players Club, Inc., 144 So. 3d 694, 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (“Arbitration provisions from one contract cannot be extended to a separate contract between the same parties unless the parties expressly agree to do so. ”).  Here, [...]’s Complaint is solely premised on alleged breach of, and a request to compel specific performance under, the 2022 Addendum.
[brief] A copy of this opinion was submitted to the trial court and is included in the Appendix with this filing.  (Pa83-Pa101).  professionals’ who are regulated by a separate regulatory scheme,” such as home inspectors, were not covered by the exception.  Id. at 599.  We explained the exception “must be narrowly construed to exempt CFA liability only as to those professionals who have historically been recognized as ‘learned’ based on the requirement of extensive learning or erudition. ”  Ibid.  To the extent prior decisions relied upon regulation of semi-professionals to hold otherwise, as in Plemmons v. Blue Chip Ins. Servs., Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 551, 564 (App. Div. 2006) and Atlantic Ambulance Corp. v. Cullum, 451 N.J. Super. 247, 257-58 (App. Div. 2017), we found such rationale “inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 150 N.J. 255 (1997).
[brief] This rule provides, in relevant part:  ****  Assigned counsel may not seek to withdraw on the ground of lack of merit of the petition.  Counsel should advance all of the legitimate arguments requested by the defendant that the record will support.  If defendant insists upon the assertion of any grounds for relief that counsel deems to be without merit, counsel shall list such claims in the petition or amended petition or incorporate them by reference….  *Rule 3:22–6,* and not *R.P.C. 3.1,* “governs the performance of PCR counsel and that if the standard of conduct imposed by that rule is violated, a new PCR proceeding will be required.
[brief] (001a.)  On September 27, 2023, the Board issued its Order.  Ibid.  In this Order, not only did the Board not increase the TREC Factor from 0.6 to 1.0, the Board instead rejected the entire project, on the realization that the [...] would be a “grid-supply” (i.e. – would direct energy into the grid) pursuant to N.J.A.C. 14:8-1.2 rather than “net metered” (i.e. – would provide energy only to the customer on site), and that the innovative solar program that the Project filed under was only designed to work for net metered projects.
[brief] 28  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES CITED | Page | |-------------|------| | Belfer v. Merling, | 12 | | 322 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 1999) | | | Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, | 10 | | 214 N.J. Super. 384 (2013) | | | Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., | 17,19 | | 89 N.J. 270 (1982) | | | Estate of Chin v. Saint Barnabas Med. Ctr., | 18 | | 160 N.J. 454 (1999) | | | Fagas v. Scott, | 12 | | 251 N.J. Super 169 (Law Div. 1991) | | | Ferolito v. Park Hill Ass’n, Inc., | 12 | | 408 N.J. Super. 401 (App. Div. 2009) | | | Grow Co., Inc. v. Chokshi, | 23,24 | | 424 N.J. Super 357(App. Div. 2012) | | | Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp., | 22,23 | | 253 N.J. 191 (2023) | | | Hubbard v. Reed, | 17,18 | | 168 N.J. 387 (2001) | | | In re Prob. of Will & Codicil of Macool, | 22 | | 416 N.J. at 313 | | | LoBiondo v. Schwartz, | 13,19 | | 199 N.J. 62 (2009) | | | McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel & Casino, | 12 | | 132 N.J. (1993) | | Redline v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995) ...........................................................................................................
[directive] a.  Se você está se declarando culpado por tal crime, o período mínimo obrigatório sem possibilidade de obter a liberdade condicional é de anos e meses (inserir o número de anos/meses) e o período máximo de desqualificação à liberdade condicional pode ser de anos e meses (inserir o número de anos/meses) e este período não pode ser reduzido por créditos de bom comportamento, trabalho ou créditos mínimos de reclusão.  If you are pleading guilty to such a charge, the minimum mandatory period of parole ineligibility is years and months (fill in the number of years/months) and the maximum period of parole ineligibility can be years and months (fill in the number of years/months) and this period cannot be reduced by good time, work, or minimum custody credits.
[brief] Appellants contend that their Amended Policy is necessary to comply with federal and state recordkeeping laws, and that the injunction threatens to put them in noncompliance.  See (Db18-23).  Initially, it is undisputed that their Original Policy was in place “uneventfully” for four years before Appellants amended it.  (Da137).  During that time, Appellants never expressed any concern that they had been actively violating these laws.  In any event, Appellants cannot show that the court’s injunction, and the policy that it reinstates, are inconsistent with—or even remotely implicate—the recordkeeping laws they now cite.  6  Pursuant to R. 1:36-3, copies of all unpublished opinions cited within this brief are submitted as part of the State’s Appendix (Ra26-79).  Contrary to Appellants’ misunderstanding, the federal Family Education Rights Privacy Act (“FERPA”) and New Jersey Pupil Records Act (“NJPRA”) have little to do with this case.
[brief] In general, “in the absence of fraud or mistake, parties to stipulations and agreements entered into in the course of judicial proceedings are ordinarily estopped to take positions inconsistent therewith. ”  Trenton Oil Co., Inc. v. Dries, 30 N.J. Super. 122, 128–29 (Law. Div. 1954) (quoting 31 C.J.S. Estoppel, s 120, page 384).  Parties are not “permitted to ‘blow both hot and cold,’ taking a position inconsistent with prior conduct, if this would injure another, regardless of whether that person has actually relied thereon. ”  Heuer v. Heuer, 152 N.J. 226, 237 (1998) (quotation omitted).
[directive] Positional asphyxiation is insufficient intake of oxygen as a result of body position that interferes with the subject’s ability to breathe.  It can occur during the process of subduing and restraining a person by placing the person in a posture that prevents or impedes the mechanism of normal breathing.  If the person cannot escape from the position, death may occur very rapidly.  Restraint in the prone position presents a significant risk of asphyxia, particularly when a person is handcuffed and left in a face-down position.  As soon as handcuffed and restrained, a person should be raised immediately to a seated or standing position that does not impede the mechanism of normal breathing.
[brief] The import of the *Button* and *Primus* holdings is the principle that “collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment. ”  *United Transp. Union v. Michigan Bar*, 401 U.S. 576 (1971).  The DACCA in no way restricts people’s access to the court or attorney solicitation of clients.  In fact, the DACCA does not apply at all once litigation has been filed.  Nor does it regulate any aspects of the attorney-client relationship.  Any attorney is free to provide legal advice and representation to clients in connection with their defenses to an alleged debt that is owed.  As argued before, the business of debt adjustment and the practice of law are separate areas of endeavor.  In those cases where these areas overlap, attorneys can still engage in debt adjustment as their non-principal engagement, or under the auspices of a non-profit company.  Therefore, the DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor does not infringe on attorneys’ First Amendment rights.  POINT VI
[brief] Site photographs of current parking usage and conditions were presented, showing that Lot 8 attendees/staff regularly and typically parked in the School courtyard in a chaotic and haphazard manner (1T11-4 to 20).  Board Attorney [...] opined the Board should defer on the Application as not within its jurisdiction.  He confirmed that a Township search located no record of any Site Plan or variance approvals/Resolution or permits applicable to the Lot 8 Synagogue, nor as to the School property being approved for Lot 8 off-site parking use (1T11-21 to 17-11).  Attorney [...] nevertheless continued to opine the Board should not make a determination as to whether the off-site parking use of the school Lot 5 is or is not a legal nonconforming use as per N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 (1T17-12 to 25-10).  At that point, the Board Chairman requested the [...] Attorney to present any proofs that would demonstrate any Zoning approvals or a zoning right to utilize this School Lot 5 as an off-site parking facility/use by the Synagogue.  [...] acknowledged the Synagogue had no records, documents, or evidence to demonstrate that Synagogue parking use on the School Lot 5 had ever been legal and/or been approved by any Zoning Board or authority.
[brief] This was directly contradicted by the Commission’s own Final Decision.  (Ca016) (“In this matter, the Commission finds that, while the subject matter of the Facebook posts – opting out of the union and masking in schools – may relate to the business of the Board ….  ”).  While a review of Leonard or Treston, supra, clearly show that a school board member can compromise a school board in violation of the Act without speaking directly on school board issues, here even the Commission agreed in its Final Decision that Respondent spoke directly to Board issues.  Even the Commission’s Statement in Lieu of a Brief in this matter before the Appellate Division acknowledges that.  (p. 10 “… the Commission correctly concluded that, although [...]’s speech related to board business…. ”).  It is undisputed that her posts dealt with Board business.  Respondent further asserts that “it is questionable whether the evidence presented by Complainants actually establish that there was such an ‘uproar,’”\(^1\) --- \(^1\)  Respondent repeatedly attributes this word to Appellants, but the only use of the word “uproar” in Appellants initial Brief was a direct quote from a news article.
[brief] ”  N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 340 (2010) (quoting State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 358 (2004)).  Thus, “where error was advanced to secure a tactical advantage at trial, the party responsible will not be permitted to complain on appeal. ”  Brett, 144 N.J. at 503; see also State v. Munafo, 222 N.J. 480, 487 (2015) (quoting State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 561 (2013)) (affirming that, under the invited error doctrine, “trial errors that were induced, encouraged or acquiesced in or consented to by defense counsel ordinarily are not a basis for reversal on appeal”); State v. Williams, 219 N.J. 89, 100 (2014) (explaining that the “invited-error doctrine is intended to prevent defendants from manipulating the system and will apply when a defendant in some way has led the court into error while pursuing a tactical advantage that does not work as planned”).
[brief] Plaintiff portrays the Township’s references to several pension cases as “short on facts, self-serving, and misleading. ”  See PB22-PB32.  However, Plaintiff’s attempts to distinguish the instant matter are largely premised on the Township agreeing to dismiss any disciplinary charges filed or contemplated alleging that Plaintiff is unfit for duty other than those arising out of and related to his medical disability in exchange for Plaintiff’s irrevocable resignation.  See DA15-DA18 at ¶¶ 12-13.  Thus, Rooth v. Bd. of Trustees, Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 472 N.J. Super. 357 (App. Div. 2022), Cardinale, supra, and In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, 454 N.J. Super. 386 (App. Div. 2018) are applicable to the instant matter because the Township only agreed that Plaintiff was medically disabled and to dismiss non-related disciplinary charges in exchange for the precise terms severed by the Chancery Division.  Notably, it is false that Plaintiff could not be fired for cause as the Township reiterated that its desire to terminate Plaintiff if the Court severed or otherwise amended the provision at issue.  See 1T8:8-1T9:2; 1T23:24-1T25:17.  In essence, Plaintiff is only now able to distinguish these cases because of a bargained-for consideration that no longer exists.  Further, regarding Cardinale, supra, it is irrelevant whether the Agreement contains “goal-oriented language” as it could not guarantee whether [...] would process the application, Cardinale, supra, 458 N.J. Super. at 274, and Parties recognized the [...]’s authority as to Plaintiff’s IOD application since said authority is conferred by statute, not contract.  See N.J.S.A. 43:7-18.1.  Similarly, the inclusion of “unlikely” is immaterial as a point of contrast as the term is inherently subjective and vague by nature.  To illustrate, the logical follow-up to something being unlikely, is precisely how unlikely it is.  Next, Carr v. Borough of Glen Ridge, A-1124-20, 2022 WL 38864 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. January 5, 2022) (DA125) demonstrates changes to a restoration provision are not “simple amendment[s]” and instead “constitute a substantive change to the applicability of the [Agreement]” which would “unravel the [Agreement] and send the parties back to the drawing board” and thus “lead to an ‘absurd result. ’”  Id. at *3 (quoting Barila, supra, 241 N.J. at 616).  Plaintiff’s claim has the same motivations and causal effect of the plaintiff in Carr, supra, but has simply opted for a severance claim instead of the unsuccessful specific performance and reformation claim.  Thus, Carr, supra, demonstrates the Pension Board’s determination an agreement irrevocable resignation renders an applicant ineligible does not trigger a municipal employer’s contractual duty to “do all things lawful, reasonable, and necessary” and address “substantive impediments” arising in the IOD application process.  Ibid.  Accordingly, the Township did not breach the Agreement, the Chancery Division’s decision must be reversed and Plaintiff’s Complaint dismissed with prejudice.  POINT II