[brief] Cases  Atlantic City, 2013 NJ [...] LEXIS 38, [...] No. 2023-82, 39 NJPER ¶161 (May 13, 2013)  .................................................................  34  Borough of Bergenfield, 2020  NJ [...] LEXIS 47 (April 30, 2020)  ............  40  Borough of East Rutherford v. East Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190 (2013)  ..............................................................................  19, 23 Borough of New Milford, 2012  NJ [...] LEXIS 18, 38 NJPER 340 (¶116 2012)  .................................................................................. 18, 34, 35 City of Paterson 2023  NJ [...] LEXIS 4, 49 NJPER ¶81 (January 19, 2023)  ..................................................................................  30 Div. 540, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Mercer Cty. Imp. Auth., 76 N.J. 245 (1978)  .................................................................  19  Hillsdale PBA Local 207 v. Borough of Hillsdale, 137 N.J. 71 (1994) .......... 16  Hopewell Tp., 2019 NJ [...] LEXIS 100, 46 NJPER 117 (¶26 2019)  ......... 18  In re Borough of Bergenfield, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2398 (App. Div. October 5, 2021) ...............................................................  40  In re City of Camden, 429 N.J. Super. 309 (App. Div. 2013) cert. denied 215 N.J. 485 (2013)  .................................................................  15  New Jersey Highway Authority v. International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, Local 193, 274 N.J. Super. 599 (App. Div. 1994), certif. denied 139 N.J. 288 ...............................................................  19, 23 New Jersey State Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. Irvington, 80 N.J. 271 (1979) ...........................................................................  12, 14 Somerset Cty. Sheriff’s Office and Somerset Cty. Sheriff FOP, Lodge No. 39, P.E.R.C. No. 2007-33, 32 NJPER 372 (¶156 2006), aff’d, 34 NJPER 21 (¶8 App. Div. 2008 ...............................................................  7  Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 ...........................................................................................................  11, 19 N.J.S.A 2A:24-8(a)............................................................................................................. 23 N.J.S.A. 34:13A-14(1)(a)................................................................................................. 11 N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16(b)(2) ............................................................................................... 11 N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16(f)(5)(a)............................................................................................ 15 N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16(g)...................................................................................................... passim Rules N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.7(f)........................................................................................................ 32 N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.7(g)....................................................................................................... 17, 19, 33 N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.7(g)(1)................................................................................................. 16 N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.7(g)(2)............................................................................................... 5, 20 N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.9 (c) ..................................................................................................... 33 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Appellant [...], [...] (“[...]”) filed this appeal challenging the decision of the [...] (“[...]” or “Commission”) because it was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable in finding that: (1) the Arbitrator did not err when he rejected the [...]’s Revised Final Offers and considered only the [...]’s original Final Offer; (2) the Arbitrator did not make a mistake of fact regarding the [...]’s final offer on health benefits; (3) the Arbitrator did not misapply the N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16(g) criteria; (4) the Arbitrator appropriately considered the internal comparables budgeted by the City and approved by the Department of Community Affairs in applying the 16(g) factors; and (5) the Arbitrator did not err by directing that the parties, and not the Arbitrator, blend the three fire supervisory contracts into a single agreement.