ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Notwithstanding Section 5.3, and subject to the requirements of Section 5.5, unless the agency adopts a policy that prohibits or restricts de-activation as may be authorized by this Section, a BWC-equipped officer may de-activate a BWC while participating in a discussion pertaining to criminal investigation strategy and planning (e.g., to consider what investigative techniques to pursue, such as what questions to pose to a suspect or witness, whether to summon a drug/explosives detection canine, whether to apply for a search warrant, whether to request permission to conduct a consent search, or to conduct another type of warrantless search, etc.), provided that the strategy/planning discussion is not conducted in the immediate presence of a civilian (i.e., under circumstances where a civilian might overhear the strategy discussion), and further provided that the BWC- equipped officer is not actively engaged in the collection of physical evidence (i.e., conducting a search).  When an officer de-activates a BWC pursuant to this Section, the officer shall narrate the circumstances of the de-activation (e.g., “I am now turning off my BWC to discuss investigative strategy with my supervisor. ”).  6.6
[brief] As to Plaintiffs’ request for “[a]dditional [p]roposed [c]ustodians,” the order recounts [...]’s ruling during the status conference that “[t]he addition of further custodians for discovery purposes is premature at this time. ”  Id. ¶ E.  Under this ruling, which is consistent with Sedona Principle 6 discussed below, if any documents need to be collected from [...] and [...] and reviewed for potential production, it will be only after [...] substantially completes its document production, and only for the limited purpose of filling any specific, narrow gaps Plaintiffs identify in [...]’s productions.  Plaintiffs then inserted their demand to designate [...] and [...] as document custodians into their list of issues for discovery mediation in July 2021.  [...]’s Sep. State.  Plaintiffs’ mediation demands bore no resemblance to the “very targeted” discovery contemplated by the Court.  Instead, Plaintiffs insisted that addition of [...] and [...] as custodians “[c]oncerns substantially all of Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production,” listing 34 RFPs as being related to [...] and [...].  Swanson Decl., Ex. 4 (emphasis added).  III.
[brief] (Aa216-31).  Those counts are therefore not at issue in this appeal and will not be addressed herein.  Conduct,” Board members still voted to ratify the bill — with the exception of [...], who abstained.  (Aa2).  On July 21, 2020, after ruling on [...]’s motion to dismiss, the Commission voted to find probable cause to credit the allegations asserted in counts one through four of the complaint.  (Aa205-12).  The matter was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law as a contested case, and was eventually consolidated with a complaint [...] initiated against [...] alleging that she violated the Act by endorsing a candidate in a Board election without issuing a disclaimer that it was not an endorsement in her official capacity, and by going to a polling site to collect materials she was not authorized to receive.
[brief] (Da17.)  The de novo court noted,  During the trial de novo, this court inquired why the Alcotest was not introduced and an assistant prosecutor responded that she had questioned the municipal prosecutor on this, and he indicated to her that [...] was seen on video using his cell phone while performing the Alcotest which violated the protocols established in State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 825 (2008).  (Da17.)  The de novo court further faulted “the municipal judge [for] fail[ure] to make any inquiry as to why the evidence was not being admitted. ”  (Da17.)  Because neither the Alcotest results nor the additional exhibits requested by the de novo court clerk were part of the record before the municipal court, the de novo court violated [...]’s constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment and New Jersey Constitution, article I, paragraph 10.  A person charged with a criminal offense has the right to confront his accusers.
[brief] Moreover, the court in *Superior Officers* directly considered a purported Contract Clause violation in the context of the MSRA:  We reject plaintiff’s contention that the broad grant of authority to the State under the statutory framework violates New Jersey’s Contract Clause, N.J. Const., Art, IV, § VII, ¶ 3.  Under that Clause, the Legislature cannot pass “any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or depriving a party of any remedy for enforcing a contract which existed when the contract was made. ”  N.J. Const., Art. IV, § VII, ¶ 3.
[brief] As provided in its stated Rationale, the SRD Rule “applies only to developments which by their singular or collective size, location and design could have a significant adverse effect on the scenic resources of the coastal zone. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10(g).  In addition, the CZM Rules explicitly recognize that all resource rules do not necessarily apply to each and every development proposed in the coastal zone.  N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.1(e) states:  The Department does not expect each proposed use of coastal resources to involve all location rules, use rules, and resource rules.  Decision-making on proposed actions involves examining, weighing, and evaluating complex interests using the framework provided by this chapter.  The [CZM] Rules provide a mechanism for integrating professional judgment by Department officials, as well as recommendations and comments by applicants, public agencies, specific interest groups, corporations, and citizens into the coastal decision-making process.  A rule for scenic resources and design was first promulgated by the Department in 1978.
[brief] A.  Facts Elicited At the Motion to Suppress Hearing on October 29, 2021.  Officer [...] testified that he was on duty on April 24, 2019, as part of the Special Enforcement Team (SET) with the [...], which is a plain-clothes unit that uses surveillance to monitor controlled-dangerous-substance (CDS) activity.  (1T5-10 to 6-7).  Taranto had been an officer for ten years and had been assigned to the Special Enforcement Team for two and a half years.  (1T5-18 to 24; 1T29-2 to 4).  During his career, he was involved in hundreds of narcotics-related investigations.  (1T6-8 to 14).  That day, around 6:30 p.m., he was conducting general surveillance in an unmarked vehicle in the parking lot of the [...] in Toms River, not looking for anyone in particular.
[brief] For the reason stated in Points I through IV, [...]’s convictions must be reversed and his convictions vacated, and Attorney permitted to file motion to dismiss indictment.  Alternatively, for the reason stated in Point I, Point II, Point III, and Point IV that proves the Weight of Evidence is not sufficient to warrant a conviction, and Miscarriage of Justice has saturated this case.  Respectfully submitted  By: Charles M. [...], III
[directive] Prior non-domestic incident of assault in a police report or criminal record (against any person other than a Partner or a Partner’s child)  Prior non-domestic:  The Defendant previously assaulted any person who is not a Partner or a Partner’s child, and it is recorded in a police report or criminal record.  This Item differs from Item 10 only in who the assaulted person is.  ✔The incident must include physical contact, the use or attempted use of a weapon to contact the victim’s body, or a threat of harm made while displaying a weapon.  If you do not have a detailed description of the incident, count a charge of assault or other violent offense against someone other than a Partner or a Partner’s child as a non-domestic incident.  (Note: a charge is not required.)  ✔The incident must have been reported to the police.  ✔The incident must have occurred on a separate occasion, before the Index Assault.  If the Index Assault is part of a cluster of assaults documented in 1 police report, count any non-domestic assault that occurred at least 24 hours before the Index Assault as a prior non-domestic incident.  ✘Incidents involving only pets or property do not count for this Item.  12.
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022  4.8.2  There shall be a strong presumption against the initiation of vehicular pursuits based solely upon motor vehicle violations.  Officers involved in vehicular pursuits must immediately notify both the supervisor and police communications, state the reason for the pursuit, and provide the information required by Addendum B of this Policy.  4.8.3  Vehicular pursuits shall be monitored by a supervisor and shall be terminated if directed to do so by a supervisor, or if the supervisor has not affirmatively authorized the continuation of the pursuit after being notified and given an opportunity to assess the situation.  17  USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022  Core Principle Five Duty to Intervene and Report.
[brief] ” (PSR 5-8, 11-12)  And the court failed to “qualitative[ly] assess[ ]” or explain the basis for aggravating factors six and nine “beyond the simple finding of [his] criminal history. ”  State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 153-54 (2006); Case, 220 N.J. at 65.  __________________  28
[brief] Tellingly, Plaintiffs do not argue that they have identified any gaps or deficiencies in the documents [...] has produced to date.  To the contrary, the [...] documents Plaintiffs rely on demonstrate that, as expected for the apex leaders of one of the world’s largest public companies, [...] and [...] provide high-level guidance and final approvals and rely on others (teams of other senior executives, managers, and engineers) to implement the policies they approve.  81 of those executives, managers, and engineers are already custodians.  [...]’s productions from their files plus various non-custodial sources, is more than sufficient to constitute a reasonably diligent search for relevant documents.  Plaintiffs’ argument that [...] is “running out the clock” on producing documents from [...] and [...] assumes the point at issue—that [...] and [...] should be added as custodians.  In reality, there is no need to search or collect from their custodial files—and certainly not with the overbroad scope of collection Plaintiffs demand.  In any event, time is not nearly as short as Plaintiffs suggest.  Discovery does not close until June 2022, and [...] is on pace to meet the January 31, 2022 substantial completion deadline.  So Plaintiffs will have five months to review [...]’s production and identify any gaps that could justify a “very targeted” (Ex. 3 at 48:11) collection from [...]’s and [...]’s files.  II.
[brief] (Db17 to 18).  By its definition, probable cause does not yet exist when a judge issues an anticipatory warrant, which typically applies only in situations that involve the controlled delivery of contraband.  See State v. Ulrich, 265 N.J. Super. 569, 576 (App. Div. 1993), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 304 (1994).  There is no dispute that [...]’s affidavit provided sufficient probable cause to believe that contraband would be discovered in the vehicle identified in the affidavit, and later, the search warrant.  [...] issued a valid warrant that permitted police to search the vehicle — but nowhere did it require that the car be within the borders of Toms River during the execution of the search.  Defendant further contends that [...] acted outside of his municipal territorial jurisdiction when issuing the search warrant for the Jaguar and seems to suggest that Patrolman [...] should have petitioned the Lakewood municipal court for the warrant.  (Db23).  Not so.  Pursuant to his authority under N.J.S.A. 2B:12-16(a), [...] issued a warrant to search a vehicle based on information arising in his jurisdiction which established probable cause that a crime had occurred.  Ironically, had Patrolman [...] submitted his affidavit to the Lakewood municipal court, an almost identical search warrant would have issued, and defendant likely would be in this Court now arguing that the warrant was invalid because the events supporting probable cause arose almost exclusively in Toms River.  [...] issued a valid search warrant based on an affidavit supporting probable cause that evidence of illegal activity would be found in the vehicle.  Given the inherent movability of that automobile, the warrant did not specify where the search must occur.  Stopping and searching the vehicle in Lakewood, as opposed to Toms River where the warrant issued, did not violate the scope of the warrant, especially in the absence of any allegation of bad faith on the part of the officers conducting the stop or the search.
[brief] June 23, 2021 - Highlands Applicability Determination and Water Quality Management Plan Consistency Determination ("HAD") issued to [...], by the [...], [...]  ..................................  Aa0001  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  CASES  Elliot Coal Mining Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 17 F.3d 616, 630 (3d Cir. 1994).  In re N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. Conditional Highlands  Applicability Determination, Program Interest No. 435434, 433 N.J. Super. 223, 235 (App. Div. 2013)  State v. N.T., 461 N.J. Super. 566, 571 (App. Div. 2019)  Morella v. Grand Union/New Jersey Self-Insurers Guar. Ass'n, 391 N.J. Super. 231, 240 (App. Div. 2007)  N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Alloway Twp., 438 N.J. Super. 501, 513 (App. Div. 2015)  STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 13:20-3 N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11)  N.J.S.A. 48:2-13(a)  N.J.S.A. 58:11A-2, 7, 10, 11, 13  REGULATIONS  N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2  1  “Aa” refers to Appellants’ appendix  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This case raises the question of whether the legislature intended the Respondent Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) to grant the Respondent [...] (“[...]” or “[...]”) an exemption from the DEP’s ordinary permitting requirements under the Highlands Water Protection and Planning Act (the “Highlands Act”).  [...], [...], and [...] (the “Environmental Appellants”) assert that the DEP’s application of the Highlands Act runs afoul of the very narrow statutory exemption for “routine” utility work by a “public utility. ”  The plain language and statutory intent of the Highlands Act does not authorize the DEP to exempt the proposed project from the DEP’s permitting requirements.  The proposed $246 million dollar project is a major development in the Highlands Preservation Area, which ordinarily requires a specific permit called a Highlands Preservation Area Approval (“HPAA”).  The project is non-routine and only intended to serve new customers in the State of New York.  Based on these circumstances, and the plain language and intent of the Highlands Act, this Court must now hold that the DEP’s issuance of the exemption was in error and that the proposed project must be fully vetted according to the DEP’s ordinary permitting review requirements.  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] (Pb13-14).  Still, despite the Board’s having satisfied the notice requirement under the Ricci Act, it nevertheless considered [...]’s request under its inherent equitable power.  (Pa14).  While a Board is generally bound by its enabling statutes, it has inherent authority to reopen administrative matters upon a showing of good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence.  Minsavage for Minsavage v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 240 N.J. 103, 109 (2019).  A member seeking relief by way of the Board’s inherent powers also “must demonstrate extreme hardship and a clear equity in his favor. ”  Buono v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 188 N.J. Super. 488, 493 (App. Div. 1983).  Contrary to [...]’s assertions, (Pb13), the Board considered its inherent power as well as his affidavit and the affidavits of the other troopers that he submitted in support of his contention that he did not receive the postcard.  After considering its equitable power and the affidavits presented, the Board reasonably concluded that “[...] did not exercise reasonable diligence nor demonstrate reasonable grounds for such a protracted delay in filing the eligibility registration form,” where he filed his form approximately one year and nine months past the deadline.
[brief] Facts Related to Actual Notice  1)  [...]  Nearly five months prior to the subject accident, as previously referenced, on April 22, 2015, a Biennial Bridge Inspection was performed at the subject bridge overpass located over Rt. 30 on behalf of the [...].  (Pa1343).  The inspection identified settlement at the southbound north abutment joint.  The condition was described as “ramped up and deteriorated in the left shoulder and left lane” with roadway settlement up to 2 inches.  (Pa1349, Pa1350, Pa1351 and Pa1367)(Emphasis Added).  The Biennial Bridge Inspection report recommended that the abutment joint in the southbound left lane be repaired.  (Pa1350).  Approximately two and a half months prior to the accident, another inspection of the Rt. 30 bridge was performed on June 24, 2015.  On July 2, 2015, the results and recommendations from the inspection were sent to the [...].  The inspection memo indicated that “significant settlement” in the pavement was found at the north approach.  (PA1200).  As a result of this inspection, it was recommended for immediate repair and testing.  Id.  (Emphasis Added).  2)
[brief] (Da3181)  It is actually in bad faith for the Plaintiffs to argue here that they contended to the Arbitrator that there was third party litigation.  Their quotation of law to him in their motion for judgment, omitted reference to the “third party” element of the fee-shifting exception stated In re Niles.  (4T57:9-16)  The parties argued before [...] at length about the Plaintiffs’ misleading the Arbitrator in failing to recite the need for “third party litigation” in their brief on motion for final judgment.  (4T55-60)  The Arbitrator’s decision was clearly not making a fee award on any finding that there was third-party litigation, as [...] properly recognized.  (Da3181)  This Court should not accept this new argument.
[brief] Petitioner appealed his removal, and the matter was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law (hereinafter “OAL”) for a hearing (Aa7; Aa54).  The OAL conducted two hearings on December 8, 2009 and March 25, 2010 (Ibid.).  On December 20, 2010, an OAL Initial Decision sustained the charges and affirmed Petitioner’s employment removal (Ibid.).  Following a further appeal to the New Jersey Civil Service Commission (hereinafter “Commission”), a Final Decision dated February 17, 2011, upheld the employment removal, and adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in the OAL’s Initial Decision of December 20, 2010 (Aa25-Aa34; Aa54).
[brief] Id. at 315.  “Other factors include the suspect’s age, education and intelligence, advice as to constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature and whether physical punishment or mental exhaustion was involved and prior experience with the criminal justice system. ”  State in the Interest of [...] 455 N.J. Super. 492 (2018) (citing Presha, 163 N.J. at 313).  In State in re [...], 203 N.J. 131 (2010), the Court found a patent conflict of interest in that juvenile’s mother, who was also the grandmother of the victim had been the one advising the juvenile to confess to the police.
[brief] ” (Da131).  Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration also includes a section titled “The Interest of Justice Mandates Reconsideration and Revision of the Court’s January 23, 2023 Orders” where defendants further explained why reconsideration is necessary in the interest of justice.  (Da137).  Defendants further supported their Motion for Reconsideration with multiple excerpts from the transcript of oral argument before [...].  In particular, defendants highlighted various remarks (quoted supra, at 11-13) from the January 20, 2023 telephonic hearing.  (See, e.g., Da129); see also (2T6:8-17, 2T30:4-16, 2T21-25, 2T31:21-32:7, 2T61:3-4)).  These remarks establish that [...] (i) misapprehended and then disregarded key facts (i.e., the status of the Missouri Action), (ii) misapplied or failed to apply the law (i.e., Sensient Colors), and (iii) was influenced and motivated by matters outside the record and unrelated to any recognized analysis appropriate for resolving the motions before him (i.e., misplaced feelings that he was “condemned” and taking “umbrage” at the Missouri trial judge, who apparently earns less than [...], purportedly “popp[ing] off” and deciding Missouri has jurisdiction without consulting [...], the “complex commercial judge in New Jersey,” first).
[brief] Certification of [...], Esq. in Opposition to Defendant [...]  Notice of Motion for Reconsideration of the Interlocutory Order dated August 26, 2019  EXHIBIT  A  Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify (omitted)  EXHIBIT B  Excerpt of August 26, 2019  Transcript  EXHIBIT C  Excerpt of September 23, 2019 Transcript  January 17, 2020  Order denying Motion for Reconsideration of the Interlocutory Order dated August 16, 2019  April 22, 2020
[brief] (Da-ALL0246).  It reflects no monies going to [...].  It also reflects that [...] paid a real estate commission of $15,000 to Plaintiff, which is in excess of 3.5% of the listed purchase price.\(^5\) (Da-ALL0247).  \(^5\)  The FRFPA, N.J.S.A. 46:10B-63(a)(14), provides for a maximum fee of 3.5% to a foreclosure consultant:  “a distressed property purchaser, in the course of a distressed property conditional conveyance, cannot claim, demand, charge, collect, or receive any fee, interest or any other compensation for any reason from an owner, for service or as consideration for offering or providing any option to purchase to the owner for otherwise participating in the conveyance transaction, in excess of 3.5% of the purchase price.
[brief] Defendant’s Statement of Procedural History asserts that plaintiff “has produced no documentation evidencing support of the amount owed was $255,000.(Db6, paragraph 2).  [...]’s’ bank was unable to provide him with copies of checks deposited to his account prior to 2016, but provided him with all checks issued in 2016 and 2017.  ( Vol. I,Pa. 75; TR43-24 to 47-18).  As plaintiff indicated in his initial brief, the checks paid to [...] from defendants in 2016 and 2017 totaled $95,364.82.(Pb12, Paragraph 1).