ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Appellate Division, in *Mittra*, 316 N.J. Super. at 91, further recognized that “[e]valuation of student academic performance is a murk[y] subject …  A graduate or professional school is surely the best judge of its student's academic performance and his ability to master the required curriculum. ”  *Id.* (quoting *Horowitz*, 435 U.S. at 85).  This judicial deference extends to a college or university’s admissions, modification of course and degree offerings, course selections and student grading as well as evaluations of student performance.  See e.g., State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 543 (1980); Napolitano v. Trustees of Princeton University, 186 N.J. Super. 548, 567 (App. Div. 1980); Swidryk v. St. Michaels Med. Ctr., 201 N.J. Super. 601, 606 (Law Div. 1985) (finding that “[a]s a general rule courts will not interfere with purely academic decisions of a university”); Dougherty v. Drew Univ., 534 F. Supp. 3d 363, 375–76 (D.N.J. 2021) (dismissing a breach of contract claim by a student against a University where the University decided to cancel its in-person class offerings during the COVID-19 pandemic in favor of virtual classes); Gourdine v. Felician Coll., 2006 WL 2346278, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 15, 2006) (dismissing breach of contract, implied contract and negligent misrepresentation claims against a university where the university entirely eliminated a nursing program into which students had already enrolled); Gaviria v. Lincoln Educ. Servs. Corp., 547 F. Supp. 3d 450, 453 (D.N.J. 2021) (dismissing a breach of contract claim by a student against a University); Mitelberg v. Stevens Inst. of Tech., 2021 WL 2103265, at *3 (D.N.J. May 25, 2021) (dismissing a student’s causes of action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment against a University).
[brief] The Plain Language Of Exemption #11 Does Not Require Upgrades To Be “Routine”.  (Aa0001)  [...] correctly interpreted and applied the plain language of Exemption #11 to [...]’s Project.  The Highlands Act exempts the following from regulation: the routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of public utility lines, rights of way, or systems, by a public utility, provided that the activity is consistent with the goals and purposes of this act.
[brief] During oral argument on [...]’s motion in limine, the trial court read at length from this section of [...]’s deposition.  1T:39-20 to 41-5.  The court observed that no other information about [...]’s convictions was submitted to the court for consideration and the motion to bar evidence of [...]’s prior criminal convictions was granted.  1T:44-17 to 49-2.  Ultimately, the court concluded that the only evidence before the court of any criminal convictions was for drug-related convictions that were more than 10 years old and that the undue prejudice to [...] outweighed any probative value.  1T:48-18 to 23.  The court entered an Order granting the motion in limine and barring any evidence of [...]’s criminal convictions on September 26, 2023.
[brief] Okay.  THE COURT: Did you see him exit your yard?  THE WITNESS: I did, through the fence gate.  THE COURT: Okay.  Q  The way he came in?  A  The way he came in.  Exhibit D-19 is a photograph of the area behind the fence, showing that it was “impossible” as well as illogical for [...] to jump over it.  While fleeing a large dog, why would he take a circuitous route through bushes, jump on top of an air conditioning compressor and hoist himself over a high fence, rather than simply going back out through the open gate?  More curiously, why did the court jump through hoops to find [...] credible?  The Court’s credibility finding should be discounted because it was based on a “very obvious and exceptional showing of error. ”  State v Locurto 157 N.J. 463, 467 (1999).  Even if [...] had told the truth, the resulting legal conclusions were erroneous.  The Court found the incident was unprovoked because [...] was an invitee to the property by virtue of the [...] maintenance contract, as opposed to trespassing in disregard of company policy and [...]’s instructions to wait.
[brief] Trial Court  Order of Summary Judgment ........................................  Pa376  Trial Court’s Opinion on Summary Judgment .................................  Pa377  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES/CITATIONS  ### Statutes Cited | Statute | Page | |--------------------------|------| | N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 59:8-8 | 2, 4 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3 | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 59:8-9 | 5 | | N.J.S.A. 40A:4-57 | 9 | ### Cases Cited | Case | Page | |-------------------------------------------|------| | Beauchamp v. Amedio, 164 N.J. 111 (2000) | 5 | | Brunson v. Affinity Federal Credit Union, 199 N.J. 381 (1999) | 7 | | Caravaggio v. D’Agostini, 166 N.J. 237, 246 (2001) | 4 | | Escalante v. Township of Cinnaminson, 283 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div. 1995) | 6 | | Goldfarb v. Solimine, 245 N.J. 326 (2021) | 8 | | Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lard, 186 N.J. 163 (2006) | 10 | | Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J. 606 (1999) | 6 | | Maison v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 460 N.J. Super. 222 (App. Div. 2019) | 7 | | McDade v. Siazon, 208 N.J. 463 (2011) | 3 | | O’Donnell v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 236 N.J. 335 (2019) | 6 | | Polzo v. County of Essex, 196 N.J. 569 (2008) | 6 | | Toll Brothers Inc v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 194 N.J. 223 (2008) | 9 |
[brief] CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM FINAL JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, CHANCERY DIVISION, MORRIS COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...] SAT BELOW: HON. [...], P.J.CH.  REPLY BRIEF FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS  [...], ESQ.  (No. 002101974)  LAW OFFICES OF [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  [...], ESQ.  (No. 035131989)  [...]  1133 Avenue of the Americas  New York, New York 10036 [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants #
[brief] The Trial Court misinterpreted [...] as finding that “Plaintiffs could be barred from asserting these claims in a separate action” and nevertheless “denied the motion to amend and assert these “new” causes of action”.  181a.  Based on this blatant misinterpretation of [...]’s clear statement to the contrary, the Trial Court erroneously concluded that “the prejudice to Plaintiffs has already been evaluated by the Court, and it was decided that these …claims could have been asserted earlier but are not allowable now”.  181a.  It is difficult to understand how the Trial Court could have so blatantly misread and misinterpreted [...]’s holding that in evaluating the prejudice against Plaintiffs in denying the motion to amend, Plaintiffs “would not be foreclosed from bringing these claims, they would just have to bring it in a different procedural posture. ”  885; 1T, 81:23-25.  [...] did the opposite of what the Trial Court misinterpreted; [...] evaluated the prejudice of whether Plaintiffs would be barred from bringing these new claims in a new action, and found that there would be no such prejudice because they would not be barred.  The Trial Court relies heavily on confusing statements made by [...] after the fact, in the context of a subsequent motion to consolidate in the 2015 Action filed by Plaintiffs after the filing of their Amended Complaint in this action.
[brief] In the within matter, adding information to a website cannot be construed as notice of the Ricci Act’s enactment or the requirements to register within a certain timeframe.  The statute required the Board to promulgate rules to provide notice to active and retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  The Certifying Officer Letter is proof that the website posting is not sufficient notice.  Pa77.  The notice of the Ricci Act to the Certifying Officers advises the Certifying Officers that they must distribute the information to employees pursuant to N.J.A.C. 17:5-1.4.  It also required that the Certifying Officers to provide a certification that the information was distributed.  The Respondent claims that the mailing of the postcard to a correct address establishes a presumption that the postcard was received.  This presumption is rebutted by the fact that [...] and 98 others certified via affidavits that they did not receive said postcard.  Additionally, the claim that postcards were mailed out to all “200,647 SPRS retirees” is a misstatement of fact.  Rb13.  New Jersey State Troopers are assigned a badge number upon successful completion of the academy and these badge numbers are never repeated.  Currently, the New Jersey State Police badge numbers only reach the 9,000s; meaning that in the entire history of the New Jersey State Police, there are less than 10,000 New Jersey State Troopers, which includes all active or retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  Failure to provide any notice, adequate or actual, is reasonable and equitable grounds for relaxing the deadline for registration under the Ricci Act.
[brief] This matter is before the Appellate Division on the appeal of Plaintiffs/Plaintiffs, [...] and [...]  (“Plaintiffs”) of the Trial Court’s March 6, 2024 Order Granting the Respondent/Defendant, [...]’s (“Authority”) Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing the claims filed by Plaintiffs, as well as a subsequent Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration as to the March 6, 2024 Order thereafter entered on May 7, 2024.
[brief] (Pa134).  **III.  TRANSFER AND ASSIGNMENT OF THE ACCOUNT**  On December 31, 2019, after the Account had been charged off, [...] sold, assigned, and conveyed the rights to various consumer credit accounts, including the Account, to [...] (“[...]”).  (Pa134, Pa170 & Pa175-Pa186).  Thereafter, on January 15, 2020, the Account was further sold, assigned, and conveyed, first from [...] to [...], then from [...] to [...], then from [...] to [...], and finally from [...] to [...].  (Pa170-Pa171 & Pa175-Pa186). ¹  On January 16, 2020, [...] provided notice to Appellant of the sale to [...].  (Pa134 & Pa163).  Thus, all rights, title, and interest to Appellant’s --- ¹  Thus, each of the Respondents is an assignee of the Account and can enforce all rights and remedies set forth in the Cardholder Agreement, which remained the same throughout the pendency of the Account and thereafter, including during the transfers to and among Defendants.  (Pa148-Pa161, Pa171 & Pa175-Pa186).  Account, including any associated receivables, and the right to enforce the Arbitration Agreement were therefore assigned to [...].  (Pa 134 & Pa171).  Appellant never rejected or opted out of the terms of the Arbitration Agreement.  (Pa171).  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] (Id.)  The existing single-family home on the Property near center had a grade elevation of 18 feet.  (Id.)  In regrading the Property as part of this site plan (based upon stormwater management, street design, utilities, etc.), [...] did not exceed that 18 feet existing grade elevation at the center of the Property.  In fact, the area where the proposed residential dwellings are located, the grade is approximately 18 feet.  So by raising the grade on the eastern portion of the Property, [...] effectively flattened most of the Property where development was going to occur.  That is certainly not a mound.  As [...] also noted, if there was mounding, each carriage house, duplex, or triplex would be sitting on its own mound, which is not the case here.  [...]’s expert testimony confirmed there was no mounding or terracing, --- 2
[brief] Amendment of the Oceanfront—Broadway Redevelopment Plan  On October 14, 2020, the City Council conducted a meeting at which it introduced for first reading Ordinance No. 23-20, which was to approve amendments to the Redevelopment Plan.  (Pa592 to Pa605).  The Ordinance identified that Defendant [...] had proposed a plan for the redevelopment of the [...] Property, including a residential project (the “Project”).  Ibid.  It also identified that the Project would require amendments to the Redevelopment Plan, particularly the Design Guidelines.  Ibid.  Further, the Ordinance identified that [...] had prepared amendments to the Redevelopment Plan and the Design Guidelines providing for multi-family residential uses and associated accessory and amenity use, along with bulk standards associated therewith.  Ibid.  Ordinance No. 23-20 recognized that the Mayor and Council had referred the proposed amendments to the City’s Planning Board for its review and comment in accordance with N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7 of the Redevelopment Law and that the Planning Board found and concluded that the proposed amendments were consistent with the City’s Master Plan.
[brief] *Id.* at 146-147.  The Court determined that [...] would not be held liable without a similar finding of fault against [...].  *Id.* at 147.  The Supreme Court affirmed *Kane* in a published opinion “substantially for the reasons expressed” and did not offer any additional analysis on an employer’s participation at trial.  *Kane v. Hartz Mt. Indus.*, 143 N.J. 141, 142 (1996).
[brief] ”  Simply stated, the State presented no evidence to support the second statutory element required to find a dog potentially dangerous: i.e. that the dog poses a “serious threat” of death or serious bodily injury to a human, or a “serious threat” of death to a companion animal.  N.J.S.A. 4:19:23, generally.  A.  Mischaracterizations of the courts’ decisions below.  The State asserts at Pb6 that both courts below found that [...] poses a “serious threat” of death or serious bodily injury to a human as set forth in N.J.S.A. 4:19-23(a)(1) and (a)(2)(a), and that the dog poses a “serious threat” of death to a companion animal N.J.S.A. 4:19-23(a)(2)(b).
[brief] ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case Name | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Cases** | | | *Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Wallia* | 32 | | 211 N. J. Super. 231 (App. Div. 1986) | | | *Ayers v. Jackson Township* | 29 | | 106 N.J. 557 (1987) | | | *Banks v. Wolk* | 39 | | 918 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1990) | | | *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America* | 19 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | *Camden Cnty Emergency Recovery Assoc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.* | 20 | | 320 N.J. Super. 59 (App. Div. 1999) | | | *Camden County Energy Recovery Assocs., L.P. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot.* | 20 | | 320 N.J. Super. 59 (App.Div.1999) | | | *Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman* | 29 | | 145 N.J. 395 (N.J. 1996) | | | *County of Essex v. First Union Nat. Bank* | 32 | | 373 N. J. Super. 543 (App. Div. 2004) | | | *Cowan v. Doering* | 27 | | 111 N.J. 451 (1988) | | | *Coyle v. Alexander's* | 25 | | 199 N.J. Super. 212 (App. Div. 1985) | | | *Cumberland Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. GSP Recycling Co.* | 25, 46 | | 358 N.J Super. 484 (App. Div. 2003) | | | *Davis v. Brooks* | 27 | | 280 N.J. Super. 406 (App. Div. 1993)
[brief] For example, Count VII of the Complaint alleges that [...] committed Fraud / Misrepresentation when it knowingly and willfully produced fraudulent invoices that misrepresented that it was for “custodial services”, when [...] admittedly never performed any custodial services for the months in question.  But rather than analyze the specific elements of whether [...] is liable for Fraud / Misrepresentation under Count VII, the court enforced a wholesale dismissal of the entire Complaint.  \(^{51}\) Pa279 – Pa331 POINT FIFTEEN [Improper credibility and fact-finding]  (Argued Pa228 – Pa229)  In summary judgment motions, the court should not play the 13th juror by resolving genuine issues of material facts in dispute.  The court also should not make credibility determinations and findings of fact that are relegated to the jury.  In dismissing the Complaint, the court erroneously made findings of fact and credibility determinations that were within the province of a jury.  The court’s dismissal of the Complaint should therefore be reversed.
[directive] (a)  The meaningful command-level review of the incident shall be undertaken by at least two levels of supervisors.  These levels may include the immediate supervisor, internal affairs, training officers, or command staff.  At least one reviewer must be two levels or more above the officer who engaged in the vehicular pursuit; (b)  The review shall include an examination of all available sources of information about the incident, including any video of the incident, recordings of 911 calls and police radio transmissions, reports, officer or other witness statements, medical records, or records of injuries; (c)  The reviewing supervisors shall make a recommendation of what action, if any, should be undertaken, including policy changes, remedial training, disciplinary action, administrative action, or, if appropriate, referral for criminal prosecution; and (d)  The law enforcement executive, or a command level officer no more than one rank below the law enforcement executive for departments with more than 100 officers, shall review each vehicular pursuit investigation and approve or reject the recommendations of the supervisors who conducted the review.  The law enforcement executive’s decision, or the decision of the designee, shall be memorialized and retained in the vehicular pursuit investigative file.  (e)  Vehicular pursuits that are determined to not be in compliance with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, or agency policy, shall be forwarded by municipal and county agencies to the County Prosecutor’s Office for review.  Vehicular pursuits involving statewide law enforcement agencies, or county prosecutor’s office personnel, that are determined to not be in compliance with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, or agency policy, shall be forwarded to the Director of the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability or their designee for review.  12.2  The law enforcement executive shall conduct an annual review of all vehicular pursuit incidents in their department.  The review shall include, at a minimum, the following: (a) analytical reports from the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal; (b) an audit of BWCs and other videos on a risk-based and randomly selected basis; (c) any internal affairs complaints; and (d) an analysis of vehicular pursuits to ensure that they are being conducted without discrimination based on race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, disability, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, or any other protected characteristic.
[brief] WHERE PLAINTIFF DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANT RESTEL WAS AN “AIDER AND ABETTOR OF DISCRIMINATION”  Where Plaintiff did not sufficiently plead a cause of action for a violation of the NJLAD, the Trial Court below properly dismissed the individual claims against Defendant [...].  Where there was no violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, there simply could be no liability as to Defendant [...] as an “aider and abettor. ”  (Pa10)  (“The Complaint’s failure to establish a prima facie case of retaliation as against the Defendant [...] proves fatal to the remaining claims of individual aider and abettor liability.
[brief] See, e.g., Constantino v. Ventriglia, 324 N.J. Super. 437, 451 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 10, (2000) (prohibition against a “net opinion” bars expert testimony based on unfounded speculation, possibilities or probabilities); see also Koruba v. Am Honda Mtr. Co., 396 N.J. Super. 517, 525 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Grzanka, 301 N.J. Super. at 580 (holding the net opinion rule prohibits “speculative testimony”)).  The expert report is further defective and inadmissible as a net opinion on two additional bases.
[brief] Under the circumstances outlined in the appellate brief filed with the court, [...] is entitled to have the Appellate Court address whether the Tyler decision should be applied to his case.  [...] has spent many years renovating and building equity in his home and after suffering through the pandemic and other serious hardships, it would be unconscionable and unlawful to deny [...] the right to save his home when the tax foreclosure judgment in this case is unconstitutional.  The Courts have an obligation to ensure compliance with the Tyler decision and protect [...]’s rights.  [...] will be greatly prejudiced if foreclosure judgment is not vacated.  The severe consequences of Plaintiffs foreclosure in this case are exactly what the Supreme Courts are confirming is unlawful and have stopped.
[directive] STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  Actor engages in course of conduct toward a specific person that would cause a reasonable 3rd Degree $20,000 to $50,000 10% permissible person to fear for his safety or the safety of a third person or suffer other emotional distress; third degree if committed in violation of an existing court order, or is a second or subsequent 2C:12-10  Stalking offense of stalking against the same victim, or is committed while serving a term of imprisonment, or while on parole or probation for a conviction for any indictable offense under 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible the laws of this state, any other state or the United States; otherwise, fourth degree.  Actor knowingly takes or attempts to exercise unlawful control over a firearm or other weapon 1st Degree $100,000 to $250,000 10% permissible in the possession of a law enforcement or corrections officer when that officer is acting in the Disarming Law performance of his duties, and either is in uniform or exhibits evidence of his authority, 2C:12-11(a)(b)  Enforcement Officer second degree; first degree if the actor fires or discharges the firearm, or uses or threatens to use the firearm or weapon against the officer or any other person, or the officer or another 2nd Degree $50,000 to $100,000 10% permissible person suffers serious bodily injury.  Actor unlawfully restrains another in circumstances exposing the other to serious bodily injury  2C:13-2(a)(b)  Criminal Restraint 3rd Degree $10,000 to $25,000 10% permissible or holds another in a condition of involuntary servitude. 24  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2
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