ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As the trial judge stated in its oral opinion, “there was testimony that [...] dealt with other brands too. ”  See T4 at 6:16-7:3.  Indeed, [...] conceded that [...] did not impose any requirements or restrictions as to sales, advertising, marketing, budgeting, promotions, or hiring practices.  [...] concedes that it did not solely advertise [...] products and that its advertisement always included [...]’s business information because the goal was to “get sales back to [...]. ”  Next, in relying on Lithuanian Commerce in its July 17, 2023 decision, the trial court noted that the alleged franchisee had a letter stating that it was a sole distributor.  See T4 at 5:5-15.  As the trial court highlighted, in Lithuanian Commerce, the plaintiff cited to two actual documents between the parties in the litigation.  See Lithuanian Com. Corp. v. Sara Lee Hosiery, 179 F.R.D. 450, 470 (D.N.J. 1998).  The first document said, “[p]lease be advised by this letter that [LCC] is the only business enterprise authorized to distribute L'eggs pantyhose in the nations of Lithuania and Latvia. ”  Id.  The second document said, “[t]his instrument is drafted by Sara Lee Hosiery, the owner of the L'eggs brand name and manufacturer of said pantyhose. ”  Id.  Here, there were no such documents.  The trial court correctly held there was no record evidence on the Motion for Summary Judgment evidencing a written arrangement transferring a license, and it also correctly held that the new documents Appellant submitted with its Motion to Amend failed to meet the NJFPA threshold requirement.
[brief] Defendants’ procedural history includes extensive discussions of the proceedings below that have no relevance to the within appeal.  The irrelevant information includes discussions of the discovery disputes which resulted in the motion court’s entry of an Order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice despite the failure of defendants to obtain a dismissal without prejudice prior to the entry of a dismissal with prejudice.(Db 4-5).  The two tiered procedure of R. 4:23-5(1)which provides for the entry of a dismissal without prejudice followed by a 60 day period to give the delinquent party to provide outstanding discovery is mandatory.  Salazar.  MKJGC Design, 458 N.J. Super. 551, 561-563 (App. Div. 2019); Thabo v. Z Transp., 452 N.J. Super. 359, 369 (App. Div. 2019); St. James AME Dev. Corp., 403 N.J. Super. 86, 95 (App. Div. 2008); Colonial Specialty Foods, Inc., 317 N.J. Super. 207 (App. Div. 1999).
[brief] Read literally and in isolation, § 1692c(b) arguably supports Appellant’s theory.  However, as Superior Courts in New Jersey have concluded, Appellant’s theory fails according to several principles of statutory construction.  *Miller v. Americollect, Inc.*, 2022 WL 20470401 at *8-10; *Mhrez Decision*; Appx., at 35a; *Hopkins v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.*, Case No. PAS-L-342-23.  See also *Asmad-Escobar v. Phoenix Fin. Servs. LLC*, 2024 WL 2839329, at *3; *Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.*, 2024 WL 2838327.  In construing a statute, the Court’s goal is to give effect to the legislature’s intent.
[brief] Lancos v. Silverman, 400 N.J. Super. 258, 271-72 (App. Div. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Price, 949 A.2d at 628 (“If the traditional reasons for tolerating inconsistent jury verdicts are not sufficient in civil cases, those reasons are clearly not sufficient in criminal cases. ”).  The prohibition in civil trials also belies the idea that inconsistent verdicts must be accepted because of their unavoidability.
[brief] At the Hearing, Plaintiff, [...], testified that the [...] had done work on their property in the area of the garage extension, which caused flooding onto his property that is adjacent to the [...]’ property by expanding their driveway with crushed stone.  “They did a lot of grading to the property.  They extended the driveway, they pushed the driveway.  They built a driveway around the back of it.  And they're causing me to flood. ”  (1T23:1-2)  [...] testified that the flooding cause him to lose over 200 trees on his property.  (1T23:18-22)  At the Hearing, Plaintiffs produced [...] as an expert in planning and engineering.
[brief] ”  [161 N.J. Super. at 377]  The observation is particularly relevant here.  If [...] had chosen for any reason not to proceed with the process after the bids were opened, it need not have forwarded any additional information about the asserted stock transaction, and thus, had the apparent option of simply abandoning its bid.  That opportunity, whether real or imagined, was sufficient to give [...] an advantage over conforming bidders.  Although no such analysis was undertaken by the Law Division here, we are satisfied that [...]'s failure to provide a timely and accurate disclosure of ownership violates the second prong of River Vale.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN ADMITTING PRIOR TESTIMONY OF THE RESPONDING OFFICERS  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW  B.  THE TRIAL COURT'S RELIANCE ON N.J.R.E. 105 AND CASE LAW WAS PROPER IN ADMITTING THE OFFICERS' OPINIONS WITH A LIMITING INSTRUCTION FOR THE PURPOSE OF IMPEACHING [...] C.  THE JURY WOULD HAVE, AND DID HEAR EVIDENCE OF THE OFFICERS' OPINIONS  DURING [...]'S TESTIMONY.................................................................41  III.
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[brief] The Chancery Court Did Not Properly Scrutinize the Billing Rates or Staffing Decisions of [...]’s Counsel  The 5,485.1 hours of work for which [...] and his counsel sought payment in the Global Fee Application was conducted by twelve attorneys from the [...] law firm, most of whom were partners of the firm or otherwise senior attorneys – specifically, eight partners, two “counsel,” and only two associates.  (Da212-233).  Of those twelve attorneys, the vast majority (93.8%) of the work – 5,145.7 hours – for which payment was sought was conducted by four partners, one of which, [...], Esq., is the firm’s chair and managing partner, and another, [...], Esq. is co-chair of the firm’s litigation department.  (Id.)  A mere 74.2 hours – only 1.3% of the total work sought for payment – was conducted by associates.  (Da25, ¶75; Da233).  The Chancery Court provided no analysis whatsoever as to whether it was reasonable or necessary for [...]’s counsel to have proceeded in this way, utilizing almost exclusively senior attorneys likely commanding some of the highest rates in the firm to do almost all of the work.  Indeed, it is well established that it is not proper for senior attorneys to do all the work and then demand their higher rates when many of the same tasks could have been delegated to less experienced professionals.  Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 762 F.2d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 1985) (awarding able and experienced counsel fees under the Clean Air Act at paralegal rates for work which was “mundane or minor in character”), modified, 478 U.S. 546, 106 S. Ct. 3088, 92 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1986); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 591-93 (3d Cir. 1984) (awarding partners compensation under the equitable fund doctrine in a class action at an associate attorney level for “tasks which are customarily performed by junior associates or paralegals”); *Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines*, 719 F.2d 670, 677 (3d Cir. 1983) (“Nor do we approve the wasteful use of highly skilled and highly priced talent for matters easily delegable to non-professionals or less experienced associates.  Routine tasks, if performed by senior partners in large firms, should not be billed at their usual rates.  A Michelangelo should not charge Sistine Chapel rates for painting a farmer's barn. ”); *Transamerica Life Ins. Co. v. Daibes Gas Holdings Atlanta, L.L.C.*, Civil Action No. 18-cv-10869(SRC)(CLW), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44489, at *15 (D. N.J. Jan. 26, 2022) (“While a partner may rightly spend time working on all of these tasks, (e.g., drafting a pleading, taking part in discovery, and working with an expert), most appropriately in a supervisory capacity, Plaintiff here does not adequately justify the amount of partner time spent on these tasks. ”)(citing *Ursic*, 719 F.2d. at 676); see also, *Rendine*, 141 N.J. at 336 (trial court may reduce a fee request if the hours expended “exceed those that competent counsel reasonably would have expended to achieve a comparable result”) (emphasis added).
[brief] Such an outcome would render a monetary judgment meaningless and reward bad conduct.  It would also disincentive firms from being willing to work on contingency fee arrangements on otherwise meritorious matters, freezing less well-off parties who rely on such fee structures for access to the courts.  Equity should not abide such a result.  Thus, even if the court were to find the fee award too high in these circumstances – which it should not – a remand and not reversal would be the correct result.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] (Pa7, ¶¶22-25).  Other than rescheduling the closing date, each of these amendments “otherwise ratif[ied] and reaffirm[ed]” the agreements.  (Pa7, ¶25).  On June 1, 2022, Plaintiff’s counsel wrote to [...]’s counsel, “requesting assurances that Defendant [...] would honor its obligations to Plaintiff under the [PSA] Agreement,” as Plaintiff had “growing concerns” that, based upon prior conversations between those parties, [...] may have no longer intended to “adhere to the terms of the Agreement. ” (Pa7, ¶27).  On June 7, 2022, [...]’s counsel responded, advising Plaintiff that the [...] “had been amended by [[...]] and [the Seller] to allow [[...]] to pursue a potential assumption of the existing loan” on the Property, thereby acquiring all rights to the Property, not just the rights to the “improvements. ” (Pa8, ¶29).  [...]’s counsel explained that this amendment was necessary because [...] was unable to “secure leasehold financing” and the “original structure” of the deal was no longer feasible.  (Id.)  [...] “took the position that it was no longer bound by the terms of the [PSA] and would proceed to close on the deal without Plaintiff’s participation. ” (Id.)  On June 28, 2022, however, trying to salvage the deal, [...] and Plaintiff agreed to a one-day extension of the closing dates for both the [...] and PSA.
[brief] Because [...] dismissed its claim for the amounts due under the Provision, Appellants are under no obligation to pay it, and [...] is precluded from pursuing it.  This result is consistent with *Cox* because, in that case, the ascertainable loss was the cost of repairs caused by the contractor’s CFA violation.  138 N.J. at 18.  Appellants, in contrast, have not suffered any loss because they do not owe any money under the Concession Recovery Provision.  Moreover, Appellants cannot rely on their purported attorneys’ fees and costs alone to satisfy the ascertainable loss requirement.  Apart from the lack of any case law to support Appellants’ position, the CFA empowers courts to award “reasonable attorneys’ fees, filing fees, and reasonable costs of suit” to consumers that prevail on a CFA claim.  N.J.S.A. 56:8-19.  It is entirely circular for a party to establish ascertainable loss on the basis of attorneys’ fees and costs only, then claim entitlement to attorneys’ fees and costs under the CFA for satisfying the elements of a CFA claim, including the requirement to show an ascertainable loss.  Allowing attorneys’ fees and costs (of which no record was made below by Appellants) to prove ascertainable loss would also render that essential element superfluous.  A plaintiff could simply file a claim under the CFA even if it suffered no ascertainable loss resulting from the alleged CFA violation and claim to have an ascertainable loss in the form of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in filing the complaint.  By including the ascertainable loss requirement, and allowing a party to recover attorneys’ fees only if they prevail, the Legislature clearly did not intend for attorneys’ fees and costs alone to be sufficient to demonstrate ascertainable loss.  See GE Solid State, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 132 N.J. 298, 307 (1993) (stating that the goal of statutory interpretation is to “divine the Legislature’s intent”); see also Sanchez v. Fitness Factory Edgewater, LLC, 242 N.J. 252, 261 (2020) (stating that courts should “strive for an interpretation that gives effect to all of the statutory provisions and does not render any language inoperative, superfluous, void[,] or insignificant”) (citations omitted).  For these reasons, Appellants failed to satisfy the ascertainable loss requirement for a CFA claim and, thus, dismissal was warranted.
[brief] On April 17, 2023, [...] filed a second motion to dismiss with prejudice, arguing that plaintiff had failed to comply with the appellate court’s order of December 2, 2022, and the trial court’s order of March 31, 2023, to retain an attorney by April 17, 2023 (Pa105 – Pa113).  Defendant [...] joined this motion.  The trial court again dismissed the case without prejudice on May 12, 2023 (Pa114 – Pa115).  Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to appeal this decision on November 10, 2023, contending that the trial court improperly denied her motion to demand documents, allowing defendants to conceal information necessary for plaintiff to comply with the court’s order (Pa116 – Pa126).  However, the appellate court denied the appeal on December 12, 2023 (Pa150).  The case remained closed at the trial court from May 12, 2023, to March 1, 2024.  On February 14, 2024, [...] filed a third motion to dismiss with prejudice, repeating the same claims made in the second motion on April 17, 2023 (Pa151 – Pa160).
[brief] “The Board must first consider whether it is really dealing with (1) "a particular case" that can be resolved through the granting of a variance; or (2) a more general problem with the density requirement in the SSOD zone that must be addressed through a change in the ordinance itself. ”  Id.  The changes to the real estate market and warehousing industry that Plaintiffs’ offer as justification for their claim of special reasons for a height variance affect equally all properties in [...]’s SM Zone District, not just Plaintiffs’.  The market does not affect only this “particular case”; it is a “more general problem… that must be addressed through a change in the ordinance itself. ”  Id.  Indeed, the testimony of Plaintiffs’ Planner highlighted to the Board how the [...] governing body did address these market changes by adopting ordinances that allow taller buildings in other zone districts.  5T 69:3- 5T 70:13.  The conclusion of the Board’s denial Resolution in this case reflects proper concern for the considerations about exceeding zoning board powers expressed in Price:
[brief] In doing such, the court clearly neglected to seek applicable case law regarding when service of process has been deemed defective and challenged by a defendant (as has been demonstrated with evidence in this appeal) that was not cured when given the opportunity (Pa1 - Pa2).  In the Court’s Civil Action Order on November 17, 2023; the trial court responded in its denial for Motion to Reconsider (Pa1- Pa2) clearly demonstrating the court’s failure to acknowledge this error of misapplication of case law countering by opposing this defendant’s claim of Procedural Due Process stating:  “Reconsideration is “a matter within the sound discretion ….Reconsideration should be utilized only for those cases which fall into the narrow corridor in which: 1) the court has based its decision upon a palpably incorrect basis, or 2) the court did not consider or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.  The STANDARD for reconsideration requires proof of error, mistake, missed caselaw or statute, which is not present in this case (clearly laches using Clarke v. Clarke was misapplied).  The Defendant claims a violation of his Due Process Rights for a lack of service of process by the plaintiff dating back 33 years” (Pa6; Pa10; Pa21; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa41). ”  The court circumvented a direct response to the specific claim that laches does not govern Civil Rights Actions and ignored missed case law as the stated reasons for its error (Pa1 – Pa2) causing an unfair result (R 2:10-2); Gillman v Bally Mfg. Corp., 286 NJ Super 525 528 (App Div 1996)  The following will speak to the court’s abbreviated arbitrary analysis and illogical thought process in this case for if we begin with the court’s reference to what MUST be present to GRANT a Motion for Reconsideration (Pa - Pa2); what the court proports it did “not do” in order to for it to have granted a Motion to Reconsider, it has been established with evidence “it” was, in reality, what the court “did do”, as the court ignored the facts/evidence and then proceeded to error as matter of law (using laches for denial).
[brief] In contravention of the separation of powers and the exclusive authority of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law, the NJDACCA restricts the amount of debt adjustment services that New Jersey attorneys can provide their clients as part of their legal representation.  The NJDACCA does not define what “debt adjustment” is but based on the definition of a “debt adjuster”\(^2\), the statute arguably applies to any New Jersey attorney involved in foreclosure actions, as well as in bankruptcy, insolvency and collection proceedings.  Further, \(^2\) “Debt adjuster” is defined as “a person who either (a) acts or offers to act for a consideration as an intermediary between a debtor and his creditors for the purpose of settling, compounding, or otherwise altering the terms of payment of any debts of the debtor, or (b) who, to that end, receives money or other property from the debtor, or on behalf of the debtor, for payment to, or distribution among, the creditors of the debtor. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c)(1).  the phrase “principally engaged” is undefined, rendering it unclear to attorneys when their conduct falls within the ambit of the statute.  Given this overreach, the Appellate Division should find the NJDACCA is unconstitutional as applied to New Jersey attorneys.
[brief] In State v. Dalal, recusal of the Bergen County judiciary was warranted when a criminal defendant made threats against two Bergen County Superior Court judges.  221 N.J. 601 (2015).  The Supreme Court concluded that the relationships between judges within a vicinage “can raise legitimate questions about the appearance of impartiality when a colleague presides over a case involving a serious threat against a fellow judge who serves in the same vicinage. ”  Id. at 609.  The Court considered “the serious nature of the threat, the absence of any proof of manipulation [i.e., forum-shopping], the potential introduction of the evidence in one of the trials, and the relationships among judges within the Bergen Vicinage,” and concluded “that a reasonable, fully informed observer could have doubts about a Bergen County judge’s impartiality. ”  Id. at 610.  Because one of the threatened judges was subsequently reassigned to the vicinage to which the case had been transferred, and because the other had retired, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the assignment judge “to determine, after hearing from the parties, whether (1) to ask the Chief Justice to bring in a judge from another vicinage, . . . or (2) to transfer the case to another vicinage. ”  Ibid.  The rules governing judicial recusal are concerned not only with “actual conflicts and bias” but also “the appearance of impropriety. ”  State v. McCabe, 201 N.J. 34, 43 (2010).  Accordingly, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to “disqualify themselves in proceedings in which their impartiality or the appearance of their impartiality might reasonably be questioned. ”  Canon 3, Rule 3.17(B).  The standard for deciding a recusal issue is therefore: “Would a reasonably, fully informed person have doubts about the judge’s impartiality?”  DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 517 (2008).  Just as in Dalal, even if one could be “confident the trial judge could actually preside fairly and impartially,” the mere “appearance of fairness in the future proceedings will be impaired so long as a” judge from the same county “presides over the matter. ”  221 N.J. at 605 (quoting State v. Dalal, 438 N.J. Super. 156, 162 (App. Div. 2014)).  Thus, the Atlantic County judiciary should have been recused from this matter, and a new trial is required.  DeNike, 196 N.J. at 507 (remanding for a new trial “[b]ecause any lesser remedy would allow reasonable doubts to linger about the fairness of the outcome of the case”).  Alternatively, should this Court remand [...]’s case for additional proceedings, those proceedings should be transferred to another vicinage or heard by a judge from outside the Atlantic County vicinage.  POINT IV
[brief] ”).  Instead, this Court has held that the evidence must have been destroyed “in a calculated effort to circumvent the disclosure requirements;” with “an evil intent;” as part of a conscious effort to suppress evidence that would have exculpated the defendant; purposely or deliberately prevent the defendant from obtaining it; as part of a campaign of “official animus” towards the defendant; as the result of conspicuously bad, flagrant carelessness which speaks to deliberateness instead of negligence; or was destroyed with an “intention inconsistent with fair play. ”  Clark, 347 N.J. Super. at 508-09; Peterkin, 226 N.J. Super. at 42; State v. Serret, 198 N.J. Super. 21, 26 (App.Div.1984), certif. denied, 101 N.J. 217 (1985); State v. Langanella, 144 N.J. Super. 268, 282-83 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 74 N.J. 256 (1976).
[brief] (PSR 1)  Following this arrest, [...] was returned on July 3, 1996 (Ind. #2).  (Da 5-6)  Therein defendant was charged with: first-degree attempted murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a) and 2C:11-3 (Count One); two counts of second-degree --- 4  “Da” refers to defendant’s appendix attached hereto.  “1T” refers to the transcript of the hearing held on February 6, 2004.  “2T” refers to the transcript dated February 10, 2004.  “3T” refers to the transcript dated July 31, 2023.  “PSR” refers to the Pre-Sentence Report prepared for sentencing under Ind. #1 (most legible available).  aggravated assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1) (Counts Two and Three); third-degree aggravated assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12b(2) (Count Four); fourth-degree aggravated assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-b(3) (Count Five); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (Count Six); and third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b\(^5\) (Count Seven) (Da 5-6)  On May 22, 1997, defendant entered a plea agreement.