ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] asserted arbitration as an affirmative defense at the outset in its Answer.  (Da47–48.)  When Plaintiffs refused [...]’s request to arbitrate (Da103 ¶ 5), [...] moved to compel.  (Da63.)  There was no extensive motion practice or comprehensive discovery.  (Pb46 (citing *Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co.*, 980 F.2d 912, 925 (3d Cir. 1992), where the defendants “actively litigat[ed]” “for almost a year”).)  [...]’s motion to compel was timely.  Plaintiffs’ repeated claims (Pb4, 39, 48–50) that [...] “demanded … extensive written discovery” are brazenly false—and accordingly, unaccompanied by any citation to the record.  [...] has never served discovery requests or deposition notices on Plaintiffs, and it never moved to consolidate.  [...]’s passive receipt of uniform interrogatory responses that Plaintiffs were *required by court rule* to provide automatically was not a waiver, and Plaintiffs cite no case holding otherwise.  Finally, *Rule 4:5-1* requires the disclosure only of “other” proceedings that relate to or could impact the issues in the instant case.  Plaintiffs cite no case holding that a party must state its intention to move to compel arbitration of the very same case in its *Rule 4:5-1* certification.  And in any event [...] made that intention clear in its Answer and subsequent communications with Plaintiffs’ counsel.  There was no waiver.  **Conclusion**
[directive] Unauthorized Uses of CEDs  6.1  The following uses of CEDs are prohibited:  (a)  A CED shall not be used or threatened to be used to retaliate for any past conduct or to impose punishment; (b) A CED shall not be used against a person who is a passive resistor or an active resistor; (c) A CED shall not be fired or discharged for the sole purpose of preventing a person from committing property damage; (d) A CED shall not be deployed against the operator of a moving vehicle unless the use of deadly force against the operator of the motor vehicle would be authorized; and (e) Two or more CEDs shall not be discharged upon a person at the same time.  8  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] (T72-23 to 74-6).  At some point, the conversation ended in silence followed by her hanging up the receiver.  (T74-4 to 6).  The Appellant denied speaking to Sergeant in an intimidating or challenging fashion.  (T74-11 to 19).  The Appellant recalled the conversation taking place around 2:00 am, the time of her head count report.  Minutes before her 3:00 am break, the Appellant recalled [...] entering the Medical Department.  (T75-6 to 11).  The Appellant recounted another calm and tranquil conversation between herself and [...].  (T76-22 to 77-6).  [...] questioned the Appellant as to why she did not call a code.  The Appellant explained that there was no danger, but she needed supervisor assistance.  (T78-5 to 9).
[brief] [...] Failed to Prove Substantive Unconscionability.  The trial court was convinced that [...]’s “timing argument and the strong inferences drawn from this support [[...]’s] assertion that the PSA was not unfair or inequitable nor substantively unconscionable. ” (A229, Op. at 35).  The trial court properly valued the marital estate based on the evidence.  The trial court correctly determined that the marital estate suffered a $28,000,000 loss.
[brief] 1.  Improper Credibility Determinations Were Made By The Trial Court.  The record does not support the Trial Court’s credibility determinations.  In instances regarding lower court credibility evaluations, a deferential standard is applied, but “… the rules of court permit a greater scope of appellate review in a non-jury case” and the reviewing court may make new or amended findings of fact in such cases.  Greenfield v. Dusseault, 60 N.J. Super. 436, 444 (App. Div. 1960).  If findings are manifestly unsupported or inconsistent with credible evidence, or display a denial of justice, they should not be upheld.  Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155, 1963.  Appellate review broadens when errors focus on the judge’s fact evaluations.  See Walid v. Yolanda for Irene Couture, 425 N.J. Super. 171, 179 (App. Div. 2012) (citing C.B. Snyder Realty, Inc. v. BMW of N. Amer., 233 N.J. Super. 65, 69, 1989).  Here, given the record, it is clear [...]’s trial testimony and deposition testimony on key facts were inherently inconsistent and this should have weighed heavily against [...]’s credibility.  3T40:21-23.  [...]’s deposition and trial testimony revealed inconsistencies in membership interest, admissions of non- ownership in [...], and an undisclosed loan without a promissory note.  3T30:8-9, 3T40:21-23, 3T14:3-9.  More specifically, [...] stated that his initial membership interest in [...] was 10%, but subsequently, undocumented in paper nor demonstrated via exhibit, testified that [...] restructured [...], making [...] 82% member and [...] 18% member.  3T30:8-9.  Contrary to the above, [...] stated in his deposition that he was not an employee or owner of [...].  3T40:21-23.  These are key facts that should have been known to [...] instead of inconsistently testified to at the bench trial.  Further, [...] testified about consciously intermingling company funds with personal funds and falsifying documentation about the company for potential investors.  This testimony should have undoubtedly weighed against any finding of credibility.  3T83:24-86:5.  Further, [...]’s role at [...] was marked by zero client acquisitions and personal credit card debt repaid by [...].  It was undisputed that [...] paid his personal credit card debt with [...] funds.  2T132:9; 2T133:1.  This unequivocal self-dealing undermines any favorable credibility determination by the Trial Court.  The Trial Court’s finding that [...] did not benefit financially from his involvement with [...] has no support in the record.  The Trial Court’s determinations on [...] and [...] are directly counter to the evidence and testimony displaying their intricate involvement in [...], its financial mismanagement and self-dealing to the exclusion of Plaintiff.  The Trial Court’s credibility determinations regarding [...] and [...] are manifestly unsupported or inconsistent with credible evidence.  Therefore, this Court should not give any weight to the Trial Court’s credibility findings as to [...] and [...].
[brief] To that end, Congress expressly delegated to [...] the power to regulate the “construction or extension of any facilities” for the “transportation or sale of natural gas. ”  15 U.S.C. 717f(c)(1)(A).  In addition, Congress, through the Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 60101 et seq., has expressly preempted state safety regulations.  See 49 U.S.C. 60104(c)(providing that “[a] State authority may not adopt or continue in force safety standards for interstate pipeline facilities or interstate pipeline transportation).  Taken together, the regulatory scheme established by Congress governs almost every aspect of the transportation and sale of natural gas in interstate commerce, including the siting, construction and operation of natural gas facilities.  Algonquin LNG v. Loqa, 79 F.Supp.2d 52 (D.R.I. 2000).  As such, any state or local law that purports to regulate matters addressed by federal law will be deemed preempted.  Id.
[brief] A.  STANDARDS OF REVIEW  This is an appeal of a decision by an administrative agency pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 2:2-3(a)(2) which provides direct review by the Superior Court, Appellate Division of State Agency actions.  Judicial review of administrative agency actions are generally entitled to substantial deference.  While the court is required to defer to an agency’s expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field, this standard is not without its limitations.  *Goulding v. N.J. Friendship House*  245 N.J.157,167 (2021)  In determining the scope of judicial review, one must determine whether the administrative agency is interpreting the application of a statute, making factual findings, or interpreting questions of law.  Different Appellate review standards apply to these different situations.  *AB v. Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services*  407 N.J. Super. 330,339-340 (App. Div. 2009)  In this case, the appellant challenges both the findings of fact as well as the specific interpretations of law made by the [...].  [Pa38,54]  Findings of fact must be supported by the record.  If the factual findings of the administrative agency are unsupported by the record, or insufficient to support the factual conclusions, the case should ordinarily be remanded to develop an accurate and proper factual record.  *The Matter of Medicinal Marijuana*  465 N.J. Super. 343-355,378-379,384 (App. Div. 2020)  In this case the final administrative determination made concerning the appellant’s re-enrollment in the Public Employees Retirement System was based upon incorrect factual findings that were not supported by the record, as well as the Board simply failing to apply *N.J.S.A. 43:15A-25.2* and *N.J.A.C. 17:2-1A.1* to the facts of this case.  [Pa54]  While the court should provide due deference to the Board of Trustees’ findings of fact, their failure to support these facts by the competent record and the Board’s failure to properly apply the relevant statutes and administrative code sections to the appropriate facts of this case requires a reversal.  [Pa54]  This Appellate Court, therefore, is not bound by the Board of Trustees’ interpretation of the relevant statutes in this case.  DYFS v. TB 2007 N.J. 294,301-302 (2011); Gulkowsky v. Equity One, Inc. 180 N.J. 49,67 (2004)  Based on the material factual conclusion unsupported by the record, and the misapplication of relevant statutes this court should reverse and remand the decision of the [...].  B.
[brief] After explicitly referencing this evidence in the record, the trial court appropriately dismissed the evidence as insufficient to support a claim for adverse possession.  Pa11 (“Defendant has produced insufficient evidence of exclusive, continuous, open and notorious, hostile use of the property for thirty years. ”).  Without clearly articulating that the documents pertain to [...]’s Property at Lot 22 and [...]’s exclusive use and possession of same, [...] cannot meet its burden of satisfying the exclusivity prong.  [...] also cannot rely upon the [...] as that affidavit should be stricken for all the reasons set forth above.  Furthermore, the [...] conclusively opines that [...] satisfied the adverse possession statute.  Da130-131 at ¶¶ 25-30.  The [...]’s legal conclusions are inapposite.  For all of the reasons articulated above, [...] cannot satisfy the exclusivity prong, and the Order must be upheld.
[brief] In short, it is the reasonable expectations of the insured, not the policy language that controls its interpretation.  The insured’s “reasonable expectations in the transaction may not justly be frustrated and courts have properly molded their governing interpretative principles with that uppermost in mind. ”  Allen, supra, 44 N.J. at 305.  Furthermore, the consideration of the “reasonable expectations” of the insured necessarily entails a factual analysis as to what the insured in a given situation could have expected.  Bromfeld, 298 N.J. Super. at 78-79 (remanding to the trial court for, in part, a determination of “the reasonable expectations of the insureds (plaintiffs)”).  The current matter was dismissed on a motion in lieu of an answer, which requires that all facts and inferences be drawn in favor of the non-moving party, similar to a summary judgment motion.
[directive] PURSUANT TO ERPO  2C:39-9(L)(1)  3 WEAPONS-MANUFACTURE USING  3D PRINTER - UNLICENSED 2C:39-9(M)  3  WEAPONS/MANU/TRANSPORTS COVERT/UNDETECTABLE FIREARMS  2C:39-9A  3  WEAPONS-MANU/TRANSPORT/DISP/DEFACEMENT- MACHINE GUN 2C:39-9B  3  WEAPONS-MANU/TRANSPO/DISP/DEFACEMENT-SAWED OFF SHOTGUN 2C:39-9E  3 WEAPONS-MANU/TRANSP/DISP/DEFACEMENT-DEF DEFACED FIREARM 2C:39-9E  4  WEAPONS-MANU/TRANSPO/ DISP/DEFACEMENT-DEFACED FIREARM 2C:39-9G
[brief] *See In re Camden Cty.*, 170 N.J. at 449; *State v. A.L.*, 440 N.J. Super. at 418; *Elshabba* Transcript, at T9; *Rabinowitz v. Alltran Financial, LP*, Case No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. August 24, 2023), T7:16-23 (dismissing case for lack of standing where plaintiff could not demonstrate any actual damage that he sustained as a result of the FDCPA violation.).  Moreover, Appellant also lacked any “sufficient stake” in the litigation and “real adverseness with respect to the subject matter. ”  As a matter of Constitutional law, laws passed by Congress (*e.g.* FDCPA) are to be enforced by the executive branch.  *TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez*, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2207 (2021).  And Congress specifically tasked two federal agencies with implementing and enforcing the FDCPA—[...] and [...].  Because Appellant suffered no actual harm due to Respondent’s supposed statutory violations, her “stake” in the case and “adverseness” is, in effect, only the interest of policing debt collectors’ compliance with the FDCPA, generally, which is the job of the [...] and [...].  As the U.S. Supreme Court recently explained:  [T]he choice of how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law falls within the discretion of the Executive Branch, not within the purview of private plaintiffs (and their attorneys).  Private plaintiffs are not accountable to the people and are not charged with pursuing the public interest in enforcing a defendant’s general compliance with regulatory law.  *TransUnion*, at 2207.  *See also Elshabba* Transcript, at T9-10.  In sum, Appellant suffered no injury and her “stake” in the litigation is enforcing the FDCPA as a general matter, which is the province of the [...] and [...].  As such, she maintained no standing to pursue her claims.  **V. CONCLUSION**
[brief] (Id.)  In terms of the relationship between [...] and the [...], Defendant [...], the Local Office Manager, explained that [...] could not dictate the terms and conditions of employment for [...] employees.  (Pa564, Defendant Maryann [...] deposition transcript, T248:3-5).  More specifically, Defendant [...] acknowledged that there were no circumstances where [...] could “come and tell you what to do with a [...] employee” (Id., T247:5-11)
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  In conclusion, the application of collateral estoppel in this case precludes the relitigating of issues already determined by a competent court.  Appellant has had every opportunity to intercede in the original matter before [...] at which time the Ordinances authorizing the exchange of properties were contested.  It chose not to do so.  Therefore, it should not be allowed to complain about that now.  The Township's contractual obligations and the public interest it serves necessitate the enforcement of the Ordinances.  Respondent has amply demonstrated that the acquisition of the Appellant’s property has been properly undertaken in accordance with the strict provisions and requirements of the Eminent Domain Act.  In addition, we respectfully submit that the public purpose in exchanging properties with [...] is amply demonstrated, and cannot be reasonably objected to.  We therefore respectfully request that the Appellant’s appeal be dismissed, with prejudice.
[brief] THE ACCIDENT  On August 15, 2019, one of the four 15-passenger vans rented by [...] and being driven by a [...] employee was involved in a single-vehicle accident in Henrico, North Carolina (the “Accident”).  Multiple passengers, including [...], allegedly sustained injuries as a result of the Accident and have pursued claims against [...].  (Ia080 at ¶ 35; Ia167).  A police report regarding the accident identifies the owner of the van as “[...]”, and identifies the insurance company providing owned auto coverage for the van as “[...]”.  (Ia167).  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] (Pa51).  The trial court, however, determined correctly that Appellant’s reliance on Cox is misplaced.  (Pa51).  In Cox, a homeowner filed a lawsuit against [...] for violating the CFA due to a hazardous and shoddy kitchen renovation.  Id. at *34-40.  The court found ascertainable loss because the debt owed by Cox for the renovation derived from [...]’ violation of the Act by performing deficient renovation work.  Id. at *38.  The court found that the plaintiff suffered a loss equaling the cost of repairing the unsafe and unattractive renovations, which would have been avoided had [...] complied with regulations aimed to prevent such substandard work.  *Id.* at *36.  There are no similar facts here.  Most notably, as the trial court emphasized, Appellant does not dispute that her original Obligation owed to [...] is legitimate, which is distinguishable from the facts in *Cox*. (Pa51).
[brief] **Board’s Response**  Admitted that the invoices were paid.  Disputed because the Board approved a resolution rescinding payment. \(^{56}\)  Being that the April 2020 invoice was paid, that would have otherwise served to reduce the $620,250. \(^{99}\) payment by $60,800.  Thus, the court should have never ordered the entire payment of $620,250, and the factual dispute was for a jury to decide, and not the court.
[brief] **JANUARY 1, 2022**  No snow or ice cover was present throughout the day.  Rain occurred intermittently from around 1:35 AM to 3:45-3:50 AM, and then frequently to around 2:25-2:30 PM EST.  Additional rain occurred from around 4:30-4:50 PM EST through the remainder of the day.  The high temperature was near 56 F and the low temperature was near 50 F.  **JANUARY 2, 2022**  No snow or ice cover was present throughout the day.  Rain, which was ongoing from the previous day, continued to around 2:35-2:50 AM EST.  Additional rain and drizzle occurred intermittently between approximately 4:20 AM and 6:30 AM, and 6:10 PM and 6:50 PM EST.  The high temperature was near 59 F and the low temperature was near 37 F.  **JANUARY 3, 2022**  No snow or ice cover was present throughout the day.  No precipitation occurred on this day.  The high temperature was near 37 F and the low temperature was near 22 F.  **JANUARY 4, 2022**  No snow or ice cover was present throughout the day.  No precipitation occurred on this day.  The high temperature was near 35 F and the low temperature was near 19 F.  JANUARY 5, 2022  On the date of incident, no snow or ice cover was present at the start of the day (midnight).  Precipitation in the form of freezing rain and snow occurred intermittently from around 4:20 AM to 5:50 AM EST.  After 5:50 AM, freezing rain and freezing drizzle occurred frequently to around 7:30 AM EST.  After 7:30 AM, rain/freezing rain occurred frequently to around 8:25 AM EST.  Additional rain/freezing rain occurred frequently between approximately 8:50 AM and 9:05 AM, and 9:40 AM and 9:55 AM EST.  After 9:55 AM EST, rain occurred frequently to around 12:30-12:35 PM EST.  A trace (less than 0.1 inch) of snow and ice accumulated on this day.  Due to melting, no snow or ice cover remained at the end of the day (11:59 PM EST).  The high temperature was near 47 F and the low temperature was near 28 F. (Da1-Da12, report 10/17/23 of [...]).
[directive] Restrictions on Using BWCs With Enhanced Audio/Visual Capabilities.  Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Policy, if a department acquires a BWC with enhanced audio/video capabilities that allow it to record an image or conversation that could not be seen or heard by the officer wearing the device (e.g., infrared night vision or thermal imaging, sound amplification that would record conversations occurring at a remote distance), that feature/capability shall not be used without the express approval of the BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021  16  County Prosecutor or designee, or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee, in accordance with any applicable legal requirements.  7.7  Restrictions on Using BWCs Surreptitiously or to Gather Intelligence Information on First Amendment Protected Activity.  A BWC shall not be used surreptitiously.  Additionally, a BWC shall not be used to gather intelligence information based on First Amendment protected speech, associations, or religion, or to record activity that is unrelated to a response to a call for service or a law enforcement or investigative encounter between a law enforcement officer and a member of the public, provided that nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit activation of video and audio recording functions of a BWC as authorized under the law or this Policy.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021 17
[brief] **  In the normal course of business, companies regularly exchange with other entities highly confidential and valuable information via email.  Because of (i) the excessive sweep and inherent limitations of one-round keyword searching, (ii) the fact that the emails of literally hundreds of custodians will be searched, and (iii) the fact that the producing parties are forbidden from removing irrelevant emails from the productions the Order requires them to make, there is \(^6\)  This is all the more problematic as the larger firms bring a larger share of class actions.  Their exposure to irrelevant, confidential information, which cannot be erased from their minds, cannot be waved away as inconsequential.  real danger that a nonparty’s confidential and valuable commercial information will exist in the document productions of Defendants.  Thus, the procedure specified in the Order could lead to the unnecessary production of irrelevant but valuable trade secrets and other confidential information (e.g., confidential pricing, bank account credentials, and financial statements).  See, e.g., MarketRx, Inc. v. Turner, 2006 WL 851930 at *13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2006) (granting confidentiality order in non-compete action to prevent disclosure of trade secrets).  To make this breach of privacy worse, the third parties may never discover that their proprietary and confidential information was disclosed.  In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 (1984), the Supreme Court recognized that incidental release of third parties’ irrelevant information could damage their privacy interests, and courts’ processes should be managed to prevent such abuse:  “[R]elevant information in the hands of third parties may be subject to discovery.  There is an opportunity, therefore, for litigants to obtain—incidentally or purposefully—information that not only is irrelevant but if publicly released could be damaging to reputation and privacy.  The government clearly has a substantial interest in preventing this sort of abuse of its processes. ”  Moreover, parties do not have standing to protect proprietary or confidential business information of third parties.  See Borough of Seaside Park v. Comm’r of New Jersey Dep’t of Educ., 74 A.3d. 80, 107 (N.J. Super. 2013) ([O]rdinarily, litigants may not claim standing to assert rights of third parties").  So, it is up to the Court to protect those privacy interests.
[directive] Czy przedstawiono Panu(i) jakiekolwiek inne obietnice poza tymi zawartymi w niniejszym [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] formularzu lub czy grożono Panu(i) w celu nakłonienia Pana(i) do przyznania się do winy?  Have any promises other than those mentioned on this form, or any threats, been made in order to cause you to plead guilty?  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że sędzia nie jest związany jakimikolwiek obietnicami lub zaleceniami 23. a.
[directive] The following guidance on less-lethal ammunition is provided to assist the New Jersey law enforcement community in their use of force options.  The Attorney General’s Use of force Policy 2020-13 issued December 21, 2020 and revised on December 28, 2021 by 2021-14 provide for the continued use of less-lethal and conducted energy devices.  These additional use of force options have the goal of reducing the use of lethal force options.  Addendum A of the Use of Force Policy provide for the establishment of a CED/Less-Lethal Panel that will review less-lethal option and make recommendations to the Attorney General.  The ammunition on this list has been reviewed by the Panel.