ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Essentially, you're trying to cross-examine it.  You're trying to present some type of cross-examination by the fact that the water was removed without an expert, so - [...]:  Well, would there be any problem, Judge, with me questioning their expert that the employee put up a sign there, that the employee mopped it up with their expert on the stand.  Judge?  Contemporaneous with it?  THE COURT:  Yes, there would.  Yes, there would because you're attempting to get facts into evidence based upon question for the jury to basically assume.  You can ask him about his analysis of - - of the floor and why the analysis is incorrect and could she have possibly slipped on the floor.
[brief] (Pb9).  In Ensslin, a police officer had been terminated from service and the subsequent action he brought against his employer under the Law Against Discrimination was ultimately dismissed.  Ensslin, 311 N.J. Super. at 334.  After the LAD litigation, Ensslin applied for Ordinary Disability Retirement Benefits but the [...], determined he was ineligible as he was not a member in service at the time.  Ibid.  The [...] found that under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3), PFRS membership ceases “if more than 2 years have elapsed from the date of [the member’s] last contributions,” and under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6(1) an application must be made “by a member in service” or on his behalf.
[brief] *See e.g., In re FDCPA Mailing Vendor Cases*, 551 F. Supp. 3d 57, 59-61 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (explaining how the letter vendor theory and other recent FDCPA claims are attempts to apply the FDCPA in ways Congress never imagined or intended, and themselves are an abuse of the law.).  **b)  Appellant’s Letter Vendor Theory is Contrary to Congressional Intent Concerning Third Party Communications**
[brief] ”  D.G. ex rel. J.G. v. N. Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 400 N.J. Super. 1, 26 (App. Div. 2008) (citing Ryslik v. Krass, 279 N.J. Super. 293, 297 (App. Div. 1995)).  Any supposed misconduct by a trial judge must be reviewed within the context of the entire record to determine whether it had a prejudicial impact.  Id. (citing Mercer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 324 N.J. Super. 290, 320 (App. Div. 1999)).  To invalidate the trial court’s well-reasoned decision, [...] asserts that the Order “must be reversed” because [...]’ Motion “failed to contain a notice of motion or proof of service.
[brief] A receiver’s expenses in employing professionals unauthorized by the Court are incurred at the receiver’s peril.  Hershey v. Stone & Hershey, 10 N.J. Misc. 967 (Ch. 1932).  The Court’s September 24, 2021 Order appointing [...] provided that the “Receiver shall be paid from the proceeds collected in the amount of 15% which shall be assessed as an additional cost of the Judgment. ”  Ca22.  However, the Receiver amended his payment terms without seeking leave of Court to do so.  The Receiver acknowledged the terms of this appointment however, he “did not feel that was a fair way to pay the Receiver since fifteen (15%) percent would be a large amount of money to be paid over.
[brief] The commitment contains an important notice and disclosure statement required by New Jersey law, REAL ESTATE TITLE TRANSACTIONS ARE COMPLEX.  THE COMPANY DOES NOT REPRESENT YOU AND CANNOT GIVE YOU LEGAL ADVICE.  YOU ARE ENTITLED TO REVIEW THE TITLE INSURANCE COMMITMENT WITH AN ATTORNEY AT LAW OF YOUR OWN CHOOSING, AT YOUR EXPENSE, PRIOR TO THE TRANSFER OF TITLE.  WE STRONGLY ADVISE THAT YOU DO SO.  (304a, ¶1)
[brief] As Evidenced By Caselaw  [...], again, relies purely on non-binding authorities and completely ignores precedent that undermines its assertion that [...]’s SAM Account Registration website provided Plaintiffs reasonable notice of an arbitration agreement.  Indeed, this Court has made clear that agreements, such as [...]’s “Terms and Conditions of Use” does not provide sufficient notice to consumers.  “An arbitration provision is not enforceable unless the consumer has reasonable notice of its existence. ”  Wollen v. Gulf Stream Restoration & Cleaning, LLC, 468 N.J. Super. 483, 498 (App. Div. 2021).  A party may not claim a lack of notice for purely failing to read the agreement.  Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 54 (2020).  However, while internet-based contracts are generally valid, “the enforceability of an internet consumer contract often turns on whether the agreement is characterized as a ‘scrollwrap,’ ‘sign-in wrap,’ ‘clickwrap,’ or ‘browsewrap’—or a hybrid version of these electronic contract types.
[directive] if  The legislation separately identified charges that must be removed from the PSA only they are charged in conjunction with N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b )(11) or N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b )(12).  These include distributing, dispensing, or possessing with intent to distribute or dispense, on or within of of 1,000 feet any school property, or on or within 500 feet the real property comprising a public of housing facility, public park, or public building in violation N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a) or N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.  l(a).  is important to note that N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.l(a) can be charged It with non-marijuana charges and therefore may still appropriately appear on the PSA.  Therefore, these charges must be removed only when charged in conjunction with N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(ll) or N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b )(12).  3.
[brief] The ABC Law contains similar provisions.  It defines a “brewer” as “any person or entity engaged primarily in business as a brewer, manufacturer of alcoholic beverages, importer, marketer, broker or agent of any of the foregoing who sells or offers to sell beer to a beer wholesaler *in this state* or any successor to a brewer. ”  N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 55-c(2)(b) (emphasis added).  The ABC Law states, “It is hereby declared as the policy of the state that it is necessary to regulate and control the manufacture, sale and distribution *within the state* of alcoholic beverages for the purpose of fostering and promoting temperance in their consumption and respect for and obedience to law[.]”  N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 2.  As demonstrated by the “in this state” and “within the state” language in both the MBPA and the ABC Law, the purpose of these statutes “is not to regulate out-of-state transactions, since [they] clearly aim[] to regulate those transactions ‘within the state.
[brief] *(See Da161)*  **B.  No Prejudgment Interest Shall Be Awarded to Attorney Fees **  In addition, the Supreme Court of New Jersey prohibits the award of prejudgment interest on legal fees.  *See N.Bergen Rex Transp. V. Trailer Leasing Co.*, 158 N.J. 561, 730 A.2d 843 (1997).  Even where attorney fee shifting is controlled by contractual provisions, courts will strictly construe that provision in light of the general policy disfavoring the award of attorney fees.  *See McGuire v. City of Jersey City*, 125 N.J. 310, 326, 593 A.2d 309 (1991).  **VII.
[brief] We also observe that a party's failure to timely object at trial may make it “‘fair to infer from the failure to object below that in the context of the trial the error was actually of no moment. ’”  *State v. Ingram*, 196 N.J. 23, 42 (2008) (quoting *State v. Nelson*, 173 N.J. 417, 471 (2002)).  Furthermore, [...]'s fingerprint was not the only link between him and the robbery.
[brief] [4T97-5 to -12].  Defendant told the detective that he was traveling from New Hampshire to Virginia Beach, Virginia, to see his daughter.  [4T103- 13 to -16; 4T105-8 to -18].  He was in Virginia but traveled north to New Jersey to meet someone from New Hampshire.  [4T106-1 to -5; 4T110-21 to 113-6].  Defendant bought and transported cars.  [4T113-25 to 114-3].  Defendant told the detective that he transported narcotics for someone who lived in New Hampshire who was either Indian or Mexican.  [4T115-6 to 117-7].  He had some concerns for his safety.  [4T116-11 to -16].  At trial, co-defendant testified for the State as a condition of her plea agreement to provide truthful testimony.
[directive] Threat to harm or kill anyone at the Index Assault  SAMPLE QUESTION:  This time, did he/she threaten to harm or kill you or anyone else?  Count any threat to harm or kill uttered at the Index Assault by the Defendant to cause bodily harm to any person other than the ✔ Defendant (i.e., do not count threats of self-harm or suicide).  Count bodily gestures commonly recognized as threats of physical harm, e.g., mimic shooting a gun or slashing a throat.  ✔  Threats involving only pets or property, or threats of non-bodily harm, do not count for this Item.  ✘  Do not include any threats occurring before or after the Index Assault.  ✘  ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________
[directive] The following offenses are not subject to stationhouse adjustment and should result in the filing of a juvenile delinquency complaint:  1.  Offenses involving the use or possession of a controlled dangerous substance or drug paraphernalia as defined under Chapters 35 or 36 of the Criminal Code shall not be adjusted without permission of the County Prosecutor’s Office, as these 1Every law enforcement agency having patrol jurisdiction is required to designate at least one sworn officer to handle and coordinate juvenile matters.  Attorney General Executive Directive 1990- 1, page 12-3  Designation of Juvenile Officers.  Attorney General Guidelines - Stationhouse Adjustments
[directive] The seizing entity shall forward to the Property Management reports all seizures on a timely basis.  When sharing checks are received from of a Office county, the Property Management shall close out the corresponding case report and notify the seizing entity of the received funds-  Checks that m-, are received without sufficient information, number, sharing case number, etc.) to identify a specific seizure report, shall be referred to the seizing entity for proper identification.  1.  Case Files
[brief] See Abbott XXI, 206 N.J. at 357 (placing burden on State to demonstrate on remand impact of reduced funding on SFRA’s continuing constitutionality in Abbott districts).  The State’s Brief tries to sidestep the Abbott XX mandates altogether by invoking legislative “discretion,” the “Legislature’s prerogative,” and even “the concept of home rule” to justify the deferential review the trial court accorded [...]’s claim of SFRA underfunding.
[brief] ...........................................................................................................i  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED ..................................................................................  ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................  iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..............................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .....................................................................................................3  STATEMENT OF FACTS.......................................................................................................6  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AS TO THE [...] .................................................................6  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AS TO [...] .........................................................13  LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................23
[directive] 1  App ica b i i ty:  A1  Forfeiture Program  Pa rt ic ip a t ing Agen c ies 11- 1 1  Statement 11- 11:l Policy 1.  Determination of a Non-Law Enforcement Agency 11- 1 1 2 1 ta Request for Forfeiture Fund Distribution a Non-Law Enforcement Agency (Form D) 11- 2 11:3  Requesting Law Enforcement Agency Responsibilities 11- 2 D  Completion of Form 2-4 11- Review by County Prosecutor 11- 4  Review by Division of Criminal Justice 11- 4 - 0  I d Request for Forfeiture Fund Disbursement to a Non-Law - 3pp.  (Form D) Enforcement Agency  11  SOP No. Distribution of Forfeited Property to 12 - Participating Law Enforcement Apencies
[brief] ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: s/[...]  [...] Deputy Attorney General [...]  Attorney ID # 250252018  Dated: May 15, 2024  May 30, 2024  Via Electronic Filing [...], Appellate Clerk  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division Hughes Justice Complex 25 W. Market St. Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0006  Re: In The Matter Of [...], Sheriff’s Officer Lieutenant (PC15571A)  [...] Docket No. [...]  Dear Mr. Orlando:  This firm represents Appellant [...] in the above-captioned matter.
[brief] But why wouldn’t it have added to your defense overall if you could have said and also their expert says that this bullet went into [...]’ knee but in fact our expert says no, that’s not what the scientific evaluation shows at all.  It’s inconclusive.  But would you agree with me that if you had gone out and gotten your own ballistics expert, he may not have agreed with [...]’ opinion, right?  A  Anything’s possible, but it wouldn’t have – I wouldn’t -- I wouldn’t -- it wouldn’t have been used at trial.  I mean it -- it -- if I’m not putting the gun in his hand, I’m not saying [...] shot it, I don’t really care what the ballistics expert said, which is why I didn’t cross him at trial, cause it doesn’t go towards [...]’s involvement.  1T62  Q  Isn’t -- isn’t attacking the ballistics opinion of the State, isn’t that just an additional defense in an attempt to -- reasonable doubt about the case overall?
[brief] This Appeal is the sixth (6th) time (four separate actions and two appeals, inclusive of the instant appeal and the underlying judgment) the same causes of action have been challenged in the state courts of New Jersey. ¹  Those complaints, all ¹ [...] v [...], [...]; (Da152) [...] v [...] et al, [...] (Da168) and [...] v [...] et al, [...] (Da185).  McQueen v Razor, LLC, [...] (Da135)  Copies of the operative complaints are included in Respondent’s Appendix. filed and prosecuted by instant counsel, reveals the same allegations as present in the underlying Complaint here.  In all cases, the outcome was the same, dismissals of the claims brought pursuant to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, the New Jersey Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act and claims of unjust enrichment.
[directive] a.  Included in this definition, is any Assistant County Prosecutor functioning as a designee of a County Prosecutor, or Assistant Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General, functioning as a designee of the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice.  2.  “Division of State Police” shall mean and include all duly appointed sworn members of the New Jersey Division of State Police.  3.  “Criteria case” is an investigation of a motor vehicle or vessel crash in which there is one or more fatalities and/or serious injuries, and one or more of the Evaluation Criteria in this Joint Crash Investigative Protocol is, or are, present.  II.
[brief] 6.  The Township will continue to work expeditiously to reach a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) within thirty (30) days for the property commonly referred to as the [...] property and a fully-executed agreement within sixty (60) days after execution of the MOU.  The Township will advise the Special Master if it experiences difficulties in reaching these goals to allow the Special Master to intercede if need be.  Any failure by the developer of the [...] property to act on a timely basis will not be held against the Township.  7.  To assist the Township to continue its progress toward compliance, on or before February 10, 2021, [...] shall provide to the Special Master and counsel for the Township a written response to the Township Planner’s Memorandum served on January 13, 2021 and any supplemental documents provided by the Township for [...] and [...] as contemplated by the Memorandum.
[brief] A refusal occurs when a driver provides anything other than an “unequivocal, unambiguous consent” to an officer’s request that he submit to a breath test.  *State v. Widmaier*, 157 N.J. 475, 488 (1999).  Each motorist provides implied consent to submit to the test by their use of the road.  N.J.S.A. 39:50.3.  See *State v. Marquez*, 202 N.J. 485, 499 (2010).  The primary purpose of this regulation is to “curb the senseless havoc and destruction caused by intoxicated drivers. ”  *Marquez* 202 N.J. at 496 (citing *State v. Tischio*, 107 N.J. 594, 512 (1987).  Four elements must be met for a defendant to be found guilty of refusal: probable cause to believe the driver was impaired; the defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated; an officer requested that defendant submit to a test and informed the defendant of the consequences; and the defendant thereafter refused.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE BOARD’S FACTUAL FINDINGS IN CONNECTION WITH THE APPLICATION OF THE HEIGHT DEFINITION WERE NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR UNREASONABLE (Pa11-Pa12).  The trial court’s ultimate determination that the Board’s findings as to the reasons for the revised grading were not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable is adequately supported in the record.  The trial court properly acknowledged that the Board had the prerogative to find persuasive and credible the testimony of [...], [...]’s expert civil engineer, and the testimony of its own planning expert, [...] – who were asked to give an expert opinion on the terms within the definition.  Contrary to how Plaintiffs continue to attempt to spin this, the experts were not asked to make a legal determination.  Here, the Board properly found, based on the expert testimony of the licensed civil engineer who designed the project, and had over 20 years of experience in the field of civil engineering, and the Board’s own licensed professional planner, that the revised grading was not designed to allow for an increased building height, but rather because of stormwater management and underground infrastructure improvements.  The record is clear that there was more than enough support for the Board’s finding that a height variance was not required.
[brief] See Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel, 446 N.J. Super. 537, 542 n.1 (App. Div. 2016) (“[A]n issue that is not briefed on appeal is deemed waived. ”).  Next, as to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68, as noted by counsel for the [...] in his April 20, 2017 letter to Appellant's counsel in response to Appellant’s first attempt to obtain relief from the [...], that provision is also wholly inapplicable to the relief Appellant sought (Ra165-Ra166).
[brief] “[A] trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ””  Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).  The Appellate Division applies a deferential standard, however, in reviewing factual findings by a judge.  Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 594-95 (2020); State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 271 (2019).  “A reviewing court must accept the factual findings of a trial court that are ‘supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ’”  State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71, 88 (2016) (quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014)).  “Reviewing appellate courts should ‘not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge’ unless convinced that those findings and conclusions were ‘so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ’”  Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).
[directive] [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  3.  Èske w konprann ke si w ta dezobeyi kondisyon libète kondisyonèl sou sipèvizyon a yo ta kab revoke libète kondisyonèl ou an epi yo ta kab fè w retounnen nan prizon pou pije swa tout oubyen pati nan tèm libète kondisyonèl sou sipèvizyon ki rete a, menm si ou te finn pije tèm prizon yo te deja enpoze w?
[brief] (Id. at 34).  In arriving at a proper valuation of the marital estate, the trial court found:  Both parties testified and agreed that [[...]] brought no or nominal assets into the marriage.  The Court finds these facts must be taken into consideration when determining the fairness of the PSA (which incorporated the MMA) and whether the PSA is substantively unconscionable.  [Id. at 32].  The trial court further reasoned: - [...] was “intricately aware of the financial status of the parties during the marriage...[and]...provided full access to the vast majority, if not all, of the parties’ bank accounts, CD’s, credit cards and was a signatory on the vast majority of all of the parties’ checking accounts”, and - She was adequately represented by [...] concerning the legal risk involved and her exposure for fraudulent transfers in the bankruptcy”, and - “All evidence submitted shows [[...]] brought significant monies and assets into the marriage.
[brief] **POINT THREE [Private right to a cause of action issues] (Argued Pa372 – Pa373)**  The Legislature does not authorize lawsuits against public entities for any and every statutory violation.  To sue a public entity in Superior Court for statutory violations, the Legislature must express a private right to a cause of action.  After several amendments to N.J.S.A. 7F-9, the Legislature never expressed that there is a private right to a cause of action for a private company to sue a public school district in Superior Court.  Since [...] lacks an express private right to a cause of action, its Counterclaim against the [...] must be dismissed.
[directive] Restrictions that apply to internal affairs investigations may have their basis in state statutes, case law, collective bargaining agreements, local ordinances, Civil Service Commission rules or agency rules and regulations.  Internal affairs investigators shall familiarize themselves with all of these provisions.  7.0.4  Complaints must be professionally, objectively and expeditiously investigated in order to gather all information necessary to arrive at a proper disposition.  It is important to document complainants’ concerns, even those that appear to be unfounded or frivolous.  If such complaints are not documented or handled appropriately, public dissatisfaction will grow, fostering a general impression of agency insensitivity to community concerns.  7.0.5
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022 Core Principle Six Duty to Render Medical Assistance.  After any use of force, and when the environment is safe, officers shall promptly render medical assistance to any injured person consistent with the officer’s training and shall promptly request emergency medical assistance for that person, if needed or requested.  Officers also have a duty to monitor individuals for potential medical intervention after any officer uses force.  6.1  An officer’s duty to render medical assistance and monitor for potential medical intervention is particularly important following any use of force.  When the force involves the use of OC spray, officers shall take immediate action to address the effects of the OC spray, consistent with training.  6.2  The duty to render medical assistance and monitor applies to all officers on scene and continues throughout any transportation and custody of the individual.  6.3  Officers shall pay particular attention to persons reasonably believed to be pregnant, children, the elderly, physically frail individuals, and those experiencing a mental health or substance use crisis.