ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Pa92; Pa97.  The court cited only one authority, Atwater v. Underhill, 22 N.J. Eq. 599 (Ch. 1862), to support its decision that Plaintiff lacked standing because once a mortgage is cancelled, it cannot be foreclosed.  Pa96.  That case is distinguishable and 2  The oral argument transcript of 12/5/2023 is herein referred to as “T.page#-line# begs the question: Can a mortgage ever be reinstated after cancellation for any reason, including mistake?
[brief] What [...]’s February 2020 notice to its Merchant Customers failed to mention was that instead of merely simplifying its billing, the new “bundling” categories described therein increased the “interchange rate” substantially above the “interchange rates” published by the credit card issuers, with the excess fee being billed to the Merchant Customer.  For example, instead of a VISA credit card transaction resulting in a processing fee that would incorporate VISA’s published interchange rate, that transaction now resulted in a credit card processing fee that incorporated Defendant [...]’s wholly arbitrary, and typically substantially higher, “bundled” rate.  This subtle change in billing rates concealed from the putative Class of [...] Merchant Customers who used Defendant’s credit card processing services between April 2020 and the present, an increase over and above the rates provided for in their agreements with [...] amounting to hundreds, and sometimes thousands, of dollars.
[brief] The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Dismissed Appellant’s Complaint With Prejudice.  Rule 4:37-2 affords the trial court discretion to dismiss a complaint with prejudice if the plaintiff fails to comply with a court order.  See Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 254 (1982) (explaining that “[d]ismissal for failure to comply with a court rule or order shall be without prejudice unless the order specifically states that it is to be with prejudice”).
[brief] If Plaintiffs’ “per se” negligence theory was somehow allowed, any engineer who prepares a site plan for a redevelopment project in the State of New Jersey would not be afforded the protection of the Affidavit of Merit statute.  [...]’s preparation of a preliminary site plan in 2017 at the request of the [...] did not breach any sort of common knowledge duty owed to Plaintiffs or constitute a trespass onto the Property.  The remediation activities performed by [...], which do relate to the alleged trespass and damages, had nothing to do with [...]’s preliminary or revised site plans, which, again, did not call for any remediation activities.  (Pa000390 at ¶¶ 5, 7).
[brief] This was not the case.  As a result, a dozen different variances were required for Respondents Amended Application.  The Township at no time sought to amend the original court-approved plan.  Notably, the Township has also not taken the position that the potential loss of affordable housing units on the site due to the changed circumstance would not be recovered through increased affordable housing development on other sites or through other means.  The Township similarly has not taken any action that would demonstrate “hostility” toward its Mt. Laurel obligations.  No such “hostility” can even be gleaned through the Board’s denial of Respondent’s Amended Application.  The trial court strained to find such hostility.  It opted to take an appropriately made opposition to the Amended Application and turn it into something heinous.  This proverbial square peg does not fit in the round hole.  While the trial court found that the lack of opposition to the original application was evidence of bad faith in the present circumstance, the evidence supports the opposite conclusion.  The Mayor’s opposition to the Amended Application was pointed toward the density of the Project compared to its reduced acreage and the presence of the bald eagle’s nest.  Both of these considerations did not exist, or at least were not known, at the time the original application was approved by the Board in 2016.  The Mayor was not, and is not, obligated to look at the Amended Application through the same lens as the original application.  After all, the Project has a very real impact on the Township.  To require this to be viewed in a vacuum would require willful blindness lest a developer get the wrong impression.  The Mayor voicing his opinion over a Project that now had changed circumstances does not constitute the type of “past hostility” necessary for finding the appointment of a SHO and Special Master.  Despite these circumstances and Respondents’ Mt. Laurel claims being dismissed against the Appellants, the trial court conferred upon Respondents the extraordinary Mt. Laurel remedy of a SHO appointment.  Such an exceptional remedy is especially improper in this matter where the Township’s land use regulations have been found to afford a realistic opportunity for low- and moderate-income housing as required under Mt. Laurel.  Pursuant to the above, the Appellants respectfully request that this Court reverse the trial court’s decision to appoint an SHO in this matter.
[brief] ” (Pa284 at T46:5-14 (“I mean, it looks like it happens very, very quickly, but there’s no visual abrupt edge like the edge of the deck, the concrete deck, that you cannot see, so something is up there butted up against it.  This would not meet any standard for tapers, asphalt tapers. ”)).  This drastic change in position, as the trial court held, is sufficient to deem [...]’s opinion unreliable and therefore inadmissible pursuant to N.J.R.E. 703.
[brief] Defendants/respondents [...], Police Officer [...], and Detective [...] respectfully request that the trial court’s December 1, 2023 Order granting summary judgment in their favor and dismissing plaintiff’s Complaint be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, **[...]**  Attorneys for Defendants [...], Police Officer [...], and Detective [...]  By: s/[...]  [...]  Dated: September 5, 2024  [...], : SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  Vehicular Homicide Facts:  On June 4, 2019, at about 3:44 p.m., defendant drove at about 40 miles per hour in the right eastbound lane on Morris Avenue, when he drifted across the four lanes of traffic into the right westbound lane and crashed head-on into the vehicle driven by [...] and further occupied by [...] and [...].  (Pa35 to 44).  Ms. Murray sustained bruising commensurate with her seatbelt positioning during the crash, with pain in her left shoulder and across her chest.  (Pa39).  As a result of the crash, Ms. Vasquez sustained a laceration requiring stitches to her left hand, as well as bruising and pain commensurate with her seatbelt positioning during the crash.  (Pa39 to 40).  Ms. Mele, who was the front seat passenger, was transported to [...], where, approximately twenty-six hours later, she died.  (Pa54).  [...] conducted an autopsy of Ms. Mele and ruled the cause of death to be blunt impact injuries, and the manner of death to be an accident.  (Pa55 to 59).  At the scene, defendant stated that he fell asleep and did not know what --- 2  Because this is an appeal from a pretrial motion and the trial has not occurred, the “Statement of Facts” are derived from police reports and investigative reports and are the facts that the State intends to prove at trial.  happened.  (Pa37).  At the hospital, defendant said he lost control of his vehicle.  (Pa45).  In subsequent statements, defendant again admitted that he fell asleep.  (Pa35 to 44).  Defendant’s blood was drawn at the hospital about one hour after the crash and contained cocaine metabolites (Benzoylecgonine, “BZE”), as well as Clonazepam (an anti-anxiety, muscle relaxer, Benzodiazepine) in an amount far-exceeding any therapeutic dosage/purpose.
[brief] This Point responds to Point III in defendant’s brief.  (Db33 to 44). the court, would ultimately decide whether to issue a warrant for a search of his residence.  (Db33).  None of these claims have merit.  Here, based on a thorough review of the record — including the motor-vehicle recording (MVR) and a State-provided transcript of the stop — reveal that defendant and police had a productive conversation about defendant’s concerns, and officers answered his questions and provided an accurate description of future events should defendant refuse consent to search at that moment.  Taken in context, the back-and-forth dialogue between defendant and the officers at the scene was conversational and demonstrated that defendant knew that he had the right to decline the request for consent to search.  Ultimately, officers agreed to adhere to defendant’s request to protect his wife and granddaughter from a surprise intrusion when he voluntarily provided consent.  [...]’s review of this same evidence resulted in a denial of defendant’s motion to suppress which this Court should affirm.
[brief] On January 14, 2022 NJDCR commenced discrimination action against the respondents on behalf of the Mother (Pa52).  NJDCR was coerced to withdraw its action, as it was assured that the matter had federal jurisdiction and shall be handled by federal agencies.  On July 14, 2020, within its statutory 100-days under Title VIII Fair Housing Act, HUD completed its investigations and referred the case to the DOJ and HUD stipulated this referral in writing via letter to the parties (Pa37).  HUD made this referral, because the Mother opt-out of the HUD “Voluntary Conciliation” during the said 100-days, as the Mother “elected” to proceed to court and have a judge or magistrate to decide her case.  The Mother so elected, because in lieu of a reserved parking space the respondents ([...]) were offering her to place a handicapped parking space for the general public “NEAR” her house, which would have served the disabled tenants of the large apartment complex situated two doors away from her house.  After receiving the said referral, the DOJ shelved the case for the next about three years until November 13, 2023, when DOJ issued a letter, now, telling that the jurisdiction of the matter has been with the state (Pa54)?
[brief] Specifically, the trial judge took issue with the number of hours [...] spent preparing its second Motion for Summary Judgment, contending that the motion was “very similar to the first motion for summary judgment filed,” thereby making the amount of time expended on the second Motion for Summary Judgment unreasonable.  (Pa000638).  The second Motion for Summary Judgment was sufficiently different from the first motion in that the Affidavit of Merit was no longer at issue.  In addition, [...] still had to address the negligence and trespass claims, including Plaintiffs’ new “per se” negligence argument, and the erroneous “reliance” argument arising from the [...] representative’s deposition testimony.  Moreover, an engineer from [...] was consulted regarding Plaintiffs’ Opposition and an affidavit from the engineer was deemed necessary.  This distinct and substantive work (as reflected in the detailed billing entries) relating to the second Motion for Summary Judgment was not similar to the first Motion for Summary Judgment.
[brief] All explanations of why [...] could not litigate a case without familiarizing itself with the evidence and prior proceedings fell on deaf ears.  [...] had no interest in reviewing the bona fides of the invoices.  Rather than attempting to understand the billings, or resolve any billing issues in good faith, [...] gave [...] an ultimatum.  Either agree to waive the fee and convert the case to a 20% contingency fee, or we "will let the Courts decide in a couple of years".  [...] declined to waive the earned fee and convert to a 20% contingency.  Consequently, the firm was terminated effective the evening of February 1, 2017.
[brief] In [...] Northeast, Inc. v. [...] International Asset Fund, NV, Inc., 2003 WL 22057003 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2003), the court stated:  Significantly, [...] does not allege that [...]’s act, error or omission was negligent.  It claims the opposite.  Rather, [...] urges the court to interpret the clause “negligent act, error or omission,” so that the word “negligent” only modifies the word “act” and does not modify “error” or “omission. ”  Under this interpretation, [...] would be liable for its allegedly deliberate omission, namely, the failure to remit premiums.  Defendants claim that the word “negligent” modifies all three of the nouns that follow it.  Insurance policies that provide coverage for negligent acts, errors or omissions are quite common.  This court has assumed, without deciding that the clause applies only to negligent behavior.  See Jacobson v. Fed. Ins. Co., 95 Civ. 4343, 1999 WL 893045, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1999) ([...]).
[brief] [Pa618-624].  As per the applicable standard of care established by Plaintiff’s expert, [...], the defendants [...] or [...], [...]’s doctor, needed to call for an emergency C-section immediately and at that time.  .  [Pa618-624].  [...], the infant, needed to be delivered in fifteen minutes thereafter, as per the standard of care.  .  [Pa618-624].  The defendants failed to do so.
[brief] In the same way, we argue that an average juror might not know the purpose of a grading plan for a construction project, or how to read such a plan, but would know, without the benefit of expert testimony, that a contractor who hires a surveyor to set stakes based on the engineer's grading plan, must provide the surveyor with the most current revision of the grading plan available.  And if the contractor receives a revised grading plan from the project engineer, the contractor must provide the surveyor with that updated plan as soon as possible.  At time of trial, if our Complaint is reinstated, we will demonstrate through contemporaneous business records and testimony in accord with certifications provided by the parties, that Defendant contractor [...] knew that the original grading plan which they had given to the surveyor was outdated, inaccurate and had already been revised by the time the surveyor relied on it to set his grading stakes on site.  [...] had been alerted several times by the project engineer that the old plan was seriously inaccurate.  [...] had actually received from the engineer a copy of a revised grading plan and a plain-language explanation of the error.  Yet [...] inexplicably failed to provide its surveyor with the new plan.  As the result of defendant [...]'s failure to provide its surveyor with the engineer's revised grading plan, the surveyor staked out the construction site 30" lower than it should have been.  By the time this was discovered, the majority of the grading had been performed, and the new building on site had been constructed 30" (2.5 ft.) out of vertical alignment with the pre-existing building on site.  Most importantly, the exterior grade of the [...] was now 30” below the interior floor level prohibiting use of the [...] from being used as a retail building with “ongrade” access to the building from its eastern wall.  This directly resulted in all manner of financial loss to plaintiffs, as discussed below.
[brief] Page(s)  Order and Statement of Reasons of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. Dated: March 13, 2024 ................................................................. Da1–19 Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. Dated: March 24, 2024 ................................................................. Da20 | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Avdel Corp. v. Mecure, | 17, 18 | | 58 N.J. 264 (1971) | | | Basement Store Franchise Corp. v. Natoli, | 28 | | 2014 WL 4328218 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Sept. 3, 2014) | | | Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, | 23 | | 462 N.J. Super. 594 (App. Div. 2020) | | | Bekier v. Commonwealth Construction Co., | 21 | | 2007 WL 3014704 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2007) | | | Berlin, Sachs & Werkstell v. Cart-Wright Indus., Inc., | 28 | | 1990 WL 126197 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 1990) | | | Bhagat v. Bhagat, | 25, 26 | | 217 N.J. 22 (2014) | | | Citibank, N.A. v. Estate of Simpson, | 14, 16, 17 | | 290 N.J. Super. 519 (App. Div. 1996) | | | Danka Funding, L.L.C. v. Page, Scrantom, Sprouse, Tucker & Ford, | 27, 28 | | 21 F. Supp. 2d 465 (D.N.J. 1998) | | | Display Works, LLC v. Bartley, | 23, 24 | | 182 F. Supp. 3d 166 (D. Ct. 2016) | | | FDASmart, Inc. v. Dishman Pharm. & Chems., Ltd., | 21 | | 448 N.J. Super. 195 (App. Div. 2016)
[directive] The [...] shall only have authority to only transfer funds into the [...] accounts.  External transfers shall [...]. be conducted by the in in  The funds that have been deposited individual accounts remain - the account until a final disposition (court order or settlement - agreement) is received.  Settlement agreements are given to the or [...] from either the county prosecutor [...].  Money that has been forfeited to the State is then removed from the individual accounts- which  All money forfeited to the State, except those funds are mandated by State law for other purposes, is deposited the in ([...]).  [...], The Property Management shall reconcile all bank and Division Office Investment statements within two business days of receipt, and of shall also review the statements to insure that the transfers and deposits are within the proper accounts.
[brief] See Opposition to Motion by Defendant, P162a.  When Plaintiff’s counsel appeared unwilling to informally resolve this matter, on May 28, 2021, [...] served an Offer of Judgment, pursuant to R. 4:58-1, for the total amount of $11,000.00.  Id.  By letter dated June 3, 2021, Plaintiff’s counsel rejected Defendant’s offer and provided no counteroffer.  Id.  In November and December of 2021, Plaintiff then served unnecessary subpoenas on two nonparty dealerships, seeking all service documents concerning the Vehicle.  See Opposition to Motion by Defendant, P162a.  Plaintiff clearly had all of these documents, having attached the relevant records to the Complaint.  See P074a – P107a.  On December 23, 2021, the parties completed a deposition of Plaintiff, the only deposition conducted in this action.  Id.  This matter then proceeded to arbitration on July 7, 2022, following which Plaintiff was awarded $7,500.00, with attorney’s fees to be decided by the Court.  Id.  Ultimately, the parties reached a settlement in December 2022 providing for compensation to Plaintiff in the amount of just $7,500.00 and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to Plaintiff’s counsel to be decided by the Court upon motion.  See Settlement Agreement, P121a -P128a.  The Settlement Agreement and Release required Plaintiff to file the Motion for Attorney’s Fees within 60 days of the execution of the Settlement Agreement and Release.  Id.  Although the Settlement Agreement and Release was fully executed on December 22, 2022 (see P128a), Plaintiff failed to timely file the motion for attorney’s fees and costs, waiting until March 15, 2023 to make the motion.  The parties fully briefed the matter, including a lengthy reply filed by Plaintiff.  On May 19, 2023, the trial court issued a lengthy decision and order, granting the motion in part and awarding a total of $2,449.00 in attorney’s fees and $552.20 in costs.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[directive] Do you understand that if you plead guilty to any of the following offenses: leader of a narcotics trafficking network (2C:35-3); operating a controlled dangerous substance production facility (2C:35-4); manufacturing a controlled dangerous substance (2C:35-5) distribution, possession or manufacture of gamma hydroxybututyrate (2C:35-5.2); distribution, possession or manufacture of flunitrazepam (2C:35-5.3); employing a juvenile in drug distribution (2C:35-6); distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance within 1,000 feet of school property (2C:35-7); distributing, dispensing or possessing a controlled dangerous substance within 500 feet of a public housing facility, park or building (2C:35-7.1); or, distribution, possession or manufacture of an imitation controlled dangerous substance (2C:35-11) ORAZ/AND udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, Formularz (02/23/2018), CN 11169-Polish strona 1 z 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11169- Polish page 1 of 2 przyzna się Pan(i) również do posiadania broni palnej podczas [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] [Nie dotyczy/ a. popełniania, usiłowania popełnienia, lub zmowy przestępczej NA] w celu popełnienia któregokolwiek z tych przestępstw, otrzyma Pan(i) kolejny wyrok za posiadanie broni? you also plead guilty to possessing a firearm while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of these offenses you will receive a consecutive sentence for possessing the weapon? LUB/OR przyzna się Pan(i) również do posiadania broni innej niż broń [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] [Nie dotyczy/ b. palna, do celów niezgodnych z prawem podczas popełniania, NA] usiłowania popełnienia, lub zmowy przestępczej w celu popełnienia któregokolwiek z tych przestępstw, otrzyma Pan(i) kolejny wyrok za posiadanie broni do celów niezgodnych z prawem? you also plead guilty to possessing a weapon, other than a firearm, for an unlawful purpose while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of these offenses you will receive a consecutive sentence for possessing the weapon for an unlawful purpose? LUB/OR przyzna się Pan(i) również do posiadania broni innej niż broń [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] [Nie dotyczy/ c. palna w okolicznościach nie uzasadniających w NA] aposó oczywisty legalnego użycia broni podczas popełniania, usiłowania popełnienia, lub zmowy przestępczej w celu popełnienia któregokolwiek z tych przestępstw, otrzyma Pan(i) kolejny wyrok za posiadanie broni do celów niezgodnych z prawem? you also plead guilty to possessing a weapon, other than a firearm, under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful use of the weapon while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of these offenses you will receive a consecutive sentence for possessing the weapon?
[brief] But the relevant precedent on cruel and unusual punishment from both the United States Supreme Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court has consistently drawn the constitutional line between childhood and adulthood at eighteen years old.  As such, defendant may have been a young adult, but he was an adult nonetheless for constitutional purposes when he brutally murdered [...].  Defendant asks this Court to "extend" the New Jersey Supreme Court's 2022 decision in *State v. Comer*—creating a twenty-year "look-back" provision for juvenile homicide offenders—to eighteen-to-twenty-year-old offenders.
[brief] Q.  Isn’t it true when [...] and [...] were together that they were happy?  A.  I don’t know.  I think there was more unhappiness on her side than there was happiness.  I mean there were times when there was, they were happy, but.  THE COURT: But what?  Please answer.  A.  So many times she would call me and be unhappy and tell me things about her husband, she wasn’t happy.  She wasn’t happy when he would come home from being in Cherry Hill on the weekends, she wasn’t happy that he was coming home.  (11T59-3 to 14).
[brief] Ocean County Indictment Number [...] ........................................  Da 1-3  Verdict Sheet ..................................................................................................  Da 4-5  Judgment of Conviction ................................................................................  Da 6-9 Notice of Appeal ..............................................................................................  Da 10-13  Department of Justice, Approved Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports for the Forensic Latent Print Discipline ......Da 14-16  Model Criminal Jury Charge, Final Jury Charge (Criminal)  .....................Da 17-26  TRANSCRIPT  LEGEND  Da - appendix to defendant-appellant’s brief