ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Exhibit 6 - Deed for the Matter of [...] FBO [...] to [...] for 200 E.  Park Avenue 584a-592a Exhibit 7 - Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] 593a-600a Exhibit 8 - Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] 601a-606a Exhibit 9 - Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] 607a-612a Exhibit 10 - Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] 613a-619a Exhibit 11 - Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 12- Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 13- Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 14- Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 15- Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...], and for [...] Exhibit 16- Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 17- Deed for the Matter of [...] [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 18- Deed for the Matter of [...] [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 19- Lis Pendens for the Matter of [...] v. [...] Exhibit 20- Lis Pendens for the Matter of [...] v. [...] Exhibit 21- Tax Certificate for the Matter of [...] FBO [...] to [...] Exhibit 22- Lis Pendens for the Matter of Echo Lake Enterprises LLC, v. [...] Exhibit 23- Lis Pendens for the Matter of Echo Lake Enterprises LLC, v. [...] Exhibit 24- Lis Pendens for the Matter of Echo Lake Enterprises LLC v. [...] Exhibit 25- Assignment of Tax Sale Certificate for [...] To [...] Exhibit 26- Assignment of Tax Sale Certificate for [...] FBO [...] to [...] Exhibit 27- Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 28- Assignment of Tax Sale Certificate for [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 29- Assignment of Tax Sale Certificate for [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 30- Assignment of Tax Sale Certificate for [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 31- Assignment of Tax Sale Certificate for [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 32- Lis Pendens for the Matter of Echo Lake Enterprises LLC, v. [...] Exhibit 33- Assignment of Tax Sale Certificate for [...] FBO [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 34- Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 35- Deed for the Matter of First National Acquisitions LLC to [...] for [...] Exhibit 36- Deed for the Matter of [...] to [...] for [...] Exhibit 37-
[brief] It has been otherwise stated that our appellate function is a limited one: we do not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial court unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonable credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.  Id., 483-484.  “Given our limited scope of appellate review and deference to the fact-finding role of the trial court, we cannot substitute our review of the record for that of the Law Division. ”  Township of West Windsor v. Nierenberg, 345 N.J.Super 472, citing Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc. 110 N.J. 464, 476(1988); Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. at 483-84(1974).  Moreover, “[t]here was sufficient basis in the record to support the trial court's findings and conclusions. ”  *Township of West Windsor v. Nierenberg*, 345 N.J.Super 472, citing *Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co.*, 65 N.J. at 484; see also *New Jersey Tpk. Auth. v. Sisselman*, 106 N.J.Super. 358, 370(App.Div. 1969), certif. denied, 54 N.J. 565(1969); *Fagliarone v. Township of No. Bergen*, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App.Div.1963), certif. denied, 40 N.J. 221 (1963); *Weiss v. I. Zapinsky*, 65 N.J. Super. 351, 357 (App.Div. 1961).  As the Appellate Division observed, “[a]lthough we might have reached a different result in this case, we find no abuse of discretion.  We cannot fairly say that the judge's decision under the particular circumstances of this case was clearly a mistaken one requiring our intervention and correction.  *Township of West Windsor v. Nierenberg*, 345 N.J.Super 472, citing *Casino Reinvestment Development Authority v. Hauck*, 317 N.J. Super. 584, 595 (App.Div.1999); *Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Clean-O-Mat Corp.*, 289 N.J. Super. 381, 401(App.Div.1996); certif. denied, 147 N.J. 262 (1996).  The court in *Rova Farms* further noted, “[f]indings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate substantial and credible evidence”, Ibid.  Deference to the trial court should be accorded unless its determination is so wide of the mark as to be clearly mistaken.  *Maggio v. Pruzansky*, 22 N.J. Super. 567, 577 (App. Div. 1988).  In the remand proceedings, Appellant vigorously argued his entitlement for compounding post-judgment interest.
[brief] (Sb 14)  As explained in [...]’s initial brief, McGuire has nothing to do with this case because it is about a totally different type of analysis.  Yes, both the analysis in McGuire ¹ Sb – State’s brief Ra – Appendix to defendant-appellant’s reply brief and the analysis in this case fall under the broad umbrella of “firearm and tool mark analysis. ”  But this broad term involves analysis of any marks left by any tool.  The analysis in McGuire was about the tools used to cut plastic bags.  Id. at 133.  Whatever the ability for an expert to match the markings left from a blade that cuts bags has no bearing on the ability to match completely different marks left by completely different instruments—in this case, of matching casings and bullets to a specific gun.  Although McGuire did contain some discussion of the National Academy of Sciences report discussed in [...]’s brief, it did not contain reference to the wealth of information about the unreliability about the specific matching task at issue in this case, because that information postdates McGuire.
[brief] Pa 151-152.  This diagram reflects that the accident occurred within the intersection and depicts the Plaintiff turning into the defendant before the defendant had reached the entrance to Westbound Route 280.  Again, there is no indication in the police report that there is any sort of pavement marking in this intersection such as a dotted line to reflect that left turns were allowed from two lanes, just as Plaintiff also testified at her deposition that there were no dotted lines in the intersection delineating separate lanes.  **Pa 51: 4-13.**  Her arguing now that she somehow was permitted to make the left turn onto the Route 280 on-ramp from the lane designated for straight travel through the intersection, and that there was some failing on the part of the defendant in relation to N.J.S.A. 39:4-123, is insufficient to raise the smallest question in that regard.  **D.
[brief] For example, in IMO [...], [...], Warren County, [...] (September 30, 2004), aff’d, [...] (November 17, 2004),\(^9\) the board member “endorsed a candidate for the Belleville Municipal Council through a mailing where the envelopes and letterhead bore his official title as President of the [...]. ”  Id. at 5.  The Commission reasoned that even if [...] did not intend to make the endorsement in his official capacity, he still violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b) because “the design of the letterhead, the content of the letter, and the nature of the return address on the envelope, could lead someone reading the letter to reasonably assume that the endorsement was made by Mr. [...] in his official capacity as President of the Board[,]” in \(^9\)  In the absence of any known published authority on the issues presented, the Commissioner relies on informative agency decisions of the Commission and the Commissioner as secondary authority.  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2 on R. 1:36-3 (2024).  A copy of all agency decisions has been included in respondent’s appendix pursuant to Rules 1:36-3 and 2:6-1(a)(1)(H).
[brief] \(^6\)  Due to the pervasive harms flowing from no-fault fraud schemes, insurance carriers, federal, state and local law enforcement agencies have worked together to prosecute and obtain criminal convictions of a host of medical providers, "runners" and attorneys who have created a cottage industry of no-fault fraud through which they line their own pockets without regard to the harm to consumers, insurers or the integrity of the no-fault system.  The following civil and criminal cases are but a few demonstrating the rings of health care providers, runners and attorneys who operate independently of each other but follow the same fraud script: the health care providers pay kickbacks to runners to refer patients from staged or real accidents for treatment not needed or not rendered, and lawyers pay kickbacks to runners to refer those patients as clients to make fraudulent injury claims.  For instance, in 2008, [...] sued [...], a pain management specialist, along with forty-four (44) other defendants for financial kickback schemes with chiropractors and attorneys, as well as money laundering and overbilling for services purportedly provided.
[brief] ”  In re Opinion No. 17-2012, 220 N.J. at 469.  The indictment will have no such impact on [...] and [...]’s representation of their clients.  This is confirmed by the Defendants-Respondents, who have not requested that [...] withdraw as their counsel in this consolidated matter.  (Pa169-81; Da7).  As the trial court correctly concluded RPC 1.7 is not implicated because [...] and the attorneys handling the defense, [...] and [...], do not have any adverse interest to these entities and the individual defendants.  As noted above, the indictment as to [...] was in his personal capacity and he has no involvement in this litigation.  The case of J.G. Ries and Sons, 384 NJ Super 216, the Appellate Division, 2006 at page 223, states that, “RPC 1.7 reflects the fundamental understanding that an attorney will give complete and undivided loyalty to the client and should be able to advise the client in such a way as to protect the client’s interests utilizing his professional training, ability, and judgment to the utmost. ”  The record before me does not cast any doubt on the defendants’ position that [...] and [...] will be able to, and have been, zealous advocates for their clients.  (T7).  For these reasons, there is no concurrent conflict of interest under RPC 1.17(a) and the appeal should be denied.
[brief] [...]’s Comments about the Incident  Defendant  [...] posted about the Incident on her Facebook and Instagram accounts the day after it occurred.  Da_013-14; Da_015; Da_115-123.  [...], an Essex County resident, is an Olympic medalist fencer known for wearing a hijab.  Da_004-5.  She advocates for pride in wearing this religious garb, and has authored two children’s books on this subject.  Da_004-6.  [...] has been widely recognized for both her athletic achievements and advocacy.  Id.  Muhammad’s full October 7, 2021 post about the Incident reads:  I wrote this book [The Proudest Blue: A Story of Hijab and Family] with the intention that moments like this would never happen again.  When will it stop?  Yesterday, [...], a teacher at [...] in [...] forcibly removed the hijab of a second grade student.  The young student resisted, by trying to hold onto her hijab, but the teacher pulled the hijab off, exposing her hair to the class.  Herman told the student that her hair was beautiful and she did not have to wear hijab to school anymore.  Imagine being a child and stripped of your clothing in front of your classmates.  Imagine the humiliation and trauma this experience has caused her.  This is abuse.  Schools should be a haven to all of our kids to feel safe, welcome and protected—no matter their faith.  We cannot move toward a post-racial America until we weed out the racism and bigotry that still exist in all layers of our society.  By protecting Muslim girls who wear hijab, we are protecting the rights of all of us to have a choice in the way we dress.  Writing books and posting on social is not enough.  We must stand together and vehemently denounce discrimination in all of its forms.  CALL [...] [...] and EMAIL the principal [...] and the superintendent [...]  Da_013-14; Da_115-16.  See also Da_122-23.  In the versions of this statement [...] posted to Instagram, she “tagged” the Instagram accounts of [...] and [...].  Da_016.  C. [...] and [...]’s Comments about the Incident
[directive] (See N.J.S.A. 52:4B-22(b)).  The victim has the right to talk privately with the CSVA and have the CSVA present prior to and during any law enforcement interview, medical treatment, or evidence collection procedure.  Law enforcement shall recognize that private communications between the victim and the CSVA are privileged and confidential.  (See N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.15).
[brief] When [...] filed its motion to dismiss, it was Plaintiff’s burden to show that the Agreement was procedurally unconscionable.  See *Howard v. Diolosa*, 241 N.J. Super. 222, 230 (App. Div. 1990) (“Plaintiff must demonstrate unconscionability by showing some overreaching or imposition resulting from a bargaining disparity between the parties, or such patent unfairness in the contract that no reasonable person not acting under compulsion or out of necessity would accept its terms. ”).  Yet, at the trial level, Plaintiff made “no argument regarding the procedural fairness of the contract (i.e. that plaintiff was given the contract on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis, that he had no opportunity to review the contract or arbitration clause before signing, etc.).” (Pa12 (trial court opinion)).  Further, and as the trial court correctly reasoned, Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no facts regarding procedural unconscionability.  (Pa13); accord Pace v. Hamilton Cove, 258 N.J. 82, 107 (2024) (reversing the Appellate Division and observing that the arbitration agreement was enforceable, in part, because plaintiffs’ “complaint contains no [] allegations” and the “record must contain some indicia of economic compulsion” to establish procedural unconscionability).  Nor did Plaintiff submit a certification in opposition to [...]’s motion, in accordance with R. 1:6-6, indicating or suggesting that there were any abnormalities about the negotiation process, that he was not of sound mind when he signed the Agreement, that he was illiterate or did not understand the Agreement, that he was unsophisticated, or that he was under any coercion (economic or otherwise) which could support a finding of procedural unconscionability.  See generally Baldyga v. Oldman, 261 N.J.Super. 259, 265 (App.Div.1993) (The purpose of R. 1:6-6 is in part to “eliminate the presentation of facts which are not of record by unsworn statement of counsel made in briefs and oral arguments. ”).  In this way, Plaintiff’s appellate argument is distinguishable from other matters which may have required evidentiary hearings because he did not take the time present evidence regarding such claims at the trial level.  See e.g., Moore v. Woman To Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, L.L.C., 416 N.J. Super. 30, 43 (App. Div. 2010) (identifying factual disputes about the formation of the contract, not present here, which required an evidentiary hearing); see also Kleine v. Emeritus at Emerson, 445 N.J. Super. 545, 550 (App. Div. 2016) (observing that, in light of the sworn statements submitted in opposition to defendant’s motion, not present here, an evidentiary hearing would have been required).  Thus, the trial court correctly denied Plaintiff limited discovery and enforced the parties’ Agreement.  *In re Bloomingdale Convalescent Ctr.*, 233 N.J. Super. 46, 48 n.1 (App. Div.1989) (noting an issue not briefed is waived); *Noye v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.*, 238 N.J. Super. 430, 432 n. 2 (App. Div.) (matter not argued in the brief deemed “abandoned”), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 147 (1990).
[directive] No 10% or its analog, 5 ounce or more; or marijuana, 25 pounds or more; or 50 marijuana plants or Possessing CDS with more; or hashish, 5 pounds or more.  Intent to Distribute Heroin or cocaine, 1/2 ounce or more but less than 5 ounces; LSD or its analog, in a quantity of less than 100 milligrams, or where the amount is undetermined; or phencyclidine or its analog in a quantity of less than 10 grams, or where the amount is undetermined; or 2nd Degree $75,000 to $150,000
[directive] (only complete if the offense occurred on or after August 14, 2013)  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of child pornography pursuant to 2C:24-4b(4) or 2C:24-4b(5) or an N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. attempt to commit either of these offenses and the offense occurred on or after August 14, 2013, in addition to any other sentence, and upon motion of the prosecutor, the court shall impose a special sentence of parole supervision for life, unless the court finds on the record that parole supervision for life is not needed to protect the community or deter you from future criminal activity?
[brief] Appellant was repeatedly directed by [...] to leave staff meetings to take care of some issue within the school while Caucasian employees were never asked to address issues within the school.  Appellant was directed to assist in correcting student schedule problems which were caused by [...] who was not reprimanded for this major fiasco which resulted in students sitting in the auditorium for months, yet, Appellant was criticized for allegedly ordering the wrong AP Testing materials.  The position taken by [...] was that he did not want [...] to be reprimanded and have a write-up in her folder but he had no difficulty issuing to Plaintiff a letter of non-renewal a week after she addressed [...]’s use of a racial slur.
[brief] In addition, the court’s erroneous decision to permit the snow removal agreements into evidence also compounded the error.  As set forth above, the duty of care here is defined by common law and codified by *Model Civil Jury Charge* 5.20B(2)(b).  The common law duty of commercial land owners to remove snow and ice from its walkways makes no mention of any contractual obligations to invitees.  The snow removal contracts are entirely irrelevant to this duty analysis.
[brief] Plaintiffs contend that the court may allow an amendment to align with the evidence presented.  In support of this argument, plaintiffs rely on Kernan v. One Washington Park, 154 N.J. 437 (1998).  However, Kernan does not allow a pleading to be amended to introduce a cause of action that was not initially pleaded.  Id. at 459.  In Kernan the respondent brought an action in negligence for injuries suffered in a slip and fall against a commercial landowner that was in bankruptcy.  The named defendant, however, was not a debtor in possession of the subject properties.  The Supreme Court permitted an amendment pursuant to Rules 4:9-1 and 4:9-3 because the amendment did not “introduce a new cause of action” and instead allowed plaintiff to proceed against defendant the trustee named in bankruptcy.  Ibid.  Here, plaintiffs are attempting to add a new cause of action.  Plaintiff also improperly relies on Oscar v. Simeonidis, 352 N.J. Super. 476, 479 (App. Div. 2002).  In Oscar the defendant did not object to the trial court receiving proofs on an issue that was outside of the complaint.  Id. at 489.  That did not occur here as defendants objected to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.  In *Fanarjian v. Moskowitz*, 237 N.J. Super. 395, 400 (App. Div. 1989) the plaintiff did not object, and instead agreed to “submit” to a ruling on defendant’s request for declaratory relief that was not previously pleaded.
[brief] (Pa16; Pa20).  [...] was concurrently the Municipal Prosecutor at Winslow, Chesilhurst, Hi-Nella, Borough of Berlin, and Township of Berlin, along with having her own private practice.  (1T108:5-13; Pa106; Pa114).  [...] also offered her services as an attorney to the general public through her private law firm, Donna Sigel [...], P.C. (1T108:14-18; Pa106; Pa115).  The ALJ found that in all the other municipalities except the Township of Berlin, [...] performed her services based on a professional services agreement as an independent contractor.  (Pa17).  Prior to 2015, [...] also performed municipal prosecutorial services for Winslow under a professional services agreement and, by her own admission, the nature of her services did not change between the years before 2015 and the years after 2015.
[brief] *Arapaho*, 199 Vt. at 566, 128 A.3d at 406.  The Vermont Trial Court’s monetary award also invoked Section 12.1(d) of the [...], which provides:  “In any proceeding of an alleged failure of a Unit Owner to comply with the terms of this Declaration, the Bylaws, or the Rules and Regulations of the Association, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover the costs of the proceeding and reasonable attorneys’ fees. ”  Pa564.  Once again, no showing of bad faith or deliberate misconduct is required for a “prevailing party” to recover attorneys’ fees.  [...] wholly failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that Exclusion 2.o applied to the monetary awards in the Vermont suit.
[brief] On May 17, 2023, Respondents requested [...]’s complete file on the [...] matter.  (201a).  On May 31, 2023, [...] provided Respondents with the complete [...] file.  (256a).  Then, on July 2, 2024, over one year later, after voluminous discovery was exchanged, and after arbitration and trial dates were set, Respondents suddenly filed the Disqualification Motion.  (114a – 135a).  This is a classic waiver.  If Respondents legitimately believed [...]’s representation in the prior matters would prejudice them in this matter, they would not have delayed filing the Disqualification Motion until after the matter had already been litigated for over a year, significant paper discovery had been exchanged, and arbitration and trial were scheduled.  Respondents did not provide the trial court with a single reason why they delayed filing the Disqualification Motion until now or explain why they should be permitted to do so at this late stage, confirming the delay is unreasonable and is nothing more than an impermissible tactic which will result in severe prejudice to Appellants should the disqualification order be upheld.
[directive] Requirement to Check Domestic Violence Central Registry in Domestic Violence 4.2.3 Cases.  In cases involving domestic violence, the police officer making the arrest shall, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Domestic Violence Procedures Manual, check the 11 Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2016-1 (deconfliction) does not require a law enforcement agency to initiate an automated deconfliction query when the agency applies for a complaint-warrant following an unplanned arrest.  See Deconfliction Directive Section 1(c) (exempting routine booking procedures after an unplanned arrest, including an application for a CDR-2, from the definition of a “planned operation”).  However, that Directive does not preclude an agency from conducting a deconfliction query to provide additional information that might inform the complaint-summons versus complaint-warrant decision.  See also Section 9 of the Deconfliction Directive (authorizing County Prosecutors to issue supplemental directives and guidelines for conducting automated deconfliction queries).  Any such deconfliction query following an unplanned arrest but before the decision is made whether to issue a complaint-summons or apply for a complaint-warrant may lead to information known by another agency that is relevant to the dangers that defendant’s release might pose (e.g., involvement in a gang or other organized criminal activities).  Accordingly, agencies are encouraged – and may be required by a County Prosecutor’s directive – to conduct a deconfliction query when practicable before issuing a complaint-summons.
[brief] *State v. Wilson*, 135 N.J. 4, 15 (1994).  In *Saldana*, the court ruled in a products liability case that the trial judge erred in admitting a photograph of a machine in question when there was no testimony that a warning sticker depicted in the photograph was actually on the machine at the time of the plaintiff’s accident.  *Saldana v. Michael Weinig, Inc.*, 337 N.J. Super. 35, 46-47 (App. Div. 2001).