ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 139 (emphasis added).  In fact, [...] went to great lengths to argue against the right to a jury trial in Lajara claiming that it would delay adjudication of such matters, the exact opposite of what it argues now:  “The plaintiff insurance companies claim that the drafters of the IFPA wanted to avoid the “delays and inefficiencies” of jury trials.  To be sure, other means of trying cases are more expeditious and efficient than a jury trial. ”  *Id.* at 149.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in *GEICO v. Mt. Prospect Chiropractic Center, PA*, Consol. Case Nos. 23-1378, 23-2019 & 23-2053 (April 15, 2024)(“Precedential”), addressed whether the *Lajara* case’s holding that there was a right to a jury trial under the NJIFPA precluded arbitration in the negative.
[brief] A financial agreement approved pursuant to this act shall include findings by the municipality, approved by the municipal governing body, setting forth appropriate tax exemption provisions and an appropriate annual service charge schedule which shall be based upon the provisions of section 12 of this act and the municipality's determinations as to:  a.  The relative benefits of the project to the redevelopment of the redevelopment area when compared to the costs, if any, associated with the tax exemption; b.  An assessment of the importance of the tax exemption to be granted in obtaining the development of the project and in influencing the locational decisions of probable occupants of the project or units of the project.  [N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11.]  B.  Tax Exemptions are Favored for Affordable Housing.
[brief] [...] – January 1, 2017 through December 31, 2020  [...] – January 1, 2017 through December 31, 2020  [...] – January 1, 2017 through December 31, 2020  [...] – January 1, 2017 through December 31, 2020  [...] – January 1, 2017 through December 31, 2020
[brief] That compulsion directly bears on the enforceability of a consumer contract, particularly contracts of adhesion.  In this context, only “[a] party who enters into a contract in writing, without any fraud or imposition being practiced upon him, is conclusively presumed to understand and assent to its terms and legal effect. ”  Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 321 (2019) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 127 N.J. 344, 353 (1992)).
[brief] Such activity should have happened outside the presence of the jury as it could reasonably have been foreseen to poison their disposition to [...].  It is notable that [...] had used the words “false” and “incorrect” rather than “untruthful” or “lying. ”  [...] was clearly trying to abide by the court’s determination, specifically that of another admonishment that occurred earlier that day (again the first day of trial) and again in front of the jury (2T, Pg. 142, line 18 – pg. 143, line 5).  Specifics of that admonishment, in front of the jury, included [...] being rhetorical again with [...] by saying: that anyone who has little children knows the difference between saying someone's a liar versus the information is incorrect.  Id.  Which foreseeably impressed upon the jury that [...] was no better than a child.  However, despite [...]’s apparent concern for character attacks from witnesses, [...] apparently had a different view when [...] was the subject of snide and insulting remarks.  As stated earlier, what’s good for goose, is good for the gander.  But [...] permitted [...]’s witness to say of Mr.  Cohen from the stand, “he’s not a good guy.  He’s a bad guy” (5T, Pg. 102, lines 22-23).  Also “[...] is a con artist. ” (5T Pg. 101, line 18).  But no admonishment of [...]’s witness by [...] at all.
[brief] Additionally, the Trial Court’s holding as to collateral estoppel essentially immunizes attorneys from liability for the negligent drafting of wills.  An attorney now need not comply with his duties to adhere to the standard of care and convey a testator’s wishes unambiguously; an ambiguously drafted will subsequently construed by the Court using the doctrine of probable intent will govern and the beneficiary’s and testator’s estate will have no grounds to seek damages for the attorney’s negligence in failing to adhere to the standard of care and communicate the testator’s actual intent.  That is not the law in this state and trial court erred below.
[brief] (PPCIa362-63).  22.  On February 6, 2023 (7 days after the proposed consent order had been filed), the trial court signed the Consent Order permitting [...]’s counsel’s withdrawal.  (PPCIa364-65).  The Consent Order marked [...]’s motion to change track assignment as “withdrawn. ”  Id.  The Consent Order did not set a date by which “new counsel” for [...] would have to appear or that, if it did not retain new counsel, it would be held in default.  Id.  Thus, [...]’s answer and affirmative defenses were never stricken or suppressed, and remained as defenses to [...]’s claims when [...] moved for summary judgment.
[brief] Plaintiff made a formal request to meet with [...], which was filed on November 3, 2016, to discuss career development; it was denied.  [...] filed a Certification about not knowing about the Plaintiff’s EEO complaint (Pa-) and the reasons why the Plaintiff was selected to go to the Academy but yet he refused to meet with the Plaintiff when she made a request to discuss the transfer.  The Plaintiff called the way that [...] treated women as opposed to the way he treated men (1T; 49:12).  As part of the dispute with [...], the Plaintiff was told not to correspond at all with the Intake Unit by [...].  This was totally against her job description (1T; 52:8).  Plaintiff was told by the captain that any emails to the Intake Unit were to go through his office which was contrary to what her job was (1T; 52:23).  The atmosphere in the office was the "frat boys" and the females were not treated with respect (1T; 53:6).  In the cafeteria, she was ostracized (1T; 53:18).  When the Intake Unit closed the door, the only one allowed in were “the other male counterparts” (1T; 54:8).  The defense recognized that there was a separation between discrimination and a CEPA violation (1T; 53:5).  The treatment was “ongoing” (1T; 50:16).  On September 20, 2016, the Plaintiff submitted an EEO complaint (1T; 57:25).
[brief] The Trial Court and this Court owes no deference to [...] decisions, because “in proceedings initiated in Superior Court concerning an OPRA request, [...] decisions are not entitled to any deference. ”  Paff v. Galloway Township, 229 N.J. 340, 356 (2017).  Defendants also discuss the unpublished cases of Wolosky v. Somerset County and Rise Against Hate v. Cherry Hill Township.  (Db19).  Wolosky is an unpublished opinion that, by Court rule, should be given no weight.  Rise Against Hate does address the same legal issue as that appeal, but it is also an unpublished opinion.  With respect to the Rise Against Hate case, on July 6, 2023, the Supreme Court granted certification, Rise Against Hate v. Cherry Hill Township, __ N.J. __ (2023).
[brief] On January 3, 2023, Appellant filed the Complaint against Respondents in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Docket Number [...].  Pa1-18.  On January 10, 2023, the action was transferred to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County under Docket Number [...].  Pa19.  On April 19, 2023, Respondents filed their Motion to Dismiss.  Pa20.  On July 11, 2023, Appellant filed an opposition to Respondents’ Motion and a Cross-Motion to Vacate Default Judgment, Transfer, and Consolidate.  Pa126.  On August 17, 2023, Respondents filed a reply in further support of their Motion and an opposition to Appellant’s Cross-Motion.  On August 31, 2023, Appellant filed a reply in further support of his Cross-Motion.  On October 4, 2023, the Trial Court directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing addressing the Trial Court’s decision in *Valentine v. Unifund CCR, LLC, et al.*, Docket Number BER-L-376-23 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div., Bergen Cnty., Oct. 4, 2023) ([...], J.S.C.), which the parties did on October 13, 2023.
[brief] ”  *Cohn*, 109 N.J.L. at 389.  But in circumstances involving much less violent movements of a bus or train, courts have held that simply characterizing jerky movements as “unusual” or out of the ordinary are not enough to overcome the entry of summary --- *5  This court is bound by the decisions of the former Court of Errors and Appeals, unless “more recent decisions of the Supreme Court clearly undermine the authority of a prior decision. ”  *Burrell v. Quaranta*, 259 N.J. Super. 243, 252 (App. Div. 1992).  In this appeal, [...] does not cite to any authority holding that any of the referenced Court of Errors and Appeals decisions have been expressly and or implicitly overturned, abrogated, or modified. judgment in a defendant’s favor.  See Shimp v. Pa. R.R. Co., 8 N.J. 1, 3 (1951) (reasoning that plaintiff’s “unamplified and uncorroborated statement” that common carrier vehicle gave “a jerk,” “a severe jerk,” or “sudden lurch” gave “no proof that the motion was unnecessary or unusual,” particularly when plaintiff not holding any railing while walking when train expected to begin moving).
[brief] The Plaintiff respectfully submits that on reconsideration, the Trial Court failed to apply the plain language of N.J.S.A. § 39:6A-4 and well-established law setting forth the “substantial nexus” test.  Accordingly, the Trial Court’s ruling must be reversed by the Appellate Division, and remanded to a new judge for a calculation of the statutory damages and counsel fees to which the Plaintiff is entitled.
[brief] Allowing litigation in court is the only way to further the antifraud purposes of the IFPA, RICO, and AICRA.  The Legislature made plain its purpose in enacting the IFPA:  The purpose of this act is to confront aggressively the problem of insurance fraud in New Jersey by facilitating the detection of insurance fraud, eliminating the occurrence of such fraud through the development of fraud prevention programs, requiring the restitution of fraudulently obtained insurance benefits, and reducing the amount of premium dollars used to pay fraudulent claims.  The IFPA thus unambiguously expressed the Legislature’s recognition that “[i]nsurance fraud is a problem of massive proportions that . . . results in substantial and unnecessary costs to the general public in the form of increased rates.
[brief] ...........................................  Dra1-28 State v. Andrews, No. A-3320-18, 2021 WL 6139754 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 30, 2021)  ...........................................Dra29-33  State v. Dalzell, No. A-5481-16T1, 2020 WL 3459465 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 25, 2020)  ...........................................Dra34-40 State v. Miller, No. A-3777-20, 2023 WL 4759467 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 26, 2023)  ...........................................Dra41-61 State v. Green, No. A-1158-19, 2023 WL 2764036 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 4, 2023)  ...........................................Dra62-77 State v. Murrell, No. A-1960-19, 2021 WL 5365325 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 18, 2021)  ...........................................Dra78-89 State v. Weekes, No. A-2524-18, 2021 WL 4535329 (N.J. Super.  Ct. App. Div. Oct. 5, 2021)  ...........................................Dra90-112  State v. Cooper, No. A-2695-18, 2021 WL 1289602 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 7, 2021)  ...........................................Dra113-124  State v. Williams, No. A-2256-15T3, 2020 WL 546001 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 30, 2020)  ...........................................Dra125-130  State v. Williams, No. A-2256-15T3, 2018 WL 2292999 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 21, 2018)  ...........................................Dra131-134  State v. Gonzalez, No. A-4390-13T1, 2015 WL 8079170 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2015)  ...........................................Dra135-141  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I BECAUSE THE SENTENCING COURT’S ANALYSIS OF THE STATE V. YARBOUGH FACTORS WAS IMPERMISSIBLY BASED ON DISMISSED CHARGES AND SPECULATION NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT, CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND BECAUSE THE COURT OFFERED NO OTHER VALID BASIS FOR THE IMPOSITION OF A CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE, THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE AND DIRECT THE TRIAL COURT TO IMPOSE THE CERTAIN PERSONS SENTENCE CONCURRENTLY TO THE ROBBERY SENTENCE.
[brief] The sudden reading of the private right of action out of the NJCFLA by *Veras* was simply not rooted in an examination of the NJCFLA’s legislative and statutory history and intent—as *Veras* acknowledged was the linchpin in determining whether an implied private right of action existed.  Rather, *Veras* acknowledged the existence of subsection 18 and determined that that, in and of itself, was sufficient to show that no implied private right of action existed in the statute, without further analysis.  Since *Veras* was decided in 2014, every case that has determined that no private right of action exists under the NJCFLA can, directly or indirectly, be traced back to *Veras*.
[brief] A.  IT IS IRRELEVANT THAT MR. KIELY MOVED TO B5 OCEANVIEW TERRACE IN 2023, AFTER SELLING HIS HOME  Plaintiff repeatedly draws attention to the fact that in May of 2023, [...] instructed attorney [...], Esq. to send a copy of his file to [...].  Plaintiff clearly suggests that [...] never actually lived at [...] in [...], and that his proper service address was always the Oceanview Terrace condominium.  However, that is not the case.  [...] sold his [...] residence in March of 2023, well after a default judgment had been entered against him.  This is demonstrated by copies of a Notice of Settlement (Da185) and Deed (Da187) recorded in February and March of 2023, respectively.  Thereafter, [...] moved into the condominium unit at [...].  It follows that [...] instructed [...] to forward a copy of his file to the [...] address because he could no longer receive mail at [...] property, which had just been sold.  Indeed, an email sent by [...] to [...] shortly before the date on the Deed indicates that he is in the process of moving (Da191, Email to Roglieri dated March 7, 2023).  Plaintiff has not demonstrated that [...] lived at [...] while the case was pending.  Rather, Plaintiff points to further evidence that, at all relevant times, [...] lived at [...], [...].
[brief] I’m here as a tax assessor, as a certified tax assessor. ”).  questions from the Board concerning the unit and made clear that estimating a value on the unit is basically impossible and gave a range of values from zero to a hypothetical value of $655,500.  1T55 ([...]’s expert testifying that none of the usual approaches to value a piece of real property work on this unit).  On the second appeal, [...] held that the Board was arbitrary and capricious on the issue of equity and remanded with instructions that the Board incorporate inflation, capital improvements, and market conditions into its calculations.  DA21-22.  On remand, the Board continued its efforts to calculate equity on the unit.  Thousands of pages of transcripts attest to the Board’s effort, but to no avail.  [...] also held that the Board was arbitrary and capricious.
[brief] Despite Plaintiffs’ recitation of these general principles, they fail to articulate how the Genesis Deed or the Construction Rules are ambiguous.  “A contract is ambiguous if its terms are ‘susceptible to at least two reasonable alternative interpretations. ’”  Capparelli v. Lopatin, 459 N.J. Super. 584, 604 (App. Div. 2019).  The Genesis Deed clearly and unequivocally states that, upon purchasing the Property, Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated property owners, were required to become “members of a property owner’s association” and must “faithfully abide” by any “rules and regulations it chooses” to implement.
[directive] Addendum B | April 2022  Vehicular Pursuit Policy motor vehicle, shed or any other structure described in N.J.S.A. 2C:18-1.  Vehicular pursuits shall continue to be authorized for any burglary during which the actor is armed with a weapon or injures a victim (second degree burglaries).  See Section 3.2(a)(2)(k); b.  Theft of a Motor Vehicle, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3; N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b).  This Policy authorizes vehicular pursuits for theft of a motor vehicle until at least December 31, 2022.  The [...] has been directed to review the available data as of that date, including stolen vehicle trends, effectiveness of pursuits, and resulting accidents, and determine whether this provision should remain or be modified.  Absent additional action, this provision will remain in force after December 31, 2022; c.  Receiving Stolen Property (Motor Vehicle Only), N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7; N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b)(2)(b).  This Policy authorizes vehicular pursuits for receiving stolen property (motor vehicle) until at least December 31, 2022.  The [...] has been directed to review the available data as of that date, including stolen vehicle trends, effectiveness of pursuits, and resulting accidents, and determine whether this provision should remain or be modified.  Absent additional action, this provision will remain in force after December 31, 2022; d.  Bias Intimidation, N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1.  (b) when an officer reasonably believes that the violator poses an imminent threat to the safety of the public or other officers.  An imminent threat exists when an officer reasonably believes that the actions of the violator are immediately likely to result in death or serious bodily injury to another person absent action by the officer.  This determination shall be made based upon the violator’s actions or operation of the vehicle prior to the initiation of the attempted motor vehicle stop.  The violator’s subsequent actions, including speeding or evasive driving during the pursuit itself, although often supporting the criminal charge of Eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b), shall not constitute an authorization to initiate or continue a pursuit.  3.2.1 Pursuit for motor vehicle offenses is not authorized under Paragraph 3.2 unless the violator’s vehicle is being operated so as to pose an imminent threat to the safety of the public or other officers and that threat is based on the violator’s actions or operation of the vehicle prior to the initiation of the attempted motor vehicle stop.  There shall be a strong presumption against the initiation of vehicular pursuits based solely on motor vehicle violations.
[brief] [Emphasis Added].  The proof is in the Topology report, which cites several other department stores in other parts of the country which were rehabilitated.  (Topology Report at 25-26, Pa0221-Pa0222)  Most retail shopping now occurs “online” such as [...], so this [...] site easily qualifies as “abandoned for commercial purposes” under Section 5b of the LRHL.  However, the remaining structures proposed for development in this “plan” are **NOT NECESSARY** for the 7-acre [...] site which contains 2 acres on its site for parking.  The [...] site is wholly --- 5 [...] decided to abandon this site in late 2020.  (Topology Report at pg. 9, Pa0205).  contained and has its own space for adequate parking.  The simple fact is that there is no other single site within the plan which meets the substantive criteria of Section 5b.  This principle is commonly known as the “doughnut hole” theory.  If, for example, a larger area easily satisfies the need for rehabilitation under Section 5b but there is in that area a single or other separate lots that do not meet the Section 5b criteria, the plan may still be approved.  See 62-64 Main Street, supra, at 58, quoting Levin v. Township Committee of Bridgewater, 57 N.J. 506, 539 (1971) (“The fact that single parcels in the area are useful and could not be declared blighted if considered in isolation is basis for neither excluding such parcels nor for invalidating the designation. ”); See also, Forbes v. Board of Trustees, 312 N.J. Super. 519, 531-32 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 56 N.J. 411 (1998).  In 62-64 Main Street, the owners challenged the “study” which designated their lots as being “in need of rehabilitation. ”  To be sure, that challenge was destined to fail because the four lots contained “two vacant boarded up dilapidated buildings with crumbling masonry and a decayed parking lot. ”  62-64 Main Street, supra, at 159.  The adjacent lot contained “crumbling” pavement with “no marking for parking spaces, no lighting, no landscaping. ”  Id. at 160.  Notwithstanding the vigorous dissent by the Chief Justice based on a theory of unconstitutional “taking” because the intent of the municipality was to redevelop these lots by condemnation, (Id., at 165-191), the majority upheld the designations, because the statutory definitions were satisfied.  In this case there will be no taking by condemnation but there is no other site beyond [...] that satisfies the Section 5 requirements.
[brief] (Pa16-17).  [...] indicated that there were no reimbursed expenses, but also did not indicate whether there were any expenses to be reimbursed.  (1T107:8-12; Pa52; Pa56).  Specifically, [...] was not aware of any reimbursed travel or business expenses and explained that reimbursements would be processed through his office.  (1T195:17-19; 1T200:21-201:3).  [...] stated that because [...] required that she process state police discovery, she used an application called “We Transfer” to provide discovery to defendants.  (1T47:16-48:7).  Contrary to [...]’s answers, [...] said she sends [...] an invoice for the application and [...] reimbursed her $120 annually.  (1T48:2-11).  [...] did not reimburse her for any other expenses.  (1T48:12-15).  As to Factor #14 – Furnishing of Tools and Materials, the ALJ found that [...] only provided incidental office supplies.
[brief] On July 19, 2023, the trial court conducted oral arguments on multiple motions including Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine to Bar Referencing the State of Emergency at trial and Defendants’ Motion in Limine in relevant parts, seeking to bar reference to the terms of the snow removal contract, bar evidence regarding the non-renewal or termination of [...] after the 2018 snow season, and seeking the court to relax its prior refusal to take judicial notice of the State of Emergency.  (1T).  Plaintiff argued that the State of Emergency had no impact of Defendants duty to keep its property safe for invitees.  Moreover, the purpose of a state of emergency Order is empower the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management to act on behalf of the Governor employ the resources and assets of the State, local and private agencies to provide immediate assistance to localities.  (emphasis added).  (Pa1-4).  State of Emergency declarations do not restrict a normal citizens movement or activities.  (Id.)  The State may limit access to areas of concern for public safety but will notify the public of these restrictions.  (Id.)  The main purpose of State of Emergency is to “employ the resources and assets of State, local and private agencies to provide immediate assistance to localities. ”  (Id.)  Plaintiff argued that even though Smith v . Costco Wholesale Corp., No. A-2592-21, 2023 WL 4307729 (Super. Ct. App. Div. July 3, 2023), dealt with the same snow event, the facts were not analogous, as the plaintiff went out in the middle of an ongoing snow event, slipped and fell, whereas we did not have an ongoing storm in this matter.  (Da29-32).  The trial court ruled that the State of Emergency could not be referred to at the time of trial and affirmed its prior ruling denying Defendants’ previous motion seeking judicial notice of the State of Emergency.  (1T29:6-8).  Further the trial court noted that the jury would hear about how significant of snowstorm it was from the weather expert and see photos of the incident scene depicting the weather conditions.  (1T30:3-10).  Accordingly, the trial court concluded the State of Emergency had no relevance and the potential for confusion or prejudice outweighed any probative value.