ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] But the admittance of that voluminous file into evidence did not occur simply.  [...]’s attorney objected to that as well.  The 21 boxes (and the documents they contain) which were also referred to during trial as the [...] file and also as Exhibit D4, were never exchanged in discovery.  Although [...]’s counsel reported to [...] that they had been duly exchanged, (5T, Pg. 28, lines 3-13); [...]’s attorney questioned that and objected.  (5T, Pg. 30, lines 12 – 18); [...] overruled the objection (5T, Pg. 31, lines 10-11).  However, [...]’s own sworn witness, the managing partner of the [...] law firm, [...], contradicted his own attorney and said that [...] knew that they would be suing [...] for fees so they packed the [...] file (the 21 boxes) away in a storage facility and did not open it again until trial.  (5T, Pg. 32, line 18 – Pg. 33, line 4).  It was therefore literally impossible for [...]’s attorney to see the inside of the 21 bankers boxes at any time prior to trial.  More pointedly, it is even impossible for [...]’s own attorney to have seen the inside of the 21 bankers boxes before trial to even certify that they had been turned over to counsel for [...].  [...] Admitted Highly Prejudicial Character evidence with little probative value
[brief] N.J.A.C. 7:14B-8.1(b)(4) & N.J.S.A. 58:10A-28.  This is because the Legislature has declared the discharge of petroleum products to be detrimental to the public.  The Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:10A-23.11, et seq. (the “Spill Act”) was enacted for the purpose of “protecting the citizens from the discharge of petroleum products and other hazardous substances as a threat to the public health, safety and welfare.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, [...] respectfully submits that the trial court's denial of summary judgment should be reversed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  A Professional Corporation  By: [...], Esq.  TIMOTHY P. DUGGAN, ESQ.  Dated: October 3, 2023  SAVE OLD YORK, a New Jersey non-profit entity, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...] (BURLINGTON COUNTY); TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE OF [...]; [...]; JOHN DOES A-Z; CORPORATION A-Z; [...], Defendants-Respondents SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE
[brief] Defense counsel argued against aggravating factors three (risk of reoffending) and nine (need for deterrence) and in favor of mitigating factor nine (defendant unlikely to commit another offense) for two reasons: (1) in the five years since [...] was first sentenced, he demonstrated a development in his maturity and an ability to control his anger and impulses as evidenced by his infraction-free record, his institutional programming, the testament of [...], and [...]’s own allocution at his resentencing; and (2) the age-crime curve and science of adolescent brain development—the conclusion that [...] was less likely to reoffend at age twenty-five at his resentencing than he had been at age twenty during his original sentencing.  (Da70-77; 8T 24-23 to 28-8)  The Court rejected these arguments, rejected mitigating factor nine, found both aggravating factors three and nine and gave them the exact same weight that the Court had given them at [...]’s original sentencing—substantial weight.  (8T 79-24 to 80-1; 82-12 to 25; 85-8 to 23)  Although the Court found mitigating factor fourteen and gave it moderate weight, the Court rejected all arguments concerning adolescent brain science and the age-crime curve.  (8T 24-2 to 28, 31-2 to 18, 34-9 to 35-9, 42-5 to 45-16, 79-15 to 18, 87-12 to 88-9)  A sentencing court may not find an aggravating factor unless it is “supported by competent, credible evidence in the record.
[brief] ”  On June 22, 2016, Defendant filed a “Motion for Leave to File its First Amended Answer and Counterclaim,” which is currently pending in front of the District Judge.  See ECF No. 50.  Specifically, Defendant seeks to “amend its Answer and Counterclaims to add defenses and an inequitable conduct claim related to the improper revival of both [A]sserted [P]atents in this case,” and alleges that Plaintiffs “purposefully and knowingly allowed [the Asserted Patents] to expire by failing to pay the requisite maintenance fees. ”  Id. at 2.  Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs revived the Asserted Patents, and represented that the entire period of delay in the payment of maintenance fees was unintentional.  Id. at 3.  Defendant argues that it “has reason to believe” that such statements were false and that, therefore, the Asserted Patents are unenforceable.  Id.  Plaintiffs argue in their opposition that Defendant’s discovery requests seek irrelevant and privileged documents and information.  Oppo. at 5-6, 17-22.  Plaintiffs initially claim that the revival discovery is premature and ask the Court to postpone its ruling on Defendant’s motion to compel the revival discovery until the Court’s ruling on Defendant’s pending motion to amend.  Id. at 18.  Plaintiffs assert that Defendant’s equitable estoppel and laches defenses are based on Plaintiffs’ dismissal of their initial infringement suits against Defendant, and not on their maintenance fee payments.  Id. at 5, 18-19.  Plaintiffs also contend that even if Defendant’s equitable estoppel and laches defenses could be broadly interpreted to encompass Defendant’s new allegations regarding patent revival, those defenses do not permit Defendant to investigate Plaintiffs’ and their counsel’s internal activities regarding the maintenance fee payments.  Id. at 5, 19-20.  In support, Plaintiffs argue that the Federal Circuit indicated that courts cannot inquire into the procedural minutiae of the PTO, including its acceptance of late maintenance fee payments.  Id. at 5-6, 19-20 (citing Aristocrat Techs. Australia PTY Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 543 F.3d 657, 663 (Fed. Cir. 2008) and Network Signatures, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 731 F.3d 1239, 1243-44 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
[brief] (Exhibit 4)  Regarding the signed 2/26/2024 MOTION OF STAY paperwork  From [...]: Referring to Paragraph 3, Under Certification, Pg. 1 - [...]  Did not support the two children in their growing years, until they both Both reached age 23, as he states.  There is No Proof that direct payment was made to me for the 2 children.  (Pa50)  (Exhibit 5)
[brief] Plaintiff, by its own admission, did not have such a certificate at any time prior to commencing this action in September 2022 or for the ensuing eleven-plus months that it prosecuted the case.  In addition to undermining Plaintiff’s attempt to recast itself as a New Jersey-centric business for purposes of this litigation, Plaintiff’s failure to obtain the statutorily-mandated certificate deprived Plaintiff of the right to bring the action and the Trial Court of subject matter jurisdiction to consider it.  The Trial Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff retroactively cured this defect by obtaining the certificate for the first time in September 2023—and only after Defendants raised the jurisdictional bar to suit—is premised on a misreading of New Jersey law and provides an independent basis for reversal.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] The [...] policy was applicable to the premises at [...] (Da1-Da2).  The [...] policy provided “Unit-Owners Coverage,” which included first-party coverage for certain risks to the property itself, as well as coverage for the personal possessions of the policyholders and coverage for loss of use (Da1-Da2).  In addition, Coverage E of the [...] policy provided coverage for personal liability in the amount of $100,000 for each occurrence (Da1-Da2).  Section II of the [...] policy sets forth the liability coverages.
[brief] The judge rejected [...]’s argument concerning the timing of the application, as it was inconsistent with prior arguments that other fee applications were premature.  1T67-68.  The court found that Plaintiff was \(^9\)  The primary attorney for [...] at the [...], [...], charges [...] at least $900 per hour in connection with his services.  (Pa90).  entitled to an award of fees, because the fees were incurred to “chase Defendants around and try to [undo] the frauds on the Court, and to try to . . . find where the money is, and the lies continue, and the misrepresentations continue. ”  1T68.  There had been “nothing in the way of any kind of showing of good faith” by Defendants “or anything to stop the run away train of causing expenses in this case. ”  1T69.  Defendants “don’t want to finish it.  They will never finish it. ”  1T69.  The court thus rejected [...]’s arguments that Plaintiff should not be compensated or that it was Plaintiff’s fault for incurring attorneys’ fees, and found an award of fees was warranted.
[brief] This requires the invalidation of the Ordinance.  See, Riggs vs. Long Beach Tp., 159 N.J. at 601, 622 (1988).  The required analysis by this Court will mandate an invalidation of these ordinances.  In this case, there was no recognition of the inconsistencies or rationalization when the actual action was taken by both the Planning Board and later by the Governing Body.  The cases cited in [...]’s initial brief emphasize and confirm the absolute importance and necessity on the contemporaneous recognition by the public bodies involved of the consistency or lack of consistency of the rezoning Ordinance with the Master Plan.  The failure of the Governing Body to have contemporaneous recognition of inconsistency invalidates the process and the adoption.  The facts of the instant process clearly demonstrate that the changes imposed by Redevelopment Plan were not consistent with the 1988 Master Plan and its Land Use Plan.  The Planning Board and the Governing Body both failed to actually do any analysis on the issue of consistency and failed to have any recognition of the lack of consistency.  The Redevelopment Plan must be invalidated on that basis.
[brief] Equally unsupported is counsel’s assertion that the Court in St. Vincent’s Hosp. v. Finley, 154 N.J. Super. 24, 31 (App. Div. 1977) held that it is “the rare case” when the agency fails to follow the recommendation of the ALJ (Pet. Br., p. 23).  The Court in that case said no such thing.  In fact, the Court in St. Vincent’s quoted with approval Greater Boston Television Corp. v. F.C.C., 143 U.S. App. D.C. 383, 393, 395, 444 F. 2d 841, 851, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. den. 403 U.S. 923, 91 S. Ct. 2229, 2233, 29 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1971), reh. den. 404 U.S. 877, 92 S. Ct. 30, 30 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1971), in which [...] emphasized that “[I]n the last analysis it is the agency’s function, not the Examiner’s, to make the findings of fact and select the ultimate decision, and where there is substantial evidence supporting each result it is the agency’s choice that governs” (St. Vincent’s, 154 N.J. Super. 24, 32-33).
[brief] However, none of the discovery responses served by those defendants included any reference to [...] at all.  In fact, it was not until April 18, 2019, that Plaintiff was informed, for the first time, that [...] had a sub-contract with [...].  (Pa1763).  Accordingly, on April 23, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a motion in order to file a Fourth Amended Complaint.  Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint was filed on May, 17, 2019.  (Pa 1698).  As the trial court determined, [...]’s criticism of Plaintiffs use of the fictitious party rule and Plaintiffs’ diligence is unfounded.  Further, [...] has not and at the trial level failed to articulate any prejudice that resulted it their ability to adequately defend Plaintiff’s allegations against them.  For all these reasons, Defendant’s cross-appeal must be denied.
[brief] The second page nine contains the actual signature and real initials of the Respondent.  [24a, 34a]  There was no expert handwriting analysis; however, the trial court made their own assessment of the difference in the initials from the second page nine, (the real signature page) and the initials on the first nine pages.  They are inconsistent.  [24a-34a][2T P48:L2-25]  The problems with the initials, the certification of [...], Esq., the Affidavit of the Respondent, coupled with the other problems with this document, called into question the authenticity of the document and the credibility of [...]’s certification to the court.  [19a, 24a]  The Appellants position was in jeopardy.  It was apparent they had presented the court with a false document.  [24a]  What happened next was important in the ultimate determination concerning credibility.  The Appellant refused to change his position.  [...] signed a second certification attacking [...].  “Plaintiff claims that she did not sign the agreement containing the arbitration clause and that defendants attached a different signature page to her Agreement.  That is false. ”  [42a]  His second certification again attached the initial agreement insisting it was authentic.  [24a]  The Court conducted a Zoom conference in chambers with counsel expressing serious doubt concerning the authenticity of the agreement.  [2T P47:L24-P48: L5;P51:L12-18]  Shortly after the conference, the Appellants completely abandoned their position.  They claimed they found a different arbitration agreement signed by the Respondent.  [155a]  This second agreement; however, curiously contained the same exact signature page attached to a different document.  [155a,163]  The second agreement also has various formatting problems and questions concerning its validity.  [155a-163a, 212a, 272a-273a]  The record contains no coherent explanation for the initial agreement presented to the court, nor the two certifications of [...].  [19a, 42a]
[brief] Despite [...]’s erroneous hearsay ruling, some evidence related to the 9-1-1 call still came into the hearing during cross-examination.  1T15:1-12 and 16:10-14.  Even examination of this limited evidence will yield the conclusion that the investigatory stop was supported by reasonable suspicion.  A detailed, specific report related to a crime in progress and relayed by a citizen through the 9-1-1 system can be sufficiently reliable to establish reasonable suspicion.
[brief] Defendant’s argument of plain error in the trial court’s jury instructions is without merit.  The claim of error being raised here, the failure to instruct the jury on the State’s burden to disprove self-defense when instructing on the elements of the substantive offense, was raised in *State v. Bryant*, 288 N.J. Super. 27 (App. Div.), *certif. denied*, 144 N.J. 589 (1996).
[brief] **PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO PLEAD A VIOLATION OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE UNDER THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION (Pa001028–1031). **  In Point II.A of their appellate brief, Plaintiffs argue that they have adequately pled a constitutional violation of the Takings Clause under the New Jersey State Constitution by alleging that Defendants deprived them of their previously vested property rights by eliminating terminal leave payments over $15,000.  (Pb24-30).  This exact argument was expressly rejected in the First Police Matter, which decision the Appellate Division relied upon in the _Superior Officers_ matter.  In the First Police Matter, [...] unequivocally held that in the context of the MSA, “[e]liminating lump sum payments based on the terminal leave payout at the time of retirement does not violate the Takings Clause of the New Jersey State Constitution. ” (First Police Decision at 34, Pa000297).  First, [...] found that the “[t]he Takings Clause typically applies to eminent domain, which is not the case here,” and Plaintiffs do not have a vested property right in terminal leave payments.  (Ibid.).  [...] further explained “that plaintiffs cannot establish that they have a property right to terminal leave lump sum payouts.  Plaintiffs present no cases to support their argument that the Takings Clause of the New Jersey Constitution applies to terminal leave payouts or even other rights generated by CNAs. ”  (Ibid.).
[brief] The Trial Court’s decision was correct, and Appellant’s appeal lacks merit.  “A court's role is to consider what is "written in the context of the circumstances" at the time of drafting and to apply "a rational meaning in keeping with the expressed general purpose."  *Atl. N. Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer*, 12 N.J. 293, 302, 96 A.2d 652 (1953); accord *Dontzin v. Myer*, 301 N.J. Super. 501, 507, 694 A.2d 264 (App.Div.1997).  *Sachau v. Sachau*, 206 N. J. 1, 5-6.  Further, the Appellant’s arguments often contradict the terms, intent, underlying purpose and plain language of the contract.  “It is well-settled that "[c]ourts enforce Contracts 'based on the intent of the parties, the express terms of the Contract, surrounding circumstances and the underlying purpose of the Contract.'"
[brief] During public comment, Plaintiff [...] spoke in opposition to the Ordinance, explaining the lack of need for the PILOT.  He argued that the 20% set- aside and zoning accommodations would be sufficient to ensure the viability of the development as they have been in the past for similar projects.  He also challenged the Township shifting its tax burden to the Plaintiff Borough taxpayers.  T1.82:25-85:12.  [...] [...] spoke in a similar vein.
[brief] In this case the plaintiff served a misleading appraisal that did not value the property taken.  The arbitrator treated the defendant's position as "manifestly unreasonable" based upon his inability or unwillingness to recognize the difference between valuing the "fee simple estate" and a "leased fee."  It should be clear that the arbitrator relied heavily upon [...]'s appraisal.  But [...]'s appraisal was inherently contradictory throughout and his methodology was contradictory to the instruction in Casino Reinvestment Development Authority (CRDA) v. Katz, supra.  In that case, [...] as the appraiser for CRDA, doing a fee simple appraisal, ignored the existing lease on each of two separate buildings making up the subject property, but used the lease of the other as a comparable for each.
[brief] According to engagement letters, [...] would review accounting and general ledger activity, advise on adjusting or correcting journal entries, year-end closing of books, and provide tax services, but he would not “audit or verify the data submitted. ” (Pa92-97).  When [...] would come to the office, [...] took the meeting; [...] joined later for lunch.  (Pa354; 1T109:18 to 110:24).  3  The trial court rejected the defendants’ theory that [...] had knowledge of company finances based on information found on his computer.  (36T 9:23 to 10:1).  Indeed, to the extent the defendants rely on the testimony of their computer expert, [...], to establish this, the trial court concluded that his work was “cursory and not necessarily . . . dispositive of anything. ”  (36T 41:1-3).  D.
[brief] Defendant was even asked at one point in time if his dog did anything under the circumstances, what would he have done to the dog?  He said, ‘I didn’t shoot the dog because he wasn’t doing anything to me, but if he did, he would have shot the dog also.  To me, that’s just further indication of this defendant’s mindset…  Again, all of this weighs against the second factor of Miller.  (17T220-13 to 221-20).  The record is plain that defendant was raised in a loving and supportive household, surrounded by family members who nurtured and coddled him.  Finding so was not an abuse of the court’s discretion.  The third Miller factor (the circumstances of the homicidal event and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him) also weighed against defendant.
[brief] Some two months later after their motion was denied, on December 15, 2023, Defendants belatedly filed their Answer to the First Amended Complaint.  Da173.  In violation of Court Rules (including R. 4:5-3; R. 4:6-1(b)), Defendants refused to answer parts of the First Amended Complaint, despite the trial court already denying their arbitration motion.  (Da173, fn.1; Da194-195; Da200).  After more delay, on March 1, 2024, Defendants filed a Counterclaim/Third-Party Complaint with a Jury Demand that was supposed to be filed a year earlier.  See Pa29.  J.  Defendants’ Motion to Extend Time to Appeal is Granted and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion and Reconsideration Motions Are Denied  On March 13, 2024, Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal (Da233), to this Court, but only as to the 1/30/24 Reconsideration Order.  (Da3).  On March 18, 2024, Defendants submitted a Motion to Extend Time seeking to belatedly appeal the 10/17/23 Order, and amended it on March 20, 2024.  Da238.  On April 1, 2024, Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ Motion and filed a Cross-Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ belated attempt to appeal from the 10/17/23 Order as it violated Rules 2:4-1(a), 2:4-4 and 2:5-1.  Da239.  On April 25, 2024, this Court granted Defendants’ Motion and denied Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion.  Da241, Da243.  On April 29, 2024, Defendants filed an Amended Notice of Appeal and C.I.S. to include an appeal of the 10/17/23 Order.  On May 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider this Court’s April 25, 2024 Orders.  Da244.  On May 21, 2024, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion, stating, the “parties are free to argue to the merits panel the appropriate standard of review under these circumstances. ”  Da247.  Plaintiff reserves his appeal rights to challenge this Court’s jurisdiction over the 10/17/23 Order.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] The factual assertions providing the “predicate for a claim of relief must be made by an affidavit or certification pursuant to Rule 1:4-4 and based upon personal knowledge of the declarant before the court may grant an evidentiary hearing. ”  R. 3:22-10(c).  “[A] petitioner must do more than make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.  He must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard performance. ”  State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).
[brief] In a similar fashion, it noted that [...] explained the goals of the TOA Rule as follows:  “Prior to the signing of this legislation, the system allowed for those rules to be changed in the middle of the process, even after an application has been submitted. ”  *Id.* (emphasis added).  [...]’ Answer admits its application for development was submitted on April 29, 2022 [Da18 at ¶ 25] – after the Ordinance took effect so the policy concerns described in *Jai Sai Ram* are simply inapplicable here because the application for development was submitted when the change to the zoning took place.
[directive] ”  1.  I am being questioned as part of an investigation by this agency into potential violations of department rules and regulations, or for my fitness for duty.  This investigation concerns 2.  I have invoked my rights on the grounds that I might incriminate myself in a Miranda criminal matter.  3.  I have been granted use immunity.  No answer given by me, nor evidence derived from the answer, may be used against me in any criminal proceeding, except for perjury or false swearing.  4.  I understand that I must now answer questions specifically, directly and narrowly related to the performance of my official duties or my fitness for office.  5.  If I refuse to answer, I may be subject to discipline for that refusal which can result in my dismissal from this agency.  6.  Anything I say may be used against me in any subsequent departmental charges.  7.  I have the right to consult with a representative of my collective bargaining unit, or another representative of my choice, and have him or her present during the interview.  Assistant Prosecutor or Deputy Attorney General authorizing: ____________________________________