ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [Id.; Trans. ID: [...]]  Proof of Service on the defendant was recorded on April 23rd, 2019, stating “records indicate that this item was delivered on 04/01/2019 at 02:04 p.m. in [...]. ”  [Id.; Trans. Process served by regular mail to the New York address was never returned by the post office.  On May 7th, 2019, Plaintiff filed a request to enter default judgment.
[brief] 12 Ahn v. Kim, 145 N.J. 423 (1996) ..............................................................................  8  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Howard Sav. Institution, 127 N.J. Super. 479 (Ch. Div. 1974) .....................................................  10  Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) ............................................................................. 6 Bascom Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 363 N.J. Super. 334 (2003) ................................................................. 2, 3 Berger v. Paterson Veterans Taxi Serv., 244 N.J. Super. 200 (1990) .................................................................. 2, 3 Bruce v. James P. Maclean Firm, 238 N.J. Super. 501 (Super. Ct. 1989) ................................................... 7 Chance v. McCann, 405 N.J. Super. 547 (App. Div. 2009) .................................................. 10 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) .............................................................................. 14 Cwiklinski v. Burton, 217 N.J. Super. 506 (App. Div. 1987) ................................................... 7 Davis v. DND/Fidoreo, Inc., 317 N.J. Super. 92 (App. Div. 1998) .................................................... 5 Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401 (2012) ............................................................................. 9 Garza v. Paone, 44 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 1957) .................................................... 3, 4 Goldfarb v. Roeger, 54 N.J. Super. 85 (App. Div.1959) ................................................................. 5, 9
[brief] *6  Having concluded that the record or the applicable law does not support the consent exceptions to the warrant requirement, we must consider the ramifications of that conclusion.  It is clear that the firearm and CDS that were seized from the house after their illegal warrantless search were “fruits of the poisonous tree” and should have been suppressed.  See State v. O'Neill, 193 N.J. 148, 171 n.13 (2007).  Consequently, this matter must be remanded to afford defendant an opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas to three offenses and have the judgment of conviction vacated.
[brief] 11  Statutes N.J.S.A. 5:13-1 to 11 ...................................................................................  27 N.J.S.A. 5:14-1 to 7 .....................................................................................  27 N.J.S.A. 5:15-1, et seq .................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 5:15-2 ............................................................................................  26 N.J.S.A. 5:15-5 ............................................................................................  26 N.J.S.A. 5:15-12 ..........................................................................................  28 R. 4:46-2(c) ..................................................................................................  12
[brief] standards, policies, planning, and regulation," N.J.S.A. 13:20-2; DEP Highlands Water Protection & Planning Act Guidance, State of N.J., https://www.nj.gov/dep/highlands/faq_info.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2023), [...] submitted a HAD application to the DEP, seeking a determination that construction of its proposed West Milford station is exempt from the Highlands Act, and thus it was not required to obtain a Highlands Preservation Area Approval from the DEP for the project.
[brief] **[...]’S ENROLLMENT IN THE CCIP**  On July 28, 2015, [...] issued a Notice of Subcontract Award for [...] with [...] listed as awarding company, describing [...]’s “scope of work” as “saw cutting. ”  That notice noted that it was the responsibility of the awarding contractor to ensure that subcontractors enroll in any wrap up insurance programs, and that “[n]o hired tier sub may commence work until they are properly enrolled into the Wrap-up program, as evidenced by a Certificate of Insurance provided by the Wrap-up Administrator. ”  Pa424.  On July 29, 2015, [...] completed a Contractor Enrollment Form describing its work as “concrete cutting. ”  Pa425.  [...] described [...]’s work as concrete cutting and not demolition.  Pa991, Pa999-Pa1000.  It was left to higher contractors to designate whether [...]’s saw cutting constituted demolition work or another category of work.  Pa2316, Pa2351-Pa2352.  On July 30, 2015, [...], Regional Risk Manager for [...], advised several parties via email that [...] would not be able to enroll into the CCIP for structural demolition work on the [...] retaining wall portion of the project.
[brief] Suanez v. Egeland, 353 N.J. Super. 191, 195 (App. Div. 2002).  The only “standards” upon which [...]’s report relies are guidelines given by a public body for use by highway design engineers.  Even a cursory review of the purpose and scope of these guidelines obviates that they simply have no application to the matter at bar because they are to be used for the joint construction of new roadways and sidewalks, “The guidelines contained in this manual...are primarily informational or guidance in character and serve to assist the engineer in attaining good design.  Deviations from this information or guidance do not require a design exception. ” (Pa-176a).  Its application to the repour of cement on a sidewalk apron borders on the absurd.  As the Court concluded, “Since we can’t say what he did or didn’t do, and nobody will ever see or hear that, then [Y]ou can’t say he violated a design manual 25 years ago or in 1985.  So that standard is out. ”  T:8:25-9:2-3.  In other words, there is no proof a design engineer was used, or that any design was done.  This is a cement repour of a sidewalk apron, nothing more.
[brief] ## State Cases | Case Name | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------|---------| | Balducci v. Cige, | 12 | | 240 N.J. 574 (2020) | | | Caravaggio v. D'Agostini, | 14 | | 166 N.J. 237 (2001) | | | Conway v. 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs., | 17 | | 187 N.J. 259 (2006) | | | EnviroFinance Grp., LLC v. Envtl. Barrier Co., LLC, | 34 | | 440 N.J. Super. 325 (App. Div. 2015) | | | Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chemetron Corp., | 14 | | 62 N.J. 111 (1973) | | | Federal Wine and Liquor Company v. Jabberwock Country Club, | 39 | | 120 N.J.L. 331 (E. & A. 1938) | | | Grunwald v. Bronkesh, | 14, 15 | | 131 N.J. 483 (1993) | | | Guerin v. Cassidy, | 22, 23, 26 | | 38 N.J. Super. 454 (Ch. Div.1955) | | | Higgins v. Swiecicki, | 22 | | 315 N.J. Super. 488 (App. Div. 1998) | | | Howard M. Schoor Assocs., Inc. v.  Holmdel Heights Const. Co., | 42, 43, 44 | | 68 N.J. 95 (1975) | | | Kocanowski v. Twp. Of Bridgewater, | 12 | | 237 N.J. 3 (2019) | | | Lynch v. Rubacky, | 15 | | 85 N.J. 65 (1981) | | | Marko v. Zurich North America Insurance Company, | 45 | | 386 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div. 2006) | | Newfield Fire Co. No. 1 v. Borough of Newfield, 439 N.J. Super. 202 (App. Div. 2015) ..................................................28, 34 Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Fowler, 73 N.J. 88 (1977) ................................................................................. 40 R. Jennings Mft. v. Northern Elec., 286 N.J. Super. 413 (App. Div. 1995) ......................................................45, 46 Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531 (2019) .................................................................................. 12 Save Camden Pub. Schs. v. Camden City Bd. of Educ., 454 N.J. Super. 478 (App. Div. 2018) .......................................................
[brief] 6T102:14 to 128:13.  Finally, after continued argument and a break, the court finds that the captain of the ship doctrine has no application to the case.  6T138:13-17.  The disruption of plaintiff’s case, however, cannot be undone.  Defense counsel also used rejected arguments, lengthy sidebars and speaking objections to disrupt plaintiff’s other witnesses.  See, e.g., 5T51; 5T52; 5T104; 5T125: 5T126; 5T143.  The impact was an unfair trial in which plaintiff was prevented from introducing relevant evidence in any cohesive manner.  Defense counsel was permitted to testify without qualification while plaintiff’s witnesses were prevented from testifying based on their demonstrated and relevant experience.
[brief] However, even if he were to treat with some medical professional for his claimed injuries and incur medical treatment expenses in excess of $3,600 prior to trial, he clearly is unable to meet the verbal threshold of the statute by establishing the permanent loss of a bodily function, which requires a demanding set of proofs.  The issue of what constitutes a “permanent loss of a bodily function” was the subject of a unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court decision rendered in *Brooks v.  Odom and New Jersey Transit*, 150 N.J. 395 (1997).
[brief] IV.  PLAINTIFF’S LEGAL FEES WERE NOT PERMITTED FEE SHIFTING UNDER THE CURRENT LAW (RAISED BELOW: DA45-66, DA168-178)  .........................................................  23  A.  Lawyer Is Not An Insurer for Every Mistake Occurring in the Practice ....  23  B.  Plaintiff Failed to Prove the Underlying Malpractice Case ......................... 24 C.  Plaintiff was Not Forced to Litigate with A Third Person to Protect Her Interest and the Legal Fees Incurred Were Not Foreseeable, Because Plaintiff Failed to Prove the Underlying Malpractice Claim Against the Alleged Tortfeasor ........................................................................................................................................
[brief] As a preliminary matter, defendants misperceive and try to minimize plaintiff’s argument and misconstrue the import of Schmidt v. Smith, 155 N.J. 44 (1998).  Plaintiff’s argument is based not only on the statute itself but the legislative history of that statute, caselaw interpreting that statute and the statute’s plain language requiring coverage for the payment of any work-related injury or illness.  That is the language of the statute.  The Workers Compensation portion of [...]’s policy, in accordance with the statute, covers all work-related injury and illness except for intentional wrongs.  The logical conclusion, then, is that the Employer Liability portion of the policy is meant to fill that gap in coverage.
[brief] *Baker v. McCullan*, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n. 3 (1979).  The Supreme Court has held that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 allows for municipal liability under Section 1983 where the alleged unconstitutional actions are connected to official policy.  *Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York*, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (holding that governing bodies may be sued under § 1983 where “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.
[brief] By way of example, version 6 at article 5.1 of the [...] Redevelopment Agreement, is headed “Density Payment,” and states that The parties agree . . . that under the prior version of the Redevelopment Plan, the Project qualified for a permissible density of ____ units.  Under the Redevelopment Plan, however, the Project qualifies for a permissible total density of ____ units for the total area of redevelopment to be undertaken.  **In consideration of this recognition** [increased density] and acknowledgement by the City and for additional community benefits, Redeveloper has agreed to make payment to the City in the amount of $2,000,000 ($40,000 X 50 Units) (Pa1043; emphasis added).  Version 7 of the Redevelopment Agreement eliminated article 5.1 but added an article 4.4(a) requiring:  A one-time fee in the amount of Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000) payable.  The parties agree and acknowledge that the Project qualifies for a permissible total density of 109 units under the Redevelopment Plan.  **In consideration thereof** and acknowledgement by the City and for additional community benefit Redeveloper has agreed to pay such fee to the City.  (Pa1040; emphasis added).  Version 10 added that the Redeveloper would also be responsible for off-site improvements (Pa323 at ¶ 5.1) and revised article 4.4(a) to omit any reference to density:
[brief] At the Township Committee meeting on August 21, 2017, [...] stated his intent to “affirmatively terminate [...]’ employment with the [...]”.  (326a, ¶5).  [...] testified that he inquired at the meeting “if we could terminate him [referring to Plaintiff] … if [...] were to unretire or, you know, pull back his papers …”.  ([...] Dep. 188:13-18, 657a).  [...] also confirmed that Defendants’ removal of Plaintiff from his employment was actively discussed by the Township Committee at the meeting, even though [...] admits that he had never as a member of the Township Committee previously been involved in any disciplinary issues regarding a police officer.  (Id. at 191:17-25 & 193:7-16, 658a).  [...] confirmed in his deposition testimony that he understood that [...] was asking if Defendants could terminate Plaintiff’s employment, notwithstanding that Manning did not know what the legitimate factual basis for Plaintiff’s termination would be.
[brief] ...........................................  35  Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 272 (1973)  ..................................................................43  Marley v. Palmyra Bor., 193 N.J. Super. 271, 289 (Law Div. 1983)  ..............................................................................................................32  Mem'l Props., LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 210 N.J. 512, 524 (2012)  ....................................................................................................................42  Miller v. Estate of Sperling, 166 N.J. 370, 386, 766 A.2d 738 (2001) ......38 Morey v. Palmer, 232 N.J. Super. 144 (App. Div. 1989) .............................................32 Perry v. Levy, 87 N.J.L. 670, (E.& A. 1915) .................................................................22 Posey, ex rel. v. Bordentown Sewage Authority, 171 N.J. 172, 188 (2002) ............................................................................................... 35 Ritter v. Castellini, 173 N.J. Super. 509, 513-514 (Law Div. 1980) .............................................................................................................32 Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. 385, 402 (App. Div. 2002) ...........................................................................................................15, 16 Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 242 N.J. Super. at 55.................................16 Rutkowski v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 209 N.J. Super. 140, 143 (App. Div. 1986) ............................................................................................46 Sattelberger v. Telep, 14 N.J. 353, 363 (1954) ............................................................. 47 State v. Freeman, 223 N.J. Super, 92, 115-16 (App. Div. 1988) certif. denied, 114 N.J. 525 (1989) ...............................................................................16 Sutphen v. Benthian, 165 N.J. Super. 79 (App. Div. 1979) ................................. 33 United Savings Bank v. State, 360 N.J. Super. 520, 525 (App. Div. 2002) .............................................................................................................43 Vanchieri v. New Jersey Sports and Exposition Auth., 104 N.J. 80, 87, 514 A.2d 1323 (1986) ................................................................. 29 Vincitore v. Sports & Expo. Authority, 169 N.J. 119, 123, 124 (2001) .................................................................................. 6, 36, 40 Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 101 N.J. 538 (1986) ...................................................... 43, 44 Winstock v. Galasso, 430 N.J. Super. 391, 418 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 487, 73 (2013) ....................................................... 38 New Jersey Statutes: N.J.S.A. 27:23-3(A) ............................................................................. 1, 17, 40 N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 ...............................................................................
[brief] [...] was a Certified Independent Medical Examiner.  (2T5).  [...] was previously accepted by multiple Courts as an expert in orthopedics and disability impairment.  (2T6).  [...] only accepted him as an expert in orthopedics with an indication it would give his disability impairment testimony appropriate weight.  (2T9).  [...] had been used an expert previously by [...] in offering the [...] an opinion on whether a given applicant was totally and permanently disabled.  (2T5-6).  [...] found [...] to be totally and permanently disabled from being a police sergeant.  (2T12).  [...] found [...]’s total and permanent disability to be causally related to his accident of October 17, 2015.  (2T12).
[brief] This is not a situation tainted by an impermissible conflict of interest on the part of a government official.  This is not a situation where, as in *Cent. 25 LLC v. Zoning Board of City of Union City*, 460 N.J. Super 446, 450 (App. Div. 2019), the mayor merely expressed a personal opinion on a development proposal.  In *Cent 25, LLC*, the mayor of Union City sent out a flyer stating that he was “personally not in favor” of a live poultry market planned for the City.  He did not opine on the merits of the planned market, nor did he make inflammatory or misleading statements about the impact of the planned market on the community, as the defendant Mayor did in this case.
[brief] ]  Then, toward the end of his summation, the prosecutor invoked a quote from the popular 1990 mobster film “Goodfellas” and compared the callous murders depicted in that film to what the prosecutor alleged [...] did:  Now, ladies and gentlemen, I want to conclude with a quote for you.  It’s from a movie, it’s a fictional movie, but sometimes movies have some variance of truth, so in this case it’s from a title move -- an academy award winning film and I think this quote spot on to what happened in this case.  The quote goes something like this.  Not like the movies, there’s not a lot of yelling and screaming before it happens.  Your murderers comes [sic] with smiles, they come as your friends, they come as people you’ve known your entire life and trusted and they come at a time when you least expect it.  [5T 112-2 to 14 (emphasis added). ]5  The prosecutor then continued his appeal to emotion:  Ladies and gentlemen, that is what this evidence has shown beyond a reasonable doubt, that on that cold frigid night in the [...], [...] thought he was walking with a friend, but he was being led to his execution by his executioner and he didn’t know it.
[brief] ”  Ibid. (emphasis added); see Pb21.)  Defendant in this case did not use the NJDOH investigation documents in order to inaccurately imply that plaintiff or her experts had previously taken an inconsistent position, as defense counsel in Manata did.  Moreover, the error in allowing the police report to be used cross examination in Manata affected the jury’s determination on the issue of liability, whereas plaintiff in this case claims that despite the jury’s determination that [...] deviated from the standard of care, the resolution of the proximate cause question was somehow adversely affected by the discussion of the NJDOH investigator’s conclusions.  Notably, in McLean v. Liberty Health System, 430 N.J. Super. 156 (App. Div. 2013), the Appellate Division found that the trial court erred in limiting each of the parties to presenting the testimony of only one expert witness in each area of specialty, observing, among other things, that An attorney may not take advantage of a favorable evidentiary ruling and make statements that are “contrary to facts which [the other party] was precluded from adducing.
[brief] The standard of review is plenary for dismissal of a complaint based on a preclusionary doctrine.  See Selective Ins. Co. v. McAllister, 327 N.J. Super. 168, 173 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 164 N.J. 188 (2000).  With respect to findings of fact, the “scope of appellate review of a trial court’s fact-finding function is limited. ”  Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998).  “The general rule is that findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence. ”  Id. (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Inc. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).  “Deference is especially appropriate ‘when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility. ’”  Id. (quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)).  “Therefore, an appellate court should not disturb the ‘factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [it is] convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend interests of justice. ’”  Id. (quoting Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484).  In other words, the appellate court should “exercise its original fact finding jurisdiction sparingly and in none but a clear case where there is no doubt about the matter. ”  Id. II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS “STOPPED” FROM PURSUING A BAD FAITH CLAIM DESPITE DETERMINING, ON A FULL EVIDENTIARY RECORD, THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT POSSESS KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS UNDERLYING ITS CLAIMS UNTIL AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST ACTION (PA3; 4T8:3-11).
[brief] R. 2:9-1 (a).  [...] acknowledges that this Court may ultimately hold the Department’s issuance of the Bulletin was appropriate and that its actions did not violate the APA.  [...] contends, however, that such a conclusion would be inequitable without consideration of a full and accurate record of the Department’s actions and course-of-conduct leading up to the issuance of the Bulletin.  In this regard, the Department’s submissions to this Court have squarely placed these issues in contention.  The Department is affirmatively relying on Order No. A22-13, approving the acquisition of non-party [...], as proof of the Department’s past conduct and interpretation of the Holding Act and SSAP No. 25.  The Department’s past conduct is at the fundamental core of what the Court needs to decide to determine whether the Department has engaged in de facto rule making.
[brief] Other jurisdictions specify no particular factors but instead “allow[] a trial court to consider the unique facts and circumstances in each case—and the purpose for which the evidence is being offered—in deciding whether the evidence has been properly authenticated. ”  *State v. Haight-Gyuro*, 186 P.3d 33, 37 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008); see also *State v. Luke*, 464 P.3d 914, 927 (Haw. Ct. App. 2020) (adopting “a less formulaic approach that focuses on the facts of each case”); *State v. Snead*, 783 S.E.2d 733, 736 (N.C. 2016) (“Evidence that the recording process is reliable and that the video introduced at trial is the same video that was produced by the recording process is sufficient to authenticate the video and lay a proper foundation for its admission as substantive evidence.