ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff Took Place in New Jersey  Plaintiff retained Defendants to assist in a multi-million-dollar wire transfer, including liaising with escrow attorneys to ensure the wire was not released improvidently.  Da313 ¶¶ 2 & 3.  Specifically, Plaintiff hired [...] to hold money in escrow until he received funding for the Project, and retained Defendants to ensure the escrow deposit was not released prematurely.  Da23 ¶¶ 13 & 14.  By way of background, Plaintiff engaged [...] (“[...]”) in early 2016 to obtain financing for the Project through [...] (“[...]”).  Da24 ¶ 17.  Plaintiff agreed to pay [...] a $2,500,000 escrow payment once [...] secured a standby letter of credit in the amount of $500,000,000 through [...], after which a third-party lender would utilize the letter of credit as collateral to lend funds to develop the Project.  Id. at ¶ 18.  In August 2016, Plaintiff and [...] executed a transaction agreement in connection with the loan.  *Id.* at ¶ 19.  New York attorney, [...] (“[...]”), was the initial escrow attorney for the loan.  *Id.* at ¶ 20.  Later, [...] replaced [...] with [...], first as escrow agent and then, at [...]’s recommendation, as “escrow attorney” to ensure his LPL insurance would be in place to cover any negligence.  Da25 ¶ 28.  For months, Defendants assisted Plaintiff in negotiating the terms of the escrow arrangement with [...], which detailed how and when Plaintiff’s money was to be released.  Da25–28 ¶¶ 29–39.  This assistance was in the form of phone calls and emails wherein Defendants advised Plaintiff as to [...]’ role in the transaction, written terms, and authentication processes, all to safeguard the loan funding and prevent a premature release.  Da94–105.  Defendants also counseled Plaintiff to ensure [...] held Plaintiff’s funds in his IOLTA Trust Account in accordance with the Rules of Professional Conduct and [...]’ liability insurance policy.  *Id.*  On September 30, 2016, Plaintiff directed the deposit of $2,500,000 into [...]’ IOLTA Trust Account.  Da28 ¶¶ 41 & 42.  On or about November 3, 2016, [...] discovered that [...] released the $2,500,000 without authorization and without confirmation that Plaintiff received any funding under the loan.  Da29 ¶¶ 43 & 44.  As a result of Defendants’ negligence, Plaintiff incurred substantial loss, including but not limited to the amount of the wire.  *Id.* at ¶ 45.  Subsequently, [...] and various [...] attorneys from other [...] offices arranged for Plaintiff’s representatives to meet with the FBI in New Jersey as part of the investigation of the misdirected wire.
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[brief] They did so by presenting balance sheets and financial information to [...] that were “inaccurate” because they had diverted funds from the companies, and compounded the issue when [...] used that inaccurate 21 [...] and [...] were parties to the MIPA; [...] and [...] were parties to the 2014 SPA; and [...] and [...] were parties to the 2017 SPA.  (Da906, 948, 921).  information to induce Plaintiffs’ to sell their interests for $6.3 million when [...] knew “the numbers were wrong” and “bogus. ” (27T87:23 to 88:18).  As the trial court explained: the [...] Stockholders Agreement, the MRL Operating Agreement, the SPA and the MIPA “all feed off of each other,” “there are a lot of moving parts” and “they all play off of each other.
[brief] The following facts are undisputed.  Subsequent to the [...] Incident, [...]’s urinalysis drug screens at the hospital was negative for opioids.  (T4 23:13-22, 24:7-10, 24:11-25:3, 145:3-13).  [...], the emergency room doctor, testified that [...]’s drug screen would have been positive for opioids if she had overdosed on opioids.  (T4 23:13-22, 24:7-10, 24:11-25:3).  [...] told the doctors at the hospital that she took 2 Percocet pills, which could not cause an overdose.  (T4 at 26:11-20, 29:17-20).  Excessive alcohol can lead to depressed breathing, which is what [...] was diagnosed with by the EMTs.  (T4 25:24-26:10).  There was no blood test for alcohol done on [...].  (T4 34:14-36:2).  [...] testified that [...] could have been unconscious due to alcohol ingestion.  (T4 35:8-36:2).  What caused [...]’s medical issue was never determined.  (T4 3-13).  What is clear is that there was insufficient evidence for the ALJ to find that [...] “suffered a drug overdose” at [...]’s house.  That erroneous finding, thus, cannot provide support for any discipline of [...].
[brief] I.  Defendant Must Be Given The Option To Withdraw His Guilty Plea Based Upon His Attorney And The Trial Court’s Failure To Inform Defendant Of the Fact that His License Suspension was Required, by Statute, to Run Consecutively with the Prior License Suspension, A Material Penal Consequence.  Instead, Defendant’s Attorney And The Trial Court Misled Defendant By Indicating that the License Suspension Would End in 2023, Rather than 2033.  "A guilty plea may be accepted as part of a plea bargain when the court is assured that the defendant enters into the plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily."  State v. Johnson, 182 N.J. 232, 236 (2005) (citing R. 3:9-2).  "For a plea to be knowing, intelligent and voluntary, the defendant must understand the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea."  Ibid.  (Emphasis added).  "Although a court is not responsible for informing a defendant of all consequences flowing from a guilty plea, at a minimum the court must ensure that the defendant is made fully aware of those consequences that are 'direct' or 'penal.'"  Ibid. (quoting State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 113, 122 (1988)).  "Obviously, this is best accomplished by the court satisfying itself, through specific question[s] and answer[s]," during a plea allocution.  State v. Kovack, 91 N.J. 476, 484 (1982).  "The requirement that the court be satisfied in that respect serves several salutary ends.  It avoids having a defendant enter into a plea hampered by being 'misinformed …as to a material element of a plea negotiation, which [he] has relied [on] in entering his plea.'"  Johnson, 182 N.J. at 236-37 (quoting State v. Nichols, 71 N.J. 358, 361  Any misunderstanding must be "a material factor in the decision to plead guilty."  *State v. Kiett*, 121 N.J. 483, 490 (1990).  "Clarity as to the direct and penal consequences of a defendant's guilty plea promotes the binding resolution of charges because it serves to ensure that a defendant's 'expectations [are] reasonably grounded in the terms of the plea bargain.'"  *Johnson*, 182 N.J. at 237 (quoting *State v. Marzolf*, 79 N.J. 167, 183 (1979)).
[brief] C.  Obesity, particularly rendering Plaintiff in a high-risk category as it relates to Covid-19, also qualifies as a “disability” under the NJLAD  Plaintiff also suffers from obesity.  Without any substantive reasoning placed on the record, the trial court concluded “I see no evidence presented from the plaintiff that [her termination] was because of her obesity. ”  T32:21-22.  Before the trial court could even conclude whether the adverse employment action was “causally related”, it failed to analyze whether Plaintiff’s obesity qualified as a “disability” under the NJLAD.  The inquiry of whether Plaintiff fell into a protected category is distinct from whether she can establish a causal connection.  In this regard the trial court’s conclusion is unclear, but nonetheless wrong.
[brief] Da045.  Also on January 19, 2024, the Trial Court entered an Order granting Respondent’s Motion for Offer of Judgment penalties, after a comprehensive opinion set forth upon the record.  Da047, see also (5T: 03:01 – 14:03, Trial Court opinion).  An Amended Notice of Appeal was thereafter filed by Appellant, on January 19, 2024.  Da077.  III
[brief] [...] was escorted to a third floor interview room in the Criminal Investigation Bureau that was equipped with a recorder that enabled us to capture both video and audio.  At approximately 1955 hours the interview with [...] began and [...] made it clear that he requested this interview and that he asked [...] to put him in touch with someone who is investigating the Pharmacy Murder because he wanted to talk about it.  [...] was provided with a Mercer County Rights Form, which he signed.  I then asked [...] what exactly he wanted to talk about and he stated that some people were coming to his house and bothering his family.  [...] was not sure he knew who the people were and he believed that the people might have been either [...] or myself.  We both assured [...] that we were at his residence one time when we executed the search warrant.  [...] appeared to be satisfied with our answer and seemed to drop the subject.  As the conversation continued [...] acknowledged that he has a problem with E Pills, meaning Ecstasy Pills.  I agreed with [...] that he has a number of problems and that his addiction to pills was one of his problems.  At I, [...], [...], Badge #336, being of full age, certify as follows:
[directive] Administra- Pending Pending from Prior New Cases  Not tively End of Conviction  Dismissal Years cases Closed Agency Civilian Anon. Diversion Acquittal  Exonerated Sustained Unfounded Closed Sustained Quarter  Excessive Force 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Improper Arrest 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Improper Entry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Improper Search 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Other Criminal Violation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Differential Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Demeanor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Domestic Violence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Other Rule Violation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Total Cases Opened 0  Total Cases Closed 0  Total Pending Cases 0  Total Cases >180 Days 0 First Quarter Internal Affairs Summary Date Agency Name: Year: Annual Internal Affairs Summary Source of Complaint Criminal Outcome Internal Discplinary Outcome Pending Administra- Pending from Prior New Cases Not tively End of Conviction Dismissal Years cases Closed Agency Civilian Anon. Diversion Acquittal Exonerated Sustained Unfounded Closed Sustained Year Excessive Force 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Improper Arrest 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Improper Entry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Improper Search 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Other Criminal Violation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Differential Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Demeanor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Domestic Violence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Other Rule Violation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total Cases Opened 0 Total Cases Closed 0 Total Pending Cases 0 Total Cases >180 Days 0
[brief] See ECF No. 13.  The Court finds that it is as to the ’589 Patent, but not as to the ’016 Patent.  With regard to both defenses, Defendant must establish that Plaintiffs’ conduct was either “unreasonable and inexcusable” or misleading in a way that led Defendant to infer that Plaintiffs did not intend to enforce its patents against Defendant.  The ’589 Patent expired on January 2, 2015, three days after the tolling agreement ended, and Plaintiffs did not petition the PTO until February 20, 2015.  The requested discovery seeks to determine whether Plaintiffs intentionally allowed the patent to expire.  If Plaintiffs intentionally failed to renew the patent, Defendant could use that evidence to argue that the delay in filing this action was unreasonable and/or inexcusable.  Evidence of an intentional failure to renew the patent also could be relevant to whether Plaintiffs misled Defendant regarding their intent to enforce the patent.  As such, the revival discovery as to the ’589 Patent is relevant to Defendant’s current defenses and claims.
[brief] Appellants get no further by claiming that they did not violate the LAD because they were just seeking to comply with state and federal laws governing access to student records or with parents’ federal substantive due process rights.  (Db22-23; 30-32).  As explained in detail below, Appellants misunderstand both the recordkeeping laws, see infra at 27-30, and federal substantive due process, infra at 30-40.
[brief] That is especially so in light of the fact that there were no fact issues in light of the certifications produced by the Defendants and the Plaintiff’s decision not to take Defendants’ depositions.  Furthermore, Defendants suggest that, in fact, Plaintiff did raise arguments in the alternative when answering the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants.  Plaintiff filed a thirteen-page, three-issue opposition which argued that the “law of the case” should apply, and a number of arguments in the alternative.  However, she did not argue against the application of the statute of limitations, and could not do so, as there is no factual issue on that point.  Therefore, there was nothing which precluded Plaintiff from re-raising before [...] any argument she initially raised before [...] nor incorporating it by reference.  Having failed to have done so, it was not plain error for [...] to have decided the matter based on the arguments which were actually presented to him by the parties.
[brief] Review of a Trial Court’s Order granting summary judgment is de novo based on the same standard of review the Trial Court must adhere to when deciding a Motion for Summary Judgment.  Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 244 N.J. 189, 199 (2016); see also, Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998).  The Appellate Court must first decide whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and if not, then it must decide whether the Trial Court’s rulings on the law were correct.  See Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 N.J. at 167; see also, Seaview Orthopaedics ex rel Fleming v. Nat’l Health Care Resources, Inc., 366 N.J. Super. 501, 505 (App. Div. 2004).  Summary Judgment must be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law."  R. 4:46-2(c); see also, Aronberg v. Tolbert, 207 N.J. 587, 597 (2011).  This requires a “searching review” of the record to ascertain whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 541 (1995).  The motion judge must “consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  Id.  The non-moving party has the “burden of producing in turn evidence that would support a jury verdict [and must] set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. ”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).  Bare conclusions and pleadings, without substantial factual support and tendered affidavits will not and should not defeat a meritorious application for summary judgment. ”  Brill, 142 N.J. at 536.  Further, although the standard of review of a Trial Court’s Order granting summary judgment is plenary, any evidence not before the Trial Court at the time summary judgment is decided may not be submitted to the Appellate Division.
[brief] Indeed, “[s]everal cases have liberally construed the term excusable neglect . . . [however,] excusable neglect or mistake leading to a default will not be recognized when the conduct was merely careless and reflected a lack of diligence or planning .  . . .”  *Triffin*, 436 N.J. Super. at 629-30.  Here, the lower court found that Defendant lacked excusable neglect because “they were properly served process and their personal loss, though unfortunate, d[id] not justify the defendant’s failure to answer as it occurred nineteen months after the case commenced . . . and six months after default judgment was entered. ” (Da 1 to 2).  Defendant appears to largely abandon any argument concerning whether his “neglect to answer or otherwise appear and defend was excusable under the circumstances”.  Instead, Defendant relies on his argument of improper service and the argument that lack of excusable neglect does not bar relief under Rule 4:50-1(f).  Those arguments are addressed below and do not demonstrate any basis for overturning the lower court’s denial of Defendant’s motion.  See infra Points III & IV, respectively.  In any event, there is simply no excusable neglect that Defendant could demonstrate to excuse his utter failure to move to vacate the default judgment until about August 23, 2022, which is more than five months after default judgment was entered on March 18, 2022; 18 months after the complaint was filed on February 19, 2021, and after numerous services attempts to addresses that Defendant admits he was associated with, see infra Point III.  To the extent that Defendant seeks to remedy his failure to address his lack of excusable neglect in his Reply submission, we respectfully request an opportunity to submit a surreply limited to that issue.  POINT II
[brief] The Court further mentions, (1) the defendant testified herself; the court found her not to be credible, noting that on pages 45 and 46\(^{32}\) of the transcripts, the defendant and [...] were conversing in reference to her whereabouts on the night of November 2, 2021.  (2T16:8-13)  The Superior Court interprets her “slipping” when she asked the question to [...], “Was there anybody besides me, did you see anybody there that day?”\(^{33}\) and considers her question as an admission that she was present.
[brief] On June 12, 2017, plaintiff, [...], through [...], Executrix, filed a four-count complaint against defendants, [...] d/b/a [...] (Care One), [...], [...], [...] and [...] (collectively Care One defendants).  Pa11.  Plaintiff asserted negligence of the Care One defendants (Count I), violation of New Jersey Nursing Home Responsibilities and Rights of Residents Act (NHA) of the Care One defendants (Count II), wrongful death as a result of the actions of the Care One defendants (Count III), and a claim against the Care One defendants for punitive damages.  Pa15-20.  All defendants filed an answer and cross-claims.  Pa22.  By Order dated May 13, 2021, Count IV was dismissed as to all defendants and the remaining counts were dismissed as to the corporate defendants, leaving Care One as the sole defendant for trial.  In July 2022, the court held a second pretrial hearing on defendant’s seven remaining motions in limine, one had been decided previously, and plaintiff’s one motion in limine.  12T.  Plaintiff’s motion sought to exclude testimony regarding the conclusions reached by the Department of Health and [...] in their July 6, 2016, Survey and August 18, 2016, letter to [...].  Pa42.  The court denied the motion while stating “that will be in, so long as a proper foundation is laid.  I am not making a determination right now that, in fact, it goes in.  The proper foundation actually has to be laid. ”  12T56:3-6.  The court denied defendant’s motion to bar reference to and use of alleged violations of federal and New Jersey statutory and regulatory standards at trial.  Pa81.  “Experts could cite standards if they relied on those standards as evidence of negligence but not negligence per se. ”  Ibid.  The court denied defendant’s motion to bar plaintiff’s experts from presenting opinions to the jury that are beyond the scope of their expertise.  Pa84.  “While the Court agrees that experts cannot testify beyond the scope of their expertise, [...] [sic] is permitted to testify about nursing home standards of care and about the care and treatment received by plaintiff while he was at the nursing home. ”  Pa84-85.  The case was tried before a jury in March and April 2023.  Pa1.  On April 4, 2023, the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant.  Pa131-34.  On April 10, 2023, the court entered judgment for defendant.  Pa1.  Plaintiff timely moved for a new trial.  Pa36.  That motion was denied with a Statement of Reasons.  Pa2-10.  Plaintiff timely filed a Notice of Appeal.  Pa135.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] For the reasons stated in [...]’s opening brief, pro se brief, and this reply brief, his convictions should be reversed.  And as the State concedes, if the convictions are not reversed, the matter must be remanded for: (1) the judgment of conviction to be amended to merge count three into count two, to remove the fines and penalties associated with count three, and to reflect 1,119 days of jail credits; and (2) a hearing on [...]’s ability to pay restitution.
[brief] Disclosure of the Sworn Statement was not discretionary; it was mandated by Brady, Giglio, and the Jencks Act (as memorialized in Rule 3:13-3(b) and State v. Farmer, 48 N.J. 145, 152 (1966)).  Rather than acknowledge the Brady violation, however, the State plays the blame game.  The State blames (1) [...] for not searching PACER, an electronic, federal cataloguing system he did not have access to as a pretrial detainee at the [...] while he was preparing for trial; (2) [...]’s trial counsel, [...], for not discovering [...]’ Habeas Petition in the PACER catalogue, notwithstanding the fact that it was filed under an alias, “Erwin” Torres; and (3) [...] – the attorney who filed [...]’s 2017 Post-Conviction Relief Petition – for not raising the Brady issue at the time of his filing.  Notably, the State fails to disclose that Mr. Leeds, a court-appointed lawyer, was conflicted out of the case shortly after he filed the Petition because he previously represented Codefendant [...] in this matter. \(^1\)  There exist no procedural hurdles preventing this Court from determining on the merits that [...]’s constitutional rights were violated.  The Sworn Statement was Brady material, and its disclosure was mandated.  Because Torres was, by the State’s own admission, the most critical evidence against [...], the Sworn Statement would have provided ample opportunity for cross-examination and significantly undermined his credibility.  In fact, the State recognized that Torres’ credibility was an issue at trial but did not “think” that the benefit he received as a cooperating witness (the reduction of his life sentence) alone made him unworthy of belief.  12T 65:6-16.  In other words, the State argued that the jury should require something else before finding that Torres was not a credible witness.  Meanwhile, the State was in possession of a Sworn Statement from Torres that materially undermined his credibility and trial testimony—a finding that has already been rendered by the PCR Judge.
[brief] Plaintiff Was Warned of the Exact Injuries She Alleges in the Lawsuit, and Consented to Receiving an Ozurdex® Injection.  Plaintiff and her doctor were well aware of the risks of intravitreal injections with Ozurdex®, including the potential for inflammation, retinal detachment, pellet migration, and vision loss—the exact injuries she alleges she incurred.  (Da0105; Da0121)  But they decided the benefits outweighed those risks, and on November 6, 2018, [...] administered Ozurdex® to Plaintiff’s left eye for the ninth time.  (Da0087)  As before, Plaintiff knew the risks and gave her informed written consent.  (Da0089, pp. 73-76; Da0121)  Plaintiff alleges she experienced these well-known risks after the November 6 injection.  (Da0150, p. 64; Da0204, Nos. 17, 20)  Even though these exact injuries can occur after a non-defective Ozurdex® injection, Plaintiff asserts the injuries were caused by a supposed defect in her Ozurdex® unit.