ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 8.6.4  Any questions asked of officers during an internal investigation must be "narrowly and directly" related to performance of their duties and the ongoing investigation.10  Officers must answer questions directly and narrowly related to that performance.  All answers must be complete and truthful, but officers cannot be compelled to answer questions having nothing to do with their performance as law enforcement officers, that do not implicate a rule or regulation violation, or that are unrelated to the investigation.  8.6.5
[brief] The Constitution prohibits governmental actors from interfering with parental decision-making on matters of great importance, but it does not require governmental actors (here, the school districts) to assist parents in exercising their parental authority.  Nor does the constitution prevent school districts from continuing to implement a policy of presumptive nondisclosure.  The districts’ amicus, [...] (“[...]”), advances an even more extreme parental rights claim: [...] argues that a student’s social transition is medical care requiring parental consent in all cases.
[brief] The Arbitrator cited to both the PTA and the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract, noted the “serious issues with the project,” and found that “a credit [was] due back” to [...]. \(^5\) Pa574.  The Arbitrator accordingly awarded [...] --- \(^4\)  The First Arbitration consisted of discovery requests, substantial document productions, depositions, expert reports, motion practice, pre-trial submissions, a full eight-day trial, live witness testimony from 14 individuals, post-trial submissions, post-trial arguments, and a reasoned Award.
[brief] **  For example, on the cross-examination of plaintiff, defense counsel raised for the first time the Complaint she filed with the DOH.  Defendant then introduced the unsigned letter plaintiff received back and asked how she “felt” about the DOH response.  3T193:19-25.  The same tactics were employed with [...], the Administrator at [...] who was called by plaintiff.  On cross-examination, for the first time, the issue of [...]’s “knowledge” of DOH surveys was broached by defendant as a way to bring in the unsubstantiated DOH survey.  Plaintiff objected.  The following exchange between the trial court and defense counsel ensued.
[brief] THE DECISION OF THE [...] SHOULD BE OVERTURNED  The letter brief of the respondent disputes my legal arguments in this case.  Rb14 to Rb25.  All of the respondent's legal arguments are on a foundation of facts that are disputed.  Since the legal arguments of respondent collapse once the faulty factual foundation of such arguments is exposed, I stand by my legal arguments set forth in my February 16, 2024 letter brief and will focus the remainder of this reply letter brief on the faulty factual foundation for the legal arguments of respondent.
[brief] Sans v. Ramsey Golf & Country Club, Inc., 29 N.J. 438 (1959)...33, 34 Shire Inn, Inc. v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 321 N.J. Super. 462 (App. Div. 1999).................................28 State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71(2016)........................................17 State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560 (2015)..........................................17  Town of Belleville v. Parillo’s, Inc., 83 N.J. 309 (1980).............28, 27 Township of Stafford v. Stafford Tp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 154 N.J. 62 (1998)..............................................25, 26 Traetto v. Palazzo, 436 N.J. Super. 8 (App. Div. 2014)...............34 VF Zahodiakin Engineering Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Summit, 8 N.J. 386 (1952).....................37 Villari v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Deptford, 277 N.J. Super. 130 (App. Div. 1994)...............................26, 30 Weber v. Pieretti, 72 N.J. Super. 184 (Ch. Div. 1962) ...............26 Statutes: N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 .........................................................6, 36 Other: New Jersey Zoning & Land Use Administration § 12–1.4 at 2065 (2021) ..............................................37 STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY This action was started on June 5, 2020 by way of the filing of a Verified Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writ by the Plaintiffs, [...] (hereinafter “[...]”), [...] (hereinafter “[...]”), [...] (hereinafter “[...]”), and [...] (hereinafter “[...]”), together with an Order to Show Cause for a Temporary Restraining Order and preliminary injunction shutting down Defendant [...] (hereinafter “[...]”).
[brief] 6T, 24:15-25:22; 33:24-34:22; 47:19-48:25.  Likewise, [...] testified that based on the irrefutable facts of the peculiarities of the financing of 100% affordable housing developments through the [...], Plaintiff [...] having control of the land and said land having been rezoned by [...] for a 100% affordable housing development, was evidence that Plaintiff [...], if he desired or deemed it warranted, was more than capable of entering into a 60%-40% partnership with an affordable housing developer.  6T, 32:17-33:20; 126:10-128:3; 139:16-142:24.
[brief] Exhibit N- Notice to Produce to [...] . . . . . .  R-345  Exhibit O- Consent Order dated April 29, 2022 . . . . . . R-361 Exhibit P- [...]’s initial Certification . . . . . . R-363 Exhibit Q- Certification of [...] . . . . . . R-375 Exhibit R- March 1, 2021 Court Order . . . . . . R-386 Exhibit S- [...] Incorporation papers . . . . . . R-388 Exhibit T- Cover page for April 5, 2021 Transcript (not included) previously filed with the Court R-390 Exhibit V- [...] letter dated April 7, 2021 objecting to Form of Order R-391 Exhibit W- [...] sworn certification re: EIN number dated April 12, 2021 R-394 Exhibit X- [...]’s second sworn certification re: EIN number R-397 Exhibit Y- April 16, 2021 Court Order R-407 Exhibit Z- Document showing EIN number was granted to [...] R-411 Cover Page for Transcript dated April 19, 2021 (not included) previously provided R-412 Exhibit 228- False statement by [...] to collect 401(k) for [...] R-413 Exhibit 229- February 5, 2022 letter to [...] from [...]’s attorney R-414
[directive] Such footage shall not be admissible as evidence in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding.  5.2  Circumstances When BWC Activation is Generally Required.  Except as otherwise expressly provided in Section 7 or any other provision in this Policy, or by law, an officer equipped with a BWC shall be required to activate the device whenever the officer is responding to a call for service or at the initiation of any other law enforcement or investigative encounter between an officer and a member of the public, to include any of the following circumstances,2 unless there exists an immediate threat to the officer’s life or safety that makes such activation impossible or dangerous; in such situations, the officer must activate the camera at the first reasonable opportunity to do so and it shall remain activated until the encounter has fully concluded and the officer leaves the scene: (a) the officer initiates an investigative detention (e.g., a Delaware v. Prouse traffic stop, a Terry v. Ohio criminal suspicion stop, or a checkpoint or roadblock stop); (b) the officer is responding to a call for service and is at or near the location to which the officer has been dispatched;
[brief] All Documents relating to Your Petition To Revive the ’589 Patent Under 37 CFR 1.378 dated February 20, 2015 or Your Renewed Petition To Revive the ’589 Patent Under 37 CFR 1.378 dated August 11, 2015 and their preparation and submission, including any investigation into the cause of the entire delay in payment of maintenance fees for the ’589 Patent.  REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
[brief] 11T:126-143.  The Board’s counsel again urged the Board to consider market conditions, renovations and inflation.  11T:143:23-144:10.  But the Board did not do so.  The Board expressed concern for the following: (i) any substantial rent increase would displace [...] (11T:146:1-2, 253:7-10); (ii) any substantial rent increase would raise rent above market value (11T:162:14-22, 170:21-171:1); and (iii) the Unit would not sell at the equity value sought by [...] (11T:163:21-24, 171:15-19, 199:17-20).  The Board also stated that improvements to the Unit should not be considered because they were old and depreciated.  11T:154:24-156:5, 189:18-21.  No evidence in the record permitted that conclusion.  The Board valued [...]’s equity in the Unit at only $12,804.88.  Da 54; 11T:199:9, 225:3-5, 257:23.  The Board thus ignored the Second Remand Order requiring the Board to take inflation and market conditions into account.  It also ignored its counsel’s advice that the Tenant Protection Act has no bearing on the the determination of equity.  11T:181:24-184:19.  Accordingly, the Board granted a hardship increase of only $154 per month (Da 54; 11T:279:7) based on [...]’s equity in the Unit at $12,804.80.  The Board backed into that equity number by creating what it believed was an acceptable rent increase.  11T:244-259.  It disregarded the instructions in the Second Remand Order because it believed that the rent would be too high.  After the Board’s decision on the rent increase, [...]’s counsel asked the Board to make the increase retroactive to the date that [...] filed its application for a rent increase in 2017.  The Board agreed to consider the issue of retroactivity and insert a beginning date for the rent increase in its resolution after receiving an opinion from its counsel.  11T:280:21-281:1, 281:25-282:5, 285:4-286:15.  The Board advised the parties that it would rely upon its counsel’s opinion, and that the parties should not submit any briefing on that issue.  11T:289:5-7, 291:8-22.  Once again, [...] did not provide any testimony or rebuttal documents challenging any of [...]’s proofs.
[brief] Da87.  When examined side by side, the Millstone Ordinance, which this Court found to be neither vague nor overbroad, and Ordinance 17-2017 use nearly identical language to describe prohibited noise.  “The first step in overbreadth analysis is to construe the challenged statute; it is impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the statute covers. ”  United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008).  Further, “[i]n an overbreadth challenge, the proper focus belongs on ‘what the [law] covers,’ not what regulators or legislators may have intended it to cover.
[brief] See *Case*, 76 N.J.L. 696 (where bidder failed to supply mandatory asphalt material sample), *Tufano*, 110 N.J.L. 370 (where bidder failed to obtain mandatory proof of ownership or a lease of adequate dumping grounds); *Terminal Constr. Corp.*, 67 N.J. 403 (where bidder was required, but failed to have prior federal approval); *Muirfield Cost. Co.*, 336 N.J. Super 126 (where bidder was prohibited from curing ownership disclosure information).  Here, unlike a bidders’ failure to: (i) supply mandatory material samples; (ii) obtain ownership or a lease of dumping grounds; (iii) obtain federal approval; or (iv) supply accurate ownership information, the existence of [...]’s prequalification status was objectively discernible and could not be altered by [...]’s refusal to provide the County with its Notice of Classification form.  C.
[brief] As to the proposed new interrogatories, they are cumulative and unnecessary.  After plaintiff filed this motion he deposed or re-deposed [...], [...] and [...].  Plaintiff also deposed [...] in his capacity as [...]'s document custodian.  Therefore, all of the information plaintiff is requesting in his new interrogatories was or could have been asked about at the depositions he took.  In addition, the subject matter of the proposed special interrogatories was addressed by [...] in his November 19, 2012 affidavit [Doc. No. 131] and at the December 4 and 20, 2012 hearings.  As to plaintiff's request that his consultant personally inspect defendant's computers, the Court also finds this unnecessary.  The Court is satisfied that defendant has completed a reasonable good faith search for its relevant and responsive electronic discovery.  Plaintiff's personal inspection of defendant's computers is unnecessarily intrusive.  As to plaintiff's request for an in camera review of defendant's CD's and DVD's, this is also unnecessary.  The Court accepts defendant's representation that it has now produced all relevant and responsive e-mails and documents.  In addition, the Court has personally reviewed all communications amongst the key “players” to determine what documents should and should not be produced.  Plaintiff's request for sanctions will be addressed infra.
[brief] A jury should not be allowed to speculate without the aid of expert testimony in any area where a layperson could not be expected to have sufficient knowledge or experience.  Kelly v. Berlin, 300 N.J. Super. 256, 268 (App. Div. 1998).  New Jersey courts have strictly adhered to this notion.  In Brody v. Lifson, 17 N.J. 383 (1955), an action for personal injuries suffered during a fall on terrazzo floor, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the effect of moisture on terrazzo flooring was not a matter of common knowledge, therefore, the submission of expert testimony on this issue was not in error.
[brief] Addressing the threshold question of its jurisdiction, Hunstein I first concluded the plaintiff had standing such that the action was a case-or-controversy over which a federal court could have subject matter jurisdiction.  Hunstein II vacated Hunstein I to consider the jurisdictional question following a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision on standing.  After concluding that the plaintiff had standing, Hunstein II repeated verbatim its decision in Hunstein I as to the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim.  Subsequently, Hunstein II was vacated for rehearing en banc.  Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., 17 F.4th 1103 (11th Cir. 2021).
[brief] (5T 130-10 to 24).  After determining that the juror was okay, the court officer was approached by Juror 14, a woman who told him that she had realized that she recognized the name of [...], one of the men who was allegedly in the store at the time of the robbery.  (5T 130-23 to 131-4).  According to the court officer, the remark by Juror 14 was made "in an open forum," i.e., in front of the rest of the jury.  The judge brought Juror 14 into the courtroom and asked her questions.  The juror stated that [...] had been "in a relationship with [the juror's] daughter's grandmother years ago" and that the juror had not "seen him in years."  (5T 131-24 to 132-2).  Juror 14 stated that she did not think that knowing Jones would affect her impartiality.  (5T 132-5 to 9).  The judge asked the court officer to answer a few questions, and he made it clear during that questioning that the comment that he witnessed from Juror 14 regarding [...] was made "in the presence of all the jurors."  (5T 133-22 to 25).  The judge re-examined Juror 14, who admitted that, in addition to the comment that the court officer heard her make in front of the other jurors, Juror 14 asked other jurors whether they had seen the name [...] on the witness list and told them that she needed to inform the judge that she knew Jones.  (5T 135-2 to 7).  The judge excused Juror 14 from the panel (5T 135-15 to 16}, but the judge did not conduct a voir dire of any of the other jurors to determine if Juror 14's memory of what she had said about Jones was accurate and whether the other jurors were impacted by Juror 14’s comments to them.
[brief] That the Township has acknowledged its obligation to pay constitutionally mandated just compensation has no bearing this appeal.  Likewise, that the Township has complied with the procedural requirements of the Eminent Domain Act is of no moment here.  The only issue is whether the Township has demonstrated a valid public use for the taking of Defendants’ private property.  It has not, and as such the trial court’s orders appointing condemnation commissioners and authorizing Plaintiff to take Defendants’ properties must be reversed.
[brief] **[...]**  *Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, [...]*  By:/s/ [...]  [...]  DATED: September 14, 2023  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY SADDLEWOOD COURT, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], [...], [...], and [...], Defendants-Respondents.  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL ORDERS OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, HUDSON COUNTY
[brief] That decision was followed in Berkowitz v. Haigood, 256 N.J.Super. 342, 606 A.2d 1157 (Law Div. 1992).  Here Plaintiff has pledged proceeds from this lawsuit – nothing more.  The Defendants largely seek to avoid the Trial Court’s erroneous rulings on the two evidentiary matters by claiming same are moot.  This Court should not subject the Plaintiff to a subsequent erroneous ruling and a third appeal in order to obtain a Trial on the merits that he is entitled to.  This Court should correct these erroneous rulings.  This Court should correct the Trial Court’s erroneous rulings and remand this matter for trial before a different Judge so that [...] can receive a trial on the merits he has so assiduously sought.
[brief] In reaching this result, the Court was persuaded that any “burden of having to litigate in two forums is alleviated by the fact that attorney's fees and costs are available to [...] under the CFA if she successfully asserts CFA-based defenses in the foreclosure action. ”  *Id.* at 49.  Here, the same result is all the more reasonable because the claim splitting concerns considered — but rejected — in Delta do not exist.
[brief] The Judge of Compensation therefore erred procedurally in declaring the decedent to be an essential employee.  The Judge of Compensation also erred substantively because teachers are not essential employees.  Teachers are conspicuously omitted from the workers that are specifically identified as essential employees in N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11 and 31.12.  The statute was not intended to designate teachers to be essential employees for the simple fact that after the initial shutdown during the pandemic, schools were closed and learning occurred virtually.  Thus, while teachers, and this decedent in particular, returned to work virtually during the relevant time period, they were not required to return to "in-school instruction" "during a raging pandemic," as argued by petitioner.  (Pb9).  The "proofs" relied upon by petitioner certainly do not prove otherwise or eliminate all genuine issues of material issues of fact with respect to this decedent.  The Judge of Compensation found that it was important for educators and students to return to school.
[directive] 16  The research-based “Decision Making Framework” developed by the Judiciary instructs the pretrial services program to recommend that a court impose non-minimal release conditions and monitoring when the FTA and NCA scores are 4 or higher.  In those cases, it generally would be inappropriate to charge by complaint-summons because that would have the practical effect of precluding the level of monitoring deemed necessary and appropriate by empirical research to manage the risks posed by defendant’s release.
[brief] See generally, *McBride v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.*, 295 N.J. Super. 521, 526 (App. Div. 1996)  \(^2\)  The permissibility of this delegation is a carryover from the common law which treated a lease as a sale of an interest in land.  See *McBride v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey*, 295 N.J. Super. 521, 525 (App. Div. 1996).  See also *Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc.*, 26 N.J. 379, 382 (1958)  (Historically a lease was viewed as a sale of an interest in land.  The concept of caveat emptor, applicable to such sales, seemed logically pertinent to leases of land.  However, exceptions to the broad immunity inevitably developed).  Development, 388 N.J. Super. 392, 403-05 (App. Div. 2006); Albert v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1586, 2019 WL 3003822 (App. Div. July 10, 2019), certif. denied, 240 N.J. 1 (2019).
[brief] Id.  In this case, plaintiffs, in seeking to consolidate the 2020 action with the 2015 case, candidly admitted that the 2020 case arose from the same transaction or occurrence as the claims asserted in the 2015 case.  The trial court properly held that the Orders entered in the 2015 case were valid, final, and on the merits, and fully applicable to the 2020 case.  The trial court also held that the doctrine of res judicata applied since the parties to the 2015 case and the 2020 case were the same.  Therefore, the 2020 Complaint, which involved the same nucleus of facts and circumstances that were at issue in the 2015 case, was properly barred under the Doctrine of *Res Judicata*.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page  Excerpts of Plaintiff's Expert Report prepared by [...], dated September 15, 2023 .................................................................Da1 ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases: | | --- | | **Abad v. Gagliardi,**<br>378 N.J. Super. 503 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 185 N.J. 295 (2005)...........21 | | **Ball v. N.J. Bell Tel. Co.**<br>207 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 1986)..................................................14 | | **Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Company,**<br>142 N.J. 520 (1995).................................................................................. 8, 12 | | **Chatman v. Hall,**<br>128 N.J. 394 (1992) ............................................................................. 15, 16, 17 | | **Kolitch v. Lindedahl,**<br>100 N.J. 485 (1985)....................................................................................20 | | **Lodato v. Evesham Twp.**<br>388 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div. 2006).................................................. 16, 17 | | **McGowan v. Borough of Eatontown,**<br>151 N.J. Super. 440 (App. Div. 1977)..................................................13 | | **Muhammad v. N.J. Transit,**<br>176 N.J. 185 (2003)....................................................................................21 | | **Ogborne v. Mercer Cemetery Corp.**<br>197 N.J. 448 (2009)....................................................................................20 | | **Polzo v. County of Essex,**<br>196 N.J. 569 (2008), sub nom., 209 N.J. 51 (2012).............................. 17, 22 | | **Shilinsky v. Borough of Ridgefield,**<br>No. A-0028-14T2, 2015 WL 10718483<br>(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 26, 2016)................................................. 21, 22 | | Statutes & Other Authorities: | | --- | | N.J.S. 59:1-1......................................................................................................................... 1, 13 | | N.J.S. 59:1-2.........................................................................................................................13 | | N.J.S. 59:2-1.........................................................................................................................13 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The within appeal by the Plaintiff, from an order granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants-Respondents, arises out of a Complaint by the Plaintiff-Appellant, alleging he tripped and fell in a hole in the pavement in the middle of a public roadway in the vicinity of [...] (the “Subject Roadway”).
[directive] Every Wednesday Lyndhurst 0232 (201) 804-2457  Every Tuesday Mahwah 0233 (201) 529-2862  Every Tuesday 1st, 2nd, 3rd Tuesday Maywood 0234 (201) 265-2100 @ Paramus Midland Park 0235 (551) 600-8299 1st & 3rd Wednesday 3rd Wednesday @ Moonachie 0237 (201) 641-5899  Teterboro New Milford 0238 (201) 967-5646 1st & 3rd Wednesday North Arlington 0239 (201) 991-6060  Every other Thursday Northvale 0240 (201) 767-3330 2nd & 4th Monday Norwood 0241 (201) 767-7207 1st & 3rd Wednesday Oakland 0242 (201) 377-8140 1st/3rd Thursday Old Tappan 0243 (201) 664-1849 1st Tuesday 2nd & 4th Thursday @ Oradell 0244 (201) 265-2100