ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Access ensured by the Public Trust Doctrine can be classified into different types, including linear/lateral access, perpendicular access, and visual access.  Reasonable, convenient and safe conditions at or around public access areas and public accessways often affect whether the public will be able to reach and use tidal waterways and their shores.  Such site conditions include informative signage marking public accessways, the absence of threatening or misleading signage, adequate facilities (such as restrooms and fish cleaning tables) within a reasonable distance of tidal waterways and their shores and sufficient parking located near public accessways.  Additionally, special measures, such as ramps installed in accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, can be taken to ensure that coastal lands and waters are accessible by all members of the public.  Development can block tidal waters from public view and/or make physical access to tidal waterways and their shores difficult or impossible.  Tidal shore areas located in residential areas or within private beach areas are sometimes fenced, blocked or otherwise obstructed, further complicating access to these sites.  In addition, municipalities have at times sold portions of the public beaches and vacated public streets and street ends to private owners.  The private ownership of land immediately inland from tidal waterways and their shores can limit public access to tidal waterways and their shores.  This leads to limited access to and enjoyment of public resources by citizens who have rights of access and use recognized and protected by the Public Trust Doctrine.  Furthermore, public funds have been used to support protection and maintenance of these resources.  Barriers to access also negatively affect tourism, which is one of the top revenue producing industries in New Jersey...  ***
[brief] ”  §155-19(c), (f), and (g).  In addition, the RCO also grants the Board with the authority to exercise “equitable authority to depart from the strict interpretation of the provisions [of the RCO] where fairness requires equitable intervention. ”  See §155-19.  Finally, the Board also has the power to “supply information and assistance to landlords and tenants to help them comply with the provisions of this chapter. ”  §155-19 (b).
[brief] In so doing, the Court relied heavily on the fact that the actions taken by the prosecutor’s office were done specifically to comply with Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2000-3, which provided guidelines to law enforcement concerning steps to be taken when a law enforcement officer was involved in a domestic violence incident.  The Court specifically held that as the State's chief law enforcement officer, the Attorney General has been given statutory authority to guide law enforcement entities, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-98; that authority has been used “to adopt guidelines, directives, and policies” for law enforcement in this State.  See N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Township of Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. 541, 565, 163 A.3d 887 (2017).  The Attorney General issued Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2000-3 to promote the uniform and expeditious handling of domestic violence issues involving a special subset of individuals: law enforcement officers -- individuals who are authorized to carry state-issued weapons in the cause of law enforcement.  The Directive is particularly geared to a specialized enforcement of the domestic violence laws as they intersect with officers of the law.  The Directive’s instructions are vitally important because the Attorney General is rightfully concerned about the care and circumspection necessary for a fair and correct decision about whether to re-arm a law enforcement officer accused of domestic violence.  Accordingly, the Attorney General devised uniform procedures that require the county prosecutor's personnel to act in the role of a neutral assessor of the propriety of re-arming an officer in those circumstances and not leave such decisions entirely to colleagues with whom the officer serves.
[brief] New Jersey Transit v. Somerville, 139 N.J. 582 (1995); Gannon v. Saddle Brook Twp., 56 N.J. Super. 76, 81 (App. Div. 1959).  Obviously, the REA is more specific than the Holding Act and should prevail.  operations are governed exclusively by the Reciprocal Exchange Act ("REA") unless otherwise stated.  Despite the Department’s contention that the Holding Act only monitors mergers and acquisitions of the resulting holding company systems, (Rb18), the Department is actually attempting to regulate the operations and relationships of reciprocals regardless of any merger or acquisition.  That is the only explanation for the Department’s insistence on applying the Holding Act and SSAP No. 25 criteria as part of every examination and communication.  And, in fact, the Bulletin expressly states that the Holding Act applies to the “operations of insurance holding company systems which include a New Jersey domestic insurer. ”  (JA1)  The Department is expressly and repeatedly arguing that it can apply the Holding Act to reciprocals and regulate the relationship between [...] and the individual subscribers regardless of the existence of a merger/acquisition or an insurance holding company system.  The Department is using the Bulletin to impose the Holding Act and SSAP No. 25 on the operations of reciprocals, their subscribers, their AIFs and Powers of Attorney (“POAs”) in ways that the Department has never before applied and that are prohibited by the REA.²
[brief] (Pa0001)  Answers were filed by the Town (Pa0057) and intervenor [...].  (Pa0064)  On October 6, 2023, the Trial Court denied intervenor’s motion to “settle the record” regarding exhibits.  (Pa0072)  Trial took place on January 26, 2024.\(^1\) (Pa0076)  The WARD memo (Pa0008-045) (which identified 38 clear inconsistencies between the redevelopment plan and the Master Plan) and the Planning Board transcript of February 6, 2023 (Pa0350-0551 *not being appealed from but consists of evidence sought to be admitted at trial hearing R. 2:5-1(g)) were excluded from evidence by the Trial Court.  (T34-6, T45-9 to T47-4)  Those rulings of exclusion are part of this appeal.  On February 26, 2024, the Trial Court issued a written opinion upholding the ordinance for the “plan” and dismissing the complaint with prejudice.  (Pa0074-0098)  This appeal followed on April 1, 2024.
[brief] No person shall create, commit or maintain, or allow to be created, committed or maintained, any nuisance within the [...], New Jersey.  In contrast to Section 201-2A, Section 201-2B of the East Hanover Ordinances delineates 16 specific nuisances.  The State charged [...] with violating 201-2(B)(7) but prior to trial voluntarily dismissed same.  The summons referenced in this Point simply charges that defendant created... a nuisance.
[brief] This “bootstrapping” of the Lien Laws onto the arguments now before this Court is misguided.  With respect to the Municipal Lien Law, [...] points to the statute’s narrow definition of “subcontractor” as a party in “contractual privity” with a contractor.  [...]’s flawed analysis is laid bare by its overt failure to provide a full recitation and analysis of the Municipal Lien Law.  Section 2A:44-128(a) of the Municipal Lien Law further defines a lien claimant as a “laborer, mechanic, materialman, merchant, a trader, or subcontractor” which “performs any labor or furnishes any materials, including the furnishing of oil, gasoline or lubricants and vehicle use. ”  Therefore, the full definition of the term “subcontractor” in the Municipal Lien Law includes a “party in privity” with the contractor that provides the above referenced “labor” and “materials” to the public project.  Certainly, an archaeologist cannot be included in that definition of a “subcontractor”.
[brief] **III.  Plaintiffs did not agree in their DPRP to bring their claims to ADR.**  [...] alternatively argues that Plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate their claims through their DPRP.  *See*  CCDb23-25, 32-42.  As explained, Plaintiffs’ DPRP merely incorporates AICRA’s ADR regulations.  Because AICRA does not require Plaintiffs to bring their claims to ADR, neither does their DPRP.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] It should further be noted that, in the less-than-likely hypothetical situation relied on by the Board, wherein [...] receives benefits, recovers, and is then denied re-employment, the Board, upon determining that [...] is fully recovered from his disability, could simply discontinue benefits and [...] could seek employment elsewhere.  The Board’s refusal to accept the ALJ’s correct version was not just a situation where differing minds could objectively disagree on the result; it was a capricious and arbitrary erroneous finding by the Board that cannot stand.  The Board consistently based all its findings without any support in the factual record.  Moreover, the Board did not provide any analyses as to how the ALJ’s rulings were mistaken and offered no support for its own erroneous views as to the denial of allowing the filing of disability retirement application form.  The Board’s refusal to follow the law as indicated by the ALJ is clearly evident in that the Board strictly interpreted the remedial statutes N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2) and N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(a)(1) when it was sworn to interpret these statutes liberally for the protection of police officers and firefighters.  The Board’s failure to offer any rebuttal of the ALJ’s correct interpretations of fact and law acts as an effective admission that it has no rational argument to posit to support its findings and identify where the ALJ’s opinion and interpretations are incorrect.
[brief] On appeal on the Sentencing Oral Argument calendar, this Court again remanded the case for a resentencing to conduct an analysis to justify consecutive sentences because “the court did not provide adequate findings to support imposition of consecutive terms. ” (Da27).  At the second remand, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., resentenced defendant.  (4T).  The court started its analysis by stating the standard and factors under Yarbough.  (4T 16:3-17:11).
[brief] THE INABILITY OF PARTIES TO OBTAIN DISCOVERY IN AND/OR TO COMPEL WITNESS ATTENDANCE AT NFADR PROCEEDINGS  DEMONSTRATES THAT FRAUD ACT CASES ARE MEANT TO BE RESOLVED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT.  Under N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.2, [...] is responsible for designating an organization to administer the NFADR process.  [...] is the current administrator of the New Jersey No-Fault PIP program.  See www.nj-no-fault.com/home (last visited May 9, 2024).  [...]’s rules governing the NFADR process do not provide for discovery.  See www.nj-no-fault.com/rules.  [See also Pa0377]  They do not mention interrogatories, depositions, subpoenas or document requests.  This is \(^9\)  Despite their citations to the GEICO case, respondents do not contest the point that damages are not available to a carrier under the actual NFADR rules that actually apply here.  understandable given that, during the No-Fault claims process, a medical provider is required to obtain pre-certification for the treatment and/or testing.
[brief] Finally, defendant criticizes [...]’s findings of aggravating and mitigating factors.  (Db40-48).  As noted, [...] agreed that the record supports the findings of aggravating factors (1), (3), and (9), and incorporated the findings of the original sentencing judge.  (5T23-22 to 24-3).  She also found mitigating factor (14) applied and was entitled to “great weight. ” (5T24-19 to 23).  In response to these findings, defendant again takes the divide-and-conquer approach, arguing every aggravating factor should have been given less or no weight, and every mitigating one should have been found and given heavy weight.
[brief] Third, defendant was not prejudiced by the alleged missing exhibit because the record reflects that the jury received exhibit D-11\(^4\) during its deliberations.  (See 7T:12-11 to 16-9; Db42).  After the jury delivered its verdict and was dismissed, the trial court went on the record to confirm that it had returned to counsel the exhibits previously submitted to the jurors.  (7T:12-21 to 13-6).  Defense counsel responded \(^4\) D-11 was the court document containing [...]’s guilty plea, conviction, and sentence for the crime of unlawful possession of a handgun.  (2T:120-6 to 121-22). that he “[had] Defense Exhibit 12 [and] 11” and possessed all exhibits that were admitted into evidence.  (7T:13-10 to 11 and 16-6 to 9).  The record further reflects that, during their deliberations, jurors “mixed together the Defense and State exhibits,” including D-11.  (7T:15-4 to 16-5).  The trial court’s inadvertent failure to list D-11 as a Defense Exhibit prior to deliberations therefore did not actually prejudice defendant at all.
[brief] [...] assert that the “disparity between the actual harm suffered [by [...]] and the punitive damages awarded [against them] is … unreasonable, … unjustified[,] … inequitable and contrary to New Jersey law and Due Process principles. ”  (Db53)  Here again, Devli is instructive.  Due process requires appellate review of the award for reasonableness.  …  Our Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Pritchett v. State, 248 N.J. 85, 112-13 (2021).
[directive] The notice of charges and hearing shall direct that the subject officer may: (1) enter a plea of guilty to the charges; (2) enter a plea of not guilty to the charges; or (3) waive their right to a hearing.  If the officer enters a plea of guilty or waives their right to a hearing, he or she is permitted to present mitigating factors prior to being assessed a penalty.  Conclusions of fact and the penalty imposed will be noted in the officer's personnel file after he or she has been given an opportunity to read and sign it.  Internal affairs will cause the penalty to be carried out and complete all required forms.  6.3.13
[brief] Although the trial court couched its decision in a finding that the Arbitrator exceeded his powers—the only potentially applicable grounds for vacatur—the substance of the trial court’s holding effectively ruled that the Arbitrator made a mistake of law.  This is reflected in several statements in the trial court’s June 3, 2019 Opinion.  The trial court stated, “[t]his court takes no issue with the findings of the arbitrator and [...] that the actions and breaches of fiduciary duty by [[...]] were, indeed, egregious.  However, the court finds that more is required to establish an exception to the ‘American Rule. ’”  (Da3180)  Then the trial court observed that the Arbitrator “clearly intended to decide this matter according to the holding of’ In re Niles, 176 N.J. 282, 294 (2003), (Da3181) but believed “no exception to the American Rule was established under Niles…..”  (Ibid)  Thus, the trial court recognized that the Arbitrator’s decision to award attorneys’ fees was based on his interpretation of New Jersey law, but nevertheless substituted its own legal judgment in finding the Arbitrator to have misapplied Niles.  The trial court found that the Arbitrator made a mistake of law, but legal error is not grounds for vacating an arbitration award.  The trial court improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the Arbitrator.
[directive] DATE: May 23,2016  This Directive promulgates the protocol to implement recent amendments to b.  N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 and N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6 pursuant to 2015, c. 261, effective April 18, 2016.  These procedures address two types of expungements: (1) a "Drug Court Expungement" of all records and information relating to all prior arrests, detentions, convictions, and proceedings for Title 2C offenses upon successful discharge from a term of special probation (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(m)); and (2) an expungement of all records and information of an arrest or charge not resulting in conviction (N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6).
[brief] Plaintiff initially filed suit on March 2, 2017, against the [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...].  (Pa1).  He filed an amended complaint against these same defendants on January 30, 2018.  (Pa19).  Those defendants filed an answer to the amended complaint on February 15, 2018.  (Pa56).  On December 13, 2018, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint to add claims that new defendants [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] somehow wronged him in 2016 as he was about to retire from the [...].  (Pa245).  The substantive counts in the second amended complaint can be broken down into four categories.
[brief] Reference is made to the unpublished opinion of Tonnelle USA, Inc.  v. Township of N. Bergen Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1574, 2015 WL 3966233.  (Pa164)  In this 2015 opinion, the Appellate Division found that after three (3) attempts by developer to publish notice of its application to the Zoning Board that developer’s notice was still defective.  The notices in this case similarly are misleading because they make reference to a “use variance” but fail to disclose the other variances and waivers which were required.  While reference is made to a use variance, nothing in the Notices tells the public what the structure is to be used.  [...], supra at 139-40.  The Notice also make reference to an “existing accessory structure larger than the principal use on their property. ”  This statement certainly implies that the “existing structure” was previously approved by the Township, when in fact it had not.  The Notices do not tell the public what the nature and use of the “existing structure” is or what it will be used for.  Was it a garage, chicken coop, adult book store?  The Notices do not provide any such information.  The defective Notices could not be “cured” by any public member reviewing the 2022 Zoning Application on file with the Board.
[brief] Throughout her testimony, she made clear that, contemporaneous to March of 2016, she was an unreliable historian.  Combined with her inconsistent trial testimony, which was under oath, the statement should have been deemed inadmissible by the trial court.  The cumulative effect of the trial court’s rulings admitting both of these hearsay statements to be read to the jury is harmful error that should result in the reversal of Defendant’s conviction.
[brief] The final factor police relied on in stopping [...]’s car was his license plate, which indicated that his vehicle was a New York-registered taxicab.  [...] testified that, based on his training and experience in narcotics trafficking, such vehicles are known to transport narcotics.  (3T 13-13 to 14-8; 4T 19-18 to 25)  While police are permitted to rely on specialized training and experience in forming an opinion about reasonable suspicion, they must do more than vaguely assert that something intrinsically innocent, such as a taxicab, is associated with criminal activity.  See State v. Demeter, 124 N.J. 374, 383-86 (1991) (rejecting police testimony that a film canister, an “intrinsically innocent object[],” suggested drugs because “[a]lthough the officer here said that half of his drug encounters involved the use of similar containers to hold narcotics, the record does not disclose the number of times he examined film canisters without result,” and thus the State presented “no information about what percentage of observed containers held drugs”).
[brief] ..................................................................................................  12  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY  A. April 29, 2011, Homicide and Armed Robberies  On February 26, 2014, a Mercer County Grand Jury returned  Indictment Number [...], charging defendant with murder, first degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a (Count I); murder as an accomplice, first degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a; 2C:2-6 (Count II); felony murder, first degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3) 1 (Count III); robbery, first degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (Count IV); four counts of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, second degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (Counts V, VI, VII, XII); two counts of unlawful possession of a weapon, second degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (Counts VIII, IX); tampering with evidence, fourth degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1) (Count X); and attempted robbery, first degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; 2C:5-1 (Count XI).  Da1-13.  These charges resulted from two related crimes committed by defendant on April 29, 2011: first, was defendant’s attempted robbery of [...] in Hamilton; second, was defendant’s armed robbery and murder at the [...] in Trenton.  Due to the unrelated nature of defendant’s two cases, these sections have been separated for accuracy of the record.
[brief] See Feld v. City of Orange Twp., 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. 2014 WL 8277956 (App. Div. Mar. 26, 2015).  The decision of the Appellate Division in Appellant’s first challenge, Feld v. City of Orange Twp., supra, was relied upon for guidance by [...] in the second case.  In Feld v City of Orange Twp., supra, the Appellate Division dealt with two underlying actions brought by Feld.
[brief] Ibid quoting, Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015).  Deference is given to credibility findings.  *Ibid.* (*quoting* State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 264 (2015)).  "Appellate courts owe deference to the trial court's credibility determinations as well because it has 'a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of a witness.'"  *Ibid.* (*quoting*, C.R. v. M.T., 248 N.J. 428, 440 (2021) (*quoting* Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)).
[brief] THE DEP ERRONEOUSLY PERMITTED A CIRCULAR CULVERT IN VIOLATION OF THE FLOOD HAZARD AREA CONTROL ACT RULES AND SHOULD BE REVERSED (Aa001)  The permit application proposes to install a 24-inch circular pipe culvert in a tributary to Duck Pond Run to facilitate a road crossing for the Route 1 Access Road.  Aa166.  This circular culvert was erroneously permitted by DEP in violation of the relevant Flood Hazard Area Control Act regulations regarding Requirements for Regulated Work in a Channel, N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.1, Requirements for a Regulated Activity in a Riparian Zone, N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.2, and Requirements for a Bridge or Culvert, N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7.  The applicant did not demonstrate that a bridge was infeasible at this location, as required by the regulations, and did not meet multiple other requirements regarding the permissibility of and construction standards for a circular culvert.  The DEP never discussed the failure of the applicant to justify building a pipe culvert in its various deficiency notices, and approved its construction.  The baseless approval of this circular culvert to facilitate the road crossing, which will cause over 9,000 square feet of riparian zone impacts, also undermines DEP’s finding that riparian zone impacts were minimized.  A.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  A.  Plaintiff Served as a Staffing Coordinator for Defendant [...].  Plaintiff began his employment with Defendant [...] in May 2005, first working as a security guard before he was promoted to staffing coordinator.  (Pa26).  Staffing coordinators are responsible for a variety of tasks, including the printing and distribution of daily staff sheets, assigning hospital staff, reviewing payroll entries, maintaining call logs, answering phone calls from hospital staff related to payroll, and assisting the nursing supervisor with staffing.  (Pa27).  Plaintiff reported directly to Defendant [...], who at the time served as the Lead Administrative Nursing Supervisor.  (Pa25 – Pa26).  At all times relevant to this litigation, Plaintiff was one of approximately six staffing coordinators, including his former co-workers [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”).  (Pa27 – Pa28).  Neither Plaintiff nor [...] had ever been disciplined by Defendants prior to their eventual termination.  (Pa655).  Similarly, [...]’ job performance was described as “very good” by Defendant [...].  (Pa655).  B.