ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In response to questioning from the court, [...] testified that the front windows – when raised – looked similar to the back windows.  (1T 72-15 to 22)  After pulling the Suburban over, [...] approached the passenger side of the vehicle.  (1T 11-5 to 8)  [...] identified [...] as the driver in court.  (1T 11-16 to 12-4)  [...] testified that he observed an open bottle of Jack Daniels in the cup holder and the faint odor of marijuana.  (1T 11-9 to 15, 28-6 to 8)  [...] denied having anything to drink (1T 28-6 to 18), and [...] testified that he had no reason to believe [...] was intoxicated or smoking marijuana.
[brief] In performing its gatekeeping role in regard to the admission of expert opinion, the Trial Court must also assess the methodology and underlying data used by the expert to formulate an opinion.  *Landrigan v. Celotex Corp.*, 127 N.J. 404, 420 (1992).  It is the expert’s analysis and reasoning process applied to the particular facts of the case that is at issue in determining whether his or her testimony is scientifically reliable.  *Kemp*, 174 N.J. at 431.  Furthermore, the proponent of expert’s testimony carries the heavy burden of establishing the reliability of his or her methodology.
[brief] Fourth, the trial court weighed [...]’s testimony against the perfunctory denials offered by [...].  On direct examination, [...] was repeatedly asked point-blank whether he engaged in the various misappropriations alleged by Plaintiffs.  Each time, [...] testified “no” or “never” or words to similar effect without any significant additional context or explanation.  (15T152:4-11; Tr. 152:23 to 153:3; 154:25 to 155:5; 16T6:10 to 7:8; 15:19 to 16:2; 16:19-21; 17:9-11; 22:13-21; 24:15-24).  The trial court did not find these perfunctory denials credible, stating, “there’s nothing there.  You know, there was really no meat to most of the explanations.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2A:16-53 ...........................................................................39  N.J.S.A. 2A:62-1 ............................................................................27  N.J.S.A. 2C:21-22 ..........................................................................42  Court Rules Rule 1:36-3 .................................................................  30 n.1, 31 n.2 Rule 2:6-1(a)(1)(h) ......................................................  30 n.1, 31 n.2 Rule 4:46-2 .................................................................. 21, 22, 23, 26, 27  Other Authorities U.S. Constitution, 1st Amend. ...........................................  33, 34 U.S. Constitution, 14th Amend ...........................................  34 N.J. Constitution, Art. I ....................................................  34  N.J. Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5(a)(1) .........................  42  Opinion Number 17, New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law (June 26, 1975) .................................  42  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] By way of a separate application, Applicant is also requesting approvals from [...] to allow the development of the same four proposed warehouse buildings and their related site improvements that also include 73.07 +/- acres of land located along the northern and southern sides of U.S. Route 322 (US 322 / CR 536) in the Township of Harrison, a portion of which is adjacent to Tomlin Station Road (607) and is more particularly known as [...] and [...] on the Official Harrison Township Tax Maps.  (Da6).  One property owner, [...], who filed a lawsuit below which was consolidated with the within matter, received direct notice of the Woolwich site plan application.  (Da11).  Several people from the [...] area of Harrison received notice of the Woolwich application.  (Da9-Da20).  The [...] held meetings on the Harrison portion of the Warehouse Project on November 17, 2022 and December 15, 2022.  (Pa116).  Notice of the [...] meeting was published in the newspaper on October 14, 2022.  (Pa114).  Several homeowners within Plaintiff’s association organized a media circus in hopes of intimidating the [...] into denying the application.  (Pa26).  Intimidation at the [...] meeting turned to threats to both Redeveloper and [...] members, which resulted in the denial of the Warehouse Project at the [...].  (Pa281).  Redeveloper appealed and the Trial Court reversed the site plan denial.
[brief] As explained in *Polarome*, the initial manifestation of a toxic tort injury is the “last pull of the trigger” because that is when “the issue of scientific uncertainties” over when the injury first occurs are laid to rest and “subsequent CGL policies are not triggered. ”  404 N.J. Super. at 268-269.  Although exposure to the injurious chemicals ended in *Polarome* before the relevant policies incepted, the Court’s holding demonstrated that injuries occurring after initial manifestation do not trigger additional policies, regardless of whether there is continued exposure.
[brief] During discovery, the parties exchanged expert reports (Pa36 – Pa52).  Both the expert who was disclosed for [...], [...], and the expert that was disclosed for [...], [...], reviewed essentially the same items.  These include: The pleadings in this case, the parties answers to interrogatories, the Retainer agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant, the legal bills at issue, correspondence, deposition transcripts.  In addition, [...] also reviewed Pleadings in a since discontinued New York Action between the parties to this action and [...] also reviewed a Court order of August 30, 2019, additional legal bills (from other counsel), and [...]’s report.  (Pa36 & Pa50).  Notably, neither expert reviewed the underlying files (which are referred to below as the “Sollecito file”, the “21 Bankers Boxes” and “Exhibit D4”).  [...] specifically stated in his report that the invoices were not descriptive.  None of the billing is descriptive at all.  Pa38.  He pointed out that a substantial amount of time spent reviewing the file and documents.  92.25  Hours was spent reviewing the file and 161 hours were spent reviewing documents.  And moreover that this type of general file review is very suspicious because it doesn’t describe what was done or why it was done.  Pa38.  Furthermore, he noted that when questioned at depositions, [...]’s witnesses could not recreate what files or documents were reviewed or indicate what work was performed on any specific date.  Pa38.  *2 months before trial  Cohen Reports [...] to FBI for Harassment, Bias, Corruption, and weaponizing the Sheriff’s Department*
[brief] This additional density, the additional 2.6 units per acre that we have here, can the site support it?  And, there are certain measurements that you can look at in terms of trying to determine can a site support additional density.  [(Pa388 to Pa389). ]  Specifically, [...] testified that the onsite infrastructure, including water and sewer utilities, would be able to support the additional 47 units, which he confirmed with the various utility companies.  (Pa389).  As far as garbage pickup, [...] concluded that the addition of seven new garbage refuse areas is an extreme enhancement that would more than account for the additional 100 total units, or 47 beyond the allowable number of units.  (Pa390).  In addition, the garbage refuse areas will be screened and include new landscaping, which will enhance the look of the site.  (Pa390).  Furthermore, [...] testified that there is sufficient amount of recreation area on the site to support the additional density.  (Pa390).  Specifically, 250 square feet of recreational area would be required for each of the additional 47 units, which the site provides.  (Pa390).  Plaintiffs also agreed to work closely with the Board in designing new aspects of the recreational areas, including a new playground, as the Application proceeded to final approval.  (Pa391).  Based on extensive analysis of the current parking situation at the site, and the fact that the Application would be maintaining the same percentage of required parking with the new parking proposed, [...] determined that the site can support the additional 47 units in density.
[brief] *Linden v. Board of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass’n*, 202 NJ at 278-279 (citing *Morris County*, 100 NJ at 392-395).  In *Linden* the Court expressly distinguished *Morris County* from cases like the instant one, where “the Agreement here did not define just cause for discharge” and where “the expertise of the arbitrator was sought, and the arbitrator was free to determine that the misconduct did not rise to a ‘level . . . that constitutes just cause for discharge. ’”  *Id.* at 279 (quoting *Morris County*, 100 NJ at 394).  Instead, the Supreme Court held that “the arbitrator did not impermissibly ‘read into’ the parties' agreement terms that were not there” when the arbitrator “simply interpreted the ambiguous term ‘proper cause’ in a manner unsatisfactory to management. ”  *Id.* at 179-281 (quoting *United Transportation Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp.*, 51 F.3d 376, 378 (3d Cir. 1995)).  In *Linden Board of Educ.* as here, “the CBA allow[ed the employer] to discipline or discharge for ‘proper cause’ . . . but does not define the phrase,” and that the arbitrator was thus “forced to decide what ‘proper cause’ meant[.]”  *Id.*
[brief] Page  Trial Court’s July 12, 2023 Order and Memorandum of Decision Granting Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa51; Pa52-Pa62 | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Abbotts Diaries, Inc. v. Armstrong, | 25 | | 14 N.J. 319 (1954).  | | | Adams v. DelMonte, | 12, 16| | 309 N.J. Super. 572 (1998).  | | | Bernstein v. Krom, | 10 | | 111 N.J. Super. 559 (App. Div. 1970).  | | | Board of Ed. of City of Hackensack v. City of Hackensack, | 25 | | 63 N.J. Super. 560 (App. Div. 1960).  | | | Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, | 10 | | 68 N.J. 576 (1975).  | | | Catalano v. Pemberton Tp. Bd. of Adjustment, | 10, 14| | 60 N.J. Super. 82 (App. Div. 1960).  | | | Cedar Cove, Inc. v. Stanzione, | 26 | | 122 N.J. 202 (1991).  | | | Cervase v. Kawaida Towers, Inc., | 13 | | 124 N.J. Super. 547 (Ch. Div. 1973), | | | aff’d o.b., 129 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 1974).  | | | Chasin v. Montclair State Univ., | 25 | | 159 N.J. 418 (1999).  | | | Cohen v. Thoft, | 10 | | 368 N.J. Super. 338 (App. Div. 2004).  | | Concerned Citizens of Princeton, Inc. v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Princeton, 370 N.J. Super. 429 (App. Div. 2004).  ..................................
[brief] Petitioner testified that he did not send a letter to CPS, (8T136:13; 8T160:8-18), never contacted CPS or the police about Respondent or her children and did not know the name [...].  (8T131:20 to 132:2; 11T127:23-25; 129:5; 8T138:10 to139:10).  Petitioner was also unaware of most of the events raised in the CPS letter.  (8T135:19 to 137:9).  The contention that Petitioner wrote the CPS letter is based solely on innuendo, speculation and conjecture.  (11T131:7-18).  Respondent claims that Petitioner knew who [...] was, because a few months before trial, Petitioner sent three pictures to [...], one of which included [...] when he was a little boy.  The Petitioner explained that he found pictures in a card that [...] had sent to Decedent years ago and he simply returned them to her.  (10T141:21 to 144:18; 12T174:21-25; 12T173:20-23).  [...] testified that a variety of people were in the pictures including her grandson, [...], as a young child, who died in 2003, years after the pictures were taken.  (10T139:2-3).  Prior to his death, [...] had many friends in Brigantine, including Respondent.  (10T152:7-17; 10T143:18-25).  In fact, [...] stated that people still approach her and recognize her as Thomas’s grandmother.  (10T152:8-11).  Likewise, [...] testified that a lot of people were close to Decedent and a “good bit of them” knew her grandson, [...].  (10T151:23 to 152:11).  Respondent failed to demonstrate that Petitioner ever knew the name “[...]” when the CPS letter was allegedly written.  [...] testified she was really Decedent’s friend and spent time mostly with her.  (10T136:9-10; 10T134:21).  [...] was five years younger than Respondent and would not have been acquainted with Petitioner.  (10T143:18-25).  Any one of the numerous people who were close to the Decedent and who knew [...] could have written the CPS letter.  Respondent’s contention that Petitioner wrote the letter is without basis and was part of her smear campaign against Petitioner.  The CPS letter was never authenticated, is irrelevant to this proceeding and it should not have been considered.  Had the Court scrutinized the evidence that Petitioner presented at trial, it would have been apparent that all the “inequitable conduct” attributed to the Petitioner lacked a factual basis, did not involve the Petitioner, and had no relevance to the litigation.  The Court was obviously inflamed and antagonized by the unsupported innuendos presented by Respondent, which lead to the unjust and unfair dismissal of all of Petitioner’s claims.  POINT TWO
[brief] The following are factual and data evidence, as well as scientific opinions, that [...] offers in his reports followed by the recognized evidence categories (in bold parentheticals) provided in evidence rules and case law:  [...] measured the illuminance levels of the streetlight preceding the intersection to be 0.0 foot candles, and this was not sufficient coverage for this location (data collected); this does not mean that the area was pitch-black “but below the level of illumination given by one candle at a foot away” (scientific knowledge); “the only available non-vehicular lighting caused [...] to be illuminated from behind.  . . .” (scientific knowledge); the absence of adequate lighting in front of [...] and illumination behind him caused a "backlight" condition from the driver's point of view (scientific knowledge); [...] offers Photographs 11, 12, 13 in his report to illustrate the "backlight" condition (photographs, demonstrative evidence); "the darkened appearance of [...] would have readily blended in with the other dark background items present in the area, and would have been easier for a driver to see and avoid a pedestrian with no streetlights at all, when compared to those which resulted in backlit pedestrians" (scientific knowledge, demonstrative evidence); the motorist said to the police he could not see [...] and thought he hit a cone (deposition testimony, police reports, recorded insurance statement); "it was also likely that the backlighting condition worked to negate the illuminance afforded by the motor vehicle's own headlights (scientific knowledge); [...] installed "Dangerous Intersection" signs before the incident (deposition testimony, photographs); [...] had been advised of the non-functioning streetlight (deposition testimony, private investigation, and recorded statement); and [...] was also responsible for trimming trees, as the tree closest to the stop sign was essentially hiding it from the driver's view (personal observations, video, photographs).
[brief] [...] retained [...] as an expert sometime after the October 2019 summary judgment award to [...] concluding that the Mold Exclusion in the [...] Policies barred coverage for the claims in the FAC.  3T84-14-17.  Dr. Guzzardi did not examine [...].  His opinion is based on his limited review of certain of [...]’s records and certain deposition transcripts, and an interview of [...].  3T38-11-18.  It is Dr. Guzzardi’s opinion that [...] ate food contaminated by indoor-growing mold and its mycotoxins and suffered injury.
[brief] ’”); *Friedler v. Gen. Servs. Admin.*, 271 F. Supp. 3d 40, 57 (D.D.C. 2017) ([...], J.) (remanding case to agency that originally provided notice of one basis for decision before “suddenly revers[ing] course” and ruling on two different grounds “without providing any advance notice”); *id.* at 58 (“[T]he reasons originally given . . . were later modified, and thus [challenger’s] chance to present information in connection with the original sole basis . . . was a meaningless one. ”) (cleaned up).  The proceeding here turned these principles on their head.
[brief] *Instructional Sys.*, 130 at 345 (“Few franchises are intrastate”) (citing *Winer Motors, Inc. v. Jaguar Rover Triumph, Inc.*, 208 N.J. Super. 666, 671-72 (App. Div. 1986)).  For these reasons, the Agreement’s New York choice of law provision should be disregarded since New York has no “substantial relationship” to these parties or this dispute, and New Jersey law should govern.
[brief] Defense counsel advanced oral argument to the Law Division, highlighting the legal arguments set forth in its letter memorandum of law.  (T3:3-16 to 9-10).  The State then made oral argument in opposition to the Defendant’s two applications.  (T3:9-13 to 13-3).  Defense counsel then offered brief remarks in rebuttal to the State’s argument.  (T3:13-6 to 14-16).  The Law Division then reserved decision and indicated that it would issue a written opinion thereafter.  (T3:14-17 to 14-20).  On July 19, 2023, the Law Division issued a one-page Order (DA10) and a nine-page Opinion (DA11) denying the Defendant’s two applications.
[brief] The trial court lacked jurisdiction to “reconsider” and reverse the March 22, 2024 “stay order”: such was not an interlocutory order “subject to revision at any time before the entry of final judgment in the sound discretion of the court in the interest of justice” (the trial court, in vacating the March 22, 2024 “stay order,” relied on this provision of Rule 4:42-2).  A trial court’s decision to compel or deny enforcement of a contractual arbitration provision constitutes a “final order” that triggers the 45-day appeal period provided under R. 2:4-4.  *Hayes v. Turnersville Chrysler Jeep*, 453 N.J. Super. 309 (App. Div. 2018).  Moreover, [...] had waived its right to appeal the March 22, 2024 “stay order,” having failed to file a notice of appeal within 45 days of its entry.  Thus, the trial court’s June 20, 2024 order denying the [...]’ motion to reverse its May 14, 2024 order “restor[ing]” “this matter…to the trial calendar in its entirety” should be reversed and the May 14, 2024 “reverse and restore” order should be vacated, such that the March 22, 2024 “stay order” will control.  Even were the propriety of the March 22, 2024 “stay order” properly before this court (had [...] filed a timely notice of appeal), as we argue infra, the arbitration agreement at issue is valid and enforceable.  Moreover, even were the March 22, 2024 “stay order” considered an interlocutory order subject to reconsideration, the trial court lacked authority to sua sponte “reconsider” and reverse such order, which had been entered by a different trial judge.  The trial court’s order reversal of the March 22nd “stay order” did not identify or rely on new facts or a change in the law regarding arbitration, such that that was not grounds for reconsideration.  The trial court’s June 20, 2024 order granting the [...]’ motion for reconsideration, but leaving intact its May 14, 2024 “vacation order,” relied upon the “interests of justice” provision of Rule 4:42-2 as the jurisdictional basis for reconsideration.  However, Rule 4:42-2 requires that such motion be made to the judge who entered the order, to avoid what we respectfully submit happened here: a later-in-time judge second-guessed an earlier judge’s rulings.  Had [...] even moved for reconsideration of the March 22, 2024 “stay order,” it would have been required to make such motion (“shall be made”) to the trial judge who had entered the order (R. 4:49-2(b)).  With all respect due to the trial court, we submit that a judge to whom a pending case is reassigned lacks authority to reverse the decisions of the previous judge only because he or she disagrees with them—the subsequent trial judge cannot appoint him or herself an interim court of appeals.  If this court does not agree that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to “reconsider” the March 22, 2024 “stay order” because such was a final order, it should for these reasons reverse the June 20, 2024 order denying the [...]’ reconsideration motion and vacate the May 14, 2024 order reversing the March 22, 2024 “stay order,” leaving intact the stay of [...]’s survival action in favor of arbitration.
[brief] Id. at 387.  Per Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995), in the context of fee shifting applications: the first step … is to determine the “lodestar”: the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.  In our view, the trial court's determination of the lodestar amount is the most significant element in the award of a reasonable fee because that function requires the trial court to evaluate carefully and critically the aggregate hours and specific hourly rates advanced by counsel for the prevailing party to support the fee application.
[brief] Indeed, the State’s brief cites, with apparent approval, a “familiar standard for as-applied constitutional challenges” that seems to mirror our position—“[w]hether a statute passes a constitutional challenge ‘as-applied’ to any individual school district at any particular time must be determined only in the factual context presented and in the light of circumstances as they appear. ”  [Abbott XX, 195 N.J. at 235 (citing Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 455 (1976))].  This standard is consistent with the appellants’ view and with our arguments throughout the 10-year history of this litigation.  Unfortunately, although the State now cites it with approval, it is inconsistent with how the --- 5
[brief] Because the Act *criminalizes* the practice of debt adjustment services without a license, and also infringes upon an attorney’s First Amendment right to communicate legal advice to his or her clients, the Court should apply strict scrutiny to the Limited Attorney Exemption.  See *State v. Higginbotham*, 475 N.J. Super. 205, 221 (App. Div. 2023) (“A criminal statute challenged as vague is subject to sharper scrutiny and given more exacting and critical assessment under the vagueness doctrine than civil enactments. ”).  Defendants ignore this case law.