ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] So did the aggravating and mitigating factors.  See Torres, 246 N.J. at 271-72 (holding the Yarbough fairness assessment includes considering aggravating and mitigating factors).  First, the court wrongly denied the defense’s request for mitigating factor fourteen (defendant was under twenty-six at the time of the offense).  (15T 11-2 to 16-14, 20-12 to 18, 35-18 to 38-14; Da 188)  That factor plainly applied because [...] was twenty-five at the time of the offense; he was “sentenced on or after its effective date”; and that factor is mandatory, not discretionary as the court believed.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14) (eff. Oct. 19, 2020); State v. Lane, 251 N.J. 84, 97 (2022); State v. Morente-Dubon, 474 N.J. Super. 197, 215 (App. Div. 2022) (instructing mitigating factor fourteen “shall be applied” where defendant was under twenty-six).  Second, the court erred in denying his requests for mitigating factors three (defendant acted under strong provocation) and four (substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify defendant’s conduct, though failing to establish a defense).  (15T 16-5 to 8, 35-18 to 36-20; Da 188)  Those factors were clearly supported by the State’s own asserted motive in this case: that [...] publicly outed him as a police informant.  Even the detectives recognized that [...]’s actions endangered his life and that he acted out of self-preservation, which, though not establishing a legal defense, still lessened his culpability as compared to killings motivated by, for example, pecuniary gain, organized crime, or hate.  Third, the court failed to sua sponte find or consider mitigating factor eleven (excessive hardship to defendant’s dependents).  That factor was “amply based in the record,” as [...] had five children (ages one, two, three, seven, and eight) -- two of whom were living with him -- and he “ha[d] a relationship and contact with all his children and was financially supporting them on his own. ”  (PSR 15)  State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 64 (2014) (holding “amply based” factors “must be found” and all factors “supported by credible evidence are required to be part of the deliberative process” (emphasis added)); State v. Mirakaj, 268 N.J. Super. 48, 51 (App. Div. 1993) (recognizing “[h]ardship to children” as a “significant mitigating sentencing factor”).  Finally, aggravating factor three (risk of reoffense) was not supported by the record, and aggravating factors six (extent of criminal history) and nine (need for deterrence) should have received little weight, if any.
[brief] Pa254.  In denying summary judgment, the trial court’s opinion set forth numerous findings regarding the incident of March 13, 2020.  Notably, the trial court’s opinion provided that the incident was reported by Appellant, which led to a City investigation:  On March 17, 2020, [...] submitted a letter, or M-13, explaining the incident at the request of the Fire Department Director.  A written reprimand was prepared for Defendant [...] as a result of the investigation, but the reprimand was never served due to issues with COVID-19 and Defendant [...]’s terminal leave in advance of his retirement.  Despite the incident, [...] maintained that he received support from the Department regarding the incident and stated that his tenure with the Fire Department was not impacted by the incident or his subsequent complaint.
[brief] Although the [...] frame their introductory statement as arising from a “very narrow issue” involving whether market rent should be used in lieu of a below-market, thirty year-old lease in the valuation of the Property, they have improperly bootstrapped a challenge of the Arbitrator’s factual findings in this appeal.  The only issues preserved for appeal after the Trial Court transferred the matter to binding arbitration were specifically set forth in the Trial Court’s October 20, 2021 Consent Order; all others were subject to the limited parameters set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23.  Da111.  The [...] thus have exceeded the permissible bounds of this appeal by including challenges to the factual determinations of the Arbitrator.  N.J.S.A 2A:23B-23 states that the court shall vacate an award made in arbitration only upon six limited grounds: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; (2) the court finds evident partiality by an arbitrator; corruption by an arbitrator; or misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; (3) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to section 15 of this act, so as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; (4) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's powers; (5) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the arbitration proceeding without raising the objection pursuant to subsection c. of section 15 of this act not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or (6) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation of an arbitration as required in section 9 of this act so as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding.
[brief] “The Court of Errors and Appeals held that ‘the evidence was competent … to show’ that the roof was in a defective condition at the time of the accident.  Ibid. ”  This is analogous to the situation presented in plaintiff’s case and plaintiff should have been allowed to introduce such evidence to show that the floor was in a defective (i.e., slippery) state at the time of her fall.  Where evidence is excludable for one purpose, but admissible for another, the proper course is not to exclude the evidence, but for the trial court to provide an adequate, cautionary instruction.
[brief] STATE OF NEW JERSEY  RICHARD J. HUGHES  JUSTICE COMPLEX TRENTON, NEW JERSEY 08625  [...]  ATTORNEY NO. 032101994  DEPUTY  ATTORNEY GENERAL DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE APPELLATE  BUREAU P.O. BOX 086 TRENTON, NEW JERSEY 08625 (609) 376-2400  [...] OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF
[brief] [...], contrary to reality, incredibly argue that “this type of commercial dispute does not warrant punitive damages;” “there was certainly no unconscionable or outrageous conduct here;” and that “the facts of this case [do] not meet the necessary burden under the PDA to prove ‘actual malice’ or ‘wanton and willful disregard. ’”  (Db48-49, 52)  Perhaps by the time of oral argument, the Wilfs will have read this Court’s decision more carefully and particularly its affirmance of [...]’s findings that “punitive damages should be awarded to plaintiffs because defendants repeatedly acted with a ‘willful disregard’ of their partners[,] acted with actual malice and a reckless indifference to the rights of their partners” and with “‘a hundred percent probability of harm.
[brief] \(^2\)  Without any reference to the record, defendants state in their Appellate Brief that [...] “was not blocked from speaking at the [NJ]AWWA because of the content of his proposed talk” but because “another official was preparing to speak on a similar topic. ” (Db44).  The problem with this argument is that the [...] could have had both [...] and the other official speak and, if there was only the capacity for one speaker, it may have chosen [...] over the other speaker.  Defendants, however, took it upon themselves to restrict [...]’s speech.  Finally, *DeRitis v. McGarrigle*, 861 F.3d 444, 453 (3d Cir. 2017), relied upon by defendants (Db41), does not change the analysis.  DeRitis was an Assistant Public Defender who told Judges and other attorneys that he was being punished for taking too many cases to trial and “[b]ecause of DeRitis’s statements to all of these individuals,” DeRitis was fired.  *Id.* at 450-51.  The Third Circuit stated the rule for analyzing whether speech is as a public citizen or a government employee is whether --- \(^2\)  The contention that because [...] did not raise the issue of prior restraint in his opposition to the motions of Linda and [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...] to dismiss Cout Four of the Complaint must be rejected because the policy imposing a prior restraint and the suppression of [...]s protected speech was not something those defendants were responsible for, defendants [...] and [...] Department of Environmental Protection had the policy and [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...] deprived [...] of his constitutionally-protected right to free speech.
[brief] “Enforceable stipulated damages clauses are referred to as ‘liquidated damages,’ while unenforceable provisions are labeled ‘penalties. ’”  *MetLife*, 159 N.J. at 493.  New Jersey “[c]ourts scrutinize stipulated damages provisions for ‘reasonableness’” to determine whether they are enforceable liquidated damages provisions or unenforceable penalty clauses.  *Holtham*, 460 N.J. Super. at 317 (citing *MetLife*, 159 N.J. at 493.  A contract provision that specifies “unreasonably large” damages in the event of breach “is a penalty, which is unenforceable on grounds of public policy. ”  *Rosen v. Smith Barney, Inc.*, 195 N.J. 423, 427 (2008)(citing *MetLife*, 159 N.J. at 498–99 and *Wasserman's Inc.*, 137 N.J. at 247–48).  “The purpose of a stipulated damages clause is not to compel the promisor to perform, but to compensate the promisee for non-performance. ”  *Holtham*, 460 N.J. Super. at 317 (citing *Wasserman's*, 137 N.J. at 254).  “In other words, liquidated damages are an ‘estimate in advance [of] the actual damage that will probably ensue from the breach,’ while a penalty is ‘a punishment, the threat of which is designed to prevent the breach. ’”  *Holtham*, 460 N.J. Super. at 317 (citing *Westmount Country Club v. Kameny*, 82 N.J. Super. 200, 205 (App. Div. 1964)(emphasis added).  Notably, all of the above-cited precedents involved commercial transactions, and even in that arms-length context, public policy required close scrutiny of the stipulated damage provision, and precluded enforcement of penalty clauses *even if the were fully and openly negotiated, agreed to, and “ratified” by performance.*
[brief] He admitted to going to [...]'s home in the early morning hours to commit a robbery, but proceeded to stab him several times with a knife.  Defendant stole [...]'s wallet containing five dollars and an ATM card.  Defendant was nineteen years old at the time of the crimes.  A jury found defendant guilty of murder, felony murder, robbery, burglary and unlawful possession of a weapon.  In aggregate, defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment, with a forty-year period of parole ineligibility, to run consecutive to the sentence he was already serving for a Monmouth County armed robbery.  His sentence was upheld on direct appeal.
[brief] In Kane v. Hartz Mountain Industries, Inc., 278 N.J. Super. 129 (App. Div. 1994), the Appellate Division found reversible error in the trial court’s conducting of the jury trial and remanded the case with further instructions.  The Appellate Division held that the employer-indemnitor would not have been prejudiced by a separate trial on the issue of indemnification and accordingly ruled that, on remand, the trial of the third-party claim should be severed.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification and affirmed the Appellate Division’s ruling.
[brief] 333 (2021) | 21 | | **State v. Jarbath**, 114 N.J. 394 (1989) | 44 | | Cases (Cont'd) | PAGE NOS | |---------------------------------------------------|----------| | **State v. Jenewicz**, 193 N.J. 440 (2008) | 38 | | **State v. Jenkins**, 299 N.J. Super. 61 (App. Div. 1997) | 15 | | **State v. K.S.**, 220 N.J. 190 (2015) | 43 | | **State v. Lopez**, 187 N.J. 91 (2006) | 33 | | **State v. Lykes**, 192 N.J. 537 (2007) | 33 | | **State v. Maloney**, 216 N.J. 91 (2013) | 30 | | **State v. Martelli**, 201 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 1985) | 44 | | **State v. Murphy**, 412 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 2010) | 14, 19, 20 | | **State v. Paige**, 256 N.J. Super.  362 (App. Div. 1992) | 19 | | **State v. Powell**, 84 N.J. 305 (1980) | 36 | | **State v. R.B.**, 183 N.J. 308 (2005) | 22 | | **State v. R.J.M.**, 453 N.J. Super. 261 (App. Div. 2018) | passim | | **State v. Ramirez**, 246 N.J. 61 (2021) | 30, 36 | | **State v. Rogers**, 236 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 1989) | 45 | | **State v. Sanchez-Medina**, 231 N.J. 452 (2018) | 38 | | **State v. Sands**, 76 N.J. 127 (1978) | 2, 9, 18, 24 | | **State v. Savage**, 172 N.J. 374 (2002) | 31, 32 | | **State v. Scott**, 229 N.J. 469 (2017) | 23, 27 | | **State v. Sloane**, 111 N.J. 293 (1988) | 37 | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D) | Cases (Cont'd) | PAGE NOS | |----------------|----------| | State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289 (1989) | 16 | | State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293 (2019) | 43 | | State v. Tucker, 280 N.J. Super. 149 (App. Div. 1995) | 32, 33 | | State v. Weeks, 107 N.J. 396 (1987) | passim | | State v. Whitaker, 200 N.J. 444 (2009) | 30 | | State v. Whitehead, 104 N.J. 353 (1986) | 22 | | Statutes | PAGE NOS | |----------|----------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6 | 25, 29, 33 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6c(1) | 29 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:2–6c(1)(b) | 31 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 | 25 | | N.J.S.A.
[brief] [...]’s version of events (Pa196 to Pa199).  On January 26, 2016, [...] called [...] and said, “Terri [[...]] asked me to speak with you. ” (Pa355).  Thereafter, [...] called the Board President to find out why the Police were coming to his home and calling him; but [...] did not answer her phone, so later that evening [...] walked to her nearby townhouse.  (Pa200, Pa355, Pa359).  [...] did not know who was trying to file charges and wanted an explanation to clarify if it was [...], [...], or someone else.  (Pa360).  Further, [...] wanted an explanation as to why his communication must go through legal counsel.
[brief] And again, certainly not that the Court is not cognizant of the fact that the affidavit of title may bolster the understanding of the plaintiff with regards to [...]’s involvement, but certainly there was sufficient information already available, as the defendants have pointed out, to the plaintiff with regards to [...]’ involvement in [...], that those claims may also have been raised and -- and most -- most assuredly raised before now, before December.  So for all these reasons, the Court is going to deny the application to amend the complaint.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  THE JUDGE PROPERLY ADDRESSED THE FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE BEFORE AND DURING TRIAL.  At each step of the trial process, the judge properly admitted evidence of the analysis of defendant’s fingerprints.  First, defendant’s wholesale attack on fingerprint evidence lacks support from any caselaw.  The court thus correctly denied defendant’s motion to preclude expert testimony regarding fingerprint analysis.  And the court properly handled each issue regarding the fingerprint-analysis evidence throughout trial: (1) by denying defendant’s request to ask at voir dire whether prospective jurors believed fingerprint analysis was reliable; (2) by denying defendant’s request to limit the expert testimony on fingerprint evidence; and (3) by rejecting defendant’s alternative and unfounded jury charge and instead issuing the model jury charge on fingerprint evidence.  Appellate courts review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings with deference.
[brief] Plaintiff was also unable to convince the Court that Defendant misrepresented her religious views, cultural beliefs and traditions to Plaintiff.  There was no intent on the part of Defendant to deceive Plaintiff.  Plaintiff was well aware, prior to marriage, that Defendant and her family’s values and views were different than him and his family.  For example, Defendant’s sister married outside her caste, which was an issue for Plaintiff, but not for Defendant and her family.  Defendant’s brother was divorced and remarried.  Again, an issue for Plaintiff but not for Defendant.  Defendant’s family also did not engage in a specific Diwali puja.  However, all these facts were known to Plaintiff before he married Defendant.  This includes the fact that the parties’ horoscopes did not align and their marriage was going to end in divorce.  Regardless, Plaintiff still married Defendant.  Thus, the Trial Court properly found that Plaintiff did not provide clear evidence which causes one to be convinced that the allegations sought to be proved are true.
[brief] (1)  Plaintiff did not conduct its affirmative obligation to prove that the identification of defendant on the incidents of November 7 and November 10, 2021; identification is necessary for the conviction, the plaintiff’s witness displays heavy uncertainty of who the woman was that approached him, first shift blaming [...], then [...] and continuously changes his narrative (2)  The word “nigger” is part of the First Amendment only permits of abusive language, on the basis the trial court proves the language had direct tendency to cause immediate acts of violence to the witness; [...] informs of his lax approach, testifies to his initial untruthful identification efforts on the alleged incident dates and the plaintiff did not bring forth their other witnesses, [...] and [...] to corroborate [...] statement; relying, in part, on his hearsay of [...]’s significant other; (3)  Trial court dismissal of discovery document requests, (4)  Trial courts erred when they had bearing on the fact of the defendant’s accused choice of rap music with lyrical content repeating the word nigger and curse words.
[brief] Absent Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiffs would have constructed and developed the market rate development originally proposed by Defendants [...] and [...].  Plaintiff [...] would have been in a construction business, focusing on residential construction, with [...] and/or for the affordable housing development with the assistance of [...]\(^2\) supplementing Plaintiff [...]’s own experience and expertise in real estate development.  Plaintiff [...] had rehabilitated a number of residential real estate properties and had successfully sold them.  272a (Interrogatory #65); 988a (40:2-14); 407a (90:4-9).  In fact, Plaintiff [...] had built a number of two-family homes and developed eight other rehabilitated properties.  272a (Interrogatory #65); 988a (40:2-14); 407a (90:4-9).  It was a natural segue for him to incorporate into his existing business the construction and sale of the proposed low and moderate income housing development on the [...].
[brief] Importantly, reasonable suspicion “‘does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities … [and] common-sense conclusions about human behavior. ’”  *State v. Valentine*, 134 N.J. 536, 543 (1994) (quoting *U.S. v. Cortez*, 449 U.S. 411, 418-101 (1981)).  “Although a mere hunch does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion required is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause. ”  State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 428 (2014) (internal citations omitted).
[brief] F.  The five (5) highest ratables in this community are: (1)  [...]: $5,297,500.00  (2)  [...]: $4,303,100.00  (3)  [...]: $3,180,000.00  (4)  [...]: $3,000,000.00 (5)  [...]: $2,523,000.00  G.  The general welfare of the community is advanced when the municipality seeks industrial ratables to create a better economic balance for the community, vis-à-vis educational and governmental costs engendered by residential development.
[brief] *Doe* applied *Anspach*’s coercion requirement to deny a temporary restraining order against a school’s policy which enabled students to socially transition at school unbeknownst to their parents.  *Doe* reasoned that the plaintiff/parent had not established that parental consent was constitutionally mandated before a school may honor a students’ preferred pronouns. \(^1\)  In contrast, the Revised Policy seeks to apprise parents of adverse impacts on their children’s health and safety.  Significantly, Plaintiffs fail in their effort to distinguish *Gruenke v. Seip*, 225 F.3d 290 (3rd Cir. 2000).
[directive] Você entende que deverá se submeter a um exame físico e psicológico no [...] ([...]) cuja finalidade é determinar se sua conduta quando cometeu o crime caracterizou-se por um padrão de comportamento reincidente e compulsivo?  Do you understand you will be required to submit to a physical and psychological examination at the [...] the purpose of which is to determine if your conduct in committing the offense was characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior?  [Sim/Yes]  [Não/No]  2.  Você entende que se o exame revelar que sua conduta é caracterizada por um padrão de comportamento reincidente e compulsivo, o juiz poderá sentenciá-lo à reclusão no Centro de Diagnóstico e Tratamento para Adultos para um programa de tratamento especializado para sua condição mental?
[brief] Next, the only cases cited by Respondent are inapplicable, as each of those 2 cases refers to the First Amendment rights of public school teachers being disciplined by a school board.  Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 597 U.S. 507 (2022) (“neither teachers nor students shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. ”) (emphasis added) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).  Respondent is neither a teacher or a student.  Nor is she an employee of the Board at all.  Rather, Respondent is a government official and a representative of the school board itself.  Put another way, Respondent is an agent of the government which the First Amendment protects private citizens from, not the other way around.  As the United States Supreme Court held in Kennedy, the case cited by Respondent, this is a crucial distinction: Did [...] offer his prayers in his capacity as a private citizen, or did they amount to government speech attributable to the District?  Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 509.  The difference between speaking in one’s private capacity and – alternatively – being perceived as speaking on behalf of a school board, is precisely the reason the Commission has developed a robust body of caselaw on the First Amendment and social media disclaimers for school board members.
[brief] HN4  Our Court Rules, from their inception, have been understood as "a means to the end of obtaining just and expeditious determinations between the parties on the ultimate merits."  Ragusa v. Lau, 119 N.J. 276, 284, 575 A.2d 8 (1990) (quoting Tumarkin v. Friedman, 17 N.J. Super. 20, 27, 85 A.2d 304 (App.Div.1951), certif. denied, 9 N.J. 287, 88 A.2d 39 (1952)); see also Ponden v. Ponden, 374 N.J. Super. 1, 9-10, 863 A.2d 366 (App.Div.2004), certif. denied, 183 N.J. 212, 871 A.2d 90 (2005); Tucci v. Tropicana Casino and Resort, Inc., 364 N.J. Super. 48, 53, 834 A.2d 448 (App.Div.2003).
[brief] On December 8, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint challenging both the Planning Board’s adoption of Resolution PB10-2022 and the Borough’s adoption of Ordinance 22-1516.  The Law Division conducted a trial on March 22, 2023, before [...].  The Court upheld the adoption of both the Planning Board’s Resolution and the Ordinance on May 22, 2023 in its Order for Judgment.  This appeal was filed on June 28, 2023. ²  ²  References to “1T” are to the transcript of proceedings before the Law Division, occurring on March 22, 2023.
[brief] On March 14, 2024, plaintiff filed a putative class action lawsuit against [...] in Superior Court, Union County, alleging that certain terms and conditions of her [...] health club membership agreement do not comply with New Jersey’s Health Club Services Act (“HCSA”), Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), Retail Installment Sales Act (“RISA”), and Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (“TCCWNA”).