ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] DID NOT FORM AN ENFORCEABLE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT WITH UBER THROUGH THE DECEMBER TERMS  The trial court correctly held that [...]’s arbitration agreement is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Atalese.  Among other flaws, the agreement failed to contain any adequate language informing a consumer of their waiver of the right to pursue their claims in a judicial forum, of arbitration precluding litigation, or the differences between those forums.  However, as an initial step, plaintiffs request the court more deeply consider the circumstances in which the agreement was allegedly presented – after the [...] order and already been made, and paid, and was en route to the McGintys’ home.  Last, [...] speculates that [...] had some actual knowledge of the agreement or its terms so as to render it enforceable.  This argument is not rooted in any record evidence and is in any event directly contrary to New Jersey law in several respects.  A.
[brief] The Court held that the remedy is only appropriate “after a [trial] court has had the opportunity to fully address constitutional compliance and has found constitutional compliance wanting,” meaning that only a municipality that satisfies its Mount Laurel obligation “obtain[s] immunity from a builder’s remedy” (id. at 35).  In 2024, the Legislature, after nearly a decade of a court-driven process, answered the Supreme Court’s call for alternative approaches to implementing Mount Laurel by passing the first comprehensive legislation since 1985 to do just that.
[brief] The court found that a single signature line made him both liable as corporate representative and individually.  The court held: the defendants also contend that the judgment against [...] was issued in error because a corporate officer becomes individually liable only if he or she signs a guarantee twice.  This argument lacks merit.  Id. at *6.  The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court’s observation that:  In viewing the transaction in its entirety and reading the terms of the guaranty in the light of commercial reality, and in accordance with reasonable expectations of persons in the business community .... the guarantee and the circumstances surrounding them demonstrate that Mr. Helmer [...] intended to be personally responsible for guaranteeing all of the leases.  Id. at *7.  The court went on to reject defendant’s argument that in order for personal liability to be imposed upon [...], he needed to sign the guarantee twice.
[brief] On August 9, 2024, the trial court entered an Order reserved on the Disqualification Motion but permitting Respondents to file supplemental briefing to the Disqualification Motion.  The trial court also permitted Appellants to submit supplemental briefing “to respond to [Respondents’] supplemental submission. ”  At bottom of that Order, the trial court left a handwritten note that the “[f]orm of order was contested,” adding “[t]he Court finds [the Order’s] provisions stated within sufficiently represent the findings and requests of the Court. ” and recognizing there is a likelihood of losing on the merits, [...] employed the tactic of moving to disqualify [...].  first hearing did the trial court indicate it would reverse its decision on the submission of *in camera* certifications nor amend its Order of August 9, 2024.  V.
[brief] [...]’s argument that the January 2021 Terms must be enforced fails to account for the language in its December 2021 Terms which precludes this result.  The second paragraph of [...]’s December 2021 Terms provides that this version of the terms “expressly supersede prior agreements or arrangements with you regarding the use of the Services. ”  (Da80).  Both the December 2021 and January 2021 Terms provide [...] the right to make changes to the terms from time to time, to make these changes unilaterally, and that amended terms will become effective immediately.  (Da80).  The terms continue that use of the [...] platform will be considered as consent to any changes in the terms, and that to reject any amended terms, a user must stop using [...]’s services.  (Da80).  Under these conditions, the December 2021 Terms were undoubtedly the operative terms at the time of the [...]’s crash, even if she was not aware of them for one reason or another (and the implications on waiver, et al. aside).  Most importantly, [...]’s December 2021 Agreement contains an express severability provision that does not mandate return to the January 2021 Terms because any portion is invalidated.  (Da88).  Section 2(i) of the December 2021 Terms provides that “[i]f any portion of this Arbitration Agreement is found to be unenforceable or unlawful for any reason, . . . the unenforceable or unlawful provision shall be severed from these Terms[.]” (Da88).  Curiously, [...] does not cite its own Terms.  Moreover, the case law cited by [...] universally concern circumstances in which the entire subsequent contract was invalidated or was not severable.  (Db41-42).  As one, GEM Advisors, Inc. v. Corporacion Sidenor, S.A. explains, [w]here a provision of a contract is unenforceable because of an indefinite term, the whole contract is unenforceable unless the contract is severable.”  667 F. Supp. 2d 308, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  [...]’s December 2021 agreement expressly is.  Given the clear severability, there is no reason to invalidate the entire December 2021 Terms, the invalidated provisions must simply be excised.  There is simply no basis to go backward as [...] suggests.  Here, irrespective of whether the issue was properly raised,\(^3\) there is no basis under New Jersey law or the December 2021 Terms to ignore the clear severability provision and resurrect the January 2021 Terms.  **IV.
[brief] $50,000 transfer from MR line of credit, December 5, 2014  The proof plaintiffs cite is that [...] identified a transfer on that date to an [...] account.  Pb46.  Plaintiffs note that [...] testified that [...] did not receive an equal distribution on the same date, relying upon their simplistic premise that unless [...] received an equal distribution contemporaneously with anything transferred to defendants, there was some misdeed.  Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge the context [...] provided for this transfer:  Q.  What did you get it for?  A.  Mr. [...] wanted to get paid 11.38 million [sic] in November and he wanted to get paid additional 1.28 million in December early before we signed the contract.  So as per our agreement, we transferred money to I believe it was [...], and so I could in return write those checks to Mr. [...].  Q.  So this $50,000 that you took out of [...] went to pay Mr. [...] his purchase price, correct?  A.  Yes, that was after our finalizing the numbers, and that is part of the asset sales interest of [...].  We paid - transferred to [...] and [...] paid Mr.  [...] those checks.  Q.  So you paid him with his own money, is that correct?  A. No. [16T111:7-23]  Notably, plaintiffs do not deny [...]’s explanation.  Although it was plaintiffs’ burden to prove that this transfer satisfied the elements of a conversion, breach of contract or other claim they asserted, they cite no evidence to support those claims.
[directive] If the officer involved in the pursuit is unable to complete the report within 24 hours, it should be completed as soon the officer is able to do so, or by a supervising officer within 48 hours in accordance with a written policy to be established by the department or agency.  11.2  Vehicular pursuits resulting in the death or serious bodily injury of any civilian shall be handled in accordance with Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2019-4.  As soon as any local, county, or state law enforcement agency learns of a vehicular pursuit that resulted in death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, the agency shall immediately notify the County Prosecutor’s Office for the county in which the incident occurred, who shall in turn immediately notify the Attorney General’s Office of Public Integrity and Accountability (OPIA) Director or their designee.  14
[directive] Alcohol and Drug Testing  a.  Blood samples shall be obtained in lieu of chemical breath tests, upon a probable cause determination.  b.  A urine sample may be requested, upon a probable cause determination.  c.  The County Prosecutor’s Office may request consent for the taking of blood and/or urine.  d.  Specimens will be collected as soon as possible, in a medically accepted manner.  e.  When drugs are suspected, a certified DRE officer should be consulted immediately.  f.  Blood and/or urine shall be submitted to the Division of State Police Laboratory, unless otherwise specified.  (1)  The established Division of State Police SOP on chain of custody of evidence shall be followed.  g.  All documentation concerning the submission of specimens, laboratory results, supporting test data documentation (i.e., GC or MS data) and chain of custody documentation shall be promptly - 8 - 10-8-2004  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE
[brief] **New Jersey Open Public Records Act**, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 ..................... 7, 8, 9  **New Jersey Open Public Records Act**, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5a .................... 6  **New Jersey Open Public Records Act**, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 ....................  8  TABLE OF ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS
[brief] ”  (4T 40-20 to 21)  [...] -- defendant’s sister and mother of the codefendant -- testified that she and the codefendant live on the third floor of [...].  (5T 126-10 to 14)  She testified further that she could not recall if her cousin, [...], was at her house on the afternoon of January 22, but when shown a prior statement of hers, she said, “He might have been there.  I’m not sure,” and admitted that she apparently told police that he was there.  (5T 132-22 to 134-21)  Then she claimed she “heard his voice.  That’s how I knew he was there.
[brief] (1T32:8-1T33:5).  Relying solely on Young v. Schering Corp., 275 N.J. Super. 221, 230 (App. Div. 1994), Defendants incorrectly argue that the relation-back doctrine does not apply here because the proposed libel per se claim is too unrelated to the original claim.  (Drb23).  Defendants’ reliance on Young is misplaced.  There this Court found no relation back because “[p]laintiff’s original and amended complaints rel[ied] on two distinct factual occurrences” that led to his termination.  275 N.J. Super. at 231.  Unlike the proposed amendment here, the Young Court found the amended complaint “presented a distinct claim from the one originally raised” as it was “almost entirely contradictory to the thrust of [plaintiff’s] first allegation. ”  Id. at 229-30.  Also, unlike this case, this Court --- 5 [...] was unaware of the criminal complaint until the night of January 11, 2021, after a full day of deposition testimony from [...] and the night before [...] was to appear for a second day of testimony on January 12, 2021.
[directive] Attorney General Brimage Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  Offer2 2.2  How to Determine An Authorized Plea  Although the statewide plea negotiation system established by these Guidelines is far more structured (by design and pursuant to the Supreme Court’s directive in State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998)) than the plea negotiation policies that had existed before Brimage was decided, the process for determining an authorized plea offer is straightforward, and the procedures are far less complex than those used in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
[brief] “A trial court's legal conclusions, however, and its view of ‘the consequences that flow from established facts’ are reviewed de novo.”  Goldsmith, 251 N.J. at 398 (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015)).  “[O]n appeal [appellate court’s] may only consider whether the motion to suppress was properly decided based on the evidence presented at that time. ”  *State v. Gibson*, 318 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div. 1999).  Appellate courts generally defer to a trial court’s findings of facts where “more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the review of a video recording. ”  *State v. S.S.*, 229 N.J. 360, 380 (2017).
[directive] CN: Order ______________ [Any additional conditions ordered by the court] _ 8.  as of  A copy this Order will be forwarded to the County Adjuster's Office within two (2) days of its signing.  Judge Date Defendant's Attorney: Prosecutor's Office: ---------------- ---------------- Name Name --------------- ---------------- Address Address ___________ ___________  Telephone Number _ Telephone Number _ ----------------- ----------------- Fax Fax ---------------- ---------------- ail Em ail Em _________
[brief] (Pa42.)  [...] also denied defendant’s motion in limine to bar reference to and use of alleged violations of federal and New Jersey statutory and regulatory standards at trial but directed “Experts could cite standards if they relied on those standards as evidence of negligence but not negligence per se. ”  (Pa81.)  The trial court explained its rulings as follows:  With regard to the plaintiff’s motion in limine to bar testimony regarding conclusions reached by the Department of Health, I’m going to deny that, but a proper foundation for admission must be provided.  Defense counsel—strike that.  --- ²  The documents relating to [...]’s complaint were marked as defendant’s trial exhibits D-4 ([...]’s February 12, 2016 complaint), D-5 (August 18, 2016 correspondence from [...] to [...]) and D-6 (July 6, 2016 unannounced visit/revisit report and associated documents), and were used in questioning several witnesses for impeachment purposes, but were not admitted into evidence.
[brief] [...] asked for a K-9 officer to respond to the scene.  [Da16].  [...] Sergeant [...] and his K-9, [...], responded to the scene of the motor vehicle stop.  [4T49-15 to 50-4].  [...] was trained in the detection of certain narcotics, including methamphetamines, heroin, crack, cocaine, PCP, and ecstasy.  [4T49-11 to -12].  He was not trained in the detection of the fentanyl.  [4T88-13 to -15].  Sergeant Czepiel told [...] to “sniff it out,” the command used to tell the dog to sniff around the perimeter of the vehicle.
[brief] Website, PsyPact, https://psypact.site-ym.com/page/About (last accessed April 19, 2024).  By entering into this compact to aid psychologists who practice telepsychology, New Jersey recognizes the [...] (“[...]”) as the “membership organization . . . responsible for the licensure and registration of psychologists throughout the United States and Canada. ”  N.J.S.A. 45:14B-49 at II.  This entity, the [...], has established guidelines which include:  “The psychologist shall ensure that observation or electronic recording of a client occurs only with the informed written consent of the client. ”  [...] Code of Conduct (January 2018), p. 9 of 12 at ¶11, available at https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.asppb.net/resource/resmgr/guidelines/code_of_conduct_2020_.pdf (last accessed April 19, 2024).  New Jersey’s statute adopted pursuant to the compact, a “client” includes any “recipient of psychological services, whether psychological services are delivered in the context of healthcare, corporate, supervision, or consulting services.
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp.**, | 4, 5 | | 219 N.J. 430, 435 (2014), | | | **County of Passaic v. Horizon Healthcare Services, Inc.**, | 4 | | 474 N.J. Super. 498 (App. Div. 2023), | | | **Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc.**, | 3 | | 244 N.J. 119, 131 (2020).
[brief] (11T 71:16-20)  Additionally, [...], [...], [...], and [...] each provided credible testimony Plaintiff continuously utilized the Fifth Street Lot and Sixth Street Lot for parking long after the 1972 Site Plan was approved.  (7T, 8T, 12T-14T)  The trial record is devoid of evidence suggesting this was not the case from the time the synagogue was constructed in accordance with the 1963 Agreement.
[brief] Quite simply, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate when “plaintiffs failed to present the statutorily required AOM and did not request an extension of time to do so”.  *Id.* at 374.  In the matter at bar, Plaintiff’s argument that [...], a critical care surgeon satisfies the AMS and Nicholas since his qualifications are somehow “equivalent” is without any support.  Plaintiff relies on [...]’s self-serving commentary about the similarities in critical care and surgical critical care, but [...] acknowledges that there are differences in emphasis between the surgical critical care board and the critical care board.  Clearly, these are different specialties, they are separate boards, issued by separate bodies with different requirements.  Here, Plaintiff offered a surgeon with companion certification in surgical critical care to serve as an expert against an internist with a companion board certification in critical care.  [...] and Defendant simply do not have the same type of practice, the same credentials nor the ‘kind-for-kind’ matching qualifications as required.  Any opinions offered by [...] are inevitably colored and shaped by his training in general and vascular surgery as well as surgical critical care.  **[...] is simply and undeniably not “a specialist in the same field” as Defendant.**
[brief] In addition, arbitration could not have resulted in a binding resolution of the claims between [...] and [...] until [...] settled with the other insurers because any arbitration result could have been undone by the contribution claims held by [...]’s other insurers.  This action involves a complex insurance coverage dispute involving a progressive loss over the course of nine years that implicates allocation of defense and indemnity under Owens-Illinois Inc. v. United Insurance Co., 138 N.J. 437 (1994).
[brief] POST-TRIAL MOTION PRACTICE, APPEAL, & RESENTENCING  [...] filed motions to dismiss and for a new trial.  (Da103-04)  Counsel noted the State gave him a report on the eve of trial indicating the hard drive was found to still have footage, but he did not request anything further.  (19T4-22 to 5-15; Da105)  The court denied the motions and imposed a 40-year NERA sentence.  (19T34-3 to 5, 48-12 to 13, 56-4 to 57-5; Da106-116)  On March 17, 2017, the Appellate Division affirmed [...]’s convictions, but remanded for resentencing.  (Da128-65)  His petitions for certification and certiorari were denied.  (Da127; [...] v. New Jersey, 583 U.S. 1102 (2018)).  On July 25, 2017, he was resentenced to 30 years with a 30-year parole bar.  (Da117-20)  IV.
[brief] It is well accepted that when the damages award is not tainted by the error in the liability portion of the case and is fairly separable, a re-trial need not include the issues of damages.  *Id.*  Here, the errors pertain to liability only and the damages are entirely separate from the liability issues raised.  Any remand for new trial must be limited to liability only.  For these reasons, it is respectfully requested that defendants appeal be granted in its entirety and a new trial on liability only ordered.
[brief] (See Da177).  When the Funds were not returned by July 19, [...] appeared in Court without issue to commence his commitment, but [...] did not, having by then left the country and not having returned since.  (See id.)  After [...] spent approximately 70 weekends in jail, via Orders of January 22, 2020 and March 6, 2020, the Chancery Court ordered that [...] be committed to the BCJ full-time in a further effort to coerce him to repatriate the Funds.  (See Da20, ¶55).  [...] timely appeared at the BCJ on March 6, 2020, and began his full-time commitment.  (See id.).  Via Order of March 23, 2020, however, the Chancery Court, over [...]’s objection, stayed the full-time commitment order and ordered that [...] be released due to the dangers posed by COVID-19.
[brief] This Court and the Supreme Court of the United States have held that consent cannot be voluntary after the police tell an individual that they have a warrant.  *Bumper v. North Carolina*, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (holding that “there can be no consent” “when that ‘consent’ has been given only after the official conducting the search has asserted that he possesses a warrant”); *State v. Dolly*, 255 N.J. Super. 278, 284–287 (App. Div. 1991) (consent deemed involuntary when induced by threat to execute defective search warrant).  On the other hand, “an officer’s comment regarding the inevitability of a search warrant does not indicate coercion if it is ‘a fair prediction of the events that would follow’ rather than ‘a deceptive threat made to deprive [an individual] of the ability to make an informed consent. ’”  *State v. Hagans*, 233 N.J. 30, 42 (2018) (quoting *State v. Cancel*, 256 N.J. Super. 430, 434 (App. Div. 1992)) (finding no coercion because the officers had probable cause for a warrant).  Where the police in fact have probable cause to seek a warrant, an officer’s statement that he will get a warrant unless the individual consents is “nothing more than a candid assessment of the likelihood that a judge would grant his application for a search warrant” and does not render the consent involuntary.  *Id.* (finding that the officer’s statement did not render the consent to search involuntary because the officer had probable cause to justify a search warrant); see also *Cancel*, 256 N.J. Super. at 434 (same).
[brief] 2T50:4-9; 4T138:16-144:17.  He testified he understood he faced criminal liability if he supplied false information in those submissions.  4T138:16-144:17, 150:3-155:5; 5T38:24-55:13.  h.  The affiliation of the business or any of its owners, officers or directors with any other business entity; i.  A representative list of prior and current clients; j.  Major real and personal property holdings of the business; k. Financial statements and balance sheets; l.  Banking institutions with which the business is affiliated; and m.  Organizational charts; n.  An applicant’s certificate of birth and motor vehicle driver’s license; o.  Personal or corporate federal or State income tax returns; p.  An affidavit certifying that the applicant is a minority business or women’s business, as defined in section 2 of P.L. 1986, c. 195 (C. 52:27H-21.18); and q.  Any other information the director deems necessary to effectuate the purposes of this act.  ([Emphasis added].)
[brief] **  On January 30, 2023, Petitioners filed an amended application with this court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 1:7-4 to void Chapter 375 as having been enacted in a manner that is inconsistent with the Constitution.  (Pa16-26; Pa29-35).  Motion practice followed.  The parties filed motions to supplement the record, which were granted, and Petitioners filed a motion to issue subpoenas to representatives of the Legislature, or alternatively, to conduct a hearing, which this court denied on June 27, 2023.  (Pa40-41; Pa62-224; Pa225-267; Pa268-349; Pa350-53).  Petitioners sought interlocutory review of that denial with the Supreme Court, and on October 19, 2023, the Court denied Petitioners’ motion.  \(^7\)  Past versions of the legislative calendars are archived and publicly available on the Wayback Machine.
[brief] a.  Unlike [...], the parties agreed that Respondent was medically disabled, and any charges were directly related to the medical disability as allowed by N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4.  The parties further agreed it is unlikely Respondent will improve (Da18-Da19, Par. 17 and Da 15, Par. 3) and as a result, Appellant agreed to file the IOD application pursuant to N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.10 and N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6.  f.  Contrary to Respondent, [...] had problems with cocaine and allegation of PTSD – and [...] could have been fired for cause, (not for his medical inability to perform) and that fact triggered the eligibility provisions of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4 from which he could not return to duty per N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2) if he were granted disability [per N.J.S.A 43:16A-6 Ordinary Disability or N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7 Accidental Disability].