ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Da 1-3)  On various dates between January 10, 2020 and March 6, 2020, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., held a testimonial hearing on [...]’s motion to suppress her statement to police.  (1T-7T)  [...] granted the motion in a written order on June 3, 2020, holding that it could not be used in the State’s case-in-chief.  (Da 4)  [...] ruled, however, that the statement was voluntary and could be used to cross-examine Ms. [...] if she testified at trial.  (Da 4)  Prior to trial, Ms. [...] moved to preclude [...] from testifying as an expert in forensic anthropology at trial and to limit the testimony of medical examiner [...] to prevent him from opining that the “manner of death” was homicide.  On July 12, 2021, [...] denied the motion to preclude Bird’s testimony.  (Da 5; 10T:34-14 to 42-23)  On September 28, 2022, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., denied the motion to limit Dr. Mazari’s testimony.  (Da 6-7; 15T:113-20 to 128-2)  Ms. [...] sought to plead open to counts two through four, admit to causing a false public alarm and destroying [redacted] remains, and proceed to trial solely on the murder count, but [...] held she could not do so.  (18T:9-15 to 16-13)  Beginning on December 12, 2022, [...] presided over a jury trial on all counts (18T:9-15 to 16-13)  On January 4, 2023, the jury found Ms. [...] guilty of all counts and made additional findings related to the murder count pursuant to 2C:11-3b(4)(k).  (Da 8-14)  On February 21, 2023, [...] sentenced Ms. [...] to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole pursuant to 2C:11-3b(4)(k).  (46T:27-21 to 42-17; Da 15-18)  Ms. [...] filed a notice of appeal on April 12, 2023.  (Da 19-23)  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] “As we have repeatedly stated, the test for adequate provocation is provocation sufficient to arouse the passions of an ordinary person beyond the power of his or her control. ”  Oglesby, 122 N.J. at 536 (citing Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 412).  State v. [...] is particularly enlightening here.  210 N.J. 364 (2012).  Under a rational-basis analysis, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the facts of that case did not support charging the jury with passion/provocation manslaughter.  Id. at 384-86.  In that case, [...] was involved in a love triangle with his boyfriend, [...], and [...]’s ex-boyfriend, [...].  [...] and [...] met [...] to inquire as to the return of a borrowed SUV, and to persuade [...] to enter back into a relationship with them both.
[brief] **Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Center Assoc.,** 182 N.J. 210 (2005) ................................................................................................. 42  **Conrad v. Michelle & John, Inc.,** 349 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2007) ........................................................................ 36  **Driscoll Constitutional Co., Inc. v. State,** 371 N.J. Super. 304 (App. Div. 2004) ....................................................................
[brief] That’s a different -- that would fall under a different category within ITE, and that, generally, has a higher traffic count associated with it. ” (2T 16:8-23).  The independent variable for trip generation is square footage of the building; “the height of the building does not factor in. ” (3T 26:3-21).  “It’s not a volumetric calculation.  It’s solely based on the square footage of the building. ” (3T 27:2-3).  When asked, “[s]o if these buildings were 30 feet high as opposed to somewhere between 40 and 50 feet high, would your projected traffic counts be any different?”  [...] concluded that they would not.  (3T 27:4-7).  He explained that increased volume does not “necessarily translate linearly like that[.]” (3T 31:19-25).  Post-development studies support this conclusion.
[brief] State v. Lefurge, 101 N.J. 404, 418 (1986).  It is a well settled principle of law once a grand jury has acted, an indictment should not be disturbed but only on the clearest and plainest grounds when the indictment is manifestly deficient or palpably defective.  State v. Hogan, Supra. 144 N.J. at 228-29.  In making a determination as to whether an indictment is valid, a grand jury must independently examine whether the State has presented proof to support each element of the offense charged, and whether each of those elements have been charged in the indictment.
[brief] Pa42.  By letter dated July 22, 2022, [...] of the [...] notified me for the first time that I was no longer eligible to receive any life insurance benefit.  Pa43.  Ms. Miller’s July 22, 2022 letter stated:  This letter is to provide additional information regarding the recent recalculation of your retirement allowance referenced in the July 19, 2022 letter from the [...].  ---  1  Pa = appellant’s appendix  The termination date provided on the Certification of Service and Final Salary from your former employer was pay period #3, 2022 (covers the period 1/15/22 to 1/28/22), which projected salary and service credit through this pay period.  However, your actual termination date is pay period #22, 2022 (covers the period 10/9/21 to 10/22/21) since pension contributions were not reported for pay periods #23, 2021 to #3, 2022.  Your total service credit decreased from 121 months to 118 months and your final average salary decreased from $48,342.98 to $47,796.66.  As a result, monthly retirement allowance was recalculated.  You were notified of the amount of the overpayment, the correct amount of your monthly allowance and the repayment schedule in the previous letter.  In addition, since your service credit decreased to 9 years and 10 months, your beneficiary is no longer eligible to receive a group life insurance benefit upon your passing.  Only members with at least 10 years of service credit are eligible for this benefit.  Pa43.  I appealed the recalculation of my service credit, the reduction of my monthly retirement benefit and the determination that I was not eligible for the life insurance benefit that the [...] had confirmed in its December 28, 2021 letter, Pa62 to Pa63, but my appeal was denied even though the October 27, 2022 decision denying my appeal conceded that the error in calculating my service credit (that led to the loss of my retirement benefits) was based solely “on information provided by [my] former employer.
[brief] (11T63).  [...]:  He said that I blame him.  That’s (indiscernible).  People testify in depositions all the time.  He went out and filed a lawsuit against me.  He (indiscernible).  He’s the one who filed the lawsuit.  THE COURT: No.  It was based on your client -- something that one of your client’s said.  [...]: But he filed a lawsuit -- THE COURT: Which ultimately was dismissed.  [...]: For statute of limitations.  It wasn’t dismissed for -- for -- that there wasn’t an expert or it’s not (indiscernible).  THE COURT: It’s not -- it’s a nullity.  It’s not in the case anyway.  [...]: But -- but he made it in the case.  He’s making it in his case.  THE COURT: And I kicked it out.  [...]: But they already heard it, Your Honor.  And (indiscernible).  THE COURT: Yes.  And you just created your own problem.  [...]: -- that I created a problem?  I’m addressing what he said.  He said that my client – THE COURT: No.  We’re not going -- we’re not doing this.  [...]: I wouldn’t have went here, Your Honor – THE COURT: It’s out of the case.  It’s out of the case.  It stays out of the case.  It’s not probative.  It doesn’t – it doesn’t reasonably calculate to lead to anything.  [11T64-11T65]  Subsequently, defense counsel revisited the issue with the trial court, based on the *Glassman v. Friedel*, 249 N.J. 199 (2021) decision.
[brief] The Pinelands waiver of strict compliance does not constitute an approval.  If the [...] elects to enforce local Estell Manor Ordinance 380-35 D. to deny an applicant a variance request to build within 300 feet of wetlands it is free to do so.  If the [...] finds that an applicant has failed to satisfy its burden that the development would not have a substantial detrimental impact upon neighboring properties it is free to do so.  If the [...] elects to find that an applicant has not satisfied its burden of proof of both the positive and negative criteria, it is free to do so.
[brief] See Willingboro Mall, Ltd. v. 240/242 Franklin Ave., LLC, 215 N.J. 242 (2013) (upholding oral settlement agreement reached at mediation and holding that “going forward parties that intend to enforce a settlement agreement reached at mediation must execute a signed written agreement”) (emphasis added); see also Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118 (App. Div. 1983) (upholding enforceability of oral settlement agreement reached on eve of trial and not memorialized on the record and rejecting ability of plaintiff to repudiate the following day based upon a change of heart).  Even if the Willingboro writing requirement is applicable despite the fact that the settlement at issue was not reached during a mediation, Respondent’s argument that a transcript, wherein the Respondent was questioned by the hearing officer and her own counsel and Respondent and her attorneys assented on the record to the terms and substance of the settlement is somehow an insufficient writing to satisfy the Willingboro writing requirement is ridiculous and inconsistent with Willingboro itself which recognizes that “[w]e also see no reason why an audio- or video-recorded agreement would not meet the test of ‘an agreement evidenced by a recorded signed by all parties to the agreement .  . . .’”  Willingboro, 215 N.J. at 262-63.  To suggest that an audio or video recording is sufficient, but a written transcript prepared by a certified Court Reporter is insufficient, is simply preposterous, and must be rejected by this Court.  Further, although Respondent is correct that Willingboro holds that in cases where “the complexity of the settlement terms cannot be drafted by the time the mediation session was expected to have ended, the mediation session should be continued for a brief but reasonable period of time to allow for the signing of the settlement,” no such necessity was identified in the instant matter by the hearing officer, Respondent, or her counsel.  Id.  Quite the contrary, Respondent and her counsel both agreed on the record that the material terms of the settlement were accurately and completely reflected by the representations of counsel of the record as confirmed by the questioning of Respondent by the hearing officer and her counsel.  (Pa34).  To this end, those terms were even clarified by Respondent’s counsel.  (Id.).  Accordingly, Respondent’s argument in this regard is without merit and must be rejected by this Court for what it is, another after the fact effort to justify what in this instance is nothing more than a simple case of buyer’s remorse which cannot and should not be endorsed by this Court. \(^3\)  **POINT IV**
[brief] Appellate Review of a trial court’s dismissal of a defendant on motion pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) is taken de novo.  See, e.g. *Watson v. New Jersey Dep't of Treasury*, 453 N.J. Super. 42, 47 (App. Div. 2017).  An Appellate panel owes “no deference to the trial judge's conclusions. ”  *Mac Property Group LLC & The Cake Boutique LLC v. Selective Fire and Cas. Ins. Co.*, 473 N.J. Super. 1, 16 (App. Div. 2022) (internal quotations omitted).
[brief] (1T49:6-25) (emphasis added).  In denying [...]’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court again highlighted [...]’s violation of the rights of low- and moderate-income households:  And we use this, you know, constitutionally compliant language, it’s, you know, sounds kind of pretty, kind of low key and maybe soft peddling it, what it means is **[...] has violated the rights of low- and moderate-income households, to have a place to live in [...].  That’s what it means**.  (2T9:3-8) (emphasis added).  The trial court fully recognized that [...] has the right to condemn real property and designate property as areas in need of redevelopment, but also noted that the Township has a **constitutional** obligation to provide for its fair share of affordable housing under the Mount Laurel doctrine and Fair Housing Act.  When weighing the **Crowe v. DeGioia** factors used to determine whether preliminary relief should be granted, the Court was careful to note that [...]’s significant noncompliance and its own abandonment of the DJ Action heavily swung the equities and balance of hardships in favor of Plaintiff.  The court was careful to hold that it was applying the standards applicable to injunctive relief, not adjudicating [...]’s condemnation and redevelopment rights in a vacuum as if its affordable housing compliance status was not at issue.  (2T11:9-15:10).  **ARGUMENT**
[brief] On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s finding that the plaintiffs’ statement of “Get it back to us when you can” was insufficient to convert the loan to a “pay-when-able” loan.  Ibid.  Importantly, the trial court even found the plaintiff’s testimony credible but still found that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving that the loan in question was “pay-when-able. ”  Id. at *3.  “As we read the judge's opinion, he simply found, after weighing all of the testimony, that plaintiff had not met his burden of proof.  In particular, the judge concluded that in the absence of ‘some clear indication’ to the contrary, the loan was presumed to be a demand loan. ”  *Id.* (citing *Denville Amusement Co.*, 84 N.J. Super. at 169).  Thus, the $15,000 loan was an ordinary demand loan subject to the six (6) year statute of limitation.  *Ibid.*  *Flynn* and *Guerin* clearly do not support Plaintiff’s arguments.  First, the loans in those two cases were separate and distinct new loans, not continuations or modifications of existing prior loans.
[brief] [...]: No, they're not.  Q.  In fact, there are a number of other manufacturers who make heaters for natural gas regulators, correct?  [...]: Yes.  Q.  In the process of designing this particular station at [...] [sic], you didn't make any effort to contact any other suppliers or manufacturers of catalytic heaters to see if they were interested in supplying the heater for this; isn't that correct?  [...]: Yes.
[brief] (Da0256-Da0257)  The Urgent Drug Recall included Lot #E82852, the same defective lot from which [...] had received the November 6, 2018, Ozurdex injection that blinded her left eye.  (Da0256-Da0257)  [...]’s failure to warn of the dangers of its product cost [...] her vision.  Almost two months after [...]’s fateful Ozurdex injection, [...] finally decided to warn health care providers in the United States that:  “During a routine manufacturing inspection, a single silicone particle, approximately 300 microns in diameter, was observed in dispensed Ozurdex implants.  The silicone particle has been confirmed to originate from the needle sleeve.  Retain sample testing has determined that the above-mentioned lots are affected by this defect. ”  [(Da0256-Da0257).  Emphasis added.]  [...] further admitted in the Health Hazard Assessment that: “Mild transient visual disturbance or intraocular inflammatory reaction in sensitive patients are potential safety risks.  There is also a remote possibility of corneal reaction if the particulate migrates to the anterior chamber. ”  [(Da0256-Da0257).  Emphasis added.]  [...] first became aware of the Ozurdex recall in early 2019 and realized that the Ozurdex injection that [...] received on November 6, 2018 was from one of the recalled lots which caused her injury.  [...] spoke with [...] on January 15, 2019 and documented:  “I spoke with [...] today to discuss the Ozurdex recall involving the lot that she received and injection of in November 2018.  The recall was secondary to inflammation and a possible corneal reaction of which she has developed both. ”  (Da0680)  By February 1, 2019 [...] was almost completely blind in her left eye.
[brief] The trial judge viewed the Special Master’s role as narrower than that of a judge, in that “a special master is appointed to carry out limited and specific tasks. ” (39686a).  But the importance of the appearance of impartiality applies to each task within a case, and a Special Master can be responsible for resolving highly consequential issues.  Here, for example, the Special Master’s ruling on attorneys’ fees led to an award of more than $19 million.
[brief] \textit{Ibid.}  The matter was transferred to the [...], and on June 6, 2019, [...] withdrew its OTSC and preliminary injunction request, citing Jersey City Mayor [...]’s acknowledgement that the Jersey City payroll tax would generate “sufficient revenue to supplant the Adjustment Aid [...] will lose for the 2019-20 school year[,]” and that its cost saving steps would ensure “that the loss of Adjustment Aid in the 2019-20 school year will not have a marked negative effect on educational instruction[.]” (Aa1116; Aa1574; Aa1874).
[brief] See Essex v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, 166 N.J. Super. 124, 127 (App. Div. 1979).  “Determinations of the scope of duty in negligence cases has traditionally been a function of the judiciary. ”  Estate of Desir v. Vertus, 214 N.J. 303, 322 (2013).  Public policy and fairness are the elements the courts of New Jersey utilize in determining the existence of a duty.  The Supreme Court has established a four-part framework requiring the evaluation of four factors: “the relationship of the parties; the nature of the risk; the ability to exercise care; and public policy considerations.
[brief] Driscoll v. Burlington Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433 cert denied 344 U.S. 838 (1952)  Geler v. Akawie, 358 N.J. Super. 437 (App. Div. 2003)  Gillman v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 286 N.J. Super. 523 (App. Div.), certif. den. 144 N.J. 174 (1996)  Gormely v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72 (2014)
[brief] Notably, the Board utilized Zoom and conducted hearings during the pandemic.  [...] sought a retroactive Rent Increase to August 1, 2019, which gave the Board the benefit of the doubt for a one-year delay caused by Covid-19.  After [...] filed its application on July 19, 2017, the first Board hearing did not occur until September 27, 2017, followed by hearings on October 25, 2017 and December 13, 2017.  [...] appealed the Board’s decision, and on May 25, 2018, [...] found the Board’s action arbitrary and capricious and motivated by personal feelings toward [...].
[directive] Ensuring Robust Stakeholder Engagement  Agencies should consult with community organizations, representatives of underserved communities, and other sources of information to identify potential violations of the laws they enforce that disproportionately affect underserved communities, to determine which subject matter areas and types of violations are of the greatest concern to these communities, and to enable agencies to prioritize those concerns.  Although agencies generally must maintain confidentiality regarding pending investigations, they may communicate their broader enforcement priorities publicly and may seek the assistance of non-governmental organizations in providing information relevant to agency investigations and in referring individual complainants to the agency.  Advisory bodies offer a more formal option for informing agencies’ civil enforcement priorities and strategies.  Agencies that pursue this option should assess the diversity of any advisory body they consult to consider whether its membership is able to speak from experience to considerations of racial justice and equity for underserved communities.  VI.
[directive] All healthcare facilities and law enforcement agencies shall provide sexual assault victims with information about the designated county sexual violence program, regardless of when or where the incident occurred, or whether the victim has reported the incident to a law enforcement agency.  (See generally N.J.S.A. 52:4B-22).  This information shall be personally conveyed to the victim by a representative of the healthcare facility before a sexual assault medical forensic examination (medical forensic exam) is conducted or by a representative of the law enforcement agency before a statement is taken, unless the victim requires immediate medical attention.  The personal conveyance of information about the local sexual violence program helps the victim understand the assistance and benefits a CSVA may provide.  If the services of a CSVA are requested by a victim, the healthcare facility or law enforcement agency shall contact the designated county sexual violence program on the victim’s behalf (See Appendix XX, Confidential Sexual Violence Services Organization By County).  The activated CSVA will explain their role on the SART and the services provided by the affiliated-sexual violence program, and provide the victim with the opportunity to speak privately prior to and during any investigative and sexual assault medical forensic interviews or procedures.  Additionally, at the victim’s request, the CSVA may be present during medical forensic exams and law enforcement interviews to provide crisis intervention and emotional support.  (See N.J.S.A. 52:4B-52).  However, the CSVA shall not participate in evidence collection or law enforcement interviews, and shall not take notes during these activities.  Law enforcement and the FNE may require that CSVAs provide identifying information, limited to their first name and last initial, and the name and address of their affiliated sexual violence program.  When needed, further identifying information may be obtained from the sexual violence program or the CSVA outside the victim’s presence.  The services of the sexual violence program are available to the victim throughout the entire healing process, the time period of which varies for each victim.
[brief] All narration testimony from investigators “must accord with [these] specific limits” in order to be admissible.  *Ibid.*  First, investigators cannot provide “continuous” or “running commentary” while the video is played, and counsel offering the testimony is required to ask “focused questions designed to elicit specific, helpful responses. ”  *Ibid.*  Second, “investigators can describe what appears on a recording but may not offer opinions about the content[.]”  That is, investigators can offer “objective, factual comments” such as: “the individual opened the door with his elbow. ”  However, they cannot offer “subjective interpretations” of those objective facts, such as: “he [opened the door with his elbow] to avoid leaving fingerprints. ”  Ibid (internal citation omitted).  Third, “investigators may not offer their views on factual issues that are reasonably disputed. ”  Thus a “witness cannot testify that a video shows a certain act when the opposing party reasonably contends that it does not. ”  Fourth, “investigators should not comment on what is depicted in a video based on inferences or deductions, including any drawn from other evidence. ”  Such comments are “appropriate only for closing argument. ”  Ibid.  Beyond establishing these limiting principles, the Court in Watson also reaffirmed its prior holding in State v. Sanchez, 247 N.J. 450 (2021).
[brief] The State’s ballistics expert, [...], confirmed that the Sig Sauer service weapons held twelve .40-caliber rounds in their magazines.  (4T15-12 to 16-7).  [...] testified that the Glock gun was operable, and that the magazine on it could hold 30 rounds.  (4T34-7 to 23).  [...]’ examination of the ballistics evidence showed that the casings recovered outside the store were fired from [...]’s weapon, while the casing recovered with the Glock was fired from that weapon.  The projectile recovered form [...]’s leg was fired from the Glock.  The bullet fragment recovered from the scene was too small to test.  According to [...], it is a possibility that a .9-millimeter bullet could be fired from a .40 caliber weapon, but a .40 caliber weapon couldn’t fire .9-millimeter ammunition.  (4T32-18 to 40-21).