ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Public Benefits of the Land Exchange  The agreement with [...] facilitates the Township's acquisition of lands better suited for public recreation and environmental preservation.  In addition, the Township has now provided for the construction of religious dormitories, a permitted use, in an area which is closer to the schools in which the students will be attending, bordering the common boundary line with [...].  That will clearly and positively affect traffic issues, transportation costs to the [...] and other concerns of the Township and its residents.  This strategic exchange is a prudent use of the Township's authority, ensuring that public goals are met efficiently and effectively.  The land exchange arrangement between [...] and [...] is a paradigm of forward-thinking municipal governance that prioritizes the long-term welfare of its citizens.  This strategic exchange is not merely a transaction, but a comprehensive plan designed to significantly enhance the Township's public and environmental landscape.
[directive] F.  Remedial/Corrective Action  Once an officer has displayed the requisite number of performance indicators necessary to trigger the EW review System process forth (as in set Section II.C, above) assigned supervisory personnel shall remedial initiate action to address the officer's behavior.  When an System EW review process is initiated, personnel assigned to oversee EW the System (1) should formally notify subject the officer, in writing; (2) conference with subject the officer and appropriate supervisory personnel; (3) develop and administer a remedial program including appropriate the remedial/corrective actions listed below; (4) continue to monitor the subject officer for at least months, three or until supervisor the concludes that the officer's behavior has been remediated (whichever is longer); (5) document report and findings to the appropriate supervisory personnel if warranted, and, internal the affairs unit.
[directive] with complying discovery when seek order protective authority to informant, confidential or officer an of recording undercover the general prohibiting foregoing rule undercover an that expected execution is it where warrant arrest/search of planned the in a event will operative undercover (ems., the where raid a would present informant or be officer confidential the of Director or the Prosecutor or designee, County the cover), her or his preserve be to arrested BWC-equipped instruction any to provide may specific designee, or of Justice Division Criminal their devices.  to whether activate on operation the in participating officers and if so do to practicable and safe is it as soon as activated/re-activated be shall BWC
[directive] Accordingly, the Administrative Office of the Courts has established a Transaction Fee Schedule, in connection with sentences of probation for offenses committed on and after February 1, 1993 when a probationer is sentenced to make payment on any fines, VCCB assessments, DEDR penalties, forensic lab fees or restitution awards covered under the foregoing statutory provision, as follows: (a). a transaction fee of $1 for payments in the amount of $10 or more; (b). a transaction fee of $.50 for payments between $3.01 and $9.99.  2.  No transaction fee is to be imposed for payments or installment payments of $3 of less.
[brief] BRIEF OF [...] AND NEW JERSEY  BUSINESS & INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION  [...]  [...] [...] Newark, New Jersey  07101-0652 [...] [...]  FAX  Attorneys for HealthCare Institute of New Jersey and New Jersey Business & Industry Association Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq.  (NJ Attorney ID# 016342005)  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (NJ Attorney ID# 378242022)  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] “A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one. ”  *Ibid.*  The harmless error analysis requires a court to “determine whether the error was ‘of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ’”  *Allen*, 254 N.J. at 549 (quoting *State v. Trinidad*, 241 N.J. 425, 451 (2020); *R.* 2:10-2).  This has “generally” been “considered to mean that the error was of a nature sufficient ‘to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached. ’”  *Id.* at 549-50 (quoting *State v. Macon*, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971)).
[brief] Prior to the hearing [...] advised the Court that she was requesting a forensic expert, [...], to join in the call because she was seeking additional assistance in the matter.  In response, [...] quickly forwarded documentation pertaining to the E.I.N. number.  The documentation showed that the E.I.N. number had been obtained for the [...] by [...] on November 12, 2020.  (R-275).  At the commencement of the April 19, 2021 hearing, [...] told the Court that according to [...], "we took out one for the Estate. ”  [...] advised the Court that [...] and [...] had been with the [...] for a few years and that previously Mr. [...] had been with the firm of [...].  As the hearing continued and it became clear that the [...] had hidden and made false statements about the existence of the E.I.N. number.
[brief] ⁵  The exact words used by the trial court were as follows:  “The officer testified that he observed the defendant looking startled which the Court already found not credible. ”  2T48:1-4.  startled not because he was involved in a crime, but rather because of the way the police car pulled towards him.  2T44:2-6.  Whether or not the Defendant appeared startled is a factual determination.  However whether or not the Defendant’s startled appearance is an indicator of criminality is a legal finding.  Thus, the trial court found the witness’s factual testimony that Defendant appeared startled to be credible.  The trial court then found the witness’s legal conclusion that the startled look was an indicator of criminality to be incorrect.
[brief] The individuals who had the responsibility to contact Appellant in order to restore her to the work schedule were the Area Director and Program Director, pursuant to [...]’s deposition testimony.  These were the same individuals – [...], [...], [...], and [...], to whom Appellant made her whistleblower complaints of wrongdoing.  In the case of [...] and [...], she reported wrongdoing involving them.  Therefore, a fact finder could use this evidence to find that the individuals who were responsible for bringing her back on the schedule were motivated by her whistleblowing activity not to call and bring her back, which is retaliatory.  •
[brief] \(^10\)  See Da7 for more detail on the 2019 Land Use Element.  zone which permits most of the uses proposed, such as senior citizen housing (in zones AH-1, -2, -4), adult community housing (in zones R-27 A,B,C,D,E,F or OB 1A), or assisted living and nursing homes (in zones OB1-3, OB1A, OB 2A-4, OB-5, I, IA, IA-1B, I-2, or I-2A).  To be certain, any of those zones would be a better fit for the senior living mixed-use facility proposed by [...].  See Drb2, ¶4, supra.
[brief] In State v. Reddy, 137 N.J. Super. 32 (App. Div. 1975), the Appellate Division approved the removal of a defendant who went on diatribes while in the courtroom.  The defendant was given the opportunity to return if he could comport himself.  Defendant points to an unpublished case, State v. Stuart, 2010 WL 1190538 (App. Div. 2010), in support of his argument that [...] improperly barred defendant from the trial.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 241.  The Court further cited to this Court’s prior precedent, holding “the expert assigned to conduct the Rule 4:19 examination ‘does not have the right to dictate the terms under which the examination shall be held. ’”  *Id.* at 241 (quoting *DiFiore*, 472 N.J. Super. at 130 (quoting *B.D. v. Carley*, 307 N.J. Super. 259, 262 (App. Div. 1998)).  Upon remand, Defendant moved for a protective order.
[brief] Defendants argue that their proposal provides that documents or ESI known to be responsive will not be withheld on the basis that such documents or ESI were not responsive to search methodology described in the protocol.  Defendants argue that their proposal is proportional to the needs of the case, and addresses Plaintiffs’ underlying concern that the use of search terms may not capture responsive documents or ESI and should not be used to withhold them.  Similarly, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ request for “folders or collections of information that are known to contain documents likely to be responsive to a discovery request” is overly broad and flouts the requirement that discovery be proportional to the needs of the case.  Defendants argue that their network drive folders can contain terabytes of data which would be burdensome to collect and produce.  Defendants assert that their compromise proposal accounts for proportionality: it provides for the production, without applying search terms, of discrete folders or collections of information of a reasonable volume that are known to predominantly contain documents likely to be responsive to discovery requests, and it allows the parties to meet and confer if the receiving party identifies any deficiency in the production.  Defendants point to Gamboa, et al., v. [...], et al., [...] (E.D. Mich. Filed Dec. 16, 2019), ECF No. 151 at 7, wherein the parties were required to meet and confer if a discrete document folder or collection was too big to make review of each document proportional to the needs of the case.
[brief] In the within matter, the Defendant’s request to seek reconsideration of the “law of the case” created by the Appellate Division was inappropriate.  The “law-of-the-case” doctrine is applicable where an issue has been litigated and decided during the course of a particular case.  United States v. U.S. Smelting Refin. & M. Co., 339 U.S. 186, 198, 70 S. Ct. 537, 94 L. Ed. 750 (1950).  The “law of the case” doctrine provides that a court should respect the decision of a higher court in the same controversy.  Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 538 (2011).  The order and opinion from the Appellate Division become the law of the case and require conforming judicial action by the trial court.  *In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co.*, 160 N.J. 247, 16 S. Ct 291, 40 L.Ed. 414 (1895).
[directive] The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), decided on March 2, 1971, held it a denial of equal protection to limit punishment to payment of a fine for those who are able to pay it but to controvert the fine to imprisonment for those who are unable to pay it.  The response to this opinion in the various counties has not been uniform and accordingly the Supreme Court has authorized me to issue this directive.  1.  If it is determined that the defendant has the present ability to pay the fine but voluntarily refuses to do so, the defendant may be committed.  If, however, it is determined that the defendant does not have the present ability to pay the fine he or she should be released from jail, but may be ordered to pay the fine in installments if it is determined that he or she has the ability to so pay.  2.  If the conviction is in and the fine imposed in the Superior Court, it is recommended that any installment payments be ordered made through the County Probation Department; if the conviction is in and the fine imposed in the Municipal Court, it is recommended that any installment payments be ordered made through the Municipal Court Administrator.  3.  No commitments should be made for failure to pay a fine, unless a determination has been made that the defendant has the present ability to pay the fine but refuses to do so.
[brief] The Court based its decision on two grounds.  First, the origin of the insurer's Med-Pay obligation is not found within the express mandate of the auto statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.  Respondent relies on the long line of case law (both published and unpublished) addressing same.  Respondent contends that Med pay benefits cannot be subrogated in New Jersey.  New Jersey case law dictates that there is no statutory right to subrogation for Med Pay benefits, as there is for personal injury protection ("PIP") benefits.
[brief] Differing FDCA and state-law recall obligations pertaining to the same FDA-regulated products inherently conflict:  [F]ederal regulations place a duty on manufacturers to inform the FDA of problems, and a duty on the FDA to recall [such products].  Plaintiffs’ proposed duties would add to this scheme by requiring the manufacturer to notify patients of potential defects or to pull possibly deficient devices from the market.  Therefore, a state action for failure to notify or recall would impose an additional requirement from those prescribed by federal law; such a cause of action is preempted.  Hunsaker v. Surgidev Corp., 818 F. Supp. 744, 754 (M.D. Pa. 1992), aff’d, 5 F.3d 1489 (3d Cir. 1993).  ---  20  All these cases predate the Supreme Court’s 2008 recognition of broad express preemption in pre-market approved medical device cases.  See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).  A fortiori, post-Riegel medical device cases continue to hold failure-to-recall claims preempted.  Sundaramurthy v. Abbott Vascular, Inc., 2023 WL 2311661, at *3 & n.3 (D. Mass. Mar. 1, 2023) (following Cupek); Poozhikala v. Medtronic, Inc., 2022 WL 610276, at *5 n.4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2022) (FDCA recall is a voluntary action that state law cannot make mandatory); Bryant v. Thoratec Corp., 343 F. Supp.3d 594, 604-05 (S.D. Miss. 2018) (preempting claims that “Defendants should have sooner issued a recall”; preemption not defeated because “the FDA permits voluntary recalls”); Kubicki v. Medtronic, Inc., 293 F. Supp.3d 129, 185 (D.D.C. 2018) (state-law recall claim that ignored FDA supplementation requirements preempted); Bentzley v. Medtronic, Inc., 827 F. Supp.2d 443, 451-52 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (state-law claim that FDA recall should have included unrecalled products preempted); Franklin v. Medtronic, Inc., 2010 WL 2543579, at *6 (Mag. D. Colo. May 12, 2010), adopted, 2010 WL 2543570 (D. Colo. June 22, 2010) (same as Poozhikala); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability Litigation, 592 F. Supp.2d 1147, 1159 (D. Minn. 2009) (“claims alleging that [defendant] should have recalled the [product] sooner than it did are ... preempted”), aff’d, 623 F.3d 1200 (8th Preemption of plaintiff’s claim that the defendant should have immediately recalled Ozurdex® – without waiting for the FDA to complete its independent review and order the recall – also comports with the PLA, because “[t]he Legislature, by attaching a presumption of adequacy to FDA-approved warnings, ‘recognized the preeminent role of federal regulation of drugs and medical devices.
[brief] It is undisputed that each of Plaintiff’s claims are governed by a six-year statute of limitations.  *N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1*; *Holmin v. TRW*, 330 N.J. Super. 30, 35-36 (App. Div. 2000), certif. granted, 165 N.J. 531 (2000), aff’d, 167 N.J. 205 (2001).  Generally, the date when a cause of action accrues is the date upon which the right to institute and maintain suit first arises.  *Holmin v. TRW*, 330 N.J. Super. 30, 35 (App. Div. 2000), certif. granted, 165 N.J. 531 (2000), aff’d, 167 N.J. 205 (2001).  However, the discovery rule doctrine the doctrine postpones accrual of a cause of action “so long as a party reasonably is unaware either that he has been injured, or that the injury is due to the fault or neglect of an identifiable individual or entity. ”  Caravaggio v. D’Agostini, 166 N.J. 237, 245, 765 A.2d 182, 186 (2001), citing Vispisiano v. Ashland Chemical Co., 107 N.J. 416, 527 A.2d 66 (1987).  The question is “whether the facts presented would alert a reasonable person, exercising ordinary diligence, that he or she was injured due to the fault of another. ”  Caravaggio, 166 N.J. at 246.  The standard is basically an objective one—whether plaintiff “knew or should have known” of sufficient facts to start the statute of limitations running.  Id., quoting Baird v. Am. Med. Optics, 155 N.J. 54, 72 (1998).  i.
[directive] This Directive repeals and supersedes the provisions of Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2008-2 (Guidelines for Stationhouse Adjustment of Juvenile Delinquency Offenses); the 1998 Attorney General Guidelines on Procedures for Collecting Juvenile Fingerprints and Photographs; and Attorney General Executive Directive No. 1990-1 (Handling of Juvenile Matters by Police and Prosecutors).
[brief] (1T38)  POINT  I BECAUSE [...] FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF MAILING A CANCELLATION NOTICE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED AND PLAINTIFFS’ CROSS-MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (1T, pp. 17-38)  [...] maintains that it had effectively cancelled [...]’s policy prior to the date of his accident by mailing him a Cancellation Notice.  [...] maintains that he never received the notice, and was unaware of the purported cancellation.  The procedure for cancelling an auto insurance policy is set out in N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10 17:29C-10.  Written notice of cancellation or intention not to renew; effectiveness  No written notice of cancellation or of intention not to renew sent by an insurer to an insured in accordance with the provisions of an automobile insurance policy shall be effective unless a.  (1) it is sent by certified mail or (2) at the time of the mailing of said notice, by regular mail, the insurer has obtained from the Post Office Department a date stamped proof of mailing showing the name and address of the insured and b. the insurer has retained a duplicate copy of the mailed notice which is certified to be a true copy.  An insured whose policy is cancelled without his knowledge becomes subject to enormous potential liability; that is exactly what happened here, where [...] had to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars to litigate and settle a personal injury action brought by the occupants of the other vehicle involved in the accident.  For this reason, “In order to be effective, notices of cancellation must be sent in strict compliance with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10."
[brief] (15T 153-13 to 155-21)  Defendant testified that he did not specifically recall the stop in Lakehurst conducted by [...], but that, if he displayed something to Schroeck, it would have been his business card, not an official NJSP ID that he no longer had at the time.  (16T 116-7 to 15)  When the Schroeck/Lakehurst video was played in court, defendant testified that the video is not clear but that it appears to be his business card that he showed.  (16T 139-7 to 140-17)  He testified similarly with respect to the Berkeley stop by [...], which he also did not specifically remember, but he again noted that the business card is “the only thing I had” by that point.  (16T 116-19 to 117-6; 16T 141-4 to 7)  Defendant testified that [...], who conducted the Marlboro stop, “looked familiar,” possibly from an Alcotest training session that defendant had conducted, and defendant testified that he showed Wcislo his business card.  (16T 117-7 to 20)  He agreed that the phrase “on the job” used by Wcislo in that stop was “common jargon” used simply to indicate that one is a police officer.  (16T 141-20 to 22)  When he viewed the video from that stop, he testified that he clearly “showed something,” but it was blurry and had to be the business card, not an NJSP ID, because the business card was “the only thing” he had.  (16T 142-4 to 9)  On cross-examination, defendant denied that police officers are the only people who get the courtesy of officer discretion in a traffic stop.  (16T 169-1 to 23)  As discussed further in Point V, infra, the prosecutor also grilled defendant on whether his business card violated an NJSP SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) by its appearance -- an utterly irrelevant, but highly prejudicial, topic because defendant was not charged with using an improper business card to avoid a traffic ticket.
[brief] In that matter, the court found that “defendant planning board had no power to deny defendant’s application for site plan approval because of off-site traffic conditions unless it had found that the proposed means of ingress and egress created vehicular traffic problems. ”  *Id.* at 269.  *(Emphasis added). *  For reasons unclear from the record, the hearing officer attempted to frame the denial recommendation here on the premise that ingress and egress to the site was “unsafe and inefficient. ”  However, that analysis was offered only in regard to the loading area, which was not a required element of the site plan under the zoning standards.  Further, the hearing officer’s analysis disregards that the majority of access to the site was by means of walking to the property from nearby parking areas, as to which there was no finding whatsoever relating to allegedly unsafe ingress and egress.
[brief] “If there is no genuine issue of material fact, [the Appellate Court] decide[s] whether the trial court’s ruling on the law was correct. ”  *Id.*  “A trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  *Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995), superseded on other grounds by statute, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5.  “A trial court should not grant summary judgment when the matter is not ripe for such consideration, such as when discovery has not yet been completed. ”  *Driscoll Constr. Co. v. State, Dep’t of Transp.*, 371 N.J. Super. 304, 317 (App. Div. 2004); *Hollywood Café Diner, Inc. v. Jaffee*, 473 N.J. Super. 210, 219 (App. Div. 2022) (“[I]n general, summary judgment is inappropriate prior to the completion of discovery. ” (quotation marks omitted)).  Rather, “[t]he court should afford every litigant who has a bona fide cause of action or defense the opportunity for full exposure of his case. ”  *Driscoll Constr. Co.*, 371 N.J. Super. at 317 (quotation marks omitted).  “If there is the slightest doubt as to the existence of a material issue of fact, the motion should be denied. ”  *Hermann Forwarding Co. v. Pappas Ins. Co.*, 273 N.J. Super. 54, 60 (App. Div. 1994).  The mere fact that both sides moved for summary judgment is not dispositive of whether the matter was in fact ripe for adjudication.  *Driscoll Constr. Co.*, 371 N.J. Super. at 318 (“[C]ross-motions of summary judgment do not, of necessity, obviate a plenary trial on disputed issues of fact. ”).  II.
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