ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] --- 12 New Jersey Assembly Environment and Solid Waste Committee, Statement to Senate, No. 1074 [Second Reprint] with committee amendments 1 (Mar. 11, 2019), https://pub.njleg.gov/bills/2018/S1500/1074_S3.PDF?bcs-agent-scanner=50b4da6b-f63c-ae42-9012-a02bfa46436b [hereinafter “the Committee Statement”].  That challenge resulted in a ruling by the Appellate Division that, contrary to long-standing practice, the Department had no authority to require public access as a condition of a permit.  See Hackensack Riverkeeper, 443 N.J. Super. at 314-15.  The Legislature responded to the Riverkeeper decision with a bill that was enacted into law on January 19, 2016, P.L. 2015, C.260, N.J.S.A. 13:19-10.  The statute abrogated the Riverkeeper decision by confirming DEP's authority to require public access as a condition of a permit when and where appropriate.
[brief] (Pa166, Pa211).  The contents of the Ordinance were fully set forth in the published notice.  (Pa211).  The notice further provided that the Council Meeting would take place on December 14, 2021, at 7:15pm “or as soon thereafter as the matter may be reached, at which time and place, or at any time and place such meeting shall from time to time be adjourned,” where all interested persons would be given the opportunity to be heard.  (Pa212).  Ultimately, Ordinance 1423-21 was not considered at the Council Meeting on December 14, 2021, and it was instead placed on the agenda for the regularly scheduled Council Meeting on December 28, 2021.
[brief] Pursuant to Paragraph 4.1, distributions should occur “as soon as practicable after” the Settlor’s death.  Pursuant to Paragraph 1.2, the “Trust Estate” is defined as “Any and all property deposited with my Trustee or otherwise transferred to my Trustee or held hereunder. ”  Pursuant to Paragraph 4.1, the “Residuary Trust Estate” is defined as “the balance of the Trust Estate […] after first making or providing for payment of those items specified in Section [Paragraph] 3.3. ”  Pursuant to Paragraph 3.3, “Following my death, and to the extent that the assets of my testamentary estate shall be insufficient to do so, my Trustee shall pay from the principal of the Trust Estate the expenses of my last illness and funeral, costs of administration, including timely filed claims, costs of safeguarding and delivering devises, along with any federal and state estate and inheritance taxes assessed by reason of my death. ”  Thus, the Trust language permits expenditures for those items specified in Paragraph 3.3, which relate to the testamentary estate.  Pursuant to Paragraph 4.1(A), “My Residuary Trust Estate shall be divided equally between [...], if he shall survive me, [...], if he shall survive me, and [...], if she shall survive me (the shares of my Residuary Trust Estate payable to [...], [...] and [...] shall each be termed a ‘Child's Share’). ”  Pursuant to Paragraph 4.2(A), “With respect to the equal Share for [...], [...] and [...], each of their Shares shall be paid to them outright and free of trust. ”  There are two property purchase provisions which are important in interpreting the Trust language.  Pursuant to Paragraph 4.1(A)(a), “If the property located at [...] is still owned by the trust at the time of my death, I grant my son’s, [...] and [...], the power to purchase their sister’s share of such [Boonton] property at the then fair market value. ”  Pursuant to Paragraph 4.1(A)(b), “If the property located at [...] is still owned by the trust at the time of my death, I grant my daughter, DARYL, the power to purchase both her brother’s shares in such [Florida] property valued at the then fair market value. ”  Pursuant to Paragraph 6.1, the Trustee is granted specific powers for “the administration of the Trust Estate,” which includes the power to employ legal counsel, pursuant to Paragraph 6.1(Q).
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Anderson v. County of Monmouth, | | | 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 960, *32, | | | [...] (REMAND OF CSV 4698-04); | | | [...] (October 2, 2006) | 8 | | C.L. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., | | | 473 N.J. Super. 591, 598 (App. Div. 2022) | 3-4 | | In re Polk, 90 N.J. 550 (1982) | 8 | | In the Commitment of G.G.N., | | | 372 N.J. Super. 42 (App. Div. 2004) | 5 | | In re Kallen, 92 N.J. 14 (1983) | 2 | | In the Matter of [...], Investigator, | | | Secured Facilities, [...], | | | Department of Corrections, | | | [...]; | | | [...] (November 2, 2022) | 14 | | In the Matter of [...], Juvenile Justice Commission, | | | 2009 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 250, *14-15, | | | [...] (April 15, 2009) | 7 | | Liptak v. Rite Aid, Inc., 289 N.J. 199 (App. Div. 1996) | 5 | | Matter of Hendrickson, 235 N.J. 145 (2018) | 2 | | Matturri v. Bd. of Trs. of the Judicial Ret. Sys., | | | 173 N.J. 368, 379 (2002) | 2 | | Mejia v. New Jersey Department of Corrections, | | | 446 N.J. Super 369, 376-377 (App. Div. 2016) | 4 | N.J. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, Sandy Recovery Div. v. Maione, 456 N.J. Super. 146, 155 (App. Div. 2018) ...........................................
[brief] Pa356  Order on Motion to extend time to file Appellant’s Brief by thirty days, filed November 30, 2023 ……………………………………………………..  Pa357  Certification of [...] in support of Applicants-Petitioners’ motion to extend time to file their application merits brief in this matter by sixty days with consent of my adversary, filed on December 21, 2023 ………………………………………….. Pa358 Exhibit A – True and accurate copy of the [...]; August 11, 2023 letter ………………………………………………………………………………..  Pa363 Exhibit B – True and accurate of the [...] email correspondence dated December 14, 2023 …………………………………………………………………………..  Pa365 Exhibit C – Denials from the [...] dated December 14, 2023………………………………………..  Pa367  Order on Motion to extend time granted by thirty days, Appellants merits brief shall be filed on or before January 26, 2024.
[brief] In support of aggravating factor 3, the court reasoned, contrary to the evidence in the record, that “[t]here is nothing here…that would indicate to me that under similar circumstances outside of the control of the facility that these individuals would not [] re-offend. ”  (5T88-11 to 21)  This finding contradicted both the expert psychological testimony which concluded that [...] was not likely to reoffend, as well as the neuroscientific research discussed in Comer.
[brief] (1T:26:2-19).  The court rejected the personal injury plaintiffs’ objection to the discharge of [...].  (1T:28:7-19 and 29:6-24).  The court pointed out that [...] could never be responsible for an excess verdict because he was not the receiver at the time of the mishap. (1T:29:20-24 and 30:1-6).  Also, the court made the point that when [...] was appointed the entity did not have assets.  As a receiver, [...] did not become a guarantor.  (1T:30:7-11).  [...] attempted, in the most trying of times, in the best way he possibly could, to have something left for the creditors, and to administer the diner pursuant to the bank’s request to gain some funds for them based on their Judgment.
[brief] Thus, the only testimony [...] made identifying defendant from that location came after defendant's girlfriend already identified him to the jury in the still from the clip.  During cross-examination, defendant sought to downplay Detective [...]'s examination of the surveillance footage.  Initially, he had [...] concede that she reviewed the footage on an approximately eight-or-ten inch screen, significantly smaller than the screen in the courtroom.  (5T217-24 to 218-16).  Then he asked [...] if any of the footage she reviewed showed the individual in a hoodie that the State alleged was the shooter.  (5T238-8 to 10).  When she responded it did, he asked her which clip had the best view of the person and from what distance.  (5T238-11 to 15).  She told him that the best view of the suspect was in clip thirty-nine, and the person was probably thirty feet away.  (5T238-16 to 239-2).  Defendant then played the clip and asked [...] to stop the clip when she had the best view and to point at the shooter.  (5T239-5 to 19).  When the purported shooter was visible, defendant prompted [...] to estimate the portion of the screen occupied by the best view of the person.  She responded that the person took up approximately two inches of the screen.  (5T239-20 to 240-5).  Defendant did the same thing for clip thirty-seven.  (5T240-21 to 241-3).  This time, [...] said that the person took up less than an inch of the screen, and defendant reiterated that when reviewing the footage, [...] had examined a screen smaller than the one in the courtroom.  (5T241-4 to 11).  In response to the defendant's line of questioning during re-direct, the prosecutor inquired if there was any other surveillance footage showing the "individual."  This time, Detective [...] pointed out clip thirty-eight.  (5T245-8 to 246-8).  The clip was played, and [...] pointed out the person she was referring to and stated her "belie[f]" that the person was defendant.  (5T246-10 to 24).  Defendant did not object, but before the prosecutor could ask her next question, [...] issued a curative instruction telling the jury that the determination of whether defendant was in the video was their determination to make:
[brief] That decision was issued eight years before the MLUL was adopted and, therefore, provides no guidance on the current standard (\(i.e.\), who constitutes an “interested party” under the MLUL).  The non-binding authorities cited by Plaintiffs require minimal discussion.  For example, in Village Supermarket, Inc. v. Mayfair Supermarkets, Inc., 269 N.J. Super. 224 (Law Div. 1993), the Law Division \(^2\)  The only reason the DePetro court discussed the challengers’ status as citizens/taxpayers was to distinguish Paramus Multiplex Corp. v. Hartz Mtn. Indus., Inc., 236 N.J. Super. 104 (Law Div. 1987) - a case where the court found that owners of businesses located in surrounding municipalities did not possess standing (despite their economic interest in the development).  dismissed a two-count civil complaint for damages for failure to state a claim.  _Id._ at 239.  That decision made no substantive findings regarding so-called “taxpayer” standing.  _Id._  Relatedly, _Aurentz v. Plan Bd. of Little Egg Harbor Twp._, 171 N.J. Super. 135 (Law Div. 1979) is inapplicable because Plaintiffs are not challenging a “zoning scheme” or “comprehensive plan on of the Township.
[brief] ”  *Sitkowski*, 238 N.J. Super. at 260-61.  This matter, in which Respondent’s longstanding use of Lot 5 has suddenly, after more than six decades, become subject to collateral attack is the realization of the exact concerns that this Court flagged and addressed in that case.  Even though the Planning Board approved the Site Plan in 1972, Respondent found itself appearing before the Board to defend its use of Lot Five twice in the same year nearly half a century later.  That should never have been the case because the MLUL provides protection from such a belated collateral attack.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(e) (“The court shall state on the record the reasons for imposing the sentence. ”); R. 3:21-4(h) (“At the time sentence is imposed the judge shall state reasons for imposing such sentence including findings pursuant to the criteria for withholding or imposing imprisonment or fines under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 to 2C:44-3. ”).  While the failure to explain its reason for the $25 fee alone requires vacatur of the $25 fee, it was also an abuse of discretion in this case to impose a total probation supervision fee of $1,500 on top of the $12,443.56 in restitution ordered given that [...] was unemployed at the time of the sentence.
[brief] On August 3, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a motion to disqualify counsel for two sets of defendants: (i) [...], [...], [...], [...], D.O. and [...], M.D. (collectively, the Sood defendants) and (ii) [...], [...], [...], D.C., [...], Esq., [...], [...], [...], [...], M.D., [...], D.C., [...], M.D., [...], D.O. and [...], D.O. (collectively, the [...] defendants).  Pa305-316.  Following briefing on the disqualification issue, on October 27, 2023, the trial court issued two orders denying Plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify counsel for the [...] and Sood defendants. \(^1\)  Pa305-306; Pa311-312.  \(^1\)  On that same date, the trial court also issued three orders granting the [...] and Sood Defendants, and defendant [...], M.D.’s motions to remand the case to arbitration under the Automobile Insurance Cost Recovery Act (AICRA), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1 to -35.  Plaintiffs filed an appeal as of right from those orders, challenging the trial court’s erroneous conclusion that the complex affirmative fraud claims under the IFPA, RICO and common law alleged in the complaint are subject to personal injury protection (PIP) arbitration.  That appeal is pending before this Court under Docket No. [...] and will be heard back-to-back with this interlocutory appeal.  Pa355.  On December 1, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to appeal the trial court’s denial of its motion to disqualify, which this court granted on December 29, 2023.  Pa354.  Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on January 29, 2024 and an amended notice of appeal on February 1, 2024.  Pa357-389.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] At age sixteen, defendant was waived to adult court, and, in 2017, sentenced to a five-year prison term with three years of parole ineligibility for third-degree aggravated assault and second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose.  (PSR 8).  Defendant maxed out his prison sentence in November 2010.  (PSR 8).  Just over three years later, in January 2014, defendant was again arrested for weapons offenses.  (PSR 8-9).  In 2016, defendant was convicted of second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun and sentenced to an eleven-year prison term, half without parole eligibility, as a second offender with a firearm.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3d; (10T44-17 to 19).
[brief] The first mention in the messages between [...] and [...] about the [...] property, [...], is on February 13, 2022.  This is one of the many, many deals that the two close together over several years.  Referring to Mr. [...], [...] says “owner didn’t pay” “wow” “is he crazy” and “locky [sic] you”.  196a.  [2/13/22, 8:48:44 AM]  [...] Josh [...]: 79 Sherman Street can i buy for 400k [2/14/22, 10:24:59 AM]
[brief] (Pa72-75).  Note that the Board and Respondents are used interchangeably in this brief.  That appeal clearly established that the Supervisor’s decision was a clear misinterpretation of applicable law and facts of the underlying matter.  (Id.).  On 12/23/20, [...] issued his certification as a supplemental submission for consideration by the Board.  (Pa76-81).  On 1/13/21, the Board denied [...] the right to file his disability application for multiple reasons that had no application to this case.
[brief] (See RA-79 through RA-81).  In examining Appellant’s Brief and Exhibits, it is obvious many key documents and pleadings were not included in Appellant’s submission.  Further, having the benefit of all the documents and pleadings submitted to the Court below, it is also clear Appellant’s brief contains gross misrepresentations and distortions of fact regarding what transpired since the Appellate Court’s decision of November 16, 2023 and in connection with the Trial Court’s decision to grant declaratory relief.  It is for this reason that Respondent opposes Appellant’s effort to overturn the Trial Court’s determination regarding declaratory relief and requests that this matter be remanded for a reconsideration of the award of counsel fees and possibly sanctions against Appellant for this blatant abuse of the judicial process.
[directive] Note: Some of these offenses are listed elsewhere in Bail Schedule 2 as lesser included offenses  Statute Charge Description Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  Possession of Goods (Including Actor knowingly possesses goods, including cigarettes, which are required to be taxed and Disorderly Persons  N.J.S. 54:52-18 Cigarettes)  $500 to $1,000  10% permissible on which tax has not been paid.  Offense Without Paying Tax
[brief] They harbor vermin, invite drug addicts as a haven for shelter, bring down property values, are an eyesore to neighbors, and strike fear in the families that live nearby and have to walk past them to school, church, or work.  Despite using the Tax Sale Law to its advantage in acquiring an abandoned property in [...], [...] abused the law by intentionally not paying its taxes and leaving the property to rot.  It then ignored foreclosure notices and chose to spend money on investments in two nicer towns, [...] and [...].  [...] received all notices but ignored the deadline, “assuming” he had more time based on his past experience as a tax foreclosure plaintiff.  [...] was wrong and the foreclosure ended January 23, 2023.  [...] knew what it was getting into as a plaintiff – tax foreclosure - and knew what would happen as a defendant.  It used monies that could ameliorate a scourge in [...] elsewhere.  It put the children and families of [...] in danger.  It was entitled to no relief.
[brief] Thus, it was not a grave injustice for the Court to deny Appellant’s post-trial motion for relief and this Court should affirm the Judgment.  POINT V: RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED.  Appellant spends the vast majority of his brief arguing why this Court should reverse the decisions below because of his belief that the named plaintiffs prior to June 10, 2020 did not have standing to bring their claims.  Missing from his argument is any discussion as to the standard on appeal for reviewing the June 10, 2020 Order below that amended the Complaint, pursuant to Rules 4:9-1 and 4:9-2 to include Respondent [...] as a named plaintiff.  This decision should be affirmed as it was not an abuse of the Trial Court’s discretion to conform the pleadings.  Further, if the amendment is reversed, the remaining Plaintiffs have standing.
[brief] 25 Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22 (2014) ..................................................................................  25 Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) .................................................................................. 25 Globe Motor Co. v. Igdaley, 225 N.J. 469 (2016) .................................................................................. 25 Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 3 (1995) .................................................................................... 26 Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73 (2022) .................................................................................... 24 Thomas Makuch, LLC v. Twp. of Jackson, 476 N.J. Super. 169 (App. Div. 2023) ....................................................... 26 STATUTES N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5(b) .............................................................................. 10, 11 N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-38(a) ............................................................................. 10 N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-43 to -63 ....................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-44 .................................................................................. 8 N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-46(b) ............................................................................. 19 N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-51b ...............................................................................
[brief] Appellant has single-handedly converted a simple, straightforward OPRA denial of access complaint into a multi-jurisdictional spanning litigation solely based on his obstinacy and intransigence.  [...] conceded that his personal text messages that relate to Fire District business from his tenure as a Commissioner for [...] are public records.  However, despite being assured by counsel for the Fire District innumerable times that the messages would be reviewed before release he has held them hostage, refusing to turn them over unless either the requestor or the district pays him an arbitrary $300 per hour for 80 hours to review his exponentially inflated estimate of 45,000 text messages, more than four times the cost of the original estimated special service charge assessed by the District.  A special service charge is permitted under the law for unduly burdensome requests, but it is calculated based on the salary of the lowest paid employee of an agency qualified to perform the search to recuperate the cost of compliance by a public agency, not to compensate a former elected official to produce public documents in his possession.  [...] has dragged the District into his personal vendetta against the requestor which has already resulted in tens of thousands of taxpayer dollars spent on attorney’s fees that would have been completely avoided had he just produced the documents.  Yet [...] seeks the further expenditure of taxpayer dollars to fund his crusade against the [...].  He became a defendant in a proceeding through his own sheer unreasonableness, all over 73 pages of documents.  [...] is not entitled to indemnification to fund his personal agenda.  The remaining claims against the [...] regarding due process and the validity of the underlying request do not belong in this appeal as the [...] is not a party and the underlying court declined to address them.  These issues belong in the related appeal to be addressed by the [...].
[brief] “There is also no need for more elaborate findings than were made in order to facilitate judicial review, because review of a quasi-legislative exercise, especially, requires no more than an ability to understand what action the agency took and why it did so. ”  Infinity, 377 N.J. Super. at 229 (citing In re Applic. of Howard Sav. Inst. of Newark, 32 N.J. 29, 53 (1960)).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO R. 4:6-2(e) WITH PREJUDICE (Pa92) AND DENYING PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT’S CROSS MOTION TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT (Pa98)  BECAUSE: A) Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion to Amend its Complaint (Pa57) to Include a Claim for Breach of Contract Should Have Been Granted (Pa97; Pa99); B) Plaintiff Stated a Claim for Reinstatement of the 2012 Mortgage (Pa96); C) Plaintiff Stated a Claim for Equitable Estoppel and Unjust Enrichment (T11.20-23); D) Plaintiff Stated a Claim for Cross Collateralization.(Pa97)  The standard to be applied by the Court in considering a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim under R.4:6-2(e) is set forth in Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics, 116 N.J. 739 (1989).