ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] \(^4\) L. 1996, c. 157 (codified at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1 to -49). ”  Lemelledo, 150 N.J. at 262 n.1.  When the NJCLA was combined with the New Jersey Residential Mortgage Lending Act --- \(^4\) The New Jersey Residential Mortgage Lending Act (“NJRMLA”), N.J.S.A. 17:11C-51 to -89.  (“NJRMLA”), N.J.S.A. 17:11C-51 to -89, under the umbrella of the Licensed Lenders Act (“NJLLA”), the consumer-lending based provisions formerly known as the NJCLA became the “Consumer Finance Licensing Act. ”  Like the NJCLA before it (and the NJCFLA now), the NJLLA (now comprised of both consumer loan provisions and mortgage related provisions) enumerated the Commissioner’s enforcement mechanisms at subsection 18 and stated in subsection 33(b) that “[a] consumer lender who violates or participates in the violation of any provision of sections 3 . . . shall be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.  A contract of loan not invalid for any other reason, in the making or collection of which any act shall have been done which constitutes a crime of the fourth degree under this section, shall be void and the lender shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest or charges .  . . .”  New Jersey Licensed Lenders Act, 1997 N.J. A.N. 2513.  Moreover, “[t]he [NJ]CLA, as incorporated in the Licensed Lenders Act, allow[ed] for treble damages by aggrieved consumers, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33b, and summary revocation of a lender's license, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-48a.”  Lemelledo, 150 N.J. at 272.  In 2010, the NJLLA, N.J.S.A. 17:C-1 to -49, was divided, separating the NJRMLA, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-51 to -89, from the NJCFLA—the NJRMLA and NJCFLA were now their own respective standalone statutes.
[brief] Cases  Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S. Ct. 333, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1988).  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963)  Dolson v. Anastasia, 55, N.J. 2:258 A2d 706, (1969)  Franklin Discount Co. v. Ford, supra (27 N.J., at 490)  Kulbacki v. Sobchinsky, 38 N.J. 435, 444-45, 185 A.2d 835 (1962)  State v. Franklin, 184 N. J. 516, 528, 878 A.2d 757 (2005)  State v. Johnson, 203 N.J. super. 127 (App. Div.), certif. den. 102 N.J. 312 (1985)  State v. Kluber, 130 N.J. Super. 336, 342, 327 A.2d 232 (1974), certif. denied, 67 N.J. 72, 335 A.2d 25 (1975)
[brief] There has never been any cooperation by plaintiff to remove the wrongful 2009 default/foreclosure assignment that was harming the [...] by precluding any refinancing.  There was no cooperation to provide a loan modification to stop the damages caused by the high interest rate of the 2004 loan.  There was no cooperation to assist with judicial discharge, which would have resolved refinance.  There was no disclosure of foreclosure related fees that, the records show, were wrongfully attached to the [...]’ account.  In Clark v. Nenna, 465 N.J. Super. 505 (App. Div. 2020), the court noted that only emotional distress that is severe or genuine and substantial is actionable.
[brief] *Riggs v. Long Beach*, *supra*, 109 N. J. at 611-612 (citations omitted).  Further, a determination predicated on unsupported findings is the essence of arbitrary and capricious action.  *In re Boardwalk Regency Casino Licensing Application*, 180 N.J. Super. 324, 334 (App.Div.1981), modified on other grounds, 90 N.J. 361 (1982).
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Court abused its discretion by discharging the Receiver and denying the motion to intervene despite his violations by the Receiver of New Jersey Statutes and Rules of Court which were enacted as safeguards to protect interested parties such as the [...] and [...], thereby requiring reversal of the Orders and remand to the Trial Court.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  By: /s/ [...]  ALAN A. REUTER, ESQUIRE  Dated: April 29, 2024  BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
[brief] Moreover, “a sentencing court must consider not only the factors in [State v.] Yarbough[, 100 N.J. 627 (1985),] but also those in Miller when it decides whether to impose consecutive sentences on a juvenile which may result in a lengthy period of parole ineligibility. ”  Id. [...] further stated that in light of the “overriding importance” of Miller, “we direct trial judges to exercise a heightened level of care before imposing multiple consecutive sentences on juveniles. ”  Id.
[brief] In Hockett, the court considered whether the trial court improperly excluded photographs that showed a key witness for the State using narcotics the day before being called as a witness at the trial.  Hockett, 443 N.J. Super. at 610-13.  The court found that the trial judge should not have based the decision to exclude the photographs on the credibility of the witness who was authenticating the photographs.  *Id.* at 614-15.  For the defense’s purpose, to discredit the State’s witness, all that was necessary was that the photographs supported the contention that the witness was not truthful when she claimed she had not used narcotics since March 23, 2007.  *Id.* at 614.  The photographs stood for exactly what the jury would be able to see in them.  This case is different, because what the defense purported to show with their photographs was much less direct than what was considered in either *Marroccelli* or *Hockett*.
[brief] POINT I........................................................................................................................................1  THE TRIAL COURT MADE NUMEROUS ERRORS OF FACT ACTING AS A REBUTTAL EXPERT TO [...] AND CONTESTING THE FACTS ESTABLISHED BY [...] (1282a-1296a)..........................1  POINT II .......................................................................................................................................8  THE TRIAL COURT  ERRONEOUSLY BARRED [...]’S EXPERT REPORT BY IMPERMISSIBLY CREATING ITS OWN STANDARD AND FAILING TO CORRECTLY APPLY THE STANDARD SET FORTH BY THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY (1282a-1296a)  ...........................................8  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] This record is arbitrarily unclear as to why and how the [...] determined the verification of the floodway lines on the project site was unnecessary.  The [...]’s decision not to verify any of the floodways on site is especially confusing because on November 30, 2022, the day before it issued this FHA permit, the [...] emailed the applicant’s engineer and said:  Unfortunately I just noticed that you have a floodway line on your Riparian Zone plans.  Since we are not verifying any floodways, this line cannot be on there to be approvable.  Is it possible for you to remove the floodway line from the applicable plans?  [Aa050.  Emphasis added.]  Thus, it is difficult to understand whether the [...] asserted that it was unable to approve the applicant’s floodway line because it was incorrect or for some other reason.  Even more confusing is the fact that the instant permit decision authorized plans which were last revised on November 29, 2022.  Aa009-10.  Therefore, the [...]’s request on November 30, 2022 to remove the applicant’s floodway lines from the plans, and associated assertion that the floodway lines were not “approvable” doesn’t seem to have been incorporated into the [...]’s December 1, 2022 permit decision.  By the express terms of this permit decision, the [...] approved the plans last revised on November 29, 2022.
[brief] The “trial court’s duty is to give life to that constitutional principle by impaneling a jury that ‘is as nearly impartial as the lot of humanity will admit. ’”  *Loftin*, 191 N.J. at 187, quoting *State v. Jackson*, 43 N.J. 148, 157-58 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 982 (1965).  This “high responsibility is placed on trial judges because the jury selection process is an integral part of the fair trial procedures to which every defendant charged with criminal wrongdoing is guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions.
[brief] Such contract, as other contracts, was entitled to the protection provided by the Federal Constitution and the State Constitution.  Both prohibit the adoption of any law impairing the obligation of contract.  Daniel v. Borough of Oakland, 124 N.J. Super. 69, 304 A.2d 757 (App. Div. 1973).  Likewise, State v. [...], 164 N.J. Super. 530 (App. Div. 1979)(citations omitted), discussing water services delivering contaminated water explains:
[brief] Under this standard, “[a]n administrative agency’s final quasi-judicial decision will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record. ”  *Saccone v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys.*, 219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014).  If an agency decision “could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record, considering the proofs as a whole,” courts must respect the agency’s conclusions.  *Jackson v. Concord Co.*, 54 N.J. 113, 117 (1969).  Appellate review of administrative action is generally limited to whether the agency’s action agency followed the law, whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the agency’s action, and whether the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[brief] Under the LRHL, notice requirements for ordinances adopting a redevelopment plan are as follows:  “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of the ‘Municipal Land Use Law,’ P.L.1975, c. 291 (C.40:55D-1 et seq.) or of any other law, no notice beyond that required for adoption of ordinances by the municipality shall be required for the hearing on or the adoption of the redevelopment plan or subsequent amendments thereof. ”  *N.J.S.A.* 40A:12A-7(c) (Emphasis added).  Based on the plain language of *N.J.S.A.* 40A:12A-7(c), notice for adopting a redevelopment plan is governed solely by the notice requirements for general ordinances.  N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 sets forth the notice requirements for general ordinances.  Under N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(a), the notice is required to contain “a clear and concise statement prepared by the clerk of the governing body setting forth the purpose of the ordinance…” (Emphasis added).  Zoning ordinances have a different requirement.  N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1 sets forth the standard for ordinances adopted pursuant to the MLUL.  The notice for zoning ordinances must contain a “summary of the main objectives or provisions of the ordinances…” (Emphasis added).  N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1.  Understanding the difference between the terms “statement” of “purpose” and “summary” is critical to understanding the statutory notice obligations.
[brief] The State Elicited Irrelevant and Prejudicial Testimony About [...]’s Life While Homeless and Made Denigrating Comments About His Homelessness and Poverty.  In addition to the above issues, the State engaged in further impropriety by eliciting irrelevant and prejudicial testimony about [...]’s life while homeless and by using that testimony to make denigrating comments about his homelessness and poverty.  As with making improper arguments about a defendant’s drug addiction, the State is generally not permitted to argue someone is more likely to have committed a crime simply because he is poor.  See State v. Mathis, 47 N.J. 455, 471 (1966) (“the practical result of such a doctrine would be to put a poor person under so much unfair suspicion and at such a relative disadvantage that for reasons of fairness this argument has seldom been countenanced as evidence of the graver crimes . . . .”); State v. Sherman, 230 N.J. Super. 10, 19 (App. Div. 1988) (reversing defendant’s convictions where prosecutor used summation “to suggest that defendant committed the crimes with which he was charged because he was without funds”); State v. Stewart, 162 N.J. Super. 96, 100 (App. Div. 1978) (“it is generally improper to use a defendant's poverty to establish a criminal motive”); State v. Copeland, 94 N.J. Super. 196, 202 (App. Div. 1967) (“[W]here evidence of impecuniosity of a defendant may tend to prove motive or willingness to commit a crime . . . it should not be admitted and, as naturally follows, it should not be commented upon.
[brief] The Petitioner repeats earlier discredited arguments that the Decedent intended to create a trust as a means of providing for the Respondent in her Will.  Here, the Petitioner falsifies the record, claiming that the Decedent asked [...] to serve as a trustee of a non-existent trust.  This request never occurred, as made clear in the following colloquy during Whelan’s testimony about the Decedent’s previous Will:  Q.  And you were named as a -- a – A. Trustee.  Q. -- trustee at the time.  And why did she have a trustee?  A.  So -- to help [...] with the will or to -- to be - - to stand up for whatever the will said.  So Sand -- what -- what does the trustee do?  Q.  Takes care of a trust.  A.  Oh, well, I thought it was to -- to help – help [...] enforce the -- the will.  I don't know.  *I don't know of any trust.*  (4T121-25 to 122-10; emphasis added).  7.
[brief] [...] also testified that he had taught, for five or six years, the Introduction to Forensic Anthropology course at Rutgers and other schools.  (41T130-8 to 16).  He further testified that he held a diplomat of the American Board of Medicolegal Death Investigators.  (41T:131-21).  The legislature of the State of New Jersey has seen fit to create an Office of the State Medical Examiner, to task it with responsibility for investigating and determining the cause of death of those that perish in the state, and have defined “proper forensic practice” in N.J. Admin. Code §8:70-1.8.
[brief] The validity of and/or factual support for the Committee’s “reasons” has never been questioned or challenged by Appellant, either at the December 8, 2022 meeting at which the Committee voted to adopt Ordinance 2022-17, in the Trial Court proceedings, or in Appellant’s Brief in support of this appeal.  Similarly, Appellant has presented no evidence or argument that enactment of the Redevelopment Plan was not in the public interest.  In sum, Appellant has inaccurately characterized the legislative record as being non-existent and the governing body’s “reasons” as “a monolog by the Township attorney.
[directive] Every supervisor must establish a familiarity with the agency's disciplinary process and develop an understanding of how to implement specific disciplinary procedures when called upon to deal with inappropriate behavior or misconduct.  If a supervisor fails to follow these procedures or avoids their responsibility, that supervisor is not conforming to expected behavior and must receive some sort of corrective action.  Some supervisors occasionally need to be reminded that the fundamental responsibility for direction and control rests with the immediate supervisor at the operational level, not with the law enforcement executive.
[brief] \(^5\) (14T 58-13 to 59-16; 14T 63-12 to 16)  [...] agreed that defendant never asserted to him that he was “on the job” or whether he was active duty or --- \(^4\)  At the risk of stating the obvious, defendant was “law enforcement” at the time, just not on active duty; he was still a trooper, albeit a suspended one.  \(^5\)  See footnote 4, supra. suspended.  (14T 63-20 to 25)  The encounter was very brief and [...] told defendant, “Have a good one,” and ended the stop without issuing a ticket.  (14T 63-9 to 11)
[brief] ”  *State v. Miller*, 237 N.J. 15, 28 (2019) (citation and internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).  When sentencing a defendant to a term of imprisonment, the court’s determination of the length of the sentence within the permissible range is guided by its findings of aggravating and mitigating factors, which must be supported by credible evidence in the record.  *State v. Tillery*, 238 N.J. 293, 324 (2019).  The sentencing court must articulate the reasons for its findings of aggravating and mitigating factors in order to facilitate appellate review.  *State v. Case*, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014); see also R. 3:21-4(h).
[brief] While [...] has made significant progress towards meeting its fair share obligation and has acted in good faith in negotiating a settlement agreement, the [...] and [...], do not have court-approved fair share plans and did not participate in the methodology trial before [...].  Even if Hopewell and [...] Boroughs did have approved fair share plans, it is well understood that there may be impacts from neighboring municipalities’ fair share plans.  The NJ Supreme Court has held that all municipalities must “not impede the general welfare represented by satisfaction of the housing needs of lower income people throughout the region. ”  *Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Madison*, 72 N.J. 481, 495 (1977).  For example, neighboring municipalities have an affirmative obligation to extend sewer to help with neighboring towns’ affordable housing needs.  While a municipality or regional sewerage authority generally has the discretion to grant or deny service to residents of another municipality, they still may be required to provide sewer service when doing so will enable the neighboring municipality to implement its fair share plan.  See, e.g., *Bi-County Dev. Of Clinton v. Borough of High Bridge*, 174 N.J. 301, 316, 326-328 (2001).
[brief] Count Two was ran concurrent to Count One.  Id.  On Count Three, Appellant was sentenced to the custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections for a term of fifty (50) years pursuant to the conditions of the No Early Release Act and the Graves Act.  Id.  Count Three ran consecutive to Counts One and Two.  Id.  On Count Four, Appellant was sentenced to the custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections for a term of fifty (50) years pursuant to the conditions of the No Early Release Act and the Graves Act.  Id.  Count Four ran consecutive to Counts Three (3) and One (1), and concurrent to Count (2).  Count Five of the Indictment Merged into Counts One, Two, Three and Four for the purpose of sentencing.  Id.  On July 14, 2022, the Court issued an amended Judgment of Conviction (“JOC”) and instead of committing Appellant to the “Commissioner of the Department of Corrections,” Appellant was sentenced to the “Custody of the Executive Director of the Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC). ” (Da20).  The remainder of the JOC stayed the same.  (Da20-23).  On August 5, 2022, Appellant filed Notice of Appeal.  (Da24-28).  The following is submitted in support of his appeal.
[brief] [12T171-12 to -22].  [...] further explained that in an urban area, such as Trenton, New Jersey, it is likely that a phone is going to hit off of a close tower and not one that is several miles away.  [12T171-25 to -5].  [...] also testified that he knew based on his training and experience that Willingboro, New Jersey, has several towers throughout the different park areas, so a call placed in Willingboro would very likely not hit off a tower that is several miles away.  [12T172-7 to -17].  Using S-85, [...] depicted the information for the call placed at 11:04:14 p.m. on September 17, 2019.
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADOPTING THE DATE OF THE 2010 LIABILITY TRIAL DECISION AS THE END DATE FOR THE ALLOCATION PERIOD (Pa0211)**  Even if time-on-the-risk were deemed to be the proper method to allocate [...]’s damages, the trial court erred in its application by adopting the arbitrary date of the decision in the 2010 Liability Trial, January 31, 2011, as the end date for the allocation period.
[brief] We recognize that N.J.S.A. 2A:15-67 et seq. is an older statute and that it may rarely be invoked.  However, it remains the law of our state and our courts must abide by it, even where it is perceived as delaying the disposition of a case.  See e.g. Matter of New Jersey Firemen's Ass'n Obligation to Provide Relief Applications Under Open Pub. Records Act, 230 N.J. 258, 274 (2017) (“If the Legislature's intent is clear on the face of the statute, then we must apply the law as written”); Klier v. Sordoni Skanska Const. Co., 337 N.J. Super. 76, 83 (App. Div. 2001) (“Our ultimate goal is not, and should not be, swift disposition of cases at the expense of fairness and justice.
[directive] If so, where is this recorded?  Open-Ended 18 | P a g e Appendix A 16.  Who in your agency decides whether a SAFE Kit is sent to the lab for testing?  Please specify title/rank of authorizing party.  Open-Ended 17.  Once a SAFE Kit is tested, is it returned to your agency?  N/A Yes No  If returned, where are they stored?  18.  Does your agency maintain written policies or procedures for handling SAFE Kits?  N/A Yes No 19.  Does your agency maintain written policies or procedures for logging SAFE Kits?  N/A Yes No 20.  Does your agency have written policies or procedures that list speciﬁc criteria for submitting SAFE Kits to an approved forensic laboratory for testing?  N/A Yes No 21.  Does your agency have policies or procedures that specify timelines within which your agency should send SAFE Kits to an approved forensic laboratory for testing?  N/A Yes No 22.  Does your agency maintain written policies or procedures for tracking SAFE Kits?
[brief] Likewise, a reviewing court is “not bound by an unreasonable or mistaken interpretation of [a statutory] scheme, particularly one that is contrary to legislative objectives. ”  McClain v. Bd. of Rev., 237 N.J. 445, 456 (2019).  Even more significantly, a reviewing court must have a reasoned and explained analysis to review.  See Matter of Thomas Orban/Square Properties, LLC, 461 N.J. Super. 57, 73 (App. Div. 2019) (the court “has no capacity to review at all unless there is some kind of reasonable factual record developed by the administrative agency and the agency has stated its reasons grounded in that record for its action.
[brief] 25 Del.Valley Wholesale Florist. V. Addalia, 349 N.J. Super. 228, 232 (App. Div. 2002)  11 DiGenova v. United Here Local 274, No. 16-1222, 2016 WL 3144267, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 2016)  24  Driscoll v. Burlington Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 493, 86 A2d 201 (1952), cert, den., 44 U.S. 838, 73 S.Ct. 25, 97 L.Ed. 652 (1952)
[brief] Instead, and as first advised in Alston, 204 N.J. at 628, the detectives relied on "the more prudent course" and "re-read[]" the portion of the Miranda warnings about the appoint of counsel."  The detectives' first "answer" to defendant's "question" was to remind him that he had "the right to have an attorney, any attorney that you want, present with you, at the time ... that we're asking you questions," whether that attorney be from Virginia or New Jersey.  Pa6; (1T:42-11 to 42-19).  This colloquy ended with the detectives again reminding defendant of his right to counsel, "Okay, so going back to that right [...] ... you have the right to consult with an attorney at any time and have him present before and during questioning."  Pa8; (1T:45-11 to 45-14).  Defendant indicated he understood this advice and his right to counsel and to court-appointed counsel, see Pa8-9; (1T:45-15 to 46-23).  The record here leaves no room for a finding of an ignorance of his rights, like in Gonzalez, 249 N.J. at 631-32.