ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Applying these principles to the DEP’s February 23, 2017 FHA Determination, we hold that the determination became final for purposes of a judicial appeal when the DEP denied [...]’s request for an adjudicatory hearing.  When the DEP received the request for a hearing, it had to determine if [...] had a statutory right or a particularized property interest entitling it to a hearing.  Until the NJDEP made that determination, [...]’s administrative remedies were not exhausted because it might be accorded a hearing.  Id. at 479.  The FHA regulatory scheme with regard to adjudicatory hearings is analogous to the CZM Rules, which govern the issuance of the Waterfront Development Permit (“WFD”) and modification at issue in this matter.
[brief] Plaintiff [...] was the victim of medical malpractice.  In order to prove his claim, he is willing to submit to a psychological examination with the expert of Defendants’ choosing.  His only request is for a recording to preserve evidence.  [...] will be unable to remember everything that happens or is said during the examination.  Further, he cannot communicate in his native tongue with the examiner.  The recording is created with an unobstrusive machine that will provide both sides with objective evidence of what took place during the examination.  There is no justification to prevent the recording.  A neuropsychologist should not offer his personal opinions to block evidence that would essentially make irrefutable that expert’s opinions and the facts on which he relies.  The trial court needed to weigh these factors in deciding whether to permit the recording; it failed to do so.  This Court should find that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a protective order without considering the effect of [...]’s language barrier, cognitive and memory deficits, and psychological impairments upon his ability to preserve evidence of the DME.  [...] should not be permitted to dictate the terms of the exam when he is not following his own citation of neuropsychological policies that state even an interpreter constitutes a third-party observer.  To remediate the power imbalance between [...] and the cognitively impaired, anxious, and non-English speaking [...], this Court should permit recording of the examination.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] (Pa984).  Additionally, the underlying case is not the first time that a court has held that allegations related to the proper use and ownership of engineering plans requires an affidavit of merit in order for a plaintiff to sustain its claim against a professional engineer.  See the unpublished opinion in [...] v. [...], et al., No. [...] (Superior Ct. of N.J. April 10, 2015) (held that in the field of professional engineering, the proper use of, and determination of ownership of engineering plans and designs is a complex issue that requires expert opinion and determination, pursuant to the factual circumstances of the individual case).  (Da7).
[brief] On the issue of [...]’s actions regarding the second doctor’s note, [...]’s counsel explained that the Arbitrator did not make any finding regarding the second note’s veracity, and that, regardless of the note’s veracity, [...] had no duty under the CBA to reconsider its decision to terminate [...], a decision it made before [...] produced the second note.  Counsel explained:  There were -- and -- and the arbitrator does not say anywhere, does not make any credibility determinations which would have been his -- his area to do.  Instead, he makes an ambiguous statement that subsequent medical information shows she was cleared -- cleared to work.  He doesn’t say that it was -- that he accepts the [second] note.  But, it was clear that she just made the note up.
[brief] (DA217-222).  The accompanying Statement of Reasons explained that Plaintiffs could not meet the four-prong test established in Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126, 132-33 (1982) – particularly, the first prong, irreparable harm.  (DA220-222).  The Statement of Reasons concluded:  “Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief – to either dismiss or stay the arbitration – is denied in its entirety and this Order to Show Cause is hereby dissolved.  The parties are to proceed with the AAA Arbitration as provided for in the SPA. ”  (DA222).  Plaintiffs submitted a Motion for Reconsideration on September 28, 2023, requesting the trial court reconsider the decision to deny the OTSC and stay the arbitration.
[directive] It must be expected that defense counsel will not always agree with or stipulate to all relevant facts and circumstances, and there may be contested facts or circumstances that were used by a prosecutor pursuant to these Guidelines in determining an appropriate plea offer.  For example, a defendant may deny Page 13 [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) possessing firearms, resorting to the use of violence, or participating in organized crime or street gang related activity.  While good faith negotiation is certainly permissible, the appropriate response in the event of such a dispute is not to exclude relevant factors from the prosecutor’s determination of an appropriate plea offer.  Recall that pursuant to § 3.1, a prosecutor is required to consider the defendant’s actual conduct, whether the defendant acknowledges such conduct or not, and is also required to disclose fully to the court all facts and circumstances that are deemed relevant under these Guidelines.
[brief] The fourth Miller factor  Defendant claims that the judge should have attributed substantial weight to factor four because he was diagnosed with “specific neurological and developmental deficits that would have made his experience of the criminal legal system even more difficult to navigate. ” (Db35).  He further claims that “there was no evidentiary basis to establish that [his] pleading guilty was, in fact, the best legal decision for him to make.  The resentencing court had not reviewed the discovery and had not spoken to any of the potential witnesses in the case. ” (Db36).  Additionally, “[t]he negotiated plea provided no guarantee that his sentences would be run concurrently, and [he] ultimately ended up receiving the exact same sentence that [...] did after being convicted at trial. ” (Db36).  The fourth Miller factor asks whether the defendant “might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys.
[brief] 344a.  It was not recorded until April 6, 2022 which is after the Order to Show had already been filed.  Id.  [...] admitted that he exchanged emails with Defendant [...] on February 14, 2022 at 2:40 pm (after the Entry of default judgment) and offered to buy the property from [...] for as much as $650,000.  T4, p.56:9-11.  He also admits that he never mentioned the tax foreclosure to [...] during these negotiations.
[brief] There is no reason this case \textsuperscript{25}  Plaintiff later dismissed these cross-claims.  (2T45:10-13).  should proceed in New Jersey.  New Jersey has no relevant connection to the dispute or the parties, and no interest in adjudicating a complex, defensive declaratory judgment action about a Missouri defense and indemnity contract, that was filed by plaintiff—a Delaware company based in Wisconsin—to usurp defendants’ choice of forum and avoid unfavorable Missouri law.
[brief] Based on the foregoing, the trial court’s orders dismissing [...]’s complaint should be reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court.  [...], ESQS.  Attorneys for Amici Curiae [...] and [...]  By: ____________________________  [...], Esq.  Dated: 11  The fact that the Commissioner has not yet intervened in this matter, which was filed only recently, should not deprive the Commissioner of its ability to do so on a going-forward basis in this or other similar matters.  BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE [...]
[brief] Order granting motion to permit paying audio portion of police dash cam video, dated September 26, 2023 .................................................................  Da41  Order granting motion to bar evidence of Defendant [...]’s criminal convictions, dated September 26, 2023 ........................................ Da42 Order denying motion for reconsideration of Court’s September 26, 2023, Order barring evidence of Defendant [...]’s criminal convictions, dated October 3, 2023 .........................................................  Da45 Ruling excluding [...]’s diagram of the accident from evidence, dated October 4, 2023 .................................................. 2T:99-22 to 105-23 Final Judgment, dated October 10, 2023 ......................................................... Da185 Order denying Defendants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, and remittitur, dated November 3, 2023 ........................................ Da187 TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX Volume I - (Da1 to Da186)
[brief] See Medina, 147 N.J. at 52-56 (rejecting argument that a number of deviations from model jury charge on reasonable doubt “improperly diminished the State’s burden of proof;” Court pointed to jury’s acquittal on two of five counts as confirmation of its conclusion); *State v. Brooks*, 309 N.J. Super. 43, 62-64 (App. Div.) (holding that while substitution of “you must determine” for “the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt” was “unfortunate,” “jury fully understood the obligation placed on the State by the law”), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 386 (1998); *State v. Hudson*, 286 N.J. Super. 149, 152-54 (App. Div. 1995) (no plain error in judge’s “augmentation of the model charge” on reasonable doubt).  This precise issue was decided in *State v. D’Amato*, 218 N.J. Super. 595 (App. Div. 1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 170 (1988).
[brief] Officers also executed a search warrant at [...] that night and immediately noted that the apartment was a studio apartment that did not have a bed or refrigerator, and there were no clothes in the closets.  (12T106-8 to 107-6).  A search of the apartment revealed a .45 caliber automatic firearm loaded with four rounds, a 7.62x39 Saiga AK-47 rifle with two magazines containing thirty-three rounds, a Ruger gun case, a loaded Smith and Wesson .40 caliber handgun, 45 count .9 mm Lugar pistol cartridges, respirator masks, morphine pills, 16 bricks of heroin, four black garbage bags containing suspected packaging materials, four gloves, suspected heroin, suspected CDS residue, a scale, Pyrex measuring cups, a digital scale, two boxes of zip-lock sandwich bags, baking soda, box cutters and knives, two boxes of gloves, one kilo of suspected cocaine contained in two plastic bags, multiple bags containing rock-like formations of suspected cocaine, an apartment lease in the name of [...], and motor vehicle paperwork for a 1995 Nissan Quest.
[brief] ”  Crowe, supra, at 133.  The court in Citizens Coach Co. held that “[a]n injunction will not issue where the right of the complainant, which it is designed to protect, depends upon a disputed question of law, about which there may be a doubt, which has not been settled by the courts of law of this state” (citing Stevens v. Paterson & N.R. Co., 20 N.J. Eq. 126 (1869)).
[brief] Further, it is clear that *Guidi* requires a finding that East Windsor Ordinance 18-3.1 § 2.l(a) is unconstitutional as well.  Sections 2.l(a) and 2.l(b) are of the same ilk.  They both contain identical, vague language referring to "any matter, thing, condition or act."  While § 2.l(b) pertains to things that are or may become "an annoyance, or interfere with the comfort or general well-being" of the community, § 2.l(a) pertains to things that are or may become "detrimental or a menace to the health" of the community.  There is no discernable difference between these two provisions.  Both set forth unascertainable standards that encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  Thus, both are unconstitutionally vague...  For the same reason, the language in the Ordinance 201 subsection 2A charged sub judice is unconstitutionally vague.
[brief] (Pa2372-73 (emphasis added). )  Despite this clear guidance, Defendants never determined the nature and extent of on- or off-site contamination, and the RIR indicated that additional delineation and sampling was still needed at the Property.  (4T75:2 to 80:21, 92:16 to 93:12, 94:10 to 95:3, 99:9-14; 6T105:8 to 109:4, 110:9-13; 8T94:13 to 95:13; Pa0405-08, §§ 3.7.2, 3.8, 4.1.)
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[brief] Kane Props., LLC, 325 N.J. at 229.  Further, the instructions for the application provided to applicants, stated that “[a]pplications must be completed and include all required documents,” that all legal documents which are part of the application must “be properly signed and executed,” and that “[i]ncomplete [a]pplications will be rejected and returned to the [a]pplicant. ” (48a).  Nevertheless, [...] failed to “sign and execute” the required certification as to the accuracy of the information contained in its application, but the Borough considered it anyway, again in stark contravention of its own review criteria.  (290a-416a).  The trial court concluded “there is no obligation under any statute or administrative code provision requiring an applicant to a local governing body to submit a signed application for a resolution of support. ” (8a).  But that is not the correct lens through which to view this case.  The Borough set that standard and failed to follow its own rules, and the trial court missed that crucial distinction.
[brief] ”  State v. Dabas, 215 N.J. 114, 140 (2013) (citing Clawans, 38 N.J. at 170-75).  Within this context of the presumption of innocence, the trial court erred in failing to grant an adverse inference because the State did not call its experienced officer with proper training to standardized field sobriety tests who could have testified to the scoring factors.  (2T12:16-13:11.)  Here, because the scoring factors were not evaluated, the harm was compounded because [...] had no basis for concluding that [...] failed the standardized field sobriety tests given Pittius did not use the scoring factors, and [...] was not called, who could have testified as to the scoring factors.
[brief] The undisputed facts show that Defendants breached the agreements with Plaintiff, after Plaintiff timely paid and after Defendant waived the order requirements through course of performance.  In or around April 2021, Defendant refused to honor the agreements with Plaintiff, citing to Plaintiff’s failure to place orders of 20,000 pounds and Plaintiff’s failure to remit payment on time.  Pa225; Pa432.  However, [...] testified that he was “uncomfortable” that Plaintiff did not place any orders between January 2021 and April 2021.  Pa225; Pa286.  [...] testified that after not hearing from Plaintiff for three months, he didn’t “want to work with [Plaintiff] anymore. ”  Pa226; Pa286.  Further, [...] testified that had Plaintiff been buying from Defendant on a regular basis, Defendant “probably” would have fulfilled Plaintiff’s orders.  Pa226; Pa287.  During his deposition, [...] admitted that part of Defendant’s decision to terminate the contract with Plaintiff was due to the fact that Plaintiff had not ordered a “large” amount of product from Defendant; despite the fact that Plaintiff had up to one (1) year to purchase Defendant’s product.  Pa226; Pa287.  Of course, the proverbial smoking gun sinking Defendant in this matter is an internal email from [...] confirming that Defendant terminated the agreements due to an increase in price of pipe.  Pa226; Pa442.  But since Defendant had already purchased all of the pipe required to be sold to Plaintiff under the First Contract (Pa226; Pa430), it is clear that Defendant intended to sell the pipe earmarked for Plaintiff at a higher price, since construction prices began to significantly increase from 2020 to 2021.  Accordingly, Defendant breached the First Contract.  For the reasons asserted herein, Plaintiff can, and has, established that Defendant breached the terms of the First Contract, such that the Lower Court erred in denying partial Summary Judgment in favor of Plaintiff on the issue of contract liability.
[brief] (“[...]”) and Defendant-Appellant [...] (“Defendant” or “[...]”) alleging breach of contract on a commercial loan (Da8-13).  The Process Server completed Affidavits of Service identifying personal service upon [...], individually, and [...], as the Corporate Officer on behalf of [...], on February 14, 2015 at 2:35 P.M. at [...] and [...], respectively (Da6-7).  The Affidavits of Service identify [...] as a white sixty-five (65) year old male with gray hair, 5’7” height, and weighing 185 pounds (Da6-7).  On March 23, 2015, Plaintiff requested to enter default against [...] and [...] (Da16).  On April 29, 2015, --- 1  As [...] has not filed an appeal, Plaintiff refers to [...] only as Defendant throughout this brief.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:16-51.  It is not required that there be a breach of contract prior to obtaining declaratory judgment as the DJL expressly authorizes the courts to construe contract rights either before or after a breach.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:16-54.  All that need be shown to invoke declaratory judgment jurisdiction is that a justiciable controversy exists between interested and adverse parties upon facts that are neither future, contingent, nor uncertain.  See New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. McDermott, 201 N.J. Super. 251, 254 (Law Div. 1985).  As this Court has noted, “[w]here a concrete, contested issue is presented, and there is a definite assertion of legal rights on the one side and a positive denial thereof on the other, there exists a 'justiciable controversy,' justifying maintenance of an action for declaratory judgment. ”  Bress v. L. F. Dommerich & Co., 94 N.J. Super. 282, 284 (App. Div. 1967) (quoting *Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts*, 25 N.J. Super. 568, 577 (App. Div. 1953), aff’d 15 N.J. 203 (1954)).  Respondent’s Second Amended Complaint states a claim for declaratory judgment.  Respondent alleged the requisite deeds that provide an express right to use the roadway through the [...] (via the 1955 [...]-to-[...] Deed and 1966 [...]-to-[...] Deed) (Da199–Da205).  Respondent also alleged how Appellant objected to its and its contractor’s use of the roadway and Appellant’s claim that its access rights had been judicially terminated (Da206 at ¶¶54–55).  Respondent wrote to Appellants several times prior to commencing suit to refute their position and to bring to their attention the recorded deeds recorded against the [...] that were never presented to the Court (Da158 and Da345).  When Appellants continued to refute Respondent’s position and insisted that the roadway was somehow extinguished, there arose a sufficient case in controversy to obtain declaratory judgment, justifying [...]’s order.  For the reasons stated herein, the court should affirm the decision reached by the trial court below in all respects.
[directive] This includes striking with batons or asps, less lethal ammunition, and CEDs.  Although a range of force options is generally available, the officer shall only use force that is proportional to the threat faced.  Any strikes to the head or neck with a baton or asp are considered deadly force and can only be used when deadly force is allowed.  (e)  Active Assailant.  In general, when dealing with an active assailant, officers have all force options available, though deadly force shall only be used as a last resort in accordance with Core Principle Five of this Policy.
[brief] (Da la)  Why is it that when an innocent person makes a simple mistake during a field sobriety test, that probably occurred in the middle of the night, on the side of the road, while full of anxiety and worry, while probably tired from a long day, while first time hearing all the instructions, that there is still probable cause to arrest them from a small mistake?  But when that same innocent person reads through the entire DWI field manual, reads dozens of case laws, reads the original surveys that created the SFST, and after all that was able to prove that the officer improperly administered the SFST, even though the officer rehearsed it dozens of times and was just starting his shift and was of clear and fresh mind, why is that not enough reason to throw out the charges against them?  Why does someone have to go throw multiple courts to get something done?  One innocent mistake during the test and you’re getting handcuffed, your car impounded, and you’re fingerprinted and thrown in a cell.  But a proven mistake by the officer and a judge agreeing there is a mistake, is not good enough to be free from all this mess?  Apparently, officers lying and proof they are lying is also not good enough to throw out the charges.
[brief] (9T84:21 to 85:24).  Compounding matters, despite requests, [...] refused to turn over the full set of backup documentation that [...] had been seeking.  However, after several demands, [...] did turn over to [...] certain limited QuickBooks files for [...], [...], and another entity called [...].  Upon reviewing them, [...] and [...] found about $2.1 million in accounting issues.  [...] prepared a schedule based on the limited information provided containing entries that he and [...] could not reconcile.  When confronted, [...] responded that he had incorrectly entered certain information and that [...] would correct it.  In addition, the parties discussed [...] providing an affidavit as to the errors and that [...] would file an amended tax return.  [...] also said that he would speak with [...] about the situation.  (6T72:11 to 73:21; 9T84:21 to 85:5).  One significant issue was that [...] declined to turn over to [...] and [...] full [...] backup data and supporting documents.  By letter dated September 6, 2019, [...] admonished [...] that he and [...] still had not received the full set of backup documentation that they had been requesting to support the [...] tax returns.  At the end of the letter, [...] advised [...] that if [...] was not willing to provide the information that [...] was requesting, [...] would have no choice but to pursue legal action.