ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pa30.  Included with the Petition were other retired Troopers who are requesting registration and amended health benefits in retirement.  Pa30.  All of those Troopers provided affidavits that they also did not receive notice of the Ricci Bill’s passage.  Pa30.  Pa74-110.  Furthermore, other Troopers who are not currently ill, but were only seeking to register for the Ricci Act also filed affidavits that they did not receive notice of the Ricci Act and were included in the Petition.  Pa30.  Pa111-258.  Additionally, other retired Troopers who were not present at the September 11, 2001 attacks and aftermath also submitted affidavits that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act in further support of the Petition.  Pa259-269.  President of the [...], [...], submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the [...] notifying him of the Ricci Act.
[brief] Da144 Exh C (Email of [...] to [...] dated May 2, 2023 with appended Amendment Number 1 to Motor Fuel Supply Agreement dated April 24, 2015 - Redacted As Redundant, see Da037) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da145 Exh D (Emails of [...] to [...] dated May 15, 2023 And May 25, 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da146 Plaintiff’s Brief In Further Support of Order To Show Cause and In Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Vacate Preliminary Restraints dated July 20, 2023 (Redacted pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da148 Certification of [...] dated July 19, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da150 Exh A (Email of [...] ([...]) to [...] dated September 18, 2022 - Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da111 Exh B (Email of [...] to [...] dated October 26, 2022-Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da112 Exh C (Agreement of Sale between Defendants And [...] ([...]) dated October 14, 2022-Redacted as Redundant, see Da049 and First Addendum to Contract of Sale-Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da096 Exh D (Email of [...] to Defendant [...] dated November 18, 2022-Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da097 Exh E (Email of [...] to [...] dated February 8, 2023-Redacted as Redundant, see Da066 and Email of [...] to [...] dated February 8, 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da159 Exh F (Email of [...] to [...] dated March 27, 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da161 Exh G (Email of [...] to [...] dated April 3, 2023-Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] This is supported by the fact that the Appellant dropped this appeal against [...] in spite of the fact that the trial court opinions were addressed to all defendants, including Mathews.  See Correspondence filed on behalf of Defendant/Respondent [...] dated June 14, 2024, at p. 1.  This action highlights the arbitrary and capricious nature of Appellant’s refusal to accept the repeated and consistent, sound judgment of multiple jurists.  B.
[brief] Pensions for public employees serve a public purpose.  A primary objective in establishing them is to induce able persons to enter and remain in public employment, and to render faithful and efficient service while so employed.  3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. Rev. 1963) § 12.141.  They are in the nature of compensation for services previously rendered and act as an inducement to continued and faithful service.  Being remedial in character, statutes creating pensions should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby.  McQuillin, supra, at § 12.143; and see Adams v. City of Modesto, 53 Cal. 2d 833, 3 Cal. Rptr. 561, 566, 350 P.2d 529 (1960); Giuliano v. Bd. of Trustees of Fireman's Pension F., 89 Ill. App. 2d 126, 231 N.E.2d 257, 258 (1967); Flake v. Bennett, 156 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1968).  Geller v. Department of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, 597-598.  In Geller v. Department of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, the Court evaluated a “preponderance of the equities” and “all of the circumstances” to achieve a “just result. ”  Id. at 600.  This Court is not bound by an agency's determination of a purely legal issue.
[brief] THE PCR COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S PETITION BECAUSE HE DID NOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL UNDER STRICKLAND.  Finally, because defendant’s sentence was not illegal as discussed in Point I, to succeed on PCR he was required to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  The PCR court properly found that defendant did not make a prima facie showing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel within the meaning of Strickland.
[brief] (10T200-22 to 202-13); compare State v. Mesz, 459 N.J. Super. 309, 319 (App. Div. 2019) (absence of limiting instruction addressing expert’s reliance on hearsay in reaching opinion regarding insanity was prejudicial).  The judge gave limiting instructions on the definition of hearsay and the experts’ reliance on hearsay eight additional times during trial: at the end of defendant’s direct examination of [...] (11T28-5 to 30-19); at the end of the State’s cross-examination of [...] (12T87-17 to 89-11); immediately prior to the State’s direct examination of [...] (12T199-1 to 200-10); at the end of the State’s direct examination of [...] (14T120-8 to 122-11); at the end of defendant’s summation (15T103-17 to 104-20); and three times in the final charge (15T205-1 to 9, 223-19 to 224-20; 16T7-1 to  At no time did defendant object to the content or wording of the court’s charge.
[brief] A man “hit[]” on [...]’s car, spoke with [...] in a “frantic” manner, and [...] exited.  (2T39-19 to 45-9).  [...] was already approaching the 99-cent store, with his service gun drawn, when [...] exited his unmarked vehicle.  [...] saw an armed man walk to the front door of the store, and then saw [...] shoot a round.  Three other people were behind defendant.  [...] described defendant “was almost like a silhouette – it was really bright out.  You could see him really well.  ...  There was some slight silhouette because of the dark background of the store, but when he came up to the door you could see him really well. ”  [...], nonetheless, could not identify defendant in-court.  (2T48-5 to 51-12).
[directive] If disclosure of a BWC recording as part of the State’s discovery obligations in a prosecution might present a danger to any officer or civilian (e.g., reveal an undercover officer, confidential informant, surveillance site, etc.), or might reveal confidential tactical information the disclosure of which might jeopardize future operations or officer safety (e.g., verbal codes or hand signals used to communicate information or BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021 21 instructions, techniques for interior movements and clearing rooms during execution of warrant, techniques for convincing persons to open doors during warrant execution, etc.), the County Prosecutor or designee, or Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee in cases prosecuted by the Division, shall, in the exercise of sound prosecutorial discretion, take such steps as are appropriate and authorized by law and/or Court Rule to protect the information from disclosure, such as by seeking a protective order from the court.  See Section 7.3 (“tagging” of such BWC recordings).  9.6  Third-Party Storage and Maintenance.  If a law enforcement agency authorizes a third- party to act as its agent in maintaining recordings from a BWC, the agent shall be prohibited from independently accessing, viewing, or altering any recordings, except to delete recordings as required by law or agency retention policies.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021
[brief] In fact, the trial court applied an incorrect standard of proof and should have required the Plaintiff to prove by clear and convincing evidence that service of process was in fact obtained instead of transferring the burden onto Defendants to prove that they were not served.  The defects in service in this case include:  1.  The Affidavit of Service upon [...], the record owner, was notarized two months prior to the actual date of purported service of process.  The purported date and time of service was August 23, 2021, yet the Affidavit of Service is notarized for June 23, 2021.  14a.  This defect was never cured either prior to the Default Judgment being entered or after.  2.  The notary public who allegedly signed and attested to the Affidavits of Service had no actual contact either in person or telephonic with the process server in violation of notary rules, yet the notarized Affidavits were submitted in support of Final Judgment of Default anyway.  This fatal defect was never explained or cured.  The notary was not called to testify.  3.  The GPS time stamp provided in an email from the owner of the process service company, [...] (who never appeared in court to authenticate or explain the document) corresponds to service of process being made on August 28, 2031 which is obviously impossible.  4.  The process server in question has no memory of this particular service.  5.  The self-serving use of an in-house process service company further undermines the legitimacy of the service.  In this case, the process service company, [...] was not impartial as the company’s office was located in the Plaintiff Tax Foreclosure business’s office and the very same office as Plaintiff’s-in-house counsel who prosecuted this tax foreclosure.  To be clear the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff’s attorney and the Process Server all shared the **same** office, not merely the same building, but the same office.  Pursuant to Rule 4:4-3(a), a process server cannot have an interest in the litigation.  An Affidavit of service filed by an in-house process service company, such as was used in this case, should not be afforded the same presumption of validity and the burden should have shifted to Plaintiff to prove that service was in fact made upon the defendants.
[brief] Finally, Rule 4:50-1 also granted the trial court the discretion:  [O]n motion, with briefs, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party’s representative form a final judgment or order for the following reasons: . . . (b) newly discovered evidence which would probably have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 4:49; (c) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; . . . or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.
[brief] This jury charge is not limited to falls occurring during an active snow storm, nor is it limited only to falls occurring on the sidewalk.  Such an interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the jury charge.  Moreover, the model charge simply codifies the common law duty of a commercial landowner to clear snow and ice from its walkways.  As set forth above, the common law has extended this duty beyond sidewalks to parking lots or other adjoining property (e.g. driveway aprons) owned by the defendant that is foreseeably used by pedestrians when at the defendant’s place of business.  Moreover, the lower court’s failure to charge *Model Civil Jury Charge* 5.20B(2)(b) was reversible error because the charge was not tailored to the facts at hand, was misleading, and did not accurately set forth the controlling principles of law.
[brief] ” (6T 132:5-10).  Defendant’s argument that his prior convictions were not more probative than prejudicial likewise fails.  Defendant’s argument at trial was that he was trying to deescalate the altercation.  Had defendant testified to that version of events, it would have been probative that he had previously been convicted of crimes to help the jury determine his credibility.  Considering the victim’s testimony contradicted defendant’s version of events, and portions of the video show him yelling in the victim’s face while he was backed into a corner, defendant’s credibility would have been at issue.  (Da 16 15:25-15:35; 16:03-16:21; 16:28-16-42).  Here it is important to keep in mind this Court’s standard of review.
[brief] Defendant submits that the admissibility of evidence has no bearing as to whether evidence is material for Brady-Giglio purposes.  Defendant further submits that [...]’ habeas petition: was admissible under N.J.R.E. 803(a)(1) as impeachment evidence; was admissible under N.J.R.E. 608 as evidence of his character for truthfulness; and the statements in the habeas petition can be attributed to [...].  Defendant also submits that the State committed a Jencks violation by not turning over the habeas petition.  (Db25-43).  The State counters that defendant’s arguments are meritless and contrary to well-established facts, or they were not raised below.
[brief] \(^5\)  However, if the parties could not agree on a ground rule regarding \(^5\)  See Pa245 (ordering the Board to “[n]egotiate in good faith with the [Association] over mandatorily negotiable subjects, including over negotiations ground rules respecting the presence of the Association’s Bargaining Council during negotiations sessions”).  open public negotiations, either party, or potentially [...] itself, could have instituted the impasse procedures pursuant to the framework set forth in the Act and accompanying Administrative Code, rather than for [...] to unilaterally enact a ground rule that was never agreed upon by the parties.  N.J.A.C. 19:12-3.1(a) states, in relevant part:  “In the event that a public employer and a certified or recognized employee representative have failed to achieve an agreement through direct negotiation, either the public employer, the employee representative, or the parties jointly, may notify the Director of Conciliation, in writing, of the existence of an impasse and request the appointment of a mediator. ”  The Director of Conciliation then utilizes the mediator’s confidential report to “consider whether or not fact-finding with recommendations for settlement should be invoked. ”  N.J.A.C. 19:12-3.5(b).  “If the impasse is not resolved [through fact-finding], the fact-finder shall make findings of fact and recommend the terms of settlement as soon after the conclusion of the hearing [before the fact-finder] as possible. ”  N.J.A.C. 19:12-4.3(d).  If the parties still cannot reach an agreement to resolve the impasse, “[[...]] or the Director of Conciliation may take whatever steps are deemed expedient to effect a voluntary settlement of the impasse, including the appointment of a super conciliator, where appropriate. ”  N.J.A.C. 19:12-4.3(g).  [...] exceeded its authority by unilaterally declaring a ground rule as a precondition to negotiations, even though it has previously found that ground rules are permissive subjects of negotiations and may not be imposed upon either party without agreement.  Rather, [...] should have either ordered the parties to either negotiate over the ground rule or to declare an impasse.  [...]’s determination respectfully must be reversed on this ground as well.
[brief] .............................34  Alperin v. Mayor and Township Com. of Middletown Township, 91 N.J. Super., 190 (Ch. Div. 1966)........................................................................................................35  Berninger v. Board of Adjustment, 254 N.J. Super. 401 (App. Div. 1991); aff'd. o.b. Berninger v. Board of Adjustment of Borough of Midland Park, 127 N.J. 226 (1992)....................................................................................................................34  Booth v. Bd. of Adjustment of Rockaway Twp., 50 N.J. 302 (1967).......................42  Cell S. of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 172 N.J. 75 (2002)  ....................49  Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394 (1998).......................................................................33  Cherry Hill Towers, L.L.C. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 407 F.Supp.2d 648 (D.N.J. 2006)..................................................................................................................45  Divan Builders v. Wayne Tp. Planning Bd., 66 N.J. 582 (1975).............................48  Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 233 N.J. 546 (2018)  ..............49  East/West Venture v. Borough of Fort Lee, 286 N.J. Super. 311, 328-29 (App. Div. 1996)....................................................................................................................13  Essex County v. Hindenlang, 35 N.J. Super. 479 (App.Div.1955)  .......................37  Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)  .........................................................33  Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536 (2015)  ........................................49  In The Matter of the Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5:97 by the New Jersey Council On Affordable Housing, 221 N.J. 1 (2015)  ..............................................9  Jock v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, Twp. of Wall, 184 N.J. 562 (2005)  ..................42  Klump v. Cybulski 274 Wis. 604, 81 N.W.2d 42, 47 (1957) .................................37  Kramer v. Board of Adjust., Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268 (1965) .................................35 & 50  Lang v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 160 N.J. 41 (1999)  .....................................49  Lustrelon Inc. v. Prutscher 178 N.J. Super. 128, 144 (App.Div.1981)  ...............36  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995)  .......41  Morris Cty. Fair Hous. Council v. Boonton Twp., 197 N.J. Super. 359, 367-69 (Law Div. 1984) aff’d o.b., 209 N.J. Super. 108 (App. Div. 1986)  ....................13  Motorworld, Inc. v. Benkendorf, 228 N.J. 311 (2017)  .......................................33  Mulligan v. Panther Valley Property Owners Ass’n, 337 N.J. Super 293 (App. Div 2001).  ..............................................................................................................48  Orloski v. Planning Board, 226 N.J. Super. 666 (Law Div. 1988)  .....................35  Pascack Assoc’n, Ltd. v. Mayor & Council of the Twp. of Washington, 74 N.J. 470 (1977)
[brief] Plaintiff suggests that pipeline retroactivity may be appropriate in foreclosures (such as Roberto), but in takings suits (such as this case).  There is no authority for the proposition that the same law should be afforded pipeline retroactivity in one circumstance, but full retroactivity in another circumstance.  context, and now offers an interpretation that is clearly at odds with established constitutional principles.  The issue in Harper was whether a prior decision of the Supreme Court applied retroactively.
[brief] The Court is urged to look to the history and legislative statements which serve as valuable interpretive aids in determining the legislative intent.  *State v. McQuaid*, 147 N.J. 464, 480 (1997).  Here, the body of Executive Order MEO-08-2008, the news article quoting [...] and the testimony and affirmation of [...]’s ideology and intent vaults the narrow plain reading of the text and the small portion of the Executive Order which sets forth certification as a parameter or otherwise condition to saving an employees’ job.  [...]’s news article statement that “everyone will be reinstated” to their jobs, speaks volumes and overrides the limited “Wherefore” clause in MEO-08-2008.  Executive Orders, statutes and other legislative documents are to be read sensibly rather than literally.
[brief] (Pa000095.)  The purpose of the disclosure requirement ensures that the "ultimate authority to control the joinder of parties and claims remains with the court; the parties may not choose to withhold related aspects of a claim from consideration."  *Schindel*, at *6 (quoting *Kent Motor Cars*, supra 207 N.J. at 446).  In this case, plaintiffs indisputably knew that the Will [...] drafted did not clearly provide for what they claim [...] had intended.  They brought an action in Chancery to pursue their proposed interpretation of the Will, and [...] was a key witness in that action.  Yet, at no time did plaintiffs identify [...] as a person who might be potentially liable as required by under Rule 4:5-1(b)(2).
[brief] A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft he ...  And the one that applies in this case is: ... threatens another with, or purposely puts him or her in fear of immediate bodily injury.  *6  Let me say it again, not for emphasis, but just so it's clear.  A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he or she threatens another with, or purposely puts him or her in fear of immediate bodily injury.
[brief] There were 2 independent basis to award fees below.  Fund in Court: R. 4:42-9(a) (2) allows the payment of fees & costs out of a “fund in court”.  Porreca v. City of Millville, 419 N. J. Super. 212, 224-25 (App.Div. 2011).  A fund is in court when it is within the jurisdictional authority of the court to deal with it.  Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Berenbaum, 91 N.J. Super. 551 (App. Div. 1966), certif. denied, 48 N.J. 138(1966).  The award of attorney’s fees is limited to “reasonable” fees.  In re Trust of Brown, 213 N.J. Super. 489 (Law Div. 1986).  Here, since plaintiffs refused to pay the judgment from the sale proceeds, they were unable to convey clear & insurable title.
[brief] Our scope of review is therefore a mixed one, depending upon the particular facet of the trial court's decision in question.  It is well-established that a resident of property may vitiate the warrant requirement by consenting to a search by the police.  State v. Domicz, 188 N.J. 285, 305 (2006); see also State v. Legette, 227 N.J. 460, 474-75 (2017) (ruling the State failed to establish consent to justify the warrantless police search of a residence).  An “essential element” of such consent to conduct a warrantless search is the individual's “knowledge of the right to refuse [it].”
[brief] The parties were married in a civil ceremony on December 8, 2020 in India.  (Pa1).  Plaintiff testified that he did not consider this ceremony to be the “real wedding. ” (1T112-5).  Approximately one (1) year later, the parties were married in a religious ceremony on November 28, 2021 in India.  (1T87-18); (1T88-7).  The parties separated in September 2022.  (1T104-14).  Plaintiff filed for an annulment on March 14, 2023.  (Pa1-2).  The parties could not resolve the matter and a trial took place on June 10, 2024 and June 13, 2024.  (1T\(^1\) and 2T\(^2\)).  After hearing two (2) days of testimony from the Plaintiff and certain other witnesses, the Trial Court determined that Plaintiff did not meet his burden by clear and convincing evidence that he was entitled to an annulment on the grounds of fraud.  (2T86-18; 2T88-23).  As a result, a Final Judgment of Divorce in favor of Defendant was entered on June 13, 2024.  (Pa6); (2T110-18).  Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on July 9, 2024.  (Pa9).  \(^1\) June 10, 2024  \(^2\) June 13, 2024  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS