ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................  2  I.  The Planning Board Had Jurisdiction To Rule On Plaintiff’s Site Plan Application.  (5T 27-24 to 28-2).  ........................................................................................................  2  II.  The [...] Zoning Ordinances Permit Mixed Uses Of More Than One Principal Use On Property In The Industrial Zone.  (5T 25-11 to 28-7).  ........................................................................................................  4  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................  9  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | State Cases | Page(s) | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Bartlett v. Middletown Twp.,** | | | 51 N.J. Super. 239 (App. Div. 1958) | 6, 7, 8 | | **DePetro v. Township of Wayne Planning Board,** | | | 367 N.J. Super. 161 (App. Div. 2004) | 3 | | **Fin. Servs., L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of Little Ferry,** | | | 326 N.J. Super. 265 (App. Div. 1999) | 6, 7, 8 | | **L.I.M.A. Partners v. Borough of Northvale,** | | | 219 N.J. Super. 512 (App. Div. 1987) | 6, 7, 8 | | Local Ordinances | | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Westampton Ordinance § 250-4 | 1, 4, 5 |
[brief] Here, the strong possibility -- from the jury instructions -- that the jury simply did not agree on the fundamentals of what defendant actually did wrong with respect to Counts Two and Three is too much to ignore.  As is evident in the Statement of Facts, *supra*, the State’s proofs were shaky to say the least and had a rather extreme chance of splitting the jury on the theory of guilt.  Did all 12 jurors really agree that defendant violated subsection (b) of N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 by refusing to turn in his original wallet ID in September 2016, which would mean that they believed he hadn’t really lost it back in January 2016, but instead had squirreled it away for future use back when there was nothing to indicate that he was even being investigated, let alone that he would be suspended?
[brief] Despite the redundant nature of this issue raised by the Appellant in his brief at Point II (Pb 36), the Township acknowledges that due process is guaranteed to police officers as set forth in the Attorney General Guidelines on Internal Affairs made applicable to all law enforcement agencies under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181.  The Attorney General Guidelines provide, in part, that:  The goal of internal affairs is to ensure that the integrity of the department is maintained through a system of internal discipline where fairness and justice are assured by an objective and impartial investigation and review.  The Attorney General Guidelines further state, Every law enforcement agency shall establish an internal affairs unit or function.  Depending upon the need, the internal affairs unit can be full or part-time.  In either case, this requires the establishment of a unit or the clear allocation of responsibility and resources for carrying out the internal affairs function...  After his termination as a result of [...]'s recommendation, [...] filed for arbitration under N.J.S.A. 40A:14–210 and N.J.A.C. 19:12-6.1 et seq.
[brief] L.H., 239 N.J. at 43-44 (alteration in original) (quoting Miller, 76 N.J. at 403).  For example, an officer may appeal to the suspect's "sense of decency and urg[e] him to tell the truth for his own sake."  Id. at 44 (quoting Miller, 76 N.J. at 405).  Moreover, "[o]ur jurisprudence . . . gives officers leeway to tell some lies during an interrogation."  Ibid. (citing State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 655 (1993); Miller, 76 N.J. at 403-04); see also State v. Baylor, 423 N.J. Super. 578, 588-89 (App. Div. 2011) (recognizing that "officers may employ deception or trickery in an interrogation of a suspect unless such deception or trickery was calculated to produce an untruthful confession or was offensive to due process"), certif. denied, 210 N.J. 263 (2012).
[directive] 그러므로, 이 문서에 소셜 시큐리티 번호, 운전면허증 번호, 차량 번호판 번호, 보험증권 번호, 사용 중인 금융계좌 번호, 또는 사용 중인 신용카드  번호 등 개인의  신원을 확인할 수 있는 정보를 기재하지 마십시오.
[brief] He was wearing sunglasses, earplugs, and a black jacket from a “Terminator” costume he wore the prior Halloween.  (6T70-9 to 11, 71-7 to 9, 86-4 to 11, 118-19 to 120-6, 120-2 to 5, 122-9 to 18, 150-2 to 4, 181-16 to 182-1; 8T88-19 to 23, 224-8 to 11).  Defendant “looked stern, cold” “with a blank expression. ” (6T84-10 to 12, 87-18, 144-25 to 145-8).  He did not speak or scream, nor did he show any emotion.  (6T84-10 to 21).  Defendant stopped at the entrance to the kitchen and aimed the rifle at [...].  A bullet pierced [...]’s wrist and abdomen as she sat with her hands at her waist.  (7T82-3 to 83-21).  The bullet tore through her spleen, her stomach, the edge of her liver, both kidneys, her colon, and her aorta.  (9T68-6 to 69-16).  [...] died from the single gunshot wound to her abdomen.  (9T70-15 to 21).  Defendant then turned and fired three times at his younger sister [...], striking her twice.  (6T70-11 to 71-6, 71-10 to 17, 120-7 to 11, 120-17 to 23; 7T39-16 to 19, 83-22 to 85-12).  One bullet pierced [...]’s left cheek, traveled through her airway, through the right main carotid artery supplying blood to the right side of the head, through the right upper lobe of her lung, and through the posterior rib before exiting.  (9T49-24 to 51-11).  A second bullet pierced [...]’s left upper chest, traveled through the middle lobe of her right lung, and exited through her lower right chest.  (9T51-12 to 52-12).  Each wound was fatal by itself; [...] died from the gunshot wounds to her neck and chest.
[brief] They allege that “[h]azardous liquids stored on site . . . have the potential to leak into the groundwater and make their way into Hewitt Brook and the Monksville Reservoir” and thereby impact drinking water quality.  (Ab32) (emphasis omitted).  But the only hazardous liquids stored on-site will be those used for “fuel storage, equipment refueling, and equipment maintenance. ” (Aa68).  [...] indicated that they will “routinely inspect storage and tank areas to help reduce the potential for spills” and have a plan to immediately respond to a spill or leak.  (Aa68; Aa143-153).  [...] also will not store any hazardous substances in the flood hazard area or within 100 feet of any waterbody, further averting risk of contamination.  (Aa69; Aa148).  During construction, [...] also has training and inspection plans to address unanticipated contaminated soils or groundwater safely.  (Aa154-155).  Appellants also allege that the Project’s compressor will “release methane and VOCs including chromium, benzene, radon, [and] NOx into the air. ” (Ab32).  This is inaccurate.  The compressor is powered by electricity, which will not create emissions.  (Aa55; Aa80).  The only emissions the Project would create will be an “emergency generator, a heater, and infrequent venting that will occur during operation and maintenance of the facility. ” (Aa80).  Those emissions would be subject to separate permitting requirements by DEP, not at issue here.  (Aa80).  Given the Project’s demonstrated minimal natural resource impacts, DEP correctly found it is consistent with the goals and policies of the Highlands Act.
[brief] ”  First, it merits stating that he was decidedly not supposed to simultaneously act in the capacity of a foreclosure consultant (an unlicensed one at that) and a distressed property purchaser.  Most glaringly, but without exhaustively listing them, this includes (1) his failing to have the owner show the reasonable ability to pay for subsequent conveyance of the property with the option to repurchase, (2) not giving consideration of at least the statutory minimum 82% of fair market value, (3) entering into a commercially unfair and unreasonable transaction, (6) inducing the owner to execute a deed during the 10-day cancellation period, (14) charging a fee in excess of 3.5% of the purchase price, and (19) failure to provide a three (3) year right to purchase back option.
[directive] TECHNIQUES AND FIELD PROCEDURES  Goal:  The police officer handler will be familiar with the commands, skills and procedures used for K-9 training and operations.  1.2.1  The police officer handler will identify the basic obedience commands and skills and their proper use.  1.2.2  The police officer handler will demonstrate familiarity with the major phases of obedience training (heel work, distance control and walking control) and the significance of these phases of training.  16  7/2002 K-9 Training Standards and Qualification Requirements  1.2.3  The police officer handler will identify procedures and commands used in police dog socialization.  1.2.4  The police officer handler will identify the five types of scent work (article searches; searches involving boxes, tents or other similar objects; field/open area, wooded area, or marsh/swamp searches; building searches; and searches involving tracking).  1.2.5  The police officer handler will demonstrate familiarity with the procedures and commands to be used for various types of scent work and searches utilizing a police patrol dog.  1.2.6  The police officer handler will demonstrate familiarity with the procedures and commands used during agility exercises.  1.2.7  The police officer handler will demonstrate knowledge of the major phases of criminal apprehension training, including false start, recall, straight apprehension and pat down through both standing and moving crowd, both with and without simulated assault to the handler.  1.2.8  The police officer handler will demonstrate knowledge of the procedures and commands to be used before and during criminal apprehensions utilizing a police dog.  1.2.9  The police officer handler will demonstrate knowledge of the major phases of handler protection training.  1.2.10  The police officer handler will demonstrate knowledge of the procedures and commands used during handler protection with a police patrol dog.  1.2.11  The police officer handler will identify acceptable indication signs or signals given by the police patrol dog.  1.3
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree  Bail Range  10%  Cash Bail Option Actor (1) provides services, resources, or assistance with the knowledge that the services, resources, or assistance are intended to be used in furtherance of the commission of the crime of human trafficking in violation of 2C:13-8; or (2) procures or attempts to procure a person to engage in sexual activity as defined in paragraph (2) of subsection a. of 2C:34-1, 2C:13-9
[directive] He/she must document the time the prospective trainer committed to the class training, the number of dogs trained, the areas of training, and what involvement the prospective trainer had with the class.  Weekly evaluations recommending goals and objectives, as well as documentation of accomplishments are required.  All records pertaining to the certification of K-9 patrol trainers must be maintained by the Supervising K-9 patrol trainer for a period of no less than 2 (two) years, and by the newly certified K-9 patrol trainer for the duration of his/her career.
[brief] The January 12, 2021 Transcript of Proceedings before the HPC is designated as IT; the January 19, 2022 Transcript of Application before the ZBA is designated 2T; the March 2, 2022 Transcript of Application before the ZBT is designated 3T.  The April 11, 2023 Transcript of Motion is designated 4T; the April 28, 2023 Transcript of Motion is designated 5T; the May 31, 2023 Transcript of Trial is designated 6T and the June 20, 2023 Transcript of Decision is designated 7T.  LEGAL ARGUMENT Point
[brief] 1.  No legal authority supported Complainant’s claim that Respondent’s conduct alleged in Counts 1-4 and 8-12 of the complaint violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a).  Ca171; 2.  As of Count 3, Respondent’s decision not to wear a mask at a board meeting was a “personal decision” which was unrelated to her duties as a board member and could not have compromised the Board.  Ca213; 3.  As to Counts 6 and 7, the Facebook post in question was posted prior to the time that Respondent was sworn in as a member of the Board and thus the COMMISSION was bound to dismiss these counts.  Ca213-Ca214.  Accordingly, the COMMISSION dismissed the allegation in Count 1-4 and 8-12 that Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(a) and dismissed Counts 3, 6 and in their entirety.
[brief] Moreover, the State disagrees with the defense's characterization of the trooper's testimony as perjury or as fabricated in order to justify a stop.  There is nothing in the record to suggest that the trooper knowingly gave a false statement that he did not believe to be true.  Rather, the trooper testified on direct that he was moving when he made the observation of the Defendant rolling through the stop sign and later indicated that he did not recall if he was in fact moving or stationary when he made such observation.  There is nothing in the record to suggest that this testimony was made in bad faith, and as the lower court noted, appeared to be the result of failing to review the MVR footage or preparing prior to the hearing.  (1T 21-12 to -13; IT 40-8 to -17).  The trooper's testimony as to his observation of the Defendant actually committing a motor vehicle infraction, however, was consistent with the MVR footage¹.  (Db 12)  The State’s Counterstatement of Facts and Legal Argument completely mischaracterize [...]’s testimony and evince a serious failure to acknowledge that one of its own twice lied under oath.  In so doing the State has failed to “turn square corners”.  Make no doubt about it, [...] lied when he first testified that he was operating his vehicle in the opposite lane of travel when observing the alleged infraction (1T 7-11 through 9-5).  He did not qualify his testimony by saying for example “I am not completely sure”, or “as best I can recall”, or even “I do not have an independent recollection, but based upon the review of my reports”.  No ¹The State clings to the notion that despite [...]’s incredible testimony, justification for the motor vehicle stop can be found in the MVR.  Although the MVR may depict the manner in which [...] operated his motor vehicle, it in no way can serve as a basis for the motor vehicle stop because the stop must be based on the officer’s observations, not what the MVR depicts.  Otherwise stated, because [...] ultimately admitted he could not recall where he was located when allegedly observing the [...] vehicle (1T 29-23 through 30-5), the MVR cannot be relied upon by the State to corroborate [...]’s testimony.
[brief] 569a–586a.  [...] and [...] set in place this contract flip in Plaintiffs’ pursuit to purchase the [...] Property, creating a mechanism by which the co-conspirator Defendants would wrongfully take and receive a substantial financial gain.  562a–586a.  That is, instead of negotiating on behalf of Plaintiffs directly with [...] to enter into an agreement of sale for the [...] Property (as was done with owners of the other real estate that comprised the Pork Chop Hill Assemblage), [...] and [...], in concert with the other co-conspirator Defendants, created the flip transaction of the [...] Property pursuant to which Plaintiffs’ payments for the [...]-MTDC Assignment purportedly paid to [...], unbeknownst to Plaintiffs, were to be ultimately transferred and divided between the co-conspirator Defendants.  735a–737a.
[brief] (5T 53-25, 54-9 to 16, 55-5 to 13, 55-16 to 18, 56-21 to 22, 58-8 to 11)  When he arrived, EMS was already on the scene with a Toyota 4Runner and a woman who had identified herself as [...].  (5T 59-9, 60-6)  [...] spoke with the woman, and she again identified herself as [...] but gave a different birthdate than she had given EMS.  (5T 60-9 to 15, 60-24 to 61-10)  He asked the woman for identification, but she could not provide it and instead began to look “aimlessly, and sort of frantically” around the car.  (5T 61-20 to 21, 61-25 to 62-3)  [...] testified that the woman was “very disheveled” and “seemed dazed. ”  (5T 62-6 to 9)  [...] admitted that she gave a false name to EMS and the police officer who found her.  (6T 168-8 to 18, 169-4 to 11)  She explained that she was not trying to mislead anyone, but that the fake ID was the only identification card she had with her at the time.  (6T 169-11 to 14)  [...] did not mention anything about the sexual assault or [...]’s death to the police.
[brief] ..................................................................  41  Lukasiewicz v. Haddad, 24 N.J. Super. 399, 406 (App. Div. 1953) ...........................................  39  Massotto v. Pub. Serv. Coordinated Transp., 71 N.J. Super. 39, 54 (App. Div. 1961) ..................................................................................................................  39  McKenney v. Jersey City Med.
[brief] More importantly, in 1988 [...] only bought the leased fee, subject to the [...] lease.  Both appraisers determined non-reimbursable expenses in terms of percentages derived from studies by outside sources.  The only inclusion, of any input from [...], was to apply the absolute dollar amount used by [...] derived from his percentage analysis applied to a much higher base.  Thus, bringing the net income even lower.  The arbitrator's analysis of the capitalization rate was also derived by relying upon [...]'s high rate based upon the idea of a high tenant turnover belied by the evidence.  The government has to turn square corners when taking property by eminent domain, see F.M.C Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains 100 N.J. 418, 426 (1985).
[brief] [...] is a municipality entirely within the Highlands Region Preservation Area and only [...] is at issue here.  N.J.S.A. 13:20-7(a) and (b).  [...] would be located at [...] commonly known as [...] (the Property), for which [...] was a contract purchaser at the time of application.  (Aa29; Aa34).  The Property is forty-seven acres and historically disturbed as it was operated as a former gravel quarry, then a temporary pipeyard, and most recently a recycling storage facility.  (Aa29; Aa37-39; Aa52; Aa55; Aa64; Aa75; Aa197).  The compressor station, which “act[s] as the ‘engine[’ that power[s] an interstate natural gas pipeline system as each station compresses the gas to move it through the pipeline[,]” (Aa77), would consist of a new electric motor driven compressor unit, auxiliary equipment, and an office building to operate the station (the Project).  (Aa54-55).  [...] anticipates its project will add 115,000 dekatherms per day to its system capacity.  (Aa54).  On August 31, 2020, [...] applied for a HAD, asking DEP to find [...]’s Project exempt from the Highlands Act under Exemption #11.  (Aa3; Aa21; Aa52).  [...]’s application explained why the Project is exempt from the Highlands Act.  (Aa77-84).  [...] described itself as a “public utility” as defined in New Jersey’s Department of Public Utilities Act of 1948 at N.J.S.A. 48:2-13(a).  (Aa78).  It also explained that its Project is an “upgrade” of its existing pipeline “system[,]” the 300 Line.
[brief] 25  Crippen v. Central Jersey Concrete Pipe Co., 176 N.J. 397(2003) ......................... 31,37,39  Entwistle v. Draves, 102 N.J. 559, 562 (1986) ....................................... 43,45  Fisher v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 363 N.J. Super. 457 (App. Div. 2003)  .....................  31  Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67;(1954) ......................  25  Laidlow v. Hariton Machinery Co., Inc. 170 N.J. 602 (2002) ....................... 31,37  Lee v. Brown, 232 N.J. 114, 126 (2018) ...........................................  24 Livingstone v. Abraham & Strauss, Inc., 111 N.J. 89 (1998) .......................... 26,32,33  McGovern v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc., 306 N.J. Super. 174 (App. Div. 1997)  ............  31 McLaughlin v. Rova Farms, Inc., 56 N.J. 288 (1970) .............................  44  Millison v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161(1985) ...................... 20,27,31,33,34,35,36,40,41,42 Mull v. Zeta Consumer Products, 176 N.J. 385 (2003) .......................... 31,38 Smith v. Walker, 160 N.J. 221, 248 (1999) ........................................... 44 Van Dunk v. Reckson Associates Realty Corp., 210 N.J. 449 (2012) ......................... 40 United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 67 N.J. Super. 384,(App. Div. 1961) ....................... 25 Statutes N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 .................................................. 1,3,4,30,38 N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.9 .................................................. 44 Rules N.J.R.E. 407 .................................................. 18 R. 4:46-2 .................................................. 25 Other American State Highway and Transportation Officials Methodology ("AASHTO") ........................................... 22 Assembly Insurance Committee Statement, Senate, No. 1496-L.1995, c. 142.
[brief] The judge observed that [...] relied on PCMD data to optimize its networks and had a monetary interest in ensuring its accuracy.  (1T189-6 to 191-6; 1T192-20 to 193-10).  The judge considered that [...] had been in the field for years and consistently found it accurate in locating individuals and devices.  (1T191-16 to 19; 1T194-1 to 7).  Observing that the methodology did not have to be “perfect,” the court reasoned that objections to PCMD’s precision would be assuaged by presentation of such limitations by cross-examination, as well as the model jury charge on expert testimony directing the jury to consider the accuracy of the information upon which the opinion relies.  (1T188-18 to 24; 1T193-15 to 18; 1T195-16 to 19; 1T196-22 to 24).  The court found any shortcomings of PCMD went to weight, not admissibility, of [...]’s testimony.  (1T197-2 to 9).  The court’s ruling was correct.
[brief] The Trial Court’s Statement of Reasons Makes Clear that it Followed the Appropriate Analysis.  Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the trial court both articulated the correct standard for its determination of Plaintiff’s motion or attorney’s fees and correctly applied that standard in its decision.  Plaintiff’s initial argument, that the trial court failed to set forth a “statement of reasons as to how it calculated the lodestar,” may be flatly rejected.  Apparently, Plaintiff ignored the trial court’s 10-page decision, titled “Statement of Reasons” in which it articulated its reasoning.