ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **[...]’s FINAL DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED**  As is self-evident, the final agency decision was well-reasoned, comprehensive and stands on its own.  The Commission fully considered each party’s arguments.  50 NJPER 226, 229-230 (¶50 2023)(Pa227-231).  Using its agency expertise, it then specifically acknowledged the “circumstances and dynamics” underlying the dispute at issue, and placed them in the proper context.
[brief] (Da1).  The contract to purchase is known as a Subscription and Purchase Agreement (“SPA”) and was a form contract prepared by [...]’s condominium counsel, [...], its counsel in this case.  The Complaint at ¶20 alleges the SPA to be a “form contract. ” (Da4).  Plaintiffs did not close title on the purchase of their unit because, inter alia, they assert that their unit is substantially smaller than advertised based upon measurements of 42 other units in the building by a civil engineer.
[brief] The magazine inside the Smith & Wesson was loaded, but no bullets were chambered.  (12T 23-11 to 18)  The Taurus had bullets in its magazine and one bullet in the chamber.  (12T 26-21 to 27-12)  A search of the white Corolla revealed two spent shell casings resting on top of the front windshield wipers.  (11T 187-10 to 19)  It also revealed a backpack in the rear seat containing a jury summons for [...]; a car rental agreement for the Corolla made out to [...]; and a multicolored shirt matching the one worn by the driver in the videos.  (11T 36-8 to 25; 11T 81-7 to 82-3)
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO.: [...]  On Appeal from Jury Verdict  May 25, 2023  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION  OCEAN COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...]  Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.S.C. AMENDED  REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS
[brief] T3:77:8-78:17.  - A photograph of [...] and her son taken at Chincoteague National Wildlife Refuge in Virginia on August 23, 2021 at 5:14 p.m. which is the same date as service.  214a.  - Other family photos taken in Virginia on August 24, 2021 were also introduced with time and GPS location stamps (215a, 216a).
[brief] The decision of the Board was memorialized in Resolution 57-2022 adopted on October 20, 2022.  (Pa40 to Pa50).  The Resolution was provided to the Zoning Board in advance of the meeting at which was adopted.  Each of the Zoning Board members adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law as the basis for his decision.  (2T3-7 to 2T7-2).  The trial court observed that the Resolution sets forth the Zoning Board’s findings and reasoning in “great detail”.  (3T41-14 to 3T43-12).  ARGUMENT POINT I DEFERENTIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW (Pa73-Pa74; 3T35-4 – 3T49-9)
[brief] Additionally, as Appellant noted in paragraph 11 of his Reply pursuant to the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of 3/30/2023, although [...] claims in her letter response of April 20, 2023 (p. 2, lines 1-3):  “…at no time since initiating motion practice in early 2022 has [...] demonstrated that he paid into Probation more than he was obligated to pay”  [...]’s assertion is simply absurd.  As demonstrated above, Appellant has been denied benefit of numerous court orders, denied thousands of dollars in court awarded credits, reduced support payments and eliminated arrearages, submitted prima facie evidence of same, but has been improperly denied oral argument and denied opportunity to present his proofs and to require Probation to justify its account record before the Court by way of a hearing.  Garnishment of his SSA --- \(^8\)  As cited on p. 8 (DA348) of Appellant’s certification, Motion for Correction of Probation Account Record filed 10/27/2002, $20,007 for the period 7/16/1999 to 12/31/1999, $16,704 for the period 1/1/2000 to 9/30/2000 as required by the Order of 3/25/2004.  Also see Appellant’s Motion filed 7/27/2020 citing prima facie evidence of Probation account error supporting request for a plenary hearing to correct the account record. benefits in violation of the Orders of 10/25/2021 and 4/4/2022, and garnishment of Appellant’s income further confirms the absurdity of [...]’s assertion.  The trial Court erred and abused its judicial discretion in failing to meet its obligation as finder of fact to adjudicate these issues in any manner whatsoever.  In this manner, the Court denied Appellant due process and his “day in court.
[brief] Even on the merits of the issue, the State should lose, as it failed to establish at the suppression hearing that the officers reasonably believed that [...] violated the traffic laws in this manner.  [...] testified that [...] “repeatedly” looked in her rearview mirror when the police car was behind her, suggesting that she did in fact ascertain the safety of changing lanes before doing so.  (1T 49-4 to 9)  As for failing to maintain one’s lane, it is obvious that this statutory prohibition does not apply to vehicles changing lanes.  To suggest otherwise is preposterous.  Furthermore, the State’s argument that [...] “had not intended her vehicle to change lanes” and only did so after driving over the dividing line is entirely speculative.  (Sb 45)  These arguments should be rejected in full.
[brief] Defendant [...] took a leave in advance of his pending retirement.  (Pa 91, at 46:3 – 47:3, 48:6-14)  Defendant [...] never served Defendant [...] with a letter stating the discipline he would face due to the racially discriminatory comments and actions he subjected Plaintiff to.  (Pa 91, at 46:15-47:3)  Following the unlawful discrimination that Plaintiff was subjected to in violation of the LAD, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging claims for violations of his rights under the LAD.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 68.  Similarly, in *Briglia v. Mondrian Mortgage Corporation*, 304 N.J. Super. 77 (1997), the plaintiff slipped and fell on ice hidden under fresh snow which had accumulated on the public sidewalk abutting the neighboring property, a single-family home which had been abandoned by its prior owner, defendant [...], and was in the possession of the first mortgagee, defendant [...].  *Id.* at 79-80.  At the time of the fall, the house was vacant and uninhabitable.  The Appellate Division was asked to determine whether a mortgagee in possession of vacant residential property was a commercial landowner for purposes of imposing sidewalk liability.
[brief] Here, in this matter, the Court properly found that Plaintiff did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant entered into the marriage for a fraudulent purpose, including but not limited to the sole purpose of obtaining entry into the United States.  The Court supported its decision with competent, relevant, and reasonably credible evidence, citing to details in the testimony presented at trial over two days.  The Court carefully considered and rejected the evidence that Plaintiff now claims the Court ignored.  Specifically, there is no merit to Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant only married Plaintiff for a green card and when she received same, she sought to leave the marriage.  (Pb32).  The Court found by way of Plaintiff’s testimony that Defendant never stated from her own mouth that she wanted to end the marriage and, in fact, it was the Plaintiff who filed to end the relationship, not the Defendant.  (2T85-8).  Specifically, the Court noted that there are two things that really “jumped out.
[brief] Similarly, [...] has also acknowledged he has taken no steps to differentiate between the responsibilities of [...] and the other defendants, including the general contractor [...], as related to the alleged obligation to identify pre-existing roadway defects.  (Pa0157; Pa0158; Pa0163; and Pa0164 at 131:25-132:6; 137:25-138:21).  This concession is significant in light of plaintiff’s obligation in prosecuting a professional malpractice claim is to perform an individualized evaluation of the obligations of the professional defendant.  As per [...]’s liability analysis, or lack thereof, the project’s owner/operator, general contractor, subcontractor, resident engineer and chief inspector have identical and interchangeable obligations to identify pre-existing roadway conditions.  This complete absence of substantive analysis cannot form the basis of an admissible expert opinion.
[brief] STATEMENT OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW  Final determinations made by the trial court sitting in a non-jury case are subject to a limited and well-established scope of review:  * * *  we do not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.  _In re Trust Created By Agreement Dated December 20, 1961, ex rel. Johnson_, 194 N.J. 276, 284 (2008), quoting _Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv’rs Ins. Co.  of Am._, 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  I  BECAUSE THE LAW DIVISION, NOT THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, POSSESSES THE POWER TO ORDER INJUNCTIVE AND RELATED RELIEF, THE PLAINTIFF HAD NO OBLIGATION TO FILE ANYTHING WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS.  The Defendants have never contended -- either on appeal or before the Law Division -- that they did not have a conflict of interest in voting on matters involved [...].  Their brazen acts in voting on these issues constitutes a conflict of interest as a matter of law, causing injury to third parties.  They seek to escape liability for their actions by remarkably contending that the Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause should have been filed with the local ethics board of [...].  The injuries complained of in the instant case require court intervention, not the filing of a complaint with a local ethics board, whose powers are essentially limited to issuing advisory opinions and fining government employees.  The common law principles governing conflict of interest are well equipped to provide a remedy for the Plaintiff in the Superior Court.  The mere fact that the Verified Complaint cites the Local Government Ethics Law is irrelevant, and does not operate to deprive the Law Division of subject matter jurisdiction.  On appeal, the Defendants in Points I through III contend in a variety of ways that because (1) the Department of Affairs has exclusive jurisdiction over determinations under the Local Government Ethics Law, (2) the Law Division lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the dispute between the parties.
[brief] The Supreme Court has passed upon such flagrant conduct of a lawyer who deceives third-parties for benefit of his own clients, as [...] has done:  This Court explained the concept of reliance with regard to third parties unknown to a lawyer in Banco Popular North America v. Gandi, where we stated that:  [i]f [an] attorney[']s actions are intended to induce a specific non-client[']s reasonable reliance on his or her representations, then there is a relationship between the attorney and the third party.  Contrariwise, if the attorney does absolutely nothing to induce reasonable reliance by a third party, there is no relationship to substitute for the privity requirement.
[brief] Unlike in *Bruns*, where evidence was seized during a completely unrelated traffic stop one week after the criminal activity had apparently concluded, [...]’s car was stopped due to a belief that [...] was involved in an ongoing criminal operation with [...].  Accordingly, [...] has a contemporary connection to the narcotics seized from [...]’s car, and the trial court’s ruling that [...] lacks standing must be reversed.  Furthermore, because the evidence from [...]’s car was unlawfully obtained, it may not be used against [...].  See Point I.B, infra. B.
[brief] The prosecutor discussed [...]’s mental health issues at length during his opening, (3T33-23 to 34-14, 41-2 to 8), and concluded by saying: “You may also end up considering some mental health defense of a diminished capacity because I’ve talked to you about some of the issues that were going on with the defendant during the weeks before this horrible event[,]” (3T49-9 to 13).  Likewise, in defense counsel’s opening he noted that one of [...]’s primary arguments would be that his mental health issues made the offense not purposeful murder, but some lesser offense.  (3T54-12 to 55-15).  At trial, defense counsel had made the decision not to include any expert testimony or medical records regarding [...]’s mental health issues.
[brief] Scholastic Bus Co. Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Borough of Fair Lawn, 326 N.J. Super. 49, 59 (App. Div. 1999); House of Fire Christian Church v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Clifton, 379 N.J. Super. 526, 539-40 (App. Div. 2005).  To the extent that the Applicant is arguing that everything required for review of a subdivision application will be handled during the review of site plan, this is effectively a concession that bifurcation is not appropriate.  As it stands now, there is nothing in the record to satisfy the requirements for an application for subdivision approval, and nothing in the record to support the granting of subdivision approval as required under the MLUL and the municipal ordinances.  For these reasons, the Board’s approval of the application for preliminary and final major subdivision approval was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
[brief] Similarly, with respect to the Affidavit of Title, utilization of the name [...] was part of the Defendants’ concerted effort to incorporate the prior error/mistake in the December 1998 Deed into the Property’s chain of title.  Fourth, Defendants’ failure to notify and/or consult [...] prior to signing the October 2019 deed resulted in the transfer of title without any objection by [...].  To be sure, had they notified [...], there is little doubt that the transfer would not have occurred.  Conversely, but for [...]’s fortuitous online review of the Property’s property tax record, the Defendants’ efforts may well have succeeded as [...] at all times believed he was the owner of the Property.  Fifth, as a result of Defendants’ deceitful conduct, [...] has suffered significant damages, including, most significantly, extensive attorneys’ fees incurred in this litigation to quiet title against [...]’s ownership stemming from [...]’s fraudulent transfer.
[brief] The Defendants Cannot Show that Plaintiff Committed a McKenney Violation (RAISED BELOW: Pa30-Pa40).........................................................................................................................3  A.  Legal Analysis: The Legal Standard for Finding a McKenney Violation (RAISED BELOW: Pa31-Pa33) .................................................................4  B.  Application: Defendants’ Waived Any Right to Claim a McKenney Violation Because They Failed to Register an Objection During Trial (RAISED BELOW: Pa33-Pa34) .................................................................7  C.  Application: There was no McKenney Violation  Because Plaintiff’s Trial Testimony Does Not Materially Depart from Prior Pleadings and/or Discovery (RAISED BELOW: Pa33-Pa37) ......................................................................................................................8  D. Application: Even if Plaintiff’s Testimony Did Materially Deviate from Prior Pleadings and/or Discovery, the Defendants have Failed to Articulate, Let Alone Prove Prejudice Sufficient to Justify Finding a McKenney Violation (Raised Below: Pa38-Pa40) ..................................................................................................................13 POINT II: The Defendants Have Not Preserved or Presented a Valid Challenge to the Jury Charge as Read (RAISED BELOW Pa40-Pa43) ..................................................................................................................16 POINT III: Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Summation was Proper Under the Plain Error Standard (RAISED BELOW: Pa43-Pa49) ..................................................................................................................21 POINT IV: The Jury’s Verdict was Not Against the Weight of the Evidence (RAISED BELOW: Pa49-Pa61) .................................................................28
[brief] In summary, Defendants have failed to give Plaintiffs access to the following 9 of 33 ordered records:  [...] Decision; [...] Decision; [...] Resolution; [...] Resolution; [...] Resolution; [...] Resolution; [...] Resolution; [...] Settlement and [...] Decision  On November 25, 2022, the Board filed its cross motion for a protective order quashing [...]’ deposition notice on [...] and an entry for satisfaction of judgment against [...] (208a).
[brief] [...] captured [...]’ pretrial statement on a digital video disc (DVD) made after an unrecorded initial interview.  (6T 67-4 to 6, 98-10 to 99-4). ⁴  Within the next two weeks, (9T 25-8 to 14), [...], who claimed to have observed the shooting looking through a window on the third floor of a neighboring house, told the police that he saw the Audi slow down as it neared the crowd and then heard “boom, boom, boom, boom. ” (9T 9-1 to 4, 9-20 to 24, 16-19 to 25, 18-1 to 12).  Sewell recalled that he had seen the driver before, describing his hair, moustache, and sideburns.  (9T 17-23 to 25, 18-21 to 19-6).  Sewell identified a photograph of [...] as the Audi’s driver.  (9T 26-11 to 19, 27-2 to 25).  He was unable to identify any other occupants in the car.  (9T 28-10 to 14).  Thereafter defendant and [...] were arrested without incident in separate locations.
[brief] This is an employment discrimination and retaliation case filed pursuant to the *New Jersey Law Against Discrimination*.  The Appellants have appealed the trial court’s denial of their motion to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration.  The issue before the trial court was simply whether the Appellants produced a legitimate signed employment agreement with a valid arbitration provision.  While this sounds like a straightforward question, the Appellants produced two agreements.  The circumstances involved with the Appellant’s production of these documents raised significant credibility challenges.  The court permitted limited discovery and on November 8, 2024, conducted a live plenary hearing.
[brief] In that process, the sentencer will consider the murderer’s “diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change. ”  That sentencing procedure ensures that the sentencer affords individualized “consideration” to, among other things, the defendant’s “chronological age and its hallmark features. ”  [141 S. Ct. at 1315-16 (internal citations omitted). ]  Refusing to second-guess the appropriateness of [...]’s state sentence, the Court observed that any homicide, and particularly a homicide committed by an individual under 18, is a horrific tragedy for all involved and for all affected.  Determining the proper sentence in such a case raises profound questions of morality and social policy.  The States, not the federal courts, make those broad moral and policy judgments in the first instance when enacting their sentencing laws.  And state sentencing judges and juries then determine the proper sentence in individual cases in light of the facts and circumstances of the offense, and the background of the offender.  Under our precedents, this Court’s more limited role is to safeguard the limits imposed by…the Eighth Amendment.
[brief] "While a reservation could theoretically vest an interest in a third party, the early common law courts vigorously rejected this possibility, apparently because they mistrusted and wished to limit conveyance by deed as a substitute for livery by seisin.  Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica, 7 Cal. 3d 473, 498 P.2d 987 (Cal. 1972) (citing Harris, Reservation in Favor of Strangers of the Title (1953) 6 Okla. L. Rev. 127, 132-133).  Indeed, as the author of the article noted:  "[t]he common law rule prohibiting conveying rights to third parties originated from feudal times, when “precepts governing alienability of property by deed were fettered with, and inextricably circumscribed by, the common-law concept of livery of seisin. ”  Harris, Reservations in Favor of Strangers to the Title, 6 Okla. L. Rev. at 131, 132.
[directive] See also Section 3.1 (authorizing a prosecutor to consider the defendant’s actual conduct and not just the specific episode, event or transaction constituting the specific offense to which the defendant will plead guilty).  When a prosecutor employs this Special Application and Enhancement Feature, the prosecutor shall not “double count” the weapons-related circumstance by applying the Special Offense Characteristics described in Section 7.1 based on the same specific conduct, event or episode used to establish the basis for the Special Application and Enhancement Feature.  As noted in Section 7.1, a prosecutor must use both features based upon separate and distinct conduct involving weapons.  Note that “separate and distinct” conduct can occur during a single episode or event.
[brief] A.  The Parties  [...] is located in [...] and [...], [...].  [...] are the fee simple owners of the beachfront home located at [...], [...], [...] (the “Premises”).  (Da405-Da409).  [...] is a for-profit, New Jersey corporation that operates as a community association organized for the benefit of [...] residents, who are dues paying members.  (Da155; Da324-Da325).  The [...] “sets strategic direction and provides the long range planning function for the [[...]] Community in terms of properties, buildings and major capital expenditures,” and is “an advisory board to the [...] Improvement Association, Inc. ” (Pa114).  [...] is a New Jersey, not-for-profit entity that promotes the civic interests of the home and real estate owners of [...] and does “any and all things necessary or incident to the improvement” of [...].  (Da156; Da265; Pa125).  The [...] is the “operating arm” of the two associations, which manages the summertime activities, performs maintenance, stations lifeguards, posts signage, cleans and maintains the beach lands, and sells beach badges to access the beach and ocean.  (Da2072; Pa76).  B.
[brief] “The doctrine of res judicata is not absolute. ”  *State v. One Wrist Sling Shot*, 230 N.J. Super. 498, 504 (App. Div. 1989) (citing *Hodgson v. Applegate*, 31 N.J. 29, 43 (1959); *Matter of Coruzzi*, 95 N.J. 557, 568 (1984), app. dism., 469 U.S. 802; *Plainfield v. Public Service Electric and Gas Co.*, 82 N.J. 245, 258–259 (1980)).  Deference to the trial court’s discretion on that issue is warranted here.  The State has not articulated any significant interest in precluding this suppression hearing from taking place, and far more resources have been expended on seeking to avoid it.⁴  Counsel for both the State and for --- ⁴  The Assistant Prosecutor argued that the injury to the State from taking testimony would be that its police witness could testify inconsistently to his testimony before the trial court in Union County.  T1.  The risk of a police officer [...] are paid fixed salaries to appear in court, and there is no issue of attorneys’ fees or other significant undue expense to any party.  Compared with re-litigating a lengthy civil trial, recalling expert witnesses, or compelling the testimony of a potentially traumatized child victim, an hour of testimony from a single [...] officer does not implicate the policy considerations that underly the doctrine of issue preclusion.  “It is equally clear that ‘[e]ven where these requirements are met, the doctrine [of issue preclusion], which has its roots in equity, will not be applied when it is unfair to do so. ’”  One Wrist Sling Shot at 521-22 (quoting Pace v. Kuchinsky, 347 N.J. Super. 202, 215 (App. Div. 2002)).  In a serious criminal case such as this one, a defendant has important constitutional and liberty interests which, at a minimum, serve as a counterweight to the State’s interest in pursuing issue preclusion and militate against granting leave to appeal at this time.  **POINT II**