ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Where a fundamental right to a jury trial is being stripped away, the record should not leave room for a single ounce of doubt that [...] agreed to be bound to an arbitration provision.  Appellants’ brief on appeal illustrated false statements made by [...] and discrepancies in its “proofs” on which [...] relies on to argue [...] unequivocally agreed to be bound to arbitration.  [...] fails to address these issues in its opposition brief—their silence is telling.  Instead, [...] now argues for the first time that unconscionability must be decided by the arbitrator based on the delegation clause within the arbitration agreement and Appellants’ alleged failure to dispute the delegation clause.  This new argument is flawed both procedurally and substantively.  This argument is procedurally deficient because [...] cannot raise a new argument in their opposition which was not raised at trial level.  This argument is also substantively deficient for multiple reasons: (1) it goes against New Jersey law, and (2) Appellants disputed the delegation clause in its opposition to the trial court motion to compel arbitration.  [...] further argues even if the Court determined unconscionability, the terms are not unconscionable because [...] had other choices regarding transportation.  In support of its arguments, [...] cites to various cases purportedly distinguishable from the present case.  The Court should respectfully reverse the trial court’s decision to compel arbitration because without discovery, it is not clear that [...] unequivocally checked the confirmation box and agreed to be bound to arbitration, and if she did, the terms are unconscionable and in English.  Nothing [...] has tried to argue in its opposition has changed these facts.  I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED MS. VILLEDA-GRANADOS CHECKED THE CONFIRMATION BOX AND AGREED TO BE BOUND TO ARBITRATION WITHOUT DISCOVERY BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY UBER IS INCONSISTENT.
[brief] Nevertheless, several years later when a new trial court judge assumed oversight of this matter, [...] filed the Global Fee Application, which supposedly is based on general collections-related activity over more than six years, untethered to any specific bad act(s) (for which $2.7+ million in attorneys’ fees has already been awarded).  As he did in his prior applications for all fees incurred in connection with collections efforts, [...] relies on the broad discretion of the Chancery Court and [...]’s wrongful acts as his “legal basis” for the Global Fee Application – bases that [...] had expressly rejected as sufficient for such an application.  [...] opposed the Global Fee Application and the trial court heard oral argument on April 28, 2023.  (1T\(^7\)).  The trial court issued an oral opinion at the April 28, 2023 hearing pursuant to which it granted the Global Fee Application in its entirety and awarded the entire amount sought by [...] – $3,570,357.50 – without any reduction whatsoever.  (1T68-72).  This was memorialized by way of a judgment, rather than an order, dated June 29, 2023.  (Da1-2).  The judgment was issued in favor of both [...] and his counsel, [...], and against [...] and [...], jointly and severally.  \textit{Id.}  This appeal of that June 29, 2023 judgment follows.
[brief] That is because once gas service is interrupted, [...] cannot simply flip a switch to instantaneously turn service back on after the regulator is thawed and repaired (a process that itself would take some time).  Rather, before service could be restored, [...] personnel would have to visit each of the affected premises to manually turn off the gas and lock the meter at each residential and commercial service line.  Once [...] accomplished that task, it could re-pressurize the gas mains, but would have to return again to each individual affected property in order to turn the gas back on manually and re-light the pilot for each gas appliance and furnace.  If [...] did otherwise—if it simply turned the gas back on *en masse* without visiting each property—each premises with unlit pilot lights would slowly fill up with gas, which could result in a dangerous, potentially, life-threatening condition.  If 50 or 100 houses lost service due to a regulator station failure, the restoration process could leave homes without heat for days, which in the winter months could lead to significant damage to homes (through freezing pipes, etc.) and/or the health and well-being of residents.
[brief] The second sentence in the above referenced excerpt states that “Paragraph A it deals with prohibiting people from using railroad property, or any right of way of the railroad. ”  This is one of the instances where the Judge referred to right of way and railroad property as if they were the same.  They are not.  *Ruggiero v Central Railroad, Co.* 112 N.J.L.163 (1934) specifically held that a railroad right of way was not railroad property.  Finally, the words “railroad property” do not appear in Section A.  They only appear in section B(5) as detailed above.  Using these two location describing terms interchangeably, as if they were synonyms is the source of the reversible error in this case.
[brief] ”  Id. at 179 (citations and internal quotations omitted).  To demonstrate a fundamental injustice, a defendant must show that “an error or violation played a role in the determination of guilt. ”  Ibid. (citations and internal quotations omitted).  Defense counsel recalled the cellular telephone data.  (14T 29-14 to 19).  Defense counsel admitted that he did not know how to interpret it.  (14T 30-5 to 14).  He conceded that he did not conduct any type of pretrial investigation into the data although he was knowledgeable that defendant’s whereabouts at the time of the shooting was material to the attorney’s trial strategy.  (14T 31-11 to 16).  How a claim of ineffectiveness for a trial attorney’s failure to analyze cellular telephone data could have been raised on direct appeal is puzzling.  Moreover, while the PCR judge found that the digital forensic examiner may not have qualified as an expert witness at trial, (19T 12-23 to 13-5), the court’s comments on [...]’s analysis of the data provided to him by defendant demonstrate how a pretrial investigation would have been productive.  (19T 11-23 to 12-4 to 8).  For example, the PCR judge observed that when the cellular telephone was produced, it did not contain the subscriber identification module (SIM) card which would have provided [...] with additional information.  (18T 4-14 to 5-9, 9-9 to 10; 19T 12-18 to 22).  The record did not reveal why the SIM card was removed, but the cellular telephone had been in the State’s possession.  (7T 36-6 to 10, 41-4 to 9).8  Regardless, as articulated above, the digital forensic examiner corroborated the testimony of defendant’s alibi witnesses.
[brief] After we were "divorced", [...] and I continued to live together from 2014 through July 30, 2017.  We did not sleep in separate bedrooms, we continued to carry ourselves as a married couple.  We traveled together, slept together and I continued to care for him as the subservient wife I had always been.  We remained in our property at [...], then moved to [...] in August 2016.  [A64]  When [...] approached me about getting "a divorce on paper," that was the only time a divorce was mentioned in our ten (10) year marriage.  I honestly did not think anything of the request.  He was not telling me to move out of our homes, he did not want me to stop being the dutiful wife I had been for the past ten (10) years, I was not told to stop working at our marital businesses, and in no way, was our "divorce on paper" anything like what happens when people normally get divorced.  In our case, nothing changed at all, except I was told to sign papers, which I complied with on January 17, 2014 and then we continued going about our lives as a married couple the same way we always had.
[brief] reemployment to all signatories but the author, Plaintiff.  This position is incoherent, inconsistent or contradictory.  Assuming arguendo that Defendant met its burden of establishing a legitimate reason to terminate Plaintiff, “the burden shifts back to plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the stated reasons were a pretext for discrimination, i.e. that the reasons were false and that discrimination was the real reason. ”  Barone v. Gardner Asphalt Corp., 955 F.Supp. 337, 344 (D.N.J. 1997) citing Goodman, supra, at 32.  Therefore, the trier of fact “may nevertheless be persuaded by that evidence and its inferences combined with that deduced from the respondents, that the employer’s proposed explanation is unworthy of belief and is nothing more than a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. ”  Goodman, supra, at 33.  “The evidence rebutting the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons must allow a fact finder reasonably to infer that each of the proffered non-discriminatory reasons… was either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not actually motivate the employment of this action. ”  Greenberg v. Camden Cnty. Vocational & Technical Schs., 310 N.J.Super. 189, 200 (App.Div.1998) (internal quotations omitted).  In other words, Plaintiff must prove that “the prohibited consideration played a role in the decision-making process and that it had a determinative influence on the outcome of the process. ”  Greenberg, supra, at 198 quoting Maiorino v. Schering-Plough Corp., 300 N.J. Super. 323, 344 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 150 N.J. 189 (1997).  Generally, to do this, the plaintiff need only “demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibility, inconsistencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable fact finder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and infer that the employer did not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons. ”  *Fuentes v. Perskie*, 32 F.3d 759,763 (3d Cir. 1994).  However, what constitutes evidence of pretext varies given the factual circumstances of each case.  See *Edwards v. Schlumberger-Wall Servs.*, 984 F.Supp. 264, 283 (D.N.J.1997) (Although plaintiff failed to show that defendant’s proffered reason for laying her off was “incoherent, inconsistent or contradictory,” plaintiff survived summary judgment by offering sufficient circumstantial evidence “allowing a reasonable fact finder to believe that [defendant’s] account does not provide the whole story, and that [plaintiff’s] gender was more likely than not a motivating or determinative factor in the layoff decision.)  At the summary judgment stage, the burden is relatively low.  *Wesley v. Palace Rehab. & Care Ctr., L.L.C.*, 3 F. Supp. 3d 221, 233 (D.N.J. 2014)(internal citations omitted).  A plaintiff who has already established a *prima facie* case need only point to evidence that the defendant's proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination.  *Id.*  It is without question that Defendant’s proffered reason was pretext.
[brief] [...] failed on a number of issues at the Liability Trial.  The trial court found that the “Nuclear Exclusion” precluded coverage for radionuclide contamination, and that the “Owned Property Exclusion” precluded coverage for clean-up of the contamination in the Site’s soils and sediments.  (Pa0104-Pa0105; The only “property damage” even potentially covered under the remaining policies was groundwater contamination from CVOCs.  With regard to that contamination, the trial court analyzed the various AOCs and determined that [...] had met its burden of proving “property damage” associated with 5 AOCs.  But, the trial court held that [...] had failed to prove “property damage” associated with six AOCs:  AOC 6, AOC 7, AOC 13, AOC 14, AOC B-3, and AOC B-35.  (Pa0123; Pa0125-Pa0126; Pa0129-Pa0130.)  The trial court found that the total value of unexcluded property damage as of December 31, 2009, was $12,827,154.42.
[directive] Cases 61 ............................................  3:4A(b)(5)  Rule 61 ..................... Risk Score High Involving a Crimes Serious 7.4.2  Violent and Risk Score Moderate Involving a Crimes Serious 7.4.3 .....................................61  History ......  Juvenile Another for Release  Pretrial on While Committed Crimes Serious 7.4.4 62 ...... Supervision Post-Conviction  Any of Form on While or Offense 62 .............  Flag Activity Criminal New Violent a Involving Cases 7.4.5 62  .......... Detention Pretrial Seeking of Presumption  Overcoming the 7.4.6 .......  63  Application  Detention Pretrial for Factual Basis and Specifying Legal 7.5 63 ....................................  Circumstances and Facts Relevant 7.6  63 .............................................  Rule General 7.6.1 and Facts  Certain Relevant of Existence Establishing 7.6.2 .............................................64  Circumstances 64 .....  Victim on Pretrial Release and Offense of for Impact Accounting 7.6.3  When Detention Pretrial for Eligibility Concerning Position 7.6.4  Legal Not Are Manage Risks) That Might Monitoring Services .................................................65  Available 66 .......................................  Cases Waiver  Juvenile 7.6.5 ..........................................66  Records Expunged 7.6.6  Detc;ntion Re-Opening Detention and Seek Decision to Re-Considering 7.7  Hearing.........................................................66
[brief] The Company’s primary operational goal is to provide safe and reliable service to its customers.  Indeed, safety and reliability are essential to the health and well-being of the residents and businesses in the communities [...] serves, and thus of paramount importance to the [...] employees responsible for operating the system.  Reliability requires planning to meet customer needs during cold weather when demand is highest, as well as all other times when unplanned major storm events or system disruptions may occur.  This is essential because natural gas is a critical lifeline service, especially during transmission system, which transports large volumes of gas over long distances at high pressure (an MAOP of 722 psig), and the local distribution system, which operates at approximately 100 psig.  III.  NEED FOR THE HOLMDEL REGULATOR STATION  Q.  Why is the Regulator Station needed within the [...] delivery system?
[directive] Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping Skorygowany formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Polish strona 4 z 8 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Polish page 4 of 8 pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4a, endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(3), endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(i) or (ii) (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018), luring or an attempt to commit any of these offenses and the offense occurred on or after January 14, 2004, or violating a condition of a special sentence of community supervision for life if the violation occurred on or after July 1, 2014 the court, in addition to any other sentence, will impose a special sentence of parole supervision for life?  (wypełnić tylko jeżeli przestępstwo miało miejsce 14 sierpnia 4.  (2)(a)  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  [Nie dotyczy/NA]  2013 r. lub później)
[brief] On Appeal From: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION, CIVIL PART MORRIS COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...] Hon. [...], P.J.Cv. Civil Action  BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT, [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] E-mail: [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent, HGB Realty 2, LLC OF COUNSEL: [...], Esq. (007931984)  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] ”  By definition, the victim of a murder is innocent and is almost always unarmed.  Similarly, most murders are not committed in broad daylight where the perpetrator will be easily caught but in an isolated area.  Nor was the use of a firearm particularly unusual.  In some circumstances, the firing of multiple shots might be especially heinous -- for example, where such shots are gratuitous and more than the number necessary to accomplish the killing.  Cf. State v. O’Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 217 (1989) (upholding aggravating factor one where “defendant selected a method of beating that would increase the victim’s pain”).  But here, the medical examiner specifically testified that the cause of death was “multiple gun shot wounds,” and even when the prosecutor asked whether “any one gun shot wound in particular” could have alone caused the death, the examiner maintained that the cause was “[m]ultiple gun shot wounds. ”  (4T 55-19 to 22)  Therefore, the multiple shots used here were all part of accomplishing the statutory offense: causing [...]’s death.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)-(2) (defining murder in this circumstance as “caus[ing] death,” either “purposely” or “knowingly”).
[brief] Db17-18.  That assertion is meritless, especially when the 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed (not to mention a plethora of other documents) makes clear reference to 105’ of frontage, the Subdivision Plan boldly and clearly indicates that a 40’ x 90’ portion, including 40’ of frontage, is being cut from Lot 3, and the [...] Confirmatory Deed and Defendants’ Deed both indicate 66.33’ of frontage. \textsuperscript{10}  As the trial court noted:
[brief] This argument was flatly rejected by the Appellate Division.  *Id.* at *2*.  In rejecting this argument, the Appellate Division acknowledged that “[u]nder common law, residential property owners have no duty to clear the snow and ice from public sidewalks abutting their land. ”  *Id.* at *2* (citing *Qian v. Toll Bros. Inc.*, 223 N.J. 124, 135 (2015), and *Luchejko v. City of Hoboken*, 207 N.J. 191, 201 (2011)).  The Appellate Division went on to state that “[i]f a property owner decides to remove snow from a public sidewalk, he or she will not be liable to a person who is injured on the sidewalk ‘unless through [the owner’s] negligence a new element of danger or hazard, other than the one caused by natural forces, [was] added to the safe use of the sidewalk by a pedestrian. ’”  *Id.* at *2* (citing *Luchejko*, supra, 207 N.J. at 201.)  [Emphasis added.]  “As such, if a sidewalk had been cleared and the melting snow subsequently froze into a layer of ice, the ‘refreeze’ would not be an ‘element of danger or hazard other than one caused by natural forces. ’”  *Ibid.* (quoting *Luchejko*, supra, 207 N.J. at 201.)
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellant [...] appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on November 10, 2022, by the Honorable [...], Presiding Judge of the Civil Division, Mercer County.  Plaintiff served in the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) from 1986 until retiring on May 1, 2016, to work for the State of Hawaii, Department of Health, beginning the next day, May 2, 2016.  (Pa248-249; Pa256; Pa289).  Dillon had applied for the position in Hawaii as early as August 7, 2015, and had secured the position by January 27, 2016.  (Pa394; Pa396).  While at the DEP, plaintiff, who identifies as a male, served as a Section Chief in the Bureau of Safe Drinking Water.  (Pa245).  He worked directly under defendant [...].  (Pa249).  Krietzman worked directly under defendant [...].  (Pa249).  On January 29, 2015, Dillon disregarded the instructions of his supervisors about a public speech he gave at Rutgers University, and then used a profane reference when lecturing in his capacity as DEP representative.
[directive] Subject: Drug Court - Voluntary Application Case Flow Policy and Backlog Standard Date: October 16, 2018  This directive promulgates the attached voluntary application case flow policy and backlog standards for the New Jersey Adult Drug Court program, approved by the Judicial as Council.  To assist reducing the overall criminal backlog and to expedite the processing of drug in court cases, the Drug Court Advisory Committee developed case processing standards and an accompanying flow chart.  This policy establishes a time standard of 45 days from the filing of the application to entry of the guilty plea.  Applications not determined within 45 days after the date that the application was filed will backlog status and reflected a drug court be in in backlog report.  The case flow policy also creates interim deadlines for the clinical evaluation; the state's response to the application, including any objection; any necessary hearings; and the plea.  Questions regarding this directive may be directed [...], Statewide Drug to Court Manager, via email at [...] or by telephone at [...].  Attachments flow and (Policy chart)
[brief] --- 59 Ardan v. Bd. of Rev., 231 N.J. 589, 609–10 (2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted)  60 Pa232 – Pa266 E.  Under the second prong of the implied retroactive application test, [...]’s claims fail because the retroactive application will result in either an unconstitutional interference with vested rights or a manifest injustice.
[brief] A. Jud., Law, Pub. Safety & Def. Comm. Statement to S. 184 (June 1, 1992)  ................................................................................Da91-92  Legislative History for L. 2001, c. 216 ..................................................Da86-92  Final Text Of Bill ..............................................................................Da93-95  S. Law & Pub. Safety Comm. Statement to S. 1504 (Mar. 15, 2001)  ....Da96  Press Release, Office of the Governor, “[...] Signs Law To Keep Guns Out Of The Hands Of Violent Criminals, Establishes Mandatory Minimum Five-Year Prison Terms” (Aug. 21, 2001)
[brief] **[...] MISUNDERSTAND’S TRUPIANO’S ARGUMENT CONCERNING EQUITY**  [...]’s argument is not that [...] is “barred” from filing for a hardship application.  Nor does [...] argue that the “investment” in real property was destroyed.  Rather, [...] argues that the investment was transformed and as part of that transformation, [...] changed the manner in which it would receive its return on investment from income generated from the rent roll of 11 apartments to 11 condominiums, the value of which lay in being sold, not rented.
[brief] ”  (DA363).  No issues or objections were raised during the attorney-review period to the Arbitration Provision or any other SPA provision.  (Id.)  A Certificate of Occupancy (“CO”) for the Unit was issued to Plaintiffs’ Counsel via e-mail on October 8, 2020.  (DA366).  Plaintiffs did not request access to the unit and were never physically present in the unit for the purposes of inspection or obtaining measurements of the dimensions inside the unit in anticipation of closing.  (DA393).  On November 15, 2021, Counsel for [...] issued a letter to Plaintiffs’ Counsel, [...], reminding him that a CO was issued for the Unit and requested confirmation of Plaintiffs’ intent to close.
[brief] A.  Conversion claims Counts 5 and 6 alleged the tort of conversion against [...] (Count 5 only).  [...] (Count 6 only) and [...] LLC, [...], [...] and [...] (Counts 5 and 6).  Da42-43.  It is a "general rule of tort law" that "liability must be based on personal fault."  Walker v. Choudhary, 425 N.J. Super. 135, 149 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 211 N.J. 274 (2012).  N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-1 defines "joint tortfeasors" as "two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury."  Yet, the judgment was entered against defendants who are clearly not liable for the torts alleged in Counts 5 and 6.  B.