ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Further, inter-state regulatory variation is a hallmark principle of historical gun laws—and of our Nation’s regulatory tradition more broadly.  Because legislatures need not “maximally exercise[] their power to regulate,” Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1925 (Barrett, J., concurring), there is always a range of regulatory options constitutionally available to States, meaning that different States can adopt different gun laws—all consistent with the Second Amendment.  See, e.g., Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1900-01 (describing surety and “going-armed” --- 3  Consistent with Rule 1:36-3, the State has appended a copy of this unpublished opinion to this brief.
[brief] Ass’n ex rel. Mizichko, 202 N.J. 268 (2010) | 24, 33, 40, 41 | | Local No. 153, Office & Prof. Emps. Int’l Union v. Tr. Co. of N.J., 105 N.J. 442 (1987) | 40 | | Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995) | 24 | New Jersey Tpke. Auth. v. Local 196, IFPTE, 190 N.J. 283 (2007).................. 25 PBA Local 160 v. Township of North Brunswick, 272 N.J. Super. 467 (App. Div. 1994)................................................................. 27, 28, 29, 31, 39 Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. City of Trenton, 205 N.J. 422 (2011)........................................................................................................... 25, 27 Port Auth. Police Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n of N.Y., N.J. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 340 N.J. Super. 453 (App. Div. 2001)......................  25 Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531 (2019).....................................................  24 Serico v. Rothberg, 234 N.J. 168 (2018) ...............................................................  24 State v. State Supervisory Emp. Ass’n, 78 N.J. 54 (1978)....................................  42 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960)..................  25 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) ........................................................................................................  25 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ........................................................................................................  25 STATUTES N.J.S.A. 2A:24–1 to –11 .........................................................................................
[brief] [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], Defendants-Respondent.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No.: [...]  On Appeal From SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION, MERCER COUNTY  Docket No.: [...] Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq.
[brief] Well before the PSA was signed, eminent domain was not a mere theoretical possibility; to Defendant, it was a known fact.  He testified that the State's efforts to acquire the Olga's property began in 2004.  On June 12, 2008, the [...] filed a complaint for the condemnation of parts of the Olga's property by eminent domain.  In September, 2008, the court granted the [...] the right to proceed by eminent domain.  It was not until six months later that the parties signed their PSA on April 10, 2009, but Defendant told Plaintiff nothing about it.  Defendant’s actions in entering into the PSA were duplicitous and fraudulent.  In persisting in his position based on the slimmest of technicalities, Defendant has doubled-down on his bad faith.  Although the Trial Court made no findings as to Plaintiff’s contract reformation claim, it referred to Defendant’s “intentions and actions” as “very questionable at best. ”  3T30.  SUBPOINT B
[brief] This matter is presented on appeal from a summary judgment Order of the Superior Court, Law Division, Morris County vicinage.  On June 28, 2024, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., (Ret.), entered an Order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants/respondents [...] and [...].  (Hereinafter referred to as “Respondents”).  The case involves a slip and fall on a sidewalk outside an unoccupied property where the appellant suffered serious personal injuries.  We respectfully submit that the Trial Court’s decision was erroneous for two reasons.  First, there were material facts in dispute resolved by Trial Court in favor of the movant, in violation of the standards set forth in Brill v. Guardian Life, 142 N.J. 520, 522 (1995).  Second, we respectfully submit that the law applied by the Trial Court was inappropriate because the property involved in plaintiff’s injury was neither a private residence nor was it a classic “commercial property. ”  As a result, the duties that apply to the respondent’s conduct should, respectfully, be revisited by this Court.  This matter involves a claim for serious personal injuries that occurred when the plaintiff/appellant slipped and fell on a snowy/icy sidewalk on February 18, 2021.  The reason this case does not present the typical winter weather, fall-down personal injury case is because it involves some unusual facts.  We submit that the property involved in this case was not a “residence” at the time of the accident, and instead was an unoccupied commercial-like property under renovation.  In fact, the facts demonstrated that the property was unoccupied from October 2020 to August 2021.  Therefore, we submit that the law that would typically guide the court regarding a residential fall-down on snow and ice is not applicable -- we submit that the property is more properly characterized as either a commercial property under construction or a hybrid type of property status that would require the respondent to keep the area clear.  We submit that the property could not be a residence, however, because the term “residence” necessarily contemplates the concept of “domicile” and clearly that was not the case here.  As outlined below, and according to the testimony of the defendant [...], on the date of the accident, the property was not occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Annese until six months later, at some time in August 2021.
[brief] *R.*  4:42-2(a) provides:  If an order would be subject to process to enforce a judgment pursuant to *R.*  4:59 if it were final and if the trial court certifies that there is no just reason for delay of such enforcement, the trial court may direct the entry of final judgment upon fewer than all the claims as to all parties, but only in the following circumstances: (1) upon a complete adjudication of a separate claim; or (2) upon complete adjudication of all the rights and liabilities asserted in the litigation as to any party; or (3) where a partial summary judgment or other order for payment of part of a claim is awarded.
[brief] ”  (Da34)  Plaintiffs’ cross-motion was neither withdrawn nor denied as moot; hence, both defendant’s motion to bar and plaintiffs’ cross-motion were argued on August 27, 2021.  Following oral argument, [...] denied plaintiffs’ cross-motion to designate [...] as their new trial expert.  (Pa16).  [...] gave multiple reasons.  First, he found that plaintiffs did not need a new expert because defendant had withdrawn his motion to bar [...].  1T9-1 to 4; 11-12 to 18.  Second, at the time of oral argument, the case was over three years old.  1T10-24 to 11-2.  Plaintiffs had already served their expert reports and several expert depositions had been completed but many remained to be scheduled.  Permitting plaintiff to replace [...] with a new expert would have caused delays in moving forward with expert depositions.  1T11-1 to 25.  The latest case management order at the time of the oral argument, signed by the Honorable [...], had set a deadline of October 17, 2021 for expert depositions to be completed.  (Pa220)  [...] noted that if plaintiffs were permitted to substitute [...], this deadline would not be met.  1T10-18 to 11-18).  --- 4
[brief] While the Humane Society decision may have adjudicated the constitutionality of the appointment provisions in N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24 on the basis that they did not violate the due process and equal protection rights of the plaintiffs therein, the case did not deal with the validity of statutes delegating regulatory authority to the Council.  N.J.S.A. 13:1B-27, 28, 30, 31, and 32(a).  Acknowledging that the Court in U.S. Sportsmen’s Alliance Foundation v. N.J. Dept. of Env. Prot., 182 N.J. 461 (2005) determined that the Council must exercise its regulatory authority pursuant to comprehensive policies approved by the Commissioner of the DEP, the Council nevertheless retained substantial regulatory authority over bear propagation.  The Legislature has granted the Council “substantial independence”.
[brief] The State relied upon the testimony of several other witnesses to whom defendant had made admissions.  This included defendant’s ex-girlfriends, [...] and [...], his friend [...], [...] and the hospital nurse, [...].  Defendant chose not to take the stand at the retrial.  (5T81-15 to 17).  It follows that defendant’s request below for a jury charge on passion/provocation manslaughter, (5T84-19 to 22), was based on a different ---
[brief] In Englert, the indemnity clause required a subcontractor to indemnify the general contractor and the property owner for losses to the extent caused by the subcontractor, “regardless of whether it [the loss] is caused in part by a party to be indemnified hereunder.  Ibid.  The Englert court ruled that the indemnity clause was ambiguous.  Ibid.  Specifically, the phrase “regardless of whether” the loss was caused in part by a party to be indemnified “did not distinguish between allowing indemnification for the negligence of others and allowing indemnification for [the indemnitee’s] own negligence. ”  Id. at 56.  Thus, the clause “can be read simply to eliminate the common law condition” that a party seeking indemnification be free of fault.  Ibid.; see also Mantilla, 167 N.J. at 272 (stating that common law principle that indemnitee may not recover for its own fault is “a ‘default rule’ that parties to a contract may choose to override by expressing such an intention in unequivocal terms”).
[brief] (See 2T20:18-25 and 2T21:1-8).  The Court Below specifically set forth all facts relevant to a determination on Plaintiff’s Motion.  In sum, they clearly show that [...] had no improper interest in nor participation in this matter.  They further show that the Judge acted in an unbiased manner.  In fact, it is worth noting that the Court Below conferenced this matter prior to/during oral argument on the Borough’s Motion to Dismiss in an attempt to amicably resolve this dispute.  (See generally 1T1 to 1T15).  The Court even went so far as to affirmatively ask on the record that the Borough maintain an open-mind with regards to the settlement (which was left sitting unsigned by Plaintiff for years) even after a determination was made by the Court Below.  (See 1T14:23-25 and 1T15:1-4).  There can be no doubt that the Court Below showed empathy and patience in the face of Plaintiff’s intransigence and unwillingness to compromise, only thereafter ruling on the merits of the Borough’s Motion to Dismiss. \(^1\)  Thus, Plaintiff has absolutely no basis upon which to rest these entirely baseless accusations against the Trial Judge.  Plaintiff was extended every courtesy and instead leveled unfounded accusations of bias against the Court Below all because Plaintiff seemingly cannot comprehend the law and was disappointed with the determination to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice as time barred.  See Marshall, 148 N.J. at 186 (“[B]ias \(^1\) A review of the hearing transcript (see generally 1T) shows that [...] had nothing but empathy for, and showed courtesy and patience to, the Plaintiff.  Thus, while not asserting this argument, the only party which has a basis to argue an “appearance of bias” would be the Borough. is not established by the fact that a litigant is disappointed in a court’s ruling on an issue. ”).  Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse was entirely misplaced and inappropriate.  Plaintiff presented nothing to the Court Below that warranted recusal.  Plaintiff simply alleged bias without presenting any sort of evidence of same seemingly because the Court Below determined Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed on Statute of Limitations grounds.  No other conclusion can be deduced from Plaintiff’s maneuvering except that Plaintiff simply disagreed with the Court Below and sought to “Judge shop” in some sort of Machiavellian-esque scheme for a more favorable disposition.  Accordingly, the decision of the Court Below regarding the Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal is soundly rested upon the legal principles and objective standard for recusal and therefore should be AFFIRMED.
[brief] See id.  Contrary to a private corporation engaged in the sale of goods or services, a municipality cannot seek a profit through supplying water to residents.  See K.S.B. Tech. Sales, 75 N.J. at 288 (recognizing that government entities involved in supplying potable water “operate[] at cost”); Mayor & Mun. Council of Clifton, 224 N.J. Super. at 66 (“The Commission must operate for the benefit of the public it serves and not for the purpose of collecting profits .  . . .  The concept of profit is anathema to the public interest. ”) (emphasis added); [...], 103 N.J. Super. at 549 (“It is, of course, clear that the [...] is not a private corporation seeking to make a profit. ”) (emphasis added).  Thus, a municipality distributing water – a resource within the public trust, held and managed for the benefit of the public – is engaged in an essential government function performed for the public benefit, not in the proprietary “sale” of a good or service for profit.  See K.S.B. Tech. Sales, 75 N.J. at 288 (recognizing government treatment and supply of potable water to be a “governmental function”, not a “commercial enterprise”).  4.  **Case Law Discussing Municipal Supply of Water as a Proprietary Function is Outdated and Distinguishable.**
[directive] Theft is a firearm or motor vehicle or boat or domestic animal or property is taken from the person 3rd Degree $5,000 to $20,000  10% permissible 2b(2)(a)(b)(d) of victim.  4th Degree  $1,000 to $2,500  10% permissible  2C:20-3/2C:20-  Actor unlawfully takes property valued at least $200 but not more than $500, fourth degree.
[directive] Actor has sexual activity with another person in exchange for something of economic value; promoting prostitution or owning or controlling a house of prostitution or soliciting another to 2C:34-1  Prostitution become a prostitute; second or third or fourth degree depending upon circumstances, 3rd Degree $5,000 to $15,000 10% permissible including whether a child under 18 is involved; disorderly persons offense if actor is charged only with engaging in prostitution.  4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible 67
[brief] Defendant’s trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing held before the PCR court below.  Counsel said that “the general defense was [...] never possessed or shot any gun, he was actually the victim upon entering the bodega or the store.  The people in the store attacked him. ”  1T12.  Q  Do you recall during the trial the State presenting a ballistics expert?  A  I do believe they put on a ballistics expert, yes.  Q  Do you recall if you cross-examined that expert at all?  A  I do not believe I did.  Q  Do you have an explanation as to why you did not cross-examine that ballistics expert?  A  Well, the theory of the defense’s case was that [...] never possessed, never had the gun, never shot the gun, so ballistics wouldn’t have -- any questions towards a ballistics expert wouldn’t have been helpful or useful.  They wouldn’t have been able to say who shot the gun and who possessed the gun, just whether, and this may not be totally accurate, but whether casings matched with the -- the gun that was recovered, but nothing in terms of who actually fired the weapon.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 214-15.  Further, the overall strength of the State’s case that the wallet ID was a “public record” or a “public writing” was undeniable.  On its reverse side, the ID not only stated that it was the property of [...], but also that “return postage” was “guaranteed” if the ID was found by a member of the public.  (Pa29).  The jury was instructed that the crime was one of the third degree if the stolen item “is a public record, writing or instrument kept . . . according to law with or in keeping of any public office. ”  (20T197-15 to 23 (emphasis added; ellipsis added)).  Here, the jury surely knew the ID was “kept” by [...], in light of the evidence of [...]’s collection of all of defendant’s IDs at the time he was suspended.  B.
[brief] The facts relevant to the current appeal are as follows:  The incident that is the subject matter of the present case took place on January 19, 2018.  (Pa 10)  On that date, Appellant was employed by [...] as an electrician, working out of Hoboken New Jersey.  (Pa 53)  On the date in question, [...] was a homeless woman present in the [...] Newark Broad Street Station.  (Pa 120)  At approximately 12:11 PM, Appellant was waiting on the platform to board a train to Hoboken.  (Pa 54)  Bailey approached Appellant and asked him for a cigarette.  (Id)  Appellant responded to Bailey, telling her he did not smoke.  (Id.)  Bailey walked away from Appellant.  (Id.)  Shortly thereafter, Bailey punched Appellant from behind, in the head.  (Pa 55)  Appellant fell forward on to the train.  (Id.)  A very short time after falling, Appellant stood up and “tried to get [Bailey]”  By that time, two [...] had interceded.  (Id.)  Prior to the incident, Appellant did not observe Bailey to be acting unusually or in a threatening manner.  (Id.)  The incident was witnessed by the [...] conductor who, likewise, did not observe any threatening behavior from Bailey prior to the incident.  (Pa 82)  Appellant had seen Bailey at the station before, but never reported any violent or unusual behavior about her to anyone.  (Pa 55)  Appellant did not file charges against Bailey.  (Pa 58)  After the incident, Bailey was removed from the station by EMS and was determined to be “emotionally unstable. ”  (Pa 109)  After the incident, Appellant boarded his train to Hoboken.  (Pa 58)  Upon arrival in Hoboken, Appellant reported the incident to his supervisor.  (Id.)  Appellant then went to [...] for treatment.  (Pa 59)  Appellant was given an x-ray and a CT scan at the hospital.  (Id.)  Neither scan showed anything significant.  (Id.)  **Legal Argument**
[brief] Personal service upon [...] was effectuated through a process service company [...], who utilized its server [...] to personally serve [...].  16a; 14a.  [...] testified in both deposition and at trial --- 3  All citations to “a” pages refer to Appellant’s Appendix. that he served as a process server for about 20 years or so T4 8:7-17; T4 10:2-3.  He testified as to his past employment and current employment.  He testified regarding his actions and recollection of the events here.  He testified that since he served hundreds of times per week, he did not recall specific details as to this specific job but that his notes and the electronic records were clear.  He testified as to his standard actions and procedures for all of his service jobs, and that there was no known deviation here.  T4 8:18 to 9:13; T4 17:10 to 19:22; T4 20:2 to 22:15; T4 24:18 to 25:22; T4 26:5-18; T4 28:17 to 29:21; T4 32:19 to 35:3.
[brief] ”  Plaintiff’s complaint of August 17, 2022, does not include the certification of either the public officer, tax collector or “accompanied by a report and sworn statement by an individual holding appropriate licensure or professional qualifications.  . .”  A court’s aim is to “effectuate the Legislature’s intent,” ascribing to the statute’s words, “their ordinary meaning and significance and reading them in the context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.
[brief] He described his conversation with [...] as follows:  I spoke with her about the incident approximately, like two shifts after.  And I was sitting house watch, which is our front door desk, and this was immediately after -- or this was the evening after I sat in on a second training with [...].  And she came downstairs.  And, I assume, maybe she heard or that I was very bothered in there, and she offered her support and she was consoling with me, like, which was -- it was nice of her, I thought.  She talked -- we talked about it.
[brief] [...]’s resulting “Final Judgment” does not reflect the evidence that the [...] were not given the chance to present.  The judgment does not determine whether the loan was falsely placed in default status, as the [...] charged it was.  The judgment does not determine whether the loan was falsely assigned to a foreclosure enforcement assignment in 2009, as plaintiff’s own witness, [...], acknowledged in his testimony.  [...] said only that the [...] have never been in default but made no determination that the enforcement assignment to trust/trustee in 2009 was erroneous – as plaintiff’s witness, [...], indicated.  The [...] wanted the Chancery court to declare that the 2009 assignment to the trustee/trust was erroneous, and order that said assignment be removed from the recorded registry in its entirety – a critical remedy for the [...].
[directive] Defensive Tactics & Pain Compliance Techniques.  Pain compliance techniques may be effective in controlling a passive or active resistor.  Officers may only apply pain compliance techniques for which the officer has received department approved training and only when the officer reasonably believes that the use of such a technique is necessary to further a legitimate law enforcement purpose.  Officers utilizing any pain compliance technique should consider the totality of the circumstances including, but not limited to, the following: (a) the potential for injury to the officer(s) or others if the technique is not used; (b) the potential risk of serious injury to the individual being controlled; (c) whether the pain compliance technique is effective in achieving an appropriate level of control or a different technique should be employed; (d) the nature of the offense involved; 8 USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2020
[brief] No witness identified any people or vehicles of interest in S-41, but the State argued in summation that the video shows the shooter entering the Chevy and driving away.  (4T177-19 to 20, 182-15 to 20) (7T86-8 to 10) when he heard gunshots.  (4T47-4 to 15)  He testified that he drove a white Honda Accord.  (4T17-15 to 18)  On the evening of July 6, he saw someone run and get into a dark-colored vehicle, but he was not able to make out details of the person except that they were wearing a hoodie.  (4T47-16 to 21, 64-8 to 13)  [...] followed the vehicle until it reached Route 1 & 9, at which point he stopped trailing the car.  (4T49-1 to 53-12)  He took a “blurry” photo on his phone, but could not make out the license plate number.  (4T54-1 to 2)  A cellphone image sent from [...]’s cellphone number depicting the back of a black car was admitted into evidence and published to the jury.  (2T158-9 to 160-1)  (Da15)  The State presented testimony from an expert in historical cell-site analysis.
[brief] In Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J. 398 (2001), a defendant physician twice misread reports of her patient's pregnancy tests, mistaking --- Footnote 1 of the Model Charge states: "This charge is equally appropriate for other professionals, such as: engineers, land surveyors, professional planners, etc."  specimen identification numbers for the actual test results, wrongly declaring the patient pregnant, and performing inappropriate procedures as a result of her mistake.  The Supreme Court reversed dismissal on summary judgment below and reinstated plaintiff's case for trial, despite her lack of an expert report, under the common knowledge doctrine.  In a case closely on point to ours, Bryan v. Shah, 351 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.N.J., 2005), Senior Federal District Court Judge [...] denied a motion by defendant [...] ([...]) to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of an expert report.