[brief] First, [...] was transported by officers to the police station.  See, e.g., Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 271 (“defendant acceded to the detective’s request to come to the police station”); Pearson, 318 N.J. Super. at 130 (investigators “put defendant in the back of their unmarked vehicle and drove her to the prosecutor’s office”); Ahmad, 246 N.J. at 613-14 (defendant was “placed in the back of a patrol car,” where “arrestees are normally held”).  Second, the interrogation took place in a traditional police interrogation room, an inherently coercive environment.  See, e.g., Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 271 (“defendant was directed to an interrogation room”); Stott, 171 N.J. at 366-67 (“defendant was subjected to an incommunicado interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere”); Pearson, 318 N.J. Super. at 134 (prosecutor’s office was an “inherently coercive physical environment”); Godfrey, 131 N.J. Super. at 177 (“defendant’s interrogation occurred in a room cut off from the outside world; a police-dominated atmosphere”).  Third, detectives sat between [...] and the door, a reminder that he needed to move past them to leave.  See, e.g., Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 271 (“officer positioned himself between defendant and the door”); Pearson, 318 N.J. Super. at 130 (investigators “seated themselves on either side of her”).  Fourth, detectives in the small interrogation room outnumbered [...] two to one.  See, e.g., Pearson, 318 N.J. Super. at 130 (same).  Fifth, detectives administered a formal oath to [...], and required him to speak the truth.  See, e.g., Pearson, 318 N.J. Super. at 131, 134 (“defendant was warned of the solemnity of the oath, was sworn to tell the truth, and was then asked questions designed to elicit incriminating responses”).  Sixth, the nature of the questioning conveyed that [...] was a suspect, because detectives focused on his relationship with and communications with [...], factors relevant to motive, and on his movements at the time of the homicide, factors relevant to opportunity to commit the offense.  See, e.g., Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 272 (“detective asked defendant to account for all of his movements”); Pearson, 318 N.J. Super. at 134 (“nature of the questions”).  Seventh, detectives used photographic evidence to repeatedly confront [...] about a theory that implicated him in the homicide, namely that their suspected perpetrator walked from [...] to [...]’s driveway.  Moreover, detectives directly expressed to [...] that they believed he was that suspected perpetrator, in at least four ways: (i) they repeated asked [...] to confirm that he did not come from the direction of John F. [...]; (ii) they repeatedly asked [...] to confirm that their suspect was not him; (iii) they repeatedly told [...] that their suspect was captured on video in front of [...]’s house and driveway and yard; and (iv) they told [...] that the suspect appeared bald and that [...] appeared bald.  These repeated queries sent the unmistakable message that detectives did not believe [...]’s continued pleas of ignorance about the identity of that individual.  See, e.g., Stott, 171 N.J. at 365 (“there were objective indications that defendant was a suspect”); Pearson, 318 N.J. Super. at 134 (“a reasonable person in defendant’s position would have realized she was a target … and was not free to leave”); Godfrey, 131 N.J. Super. at 177 (a reasonable person would have understood detectives believed they “were in possession of information” that “defendant was actually the man who shot” the victim).