ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  The Parties are Governed by the 1999 Agreement  It is well settled that in order for a valid contract there must be four (4) elements that are shown to exist between the parties.  There must be an offer, the offer must be accepted, there must be consideration, and performance by the parties to the contract.  Johnson & Johnson v. Charmley Drug Co., 11 N.J. 526, 539 (1953); County of Morris v. Fauver 153 N.J. 409 (1993).  A breach of contract occurs when one party fails to adhere to its obligations under the contract, and the other party has both lived up to its obligations under the contract, and has been damaged by the breach.  Murphy v. Implicito, 392 N.J. Super. 245, 265 (App. Div. 2007).  In situations such as the present matter wherein the issue involves contract interpretation, the plain language of the contract shall govern if there exists no ambiguity.  Township of White v. Castle Ridge Dev. Corp., 419 N.J. Super. 68, 74-75 (App. Div. 2011).  Clear and unambiguous language should control.  Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 202 (1999).  Most importantly, interpretation of a contract is a question of law that should be decided by the court.  *Hess Corp. v. ENI Petroleum US, LLC.*, 435 N.J. Super. 39, 59 (App. Div. 2014).  The court may not rewrite a contract or grant a better deal than for which the parties expressly bargained.  *Solondz v. Kornmehl*, 3147 N.J. Super. 16, 21 (App. Div. 1993).  In the present matter the controlling contract is clear, and therefore, should be enforced upon the plain language of the contract.  Application of the clear language of the contract demonstrates that there was no breach by the [...] and the [...] is entitled to the subject connection fees.
[brief] There, the Court permitted a parole officer who “had met with defendant more than thirty times” to identify him as the person in footage, finding her opinion met both prongs under N.J.R.E. 701.  247 N.J.at 469.  Under the first prong, the officer’s identification was “rationally based on [her] perception” because those meetings showed she had “bec[o]me familiar with defendant’s appearance” during the relevant period.  *Ibid.*  Under the second prong, the Court held her testimony would “assist the trier of fact,” identifying four factors courts should consider in analyzing that prong.  First, “the nature, duration, and timing of the witness’s contacts with the defendant are important considerations” in determining if it will assist the jury. ”  *Id.* at 470.  Second, where “there has been a change in the defendant’s appearance since the offense at issue,” a witness with knowledge of the defendant’s appearance at the time of the offense may assist the jury.
[brief] CS 327 IS CONSISTENT WITH THE GOALS AND PURPOSES OF THE HIGHLANDS ACT (RESPONDING TO APPELLANTS’ POINT I)  Exemption #11 authorizes “the routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of public utility lines, rights of way, or systems, by a public utility, provided that the activity is consistent with the goals and purposes of the [Highlands Act].”  N.J.S.A. 13:20-28a(11)(emphasis added).
[brief] State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 389 (N.J. 2015) ("An appellate court should engage in a "searching and critical" review of the record when it is faced with a trial court's admission of police-obtained statements to ensure protection of a defendant's constitutional rights.  Legal Argument – Point 2 -  Prosecution should be disqualified and denied from further participating in all matters of this appeal going forward.  (Prb cover page, Prb12)  The prosecutor’s request to deny my appeal is ironic.  This is because the prosecutor oddly disqualified herself from this appeal when she wrote in her brief, Please accept this letter memorandum, pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b), in lieu of a more formal brief submitted on behalf of the State of New Jersey.  (Prb Cover page)  [Emphasis on “letter memorandum”]  [...], 041202006  Assistant Prosecutor Director, Appellate Section Of Counsel and On the **Letter Brief** (Prb12)  [Emphasis on “letter brief”]  *State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244, 265 (N.J. 2022)* ("See N.J.S.A. 1:1-1 ("In the construction of the laws and statutes of this state, both civil and criminal, words and phrases ... shall, unless inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or unless another or different meaning is expressly indicated, be given their generally accepted meaning, according to the approved usage of the language.").")  The prosecutor mistakenly interpreted court rule 2:6-2(b) to apply to the respondent.  Court rule 2:6-2 does not apply to the respondent aka prosecutor.
[directive] Upon final disposition of the complaint, in cases where the officer was not notified of the outcome through some written form of discipline, the officer shall be notified of the outcome of the case through a written internal agency communication.  6.3.18  In all cases, a letter shall be sent to the complainant explaining the outcome of the investigation.  If the allegation was unfounded or the officer was exonerated, this conclusion shall be stated and defined for the civilian complainant.  If the allegation was not sustained, the letter shall provide the complainant with a brief explanation why the complaint was not sustained (e.g., insufficient proof, lack of witnesses, etc.).  If the allegation was sustained and discipline was imposed, the letter shall state that the allegation was sustained and that the officer has been disciplined according to agency procedures.
[brief] THE COUNTY SHERIFF AND HIS EMPLOYEES AS COUNTY (MUNICIPAL)  EMPLOYEES  The Letter-Brief filed by defense [...] on behalf of his clients frivolously argues (at Db6):  "Appellant's complaint is not one challenging an action by a municipal body, rather it is an acting seeking to enforce a right to adjournments.  "There is no challenge to any municipal or state action that would bring this matter to the Court's attention as a prerogative writ action."  This argument is without merit in light of New Jersey Statutes and Case Law.  It is obviously a frivolous argument as [...] cannot prove that the defendant [...] (Sheriff) is not a State Officer.  [...] cannot prove that the defendant [...], [...]; Clerk #3 and [...] are not County (Municipal) Employees.  [...] cannot prove that the [...] is not a local unit.  [...] cannot prove that the [...] is not a part of the [...], which is a municipal body.  "While the label "constitutional officer" is appropriately applied to the sheriff, it is meaningful only to the extent that the Constitution provides meaning.  In fact, the Constitution does little more than to establish election as the means for becoming a sheriff, while limiting the term of office to three years.  Arguably, the sheriff is a "State officer," as that term is used in Art. VII, § 3, par. 1 of the Constitution, so that he may be removed from office by impeachment.  It has been so held in Shusted v. Coyle, 139 N.J. Super. 314 (Law Div. 1976), and in Doyle v. Warren Cty., 15 N.J. Misc. 434 (Circ.Ct. 1937).
[brief] For the reasons set forth herein, Respondent [...] submits that there is no reversible error made by Honorable [...], A.J.S.C., and, therefore, His Honor’s Order should be affirmed.  Dated: November 12, 2024  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent J. Fletcher [...] & Son, Inc.  [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
[brief] Notably, comment (e) to § 509 states that stallions are traditionally not subject to strict liability due to their social utility, the long history of their use, and the intrinsic relationship between their virility and function.  Section 509, comment (e) acknowledges that stallions are more dangerous than mares and geldings, but still the Restatement’s authors do not consider stallions to be abnormally dangerous: > e.  Animals in which dangerous propensities are normal.  There are certain classes of domestic animals in which dangerous propensities are normal although abnormal in other classes of their species.  Bulls are more dangerous than cows and steers; stallions are more dangerous than mares and geldings; rams are more dangerous than ewes and lambs.
[brief] Defendant-Respondents [...], [...], and [...] (the “[...]”) submit this opposition to the June 5, 2024, Appellate Brief filed by Plaintiff-Appellant [...] (“[...]” or “Appellant”).  [...] appeals from the Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. dismissing Appellant’s Complaint and denying Appellant’s Motion to Amend its Complaint.  For the reasons set forth herein, [...]’ appeal should be dismissed.  On January 13, 2015, the Appellant entered into a contract (the “January As-Is Contract”) to purchase property located at [...] (the “Property”), as-is.  Since entering the January As-Is Contract, the Appellant has gone to great lengths to revisit the purchase of the Property.  This appeal is yet another attempt to re-litigate the very same issues and facts that were already presented before multiple other jurists, including the Court below, and were each time found to have no merit.  Accordingly, the [...] respectfully request that this Court dismiss [...]’ appeal and affirm the prior ruling of the Trial Court pursuant to the doctrines of judicial estoppel, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] “The Board finds that certain Goals and Objectives of the 2018 Plan would be contravened by the approval of the application.  More particularly, the 2018 Plan references the Objective of “Preserving and protecting the residential character…by restricting incompatible land uses…from established residential areas, and limiting intensities of use to the levels, and locations, prescribed therein” (Id. at p. 11).  The Policy Statement associated with this Goal notes that attached residential development should only be permitted in those areas specified in the Plan and should be precluded from other areas.  The residential component associated with the application, the Board finds, would be contrary to this objective.  Pa139 at ¶13.  “… the within application continues to violate the Goal of providing buffer zones to separate incompatible land uses (see 2018 Master Plan at page 13)…continues to provide a distance of only ten (10) feet from the building to the rear yards of property along [...].  This proposed condition …would, in the Board’s opinion, violate the Objective of the Master Plan that an appropriate buffer zone be provided to separate incompatible land use from single- family residences.  In the Board’s opinion, the plan as proposed would clearly violate this Goal.
[brief] The Court further noted that an “agency has inherent power to waive de minimis violations of objective standards. ”  Id., citing SMB Assocs v. Department of Envtl. Prot., 264 N.J. Super 38, 59 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 137 N.J. 58 (1994).  The Court reversed the decision of the Board, noting that even though the letter was never received by [...], even if it had been, the notice was improper and late.  In this matter, like [...], the Board failed to provide timely, adequate, or proper notice of the Ricci Act.
[brief] An Essex County Taxpayer Resident Has Constitutional, Statutory and Common Law Standing to Compel the [...] and the [...] to Account and to Collect All Statutory Long Term Tax Exemption Revenues Due the [...] under Post April 17, 1992 State Laws, Rules and Regulations.(Pa80,Pa82,Pa84,Pa86,Pa89,1T).  On April 27, 2023, the trial court and defendants extinguished an aggrieved party’s constitutional “as of right” to judicially challenge municipal action.  The Prerogative Writs Clause (Article VI, Section 6, paragraph 4) applies “as of right” to all levels of government: State, County or Municipal.  A Rule 4:69 action in lieu of prerogative writ serves as an adequate constitutional means for aggrieved third party taxpayers to seek judicial review of and relief from alleged ultra vires actions.  See, Alexander’s v. Paramus Bor., 125 N.J. 100 (1991) (holding that the scope of statutory jurisdiction accorded to the Council on Affordable Housing did not extinguish an aggrieved party’s constitutional right to judicially challenge municipal action).  But to bring an action in lieu of prerogative writs, an aggrieved plaintiff must show that the appeal could have been brought under one of the common law prerogative writs: e.g. mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition, and certiorari.  Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011); Loigman v. Tp. Com. of Middletown, 297 N.J. Super. 287 (App. Div. 1997); Ward v. Keenan, 3 N.J. 298, 303 (1949).  According to Black’s Law Dictionary (Fifth Edition), “mandamus” is the name of a writ (formerly a high prerogative writ) which issues from a court of superior jurisdiction, and is directed to a private or municipal corporation, or any of its officers, or to an executive, administrative or judicial officer, or to an inferior court, commanding the performance of a particular act therein specified, and belonging to his or their public, official, or ministerial duty, or directing the restoration of the complainant to rights or privileges of which he has been illegally deprived.
[brief] The Trial Court Properly Allowed [...]’s Testimony at Trial.  Initially, the Defendants contend that the lower court erred by denying their motion to bar or limit [...]’s testimony before commencing this bench trial, and in allowing [...]’s characterization of certain transactions at trial.  They believe the experienced trial judge sitting in the Chancery Division unable to separate the wheat from the chaff in the presentation of the evidence.  If anything, the trial court’s decision confirms that it paid close attention to the parties’ presentations, and rejected a significant component of [...]’s theory.
[brief] A copy of the pay stubs and W-2’s were introduced at trial and were ignored by both [...] during their investigation and the Court during the trial.  (See Pa 119-129)  There is nothing in the Pension legislation that eliminates all professionals being considered employees and exempt from payroll tax under all NJ Law.  Otherwise, all law firms could hire attorneys under a professional services agreement and could bypass core components of employment taxation, unemployment benefits, 401K contributions, vacation and, not to mention, the now mandatory earned sick leave.  These benefits are costly in the private sector as well.  But, the cost of the benefits is not how you analyze whether someone is an employee or an independent contractor.  The [...] printout specifically warns of the perils of Employee misclassification including significant Employer penalties and ramifications.  This is a required document to be posted by an Employer warning Employees in the workplace.  It is a simple conclusion that [...] is NOT an independent contractor.
[brief] [...] would merely vent about [...]’s management style to members of HR and other managers.  (Pa285 at 32:5-8; 290 at 50:20-51:3; Pa290 at 51:8-15).  Moreover, her complaints focused on [...]’s alleged favoritism toward other employees in 2016, a single instance in 2018 when [...] allegedly once blocked her from leaving the staffing coordinator office for a few seconds, and more general venting about [...]’s demeanor.  (Pa288-89 at 44:11-47:8; Pa289-90 at 47:9-50:19; Pa285-87 at 30:23-39:23; Pa288-91 at 44:11-53:17).  Moreover, [...] testified at her deposition that she believed she was a whistleblower because she witnessed [...] “losing it. ” (Pa300 at 90:17-25).  Critically, [...] admitted at her deposition that she did not complain about the June 24, 2020 incident between [...] and [...]. (Pa304 at 105:7-20).  The Appellate Division has found that these types of complaints do not enjoy CEPA protection.
[brief] “The substantive due process doctrine does not protect individuals from all governmental actions that infringe on liberty or injure property in violation of some law. ”  Rivkin v. Dover Twp. Rent Leveling Bd., 143 N.J. 352, 366 (1996) (citations omitted) (alterations in original).  “[S]ubstantive due process is reserved for the most egregious governmental abuses against liberty or property rights, abuses that shock the conscience or otherwise offend . . . judicial notions of fairness . . . [and that are] offensive to human dignity. ”  Ibid.  (citations omitted) (alterations in original).  The Department’s decision to issue the Permit was based on its review of the information presented to it and application of same under the CZM Rules.  Appellant’s disagreement with the Department’s ultimate decision does not equate to a due process violation.  B.
[directive] The and officers enforcement for law program training ODARA an develop shall Institute, with accordance tool in statewide ODARA a as of the implementation facilitate to prosecutors training of the components two establish shall Division  The herein. forth set procedures the who Prosecutors Assistant for training "live" mandatory (1) include shall which, program law from Liaison Officers Violence Domestic and Units Violence Domestic supervise and Prosecutors Assistant for training web-based or computer- (2) and agencies, enforcement domestic touch upon to expected be reasonably can duties whose officers enforcement sworn law the make Division shall the feasible, extent the To below. described further as incidents violence system.
[brief] Defendant disagrees with the PCR Court’s rulings but does not provide evidence that there has been an abuse of discretion or that [...]’s conclusion occurred due to a misunderstanding or misapplication of law.  1.  The PCR Court’s Rulings Pertaining to the Hard Drive Were Not in Error and Any Error Was Insufficient to Warrant  Reversal  Defendant claims that the PCR Court’s order vacating discovery orders improvidently granted by another judge was improper.
[brief] 1T19.  It was the Bank that provided Profit and Loss statements for the months of October 2021 to June 2023.  No statements were produced for the months of July 2023 through the date of the Receiver’s discharge on October 6, 2023.  Moreover, the monthly statements provided do not constitute a Final Accounting and do not provide the requisite detail necessary for a creditor to approve the receipt and disbursement of monies.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a) and (b).  Moreover, under the IFPA, all compensatory damages, defined to include investigatory expenses, costs of suit and attorneys’ fees, may be trebled.  *Allstate v. Lajara*, 222 N.J. 129, 145 (2015).  Similarly, RICO provides for treble damages, investigatory expenses, costs of suit and attorneys’ fees.  N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4(c).  Further, the New Jersey Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial for causes of action - even statutory causes of action - that sound in law rather than equity.
[brief] Contrary to Plaintiff’s contentions, the Act does not mandate coverage for intentional wrongs and does not require the [...] to cover every possible type of claim an injured worker might assert against his or her employer.  Indeed, the Act merely requires an employer to “make sufficient provisions for the complete payment of any obligation which he may incur to an injured employee, or his dependents under the provisions of said Article 2, by one of the methods hereinafter set forth in sections 34:15-77 and 34:15-78 of this title.
[brief] (Da 1 to 7).  ---  1  Da – defendant’s appendix.  1T - pretrial motion transcript dated December 20, 2013.  2T - pretrial motion transcript dated January 24, 2014.  3T - trial transcript dated June 17, 2014.  4T - trial transcript dated June 25, 2014.  5T - trial transcript dated June 26, 2014.  6T - trial transcript dated July 1, 2014.  7T - trial transcript dated July 2, 2014.  8T - trial transcript dated July 3, 2014.  9T - trial transcript dated July 8, 2014.  10T - trial transcript dated July 9, 2014.  11T - trial transcript dated July 10, 2014.  12T - trial transcript dated July 15, 2014.  13T - sentencing transcript dated September 18, 2014.  14T - post-conviction relief hearing transcript dated February 11, 2022.  15T - post-conviction relief hearing transcript dated April 8, 2022.  16T - post-conviction relief hearing transcript dated July 15, 2022.  The State agreed to sever defendant’s trial from [...], who later pled guilty to count one.
[brief] On April 11, 2020, Defense Counsel filed a Notice of Motion to Dismiss the Indictment on the grounds of: (1) due process entrapment, (2) the presentation of inappropriate, inflammatory, and prejudicial information to the Grand Jury, and (3) failure to present exculpatory evidence.  On May 4, 2020, the State responded to the motion by way of a letter brief.  Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the parties were unable to appear to argue the motion until October 28, 2020.  Following oral argument, the Motion to Dismiss the Indictment was denied.  Thereafter, on October 28, 2020, Defense Counsel propounded a formal request for supplemental discovery upon the State.  (Da1).  On November 17, 2020, the State provided Defense Counsel with a transcript of Defendant’s statement to law enforcement at the time of his arrest.  (Pa16-Pa31).  However, the supplemental discovery requested in Defense Counsel’s October 28, 2020 letter remained outstanding.  The State was advised via email accordingly.  (Da2).  The supplemental discovery was never provided.  On March 31, 2021, Defense Counsel filed a Notice of Motion to Compel Discovery.
[brief] VOLUME EXHIBIT  1  Note from [...], M.D., Dated April 15, 2020 (P. 1ac of Confidential Appendix)  | Authority | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | N.J.A.C. 4A: 2-6.2(b) | Pa. 6, 7, 17 | | N.J.A.C. 4A: 2-6.2(C) | Pa. 17 | | Blacks Law Dictionary | Pa. 9 | | *Atkinson v. Parekian*, 37 N.J.143, (1967) | Pa. 15 | | *In Re Carter*, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007) | Pa. 7, 16 | | *DeLorenzo v. Board of Review Division of Employment Sec*, 54 N.J. 361 (1969) | Pa. 14 | | *Garcia v. Board of Review*, 191 N.J. Super. 602, (APP.DIV.1983) | Pa. 15 | | *In re Polk*, 90 N.J. 550. (1982) | Pa.  15 | | *Savastano v. State Board of Review*, 99 N.J. Super. 397, (APP.DIV. 1968) | Pa. 15 | | *In re Stallworth*, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) | Pa. 7 |  TABLE OF ORDER BEING APPEALED
[brief] Before leaving, [...] told [...] that he would not be back until tomorrow morning.  (11T109-3 to 109-9; 11T110-19 to 22).  At 1:06 a.m. on September 18, [...] texted [...], “I’m excited,” to which [...] responded “OMG be safe stank . . .  I’m not GTS until it’s done. ” (12T159-9 to 21).  [...] responded, “Get some sleep, though.  Ima be all right.  This ain’t my first,” to which [...] responded, “Boy stay and STFU. ” (12T159-22 to 2).  At 1:11 a.m., [...] texted [...], “I hate that you left me for the night,” to which he responded, “It’s only for the night. ” (12T160-16 to 161-10; 11T117-18 to 118-2).  At 2:47 a.m., [...] texted [...], “Cuz, we about to get old girl, dike. ” (12T161-11 to 23; 11T118-3 to 118-15).  [...] woke up around 7:00 or 8:00 a.m. on September 18, at which point [...] was not back at [...].