ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This case is also distinct from *State v. Badessa*, where a driver was illegally stopped for allegedly avoiding a sobriety checkpoint and later charged with refusing to submit to breathalyzer based on observations made after the illegal stop.  185 N.J. 303 (2005).  The challenged evidence, the police observations leading to their request to submit to the breathalyzer, in “both time and place . . . sprang directly from” the illegal stop for avowing a sobriety checkpoint.  *Id.* at 313.  The sobriety checkpoint was intended to enforce the drunk-driving laws, among which is the refusing to submit to breathalyzer charge.  The Court noted a breathalyzer refusal is part of the comprehensive statutory scheme contained in N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 to -51, the drunk-driving laws.  *Ibid.*  In sharp contrast here, the law against driving while suspended for a prior drunk-driving offense is entirely distinct from the drug laws being enforced by the stop.  Moreover, the *Badessa* Court found the refusal statute was not a new crime that “directly threatens public safety. ”  *Id.* at 314.  But, as the United States Supreme Court noted, the type of license check done here, which led to defendant being charged with driving while suspended, is intended to protect officer and traffic safety.  *Rodriguez*, 575 U.S. 356.  Indeed, it would be a direct threat to public safety to require police to allow suspended drivers to drive away.  And permitting defendant to drive away from the scene would have left police derelict in their duty to protect the public.  See *State v. Davis*, 104 N.J. 490, 504 (1986).  Badessa’s holding thus does not control here.
[brief] Upon successful registration, you will view a printable receipt on screen.  At a later date, you will receive an email with instructions for testing.  To ensure that all who wish to testify can do so, the Chair will limit public testimony to 5 minutes per person.  Extra time will be allotted for those needing the assistance of a translator or if they require language interpretation services to testify, please contact the [...] at [...] to discuss and arrange for interpretation services in advance of the meeting.  You may also submit written testimony instead of, or in addition to, oral testimony by email to [...] by Friday, January 7, 2022 at 3:00 PM.  Written testimony will be included in the Commission’s record and distributed to all Commission members.  MONDAY, JANUARY 10, 2022  *SENATE SESSION 12:00 PM
[brief] Later, the Court correctly ruled:  Plaintiff’s argument that it was Defendants’ responsibility to inform Plaintiff that intervention was required is also without merit.  Our Supreme Court has stated that “The parties may make contractual liability dependent upon the performance of a condition precedent …  Generally, no liability can arise on a promise subject to a condition precedent until the condition is met. ”  Duff v. Trenton Beverage Co., 4 N.J. 595, 604 (1950).
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 280-81.  In making this determination, courts “concentrate on the party's litigation conduct to determine if it is consistent with its reserved right to arbitrate the dispute. ”  *Ibid.*  Among other factors, courts should evaluate: (1) the delay in making the arbitration request; (2) the filing of any motions, particularly dispositive motions, and their outcomes; (3) whether the delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party's litigation strategy; (4) the extent of discovery conducted; (5) whether the party raised the arbitration issue in its pleadings, particularly as an affirmative defense, or provided other notification of its intent to seek arbitration; (6) the proximity of the date on which the party sought arbitration to the date of trial; and (7) the resulting prejudice suffered by the other party, if any.
[brief] [...] wrote in his April 14, 2010, Opinion:  (Pa 130 id at 6,7)  The publication occurred in response to a motion to disqualify [...] as counsel for the [...] that was filed by [...] in the District Court Action, and [...] was authorized by law to publish said criminal history because the information was not subject to a sealing order at the time of its publication.  Further, [...] submitted [...]’s criminal history to illustrate that it did not receive information from the [...]’ son that was protected by the attorney-client privilege.  By producing the [history], [...] established that it had obtained the information from a filing made earlier in the District Court Action by [...]’s counsel.  Finally, the rap sheet, had “some connection or logical relation to the action” because it supported [...]’s contention that it had not received privileged information from the [...]’ son.  (Emp. Added)  The Court’s outright reliance that the information was not subject to a sealing order at the time of its publication is a fraud upon the court when it is undeniable that the CHR was sealed and stricken as of October 11, 2006.
[directive] Czy obecnie jest Pan(i) pod nadzorem kuratora S!!dowego lub na zwolnieniu warunkowym?  a.  Do you realize that a guilty plea may result in a violation of your probation or [Yes/Tak] [No/Nie] (NA/Nie dotyczy] parole?  Czy zdaje Pan(i) sobie sprawc,, ze przyznanie sic, do winy moze poci~ac za sob!! naruszenie warunk6w nadzoru kuratora lub zwolnienia warunkowego?  [Yes/Tak]  [No/Nie]  Are you presently serving a custodial sentence on another charge?
[brief] ”  \textit{Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst.}, 225 N.J. 289, 308 (2016).  Generally, because this State highly values settlements, courts “strain to give effect to the terms of a settlement wherever possible. ”  \textit{Brundage}, 195 N.J. at 601 (quoting \textit{Div. of Rate Couns. V. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils.}, 206 N.J. Super. 523 (App Div. 1985)).
[brief] See *Santana*, 475 N.J. Super. at 291 (distinguishing the cases where consumers do not need apprise themselves of the terms to proceed with or access the site’s services).  As the trial court correctly noted, much like in Wollen, [...] did not require Plaintiffs “to affirmatively assent to a review of the terms and conditions prior to registering for the SAM Program. ” (2T17:3-6 (citing Wollen, 468 N.J. Super. at 503-03)).  Without any indication to the user that they were required to “affirmatively assent, read, or acknowledge the terms and conditions,” the hyperlink is vague, ambiguous, misleading, and otherwise invalid.  Santana, 475 N.J. Super. at 288 (citing Wollen, 468 N.J. Super. at 502-03.)  An arbitration provision, like [...]’s, is not enforceable without reasonable notice of its existence.
[brief] .................................................................71  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  **Boddy v. Cigna Property & Cas. Companies,** 334 N.J. Super. 649, 659 (App. Div. 2000).  ...........................................  70  **City of Long Branch v. Liu,** 203 N.J. 464 (2010) ............................................................................. 48  **FMC Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains,** 100 N.J. 418 (1985) ..............................................................................  61  **Friedman v. Monaco and Brown Corp.,** 258 N.J. Super. 539 (App.Div. 1992)  ....................................................  47  **Hatterson v. East Jersey Water Co.,** 74 N.J. Eq. 49 (Chancery Div. 1908)  ....................................................  13  **Healy v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ.,** 287 N.J. Super. 407 (App. Div.) ............................................................  70  **Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diners’ Club, Inc.**  550 F.2d 505 (2nd Cir.), certif. den. 434 U.S. 861 (1997)  .......................  70  **Panetta v. Equity One, Inc.,** 190 N.J. 307 (2007).  .................................................. 12, 19, 47, 50, 53, 58, 59, 60, 62, 64, 65, 68
[directive] 귀하가 종신 가석방 감독의 조건을 위반하는 경우, (5) 귀하의 가석방이 취소되고, 귀하가 감독을 받고 있는 동안 발생하는 각 취소 처분에 대해 개월에서 12 18 개월까지의 금고형을 받을 수 있고, 귀하가 받은 금고형은 감형 또는 근로 점수에 의하여 단축될 수 없다는 것을 아십니까?  Do you understand that if you violate a condition of parole supervision for life, your parole may be revoked and you can be sent to prison for 12 to 18 months for each revocation that occurs while you are being supervised commutation or and that the prison term you receive cannot be reduced by work credits?  [예/Yes] [아니요/No] [해당없음/NA] 귀하가 년7 월1 일 이후에 종신 가석방 감독에 (6) 2014 대한 조건을 위반하고, 그 위반으로 기소되어 유죄 판결을 받은 경우, 귀하는 년 이하의 감옥형을 선고 5 받거나, 또는 그러한 위반이 년7 월1 일 전에 2014 발생한 경우, 개월 이하의 구금을 선고 받고, 귀하가 18 받는 선고는 종신 가석방 감독 위반으로 가석방 심사위원회로부터 받을 수 있는 금고 기간에 에 추가될 수 있다는 것을 아십니까?
[brief] [...] cannot now employ the “doctrine of last resort” simply because it and its surety, [...], were purportedly unaware that a written power of attorney is required when an attorney-in-fact is signing on behalf of a third-party.  That argument simply defies credibility and should be rejected.  F.  [...]’s Subsequent Amendments to its Standard Specifications are Irrelevant to the Issues in Dispute (A 62)  Lastly, [...] argues that [...]’s subsequent amendment to the Standard Specifications, which sought to clarify the Consent of Surety/POA requirement, is inapplicable to the Redecking Project and, by extension, tries to seek a negative inference that this was not the case prior to the amendment.  [...] certainly agrees that the amendment became effective after receipt of bids for the Redecking Project.  However, the timing of that amendment, and whether or not it applies to the Redecking Project, is not dispositive of the issue here.  [...]’s argument to the contrary is akin to improperly seeking admission into evidence at trial of an alleged tortfeasor’s initiation of subsequent remedial measures.  The fact that [...] is trying in good conscience to ensure that the defect here never occurs again is not properly considered as evidence of its error below.  The only relevant consideration is the Standard Specifications as they existed at the time of bid submission and the contents of [...]’s bid.  That is, the sole basis for decision is whether [...]’s Consent of Surety, lacking any verification that the surety is bound by the promise contained therein to issue the performance bonds if [...] were awarded the contract, is materially deficient, rendering [...]’s bid non-responsive.  And, as set forth herein, the answer to that question is “yes. ”  At the end of the day, it is unfortunate that [...]’s bid was necessarily rejected.  However, public entities are expected to turn square corners in their dealings with the public, and that is particularly so in the field of public procurement.  *Township of Hillside v. Sternin*, 25 N.J. 317, 325-26 (1957) (cautioning that contracting agencies should not succumb to the temptation to waive material defects in order to secure a low bid; “In this field it is better to leave the door tightly closed than to permit it to be ajar, thus necessitating … speculation as to whether or not it was purposely left that way”); *Meadowbrook*, supra, 138 N.J.  at 325 (a refusal to waive deviations “occasionally may result in additional cost to the public, but we have no doubt that the overriding interest in insuring the integrity of the bidding process is more important than the isolated savings at stake”).  The decision below, while causing a loss of business to [...], advanced the larger principle of upholding the foundational principles of public bidding and, ultimately, the public’s trust in the process.  The decision below should accordingly be affirmed.
[brief] By ignoring the presence of the illegal, large, makeshift liquor stand on the Subject Premises and erroneously describing the event as a “drive-by shooting,” the lower court respectfully erred by finding that the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand was not a defect in the physical condition of public property that was meant for use as a basketball court and a playground, a defect that lured the public to the Subject Premises to become intoxicated and cause mayhem.  [See Tr., 12:7-13:7.]  Respectfully, the lower court erred because a “dangerous condition of property may be found to exist when an unreasonable risk of harm is created by a combination of a defect in the property and the acts of third parties. ”  Roe by M.J. v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 317 N.J. Super. 72, 74-75 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 160 N.J. 89 (1999); see also Saldana v. DiMedio, 275 N.J. Super. 488, 503-04 (App. Div. 1994).  As acknowledged by Roe: The cases [including Levin v. County of Salem, 133 N.J. 35 (1993); Rodriguez v. N.J. Sports Exposition Authority, 193 N.J. Super 39 (App. Div. 1983); Setrin v. Glassboro State College, 136 N.J. Super. 329 (App. Div. 1975), all cited with approval by the lower court, (Tr., 11:23-12:16)] are inapposite since they involved injuries caused not by the condition of the property but by the acts of the injured party himself or the dangerous activities of other persons.  Thus, in those cases, the property itself did not contribute in any way to the causing of the injuries.  The injuries merely happened to occur on public property.  Here, plaintiff alleges that the dangerous condition of the property itself enhanced her exposure to the criminal attack.
[brief] (4T120:24-121:8).  [...] stated that she reported what happened to the police as soon as she got out of the hospital, because she knew if she kept it to herself, she would use again.  (4T121:22-25).  [...] denied ever approaching [...] at a bar after their breakup.  (4T163:1-17).  She claimed that the two mutually parted ways, and that no words needed to be said.  (4T171:23-172:4).  During her testimony, [...] made numerous statements pertaining to [...] that should never have been presented to the jury, including his prior conviction for DUI, alleged use of cocaine, and his affiliation with a known violent biker gang, the “[...].
[brief] It is also well established that the Clause's “general prohibition against successive prosecutions does not prevent the government from retrying a defendant who succeeds in getting his first conviction set aside, through direct appeal or collateral attack, because of some error in the proceedings leading to conviction. ”  The prosecution therefore is free to retry a defendant where the conviction is reversed due to “trial error” such as “incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial misconduct. ”  In Burks v. United States and Greene v. Massey, the United States Supreme Court expressly recognized an exception to this “trial error” rule in cases where the reviewing court overturned the conviction because the evidence was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.
[brief] Dated: June 13, 2023  #  Table of Contents | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| |  I.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | II.  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 3 | | III.  FOUNDATIONAL FACTS | 5 | | IV.  ARGUMENT | 8 | | 1.  Standard Of Review | 8 | | 2.  [...] Always Has The Burden Of Proof And Persuasion | 9 | | (Argued Below: Ha105) | | | 3.  The Initial Decision And [...] Decision Did Not Consider The Entire Record; They Relied Upon An Arbitrary and Capricious Selection Of [...]'s Pre-Filed Direct Testimony And Ignored The Cross Examination Of The [...] Witnesses | 10 | | (Argued Below: Ha105) | | | 4.  The [...] Decision And Initial Decision Are Fatally Wrong About The Application Of New Jersey's Climate Law To This Proceeding | 28 | | (Argued Below: Ha105) | | |  A.  The Clean Energy Act | 30 | | B.  The Global Warming Response Act | 31 | | C.  The “2019 New Jersey Energy Master Plan: Pathway To 2050” | 31 | | D.  "New Jersey's Global Warming Response Act: 80x50 Report: Evaluating Our Progress And Identifying Pathways To Reduce Emissions By 80% By 2050" | 44 | | 5.  The Proposed Regulator Station Is Not A Reliability Project, But A Costly Stranded Asset In The Making | 50 | | (Argued Below: Ha105, 106) | | | 6.  The [...] Arbitrarily And Capriciously Approved [...]’s Failure To Consider Alternatives | 53 | | (Argued Below: Ha106) | | 7.  The [...] And ID Erred As A Matter Of Law In Ignoring The Decisions Of The [...] And Accepted And Relied Upon "Expert" Testimony That Contradicted The Expert Findings Of The [...] (Argued Below: Ha106)
[brief] I.  The Proposed Stormwater System is Not Compliant with the Stormwater Management Rules, Therefore the Issuance of the FHA Permit Should be Reversed.  (Aa2521-Aa2537).  As set forth in the initial brief, technical guidance for stormwater management measures is contained within the New Jersey Stormwater Best Management Practices Manual (“BMP Manual”).  N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.9; In re Stormwater Management Rules, 348 N.J. Super. 451, 457 (App. Div. 2006).  This is not just a guidance document that interprets the implementation of the regulations, but actual technical details on how to do the stormwater management calculations and analysis and incorporated by reference as a regulation at N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.9.  The BMP Manuals use of “shall” and “must” and other similar terms reflect that the BMP Manual is not just recommendations.  [...] also argues that it has the authority to consider alternative stormwater management measures as opposed to those set forth in the BMP Manuals, and therefore these are not requirements.  (DEPb14).  First, it is --- 1  The Procedural History and Statement of Facts are inextricably interwoven and, therefore, are presented together herein.
[brief] Rather, the Trial Court simply calls the contract “self-defective”.  3T. 20:1-6.  Whether a term or terms of an offer that may be factually inaccurate but nevertheless have no impact legally or factually on the holder of the ROFR, renders that offer to be invalid is an issue that the Trial Court never addresses.  The Trial Court provided no supporting law to justify the adoption of that position from the Plaintiff.  *N.J.S.A. 12A:2-206* clearly states,  Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances (a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances; *See N.J.S.A. 12A:2-206.*  In the case at bar, the Trial Court apparently concluded that a holder of a ROFR is able to dictate the terms of an offer before the clock begins to tick on its time for exercising that ROFR.  This is clear error.  Not only is there no legal precedent for this position, but the plain language of the contract (paragraph 39 in the MFSA) requires nothing more than a "bona fide offer".
[brief] Under N.J. Court Rule 3:12-2,  If a defendant intends to rely in any way on an alibi, within 10 days after a written demand by the prosecutor the defendant shall furnish a signed alibi, stating the specific place or places at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom the defendant intends to rely to establish such alibi.  [R. 3:12-2(a). ]  However, if defendant fails to timely provide the information required, “the court may refuse to allow the party in default to present witnesses at trial as to defendant’s absence from or presence at the scene of the alleged offense. ”  R. 3:12-2(b).  Furthermore, “[t]his Court has long held that the failure to provide a separate alibi [jury] charge does not constitute reversible error. ”  State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 363 (2009); see also, e.g., State v. Edge, 57 N.J. 580, 590–91 (1971) (holding failure to give requested alibi charge was harmless); State v. Peetros, 45 N.J. 540, 544–45 (1965) (holding no reversible error in not giving alibi charge where defendant and dentist testified defendant was at dentist's office in Philadelphia when offense committed in Camden).
[brief] 1.  BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S SWORN DEPOSITION TESTIMONY, HER CERTIFIED ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES, AND THE SWORN STATEMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT EYEWITNESS, ALL SUCH MUST BE ACCEPTED AS TRUE, AND TOGETHER WITH THE BENEFIT OF ALL FAVORABLE AND LEGITIMATE INFERENCES THEREFROM, SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (2T4:24-5:13; 2T7:2-10; 1T12:25-13:12; 114a, 123a)
[brief] Moreover, Appellant’s deposition testimony that he received permission to use the PCard for personal purchases in 2012 is severely undercut by his statements throughout this litigation including but not limited to, his admissions that he explicitly denied using the Company’s PCard for personal purchases before January 1, 2020.  See Counterstatement of Facts, Section C, supra, pp. 9-13.  Based on the foregoing, it is beyond any dispute that Appellant’s own admissions, both before and during this litigation, circumscribe his ability to prove through clear and convincing evidence that a material representation was made by Respondents.
[directive] 3.6  Community Outreach 3.6.1  Commanding officers should strive to remain informed about and sensitive to the community’s needs and problems.  Regularly scheduled meetings to discuss community concerns should be held with public advisory councils, religious groups, schools, businesses and other community leaders.  These meetings help commanding officers identify potential crisis situations and keep channels of communication open between the agency and the community.  The disciplinary process should be publicized and clearly explained in these forums.  14
[brief] Governor's Press Release for Assembly Bill No. 2402, at 1 (Apr. 19, 1971).  The Legislature expanded the definition of "unlawful practice" to include "unconscionable commercial practices" and broadened the Attorney General's enforcement powers.  Ibid.  That amendment also provided for private causes of action, with an award of treble damages, attorneys' fees, and costs.  Ibid.  [...] believed that those provisions would provide "easier access to the courts for the consumer, [would] increase the attractiveness of consumer actions to attorneys and [would] also help reduce the burdens on the Division of Consumer Affairs."
[directive] Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option Actor purposely or knowingly violates any provision of a Domestic Violence  Restraining $1,000 to $2,500  No 10% Order; fourth degree if conduct constitutes a crime or disorderly persons offense; otherwise it 4th Degree is a disorderly persons offense.  Contempt of 2C:29-9b  Domestic Violence  NOTE: Bail on a fourth degree contempt must always be set by a Superior Court Judge.
[directive] b.  (1)  Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if that person purposely or knowingly violates any provision in an order entered under the provisions of the “Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991,” P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-17 et al.) or an order entered under the provisions of a substantially similar statute under the laws of another state or the United States when the conduct which constitutes the violation could also constitute a crime or a disorderly persons offense.
[brief] In fact, the sentencing judge found that aggravating factor (3) – the risk that the defendant will commit another offense – applied to defendant.  (Da105); See State v. Towey, 244 N.J. Super. 582, 593-94 (App. Div. 1990) (holding that the application of mitigating factor (9) is to be weighed against aggravating factor (3)).  Certainly, this was not defendant’s first contact with the criminal justice system; and importantly, he committed the instant offenses ---  3  Although the sentencing court identifies the program as “drug court,” effective January 1, 2022, the Drug Court Program was renamed to the New Jersey Recovery Court Program to better reflect its primary goal.  “while he was on drug court probation. ” (3T21-25 to 22-4); See Locane, 454 N.J. Super at 129 (holding that defendant’s previous contact with the criminal justice system undermined a conclusion that mitigating factor (9) applied to her sentence).  Moreover, as determined by the trial court, his “14 month sobriety while under supervision of the court” was not significant in determining the applicability of mitigating factor (9).  (3T22-9 to 12).  Therefore, the sentencing court properly rejected the application of mitigating factor (9).