ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] To help offset future losses in State aid, Chapter 67 also provided some districts with new tools to make up the lost revenue. \(^{12}\)  Recognizing that many districts are levying a school tax that is well below the LFS, Chapter 67 amended the required local share.  L. 2018, c. 67, §§ 1-2; N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5d and -70.  Thus, in FY2020 through FY2025, certain districts that receive decreased aid under the amendments are required to increase their tax levy by 2% over the prior year.  L. 2018, c. 67, § 2; N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5d; (Aa8).  And certain SDA \(^{12}\)Chapter 67 did preserve districts’ existing options for raising local funds, such as the increase of its local levy from year to year, the availability of banked cap, N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-39(e), and the ability to raise additional funds outside the tax levy growth limitation, see N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-39(c) and N.J.S.A. 18A:22-40.  districts\textsuperscript{13} (including [...]) are provided an adjustment to the levy cap that allows those districts to increase their levy up to LFS.  \textit{L.} 2018, \textit{c.} 67, § 6 (amending N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-38).  With these amendments, certain districts that have been “overfunded” are required to contribute more on the local level, although the amendments did not require them to raise their local levy up to their LFS.
[brief] On September 16, 2015, [...] initiated a collection lawsuit against [...] in the Special Civil Part of the Bergen County Law Division, under docket number [...] (“Collection Lawsuit”), seeking to collect the amount of $1,201.16, together with interests and costs, allegedly arising from a [...] account.  (Pa1).  Default was entered against [...] on December 11, 2015, then vacated (by way of [...]’s Motion) on September 29, 2021.  (Pa4).  [...] filed her Answer to [...]’s collection Complaint the same day.  (Pa6).  On September 15, 2021, [...] filed her Class Action Complaint alleging that [...]’s unlicensed attempts to enforce a void debt violated the Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1, et seq.  (Pa11).  On October 6, 2021, [...] moved to transfer the Collection Lawsuit from the Special Civil Part to the Law Division and consolidate it with the instant putative class action. \(^1\) (Pa28).  [...]’s Motion to Transfer and for Consolidation was granted on October 22, 2021.  (Pa35).  \(^1\)  [...]’s affirmative claims were later voluntarily dismissed on June 7, 2023, by way of Consent Order (Trans ID: LCV20231733202).  Default was entered against [...] on February 3, 2022 (Trans ID: LCV2022504600).  [...] filed its Answer to the Class Action Complaint on April 18, 2022 (Pa37), which was rejected the next day (Trans ID: LCV20221551653).  Default was vacated upon consent on May 4, 2022 (Trans ID: LCV20221789272).  The first Case Management Order was entered on August 2, 2022 (Trans ID: LCV20222802101).  The second Case Management Order was entered on March 9, 2023.  (Trand ID: LCV2023851729).  The third Case Management Order was entered on June 7, 2023 (Trans ID: LCV20231733202; Trans ID: LCV20231750443).  The fourth Case Management Order was entered on November 6, 2023 (Trans ID: LCV20233330553).  On December 26, 2023, [...] filed its Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.  (Pa55)  On March 21, 2024, the trial court granted [...]’s Motion to Dismiss.  (Pa86).  On May 3, 2024, [...] timely filed her Notice of Appeal (Pa87).
[brief] See Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011) (holding that issue not briefed on appeal deemed waived); Telebright Corp. v. Dir., N.J. Div. of Tax’n, 424 N.J. Super. 384, 393 (App. Div. 2012) (deeming issue waived when brief includes no substantive argument with respect to issue).  The Law Division’s denial of his motion need not be disturbed on this basis alone.  But even if this court were to evaluate whether the trial court properly found the relevant immunities applied, the trial court was correct.  For instance, to the extent that [...] purports to bring claims related to the handling of his criminal matter—whether by judges, judicial staff, judicial administrators or prosecutors—those claims fail because of the litigation privilege which insulates individuals from civil liability for any “statement made in the course of judicial, administrative, or legislative proceedings. ”  Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 563 (1990).  The privilege provides absolute immunity from suit.  Ibid.  Not only does the common law litigation privilege shield State Defendants from plaintiff’s proposed NJCRA claims, but it also immunizes them from the proposed LAD claim.  See Peterson v. Ballard, 292 N.J. Super. 575 (App. Div. 1996) (holding litigation privilege provides absolute immunity from LAD claims—immunity Legislature did not abrogate in enacting LAD).  The litigation privilege blankets all participants in the court system, conferring absolute immunity from civil liability in order “‘to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation.
[brief] Yet the jury here was repeatedly told that lesser mens reas were sufficient to convict [...] of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault.  The court told the jury that, so long as [...] purposely entered into an agreement to promote or facilitate the “crime of aggravated assault,” he could be found guilty.  (See, e.g., 13T 191-6 to 8, 192-19 to 193-1, 195-1 to 3)  The court then went on to define aggravated assault as causing significant bodily injury purposely, knowingly, or recklessly with extreme indifference.  (13T 196-19 to 25, 197-5 to 9, 197-16 to 198-12, 198-20 to 24, 199-5 to 24, 200-10 to 18, 201-8 to 11)  This instruction flatly violates the law on conspiracy.
[directive] It is recommended that the following agencies implement procedures as follows:  State Parole Board  Upon receipt of a victim registration form, the State Parole Board should send an acknowledgment letter to the victim with a copy to the County Prosecutor's Office.  (See Appendix A-2.)  When a parole release decision is rendered in the case of State, county or juvenile inmate sentenced by the Superior Court, the State Parole Board should provide notification to the appropriate County Prosecutor's Office within fifteen (15) working days of that decision.  When a parole release decision is rendered in the case of any inmate for whom there was received a victim input registration form, the State Parole Board should notify the registered victim within fifteen (15) working days of that decision.  A copy of such notification should, at the same time, be forwarded to the appropriate County Prosecutor's Office.  (See appendix A-3.)  The State Parole Board should notify a registered victim of the filing by an inmate of a petition for executive clemency within thirty (30) days of receipt of the petition.  (See Appendix A-4.)  Upon receipt of the Governor's decision concerning an inmate's application for executive clemency, the State Parole Board should notify the registered victim of the decision within ten (10) working days.  A copy of such notification should, at the same time, be forwarded to the appropriate County Prosecutor's Office.  Upon receipt of notification from the Department of Corrections of the release of an inmate for any reason other than parole, the State Parole Board should, within ten (10) working days, notify the registered victim of the inmate's release.  (See Appendix A-5.)  Notification as required in the above sections should also be provided to homicide and sudden death survivors who have registered with the State Parole Board.  State Department of Corrections
[brief] ’”  242 N.J. at 419 (emphasis added).  This case was not lacking evidence.  Surveillance video was played during the trial, and the State argued that it was defendant portrayed in those videos, and he was holding a handgun.  Defendant has a tattoo of red lips on the side of his neck which was shown to the jury in a photograph taken on the date of his arrest and displayed to them in court, and that same tattoo is seen on the individual brandishing a handgun in the surveillance footage moments before defendant is shot.  (Da17 24:20-26; 54:57-55:27; 2T35:6-8; 43:24-44:2; 71:16-21; 74:8-19).  Unlike as argued by defendant, that “[defendant] was placed at the crime scene and identified as the shooter by witnesses he had no opportunity to cross-examine,” it was the surveillance video and screen shots that allowed the jury to identify him, not the detective’s testimony.  Clearly, this is not a case like State v. Branch, where there was a lack of physical evidence and “the sketch and the witnesses' descriptions of the defendant resembled neither his appearance on the day of his arrest nor the picture of him in the array. ”  Medina, 242 N.J. at 419.  Furthermore, the detective’s testimony, when looked at in context, did not create an ‘inescapable inference’ that an unavailable source had implicated defendant.  Testifying about his interview with the victim and offhandedly noting he “took a few statements from witnesses” does not inescapably imply that he is withholding evidence from the jury.  These are simply steps he took while investigating the shooting.  Even if the testimony was admitted in error, that error was not “clearly capable of producing an unjust result” as to require reversal because the mention of the statement was not crucial to the State’s case.  See State in the Interest of [...], 195 N.J. 324, 350 (2008).  The video evidence clearly shows defendant brandishing a handgun at the victim moments before he is shot.  Defendant cannot demonstrate that the challenged testimony of the detective had any appreciable effect on the outcome of his case and any error in admitting it, assuming it occurred, was harmless.  R. 2:10-2.
[brief] As mentioned repeatedly in the brief the Court found “all the evidence in this case indicates that the [...] were paying rent. ”  The factors mentioned in *Morrocco v. Felton* do not apply to the instant case.  Moreover, as Plaintiff counsel makes clear in his rebuttal the facts in the Motion are speculative because of no Certification and the many alleged statements that are material to the alleged issue of ownership were made by a deceased man.  2T15-20  Moreover, as the Court noted the alleged right to repurchase the agreement was never reduced to any writing for the Court to evaluate.  2T61-2  Finally in New Jersey landlord-tenant cases, the standard of review gives substantial deference to the trial court's factual findings, which the court “must uphold ... so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  *State v. Handy*, 206 N.J. 39, 44, 18 A.3d 179 (2011) (quoting *State v. Elders*, 192 N.J. 224, 243, 927 A.2d 1250 (2007)).  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] In support of its argument that the arbitration agreement is not unconscionable, [...] asserts to this Court that the arbitration agreement between the parties is not a “one-sided waiver” similar to the one in Kleine v. Emeritus at Emerson, 445 N.J. Super. 545, 551 (App. Div. 2016) because both Appellants and [...] waived their rights to a jury trial.  (Db30-31).  What [...] fails to mention, however, is that [...] is reaping the benefits of this waiver.  [...] would not be compelling arbitration if it were not to their benefit and the detriment to its users.  With arbitration, [...] may thwart their responsibility of having to provide important discovery and it is less likely for the public to know about the details of a case through arbitration compared to a jury trial.  CONCLUSION
[brief] N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3b is clear that only “information concerning a criminal investigation shall be available to the public within 24 hours or as soon as practicable, of a request for such information: where a crime has been reported but no arrest yet made, information as to the type of crime, time, location and type of weapon, if any”.  (Emphasis supplied).  Section 3b does not refer to records.  Indeed, this court has stated, in [...] v. Lyndhurst, 441 N.J. Super. 70, 112 (App. Div. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 229 N.J. 541, 570-572 (2017) that:  Had the Legislature intended section 3(b) to oblige a public agency to release records, as opposed to information, it would have said so...  We conclude the word “information,” as used in the statute, is not synonymous with tangible records, such as written documents, notes, or recordings that contain the specified information.  The required “information” may be conveyed in a newly drafted press release.  Conceivably, the information could be provided in a public oral announcement.  Comparison of the OPRA requests in Lyndhurst to this case reveals that the [...] reporter specifically included “information” in the requests to the various municipal and county agencies.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS LAIBLE FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT WAS MANIFESTLY UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENTIAL RECORD (36T51-22 to 52-6)…- 40 - POINT VI.  THE TRIAL COURT’S RELIANCE UPON TRANSACTIONS THAT OCCURRED MORE THAN SIX YEARS BEFORE THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED CLEARLY PRODUCED AN UNJUST RESULT (13T58-7 to 100-23; 23T95-9 to 105-12; 36T52-7 to 24) ………………………………………………………….- 41 - POINT VII.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW BY HOLDING DEFENDANT JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES AWARDED IN THE JUDGMENT (23T96-3 to 97-15; 36T49-11 to 51-21; 37T42-15 to 45-5)…………………………………………………………………………………..-
[brief] [...], however, disregards experts like [...] and performs its own self-serving “survey” of the Property to support its conclusions.  According to [...]’s misguided “survey,” the physical church is located on Lot 19 and [...]’s Property on Lot 22 is actually [...]’s Lot 20.  Upon information and belief, [...] is not a licensed surveyor, nor has it ever represented that it holds a surveyor license in New Jersey.  Of course, [...] has never produced any expert report to support its conclusions either.  For that matter, [...] appears to have hired [...] to fill the dispositive lack of a surveying expert to support its position, but [...] ultimately disregarded [...] when the [...] Survey arrived at the opposite conclusion (e.g., that [...]’s owns the Property at Lot 22 and [...]’s physical church resides on Lot 20).
[brief] Although this allegation was alleged in support of an earlier cause of action in the Amended Complaint, the [...] included a paragraph in the Tortious Interference with Business claim that incorporated previous allegations.  (Da73).  As to whether [...] has coverage, the case of *N. Plainfield Board of Educ. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.*, No. 05-4398 (MLC), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39555 (D.N.J. 2008) is instructive.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  1.  On or about September 19, 2022, the Township filed a Complaint for, among other things, breach of contract as a result of sewer connection fees.  Da16.  2.  On or about October 21, 2022, the Borough filed an Answer.  Da158.  3.  The parties engaged in discovery through October 4, 2023.  4.  On October 6, 2023, the Township filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  Da1.  5.  On October 24, 2023, the Borough filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.  Da146.  6.  Oral argument on the Motions was heard by the Honorable [...], J.S.C, on December 8, 2023.  Da170.  7.  On December 8, 2023, the Court granted the Township’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denied the Borough’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S ‘FAILURE-TO-TIMELY-RECALL’ CLAIM IS NOT RECOGNIZED BY NEW JERSEY LAW AND IS PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW.  [(Da0785; Da0816; Da0846); Court did not address preemption although it was raised in the briefing]  A.  The PLA Does Not Recognize the ‘Failure-to-Timely-Recall’ Claim Pled in the Complaint.  Plaintiff concedes the PLA does not authorize a ‘failure-to-timely-recall’ claim.  Rather than withdraw the untenable claim, she attempts to recast it as a post-sale failure-to-warn claim as if the language in the Complaint did not exist.  The very paragraphs she cites for her purported post-sale failure-to-warn claim (Opp 25) unambiguously demonstrate the claim she pled is for a failure to timely recall.  Leaving aside the conclusory boilerplate allegations (Da0001, ¶¶ 39, 44-46), the facts alleged specifically for this case in paragraphs 47, 48, and 49 indisputably plead [...] “failed to recall” Ozurdex® soon enough (id., ¶¶ 47-49).  Dispositively, none of the paragraphs cited by Plaintiff allege [...] should have, but did not, provide a warning post sale.  B.  Federal Law Preempts  Both Plaintiff’s ‘Failure-to-Timely-Recall’ Claim and Any Unpled Claim that [...] Should Have Provided a Post-Sale Warning About a Recall Issue.  Plaintiff indisputably waived any opposition to federal preemption by failing to address the issue below and is thus precluded from opposing it now. \(^1\) (OB 14, 22)
[brief] [...] INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR DAUGHTER, [...] v. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], JOHN DOES, MARY DOES, ABC PARTNERSHIPS AND XYZ CORPORATIONS, JOINTLY, SEVERALLY AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE, Case Type: Civil  Civil County/Agency: Atlantic Trial Court/Agency  Docket No: [...]  Trial Court Judge/Agency Name: Honorable [...], J.S.C  Dear Judges
[brief] On March 15, 2023, plaintiff’s counsel filed a 135-page Notice of Motion for Judgment Awarding Attorney’s Fees and Costs, proposed Order, Letter brief and Certification with 10 supporting exhibits.  (Pa22-156).  The motion complied with the standards set forth in Rule 4:42-9(8) (attorney’s fees may be awarded in all cases where same are permitted by statute) and *Rendine v. Pantzer*, 141 N.J. 295, 316-337 (1995).  *Ibid*.  Counsel presented 67.3 billable hours over a three-year period, at a billing rate of $525 per hour, for time expended, *inter alia*, in drafting pleadings, engaging in discovery, deposition and motion practice, engaging in court-ordered arbitration, settlement negotiations, and preparing his fee application.  (Pa151-155).  He presented evidence supporting the fairness and accuracy of work performed and proof of --- \(^4\)  The word “have” in this sentence appears to be a typographical error and should be replaced by the word “pay. ”  prevailing billing rates in the area.  (Pa42-150).  Counsel also requested oral argument pursuant to Rule 1:6-2 if opposition to his motion was filed.  (Pa23).  On March 23, 2023, defendant’s counsel filed a 15-page combined opposing Certification and Brief, together with five (5) exhibits, in which he urged the Court to deny plaintiff’s counsel’s fee application in its entirety.
[brief] (Aa377)  (Aa379)  On August 17, 2023, [...], filed a motion for reconsideration.  (Aa386)  On August 22, 2023, the Defendant redeemed the tax sale certificate in the amount of $20,025.97.  When informed that neither the Plaintiff or [...] paid taxes for the year, the Defendant remitted payment for the 1, 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} quarter 2023 taxes, interest and open sewer balance in the amount of $5,213.08 (Aa394 to 397).
[brief] To be an enforceable contract there must be a definite offer, acceptance of that offer and consideration. \(^{56}\)  “No contract is enforceable, of course, without the flow of consideration—both sides must ‘get something’ out of the exchange. ”\(^{57}\)  Consideration is something of value.  Where the contract provides for an exchange of promises, each promise is consideration for the other promise.  A failure of consideration describes a situation in which a contract is valid when formed but becomes unenforceable because the performance bargained for has not been rendered.  Here, if we are to believe [...]’s debunked claim that it is entitled to summary judgment on a breach of contract theory, then there must be consideration for the payment of invoices for services that undisputedly were never rendered.  To wit, the consideration for the 2019-2020 contract was simple – [...] was to pay [...] --- \(^{56}\) Friedman v. Tappan Dev. Corp., 22 N.J. 523, 531 (1956) \(^{57}\) Cont'l Bank of Pennsylvania v. Barclay Riding Acad., Inc., 93 N.J. 153, 170 (1983) for actually performing work.  [...] provided a service, and [...] paid [...] after that service was provided.  Both the promise to pay and promise to perform the service constituted consideration for the contract.  [...] admits that it did not work in April / May / June / July 1-6, 2020, so they did not provide anything of value to [...].  Without [...] establishing there was valid or sufficient consideration to change the payment terms of the agreement, it cannot claim that there was a valid contract to obtain payment for April / May / June / July 1-6, 2020.  The Board did not receive anything of value for the April / May / June 2020 invoices, so consideration for these payments under never-before-agreed-upon terms failed.  Under the actual contract between the parties, the consideration for receiving payment was extinguished when [...] did not provide any value, i.e., services.  The failure of consideration thus invalidates any claim for payment under the April / May / June 2020 invoices under a breach of contract theory.  In citing [...]’s mandated school closures along with a stay at home order, and admitting that [...] did not perform work, [...]’s Counterclaim recognizes that consideration to obtain payment on the 2019-2020 contract failed, or was non-existent.  Thus, [...]’s motion for summary judgment based on its debunked breach of contract theory cannot be sustained for lack of, and failure of, consideration.  The court therefore committed error in granting [...]’s summary judgment on the Complaint.
[directive] This Directive focuses specifically on rules to ensure that individuals are not discriminated against on the basis of gender identity or expression and that they are guaranteed safety and dignity in all encounters with law enforcement and with the criminal justice system.  Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the state in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the state, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the state of New Jersey to implement and comply with the following directives.
[brief] See Gonzalez v. Safe & Sound Sec. Corp., 185 N.J. 100, 114 (2005) (quoting N.Y. S. & W. R. Co. v. Vermeulen, 44 N.J. 491, 501 (1965)) (“Due process requires that there be an opportunity to present every available defense. ”).  Nor would it be sensible or fair for the landlord-tenant court to hold that it had jurisdiction to read one part of the Lease to determine Tenant owed Landlord money but no jurisdiction to read a different part of the Lease to determine whether Landlord owed Tenant more money subject to offset that would resolve the landlord-tenant case.
[brief] **REPLY TO PROCEDURAL HISTORY STATEMENTS**  At DAb1, the Applicant accepts plaintiff's procedural history presentation.  The Board's procedural history (DBb18-DBb20) is out of sequence (see R. 2:6-2(a)(4) & (5)) and argumentative.  Whether "any layman would be aware" (DBb19) and whether "[t]he record reflects that the applicant met its burden" (DBb20) will be addressed below.  **REPLY TO COUNTERSTATEMENTS OF FACT**
[brief] The [...] expressly represented to Plaintiff [...] that they were the legal owners of the entirety of line-item Lot: 3.01, and under the totality of the circumstances Plaintiff [...] reasonably believed this to be true.  •  Over the next 28 years, Plaintiff [...], reasonably believing that Defendant Keansburg in fact owned such property, made what amounts to over $872,916.70 in rental payments to The [...] which Keansburg collected, converted to their own use, and kept.