ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 5 N.J.S.A. 54:5-97.1 ...........................................................................  5 R. 4:4-3 ..........................................................................................  45 R. 4:4-3(a) ....................................................................................... 2, 34, 37, 45 R. 4:4-4(a) ....................................................................................... 36, 40, 42 R. 4:4-4(a)(2) ..................................................................................  42 R. 4:4-4(e) ......................................................................................  42 R. 4:4-7 ..........................................................................................  34 R. 4:50-1 ......................................................................................... 8, 25, 32, 33, 34, 43, 49, 50 R. 4:50-1(d) ...................................................................................  43  Restatement, Judgments 2d, §§ 2, 3 (1982) ........................................  42
[brief] Riggs v. Long Beach, supra, 109 N.J. at 611.  As enunciated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Riggs:  First, the ordinance must advance one of the purposes of the Municipal Land Use Law as set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2; Second, the ordinance must be "substantially consistent with the land use plan element and the housing plan element of the master plan not the “objectives” element of the Master Plan as was the thinking of the Planning Board and the court below, (see N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62a), unless the requirements of the statute are otherwise satisfied; Third, the ordinance must comport with constitutional constraints on the zoning power, including those pertaining to due process, equal protection, and the prohibition against confiscation; and Fourth, the ordinance must be adopted in accordance with statutory and municipal procedural requirements.
[brief] A defendant is ineligible for Track One if he has a prior conviction for “murder, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault,” N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(7), or if he was “convicted on two or more separate occasions of crimes of the first or second degree” or on “two or more separate occasions, where one of the offenses is a crime of the third degree, other than crimes defined in N.J.S.2C:35-10, and one of the offenses is a crime of the first or second degree. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(6).  A defendant with a prior conviction for an offense during which he possessed a firearm is not ineligible for Track One solely by virtue of that single conviction, unless, of course, that conviction was for one of the offenses enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(7).  State v. Maurer, 438 N.J. Super. 402, The State’s interpretation seeks to expand on these three simple, straightforward categories—present offenses, other pending charges, and past convictions—by creating a fourth disqualification category for offenses committed while on bail or pretrial release, which would only apply to firearms offenses.  The State’s reading of the statute is incorrect for four reasons: (i) it misreads the plain language of section (a); (ii) by reading “any pending charge” in subsection (a)(5) to include “the present offense,” it would render the term “present offense” superfluous; (iii) it would give a different meaning to “pending offense” in subsections (a)(5) and (a)(7); and (iv) the language of subsection (a)(5) is clear that the Legislature’s aim was to target pending firearms offenses rather than the commission of a firearms offense while on bail or pretrial release for another offense.
[brief] By virtue of the foregoing arguments and authorities, Petitioners respectfully submit that the Trial Court was correct in disqualifying [...] and [...] due to an irreconcilable conflict of interest.  Because of the conversations [...] previously had with [...], Respondents received prejudicial confidential information substantially harmful to Petitioners and directly relating to the same litigation.  Rules of Professional Conduct 1.18 compels disqualification and bars disclosure of all such information.  Ms. \textsuperscript{22}  It is incredible that [...] would state that [...] would have to “invalidate bequests to two charitable beneficiaries,” when based on the October 2022 Will, his clients are alleged to have caused the invalidation of those two bequests, when such invalidation inured to the benefit of the Respondents.  RB2, Pa66, Pa155.  Knoll’s Certification has been presented to this Court, as it was in the Trial Court, for *in camera* review.  Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that Respondents’ Appeal be denied.
[brief] In considering whether plaintiff was comparatively negligent, you may consider that even persons of reasonable prudence in certain circumstances may have their attention distracted so that they would not realize or remember the existence of a hazardous condition and would fail to protect themselves against it.  Mere lapse of memory or inattention or mental abstraction at the critical moment is not an adequate excuse.  One who is inattentive or forgetful of a known and obvious danger is comparatively negligent unless there is some condition or circumstance which would distract or divert the mind or attention of a reasonably prudent person.
[directive] 9.6.3  As a general matter, a request for internal investigation case files may satisfy the good cause requirement: (a)  If a Civilian Review Board that meets certain minimum requirements requests access to a completed or closed investigation file, subject to the conditions described in this section; or (b) If another law enforcement agency requests the files because it is considering hiring an officer who was formerly employed at the agency with the internal investigation files.  9.6.4
[brief] (Ja53).  Among other things, the Plan Amendment Ordinance amended the Redevelopment Plan to require that “[a] site plan application cannot be submitted to the Planning Board unless the applicant is designated as the redeveloper by the Township. ” (Id.).  Accordingly, the Plan Amendment Ordinance prevented Plaintiff, the only entity with contractual rights to develop the Property, from submitting a site plan application to the Planning Board.  (Id.).  The Township did not enter into a redevelopment agreement with [...].  As a result, the Township had to restart the redeveloper designation process.
[brief] *While the immunity continues this Court finds, for now, [...] is not acting in bad faith.  It is certainly questionable whether it is acting in good faith.  This Court strongly cautions [...] that in the future it will not proceed in the same fashion as it has to date.*  Deadlines will be enforced and a determination of bad faith can be and probably will be revisited in the future.  Pa015; Ra001 (italics added).
[brief] 2.  The Court’s assessment of the overall fairness of the sentences was fatally flawed for the same reasons as its assessments of aggravating factors three and nine; its assessment of the need to incapacitate and deter were not supported by competent, credible evidence in the record and it failed to consider relevant social science regarding deterrence and incapacitation.  ..................................................42  D.  The Court Erred In Considering Defendant’s Dismissed Charges.................................................................47  E.  The Parole Disqualifier Imposed On Count Three Is Illegal..............................................................................48  F.  This Case Should Be Reassigned To A Different Judge On Remand.................................................................48  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................50
[brief] [...] AND [...], as husband and wife and Individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Respondents, vs. [...], [...], Defendants-Respondents, [...] and [...], Defendants-Respondents-Cross-Appellants, (For Continuation of Caption  See Inside Cover)  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, PASSAIC COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. HON.
[brief] Is armed with, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon. ”  Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Robbery in the First-Degree (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1)” (rev. Sep. 10, 2012).  Not only did the court skip this part of the model charge, but at no point did the court use different words to explain this critical concept of grading.  In conjunction with the court’s omission of the definition of the second element of robbery, this failure to advise the jury on the grading of robbery meant that the jury did not understand which three elements the State needed to prove to support a first-degree robbery conviction, nor how they could return a verdict for second-degree robbery.
[brief] After re-analyzing and concluding the plaintiff still had standing, *Hunstein II* repeated verbatim its decision in *Hunstein I* as to the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim.  Subsequently, *Hunstein II* was vacated for rehearing *en banc*.  *Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs.*, 17 F.4th 1103 (11th Cir. 2021).
[brief] There is no doubt from the exchange that the defense is introducing the substance of the unauthenticated hearsay document, which was not admitted in evidence, for the truth of the matter asserted, the purported investigation and conclusions.  Even the trial judge acknowledged that the testimony was being used as proof of the results of the investigation.  7T318:1-2.  The admission of that testimony was error and was critical to defendant’s case.  In summation, the defense highlighted the investigation and the conclusions made to prove defendant was not liable, and to undermine plaintiff’s case and credibility.  11T76:9 to 77:11.
[brief] (Pa20.)  By the Complaint, plaintiff-appellant [...] sought damages from the various defendants for the personal injuries that she allegedly suffered as a result of her slip and fall on the public sidewalk adjacent to [...]’ property that occurred on February 18, 2021.  Plaintiff-appellant [...] sought damages for the loss of companionship, services and consortium of his wife allegedly caused by the injuries she suffered in her slip and fall.  (Pa25.)  In the First Count of the Complaint, plaintiffs-appellants alleged that [...] “had a legal duty to properly maintain the aforementioned property.  In particular, [...] had a legal obligation to maintain their premises in a reasonable and prudent manner. ”  (Pa21, First Count, ¶3.)  Also in the First Count, plaintiffs-appellants alleged that “a dangerous condition existed, wherein snow and ice was not properly removed and/or remediated. ”  (Pa21, First Count, ¶4.)  Plaintiffs-appellants further alleged in the First Count that [...] “were negligent in that they failed to exercise reasonable care to maintain the premises in a safe condition and also failed to warn the plaintiff, and other invitees, of the dangerous condition which existed on their premises. ” (Pa21, First Count, ¶4.)  On September 13, 2022, [...] filed their Answer to the Complaint, wherein they denied all of the substantive allegations asserted against them.  (Pa28.)  On April 12, 2024, the Motion Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant [...].  [...] is not a party to this appeal.  On April 18, 2024, [...] filed a motion seeking summary judgment on the grounds that they were not liable for plaintiff-appellant [...]’s alleged slip and fall and her resulting injuries as the well-settled law in New Jersey holds that residential property owners are not liable for injuries caused by the dangerous condition of public sidewalks adjacent to their property, including the presence of unshoveled or allegedly improperly shoveled snow and/or ice.  (Pa49.)  By Order entered on June 28, 2024, The Honorable [...], J.S.C. granted [...]’ motion and entered an Order granting summary judgment in their favor, which Order included His Honor’s Statement of Reasons.  (Pal; Pa3.)  On or about August 8, 2024, plaintiff-appellant [...] filed her Notice of Appeal.  Thereafter, on August 13, 2024, plaintiff-appellant filed an Amended Notice of Appeal.  (Pall.)  Statement of Facts
[brief] BRIEF [...]  ATTORNEYS AT LAW [...] [...]  [...]  (fax)  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant, [...]  Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq. (Attorney ID #034882005)  [...], Esq.  (Attorney ID #429902023)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ...........................................  iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................ iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................................................  1  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................  4 LEGAL ARGUMENT .........................................................................................  7 POINT I  APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW ..............................................  7  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PSA IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND THE LAW (Pa0192; Pa0194)  ..................................................................................................  10  A.  The Trial Court  Erred in Dismissing Count One of the Complaint and Granting in Part and Denying in Part Specific Performance .............................................................................  10  1.  The Trial Court's Determination of the Parties' Obligations under the PSA is Unsupported by the Facts  ........................................................................................................  10  2.  The Trial Court Improperly Relied on Extrinsic Evidence to Alter the Terms of the PSA ..................................................  12  B.  The Trial Court  Erred in Dismissing Count Three of the Complaint ..................................................................................................................  17  POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND MISAPPLIED  THE LAW IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER (Pa0190; 1T20-23) ..................................................................................  21 POINT IV  PLAINTIFF WAS NOT REQUIRED TO SEEK OR OBTAIN A STAY OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT (Issue Not Raised Below)  ..................................................................................................................26  POINT V DEFENDANTS' CONDITION PRECEDENT ARGUMENT IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND THE LAW (5T61:5 to 70:9)...........................................................................................................31  CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................35
[directive] Authorization to Use Conducted Energy Devices  [Amended March 3, 2016]  1.  An officer authorized to use a conducted energy device pursuant to this supplemental policy may fire and/or discharge the device during an actual operation only where: a. i) the officer believes such force is reasonably necessary to prevent the person against whom the device is targeted from causing death or serious bodily injury to him/herself, an officer, or any other person; or ii) the person against whom the device is targeted is armed with an object that the officer reasonably believes could be used as a deadly weapon, and the person refuses the officer’s command to put down or surrender the object after having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so; or iii) the officer believes such force is reasonably necessary to prevent the immediate flight of an individual whom the officer has probable cause to believe has committed an offense in which the suspect caused or attempted to cause death or serious bodily injury; or iv) the person against whom the device is targeted resists a lawful arrest by using or threatening to use physical force or violence against the officer or another in a manner and to a degree that the officer reasonably believes creates a substantial risk of causing bodily injury to the officer, a victim, or a bystander; and b. the individual will not voluntarily submit to custody after having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so considering the exigency of the situation and the immediacy of the need to employ law enforcement force.
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree Bail Range
[brief] In October 1992, the Decedent purchased a home at [...] in [...] (“Home”) one month before her marriage to the Petitioner.  The mortgage was obtained through [...], and it was paid off solely by the Decedent.  The Petitioner’s name was never added to the Deed. (11T91-4 to 9).  Prior to marrying the Petitioner, the Decedent had a child, [...], the Respondent in this matter (“Respondent”).
[brief] Tenant then submitted a brief seeking to fix the amount owed on the Tenant’s Allowance “after set-off for Landlord’s attorneys’ fees and costs” (Pb53).  Landlord appears to be making the argument that by asking that the court-authorized counsel fees be set off against Tenant’s Allowance, Tenant somehow “admitted” liability for those attorney’s fees.  On the contrary, all Tenant was doing was accepting the ruling that the judge had already made and staking its legal position against that backdrop.  As to the third argument, that “Tenant is not entitled to legal fees under the express terms of the Lease,” it is unclear what “express terms of the Lease” Landlord is referring to.
[brief] May 29, 2017 (redacted)  Motor Vehicle Retail Order for Plaintiff’s Purchase of New 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe, VIN #5NMZUDLB0HH011768 (Exbt. 1 to Cmplt.)…………………………..60a-64a  May 29, 2017 (redacted) Retail Installment Sales Contract for Plaintiff’s Purchase of New 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe, VIN #5NMZUDLB0HH011768 (Exbt. 2 to Cmplt.)…………………..65a-70a  Ten Year/100,000 mile (redacted) Powertrain Warranty on New 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 3 to Cmplt.)…………………..71a-73a  January 28, 2019 (redacted)  [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 4 to Cmplt.)……………..74a-76a  February 4, 2019 (redacted)  [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 5 to Cmplt.)……………..77a-78a  February 15, 2019 (redacted)  [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 6 to Cmplt.)……………..79a-80a  March 6, 2019 (redacted)  [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 7 to Cmplt.)……………..81a-82a  March 20, 2019 (redacted)  [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 8 to Cmplt.)……………..83a-84a  September 20, 2019 (redacted)  [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 9 to Cmplt.)……………..85a-87a  October 9, 2019 (redacted)  [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 10 to Cmplt.)……………..88a-89a October 11, 2019 (redacted)  [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 11 to Cmplt.)……………..90a-92a November 12, 2019 (redacted) [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 12 to Cmplt.)……………..93a-95a December 31, 2019 (redacted) [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 13 to Cmplt.)……………96a-97a January 15, 2020 (redacted) [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 14 to Cmplt.)…………..98a-100a January 6, 2020 Customer Claim Form and [...] Rejection of Plaintiff’s Mediation Request (redacted) (Exbt.15 to Cmplt.)……………………………………………………………..101a-103a August 13, 2020 (redacted) [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 16 to Cmplt.)………..104a-107a November 27, 2020 photo of 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe’s instrument cluster showing a lit Check
[brief] Their pre-answer motions were both based upon a central, yet fundamentally flawed premise: namely, that Plaintiff waived its right to seek specific performance of the PSA when it accepted return of its Earnest Money Deposit in mid-July 2022.  Defendants argued that Plaintiff had a choice to “either” to seek return of the Deposit “or” seek specific performance.  Yet, by its terms, Section 13.1 of the PSA expressly permitted Plaintiff to demand return of the Deposit and seek specific performance as an additional and non-exclusive remedy where, as here, [...] proceeded to close on the underlying real estate transaction with the fee owner and without Plaintiff.  (Pa115-116, PSA § 13.1).  Indeed, the “in addition to” language in PSA § 13.1 was expressly written to protect Plaintiff from exactly what transpired here—i.e., [...] proceeded to close but cut Plaintiff out of the deal.  The trial court’s pre-answer dismissal of the Complaint, with prejudice, as against both Defendants was erroneous.
[brief] (Aa0030).  [...] reviewed and agreed with these conclusions in its finding that the design was consistent with the Stormwater Rules and BMP’s.  (Aa0087).  For the approved BMP 271, the two test pits and two infiltration tests are located at the BMP.  The higher seasonal high water table elevation of 86.8 was used to confirm adequate separation between the seasonal high water table and the bottom of the basin.
[directive] Informed my client that, if applicable, the charge may be tried by the court upon waiver of indictment and trial by jury, if in writing and signed by the defendant.  R.  7)  Informed my client of the date of the pre-indictment disposition conference held pursuant to 3:4-6, which is on .  8)  Informed my client that there is a recovery court program (formerly called the drug court program) and where and how to make an application to that program.
[brief] Neither was a party in the bankruptcy proceeding.  Whether or not the [...] was successful in obtaining contribution from [...] would have no effect on the bankruptcy estate.  It would not increase or decrease the amount of the estate.  In re Alfreda Johnson v. [...] of NY, 2006 WL 6613652, US [...]ruptcy Court, E. D. Pennsylvania., the defendant in an adversary proceeding filed a third-party complaint for contribution and indemnity.  The Court stated on p.3 of the decision: “Indemnity or contribution claims made by those who are sued by representatives of the bankruptcy estate against third parties generally fall outside the scope of bankruptcy court jurisdiction. ”  The Johnson court also stated: “Other courts have also concluded that third-party claims brought by those who were sued by the bankruptcy trustee will not fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court where the defendant would be the only one to recover on those third-party claims. ”  Id.( See cases cited therein)  “This follows because it does not matter to the bankruptcy estate or to the debtor whether or not the third party claimant is successful in obtaining indemnification or contribution. ”  Id.  Similarly, in In Re: Green Field Energy Services, Inc. v. MOR MGH Holding, 554 B.R. 315 U.S. [...]ruptcy Ct., D. Delaware (2016), the bankruptcy court held that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction on claims contained in a third-party complaint.