[brief] For the reasons explained below, both questions should be answered in the affirmative.  This matter arises out of the Planning Board’s decision to approve [...]’ conditional use application for a cannabis micro-dispensary.  The Planning Board found that [...]’ application satisfied all relevant conditional use standards and, accordingly, unanimously approved [...]’ application.  In conjunction therewith, the Planning Board correctly found that [...] was entitled to the benefit of the TOA Rule, starting from the date on which it commenced Hoboken’s cannabis land use development approval process by submitting a complete application to the CRB.  [...] – a nonprofit corporation formed after the Planning Board approved [...]’ conditional use application – commenced this litigation alleging that the Planning Board’s application of the TOA Rule was “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. ”  [...] – who was (incorrectly) permitted to intervene on the eve of trial – asserted similar claims just days before the trial court entered its final decision.  When analyzing whether Plaintiffs possessed standing to assert claims under the MLUL, the trial court failed to apply the proper standard – the “interested party” standard set forth in the MLUL.  The plain language of the MLUL, and the binding case law interpreting same, make clear that a party only possesses standing if it establishes that it has a possessory interest in property that will be adversely affected by the challenged development.  Plaintiffs made no such showing, admitted they would suffer no such adversity, and the trial court made specific findings of fact that Plaintiffs did not possess property anywhere near the facility in question and were not affected in any way whatsoever by the challenged approval.  Notwithstanding its factual findings, the trial court – relying on a single outdated decision issued prior to the enactment of the MLUL – erroneously concluded that Plaintiffs possessed standing.  Had the trial court applied the correct standard – i.e., the “interested party” standard in the MLUL – the only conclusion it could have reached was that neither party possesses standing.  The trial court’s decision to the contrary runs afoul of every single relevant authority interpreting the MLUL.  Further, the trial court erroneously concluded that [...]’ submission of a complete application to the CRB did not constitute an application for development under the MLUL and, therefore, did not trigger the TOA Rule.  That decision is contrary to the clear provisions of the MLUL, which provide that an application is complete for purposes of the TOA Rule when submitted to an agency created by, or responsible to, the municipality when such agency is acting pursuant to the MLUL.  The CRB – a municipal agency specifically created as an arm of the Planning Board to review cannabis-related development applications – meets the statutory criteria.  Significantly, the trial court’s decision to overturn the Planning Board’s decision is contrary to the overall purpose and spirit of the TOA Rule.  The Legislature enacted the TOA Rule specifically to avoid situations – like here – where a developer spends time and money pursuing an application, only to have a municipality change the zoning to the developer’s detriment while the application was pending.  The trial court erred in failing to consider and give effect to the Legislative intent when adjudicating this issue of first impression.  That gravely inequitable result must be reversed.