ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Commissioner’s docket is filled with numerous cases seeking relief for violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-1, et seq.  For example, in a 2004 case, Lacey Twp. Bd. of Ed. v. N.J. Dept. of Ed., the Commissioner of Education decided a claim alleging that the New Jersey Department of Education “failed to provide petitioner with the appropriate level or amount of funding pursuant to the Comprehensive Education Improvement and Financing Act, N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-1, et seq. ”.  The Commissioner of Education interpreted N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-1, et seq. and decided whether the petitioner was entitled to monetary relief under that statute. \(^{18}\)  In Lakewood Bd. of Ed. v. N.J. Dept. of Ed., the petitioner appealed alleging a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-15 (which has since been repealed), asserting that it was owed additional funding under the statute.  The Commissioner of Education confirmed his own jurisdiction in that matter when he held, “Initially, the Commissioner finds that the express language of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-15 provides petitioner with the right of appeal” to the Commissioner.\(^{19}\)  The court \(^{18}\) Pa182 – Pa195 \(^{19}\)  Pa196 – Pa210 therefore has no reason to break from the Commissioner’s precedent in deciding matters under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-1, et seq.  E.  Interpreting, implementing, and enforcing N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9 is under the Commissioner of Education’s jurisdiction.  (Argued at Pa368)  The Commissioner of Education (not Superior Court, Law Division) is tasked with interpreting and implementing the 18A legislation under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  The Commissioner of Education has the authority and expertise to determine how the statute is applied to school districts, and can order the Board to act in a specific manner.  [...]’s Counterclaim clearly attempts to circumvent the Commissioner’s review of their claim based on N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  Hence, since the Counterclaim arises under the school laws, the Commissioner of Education (not Superior Court, Law Division) retains jurisdiction over [...]’s Counterclaim.  The court’s initial ruling on the cross-motion for summary judgment that the Commissioner had jurisdiction over the Counterclaim was therefore correct. \(^{20}\)  The court’s reconsideration ruling that it had jurisdiction over the Counterclaim was in error and should be reversed. \(^{21}\)  POINT TWO
[brief] 5 N.J. Practice, Clapp, Wills & Administration § 62, at 224-28 (3d ed. 1982).  Underlying the absence of a requirement of showing suspicious circumstances with an inter vivos gift is the belief that a living donor is not likely to give to another something that he or she can still enjoy.  Id. at § 62, at 226 n. 15.  When the presumption of undue influence arises from an inter vivos gift, the donee has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence not only that "no deception was practiced therein, no undue influence used, and that all was fair, open and voluntary, but that it was well understood."
[brief] 6T, 23:13-25:9; 33:21-35:7.  [...] made no assumptions, because none were necessary; he simply analyzed the real, certain, and actual data provided by [...], as required, in its application to the [...].  6T, 23:13-25:9; 33:21-35:7.  Yet, the Trial Court erroneously invented a standard that the Supreme Court did not establish.
[brief] In resolving this issue, I must first carefully define the contours of the work-product privilege.  “[T]he work product doctrine insulates a lawyer’s research, analysis of legal theories, mental impressions, notes, and memoranda of witnesses’ statements from an opposing counsel’s inquiries. ”  *Dunn v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.*, 927 F.2d 869, 875 (5th Cir. 1991).  Importantly, the work-product doctrine does not protect from disclosure documents that a third-party witness or former company employees voluntarily hands over to Plaintiffs’ counsel during the course of litigation.  Simply put, there is nothing about those documents—many of which were probably Defendants’ business records—that reflects the mental processes of Plaintiffs’ counsel.  If the work-product doctrine did apply in such a situation, Plaintiffs could insulate from production any and all documents it obtained from any witnesses or sources in a case.  That would, to say the very least, be an odd result.  Not surprisingly, Plaintiffs cannot cite a single case adopting the construction of the work-product privilege it advocates here.  As such, I order Plaintiffs to produce documents received from non-parties by November 12, 2021.
[brief] ”  (6T 166-15 to 20)  She testified that she eventually found her phone, and she called her boyfriend, though she felt like she could not “tell anybody what happened. ”  (6T 165-11 to 24, 166-4 to 8)  Although she initially did not want to leave the area because she wanted to get help, she thought that nobody “was going to believe” her, so she instead called her friend who lived in Pennsylvania.  (6T 166-21 to 167-4)  She testified on cross-examination that she slept in the car the night of the 28th and contacted her friend the afternoon of the 29th.  (7T 43-13 to 47-3)  She started driving to her friend’s house, but she was tired, and had barely eaten or slept, so she pulled over into a well-lit parking lot with some trucks.  (6T 167-7 to 9, 167-13 to 22)  She testified that she was thirsty, but the only thing in the car were the cans of White Claw from earlier, so she drank two of them and then fell asleep.  She did not wake up until an ambulance arrived.  (6T 167-24 to 168-4)  [...] testified that around 2 a.m. on September 30, he was finishing his shift as a truck driver at an industrial area just off the Kutztown exit in Pennsylvania.
[brief] [...]’s Unadjudicated Hackensack Project Claims  At the time [...] became [...]’s subcontractor on the Hackensack Project in June 2019, it was clear the project was facing significant delays and execution issues arising from [...]’s performance as prime contractor.  Pa574 (“It was admittedly a project fraught with difficulty acknowledged from the start with an exception from liquidated damages and credible testimony that there were serious issues with the project. ”).  Eventually, [...] stopped paying [...] for its work on the Hackensack Project.  Pa402.  Once the final judgment was entered in [...]’s arbitration with the owner of the Hackensack Project, [...]’s claim for nonpayment on the Hackensack Project against [...] became ripe.  By letter dated January 26, 2024, [...] sent [...] a letter demanding payment of $2,084,220.03, which is the balance [...] owes [...] for [...]’s work.  Da12-Da13.  [...] rejected [...]’s demand.  Da15-Da16.  Pursuant to the dispute resolution clause of the Hackensack Subcontract, [...] requested a mediation with the [...].  Da18.  The parties participate in a mediation on June 4, 2024, but were unable to resolve their claims.  Da3 ¶ 17.  [...] thereafter (also pursuant to the dispute resolution clause) commenced an arbitration to resolve its Hackensack Project claims (the “Hackensack Arbitration”).  Da25-Da27.  Rather than participate in the Hackensack Arbitration, which is expressly mandated by the parties’ agreement, [...] filed the instant action on June 20, 2024.  [...] also unilaterally and without [...]’s consent directed the [...] to stay the Hackensack Arbitration pending resolution of this action.  The [...] complied, and the Hackensack Arbitration is currently stayed pending the final resolution of [...]’s claim for injunctive relief in this proceeding.
[brief] He also added a new detail, that when [...] had come to the back door two months prior, he was trying to pick the house’s locks.  (21T:181-1 to 20).  He also stated that he did not feel compassion or any desire to get [...] help because he was an intruder and defendant “felt violated. ” (21T:196-18 to 197-13).  Defendant said multiple times that he felt he did nothing wrong.  (21T:182-11 to 184-10).
[brief] THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE BREACH OF CONTRACT AND IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING COUNT OF THE COMPLAINT WHERE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS EXIST REGARDING THE UNDERLYING MALICE THAT [...] HELD AGAINST MR. ALLEN; AND THE [...]’S FAILURE TO ABIDE BY ITS EXECUTIVE ORDER 008 AND THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ORDER, FACTS WHICH ONLY A JURY CAN DECIDE.  (T1 P62 L22-25; P62 L1-5)  [...]’s purpose for running for elective office was to make a positive impact on the West Ward of Newark and believed his job would be protected as set forth in MEO-08-2008, trusting words and sentiments of former [...].
[brief] (Da159; Da183 ¶ 9; T26-10 to -13.)  The court was concerned that a relevancy review would result in the non-production of discoverable documents, and it implemented a protocol designed to prevent that outcome.  (Da159.)  The production of irrelevant documents was an inherent and inevitable byproduct of the court’s effort to ensure production of relevant materials; it was not the object of the court’s order.  Moreover, Lipsky does not remotely resemble the case before this Court.  In that case, the trial court had entered a discovery order compelling a state agency, subject to a third-party subpoena, to surrender its employees’ state-issued cell phones and personal cell phones to a litigant’s eDiscovery vendor, which would then copy the phones’ entire contents -- including privileged materials and, presumably, the employees’ most sensitive personal, health, and financial information -- before searching the contents for materials responsive to the subpoena.
[brief] *State v. Carroll*, 456 N.J. Super. 520, 544 (App. Div. 2018); *State in the Interest of J.G.*, 151 N.J. 565, 591 (1997).  It “requires nothing more than a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. ”  *State v. Johnson*, 171 N.J. 192, 214 (2002) (citations omitted, alteration in original).  And as with the reasonable-suspicion test, courts determining whether probable cause existed to justify an officer’s search should consider the totality of the circumstances, including the officer’s experience and evidence of the high-crime reputation of an area.
[brief] It is undisputed that [...] was the majority owner of [...] and in control of all of the LLC [...]’s operations.  Thus, there is no basis to pierce the corporate veil to find [...] or [...] liable for the actions of the LLC with respect to plaintiff.  The Trial Court found, among other things (Pa47):  The record is devoid of any facts establishing that defendants [...] and [...] were indistinguishable from [...].  Mr. [...] had no access to the bank accounts or finances of [...].  Mr. [...] was the Chief Financial Officer of [...] in name only; Dr. [...] controlled [...]....  There was no proof that [...] was the alter ego of Mr. [...] or Mr. [...], or that their liability was equal to that of Dr. [...].  Nor did plaintiff present any credible evidence that Mr. [...] and Mr. [...] abused the privilege of incorporation by using [...] to engage in unlawful practices to perpetrate a fraud or injustice....  \textsuperscript{15}  Plaintiff also may assert claims for “self-dealing” and “waste” which do not give rise to an independent cause of action and are otherwise addressed in this section of [...] and [...]’s Brief.  Similarly, even though N.J.S.A. 42:2C (New Jersey Uniform Limited Liability Act) is not directly applicable to this Delaware LLC (see Section III.B., fn. 12), for the reasons already discussed, plaintiff has failed to show that [...] or [...] engaged in gross negligence or recklessness that would otherwise be in violation of N.J.S. A. 42:2C-39(c), as plaintiff has asserted.  Moreover, this statute applies to members; plaintiff has admitted that the evidence establishes that [...] was not a member.  In the context of a corporate shareholder and its subsidiary, the Court in Verni ex rel. Burstein v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 160, 199-200 (App. Div. 2006), certif. denied, 189 N.J. 429 (2007) (citations omitted)(emphasis added), described the requirements in order to pierce the corporate veil as follows:
[directive] Attachments  Chief Justice [...] c: Attorney General [...] S. Public Defender [...] E.  [...], Director, Division of Criminal Justice  Criminal Presiding Judges  Municipal Court Judges of [...], Chief Staff D. AOC Directors and Assistant Directors  Special Assistants to the Administrative Director  Criminal Division Managers and Assistants  Assistant Municipal Division Managers  [...], Chief, Municipal Court Services  [...], Chief, Municipal Court Services  [...], Chief, Criminal Practice  [...], Chief, A TCSU  [...], Municipal Court Services  Municipal Court Directors and Administrators  6  Jmey ~!IP~ Crom  New New Jersey Judiciary @ .. ..... ......  J, , • tt of Municipal Court New Jersey -./J .- Complaint Information Form ~ •~StM(e JJ/rMU  Instructions: of of  Please complete the following information to the best your ability.  This information will help the preparation the in complaint.  Your Name (you are the complainant)  Street Address City State Zip Telephone Number Email Address  Defendant's Name Street Address City State Zip Telephone Number (if known) of Date Birth (if known)  Driver's License (if known)  State I the person you are charging elected public official or a candidate for elected public office?  an Is Yes No or If yes, provide any information regarding what elected office the person a candidate for currently holds.  is  If this a motor vehicle complaint list: is # of of License Plate  Other Vehicle Description vehicle (if known)  State I I of Names and addresses witnesses (use additional paper if necessary)  Name Address For Court Use Only  Court Administrator/Deputy Initials: Date: Corresponding Complaint Numbers: (Every request the requires of filing a complaint.)
[brief] ”  In addition, such a claim is barred by the integration provisions in the Lease and Purchase and Sale Agreement.  To establish a claim for fraudulent inducement, five elements must be proven by clear and convincing evidence: (1) a material representation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) made with knowledge of its falsity; and (3) with the intention that the other party rely thereon; (4) resulting in reliance by that party; (5) to his detriment.  Jewish Ctr. Of Sussex County v. Whale, 86 N.J. 619, 624 (1981); RNC Systems, Inc. v. Modern Technology Group, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 436, 451 (D.N.J. 2012).  Evidence that is clear and convincing is “evidence which is ‘so clear, direct, and weighty and convincing as to enable [the fact finder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. ’”  Aiello v. Knoll Golf Club, 64 N.J. Super. 156, 162 (App. Div. 1960) (citation omitted).  Under this standard, even uncontroverted evidence may nonetheless fail to meet the elevated clear and convincing evidence standard.  In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 408 (1987).  The clear and convincing standard must be applied to both liability and damages in the Appellants’ attempt to prove fraud in the inducement.  As if the difficulty in meeting this standard is not enough for Appellants, it clearly becomes impossible under New Jersey case law, as extrinsic evidence to show fraud in the inducement is not admissible in disputes where the matters were expressly addressed in an integrated agreement.
[brief] The *RESTATEMENT* provides,  For the purposes of liability . . . a lawyer owes a duty to use care .  . .  (2)  To a non-client when and to the extent that the lawyer or (with the lawyer's acquiescence) the lawyer's client invites the non-client to rely on the lawyer's opinion or provision of other legal services, the non-client so relies, and the non-client is not, under applicable law, too remote from the lawyer to be entitled to protection....  Section 73, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS.  Our courts have recognized numerous circumstances where an attorney may be liable to a non-client.  The question of whether a duty of care is owed requires the examination of fairness and public policy, foreseeability, and the relationship between the parties.  “Foreseeability of the risk of harm is the foundational element in the determination of whether a duty exists”  G.A.H. v. K.G.G., 238 N.J. 401 (2019).  As the lower court found in its opinion, the evidence clearly creates a genuine issue of material fact to be determined by a jury as to whether the Respondents represented [...].
[brief] [...] did not race to the courthouse or deprive Defendants of a reasonable opportunity to file first  The first “special equity” does not apply here because [...] did not “race” to the courthouse or deprive Defendants of a reasonable opportunity to file suit in the jurisdiction of their choice.  To the contrary, [...] did not commence this action until nearly nine months after Defendants began tendering the underlying PCB lawsuits to [...].  (Pa001; Pa012).  In fact, much of that litigation had already been pending for years, including one case that was litigated fully to verdict.  (Pa470-72).  Defendants’ characterization of [...]’s first-filed action as being a “surreptitious” or “preemptive” filing (Db3) simply makes no sense.  Defendants do not cite a single New Jersey decision with analogous facts.
[brief] Any impropriety in the admission of defendant’s statements constitutes harmless error.  Even if this Court concludes that defendant’s Miranda rights were violated as to his post-arrest statements, any error was harmless due to the unchallenged admissibility of the statements to [...] and [...] and the testimonies of [...], [...], and [...], all pointing to defendant as the “pied piper” of the plan for [...] to fight [...].  Defendant’s conviction should thus be affirmed regardless of the admissibility of his post-arrest statements.  As our Supreme Court recognized in Tillery, a Miranda violation may nevertheless constitute harmless error.  238 N.J. at 302.  The proper analysis is whether the violation of a defendant’s constitutional right is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588, 614 n.12 (2011).  More recently, the Court explained that “[i]f a defendant's un-Mirandized statement is admitted in error, an appellate court will not reverse the conviction unless the error was ‘of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ’”  *State v. Ahmad*, 246 N.J. 592, 612 (2021); see also *State v. Marshall*, 123 N.J. 1, 121 (1991) (applying harmless-error analysis to violations of defendant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination).  Here, a wealth of testimony from a handful of witnesses, as well as two unchallenged videotaped statements by defendant to [...] and [...], implicated defendant as the ringleader of the conspiracy to assault [...].  Phone records also indicated that defendant called [...] shortly before the fight, confirming [...]’s testimony.  Moreover, the jury saw surveillance footage showing defendant leading the group to [...]’s house as well as a cell phone video of the fight which corroborated [...]’s testimony—and contradicted defendant’s version—that defendant punched him for trying to stop the fight.  Accordingly, even if the admission of defendant’s statements were erroneous, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and should be affirmed.  **POINT III**
[brief] Table of Contents  Section  Preliminary Statement .........................................................  1  Procedural History ...............................................................  2 Statement of Facts ..................................................................  3  Legal Argument  The guilty verdicts should be vacated because the State failed to prove the charges of Leaving the Scene of an Accident and Failure to Report an Accident beyond a reasonable doubt.  ..............................................  7  A.  The State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] drove and crashed into the parked car (Raised below: 4T.4-12 to 5-20).  . . 8  B.  The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] violated the charged statutes by unlawfully leaving the scene of an accident (Raised below: 4T.5-21 to 8-18).  .......................  10  Conclusion ............................................................................. 12  ##  Table of Judgment and Ruling Being Appealed | Document | Appendix page no. | |-----------------------------------------------|-------------------| | Written Decision of the Hon. [...], J.S.C. | 1a | | Order of the Hon. [...], J.S.C. | 16a | ## Defendant’s Appendix | Appendix document | Appendix page no. | |-------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | Written Decision of the Hon. [...], J.S.C. | 1a | | Order of the Hon. [...], J.S.C. | 16a | | Copies of Motor Vehicle Tickets | 17a | | Dispositions of Motor Vehicle Tickets | 20a | | Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court – Law Division | 23a | | Order for Stay | 25a | | Case Information Statement | 27a | | Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court – Appellate Division | 30a | | Transcript Certification | 34a | | [...] Letter, Trial Exhibit D-1 | 35a | | Bodycam Video, Trial Exhibit S-1(video) | 36a |
[brief] ”  Id. at 500 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435).  “Litigants in good faith may raise alternative legal grounds for a desired outcome, and the court’s rejection of or failure to reach certain grounds is not a sufficient reason for reducing a fee.  The result is what matters. ”  Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435.  The sole “denied” motion [...] points to his brief is that acknowledged in Plaintiff’s fee affidavit – an order to show cause to prevent Defendants from harassing Plaintiff and appearing at his home.
[directive] DWI Refusal  To prove a DWI refusal violation the evidentiary standard is the preponderance of the evidence.  In general, the proofs are met based upon the testimony of the arresting officer of his/her observations that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle, the defendant had been arrested for a DWI violation, the officer read the defendant the Standard NJ MVC (Refusal) Statement, and the defendant refused to submit to chemical breath testing.  Prosecution of DWI and DWI Refusal Offenses
[brief] *Tynan v. Gen. Motors Corp.*, 248 N.J. Super. 654, 668 (App. Div.), *certif. denied*, 127 N.J. 548 (1991), *rev'd in part*, 127 N.J. 269 (1992).  “A corporation and its employees are not separate persons for the purpose of civil conspiracy, and a conspiracy cannot exist in the absence of two or more persons acting in concert. ”  *Nat'l Auto Div., LLC v. Collector's All., Inc.*, No. A-3178-14T3, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 234, at *13 (App. Div. Jan. 31, 2017).  Here, Appellants cannot establish a conspiracy where they allege that [...], [...], and [...] conspired to create [...] because that alleged conspiracy consists of a corporation, its principal, and its agent.
[brief] Even where a Mt. Laurel judge evaluates whether a resolution by a planning board was contrary to the intent of a settlement agreement, it must do so based on the terms of the settlement agreement and the full record of proceedings before the planning board, including the transcripts.  *Id.* at 403-404.  There were no transcripts in the motion record.  In sum, the trial court’s decision to set aside the Supplemental Resolution is not supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence and should be reversed.