ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Notice of Motion   Proof of Service   Brief in Support of Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Counterclaim *   Statement of Material Facts *   Proposed Order   Omnibus Certification of Exhibits  Board Exhibits 1 – 14  *  Other than the Brief in Support of Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the Counterclaim, and the Statement of Material Facts, at Pa332 – Pa395, which were produced in the Appendix under R. 2:6-1(a)(2) because the matter is referenced in the Appellate Brief as to where it was argued below, and the document is required for a full understanding of the issues presented, the remainder of the materials are not submitted in the Appendix as per R. 2:6-1(a)(2).  February 7, 2023
[brief] Purchaser expressly waives its rights to seek damages in the event of Seller’s default hereunder.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing contained in this Section 13.1 will limit Purchaser’s remedies at law, in equity or as herein provided in pursuing remedies for any breach by Seller of any of the Termination Surviving Obligations.  (Pa115-116, PSA § 13.1 (emphasis added)).  Hence, Plaintiff had a contractual right to (and actively did) insist upon participating in the rescheduled closing with the Fee Owner, to ensure specific performance under the PSA, such that it would acquire title to the Real Property directly from the Fee Owner, regardless of and in addition to the termination and return of the Earnest Money Deposit.  (See id.).
[brief] THE CHANCERY COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING DR. ONDIK’S APPLICATIONS.  (Ra1-7)  Contrary to [...]’s argument that this Court should apply a de novo standard of review, this Court will not reverse Chancery Court’s denial of injunctive relief unless the Chancery Court abused its discretion.  Waste Mgmt. of N.J., Inc. v. Union Cnty. Util. Auth., 399 N.J. Super. 508, 520 (App. Div. 2008); Rinaldo v. RLRI Inv., LLC, 387 N.J. Super. 387, 396 (App. Div. 2006).  This Court applies the same standard when reviewing the Chancery Court’s denial of [...]’s motion for reconsideration.  The Pitney Bowes Bank v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015).  Although [...] ignores the reconsideration standard in his brief, the 2024 Order expressly denied [...]’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s December 2023 Order (Pa61).  Regardless of whether this Court treats [...]’s appeal as an appeal of a motion for reconsideration or an appeal of denial of his request for an injunction, the Court reviews the Chancery Court’s decision for abuse of discretion—not under a de novo review.  [...] has not even argued, much less demonstrated, that the Chancery Court’s decisions were irrational, inexplicably departed from existing policies or were based on an impermissible basis.  Pitney Bowes, 440 N.J. Super. at 382.  This is because he cannot.  As set forth below, it is clear that the Chancery Court did not abuse its discretion in denying [...]’s initial application for a preliminary injunction or his motion for reconsideration thereafter.
[brief] Following my November 14, 2021 citation for an alleged traffic violation, I, Appellant [...], was entitled to a fair trial to dispute it.  However, the municipal court and the trial court denied my constitutional rights including, but not limited to, receiving complete discovery, witnesses and to be represented by an attorney.  Upon receiving my citation, I retained [...] as my attorney, and on January 4, 2022, Mr. Wigenton, provided to me as discovery, copies of the ticket and citation by [...] and of the applied statute, dated 2013 (Pa6-Pa10).  Finding this to be incomplete, I addressed my concern in a letter to the Honorable [...] as detailed in the preliminary section of this letter brief.  Her Honor Judge Sonnenblick held a hearing via teleconference on January 18, 2022, at which Mr. Wigenton represented me and told me I need not appear.  Since Mr. Wigenton did not agree with my preference for trial, he asked for an adjournment, so I could request time to find another attorney and complete discovery.  I followed Mr. Wigenton's appearance with my own letter to Judge Sonnenblick, dated January 19, 2022, echoing both said requests.  A new court appearance was set for March 8, 2022.  Before our appearance, I was approached by prosecutor [...] with a plea offer.  Mr. Vecchio stated that I could avoid points on my record if I accepted a guilty plea to my alleged violation.  I declined, and in the hearing that proceeded, Judge Sonnenblick officially reset discovery and adjourned the matter until April 13, 2022, to allow for said discovery and my attainment of a new attorney.  On the trial date of April 13, 2022, Mr. Vecchio again approached me prior to trial that day with a plea offer, to which I again declined.  I expressed my dismay that I had not yet been given full discovery, as the records custodian, [...], continued to withhold the complete videos that I had rightfully requested.  Further, I inquired about [...] but not limited to, whom I had subpoenaed as witnesses but did not see present for trial.  Mr. Vecchio simply dismissed my inquiry and stated they were not coming, thus fueling my emotional response (as I began to cry) that surfaced during my appearance before Judge Sonnenblick.  Her Honor then, in effect, appeared to reverse all her positions from March 8, 2022—from which she already knew that discovery was incomplete, and now saw that I did not have my witnesses either.  When I voiced that I had not yet found new counsel, Judge Sonnenblick told me I was not getting one.  Her Honor nevertheless proceeded and targeted my psychological state (as I was crying), again a result of my encounter with Mr. Vecchio immediately prior to this.  It was in this unclear state that I agreed to the plea, despite being denied my constitutional rights including, but not limited to, receiving complete discovery, witnesses and to be represented by an attorney and treatment with dignity and respect.
[directive] 2.  Nothing in this Directive, including in Part II.A.1, prevents a law enforcement officer from respectfully asking a transgender individual as to their preference with respect to the gender of the searching officer, documenting that preference, and performing searches in accordance with that preference, if authorized by the relevant state, county, or local law enforcement agency.  3.  Law enforcement officers shall never require transgender, non-binary, and gender non- conforming individuals to remove appearance-related items (such as prosthetics, bras, Page 6 clothes, undergarments, wigs, chest binders, or cosmetic items) during a search unless all individuals, regardless of gender, would be required to remove such items during that search.  As for any individual, officers may require the removal of such items when necessary to ensure the safety and security of any person, but should take care when practicable to remove the items in a respectful, non-invasive, and private manner.
[brief] On March 8, 2020, the Vermont Court appointed a “Litigation Receiver” (Pa696–99) and empowered the Litigation Receiver to speak and act in the name of the Association in the Derivative Action (Pa696 ¶¶ 1–2), even though the Association was solvent and had a fully functioning Board of Directors.  Pa477 ¶ 17.  On August 3, 2020, the Vermont Trial Court issued a summary judgment ruling that [...] was liable to the [...] for breach of fiduciary duty.  Pa477–49 ¶¶ 17–22; Pa360–38.  Without discussing or referencing [...]’s sworn testimony, quoted above, that the “AYE” unit owner votes cast in favor of firing [...] and [...], hiring [...], and supporting the Derivative Action did not alter or impair any Association interests (as Ohio has admitted for purposes of this appeal) but, to the contrary, advanced the Association’s interests as they were defined by the Unit Owner vote taken December 19, 2019, the Court wrote as follows:  The Defendants . . . fail to acknowledge that they were personally in an adversary role against the Association in [the 1007 Case in which the August 23 Order had been granted].  Directing new counsel to withdraw legal filings for the obvious purpose of personally benefiting the Defendants financially, and harming the Association financially, was a clear violation of Defendants’ duties to the Association.  The same is true of the attempt to obtain the privileged records of the Association’s prior counsel [[...] and [...]], which were generated at least in part in her capacity as a lawyer opposing defendants.  Pa364.  The Vermont Trial Court’s summary judgment decision did not identify any money or property that the Association lost, or that any Director gained, as a result of anything that happened on December 19, 2019.
[brief] The respondent also engages in an extensive conversation about everything but the fact that there is no legal authorization in the State of New Jersey for a sneak and peek warrant.  The respondent also does not address the fact that the detectives knowingly misrepresented to the court that they needed to surreptitiously enter the apartment to locate an area to place a surveillance camera inside the apartment.  However, the State skirts the issue that the detectives never even attempted to perform the reasons provided to the court in the affidavit in support of the warrant, which was to place a camera in the apartment.  Instead, the detectives entered the apartment with the singular focus to search and seize evidence.  Trial counsel failed miserably in his responsibility to the challenge the egregious misconduct of the detectives’ conduct, which the State does not address.
[brief] The Bergenfield holding stands for the simple proposition that a party cannot be compelled to sign a contract that does not accurately reflect the interest arbitration award, and the Arbitrator must resolve an ambiguity in the Award.  In the Matter of [...] and [...], 2022 NJ PERC LEXIS 95, *12 (2022).  (“The Bergenfield holding was narrowly applicable to the unique situation therein concerning whether the Borough "could only be compelled to sign a contract that accurately reflected the interest arbitration award.  POINT VI
[brief] If the LAD does not cover denied anxiety --- \(^1\)  If all of the non-processing is because they believe they have immunity from Administrative Process, they should have stated that as a response to ADA/LAD Complaints long ago.  That argument is specious – which is why they don’t answer with it.  A quick Declaratory Judgment Action would have destroyed any such immunity from AOC Process argument.  \(^2\)  The first concerned "bouncing" [...]’s Exculpatory Motion, used as evidence for an informal venue change request.  The second involved an ADA/LAD Complaint for not processing [...]’s formal motion for a venue change – a rule violation.  (The venue issue took about a year to resolve, or three months from the second ADA/LAD complaint, which should not have to have been filed.)  medication, denial of dad/counsel (via misinformation), forced hopeless situations (for "fun" at the expense of people with mental disabilities), or extrajudicial kidnapping, what good is it?  Regarding the CRA against [...], [...] noted a potential policy of denying family access to detainees.  1T-2-3-5 (April '21).  [...]'s SAC mentions [...] as parent/counsel:  See, e.g., Pa146, ¶3 - "[[...]] asked for his dad as counsel ... when he was voluntarily surrendering;" Pa147, ¶4 (end) - "Leaving him alone after lying to him that his dad/counsel had abandoned him, highly suggests they were attempting to provoke a suicide attempt ....  This is complicated by the lack of a defined "family" right, though State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304 (2000), suggests there should be family contact accommodations for developmentally disabled individuals.  ([...]’s mental age when he was arrested was maybe 16-17 years old.)  The Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128, 134-35 (App. Div. 2021) remand was for de novo review of the SAC/revised SAC, not to "rubber stamp" [...]’s findings or use the remanded Federal Complaint as a reference point.  II.
[brief] No depositions had been conducted.  Depositions were to be completed in November 13, 2024.  (Pa62).  Service of expert’s reports was due on or before December 30, 2024.  (Pa62).  Rebuttal reports were not due until February 7, 2025 and expert depositions were to be completed by March 1, 2025.  (Pa62).  The discovery end date was March 1, 2025.  (Pa62).  Arbitration was scheduled for March 12, 2025 and trial was May 19, 2025.  (Pa62).  As of July 2, 2025, when the motion was filed trial was still 10 months away.
[directive] present target the Accounting premises.  any  Prior in execution individuals to the of C. foY exist, exigent circumstances written plan, search a that operations warrant requires unless following: shall the include plan such or identify the of steps residents occupants timely taken to any The reasonable 1. otherwise, any quarters, subdivided or living legal location searched, and be to taken. searched, steps those to were when and the specific within be unit target following or information anyone known at to present believed for the be The 2. with if can premises, reasonable efforts. determined it be criminal are they i. whether connected to the gender, and The age and cause; activity support probable detailed to known; ii. physical if or Cognitive disabilities, and iii. Animals.
[brief] See Arbus, Maybruch & Goode, LLC, 475 N.J. Super.  at 518 (observing that no rigorous ethics rule existed like the one the party urged the Appellate Division to adopt and declining to adopt such a rule as a basis for reversing the trial court at the expense of usurping the Supreme Court’s exclusive authority); see also In re Petition for Review of Opinion 552 of Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, 102 N.J. 194, 206 n.3 (1986) (“Only in the most sensitive circumstances have we imposed a *per se* rule of disqualification for potential conflicts of interest.  In the past we have by administrative directive . . .” (emphasis added)); Notice to the Bar, 91 N.J.L.J. 81 (Feb. 8, 1968) (Supreme Court’s notice to the bar announcing *per se* prohibition on joint representation of driver and passenger).  On this basis too, the Court should reject [...]’s request and affirm the trial court’s denial of [...]’s motion to disqualify the [...].
[brief] 206 N.J. at 257-58, citing N.J.S.A. 34:19-2e (emphasis added).  Our Supreme Court in Donelson went on to identify the following as a non-exclusive list of potential adverse employment actions: targeting an employee for reprisals; making false accusations of misconduct; giving negative performance reviews; issuing an unwarranted suspension; and requiring pre-textual mental health evaluations.  Ibid.
[brief] Id. at 91.  The plaintiff also filed an AOM of a doctor who was Board Certified and specialized in hematology, but did not state that she was Board Certified or specialized in internal medicine.  *Id.* at 91-92.  The defendant doctors filed an answer to the complaint, asserting that they were both specialists in internal medicine.  *Id.*  It was undisputed that both defendant doctors were not Board Certified or specialized in internal medicine.  *Id.*  The defendant doctors alleged that the subject of the claim was internal medicine, while the AOM doctor alleged that the subject of the claim was hematology.  *Id.* at 91-92.  The AOM doctor only became Board Certified in internal medicine after the alleged malpractice occurred.  *Id.* at 93.  The defendant doctors filed a motion to dismiss for the plaintiff’s failure to provide an AOM from an expert in their same specialty.
[brief] Ordinarily, inconsistent verdicts are accepted provided it is not clear why the jury came out the way it did and there were not errors in the court’s instructions.  State v. Grey, 147 N.J. 4, 11 (1996).  But that principle only applies where the defendant received one or more acquittals, and thus, has potentially already received the windfall of a lenient jury.  Id. at 9-10.  That principle has never been applied where a jury rendered an excessive number of legally inconsistent convictions.  Again, it was impossible for [...] to have committed both purposeful murder and a form of reckless manslaughter in the same killing—it must have been one or the other.  The jury selected both, which was improper, demonstrating at best a complete inability to understand the concept of lesser-included offenses.  The opportunity to clarify or rectify that issue with the jury has now passed.  It cannot be, especially for an offense that has resulted in a lifelong prison sentence, that we simply assume the jury meant to convict only on the greater offense.  [...] had valid grounds for his jury to consider manslaughter as an alternative, and constitutional protections demand that he be afforded a jury trial in which the jury appropriately considers and responds to those offenses.  It is true that trial counsel did not object to this issue.  But the trial court should have noticed the incompatible verdict returned by the jury and made an inquiry into this issue.  Indeed, review and control of the verdict sheet is something that is distinctly the trial court’s domain, not defense counsel’s.  See R. 3:19-1.  So too is ensuring that the jury’s verdict is accurately reflected by the verdict sheet a province of the trial court.  Butler, 27 N.J. at 608.  The trial court here even explicitly stated that it had reviewed the verdict sheet right after polling the jury, and so should have been well-alerted to this issue.  Accordingly, there is nothing about trial counsel’s failure to note the issue that amounts to waiver or invited error.  In short, there was a more than adequate basis for a reasonable jury to conclude that [...] did not commit purposeful murder but a lesser form of manslaughter.  Because the jury indicated it unanimously believed he committed those lesser forms, his murder conviction cannot stand because it is irreconcilable with such a verdict.  Accordingly, [...]’s conviction for murder must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial in which the jury appropriately considers the lesser-included offenses.
[brief] On the other hand, Defendant Counsel’s self-serving rebuttal was merely that a “reasonable hourly rate is likely between $250.00 and $350 per hour,” with no documentation or evidence to support his contention (Pa171).  In its appellate opposition, Defendant fudges its position by stating that Defendant argued that the hourly rates should be $250/hr.  Opp. Brief, pages 12-13, fn1.  Defendant is clearly attempting to make it seem as though the trial court split the difference between the proposed hourly rates.
[brief] This Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether this matter should be remanded to the [...] or the [...] (“[...]”) for further fact finding.  Here, only two issues remain in this Appeal.  Given that the record before this Court was previously supplemented by the [...], the record already contains every fact concerning these issues, including specific findings by [...] as to the consistency of CS 327 with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act and consistency with the applicable WQM Plan.  Accordingly, remand to the [...] or the [...] is unnecessary.  I.
[brief] On 12/20/2010, Hon. [...], a high ranking NJ State Judge and the Chief of the NJ Administrative Office of the Courts (NJ AOC), in his Administrative Order 01-2020 (068a) declared that the alleged assignment of 2/27/2009 robo-signed by [...] was fraudulent and it had to be removed from the [...]’s foreclosure complaint of 3/10/2009 and then he suspended that Foreclosure complaint.  Based on that order of 12/20/2010 by Hon. Grant (068a), the NJ Judiciary identified all suspended foreclosure complaints and added them to a list called the Group 3 List and saved it on eCourt under [...] docket.  That docket is now sealed by the NJ OOF and the public does not have access to its content.  The reason is unknown.  My name was on the Group 3 List, it is on page 400 with [...]’s name and the Foreclosure Docket number (087a).  Based on that order of Hon. Glenn (068a), [...] was supposed to cure the deficiencies of the alleged assignment of mortgage of 2/27/2009 (065a) and bring it back to record it again in the Monmouth County Hall of Records.  But [...] in violation of the court order of 12/20/2010 (068) did not cure the deficiencies of the alleged assignment of mortgage of 2/27/2009 (065a).  Based on the forged assignment of mortgage of 2/27/2009, [...] forged the Affidavit of Lost Note of 2/12/2014 (088a) and the Assignment of mortgage of 2/28/2014 (097a) from [...] to [...] ([...]) and sold them all to [...] for a penny on a dollar.
[brief] The stay was granted subject to accurate asset disclosures being made by Defendants to verify Defendants’ asserted inability to post liquid security.  *Ibid.*  After several motions over the gross inadequacy of Defendants’ disclosures, and only after Plaintiff had been granted permission to subpoena their bank records, Defendants finally disclosed the overseas transfers in January 2017.  (Pa55).  On February 13, 2017, the court lifted the stay of execution and forfeited to Plaintiff all collateral that had been pledged with the exception of Defendants’ [...] stock, and expanded a constructive trust that had been placed over [...]’s profits to include all of Defendants’ assets, wherever located.
[brief] Id. at 265-66.  As the facts in Smith demonstrated, detectives may be able to see through even dark automotive window tinting.  Id. at 252.  Consequently, the Court underscored repeatedly that, “In order to establish a reasonable suspicion of a tinted windows violation under N.J.S.A. 39:3-74, the State will therefore need to present evidence that tinting on the front windshield or front side windows inhibited officers’ ability to clearly see the vehicle’s occupants or articles inside. ”  Id. at 266.  At the hearing on [...]’s motion to suppress, the State failed to satisfy its burden of proving a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74 because [...]’s testimony did not demonstrate that front window tint – as opposed to back window tint or external factors – was responsible for obstructing [...]’s ability to see inside the car.
[brief] ”  *State v. O’Donnell*, 117 N.J. 210, 216 (1989).  Although appellate review of sentencing decisions is generally deferential, where, as here, “the trial court. . . merely enumerates” the aggravating and mitigating factors “or forgoes a qualitative analysis, or provides little insight into the sentencing decision, then the deferential standard will not apply.
[brief] DEFENDANT COULD NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, BE CONVICTED OF THIRD[-]DEGREE SHOPLIFTING FOR THE THEFT OF A TELEVISION WHOSE FULL RETAIL VALUE WAS $499.  (NOT RAISED BELOW).  POINT IV  THE SENTENCE IMPOSED ON THE ROBBERY CONVICTION IS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE AND SHOULD BE REDUCED.  In his pro se supplemental brief, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:
[brief] ”  Pb29.  The law is clear that there is no requirement to first seek, and be denied, zoning approval before obtaining relief from the Court.  As set forth in [...]’s opening brief, the Supreme Court in Toll Bros. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 559 (2002) rejected the argument that the developer of affordable housing was required to “first seek approval for its development from the Township, thereby denying it the opportunity to hear the application. ”  In any event, [...] applied to the land use board for a variance and was denied a hearing.  [...] contends “there has bee no bad faith actions by the Borough.