ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] loss.\textsuperscript{84}  An independent tort action is often “not cognizable where there is no duty owed to the plaintiff other than the duty arising out of the contract itself. ”\textsuperscript{85}  Nor is the specter of the bar against implied warranty claims per N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(b), which prohibits judgments “on the basis of strict liability, implied warranty or products liability” applicable to the complaint.  None of those claims are pled in the complaint.  31a-110a.  All three of those claims – including that of implied warranty – deal with tort injuries, i.e., injuries to the person.  For example, implied warranty claims in this context involve strict liability claims for injuries to the person and not breach of contract claims for benefit of the bargain damages.
[brief] Here, right from the beginning of the March 12 interview, the detectives referenced what Defendant told them “the other night,” meaning March 6.  (Da157)  Their first substantive question related to the investigation of [...]’s murder was to ask Defendant to tell them everything he did on March 5, to which Defendant responded that he had already told them what he did in his March 6 statement.  (Da159)  Defendant had asserted on March 6th that he did not leave the [...] at all that evening (Da138, 142, 144), an assertion he was then stuck with in his March 12th statement even when police confronted him with surveillance video from the [...].  (Da190)  This proved critical, as the State argued in closing that the [...] Inn surveillance proved that Defendant had lied about this assertion.  (38T148-16 to 20)  Additionally, in Defendant’s March 6th statement, he admitted (1) that he bought drugs from [...] that he then sold and (2) that [...] obtained the drugs from “up North” (Da149)—assertions that ultimately served as a core component of the State’s theory.  (38T147-16 to 148-2, 186-12 to 17)  Based on an evaluation of the O’Neill factors, the second statement to the police should have been suppressed.  Although there was a six day gap between the warned and unwarned statement (factor 2), [...] had already made a crucial admission about drug dealing in his March 6 statement (factor 1).  [...] conducted both interrogations (factor 3) and did not warn Defendant that his March 6 statement could not be used against him (factor 4).  Finally, much of the March 12 interrogation was a continuation of the March 6 interrogation, challenging Defendant’s assertion that he had never left the [...] that evening (factor 5).  Beyond the O’Neill factors themselves, “courts must view the totality of the circumstances in light of the relevant factors and then determine,” O’Neill, 193 N.J. at 181, whether the State has met its burden to show that Defendant’s “waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary beyond reasonable doubt. ”  State v. Carrion, 249 N.J. 253, 284 (2021).
[brief] Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191 (2019) .............................................................................28, 30 Gras v. Assocs. First Cap. Corp., 346 N.J. Super. 42 (App. Div. 2001) ....................................................28 Griffin v. Burlington Volkswagen, Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 515 (App. Div. 2010) ..................................................18, 21, 22 Hall v. Healthsouth Rehabilitation Hospital of Vineland, No. A-2453-12T4, 2013 WL 3581263 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 16, 2013) ......................................................................................44 Hamilton v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 22-cv-6917, 2023 WL 5769500 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2023) ...............25, 47, 48 Heidbreder v. Epic Games, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 3d 591 (E.D.N.C. 2020) ..................................................37, 38, 40 Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019) ............................................................................26 Hojnowski ex rel. Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 375 N.J. Super. 568 (App. Div. 2005)
[directive] Law enforcement agencies engaged in a missing or unidentified persons investigation shall contact the New Jersey State Police Missing Persons Unit and other appropriate law enforcement agencies for assistance as required.  Where a crime or other unlawful act is suspected, law enforcement agencies engaged in a missing or unidentified person investigation shall work with the county prosecutor in developing the case for criminal prosecution as appropriate.  Referrals to the county prosecutor's victim/witness services coordinator shall be made as appropriate.  Crime Prevention and Personal Safety Programs shall be conducted regarding missing persons issues as appropriate.
[brief] Count 11 involved a social media post by Board President [...] on the West Amwell and Lambertville primary Facebook pages.  Mr. [...] fails to properly disclaim his speech in the post, and he chooses to insult those against the referendum, and his post shows a reference to the District “Crest” (Complaint, Pa29).  As with [...]’s post, the post referenced in Count 11 inflamed the community and increased the amount of distrust the public had for the Board.  In Mr. [...]’s case the violation is perhaps more egregious, in that the sitting Board President decided to go out of his way to alienate voters who were against the Referendum.  As such, Count 11 should also be considered a violation per the Commission’s advisory opinion A02-22.
[brief] 448 N.J. Super. at 448-451.  The court concluded its opinion referring to prior case law announcing consequences for recalcitrant municipalities, and noted as follows:  Regrettably, because [...] failed to heed this warning, the elements of its affordable housing plan will not be those selected by its elected and appointed representatives, but instead, will be those designed and implemented by third parties, the Special Master, and the Court.  [Id. at 468 (emphasis added)].  Such a course of action was especially appropriate in this case given the factual circumstances outlined above.  In granting Plaintiffs’ request for a Special Hearing Officer ("SHO"), the Trial Court reasoned that "[p]ermitting the Zoning Board to once again rule upon an application regarding [...]’s Property would lead to nothing but heightened antagonism, extraordinarily lengthy, expensive hearings resulting in another pre-ordained denial, and yet more litigation and delay."  M57.
[brief] It is recognized that the Chancery Division has discretion in appointing a receiver or special fiscal agent.  See Ravin, Sarasohn, Cook, Baumgarten, Fisch & Rosen, P.C. v. Lowenstein Sandler, P. C., 365 N.J. Super. 241, 249, 839 A.2d 52 (App. Div. 2003).  However, “[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  Smith v. Datla, 451 N.J. Super. 82, 88 (App. Div. 2017).
[brief] Drb10  J B Pool Mgmt., LLC v. Four Seasons, 431 N.J. Super. 233 (App. Div. 2013)  Drb12, Drb13 Jen Electric, Inc. v. County of Essex, 197 N.J. 627 (N.J. 2009)  Drb5 Kohler v. Flava Enters., Inc., 779 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2015)  Drb12  Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 432 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 2013)  Drb4 Lithuanian Commerce Corp., Ltd. v. Hosiery, 179 F.R.D. 450 (D.N.J. 1998)  Drb13 Loomis v. Corinno Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 18 (N.Y. 1981)  Drb7 Mastondrea v. Occidental Hotels, 391 N.J. Super. 261 (App. Div. 2007)  Drb6  Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436 (1912)  Drb2 Midland Funding LLC v. Albern, 433 N.J. Super., 494 (App. Div. 2013)  Drb14  Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics, 116 N.J. 739 (N.J. 1989)
[brief] Not only did Appellants not argue due process or any denial of any Constitutional rights below, Appellants never filed any motions on that issue.  Appellants did submit a letter to the Court objecting to the submission for in-camera review of the Certification.  (Pa53).  Appellants also included an argument in their brief objecting to the in-camera review.  (Db328a-330a)  However, Appellants never raised the issue of due process or the fourteenth Amendment.  It should be noted that Respondents relied upon [...] in submitting the Certification for in-camera review.  Notably, nowhere in Appellant’s brief do they address [...].  B.
[brief] also reasoned that the parroting of the word “violent” by [...]’s friend, without more, does not suffice to demonstrate that the stopping of the bus was beyond the ordinary jerking and jolting to be expected, particularly when that statement was inconsistent with the other evidence.  (1T11:17-12:4).  Explaining that “there are normal jerks and jolts and stops and starts” on a commercial vehicle that are unavoidable, the trial court held that the evidence presented could not support a finding that the stop at issue here rose to the level of negligence.
[brief] In 2019, plaintiff sued defendants in the Chancery Division, seeking reinstatement *nunc pro tunc* of a 2004 mortgage that plaintiff alleged was mistakenly discharged.  A1.  Defendants filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Third Party Complaint, seeking to quiet title on their residential property and asserting claims for money damages against plaintiff for fraud, slander of title, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  A6.  Plaintiff filed an Answer and Cross Claim demanding ninety-five thousand dollars ($95,000.00) in contractual litigation fees pursuant to Section 9 of the mortgage contract.  A1415.  On April 21, 2021, the Chancery court granted summary judgment for plaintiff on its claim and reinstated its mortgage *nunc pro tunc*.  A1185.  After --- 1  References to transcripts are as follows: - 1T 6/8/21 (hearing) - 2T 4/19/22 (hearing) - 3T 5/6/22 (hearing) - 4T 6/23/22 (hearing) - 5T 7/11/22 (trial) - 6T 7/11/22 (trial) (vol. 2) - 7T 10/6/22 (hearing) - 8T 11/9/22 (hearing) - 9T 1/13/23 (hearing) - 10T 4/21/23 (hearing) - 11T 6/15/23 (hearing) - 12T 6/22/23 (hearing)
[brief] ”  (Da69) (referring to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(14)); see also (Da63) (finding it was “constrained to remand for reconsideration of the aggregate sentence. ”).  Finally, the Court also noted that, on remand, the court should merge the felony murder conviction with the purposeful and/or knowing murder conviction and delete any reference to aggravating factor (6), which was mistakenly put on the judgment of conviction.  (Da69); see (Da60 n. 5; Da62 n. 6).  Remand Proceedings
[brief] [...]  [...] [...] P.O. Box 650 [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant  United States Fire Insurance Company Of Counsel and On The Brief: [...], Esq. (028441987)  [...]  [...], Esq. (021592008)  [...]  [...], Esq. (276092018)  [...] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 3 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 6 | | A. Plainville Site History and Operations | 6 | | B. Contamination at the Plainville Site | 7 | | C. The US Fire Policy | 9 | | D. [...]’s Communications with US Fire | 9 | | E. The Declaratory Judgment Action | 10 | | 1. The Liability Trial | 11 | | 2.
[brief] (11T128-16 to 129-4; Sa1 at 10:49:11 to 10:50:21; Da51 to Da52).  As defendant continued to talk over [...], [...] asked defendant to listen to [...]’s instruction.  (11T130-1 to 2; Sa1 at 10:50:09 to 10:50:11; Da52 to Da53).  [...] noted that he did not “think [defendant] had anything to do with” stabbing [...].  (11T129-5 to 8; Sa1 at 10:49:41 to 10:49:46; Da52).  Defendant then asked [...] and [...] if he could call his girlfriend and “get the number to call this lawyer or something,” bargaining that he would cooperate without being charged, “but if not,” that he “better get a lawyer.
[brief] ”  See Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483, 494-495 (1993).  The “discovery rule” operates to “postpone the accrual of a cause of action when a plaintiff does not and cannot know the facts that constitute an actionable claim. ”  *Id.* at 494-498.  The “discovery rule” focuses on “an injured party’s knowledge concerning the origin and existence of his injuries as related to the conduct of another person.
[brief] ”  *Public Service Corp. v. Westfield*, 80 N.J. Eq. 295, 303 (Ch. Div. 1912), affirmed, 82 N.J. Eq. 662 (E.&A. 1914).  It is still plainly good law enshrined in the Revised Statutes, and it cannot be blithely disregarded as [...] and the court below did.  [...] is therefore still bound to the 1892 Agreement’s terms, and such terms expressly permit the Town to regulate new poles.  The court below is likewise bound by that statute.  Indeed, courts have repeatedly upheld the validity of the 1892 Agreement in the years since, despite intervening events, such as when the Town was reincorporated in 1903, and have made it clear that the Town is entitled to reasonably regulate the construction of new poles.
[brief] Detectives theorized that the perpetrator walked east after departing from [...]’s residence at [...], went off camera on [...], and then circled back on camera and turned at or near the driveway of [...]’s residence at [...].  (Da 40-44; Da 47-49; Da 54; 25T 45-22 to 46-15; 47-12 to 16; 48-3 to 8; 49-12 to 14; 53-21 to 54-5; 55-8 to 11; 56-2 to 3; 62-18 to 19)  After placing [...] under oath (25T 17-5 to 17; Da 21), detectives asked [...] to describe his relationship with and communication with [...].
[brief] Indeed, even [...]’s “decade-long efforts” evidence the abandonment of the MOU.  The MOU mandated proof of bank mortgage financing (which she did not obtain) and a second mortgage (which did not occur) prior to additional disbursements (which were not made consistent with the MOU) and pay off the bundled loan in two years (which she did not do), not ten years of attempted refinancing.  Da311-14.  Moreover, if, as [...] contends, the MOU’s “Expression of Intent” was to execute additional agreements, which were the Operating Agreements (Pb24), then, by their own terms, the Operating Agreements supplanted, superseded, and terminated the MOU.
[brief] Specifically, Rule 4:67-2(b) states:  ...  The notice of motion to proceed summarily shall be supported by affidavits made pursuant to R. 1:6-6 and, if addressed to the defendant, may be served with the summons and complaint; but it shall not be returnable until after the expiration of the time within which the defendant is required to answer the complaint.  If the court is satisfied that the matter may be completely disposed of on the record (which may be supplemented by interrogatories, depositions and demands for admissions) or on minimal testimony in open court, it shall, by order, fix a short date for the trial of the action, which shall proceed in accordance with R. 4:67-5, insofar as applicable.  Here, the parties should have been permitted to conduct discovery and/or present minimal testimony to resolve the disputed issues of fact relating to the proposed sale.  [...] failed to provide the Court and defendants with an affidavit supporting his application for summary disposition under Rule 4:67-2(b) and Rule 1:6-6.
[brief] Moreover, a preliminary injunction is not necessary to maintain the status quo, as the status quo can be preserved in the condemnation proceeding.  The trial court also erred by failing even to evaluate irreparable harm as to the injunction against redevelopment efforts, which the court also granted.  As explained in Section IV of this brief, Plaintiff faced no irreparable harm requiring an injunction against redevelopment efforts because Rule 4:69 sets forth the established process to challenge government actions, including for redevelopment.  Namely, the proper procedure is to allow [...] to, first, take the action, and then Plaintiff can challenge that action by filing an action in lieu of prerogative writs under Rule 4:69.
[brief] The use of operational funds to meet urgent facilities needs is directly attributable to the State’s failure to adequately finance the school construction remedy ordered in the Abbott litigation.  Abbott V, 153 N.J. at 524.  For example, the District was forced to use operational funds to renovate two over 100-year-old buildings, [...] and [...], to meet the Abbott mandate for universal, high-quality preschool for all three- and four-year olds residing in [...].  (Pa2083-Pa2084, No. 151); Abbott V, 153 N.J. at 507-08.  [...] currently houses over 40% of its students in antiquated facilities, including sixteen (16) schools that are more than 100 years old and four (4) schools constructed in the 1920s.  (Pa2055, ¶ 4.)  Many of these buildings lack adequate ---
[brief] THE COMMISSION PROPERLY FOUND THAT [...] HAD JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE (Addressing [...]’s Point III.A., B., C. and D.)  [...] argues that the Commission erred by finding [...] had jurisdiction to investigate [...]’s allegations for two reasons: (1) the alleged conduct did not occur at a location subject to the State Policy; and (2) “all undisputed facts demonstrate that the alleged State Policy violate arose out of, and involved exclusively, activity in connection with a union campaign,” which is protected by EERA, and regulated by union bylaws.
[brief] Appellant’s failure to brief certain issues on appeal constitutes Appellant’s waiver of same and the trial court’s findings should be upheld.  Despite seemingly appealing the entirety of the trial court’s December 8, 2023, Orders, Appellant has failed to brief certain issues and findings of the trial court.  In accordance with applicable New Jersey law, Appellant has waived all such issues which Appellant has failed to brief.  New Jersey law is well-settled, “[a]n issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived. ”  Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011) (citations omitted); Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5 on R. 2:6-2 (2024) (“It is, of course, clear that an issue not briefed is deemed waived. ”); State v. Amboy Nat. Bank, 447 N.J. Super. 142, 148 n.1 (App. Div.), certif. denied 288 N.J. 249 (2016) (issue addressed for first time in reply brief deemed waived); 539 Absecon Boulevard, L.L.C. v. Shan Enters. Ltd. P’ship, 406 N.J. Super. 242, 272 n.10 (App. Div. 2009) (noting claims not briefed are deemed abandoned).  Here, the trial court granted summary judgment as to the Township’s claims for unjust enrichment and conversion.  [Da178].  Specifically, the trial court expressly declared:  As [the Township’s] claims against Defendants for unjust enrichment and conversion also relate to [the Township’s] claim of entitlement to the connection fees from [...], and that [Appellant’s] collection and retention of those connection fees would violate the 1999 Agreement, this Court also grants summary judgment to [the Township] on those claims.  [Da178 (emphasis added). ]  As such, Appellant has waived the following issues as a matter of law: (i) the trial court’s determination the Township was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law for unjust enrichment; and (ii) the trial court’s determination the Township was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law for conversion.  Given Appellant’s failure to brief and subsequent waiver of the trial court’s findings, Appellant’s appeal cannot succeed and is moot on its face.  Therefore, the Appeal must be denied and the trial court’s decision fully remain intact.
[brief] In contrast to [...], the trial court found [...]’s testimony “extremely credible” and determined that “his testimony was based on scientific analysis as well as vast experience and his training. ”  Da25a.  That scientific analysis is known as an exposure pathway analysis, which the trial court explained in detail in its findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Da14a-Da17a.  [...] omits any substantive discussion of [...]’s testimony.
[brief] The sentence on the aggravated assault was mandated by the Graves Act.  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6g.  So even assuming arguendo that the sentencing court committed error in the finding and weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors (which the State disputes), it had no impact on the length of the individual terms as the sentence was mandated on the aggravated assault or the minimum allowable for the murder despite the Court finding that the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating factors.  The determinative argument on appeal is whether the sentences should run consecutive or concurrent to each other.
[directive] Enforcing Anti-Discrimination Mandates  One way for agencies to promote racial justice and equity for underserved communities is to vigorously enforce anti-discrimination and anti-harassment mandates in the laws they administer.  The groundbreaking environmental justice law signed by [...] on September 18, 2020, defines 4 “overburdened community” as “any census block group, as determined in accordance with the most recent United States Census, in which: (1) at least 35 percent of the households qualify as low-income households; (2) at least 40 percent of the residents identify as minority or as members of a State recognized tribal community; or (3) at least 40 percent of the households have limited English proficiency.
[brief] As such, the time and cost associated with the [...] application is speculative; and cannot be concluded to be more time consuming and expensive than the anticipated mitigation required for the Applegarth Intersection.  Likewise, when the Township secured the 2016 Judgment of Compliance, the VC-2 Zone with the obligation of the Route 33 Signal was included in the LDO.  Ba1-16.  At that time, the Respondents had secured the initial approval for the Property (including the Route 33 Signal) which resulted in the site being included in the 2016 HEFSP.  The Respondents did not object to the obligation of the Route 33 Signal during the DJ Action; and the Respondents and the prior owner included the Route 33 Signal in both applications to the Board.
[brief] At about 12:30 a.m., [...] and [...] were patrolling in an area where motor vehicle burglaries had previously been reported.  They saw Plaintiff transfer a backpack from one Jeep vehicle into a second Jeep.  When the officers inquired, Plaintiff said that he did not have identification because he left it in a nearby tavern.  Plaintiff had keys to both vehicles in his hands, but could not provide the last name of an owner.  The officers could not see the backpack that Plaintiff placed inside the vehicle.  When questioned, Plaintiff expressed that he placed it under the floorboard of the rear cargo area because it contained alcohol.  The officers saw objects in Plaintiff’s pockets, and a pat down search uncovered two knives.  Plaintiff then sat down on the ground and inexplicably became agitated and began crying.  The officers asked Plaintiff for the keys to the vehicles so that they could determine the identity of the owners and ascertain if any stolen property was in the vehicles.
[brief] The trial judge did not make even a passing reference to the Rent Offset or Allowance Offset clauses in the Lease.  In an order memorializing the decision issued on the same day--November 10, 2021--the trial judge found, in paragraph one, that “[b]ecause the Tenant is in breach of the lease due to nonpayment of five months of rent,” Tenant was “not due any refund of fit up costs under Section 4.02 of the lease” (Da1).  On or about November 29, 2021, Tenant deposited the Escrow Funds within the time frame set forth in the November 10, 2021 order (Da179-Da181).  On December 9, 2021, Landlord filed an application for attorneys’ fees and costs seeking an award of an additional $65,798.68 (Da242;Da246).  On December 29, 2021, Landlord requested an order directing the disbursement of the Escrow Funds (Da236-Da237).  On January 7, 2022, Tenant filed a motion seeking to fix the amount of Tenant’s Allowance reimbursement and opposing Landlord’s request for attorney’s fees (Da173-Da178).  After filing additional submissions (Da238-Da240), the parties awaited the trial judge’s ruling.