ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Upon a challenge to the sufficiency of service when lodged (Pa6; Pa10; Pa21; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa41), the party ASSERTING the validity of service BEARS the burden of proof on that issue.  Because courts LACK PERSONAL JURISDICTION where service of process is IMPROPER, determining proper service is a threshold issue as recognized in; Lampe v. Xouth, Inc., 952 F.2d 697, 700–01 (3d Cir.1991) ("A court obtains personal jurisdiction over the parties when the complaint and summons are “PROPERLY SERVED” upon the defendant.  Effective service of process is therefore a PREREQUISITE to PROCEEDING FURTHER in a case."); see also U.S. v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir.2000) ("[T]he entry of a default judgment WITHOUT PROPER SERVICE of a complaint renders that JUDGMENT VOID."); The following cited case of Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc., 756 F.2d 14, 19 (3d Cir.1985) is of relevance as it too cites precedent in which ("A default judgment entered when there has been NO proper service of the complaint is, A FORTIORI, VOID, and should be set aside.").
[brief] Plaintiffs apparently concede the facts related to their amendment of pleadings and that, prior thereto, [...] had opened the case as a "non-monetary" claim.  (Da354)(Da357)(Da1319-1320)  While Plaintiffs contend that [...] always knew the case was worth more than $1,000,000 because they sought to expel him from [...], [...] is who needed to know an ascribed value so that its rules and fees could be applied.  (Da212-214)(Da219)  That is why [...]'s rules require the delineation between monetary and non-monetary claims, and that is why they require evaluation of “disclosed” claims.  (Da198-199 at R-4)  Plaintiffs’ claims contained no ‘disclosed’ large monetary claims when filed and their claims were recorded as “undetermined amount”, which is why the [...]’s Large Complex Claims were not triggered initially.  (Da226-268)(Da354)  That is also why [...] agreed with [...] that the amended filing did trigger the Large Complex Case rules.
[directive] d.  Você consultou um advogado sobre as possíveis consequências imigratórias da sua [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] declaração de culpa?  Se a resposta for “Não”, prossiga à pergunta 17e.  Se a resposta for “Sim”, prossiga à pergunta 17f.  Have you discussed with an attorney the potential immigration consequences of your plea?  If the answer is “No,” proceed to question 17e.  If the answer is “Yes,” proceed to question 17f.  e.  Você gostaria de ter a oportunidade de consultar um advogado?  [Sim/Yes]  [Não/No]  Would you like the opportunity to do so?  f. Tendo sido informado sobre as possíveis consequências imigratórias e sobre o direito de [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] procurar assessoria jurídica individualizada para obter informações sobre as consequências imigratórias, você ainda deseja declarar-se culpado?  Having been advised of the possible immigration consequences and of your right to seek individualized legal advice on your immigration consequences, do you still wish to plead guilty?
[brief] (1T23-12)  Certain that rent for those months had in fact been paid, [...] so testified.  (1T12-5, 1T26-3)  The court insisted it could not credit those months.  THE COURT: May is not there either.  [...]: She got paid for it.  THE COURT: How about June?  [...]: She got paid, it’s okay, I don’t have the proof it is what it is.  THE COURT: I’m sorry.  [...]: She definitely got paid for those months, but — THE COURT: I don’t have proof.  [...]: She’s not including that in what I owe her.  THE COURT: I don’t have proof from you.  (1T24-14)  It was then that the court asked Plaintiff whether Plaintiff had a receipt book.  (1T26-16)  Plaintiff deflected by asking “Receipt for what?” (1T26-17)  When pressed, Plaintiff stated “These are the receipts that I use for my tenants. ”  (1T26-22)  Examining the book, the court pressed Plaintiff:  THE COURT: So did you give her receipts?  [...]: I never gave her receipt.  THE COURT: Take your receipt books back.  (1T27-4)  The court then resumed its accounting relying only on Defendant’s Zelle transfer receipts.
[brief] Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the trial court in denying Defendant’s motion to vacate Default Judgment and denying Defendant’s motion for reconsideration.  Respectfully submitted, [...] /s/ [...]  THOMAS B. O’CONNELL, ESQ.  Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  [...]  Plaintiff-Respondent v. [...] & [...]  Defendants-Appellant  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT, LAW DIVISION
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM AGAINST [...].  ..............................................................................................................................................................................1  The Discovery Rule is Inapplicable to Plaintiff’s Claims against Urban Engineers, LLC .........................................................................................................................................................................................1  Plaintiff’s Pleadings Against Fictitious Defendants are Insufficiently Specific ....2  Plaintiff Failed to Diligently Discover the True Identities of the Fictitious Defendants .................................................................................................................................................................................................4  The Procedural Requirements of the Fictitious Pleading Rule Should Not Be Relaxed Under Rule 1:1-2 .....................................................................................................................5  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ### CASES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Claypotch v. Heller, Inc., 360 N.J. Super. 472 (App. Div. 2003) | 4 | | Henry v. New Jersey Dept. of Human Services, 204 N.J. 320 (2010) | 1 | | Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267 (1973) | 1 | | Romagnola v. Gillespie, Inc., 194 N.J. 596 (2008) | 6 | | Rutkowski v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 209 N.J. Super. 140 | 3, 4 | | Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 101 N.J. 538 (1986) | 2, 3 | ### RULES | Rule | Page | |------|------| | R. 1:1-2 | 5, 6 | | R. 4:26-4 | passim | PLAINTIFF’S FICTITIOUS PARTY COUNT INCLUDED WITHIN THE ORIGINALLY FILED COMPLAINT AND FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT DID NOT PRESERVE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM AGAINST [...].
[brief] ”  Id.  Ultimately, [...] concluded that the easement in question was taxable by the local municipality because it was taxable as “real property” because it was “a substantial interest in land”.  Id. at 60.  Importantly, in reaching his decision, [...] explained the following:  I recognize that the easements herein are not appurtenant to other lands owned by the grantees and that they are therefore within the common law category of easements in gross.  Nevertheless, the absence of a dominant tenement to which the easement may be appurtenant does not detract from its character as a substantial interest in land, so as to come within the compass of “lands” under the applicable statute.  As a comment to the Restatement of Property s 454 (1944) points out:  b.  Easement in gross as real or personal property.  Depending on its period of duration, an easement in gross may be, as an interest in land, either real property or a chattel real.  Thus, if it is to endure indefinitely or for a period measured by the life of a human being, it is real property.  If its duration is measured by a definite period or periods of time, it is a chattel real.  _Id._ at 57-58 (emphasis added).  [...]’s reasoning and holding, which was adopted by our Supreme Court, ultimately shows that [...]’s “right of way” is both “property” and “real property” for the purposes of _N.J.S.A._ 48:12-152.  Therefore, [...]’s right of way must be considered “the property of any railroad” as the phrase is meant by _N.J.S.A._ 48:12-152(b)(5).  In turn, because it is undeniable that [...] collided with Train 81 while she was misusing [...]’s right of way, [...] was correct in concluding that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by _N.J.S.A._ 48:12-152 as a matter of law.  **B.
[brief] Under the FAA and NJAA, this Court should order the Trial Court to stay litigation pending the AAA arbitration.  As explained above, Plaintiffs are bound by a valid arbitration provision in the Contract.  Indeed, the Trial Court has already held (at least twice) that the dispute at issue is arbitrable under the Contract and entered the January Consent Order to which Plaintiffs consented.  As such, the case must be stayed pending arbitration.
[brief] Respondent [...] Acquires the Development Rights for the Project from the Landlord.  On October 17, 2017, Respondent [...] executed a Land Lease with [...] for the Property.  (Pa002167 - Pa002189).  [...] leased the Property to [...] granting it exclusive occupancy.  (Pa002168).  [...] agreed to “use the Property solely to install and operate a Photovoltaic Solar Energy Facility. ” (Pa002168).  [...] also agreed to obtain a system impact study from PJM.  (Pa002176).  As a party with legal possession of the Property, [...] began the work, including significant expense, of completing the approvals for a solar facility.  Indeed, in his deposition testimony, [...], principal of [...], confirmed that [...] acquired the development rights from [...] when it executed the Lease:  “When we obtain land rights and secure the land, then it is synonymous with obtaining solar rights.  Land rights, when you secure the land, goes with the solar rights. ” (Pa002208).  [...] also testified that “The WMPAs run with the land.  It demonstrates land control.  The same with the DEP, it is the land control.  All of those rights belong to the owner of the land. ” (Pa002209).  When asked directly when [...] acquired the solar rights here, [...] testified that “[w]hen we signed the lease agreement, we acquired the rights to the solar project.  The day we signed the lease agreement was the day the solar rights belonged to whoever owned the land. ” (Id.).  [...] testified that in his experience of the solar industry, it is typical for developers to “sign the lease and move forward” because all development rights are acquired through the lease.  (Id.).  Ultimately, Respondent [...] sent a letter to the [...] advising the Board that his client [...] had acquired the right to develop the Property through its lease with [...], a lease that specifically provided for [...]’s development of a solar facility.
[brief] The issue presented in this appeal is whether a custodian of records must autonomously provide information pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b) when denying access to an exempt criminal investigatory record under the Open Public Records Act (hereinafter “OPRA”) in response to a records request and whether not doing so is an OPRA violation.  The matter comes before this Panel after a prior appellate remand to the trial court.  The remand resulted from an appeal made by the Plaintiff of the trial court’s dismissal of his denial of access OPRA complaint.  The Appellate Division remanded the matter so that the trial court could conduct an *in camera* examination of an unreleased criminal record to determine whether it was properly withheld as an exempt criminal investigatory record.  On remand, after “review of the criminal investigatory reports that were withheld by the Township as not eligible for disclosure under OPRA,” the trial court ordered the production of “information as to the type of crime [investigated], time, location and type of weapon, if any. ”  After cross-motions for reconsideration, the trial court clarified its decision and awarded Plaintiff attorney’s fees as a prevailing party, which *ipso facto*, is a determination that access was improperly denied under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 and the custodian committed an OPRA violation.  In this case the Plaintiff **never** made a specific request for information as explicitly required by N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b), nor was the custodian given an opportunity to provide such information before the Plaintiff filed a complaint challenging the denial of access to criminal investigatory records.  The trial court’s holding establishes a rule that would trigger an obligation under Section 3 of OPRA for a custodian, when properly denying access to a criminal investigatory record, to examine the exempt record and extract information.  Such a position engrafts a secondary obligation upon a custodian not embraced or required by the Open Public Records Act.  To the contrary, criminal investigatory records are exempt from OPRA disclosure and the exemption is not qualified by N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3.  Indeed, Section 3 governs access to government records and information of investigations in progress—not access to exempt criminal investigatory records.
[brief] IMPLIED  COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING THIS ISSUE WAS NOT DISCUSSED/ RAISED BELOW  In addition to the express terms of a contract, the law provides that every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  This means that, even though not specifically stated in the contract, it is implied or understood that each party to the contract must act in good faith and deal fairly with the other party in performing or enforcing the terms of the contract.  *Wade v. Kessler Institute*, 172 N.J. 327,345 (2002).  To act in good faith and deal fairly, a party must act in a way that is honest and faithful to the agreed purposes of the contract.  A party must not act in bad faith, dishonestly, or with improper motive to destroy or injure the right of the other party to receive the benefits of the contract.  Thus, if there is a contract and one of the parties ("actor") acts in bad faith or with improper motive to destroy or injure the right of the other party to receive the benefits or reasonable expectations of the contract, the actor has breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  (*Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Center Assoc.*, 182 NJ 210, at 230-231; *Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp.*, 168 NJ 236, at 251 (citations omitted); *Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc.*, 448 NJ 396, at 420.  See also *Wade v. Kessler Institute*, supra, at 327; *Palisades Properties, Inc. v. Brunetti*, 44 NJ 317.  For purposes of the singular issue being argued in this appeal, the Defendant claims that the Plaintiff breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by 1.) mis-representing that Plaintiff did not have her share of the down payment (the $70,000.00 previously discussed) and her intentional withholding of the monies (THRU TODAY) and 2.) her intentional failure to sell her Toms River property to obtain funds that she said she didn’t have (which she did).
[brief] ”  Id. at 540 (internal citation omitted).  Accordingly, where there is no evidence in the record in support of the non-moving party’s claims, summary judgment is warranted.  See Mandel v. UBS/PaineWebber, Inc., 373 N.J. Super. 55, 76 (App. Div. 2004) (affirming summary judgment for defendants as there was no evidence on the record in support of plaintiff’s claims); accord Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 61 (2015).  [...] is the record owner of its Property at Lot 22 and its deeded rights is dispositive of its ownership of the parcel.
[brief] The defense argued that [...] came home, found her wife dead, panicked, and fled.  (8T 32-3 to 15)  The State argued that she fled after committing the murder to avoid capture.  (8T 41-1 to 44-18)  Surveillance seems to show [...]’s car come home and leave on May 17, consistent with both the State and defense theory.  (4T 97-10 to 108-5)  The evidence established that [...] drove to New York, left her car there, bought a Greyhound bus ticket to Miami, but ultimately ended up switching buses and going to Houston.
[brief] ............................................................................................38, 39  Canopy Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 395 F. Supp.2d 1103 (D. Utah 2005) ..................................................................71  Carroll v. Cellco P’ship, 313 N.J. Super. 488 (App. Div. 1998) ..................................................................40, 47 Cem Bus. Sols., Inc. v. BHI Energy, Civil Action No. 21-18543, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62724 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2022)  ........................................................................................................63  Chairperson v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 77 A.3d 121 (Conn. 2013) ....................................................................................65  Chem. Bank of N.J. Nat’l Ass’n v. Bailey, 296 N.J. Super. 515 (App. Div. 1997) ..................................................................57  Claron v. Thommessen, 96 N.J. Eq. 650 (E. & A. 1924) ..........................................................................26
[brief] A.  The need for the Regulator Station stems from [...]’s 2012 upgrade to the new Holmdel transmission line.  Specifically, the Regulator Station is needed to adequately, safely and reliably accomplish the more than 600 psig reduction in gas pressure between the transmission system and the distribution system, so that pressure is reduced for the safe and efficient delivery of gas to [...]’s local customers.  For the reasons set forth below, the temporary regulator station that is currently managing the 600 psig pressure reduction is an interim solution on which [...] cannot rely to ensure the adequate, reliable and efficient delivery of natural gas on a long-term basis.  Q.  What other equipment is necessary to operate the Regulator Station safely, efficiently and reliably?  A.
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing [...]’s Complaint.  First, she has failed to present any genuine issues of material fact capable of supporting a *prima facie* case of CEPA retaliation.  Second, even if she could, Defendants have proffered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for their termination: [...]’s theft of hospital funds.  Even providing [...] with all reasonable inferences of fact, she cannot point to any disputed facts capable of supporting a finding of pretext.  Finally, even if this Court disagrees with all of the above, there is no evidence that [...] and [...], individually, retaliated against [...].
[brief] \(^2\) --- \(^2\)  The closest that Defendants come is *Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer*, 520 U.S. 939 (1997), which compares government-led and relator-led *qui tam* actions.  Db6.  The problem for Defendants is that the 1986 amendments to the public disclosure bar at issue in *Hughes Aircraft* created the original source exception to the public disclosure bar and, Second, the lawsuits in *Bayer Corp.* had been dismissed years before the amendments took effect.  The question *Bayer Corp.* answered affirmatively is whether a legislative amendment can have retroactive effect to revive a long-dismissed lawsuit.  That is not the question in this case, which instead asks whether the 2023 Veto Amendment should apply retroactively to a “pending case[] that [was] not dismissed prior to the effective date of the new statute[].”  *Roik*, 477 N.J. Super. at 573-74.  Applying the 2023 Veto Amendment to “cases in the pipeline advances the purpose of the law and does not frustrate the administration, but instead provide trial courts grappling with this issue a means to resolve cases in accordance with the law. ”  *Id.*  * * *  Finally, even if the Court agrees with Defendants that the 2023 Veto Amendment does not give the Attorney General power to veto application of the public disclosure bar as to claims submitted before the amendment was enacted on June 30, 2023, Relator’s allegations concerning Defendants’ ongoing false claims submitted after June 30, 2023, must still survive.
[directive] Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  Actor unlawfully takes property valued at more than $500 but less than $75,000; or property  2C:20-3/2C:20-  Theft is a firearm or motor vehicle or boat or domestic animal or property is taken from the person 3rd Degree $5,000 to $20,000
[brief] **RES JUDICATA DOES NOT BAR THIS ACTION BECAUSE THE EMINENT DOMAIN ACT PROVIDES THE EXCLUSIVE FORUM FOR THE ADJUDICATION OF ALL ISSUES RELATED TO THE GOVERNMENT’S EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN. **  (Raised below: 2T16-17)  In opposition to Defendants’ motion for a stay pending appeal, the Township relied on the argument that all issues in this matter were resolved by an order entered in the matter *[...] V. [...]*, Docket No. [...].
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED ........................................................................................................ iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................................................  iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................................  1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................  1 ARGUMENT  THE LAW DIVISION’S ORDER SHOULD BE VACATED; AND THE MATTER REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS (Pa1-Pa16) .........................................................................................
[brief] In 2009, Appellant [...] was convicted at trial for his alleged participation in three home invasions, dating back to the 1990s.  There existed scant trial evidence connecting Mr. Tairi to the home invasions—no DNA; no biological testing; no serological analysis; no fingerprinting; no blood spatter; and no eye witnesses.  To the contrary, the little evidence that was presented pointed elsewhere.  Accordingly, the only prosecution witness meaningfully connecting Mr. Tairi to the home invasions was codefendant [...], who testified that he and Mr. Tairi participated in the home invasions together.  The testimony and credibility of Torres was the single most important aspect of Mr. Tairi’s trial—the State concedes that fact.  During its opening, the State referred to Torres as “the best evidence it had. ”  Finally, during summation, the State referred to Torres’s testimony as “extremely important. ”  With precious little inculpatory evidence, Torres’s testimony alone resulted in Mr. Tairi’s conviction.  However, at the time Torres testified, the [...] (hereinafter “[...]”), was in possession of a Sworn Statement signed by Torres, that he filed in connection with a Habeas Corpus Petition in Federal Court.  [...] was counsel of record in Torres’s federal case and opposed his Petition.  The Sworn Statement – that contradicted Torres’s testimony at Mr. Tairi’s trial – was intentionally withheld from Appellant; that is, rather than disclosing the Sworn Statement to Mr. Tairi, the State offered Torres the opportunity to testify in Mr. Tairi’s trial, in exchange for a reduced sentence.  The State then elicited testimony from Torres that it knew to be false, or in contradiction to his falsely sworn Habeas Petition.  There exists no authority that excuses the State’s failure to turn over the Sworn Statement made by Torres.  Disclosure of the Sworn Statement was not discretionary, it was mandated by Jencks, Brady, and Giglio.  The failure to disclose the Sworn Statement constitutes a violation of Mr.  Tairi’s fundamental right to due process; all courts who have considered this issue have ordered reversal.  Thus, this Court must do the same.
[brief] Germane to the discovery of evidence, the State may seize evidence without a warrant if that evidence is discovered in “plain view. ”  The plain view exception to the warrant obligation requires that: 1) police perceived the existence of the evidence from a lawful vantage point; 2) the officer has to ---  2  The State acknowledges that the law on “plain view” substantively changed in favor of admission in 2016 with *State v. Gonzales*, 227 N.J. 77 (2016), so our analysis will involve the law as it was pre-*Gonzales*.