ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  On November 6, 2022, at approximately 10:30 a.m., Officer [...] of the [...] was dispatched to [...], the [...], on a report of a hunting complaint.  When he arrived, Officer Swan observed a male, later identified as [...], lying face down with blood pooling around his head.  Marrero appeared to have a gunshot wound on his back.  Employees of the golf course alerted Officer Swan to a male later identified as [...].  Defendant was walking toward Officer Swan --- 2 “Pa” refers to Appendix of the State’s brief. while talking on his cell phone.  Officer Swan ordered defendant to his knees and placed him in custody.  Defendant was transported to [...] to be interviewed and processed.  On April 9, 2024, [...] heard testimony from Lieutenant [...], then Detective-Sergeant, in defendant’s motion to suppress statements made to law enforcement and others while in custody.
[brief] 1T55-19 to 1T56-13.  Thereafter, [...] contacted [...], who conducted tests confirming substantial mold contamination throughout the condominium, including contamination of the bedroom surfaces by Stachybotrys mold, sometimes referred to as “black mold,” which is known to produce the harmful mycotoxin Trichothecene. \(^3\) Da1763.  After discovering in March, 2009 that he had been exposed to toxic mold, [...] consulted two medical doctors who issued reports and recommended that [...] should vacate the contaminated premises.
[brief] The New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A.§2A:23B-1 to -36, is nearly identical to the FAA and enunciates the same policies favoring arbitration.  Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 440 (2014).  The NJAA governs “all agreements to arbitrate made on or after January 1, 2003,” and exempts from its provisions only “an arbitration between an employer and a duly elected representative of employees under a collective bargaining agreement or collectively negotiated agreement. ”  N.J.S.A. §2A:23B-3(a).  Significantly, since its enactment, the NJAA has applied automatically as a matter of law to all non-exempted arbitration agreements from its January 1, 2003, effective date on, see ibid., and has applied to all agreements to arbitrate made on or after July 4, 1923, since January 1, 2005, see id. at (c) to (d).  Within N.J.S.A.§2A:23B-3 itself, therefore, the Legislature marked the difference between optional and mandatory application of the NJAA.  In short, for arbitration agreements entered since 2003, there has been no need to express an intent that the NJAA would apply because its application has been automatic, absent preemption.  As articulated above in the FAA argument, the present matter contains valid contractual arbitration clauses in both the [...] as well as mandatory AOB forms that all healthcare providers must sign to have their claims processed.  These arbitration provisions concern neither collective bargaining nor negotiations between an employer and employee, the only two express carve outs under the NJAA.  Also, the dispute at issue concerns claims paid six years prior to the initiation of this lawsuit in 2023, with the broadest statute of limitations extending back to 2018.  The AOB and DPR contracts, thus, were all entered from 2018 forward, all beyond the NJAA initiation date of January 1, 2005.  Thus, there can be no valid argument that the NJAA does not apply to the present matter or that the claims at issue do not meet any of the express statutory carve outs.  In conclusion, the NJAA is directly applicable to the claims at issue in this matter and mandates that the dispute between plaintiff and defendants be arbitrated in mandatory No-Fault Arbitration.  Thus, the trial judge was correct in remanding the claims to [...] for dispute resolution.  **Point II: The Legislature Implemented Safeguards to Combat Fraud Through the 1998 Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act, Not Through Civil Litigation in the Court System.
[brief] In other words, [...] suffers from a 9/11 illness and is disabled as a result.  He qualifies for accidental disability benefits under the Ricci Act standard.  [...] was denied the ability to register his presence at the September 11th terrorist attacks and therefore also denied accidental disability benefits based on an unsupported finding that Division mailed a post card notifying him of his requirement to register.  This finding is arbitrary, capricious, and against the substantial weight of the evidence.  The Division alleges that the two-year time frame for registration requires strict implementation to “verify applicants’ dates and locations of service as witnesses and memories inevitably continue to become unavailable and fade. ”  Rb9.\footnote{Rb references the Respondent’s Brief.}  Under the Ricci Act, members who seek to amend benefits thereunder are not required to produce witness verification statements.  Additionally, there has been no suggestion that the dates that [...] was at ground zero (or other similarly situated members) need verification by the Division.  Neither is required under the Ricci Act.  Furthermore, almost two decades had passed since the September 11\textsuperscript{th} terrorist attacks when the Ricci Act was signed into law.  The assertion by Respondent that the two-year registration window was to rectify a fleeting memory is erroneous.  Respondent’s argument lacks merit.  The determination below was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and against the substantial weight of the evidence.  It should therefore be reversed, and retired Trooper [...] should be permitted to register his presence at 9/11 and granted accidental disability benefits.
[directive] The Present Offense Was Committed While on Release for Another Offense or 4.5.5  While on Any Form of Post-Conviction Supervision.  Except as otherwise provided pursuant to subsection 4.5.2, a law enforcement agency shall apply for a complaint-warrant if the present offense was committed while the defendant was on release for any other indictable crime, or disorderly persons offense, or petty disorderly persons offense (i.e., defendant has a pending charge), whether that previous offense had been charged by complaint-warrant or complaint-summons, or while on probation, special probation, intensive supervision program (ISP), parole, community supervision for life (CSL), parole supervision for life (PSL), or on pretrial intervention (PTI) where the defendant had pleaded guilty as required by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(g)(3) (see P.L. 2015, c. 98), of if defendant was on release pending sentencing or appeal, unless an assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general consulted in accordance with Section 3.2 of this Directive, or a supervisory police officer designated pursuant to subsection 3.3.2 who is authorized by the County Prosecutor to overcome presumptions under Section 4 of this Directive, determines that the presumption of charging by 17
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 28.  [...] did not explicitly rely on *Wildwood Crest* in her opinion or otherwise discuss the stranger-to-the-deed rule, but appears to have implicitly adopted the minority position applied in that case.  This was wrong for two reasons: first, despite some criticism of the common law rule, it serves a valid purpose and should be adopted in New Jersey absent compelling circumstances rendering it inequitable in a given case; and second, even if there is good reason to deviate from the common law rule where the grantor’s intention is clearly and precisely expressed, that did not happen here.
[brief] This is a case where, if the Board were to grant the variance, it would be usurping the planning role of the Planning Board and the legislative role of the governing body, by granting a variance that had been denied through planning and the legislative process required under the MLUL.  A granting of the variance for the proposed use would clearly substantially impair the zone plan and the zone ordinance which had recently been confirmed, both in the governing body’s denial of the rezoning of this Property and the updated 2019 Master Plan and Land Use Element update confirming the zoning for this property to remain as R-20.  The appellate court should reverse the decision of the trial court and reinstate the Board’s decision -- a decision which appropriately weights the derogation of the recently updated master plan as a significant negative impact under the Sica test, a negative impact that the [...]’s application did not overcome.
[directive] Strong-hand kneeling, barricade position.  Crouched over top of barricade position.  Support side of barricade, strong hand kneeling or standing •  On command, from a secured holstered position, standing 2 yards behind the barricade, approach the barricade and assume the strong-hand kneeling barricade position, fire 4 rounds with strong hand.  (30 seconds)  ---STOP TIME— •  Decock and remain behind cover with visual focus towards the threat area.  • Reload if needed (revolvers will reload and index the cylinder)  •  On command assume a crouched position and fire 3 rounds over the top of the barricade using the strong hand.  (25 seconds)  ---STOP TIME— •  Decock and remain behind cover with visual focus towards the threat area.  Reload if necessary •  On command using the strong hand fire 3 rounds, standing or kneeling on the support side of the barricade.  (25 seconds)  ---STOP TIME--- •  Reload if required and holster an uncocked weapon.  • Reload loading devices.  Phase II 15-Yard Line.  Time: 5 seconds.  3 rounds.  Point shoulder position.  •  On command, from a secured holster position, draw and fire 3 rounds in 5 seconds from a point shoulder position.  ---STOP TIME--- 9-41  Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards
[brief] 6 POINT I.  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW (Raised Below: T1) ..............................................  6  POINT II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RAZOR’S MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS, AND UNFAIR AND ABUSIVE ENFORCEMENT OF A VOID DEBT DO NOT GIVE RISE TO VIOLATIONS OF THE CFA (Raised Below: T1)  .................. 7  i.  The Private Right of Action Under the NJCFLA ............... 7  ii.  [...]’s Unlawful Conduct Violated the Consumer Fraud Act .................................................. 19  iii.  [...]’s Unlawful Conduct Caused [...] to Suffer an Ascertainable Loss ......................... 26 POINT III.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT VALENTINE LACKS STANDING TO ASSERT CLAIMS FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (Raised Below: T1) ........................................... 29 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 32 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Asset Acceptance, LLC v. Toft, No. A-2827-22, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 820 (App. Div. May 8, 2024) ......................................................... 8 Bacon v. N.J. State Dep't of Educ., 443 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 2015).......................................................... 6 Browne v. Nat'l Collegiate Student Loan Tr., No. 21-11871 (KM) (JSA), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244537 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2021)................................................................. 15 Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, P.C., 777 F. Supp. 2d 823 (D.N.J. 2011) ......................................................... 21, 22 Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2 (1994).............................................................................. 27, 28 DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325 (App. Div. 2013).................................................... 21, 23, 24, 25 Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem'l Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div. 1957)....................................................... 7 Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91 (2018)............................................................................. 7 F.G. v. MacDonell, 150 N.J. 550 (1997)............................................................................. 7 Family Fin. Corp. v. Gaffney, 11 N.J. 565 (1953).............................................................................. 10 Family Fin. Corp. v. Gough, 10 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1950)....................................................... 10 Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 207 N.J. 557 (2011)........................................................................... 20, 22 Hoffman v. Asseenontv.Com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 2009).................................................... 28 In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation, 108 N.J. 35 (1987)
[brief] See id. at 150-170.  The Board agreed that market conditions do not factor into the formula because, as [...]’s expert testified, [...]’s unit is unmarketable in its present condition due to the tenant protection status.  See id. at 155.  The Board deliberated extensively on the difficulty of quantifying market forces such as inflation and reassessments when a certified appraiser is unable to do same.  See id. at 172-76.  They spent an equal length of time discussing how to ensure they are following [...]’s instructions and considering market conditions such as inflation and reassessments.  See id. at 176-200, 209-12.  They took some relief in knowing that [...]’s formula reflects the black letter of the Ordinance.  See id. at 205.  Ultimately, they concluded that [...]’s formula makes the most conceptual sense and voted to adopt same as [...]’s equity in [...]’s unit.
[brief] Model Criminal Jury Charge, Out-of-Court Identification ...............Da 199-207 | CASES | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | **Bullcoming v. New Mexico**, 564 U.S. 647 (2011) | 31 | | **In re Accutane Litig.**, 234 N.J. 340 (2018) | 21 | | **People v. Griffin**, 985 P.2d 15 (Colo. App. 1998) | 32 | | **People v. Pearson**, 116 N.E.3d 304 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) | 32 | | **State ex rel. J.A.**, 195 N.J. 324 (2008) | 31 | | **State v. Case**, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) | 45 | | **State v. Cassidy**, 235 N.J. 482 (2018) | 15 | | **State v. Concepcion**, 111 N.J. 373 (1988) | 34 | | **State v. Dunbar**, 108 N.J. 80 (1987) | 45 | | **State v. Galiano**, 349 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 2002) | 47 | | **State v. Hawks**, 114 N.J. 359 (1989) | 47 | | **State v. Henderson**, 208 N.J. 208 (2011) | 34, 35 | | **State v. J.R.**, 227 N.J. 393 (2017) | 16 | | **State v. Johnson**, 109 N.J. Super. 69 (App. Div. 1970) | 47 | | **State v. Kiser**, 2019 WL 2402962 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2019) | 32 | | **State v. Kruse**, 105 N.J. 354 (1987) | 48 | | **State v. Little**, 246 N.J. 402 (2021) | 23 | | **State v. Loftin**, 191 N.J. 172 (2007) | 23 | | CASES (Cont’d.) | PAGE NOS. | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325 (1971) | 38 | | State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011) | 43 | | State v. Mervilus, 418 N.J.
[brief] While the Township argues that it “[c]learly . . . has a contractual obligation to [the Developer]” (Pb36), it does not cite to any contractual provision that requires it to take Defendants’ properties.  And it is not as if the parties did not contemplate the issue of other parties being in possession of the lots listed in both the ordinance authorizing the land swap or the contract with the Developer.  The schedule of lots indicated the subject lots, along with two others, were not owned by the municipality.  (Da28; 48)  Paragraph 6(e) of the contract stated that “[e]xcept as set forth in Paragraph 11(a) below, there are no parties in possession of any portion of the Property….”
[brief] If Landlord fails to pay Tenant an installment of the Tenant’s Allowance within ten (10) days after Landlord’s receipt of written notice from Tenant that such installment is past due, then, **as its sole remedy**, Tenant shall have the right to offset such amount against the Minimum Rent payable by Tenant hereunder.  (Da17-18, Lease at § 4.02) (emphasis added).  Conversely, Landlord’s ability to offset past due amounts prior to the expiration of the applicable cure period is not its sole remedy; rather it is merely one of the various enumerated rights and remedies that Landlord may exercise in its sole discretion: \(^{12}\)  Tenant’s obligation to provide Landlord with a written notice of any alleged failure to remit a Tenant Allowance payment when due further cuts against Tenant’s position that Section 4.02 provides for an “automatic offset” of the amounts due under the Lease.
[brief] (Db38-39.)  But [...] never adequately explains why a privilege review would be any more expensive than a relevancy review.  Indeed, the trial court stated, “I really don’t understand that argument.  They’re going to have to review the documents anyway for privilege; I think it would cost them less money if they didn’t have to review the documents for relevance because they can just eliminate that review. ” (T5-1 to -8.)  And if [...]’s belief is that “the parties might have benefited from the previous relevancy reviews conducted in [related] cases,” (Db39), that is entirely at odds with the record below.  Indeed, both [...] and [...] had complained extensively to the trial court about the inadequacies of their adversaries’ productions in the related cases. \(^{18}\) (Da182 ¶¶ 4, 8; Da155-56; T13-8 to -22, T20-6 to -17.)  Finally, [...] is wrong that the trial court “offered no good reason” for its discovery Order.  (Db39.)  The trial court noted “the contentious litigation . . . going on throughout the country” where each side claims the other is withholding relevant evidence.  (T18-19 to -24.)  The court disclaimed its intention to compel the production of “a mass of irrelevant” documents and included in its order confidentiality and clawback provisions.  (T24-18 to -21, T6-8 to -10.)  The court clearly and cogently explained the benefits to be achieved by its discovery protocol: the production of all relevant materials by restricting the producing parties from making unilateral relevancy determinations.  (T21-8 to 23-7, T24-11 to 25-14.)
[brief] 9 U.S.C. § 1 .................................................................................................1  9 U.S.C.A. § 4 ............................................................................................16, 18  27 U.S.C. § 203 .........................................................................................2  America Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, Rule 7(a) .................................................................46, 47 N.J. Assembly Bill A3619 (2005) .................................................................44  N.J. Rev. Stat. § 33:1-93.13(2)(c) ...............................................................5  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The Defendants appeal from the Default Judgment entered on February 3, 202 as it is void ab initio.  48a.  They also appeal from the Order Denying their Motion to Vacate Default which was filed on April 27, 2023.  353a.  On November 19, 1997, Mr. [...], purchased the subject property known as [...].  1a.  There was no mortgage on the property.  100a.  The property is a four-family house with four different units occupied by four longstanding tenants.  T3, p. 114:8-14.  These tenants have lived there for decades.  T3, p. 115:9-10, T3, p.101, l-10.  Since the foreclosure at issue, the same tenants continued to live at the property, none have been displaced.  T3, p. 115:2-10  The original foreclosure
[brief] ”  (2T 71-9 to 11, 72-6 to 13)  The court also found that the neighborhood was a high-crime area and that, after the police ordered [...], [...], and [...] to stop, [...] and [...] fled while [...] remained still.  (2T 64-21 to 23, 67-10 to 14)  The court further observed that if [...] and [...] “had merely stood still, we wouldn’t be here today.
[brief] [...]’s allocation model first calculated [...]’s damages on an AOC-by-AOC basis by developing a weighting factor for each AOC and then multiplying that factor by [...]’s covered damages.  (Pa0290-99).  [...] then pro-rated the damages for each AOC over its period of operations, as found by the trial court.  Although the *Boston Gas* Court did not specifically address how the fact-based allocation should be performed, see *Bos. Gas*, 910 N.E. 2d at 312-316, the proportionation of damages over the period of operations, as described by [...] and adopted by [...], is supported by the decision of the Massachusetts Superior Court in *Maestranzi Bros., Inc. v. Am. Employers' Ins. Co.*, No. 2005-1856 B, 2010 Mass. Super LEXIS 65 (Mass. Super. Apr. 9, 2010) (Pa0500-06).
[brief] All real property subject to assessment and taxation for local use shall be assessed according to the same standard of value, which shall be the true value of such real property and the assessment shall be expressed in terms of the taxable value of such property, which taxable values shall be that percent of true value as shall be established by each county board of taxation as the level of taxable value to be applied uniformly throughout the county.  The incorrect assertion that the Unit was assessed based on replacement cost causes [...]’s arguments (and its expert) to be transparently inconsistent and contradictory.  For example, on the one hand [...] asserts that the assessed value of the Unit was based on “cost” and then in the next clause of the same sentence asserts that the assessment accounted for the fact that the unit had a rent-controlled protected Tenant.
[directive] Expedited dispositions are provided for in 19 U.S.C. (otherwise known as the 1612 ’Junker Provision”).  The use of the expedited disposition provisions applies to Treasury agency forfeitures pursued under the authority administrative of U.S.C. 1607.  19  To establish a uniform appraisal methodology and a of standard source for the appraised value seized Book vehicles, the N.A.D.A. Blue “low retail value” is to be used by the seizing agencies and the national seized property contractor for assigning “appraised” or “fair market” values.  Post-Seizure Administrative Processing 111.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b(1) ........................................................................................................3  OTHER AUTHORITIES  1991 Supreme Court Committee Comment to New Jersey Rules of Evidence, reprinted in Biunno, New Jersey Rules of Evidence (2001 ed.) at 949)  ..................................................................................................................21  II  McCormick on Evidence § 214, at 17 (4th ed. 1992)  .......................................................12  [...], Foundation for Contemporaneous Videotape Evidence, 16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 493, § 5 (Originally published in 1992)  .................................................................................................................15  RULES  Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(1) to (10) ..............................................................................................21  N.J.R.E. 801 ..........................................................................................................................9  N.J.R.E. 901 .........................................................................................................................8, 21 N.J.R.E. 1001(b) ..................................................................................................................10
[directive] Vehicular Pursuit Policy (h) if advised of any unanticipated condition, event, or circumstance that substantially increases the risk to public safety inherent in the pursuit.  3.5  When a vehicular pursuit is terminated, officers shall immediately cease all emergency vehicle operations, including turning off all emergency warning lights and audible devices (sirens), and disengaging from the violator’s vehicle.  6  USE OF FORCE POLICY Addendum B | December 2020