ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 2.  The New Jersey Resiliency Program for Law Enforcement in DLPS as established pursuant to Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 7 Page 8 2019-1 in the Division of Criminal Justice shall be administratively allocated to OACR.  Within OACR, it shall be administered by the Resiliency Bureau.  The Resiliency Bureau’s mission shall be to address and provide interventions to ameliorate the mental and emotional toll taken on law enforcement due to the demanding, and at times dangerous and traumatic nature of their work.  The Resiliency Bureau shall oversee and manage the New Jersey Resiliency Program for Law Enforcement and include a Statewide Chief Resiliency Officer to oversee, coordinate, train, and support the Resiliency Program Officers pursuant to Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2019-1.  The Bureau will also include a Chief Resiliency Officer for DLPS, which may be the same person as the Statewide Chief Resiliency Officer.  Law Enforcement-Led Alternative Policy and Programming Bureau.
[brief] It is noted that the everyone was specifically instructed as follows:  So the first part of this meeting is going to be, the attorneys are trying to do their best, their job to recreate the testimony that was and the evidence that was submitted at the May Meeting.  Then we’re going to go to cross examination like we did last time.  And [...] will try to do the best possible he can do to recreate his cross and his testimony.  (T 6:5 – 6:11)  August 22, 2022  The Appellant in this matter is asking the court to remand for a new re-do rehearing as the attempt by Counsel for the Zoning Board to reconstruction led to the obvious mischief and human nature that denied both parties’ due process.
[brief] (Pa099).  Because of an audio malfunction on the evening of May 23, 2022, the ZBA conducted a recorded rehearing of the May 23, 2022 hearing to ensure a verbatim record of the proceedings in accord with N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10 f. (Pa787; Pa499-502).  The rehearing commenced on August 22, 2022.  (Pa499).  The rehearing took place before the ZBA allowed any further testimony, opened the hearings to the public, deliberated or rendered any decision on the matter.  (Pa499).  There were no temporal limitations placed on the rehearing which, in fact, continued on the evening of September 12, 2022.  (Pa584-585).  The ZBA compelled all witnesses to attend the rehearsings to testify anew and to (re)submit to cross-examination.  (Pa787; Pa584-585).  All parties were given the opportunity to create a record.  (Pa787; Pa584-585).  For tactical reasons, the Objectors elected not to take make a record of certain evidential proffers despite having been afforded an opportunity to do so.  (Pa566).  That decision was verbalized on the record of the rehearing.  (Pa566).  Absence of Constitutional Issues
[brief] [1T5; 1T23].  After hearing the testimony of the officers, [...] reserved his decision to issue a written opinion.  [1T51-21 to 52-9].  On October 27, 2022, [...] denied defendant’s motion to suppress the search and seizure of his vehicle.  [Da6-15].  [...] found the officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle based on the observed motor vehicle violation.  [Da11].  Turning to the canine sniff of the vehicle, [...] found that the sniff prolonged the stop of the car but that the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to prolong the motor vehicle stop.
[brief] Defendant argues the lack of actual damages means Plaintiff lacks standing.  But actual damages are not an element of an FDCPA claim.  Cf. *Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel*, 446 N.J. Super. 537, 549 (App. Div. 2016) (listing the elements).  In the absence of actual damages, Plaintiff may recover “additional” (15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)) or statutory damages up to $1,000, as well as an award of attorney’s fees (15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3)).  *Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, L.L.C.*, 736 F.3d 1076, 1083 (7th Cir. 2013); *Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Serv., L.L.C.*, 660 F.3d 1055, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Statutory damages under the FDCPA are intended to ‘deter violations by imposing a cost on the defendant even if his misconduct imposed no cost on the plaintiff’”); see also [...], *Fair Debt Collection* § 11.9.4 (10th ed. 2022) (updated at www.nclc.org/library) (collecting cases).  Statutory damages under the FDCPA, like nominal damages for certain common law torts, is “premised upon the wrong itself. ”  *Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello*, 189 N.J. Super. 347, 354 (App. Div. 1983).  The reason is the FDCPA is “primarily self-enforcing; consumers who have been subjected to collection abuses will be enforcing compliance. ”  S. Rep. 95-382 (1977) at *5, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695 at 1699 (hereinafter, “Senate Report”) (emphasis added).  The Second Circuit explained:  [T]he FDCPA enlists the efforts of sophisticated consumers like Jacobson as “private attorneys general” to aid their less sophisticated counterparts, who are unlikely themselves to bring suit under the Act, but who are assumed by the Act to benefit from the deterrent effect of civil actions brought by others.  *Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs.*, 516 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2008).
[brief] Specifically, when this issue was raised for the first time by the plaintiff in the midst of the meeting on February 27, 2023, it was pointed out by a Board Member that the doors of what was previously the Borough’s offices at [...] had markings which would direct people who were present at that location for non-police business to the general municipal business office at [...].  It was also pointed out that the telephone number on the Notice was in fact accurate.  These items are identified on pages 19 and 20 of the transcript.  It is clear from the picture that the doors to the area of the [...], that were previously the home of the Borough offices now indicate that these offices house the [...].  Da1-Da3.  The doors further indicate that this is a secure area for employees only.  The doors also indicate that all other departments are located at [...].  I would point out that this information is permanently attached to the doors with professional lettering and appears on both the easterly and westerly doors.  Under the circumstances, it is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff’s complaint on this issue should fail.
[directive] If the officer in question is obviously unfit for duty, the officer in authority may effect an immediate suspension pending the outcome of the evaluation and investigation.  See Section 5.2 (“Immediate Suspension Pending Investigation and Disposition”).  2.4.3  At the same time, law enforcement work places an extraordinary mental and emotional toll on officers, and all officers must be free to seek treatment and support that enables them to cope with those pressures.  Accordingly, under no circumstances shall an officer face any sort of discrimination or adverse internal affairs consequences for the sole reason that the officer decided to seek medical or psychological treatment for a mental health concern, including depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, or substance use disorder.
[directive] Data/Date  Réu/Defendant  Advogado de defesa/Defense Attorney  Promotor/Prosecutor no Formulário Promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11728-Portuguese página 2 de 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11728-Portuguese page 2 of 2
[brief] Thus, this affidavit cannot constitute the series of steps that the substantial compliance rule requires.  Furthermore, it is uncontested that the [...] affidavit was not provided to Defendants during the time period set out in the Affidavit of Merit statute, which precludes a finding that Plaintiff met the series-of-steps requirement.  *Ferreira*, 178 N.J. at 152–53 (series-of-steps requirement not met when plaintiff did not forward Affidavit of Merit to opposing counsel within statutory time frame.)  Furthermore, while Plaintiff now argues that she was unable to provide the affidavit due to alleged lack of medical records, she specifically asserted that the reason why the Affidavit of Merit was not timely filed was her counsel’s error in keeping track of the statutory requirement.  She neither requested a *Ferreira* conference nor mentioned any issue with producing an affidavit during the statutory period.  These militate against the fulfillment of this element.  See, *Est. of Yearby v. Middlesex Cnty.*, 453 N.J. Super. 388, 402 (App. Div. 2018) (series of steps not established when plaintiff’s counsel “did not request the trial court to conduct a *Ferreira* conference or inform defendants’ counsel or the trial court that he was having difficulty securing the AOM. ”)  The second element cannot be met and, as a result, the substantial compliance doctrine does not apply.
[brief] Therefore, the deference sometimes extended to actions by local authorities is not applicable to this review.  Summary judgment shall be granted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  R. 4:46-2(c).  The evidence considered on a summary judgment motion is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant.  *Judson v. People’s Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield*, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954); *Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance*, 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995).  A trial court's summary judgment dismissal decision is reviewed *de novo*.  *Giannakopoulos v. Mid State Mall*, 438 N.J. Super. 595, 599 (App. Div. 2014).  Utilizing the same standard as the motion court, the appellate court considers "whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party."  *Brill* at 540.  These critical points are undisputed:  - [...] held the appointed office of municipal sewerage authority commissioner at the time of the alleged incident.  •  A sewerage authority commissioner can be removed from office “only for inefficiency or neglect of duty or misconduct in office. ”  N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c).  •  The allegation against [...] is not connected to sewerage authority business, operations, or personnel.  The allegation does not involve misappropriation of borough resources or improper dealings with borough employees.  Nothing occurred on Borough “time. ”  [...] never identified himself by his full name or represented himself as acting as a commissioner during the incident.  • [...] never established that anyone besides [...] saw the video.  The motion judge correctly recognized that [...] is entitled to summary judgment on these undisputed facts because [...] cannot connect any acts by [...] to his role as a commissioner to meet the statutory standard for removal of “misconduct in office. ”  A.  [...] was properly granted summary judgment because an appointed public official's private conduct cannot constitute misconduct in office under N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c).
[brief] (6T18-21 to 24; 6T20-1 to 3).  At a trial, he said that a photograph of [...] resembled the man he drove down with from Vermont.  (6T28-8 to 20).  Based on phone records for numbers used by defendant and [...], [...], recognized as an expert in historical cell-site analysis, created a report and map for each number.  (3T145-5 to 7; 3T152-12 to 19; 3T153-9 to 13).  Based on his analysis, [...] determined that when the phones called each other at around 7:09 p.m., they were in the "downtown general Elizabeth area."  (3T179-1 to 5).  Then, "[b]oth devices ended up terminating their usage in Jersey City."  (3T179-6 to 10).  These records show that the phone associated with defendant followed the same path as the "vehicle of interest."  * * * *
[brief] R. 2:5-5. requirements of SSAP No. 25, which governs accounting and disclosures for transactions between affiliates and related parties, defined as “entities that have common interest as a result of ownership, control, affiliation or by contract. ”  Such a requirement on attorney-in-fact fees paid by individual subscribers to [...] had never been previously suggested by the Department to [...], much less imposed on [...].  In fact, in September 2022, before the Bulletin was issued, [...] submitted an unambiguous letter to the Department disputing its new application of the Holding Act and SSAP No. 25. to its attorney-in-fact fees.  (Ia.2-6)  To be clear, [...] does not dispute that SSAP No. 25 applies to reciprocal insurance exchanges, and has always complied with the requirements duly imposed thereunder.
[brief] At the time of the incident, Plaintiff was an employee of [...] and was acting in the course and scope of his employment with [...].  Pursuant to the indemnification language of the Subcontract, and consistent with D’Avila, [...] filed a third-party complaint against [...] seeking contribution and indemnification.  The correct procedure, as set forth by D’Avila, would have been to deny [...]’ Motion for Summary Judgment and allow the jury to allocate damages amongst [...], [...], and Plaintiff, to the extent any of the parties were responsible, at least in part, for his injuries.  Subsequent to the jury’s verdict, any of [...]’ liability would have been borne and shared by the responsible parties.  Finally, as per the instructions provided by D’Avila, [...]’ contractual indemnification agreement would have been triggered and, to the extent [...] was found liable for any of Plaintiff’s damages, [...] would be contractually obligated to indemnify [...] for [...]’s share of damages.  Instead, in direct contradiction of this Court’s holding in D’Avila, [...] was summarily dismissed from this action due to alleged ambiguity in the indemnification provision.
[directive] Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.  HUGHES JUSTICE COMPLEX ∙ TELEPHONE: (609)292-4925: FAX: (609)292-3508  New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer ∙ Printed on Recycled Paper and Recyclable B.  The provisions of this Directive shall be severable.  If any phrase, clause, Severability. sentence, or provision of this Directive is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of the document shall not be affected.
[brief] As a preliminary matter, the Defendants waived any right to claim a *McKenney* violation because they failed to object to any of Plaintiff’s testimony at any time while she testified, nor did they move for a mistrial/curative instruction at the conclusion of her testimony.  See 4T at 110:9-201:11 (Plaintiff’s testimony, containing no objections or motions for mistrial based on her testimony); id. at 201:15-202:14 (sidebar conference immediately following Plaintiff’s testimony during which Defense Counsel raised no objections/motions, nor announced any intent to do the same).  Nor did the Defendants make any objections or move for a mistrial when Plaintiff’s counsel rested on their case in chief; rather they only made a standard motion for directed verdict, with no reference to any supposedly surprising or prejudicial testimony warranting a mistrial or corrective instruction.  See 5T at 4:20-8:24.  Instead of doing any of these things, the Defendants took advantage of the proper remedy for supposedly inconsistent testimony, and rigorously cross-examined plaintiff.  See 4T at 158:17-191:25; 199:201:1-3.  In short, by failing to register any sort of objection or request a mistrial at the time of Plaintiff’s testimony, the Defendants have waived any right to seek a mistrial based on supposed McKenney violation.  See T.L., 238 N.J. 231.  As such, the Defendants arguments concerning Plaintiff’s alleged “material deviations” should be disregarded on their face, and the Jury’s verdict affirmed.  C.
[brief] The parties for the past 35 plus years continued to designate Unit 74 for the Association’s superintendent, and after renting the Unit for seventeen (17) plus years, the parties entered into an agreement “through counsel”, for Plaintiff’s purchase of the unit as specifically provided for in paragraph 8(e) of the Master Deed.  Pursuant to the Plaintiff’s title company’s legal description recorded with the Deed, Unit 74 comes with an aggregate .81% interest in the Common Elements of said Condominium.  See Pa 97-100.  Plaintiff’s prior counsel specifically confirmed in writing the Association voted “pursuant to paragraph 8(e) of the Master Deed” on December 22, 2015 to purchase the Unit by a margin of 81% of the unit owners, (See Pa 198-201), and finalized a Contract of Sale for the purchase on February 1, 2016.
[brief] Accordingly, Defendant’s actions in failing to fix a known roadway hazard should be viewed under the ordinary negligence standard.  Fitzgerald v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 106, 109 (1996).  However, even assuming arguendo that there is a basis to argue that Defendant’s actions may be considered discretionary versus ministerial in nature, that dispute unquestionably is one for a jury.  Henebema v. South Jersey Transportation Auth., 430 N.J. Super. 485, 506 (App Div. 2013), aff’d, 219 N.J. 481 (2014).
[brief] And [...] so found (3T:12/16/22 15:17-20)  As summarized by Plaintiffs' Certification paragraph 38 (202a):  In summary, Defendants have failed to give Plaintiffs access to the following 9 of 33 ordered records:  EDS02980-2013 Decision; EDS08395-2013 Decision; EDS13153-2013 Resolution; EDS14420-2013 Resolution; EDS15625-2013 Resolution; EDS16243-2013 Resolution; EDS11571-2014 Resolution; EDS12582-2014 Settlement and EDS12582-2014 Decision  Furthermore, the Board, at no time prior to the entry of the 9/25/22 Order enforcing the 8/28/20 Order did the Board even care to disclose that 9 of the 33 records were unaccounted for.  (3T:12/16/22 4:1-22)  Nor did the Board comply with the [...]'s order to diligently search for the 9 missing records.
[brief] The only damage evidence required in the case was the cost of the additional excavation incurred by plaintiffs.  As to lost rents, Plaintiffs can produce leases already signed by tenants for stores in the new building on site, whose occupancy was delayed for many months due to the town's refusal to issue certificates of occupancy until all issues on the site were resolved.  The economic impact on plaintiff from these lost rents is self-evident.  (Pa464)  Likewise, Plaintiffs can produce at trial engineering plans, records of the Board of Adjustment, and invoices concerning another element of damages – the need to increase the height of a retaining wall on the site by three feet, directly due to the grading mistake.  (Pa465)  One element of damages, stemming from the [...], is not as direct as others, but can still be proven to a jury through the factual testimony of [...], and through documentary evidence.  As [...] certifies, "Absent the [grading] error, the [...] could have been leased to one (1) user or three (3) separate users based upon the number of approved parking spaces."  464a.
[brief] If the courts can reach inconsistent interpretations of the same, or substantially similar clauses, this Court must not hold [...] to a seemingly higher standard and expect that [...] would have understood the meaning of [...]’s clause to include indemnification for [...]’s own negligence.  This is especially true when the actual standard requires contractors to draft indemnification clauses in a clear and unambiguous manner and, in cases such as this one where [...] drafted the contract, a failure to do so will be strictly construed against [...].  CONCLUSION
[brief] A. Pleadings .............................................................................................................................14  B.  The [...]’ Motion for Leave to Amend .....................................................................14  C.  Partial Summary Judgment in Favor of [...] on Count 2 of the Amended Complaint .........................................................................................................................15  D.  Partial Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants and Voluntary Dismissal of Additional Claims .......................................................................................................................19  E. Trial and the Motions in Limine ..........................................................................................20  ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................................21
[brief] [...] cross-moved to vacate it again on grounds that: (a) AAA rules and parties’ arbitration agreement required 3 arbitrators for Plaintiffs’ monetary claims; (b) the Arbitrator’s postponement denial was “misconduct”; (c) the Arbitrator ignored his own standard being applied for summary relief; and (d) no statute, rule or agreement allowed the $314,000 fee award and the “third-party tort” exception did not apply.  (Da2224-2548)  On April 10, 2019, the Court denied [...]’s motion to reconsider its December 7, 2018, refusal to vacate the Partial Final Award.  (4T18:15-25)  It also heard oral argument on confirmation or vacatur of the Final Award.  (4T18-84)  On June 3, 2019, the Court by written decision confirmed the Final Award in almost respects, and again rejected [...]’s vacatur motion.
[brief] *Id.* at 235.  In the case before the Court, there was no allegation that Defendant lawfully possessed a weapon but engaged in conduct that was reckless, e.g. brandishing the weapon in a crowd of people, mishandling or misusing the gun in the backseat of [...]'s vehicle, etcetera.  Even if, however, the jury had determined that [...] lawfully possessed the weapon but used it in connection with the shooting of [...] in his vehicle, the jury would necessarily have had to convict [...] of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose.  Unlike in Campfield and Lane, the State in the case at bar did not prove, or attempt to prove, that any reckless conduct on the part of [...] caused the death of [...].