ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] They attempt to parse a difference in between that matter and the one at hand by stating that the mayor of [...] simply stated that he was personally not in favor of an application.  The Mayor in this matter offered his personal disfavor of an application.  He did so in one press release prior to a hearing on the Amended Application.  Respondents offer no argument that the Mayor’s opinion and first amendment rights cannot be curtailed.  In fact, they agree that the Mayor had a right to show up at the hearing and voice his opinion on the matter.  They fail to articulate how the Mayor’s opinion at the hearing as opposed to prior to the hearing has any different impact.  In other words, the Respondents suggest that the Mayor’s written opinion prior to the hearing “impermissibly tainted the [...] hearing”, but that if the Mayor attended the hearing and expressed those same opinions directly to the [...] members there would be no similar tainting of the [...].  It is impossible to square these two scenarios.  It is not a stretch to say that had the Mayor attended the hearing and spoke before the [...], and public in attendance, that we would be hearing the same arguments from Respondents – the Mayor offered an “incendiary” opinion in order to tip the scales and did so in full view of the public before the [...].
[brief] At the very least, the statute requires a report on the defendant’s mental condition where the sentencing court is deciding the overall sentence for an endangering conviction and another offense.  While this later portion of the statute uses the language “report on the defendant’s mental condition,” rather than “complete psychological evaluation,” [...]’s self-reported mental health included in the presentence report is not sufficient to satisfy this requirement.  As our courts have explained, “[t]he coupling of words denotes an intention that they shall be understood in the same general sense” and “[t]he natural, ordinary and general meaning of terms and expressions may be limited, qualified and specialized by those in immediate association. ”  State v. Sisler, 177 N.J. 199, 206-207 (2003) (citation omitted).  Thus, in construing “a report on the defendant’s mental condition,” this Court should consider the language in the preceding sentences of the same and preceding paragraph, mandating “complete psychological evaluations” and “psychological examination[s],” and find that the provision is also referring to an expert psychological evaluation or examination – or an expert report – not to a defendant’s self-report on his mental status and history.
[brief] These cases raised takings claims seeking just compensation after a tax sale and were not direct appeals from foreclosure.  See *Fair v. Continental Resources*, 143 S. Ct. 2580 (2023) (vacating Cont’l Res. v. Fair, 971 N. W. 2d. 313, 316-317 (N.E. 2022)); see also *Nieven v. Tax* 106, No. 22-237 (U.S. 2023).  Thus, the *Roberto* Court was balancing the Supremacy Clause, *Tyler*, *Fair* and *Nieven* when determining how broadly to interpret the “pipeline.
[directive] Achieving the desired level of discipline within the law enforcement agency is among the most important responsibilities of the law enforcement executive.  Yet, this is one of the most frequently neglected processes within many law enforcement agencies.  While the word “discipline” was originally defined as instruction, teaching or training, its meaning has shifted toward a concept of control through punishment.  This emphasis on control has resulted in discipline being viewed as a negative threat rather than a mechanism for remediation and improvement.  Too frequently rules of conduct and disciplinary procedures are used as an end in themselves, and their purpose in reaching agency goals is forgotten.  Focusing on the negative aspects of discipline diminishes officer morale and productivity.
[brief] (Pb39).  [...] also claims the trial court “inverted the Printing Mart standard of review” by affording defendants the “benefit of any doubt. ” (Pb39 – Pb40).  Finally, [...] reiterates its arguments regarding insufficiency of notice under N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 and claims the trial court failed to make certain “reasonable inference[s] of fact” in its favor on that issue.  A.  The Trial Court Correctly Applied the Motion to Dismiss Standard.
[brief] Pa30.  Pa107-254.  Additionally, other retired Troopers who were not present at the September 11, 2001 attacks and aftermath also submitted affidavits that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act in further support of the Petition.  Pa255-265.  President of the [...], [...], submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the [...] notifying him of the Ricci Act.
[brief] The motion court denied the request for a hearing, ruling, “whether the generalized description provided by [...] constitutes an identification within the intendment of the Wade Henderson line of questioning, assuming that it does, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to show any evidence that this identification was made amidst highly\(^4\) suggestive circumstances. ”  (4T 16-3 to 9)  This might be analogized to the posture of State v. Anthony, 237 N.J. 213 (2019).
[brief] (Aa756 – Aa757).  Respondents filed a motion to dismiss [...]’s petition that was substantially similar to the motion filed in opposition to [...]’s Petition.  (Aa757).  Subsequently, the Petitions from [...] and [...] were consolidated.  (Aa757).  [...] and [...] filed a joint opposition to Respondents’ motions to dismiss.  (Aa758).  The consolidated petitions, and the motions to dismiss said petitions, languished for the next seven months, with no decision forthcoming in that time.  C.
[brief] The [...] describes its non-profit association and points out that it serves more than 800 active members, including [...].  [...] is a direct writer of medical malpractice insurance.  The [...]’s members also include many in the healthcare community who directly and/or indirectly rely upon medical malpractice insurance coverage provided by [...].  The ultimate effect of the Bulletin, and the Department’s goal in issuing it, is consumer protection, including the [...] consumer subscribers to [...].
[brief] Cases  Hudson v. Hudson, 36 N.J. 549, 553 (1962) .........................................................1 In re Kensington Intern. Ltd., 368 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 2004)..................................14 Instructional Sys. v. Comput. Curriculum Corp., 130 N.J. 324, 327 (1992)...........5 Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) .....................................6 Ovoloa v. Xing Lan Liu, 431 N.J. Super. 493, 501 (App. Div. 2013) ......................6 SKS Holdings LLC v. Kaplan, Nos. A-4606-19, A-4626-19, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 682 (App. Div. May 5, 2023) .........................................................5 Torres v. Schripps, Inc., 342 N.J. Super. 419, 436 (App. Div. 2001)....... i, 12, 13 Walensky v. Jonathan Royce Intern., Inc., 264 N.J. Super. 276, 281 (App. Div. 1993) .........................................................................................................................7 Weed v. Casie Enterprise, 279 N.J. Super. 517, 527 (App. Div. 1995) ...... 1, 2, 4 Statutes N.J.S.A. 14A:10A-1 .................................................................................................7  N.J.S.A. 42:2C-37(b)(1) .........................................................................................3  N.J.S.A. 42:2C-49(c) .............................................................................................3  I.  INTRODUCTION  The Appellant incorporates her procedural history, statement of facts, and standards of review sections from her Appellant Brief herein by reference.  Plaintiff also incorporates the arguments set forth in her Appellant Brief as if set forth at full herein.  Plaintiff will address certain points of Respondents in this Reply.¹ II.
[brief] 433 N.J. Super. at 229.  The Act focuses on “stringent water and natural resource protection. ”  N.J.S.A. 13:20-2.  Nowhere is DEP directed to evaluate utility “need” or how a utility should operate.  This is exactly what FERC and the Board of Public Utilities evaluate in their natural gas transmission project reviews.  15 U.S.C. § 717f; Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination, Program Interest No. 435434, 433 N.J. Super. at 237.  Indeed, “[t]he principles of comity and deference to sibling agencies are part of the fundamental responsibility of administrative tribunals charged with overseeing complex and manifold activities” when two or more agencies have jurisdiction over separate components – such as need and environmental impacts - of the same action.
[brief] *State v. Kluber*, 130 N.J. Super. 336, 341-342 (App. Div. 1974) certif. denied, 67 N.J. 72 (1975) overruled on other grounds, *United States v. Martin Linen Supply Company*, 430 U.S. 564 (1977) (see also, 18T:56-25 to 57-5).  Thus, the appellate standard and the standard required of the trial court are one and the same.  It comes down to a determination of whether any rational factfinder could find that the State proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2:  A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission, he (1) agrees with such other person or persons that they, or one of more of them, will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or a solicitation to commit such a crime, or (2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime, or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.
[brief] [...]’s Notice of Cross Appeal.........................................................Pa 1  [...]’s Verified Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writ..........................Pa 5  Docket Report for [...].......................................................Pa 14 Rosato v. Rent Leveling Board of Jersey City (W-010254-89)......................Pa 17 Saltzman v. Mayor and Commissioners of Town of West New York (A-05782-84T1)..............................................................................Pa 21 [...]’s Aug. 11, 2022 Memorandum to Calculate Rent Increase.............Pa 37 [...]’s Hardship Application for Rent Increase....................................Pa 43 Certification of [...].........................................................Pa 48 [...]’s 2016 Income Statement......................................................Pa 50 [...]’s 2014 Tax Return..................................................................Pa 52 [...]’s 2015 Tax Return..................................................................Pa 62 [...]’s 2016 Tax Return..................................................................Pa 71 TABLE OF ORDER(S) BEING CROSS-APPEALED Order, dated September 30, 2022, by Hon. [...], P.J.Cv. ……………Da7 | Hearing Date | Presiding | Transcript Designation | |--------------------|---------------|------------------------| | September 30, 2022 | [...] | 14T | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT After several years of subsidizing the rent for Unit 11 (the “Unit”) at [...] in [...] (the “Property”) for the benefit of its tenant, [...] (“[...]”), and thus earning negative returns on that Unit, plaintiff//cross-appellant [...] Realty, Inc.
[brief] Id. 221 N.J. at 385-86, 113 A.3d 1174 (citations omitted).  [State v. Moorer, 448 N.J. Super. 94, 106 App. Div. 2016.]  Here, the court below properly found that the Defense had inferred during cross-examination that Defendant had a motive to fabricate his trial testimony.  Furthermore, the prior consistent statement was made before the existence of the plea agreement, which was the alleged motive to fabricate.  However, even if this court finds that it was made contemporaneous to the plea, New Jersey does not have a rigid temporal requirement for admission in circumstances such as this.  Therefore, as will be shown, the court acted properly in admitting the statement and that ruling cannot be said to be a manifest denial of justice requiring reversal.  New Jersey Rule of Evidence 607 notes that “A prior consistent statement shall not be admitted to support the credibility of a witness except: (1) to rebut an express or implied charge against the witness of recent fabrication or of improper influence or motive.
[directive] Prosecutor County if the only bail monetary of imposition the request may prosecutor  A Deputy or a Justice Criminal of Division the of Director or the Prosecutor, Assistant First or bail monetary of imposition (1) that: determines Division, the by prosecuted cases in Director non- no (2)  Law, Reform Bail the by authorized is release defendant's of the condition a as reasonably to sufficient be would conditions of combination or condition release monetary believed reasonably is defendant (3) the required, when court in appearance defendant's the assure requested amount in monetary the bail post her to or him allow will that assets financial have to loan, a obtain or company to surety from a bond a purchase to having without prosecutor the by provisions the subject to would, requested amount the at set bail monetary of imposition (4) and detention.
[brief] The PTA Arbitration  During the course of the parties’ contractual relationship under the PTA, disputes arose concerning the calculation of EGP to be paid by [...] to [...] as consideration for the transfer of rights to perform the multitude of construction contracts that were to be transferred by [...] to [...] pursuant to the PTA.  As a result, [...] and [...] submitted their disputes under the PTA to arbitration before the [...] (the “AAA”) to be resolved in a case captioned [...] v. [...] New Jersey, LLC, [...] (the “PTA Arbitration”).  Pa568-580.  [...] and [...] both filed competing statements of claims and/or counterclaims.  Pa174-Pa188 ([...]’s Fourth Amended Statement of Claim); Pa191-Pa209 ([...]’s Fifth Amended Statement of Counterclaim).  It bears emphasis that the subject matter of the PTA Arbitration was confined to the (i) the entitlement to EGP, and (ii) the calculation of the amount of EGP due to [...].
[brief] Nevertheless, in its appeal, the [...] takes the unfathomable position that this was an invitation to expand their final offers to request additional contract changes or to include additions not in its original final offer.  On October 26, 2023, and on the evening of November 2, 2023, which was also the night before the final hearing date, at 7:43 p.m., the [...] submitted revised final offers.  (Aa247-250, Aa 251-279)  Much to the [...]’s surprise, it contained a multitude of new terms that were not included in the [...]’s September 11, 2023 final offer.  At 8:13 p.m. on the same evening, Counsel for the [...] objected to the revised final offers.  (Aa374)  [...] rightfully rejected the revised final offer in his decision:
[brief] (Not raised below)  Even if this Court does not agree that the errors merit reversal individually, [...]’s convictions must be reversed because their cumulative effect fundamentally obstructed the jury’s ability to assess the evidence at trial.  See, e.g., State v. Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452, 469 (2018) (“[E]ven if an individual error does not require reversal, the cumulative effect of a series of errors can cast doubt on a verdict and call for a new trial”).  The State’s case against [...] was tenuous.  [...]’s cell phone, credit card, and toll records all showed no signs of him being present in New Jersey during the period at issue.  No witness testified to having seen [...] in New Jersey around these dates.  Evidence established that [...] was living in Virginia at the time and a ping of the same cell phone that showed no signs of being used in New Jersey during this time was used by police to locate [...] in Virginia the day after the BB gun incident.  The State’s case depended on the claim that [...] harbored anger toward his mother and her family, but the State’s own witnesses established that this motive was shared by [...]’s father and brother, both of whom actually lived in New Jersey minutes away from the incidents, but were never seriously investigated.  All the aforementioned errors distracted the jury from serious and independent consideration of whether the evidence that the State introduced amounted to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  These errors were thus “clearly capable of producing an unjust result,” and Mazarisi’s convictions must be reversed.  See R. 2:10-2; Frisby, 174 N.J. at 591.  **CONCLUSION**  For all these reasons, [...]’s convictions must be reversed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender BY: [...]  ZACHARY G. MARKARIAN  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney  ID. No 279272018  Dated: March 29, 2023  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NO. [...]  CASE NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.
[brief] Those factors are (1) the amount of the estate and the amount thereof in dispute or jeopardy as to which professional services were made necessary; (2) the nature and extent of the jeopardy or risk involved; (3) the nature, extent and difficulty of the services rendered; (4) the experience and legal knowledge required and the skill, diligence, ability and judgment shown; (5) the time necessarily spent by the attorney in performance of his services; (6) the results obtained; (7) the benefits or advantages resulting to the estate, and their importance; (8) any special circumstances including the standing of the attorney for integrity and skill; and (9) the overhead expense to which the attorney has been put.  As discussed at length above and throughout this brief, the basis for the award of fees could not be any clearer.  Once the Court determines that fees are appropriate, the Court then engages in a two-step process.
[brief] [...] clearly wants this Court to overlook key relevant actions and facts, which he omitted from his Procedural History, since they also invalidate and refute key parts of his subsequent opposition to my filed Appeal.  His Faulty History starts w/his May 5, 2022 Verified Complaint, as if there was no prior legal action/requirement for filing it.  As prior Brief stated (p. 4), “Court issued Mar. 25, ‘22 Order ([...]) (13a-14a) based on same day Hearing rulings for [...] to file a formal accounting based on R.4:87 for review & any exceptions from Surrogate Audit & Interested Parties based on his filing Verified Complaint to resign [as Co-Trustee]. ”  R.4:87-8 states “any interested party [incl. me, as per Verified Complaint, par. 4 (52a)] may… serve accountant written exceptions… to any item in or omission from the account”.  It deliberately misrepresented procedural purpose of the Verified Complaint.  It was NOT filed simply “to settle his IA”.  It was filed since the March 25th Order required it to be filed in order for [...] to address any Exceptions and requests by Interested Parties and Surrogate Audit regarding his IA, as per 4:87, and for its Court approval prior to allowing [...] to be discharged as Co-Trustee.
[brief] This burden rests on the defendant’s shoulders.  *State v. Koskovich*, 168 N.J. 448, 529 (2001).  Jury “charges must be read as a whole in determining whether there was any error. ”  *State v. Torres*, 183 N.J. 554, 564 (2005).  The effect of any error must be considered “in light ‘of the overall strength of the States case. ””  *State v. Walker*, 203 N.J. 73, 90 (2010) (quoting *State v. Chapland*, 187 N.J. 275, 289 (2006)).  Any unchallenged issue with the jury charge is considered “in light of ‘the totality of the entire charge, not in isolation. ’”  *State v. Burns*, 192 N.J. 312, 341 (2007) (quoting *Chapland*, 187 N.J. at 289).  In the instant case, the trial judge read almost word for word the model jury instructions written by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
[brief] Defense counsel had filed multiple motions to suppress witnesses’ “[i]n and [o]ut of” court identifications, which were withdrawn.  The identification exchange was as follows:  Q.  This person that shot [[...],] did you ever see him before?  A. No.  Q. No.  Do you see him in the courtroom today?  A. No.  Q.  You don't see him in the court room today, this person?  A. Yes.  THE COURT: Asked and answered ...  [Defense Counsel]: Excuse me-  THE COURT: I said asked and answered.  [Prosecutor]: Judge, I thought she said yes.  THE WITNESS: I said yes.  ....  Q.  You do.  Can you tell us where he's seated?  A.  Right there.  Defense counsel requested a sidebar and objected.  He moved for “the answer [to] be stricken” because [...] had previously “d[one] an array” where “she picked a different person,” and argued a trial could not “be more of a suggestive atmosphere to do an identification. ”  The judge inquired, “when you say you want me to strike the answer, do you want me to strike both answers?  Because if I say that answer is stricken, will the jury know which one I mean[?]”  Defense counsel responded that he “assume[d] it would have to be ... both answers,” though he clarified he was most “concerned about ... the in-court identification. ”  The judge advised, “I'm going to say to the jury that the last answer of the witness is stricken. ”  Defense counsel requested no further charge.  The judge then instructed the jury: “the last answer of the witness is stricken from the record and the jury will disregard it.
[brief] On or about October 13, 2020, Appellant filed his complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County (Docket No. [...]).  Aa1 to Aa44.\(^1\)  Defendants [...], [...], and [...] removed this matter to federal court on or about December 14, 2020 based on the federal claims alleged against all the Defendant in Counts XI-XV, docketed as [...] v. [...], et al., [...].  The removal terminated the state court action in Middlesex County.