ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] D.  Qualified Immunity  “The doctrine of qualified immunity operates to shield government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ”  Morillo v. Torres, 222 N.J. 104, 116 (2013).  Qualified immunity interposes a significant hurdle for plaintiffs seeking to recover for asserted civil rights violations at the hands of law-enforcement officials.  Morillo v. Torres, 222 N.J. at 116.  By deliberate design, qualified immunity is an exacting standard.  It “gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. ”  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011).  Whether an official is covered by qualified immunity is a matter of law to be decided by the court ‘preferably on a properly supported motion for summary judgment or dismissal. ”  Gormley v. Wood-el, 218 N.J. 72, 113 (2014); Doner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 387 (2000).  Qualified immunity balances two important interests – the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably. ”  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).  See also Gormley v. Wood - el., 218 N.J. at 113.  Qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. ”  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability. ”  Id.  Moreover, qualified immunity, like absolute immunity, “is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. ”  Id.  The purpose of qualified immunity is to: [permit courts [to] expeditiously] ……..weed out suits, which fail the test without requiring a defendant who rightly claims qualified immunity to engage in expensive and time consuming preparation to defend the suit on its merits.  One of the purposes of immunity, absolute or qualified, is to spare a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn out suit. ”  Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991).  Qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent, or those who knowingly violate the law.  Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).  As such, the protection afforded a defendant should be denied only in the most exceptional instances.  Lassiter v. Alabama A&M University, 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir. 1994).  E.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel under nearly identical circumstances in Price v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins., 182 N.J. at 529.  There, the plaintiff had “failed to file a complaint in Superior Court until eleven months after the six-year statute of limitations expired. ”  *Id.* at 527.  But after the limitations period expired, [...] continued to correspond with plaintiff’s counsel, accept medical records, and evaluate the UIM claim.  *Id.* at 526.  The Court held that [...] was estopped from disclaiming coverage because the insurer had waited over a year after the statute expired to notify plaintiff, in litigation, that the statute of limitations barred his claim.  *Id.*  Our Supreme Court thus reaffirmed that an “[u]nreasonable delay in disclaiming coverage, or in giving notice of the possibility of such a disclaimer . . . can estop an insurer from later repudiating responsibility under the insurance policy.
[brief] After being informed that he could withdraw his waiver at any time, defendant provided a statement to [...] in which he claimed that he broke the fight up, that he “just happened” to be going to [...]’s separately, that he knew the [...] from coaching them in football but did not know their names, and admitted for the first time that he punched [...]—none of which he told [...]—and did not invoke his Miranda rights.  (11T69-1 to 7, 70-12 to 20, 75-16 to 25, 81-16 to 19, 92-8 to 10).  Two days later, when defendant was arrested and while being processed at the [...], defendant continued volunteering statements and attempting to distance himself from the fight.
[brief] 3,25 Williston on Contracts §2:3 (4th ed.1990) ....................... 21 Appendix Table of Contents Order denying Defendants-Appellants' motion to compel arbitration filed November 8, 2024 .................................................................la Notice of Appeal .................................................................................................................. 3a Complaint filed January 19, 2023 ...................................................................................... 7a Defendants-Appellants' motion to compel arbitration filed May 8, 2023 ........................................... 17a Certification of Defendant-Appellant [...], filed May 8, 2023 .................................................. 19a Exhibit A: Plaintiff-Respondent's employment application ............................................. 22a Exhibit B: Plaintiff-Respondent's Incomplete Agreement found in her personnel file ........................................ 24a Exhibit C: Email from Defendant-Appellant [...] to Plaintiff-Respondent, dated April 9, 2022 .................................................. 35a Affidavit of [...], filed June 15, 2023 ............................................................37a Certification of [...], filed August 21, 2023 ....................................................... 42a Exhibit A: Statement from [...] dated May 10, 2023 ..................... 46a Exhibit B: Employment Agreement of [...] .................................................. 48a Exhibit C: Employment Agreement of [...] ........................................ 64a
[brief] THE [...]’S DENIAL OF APPELLANT’S ADJUDICATORY HEARING REQUEST WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.  [Aa132-Aa136.]  The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) recognizes that “[p]ersons who have particularized property interests or who are directly affected by a permitting decision have constitutional and statutory rights and remedies. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.1.  The APA affords hearing rights to persons “who has a particularized property interest sufficient to require a hearing on constitutional or statutory grounds. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.2.  Clearly, the APA recognizes that someone other than the applicant has a right to obtain an adjudicatory hearing based on a “particularized property interest. ”  The APA does not limit a person’s rights to appeal a permit decision directly to the Appellate Division and affords an adjudicatory hearing to provide complete facts to those that qualify under the Act.  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.3; R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  An adjudicatory hearing enhances agency decision-making and can result in more effective judicial review in the event of an appeal to the Appellate Division.  Appellant acknowledges that an aggrieved application has the primary right to qualify for an adjudicatory hearing.  The [...] relies heavily upon the Court’s quote that “third parties generally are not able to meet…this rigorous review standard [particularized property interest].”  In re NJDPES No. NJ0025241, 185 N.J. 474, 482 (2006).  However, the factual situation presented herein is distinguishable from the case law cited by the [...] in its decision.  Moreover, as discussed in more detail below, the [...] incorrectly focuses on the need for a particularized property interest of “constitutional significance” while ignoring the plain language of the APA. \(^3\) Appellant’s dock is adjacent to [...]’s dock and extends approximately 105 feet into Barnegat Bay.
[brief] (3T Pg. 19, Ln. 1 – Pg. 30, Ln. 3).  She also identified Defendant at trial based upon the fact that on September 17, 2023, the Defendant arrived at [...]’s office to retrieve the trap.  (3T Pg. 30, Ln. 4 – Pg. 30, Ln. 25).  [...] testified that the trap was on a sidewalk where the public had the right of pedestrian travel and that rodents could feed on the exposed food.
[brief] “[D]iscovery otherwise permitted may be limited by the court if it determines that the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. ”  *Id.* at 383 (quotations and citations omitted).  The analysis requires trial courts to “strive to avoid placing undue burdens upon litigants[.]”  *Id.* (citation omitted).  This requirement exists for good reason.  Left unchecked by the gatekeeping function of courts, ESI discovery costs will overwhelm litigants and prevent cases from being resolved on their merits.
[brief] This contention is misleading and stands in direct contradiction to [...]’s and [...]’s own policies and contract.  Indeed, Respondent [...] admitted that [...], who receives funding from the state, must coordinate an investigation with [...] if there was sexual harassment committed by a [...] employee against a [...] employee.  (Pa669) 54:1-57:10, 59:3-20.  Furthermore, Respondents’ contract indicates that [...]’s policies apply to non-employees who have contact with [...] employees (such as [...]).  (Pa1004-5, Pa1006-1021).  [...] cannot place their employees in [...] offices and force them to intertwine their jobs with [...] employees, and simply throw their hands up when a [...] employee violates [...]’s sexual harassment policy.  [...] and [...] contracted to intertwine their businesses, and therefore – as expressly admitted by Respondent [...] – both maintain a responsibility to ensure that the workplace is free from sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation for all employees at the facility by conducting prompt investigations and by taking appropriate remedial action.
[brief] While both cases involved a finding that a trial judge intruded on the province of the jury, they dealt with situations that are very different from this case.  In Marroccelli, the court was considering whether the trial court improperly required the defense to produce “a handwriting expert, “known exemplars of [[...]'s] handwriting, signatures of ... [...] from known reliable sources, or any other means or method by which to support the assertion that the note is authentic[ ] and, therefore, trustworthy. ”  State v. Marroccelli, 448 N.J. Super. 349, 365 (App. Div. 2017).  The court found that it should have been sufficient to provide testimony from someone who was familiar with the handwriting of the note.  Id. at 312.  This case has nothing to do with the authentication requirements for handwriting, and Marroccelli has little relevance to photographs that were taken years after an incident.
[brief] 3T42:2-43:9 (P-37) Da077-78.  [...] reviewed the 2 page document and discussed certain omissions with [...], who agreed to adjust the schedule to reflect [...]’s investment in the India property.  3T43:17-45:1, 46:18-47:6.  [...] asked for additional information, which [...] agreed to provide.  3T50:5-14.  In April 2014, [...] received P-41 (Da979) from [...], which he reviewed and made his own entries on.  3T52:2-53:8.  [...] then suggested that since their properties in India and Fort Lee were of equal value, [...] could take the India property, [...] could take the Fort Lee property and they would remove those properties from the list of properties to be split.  [...] agreed and they went out to lunch.  3T53:20-54:11.  In May 2014, [...] received P-43 (Da980) from [...].  He reviewed the document, made entries of his own and discussed further the division of a multi-family residential building and commercial properties.  [...] advised he would work further on a value for [...].  3T58:3, 59:3-6, 59:15, 60:3-13, 62:5-9.  [...] reviewed the values of the properties and devised two options for their division in which [...] and [...] would each receive $6.2 million.  3T63:1-64:4.  Their discussions continued, “almost every day. ”
[brief] A.  Visual inspection of Defendant’s evidence reveals incontrovertible facts of TILA violations.  Congress passed the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") in 1968 to ensure a "meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices."
[brief] The ruling in Grabowsky, which involved an alleged conflict of interest of a land use board member, does not govern the determination of whether there is a conflict of interest of a member of the governing body voting on an ordinance that is governed by the Local Government Ethics Law adopted in 1991.  Defendants did not cite Grabowsky in its moving brief in support of the motion for summary judgment because it was not the applicable standard; when Plaintiff argued Grabowsky in opposition, Defendants discussed Grabowsky in reply.  Plaintiff’s suggestion that Defendants’ counsel violated the Rules of Professional Conduct because they did not cite Grabowsky in the moving brief as to the alleged conflict of interest is inappropriate and ironic given the fact that Plaintiff has not even bothered to discuss in this appeal cases expressly cited by the trial court in its decision.
[brief] ”  Williams, 219 N.J. at 91.  Therefore, these statements are a far cry from the implied hearsay our Supreme Court has consistently stated is not admissible.  Cf. State v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427, 446 (1989) (finding improper a police officer's testimony that after he canvassed the neighborhood looking for leads, “he focused on the defendant as the subject of his investigation and placed his picture in the [photo] array”).  Thus, defendant’s argument on this point must be rejected in its entirety.  Point IV
[directive] The department’s ALPR data record keeping system, which may be automated, shall document the following information: the date and time of access, and, in the case of access to stored non-alert data, the type of access authorized by Section 10.2 of these Guidelines (i. e., post-scan BOLO query, crime scene query, or crime trend analysis); the authorized user who accessed the stored data; whether an automated software program was used to analyze stored data; the designated supervisor who reviewed and approved any disclosure of personal identifying information based upon crime trend analysis when such approval is required by Section 10.2.3 of these Guidelines; the designated supervisor who approved any use of an automated crime trend analysis computer program that would automatically alert and disclose personal identifying -6- information in accordance with Section 10.2.3; any other information required to be documented pursuant to Section 10.2 or any other provision of these Guidelines.
[directive] But there is on.2 reason to think that they knew what was going  From the time that [...] was placed in the Department of Law & Public Safety in 1948, the [...] Director has reported directly to the Attorney General, and the Department’s longstanding practice is for Division Directors to update the Attorney General regularly on significant enforcement matters.  In addition, even before [...] took his case to the New Jersey Supreme Court, at least three gay bars sanctioned under Rules 4 and 5 brought legal challenges against [...] resulting in decisions by the Appellate Division.
[brief] The Court reasoned that OPMA defines the term “adequate notice” as giving written notice to newspapers at least 48 hours before the meeting, which is unlike the provisions of the Municipal Land Use Law that require publication.  *Id.* at 26 (citing N.J.S.A. 10:4–8d; N.J.S.A. 40:55D–12a).  It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended for OPMA to only require transmission of the notice to newspapers in order to satisfy the “adequate notice” requirement.  This is the precise issue that was presented to the trial court in this matter.  Here, Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants violated the notice provisions of OPMA because some of the meeting notices at issue may not have actually been published in the newspapers they were sent to.  (Pa83).  However, the trial court aptly recited the facts of record which demonstrate that the Defendants properly transmitted notice of the subject meetings to the newspapers, and that publication is not ultimately required to satisfy OPMA.  (Pa86, Pa234, 1T at 17:9 – 18:2).  Therefore, the Court held that there was no OPMA violation.
[brief] See Kane Props., LLC v. City of Hoboken, 325 N.J. 199, 229 (2013) (stating that when governing body adopts an ordinance it must follow the ordinance).  Similarly, the Borough required all legal documents in support of the application to “be properly signed and executed. ” (48a).  [...], however, failed to execute the required certification that attested (1) to the accuracy of the documents submitted with the application, (2) that the applicant’s proposed location applied with applicable zoning requirements, and (3) that the applicant did not omit or conceal any documents that would impact the decision to grant or deny the application.  [...]’s failure to provide the required signed certification, and the Borough’s decision to accept the application and grant the resolution without that legal certification are reversible error.
[brief] (CONT'D.)  D.  Detectives Improperly Contradicted The Miranda Warnings During The Formal Interrogation..........................  26  E.  The Improper Admission Of Defendant’s Statements Was Harmful Error.............................................  28 POINT III  THE COURT IMPROPERLY FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE NECESSARY PURPOSEFUL MENS REA OF CONSPIRACY.  (Not Raised Below)..................  29 POINT IV  THE COURT IMPROPERLY FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THEY HAD TO UNANIMOUSLY AGREE ON ALL ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF CONSPIRACY.  (Not Raised Below)..............................................
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  October 22, 2021  Order and Statement of Reasons granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted Pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e) ..........................................................Pa22 December 2, 2022 Order of Appellate Division reversing and remanding October 22, 2021 trial court Order) ......................................................Pa49 March 3, 2023  Order setting date certain for Petitioner to retain counsel .................................................................Pa72 March 31, 2023  Order denying Petitioner’s Motion to Demand Documents .................................................................Pa103 May 12, 2023  Order granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint without prejudice .............................................................Pa114 December 12, 2023  Order of Appellate Division denying Petitioner’s Motion for Leave to Appeal .............................................................Pa150 March 1, 2024 Order granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint with prejudice .............................................................Pa1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY/STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] (15T1739-4 to 184-13).  *Mahoney*, 188 N.J. at 376.  Finally, defendant did not object to these particular remarks at the time they were made or raised them as grounds for a new trial, see R. 2:10-2; R. 3:30-1.  Defendant did not believe that the AP overstepped his bounds at the time the remarks were made.  Smith, 212 N.J. at 409.  In sum, as there was no prosecutorial misconduct, the APs’ remarks, whether considered individually or cumulatively, did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.
[brief] Furthermore, even if an email was sent to the Certifying Officers on August 8, 2019, it was still outside the timeframe required by the Ricci Act to provide notice to the members of the retirement system.  Moreover, [...] certified that he never received the postcard regarding the Ricci Act.  Pa56.  It is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable that the Board does not have to abide by the statutory timelines applicable to the Board but is unwilling to relax the timeframes applicable to [...].  The Board has acknowledged that the third-party vendor was not contacted to mail the postcards until more than 30 days after the enactment of the Ricci Act.  The third-party vendor could not mail the notice within 30 days of the enactment of the Ricci Act.  Because this notice was not sent in accordance with the requirements specified in the Ricci Act, the Board should have granted [...]’s request to register outside the timeframe specified in the Act.  The Board failed to consider its power to relax time limits in the interest of justice or in furtherance of a just accommodation.
[brief] ”  T7-T9 (citing *In re Camden Cty.*, at 449).  Moreover, Appellant lacked “real adverseness with respect to the subject matter” because the task of policing a debt collector’s compliance with the FDCPA is for the assigned federal agencies (*e.g.*, [...] and [...]), not Appellant or a class of consumer plaintiffs.  T9-T10 (citing *In re* Camden Cty., at 449).  Thus, despite New Jersey’s more “liberal rules of standing,” Appellant lacks standing to pursue his claims.
[brief] Further, for the same reasons, the “staffing” issue identified by the New Motion Judge has no pertinence either.  The “staffing” issue could have mattered, perhaps, only if the C-section had been timely called and only if thereafter, no was available to perform it.  Nonetheless, the New Motion Judge erred by concluding that the facts establish that [...] would not have been available to perform the C-section, if it had been timely called.  This can be gleaned from evidence in the record, as explained below.  At the outset of this case, Plaintiff believed that [...], the attending physician who delivered [...] 39 minutes after the alarming 9:48 p.m. strip reading, was a target defendant.  But something developed in discovery that surprised Plaintiff – that being that neither [...] or [...] called for the c-section at 9:48 p.m., as remarkable as that seemed at the start of the case.  This rendered it impossible for [...] to perform the c-section by 10:03 p.m., within the period of time established by the appropriate standard of care, since no one had notified him of the obvious emergency.  In fact, as it developed in discovery, because the C-section was not timely called, [...] was unaware of the grave medical concerns faced by [...] and her yet-to-be born daughter [...] until about 10:12 p.m..
[directive] Pozwy, wnioski oraz wszelkie inne dokumenty składane w sądzie należy złożyć w języku angielskim Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English  Sądownictwo w New Jersey Hrabstwo County New Jersey Judiciary Sygn. akt prokuratury Formularz oświadczenia w odpowiedzi na zarzuty Prosecutor File Number Plea Form (Polish)  Imię i nazwisko oskarżonego Defendant’s Name przed sędzią: before Judge:  Proszę wymienić zarzuty, do których się Pan(i) przyznaje:  1.  List the charges to which you are pleading guilty: