[brief] But this Court has already unequivocally held that N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 does not bar a defendant with a prior firearms conviction from Track One, as a defendant may “have a prior conviction for a weapons charge and still be eligible for Drug Court. ”  Maurer, 438 N.J. Super. at 415.  The simple fact is that the statute disqualifies defendants for different classes of offenses depending on whether those offenses are prior convictions, present charges on which defendants seek admission to Recovery Court, or other pending charges.  The Legislature disqualified persons with prior convictions for “murder, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault,” N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(7), but did not disqualify persons with prior convictions for firearms offenses.  N.J.S.A 2C:35-14(a)(5).  The Legislature also treated charges for aggravated assault differently depending on the degree and whether they are present, pending, or prior convictions.  A defendant who is presently convicted for third-degree aggravated assault may be admitted to Track One on that charge (subsection (b)(2) bars only convictions for second-degree aggravated assault), but a defendant with a prior conviction or pending charge for third-degree aggravated assault is ineligible for Track One.  Compare N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(7) with N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(b)(2).  Perhaps the Legislature’s reason for targeting pending firearms charges was that, because the Graves Act imposes mandatory incarceration for most offenses involving the possession of a firearm, see N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), the Recovery Court judge should wait to see whether the defendant is going to be convicted and sentenced to prison on the firearms offense; after all, a defendant cannot be sentenced to Recovery Court if he is presently serving a prison term.  But if the other pending firearms charge were resolved by acquittal, dismissal, or non-custodial probation, the Legislature apparently believed it would not be per se contrary to public safety to allow that individual to enter Recovery Court.  Regardless of whether this Court concurs with the policy choice of the Legislature, “a court may neither rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature nor presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language. ”  O’Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 488 (2002).  Here, the Legislature plainly disqualified a defendant from Recovery Court who seeks admission on present charges in which he possessed a firearm or who has other presently pending charges during which he possessed a firearm, but does not disqualify a defendant with a conviction for an offense involving possession of a firearm where that case has been resolved via conviction and is no longer pending.  As applied to [...], [...]’s Morris County indictment under which he seeks admission to Recovery Court does not charge him with possessing a firearm; thus, he is not disqualified by the “present offense” clause of subsection (a)(5).  Additionally, because his firearm charge in Essex County was resolved via guilty plea and a sentence of probation by the time of the Recovery Court Judge’s legal determination, the Essex County case was no longer pending.  Accordingly, [...] was not barred by the “pending charge” clause of subsection (a)(5).  This Court should therefore affirm [...]’s decision that [...] is not disqualified from Recovery Court by subsection (a)(5).  B.  The State In This Case Had The Right To Seek Appellate Review Of The Recovery Court Judge’s Legal Interpretation Of Subsection (a)(5), But This Court Need Not And Should Not Decide Whether All Determinations Under Subsection (a)(5) Are Appealable By The State.