ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The things that the defendant says about not being able to get a fair trial, that's a subjective belief that was not articulated to [...].  If that was a fear or concern that he had, he didn't share it.  In fact, at the beginning of the day on November 29, 2016 [...] went out of his way to assure the defendant that he would be given a fair trial.  The issue of the threats that the defendant asserts he has received, that is something which is simply asserted at this point.  It's not proven in any reliable way.  There's no separate certification.  There's no additional proof of any threats.  Now, maybe that proof doesn't exist, maybe it is only verbal, maybe there is nothing in writing.  I don't know any of that, but none of that was brought to the Court and the Court cannot look at it as something that is made so simply by somebody saying that it is so.  And [...] argues in detail what the defendant's views were and what his perceptions are but those don't prove what needs to be proven under these factors as far as I'm concerned.  The trial court  [...] accepted a plea in this agreement and the existence of a plea bargain is a factor which the Court is required to consider under Slater.  The judge made the finding that the plea was entered into in a knowing, intelligent and voluntary way, there was an adequate factual basis for the guilty plea.  There was no evidence that the defendant had been forced, threatened or coerced and we all know [...] never would have accepted the [...] cannot pursue certain additional remedies.  He certainly has every right to appeal this decision of mine and I encourage him to do so if he disagrees with it.  He has other rights relating to pursuing a post-conviction relief application if he wants to.  He has every right to do those things and he should do what is right for him.  But the motion that is before the Court today is denied for the reasons I have asserted on the record.
[brief] THE STANDARD OF REVIEW (Raised Below: T1)  On appeal, the Court applies a plenary standard or review from a trial court’s granting of a motion to dismiss.  Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div. 2011); Bacon v. N.J. State Dep’t of Educ., 443 N.J. Super. 24, 33 (App. Div. 2015).  On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under R. 4:6-2(e), the plaintiff is “entitled to every reasonable inference of fact. ”  Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 107 (2018) (quoting *Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp.*, 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)).  And “if a generous reading of the allegations merely suggests a cause of action, the complaint will withstand the motion. ”  *F.G. v. MacDonell*, 150 N.J. 550, 556 (1997).  The Court “searches the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary. ”  *Printing Mart-Morristown*, 116 N.J. at 746 (quoting *Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem’l Park*, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957) (internal quotation marks omitted).  **POINT II.
[brief] For complaints to be actionable under LAD, they must be complaints about acts that are unlawful under the statute.  Plaintiff’s counsel misled the jury that a “reasonable person” standard applies in retaliation complaints when, in fact, it does not.  Plaintiff needs to prove she engaged in a protected activity, that an adverse employment action resulted, and that the adverse employment action was causally related to the protected activity.  For example, Plaintiff’s counsel stated in her summation:  I do not have to prove, ladies and gentlemen, that they intended to retaliate.  The question is, would a reasonable person believe that all of these things are happening because of their complaints?  (7T:70:10-13).  Would a reasonable person believe, it doesn’t matter if they didn’t intend that, would a reasonable person believe this is happening to me because of this?  (7T:70:21-23).  Plaintiff’s counsel again steps outside her broad latitude in summation by misleading the jury in statements asserting that non-action is retaliation and conflating discrimination allegations with retaliation allegations.  They’re going to ask you, has the plaintiff proven beyond a preponderance of the evidence under New Jersey LAD, that her employer, [...] or [...], [...], the mayor, and [...] with his, “stupid Jews,” comment did -- do you think anybody retaliated against her?  I asked [...], as cocky as she is, did you ask [...] to fire my client?  Well, what did he say?  “No.  She got a lawyer. ”  (7T:75:9-20).  ii.  Plaintiff’s Counsel  Misstated and Distorted Facts During Summation
[brief] ”  [...]’s App. Br. at 39 n.11.  [...] did not join [...] as a party in the [...] (and it did it have a basis to do so) and while [...] is obligated to pay over to [...] the amount of the partial award [...] obtained (for which [...] is still waiting payment), the award does not fulfill [...]’s obligation to [...] as subcontractor, making the [...] a necessary vehicle for [...] to fully pursue its right to payment.}
[brief] See *Riddell v. Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange*, 18 F.Supp.2d 468 (D.N.J. 1998).  In *Riddell*, the District Court made note of the fact the plaintiff there brought employment discrimination claims when confronted with a release she signed in connection with receiving a severance package, but the plaintiff did not understand what she was signing.  See id.  There, the employee admitted to having signed the release, but claimed she did not really understand it, and further “that she was given only a few minutes to review the document and never had an opportunity to negotiate its terms. ”  Id.  After undergoing a multi-factor analysis, the District Court invalidated the release.  Id. at 471.  This same test is used under New Jersey State law to evaluate the validity of releases for statutory claims.
[brief] Under N.J.A.C. 13:1E-2.4(a), requests are required to be submitted by hand delivery during normal business hours, mailed, or submitted electronically through the Department’s OPRA website.  N.J.A.C. 13:1E-2.4(a).  Submissions by facsimile or e-mail are not permitted.  *Ibid.*  Moreover, only the agency’s custodian of the record requested is authorized to accept receipt of OPRA requests on behalf of the Division, and requests are not considered filed until received by the custodian.  N.J.A.C. 13:1E-2.4(b).  All other officers or employees are barred from accepting requests on behalf of the Division.
[brief] (Da33-38).  This Plan was developed “based on the recommendations of the Judiciary’s Post-Pandemic Planning Committee on Resuming Jury Trials,” which considered national best practices and models introduced in other jurisdictions, including federal courts.  (Da33).  The “Committee” referenced includes representatives from the Prosecutor’s Association, Public Defender’s Office, and Civil & Criminal judges.  (Da31).  Moreover, the “Judiciary Stakeholder Coordinating Committee” which includes the Attorney General, Public Defender, and New Jersey State Bar Association members – also reviewed and assisted in finalizing the report.  (Da33).  This 46-page Plan identifies numerous critical components to the post-pandemic jury selection process.  (Da39-84).  Specifically, there was supposed to be pre-selection prescreening process requires jurors who report an inability to serve to substantiate their hardship and those who express more generalized concerns to appear virtually before a judge.  (Da60-61)  This prescreening process serves the important purpose of ‘[e]liminating from the pool of jurors who could not report in person for the trial dates. ” (Da61).  “The Supreme Court is committed to ensuring representative and inclusive juries at every stage of the selection process. ”  (Da64).  “Virtual jury selection will start with a panel of **30 jurors** *(so that all jurors are visible in the Zoom courtroom)*.  (Da66); (Emphasis added).  More specifically, “[t]he judge will hold two Zoom sessions (morning and afternoon) with 30 jurors at each session.  The judge will provide the basic information about the trial and excuse jurors for cause. ”  (Da69)  “Following general and individualized questioning, the starting group of 210 jurors will be reduced to about 60-70 jurors who will be scheduled to report in person on consecutive days. ”  (Da71)  “Some degree of in-person questioning (including as to anything that has changed) will be conducted. ”  (Da72)  On September 17, 2020, our Supreme Court issued another Order, which [...] supplemented with a Notice to the Bar dated the same date.
[brief] [...] was a co-worker of [...] and worked with him for the 3.5 years [...] worked for [...].  (9T5:2, 5-6).  As an Officer, [...] conducted property checks, which involved checking an area, the buildings, looking for suspicious activity, break ins, forced entry, in both residential and commercial districts.  (9T5:16-20).  Other Officers had different opinions of what constituted a property check.  (9T6:5-6).  It was a regular occurrence to be conducting a property check and, for one reason or another, an Officer is distracted and must leave the property check to go to a different call or other more pressing activity.  (9T6:8-18).  It was a regular, if not frequent, occurrence to be involved in doing a property check and become distracted with some other duty-related activity and forget to call in the property check.  (9T6:25).  The only training [...] received in conducting property checks came when he was shadowing another officer who showed [...] that Officer's way of doing property checks, but [...] did not receive any formal training resulting from formal policies of how to conduct a property check.  (9T7:8-17).  Per [...], at times, the Officers of [...] would experience problems with their radios, including the car radio and portable radios.  (9T9:8-14).  Sometimes an Officer could key the radio while on foot patrol, thinking the call to report the property check went through, but it did not.  (9T9:18).  Officer [...] ("[...]"), who served as a United States Marine, works as a Patrol Officer with [...]’s Police Department.
[brief] “What’s not coming in here is what the State determined one way or another and you can’t get it in indirectly when you can’t get it in directly because the concept is you would have to have someone from the State come in and testify as to what they did. ”  3T185:22-186:2.  See also 3T186:12-15 (“You’re not getting in directly or indirectly what the State’s conclusion was with reference to the Complaint. ”); 3T188:3-5 (You’re not getting in the State’s determination directly or indirectly. ”).
[brief] The amendment empowered the AG, without taking over the litigation, to block dismissal of a relator-initiated NJFCA action even if the defendant had established that the public disclosure bar applied (the “2023 Amendment”).  See Ja4019 (amendment to N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-9(c)).  The federal FCA was identically amended in 2010, and other state FCAs have since followed suit.  But this was the first time New Jersey allowed a relator-led NJFCA claim to proceed when the elements of the public disclosure bar were met—that is, when the claim was based upon publicly disclosed information and the relator was not an “original source” of the information.  On August 16, 2023—more than eight years after Relator’s original complaint was filed and more than four years after the AG had declined to take over the action—the New Jersey AG filed a Notice Opposing Dismissal of Relator’s Action based on the 2023 Amendment.
[brief] That is because, in most negligence cases, a plaintiff is not required to establish the applicable standard of care.  Moreover, the court initially held that it would need to make a decision on the applicable standard of care at a latter point in time.  (1T Hearing, page 23) (“Maybe, maybe not.  But again, we’ll have to -- we’ll have to sort out those claims when we get there”)  It is generally undisputed that expert testimony is required when topics require specialized knowledge or expertise.  If a subject is “so esoteric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid judgment” then expert testimony is necessary.  Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 283 (1982).  Expert opinions are necessary when the issues that a jury must decide are outside the scope of the knowledge of an average juror.
[brief] Pursuant to the project schedule set forth in the Redevelopment Agreement, [...] was required to (i) commence construction of the Residential Project upon completion of the [...] Mall, and (ii) commence construction of the Office Project upon completion of the Project Garage.  Da118-Da120.  [...] never moved forward with construction of the Office Project or Residential Project.  In addition to the three Project components to be constructed by [...], the Redevelopment Agreement further provided for the construction and operation by the Authority of an above-ground parking facility to address additional parking demand that would be generated by the [...] Mall, the Office Project and the Residential Project (the “Authority Garage”).  Da104.  Pursuant to the project schedule set forth in the Redevelopment Agreement, the Authority was required to commence construction of the Authority Garage upon completion of the Project Garage.  Da118-Da120.  Existing economic conditions in 2007 and 2008 impacted the viability of the Residential Project, Office Project and Authority Garage.  Da263-Da264.  Pursuant to Section 8.7 of the Redevelopment Agreement, the Authority and [...] acknowledged that the consent of [...]  (“[...],” now known as [...] and referred to herein as “[...]”), the third-party insurer of the Authority’s outstanding parking revenue bonds, was required as an express condition precedent prior to undertaking any action or issuing any additional obligations to finance the construction of the Authority Garage.  Da63-Da64.  On May 11, 2012, the Authority, the City and [...] amended the Redevelopment Agreement to permit a supermarket use as part of the [...] Mall and to develop the terms and conditions of the parking validation system for the Project Garage.  Da240.  [...] then waited more than seven (7) years to initiate the present action.
[brief] Even after the judge sentenced the Defendant, counsel did not object creating the presumption that trial counsel perceived no prejudice.  *State v. Wilbely*, 63 N.J. 420, 422 (1973).  Defense cites to *State v. Beauchamp*, 262 N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div. 1993), stating a sentencing judge has no authority to impose conditions of parole.  *Beauchamp*, unlike the case at bar, contemplates a Defendant who is not yet on parole.  It does not discuss what is to happen to someone who is already actively on parole.  Defendant, as stated ante, is subject to parole supervision for life for an unrelated case.
[brief] Plaintiffs contend that there are no material disputes of facts over the following dispositive circumstances:  -  The leases executed by the Landlord and each of the Tenant Defendants were similar -- and identical with respect to the issues presented by the Motion.  At Article 3 of the leases, each of the Tenant Defendants assumed an unambiguous and broad duty “at [their] own expense and at all times, [to] maintain the premises in and safe condition. ”  - Article 3 also imposed on the Tenant Defendants the responsibility “for all repairs required, excepting the roof, exterior walls and structural foundations. ”  Therefore, according to the terms of the leases, the Landlord Defendant had exclusive responsibility to maintain and repair “the roof, exterior walls and structural foundations. ”  But these were the only matters of maintenance or repair over which the Landlord Defendant maintained exclusive duty.  - Article 3 explicitly placed each of the Tenant Defendants under an explicit duty to “maintain in good repair such portions adjacent to the premises such as sidewalks, driveways, lawns, shrubbery, which would otherwise be required to be maintained by [Landlord]. ”  •  Article 17 does not establish that the walkway where [...] was injured was a “common area” or that “common area” fees were paid for the purposes of maintaining that area.  •  The term “common area” was not defined in the lease.  •  That the Tenant Defendants, by virtue of their leases, owed a duty to [...].  SECTION B – THE CROSS APPEAL POINT I FICTITIOUS PARTY PLEADING AND RELATION BACK ALLOWS FOR PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS
[brief] Oral closing statements were completed in March 2013, at which time [...] took the matter under advisement.  [...] did not write an opinion.  Rather, she delivered her rulings orally on the record over 13 days, specifically, on August 5, 6, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 22, 23 and 26, 2013, and September 3, 2013.  [...] held that, notwithstanding this Court’s directions, the [...] were entitled to zero management fees, zero interest, and zero compensation of any kind for any of the money they had lent or invested into the partnership, or any of their efforts in obtaining financing and developing the project.
[directive] (only complete if the offense occurred on or after February 1, 2018)  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(iii) N.J.S.A. or leader of a child pornography network pursuant to 2C:24-4.1, N.J.S.A. or an attempt to commit either of these offenses and the offense occurred on or after February 1, 2018, in addition to any other sentence, and upon motion of the prosecutor, the court shall impose a special sentence of parole supervision for life, unless the court finds on the record that parole supervision for life is not needed to protect the community or deter you from future criminal activity?
[brief] And … that constitutional right includes the right of a parent to have an opinion and … a say in what a minor child is called and by what pronouns they are referred. ”  *Id.*  *Tatel v. Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist.*, 675 F. Supp.3d 551 (W.D. Pa. 2023) held that gender dysphoria/transitioning instruction without parental notification interfered with parents’ rights and “implicates the heart of parental decision-making on matters of the greatest …, i.e., … constitutional importance” because “[w]ithout notice to parents … that information could not be placed by parents in the family’s moral or religious context.
[brief] (Db49; Locane, 454 N.J. Super. at 129).  Though a parent’s incarceration undoubtedly impacts his child’s development, applying mitigating factor eleven based solely on this common hardship would permit a defendant to unfairly benefit from the mere existence of his children.  (See Dalziel, 182 N.J. at 505).  Third, defendant asserts that the trial court erred by finding aggravating factors three and six because his criminal history was “mostly remote, largely drug-related third-degree offenses, and [defendant] had no violent homicides or assaults in his past.
[brief] ”  See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 17:30C-1 to -31 (the Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act) (applying to reciprocals); see also N.J.S.A. 17:23-41 (definitions relating to the corporate governance of insurers, which defines “Insurer” to include “reciprocal insurance exchanges,” while notably (and separately) identifying “Insurance group” to mean “those insurers and affiliates included within an insurance holding company system as defined in section 1 of P.L.1970, c. 22 (C.17:27A-1) [the Holding Company Act]”; N.J.S.A. 17:23B-1 (Insurance Regulatory Information System, which defines “Insurer” to include a “reciprocal exchange’); N.J.S.A. 17:29C-1.1 (Cancellations and Renewals, which also includes “reciprocal exchange” within its definition of “Insurer”).  Like the above examples, the Holding Act could have included an omnibus definition of “insurer,” or referred to the REA itself, but did not do so.
[directive] Securities which may purchased by local units :5-15.1. be 40A -8.  Securities which may be purchased by local units.  -a.  When authorized by a cash management plan approved pursuant to N.J.S.40A:5-14, any local unit may use moneys which may be in hand for the purchase of the following types of securities which, if suitable for registry, may be registered in the name of the local unit:
[brief] *Globe Motor Co.*, 225 N.J. at 482 (quoting *Model Jury* Charge (Civil) § 4.10A “The Contract Claim—Generally” (May 1998)) (brackets omitted).  Moreover, “[e]ach element must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence” and “[u]nder that standard, ‘a litigant must establish that a desired inference is more probable than not.  If the evidence is in equipoise, the burden has not been met. ’”  Id. (quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163, 169 (2006)).  It follows that where a plaintiff suing for breach of contract cannot proffer a reasonable reading of a disputed contractual term, the plaintiff has failed to satisfy that burden.  See also, e.g., Comerata v. Chaumont, Inc., 52 N.J. Super. 299, 307 (App. Div. 1958); Am. Litho. Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 81 N.J.L. 271, 274 (1911).
[brief] For example, defendants claim in the very first paragraph of their Statement of Facts that “[t]he sole cause of Plaintiff’s fall was slipping on snow and ice. ”  Db3.  In discovery, plaintiff produced the report of [...] and identified [...], the author, as an expert witness.  Pa86.  The report concludes that plaintiff’s fall “was caused, individually or in combination, by the following:” • Abrupt and excessive change in the public sidewalk surface running slope at the incident location, which acts as a ramp and was measured to change from 6.7% to 21.3% in the direction of pedestrian travel.  •  A “hidden” pedestrian slipping hazard in the form of ice and snow that covered the abrupt, excessively sloped concrete public sidewalk surface at the incident location, which was uncleared, unsalted and/or unsanded at the time of the incident.  •  Improper/inadequate snow/ice removal from the incident concrete public sidewalk surface prior to the incident.  •  Inadequate salting/sanding of the incident concrete public sidewalk surface prior to the incident.  Pa88-89.  Defendants’ statement, therefore, is not a fact but, rather, a material issue in the case, which is in dispute.  Given that material factual dispute, summary judgment was inappropriate.
[brief] Frankly, if [...] lacked knowledge of the relevant standards, then on what basis did its actuaries provide an opinion that the premium rate increase was not excessive?  Does it also mean that [...]’s representations in its actuarial memoranda that the application was prepared consistent with ASOPs 8, 18 and 25 was false?  Did [...] ask for clarification from the Department about the applicable standards over the course of three separate rate increase filings (two of which were approved)?  Did [...] ever ask the Department for clarification of any unknown terms when it either met with or spoke with the Department during the rate review process?  The answers to these questions are “no”.
[brief] In re Herbstman, 84 N.J. 485, 421 A.2d 592 (1980)...........................................38  In re Integration of Neb. State Bar Ass’n, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265, 268 (1937) ..................................................................................................................39  In re Niles, 176 N.J. 282, 293, 823 A.2d 1 (2003) ..............................................20  In re Theokary, 592 F.App’x 102 (3d Cir.  2015)  ...............................................37  In re Turner, 83 N.J. 536, 416 A.2d 894 (1980)..................................................38  In the Matter of [...], 180 N.J. 234 (2004)  ........................................37, 38, 39  Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 919 (3d Cir. 1985)