ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Assess and Gather Information.  The responding officer should consider whether the person is attempting to cause harm to themselves or another, and whether any hostages or third parties are present.  Responding officers and supervisors should gather as much information as possible from available sources.  This includes friends, family, and witnesses.  Establishing communication with the barricaded individual and assessing their status is a primary goal.  Officers should consider the factors in the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy Core Principle 2 (Force as a Last Resort and Duty to De-Escalate) when assessing the situation.3  In addition, officers should consider the barricaded individual’s primary language and, if communication is difficult, take reasonable steps to establish communication via the person’s primary language, such as utilizing bilingual officers, interpreters, telephonic interpretation/translation services, or community crisis response teams,4 if feasible and appropriate.  Of particular importance is determining whether the subject is wanted for a criminal offense.  If the person is not a wanted person, the officer should consider whether the person is experiencing a behavioral health episode caused by a mental health, substance use or similar crisis.  https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide/directives/ag-Directive-2022-4_Directive-Updating-Statewide- 3
[brief] [...] owned the 99-cent store at [...].  On July 30, 2014, at around 3:00 p.m., Darby was in the store’s back office with [...] and [...].  Darby’s uncle, [...], was behind the counter that was behind a glass enclosure, doing some handiwork.  (3T76-21 to 80-12; 3T111-20 to 113-11; 3T115-8 to 17).  As [...], Lloyd’s brother, left the store, [...] and Harris saw defendant enter the store and walk to the back office.
[brief] Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J. 411 (2006) ............................................................................................  13 Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218 (1998) ............................................................................................  18  D’Atria v. D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392 (Ch. Div. 1990) .................................................................  19  Gardner v. Pawliw, 150 N.J. 359 (1997) ............................................................................................  11  Georgis v. Scarpa, 226 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div. 1988) ...............................................................  16  Hoover v. Wetzler, 472 N.J. Super. 230 (App. Div. 2022) .................................................................9  Huszar v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 375 N.J. Super. 463 (App. Div. 2005), certification granted, cause remanded, 185 N.J. 290 (2005) ..............................9  Irani v. K-Mart Corp., 281 N.J. Super. 383 (App. Div. 1995) ...............................................................16  Johnson v. Mountainside Hosp., Respiratory Disease Associates, 199 N.J. Super. 114 (App. Div. 1985) ...............................................................16  Leitner v. Toms River Reg’l Sch., 392 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 2007) ..................................................................9  Newmark-Shortino v. Buna, 427 N. J. Super. 285 (App. Div. 2012) ...............................................................11 Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463 (2013).........................................................................................15 O'Donnell v. Ahmed, 363 N.J. Super. 44 (Law. Div. 2003) ...............................................................13 Rivers v. LSC P’ship, 378 N.J. Super. 68 (App. Div. 2005) ...............................................................9, 12 Tucci v. Tropicana Casino & Resort, Inc., 364 N.J. Super. 48 (App. Div. 2003) ...............................................................15 US Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449 (2012).........................................................................................10, 22 Vitti v. Brown, 359 N.J. Super. 40 (Law. Div. 2003) ...............................................................12 Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. Chem. & Pollution Scis., Inc., 105 N.J. 464 (1987).........................................................................................16 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Defendant / Respondent [...] (“[...]”) submits this brief, appendix, and confidential appendix in opposition to plaintiff’s appeal.
[brief] This is a case where Plaintiff, [...]’ (“Plaintiff”) benefitted from funds provided by Defendant [...] (“[...]”) and then turned on [...] and claimed that [...] and its representatives [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) (the “Defendants”) violated her rights.  This is interesting for a couple of reasons because Plaintiff received $9,600.00 but only paid $7,043.92 to [...] and in the Bankruptcy Court, Plaintiff offered to return the money she received.  [...] is in the business of purchasing a portion of the proceeds of plaintiff’s cases but not the claim itself.  Their contracts are contingent, non-recourse purchase agreements, not loans and include payment terms and representations from plaintiffs, including that the plaintiff has not filed, and is not contemplating filing, for bankruptcy.  Here, Plaintiff had a personal injury claim (the “PI Claim”) and an Underinsured Motorist Claim (the “UIM Claim”).  Plaintiff contacted [...] to provide her with $1,200.00.  Before signing the Contract on June 23, 2016, her attorney, [...], Esq., advised her not to sign.  However, against his advice she signed the Contract and took the $1,200.00.  Also on June 23, 2016, Plaintiff met with her attorney, [...], Esq. to sign her Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petition.  When Plaintiff filed the Chapter 13 Petition on July 20, 2016, she did not disclose her PI Claim nor that she sold to [...] the proceeds from the PI Claim.  The bankruptcy was converted to Chapter 7 on April 19, 2017.  She did not notify the Court about the PI and UIM Claims and [...] for several years.  On August 22, 2018, Plaintiff signed a 2nd Contract for $2,900.00.  When the PI Claim settled January 2019, on January 15, 2019, Curnow paid $7,043.92 to [...] to pay off the 2016 and 2018 Contracts.  On February 1, 2019, Plaintiff signed a Contract for $5,500.0 regarding the UIM proceeds.  Again, Plaintiff did not tell [...] about the bankruptcy.  After the UIM Claim settled, Plaintiff filed multiple Amended Schedules that referenced the UIM Claim, but not the sale to [...].  When the Trustee sought to have the Bankruptcy Court pay Curnow’s fee and [...], Plaintiff objected to the paying [...] the contractual amount due but told the Court that [...] should be paid the amount Plaintiff received, $7,835.00.  Although Curnow’s fee was approved, no money was to be paid to [...].  Plaintiff filed 2 Complaints against Defendants alleging that they illegally lent money, committed usury, violated RICO, violated the Truth in Consumer Contract Warranty and Notice Act (“TCCWNA”), the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”) and violated New Jersey’s alleged public policy prohibiting the assignment of personal injury proceeds.
[brief] (THE ISSUE WAS RAISED IN 12/16/22 ORDER (249A) GRANTING THE BOARD'S CROSS-MOTION (208A))  On 11/25/22, [...] motioned (208a) for a Warrant of Satisfaction of the 8/20/20 final order.  The Appellate Division reviews a Rule 1:10-3 Order under an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the Court's granting or denying of a motion related to when a party does not comply with a judgment or order."  N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. State, Off. of Governor, 451 N.J. Super. 282, 296 (App. Div. 2017) (alteration in Here, as of today, [...] has still not complied with the August 20, 2020 Final Order (8a).
[brief] Paragraph 24(F) is, in fact, the more general and Paragraph 24(G) the more specific.  Paragraph 24(F) is only “specific” if it addresses [...]’s Estate Plan and [...]’s bequest to [...].  The Probate Court read Paragraph 24(F) to operate as a general waiver and release, relinquishing all rights to the Palm Beach Property from any source.  (See Da274).  This is broad and non- specific.  It is *general*.  Paragraph 24(G), on the other hand, specifically identifies a basket of assets in which [...] reserves all rights.
[brief] Lastly, we acknowledge that rescinding the policy in respect of [...], [...], and the firm as an entity, but not in respect of [...], encompasses a certain degree of line drawing.  Unlike the dissent, however, we are convinced that our disposition is consistent with rescission as an equitable remedy, which properly depends on the totality of the circumstances in a given case and resides within a court’s discretion.  Here, those circumstances include our concern for the public, which distinguishes this matter from the more typical contract case.  As the trial court succinctly observed:  “Equitable relief does not mean automatic relief. ”  [Id. at 141-42 (emphasis added)].  Similarly, in Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Lacroix, 194 N.J. 515 (2008), our Supreme Court applied a partial rescission of an automobile policy in order to provide PIP benefits to an 18-year-old girl whose father had misrepresented his daughter’s status in the insurance application to lower his auto premium, stating that “we have never turned a deaf ear to the equities when plainly innocent parties cry out for relief. ”  Lacroix at 530.  The Court in Lacroix also noted that when providing equitable relief:  Rescission remains a form of equitable relief in whatever setting its need arises, and courts wielding that remedy retain the discretion and judgment required to ensure that equity is done.  In furtherance of that objective, a court may shape the rescission remedy in order to serve substantial.  The power to mold the rescission remedy to do justice under the circumstances is perforce available when rescission is employed in the insurance context.  See, e.g., First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. [...], 177 N.J. 125, 129 (2003) (voiding legal malpractice insurance coverage ab initio as to law firm and defalcating partners because of equitable fraud, but retaining coverage under policy “in respect of any innocent partner. ”).  [Id. at 529 (some internal citations omitted)].
[brief] **The October 17, 2015 Motor Vehicle Accident and AD Application**  Petitioner filed for Accidental Disability retirement benefits on June 29, 2016, requesting an effective date of July 1, 2016.  (Pa1).  On his application, Petitioner identified an accident date of October 17, 2015 and stated he sustained “herniated cervical discs 5 and 6 with spinal cord displacement as a result of a motor vehicle accident. ”  (Pa1).  Reports related to the accident state that Petitioner was responding in his police vehicle to a “shots fired” call at the Camden intersection of 8th and Pine street.  (Pa16).  As he was traveling through the intersection, a civilian ran a stop sign and struck Petitioner’s vehicle on the rear driver’s side, causing damage to the left rear wheel.  (Pa11; Pa16).  Petitioner was thrown to the passenger side of his vehicle and reported injury to his neck, upper and lower back and left knee.  (1T\textsuperscript{2}40; Pa7).  **B. Petitioner’s Treatment and Surgery**
[brief] The State urged the court to find that the warrantless search of [...]’ Audi was justified under the consent search exception to the warrant requirement.  The State posited that the validity of a vehicle consent search requires a two-prong analysis and that the State met its burden as to each prong:  “The way that the State sees this case as we have articulated in the past is in two separate stages.  . . .  We see whether or not the motor vehicle stop itself was lawful[.] . . .  And then the second part is whether or not the officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion to ask to consent to search. ”  (3T 16-5 to 16-6; 3T 22-23 to 23-3)  The State argued that the stop was lawfully “conducted due to the motor vehicle infractions,” “lawful . . . because of the motor vehicle infractions. ”  (3T 16-7 to 16-8; 3T 22-23 to 23-1)  With respect to the search, the State argued that the information the detectives had gathered during their prior investigation of [...], “coupled with” [...]’ “behavior” and “responses” to [...] during the course of the stop, furnished the detectives with reasonable suspicion to ask for consent to search.  (3T 23-4 to 23-9)  After determining that the testimony of the detectives was credible (Pa 5-9), the court made the following findings.
[brief] On 14-02-232  30 years  No parole eligibility for 30 years, count concurrent to sentence on 11-01-832, defendant reserves right to withdraw plea if current Pennsylvania charges are not run concurrent to this plea.  State does not oppose all open NPS time served concurrent.  Main Plea Form / Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #05-11 (08/01/2011), CN 10079-English Defendant's Initials: Da 19  14.  Has the prosecutor promised that he or she will NOT:  a. Speak at sentencing?  [Yes]  [No] b. Seek an extended term of confinement?  [Yes]  [No] c.  Seek a stipulation of parole ineligibility?  [Yes]  [No]  15.  Are you aware that you must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution?
[brief] Appellants argue that the discovery exchanged between the parties is one-sided in favor of Respondents, and claim that they will be prejudiced as a result.  However, Appellants allowed the discovery end date to pass without filing a motion to extend.  Appellants claim that they required more information from Respondents, but never served Respondents with supplemental interrogatories, or any supplemental requests.  Appellants claim that they needed to take depositions of Respondents’ representatives, but never served a Notice of Deposition.  Appellants argue that Respondents’ discovery responses were boilerplate and improper, but never served Respondents with a deficiency letter and never filed a motion to compel discovery.  Again, Respondents have maintained that we would produce our clients for deposition whenever Appellants wanted them, but we were trying to hold off requiring Appellants to undergo that expense to see if we could resolve the case.  If this matter proceeds to arbitration we would agree to produce our clients for a depositions should Appellants indicate that they need that.
[directive] The audit trail must include, at a minimum: a. the date of the request, b. the name of the individual requesting the information, c. the name of the agency requesting the information, d. the reason (need to know) for the requested dissemination, e. the information inquired upon, f. the information provided to the requester, g. the name of the individual disseminating the information, and h. the date of the dissemination (if different from the date of the request).  4.  Information should not be disseminated if it was received from another agency (i.e., third party information) unless the agency from which it was received agrees to its dissemination.
[directive] Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  Possession or Consumption of Alcoholic Actor under legal age possesses or consumes alcohol in any school, public conveyance, 2C:33-15(a)(b)  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible Beverage by public place, or place of assembly or motor vehicle.  Person under Legal Age
[directive] Supervisors who have sufficient time and resources to properly perform their duties should be able to timely identify officers with performance and misconduct issues.  Supervisors can react to problems they identify through direction, counseling and effective performance evaluations.  Proper training of agency supervisors is critical to the discipline and performance of law enforcement officers.  Emphasis should be placed on anticipating problems among officers before they result in improper performance or misconduct.  Supervisors are expected to recognize potentially troublesome officers, identify training needs of officers and provide professional support in a consistent and fair manner.
[directive] Post-Conviction Form of Any on While seeking of presumption the unless Section 7.3, under covered otherwise not cases  In pretrial for shall apply prosecutor the subsection 7.4.6, to pursuant overcome detention is pretrial defendant the and its degree), of crime(regardless indictable an is offense present the if detention offense: present the committed disorderly persons (ii) or crime a indictable an (i) for pretrial release on while (a) whether N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a), in defined as violence domestic involving offense complaint- or complaint-warrant by charged been had offense previous that or summons, (ISP), parole, supervision program intensive probation, special probation, on while (b) on was or (PSL), for supervision life parole (CSL), life for supervision community required by guilty had as pleaded defendant the where (PTI) intervention pretrial 69
[brief] The trial court expressly found that the defendants breached the SPAs, saying “The numbers were wrong.  It was bogus. ” (37T 87:20 to 88:1).  As [...] did in the 2014 SPA, [...] represented in the 2017 SPA that consummating the purchase would not result in the breach of any agreement to which either she or [...] were bound — including the [...] Stockholder Agreement, which the trial court found had been breached.  (36T 50:10 to 51:21). by Buyer as required by this Agreement.  (Da2744).
[brief] Q.  In your report you indicate, on the bottom of page 6 -- you read it into the record -- that [...] would have been able to share up to 60 percent if he partnered with another developer.  Correct?  A.  Correct.  Q.  Now, when you say up to, I assume that also means it might be something less.  Correct?  A.  That’s correct.  Q.  Depending upon the negotiations, depending upon what the leverage was with a partner, he might have 20 percent, 30 percent, or anything in between; correct?  A.  Of course.  It would have still been a very positive number.
[brief] (Sb14-15)  The State argues that the Parole Board’s task is different, as the Board is charged with an inquiry broader than recidivism—whether an “inmate has failed to cooperate in his or her own rehabilitation or that there is a reasonable expectation that the inmate will violate conditions of parole. ”  N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53 (2024).  (Sb14)  The quoted language is the current parole standard that took effect on August 18, 1997.  L.1997, c. 213.  But the parole determinations in the two cases cited by [...]—Berta and Trantino—was “governed by the version of the Parole Act of 1979 (Parole Act or Act), in effect when his crime was committed . . . before significant revisions to the Act were adopted in 1997,” which provided that an inmate “shall be released on parole at the time of parole eligibility, unless [it is shown] by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a substantial likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime.
[brief] CPa5.  In December 2021, [...] also began a new search for his successor.  [...] no longer considered plaintiff a potential successor because “he had made a blunt decision in the previous year, and I was not recommending him any longer for a managerial position. ”  Pa180.  On July 5, 2022, [...], [...], and [...] interviewed an outside candidate in New York and decided to hire him as [...]’s replacement.  CPa9; Pa178, 219, 231, 236, 350.  On July 6, 2022, [...] and [...] met with counsel in New York about plaintiff’s lawsuit, which he had filed on May 24, 2022.  CPa11.  LEGAL ARGUMENT THE DECISIONS BELOW
[brief] (Ibid.).  Furthermore, the [...]’s counsel told [...] that “recent Interim Order of the [[...]] was directed towards [him] individually, and [he was] responsible for making sure [he complied] with their orders and filing deadlines. ” (Ibid.).  On May 11, 2021, a staff attorney for the [...] informed the [...], with a copy to [...], that the [...] Complaint were scheduled for adjudication on May 18, 2021 at 1:30 PM.
[directive] Page 14  Appendix D  Stationhouse Adjustment Quarterly Report  Law Enforcement Agency: ____________________________________________  Name of Person  Completing Report: ____________________________________________  Date: ____________________________________________  1st Check Quarter: January 1 - March 31   2nd April 1 - June 30   3rd  July 1 - September 30   4th  October 1 - December 31   15th  Completed reports must be submitted to the County Prosecutor’s Office by the day of month following the close of each quarter.  Complete one line of this report for each stationhouse adjustment (1) considered and accepted (2) considered and rejected and (3) completed (including unsuccessful terminations) by your agency during the quarterly reporting period.  Indicate the outcome of the adjustment by entering the appropriate code in column five.  Codes are listed at the bottom of this form.  Age at Ethnicity Sex Prior Statutory Citation Outcome Time of Contacts  Offense Adjusted enter code enter code Offense  Attorney General Guidelines - Stationhouse Adjustments  Page 15  Age at Ethnicity Sex Prior Statutory Citation Outcome Time of Contacts  Offense Adjusted enter code enter code Offense Notes: Race = 1. Caucasian 2. Black 3. Hispanic 4. Asian/Pacific Islander 5. American Indian 6. Southern Asian 7.  Other (specify above)  Prior Contacts = Indicate “Y” or “N” for any prior juvenile delinquency complaints or stationhouse adjustments  Statutory Cite = Indicate statutory citation for offense adjusted.  If the offense is an ordinance violation simply write in “ordinance. ”  Outcome = 1.  Successfully Completed 2.  Parent/Guardian/Caregiver not available or refused participation 3.  Juvenile refused participation 4.  Victim insisted on formal complaint 5.  Not adjusted due to lack of resources 6.  Juvenile either committed a new offense or did not complete terms of adjustment agreement, resulting in the filing of a juvenile delinquency complaint 7.  Agency considered and rejected stationhouse adjustment  Attach additional sheets as necessary.
[brief] (Db 22-23)  *Masce* expressly limits the catchall phrase in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(d) to those civil penalties already authorized under a separate statute.  *Id.* at 356-57.  “We construe N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(d) to mean that the court may impose those civil penalties specified in a statute. ”  *Ibid.*  As the State correctly observed, no statute specifically authorized the penalties imposed on [...].  (Sb 22)  Thus, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(d) cannot provide statutory support for the conditions imposed on [...].
[directive] Except f o r the [...], whenever a deposit is U.S. made to the Customs Suspense Account by the other Treasury law enforcement agencies, a report of the deposit along with a copy of the Deposit Information Form, attachment A, within hours the deposit. must be FAXED to the ASD of 4  8  The purpose of this form is to ensure timely notice to the [...] (ASD) of the into the Suspense Account.  transmission of monies  This process will enhance the ability of the [...] to maintain more effective and timely control of deposits to the Suspense Account.  A.  Treasury law enforcement agency shall FAX the to -The accounting (formally the NFC) Services DiGision  Deposit Information the form as F o r f e i t u r e Fund Team, in provided Attachment A to this Directive.  i s not B.  This form to be used in reporting cash and net proceeds of forfeited property received by Treasury agencies as their share from non-Treasury agencies.  These funds, also known as Reverse Asset Sharing, shall continue to be forwarded to the Executive Office Directive  No. Rev. 4 June 19, 1996  Page of 8  10 in for Asset Forfeiture, Attn: Revenue Desk, accordance with VIII. B., page of the Secretary of 16, the Treasury's Guidelines for Seized and Forfeited Property, 10/1/93.  V. AND DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS FOR SEIZED, FORFEITED CURRENCY COST BONDS IN THE CUSTOMS SUSPENSE ACCOUNT OR TREASURY FORFEITURE FUND