ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT ENGAGED IN BIAS IN MAKING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT DETERMINATION  WHICH FAVORED THE RESPONDENTS’ POSITION AND IGNORED THE POSITION OF THE APPELLANT  Pa93, Pa115  Justice has to be administered fairly by judges but it must also appear to the public that justice has been administered fairly; justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.  State v. Deutsch, 34 N.J. 190, 206 (1961) quoting Offiut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).  The Supreme Court noted in DeNike v. Cupo, “it is not necessary to prove actual prejudice on the part of the court” to establish an appearance of impropriety; an objectively reasonable belief that the proceedings were not fair is sufficient to prove prejudice.  DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502 (2008).  The Trial Court engaged in bias in the analysis of the arguments made in the court filing by respondents for Summary Judgment and Appellant’s Opposition papers.  When the Trial Court decision is reviewed, each cause of action was discussed from the Respondents’ perspective with the Court agreeing to each position taken by the Respondents.  The Appellant presented documentary, evidentiary material which supported each cause of action.  The Court was tasked with determining if there were material issues in dispute and failed in this task.  Instead, the Court spent time in analysis from the Respondents’ perspective and issued a ruling from that perspective while ignoring the positions taken by the Appellant.  For each cause of action, the Trial Court discussed it from the Respondents’ viewpoint and wrote after this review that the Court agrees with the Respondents.  As a result of the Court’s biased review of the pleadings and the documentary, evidentiary material presented to the Court, and with a failure to grant all favorable inferences to the Appellant, the Trial Court reached a biased conclusion which deprived Appellant of her day in Court on the noted causes of action.  It is requested that the Appellate Court reverse and remand this matter to the trial court so that the record can be completed.  It is also requested that upon return to the trial court that the matter should be reassigned to another judge for completion.  A request is further made that the Appellate Court consider transferring this matter to another County on return to the Trial Court.
[directive] Activity Criminal 6.  History.  Juvenile Violent and Score Risk Moderate a Involving Crimes Serious 7.4.3 seeking pretrial of presumption the Section unless 7.3, under covered otherwise cases  In not detention pretrial for apply shall prosecutor the 7.4.6, subsection to pursuant overcome detention is score (NCA)  Criminal Activity  New crime the and second-degree or afirst- isfor charge present if the been had juvenile a as the defendant and 4 assessment is risk pretrial automated the by determined 2s detained, be will defendant presumption the that a establishes Reform Law Bail the circumstances, these In See evidence. ofthe preponderance a presumption by rebutted is the that finds court the 2A:162-19(b), unless N.J.S.A. 9(e)(2).
[brief] The Highlands Act directly affects matters that are regulated by FERC under the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme set forth under the Natural Gas Act; specifically, the siting, construction and operation of CS 327.  FERC approved the construction of [...]’s Project, including the CS 327 facilities, and authorized [...] to construct and place these facilities in service.  See 179 FERC ¶ 61,041; TGPsa001.  In approving the Project, the FERC found that [...]’s proposed facilities will be used to transport natural gas in interstate commerce and are in the public convenience and necessity pursuant to the Natural Gas Act.  See 179 FERC ¶ 61,041 P85; TGPa0004.  Accordingly, because Congress has manifested its intent to occupy the field of transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, which includes the siting, construction and operation of compressor stations, there is “no room” for [...] to do the same through application of the Highlands Act.
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022  (1) when there is imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another person, created by a person in the vehicle using means other than the vehicle, such as when shots are being fired from the vehicle; or (2) when the suspect is driving their vehicle toward persons other than the officer in a manner creating an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, such as in a terrorist attack; or (3) when the officer is being dragged or carried by the vehicle, cannot disengage from the vehicle, and is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.  4.7
[brief] POINT V [...] FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF IN THIS MATTER.  (Pa218-Pa249; Pa288-Pa242).  The burden of proof falls on the agency in enforcement proceedings to prove violation of administrative regulations.—Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Moffett, 218 N.J.Super. 331, 341 (App. Div. 1987).  The agency must prove its case by a preponderance of credible evidence, which is the standard in administrative proceedings.  Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 143 (1962).  The evidence must be such as to lead a reasonably cautious mind to a given conclusion.  Bornstein v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 26 N.J. 263 (1958).  Preponderance may also be described as the greater weight of credible evidence in the case, not necessarily dependent on the number of witnesses, but having the greater convincing power.  State v. Lewis, 67 N.J. 47 (1975).  Credibility, or more specifically, credible testimony, in turn, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself, as well.
[directive] Demographic data collection.  The data collected should follow the below standards, as reflected in Appendix A (which may be updated in the future).  Demographic information should be collected from applicants and promotion candidates on a distinct form from any application so as to remain separate from the selection process.  1.  Race: i. American Indian or Alaska Native ii. Asian iii. Black or African American iv. Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander v. White vi.  Two or more races vii.  Other 2.  Ethnicity: i. Hispanic or Latino ii. Not Hispanic or Latino  3.  Gender: 7  As with all demographic reporting categories, applicants cannot be required to provide sexual orientation.  The sexual orientation reporting category applies only to applicants, not current officers.  We recognize that in civil service jurisdictions, it may not be possible to capture the sexual orientation category.  6  i.  Female ii. Male iii. X or Non-Binary 4.  Sexual orientation (for applicant reporting only):  i.  Do you identify as LGBTQ+, yes or no?  D.  Additional requirements.
[brief] Here, Plaintiff has confirmed that his claim that he was placed in a false light arises solely from his termination by the Councilman on January 12, 2018.  (Pa10, Pa70.)  The Complaint, however, was not filed until two years later.  (Pa3.)  Thus, his claim of false light invasion of privacy through making Plaintiff appear to be a bad employee by terminating him is, on his own testimony and the date of the filing of the complaint, barred by the statute of limitations.  The trial court, therefore, properly dismissed Plaintiff’s False Light claim because it was out of time and because Plaintiff “failed to establish evidence of defendants’ unauthorized release of private and truthful information about Plaintiff.
[brief] [As a May 2024 update, in my Aug. 4, 2023 Hearing presentation I indicated that “A vested remainder beneficiary interest is when the vested remainder beneficiary will receive possession because the interest is not subject to any conditions or limitations except for the natural ending of the prior interest; that is the death of a lifetime beneficiary which in this case is [...].  That is what the [[...]] Will confers on me.  New Jersey Appellate ruling for [...], Docket No. [...] of September 6, 2011 further supports the case that I am vested remainder beneficiary, and I have found other Court cases in which Judges have ruled similarly.] (4T, p. 34, line 19, to p. 35, line 5)
[brief] N.J.R.E. 104 ……………………………………………………………………………………..  14 N.J.R.E. 701 ……………………………………………………………………………………..34, 35, 37 N.J.R.E. 702 ……………………………………………………………………………………..13, 14, 18 R. 1:36-3 ……………………………………………………………………………………..  18 R. 2:10-2 ……………………………………………………………………………………..15, 16, 25, 34  TABLE OF APPENDIX  Surveillance video from [...] restaurant cash register area, September 28, 2018  ........................................................................  Pa1  Surveillance video from [...] restaurant kitchen, September 28, 2018 ........................................................................  Pa2  [...] body-worn camera footage, September 28, 2018 ........................................................................  Pa3  Surveillance video from [...] restaurant kitchen, September 30, 2018 ........................................................................  Pa4  Surveillance video from [...] restaurant cash register area, September 30, 2018 ........................................................................  Pa5  [...] body-worn camera footage, September 30, 2018 ........................................................................  Pa6  Unpublished Opinion in State v. McKoy, No. A-2553-19 (App. Div. Nov. 28, 2022) .................................................................. Pa7-22 Unpublished Opinion in State v. Monell, No. A-4419-18 (App. Div. Nov. 15, 2021)
[brief] On June 4, 2011, Defendant was arrested and charged with several motor vehicle violations including his fourth DWI in Ship Bottom, New Jersey.  (Ra14)  At the scene, Defendant presented a Pennsylvania drivers’ license bearing his picture and the name, “[...]”.  (Ra14-Ra21)  It was subsequently discovered that this Pennsylvania license was fraudulent.  (Ra17)  As a result, complaints bearing Defendant’s real name ([...]) were not issued until August 11, 2011.  (Da23-Da27; Ra13-Ra15)  On February 8, 2013, Defendant appeared with [...], Public Defender, at the Borough of Ship Bottom Municipal Court, and pled guilty to DWI.
[brief] Regarding the per se standard, Respondent’s argument also relies heavily on the assertion that the results of alcotests, like the one performed on Appellant, are accurate and reliable.  In so arguing, Respondent cites the Chun prerequisites, as well as other “safeguards”, such as the use of slope detectors and the fact that multiple breath samples are taken from each subject when alcotests are performed.  (Resp. Brief at 23-24).  Respondent’s argument fails to recognize that, no matter how many safeguards are in place to ensure the accuracy and reliability of alcotest results, those safeguards are irrelevant where, as here, the tester fails to abide by the established procedures set by the Supreme Court in Chun.  For this additional reason, Respondent’s argument that the Law Division did not err by finding Appellant guilty under the *per se* standard of liability is misplaced.
[brief] [...] initiated this matter by filing a Complaint on July 7, 2022, seeking to quiet title and for compensation for the use of the Strip since 1991.  Pa18.  [...] answered and counterclaimed by way of a pleading on September 26, 2022, asserting claims for adverse possession, prescriptive easement, and seeking a declaratory judgment awarding the Strip to [...].  Pa28.  [...] filed an Amended Complaint on May 30, 2023, which added a claim for a declaratory judgment.  Da1.  [...], in turn, filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim, adding counts asserting ownership of the Strip by color of title, equitable conversion, and constructive trust.  Da17.  The court below conducted a three-day trial from September 5 through 7, 2023.  [...] read the Court’s decision into the record on December 20, 2023, and entered a final Order on January 16, 2024 (and amended that Order on January 24, 2024).  4Tr.¹; Pa12; Pa15.  The Order granted [...]’s request for a declaratory judgment that it owned the Strip and, in addition, awarded [...] the Strip by way of adverse possession.
[brief] Da32.  However, the proper calculation of interest (which when misapplied is indeed a mathematical error) is one of four errors in the Award and despite the Arbitrator’s best efforts, his calculations are still incorrect.  The four distinct computational and/or form errors in the Award consist of: (1) two interest miscalculations; (2) the contractually mandated fee for [...] and [...] and [...]’s current project progress; (3) the EGPs listed in [...]’s Financial Reporting/Forecasts; and (4) [...]’s disappearance on the final iterations of the supposed “amendments” to the PTA.  Below is a description of these miscalculations and errors, and in the Trial Court, [...] created an exhibit of alternative calculations to remedy those errors (“Alternative Calculations”), which it provided to the Trial Court in conjunction with its Motion to Vacate or Modify the Award.  Da474-483.  Tab 1 of the Alternative Calculations is the breakdown of the current Award, to be used as comparison to the proposed alternative calculations.  Da474-75.  Importantly, [...] is not questioning the Arbitrator’s evaluation of evidence.  Instead, [...] has identified blatant mathematical errors and errors in the description of EGPs, neither of which relate to the substantive merits of the Arbitrator’s decision (whether or not [...] owed [...] EGP payments for the projects at issue) but rather are so obvious and objective, they must be corrected by this Court.
[brief] Instead, the Defendants rely upon the case of Zorba Contractors, Inc. v. Housing Authority, City of Newark, 362 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 2003), for the proposition that they are entitled to a jury trial.  However, that case is distinguishable from the facts before this Court.  Initially, the statute dealt with in *Zorba* was the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA).  Unlike the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act, the CFA specifically states that "in any action under this section the court shall, in addition to any other appropriate legal or equitable relief, award threefold the damages sustained by any person in interest."  *N.J.S.A.* 56:8-19.  The *Zorba* Court latched onto the statute's use of the word "legal relief" and stated that "the word legal is a term of art."  362 *N.J. Super.* at 137.  The court further stated that "if an action is 'legal' in nature, the right to a jury trial attaches.  Consequently, the Legislature's characterization of a cause of action as legal may justify an inference that it intended to authorize a jury trial."  *Ibid.* (Citation omitted).  In contrast, the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act does not use the term "legal relief."
[brief] The plain language of the exclusion does not mention any particular species of mold; it does not mention trichothecenes or any other hazardous mycotoxin; and it does not require that the mold-contaminated food must be eaten and cause an identifiable and distinct injury.  As written, the exception applies (and, therefore, the mold exclusion “does not apply”) when there is mold “on” food that is “intended for \(^3\)  As [...]’s expert witness testified without contradiction, requiring such proof would be an impossibility because there is no scientific way to determine the extent of bodily injury caused by any one of the three recognized pathways of harmful mold exposure: ingestion, inhalation, and dermal contact.
[brief] This Court also addressed this outcome in its prior Opinion:  The judge found that [...]'s testimony was clouded by his involvement in the divorce litigation and his understanding of article three did not make sense, especially regarding his claim that the loan was only forgiven as to him, not [...].  The judge found [...] was very credible, especially given his thirty-year relationship with [...] and his familiarity with the entire family.  The judge accepted [...]'s testimony that once he was alone "behind closed doors" with his client, without [...], [...] was "unequivocal" that he wanted the debt forgiven and the mortgage cancelled.  Moreover, [...] found it "clear as day" that what [...] "wanted was going to indirectly benefit [...]."  The judge concluded that [...] was not the type of person who would say anything a client or anyone else wanted if not true as demonstrated by his refusal to sign the original certification presented by [...]'s attorneys in the divorce and that [...] "never wavered" that the forgiveness of the debt was what [...] wanted.  The judge found that as [...] explained, the first sentence of article three was the lawyer's language, and the second sentence was [...]'s emphasizing that "he wanted the debt cancelled of record."  [Pa000075.]  This Court affirmed the trial court's ruling in its July 8, 2022 opinion.
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021 reviewing all internal affairs complaints made against its officers, regardless of outcome, for evidence of a pattern or practice of inappropriate or unconstitutional conduct.  3.4.7  For further information regarding the Attorney General’s requirements for early warning systems, agencies should consult the Early Warning Systems Directive.  3.5  Staff Inspections  3.5.1  While the primary responsibility for enforcing agency policies rests with the line supervisors, management cannot rely solely on those supervisors for detecting violations.  Administrators should establish a mechanism to determine whether an agency's policies and procedures are being properly implemented.  It is necessary for management to know if behavior is, in fact, consistent with the agency's rules and regulations, policies and procedures.  The task of detecting such defects should be delegated to an inspection unit or function.  3.5.2  Large agencies might establish an inspection unit operating directly out of the office of the law enforcement executive.
[brief] Da167 ¶¶ 1–5; Da176 ¶ 5.  [...] never traveled to New Jersey in connection with the representation.  Da168 ¶ 8.  [...] is a limited liability partnership with its headquarters and principal place of business in Dallas, Texas.  Da195 ¶ 4.  In addition to its Dallas headquarters, [...] has offices in eighteen other locations throughout the United States, including a small office in Newark, New Jersey.  Da196 ¶¶ 6–11.
[brief] As the Trial Court was keenly aware, a court of equity “always attempts to get at the substance of things, and to ascertain, affirm, and enforce rights and duties which spring from the ‘real’ relations of parties.  It will never suffer the mere appearance and external form to conceal the true purposes, objects, and consequences of a transaction. ”  2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence (5 ed. 1941), § 378 at 41.
[brief] On January 2, 2024, [...] appeared before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., and pled guilty to an amended charge of third-degree aggravated assault under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7), with his plea being conditioned upon his admission to PTI.  Da233, Da234-5 (3:3-4:7).  The plea agreement also required the following, as set forth by the assistant prosecutor on the record:  [D]efendant [[...]] is going to be providing a truthful factual basis to the crime.  In addition, he will also be agreeing to provide truthful testimony against the Co-defendant [...], if there is a trial, at that trial.  Therefore, meaning he would have to take the stand.  He would actually have to answer questions on direct and he would have to answer questions on cross regarding that, and he would be bound by his actual factual basis about what had happened and what he had saw.  [Da236, 4:8-17 (emphasis added). ]  [...]’s criminal defense attorney confirmed [...]’s understanding of the plea agreement’s terms.
[brief] ”  47 N.J.R. 2531(a) (Oct 19, --- 11 DEP, Water Quality Management Planning Program web page, available at nj.gov/dep/wqmp/wqmps.html (emphasis added).  2015) (emphasis added); 48 N.J.R. 2244(a) (Nov. 7, 2016) (response to comment #164).  But the DEP made no findings regarding wasteload allocations or TMDLs anywhere in the record of the instant decision.
[brief] This case has nothing to do with UPEPA.  The complaint clearly states that all claims are for using a picture that was taken in the privacy of my own home.  There is also no evidence that has been provided that this case falls under UPEPA nor evidence to the contrary which, as per the SLAPP guidelines, I would have a right to provide to the court before a decision would be made on whether this case was a SLAPP case or not.  As of now, it’s just the Defendants opinion and nothing more.  It is for these reasons that I am asking the court to deny this appeal.  **Certification**  I hereby certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true.  I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.  DATED: 9/16/24  [Signature]  [...]  [...], Plaintiff, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], AND [...], Defendants.
[brief] THE STANDARD OF REVIEW - TRIAL COURT’S DETERMINATIONS OF LAW ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SPECIAL DEFERENCE  (Issue Not Addressed Below)  R. 2:2-3(a) sets out appeals allowed as of right to the Appellate Division:  a) from final judgments of Superior Court trial divisions and Tax Court ...  The April 3 Order was converted to a denial of Appellants’ motion to vacate the Final Judgment by the September 27 Order and thus is a final order of the Superior Court in that it finally determined the issues then outstanding between the parties.  The record below was set forth extensively in the parties certifications and the lower court’s oral transcriptions of its decisions.  No dispute is asserted in this appeal as to the factual conclusions in the lower court’s statements.  This appeal thus accepts the facts as found, but challenges the conclusions of law on those facts.  These are determinations of law.  "A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference."  *Manalapan Realty v. Manalapan Twp. Comm.*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  **POINT II**