ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See *McShain v. Evesham Tp.*, 395 A.2d 251, 163 N.J. Super. 522, 529 (Law Div. 1978)(refusing to allow municipality to seek relief based on unplled TCA defense).  answer, the municipal defendant filed a summary judgment motion predicated on the TCA and the court held that “defendant is estopped to raise the defense of failure to comply with the notice provisions of the Tort Claims Act."  Also, in *Peskin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.*, 214 N.J. Super. 686, 704 (Law Div. 1986), the court denied a summary judgment motion predicated on failure to join a party defendant and filed after defendant filed its answer "without setting forth the affirmative defense of the entire controversy doctrine, as required by R. 4:5-4."  These cases indicate that defendant cannot file an answer without pleading therein any TCA defense and months later and after facing a class certification motion, file a summary judgment motion.
[brief] THE COURT: Right.  And this Court made the decision on the 404(b) in the murder charge and [...] rendered an opinion as to the armed robbery and I think he suppressed -- did not suppress cash and clothing found in a car but did suppress the gun found under the front hood.  MR. HESKETH: Correct.  THE COURT: But certainly -- [...] certainly has the opportunity to file that appeal.  BY THE COURT:  Q  So [...], I understand you're prepared to plead guilty to a first degree felony murder, is that correct?
[brief] Our court rules permit reconsideration of a trial court’s decision only if the aggrieved party “states[s] with specificity the basis on which [the motion for reconsideration] is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred. ”  Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020).  The magnitude of the error cited “must be a game-changer for reconsideration to be appropriate.  Said another way, a litigant must initially demonstrate that the Court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner, before the Court should engage in the actual reconsideration process. ”  Palombi, supra, 414 N.J. Super. at 289.  Courts should only grant reconsideration when either (1) the court has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or (2) it is obvious that the court either did not consider or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.
[brief] Respondent does not generally dispute Appellant's Statement of Facts but believes that the transcripts speak for themselves.  Appellant also notes that the Court indicated that [...] admitted that she was not arguing a failure of notice, but merely explaining why there was a lack of reply paperwork filed.  (4T15:11-16).  Moreover, the court noted that [...] could have gone into E-Courts and found the Notice and the Reply papers.  (4T15:18-16:20).  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[directive] The prosecutor's completed requested test/examination will be or on which the submitted will be report requested prosecutor.  the submitted to thereon report and any operating procedure supersede and preempt standard deemed to shall be Section This of of that authority of the laws the State New Jersey operating under the an agency protocol of or preparing or test or given to a report conducting a priority to be determine the would otherwise order been tests by the in which they had to prioritize general practice a examination (e.g., to of Division of Criminal Justice authorized 10.4 (Director the Section also See submitted). disputes chief law enforcement officer to resolve State's authority as General's Attorney exercise reports). completion of required timely order and Prioritization Requests. with Compliance 10.4 satisfactorily with an agency is not complying reason believe that prosecutor to has If a all to requested not using available means submit a Section, or is of this requirements of any the Page 80 deadline test/examination prosecutor a to enable the to meet requested conduct a report and/or of Director prosecutor may notify and consult with the the Reform Law, Bail under the imposed Attorney Director is hereby authorized to exercise the The Criminal Justice. of Division the are officer of State take such actions as enforcement the and to chief law authority as General's and ensure that requested reports are prepared and to any dispute necessary to resolve reasonably that no expeditiously as possible to ensure conducted as are tests/examinations requested trial deadline of a failure to indict or proceed to by a because custody from is released defendant Bail Reform Law. under the established INDICTMENT/TRIAL GENERAL OF SPEEDY ATTORNEY NOTICE TO 11. VIOLATIONS indictment/trial time automated system to track speedy an establishing Judiciary is The counsel to alert judges, prosecutors, and defense Law and Bail Reform under the imposed limits necessary and responsible to ensure that all Prosecutors are approach. deadlines as statutory timely prepared for indictment and trial in a cases are ensure that taken to steps are appropriate law will be released due to delays attributed to defendant dangerous that no manner so pretrial (prioritization of police reports and laboratory tests in Section 10 See also enforcement. has imposed under the Bail Reform Law that a deadline determines If court a detention cases). promptly the prosecuting the case shall report responsible for prosecutor met, the not been Division Justice. through Director of the of Criminal General the Attorney to the circumstances N.J.S.A. whether a court found pursuant to for delay, reasons indicate the shall The report with requirements trial in accordance the time commence failure to that the 2A:162-22(b)(2)(a) prosecutor, that unreasonable delay by the the steps to was due Bail Reform Law the set forth in comply with the enforcement agencies to attempt to law prosecutor and taken by the were from of failure released custody as a result the defendant was whether a and deadlines, statutory Bail Reform requirements of the Law.
[brief] B.  The sentencing court relied on proper facts in finding aggravating factors three and nine.  Defendant next claims that, in finding aggravating factors three and nine, the sentencing court double-counted the fact that he was convicted of manslaughter by pointing a firearm at someone and pulling the trigger, improperly speculated that people who commit crimes with a gun are more likely to reoffend, and relied exclusively on general deterrence without finding a need for specific deterrence.  Because [...] properly found both aggravating circumstances, defendant is not entitled to a remand for another resentencing hearing.
[brief] 1.  **The USAA Policy**  The PURE Excess Policy is excess to a primary New Jersey Standard Auto Policy issued to [...] and [...] by [...] (the “USAA Policy”).  The USAA Policy contains liability and underinsured motorist coverage parts.  (Pa 33).  Under the UIM coverage part of the USAA Policy, “covered person” is defined to mean:  1.  **You** or any **family member.**  2.  Any other person **occupying your covered auto.**  3.  Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of **BI** to which this coverage applies sustained by any person described in 1 or 2 above.  ---  2  Under both the liability and the UIM coverage part of the USAA Policy, “family member” is defined to mean “a person related to you by blood, marriage, registered civil union or adoption who resides primarily in your household.  This includes a ward or foster child. ” (Pa 59, at Part C, Uninsured Motorists Coverage).  The insuring agreement of the UIM coverage part provides, in relevant part:  A.  **We** will pay compensatory damages which a **covered person** is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an **uninsured motor vehicle** or **underinsured motor vehicle** because of: 1. **BI** [bodily injury] sustained by a **covered person** and caused by an auto accident; and 2.  **PD** [property damage] caused by an auto accident.  However, **we** will not pay for **PD** caused by a hit-and-run motor vehicle.  *Id.*  “Underinsured motor vehicle” is defined to mean a “land motor vehicle or trailer of any type to which one or more liability bonds or policies apply, but the sum of the limits of liability for **BI** or **PD** under all such bonds or policies is less than the sum of the applicable limits of liability for UM Coverage under this policy and all other policies affording UM Coverage to the **covered person. **”  *Id.*  However, importantly, “uninsured motor vehicle” and “underinsured motor vehicle” do not include any vehicle:  1.  Owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of **you** [named insured and spouse] or any **family member**.  *Id.*  Accordingly, there is no UIM coverage for an accident involving an at-fault vehicle that is owned by a named insured or made available for the regular use of a family member, both of which are the case here.  2.  **The PURE Excess Policy**
[brief] Id.  The judgment of a municipal body may not be substituted for a trial court’s determination unless the body’s determination was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  See Bayshore Sewing Co. v. Dept. of Env., 122 NJ. Super. 184,200 (Ch. Div.), affd, 131 N.J. Super. 37 (App. Div. 1973).  As outlined above, each time the trial court remanded [...]’s hardship application to [...], [...] scrupulously adhered to the instructions of the court.  The Board took great care to ensure that the appropriate factors, as outlined by both the RCO and the opinions of the courts below, were considered at length over the course of ten lengthy meetings.  During each of the ten meetings, the parties were afforded the opportunity to present evidence, and each party exercised the opportunity.  To find, therefore, that [...] members, some of whom went to great lengths to devise formulas for use in the weighing of the important evidence, acted in a “willful and unreasoning [manner], without consideration and in disregard of their circumstances” would flout the record.  For that reason, [...] respectfully requests that the Court reverse all decisions holding that [...] has acted arbitrarily and capriciously but most specifically in the September 30, 2022 trial court decision in which it set the rent at $2,400 per month without remanding the matter back to [...] for further determinations.
[brief] Staffing Coordinator Office Dynamics and the Impact of COVID-19.  The staffing coordinator office is relatively small, with only two or three staffing coordinators (out of six total) present on any given workday.  (Pa66-67).  The staffing coordinators sit in an open office suite, with four computers that sit atop an L-shaped desk.  [...]’s office is located to the left of that L-shaped desk and to the right of that desk lies the nursing supervisor’s office. (Pa66-67).  [...] testified that she and [...] had a “good working relationship. ” (Pa354 at 51:20-23).  [...] would often confide in [...] and share with her personal details about his life.  (Pa354 at 51:20-52:2).  Despite the friendliness of the group, [...] described the staffing coordinator office as a “very stressful environment. ” (Pa358 at 66:24-67:8).  Those already-high stress levels only amplified during the COVID-19 pandemic.  (Pa358-59).  The staffing coordinators were the gatekeepers of the personal protective equipment.  (Pa359).  Employees’ morale began to drop during the COVID-19 pandemic as employees became increasingly nervous about spending extra time working at the hospital.  (Pa166).  Unlike others in hospital administration, the staffing coordinators could not work from home during the COVID-19 pandemic, increasing frustrations.  (Pa359).  The stress also impacted [...].  [...], one of the nursing supervisors who worked with [...], described [...] as more anxious during the COVID-19 pandemic.  (Pa454 at 23:14-24).  [...], one of [...]’s staffing coordinators for years, testified that as the COVID-19 pandemic wore on, [...] grew “angry at the world it seemed like. ” (Pa433 at 17:3-18).  Plaintiffs testified that [...] sometimes “belittled” and “degraded” them during this time, and that her management style was not always “professional. ” (Pa175 at 67:13-68:6; Pa176 at 70:10-12; Pa184 at 101:22-102:3; Pa194 at 143:22-144:22; Pa240 at 61:18-62:12; Pa240 at 64:10-18; Pa241 at 65:6-17; Pa285 at 30:23-31:5; Pa286 at 35:1-7; Pa305 at 109:6-110:7).  However, [...] admitted that [...]’s treatment of the staffing coordinators was not targeted at anyone and “stemmed from frustration. ” (Pa243 at 75:3-76:18).  Plaintiffs routinely vented about [...]’s conduct to each other, as well as to others.  (Pa175 at 67:22-68:6; Pa176 at 70:10-12; Pa237-38 at 49:1-55:25; Pa240 at 61:25-62:12).  V.  [...]’s Chronic Complaints and Improper Behavior.
[brief] [Ibid. (emphasis added). ]  N.J.S.A. 40A:11-2(6) defines “professional services” as: services rendered or performed by a person authorized by law to practice a recognized profession, whose practice is regulated by law, and the performance of which services requires knowledge of an advanced type in a field of learning acquired by a prolonged formal course of specialized instruction and study as distinguished from general academic instruction or apprenticeship and training.  . . .  [Ibid.]  Thus, in plain terms, Chapter 92 restricts from PERS eligibility those employed under professional services contracts awarded under the LPCL.
[brief] See R. 4:9-1; R. 4:9-3.  If Plaintiff/Respondent had chosen the latter course, Plaintiff/Respondent would have been at risk of Appellant asserting third-party claims against [...] and [...].  If that had occurred, the claimed negligence would be presented to the jury, but [...] and [...] would have been represented by counsel at trial and would have been on the verdict sheet.  Plaintiff/Respondent would not be able to recover directly from [...] and/or [...], but the JTCL would undoubtedly apply.  Instead, Plaintiff/Respondent chose the course seeking to amend in an effort to present direct claims based upon Appellant’s allegations.  When Plaintiff/Respondent did so, the Trial Court dismissed the claims against [...] and [...] on statute of limitations grounds.
[brief] Therefore, the City respectfully submits that the *[...]* matter should be considered determinative in this matter in order to maintain consistency.  **III.  NEW AMENDMENTS TO THE OPRA STATUTE HAVE CLARIFIED THAT THE DOCUMENTS/RECORDS AT ISSUE ARE PRIVATE AND SHOULD NOT BE DISCLOSED**  On June 5, 2024, a series of amendments were enacted to the OPRA statute (2024 N.J. S.N. 2930).  Among those changes were amendments which specifically clarify the law as it relates to the issues in this case, which became effective September 3, 2024, as follows:  A government record shall not include the following information which is deemed to be confidential for the purposes of P.L.1963, c.73 (C.47:1A-1 et seq.) as amended and supplemented… that portion of any document that discloses the personal identifying information of any person provided to a public agency for the sole purpose of receiving official notifications (N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1)
[directive] Forfeiture actions must be filed within ninety (90) days of the date of seizure.  N.J.S.A. 2C:64-3.  A successful forfeiture action under N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1(a)(5) will likely require criminal charges arising out of or related to the property seized unless (1) “there is no known owner of the seized property and no person credibly asserts an ownership interest in the seized property” or (2) the State establishes by preponderance of evidence that the property seized has a value of more than $10,000.
[directive] Law enforcement agency, agency, or department.  A law enforcement agency operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey.  Some BWC models may be turned on and remain in a standby or buffering mode, during which the device 1 does not make a permanent record of images/sounds unless the officer activates the recording mode/function.  With respect to these models, when the officer activates the recording mode/function, the device automatically preserves an electronic recording of the events that transpired a fixed period of time (e.g., 30 seconds) before the recording mode/function was activated.  This time-delay or “buffering” feature allows the device to capture data concerning the event/circumstances that prompted the officer to activate the BWC.  When an officer does not activate the recording mode/function, data captured while the device is in standby/buffering mode is overwritten automatically.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022 2 Law enforcement officer.
[brief] Just as the NJFPA protects franchisees in this state, as described above, the intent of the MBPA is to “further the public policy of this State and protect beer wholesalers from unreasonable demands and requirements by brewers. ”  N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.13(c); see also Business Incentives Co. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 397 F. Supp. 63, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (declining to apply a contractual provision that New York law because, pursuant to the Restatement, “New Jersey has a strong public policy – enunciated both by its courts and its legislature – in favor of protecting the relatively powerless consumer or small businessman from more powerful commercial giants”) (emphasis added); Winer Motors, Inc, 208 N.J. Super. at 666, n.3 (App. Div. 1986) (recognizing the “unequal bargaining power between franchiser and franchisee” as a reason to disregard the contractually agreed-upon choice-of-law provision in a franchise agreement).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT CROSS-EXAMINING DEFENDANT BROWN WITH HIS PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS FALLS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF DISCOVERABILITY (Da444-7)  [...]’s narrowly-tailored discovery order correctly required [...] to answer questions at his deposition regarding his prior inconsistent statements, which were not protected by any privilege or court order, while reserving the ultimate issue of admissibility for a later date.  “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action [....]”  R. 4:10-2(a).  “It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence[.]”  Id.  Evidence is generally admissible if relevant, meaning it has “a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. ”  See N.J.R.E. 401 and 402.  Thus, the scope of discoverability is broader than admissibility.
[brief] Case, 220 N.J. at 64.  (Sb26)  As for the court’s disregard of the expert findings in this case – wherein two experts at the original sentencing found that [...] was uniquely immature and prone to peer pressure, and one expert at his 2018 re-sentencing found that he was rehabilitated – the State argues that alleged “weaknesses in the proffered expert opinions” authorized the court to “refus[e] to accord [their opinions] more weight.
[brief] 36a Scheduling Order (2pp) .................................................................  37a TRANSCRIPTS:²  [...], March 8, 2022 (3pp) ...........  1T__-__ [...], April 12, 2022 (3pp)  ..........  2T__-__ [...], June 7, 2022 (3pp)  ............  3T__-__ [...], September 6, 2022 (3pp)  ....  4T__-__ [...], October 18, 2022 (11pp)  .....  5T__-__ [...], December 6, 2022 (3pp)  .....  6T__-__  ¹  Defendant’s appendix, attached, is cited to as suggested in R. 2:6-8—e.g., page one is cited as “Da1a. ”  ²  Transcripts are cited to by page and line as suggested in R. 2:6-8—e.g., page 3 from line 17 to line 24 of the August 3, 2023, transcript is cited as “7T3-17/24” and page 10, line 18, to page 11, line 3, of the September 12, 2023, transcript is cited as “8T10-18/11-3.
[brief] The Rules provide that before an attorney can file suit against a client to recover a fee, the attorney must notify the client of the availability of fee arbitration.  “The policy underlying the fee arbitration system is the promotion of public confidence in the bar and the judicial system. ”  Saffer v. Willoughby, 143 N.J. 256, 263 (1996).  The purpose of the Rule is to give clients who might be responsible to pay legal fees the ability for a short window of time to request the alternate dispute procedure of arbitration before being subjected to litigation.  Kamaratos v. Palias, 360 N.J. Super. 76, 86 (App. Div. 2003).  The Rule provides a mechanism for the resolution of fee disputes between attorneys and their clients.  In re LiVolsi, 85 N.J. 576, 581 (1981).  A “fair fee arbitration system will do much to assure the public of the fairness of the judicial system as a whole, and thereby increase the public confidence that is so necessary for that system to operate effectively. ”  Id. at 604.  A Fee Committee has jurisdiction only “to arbitrate fee disputes between clients and attorneys. ”  R. 1:20A-2(a).  The rules specifically provide that the “fee committee shall not have jurisdiction to decide . . . claims for monetary damages resulting from legal malpractice, although a fee committee may consider the quality of services rendered in assessing the reasonableness of the fee pursuant to RPC 1.5. ”  Saffer, supra, 143 N.J. at 265-66.  Rule 1:20A-6 provides in relevant part that “No lawsuit to recover a fee may be filed until the expiration of the 30 day period herein giving Pre-action Notice to a client .
[brief] [...] are “extremely wealthy,” as the trial court observed, sophisticated business professionals who have been enriched all this time by the monies to which [...] is entitled and have had free reign to invest and reap the benefits of interest (and perhaps compound interest) of those monies at [...]’s expense.  [...]’ conduct prevented [...] from the use of these monies for decades, which to date, remain under the Wilfs’ control.  If these circumstances do not warrant the application of compound interest under principles of equity, it is difficult to imagine what circumstances would.  For all these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest at a compound interest rate to [...] and affirming that decision would not “represent[t] a manifest denial of justice. ”  Bussell, 259 N.J. Super. at 521 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The prejudgment interest award therefore should not be disturbed. \(^4\)  **CONCLUSION**