ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa1-20)  The complaint alleged medical malpractice against, *inter alia*, [...] (“[...]”).  (Id.)  The New Jersey Department of Health licensed [...] to provide “Adult Partial Care Services. ”  (Pa76)  It is a non-residential facility located in [...]. \(^1\) (Id.)  The complaint stems from the death of Plaintiff’s decedent, whose death Plaintiff alleged was the result of receiving an excessive amount of insulin at [...] (“[...]”), the residential care facility where he was a resident.  (Pa1-20)  [...] filed its Answer on June 14, 2024.  (Pa21-34)  As part of its Answer, [...] also made a demand for an Affidavit of Merit under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  (Id.)  Plaintiff served two Affidavits of Merit authored by [...] and [...].  (Pa42-43; Pa58)  \(^{1}\)  See, N.J.A.C. 10:37F-1.3 (defining “Partial care" as “an individualized, outcome-oriented mental health service, which provides a comprehensive, structured, *non-residential*, interdisciplinary treatment and psychiatric rehabilitation program in a community setting to assist consumers who have serious mental illness in increasing or maximizing independence and community living skills and enhancing the quality of their lives.
[directive] a.  An individual's name, title, position, salary, payroll record, length of service in the instrumentality of government and in the government, date of separation from government service and the reason therefor; and the amount and type of pension he is receiving; b.  Data contained in information which disclose conformity with specific experimental, educational or medical qualifications required for government employment or for receipt of a public pension, but in no event shall detailed medical or psychological information be released.  3.  This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
[brief] As the parties stipulated, visually and in the eyes of the voter, once they filled out the ballot, it would have looked along the following lines:  | OFFICE TITLE | COLUMN A | PERSONAL CHOICE | |--------------|----------|-----------------| | | [...] | WRITE -IN CIRZ | | FOR MEMBERSHIP TO THE BOARD OF FIRE COMMISSIONERS  THREE Year Term (Vote for TWO)  | [...] | WRITE-IN GOLDEN | | | [...] | | | | [...] | | (2T26:22-28:14; Pa1).8  Given this understanding, there should be no doubt as to who the voter was trying to vote for, and that clear intent should carry the day.
[brief] Id. at 149 (quoting Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J. 389, 404 (2001) (quoting Office of the Governor, News Release 1 (June 29, 1995))).  The purpose is to weed out frivolous lawsuits early in the litigation while, at the same time, ensuring plaintiffs with meritorious claims will have their day in court.  Ferreira at 150–51 (quoting Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 395 (2001) (also citing Palanque at 404, stating that the legislature intended “to curtail frivolous litigation without preventing access to the courts for meritorious claims”) (also citing Galik v. Clara Maass Medical Center, 167 N.J. 341, 359 (2001), stating “there is no legislative interest in barring meritorious claims brought in good faith”).  The Legislative purpose was not to “create a minefield of hyper-technicalities in order to doom innocent litigants possessing meritorious claims. ”  Ferreira at 151 (quoting Mayfield v. Community Med. Assocs., P.A., 335 N.J. Super. 198, 209 (App. Div. 2000).  Having provided this Court with the New Jersey Legislature’s purpose for enacting the Affidavit of Merit Statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27, Plaintiff now turns to the pertinent text of the statute as it applies to these circumstances.
[brief] The tenants filed a third-party action alleging legal malpractice by their attorney and the attorney for the landlords.  In the course of the dispute, the question of whether the attorneys should have conducted a title search prior to the tenants entering the lease became an issue between competing legal experts for the respective parties.  The trial judge granted summary judgment on the malpractice claim based on his personal experience as a lawyer that such a title search was never conducted.
[brief] State v. Jackmon, 305 N.J. Super. 274, 299 App. Div. 1997) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Sette, 259 N.J. Super. 156, 190-91 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 597, 617 (1992)), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 49 (1998).  "[T]he key to finding harmless error in such cases is the isolated nature of the transgression and the fact that a correct definition of the law on the same charge is found elsewhere in the court's instructions."  Ibid.  For example, in State v. Smith, a panel of this Court concluded that the judge "fully and accurately instructed the jury on the elements of attempt" even though the instruction was given "during an explanation of the law relating to another offense."  322 N.J. Super. 385, 399 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 489 (1999).  This Court held that, based on the defendant's testimony, the overwhelming evidence that established his guilt, and the "appearance elsewhere in the jury instructions of a proper charge[,] . . . the failure to define attempt in the robbery charge did not prejudice defendant's rights."
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS0F0F ...........................................................................  2  1.  Factual History of the Election .........................................................................................  2  2.  Procedural History of the Lawsuit .......................................................................................  4  STANDARD OF REVIEW .....................................................................................................  5  1.  Legal Questions by the Trial Court Require De Novo Review .................................  5  2.  Factual Findings by the Trial Court Require Deference ............................................  6  3.  Election Contests  Warrant Special Considerations .....................................................  6  LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................
[brief] The Defendant’s actions go beyond “harsh” or “unkind,” as defense counsel suggests.  According to the defendant’s own evidence, [...] is a “couch potato” and very calm.  The State cannot think of one scenario in which the Defendant would have to kick, drag, and closed fist punch a dog that is so calm she is characterized as a “couch potato. ”  This goes well beyond the bounds of needing to correct a dog’s behavior.  Defendant also argues that the trial judge did not give the jury examples of what acts are and are not cruel.  (Db8).  Defendant further contend that the State failed to show injury to the dog, or that the defendant acted cruelly, suggesting the State needs to show something more than that the act of punching, kicking, or dragging took place.  This is incorrect.  The court is not required to give examples to the jury of what is cruel and what is not.  Defendant has cited to no case law or statute that requires a judge to do so.  Additionally, the statute and the model jury charge for N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1) do not require the State to show injury, nor do they require the State to show that there was more than kicking, punching and or dragging.  The State showed sufficient evidence to the jury to convict the Defendant of animal cruelty based on common sense and legal doctrine.  Based on the above, Defendant’s jury charge as sound, his conviction is valid, and this Court should affirm.
[brief] The “SAC” was filed on June 25, 2020, as part of Plaintiff’s “motion to file or amend complaint. ” (Da031; Transaction ID: [...]).  Both the [...] and State Defendants opposed this motion.  (Da031-32; Transaction ID: [...]; [...]).  Plaintiff received numerous extensions of time to file a reply.  (Da--).  Oral argument was held on April 5, 2011, and an Order denying Plaintiff’s motion was issued on April 5, 2021.  (Da032-33; Transaction ID: [...]; [...]).  Indeed, [...]’s detailed analysis in her April 1, 2021, oral decision, set forth the reasoning as to why the “SAC” (Pa9-18) was an insufficient pleading.  (4/1/21 Transcript @ T29:22 to T59:13).  It should be noted that [...] agreed with [...]’s reasoning.  (5/25/23 Transcript @ T50:6 to T54:10).  Thus, the “SAC” could not have been the operative complaint.  Furthermore, as set forth above in the Statement of Facts, Plaintiff did not object when [...] specifically asked Plaintiff’s counsel and counsel for the [...] Defendants.  When asked, Plaintiff’s counsel responded that [...]’s conclusion.  Thus, Plaintiff cannot now raise this issue.  Finally, the “revised SAC” (Pa259-312) certainly cannot be the operative pleading for the underlying Superior Court action because it was only first filed as part of Plaintiff’s initial appeal and was only later filed with Trial Court on as part of Plaintiff’s motion to amend filed on May 3, 2023, in defiance of [...]’s 2021 Order denying Plaintiff leave to file another motion to amend.  (D035, Transaction ID: [...]).  Indeed, Plaintiff admits the “revised SAC” was drafted in response to “[...]’s critiques” (Pb20) and that it has not been subject to “review” by a Judge (Pb45).  Therefore, the “revised SAC” could not have been the operative complaint.  As such, the only possible pleading that could have been the operative complaint and the subject of [...]’s dismissal Orders of May 30, 2023, and July 10, 2023, is the Fifth Amended Complaint (Da293-358).
[directive] This LY Guidelines Seized and Forfeited Property Chapter for I EQUITABLE SHARING FORFEITED PROPERTY WITH OF FEDERAL, AGENCIES  STATE LOCAL AND Treasury has the authority to transfer forfeited cash, property, and sales proceeds of forfeited property to federal, state and local law enforcement agencies that participated in a seizure and forfeiture action.  Requests for equitable sharing shall be filed on a Treasury Form TDF 92-22.46 (Request for Transfer of Property SeizedEorfeited by a Treasury Agency).
[brief] C.  FORMAL NOTICE OF CANCELLATION WAS REQUIRED BY STATUTE, REGULATION, AND COMMON LAW, AND WAS NOT PROVIDED TO [...]  Most critically, [...] and [...], like the trial court, remarkably disregard long-established New Jersey law in an attempt to support the dubious proposition that they need not comply with any legal requirements of formal notice of cancellation of one of their insureds’ insurance under the CCIP Policy, necessarily conceding they did not provide this formal notice.
[brief] [...] describes [...] as the Administrator of the DEP Office of Labor Relations.  (Pa246).  [...] faults [...] for discussing or issuing disciplinary charges as the head of employee relations.  (Pa466).  [...] served [...] with the notice of a two-day discipline in December 2015 for planning a public speech at an AWWA conference without getting prior DEP approval.  (Pa254).  The issue of the two-day discipline was resolved after plaintiff retired on May 1, 2016, and resulted in a one-day suspension.  (Pa310; Pa338).  [...]
[brief] The inspector was a professional engineer acting in that capacity at all relevant times.  This inspector’s only task was to confirm that the contractors were following the construction plans.  When [...]’s inspector was on-site, he did not actively inspect the alleged accident location as it was not part of the Project.  Despite [...]’s tenuous connection to the Project and the accident site, Plaintiffs allege that [...] had a universal, affirmative duty to inspect the entire roadway for pre-existing conditions, and failed to properly exercise this duty.
[brief] Appellant, again after the fact, also alleges (this time in an amended Complaint) she was somehow disabled during her employment and that Respondent should have accommodated her by allowing her to work from home.  The only problem—she wasn’t disabled under applicable law, never previously mentioned to anyone associated with the Respondent the existence of any disability, and never requested any assistance or accommodation from Respondent for her now alleged supposed disabilities.  Only years later in her amended Complaint does Appellant allege for the first time, without any supporting medical documentation, that she was disabled because she was obese, had high blood pressure, and was suffering from a generalized anxiety disorder.  Even given the two years this matter was before the lower court, Appellant could not produce a single document demonstrating the existence of any of her alleged conditions.  With respect to her allegations she suffers from a generalized anxiety disorder, Appellant points to fragments of informal off color conversations exchanged between her and a group of her coworkers that casually included the word “anxiety”.  That is it.  Nothing more.  Why?  She wasn’t suffering from any sort of disabling generalized anxiety disorder.  No doctor says she was.  She also acknowledges she wasn’t under any medical care for any form of anxiety at the time of her termination.  Not only that, she even certified to Respondent’s insurance carrier upon hire that she did not have any mental or nervous disorders (or high blood pressure for that matter- another condition she references after the fact, even though similarly she wasn’t under any medical care for the same).  As for her obesity, Appellant’s obesity is not a question of fact.  Appellant was not thin when she was hired by Respondent.  Nor was she thin at any time during her employment with Respondent.  Indeed, she has been overweight since childhood.  But she also was not disabled.  Appellant never mentioned even once to her supervisors that she had a purported disability.  Appellant admits that she was not undergoing any medical care for ANY condition in the run up to her demand to work from home.  In short, Appellant is heavy.  Respondent concedes that fact.  But her body shape was not a disability.  She never said she was disabled.  No medical professional said she was disabled.  To hold Respondent legally liable for not acquiescing to Appellant’s and her colleagues’ demand (none of whom alleged or mentioned a “disability” in their collective demand letter) to work from home prior to the government lockdown would be an extreme injustice.
[brief] The jury answered the following interrogatories.  A.  Negligence Claims:  1)  Has the Plaintiff proven by a preponderance of the evidence that [...] deviated from the accepted standard of care applicable to a long term care Facility?  (Pa87.)  The jury responded “Yes” to this question, with one of the eight jurors voting “No”.  (See ibid.)  2)  Has the plaintiff proven by a preponderance of the evidence that [...]’s deviation from the accepted standard of care applicable to a long term care facility was a proximate cause of [...]’s damages and death?  (Ibid.)  The jury unanimously responded “No” to this question.  (See ibid.)  3)  Has the Plaintiff proven by a preponderance of the evidence that [...]’s nursing staff deviated from the accepted standard of care applicable to nurses?  (Pa88.)  The jury answered this question “No”, with one juror answering “Yes”.  (See ibid.)  Based on the “No” responses to questions 2 and 3, the jury did not answer questions 4 and 5, relating to proximate cause and damages.  (See ibid.)
[brief] The Court directed the trial court to: (1) determine Plaintiffs’ non-RICO and RICO damages based on the appropriate statute of limitations periods; (2) reconsider whether any party was entitled to punitive damages and, if so, the amounts; and (3) reconsider attorneys’ fees and allow attorneys’ fees only for Plaintiffs’ pursuit of their RICO claims within the relevant statute of limitations period.  The trial court was to be guided by the directives of this Court.
[brief] com/press-releases/new-sailpoint-survey-exposes-concerning-generational-differences-regarding-corporate-email-use-and-cybersecurity-posture/. revealing emails to strangers they will never know. \(^8\)  The more copies of this valuable or private data that is distributed widely, the more chances there are for it to be accessed without authorization, or in the present age of hacking, simply stolen.  Keyword hits and relevance “are not synonymous. ”  *Youngevity Int’l Corp. v. Smith*, No. 16CV00704, 2017 WL 6541106 at *10 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017).
[brief] The following pleadings done by the appellant reveal, prima facie:  “Your Honor, I sought recusal.  And the fact that you have scheduled two motions together for a hearing, it appears that you have already decided the recusal,” (2T3, 22-25).  “Your Honor, I have sought recusal and stay in separating these two cases, but it appears that the cases are adjoined.  I respectfully object at that, and I seek these two cases to be separated.  Can you grant me that?  THE COURT: “I’m hearing both motions today,” (2T8, 19-24).
[brief] [...] testified that she believed the email describing [...]’s behavior as becoming “calmer” referenced the fact that he “would kind of act up when he did not want to be collected again… .” (Pa844a-Pa845a).  On October 11, 2017, [...] sent [...] an email stating that [...] “was good to collect again this morning, he seems back to himself and refreshed after his little break. ” (Pa1068a).
[brief] See *Paragon Contractors, Inc. v. Peachtree Condominium Association*, 202 N.J. 415, 419 (2010).  The New Jersey Supreme Court held in *Paragon* that “lawyers and litigants should understand that, going forward, a reliance on the scheduling of a Ferreira conference to avoid the strictures of the Affidavit of Merit Statute is entirely unwarranted and will not serve to toll the statutory time frames. ”  *Id.* at 426.  Thus, Appellants’ argument that the absence of a Ferreira conference somehow relieved them of filing an affidavit of merit is absolutely unfounded.  Appellants also improperly look to the case of *A.T. v. Cohen*, 231 N.J. 337 (2017) in furtherance of their claim to an exemption.
[brief] Tellingly, the Respondents self-interest in asserting NJLAD claims is found in their own arguments that outright suggest that the low to moderate income housing units would only go to racial minorities.  Respondents argue unironically: “as the owners of property designed to assist the Township in meeting its constitutional affordable housing obligations, Plaintiffs have clear standing to maintain this claim on behalf of racial minorities and families who will occupy the housing units in the planned development on the Subject Property. ”  Pb73.  Respondents equate low to moderate income housing with racial minorities directly.  This is not only absurd, but also in and of itself, discriminatory.
[brief] ...........................................  11  A.  The Court Decides Whether An Enforceable Arbitration Clause Exists (Pa1-Pa16) ..................................................  14  B.  This One-Sided Arbitration Clause Is Not Enforceable (Pa1-Pa16) .......................................................................  16  POINT II  THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE ONE-SIDED ARBITRATION AGREEMENT; AND IN ITS DISCUSSIONS OF SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL UNCONSCIONABILITY  [Raised Below at Pa 67-72; Decided at Pa1-16]  ...........................................  18  A.  The Law Division Erred by Ruling On Procedural Unconscionability Without Authorizing Discovery or Conducting a Hearing (Pa1-Pa16)  ..................................................  21  B.  The Law Division’s Ruling Concerning Substantive Unconscionability Was In Error (Pa1-Pa16)  ...........................................  22 CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................
[brief] In resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court determines whether the well-pleaded factual allegations in the Complaint suggest that the Appellant has a viable cause of action.  *Michel v. New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co.*, 2018 WL 5985985, at *2 (App. Div. Nov. 15, 2018).  However, “conclusory allegations” are not entitled to the presumption of truth and are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.  *Id.*  “In evaluating motions to dismiss, courts consider allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim. ”  *Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi*, 184 N.J. 161, 183 (2005) (citations and quotations omitted.).  Where a “complaint states no basis for relief and . . . discovery would not provide one, dismissal of the complaint [under Rule 4:6–2] is appropriate. ”  Cnty. of Warren v. State, 409 N.J. Super. 495, 503 (App. Div. 2009).  B.
[brief] [...] therefore has clearly failed to meet its heavy burden to establish that the Award should be vacated or modified, and the Court should accordingly deny [...]’s appeal in full and affirm the Trial Court’s June 12 Orders.  And finally, [...]’s proposed counterclaim is a blatantly transparent (and impermissible) attempt to further stall [...]’s collection efforts with respect to the Award and should not be permitted into this summary action.
[brief] Ironically [...] had recused herself from my case on 1/25/19.  The [...] violated my constitutional rights specifically the US 1st, 4th, and 14th Amendments.  On 9/23/19 the [...] wrote me a letter that they did not examine any documents that parties recorded in the Hall of Records because they assumed that parties had examined them before recording (125a).  On 3/29/20 my Expert Witness notarized his Affidavit about the mortgage documents submitted by [...] in the Foreclosure Court.  [...] pleaded in his affidavit that the assignments of 2/27/2009 (065a) and 2/28/2014 (097a) transferred no value from [...] to [...] or [...]; and the unauthenticated copy of the alleged Note (091a) was worthless.  On 1/13/22, based on the four forged mortgage documents submitted by [...] the [...] granted Writ of Execution to [...] and sent it to the [...] for sheriff sale.
[brief] The Defendants advertised what the prizes were.  100% of the advertised prizes were paid out.  Every penny that was in that ad was paid out.  Pa18.  The Plaintiff does not claim the ad induced him into playing.  He does not say that if he knew of the particular rule in question, he would not have played in the tournament.  Pa4-6.  The prizes or the rule in question were not on his mind when he entered the tournament.  There is no such evidence in the record.  He had a very good and unusual result.  The Plaintiff was obviously surprised by his performance in the tournament.  In his own words “I ended up with an amazing result. ”  Pa4.  The Defendants paid him what they owed him that night.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT OVERLOOKED THAT THE APPELLANT HAD THREE SEPARATE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE CAUSES OF ACTIONS, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OF WHICH WAS NOT EXHAUSTED. **  Appellant’s complaint rested on the following causes of action (“CoA”):  **CoA No.1:**  RESPONDENTS HAD IGNORED APPELLANT’S INDEPENDENT REQUEST FOR A HANDICAPPED PARKING SPACE AT HIS STREET FRONT.
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