ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] New Jersey Judiciary Perguntas Adicionais para Determinados Crimes  Sexuais 1o (preencher se o crime ocorreu a partir de de dezembro de 1998)  Additional Questions for Certain Sexual Offenses (Portuguese) (Use if committed on or after December 1, 1998)  Você deverá responder a estas perguntas se estiver se declarando culpado pelo crime ou qualquer tentativa de cometer os crimes de agressão sexual qualificada, agressão sexual, contato sexual criminal qualificado, sequestro segundo os termos da lei 2C:13-1c(2), por colocar em risco o bem-estar de um menor com conduta sexual que prejudique ou corrompa a moral do menor segundo os termos da lei 2C:24-4a, por colocar em risco o bem-estar de um menor segundo os termos da lei 2C:24-4b(4), colocar em risco o bem-estar do menor nos termos da lei 2C:24-4b(5) (se o crime ocorreu no dia 1º de fevereiro de 2018 ou após esta data) ou líder de rede de pornografia infantil nos termos da lei 2C:24-4.1 (se o crime ocorreu no dia 1º de fevereiro de 2018 ou após esta data).  These additional questions need to be answered if you are pleading guilty to the offense of or any attempt to commit the offense of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping under 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child under 2C:24-4a, endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(4), endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5) (if the offense was committed on or after 2C:24-4.1 (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, February 1, 2018), or leader of a child pornography network pursuant to 2018)
[brief] \(^9\)  Plaintiff has, to date, never provided any response to this argument, either before the trial court or in the initial brief.  Finally, Plaintiff’s argument on the issue of “defect” repeatedly emphasizes the issue of “causation”—that [...] and [...] would have allegedly prevented the crash.  Pb14, 16, 20-21.  But defect and causation are two separate elements, and the trial court did not reach the issue of causation because Plaintiff’s claim failed on the threshold issue of defect.  II.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .........................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY; STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................3  A.  The First Mortgage .................................................................................................3  B. Bankruptcy Proceeding, Second/Later Mortgage ....................................................4  C.  Foreclosure Action ..................................................................................................4  LEGAL ARGUMENT .....................................................................................................6  POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT  CORRECTLY GRANTED DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE ..............................6
[brief] Likewise, the court’s permitting of Plaintiff to question Defendants regarding their April 2018 services and storm further compounded and amplified the aggregate effect of the court’s errors.  As mentioned above, this entire line of questioning was intended to only poison the jury against [...] since their handling of a later snow event had absolutely no bearing on how [...] performed on the date of loss.  There is no probative value and Plaintiff simply wanted to impress upon the jury that both [...] and [...] were dissatisfied with [...] in hopes of having this pejorative view of [...] taint how the jury perceived [...]’s performance on the date of loss.  Obviously, poisoning a jury against Defendants makes it virtually impossible for the jury to be impartial, thus rendering the trial unfair.
[brief] THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS NOT PLENARY WITH REGARD TO THE ENTIRE LOWER COURT RULING  Appellant takes the position that this court’s review of the lower court’s decisions is *de novo*.  While questions on appeal as to statutory interpretation may require plenary review, Appellant ignores the breadth of the ruling below.  The Court did interpret N.J.S.A. 3B:17-2 and R. 4:87-1 as permissive, not mandatory, but the Court’s ruling did not end there.  The Hon. [...], J.S.C. found that even if an accounting was required, [...] had already provided sufficient information and documents to constitute such accounting.  1T16:25-1T17:3; 1T18:6-1T18:9.  Review of that part of the decision should give deference to [...]’s factual findings and determinations as to credibility.  *Rova Farms Resort, Inc v Investors Ins. Co.*, 65 NJ 474, 483-84 (1974).  The Appellate Court has held that it does “not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice," *Fagliarone v. Twp. of No. Bergen*, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963).  Appellant has made no showing that the lower court’s finding that [...] provided Appellant with sufficient information to constitute an informal accounting was “manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice”.
[directive] b.  For the purposes of this Executive Directive, a "stationhouse adjustment" would ordinarily entail warning the juvenile about the future consequences of his or her continued delinquent activity, and notifying the juvenile's parent(s) or guardians about the matter.  Where a "stationhouse adjustment" is used to resolve a minor juvenile matter, the law enforcement agency should keep a record of the identity of the juvenile and the date and nature of the offense involved, consistent with recommended recordkeeping procedures to be developed by the [...] in consultation with the [...].  These recommended procedures shall be designed to minimize any additional administrative burdens upon law enforcement agencies and officers.  The [...] and the [...] shall provide ongoing technical assistance and guidance to law enforcement agencies in the appropriate use of "stationhouse adjustments."  PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE EXERCISE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
[brief] For these reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court grant the State’s motion for leave to appeal and reverse the trial court’s order suppressing the statements defendant made during phone calls to his parents.  Respectfully submitted, [...] ACTING [...] BY: S/NARLINE  CASIMIR NARLINE  CASIMIR SDAG/AAP  Attorney ID 047572013  DATED: September 20, 2024 November 21, 2024
[brief] (RAISED BELOW, PA307-08; PA310; PA313-14; PA316).  A conflict may be waived provided a lawyer gives “each affected client [] informed consent, confirmed in writing, after full disclosure and consultation,” which includes “an explanation of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved. ”  RPC 1.7(b)(1)  The trial court found that “all the defendants assert that they have signed [an] informed consent waiver to any potential conflicts of interest” and that they “have been properly informed by their attorneys of the potential risks involved with multi-defendant representation. ”  Pa310; Pa316.  That holding lacks record support and misapplies the law of informed consent.  Initially, the informed consent waivers purportedly signed by defendants are not part of the record; defendants refused to produce them claiming, without legal support, attorney-client privilege.  Pa317-318.  Although defendants offered the trial court an opportunity to review the written waivers in camera, it declined that invitation, and decided the waivers were sufficient without ever having seen them.  See Brazza v. Kagen, A-1991-21, 2023 WL 4418263, at *3 (App. Div. July 10, 2023) (noting that judge was not satisfied the estate received full disclosure and since plaintiff failed to provide the waiver, appointed independent counsel to explain implications to the client) (Pa397-398).  Absent the waivers, the trial court relied on certifications submitted by three of the ten individual defendants ([...], [...], and [...]) that illustrate the inadequacy of the informed consent.  The certifications speak in generalities, without any indication as to what risks and dangers of the dual representation were discussed, the extent to which counsel’s activities may be compromised by a conflict, the benefits of having independent counsel, waiver of confidentiality, or the effect of a potential disagreement between the parties relating to the joint representation.  See, e.g., State v. Sheika, 337 N.J. Super. 228, 248 (App. Div. 2001) (stating that attorney should apprise the client of “the potential problems and pitfalls pertaining to the potential conflict”); Advisory Comm. Op. 679 (1995) (observing that consultation should “include an explanation of the implications of the proposed representation, including both its risks and advantages”); Advisory Comm. Op. 509 (1983) (stating that the lawyer disclose to both clients the possible effect of the conflict on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each); Michels & Hockenjoss, New Jersey Attorney Ethics, § 26.5 (2024) (listing examples of written disclosures).
[brief] This Court may think that the trial judge’s impression that the matter had federal jurisdiction prevented him from involvement, but that thinking shall be wrong, because the trial judge reminded unfazed after he was presented through reconsideration the [...]’s November 13, 2023 letter, which plainly stated that his court (local courts) had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter (Pa54).  You see__ the aforesaid conviction by the trial judge about viable and pending [...] compromise at work, defied the July 14, 2020 [...] letter, which stated that [...] had referred the case to the [...] back in 2020, relinquishing its involvement over the matter (Pa37).  In a nutshell__ on October 20, 2023 when the trial judge granted the respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (disposing of the appellant’s case), contrary to --- \(^1\)  Papers filed by respondents in alleging the existence of such compromise were about 4 years old.  These were the 2020 papers drafted by respondents and presented to [...], in response to attempts by [...] to “conciliate” the matter during its 100 days time window under Title VIII.  Yet the judge believed about ongoing comprise and terms thereof.
[brief] Of course, analysis of legislative history is only necessary when the legislative intent, as expressed through the plain language is ambiguous; otherwise, the plain language is applied and a court need go no further.  See, e.g., Matter of H.D., 241 N.J. 412, 418 (2020).  [...] offers no plausible explanation that justifies an examination of the legislative history, other than application of the plain language creates a result that it does not like.  But even when the legislative history is considered, the facts presented do not line up to justify a departure from the rule that requires the application to be submitted and complete before the new regulations take effect.  Instead, the legislative history highlights the unfairness of the prior regime, where a municipality could, as occurred in Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Committee of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995), amend its zoning ordinance to prohibit a use in the middle of hearings on an application for that use (i.e., before the otherwise applicable statutory protections set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-49(a) that insulate a preliminary site plan or subdivision from changes in zoning for three years).
[brief] The disclosure clarifies in unmistakable terms that the debt cannot be enforced.  T28-29; Appx., at 9a (“The law limits how long a consumer can be [sued] on a debt. ”).  In any event, because an expired debt is not extinguished, leaving a moral obligation to pay, it is not inaccurate or misleading to state that the consumer could take advantage of “savings” by accepting one of the payment plan offers in the letter, instead of paying the full account balance.
[brief] Date Submitted: August 2, 2024  [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  [...] [...]  Attorney for Respondents  [...] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS | 3 | | A. The School Funding Reform Act of 2008 | 3 | | B. The [...] | 4 | | 1.  The District’s Financial Condition and SFRA Funding | 5 | | 2.  The State’s Monitoring of the District | 6 | | C.  The July 7, 2014 Petition of Appeal | 8 | | D.  The March 1, 2021 Initial Decision | 9 | | E.  The July 26, 2021 Final Agency Decision | 10 | | F.  The Appellate Division’s March 6, 2023 Decision | 11 | | G.  The Comprehensive Review of the District | 11 | | 1.  Governance | 12 | | 2.  Curriculum and Instruction | 18 | | 3.  Special Education | 21 | | 4.  Financial Practices | 24 | | 5.  Transportation | 24 | | H.  The April 1, 2024 Final Agency Decision | 27 |  ARGUMENT  THE SCHOOL FUNDING REFORM ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO THE LAKEWOOD PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT ..................................................................................29  A.  The District’s Ineffective Policies and Extreme Mismanagement Are a Root Cause of Its Inability to Provide T&E .................................................................................................................  34  B.  The District Has Failed to Take Steps to Reduce Its Special Education Costs .................................................................................................................................  42  C.  The District Has Severely Mismanaged Its Transportation Responsibilities, Resulting in Inflated Costs .................................................................................. 46  CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................................................  50  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES  Abbott v. Burke (Abbott I), 100 N.J. 269 (1985) .........................................................................................................................32, 33 Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 119 N.J. 287 (1990) ..........................................................................................................................
[brief] This supplemental point does not challenge whether some expert, such as a software engineer from [...], could be sufficiently qualified to testify about GPS and health activity data obtained from an iPhone.  Rather, the issue is whether lay testimony about such data is permissible. testify to its authenticity and be cross-examined on the methodology of the map’s creation and its margin of error. ”  *State v. Wilson*, 227 N.J. 534, 553, (2017).  New Jersey appellate courts have not yet addressed the issue of whether a lay witness is permitted to testify about GPS location or health activity data obtained from a cell phone.
[brief] To begin, a review of the language of the deed itself precludes any conclusion that Richard intended to transfer the property to his brother or otherwise deceive him:  “[...], the Grantor herein, is the same person as [...].  The Within Deed Correctory deed executed and recorded in order to vest title in the Grantee’s proper name. ” (Da343).  The Affidavit of Consideration states: “Correctory Deed executed to vest title in the Grantee under his correct name for which no consideration was paid. ” (Da344).  Additionally, the deed contained signature blocks for both [...] and [...].  Id.  With respect to the [...] signature, Richard concedes that he signed the name [...] pursuant to the advice and guidance of his attorney, [...], Esq. 3T61-62.  No evidence was adduced at trial to establish that [...] a/k/a [...] personally signed the deed. \(^5\)  Rather, [...] was neither present when the December 1998 Deed was signed or otherwise made aware that Richard had the deed drawn up by his attorney.  (3T57-58; 3T63:18-21, January 9, 2023).  In short, the December 1998 Deed was not a deed intended to transfer title.
[brief] B.  The trial court exceeded its authority in vacating the arbitration award due to a perceived mistake of law.  The trial court exceeded its authority in vacating the attorneys’ fees award.  The trial court’s reliance on *In re Estate of Lash*, and indeed, its analysis as a whole, was in error.  *Lash* involved a claim for attorneys’ fees brought *in court*, not arbitration.  Here, the trial court decided the issue as if it too were raised in court—not before an arbitrator—and applied the standard a court is required apply in deciding whether a party is entitled to attorneys’ fees.  But See *Tretina*, 396 N.J. Super. at 353 (“arbitrators have no obligation to follow principles of law which would govern an action in a court of law. ”) (internal citation omitted).  The trial court exceeded its role, which should have been to analyze the Arbitrator’s decision against the grounds for vacatur set forth in the NJAA, and vacate the award only if the enumerated statutory grounds permitted it to do so.
[brief] ([...] Tr. 36:3-5; 46:1 to 47:23, 177:22 to 178:16; Da287).  9.  Plaintiff inappropriately responded to *multiple students on separate occasions*, wherein she told the students she "didn't sleep" with them, and acknowledged that she wrote that she told a student "I don't know who [you] slept with last night" in that student's discipline report, which is viewable to the parent and stays on the child's record so a college could see it.  Plaintiff received a verbal warning for same.  ([...] Tr. 36:10 to 37:5; 39:20 to 41:2; 175:1 to 176:25; Da297, 301).
[brief] Defendants for the first time asks the appellate Court to grant Summary Judgment alleging that plaintiff did not respond to their statement of material facts, although plaintiff responded to all defendants.  (Pa480-Pa484).  An appellate court ordinarily will not consider issues that were not presented to the trial court, Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973), and an appellate court should be even more hesitant to raise an issue sua sponte that the parties have not had an opportunity to address, See Robbiani v. Burke, 77 N.J. 383, 395 (1978).  More significantly, in Leang v [...], the Appellate Division said that a respondent’s failure to comply with R. 4:46-2(b) will not justify a grant of the motion based on the assumption that the movants’ statement of material facts is true when the record as a whole clearly shows a material dispute.  Id at 399 NJ Super 329, 356-357 (App. Div 2008).  Defendants’ facts were not sufficiently supported, and the records as a whole showed a material dispute.
[brief] Order granting Summary Judgment and dismissing the Plaintiff/Appellants’ Complaint, dated March 31, 2023  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da88  Transcript dated March 31, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1T  Order denying Plaintiff/Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration dated July 3, 2023 . . . . . . . . . .  Da48–Da58 #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] The Standard of Review and Canons of Construction  The Court reviews the interpretation of a Settlement Agreement *de novo*.  *Kieffer v. Best Buy*, 205 N.J. 213, 222-23 (2011) (“The interpretation of a contract is subject to de novo review by an appellate court. ”); *In re Est. of Balk*, 445 N.J. Super. 395, 399-400 (App. Div. 2016) (noting that a settlement agreement is a contract, subject to the “ordinary principles of contract law” and is reviewed *de novo*).  The Court “pay[s] no special deference to the trial court’s interpretation” of a contract and should “look at the contract with fresh eyes. ”  *Kieffer*, 205 N.J. at 223; see also *Balk*, 445 N.J. Super. at 400.  The primary intent of a court reviewing a contract is to give effect to the parties’ expressed intent.  *Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Am. Med. Plumbing, Inc.*, 458 N.J. Super. 535, 539-40 (App. Div. 2019) (“[I]t is not the real intent but the intent expressed or apparent in the writing that controls. ”) (quotation omitted); *C.L. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs.*, 473 N.J. Super. 591, 599 (App. Div. 2022) (noting if the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous then there is “no room for construction” and it must be enforced as written) (internal quotation omitted).  A court must “strive to give effect to ‘all parts of the writing and every word of it,’ to the extent possible. ”  Id. (quoting Washington Constr. Co. v. Spinella, 8 N.J. 212, 217 (1951)).  The Probate Court violated this principle by grafting an unexpressed limitation onto Paragraph 24(G) that limited its application, despite a reasonable reading that gave full effect to all terms.
[brief] On January 19, 2024, the Arbitrator issued a preliminary award in which he ignored the explicit terms of the PTA, imposed extra-contractual obligations on [...] concerning the Installment Payments, mis-transcribed certain projects’ EPGs from documents upon which he claimed to have relied, and miscalculated the interest owed on any supposedly overdue payments.  Even after extensive motion practice resulting in some corrections, the final iteration of the Award still contains several computational and form errors.  [...] moved (prematurely) to confirm the Award in the Trial Court and [...] cross-moved to vacate or modify the Award.  [...] also sought to assert a counterclaim for setoff against the Award for the amounts [...] owes [...] as its subcontractor on project called the Hackensack Project, because [...], as an inoperative entity, will be unable to pay the judgment [...] will eventually obtain in that arbitration, which is currently ongoing (the “Hackensack Arbitration”).  On June 12, 2024, by way of three separate Orders, the Trial Court improperly affirmed the Award, denying [...]’s motion to vacate, motion to modify, and motion for leave to assert a counterclaim for setoff.
[brief] Exhibit F - Excerpts of an insurance policy issued by defendant [...] to [...]………………Dta176  Exhibit G - Excerpts of [...]’s CCIP Manual for the [...]…………………………………………………..Dta507  Exhibit H - Certificate of insurance issued to [...]……………………Dta824  Exhibit I - Deposition of [...]……………………………Dta828  Exhibit J - Excerpts of deposition of [...]………………Dta862  Exhibit K - Excerpts of [...] policy issued to [...]………………Dta234  Exhibit L - Excerpts of forms evidencing [...]’s enrollment in the contractor controlled insurance program (“CCIP”) for the project………………………………………………………Dta886