ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] She thought police would have “assumed that it wasn’t an accident” because of the bruises and “thought that we beat him” to death, which would have resulted in them both being arrested and losing custody of [...].  (Da 49).  She told her sister, “[W]hen I saw baby D like that in his bed, I immediately left.  All of, all rationality, all common sense, all everything left. ” (Da 51).  The State also introduced a call between [...] and [...], in which she said she was hurt that he had not contacted her after her arrest.
[brief] [...]’s continued assertion that [...]’s equity was based upon the Unit’s appraised fair market value is inaccurate.  Of further note, even if the Unit’s appraised value was used to determine [...]’s equity (it was not), [...] did not submit any competing appraisal from a licensed appraiser challenging [...]’s appraisal.  [...] also does not refute the specific sums adopted by the Court to determine [...]’s equity in the Unit.
[brief] “[T]he phrase ‘any and all’ [in a settlement release] allows for no exception. ”  *Isetts v. Borough of Roseland*, 364 N.J. Super. 247, 256 (App. Div. 2003).  In the absence of fraud, misrepresentation or overreaching by the releasee, in the absence of a showing that the releasor was suffering from an incapacity affecting his ability to understand the meaning of the release and in the absence of any other equitable ground, it is the law of this State that the release is binding and that the releasor will be held to the terms of the bargain he willingly and knowingly entered.
[brief] [...] even acted in the capacity of [...]’s mentor and, yet, [...] filed a lawsuit against him.  \(^2\)  [...] and his father, Peter [...] Sr., are principals of [...].  \(^3\)  The matters have since been consolidated in the law division under docket number [...]. per month, Respondents defaulted on the loans and, apparently, never had an intention of making [...] whole for the monies loaned despite their assurances that the amounts would be paid back.
[brief] (Pa232 at ¶8).  Again, it is important to remember, there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that the log at issue would have provided any information on whether the lights malfunctioned.  The evidence explains that the TMS is a “scheduling” system that “schedules” the cue for the lights to dim.  However, there is nothing to suggest it provides definitive evidence as to whether the lights responded to the cue.  Further, in light of the simple fact that there were aisle lights and step lights which provided adequate visual cues for someone walking in the auditorium, whether the TMS system contained any information about the lights, becomes completely irrelevant.
[brief] The record in this case provides ample evidence that the State’s effort to impose on [...] a far greater share of the financial burden of providing its public school students with T&E is ill-founded.  After all, as of the 2010 U.S. census, [...] had the 555\(^{th}\) lowest per capita income of New Jersey’s 564 municipalities--$16,430, compared to the state’s $34,858.  (Pa261).  This court also may judicially notice that the estimates for the 2023 U.S. census show [...] Township’s median household income is $59,054, with 4.29 persons per household, and 25.4% of its total population lives in poverty.  When the area of the Township dominated by retirement communities is excluded, the median  The main statutory vehicle for assuring that SFRA provides the funding for every district to provide T&E to its students is the “Adequacy Budget,” which has been characterized by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Abbott XX as the “core” of SFRA’s formula.
[brief] Furthermore, medical malpractice cases require extensive discovery due to the complexity of medical treatment and records involved in such cases.  Discovery in a medical malpractice case typically involves obtaining medical records, interviewing witnesses, and consulting with medical experts to evaluate the standard of care provided by the defendant healthcare provider.  Additionally, given that medical treatment is an ongoing process, it is often difficult to anticipate with absolute certainty the timelines for discovery in a medical malpractice case.  Medical records are voluminous and complex, and require significant time and effort to review and analyze.  The medical records in a medical malpractice case often include not only the records from the specific case in question, but also a plaintiff's prior medical history and ongoing treatment.  As a result, it may take several months to obtain all relevant medical records and review them thoroughly.  Medical malpractice cases also often require the use of medical experts to establish the standard of care and to provide opinions on whether a defendant healthcare provider breached that standard of care.  These experts need time to review the medical records, evaluate the facts of the case, and prepare their opinions.  This process can also take several months, particularly if multiple experts are involved or if there are disputes between the parties' experts.  Given the complexity of medical malpractice cases and the extensive discovery required, it is often impossible to anticipate with absolute certainty the timelines for discovery.  The parties may need to request additional time to complete discovery, or the court may need to issue scheduling orders with built-in flexibility to account for the ongoing nature of medical treatment and the review of medical records.  Ultimately, the goal of discovery in a medical malpractice case is to ensure that all relevant evidence is obtained and analyzed, so that the parties can make informed decisions and the Court can render a just and fair decision.  Therefore, the Appellant should not suffer the ultimate sanction of a dismissal with prejudice for simply not predicting when discovery will be completed with absolute certainty.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] (11T49-24 to 51-17).  Under the direction of law enforcement, [...] consented to and called defendant five times to advise him that the marijuana delivery would be delayed until the next day, on March 1, 2017.  (11T62-25 to 64-24).  The trip needed to be delayed to give law enforcement time to set up its controlled delivery of the marijuana to defendant.  (11T64-22 to 24).  The [...] and the [...] ("[...]")
[brief] THE DELEGATION OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY TO THE COUNCIL VIOLATED THE PRIVATE NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE (Pa115, Pa130-132).  While the adjudication of these constitutional issues may be of first impression in New Jersey, it has long been decided by the federal judiciary. \(^6\)  A recent example is *National Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n v. Black*, supra, 53 F.4th at 872, 888-89, in which the Fifth Circuit, relying on well-established United States Supreme Court precedents enunciating the private non-delegation doctrine, id. 880-81, declared the Horseracing Integrity and Racing Safety Act ("HISA"), 15 U.S.C.A. §3052, to be unconstitutional, because it gave “a private entity the last word on implementing federal law. ”  The court held that the private entity must be truly subordinate to the public agency or official for rule-making purposes in order for the private non-delegation doctrine not to apply.\(^7\)  For an explanation of the private non-delegation doctrine, see *Consumers’ Research, Cause Based Commerce, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission*, 88 F.4th 917, 925 (11th Cir. 2023).  See also, [...], “The Private Nondelegation Doctrine: --- \(^6\)  See e.g., A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1936); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 59 S.Ct. 379, 83 L.Ed. 441 (1939); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263 (1940).
[directive] INCIDENT RESPONSE PROTOCOLS  A.  Department-Wide Response  1.  This Department will accept, document, and preserve all calls or reports, including those made anonymously, regarding domestic violence as on-the-record information.  A detailed Criminal Investigation Report (CIR) must be completed by the responding officer to a domestic violence call.  This report is to be completed regardless of whether or not an arrest is made, and regardless of whether or not a criminal offense has been committed.  2.  All reports of possible criminal activity implicating law enforcement officers in domestic violence will be documented in accordance with approved policies and procedures governing the handling of reports of domestic violence incidents.  3.  A copy of the report alleging domestic violence by an officer will be forwarded to the Chief of Police or Law Enforcement Chief Executive through the chain of command including the Internal Affairs Officer.  4.  The Department will make all such CIRs available to the victim N.J.S.A. without cost.  47:1A-1.1.  5.  The Department will make all such CIRs available to the officer at no cost.  6.  The Chief of Police or Law Enforcement Chief Executive will consult with the County Prosecutor, who will determine who should be the designated Principal Law Enforcement Contact person.  If the designated Principal Law Enforcement Contact person is not available 24/7, then, after consultation with the Chief of Police of -7- Law Enforcement Chief Executive, the County Prosecutor will select an alternate contact person.  The contact person’s information must be provided to the victim.  The Principal Law Enforcement Contact person will:  a.  Advise the victim to immediately report any violation of any restraining order to the police department where it occurred and to the designated Principal Law Enforcement Contact person.  b.  Advise the victim to contact the designated Principal Law Enforcement Contact person if there is any harassment, witness tampering or intimidation by a law enforcement officer.  c.  Intervene if the officer or agents of the officer are harassing or intimidating the victim, or violating no-contact orders.  d.  Provide the victim with the name and contact number of the domestic violence Assistant Prosecutor in the county where the abusive officer is charged with committing a criminal offense, contempt of a domestic violence restraining order, or subject to a motion for forfeiture of weapons.  The victim should also be provided with the name of the victim-witness advocate or detective in the Prosecutor's Office who have been designated as the resource persons in the Prosecutor's Office.
[brief] | 8, 9 | | Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70 (2005).  | 8 | | Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973).  | 1 | | **Unreported Cases** | | A.M.S. v. M.L.S., No. A-1905-19, 2021 WL 3197768 (App. Div. July 29, 2021)(Pra1).  | 2-3, 11 | | Dawson v. Wright, No. A-0952-06T5, 2007 WL 3376226 (App. Div. Nov. 15, 2007)(Pra8).  | 1 | | **Court Rules** | | R. 1:36-3 | 1 | | R. 2:6-2 | 1 | | R. 4:23-3 | 7 | | R. 4:50 | *passim* | | R. 5:3-5 | 11 | | R. 5:5-10 | 3 |
[brief] Despite the above rulings and findings, Plaintiff’s insistence, announced at the family meeting in 2012, on obtaining a greater inheritance than he was entitled to under Korean law, never ceased.  From the date the Administrator was appointed by the court on May 14, 2014, Plaintiff insisted that the Administrator continue to search for assets of the Estate that did not exist.  In addition to Plaintiff’s disregard of the confidentiality orders that had been entered, Plaintiff disregarded, for example, [...]’s May 8, 2014 ruling that [...] was not an asset of Decedent’s Estate; Plaintiff continued to insist, over a period of several years, that the Administrator continue to investigate [...].
[brief] He also testified that the proposed development, as amended, was consistent with the Township’s Master Plan and particularly suitable because “the proposed uses are compatible with multi-family housing in [...] that is adjacent to the site, and the mixed-use development that has been approved to the east” and also due to “its location on Route 33 and the presence of public water and sewer on the property. ”  M32.  The Trial Court also noted that the Board ignored the competent evidence presented by Plaintiffs ([...]’s) architect in support of variance relief, despite any proofs to the contrary:  [...], [...]’s architect, testified, without contradiction or challenge, that the proposed parking in the front of the nonresidential structures is more beneficial for retail purposes because parking in the rear of retail does not properly support retail and the parking in the front yard would actually allow retail to thrive.  TN 64:24-65:90.  Among the other benefits identified by [...]’s experts, all ignored by the Zoning Board when denying [...]’s requested variance relief, were the fact that the proposed development provided more open space than the original 2016 Approval, provided for a pedestrian friendly mixed-use environment that serves local and regional needs while also creating new employment opportunities within the Township, and that [...]’s proposed affordable units would provide housing opportunities for low and moderate income individuals who are otherwise unable to afford market-rate housing.  M33-34.
[brief] As noted in [...]’s original brief, social science research on the deterrent effect of extending the length of sentences shows that increasing the length of a substantial sentence (such a ten-years) has no material deterrent effect.  (Db46)  Lengthening sentences is particularly ineffectual at deterring juveniles or young adolescents, as they are “less likely to take possible punishment into account when making impulsive, ill-considered decisions that stem from immaturity. ”  Comer, 249 N.J. at 399.  Separately, the court would have had difficulty justifying the incapacitative value of incarcerating [...] beyond his late-twenties in light of the “age-crime curve,” which demonstrates that “‘that more than 90% of all juvenile offenders desist from crime by their mid-20s. ’”  Ibid. (quoting [...], *The Influence of Neuroscience on U.S. Supreme Court Decisions about Adolescents’ Criminal Culpability*, 14 Neuroscience 513, 516 (2013)); see also id. at 400 (“‘[T]he rates for both prevalence and incidence of offending appear highest during adolescence; they peak sharply at about age 17 and drop precipitously in young adulthood. ’”) (quoting *Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy*, 100 Psych. Rev. 674, 675 (1993)).  Accordingly, this court should reverse the sentencing court’s consecutive sentence determination and remand for reconsideration in light of the social science of deterrence and incapacitation.
[directive] The Offices of Victim-Witness Advocacy shall provide social service referrals.  Referral services shall minimally include:  1.  Counseling.  2. Support groups.  3. Crime prevention.  4.  Treatment programs (drug, alcohol, domestic violence).  5.  Medical attention.  6.  Emergency shelters.  7.  Homemaker services.  8.  Food and clothing.  9.  Financial entitlements.  C.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...] ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION: ESSEX COUNTY  DOCKET NO. [...]  SAT BELOW: HON.  [...], J.S.C.  RESPONDENT’S BRIEF  [...], Esq.-ID#035021986  [...]  [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Respondent  [...], Esq.  On the Brief TABLE OF CONTENTS  PAGE NO.  Table of Citations .................................................. ii  Preliminary Statement and ........................................  1  Procedural History ....................................................  3 Statement of Facts .....................................................  5  A.  The Facts in Respondent’s Complaint ..............  5  B. The Appellants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration  6  C.  The Respondent’s Deposition ...............................  10  D.  The Plenary Hearing ...........................................  13  Legal Argument .......................................................  17 POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED  THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE RESPONDENT SIGNED AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT  [2T P47-59, 1a].................................................  17  POINT II: THE ENACTMENT OF ENDING FORCE  ARBITRATION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AND HARASSMENT ACT OF 2021  9 U.S.C. §401 RENDERS  ANY ARBITRATION CLAUSE IN THIS CASE UNENFORCEABLE [1T P5-18]..................  25  Conclusion ...............................................................  30  | Citation | Page No. | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------| | Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Grp. 219 N.J. 430 (2014) | 19 | | Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center 215 N.J. 265 @275 (2013) | 18,19 | | D’Agostino v. Maldonado 216 N.J. 168,182,78 Aa3d 1061 (N.J. 2017) | 18 | | Famuyide v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. 180 N.J. 74 (2004) | 28 | | Leodori v. Cigna Corp. 175 N.J. 293 (2003) | 19,20,21 | | Lehman v. Toys R Us Inc. 132 N.J. 587 (1993).
[brief] The Supreme Court in Alpha Board of Education v. Alpha Education Association, 190 N.J. 34, 918 (2006), determined that an arbitrator’s decision that a dispute was procedurally arbitrable, by utilizing the “continuing violation doctrine,” was reasonably debatable despite the time limitations of the parties’ grievance procedure.  In New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Local 196, 190 N.J. at 45, the Court endorsed a deferential limitation on the public policy exception to arbitral review, in finding “reasonably debatable” an arbitrator’s reinstatement of a toll collector working for the Garden State Parkway had fired a paint ball gun at a slower moving vehicle after his shift ended.  190 N.J. at 304.
[brief] All the above notwithstanding, Defendants argue that, since Plaintiff filed suit before complying with N.J.S.A. 42:2C–65(a), Plaintiff’s case should be dismissed because (1) the trial court lacked “subject matter jurisdiction” when the case was filed, and (2) subject matter jurisdiction “cannot be cured after the fact. ”  Da22–25.  However, this argument is fatally flawed because subject matter jurisdiction is not an issue in this case.
[brief] The Land Use Board Finding / Determination is entitled to a presumption of validity …………………………………………..  39  POINT  4  Any potential reversal of the Planning Board Decision should, at a minimum, be accompanied by an Order for a Remand ..................  40  POINT  5  The Trial Court properly analyzed the overall merits of the Plaintiff / Appellant Appeal – and there is no reason to disturb the Trial Court Decision  .......................................................  41 CONCLUSION ..............................................................
[brief] In passing, [...] states that the Ordinance is explicitly based on the Federal Telecommunications Act, Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. LA. No. 104-104, 110 Stat (“FTA”).  (Db37.)  The FTA regulates “personal wireless service facilities,” not electric utilities.  47 U.S.C. § 332(c).  ⁶  [...] asserts in footnote 7 (Db45) that the trial court cited to N.J.S.A. 48:3-17.1 in its decision.  This is incorrect.  The trial court did not state that its opinion was based on N.J.S.A. 48:3-17.1.  (Da006a).  Rather, it simply referred to this statute under Section III – Law – in the decision.  (Da0006a).  D.
[brief] It was not.  “[A]rguments of counsel can by no means serve as a substitute for instruction by the court. ”  State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 499 (2006); see also State v. Eldridge, 388 N.J.Super. 485, 496 (App. Div. 2006) (“If a jury instruction is faulty, arguments by a defense attorney in closing by no means serve as a substitute for proper instructions from the court. ”).  Indeed, that argument obscures the true deficiency in the jury instruction.  Though defense counsel pointed out to jurors that the victim had experience with disgruntled litigants, jurors were not told they were required to consider that experience, nor his experience with [...] in particular, as an element of the terroristic threat charges.  Further, jurors were also advised – correctly – that they must “accept and apply” the law as given to them by the court, not the attorneys.  (4T 43-16 to 21)  They were never instructed that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable person similarly situated to the victim would have viewed [...]’s words as threatening.  Jurors deliberated on [...]’s guilt with a constitutionally deficient understanding of the State’s burden of proof.  That requires reversal of [...]’s convictions.
[brief] ” (Da1).  That bears heavily on the meaning of the Revised Policy’s text.  Appellants’ public statements and statements in litigation confirm that the notifications relating to “adverse impact” would still turn heavily on a student’s “sexual orientation; transitioning; [and] gender identity or expression,” despite the removal of the illustrative list from the policy.  After the State initially filed its lawsuit challenging the Original Policy, the Board doubled down on its position, confirming the Original Policy required all staff to “notify appropriate school administrators and a student’s parents whenever the staff member is made aware of any facts or circumstances that may have a material impact on a student’s physical and/or mental health and/or social emotional well-being, including but not limited to … sexual orientation; transitioning; [and] gender identity or expression.
[directive] Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Local Finance Board shall, in fix accordance with a classification system established by said board, determine and the minimum amount of any official bond which may be required of a municipal court judge or clerk of a municipal court.  L.1960, c. 169, s. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1962.  Amended by L.1977, c. 396, s. 5, eff. Feb. 23,1978.  of  of  Fixing bond in excess minimum amount :5-39.  40A fix  The governing body of any municipality authorized by law to the amount of any bond given by a in municipal court judge or clerk of a municipal court may fix such amount excess of the minimum prescribed by the local finance board.  1, s. L.1960, c. 169, s. eff. Jan. 1,1962.  Amended byL.1977, c. 396, 6, eff.  Feb. 23,1978. of  Classification system purpose determining amount bond; minimum amount for of :5-41.  40'4  In establishing the said classification system, the board shall utilize audits made by it or under its on supervision and also the reports of the municipal magistrates, file in the administrative office of the courts.  The board shall confer with the administrative director of said office and, if it shall so desire, with municipal officials.  The board shall take into consideration the probable amounts of money which will be received from fines, penalties and costs, and which will be handled for bail, security, fees and other purposes.  After the establishment of the said classification system, no such official bond shall be given or accepted below the minimum amount prescribed by the said classification system and in no case shall any such official bond be in an amount less than $1,000.00.