ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Global Fee Application is Excessive and Punitive on Its Face and Should Have Been Denied for That Reason Alone  The Chancery Court should have denied the Global Fee Application outright based given the blatantly excessive quantum of fees sought.  No critical analysis of the fees sought was even required to make that determination, but, at a minimum, the shocking numbers submitted for payment in the Global Fee Application should have given the Chancery Court pause.  On its own, the 5,485.1 hours of legal work sought for payment in the Global Fee Application is astonishing.  Over the relevant time period, that equates to approximately 900 hours per year spent on general efforts to collect on the judgment.  Again, this time is *in addition to* the thousands of hours purportedly spent by [...]’s counsel on the “discrete efforts” in relation to other post-judgment collection proceedings tethered to specific bad acts for which [...] and his counsel were already awarded $2,721,804.14.  (Da7-9, ¶¶5,7).  The 5,485.1 hours also apparently excludes all time spent on related appeals, which [...]’s counsel claimed constitutes an additional $1.4 million in fees not including in the Global Fee Application.  (Da8, ¶6).  It also excludes time spent on efforts to execute on defendants’ assets in Slovakia.  (Da16-17, ¶38).  Combining all of these purported efforts, [...]’s billing is roughly the equivalent of one highly experienced attorney working on nothing but this post-judgment case all day, every business day, for six years.  Such an extraordinary expenditure of time was not remotely reasonable or necessary.  5,485.1 hours on general collection efforts is excessive and punitive on its face, especially when millions in attorneys’ fees have already been awarded for the thousands of hours purportedly spent on other efforts to “secure security” or otherwise remedy purported bad acts of the defendants.  (Da7-9, ¶¶5,7; Da13, ¶27).  [...] intentionally filed the Global Fee Application in its excess form hoping that the trial court would summarily grant it based on [...]’s general bad acts during these post-judgment proceedings.  Fee applications demonstrating this level of excess can and should be denied in their entirety to disincentivize parties from filing them.  See, e.g., Young, 905 F.3d at 236; Clemens, 903 F.3d at 402-03; Fair Housing Council of Greater Washington v. Landow, 999 F.2d at 98-99; Lewis, 944 F.2d at 958; Brown, 612 F.2d at 1059.  E.
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[brief] ”  182 N.J. at 529.  Indeed, our courts have repeatedly held that an insurer may, for equitable reasons, “be refused the right to assert an exclusion or the absence of specific coverage. ”  *Doto v. Russo*, 140 N.J. 544, 557 (1995) (collecting precedent).  “Nor have [our courts] permitted insurance companies to seek refuge in the literal language of their policies when the company’s conduct and actions, or that of their agents, causes the insured to act or to fail to act based on that conduct.
[brief] 29 Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103-104 (1963) ............................. 26 Statutes N.J.A.C. 11:3-4.9 ........................................... 28 N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1(a) ........................................... 11, 14, 15, 22 N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.2 ........................................... 8, 24 N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.6 ........................................... 27 N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.6(a) ........................................... 8 N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.6(d)(3) ....................................... 8 N.J.S.A. 1:1-1 ................................................. 9 N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2 ............................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 17:33A-1 ............................................ 1 N.J.S.A. 17:33A-2 ............................................ 4, 14, 23 N.J.S.A. 17:33A-4(a)(1) ......................................  4 N.J.S.A. 17:33A-4(b) and (c) ................................  4 N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a) ........................................  5 N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a)(1) ......................................  15 N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(b) ........................................  19 N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(d) ........................................  5, 30 N.J.S.A. 17:33A-8(a) ........................................  5 N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1(b) .......................................  4, 20, 23 N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5(i) ..........................................  7, 24 N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a) ...........................................  7 N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(c) ...........................................  11 N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(i) ...........................................  10  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13(g) ...........................................  25  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-15 ..............................................  31  N.J.R.E. 201(b) ..................................................  21  Other Authorities
[brief] In this case, the Trial Court addressed the Appellant’s claims and found that the Board did not consider the Sketch and therefore was not relevant to the Board’s approval including the height to which [...] was to construct its building.  Therefore, the Sketch did not support the Appellant’s claim that the Approved Building was not constructed in accordance with the Board’s approval.  The Trial Court’s rulings were reasonable and correct under the law.  Accordingly, based on the law set forth, the Trial Court’s evidentiary rulings to exclude the Sketch, and the [...] Ad should be given deference and the dismissal of the Appellant’s actions upheld in this Appeal.
[directive] Stationhouse Adjustments  A stationhouse adjustment is an alternative method that law enforcement agencies may use to handle minor juvenile delinquency offenses first-time juvenile offenders who have committed within their jurisdiction.  The intent of the stationhouse adjustment program is to provide for immediate consequences, such as community service or restitution and a prompt and convenient resolution for the victim, while at the same time benefitting the juvenile by avoiding the stigma of a formal juvenile delinquency record.  In many instances, this early intervention will deter the youth from continuing their negative behavior and divert the youth from progressing further into the juvenile justice system.  In a stationhouse adjustment, the juvenile officer typically asks the juvenile, a parent or guardian/caregiver, or other responsible adult designated by the parent or guardian/caregiver (herein referred to as “designee”) and the victim to come to the stationhouse to discuss the offense.  The officer may refer a juvenile for needed services, and, if property has been stolen or damaged, require the juvenile to make restitution in some form.  Usually the officer will discuss the offense with the juvenile’s parent or guardian/caregiver and request assurances that the juvenile will not commit any future offenses.  This process allows juvenile officers to resolve minor disputes without the need to file a complaint with the court.  Victims of minor offenses are often better served since a matter can be resolved locally, providing for a more efficient and expeditious resolution.  However, it is important to give the victim the opportunity to have input.  Furthermore, the victim always has the right to sign a complaint if he or she objects to a stationhouse adjustment.  Mandatory Availability of Stationhouse Adjustments
[brief] (Raised Below: T6-25).  A.  The Plain Language of the Contract Should Prevail.  While a Court may not substitute its own judgement for that of the arbitrator, a Court cannot uphold an award that violates N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 & 9.  An arbitration award procured by undue means, where a mistake of fact or law is apparent, cannot pass muster.  Additionally, where, as here, an arbitrator ignores clear and unambiguous language or contradicts plain contract language, the arbitration award must be vacated.  The Division’s reliance on Borough of East Rutherford v. East Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190, is misguided.  The determination in East Rutherford upheld plain contractual language over statutory language which increased insurance copayments above what the contract specified.  Id.  The Arbitrator ordered reversion back to the copayment specified in the plain language of the contract and also ordered reimbursement to the affected employees.  Ultimately, the Arbitrator concluded that the CBA was violated when PBA members were required to pay the increased co-payment...  [S]he found "no legal or contractual reason" that prevented her from "direct[ing] the Borough to reimburse the employees for the amount of the [increased] co-payments" for the duration of the contractual period.  She added that the Borough could impose a "reasonable documentation" requirement that compelled bargaining unit employees to support each request for reimbursement.  *Borough of East Rutherford v. East Rutherford PBA Local 275*, 213 N.J. 190, 198.  The underlying rationale for the New Jersey Supreme Court upholding the arbitration award in *East Rutherford*, supra, is the same reason the within arbitration award should be vacated.  Specifically, the arbitration award hereinbelow ignored the plain language of the contract and instead followed the Treasury Circulars; similarly, *East Rutherford* ignored the plain language of the contract and instead followed statutory amendments.
[brief] First, [...] was the only one that presented testimony from an expert civil engineer – [...] – as so accepted by the Board.  (Ra220 24:9 through Ra230 61:2)  [...] testified that the change in grade was not “designed to allow increased building height. ”  As [...] explained the change in grade for this particular area was driven by (a) the seasonal ground water table and (b) the height / size of the underground stormwater management system.  (Ra356 60:20-23.)  That, combined with the sanitary sewer, utilities and roads drove what was needed for grading.  The underground stormwater management system, designed in conformity with NJDEP requirements, needed to be “underground” - hence the name.  However, the system can only go so far underground because, as [...] explained, the system must be at least one foot above the seasonal ground water table.  (Ra356 59:9-60:2.)  From there, the stormwater management system has a particular height dimension.  As [...] explained, in order to have the system underground with roads and curbing on top of it, the grade in this entire area needed to be increased.  The grade was not increased beyond the 18 feet existing grade where the existing house sits at the center of the Property.  (Ra356 60:3-6.)  Thus, the change in grade was not designed to allow increased building height, but rather to allow for the stormwater management system and layout of the overall Project.  All of this was further confirmed by the Board’s own planner, [...].  [...] opined, relying on the testimony of [...] (as confirmed by the Board Engineer) that the change in grade was not designed to allow for an increased building height but rather for stormwater management and design layout.  (Ra360 73:1-3.)  As [...]’s planner, [...], testified, the architectural elevations and dimensions of the plans presented to the Board are the same within the RR Zone ordinance and YB Settlement Agreement.  (Ra238 96:9-19.)  Recall, this RR Zone was specifically created to allow this Project and these dwellings.  The record is clear that the Board properly found that the change in grade was not designed to allow increased building height.
[brief] This was not quite the same argument as what he had presented within his motion papers, nor as what he had stated within his R. 1:4-8 letter.  My primary position was that [...] had negotiated directly with me and made a contract directly with me, not my late mother.  (Pa61)  This position was virtually identical to that of the successful plaintiff in *Haylett v. Baladi*, 2010 WL 2346713, where in that case the plaintiff was the secretary for an auto repair shop, who in attempting to sell an abandoned car, had entered into a verbal contract with the defendant, whom apparently took the car and kept it, but had never paid for it.  The secretary Haylett brought suit against the defendant Baladi, whom later via its counsel had then argued that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring suit, as the title was not in her name, and she was not even the owner (or corporate officer) of the auto repair shop where the vehicle had been abandoned at.  That is, Baladi had contended that Haylett "had no ownership, title or proprietary interest in the subject automobile and therefore lacked standing to commence the civil action for loss of property."  However the trial court rejected the defendant’s contention, as did the unanimous Appellate panel:  "Baladi argues that Haylett had no standing to sue in her own name because she was representing an auto body shop that she did not own and that she could not sell the car because she did not have the title.  We reject this argument. ”  [emphasis added]  *Id.* at *1  The unanimous Appellate panel found that the plaintiff had standing because the defendant “dealt with her”, and also found that the plaintiff’s lack of title was not an impediment to the contract, because the defendant had “accepted it that way”.  The Appellate panel further found that the appropriate measure of damages was based on the defendant’s unjust enrichment of $3,000, rather than just the (breached) contract amount of $500 that the defendant had failed to pay, therein holding:  “The judge decided that any contract was breached by Baladi's nonpayment.  A return of the 2001 Sebring, after Baladi had used it for several months, would not be fair.  Therefore, on a quantum meruit basis, the judge awarded $3,000 as a fair market value of the 2001 Sebring at the time it came into Baladi's possession.  We perceive no error in this approach. ”
[brief] On or about August 16, 2019, [...] was assigned as a Senior Corrections Officer at the Stowe 2 North Dormitory at the [...].  (1T34.10-14; 1T58.16-19).  Senior Corrections Officer [...] (“[...]”) was assigned to the Stowe 2 South Dormitory.  (1T34.20-22; Pa121a)².  Both Gales and [...] were on third shift.  (1T34.10-22).  Stowe Two Housing Unit is a second floor housing unit with a vestibule between the first and second doors.  (Pa4a).  To the left, there is a common area with benches.  (Pa4a).  To the right, there are six housing wings.  Additionally, there is an officer’s desk area.  (Pa4a).  There is also a common day-space area that also has benches.  (Pa4a).  The day-space is shared between the two housing units.  (1T10.16 to 11.5).  There are typically eight inmates per wing and approximately 40 inmates per housing unit.  (1T11.23-25; 1T12.1-3).  Senior Corrections Officer [...] (“[...]”) worked as the Relief Officer for Stowe 2 North and South housing units.  (1T64.19-22; --- ²The entire matter was audio recorded by the Office of Administrative Law.
[brief] The trial court, like [...] and [...], referred to certain emails regarding discrete work done on the [...] retaining wall in August 2015, months before the accident, that was excluded from coverage as “demolition work. ”  A July 30, 2015 email from [...] of [...] advising several parties that [...] would not be permitted to enroll because it was performing structural demolition did not prevent [...]’s enrollment later that day.
[brief] Specifically, the *Dela Vega* Court explicitly stated that it was “troubled” by the intrafamily liability exclusion in the insurance policy.  Id. at *2. (Pa106).  The Court was troubled by the fact that the operation of the intrafamily liability provision caused an 85% reduction in liability coverage purchased by the insured.  The Court was troubled by the fact that most consumers assume that “an injured family member passenger in an insured auto would have the benefit of the full policy limits purchased,” without distinction as to whether those were policy limits purchased under a primary automobile insurance policy or an excess policy.  *Dela Vega*, supra, A-2272-19 (App. Div. May 6, 2022) (slip op. at 2, FN2) (emphasis added).  (Pa107).  The Court was troubled by the “reduction in coverage available to an entire class of victims based solely on the injured victim's status as a named insured or resident family-member. ”  Ibid.  The troubling nature of the intrafamily liability limitations/exclusions as expressed by the Court in Dela Vega has absolutely nothing to do with whether they are contained in primary or excess policies but rather with the very nature of clauses that eliminate the liability coverage purchased by a consumer and indicated on the policy declarations’ pages.  Whether or not this Court shoulder share in the concerns expressed by the Dela Vega court has been addressed in plaintiffs’ moving brief; however if, as suggested in plaintiffs’ moving brief, those concerns are shared by this Court, then they are equally applicable to both primary and excess liability policies.
[brief] *In re State Bd. of Educ.’s Denial of Petition to Adopt Regulations Implementing N.J. High Sch. Voter Registration Law*, 422 N.J. Super. 521, 530-31 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting *Wnuck*, 337 N.J. at 56).  Once the court has interpreted the meaning of a statute, the review of an agency’s decision in applying the statute is “more deferential. ”
[brief] When construing a contract, “the court’s goal is to ascertain ‘the intention of the parties to the contract as revealed by the language used, taken as an entirety…the situation of the parties, the attendant circumstances, and the objects they were thereby striving to attain. ’ ”  Phoenix Pinelands Corporation v. Davidoff, 467 N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div. 2021), citing Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of County of Mercer, 333 N.J. Super. 310, 325 (App. Div. 2000); Cruz-Mendez v. ISU/Insurance Servs., 156 N.J. 556, 570-571 (1999) aff’d. 169 N.J. 135 (2001)  The document is to “be read as a whole, without artificial emphasis on one section, with a consequent disregard for others. ”  (Id.)  Finally, and perhaps most important, the interpretation “should ‘accord with justice and common sense. ’ ”  Phoenix Pinelands, supra., citing Borough of Princeton, supra., at 325, quoting Krosnowski v. Krosnowski, 22 N.J. 376, 387 (1956)  See also Hardy ex rel. Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 101-102 (2009); Porreca v. City of Millville, 419 N.J. Super. 212, 233-234 (App. Div. 2011)  The trial court held that the word “premises”, as used in the tenant defendants’ leases referred to the demised premises; that portion of the strip mall rented to each tenant.
[directive] 3.4.1  Although the internal affairs process is frequently triggered by the filing of a civilian complaint, law enforcement agencies must also proactively work to detect troubling patterns in police conduct before that conduct escalates into more serious internal affairs issues.  3.4.2  To enhance its integrity, provide an optimal level of service to the community and reduce its exposure to civil liability, every law enforcement agency should establish procedures for dealing with problem employees.  Law enforcement agencies have a duty to monitor their employees’ behavior, and establish mechanisms that provide the internal affairs function and the law enforcement executive with the ability to track the complaint records of individual officers and identify those officers with a disproportionate number of complaints against them.  Law enforcement agencies must utilize the information developed by these mechanisms to prevent individual officers from engaging in conduct or behavior that violates the constitutional liberties every member of the community enjoys.  It also is expected that law enforcement agencies will utilize the information to prevent development of patterns, practices or trends of inappropriate behavior or conduct.  3.4.3
[brief] However, the case is both factually distinguishable and largely irrelevant.  In *[...]*, the parties to a maritime dispute agreed to an arbitration before a three-arbitrator panel where each party appointed an arbitrator and then those two arbitrators selected the third arbitrator:  Any and all differences and disputes of whatsoever nature arising out of this Charter shall be put to arbitration in the City of New York pursuant to the laws relating to arbitration there in force, before a board of three persons, consisting of one arbitrator to be appointed by the Owner [Trade], one by the Charterer [[...]], and one by the two so chosen.  The decision of any two of the three on any point or points shall be final….  The arbitrators may grant any relief which they, or a majority of them, deem just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties, including, but not limited to, specific performance.  931 F.2d at 192.  The parties also agreed that proceedings would be bifurcated, with liability decided first and then the issue of damages.  *Id.*, at 193.  The panel rendered a liability decision in favor of [...] (“[...]”), but before further proceedings on damages, [...] (“[...]”)'s selected arbitrator died.  [...] then sought to have an entirely new arbitration panel appointed and “proceed to rearbitrate the entire dispute from the beginning” including the issue of liability.  *Ibid.*  The Second Circuit rejected that application.  First, it held that while case law allows for a matter to be rearbitrated *ab initio* when an arbitrator dies or becomes unavailable before the issuance of an award, it does not allow for a matter to be rearbitrated after the issuance of an award.  Second, the arbitration involved a panel of arbitrators, not a single arbitrator; and the arbitration agreement gave each party the power to select one arbitrator.  Thus, the Second Circuit held that [...] could appoint a replacement arbitrator to join the other two arbitrators for further proceedings on the issue of damages.  *[...]* is wholly inapposite to the situation at bar.  Contrary to [...]’s arguments, and unlike [...], [...] does not seek to vitiate the liability award.  Moreover, as set forth at length in [...]’s initial brief, the arbitration agreement between [...] and [...] names only a single, specifically identified arbitrator with unique expertise and makes no provision for the substitution or replacement.
[brief] Defendant’s exclusionary rule argument is misplaced.  At the suppression hearing, [...] testified that a body camera is always recording, and “when you hit the button, that starts the audio and [video is] capture[d] back 20 or 30 seconds prior to the button being pressed”.  (T24-17 to 19).  At the hearing, the trial judge correctly noted that the issue was not whether the police turned on their body cameras; rather “[i]t’s the point when [they] turned it on. ” (T18-2 to 3).
[brief] Therefore, it is the applicant that has failed to show how this combination of uses cannot be designed in a 2½ story building with fewer units.  …  [...] nearby … provides substantially the same congregate care and support services, including semi-independent living, assisted living and memory care as proposed by applicant, but on two floors.  Da137-138.  As a result of the excessive bulk and density requested, the Board found that the proposal was detrimental to several purposes of the MLUL.\(^{10}\) Da138.