ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Ricci Act states that the Board of Trustees “shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L. 2019, c. 157, within 30 days of enactment. ”  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  (Emphasis added).  The Board was required to notify all members of the State Police Retirement System of the Ricci Act by August 7, 2019, including the requirement to “register” by filing a form indicating the dates and locations of service within two (2) years.  On August 8, 2019, more than 30 days after the Ricci Act’s passage, the Division of Pensions distributed an email to all Certifying Officers “advising them of their responsibilities under the Ricci Act. ”  Pa11.  However, while this is cited in the Final Agency Decision, no actual email dated August 8, 2019, was ever produced, only a Memorandum dated “August 2019. ”  Pa66.  On or about August 9, 2019, more than 30 days after the passage of the Ricci Act, the Division of Pensions contracted [...] to mail postcards to retirees.  Pa68.  No “close date” appears on the document.  Pa68.  In support of his request for amended benefits under the Ricci Act, [...] submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the State Police Retirement Board or the Division of Pensions with respect to the passage of P.L. 2019, c.157 (Chapter 157), the Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act.  Pa56.  [...] was present and involved in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks which took place on September 11, 2001.
[brief] The Parties’ Pre-Trial Submissions  Pursuant to a Scheduling Order entered by the Trial Court, the parties were directed to submit pre-marked joint exhibits and trial briefs to the Court.  Counsel for the parties conferred and submitted joint exhibits to the Trial Court which were marked as J-1 through J-13 (Pa68; Pa533-1482).  Counsel for the parties also submitted trial briefs in accordance with the schedule established by the Trial Court.  The Plaintiff’s trial brief indicated that even though the Trial Court had dismissed the Plaintiff’s Public Trust Doctrine claims, the Plaintiff still intended to present evidence at trial regarding alleged violations of the Public Trust Doctrine by the [...].  The [...] therefore filed a motion in limine to bar the presentation of any testimony regarding alleged Public Trust Doctrine violations by the [...] (Pa528; Pa530).  That motion in limine was argued on the first day scheduled for trial (i.e. February 27, 2023).  After considering the arguments of counsel, [...] granted the [...]’s motion in limine, concluding that the Plaintiff’s Public Trust Doctrine claims had previously been dismissed with prejudice through his prior rulings in the case (7T, pp. 4-8; Pa1731).
[brief] The Court found one of the neuropsychologists, [...], in the DiFiore matter would conduct the examination with a third-party observer or a recording.  *Id.* at 240.  The Court noted that the Policy Statement permits third-party observation, such as when required by court order.  *Id.* at 240-41.  The Court further held “with all due respect to professional associations, they do not set the court rules of this state.
[brief] The Defendant’s sole defense to the Plaintiff’s case relied upon it seeking to establish that its floor, when wet, was not slippery and therefore did not cause the Plaintiff to fall.  The trial Court’s erroneous rulings permitted the defense to mislead the jury with impunity on this critical issue.  A.  EXCLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF ARLENE CASTELLO WAS IMPROPER UNDER EVID. R. 407 AND EVID. R. 403  Plaintiff’s witness, [...], observed the Defendant’s agent mop the floor and place a slip hazard warning sign just moments after the Plaintiff’s fall.  Her testimony as to these observations, precluded by the trial Court, citing Evid.  R. 407 and Evid.  R. 403, should have been allowed for the reasons set forth by Plaintiff at trial and in her initial Brief.¹
[brief] In arriving at its decision to restore [...]’s money, [...] advised [...] of her right to appeal the determination and restoration if she did not agree with same.  She did not.  (See Pa90, Pl.’s Trial Ex. P-26).  The lower court of equity should not have rewarded [...], a litigant with “unclean hands” who improperly utilized the checking account of another without authorization to pay for her credit card.
[brief] N.J.R.E. 201.  In Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 81 (2010), in a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court considered the definition of “principal place of business” and stated:  “And we conclude that the phrase “principal place of business” refers to the place where the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate activities.  Lower federal courts have often metaphorically called that place the corporation’s “nerve center. ”  ...  Plaintiff’s “principal place of business” is not in [...] but in [...], which is the location of its principal executive offices.  Hertz Corp. v. Friend, supra.
[brief] (3T 208-7 to 21, 215-6 to 218-4)  [...] testified that the gun was a “9-millimeter Luger caliber Bryco Arms semi-automatic pistol,” and that it was operable and capable of being discharged.  (3T 219-9 to 224-11)  [...] also testified that he examined a bullet cartridge, which he identified as “9-millimeter Luger caliber, metal-jacketed hollow-point bullet cartridge. ”  (3T 224-12 to 228-14)
[brief] [...] drives away while [...] remains and walks off screen.  (11T60-24 to 61-7; Da90 4:55:58-4:56:22)  The defense showed it was nearly impossible to shoot [...] at 12:11pm in [...] and get back to [...] by 12:25pm  One route is 16.2 miles (Brigantine tunnel to [...] Expressway, through two toll plazas, then several local roads before reaching [...].  It includes seven traffic --- \(^6\)  The State admitted that this video depicted [...] sitting in [...]’ car and did not contest [...]’s timeline from 1pm on.  (15T81-14 to 82-8) lights.  The other is 15 miles on local roads, including 24 lights.  (14T28-20 to 25, 29-20 to 23, 30-11 to 14, 32-15 to 17, 33-1, 33-18 to 20, 34-16 to 35-22)  The defense presented evidence shooter was much shorter than [...] and had different tattoos.  [...] testified the shooter was 5’8; [...] is 6’1.  [...] and [...] saw the shooter’s facial tattoo; [...] has none.  [...] has hand tattoos, and witnesses saw no markings on the shooter’s hands.  (10T43-21 to 44-12, 75-19 to 25, 135-23 to 136-14, 140-21 to 25; Da102)  The police did not search for or collect gunshot residue, and no ballistics evidence or gun was found.  (10T199-7 to 12; 13T174-20 to 23)  [...] never looked up the location of cell towers in the call records, and never spoke to [...].  (13T106-15 to 20, 120-11 to 23)  Though the shooter is right-handed, [...] signed forms and was seen drinking a beverage with his left hand.  Defense counsel promised in opening to prove [...] innocent, leading the prosecutor in summation to repeatedly comment on [...]’s “failure” to present evidence proving his innocence.  (9T42-3 to 11; 15T83-1 to 14; see also 15T93-14 to 16, 95-4 to 10, 105-8 to 9, 111-17 to 18)  The jury deliberated for three days, then advised it had taken several votes but was unable to reach a consensus.
[brief] ”  (13T 195-17 to 196-6)  At the same time, he admitted that he might have said in his statement that [...] was “in the Mob Piru gang,” a Bloods set (9T 155-6 to 18; 13T 155-16 to 156-2, 158-18 to 20), and that [...] came to the party with numerous other gang members (9T 157-18 to 20).  And further, that [...] had “a lot of authority,” and, for that reason, possible rivals, including “[...]” and [...],” both of whom were at the party, might covet “[...]’s power” and want to “get him out of the way,” and that the shooting might have been a “setup. ”  (9T 157-7 to 17, 160-15 to 19; 13T 143-2 to 148-19, 179-25 to 180-7, 189-7 to 15, 192-18 to 19, 255-12 to 21; 14T 246-15 to 247-7; 15T 122-2 to 7, 156-7 to 159-20, 166-14 to 168-14, 180-15 to 183-14)
[directive] vi  USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2020  Core Principle One  The Sanctity of Human Life and Serving the Community.  In serving the community, officers shall make every effort to preserve and protect human life and the safety of all persons.  Officers shall also respect and uphold the dignity of all persons at all times in a non-discriminatory manner.  1.1  A respectful and cooperative relationship with the community is essential for effective law enforcement.  That relationship can be undermined when force is used unnecessarily or unequally.  1.2  Every officer shall respect the sanctity of human life and the dignity of every person, and act to preserve every life, whenever possible, and avoid unnecessary injury to members of the public or themselves.  1.3  In carrying out their duties as guardians of public safety, officers shall at all times treat every person equally without regard to the individual’s actual or perceived race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, civil union status, domestic partnership status, affectional or sexual orientation, genetic information, sex, gender identity or expression, disability, nationality, familial status, or any other protected characteristic under N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq.  1
[brief] [...] argues that (a) Plaintiffs fail to show that [...] and [...] are likely to have documents that fill substantial gaps in [...]’s comprehensive document production; and (b) to the extent that any collections from [...] and [...] are deemed necessary, performing targeted collections after the January 31, 2022 deadline for substantial completion of document production would be appropriate and would not delay discovery as discovery does not close until June 2022.  See Exhibit B (Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Mark [...] and Sheryl [...] as Document Custodians).  4.  Plaintiffs submitted their reply on October 13, 2021.  Plaintiffs argue that (a) [...] and [...] are likely to possess unique and relevant information because their knowledge and statements are at the heart of Plaintiffs’ allegations, including their detailed and intimate knowledge of friend sharing, whitelisting, business partners, and third party misuse of information; and (b) a targeted search of [...]’s and [...]’s files is appropriate.  See Exhibit C (Reply in Support of Motion to Compel Mark [...] and Sheryl [...] as Document Custodians).
[directive] I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of New Jersey to implement and comply with the August 2020 IAPP, pursuant to my authority under state constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, and to take any additional measures necessary to update their guidelines consistent with the August 2020 IAPP, as required by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181.  This Directive and the August 2020 IAPP are subject to the same policies and standards governing severability and non-enforceability by third parties established in AG Directives 2019-5 and 2020-5, and the August 2020 IAPP shall remain in force and effect unless and until it is repealed, amended, or superseded by Order of the Attorney General.
[brief] [...]’s ultimate decision whether to register had no effect on her status as a [...] client or her ability to continue receiving [...]’s advisory services.  By contrast, the consumers in *Wollen* were searching for a contractor to complete home renovation totaling nearly $100,000.  In order to receive referrals to qualified contractors, the *Wollen* plaintiffs were *required* to complete a web-based form and submit to the website’s terms.  Indeed, it was a significant fact in the reasoning of *Wollen* that the parties had no preexisting relationship, unlike here.  One can easily imagine, moreover, a consumer seeking the services of the defendant in *Wollen* in a situation of duress due to a home-maintenance emergency like a broken pipe or roof leak.  It is impossible to conjure such a situation in relation to an existing [...] brokerage client deciding to sign up for web access to complement their existing lines of communication with [...].  The facts of this case involve a simple and voluntary decision to utilize an optional [...] service.  In sum, the trial court misapplied *Wollen* and failed to find that [...]’s SAM registration website provided notice sufficient to bind online to the SAM Terms of Use.  Had the trial court properly applied the law to the record, it would have concluded that the Respondents had reasonable notice of the SAM Terms of Use and were bound by the predispute arbitration agreement therein.  CONCLUSION
[directive] Although a witness/subject is entitled to a representative, he/she is not necessarily entitled to a particular representative.  5.1.14  Once a complaint has been received, the subject officer shall be notified in writing that a report has been made and that an Such notification shall not investigation will commence.  include the name of the complainant.  This notification is not necessary if doing so would impede the investigation.  An example of a notification form is found in Appendix C.  Page 6  6.0.1  All allegations of officer misconduct shall be thoroughly, objectively, and promptly investigated to their logical in conformance with this policy, regardless of conclusion whether the officer resigns or otherwise separates from the agency.
[directive] Tangible Personal Property - Recovered and Disposition  7.3.1  Where tangible personal property comes into the possession of the police department, by finding and recovery, by a member of the police force acting in the line of duty, and if the owner or his whereabouts is unknown and cannot be ascertained, or if the owner shall refuse to receive the property, then the property shall not be disposed of for 6 months, except in cases of motor vehicles, which shall be for 3 months.  The municipality, by resolution, may then provide for the sale, in whole or in part, of any such property, at public auction.  Moneys received from the sale of any such property shall be paid into the general municipal treasury.  All unclaimed moneys coming into the possession of the police department shall be turned over within 48 hours to the municipal treasurer for retention in a trust account and, after 6 months, if unclaimed by any person entitled thereto, be paid into the general municipal treasury.
[brief] “The minimum requirements of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard. ”  Filgueiras v. Newark Pub. Schs., 426 N.J. Super. 449, 473 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 106 (1995)).  [...] met those requirements.  [...]’s waterfront development permitting process provides third party objectors the opportunity to submit public comments that are considered by ---  8  Nor do waterfront development permits “convey any property rights or any exclusive privilege” or “relinquish the State’s” ownership of the tidelands interests.  (Aa3).  Permits represent preliminary permissions for development.  Because the permitted activity in this case is on State-owned tidelands, it is undisputed that the State owns all of the lands of [...] outside of the [...]’s permit area and [...]’s permit area.
[brief] Exhibit O, Estate of Alexander v. [...], A-1123-17 (App. Div. Apr. 19, 2018) (unpublished), filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit P, Affidavit of [...], P.E., dated August 23, 2017, filed May 24, 2019 Exhibit Q, Affidavit of [...], P.E., dated August 22, 2017, filed May 24, 2019 Exhibit R, N.J.A.C. 13:40 (Rev. Nov. 16, 2015), filed May 24, 2019
[brief] The statutory bar to suit contained in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(c) requires a finding that a plaintiff acted "with specific intent."  The Legislature did not include a similar scienter requirement in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a).  The inclusion of a scienter requirement in subsection (c), and absence of the requirement in subsection (a), manifests a legislative intention to bar the claims of uninsured motorists without regard to a motorist's good faith belief regarding the status of his or her coverage.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5.  We cannot impose a scienter requirement where the Legislature has chosen not to do so.  Hardy, supra, 198 N.J. at 104-05.
[brief] Prior to September 15, 2022, the Defendants tried yet again to stymie the sale by filing a motion for a stay.  (Da472).  That motion, as recognized by the trial court, had “no basis in law or fact. ”  Da38.  In its Statement of Reasons, the trial court noted that one of the asserted bases for the Defendants’ motion was their understanding that [...] did not intend to move into the Boonton Property, but rather intended to purchase it as an investment property and resell it.  (Da44).  The trial court found that the owner of the property “is permitted to occupy and/or sell the home and the Trust places no restrictions on how the owner may or may not dispose of the Boonton Property. ” (Da44).  Given that the Trust did not require either [...] or [...] to reside at the property as a condition to purchasing it (or even have any language that could be construed in that manner), the trial court could not have imposed such a requirement.  The claim asserted by the Defendants in the proposed first supplemental complaint is in keeping with their entire approach to this matter – that nobody other than [...] should have ever been able to buy the Boonton Property, that they had the right to continue to file meritless motions aimed at impeding the Plaintiff’s administration of the Trust, and that the Plaintiff had no responsibility to anyone other than [...].
[brief] Respondent argues that defendants “did not describe their efforts to search for lease agreements they claimed they could not find, or even certify that the only documents they had relating to inspections performed at the Property were the OPRA records that Plaintiffs provided to them. ”  The record shows that defendants responded with the information they had.  With respect to Request 19, the trial court indicated that defendants needed to provide a certification from [...] and describe the efforts made to locate the lease agreements; defendants submitted an amended response, certified by [...], providing, “all the Leases were transferred to the Plaintiffs and in their possession on or before the closing date of September 27, 2019.
[brief] (Pa551).  The Subject Property is also heavily wooded with mature trees.  (Pa432; SDa033; SDa034; SDa041).  There is an existing single-family home on the Subject Property.  (Pa526; Pa103).  The existing single-family home dates to c. 1976.  (Pa531; Pa103).  The home was originally constructed with the benefit of variances for e.g. inadequate gross floor area, lot frontage, front setback, setback to structure supporting the parking area, rear yard setback, lot area and a variance to allow the construction of a home on a street that was not improved to municipal standards.
[brief] After the Motions to Suppress were granted and denied on November 1, 2023, the State sought and obtained a Superseding Indictment [[...]] [Da5] which included an additional Count of unlawful possession of a weapon without having first obtained a permit to possess.  The March 8, 2024 defense Motion for Reconsideration [Da25], see Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128 (App. Div. 2021), came on for hearing on May 30, 2024.  The Motion Judge, after marking 2 of the defense photographs as R1 [Da31] and R2 [Da32], concluded:  So if there’s an implied invitation to come to the front path, knock on the front door and not linger longer unless invited, does that not also include the right of the police to go into the driveway area, where they had to be getting to the front door, install the GPS devices, for which they had a warrant and leave.  ***  That’s my ruling.  That was my ruling.  3T: 5/30/24 T10-8 to 16 --- 1  The proceedings below are found in the following transcripts:  1T: 10/3/23  Suppression Hearing  2T: 11/1/23  Suppression Hearing  3T: 5/30/24  Reconsideration  Hearing and bench opinion  Order Denying Reconsideration was filed on May 30, 2024 [Da2] and Motion for Leave to Appeal to the Appellate Division was denied [Da33].  Leave to Appeal was granted by the Supreme Court on October 1, 2024 [Da34] which then remanded to the Superior Court, Appellate Division to consider the merits of this appeal.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Now, an MVR may aid the trial court by providing a visual and auditory glimpse into the interaction between the police and the suspect.  Id. at 41.  A review of the MVR in this case — from the moment police stopped defendant’s vehicle to placing him in the patrol car for transport — confirmed [...]’s testimony that defendant remained cooperative and conversational during the exchange with police.  (Da 3:12:55 to 3:29:45; 1T61-14 to 62-8).  No officer raised their voice nor threatened defendant during the entire interaction.  Instead, the officers and defendant engaged in productive conversations, complete with eye contact and direct responses to questions, which culminated in jovial banter as defendant entered the police vehicle.  Officers answered defendant’s questions and addressed his concerns.  Defendant was cooperative and helpful, even assisting an officer to open his trunk when they struggled to do so.  (1T51-23 to 52-5); see also King, 44 N.J. at 353 (affirmatively assisting police is behavior indicative of voluntariness).  Just as “reading a cold transcript is no substitute for viewing the video in evaluating the circumstances of an interrogation[,]” S.S., 229 N.J. at 385, neither is extracting quotes from a continuing dialogue an accurate depiction of the tenor of the conversation.  Here, [...] reviewed the MVR and transcript in their entirety, without plucking quotes out of context, to evaluate the officers’ and the defendant’s demeanor, questions, and commentary.  She then determined that the evidence showed that defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his home under the totality of the circumstances.  See (2T18-21 to 23 (finding that [...] informed defendant of his right to refuse consent)).  Sufficient evidence exists to support that determination.  The judge’s factual and legal findings support the ruling that consent was both knowing and voluntary and thus, should be affirmed.
[brief] More importantly, the rule would not require hunters in the field to engage in a legal fact-sensitive analysis when deciding to pull the trigger of a loaded gun.  Further, the word “occupied” as used in the statute has an exceedingly broad meaning.  The word “occupy” means “to take or enter upon possession of; to hold possession of; to hold or keep for use; to possess; to tenant; to do business in; to take hold or possession.  Actual use, possession, cultivation.  Black’s Law Dictionary p 974 (Fifth Ed. 1979).  That the statute has been broadened over the years reflects the Legislature’s continuing concern with the safety of its citizens – especially because this State is the most densely populated State in the Union.
[brief] Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant  [...] /s/ [...]  RAYMOND M. BROWN  Dated: September 24, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  [...] and [...], husband and wife, Plaintiffs/Respondents, v. [...], [...], [...], and JOHN DOE(S) 1-10, Defendants/Appellants.
[brief] Reminded by [...] that he had promised that he would return the home once the loan had been repaid, [...] then denied having entered into any such bargain.  In September 2023, after making what she believed was the final payment under the loan, [...] told [...] that she now expected him to give back her home.  (2T12-12).  [...] then responded by offering a lease, which [...] recognized as his trying to make her a tenant.  (2T12-12, 2T54-7) (Da43).  Accordingly she refused to sign it or to make any further payments, as she had completed her end of the bargain.  (2T31-6) (Da43).  On March 14, 2024, [...] was served with a summary eviction action [...] v. [...] docket [...].