ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] voluntarily dismissed the [...] as a defendant, but moved to reinstate his complaint when [...] was successful in maintaining a summary judgment motion against Plaintiff in September of 2006.  This court ruled that Plaintiff, who apparently had undertaken little or no discovery, enjoyed neither an express easement nor a prescriptive easement over [...]’s land.  Plaintiff then focused his attention on the Harrison land, claiming an easement by necessity.  (Da600)(emphasis added)  [...] also made these “findings of fact: ”  9.  Plaintiff has always accessed his property by using a lane from [...] across [...]’s property, apparently pursuant to a revocable license, and then, with the permission of his neighbor to the north, [...].  . . . 10 .  Plaintiff has no legal right to use the [...] Lane because this court has already granted summary judgment to [...] that Plaintiff did not have an express easement or a prescriptive easement to do so.  [...] apparently continues to allow Plaintiff to use the lane and gain access to [...].  (Da612-Da613)(emphasis added)  Later in her opinion, [...] referred to [...] “informally permitting access” to the portion of the driveway on his property for a period of time but refusing to acknowledge an easement.  (Da619)(emphasis added).  Referring to the earlier proceedings, she wrote, [...] objected to a judgment finding an express easement or an easement by prescription and, prevailing in 2006, eliminated [[...]’s] right of access.  This deprivation, however, did not entitle Plaintiff to now look to [the [...]’s] land since the conveyance from [...] to [...] did not deprive Lot 45 of access to [...], but rather [...]’s revocation of what apparently was a *license.*”
[brief] ## CASES | Case Name | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Allgor v. Travelers Ins. Co.,** | 46 | | 280 N.J. Super. 254 (App. Div. 1995) | | | **AMB Prop., LP v. Penn Am. Ins. Co.,** | 38 | | 418 N.J. Super. 441 (App. Div. 2011) | | | **Amir v. D’Agostino,** | 31 | | 328 N.J. Super. 141 (App. Div. 1998) | | | **AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,** | 30, 33 | | 563 U.S. 333 (2011) | | | **Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P.,**| 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 41, 43 | | 219 N.J. 430 (2014) | | | **Blanton v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC,** | 44 | | 962 F.3d 842 (6th Cir. 2020) | | | **Brawer v. Brawer,** | 27, 29 | | 329 N.J. Super. 273 (App. Div. 2000) | | | **Broadway Maint. Corp. v. Rutgers, the State Univ.,** | 45 | | 90 N.J. 253 (1982) | | | **Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C.,** | 16 | | 323 N.J. Super. 118 (App. Div. 1999) | | | **Christ Hosp. v. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs.,** | 31 | | 330 N.J. Super. 55 (App. Div. 2000) | | | **Chung v. StudentCity.Com, Inc.,** | 40 | | No. 10-10943, 2013 WL 504757 (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 2013) | | | **Cole v.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING VILLEDA UNEQUIVOCALLY AGREED TO UBER’S TERMS AND CONDITIONS ALONG WITH THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT BECAUSE VILLEDA REFUTES THE AFFIDAVIT FROM UBER.  (Pa03)  By its unequivocal determination that [...] checked the box to indicate she “reviewed and agreed to the Terms and Conditions,” the trial court incorrectly disregarded Appellant’s various arguments, supported by evidence, that the Affidavit from [...] is false.  Pa17-20.  The New Jersey Arbitration Act mandates that the Court determines whether an agreement to arbitrate exists and that the controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6(b).  When the trial court faces this determination summarily, the trial court must view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  Kleine v. Emeritus at Emerson, 445 N.J. Super. 548, n.12 (App. Div. 2016)(citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)).  In Kleine, the brother of the plaintiff, [...], was presented with stacks of paper to sign and initial to admit his sister to a new nursing home, after removing her from a different nursing home where she was caused to suffer trauma.  445 N.J. Super. at 548-549.  He was left alone to sign the stacks of paper with no explanation or instructions.  Id. at 549.  McMahon made further assertions surrounding the context in which he received a waiver he allegedly signed containing an arbitration clause to waive his sister’s right to a jury trial and right to appeal any adverse decision.  Id.  The Kleine Court opined had the judge assumed the truth of the sworn statements of McMahon and considered the language of the agreement in the light most favorable to McMahon, “the one-sided waiver extracted by defendant, as well as an assumption of the truth of McMahon’s assertions about the manner in which the contract was formed, would have required an evidentiary hearing related to unconscionability. ”  Id. at 551.  Here, in the written briefs and oral argument heard in connection with [...]’s motion to compel arbitration, the trial court erred by disregarding the statements made and evidence from Appellant disproving the assertions made by [...].  Pa17-20; 1T24:1-25; 25:1-21.
[brief] ’”  Zuber, 227 N.J. at 452 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75).  A sentencing judge does not discharge his or her duty under Miller by simply considering the youth factors.  Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 734 (observing that Miller “did more than require a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender's youth before imposing life without parole”).  Zuber requires sentencing courts to consider the Miller factors at every stage of sentencing, including as part of the evaluation of the statutory sentencing factors and the decision to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences.  *Zuber*, 227 N.J. at 447.  The *Miller* analysis is not complete until the judge “addresse[s] the question *Miller* and *Montgomery* require a sentencer to ask: whether the petitioner was among the very ‘rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility’” such as to warrant a sentence that is the practical equivalent of life without parole.  *Tatum v. Arizona*, 137 S.Ct. 11, 12 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting *Montgomery*, 136 S.Ct. at 735); See *Zuber*, 227 N.J. at 440 (citing *Miller*, 567 U.S. at 479).  As the resentencing court acknowledged, [...] was originally sentenced to the practical equivalent of life without parole.
[brief] ” (Da228-229, ¶4).  See [...]’s Statement of Facts, supra at 12-13, regarding the express contradictions as to “maintenance fees would not increase. ”  6  See [...]’s Statement of Facts, supra, at pages 12-13.  Finally, eight (8) of the plaintiffs claimed that they were told they could exchange their intervals “whenever and wherever” they wanted or they could use their intervals “whenever they wanted” and that they could reserve rooms at owner’s rates “whenever they wanted.
[brief] At his deposition, [...] explained that, subsequent to the Accident, he became aware of a miscommunication regarding which specific Parkway cut-through he was supposed to utilize on the day of the Accident.  Due to that miscommunication, [...] believed that he was supposed to use the paved cut-through, rather than the unpaved “grassy” cut through:  Q:  Why did you use the emergency vehicle turnaround at 87.5?  A: Because I was instructed to use the turnaround by the foreman on the job.  It was a miscommunication, I thought that that was the one I was supposed to use when there was one further back over the grass that he was talking about.  Q: Who was this person that instructed you?  A: [...]. \(^1\)
[directive] Scan up-to-date Live an utilize 2.2.4. and 2.2.2, 2.2.3, subsections process.  See without the decision is made pursuant to this subsection charging event that the  In the determining overcome a assessment, when whether to risk automated preliminary of a benefit with assistant in accordance subsection 4.3.1, the acomplaint-summons issuing presumption of special designated supervisory officer shall give general, or attorney prosecutor, deputy program providing the pretrial protection served by services public interest of consideration to the any make as to assessment and to recommendations an objective conduct opportunity to with an release.l3 be posed by risks that would defendant's manage the needed to may be that conditions charging decision be construed to require that the shall be subsection
[brief] [...] and his medical practice, the [...] (collectively, the “[...]”), sued [...].  (Da60).  The [...] identified Dr. Hole as a “competing physician” at [...] who engaged in a “scheme” to attempt “to interfere with the business relationship that Dr. Russonella has with [...] by fabricating allegations of inappropriate conduct and misrepresentation. ”  (Da60).  The [...] accused Dr. Hole of writing “scurrilous letter(s) to” the chair of St. Mary’s credentials committee, which questioned Dr. Russonella’s “character and veracity. ”  (Da60).  The [...] further contended that Dr. Hole undertook to slander Dr. Russonella’s professional judgment and credentials by writing and by making inappropriate statements to fellow physicians practicing at St. Mary’s.  (Da60).  They further alleged that Dr. Hole knowingly made these untrue statements with the “malicious[] inten[t] to injure . . . [Dr. Russonella’s . . . practice[,] good name and profession” by causing Dr. Russonella “infamy and disgrace. ” (Da60).  Further still, the [...] alleged that Dr. Hole intended to “vex, harass, oppress, and totally ruin [Dr. Russonella’s] profession. ” (Da60).  On July 20, 2017—eleven days after the filing of the Complaint—[...] issued a reservation of rights letter to Dr. Hole.
[brief] A.  The Association’s entire membership does not constitute its “designated representatives” within the meaning of the Act.  The Association has refused to negotiate without the potential presence of its entire membership (which the Association self-identifies as a “Bargaining Council”) at negotiations sessions (Pa220, ¶ 5-6).  By the Act’s plain language, however, negotiations must be conducted between designated representatives of each party, and not between the entire Association and the entire Board.  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3.  In other words, it is self-evident that the entire Association cannot be a representative of itself.  Yet, that is exactly what the Association seeks in this case and what [...]’s holding permits.  In its decision, [...] cites to several of its decisions which stand for the proposition that “[n]either the employer nor the majority representative may dictate the other’s choice of representatives for collective negotiations [emphasis added]” (Pa233).  However, [...] conflates this analysis with the actual issue presented in this matter – whether the majority representative may designate its entire membership as “representatives” for collective bargaining within the intent of the Act.
[brief] (8T64:6-68:24).  [...] testified that "you never turn a person loose on the sales floor I don’t care how much training they have until they’re ready."  (8T69:9-11).  Inasmuch as he was still in training and not ready to be "turned loose" on the sales floor by himself, [...] should have been paired with an experienced employee at the time of the altercation with plaintiff, according to [...]’s testimony.  (8T87:20-24).  [...] failure to make sure [...] was ready before turning him loose on the sales floor by himself constituted a breach of the standard of care in the retail industry for training and supervision, and was a cause of the incident between [...] and plaintiff.
[directive] ”  Asking About and Recording Gender Identity Information  As this Directive lays out, certain law enforcement policies and practices turn on the gender of an individual.  Such interactions shall be performed in accordance with the individual’s gender identity, regardless of the gender that individual was assigned at birth and/or their anatomical characteristics.  That requires officers to properly recognize an individual’s gender identity and record that information.  In many cases, an individual’s gender will be properly reflected on their driver’s license or other official documentation, and a law enforcement officer will be able to rely on that information alone.  But there are circumstances in which an officer will need more information.  Officers should recognize that some transgender, non-binary, or gender non-conforming individuals’ government- issued identification may reflect their gender assigned at birth rather than their gender identity.  Moreover, an individual may have an “X” marker for gender on their official documentation, which indicates that the individual has an “undesignated/non-binary” identification.  So where an individual does not have any form of official identification with them, where an individual has an identification with an “X” marking, where an individual indicates to the officer that their gender identity does not match the gender on their documentation, or where the officer does not know the individual’s gender identity, law enforcement officers may ask for additional information to ensure the dignity, safety, and legal rights of the individual, in accordance with Part I.B.  In such a scenario, law enforcement officers should respectfully ask the individual, “What pronouns do you use?,” in order to address individuals using their chosen pronouns and titles of Page 14 respect.
[brief] DA at 101a, 347a.  There had been no discussion in the intervening time between the [...] and [...] about the status of the project.  DA at 102a.  Since the Walnut Avenue property fell through, [...] has attempted to purchase property in [...] to replace the [...], but it was unsuccessful.  DA at 304a – 305a.  [...] is currently attempting to purchase property in [...] where a new substation can be constructed, but it has yet to do so.  DA at 304a.  Until such a property is purchased, [...] does not know exactly how it will need to route the connections for the combined projects [...] and [...].
[brief] The law regarding the constitutionality and substantial government interests for restrictions on “off-premises” versus “on-premises” signage is well settled.  There was no need for a plenary hearing because case law above establishes the Distance Regulation passes the intermediate scrutiny test.  Plaintiff simply misapplies *E & J Equities*, a case concerning the standard for adopting of a new ordinance, to the instant case which concerned the issue of a variance from existing ordinance for which there is well settled body of case law.  Under Plaintiff’s logic, *E & J Equities* mandates that local municipalities conduct a full constitutional analysis in every variance hearing.  This is not just incorrect but in direct opposition to applicable law.  On the contrary, the relevant case law demonstrates that when there is a constitutional challenge to an existing ordinance, as in the instant case, it is indeed proper for the trial court to analyze the “purposes” section of the ordinance and relevant case law regarding the subject restriction.  In the instant case, it is well settled that the purposes outlined in the ordinance, traffic safety and aesthetics, are to sufficient government interest to regulate “off-premises” versus “on-premises” signage.  Moreover, the relevant case law makes clear that a 1000-foot restriction on “off-premises” signage from an intersection is constitutional.  Thus, the Trial Court correctly found that the Defendants identified a substantial government interest for the Distance Regulation.
[directive] Violence Domestic in Factors Special 4.6.10 in acomplaint-warrant or acomplaint-summons for apply to whether determining  In general attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant or officer police the cases, violence domestic to pursuant designated officer supervisory or 3.2 Section with accordance in consulted the to relevant circumstances following the to consideration special give shall 3.3.2 subsection complaint- a on released be to were defendant if victim the to posed be would that risks summons: complaint- a of issuance from automatically resulting detention mandatory the whether (1) from victim a discourage might situation, violence domestic the exacerbate might warrant the serve not would otherwise or prosecution, the with cooperating or charge the pursuing justice; of interest be would offenses, it violence domestic of nature repetitive the given whether, (2) is defendant the if recognition that in acomplaint-warrant for apply to appropriate pretrial on while crime new a commits thereafter and complaint-summons by charged release. revoke 2A:162-24 to N.J.S.A. to pursuant move cannot prosecutor release, the 30); note Cf. 8.4.3. and 4.5.2 subsections (See injury; such of extent and the injury, of signs exhibited victim the whether (3) used; be to threatened was or victim, the against used was weapon of type any whether (4) restraining final or temporary a violated previously time any at has defendant whether the (5) if acomplaint-warrant applying for of presumption a (creating 4.5.2 subsection cf. order, release or order restraining of a violation in committed was offense present the violation(s); previous such of seriousness and nature the and condition), that firearms or more one possesses defendant the that believe to reason there is whether (6) Prevention the pursuant to surrendered or seized be cannot reasons other or practical for complaint- on custody a from release defendant's the before Act Violence Domestic of another such as arrest of place than the other location a at kept firearm a (e.g., summons premises); business or office an or residence, or sadness excessive such as behavior suicidal exhibited defendant the whether (7) self-injury; threatening or moodiness 49
[brief] Upon review, this court commented that the judge reached his conclusion after “thoughtful consideration of the evidence,” and that “the double-murder home-invasion burglary does not appear to be an example of children ‘lack[ing] maturity and responsibility. ”  Baker, No. A-2961-18, slip op. 10-12.  Nonetheless, the court remanded the matter for resentencing pursuant to Comer.  Id. at 12.  V.  Third sentencing
[brief] (Pb35-Pb36).  Again, Plaintiff conflates the requirements for zoning ordinances and land use boards with the requirements for general legislation ordinances.  Case law is clear that for general legislation ordinances, substantial compliance with the notice requirements is all that is required.  The Trial Court correctly concluded that the notice substantially complied with the requirements of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 because the title of Ordinance 13-2022 contained its purpose and therefore, separate words, restating the statement of purpose was unnecessary.  V.
[brief] Deference to the trial court should be accorded unless its determination is so wide of the mark as to be clearly mistaken.  *Maggio v. Pruzansky*, 22 N.J. Super. 567, 577 (App. Div. 1988).  As the lower Court clearly considered these arguments of Appellant in seeking an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to R. 4:42-9(a)(2) and rejected such relief with legal basis for said denial, this determination should not be disturbed upon appellate review.
[brief] As of today the sheriff is still possessed of all his common law powers as a police officer which are specifically set forth at some length in 1 Blackstone [*]344; 1 Chitty's Criminal Law [*]25.  See the notes in Elmer's Digest, page 452.  There is nothing in the statutes abolishing these common law duties of the sheriff, so I have come to the conclusion that he still has the primal power as a police and peace officer in the county, where necessary, to arrest any one on a criminal charge.  State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 185-86 (N.J. 1953)  II
[directive] The Directive #12-06  Standard Grand Jury Charge  July 20, 2006  Page 2  Presiding Judges had based their draft on the various grand jury charges previously in use in the counties.  At the risk of being redundant, I would stress again that use of these standard grand jury charges as written is mandatory statewide.  I will be providing informational copies of the standard grand jury charge(s) to the Attorney General, the Prosecutors, the Public Defender, and the NJSBA.  Any questions regarding this standard grand jury charge or regarding grand juries in general may be directed to [...], Jury Management ([...]) or to [...], Assistant Director ([...]).  /msg attachments cc: Chief Justice [...] Criminal Presiding Judges
[directive] B.  A sworn law enforcement officer who tests positive for illegal drug use; is found to have been consuming or being under the influence of cannabis or marijuana while at work or during work hours; or refuses to submit to a drug test, and who resigns or retires in lieu of disciplinary action or prior to the completion of final disciplinary action, shall be reported by his or her employer to [...] and shall be permanently barred from future law enforcement employment in New Jersey.  C.  Notifications to the [...] shall include the following information as to each individual: 1. Name and address of the submitting agency, and contact person; 2. Name of the individual who tested positive; 3. Last known address of the individual; 4. Date of birth; 5. Social security number; 6. SBI number (if known); 7. Gender; 8. Race; 9.  Eye color; 10.  Substance the individual tested positive for, the circumstances of the officer being found to have been consuming or being under the influence of cannabis or marijuana while at work or during work hours, or circumstances of the refusal to submit a urine sample; 11.  Date of the drug test or refusal; 12.  Date of final dismissal or separation from the agency; and 13.  Whether the individual was an applicant, trainee or sworn law enforcement officer.  D.  The certification section of the notification form must be completed by the chief or director, and notarized with a raised seal.  E.
[brief] Nonresidential districts.  (a)  In the TC, B, OB and LR Districts, no wall or fence shall exceed a height of six feet above ground level; provided, however, that wherever tennis courts and other court sports are permitted accessory uses, a fence used to enclose said courts may be erected to a height of not more than 15 feet above ground level, and further provided that said fence is located at least 10 feet from a property line.  Upon discontinuance of tennis court use, any such fence shall either be reduced to a height of six feet or removed.  (b)  In the I Districts, no wall or fence shall exceed a height of eight feet above ground level and shall be permitted in side and rear yards only.  All other portions of this Section shall remain unchanged.  SECTION 17.
[brief] ONE POLICY OF EQUITY IS THE DOCTRINE OF UNCLEAN HANDS, WHICH STATES THAT A COURT SHOULD NOT GIVE RELIEF TO A WRONGDOER IN A SUIT WHO ACTED AGAINST THE PRINCIPLES OF FAIRNESS.  THIS ISSUE WAS NOT DISCUSSED/RAISED BELOW  5.  IMPLIED  COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING THIS ISSUE WAS NOT DISCUSSED/RAISED BELOW  6.  THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES TO COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF IS UNWARRANTED AND COUNSEL FEES SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO DEFENDANT  THIS ISSUE IS CONTAINED IN THE RULING OF [...], OCTOBER 13, 2023 AT PARAGRAPH 26 OF DOCUMENT DA  5  PERSPECTIVE AND CONCLUSION TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS