ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] .............19  Lederer v. Gursey Schneider LLP, 22 Cal.App.5th 508, 527, 231 Cal.Rptr.3d 518 (2018)  ..................................................................................................................14  Lieberman v. Employers Ins., of Wausau, 84 N.J. 325, 341, 419 A.2d 417 (1980).12  Lovett v. Estate of Lovett, 250 N.J.Super. 79 (Ch.Div. 1991)..........................12, 30, 31 McCullough v. Sullivan, 102 N.J.L. 381, 132 A.102 (1926)........................................24
[brief] His affidavit, D-155, was admitted into evidence.  14T25:2-14 A31 and DGNS from about 2009.  (D-155)  Da994.  As [...] acknowledged, 2T66:5-67:3, [...] met with him and [...] every tax season “to review [the businesses’] financial books and records, including the general ledgers and QuickBooks files.
[brief] 5T10:3-5.  On June 1, 2023, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey, the Appellant filed a Motion Reopening Appellant’s Chapter 7 Case and Determining that the Postpetition Judgment Obtained by Creditor [...] is Not Enforceable Beyond, or Alternatively Shall Be Molded to, the $200,000 Policy Limit of the Debtor’s Automobile Insurance.  Da62-82.  On June 14, 2023, Appellee filed an Opposition and Cross-Motion for an order declaring the Judgment be enforced as a non-dischargeable debt against the Appellant.  Da83-94.
[brief] (Da22-Da44).  The trial court denied this motion, first acknowledging that the State’s proffered expert testimony on firearm and toolmark identification “is well-established, spanning over 100 years in the United States. ”  (5T125-9 to 16).  The court found that New Jersey courts have repeatedly found that this proffered --- \(^2\) *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). testimony was scientifically reliable in New Jersey courts under the Frye\(^3\) standard and provisions in N.J.R.E. 702.  (5T125-9 to 16).  The trial court further found that defendant failed to meet his burden by relying on cases alleging the unreliability of toolmark identification under Daubert when the correct test in New Jersey is under Frye.  (5T127-9 to 25).  The court further found that defendant failed to prove that the prejudicial value would be outweighed by the probative value under N.J.R.E. 403.  (5T128-1 to 9).  The trial court stated the same in a written order.  (Pa1-Pa2).  On February 17, 2022, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for an alibi jury instruction based on the contents of defendant’s taped statement.  (13T66-22 to 70-18).  The court concluded that defendant failed to comply with alibi notification requirements in Rule 3:12-2 but, even if defendant had provided timely notice of its reliance on an alibi, the record did not support this instruction because defendant failed to establish proof of an alibi.
[brief] The essential difference between an employment and an independent contractor is the one who hires an independent contractor has no right to control the manner in which the work is to be done.  Rather, the work performs out of the contractor’s own enterprise and the contractor is properly charged with responsibility for preventing the risk of injury.  The facts demonstrate that [...] worked for [...] on a (indiscernible) basis using a 1099 form on a trip-by-trip basis for said fee.  As stated before, he performs similar task for other entities on the same basis.  Other than providing a list of goods, details on how the work was to be performed is left to [...]....(1T:11:12-12:1)
[brief] (Da45, Da50-51).  In other words, the Amended Policy categorically and facially treats transgender students (subject to blanket notification) differently than it treats cisgender students (subject to no parental notification).  Although Appellants below argued that the Amended Policy could apply to cisgender students who requested a social transition, as the court noted, “who but transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students would request public and social accommodations or express a change in gender identity or expression?” (Da106-107).  Indeed, Appellants no longer seriously argue that the Amended Policy applies equally to cisgender students.  Nor does the Amended Policy guarantee that a student’s requested accommodation be respected if the student’s parents object.  It does not guarantee that a student’s preference of name and pronoun will be respected, instead leaving providing an amorphous instruction that parents be consulted “[w]here there is a disagreement between the student and the family” in order to “develop a plan for how the student will be referred to at school, including the pupil’s name and/or choice of pronouns.” (Da45-46).  Nor does the Amended Policy guarantee a student the ability to access and use restrooms, locker rooms, and changing facilities in accordance with their gender identity, mandating instead that the school consult with “the student’s parent/guardian to develop a plan for the student’s use of facilities. ” (Da50-51).  These provisions also treat transgender students (not guaranteed to be treated in accordance with their gender identity) differently than they treat cisgender students (guaranteed to be treated in accordance with their gender identity).  Other evidence of differential treatment abounds.  The Amended Policy’s title—“Transgender Students”—underscores that it does not apply to cisgender students, and the remainder of its language eliminates any doubt.
[directive] Barricaded Individual.  2.1  A person who is the focus of a law enforcement intervention effort, has taken a position in a physical location, including a structure or vehicle, who does not allow immediate law enforcement access, and is refusing law enforcement orders to exit or comply.  Depending upon the circumstances, a subject could also be barricaded in an open- air or outside setting, such as a tree stand or densely wooded area or on a bridge.  A Barricaded Individual may be someone suspected of an offense (a Barricaded Suspect) or a person in need of medical or mental health intervention (a Barricaded Subject).  Before determining that a person is a barricaded individual, law enforcement shall consider whether the person is simply refusing to make contact, but not presently a danger to self or others,1 nor subject to a lawful arrest for an offense at that time.
[brief] (5T67:24-68:3).  On direct, the defendant first read in testimony given by the plaintiff during her deposition.  (5T69:17-73:17).  The defendant next called its liability expert, [...], P.E., to testify.  (5T73:21-22).  [...] testified about a demonstration he performed at the [...] store to recreate the plaintiff’s walking path that led to her fall to determine the cause of her fall.
[brief] Plaintiff mailed the Pre-Action Notice to Defendant’s last known address (less than 30 days’ since it was provided by [...]) as set forth in the Retainer Agreement, by regular and certified mail, and also by email to the same address specified by [...] and the only method used by the parties to communicate.  This was the same last known address that was also provided to the trial court on August 27th, 2019, and the very same address that was used by the Bergen County Fee Arbitration Secretary when mailing the Committee’s fee award determination.  Plaintiff referred to this mailing in the complaint fully complying with Rule 1:20A-6.
[directive] Maintained by the Newborn Screening Program  I.  Introduction and Overview  The Newborn Screening Program is an important public-health program designed to detect unseen illnesses and connect newborn infants with comprehensive healthcare and services.  See N.J.S.A. 26:2-110, -111; N.J.A.C. 8:18-1.12.  New Jersey law requires that every baby born in the State must have a bloodspot screen taken within 48 hours of birth to test for various conditions that can cause serious health problems or even death, unless a parent or guardian objects on religious grounds.  See N.J.S.A. 26:2-110, -111; N.J.A.C. 8:18-1.12.  The Program is critical to helping medical professionals, parents, and guardians quickly detect a variety of congenital disorders, and to helping prevent future problems related to those conditions through early diagnosis and treatment.  It also provides universal access to screening for all babies, including those who otherwise might not have sufficient access to care.  See N.J.S.A. 26:2-110.  Crucial to the success of the Program is that information gathered through it is kept private.  N.J.S.A. 26:2-111; N.J.A.C. 8:18-1.13.  And given the sensitivity inherent in this Program, law enforcement has almost never sought to use this material as part of an investigation—indeed, the Department of Health in 2022 revealed that only five grand jury subpoenas had been received (from four law enforcement agencies) over the preceding five years, an average of one per year.  But even the infrequent use of information gathered via a public-health program can impact the public’s trust in such programs, which can in turn jeopardize public safety and public health.  Therefore, in the interests of bolstering public confidence in this medical-screening program, this Directive adds new and important limits to ensure that law enforcement agencies will only seek such information in genuinely exceptional circumstances.  It does this by imposing new approval requirements for the rare cases in which law enforcement seeks to obtain newborn “bloodspot” information, and designates the legal process this Office will require all law enforcement agencies to follow going forward.  June 20, 2024  Page 2  Therefore, pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law-enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey to implement and comply with the directives outlined below:
[brief] (1T 20-10 to 24)  That analysis was insufficient, failing to actually examine the reliability of the method upon which the State’s entire case rests.  A court should hold a testimonial hearing whenever “the qualification of a person to be a witness, or the admissibility of evidence. . . is in issue. ”  N.J.R.E. 104(a).  This is especially true when the reliability of a proposed topic of expert testimony or the reliability of an individual expert’s testimony is at issue.  *State* v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 567 (2005); State v. Mervilus, 418 N.J. Super. 138, 139 (App. Div. 2011).
[brief] Respondent’s argument that it proved DWI beyond a reasonable doubt under the observational, or “under the influence”, standard is similarly misguided.  Respondent argues that the Law Division properly found Appellant guilty under the observational standard because [...] testified that, before performing field sobriety tests on Appellant, he “smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage, had slurred speech, and had bloodshot and droopy eyes,” and because Appellant further admitted to [...] that he previously drank one martini on the evening in question.  (Resp. Brief at 25).  Respondent does nothing to address the arguments contained in Appellant’s brief to this point; namely, the fact that the trial court erred in crediting [...]’s testimony considering the fact that [...]’s testimony was replete with instances of forgetfulness and further evidenced a lack of credible recollection by [...].  (App. Brief at 23-26).  Indeed, when examined [...] provided inconsistent testimony regarding whether he gave Appellant a subsequent *Miranda*\(^3\) warning following his arrest, (App. Brief at 23; Aa038- \(^3\) *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). and [...] could not recall what he used as a stimulus when conducting the horizontal gaze nystagmus test on Appellant, (App. Brief at 24; 2T17:11-13).  In addition, [...] could not recall what shoes Appellant was wearing or whether Appellant requested to take off his shoes while performing the walk-and-turn test.  (App. Brief at 24; 2T20:13-19).  In fact, [...] himself acknowledged that his memory of the events on November 5, 2019 was unclear given the fact that those events had occurred over two years prior to [...] providing testimony in this matter.  (App. Brief at 24-25; 2T18:19-19:2).  Despite Respondent’s contentions about the sufficiency of the evidence under the observational standard, the Law Division erred in crediting Office Ordway’s testimony.  Accordingly, the Law Division erred in finding that Respondent proved DWI beyond a reasonable doubt under the observational standard.  In sum, Respondent is incorrect in arguing that the Law Division properly found that Appellant committed DWI beyond a reasonable doubt under both the per se and observational standards of liability.
[brief] (Da59-60; 9T16-10 to 17-6).  On August 5, 2022, [...] denied defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.  (Da65; 10T25-3 to 31-4).  The judge granted the State’s motion for an extended term and sentenced defendant to twenty years in prison subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA).  (Da66-67; 10T32-25 to 33-4; 10T57-21 to 58-4).
[brief] ”  Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590, 604 (N.J. 2001); see also AC Ocean Walk, LLC v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 256 N.J. 294, 312 (2024) (“‘If the language is clear, that is the end of the inquiry,’ and courts will not engage in ‘a strained construction to support the imposition of liability’ or write a better policy for the insured than the one purchased. ’”) (quoting Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 195 N.J. 231, 238 (2008)).  Here, the insureds’ purported expectation of coverage is objectively unreasonable and thus has no bearing on coverage.  As discussed above, the primary [...] contains the same definition of “underinsured motor vehicle” as under the [...], and barred UIM coverage for the same reason.
[brief] In Hoffman, the defendant’s website contained a forum selection provision that was not available to the plaintiff “unless he or she scrolled down to a submerged portion of the webpage where the disclaimer containing the clause appeared. ”  Hoffman v. Supplements Togo Mgmt., LLC, 419 N.J. Super. 596, 611 (App. Div. 2011).  And if a consumer purchased one of the defendant’s products, the website would skip ahead to new pages that did not contain the disclaimer.  Ibid.  Thus, the Appellate Division found that the clause was unreasonably masked from the view of prospective purchasers because of “its circuitous mode of presentation[,]” and therefore, unenforceable.  Ibid.  Similarly, in Wollen, the Court considered the instance where a consumer would have to create an account and navigate multiple webpages to submit an internet-based service request.  468 N.J. Super. at 487-88.  On the seventh and final webpage contained fields to input the user’s contact information.  Id. at 488.  This final page contained a hyperlink, which, in turn, contained an arbitration agreement.  Id. at 488-89.  The Appellate Division “found the hyperlink ‘vague, ambiguous and misleading’ because the hyperlink did not indicate that the user was required to affirmatively assent, read, or acknowledge the terms and conditions before submitting his or her request for service. ”  Santana v. SmileDirectClub, LLC, 475 N.J. Super. 279, 288 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Wollen, 468 N.J. Super. at 502-03).
[directive] At the direction of Attorney General [...], the [...] (“[...]”) is establishing these standard operating procedures (“SOP”) for grand jury presentations of investigations involving fatal police encounters.  Introduction  In December 2019, Attorney General Grewal issued Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive,”1 Directive 2019-4, also known as the “Independent Prosecutor which established a mandatory ten-step process for conducting independent criminal investigations in cases involving fatal police encounters.  These SOP cover the preparation and presentation of matters to the grand jury, encompassed in Steps 6 through 10 of the Independent Prosecutor Directive, after the investigative process has been completed.  In particular, Step 8 of the Directive addressed the presentation of evidence to a grand jury.  Step 8 distinguished between two categories of cases: those where the prosecutor is to present the matter to the grand jury, and those where the prosecutor is required subject to a presumption in favor of presenting to the grand jury, but may decline to do so in certain limited situations.  Grand jury presentation is mandatory in three types of cases, which will be collectively referred to here as “fatal police encounters”:  1.  The use of force by a law enforcement officer resulting in death; Available at: https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide/directives/ag-Directive-2019-4.pdf.  1  1  2.  The death of a civilian during an encounter with a law enforcement officer; and 3.  The death of a civilian while in the custody of law enforcement, where the death could be plausibly linked to the actions of a law enforcement officer, whether through the intentional use of force or a reckless indifference to human life.  These SOP focus only on these circumstances where grand jury presentation is mandatory.  Generally speaking, [...] investigators and prosecutors, not County Prosecutor offices, will handle cases that involve mandatory grand jury presentation, so as to comply with N.J.S.A. 52:17B-107(a)(2), which requires that investigations into fatal police encounters be handled by the Prosecutors.2 Attorney General rather than County I.
[brief] Da110-11.  On the morning of the adjourned scheduled sale date of December 14, 2023, counsel for Borrower and [...] contacted counsel for Plaintiff in the action below to request yet another adjournment, claiming another imminent refinance closing.  Plaintiff did not believe them and noted to them that the Borrower retained its statutory redemption right.  Da111-12.  The sale occurred on December 14, 2023 and Plaintiff was the winning bidder in the amount of $100.00.  Da250; Da275.  Plaintiff has requested that the Sheriff’s deed (the “Deed”) be executed in favor of [...] (“Plaintiff’s Designee”).  On December 26, 2023, the day of the expiration of the redemption period, Borrower and [...] filed another emergency motion (the “Sale Objection”) to object to confirmation of the sale and to stay delivery by the Sheriff of the foreclosure deed (the “Deed”).
[brief] [(Da60) (footnote omitted). ]  ---  \(^4\)  Specifically: Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016); State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, cert. denied, 583 U.S. 826 (2017).
[brief] See, e.g., Royal Park Invs. SA/NA v. HSBC Bank USA Nat’l Ass’n, No. 14-cv-08175, 2016 WL 11805202, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016) (“[T]he receiving party is not entitled to non-responsive documents, and thus failing to conduct a subsequent manual review gives that party more than it is entitled to. ”).  ESI is not exempt from Rules 26 and 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Raine Grp. LLC v. Reign Cap., LLC, No. 21-cv-1898, 2022 WL 538336, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2022), which only obligate a party to produce information that is relevant and responsive.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (limiting the scope of discovery to “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a) (“A party may serve on any other party a request within the scope of Rule 26(b) ....”); Raine Grp., 2022 WL 538336, at *1 (“[A]n ESI protocol and search terms work in tandem with the parties’ obligations under the Federal Rules and do not replace a party’s independent obligation to produce electronic (or paper) documents that are reasonably accessible, relevant, and responsive within the meaning of Rule 34.”).  Search terms, even when narrowly tailored, may still produce some amount of non-responsive documents.  As such, [...] is entitled to review its documents to ensure that they are responsive to the discovery demands even if they hit on one or more of the parties’ agreed-upon search terms.  In doing so, the Court expects [...] to promptly produce all non-privileged documents responsive to the parties’ document demands, except for those that it properly withholds based on an objection.  Based on the parties’ filings, it appears that they have not yet engaged in any meaningful dialogue about proposed search terms, custodians, and date ranges to be applied to any searches for ESI.  Without such discussions, arguments about relevance and burden are speculative at best.  It is standard practice for the negotiation of search protocols to be an iterative process that allows parties to narrowly tailor search terms, custodians, and date ranges to locate responsive and non-privileged documents for production.  Generally, if the search protocol is narrowly tailored and tested by both parties, they can minimize concerns about fishing expeditions and the production of large quantities of non-responsive documents.  With the general ESI protocol dispute now resolved and with the foregoing in mind, the parties are directed to meet and confer to negotiate search terms, custodians, and date ranges that are (1) narrowly tailored to achieve responsive search results, (2) proportional to the needs of the case, and (3) not unduly burdensome, costly, or voluminous.
[brief] However, the trial court rightly noted that it shall not substitute its own judgment for that of the governing body on issues of fact, and the governing body's decision should only be disturbed when it is arbitrary and capricious or unreasonable."  Kenwood Assocs. v. Bd. of Adjustment of the City of Englewood, 141 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1976).  As noted, there is nothing in applicable law or the NJCREAMM Act, that prohibits the cannabis Subcommittee members or the members of the entire Borough Council from considering the size of the applicant's company or organization in deciding the issuance of the Resolution of Support.
[brief] And to overcome that presumption under both constitutions, the State must show by a preponderance of evidence that the search falls within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.  State v. Manning, 240 N.J. 308, 329 (2020); see also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 (1974).  "One such exception is the automobile exception to the warrant requirement."  Witt, 223 N.J. at 422.  In Witt, the Court abandoned the "pure exigent-circumstances requirement" it had added to the constitutional standard to justify an automobile search in State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657, 671 (2000), as reiterated in State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 11 (2009), and returned to the standard set forth in State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211 (1981).  Witt, 223 N.J. at 447.  Specifically, the Court in Witt held "the automobile exception authorize[s] the warrantless search of an automobile only when the police have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of an offense and the circumstances giving rise to probable cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous," Ibid. (citing Alston, 88 N.J. at 233).
[brief] A.  Defendant [...] is in default in this litigation and has waived the right to participate in these proceedings.  [...]’s Contract with [...] is dated June 30, 2022.  (Pa15; Dr91)  Installation of [...]’s equipment began in July 2022.  (Pa3)  Plaintiffs’ complaints about faulty installation began in September 2022 (Pa33) and resulted in [...]’s unsuccessful remediation attempts throughout the remainder of 2022 and into 2023.  (Pa22, Pa33)  In January 2023, [...]’s insurance carrier became actively involved in response and to investigate Plaintiffs’ claims.  (Pa47)  The parties communicated with respect to these claims until October 24, 2023 when Plaintiffs instituted this action.(Pa1).  Defendant [...] filed its Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Cross-Claims on December 27, 2022.