ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The only issue on appeal is whether [...] was an employee of [...].  She was not.  Accordantly, the trial court correctly granted the State Respondents’ motion for reconsideration, holding that since she was solely employed by an independent contractor of [...], she could not maintain her NJLAD claims against the State entity or its employees.  That determination should be affirmed because [...]’s arguments are foreclosed by settled precedent.  As this court held in Pukowsky v. Caruso and its progeny, courts must consider twelve factors in ascertaining whether an individual is an independent contractor or an employee for the purposes of determining liability under the NJLAD.  [...] failed to present a scintilla of evidence to the trial court to meet any of those factors.  Nor has she made that showing here.  Rather, the record reflects that [...] admitted that she was an employee of Respondent [...] (“[...]”).  That fact was also memorialized in an agreement between [...] and [...] and implemented in practice.  While [...] assigned [...] to work at [...]’s [...] (“[...]”), [...] had no authority over her.  The State Respondents did not supervise [...], did not assign work to her or pay her, had no ability to grant or deny her leave requests, or to determine where or when she would work.  Nor was the work that [...] did an integral part of [...]’s business.  In short, applying the Pukowsky factors, she was not an employee, so her NJLAD claims against the State Respondents were properly dismissed.  Although [...] attempts to obfuscate that point by alleging that [...] and [...] were her “joint employers,” she does not rely upon existing NJLAD case law to support this theory, but rather, she has created a whole new legal standard that she pulls together from various cases decided outside this jurisdiction and that do not interpret the NJLAD.  In doing so, [...] conveniently ignores that to establish such a joint employer relationship, she must meet the Pukowsky factors as to both purported employers (here, [...] and [...]), which she has not done for the [...].  Finally, even if [...] were a [...] employee, the record before the trial court at summary judgment supported the existence of an irrefutable prompt and remedial defense pursuant to the case of Bouton v. BMW of North America.  For these reasons, explained in further detail below, the trial court’s order granting State Respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration and dismissing [...]’s NJLAD claims against them should be affirmed.
[brief] The parties must also submit written estimates of the financial impact of their respective last offers on the taxpayers as part of their final offer submissions.  The arbitrator may accept a revision of such offer at any time before the arbitrator takes testimony or evidence or, if the parties agree to permit revisions and the arbitrator approves such an agreement, before the close of the hearing.  Upon taking testimony or evidence, the arbitrator shall notify the parties that their offers shall be deemed final, binding and irreversible unless the arbitrator approves an agreement between the parties to permit revisions before the close of the hearing.
[directive] This Directive now establishes that certain categories of discipline will always require disclosure, and describes what specific internal affairs materials law enforcement agencies must always disclose.  As to which categories will always require disclosure, there are certain sustained offenses for which the need for accountability and deterrence necessitates disclosure regardless of the seniority of the officer or their record of misconduct.  These categories—assessed based on Rivera, the Attorney General’s internal affairs reporting portal, and prior Attorney General Directives relating to and obligations—include, but are not limited to, instances of Brady Giglio differential treatment and excessive force.  These disclosures expand upon Directive 2020-5’s focus on the length of discipline imposed, as experience has shown that metric does not always capture serious misconduct.  As to what materials must always be disclosed, this Directive draws a line between materials relating to an investigation’s findings on the one hand, and the wealth of investigative notes that detail (among other things) conversations with witnesses and victims on the other.  This Directive mandates the disclosure of the former—to provide the public with information about allegations, findings, and discipline, without delaying disclosure based on a lengthy and costly redaction process.
[brief] There is a subsequent Deed from [...] individually to [...], Inc. but there is no reference to a Riparian Grant in that Deed from [...] (individually) to [...], Inc.  This because [...] did not have title to the Riparian Grant (1T67:25).  If the Municipality were to bring this foreclosure proceeding, he believes that if [...] had acquired the Riparian Grant then the Borough would have to name [...] individually.  (1T68:12).  There are in effect, three chains of title before [...], Inc. who were actually named in the foreclosure proceeding: [...], [...] and [...], individually (1T68:12).
[brief] (“FHACA”).  The FHACA requires the [...] to protect the health, safety and welfare of the State by delineating flood hazard areas and regulated waters and controlling discharges into these areas through a permit program.  See N.J.S.A. 58:16A-50b.  The regulations at N.J.A.C. 7:13-1 et seq. create various permitting programs, including the permit decision involved in this appeal.  The FHACA vests jurisdiction in the [...] for flooding and flood preparation within the state.  The FHACA provides the [...] with “broad authority” to “map flood hazard areas, adopt land regulations, control stream encroachments, coordinate the development, dissemination, and use of relevant information and integrate the control activities of municipal, county, state and federal governments.
[brief] While employed as a security guard at a restaurant in Bridgewater, New Jersey, the Plaintiff was arrested and criminally charged with third-degree aggravated assault after seeking to remove a patron, not coincidentally the son of a retired Bridgewater police officer (Pa007-008).  After a trial, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Criminal Part, Somerset County acquitted the Appellant of third-degree aggravated assault on June 6, 2017 (Pa103), and following therefrom a judgment of acquittal did finally issue from the Clerk of the Superior Court on July 31, 2017, pursuant to Rule 3:21-5 (Pa105-107).
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[brief] [...] in its Foreclosure Complaint of 5/12/16 against my house (141a) claimed no injury at all.  [...] was a debt collector and paid a few hundred dollars to [...] to buy the Mortgage Assignments of 2/27/2009 (065a), the Mortgage Assignment of 2/28/2014 (097a), and the Affidavit of Lost Note of 2/12/2014 (088a).  Then [...] forged the HAM Agreement of 2015 (103a) to defraud me and the courts to cash in the full amount of the Note.  [...] is in violations of FDCPA unfair and deceptive practices.
[brief] Like the *Vincitore* and *Roe* plaintiffs, the plaintiff used the roadway with due care.  Further, like the *Vincitore* and *Roe* plaintiffs, it is reasonably foreseeable that defendant had actual and/or constructive notice that this roadway and sidewalk adjacent to the tree would continue to be used in this manner.  Defendant [...] cannot claim that it did not know of a defect when it shared responsibility in inspecting the construction of the sidewalk and is responsible for the cutting/shaving of the tree roots.  Additionally, the dangerous condition of the tree root, like the property in the *Vincitore* and *Roe* matters, was apparent.  However, the defendant herein did not take any action to correct it.  Further, like the *Vincitore* and *Roe* plaintiffs, it is reasonably foreseeable that defendant had actual and/or constructive notice that this roadway and sidewalk adjacent to the tree would continue to be used in this manner.  Defendant [...] cannot claim that it did not know of a defect when it had a responsibility to inspect the construction of the sidewalk and was the only entity permitted to shave the tree roots.  “Okay.
[brief] **Legal Argument**  **Point I**  The jury clearly found that the State disproved self-defense with regard to passion / provocation manslaughter.  The defendant asserts that her conviction must be overturned because the jury found that the State did not disprove self-defense.  But in this case, the verdict sheet was written so that self-defense was a separate question relating to the charges of murder, passion / provocation manslaughter, aggravated manslaughter, and reckless manslaughter.  (Da 13-18).  The verdict sheet clearly shows that the jury found that the State failed to disprove self-defense with respect to the charge of murder.  (Da 13).  The verdict sheet also shows that the State disproved self-defense regarding the charge of passion / provocation manslaughter and the jury found the defendant guilty of passion / provocation manslaughter.  (Da 14).  The verdict in this case is a valid, inconsistent verdict.  “An inconsistent verdict may be the product of jury nullification. ”  State v. Banko, 182 N.J. 44, 54 (2004).  “We permit inconsistent verdicts to be returned by a jury because it is beyond our power to prevent them. ”  Id.  “Such verdicts are permitted normally so long as the evidence was sufficient to establish guilt on the substantive offense beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  Id. (quotations omitted).  The jury in this case found that the State failed to disprove self-defense regarding murder but disproved self-defense with regard to passion / provocation manslaughter.  (Da 13-14).  While we do not know the reason the jury arrived at this inconsistent verdict, there was ample evidence to support the manslaughter conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.  The defendant herself testified that she cut the defendant in the neck and repeatedly hit him in the head with a tire iron.  The jury saw video of the defendant striking the defendant with the tire iron and dumping his body in a parking lot.  The jury saw a moment on the video when the victim’s foot moved, indicating that he was still alive when the defendant hit him with the tire iron.  (Pa 1 at 3:50:00 to 3:50:20).  If the jury believed that the victim was still alive, the victim’s foot movement was sufficient evidence to disprove the defendant’s claim of self-defense.  Although the verdict was inconsistent, it was supported by evidence in the record and must be accepted.
[brief] (Pa 899, April 4, 2019 letter from [...] to Plaintiff).  The Investigation commenced after the [...] became aware of Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant [...] on November 20, 2018, over a week prior to Plaintiff reporting same to [...].  (Id.).  During that investigation, Defendant [...] continued to work in the Burlington East [...] Office.  (Pa723, Defendant [...] deposition transcript, T40:11-17).  Defendant [...] eventually requested, and was granted, a transfer out of the Burlington East [...] Office, which occurred after the EEO Investigation.
[brief] [...] and [...] are only engaged in the passive 7 N.J. S.A. 17:11C-2 (“‘Sales finance company’ shall have the meaning ascribed to that term in section 1 of P.L.1960, c. 40 (C.17:16C-1).”).  holding and financing of debt portfolios.  Pa109, ¶¶ 5-6.  These activities do not qualify [...] and [...] as “consumer lenders” or “sales finance companies” such that the NJCFLA would then require licensure.
[brief] (30T 56-16 to 19)  Unable to rely on [...]’s prior convictions, the court had to look further afield for support for factor (3).  Despite the fact that [...]t “apologize[d] for my actions on the night of March 23rd, 2019” (30T 12-12-13 to 14); said “[he] really wish[ed] [he] had never taken that gun”; twice said he was “sorry”; and asked for “forgiveness” (30T 12-18 to 19), the court found factor (3) on the ground that he did not admit his responsibility or express remorse:  [[...]t’s] inability to admit the crimes he committed ... and his overall lack of remorse demonstrate[] qualities that make him less amenable to rehabilitative and correctional programs designed to reduce the risk of reoffending, and thus make him more likely to reoffend.  As a result, aggravating factor (3) applies, and in this court’s opinion applies with significant weight.  (30T 54-15 to 22)  (emphasis added)  Further, on the ground that the jury found p/p rather than self-defense, the court concluded that [...]t “lied on the witness stand. ”  (30T 54-8 to 22)  Combining its finding that [...]t did not confess his guilt at sentencing and its finding that he relied on what the court deemed the “false narrative” that he acted in self-defense, the court concluded, under aggravating factor (9), that there was a “need for a strong sentence for deterrence[.]”  (30T 55-7 to 17)  (emphasis added)  The record does not support a finding of factor (3) or (9).  The United States and New Jersey Supreme Courts have forbidden courts from penalizing defendants for not confessing guilt or expressing contrition at sentencing.
[brief] ’”  State v. Deatore, 70 N.J. 100, 105 (1976) (quoting State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 160 (1964)).  “The sufficiency of a stated disclaimer of any partiality in circumstances such as here involved would not only seem to run ‘counter to human nature’ as above, but to fly ‘in the face of the plain reality of the courtroom. ’”  Id. at 106 (quoting State v. Miller, 67 N.J. 229, 245 (1975) (Clifford, J., concurring and dissenting in part)).  The grounds for excusing [...] despite her assurances of impartiality rose even higher after it was revealed that [...] not only had connections to [...]’s family, but also to the State’s first witness, [...].  See Deatore, 70 N.J. at 106 (stating that trial courts should excuse jurors who have “connections with a party or witness”).
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[brief] (9T 15-17 to 15-23; 9T 61-13 to 61-22)  While dice games at the barbershop were a common occurrence, they did not usually take place on Mondays.  (9T 73-11 to 73-23; 9T 13-15 to 14-13)  When one of the witnesses, [...], was asked how he knew there was going to be a game that Monday, he said that “a Black guy” who he knows as “[...]” – Cee-Lo is a dice game, he explained – called him and said “he wanted to play” and asked if there was a game that night.  [...] then called [...] who told him there would be a game.  (9T 13-23 to 13-24; 9T 14-14 to 15-6)  [...] also testified about a dice game that took place two days before the shooting.
[brief] As other courts have noted, the maxim is "wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth" to acts of the Legislature.  *Ibid.* (quoting *Jarecki*, 367 U.S. at 307).  Its application is particularly appropriate here, as we are construing the words of "an exemption from a comprehensive policy designed to protect environmental interests," *M. Alfieri*, 269 N.J. Super. at 554, which we are bound to interpret narrowly.  The canon cautions us to take care against interpreting "upgrade" in a way that would give it a broad scope unintended by the Legislature.  Applying it here by allowing "routine" to modify "upgrade" makes upgrade consistent with the other activities included in the exemption.  It removes "upgrade" from the status of an outlier and makes it consonant with "maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, [and] repair," N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11), powerful evidence in our view of the Legislature's intended scope of the word.  See Scalia & Garner, *Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts* 195 ("When several nouns or verbs or adjectives or adverbs — any words — are associated in a context suggesting that the words have something in common, they should be assigned a permissible meaning that makes them similar.").  ---
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF CONTENTS | i | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS | iii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iv | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 5 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 12 | | POINT I | | | SUMMARY  JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE AS THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT AND DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW | 12 | | POINT II | | | APPELLANT FAILED TO IDENTIFY ANY PUBLIC POLICY IN SUPPORT OF HER PIERCE CLAIM | 14 | | POINT III | | | APPELLANT FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF ANY DISABILITY | 20 | | A.  Appellant Has Failed to Demonstrate a Prima Facie Case Under the NJLAD | 21 | B.  Appellant Cannot Establish the Existence of Generalized Anxiety.  23  C.  Obesity Is Not a Disability Under the NJLAD as a Matter of Law.  26  POINT IV  APPELLANT’S COUNSEL ATTEMPTS TO PLACE THE BLAME FOR ITS ERRORS UPON THE TRIAL JUDGE 30 POINT V THERE IS NOT A SINGLE IOTA OF EVIDENCE THAT DEMONSTRATES PRETEXT 32 POINT VI APPELLANT’S PIERCE CLAIM IS PREEMPTED 34 CONCLUSION 35 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (August 14, 2023) Pa577 | Cases | Page | |-------------------------------------------|------| | Arterbridge v. Wayfair, LLC | 14, 17, 19 | | 2022 WL 577956 (D.N.J Feb, 25, 2022) | | | Bosshard v. Hackensack University Medical Ctr. | 34 | | 345 N.J. Super. 78 (App. Div. 1994) | | | Brill v. Guardian Life, Ins. Co. of Am. | 12, 13 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | Campione v. Arizona Beverages USA | 15 | | 2024 WL 65482 (App. Div. Jan. 5, 2024) | | | Catalane v. Gilian Instrument Corp. | 34 | | 271 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div. 1994) | | | Chirino v. City of Hoboken | 23 | | 2019 WL 3852543 (App. Div. Aug. 16, 2019) | | | Cowher v. Carson & Roberts | 28 | | 425 N.J. Super. 285 (2012) | | | Delacruz v. Alfieri | 13 | | 447 N.J. Super. 1 (Law. Div. 2015) | | | Dickson v. Cmty. Bus Lines, Inc. | 26, 28| | 458 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div. 2019) | | | Dzwonar v. McDevitt | 17 | | 177 N.J. 451 (2003) | | | El-Sioufi v. St. Peter’s Univ. Hosp. | 21 | | 382 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2005) | | | Est. of Roach v. TRW, Inc. | 16 | | 164 N.J. 598 (2000) | | Est. of Zoto v.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...........................................  1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...............................................  4 STANDARD OF REVIEW ..............................................  5 STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................  7 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................  14  I.  POINT I –  There is sufficient evidence in the record to deny summary judgment on Plaintiff’s CEPA Claim ...........................................  14 (Pa712-Pa733)  II.  POINT II –  The motion Court erred by granting summary judgment because it did not grant Plaintiff all reasonable factual inferences from the record evidence ............  28 (Pa712-Pa733)  CONCLUSION .......................................................  32  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS PAGE: Order Granting Summary Judgment (July 16, 2024)
[brief] (Da179, Da348, Da350, Da356, Da363, Da413, Da416).  This included communications and certain objections from other sibling owners as well, including: • March 8, 2023 correspondence from [...] requesting an increase of the asking price in order to get the best possible offer for the Subject Property.  (Da432).  • April 4, 2023 correspondence from [...] stating that she has “been out of the loop of any and all decisions made after April 13th 2022” and “[w]hen questioned of damage I was told the woman up the street took the installation and to back off. ” (Da435).  Colleen states that she did her best “to stay out of the DYSFUNCTION and CHAOS between siblings, but the dynamics between some siblings were so out of control, we end up here with unknown persons selling our home…” (Da435).  • July 4, 2023 correspondence from [...] requesting that [...] call him “pertaining to why the gas at [...],” was “shut off” and stating that “[t]he owners of this house should be made aware of any issues pertaining to the integrity of the house moving forward. ” (Da437).  Mark also states “I want answers and I want answers now” and “please follow up with this person and get me the answers I’m seeking” including “the status on the respective buyer that I have not heard a peep of over the last six weeks. ”  (Da437).  - April 3, 2023 correspondence from [...] which states that he was “also led to believe that the house…was the sell as is” and “[a]s far as any smoke detectors or CO 2 detectors nothing was even mentioned until I read your last email. ” (Da494).  - Certification of [...] in response to the Order to Show Cause admitting that the property was not sold as envisioned by the Consent Judgment.  (Da545).  Further, the factual record contained information relating to [...]’s complaint to the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance – Real Estate Commission regarding [...] and the objections and disputes relating to [...]’s questionable actions relating to the marketing and sale of the Subject Property.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE REVISED LOT GRADE WAS THE RESULT OF “MOUNDING, TERRACING, OR OTHER DEVICES”  DESIGNED TO ALLOW INCREASED BUILDING HEIGHT (SEE APPENDIX – OPINION Pa15-16).  The trial court failed to determine and address whether the revised lot grade of the proposed development was the result of “mounding, terracing, or other devices” designed to allow increased building height.  Furthermore, the trial court failed to address the Board’s failure to consider whether the revised lot grade is not just the result of “mounding”, but whether it included either “terracing” or “other devices. ”  The fact that the trial court failed to address the entire Building Height definition on the property is plain error requiring reversal of the decision below.