ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The New Jersey Long Term Tax Exemption Law allows a municipality to “enter into a financial agreement with an urban renewal entity for the undertaking of a project set forth in a redevelopment plan adopted by the --- \(^4\) Sections II(A), II(B), II(C), and II(D) respond to Sections I(A) and I(B) in Plaintiffs’ brief.  governing body pursuant to the ‘Local Redevelopment and Housing Law[.]’”  N.J.S.A. 40A:20-4.  The Legislature intended to give the state’s municipalities wide latitude to craft an appropriate agreement:  In enacting the LTTEL, the Legislature carefully crafted a statutory scheme that provides municipalities with the means to carry out the public policy underpinning the act.
[directive] This to deadline was due 30, the pandemic.  Agencies training to were required this the more than and COVID-19 officers, 38,000 a December 31, train of 2021.  their majority to officers by law statewide coordinators and the ICAT-ABLE county 2021-7  Directive also required Director the of of Office training report enforcement Executive to agency the to coordinators training ("[...]") their respective in the on the of Public progress and Integrity Accountability jurisdictions.  However, COVID-19 compliance Agencies the training.  with substantial the reported Accordingly, this closures a training.  Directive continued, in completing resulting delay the in deadlines:  following ABLE the adjustments and training makes ICAT the to of All 1. law with Department the the of enforcement exception  Corrections agencies, September 2022.  county the training and shall 30, by correctional agencies, complete agencies shall 2. the complete correctional of county and Department Corrections training 2022  31, December by [...] •Printed Paper Is Employer  Equal Jersey is Recyclable New a,nd Recycled Oppo~•turtiity ors Arti ~y ~ a ~ ~r'RRY A~'~ d ~ ~1~' t • ~ third to the parties. is pursuant Directive issued Non-enforceability A. This by enforcement efficient uniform General's and ensure authority to Attorney the This throughout the criminal state. administration of of justice laws the and that officials agencies enforcement and on limitations law imposes Directive the under States United and than limitations imposed the restrictive more may be regulations. state statutes and federal and Constitutions, New and Jersey substantive any to create any shall in way this Directive be in construed Nothing any enforced that party. right third by may be any phrase, If severable. of shall be this B. Severability. provisions Directive The of a declared court is of this or by provision Directive sentence clause, of of the remainder invalid, jurisdiction the the validity to competent be affected. document shall not be in out this Directive concerning laid the C. requirements. Questions. questions Any of Policing Chief, J. Office Stephen Bureau shall Wenger, to addressed be at & Accountability of Office Public Integrity within the Policy [...] remain in immediately shall D. date. effect shall and This Effective Directive take of Order Attorney the superseded or repealed, amended, unless force is it by General.
[brief] 1.  Appellant has repeatedly submitted prima facie evidence of material Probation account error in multiple motions before the court with extensive evidence of account error, including court orders which Probation failed to properly enforce: the Orders of 10/20/1998, 2/5/1999, the FJOD, the Appellate Remand Orders of 1/17/2002 and 10/27/2005, the trial court’s orders of 3/25/2004, 10/22/2009, 2/2/2012, 2/6/2012, 6/28/2012, 7/20/2012, 10/11/2013, 12/10/2014, 10/27/2015, 1/10/2020, 10/25/2021, 1/11/2022 and 4/4/2022.
[brief] With this foundation, [...] testified that on December 25 at 8:02 p.m., defendant’s phone used a tower in Orange, the “Parkway Tower,” to receive a text message.  Id. at 12.  Using his maps, [...] gave his opinion that the Parkway Tower’s coverage radius “would reasonably include the crime scene. ”  Id. at 12-13.  [...] acknowledged that the crime scene is slightly less than one mile from the Parkway Tower and is at the “outer boundary” of his estimated coverage area.  Id. at 13.  [...] also acknowledged, however, that two other cell towers were closer to, and within range of, the crime scene.  Ibid.  The Supreme Court also noted that [...] testified that he did not test the actual range of the Parkway Tower and further noted that a tower’s range and coverage area can be affected by many factors, including the height of the antenna, surrounding terrain and buildings, signal frequency, transmitter and phone power ratings, and antenna direction, but he did not offer measurements or data as to those specific factors when testifying as to his estimated range for the Parkway Tower.  Ibid.  [...] similarly did not measure the actual coverage area of the Parkway Tower through either “drive testing” or “propagation maps. ”  Ibid.  The trial court and Appellate Division both found [...]’s testimony to be admissible.  The Supreme Court disagreed.
[brief] B.  Given the Complexities of the Field, New Jersey Courts Should Develop Model Criminal Jury Charges Concerning Fingerprint Comparison Opinion Testimony.  As discussed above, jurors tend to overvalue forensic testimony in general, and fingerprint comparison testimony, in particular.  However, there is currently no model jury charge in New Jersey that instructs jurors about evaluating fingerprint comparison evidence.  The only instruction in the New Jersey Model Criminal Jury Charges that directly addresses fingerprint evidence at all is an instruction that a law enforcement agency’s possession of a person’s fingerprints does not mean that person has a criminal record.  See N.J. Model Jury Charges (Criminal), Non 2C, “Fingerprints” (rev. Jan. 6, 1992).15  The New Jersey Supreme Court and Appellate Division have called for the development of model charges that instruct juries about evaluating other types of identification and expert opinion testimony, to address concerns much like those that exist for fingerprint evidence.
[brief] ”  Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (quoting [...], Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 Developmental Review 339, 339 (1992)).  These traits make juveniles’ misconduct less morally reprehensible than that of adults.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.  Second, juveniles have less ability to escape negative environments and are more susceptible to the influences in those environments.
[brief] Div. 2023) | | | Baskin v. P.C. Richards & Sons, | 14, 16 | | 246 N.J. 157 (2021) | | | Bell v. Stafford Tp., | 15 | | 110 N.J. 384 (1988) | | | Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, | 14 | | 244 N.J. 567 (2021) | | | Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, | 15 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | Brown v. Heymann, | 17 | | 62 N.J. 1 (1972) | | | Burnett v. County of Bergen, | 22 | | 198 N.J. 408 (2009) | | | Carter v. Carter Coal Co., | 25, 26 | | 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1936) | | | City of Camden v. Whitman, | 21 | | 325 N.J. Super. 236 (App. Div. 1999) | | | Community Financial Services Assoc., of America, Limited v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, | 26 | | 51 F.4th 616 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. granted in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Assoc., 143 S.Ct. 978 (2023)  | | Consumers’ Research, Cause Based Commerce, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 88 F.4th 917 (11th Cir. 2023)  ..................................................................................  25 County of Warren v. State, 409 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 2009), certif. den., 201 N.J. 153 (2010)  ...........................................................................................................  16  Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 59 S.Ct. 379, 83 L.Ed. 441 (1939)  ............................................................  25 David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301 (1965) .......................................................................................................  18 Fernandez v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 402 N.J. Super. 166 (App. Div. 2008), aff’d o.b., 199 N.J. 591 (2009)  ...........................................................................................................  14  Fink v. Cole, 302 N.Y. 216, 97 N.E.2d 873 (Ct. App.  1951) ............................................................. 31 Group Health Insurance of New Jersey v. Howell, 40 N.J. 436 (1963) ....................................................................................................... 31 Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 2116, 2131, 204 L.Ed.2d 522 (2019) ([...], dissenting) ............................................................ 26 Hopewell Tp. v. Gruchowski, 29 N.J. Super. 605 (Co. 1954) ...................................................................................... 35 Horizon Health Center v. Felicissimo, 135 N.J. 126 (1994) .................................................................................................... 16 Humane Society of the United States v. N.J. State Fish and Game Council, 70 N.J. 565 (1976) ....................................................................................................... passim In re Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive Nos. 2020-5 and 2020-6, 246 N.J. 462 (2021) .................................................................................................... 36 In the Matter of Petition to Repeal Rules Permitting Black Bear Hunting, etc., No. A-0984-20, 2022 WL 2251251 (App. Div., June 22, 2022), certif. den. 253 N.J. 434 (2023)
[brief] JUDGMENT SINCE APPELLANT DID NOT PRESERVE THIS ISSUE FOR APPEAL AND THE ARGUMENT IS INOPPOSITE TO THE POSITION ARGUED DURING THE TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS  ..................  36  A.  Appellant Failed to Preserve “Discovery” Argument Before the Trial Court and is Therefore Barred from Advancing Argument................................................................. 36 B.  Appellant Should Be Barred from Arguing This Matter Was Not Ripe for Summary Judgment Under the Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel......................................................  38 C.  Further Discovery Is Unnecessary and Will Not Change the Outcome of This Matter Since the Material Facts Are Undisputed.............................................................
[brief] “An essential element of a fair hearing within the concept of due process of law is the impartiality, i.e., open-mindedness, of the trial body. ”  Falcone v. Dantinne, 420 F.2d 1157, 1166 (3d Cir. 1969).  Here, the trial judge’s comments from the outset of this proceeding reflected that he was neither impartial nor open-minded about the case.  Specifically, after acknowledging he had not yet read the entire Lease or had any other exposure to the case (1T18-4 to 18-6), and having confirmed in that colloquy his understanding of Tenant’s claim that under the Lease Landlord owes Tenant for the Tenant’s Allowance offset, the trial judge stated that it would “be up to the, the tenant” whether to pay some amount to be determined later, having apparently already ruled out the offset argument without first looking at the Lease.
[directive] This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  As ações, petições e outros documentos entregues ao tribunal deverão estar em inglês Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English Tribunal Superior de Nova Jersey
[brief] **Respondent’s Motion To Disqualify [...] (102a – 201a). **  At the outset of this case, Respondents’ prior counsel requested that [...] provide the files in [...]’s possession concerning the prior matters.  In response, on or about May 31, 2023, [...] provided Respondents with the files.  (256a).  However, *although Respondents now claim they are prejudiced as a result of the information purportedly provided to [...] in connection with the prior matter, inexplicably, no further action was taken by Respondents for over a year.*  Indeed, although this matter has now been pending for nearly two years, voluminous discovery exchanged, substantial motion practice held, and the matter was scheduled for arbitration and trial, Respondents employed a clear litigation tactic to disqualify [...] (the “Disqualification Motion”) as a last-ditch attempt to gain an advantage before the matter proceeded to arbitration and trial.
[brief] i.  The Parties acknowledge that the Developer will incur substantial costs if the deadlines set forth herein are not achieved by the dates provided.  As a result of the foregoing, if any deadline or timeframe set forth herein that is the responsibility of the Township or the Board is not achieved in accordance with the timeline set forth above, inclusive of the 15-day extension period with respect to the adoption of the Ordinance, there shall be a penalty in the amount of five hundred ($500) per day (“Per Diem Penalty”), excepting acts of god or inclement weather cancellations or the like provided that the Township or the Board takes the required action no later than the next regular or special scheduled meeting.  The Developer shall receive a credit (“Credit”) for each day that the action, decision, meeting, or similar item is not acted upon by the Township or Board, as the case may be, or does not take place by the appropriate deadline.  By way of example, if \(^6\) The Municipal Land Use Act (‘MLUL’), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et seq., governs land use applications and requires such land use applications to be presented to and considered by a municipal land use board (Planning Board or Board of Adjustment).  the Township is responsible for adopting the Ordinance by January 30, 2021, and adopts the Ordinance on February 15, 2021 and in violation of this agreement, the Developer will be entitled to a Credit totaling 15 multiplied by the Per Diem Penalty.  The Developer shall be entitled to apply the Credit towards any fee that is due and payable to the Township in the ordinary course of development the Property, such as, but not limited to, application fees, building or construction permits, or connection fees for sanitary sewer or potable water.  This Paragraph does not limit the Developer’s remedies, in law or equity, to redress non-compliance by the Township or the Board and does not limit the Township or the Board’s defenses thereto.
[brief] 20 Baptist Home of S. Jersey v. Bo. of Riverton, 201 N.J. Super. 226 (Law Div. 1984).........................................................  39  CBS Outdoor v. Lebanon Planning Bd., 414 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 2010)..........................................................  20 Cell South of N.J. v. Bd. of Adj., 172 N.J. 75 (2002) ..................................................  20 Chou v. Rutgers, State University, 283 N.J. Super. 524 (App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 345 N.J.  374 (1996) .................................................. 20 Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Bd. of Adj., 233 N.J. 546 (2018).................................................. 48  Field v. Franklin Twp. Planning Bd., 190 N.J. Super. 326 (App. Div. 1983).................................................. 35  Grubbs v. Slothower, 389 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 2007) ..............................................  27  Jayber v. Mun. Council, 238 N.J. Super. 165 (App. Div.), certif. denied 122 N.J. 142 (1990).................................................. 23 Kensington Senior Development, LLC v. Twp. of Verona, slip op., A-1010-19 (App. Div. Dec. 1, 2021) .................................................. 34  Kramer v. Sea Girt Board of Adj., 45 N.J. 268 (1965).................................................. 19 Med. Ctr. v. Princeton Twp. Zoning Bd., 343 N.J. Super. 177 (App. Div. 2001).................................................. 33 Medici v. BPR Co., Inc., 107 N.J. 1 (1987) .................................................. 15, 22 N.
[brief] M44.  The Mayor recklessly disregarded the impact of his press release, and launched a public campaign to interfere with the Zoning Board process by suggesting that Plaintiffs proposed an unlawful and unrestrained development - a campaign which was very successful at the Zoning Board level.  The statements made by the Mayor are even more egregious considering the numerous statements and implications which are at odds with the truth.  Notably, the Trial Court found that the Mayor’s statements implied that Plaintiffs failed to adequately protect the bald eagle’s nest, when in reality, Plaintiffs had undergone considerable sacrifice to meet the applicable guidelines to do so, and the Mayor further claimed that Plaintiffs were at fault for not reducing the number of affordable units in the development, when, in reality, the number of affordable units was predetermined by an agreement signed years earlier by the Mayor himself.
[brief] [...] relies on the arguments made in her previously filed brief, and adds the following:  POINT I THE INAPPROPRIATE AND UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY OF FOUR FORENSIC EXAMINERS WAS CENTRAL TO THE STATE’S CASE.  THE ADMISSION OF THIS TESTIMONY REQUIRES THE REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT’S CONVICTIONS.  In her initial brief, [...] set forth the myriad ways in which the four forensic examiners who testified on behalf of the State overstepped the bounds of appropriate testimony.
[directive] 8.0.9  A subject officer who reasonably believes that what he or she might say during an internal affairs interview could be used against him or her in a criminal case cannot ordinarily be disciplined for exercising their Miranda rights.  However, an officer can be disciplined for refusing to answer questions during an internal affairs interview if he or she has been told that whatever he or she says during the interview will not be used in a criminal case.  Informing an officer that their statement will not be used against him or her in a criminal case is called a Garrity warning.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On December 12, 2018, a State Grand Jury returned Indictment Number [...], charging defendant [...] with first-degree maintaining or operating a controlled dangerous substance production facility, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4, 2C:2-6 (Count 9); first-degree possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1), 2C:35-5b(1), 2C:2-6 (Count 11); second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), 2C:2-6 (Count 12); second-degree conspiracy to commit the aforementioned crimes, N.J. S.A. 2C:5-2 (Count 8); third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1), 2C:2-6 (Count 10); second-degree possession of a firearm during the commission of certain crimes, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1, 2C:2-6 (Count 13); and second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b) (Count 17). ¹ (Da 9-15, 19)  The indictment charged [...]’s co-defendants, [...] and [...], with several of these offenses and others.  (Da 1-20)
[brief] “[A] party’s performance under a contract may breach that implied covenant even though that performance does not violate a pertinent express term. ”  Id. (internal citations omitted).  However, “these implied terms do not override express, inconsistent terms. ”  Kas Oriental Rugs, Inc. v. Ellman, 394 N.J.Super. 278, 287 (App. Div. 2007).  “The law continues to prohibit the enforcement of an implied contract or an implied provision that conflicts or is inconsistent with the parties’ express contract .  . . .”  Id.  As a matter of law, the PSA was validly terminated upon the return of the Deposit to Plaintiff on July 15, 2022.
[brief] RFP No. 7 requests that [...] run “electronic searches” structured to identify documents and ESI of five custodians during a certain time period using the search terms set forth in the request.  (ECF 63-1, at 2.)  [...] initially objected to the request on grounds of overbreadth, relevance, and proportionality, but agreed to “supplement” its response.  After meeting and conferring, [...] agreed to run [...]’s requested searches.
[brief] The Defendants also contend that the Court’s jury charge as read “conflated Plaintiff’s four separate claims of religious discrimination, disability discrimination, retaliation for making complaints and retaliation for seeking legal advice. ”  Db at p. 22.  However, what the Defendants fail to mention is that they did not object to the Charge as read.  Furthermore, the Defendants do not specifically identify the supposedly offending language anywhere in their brief.  Considering these clear failures, Defendants’ appeal on the grounds of an improper jury charge must be disregarded, and the Jury’s verdict affirmed.
[brief] PA44-48.  On October 27, 2021, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration (“Motion for Reconsideration”) of the October 22, 2021 Order.  DA1.  On November 4, 2021, [...] filed an opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration.  RA0025-33.  On November 17, 2021, Appellant filed a reply in support of her Motion for Reconsideration. RA0034-35.  On November 19, 2021, the trial court denied Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration.  DA2.  On December 7, 2021, Appellant appealed the October 22, 2021 Order granting [...]’s motion to dismiss the Complaint.
[brief] (1T; 12a-27a)  A.  The Summary Judgment Standard.  (1T; 12a-27a)  Due to the genuine issues of material fact, the grant below of summary judgment was improper.  This Court’s review on appeal is de novo, applying the same standard as the Court below.  Chance v. McCann, 405 N.J. Super. 547, 563 (App. Div. 2009).  In establishing the summary judgment standard to be applied, our Supreme Court held as follows:
[brief] Specifically, the Court noted that there are two things that really "jumped out" to him.  (2T85-8).  "One is that the Plaintiff has repeatedly stated that the Defendant has never said from her own mouth that she wants to end the relationship..." and it's the Plaintiff who filed to end the relationship.  Id.  Second, that Defendant minimized his actions and those of his family, which actions led to the demise of the marriage.  (2T85 and 86).  Essentially, that "the facts aren't adding up to what the plaintiff believes happened.  The Plaintiff to this Court is minimizing his actions that he even testified to..."  (2T86-24; 2T87-1).  For example, "the Defendant through Plaintiff's own testimony, didn't say I don't want children.  She said not yet."  (2T87-20).  Further, that the Defendant's characterization of herself on the wedding website was "modern" and how "it is reasonable that someone who felt that they were in a more modern relationship would be trusted to go to D.C. to do a job training, would be trusted to meet up with a friend in Canada to say hello, wouldn't need to be watched."  (2T88)  The Court also found that it did not feel that Defendant was “pulling the plug on a marriage necessarily.  I think she was finding her legs and I’m not sure she was given the space or the support to do so.
[brief] Shim v. Washington Township Planning Board, 298 N.J. Super. 395, 413 (App. Div. 1997).  In the present case, [...] had an opportunity to cross examine [...]’s witnesses, and present their own witnesses.  Although counsel for [...] attended the hearings, counsel chose not to question [...]’s witnesses or present any witnesses on behalf of Appellant.  Having not taken the opportunity at the hearing, [...] cannot now claim that the Board did not allow contrary testimony or that the trial court erred in finding that no contrary testimony was provided.  In further support of its argument, [...] relies on comments made by the Zoning Board Attorney providing explanations to the Board and public about the nature of the hearing and matters that were, or were not, subject to the Board’s jurisdiction.