ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Statement of Facts submitted with the moving papers on behalf of appellant/plaintiff [...] is only disputed to the extent that they contain legal conclusions rather than statements of facts.  On January 30, 2022, appellant/plaintiff [...] applied for automobile insurance with [...] via the [...] website.  One day prior, on January 29, 2022, [...] sought a price quote for automobile insurance policy with respondent/defendant [...] via the website of [...].  (DR01-DR05 L:16-32).  [...] requested multiple price quotes of this agency, initially giving a New Jersey address and then giving a North Carolina address.  (DR01-DR05 L:36-47, 70-78, 110-120).  On [...]’s application for insurance with [...], he indicated that he resided at [...].  He sought to insure a 1999 Toyota Corolla and 2002 Kia Sportage.  (PA079-080).  Appellant/plaintiff indicated that the vehicles would be garaged at a North Carolina ZIP code: 28262.  (PA073-077; PA079-080).  When filling out his application for insurance, plaintiff used IP address “96.225.51.9. ”, which is located in East Orange, New Jersey.  When [...] filled out the application for insurance, he was living in New Jersey as his North Carolina lease had expired.  (PA073-077; PA046, T28:L14-26; PA048, T37:L5-9).  Upon signing the application for insurance, appellant/plaintiff indicated that the information he provided to [...] was true and accurate.  [...] issued a policy of insurance covering appellant/plaintiff’s vehicles which took effect on February 4, 2022.  (PA073-077; PA079-080).  On February 28, 2022, appellant/plaintiff amended his policy online to change his mailing address to [...].  (PA174-204, T:29-32).  He did not change the garaging location of the [...] insured vehicles, nor did he inform respondent/defendant [...] that he was a resident of New Jersey.  (PA048, T38:L25-T39:L10; PA048, T40:L7-10; PA070-071).  On April 13, 2022, plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident with respondent/defendant [...] in West Orange, New Jersey.  (PA002).  According to the Police Report, [...] resided at [...] and was operating the [...] insured 2002 Kia Sportage.  (PA069-71).  The report also indicated that [...] had a policy of insurance issued in North Carolina and the Kia Sportage had North Carolina license plates.  (PA069-71).  Prior to the accident, appellant/plaintiff [...] acquired a New Jersey Driver’s License.  (PA070-071; PA051, T51:L13-23).  After an investigation into the accident and related claims, respondent/defendant [...] disclaimed coverage because at the time of the policy inception, the insured vehicles were garaged in New Jersey, not in North Carolina.
[brief] [Pa3326-3442].  In pertinent part, by Order dated April 5, 2022, the trial court granted the [...]’s motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim.  [Pa3442].  At page 6 of the accompanying Opinion, the trial court wrote:  On October 28, 2021, [...] filed a motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint and to deny [Appellants’] leave to amend the complaint.  On December 7, 2021, this Court granted [...]’s dismissal and denied [Appellants’] request to file a second amended complaint.  The same reasoning was used for both decisions.  This Court found that the [Appellants’] default under its lease with [...] was the cause of the termination.  That event then enabled the [...] to enter a new lease with [...] and become successors to the solar farm development.  [Pa3449].  This same statement was repeated in the Opinion accompanying the trial court’s April 5, 2022 Order denying Appellants’ request for default judgment against [...] and [...] and the Court’s April 5, 2022 Order denying [...]’s cross-motion for sanctions.  [Pa3425].  D. Appellants’ Second Action Against [...] And The Dismissal
[brief] It should remand for further consideration of whether any smaller award could have sufficiently deterred [...] from further violations and the financial impacts of any such award.  CONCLUSION  [...] respectfully requests: (a) reversal of the decisions and Orders that confirmed the July 18, 2018 and December 13, 2018 arbitration awards and denied [...]’s motions to vacate (and to reconsider), remanding for new arbitration hearings on all monetary claims; (b) reversing the November 18, 2022 valuation (and order denying reconsideration), and remanding with instructions to disallow: (i) Plaintiffs’ personal legal fees as a company-wide liability; and (ii) any discounts to fair value; and (c) vacating and remanding the 2018 fee award.
[brief] [Pa198-316].  That motion was granted on June 7, 2019 [Pa317-318].  Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, adding some of the Respondents as some of the John Doe defendants, was filed on June 12, 2019 [Pa319-330]:  [...] filed an Answer on July 3, 2019 [348-355] and an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint on August 21, 2019.  [Pa400-405].  Respondent [...] filed an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint on August 15, 2019.  [Pa358-362].  Respondent [...] a/k/a [...] filed an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint on September 10, 2019.  [Pa425-431].  In the meantime, Plaintiffs discovered that they had been provided with inaccurate or incomplete information concerning the parties specified in the Second Amended Complaint [see Pa339-345].  Therefore, on August 19, 2019, Plaintiffs were forced to file a Third Amended Complaint so that they could finally have all the correct Respondents joined as the “John Doe" defendants.
[brief] ”  Id. at 501 (quoting Kernan v. One Washington Park Urban Renewal Assocs., 154 N.J. 437, 456-57 (1998).  In *Notte*, the Court first evaluated whether there would be prejudice to the non-moving party.  Having found that there was no prejudice to the non-moving party, the Court *then* moved to the analysis of whether the amendment would be futile holding that “while motions for leave to amend are to be determined without consideration of the ultimate merits of the amendment, those determinations must be made in light of the factual situation existing at the time each motion is made.
[brief] [...] presented the testimony of [...], one of the men who was on the porch of [...] when the police arrived.  Normil testified that he had arrived at the house at about 9:00 on the morning in question in a black Hyundai Sonata.  When he arrived, [...]’s white car was already there.  (13T 43-10 to 21; 13T 50-17 to 51-9; 13T 62-1 to 17)  The Sonata belonged to [...], a girl with whom Normil was involved.  (13T 63-5 to 16)  Normil and [...] had a conversation (13T 46-1 to 7), after which [...] or [...] (Normil was unsure of the surname) arrived.  (13T 46-8 to 16)  A conversation ensued between Normil, [...] and Dennis (13T 47-24 to 48-3), after which, at about 9:45 a.m., [...] and Normil got in the Sonata, Dennis got in the Corolla, and they all drove away.  (13T 48-21 to 49-17)  Normil and [...] went to pick up [...] and the three proceeded to [...], where Normil and Harris had court appearances scheduled.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING [...]’S IMPROPER SECOND DISPOSITIVE MOTION – [...]’S MOTION TO BAR—“AS MOOT,” RATHER THAN WITH PREJUDICE FOR VIOLATING THE TRIAL COURT’S CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER (PA8-PA9)  The Trial Court denied [...]’s “Motion to Bar” as moot, when the Trial Court should have denied [...]’s “Motion to Bar” with prejudice because [...] filed this motion in direct violation of the Trial Court’s Case Management Order.  Specifically, the parties were required to file all “dispositive motions” by January 20, 2023.  [...] did, in fact, file a dispositive motion on January 20, 2023, which is the subject of this appeal.  On February 17, 2023, however, [...] filed a second dispositive motion, this one stylized as a “Motion to Bar” [...]’s damages expert report and testimony, and seeking dispositive relief in connection with same.  (See Pa682-693).  Indeed, confirming that [...] did not hide the fact that this was a second dispositive motion, [...] even submitted a “Statement of Material Facts” in support of its motion, only applicable to dispositive motions.  (Pa686).  [...] did not provide any explanation as to why such motion was filed in direct violation of the Trial Court’s scheduling order.  Accordingly, the Trial Court should have denied [...]’s motion, with prejudice, rather than as moot.  As it stands, the Trial Court’s order leaves open the possibility that the parties will have to spend the time and resources to address an improper, second dispositive motion, should the other orders being appealed be reversed.  [...] respectfully requests that this possibility be foreclosed, and therefore modify the Trial Court’s order on [...]’s Motion to Bar as being a denial with prejudice.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Additionally, or in the event the Court declines to base its decision on estoppel principles, the Court should find that [...] has not satisfied the Cole factors.  [...] prepared the contract, insists that he never signed it, and then relied on it to raise this arbitration claim at the eleventh hour.  This matter is nearly ready for trial.  It would be inequitable to compel [...] to begin another process in another forum to prosecute a claim to be compensated for work performed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  *Counsel for Plaintiff,*  *[...] Finish Carpentry, LLC*  By: *[...]*  [...], Esquire  Dated September 3, 2024  TRIMLINE FINISH CARPENTRY, LLC, Plaintiff/Respondent, vs. [...] a/k/a [...], and JOHN DOES (I-X) (Multiple Alternative, Fictitious Entities), Individually, and J/S/A, Defendants/Appellants.
[brief] **POINT III**  Granting Summary Judgment to the Respondent/Defendant is consistent with the goals of the Verbal Threshold legislation.  Due to the history and legislative intent behind AICRA, the verbal threshold standard must not be read liberally to allow the threshold to be easily met.  Rather, the verbal threshold must be viewed as an important barrier designed to keep insurance costs down.  Insureds selecting the verbal threshold experience significant savings in insurance premiums because of the limitation on their right to sue for non-economic injury.  One way AICRA seeks to keep the cost of premiums down is by limiting the right of people injured in motor vehicle accidents to sue for non-economic injuries.  The insured has the option of electing a no threshold (the unlimited right to sue for non-economic injury), or a verbal threshold (where the right to sue for non-economic loss is limited).  N.J.S.A. 39:6A8.  With respect to the verbal threshold, the legislation's preamble states: "this legislation...provides for a revised lawsuit threshold for suits for pain and suffering which will eliminate suits for injuries which are not serious or permanent, including those for soft tissue injuries...."  N.J.S.A. 39:6A1.1.  The Supreme Court has stated that, in enacting AICRA, the Legislature, "adopted Oswin’s interpretation of the 1988 threshold requiring a plaintiff to prove a threshold injury by objective credible evidence."  DiProsopero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 495 (2005).  See also, Serrano v. Serrano, 183 N.J. 508, 514 (2005) ("The new threshold has incorporated Oswin's requirement that the injury be proven by objective credible evidence"); Juarez v J.A. Salerno & Sons, 185 N.J. 332, 334 (2005) (The plaintiff was required to "prove by objective credible evidence that she suffered a permanent injury").  In the instant action, granting Summary Judgment in favor of the defendant is consistent with the goals of AICRA.
[directive] SUMMARY OF RULES AND STATUTES REGARDING BAIL FOR INDICTABLE OFFENSES  Rule or Statute Description  Effective June 1, 2007, when a person charged with a crime with bail restrictions posts cash bail or secures a bail bond, the person, no later than the time of posting bail or proffering the surety or bail bond, shall provide to the prosecutor, on a form promulgated by the Attorney General, relevant information under penalty of perjury about the obligor, indemnifier or person posting cash bail, the security offered, and the source of any money or property used to post the cash bail or secure the surety or bail bond, as the case may be.  This required information shall include, but not be limited to, the defendant's employment history, the names and addresses of any persons who contributed money or pledged security for the proffered bail or toward a surety bond, the amount, nature and timing of such contributions, and the relationship to the defendant of any such persons contributing resources.  Bail may not be accepted from a person subject to the requirements of this subsection until the prosecutor is provided the completed form required by this subsection.  2A:162-13  Bail Sufficiency; Source Hearing.  When a person charged with an offense posts cash bail or secures a bail bond in any amount, the court may, upon the request of the prosecutor, conduct an inquiry to determine the reliability of the obligor or person posting cash bail, the value and sufficiency of any security offered, the relationship of the obligor or (See also Rule 3:26-8(a–g), page 94 person posting cash bail to the defendant and the defendant's interest in ensuring that the bail is not forfeited, and whether the funds used to post the cash bail or herein.) secure the bail bond were acquired as a result of criminal or unlawful conduct.  When the offense charged against such person is a crime with bail restrictions, the court shall, upon the request of the prosecutor, conduct an inquiry.  The court may examine, under oath or otherwise, any person who may possess relevant information, and may inquire into any matter appropriate to its determination.  The court shall issue an order either approving or disapproving the bail.  The court shall not issue an order approving the bail unless it is satisfied that the evidence adduced in the inquiry establishes the reliability of the source of the funds used to post bail or security offered, that the relationship of the obligor or person posting cash bail is sufficient to ensure the defendant's presence in court when required, and that the funds used to post cash bail or secure a bail bond were not acquired as a result of criminal or unlawful conduct.  2A:162-14  This statute, effective on January 9, 2004, provides that the inquiry as authorized in 2A:162-13 be governed by Rules adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court.  Procedures.  (See Rule 3:26-8, page 94 herein, effective Sept. 1, 2008, which established the procedures.)  97  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] The trial court conducted an extensive application of the facts to the various Pukowsky factors:  As to the first, second, and third Pukowsky factors, ‘the employer’s right to control the means and manner of the worker’s performance,’ ‘the kind of occupation—supervised or unsupervised,” and ‘skill,’ the Court finds that Plaintiff indeed performed work that was unsupervised in nature and that required the use of his independent professional judgment, skill, and compliance with relevant professional standards for attorneys, namely the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct.  Given his role as an attorney serving as a part- time County Counsel, Defendants did not have the right to control the means and manner of Plaintiff’s performance.  Thus, factors one, two, and three weigh against Plaintiff.
[brief] In Moore v. Woman To Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, L.L.C., 416 N.J. Super. 30, 35 (App. Div. 2010), the court analyzed an arbitration agreement in the context of a medical malpractice action and found:  Pre-dispute agreement between patient and medical providers requiring patient to arbitrate medical malpractice claims was not per se unenforceable, pursuant to section of Arbitration Act providing that agreements to submit to arbitration any existing or subsequent controversy were valid and enforceable; statute encompassed pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate and did not exclude agreements to arbitrate medical malpractice claims.  Following factual discovery, the Appellate Division, analyzed the Rudbart factors and enforced the parties’ agreement to arbitrate medical malpractice claims of the plaintiff and her unborn child (Da067).
[brief] Entering the restaurant, [...] heard defendant screaming obscenities at the restaurant staff.  (7T62-15 to -23).  He and [...] wanted to escort defendant outside in order to limit the disturbance to customers.  (6T142-22 to 143-2).  [...] attempted “to guide [defendant] outside of the restaurant where” they could have a calm discussion and stepped toward defendant.  In response, defendant punched [...] in the chest.  (7T80-16 to 81-19).  --- 3  Defendant and [...]’s words are difficult to discern from the video marked as S-4, which includes an audio recording of the initial stage of their encounter.  [...] and [...] then attempted to grab defendant and arrest him as defendant made his way out of the restaurant.
[brief] As interpreted in New Shrewsbury Borough v. Block 115, Lot 4, 74 N.J.Super. 1, 9 (1962), the three-month period of limitations in N.J.S.A. 54:5-104-67, that no application shall be entertained to reopen such judgment after three months from the date of recording thereof in the office of the county recording officer and then only upon grounds of lack of jurisdiction or fraud in the conduct) applies to all grounds other than “lack of jurisdiction or fraud” [emphasis added].  In New Shrewsbury, supra at p. 8, 9; addressing the relationship between statute and Rules of Court, the court stated: “A motion to reopen a judgment is a matter of practice and procedure and subject therefore to the rule-making power of the Supreme Court.
[brief] This matter is brought to this Court for original jurisdiction to review the procedural deformities in the enactment of a statute.  N.J.S.A. 1:7-1, *et seq.*  N.J.S.A 1:7-1 states that [i]f, at any time within one year after any law or joint resolution has been filed with the Secretary of State pursuant to sections 1:2-5, 1:2-6 or 1:2-7 of this Title, the Governor has reason to believe that any such law or joint resolution was not duly passed by both houses of Legislature, or approved by the Governor or otherwise made effective as law in the manner required by the Constitution, he may direct the Attorney-General to apply to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, to have the law or joint resolution adjudged void.  Thereupon the Attorney-General shall prepare, sign and prosecute the application.  N.J.S.A. 1:7-4 vests the power to challenge legislation in the hands of the public.  N.J.S.A. 1:7-3 explains that “[a]fter a full hearing the court may, if satisfied that the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the enactment and approval of laws and joint resolutions have not been complied with, adjudge the law or joint resolution or any part thereof to be void.
[brief] As to the degree of the need for access, the Plaintiff/Respondent claims that he is seeking the e-mail addresses so that he can provide residents with information regarding a bond referendum that was held by the [...] on January 25, 2022.  Da024.  Therefore, the stated need is for a political purpose.  There are many other ways that the Plaintiff/Respondent can obtain e-mail addresses of residents who are interested in receiving this type of communication by directly soliciting them.  There is no shortage of methods to solicit contact information from individuals who voluntarily wish to receive information from Plaintiff/Respondent, and therefore his stated objective can be accomplished without the requested list.
[brief] [Pa3298; Pa3312].  In denying leave to file a Second Amended Complaint and dismissing the First Amended Complaint, the trial court held that:  [Appellants] cannot, after discovery is long closed, and most other defendants have been dismissed, seek to first add claims against [...], especially where [Appellants] knew of the predicate facts years prior, but chose not to assert them previously.  To permit the amendment would bog down judicial administration and economy and be prejudicial to [...].  [Pa3309].  * * * * *  Here, the First Amended Complaint asserts no claims against [...] and seeks no relief against it.  The First Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against [...].  Thus, pursuant to R. 4:6-2 the First Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice as against [...].  [Pa3310].  Following dismissal of [...], motion practice ensued among Appellants and the remaining defendants, [...] and [...].
[brief] The trial court noted that no genuine issue of fact existed suggesting individual defendants had retaliated, [...] was not disciplined for the desk allegation, was not barred from the building, and he puts forth no legal argument suggesting [...] not finding the individuals who publicly posted a flyer constitutes retaliation against him.  (3T39:1-11).  Beasley, 377 N.J. Super. at 606.  Finally, plaintiff suggests the [...] “banned” him from the [...] building after he retired.  (Pb13).  The record is undisputed that he is incorrect.  [...] was advised that he could not enter without an escort.  (Pa751).  Plaintiff cites no case law that a member of the public should have free access to travel through government buildings unescorted without an appointment or a business purpose for being there.  An outright ban was not considered because the [...] knew plaintiff’s wife was still working in the building and that he may want to visit her.  (Pa752).  As noted by the trial court, the [...] was not retaliating by denying unescorted access to wherever he wished to travel in the building.  (3T43:2-5).  The State and [...] were entitled to judgment on the retaliation claims.  The dismissal of these claims should be affirmed.
[brief] [...] and [...] are siblings, both born to [...] and [...], their parents.  The Parents, [...] and [...], sought help from [...] and [...] on various issues over the years, and in regards to this case had a need for new housing in 2014.  [...] and [...] believed the parents trusted them and that prior to the move from Florida to New Jersey in 2016, “at that time, it became clear to Ramona and Francisco they could no longer live on their own in Florida without their support system around them. ” (Pa 16, Pa 329-377 - Cueto Deposition pp. 50, L 20-23; pp. 36-37, L 20-25, 1-13; p. 92, L 6 -19, p. 24 L 12-19; pp. 36-37, L 9-25, 1-13; p. 93 L 25, p. 94 L 1-25, p. 95, L 1-6; p. 25 L 20-25, p.2 6 L 1-16; p. 26-27 L 24-25, 1-15, pp. 50-51, L 14-25, 1-24.)
[brief] General election.  The words "general election" shall be taken to mean the annual election to be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November and in any statute in which it is provided that any public officer shall be elected, or any public question shall be voted upon, at an election at which members of the General Assembly are to be voted for or elected, or words to that effect, shall be taken to mean, and shall be construed to be the equivalent of a provision, that said public officers shall be elected, or that said public question shall be voted upon, "at a general election."
[brief] (Pa71-72).  Pursuant to this disposition, on April 21, 2025, [...] filed his emergent motion on short notice to extend the stay pending appeal of the trial court’s Final Order declaring [...] the winner and to --- 4  This contested write-in ballot is separate from the write-in ballot [...] attempted to contest by way of amending his cross-petition for the third time.  accelerate the appeal.  On April 22, 2025, [...] filed a cross-appeal, challenging the portion of [...]’s decision rejecting the challenged mail-in votes and [...]’s third amended answer and cross-petition.  This court granted [...]’s motion on April 25, 2025, and set expedited briefing and oral argument schedules for the appeal and cross-appeal.