ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................5-7  LEGAL ARGUMENT.................................................................................................7  I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE BALANCING TEST OUTLINED IN DOE V. PORITZ WEIGHED IN FAVOR OF DISCLOSURE (Da115)..............................................7-11  II.  THE INFORMATION AT ISSUE IN THIS MATTER DOES NOT QUALIFY AS A PUBLIC RECORD UNDER THE DEFINITION IN THE OPRA STATUTE (Da107)..................................................11-13  CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................13
[brief] Fanelli v. City of Trenton, 135 N.J. 582, 589, 641 A.2d 541 (1994).  Thus, a challenge to the validity of a municipal ordinance or action must overcome the presumption of validity—a heavy burden.  Assocs. v. City of Newark, 132 N.J. 180, 185, 623 A.2d 1366 (1993).  New Jersey courts have consistently held that actions of municipal boards are presumed valid and will not be interfered with unless the local agency action is determined to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  Manalapan Builders Alliance, Inc. v. Township Committee, 256 N.J. Super. 295, 304 (App. Div. 1992); New Jersey Shore Builders Ass’n. v. Township of Ocean, 128 N.J. Super. 135, 137 (App. Div. 1974), cert. denied, 65 N.J. 292 (1974).  A court accords due deference to the local agency’s broad discretion in planning and zoning matters and only reverses a local agency decision if it finds the decision to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  Kramer v. Board of Adj., Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965); Nunziato v. Planning Board, 225 N.J. Super. 124, 133 (App. Div. 1988).
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the grant of summary judgment below and remand this matter for trial as to Plaintiff’s CEPA claim.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant  By: /s/ [...] #024491996  Dated: August 17, 2023  Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...] & ALL MEMBERS OF THE TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE OF THE [...], individually and in their official capacities, [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] “It is insufficient for plaintiff’s expert simply to follow slavishly an ‘accepted practice’ formula; there must be some evidential support offered by the expert establishing the existence of the standard. ”  Id.  “A standard which is personal to the expert is equivalent to a net opinion. ”  Id.  The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed this issue extensively in Davis.  That case, like the present matter, involved an expert’s inability to establish a standard of care applicable to an inspector.
[brief] [...] testified that [...] did not have any serious psychiatric disorder under Axis I of the DSM, but he was also not “normal neurologically. ”  (2T42-23 to 46-11; 34-8 to 9)  Rather, testing concluded that [...] had a personality disorder resulting in his “difficulty getting along with people. ”  (2T33-24 to 34-14)  [...] thus “found himself influenced and coerced by others, including the two individuals who were involved in the slaying of the [...][.]” (2T44-15 to 20)  At his sentencing in 1995, the court found aggravating factors 1 (nature of crime), 3 (likelihood of reoffending), 6 (criminal record), 9 (deterrence), and 12 (elderly victim), ascribing significant weight to all but factor 6.
[brief] In exchange for the *Roma* settlement class members’ release of their claims, [...] agreed to provide up to $7.2 million to the Settlement Class in cash and product credits and to pay class counsel $940,000.  Settlement Agreement, §§ 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.7, 3.8 (Pa000048–Pa000051, Pa000054–Pa000056); Da30.  On February 20, 2015, the Hunterdon County court approved the settlement and entered final judgment.  Pa000071–Pa000076.  According to the Settlement Agreement, the court retained “exclusive jurisdiction over the Parties and Class Members for all matters relating to this action and the settlement, including the . . . enforcement of the Agreement. ”  Pa000075; Settlement Agreement, §§ 8.17, 8.18 (Pa000069).  The settlement class ultimately included 38,337 class members, including Plaintiff, Pa000085, and [...] remitted approximately $353,827.97 in cash and product credits to the class members, and an additional $940,000 in attorneys’ fees, for a total settlement value of approximately $1.3 million.
[brief] Leyse v. Bank of America National Ass’n., 804 F.3d 316 (3d Cir. 2015) .......................................................................................................  29  Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 143 S. Ct. 2028 (2023) ................................................................................................................ 16  Mastondrea v. Occidental Hotels Management S.A., 391 N.J. Super. 261 (App. Div. 2007) ......................................................................................  14  Materials Research Corp. v. Metron, Inc., 64 N.J. 74 (1973) ......................................................................................................................... 27, 28 Menley & James Laboratories, Ltd. v. Vornado, Inc., 90 N.J. Super. 404 (Ch. Div. 1966) ..........................................................................................  27, 28 New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001)  ....................................................................................................................  26 Patel v. Karnavati America, LLC, 437 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 2014) .......................................................................................  14
[directive] deconfliction queries pursuant to make are required to agencies Initiating Operations.  Deconfliction Queries Before Planned to Make 4.  Requirement  Deconfliction Rule.  General A. operating under operation, enforcement agency while planned a law initiating any  Prior to deconfliction query in accordance shall make a State of New Jersey of laws of the authority the the to make a this Directive, unless it is not feasible in Section 6 of procedures specified with the County Prosecutor or First operation, or unless the initiating the planned query before deconfliction Director, Criminal or Deputy of Division of Justice Director the Prosecutor, or the Assistant of Directive deconfliction requirements this operation from the planned exempts the expressly Section. of this subsection C pursuant to Conducted.
[brief] The No Fault statute and Forthright Arbitration Rules further provide multiple levels of due process to ensure the fairness of the proceedings for all parties:  The Commissioner [of the [...]] shall establish standards of performance for the organization to ensure the independence and fairness of the review process, including, but not limited to, standards relative to the professional qualifications of the professionals presiding over the dispute resolution process, and standards to ensure that no conflict of interest exists which would prevent the professional from performing his duties in an impartial manner.
[brief] Again, Respondent also posted an actual picture of herself swearing in as a Board member with the words “I was elected onto the central regional board of education” below.  (Ca223-224).  It was also undisputed that Respondent posted no Melnyk disclaimer from her Facebook account at any time.  (Ca021, Ca023).  [...] directly addressed respondent’s failure to issue a Melnyk disclaimer, stating that in Melnyk, “the SEC noted the lack of disclaimer, finding it would be ‘reasonable for a member of the public, such as the complainant, to perceive the statements as being made by Respondent in her capacity as a Board member,’” and that Respondent’s postings were “public and there was no disclaimer to the effect that the statements were her own personal opinions, and not that of the Board or Board members.
[brief] With regard to the [...]’ claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the proofs are also sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that (1) plaintiff acted intentionally or recklessly (in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that emotional distress will follow); (2) plaintiff’s conduct was “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community;” (3) plaintiff’s actions proximately caused emotional distress to the [...]; and (4) the emotional distress was “so severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it.
[brief] The Indictment References [...] and an Unnamed Partner, [...], as Being Participants in the Wrongdoing of [...] and His Co-Defendants  Not only does the Indictment name [...] as a defendant, it alleges criminal wrongdoing by others in his firm arising out of the practice of law.  The criminal wrongdoing alleged by the State of New Jersey was assisted by [...] and other unnamed attorneys in the firm, including “[...]. ”  A comprehensive analysis of the Indictment contradicts the motion judge’s statement that “Brown and Connery is not adverse to the State or to the Attorney General” (T6:20-21) because the Indictment specifically references [...] multiple times.  Near the beginning, the Indictment describes “[...]” as “an attorney and partner at the law firm of [...]. ” (Indictment, page 8, Pa16) (emphasis added).  The motion judge’s repeated statement that [...] was Indicted “in his personal capacity” is unclear because the judge does explain what is meant by “personal capacity” but to the extent the motion judge’s decision tried to distance [...] from the Indictment it failed to account for the explanation of who [...] is (see above) and the numerous references to the involvement of [...] in the criminal conspiracy.
[brief] He explained his scientific methodology for formulating his opinion as to the location of the plaintiff’s fall.  This included a recreation of the May 29, 2019 incident using surveillance video footage of the incident along with a live feed surveillance video and a demonstration with a shopping cart with potted plants to simulate the top of the plaintiff’s head.  [...] explained to the jury in detail how and why his recreation matched the conditions as they existed in aisle 58 at the time of the plaintiff’s incident.  The jury was presented with two differing versions of the incident and [...]’s testimony clearly aided the jury in understanding the evidence presented and determining the facts.  It is difficult to understand the plaintiff’s position that [...]’s testimony “was essentially a lay interpretation of the video footage of the plaintiff’s fall that the jury was just as qualified to make on its own”.  (Pb40).  It is undisputed that the video footage of the plaintiff’s fall only shows her head and does not show “where her foot placement was or where the rollator was in relation to…her when she fell…” (5T115:22-25).  It is thus inconceivable how a lay juror could determine how the plaintiff’s fall occurred by review of the video footage of the incident alone.  [...]’s recreation of the incident became necessary to aid the jury in understanding the cause of the incident where there were no eyewitnesses to the incident or video or other evidence depicting the cause of the plaintiff’s fall.  [...]’s method of recreating the incident, using surveillance video footage of the incident along with a live feed surveillance video and a shopping cart with potted plants to simulate the top of the plaintiff’s head, was not within the ken of an average juror.  In sum, the subject matter on which [...] testified, was not within the ken of the average juror.  His testimony aided the jury in understanding the evidence presented and determining the facts in the case.  This rendered him qualified to testify as an expert witness.  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to strike [...]’s testimony in its entirety.
[brief] [...] first saw Plaintiff on December 12, 2018, less than two weeks after the accident.  3T.33:1 to 16.  He saw him periodically thereafter until February 2021.  Id., at 51:17 to 21.  During the course of his testimony, [...] gave no indication that he had instructed Plaintiff not to work during that time, and he was not asked, and therefore did not offer, any opinion concerning Plaintiff’s ability to work.  4T.6:12 to 51:4.  As a result, it came as a surprise to defense counsel when Plaintiff amended his Pre-Trial Exchange to identify a witness to support a lost wage claim.  2T.22:10 to 23.  Although the Court precluded testimony from that witness, over the defense’s objection, it permitted Plaintiff to present his claim that he was unable to work from December 6, 2018 through January 24, 2019, during the majority of which time he was under [...]’s care.  3T.57:18 to 59:8.  Plaintiff admittedly applied for disability before and after the accident for conditions unrelated to it.  Id., at 58:9 to 20.  Without expert proofs distinguishing between the accident-related and unrelated causes of those disability applications, Plaintiff presented a net wage loss claim of $2,867.31.  Ibid.  The jury awarded $3,500.00.  5T.33:18 to 34:2.  The discrepancy between the amount proven and the amount awarded is not known.  Assuming, however, that the jury accepted Plaintiff’s counsel’s repeated entreaties to “make right” that which Defendants had refused to do for “nearly five years,” whatever the amount awarded, the presentation of the claim compounded the prejudice to Defendants caused by counsel’s “theme” by giving the jury the impression that the Defendants had wrongfully deprived Plaintiff of earnings due him.  Similarly, and despite the lack of any testimony from [...] concerning the need for any treatment subsequent to February 2021, during the course of his direct testimony, Plaintiff “blurted out” that he had recently returned to treatment.  3T.51:22 to 52:4.  In an equally unresponsive answer to a question posed on cross-examination, Plaintiff testified that he had not gone back for treatment sooner because he had been without insurance for one-and-one-half years.  Id., at 108:19 to 22.  In essence, despite the lack of any claim for medical expenses, Plaintiff portrayed himself as having been in need of treatment for a significant period of time but unable to obtain it based upon a lack of insurance which he presumably could not afford due to Defendants’ failure to accept accountability for his damages.  Thus, as presented, by failing to “make it right”, Defendants not only deprived Plaintiff of two months of earnings, they also deprived him of the ability to seek needed medical care.  “The purpose of … personal injury compensation is neither to reward the plaintiff nor to punish the defendant but to replace plaintiff’s losses. ”
[brief] Da43a.  [...] contends on appeal that the trial court erred because it wrongly applied the “first manifestation” trigger and did so by relying on extra-jurisdictional law and unpublished cases.  Db43-44.  Once more, [...] misleads.  The trial court concluded that [...]’s injuries and damages manifested before the [...] under either the first manifestation or continuous trigger rule.  Da39a-Da43a  In so concluding, the trial court applied binding New Jersey law.  Id.  That decision should be affirmed.
[brief] (Db2.)  The trial court correctly found that Plaintiffs were never in possession of an arbitration agreement, and therefore [...] could not demonstrate any of the above factors.  (2T12:16-13:13.)  Plaintiffs are not experienced investors, have no legal background of any kind, and never saw the documents [...] relies on until the motions prompting this appeal were filed.  Indeed, nobody from [...] ever gave Plaintiffs the agreements, nor were they included or even referenced in any of the account statements that [...] relies on to suggest there was some course of conduct that would override our Supreme Court’s clear holdings that a party must assent to an arbitration agreement to be bound by its terms.  In weighing the totality of circumstances, Plaintiffs did not knowingly and voluntarily waive their right to trial by jury.  B.
[brief] The [...] is an organization, founded in 1871, governed by the chief insurance regulators from the 50 states (including New Jersey), the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories to coordinate regulation of multistate insurers.  See https://content.naic.org/about.  7  The Court can also take judicial notice of this congressional testimony.  every single insurer in the United States, identifying whether the Holding Act applied, based upon information provided by state regulators.  *Id.*  [...] is included and is specifically identified as **not** being subject to the Holding Act.  See https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg56778/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg56778.pdf at p. 142.  Thus, the Department’s position in 2010 was that [...] was not subject to the Holding Act—since that time, [...] and [...] have not altered their corporate structure, and no laws, rules, regulations, or amendments to existing law have been passed to change the Department’s position.  Ja67-68.  This just confirms that when its legislative amendment failed, the Department dropped the Holding Act applicability issue for nearly twenty years.  *Id.*  Indeed, the Department did not raise the issue of the applicability of the Holding Act or SSAP No. 25 to AIF Fees during [...]’s subsequent quarterly and annual financial statements.  *Id.*  Instead, the Department remained silent and accepted the status quo until now.  *Id.*  To be clear, the Department repeatedly acknowledged to [...] and other reciprocals during its examinations and follow-ups that they were not subject to the Holding Act, and therefore the only way to apply these requirements to reciprocals would be to pass a new statute.  See Ja67-68.  That never occurred and, to date, the Department has never required reciprocals to comply with the Holding Act.  *Id.*  Indeed, if the Holding Act applied, reciprocals would have been required to file the following forms with the Department on an **annual basis**: 1) Insurance Holding Company System Annual Registration Statement (“Form B”); and 2) Summary of Changes to Registration Statement (“Form C”).  See N.J.S.A. 17:27A-1 to -14.  Reciprocals would also have been required to file a “Form D” to provide advance notice of significant affiliate transactions or modifications to existing affiliate agreements.  Id.  None of these forms have ever been requested by or filed with the Department.  Ja72-76.  Despite this, the Department is now claiming that reciprocal exchanges are, and always have been, subject to the Holding Act pursuant to its newly issued Bulletin.\(^8\) C.
[brief] (Pa6; Pa28-29).  [...]’s requests all sought the same thing: to extract DNA evidence from thirteen sealed ransom envelopes with ten attached stamps, as well as one sealed envelope with its stamp from the man convicted of murdering [...]  ([...]), the ladder used in the Lindbergh kidnapping, and the lumber found in [...]’s attic.  (Pa141).  [...] detailed his proposed testing methods.
[directive] When an investment in bonds maturing in more than one year is authorized, the maturity of those bonds shall approximate the prospective use of the funds invested.  d.  The cash management plan may include authorization to invest in any of the investments 8 authorized pursuant to section of P.L.1977, c.396 (C.40A:5-15.1) and shall set policies for selecting and evaluating investment instruments accordingly.  Such policies shall consider preservation of capital, liquidity, current and historical investment returns, diversification, maturity requirements, costs and fees, and when appropriate, policies of investment instrument administrators.  Policies shall be based on a cash flow analysis prepared by the chief financial officer and be commensurate with the nature and size  All of the funds held the local unit. investments shall be made on a competitive basis insofar as by practicable.  Document 2 2 Page of - e.
[brief] | | | **Hirsch v Amper Financial Services, LLC,** | 9 | | 215 N.J. 174 (2013)  | | | **Hodges v. Comcast Cable Communs., LLC,** | 6, 24 | | 12 F.4th 1108 (9th Cir. 2021)  | | Jack v. Ring, LLC, 91 Cal. App. 5th 1186 (2023)  .................................................................
[brief] \textsuperscript{4}  This is particularly so in light of the summary judgment standard, \textit{Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.}, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995), the requirement to construe the NJLAD liberally, \textit{Nini v. Mercer County Community College}, 202 N.J. 98, 109 (2010), the inherent fact-intensive nature of employment cases, \textit{Marzano v. Computer Science Corp., Inc.}, 91 F.3d 497, 509 (3d Cir. 1996) (summary judgment is “rare” in employment cases), and that [...] failed to investigate or take effective remedial action to cure the discriminatory working environment, see, \textit{Velez v. City of Jersey City}, 358 N.J. Super. 224, 237-38 (App. Div. 2003) (reversing summary judgment where “no investigation was conducted and no effort was made to remediate past conduct or prevent future similar conduct.
[brief] ’  On the record before us, plaintiff could not prove to a jury ‘behavior that is patently unacceptable under any given circumstance. ’  As the judge recognized, it is unrealistic to expect that a municipality, having numerous trees on its streets, parks, and sidewalks, will be able to prevent every branch from dropping to the ground in public areas.  In this case, the branch in question was green and leafy, and its distress would not have been visible when observed from ground level.  Plaintiff’s own expert [...] acknowledged that the defect in the branch was latent, not patent.  Plaintiff himself did not discern any danger despite his repeated trips to the job site, and even [...] did not bother to warn plaintiff about the falling branches.  [*Id.* at **11.]  The City also cited Sims v. City of Newark, 244 N.J. Super. 32 (Law Div. 1990), which will be discussed infra.  POINT III
[brief] Respondent’s Point I  In their Brief at page 24, Respondent says, “At the time of the June 12 Orders that Defendants have appealed here, the [...]’s Answer had already been struck with prejudice and [...]’s Answer had been struck without prejudice…  Accordingly, Defendants were required to demonstrate that ‘fully responsive discovery [had] been provided’ in accordance with R. 4:23-5(a)(2).
[brief] Statement of Facts  Plaintiff presents a Statement of Facts concerning only the underlying incident in question.  It is Defendants’ position that this is inappropriate because no meaningful discovery has taken place and, in that regard, the truth of the underlying incident is not, and indeed cannot be, at issue in this appeal.  Thus, while Defendants categorically deny any wrongdoing regarding the underlying incident, the Defendants are very obviously not in a position to provide evidence to refute the underlying facts of the incident itself because no discovery has taken place.  In that regard, as detailed below, the actual facts at issue in that instant appeal concern: (1) the content of the various pleadings filed by Plaintiff, particularly the proposed pleading filed with the June 25, 2021, motion, and, (2) the timeline explaining why this case has not gotten past the pleading stage despite this action being approximately eight (8) years old and subject incident having occurred over 10 years ago.