ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Public Notice.  Every department or agency shall take reasonable steps to inform the citizenry of the agency’s use of this technology.  The department shall publish a statement that it deploys BWCs on its internet website or, if the department does not have its own website, then on the municipality’s website when feasible.  The County Prosecutor may assist departments in providing general public notice of their deployment of BWCs pursuant to this section.  The website posting shall include a picture showing what the device looks like, and how it is to be worn by uniformed officers or plainclothes detectives so that citizens will be able to determine whether an officer is equipped with the device.  Notwithstanding the above general public notice requirement, officers wearing BWCs must comply with all relevant laws regarding notice to any subject of a BWC recording, pursuant to P.L. 2020, c. 129, section 1d-e, discussed in section 4.2, infra. 4.2  Specific Notice to Certain Individuals During an Encounter.
[brief] The court imposed minimum fine and court costs.  2T19-1 to 4.  At the time of the municipal court appeal, defendant addressed the back of the ticket in one sentence in his original brief.  There was no mention of the alternative marker in either parties’ original briefs to the Superior Court.  The Superior Court asked for supplemental briefs as to whether the back of the ticket, with the alternative marker, should be considered part of the record.  The State agreed in its supplemental brief that the sole issue on appeal to the Superior Court was the constitutionality of the statute, as applied to [...], but nonetheless stated that the back of the ticket was part of the record below.
[directive] 4.7  Shooting from a moving vehicle.  Strict additional requirements must be met before an officer may shoot from a moving vehicle.  Every discharge of a firearm by an officer creates risk to the public and to other responding officers.  Firearms discharges from moving vehicles by law enforcement officers have proven to be inaccurate and ineffective, generally creating unacceptable levels of risk.  Due to these risks, law enforcement officers shall not discharge a firearm from a moving vehicle except in the following extraordinarily rare circumstance: (a) when the suspect is driving a vehicle toward persons other than the officer in a manner creating an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, such as in a terrorist attack; and (b) no other means are available at that time to avert or eliminate the danger.
[brief] The Amici set forth that deference should be provided to the [...] (“[...]”) for their interpretation of the Laws Against Discrimination (“LAD”) as it relates to gender identity.  However, the Amici fail to take into account the Attorney General’s lack of prosecution to prevent similar polices of parental notification and parental involvement since 2014.  See Da234-235, Para. 6-7.  Although interpretations of a statue by agencies empowered to enforce them are given substantial deference in the context of statutory interpretation, the presumption of valid is not without limits.  *Reilly v. AAA Mid-Atlantic Ins. Co. of New Jersey*, 194 N.J. 474, 485 (2008).  The Supreme Court has cautioned that “if an agency's statutory interpretation is contrary to the statutory language, or if the agency's interpretation undermines the Legislature's intent, no deference is required. ”  *Id.*  It should be noted that deference does not go so far as to “permit an administrative agency under the guise of an administrative interpretation to give a statute any greater effect than is permitted by the statutory language. ”  *Id.*  As previously noted in the initial moving brief, [...] (“[...]”), is an outside vendor that contracts with districts to draft and advise on policies and regulations.  *See* Da 57, Para. 4 and Da234, Para. 4.  In September 2014 and again in July of 2015, [...] recommended adoption of transgender polices, which included parental notification and consent for certain younger students.  *See* Da234, Para. 5 and Da238-244.  Neither the Attorney General nor the Director of the [...] initiated a lawsuit against [...] for adopting these polices.  The lack of prosecution is significant insofar as the LAD was amended in 2006 to include gender identity and expression as a protected class.  Furthermore, the LAD has never been substantively applied in the manner which the Amici suggest before this Court.
[brief] Adequate Notice was Provided as the Trial Court Properly Concluded.  (T2, 36:13-37:18)**  Plaintiff’s second argument regarding insufficient notice is essentially an allegation of concealment of the adoption of Ordinance 13-2022.  Plaintiff claims it did not file its Complaint timely “because it did not learn that the Township passed Ordinance 13-2022 and adopted the [...] until many months after that action occurred. ” (Pb23).  The Trial Court properly rejected this argument because the Notice gave sufficient information to indicate Ordinance 13-2022 was adopted and that Ordinance 13-2022 adopted the Redevelopment Plan.  (Pa58-61).  If Plaintiff wanted to learn about the specifics included within the Redevelopment Plan, it was Plaintiff’s responsibility to obtain a copy of the Redevelopment Plan.  (Pa61).  Plaintiff’s failure to do so does not excuse Plaintiff from timely filing its Complaint.  **A.
[brief] [...] had not “clocked in. ”  This argument by plaintiff is meritless and has been flatly rejected by the Legislature, this Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-36 provides, in pertinent part:  Employment shall be deemed to commence when an employee arrives at the employer’s place of employment to report for work and shall terminate when the employee leaves the employer’s place of employment, excluding areas not under the control of the employer . . .  “The premises rule is based on the notion that an injury to an employee that happens going to or coming from work arises out of and in the course of employment if the injury takes place on the employer’s premises. ”  Lapsley, 249 N.J. at 435; Kristiansen, 153 N.J. at 316.  Therefore, the fact that an employee had punched out on the time clock does not preclude compensability.  *Lapsley*, 249 N.J. at 435-36 (emphasis added); see also *Brower v. ICT Group*, 164 N.J. 367, 372 (2000).  Significantly, the defendants in *Konitch*, *supra*, and *DeCicco*, *supra*, had not “clocked in,” but nonetheless had, as a matter of law, co-employee immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Act.  The irony with plaintiff’s “clocked in” argument is that the decedent’s husband filed a workers’ compensation Claim Petition and (without objection from [...]) is receiving lifetime workers’ compensation dependency benefits from his wife’s accident -- even though the decedent had not “clocked in. ”
[brief] Whereas the current maximum density permitted for senior housing is 10 units per acre (in the AH-1 Zone) and the maximum recommended density for the proposed Senior Housing Overlay Zones is 14.3 units per acre (in the Senior Housing Overlay – 2 Zone), the applicant is proposing a density of 20.4 units per acre.  Also, whereas the current maximum floor area ratio permitted for senior housing is 30% (in the OB-4 Zone), the applicant is proposing a floor area ratio of 48.2%.”  Da30-31.  I, IA, I-1B, I-2, I-2A = assisted living and nursing homes and hospitals 5.  [...] argues that its project’s parking setback violations are not bulk requirements.
[brief] To satisfy the fourth factor for continuity, [...] must show it possessed the land for the entire statutory period without interruption, which is perhaps the prong [...] fails to satisfy the most.  Stump, supra, 314 N.J. Super. at 566.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-30, [...] must prove the satisfaction of all of the required elements for the entire statutory period, which ranges from 30 years for all real estate to 60 years for uncultivated tracts:  Thirty years’ actual possession of any real estate excepting woodlands or uncultivated tracts, and 60 years’ actual possession of woodlands or uncultivated tracts, uninterruptedly continued by occupancy, descent, conveyance or otherwise, shall, in whatever way or manner such possession might have commenced or have been continued, vest a full and complete right and title in every actual possessor or occupier of such real estate, woodlands or uncultivated tracts, and shall be a good and sufficient bar to all claims that may be made or actions commenced by any person whatsoever for the recovery of any such real estate, woodlands or uncultivated tracts.
[brief] See e.g. In the Matter of [...] and [...], 38 NJPER P89, 2011 NJ PERC Lexis 144, * 8 (Dec. 28, 2011).  Thus, given that N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16g sets forth general criteria rather than a formula for the arbitrator to follow, the treatment of the parties’ proposals involves judgment and discretion, and an arbitrator will rarely be able to demonstrate that an award is the only “correct” one.  Ibid.  Some of the evidence may be conflicting and an arbitrator’s award is not necessarily flawed because some pieces of evidence, standing alone, might point to a different result.  *Id.* at **8-9*.  Accordingly, the Commission will defer to the arbitrator’s judgment, discretion and labor relations expertise, *Id.* at *9*, as well as the arbitrator’s required training in this area.  See e.g. *East Rutherford*, 213 *N.J.* at 203 (“even when the award implicates a clear mandate of public policy, the deferential ‘reasonably debatable’ standard still governs.
[brief] The Trial Court Properly Allowed [...]’s Testimony at Trial.  Initially, the appellants contend that the lower court erred by denying their motion to bar or limit [...]’s testimony before commencing this bench trial, and in allowing [...]’s characterization of certain transactions at trial.  They believe the experienced trial judge sitting in the Chancery Division unable to separate the wheat from the chaff in the presentation of the evidence.  If anything, the trial court’s decision confirms that it paid close attention to the parties’ presentations, and rejected a significant component of [...]’s theory.  (26T23:8 to 28:5).  The admission of expert testimony is committed to the trial court’s sound discretion, and a trial court’s determination on a motion to strike expert testimony is entitled to deference on appeal.  Such a decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  *Townsend v. Pierre*, 221 N.J. 36, 52-53 (2015).  When confronted with an evidence determination precedent to a ruling on summary judgment – as occurred here with defendants’ pre-trial motion to bar [...] – the trial court must address the evidence decision first, and that decision is subject to review for abuse of discretion.  *Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.*, 202 N.J. 369, 385 (2010).  Here, the trial court acted well within its discretion in denying the motion to bar or limit [...]’s testimony before trial and allowing his testimony at trial.
[brief] Indeed, in Ernest Bock & Sons-Dobco Pennsauken JV v. Township of Pennsauken, 477 N.J. Super. 254, 263 (App. Div. 2023), a case cited by Respondents, the Appellate Division confirmed that the trial court’s legal conclusions and interpretations (like [...]’s interpretation of the PWCRA) must be reviewed de novo.  In the only other case cited by Respondents, Palamar Constr., Inc. v. Pennsauken, 196 N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 1983), the court was not tasked with interpreting a statute (like the Court is here).  POINT II
[brief] B.  Background on the 2021 Lawsuit.  The 2021 Lawsuit, initially filed on September 3, 2021 and amended on November 18, 2021, alleges that Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff for her initiation of the 2016 Lawsuit, which resulted in the issuance of the Injunction.  Although Defendants were prevented from transferring Plaintiff and from disrupting the status quo, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant [...], new Superintendent [...] --- 2  The 2016 lawsuit is captioned Andreula v. The [...], et al., [...], and is scheduled for trial on September 25, 2023.  That case will too be in this Appellate Division after the trial.
[brief] *Maio v. Aetna, Inc.*, 221 F.3d 472, 483 (3d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).  Although "RICO is to be read broadly, . . . section 1964(c)'s limitation of RICO standing to persons injured in their business or property has a restrictive significance[.]"  *Id.*  “That limitation ‘helps to assure that RICO is not expanded to provide a federal cause of action and treble damages to every tort plaintiff[,]’ and focuses the inquiry of injury to the Respondent's financial position. ”  *Twp. of Marlboro v. Scannapieco*, 545 F. Supp. 2d 452, 457-58 (D.N.J. 2008) (quoting *West Virginia v. Moore*, 895 F. Supp. 864, 871 (S.D.W.Va. 1995) (applying nearly identical two-pronged standard to establish standing)).
[brief] THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING ARTICLE 1 OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION  FALSE LIGHT ALLEGATION IN WHICH [...] PLACED MR. ALLEN IN A FALSE AND NEGATIVE LIGHT BY PUBLISHING STATEMENTS ABOUT HIM WHICH WERE PRIVATE AND PART OF HIS PAST PERSONA, WHICH ARE QUESTIONS ONLY A JURY CAN DECIDE.(T1 P63 L6-13)  Defendant testified disparagingly about [...] and [...] testified that [...] blackballed him, and released private information publicly by calling him a thug, in a hurtful reference to his past, from which he has long become a contributing member of society.  [...]’s conduct cast [...] in a false light not through defamatory comments but through his release of private information to the public.  *Swan v. Boardwalk Regency Corp.*, 407 NJ Super. 108, 119 (App. Div. 2009).  Not all false light allegations are defamation.  Where there is truth in the statements it does not fall under the one (1) year statute as defamation but is a two (2) year statute of limitations which [...]’s timely filing has met.  [...]’s conduct was a tort against [...]; therefore, it is subject to the two-year statute of limitations under N.J.S.A.2A:14-2.  [...] knew [...]’s past involvement in the criminal justice system, one of the very reasons he brought him into his fold.  [...] used [...] for his street credit and then turned on him by spreading disparaging remarks and calling him a thug and referring to the man [...] had long left behind.  This stigma made it difficult for [...] to be considered a trusted or otherwise viable candidate for West Ward Councilman and further diminished the community’s perception of [...] which he had worked so hard to restore.  Notwithstanding this issue being presented to the Court during oral argument it failed to appreciate the fact sensitive nature and undertook no analysis of the allegation but rather decided, in error, that as a matter of law, no false light could have occurred due to the statute of limitation.  T1 p. 63L6-9.  [...] met the two-year statute of limitations based on the false light claim or private and truthful information being disseminated and therefore the court erred in dismissing this Count.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] Supervisory Response.  3.2  Officers shall immediately request the response of a supervisor to any incident that appears to involve a barricaded individual or appears to have a reasonable probability of evolving into a barricade situation.  Law enforcement agencies shall adopt policies requiring immediate supervisory response to such incidents.  Officers and supervisors shall quickly determine whether additional resources are needed and promptly call for the response of the needed resources, which may include ARRIVE Together teams or other mental health/crisis intervention resources.  Whenever the incident involves a Barricaded Individual or Hostage Situation, the supervisor shall promptly contact the commander of the appropriate Tactical Team, as described in Section 4.3.
[brief] New Jersey courts have long held that an implied easement can be created when a map is referenced in a genesis deed.  *Lennig v. Ocean City Ass’n*, 41 N.J. Eq. 606, 608-09 (1886) (implied easement based on map); *Point Pleasant Manor Bldg. Co. v. Brown*, 42 N.J. Super. 297, 303 (App. Div. 1956) (affirming trial court’s conclusion that developer’s intent was evident in the first-filed map); *Brunetti v. Old Bridge Mun. Utils. Auth.*, A-4576-13T3, 2015 WL 5611788, at *1-*2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 22, 2015)\(^{13}\) (affirming summary judgment based in part on the trial court interpretation of map); see also *Wilson v. Miller*, 25 N.J. Super. 280, 287 (App. Div. 1953) (affirming summary judgment based on trial court’s interpretation of relevant documents in partition action, despite defendants’ argument that it constituted a “trial by affidavit”).  An implied easement based on a map referenced in a genesis deed must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence.  *Point Pleasant*, 42 N.J. Super. at 303 (rejecting that an easement arising from a map must be shown by a clear \(^{13}\) This unpublished opinion was provided to the trial court and is found at Da315. manifestation of intent); see also State v. E. Shores, Inc., 131 N.J. Super. 300, 311 (Ch. Div. 1974) (finding implied easement from filed map of community without reference to clear and convincing standard).  Defendants incorrectly suggest “an implied easement appurtenant must be established by clear and convincing evidence. ” (Db12-Db13).  While there was a time when prescriptive easements were subject to a “clear and convincing” evidence standard, this is not a prescriptive easement case and that burden of proof was struck down long ago.
[brief] The jury would not have heard the testimony of [...], [...]’s expert in this case.  [...] should not be allowed to “retry” or relitigate the underlying case by introducing new evidence that [...] failed to introduce because it improperly failed to defend [...].  LCS, Inc., supra.  The Trial Court’s ruling that [...]’s claims were precluded by the manifestation of compensable injury from mold before the commencement of the first [...] policy at issue is erroneous as a matter of law and should be reversed.  CONCLUSION
[brief] ’”  State v. K.P.S., 221 N.J. 266, 277 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Morris Cnty. Fair Hous. Council v. Boonton Twp., 209 N.J. Super. 393, 444 n.16 (Law Div. 1985)).  “Simply put, for collateral-estoppel purposes, ‘the question to be decided is whether a party has had his day in court on an issue. ’”  Id. at 278 (quoting McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 38 N.J. 156, 161 (1962)).  Related to this principle is the requirement of a defendant to timely assert his rights or risk waiving them, for even “a meritorious challenge to an illegal search may be lost if not made when required. ”  *State v. Boyd*, 165 N.J. Super. 304, 309 (App. Div. 1979).  Thus, when a defendant moves to suppress evidence under Rule 3:5-7, he must specify which aspect of the warrantless search he is challenging and raise any relevant arguments before the motion court so it can rule on those issues.
[brief] (Da16-17; 3T 17-20 to 23)  Defendant thereafter filed a second motion to suppress the in-court and out-of-court identifications of the witnesses not addressed in the court’s June 28 order, most notably that of [...].  (Da18, 20)  On October 17, 2019, the Court denied this motion without taking any further testimony.  (Da23; 4T 14-7 to 17-15)  Trial commenced on September 14, 2021, and closing arguments were delivered on September 20, 2021.  (7T; 8T; 9T; 10T; 11T)
[brief] J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 1986) | | | Boss v. Rockland Elec. Co., | 23 | | 95 N.J. 33 (1983) | | | Bress v. L. F. Dommerich & Co., | 38 | | 94 N.J. Super. 282 (App. Div. 1967) | | | Brookshire Equities, L.L.C. v. Montaquiza, | 27, 29 | | 346 N.J. Super. 310 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 172 N.J. 179 (2002)| | | Camp Clearwater Inc. v. Plock, | 24 | | 52 N.J. Super. 583, 596 (Ch. Div. 1958) | | | Carrington Mortgage Servs, LLC v. Moore, | 33 | | 464 N.J. Super. 59 (App. Div. 2020) | | | Colucci v. Thomas Nicol Asphalt Co., | 15 | | 194 N.J. Super. 510 (App. Div. 1984) | | | Culver v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., | 27 | | 115 N.J. 451 (1989)
[brief] We note that in the Brennan case, the Supreme Court gave no weight to a survey conducted by the Defendants in that case while the matter was pending before Superior Court.  A large plurality of respondents (16 of 39) in that survey did not want their personal information disclosed.  Brennan, 233 N.J. at 335.  But when the Supreme Court determined that respondents’ personal information should be disclosed, the Court gave that survey no weight, and only discussed that survey as part of its discussion of the facts.
[brief] On December 14, 2022, Appellants filed an Order to Show Cause seeking a preliminary injunction ("Motion for a Preliminary Injunction") against [...] from, among other things, terminating the parties’ Wholesaler Agreement.  (Pa18-22).  On December 15, 2022, the Court granted Appellants’ Order to Show Cause.  (Pa18-22).  On January 19, 2023, Defendants filed their opposition to the Order to Show Cause, and also filed the Motion to Compel.  On January 23, 2023, Appellants filed their Reply Brief in support of the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.  On February 7, 2023, Appellants filed their opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Compel, and Defendants filed their reply in support of the Motion to Compel on February 13, 2023.  After several adjournments of oral arguments by the Court, oral arguments on the two motions were scheduled for September 29, 2023.¹  On September 29, 2023, the Hon. [...], J.S.C. heard oral arguments and, on the record, granted Appellant’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction in full. (T3:2-5; 78:10-13).  That same day, [...] entered ¹  On September 25, 2023, Defendants submitted an untimely and procedurally improper letter to the Court without its permission, in an effort to supplement their previous submissions to the Court.  Appellants submitted a responsive letter the next day requesting that the Court disregard Defendants’ procedurally improper letter.  The Court acknowledged that Defendants’ untimely submissions were “filed late and without permission. ”  (T47:24-48:1).  an Order prohibiting [...] for the length of litigation from, among other things, (1) not “complying” with all terms of the Wholesaler Agreement, (2) from refusing to Appellants the right to “purchase and resell” Sapporo products in the assigned territories, and (3) from “disparaging, defaming, and/or slandering” Appellants or their representatives (Pa148-149).  [...] did not, however, decide Defendants’ Motion to Compel during oral arguments and reserved judgment, so that he could review and consider County of Passaic and its impact on the arbitration clause in the Wholesaler Agreement.  On October 23, 2023, the Court issued and filed the Decision granting Defendants’ Motion to Compel.  (Pa1-7).  On December 7, 2023, Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal with the Superior Court – Appellate Division.
[brief] Lastly, in the alternative, if this Court does not find the issue sufficiently preserved under the rational basis test, a passion/provocation instruction was otherwise warranted under the “clearly indicated” standard of review.  When defense counsel does not specifically request a lesser-included charge, the court nonetheless “has an independent obligation to instruct on lesser included charges when the facts adduced at trial clearly indicate that a jury could convict on the lesser while acquitting on the greater offense. ”  *State v. Thomas*, 187 N.J. 119, 132 (2006) (citing *Jenkins*, 178 N.J. at 361).  A record “clearly indicates” a lesser included offense if the evidence for the offense is “jumping off the page. ”  *State v. Dunbrack*, 245 N.J. 531, 545 (2021) (citing *State v. Denofa*, 187 N.J. 24, 42 (2006)).  Stated another way, a judge is required to instruct a lesser included offense not requested by the parties when the charge is “obvious from the record. ”  Ibid.  For all of the reasons the previously stated, the passion/provocation issue was “jumping off the page” such that the trial court should have instructed it.