ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] C. State’s reference on summation regarding [...]’s failure to record her forensic examination of defendant.  Defendant alleged at trial and in his motion for a new trial that the State inappropriately argued on summation that [...] withheld information from the jury because she did not video tape her forensic interview of defendant.  (15T193-25 to 194-16; 17T14-2 to 16-14).  Put in its proper context, the State was not claiming that [...] violated a non-existing rule requiring her to videotape her interview with defendant.  The AP was arguing instead that the jurors could see and hear for themselves what defendant said during his videotaped interviews with [...] and with [...], but had to blindly trust [...]’s say-so as to what defendant told her during her unrecorded interview with him.  (15T150-5 to 152-11; 17T37-14 to 38-11).  [...] admitted on cross-examination that her ten-page written evaluation of defendant’s mental state was an edited version of her unrecorded interview with defendant.  (11T37-19 to 38-16).  Her report was based on notes she took during the unrecorded interview, but these notes were stored in a box in her attic and were never turned over to the State and or presented to the jury.  (11T33-13 to 38-16; 17T38-20 to 39-3).  [...] rejected defendant’s claim:
[brief] [...] testified that Decedent told her about a prenup before they got married, probably when they got engaged.  (11T43:16-25; 11T43:16 to 44:7).  Decedent told [...] that [...] wanted Decedent to have a prenuptial agreement before she got married.  11T 11:18 to 12:10.  This unreliable hearsay testimony does not support a finding that Petitioner was presented with a prenuptial agreement or that he signed it.  Likewise, [...] recalled that a little after they were married, Decedent mentioned “I have a prenup” but didn’t say anything else.
[brief] (3T5:1-23).  The second judge held that Defendants did not undertake any discovery, so the record was not meaningfully different than what was before the first judge eight months earlier.  (3T56:18-25, 3T73:4-74:14).  The “only difference” was issuance of the \textit{Tyler} decision in the \textsuperscript{5}  Defendants’ apparent purpose in doing so was to establish [...]’s “sophistication,” (458a¶11), for reasons which will be explored in the legal argument section of this brief. interim.  (3T75:22-76:1).  The second judge did “not count” Defendants’ public-record documents that were available to them at the time of their original motion, but which they did not submit to the first judge.
[brief] ”).  The Court titled its subheading on this analysis as: “The Attorney General’s Right to Proceed Summarily under the Law Against Discrimination is Well-Settled [emphasis added] (Da103). ”  However, this misconstrues the requirement of the Crowe test and what the Court is being asked to consider regarding same.  It is not disputed that the Attorney General has a well-settled legal right to “proceed in a summary manner in the Superior Court of New Jersey to obtain an injunction,” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1.
[brief] No authority existed for the 2009 assignment from [...] to [...], trustee, [...], by the Limited Power of Attorney from [...] to [...] d/b/a [...] (A824, [...] n/k/a [...]).  The [...] had no Lender or Mortgagee -- only a wrongful 2009 assignment reflecting a wrongful default and foreclosure enforcement that never, in fact, occurred, and ultimately caused grave financial damage to the [...].  Importantly, the [...] were also precluded from presenting proofs about the wrongful foreclosure and default fees that were assessed to them over the years.
[directive] By dated the established parameters for sentencing, or sentencing only as may follows:  (I) hearings proceed using remote options (phone video) with of of the consent all parties; and (2) courts have the authority to stay the commencement the  This custodial term for certain sentences in Criminal, Family, and Municipal matters.  directive of 2020 implements those provisions the Court's April 20, Order.  judges case-by-case on  The attached guidance sets forth options should consider a basis jail for sentencing proceedings, including sentences to state prison, probation, county and juvenile facilities.  of which  Sentences in a state prison term will be imposed can proceed (with the consent judge's or the all parties) be adjourned at discretion.  Options for sentences other than state of (I) jail prison include, adjourning the sentence, (2) ordering that the custodial portion a county or or disposition placement sentence a juvenile to secure be served immediately, (3) ordering that of of sentence jail or disposition the commencement the custodial portion a county a juvenile to of weighing the or secure 2020 be based placement stayed delayed on a factors listed in April 20, health COVID-19 emergency.  Order, including risks attendant to the public  ADA  ENSURING mJ TO AN DOOR OPEN JUSTICE
[brief] 20 TABLE TO APPENDIX  State Grand Jury Indictment No. [...], filed August 11, 2022 ..............................................................................  Ma1 to Ma16  Hudson County Grand Jury Indictment No. [...], filed February 28, 2023.............................................................................Ma17 to Ma18  Order Denying State’s Omnibus Motion by the Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated October 28, 2024.........................Ma19 to Ma20  State Notice of Motion for Reconsideration, filed November 17, 2024 ........................................................................................................  Ma21 Order Denying Reconsideration by the Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated December 17, 2024..............................................  Ma22 State Motion for Stay Certification, filed December 16, 2024 ..............................................................................................................  Ma23 to Ma24 Order Denying Stay by Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated December 19, 2024 .................................................................  Ma25  State’s Application for Emergent Relief filed December 19, 2024..................................................................................  Ma26 to Ma36  Order granting Application for Emergent Relief by the Hon. [...], J.A.D., dated December 19, 2024 ......................  Ma37 to Ma38  Order granting Leave to Appeal by the Hon. [...], J.A.D., dated December 31, 2024.............................................  Ma39  Appellate Division Order Denying Hudson Emergent Application, dated January 29, 2025 ..........................................................
[brief] In order to establish a *prima facie* case under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, 34:19-1 et. seq.  (“CEPA”), Plaintiff must show that: (1) he reasonably believed that his employer’s conduct was violating either a law, rule or a regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; (2) he performed a “whistleblowing” activity as defined by CEPA; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistleblowing activity and the adverse employment action.  *Dzwonar v. McDevitt*, 177 N.J. 451, 462 (2003)(emphasis added); *Kolb v. Burns*, 320 N.J. Super. 467, 476-79 (App. Div. 1999).  In the case at bar, the Trial Court correctly held that Plaintiff cannot establish the elements of a *prima facie* case under CEPA.  (Pa23 to Pa27).  A.  The Trial Court Correctly Held that There Was No Evidence that Plaintiff Reasonably Believed that Defendants’ Conduct on or before July 5, 2016  Was Violative of Any Law, Rule or Regulation, or Clear Mandate of Public Policy.  (Pa23 to Pa25)  CEPA was enacted “to protect from retaliatory action employees who ‘blow the whistle’ on employers engaged in illegal or harmful activity. ”  Blackburn v. UPS, 3 F. Supp. 2d 504, 512 (D.N.J. 1998)(citations omitted)(emphasis added).  In order to establish the first prong of a prima facie case under CEPA, Plaintiff must show that he reasonably believed that his employer’s conduct was violating either a law, rule or a regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy.  Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 462 (emphasis added).  In short, in order to maintain an action under CEPA, a Plaintiff must first be able to establish that he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer engaged in some misconduct that was contrary to law or public policy.
[brief] Specifically, one of the procedures outlined in Directive 2019-6 is found in section 5 which states:  "Any known prior testimony by informant.  The case name and jurisdiction of any criminal case known to the prosecution team in which the jailhouse informant testified (or a prosecutor intended to have the informant testify) about statements made by another suspect or criminal defendant while detained or incarcerated, and whether the jailhouse informant was offered or received any benefit in exchange for or subsequent to such testimony".  Here, the [...] did not only violate Brady-Giglio, it also violated the Attorney General's Directive when it failed to disclose potent impeachment material that demonstrates a consistent pattern of unreliable information provided by [...] in High-Profile cases.
[brief] Ibid.  The State conceded that this was valid cross examination. \(^{12}\) Ibid.  The only objection was to the fact that \(^{12}\) Thus, the Rule 104 hearing defendant claims was necessary was not necessary at all—the impeachment testimony was always going to come in, and the jury was always going to hear that [...] recanted his testimony and signed a statement that he fabricated his story.
[brief] ”  *R.*  4:46-2(c).  “When the evidence ‘is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,’ trial courts should not hesitate to grant summary judgment. ”  *Id.* at 540 (quoting *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); *Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A.*, 189 N.J. 436, 445-46 (2007) (same).  Thus, to avoid summary judgment, Appellant can no longer rely on his own allegations; rather, he must show that the competent record evidence exists to create a genuine issue of material fact.  See *Merchants Express Money Order Co. v. Sun Nat’l Bank*, 374 N.J. Super. 556, 563 (App. Div.) (holding that only competent evidence is sufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment), certif. granted, 183 N.J. 592 (2005).
[brief] Furthermore, while liquidated damage clauses may be enforceable, penalty clauses are unlawful and should not be enforced.  Wasserman’s Inc. v. Middletown, 137 N.J. 238, 248-249 (1994).  [...] even recognized that the penalty did not accrue while the parties were negotiating the terms of approvals for the development and form of Resolution and, such was seemingly a justification for tolling any delay penalties, but it arbitrarily lifted the tolling in October.  If [...] believed the penalty began in October, it should have provided notice in October, but it did not.  [...]’s claims of wrongful delay in the adoption of the Resolution are barred by the doctrine of laches since [...]’s delay in making a claim to a credit a month and a half later and lack of any effort between November 21, 2022 and its motion to request a credit for a sum certain are unexplainable, unexcusable and unreasonable to the detriment of the [...] and taxpayers.
[brief] “Because of the importance of stability and finality to public actions, courts do not routinely grant an enlargement of time to file an action in lieu of prerogative writs. ”  Tri-State Ship Repair & Dry Dock Co. v. City of Perth Amboy, 349 N.J. Super. 418, 423 (App. Div. 2022), certif. den., 174 N.J. 189 (2002).  None of the exceptions permitting enlargement “in the interest of justice” – such as those involving “important public as opposed to private interests which require adjudication or clarification” – are applicable here.  See R. 4:69-6(c); Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 586 (1975); Tri-State, 349 N.J. Super. at 424 (finding that a plaintiff’s inclusion of its property in a redevelopment district involved a private rather than public interest).  In this action, [...] did not articulate, and the trial court did not provide, any legitimate basis warranting a 190-day enlargement of the applicable statute of limitations.  Instead, the trial court simply concluded that enlargement was warranted because [...] had “been involved in this fight from day one[.]” (3T13:3-4.)  That conclusion (even if true) does not warrant enlargement of the statute of limitations.  That [...] challenged the subject resolution before the Planning Board – and then inexplicably failed to timely assert claims in this litigation – does not implicate an “important public right. ”  Rather, the “grievance” is purely “private” and particular to [...] (despite her inability to articulate any property right affected by the subject resolution.)  [...] knowingly and voluntarily slumbered on her rights and then sought to intervene at the eleventh hour for an improper purpose.  Under the circumstances, enlargement of the statute of limitations – which is not routinely granted– was not warranted.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] 2.  The anchorage of the floor or roof to walls or columns, and of walls and columns to foundations is not capable of resisting all nominal loads or load effects.  3.  Structures or components thereof that have reached their limit state.  4.  Structural members are incapable of supporting nominal loads and load effects.  5.  Stairs, landings, balconies and all similar walking surfaces, including guards and handrails, are not structurally sound, not properly anchored or are anchored with connections not capable of supporting all nominal loads and resisting all load effects.  6.  Foundation systems that are not firmly supported by footings are not plumb and free from open cracks and breaks, are not properly anchored or are not capable of supporting all nominal loads and resisting all load effects.  II.
[brief] ”  Adams, 309 N.J. Super. at 582.  Thus, enlargement of the time to appeal was necessary to give the plaintiff an opportunity to challenge that false information.  Id.  This court distinguished Adams in Rocky Hill, concluding it was not relevant because “[t]here was no deception here; the ordinance was the subject of intense debate at all times. ”  Rocky Hill, 406 N.J. Super. at 402.  Also, Gregory is factually distinct, as the issue in that case was the municipality allowing a private business to utilize public property, including beachside parking spaces, street right-of-way’s, and sand dunes.  Gregory, 391 N.J. Super. at 185.  The Gregory court found a “close relationship” between varying municipal agencies involved in the challenged decision, which may favor an enlargement of time to challenge the first acting agency.  Id. at 190.  Here, [...] owns the Property upon which the proposed warehousing is to be built, so there is no similar encroachment upon municipal property.  Further, [...] is challenging the actions of a single municipal entity, [...], in adopting Ordinance No. 13-2022, not multiple agencies.  Accordingly, neither case supports [...]’s proposition of a public interest component in its challenge to this ordinance.
[brief] Here, defense counsel’s objection was promptly made, after counsel courteously waited for the prosecutor to complete his summation.  The prosecutor did not “withdraw” his remarks; rather, the judge chose to deliver a limiting instruction in order to ameliorate their impact.  But she did not order the remarks to be stricken from the record, nor did she instruct the jurors to disregard them; she merely instructed them that all counsel have the obligation to present truthful testimony, and that credibility determinations are to be made by the jurors alone.  This instruction actually created more problems than it solved.
[brief] The Chancery Court did not address these issues concerning the rates; nor could it, since no objective evidence to support the rates was submitted in the Global Fee Application.  \(^4\)  As noted in our primary brief and below, however, Plaintiff wrongly seeks to apply his attorneys’ 2022 rates for work in all years.  \(^5\)  See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Inflation Calculator - https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm  The Chancery Court also did not address the gross overstaffing or the fact that nearly the entire Global Fee Application (98.7%) was comprised of work by senior attorneys at their elevated rates.
[brief] There are two very broad issues with the Commission’s final order to dismiss the complaint in its entirety.  First, the Commission denied complainant’s request to amend his complaint.  Subsequent to filing, complainant filed an OPRA request with the District regarding the referendum, and received a very large document dump in response (“Document Dump”).  The Document Dump was a veritable treasure trove of information regarding unethical individual and collective BOE conduct during the referendum.  This includes numerous emails and documents between Board members and the District Superintendent directly discussing referendum electioneering and how to shape the referendum narrative in a light favorable to the voting public.  By failing to allow [...] to amend his complaint based on the new Document Dump information, the Commission failed to allow [...] the liberality and generosity required as a matter of law in considering a motion to dismiss.  Further, in dismissing the complaint in its entirety, the School Ethics Commission failed to consider each count on its own merits, based on the law and its own history of precedents and advisory decisions.  In numerous similar decisions that will be detailed in this brief, the Commission has found violations of the School Ethics Act and ordered penalties.  In its findings here, the Commission has completely ignored its own advisory opinions and decisions involving Social Media, and actions of individual Board members on public forums.  The Commission clearly acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to follow its own precedents and advisory opinions, and failing to carefully consider each charge on its own merits.  Finally, by dismissing these counts with little or no reasoning behind the decision, the Commission is encouraging School Boards across the State to engage in similar actions.  The Commission has sent a message that Boards are now free to electioneer for district referendums and that Board members have carte blanche to deceive voters on facilities questions.
[directive] See detention pretrial a filing of presumption rebuttable a establishes supervisors). of (designation 7.8  Section also Detention.  Pretrial for Applying nst ai g  A Presumption 7.2 shall not prosecutor 7.4, or the 7.3 Sections under covered otherwise not case any In or the Prosecutor, Assistant First or Prosecutor County the unless detention pretrial for apply the by in prosecuted cases
[brief] Defendants challenge the trial court’s finding that the Noise Ordinance “provide[s] for subjective enforcement of a rule that prohibits sound generated by an unamplified human voice during daytime hours that can be heard a mere 50 feet from the sound generator’s property line and which ‘annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health or welfare of other[.]’”  Da88.  Arguably it is even broader than that, since the prohibition of excessive loud talking found in Section 146-7(C) need not even “annoy, injure or endanger the comfort, repose, health or welfare of others,” and instead need only “disturb the peace and quiet of the neighborhood. ”
[directive] Every other [...]  Wednesday; Every Thursday Monday, Wednesday, [...]  Thursday [...]  2nd Wednesday [...]  Every Wednesday [...]  Monday-Thursday [...]  2nd & 4th  Thursday [...]  Thursdays [...]  1st & 3rd Tuesday Criminal: [...]  [...]  Monday-Thursday Traffic: [...]  [...]  Thursdays [...]  Thursdays [...]  Tuesdays Tuesday & [...]  Wednesday [...]  Monday-Thursday [...]  2nd & 4th  Thursday [...]  Wednesday Monday, Tuesday, [...]  Thursday [...]  1st & 3rd Wednesday [...]  Monday & Tuesday 1st, 2nd & 3rd  [...]  Wednesday [...]  1st & 3rd  Wednesday [...]  Tuesday & Thursday [...]
[brief] ” (11T132-21 to 133-3; Sa1 at 10:53:35 to 10:53:48; Da57).  Defendant called the evidence “lies. ” (11T132-24; Da58; Sa1 at 10:53:41 to 10:54:05; Da57).  After a few moments of banter, defendant again professed his innocence and said he defused the fight.  (11T133-15 to 134-14; Sa1 at 10:54:05 to 10:55:37).  In response, the detectives asked no substantive questions.  (11T134-10 to 14; Sa1 at 10:55:37 to 10:55:41; Da58 to Da59).  After troubleshooting the fingerprinting software, a few silent moments passed before defendant volunteered more statements about how “[...] and them [are] always fighting and shit,” disclaiming involvement.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . .  1  POINT I  THE OPPOSITION BRIEF OF [...] CONTAINS SEVERAL FACTUAL INACCURACIES  . . . . . .  1  POINT II  [...]'S RELIANCE ON McELWEE DOES NOT SAVE ALLEGED RULE AND REGULATION CHARGES FROM DISMISSAL UNDER THE 45-DAY RULE  . . . . . .  2  POINT III
[brief] 1T63  Q  All right.  Let’s just -- you said it wouldn’t have helped, right?  But you don’t know if it would have helped because you didn’t get the expert, right?  A  Based on my theory of the case it would not have helped.  Q  Well, I understand.  But the short answer is you didn’t go and investigate and get your own opinion.  A  That is true, yes.  Q  So we don’t really know if it would have helped.  A  Based on my theory of the case it wouldn’t have helped.  1T64  Q  Let me ask you this.  All right.  What happens if I said, all right, I want you to assume as we stand here I -- let’s say we were back at the trial before the trial came, okay, and I said I -- I looked at -- I was your assistant, I got [...]’ report, I got my own expert here, he’s a ballistics expert, too, he’s all ready and willing to go and to testify and he impeaches and contradicts [...]’ expert opinion that the Glock fired the weapon.
[brief] “The goals of the [entire controversy] doctrine are to promote judicial efficiency, assure fairness to all parties with a material interest in an action, and encourage the conclusive determination of a legal controversy. ”  Olds v Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 431(1997).  Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) ensures that these goals are met by requiring each party to certify with its first pleading whether the matter in controversy is the subject of any pending [or contemplated] litigation. ”  Karpovich v Barbarula, 150 N.J.473, 480 (1997).  The Trial Court correctly found that Plaintiff should have complied with Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) and included Defendants as a party to the Lease Litigation.
[brief] Appellant properly appealed and requested the relief that the [...] be ordered to promote her to Sheriff’s Officer Lieutenant based on the Veteran’s Preference requirements of N.J.A.C. 4A:5-2.2(c).  (AA0232-0236)  The basis for the appeal was the failure of the [...] to properly follow the requirements for considering eligible candidates for the Sheriff’s Officer Lieutenant position.  (AA0233-0237)  The decision of the Respondent Commission reflected that Appellant clearly met the burden of proof required for this appeal:
[brief] Plaintiffs’ Order to Show Cause specifically alleges, in relevant part, that “[b]y creating an affirmative requirement to notify a student’s parent/guardian of the student’s change in gender identity or expression, and by subjecting students to differential treatment with respect to…recordkeeping…the Amended Policy expressly targets students for disparate treatment based on their LAD-protected characteristics…” [emphasis added] (Da016, ¶ 32).  Plaintiffs also alleged that the Board’s amended policy was issued “in contravention of state guidance and the LAD” (Da013).
[directive] Heroin .5 oz. (14.17 g.)  5 oz. (141.75 g.)  50 oz. (1.42 kg.)  Cocaine .5 oz. (14.17 g.)  5 oz. (141.75 g.)  50 oz. (1.42 kg.)  LSD any amount under 100 mg.  100 mg.  1 g.  PCP any amount g. g. under 10 g.  100  10  Methamphetamine* .5 oz. (14.17 g.)  5 oz. (141.75 g.)  50 oz. (1.42 kg.)  Page 54  [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)