[brief] Even if 2005 were not the correct date for interest to begin to accrue (it is), the trial court’s decision to use 1989 as the start date for interest calculations would also be incorrect.  (Pa0057.)  The covered costs incurred by [...], when properly allocated, only reached the [...] layer in 1996.  (Pa261.)  That is the year when [...]’s coverage would have been properly triggered had the primary insurer paid its limits, and it is only then that interest can begin to run on the basis that [...] was “deprived of the money to which it was entitled. ”  (Prb 27.)  Finally, the trial court applied a 2% enhancement to interest rates, but did not cite any inequitable conduct or unusual circumstances caused by US fire that justified this enhancement.  [...] concedes that prejudgment interest should generally be applied based on the interest rates set forth in R. 4:42-11(a)(i), and that the 2% enhancement in R. 4:42-11(a)(iii) should only be applied in unusual circumstances and when required by the equities.  (Prb 28.)  In support of a 2% enhancement, the trial court cited the period of discovery before the liability trial and asserted that [...] pursued “extensive discovery” against [...].  (Prb 28; Pa58.)  Yet, there is nothing in this record, and there was nothing in the record before the trial court, to support this assertion.  The trial court did not cite any discovery pursued by [...] in support of its assertion.  [...] cites only to a self-serving certification in support of the assertion.  This case involved 15 different insurers and a sophisticated entity seeking millions of dollars in coverage for an extensively polluted site – discovery was not driven by [...] alone.  Moreover, there is no support for the position that discovery is “unusual” or somehow “inequitable” – discovery is necessary and required and permitted by our Court Rules.  The trial court also cited the length of this case in applying the 2% enhancement.  (Pa58.)  Yet, the first five years of this case focused on choice of law, an issue on which [...] took no position.  (Prb 9.)  Further, the length of this case is largely attributable to prolonged decision making from the trial court, which left a motion for reconsideration pending for five years.  [...] has been ordered to pay interest for that entire period at an inflated rate.  Based on [...]’s calculations, more than $200,000 in interest accrued in the five year period [...]’s motion for reconsideration was pending.  (Da0261.)  There is nothing inequitable or unusual about [...]’s conduct in this case.  The only thing inequitable here is the trial court’s award of interest.  The trial court simply accepted [...]’s reply interest calculations, which were the fourth different set of interest calculations served and the highest interest calculations provided yet.  The trial court then entered an Order that awarded [...] over $1 million in prejudgment interest – an amount that exceeded the amount sought in [...]’s moving papers by more than $200,000.  Finally, the trial court ordered [...] to pay interest from a start date without basis in the allocation of damages or the facts of this matter, and required [...] to do so at an inflated rate.  The trial court’s punitive interest award is without basis and must be reversed.  **CONCLUSION**