ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Article 3 of the Leases**  Against this backdrop, this Court should hold the Tenant Defendants to the obligations which they assumed under the terms of their leases.  The leases executed by the Landlord and each of the Tenant Defendants were similar -- and identical with respect to the issues presented by the Motion.  At Article 3 of the leases, each of the Tenant Defendants assumed an unambiguous and broad duty “at [their] own expense and at all times, [to] maintain the premises in and safe condition,” including an explicit duty to “maintain in good repair such portions adjacent to the premises such as sidewalks, driveways, lawns, shrubbery, which would otherwise be required to be maintained by [Landlord].”  [See, e.g., Pa991].  Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs contend that there is no genuine legal dispute over whether the Tenant Defendants had a duty to maintain, and remove snow and ice, from the location where [...] slipped on ice and fell.  **B.
[brief] ..............................................  12 State v. Township of Pennsauken, 160 N.J. 156 (1999) ....................... 62 State Dept. of Health v. Tegnazian, 205 N.J. Super. 160 (App. Div. 1985) .  12 Sun Co. Zoning Board, 286 N.J. Super. 440 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 144 N.J. 376 (1966) ..........................................................  62
[brief] In Overlook Terrace, supra, 71 N.J. 451, The Court found State preemption of a local rental control board restriction in rent increase where a State created agency, the [...], had approved and ordered the increase.  “There is a general presumption that state legislation creating a state agency preempts municipal control of that state agency. ”  Id. at 464.  See also Plaza Joint Venture, supra, 174 N.J. Super. at 241 (Presumption of preemption of municipal control applies where there is state legislation creating a state agency and so state agency controls the conversion of rental units into condominiums in Atlantic City).  We have nothing like that here.
[brief] [...] identifies no authority suggesting that the Division’s use of its website to fulfill this notice requirement was inadequate.  Even though the Division satisfied the only notice requirement under the Ricci Act through the website posting, it went above and beyond to provide additional notice to its members through other means.  On August 8, 2019, the Division provided a letter about the Ricci Act to all Certifying Officers and advised them of their responsibility to make the letter available to all members at their respective locations.  (Pa11).
[brief] [...], Esq. (No. 397262022)  [...], Esq. (No. 020092007)  [...] [...]  Telephone: [...]  [...]  [...]  [...], Esq.  (Admitted in NY Only)  [...] One Pennsylvania Plaza, 45th Floor, Suite 4515  New York, New York 10119  Telephone: [...] [...]  Attorneys for Amicus Curiae [...]  BRIEF & APPENDIX OF [...]
[brief] There, the Highway Department sought to condemn a tract of land for two reasons (1) in order to transplant shrubs and trees from a tract of land the Department had formerly used as a nursery but which the State was turning into an office building, and (2) to potentially erect service buildings at some point in the future.  11 N.J. Super. 264, 269 (Law Div. 1951).  The Law Division rejected the taking because the Department’s statute did not give it authority to condemn for these purposes.  Id. at 269–70.
[directive] Examples of legitimate and specific reasons include but are not limited to:  Persons who are subject to an outstanding arrest warrant • Missing persons • AMBER/SILVER alerts •  Vehicles and/or persons involved in prior suspicious activity, such as groups of • vehicles travelling together suspected of criminal activity, or subjects trying to open doors to random cars  Stolen vehicles • Vehicles reasonably believed to be involved in the commission of a crime or • disorderly persons offense  Vehicles registered to or reasonably believed to be operated by persons who do • not have a valid operator’s license or who are on the revoked or suspended list  Vehicles with expired registrations or other Title 39 violations •  3
[brief] Appellant contends that “collecting or enforcing a loan” constitutes “subsequent performance” of the contract within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, relying primarily on an extremely broad and inapplicable interpretation of Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 207 N.J. 557 (2011).  Appellant ignores cases demonstrating that the CFA does not apply to the activities of Respondents in this case, in addition to subsequent case law following Gonzalez which limits its holding to predatory terms contained in post-judgment settlement agreements.  Gomez, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183099, at *15-17; Woo-Padva, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550, at *13-14; Delgado, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 713, at *16-17.  In fact, Gomez is yet another case brought by Appellant’s counsel where the plaintiff asserted that the CFA governs the actions of debt buyers.
[directive] If the subject officer enters a plea of not guilty and requests a hearing, the law enforcement executive will set the date for the hearing as provided by statute and arrange for the hearing of the charges.  Internal affairs may assist the assigned supervisor or prosecutor in preparing the agency's prosecution of the charges.  This includes proper notification of all witnesses and preparing all documentary and physical evidence for presentation at the hearing.  6.3.14  The hearing shall be held before the designated hearing officer.
[brief] Board Member [...] when giving his "yes" vote for a denial stated that he found the application "detrimental to the public good and interest and went against the purpose of the master plan."  (Pa485)  Mr. Luthman went on to further summarize that the application would diminish the amount of open space and could create a parking problem in the future.  (Pa487).  Board Member [...] stated that his vote for denial was due to traffic concerns with the requested increased density.  (Pa489).  Board Member [...] expressed in summary that the issues that led to his vote for denial had to do with the issues of the new configuration of the parking and drainage brought on by the increase in density.  (Pa489-Pa490)  Board Member [...] stated that her "yes" vote for denial was because of the increased density and its effect on traffic in the surrounding neighborhood.  Ms. O'Toole also did not believe this application went along with the township's master plan.  (Pa491)  Board Member [...] when giving his "yes" vote for denial stated, in summation, that the increased density is not in conformance with the master plan, the amount of parking is understated and underestimated, and the increased density is a detriment to the surrounding neighborhood.  (Pa491 - Pa49211).  Board Chairman [...] voted "yes" for a denial and stated that he agreed with all of the statements made by [...] as well as the departure it would be from the Township's master plan.  Mr. Alston also agreed with Mr. Luthman that it would be reducing Open Space to build more apartments in an already crowded existing space.  (Pa492).
[brief] A.  No Presumption of Constitutionality Applies To The Limited Attorney Exemption Because It Impinges On A Constitutionally Protected Right.  (T. at 9:12-10:1).  Defendants’ argument regarding the presumption of constitutionality to the Limited Attorney Exemption is based on a misconstruction of Plaintiffs’ appeal and a new, flawed interpretation of the Act, devoid of any legal basis.  There can be no dispute that legislation (such as the Limited Attorney Exemption) that restricts a constitutionally protected right carries no presumption of constitutionality.  See, e.g., Bell v. Stafford Twp., 110 N.J. 384, 395 (1988) ("[I]f an enactment directly impinges on a constitutionally protected right, the presumption in favor of its validity disappears.") (emphasis added).  Defendants first incorrectly claim that Plaintiffs’ argument is that “there is a fundamental right to practice law. ”  Plaintiffs instead argue that (1) the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the practice of law under the Constitution; (2) an attorney’s right to render advice to their client, i.e., free speech, is protected under the First Amendment;\(^1\) and therefore (3) an attorney’s performance of debt adjustment services for a client -- which constitutes the practice of law in this State protected by the plenary license granted to the attorney by the Supreme Court and necessarily entails client communications -- is constitutionally-protected conduct.  Defendants also assert an alternative last-ditch argument that the Limited Attorney Exemption does not impinge upon constitutionally-protected conduct because it “concerns only debt adjustment outside of litigation. ”\(^2\)  Defendants even contend that “once litigation is filed, attorneys are governed by the applicable rules of court. ”  Db at 22.  Defendants’ attempt to fabricate an artificial carve-out of the --- \(^1\)  Plaintiffs again refer to the series of United States Supreme Court decisions in which the Court frequently rejected governmental efforts to proscribe the First Amendment-protected speech of attorneys (i.e., rendering legal advice to their clients).  See Pb at 38-40.  \(^2\)  Defendants did not raise this argument below, and thus the Court should not consider it as it has been waived.  E.g., Cipala v. Lincoln Tech. Inst., 179 N.J. 45, 52 (2004).  Act to render it applicable only to debt adjustment “outside of litigation” (and, therefore, outside of the purview of Court Rules) finds no support in the Act, any legislative history or any case law interpreting the Act.  Moreover, this purported carve-out does not advance Defendants’ opposition; an attorney’s debt adjustment services outside of litigation -- just like services in connection with litigation -- still falls within the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction and involves communications with clients protected by the Constitution.  B.
[brief] (PA305-PA306).  Applicant attempts to argue was that this is a tri-furcated\(^4\) application and that it would all be dealt with at site plan review.  (1T41-16 to 1T41-23; 1T42-3 to 1T42-20).  However, as is the more typical case when dealing with a bifurcated use variance application and subsequent site plan application, the fact that it is bifurcated does not mean an applicant is able to simply ignore aspects of a use variance application that would be more appropriate to discuss at site plan.
[brief] Schedule “A” - Checklist.................................................................Pa11  Rider “A” – Corporate Information ..............................................Pa25  Rider “B” – Contract Purchaser’s Consent.................................Pa27  Rider “C” – Variances and Waivers..............................................Pa28  Rider “D” – Justification for Variances.......................................Pa29  Rider “E” – Resumes.....................................................................Pa31  Rider “F” – Tax Certification and Property Owners List ...............Pa36  [...] Memorandum, dated October 13, 2020 .................................................................Pa48
[brief] On the Brief  [...], Esquire N.J. Attorney ID No. 013901995  [...]  Date Submitted: April 5, 2024 # TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . iii TABLE OF JUDGMENTS . . . . . . . . v TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS . . . . . . vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . vii PRELIMINARY STATEMENT . . . . . . 1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY . . . . . . . . 4 STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . 7 [...]’s Background in Law Enforcement . . . . 7 [...]’s Medical Background . . . . . . 9 The Motor Vehicle Accident of October 17, 2015 . . 12 [...]’s Injuries from October 17, 2015 . . . . 13 [...]’s Expert . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Respondent’s Expert . . . . . . . . . . . 16 The Purported Workers’ Compensation Injury of 2009 . . 17 LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT LACKED A GOOD FAITH BASIS UPON WHICH TO ARGUE THAT PEARSON WAS INVOLVED IN AN INCIDENT OR ACCIDENT IN 2009 BASED ON THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
[brief] ” (Aa38; Aa792).  That petition was transferred to the OAL as a contested case on January 23, 2017, and was assigned to Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) [...].  (Aa38).  On April 3, 2017, [...] filed an unopposed motion to intervene, which was granted.  (Aa38-39).  While that proceeding was pending, [...] filed an application with [...] on January 2, 2018, seeking use variances, a site plan approval, and a conditional use approval for the construction of a regulator station at 960 [...] Road (hereinafter “Project”).  (Ra13; Ra17).  The application was denied on October 25, 2018.  (Aa39).  --- 2  “Ab” refers to Appellant’s Brief, and “Aa” refers to Appellant’s Appendix.  “Ra” refers to [...]’s Appendix.  3  [...]’s decision regarding the site at 970 [...] Road does not form the basis of the present appeal.  4  [...] placed [...]’s January 11, 2017 petition on inactive status for six  As a result, on November 29, 2018, [...] filed a petition (Petition) with the [...] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19, seeking the same determination with respect to the Project as in the January 11, 2017 petition.
[brief] The Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance of counsel.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI; State v. Norman, 151 N.J. 5, 23 (1997).  The “benchmark” for analysis of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is “whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. ”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).  It is a well-settled principle of New Jersey case law that “[a]n accused is guaranteed the right to the assistance of counsel in a criminal proceeding, but not the constitutional right to counsel of his choice. ”  State v. Jiminez, 175 N.J. 475 (2003).
[directive] Internal investigation case files generally are not releasable to Civilian Review Boards, but the “good cause” standard may be satisfied when a Civilian Review Board requests records from a completed or closed investigation file and the Civilian Review Board has in place certain minimum procedural safeguards, as described in Section 9.7.2, to preserve the confidentiality of the requested records and the integrity of the internal affairs function, in addition to complying with all other applicable legal requirements.  A violation of any of these requirements may result in the revocation of a Civilian Review Board’s access to confidential law enforcement information, including internal affairs records, and potentially may result in other adverse or remedial actions under federal, state, or local law.
[brief] If that clock was accurate, this encounter happened at about 4:28-4:33 a.m., three hours after the initial dispatch call. her, and she was escorted by [...] out to the street, where he warned her of her rights against self-incrimination.  (1T10-2 to 11; Da20; Dca clip four, 22:15 to 27:40).  Before joining them, [...] briefly went into the courtyard to explain to [...]’s daughter, [...], and a male companion that [...] was being detained.  (Dca 1, clip four, 23:50 to 24:10).  As Ortiz joined Velez and [...] on the street, Velez told [...] that she was not yet being questioned, but that everything appeared on surveillance video.  (Dca 1, clip four, 24:15 to 24:40).  At the police car, after calmly and patiently reading [...] the complete Miranda warnings, while a few other officers stood a fair distance away, and not “surround[ing]” [...], as defendant claims (Db6), [...] twice told [...] in a calm voice that she was not in trouble, unless she lied to him, and then explained what the surveillance video showed.
[brief] The trial court relied on the incorrect legal standard when granting [...]’s motion to bar evidence of his prior criminal convictions.  The trial court knew that [...] had limited liability insurance coverage and that if Plaintiff was to recover a meaningful damage award for her injuries it would have to come from [...] and the [...] defendants.  By excluding evidence of [...]’s criminal conviction, the trial court denied [...] the right to attack [...]’s credibility and reveal the truth about this criminal record.  Such evidence is powerful.  What the trial court improperly characterized as prejudicial evidence is highly probative evidence of a party’s credibility.  Simply put, [...] misrepresented the truth about his criminal record during his deposition and [...] should have been permitted to confront him with evidence that confirmed his misrepresentations.  In excluding this evidence, the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard and committed an abuse of discretion.  In New Jersey, a witness generally may be impeached with evidence of a prior criminal conviction.
[directive] Officers should consider an individual’s mental, physical, developmental, intellectual disability, or other conditions, such as age of the suspect, that affect the person’s ability to communicate or comply.  This includes, when feasible, considering the following factors related to the individual: (a) behavioral or mental health crisis; (b) drug interaction; (c) medical condition; (d) mental impairment; (e) physical limitation; (f) developmental disability, including autism spectrum disorder; (g) cognitive impairment or intellectual disability; (h) hearing loss or impairment; (i) communication disorder, including speech impairment; (j) language barrier; (k) visual impairment; (l) age; or (m) other factors beyond the individual’s control.
[brief] Compare Ja1-2 with N.J.S.A. 17:50-1 et. seq.  The [...] has made clear that it intends to use SSAP No. 25 to scrutinize and ultimately regulate profits of the [...]—that action is unlawful and must be curtailed.  Ja1-2.  In recent routine financial examinations and other questioning by the [...], for example, it has begun asking reciprocals for the quantum of the [...] fees collected from subscribers and other onerous reporting, allegedly to confirm that those fees are reasonable, arms-length, and market rate.  Ja72-76.  The [...] is declaring its ability to scrutinize and regulate the [...] fees, i.e., the profits of an [...].
[brief] “[T]he Legislature understood and understands its obligations for the notice from which the selling officer may not depart….”  Fidelity Union Bank v. Trim, 210 N.J. Super. 476, 478-79 (App. Div. 1986) (emphasis added).  [...] was required to apply the law as written, not as she wished it to be, and her application of the wrong criteria was reversible error as a matter of law.  See Frugis v. Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250, 280 (2003) (citing Cornblatt v. Barrow, 153 N.J. 218, 231 (1998) (“If the language is plain and clearly reveals the statute’s meaning, the Court’s sole function is to enforce the statute according to its terms.
[brief] ”)  While the decision of whether to dismiss an indictment initially lies within the discretion of the trial court and is reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard, appellate courts need not give deference to a trial judge’s factual rulings in cases where the court failed to give sufficient regard to all relevant information.  *State v. Twiggs*, 233 N.J. 513, 532 (2018); *State v. Ramirez*, 252 N.J. 277, 298 (2022).  And any purely legal determinations included in the decision to dismiss are reviewed de novo.  *Twiggs*, 233 N.J. at 532; *State v. Scherzer*, 301 N.J. Super. 363, 424 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 466 (1997).  In this case, without any evidence, [...] found the loss of the [...] profile violated defendant’s rights and that the only appropriate remedy was a dismissal of his indictment.  This ruling ignored the other evidence of defendant’s guilt, the other evidence available to replicate the contents of the missing profile, and the other less extreme remedies that could have been imposed to alleviate any remaining prejudice defendant suffered as a result of the lost profile, namely an adverse-inference jury instruction.  [...]’s legally and factually unsupported ruling thus should be reversed on appeal.
[brief] ”  Id. at 504.  (emphasis added).  Moreover, the need for a clear explanation in the arbitration agreement is particularly important when a litigant may be waiving statutory rights.  The Supreme Court emphasized that a “waiver of statutory rights ‘must be clearly and unmistakably established, and contractual language alleged to constitute a waiver will not be read expansively. ’”  Garfinkel, 168 N.J. at 132 (citing Red Bank Reg’l Educ. Ass’n v. Red Bank Reg’l High Sch. Bd. Of Educ., 78 N.J. 122, 140 (1978)); see also Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, 330 N. J. Super. 252, 273 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 527 (2000) (noting that it is a “well-settled principle that ‘[a] cause depriving a citizen of access to the courts should clearly state its purpose. ’”) (citation omitted); Itzhakov v. Segal, 2019 WL 4050104 (App. Div. Aug. 28, 2019) (invalidating an arbitration clause because the “Court must be convinced that [the party] intended to waive his statutory rights” through “[a]n unambiguous writing”).
[brief] \(^{24}\) *In re New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination*, Program Interest No. 435434, 433 N.J. Super. 223, 237 (App. Div. 2013).  District to DEP’s decision to deem an electrical substation proposed by [...] (“[...]”) in [...] as qualified for Exemption #11.  As summarized by the Appellate Division, “[...] found the substation necessary, noting that residential customers in the area increased by thirty-percent between 1999 and 2006, resulting in twenty-percent overloads during peak periods, and that the substation as planned and placed would help to ensure adequate voltage levels. ”  [...]’s September 14, 2009 Order authoring [...] to construct the substation summarized the testimony of a [...] employee as attesting that “the proposed Substation is required to meet existing need” and “that, in addition to electrical load demand and voltage issues, the Substation is needed to address reliability. ”  [...] concluded that “[...] has submitted credible evidence of current need for the Substation. ”  Overall, the Appellate Division in Highlands Applicability concluded that “Given JCP & L's obligation [to maintain regular and uninterrupted electric service to its customers] and [...]'s findings, it appears clear that, even if the exemption is interpreted as requiring that an upgrade be "routine," a project that is limited to what is necessary to satisfy JCP & L's duty to provide ‘regular and uninterrupted electric service to --- 25 Id. at 227 (emphasis added).  26 [...] Order, Docket No. [...], pg. 4 (September 14, 2009) (emphasis added).  27 Id. (emphasis added).  28 Id. at 13 (emphasis added).  its customers’ falls within the exemption intended by the Legislature. ”  Therefore, Highlands Applicability stands for the general principle that a “routine upgrade” has the purpose of serving the reliability needs of a public utility’s existing customer base.
[brief] As such, it is respectfully submitted that, as was the case in Lott, the discovery rule would act to toll any applicable statute of limitations.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, Appellants/Cross-Respondents argue that the subject matter is governed by Appellate Division’s decision in Benipal v. [...], [...], 2022 WL 3363909, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 16, 2022).8