ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Issue was partly argued in point 4 above.)  State v. Badessa, 185 N.J. 303, 311 (N.J. 2005) ("the State is barred from introducing into evidence the "fruits" of an unlawful search or seizure by the police...Those "fruits" include not only "tangible materials" seized, but also "testimony as to matters observed" in the course of a Fourth Amendment violation.  Ibid.; see also Murray v. United States, (1988) (stating that "exclusionary rule prohibits introduction into evidence of tangible materials seized during an unlawful search" and "testimony concerning knowledge acquired during an unlawful search"); State v. Puzio, 379 N.J.Super. 378, 878 A.2d 857 (App.Div. 2005) (excluding observations made by police officer after unlawful stop of defendant's vehicle that led to defendant's arrest for DWI).  Even evidence indirectly acquired by the police through a constitutional violation is subject to suppression.  [Internal citations omitted by me]  Pulling me over in the middle of the night for no reason is a violation of my 4th amendment rights and all evidence including the refusal should have been suppressed.
[brief] The role of the Court is to look at the factual testimony before the board.  Price v. Strategic Capital Partners. LLC, 404 N.J. Super. 295, 304 (2008).  Per the Appellants Trial Brief, in their statement of facts and throughout their hearings and undisputed by the Defendant Board, the property presently contains 266 units which results in a 53 unit above what is permitted and what currently exists, when the proposed lot consolidation is taken into account.  The number of units on the site as it exists is above the permitted amount per acre in the EMF-18 zone.  Appellant goes on to state that their proposal is to add a total of 100 additional units to the property.  The Appellant is proposing a total of more units than allowed by [...] Borough Ordinance §348-10.17.2 for the EMF-18 Multifamily zone.  The MLUL explicitly recognizes the regulation of the density of development as a general purpose of zoning that contributes to "the well-being of persons, neighborhoods, communities and regions and preservation for the environment."
[brief] Later during the course of the second day of his deposition, [...] provided testimony regarding the nature of the subject pre-existing condition that materially diverged from his testimony provided on the initial day of his deposition.  Specially, [...] testified during the initial day of his deposition the roadway condition that allegedly caused plaintiff’s accident involved an abrupt change in elevation of up to 2” with no tapering of the roadway surface.  (Pa0187 at 161:12-18).  However, during the second day of his deposition, when shown a close-up of the allegedly dangerous condition, (Pa1861), [...] conceded that the roadway area in question did incorporate some level of tapering and did not involve an abrupt 2” change in elevation.  (Pa0285 at 47:14-16).  [...] then revised his opinion to contend that the subject roadway condition was a dangerous condition because it involved an insufficient degree of tapering of the roadway surface.  (Pa0285 at 47:5-12).  [...] predicated his opinion of inadequate tapering on an [...] standard design detail pertaining to paving operations.
[brief] Da347-390.  These Forecasts were prepared by [...] and shared with [...] at its request to forecast EGP and Installment Payments, as evidenced by their titles: “Preliminary Project Installment Schedule” and “PTA Forecast. ”  See, e.g., Da368, Da373, Da383.  While forecasting for possible but still uncertain future revenue and expenses for prudent business management purposes, the spreadsheets did not purport to and did not in fact serve to amend the PTA.
[brief] [...] did not elect to be terminated; he was left with a few viable options.  There are no facts in the record that would support the legal conclusion that appellant was actually terminated in March of 2020.  The Board’s letter also incorrectly states: “[...] clarified there was no actual layoff of its employees in the Recreation Department. ”  [Pa54,55]  [...] never said this.  Rather they indicated there was no “formal layoff notice. ”  This of course was based on emergent circumstances that were not properly considered by the Board.
[brief] In their motion to vacate, Appellants carefully reviewed [...]’s written statements and checked off boxes as to the Property condition and categorically rebutted his conclusions, ultimately questioning whether Mr. [...] ever visited the Property based upon the demonstrable inaccuracy of his observations:  [...] Statement: (i).  [...] states that the Property is “in need of rehabilitation and no rehabilitation has taken place in the prior six months. ”  [...] Rebuttal  I do not know how [...] could have supported this statement in January 2022.  [...] only acquired the Certificate in December 2021.  [...] had no basis for this conclusion and apparently made no effort to investigate the work undertaken at the Property and the variance process that was pending in [...].(99a-100a)
[brief] (17T222-8 to 223-13).  Defendant intimates that his demeanor throughout trial raised legitimate concerns regarding his ability to assist in his defense.  (Db99-100).  Yet at no time did defendant argue this at trial, despite on-the-record discussions that defendant often sat at defense table with his head down, writing out Roman numerals during court proceedings.  (7T336-14 to 342-3).  The fifth Miller factor (mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it) was found by [...] to “slightly weigh” in defendant’s favor.  (17T218-8 to 11, 223-15 to 17).
[brief] ”)  This matter was then transferred to the Office of Administrative Law for discovery and a hearing.  On February 24, 2023, following the exchange of discovery, Appellants filed a Motion for Summary Decision.  (Ca041-Ca070).  Appellants attached a number of Exhibits to this Motion.  (Ca071-Ca200).  Based on the evidence in the record, Respondents asked [...] to find that Respondent had violated the Act as to Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the Amended Complaint.
[brief] To affirm the court’s April 28, 2023, reconsideration order dismissing [...]’s 10-count Complaint, the Appellate Division would have to: **1)** determine that **2)** decline to enforce the presumptive prospective application of *N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)*, even though the Legislature never expressed that the June 29, 2020, effective date of the statute was to have retroactive application; **3)** apply retroactive application to N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), even though the Legislature never intended it to have retroactive application, and doing so would result in the unconstitutional interference with the vested rights of [...] or a manifest injustice; **4)** rule that there was sufficient consideration on a pay-for-services contract that allowed the [...] to hold [...] liable for $1.9-million in payments despite rendering no services; **5)** approve the wholesale dismissal of [...]’s 10-count complaint, even though [...] can establish the prima facie elements of each of the individual counts under multiple theories of liability, and even though [...] and the court never analyzed any of the elements of the individually-pleaded counts in its motion; and **6)** rule that there are no genuine issues of material facts in dispute as to the Complaint without any exchange of discovery, even though [...] disputes [...]’s claims, and had several months of discovery left when the court dismissed the Complaint.  In sum, the Appellate Division should reverse the court’s April 28, 2023, order, dismiss [...]’s Complaint with prejudice, and restore [...]’s Complaint to the discovery calendar.
[brief] ” (Ca166 at Requests for Admission [RQA] 4; Ca169 at Response to RQA 4).  Respondent also admitted that, “[a]s a result of [her] campaigning for the Board from [her] personal Facebook account, and announcing that [she] won a seat on the Board from that account, some of [her] Facebook friends became aware that [she is] a member of the Board. ” (Ca166 at RQA 3; Ca169 at Response to RQA 3).  13.  Also on January 17, 2022, Respondent publicly shared a post on Facebook urging school employees to form new labor unions to replace their existing unions:
[brief] 36 - **Buckelew v. Grossbard**, 87 N.J. 512 (1984) ..............................................  13 - **Castel Cap. Corp v. Fireco of N.J.**, 81 N.J. 489 (1980) ..............................................  14 - **Civalier v. Estate of Trancucci**, 138 N.J. 52 (1994)
[brief] Defendant [...] is a New Jersey non-profit organization with a principal place of business located at [...].  (Id. at ¶6).  Importantly, Defendant [...] was employed at all times relevant herein by [...] as a senior investigator.  (Id. at ¶7).  During her time working for [...], Plaintiff worked out of the Burlington East [...] Office in [...], the same location where Defendant [...] worked.  (Pa227, Plaintiff’s Answers to Interrogatories, Par. 2)  Plaintiff alleges that in approximately March/April 2018, [...] employee Defendant [...] began “regularly sexually harassing Plaintiff [...]”:
[brief] [...] asserted three additional claims for relief against the Borough which were the subject of the trial held before [...] on February 27, 2023.  In Count One of its Complaint, [...] alleged that Ordinance 1667 should be invalidated because the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan is substantially inconsistent with the Borough’s master plan.  In Count Two of its Complaint, [...] alleged that Ordinance 1667 should be invalidated because the Borough did not follow the statutory steps necessary to adopt an ordinance that is substantially inconsistent with its master plan.  Finally, in Count Three of its Complaint, [...] alleged that Ordinance 1667 should be invalidated because the Borough’s adoption of the ordinance was arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with sound zoning principles.  (Pa11-17).  The Trial Court properly found, based upon substantial credible evidence in the record, that all of these inter-related counts should be dismissed because [...] failed to demonstrate that the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan was substantially inconsistent with the Borough’s master plan or that its adoption was arbitrary, capricious or unlawful.  The Trial Court’s entry of judgment dismissing Counts 1-3 of the Plaintiff’s Complaint should therefore be affirmed on appeal.
[brief] The Master Plan does not designate Plaintiff’s Property for a park.  While the increase in open space in other locations of [...] in furtherance of Objective 2 (Open Space) are specified in the Master Plan’s Land Use Element, Plaintiff’s Property is not one of them.  Thus, the use of half Plaintiff’s Property for a park available for use by all residents of the county (the park land is intended to be bought by the [...]) is not contemplated in the Master Plan to implement the open space objective and is clearly inconsistent with the Master Plan.  The Legislature has permitted municipalities to use their Master Plans to designate areas within the municipality for a variety of public purposes, including open space. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-28.  See also, New Jersey Shore Builders Ass’n v. Township of Jackson, 199 N.J. 449, 453-4 (2009).  The Borough’s 2019 updated Master Plan does not designate Plaintiff’s Property as being the location for an 11 acre park.  Nor does the 2019 updated Master Plan envision a deviation from the 350 Unit [...] which the updated Master Plan endorses to be developed on the 22.5 acre site.
[directive] #1  The police or law enforcement officer “shall inform the person tested of his[/her] rights” to be furnished with a copy of the record of any chemical breath tests administered.  This first provision is designed to inform the defendant that a record of any chemical breath tests administered will be made and that the defendant is entitled to receive a copy of that record.  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(b); N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.24b; N.J.S.A. 12:7-55b.  That record, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 13:51-3.6(a)2, is the “Alcohol Influence Report Form, Breathalyzer Check List. ”  N.J.A.C. 13:51 Appendix.  With the introduction of the Alcotest® 7110 MKIII-C, a printed record, in the form of an Alcohol Influence Report, will be automatically printed by the Attorney General Guideline:  Page 20  Prosecution of DWI & Refusal Violations  Alcotest® 7110 MKIII-C.  N.J.A.C. 13:51-3.6(c)2.  Following the administration of any breath tests, regardless of the results obtained, and the normal processing of a defendant, the defendant should be given a copy of the Alcohol Influence Report.
[brief] The Complaint and Jury Demand was filed by [...] on the date of November 8, 2021.  (Da1, Complaint and Jury Demand)  The Answer and Counterclaim to the Complaint and Jury Demand was filed on February 5, 2022.  (Da23, Answer and Counterclaim to the Complaint and Jury Demand)  [...] filed a Counterclaim at the same time the Answer to the Complaint and Jury Demand was filed.  (Da23, Counterclaim).  [...] ([...]) filed an Answer to the Counterclaim on March 10, 2022.  (Da41, Answer to Counterclaim).  Thereafter, the discovery time period ensued.  Demands for Answers to Interrogatories from [...] were answered by [...].  (Da55, [...] Answers to Interrogatories)  In addition, [...] served a Request for Admissions which was timely answered by [...].  (Da64, [...] Answers to Admissions)  [...] served a Request for Answers to Interrogatories on [...] and answers were provided.  (Da81, [...] Answers to Interrogatories)  [...] served a Request for Admissions on [...] on June 24, 2022 (Da107, Request for Admissions) and answers were not provided within the required 30-day time period and as a result the statements made by [...] in the Request for Admissions are deemed to be admitted.
[brief] THE COMPLAINT DID NOT ALLEGE THAT THE INTERFERENCE WAS WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION OR EXCUSE LEAVING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY FOR A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INTERFERENCE WHICH TRIGGERS COVERAGE (Raised Below: Pa426; 2T4)  The complaint failed to allege a critical element of the tortious interference count.  Specifically, the complaint did not allege that [...]’ interference was without justification or excuse leaving open the possibility for a cause of action for negligent interference of contractual relations which triggers coverage.  See underlying complaint (Pa182, Pa294).
[brief] Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135, 158, 777 A.2d 19, 32 (2001)  The Appellate Division may find it confusing as to how the December 10, 1998 deed was prepared and the surrounding circumstances.  However, what is crystal clear is that [...] did willfully engage in a fraud by forging his brother [...]’s signature on the title transfer documents listing [...] as the transferee, and [...] signed his own name at the end of the document as the transferor.
[brief] Parrella is likewise distinguishable from the case before this Court.  In Parrella, [...] successfully moved to compel arbitration of the plaintiff’s claims premised on allegedly false advertisements.  2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 59 at *2.  The plaintiff had previous Sirius accounts, but ultimately terminated each account.  Id. at *2-3.  In 2017, the plaintiff received a promotional advertisement and, while discussing his eligibility for the promotion with a Sirius representative, he signed up for a different subscription.  Id. at *3-4.  After signing up but prior to the service being effective, he received a welcome package that included an arbitration agreement.  Id. at *5-6.  Prior to the renewal of the service, the plaintiff also received a notice directing him to consult the agreement.  Id. at *8.  The Appellate Division ultimately determined the arbitration agreement was valid because the plaintiff “agreed to and used several trial and full-price service subscriptions and canceled several accounts.  Upon the acceptance of each trial and paid subscription use, the defendants provided the plaintiff with a hard copy welcome kit containing the agreement governing the parties’ relationship. ”  Id. at *11.  “Plaintiff was also informed if he did not want to be bound by the agreement, he could cancel at any time. ”  Id. at *12.  Further, because the plaintiff terminated several other accounts, it was apparent that the plaintiff was familiar with the cancelation process.  *Ibid.*  The plaintiff was also unable to dispute that he received the agreement.  *Ibid.*  None of these facts are present here, and there is no basis (other than the speculation of [...]’s COO, [...]) on which this Court can find that either [...] or [...] implied assent to waive their rights.
[brief] In language that is virtually identical, both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. 1, par. 7 of the New Jersey Constitution require that any warrant issued must "particularly" describe the place/person to be searched and the articles to be seized.  Imposing an obligation on police to particularly describe the area to be searched or the item or person to be seized serves the same purpose as the requirement of the warrant itself: to prevent a concentration of power in executive officials, to guarantee a neutral and detached assessment of probable cause prior to an intrusive search and seizure, and to limit the discretion of the executing officer. \(^{10}\) \(^{10}\)  Despite the similarity between the text of Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution and the text of the Fourth Amendment, the New Jersey Supreme Court  Unless the search and seizure is limited to specified areas, items and persons, the resulting unfettered discretion would permit an interested executive branch to determine the bounds of the warrant, and hence the area to be searched and the persons and property to be seized.  The evil at which this requirement was directed was the so called general warrant commonly used by the British in pre- Revolutionary War times and, to some extent, is still existent in commonwealth nations such as Canada and which the State herein appears to be intent on resurrecting.  See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965)("Vivid in the memory of the newly independent Americans were those general warrants known as writs of assistance under which officers of the Crown had so bedeviled the colonists."); Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property, 367 U.S. 717, 729 (1960) ("The Bill of Rights was fashioned against the background of knowledge that unrestricted power of has found that the former "affords our citizens greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than does the Fourth Amendment."  State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 145 (1987) (unlike the Fourth Amendment, article I, paragraph 7 does not provide for good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule); see State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338 (1982) (New Jersey Constitution protects privacy interest in phone-toll billing records even though federal constitution does not); State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211 (1981) (criteria for standing to challenge validity of searches and seizures are more liberal under article I, paragraph 7 than under Fourth Amendment).
[brief] In a Supplemental Certification in support of [...]’s motion to strike Plaintiffs’ discovery requests [...]’s expert [...] changed the rationale for the exemption given in Exhibit 16.  In his supplemental offering, he maintained that the “primary benefit” of the PILOT agreement for [...] is that it will facilitate sales and . . . provide a desired absorption rate in the development,” Pa260, par 14, meaning facilitate the “pace” of sales.  Pa261, par 15.  There are no data or analytical information in the record by which to assess [...]’s assertions about the importance of the exemption for the “absorption rate” of affected homes.  [...]’s opinion was that owners paying 99.5% of full taxes for all but 5 years of the 30-years the PILOT is in effect will not accomplish much:  “Based on my experience in structuring long-term PILOT agreements for for-sale housing, a 5-year term for such tax relief is not a material incentive to accelerate the sales pace or full pricing of such units, because the incentive is of such limited duration. ”  Pa246, par 19.  Significantly, [...]’s absorption rate rationale is not borne out by statements at the Ordinance hearing.  At that hearing, a Township representative who had been in negotiations with [...] said that it “was intentioned by the Township to minimize the impact of this PILOT program on the existing single family home supply in the Township” and that that “was a specific issue that the Township wanted us to address as we negotiated the terms. ”  T1.61:22-62:14.  The Issue of Purpose  The conclusion that this Project would be financially viable if it were subject to full taxes, Pa706, par 21, and that the Project would be built regardless, Id., par 22, raises a question as to the actual purpose for the exemption.
[brief] ...............................................................passim Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J 498, 589 A.2d 143 (1991)  ......................................................... 40, 41  Veras v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176, 2014 WL 1050512, (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014)  ...........................................................................10  VW Credit, Inc. v. Coast Auto. Group, Ltd., 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 417, 2005 WL 3750752 (Sup. Ct. N.J. App. Div. 2005)  ..................................................................40  Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398, 591 A.2d 592 (1991) ............................................................ 40, 41 Wisniewski v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co, 290 F.App’x 153 (3d Cir. 2010) ..................................................................44 Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550, 2023 WL 6157245 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 21, 2023) ............................................................. passim Statutes 15 U.S.C. § 1692 ....................................................................................... 5, 26 N.J.S.A. § 17:11C ...................................................................................... 2 N.J.S.A. § 56:8 .......................................................................................... 2 N.J.S.A. 17 ................................................................................................. 6, 13, 38 N.J.S.A. 17:11C ....................................................................................... 6, 38 N.J.S.A. 2A: 16-53 .................................................................................... 7, 13 N.J.S.A. 56 ............................................................................................... passim Rule 4:6 ..................................................................................................... 9 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] Third, [...] found that the detectives appropriately handled what defendant characterized to be an ambiguous invocation.  From its view of the video-recorded statement, the lower court found as a matter of fact that neither [...], nor [...] heard the defendant mumble, “I don’t want to tell you much,” in response to the question, “Can you tell me what happened?”  The court noted that this was “clear” from the video because both detectives immediately reacted to defendant’s mumbled statement by leaning forward and concurrently asking the defendant to repeat what he had said.  The court found defendant’s response to this request for clarification, “I said I couldn’t say for the most part,” indicated a willingness by the defendant to speak with detectives and not a desire to remain silent.  Defendant’s statement that he does not “like to talk about it, let’s just say like the rest is history pretty much,” was also found not to be an invocation of silence.  The court found defendant was speaking about having an “out of body experience” and that this was simply part of the dialogue about the criminal conduct with the detectives.  [...] found the detectives scrupulously honored the defendant’s right to silence.