ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As the State’s argument regarding the language of the statute fails to support its proffered reading, we should address the State’s secondary argument; that [...]’s interpretation of the statute “would lead to an absurd and unreasonable result. ”  (Sb18)  Specifically, the State notes that this interpretation means that defendant facing a firearms charge in a case other than that for which he seeks admission to Recovery Court is ineligible for Track One while the firearms charge is pending—while he retains the presumption of innocence—but becomes eligible once he is convicted and the firearms charge is no longer pending.
[brief] a.  Applicable Law (Ja1-3; 4T)  Whether a disclosure is “public” for NJFCA purposes turns on whether the relevant information has been placed in the public domain or made available for public use.  See, e.g., Cause of Action v. Chicago Transit Auth., 815 F.3d 267, 274 (7th Cir. 2016); United States ex rel. Maxwell v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp., 540 F.3d 1180, 1185 (10th Cir. 2008) (public disclosure requires that information be “generally available and not subject to obligations of confidentiality”).  The “disclosure” component focuses on actual disclosure and requires more than “mere theoretical or potential availability of information. ”  United States ex rel. Holmes v. Consumer Ins. Grp., 318 F.3d 1199, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2003).  Affirmative disclosure is the “talisman” public disclosure bar.  United States ex rel. Wilson v. Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 777 F.3d 691, 698-99 (4th Cir. 2015).  b.  Discussion (Ja1-3; 4T)
[brief] (Pb23.)  To the contrary, after the Accident, two [...] employees admitted that its work on the date of the Accident was demolition work.  [...] conceded during his deposition that the saw cutting [...] was performing on the Ritz Wall on the date of the Accident “would be considered incidental demolition work. ”  ([...] Tr., 65:13-66:2 at Pa999-1000; see also [...]’ Aug. 5, 2015 email admitting excluded “demolition work” at Pa2422.)  Further, [...] ([...]’s laborer) testified in the Hood Lawsuit that [...]’s services were only utilized as needed as excavation uncovered existing structures and that on the date of the Accident that he (i.e., [...]) was wire sawing parts of the concrete wall for removal that were recently located during excavation.  ([...] Tr., 14:15-15:13 at Pa1123-1124 and 36:8-21 at Pa1145; see also Pa2671, photograph of Project on date of Accident.)
[brief] *N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-2(a)*.  See also *62-64 Main St., L.L.C. v. Mayor & Council of City of Hackensack*, 221 N.J. 129, 163 (2015) (noting that the Blighted Areas Clause of the N.J. Constitution was designed to “‘provide incentives for private investment’”).  If a potential redeveloper is unable to rely upon the actions of the municipality in adopting a redevelopment plan, it will only serve to further disincentivize private investment in an area that is already struggling due to lack of private investment.
[brief] TWO ARC IS NOT ENTITLED TO A MODIFICATION OR CORRECTION OF THE AWARD | 31 | | A.  [...] Impermissibly Asks the Court to Examine Arbitral Evidence (Based on Its Own Erroneous Interpretations of the Evidence) and Refashion New Damages Figures | 32 | | B.  [...] Continues to Misconstrue N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-24 | 34 | | POINT  THREE ARC’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO FILE A COUNTERCLAIM IS IMPROPER | 37 | | CONCLUSION | 41 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **[...] NJ, LLC v. [...],** | | | [...] | 40 | | **Barcon Assocs. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp.,** | | | 86 N.J. 179 (1981) | 39, 40 | | **Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park,** | | | 241 N.J. 595 (2020) | 22 | | **Block v. Plosia,** | | | 390 N.J. Super. 543 (App. Div. 2007) | 16 | | **Borough of East Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Local 275,** | | | 213 N.J. 190 (2013) | 32 | | **Cnty. Coll. of Morris Staff Ass’n v. Cnty. Coll. of Morris,** | | | 100 N.J. 383 (1985) | 21 | | **Curran v. Curran,** | | | 453 N.J. Super. 315 (App. Div. 2018) | 37, 39 | | **Del Piano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.,** | | | 371 N.J. Super. 503 (App. Div. 2004) | 15 | | **ERG Renovation & Constr., LLC v. Delric Constr. Co., Inc.,** | | | 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 58 (App. Div. Jan. 12, 2015) | 18 | | **Esslinger’s Inc. v. Alachnowicz,** | | | 68 N.J. Super. 339 (App. Div. 1961) | 29 | | **Fawzy v. Fawzy,** | | | 199 N.J. 456 (2009) | 32 | | **Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Mgmt., Inc.,** | | | 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981) | 39 | | **Home Owners Constr. Co. v. Borough of Glen Rock,** | | | 34 N.J. 305 (1961) | 28 | Jang Won So v. EverBeauty, Inc., 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 4 (App. Div. Jan. 2, 2018) ...........................................26 Kearny PBA Local No. 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208 (1979)
[brief] The claim asserted in the First Count of the proposed second supplemental complaint had been decided by the trial court the year before, and [...] had received his share of the proceeds.  (8T106:12-15).  In the Second Count, the Defendants likewise seek to revisit issues that had already been decided or are legally unsustainable.  The Defendants point to the trial court’s ruling that the Trustee’s effort to purchase the Boonton Property along with [...] violated her duty of impartiality.  (Da346, at ¶67).  The Trustee complied and did not purchase the Property, and as [...] had submitted a higher bid than [...], [...] and [...] alone purchased the property.  (Da146).  Even [...] acknowledged at trial that [...] was the sole purchaser of the Boonton Property.  (8T73:13-18).  Therefore, this could not possibly have resulted in losses.
[brief] Here, at a particular crossroad, instead of turning right or continuing straight into Toms River, defendant turned left and traveled further into Lakewood.  Possessing the valid search warrant for the vehicle in question, the officers lawfully followed defendant’s car just over the border into Lakewood and conducted the motor-vehicle stop.  Nothing in New Jersey jurisprudence prohibited the officers from stopping the vehicle in a neighboring jurisdiction pursuant to a search warrant.  Yet defendant claims that N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152 precluded the officers from executing the search warrant on defendant’s vehicle outside of their Toms River jurisdiction.
[directive] States and the regulations of the United these deploy BWCs, and enforcement agencies that enforced by law implemented and intended to be other persons or entities. any be enforced by promises or rights that may create any provisions do not 24 Page QUESTIONS 16. be shall of Directive implementation this or interpretation concerning Any questions the or Justice, of Division designee. Criminal the to of addressed Director the EFFECTIVE DATE 17. opportunity an provide to order after in issued is effect it take days shall 60 Directive This issue and develop to and requirements comply its with to prepare enforcement to agencies law for herein. established procedures and standards, with policies, the consistent and policies procedures until repealed, is it and unless effect remain and force in shall Directive Once this effective, General.
[brief] On the night of July 11, 2014, [...] was conducting a routine milling and paving operation for the [...] (“[...]”) on the eastern spur of the New Jersey Turnpike near mile 113.  Pa151a; Pa200a-03a, 210a.  [...] was serving as a milling foreman on the project.  Pa151a; Pa200a-03a, 210a, Pa207a.  At approximately 11:00pm, a street sweeper owned by Defendant [...] (“[...]”) and operated by Defendant [...] (“[...]”), a [...] employee, struck [...].  Pa151a-52a.  [...] was taken to the hospital and passed away approximately one month later without regaining consciousness.  Pa188a.  At the time that he was struck by the sweeper, [...] was wearing his reflective safety vest, boots, and hard hat, and also had a working flashlight that was turned on.  Pa151a; Pa209a, 211a; Pa225a; Pa246a; Pa280a; Pa286a-87a.  [...] and/or his Estate received workers’ compensation benefits arising out of his employment with [...].  Pa142a at No. 17.
[brief] ”  Ferraro, supra, at 73.  The Ferraro court recognized the statutory obligation of Holmdel’s board to exercise “…its own responsibilities…”, phrased “…the fact that Hazlet allows the use may suggest…” in the permissive “may”, not the mandatory “shall”, and told Holmdel’s board to give “…significant weight to the zoning ordinance and plan of the adjacent municipality…as well as to the character and uses of surrounding property in both Hazlet and Holmdel. ”  Id.  The Ferraro court did not require the Holmdel board to simply accept the other town’s regulations for proposed new uses as binding or to ignore the character of existing uses in either town.  This language also makes clear, since it must give “significant weight” to it, that a board should actually have knowledge of the adjoining town’s zoning ordinance and plan, and of the character of the uses in the adjoining town.
[brief] (Da21 to 22).  Given the Defendants’ subsequent agreement not to call [...] as a witness at trial, the certification of counsel filed in support of this motion is not appended.  On February 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment requesting a jury instruction as to Defendant [...]’s duty to ensure that Defendant [...] had a valid driver’s license before entrusting his mother’s car to her.  (Da23 to 24).  Given the stipulations subsequently made by the parties with respect to liability, the certification of counsel filed in support of this motion is not appended.
[brief] Orders A29 | Description | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | App. Div. Order granting leave to appeal | A1 | | June 12, 2024  Orders | A3 | | Amplification filed by [...] | A6 | | 10/7/22  Order | A12 | | 12/16/22  Order | A14 | | 3/3/23  Order | A16 | | 4/14/23  Order | A18 | | 9/8/23  Orders | A20 | | 11/9/23  CMO | A27 | | 12/22/23  Orders | A29 | | Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint | A32 | | Defendants’ Answer and Crossclaims | A44 | | Defendants’ Notice of Cross-Motion to restore Answers and Counterclaims | A54 | | Proposed Order | A56 | | Cert. of Counsel in support of defendants’ motion (5/28/24) | A57 | | Plaintiffs’ punch list with defendants’ responses (11/20/23) | A68 | | Amended Certification of Defendants’ Counsel in support of reinstatement | A75 | | Cert. of Defendants’ Counsel in support of reinstatement (12/25/23) | A77 | | Defendants’ Amended Answers to Plaintiffs’ Punch List following Court | A81 | | directives at February 8, 2024
[brief] UDO § 18-902(E) requires the following bulk Ordinance requirements for uses in the R-12 Zone, with the exception of Places of Worship:  a.  Minimum Lot Area – 12,000 square feet b.  Minimum Lot Width – 90 feet c.  Front Yard Setback – 30 feet d.  Rear Yard Setback – 20 feet e.  Side Yard Setback – 10 feet with an aggregate of 25 feet f.  Accessory Building: i.  Side Yard Setback – 10 feet ii.  Rear Yard Setback – 10 Feet g.  Maximum Building Coverage – 30% h.  Maximum Building Height – 35 feet  Plaintiff’s application complied with each of these Ordinance requirements.  The application further sought to provide a minimum of four off-street parking spaces for each of the dwellings.  There were no bulk variances requested as part of the application.
[brief] Thus, suppression is required for the contraband recovered in the car.  *State v. Smith*, 212 N.J. 365, 388 (2012) (“The general remedy for police seizure of evidence in disregard of the warrant requirement is suppression of the evidence obtained improperly. ” (citation omitted)).  [...]’s purported consent to the search of his home was also the direct result of the police’s unlawful execution of the search warrant and the discovery of contraband in the car.  So the fruits of that search must also be suppressed.  See *State v. Smith*, 155 N.J. 83, 100-01 (1998); *State v. Atwood*, 232 N.J. 433, 449 (2018); *State v. Rodriguez*, 172 N.J. 117, 132 (2002).  In sum, the scope of the search warrant was clear: probable cause existed that drugs and other contraband would be in the car while it was traveling in Toms River.  And the court had no occasion to consider whether there was probable cause to search the car in Lakewood.  Because the [...] officers failed to respect the bounds of the warrant, suppression is required.  POINT II
[brief] State Police Retirement Board Final Decision 9/27/23……………………………Pa9  State Police Retirement Board Initial Decision 6/13/23…………………………Pa24  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On or about July 8, 2019, the Bill Ricci Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Ricci Act”) was signed into law.  On or about March 3, 2023, [...], along with many others, filed his Eligibility Registration Form to register his presence at Ground Zero under the Ricci Act, along with a Request for Amended Benefits Form, Affidavit, and Petition.  Pa30.  Pa56.  Pa58.  Pa60.  On or about May 2, 2023, the Division of Pensions administratively denied [...]’s appeal and the matter was transmitted to the State Police Retirement Board.  Pa61.  On or about June 13, 2023, the State Police Retirement Board issued an initial decision to deny [...]’s request to register for the Ricci Act.  Pa24.  On or about July 18, 2023, [...] appealed the Board’s initial decision and requested an administrative hearing.  Pa16.  The Board denied an administrative hearing and issued a Final Agency Decision on September 27, 2023.  Pa9.  This appeal ensued.  Pa1.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] ### CASES  **Alabama v. White,** 496 U.S. 325 (1990) ...........................................................................................................  19  **Florida v. J.L.,** 529 U.S. 266 (2000) ..................................................................................................................  17  **Graham v. Connor,** 490 U.S. 386 (1989) ..................................................................................................................  23  **Navarette v. California,** 572 U.S. 393 (2014)  ....................................................................................................................  14  **State v. Bailey,** 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1192 .........................................................................................  17  **State v. Basil,** 202 N.J. 570 (2010) ......................................................................................................................  13  **State v. Bivins,** 226 N.J. 1 (2006) ..........................................................................................................................
[brief] See Liberty Ins. v. Techdan, LLC, 253 N.J. 87, 118-119 (2023) (holding that IFPA claims are subject to the CNA, where liability and damages are apportioned according to each party’s degree of fault, with the fault of all defendants adding up to one hundred percent).  The principle underlying the CNA is that “[i]t is only fair that each person only pay for injuries he or she proximately caused. ”  Fernandes v. DAR Dev. Corp., 222 N.J. 390, 407 (2015).  To that end, where liability is in dispute, the jury is required to determine “the extent, in the form of a percentage, of each party’s negligence or fault. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2(a)(2).  Significantly, the plaintiff may recover the full amount of the damages from any party determined to be 60% or more responsible for the total damages, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3(a), but if a party is adjudged less than 60% responsible, he or she is only liable for the percentage directly attributable to that party’s fault, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3(c).  Notably, the adversity of defendants’ interests persists throughout the entirety of the lawsuit because apportionment of fault is required even if a joint tortfeasor settles and is not a remaining defendant at trial.
[brief] (PA000006).  First, Defendant [...] did not have a policy in place regarding the proper ratio of staff members to individuals.  Same was necessary to ensure adequate care was consistently given to each disabled individual.  Id.  Plaintiff initially became aware of this issue when several of her co-workers were forced to work alone, caring for up to four individuals at once.  Id.  Plaintiff reasonably believed this policy to be in violation of N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b).  Id.  This presented serious problems for staff and the patients at Defendant [...]’ group homes.  *Id.*  For example, if an individual had to be escorted to the bathroom, other individuals would be left unsupervised until the staff member returned, and individuals who were left unsupervised were more likely to get hurt.  *Id.*  When Plaintiff brought her concerns regarding the ratio of staff to individuals to Defendant [...], Defendant [...] gave Plaintiff the run around and simply told Plaintiff there is no set ratio.  *Id.*  Defendant [...] completely ignored Plaintiff’s valid concerns for the individuals at Defendant [...]’ safety and wellbeing.  *Id.*  Further, Defendant [...] blamed this issue on the fact Defendant [...] was consistently understaffed, and she took no responsibility for any understaffing issue.
[brief] This argument is addressed below.  material fact.  She testified that [...] approved the charge pay “as long as I don’t get in trouble. ” (Pa230 at 22:18-21).  However, this is directly contradicted by her interview with [...] wherein she stated that she took [...]’s silence on the charge pay as approval.  (Pa547).  [...]’s testimony is also contradicted by [...] and [...], who confirmed that [...] never approved the charge pay, and [...]’s testimony.  (See Pa362 at 83:7-21-84:14; Pa475 ([...] denies [...]’s request for prospective staffing coordinator charge pay); Pa297 at 80:10-14 ([...] admitting at her deposition that she had no firsthand knowledge of [...] ever approving charge pay for any staffing coordinator); Pa547-48 ([...] never notified [...] whether [...] had directly approved her receipt of charge pay); Pa477 ([...] told [...] that he never received approval from [...] to enter charge pay); Pa475; Pa105-06 at 89:6-90:6 ([...] told [...] that she never would have entered charge pay for only three of her five staffing coordinators); Pa361 at 78:14-21 ([...] previously sought extra pay for her staffing coordinators during the COVID-19 pandemic, but was rejected by senior management); Pa364 at 90:5-91:1; Pa475; Pa482-528 (Plaintiffs suspiciously entered charge pay for each other after [...] reviewed their time cards for pay periods).  As such, no reasonable juror could find that [...] approved the charge pay.
[directive] Administrative Office of the Courts  [...],J.A.D.  Acting Administrative Director of the Courts  www.njcourts.gov • Phone: 609-376-3000 • Fax: 609-376-3002  Directive# 29-17  [Supersedes Directive #08-95]  [Questions or comments may be directed to J.A. (609)815-2900 ext. 55350]  To: Assignment Judges  Trial Court Administrators  From: [...], Re: Alternate Care for the Dependents of Persons Detained as Part of the Judicial Process  Date: November 1, 2017
[brief] Prior to the initiation of an arbitration, the No-Fault regulations and Decision Point Review adopted by [...] provide multiple levels of due process during the treatment and claim submission process:  - Health Care Providers must provide notice of commencement of treatment within twenty-one days to the carrier.  - The carrier has sixty days to investigate coverage and the claim and can request an automatic forty-five day extension if needed; - The healthcare providers must follow Care Paths promulgated by NJDOBI which direct the course of treatment and ration care; - All treatment plans must be pre-certified with the carrier pursuant to their DPR plan prior to care; - If the care plan is denied by the carrier, the health care provider must file a pre-service appeal; - If the pre-service appeal is denied and the care is provided, the health care provider must file a post-service appeal prior to the claims being ripe for arbitration; - If all of these steps fail, arbitration may be initiated if all conditions precedent are met.
[brief] In addition, the Trial Judge did not rely on her personal opinions regarding freezing rain, instead, she followed this State’s Supreme Court opinion in Pareja, supra, which immunizes commercial property owners from incidents during ongoing storms, and explained that Plaintiff had provided no admissible opinion testimony regarding the standard of care applicable for paint on the Subject Location.  Despite Plaintiff’s contentions to the contrary, at no time did the Trial Court ignore [...]’s opinions and give credence to [...]’s opinion.  **Of note, [...]’s name is not mentioned during the oral argument.
[brief] This office is counsel to [...] ("Respondent") with regard to the above matter.  Please accept this letter brief, in lieu of a more formal pleading, as Respondent’s submission in response to the panel’s January 14, 2025 request for supplemental briefing on the effect of 257-261 20th Ave. v. Roberto, 2025 N.J. Lexis 2 on this appeal.  The Respondent adopts, concurs with and supports the submission of [...] ("[...]").  Respondent further notes that the Roberto Court also considers whether it was appropriate to vacate the final judgment under R. 4:50-1(f).  Id. at *20.  While questioning whether truly exceptional circumstances were present in the case, the Court opts to allow the order vacating the final judgment to remain in place, and only notes that the motion to vacate final judgment was timely under the Court Rules.  Id. at *21.  Most significantly, however, the Court specifically indicates "that we do not adopt the Appellate Division's analysis under Rule 4:50-1(f).  See Roberto, 477 N.J.Super. at 368-70."  Id.  Thus, the Court overruled the conclusion of the Appellate Division as follows:  "In sum, we conclude that retroactive application of Tyler separately mandates grounds to vacate final judgment and the motion judge did not abuse his discretion in vacating final judgment under Rule 4:50-1(f) based on the substantial credible evidence presented."  Roberto, 477 N.J.Super. at 370.  Consequently, the New Jersey Supreme Court vitiated the argument that Tyler, alone, provides a basis to vacate a final judgment of foreclosure.  Consequently, to the extent that the Appellant claims that Tyler provides a basis to vacate the final judgment, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Roberto has clarified that the Appellant is barred from asserting same.  Thus, and based upon all of the arguments presented in Respondent’s brief and [...]’s brief, the order denying the Appellant’s motion to vacate final judgment should be affirmed by this court.  Respectfully submitted, [...], Esquire
[brief] On March 15, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against [...] and other defendants.  (Pa0023). ¹  On June 2, 2023, [...] filed a motion to dismiss the claims asserted against him in favor of arbitration under the No-Fault statute and on other grounds.  (Pa0341).  On April 14, 2023 and April 24, 2023, the other defendants moved to dismiss the claims against them in favor of arbitration under the No-Fault statute and on other grounds similar to those raised by Cho.  (Pa0335, Pa0338).  Because the trial court judge then presiding over this matter was being reassigned to another division, [...] and the other defendants withdrew their ¹ “Pa_” refers the Appendix submitted on behalf of Plaintiffs. motions to dismiss and refiled them between August 10 and August 16, 2023.  (Pa0344, Pa0347, Pa0350).  On October 24, 2023, the trial court held oral argument on the motions to dismiss.  On October 27, 2023, the trial court issued orders and written decision in which it dismissed all claims against [...] and the other moving defendants in favor of arbitration.  (Pa0001 to Pa0022).  The trial court did not rule on [...]’s other grounds for dismissal, including the statute of limitations and the failure to state a claim. \(^2\)  **ARGUMENT**