ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] First, the feasibility of naming [...] is problematic since it did not exist in 1947 when the Genesis Deed was conveyed.  [...] was formed on December 31, 1984 as a Limited Partnership by [...] and [...].  ([...] was later transformed into a Limited Liability Corporation (LLC) owning the Property described in Schedule A, on October 5, 1999.  (Da391)(Da39).  Moreover, the formation documents for [...] fail to confer any development rights over Plaintiffs’ property.  In fact, the 1984 formation document, Article III Section 3.1, sets forth the “[P]urpose of the Partnership.  The business of the Partnership shall consist of owning the Property described in Schedule A, and of leasing, operating, developing and managing the Property in a businesslike fashion with the intent of producing profits. ”  (Da391).  Plaintiffs’ property is not mentioned in “Schedule A”.  Furthermore, there is no evidence that [...] was ever the Developer of this subdivision.
[brief] Although what [...] says next is mostly inaudible, the officers’ audible responses indicate that [...] again asked what would happen if he did not consent.  An officer then told [...] that, if he did not provide consent, “[w]e’d wind up going back to our headquarters to write a search warrant, we’ll come back.  And make entry into the house.  So basically you’re saving us some time here and you’re saving yourself a little bit of heart ache.  We write a search warrant, we’re gonna tear through the house.  You know what I mean? ”  (Da 25)  At that point, after remarking that “[y]ou guys did that one time,” [...] signed the consent to search form.
[brief] Had the Court actually notified [...] that it was proceeding under R. 1:10-2, which the June 7, 2016 Order contemplated for violations (Da13-14), [...] was entitled to its safeguards before such a penalty were imposed.  Those safeguards included that a summary proceeding must be held instead of merely oral argument on a motion.  R. 1:10-2(a).  [...] also could have sought decision by another judge.  R. 1:10-2(c).  In fact, Plaintiffs had accused [...] of insulting and disrespecting the Judge, which would have mandated a different judge consider a contempt violation to be fair.  (1T16:16-17:1(1T33:11-23)  However, [...] was denied R. 1:10-2 safeguards while a contempt-like penalty was nevertheless imposed on him by a R. 1:10-3 motion.  That decision violated [...]’s rights under both R. 1:10-3 and R. 1:10-2.
[directive] Czy rozumie Pan(i), że będzie Pan(i) zobowiązany(a) do poddania się badaniu [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] 1. psychologicznemu przeprowadzonemu przez Zarząd Służby Więziennej w celu ustalenia, czy Pana(i) postępowanie związane z popełnieniem przestępstwa stanowiło element powtarzalnego i kompulsywnego zachowania, a jeśli tak – czy odniesie Pan(i) korzyść z terapii dla przestępców seksualnych i czy jest Pan(i) gotowy(a) poddać się tego rodzaju terapia? Do you understand you will be required to submit to a psychological examination by the Department of Corrections the purpose of which is to determine if your conduct in committing the offense was characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior and if it was, whether you are amenable to (will benefit from) sex offender treatment and you are willing to participate in such treatment? że jeśli badanie wykaże, iż Pana postępowanie stanowiło [Tak/Yes]
[brief] I.  THE PROOFS SUBMITTED BY PLAINTIFF ESTABLISH  AN EXPRESS EASEMENT WAS GRANTED IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY THAT WAS NOT WAIVED, ABANDONED OR OTHERWISE TERMINATED.  ALTERNATIVELY, PLAINTIFF WAS GRANTED AN IRREVOCABLE LICENSE.  (7T, 8T, 13T, 14T, Da13-35, Da123-143, Da177-209; Da213-237 Da278-418; Da517-659; Da690-693; Da900-925; Da948-952; Da958-1005)  .................................................................  38  A.  The terms of the 1963 Agreement, the intent of the parties, and the surrounding circumstances support a finding that the [...] granted the [...] an express easement in the Subject Property.  (7T, 8T, 13T, 14T, Da13-35, Da123-143, Da177-209; Da213-237; Da278-418; Da517-659; Da690-693; Da900-925; Da948-952; Da958-1005)...........  38
[brief] March 28, 2022 (Zoning Board of Adjustment Transcript)...........Pa412³ August 22, 2022 (Zoning Board of Adjustment Transcript)...........Pa496 September 12, 2022 (Zoning Board of Adjustment Transcript).......Pa625 October 13, 2023 (Trial Court, Motion Transcript)....................T  ³  The Respondents are fully familiar with the rule-based citation conventions for transcripts pursuant to N.J. Ct. R. 2:6-8.  That said, after consultation with the Court, the Respondents are adopting the same citation convention as the Appellants (who included the intermediate transcripts within their Appendix rather than producing them separately).  Additionally, after consultation with the Court, the Respondents are not proffering full, separate, copies of the transcripts of hearings before the Zoning Board of Adjustment to avoid duplicative documentation.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  Regarding questions of law, [...]’s June 23, 2021 Decision is subject to the de novo standard of review.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey has stated that “we are in no way bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue, particularly when that interpretation is inaccurate or contrary to legislative objectives[.]  Like all matters of law, we apply de novo review to an agency's interpretation of a statute or case law. ”  It is well settled that “courts give no deference to agencies with respect to determinations of issues of law; they apply a de novo standard of judicial review. ”  Regarding question of fact, [...]’s June 23, 2021 Decision is subject to the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review.  The Appellate Division “will reverse an agency decision if it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable or if it is not supported by credible evidence in the record. ”  Here, [...] challenge [...]’s June 23, 2021 Decision – which consists of both its Highlands Applicability Determination (“HAD”) and its Water Quality Management Plan Consistency Determination (“WQMP CD”) – as constituting both an 7 Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27, 17 A.3d 801 (2011) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  8  In re Six Month Extension of N.J.A.C. 5:91-1 et seq., 372 N.J. Super. 61, 93 (App. Div. 2004).  9  In re N.J. Pinelands Com'n Resolution, 356 N.J. Super. 363, 372 (App. Div. 2003).  error of law and errors regarding the facts, as described further below.  [...]’s HAD consists of two components. \textsuperscript{10}  The first component is whether the Project can be considered “[t]he routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of public utility lines, rights-of-way, or systems, by a public utility. ”\textsuperscript{11}  The second component is whether the Project “is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act. ”\textsuperscript{12}  The first component is a question of law and thus subject to the \textit{de novo} standard of review.  The second component is a question of fact and thus subject to the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review.  [...]’s WQMP CD is a mixed question of law and fact.  \textsuperscript{10}  Technically, the HAD consists of a third component: whether or not the proposed activity is being conducted by a “public utility. ”  While [...] saw the need to submit materials to [...] justifying itself as “public utility,” it did not cite any New Jersey court ruling upholding an interpretation of “public utility” under Exemption #11 that would include an interstate natural gas pipeline transmission company such as [...].  Aa1327 to Aa1333.  \textsuperscript{11}  N.J.A.C. 7:38-2.3(a)(11).  \textsuperscript{12}  \textit{Id.}  II.
[brief] It is well settled that Appellate Courts must give deference to decisions of the trial court because the trial court is the trier-of-fact.  Cosme v. East Newark Twp. Comm., 304 N.J. Super. 191 (App. Div. 1997).  In Cosme, the Court stated:  ...[W]e are enjoined to accord substantial deference to...rulings of trial judges and not to ‘invalidate such determinations merely because from our examination of the record we believe that we would have decided differently. ’  Id. at 202 (quoting Smith v. Smith, 17 N.J. Super. 128, 134 (App. Div. 1951)).  The Appellate Court grants “substantial deference to a trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, which will only be disturbed if they are ‘manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant, and reasonably credible evidence.
[brief] The Kronos Time Card Audit Trail establishes that [...] entered “hourly charge” pay on [...]’s behalf thirty-five times over a period of two months, comprising four pay periods, from May 30, 2020 to July 11, 2020.  (Pa483-529).  It further shows that [...] entered “hourly charge” pay on [...]’s behalf nine times for one pay period, ending June 27, 2020.  (Pa483-529).  [...] does not dispute that he entered “hourly charge” for [...] and [...].  (Pa169 at 40:9-16).
[brief] *Mattia v. N. Ins. Co. of N.Y.*, 35 N.J. Super. 503, 510 (App. Div. 1955).  The doctrine is invoked in “the interests of justice, morality and common fairness. ”  *Palatine I v. Planning Bd.*, 133 N.J. 546, 560 (1993).  Reversing the decision below to amend the complaint and determining that the individual Respondents do not have standing would be a manifest injustice considering the factual circumstances created by Appellant to further his fraud.
[brief] 1  LEGAL ARGUMENT  1  POINT I THE OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT  [...] IS MISGUIDED AND ERRONEOUS DUE TO ITS MISAPPLICATION OF THE LEGAL PRECEDENTS  APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.  1 (Raised below: Pa1021-1066; 1T14-35; 2T4-13)  POINT II  DEFENDANT [...] HAS NOT EFFECTIVELY DEMONSTRATED TO THIS COURT  THAT THERE WERE NO DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS, AND THAT THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY BARRED THE COMPETENT OPINIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S ENGINEERING EXPERTS.  8  (Raised below: Pa1021-1066; 1T42-52; 2T21-33; 3T)  CONCLUSION
[brief] ”  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 8 on R. 4:10-2 (Gann 2007).  Thus, at its broadest, Rule 4:10-2 provides for ESI discovery into any matters “relevant” to the subject matter of the action, but makes no allowance for discovery into “irrelevant” matters.  Further, even to the extent matters may be “relevant,” ESI discovery is to be limited if the burden of production outweighs the benefit of the exchange.  As this Court has explained, “when the burdens outweigh the benefits[,] the tools of discovery become, intentionally or unintentionally, weapons of oppression. ”  Trenton Renewable Power, LLC v. Denali Water Sols., LLC, 470 N.J. Super. 218, 228 (App. Div. 2022) (quotations and citation omitted).
[brief] A.  Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint  This matter arises out of a workplace accident that occurred on September 28, 2020.  Ja44.  Plaintiff alleges that he was injured by a bailer during the course of his employment with Defendant, [...]  Ibid.  More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered injuries to his right foot when a part of the bailer he was feeding copper into fell and landed on his foot.  Ibid.  The only defendants named in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint are Plaintiff’s employer, [...], and [...]’s insurers.  Ibid.  Plaintiff’s primary cause of action is an intentional wrong claim against his employer, [...], for which Plaintiff now seeks coverage under [...]’s Workers’ Compensation and Employer’s Liability Insurance Policy, which was issued by [...], and an excess liability insurance policy issued by [...].  Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint states her claim against [...] as follows:  5.  At all times herein relevant, Defendant, [...], as Plaintiff’s employer, was responsible for the training and supervision of its employees and was also responsible for the inspection, maintenance, repair, supervision and proper working condition of the subject bailer and was responsible for providing a safe and hazard-free work environment.  6.  At all times mentioned and specifically on September 28, 2020, Defendant, [...], knew, or had reason to know, that the aforesaid bailer was damaged and could not be safely used as intended at the time of the subject accident, thereby causing the intentional use of damaged, defective, substandard and dangerous equipment in an ultra-hazardous and unsafe manner.  7.  The aforesaid conduct of Defendant, [...] was so egregious as to cause a reasonable person to conclude with practical certainty that some employee of Defendant, [...] would be injured in the very manner that occurred to the Plaintiff.  8.  As a result of the aforesaid grossly negligent and/or intentional wrongdoing of Defendant, [...], Plaintiff has suffered severe and permanent bodily injuries for which he has obtained medical treatment and which caused him great pain and suffering, incapacitated him from pursuing usual activities and left him with permanent disabilities that will in the future similarly incapacitate him, cause him pain and suffering, and require medical attention and has caused him to accumulate medical expenses.  [Ja45, ¶¶5-8 (emphasis added).
[brief] \textsuperscript{18}  See \textit{Jackson v. Hankinson}, 94 N.J. Super. 505, 514 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd, 51 N.J. 230 (1968).  \textsuperscript{19}  \textit{Douglas v. Harris}, 35 N.J. 270 (1961).  \textsuperscript{20}  \textit{Hill v. Board of Educ. of Middletown Tp.}, 183 N.J. Super. 36, 38-41 (App.  Div. 1982), certif. denied, 91 N.J. 233 (1982)(additional citations omitted)(emphasis added).  We agree with the trial judge's conclusion that there was no substantial compliance with the notice requirements of the act.  In our view, however, the circumstances are such that defendant is equitably estopped from relying on the consequences of plaintiffs' failure to give notice.
[brief] Div. 2013) | 11 | | Fine v. City of Margate, 48 F. Supp. 3d 772 (D.N.J. 2014) | 21, 22 | | Gerber v. Springfield Bd. of Educ., 328 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 2000) | 21 | | Gilhooley v. Cnty. of Union, 164 N.J. 533 (2000) | 20, 21 | | Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274 (1994) | 12 | | Judson v. Peoples Bank Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67 (1954) | 16 | | Kahrar v. Borough of Wallington, 171 N.J. 3 (2002) | 23, 24 | | Knowles v. Mantua Tp. Soccer Ass’n., 176 N.J. 324 (2003) | 20, 21, 22, 24 | | Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301 (N.J. 2020) | 12 | Lapidoth v. Telcordia Tech., Inc., 420 N.J. Super. 411 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 208 N.J. 600 (2011)................................................................. 10 Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995)........ 9 Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 486 (App. Div. 2007).................. 11 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)..... 13 Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 2015)......................................................................................... 11 Rules Rule 4:46.............................................................................................................. 13 Rule 4:46-2 ........................................................................................................... 10, 15 Rule 4:49-2 ........................................................................................................... 11, 12 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Under the summary judgment standard, plaintiff’s evidence concerning liability — her deposition testimony, her answers to interrogatories, and the sworn statement of an eyewitness – all should have been accepted as true, and [...] should have been accorded the benefit of all the favorable and legitimate inferences deduced therefrom.
[brief] (Da 23)  New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller, *The High Price of Unregulated Police* purportedly observing a white Chevy Equinox make an illegal U-turn from Route 46 east onto Route 46 west.  (1T 14-6 to 16-9, 136-5 to 137-6)  He testified that he accordingly wrote the driver, [...], tickets for making an illegal U-turn, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-125, and for careless driving, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.  (1T 136-11 to 137-14)  [...] testified that he must have also had a reason for writing [...] tickets for obstructing the passage of other vehicles, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-67, and delaying traffic, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-56, but that he “could not recall at this exact moment if [[...]] was delaying traffic or not,” or if there were any cars in front of or behind him, or if he cut off or almost hit anyone.  (1T 141-21 to 143-8; 147-1 to 148-14)  After pulling him over, [...] asked [...] for a copy of his license, registration and proof of insurance.
[brief] We agree that a hearing was required.  The governing law at the time of the court's ruling in 2018, as to the contents of the record of an out-of-court identification procedure, was set forth in Delgado, 188 N.J. at 48 and Rule 3:11.  In Delgado, 188 N.J. at 63, the Court invoked its supervisory powers under Article VI, Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the New Jersey Constitution to require “that, as a condition to the admissibility of an out-of-court identification, law enforcement officers make a written record detailing the out-of-court identification procedure, including the place where the procedure was conducted, the dialogue between the witness and the interlocutor, and the results.
[brief] However, at Doc. 186-1 at 4, it states, “By way of example, Plaintiffs have objected to the search term ‘acquisition’ on the basis that the term is not relevant to the case. ” (emphasis added).  This sentence leads the Court to believe Plaintiffs made more particularized objections at some point.  Thus, on this record, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs’ objections, which the Court does not have all of, were only boilerplate objections.  Thus, the Court rejects Defendants argument (without prejudice) that all of Plaintiffs’ objections were waived for lack of specificity.
[brief] 14  Yates v. Ortho-Mcneil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 808 F.3d 281 (6th Cir. 2015) .......................................  25  In re Zantac (Ranitidine) Products Liability Litigation, 548 F. Supp.3d 1225 (S.D. Fla. 2021) ..........................
[brief] Indeed, in any conflict between specific and general statutory language, the specific should prevail.  *Brennan v. Byrne*, 31 N.J. 333, 337 (1960); *State v. Hotel Bar Foods, Inc.*  18 N.J. 115, 128 (1955).  We should also note, in judging the comprehensiveness and pervasiveness of the supposed state regulation of noise in this context, that what the lower Court is saying is that it is the Model Nuisance Code which preempts.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the summary judgment granted in favor of Defendant [...], and against Plaintiff, dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint, with prejudice, be affirmed.  Respectfully Submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendant [...]  /s/[...]  Dated: April 5, 2024  [...]  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...], [...], [...], [...], HEAD DOE AND JOHN DOES 1-10, (DOES IDENTITIES UNKNOWN), Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] Effective September 3, 2024, the following language was added to the list of documents and information that are not public records under OPRA: “that portion of any document that discloses the personal identifying information of any person provided to a public agency for the sole purpose of receiving official notifications[.]” (P.L. 2024, Ch. 16; N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 (effective Sept. 3, 2024).  “Personal identifying information” is a defined term.  (Id.).  Personal identifying information” means information that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual.  Personal identifying information shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following data elements: name, social security number, credit card number, debit card number, bank account information, month and day of birth, any personal email address required by a public agency for government applications, services, or programs, personal telephone number, the street address portion of any person’s primary or secondary home address, or driver license number of any person.
[brief] His inquiries and their answers proceeded as follows:  - **Where are you coming from?**  [...] and [...] both answered, “New Jersey,” and both said they were checking out a country club.  - **Where are you now?**  [...] said, “I’m not sure, New Jersey, I think”; [...] answered, “pretty sure New Jersey. ”  - **Where are you going?**  [...], albeit after a long pause, said they were going to Virginia Beach where his daughter lives; [...] answered that they were going to Virginia, showed [...] that she had directions to Virginia on her phone’s GPS application, and said [...] had family there.  - **How long have you known each other?**  [...] said about six months; [...] said a few months.  - **How did you meet?**  [...] said they met at a friend’s house in New Hampshire; [...] said they met through friends at home.  - **Why were you at the country club?**  [...] said they were checking it out; [...] said they were exploring and went to look at it.  Rather than contributing to the officer’s suspicion, the fact that [...] and [...] gave virtually identical responses should have countered his hunch that “something [was] wrong.
[brief] Plaintiff/Respondent  Appearing pro se REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT/DEFENDANT  [...]  LAW  OFFICES OF JOHN T. BAZZURRO, LLC  [...]  Counsel for Appellant/Defendant  On the Brief: [...], Esquire  Attorney Id No. 024401994  June 20, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT......................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT....................  2 POINT I: Denial of Reconsideration Was Palpably Improper ....  2 POINT II: The Trial Court Dismissed the Complaint Because R 1:20A-6 Service Never Occurred.  Plaintiff Can Not Refute That Decision as he Failed to File a Cross-Appeal..........................  7  POINT III: The Numerous Misrepresentations of Fact and Law Make Plaintiff’s Brief Incredible...........................  10 POINT IV: The 2019 Complaint Was Never Served and the Trial Court Lacked Personal Jurisdiction to Reinstate It.....................  13  CONCLUSION ........................................  15  TABLE OF CONTENTS-APPENDIX - 6/20/24
[brief] Indeed, the only analysis that the trial court provided regarding this claim was in connection with the 2007 [...] – to which Defendant was not a party – where the trial judge concluded, “And I think Count 11, those do violate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which I think are present here. ”  36T51-19 to -21.  Plainly, Defendant cannot be liable for a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing regarding a contract that she was not a party to.  FDIC Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 876 (3d Cir. 1994).  Moreover, Plaintiffs’ claim failed as a matter of law because: (1) it was based on the same underlying conduct as their breach of contract claims; (2) it did not fall within the limited circumstances warranting pursuit of such a claim; and (3) Plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proof of a bad motive or intent in establishing a breach of the implied covenant by Defendant.  Tredo, supra, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *8-9.  Thus, the trial court erred as a matter of law by holding Defendant liable for breaching the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the 2007 [...] and [...], which produced an unjust result requiring the reversal of the Judgment against Defendant as to Count 11 of the Amended Complaint in the interests of justice.