ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In order for Addendum II to have any legal validity, it had to be signed by [...].  Moreover, it was not [...] that had presented the draft Addendum II to [...] or otherwise indicated that it intended to sign the document.  Instead, it was [...], which presented the draft to [...] on May 4, 2023, with only a note from its attorney stating he was “sure that Seller will execute as well”.  Da070.Worse, [...], which was copied on the transmittal, failed to respond to the communication by expressing that they would sign the document.  [...]’s first indication that [...] agreed to the modification was when they received the fully executed version on May 8, 2023.  Where the contractual provision governing the ROFR expressly grants the ROFR holder the right to “purchase” the real estate on the “same terms” as a third-party purchaser, New Jersey courts have held that the property owner must provide the ROFR holder with all final terms of the prospective sale or offer to provide the ROFR holder with legally adequate notice of the sales terms and start the clock for the holder to exercise its ROFR.
[brief] [Pa285].  As a result of its ownership of the Property, [...] owned certain rights for the development of a solar energy farm at the Property, which it offered to sell to Appellant, [...], in 2015.  [Pa285].  The development of a solar project such as the one in question involves numerous interrelated development activities such as obtaining a suitable site, designing the plant, maximizing energy yield, securing power purchasers and obtaining all necessary authorizations and permissions from the utilities and local, state and federal agencies (the “Solar Rights”).  [Pa139].  These Solar Rights are contractual in nature and are specific to the Property.  [Pa140].  By way of a Sale/Purchase Agreement, [...] purchased all of [...]’s Solar Rights for $600,000 plus reimbursements, which was paid by [...] in September 2015.  [Pa285-86].  Appellant, [...], was formed in or around 2015 as a special purpose entity to develop a utility-scale solar energy farm to be located at the Property (the “Solar Project”).  [Pa139].  [...] obtained a Wholesale Market Participation Agreement (the “WMPA”) in conjunction with [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”).  The WMPA permits the sale of electricity generated at the Property to a local utility.  The Interconnection Agreement with [...] allows the owner of the Solar Project to connect a utility and obtain the right to earn Solar Energy Renewable Credits (“SREC”) from the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities pursuant to the New Jersey Solar Act.  [Pa140-41]. \(^3\)  Together with the sale of the Solar Rights to [...], [...] entered a land lease agreement with Appellant, [...], on or about September 1, 2015 (the “Lease”).  [Pa286; Pa139].  Pursuant to the Lease, [...] was required to make an annual rental payment to [...] on September 1 of each year.  [Pa286; Pa139].  **B.
[brief] 15 U.S.C. Section 1637(b)(11)(B)(iv) requires that a creditor shall transmit to the obligor in each billing cycle the following information:  “a toll-free number at which the consumer may receive information about accessing credit counseling and debt management services. ”  (Emphasis Added).  A visual inspection by the lower Court of Defendant’s Exhibits L (Da71), M (Da73), N (Da75), O (Da77), P (Da79), and Q (Da81) would have revealed the incontrovertible fact that Plaintiff failed to provide any information about accessing debt management services in any of those Exhibits.
[brief] *State v. Comer*, 249 N.J. 359, 399 (2022).  Rather, the State argues that the sentencing fulfilled its duty and must be affirmed merely because the sentencing court “considered” the evidence and articulated a basis for continuing to place great weight on aggravating factors three and nine and rejecting mitigating factor nine.  (Sb12-19)  But when certain factors have been universally accepted as weighing against a likelihood of recidivism or need for deterrence, a court *must* correspondingly reduce the weight given to aggravating factors three and nine unless the court provides a basis for declining to do so grounded in competent, credible evidence.  On the question of whether the evidence presented by [...] is universally accepted as weighing against the likelihood of recidivism and deterrence, the State challenges [...]’s citation to parole cases in support of [...]’s argument that a prison record free of infractions with rehabilitative programming is linked with a lower risk of recidivism and less need for deterrence.
[brief] 2 Corbin on Contracts § 65.33 (“since ‘specific performance requires parties to perform their contractual promises, specific performance is inconsistent with termination of [an] agreement”).  One seeking specific performance seeks to enforce a valid and existing contract.  *Marioni v. 94 Broadway, Inc.*, 374 N.J. Super. 588, 598 (App. Div. 2005) (“[T]o establish a right to the remedy of specific performance, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the contract in question is valid and enforceable at law.
[brief] All case law post 2014 in the Superior Court and/or the District Court which analyzes the private right of action under the NJCFLA can be traced back to *Veras*.  The first cases in the Superior Court to address the private right of action under the NJCFLA were *New Century Fin. v. Trewin*, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688 (Ch. Div. May 24, 2018) (Pa116) and *Woo-Padva* 1, *supra*. (Pa133).
[brief] In this matter, like Ensslin, the Board failed to provide timely, adequate, or proper notice of the Ricci Act.  Also like Ensslin, [...] never received the notice.  The Board did not fulfill its obligation to notify the members of the [...] of this legislation “within 30 days” of July 8, 2019, including the requirement that they had to register their presence at the World Trade Center within 2 years of the law’s enactment, as was required by law.  The determination of the [...] acknowledges that it did not comply with the requirement to provide notice to all members and retirants enrolled in the [...] within 30 days of the Ricci Act’s enactment.
[brief] Additionally, the drafting attorney must contemplate potential problems that may arise down the road and address them in the document to avoid future conflicts.  It is not enough for the drafting attorney to simply draft a Property Settlement Agreement only focusing on the current issues, they have a duty to go beyond same, as the Property Settlement Agreement is and will become the most valuable document the divorcing parties will use.  Planning for future concerns or conflicts is one of the most important elements of a good property settlement agreement.  A qualified legal professional could take potential issues into account during the drafting process and analyze likely outcomes based on their own experience in this field and the two parties’ specific circumstances.  A lawyer cannot guarantee a certain outcome in the future, but there is language that can be put into a marital settlement agreement to protect the parties in the event of a dispute later on.  The distribution of assets and liabilities is a central component of a New Jersey property division settlement.  It addresses shared assets, marital and pre-marital debts, loans, and tax implications and who should bear them.  It also takes into account what the equitable distribution of the property should be and should address all outstanding issues.  For the property settlement agreement to be enforceable, it needs to be submitted to the court along with the Final Judgment of Divorce.  This document is important because it will essentially serve as a post-divorce manual.  Whenever there is a question about an expense, an investment, or a piece of property, the ex-spouses will consult the agreement, as it is constructed to provide guidance on numerous scenarios.  Because this document will likely be revisited many times in the years after a divorce, it is critical that all relevant information is included.  The more detail, the better chance that there will be no post-judgment litigation, which can be expensive and emotionally overwhelming.
[brief] In the First Count of the Complaint, Plaintiff sought a Declaratory Judgment pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Law (“UDJL”), N.J.S.A. 2A: 16-53 declaring that all accounts [...] took assignment of prior to obtaining a license are void, and granting a permanent injunction “pursuant to the [NJ]CFA” prohibiting any further attempts to collect on those accounts or transfer them to other entities.
[brief] [...] advertised, as the special master, and conducted the sale on January 18, 2022.  [...] filed a motion for confirmation of the sale, which was not considered until May 22 due to the unsuccessful attempts by counsel for [...] who opposed the approval of the sale.  Ultimately, the sale was confirmed by order of the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. under Chancery Div. Docket No. [...], dated May 27, 2022.  (Ca150).  The deed transferring any interest that [...] had as receiver was recorded in the Camden County clerk’s Office on June 30, 2022, and in the Burlington County clerk’s Office on August 2, 2022.  (Ca102).  Also, a bill of sale was given to the purchaser for all of the assets in possession of the receiver.  [...] purchased the assets through an entity, [...], and requested that [...] remain under the bank’s employ to continue to operate the diner.
[brief] In addition, the trial court misapprehended the legal standard for obtaining attorneys’ fees, erroneously conflating the prevailing party standard under UPEPA with the frivolous litigation standard under New Jersey’s Frivolous Litigation Statute.  Under UPEPA, the court “shall” award attorneys’ fees and costs “if the moving party prevails on the order to show cause. ”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A–58.  No showing that the non-moving party’s action is “frivolous” is required.  By contrast, to obtain discretionary attorneys’ fees under the Frivolous Litigation Statute, the court must find that the complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or defense in question “was frivolous,” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-59.1(a)(1), meaning that it was “pursued in bad faith, solely for the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious injury,” *Ferolito v. Park Hill Ass’n, Inc.*, 408 N.J. Super. 401, 407 (App. Div. 2009).  In denying Defendants’ motion, however, the trial court found that Defendants had failed to demonstrate that Plaintiff’s action was frivolous, noting the lack of a “court order that, at least in the eyes of this Court, adjudicates whether the matter is frivolous and has no basis for going forward. ”  T26:21–24; see also id. at 44:8–13 (court “d[id] not and c[ould] not find and make that leap . . . that this was a frivolous action and only filed by the plaintiff with the purpose to harass the defendant. ”).  Further compounding that error, the trial court appeared to graft onto the R.4:50-1(f) standard a requirement that any motion to dismiss filed by Defendants ultimately be successful—despite Plaintiff already having voluntarily dismissed the action, rendering Defendants the prevailing parties.  See T18:23–19:2 (trial court asking “where is that substantially before the Court that this would even have been ripe for a motion to dismiss given the liberal standard of that requirement that the Court has to adhere to on the case law, court rules?”).  The trial court’s “misconception of the applicable law” governing the award of attorneys’ fees—Defendants’ entitlement to which has no bearing on their ultimate entitlement to relief from the judgment under R.4:50-1(f)—was an abuse of discretion.  Johnson v. Johnson, 320 N.J. Super. 371, 378 (App. Div. 1999); Connolly v. Burger King Corp., 306 N.J. Super. 344, 349 (App. Div. 1997) (trial court abused its discretion by applying “an incorrect standard. ”).  The trial court’s order should accordingly be reversed.
[directive] the County Prosecutor's  Provide individually; a description a the property, a description of the law enforcement use, justification or for the property versus selling, etc., the appraised value using - . - .^1 0 estimated value of tbe property and the total appraised estimated or Do value of'all property liquidated during the period.  not include or property that was distributed another law enforcement agency to Prima Facie contraband.  II: C.
[brief] In fact, RICO contemplates the exact opposite by allowing recovery of “costs of investigation and litigation. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4(c) (emphasis added).  If RICO only allowed recovery for fees incurred post-filing, then the statute’s explicit, conjunctive inclusion of “investigation” would be superfluous.  See, e.g., Sanchez v. Fitness Factory Edgewater, LLC, 242 N.J. 252, 261 (2020) (explaining that in interpreting a statute, courts “‘strive for an interpretation that gives effect to all of the statutory provisions and does not render any language inoperative, superfluous, void[,] or insignificant’” (citation omitted)).  Moreover, extensive and long-term investigation is the only way to root out the “highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains millions of dollars from th[e] State’s economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud and corruption. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1.1(b).  The RICO statute thus makes clear that investigation is critical to its aims, and it does not support the [...]’ position that pre-filing investigative costs are not recoverable.  The fee analyses were consistent with the Appellate Division’s clear remand instructions and the RICO statute.
[brief] To the extent such suggestion has credibility, the Township Committee, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A: 12A-7(d), herewith sets forth its reasons for adopting this Redevelopment Plan.  A.  At the time the Township’s Master Plan was adopted in 1997, its focus was on the preservation of farmland and promoting the Township’s agricultural character through a then-newly crafted “Transfer of Development Rights” (“TOR”) legislative program.
[brief] provisions were not the causation for the fees incurred.  This is largely because there is no error for Plaintiff to correct after [...] sets aside all original Chinese agreements between [...] and [...].  The Amended Judgment of Divorce is for a totally different remedy the Plaintiff was seeking for one half (1/2) of the amount of the family assets allegedly contained in the Will of [...], for which Defendants were not told and asked to be incorporated in the original PSA by Plaintiff.  Therefore, the case cited by the Appellate Division in its decision, *In re Estate of Lash*, 169 N.J. 20, 26 (2001), does not support the ruling that the Defendants here are liable for the Plaintiff’s attorney fees per se.
[brief] 2  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS & RULINGS  Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay  Promotion filed 12/22/23 Pa-24  Order granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss filed  12/22/23 Pa-25  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Plaintiff relies upon the Procedural History set forth in his previously filed Appeal Brief.  STATEMENT OF FACTS  Plaintiff relies upon the Procedural History set forth in his previously filed Appeal Brief.  RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT’S BRIEF  Once again, the Defendants have failed to recognize that there is a constitutional distinction between failure to promote and failure to consider a person to be promoted.  In the instant case, the Chief’s actions were directed to depriving the Appellant of his right to be considered.  The Chief changed the dates to preclude the Plaintiff from being number one on the list.  Failure to promote is subject to mediation.  Failure to consider a person for promotion is a 1983 violation.  CONCLUSION  For the reasons expressed herein, it is respectfully submitted that this Court reverse the decision of the Court below and remand the matter back to the Court below for trial.
[brief] (1T18-6 to 11).  \(^3\) [...]’s report indicates June 5, which was incorrect.  (Da23).  wall; he reported an injury to his left foot.  (1T7-3 to 9; 1T10-13 to 25; Dca 1, clip one, 1:40:15 a.m. to 1:43 a.m.).  Defendant denied having been shot; he said that he fell.  (Dca 1, clip one, 1:42 to 1:43:35).  Defendant admitted that a “lady” had called 911 on his behalf.  (Dca 1, clip one, 1:43:45 a.m.).  A woman unseen at that time on the video, and later identified as [...], was heard voluntarily telling police she had called in the incident, at defendant’s request; they did not approach her.
[brief] 2.  [...] is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of New Jersey, and is a public utility engaged in the transportation and distribution of natural gas, and thereby subject to the jurisdiction of the Board, with a principal business office located at [...].  As a local natural gas distribution company, [...] provides regulated retail natural gas service to approximately 538,000 customers in Monmouth and Ocean counties, as well as portions of Burlington, Middlesex and Morris counties.  3.  Communications and correspondence relating to this filing should be sent to:  [...] Vice President – Regulatory Affairs  [...] 1415 Wyckoff Road Wall, New Jersey 07719 [...]  mkahrer@[...]. com  [...] Regulatory Affairs Counsel  [...] 1415 Wyckoff Road Wall, New Jersey 07719 [...]  adembia@[...].com  [...] [...] [...] [...]
[directive] [...] Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy  [...]  [...] [...]  [...] [...] [...] [...]  [...] Office: [...]  Office: [...] Cape May County  [...] Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy  [...]  [...] [...] [...] Cape May Court House, New Jersey 08210- [...] 1654  Office: [...] Office: [...]  Essex County [...] Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy
[brief] N.J.S.A. 34:15-8; Millison, supra, 101 N.J. at 169.  Intentional wrongful conduct is excepted from workers compensation coverage because such conduct neither constitutes a natural risk of employment, nor arises out of the employment.  Those notions are at the heart of the Workers' Compensation bargain in the first instance.  See Laidlow, supra, 170 N.J. at 606.  This State has an established public policy favoring full compensation for its injured employees, including injuries that do not arise as a natural risk of the employment.  See Lohmeyer v. Frontier Ins. Co., 294 N.J. Super. 547, 555-56 (App. Div. 1996) (describing the "mandatory coverage requirement of N.J.S.A. 34:15-87" and noting "[an insurance] policy which purports to provide workers' compensation coverage is governed by the workers' compensation laws and must conform with its regulatory policy.").
[brief] Db29.  In other words, [...] suggests he is entitled to the law-created, fictional undiscounted value that the Balsamides, Lawson, and Sipko courts reserved as a punishment to the payor simply because he had already paid other forms of damages for his bad behavior.  [...]’s theory is simply not the law, and not serious in light of Lawson, Balsamides, and Sipko.  None of these cases support the nonsensical theory that a member, dissociated for harming the Company, could receive an undiscounted value for that member’s forced buy out simply because that member’s conduct was so egregious that the member had also been sanctioned throughout the litigation leading up to the dissociation and also made to pay damages for that conduct.  First and foremost, [...]’s conduct caused the buyout, and his bad behavior is judicially established.  Not only is [...] not a victim, he is not even neutral.  He is the oppressor.  Paying [...] an undiscounted value would punish the Company, which did no wrong, contrary to every single word expressed by every single court in every single one of the above-cited cases.
[brief] Additionally, subsection d of *N.J.S.A. 10:6-2* specifically provides that an action brought pursuant to the Act may be filed in New Jersey Superior Court.  The Courts have recognized two types of claims under the CRA: a claim for when one is “deprived of a right” and a claim for when one’s “rights are interfered with by threats, intimidation, coercion, or force. ”  *Felicioni v. Admin. Office of Courts*, 404 N.J. Super. 382, 400 (App. Div. 2008).  In this matter, Plaintiffs alleged --- 4  The Third Circuit has held that the New Jersey Constitution offers broader protections than the Federal Constitution.  *Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth*, 436 F. 3d 397, 404 (3d Cir. 2006). that they were deprived of their rights in violation of the CRA based upon several theories under the New Jersey Constitution as set forth below.
[brief] The court stated, “This Court finds that plaintiff proposed an amended Complaint adding what is tantamount to a spoliation Count would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. ”  (T:54:18-21)  The court then made various findings of fact gleaned from the parties’ certifications in support of its conclusion that the plaintiff’s proposed fraudulent concealment count would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  It is respectfully submitted that it was improper for the court to decide the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint to include a count for fraudulent concealment as if it were a motion for summary judgment under R. 4:46.  In *Interchange State Bank v. Rinaldi*, 303 N.J. Super. 239 (App. Div. 1997), the appellate division affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for leave to amend his answer to include a counterclaim asserting that the plaintiff violated the anti-tying provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act because the defendant’s allegations that plaintiff violated the provisions of the Bank Holding Act were legally insufficient to establish the necessary elements of the claimed cause of action.
[brief] ”  S. Rep. No. 95–382, at 2 (1977) (emphasis added).  The Report goes on to state:  “[The FDCPA] prohibits disclosing the consumer’s personal affairs to third persons.  Other than to obtain location information a debt collector may not contact third persons such as a consumer’s friends, neighbors, relatives, or employer.  Such contacts are not legitimate collection practices and result in serious invasions of privacy, as well as loss of jobs. ”  Id. at 4 (emphasis added).  Thus, Appellant’s letter vendor theory of liability, far from comporting with FDCPA legislative history, is at odds with clear Congressional intent to prevent disclosures only to friends, neighbors, relatives, or employers, which may cause reputational or professional harm.
[brief] That risk is particularly acute in this case.  [...] and [...] run one of the largest, most prominent companies in the world.  Their responsibilities are enormous, and their time is precious.  Designating them as custodians would trigger custodial interviews and the other burdens of document identification, search, and collection that impose on that time and trade off with their focus on running [...]’s business, all in service of an impermissible fishing expedition.
[brief] (24T93-3 to 8; 27T39-14)  He located a 9mm shell casing within four or five feet of the victim, as well as two spots of saliva right near the shell casing; he photographed and collected both, swabbing the saliva with a sterile Q-tip.  (27T41-17 to 42-1, 49-14, 42-11 to 20)  At 10:00 p.m., [...] [...] arrived and heard on the radio that [...] had seen [...] walking toward [...] from the [...].
[brief] [...]’s prior inconsistent statements at his plea hearing regarding the incident that forms the basis of this civil litigation are firmly within the scope of discoverability.  No civil reservation, court order, or legal privilege applies to these statements.  Even if a civil reservation were to be entered in the future, a civil reservation is not a license to commit perjury or to proffer a fraudulent defense in a civil action without being subject to cross-examination.  That said, the trial court’s present order is limited to requiring [...] to answer questions regarding his prior statements at his discovery deposition.  No ruling has been made regarding the ultimate admissibility of those prior statements.  Interlocutory review of the trial court’s narrowly-tailored, legally correct discovery order is unwarranted and [...]’s motions for leave to appeal and for a stay should be denied.