ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] VOLUME IV APPENDIX DOCUMENT APPENDIX  PAGE  #  Order entered on April 14, 2023 denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the Summary Judgment Order.  This document is not included as it has been previously included in Plaintiff-Appellant Appendix at Vol. IV Pa. 590………………………….  Scheduling Order entered on May 23, 2023 by the Clerk of the Appellant Division……………Pa. 601 | Cases | Page # | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| | Citibank, N.A. v Estate of Simpson, 290 N.J. Super. 519(App. Div. 1996) | 18 | | Craft v. Stevenson Lumbar Yard, Inc., 179 N.J. 56 (2004) | 18 | | General Elec. Co v. Fred Sulzer & Co., 86 N.J. Super. 520(App. Div. 1965) | 18 | | Hinton v. Meyers, 416 N.J. Super. 141 (App. Div. 2010) | 22 | | Hollywood Café Diner Inc., 417 N.J. Super 210(App. Div. 2022) | 29 | | Kennelly-Murray v. McGill, 381 N.J. Super. 313 (App. Div. 2005) | 22 | | Leitner v. Toms River Regional Schools, 392 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 2007) | 27-29 | | Metromedia Co. v. Mountain Associates 139 N.J. 62 (1995) | 17 | | Montiel v. Ingersol, 347 N.J. Super. 246(Law Div. 2001) | 26 | | Mt. Hope Inn v. Travelers Indem. Co., 157 N.J. Super. 431 (App. Div. 1978) | 19 | | Ponden v. Ponden, 374 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2004), certif. denied | 28 | | 183 N.J. 212 (2005) | | ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page # | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| | **Price v. New Jersey Manufacturing Co.,** | | | 182 N.J. 519 (2005) ........................................................................ | 19-21 | | **Shelcusky v. Garjulio,** | | | 172 N.J. 183 (2002) ....................................................................... | 21-23 | | **Tucci v. Tropicana Casino,** | | | 364 N.J. Super. 48 (App. Div. 2003) ....................................... | 26-27 | | **Viti v. Brown,** | | | 359 N.J. Super. 40 (Law Div. 2003) ......................................... | 25 | | **W.V Pangborne & Co. v. New Jersey Dept of Transp.,** | | | 116 N.J. 543(2005) ....................................................................... | 19-21 | ### Statutes and Rules | Statute | Page # | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| | N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-1 ........................................................................... | 17 | | N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-6 ........................................................................... | 15 | | R. 1:6-3 ............................................................................................ | 23 | | R. 4:5-4 ............................................................................................ | 18 | | R. 4:24-1(c) .................................................................................... | 25, 28-29 | ### Other | Other | Page # | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| | **[...]’s Tangled Web of Questionable Billing Practices,** | | | Healthcare, Aug. 11, 2016 ................................................................ | 4 | TABLE OF ORDERS APPEALED FROM
[brief] Thus, the debt was void upon assignment to [...]—the first unlicensed entity in the chain of assignment—pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  The debt was also void upon assignment to [...], [...], [...], and [...] since they were all unlicensed.  Upon assignment of the void account, [...] initiated a collection lawsuit against [...] in the Special Civil Part of the Bergen County Law Division.  Like any person without a legal education, Mr. [...] was unaware of the NJCFLA and its licensure requirements, let alone the fact that [...] was unlicensed and enforcing a void debt.  Moreover, Mr. [...] disputes he was ever served with [...]’s collection Complaint.  [...] later sought default judgment on the void debt and, on or about April 21, 2017, default judgment was entered against [...].
[directive] Submit the to the Municipal Court Forms for Expungement of Arrest or Charge Records  Upon completion of the Application and Order, the Applicant must submit the completed Forms via either hand delivery or mail to the municipal cout1 where those proceedings were dismissed, the Applicant was acquitted, or the Applicant was discharged without a conviction or finding of guilt.  The Application will then be reviewed by a Municipal Court Judge.  If approved, the Municipal Court Judge will sign the Application and forward the signed Application and Order to the Applicant and the County Criminal Division for submission to the Superior Court Judge.  the event the Application is In improperly or incompletely filled out, the Applicant will be notified by municipal court staff.  After review by a Superior Court Judge, and granted, a copy of the signed Application and executed Order for Expungement will be forwarded to the if appropriate prosecutor and Municipal Court for the expungement of applicable records.  A copy of the signed Application and executed Order will also be forwarded to the Applicant.  Published: 05/2016, CN: 11980 (Municipal Instructions and Forms for Expungement of A.rrest or Charge Records) page of I I "!· ••• Application for Expungement of Arrest or Charge Records
[brief] However as stated in the appellate brief, the appellate division affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to vacate judgment without applying or even mentioning Tyler.  The appellate decision in [...]’s case was entered June 8, 2023 within days of Tyler.  Since the case was decided simultaneously with the decision in Tyler, it appears the Court likely reviewed [...]’s appeal before the Tyler decision and same was an oversight.  Since the controlling law was overlooked and the matter was decided based upon an impermissible basis, [...] did meet the standard for a motion for reconsideration in New Jersey.  Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, Fusco v. Board of Educ. of City of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455.
[brief] The lower court was required to accept as true Plaintiff’s pleadings that Defendants [...] and [...] knowingly and substantially assisted in retaliating against Plaintiff by authorizing the sham investigation, spanning over six months, where the investigator did not give Plaintiff an opportunity to meaningfully respond to a legible transcript and did not interview any of the individuals that she identified with knowledge, despite saying he would do both things.  231a-242a, 246a-247a.
[brief] Id at 444, quoting Garfinkle, 168 N.J. at 132.  With regard to agreements to arbitrate, the Atalese Court held that an enforceable arbitration provision "at least in some general and sufficiently broad way, must explain that the plaintiff is giving up her right to bring her claims in court or have a jury resolve the dispute."  Atalese, 219 N.J. at 447.  It further held that "[n]o particular form or words is necessary to accomplish a clear and unambiguous waiver of rights."  Id. at 444.  The language, to pass muster under the Plain Language Act codified as N.J.S.A. 56:12 -2, must generally be "written in a simple, clear, understandable and easily readable way."  Ibid.  Atalese remains the seminal opinion as to the enforceability of arbitration provisions, dictating exactly what is required for an agreement to arbitrate to be enforceable.  Nothing more than that which is referenced in Atalese is required for an enforceable agreement to arbitrate to exist.
[brief] Respondents’ Initial Efforts To Create An All-Purpose Regional School District With [...]’s Participation.  This matter began with [...]’s intention to join a new, all-purpose regional school district with the Respondent Boards of [...], Atlantic [...], and [...].  [...] does not have its own board of education or its own school system.  Instead, its students are educated in the neighboring school districts of [...] and [...].  [...] students in pre-K through eighth grade attend school in [...], and high  1  The procedural history and statement of facts have been combined for the Court’s convenience because they are inextricably intertwined.
[directive] i.  The use of force by a law enforcement officer resulting in death or serious bodily injury likely to result in death; ii.  The death of a civilian during an encounter with a law enforcement officer; iii.  The death of a civilian while in the custody of law enforcement, where the death could be plausibly linked to the actions of a law enforcement officer, whether through the intentional use of force or a reckless indifference to life;1 human iv.  Where the Principal of the Investigation is a member of the Division of Criminal Justice or the New Jersey State Police; or In cases involving a death inside a prison, jail, or other detention facility, the investigation shall be subject 1 to the protocols described below in Section III of this Directive.  Page 5 v.  Any other LE Incident where, in the discretion of the OPIA Director, justice would be served by appointing OPIA as the Independent Investigator.  b.  The County Prosecutor’s Office in the county where the LE Incident occurred shall serve as the “default” Independent Investigator in the following circumstances, subject to a conflict check conducted pursuant to Section II.C.2 below:  i.  The use of force by a law enforcement officer resulting in serious bodily injury, but unlikely to result in death; or ii.  The use of deadly force by a law enforcement officer acting in their official capacity, except those resulting in death or likely to result in death.  Review for Conflicts of Interest
[directive] This Directive promulgates for immediate use eleven new and revised form orders as of et approved by the Judicial Council to implement the requirements N.J.S.A. 2C:4-5 seq. and N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1 et seq. regarding competency and sanity evaluations criminal matters.  in  These form orders were drafted by the Forensic Evaluation Workgroup, a group comprised of various criminal practice and forensic evaluation system stakeholders, including representatives from the Judiciary, the Office of the Attorney General, the Office of the Public of Defender, county prosecutors, and executive and clinical administration from the Division Mental Health and Addiction Services.  These form orders will be posted on the Criminal Forms page of the Judiciary's Internet website and the Criminal Division Forms page of the Judiciary's lnfoNet.  The following briefly explains the situations which each order should be used.  For a in of more detailed explanation, please see the text that precedes the orders in each the subsequent attachments.
[brief] (Aa754).  [...] passed the first resolution on February 2, 2022, followed by the [...] on February 9, 2022, and the [...] on June 9, 2022.  (Aa754).  The [...], Atlantic [...], and [...] (collectively “[...]”) passed their resolutions on June 13, 14, and 15, 2022, respectively.  (Aa754).2  Consistent with the aforementioned resolutions, on July 15, 2022, [...], along with the Boroughs of Highlands and Atlantic Highlands and the Tri-Districts, filed with the Commissioner a Verified Joint Petition for Regionalization.  (Aa22 – Aa371).  [...] and [...] were not copied on this Joint Petition.  The Joint Petition sought the Commissioner’s approval to place on the November 2022 ballot the issues of Henry Hudson’s expansion from a limited-purpose regional district to an all-purpose regional district, and [...]’s attempted withdrawal from [...] and [...] and simultaneous joining in the expanded [...].  (Aa39 – Aa41).  On June 23, 2022, [...] filed a Petition of Appeal with the Commissioner which, in relevant part, challenged the legal authority of [...] to withdraw from [...] and seek to regionalize with Highlands and Atlantic Highlands.
[directive] 1.0.11  Indifference to the internal affairs function will have a negative impact on the administration of criminal justice and the delivery of police services to New Jersey’s residents.  Agencies that fail to make the internal affairs function a priority can lose the respect and support of the community.  The integrity of individual law enforcement agencies, and the reputation of the State’s criminal justice system, can also suffer if agencies fail to identify and correct officer misconduct.  In addition, law enforcement agencies that fail to implement a meaningful and objective internal affairs process may be found liable in civil lawsuits for their failure to effectively address officer misconduct.  It is for these reasons that the Attorney General has issued this revised policy and directed that the State’s law enforcement agencies implement the critical mandates set forth by the policy.
[brief] The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize parties to obtain discovery of “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case...”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).  “Information within the scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. ”  Id.  District courts have broad discretion to limit discovery where the discovery sought is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. ”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).  A party may request the production of any document within the scope of Rule 26(b).  Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a).  “For each item or category, the response must either state that inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested or state an objection to the request, including the reasons. ”  Rule 34(b)(2)(B).  If the responding party chooses to produce responsive information, rather than allow for inspection, the production must be completed no later than the time specified in the request or another reasonable time specified in the response.  Id.  An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld based on that objection.
[directive] 1.  "Tiplines" established pursuant to SNAP Guideline 5.8 shall be staffed by law enforcement officers, and the role of school officials with respect to the operation of such tiplines shall be limited to publicizing to members of the school community the existence and purpose of these tiplines.  2.  The Narcotics Crime Prevention and Public Awareness Working Group is hereby directed to prepare in conjunction with the School Zone Narcotics Enforcement Working Group a model student watch program.  Each county prosecutor and local law enforcement agency shall be responsible for assisting school officials in developing and implementing watch groups or similar student oriented crime prevention and awareness programs.  Nothing in this subsection, however, shall be construed to require any school or school district to develop or implement a student watch program.
[brief] Finally, the absurd—and therefore clearly unintended—effect of Defendants’ interpretation of AICRA’s arbitration provision would be that insurers must discover fraudulent PIP claims within the short time allotted to approve or deny such claims—a maximum of 105 days.  But that is simply not reasonable with the kind of fraudulent scheme alleged here.  Plaintiffs needed the testimony of who are essentially cooperating witnesses to discover that [...] was illegally owned and controlled, and that Defendants were paying and receiving kickbacks and self-referrals.  See Pa0448 ([...] Cert. ¶¶ 6-11); Pa0043-0045 (Compl. ¶¶ 137-276).
[brief] ” (See Pa109-111 (Consent Order)).  The plain meaning of the first portion of paragraph five of the Consent Order is consistent with the plain meaning of paragraphs one through four: it restricts the ability of the parties to refile any claims that were or could have been asserted in the Chancery Action by ensuring that a party’s Claims, Relief, or Defenses would only be preserved in the event of (i) a “Refiled Action”, which is defined in paragraphs 2 and 3 to require its commencement within the mandatory filing deadline: sixty days from the issuance of the [...]; or (ii) “Responsive Pleadings in a Refiled Action,” which are defined in paragraph 4 to be responsive pleadings that are filed following the commencement of a “Refiled Action”.  (Pa110-111 (Consent Order)).  The balance of Paragraph 5 of the Consent Order reinforces the 60-day refiling deadline by restricting any party’s ability to raise defenses such as waiver, estoppel, and any other time-based doctrines or defenses, during the same limited 60-day window.  (Pa111 (Consent Order)).  The Trial Court properly rejected the argument which Appellants raise once again on appeal – that “nothing in the Consent Order bars the parties from asserting claims after the sixty (60) day period. ”  Pb. at 2.  The Trial Court properly held that Appellants’ argument was “unpersuasive” (Pa8 (Opinion)).
[brief] THE [...] IMPROPERLY ISSUED THE FHACA PERMIT BECAUSE THE [...] DID NOT MAKE ANY FINDINGS REGARDING THE BEST AVAILABLE PRECIPITATION DATA AND ASSOCIATED FLOOD ELEVATION FORECASTS (Aa001)  The [...] arbitrarily and capriciously ignored the best available precipitation data when it issued this permit on December 1, 2022—data that was known to the [...] at least as early as November of 2021.  The Cornell Studies, commissioned and peer reviewed by the [...]’s scientists, demonstrated that precipitation had already increased 2.5%-10% beyond the information previously relied on by [...], and would likely increase by more than 20% by the year 2100.  Aa184.  This information was later formally incorporated into the agency’s Inland Flood Protection Rule (“IFPR”).  Regardless of when the IFPR became effective, the [...] had a duty at the time the permit application was reviewed and the permit was issued to ensure the proposed development was designed to withstand “a flood equal to the 100-year flood plus an additional amount of water in fluvial areas to account for possible future increases in flows due to development or other factors. ”  Despite this duty and the new data in its possession, the [...] appears to have allowed a massive development with 241 acres of new impervious surface to --- 20 See N.J.A.C. 7:13-1.2 (emphasis added), the [...]’s definition of “flood hazard area design flood” which was in effect at the time this permit application was deemed complete for review on August 4, 2022 (Aa024).  proceed under outdated flooding forecasts and obsolete precipitation data.  This arbitrary decision violates the express legislative policy of the Flood Hazard Area Control Act (FHACA) to avoid the “improper development and use of [flood hazard areas] which would constitute a threat to the safety, health, and general welfare from flooding,” N.J.S.A. 58:16A-52(a), and violates the agency’s own regulations requiring it to account for additional water to protect the public from flooding, N.J.A.C. 7:13-1.2, and to “minimize damage to life and property from flooding caused by development within flood hazard areas. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:13-1.1(c).  The permit must be vacated and remanded to the [...].
[brief] Notably, [...] did not inform Plaintiff or [...] that Defendants’ LSRP had determined that the draft RIR was insufficient for submission to the NJDEP.  (4T52:24 to 53:2; 8T91:3-13.)  After the phone call, on December 18, 2020, [...] emailed the participants of the call with a summary of their discussion and requested that [...] provide, among other things, a copy of the RIR that was filed and proof of submission to the NJDEP.  (Pa0371-72.)  On December 23, 2020, [...] replied that he had requested the documents “from the former LSRP and former attorney,” which prompted even more confusion from Plaintiff and [...] given the inconsistencies in [...]’s representations.  (Pa0379-80.)  In truth, however, [...] simply lied that the RIR had been submitted in December 2020.  (4T54:21 to 55:7; 8T88:17 to 89:7.)  In fact, prior to submission of the RIR, Defendants were required to first submit a preliminary assessment report to the NJDEP, which did not occur until January 2021.  (5T23:16 to 25:23; Pa0383.)  Interestingly, the preliminary assessment report that [...] directed [...] to file in January 2021 was actually the RT PA Report that [...] prepared in August 2018.  (4T56:8 to 57:22, 179:20 to 182:3; 5T25:24 to 27:6; 8T42:19-24.)  And although the RIR could have been filed after the submission of the preliminary assessment report, [...], Defendants’ then-LSRP, still felt that [...]’s proposed RIR was not sufficient for submission to the NJDEP as, among other things, delineation of contamination remained incomplete.  (5T19:8 to 20:8, 22:4-10, 27:7-13; 6T81:25 to 82:8; 8T93:21 to 94:4.)  For several months in early 2021, [...] became unresponsive and [...] was unable to contact him.
[directive] On ___________ the above captioned defendant was convicted of an offense enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6.3 and the victim of the crime(s) was under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the offense and the defendant resides in a household with other minor children or is the parent of a minor child.  The court will proceed with sentencing on _______________ unless otherwise advised by DYFS.  Criminal Division Probation Officer Phone Number Supplemental Contact: Team Leader  Phone Number c: Team Leader  Defendants file DYFS REFERRAL  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6.3
[brief] *See Ledezma v. A & L Drywall*, 254 N.J. Super. at 618; *see also Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. at 267-71; *see also Hewitt v. Hollahan*, 56 N.J. Super. at 377-78.  Accordingly, it was legally and logically unfounded for the trial court to forbid [...] from reviewing information that it purportedly already has in its possession.  Moreover, Respondents deployed the age-old sharp tactic of “better to ask for forgiveness than to ask for permission. ”  In this case, that tactic was designed to have the exact unconstitutional effect it had on Appellants and [...].  Respondents made the impermissible but calculated tactical decision to file for disqualification in the first place, coming after *months* of discovery and only filed once a trial date was set.  *See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 109 N.J. at 218.  Respondents acknowledged they were not permitted to file the *in camera* Certification but submitted it anyway: “Notwithstanding the fact that [[...]] was denied the opportunity to obtain a Certification for *in camera* inspection….” (300a).  Respondents did so only after it appeared that the trial court would rule against them as a deliberate and impermissible tactic.  *See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 109 N.J. at 218.  The trial court admitted Appellants did not review the Certification, (T4:9-12), and were accordingly at a “disadvantage” for not having the information.  (T28:2-3).  Respondents misused disqualification and misused *in camera* review, which the trial court then condoned.  *See Richardson v. DeFazio*, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS at *7 (citing *Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 109 N.J. at 218, 221).  Respondents *wanted* to disadvantage Appellants.  The trial court assisted Respondents in doing so in violation of constitutional precepts.  At a minimum, the trial court should have given [...] notice that it intended to reverse its prior ruling concerning *in camera* review of the Certification so [...] could have elected to retain screening counsel to address the issue.  However, the trial court did not provide [...] an opportunity to respond whatsoever which was a gross violation of Appellants’ due process rights.  *See Doe v. Poritz*, 142 N.J. 1 (1995) (holding that the minimum requirements of due process are “notice and the opportunity to be heard. ”).  The trial court’s Disqualification Order thus lacks the basic legitimacy required by the Constitutions.  For these reasons, the trial court erred and the Disqualification Order should be reversed.