ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [Pa203 at ¶ 16].  As a result, [...] submitted the Consent Judgments for entry on September 29, 2023, along with a certification setting forth [...]’s default.  [Pa41; Pa43].  In its October 30, 2023 response, [...] did not dispute that it had authorized third-parties to dispose of unknown materials at the Leased Premises, or that [...] had failed to provide any documentation or information regarding the source or composition of these materials.  [Pa167].  Instead, it claimed that “an individual by the name of [...]” had ostensibly agreed to pave the Leased Premises for $1,500 in the final month of [...]’s occupancy.  [Pa169].  [...] further alleged that the material, consisting largely of asphalt millings, was provided “by one [...]. ”  [Pa170].  [...] provided cell phones numbers for both individuals, but to this day has not produced a single document to support its claims or to lend clarity about the tons of material that [...] would be required to address.  [Pa175 at ¶¶ 7-8].  In light of [...]’s refusal to cooperate further, [...] attempted to locate the individuals responsible for the materials that had been dumped at the Leased Premises to determine what, exactly, had been dumped.
[brief] (Partially raised below at 13T 57-12 to 71-10; 14T 8-4 to 13-15) .................................32  A.  The State Argued An Incorrect Theory Of Accomplice Liability, And The Trial Court’s Instruction Did Not Correct The Legal Misconception Presented To The Jury.  ...........................................  33  B.  The Trial Court Failed To Provide Two Necessary Instructions: The Identification And Alibi Charges...............  35  C.  The Improper Explanation Of Accomplice Liability, As Well As The Missing Identification And Alibi Instructions, Require Reversal Of [...]’s Convictions...............................................................  39  TABLE OF CONTENTS  (CONT'D.)  POINT IV
[brief] Defendant’s entire argument attempts to make the failure to receive an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate by the closing date a prerequisite for termination.  It emphasizes the language that says Plaintiff’s “obligation to close title hereunder is conditioned upon [[...]] delivering . . . an ‘Acceptable Estoppel Certificate”.  But in doing so Defendant incorrectly examines that language in a vacuum.  It ignores the fact that very clause does not even have a time element, i.e., delivering an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate at the closing or even by the closing.  Likewise, Defendant makes no mention of the fact the PSA mandates supplying ‘the’ executed estoppel as opposed to ‘an’ executed estoppel.  Similarly, though it discusses paragraph 9.1(l) (Pb11,18) it completely overlooks the Acceptable Estoppel Certificate is to be delivered “if obtained. ”  More importantly, Defendant underplays the importance of the required prompt delivery equating that with being a mechanism to keep Plaintiff informed.  However, that very proposition is patently unsupportable, a point now addressed.
[brief] Defendant objects to one isolated comment in the State’s opening statement.  The jury was cautioned in the opening and final jury instructions that the opening and closing statements made by the attorneys were not considered evidence and cannot be treated as evidence.  [4T7-15 to -21; 5T57-16 to -21].  The now objected-to portion of the State’s opening was one comment in the State’s argument.  It was not repeated.  It was not a theme of the State’s opening argument.  Defendant contends that the State’s closing statement also encouraged the jury to convict defendant for being a bad person by contributing to [...]’s drug addiction but that statement is inaccurate.  The State fairly commented on the evidence before the jury: defendant had distributed drugs to [...] during the course of their trip to Virginia.  Defendant did not possess heroin but fentanyl.  During defendant’s closing, defendant made much of the fact that the investigating officers initially believed defendant possessed heroin, not fentanyl.  [5T39-24 to 40-22].  Defendant argued that the drugs could have been switched somewhere between being removed from defendant’s truck and being submitted to the Forensic Laboratory for testing.  [5T38-23 to 40-12].  Defendant said, “You will recall that the substances Jasmine [...] said she used, and actually, [...] mentioned in his statement to the police, was believed to be heroin. ”  [5T40-1 to -4].  The State’s summation rebutted the allegations that the drugs were switched or altered by some unseen actors.  The State’s closing did not exceed the boundaries of the testimony heard by the jurors nor did it ask the jurors to convict defendant for being a bad person.  Defendant cannot succeed on this argument.
[brief] Here, the Board’s determination is reasonable and complies with the governing statute.  The unambiguous language of the Ricci Act provides:  A member or retiree shall not be eligible for the presumption or recalculation under this subsection unless within two years of the effective date of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, the member or retiree files a written and sworn statement with the retirement system on a form provided by the board of trustees thereof indicating the dates and locations of service.
[brief] None of the cases address the [...] situation presented here.  This 'witness' was sent to the bodega, not to investigate anything, but to provide tech support to someone who had been unsuccessful trying to download video footage.  He was not looking at the footage he was downloading.  The time and date stamps do not match when the shooting occurred, and so the 'witness' guesses that that means there must be something wrong with the time and date stamping.  At OAGb17, the Attorney General’s analogy that the [...] situation presented here was similar to the facts in People v. Tuncap, CRA12-032, 2014 WL 235471 (Guam Jan. 16, 2014) is misguided.
[brief] 414a.  The Trial Court was blatantly incorrect.  First, the fact that [...] were not Plaintiffs’ attorneys is wholly irrelevant.  The fact that [...] were not Plaintiffs’ attorneys did not absolve them of their requirement to disclose material information or to refrain from concealing material information.  As set forth in *Berman v. Gurwicz*, 189 N.J. Super. 89, 93–94, 458 A.2d 1311, 1313–14 (Ch. Div. 1981), aff’d, 189 N.J. Super. 49, 458 A.2d 1289 (App. Div. 1983), a leading case in fiduciary duties in transactions:
[brief] C.  [...]’S Standard Of Review Is Improper And Inapplicable [Issue Raised in Appellate Brief Db12]  The first sentence of [...]’s legal argument should end its appeal before it begins.  [...]’s statement that it “respects the Trial Court’s factual findings” and “disagrees with the Court’s legal determination that [...] did not suffer damages caused by the [...]’s breach” (Db12) is inconsistent with the appropriate standard of review for an Order of Judgment articulated by our Supreme Court that “we do not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice” and equally inconsistent with the abuse of discretion standard of review for a motion for reconsideration set forth in R. 4:49-2.
[brief] *Kanter v. Passaic*, 107 N.J. Super. 556 (L. Div. 1969) is not to the contrary.  The Court there undertook a spot zoning analysis but, because the objector offered no expert opinion, found that the ordinance did not constitute spot zoning.  While this Court in *Meredith v. Mayor & Borough Council of Somerdale & [...]*, A-1933-20, 2022 N.J. Super. --- \(^2\)  In its original brief, Appellant mis-cited the location of version 6 in its Appendix at page 10 as being Pa1043.  Unpub. LEXIS 971, *8 (App. Div., Jun. 3, 2022) rejected a spot zoning challenge in a redevelopment context, it did so after hearing expert testimony from the City planner and the planner retained by the plaintiff.  CONCLUSION
[brief] The proposed development, on a 650-acre site at the intersection of U.S. Route 1 and Quakerbridge Road, represents the largest warehouse development in the State of New Jersey.  The permit authorizes a disturbance of more than 400 acres, an increase of more than 241 acres of impervious coverage, which would include a total of 5.5 million square feet of building footprint coverage, 2,435 car parking spaces, 1,072 truck-trailer parking spaces, internal access roads, improvements to adjacent public roadways, utilities, stormwater management, lighting, and significant landscaping and earth grading.  Given the massive scale of the proposed development and the potential for unsafe flooding from this project, the DEP should not have left significant questions unanswered in its permit decision.  For the following three reasons, this Court must vacate and remand the permit to the DEP.  First, the permit rests on the DEP’s required (but missing) evaluation of whether the stormwater runoff from this proposed development will further impair any of the nearby receiving waterways.  Second, the permit authorizes the construction of a pipe culvert and road crossing that the DEP’s regulations do not allow without an adequate justification, and there is not any justification presented for this serious disturbance to the stream corridor.  Third, the DEP arbitrarily failed to require use of the best available data when it issued this permit, because the DEP already had in its possession updated studies showing significant increases in precipitation.  The DEP’s errors in this case are a violation of the legislative policies behind the Flood Hazard Area Control Act and the Water Quality Planning Act, a failure to create an adequate record for the public and Court to review, and arbitrary and capricious decision making.  The permit decision does not represent the level of good science and good governance that is required and expected of the DEP.  Appellant now seeks a reversal of the DEP’s erroneous permit decision.  In the alternative, Appellant seeks a remand to the agency for further factfinding.
[brief] The choice, therefore, was removed from the trial court and cannot be considered excessive or inappropriate.  This is especially true considering the Court’s restraint: an extended term on a second-degree conviction would subject defendant to upwards of twenty years in prison, while the Court elected to impose thirteen.  The Court also imposed the minimum possible term of parole ineligibility and ran defendant’s sentences for Hindering and being a Certain Person concurrently to the thirteen on the conviction for an Unlawful Possession of a Weapon.  The sentence of the Court actually defied the theory of *State v. Case*, which held that “when the mitigating factors preponderate, sentences will tend towards the lower range, and when the aggravating factors preponderate, sentences will tend toward the higher end of the range. ”  220 N.J. At 64-65.  Here, the aggravating factors preponderated but nevertheless defendant was sentenced in the lower range.  With respect to “double counting,” a sentencing Court may not cite an element of an offense as an aggravating factor to increase punishment.  *State v. Fuentes*, 217 N.J. at 74-75; *State v. Kromphold* 162 N.J. 345, 353 (2000); *State v. Yarbough*, 100 N.J. 627, 633 (1985), as amended by N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a).  The sentencing Court did no such thing.  The Court imposed an extended term on Count 1, Unlawful Possession of a Weapon.  To justify that sentence, the Court relied on defendant’s prior conviction for a weapons offense.  That conviction is not an element of the crime – it cannot therefore be subject to reversal for double counting.  See *State v. McDuffie*, 450 N.J. Super. 554, 576 (App. Div. 2017) (rejecting as meritless defendant’s claim that “the court impermissibly double-counted his criminal record, when granting the State’s motion for a discretionary extended term, and again, when imposing aggravating factor six”).  More importantly, however, it triggers a mandatory extended term: the Court not only can, but must rely on that prior conviction.  For the aggravating factors, the Court relied on defendant’s criminal history to establish that he is a risk to reoffend (3), that he did in fact have a criminal history (6), and that his continued resort to weapons offenses was worthy of deterring (9).  It is difficult to imagine how else one could arrive at such conclusions.  Nevertheless, the defendant’s criminal history is not an element of the offense for which the extended term was imposed.  It is therefore neither duplicative nor improper.  **CONCLUSION
[brief] (Ibid.)  He also ordered repayment of $95,000 of medical expenses.  (Pa2221)  The Arbitrator also disassociated [...] by reference to all of the history of the parties’ relationship.  “There is no need to restate Respondent’s objectionable actions.  Incorporated herein by reference is Claimant’s brief September 1, 2018, Pages 3-6 as to Phase 1 and 7.16, as to Phase II, and [...]’s Orders. ”  (Pa2221)  However, the Arbitrator did not Order that [...]’s interest should later be valued by the Court based on a relitigation of any of those facts and claims.  (Da2220. para.3)  He ruled the opposite, that the Arbitration was finished.  “The Award is in full determination of all claims and counterclaims submitted to this Arbitration.  All claims not expressly granted herein are hereby denied. ”  (Da2223)  Therefore, there can be no doubt that whatever monetary relief the Arbitrator found due to [...], based on any and all of the past wrongful conduct asserted against [...] in Plaintiffs’ complaint for breach of fiduciary duty, that was all the monetary relief to which [...] was entitled.  Once that Final Award was entered and reduced to a judgment on December 7, 2018 in the amount of $774,638.15, there was no longer any unremedied misconduct or oppression that needed to be considered when valuing [...]’s interest.  (Pa3210)  However, over [...]’s res judicata objections, the Court did impose a significant 35% discount based on that same past conduct.  (Pa3202-3204)  It agreed that “fairness and equity” must be considered in deciding whether to apply a discount to fair value and that the past conduct was already litigated.  However, it nevertheless re-used that past conduct as the basis to discount.  (Ibid.)  The Court even included reference to [...]’s conduct, “adding additional incurred legal expenses to the [...] balance sheet…”  (Da3204)  Yet, it knew that [...] had paid the $503,000 legal and expense reimbursement on the July 13, 2018, sanction order.  (Da3155)  The Court had also confirmed the Arbitrator’s reimbursement Order for another $504,000 of [...]’s “personal legal fees” that [...] paid while [...] was in management control during Phase I of this case.  (Pa3162)  Thus, the Court admittedly discounted based on the same past conduct separately remedied.  This was a misapplication of law, violated principles of res judicata and also the "fairness and equity" that the Court recognized was required in valuations.  The result of doing so was to grant Plaintiffs another monetary award for the same conduct, by paying [...] 35% less than his shares are worth.  This Court should reverse the valuation decision's discount to fair value as a violation of res judicata.
[brief] Plaintiff was not, however, prevented from offering those same criticisms against “the facility”, [...], even though plaintiff had no suitably qualified expert to do so.  Furthermore, the jury found that [...] deviated from the standard of care.  (See Pa87.)  Plaintiff cannot now complain that the trial court, by allowing [...] and [...]’s respiratory care opinions to be presented against “the facility” or the “nursing home” committed reversible error by declining to allow plaintiff to also present those same opinions against the nursing staff directly.  Again, plaintiff—having been afforded every opportunity to present her causes of action and theory of the case to the jury as she wished, thus inviting the “errors” now complained of—cannot demonstrate that she has been prejudiced in a fashion that requires a new trial.  Plaintiff’s motion must be denied and the April 10, 2023 order of judgment on the jury verdict confirmed.
[directive] Division of Criminal Justice  Mandatory In-Service Law Enforcement Training  The in-service training of police officers has always been encouraged.  Continued law enforcement education will enable an officer to perform more efficiently and more safely, and is essential in limiting liability in civil actions arising from officer’s activities.  Some in-service training is mandated by the county prosecutor, the Attorney General or through various state or federal statutes or rules.  This paper identifies those mandated in-service training programs that apply to law enforcement personnel in the state.
[brief] Although Respondent argues that the statements attributed to her by Complainant were not made in her capacity as a Board member, and do not relate to her Board membership or to Board actions, the Commission finds that the statements on her Facebook page are clearly linked to her Board membership (and candidacy).  Respondent’s Facebook page is clearly marked with the banner, ‘Re-Elect [...] to the [...],’ but does not appear to have a disclaimer noting that the statements are her own and unrelated to the Board.  Melnyk v. Fiel, Commission Docket No. C64-18 (2019) (Ca269)), reaffirmed, e.g., Commission’s Advisory Opinion A02-22 (February 25, 2022) (Ca233); I/M/O [...], Commission Docket No. C71-18, at pp. 7-8 (2021) (Ca242-243).  There is a robust body of decisions and advisory opinions which school officials can utilize to determine when, and how, a disclaimer must be used on social media when speaking in their personal/private capacity in order to avoid running afoul of the Act.
[directive] N.J.S.A. 2C:35- condition release, 5(b of of rart 10( a )(3) as the basis granting use as monitoring .  motion by of •  Pretria will not file a V 10lation  Monitoring a revocation motion. prosecutor) for susrected marijuana or hashish use • Pretria will not mark a defendant non- or compliant for positive mar~juana hashish drug test results  #13-21-June Directive 30, 2021
[directive] right shall restrict impede the Attorney This General's supervisory power pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act 1970, of 52:17B-97 N.J.S.A seq., any other law, rule, regulation, directive, or et opinion agreement.  The Attorney General may assess the county or of These prosecutors for the cost of conducting audits forfeiture records.  administrative shall be within a maximum established by agreement costs from time to time between the Attorney General and a majority of the county prosecutors.  The of audit may be assessed against the audited the cost agency's law enforcement trust fund.  ~ NJR&FS Program S.O.P. Forfeiture 12 8
[brief] (Pa94; Pa96)  [...] testified that the surveillance videos could be watched in the manager’s office and that in order to isolate or focus upon one particular camera view, one had the ability to utilize a mouse to double click on a camera view and enlarge the image.  (Pa96)  He further testified that the ability to preserve the video existed and that policies were in place for the preservation of surveillance footage, stating that “if there had been an incident such as theft or a customer accident or an employee accident, we would register the time code and the camera number and send it up to . . . corporate basically so that they can pull the video and save it. ”  (Pa96)  Although [...] was the individual who reviewed the surveillance videos on the day of the incident in order to ascertain what was present on such footage (Pa97), according to [...], he did not preserve any video from the date of the incident because he was unable to find a clear video of the moment Plaintiff was struck; as such, no surveillance footage of [...] maneuvering his U-boat around the store, or of [...] pushing the U-boat towards the Plaintiff, exists.  (Pa96-Pa98)  Despite the fact that video footage was accessible in the store and by the corporate office, no surveillance footage from the date of Plaintiff’s incident was preserved and retained by [...].
[brief] [...] treated the second motion as though it were a motion for reconsideration of [...]'s prior order, and declined to consider the additional proofs produced by defendants.  "The trial court has the inherent power, to be exercised in its sound discretion, to review, revise, reconsider and modify its interlocutory orders at any time prior to the entry of final judgment."  See Cineas v. Mammone, 270 N.J. Super. 200, 207 (App. Div. 1994), citing Johnson v. Cyclop Strapping Corp., 220 N.J. Super. 250, 257 (App. Div. 1987).  The submission of new factual material and/or fundamental legal error justifies the court’s later conduct.
[directive] For example, decisions about civil enforcement actions and Page 5 investigations shall be made free of political or partisan considerations, and discretion must be exercised to the extent possible without regard to partisanship or the social, political, or ideological position of the individuals or companies involved.  Moreover, LPS employees, including attorneys and civil investigators, should not communicate with any representative of the Governor’s Office or the Legislature regarding a specific pending or contemplated civil enforcement matter.  If any LPS employee receives a request for a prohibited communication, the individual should decline to answer and immediately elevate the matter through their supervisory chain to First Assistant Attorney General.  The Attorney General may, in their discretion, determine that communication with the Governor’s Office regarding a specific civil enforcement matter is appropriate.  Such communication may be appropriate when the exercise of the Attorney General’s civil enforcement authority is likely to have a significant policy or fiscal impact on the State; for example, if a contemplated settlement is likely to result in a substantial financial recovery for the State, require the funding of new State programs, or involve policy determinations regarding the forms of injunctive relief that would best serve state interests.  Similarly, communication often may be appropriate when the Attorney General is contemplating legal action against another government entity, including the federal government, a state agency, or a municipality, or when an action involves the enforcement of the Governor’s Executive Orders.  Communications regarding civil enforcement matters, if they occur, should be limited to members of the Attorney General’s Executive Leadership Team, or their designees, and the Office of the Governor’s Chief Counsel (Counsel’s Office).
[brief] As [...] properly found, the delay in defendant’s trial did not prejudice him.  He was already being detained because of the serious federal charges he was facing, which included kidnapping and possession of a firearm.  The State case against defendant was relatively simple and the delay would not affect his ability to defend his case, notwithstanding his contention that he was harmed by the destruction of videos and the unavailability of witnesses.  (2T10-19 to 11-6).  Moreover, defendant defense was responsible for a portion of that delay.  [...] noted that the court file was “replete with correspondence from counsel for the defense asking the court to adjourn on several occasions, [s]tatus conferences, pretrial conferences and any matters involving this matter.