ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Second, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic prompted the pending request for relief.  The parties differ about the impact of the pandemic in county jails.  Movants contend that inmates face a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19 in jail.  They point to the number of documented cases and deaths among 8 inmates in New Jersey correctional facilities.  As of February 9, 2021, there Dep’t of Corr., have been 4,283 cases and 52 deaths.  COVID 19 Updates, https://www.state.nj.us/corrections/pages/COVID19Updates.shtml.  In response, the State highlights efforts to reduce the prison population and prevent the spread of COVID-19 among prisoners.
[directive] N.J.S.A. in specified officer judicial a to submitted be shall offense or crime such any for complaint-warrant assistant an approval of express the without complaint-warrant, approve a to authorized general  The 3.1.  Section to pursuant designated general attorney deputy or prosecutor attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant an with consult section to this in established requirement a is arrested is defendant a which for offense serious most the if apply not does general grounds the of any where violence domestic involving than one other offense persons disorderly
[brief] To be sure, "[t]he eradication of the 'cancer of discrimination' has long been one of our State's highest priorities."  Dixon v. Rutgers, The State University of N.J., 110 N.J. 432, 451, 541 A.2d 1046 (1988).  State v. Soto, 324 N.J. Super. 66, 83 (Law Div. 1996)  N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36 is legislation that grants a civil right cognizable under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (N.J.S.A. 10:6-1,2).  "The "right" provided by the act is statutory and not recognized at common law."  Beneficial Fin. Co. Atlantic City v. Swaggerty, 170 N.J. Super. 398, 402 (App. Div. 1979)  "It is well settled that private causes of action may be predicated on a statutory violation."  Peoples National Bank of N.J. v. Fowler, 73 N.J. 88, 102 (N.J. 1977).  "As we held in C.S., the statutory right to pursue a "civil action" is a right to a proceeding which falls within the jurisdiction of the trial court, rather than this court.  Id. at 342-43.  While the federal statute has been revised and recodified in the time since we decided C.S., the operative provisions which create the state court remedy remain essentially the same for purposes of deciding where this dispute should be heard.  Hasbrouck Heights B.O.E. v. W.J., 358 N.J. Super. 8, 12 (App. Div. 2003)  Plaintiffs civil rights was deprived and interfered with until after the filing and serving of complaint.  Plaintiff made multiple requests in person and a request in writing and was denied or refused adjournments each time.
[brief] He claims that: 1) the detectives exceeded the booking exception to Miranda; 2) defendant unambiguously invoked his right to counsel during booking; 3) defendant’s references to an attorney played for the jury risked an impermissible inference of guilt; 4) the detectives contradicted the Miranda warnings at the post-arrest formal interview; and 5) the court’s admission of his statements constituted harmful error.  Contrary to defendant’s arguments, the trial court’s admissibility rulings were correct and should be affirmed.  So long as a trial court’s factual findings at a suppression hearing are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record, appellate courts review the decision deferentially.
[directive] STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.
[brief] [...] is in peaceable possession of the Property as the undisputed record owner.  A claim to quiet title is governed by N.J.S.A. 2A:62-1:  Any person in the peaceable possession of lands in this state and claiming ownership thereof, may, when his title thereto, or any part thereof, is denied or disputed, or any other person claims or is claimed to own the same, or any part thereof or interest therein, or to hold a lien or encumbrance thereon, and when no action is pending to enforce or test the validity of such title, claim or encumbrance, maintain an action in the superior court to settle the title to such lands and to clear up all doubts and disputes concerning the same.  [N.J.S.A. 2A:62-1.]  In order to quiet title under the statute, a plaintiff must first be in “peaceable possession” of the subject property.  *Ibid.*  “Peaceable possession” is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a quiet title action.  *Cf.*  *Persons v. Bregman*, 182 N.J. Super. 476, 479 (App. Div. 1982).  [...] has been the record owner of the Property since 1985 in furtherance of its laudable community development goals.  In fact, [...] has already developed the portion of the parcel on the Camden St. side.  Furthermore, the [...] conclusively establishes [...]’s record ownership of the Property.  Therefore, [...] was entitled to file this action in the Superior Court to avail its rights as the record owner.  The trial court correctly granted [...]’s request for a judgment to quiet title to [...]’s claims of ownership, whether by virtue of its allegation of direct ownership of the Property or through adverse possession.
[directive] Therefore, pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, and consistent with my obligations under Brimage, 153 N.J. 1, I hereby direct all law enforcement to comply
[brief] Notice of Motion to Suppress and Dismiss by [...] 10/13/2020 Pa059  Hawkin’s Letter to [...] 4/15/2021.  Pa061  Certification of [...] 4/15/2021 Pa063  Order Brought by [...]  Pa065  Letter from [...] to [...], Dated 9/30/2020 Pa068  Discovery Desk Central Records Pa069 --- \(^2\)  The various summonses and criminal records are different because some have notations and others don’t, thus they should not be considered duplicates.
[directive] [Non/No] ta kab revoke libète kondisyonèl ou an epi yo ta kab fè w retounnen nan prizon pou pije swa tout oubyen pati nan tèm libète kondisyonèl sou sipèvizyon ki rete a, menm si ou te finn pije tèm prizon yo te deja enpoze w?  Do you understand that if you violate the conditions of your parole supervision that your parole may be revoked and you may be subject to return to prison to serve all or any portion of the remaining period of parole supervision, even if you have completed serving the term of imprisonment previously imposed?  Dat/Date  Akize a/Defendant Avoka LaDefans/Defense Attorney Komisè Gouvènman/Prosecutor Fòm Revize Apati di 01/08/2018, Pibliye pa Sipleman dekrè nimewo #04-14, CN 11171-Haitian Creole paj 2 nan 2 Revised Form Effective 01/08/2018, Promulgated by Supplement to Directive #04-14, CN 11171- Haitian Creole page 2 of 2
[brief] Haynoski v. Haynoski, 264 N.J. Super. 408, 414 (App. Div. 1993).  As such, the Court’s award of fees can only be supported by R. 4:42-9 or some other basis.  While attorney’s fees may be allowed in a judgment pursuant to R. 4:42-9 where the parties have agreed thereto in advance in an agreement, such a provision will be strictly construed in light of the general policy disfavoring attorney’s fee awards.  See McGuire v. City of Jersey City, 125 N.J. 310, 317 (1991); Verna v. Links at Valleybrook, 371 N.J. Super. 77, 100-101 (App. Div. 2004); Englewood v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 406 N.J. Super. 110, 123 (App. Div.), certif. den., 199 N.J. 515 (2009).  A proportionality review under Rendine v. Pantzner, 141 N.J. 2922 (1995) is particularly relevant in contract-fee cases.  Litton Industries v. IMO Industries, 200 N.J. 372, 286-280 (2009).  Any award of attorneys’ fees based on a contractual provision is limited to those fees reasonable in the circumstances and does not automatically encompass the full fee charged.
[brief] .....................................................  27-28  Matter of Ventre No. A-0011-21, 2022 WL 2542293 (App. Div. July 8, 2022)  ...................  26, 29  Universal N. Am. Ins. Co. v. Bridgepointe Condo. Ass’n, Inc.  456 N.J. Super. 480 (Law Div. 2018)  .....................................................  16
[brief] Consideration of a request for a variance is a complex process of considering both positive and negative criteria including the provisions of the municipality's Master Plan and periodic reexamination reports.  A lead case is Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1 (1987), which contains an extensive discussion of the overall framework and operation of zoning law on variances.  (The Cox and Koenig treatise devotes 200 pages alone to the law and practice of variances.)  Zoning ordinances are to be liberally construed in favor of the municipality.  See e.g., State v. Township of Pennsauken, 160 N.J. 156, 171 (1999).  On judicial review, a zoning board's factual determinations can only be reversed if arbitrary and capricious, primarily because, it is very commonly stated, local citizens serving on boards are more familiar with a community's characteristics than a reviewing court.
[brief] BRIEF  Of record & on the brief: [...]  Of record: [...]  ¹  In its brief deficiency letter filed 5-28-24, the Appellate Division clerk’s office directed plaintiff to modify the caption to reflect the order that is being appealed (931a)(i.e., using an incomplete caption) instead of using the full title of the action pursuant to R. 2:6-6(a)(3).  415a.  ²  As used in this document, use of the plural includes the singular, where applicable.  The parties are referred to in the plural regardless of their actual number.  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | HEADING | PAGE | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED | iii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iv | | A. CASELAW | iv | | B. STATUTES & REGULATIONS | xv | | C. RULES | xvi | | D. OTHER AUTHORITIES | xvii | | E. ABBREVIATED TERMS | xviii| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 2 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 3 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 5 | | i.
[brief] This letter is submitted in lieu of a formal reply brief pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b).  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  ..................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................  1 POINT I  NONE OF EARLEY’S CLAIMS ARE PROCEDURALLY BARRED, BY RULE 3:22-4 OR OTHERWISE ...........................................................................................................  1 POINT II  THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED EARLEY’S PCR PETITION WITHOUT CONDUCTING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING .............................................................................  5 POINT III  THE PCR JUDGE’S REFUSAL TO RECUSE HERSELF WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCREION, REQUIRING REVIVERSAL ..............................................................................  10  POINT IV  THE STATE IGNORES THE FACTS AND THE RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS IN DEFENDING  JUDGE D’ARCY’S INSISTENCE THAT THE PCR PROCEED ON THE MERITS EVEN THOUGH INVESTIGATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS WERE INCOMPLETE .................................................................................  13  CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................  15
[brief] [...] testified that on September 29, he was getting ready for work when he heard gunshots coming from right outside his window.  (6T89:8-13, 89-21 to 23).  [...] peeked out his window and saw “a man holding a gun[,] shooting. ”  He described the man as roughly “5’6” or probably one or two inches taller,” “[d]ark-skinned,” wearing a sweatsuit that was “probably gray maybe. ” (6T90:1 to 16; 91-10 to 19, 93-8 to 12).  Defendant is 5’9”, well within [...]’s estimation.  [...] testified that he could not see who the person was shooting at and that there was another person standing next to the shooter, but “I don’t remember what [the person next to the shooter] looked like. ” (6T 94-6, 94-10 to 16).  [...] estimated that the shooter was about 14 feet away from his window.  (6T96 1-15).  He testified that after the shooting, the man went across the street and fled.
[brief] An insurer’s ability to require assignee providers to submit claims to PIP ADR is important because under DOBI regulations, providers otherwise have the option, but not the obligation, to do so.  N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.6(a) states that “[a] request for dispute resolution of a PIP dispute may be made by the injured party, the insured, a provider who is an assignee of PIP benefits pursuant to N.J.A.C. 11:3-4.9 or the insurer, in accordance with the terms of the policy as approved by the Commissioner. ”  N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.6(a) (emphasis added).  This court has explained that “[t]he use of the term ‘may’ clearly gives plaintiff [assignee healthcare provider] the option of filing for arbitration, but does not require it to do so.
[brief] ”  (Pa298 at 6:1-2.)  He questioned the “integrity of this body and to the process to see the way in which this bill was brought to the floor today. ”  (Pa298 at 6:3-9.)  He noted that those who testified in committee did so without having seen the bill.  (Pa298 at 6:10-14.)  He noted even though the legislative session was two years, the bill was only days earlier.  (Pa298 at 6:3-14.)  [...] questioned why the Assembly would “jam it through at the last possible second?  . . . do you have no integrity?  . . .  How can you rip the democratic process away from our constituents and . . . treat them this way?  It is wrong. ”  (Pa298 at 6:15-22.)  The public is entitled to voice its opinion to its representatives, but the Legislature took away those rights by failing to post the bill on its legislative calendar, provide notice of the language of this bill to the public, and providing the three required readings.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Application for Legal Fees and the Trial Court’s Award.  On August 31, 2018, after the retirement of [...] – who had presided over the case for more than five years – Plaintiff filed a motion for an award of counsel fees and costs.  (Da385-792).  Defendant also filed a motion for an award of attorney fees and costs.  Plaintiff’s legal fee application attached invoices from three law firms.  The total was $1,441,139.96, consisting of $1,387,392.22 in fees and $53,747.74 in disbursements.  (Da394).  Plaintiff alleged that each and every entry for fees and disbursements that had been billed to Plaintiff by the three firms should be awarded.  On January 14, 2019, the trial court entered an order and opinion providing, inter alia, that Plaintiff be awarded counsel fees and costs in the amount of $1,049,589.14, “to be distributed out of the Decedent’s New Jersey estate assets. ”  (Da212-218).  (See Statement of Facts, infra, for an explanation as to how the court determined the award.)  The trial court also awarded counsel fees and costs to Defendant in the amount of $978,157.99.  (Id.).  H.  The First Legal Fee Award That Was Vacated
[brief] *Id.*; Pa57-Pa58.  **Step Four:**  In step 4, [...] evaluated whether Stachybotrys Chartarum was likely to contaminate [...]’s food.  2T56-23 to 2T57-4.  Since there was no evidence that any of [...]’s foods were contaminated by mold because they were never tested, [...] focused on whether household foods could act as a food source for Stachybotrys Chartarum.  2T57-5 to 2T58-21.  Stachybotrys Chartarum requires a food with high cellulose, a high moisture content, and ambient temperatures to grow and proliferate.  *Id.*  Household foods do not provide these conditions.  Very few have a sufficient water activity.  Very few have a high enough cellulose content.  And most foods are stored in a refrigerator, which is too cold to support growth of this mold.
[brief] ”  N.J.R.E. 607(b).  The companion rule to N.J.R.E. 607 is N.J.R.E. 803(a), which sets forth a similar hearsay exception that is not dependent upon the declarant’s unavailability.  The rule states that:  The following statements are not excluded by the hearsay rule:  ...  The declarant-witness testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior otherwise admissible statement, and the statement:  (2) Is consistent with the declarant-witness’ testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant –witness of (A) recent fabrication or (B) improper influence or motive...  [N.J.R.E. 803(A)]  Under N.J.R.E. 607, once there has been an implied or expressed inference as noted above, “the party calling a witness may [] attempt to support credibility through direct or redirect examination and through the introduction of extrinsic evidence.
[brief] Ca159, 328.  For example, $16,785.92 in professional fees were paid by the Receiver from the diner’s proceeds during the period of January 2022 to November 2022.  Ca340.  Questions such as identity, terms, services rendered and for whom are not addressed.  Among other things, the Trial Court abused its discretion by discharging the Receiver and denying the motion to intervene without scrutinizing or sufficiently scrutinizing all of the foregoing issues.  II.
[brief] (15T17-22 to 18-4).  On cross-examination, he claimed he attended [...]’s wake but did not realize he was “part of a case” until the detective agency called him in 2020.  (15T25-11 to 13; 15T26-21 to 27-1).  [...] testified that she “kinda sorta” knew defendant in 2012 and they were “like friends” or “I guess you could call it dating.
[directive] Technology  In 2010, Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2010-5 established statewide guidelines governing the use of automated license plate recognition (ALPR) technology and the data it generates.1  After more than a decade of experience with what was then an emerging technology, an updated policy on ALPRs is necessary.  This update has two major goals.  First, it maintains—and builds upon—the significant safeguards from abuse and privacy protections that have served the State well under the 2010 policy, including continuing to apply the New Jersey Supreme Court’s framework in State v. Donis, 157 N.J. 44 (1998), limiting law enforcement access to personal identifying information associated with a vehicle’s license plate unless there is a particularized basis.  Second, the revised policy facilitates the sharing and standardization of ALPR data statewide in order to maximize our ability to use this tool to solve and prevent crimes.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This action arises from the tragic death of [...] (“[...]”) due to a worksite accident.  King, a maintenance worker with [...]  (“[...]” or “[...]”), died after coming into contact with a 277-volt wire while working on an emergency light fixture.  [...]R2 is liable for King’s demise because [...]R2 is the landlord of the premises upon which King worked.  As the landlord, [...]R2 knew or should have known about the faulty electrical panel box which was indecipherable and required “trial and error” testing to determine the controlling breaker.  As this faulty electrical panel box ultimately caused King’s death, [...]R2’s liability should be self-evident.  However, [...]R2 argued at the trial court level that it is not liable for King’s demise because of a “triple net lease” that existed on the relevant property.  According to [...]R2, this lease delegated any duty of care [...]R2 may have owed to the tenant of the property [...] (“[...]”).  The trial court correctly rejected the notion that the lease delegated any duty of care owed by [...]R2 because the faulty electrical panel box predated the execution of the lease.  As this defect occurred prior to [...] taking exclusive control of the property under the lease, [...]R2 had the opportunity and ability to exercise reasonable care to ameliorate the risk posed by the faulty electrical panel box.  However, the trial court erred in finding that this duty of care terminated based on § 358 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965).
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[brief] Pa 73a.  On May 18, 2023, [...] entered an Amended Order correcting the due date for filing defendants’ trial brief for a typographical error.  Pa 75a.  On May 31, 2023, a trial was conducted in the matter below before the Honorable [...], J.S.C.  On June 20, 2023, [...] entered a Trial Order upholding the [...]’s and [...]’s actions below and dismissing plaintiffs’ Complaint.
[brief] RESPONDENT IS PRECLUDED FROM ARGUING THAT THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AFTER FAILING TO RAISE THIS ISSUE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND AFFIRMATIVELY REPRESENTING IN THE TRIAL COURT THAT NO MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT REQUIRED A PLENARY HEARING AND THE MATTER WAS APPROPRIATE FOR RESOLUTION BY THE TRIAL COURT ON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS IN THE RECORD AS A MATTER OF LAW.  In Point II of her appellate brief, Respondent belatedly argues that Appellant’s request for appellate relief should be denied “because there are material facts in dispute which would allow a fact[]finder to find no enforceable contract.
[brief] [...]/Mother  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF [...], CROSS APPELLANT, CIVIL ACTION  DOCKET [...]  ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CHANCERY  DIVISION-PROBATE PART  CAMDEN COUNTY  DOCKET BELOW: [...]  SAT BELOW:  HONORABLE  [...], P.J.CH.  HONORABLE  [...], P.J.CH.  __________________________________________  [...]’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO HAZEL MAY’S APPELLATE
[brief] ” (Id. at 27 (emphasis in original)).  They argue that “Plaintiffs’ request for this ‘document dump’ in the name of efficiency and fairness lacks relationship to either. ” (Id. at 3-4).  That is, no time is saved because the documents must still be reviewed for privilege, and a production without a responsiveness review “is not more ‘fair’ to either party because the responsiveness reviews Defendants have performed to date were entirely proper and Plaintiffs have offered no evidence to the contrary. ” (Id.).  They contend that a party “only has an obligation to produce responsive documents,” and assert that “relying upon search terms alone will almost always result in the capture of non-responsive documents, which may then be reviewed and removed from any production. ”  (Id. at 5 (emphasis in original)).  Plaintiffs reply that at the time of their Local Rule 37 letter, defendants had not informed plaintiffs that additional documents existed and, therefore, plaintiffs could not have included this relief in their letter.