ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **  In 2017, mindful of the Supreme Court’s directive to subject the formula “to periodic reexamination and retooling as necessary to keep the formula operating with equity, transparency, and predictability,” Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 174, the State began taking steps to address certain school funding inequities, such as those illustrated by [...]’s experience, that had developed over time.  See generally Senate Select Comm., Pub. Hearing on Sch. Funding Fairness (Jan. 27, Feb. 2, 14, and 22, 2017); (Aa7).  Of particular concern to the Legislature was the issue of “overfunding” and “underfunding[.]”  Senate Select Comm., Pub. Hearing on Sch. Funding Fairness (Jan. 27, 2017), at 5, 17, 18-19, 102; Senate Select Comm., Pub. Hearing on Sch. Funding Fairness (Feb. 2, 2017), at 30, 35; Senate Select Comm., Pub. Hearing on Sch. Funding Fairness (Feb. 14, 2017), at 27-28, 32, 41, 43, 46, 63, 73, 77, 79-80; Senate Select Comm., Pub. Hearing on Sch. Funding Fairness (Feb. 22, 2017), at 3, 10, 21-22, 25, 31, 34, 36-37, 40-43, 49, 51, 58, 60, 63, 69-71, 74, 77, 90, 93-95, 99, 101, 111, 125; (Aa7).
[brief] A.  We taught all the hardscopers in the northeast who used – built out of block- we started framing them to move all the – doing all the pre-framing, so that became an ancillary business.  . .  Because just to sell that stainless, you know, we’d make it to all their specs and sell it to all the hardscopers and landscapers.  . .  I think we would end up spending 40 or 50 grand on marketing . . .  I think we tried to do, like, around 10 percent.  So some years, you know, 100 grand in marketing . . . shows were expensive.  Shows were probably 30, 50 grand a year.  You know, each one.  And you don’t even count the labor, driving the stuff there.  But just what they cost.  And you know, they were very expensive, building the brand.  (See Pa257-Pa258 at T23:3-24:5).  G.  Over The Decade Long Period That [...] Is A [...] Distributor, [...] And [...] Work To Develop The [...] Brand To Their Mutual Benefit.  [...] worked tirelessly, with the support of [...], to promote the [...] product lines for the mutual benefit of [...] and [...]’s [...] companies.
[brief] On [...]’s cross-examination, defense counsel played a portion of the MVR in which one of the officers told [...], “the kid is wearing a ski mask on top of his head,” he’s “wearing all black,” and “he fits the bill. ”  (3T 41-7 to 44-20)  [...] explained both on cross and redirect that [...]’s clothing and race matched the description of a suspect in an armed robbery that occurred the previous night in South River.  (3T 44-21 to 46-22, 137-2 to 21)
[brief] [7T 159-17 to 161-11].  E.  The Resolution  The Board adopted a 27-page written resolution on August 4, 2021.  [Da118].  The Resolution reluctantly found the proposed development to be inherently beneficial (Da131), but does not discuss the nature and extent of the benefits it would engender.  The Resolution identified detriments, but does not identify specific facts upon which those alleged detriments are based.  Those findings are discussed below.  The Board declined to identify any mitigating conditions on the purported detriments, and the majority of the Board’s analysis in its Resolution concerns its conclusion that the Property is an inappropriate location for the proposed development as the Township had declined to rezone the Property.
[directive] I. of  The Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA) permits the use home detention if the court finds it necessary to restrict the defendant to a specified residence to reasonably ensure: • that the defendant will appear for court; of • that the safety the victims and the public protected; and/or is • that the defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process.  of  Given the importance striking an appropriate balance between these of of concerns and the liberty and due process rights the defendant, the use home detention must be strictly limited to only those cases where other condition( s) are no sufficient to manage the defendant's risk.  Courts must continue make a hierarchal to of determination regarding conditions release.  The hierarchy home detention, for from least restrictive to most restrictive, follows: is as - Home Detention (HD): o Home Detention with Limited Exceptions (HDLE) o Strict Home Detention (Strict HD) - Home Detention with Electronic Monitoring (HDEM) if Note that a defendant ordered to HD with EM, that a separate category is is (HDEM) unrelated to Strict HD or HDLE.
[brief] THE BALANCE OF THE STATE’S BRIEF FAILS TO ADDRESS ARGUMENTS RAISED BY THE DEFENDANT OR LACKS SUFFICIENT MERIT TO WARRANT A RESPONSE.  The Defendant need not consume any more of this Court’s time than the State has discussing the statutory laws of Guam (Pb10), Colorado, Arizona (Pb12), Indiana (Pb13) or Oklahoma (Pb14).  That is fodder for the New Jersey Legislature.
[brief] Further, the testimony of [...] in giving an opinion of value as a leased fee is based on the generally accepted standards as established by the same generally accepted appraisal standards, but which is essentially misleading, irrelevant, and prejudicial.  (1T132 13-23)  The taking was of the fee simple estate and based upon generally accepted appraisal standards as set forth in the Appraisal Institute text, 15th ed. Pg. 415:  “...When the fee simple estate is valued, the presumption is that the property is available to be leased at market rates.  When an appraisal involves the valuation of the fee simple interest in a leased property, the valuation of the entire bundle of rights applies. ”  The fact is that since the issue in Eminent Domain cases is the amount of just compensation, usually represented by the market value, as testified to by Appraisers, following generally accepted standards of the Appraisal Institute, New Jersey Court’s often rely upon the standards referenced in The Appraisal Institute’s text, The Appraisal of Real Estate.
[brief] On August 12, 2015, [...] was filed, charging defendant, along with [...] and [...], with first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1) and (2) (count one); second-degree conspiracy to commit armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1) and (2) (count two); second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1) (count three); third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(2) (count four); third-degree possession of a weapon, a tire iron, for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d (count five); and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (the tire iron), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d (count six).
[brief] (4T 68-21 to 69-15, 75-11 to 14)  [...] testified that she last saw her son on September 25 when she lent him her car, and last spoke to [...] on the morning of September 27 when he had not returned the car like he was supposed to.  (4T 63-14 to 15, 64-2 to 23, 65-10 to 21, 67-1 to 14, 68-2 to 5, 68-15 to 20)  [...] testified that he also investigated [...]’s social media and determined that he was “friends” with [...] on Facebook, (6T 59-18 to 61-17, 67-16 to 23) and checked [...]’s phone records, determining that there had been a call from [...] to [...] on September 25.
[brief] However, for additional context and information, [...] retained ownership of its plans under both its contract as a consultant to [...] and its contract with [...].  _Instruments of Service_ … drawings, specifications, and other documents furnished by [...] Associates are instruments of service and shall not become property of the owner whether or not the project is commenced.  (Pa92).  On April 1, 2019, defendant [...] Associates, P.A. filed an answer to plaintiffs’ complaint.  The Civil Case Information Statement filed with [...]’s answer identified the action as professional malpractice.  (Pa63; Pa506).  [...]’s answer also listed the Affidavit of Merit Statute as a separate defense (Pa71).  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 et seq., an affidavit of merit was required to be filed with the court and served on [...] in support of Appellants’ professional malpractice claim against [...].  Appellants did not file or serve an affidavit of merit within the statutory period of 120 days from the date that [...]’s answer was filed.  [...] moved to dismiss Appellants’ complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim under R. 4:6-2(e) based on Appellants’ failure to serve an affidavit of merit against [...] pursuant to N.J.S.A.  2A:53A-27 et seq.  The Honorable [...], J.S.C. granted [...]’s motion to dismiss and issued a written opinion explaining the basis and rationale for [...]’s dismissal.  (Pa984; Pa986).  Appellants now seek to overturn [...]’s dismissal in the underlying matter.
[brief] Petitioner relies on these cases as justification that his matter should be determined similarly.  However, the facts contained in both of these are readily distinguishable from this case.  *[...]* concerns a sheriff’s officer who was off duty and visited a female acquaintance, whom he previously had a romantic relationship with.  Heavy drinking was involved during the visit, and the female alleged that she was subjected to unwanted touching and filed a criminal complaint.  See *[...]* at 222.  [...] admitted to fondling the female without her consent during this visit and later plead guilty to one count of 4th degree criminal sexual content.  *Id.*  The issue before the Supreme Court determined whether or not [...]’s criminal conviction forfeited his pension.  *Id.* at 226.  In its determination regarding the appropriateness of forfeiture, the Court conducted an analysis into whether a substantial nexus existed between the offending conduct and his sheriff’s officer position.  See *[...]* at 227-28.  In its review, the Court noted that although this conduct was egregious, criminal and violated employment policies, a substantial nexus between the conduct, and his job could not be found and his pension was not forfeited Id. at 232.  In reaching its holding, the Court relied on the fact that [...] was not at work or engaged in any work duties at the time, nor was he wearing his official uniform during the incident.  Id. at 222, 233.  Furthermore, the female acquaintance was not a random member of the public but someone whom he had a previous romantic relationship with.  Id.  Following its analysis, the Court declined to establish a causal nexus between the misconduct and his employment, stating that there was no relation to “his office or its trappings” in the commission of the offense.  Id. at 236.  Similarly, In re Hess, 422 N.J. Super. 27 (App. Div. 2011) has a significantly varying fact pattern from the current matter.
[brief] POINT V THE MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR A HEARING ON WOODS’S ABILITY TO PAY RESTITUTION.  (16T35-21 to 36-16)  To impose restitution, the sentencing court must find (1) that the victim “suffered a loss,” and (2) that the defendant “is able to pay or, given a fair opportunity, will be able to pay restitution. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(b).  “In determining the amount and method of payment of a fine, the court shall take into account the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that its payment will impose. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(c).  Due process requires that a defendant receive a hearing to determine his or her ability to pay restitution.  State v. Martinez, 392 N.J. Super. 307, 322 (App. Div. 2007); State v. Topping, 248 N.J. Super. 86, 90 (App. Div. 1991).  Here, the trial court imposed $9,710 in restitution but “recognize[d] that Mr. [...] may not have the ability to pay that. ” (16T36-13 to 14).  Consequently, the matter should be remanded for the trial court to conduct an adequate ability-to-pay hearing before ordering [...] to pay restitution.
[brief] [...]’s name is noticeably absent from this statement.  That is because there is no allegation that [...] converted funds or was otherwise involved in the claims in the Underlying Litigation.  With regard to the third Berrie factor, [...]’s deposition must be balanced against the necessity of the information and the ease of obtaining the information through other means.  [...] has not established that they are unable to obtain the discovery they are seeking through other means (i.e. depositions or basic discovery) or that this information is relevant or necessary to the claims in the Underlying Litigation.
[brief] *Maslo v. City of Jersey*, 346 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 2002); *Polzo*, 209 N.J. at 75 (summary judgment was warranted where Appellant could not show “that the shoulder depression ‘was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character’”).  As such, it is respectfully submitted that the trial court correctly determined that Plaintiff failed to establish that [...] had notice of the alleged dangerous condition and therefore summary judgment was appropriate and the trial court’s Order and judgment be affirmed.
[brief] A. Irreconcilably Inconsistent Positions .................................................40 B. Bad Faith and No Available Lessor Sanction .................................44 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................47 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Abdelfattah Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.,** | | | Case No. HUD-L-394-22 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Apr. 19, 2023) (J. [...]) | 10 | | **Ali v. Credit Corp. Sols., Inc.,** | | | 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59126 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2022) | 24, 25 | | **Asmad-Escobar v. Phx. Fin. Servs. LLC,** | | | No. A-2238-22, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1044 (N.J. App. Div. Jun. 5, 2024) | passim | | **Burgos v. State,** | | | 222 N.J. 175 (2015) | 20 | | **Bush v. Optio Solutions, LLC,** | | | No. CV 21-1880 (GRB)(ARL), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140835 | 36 | | (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2021) | | | **Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Credit Mgmt.,** | | | 550 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2008) | 7 | | **Castro v. NYT Television,** | | | 370 N.J.Super. 282 (N.J.Super. Ct. May 25, 2004) | 29, 30 | | **Cavazzini v. MRS Assocs.,** | | | 574 F. Supp. 3d 134 (E.D.N.Y 2021) | 11 | | **Ciccone v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs., LLC,** | | | No. 21-cv-3764, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228037 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2021) | 11 | | **Danise v. Saxon Mortg. Servs.,** | | | 738 Fed. Appx. 47 (3d Cir. 2018) | 44 | Danise v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., No. 15-06062 (JLL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174888 (D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2016), affirmed Danise v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., 738 Fed. Appx. 47 (3d Cir. 2018) ..................................................................................................................39, 42, 46 DepoLink Court Reporting & Litigation Support Services v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325 (App.Div. March 18, 2013) .................................................................30 Diana v. First National Collection Bureau, No. HUD-L-003014-23 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Hud. Cty Aug. 2, 2024)
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENTS  POINT I APPELLANT SEEKS BUT IS NOT ENTITLED TO TRECS.  (Responding to Court’s Questions 1 & 2)  Appellant, [...] (“[...]”) asks this court to deem its grid supply project eligible for participation in the TI program and require the Board to award [...] TREC s, or a similar incentive, to allow it to generate and receive the higher incentive value of the TREC under the TI program than what is currently available in the Competitive Solar Incentive (“CSI”) program.
[brief] ....................................................................................18  N. Plainfield Board of Educ.v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 05-4398 (MLC), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39555 (D.N.J. 2008) .................................................................................................................................................11, 12, 13, 18 N.J. Mortg. Corp. v. Masefield Corp., 63 N.J. Super. 369 (App. Div. 1960) .......................................................................................8
[directive] Criminal Justice of Division  The through eCDR electronically the be Cause filed Probable to of Affidavit an allow that procedures and made oral statements any supplement to and acomplaint-warrant application for an support to system of Affidavit  The complaint-warrant. applying for the officer enforcement oath law under the by the in statements certify the that officer to the allowing acheck-box shall include Probable Cause false statements willfully filing that aware the is that affiant acknowledging and true, are Affidavit punishment. to her or him would subject and facts of description relevant concise a include shall Cause Probable of Affidavit  The the that and committed was offenses) the that believe to cause probable that circumstances support the to as statement concise a include sha11  Affidavit it. committed  The one who the is defendant personal officer's the (e.g., offenses) the committed defendant believing the that for basis officer's a whether shall indicate and etc.), admission, defendant's eyewitnesses, of statements observations, Affidavit. submitting the officer known the to injury the of extent the so, if and, injured was victim basis the to officer's as statement and circumstances and facts relevant of description foregoing  The Law Preliminary a by supplemented, or established, be may exists cause probable that believing for In 3:4-2(c)(1)(A).
[brief] [...] did not assert any claims against [...] or seek any relief from [...], but merely included [...] “as an ‘interested party’ given the MCS-90 surety.  (1Da-21Da)  Defendants hired [...], Esq., to represent them.  On May 17, 2022, [...] and [...] answered [...]’s Second Amended Complaint.  Their Answer also included a third-party complaint against [...] seeking insurance coverage.  Defendants also filed a motion to vacate the Default Judgment entered on November 30, 2021.  On July 15, 2022, the court vacated the Default Judgment against [...].  (PPCIa122)  On August 17, 2022, [...] dismissed its Federal Court Complaint without prejudice (22Da), and on November 4, 2022, [...] filed an Answer to the Defendants’ Third-Party Complaint, which included Counterclaims and a Third-Party Complaint against the Defendants seeking the same declaratory relief and personal indemnification relief [...] sought in its Federal Court Complaint.  Again, [...] Insurance did not assert any claims against [...] or seek any relief from [...], but merely included [...] “as an ‘interested party’ pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:16-56” given [...]’s expected MCS-90 surety claim.  (PPCIa132).  On January 6, 2023, [...] filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against [...].
[brief] ¹  Likewise, the [...] is not entitled to any discretion or deference where (as here) its actions violate the PWCRA and the Local Public Contracts Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:11-1 et seq. (“LPCL”).  See Meadowbrook Carting Co. v. Borough of Island Heights, 138 N.J. 307 (1994).  Respondents’ argument that the trial court’s legal conclusions are entitled to deference is wrong.
[brief] --- \(^9\)  It can be assumed that many of the construction jobs will be filled by employees living outside of [...] and the Boroughs.  Thus, even though Section 9.02 says the Township “has reviewed the Application and accompanying financial information” the section includes no data, no analysis.  While the Township’s expert stated in the Ordinance hearing that a comprehensive financial analysis had been performed, he did not disclose its contents.  Indeed, to date that analysis has not been disclosed, defendants having persuaded the Trial Judge to quash discovery.  Section 9.02 further asserts that the exemption “is critical” due “to the extraordinary costs associated with the development of the Property.
[brief] Ind. No. [...] ..........................................................  Da1 Notice of Motion to Suppress ..................................................  Da7 Communications Data Warrant and Anticipatory Search Warrant...  Da9 [...] Body Worn Camera (S2 at hearing).  Da14 May 31, 2023  Order Denying Suppression ..............................  Da15 May 31, 2023  Written Opinion Denying Suppression ...............  Da16 October 10, 2023  Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum ..........  Da27  Letters of Support (Exhibit A to Sentencing Memorandum) ...  Da34  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS  Judgment of Conviction........................................Da103  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPT  CITATIONS  T - Motion Hearing, March 8, 2023  2T - Motion Hearing, April 26, 2023  3T - Sentencing, October 13, 2023  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] 13  Hartmann v. Police Dep't of Ridgewood, 258 N.J. Super. 32 (App. Div. 1992) ...........................................  38 Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980).......................... 12, 13  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474 (2007) .................................................. 13  In re Emmons, 63 N.J. Super. 136, 140 (App. Div. 1960) ....................  38  In re Kerlin, 151 N.J. Super. 179, 186 (App. Div. 1977) ..................... 32 In re Polk, 90 N.J. 550 (1982) ....................................................... 15, 20 In re Suspension or Revoc. License of Kerlin, 151 N.J. Super. 179, 184 n.2 (App. Div. 1977) ............................... 15 In the Matter of [...], [...], 2021 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 414, *38, OAL DKT. NO. [...]; CSC DKT. NO. [...] (November 22, 2021) ............................ 38 In the Matter of [...], [...], 2014 N.J. AGEN. LEXIS 236, OAL DKT. NO. [...] (May 19, 2014) .............................. 32-33, .................................................................................................. 40 In the Matter of [...] [...], 2014 N.J. CSC LEXIS 373, *47, CSC DKT. NO. [...] OAL DKT. NO. [...] (March 13, 2014) .............................. 28, 31 In the Matter of [...], [...], 2020 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 300, *54-55, OAL DKT. NO. [...]; CSC DKT. NO. [...] (August 19, 2020)
[directive] Resisting arrest  Prosecutor’s Office Court ❏ ❍ ❍ (specify)  Assault on a State Trooper Prosecutor’s Office Court ❏ ❍ ❍ (specify)  Disorderly conduct filed by the Trooper Prosecutor’s Office Court ❏ ❍ ❍ (specify)  Describe criminal charge against State Trooper: Quasi-criminal ❏ Criminal ❏
[brief] Trial courts, in their capacities as finders of fact, are given a high degree of deference by higher courts, particularly when witness credibility is at issue.  In dismissing this action, the trial court ignored that core principle and retroactively replaced its own well-reasoned factual and credibility findings with statements made by this Court in another case.  Significantly, this Court’s remarks were made in an entirely different context, and without the benefit of the robust evidentiary record the trial court in this action relied upon.  Moreover, this Court’s comments were not essential to its decision.  Irrespective of whether the trial court felt pressure to adopt the comments of this Court, the end result deprived Plaintiff of its day in court and wrongfully preempted meritorious claims that would have addressed corrupt dealings between the [...] (“City”) and [...] (“[...]”).
[brief] CONTENTS  Preliminary Statement .............................................................................................................5  Procedural History ......................................................................................................................5  Facts ...........................................................................................................................................8  Legal Argument: I.  Because Defense Counsel Not Only Failed to Present but also Undermined His Client’s Defense, This Court Should Vacate the Conviction and Remand for a New Trial (Da13a, 16a-18a)  ........................................9  II.  Given Changes in Double Jeopardy Jurisprudence and the Severity of the Penalties to Which Defendant Is Exposed, This Court Should Remand This Matter for a Jury Trial (Da18a-19a)  ........................................15  Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................17