ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ’”  Regis, 208 N.J. at 445 (quoting Statement to Assembly Bill No. 4, at 64 (Jan. 15, 1951)).  The 1951 version of the statute is nearly identical to section 79 of the 1948 Uniform Vehicle Code (entitled “Turning movements and required signals”), with the only differences being the inclusion of “or start or back a vehicle” and the substitution of “safety” for “reasonable safety” in the first sentence of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126.  Compare L. 1951, c. 23, § 67 with Act V, Unif. Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, § 79, Nat’l Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances (1948).  Since 1951, the only amendment to N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 was to the portion of the statute explaining how to give hand signals.  See L. 1956, c. 107, § 2.  The sponsor’s statement noted that the 1956 amendments “will promote greater safety on our highways, and will make our traffic laws more sensible, more uniform, and easier to understand, both for our own drivers and those from other States. ”  Sponsor’s Statement to S. 177, at 10 (1956).  In all other respects, the present version of the statute is the same as the 1951 version.  Apparent from the statements accompanying the Uniform Vehicle Code and New Jersey legislation, the legislative intent in enacting traffic laws generally was to promote safety and the orderly flow of traffic.  N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 should be viewed through that lens.  From its inception in 1928, there was an intent to include several maneuvers (“starting, stopping, backing or turning”) within the meaning of “such movement,” and a requirement to signal before any of these “movement[s]” if another vehicle might be affected.
[brief] The “significant state interests” special equity requires denial of Defendants’ motion  Among the suits tendered to [...] is the [...], where the State seeks to recover for PCB contamination from [...]’s former New Jersey facilities and from [...]’s design, production, marketing, sale, and distribution of PCBs throughout New Jersey.  Thus, New Jersey’s state interests favor retaining this case, rather than deferring to a second-filed action in Missouri.  Defendants mistakenly argue that the [...] is not relevant to the evaluation of this factor.  (Db35-36).  The record, however, clearly shows that Defendants tendered “all current and future PCB-related litigation wherein Old [...] is, or will be, named as a defendant. ” (Pa012; Pa471) (emphasis added).  This obviously includes the [...].  Given the foregoing, New Jersey has a compelling interest in retaining this action, rather than deferring to a second-filed action in Missouri, where the case concerns the enforceability of an indemnity agreement made in New Jersey by a New Jersey corporation where Defendants allege that [...]’s indemnity obligation is triggered by alleged environmental contamination in New Jersey, and by the manufacture of PCB-containing products in New Jersey after Defendants sold and shipped millions of pounds of toxic PCBs into New Jersey without adequate warnings or disclosures, and one of the underlying PCB lawsuits is brought by the [...] to redress pollution in New Jersey.  (Pa025-26; Pa134-37; Pa498-99; Pa592-601; Pa610-59).  2.
[brief] This case is more similar to the circumstances presented by the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s decision in *[...] v. Fox Rothschild, LLP*, 240 N.J. 286 (2020).  In *[...]*, the plaintiff, [...], alleged that he instructed a business associate to wire $2.4 million into the defendant law firm’s trust account in connection with a real estate transaction involving the firm’s client, [...].  The money was wired without any limiting instructions or directions.  Nor did the wire instructions state that [...] was the owner of the funds.  The firm, in other words, was not an escrow agent.  [...] later instructed the firm to disburse the money to him, which it did.  When the real estate transaction fell through, [...] alleged that [...] defrauded him out of the $2.4 million and sued the law firm for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and other causes of action for how it allegedly handled the funds at issue.  The trial court granted the law firm’s motion for summary judgment, and the case was ultimately reviewed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.  The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the firm, holding as a matter of law that the firm owed no duty to [...].
[brief] This Order was properly supported by the record below and should be affirmed.  Count VI sought rescission of the agreement between [...] and [...].  Because both parties to the Repurchase Agreement, [...] and [...], voided the Agreement, the Court below properly vacated the agreement.  Similarly properly supported was the decision regarding Appellant’s breaches of contract and fiduciary duties from Counts II and III.  The Court below properly held that Appellant’s admitted non- payment of taxes and transfer of these monies to his personal companies via agreements that he concealed from Respondents was a breach of the respective corporate documents and a breach of his fiduciary duties.  The trial Court also properly granted final judgment at trial as to Appellant’s liability for fraud and awarded damages.
[directive] It is on the day , 20 _ that:  ORDERED  N.J.S.A. I.  Defendant hereby ordered pursuant to 2C:4-5a to be examined a qualified by is of of psychiatrist or licensed psychologist designated by the Commissioner the Depaitment Health in order to determine defendant's fitness to proceed to trial.  Defense counsel shall of provide access to and copies the defendant's medical records, as available, and the as examiner deems necessary to perform the examination.  Arrangements for a place to conduct such an evaluation shall be made by the [...]
[brief] Pa661.  The projected market value of the 808 for-sale units is a “conservative” $285 million and the market value of the 269 rental units is estimated at $47 million, for a total of $332 million (all rounded figures).  Id.  This means that the market value of the for-sale units represents 85% of the total value of all units in the Project.  The exemption approved by the Township is accompanied by a 30-year agreement for payments-in-lieu of taxes (“PILOT”).  The PILOT will yield the Township an estimated $387 million in unrestricted revenue over 30 years, 6 times the $67 million in municipal taxes it could otherwise collect.  It will also keep the Project off the tax rolls for at least that long.  (The exemption period may be extended for a phased development to 50 years.  T1.51:2.)  The Plaintiff Boroughs are partners with [...] in the [...], which is funded by each of the three municipalities through school taxes in proportion to ratable wealth.
[brief] 4.18.1.  The Contractor shall indemnify and hold harmless the Owner and the Architect and their agents and employees from and against all claims, damages, losses and expenses including attorneys' fees arising out of or resulting from the performance of the Work, provided that any such claim, damage, loss or expense (a) is attributable to bodily injury, sickness, disease or death, or to injury to or destruction of tangible property (other than the Work itself) including the loss of use resulting therefrom, and (b) is caused in whole or in part by any negligent act or omission of the Contractor, any Subcontractor, anyone directly or indirectly employed by any of them or anyone for whose acts any of them may be liable, regardless of whether or not it is caused in part by a party indemnified hereunder.
[brief] The Plaintiffs retained [...] to testify as an expert witness at trial to establish the amount of lost profits damages the Plaintiffs suffered because they were allegedly not allowed to develop the COAH Project.  Pa 274.  [...] issued a report in which he calculated the Plaintiffs’ estimated lost profits allegedly suffered as a result of their inability to complete the COAH Project.  Pa 274.  In his report, [...] did not cite to any prior projects completed by either Plaintiffs in calculating the amount of profits the Plaintiffs would have made in connection with the COAH Project, because there are no such projects.
[directive] A.  The Court Must Find that the Defendant Meets the 1.  Following Residency Requirements of  Prior to ordering any type home detention with or without electronic monitoring, the court must ensure that the defendant meets certain minimum requirements.  Most significant that the defendant have a residence at which is of defendant is permitted to reside during the pendency the criminal matter.  For a prospective home detention defendant, the residence at a minimum must: • be available and accessible without interruption 24 hours per day/7 days per week; • be stable; and, • belong to the defendant, or the defendant must provide the court proof that the defendant may reside at that residence.  If the court intends to order electronic monitoring, then the residence must also: • have an available power supply to properly charge the necessary equipment.  The court must determine whether the residence is appropriate in accordance of with this Directive in the presence the parties and on the record using either the Home Detention Screening Form (CN 12973) or the Electronic Monitoring Screening Form (CN 12220) promulgated with this directive.  Questions regarding residency must be answered by the defendant or defense counsel, not by court staff.  Court staff shall not determine whether a proffered address is acceptable.  If the court the court satisfied that the residence requirement has been met, is shall record the address the release order.  on  Once the court has approved the residence at which the defendant shall reside, the residence may not change absent of further order the court on defendant's application, which can be made by submitting a completed Request for Leave from Home Detention form (CJ 12740) of Page 3 12 of to the court.  As part this application, a new Home Detention Screening Form ( CN 12973) or Electronic Monitoring Screening Form (CN 12220) must be completed and submitted.  Not every defendant will be able to satisfy the residence requirement for home detention ( e.g., defendants without housing or defendants in temporary housing).  Those defendants unable to provide a reliable residence shall not be ordered to home detention.
[brief] By 2030 [...] must have achieved a 22% reduction in natural gas consumption, with "significant numbers of replacement beginning in 2030."  By 2040 [...] must have achieved a reduction of 64%.  By 2030, at the absolute latest, then, the need for the proposed regulator and its capacity to serve a load substantially higher than at present will have long since vanished entirely, and, indeed, the 16-inch transmission line will become a candidate for stranded asset treatment.  But the most glaring mistake in the [...] argument (and [...]’s testimony), and the [...]’s acceptance of it, is that they are diversionary and irrelevant.  Whatever the future may hold, the Clean Energy Act requires now that decisions such as the ones rendered in this case “shall to the maximum extent practicable and feasible conform” with the EMP, now, not just at some unknown time in the future.  N.J.S.A. 52:27F-15(b)(emphasis added).  There is simply no discretion to ignore this mandate.
[brief] within a few hours, the fire had been suppressed.  (13T:117-19 to 143-10; 15T:77-23 to 79-9; 135-9 to 136-13).  Deputy Fire Marshall [...] and his team of investigators responded to the [...] fire, with Deputy Tuberion overseeing the investigation and determine the origin and cause of this fire.  While the fire was still active upon his arrival, it had by then been “mostly extinguished. ”  Once the fire was fully extinguished, Deputy Tuberion’s origin and cause investigation included visual examinations of the inside and outside of [...] and use of a combustible gas meter.  (14T:69-6 to 97-25).  The combustible gas meter provided a reading of 486 parts per million, “a high,” dangerous level.  Deputy Tuberion’s visual inspection located a “V pattern,” indicating the lowest burn location of the fire, and possible fire origin, at the back of the [...] building, as well as a “particular sill plating … basically the bottom of a room or the foundation of the house” that was “heavily, heavily charred. ”  It was determined that this location at the rear of the building, specifically the secretary’s office, was the origin point of the fire.  (14T:69-6 to 97-25; 100-2 to 101-4; 152-20 to 153-3; 168-11 to 168-25).  After this initial investigation, Deputy Tuberion and his team were unable to rule out two potential causes for this fire: “ignitable liquid” or “energized electrical equipment.
[brief] Certainly, “the primary duty of a prosecutor is not to obtain convictions but to see that justice is done. ”  Ibid.  But “trials do not occur in a vacuum and a courtroom is not a classroom. ”  State v. Goode, 278 N.J. Super. 85, 92 (App Div. 1994).  “Thus, prosecutors are afforded considerable leeway in their remarks to the jury.  Ibid. (citing State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518, 540 (1992)).  The determination whether prosecutorial misconduct warrants reversal of a criminal conviction requires an evaluation of the misconduct and its prejudicial effect on the defendant’s right to a fair trial.  Timmendequas, 161 N.J. at 575.  “To justify reversal, the prosecutor’s conduct must have been ‘clearly and unmistakably improper,’ and must have substantially prejudiced defendant’s fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense. ”  Ibid. (citations omitted).  When determining whether alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct are sufficiently egregious as to deprive defendant of his right to a fair trial, the reviewing court “must take into account the tenor of the trial and the degree of responsiveness of both counsel and the court to the improprieties” when they occurred.  State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518, 540 (1992).  Generally, when trial counsel makes no objection to the improper remarks, the remarks will not be deemed prejudicial as trial counsel’s failure to object indicates that he or she did not believe the remarks were prejudicial at the time they were made.
[brief] CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................31  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Abouzaid v. Mansard Gardens Assocs., LLC,** | 22, 23 | | 207 N.J. 67 (2011) | | | **Amabile v. Lerner,** | 8 | | 74 N.J. Super. 443 (App. Div. 1962) | | | **Bass v. House of Prayer Cogic of Orange,** | 24 | | No. A-1284-20, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3173 (App. Div. Dec. 29, 2021) | | | **Brae Asset Fund. L.P. v. Newman,** | 24 | | 327 N.J. Super. 129 (App. Div. 1999) | | | **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Amer.,** | 8 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1993) | | | **Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co.,** | 27 | | 56 N.J. 383 (1970) | | | **Central Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Utica Nat’l Ins. Group,** | 14 | | 232 N.J. Super. 467 (App. Div. 1989) | | | **Flomerfelt v. Cardiello,** | 23, 24 | | 202 N.J. 432 (2010) | | | **Grange Ins. Ass’n v. Roberts,** | 12 | | 179 Wn. App. 739 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) | | | **Griggs v. Bertram,** | 28 | | 88 N.J. 347 (1982) | | | **Hammer v. Thomas,** | 15 | | 415 N.J. Super. 237 (App. Div. 2010) | | | **Inventiv Health Consulting, Inc. v. Atkinson,** | 10 | | Civil Action No. 18-12560 (ES) (SCM), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208787 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2019) | | Judson v. People’s Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67 (1955)
[brief] Defendant Unreasonably Rejects Credible and Unrebutted Expert Testimony.  Underlying a municipal zoning board’s quasi-judicial authority to grant or deny variances, is the authority to determine witness credibility and weigh testimony.  *Baghdikian v. Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of Ramsey*, 247 N.J. Super. 45, 50 (App. Div. 1991) (citations omitted).  Zoning boards are not bound by the testimony of any expert, and may choose which witnesses to believe.  *El Shaer v. Planning Bd.*, 249 N.J. Super. 323, 329 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 546 (1991).
[brief] **A.  The Parties**  Plaintiff [...] is the Chief Legal Officer and Chief of Business Affairs for defendant [...] ("[...]" or "[...]").  Pa24,50.  [...] is a wholly owned subsidiary of defendant [...] America, a holding company.  [...] America is a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in New Jersey.  Pa206, 211.  [...] America is a wholly owned subsidiary of defendant [...] AG, a German corporation.  Pa229.  [...] AG, in turn, is a wholly owned subsidiary of defendant [...].3  Pa31.  At all relevant times, defendant [...] was the Chief --- 2  On August 2, 2024, the trial court granted plaintiff leave to file the Third Amended Complaint to add claims of successor liability against [...], which had acquired all of the outstanding stock of [...].
[brief] Miscoski is distinguishable.  Miscoski was not a prerogative writ matter.  Miscoski involved a Local Finance Board Ethics Complaint and a $500 fine.  Miscoski did not involve a public official who voted on municipal legislation that could and would benefit his own local business.  Miscoski involved a public official who voted on municipal legislation that could conceivably benefit his mother.  Miscoski involved statutory interpretation.  Miscowski involved whether a public official’s mother fell within a prohibited affiliated benefit group.  Indeed, in footnote 3 buried at the end of this persuasive opinion, the Miscoski panel noted:  “This, in fact, may signify a potential area where a disqualification under common law precedent may be required if raised in a prerogative writs action, even though there is not a statutory violation. ”  (Da023).  Here, plaintiff clearly argued that [...] had both a statutory and common law disqualifying conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety.
[brief] The Court stated in Morris the following:  "[...] also transferred the matter from the Chancery Division to the Law Division pursuant to Rule 4:69-1 because 'despite being framed as an action to enforce the requirements, [p]laintiff effectively seeks to compel the exercise of a ministerial duty, as set forth in the ordinance, by compelling [the City] to enforce the residency requirements.  Therefore, this is an action in lieu of prerogative writ[s]."  Citing from Morris v. DeMarco DOCKET NO. A-1380-17T1 (App. Div. Jun. 27, 2019) (Pa 397-402)
[brief] The Zoning  After the Legislature adopted the NJCREAMM Act, PL. 2021, c. 19, [...] elected to make the retail sale of cannabis a conditionally permitted use pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55-67 of the Municipal Land Use Law (“MLUL”).  [...] did this by adopting Ordinance B-384 on August 18, 2021.  [Da363].  The original conditional-use standards included a proximity restriction between cannabis businesses and a limitation against cannabis businesses on the same block frontage as schools.  [Da372-373].  Separately, [...] created a [...].  [Da380].  § 36-1A of the [...] Code states that “There is hereby created a City of [...] [...] ("Review Board") which shall serve as an advisory committee to the City of [...] whose duty it shall be to review applications for cannabis wholesaler, cannabis retailer, medical cannabis dispensary and cannabis delivery operations based within the City of [...].
[brief] Defendant was convicted of carrying a handgun in New Jersey without a New Jersey-issued permit to carry a handgun (NJ Carry Permit), in violation of New Jersey law.  She challenges her conviction as inconsistent with the Second Amendment and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution solely on the ground that, at the time of her arrest in New Jersey, she possessed a Pennsylvania-issued license to carry a handgun (PA Carry License), which authorizes her lawfully to carry a handgun in Pennsylvania.  Neither of defendant’s constitutional challenges has merit.  First, as the U.S. Supreme Court held in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen and this Court confirmed in State v. Wade, the Second Amendment has always allowed States to require individuals obtain permits handguns before publicly carrying firearms within their borders, to impose public-safety-oriented conditions on the State’s issuance of such permits, and to enforce those permitting requirements against those who violate them.  Defendant’s claim that she is, nonetheless, entitled to flout New Jersey’s permitting requirements just because she meets the different carry requirements imposed by another State is flatly inconsistent with Bruen and Wade, case law from this Court, and bedrock principles of federalism and representative democracy.  Further, accepting her argument would have the perverse result of forcing New Jersey to favor out-of-state residents by effectively exempting them from its permitting laws, even as to the residents of States that allow individuals to carry firearms without any permit at all.  Nothing in the Second Amendment requires this untenable result.  Second, defendant’s conviction does not offend the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  While the Clause requires state courts to apply the laws of sister states when applicable, such as when a lawsuit is brought in New Jersey concerning a contract governed by Delaware law, it has no bearing on defendant’s conviction for carrying a handgun in New Jersey contrary to New Jersey’s own law.  Indeed, although defendant grounds her Full Faith and Credit Clause challenge in the fact that she possesses a PA Carry License, that license does not even purport to authorize her to carry a handgun in New Jersey.  And precedent from this Court squarely rejects the proposition that the Full Faith and Credit Clause compels New Jersey to allow a person to possess a handgun in New Jersey just because that person may be authorized to possess a handgun in another state.  Because defendant’s conviction is consistent with the Second Amendment and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, this Court should affirm.  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] In *Public Service Electric Company v. Westfield* (D.N.J., Sept. 5, 1918), [...] indicated that “if the effect of the decisions of the State Courts was to impair  Indeed, in *N.J. Nat. Gas Co. v. Borough of Red Bank*, *supra*, the court found that a statute pertaining to the laying of gas lines required consent by the municipality and that this provided authority for the municipality to impose reasonable regulations.  Id. at 178.  So too, with respect to the erection of electrical power lines on poles, N.J.S.A. 48:7-1 requires consent of the owner (here, the municipality) and this likewise provides legislative authority to the municipality to impose reasonable regulations.  In addition, N.J.A.C. 14:5-7.1 requires that construction of transmission lines requires agreement with the owners of the property over which the line will pass.  This too, provides authority for the municipality having the right-of-way to impose reasonable requirements.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] (11T:12-19 to 13-10; 21 to 14-5; 50-7 to 8).  Based on the condition of the Tucson, detectives determined that the vehicle was involved in the shooting.  More specifically, the driver’s side window had shattered glass hanging from where the window would go down into the door and bullet holes were observed on the driver’s side door.  (11T:14-21 to 15-17).  Detectives also observed a bullet lodged in the inside frame on the passenger side of the vehicle.  All of these observations were made without going inside, touching, or moving anything inside of the vehicle.  (11T:17-9 to 13).  Detectives then entered the hospital to try and identify the two gunshot victims.  They learned that one victim, [...], was shot in the left shoulder and had a graze wound to his neck.  The other victim, [...], was shot in the face and head area.  (11T:18-19 to 19-2; 20-4 to 21).  By the time detectives arrived at the hospital, [...] was unconscious, intubated and in critical condition.  (11T:20-24 to 21-4).  As detectives were leaving the hospital, they were notified by hospital staff that a security guard found what appeared to be a bullet on the floor in the emergency room within the same path that [...] and [...] had entered the emergency room.