ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [Counts] 7 and 8 are breach of contract, and I think there was a breach.  . . .  And we’re talking about the [...] and then also the [...].  With regard to the Operating Agreement, [...], [...], [...], breached their obligations.  . . .  So withdrawals were made of capital from the company without approval and authorization from, in this --- 8  Plaintiffs added the [...] as an additional document that purportedly authorized the award of fees in their reply brief.  Defendants objected to the assertion of a new argument in a reply brief, which improperly deprived them an opportunity to present written opposition.  9/9/2022T36:16-37:2.  See, Borough of Berlin v. Remington & Vernick Eng'rs, 337 N.J. Super. 590, 596 (App. Div. 2001) ("Raising an issue for the first time in a reply brief is improper, and we generally will not consider such an issue.").  Nonetheless, the trial court proceeded to reference this agreement in its decision.  24T50:10-51:19.
[directive] 4.  The Prosecutor's Office shall forward all discoverable materials, and the reasons the court is seeking this evaluation, to the [...] Jail Program Coordinator. of The State psychiatric hospital provide this comt and all counsel with his/her determination 5.  NJ.SA. competency pursuant to 2C:4-5.; and The prosecutor shall deliver this court order to the [...] Jail Coordinator at the Ann Klein 6. of of Forensic Center within two (2) business days execution the order; of  Upon entry this order a case conference scheduled with counsel in this matter within 7. is of of of forty-five (45) days the entry this order to review the status the case.
[brief] In *Lopez v. [...]*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124730, at *13* (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2016) (Pa86), the District Court held that a debt buyer had to be licensed under the NJCFLA and opined, “a debt collector's representation in a collection complaint that it had the right to collect a debt when, in fact, it lacked the license required to initially purchase the debt, would violate, at minimum, FDCPA section e(10).
[brief] Although [...] did not use any “light towers” to provide additional illumination of the work zone on the night of the accident, Pa204a, [...] employees testified that light towers were not typically used for milling and paving jobs because there is no vehicle to which they can be secured in the moving work zone; it was very common on milling projects to only use lights from the equipment and vehicles on site to illuminate the work zone.  Pa205a, 218a; Pa281a.  [...] testified that [...] was “lit up” from the lighting emanating from the milling machine in the work zone, and that the lights on the sweeper are “pretty bright.
[brief] This attempt at an end-run was brought to the attention of the Dean of Pharmacy and the Provost, and [...] was ultimately denied admission into the MBA program.  Plaintiff-Appellant argues that, by denying him admission into the MBA program (\textit{while he was on academic probation in another program}), [...] improperly made a new rule just for him.  Plaintiff-Appellant also makes the point that, over his tenure in the Pharmacy program, his GPA – eventually – rose above a 3.0.  However, as set forth above, the 3.0 GPA requirement, which was clearly stated in various University sources, related to the minimal GPA necessary after the first academic year (through May 2012).  Moreover, that requirement was pedagogically sound in that there would not have been enough time to take the courses necessary to fulfill course requirements for two degrees if entry into the dual degree occurred in later years.  When asked why he did not sue [...] in the Spring of 2013, Plaintiff-Appellant alleged that was because he was a full-time student then.
[brief] \(^2\)  Practically, what that means is that each joint tortfeasor in a CNA case, has an unyielding interest in minimizing their own liability and maximizing that of their co-defendants because the exposure for damages is directly correlated to that defendant’s percentage of fault and, even more significantly, the prospect that such defendant may be liable to pay the entire judgment if he or she is found to be 60% or more liable.  Even if a defendant settles claims with Plaintiffs, a jury’s finding that that he or she is 60% or more liable could subject that defendant to a contribution claim by the remaining defendants.  That rule compels the most culpable defendants to point to their co-defendants if only to avoid liability for the full judgment amount.  Those considerations are exacerbated by the fact that IFPA damages are trebled if the defendant is found to have engaged in a pattern of violating the statute, N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(b).  So, the stakes are extraordinarily high.  Those dynamics render the interests of all codefendants “directly adverse” to one another in the same manner as the conflict inherent in the representation of a driver and passenger in a motor vehicle accident and constitutes a conflict per se.
[brief] ”  Ja151-Ja152.  Nowhere, of course, does the 1999 Master Plan define “wholesale distribution center”, or explain if there was an intended difference between that and a “distribution center. ”  (Id.)  Yet, the side yard, front yard, and rear-yard setbacks for warehouses in both the SM and GM Zones are the same, despite the height differences.  The Master Plan does not express concerns about height limits for permitted uses; the word “height” is not even found in this section of the Master Plan.
[brief] "[A] zoning ordinance must conform to MLUL [Municipal Land Use Law] requirements and further MLUL goals."  Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 253 (2015) (citing Rumson Ests. Inc. v. Mayor & Council of Fair Haven, 177 N.J. 338, 351 (2003)).  Those goals are to "regulate land development 'in a manner which will promote the public health, safety, morals and general welfare' using uniform and efficient procedures."  Id. (quoting Rumson, 177 N.J. at 349)); see also N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 (setting forth the intent and purpose of the MLUL).  Further, the ordinance must be consistent with the township's master plan and "be adopted in accordance with statutory and municipal procedural requirements."  Riggs, 109 N.J. at 611-12.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d) requires a redevelopment plan to be "substantially consistent with the municipal master plan."  The local government, however, may "adopt a redevelopment plan which is inconsistent with . . . the master plan by affirmative vote of a majority of its full authorized membership with the reasons for so acting set forth in the redevelopment plan."  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d).  [...] is not consistent with the [...]'s master plan.
[brief] THE ZONING BOARD  RESOLUTION/DETERMINATION WAS PROPERLY FOUNDED IN THE LAW AND RECORD.  THE TRIAL COURT OPINION/ORDER VACATING THAT RESOLUTION WAS UNFOUNDED IN THE LAW AND FACTS  This is the Appeal of the Trial Court’s reversal and invalidation of the Zoning Board Resolution finding that the [...] Lot 8 use of the portions of the School Lot 5 for an off-site parking use/facility is not a legal use and not a nonconforming legal use.
[directive] The Lieutenant was ordered by the Deputy Chief to appear for a psychiatric exam on October 1, 2022 at 9 am as part of the “re-arming” process.  The doctor’s office advised the police department that the Lieutenant had failed to appear for the appointment.  Further investigation revealed that a member of the doctor’s staff had rescheduled the appointment for October 15 and failed to enter the new date into the office computer system, resulting in the call to the police department reporting the Lieutenant’s absence.  The examination was conducted as scheduled on October 15, 2022.
[brief] The trial judge adhered to that process in this case."  [Land, slip op. at 9.]  Thus, it is clear that a party is not entitled to a jury trial in a private action brought by an insurance carrier under the Fraud Act.  Had the [...] been entitled to a jury trial under the Fraud Act because the carrier was seeking "monetary damages" as argued by the Defendants here, the Appellate Division in Land would have been required to vacate the Order for Judgment since the [...] would have been deprived of their constitutional right to a jury trial.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 313.  Thus, even if [...] were somehow successful here, the Court must still apply the factors under *Enright*.  Here, “the bona fides” of [...]’s declination is based on [...]’s actual unenrollment from the CCIP, as well [...]’s acknowledgment that it was unenrolled, weigh sharply against awarding attorneys’ fees.  Also, [...]’s justification in litigating coverage is well-reasoned based on the overwhelming evidence that [...] was not enrolled at the time of the Accident and [...]’s several admissions of the same.  The trial court’s denial of [...]’ summary judgment motion and granting of [...]’s motion of [...] further bolsters [...]’s decision not to provide coverage and defend its coverage position.  Additionally, the general conduct of the parties, including [...]’s large payment on behalf of other entities settling the Hood Lawsuit must also be taken into account.  Finally, the “totality of the circumstances” must be considered, including the compelling support for [...]’s conclusion that [...] was not an insured under the CCIP and [...]’ ([...]’s primary insurer with the most financial incentive) unwillingness to pursue coverage under the CCIP via this DJ Action, which only changed when it was named as a defendant.  Further, the Court should consider that [...] was informed and acknowledged that it had been unenrolled from the CCIP, did not object, and ultimately maintained coverage for the Accident through [...] and [...].  The Court should likewise consider that [...]’s pricing for the work at the Project included an increase based on its unenrollment from the CCIP (as it did with the increased proposal), and even that [...] increased [...]’s premiums at the end of the [...] Policy period.  Finally, in situations involving “novel and unsettled insurance coverage issues,” as is the case here, the Enright factors do not favor an award of fees.  Jignayasa Desai, D.O., LLC v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 473 N.J. Super. 582, 590 (App. Div. 2022) (declining to award attorney fees after analyzing Enright factors where the “issue presented was novel and unsettled. ”).  The trial court’s decision in [...]’s favor, as well as the trial judge’s statement on the record expressing surprise that he was deciding issues of first impression, support the argument that the issues presented were novel and unsettled, thereby weighing heavily against an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.  (May 26, 2023 Oral Arg. Tr. 90:19-24.)  Therefore, the Court here – or the trial court on remand - should exercise its discretion and deny [...]’ claim for attorneys’ fees in the DJ Action.\textsuperscript{13}
[directive] 2A:162-13  Bail Sufficiency; Source Hearing.  When a person charged with an offense posts cash bail or secures a bail bond in any amount, the court may, upon the request of the prosecutor, conduct an inquiry to determine the reliability of the obligor or person posting cash bail, the value and sufficiency of any security offered, the relationship of the obligor or (See also Rule 3:26-8(a–g), page 94 person posting cash bail to the defendant and the defendant's interest in ensuring that the bail is not forfeited, and whether the funds used to post the cash bail or herein.) secure the bail bond were acquired as a result of criminal or unlawful conduct.
[brief] As in *Forsythe*, the bill ultimately adopted by the Legislature and submitted to the Governor for approval was before the Senate and General Assembly for more than the prescribed one calendar day period.  (Pa231-32; Pa236; Pa253; Pa260).  A6260 and S49 were identical bills “absolutely equivalent to one another in terms of substantive content,” *Forsythe*, 91 N.J. at 150, and “each bill had several days between the readings. ” (Pb39).  Therefore, there was “in constitutional effect, one bill that was properly acted upon by each legislative house. ”  *Forsythe*, 91 N.J. at 150.  The procedure ultimately followed by the General Assembly to substitute S49 for A6260 “was simply a device to place before the Governor for his final action a single, passed bill. ”  *Ibid.*  And Petitioners’ attempts to distinguish *Forsythe* fall flat.
[brief] III.  DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR HIS PRO SE STATUS.  “Procedural rules are not abrogated or abridged by plaintiff’s pro se status. ”  Rosenblum v. Borough of Closter, 285 N.J. Super. 230, 241 (App. Div. 1995).  “Litigants are free to represent themselves if they so choose, but in exercising that choice they must understand that they are required to follow accepted rules of procedure … to guarantee an orderly process. ”  Tuckey v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 236 N.J. Super. 221, 224 (App. Div. 1989).  [...]’s pro se status until the entry of current counsel should play no role in the Court’s decision.  CONCLUSION  For reasons set forth above, the Court should find that [...] is estopped from asserting a right to compel arbitration at this point.
[brief] None of the reasons that [...] noted in his ruling provided reasonable and sufficient ground to deny plaintiffs their chosen expert on the most critical issue the jury was to decide.  [...] said that plaintiffs already had an expert in [...].  1T9.  But this was plaintiffs’ choice, not the judge’s.  When [...] made his August 27 decision, the discovery end date was nearly three months away, and even expert depositions had almost two months left for completion.  The Rules of Court still provided plaintiffs with a right to amend their answers to interrogatories to identify a new expert.  Plaintiffs had a qualified right, at least, to choose the expert witness they wanted to testify at trial, and they chose [...] specifically to address the problems that defendant had continually raised against [...].  [...] abused his discretion by overriding plaintiffs’ choice, and sticking them with the problematic [...] for trial, without a sufficient and compelling reason to do so.
[brief] Da36, ¶ 60, with Ex. C (November 30, 2022 email from [...] to [...] and [...] stating “It appears we may have committed malpractice here. ”)(Da96).  During the same call, [...] directed [...] to file a lawsuit in the case that had been mishandled by [...].  Plaintiff [...] told [...] that the Defendant Firm had a conflict of interest under the New Jersey’s Rules of Professional Conduct (RPCs) that prevented continued representation of the client since the Firm had committed malpractice by failing to file a Notice of Claim against the public entity that injured the claimant in that case.  Plaintiff [...] advised [...] that instead of the Firm simply filing a defective lawsuit, the Firm should notify the client of the malpractice.  Defendant [...] responded that the client did not speak English, only Spanish, so he would never detect the Firm's mistake and the case would eventually “go away” if the Firm was unable to settle the case with other potential defendants.  Defendant [...] instructed [...] to “stay quiet” and not post anything to the file or notify the client and proceed as instructed with filing a lawsuit.  [...] objected because he did not want to be associated with [...]’s scheme to deceive the client.  [...] advised [...] that at times “we have to do things that are uncomfortable to protect the law firm” and he ordered [...] to do as he, [...], demanded.
[brief] POINT IV  AS NO ERROR EXISTS, THERE CAN BE NO ARGUMENT THAT CUMULATIVE ERRORS REQUIRE  REVERSAL  Reversal is not warranted under the cumulative error doctrine because defendant has not demonstrated that any errors occurred at the trial level.  (See Pellicer v. Saint Barnabas Hosp., 200 N.J. 22, 53 (2009)).  Accordingly, defendant received a fair trial and his appeal should be denied.
[directive] These procedures are important because often there are times when a law enforcement officer or other investigative employee knows of or Brady Giglio information yet the prosecutor does not.  The United States and New Jersey Supreme Courts have made clear that even under these circumstances, knowledge of potential or information is imputed to the prosecutor, and, therefore, “the individual Brady Giglio prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police. ”  Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, Kyles v. 437-38 (1995); Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154; Womack, 145 N.J. 576, 589, see also State v. denied, 519 U.S. 101 (1996); Carter, 91 N.J. at 110; Mustaro, 411 N.J. cert. State v. Super. 91, 102 (App. Div. 2009) (finding even if prosecutor was unaware of existence of impeachment material on videotape, arresting officer was aware; consequently, officer’s knowledge was imputed to State).
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 245.  Deference likewise does not end because a lower court’s factual findings are based upon video evidence; “[v]ideo-recorded evidence is reviewed under the same standard. ”  *Hagans*, 233 N.J. at 38; *S.S.*, 229 N.J. at 379-81; *State v. A.M.*, 237 N.J. 384, 395-96 (2019).
[directive] Prosecution of DWI & Refusal Violations  (1)  Judicial Notice/Scientific Reliability  The issue of judicial notice of the scientific reliability of chemical breath testing instruments, as a foundational criterion, has been settled, and is essentially no longer an issue in dispute.  See, N.J.A.C. 13:51-3.5(a)(1), and State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. at 170; Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. at 82; State v. Tischio, 107 N.J. at 516, n.5, 517-8, 520; State v. Downie, [Breathalyzer®].  117 N.J. at 453, 457, 466-469 for photometric instruments  See, N.J.A.C. 13:51- 3.5(a)(2), and State v. Foley, et al., 370 N.J. Super. 341, 348, 351, 359 (Law Div. 2004) for infra- red and electrochemical instruments, when used as a dual system of chemical breath testing [Alcotest® 7110 MKIII-C]  (2)  Operator properly trained  In general, proof of the status of a Breath Test Operator is obtained through the introduction of the officer’s "replica" certificate.  It is not necessary or required that the State establish or prove facts behind the certification of the operator, particularly in the absence of some relevant factual evidence from the defense that might bring the document into question.  State v. Maure, 240 N.J. Super. at 278-9.  Documents such as an "Operator's Certificate" and "replica" certificates are self authenticating documents.  State v. Cardone, 146 N.J. Super. 23, 28-29 (App. Div. 1976), certif. den. 73 N.J. 3 (1977).  N.J.R.E. §902.  Furthermore there is a presumption, at law, that the Attorney General as a public official does not act improperly in the exercise of official duties such as the issuance of an "Operator's Certificate" or "replica" certificate.  State v. Matulewicz, 101 N.J. 27, 31 (1985).  Also N.J.R.E. §803(c)(8).  However, in the event there is any question regarding the certification status of an Operator, the provisions of the Chemical Breath Testing Rules, at N.J.A.C. 13:51-1.14 and 13:51- 4.2(a)1 control.
[brief] See State v. Golotta, 178 N.J. 205, 219-220 (2003).  Generally speaking, information imparted from a citizen directly to a police officer will receive greater weight than information received from an anonymous tipster.  *State v. Basil*, 202 N.J. 570, 586 (2010).  Thus, an objectively reasonable police officer may assume that an ordinary citizen reporting a crime, which the citizen purports to have observed, is providing reliable information.  *Ibid.*  This is so because “we assume that an ordinary citizen ‘is motivated by factors that are consistent with law enforcement goals,’” *Ibid.* (*quoting Davis*, 104 N.J. at 506), and thus may be regarded as trustworthy.  *State v. Hathaway*, 222 N.J. 453, 471 (2015).  Information received from a person concerning a criminal event would not especially entail further exploration or verification of his personal credibility or reliability before appropriate police action is taken.  *Ibid.*  In each of these precedents, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that even an anonymous report of criminal activity by an ordinary citizen, when considered in the context of other facts, was sufficient to give law enforcement personnel authority to enter a premises under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement.  effectuate an arrest based on probable cause, or conduct a *Terry* stop.  *See State v. Frankel*, 179 N.J. 586, 598 (2004), A critical element of the Court’s analysis in each case was that the citizen reported criminal activity based on personal knowledge.  Such specific, detailed reports of a crime by citizens are made even more reliable when they are relayed through the 9-1-1 system.  By its nature, a call placed and processed via the 9-1-1 system carries enhanced reliability not found in other contexts.  *State v. Golotta*, 178 N.J. 205, 218 (2003).
[brief] THE COURT’S REVERSAL OF THE ORDER IS URGENTLY NECESSARY.  Plaintiffs attempt to portray this order as a “reasoned decision” that is unworthy of reversal but the Order’s extraordinary implications transcend the issues in the instant matter and go to the heart of our system for resolving civil disputes.  Pl. Br. 3.  The Order transgresses what had been a bright line: absent discovery misconduct, which is not shown here, Rule 4:10-2 does not authorize orders to produce material outside that rule’s scope of discovery.  Appeals to a trial court’s discretion to enter such orders must remain unavailing.  Just as a trial court has no discretion to compel discovery on claims that fail as a matter of law, it also lacks discretion to order the production of irrelevant information.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Additionally, plaintiff’s claim that the Planning Board’s December 16, 2021, special meeting was held in violation of the OPMA was timely filed.  (Plaintiffs’ Brief, page 32.)  It was at this meeting that the Planning Board continued its review of Ordinance 1423-21 and found inconsistencies.  There was also no recording of the meeting created, in violation of the Municipal Land Use Law, specifically N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(f).  Id.  Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint was filed January 20, 2022, well within the 45-day limitations period to challenge the adoption of Ordinance 1423-21.  (Pa1.)  In the Borough's Preliminary Statement on Page 1 of its Brief, it asserts that the Trial Court found “that most of Plaintiff's claims were filed out of time.
[brief] ..............................................................................12  Hirsch v. Amper Financial Services, LLC, 215 N.J. 174 (2013)  ..............................................................................10  Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113 (2009)  ..............................................................................12  Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick, LLC, 143 226 N.J. 370 (2016)  ........................................................................3  Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163 (2006) ..............................................................................21 Littman v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 337 N.J. Super. 134 (App. Div. 2001) ....................................................20 N. Haledon Fire Co. No. 1 v. Borough of N. Haledon, 425 N.J. Super (App. Div. 2012) ............................................................29 Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Fiouris, 395 N.J. Super. 156 (App. Div. 2007) ..................................................17, 18, 21, 22 New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921) (Holmes, J.) .................................................................2 Matter of Restrepo Dep’t of Corr., 449 N.J. Super. 409 (App. Div. 2017) .........................................................26 Roig v. Kelsey, 135 N.J. 500 (1994) ......................................................................................23, 27 Sanjuan v. Sch. Dist. of W. New York, Hudson Cnty., 256 N.J. 369 (2024) .......................................................................................10 State Farm Guar. Ins. Co. v. Tri-Cnty. Chiropractic & Rehab. Ctr., P.C., No. 22-cv-4852, 2023 WL 4362748 (D.N.J. July 6, 2023)