ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] B.  Plaintiff Has Failed to Adduce Evidence That the Circumstances Surrounding the Incident Resulting in the Injuries to [...] Were More Than a Fact of Life of Industrial Employment and Plainly Beyond Anything the Legislature Intended the Worker’s Compensation Act to Immunize (Pa3a).  As set forth above, the evidence in this matter plainly does not support a finding that [...] took any intentional act that it knew was substantially certain to result in serious injury or death to [...].  However, even if --- 2  A copy of this unpublished opinion is included with Defendant’s appendix, in accordance with R. 1:36-3.  Plaintiff were able to supply such evidence, her claim against [...] would still fail because the undisputed material facts do not establish that the circumstances surrounding [...]’s injury were more than a fact of life of industrial employment and plainly beyond anything that the Legislature intended the Workers’ Compensation Act to immunize.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law.
[brief] The facts of Vezeriannis are similar to the case at bar and highly persuasive.  There, the borrower had a loan with Lender A secured by a mortgage.  The borrower refinanced the original loan from Lender B.  At the closing, the borrower directed the proceeds of the new loan be used to pay off the --- ⁴  A copy of the Vezeriannis decision was attached as Exhibit “A” to Respondent’s “Memorandum of Law” which was submitted in opposition to Appellant’s Cross-Motion and in further support of the Motion.
[brief] (Da1-2, Da5-58).  On February 28, 2024, the court granted the motion to proceed summarily.  (Da3-Da4).  Plaintiffs and Defendants submitted briefs, and oral arguments were heard on June 27, 2024.  (Da89-90).  On the same day, the court issued its decision from the bench holding that (1) the case concerns a matter of important public interest requiring the enlargement of the statute of limitations for prerogative writs; (2) BOG members’ continuing service is subject to review under the quo warranto statute; and (3) the Restructuring Act’s residency requirements are continuous and must be maintained by the residency-restricted BOG members for the duration of their term, not just on the date of appointment or on the date they take office.
[brief] In the First Count [...] alleged that, while the Redevelopment Plan was referred to the [...] for the mandated “consistency review”, the [...] failed to advise the [...] that the challenged Redevelopment Plan was inconsistent with the Master Plan; specifically included as a reason was the failure of the [...] to consider the Common Law Public Trust Doctrine, the Statutory Public Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative Public Access Rule recently enacted by the [...] (“[...]”).  In the Second Count, [...] argued that while the LRHL, does permit a Redevelopment Plan that is inconsistent with the Master Plan the specific reasons for such deviations(s) must be outlined in the Redevelopment Plan and the adopting Ordinance itself, the Redevelopment Plan and the adopting Ordinance 1667 failed to do so.  In the Third Count, [...] cumulatively asserted that Ordinance 1667 (and the “Redevelopment Plan”) are contrary to sound zoning and redevelopment principles, that the proposed use is incompatible with the surrounding uses and properties, and that therefore such actions were contrary to law and were arbitrary, capricious and invalid.  Lastly, in the Fourth Count [...] asserted that the defendant’s undisputed failure to consider the Common Law Public Trust Doctrine, the Statutory Public Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative Public Access Rule recently enacted by the [...] renders Ordinance 1667 (and the “Redevelopment Plan”) invalid, and that Redevelopment Plan’s specific provision calling for the abolishment and closing of a long existing public access point and 300 public parking spaces is in violation of those State policies.
[directive] Page 3 F.  Nothing in this Directive shall be interpreted to alter the drug testing requirements for law enforcement applicants or trainees contained in AG Directive 2018-2 and the AG Drug Testing Policy.  G.  Nothing in this Directive shall be interpreted to alter the drug testing requirements for law enforcement officers for whom reasonable suspicion exists to believe are using drugs illegally, contained in AG Directive 2018-2 and the AG Drug Testing Policy.  II.
[brief] (Sa62).  The Order overruled the State’s objections to admission into Recovery Court, to include its objection as to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a(5), as the lower court found “the current Morris County charges do not involve a firearm and the Essex County charges involving a firearm are no longer pending, having been disposed by guilty plea and a sentence of non-custodial probation. ” (Sa63).  Accompanying the Order was the Statement of Reasons where the lower court cited this Court’s decision in State v. Ancrum, 449 N.J. Super. 526 (App. Div. 2017), as aligning with the defendant’s interpretation of the second clause of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a(5), that is, the statute should be construed as meaning “a pending charge involving a firearm. ” (Sa81-Sa82).  The lower court concluded the first clause of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a(5) “plainly and exclusively refers to the present Morris County charges, and that the second clause does not, instead referring to other pending charges that somehow involve possession of a firearm. ” (Sa82).  Once that possession of a firearm charge is disposed of, whether by guilty plea or other manner, it is no longer pending and does not bar an applicant from Recovery Court.  Ibid.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I LEAVE TO APPEAL SHOULD BE GRANTED.
[brief] He also took blood swabbings from [...]’s car.  (5T 150- [...] testified that he did not see the tire iron in his initial review of the scene, adding that officers at the scene said that it had been thrown into the woods.  (5T 150-21 to 152-2).  He testified that he did not believe that it had been in the woods, although he could cite no evidence for that belief.  (5T 186-17 to 187-13).  [...] did not “process” the tire iron for fingerprints, because he had been “told” that if an item was dusted for fingerprints it could not be submitted for DNA analysis.  (5T 152-20 to 155-9; 5T 184-23 to 185-7).  However, it was [...]’s understanding that fingerprint and DNA tests could be conducted on the same piece of evidence.  (6T 43-14 to 20).  [...] requested that the tire iron be tested for DNA, but that was not done; it was not tested for fingerprints, he testified, because the authorities wanted it tested for DNA and were concerned that fingerprint powder would “contaminate” it.  (8T 47-19 to 49-20).  [...], a forensic scientist with the [...], testified that her testing did not show blood on the tire iron.  (5T 104-6 to 9).  [...], a DNA analyst for the [...] who qualified as an expert in DNA analysis (5T 117-10 to 119-24), testified that the tire iron was not submitted to her for analysis.  (5T 131-25 to 132-8).  [...] acknowledged that at the hospital after the incident, the police found two and one-half “bundles” of heroin that had been in his pocket.
[brief] On February 1, 2018, the State Grand Jury returned Indictment No. [...], charging defendant [...], also known as [...], with first-degree possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of N.J.S.A.  2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1) (count one); first-degree possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(10)(a) (count two); third-degree possession of cocaine, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count three); and fourth-degree possession of marijuana, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3) (count four).  (Da1-4)  On January 14, 2020, in a written decision and order, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.  (Da6-29).  On May 8, 2020, the court issued an order denying defendant’s motion for reconsideration.  (Da30).  On April 5, 2021, the trial court denied in part and granted in part defendant’s motion to suppress his statements.  (Da31; 6T3-10 to 26-20).  On December 10, 2021, the court denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration.  (Da32-43).  Defendant was tried before a jury from March 15 to March 24, 2022.  Defendant did not testify or present any witnesses.  (12T42-4 to 5).  On March 24, 2022, the jury found defendant guilty on counts two, three, and four and not guilty on count one.  (Da44; Pa6-8;112T5-13 to 7-4).  On October 7, 2022, the court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 12 years flat on count two; to five years on count three; and 18 months on count four.2 (Da44; 15T41-2 to 16).  The court denied defendant bail pending appeal.  (15T43-10 to 48-24; Da47).  On November 23, 2022, defendant filed an amended Notice of Appeal.  (Da54-58).  On December 29, 2022, this Court denied defendant’s request for bail pending appeal.  (Da48).
[brief] *(Id.* at 375-77.)  In accordance with N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53.j, if the Borough wanted to decline to accept the dedication of the Roads, the time to have done so would have been when it was presented with the 2005 Map and the 2010 Map (just like [...] would have had the right to reject the dedication of the hypothetical road at the time of its review of [...]’s subdivision application).
[brief] POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AND TO HAVE COUNSEL AT A CRITICAL STAGE OF THE TRIAL JUST BEFORE JURY DELIBERATIONS BEGAN, RESULTING IN THE COURT FAILING TO PROVIDE THE JURY WITH A CRITICAL DEFENSE EXHIBIT.  (Not Raised Below)  Before the jury was sent to begin deliberations -- but outside the presence of [...] and his attorney -- the trial court submitted the trial exhibits to the jury and provided additional jury instruction.  However, the court evidently failed to submit to the jury a key defense exhibit that memorialized the lenient sentence [...] received after informing against [...].  The court’s ex parte actions denied [...] his rights to be present and to have counsel, and its exclusion of the defense exhibit denied him a fair trial.  Therefore, his convictions must be reversed.
[brief] **  For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this court affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Middlesex County Prosecutor  By: [...]  Assistant Prosecutor Attorney No. 059632013  Date: August 12, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County.  Indictment Nos. [...], [...] Sat  Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a jury.  BRIEF & APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
[brief] The United States Supreme Court has prescribed that the Fourth Amendment “must provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was adopted. ”  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012).  Thus, the bounds of the Amendment’s protections are “guided by the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the common law at the time of the framing[.]”  Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2001) (quotation omitted).  And at the Nation’s founding, it was understood that a search warrant was unconstitutionally void if executed outside the territorial jurisdiction of either the authorizing judge or executing law enforcement officer.  That is, a breach of either geographical limit resulted in a constitutional violation and voided the warrant.  A trio of federal courts of appeals decisions recently detailed this legal history.  United States v. Henderson, 906 F.3d 1109, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 2018); United States v. Krueger, 809 F.3d 1109, 1123-26 (10th Cir. 2015) ([...], J., concurring); Engleman v. Murray, 546 F.3d 944, 948-49 (8th Cir. 2008).
[brief] [...] and [...] are attempting to delay and ultimately deny over two hundred working families long-promised and constitutionally mandated housing opportunities in the Township of [...].  They do so with novel legal theories about municipal authority and bring these theories six years too late.  [...] Township’s affordable housing plan has been vetted by the lower court pursuant to several publicly-noticed hearings, and every municipal action taken by [...] Township has complied with the appropriate sunshine laws.  [...] urges the court to reject the Appellants’ belated attempt to thwart the Mount Laurel compliance of its neighbor.  FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND¹
[brief] “When reviewing the decision of a trial court that has reviewed municipal action, [the Appellate Court] is bound by the same standards as was the trial court. ”  *Fallone Props., LLC v. Bethlehem Twp. Planning Bd.*, 369 N.J. Super. 552, 562 (App. Div. 2004); see also *Bryant v. City of Atlantic City*, 309 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 1998).  A court’s “review of the adoption of a redevelopment plan is limited. ”  *240 Half Mile Rd., LLC v. Twp. of Middletown*, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1002 at *28 (App. Div. June 7, 2022).  A “presumption of validity attaches to the adoption of a redevelopment plan” with “deference” given to a governing body in making such a determination.
[brief] Again, [...] became jealous when Appellant went to get coffee with other male employees, including [...].  [...] also made jealous comments when Appellant brought coffee for the security guard.  Id.  Moreover, [...] attempted to discuss personal matters with Appellant, such as asking about her marriage or why she did not have many pictures of her husband at work.  (Pa342-45) 72:12-82:22.  [...] also made comments about kissing Appellant, which made her uncomfortable, especially because [...] was married.  Id.  He discussed personal matters with Appellant, including sexual preferences, her clothing, and her relationship status.  When Appellant tried to disengage from conversation concerning personal matters, [...] would immediately change the subject and begin asking work-related questions.  Id.  On another occasion, [...] saw Appellant on her way to drop her children off at school.  He then approached her and asked where she was going and why she did not stop and say hello to him.  Id.; (Pa230).  [...] even referred to Appellant “hot babe,” including in text messages.
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE NINTH COUNT THROUGH THE ELEVENTH COUNT OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE AGAINST [...] (183a)**  The Ninth Count through the Eleventh Count of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint allege legal malpractice against [...].  The legal malpractice alleged in said Counts arises solely from Plaintiffs’ newly discovered evidence and newly discovered claim in the 2015 Action that [...] was Sole Member of [...] and controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity.  The legal malpractice claimed against [...] arises solely from [...]’s failure to advise Plaintiffs of said facts during the course of his representation.  None of these facts nor claims were alleged in the complaint that was dismissed against [...] in the 2015 Action, as said facts were discovered in the course of the 2015 Action following said dismissal.  The Trial Court’s sole basis for dismissing said Counts against [...] was expressed by the Trial Court as follows:  To the extent these Counts are based on the same factual predicates underlying the legal malpractice claims asserted in the 2015 case, they are clearly barred by the Law of the Case Doctrine, as the legal malpractice claims asserted in that case were dismissed with prejudice by the Court…  The Trial Court does not explain how claims that are entirely new, arising out of the discovery that [...] was Sole Member of [...] and controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity – facts and claims which were not pled before the dismissal of the complaint against [...] in the 2015 Action, since they were unknown by Plaintiffs at the time – could possibly be “based on the same factual predicates underlying the legal malpractice claims asserted in the 2015 case. ”  The Trial Court’s simplistic, unnuanced, and curt analysis seems to strain itself in order to achieve a desired outcome, but it comes woefully short of making any sense in fact, law, or reason.  It is a factual, legal, and physical impossibility for Plaintiffs’ new claims, arising solely out of the discovery that [...] was Sole Member of [...] and controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity, to be “based on the same factual predicates underlying the legal malpractice claims asserted in the 2015 case”, which never alleged such facts.  The new legal malpractice claims against [...] were not and could not have been known or pled prior to the dismissal of the previous claims, because they arise solely out of [...]’s ownership of [...] and control and operation of [...] as a sham entity, which are facts that could not have been known and were not previously known or alleged at the time of the original complaint in the 2015 Action.  The new legal malpractice claims against [...] have absolutely no connection to the prior, dismissed legal malpractice claims, and share absolutely no factual predicates.
[brief] It is requested that the Appellate Court determine that the Adverse Possession statute applies and that a decision be entered by the Appellate Court for the Appellant.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE A DETERMINATION ON THE ISSUE OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND AS A RESULT THERE WAS A FAILURE TO FIND FOR [...] WHICH WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE DOCUMENTARY  EVIDENTIARY RECORD PRESENTED TO THE COURT  Da203, 1T, Da255  Adverse Possession is set out at N.J.S.A. 2A:14-30 and 2A:14-31 and provides, a possessor is vested with the title to real estate, unless the property consists of woodlands or uncultivated tracts.  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-30 and 2A: 14-31.
[brief] The Second Ordinance eliminates 50 residential units shown on the Master Plan for development on Plaintiff’s property and replaces that development with a park.  The amendment makes it more difficult for the municipality to meet Objective 3 (the providing of affordable housing) because, as a result of the Second Ordinance, the economics of the project for the potential developer become worse.  In other words, pursuant to the Second Ordinance, there are only 230 market residential units (300 total residential units proposed less 70 low income housing units proposed) to support the possible construction of 70 low income housing units, as opposed to the Master Plan’s vision that there would be 280 market units (350 total residential units less 70 low income housing units) economically supporting the possible construction of the affordable housing.  Since low income housing units do not generate profits for the developer, the more market units in the project relative to the total number of affordable housing units, the greater the likelihood the project will meet the economics necessary to get built.  The Second Ordinance decreases the chances that low income housing will be built in [...] by changing the ratio.  4.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW .............................................................................................8  ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................16  POINT I THIS COURT SHOULD CONFIRM THE ARBITRATION AWARD BECAUSE IT REPRESENTS A REASONABLY DEBATEABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE PARTIES’ AGREEMENT ..............................................16 POINT II THIS COURT SHOULD CONFIRM THE ARBITRATION AWARD BECAUSE THE ARBITRATOR DID NOT EXCEED THE SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY UNDER THE CONTRACT ............................................................25 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................23 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[directive] This warning informs the officer being interviewed that he or she must cooperate with the investigation and can be disciplined for failing to do so because the County Prosecutor has decided to provide the officer with "use immunity."  8.0.10  It is for this reason that the internal affairs investigator must continually reassess the nature of an internal affairs investigation as evidence is being gathered.  Having initially determined that a particular allegation is criminal or administrative in nature, it is important for the internal affairs investigator to revisit that decision during the course of an investigation to determine whether any of the evidence gathered following the initial determination changes the investigation’s nature and scope.  If the nature and scope of an investigation change, the investigator must be prepared to change the methods and procedures he or she utilizes to reflect the new focus.  For example, if an investigator Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (coerced statements obtained by threat of removal from office cannot be 6 used in criminal proceedings); see Appendix J. 46 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 initially determines that an allegation appears to be a disciplinary matter but later evidence leads the investigator to conclude that criminal conduct may have occurred, he or she must cease using the methods and procedures appropriate for an administrative investigation and notify the County Prosecutor immediately before proceeding further.
[brief] Throughout its discussion of these non-existent problems and elsewhere, the [...] brief repeatedly emphasizes that it must install the gas combustion regulator to provide "safe, adequate and proper service," citing N.J.S.A. 48:2-3.  The ID and the Decision did the same.  Thus, [...]'s brief in effect contends that for the past eleven years since 2012 it has been in violation of its statutory duty and has not been providing "safe, adequate and proper service."  Its witnesses on cross-examination show that it has, and can continue for many years.  Nonetheless, the ID and the [...] have committed errors of law, because the statute requires more:
[brief] Arbaugh v. Y H Corp. 546 U.S. 500 (2006) · 126 S. Ct. 1235  Decided Feb 22, 2006  [...] as Trustee v. [...], et al., Case No. [...], Superior Ct. of NJ: Brady v. McHugh, supra.  Chase Home Finance v. Koren  Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 225 (App. Div. 2011)  Deutsche Bank Nat. v. Mitchell, 27 A. 3d 1229 - NJ: Appellate Div. 2011, In re D'Aconti, 719 A. 2d 652 - NJ: Appellate Div. 1998  Investors Bank v. Torres, ([...]) ([...]) (2020))  Klapprott v. U.S., 335 U.S. 601, 69 S.Ct. 384, 93 L.Ed. 266 (1949), remand modified in 336 U.S. 942, 69 S.Ct. 384, 93 L.Ed. 1099 (1949).  Lacks v Lacks, 41 N.Y.2d 71, 75 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L. Ed.2d 351, 364 (1992).  Marsh v. Mitchell, 26 N. J. Eq. 497  Nuveen Mun. Trust v. WITHUMSMITH BROWN, 692 F. 3d 283  Potter v. Steer COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY  Nov 16, 1923  122 A. 685 (Ch. Div. 1923)  Shammas v. Shammas, 88 A. 2d 204 - NJ: Supreme Court  1952  Whalen v. Manchester Land Co., 65 N.J. Law, 206,47 Atl. 443  Wilford v. Sigmund Eisner Company, 13 N.J. Super. 27 (App. Div. 1951)]  Wright v. Wells, 12 N.J. Law, 131 COURT RULES: Rule 1:6-6  Rule. 1:6-2(f)  Rule 1:7-4  Rule: 4:42-2  Rule 4:46-2(c)  Rule 4:64-(1)(b)(11)  Federal Rule of Evidence: 901(a)  NJ STATUTES
[directive] (a)  Conduct and assist in investigations where computers, networks, telecommunication devices, and other technological devices are the instrument or target of the commission of criminal acts against network resources critical to the -5- function of private or public entities; (b)  Provide training for the New Jersey law enforcement community regarding network intrusion related crimes and their impact on private and public entities; (c)  Provide corporate outreach services to educate and inform the public and private sector, as well as institutions of higher education within the state, as to the dangers and vulnerabilities of wired and wireless networks; (d)  Establish and maintain a state cyber security response group for incident response statewide in the event of significant network intrusion.