ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See Edwards, 357 N.J. Super. 196.  "It is just inexcusable to plead merely a conclusion and thereafter attempt to justify this action by an attempt to resort to the discovery practice permitted by our rules.  Such discovery is intended, as an aid, to every litigant to avoid surprise and make a lawsuit an inquiry into truth and justice.  It is not (and was not intended) to be a substitute for good pleading, a shield for the lazy pleader or a means of avoiding the requirements of pleading legally sufficient facts."  Gruccio v. Baxter, 343 A.2d 145 (N.J. Super. L. Div. 1975).  Thus, a Plaintiff cannot rely on later discovery to survive a motion to dismiss.
[brief] Defendant unleashes a flurry of attacks at the officer’s testimony, asserting that he is not a drug-recognition expert, did not explain in enough detail “why or under what circumstances” constricted pupils are a sign of impairment, and “did not actually believe” defendant was under the influence.  *(Db15 to 18). *  However, the Law Division found the officer credible, and the officer testified that in his training and experience “constricted pupils . . . is an indication of drug use,” which led him to believe that defendant was “[p]ossibly under the influence. ”  *(1T122-6 to 8, 17).*  The weight of the authority in other jurisdictions – as well as unpublished cases by this Court – confirms that a police officer’s observation of constricted pupils reasonably suggests drug impairment.  See, e.g., Kenyon, 651 N.W.2d at 274; Dubaniewicz, 208 A.3d at 495-96; Stewart, 340 P.3d at 807; Cantalupo, No. A-4142-16T2, at *8; Mauro, No. A-2085-09T3, at *5.
[directive] An agency may enter into a written Sharing with agencies not covered by this agreement to share ALPR data with, or receive data from, a law enforcement agency outside of New Jersey or otherwise not covered by this Directive with the approval of the [...].  Only federally recognized law enforcement agencies may receive access to a New Jersey agency’s ALPR data.  The [...] may agree to share ALPR data with a law enforcement agency outside of New Jersey if the out of state agency agrees in writing to use the data only for documented, legitimate law enforcement purposes and to follow other restrictions required by the [...] in order to achieve the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599, 616-19 (1994) (establishing the level of individualized suspicion required before an officer may order a passenger to exit a motor vehicle stopped for a traffic violation).
[brief] Defendant points to the fact that an Affidavit of Merit was submitted by Plaintiff to argue that Plaintiff could have gotten one in a timely manner, however, even at oral argument the Trial Court Judge stated that the Affidavit of Merit, even if it was timely, would not have been sufficient.  Yet, the Trial Court Judge never explained why the untimely Affidavit of Merit was insufficient and Plaintiff should have been given an opportunity to at least address the insufficiencies.  The sole reason that Plaintiff even submitted an Affidavit of Merit was in an attempt to sufficiently comply with the Affidavit of Merit Statute.  Plaintiff’s Counsel knew that without the medical records from Defendants, it would be impossible for Plaintiff to produce a sufficient Affidavit of Merit.  In circumstances such as the ones presented in this case, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 safeguards a plaintiff from a defendant that is attempting to defeat plaintiff’s meritorious claims by withholding the very records that a plaintiff needs to acquire an Affidavit of Merit and prove their case.
[directive] This does not preclude standard pre- seizure consideration of the asset presented for adoption, nor relieve adopting officials of the duty to verify that does it forfeitable under seized property presented for adoption is federal law and that its seizure was based upon probable cause.  - -.  Circumstances that may make feder3l forfeiture appropriate include, but are not limited to the following:  The pertinent state or local prosecuting official has 1. reviewed the case and has declined to initiate forfeiture proceedings.  January No. Directive 34 2 0 0 0 17, Page of 2 5  State and local law enforcement officials request federal 2 . assistance and state a belief that:  >  A forfeiture action could not be maintained under state law.  > The seized asset poses unique management or disposition problems.  > State laws or procedures will delay the forfeiture and adversely affect the rights of the parties that have an interest in the property, or cause significant diminution in the value of the asset.  > Federal adoption will enhance the scope and objective of the overall criminal investigation.  Requirements for an Adoption
[brief] --- \(^8\) $4.5 million in 2014, $5.6 million in 2016, $8.5 million in 2017, $28 million in 2018 (plus $1.57 million in emergency aid), $36 million in 2019, $55 million in 2020, $71 million requested for 2021 but replaced by federal COVID funding to [...], $24 million in 2022 (supplemented by the balance of federal funds), $50 million certified in 2023 (with another $43 million pending), and $104 million requested, but still pending, for 2024.  \(^9\)  The process requires the Commissioner to submit a certification to the State Treasurer regarding the necessity for such an advance state aid loan, and the State Treasurer must approve.  The Comprehensive Review referred to $215,124,570\textsuperscript{10} of such loans having been extended to [...] in a brief section of the PCG report entitled “District Financial Challenges,” but it never describes the extent of that challenge and its impact on the district, let alone how that “challenge” can be overcome.  Under the governing statute, that district indebtedness is to be repaid within 10 years “through automatic reductions in State aid provided to the school district in subsequent years.
[brief] The [...] moved for summary judgment arguing, among other things, [...]'s conclusions constituted impermissible net opinions, and thus, plaintiffs' claims against them should be dismissed with prejudice.  Defendants [...] and [...] also moved for summary judgment.  Subsequently, the [...] filed another motion for summary judgment arguing that there is no causal connection between their alleged negligence and [...]'s injuries.  Plaintiffs opposed the motions and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of superseding cause.  Oral argument on all motions for summary judgment were heard in November 2018.  At that time, plaintiffs withdrew their opposition to defendants [...] and [...] motions for summary judgment and conceded that the [...] did not breach their duty of care in designing the 2006 plan, since the plan depicted the kettle being shielded by two walls.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ........................................................................................................v-vii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1  RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................................3  STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................4  A. About Defendant [...] ..............................................................................................4  B.  Individuals With Enumerated Criminal Convictions Are Statutorily Disqualified From Working at [...]’s Group Homes.........................................................................................................................5  C.  Plaintiff Lied Multiple Times on Her Employment Application Documents.........................................................................................................................................................................................6  D.  Plaintiff’s Criminal Convictions.......................................................................................7  E.  [...] Would Not Have Hired Plaintiff Had It Been Aware Of Her Criminal Convictions During Application and Would Have Terminated Her Employment As Soon As It Found Out.....................8  F. Plaintiff’s Other Lies........................................................................................................8  G. Plaintiff’s Employment at [...]..................................................................................11  H. Plaintiff’s Deposition Testimony Regarding Her Complaints to [...].........................................................................................................................................................................................15  ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................17
[brief] …  *Riddel*, 18 F.Supp.2d at 472-73.  In the present matter, Appellant has certified that she was never presented with a physical or digital copy of the Arbitration Agreement even after she “acknowledged” it.  (Pa000213).  Appellant was not provided with enough time to review and contemplate whether she would agree or have questions about the Arbitration Agreement because she was simply instructed to quickly click through the company “policies” listed on the employee portal.  See id.  In fact, Respondents instructed Appellant to click through these policies while she was preoccupied and in the waiting room to complete her pre-employment health screening.  See id.  No employee of Respondents ever informed Appellant that the Arbitration Agreement would be a part of the policies and procedures she reviewed, no employee told her an Arbitration Agreement would be part of the onboarding process, and no employee ever informed Plaintiff that a condition of her employment would have been signing the Arbitration Agreement and giving up her right to sue for claims of discrimination before a judge and jury.
[brief] Plaintiff could have brought Defendants into the bankruptcy preference action so that Defendants could have participated in the action and the ultimate settlement perhaps contributing to the same.  Instead, Plaintiff decided to extend a second mortgage to Defendants, while in active litigation with the bankruptcy trustee, and then negotiate the terms of the settlement with the bankruptcy trustee to the exclusion of the Defendants.  Plaintiff chose to voluntarily settle the bankruptcy preference action by paying the trustee $60,000.  Plaintiff negotiated the terms with the trustee to the exclusion of the Defendants.  Plaintiff could have litigated the preference action with the trustee and perhaps been successful, but they chose to settle instead.  They cannot now be permitted to walk back on this decision, upon which Defendants relied.
[brief] It is further ORDERED that [...]’s application for accidental disability retirement benefits be reviewed, processed, and either granted or denied based on its merits and on the factors outlined in N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(a)(1).  On 9/6/22, Respondent submitted a letter of exceptions and on 9/14/22, after being granted a slight extension of time, [...] issued his response to any exceptions.  (Pa131-145).
[brief] It cannot be seriously questioned that equipping multistory apartments buildings with ambulance stretcher accessible elevators is not a legitimate area of concern for a planning board.  It also cannot be seriously doubted that having such elevator would benefit the public health safety and welfare.  The Courts have long recognized that "because of their peculiar knowledge of local conditions," municipal land use boards "must be allowed wide latitude in their delegated discretion."  *Jock v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, Twp. of Wall*, 184 N.J. 562, 597, (2005); accord *Booth v. Bd. of Adjustment of Rockaway Twp.*, 50 N.J. 302, 306, (1967).
[brief] The *Kindred Nursing* decision reaffirmed that the FAA “displaces any rule . . . covertly . . . disfavoring contracts that (oh, so coincidently) have the defining features of arbitration agreements. ”  *Id.* at 1426.  [...]’s concurring opinion in *Kernahan* only serves to highlight the public policy basis for his earlier majority opinion in *Atalese*, by focusing predominantly on the *adhesional* nature of contracts for *needed* goods and services as warranting an express waiver of the right to seek relief in a court of law.  *Kernahan*, 236 N.J. at 327.  But the parties’ agreement here does not fall within that category of contracts, and therefore, should not be subject to disfavored treatment.
[brief] Specifically, the Court held that “we find no support in CEPA’s language, construction or application in this Court’s case law that supports that watchdog employees are stripped of whistleblower protection as a result of their position or because they are performing their regular job duties”.  *Id.* at 387.  The Court also specifically rejected any ‘exhaustion of remedies’ requirement as not supported by CEPA’s statutory language and held that “CEPA imposes no additional requirements on watchdog employees bringing a CEPA claim”.  *Id.* at 388.  In interpreting the specific language of N.J.S.A. 34:19-3, which requires that a plaintiff proceeding under subsection [c] have “objected to” or “refused to participate in” what the plaintiff reasonably believes to be illegal conduct, our Supreme Court in *Lippman* reasoned that: [1] there is no language in subsection [c] “that hints that an employee’s job duties affect whether he or she may bring a CEPA action; & [2] the statutory language “implies that CEPA-protected conduct can occur within the course of an employee’s normal job duties”.
[brief] (383a-402a).  The April 3, 2023 Order specifically made findings with respect to two issues raised by Appellants but reserved a final decision pending “further motion practice or a plenary hearing. ” (20a-23a).  Those reserved issues were: ¹ References to the April 3, 2023 Transcript are referred to herein as 1T 3/17/23.  (i) whether the Final Judgment was void, under 4:50-1(d), as being based upon the utilization of the expedited foreclosure procedure only available on a determination of the property’s abandonment, which [...] had earlier supplied in reliance upon the Plaintiff’s expert report which attached pictures of a different property.  Thus, [...] opened discovery to investigate the propriety of the abandonment determination (20a-23a); and (ii) whether the Final Judgment was avoidable under 4:50-1(f), for “any other reason justifying relief. ”  (20a-23a).  The April 3, 2023 Order allowed ninety (90) days of discovery before the parties were to return “for further motion practice or a plenary hearing.
[brief] Defendant [...] is a medical doctor who had the benefit of attending seminars which provided him with updated versions of his arbitration form over the years.  Meanwhile, Plaintiff’s decedent [...] was functionally illiterate.  She would have reasonably assumed that her doctor had her best interest in mind, and she likely would have signed any number of forms provided to her by his office.  As to the fourth Rudbart factor, the public has a strong interest in physician-patient communication over the waiver of constitutional rights.
[brief] [...] more than “adequately explain[ed]” the “bas[es] for doing so” (Db54) – clearly, cogently and succinctly at that – in his Order on Remand and Final Judgment.  The fact that neither [...], nor this Court, made any findings or ruling regarding compound interest (Db58) is not surprising or relevant.  As [...] conceded, the parties stipulated after trial, based upon their forensic accountants’ recommendation, to prejudgment interest at the equity rate of 8.875%, compounded.  Thus, [...] and [...] are inapposite.30  The Wilfs’ further assertion  28  The Wilfs do not challenge this determination on appeal.  29  In Devli, the Court awarded prejudgment interest at 4.5%.  30  These cases are also distinguishable on the ground that neither involved claims for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, RICO or tort claims. that “compound interest … is not compensatory” is refuted by the legal authority upon which they rely on this appeal.
[brief] POINT II THE LAND EXCHANGE CONTRACT IS LEGALLY SOUND AND FURTHERS THE PUBLIC INTEREST.................................................................18  POINT III THE TOWNSHIP HAS COMPLIED WITH ALL PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR EMINENT  DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS.........................................................................................24  POINT IV APPELLANT’S APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED BASED UPON THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL.................................................................28  POINT V THE TOWNSHIP’S OBLIGATION TO FULFILL ITS CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS WITH [...]  NECESSITATES THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ORDINANCE.  ...........................................................................................................35  POINT VI  THE TOWNSHIP SHOULD NOT BE PROHIBITED FROM CONTINUING TO HONOR ITS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS WITH [...]........................................36  CONCLUSION  ..................................................................................................................................................37
[brief] Schiavo v. Marina District Develop. Co., LLC 442 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 2015)  26 Schneider v. Simonini 163 N.J. 336 (2000)  12 State v. Perini Corp. 221 N.J. 412 (2015)  30 St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks 509 U.S. 502 (1993)  33  Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist. 184 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 1999)  29 Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine 450 U.S. 248 (1981)  33  Valdivia v. Paducah Ctr. For Health & Rehab. 507 F. Supp. 3d 805 (W.D. Ky. 2020)  18  Victor v. State 203 N.J. 383 (2010)  29 Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co. 173 N.J. 1 (2002)  33  Warner v. United Nat.  Foods, Inc.  513 F. Supp. 3d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2021)  18, 19  Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc. 182 N.J. 436 (2005)  33 Rules N.J. Court R. 4:46-2(c)  12  Other Authorities  N.J. Exec. Order No. 102  N.J. Exec. Order No. 103  N.J. Exec. Order No. 104  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] (Da9-Da11).  On July 29, 2024, [...] filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the court’s July 8, 2024 Order.  (Da211-Da212).  On October 4, 2024, the court below denied the motion for reasons stated on the record and filed an Order consistent therewith.  (Da12-Da13; 2T).  In its oral decision, the court recognized there were no cases on point that address condemnation of a property that is subject to a builder’s remedy lawsuit in a municipality that is not constitutionally compliant.
[brief] The Court reasoned and/or rationalized that there was not and/or that the Court did not see any impact upon the [...] or any impact of consequence.  THE COURT:  …  You filed your claim.  The only pocket of money that might have to answer and actually pay your client is if there was a policy of insurance that was in play – that was present at the time that would cover for the injury that your client sustained and if that exists, that contract of insurance, it can’t go away.
[brief] (RAISED BELOW: ORDERED AND DECISION (Da60; Da80-82)  The Court below found that Ordinance No. 17-2017 was void because the Borough and its Board of Health “are subject to the jurisdiction of the [...] in matters of public health, and the [...] already adopted an ordinance addressing noise nuisance, which preempts Ordinance No. 17-2017 adopted by Defendants on the same subject.  N.J.S.A. 26:3-92-93. ”  Da80.  The Court further held that: even if [...]’s Model Nuisance Ordinance did not preempt Defendants’ ordinance under N.J.S.A. 26:3-92, 93, [...] is part of a comprehensive statutory and administrative framework to furnish Public Health Services, thus the ordinance adopted by [...] is under a specific grant of authority which preempts Defendant Borough’s general grant of authority under the Home Rule Act.  [Ibid.]  Before reviewing these alternate bases for finding the ordinance preempted, a review of when municipal action is preempted by state action is in order.
[brief] Significantly, this court has stated: “It is clear . . . that the IFPA is aimed primarily at the areas of automobile and health insurance, where fraud has been most rampant. ”  *Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Bryan*, 388 N.J. Super. 550, 558 (App. Div. 2006).  As a key element to further that public policy, the IFPA grants insurers a private right of action:  “Any insurance company damaged as the result of a violation of any provision of this act may sue therefor in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover compensatory damages, which shall include reasonable investigation expenses, costs of suit and attorneys fees. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a).  An insurer “shall recover treble damages if the court determines that the defendant has engaged in a pattern of violating” the IFPA’s substantive provisions.
[brief] ”  Crespo v. Crespo, 395 N.J. Super. 190, 193-94 (App. Div. 2007) (citing Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484).  II.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT [...]’S MOLD EXCLUSIONS  BAR COVERAGE FOR CHENAULT’S MOLD INJURIES  The Mold Exclusions in the Zurich Policies are unambiguous and bar coverage for [...]’s mold-caused injuries.
[directive] Arson 3rd Degree $10,000 to $35,000  10% permissible damage or destruction, or for the purpose of collecting insurance for the destruction to such property.  Actor directly or indirectly pays or accepts or offers to pay or accept any form of consideration including, but not limited to, money or any other pecuniary benefit, regardless of whether any 2C:17-1d(1-3)  Aggravated Arson 1st Degree $100,000 to $250,000  No 10% consideration is actually exchanged, for the purpose of starting a fire or causing an explosion, in violation of this section.  35
[brief] At the time of the MOU, it was over $37 million.  (Da32-33).  For Appellants to expect to be paid $45 million in cash in addition to receiving the benefit of [...]’ assumption of [...]’ liabilities would be to expect a double payment.  This would be an example of the absurdity alleged.  Appellants finally complain about the result created by their guaranty agreement with [...], [...]’ major lender, to argue that they are placed in an unfair position.  The result of those contracts is entirely irrelevant to the enforceability of the MOU.  Appellants made their bargain in the MOU with full knowledge of the guaranty agreements they entered prior.  If Appellants wanted further protections relating to those contracts, they could have sought them during negotiations.  [...] cannot be held accountable for contracts to which they are not a party and which Appellants themselves freely chose to enter.  VI.
[brief] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 5 | | A. Contract Scope of Work Description | 5 | | B. Bid Process for Redecking Project | 7 | | C. The Decision Below | 13 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 16 | | A. Standard of Review | 18 | | B.
[brief] A court may enlarge the time for filing based upon other equitable considerations.  Id.  In this regard, the Appellate Division has observed:  A determination of whether the interest of justice requires a relaxation of the time limit involves, in any case, a consideration of the potential impact upon the municipality if the matter proceeds as well as a consideration of the impact upon the plaintiff if the claim to relief is barred.  It is also appropriate to look to the previous actions or inactions of the plaintiff; if it sat idly by in the past, its entitlement to the enlargement of the time limit is weakened.  Southport Development Group, Inc. v. Township of Wall, 310 N.J. Super. 548, 556 (App. Div. 1998) (citing County of Ocean v. Zekaria Realty, Inc., 271 N.J. Super. 280, 288 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1000 (1994)).  New Jersey decisional law includes many cases in which the courts have relaxed R. 4:69-6, including matters where the initial 45 days have long since expired.