ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] There was no blood visible until his body was rolled over.  (18T:10-19 to 20; 12-22 to 4; 38-19 to 39-24).  In Moon, the gunshot to the head was very obviously bloody as it blew a hole through his skull.  396 N.J. Super at 113.  Moreover, mucous was leaking from [...]’ mouth and nose as well when he was rolled over.  (18T:38-22 to 39-4).  Additionally, defendant admitted that he knew he should have called 911 sooner, and had aimed “low” to avoid a fatal shot.  (21T:172-4 to 178-18, 185-13 to 22; 192-15 to 21).  Regardless, defendant also admitted to watching baseball after shooting [...], and stated that his compassion was gone as he felt he had been “violated. ” (21T:131-16 to 140-4, 196-18 to 197-13).  Defendant obviously caused bodily injury to [...] by shooting him in the body twice.  Secondly, the gunshot wounds rendered [...] physically helpless; he was unable to flee or call for help and inevitably lost consciousness, but did not die in the same moment he was shot as the victim did in Moon.  Thirdly, defendant must have reasonably believed [...] was physically helpless, given the respective locations of the gunshot wounds, his claim to aim “low,” and his statement that he knew he should have called for help.  With all elements of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a) satisfied by defendant’s conduct, it certainly did not violate defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process to convict him of the offense.
[brief] As a result of the court's ruling, the State played the entire one-hour-long statement during [...]'s testimony in the State's case-in-chief on October 22, 2021, seventeen days after [...] had testified on October 5, 2021 (24T144-24 to 24T186-23).  At the time the video was played, the court did not provide the jury with any instructions how to consider it as evidence (24T186-21 to 24T188-21).  During the jury charge, the court instructed the jury only on prior "inconsistent" statements (26T109-19 to 26T110-23).  At the jury's request, the video of [...]'s police statement was played again during deliberations, back-to-back with a playback of his trial testimony (29T4-20 to 29T5-10).
[brief] ” (Aa2).  On March 6, 2023, the Commission requested clarification from the ALJ as to whether the [...] matter was fully resolved — that is, whether the February 27, 2023 order constituted an initial decision that may be reviewed by the Commission.  (Aa187).  After conducting a conference call with the parties, the ALJ issued an initial decision on April 27, 2023, adopting and incorporating “[t]he factual discussion and findings of fact pertaining to th[e] [[...]] matter delineated in the Order on Summary Decision” and, once again, concluding that reprimand was the appropriate penalty.  (Aa187-189).  After the parties filed exceptions, the Commission issued its decision on July 25, 2023, adopting the ALJ’s findings of fact and legal conclusions that [...] violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b), and -24.1(e) and (f), and also agreeing with the ALJ that [...] did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(c).
[brief] The divisibility of the CCIP policies according to each “Named Insured” subcontractor establishes that each subcontractor constitutes its own separate “risk” under the [...] liability policies.  The particular “risk” at issue in this instance is [...], which only has one “location” in a single state – New Jersey.  “[W]e are convinced ‘multi-state location risks’ does not apply to a New Jersey corporation … with its sole office location in New Jersey, irrespective of whether the performance of its operations may extend beyond New Jersey borders. ”  *Nova Dev. Grp., Inc. v. J.J. Farber-Lottman Co.*, No. A-5531-08T2, 2010 WL 4117113, at *2 (App. Div. 2010) (Dtsa1.)  [...]’s claim that the regulation is inapplicable because of an “inseparable workers’ compensation element” (Zb38) again ignores the law.  First, [...]’s “liability” policies are not “workers compensation insurance. ”  Second, *N.J.S.A. 11:1-20. 1(a)* is inapplicable to “workers compensation insurance” because such insurance is governed by its own cancellation statute, *N.J.S.A. 34:15-81.*
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This appeal should be granted because the trial court made numerous material errors of law and rulings that were not supported by the evidential record, requiring the reversal of the final judgment (the “Judgment”) entered against defendant, [...] (“Defendant”).  In this case, plaintiffs alleged that the defendants fraudulently induced them to sell their respective ownership interests in [...] and [...] for approximately $6.3M, by fraudulently manipulating the companies’ books and records, which, in turn, caused plaintiffs to sell their interests for a lower price than would have been warranted had the books and records been accurate.  Notwithstanding the fact that the entire premise of plaintiffs’ fanciful fraud claim collapsed like a house of cards and was dismissed, the court shockingly entered Judgment against the defendants on the remaining counts of plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (i.e. conversion, breach of contract etc.)
[brief] A digital recorder was located in the basement of [...], that contained surveillance camera recordings for the building.  This video recording appeared to connect a 2017 red Hyundai Elantra to the setting of the fire.  Additionally found at the back of [...] was a broken glass bottle and broken glass shards from a back room.  [...] of the Crime Scene Unit of the [...] also responded to the scene of this fire at approximately 12:25 a.m., because arson was suspected.
[brief] Most of defendants' proofs are in the form of declarations by defendant's Grand Sheik [...] (see certification, Pa138 to Pa146).  If he has evidence that "Plaintiff has also used the Defendant’s organization’s federal tax identification number" (Db14 (citing Pa141)), he should produce or at least identify that evidence.  The record is devoid of such proof.  Defendants admit that plaintiff paid property expenses, but they claim they need "supporting documentation" (Db14).  Any discovery matter can be resolved following the remand of this case -- where there are clearly genuine disputed issues of fact.
[brief] In this case there was no written policy issued to [...] related to the vans, only a Certificate of Coverage.  Courts should construe insurance policies against the insurer, consistent with the reasonable expectations of insureds, when those policies are overly complicated, unclear, or written as a trap for the unguarded consumer.  Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Insurance Co., 34 N.J. 475 (1961).  B.
[brief] Principles of equity, fairness, and full indemnity, which underlie the constitutional mandate of just compensation, require that the owner be made financially whole as a consequence of plaintiff’s mistake and plaintiff having been allowed to amend its description of the taking.  Rule 1:1-2 provides that the rules are to be construed to secure a just determination and to eliminate unjustifiable expense.  Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint had been granted “in the interest of justice. ”  R. 4:9-1.  The interest of justice, however, should have been balanced with reimbursement of the owner’s costs of his expert reports.  Making the property owner pay for the “mistake” made by the government is clearly wrong and violates the constitutional principle that a property owner is entitled to indemnity and to be made financially whole as a result of the taking.  By order entered on January 8, 2021, the court denied the owner’s motion for his expert fees, without prejudice, on the basis that the owner had not cited a Court Rule, case law or legal basis for the relief requested.  In addition to principles of fairness and equity, the owner had cited N.J.S.A. 20:3-35, which provides for expert fees upon a condemnor’s abandonment of a taking, and N.J.S.A. 20:3-26 (b) which provides for expert fees when a condemnor does not have the right to condemn.  (Da112-114; Da149-153)  By way of analogy, plaintiff’s amendment corresponds to an abandonment of the description in the declaration of taking as well as to the position that plaintiff did not have the right to condemn the taking as originally described.  The owner did provide sufficient legal basis for reimbursement of his expert costs.  Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the court below erred in denying the owner’s motion for reimbursement of his expert fees incurred prior to the plaintiff’s amendment.
[brief] The cases dealing with similar theories of liability advanced by employees against their employers have consistently rejected these claims, even in the face of evidence of violations of safety standards, failing to utilize spotters, serious OSHA citations, and fatal accidents.  Van Dunk, 210 N.J. at 452 (holding that a finding of gross negligence, or even recklessness, fails to satisfy the standard of an intentional wrong); Millison, 101 N.J. at 179 (1985) (“the mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk—even the strong probability of a risk—will come up short of the “substantial certainty” needed to find an intentional wrong”); Pa428, Jarosz, 2013 WL 5268926, at *6 (finding that the knowing failure to take safety precautions may be an “exceptional wrong,” but it is “not the type of egregious conduct associated with an intentional wrong”); see also Pa421a, Bergen, 2009 WL 222943, at *7 (finding intentional wrong standard not satisfied where company conduct was likely reckless and company admitted to the negligence of its driver).
[brief] Correspondingly, Grand Entertainment Group, Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476 (3d Cir.1993) (citing 4A Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1083 (1987) holds; “Although Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 is to be construed liberally, the Plaintiff MUST demonstrate that the legal requirements set forth in the Rule have been fulfilled.  Defense counsel represented that [...] had NOT been served at all, and therefore had NOT RESPONDED to the Complaint” (This instance case PRECISELY mirrors this defendant’s case for: “TO” respond, it is only reasonable one **must have** been first notified as in the case of [...] to which no such evidence is **present** that Service of Process was executed properly to this defendant in 1990).  The Third Circuit Court ruled from **evidence** presented by the defendant’s counsel in **favor of the defense** ([...] Inc.) as the Plaintiff “FAILED” to prove **validity of service** (Plaintiff [...] before this court **mirrored** that of Plaintiff [...] as she FAILED TO PROVE validity of service by **NOT** responding to claims of jurisdictional challenge i.e. Service of Process) (Pa1).  The Third Circuit has consistently demonstrated validity of service **must be proven** by the party **claiming** validity of service as the plaintiff in this case **clearly failed** to **respond** to this defendant’s **direct challenge to validity of service and/or** to **DISPUTE ANY** claims **asserted** by this defendant (Pa6; Pa10; Pa21; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa41).
[brief] [...]  ROBERT CARTER PIERCE  Attorney for Defendant-Appellant  Dated: March 10, 2024  [...] – No. 279742018  Assistant Prosecutor Appellate Section Of Counsel and on the Brief  May 29, 2024  LETTER IN LIEU OF BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Re: State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...]  (Defendant-Appellant)  Docket No. [...]  Criminal Action: On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction, entered in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a Jury
[directive] Directive #19-19 - "Guidelines for Extreme Risk Protective Orders" August 12, 2019 Page 5 (9) has recklessly used, displayed, or brandished a firearm; or (10) has existing previous extreme risk protective order issued against him or an her; (11) has previously violated an extreme risk protective order issued against him or her.  or (12) has any prior involuntary commitment a hospital treatment facility for in persons with psychiatric disabilities; (13) has received or is receiving mental health treatment; (14) has complied or has failed to comply with any mental health treatment; and of (15) has received a diagnosis a mental health disorder.  It is important to note that the Act lists eight factors for the court to consider when making the determination for extreme risk protective order.  These are the first eight factors listed above an and in Guideline 3(d).  However, because N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(f) contains non-exclusive language regarding the information to be submitted to the court by the prosecutor or designee ("including, but not limited to ... and N.J.S.A. 2C:58-24 requires the court to consider the eight factors as "), well as "any other relevant evidence" for the final extreme risk protective order, Guideline 3(d) includes additional factors (factors 9 through 11) to provide guidance both to prosecutors (as to the information to be provided to the court) and to the court.
[brief] On March 29, 2019 at approximately 2:26 pm plaintiffs [...] & [...] were driving their vehicle (2017 Toyota Camry) on Rt.27 Southboud.  At or about the same time, Defendant [...] was driving her vehicle making a right turn on Rt.27 from the parking lot of 4951.  Defendant's vehicle struck Plaintiff's vehicle.  The police report (page 40) shows that Defendant was found responsible for the crash because plaintiff has right away of traffic.  Plaintiff's vehicle was totaled as a result collision.  Plaintiffs suffered permanent injuries as result of collision.  The report by [...], DC, who confirmed the performance of the plaintiffs' injuries.  Plaintiffs keep seeing the doctor for the treatment and every period of time, the progressive insurance company will give the plaintiffs some treatment opinions through IME.  (page 44)  Plaintiffs can not got a full-time work as a result of collision because it is necessary to visit the doctor two to three times a week.(page 61, page 45, page 175, page 209, page 226)  Plaintiffs can not take care of their two daughter and can not live a good married life as a result of collision .Because of the financial problems and Physical discomfort it brings.
[brief] The State’s skepticism about the believability of the facts of that would need to be found to support a manslaughter conviction turns the inquiry about whether to charge the offense on its head.  There is a basis in this record on which a reasonable jury could find that there was a provocation that inflamed [...].  In *Blanks*, this Court held that a passion/provocation instruction should have been given, although it was not requested, because the defendant testified that the “victim’s attitude towards him was belligerent,” that the victim punched him, and a fork found near the victim’s body “suggest[ed] that the victim may have brandished the fork and further provoked the defendant.
[brief] A fifteen (15) year career hangs in the balance in this matter.  An objective, impartial weighing of the evidence in this matter leaves no room for any conclusion other than the one that [...] was truthful throughout these proceedings.  Even if mistakes were made, given his virtually unblemished record, a penalty must be reversed.  Progressive discipline is better served with remedial training with a defined suspension.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  By: ____________________________  [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  [...], Appellant, v. [...], Respondent.
[brief] Next, the determination is whether the actions were severe or pervasive enough for a reasonable person of the same protected class to believe that the conditions of employment are altered, and the working environment is hostile or abusive.  The lower court determined that “Although Defendant [...]’s conduct was a single isolated event, a reasonable factfinder could determine that the comment made in a particularly sensitive time, the COVID-19 pandemic, was severe and pervasive enough to be considered a rare and extreme case contemplated by the Supreme Court in Lehmann. ”  (Pa 264)  Taylor v. Metzger is directly on point as to when these elements are satisfied by one single but particularly severe incident of a high-level defendant supervisor harassing a lower-level Plaintiff in an overtly racial manner.  The central issue in Taylor was whether a single derogatory racial comment directed against a subordinate by a supervisor could create a hostile work environment under the LAD.
[brief] Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47, 63 (2d Cir. 1988), where the court found that the term as used in a statute prohibiting a bank from affiliating with an entity “engaged principally” in underwriting or securities is “intrinsically ambiguous. ”  The Court should analyze these terms as used in the Limited Attorney Exemption in the Act – a statute that [...] cannot even understand or interpret.
[brief] Da24-25.  Defendant [...] purported to respond to Plaintiffs’ requests on September 29, 2023. Da309-330, 331-348.  Upon review of the responses, however, it became apparent that Ms. [...] had not responded to the discovery requests that were directed to her, but rather, to the discovery requests that had been directed to Rocco [...], who was dismissed from the case without prejudice on September 8, 2023.  See id.  Though similar, the requests differed in that the requests directed to Defendant [...] requested information relating to her role as property manager, her communications with tenants and/or the superintendent regarding issues with the Property, and attempts to remediate issues with the Property.  Da371-72.  On October 6, 2023, Plaintiffs served a deficiency letter detailing Defendant [...]’s deficiencies in failing to respond to the correct discovery requests.
[directive] JERSEY FOR SYSTEM COURSES  2005,  On August Acting [...] entered an Executive Order 5, preserve implementing the National Incident Management System (NIMS).  In order to the State's eligibility for federal preparedness assistance, Acting [...]'s Executive Order requires all State Department Agencies to take certain steps to implement and NIMS.  President has required that federal departments and agencies [...] all require State local institutionalization of the NlMS a prerequisite to federal as and NIMS preparedness assistance.
[brief] The statute itself confirms the Commissioner’s jurisdiction over the Counterclaim.  (Argued at Pa365 – Pa366)  Title 18A contains the education / school law statutes under the Commissioner’s jurisdiction.  *N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9* is organized under the *Comprehensive Education Improvement and Financing Act*, which are the 18A statutes with the “7F” designation.  These 7F statutes govern school funding and budget matters, and certainly fall within the purview of the Commissioner’s jurisdiction.  The beginning of the statute at issue confirms the Commissioner’s jurisdiction in the enforcement and violations of *N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)*.  As per *N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(a)*:  In order to receive any State aid…a school district…shall comply with the rules and standards for the equalization of opportunity…and shall further comply with any directive issued by the commissioner…The commissioner is hereby authorized to withhold all or part of a district’s State aid for failure to comply with any rule, standard or directive.  (emphasis supplied)  The Legislature thus expressly authorized the Commissioner of Education (not Superior Court, Law Division) to enforce compliance with *N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9*.  In carrying out that authority, the Commissioner of Education (not Superior Court) is authorized to withhold State funding for school districts who are not compliant.  The original statute under *N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9*, which confirms the Commissioner’s authority to withhold State aid for lack of compliance, became effective in December 1996.  At no time was there a subsequent amendment that granted those powers in the Superior Court, Law Division.  The statute that [...]’s Counterclaim and summary judgment rely upon does not have general application to all persons, such as civil rights statutes.  Instead, the 18A statute is specific and applicable only to school districts, so it no doubt arises under the school laws for which the Commissioner of Education retains jurisdiction.
[brief] I, ¶ 1 | 10, 20, 29, 46, 51 | | N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 9 | 10, 20, 29, 46, 51 | | N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 10| 10, 20, 29, 46, 51 | | U.S. Const. amend. V | 10, 20, 29, 46, 51 | | U.S. Const. amend. VI | 10, 20, 29, 46, 51 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV | 10, 20, 29, 46, 51 | | OTHER AUTHORITIES | PAGE NOS. | |------------------|-----------| | Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Evidence of Mental Disease or Defect (N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2)” (rev. June 5, 2006) | 24 | | Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Unlawful Possession of a Handgun (Second Degree) (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b)” (rev. June 11, 2018) | 46 | | Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Unlawful Possession of a Weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d)” (rev. Apr. 18, 2018) | 46 | PROCEDURAL HISTORY On July 30, 2018, [...] was filed, charging defendant-appellant, [...], with: first-degree murder under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and/or (2) (Count One); second-degree possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (Count Two); two counts of second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (Counts Three and Four); and two counts of third-degree endangering another person under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-7.1 (Counts Five and Six).
[directive] Freedom of speech is a foundational American principle.  Fidelity to this right--embodied in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and in the New Jersey Constitution-has distinguished our country throughout its history.  Free speech protections have always intersected with many aspects of everyday life, including the role of law enforcement, but increasingly so with modem advances in communication technology.  In particular, given widespread ownership of smartphones over the past decade, civilian recordings of police activity are now routine.  The First Amendment's protection of an individual's right to record "police officers conducting their official duties in public" is well-recognized.  Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 355 (3d Cir. 2017).  In order to continue building better relationships between communities and police, this Directive is necessary to ensure that the First Amendment's bounds are as clear as possible-to both civilians and law enforcement alike-with respect to the right to observe, object to, and record police activity.
[brief] As for the PLA, in terms of post-sale duties, the statute created a limited post-sale duty to warn and went no further.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-4 (product manufacturer “shall not be liable” if it “provides an adequate warning or instruction” about “dangers [it] discovers or reasonably should discover after the product leaves its control”).  No precedent supports plaintiff’s attempt to transform that limited duty into a broad recall obligation by alleging, as a “warning,” everything that formed the basis for the FDA’s eventual recall.  As in Sinclair, such an expansion of liability lies with “the Legislature,” not the judiciary.
[brief] First, [...] does not speak English.  (Pa168.)  This factor supports recording the exam for two reasons: first, in order to verify that the translator properly translates the exam; second, because [...]’s only basis for prohibiting the limitation is the ABN Policy Statement that states it is a deviation from the Statement to permit any third-party observation, even an interpreter.  (Pa244); Lewandowski, 23 Applied Neuropsych. 396, 397.  As [...] noted, there is no difference between letting the interpreter observe and translate and permitting an unobtrusive recording.  DiFiore, 254 N.J. at 239.  Next, the very reason for the examination is to assess [...]’s cognitive limitations, including his forgetfulness and impaired memory.