ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa972.)  [...] then emailed [...] on July 21, 2015, asking for an update on the revised proposal (Pa2291) and providing [...] with CCIP paperwork based on the anticipation – at the time – that [...] would enroll.  (Pa2129.)  The CCIP paperwork included “Schedule ‘A’ to the C. [...] Contractors Subcontract” which described the CCIP and Insurance Requirements for the Project (also identified as Attachment 3, Amendment to the [...] Subcontract with [...], referred herein as the “CCIP Contract”), CCIP Insurance Procedures Manual (“CCIP Manual”) and other forms for enrollment in the CCIP.
[brief] On July 13, 2022, a Bergen County grand jury returned Indictment Number [...], charging defendant, [...], with count one, third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), methamphetamine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); count two, fourth-degree possession of a false government document, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-2.1(d); count three, second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); count four, fourth-degree possession of a defaced firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(d); and count five, second-degree possession of a firearm by a certain person, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1).
[brief] ”  [...] alleges that after comparing [...]’s privilege log and production to that of [...], to whom it sent “overlap[ing]” discovery requests, it found several deficiencies with [...]’s representations that it searched for and identified all responsive documents.  [...] further contends that there are approximately 39 documents that [...] has failed to produce or include on its privilege log that [...] believes are responsive to its discovery requests.  [...] also alleges that these omissions and [...]’s lack of cooperation call into question [...]’s entire document collection, search and review procedures.  8.
[brief] (Aa151) (Aa167-174)  (Aa183)  Within three months from entry of the final judgment, Defendant continued to press its desire, intention and financially ability to redeem.  The last attempt to redeem which Plaintiff rejected on April 4, 2023, the Plaintiff was informed will cause Defendant to file a motion to vacate.  Plaintiff, then concluded its sale of the Premises to [...]. on April 21, 2023, the same day Defendant filed the motion to vacate the judgment.  The bona fide purchaser claimed status, nor the Plaintiff contention that the final judgment, statutorily, precluded a post judgment redemption, ignores the equities in favor of the Defendant.  In this appeal the same questions at the trial level are asked:
[brief] The notice must give “an accurate description of what the property will be used for under the application. ”  *Northgate Condo. Ass’n v. Borough of Hillsdale Planning Bd.*, 214 N.J. 120, 139-40 (2013)(quoting *Perlmart of Lacey, Inc. v. Lacey Twp. Planning Bd.*, 295 N.J. Super. 234, 238 (App. Div. 1996)).  The word “use” never appears in the Notice.  The term “garage” never appears in the Notice.  The Notice also make reference to an “existing accessory structure larger than the principal use on their property. ”  Pa31 and 32.  This statement certainly implies that the “existing structure” was previously approved by the Township, when in fact it had not.  The Notices do not tell the public what the nature and use of the “existing structure” is or what it will be used for.  The Notices do not provide any such information.  The Respondents make an argument which is a non sequitur as it applies to the defective notice in the matter before this Court.  Whether the application and corresponding notice were expressed in terms of an expansion of a preexisting nonconforming use, or a new, non-allowed use, is immaterial to the adequacy of the notice.
[brief] (Da2154)  [...]’s counsel asked the Arbitrator for a 45-day postponement.  (Ibid.)  He cited several legitimate reasons for it, including that: (a) [...] had earlier secured different counsel who agreed to accept his case but who then suddenly withdrew; (b) [...]’s ex-wife had suffered a stroke requiring him to care for their kids; and (c) [...]’s increased child care obligation also hindered his time and ability to continue to find counsel for him and the minor children.  (Ibid.)  Another reason for the request for a 45-day postponement was the obvious volume of the Plaintiffs’ submissions and arguments, the 8-year history of the case and a need to ‘get up to speed’ with wide-ranging facts and legalities.  Plaintiffs’ motion to confirm the Final Award contained 75 exhibits and almost 1,000 Pages.  (Da1380-2223)  Their motion for final relief to the Arbitrator was just as voluminous.  However, [...]’s counsel confirmed that, if given the 45-day extension, he could prepare and file opposition.
[directive] you are not waiving  Do you understand that by pleading your right to appeal (1) the denial of a motion to suppress physical evidence (R. 3:5-7(d)) or (2) the denial of acceptance into a pretrial intervention program (PTI) (R. 3:28(g))?  você está renunciando e.  Você entende também que ao se declarar culpado ao direito de [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] recorrer da negação de todas as outras petições anteriores ao julgamento, exceto das seguintes: you are waiving
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING [...]’ MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT ON PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS FOR NEGLIGENT TRAINING AND SUPERVISION (9T 109:12 – 130:18)  A.  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS DE NOVO  B.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE FROM WHICH A REASONABLE JUROR COULD CONCLUDE THAT [...] POSSESSED ANY ATTRIBUTE THAT POSED A RISK OF HARM TO CUSTOMERS  C. THE TRIAL COURT'S REASONING WAS FLAWED BECAUSE IT ASSUMED THERE WAS EVIDENCE [...] WAS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO CUSTOMERS  D.  LOWE'S CROSS-APPEAL IS DISPOSITIVE  II.
[brief] Of course, as is seen in the Model Jury Charges, the immunity afforded to residential property owners for the condition of an adjoining sidewalk is not absolute.  Instead, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that “[r]esidential homeowners can safely rely on the fact that they will not be liable unless they create or exacerbate a dangerous condition. ”  Luchejko, supra, 207 N.J. at 210.  In this regard, the abutting landowner is liable for faulty or dangerous construction of a sidewalk if either he or his predecessors in title built the sidewalk.  Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., supra, 87 N.J. at 152.  Similarly, the owner is also liable for improper or negligent repair of the sidewalk.  Ibid.  Likewise, if the sidewalk is rendered unsafe by the abutting owner’s “special use” or his “improper use” of it, the owner will be liable.  Ibid.  Finally, an abutting owner may be liable for injuries arising from an “invasion of the public easement for the owner’s benefit by the erection and use of devices located over and above the sidewalk” that creates “a dangerous condition in the public easement. ”  Id. at 152-153.  Important for purposes of this appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court has also made it transparently clear that residential property owner/public sidewalk immunity applies in cases involving snow and ice on a public sidewalk.
[brief] ”  See State v. Hedgespeth, 464 N.J. Super. 421, 431, (App. Div. 2020), rev’d on other grounds, 249 N.J. 234 (2021) (quoting State v. R.J.M., 453 N.J. Super. 261, 266-67 (App. Div. 2018)) (internal quotations omitted).  Under Rule 609(b)(1), a prior conviction is presumptively inadmissible if more than ten years have passed since either (1) the date of conviction, or (2) the date of release from confinement, whichever is later.
[brief] The notice shall state the time and place for taking the deposition, which shall be reasonably convenient for all parties, and the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known a general description sufficient to identify the person or the particular class or group to which the person belongs.  If a defendant fails to appear or answer in any civil action within the time prescribed by these rules, depositions may be taken without notice to that defendant.  *R. 4:14-2(a).*  Rule 4:14-2(a), therefore, does not demonstrate any basis for a finding that the trial court erred by precluding Plaintiff’s attempt to compel non-party [...]’s deposition by serving a deposition notice on the [...].
[brief] Id. at 408.  The reason why this extra showing—beyond rote recitation of the rate of the firm to be compensated—is required in supporting the lodestar is not difficult to ascertain.  Were this not the case courts would simply affirm the lodestar, ipse dixit, every single time it is asked for in the exact amount it is asked for in every case as long as the firm to be compensated attests that it is charging what it always charges.  That sort of rubber-stamping would not be at all consistent with the judicial role.  See, eg. State v. Arroyo-Nunez, 470 N.J. Super. 351, 380 (App. Div. 2022) (“It is evident from our discussion that regardless of the particular context, any determination of good cause demands the court's considered judgment, not some rubber stamp. ”).  Accordingly, Landlord’s failure to provide any evidence as to the prevailing community market rate is all the court needed to deny the fee application in its entirety under step two.  Ibid.  That the court opted instead to insert its own experience and perspective\(^7\) where the Landlord’s proofs were lacking did not constitute a misapplication of the court’s discretion.  \(^7\)  Contrary to Landlord’s position there exists no bright-line prohibition in New Jersey against a court considering attorneys’ hourly rates in other cases (Pb59).  What was objectionable in Siegelstein was the trial court’s reliance on “personal CONCLUSION  For the above reasons, paragraph one (1) of the trial court’s 2021 order must be vacated, the entirety of the 2023 order must be vacated, and the matter must be remanded to fix the amount of Tenant’s Allowance and determine what effect the remand should have on attorneys’ fees under § 17.06 of the Lease.
[brief] Bow & Arrow Manor v. West Orange, 63 N.J. 335 (1973)..........................1, 5 Bryant v. City of Atlantic City, 309 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 1997)...........11  Cohen v. Borough of Rumson, 396 N.J. Super. 608 (App. Div. 2007)...........8
[brief] (4T 129-22 to 130-6).  One spent shell casing was recovered with the Glock.  (4T 134-18 to 22).  Of the officers' guns, only [...]'s was missing rounds from the usual 13 that are in such weapons; his gun contained only 11 rounds.  (4T 138-16 to 143-25).  [...] tried to get fingerprints from the Glock and, more generally from the scene, but was unsuccessful.  (4T 148-23 to 156-1).  However, he found two shell casings near cars, and a bullet fragment at the scene.  (4T 152-2 to 155-16; 4T 168-8 to 15; 5T 30-12 to 18).  The detective also recovered, from the floor of the store, an "extended magazine" built to hold 31 rounds, but it only contained 17, (4T 175-23 to 24).  That magazine fits the Glock that was seized, he testified, but it hangs off the bottom of the gun because it is not the magazine that came with the weapon.  (4T 175-23 to 176-6).  Captain [...] said that other officers broke through the door into the store and arrested defendant, who was "on the floor."
[brief] [...] claims that Appellant [...] is simply trying to stop competition.  **NO.**  What Blackridge is challenging is competing on an unlevel playing field that [...] heavily tilted in favor of [...] through an ordinance change for that site alone and which [...] officials bought into despite staff rejections and clear non-compliance with the key CAFRA rule for high rise development along the New Jersey Coast.  This Court should reject such unequal application of law and re-level the playing field, forcing [...] to redesign a building that meets the Rule.  This Court should tell [...], as multiple Courts have told it before, to apply its rules as written and not to waive them in ad hoc fashion.  REPLY STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Cardholder Agreement violates TILA because it is “confusing” and not in logical sequence.  The Minimum Payment Due Section of the Cardholder Agreement states:  “Each billing period you must pay at least the Minimum Payment Due by the Payment Due Date shown on your billing statement”  Exhibit B (Da44).  The Default Section, which is on a different page than the Minimum Payment Due Section, states:  “You are in default if: you fail to comply with the terms of this Agreement … including failing to make a required payment when due ….  ”  Exhibit B (Da45).  The Your Billing Rights Section, which is on a different page than either the Minimum Payment Due Section or the Default Section, states:  “While we investigate whether or not there has been an error [on your billing statement]:  While you do not have to pay the amount in question, ….  ”  Exhibit B (Da47).  (Emphasis Added).  “Although [...] does not in fact require the payment of disputed amounts, [...]’s argument that the Cardholder Agreement is nevertheless ambiguous on this issue has merit.  The standard under TILA is for creditors to disclose terms in a ‘meaningful sequence’, i.e., those disclosures which are logically related must be grouped together rather than scattered throughout the contract. ’…  The statements at issue here are located in a section totally apart …, which tells the consumer he is not to pay any disputed amounts.  Therefore, from the perspective of any ordinary consumer, these statements may cause a consumer to scratch his head as to whether he is required to pay the disputed amounts.  Cf. Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 599-01 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that debt collection letter violated the …“FDCPA” because it did not explain the apparent contradiction between one statement addressing debtor’s rights and another addressing debtor’s obligation to pay) …. ”  [...] v. [...] Bank (Illinois), 8 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1039 (N.D. Ill. 1998).  (Emphasis Added).  The [...] court upheld the complaint that the creditor violated TILA.  Plaintiff’s Cardmember Agreement violated TILA because (1) it is confusing as to whether or not Defendant must pay the Minimum Amount Due, when the Minimum Amount Due contains an error in whole or in part, and (2) the Minimum Payment Due Section, the Default Section and the Your Billing Rights Section are “scattered throughout” the Cardmember Agreement when those Sections must be “grouped together” in a “meaningful sequence.
[directive] Recent firearms deployment changes in the law enforcement community, new firearms technology and thoughtful review of present policy have necessitated the amendment of the Firearms Qualification And Requalification Standards For New Jersey Law Enforcement, last updated in April 2001.  After consultation with the New Jersey law enforcement firearms instructors community, the following changes have been incorporated in this edition of the Standards:  •  The handgun night qualification course has been completely revised.  The new course of fire replaces long, sustained strings of fire with more duty relevant testing, including the mandated use of handheld or gun-mounted lights.  In addition, the minimum qualification score has been increased from 70% to 80% which parallels the requirement for daylight qualification.  •  The recent problem with black bears in New Jersey has brought back the shotgun slug into the law enforcement arsenal.  Agencies deploying the slugs requested guidance in the training and qualification of their personnel with this shotgun ammunition.  Therefore, a "Shotgun Slug Qualification Course" (SSQC) has been developed for qualification under both daylight and night firing conditions.  As with the traditional "OO Buck" ammunition, qualification will be required semi-annually.  •  Recent technology has given birth to a new class of firearm referred to as the "Personal Defense Weapon" (PDW).  Developed for military personnel assigned to confined areas, this firearm resembles a submachine gun in size and a rifle in performance.  Several New Jersey law enforcement agencies are considering the purchase of this type of weapon.  In the law enforcement community this type of weapon would be deployed as a subgun, however, since the ammunition is fired at rifle-defined velocities, agencies are 1 6/2003 confused as to training and qualification requirements.  Therefore, a new class of firearm, "Personal Defense Weapon" (PDW), has been added to the policy to define the firearm itself and its place in training and qualification.  The PDW will be considered a submachine gun and all personnel utilizing such firearms will follow the subgun protocol for training and qualification.  In addition, slight procedural changes were made to the Subgun Qualification Course to accommodate the widening variety of subguns being manufactured and deployed.  •  A slight change was made to the Scoped Rifle Qualification Course regarding the time requirements at the 100 & 50 yard lines, shooting position at the 50 yard line as well as an adjustment to the qualification target.  The complete, updated Firearms Qualification And Requalification Standards For New Jersey Law Enforcement can be found at the [...]'s web site, [...].  These changes may be adopted as soon as possible, and become mandatory effective January 1, 2004.  If you have any questions concerning firearms qualification standards please call the [...] State Range Master at [...].  2 6/2003
[brief] The DEP’s 2020 Report explained in detail how anthropogenic climate change will specifically and adversely impact the Highlands environment in NJ.  For example, the 2020 Report explains how the Highlands forest resources (p. 85), wetlands (p. 96), and terrestrial systems (p. 115), are all expected to be adversely impacted by climate change (in very specific ways).  In October of 2021, the DEP issued another report titled “Climate Change Resiliency Strategy” which further addressed the necessity of revising its regulations to adapt to climate change in New Jersey, including the DEP’s intention to study and adapt its regulations to the reality of climate change impacts in New Jersey.
[directive] Physical Force.  Physical force involves contact with a subject beyond that which is generally used to effect an arrest or other law enforcement objective.  Physical force is employed when necessary to overcome a subject’s physical resistance to the exertion of the officer’s authority, or to protect persons or property.  Examples include taking a resisting subject to the ground, using wrist or arm locks, striking the subject with the hands or feet, or other similar methods of hand-to-hand confrontation, such as certain pain compliance techniques.
[directive] Page 2  The Court in its Administrative Determinations also approved the Special Committee’s recommendation for creation of a standing committee on the jury selection process and procedures.  Formation of the Supreme Court Committee on Jury Selection in Civil and Criminal Trials is underway.  Part of that committee’s initial charge will be to review the model voir dire questions promulgated by this Directive for any necessary revisions or refinements, e.g., suggestions by the Judiciary Advisory Committee on Americans with Disabilities Act Compliance.  Additionally, please also be aware that the Court, in accordance with the Special Committee’s recommendation has amended Rule 1:8-3(f), effective September 1, 2006, to require that attorneys submit any proposed supplemental voir dire questions in writing and that trial judges rule on the record regarding questions requested by attorneys and any attorney participation at voir dire.  Any questions regarding this Directive or the underlying Standards may be directed to [...], Esq., of the AOC’s Office of Trial Court Services by e-mail or by phone ([...]).  P.S.C. Attachments (Jury Selection Standards; Model Voir Dire Questions)
[brief] A past practice cannot unilaterally change written contract terms, there must be a mutual agreement in writing to modify any terms.  Where an arbitration panel ignored clear language of an agreement and reached a different result than bargained for by the parties, the arbitration panel was found to have exceeded its authority.  *City Ass'n of Sup'rs and Adm'rs v. State Operated School Dist. of City of Newark*, 311 N.J. Super. 300 (App. Div. 1998).
[brief] But in June 2021, [...] promised not to develop its contaminated DPW site without any prior citizen input.  On Tuesday August 17, 2021 and at the close of the public TC meeting, defendant [...] chastised residents (including plaintiff) for uniting, contesting and defeating a [...] zoning board application the night before.  The Ministerial Defaults and Original Consensual Agreement to File An Answer Out-of-Time
[brief] Without any legal contention or concrete suggestion, amicus does not provide “the court with information pertaining to matters of law about which the court may be in doubt. ”  Keenan v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 106 N.J. Super. 312, 316 (App. Div. 1969).  Nevertheless, [...] cannot use legal support to refute the trial judge’s decisions because New Jersey has a long history of deeming fingerprint evidence reliable.
[brief] (Ca13).  The motion was supported by a certification of [...].  (Ca13).  On April 29, 2022, [...] entered an order, under [...], denying [...]’s motion to intervene.  (Ca305).  On October 26, 2023, [...] entered an order discharging [...] as receiver.  (Ca2).  On July 28, 2023, [...], the vice president of [...], submitted a certification to the court in the matter of [...] v. [...], et al., under Docket No. [...], in support of the receiver’s motion to terminate the receivership.  On November 17, 2023, [...] entered an order denying the motions for reconsideration of the [...] and [...].  (Ca1).  On November 20, 2023, [...] filed a notice of appeal from the orders of November 17, 2023, denying the motion for reconsideration of the November 6, 2023 order discharging the receiver.  (Ca4).  On November 24, 2023, the appellants, [...] and [...], filed a Notice of Appeal of the orders entered by the trial court under [...], of November 17, 2023 and October 10, 2023.  On April 10, 2024, the appellate division issued a Scheduling order, under which the brief of the Lopez appellants was due by April 22, 2024.  On April 29, 2024, the Lopez appellants filed a notice of motion to file their brief as within time.  On April 29, 2024, the appellants, [...] and [...], filed their brief and appendix.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] (Pa000212-Pa000215).  [...] was the municipal prosecutor in [...] where [...] was mayor.  (Pa000108).  [...] prepared drafts of the Will, which [...] picked up and reviewed with [...].  Changes were made and the marked-up drafts were returned to [...]’s office.  (Pa000157-Pa000159, Pa000208).  [...] did not draft the language in Article Third to minimize estate tax exposure.  (Pa000212).  [...] signed his Will on July 9, 2014.
[brief] (Dta 843,875.)  \(^6\)  [...]’s representative testified that, on some projects, subcontractors were excluded from some work and enrolled for other work on the same project.  (Dta875, [...] dep.  T35-10 to 36-15.) notified that we were accepted.  [Dta1298-1299, 4/8/19 dep. of [...], T19-11 to 20-19.]
[brief] Ibid.  Moreover, at least one of the gunshots was fired at a 90-degree angle to the ground, straight down.  (21T:94-5 to 22).  It is not “rational” to find that an unarmed person moving angrily towards you, at the absolute best possible interpretation of the viable evidence at trial, is adequate provocation for such a passion/provocation charge, and when it is now undisputed that defendant was the armed party, not [...].