ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Directive this domestic would exacerbate the acomplaint-warrant from issuance of automatically jail resulting county detention in surrender, no-contact, weapons benefits ofobtaining a the degree that outweighs manner a situation in a and to violence if 4.6.1.  also that See subsection Note acomplaint-warrant. imposed on release condition of pretrial special or other be reasonably necessary to deemed to condition of pretrial release is special or other weapons-surrender, no-contact, a to be ordered for the defendant appropriate might be violence victim, it also domestic safety of the immediate assure the pretrial services can monitored by the be defendant's movements that the monitoring device so wear an electronic to That protection afforded to the victim.  thereby enhance the condition and no-contact means to enforce the program a as has been defendant who Bail Reform Law, that is, a under the defendant' "eligible defendant is an presupposes that the complaint-warrant. charged by 44 Page Records. Expunged 4.7 issuing acomplaint-summons of presumption the determining to overcome whether In 3.3.2 subsection designated to pursuant supervisory officer or prosecutor Section a 4.3, to pursuant 2C:52- N.J.S.A. See circumstances. relevant the of of totality part as records consider expunged may county court, any be to provided shall or convictions arrests prior of ... records 21 ("expunged or Attorney the services agency, pretrial the Court, the of Superior Division Probation prosecutor, the pretrial release [or] hearing, bail a with in conjunction use for are requested General same when Reform Law]"). 31 Bail 2014, [the P.L. c. 11 of 1 sections through to pursuant determination Rule 3:3-1(e), required to pursuant is acomplaint-warrant for application where case any In complaint- apply fora this to Directive to pursuant made been has determination a any where or case prosecutor andlor agency enforcement law the convictions, or arrests expunged of warrant regardless If, however, records. expunged or obtain access waiting to charging by process the shall delay not for apply or acomplaint-summons issue whether determination to the affect might expunged records with in accordance consulted general attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant the acomplaint-warrant, the 3.3.2, delay subsection may to pursuant designated officer supervisory or designated 3.2, Section obtain access to undertaken or being are efforts while period reasonable a for decision charging on police the placed that be burdens would administrative the considering records, expunged other or judge a to presented can be the defendant that provided further delay, the and by department 3:4-1.
[brief] Regarding the DOH hearsay documents, as discussed supra at 10-24, defense counsel had [...] reading exactly what they wanted him to say.  Plaintiff’s counsel was so confused by the judge’s constant parsing of [...]’s testimony that at one point he stated, “I'm trying to do what Your Honor is asking.  When you say do that, I'm having trouble understanding what you're asking me to do. ”  7T124:17-19.  The sidebars were not only lengthy: they were confusing as the judge ping-ponged between issues.  Although the NHA does not provide a private right of action for a violation of responsibilities as defined in the Act, there is no law or even common sense that would support the elimination of the word “responsibility” from an expert’s lexicon while testifying at trial.
[brief] “[I]t is within the court’s discretion to award attorney’s fees as a sanction for committing a fraud on the court”.  *Triffin*, 411 N.J. Super. at 314 (citing *Kingsdorf v. Kingsdorf*, 351 N.J. Super. 144, 159 (App. Div. 2002)).  “[S]eparate and distinct from court rules and statutes, courts possess an inherent power to sanction an individual for committing a fraud on the court. ”  *Ibid.*  The chancery court likewise holds the inherent equitable authority to mold a remedy for the conduct of the parties before it.
[brief] She only knew defendant as “[...]. ”  They never dated or were good friends, but rather they would talk “when he would come around. ”  She described the shooter wearing army fatigue shorts, a white shirt, and lime green sneakers with orange and black.  Like [...], she told police he had a tattoo on his face, and she did not recall distinguishing markings on his hands.  (10T27-25 to 28-16, 29-5 to 7, 33-5 to 7, 38-18 to 39-15, 40-11 to 17, 43-21 to 45-2, 75-19 to 25, 83-11 to 22)
[brief] An analysis of the deeds and documents of record relating to this case clearly show the error of the Court.  This not only includes a series of deeds, but it also includes the tax sale foreclosure, copies of maps and other related documents.  The property is identified on the Tax Map of the [...] as Lot 3, Block 184 and Lot 3.01, Block 184.  Lot 3.01 is made up of both a small upland area as well as an extensive Riparian Grant which is more commonly referred to and identified on the Tax Map as the "[...]".  As concerns the title to the upland property along the Raritan Bay prior to 1900, the area now known as Blocks 3 and 3.01 was owned by [...].  While Quinlan owned the upland, as to Lot 3, the State of New Jersey was and still is the owner of record of the land below the mean high water line.  In 1879, Quinlan acquired the fee simple title to the lands underwater from the State of New Jersey being what is today known as Lot 3.01.  The State retained ownership of the lands underwater in front of the Western portion of Lot 3.  The current Tax Map even recites the Riparian Grant.  The [...] had knowledge of this fact and recognizes same on the official Tax Map today.  Accordingly, in 1909, [...] was the owner of land shown on a certain Map entitled "Map of Keansburg Heights" filed in the Monmouth County Clerk's Office on June 25, 1909, in [...] (Pa206).  There was a clear reflection as to what was conveyed.  "Together with such Riparian rights and other rights, privileges and franchises in and to the lands lying under the waters of the Raritan Bay in front of and adjoining the above-described premises as are now vested in the party of the first part" (Pa918).  Unquestionably, Quinlan conveyed to [...] not only whatever was owned by him for the upland portion of what is now known as Lot 3.01, but also the area of the Riparian Grant Quinlan had acquired from the State of New Jersey in 1879 lands under water.
[brief] Appellate courts thus “give deference to ‘supported factual findings of the trial court, but review de novo the lower court’s application of any legal rules to such factual findings. ’”  *State v. Behn*, 375 N.J. Super. 409, 432 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting *State v. Harris*, 181 N.J. 391, 416 (2004)).  In *State v. Marshall*, the New Jersey Supreme Court extolled the virtues and simplicity of the unified materiality test set forth in *United States v. Bagley*, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).
[brief] As with most agency action, there is room for debate over what is reasonable.  To be reasonable, an agency's choice of action for providing notice does not require adoption of a perfect practice.  Here, the intended purpose of the action challenged—the Commissions' attempted notice—was to reach persons who might have been affected by the wrongfully calculated reimbursement rate, to notify those persons of the availability of supplemental reimbursement, and to inform them of the procedures for requesting supplemental reimbursement.  (pp. 16-19)  3.  The problem in this dispute over the adequacy of notice is that the evidence thus far produced has the capacity to support the claim that the methods of notice—the letter and website link—were not reasonably designed to likely reach the categories of members who may have been affected by the erroneous reimbursement rates.  The Unions have advanced some evidence on which there could be based a finding that the notice was not reasonably designed to give notice to the proper universe of individuals affected.  Against that presentation, based on the present record, the Court cannot conclude that either the website's ten-word, cryptically described notice and link or the letter to the certifying officers provides sufficient evidence to support deferring to the agency's choice of notice as reasonable.  With the thin record available, it is not known what action, if any, certifying officers generally took in response to the Commissions' letter.  Nor does the record disclose what notice, if any, former employees and retirees received of the potential for supplemental reimbursement in light of the Commissions' apparent reliance on the link.  Accordingly, the Court orders a remand for the development of a proper record to permit meaningful judicial review.
[brief] Upon the Court’s decision, [...] orally moved for a stay of the Sale Confirmation Order.  The Court granted that stay on terms and conditions set forth in the Sale Confirmation Order but did not require the posting of a supersedeas bond for the stay.  The terms and conditions of the Sale Confirmation Order included the following language typed in by the court below at the bottom of the last page of that order:  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all post-sale proceedings (specifically the delivery of a Deed by the [...]) be and hereby are stayed until March 22, 2024 or until such time as Defendants herein file an appeal and move in the Appellate Division for a further stay pending the resolution of the appeal, whichever date is sooner.
[brief] The broad parameters of Judicial Notice are set forth in N.J.R.E. 201.  Certainly the Court can take notice of the law of this State, Acts and Resolutions of the United States, as well as “regulations and determinations of all governmental subdivisions and agencies thereof. ”  In fact, judicial notice is mandatory “if requested by a party on notice to all other parties and if supplied with the necessary information. ”  N.J.R.E. 201.  The Workers’ Compensation Judge took proper Judicial Notice of New Jersey Executive Orders, regulations and determinations of the State Police, State Department of Emergency Management, New Jersey Department of Health, Federal Department of Homeland Security as well as the Death Certificate.  N.J.R.E. 201 (a).  The Court below also had the discretion to take Notice of Facts of generalized knowledge that cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute; facts pertinent to the event (such as the existence of the pandemic).  The transcripts of the proceedings below profoundly demonstrate that the Workers’ Compensation Judge afforded Respondent full opportunity to be heard pursuant to N.J.R.E. 201 (e).  Respondent has not made any argument in the Workers’ Compensation proceedings or at the Appellate Division that [...] inappropriately or incorrectly took Judicial Notice of any of the documents filed in support of Petitioner’s essential worker motion.  Every item of Judicial Notice that was recognized by [...] in making her finding has been, and remains unopposed by Respondent.  Judicial Notice was properly taken by the Workers’ Compensation Court.
[brief] ’”  State v. Hernandez, 170 N.J. 106, 131 (2001) (citation omitted).  Moreover, a limiting instruction should be given “not only at the time that other-crimes evidence is presented, but also in the final jury charge. ”  Blakney, 189 N.J. at 93.  Here, the trial court made several critical errors in its limiting instruction regarding the robbery evidence.
[brief] *Id.*; N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.2.  The [...]’s requirement that Appellant demonstrate “a constitutionally protected individual property interest” is a legal error.  [Aa135.]  A court is never bound by an agency’s determination of a purely legal issue.  *In re Stream Encroachment Permit*, 402 N.J. Super. 587, 597 (App. Div. 2008).  When “the issue involves the interpretation of statutes and regulations, it is purely a legal issue, which we consider de novo. ”  *Klawitter v. City of Trenton*, 395 N.J. Super. 302, 318 (App. Div. 2007).  In its May 31, 2019 letter, [...] states that “[Appellant’s] claimed right to a hearing would have merit only if her claims that [...]’s dock will materially interfere with the ability to navigate to and from the [Appellant’s] dock were valid and substantial. ”  [Aa432.]  While [...] goes on to state its position that Appellant’s navigation claim is not valid and substantial, the statement recognizes that a navigation claim particular to Appellant would be justification for a hearing.  The [...] decision states that [...]’s permit application does not hinder navigation or access to adjacent water areas simply because the end of the dock is approximately 163 feet from the nearest authorized navigation channel.  [Aa135.]  First, this conclusion is made without any support in the record.  Moreover, the decision completely fails to account for the navigation and access issues suffered by Appellant when navigating from its waterfront facilities to the navigational channel referenced by the [...].  This navigational issue was a reason why Appellant objected to the permit and associated modification and support for its entitlement to an adjudicatory hearing.  Finally, it should also be noted that Appellant is appealing the [...]’s grant of the tidelands license to [...] in a separate pending appeal with Docket No.: [...].  While outside the scope of this appeal, the arguments presented in the tidelands appeal are set forth in the record in this matter at Aa322-Aa344.  Appellant submits that the tidelands instrument, which is required under the WFD permit and modification, was issued in error and should be reversed.  For the reasons set forth herein, Appellant submits that it has a particularized property interest sufficient to entitle it to an adjudicatory hearing.  As such, the [...]’s decision to deny Appellant’s adjudicatory hearing request was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable and should be reversed.
[brief] \textsuperscript{5}  This phrase is also used in [...]’s borough code (applicable to its regular employees) that [...] previously tried to enforce against [...] that was found improper in the prior Appellate Division opinion.  [...] analyzed the law and made express findings that these cases are inapplicable to [...]’s situation.  [...] also cites to unreported and administrative decisions, which are not binding on this appeal, distinguishable factually, and apply different legal standards than the statute that controls here.  It is undisputed that [...] is charged for an act occurring on his personal time involving a private social media group.  This alleged conduct did not directly or indirectly involve the sewerage authority, the performance of his duties as a commissioner, or the borough’s time, equipment, or personnel.  It did not occur while he was on duty; did not occur during a public meeting; did not involve public business; had no relation to any official act he would ordinarily perform; did not involve public resources or equipment; did not involve another employee; and was not directed at any local official or the subject of any borough activities or policies.  As a result, the allegation against [...] is beyond the clear statutory basis for which [...] could remove him as a commissioner.
[brief] (1T25:25-26:8; 28:7-24).  The court, however, found that [...]’s purpose in condemning the property is “not for a public use, but for a private use,” for something that is not “generally considered to be a public interest kind of thing. ” (1T24:2-25:4).  The Court contrasted commercial redevelopment with a hospital or open space, which the Court said are generally considered to be more in the public interest.  (1T24:5-12; 51:11-16).
[brief] Defendant [...] testified that he has lived at the property where plaintiff fell for 50 years.  Pa64 at 8:4-11.  He purchased the property in 1972.  Pa200.  [...] testified that the sidewalk where plaintiff was caused to fall “was done new about 25 years ago, completely a new one. ”  Pa66 at 14:25-15:1.  Asked to clarify, defendant stated unequivocally “It’s never been repaired.  The sidewalk was constructed about 25 years ago. ”  *Id.* at 15:8-9.  [...] “hired a contractor to do it. ”  *Id.* at 16:8.  That was an affirmative act that foreseeably created a hazardous condition and, as such, defendants are not entitled to be immunized from liability for their conduct.  In *Deberjeois v. Schneider*, 254 N.J. Super. 694 (Law Div. 1991), aff’d, 260 N.J. Super. 518 (App. Div. 1992), the trial court, on a motion for summary judgment, examined the sidewalk exception-to-liability rule and concluded as follows:
[brief] “Bad Faith”  Bad Faith is often referred to as the doing of an act for a dishonest purpose.  The term also “contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with a furtive design or some motive of interest or ill will. ”  Borough of Essex Fells v. *Kessler Institute for Rehab.*, 289 N.J. Super. 329, 338 (1995), citing *Lustrelon Inc. v. Prutscher* 178 N.J. Super. 128, 144 (App.Div.1981).  The party making the claim that the government has conducted itself in bad faith or in a fraudulent manner has the burden of proof.
[brief] In his brief in response, defendant adopted the State’s statement of facts and also asserted the following:  “[...] was not associated with the stolen car observed in the vicinity of his stop; [...] did not look directly at officers before proceeding away from them; officers lacked sufficient observations or reason to believe that [...] was armed or involved in the alleged carjacking; and officers generally lacked probable cause to seize and search [...].” (Pa62).  the right side of his waistband as he was jogging.  (Pa60).  Based on his training and experience, [...] believed defendant was armed.  (Pa60).  Defendant then looked directly at the police vehicle and began running at a full sprint.  (Pa60).  As officers activated their emergency lights, defendant jumped a fence at [...] with [...] directly behind him.  (Pa60).  [...] was able to grab defendant’s leg, and during the scuffle, the officer observed a handgun in defendant’s waistband.  (Pa60).  Defendant broke free and continued to run.  (Pa60).  Officers then found defendant hiding under a Nissan Xterra.  (Pa60).  He was in possession of a Mercedes-Benz key fob and $1,744 in U.S. currency.  (Pa60).  Another officer recovered defendant’s handgun in the backyard of a nearby home.  (Pa60).  In his Union County case, defendant moved to suppress evidence seized as a result of his April 23, 2022 pursuit and arrest.  (Pa7).  After the parties fully litigated the motion, the Union County court denied defendant’s motion on the merits.  (Pa37-53).
[brief] The 1892 Resolution provides no support for the Ordinance.  First, even if [...]’s putative construction of the 1892 Resolution were correct (which it is not), it is preempted by operation of New Jersey statutory and regulatory law enacted over the last century in response to the growth of what has become the modern day electrical grid, including the supervening authority of N.J.S.A. 48:7-1, N.J.S.A. 48:3-17.1, other provisions of Title 48 of the New Jersey Statutes, and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in In re PSE&G.
[brief] (Da34)  Plaintiffs disagreed; oral argument followed.  At the time that [...] heard oral argument, [...]’s expert report had been served on defendants, he had been deposed, and defendant’s experts were in possession of his expert report and his deposition so that they could analyze and respond to it.  Additionally, the case was already three years old, with numerous discovery deadline extensions.  Further, all parties were in the midst of scheduling depositions of experts, mindful of the fast-approaching October 17, 2021, deadline set by [...].  (Pa221).  Given the complexity of the issues, the number of attorneys involved in the case and the number of experts still to be deposed, adding a completely new expert would have disrupted the recently established deposition schedule.  A substitution of plaintiff’s expert would also have been costly, as defendant would have had to carefully prepare for and then take the deposition of [...].  This would have involved considerable time and expense.  As defendant’s attorney later informed [...] on November 12, 2021, he spent approximately forty-five hours preparing for the deposition of [...].  2T21-5 to 8.  Given the circumstances surrounding the age of the case, and the complications and delays which would necessarily ensue from permitting [...] to replace [...] as trial expert, [...] denied plaintiffs’ cross-motion.(Pa16; 1T9-1 to 11-25).
[brief] 41  Table of Judgments, Orders, and Rulings (at indicated pages in accompanying Appendix Volumes)  June 22, 2023  Final Judgment A1149 January 13, 2023  Order A1157 November 9, 2022  Order A1159 November 9, 2022  Order A1161 December 16, 2022  Order and Statement of Reasons denying reconsideration  A1163  ### Table of Authorities ####  Federal Cases - **Paloian v. LaSalle Bank, N.A.**, 619 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2010)  ...........................................  21, 24 - **Richardson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.**, 740 F.3d 1035 (5th Cir. 2014) .................. 14 - **Schiano v. HomEq Servicing Corp. & HomEq Servicing**, 832 Fed. Appx. 116 (3d Cir. 2020) ......................................................................................................................... 3 #### State Cases - **Andrew v. Deshler**, 45 N.J.L. 167 (1883) .................................................................................. 34 - **Baglini v. Lauletta**, 338 N.J. Super. 282 (App. Div. 2001) ............................................. 38 - **Bogert v. City of Elizabeth**, 27 N.J. Eq. 568 (1876) ............................................................ 18 - **Brookdale Park Homes, Inc. v. Bridgewater Twp.**, 115 N.J. Super. 489 (Ch. Div. 1971) ................................................................................................................................. 17 - **Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc.**, 111 N.J. 355 (1988) .............................................. 36 - **Clark v. Nenna**, 465 N.J. Super. 505 (App. Div. 2020) ....................................................... 37 - **Estate of Gilbert Smith v. Cohen**, 123 N.J. Eq. 419 (1938) .................................................. 18 - **Fittichauer v. Metro. Fireproofing Co.**, 70 N.J. Eq. 429 (Ch. 1905) ................................. 17 - **Graziano v. Grant**, 326 N.J. Super. 328 (App. Div. 1999) .................................................. 30 - **Hart v. Clear Recon Corp.**, 27 Cal. App. 5th 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) .... 13, 16 - **Hatch v. T & L Associates**, 319 N.J. Super. 644 (App. Div. 1999) ................................. 15 - **In re Niles**, 176 N.J. 282 (2003)