ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Separately, during its review of the mail-in ballots and provisional ballots, the Board rejected a mail-in ballot submitted by [...] because the inner certificate of her ballot was completely blank.  (1T17:21-1T18:5; 1T20:18-1T21:5; Da10-Da11).  Ms. Gilham attempted to cure the deficiency, but because Ms. Gilham left the inner certificate of her mail-in ballot completely blank, the Board could not allow her to do so.  (1T18:11-1T19:13).  The Board also rejected several mail-in ballots, including seven mail-in ballots contested by [...], ³ Pa1 is a copy of the sample mail-in ballot that was mailed to voters.  The parties stipulated at trial that the sample mail-in ballot was identical to the ballot that a voter would have seen when casting a machine vote.  (2T27:14-2T28:14). because they were received and post-marked three days after the polls closed.  (1T32:6-9; 2T76:16-21; Da12-Da17).  Finally, the Board accepted a mail-in ballot submitted by [...].  (Pa15 at ¶ 57).  On March 7, 2025, [...] filed an election contest, alleging, among other things, that the Fire Commissioners improperly changed the results of the election by counting votes from the above noted write-in ballots in contravention of N.J.S.A. 19:16-3(f), and that the Board improperly accepted a mail-in ballot submitted by [...], who [...] claimed was not domiciled in [...].
[brief] ”  144 S.Ct. at 1854 (quoting Mathis, 579 U.S.  Thus, a judge may not determine whether a defendant’s prior offenses were “committed at different times” or whether “the latest in time of these crimes or the date of the defendant’s last release from confinement, whichever is later, is within 10 years of the date of the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced. ”  Because those questions go beyond determining “what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of,” they must be submitted to a jury and cannot be decided by a judge.
[brief] [...] summarized its position, in its own words, as follows:  For decades, the fossil fuel industry has misled consumers and the public about climate change.  Since at least the 1950s, its own scientists have consistently concluded that fossil fuels produce carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas pollution that can have catastrophic consequences for the planet and its people.  The industry took these --- 2  The facts and procedure are interrelated, so they are presented together.  internal scientific findings seriously, investing heavily to protect its own assets and infrastructure from rising seas, stronger storms, and other climate change impacts.  But rather than warn consumers and the public, fossil fuel companies and their surrogates mounted a disinformation campaign to discredit the scientific consensus on climate change; create doubt in the minds of consumers, the media, teachers, policymakers, and the public about the climate change impacts of burning fossil fuels; and delay the energy economy’s transition to a lower-carbon future.  This successful climate deception campaign had the purpose and effect of inflating and sustaining the market for fossil fuels, which in turn drove up greenhouse gas emissions, accelerated global warming, and brought about devastating climate change impacts to the State of New Jersey….  [See Paragraph 1 of the [...]’s complaint, [...].]  Thus, as a matter of both justice and fairness, the [...] must be precluded or estopped from taking a position in this case that is directly contrary to the State’s position in Mass. v. EPA and its complaint against the fossil fuel industry.  [...] v. [...], 190 N.J. 342, 352 (2007).  [...]’s argument that “the impacts of the Project are speculative” rings hollow because the [...] is fully aware that climate change impacts are actually “devastating” to the State.  Ironically, [...] has asked this Court to join it in a loud chorus of “Don’t Look Up” in this case, while complaining of that posture in another case.  ____________________
[brief] On April 7, 2020, [...] was transferred to the COVID wing and started on Plaquenil and azithromycin.  On April 15, 2020, a chest x-ray was performed.  (See Da210-213 ¶6.)  The AOM also indicates that efforts to contain the spread of COVID-19 and to treat patients for the disease were taken, including testing, isolation of COVID-19 positive patients, other social distancing measures, and the administration of medication to plaintiff’s decedent.  (See ibid.; Da215-218.)  The facts set forth in the AOM, based upon [...]’ review of the medical records, confirm that there is no possibility that facts can be established in this case that would support a claim of gross negligence, let alone intentional wrongdoing in the sense of an evil minded act or wanton and willful disregard of the rights of another beyond the scope of the statutory immunity.
[brief] The State adopts the procedural history and statement of facts as set forth in defendant [...]’s (defendant) September 27, 2024 brief and additionally adds the following facts:  On May 15, 2024, New Jersey State Police Detective [...] testified regarding defendant’s Miranda\(^1\) statement.  During the hearing, the State moved the Miranda waiver form and defendant’s recorded statement into evidence.  (See Pa1; Pa2). \(^2\)  The State also provided a copy of the transcript of defendant’s recorded statement to the motion court.  (See Pa3-19).  Prior to defendant being advised of and waiving his Miranda rights, Detective McCoy advised defendant off-camera of his charges arising out of Union County.  At that time, defendant had not been charged for anything pertaining to the April 20, 2022 incident.  During the recorded statement, defendant, in the presence of his attorney, admitted to being an occupant of the same vehicle that was used during the shooting incident that occurred on April 20, 2022.  (Pa2; Pa7).  He also denied knowing who the owner of the BB gun was.  (Pa2; Pa9-10).  --- \(^1\)  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  \(^2\)  The State adopts the abbreviations used in defendant’s brief and additionally uses the following abbreviations:  Db - defendant’s brief  Pa – The State’s appendix  Defendant objected to the statement being admissible, arguing defendant did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights because he was not advised of the charges arising from the April 20, 2022 incident prior to waiving his rights.  Defendant further argued the statement was not admissible under N.J.R.E.  404(b).  After considering the evidence presented at the hearing, as well as the parties’ arguments, the motion court entered an order and opinion dated September 9, 2024, granting the State’s motion to admit defendant’s statement.
[brief] Upon examination of the state of the law of malicious prosecution in 1871 (when 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted), the Supreme Court discovered that most American courts had quite simply and logically concluded that “favorable termination” meant that a criminal prosecution ended without a conviction.  Id. at 45.  The Supreme Court’s historied analysis indicated that some courts were not only unconcerned with an acquittal or dismissal accompanied by some indicia of innocence, but one court even explicitly added that a claim for malicious prosecution will lie wherever there was “a final end of the prosecution, and the party discharged. ”  Id. at 46 (quoting Thomas v. DeGraffenreid, 11 S.C.L. 143, 145 (emphasis supplied).  Additionally, “The treatises of that era agreed that a favorable termination occurred so long as the prosecution ended without conviction. ”  Id.  The greatest divergence in malicious prosecution jurisprudence arose in cases where criminal defendants were acquitted of the most serious charges but convicted on minor offenses.  See Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181 (2009).  As Thompson established, all federal and State courts throughout the country over the course of more than one century had logically concluded that “termination” of a criminal proceeding occurred when the case ended, and none had indulged the fantastical notion that a judge’s oral finding of not guilty triggered the statute of limitations on a malicious prosecution claim.  Thompson further clarified that, as far back as 1871, finality again was the lynchpin in defining favorable termination.  The essence of Thompson – that finality of the criminal case reinforces the accrual of a malicious prosecution claim – not only affirmed Heck’s and Coello’s pragmatic concerns against the potential for conflicting criminal and civil judgments but left no equivocation as to a critical element of the tort, which is the favorable termination of the criminal prosecution.
[brief] The responding party will fight extremely hard for very narrow, specific search terms, and the requesting party will fight hard for broad, vague, and general terms.  This will inevitably lead to unnecessary litigation at the outset of the discovery process.  That litigation will be especially unproductive, because the parties will be arguing about search terms that they have not even used yet.  It is for this reason that federal courts have repeatedly held that “a party’s agreement to run search terms does not waive its right to review the resulting documents for relevance.
[brief] This dispute arises from the disposition and administration of the Estate of [...] (“Harriet’s Estate”).  I.  The Cohen Family History  [...] (“Harriet”) was the matriarch of the Cohen family and the wife of [...] (“Robert”).  In the 1970s, Robert purchased a bankrupt newsstand at Newark Airport and built it up into the now ubiquitous [...] chain, substantially increasing the family’s wealth.  *Cohen v. Perelman*, No. BER C-94-12, 2014 WL 2921601, at *1 (Ch. Div. June 24, 2014), aff’d, 2018 WL 6034978 (App. Div. Nov. 19, 2018), certif. denied, 237 N.J. 187.  Harriet and Robert had three children: [...] (the Plaintiff), [...], and [...].  *Id.*, at *2.  [...] had one daughter, [...] (the Defendant).  *Id.*  [...] and [...] both pre-deceased their parents.  *Id.*  Cohen is Robert and Harriet’s surviving child.  (Da9, at ¶ 8).  He is the executor of both Robert and Harriet’s estates, the trustee of several of their respective trusts, and a beneficiary of several of their respective trusts.
[brief] (Da0229; Da0237-Da0238)  [...]’s December 28, 2018 URGENT DRUG RECALL twice identified the silicone particulate as a “defect. ”  (Da0256-Da0257.  Emphasis added.)  As set forth in the Court’s May 26, 2023 Order Denying Summary Judgment, quoting from the PLA, N.J. Stat. Sec. 2A:58C-2, “a manufacturer of a product shall be held liable if the claimant proves that the product causing harm deviated from the ‘design specifications … or the performance standards of the manufacturer.
[brief] The trial court found that despite the Certificate of Liability Insurance, [...] was soon unenrolled from the CCIP, and aware of its supposedly impermissible enrollment and subsequent unenrollment, because it performed “demolition work,” subject to [...]’s authority and sole discretion to request cancellation or changes to the CCIP Policies.  Pa2739-Pa2747.  Once again, the trial court’s reasoning was incorrect.
[brief] ”  GE Solid State, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 132 N.J. 298, 307-08 (1993); see also State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 579 (1997).  Nowhere in the Ricci Act is there a requirement that the Board send notice, through a postcard, by certified mail or other means, or otherwise require actual receipt of notice.  Thus, in accord with the statutory canon of *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, the expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of another left unmentioned, this court should reject [...]’s request to create a requirement where the Legislature has chosen not to.  The Ricci Act simply required that the Board provide notice within thirty days of its enactment, without specifying in what manner.  The Board complied with this requirement when it posted information about the Ricci Act on its website.
[directive] 1.  An identification number unique to the property.  2.  Description of each item of the property, including particular identifiers such as make and model and unique identifiers such as serial number and owner applied number.  3.  Name of person(s) to whom property is related (defendant, owner, finder).  4.  Date that each item came into police custody.  5.  Identity of officer who took custody of property (name, initials, badge or employee number).  6.  Location where each item is stored.  7.  Date that each item was entered into storage.  8.  Identity of officer who entered property into storage.  9.  Date of each time that item was removed from storage or police custody.  10.  Identity of officer who removed item from storage or police custody each time it was removed.  11.  Reason the item was removed (e.g. trial or lab) for each time it was removed.  12.  Date of final disposition of each item.  13.  Manner of disposition (returned to owner, destroyed, turned over to another agency, etc.).  14.  Identity of officer responsible for authorizing final disposition.  15.  Identity of officer responsible for carrying out final disposition.  Property Reports.
[brief] Almost All Material Facts [...] Relied Upon to Seek Summary Judgment Are Disputed.  Plaintiff disputes [...]'s assertion below that it has proven with certainty that the streetlight was out by virtue of the fact that the first officer arrived within minutes of the accident.  As seen, [...] gave the opinion that the streetlight was likely out due to the history of the light being more off than on, that [...] did not see what he struck, and the fact that the light was out during the investigation.  Plaintiff also disputes that the floodlight at the investigation scene caused the streetlight to be out.  Here again, [...] and [...] opined that the floodlight at the scene was pointed down to illuminate the incident scene.  They disagreed at deposition that training a light beam from a flashlight at the light pole's photocell recreated the ambient lighting scenario at the scene of the accident.  Plaintiff also disputes [...]'s assertion that there was no notice given to [...] by [...] of the street light being out.  As seen in great detail above, a jury could conclude more likely than not, in plaintiff's favor, that [...] had given notice to [...] prior to the accident.  Plaintiff also disputes [...]'s contention that the streetlight it sold [...] was not defective so as to constitute a hazard in the intersection.  Plaintiff disputes this defendant’s contention that no witnesses reported the light being out, as seen above.  Plaintiff further disputes [...]'s contention that [...] agreed that the streetlight was not defective since, along with [...], [...] is headstrong that the defective streetlight caused a backlight effect in the intersection.  Plaintiff also disputes [...]’s argument that [...] agreed that there was no evidence of notice to [...] since [...] reiterated, in various parts in his deposition, that he is aware, as discussed above, that [...] changed his statement or testimony on the call he made to [...].  Plaintiff also disputes [...]’s assertion that, even if the light was on, it would not illuminate the crosswalk.  Rather, what [...] and [...] are adamant about in their reports and their testimony is that the tree branches prevented lighting from reaching the crosswalk.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT USURPED THE FUNCTION OF THE JURY IN GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT BY WEIGHING AND EVALUATING THE EVIDENCE ON CRITICAL FACT QUESTIONS, INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF INTENT, REASONABLENESS AND RELIANCE WHICH IMPLICATE STATE OF MIND RATHER THAN VIEWING THE FACTS IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFFS.  THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY  JUDGMENT FAILED TO ADHERE TO SETTLED  PRINCIPLES OF SUMMARY  JUDGMENT  JURISPRUDENCE WHICH REQUIRES THE COURT TO ACCEPT AS TRUE  ALL FACTS SET FORTH BY THE NON-MOVING PARTY, AND REASONABLE INFERENCES THEREFROM.  INSTEAD, THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY WEIGHED AND EVALUATED EVIDENCE, AND DISREGARDED EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD ESTABLISHING, AT MINIMUM, TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT.
[brief] We view [CEPA] as a reaffirmation of this State’s repugnance to an employer’s retaliation against an employee who has done nothing more than assert statutory rights and protections and a recognition by the Legislature of a pre-existing common-law tort cause of action for such retaliatory discharge.  In New Jersey, we are deeply committed to the principle that an employer’s right to discharge an employee carries a correlative duty to protect his freedom to decline to perform an act that would constitute a violation of a clear mandate of public policy.
[brief] The key question as to whether an action constitutes illegal spot zoning is whether a municipality seeks to advance the community interest rather than purely a private interest.  See Kozesnik v. Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 172 (1957); Weymouth Tp., supra, 80 N.J. at 18.  No question of material fact exists that the amendments were enacted to serve the collective interests of the community.  [...] explicitly recites that the City Council found and concluded that the amendments were consistent with the City Master Plan, i.e. the collective interests of the community.
[brief] ”  P110a.  [...], the Deputy Surrogate for Atlantic County (hereinafter “[...]”), reviewed the pleadings filed in this case and advised Respondent’s attorney that she recognized the signature of [...] above his typed name on the signature pages.  (10T\(^4\) 13:12-14; 10T 15:19-25; 10T 33:2-5; 10T 16:1-10).  Around February 4, 2022, [...] asked the Surrogate of Atlantic County if she could serve as a witness in this case, who stated that he would talk to the Motion Judge who then had this case.
[brief] [Redacted]  See [...], Ex. 27 at 5330  [Redacted]; [...], Ex. 28 at 1670 [Redacted]; [...], Ex. 29 at 2648-2649 [Redacted].  Given [...] led [...]’s efforts to monetize users’ information while at the same time shaping [...]’s public façade of respecting users’ privacy, her custodial files are all but certain to contain core information relevant Plaintiffs’ claims.
[brief] Plaintiff cannot be allowed to subject Defendants to an impermissible fishing expedition.  See Justiano v. G4S Secure Solutions, Inc., 291 F.R.D. 80, 83 (D.N.J. 2013) (“Discovery should not serve as a fishing expedition during which a party searches for evidence to support facts not yet pleaded”); Edwards v. Prudential Prop. and Cas. Co., 357 N.J. Super. 196, 202 (App. Div. 2003) (“the motion [to dismiss] may not be denied based on the possibility that discovery may establish the requisite claim; rather, the legal requisites for plaintiffs' claim must be apparent from the complaint itself”); Glass v. Suburban Restoration Co., 317 N.J. Super. 574, 582 (App. Div. 1998) (“It has long been established that pleadings reciting mere conclusions without facts and reliance on subsequent discovery do not justify a lawsuit”); Rieder v. Dep’t of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987) (dismissal is mandated where a factual allegation is palpably insufficient to support a claim upon which relief can be granted).  Thus, Plaintiff’s attempt to save her lawsuit by suggesting that discovery will create a cause of action is manifestly wrong and without basis in law.  To the extent this Court is willing to consider Plaintiff’s abandoned arguments with regard to claims against Defendant [...] (which it should not), Defendants respectfully submit that the Court’s dismissal of Count Five was proper and conforms with well-settled New Jersey law.
[brief] AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA)  TITLE II (28 CFR Part 35)....8  HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (HIPAA) OF 1996 (45 CFR Part 160 and Subparts A and E of Par 164) ...... 5, 6, 9 STATE STATUTES R. 1:3-1...........................................................................................................9  R. 1:3-3...........................................................................................................9 R. 4:14..........................................................................................................11 R. 4:14-2.......................................................................................................12 R. 4:23-2(b)(3) ..........................................................................................13 R. 4:23-2(b)(4) .........................................................................................13 R. 4:23-4....................................................................................................7, 8, 10 R. 4:23-5.......................................................................................................1 R. 4:23-5(a)(2) ........................................................................................................... 1, 8, 14 R. 4:23-5(c) .................................................................................................................. 8, 13, 15 R.4:24-1(c) .................................................................................................................... 4 TABLE OF JUDGEMENT, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED JUNE 1, 2023 ORDER GRANTING DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE ................................................. AP 1 JANUARY 6, 2023 ORDER GRANTING DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE ................................. AP 46 STATEMENT OF THE CASE [...] (herewith in “Plaintiff”) appeals from the judgement granting the Defendants, [...]
[brief] The Sponsor [[...]] reserves the right to terminate or modify the CCIP or any portion thereof.  If the Sponsor exercises this right, subcontractors will be provided with at least 30 days notice of cancellation.  At its option, Sponsor may procure alternate coverage or may require the Subcontractors to procure and maintain alternate insurance coverage.  Sponsor shall identify the details and limits of such alternate insurance coverage to Contractor with its written notice of OCIP Termination.  The form, limits of liability and cost of such insurance and the insurer issuing such insurance to Subcontractors will be subject to Sponsor’s approval.  Should coverage be cancelled by the insurer, 30 days written notice will be provided per the contract.  Pa589.  [...]’s subcontract, referring to insurance requirements, provided that “[...] building Corp. may, for any reason, modify the CCIP Coverages, discontinue the CCIP, or request that any Subcontractor of any tier withdraw from the CCIP upon thirty (30) days written notice. ”  Pa570.  III.
[brief] Mortensen is instructive.  That case involved whether Montana’s “reasonable expectations” rule was preempted by the FAA.  Mortensen, 722 F.3d at 1160.  That state law provided that a contract that is contrary to the “reasonable expectations” of a party is invalid as a matter of public policy, and that adhesive waivers of constitutional rights are outside of a consumer’s reasonable expectations.  Id.  Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the “reasonable expectations” rule was one of general applicability to all contracts, it was nonetheless “contrary to the FAA as interpreted by Concepcion because it disproportionally applies to arbitration agreements, invalidating them at a higher rate than other contract provisions. ”  Id. at 1161.  Just over eighteen months after Atalese was issued, this Court acknowledged the similarity between the rule in Atalese and the Montana rule in Mortensen.
[brief] [...] further testified that the proposed development would not block light or air.  “. . .  I think it is important to note that the buildings are not connected.  This is not just one large massive building.  You have a drive aisle in between the two and the two buildings to the west with the way the building is situated will get sun when the sun comes up.  It’s not going to block, the property to the west will not continually be in the shadow of this building.  (1T 44:5-16).