ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Further, it is a fundamentally “well recognized rule that a litigant who voluntarily accepts the benefits of a judgment is estopped from attacking it on appeal. ”  See G.M. v. R.M., 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 253, at *19 (App. Div. Feb. 2, 2018) (Citing Tassie v. Tassie, 140 N.J. Super. 517, 524 (App. Div. 1976)).  This rule is a “corollary to the established principle that any act upon the part of a litigant which he expressly or impliedly recognizes the validity of a judgment against him operates as a waiver of his right to appeal therefrom, or to bring error to reverse it. ”  Id. see also Sturdivant v. General Brass & Machine Corp., 115 N.J. Super. 224, 227-28 (App. Div. 1971).  In accordance with this fundamental rule, the Appellant recognized the ruling of the Trial Court regarding the Spill Act claims against [...] and the [...].
[brief] P30a.  When testifying at trial, [...] represented Respondent, Respondent testified that she discussed with [...] her concerns that the will would be challenged by Petitioner before the Decedent’s death, and after this litigation was brought, [...] had discussions with [...], Esquire, who represents Respondent in this litigation, gave him documents so that Decedent’s file could be recreated for this litigation.  (9T269:4-7).  That file included a photocopy of a prenuptial agreement (hereinafter “Photocopy”) that had the words “Exhibit B” written across the bottom, that was given to him by Respondent’s attorney, but [...] testified under oath at his deposition that it was given to him by Decedent.
[brief] This property is an investment property located in [...], previously owned by Appellant [...]. \(^1\)  Appellant testified that this was one of many such properties, and while he had denied in his sworn certifications that he was familiar with tax foreclosures the testimony showed that he was and is repeatedly delinquent in paying his taxes, accruing tax liens and facing tax foreclosures on multiple properties over the course of the past decade.  T3 101:11 to 102:14. \(^2\)  The testimony showed that he had, in fact, been faced with other tax foreclosures, knew about the --- \(^1\)  [...] acquired the Property by deed in his sole name in 1998 but while already married to [...].  He remains married; thus [...] is an owner.  [...]’s marital status was unknown at the time of the original complaint so a Jane Doe “[...], wife of [...]” was first named.  But upon service and [...] stating to the process server that she was married to [...] and that her name was “Linda”, the complaint was amended to “[...], wife of [...]. ”7a.  \(^2\)  Reference to the Trial Transcripts from 3/29/2023 is “T3” (as per Appellant’s submission), and “T4” for the 4/20/2023 date. process, and had familiarity with how to redeem and what to do in these situations.  T3 101:11 to 102:14; See also Court’s Decision at T4 100:2-10.  With this subject property, the taxes had not been paid for the year 2018 and the tax collector issued a tax sale certificate ([...]) in December, 2018.  The lien holder [...] (hereafter “[...]”), held the [...] for over 2 years, paid subsequent taxes during that time period, and then not being redeemed, per N.J.S.A. 54:5-86 it began foreclosure procedures.
[brief] First, the valuation testimony demonstrated that none of the prior transactions [...] cited as history were even analogous to this one.  None of them were involuntary buyouts or Court Ordered.  None had valuation experts or appraisals of company value associated with them.  None were for anywhere near what could be considered significant membership interests, with all of those reviewed by [...] being between 1-2%.  (6T229:18-23)(6T54:20-55:17)(Da2576)  Conversely, [...] held almost 30% of the company’s interests.  He was not asking to be bought out but was expelled, and there was a Court-Ordered valuation appraisal at the Court’s disposal.  There were 3.  Just because 1-2% shareholders did not expend the cost to value their interests in the past did not mean that they were prohibited from doing so, or that Brad was not entitled to fair value.  In fact, [...] also recognized that [...]’s Tax Book Value sales of the past were not similar to this case because those were minor shareholders who needed money and needed it quickly.  (6T220:14-25)  He said it was not “practical” for those 1-2% transfers to be actually valued using accountants, but they could have if they wanted to.  Bonavito further testified that if he was an [...] shareholder he would want a valuation appraisal here because of the substantial difference from [...]’s actual value to the reported Tax Book Value.  (6T222:1-25)(5T54:20-55:17)  Bonavito also did not confirm that every prior buyout transaction was at book value, as Plaintiffs argue.  He admitted that he did not even review all of the prior transactions.  (6T214:20-23)  He therefore did not review at least 19 of the prior transactions.  (6T214:20-23)  He also admitted that he did not “do a study of” the prior transactions and that it was not a “big focus” for him.  (6T232:14-18)  Moreover, the testimony and reports of [...] and Plaintiff’s expert, [...], confirmed that there was a very substantial difference in the reported Tax Book Values and the actual Net Asset Value of Brad’s interests.
[directive] It is strongly emphasized that the monetary ranges in the Bail Schedules continue to be advisory, not preset.  An individualized assessment of the defendant’s risk of flight/risk of failure to appear in court shall be conducted when considering or setting monetary bail.  Releasing a defendant on his or her own recognizance (R.O.R.) is permissible for any offense where the judge/judicial officer deems it appropriate.  The advisory monetary ranges contained in the Bail Schedules have not changed.  The advisory monetary bail ranges for attempts or conspiracies to commit crimes should continue to generally be the same as for the actual substantive crimes.  For persons charged with fourth degree crimes, disorderly persons offenses, or petty disorderly person offenses, ordinarily the maximum statutory bail amount is $2500.  For good cause shown, however, a higher monetary bail may be imposed after evaluation of a defendant’s risk of flight/risk of failure to appear in court.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:6-1.  See also State v. Steele, 430 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 2013), subsequent appeal dismissed 223 N.J. 284 (2014).  Many of the court rules and statutes cited in the 2005 Bail Schedules and supplements thereto have since been amended and now focus primarily on “eligible defendants” under the Criminal Justice Reform Law, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 et seq., effective January 1, 2017.
[brief] In [...] v. [...], the trial court rejected the plaintiff’s CFA claims asserting unlawful charges for ambulance services, on the basis that plaintiff never paid the charges and therefore did not suffer ascertainable loss.  On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed that ruling (while affirming dismissal on other grounds), writing,  The [trial] judge ruled that appellants did not suffer an ascertainable loss under the CFA because [they] failed to pay Atlantic's bill.  The judge expressly rejected appellants' argument that an excessive bill from Atlantic was sufficient to prove an ascertainable loss…  We conclude that the judge's [ruling] on that basis was flawed because appellants were not required to have paid Atlantic's bill to demonstrate an ascertainable loss.  The certainty implicit in the concept of an "ascertainable" loss is that it is quantifiable or measurable.  Moreover, it need not yet have been experienced as an out-of-pocket loss to the plaintiff.  An "estimate of damages, calculated within a reasonable degree of certainty" will suffice to demonstrate an ascertainable loss.  [Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234, 248-49, 872 A.2d 783 (2005) (quoting Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 22-23, 647 A.2d 454 (1994)).]
[directive] If the public should be made aware of a condition that is caused by the non-criminal misconduct of a public official, that individual may be named and criticized.  Before such a presentment seeking censure of an individual is approved, you must be satisfied that the proof of such wrongdoing is conclusive to show that the conduct of the individual is unquestionably related to the undesirable condition reported upon.  Criticism of a public official is allowable only where it is closely associated with the need to draw critical attention to the undesirable public condition.  It would not be fair to name a person unjustifiably in a presentment and perhaps destroy that person’s reputation and standing in the community.  And so, as a matter of fundamental fairness, if you return a presentment naming and censuring a specific individual, it will not be made public until I, as Assignment Judge, obtain and review the full record of the testimony and exhibits and determine that sufficient evidence has been presented to support such charges.
[brief] The Trial Court discounted documentary, evidentiary material which Court Rule 4:46-2(c) references as the documents of significance at the Summary Judgment proceeding.  The Court in rendering the decision used the Respondent’s Statement of Material Facts including each paragraph word for word and then noted the Appellant’s Responses to the Statement of Material Facts rather than engaging in an analysis of the causes of action and whether there was sufficient documentary evidentiary material in the record to support the causes of action pled.  The Court then dismissed each and every cause of action despite there being a wealth of documentary evidentiary material in the record to support the causes of action.  Glaringly, despite there being a video recording which was recorded by students in [...]’s class where she said out loud why can’t I say nigger, you say nigger.  In this footage you could hear the students responding, gasping and upset as the students told [...] that she can’t say that word.  [...] used a racial slur which creates a hostile work environment and was violative of the school policies prohibiting the use of this language in school, yet, the Court evidently discounted this.  The record also reflected the fact that when Appellant and [...] were notified by the students and [...], that they wanted something to be done about [...] using the racial slur, [...] and Appellant met with the students and then notified [...], the Superintendent of Human Resources of the actions of [...].
[brief] Order and Statement of Reasons entered September 29, 2023 (Da393-417) | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Accident Index Bureau, Inc. v. Male, | 8 | | 95 N.J. Super. 39 (App. Div. 1967) | | | Am. Humanist Ass'n v. Matawan-Aberdeen Reg'l Sch. Dist., | 39 | | 440 N.J. Super. 582 (Law Div. 2015) | | | Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., | 39 | | 415 N.J. Super. 301 (App. Div. 2010) | | | Brown v. City of Paterson, 424 N.J. Super. 176 (App. Div. 2012) | 7, 29, 36 | | Cafaro v. Cafaro, 118 N.J.L. 123 (E. & A. 1937) | 37 | | Casser v. Twp. of Knowlton, | | | 441 N.J. Super. 353 (App. Div. 2015) | 40 | | Comm. to Recall [...]
[brief] Defendant [...] testified that he never wrote him up, nor did he afford him a counselling session before terminating him.  Defendant [...] testified that he afforded both his brother Brian [...] and [...] counselling sessions, but not [...].  It is evident but more specifically, admitted, that [...]’s termination was only because he took out petitions to run for Councilman in the West Ward of Newark, and any purported justification is pretextual, which considering credibility and state of mind standard, it is a question left for the jury.
[brief] Importantly, all iterations of the consumer lending based provisions—whether the NJCFLA, the NJSLL, NJCLA, or NJLLA—were enacted remedially to protect New Jersey consumers by, inter alia, curtailing predatory and usurious lending practices, limiting what property could be held as collateral, conducting ongoing criminal background checks on applicants and licensees, and ensuring that only qualified, regulated, licensed entities would enter the marketplace as consumer lenders in New Jersey.  Indeed, in addition to regular criminal background checks for every officer, director, partner, and/or owner with a controlling interest in the applicant/licensee, the Commissioner must “find[] that the financial responsibility, experience, character, and general fitness of the applicant for a new license or for a renewal of a license demonstrate that the business will be operated honestly, fairly, and efficiently within the purposes of [the NJCFLA]”  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-7(c); see also N.J.S.A. 17:11C- 7(e).  Like the NJSLL and NJCLA, the newly titled NJCFLA (under the umbrella of the NJLLA) allowed for a private right of action by individual consumers in addition to the enforcement remedies of the Commissioner.  Indeed, codified statutory mechanism of enforcement by which an individual consumer voided an unlawful loan contract and/or pursued treble damages was N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b)—the same provision of the same statute which Plaintiff asserts has voided her unlawful contract in the instant action under the same NJCFLA.  In 2010, when the NJRLMA and NJCFLA were separated, subsection 18 (of the then NJLLA) remained combined with the consumer lending provisions, as it had been for several decades.
[brief] ”  Torres, 246 N.J. at 262 (citation omitted).  But even during parole hearings, the factors to be considered do not ignore who the inmate was prior to their incarceration, but include the nature and pattern of previous convictions; their adjustment to prior probation, parole, and incarceration; factors surrounding the offense; aggravating and mitigating circumstance surrounding the offense; history of employment, education, and military service; family and marital history; statements by the sentencing court reflecting the reasons for the sentence imposed; and statements from the prosecutor and victim.
[brief] DEFENDANT’S CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE MEDICAL EXAMINER’S TESTIMONY IMPROPERLY EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF HIS EXPERTISE.  (5T 139-4 to 7, 139-14 to 23; 7T 92-8 to 97-11)  The trial court functions as a gatekeeper to ensure that only sound scientific evidence is presented to the jury.  “Properly exercised, the gatekeeping function prevents the jury’s exposure to unsound science through the compelling voice of an expert.  . . .  Difficult as it may be, the gatekeeping role must be rigorous. ”  In re Accutane Litig., 234 N.J. 340, 346, 390 (2018).  Scientific evidence must be reliable to be admissible, and experts must not stray beyond the bounds of their expertise.  State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208 (1984).  In [...]’s trial, the court erred in its role as gatekeeper, permitting the medical examiner, [...], to testify over defense objection that the amount of blood seen in the crime scene photos of the car was inconsistent with [...] being stabbed in the car.  (5T 139-4 to 7, 139-14 to 23, 140-1 to 14; 7T 92-8 to 97-11)  This testimony exceeded the scope of [...]’s expertise as a forensic pathologist and was therefore inadmissible.  The improper admission of this testimony unfairly strengthened the State’s case while severely undermining [...]’s testimony that she stabbed [...] in self-defense in the car.  This inappropriate testimony deprived [...] of her rights to due process and to a fair trial and requires reversal of her convictions.  *U.S. Const.* amend. XIV, *N.J. Const.* art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, and 10.
[brief] \(^9\)  From the judiciary’s perspective, once parties contract for binding arbitration, all that remains is the possible need to: enforce orders or subpoena issued by the arbitrator, which have been ignored, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-17(g); confirm the arbitration award, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-22; correct or modify an award, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-24, and in very limited circumstances, vacate an award N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23.  If not for this limitation on judicial intervention of arbitration awards, “the purpose of the arbitration contract, which is to provide an effective, expedient, and fair resolution of disputes, would be severely undermined. ”  [See Curran, 453 N.J. Super. at 321 (citation omitted.)]  Permitting [...]’s requested counterclaim threatens to thwart or complicate enforcement of the Award, transforming the character of the Arbitration as an excuse to postpone the enforcement of the Arbitrator’s ruling.
[brief] Defendant hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the procedural history set forth in the appellate papers of plaintiff/appellant, [...].  (Plf. Brief at 4.)  The basis for the appeal filed by the plaintiff/appellant is (1) the trial court’s October 6, 2023 Order denying plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial (Pa665-66) and; (2) the trial court’s March 11, 2024 Order granting defendant/respondent  [...] attorney’s fees and costs.  (Pa667-68).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] The appellant in that matter was convicted of a violation of [...]’s noise ordinance, which provided a similar standard to that at issue in [...]’s Noise Ordinance. \(^2\)  There, the issue of preemption was apparently not raised at trial, and the Appellate Division refused to consider it further, recognizing however that:  The state law clearly contemplates and, indeed, expressly authorizes municipal ordinances regulating noise.  The only noted limitations on municipal regulation of noise are that: (1) the local ordinance must be “more stringent” than any regulations issued under the NCA, *N.J.S.A.* 13:1G-21; and (2) the ordinance must be submitted for approval to the [...] (“[...]”).
[brief] The Trial Court Erred In Determining that Applicant Had Met the Requirements of the Township Ordinances for Preliminary and Final Subdivision Approval.  (Pa304-Pa306).  142-77, therefore the analysis is similar for both applications for preliminary approvals and applications for final approvals.  The Trial Court properly held that the application was a “major subdivision” as defined by [...] Ordinances and the MLUL, and therefore the requirements of [...] Ordinances §§ 142-77 and 142-78 applied to the application.  However, the Trial Court then erred in determining that the Applicant had presented a full application.  The statutory grant of municipal power to zone and to control the subdivision of property is provided by the MLUL.  *Pizzo Mantin Group v. Twp. of Randolph*, 137 N.J. 216, 223 (1994).  As such, “a municipality may, by ordinance, require proposed subdivision plans to be submitted to the planning board. ”  *Id.* at 225; N.J.S.A. 40:55D-37.  If an ordinance is adopted, a subdivision ordinance must include standards for the approval.  *Ibid.*; N.J.S.A. 40:55D-38.  Therefore, municipalities must review a subdivision application in the context of the requirements of the ordinance.  *Id.* at 228-30.  The purpose of the ordinance is not to provide just a checklist item to complete, but provides the framework of how a board addresses the concern for public welfare and sound planning in regulating the subdivision of properties.  *Id.* at 229-30.  [...] has adopted Ordinances §§ 142-77 and 142-78, which govern the submission requirements of preliminary and final plats for major subdivision applications.
[brief] A.  That's correct.  [1T133:25, -134:1-25, -135:1-25.]  However, the 10-inch line was originally installed in 1965 and 1968.  The stated purpose of the 16-inch line was to "increase supplier diversity" and to improve the Monmouth County system, and to "also allow for the in-line inspection of this transmission line, as the current line cannot utilize smart pig technology in its current configuration."
[brief] The present action is a “garden variety” prerogative writ action to review the denial of an application for development by a municipal land use board.  Unfortunately, the Trial Court abrogated its obligation to review the denial under the relevant statutory and case law; and, instead, decided to impose its decision and use the case as a vehicle to demonstrate its knowledge of obscure relief inapplicable to the matter.  In an attempt to impose such relief, the Trial Court ignored the record developed before the municipal land use board and selectively chose those facts which implemented its agenda.  As such, this Appellate Court cannot give countenance to these actions and must overturn the decision of the Trial Court.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(e).  Density restrictions, in the residential context, and FAR restrictions, in the commercial setting, both serve to limit the intensity of the use of the land to be developed.  Commercial Realty, supra, 122 N.J. at 561...  Special reasons are those that promote the purposes of zoning as set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2.  Burbridge, supra, 117 N.J. at 386-87, 568 A.2d 527; Medici, supra, 107 N.J. at 10, 18, 526 A.2d 109.
[brief] What plaintiff now claims – without having pleaded it in her complaint or citing anything in the record – to be “deliberate concealment,” Op. Br. at 23-24, 43-44, is nothing of the sort.  Rather, plaintiff admits that the same facts she claims were “concealed” were disclosed in numerous “countries outside the U.S.,” id. at 24, that had different, less protracted regulatory schemes for pharmaceutical products.  Defendant reported this overseas activity to the FDA (Da0258 ¶70).  The product here – a prescription medicine – and the defendant here, which scrupulously complied with everything the FDA required, are precisely what the PLA was enacted to protect from broad, unprecedented common-law liability theories such as plaintiff’s failure-to-recall claim.\textsuperscript{16}
[brief] The Motion was denied on 3/30/2023.  18.  Unaware of the Order of 5/27/2022, Appellant filed a Motion for Correction of Probation Account Errors and requested consolidation of his current Motion for Reconsideration and requested consolidation with his previous Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of 4/4/2022 (DA469).  The Order of 3/30/2023 (DA20) denied the Motion.  19.  Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of 3/30/2023.  The Court issued a denial on 5/12/2023 (DA14).  Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal, and subsequently an amended Notice of Appeal (DA1) of the Order of 5/12/2023 and the underlying Order of 3/30/2023.
[brief] [...] did not become a plaintiff until 2009.  based on the existing trial court record, any relevant findings of fact found by the trial judge, and such additional testimony or evidence the court may deem necessary for its decision;” and (ii) warned [...] that “[t]his should not be viewed as an opportunity to re-litigate any finding of fact or conclusion made by the trial judge, which has been affirmed on appeal.  Those findings are binding on remand. ”  (Id. at *25-26)  Nevertheless, once again evidencing their recurrent disdain for judicial authority, [...] on appeal seek to reargue [...]’s affirmed and now binding findings of fact and conclusions regarding [...]’s entitlement to an award of punitive damages.  The Wilfs’ arguments in that regard should warrant no further discussion.
[brief] Id. 5.  Prior to 1963, the Congregation operated a synagogue, off [...] on [...] in the [...] (“[...]”), east of the Congregation’s Property.  (7T 20:2-21:25)  6.  Prior to 1963, [...] was the principal of the [...] and the Rabbi of the [...].  Id., at 35:10-16; 36:3-20.  7.  Prior to 1963, [...] and members of the [...] endeavored to build a new Orthodox Jewish synagogue on the corner of [...] and [...], property then owned by the [...].  *Id.*, at 33:18-41:6.  8.  On December 31, 1962, the [...] deeded a portion of its property to the Congregation.  *(Da123-143)*  **Conveyance of the Easement and Construction of Synagogue**
[brief] Id.  Furthermore, [...] testified that when the idea of [...] returning to Long Branch Public School was raised, “[...] got close to his mother’s face, and stared at her. ” (13T:27-8 to 10).  Again, [...] did not testify at the trial and this information was never mentioned in the State’s case.  The court did not sua sponte give a limiting instruction as to how this evidence could be used.  State v. Mesz, 459 N.J. Super. at 319.