ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  In its Opposition, Plaintiff-Respondent [...] (“Plaintiff”) does not refute the arguments made by Defendants-Appellants [...] and [...] (together, “[...]” or the “[...]”).  Plaintiff downplays the trial court’s errors by focusing on [...]’s non-compliance with the Mount Laurel doctrine.  But a finding of non-compliance merely makes a municipality vulnerable to a builder’s remedy lawsuit – it does not eliminate the municipality’s constitutional rights to redevelop or condemn property for redevelopment purposes.  [...]’s non-compliance also does not override the Crowe factors that Plaintiff must satisfy to obtain injunctive relief.  When the trial court preemptively enjoins governmental actions rather than letting the [...] take those actions and be challenged in the normal course, the trial court upends the judicial process.  Plaintiff’s arguments – including those based on [...]’s non-compliance – should be raised as legal arguments in opposition to a condemnation proceeding if one is filed, or in an action in lieu of prerogative writs to challenge a redevelopment action.  Neither the Constitution nor our legal system lets the trial court paralyze [...]’s governing body by enjoining governmental actions before they are taken, especially when the proposed governmental actions are expressly authorized by the Constitution.
[brief] \(^1\)  [...] was an active member of the New Jersey State Police at the time the Ricci Act was signed into law.  The Board has acknowledged that the third-party vendor was not contacted to mail the postcards until more than 30 days after the enactment of the Ricci Act.  The third-party vendor could not mail the notice within 30 days of the enactment of the Ricci Act.  Because notice of the Ricci Act was not sent in accordance with the requirements specified by law, the Board should have granted [...]’s request to register outside the timeframe specified in the Act.  The Board failed to consider its power to relax time limits in the interest of justice or in furtherance of a just accommodation.  It is within the Board’s power to relax time limits.  The Board’s initial denial has failed to consider, evaluate, and weigh [...]’s equitable claims.  Most notably, it failed to even mention the approximately one hundred affidavits submitted that support the fact that these postcards or other any other correspondence were never received by [...] or other members of the pension system.  Furthermore, the Board’s decision inflicts obvious and unnecessary harm upon [...] and fails to advance the legislative purpose of the Ricci Act.  The legislative purpose of the Ricci Act was to provide first responders with the ability to alter their retirement benefits if they have fallen ill as a result of their honorable and heroic service at the largest terrorist attack this country has ever see, not to unnecessarily and arbitrarily deny sick retired troopers accidental disability benefits.  [...] and ninety-seven (97) other active and retired troopers provided affidavits that they never received any notice of the Ricci Act.  Because the Board failed to fulfill its statutory obligation under the Act to provide notice to all the members of the retirement system within 30 days, and further because it appears that the vast majority never got any notice at all, the Board’s determination was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  As such, in the interest of justice and in the furtherance of a just accommodation, we respectfully request that Board’s determination be reversed, and that [...]’s application to register his presence at Ground Zero and his request for amended benefits be granted.
[brief] As the Supreme Court of the United States recently reemphasized in Smith v. Arizona, 144 S. Ct. 1785, 1796 (2024), the right to cross-examine an expert about an analysis he did not conduct does not satisfy the constitution.  “The real witness against” [...], in the context of the verification, was the verifier, not the original analyst.  Ibid.  That is the person who needs to testify about the verification in order to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.  The original examiner being available for cross-examination does nothing to cure the constitutional violation of allowing the examiner to convey the substance of the verifier’s opinion.
[brief] As stated by the Court, [...] still must prove their case on the site plan application in accordance with MLUL standards and applicable case law in order to warrant overall approval of the plan. (pg. 57, para. 3).  As set forth above, the Trial Court provided an exhaustive roadmap for the consideration of the Site Plan Application, which, as the Trial Court found in its August 9, 2022 Order and Opinion, (M479), was strictly followed by all Parties involved.
[brief] To accomplish this, the express language of the IFPA provides for actions brought by the Commissioner to be filed in a “court of competent jurisdiction. ”  *N.J.S.A.* 17:33A-5.  Similarly, for actions brought by an insurance company for damages as a result of a violation of the IFPA, they may sue in a court of competent jurisdiction.  *N.J.S.A.* 17:33A-7.
[brief] Nonetheless, none of those requests was responded to adequately (and most were not responded to at all) until a February 23, 2024, letter from [...].  That letter stated that [...] would be recused because he had testified for the State in this case, and it set forth, for the first time, a specific timetable for the State’s compliance with this court’s remand order, as modified by your November 27, 2023, order.  [...] in response to that order.
[brief] PAGE  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................1  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................2  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................5  A.  The Suppression Hearing .............................................................................5  B.  The Decision of the Trial Court ...................................................................17  C.  Defendant's Guilty Pleas ............................................................................18  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................18  POINT I  The Judge correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress the gun..................................................................................................................18  A.  As Defendant Lacked a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy  Once He Delivered the Gun to a Stranger, No Search Implicating Defendant Occurred.  ..................................................18  B.  The Consent of a Third Party Was Obtained Lawfully, So the Gun Was Seized Lawfully.  ...............................................................22  1.  Valid Consent Was Given by the Daughter, [...]  .........................................................................................................23  2.  [...]  Also Gave Valid Consent to Search ........ 26  CONCLUSION
[directive] AVI:  Sa se yon dokiman piblik.  Pa mete okenn enfòmasyon idantifikasyon pèsonèl sou li, kankou nimewo Sosyal, nimewo Lisans pou kondwi, oswa nimewo kont an bank ak kat kredi aktif yo.  Dokiman sa a ap disponib ba piblik la sou demann jan li soumèt la.  NOTICE:
[brief] \(^10\) --- \(^9\)  “The most common way to prove the harm inflicted by [legal] malpractice is to proceed by way of a ‘suit within a suit’ in which a plaintiff presents the evidence that would have been submitted at trial had no malpractice occurred. ”  *Garcia v. Kozlov, Seaton, Romanini & Brooks, P.C.*, 179 N.J. 343, 358, 845 A.2d 602 (2004).  At such a trial, the plaintiff, who typically was the plaintiff in the underlying case, must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence that: “(1) he [or she] would have recovered a judgment in the action against the main defendant, (2) the amount of that judgment, and (3) the degree of collectability of such judgment. ”  *Id.*; See also *Mosley v. Friauf*, 2023 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 80018 n. 2 (“To prevail in a legal malpractice action, a plaintiff must prove that he would have obtained relief in the underlying lawsuit, but for the attorney's malpractice; consequently, the trial of a legal malpractice claim becomes, in effect, a trial within a trial”; *Shearon v. Seaman*, 198 S.W.3d 209, 214 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citation omitted).
[directive] Jeśli przestępstwo miało miejsce po 8 stycznia 1997 r., musi Pan(i) zapłacić kwotę 30 USD g.  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No] na Fundusz na rzecz Szkoleń i Sprzętu dla Funkcjonariuszy Organów Ścigania?  If the crime occurred on or after January 9, 1997 you must pay a Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund penalty of $30?
[brief] This balance requires a defendant be advised of the specific rights set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), prior to custodial interrogation.  See also State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 400-01 (2009); M.L., 253 N.J. Super. at 20.  “[P]olice must warn [a] suspect (1) of the right to remain silent; (2) that any statement made may be used against him ...; (3) that the person has a right to an attorney; and (4) that if the person cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided. ”  State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 461 (2005)(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444); State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 396-97 (2019).  The State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has waived these rights.
[brief] (Aa19-21; Aa25-36).  DCF’s investigation revealed that, on the morning of September 9, 2022, [...] and [...] engaged in a dispute outside the NJDOL that resulted in police intervention.  (Aa26-27).  It credited [...]’s account that [...] approached her as she collected signatures for a union petition and referred to her by a male name despite being corrected multiple times.  (Aa20l Aa32-34).  This purposeful and repeated misnaming, which the evidence supported continued at the union office later that afternoon, caused [...] to feel “threatened and bullied. ”  (Aa27).  DCF found that [...]’s denial, and his claim of having congratulated [...] on her transition during the September 9 confrontation, lacked credibility when compared to [...]’s account.  (Aa32-34).  In reaching this conclusion, DCF relied on the specificity and consistency of [...]’s allegations, the text message exchange between [...] and [...] about [...]’s interactions with [...] that day, and the video footage, all of which corroborated [...]’s account of the dispute outside the NJDOL building—and it noted that despite having had opportunities to do so, [...] had not provided any evidence to support his claims to the contrary.
[brief] Lastly, in regard to the injuries sustained, N.J.S.A. 4:19-23a(1) requires “bodily injury” to a person during an unprovoked attack.  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1 defines “bodily injury” as any physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.  Here, [...] testified that on a daily basis he has shooting pains going up and down his leg.  (2T:31-9 to 19).  He also stated that he does not have the same power in his leg as he did before the attack.  *(Ibid.)*  Therefore, the court had ample evidence to find that [...] suffered a “bodily injury” as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1 from the unprovoked attack.  In sum, the Law Division had more than enough evidence to find that [...] was potentially dangerous by clear and convincing evidence.  [...] was unprovoked and bit two different people: Kilen [...] on September 12, 2022, and [...] on July 27, 2022.  [...] was also unprovoked and bit two different dogs, killing one of them: [...] on August 4, 2022, and [...] on September 12, 2022.  Despite [...]’s certifications and training, it is clear he poses a serious threat of serious bodily injury or death to a person, and a serious threat of death to another domestic animal.  Therefore, the Municipal Court and the Law Division were correct in finding that the State both N.J.S.A. 4:19-23a(1) and (2).
[brief] Plaintiff took the position at trial that “the standard [for ¶25 of the JOD purposes] is the income at the time the children were going to school.  Not what her income is now (1T:106, L11 – 13).  The Plaintiff testified (“to the best of [her] recollection”) that the first time she provided the Defendant with her income information after the JOD was entered was “2017” which was a year after the youngest child graduated college and five (5) years after she began college (1T:97, L21 – 24).  In fact, the Plaintiff answered “I don’t know” when asked what her income was in 2012 (1T:107, L15 – 20).  Plaintiff testified that in 2010, the parties had a conversation in the driveway of her home whereupon they both agreed that neither one of them could afford $40,000 – $44,000 per year for [...]’s Seton Hall education (1T:127, L8 – 24)
[brief] [...] Exhibit WW from its Index (Da174) of Exhibits inclusive of Exhibits not before the Zoning Board --- being email dated 2/20/2019 from Board Attorney [...] to [...] Attorney [...] with Lakewood Code Book Pages showing Code §18-8 and 18-8.1 dated Revised 12/84 submitted with Exhibits A to EEE as per 6/2/2022  Court Order to Court Da262-265 --- 3  The attached Da257 through 261 are copies of microfilmed newspaper articles from the [...] on the referenced dated in the 1960’s.  The documents are in the quality available and no better-quality document is available.  Lakewood Code Provisions in Place since 2009: A.  §18-905 – Parking Regulations for Places of Worship (Exhibit EE on Index, Da174 submitted by [...])  Da266-267 B.  §18-906 – Parking Regulations for Public and Private Schools (Exhibit FF on Index, Da174 submitted by [...])  Da268-269  Trial Court Opinion invalidating Board Resolution and Dismissing Counterclaim (12/1/2022) and Correction Letter (1/13/2023)  Da270-287  Order for Final Judgment Invalidating Board Resolution and other Relief (12/1/2022)
[brief] REPLYING TO POINT III, THE PUBLIC NOTICE WAS INSUFFICIENT, AND, THEREFORE, THE BOARD LACKED JURISDICTION.  [...] will try not to repeat that which is set forth in Point III of the original merits brief.  The arguments at Pb29 to Pb31 serve only to prove [...]'s point.  The traffic study and other proofs were based on a nine-family development, when in fact the major subdivision approval would authorize an eighteen-family development.  At Pb31 to Pb33, plaintiffs urge that basement apartments were not part of the application.  The application was for the approval of nine single-family homes -- the approval would authorize as many as eighteen single-family homes.  [...] submits that this discrepancy would be highly material to an ordinary lay person and that the public notice should have explained this.  Because the notice failed to do so, and because the Applicant did not publish new notice after being warned of the deficiency, the Board lacked jurisdiction even if the application were otherwise deserving of approval.
[brief] History and Analysis of Rule Amendments: See Online Edition 1.  Overview.  2.  Paragraph (a): Plea Discussions Generally.  3.  Paragraph (b): Entry of Plea.  4.  Paragraph (c): Disclosure to Court.  4.1.  General principles.  4.2.  Prosecutorial disclosure.  4.3.  Terms of plea agreement.  4.4.  Rejection of plea; void plea.  5.  Paragraph (d): Agreements Involving the Right to Appeal.  6.  Paragraph (e): Withdrawal of Plea.  6.1.  Defendant's withdrawal.  6.2.  Prosecutor's withdrawal.  6.3.  Performance of plea agreement.  7.  Paragraph (f): Conditional Pleas.  8.  Paragraph (g): Plea Cut Off.
[brief] [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], [...], former ABSECON CHIEF OF POLICE  [...], ABSECON MAYOR  [...], ABSECON OFFICER  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], VICINAGE I OF THE SUPERIOR COURT, THE NEW JERSEY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, [...], A.S.J.C, AND [...], J.A.D., ACTING AOC ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR, THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND J. DOES #1 TO #100, Fictitious Persons or Entities Whose Real Names are Unknown At This Time, jointly, severally and in the alternative, Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] (Volume 1, Pa 104-114).  Defense counsel produced [...] for a deposition on July 22, 2022.  (Pa. 314-351).  [...]’s counsel served a courtesy copy of the motion papers on [...], the pretrial judge assigned to the case.  (Volume I, Pa. 113-114).  The motions were assigned to two judges, [...], J.S.C. and [...], [...] denied Dr, Bellifemine’s motion to extend discovery and compel [...] because the motion was filed after the trial date and granted defendant’s motion to bar discovery conducted after the trial date because the parties pursued the discovery without permission.
[brief] Instead, [...] submitted only the July 31, 2019, email from [...] to [...], which [...] claims includes the information that [...] provided to [...] in the 2019 application.  (Ia122-126).  “Exclusions” and states in bold, black letters that “[t]his program is not available for surfing activities, ice hockey, lacrosse, rugby or tackle football camps and clinics” (Ia583).  Conspicuously absent from that page or in anywhere in the application is any reference to, or mention of, 12 to 15 passenger vans.
[brief] In response, the Superior Court held that: (a) the MSRA “provides the Designee with authority that impairs the contract rights of the plaintiffs[;]” (b) “Courts have . . . recognized that at times based on extraordinary circumstances contracts of public employment are subject to modification or early termination[;]” and (c) “Plaintiffs were well aware of the financial state of [...] when entering into their respective CNAs and MOAs, it was even included in the language of the agreements.
[brief] THE INITIAL POINT OF IMPACT IS IN DISPUTE AND A JURY DETERMINATION OF THAT LOCATION WOULD LIKELY ALSO DETERMINE WHETHER THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE OPERATION OF HIS VEHICLE Point III  5  THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S LACK OF OBSERVATION WHICH IS ALSO A DISPUTED MATERIAL FACT  The Defendant-Respondent asserts that Plaintiff-Appellant failed to provide sufficient time for consideration of the motor vehicle statute, N.J.S.A. §39:4-123.
[brief] By: s/[...]  MICHAEL HERBERT, ESQUIRE s/[...]  ALENA HYATT, ESQUIRE s/[...]  JOHN C. LOWENBERG, ESQUIRE [...]  A Professional Corporation  By: [...], Esquire (I.D. No. 014951997)  [...], Esquire (I.D. No. 036402005)  [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Respondent, [...]  [...] AND [...], Appellants, v. [...] and [...], Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  On Appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey  Mercer County – Law Division  Docket No.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], A.J.S.C.  BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, [...]
[directive] (p)  Each agency shall ensure that officers assigned to the internal affairs function complete training as mandated by the Division of Criminal Justice.  (q)  Each County Prosecutor shall ensure that each agency within the Prosecutor’s jurisdiction implement and maintain a system of ensuring appropriate training for all personnel involved in the agency’s internal affairs function.  (r)  The Division of Criminal Justice shall conduct periodic “train-the-trainer” courses for all persons assigned responsibility for internal affairs training within the County Prosecutor’s Offices.  1.0.10  The above list represents critical performance standards that every county and municipal law enforcement agency must implement.  Agencies that make a vigorous commitment to the internal affairs process signal their desire to comply with the highest standards of professionalism in law enforcement.  They also ensure that their officers will be accountable for their actions to both the agency and the community.  Agencies that fail to make such a commitment run the risk of failing to uncover policies, practices and procedures that may undermine legitimate efforts to provide the highest quality law enforcement services.  1.0.11  Indifference to the internal affairs function will have a negative impact on the administration of criminal justice and the delivery of police services to New Jersey’s residents.  Agencies that fail to make the internal affairs function a priority can lose the respect and support of the community.  The integrity of individual law enforcement agencies, and the reputation of the State’s criminal justice system, can also suffer if agencies fail to identify and correct officer misconduct.  In addition, law enforcement agencies that fail to implement a meaningful and objective internal affairs process may be found liable in civil lawsuits for their failure to effectively address officer misconduct.  It is for these reasons that the Attorney General has issued this revised policy and directed that the State’s law enforcement agencies implement the critical mandates set forth by the policy.
[brief] In a word, the State needs to have something.  Further, an appellate court is traditionally loath to disturb a lower court’s findings of fact.  Indeed, an appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress evidence “must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision, so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  *State v. Evans*, 235 N.J. 125, 133 (2018) (internal quotations omitted).  See also, *State v. Cohen*, 254 N.J. 308 (2023) (noting that an appellate review will defer to the findings of the trial court absent a mistake so egregious that justice demands correction.)
[brief] C.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE AUGUST 26, 2022, ORDERS DISMISSING RESPONDENTS  [...] AND [...] WITH PREJUDICE (ISSUE RAISED BELOW: SEE OCTOBER 7, 2022, TRIAL COURT ORDER)  The trial court’s October 7, 2022, Order denied the Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration of the two August 26, 2022, Orders dismissing [...] and [...] from this case with prejudice.  This Order was entered in error for the reasons discussed above.  The Appellate Division’s standard of review of an Order granting or denying a Motion for Reconsideration is as follows:  This court's standard of review on a motion for reconsideration is deferential.  See Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021).  Motions for reconsideration are governed by Rule 4:49-2, which provides that the decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.  *Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment*, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015).  *Hoover v. Wetzler*, 472 N.J. Super. 230, 235 (App. Div. 2022).  This Court has reversed trial court Orders in similar circumstances.
[brief] Thus, “a plaintiff may get relief if it relies to its detriment on a defendant’s intentional misleading assertions. ”  *Id.* at 226 (emphasis added) (citing *Bak-A-Lum Corp. v. Alcoa Building Prods.*, 69 N.J. 123, 129-130 (1976)).  “As a general rule, [s]ubterfuges and evasions in the performance of a contract violate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing even though the actor believes his conduct to be justified. ”  *Brunswick Hills Racquet Club*, 182 N.J. at 225 (citations and internal quotes omitted) (emphasis added).  This is exactly what is alleged in the Complaint, as against both [...] and [...].