ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] This Directive promulgates guidance on motions to reopen pretrial detention hearings under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f) in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in In the Matter of the Request to Release Certain Pretrial Detainees decided February 11, 2021.  Under the Criminal Justice Reform Act, defendants who pose a serious risk of non- appearance, danger, or obstruction can be detained before trial if no combination of conditions of release will reasonably guard against those risks.  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15.  Because of the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the continued suspension of jury trials, the length of pretrial detention has been extended in many cases.  In response, the [...] and the [...] ([...]) jointly applied to the Court to enter an Order to Show Cause seeking two forms of relief: (1) the release of all defendants detained for six months or longer whose most serious charge is a second-degree offense or lower, with an opportunity for the State to object in individual cases and seek to justify continued detention under an enhanced burden of proof; and (2) new detention hearings under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f) for all defendants detained for six months or longer who are charged with a first-degree offense and entitled to a presumption of release.  Slip op. at 3.  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f) presents a path for individual defendants to argue against continued detention when (1) there is new information, or a change in circumstances, (2) that is material to the release decision.  Id. at 18.  As to the first prong, the Court found that “[t]he unexpected duration of the pandemic as well as the continued suspension of jury trials, without a clear end date for either, constitutes new information or a change in circumstances. ”  Id. at 19.  However, the second prong of N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f) concerning “materiality” will vary by defendant and turn on the particular facts of each case.  rm  ADA ENSURING DOOR AN OPEN TO JUSTICE with Americans Act Disabilities Directive # 05-21 February 12, 2021
[brief] ”  6T28-4-5.  That exclusion precludes coverage for “any liability, damage, loss, cost or expense:  A.  *Caused directly or indirectly* by the actual, alleged or threatened inhalation of, ingestion of, contact with, *exposure to*, existence of, or presence of any:  1.  *Fungi*, or bacteria….” (emphasis added).  Da277a.  This language is clear, unambiguous, and plainly bars coverage for “liability, damage, [or] loss” caused, “directly or indirectly,” by mold.
[brief] (Pa36, 40).  Plaintiff states that had [...] not failed to keep Plaintiff informed about the transaction, Plaintiff “would have [taken] immediate steps to protect its legal interest to prevent the closing from going forward in Plaintiff’s absence. ” (Pa12, ¶ 46).  As set forth below, however, Plaintiff had no “legal interest” in the transaction because it had already terminated the PSA by receiving back its deposit.
[brief] [...] stayed in the car and waited for them.  (13T 49-18 to 50-16)  After they were done in court, [...] and [...] got back in the car, [...] was now driving because [...] did not have a driver’s license and did not want to be seen driving away from the municipal court.  (13T 51-10 to 18)  [...] asked [...] to drive him to the outlet stores where all three men shopped for 20 to 40 minutes.  (13T 51-20 to 53-6)  They then returned to [...].  The white Corolla was there again, but [...] was not there.  (13T 53-7 to 24)  [...] began to look for the keys to the Corolla inside the car.  [...] never saw him locate the keys.  (13T 54-24 to 55-4)  [...]’s girlfriend then dropped [...] off at the house.  (13T 60-13 to 19)  [...] did not see anyone enter the house.  (13T 61-8 to 9)  About a minute and a half after [...]’s arrival, the police arrived and blocked off the street.  (13T 55-8 to 56-5; 13T 61-15 to 22)  [...] saw one of the officers find the keys to the Corolla in a trash can on the porch, and heard him announce this fact to the other officers.  (13T 56-6 to 57-11)  Buccal DNA swabs were taken of all six men detailed at [...], although only those of the two defendants were later submitted for testing.  (11T 178-12 to 179-9)  DNA swabs of the Corolla’s steering wheel and of various parts of the Smith & Wesson firearm were also taken.  (11T 106-9 to 18)  No DNA matches were reported (11T 131-11 to 132-2; 11T 140-23 to 141-20), nor were any fingerprint matches reported.  (11T 132-3 to 6; 11T 141-21 to 142-13)  The State produced the testimony of a detective from the New Jersey State Police that neither [...] nor [...] had ever applied for a New Jersey gun permit, and that neither of the two guns found at [...] were registered firearms in New Jersey.  (10T 53-12 to 56-21)  This appeal follows.
[brief] Plaintiff Fails to Plead Actual Malice as to Each CAIR Defendant  Even in its error, the trial court below appeared to recognize that the Complaint’s allegations against the [...] were insufficient to plead actual malice.  Thus, it wrongly held that allegations concerning [...] could be imputed to the [...].  See Da_216-18.  This reasoning defied the settled principle that actual malice must be sufficiently pled as to each defendant.  See Durando, 209 N.J. at 251 (“The [actual malice] test is subjective, not objective, and involves analyzing the thought processes of the particular defendant” (emphasis added)); Secord v. Cockburn, 747 F. Supp. 779, 787 (D.D.C. 1990) (“Actual malice must be proved separately with respect to each defendant”).  Indeed, even Plaintiff now appears to concede (by declining to dispute), that it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to impute [...]’s alleged subjective knowledge of falsity to the [...].
[brief] A list of 20 candidate prints was returned by IAFIS.  *Ibid.*  An FBI examiner concluded that the latent print on the detonator was [...]’s.  *Ibid.*  A second examiner verified this conclusion and agreed.  *Id.* at 2.  The Spanish National Police conducted a comparison that showed that [...] was excluded as the person who left the print, but the FBI then retained an “independent expert to review the FBI’s fingerprint identification,” who “concurred with the FBI’s identification. ”  *Id.* at 2-3.  Even when faced with, in the words of a federal investigator, “no corroborating evidence linking [...] to the bombing,” no evidence that [...] traveled, and the fact that [...] had an expired passport, the FBI contained to commit to his guilt due to the fingerprint, speculating that [...] touched the item in the United States and then it was transported abroad.  *Id.* at 58.  The Spanish police, undeterred by the FBI’s fixation on [...], developed a different, and correct suspect, leading to the proceedings against [...] to be withdrawn after he had been incarcerated for two weeks.  *Id.* at 3, 75.  Although many issues led to the wrongful identification and pursuit of [...]—including the cognitive bias of the reviewers—the Office of the Inspector General concluded that the use of a database search was one of them.
[brief] (Pa55-Pa58).  Pursuant to Rule 4:69-6(c) a court can enlarge the time for appeal under Rule 4:69-6(a) “where it is manifest that the interest of justice so requires. ”  The grant or denial of an enlargement of time requires the exercise of judicial discretion and requires consideration of both the impact to the governmental entity and the plaintiff.  Tri-State Ship Repair & Dry Dock Co. v. City of Perth Amboy, 349 N.J. Super. 418, 423-24 (App. Div. 2002).  Here, the Trial Court properly denied Plaintiff’s request for enlargement of time, finding that Plaintiff has raised predominately private interests.
[directive] operational this shall become Section This Inform Char~~ Decisions.  Incident Report to Enforcement Preliminary Law Use of 5.5 an of this arrest for offense subject to the provisions making an officers enforcement Law Preliminary Incident prepare a Law Enforcement practicable, to when encouraged, are Directive or officer to Section 3.2 a designated supervisory prosecutor pursuant consulting a before Report preparing an applying for acomplaint-warrant or before otherwise Section 3.3, or pursuant to prepare application.  It is especially important to of such in support  Cause of Probable Affidavit seek in cases where it might be appropriate to Report Incident Enforcement  Preliminary Law  a  Nothing herein shall be construed County to limit a of release.
[brief] This is outlined in the report of [...]’s Planner [...]’ Report incorporated by reference herein.  (Pa300)  The 1988 Master Plan calls for the relevant area to be zoned for and developed by mixed use development not exceeding $2\frac{1}{2}$ to $3\frac{1}{2}$ stories in height, with a residential density not exceeding 16 units per acre.  The Redevelopment Plan authorizes mixed use buildings of 6 to 7 stories, with a density of 50+ units per acre.  The 1988 Master Plan calls for the existing public parking area (on Lot 3) of about 300 spaces available to the public to be refurbished and expanded to serve the existing amusement area, beach, pier and recreation.  The Redevelopment Plan authorizes building condominiums on the existing public parking, replacing it with public parking of only about 150 spaces and other parking dedicated only to the new buildings/residences.  The Trial Court explained away the inconsistencies as “subjective value assessment.
[brief] Our federal and state Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant “the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. ”  U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, par. 10.  Because the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses who testify in court is the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,” confrontation is “essential” to a “fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations.
[brief] Last, [...] raises several points not properly on appeal.  Most of these issues were not addressed by the trial court by virtue of its determination the agreement was facially unenforceable: who, if anyone, clicked the consent box; whether it applies to [...]; and whether [...] waived its right to arbitrate.  This also includes whether the January 2021 terms become enforceable, never properly raised by [...] below.  While some of these contentions can be addressed by the Court on the thin existing record or as a matter of law, at least in favor of plaintiffs as non-movants, this Court should decline to engage in the expansive exercise of original jurisdiction [...] calls for to resolve others.
[brief] ”  AA15 (emphasis added).  Even putting aside the September 2023 incident and assuming that she did not receive counseling related to that incident, [...]’s undisputed disciplinary history, and most notably the 45 day suspension for untruthfulness, insubordination, and related misconduct more than justified the Commission’s decision to remove her from the eligible list.  As part of the settlement agreement imposing a forty-five (45) day suspension upon her, Ms. [...] admitted to untruthfulness and insubordination following the loss of her firearm.  AA133-37.
[brief] No Certificate of Occupancy would be issued for the newly constructed strip mall.  The 2.5 ft. discrepancy was consistent with the discrepancy between the elevation shown on [...]'s 2005 grading plan originally provided by [...] to [...], and the revised grading plan provided to [...] by [...] in late 2008 but never forwarded by [...] to [...] before [...] performed its stakeout of the new building's elevation in March 2009.  Clearly this incorrect grading of the building site flowed directly from the surveyors' use of the outdated grading plan provided by [...] despite [...]'s knowledge that the old plan had recently been corrected and superseded.  This constituted classic Common Knowledge Negligence by Defendant [...], understandable by an average juror with the testimony of [...] and related witnesses with no need for expert testimony on liability.
[brief] We trust the court's reading of our extensive excerpts and the transcripts will show we have been faithful to the real facts.  The essential point is that neither the ID nor the Decision offered any explanation of why they credited one "testimony" but not the other.  Since cross-examination is the bedrock test of credibility in our courts, this omission is surely fatal.  Here is what we hope is obvious to this court.  In making its overblown claims in their brief and their witnesses' lawyer-curated written direct testimony, [...]'s own lawyers are trying to affirmatively prove that [...] is a stupid, careless and irresponsible utility, willing to place itself and its customers at very considerable and almost daily risks of losses of (allegedly "lifeline") service and other devastating consequences. ”  [...]b7.  Worse still, [...] first installed the 16-inch pipe that it claims can only be serviced by the expensive gas fired regulator in 2012.  It also purchased the regulator in a sole source, non-competitive procurement in 2012.  Since then, [...] has conducted itself in a most casual manner, going through two zoning board proceedings, filing two petitions for relief from the BPU, and then allowing this proceeding to proceed at a relatively leisurely pace.  The ALJ didn't issue the ID for over a year, but [...] made no attempt to hasten the ID.  To give any credence to [...]'s claims is to accept that [...] has been willing to expose itself and its customers to these very considerable risks from 2012 to this day and beyond, for eleven years.
[brief] 1.  On November 12, 2012, Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint against Defendant to enforce its express easement following Defendant’s interference with Plaintiff’s rights, including its right to utilize the Subject Property for parking along Madison Avenue and Fifth Street (“Fifth Street Lot”) and Sixth Street (“Sixth Street Lot”), as well as to connect its HVAC system to the boiler room located on the Subject Property.  (Da1-4)  2.  On April 1, 2013, Plaintiff filed a nine-count Amended Verified Complaint seeking judgment in its favor to determine the [...] granted enforceable easement rights in 1963 or, alternatively, [...] was granted irrevocable rights in the Subject Property.  (Da123-143)  On April 29, 2013, Defendant filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint.  (Da144)  3.  After nearly four (4) years of litigation, on April 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.  (Da160)  In response, on June 28, 2016, Defendant filed a Notice of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.  (Da162)  The only issue argued on the competing motions for partial summary judgment was a question of law, not fact: whether the 1963 Agreement constituted an express easement.  (Da160-164)  On July 15, 2016, the Trial Court entered an Order granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff finding the rights conveyed to Plaintiff by the 1963 Agreement constitute enforceable easement rights (“Partial Summary Judgment Order”).  (Da218-219)  On August 16, 2016, the Trial Court entered an Amended Partial Summary Judgment Order correcting the legal property description.  (Da170 -171)  2017 Trial 4.  Following a five-day trial in 2017 on the issues not resolved by the Partial Summary Judgment, where witnesses on behalf of both parties testified and documents were marked into evidence, the Trial Court entered an Order on June 27, 2017 granting judgment in favor of [...] and against Defendant (“2017 Judgment”) finding (1) Plaintiff was granted an easement; (2) said easement was not waived, abandoned or otherwise terminated; and (3) Defendant violated Plaintiff’s rights by interfering with its easement rights.
[brief] ” (SDa2).  On June 9, 2023, a notation was placed on the eCourts docket again identifying the motion as a “MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT, FAILURE TO STATE CLAIM.” (SDa111).  Also on June 9, 2023, eCourts generated another email notification to the parties about the return date and oral argument, once again identifying the motion as “MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT, FAILURE TO STATE CLAIM. ” (SDa116-18).  [...] did not file opposition to State Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the trial court issued an order granting the unopposed motion on July 10, 2023, citing the same reasoning as applied to the Absecon Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
[brief] .................................................. 272a-278a  Plaintiff’s counsel’s e-mail exchange with Defendant’s counsel from July 6 through September 16, 2021, regarding ongoing settlement negotiations (Exhibit 6 to [...] Reply Cert.)  .................................................. 279a-284a  Stitsworth v. Ford Motor Co., No. 95-5763, 1996 U.S. Dist., Unpub., LEXIS 1657 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 1996)
[brief] ” (Da406).  The court determined that such “[m]andatory differential treatment based on LAD-protected characteristics … invites a violation of the LAD. ”  *Ibid.*  The court rejected Appellants’ argument that an injunction would infringe parents’ fundamental constitutional rights.  The court found to the contrary that “one could reasonably argue that investigation and reporting in accordance with the Revised Policy invites … school staff[] to invade the privacy of students and parents simply to determine whether a student’s protected characteristic or behavior, coupled with other incident, has caused an ‘adverse impact’ to their ‘physical and/or mental health, safety and/or social/emotional well-being.’” (Da411).  It found that the stigma associated with such an unnecessary invasion of the family sphere “may be irrevocable. ” (Da412).  The trial court also found that the State established a threat of immediate and irreparable harm.  (Da407-08).  Citing “unrefuted evidence of disparate impact, including mental health issues, and infliction of physical or emotional harm by immediate family members,” the court found that irreparable injury to students may occur absent preliminary restraints.  (Da408).  And the Revised Policy may cause irreparable harm to school staff, who are subject to discipline “if they misinterpret or fail to report” the so-called “behaviors that may have an adverse impact” on any student’s physical or mental wellbeing.  (Da409).  This fear of discipline would also incentivize over-reporting and exacerbate the potential of harm to students.  (Da410).  And the trial court found that the relative hardship to the parties weighed in favor of the State.  (Da412).
[directive] This section indicates grading of various theft offenses.  38  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2 STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants
[brief] That being said, here, unlike in each of the cases cited by defendant, the comments defendant now complains of came from the detectives' comments during the interview, not in their testimony.  The only exception is the comments on the truthfulness of defendant's interview responses offered by the detective in response to the questions of defense counsel, not the State.  Defendant cannot elicit testimony on the detective's impression of his honesty and then complain about it on appeal.  And again, significantly, defendant did not object to the detective's testimony at trial, and it certainly does not rise to the level of plain error on appeal.  POINT III
[brief] (Reply)  Unpublished decision of Haylett v. Baladi, 2010 WL 2346713 on Westlaw  Pra1  [...]'s advertisement in the Yellow Pages seeking junk cars.  Pra3  Relevant page of [...]'s non-conforming Respondent brief  * Pra4  *  This single-page exhibit is germane to a reply argument in this appeal, see Prb12.  ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES #### Published Opinions | Opinion | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Badiali v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Grp., 429 N.J. Super. 121 (App.Div. 2012) | 12 | | Bove v. AkPharma Inc., 460 N.J. Super. 123 (App.Div. 2019) | 13, 14 | | Calabotta v. Phibro Animal Health Corp., 460 N.J. Super. 38 (App.Div. 2019) | 10 | | Caputo v. Nice-Pak Products, Inc., 300 N.J. Super. 498, 693 A.2d 494 (App.Div. 1997) | 9 | | Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco of N.J., 81 N.J. 548, 410 A.2d 674 (1980) | 9 | | First Atl. Fed. Credit Union v. Perez, 391 N.J. Super. 419 (App.Div. 2007) | 13, 14 | | Horowitz v. Weishoff, 346 N.J. Super. 165, 787 A.2d 236 (App.
[brief] HCPO  Transcript of Defendant’s Statement (appended at Da 4-108)……………1T June 10, 2019 ([...] motion argument)…………………………………………………2T June 28, 2019 (Miranda motion argument and hearing)………………………………3T  January 9, 2020 (in limine motion argument and hearing)……………………………..4T  January 28, 2020 (trial)……………………………………………………………………5T  January 29, 2020 (trial)……………………………………………………………………6T  January 30, 2020 (trial)……………………………………………………………………7T February 3, 2020 (trial)……………………………………………………………………8T  February 4, 2020 (trial)……………………………………………………………………9T  February 5, 2020 (trial)……………………………………………………………………10T  February 6, 2020 (trial)……………………………………………………………………11T  February 7, 2020 (trial)……………………………………………………………………12T  February 10, 2020 (trial)………………………………………………………………….13T  June 24, 2021 (extended-term motion argument)………………………………………14T  August 5, 2021 (sentencing)
[brief] Elazar v. Macrietta Cleaners, Inc., 230 N.J. 123, 135 (2017).  On September 16, 2013, plaintiff [...] was working at the [...], in [...], where she slipped on a wet floor, on her way back to the kitchen area of the store, causing her left arm to land in a bagel kettle filled with hot water.  She suffered first-degree burns to the left side of her face, neck and chest, and second-degree burns to her left flank, forearm, and armpit, as well as visible scarring.  Plaintiff's husband [...] asserts a per quod claim.  --------
[brief] (Pa0205).  The termination of these agreements with [...] and [...]’s claim against [...] for monies due under the architectural services contract (“A/K”).  Both contracts with [...] required [...] to make initial deposits when he signed the contracts.  Both provided for part of the initial deposits to be non-refundable if the customer (“[...]”) “elects to cancel or discontinue the Agreement. ”  To receive the refundable portion of the deposits, the agreements required [...] to make the election to cancel before paying the second required deposits, and in the case of an alleged breach of the construction contract “prior to commencement of work. ”  The HPA incorporated the CC and said [...] would “commence the work following delivery of the [modular] House and shall utilize its best efforts to complete the work within 8-10 months of delivery, on or about February 2010. ” (Pa0205-0206).  The HPA and CC also provided if either party defaulted in his or its obligations under the agreements, the non-defaulting party had the right to terminate, following the giving of “not less than fifteen (15) days written notice” notice setting forth the “specific nature of the other party’s breach” and providing ten (10) days to cure the breach “before termination becomes effective. ” (Pa0206).  [...]’s and [...]’s claims were heard in Arbitration.
[brief] (Da2483-2485).  On March 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed a cross-motion entitled, “Notice of Cross Motion and Opposition to Motion. ” (Da 2486-2487).  In orders entered on June 19, 2023, the probate court granted the Administrator’s motion (Da 2491-2493) and denied Plaintiff’s cross-motion.  (Da 2496-2497).  Plaintiff appealed both of these orders on August 2, 2023.  (Da2494-2495).
[directive] Each ability to impact an officer's Policy and the use-of force justification  General Use of Force discussion of how the Attorney a the specific audio-video New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice apply to established under the defenses include segment where each civilian who The should a scenario that was presented.  program also use-of-force were the principal of a officer is interviewed as if he or she a police portrayed perception and memory can differ from an objective how human investigation to demonstrate of sudden events.