ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See N.J. ex rel. Santiago v. Haig's Serv. Corp., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113188, at *33 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2016) (noting theft from client was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination); see also Parikh v. UPS, 491 F. App’x 303, 307 (3d Cir. 2012) (affirming District Court’s finding that defendants met their burden of identifying a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff, i.e., falsifying timecards.); Rich v. Verizon N.J. Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203131, at *65 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2017) (defendant’s proffered reason for terminating plaintiff, that he falsified answers on a required report, was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his termination).  When asked at his deposition, [...] testified that he had no evidence to dispute that his termination was the result of entering unauthorized charge pay for other staffing coordinators.  (Pa191 at 130:3-17).  He also admitted that unauthorized receipt of charge pay was appropriate grounds for termination.  (Pa194 at 142:24-143:17).  It cannot be disputed that [...] discovered [...]’s receipt of charge pay, that she reported it to [...], who raised it to [...], and that [...] launched an investigation.  Neither [...], nor [...], nor [...] dispute the accuracy of [...]’s notes, which reflect that charge pay was taken without express approval.  (Pa535-41; see also Pa297 at 80:10-14 ([...] admitting at her deposition that she had no firsthand knowledge of [...] ever approving charge pay for any staffing coordinator); Pa547-48 ([...] never received confirmation from [...] as to charge pay); Pa477 ([...] stated he never received approval from [...] to enter the charge pay)).  Based upon the undisputed findings of the investigation reflected in those notes, and the undisputed Kronos Time Card Audit Trial showing the payments, the “term panel” indisputably ended the employed of all three Plaintiffs.  Critically, Defendants have no obligation to correctly determine whether [...] entered and received the charge pay without authorization.  See Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2013).  “This burden is relatively light and is satisfied if the employer provides evidence, which, if true, would permit a conclusion that it took the adverse employment action for a non-discriminatory reason. ”); see also Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether [retaliatory] animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent. ”).  Defendants have more than met their burden to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for [...]’s termination.
[brief] Here, [...] did not have any broad or philosophical discussions with [...] regarding settlement strategies or approach to litigation and, in fact, merely held an initial consultation and then predominately communicated with [...]’ secretary thereafter.  (340a – 341a ¶ 20 – 22).  Notably, the trial Court recognized that Respondents submitted no evidence that [...] had utilized information obtained from the prior matters:  It should also be noted that there is no evidence that the [...] has so utilized this information in the current litigation and, as such, this Court is specifically finding no basis upon which to determine that any RPCs, including 1.9 or 1.10, were in any way violated.  (T24:23 – T25:3) (emphasis added).  This is telling.  Despite approximately one and a half years of litigation and discovery, Respondents have not produced a single shred of evidence that this purported “confidential information” has been misused, or used at all in this straightforward matter involving the failure to pay back loans.  Thus, the trial court should have rejected Respondents’ request for disqualification as there was no evidence submitted that [...] had obtained confidential information or insight and certainly no evidence that the information was being utilized against Respondents.
[brief] The proposed use will satisfy MLUL objectives while increasing aesthetics for an important area of the town and will not impact neighboring properties.  Plaintiff’s contention that increased density will result in unsustainable traffic is not born out by the evidence.  Therefore, the Board did not err in granting defendant the various (c) and (d) variances.  (Pa71).  Plaintiff brings no new argument or evidence demonstrating an abuse in discretion of the Trial Court’s reasoning.  II.
[brief] The lower court orders providing for this case to be resolved by default rather than on its merits contravenes New Jersey law stressing that determination of court disputes by default should be avoided wherever possible.  This is not a case where a party failed to respond to discovery requests.  Defendants answered plaintiffs’ requests several times, the record shows, by initial then amended and supplemental responses.  Though plaintiffs continued to claim insufficiency with defendants’ responses, the record shows that [...] reviewed this in detail, at the February 8 conference, and detailed for defendants what must be provided to obtain compliance and restore their Answer.  Defendants did this – serving their amended responses with the certifications that [...] directed.  Whatever responses possibly remained deficient as the lower court said at the June 12 and prior March 6 motion hearings denying reinstatement (which defendants dispute and the record on appeal does not support), the record does not present such “drastic circumstances of noncompliance with discovery” that warrants imposing the ultimate sanction on these defendants.  It was improper under the circumstances shown by this record to deprive defendants of a determination of plaintiffs’ hotly contested claims on their merits.  CONCLUSION
[directive] I.  PURPOSE  This Department recognizes that some law enforcement officers commit acts of N.J.S.A. et. seq. domestic violence as defined in 2C:25-17  The integrity of the law enforcement profession and the community's trust in law enforcement are dependent upon a uniform policy on the handling of such incidents.  II.  POLICY  This Department will act quickly where incidents of domestic violence are alleged to have occurred to protect the victim, arrest the perpetrator, where appropriate, and conduct parallel administrative and criminal investigations.  In addition, the Department will work to develop and implement appropriate, case-specific remedies to the situation.  This policy for handling of domestic violence incidents involving law enforcement
[brief] The car’s GPS showed it traveling around Piscataway between noon and 1:00 p.m., returning to the hotel at 1:37 p.m.; traveling to Perth Amboy, returning to the hotel around 2:30 p.m.; traveling to Essex County, arriving in Irvington at 3:06 p.m. and in Newark at 3:59 p.m.; leaving Newark at 5:28 p.m., and arriving back at the hotel around 5:40 p.m., where it remained until 6:35 p.m.  After leaving the hotel at 6:35 p.m., the car went back to Piscataway before going to the barbershop.  (13T 92-8 to 97-20)  After leaving the barbershop, the car traveled around Edison for about 40 minutes, making at least one stop at a 7-Eleven, before returning to the hotel at 9:50 p.m.  (13T 98-8 to 99-23)  The surveillance footage from the hotel, which captured activity around the lobby and main entrance, did not show the Chrysler when it returned to the hotel in the afternoon and early evening.
[brief] The Judicial Standard of Review of the Decision of the [...] Requires Deference To the Board Unless There Has Been a Clear Abuse of Discretion | 10 | | II.  The Board’s Decision to Approve the Application was not Arbitrary, Capricious or Unreasonable or in Violation of the Municipal Land Use Law | 11 | | A.  The Trial Court Properly Held that that [...]’s Application Met The Requirements of the Robbinsville Ordinances.
[brief] For example, if there is an emergent event or dangerous condition, this is way the City can communicate with residents to warn and advise them of how to proceed.  If residents become aware that signing up for [...] will lead to the disclosure of their personal e-mail address to anyone who asks for it, they are unlikely to continue using the service.  This could prevent residents from receiving lifesaving communications.  The lower court indicated that, “If one receives an unsolicited e-mail, one can simply block or change it. ”  Da110.  It was the City’s position in response to the OPRA request and subsequent Order to Show Cause that simply blocking an e-mail will not address the potential issue.  Further, changing an e-mail address is not a simple endeavor.  As indicated above, e-mail addresses are used for almost all personal and business correspondence, and an e-mail address itself is utilized as user identification for various websites, including banking websites.  If the Court’s Decision were to stand as is, it would mean that essentially any person or organization could obtain the e-mail addresses of every single person in every municipality that uses [...] or a similar service.  This means that residents will be faced with making a choose to receive important public information and inevitably being spammed with never ending unwanted e-mails, and potentially subject to hacking attempts, or forgo registering to receive important and potentially lifesaving emergency communications from the City and maintaining confidentiality in their personal email, cellphone and other contact information.
[brief] If the Court had done so, what difference would it have made?  Does Defendant seriously claim that he would somehow have taken action to preserve the testimony of [...] or to somehow enhance his ability to locate him in the time period between the settlement in February 2020 and September 2020 when they sat on their hands for nearly two years after being sued?  Furthermore, [...] presumably knew of the potential claim for legal malpractice.  As set forth by [...] on page sixty-eight (68) of his deposition, when an attorney blows a deadline to cancel a lease, they should know that there is a potential legal malpractice claim.  The record does not contain anything from either Mr. [...] or his counsel providing competent evidence of any prejudice they have suffered as a consequence of the supposed failure of [...] to amend a R.4:5-1 statement when the party who had been identified in such a statement is not subject to joinder in the action and when the claims of legal malpractice were exempt from the entire controversy doctrine.
[brief] 53.  Court stretches its lack of credibility further by falsely claiming (p. 16), "even assuming en arguendo that [...] has standing to file exceptions to the Intermediate Account, his exceptions are flawed and fail pursuant to R. 4:87-8 of Court Rules, which states, "[t]he exceptions shall state particularly the item or omission excepted to, the modification sought in the account and the reasons for the modification."  The only problem with that Court denial is that each of my Exceptions did state particularly the items or omissions for exceptions, the modifications sought in the accounting, and the reasons for the modifications.  54.  To make the Court's biased attempts to take away my legal rights in this Case even more egregious, it cited a portion of R.4:87-8 (See par. 53), while ignoring the part of R.4:87-8 that supports my legal rights, as a designated "interested party" to submit Exceptions to [...], CPA, based on:  In all actions for the settlement of accounts, other than plenary actions, any interested person may, at least 5 days before the return of the order to show cause or within such time as the court allows, serve the accountant written exceptions, to any item in or omission from the account 55.  Court doubled down on its lack of credibility for its ruling (p. 16) (33a) by citing "an exception may be stricken because of its insufficiency in law", and then falsely ruling that "[...]'s exceptions are insufficient as a matter of law because they relate to style rather than substance, concern matters of fiduciary discretion, or do not relate to the accounting", all of which were falsely claimed by [...], but refuted by me, since none of his claims are supported by facts challenging my Exceptions, all of which relate to substance of Trust assets, substance of Trust expense deductions against assets, and substance of required reporting details for figures in the Trust Accounting.
[directive] SECTION 2  OVERVIEW OF BASIC APPROACH OF THESE GUIDELINES  2.1  Essential Features of the Brimage Guidelines  These Guidelines govern how prosecutors are to handle cases arising under Chapter 35 of Title 2C that are subject to a waivable mandatory term of imprisonment and parole ineligibility (“Brimage-eligible offenses”).  These Guidelines are designed to establish a unified statewide plea negotiation system that is uniform, rational and proportionate, giving fair warning to would-be drug dealers and differentiating the culpability of offenders based upon objective criteria that can be uniformly assessed and applied by prosecutors in all counties.  This plea negotiation system employs basic features from the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, as well as from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  The system adopts one of the central principles of the sentencing provisions of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice by establishing a range of permissible sentencing outcomes with a “presumptive” term fixed at or around the midpoint of the range.  Prosecutors will be permitted to extend a plea offer other than the presumptive offer only after considering carefully-defined aggravating and mitigating factors.  This system complies with the Supreme Court’s directive in State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998), that, “the [Attorney General] guidelines should specify permissible ranges of plea offers for particular crimes and should be more explicit regarding permissible bases for upward and downward departures. ”  153 N.J. at 25.  To ensure the greatest possible degree of uniformity, the system assigns point values for each aggravating or mitigating factor.  A prosecutor is authorized to extend a plea offer above or below the presumptive plea offer displayed in the appropriate cell in the Table of Authorized Plea Offers only where a numeric calculation of all applicable aggravating and mitigating points exceeds an established threshold.  The system borrows from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines the use of a matrix of offense conduct and criminal history (“Table of Authorized Plea Offers”).
[brief] Subject to the right to be prosecuted by indictment, if any court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action or issue therein or if there has been an inability to serve a party without whom the action cannot proceed as provided by R. 4:28-1, it shall, on motion or on its own initiative, order the action, with the record and all papers on file, transferred to the proper court or administrative agency, if any, in the State.  The action shall then be proceeded upon as if it had been originally commenced in that court or agency. ”
[brief] Specifically, with respect to Tenant’s argument that the Rent Arrears should be offset by the 2020 and 2021 Tenant Allowance payments that Tenant would have been owed had it not been in monetary default under the Lease, [...] stated the following:  THE COURT:  …  And it was the defendant’s position that they owed $196,669.16, however they believed that that would have been, should have eclipsed by $334,000 in refund, a refund that they would be due under Section 4.02 of the lease to compensate them for a certain percentage of the fit up cost.  …  THE COURT: Okay.  All right, well let me – just to somewhat simplify things, or I hope it will simplify things, I’ll give you my ruling on certain legal issues.  First of all, the plaintiff had argued that the defendant was not entitled to the refund because they were in breach.  And my reading of the contract, I think that bears out.  You know you want those refunds, you’ve got to be, you can’t be in breach.  So there is rent due and owing for this period of time (2T4-7 to 2T4-13, 2T6-18 to 2T7:2).  Tenant, however, refused to accept this ruling and continued to argue that the $196,669.16 in Rent Arrears Tenant admittedly owed to Landlord for April 2020 through August 2020 should be offset by the 2020 and 2021 Tenant Allowance payments.  (2T9-2 to 2T9-9).  [...] clearly and unambiguously rejected this argument because, under the express terms of the Lease, Tenant was not entitled to these payments where it was admittedly in monetary default when they came due.
[brief] ” (Pa3).  The Trial Court concluded that Plaintiff had not sufficiently pled the elements of disability discrimination under the NJLAD.  In that regard, the Court noted that Plaintiff made only “vague assertions” that unnamed firefighters referenced in the Second Amended Complaint “consisting of those now and in the future” “have a disability because they have taken sick or injury leave. ”  In so doing, the Court highlighted that no disability for any purported member was identified anywhere in the Complaint, just generalized claims of sick days taken.  (Pa3-4).  The Court concluded that Plaintiff had failed to adequately plead/identify even the most basic of *prima facie* elements of a LAD claim, i.e., that any member alluded to in the Second Amended Complaint fell within a protected class.  (Pa4).  The Trial Court also concluded that Plaintiff failed to adequately plead other *prima facie* elements of a disability discrimination/failure to accommodate case with respect to the unidentified members alluded to, e.g., that they were qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, that they were terminated or otherwise suffered an adverse employment action due to disability, etc.  (Pa4).  [...] further and in sum concluded that “Plaintiff has failed to establish a *prima facie* case of failure to accommodate a disability because Plaintiff has not established the elements of such. ”  *Id.*  The Trial Court also found that Plaintiff had failed to join indispensable parties that would be “necessary to [any] judgment” in this action.  By way of example, the Court noted that Plaintiff sought LAD compensatory damages for claimed instances of unidentified members being subjected to discrimination; yet, there was no appropriate party in interest in the case to whom such damages could be awarded.  (Pa4).  For all of these reasons, the Trial Court concluded that the “defects in the Amended Complaint are more than enough to warrant dismissal at this stage” and, as such, that the Court would not address the other arguments of counsel.
[brief] Defendant never appealed the Order of May 27th, 2022.  Defendant failed to present any new facts or information to support reconsideration of the judgment entered on May 27th, 2022.  [Da17-18]  On October 7th, 2022, the court denied the remaining part of defendant’s motion (raised for the first time), concerning removal of documents from the docket.  [Pa6; Trans. ID: [...]]  On November 7th, 2022, Defendant filed her Notice of Appeal, challenging only the Order of September 23rd, 2022; she did not appeal the underlying Order of May 27th, 2022, nor did she request the transcript of the oral argument that took place before [...].
[brief] Plaintiff’s linchpin argument is that Shaw “overruled” or “superseded” Plemmons.  Reading Shaw for what it is – not what Plaintiff would like it to be – shows that the trial court was correct that Plemmons is still dispositive of the issue presented here.  In Shaw, this Court addressed both the “narrow issue” of “whether semi-professionals such as home inspectors should be deemed to be learned professionals” for the purposes of exemption from the CFA, in addition to the “broader basis [of] how and when the ‘learned professional’ exemption should be applied by courts to exempt individuals from CFA liability.
[brief] On December 1, 2022, the NJ DEP issued the final agency decision regarding the “Flood Hazard Area Verification and Flood Hazard Area Individual Permit, [...]” to [...].  The permit “authorizes the construction of seven warehouses, associated internal roadways, parking, stormwater management features and other associated amenities. ”  The DEP also “determined that this project meets the requirements of the Stormwater Management rules at N.J.A.C. 7:8. ”  While the pipe culvert is not specifically mentioned, the “statement of authorized impacts” includes a new roadway crossing a water with 9,091 square feet of riparian zone impacts.  The final agency decisions were published in the DEP’s Bulletin on December 21, 2022.  On February 6, 2023, Appellant filed a notice of this appeal seeking review of the DEP’s erroneous December 1, 2023 permit decisions.  On June 8, 2023, the DEP served the Statement of Items Comprising the Record on --- 12 DEP, Bulletin Vol. 46, Issue 24 at 239 (Dec. 21, 2022) Appeal.
[brief] There is no dispute that the jury was charged on the incorrect form of unlawful possession.  Instead, the State tries to cobble together a proper charge for those convictions based on other parts of the judge’s overall instructions.  In that vein, it is notable that, with respect to the element that the State must prove the defendant did not have a valid permit, the State relies not on an actual instruction, but only on the stipulation submitted with respect to that issue.  Our Supreme Court has already held that the failure to instruct the jury on that element alone, even where it is uncontested, is reversible error.
[directive] A person who is uncooperative, fails to comply with directions from an officer, and instead actively attempts to avoid physical control.  This type of resistance includes, but is not limited to, evasive movement of the arm, flailing arms, tensing arms beneath the body to avoid handcuffing, and flight.  In a correctional institution, any member of a group of four or more inmates or detainees who fails to comply with an order from a correctional police officer – or a single inmate or detainee who fails to comply with an order related to handcuffing inside a cell or secured tier – shall be considered an active resistor.  See Section 2.6 (requiring that officers provide warning and an opportunity to comply before force is used against active resistors).  Bodily Injury.
[brief] [...] and [...] (“[...]”), and on December 21, 2012, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint adding [...], [...], [...], and [...] (“[...]”) as Defendants.  1a.\(^1\)  Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleged that, in addition to the legal malpractice of Defendants [...] and [...], all Defendants had conspired to commit fraud, conversion, and tortious interference with a contract and business advantage.  1a-17a.  In summary, Plaintiffs’ case centered on Defendants’ wrongful conduct in blocking Plaintiffs’ efforts to develop a mixed-use rental townhome/commercial development, and later, an affordable housing development, on property located in [...], New Jersey, known as “[...]. ”  1a-17a.  Plaintiffs alleged that after agreeing that Plaintiffs would pursue such a development, Defendants connived to have [...] rezoned for affordable housing so that Defendant [...] could build a mixed-use market rate development on a different property that [...] sought to develop in [...], \(^{1}\) “Pa” denotes the accompanying appendix.  Transcript references are as follows:  1T= October 12, 2018  Transcript of Motion to Bar Hearing 2T= November 30, 2018  Transcript of Motion for Reconsideration Hearing 3T= February 15, 2019  Transcript of Summary Judgment  Motion Hearing 4T= January 19, 2023  Transcript of Rule 104 Hearing 5T= January 20, 2023  Transcript of Rule 104  Hearing known as “[...]. ”  1a-17a.  The rezoning of [...] to 100% affordable housing would allow Defendant [...] to develop [...] with little or no affordable housing obligation.  1a-17a.  Defendants then prevented Plaintiffs from acting as the affordable housing developer at [...], instead causing Defendant [...] to get that project.  1a-17a.  Defendants [...] and [...] filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint on January 31, 2013.