ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On that date, Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle operated by an insured of [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) which carried UM/UIM limits in the amount of $100,000.00.  The tortfeasor in that matter was insured with a policy of insurance with [...] in the amount of $15,000.00; and the Plaintiff also had a policy of insurance with [...].  However, the Plaintiff’s policy of insurance carried UM/UIM limits in the amount of $25,000.00.  Id. at 644.  Upon learning of the coverage limits of the tortfeasor, Plaintiff’s attorney placed [...] on notice of Plaintiff’s intention to seek UIM benefits under the policy it issued to the driver of the vehicle in which Plaintiff was a passenger.  Thereafter, on October 3, 2006, Plaintiff’s insurance carrier [...] sent a letter to Plaintiff’s Counsel which indicated that [...]’s policy had limits of $100,000.00 and went on to state:  “‘the host vehicle is primary for the UM/UIM coverage.  I have contacted [...] . . . and they have accepted this claim as a valid claim, also note their limits are $ 100/$ 300 in Bodily Injury and I have lower coverage so, therefore, there is no valid [GEICO] UM/UIM coverage for this loss. ’”  Id.  In addition, a letter dated October 3, 2006 from [...] requested information regarding plaintiff’s injuries and claims.  Id.  Thereafter, the [...] claims adjuster “confirmed, by telephone with plaintiff’s counsel, that the [...] policy coverage was primary, with limits of $100,000.00 per person, $300,000.00 per accident. ”  Id.  Two months after receiving that phone call, the tortfeasor’s carrier offered its limits of $15,000.00 and consent to settle was requested pursuant to Longworth v VanHouten.  Id.  After consent was given to settle with the tortfeasor, [...] attempted to negotiate a settlement from December 2006 through April 2007.  Id. at 645.  Thereafter, despite a request for Plaintiff’s declaration page on October 3, 2006, Plaintiff finally provided it in May 2007.  When the declaration sheet was provided, [...] discovered the Plaintiff’s personal UIM limits were only $25,000.00 and sought to enforce its step-down clause.
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT DID NOTHING IMPROPER BY EVALUATING THE DISCOVERY PRESENTED IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO AMEND THE PLEADINGS AND DETERMINING THAT MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED**  Plaintiff attempts to argue that the Court erred in considering facts outside of the Complaint in deciding the Motion for Leave to Amend, *while completely ignoring the fact* that Plaintiff’s own motion papers sought to have the Court consider facts outside the Complaint in order to grant her request for an adverse inference and to have facts specifically deemed uncontroverted for the purposes of motions and trial.  (Pa13 to Pa120).  Plaintiff submitted over one hundred pages annexed to the October 24, 2018 Motion to Leave to Amend the Complaint.  (Pa13 to Pa120).  This is tantamount to throwing everything at the wall and seeing what sticks.  Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend requested relief that went beyond the motion itself.  (Pa12).  Plaintiff wanted a count for fraudulent concealment to be added to the complaint, an adverse inference of spoliation, and asked the Court to deem certain facts as conclusively established.  (Pa12).  Plaintiff essentially asked the Court for summary judgment on the “facts” within a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint.  [...], like this Respondent, had to dissect and decipher the motion’s true intent and address even the most curious arguments.
[directive] The provisions of this Directive shall remain in force and effect unless and until it is repealed, amended, or superseded by Order of the Attorney General.  E. compliance.  Every law enforcement agency operating under the Implementation and authority of the laws of the state of New Jersey shall implement or adopt policies consistent with this Directive.  Any officer who knowingly violates the requirements of this Directive or the agency’s policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order, or applicable laws, shall be subject to discipline.
[brief] (Pa19-20).  Plaintiff originally filed a pro se complaint on August 12, 2020.  (Pa1).  The Township filed a Motion to Dismiss, relying on the protections and immunities of Title 59 Tort Claims Act.  (Pa14).  The Motion was opposed by counsel, who Plaintiff had subsequently retained.  The parties appeared for oral arguments on the Township’s Motion on November 21, 2021, which was ultimately denied.  (Pa16).  The parties proceeded through the discovery phase until its close on April 3, 2023.  At the conclusion of discovery, the Township moved for Summary Judgment on April 28, 2023.  (Pa34).  Plaintiff filed opposition to the motion on May 16, 2023.  (Pa40).  The parties appeared for oral arguments on the Township’s motion for summary judgment on October 20, 2023, and the Honorable [...], J.S.C. granted the motion.  (Pa376).  Plaintiff thereafter filed the within appeal on November 29, 2023.  (Pa387).  LEGAL ARGUMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] Accordingly, DEP’s February 11, 2010 HAD for the 300 Line Project is not a valid precedent for the East 300 Upgrade Project currently at issue.  As for [...]’s NEUP, the portion of this project within the Highlands Preservation Area was “approximately 7.6 miles of new 30-inch outside diameter underground natural gas pipeline adjacent to the existing 24-mch natural gas pipeline,” Aa0291, as well as “above ground improvements. ”  Aa0291.  DEP characterized the proposed activity as a “new upgrade project. ”  Aa0291 (emphasis added) and did indeed “determine[] that the project…qualifie[d] for [Exemption #11].”  Aa0297.  But, as with the 300 Line Project, this DEP decision regarding NEUP preceded the 2013 case of Highlands Applicability and should be analyzed under the proper statutory construction of “routine upgrade” – not \textsuperscript{40}  Id. at P 6.  \textsuperscript{41}  Id. simply “upgrade” (let alone “new upgrade”).  Therefore, while here DEP did not explicitly defer to [...] to determine the need for the proposed activity, it is still logical to consider the [...] Certificate for NEUP dispositive of the issue of the exact purpose of the relevant New Jersey portion of NEUP; this [...] Certificate was issued by the government agency with the expertise to determine the issue of need.
[brief] (Pa49.)  On June 28, 2024, after reviewing all parties’ submissions and hearing oral argument, [...] granted summary judgment in favor of the [...].  (Pa1.)  [...] articulated his reasons for granting summary judgment as follows:  [T]he Court cannot qualify Defendants’ Property as commercial.  Simply put, the Property was not designed with the intention of generating any income or profit.  Defendants purchased the Property to reside there as a family and in fact continue to reside there.  It was not owned in any way for investment purposes, nor did Defendants expect to receive any benefit from the use of the sidewalk at issue.  The Property was and is strictly used as Defendants’ private home, and the fact that renovations were ongoing at the time of the incident does not impact or otherwise alter these findings.  * * *  The Court is satisfied that the Supreme Court case Foley v. Ulrich, 50 N.J. 426 (1967) – as cited by Defendants – is on “all fours” with the facts of this case.  Accordingly, as Foley sets forth, to allege that Defendants poorly cleared snow and/or ice from the sidewalk is not enough to circumvent the bar against imposing liability on residential property owners.  Foley, 50 N.J. at 427.  Simply put, clearing of snow is not tantamount to the creation of a hazardous condition aside from one caused by natural forces.  Thus, because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants somehow created a new element of hazard or danger, Defendants cannot be held liable for any injuries Plaintiff sustained from the subject accident.  (Pa10.)
[brief] N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.49.  The intent and purpose of the PWCRA is further delineated by its express definition of “Worker” to be protected thereby:  “Worker” includes laborer, mechanic, skilled or semi-skilled laborer and apprentices or helpers employed by any contractor or subcontractor and engaged in the performance of services directly upon a public work, who have completed or are actively participating in a registered apprenticeship program, regardless of whether their work becomes a component part thereof, but does not include material suppliers or their employees who do not perform services at the job site.  N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.50.  (emphasis added)  There can be no dispute that those employed by an archaeological firm are not “construction industry workers” as defined under the PWCRA or that the Legislature sought to protect thereunder.
[brief] Plaintiff’s answers to interrogatories specifically allege he was caused to slip and because of icy conditions he encountered immediately upon stepping out onto the landing.  (Pa315).  Plaintiff’s own liability expert specifically concluded the low coefficient of friction that allegedly existed at the moment of plaintiff’s fall was caused by the icy conditions.  (Pa471, report of [...], pg. 17).  Plaintiff’s own weather expert noted  The National Weather Service had issued a Winter Weather Advisory for freezing rain go into effect at 4 AM.  . . .  Around the time of the slip-and-fall incident, 7:30 AM, it was cloudy and 32 degrees with light freezing rain.  (Da13-Da26, report 7/3/23 [...]).  The opinions of plaintiff’s liability expert re: the existence of allegedly prior slippery conditions caused by rainfall accumulating on the stairs after the painting was done had no basis in the facts of this case.  The most obvious example of the expert simply ignoring the facts of the case is the opinion that “[t]he design of the stairs allows rain water to accumulate on the stairs creating a slip and fall hazard. ” (Pa463, report of [...], pg. 9).  It rained on more than 15 occasions after the steps were painted but before plaintiff fell.  (Da27-Da45, report 11/17/23 [...])  Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony directly contradicts the opinion by the expert that rain on the stairs previously created a slipping hazard:
[directive] Commencing a criminal investigation into the subject matter of an internal affairs complaint will suspend the 45-day rule pending the disposition of that investigation; such suspension remains until the disposition of the criminal investigation.  (Similarly, a criminal investigation will toll the notice requirements established in Sections 6.1.4 – 6.1.6.)  Upon disposition of the criminal investigation, agencies will once again be bound by the 45-day INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 25 rule, with the 45-day period starting anew upon termination of the criminal investigation.  Therefore, in the event a County Prosecutor has initiated a criminal investigation of an internal affairs matter, the internal affairs function must remain in contact with the County Prosecutor on a regular basis to determine the investigation’s progress.  Where a County Prosecutor has decided to terminate a criminal investigation and return the matter to the agency for appropriate disciplinary action, the internal affairs investigator and County Prosecutor must be able to document the date on which the County Prosecutor disposed of the criminal investigation.  6.1.9
[brief] Put into the simplest terms possible, the Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims against [...] and [...].  Their claims belonged exclusively to [...], as evidenced by the judgments [...] already obtained against the various [...] entities in connection with the intercompany loan agreements.  The trial court erred in concluding that [...] and the Plaintiff were synonymous and could be used interchangeably.  The Plaintiffs’ testimony at trial reveals that they suffered absolutely no personal financial harm from the alleged improper transactions and sustained no “special injuries. ”  Notwithstanding the absence of any personal financial damage stemming from the allegations contained in the complaint, [...] awarded damages to the Plaintiffs in the exact same amount as the sum of the judgments obtained by [...] against the [...] entities – further solidifying the fact that the Plaintiffs had sustained no real damages of their own – and conclusively establishing the fact that the trial court failed to distinguish between the corporate entity and the Plaintiffs here.  [...], upon his assignment to Chancery, inherited [...]’s post-trial judgment and order.  [...] then entered a final judgment and – at the request of Plaintiffs – amended the case caption to include [...] in an apparent effort to “remedy” the issue of standing.  The entry of judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs and the subsequent amendment of the case caption to include [...] as a plaintiff was clear error and should be reversed.
[brief] *Ibid.*  Thus, the fact that one option might be viewed as “superior” does not render the governing body’s decision rejecting that option in favor of another rational option as arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  Here, the modification reducing the total number of units to be constructed was a rational decision by the Borough, in light of the fact that a larger portion of the Property would be dedicated to open space and passive recreation.  There was unrebuted expert planning testimony that the addition of this open space is consistent with Objective Two and Objective Six of the Master Plan.  See Pa 31.  The number of affordable units was not changed; i.e., the Amended Redevelopment Plan’s inclusion of 70 affordable units remains consistent.  Therefore, the amendment to the Redevelopment Plan furthered Objective Three, which aims to satisfy the Borough’s affordable housing obligation.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Respondents [...] and [...]  By: ____________________________  [...]  Dated: October 5, 2023  [...], PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], CHARLES KUCINSKI, LISA DANCHECK MARTIN, JOHN DOE ADMINISTRATORS AND STAFF 1-10, AND ABC BOARD MEMBERS 1-10, SAID NAMES BEING FICTITIOUS, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM FINAL ORDER OF SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW  DIVISION: ESSEX COUNTY  DOCKET NO. [...]  SAT BELOW: HON.  BRIDGET  A. STECHER, J.S.C.  DEFENDANTS – RESPONDENTS  [...] AND [...]’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL
[brief] I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................................................4  II.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT AND CROSSCLAIMS AGAINST PURE POWER ENGINEERING, INC.  IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT STATUTE, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27...............................................................................................................................4  A.  The Factual Allegations by Appellant in the Trial Court Complaint Implicate that an Affidavit of Merit Was Required and Appellant’s Complaint and Crossclaims Against [...] were Properly Dismissed as Appellant Failed to Obtain an Affidavit of Merit in Accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27...............................................................................................................................4  B.  The Limited Common Knowledge Exception is Inapplicable because the Average Lay Juror Does Not Have Knowledge of the Duties of Professional Engineers’ Code of Ethics or their Profession Standard of Care.................................8  C.  The Limited Extraordinary Circumstances Exception is Inapplicable to the Facts Alleged by Appellant.............................................................................................................9  III.  CONCLUSION  ....................................................................................................................11  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] ”  Catalane v. Gilian Instrument Corp., 271 N.J. Super. 476, 501 (App. Div. 1994).  As stated above, The Supreme Court further that the most important factor to take into consideration is the “rehprehensibility of the conduct. ”  In [...], Plaintiff a senior corrections officer for the [...] (“[...]”), sued the [...] for violating the LAD when it failed to accommodate her request for a three-month leave of absence due to her diagnosis of multiple sclerosis.  After a lengthy trial, the jury agreed with [...] and awarded her approximately $1.8 million in emotional distress and economic compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages.
[brief] Notwithstanding that [the witness] identified defendant for the first time in court, her identification was constitutionally valid.  See *United States v. Domina*, 784 F.2d 1361, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986) (observing that no decision of the Supreme Court requires in-court identifications to meet the same standards of reliability as pretrial identifications), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038 (1987).  Although undercut by the long delay between the crime and the trial, the reliability of the identification is supported by other considerations....  [The witness] had ample opportunity to view the assailants under circumstances in which she was seeking to establish their identities.  The courtroom atmosphere was suggestive, but not so much so as to outweigh the reliability of the identification.  Defense counsel had ample chance to challenge the accuracy of the identification on cross-examination, and the jury was free to discount its value based on [the witnesses'] inability to identify anyone on earlier occasions.  See *Domina*, 784 F.2d at 1368 (noting that one advantage of in-court identification over pretrial identification is that jury can observe [the] witness during identification process).  *17  [Id. at 327-28.]  Thus, first-time in-court identifications are admissible under *Clausell* and were not revised or eliminated under *Henderson*, which only addressed suggestive pre-trial identifications.
[brief] (Cma1 to 21).  at the [...] in preparation for the warrant’s execution that morning.  (1T42-5 to 44-10; 1T48-1 to 50-2; 1T67-10 to 21; 1T78-25 to 79-22; 1T87-3 to 17; 5T71-6 to 73-6).
[brief] At the next, April 17, 2023, hearing, Plaintiff presented [...] to discuss the “data that [[...] has seen] from other traffic engineers, particularly transportation planning and design on some evaluations that they’ve done safety before and after studies. ” (4/17/23 Transcript @T4).  [...]’s representative [...] explained that “these studies” were done in relation to billboard locations over Pennsylvania, which proved there was no safety change before and after billboards were installed.
[brief] Nor did [...] demonstrate extreme hardship in this matter, as he will continue to receive his Special Retirement benefits with concurrent retiree health benefits coverage.  (Pa70-71).  It should also be noted that cases involving the use of the Board’s equitable power for reopening proceedings or relaxing deadlines “were bottomed on the inherent power of an administrative agency, in the absence of legislative restriction, to reopen or to modify and to rehear orders previously entered by it.
[brief] Specifically, the proposed Second Amended Complaint sought to add a claim for fraud in the inducement as to the subject lease, breach of the subject lease for allegedly violating the confidentiality provision therein and wrongful eviction.  [Pa3091-3150].  [...] opposed the Appellants’ motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint and cross-moved to dismiss Appellants’ First Amended Complaint pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim since the First Amended Complaint did not assert any claims or seek any relief against [...].  [Pa3217].  On December 7, 2021, the trial court entered an Order denying Appellants’ motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (the “Order Denying Leave to Amend”) and entered a separate Order dismissing Appellants’ First Amended Complaint without prejudice as to [...] pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e) (the “Dismissal Order”).
[brief] In this claim, Plaintiffs sought to pierce the corporate veil of various entities not even named as parties to this lawsuit.  This claim is undoubtedly a derivative claim for same general reasons set forth above.  The only parties that would have standing to bring such a claim would be [...] or the [...] (bringing a derivative claim on behalf of [...].)  Plaintiffs did not assert such claims.  Thus, Plaintiffs have no standing to assert Count VII.
[brief] They are also required to provide “extended medical benefits”, also referred to as med-pay benefits.  These benefits specifically apply only when PIP benefits are not available to an injured insured.  The authority requiring insurers to offer such benefits is regulatory (N.J.A.C. 11:3-7.3(b)).  Nothing within the regulatory scheme obligating personal automobile insurers to provide extended medical benefits includes any right of the insurer paying such benefits to seek recovery by way of subrogation against the responsible party.  [...] relied upon a Dept. of Ins. in Circular Letter New Jersey Automobile 9, dated 2/22/73, indicating that extended medical benefits “will be subrogable.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On August 6, 2021, several individuals burglarized and stole eight vehicles from the [...] car dealership in [...].  (Sa32).  When police arrived to investigate, numerous vehicle key fobs were observed strewn across the lot and a window into the building on the lot was broken.  Ibid.  Security cameras on the property were spray-painted over and the [...]’ office was ransacked.  (Sa34).  As the scene was processed, surveillance footage from a nearby business was located and showed a vehicle arrive in the area around 2:45AM and park at a Shell gas station across the street from [...].  (Sa33).  Five males were observed exiting the vehicle, crossing the street, and forcing their way inside of the business.  Ibid.  Eight vehicles were driven off the lot between 3:30AM and 5:30AM.  Ibid.  Money, dealer plates, key fobs, and dealer reassignment books were also stolen.  (Sa34).  A latent fingerprint was lifted from the exterior side of the window the suspects had burglarized.  (Sa33; Sa36 to Sa37).  After a forensic examination, the fingerprint was determined to match Defendant, [...].  (Sa38).  Thirteen days later, on August 19, 2021, Newark police officers located one of the vehicles stolen from [...], a black 2011 BMW.  (Sa41).  Sleeping in the ---  1  The Statement of Facts and Procedural History have been combined for clarity.
[directive] 1 - 1 October and Amended as - .=- - 1 - 1  N. Civil Forfeiture J.S.A. 2Ci64-1, seq. et 3 - 1  CLETAKounty Prosecutor's Law Enforcement Trust Acct. 72- 3  Contraband, Distribution of 12- Contributive Share 4 128 12- 2  Contributive Share, defined - - New State Page SOP Index Administration  Jersey Program of Forfeiture I - SOP No. 08 County Forfeiture Program Reports 8 - 1
[brief] Order Vacating Order Staying Order Compelling [...] to Submit to a Buccal Swab (June 21, 2018)  ………………………  Da121  Notice of Motion for Reasonable Force to Obtain Buccal Swab (Sept. 4, 2018)…………………………………………………………..  Da122-123  Order Authorizing the Use of Reasonable Force to Obtain Buccal Swab but Staying Order to Allow Defendant to Review Discovery (Oct. 11, 2018)  ……………………………  Da124-125  Order Authorizing Blood Draw in Lieu of Buccal Swab (Nov. 1, 2018)  ……………………………………………………………  Da126-127  Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress his Statements in Part and Granting it in Part (Mar. 11, 2020)  …………………………………  Da128-130  [...] Investigation Report ……..  Da131-135  Sevon [...] Consent to Search Room 517 ……………………………  Da136  Sevon [...] Waiver of Right to be Present During Search …………  Da137  Video Recording of Defendant’s March 6, 2018 Statement………..  Da138  Transcript of Defendant’s March 6, 2018 Statement ……………  Da139-152  Video Recording of Defendant’s March 12, 2018 Statement ………  Da153  Defendant’s Miranda Waiver (Mar. 12, 2018)  ………………………  Da154  Transcript of Defendant’s March 12, 2018 Statement  …………..  Da155-399  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES