ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Plaintiff also requested an injunction from the Court.  An injunction is an equitable remedy; it is not a separate legal claim in and of itself.  Madej v. Maiden, 951 F.3d 364, 369 (6th Cir. 2020) (stating “an injunction is a remedy, not a claim.  If [plaintiff] cannot show ‘actual success’ on their claims, they cannot obtain a permanent injunction. ”).  The Plaintiff’s injunction “claim” was actually a request for a remedy from the trial court.  Because summary judgment against the Plaintiff was appropriate as to its claims for quiet title and tortious interference, the Plaintiff’s request for an injunction against the Defendants was also properly denied by the Chancery Division.  Thus, the Chancery Division’s Order of March 4, 2024 should be affirmed.
[brief] ”  246 N.J. at 272.  In particular, the sentencing goals of deterrence, incapacitation, and proportionality spelled out in subsections (3) and (4) of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(b) are highly relevant, as the overall fairness evaluation must “contextualize[e] the individual sentences’ length, deterrent value, and incapacitation purpose and need. ”  Id. at 271.  [...] argued that because he would be fifty-eight years old upon completing his twenty-year NERA sentence, the fairness assessment should point toward a concurrent sentence because a consecutive sentence was neither necessary nor would be effective to advance the goals of incapacitation or deterrence.
[brief] Id.  [...] challenged the statute as being facially unconstitutional.  Id. at 1896.  After a historical analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that “[t]aken together, the surety and going armed laws confirm what common sense suggests: When an individual poses a clear threat of physical violence to another, the threatening individual may be disarmed. ”  Id. at 1901.  This finding was within the domestic violence context and based on a judicial finding.  See id. at 1901-02.  Nothing in [...] can be read as holding that a state may assume that an individual with a carry permit from a sister state poses a credible threat to the safety of others.
[brief] (Id.).  The Supervisor did state that the MOU would not permit [...] to return as a Paterson police officer, citing N.J.A.C. 43:16A-8(2) as the Supervisor’s alleged, albeit erroneous, authority for this position.  (Pa72-96).  However, the statute cited does not expressly state that an application for retirement disability cannot be filed and considered on its merits.  (Id.).  On 11/10/20, [...] issued a formal appeal to the Board appealing the Supervisor’s Decision.
[brief] “The effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might otherwise have existed.  . . , as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse.  . . .”  Under equitable estoppel: "[a] party asserting equitable estoppel may rely upon 'conduct, inaction, representation of the actor, misrepresentation, silence or omission." \footnote{Ridge Chevrolet-Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Scarano, 238 N.J. Super. 149, 154 (App. Div. 1990)(citation omitted).}  Likewise, judicial estoppel, "looks to the connection between the litigant and the judicial system" rather than the relationship between the parties. \textsuperscript{26}  Judicial estoppel "precludes a party from assuming a position in a legal proceeding totally inconsistent with the one previously asserted in the same or another proceeding."
[brief] [...] filed its Complaint against [...] on September 15, 2023, asserting a single book account claim for $198,066.38.  (Pa6-11.)  [...] moved to dismiss the Complaint on November 3, 2023, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on [...]’s failure to comply with the Purchase Order’s dispute resolution provision.  (Pa13-14.)  [...] filed its opposition to the Motion on December 5, 2023.  (Pa53-56, Da1.)  [...] filed its reply brief on December 11, 2023, and the Motion was set to be heard on December 15, 2023.  (Pa 84.)  The trial court, *sua sponte*, carried the Motion until May 24, 2024, when it dismissed the Complaint without prejudice and awarded [...] its reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with the action.  (Pa1-2.)  By letter to [...]’s counsel dated June 3, 2024, [...] requested its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with the Motion.  (Pa82-83.)  On June 20, 2024, [...] filed its Notice of Appeal.  (Pa85-87.)
[directive] 1.  You shall obey all federal, state, and municipal laws and ordinances.  You shall notify your probation officer if you are arrested or issued a summons in any jurisdiction.  2.  You shall report to your probation officer as directed.  3.  You shall answer truthfully all inquiries made by your probation officer.  4.  You shall permit your probation officer to visit your residence or any other suitable place.  5.  You shall submit at any time to a search conducted by a probation officer, without a warrant, of your person, place of residence, vehicle, or other personal property.  6.  You shall promptly report any change of address or residence to your probation officer.  You must obtain permission from your probation officer if you wish to move outside the county or state.  You may not leave the state of New Jersey for more than 24 hours without permission from your probation officer.  7.  You shall cooperate in any medical and/or psychological examinations, tests and/or counseling your probation officer recommends.  8.  You shall submit to drug or alcohol testing at any time, as directed by your probation officer.  9.  You shall support your dependents and meet your family responsibilities.  10.  You shall seek and maintain gainful employment, and promptly notify your officer when you change your place of employment or find yourself out of work.  N.J.S.A.
[directive] Defendant Name Complaint/Indictment Number  SBI Number 4.  Purpose of leave: Frequency: Length: Comment:  Defense Attorney’s Name  Defense Attorney’s Signature Date s/ I, (defendant) do hereby certify that by residing at the above address, I will not be in violation of any court ordered Temporary or Final Restraining Order, any Division of Child Protection and Permanency orders/agreements, a court order barring me from contact with any person or persons, or any other court order.  Defendant’s Defendant’s Signature Name Date s/ Form Promulgated by Directive #19-23 (10/17/2023), CN: 12973  page 5 of 5  Atachment 3  Electronic Monitoring Screening Form (CN 12220)
[brief] Having now found that interlocutory review of the trial court’s rulings are necessary, this Appellate Division must reverse the trial court’s incorrect legal ruling that the redevelopment plan and not the underlying zoning existing prior to the adoption of the [...] is the operative zoning for determining just compensation; as well as the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s in limine motion to bar such baseless and incorrect testimony from being presented to the jury.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Id at 10.  In the case at hand, APPELLANTS’ Complaint alleges that RESPONDENTS failed to maintain control of the premises by allowing a dangerous condition to arise - the open and obvious sale of alcohol at a large makeshift stand.  (P4 at ¶21).  The Complaint further alleges that [...] “failed to terminate the illegal and ongoing sale of alcohol, which was open and obvious, and which had been occurring at the same location over a large concession stand months prior to the shooting (P4 at ¶22).  However, despite those allegations, APPELLANTS’ Complaint failed to set forth any facts which established that [...], or its officers, had a ministerial duty to immediately remove the makeshift liquor store from the premises.  The Trial Court expressly cited such failure in reaching its decision to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice.  (T at 10:10-17)  APPELLANTS’ Complaint fails to include any facts which set forth that [...] officers were mandated to act in a prescribed fashion or failed to carry out a retired duty.  APPELLANTS’ reliance on *Shore v. Housing Authority of Harrison*, 208 N.J. Super. 348 (App. Div. 1987) is misplaced.  In Shore, “the allegation is that the officer was not where he should have been because of his socializing and failure to patrol the project as his duties required. ”  *Id.* at 353.  Here, APPELLANTS’ Complaint does not allege that [...] officers failed to patrol the premises as required, it alleges the officers failed to carry out a specific action – removing the liquor stand – while on duty.  That is far afield from the conduct at issue in *Shore* – a complete failure to perform required duties, at all – and, in the absence of facts establishing a firm and unwaivable mandate to act in that fashion, is an exercise of discretion which is immunized from liability under Section 59:5-4 of the TCA.
[brief] On July 16, 2019, Newark Police responded to a shooting in progress at [...].  (1T28:16-29:19).  They observed multiple cars parked along the street and a blood splatter trail.  (1T30:4-7).  Police located a spent shell casing about 25 feet away from the blood splatter.  (1T31:12-18).  Arriving on the scene, which was in front of a bodega, [...] observed “an amount of blood,” a hat lying on the sidewalk, and a single shell casing.  (2T25:12-26:17).  He found out the victim was already at the hospital, and learned his name was [...] (“victim”).  The Detective went to see the victim at the hospital but was unable to speak to him due to his injuries and the pain medication he was given.  So, a few days later, the detective spoke with the victim at headquarters, and testified that, “[h]e sounded muffled a little bit, but he was able to communicate.  But his face was swollen, it was still swollen.  It looked like it was swollen even more than I had seen initially,” and saw “stitching, as if it's closing a hole, like near the bottom of his chin. ”  [...] attempted to look for the suspected shooter, after identifying him as [...] (“defendant”).  He was arrested on August 13, 2019.  Video surveillance footage, played at trial, shows the suspect speaking with the victim while brandishing a black handgun.  The suspect holding the handgun, moments before defendant is shot, has a tattoo of red lips on the side of his neck.  Defendant has a tattoo of red lips on the side of his neck, which was shown to the jury both in a photograph taken on the date of his arrest and displayed in court at trial.  The victim can be seen running away, clutching at his face, moments after the suspect is seen holding a handgun.  Legal Argument Point
[brief] \textit{American Medical Association Journal of Ethics}, 18(3), 299-310.}  The very purpose of the [...] is to provide a means to resolve disputes, including all negligence claims resulting from medical treatment in any area of medicine.  The statute as enacted affords due process to all parties and provides for the fair resolution of all claims, involving all specialties.  Pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the context of medical care are enforceable, without exceptions, and serve the greater public good and the betterment of patient care.  CONCLUSION
[brief] In that case, a company was under grand jury investigation, and the company hired lawyers for certain employees, including non-target employees and former employees of the company.  In re Grand Jury, 200 N.J. at 486.  The employees had no choice in selecting counsel and had to either accept the employer’s choice of counsel and agreement to pay their legal fees or retain and pay for counsel of their own choosing.  Ibid.  Per each retainer, the company agreed to pay the employees’ legal fees.  *Ibid.*  The State moved to disqualify each counsel for the employees under RPCs 1.7, 1.8, and 1.10.  *Id.* at 488.  Given that scenario, the Supreme Court held that “a lawyer may represent a client but accept payment, directly or indirectly, from a third party” if six conditions are met.  *Id.* at 495.  Those are: “(1) The informed consent of the client is secured,” (2) “The third-party payer is prohibited from, in any way, directing, regulating or interfering with the lawyer’s professional judgment in representing his client,” “(3)  There cannot be any current attorney-client relationship between the lawyer and the third-party payer,” “(4) The lawyer is prohibited from communicating with the third-party payer concerning the substance of the representation of his client,” “(5) The third-party payer shall process and pay all such invoices within the regular course of its business, consistent with manner, speed and frequency it pays its own counsel,” and (6) the third-party can only be relieved of its payment obligation by the court.  *Id.* at 495-97.  The factual scenario present in *In re Grand Jury* is not present here.
[brief] ........................................................................................................................................  2  B.  JURISDICTION OF THE COURT IS IMPLICATED; THE UNAUTHORIZED TRANSFER WAS RETALIATORY; PLAINTIFF  CHALLENGED  CHANCERY DIVISION JURISDICTION BELOW; SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY RECORDS DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE WAS NO ORDER TRANSFERRING THIS LAW  DIVISION MATTER TO THE CHANCERY DIVISION JUDGE; CHANCERY DIVISION JUDGE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE CLEAR MANDATES OF R. 1:13-4, R. 4:3-1 AND R. 4:3-4; PLAINTIFFS' QUESTIONS RAISED ON APPEAL
[brief] The trial court actually found the opposite of such and stated that the Township “pro-actively [came] into voluntary compliance with its Mt. Laurel obligations” and “is diligently implementing them. ”  See M51-52.  This case is also not a “builder’s remedy” lawsuit.  In that type of action, a plaintiff who seeks to provide a substantial amount of lower income housing and who has attempted in good faith to seek relief to proceed with the project, “thereafter vindicates the constitutional obligation in Mount-Laurel type litigation,” and is granted a declaration of plaintiff’s entitlement to a “builder’s remedy” to proceed with the project.  Such circumstances have generally been found only where the governing body or board has a history or pattern of obstruction and/or hostility to an affordable housing developer and/or the court itself.  See Matter of Application of [...], 448 N.J.Super. 441, 466 (Law Div. 2016).  In [...] v. [...], 445 N.J.Super 220, a “builder's remedy” lawsuit, the court recognized that the designation of a Special Master was a mechanism utilized in the specific context of Mt. Laurel lawsuit where a municipality was found to have failed to comply with its fair share housing obligations under the Mount Laurel doctrine:
[brief] 10  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Authority | Page | |------------------------------------------------|------| | Bard v. Jahnke, | 4, 5 | | 16 A.D. 3d 896 (3rd Dept. 2005) | | | Casatelli v. Dressler, | 2, 3 | | Docket No. [...], 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub., LEXIS 1683 (App. Div., June 27, 2011) | | | Hill v. Yaskin, | 6 | | 75 N.J. 139 (1977) | | | Hubner v. Spring Valley Equestrian Center, | 9 | | 203 N.J. 184 (2010) | | | Hyun Na Seo v. Yozgadlian, | 2 | | 320 N.J. Super. 68 (App. Div. 1999) | | | Kodi v. Braxton, | 7 | | Docket No. [...], 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1474 (App. Div. June 16, 2009) | | | Komoldi v. Picciano, | 6 | | 217 N.J. 387 (2014)
[brief] Plaintiffs argue that the trial court should have assumed that a standard of care for [...]’s work existed, and then determine whether [...]’s testimony comported with that standard.  But this turns the inquiry on its head -- the purpose of expert engineering testimony in a professional negligence action is to establish the standard of care applicable to the defendant engineer and explain how that engineer breached this standard.  See Davis, 219 N.J. at 404-407.  [...] wholly failed to satisfy this burden of proof.
[brief] In his written report, Plaintiffs’ expert broadly opined that all defendants, including [...], had some vague obligation to continuously inspect the entire roadway for pre-existing conditions.  [...] did not explain or analyze any of the defendants’ distinct professional or contractual duties.  Rather, he made the bald assertion that all participants on a construction project -- regardless of role -- have a duty to continuously inspect the roadway for pre-existing, dangerous conditions.  At his deposition and the Rule 104 hearing, he did not provide any independent, objective support for this opinion despite repeated requests from defense counsel.
[brief] The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.  See 9 U.S.C.A. § 4.  The FAA’s general requirement that arbitration clauses in contracts involving interstate commerce be enforced has repeatedly been upheld by the United States Supreme Court and by state courts, including in New Jersey and New York.  See, e.g., Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003) (“Because the statute provides for the enforcement of arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce Clause, [] it is perfectly clear that the FAA encompasses a wider range of transactions than those actually in commerce – that is, within the flow of interstate commerce. ”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); *Antonucci v. Curvature Newco, Inc.*, 470 N.J. Super. 553, 564 (App. Div. 2022) (“[T]he FAA protects arbitration agreements involving interstate commerce”); *Reid v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.*, 586 N.Y.S.2d 459, 460 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1992) (holding that the FAA applies to any written agreement to arbitrate where interstate commerce is involved), *aff’d*, 590 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1st Dep’t 1992), *aff’d sub nom. Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.*, 601 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1993).
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I DETECTIVE MACRAE HAD A REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO BELIEVE DEFENDANT HAD ENGAGED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.  The testimony provided at the motion to suppress hearing firmly established police articulated a reasonable suspicion to suspect defendant was engaged in drug activity.  The stop of his car and the incidental discovery that defendant was driving with a suspended license were thus lawful.  Accordingly, [...]’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress should be affirmed.  Appellate review of a motion judge’s findings is deferential and “exceedingly narrow. ”  State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999).  Courts must give “great deference” to the motion judge’s factual findings.  State v. Barrow, 408 N.J. Super. 509, 516 (App. Div. 2009).  After all, the motion judge’s factual and credibility findings are “often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record. ”  Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474.  Thus, courts “are obliged to uphold the motion judge’s factual findings” that are supported by the record and should only review the motion judge’s legal conclusions de novo.
[brief] 21  **Bergen County Pines Hosp. v. Dept. of Human Services,** 96 N.J. 456 (1984) ...............................................................................................................................  28  **Bressman v. Gash,** 131 N.J. 517, 522-23 (1993) ............................................................................................................. 35  **Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,** 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ..............................................................................................................................  20  **Dresner v. Carrara,** 69 N.J. 237, 240 (1976) ....................................................................................................................  36  **Dunkin’ Donuts of N.J., Inc. v. N. Brunswick Planning Bd.,** 193 N.J. Super. 513, 515 (App. Div. 1984) ......................................................................................... 29, 30  **Elizabeth Lodge No. 289 v. Legalized Games of Chance Control Commission,** 67 N.J. Super. 239, 246 (App. Div. 1961) ......................................................................................... 20  **Harrington Glen, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Leonia,** 52 N.J. 22, 28 (1968) .......................................................................................................................... 38  **Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland,** 497 F. Supp. 839, 854 (E.D.Va.1980) ..................................................................................................... 28  **In re Herrmann,** 192 N.J. 19, 27–28 (2007)  .................................................................................................................. 19, 20
[brief] Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 74-75 (1954).  Here, the trial court initially denied summary judgment.  However, the trial court then exercised its discretion in reconsidering the denial of summary judgment.  This reconsideration was appropriate and just in the circumstances.  After reconsidering, the trial court clearly reviewed the facts as presented under the summary judgment standard and found no genuine issue of material fact as to the City’s affirmative defense.  Accordingly, reconsideration was appropriately granted and summary judgment, as a result, was appropriately granted.  For the reasons below, this Court should affirm the decision of the trial court to grant reconsideration and ultimately grant summary judgment.
[brief] a.  [...] Is Charged With His “Third Or Subsequent” DWI.  On or about June 4, 2011, defendant was charged with DWI (and other related traffic offenses) in [...].  This charge represented a “third or subsequent” DWI potentially subjecting defendant to a 10-year loss of driving privileges as well as other onerous penalties.  Defendant was represented by [...] at the time of his guilty plea.  b.
[brief] Having evolved in the medical malpractice context, and extended to other causes of action, the discovery rule is essentially a rule of equity that remedies the injustice that results when an injured person, unaware that he has a cause of action, is denied his day in court solely because of his ignorance, if he is otherwise blameless.  Henry v. New Jersey Dept. of Human Services, 204 N.J. 320, 335-36 (2010) (citing Lopez, 62 N.J. at 273-74; Grunwald v.  Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483, 492 (1993); O’Keefe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 491 (1980).  The discovery rule applies in both scenarios where the plaintiff did not discover the injury, and where the plaintiff did discover the injury but did not know that it was attributable to the fault of another.  Lopez, 62 N.J. at 274.  In order to establish a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must establish that the underlying criminal action terminated favorably.