ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **POINT II – DESPITE THE UNJUSTIFIABLE EXCLUSION OF IMPORTANT EVIDENCE, THE EVIDENCE STILL SUPPORTED  A FINDING OF REASONABLE SUSPICION**  Second, Defendant’s contentions misinterpret the law related to reasonable suspicion.  Defendant contends that a 9-1-1 call alone cannot create reasonable suspicion under these circumstances.  As support, Defendant relies on *Florida v. J.L.*, 529 U.S. 266 (2000).  In *J.L.*, the United States Supreme Court found that an anonymous report of a person with a firearm, standing alone, is insufficient to justify an investigatory stop.  *Florida v. J.L.*, 529 U.S. 266, 273 (2000).  However, *J.L.* did not involve a tip made through the 9-1-1 system.  And since the publication of *J.L.*, both the United States Supreme Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court have held that this is an important distinction.  See *Navarette v. California*, 572 U.S. 393 (2014); *State v. Golotta*, 178 N.J. 205 (2003); and *State v. Gamble*, 218 N.J. 412, 429 (2014).
[brief] Defendants Appellants in their appellate brief did not argue that this Court shall review the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses during the jury trial.  \(^{1}\)  See Ford v. Reichert, 23 N.J. 429, 435, 129 A.2d 439 (1957) (“In the procedure before us, however, the judicial fundamental of the right to be heard seems to have been completely forgotten.  …  If and when the Appellate Division concludes substantial justice requires the invoking of the plain error rule and the issues have not been presented or argued, the litigants are entitled to notice of the points the court thinks constitute plain error and have a right to be heard before a final determination.  The court should not deprive the parties of their day in court or their right to be heard on matters which may defeat their cause. ”)  Defendants asked this Court to review whether Plaintiff had proved causation and damage in the underlying matrimonial case, where the Defendants represented the Plaintiff, in the “trial within a trial” legal malpractice case after the Appellate Division substituted an unsubstantiated jury award of $500,000, which was vacated by Appellate Division for Plaintiff’s failure to prove actual damages before awarding the $449,798.50 to Plaintiff for attorney fees, because this Court in its decision had rendered a proposition which had no direct support from any precedent in the State of New Jersey and across the nation.
[brief] The Court in Nuckel held that the proposed driveway in question constituted a second primary use because it serviced a hotel on an adjacent lot and not the auto body shop located upon the subject lot.  A d (1) variance is not required for a second driveway where the driveway does not service an adjacent property.  See Mountain Hill, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Middletown, 403 N.J. Super. 210, 243 (App. Div. 2008) certify. denied, 197 N.J. 475 (2009).  ("Driveways are so ineluctably incidental to any main structure and so customary for all structures that they are permitted accessory structures and uses in every zone.").  Contrary to the argument of Plaintiff both applications were well within the 10% bulk requirement for maximum building coverage.  The [...] application proposed a building coverage of 1.4% and the [...] application proposed a building coverage of .8%.  See Ja217 and Ja269.
[brief] As the trial court correctly noted, [...] testified that through his five-year career as a police officer, this was only the second instance where his mobile data terminal reflected inaccurate information.  (Da30; 1T68-14 to 69-9).  In light of the infrequency of errors in the system, the officer’s reliance on that information for purposes of a limited detention to investigate its accuracy was reasonable.  Indeed, [...] credibly testified that he stopped the Toyota to investigate the validity of the warrant and not simply to arrest the driver.  Indeed, as [...] also stated, they could not simply arrest someone without confirming the accuracy of the information in the mobile data terminal.  (1T51-5 to 52-11).  Thus, as [...] testified, it was necessary to stop the vehicle to confirm the driver was the registered owner, in case the warrant was valid.  (1T53-19 to 54-1).  Accordingly, the trial court’s finding that the officers acted reasonably is supported by the record.
[brief] APPELLANT  [...] VOLUME I | APPENDIX DOCUMENT | APPENDIX PAGE # | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------| | Plaintiff [...]’s Complaint and Jury Demand dated November 24, 2020 | Pa. 1-6 | | Plaintiff [...]’s First Amended Complaint dated December 9, 2020 adding Defendant [...] | Pa. 7-11 | | Plaintiff [...]’s Second Amended Complaint dated April 16, 2021  Removing [...] and adding back [...] | Pa. 12-17 | | Stipulation Extending Time to Answer by [...] and [...] filed on January 25, 2021 | Pa. 18 | | Plaintiff [...]’s Third Amended Complaint dated April 26, 2021 (Correcting Jury Demand) | Pa. 19-24 | | Answer, Affirmative Defendants, Demand for Damages
[brief] The trial court rightly held that the State demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on the merits on its claim that this new policy subjected transgender, gender non-conforming, or non-binary students to disparate treatment and to a disparate impact under the LAD.  The trial court properly found that failure to enjoin these policies would irreparably harm these students—students who already face distressingly high risks of mental health challenges and suicide.  And the court accurately reasoned that Appellants would not be harmed by an order maintaining the prior policy, which had been in place for four years without identified problems, while [...]’s administrative proceeding plays out.  Appellants do not directly challenge these findings, which are amply sufficient to justify the preliminary injunction.  The arguments Appellants do present on appeal cannot overcome the trial court’s meticulous findings on each Crowe factor.  Appellants claim the State’s right to relief was insufficiently settled and that their new policy is compelled by state and federal recordkeeping laws.  But the State’s right to relief could scarcely be clearer: the court found (and Appellants’ opening brief does not dispute) that the policy likely violates the LAD, and N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1 provides the Attorney General and Director the express right to seek an injunction in this situation.  Second, the injunction has nothing to do with recordkeeping; this case concerns whether schools may adopt policies requiring affirmative disclosure of students’ gender identities on a discriminatory basis, not when such schools can withhold records from requesting parents.  Appellants misunderstand what this case is about.  The State has always embraced the central role that parents play in decisions regarding their children.  And, consistent with the LAD, schools may disclose a student’s gender identity in a number of circumstances, including where the school has a compelling and non-discriminatory basis to do so.  But they may not enforce a policy requiring personnel to discriminate based on a protected characteristic—let alone while the State’s administrative action plays out.  This court should affirm.
[directive] 1.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하가 다음의 강력범죄에 대하여  유죄를 시인하기 때문에,  Do you understand that because of your plea of guilty to (조기석방 금지법에 해당하는  제1 급 및 제2 급 강력범죄(들)을 열거하십시오)  (List First or Second Degree Violent Crime(s) to Which NERA Applies)  그  범죄(들)에  대한 가석방 자격이 생기기  전에 그 범죄(들)에  대하여  부과된 형량의  85%를 복역해야 한다는 것을 아십니까?  시행 2018  년 1 월 8 일 개정 보충  지령 제04-14 호 에 의거 공표 됨, CN 11171-Korean 페이지1/2  Revised Form Effective 01/08/2018, Promulgated by Supplement to Directive #04-14, CN 11171-Korean page 1 of 2  you will be required to serve 85% of the sentence imposed for that offense(s) before you will be eligible for parole on that offense(s)?  2.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하가 이 혐의(들)에 대하여  유죄 시인을 했기 때문에 법정은 년 간의 가석방 보호감독을 부과했고, 그 기간은 귀하가 금고 형량을 완료한 후 즉시 시작된다는 것을 아십니까?  제1급 가석방 보호감독 기간 – 5년  제1 급 가석방  보호감독 기간 – 3 년  Do you understand that because you have pled guilty to these charges the court must impose a year term of parole supervision and that term will begin as soon as you complete the sentence of incarceration?
[brief] The IFPA was enacted to combat the pervasive issue of insurance fraud, which has significant financial implications, leading to higher premiums and costs.  Ensuring that IFPA violations are addressed properly, with each party receiving conflict-free representation is essential to the proper adjudication of fraudulent activities.  By way of this appeal, we ask this court not only to undo the damage caused by the trial court’s decision in this case, but to clarify novel issues of law and to hold that: (i) joint representation in a CNA joint liability case triggers an automatic per se conflict in cases of intentional torts, and/or concerted acts, and (ii) that conflict is nonwaivable if legal fees are funded by one of the joint defendants who is represented by the same lawyer.
[directive] 1.0.12  The internal affairs process represents the agency's response to allegations and complaints that have been brought to the agency's attention either by agency employees or members of the public.  Law enforcement agencies must establish and implement a process of investigation and review that is both meaningful and objective.  The process must be designed to ensure that individuals receive adequate redress for legitimate complaints of misconduct.  It is not enough for law enforcement executives to adopt a policy governing the receipt, investigation and resolution of complaints of officer misconduct; rather, the policy must be implemented and executed with a commitment to the integrity of the agency and the constitutional rights of the public.  Agencies with an objective and fair internal affairs process will limit their risk of civil liability.  1.0.13  This policy, the procedures set forth in the policy and the legal citations contained in the text are intended for implementation by all State, county and municipal law enforcement agencies.  As made clear in AG Directive 2019-5 (issued concurrently with the publication of this December 2019 version of this policy), all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey are directed to implement and comply with this policy, and to take any additional measures necessary to update their guidelines consistent with this policy, as required by N.J.S.A 40A:14-181.
[brief] Id. at 3T119:7.  **Defendant Admitted She Charged [...] For Her Personal Expenses**  Despite acknowledging that thousands of dollars of [...] insurance payments, and her car payments, were her sole responsibility, Defendant admitted she charged these amounts to Plaintiff by “mistake”, which improperly reduced his share of the profits.  3T:162:11-19 and 3T166:11-25.  The [...] was admitted into evidence as Plaintiff’s trial Exhibit P30. Pa68-201.  Page 103 of the ledger references a November 13, 2019 payment in the amount of $6,273 to [...] for Defendant’s car, and a total of $4,387.20 in [...] insurance payments for Defendant’s insurance.  Pa170.  Defendant admitted that both these items were her sole responsibility and that she improperly charged them to Plaintiff by mistake, which was never corrected.  3T:162:11-19 and 3T166:11-25.  **Defendant Admitted that she Paid Herself an Unauthorized Salary**
[brief] [...] further testified [...] “knocked several times while stating ‘police, search warrant. ’”  [...] then stated officers waited twenty to twenty five seconds before police used a ram to breach the apartment.  [...] testified he wore a body camera on the date in question.  [...] explained that the body camera is always recording.  Upon initiating the recording however, the first twenty to thirty seconds of the body camera’s is only video with no sound.  After that brief period the body camera records both visual and audio.  He turned on his body camera prior to entering the apartment.  [...] further testified, after reviewing his body camera footage, he believed that the purpose of a pause in between several attempts by another police officer who utilized a ram to forcibly enter the apartment was so an officer could again state “police, search warrant. ”  However, because the body camera was just activated no sound was recorded.  [...] testified he was aware of the July 2015 Attorney General directive regarding body worn cameras.  [...] also testified he was aware of the [...]’s policy regarding body cameras; he stated an officer’s body camera should be activated “whenever an officer makes contact with an individual. ”  [...] testified he was not required to activate his body camera, but on cross examination conceded he should have activated his body camera prior to the knock and announce portion of the warrant’s execution.
[brief] In justifying an investigatory detention based on reasonable suspicion, a police officer must “be able to articulate something more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch. ”  *State v. Stovall*, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002); quoting United States v. Soklow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).  But the reasonable suspicion standard involves a significantly lower degree of objective evidentiary justification than does the probable cause test.
[brief] *Luchejko*, supra, 207 N.J. at 211; *Qian v. Toll Brothers, Inc.*, 223 N.J. 124, 136 (2015).  Nothing demonstrates the emptiness of plaintiff-appellant’s argument more definitively than the holding of our Supreme Court in *Foley v. Ulrich*, 50 N.J. 426 (1967), a case strikingly similar to the instant matter.  [...] presented *Foley* to the Motion Court which relied upon it significantly in rejecting plaintiff-appellant’s opposition to the Anneses’ motion for summary judgment, which advanced this very same argument that plaintiff-appellant is now making to this Appellate Court.
[brief] Appellants seek to invalidate the Wholesaler Agreement’s arbitration clause by arguing that, without an express waiver of the right to bring suit in a judicial forum, the arbitration clause violates New Jersey public policy as set forth in Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014), and its progeny.  (Pb at 3, 36-39.)  However, these cases generally involve contracts of adhesion signed by unsophisticated parties, which is not the case here.
[brief] ”  State v. Martelli, 201 N.J. Super. 378, 386 (App. Div. 1985).  Second, the Court’s reasoning suggested it believed that aggravating factors three and nine should be found for every crime where the defendant pointed a firearm at a person and pulled the trigger.  (8T 78-22 to 79-21, 81-23 to 82-6)  With respect to mitigating factor three in particular, the Court speculated that a person who has reached the point “to pull the trigger on a \textsuperscript{4} Accord Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Murder, Passion/Provocation and Aggravated/Reckless Manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and (2); 2C:11-4a, b(1) and b(2)” (rev. June 8, 2015) at 2-3 (citing State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 269-74 (1993)).  handgun, point it at somebody,” is “a certain kind of person” and “can reach that point again;” in other words, there is something specific about what it takes to point and fire a firearm which means that a person who has done that is particularly likely to reoffend.
[brief] MZM Constr. Co. v. N.J. Bldg. Laborers Statewide Benefit Funds, 974 F.3d 386, 404 (3d Cir. 2020) (decided under New Jersey law).  Because no such evidence exists, [...]’s argument fails.³  [...] also argues that, pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”), [...] “had a good faith duty to provide Plaintiff with a copy of the application and deposit agreement or advise him where they could be located .  . . .” (Appellant Br., 20-21.)  However, once again, he failed to raise this argument in the trial court.  (See SA001-032.)  Thus, once again, [...] waived his argument, and this Court should not consider it.
[brief] The Board filed its Notice of Appeal on September 21, 2022, Pa396, and filed its Amended Notice of Appeal on March 18, 2024, Pa407.  The Township filed its Notice of Appeal on September 21, 2022, Pa396, and filed its Amended Notice of Appeal on January 8, 2023, Pa400.  \(^3\)  [...] retired in September 2023.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Before his marriage to Decedent, Petitioner, as a *pro se* plaintiff filed two Federal lawsuits that expressed his distress over the accounting, the liquor license, and the distribution of his father's estate, both of which were not resolved on the merits, but rather, were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  *Sutton v. Sutton*, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 391.  The first Federal Lawsuit was dismissed on August 6, 1990, and the second on April 30, 1992, holding, *inter alia*, that the Rooker Felman doctrine barred Federal Court review of the state court's approval of the Consent Order and that the Petitioner's First Amendment claim was inextricably intertwined with the validity of the Consent Order.
[brief] The question of whether the Plaintiff has stated a viable claim for relief turns ultimately upon whether [...] and the other assignees of the Plaintiff’s credit card account and debt were functioning as a “consumer lender” and/or “sales finance company” under the NJFCLA at the time they accepted assignment of such account and debt and/or sought to enforce and collect the same and were thereby required to secure a license.  If they were so obligated, the Plaintiff has stated a viable claim for relief under the FDCPA as against [...], inasmuch as one could reasonably conclude in such circumstances that the letter [...] sent to the debtor was misleading and/or unconscionable because it did not report that the serial creditors were unlicensed at the time they accepted assignment of the debt and/or initiated legal proceedings against the debtor in the Bergen County Action and that the debt was void.  Thus, presuming a license was required and not obtained at the time of the first assignment of the debt, one could conclude that [...]’s account and resulting debt were rendered void.
[directive] Rule or Statute Description  Effective June 1, 2007, when a person charged with a crime with bail restrictions posts cash bail or secures a bail bond, the person, no later than the time of posting bail or proffering the surety or bail bond, shall provide to the prosecutor, on a form promulgated by the Attorney General, relevant information under penalty of perjury about the obligor, indemnifier or person posting cash bail, the security offered, and the source of any money or property used to post the cash bail or secure the surety or bail bond, as the case may be.
[brief] The plain language of the 2015 Settlement makes clear the parties’ intent to resolve only claims that had accrued as of the date of entry of final judgment.  See, e.g., Pa0044-45, 2015 Settlement, at ¶2.1 (“The purpose of this Settlement is to forever settle and compromise any and all claims, disputes, and controversies that were or could have been raised against [...] in the Settled Action…”)(emphasis added); Pa0059-60, at ¶5.2 (“settle, compromise, and discharge all of the Class Representative’s and the Class Members’ Released Claims which were or which could have been asserted in this action…”).
[brief] AOC 22  AOC 22 is a dry well located in what was known as the courtyard area of the Site.  (Pa0126).  The dry well was first used in 1965 or 1966 and remained in use until 1977.  (Id).  During its period of operation, the dry well received discharges of steam condensate from a sump containing two pit degreasers.  (Pa0126-27).  This dry well is one of the primary sources of DNAPL CVOC contamination at the Site.  (Pa0128).  PERC, TCE and TCA all reached the groundwater from AOC 22 during its period of operations.  (Id).  The subsurface disposal of wastewaters at the Site ended with the closure of AOC 22 in 1977 (Pa0280-81).
[brief] THE TRIAL JUDGE ALLOWED PLAINTIFF’S EXPERTS TO GIVE RESPIRATORY CARE OPINIONS AGAINST “THE FACILITY” OR “THE NURSING HOME”  ALTHOUGH THEY WERE NOT QUALIFIED.  Plaintiff further contends that plaintiff’s experts [...] and [...] were improperly prohibited from giving testimony regarding the conduct of individual members of defendant’s nursing staff, particularly the respiratory therapist, and in linking that conduct to [...]’s death.  Plaintiff contends that her experts were qualified to testify, based upon their professional experience, about the respiratory care provided to [...] although plaintiff’s experts were not respiratory therapists.  The limitations placed upon plaintiff’s experts’ trial testimony were inappropriate in plaintiff’s view because, among other things, [...] previously denied defendant’s motion in limine to prohibit [...] from giving nursing opinions.  (See Pb3; Pb24-32.)  Plaintiff on appeal disregards, however, that plaintiff at trial was permitted to question the defense fact witnesses extensively regarding the respiratory care services provided.  Furthermore, plaintiff’s experts were permitted to discuss in detail the failures of “the facility”, including purported failures to provide respiratory care, thus leading the jury to conclude that although “the facility” deviated from the standard of care, nothing “the facility” did caused the death and damages at issue.  There was only one defendant in this case, [...] d/b/a [...].  Plaintiff did not name respiratory therapist [...] as a defendant and did not obtain an affidavit of merit against the facility or a respiratory therapist, but instead provided only one from [...] against the nursing staff.
[brief] (8T 51-2 to 21)  Just before he walked into the Tavern, the man exited the Tavern and walked past him.  (8T 51-20 to 52-2)  [...] only saw the man for half a second and did not get a good look at his face because it was dark, he was looking down, and he had dark glasses, a hood, and something covering his face; [...] did not recognize the man but assumed it was someone helping [...].  (8T 52-5 to 53-2)  [...] estimated that the man he saw was six feet or six feet one inch tall.  (8T 53-3 to 9)  After [...] punched in and went into the back office, [...], the man who was cleaning the bar, told [...] that the man was not working with [...]; [...] spoke with [...] to confirm this.  (8T 53-12 to 20)  [...] looked around the kitchen, did not see anything missing, but then called the police.  (8T 53-21 to 54-8)  [...] of the [...] was dispatched to respond to [...] around 4:48 a.m. on a report of a suspicious person inside the building; it was reported that the suspect had left the building ten minutes earlier.
[brief] See State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014).  This Court’s review of the trial court’s sentencing decision is limited to the abuse of discretion standard.  State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 73 (2020).  This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.  Ibid.  The record below shows no abuse of discretion.