ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa164 at ¶2.)  The Bond Ordinance was offered for introduction and authorized for a first reading and publication at a meeting of the Township Committee on June 1, 2021.  (Id. at ¶3.)  On June 1, 2021, the Township Committee introduced the Bond Ordinance without hearing public comment prior to introduction.  (Id. at ¶4.)  Before the close of the June 1, 2021 meeting, the Township Committee opened the meeting to the public for comments on any matters and at such time members of the public had an opportunity to comment on the introduction of the Bond Ordinance.  (Id. at ¶5.)  As reflected in the Minutes, Plaintiff offered comments at such time at the June 1, 2021 meeting.  (Id. at ¶6.)  The Bond Ordinance was duly published on June 3, 2021.  (Id. at ¶8.)  On June 15, 2021, the Township Committee offered the Bond Ordinance for a second reading and opened the meeting to the public for comments on the subject ordinance.  (Id. at ¶13.)  Members of the public were limited to three (3) minutes of comments.  (Id. at ¶14.)  Plaintiff questioned the three-minute limit at that meeting.  (Id. at ¶15.)  As to the subject Bond Ordinance, Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint that he questioned whether Defendant [...] had a disqualifying conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety as to the Flex Parking Removal Project; why the costs of that Project were not being specially assessed against the Downtown Millburn Avenue property owners and businesses directly benefitting from the capital improvement; how the costs of that Project had been determined; whether the local elected officials had a duty to respond to questions on a second reading of an ordinance; the source of funding for the 9-11 Project and the funding options for the Projects authorized in the Bond Ordinance; and whether the governing body had received a written legal opinion regarding the validity of the Bond Ordinance.  (Id. at ¶16.)  Plaintiff did not provide a transcript of the hearing on the Ordinance to the trial court.  (Id. at ¶17.)  The official minutes were the only written record of the meeting.  (Id. at ¶18.)  According to the minutes, Plaintiff stepped forward to be heard on the Bond Ordinance and made comments and recommendations as follows: [...], of [...], stated his concerns on Ordinance 2579-21.  He offered several recommendations to the Committee for consideration.  He voiced his concern of the removal of flex parking and asked if the Committee members who owned businesses in the area, where the flex parking was located, could vote on the ordinance in question.  (Id. at ¶19.)  No other members of the public sought to be heard on the Ordinance and the public hearing was closed.  (Id. at ¶20.)  Thereafter, the Township Committee proceeded with a vote to adopt the Bond Ordinance after it was duly moved and seconded for adoption and passed unanimously despite Plaintiff’s concerns.  (Id. at ¶21.)  Notice of adoption of the Bond Ordinance was published on June 24, 2021.  (Id. at ¶23.)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ANY ERROR IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY
[brief] (9T205:25 to 206:2)  [...] acknowledged at trial that there was evidence of physical manipulation on the signature line of [...], stating that there could be a double line under a signature, which is evidence of the signature being taken from another source.  (9T198:21-199:1; See P115a).  [...] stated that he was not to analyze [...]’s name, just Petitioner’s signature.  (9T199:1-3).  Petitioner had not seen the Photocopy before this litigation, he did not sign it and believed it was manufactured.
[brief] In Brazza v. Kagen, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s medical malpractice action with prejudice due to the plaintiff’s expert being disqualified and the plaintiff’s failure to obtain a new expert.  2023 WL 4418263 at *1.  One year after the dismissal, the plaintiff sought vacation of the dismissal order.  Id.  The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed.  Id.  Here, the Appellant sought relief less than one month after the March 17, 2023, Order denying Reconsideration.  The Appellant did not cause undue delay as the plaintiff did in Brazza.  The Appellant was completely justified in seeking immediate relief from the harsh results of the trial court’s Order.  Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court’s May 12, 2023, Order denying vacation of its prior Order.
[brief] The court favorably quoted the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 370 (1958):  Community redevelopment is a modern facet of municipal government.  Soundly planned redevelopment can make the difference between continued stagnation and decline and resurgence of healthy growth.  It provides the means of removing the decadent effect of slums and blight on neighboring property values, of opening up new areas for residence and industry.  In recent years, recognition has grown that governing bodies must either plan for the development or redevelopment of urban areas or permit them to become more congested, deteriorated, obsolescent, unhealthy, stagnant, inefficient and costly.
[brief] We also recognize that the merits or wisdom of the State’s climate policies are not for this court to decide, and we do not argue otherwise.  Those matters are for the Legislature, the Governor and the relevant agencies to implement.  The climate laws, however, include a very clear and unambiguous requirement that the Energy Master Plan be applied “to the maximum extent practicable” to proceedings including this one.  The ID and the BPU Order explicitly declined to comply with this requirement, and the reasons for this violation are simply wrong.  Our extended discussion of the State’s climate laws and the Energy Master Plan and other reports are to show that the policies and the statutory command violated here are not some casual wishful thinking that might come to pass at some future date, and might not at all, as [...] argues, but a comprehensive set of plans to address an existential problem of our time with urgency.
[brief] As previously noted, it is axiomatic that the decisions, procedures, and actions of State administrative agencies, such as the [...], are subject to “judicial review and supervision to assure fairness in the administrative process. ”  Hospital Center at Orange.  Guhl, 331 N.J. Super. 322, 333 (App. Div. 2000); In re Arndt, 67 N.J. 432, 436 (1975).
[brief] (1T126-11).  In fact, Plaintiff felt that Defendant became “opinionated” as soon as her green card arrived.  (1T127-3).  However, on cross-examination, it was elicited via Plaintiff’s testimony that Defendant had voiced her opinions in the past regarding selection of the wedding venue and in addressing an issue pertaining to wedding albums, which opinions lead to a “fight. ” (1T127-6).  In June of 2022, the parties visited Plaintiff’s friends in Canada.
[brief] Order Granted Motion to Waive Defendant to Adult Court ........................................ Da1-2 Indictment [...]....................................................................................................  Da3-6 Order Denying Miranda Motion dated 3-25-21.................................................................  Da7 Order Denying Interlocutory Appeal dated 5-13-21.........................................................  Da8 Verdict Sheet.................................................................................................................. Da9-15 JOC and Order of Commitment dated 6-30-22............................................................... Da16-19 Amended JOC Order of Commitment dated 7-14-22.....................................................
[brief] 1:3-8.  The treasurer of each county, upon receiving the number of paper volumes allotted to his county pursuant to the provisions of section 1:3-7 of this Title, shall, after retaining one copy for himself, forthwith distribute the remaining volumes at the expense of the county as follows:  a.  To each municipal magistrate in the county, one copy; b. To the clerk of the board of chosen freeholders, and to each chosen freeholder, one copy; c.  To each incorporated library company in the county which does not receive a bound copy of the laws under the provisions of said section 1:3-7, one copy; and d.  The remainder shall be transmitted in equal proportions to the clerks of the several municipalities in the county, each of which clerks shall, after retaining one copy for the use of his municipality, distribute the residue, within one week after receiving the same, to the following officers in his municipality, giving them preference in the order named: the assessor, collector and director of welfare, each one copy.  The receipts of the persons receiving copies of the laws from the county treasurer shall be sufficient vouchers to such treasurer in the settlement of his accounts, for the money expended by him for this purpose, and for a reasonable compensation for his trouble.  3.  Section 1:3-9 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows: 1:3-9.  So many of the laws of the United States as may at any time be apportioned to this State by the Congress of the United States shall be delivered to the custodian of the State House, who shall, after retaining one set for his own use, distribute the remainder at the expense of the State as follows:
[brief] (Da46-47)  Ordinance 7-23 does not provide any additional findings as to the purported benefit of the exchange to the public or how the lands to be acquired by the Township will be used.  Defendants’ Properties and all lots owned by the Township are located in an Industrial Zone that does not include school or religious institutions as a permitted principal use.  (See Da18)  The Township filed its condemnation actions against Defendants on June 14, 2023.  (Da5-9)  The trial court entered an Order to Show Cause on June 15 (“OTSC”).  Pursuant to the OTSC, on July 18, 2023, Defendants filed their Answers and briefs and certifications in opposition to the Township’s authority to take their property by eminent domain.  (Da10-13)  The return date of the OTSC was adjourned.  On August 26, 2023, the Township adopted Ordinance No. 26-23 that again authorized the taking of Defendants’ properties, although this ordinance acknowledges the land swap.  (Da53-54)  Ordinance No. 26-23 does not provide any specific findings or citation to a record regarding open space acquisition.  It does not impose any limitation on the Developer’s use of the Defendants’ properties to be acquired.  Nor does the ordinance provide any findings related to the proposed use by the Township of the lands after the exchange to the Developer.  On October 20, 2023, the trial court heard oral argument on the Township’s Order to Show Cause and Commissioners, finding the Township is authorized to and has duly exercised its power of eminent domain and entered its Orders on October 23, 2023 to confirm the authority of the Township to take Defendants’ properties.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  [...] filed his Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause on November 1, 2023, seeking declaratory judgment that the Restrictive Covenant in his Employment Agreement to which he had voluntarily agreed was unenforceable and/or limiting the Restrictive Covenant so that [...] could work at the [...]’s Flemington office when his employment with [...] ended on December 31, 2023.  (Pa7, ¶36).  [...] admitted [...]’s office within the scope and radius prohibited by the Restrictive Covenant.  (Id., ¶37).  On November 17, 2023, [...] opposed the application, in part because the issues presented by [...]’s application were not ripe: [...] was still employed at [...], [...] had not made any determination about enforcing the Restrictive Covenant and had been negotiating with [...].  (Ra8-118).  Regardless [...] could not satisfy the requirements for a preliminary injunction.  (Id.).  On December 1, 2023, the Chancery Court conducted oral argument.  (1T). ¹  On December 11, 2023, the Court entered an order and Statement of  Reasons denying [...]’s application without prejudice because it was not ripe.  (“December 2023 Order”) (Ra4-7).
[brief] On the other hand, a “Hospitalist” is not a specialty or subspecialty of anything.  168a-178a.  A Hospitalist certification may be obtained, but [...] does not possess such certification.  [...]’s argument also confuses the distinction between specialties and subspecialties.  According to the ABMS, Internal Medicine is a distinct medical specialty.  170a.  Furthermore, Hematology and Medical Oncology are merely subspecialties of the Internal Medicine specialty.  Id.  N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(a) allows an expert to qualify on the basis of either their specialty or subspecialty.  Applying the express requirements of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(a), the basis of the Appellant’s claims involve the practice of Internal Medicine, more specifically, Hematology.  3a, Appellant’s Complaint, ¶ 11-14 (alleging that the withholding of Xarelto, a prescription blood thinner (emphasis added), constituted part of the alleged medical malpractice).
[brief] (Pls.’ Supp’l Mem. at 1).  They acknowledge that the topics are predicated upon defendants’ informal response to the Depo Notice, but state “that is because Plaintiffs used the responses to narrow the deposition scope so the deposition could proceed expeditiously. ”  (Id.).  They argue that allowing defendants to provide written responses to these topics will deny plaintiffs the ability to ask “probing questions necessary to discover critical facts,” and submit that none of the six topics implicates privileged material or attorney work product.  (Id. at 1-2).  Analysis
[directive] Courts engage in judicial surgery “when necessary” to “save an be constitutionally doomed. ” enactment that otherwise would Natale, 184 N.J. at 485-86 (citing Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 94 N.J. 85, 104 (1983)).  The tool is a way to resolve constitutional defects.  See NYT Cable TV v. Homestead at Mansfield, Inc., 111 N.J. 21, 27-28 (1988) ([...], (“In necessitous circumstances when the constitutionality of a concurring) statute is threatened, we have excised constitutional defects or engrafted new meanings to assure its survival. ”).  Absent a constitutional violation, the Attorney General argues, judicial surgery is inappropriate.  Courts strive to give effect to the Legislature’s intent.  State v. J.V., 242 N.J. 432, 442 (2020).  As a result, when part of a law is invalid, courts must wanted “the enactment first decide whether the lawmakers [to] stand or fall as 15 a unitary whole. ”  State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 527 (1958); see also Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 72 N.J. 412, 422 (1977); N.J.S.A. 1:1-10.  If a court concludes the Legislature would prefer that a law be altered or narrowed, rather than struck down entirely, the court may engage in surgery to remedy the flaw.  See, e.g., Natale, 184 N.J. at 487 (eliminating presumptive terms in sentencing to preserve the constitutionality of the criminal code); Town Tobacconist, 94 N.J. at 103-04 (striking language from the Drug Paraphernalia Act to avoid constitutional perils of vagueness and arbitrary enforcement); Chamber of Commerce v. State, 89 N.J. 131, 161-62 (1982) (striking language from the Strikebreakers Act to avoid a violation of the Commerce Clause).  Under the circumstances of this matter, we decline to engage in judicial surgery.  That approach would work a wholesale change in an otherwise constitutional statute to remedy circumstances best assessed on a case-by-case basis.
[brief] In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 270, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision of the Appellate Division.  The [...] and the [...] were improperly reducing reimbursements for out-of-network behavioral health services.  In the prior case, the Appellate Division found in favor of Yucht’s appeal which sought reimbursement at the statutory 80% of reasonable and customary charges for behavioral health services.  *In re Yucht*, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2188.  Pra1.  As a result, the Commissions adopted resolutions to provide for reimbursement of the improper rate paid by members retroactive to 2009.  Identical to the within appeal, the [...] posted notice on their website with a link to a claim form.  *In re State and Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht*, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1938.  Pra5.  Also identical to the within matter, the Division sent a letter to all Certifying Officers with the same exact terms contained in the Certifying Officer Letter’s “EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITIES” section.
[brief] Article VI, Section V, Paragraph 4 of our State Constitution provides:  Prerogative writs are superseded and, in lieu thereof, review, hearing and relief shall be afforded in the Superior Court, on terms and in the manner provided by the rules of the Supreme Court, as of right, except in criminal cases where such review shall be discretionary.  (emphasis supplied).  **Long Term Tax Exemption Authority**  Article VIII, Section I, paragraph 1(a) of our State Constitution requires all property be assessed for taxation under general laws and **by uniform rules. **  (emphasis supplied).  Article VIII, Section III, paragraph 1 of our State Constitution authorizes but limits and constrains “blighted area” redevelopment long term tax exemptions.
[brief] The reason for Plaintiff’s “bare-bones” pleading was two-fold.  \textbf{First}, Plaintiff was not asking the trial court to determine whether any assets were missing, and if so, who was responsible for the lost items.  Plaintiff merely wished for Defendant to account for his actions, and to inform Plaintiff of the assets that remain in his hands and of those sold.  In response, Defendant submitted an extensive Certification outlining some of the assets that came into his possession upon appointment (Pa62–86), but \textit{failed} to inform the trial court of the \textit{disposition} of those assets since that time or those that remain.  Unfortunately, this “red herring” achieved its desired effect in leading the trial court to not only assume that breaches of fiduciary duty had not occurred and that an accounting was unnecessary, but to go so far as to state that “[...] has provided a comprehensive and exhaustive informal accounting of everything that was in the residence and all of the personal property contained in the residence.
[brief] ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED  TABLE OF CONTENTS  I.  PLAINTIFFS’ SEPARATE STATEMENT...—— II.  INTRODUCTION...—— III.  RELEVANT BACKGROUND...——  IV.  LEGAL STANDARD...——  V. ARGUMENT...——  A.  [...] and [...] Possess Relevant Information...——  1.  As the Key Decision Maker on Issues Related to User Privacy, Zuckerberg’s Documents Are Uniquely Relevant to Plaintiffs’ Claims...——  2.  Sandberg’s Documents Are Critical as She Oversees [...]’s Monetization of User Data and [...]’s Messaging Regarding User Data Misuse...——  B.  Adding [...] and [...] as Document Custodians Is Proportional to the Needs of the Case and Will Not Cause Undue Burden...——  C.  Given the Case Schedule, [...] Should Commence with Searching These Custodial Files...——  D.  The Apex Doctrine Does Not Apply...——  VI.  CONCLUSION...—— TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[directive] See, ~ Revised Brimage Guidelines, Section 11.4 (any plea offer tendered to a school zone defendant who possessed a firearm must require the defendant to plead guilty to both the firearms and school zone charges so as to ensure that the court imposes consecutive sentences on those two convictions as required by law.)  It should be noted that the firearms offense defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1 is now designated as a "Graves Act" crime by L. 2007, c_. 341 (effective January 13, 2008).  Accordingly, any such firearms offense is subject to the Attorney General Directive to Ensure Uniform Enforcament of the "Graves Act" (corrected version issued on November 25, 2008), which generally prohibits the downgrading or dismissal ofa ftrearms charge.
[brief] The Board appeared to be confused on this point as well on remand.  For example, at the first hearing of the second remand on March 11, 2020 one board member asked how much the condo fee was.  Someone suggested “four-hundred-and-nine dollars and 17 cents I believe” and another person agreed “yea, about $410. ”  8T20-24.  IV.  IT WAS ERROR TO OVERTURN THE BOARD’S FINDINGS ON MAINTENANCE FEES
[brief] In the Matter of the Estate of [...], Deceased.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON LEAVE TO APPEAL FROM MAY 31, 2024  ORDER DISQUALIFYING COUNSEL  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CHANCERY  DIVISION: PROBATE PART  SUSSEX COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J.Ch.  BRIEF AND SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX
[brief] ¶25 of the JOD specifically required the Plaintiff to establish that fact (as well as the Defendant’s income) with competent evidence.  The Plaintiff was also legally obligated to prove damages with such certainty as the nature of the case may permit, laying a foundation which will enable the trier of the facts to make a fair and reasonable estimate.  Damage awards may not be based on mere speculation.  See Kelly v. Berlin, 300 N.J. Super. 256, 268 (App. Div. 1997).  The Plaintiff failed to prove (after almost 7 years of litigation and preparation for the plenary hearing) what each parties’ incomes were “at the time of enrollment” of each child (to determine proportionality).  The Plaintiff also failed to prove “whether or not the parties can afford such education” (or, in her case, could) (Da23).  The trial court’s conclusions in both regards are sound judicial discretion at its finest.
[brief] Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...], : CIVIL ACTION : ON APPEAL FROM THE Plaintiff-Appellant, : FINAL ORDER OF THE vs. : OF THE SUPERIOR COURT  [...], CLAUDINA : OF NEW JERSEY, LEON, and/or [...] (a : LAW DIVISION, person, persons, entity or entities : HUDSON COUNTY whose identity is presently : Docket No. [...] unknown), Defendants-Respondents.  : Sat Below: : HON. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS