ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In addition, without being qualified an expert, [...] testified, “Cell site tower information, cell phone extraction information . . . puts both [...] and [...] in Willingboro at the time of the homicide” and that “the evidence that [...] was in [the victim’s] car was based on cell phone locations because he was in Willingboro[.]” (11T220-7 to 9; 11T227-22 to 25).  Luyber further stated that Woods’s phone was “hitting off of the cell tower, that one third of a pie which is in the area of [...]’s house along with the homicide scene. ” (2T229-5 to 7).  ____________________
[directive] Request by Defendant/Juvenile for Copies of Their Own Expunged  www.nJcour l 5.gov and/or Sealed Records  Superior Court of County Division: Independence• Integrity  Municipal Court of Fairness• Quality Service Part A: Requestor Identification – Defendant/Juvenile  First Name Middle Initial Last Name Date of Birth Last 4 digits  Social Security Number  Complaint Number/Docket Number/Accusation Number/Indictment Number Address  Home/Cellphone (Include area code) ext. City State Zip Code  Email Address  I certify that I am the subject of the documents requested.  (photo ID required)  ☐  I am the parent for the juvenile indicated above.  (photo ID required)  ☐  I , Attorney ID # __________, certify that I am the attorney for the defendant/juvenile ☐ indicated above and have been authorized by my client to request these records.  (photo ID not required)  By signing below, I represent that I am a person entitled to a copy of this expunged record.  I certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true.  I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.  N.J.S.A. 2C:28-2(a) provides that a person who makes a false statement under affirmation when they do not believe it to be true may be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.  Signature: Date: Part B: Information  Requested Copy of Expungement Order ☐ Copy of Expungement Petition ☐ Certification of Expungement by Supreme Court Order ☐ Copy of Sealed Record ☐ Other (Describe)  ☐ Certified or Exemplified Copies (extra charge if applicable)  Judiciary Use Only Form of identification presented Type of ID: ID #: Court staff is unable to provide the requested record.  ☐ Reason: Proper identification not provided.  ☐ Requestor is not the individual who is the subject of the documents, or their attorney.  ☐  The court has no record.  ☐  The record is not expunged or sealed.  ☐  Signature of Judiciary staff person  Date Published: 8/2021, CN 12830  Attachment 6
[directive] If a defendant is successful in a later PCR application regarding the prior sentence, then the defendant can move for re-sentencing.  Cf., State v. Haliski, 140 N.J. 1 (1995) (Graves Act sentence to be imposed until a defendant’s conviction is otherwise found deficient.)  8(...continued) enhanced penalties as a repeat offender; and b.  Transmit the abstract to the appropriate municipal court judge prior to the imposition of sentence. ”  9  The holding in State v. Laurick, supra, with respect to enhancing sentences, has been abrogated by Nichols v. U.S., 511 U.S. 738, 742, n.7, 748-9, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 1925, n.7, 1927-8, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994).
[brief] • Plaintiffs and defendants collectively – the parties.  • The complete geographical confines of the [...], New Jersey – the Borough.  • All the residents of the Borough collectively, inclusive of plaintiffs – the residents.  • [...] – fictitious parties named to the complaint – the Does.  • Plaintiff and defendant collectively – the parties.  • All the residents of the City collectively, inclusive of plaintiff – the residents.  •  The drinking water sold and delivered to plaintiffs by defendants and that is the subject of this case - the water.  • The sale that is the subject of this case - the sale.  • [...] – [...]. • [...] – [...].
[brief] ”  Griffin v. Burlington Volkswagen, Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 515, 518–19 (App. Div. 2010) (citations omitted); Angrisiani v. Fin. Tech. Ventures, L.P., 402 N.J. Super. 138, 149 (App. Div. 2008) (recognizing that an arbitration provision calling for arbitration of “any and all controversies, claims or disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement” is “extremely broad”).
[brief] The trial court erred in concluding that Plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment.  The court’s discussion about the significance of a company witness’s testimony skips the critical step of identifying actual evidence that supports an inference that Plaintiff’s Ozurdex applicator disbursed a particulate.  Instead, the court wrongly concluded that a hypothetical acknowledging that if such a disbursement had occurred, it would be a deviation from performance standards, was sufficient evidence of a product defect under the PLA.  Moreover, the record reveals significant problems with the methodology and reasoning of Plaintiff’s experts such that the court should have exercised its gatekeeping function and excluded their opinions.  Accordingly, this Court should reverse the decision of the trial court and enter summary judgment for Defendants.
[brief] On a review in the Superior Court, the factual determinations of a zoning board enjoy a presumption of validity.  A board’s determinations will not be overturned unless arbitrary and capricious or unreasonable, and the burden of proving such is upon the plaintiff.  Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of the Twp. of Franklin, 233 N.J. 546, 558 (2018); Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536, 551 (2015); Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 284 (2013); Toll Bros., Inc. v. Burlington County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 194 N.J. 223, 256 (2008); Jock v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of the Twp. of Wall, 184 N.J. 562, 597 (2005); Cell v.  Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of West Windsor Twp., 172 N.J. 75, 81-82 (2002); Berninger v. Board of Adjustment of Midland Park, 254 N.J. Super. 401, 407 (App. Div. 1991), aff’d o.b., 127 N.J. 226 (1992).  The rationale for the "arbitrary and capricious" standard is that local citizens familiar with their community's characteristics and interests, rather than courts, are in the best position to assess the merits of variance applications.  CBS Outdoor v. Lebanon Planning Bd., 414 N.J. Super. 563, 577 (App. Div. 2010); Medical Ctr. at Princeton v. Princeton Twp. Zoning Bd., 343 N.J. Super. 177, 198 (App. Div. 2001)(citing Ward v. Scott, 16 N.J. 16, 23 (1954) and Hawrylo v. Board of Adjustment of Harding Twp., 249 N.J. Super. 568, 578 (App. Div. 1991)).  The arbitrary and capricious standard is a deferential standard of review for agency action.  See PADNA v. City Council of Jersey City, 413 N.J. Super. 322, 332 (App. Div. 2010), certif. den., 205 N.J. 79 (2011).  Superior Court review is intended to be a determination of the validity of the agency's action, not substitution of the court's judgment therefor.  CBS Outdoor, supra, 414 N.J. Super. at 578; Rocky Hill Citizens v. Planning Bd. of Boro. of Rocky Hill, 406 N.J. Super. 384, 411-412 (App. Div. 2009); Burbridge v. Mine Hill Twp., 117 N.J. 376 (1990).  See also *Bressman v. Gash*, 131 N.J. 517, 526-528 (1993); *Randolph Town Ctr. v. Randolph Twp.*, 324 N.J. Super. 412, 418 (App. Div. 1999).  “[L]and use decisions are entrusted to the sound discretion of the municipal boards, which are to be guided by the positive and negative criteria set forth in the enabling statutes. ”  *Kaufmann v. Planning Bd. for Warren Twp.*, 110 N.J. 551, 558 (1988).  Applying the foregoing standard of review to the present case leads to only one conclusion—the Zoning Board acted properly in granting the requested use variance and the same should be affirmed.
[brief] Section 12.1.  It provides:  Redeveloper agrees to proceed in good faith and at its own cost and expense to obtain all Governmental Approvals to develop and construct the Project in accordance with the Redevelopment Project Schedule.  Redeveloper agrees that it shall not seek any use variances pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d) in connection with its applications for the Governmental Approvals.
[brief] Jersey City Med. Ctr.,** | 49, 50 | | 215 N.J. 265 (2013) | | | **Collazo v. Prime Flight of Delaware, Inc.,** | 18, 19 | | No. 19-cv-21312, 2020 WL 3958498 (D.N.J. July 13, 2020) | | Colloty v. Schuman, 73 N.J.L. 92 (Sup. Ct. 1905).................................................................35 Columbus Circle NJ LLC v. Island Constr. Co., LLC, No. A-1907-15T1, 2017 WL 958489 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 13, 2017) (unpublished opinion)..................................................17 Cottrell v. Holtzberg, 468 N.J. Super. 59 (App. Div. 2021)......................................................26 Danaher Corp. v. Lean Focus, LLC, No. 19-cv-750, 2021 WL 3190389 (W.D. Wis. July 28, 2021).....................42 Delgado v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA, LLC, No. A-0933-22, 2023 WL 5538644 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 29, 2023) (unpublished opinion)....................................................20 Dixon v. Rutgers, the State Univ. of N.J., 110 N.J. 432 (1988).................................................................................32 Drosos v. GMM Global Money Managers Ltd., No. A-3674-21, 2023 WL 7545067 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 14, 2023) (unpublished opinion).....................................................19, 20, 21, 22 Duncan v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 700606/2020, 2023 WL 7198189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. Sept. 27, 2023).........................................................................................5 Eckert/Wordell Architects, Inc. v. FJM Props. of Willmar, LLC, 756 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 2014)..................................................................44 Edwards v. Mohammed, No. MID-L-3906-19 (N.J. Super. Ct. Middlesex Cty. Jan. 7, 2022)...............5 Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y v. Moreno, 277 F. Supp. 3d 1191 (D.N.M. 2017).........................................................44
[brief] In the matter of [...] and [...] v. [...], et al., in the superior court of New Jersey, Civil Part, Docket No: [...], [...] denied [...]’s application for intervention.  (Ca308 at p.34, lines 14-17).  [...] pointed out that [...] waited, “far too long”, and that “your clients created a situation to try and void a valid sale so I am denying your application in its entirety.  I am granting [...]’s in its entirety.
[brief] There are several problems with position of [...].  Most basically, is what is sometimes stated as “what’s good for the goose is good for the gander. ”  [...]’s expert also did not review the file, the 21 boxes.  It has already been established that those boxes, that file had been in storage sealed in boxes until unsealed in court.  Neither expert reviewed those 21 boxes, the file because those files were not provided in discovery.  In fact, a comparison of the documents reviewed by [...]’s expert and the documents reviewed by [...]’s expert show an almost identical list.  These include: The pleadings in this case, the parties answers to interrogatories, the Retainer agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant, the legal bills at issue, correspondence, deposition transcripts.  In addition, [...]’s expert also reviewed Pleadings in a since discontinued New York Action between the parties to this action, and [...]’s expert also reviewed a Court order of August 30, 2019, additional legal bills (from other counsel), and [...]’s report.  (Pa36 & Pa50).  Notably, neither expert reviewed the underlying files (which are referred to below as the “Sollecito file”, the “21 Bankers Boxes” and “Exhibit D4”).  Yet [...] permitted [...]’s expert to testify in his opinion that the billing was reasonable (6T, Pg. 93, lines 2, 12-14).  And at the same time, and for the exact same offense – not reviewing the 21 boxes of file, [...]’s expert was barred from testifying that the bills were not reasonable.  Not only was the ruling on the expert completely improper, but it reflects such a double standard that the bias of [...] discussed above is clear.
[brief] The reasoning of Jordan does not squarely apply to the present dispute.  As the Court of Appeals explained in Jordan, discovery from third parties is generally more limited than discovery from parties because “nonparties are strangers to the litigation, and since they have no dog in the fight, they have a different set of expectations from the parties themselves. ”  921 F.3d at 189 (cleaned up, quoting Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 717 (1st Cir. 1998)).  See also id. (“Bystanders should not be drawn into the parties’ dispute without some good reason, even if they have information that falls within the scope of party discovery. ”).  Here, [...], unlike the third-party subpoena recipient in the Jordan case, is not a “stranger” or “bystander”; [...]’s claims are against the Defendants for decisions they allegedly made while working for [...], which [...] contends constituted unlawful discrimination and retaliation, and created a hostile work environment.  Regardless, the Court need not reach the question of whether [...] qualifies as a “bystander” as contemplated in Jordan, because the Court would reach the same conclusions as to time frame, custodians, and the other issues decided at the hearing and herein when applying the relevance, burden and proportionality analysis required by Rule 26 itself.
[brief] (13T28:13 to 29:8).  Some parts of these structured transactions occurred prior to the presentation of P-48 and P-50 and/or the closing, with additional money moved afterward.  These transactions, in particular, were relevant to [...]’s conclusion that the defendants were diverting funds to mislead the Plaintiffs as to the values on P-48 and P-50.  (13T31:6 to 33:3).  As to whether these and other abnormalities were merely innocent accounting errors, [...] explained that multiple entries in multiple company books over multiple years were inconsistent in ways that suggested that these issues were not just innocent errors.  Moreover, rectification of an error would usually occur with an opposing transaction for the same dollar amount.  [...] did not observe that in the books and records.  (10T72:4-8; 73:4 to 74:2).  Over several days, [...] testified about dozens of transactions that represented diversions of funds from [...] and [...].  In some cases, he was unable to trace the funds to a particular destination.  In other cases, [...] was able to identify specific funds diverted on specific dates and the precise destination of those funds.  In total, [...] identified about $10 million that he believed was diverted from [...] and [...] into accounts controlled by the [...].  (Pa189-351).  The trial court afforded the defendants a full opportunity to respond to [...]’s analysis.
[brief] 1  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.  . . . . . . . . . . .  4  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW (Aa0001)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11  II.  [...]’S PROJECT DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR EXEMPTION # 11  FROM THE HIGHLANDS ACT (Aa0001)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] LEGAL POINT VIII.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND DECLARE THAT THE FORECLOSURE COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION BY PROCEEDING WITH THE FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT FILED BY [...] ON 5/12/16.  Raised Below: paragraph 14 (026a) and paragraph 30 (028a).  In 1T page 4 lines 17-22 and page 5 lines 10-14 and page 5 lines 16-21.  Bayview did not oppose and did not deny my claims and arguments.  The denial order is at (221a).  The Foreclosure Court of Monmouth County Superior Court (the Trial Court) never had subject matter jurisdiction over the Foreclosure Complaint against my house filed on 5/12/16 by Bayview.  I have not seen that the Trial Court verify the foreclosing Plaintiff standing to file for foreclosure.  The Court grants summary judgment motions to any Plaintiff who files for foreclosure in Monmouth County.  Based on my personal knowledge the Trial Court granted summary judgments motions to foreclosing Plaintiffs without verifying their standings to foreclose.  They are: [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].  Bayview has submitted five mortgage documents in this case.  They are: – The Mortgage Assignment of 2/27/2009 from [...] to Case (065a) – The Affidavit of Lost Note of 2/12/14 (088a).  An unauthenticated copy of the alleged Note (091a) which was submitted as attachment1 to the Affidavit of Lost Note of 2/12/14.  – The Mortgage Assignment of 2//28/14 from [...] to Bayview (097a) – The HAM Agreement of 2015 103a) – The Certification of [...] of 10/18/22 (115a)  Bayview filed its Foreclosure Complaint against my house on 5/12/16.
[brief] However, . . . I don’t understand how there can be a theory that . . . the moving party in this case could have possibly . . . interfered with the tortious relationship, given the fact that there was no transaction that took place.  [I]t’s undisputed the transaction never took place.  That the [...] backed away from the situation.  And under those circumstances, I don’t see how they meet the -- how -- how there’s any possible way of meeting the four part standard under Printing Mart versus Sharp Electronics.  --- \(^3\)  [...]’s “Cross-Motion” was made in response to a Motion to File an Amended Complaint and thus did not “relate[ ] to the subject matter of the original motion. ”  R. 1:6-3(b); (P271a-P272a, P275a-P276a).  It thus was not a proper cross-motion.  The Trial Court, nevertheless, over Plaintiffs’ objection, treated [...]’s motion as a cross-motion.  \(^4\)  The Trial Court entered summary judgment in favor of [...] on Plaintiffs’ claims of tortious interference, unjust enrichment, declaratory judgment, and civil conspiracy.
[directive] E. trainings.  Under Directive 2020-13, officers are required Deadline for ICAT and ABLE to complete the New UOF Trainings by December 31, 2021.  Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the scope of the undertaking to provide this new training to more than 38,000 officers, it is necessary to extend the deadline for ICAT and ABLE training (but not Nothing in this Directive should be interpreted as prohibiting any law enforcement agency from completing two or 5 more rounds of firearms requalification during 2021, or requiring officers to complete any additional in-service training, as circumstances permit.
[brief] THE COURT:  Well, let me ask you this, can't their client waive that potential conflict?  [...]: Yes, and then -- and set off a ticking time bomb under this litigation.  At some point they're going to realize -- THE COURT: But what ticking time bomb?  [...]: Excuse me, Judge?  THE COURT: What?  What ticking time bomb?  [...]: Because I -- you know what, can't get a fair trial here because of the Comparative Negligence Act.
[brief] The Chancery Division evaluated the credibility of the witnesses at trial, which included the five witnesses presented by the Petitioner and the eight presented by the Respondent.  (Pa 16-20).  As to the Petitioner’s testimony, the Court concluded:  Petitioner’s testimony was contradicted by multiple fact witnesses, exhibits, and even his own testimony between his deposition and at trial.  This court does not find Petitioner to be a credible witness.  (Pa 25).  As to the Petitioner’s other witness, the Chancery Division found [...], a former neighbor, to be credible but essentially irrelevant in terms of the time period testified to.  (Pa 25).  As to [...], a longtime friend of Petitioner, the Court found him “credible but not persuasive. ” (Pa 25).  The Court similarly found [...] as “credible but not persuasive. ” (Pa 25-26).  The Petitioner’s last witness, [...], a caretaker for the Decedent’s mother, was found to be “credible but not relevant to this court’s inquiry. ” (Pa 26).  All five of the Respondent’s witnesses were found to be credible and relevant.  The testimony of the forensic document examination expert, [...], was found to be “uncontroverted and extremely credible. ” (Pa 26).  Both attorneys, Timothy and [...], were found to be credible.  (Pa 26-27).  Atlantic County Deputy Surrogate, [...], was held credible, as was the testimony of [...] and [...].  (Pa 27).  [...]’s testimony was found to be “reasonable, well-founded and credible. ” (Pa 28).  As to the Respondent, the Chancery Division held as follows:  Most of Respondent’s testimony is contradicted and supported by other witnesses.  She was composed.  Her demeanor was such that her recollection of all the facts as recited was believable.  Respondent was extremely credible while testifying as to her shortcomings in life including the relationship with the father of her children and her challenges with substance abuse and parenting.  The fact that she admitted that, at times, she was not a “model” child was also credible.  In the end, her bond and close relationship with her mother and the love they shared as a mother and daughter was evident.  This court finds Respondent credible.  (Pa 28).  STATEMENT OF STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] 460 N.J. Super. at 102-04; cf. State v. Howard-French, 468 N.J. Super. 448, 458-65 (App. Div. 2021) (not plain error where officer’s interview comments did not directly opine on defendant’s guilt and only “implied” he was lying).  Here, the trial court failed to redact the detectives’ constant accusations that [...] was guilty and lying and their theories of how and why he did it.  First, the detectives directly and repeatedly accused him of the murder (e.g., “You did it”; “you ran to that car, you shot him”; “You went there, you said I’m God tonight, shot through the window of his car”; “You went back around the corner, shot him, then left again.
[directive] In recognition of this data and the substantial human costs associated with high-speed vehicular pursuits, this Policy further restricts the circumstances under which pursuits can be undertaken.  The offenses for which officers may pursue suspects has been limited to only the most serious crimes.  Significantly, both auto theft and most drug offenses have been removed from the list of crimes authorizing the initiation of a pursuit.  This Policy creates a strong presumption against the initiation of pursuits for traffic violations and prohibits continuation of a pursuit based on the risk created by the speed or evasive driving of the fleeing suspect during the pursuit itself.  It also requires greater oversight by supervisors, and mandates that a pursuit be terminated unless a supervisor affirmatively authorizes it to be continued.  1.4
[brief] \(^{12}\) \(^{12}\) [...] expressed that the trial court’s discovery protocol would impose undue burden and expense because the parties would be required to perform a privilege review of irrelevant documents that would not otherwise be produced or logged.  (Da126 ¶ 23.)  But the trial court’s response was that it could discern no reason that a privilege review of all documents returned by the ESI search terms would be any more burdensome or expensive than a relevance review of those same documents.  (Da159.)  Fourth, the trial court’s discovery protocol was tailored to the needs of this specific case, given the parties’ contentious disputes in related litigations.
[brief] Plaintiff’s claims based on contractual duties and fiduciary duties were correctly dismissed by the trial court.  (46a-47a)  A.  The title commitment does not support plaintiff’s claims.  (43a)  25  B.  When a transaction is illegal, the parties to the transaction are barred from bringing claims against 28 each other and the only remedy available against a third-party is recovery of funds still in the possession of the third-party.  (44a-48a)  Point III.