ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Utilizing either date – August 1 or August 5, 2019 – as the date of accrual means that Plaintiff was required to file a Complaint with the Superior Court on or before August 5, 2021 to be within the applicable Statute of Limitations.  That did no occur.  (See Pa084-Pa099; see also Da001-Da002).  In or about January 2020, [...], filed a complaint with HUD alleging improper denial of a reasonable accommodation, *i.e.*, a handicap parking space, by the [...].  (See Pa279-Pa283).  On or about February 7, 2020, [...], under the auspices of the HUD Conciliation Process, was willing to provide [...] with a handicap designated parking area at the nearest available location to [...].  (See Da037-Da046).  This area is located at [...] and is literally (when viewed from Park Avenue) the next property over to the right.  (See Da035).  Therefore, the requested handicap parking space would have been at most a *de minimis* distance, if not exactly the same distance, to the left instead of the right when coming from [...]’s front door.  This litigation could have resolved amicably *over four (4) years ago* in or about February 2020 had Plaintiff simply been willing to, upon information and belief, *allow* his mother to sign the Conciliation Agreement or to sign it himself as his mother’s power of attorney.  (See Da057-Da060; see also Da037-Da046).  However, Plaintiff simply appears entirely unwilling to compromise and wanted nothing more than to extract a pound of flesh instead of providing his own mother with the handicap parking space at that time.
[brief] (Pa1947.)  From 2008-09 to 2018-19, the local levy rose 44% from $86 million to $124 million.  (Id.)  The State also fails to acknowledge that, during that same timeframe, [...]’s LFS more than doubled, increasing from $196.2 million to $474 million, (Pa915, ¶ 33; Pa930, ¶ 154), even as the State’s share of the Adequacy Budget remained flat.  (Pb14; Pa931, ¶ 160.)  As a consequence, the gap between the District’s LFS and local levy dramatically grew during this period, from $110 million in 2008-09 to $337 million in 2019-20.  (Pb15-16.)  The capped increases in the local levy were vastly outpaced by an ever-growing LFS.  (Pa915, ¶ 29.)  Thus, [...] did not “refuse” to increase property taxes.  The combination of the 2% cap and a climbing LFS each year made it impossible to raise the local contribution to a level anywhere near a fully funded Adequacy Budget.
[directive] Said repott shall be provided no later than thirty (30) days from date admission; and, by be 5.  The defendant shall not administratively discharged the institution without further of order this comt; and, ______ 6.  A hearing on this matter shall take place on . or by 7.  The written report submitted the qualified psychiatrist licensed psychologist to this an Court shall not include opinion with respect to whether the defendant was insane at the NJ.SA. of 2C:4-l time the crime pursuant to and/or whether the defendant suffered from a NJS.A. of or mental disease defect at the time the crime pursuant to 2C:4-2; of3 page 2 by [...], Published Directive 12326 (Competency 2)
[brief] [...] confirmed that the work on the date of the Accident, despite noting Proposal Two, was actually done pursuant to a subsequent proposal.  (Pa1035, [...] Tr., 75:20-76:1.)  Referencing the invoice (Pa422), Plaintiffs incorrectly also assert “core drilling” was being done on the December 11, 2015 Accident date (Pb12 and Pb24).  However, there is no discussion of core drilling (only wire sawing) on December 11, 2015.  (Pa422.)  [...]’s Job Ticket No. 43788 on the Accident date describes the work completed by [...] of [...] as “wire sawing” and specifies performing “saw cut in north side wall” and further identifies the contact for [...] as [...].  (Pa423.)  Swindell admitted in the Hood Lawsuit that on the date of the Accident he (i.e., [...]) was working in the northeast corner wire sawing parts of the concrete wall for removal that were recently located during excavation.  (Swindell Tr., 14:15-15:13 at Pa1123-1124 and 36:8-21 at Pa1145.)  Swindell further prepared a written statement after the Accident stating he “had been working the northeast corner of the job site” doing “cutting with an electric wire saw to demo concrete north face – wall north face. ”  (Pa99, Swindell Tr., 36:8-21, and Statement, Pa1298.)  A foreman for [...] and several [...] employees confirmed that [...] was performing demolition on the date of the Accident.  ([...] Tr., 174:5-8 at Pa1475; [...] Tr., 107:1-4 at Pa1712, 115:2-23 at Pa1720, and 124:7-15 at Pa1729; and [...] Tr., 25:9-19 at Pa955 and 70:5-11 at Pa967.)
[brief] The reason is that the FDCPA empowers consumers to act as private attorneys general.  Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008); Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 345 (3d Cir. 2004) abrogated on other grounds by Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153 (2016); Johnson v. Statewide Collections, Inc., 778 P.2d 93, 99 (Wyo. 1989) (“the primary enforcement” of the FDCPA “is self-enforcement by the aggrieved debt acting as a ‘private attorney general’”).  “In this way, the FDCPA enlists the efforts of sophisticated consumers…as ‘private attorneys general’ to aid their less sophisticated counterparts, who are unlikely themselves to bring suit under the Act, but who are assumed by the Act to benefit from the deterrent effect of civil action brought by others”
[brief] The Trial Court awarded sanctions against Mother to reimburse Estranged Wife and her counsel for the hours spent pursuing discovery that was completely irrelevant to the probate issues before the court, and/or to answer a factual question that they knew not to be in dispute.  Estranged Wife and her counsel chose to pursue discovery that was irrelevant under the law and undisputed facts and then asked to be paid for the busywork that it created.  The award of counsel fees and duplicative monetary damages rewarded the Estranged Wife and her counsel for their abuse of the discovery process and the legal system.  It should not be tolerated.  Accordingly, Mother–[...] respectfully requests that this Honorable Court reverse the award of $44,000.00 in counsel fees and $20,000.00 in additional monetary sanctions contained in the Trial Court’s November 2, 2022 Order.  (MA-66)  Respectfully submitted, [...] s/ [...], Esq.  LAWRENCE A. KATZ  Counsel for Appellant
[directive] 1  Purpose of Policy ...................................................................................................................................  1  2  Definitions ............................................................................................................................................. 2  3  Deciding Whether to Pursue .................................................................................................................  4  4  Role of the Pursuing Officer ..................................................................................................................  7  5  Vehicular Pursuit Restrictions ...............................................................................................................  8  6  Authorized Tire Deflation Devices ......................................................................................................  10  7  Role of the Supervisor .........................................................................................................................  12  8  Role of Police Communications ..........................................................................................................  13  9  Reinstating Pursuits ............................................................................................................................  13  10  Interjurisdictional Pursuits .................................................................................................................. 13  11  Vehicular Pursuit Reporting ................................................................................................................ 14  12  Vehicular Pursuit Review ....................................................................................................................  15  13  Training ............................................................................................................................................... 16  14  Individual Agency Policies ...................................................................................................................
[directive] When a temporary or final restraining order is issued that requires service outside the issuing county, 1.  The restraining order, along with the complaint and any other relevant documents (e.g. search warrant, etc.) must immediately be brought or faxed to the sheriff's department in the issuing county.  a.  The sheriff's department in the issuing county must similarly bring or fax the order and related documents to the sheriff's department in the county of the defendant's residence or business.  b.  The sheriff's department in the receiving county, pursuant to local policy, will either (1) execute service on the defendant or (2) will immediately bring or fax the order and related documents to the police department in the municipality in which the defendant resides or works so that it can execute service accordingly.  c.  The return of service should then be faxed back to the sheriff's department in the issuing county, which in turn must immediately deliver or fax the return of service to the Family Division in the issuing county.  2.
[brief] The basis of Appellant’s claim is her termination for an insubordinate e-mail sent by her and other employees (who were similarly terminated) in which they demanded to work from home prior to the existence of any federal, state, or local mandate requiring her employer to do so.  This is essentially the same issue that was present in *Pierce*, wherein the plaintiff disagreed with the employer’s actions, not on the basis of an identifiable public policy, but based upon her own subjective beliefs.  As evidence thereof, Appellant does not, and cannot, reference the existence of any actual public policy upon which Appellant stakes her belief that the actions of Respondent were in contravention to nor has she identified any such policy in her discovery responses or during her deposition.  As of the date of her termination no mandate, no executive order, or other requirement existed which restricted the ability of an employer to require its workforce to report to the office.  See N.J. Exec. Order No. 102; N.J. Exec. Order No. 103.  Appellant cannot point to any actual violation or contravention of a clear mandate of public policy to support her claim and Appellant’s CEPA argument regarding application of future Executive Orders does not fit with the required analysis under *Pierce*, which applies an entirely different, and narrower, standard.  Notably, when directly asked which policy her Complaint was referring to, Appellant responded “I would assume that was in regards to there being like a national emergency declared, perhaps, and, you know, New Jersey public schools being closed. ”  Pa247; Pl. Dep. T. 50:08–11.  Yet, it is noteworthy that even public schools were open at the time of Appellant’s termination.  Exec. Order No. 104.  **POINT III**
[brief] On December 6, 2019, the [...] (“[...]” or “[...]”) initiated a program for the bridging of the existing initial legislatively mandated solar incentive program and the then-to-be-developed “Successor Solar Incentive Program” (“SUSI Program”).  This bridge program was to become known as the Transition Incentive Program (“TI Program”).  See In The Matter of A New Jersey Solar Transition Pursuant to P.L. 2018, C.17, Order, [...], [...], dated December 6, 2019.  (009a².)  One of the elements initially missing from the initial program, but subsequently added by the [...] later was the use of new and innovative solar technologies, as well as the opportunity to seek a specific TREC Factor for these innovative technologies – in essence, a percentage of the basic Transition Renewable Energy Certificate value used to finance solar incentives.  See In The Matter of a New Jersey Solar Transition Pursuant to P.L. 2018, C.17, Order, [...], [...], dated January 8, 2020.  (045a.)  What had originally been an open question was clarified.  ¹  Because of they are inextricably intertwined, Appellant combined the Statement of Facts and Procedural History into one statement for better clarity and for the court’s convenience.
[brief] “We should not tolerate interpreting a trust to provide benefits the settlor did not intend. ”  *In re Nelson*, 454 N.J. Super. 151, 163 (App. Div. 2018).  Clearly, the Settlor did not intend for [...] to receive a $149,000 profit upon purchasing the Boonton Property.  By doing so, [...] received more than his one-third equal share.  Similarly, the Settlor did not intend for [...] to purchase the Florida Property approximately $80,000 below fair market value.  Again, by doing so, [...] received more than her one-third equal share.  4.
[brief] As correctly found by the motion court, it should not be done piecemeal.  (1T48:17-21).  Indeed, Defendants concede that the two cases are related and involve common questions of law and fact.  In an August 23, 2023, letter to the trial court, Defendants’ counsel made reference to their Law Division Complaint to refute Plaintiff’s claim that she is the equitable owner of the Property.  (Pa001).  Moreover, the lower court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion to consolidate does not preclude a finding that these cases should be handled in one forum.  Defendants take the position that the trial court’s denial of consolidation proves that the Law Division Action is completely separate from the Chancery Action (1T15:12-22), however, the motion judge disagreed and provided the following clarification:  THE COURT:  Not necessarily.  I mean, I understand that argument and will give some weight to that, but on the other hand, you know, we are not in the business of taking Law Division actions.  A lot of your counterclaims are, you know, very similar.  And, you know, the question, is, am I taking everything or are we going to keep those separate?  Now that [the Law Division action] goes to arbitration, so I don’t necessarily put blinders on.  So we are supposed to do discovery and have a trial on your counterclaims while you are doing discovery and having arbitration on her mismanagement or whatever it is over there?  I mean, it makes no sense.  (1T15:23-16:12).  Thus, the motion court was of the correct opinion that simply because consolidation was denied earlier, it did not preclude a finding that these two cases should be arbitrated together in view of all the similarities and connections between them.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] Seksyèl atravè tout leta yo Statewide Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner Program  Penalty  Èske w konprann ke si deli a te komèt le oubyen aprè le 4 me 2001 swit de deklarasyon koupab [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] ou an wap oblije peye yon amann de $800 pou chak zak pou ki w plede koupab?
[brief] During the journey, three calls were placed from [...]'s cell phone to the Holiday Inn reservation line.  Upon their arrival, [...] spotted [...]'s car and told [...] that [...] had returned.  [...] told [...] to wait and [...] and [...] entered the Holiday Inn.  On the way to [...]'s room, [...] put on gloves, took duct tape from his pocket, and displayed a handgun.  [...], who had not seen any of these items previously, became nervous because this was not part of the plan.  When they arrived at [...]'s room, [...] told [...] to use her key card to open the door, but it did not work.  [...] called [...]'s cell phone and could hear it ringing, but [...] did not respond.  [...] knocked on the door.  [...] answered, told [...] and [...] that [...] was sleeping, and tried to close the door.  [...] used her foot to prevent the door from closing, and she and [...] entered the room.  Once inside, [...] grabbed [...] by the hair, pointed the gun at her head, and demanded the money and [...]'s car keys.  [...] searched the room.  [...] continued to sleep.  [...] shoved [...] into the bathroom and told [...] to tape her up, which [...] did, duct taping [...]'s wrists, mouth, and ankles.  [...] got a good look at [...] and noticed a scar on the left side of his face.  *
[directive] The criminal new flee, commit will defendant a that likelihood the assess to courts requiring approach, critical most the of One other witnesses. and intimidating victims by justice obstruct or activity, henceforth will process predictive this that is initiative reform entire the undergirding innovations validated and been designed has that process risk-assessment pretrial an objective informed by be risk- pretrial of validated  The a use 2A:162-25(c).  N.J.S.A.  See research. empirical through system. release effective pretrial and just a toward advance major a represents assessmentinstrument general the on depends AOC the by approved process risk-assessment pretrial the because  However, 2 have procedures and systems well-designed that in exception notable a are violence domestic involving Cases other restraints of and enforcement the and issuance through victims violence protect domestic to implemented been N.J.S.A. 2C:25-26 See charges. of disposition pending released defendants of conduct control the to conditions special Jersey of New Court of Supreme the authority the under issued Manual Procedures Violence Domestic the and -34 to the when court the alert (requiring to officers 4.6.4 subsection also See (2008).
[brief] Specifically, the phrase “…provided that such claim…is attributable to bodily injury, sickness, disease or death sustained by anyone, including employees of Subcontractor or to injury to or destruction of intangible property (other than the Work itself) including loss of use resulting therefrom, caused in whole or in part by negligent acts or omissions of the Subcontractor” is clearly missing the word “and” or “is” between “therefrom,” and “caused. ”  There is a significant difference between: • “…provided that such claim, damage, loss or expense is attributable to bodily injury,…caused in whole or in part by negligent acts or omissions of the Subcontractor…” and • “…provided that such claim, damage, loss or expense is attributable to bodily injury,…AND caused in whole or in part by negligent acts or omissions of the Subcontractor…” or “…provided that such claim, damage, loss or expense is attributable to bodily injury,…IS caused in whole or in part by negligent acts or omissions of the Subcontractor…”  Without the “and” or “is”, the “claim” only specifically applies to “bodily injury, sickness, disease or death sustained by anyone…”  The run-on nature of the sentence and multiple commas cannot conclusively establish whether the “claim” must also be “caused in whole or in part by the negligent acts or omissions of the Subcontractor. ”  This phrase is impermissibly vague and ambiguous and fails to include language sufficient for [...] to meet its heightened burden.  Construed strictly against [...], the indemnification clause [...] drafted does not meet the Azurak standard.  [...]’s claim for contractual indemnification fails as a matter of law.
[brief] This litigation arises out of an incident occurring on January 14, 2019, at which time Appellant, [...] (“[...]”), claims to have sustained property damage as the result of a water leak at her home in Jersey City, New Jersey.  Respondent, [...] (“[...]”), [...]’s homeowner’s insurance carrier, retained Respondent, [...]  (“[...]”), to inspect [...]’s home, and to photograph, inventory and provide research to [...] regarding the condition and value of the items of personal property [...] claimed were damaged as the result of the water leak.  [...] is engaged in the business of providing investigative and evaluation services to property and casualty insurance companies.  [...] was not retained by any party and did not undertake to restore, repair or clean [...]’s property.  [...] is not an insurance adjusting firm.  Pursuant to its contract with [...], [...] provided its findings and recommendations to [...] concerning the items that [...] claimed were damaged, and whether those items should be repaired or replaced.  [...] made the decision as to whether to restore, repair or replace an item.  [...] furnished [...] with research regarding the value of the items [...] claimed were damaged.  [...] made the ultimate determination as to what compensation, if any, [...] should receive for any particular item.  [...] acknowledged that there was no contract between her and [...], and that [...] was not engaged to restore, repair or clean her property.  As a courtesy, [...], at [...]’s request and at no cost to her, arranged for some of [...]’s damaged garments to be transported to a local dry cleaner.  Prior to these items being removed from her home and taken to the dry cleaner, [...] had already certified to [...] that they were damaged as the result of the water leak and flooding.  [...] claims that some of the garments transported to the dry cleaner were not returned to her.  She also alleges that some of the items were damaged when they were returned from the dry cleaner.  However, [...] has not produced any credible evidence establishing which of the items that were transported to the dry cleaner were not later returned to her.  She has produced no evidence establishing the value of any of the items she alleges were damaged or lost.  In addition, [...] has not, and under the fact of this case cannot, demonstrate that any conduct by or for which [...] is responsible is causally related to any damage she claims was present when items of her personal property were returned to her from the dry cleaner.  For the reasons expressed more fully below, [...]’s appeal of the Trial Court’s Orders should be denied and dismissed because there are no material issues of fact for trial as [...] is unable to establish a cause of action, whether based in negligence or contractual theories, against [...].
[brief] See also Triffin v. American Intern., 372 N.J. Super. 517, 524 (App. Div. 2004) (“we have no explanation from the motion judge as to why plaintiff’s request for oral argument was denied . . . [h]owever, under these circumstances, we are convinced that [she] nevertheless arrived at the proper result . . . [and] her refusal to entertain oral argument is insufficient to require our intervention. ”); Cobra Products v. Federal Ins. Co., 317 N.J. Super. 392, 396 (App. Div. 1998), certif. den. 160 N.J. 89 (1999) (affirming grant of summary judgment where the motion judge, “for some unknown reason, denied the parties’ requests for oral argument and decided the matter on the briefs. ”).  And this is not a case where the court haphazardly dispensed with oral argument.  Rather, the motion judge, seeking to ensure that the parties had a chance to build a record, ordered a Rule 104 hearing.  Although a Rule 104 hearing is different from oral argument on a motion for summary judgment, that distinction is narrow and academic.  Here, it was Plaintiffs’ burden to prove duty, breach, and causation.  To do so, they produced a single liability expert.  After the Rule 104 hearing and post-hearing submissions, the court ruled that Plaintiffs’ expert and sole proof of liability was unreliable.  Plaintiffs’ ability to prove duty, breach, and causation, and thus their ability to win at trial, hinged on this now discredited liability expert.  Plaintiffs may not have had oral argument in form, but they certainly had it in substance.  Plaintiffs’ briefing does not even describe what oral argument would have changed.  In sum, Plaintiff complains of a technicality without much elaboration, relies exclusively on unpublished authority, and ignores the published caselaw that contradicts his argument.  Plaintiffs just want a second bite at the apple and have not shown that they are entitled to it.