ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (4T:213:5-15).  Plaintiff also admitted that a year before the [...] incident, she started using a rollator, which she was using at the time of the accident.  (4T213:7-10).  Her testimony, however, as to the reason for her use of the rollator was inconsistent.  On the one hand, she testified that her use of the rollator was in no way related to balance issues.  (4T213:7-20; 247:5-11).  Rather, her sole purpose for using the rollator was for security in the event she went out in public and someone bumped into her.  (4T257:13-16).  However, when asked if the rollator provided her with both a feeling of security and helped her with her balance, the plaintiff testified, “Maybe.  Yeah”.  (4T:213:21-24).  The plaintiff was also questioned at the time of her deposition about two prior falls she had before the [...] incident.
[directive] 1.  Have you, or family member, or a close personal friend, ever had any experience, either so good or so bad, with a doctor or any other health care provider, that would make it difficult for you to sit as an impartial juror in this matter?  2.  If the law and the evidence warranted, could you award damages for the plaintiff even if you felt sympathy for the doctor?  3.  Regardless of plaintiff’s present condition, if the law and evidence warranted, could you render a verdict in favor of the defendant despite being sympathetic to the plaintiff?  4.  Have you, any family member, or close personal friend ever worked for:  Attorneys  Doctors, Hospitals or Physical Therapists  Any type of health care provider  Any ambulance / EMT / Rescue Model Civil Jury Voir Dire Questions Revised as Promulgated by Directive #4-07
[brief] Here, there was lengthy testimony, mostly elicited by defendant, that was limited in detail about the anonymous tip that police received, the identity of the caller, and what resulted from the call.  First, [...] testified that after defendant confessed to her that he killed [...], she told a “friend of [hers]” who then called the police within 24 hours of the murder.  [11T70-15 to 71-2].  Later that day during the trial, the anonymous tip was addressed again during the direct examination of [...].  The following colloquy was exchanged:
[brief] These core principles governed plaintiff’s denied Motion for Reconsideration, Vacation, Alteration, and Amendment.  Midland Funding LLC v. Albern, 433 N.J. Super. 494, 499 (App Div. 2013) (“Our procedural rules were designed to be ‘a means to the end of obtaining just and expeditious determinations between the parties on the ultimate merits. ’” (quoting Ragusa v. Lau, 119 N.J. 276, 284 (1990)); See Rule 1:1-2, Rule 1:4-8, Rule 1:7-4, Rule 1:13-1, Rule 4:49-2, Rule 4:50-1 (c), (d), and (f).  The trial court failed to exercise its inherent equitable powers.  In addition, the trial court violated our Judiciary’s Mission Statement.  The Judiciary’s Mission Statement provides:
[brief] When the parties agree to follow the AAA rules for the purpose of selecting an arbitrator, the issue is a procedural question to be determined in the arbitration forum.  While there is no New Jersey case specifically addressing the issue raised by [...], the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the issue definitively: [...] finally asserts that the arbitrator exceeded his power because the arbitration proceedings should have been heard by a panel of three arbitrators instead of by only one.  [...] contends that because [...]’s actual claim was in the millions of dollars, it had the right to insist that three arbitrators hear the case, pursuant to the AAA’s Complex Case Procedures.  We have heretofore recognized that, in such a circumstance, a court generally lacks jurisdiction to determine the number of arbitrators needed to hear and resolve an arbitration.  See Dockser v. Schwartzberg, 433 F.3d 421, 423 (4th Cir.2006) (concluding that when “[t]he parties have agreed that arbitrator selection should follow the rules and procedures of the” AAA, “the number of the arbitrators is a procedural question to be answered exclusively in that forum”).  Thus, [...] has failed to satisfy its burden of showing that the arbitrator exceeded his power, and the Award cannot be vacated on that basis.
[brief] [...] Received a Judicial Declaration that It Had No Duty to Defend or Indemnify [...] in the Underlying Action  On June 9, 2020, [...] filed this declaratory judgment action, seeking a determination of its rights and obligations to [...] with respect to the remaining tortious interference claim.  (Da11-19).  More specifically, [...] asserts that the [...] allege that [...] acted intentionally and with the intent to injure them.  (Da11-19).  [...] alleged that these types of allegations are excluded from coverage under the Policy’s “Knowing Violation of the Rights of Another” and “With Knowledge of Falsity” exclusions.  (Da16-17).  In response, [...] filed counterclaims against [...] seeking damages for breach of contract and bad faith as well as declaratory judgment as to the breach of contract and bad faith.  (Da31-36).  The trial court ruled in favor of [...].  (Da1-2).  It found that [...] was not entitled to coverage or a defense under the [...] Policy for the claims pursued by the [...].  (Da1-2).  This appeal followed.  (Da3-6).
[brief] ” (citing Abtrax Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 139 N.J. 513–14).  There is no like ground shown by the record in this case before the Court here.  The ultimate sanction is supposed to be employed “sparingly,” our caselaw provides, and the few cases that warrant it are those where the offending party has engaged in an egregious and prolonged campaign to thwart another party's access to discovery – as in Abtrax Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 139 N.J. 499 (finding the “extreme sanction” of dismissing complaint with prejudice justified where plaintiff falsely represented documents did not exist for years when they were in plaintiff's possession), and FFik-Rymarkiewicz, supra, 430 N.J. Super. 469(affirming trial court's dismissal of complaint with prejudice where for years plaintiff refused to provide responsive discovery), certif. denied, 214 N.J. 118 (2013).
[directive] [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No] złagodzenia kary lub skrócenia okresu niemożności ubiegania się o zwolnienie warunkowe? (Jeżeli tak, należy koniecznie odpowiedzieć na pytania 12 i 13 powyżej).  Have you and the Prosecutor entered into any agreement to provide for a lesser sentence or period of parole ineligibility than would otherwise be required?
[brief] As such, defendant’s argument that the State advised the jury to find defendant guilty as an accomplice for the sole act of hiding the firearm after [...] used it is not supported by the evidence.  Furthermore, the *Whitaker* Court found that the jury charges were inadequate because it was “impossible to determine” whether the jury convicted defendant based on the State’s erroneous recitation of accomplice liability.  *Id.* at 465.  Again, *Whitaker* is distinguished because here, defendant was not convicted on the sole fact that he hid a firearm involved in a murder after the fact, but because there was sufficient evidence proving that defendant had the requisite criminal intent to commit or attempt to commit all of the charged offenses.
[brief] [...]’s Notice and Updates to its Insurance Companies and the Insurance Companies’ Lack of Action  On December 10, 1986, [...] notified all of its historic general liability insurance companies of the EPA’s Request for Information and requested defense and indemnification under the policies it had purchased.  (Pa0336-52).  After providing this initial notice, [...] regularly provided updates relating to the [...] through its law firms.  (e.g., Pa0435-63; Pa0353-62; Pa0410-14; Pa0464-71; Pa0472-86).  [...]’s first update was on February 5, 1987.  (Pa0435-63).  The updates continued on an annual or nearly annual basis until August of 2004.  (Pa0472-86).  Despite the numerous status reports provided and opportunities to investigate [...]’s claim further, none of the insurance companies, including [...], took any steps to do so.  (Pa0244-48; Pa0492-99).  Yet, in 1995, almost nine years after receiving [...]’s original notice, and without having conducted any investigation, [...] sent a reservation of rights letter in which it asserted numerous grounds on which it might deny coverage.  (Pa0368-69).  V. AOCs Where the Trial Court Found Property Damage During [...]’s Policy Period
[directive] VICTIMS OF RACIAL, RELIGIOUS OR ETHNICALLY MOTIVATED ACTS  A.  Victims shall be provided with information about the criminal justice process.  B.  Brochures about the criminal justice process and victims rights information shall be displayed in the police station.  C.  Face to face case specific explanation of system and process shall be provided.  D.  Victims shall be provided with information about victim compensation.  E.  Procedures shall be established to ensure that victims are periodically informed of the status closing of investigations.  F.  Victims shall be advised of any arrest, bail and pre-trial release as soon as possible.  G.  Information shall be provided on the status of any property stolen or removed as well as procedures and regulations governing property return.  TREATMENT
[directive] (It should be noted that if defendant’s relevant conduct involves different kinds of weapons (e.g., an assault firearm or machine gun and a nonassault semi-automatic firearm), the possession of these two types of weapons shall be deemed to constitute “separate and distinct conduct” for the purposes of these Guidelines, notwithstanding that the possession of the two distinct types of firearms occurred simultaneously.  In other words, enumerated circumstance #1 is automatically deemed to be separate and distinct from enumerated circumstance #2.)
[brief] Pa25; Pa12 at ¶12; Pa56 at ¶12.  As the EEOC ultimately declined to pursue Plaintiff’s submission, the District’s administration was never formally notified of Plaintiff’s submission.  Pa12 at ¶17; Pa57 at ¶17; Pa34 at ¶11.  Meanwhile, on or around February 15, 2021, Plaintiff texted full-time security officer [...] and told [...] that “I may resign next week. ”  Pa27.  Plaintiff described his working relationship with [...] as alternatingly “pleasant” and “acrimonious”.  Pa18 at ¶60; Pa59 at ¶60.  On February 22nd, Plaintiff texted [...] and told him that “I want to represent the [substitute security officers] for a union.  We need a raise. ”  Pa29.  Plaintiff asked [...] to inform Director of Operations [...] about the Plaintiff’s demand for raise.  Pa12 at ¶16; Pa57 at ¶16; Pa30.  On March 1st, the EEOC informed Plaintiff that it would not be prosecuting his submission.
[brief] Beginning with the purpose of the restriction, the proposed deviation will not offend the purpose of the height restriction in the SM Zone as the proposed use was permitted in the SM Zone as far back as 1991, and pursuant to applicable 1999 Master Plan, “warehouse distribution use was envisioned for this tract. ” (5T 66:2-23); see also Ja150-Ja152.  Upon his review of the Master Plan and applicable zoning ordinances, [...] concluded that “the intent of the 30-foot height restriction was not to restrict warehouse use[,]” “[b]ut rather to limit the types of high-impact uses that were permitted in the township’s GM, general manufacturing, zone. ” (5T 77:23-25 through 80:1-7).  [...] provided comprehensive testimony on the 1999 Master Plan.  He explained that the Master Plan provides that the “GM zone poses special concerns, because it can have significant off-site impacts. ”  The listed impacts include, “noise, dust, odors, and visuals[;]” “[t]raffic impacts are not cited in any way. ”  [...] determined that the concerns for the GM Zone likely stemmed from the [...] and the [...], as both properties were specifically mentioned.  The GM Zone also potentially permits high-impact uses, including heavy manufacturing, while the SM, when compared to the GM, provides for industrial uses “[a]t a lesser magnitude and intensity than uses in industrial districts. ”  [...] concluded that this language suggests that the SM Zone is “less likely to result in off-site impacts”, when compared to the uses in the GM Zone; uses like the two expressly mentioned.  (5T 78:3-25; through 80:1-7).  Therefore, the proposed deviation would not contradict the intent of the restriction as it was intended to limit off-site impacts, such as “noise, dust, odors, and visuals”, more common to higher intensity industrial uses permitted in the GM Zone.  [...] found no evidence “that the 30-foot height limitation in the SM zone was intended to restrict warehouse distribution use because of traffic impacts. ” (11/30/22 T. 79:14-23).  No one rebutted, contradicted, or undermined his testimony and conclusions.  This empirically and factually supported evidence is the same language upon which this very Board relied in 2019 to reach the same conclusion as [...]; and contradicts the Board’s 2023 factually unsupported musings on the intentions underlying SM Zone/ GM Zone distinctions to any credibility.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ argument that [...] exhibited certain “habitual tendencies” that gave reason to believe he would launch a sustained attack on his handler directly contradicts the opinion of their own expert.  [...] opines that [...]’ injuries were caused by a specific type of aggressive stallion behavior that involves a sudden, unprovoked “out of the blue” attack.  [Pa 900].  According to [...], this behavior is unrelated to the “everyday” aggressive character of stallions, and that its causes or triggers are poorly understood.  Ibid.  For these reasons, [...] testified that the first episode of a sudden, sustained attack is impossible to predict.  [Pa 955-56, 980].  Accepting [...]’s opinion, there is no way that anyone could have predicted that prior difficulties catching [...] or getting him to ejaculate could have been a sign that he might attack [...] in the manner he did, because there is no evidence that he had ever attempted a sustained attack prior to October 3, 2018.  By contrast, the element of scienter retained in the common law theory of strict liability requires knowledge that a particular animal was likely to injure the plaintiff in the manner complained of.
[brief] 4.  Governing Law.  This Memorandum shall be construed and governed in accordance with the laws of the State of New Jersey.  Any dispute arising out of or relating to this Memorandum shall be resolved by an arbitrator appointed according to the arbitration rules of the [...].  (Da313).  The motion court correctly concluded that the parties intended for this arbitration provision to be included in the 2022 Addendum.  It also properly found that these sophisticated, commercial parties had a meeting of the minds with regard to the arbitration agreement, thereby rendering Atalese, supra, inapplicable.
[brief] Board’s attorney that he could use against a rival Board member “with whom he had a negative history. ”  Ibid.  The ALJ further found that [...]’s use of that advantage also violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12.24.1(e) because it constituted a private action that, “by its very nature, compromise[d] the integrity and accountability of the Board and its proper use of school resources. ”  Ibid.  The ALJ also found that [...]’s use of the Board attorney violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f) because that action constituted a use of “school resources for his own personal gain” that he would not have otherwise had access to, but for his position as Board President.
[brief] The strip mall contained multiple tenants who occupied portions thereof pursuant to written leases.  Defendant [...], d/b/a [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) was one such tenant.  Its offices had been closed due to inclement weather for approximately two days prior to March 16, 2017, and remained closed at the time of the subject accident.  [...] went to the strip mall for the purpose of celebrating his son’s birthday at [...], another tenant’s business.  He parked his car and attempted to enter the restaurant through a back door into the kitchen.  As he walked from the parking lot towards the restaurant, he slipped on black ice and fell, allegedly sustaining serious injuries.  [...] was still in the parking lot at the time of his fall.  [...] then got up from the asphalt lot and took photographs of the location of his fall.  Plaintiff retained counsel sometime between March 16, 2017 and April 7, 2017.  On July 3, 2018, counsel filed an initial complaint naming the landlord and various “John Doe” defendants who “had control of the premises. ”  Plaintiff’s counsel filed a first amended complaint on November 27, 2018.  [...] was not named as a defendant in the case until the filing of plaintiff’s second amended complaint on June 12, 2019, approximately three months after the statute of limitations had run.
[brief] (Da85–87.)  It specifies what entity would administer the arbitration, what rules apply to an arbitration proceeding, who the arbitrator would be, and how the arbitrator would be picked.  (Id.)  Section 2(d) explains in detail the process of initiating an arbitration.  (Id.)  The December Terms also delegate all threshold questions of arbitrability, including the enforceability of the arbitration agreement, to the arbitrator.  That delegation clause (see Da84–85) provides in relevant part:
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1......................................................... 27 N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6.........................................................  26 N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2.........................................................  27 N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2a.......................................................  31 N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2b......................................................  31, 32 N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4......................................................... 27 N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2 ......................................................... 27 N.J.S.A. 10:6-1......................................................... 36 N.J.S.A. 34:19-1......................................................... 1, 22 Table of Orders Order and Statement of Reasons granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment filed May 22, 2023 ...........................................12a Table of Transcripts Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment December 12, 2022 ...............1T List of Appended Items Plaintiff-Appellant’s Filed Notice of Appeal.............................................1a Plaintiff-Appellant’s Filed Civil Case Information Statement ......................7a Trial Court Order & Statement of Reasons Granting Summary Judgment.......12a Defendants’ Filed Civil Case Information Statement .................................28a Defendants’ Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment...............................30a Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts............................................32a Plaintiff’s Responsive Statement of Facts..............................................36a Certification of [...], Esq....................................................58a Exhibit A Plaintiff’s Complaint.............................................................................63a Exhibit B Excerpts of Deposition of [...].........................................79a
[brief] But [...]’s refusal to participate in that process now requires that the Court intercede.  Accordingly, [...] must produce documents flagged by the 78 unopposed search terms contained in DE 48-7.  Those terms appear “reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence” in that the terms were based on sample emails related to this case and the parties already eliminated many generic words like “money. ”  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).  1  [...] need not use those terms to which it has already objected.  Excluding the objected-to terms and those that [...] voluntarily removed, there are 78 terms remaining on the list.  This Order does not, of course, prevent [...] from withholding documents that are privileged.  However, in doing so, [...] must follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing designating privileged documents withheld from discovery requests.  Furthermore, [...] is free to review the results of the keyword searches and to withhold documents that are truly irrelevant to this case.  However, [...] did not object to any of the 28 requests in [...]’s Revised Requests and all 28 requests appear relevant.  See Oppenheimer, 437 U.S. at 351.  So, any documents that are returned by the 78 keywords and that are within the scope of the 28 Revised Requests must be produced.
[directive] PSA Activity Criminal seeking of presumption unless the 7.3, ~ Section under covered otherwise not cases  In pretrial for shall apply prosecutor the 7.4.6, subsection to pursuant overcome detention is pretrial  Appear to Failure the (i) and crime fourth-degree or athird- for is charge present the if detention PSA the by determined score (NCA)  Activity Criminal New or (FTA) regardless is score 5 a (NCA)  PSA Activity Criminal New the if (ii) or is 6, detained, will defendant be presumption the that a establishes Law Reform Bail the circumstances, In these 20 evidence.  the of preponderance a by rebutted is presumption that the finds court the unless 2A:162-19(b), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(2).
[brief] Harvey itself, which the State relies on in this attempt to stop this Court from substantively considering the issues, undermines the State’s position.  (Sb 28)  In Harvey, our Supreme Court held that it was inappropriate to append to a Supreme Court brief an expert report that opined directly on the facts of the case.  State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 201 (1997).  But our Supreme Court explicitly distinguished considering a new expert report from the obligation of an appellate court to consider scientific authorities:  “As previously explained, an appellate court may review scientific literature and judicial opinions, including those published after trial, to determine whether a technique is generally accepted.  That practice, however, does not constitute an invitation for the parties to supplement the record with additional expert testimony. ”  Id. at 202.  Our Court specifically held that appellate courts have an obligation to review scientific evidence, even if that information was not introduced at trial, because “if the result obtained is the product of invalid scientific theory, there is no good reason to accept it simply because we were fooled at the inception of the inquiry[.]”  Id. at 168 (internal quotation marks omitted).  [...] does not present any new expert reports.  He is relying on exactly the kind of reliable scientific authority this Court is not only allowed to consider but that it must consider.
[brief] THE CERTIFICATION IN OPPOSITION TO OBJECTORS’ MOTION TO ENLARGE THE PERIOD OF TIME IN WHICH TO FILE THE COMPLAINT IN LIEU OF PREROGATIVE WRITS AND EXPAND THE RECORD BELOW WAS BASED UPON FACTS APPEARING IN THE RECORD AND REPLETE WITH RELEVANT, CERTIFIED, EXCERPTS FROM THE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE HEARINGS BEFORE THE ZBA (Not Raised Below by Appellants).  Objectors contend that the Certification of [...] in opposition to the Objectors’ Motion to Enlarge the Period of Time in Which to File the Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs and Expand the Record Below was improper because it was not based upon personal knowledge or facts appearing of record.  Objectors seemingly ignore the fact that Objectors’ own motion was supported by a Certification of counsel as well as a Certification of a “non-legally trained contractor” working for counsel.  (Pa812; Pa172-176).  Setting this fact aside, the Certification of [...] was both based upon personal knowledge and supported by facts appearing of record.  The Certification of [...] addressed three (3) issues: a) the allegation that the ZBA failed to maintain a verbatim record; b) the allegation that the Homeowners (or the Board Secretary) were somehow at fault for Objectors’ failure to timely file their Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs; and c) the allegation that the Homeowners obtained their approval by fraud.