ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The account application expressly referred to the “account agreement that includes the Arbitration Agreement under which any dispute between the Customer and the Bank relating to the Customer’s use of any deposit account, product or service will be decided in Arbitration[.]” (PA035.)  That description refers to only one document: the DAA.  Moreover, [...] acknowledged “receipt of, and agreement to be bound by,” the DAA’s terms by signing the account application (id.), and otherwise was under an obligation to inquire about the DAA and its terms, see Section IV.B, supra.  Thus, the DAA was properly incorporated into the account application.
[directive] l 2A:162- S.A. N.J. 26 the overcome to sufficient evidence facie consider prima as may court a that provides 3:4A(b)(5)  Rule not is release defendant's the program that pretrial services the recommendation by a release of presumption  This conditions").  maximum released, or if recommended not "release determination that a (i.e., recommended AOC. the by approved risk-assessment process pretrial objective on the based is turn, in recommendation, 62  Page that or crime a firearm, involving a crime a ten for preceding years the within delinquent adjudicated an or 2C:43-7.2, N.J.S.A. Act, Eazly Release  No the to be subject would an adult by committed if to construed shall subsection be Nothing in this foregoing offenses.
[directive] New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2 I.  New Limits on Marijuana and Hashish  As of February 22, 2021, the following conduct no longer violates state law:  Simple possession of 6 ounces or less of marijuana, 2C:35-10(a)(4)(b); • Simple possession of 17 grams or less of hashish, 2C:35-10(a)(4)(b); • Being under the influence of marijuana or hashish, 2C:35-10(b); • Failure to properly dispose of marijuana or hashish, 2C:35-10(c); • Possession of paraphernalia for marijuana or hashish, 2C:36-2; and • Possession of marijuana or hashish as a motor vehicle operator, 39:4-49.1.
[brief] [...] charges [...] with disseminating an inappropriate, offensive video on his personal time in a privately organized social media group.  The alleged conduct did not directly or indirectly involve the sewerage authority, the performance of [...]’s duties as a commissioner, or [...]’s time, equipment, or personnel.  It did not occur while [...] was on duty; did not occur during a public meeting; did not involve public business; had no relation to any official act [...] would ordinarily perform; did not involve public resources or equipment; did not involve another employee; and was not directed at any local official or the subject of any borough activities or policies.  [...]’s arguments stretch the legal discussions in the cited cases to try to apply these to [...]’s situation.  (Db 20-22).  But this is wrong because the cases cited by [...] do not apply the specific standard of “misconduct in office” to their facts and are irrelevant to the issue here.  The cases cited by [...] do not support the conclusion that the allegations made against Mr.  Maloney fit the definition of “misconduct in office.
[directive] A-1  I.  RELEVANT AGENCIES .............................................................................................  A-2 II.  SEXUAL OFFENSES ....................................................................................................  A-5  III.  SEXUAL ASSAULT  VICTIM’S RIGHT TO A  CONFIDENTIAL SEXUAL VIOLENCE ADVOCATE ........................................................................  A-10  IV.  VICTIM-COUNSELOR PRIVILEGE FOR CONFIDENTIAL SEXUAL VIOLENCE ADVOCATES .......................................................................  A-11  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT  V. SEXUAL ASSAULT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL ...............................................  A-12  VI.  MINOR SEXUAL ASSAULT  VICTIMS’ RIGHT TO CONSENT TO MEDICAL CARE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT  MEDICAL FORENSIC EXAMINATIONS .................................................................................  A-14  VII.  MANDATORY  CHILD ABUSE REPORTING ......................................................  A-16 VIII.  STANDARDS FOR SERVICES TO CRIME  VICTIMS ..........................................  A-17  IX.  STATEWIDE FORENSIC NURSE EXAMINER LEGISLATION.........................  A-22  X.  SEXUAL ASSAULT RESPONSE TEAM LEGISLATION .....................................  A-25  XI.  PROTECTION ORDERS FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT  VICTIMS ............................  A-26  XII.  SEXUAL ASSAULT SURVIVOR PROTECTION ACT (SASPA) ........................ A-28  XIII.  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2011-1 - REVISION.....................................................................................................  A-32  XIV.  FEEDBACK FORM ....................................................................................................  A-38  XV.  COUNTY  SART ACTIVATION  MEMBER SURVEY ...........................................  A-41  XVI.  SEXUAL ASSAULT RESPONSE TEAM (SART)  ACTIVATION PROCESS SCRIPT ......................................................................................................  A-43 XVII.  STATEWIDE AND GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES ...........................................  A-45 XVIII.  FORENSIC NURSING PROGRAMS BY COUNTY ..............................................  A-47 XIX.  VICTIM WITNESS ADVOCACY OFFICES BY COUNTY ...................................  A-49  XX.  CONFIDENTIAL SEXUAL VIOLENCE SERVICES ORGANIZATIONS BY COUNTY ...........................................................................  A-51  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT  SEXUAL ASSAULT RESPONSE TEAM (SART)  OVERVIEW  N.J.S.A. 52:4B-50 to -60 mandates every County Prosecutor’s Office establish a SART and a SART Advisory Board.
[directive] Aggravated Assault human life, points a firearm at or in the direction of another, whether or not the actor believes 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible it to be loaded.  3rd Degree $5,000 to $15,000 10% permissible  Actor commits simple assault upon police officer or upon other categories of people as listed 2C:12-1b(5)  Aggravated Assault in the statute; (fireman, first aid person, school teacher, bus driver, DYFS worker, judge, motorbus operator); third degree if victim suffers bodily injury; otherwise, fourth degree.  4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible
[brief] ”  Nyema, 249 N.J. at 528 (quoting State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 25-26 (2010)).  “It is fundamental to a totality of the circumstances analysis of whether reasonable suspicion exists that courts may consider the experience and knowledge of law enforcement officers. ”  State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 363 (2002).  Under N.J.S.A. 39:4-126, a signal of intention to change lanes is required “in the event any other traffic may be affected by such movement. ”  The “clear and unambiguous language” of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 does “not project a requirement that a turn movement must affect other traffic but merely that it has the potential of doing so. ”  State v. Moss, 277 N.J. Super. 545, 547 (App. Div. 1994); accord Williamson, 138 N.J. at 304.  In Williamson, the Court interpreted the language “may affect traffic” as implying that other traffic is “fairly close and visible, and that the signal need not be dictated solely by concerns of safety and accident avoidance. ”  138 N.J. at 304.  The Court reasoned that “[m]otorists in the vicinity whose movements may be affected must be made aware of a driver’s intentions. ”  Ibid.  Police may rely on N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 to make a lawful motor-vehicle stop even where the only vehicle that may be affected by the driver’s failure to make an appropriate turn signal is the police car behind it.
[brief] ”  (6T 133-10 to 20)  [...] kept squeezing [...]’s leg while she kept trying to “push his hand off. ”  (6T 133-20 to 25)  [...] told [...] “that he wanted to have sex with [her] before [they] die. ”  (6T 133-25 to 134-1)  [...] said no and asked [...] to stop and “chill out.
[directive] LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING MATERIAL  ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE AND THE SAFE RETURN PROGRAM  Alzheimer’s Disease  Alzheimer’s Disease afflicts approximately 4 million Americans and an estimated 150,000 people with Alzheimer’s Disease live in New Jersey alone.  Alzheimer’s Disease is a progressive, degenerative disease of the brain in which brain cells die and are not replaced.  It results in impaired memory, thinking and behavior.  It is the most common form of dementing illness.  The causes of Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) are still unknown and there is currently no cure.  Alzheimer’s Disease strikes equally at men and women, all races, and all socioeconomic groups.  Alzheimer’s Disease usually has gradual onset.  Early symptoms include problems remembering recent events and difficulty performing familiar tasks.  Additionally, the person with Alzheimer’s Disease may experience confusion, personality change, behavior change, impaired judgement, and difficulty finding words, finishing thoughts or following directions.  How quickly these changes occur vary from person to person, but the disease eventually leaves the individual totally unable to care for himself or herself.  The way in which Alzheimer’s Disease affects
[directive] Issued by: [...]  Administrative Director  This Directive promulgates the two-part protocol developed by the Conferences of Criminal Presiding Judges and Criminal Division Managers in conjunction with the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) in the Department of Human Services to implement L. 2003, c. 301.  That legislation, signed into law on January 14, 2004 and effective as of April 13, 2004, (a) establishes requirements for the collection of information regarding the care of minor children when the sole caretaker is being incarcerated and for referrals to DYFS in certain such situations; and (b) provides for referrals to DYFS in certain instances where an individual is convicted of one or more specifically enumerated offenses, the victim was under age eighteen at the time of the offense, and the defendant lives in a household with minor children or is the parent of a minor child.
[brief] Despite the mirror-image quality of the allegations in this matter and in *Lajara*, [...] takes the inconsistent position here that this is not a PIP suit.  Supreme Court did not face, or address, the same issue in *Lajara* that this Court faces here, because the waiver of the right to a jury trial was not in dispute in *Lajara*.  In addition, none of the parties raised the issue in *Lajara* that the parties to this action raise:  Whether the claims at issue were subject to arbitration under AICRA.  Moreover, the defendant providers in *Lajara* did not argue that [...] had waived its right to a jury trial by opting into the arbitration protocol of AICRA; therefore, the trial court, the Appellate Division, and the Supreme Court were not called upon to resolve that issue in *Lajara*.  The converse is also true.  None of the defendants in *Lajara* demanded that the claims be resolved in arbitration, as the Defendants do here.  The issue presented on this appeal simply was not before the Court in *Lajara*.  As the Defendants in this action have correctly pointed out:  Until [...] addressed the issue below, no provider had ever objected to the attempt by insurance companies such as [...] to – as the Trial Court expressed it – make an “end-run around” their voluntary participation in arbitration under AICRA by cloaking their PIP claims in causes of action for fraud under the NJIFPA and RICO.
[directive] [...] 6.2 l ..........................................................81  PARTIES THIRD BY NON-ENFORCEABILITY  17.  ...................................................................................................................81  EXCEPTIONS 18.  .....................................................................................................................81  QUESTIONS 9.  ................................................................................................................81  SUPERSEDURE 20.  ...........................................................................................................82  DATE EFFECTIVE 21.  9  Page OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION  1. mes. Chan  Systemwide ~for Preparin 1.1 Law"), Reform ("Bail 2014, 31 c. P.L. signed [...] Governor 2014, 1l, August On This system. justice criminal adult
[brief] This clause simply means that [...]’s contributory negligence will not prohibit it from being indemnified.  On the other hand, this clause does not satisfy the bright line language requirement, as it does not distinguish between allowing indemnification for the negligence of others and allowing indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence.  Englert, 389 N.J. Super. at 56.  Simply put, this clause will not: 1) void indemnity that \textit{does} exist or 2) create indemnity that \textit{does not} exist. \(^9\) [...] misstates Englert’s ultimate conclusion.
[brief] “The interest of our courts is in the protection of the civil rights of our citizens, through enforcement of state and federal constitutions and civil rights statutes, not the opposite.  Our Constitution requires the exercise of these concerns. ”  Bung's Bar & Grille, Inc. v. Township Council, 206 N.J. Super. 432, 459 (Law Div. 1985)  “We may decline to dismiss a matter on mootness grounds in order to address an important matter of public interest.  Reilly v. AAA Mid-Atl. Ins. Co. of N.J., 194 N.J. 474, 484,  Protecting the civil rights of New Jersey citizens is surely a matter of public interest.  Indeed, there is no “public interest” in depriving a class of New Jersey residents their constitutional rights while appellate review is pursued.  See, e.g., Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1297 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he public, when the state is a party asserting harm, has no interest in enforcing an unconstitutional law. ”).  On the contrary, granting a stay would simply allow the State to continue to violate the equal protection rights of New Jersey same-sex couples, which can hardly be considered a public interest.  Cf. Armstrong v. O'Connell, 416 F. Supp. 1325, 1331 (E.D.Wis. 1976).  In addition, the question to be addressed involves not only [...]'s private interests, but also an issue of some public importance, i.e. when the public may properly be called upon to reimburse a police officer for attorney fees incurred in defense of criminal charges brought against the officer.
[brief] On September 17, 2016, defendant attended a baby shower for [...], who was pregnant with his twins.  (8T60-6 to 61-19).  The shower was held at the home of Reggie and [...], Sianni’s aunt and uncle, at [...] (Tipps) in [...].  (8T60-7 to 11; 8T61-1 to 3; 12T105-1 to 3).
[brief] i  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................. iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................. v  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..............................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....................................................................................................  2  I.  THE COLLECTION ACTION .......................................................................................  2  II.  THE PRESENT ACTION AND APPEAL .....................................................................  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................  5  I.  THE DEBT .....................................................................................................................  5  II.  THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE ..........................................................................  6  III.  TRANSFER AND ASSIGNMENT OF THE ACCOUNT .............................................  9  LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................  10  I.  THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER AN APPEAL FROM THE LOWER COURT’S INTERLOCUTORY ORDER COMPELLING ARBITRATION .............................................................................................................  10  II.  EVEN IF THIS COURT EXERCISES JURISDICTION, THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE MATTER MUST BE REFERRED TO ARBITRATION ..................................................................................  12  A.  There is an Insurmountable Preference for Arbitration  .................................  13  B.  The United States Supreme Court and New Jersey Courts Mandate that an Arbitrator Determine the Arbitration Agreement’s Enforceability ....  14  C.  The Arbitration Agreement is Enforceable under Both Federal and New Jersey Law ......................................................................................................  19  D.  Appellant’s Claims are Encompassed by the Cardholder Agreement and Respondents are Entitled to Enforce it .......................................................  22  E.  Respondents’ Motion was Timely and Defendants did not Waive their Right to Arbitrate  .........................................................................................  26  APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[directive] 3.5  Prosecutor's to Require Consultation/Char~~Approval for Additional Authority County Offenses.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed to limit of Prosecutor the authority a Counfiy to require that agencies and officers operating within the Prosecutor's jurisdiction contact and/or obtain charging approval from designated assistant for such approval prosecutors offenses where is not disorderly required by this Directive (e.g., other than persons offenses those involving domestic violence where any of the grounds specified in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-21(a)(1) to (4) apply).  Section shall operational on October This become 31, 2016. of
[directive] If the crime involves a violation N.J.S.A. of 2C:24-4b(3) (causes or permits child to engage in sexual act that is to be photographed or exhibited), N.J.S.A. if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, 2C:24-4b(4) (photographs or films a child in N.J.S.A. sexual act), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, 2C:24-4b(5)(b) (knowingly N.J.S.A. possessing or knowingly viewing child pornography), 2C:24-4.1 (leader of a child pornography N.J.S.A. network), if the crime was committed on or after February 1, 2018, 2C:34-3 (selling, distributing or N.J.S.A. exhibiting obscene material to a person under age 18) or an offense involving computer criminal activity in violation of any provision of Title 2C, chapter 20, you will be assessed a mandatory penalty as listed below for each offense for which you pled guilty? (1) $2,000 in the case of a 1st degree crime (2) $1,000 in the case of a 2nd degree crime (3) $750 in the case of a 3rd degree crime (4)  $500 in the case of a 4th degree crime (5)  $250 in the case of a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense
[brief] ” (7T305-15 to 307-9; 8T65-16 to 18).  Defendant claimed he had mood swings; one moment he would be happy and then suddenly he would feel angry and sad.  (7T307-14 to 308-3; 8T99-24 to 100-4).  “It would just be on and off. ” (7T308-5 to 6).  But he did not know if he felt that way before shooting his family.  (7T308-7 to 20).
[brief] ’”  *Sterling Laurel Realty, LLC v. Laurel Gardens Co-Op, Inc.*, 444 N.J. Super. 470, 476 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting *State v. D.A.*, 191 N.J. 158, 164 (2007)).  In interpreting a statute, “[Courts] do not add terms which may have been intentionally omitted by the Legislature, speculate, or otherwise engage in an interpretation which would avoid its plain meaning. ”  *State v. Perry*, 439 N.J. Super. 514, 523 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 222 N.J. 306 (2015).  Pursuant to the doctrine of expression unius est exclusion alterius, the mention of one thing usually implies the exclusion of another.  *Squires*, 200 N.J. Super. at 503.  Here, the Legislative intent is clear.  The Holding Act does not, nor was it meant to, apply to reciprocal exchanges.
[brief] $75,500 transferred from [...]’s MR line of credit account on August 22, 2014 to [...]’s bank account ending in #8309.  (26T11-16).  -  [...] was shown extracts of the [...] bank account from the company’s QuickBooks software and was able to tie the transfer of $75,500 from that account to a bank statement for the company for August 2014, which showed the funds were transferred to an account ending in 8309, which Plaintiffs established belonged to [...].  (Da844; 13T25:18 to 26:19).  -  When cross-examined, [...] could not identify a similar $75,500 distribution paid to [...].  (18T111:24 to 113:4).  Misappropriation #9:
[brief] In another example, this court disagreed with the [...]’s determination that no material issue of disputed fact existed where the appointing authority never held a hearing, but rather retained an “outside consultant” whose investigation concluded that “it was more likely than not” that the appellant made “derogatory comments and engaged in an unprofessional action. ”  In Matter of J.L., No. A-2501-13T4, 2016 WL 512431, at *2–3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 10, 2016).  The court explained that “[i]f there was actual proof” the appellant “made such comments and engaged in an unprofessional action that evidence would support a finding of a violation of the State Policy. ”  Id.  *2.  The court criticized the [...] for denying a fact-finding hearing where the appellant had denied the comments and actions alleged, the [...] “was not provided a written record of the witnesses’ interviews and did not have any way to determine what they actually said,” and the [...] merely relied upon a letter from the employer’s counsel summarizing the EEO investigation report – which the appellant disputed.  *Id.*  *2.  The court explained that there were “plainly disputed material facts” where one side contended the other made inappropriate comments and acted unprofessionally, and the other side denied it.  *Id.*  *3.  Thus, “[t]he plain language of N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.1(d) requires a hearing in such circumstances,” since it depended on credibility determinations that “can only be assessed by a fact-finder making first-hand observations and evaluations of the witnesses. ”  *Id.*  *3.  The court held that the “Commission’s reliance on the written record was a mistaken exercise of discretion. ”  *Id.* at *3.
[directive] Division of Criminal Justice Home  https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide.htm#use Drug Testing  Revised December, 2020 • DWI Enforcement  "John's Law" -- Potential Liability Warning and Mandatory 12-Hour • • Impoundment of Motor Vehicles  Prosecution of DWI and Refusal Violations - These Guidelines replace all • previously issued memoranda from the Division of Criminal Justice or the Attorney General, regarding the Standard (Refusal) Statements for DWI refusal, CDL/DWI refusal and OVWI refusal.