ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Da384).  During the course of the probate matter, the five siblings entered into a Consent Judgment, dated April 13, 2022.  (Da395).  The Consent Judgment was signed and agreed to by all parties (and counsel) and was countersigned by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. (Da395).  The Consent Judgment addressed the various probate assets of [...]’s Estate, and also contained numerous provisions and specific thresholds related to the sale of the Subject Property.  (Da395).  The Subject Property was not a probate asset because [...] and her husband had transferred title of the property to the five adult children prior to their deaths but retained a life estate that extinguished upon their deaths.
[brief] In *State v. [...]*, 212 N.J. 295 (2012), [...] entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the charge of sexual assault in the second-degree.  Aside from the dismissal of all remaining charges, the State agreed to recommend that [...] be sentenced as if he had pleaded to a crime of the third degree and that he receive a noncustodial period of probation.  [...] executed the plea form, including additional forms specific to sexual offenses.  He also acknowledged he would be examined at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center and that he understood he would have to register his address every ninety days with law enforcement in the community in which he chose to reside.  Regarding the potential consequences of pleading guilty to sexual assault, those exchanges were the extent of the discussion between defendant and the trial court.  *Id.* at 299.  According to the Avenel Report, [...]’s behavior was found not to be compulsive or repetitive.
[brief] Whether or not these hypothetical or theoretical fees were validly earned would depend not only on the agreement and the individual [[...]]’ actions, but also [...]’s actions in developing the Project; if [...] had done the work developing [...], it would demonstrate that any development fees to [the [...]] were improper.  As [the [...]] concede, each of these witnesses testified about important steps in the initial development of the [...] project, and that they had interactions with [...] but little to no interaction with any of the individual Defendants.  Db at 40-41.  (39080a-81a)  • **[...] Should Not Be Awarded Fees for “All of the Work Done to Establish All of the Facts” at Trial” (Db38)**
[brief] ”  *Ramirez*, 246 N.J. at 67-68 (internal quotations omitted); see *Bowser*, 297 N.J. Super. at 602 (finding “[i]t is possible for an accomplice to be guilty of robbery and for his compatriot to be guilty of armed robbery. ”) (quoting *State v. White*, 98 N.J. 122, 131 (1984)); see also *Fair*, 45 N.J. at 95 (“Each defendant may thus be guilty of a higher or lower degree of crime than the other, the degree of guilt depending entirely upon his own actions, intent and state of mind. ”)  Our Supreme Court has long recognized that the requirement of submission of lesser-included offenses to the jury is designed to avoid placing the jury in a position of having to make an “all-or-nothing choice” between convicting the defendant of a greater offense and acquitting the defendant.
[brief] As to the R-2 zone in which the subject Property is located, the New Strata Report states:  As Jersey City’s decline was successfully halted in the 1980s and growth picked up speed in the 1990s and continued to accelerate to this day, the R-2 zone has slowly vanished from the Jersey City zoning map.  Today, only a few random strips of the R-2 zone remain as Jersey City’s continued growth now provides a more positive context that can support all the historic commercial streets in the city.  Thus, the R-2 zone district has been removed from most areas of the city and only remains on the map in small leftover areas that have not required attention from the [...].  Continuing to enforce the R-2 zoning standards in a now hot real estate market with a growing population and clear demand for new commercial space would be tantamount to Jersey City turning its back on its own success.  It is therefore quite clear that increased building height, density, and an expansion of permitted uses would be supported and approved by the City for development projects in this area by 2019.  Pa133.
[brief] The fiduciary requirements of reasonable skill and diligence set forth in N.J.A.C. § 11:17A-4.10 codified long-standing common law.  Holm v. Purdy, 252 N.J. 384, 404 (2022) (“‘The common law has long recognized that an insurance broker owes a duty to the insured to act with reasonable skill and diligence in performing the services of a broker. ’”) quoting Carter Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. EMAR Grp., Inc., 135 N.J. 182, 188-89 (1994).  “‘If an agent or broker fails to exercise the requisite skill and diligence when fulfilling those obligations, then there is a breach in the duty of care, and liability arises. ””  Holm at 405 quoting President v. Jenkins, 180 N.J. 550, 569 (2004).  “The broker's duties are to ‘(1) procure the insurance; (2) to secure a policy that is neither void nor materially deficient; and (3) to provide the coverage he or she undertook to supply. ’”  Holm at 405 quoting President at 569.  The Defendants in the instant matter breached their fiduciary duty and the relevant standard of care by disbursing their client’s money without securing a policy for their proposed insured, and then issuing a policy to the wrong insured.
[brief] When a dispute arose, [...] initiated arbitration proceedings before “[...], Arbitrator/Mediator”, but [...] did not appear.  After Shriftman entered an award for [...], [...] initiated proceedings to confirm it.  The District Court rejected that the request, finding only [...] and [...] could arbitrate disputes between the parties and the District Court could not appoint or approve of a substitute:  The case here is indistinguishable from the decision in Moss: the arbitration clause at issue only refers to two specific arbitrators, not arbitrations generally; there is no provision for the appointment of a substitute; and there is no indication anywhere in the four corners of the contract or from extrinsic evidence that the parties consented to arbitrate before anyone else.  See CBA at 6.  Thus, even if Petitioners had argued that Arbitrator Shriftman was a permissible substitute under the clause, it appears that this Court would have to disagree.  Id., at *8.  See also Grant v. Magnolia Manor-Greenwood, Inc., 678 S.E.2d 435, 438 (S.C. 2009) (“We see great merit in the Second Circuit's view that Section 5 [of the FAA] does not apply in cases where a specifically designated arbitrator becomes unavailable”).  Here, [...] and [...] specifically agreed to a single, specific arbitrator:  If a dispute arises between the parties regarding the performance of the conditions upon which this settlement is based, then the parties agree to binding arbitration of the dispute before [...] as the sole arbitrator.
[brief] Plaintiff has brought false arrest and excessive force claims under the NJCRA.  The operative language of the statute provides as follows:  Any person who has been deprived of any substantive due process or equal protection rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or any substantive rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this State, or whose exercise or enjoyment of those substantive rights, privileges or immunities has been interfered with or attempted to be interfered with, by threats, intimidation or coercion by a person acting under color of law, may bring a civil action for damages and for injunctive or other appropriate relief.  The penalty provided in subsection e. of this section shall be applicable to a violation of this subsection.  N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c).  “The [NJCRA] was modeled after the federal Civil Rights Act of 1871,” which is codified at 42 U.S.C. §1983.  Filgueiras v. Newark Public Schools, 426 N.J. Super. 449, 468 (App. Div. 2012), certif. den. 212 N.J. 460 (2012).
[brief] As detailed further below in the “Reply” portion of this Brief, the application of Massachusetts to the issue of allocation of coverage was initially found to support the [...] position on a “fact-based allocation. ”}  \textit{Id.}  As discussed below, in this case, the trial court did, in fact, reduce the fees requested to account for [...]’s lack of success on certain issues.\footnote{Notably, the amount requested by [...] already reflected reductions to the fees incurred to account for [...]’s lack of success on certain issues, including the application of the owned property exclusion and the nuclear exclusion.
[brief] The evidence in question consisted of a rendering submitted to the Zoning Board known as “Park Avenue (West Side) Diagrammatic Elevation” (hereafter “the Diagrammatic Elevation”), which can be found in the Exhibit labeled Z-1 and which was submitted as part of [...]’s original application for variance relief to the [...] in 2022 (4a).  It is referenced in the Amended Resolution of Approval Application of [...] Avenue Corp. (hereafter “Amended Resolution”) as included in the plans submitted by the respondent, [...], as part of its application for variance relief.  (11a)  It is identified in transcript 2T as “P-1 Rendering of street on 2nd Street” (1a).  This Diagrammatic Elevation very clearly indicates that the building under construction, known as [...], as measured from the top of its façade, was to stand approximately one foot taller than the building adjacent to it to the south, known as [...].  Appellant sought to submit the Diagrammatic Elevation document, along with two photographs (identified in transcript 2T, 2 as P2 and P3) he had taken of the site which clearly show an approximately 8-inch thick roof slab, five cinder blocks, and what appears to be a 2” x 6” board sticking up over the façade of the adjacent building.  (6a, 7a).  The Court refused to admit the Diagrammatic Elevation (P1) as evidence but did admit the two photographs, Exhibits P2 and P3.  Appellant also sought admission of a fourth piece of evidence (2T, 2 Exhibit P4), consisting of a page from [...]’s website disclosing the dimensions of a commonly sold type of cinder block.  This illustration suggested that the sides of the cinder blocks shown in the photographs were each 8 inches (8a).  The Court refused to admit this fourth piece of evidence (P4) as well.  For the sake of Argument, Appellant assumes that the Court barred them as not relevant under NJRE 402.  The Court did not actually cite any rules of evidence in its decision, but Appellant can deduce no other rationale for them being barred.  Simple Math Appellant’s purpose in seeking admission of this evidence was to demonstrate that the building’s dimensions had clearly exceeded a limitation placed on it by the Diagrammatic Elevation.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the reasons set forth in this brief, the evidence seized during the course of the traffic stop must be suppressed.  [...] respectfully requests that the matter be remanded to the trial court to provide him with an opportunity to withdraw his plea.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for the Defendant-Appellant  BY: s/[...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID: 446232023  Dated: December 1, 2023  Superior Court of New Jersey  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] ”  *State v. Dunbar*, 434 N.J. Super. 522, 527 (App. Div. 2014); see also *State v. Birkenmeier*, 185 N.J. 552, 562 (2006) (“Facts that might seem innocent when viewed in isolation can sustain a finding of reasonable suspicion when considered in the aggregate”); *State v. Mann*, 203 N.J. 328, 338 (2010) (“[T]he fact that a suspect's behavior may be consistent with innocent behavior does not control the analysis. ”).
[brief] ”  *Jimenez v. Quarterman*, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009).  Moreover, as to the No-Fault Law in particular, the Supreme Court has long held that “approaches which minimize resort to the judicial process, or at least do not increase reliance upon the judiciary, are strongly to be favored” when interpreting the No-Fault Law.  *Gambino v. Royal Globe Ins. Companies*, 86 N.J. 100, 107 (1981).  Indicative of the weakness of [...]’s position, [...] first detours the Court to constitutional and regulatory arguments.
[brief] In addressing the harm caused by the public dissemination of confidential information maintained by the FBI, the Linares Opinion found as follows (Pa 8 id 18):  If an originating law enforcement entity no longer had the records containing some of the information posted and the FBI maintains comprehensive criminal history records, it is reasonable to infer that such sensitive information came from the FBI.  ...  In court proceedings related to the prior incident relied on by Plaintiffs, the presiding judge stated that one of [...]’s loans was called “[b]ecause of the information given by the FBI. ”  (See id., Ex. I.)  Therefore, the facts alleged assert that prior FBI disclosures had a negative financial impact on [...]; a reasonable inference is that a casual nexus exists between the alleged harm here and any alleged disclosure of his rap sheet to his financial institutions and business associates.  (Emphasis Added)  In objection to the Linares Opinion, the FBI claimed that the “pull” of the highly confidential and legally protected information could have come from “any” one of countless law enforcement agencies across the country.  To resolve that issue, [...] ordered the FBI to simply identify the party or parties that disseminated the information from its database.  In response, the FBI revealed that the information originated in [...], a town Roggio had never visited and had no connection.  (Pa 165 id 5 ¶ 22)  The circumstances of this were uncovered through an investigation and adjudicated in the matter of [...] v. [...] and [...], [...].
[brief] (Ja13-Ja43)  Critically, and in addition to class certification, a declaratory judgment, actual damages, statutory damages, treble damages, attorney fees and costs, and pre/post judgment interest, Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks “…injunctive relief, enjoining Defendants from engaging in future violations of the HCSA, CFA, TCCWNA, and RISA;” (Ja27) (i.e. “public injunctive relief” enjoining [...] from engaging in future violations of the HCSA, CFA, TCCWNA, and RISA.  (Ja27-Ja28).  Infra Section I(A)
[brief] Certification of [...], Esq. in support of Defendants' Notice of Cross-Motion for Reconsideration…………………………………………………………..742a  Exhibit A Order and Written Opinion filed May 23, 2017 in the [...], et als.  v. [...], et als., Docket No. [...]  Omitted see 261a  Exhibit B  The Court's June 8, 2021 decision  Omitted see 583a  Exhibit C  The Court's October 25, 2021 decision granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration and denying Defendants' Cross-Motion for Reconsideration………………………………………..744a
[brief] In [...] Engineering, for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion to reopen a judgment against them in a breach of contract action on the ground that the contract had been awarded to the plaintiff based on an illegal kickback scheme.  74 N.J. at 117–18, 125–26 (crediting “the trial judge’s finding that [...] received the park project in return for his faithful service to . . . [the] former Mayor of Jersey City, as a conduit for illegal kickbacks”).  The court held that relief under subsection (f) was “warranted because of the public policy to prevent recovery of money damages for breach of an illegal public contract executed by plaintiff as part of a fraudulent scheme. ”
[brief] 1.  Did the Trial Court properly find that the Board did not rely on the Sketch to establish the height of the Approved Building?  2.  Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when it relied on the Board’s Resolution to find that the Board did not rely upon the Sketch when granting [...] site plan approval for the Approved Building?  3.  Based on the Trial Court’s finding that the Board did not rely upon the Sketch, did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when it ruled that the Sketch was irrelevant to prove the height of the Approved Building and therefore not admissible into evidence?  4.  Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when it found the Home Depot Ad proffered by the Appellant to be irrelevant to prove whether the building constructed by [...] complied with the building height approved by the Board for the Approved Building and therefore not admissible into evidence?  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] He claimed that his injury was due to negligence in the starting of the bus.  *Id.* at 388.  That Court found that, even after giving due allowance that jerks and jolts in the operation of a vehicle carrying passengers operated by a common carrier should be shown to have been of such an unusual character as to speak of negligence in that operation, the testimony for plaintiff fairly satisfied that requirement.  *Ibid.*  The plaintiff was a passenger and had just boarded the bus and was about to take his seat.  [...], a witness for the plaintiff, was a fellow passenger on the same bus, and testified that “before he had any chance to reach the seat, the driver pulled so fast his car -- I couldn’t express it. ”  *Id.* at 389.  Another passenger testified that “[a]s soon as [...] stepped on the bus, the chauffeur had started his car off with such a jerk that it threw him against the window, and he went right through with his elbow and cut his side there. ”  *Ibid.*  Based upon the evidence presented on the motion for summary judgment, keeping in mind of course that this was a case decided well before *Brill* and the changes made to the summary judgment analytical framework, the Court then held that “the trial judge is required to decide whether or not the evidence tends to indicate the occurrence of such a violent or unusual jerk or jolt as to speak of negligence in operation. ”  *Ibid.*  The Court believed “that to start the bus with such a violent jerk as practically to throw the plaintiff off his feet and against a window with such violence as to break it, would not only justify, but require the trial judge to leave to the jury the question whether there was negligence in the operation of the bus whereby plaintiff sustained his injury. ”  *Ibid.*  The evidence presented by [...] and the Eyewitness to the incident, accepted as true under *Brill* and its progeny, makes it abundantly clear that the sudden stop was anything but usual – it was a *forceful*, *abrupt*, and *sudden* stop, and based upon the motion record, it was most certainly *not* merely an ordinary jerk or jolt.  Coupled with the legitimate inferences flowing from these facts, creates a recognizable basis to find the driver negligent in the operation of the bus that day -- by a jury of Plaintiff’s peers, not as a matter of law.  The Court was not free to weigh the evidence and the credibility of the eyewitness based upon her sworn written statement, and certainly a jury could find that the stop was violent and unusual under the circumstances as described by [...] and the eyewitness, [...].  The Court did not accept as true the deposition testimony given by [...], nor the sworn statement made by the eyewitness, [...], given two days after the incident.  Whether the stop was merely a “jerk or jolt” or whether it was violent in nature is a material fact to be determined by the jury.  [...] is entitled to her day in court and have that genuine issue of material fact decided by a jury of her peers.
[brief] In addition to testifying with respect to his maintenance of the Property, [...] also testified that at some point of time, he received notifications through property tracking portals that the Property had been transferred to an LLC.  (9T14:19-16:12, Jan. 24, 2023).  When he brought up the issue to [...], [...] brushed off the notion that the Property had been transferred.  (“No.  He didn't seem like he had any knowledge whatsoever, he just kind of brushed it off as if it was one of those things that -- one of those things that just happened. ”).  Moreover, even after the notification with respect to the change in ownership, [...] continued to act as property manager for the Property.  (9T16:14-17, Jan. 24, 2023).
[brief] Dulaney, 997 N.E.2d 560, 565-66 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013); State v. Kirkland, 442 S.E.2d 491, 491-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); (Db26 to 27).  But New Jersey courts are not bound by the interpretation of statutes and rules different than those in this State.  To the contrary, our courts must interpret and adhere to New Jersey statutory and case law, whether it is the same or different than parallel laws in other jurisdictions.  See, e.g., State v. Ates, 217 N.J. 253, 269-72 (interpreting New Jersey’s specific wiretap law, but also considering federal court cases that have interpreted the federal statute on which the New Jersey law was based), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 935 (2014); State v. Burns, 462 N.J. Super. 235, 243-44 (App. Div.) (recognizing that New Jersey’s wiretap statute is more restrictive than its federal counterpart), certif. denied, 241 N.J. 477 (2020).  This is true, especially here, where New Jersey law regarding magistrate jurisdiction and the application of the exclusionary rule for warrant violations does not follow federal law.
[brief] See *General Motors Corp. v. City of Linden*, supra.  **B.  The Trial Court’s Finding that the Statute of Limitations for a Malicious Prosecution Claim is Two Years Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2’s Time Limitations for Personal Injury Claims is Contrary to Settled Law, Holding That a Malicious Prosecution Claim is Subject to a Six-Year Statute of Limitations Consistent with N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1a.**
[brief] Appellate Division Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for A Limited Remand (Oct. 13, 2022) ................................Da45 Order Dismissing Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial (Oct. 18, 2022) .....Da46 Notice of Motion for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court (Oct. 13, 2022) ................................................................................Da47 Supreme Court Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Appeal (Jan. 10, 2023) ................................................................................Da48 State v. Townsend, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1648 (App. Div. Aug. 28, 2020) ................................................................Da49-60  State v. Honore, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 997 (App. Div. May 1, 2019) ................................................................Da61-69  [...] Plea Forms ([...]) ........................................Da70-77  Judgment of Conviction, [...], [...] ......................Da78-81  INDEX TO APPENDIX (cont’d)
[brief] _To the extent the partnership agreement does not otherwise provide, this act governs relations among the partners and between the partners and the partnership._  [Cohen, _supra_ at 156, citing N.J.S.A. 42:1A-4(a) (emph. added)].  Clearly, in _Cohen_ had there been no express statement in the partnership agreement itself, the Court would not have upheld the use of “book value” as the buyout methodology.  The buyout would have required “fair value” under the UPA.  _Cohen’s_ holding thereby prohibits mandatory use of ‘Tax Book Value’ in this case as a methodology since there was no written agreement requiring it.  (9T32:18-33:14)  It simply does not matter if prior buyouts were voluntarily done that way, because in each prior case there could have been a legal challenge to using that method in which event the law required fair value.  The Chancery Court was instead free to use whatever methodology it believed to be fair value.  _See, Lawson Mardon Wheaton v. Smith, supra_, 160 N.J. at 393, recognizing, “‘fair value’ is a flexible standard dependent on the circumstances and context of a transaction.