ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendants Conflate Generalized Workplace Conduct with the Conduct Giving Rise to CEPA Protected Activity.  Defendants attempt to conflate Defendant [...]’s generalized workplace conduct with her unlawful harassment.  This mischaracterization creates a strawman argument, obscuring the specific conduct that gives rise to Plaintiff’s CEPA-protected activity.  Two truths coexist: (1) Defendant [...] had a history of poor workplace conduct that while unprofessional, does not constitute criminal harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4; and (2) some of Defendant [...]’s specific actions, including the June 2020 incident, constitute unlawful harassment as defined by statute.  It is the latter, not the former, that forms the basis of Plaintiff’s CEPA claim.  By commingling these distinct issues, Defendants attempt to distract the Court.  The Trial Court erroneously minimized the legal violation as a reflection of Defendant [...]’s management style.  However, Plaintiff does not argue that Defendant [...]’s generalized “management style” itself constituted criminal harassment.  Rather Plaintiff contends that certain specific conduct, most significantly the incident with [...], gave rise to a reasonable, good faith belief that Defendant [...] violated the law, which satisfies the first prong of this Court’s CEPA analysis.  As Plaintiff set forth in the Brief, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) and (c) define harassment as occurring when a person “makes, or causes to be made, one or more communications . . . in offensively coarse language or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or harm . . . or c) engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person. ”  See N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a)-(c); see also State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 580 (1997).  The characterization of Defendant [...]’s behavior as harassment is not a bald assertion but is, instead, rooted in the specific, observed conduct that aligns with the statutory language.  These behaviors are not generalized workplace dissatisfaction but specific actions that reasonably suggested an intent to alarm or intimidate.  It is also unreasonable to argue that a whistleblower employee must understand the contours of the statute in a manner that is different than its plain language.  Whistleblowers are not held to a standard of legal certainty but to a reasonable layperson’s understanding of the law.  Plaintiff’s belief that the conduct constituted criminal harassment was, therefore, reasonable under the circumstances, as it comports with a lay person’s understanding of the statute.  CEPA’s framework is designed to protect employees who act in good faith to report perceived violations, not to create mini trials regarding the underlying acts.  As set forth in Plaintiff’s initial Brief, Plaintiff engaged in protected whistleblowing activity under CEPA by disclosing these incidents of harassment.  B.
[brief] Plaintiff-Respondent [...], Esquire was appointed for the sole purpose of selling the real property and premises located at [...] pursuant to an Order of the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. dated January 13, 2023.  (Da30).  The Order did not require Mr. Paone to obtain unanimous consent of all co-owners and did not require Mr. Paone to sell the property for a specific price.  (Da31).  The Order required all co-owners to cooperate with Mr. Paone’s efforts to sell the property.  (Da33).  The Order, however, did not authorize Mr. Paone to sign closing documents on behalf of any co-owners that refused to cooperate with him or that refused to sign the necessary closing documents to convey clear title to the buyer of the property.  (Da33).  On January 27, 2023, Plaintiff-Respondent signed a listing agreement with [...] to sell the Property for an initial price of $537,900.00 and a total realtors’ commission of five (5.0%) percent.  (Da37).  The Property was shown 15 times to prospection purchasers between January 26, 2023 and February 26, 2023.  (Da43).  The Plaintiff-Respondent did not receive any offers until March 7, 2023, when the Plaintiff-Respondent received a cash offer from Ms. [...] to purchase the Property for Four Hundred Eighty Thousand ($480,000.00) Dollars.  (Da50).  The Plaintiff- Respondent did not accept Ms. Montiero’s initial offer, and on March 11, 2023, the Plaintiff-Respondent received an offer from Kenya and [...] to purchase the Property for Five Hundred Fifteen Thousand ($515,000.00) Dollars, but offer that was subject to a mortgage contingency.  (Da66).  Although the Plaintiff-Respondent initially accepted the offer from Mr. and Mrs. Penca, Mr. and Mrs. Penca withdrew the offer on March 14, 2023.  (Da80).  On or about March 15, 2023, Ms. Monteiro (hereinafter referred to as the “Buyer”) increased her cash offer to purchase the Property for Five Hundred Thousand ($500,000.00) Dollars.  (Da82).  Plaintiff-Respondent accepted Ms. Montiero’s offer and the attorney-review period was completed on April 14, 2023.  (Da115).  When some of the owners failed to confirm that they would execute the necessary documents to convey title to the Buyer, the Plaintiff-Respondent filed a Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause that sought to obtain a judgment approving the sale of the Property to [...] for the sale price of Five Hundred Thousand ($500,000.00) Dollars and authorizing him to sign any necessary closing documents on behalf of any Owner that would be necessary to convey clear and marketable title to the Property to the Buyer.  (Da15).  Oral argument was conducted in person on October 13, 2013, at which time the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. entered a judgment confirming the private sale of lands (Da1) and an order that denied the Defendant-Appellant’s Notice of Motion Seeking Permission to File a Counterclaim.  (Da4).
[brief] As a threshold matter, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Certification in Support of Summary Judgment was inadmissible because it took the form of a certification and not an affidavit.  Defendant is mistaken.  Plaintiff notes that R. 1:4-4(b) expressly permits a certification in lieu of an affidavit as required by the Court Rules so long as it contained the requisite language.  R. 1:4-4(b).  Plaintiff’s Certification set forth that requisite language and Defendant’s argument is incorrect.  PA – 47 to 48.  C)
[brief] The Trial Court spent significant time weighing the evidence to determine the truth which was improper and then discounted the best evidence in the record.  To illustrate the actions of [...] and engagement in the use of the noted racial slur.  The Trial Court evidently disregarded the video footage which supported the claims of discrimination based on race and hostile work environment.  The video footage was concrete evidence which supported the noted causes of action, yet, in the decision, the Trial Court failed to even mention the video footage and the behavior of [...].  The video footage alone supported the fact that there were material issues in dispute.  This Trial Court instead engaged in weighing of the evidence and discounting the evidence which served to diminish the value of the evidence.  A review of the rulings by the Trial Court illustrates repeat instances of weighing the evidence and discounting the evidence.
[directive] 5.  b)  Do you understand that if you are convicted and your conduct was found to be characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior your name, age, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, eye color, any distinguishing scars or tattoos you have, your photograph, the make, model, color, year and license plate county in which you reside number of any vehicle you operate, the street address, zip code, municipality and and a description of the offense for which you are pleading guilty, may be publicly available on the Internet?
[brief] The Township and the Board had filed this action in 2015 in compliance with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in *In The Matter of the Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5:97 by the New Jersey Council On Affordable Housing*, 221 N.J. 1 (2015), which has become known as Mount Laurel IV.  Pursuant to the process created under Mount Laurel IV, the Township and the Planning Board obligated themselves to develop, adopt, endorse and ultimately enact, a constitutionally compliant affordable housing plan in the form of a Housing Element and Fair Share Plan (“HEFSP” or “Affordable Housing Plan”), in accordance with *N.J.S.A. 55D-28* and under the auspices of the Court.
[brief] The Redevelopment Payment was used by [...] to effectuate and defray costs of improvements in the area, and thus a rational nexus existed between the payment and the redevelopment plan.  (Pa58).  This finding is erroneous for several reasons.  First, neither movant argued that there was such a nexus in their opening briefs; they argued that the [...] delegated authority to the City to collect the $2,000,000 fee irrespective of the absence of any nexus.  It is one thing to argue that a municipal act is authorized by a statute, as Defendants did here insofar as they argued that there is no nexus requirement in the [...].  It is something different to find, as the Court did here, that there is a "nexus" between the senior center and the plan.  The term "nexus" requires a logical interconnection between two events.  See e.g. 181 Inc. v. Salem County Planning Board, 133 N.J. Super. 350 (L. Div. 1975) aff'd in pertinent part and rev'd in part 140 N.J. Super. 247 (App. Div. 1976) where the Court invalidated a planning board's requirement for a land dedication which, although possibly authorized by statute, had no nexus to the project for which the approval was given:  The word "nexus" is derived from the Latin "nectere" meaning "to bind" and signifies a connection or a connected group or series.  Id.  In the framework of this case, a rational nexus means an interconnection between two events, direct and substantial in nature and clearly and logically linked together.  It signifies a connection more definitely and clearly established than a "reasonable connection."  It cannot be used to portray an indirect, remote or vague relationship.  Id. at 357 to 58.  Accord County of Ocean v. Zekaria Realty, Inc., 271 N.J. Super. 280 (App. Div. 1994).  Here, the lower court conflated Defendants’ argument, which claimed it had been delegated the authority to collect the $2,000,000 payment with a much different inquiry: whether there was a “rational, . . . direct and substantial” interconnection between the redevelopment plan and the payment, *181 Inc, supra*, which was an argument which Defendants did not advance.  Second, there was nothing in the record to assess whether the payment bore any relationship to the redevelopment plan or project, let alone evidence sufficient to demonstrate a direct and substantial relationship as our Courts have required.  The burden was on Defendants to make such a connection and believing none was necessary, they failed to do so.  Nor could they, for the senior center was not mentioned in the 2020 Plan amendment; the $2,000,000 payment was not mentioned in the 2020 Plan Amendment; and a center of this nature is not even a permitted use within the redevelopment area.
[brief] This began with a pair of studies authored at Cornell University, titled “Changes in Hourly and Daily Extreme Rainfall Amounts in NJ since the Publication of NOAA Atlas 14 Volume” (“Changes in Rainfall Amounts”) and “Projected Changes in Extreme Rainfall in New Jersey based on an Ensemble of Downscaled Climate Model Projections” (“Projected Changes in Rainfall”).⁶  DEP used these Cornell Studies to update the --- ⁶ [...] and [...], Changes in Hourly and Daily Extreme Rainfall Amounts in NJ since the Publication of NOAA Atlas 14 Volume, https://dep.nj.gov/wp-content/uploads/sab/nj-atlas-14.pdf; [...], Projected Changes in Extreme Rainfall in New Jersey based on an Ensemble of precipitation data in NOAA Atlas 14 in December 2022 by proposing the Inland Flood Protection Rule (“IFPR”), which uses “adjustment factors” and “change factors” on the existing NOAA Atlas 14 data to reflect current and future precipitation rates.
[directive] Allegations that cannot be sustained, are not credible, or have resulted in the exoneration of an employee, including where the previous finding has either been vacated, or overturned on the merits in any subsequent action, generally are not considered to be sustained findings subject to the disclosure requirements of this Policy.  On the other hand, if the officer negotiates a plea or there is an administrative or civil settlement with the employer whereby the charge is dismissed, the charge would still be considered sustained, if there was sufficient credible evidence to prove the allegation, and the officer does not challenge the finding and obtain a favorable ruling by a hearing officer, arbitrator, Administrative Law Judge, Civil Service Commission or the Superior Court.  The reporting and public dissemination requirements of (a) through (j) above become applicable once an officer’s discipline is sustained, as defined above.
[brief] Again, Amended Policy 5756 permits the following:  “The school district shall accept a student’s asserted gender identity; parental consent is not required.  A student need not meet any threshold diagnosis or treatment requirements to have his or her gender identity recognized and respected by the school district, school, or school staff members.  In addition, a legal or court-ordered name change is not required. ”  Thus, this issue is dissimilar to that in Doe v. Del. Valley Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., a case involving school policies related to treatment of transgender students.  2024 WL 706797 1 (D.J. N.J. Feb. 21, 2024).  The question in that matter pertained to whether Plaintiff has a fundamental constitutional right that requires the Board Defendants to obtain Plaintiff's consent prior to recognizing and referring to [...] as to her preferred gender.  Id. at 6.  As demonstrated above, this is not at issue, as Amended Policy 5756 requires a school district to accept a student’s asserted gender identity without parental consent.  Amended Policy 5756 requires parental notice in regard to the name change only when a request is made by the student for a mandatory student record, including gender.  Thus, this case has no bearing to the matter at hand.
[brief] [FEDa120]; •  In dismissing Count 2 of the First Amended Complaint (tortious interference with prospective economic advantage), “[Appellants] assert that [...] used confidential information under the NDA to negotiate a competing deal with the owners of the Property, and that [...] ‘undercut [Appellants’] deal’ and, had they not done so, ‘[Appellants] would have received the economic benefit of having the Solar Project at the Project Site.
[brief] *Id.* at 340-41.  The *Jamerson* Court rejected the state’s argument that the standard instruction informing the jury that it was up to them to assess the value of the expert’s testimony was “sufficient to overcome the prejudicial effect of [the doctor]'s statements. ”  *Id.* at 342.  With respect to such instruction, the *Jamerson* Court explained:  “By definition, a jury cannot give the ‘proper’ amount of weight to an expert’s opinion when they labor under the erroneous assumption that the expert is testifying to an area within his expertise. ”  *Ibid.*  Courts throughout the country have followed *Jamerson* to prohibit medical examiners from opining that the victim died as the result of a “homicide” where that opinion is based on information within the jury’s ken, rather than the witness’s medical expertise.
[directive] This means:  A.  (1)  사용하거나, 모살, 고살, 고살, 폭행, 유괴, 귀하는 다른 사람을 상대로 가중 가중 가중 성폭행, 성접촉, 강도, 가중 범죄적 주거침입 절도 또는 도피할 의도를 가지고 총기를 합니다.
[brief] Beginning with factor three, the detective arrived at her opinion of the path of travel by identifying videos she believed depicted either the Chevy or the suspect walking on foot; she put those specific videos in chronological order based upon their timestamps; and then she drew a line that connected the earliest video to the latest video.  (4T149-21 to 154-1).  This act of selecting particular videos out of a larger pool of footage already implicated reasonably disputed facts.
[brief] To help minimize the deficit in the State’s share of funding [...]’s Adequacy Budget, the SFRA provided Adjustment Aid and EAA.  Because [...]’s total state aid continued over the decade to fall further behind the amount received in 2008-09, Adjustment Aid increased from $109.9 million in 2009-10 to $181.9 million in 2019-20.  (Pa915, ¶ 38 to Pa916, ¶ 44; Pa930, ¶ 152 to Pa931, ¶ 157.)  But the District did not receive EAA at the level set by the SFRA as enacted.
[brief] In *Lash*, 169 N.J. 20, where the administrator of an estate misappropriated the estate’s funds, the Supreme Court must decide whether the estate can recover counsel fees incurred in the proceeding to recover the misappropriated amounts from the surety on the bond, or whether the estate is responsible for those fees.  The plaintiff was awarded a judgment of $800,000 against the administrator.  The surety settled the claim to compensate the estate for the loss of $800,000, but not the legal fees incurred by the estate to pursue the action.  The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court below that the estate, rather than the surety, is liable for the attorneys’ fees.  The Supreme Court determined that the surety shall pay the attorneys’ fees incurred in the bond litigation on the ground that those fees are merely a portion of the damages plaintiff suffered at the hands of tortfeasor.  Again, the award of legal fees is in addition to the actual damages of $800,000 suffered by plaintiff estate, not because the estate incurred legal fees by commencing an action against the administrator for his wrongful act per se, but because the estate, after successfully recovering damages caused by an administrator, requested that the surety bear liability for the attorneys’ fees incurred in the proceeding on the bond.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiff [...] (“Plaintiff”) was assigned by [...] (“[...]”), a staffing agency retained by [...] (“[...]”), to perform services at the [...] Cancer Institute of New Jersey (“[...]”).  Prior to her assignment, Plaintiff, a highly educated individual, executed a Mutual Arbitration Agreement (“MAA”) on or about January 4, 2022, whereby she agreed to submit certain claims against [...], and/or its client [...], to confidential arbitration in exchange for employment with [...].  Nevertheless, despite executing this agreement, Plaintiff subsequently filed a Complaint in the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division alleging violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq.  [...], [...], [...] (improperly plead as “[...] Cancer Institute of New Jersey”), and [...] (collectively, “Defendants”) moved to enforce the MAA, and the trial court granted Defendants’ motions for the reasons set forth by Defendants in their briefing.
[brief] A producer of insurance has a fiduciary obligation to its client.  N.J.A.C. § 11:17A-4.10 (“An insurance producer acts in a fiduciary capacity in the conduct of his or her insurance business. ”)  “The import of the fiduciary relationship between the professional and the client is no more evident than in the area of insurance coverage. ”  Aden v. Fortsh, 169 N.J. 64, 78 (2001).  “‘The fiduciary relationship gives rise to a duty owed by the broker to the client ‘to exercise good faith and reasonable skill in advising insureds. ’”  Aden at 79 quoting Weinisch v. Sawyer, 123 N.J. 333, 340 (1991).  An insurance broker is liable for the loss sustained by a client resulting from the broker’s failure to exercise the requisite skill and diligence.  See Aden at 79 (“Furthermore, if a broker ‘neglects to procure the insurance or if the policy is void or materially deficient or does not provide the coverage he undertook to supply, because of his failure to exercise the requisite skill or diligence, he becomes liable to his principal for the loss sustained thereby. ’”) quoting Rider v. Lynch, 42 N.J. 465, 476 (1964); see also Satec, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Group, Inc., 450 N.J.Super. 319, 329 (App. Div. 2017) (“Insurance intermediaries in this State must act in a fiduciary capacity to the client ‘[b]ecause of the increasing complexity of the insurance industry and the specialized knowledge required to understand all of its intricacies. ’”) quoting Walker v. Atl. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 216 N.J. Super. 255, 260 (App.Div. 1987).
[brief] The State’s pathologist, [...], opined that her body was placed there between 8:00pm on the 13th and 2:00am on the 14th.  Db7.  His conclusion was drawn based on post-mortem rigor mortis and lividity, both of which can be used to measure time since death, as well as decomposition and skin slippage, information regarding the victim’s potential physical activity prior to death and cocaine in her system (both of which can accelerate these body processes), and information regarding the temperature of the ambient air and the axillary (body) temperature.  Db7-8.  Dr. DiCarlo further opined that, where multiple readings of the ambient temperature were taken, one thermometer with a reading inconsistent with the body conditions and other readings was likely faulty or did not work properly.  7T 67:7-19.  A pathologist and meteorologist testifying on behalf of the defendant disputed Dr. DiCarlo’s findings.  Db9.  Other evidence corroborated the State’s theory of events, to include the audio directions directing the defendant from the body’s location to his home (Db7), a witness to the defendant’s confession to the murder (6T 106-117), surveillance video discounting the defendant’s theory that another of the victim’s partners was responsible (5T 76:6-81:22), cell phone records (e.g., 4T 105:10-24), evidence related to the strangulation like the location of bruising and fractured bones (7T 52:6-55:12), and the rented carpet cleaning machine (Db11), large bins, and large freezer found within [...]’s home (7T 208:2-209:4).