ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Am. Litho. Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co.** | 4 | | 81 N.J.L. 271 (1911) | | | **C.E. v. Elizabeth Pub. Sch. Dist.** | 3 | | 2023 WL 4571437 (N.J. App. Div. July 18, 2023) | | | **Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.** | 10 | | 195 N.J. 231 (2008) | | | **Cohen v. Perelman** | 6 | | 2014 WL 2921601 (Ch. Div. June 24, 2014) | | | **Comerata v. Chaumont, Inc.** | 4 | | 52 N.J. Super. 299 (App. Div. 1958) | | | **Concord Ins. Co. v. Miles** | 2 | | 118 N.J. Super. 551 (App. Div. 1972) | | | **Estate of Lansing v. Div. of Taxation** | 11 | | 6 N.J. Tax. 137 (1983) | | | **Estate of Lustgarten v. Director, Div. of Taxation** | 11 | | 281 N.J. Super. 275 (App. Div. 1995) | | | **Gil v. Clara Maass Medical Center** | 8 | | 450 N.J. Super. 368 (App. Div. 2017) | | | **Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev** | 3-4 | | 225 N.J. 469 (2016) | | | **In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. S’holder Litig.** | 6 | | 124 A.3d 1025 (Del. Ch. 2015) | | | **Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land** | 4 | | 186 N.J. 163 (2006) | | | **Matter of Estate of Perkel** | 3 | | 2022 WL 17660550 (N.J. App. Div. Dec. 14, 2022) | | OTHER AUTHORITIES 2 McCormick on Evid. § 337 (8th ed. 2022) ......................................................... 2 N.J. Model Jury Charge (Civil) § 4.10A (May 1998) ........................................... 4 Rule 4:67-1 ..............................................................................................................
[brief] In any event, the record is devoid of any evidence that such consultation affected the outcome of the case, and the trial court  Ultimately, [...] argues that, contrary to the substantial documentary evidence and powerful expert testimony offered by [...], [...] had no notice of [...]’s claim to the Strip and his record title to the Strip prevails.  Pb10-28.  All of those arguments fail because, as he did at trial, [...] adheres narrowly to the only subset of facts that favors him: the metes and bounds description of the Strip appears in the chain of title to Lot 4 (and its predecessor lots) since at least 1933, and the same description only first appears in the chain of title to Lot 3 in 1971.  Pb11-12.  Because the Strip appears in Lot 4’s chain of title longer, [...] asked the trial court, and now this Court, to ignore the significant weight of the balance of the relevant facts to find that his record title prevails over any rival legal theory or claim.  [...]’s view simply is inconsistent with New Jersey property law.
[brief] VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND HIS RIGHTS TO A JURY TRIAL.  (14T 21-16 to 29-8)  Should this Court decline to vacate [...]’s convictions for the reasons stated in his opening brief, he is entitled to a resentencing because the court sentenced him to an extended term as a persistent offender pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) without a jury having found beyond a reasonable doubt the statutorily required facts regarding his predicate convictions.
[brief] The Supreme Court’s decision at *Urban v. Manasquan Planning Bd.*, 124 N.J. 651, 662 (1991), rebukes a local planning board’s determination based on inappropriate factors such as ownership of the lots, and lacks applicability here.  *In re Issuance of a Permit by Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. to Ciba-Geigy Corp.*, 120 N.J. 164, 172 (1990), does apply to the general principle that fact-finding is necessary, but is limited in utility because it addresses the granting of permits by an administrative agency.  Of course, Plaintiffs omit the fact that the case plainly indicates that “the usual remedy is to remand the matter to the agency to correct the deficiency.
[brief] The Board properly chose to grant [...] a 5% management fee based on the operating income.  The record is replete with the Board’s rationale for granting a 5% management fee rather than the $1800.00 fee [...] sought.  The Board did not reach this figure arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably—instead, the Board made its determination based on market data and a review of the record and testimony.  The Board based its decision, in part, on the fact that [...] was engaged in self-dealing by virtue of the fact that [...] owned both [...] and the management company, making the $1,800.00 fee unreasonable.  See 7T at 229:3-6; 232:19-21; 241:22-23.  In addition, the Board reached its decision after establishing that it had dealt with a similar management fee in the past where they granted a fee of 10%.  Id. at 229:3-13.  Moreover, the Board confirmed, through external sources, that the going rate for management fees are anywhere from 5-10%.  Id. at 230:14-233:17.  The Board again engaged in lengthy deliberations on this issue, analyzing the fee and discussing the fairest way to determine and calculate the fee.  Id. at 229:13-249:19.  In fact, the Board actually voted on granting a 10% management fee, but that vote failed.  Id. at 244:17-246:23.  Thereafter, the Board voted on granting a 5% management fee.  In support of this figure one Board member found that:  I would just say in support of a robust record that I think, in this case, you know five percent is on the lower range of the acceptable norm.  I think that given the murkiness as to if there were any duplicative services potentially rendered between the condo association versus this (indiscernible) management and how that might have been parsed out and the difficulties involved in pining down exactly what that might have been in the previous section that we deliberated on, I think it’s cleaner to evaluate this at a lower range -- on the lower range of the acceptable range.  So, I think five percent is supportable as, suggested by my colleague.  Id. at 247:13-25.  Furthermore, the Board reached its decision by analyzing the level and quality of service rendered by the landlord in maintaining and operating the unit and whether [...] managed the property in a reasonably efficient and economical manner as required by the RCO.  Ultimately, Board members found that the level of service was lacking and that the property was not being efficiently managed.  (Id. at 47:18-20; 62:4-14.)  The decision to grant a 5% management fee was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.
[brief] [...], Esq., the scrivener of the Will, confirmed that when [...] spoke to him about forgiving the mortgage debt, [...] was referring to [...]’s obligation.  [...] never told Mr. Balsamo that he intended to forgive the debt as to [...].  During a deposition in the divorce action, [...] first became aware that [...] intended to assert the position that [...] forgave the mortgage debt as to both her and [...] and that the mortgage lien should be cancelled as to both her and [...].  [...] and [...] were clients of Balsamo.  Balsamo without providing notice to [...], either individually or as Executor of [...]’s Estate, executed a certification in favor of [...] contradicting [...]’s intent in the Will to forgive the mortgage debt as to [...] only.  Balsamo’s execution of the certification without notice to [...], as either Executor of individual client, was a breach of his fiduciary duty to [...] and his deceased client, [...].
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:55-32 provides that zoning regulations shall be in accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed for one or more of the following purposes: to lessen congestion in the streets; secure safety from fire, flood, panic and other dangers; promote health, morals or the general welfare; provide adequate light and air; prevent the overcrowding of land or buildings; avoid undue concentration of population.  Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view of conserving the value of property and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such municipality.  In short, the Plaintiff failed to convince the Board that it had satisfied any of the c(2)criteria under the statute.
[brief] 2  Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483, 494 (1993)  3, 4, 5 L.A. v. New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Services, 217 N.J. 311, 323 (2014)  2 Rules Page R. 4:46-2 (c)  2  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] There the Court said:  “Recently, in JH v [...], this Court emphasized the importance of control in imposing a duty on a landlord, finding that ‘a landlord has a duty to exercise reasonable care against foreseeable dangers arising from the use of those portions of the rental property over which the landlord retains control. ’”  (emphasis in original)  Shields, 491.  It is noteworthy that the same argument that Hopkins should be applied to evaluate commercial lessor liability in lieu of McBride and Geringer was made in the Shields matter, and Supreme Court chose not to adopt that change.  Instead, the Shields court noted simply that the plaintiff had contended that the factors of --- 3 Plaintiff also cites to Geringer, 403-405 (Pb 11) suggesting that it held a lessor can be liable if a condition “predates” a lease.
[brief] **JUDGE ALLENDE CORRECTLY APPLIED THE “LAW OF THE CASE” DOCTRINE TO DISMISS COUNTS I THROUGH IX AND REJECTED MOSLEY’S ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT THAT AN APRIL 14, 2023 COURT ORDER IN THE DISMISSED CRIMINAL ACTION “TRIGGERED THE TRUE ACCRUAL DATE. ”**  (Addressing Appellant’s Point III.)  [...] correctly applied the “law of the case” doctrine in determining that an April 14, 2023 court order, which vacated the amended judgment of conviction and dismissed the VOP charge, did not alter an earlier court’s finding that [...]’s malicious prosecution claims first began to accrue on March 6, 2018, five years earlier, when the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed [...]’s VOP conviction on direct appeal.
[directive] Expunged Records.  In determining whether to overcome the presumption of issuing a complaint-summons pursuant to Section 4.3, a prosecutor or supervisory officer designated pursuant to subsection 3.3.2 may consider expunged records as part of the totality of relevant circumstances.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:52-21 (“expunged records . . . of prior arrests or convictions shall be provided to any court, county prosecutor, the Probation Division of the Superior Court, the pretrial services agency, or the Attorney General when same are requested for use in conjunction with a bail hearing, [or] pretrial release determination pursuant to sections 1 through 11 of P.L. 2014, c. 31 [the Bail Reform Law]”).  In any case where application for a complaint-warrant is required pursuant to Rule 3:3- 1(e), or any case where a determination has been made pursuant to this Directive to apply for a complaint-warrant regardless of expunged arrests or convictions, the law enforcement agency and/or prosecutor shall not delay the charging process by waiting to obtain or access expunged records.  If, however, expunged records might affect the determination whether to issue a complaint-summons or apply for a complaint-warrant, the assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general consulted in accordance with Section 3.2, or designated supervisory officer designated pursuant to subsection 3.3.2, may delay the charging decision for a reasonable period while efforts are being undertaken to obtain or access expunged records, considering the administrative burdens that would be placed on the police department by the delay, and further provided that the defendant can be presented to a judge or other judicial officer within 12 hours of arrest as required by Rule 3:4-1.  4.8
[directive] Therefore, the following conditions will apply to all kits – reported and unreported – in an agency’s custody:  Type of Frozen Refrigerated Temp. Controlled Room Evidence Below - Between 2°C and 8°C  Between 15.5°C and Temp. 10°C (36°F and 75°F)  24°C (14°F) with less than 25% (60°F and 75°F) humidity with less than 60% humidity  Liquid blood Never Best Less than 24 hours*  Not ideal  Urine Less than 24 hours, or Best Not ideal  Not ideal as soon as possible*  Dry biological Not ideal Not ideal Best Acceptable stained item  Wet items (if they can’t be Best Acceptable Less than 24 hours*  Not ideal dried)  Hair  Not ideal Not ideal Best Acceptable Swabs with biological Not ideal Best (wet)  Best (dried)  Not ideal material  Buccal swabs Less than Not ideal  Not ideal Best 24 hours*  *If operational requirements prevent submission of DFSA kits within 24 hours, specimens must be refrigerated and submitted as soon as possible, but no later than ten (10) calendar days from the date of collection, unless the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or his/her/their attorney designee, or the County Prosecutor or his/her/their attorney designee determines there is good cause to delay submission to the lab and provides written approval of an extension in time to the agency.
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[brief] Rather, courts have limited liability in the consumer debt context to the original seller of the debt—not to subsequent purchasers in the chain who have no connection to the original consumer transaction and who had no role in negotiating the original credit terms.  See Chulsky v. Hudson L. Offs., P.C., 777 F. Supp. 2d 823, 847 (D.N.J. 2011) (“A debt buyer . . . is not a ‘seller’ whose ‘subsequent performance’ falls within the ambit of the NJCFA.
[directive] See Section 3.7.  In order to promote the interests of finality and the efficient disposition of the case, the prosecutor may also elect in these circumstances to permit the defendant to be sentenced in accordance with the original “open” offer, provided that the prosecutor alerts the court to the newly-learned information so that the court can properly discharge its responsibility in deciding whether to accept, reject or vacate the negotiated disposition.  See Sections 3.1 and 3.7.  If the prosecutor initially determines that the defendant is ineligible for a standardized “open” plea offer based on criterion #3 and subsequently learns that the amount of drugs involved did not, in fact, exceed the Guidelines threshold, the prosecutor shall be required to tender a standardized “open” plea offer, regardless of the timing of the plea, see Section 4.5 and footnote 2, supra, provided of course that the defendant would otherwise have been eligible for an “open” offer at the time that the prosecutor determined that the defendant was ineligible based on the amount of drugs involved.  It should be noted, finally, that as a practical matter, in many cases, criterion #3 will not be critical to the prosecutor’s determination of eligibility for an “open” plea offer.
[brief] Plaintiffs disagree with Defendants’ Preliminary Statement that there are “only two issues on this appeal. ”  The two issues they set forth clearly are issues on the appeal, but Plaintiffs’ Brief has outlined the other issues.  Defendants’ Preliminary Statement contains factual statements without a citation to the record (Page 2, reliance on representations by [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) from unnamed municipal officials.  This is hearsay and it ignores N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 and the right of prospective purchaser to obtain a certificate of nonconformity when [...] Madison, LLC (hereinafter “[...]”) bought the property.
[brief] 21  B.  Even If The Court Accepts The Concept Of “Pay- When-Able Loans,” Plaintiff Has Not Proven There Was A “Third Loan” Or That It Was A “Pay-When-Able Loan” (Da1-69)  .........................................................................................  22  C.  The Court Overlooked The Fact That The Discharge Of Mortgage Signed By [...] Stated That It Was “Paid In Full” (Da1-69)  ...........................................  29  D.  Defendants Are Not Equitably Estopped From Asserting a Statute of Limitations Defense (Da1-69) ........  31 POINT  IV  PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE HIS CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Da1-69)
[brief] Again, Defendants and the Trial Court misconstrue case law and insist Plaintiff “d[id] not allege that DSPs were not trained in any of the five categories listed, nor does [the regulation] state that watching videos is an insufficient training method. ”  Resp. Br. 13. (PA000090-PA000091).  Plaintiff need not allege the details which form the unlawfulness of Defendants’ actions as CEPA “is not to make lawyers out of conscientious employees”  Mehlman, 153 N.J. at 193-94.  So long as Plaintiff “identified authority that applies to the ‘activity, policy, or practice’” of Defendants, being basic training to ensure staff competency, is sufficient at the prima facie stage.  Hitesman, 218 N.J. at 11. (PA000008).
[brief] “In some circumstances, it is difficult to identify a single error that deprives defendant of a fair trial. ”  Id. at 160.  “Where any one of several errors assigned would not in itself be sufficient to warrant a reversal, [but] all of them taken together justify the conclusion that [the] defendant was not accorded a fair trial, it becomes the duty of this court to reverse. ”  *Id.* at 155 (quoting *State v. Orecchio*, 16 N.J. 125, 134 (1954)).  “If a defendant alleges multiple trial errors, the theory of cumulative error will still not apply[, however,] where no error was prejudicial, and the trial was fair. ”  *Ibid.*  Each asserted error is thus assessed in light of the strength of the State’s case.  *See ibid.*  Thus, progressing through each of defendant’s complained of purported errors, the common theme is the pointed strength of the State’s case, and the fact that none of the complained of purported errors was prejudicial.
[directive] 5.  e. 1993 8 2 경우, [예/Yes] [아니요/No] 범죄가 년 월 일 이후에 발생했을 유죄가 확정된 각 죄목마다 귀하는 $75 아십니까?  안전 이웃 봉사기금으로 책정된 금액 을 지불해야 하는 것을  If the offense occurred on or after August 2, 1993 you must pay a $75 Safe Neighborhood Services Fund assessment for each conviction?
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-1 - APPENDIX A - GUIDELINES FOR POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004)  FORM (8)  If the summoned person refuses or declines to accept receipt of the original of the completed POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2- 20-2004)  Form, the law enforcement officer shall record that fact in the right-hand margin of the original Form, by noting that the summoned person refused or declined to accept receipt of the document.  The original will then be retained in the law enforcement agency file for that case along with any copies.
[brief] The GPS location data from [...]’s phone reflected that his phone was in the following areas: [...] at 12:51 a.m.; [...] from 1:34 to 1:41 a.m.; [...] at 1:41 a.m.; [...] at 1:54 a.m.; [...] at 2:48 a.m.; [...] at 2:58 a.m.; and Bloomfield Lana at 3:09 a.m. (12T129-3 to 130-15; 12T133-1 to 135-7).  Location data from [...]’s phone reflected that the phone was near the following locations: [...] between 12:45 and 1:08 a.m.; 61 [...] between 1:33 and 1:42 a.m., and 61 [...] between 1:55 a.m. to 7:07 a.m. (12T149-23 to 153-21).  The police also recovered three images from [...]’s phone of [...] holding a handgun that he had deleted at 3:41 a.m. on September 18.  (12T140-14 to 145-8).  The police did not find the cell phone [...] had been using at the time of the murder.  (12T157-12 to 20).  [...] testified that a few days after the murder, [...] tossed his cell phone out of a car window and said he had forgotten his pin.  (11T133-9 to 25).  Without objection, [...] was qualified as an expert in cell phone mapping and cell phone forensics.  (12T163-24 to 168-7).  As described in detail in Point II below, [...] created two maps using “call detail records” from [...]’s cell phone provider and opined that his phone was in the general area of [...] at 11:04 p.m. on September 17 and in the general area of 61 [...] at 2:25 a.m. on September 18.  (12T170-2 to 178-22).
[brief] Defendant [...] never authorized the transfer of title to the Property to the Plaintiff or anyone else.  (Pa142).  Mr. [...], who signed the quitclaim deed in 2020, did not have any authority on behalf of the owner, Defendant [...], Inc., to execute a deed as he was not in 2020 (and is presently not) an officer or otherwise empowered with the authority to execute a deed on behalf of Defendant [...], Inc., the national not-for-profit religious organization.  (Pa142-Pa143).  The attorney whose name appears as preparer on the 2021 deed being challenged, [...], Esquire, was not and is not licensed to practice law in the State of New Jersey.  (Pa143).  Despite the statements in the 2021 deed, [...], the Executive Secretary of the Plaintiff, is claiming she prepared the deed on behalf of the Plaintiff.  (Pa143).  [...] is also not licensed as an attorney in the State of New Jersey and she has no authority to convey property owned by Defendant [...], Inc.  (Pa143).  On June 7, 2021, the Plaintiff Non-Profit Corporation was dissolved.
[brief] Specifically, the court merged count two (second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose) into count one (first-degree murder) and sentenced him on count one to a thirty-year term without parole; on count three (second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon) to a concurrent ten-year term; and on count four (certain-persons not to possess a firearm) to a consecutive five-year term without parole.  (15T 4-12 to 16-23, 34-20 to 41-8; Da 181-96)  The court’s imposition of consecutive terms on the murder and certain-persons counts, and its weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors, violated Yarbough and its progeny.
[directive] It is ORDERED, pursuant to N.J. Const. Art. VI, sec. 2 par. 3, that effective immediately and until further order the provisions of Rule 3:1-4 of the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey are supplemented and relaxed so as to permit the Superior Court to issue and transmit to the Department of Corrections electronic Orders to Produce inmates for court proceedings with those orders or writs containing an electronically affixed signature of a Superior Court judge rather than an original signature and having the same authority as such orders to produce containing a judge=s original signature.  For the Court, /s/ [...]