ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  [...], Organization, http://www.nasonline.org/about-nas/organization/ (Last Visited April 17, 2023).  The 2008 report by [...] concluded that the “validity of the fundamental assumptions of uniqueness and reproducibility of firearms-related toolmarks has not yet been fully demonstrated,” and accordingly called for significant research to place even the basic premises of firearms examination on “solid scientific footing. ”  Ballistics Imaging at 82.  The second report from the [...] was issued in 2009.  *A Path Forward*.  After adopting and incorporating the conclusions of *Ballistics Imaging*, the report expressed concern that despite the “challenging” nature of distinguishing between marks left by the same or different firearms/tools, “the decision of the toolmark examiner remains a subjective decision based on unarticulated standards and no statistical foundation for estimation of error rates. ”  *Id.* at 153-54.  Nor could the [...] discern any standards sufficient to guide examiners in that endeavor, noting that “a fundamental problem with toolmark and firearm analysis is the lack of a precisely defined process,” and criticizing the [...] Theory of Identification for failing to “provide a specific protocol,” and “not even consider[ing], much less address[ing], questions regarding variability, reliability, repeatability, or the number of correlations needed to achieve a given degree of confidence. ”  *Id.* at 155.  And, as to the research that could help flesh out such protocols, the NAS report could say only that (1) “sufficient studies have not been done to understand the reliability and repeatability of the methods,” and (2) “the scientific knowledge base for toolmark and firearms analysis is fairly limited. ”  *Id.* at 154.  The 2009 report concluded that firearms examination evidence lacks “any meaningful scientific validation, determination of error rates, or reliability testing to explain the limits of the discipline. ”  *Id.* at 107-08.  The report acknowledged that examiners are capable of the fairly simple task of narrowing the pool of possible firearms matches using class characteristics, but the discipline and its methodology had not been demonstrated to consistently link bullets or cartridges to a particular source.  *Id.* at 154.  This recognized scientific limitation is what the defense requested to be reflected in the testimony in this case: the expert could explain that the bullets and casings shared class characteristics with the suspect gun, but should not be able to state that the bullets and casings were definitively fired by that gun.
[brief] Thus, under N.J.R.E. 703, the other examiners’ review that [...] relied on in forming his opinion and was not introduced for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather as evidence that the expert conformed to the proper methodology used by experts in the field.  Even so, the testimony defendant now calls error did not amount to plain error.  See Pearson, 116 N.E.3d at 311.
[brief] As a result, [...] had both the duty of reasonable care to make the premises safe and also had the affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable inspection to discover conditions that would render the premises unsafe.  When a plaintiff claiming injury as a result of a dangerous condition has shown that the circumstances were such as to create the reasonable probability that the dangerous condition would occur, she need not also prove actual or constructive notice of the specific condition.  Ryder v. Ocean Cty. Mall, 340 N.J. Super. 504, 506 (App. Div. 2001).  In this case, it is well established that there had been prior spills because there had been other instances of spills on [...]’ floor that needed to be cleaned up.  [...]’ backroom was explicitly stocked with cleaning supplies to be used in such instances to clean spills.  However, there is no evidence that [...] affirmatively conducted inspections to discover dangerous conditions once the store was open.  The question herein is whether given the fact that [...] had prior spills, did not have any maintenance people in the store, and merely relied on the salespeople to discover and clean up spills (which was outside the scope of their maintenance duties) constitutes as a breach of the duty owed to Plaintiff?  Is reliance on salespeople to clean up spills only if discovered considered a reasonable inspection?  Such a dispute is ripe for submission to a jury.
[brief] CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE  [...], of full age, hereby certifies as follows:  1.  I am a Partner at the law firm of [...], attorneys for the Plaintiff/Respondent, [...] ("[...]"), in the within matter.  2.  On June 20, 2024, I filed electronically with the Court, [...]’s Appellate Brief, Request for Oral Argument and Certification of Service.  I hereby certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true.  I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements are willfully false, I am subject to punishments.  [...]
[brief] (9T10-12 to 13-3)  Plaintiff’s counsel openly acknowledged that:  “There’s no argument … that the treatment, the surgery that this man had was unreasonable, unnecessary.  It’s a causal relationship argument.  So, obviously, if a jury found that these injuries are not causally related to the accident, then everything falls. ”  (9T16-11 to 16) (emphasis added).  Defense counsel agreed that Plaintiff is entitled to recover medical expenses if they are causally related to the incident in question.  The verdict would be molded to include the medical bills only if the jury finds that the injuries are causally related.  (9T18-17 to 19-14)  Plaintiff’s counsel said “okay.  … that’s all I’m asking for.  (9T19-16 to 17)  The Court explained that the orders would include notations to the effect that the issue of reimbursement of medical expenses under the Workers’ Compensation lien would be addressed at trial based upon the jury findings as to the issue of causation.
[brief] Notably, Plaintiff relied on the February 2015 work order demonstrating that the sign was knocked down and reinstalled six days later, approximately 37 days before the accident.  Da181.  Nothing in the record indicated that there were any complaints regarding the sign at any time between the sign being reinstalled in February and the incident in March.  No witness, expert or otherwise, could specify the time the sign was knocked down, nor were there any affidavits from local citizens regarding the length of time the sign was missing after it was reinstalled the previous month.  Plaintiff’s proofs could not constitute “competent evidential material beyond mere speculation,” because, rather than specifying how long the sign was down, it called for the trial court to assume or speculate such facts.  In fact, Plaintiff argued such in his opposition to the City’s motion for summary judgment:
[brief] [...], a licensed private investigator, provided a certification averring that he interviewed [...], a former employee of the [...].  Mr. McCullar stated that he worked for the [...] from 2016 to 2017 as the director of the hotel’s front office at the time.  Also, that he did not recall being contacted to testify, provide documentation and/or to produce any tangible evidence such as surveillance videos relating to a legal matter in the State of New Jersey.  Mr. McCullar further advised that Mr. Rusin should contact the Human Services or Legal Compliance Team if any further assistance was needed.  Mr. Rusin established that after review of the PCR file, that trial counsel attempted to serve a subpoena on the [...], and that the proper Hilton Hotel to be served was the [...], [...], which was clearly on the receipt/invoice the defendant provided to trial counsel.
[brief] Per the Appellant/Cross-Respondents’, the burden of proof at the R. 4:40-1 stage is higher than at the close of trial and, therefore, the Court should have reconsidered their statute of limitations argument under the lesser standard.  Even if the Court’s opinion did not specifically spell out the burden of proof applicable at the conclusion of the case, the Court’s opinion made it clear that reasoning behind its decision on Appellant/Cross-Respondents’ R. 4:40-1 motion was incorporated into the post-trial opinion.  Specifically, in the Conclusion section of its opinion, the Court summarized its findings with respect to Appellant/Cross-Respondents’ claims as follows:
[brief] This argument is plainly without merit as service was effectuated on Defendant in accordance with the Court’s September 24, 2021 order pursuant to *Rule 4:4-4(b)(3)* granting substitute service on Defendant’s last known address at [...].  That order deemed that service on the defendant was effectuated as of the date of the order.  Therefore, not only was there no “technical defect” in the service of process, which would nevertheless not provide a basis for overturning the lower court’s order, but service was properly effectuated.
[brief] Mitigating factor #9 -  The character and attitude of the defendant indicate he is unlikely to commit another offense.  There was ample information in the record for the court to find that [...] was entitled to Mitigating Factor #9.  As extensively argued below, [...] had “taken every step possible to rehabilitate himself. ” (T3 9:3 through 4).  This was evidenced by 54 letters from individual associated to him in the AA program, to his sponsor, and his Rabbi.  At the time of [...]’s sentence, he was gainfully employed, and had removed himself from the area that contributed to his ongoing substance abuse issue.  Moreover, [...] himself, at the time of his sentencing, acknowledged to the court that he “allowed himself to be a part of something that could ruin lives and ant the chance to show my contrition by being a functioning party of my family and society as a whole. ” (T3 19:12 through 15).  Despite the above information, the trial court erred by improperly minimizing the extent of the rehabilitation by the Defendant.  Further, the trial court erred in not considering the extent of [...]’s character and background, specifically identified in the character letters, his involvement and commitment to his sobriety and his gainful employment.  Accordingly, the trial court erred by failing to find Mitigating Factor #9 and providing it with the appropriate weight.
[brief] State v. M.B., 471 N.J. Super. 376 (App. Div. 2022) ..............................................23  State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1 (1991), supplemented 130 N.J. 109 (1992)  ....7, 18 State v. Montijo, 320 N.J. Super. 483 (Law. Div. 1998) ...........................................6, 17 State v. Mustaro, 411 N.J. Super. 91 (App. Div. 2009) .............................................8  State v. Peterkin, 226 N.J. Super. 25 (App. Div.), certif. denied 114 N.J. 295 (1988) ......................................................... 6, 7, 10, 11  State v. Porro, 175 N.J. Super. 49 (App. Div. 1980) ..................................................7  State v. Ramirez, 252 N.J. 277 (2022) ........................................................................9  State v. Richardson, 452 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 2017) .......................................10 State v. Robertson, 438 N.J. Super. 47 (App. Div. 2014), opinion after grant of certification on other grounds, 228 N.J. 138, (2017)  .........................17
[brief] Against that presentation, based on the present record, the Court cannot conclude that either the website's ten-word, cryptically described notice and link or the letter to the certifying officers provides sufficient evidence to support deferring to the agency's choice of notice as reasonable.  With the thin record available, it is not known what action, if any, certifying officers generally took in response to the Commissions' letter.  Nor does the record disclose what notice, if any, former employees and retirees received of the potential for supplemental reimbursement in light of the Commissions' apparent reliance on the link.  Accordingly, the Court orders a remand for the development of a proper record to permit meaningful judicial review.
[brief] Plaintiffs may think that the alleged shift of regional school costs was unfair, but any such shift was a product of the law, not the Financial Agreement.  The LTTEL specifically allocates five percent of the annual service charge collected under a PILOT to the county, and does not allocate any of the service charge to the schools.  N.J.S.A. 40A:20-12(e) (“Each municipality which enters into a financial agreement on or after the effective date of P.L. 2003, c. 125 (C. 40A:12A-4.1 et al.) shall remit 5 percent of the annual service charge collected by the municipality to the county in accordance with the provisions of R.S. 54:4-74. ”).  Plaintiffs’ arguments about the effect that the statutorily-determined allocation could have on tax rates in the boroughs are best directed at the Legislature, not the Township.
[brief] In re Yucht, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2188…………………………Pra1  In re State and Sch. Emples.  Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1938………………………………………Pra5  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS
[brief] 24  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Order granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, filed March 15, 2024  Pa5  Order denying Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment, filed March 15, 2024  Pa7  Oral Decision (March 15, 2024)  1T17  # TABLE OF APPENDIX | Document | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Notice of Appeal, filed April 22, 2024 | 001a | | Order Granting Summary Judgment to Defendant | 005a | | Order Denying Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment | 007a | | Defendant’s Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment | 009a | | Defendant’s Proposed Form of Order | 012a | | Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts | 014a | | Certification of [...] | 018a | | Exhibit A to Certification of [...] (Complaint) | 021a | | Exhibit B to Certification of [...] (Answer) | 028a | | Exhibit C to Certification of [...] (Police Report) | 034a | | Exhibit D to Certification of [...] (Cancellation Notice) | 038a | | Exhibit E to Certification of [...] (Certificate of Mailing - Excerpt) | 040a | | Exhibit F to Certification of [...] (Final Request for Payment) | 044a | | Exhibit G to Certification of [...] (Policy Declaration Pages) | 049a | | Authority | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------| | **Statutes:** | | | N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10 | 5, 6, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19 | | **Court Rules:** | | | R. 1:6-6 | 8 | | **Case Law:** | | | *Celino v. General Acci. Ins.*, | 14, 15, 18 | | 211 N.J.Super. 538 (App. Div. 1986) | | | *Hodges v. Pennsylvania Nat. Ins. Co.*, | 6, 7, 10, 11, 18, 19, 20 | | 260 N.
[directive] The police officer handler trainee will have the knowledge to properly complete a police report for any given situation requiring the use of a police dog.  1.4.1  The police officer handler will list the qualities of a good police report for situations which required the use of a police dog.  18 7/2002  K-9 Training Standards and Qualification Requirements  1.4.2  The police officer handler will list the types of information to be included in an incident report, offense report or use of force report dealing with the use of a police dog.  1.4.3  The police officer handler will be familiar with individual agency requirements for reports and records pertaining to operations or activities involving police dogs.  1.5  RECORD KEEPING Goal:
[directive] Page 2 of 3  The attached procedures, request form, and order are to be used to provide expunged and sealed records to the individual who is the subject of the expunged records.  The request form must be completed and presented in person along with a government-issued photo identification.  It should be noted that a juvenile (under age 18) must have their parent or attorney make the request for the expunged or sealed record.  Requests for a Certification of Expungement submitted by an attorney on behalf of their client will be processed centrally by the Superior Court Clerk’s Office.  All other requests for expunged records submitted by an attorney on behalf of their client must be processed by the court where the expungement was granted, or where the conviction or juvenile adjudication was ordered sealed from public access.  As noted on the Request Form, any individual who submits a request for expunged records and who makes a false statement under affirmation may be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:28-2(a).  Matters expunged or sealed upon the order of a Superior Court or Municipal Court judge will require an Order Permitting Release of Expunged or Sealed Records prior to providing the requested record.
[brief] Irrespective of this appeal, the Department recognizes the State’s constitutional duty to address the lack of T&E in the District, and... steps to remedy that situation.  [SB at 49].  --- \(^2\)This is at odds with the language of the Commissioner’s annual certifications to the State Treasurer, which underlay the advance state aid loans, to the effect that without such loans the district would have insufficient funds to provide T&E.  [N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-56 ].  \(^3\)A careful review of the State’s brief produced only one reference to the State requiring the [...] to take any action—the monitor’s requirement in 2014 that the District “increase its tax levy up to the maximum amount,” a requirement that the District satisfied.  [SB at 8 and 39].  Otherwise, the State’s brief refers multiple times to “recommendations,” “warnings,” “suggestions,” and “recognition” by the State to [...] [see, e.g., SB at 2, 6, 7, 8, 29, 40 and 42].
[brief] [...] ordered the parties to produce all relevant non-privileged, non-trade secret documents.  The protocol that he chose to achieve that end directed the parties to agree on ESI search terms and custodians, and to run the search terms through their IT systems.  This approach, he concluded, would ---  10  In accordance with Rule 1:36-3, [...] have included copies of all unpublished opinions in their appendix.  [...] are not aware of any contrary unpublished opinions other than those in [...]’s appendix.  11  Although the trial court made some general statements about ESI, as discussed in this brief, its ultimate decision was based on the combative history between the parties in which each side had accused the other of hiding relevant evidence.  In short, the court’s decision rests on the specific circumstances presented in this case. yield the greatest amount of legitimate discoverable materials.
[brief] On or about March 10, 2009, when [...] still had no interest in [...], Defendant [...] filed an application with the [...] for the [...] development on behalf of [...].  581a (217:17-219:22).  Shortly thereafter, Defendants [...] and [...] induced Plaintiff [...] into assigning his interest in [...] to [...] in order to secure the deal that Defendants [...] and [...] had memorialized in their 2008 memorandum to Plaintiff [...] and Mr.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  The Motion pending in the trial Court, from the viewpoint of the Defendant was a R. 4:6-2(e) which is a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted which essentially was that the Plaintiff’s relief should come from the Rules --- 1T - Transcript of Motion Hearing on 12/22/23. and Regulations of the [...].  The Plaintiff alleges that the Chief of Police manipulated the process for the sole purpose of depriving him to be considered for promotion since he was no. 1 on the list and that expired once the Chief put in a new process of five months as opposed to one year (Pa-1).  The Certifications of the Plaintiff (Pa-8 and Pa-20) clearly establish that the process of extending a list for one year preceded the list on which the Plaintiff was no. 1, and was reinstituted after the Plaintiff was removed from the list because the process of five months expired one month before the next promotion would be considered.  This is not a failure to promote.  This is a deliberate policy change to remove the Plaintiff who was no. 1 on the list and would have been no. 1 for the next promotion if the Chief had not reduced the process to five months, as opposed to every other time when it was one year or more.  As no. 1 on the list, the Plaintiff had the right to be considered for promotion.  Because the Chief changed the process from one year to five months, which ended one month prior to the next retirement.  The Chief removed the Plaintiff from the no. 1 position and started the process all over again thereby removing the Plaintiff who worked his way from no. 3 to no. 2 to no. 1.  This was not a process that expired.  This is a process that was changed for one reason and one reason only and that was to deprive the Plaintiff of the no. 1 position prior to the next available promotion.  In order to have his case decided pursuant to the Rules and Regulations of the Township, the Plaintiff’s complaint must be that “I was overlooked for promotion,” or “I was not promoted.
[brief] ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Cases** | | | Berg v. Christie, | 24, 25, 26 | | 225 N.J. 245 (2016) | | | Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Mercer | 10 | | 169 N.J. 135 (2001) | | | Burnson v. Evans, | 15 | | 137 N.J.L. 511 (Sup. Ct. 1948) | | | Cohen v. Thoft, | 8 | | 368 N.J. Super. 338 (App. Div. 2004) | | | Fair Share Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. N.J. State League of Municipalities, | 19 | | 207 N.J. 489 (2011) | | | Febbi v. Bd. of Rev., | 21 | | 35 N.J. 601 (1961) | | | Gallagher v. Irvington, | 21, 26 | | 190 N.J. Super. 394 (App. Div. 1983) | | | Hankins v. Newell, | 13 | | 75 N.J.L. 26 (Sup. Ct. 1907) | | | Hopewell Valley Citizens’ Grp., Inc. v. Berwind Prop. Grp. Dev. Co., L.P., | 11 | | 204 N.J. 569 (2011) | | | In re Christie’s Appointment of Perez as Pub. Member 7 of Rutgers Univ. Bd. of Governors, | 10, 12, 15 | | 436 N.J. Super. 575 (App. Div. 2014) | | | Kieffer v. Best Buy, | 32 | | 205 N.J. 213 (2006) | | | Kratovil v. Angelson, | passim | | 473 N.J. Super. 484 (Law Div. 2020) | | | Marconi v. United Airlines, | 15 | | 460 N.J. Super. 330 (App. Div. 2019) | | | Morrill v. Wollman, | 27, 28 | | 271 N.W.2d 356 (S.D. 1978) | | | Mullen v. Ippolito Corp., | 8 | | 428 N.J. Super. 85 (App. Div. 2012) | | | Point Pleasant Borough PBA Local No. 158 v. Borough of Point Pleasant, | 11 | | 412 N.J. Super. 328 (App. Div. 2010) | | Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34 (2016) .................................................................................................................. 32 Robertson v. Kulongoski, 466 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006) ................................................................................................. 24 Rutgers State Univ. v. Piluso, 113 N.J. Super. 65 (Law Div. 1971), aff’d, 60 N.J. 142 (1972) ............................................. 19 Save Camden Pub. Sch. v. Camden City Bd. of Ed., 454 N.J. Super. 478 (App. Div. 2018) ...................................................................................... 8 Scott v. Cholmondeley, 129 N.J. Eq. 152 (Ch. 1941) .................................................................................................... 12, 13 Shepherd v. Hunterdon Dev. Ctr., 174 N.J. 1 (2002) ....................................................................................................................... 11 Skolski v. Woodcock, 149 N.J. Super. 340 (App. Div. 1977) ....................................................................................... 28 Smith v. Trustees of Bethel African Methodist Episcopal Church of Jersey City, 89 N.J.L. 397 (Sup. Ct. 1916) ................................................................................................. 13 State by Info. of Hancock ex rel. Banks v. Elwell, 163 A.2d 342 (Me. 1960) ..........................................................................................................