ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Reasonable notice was not provided of the arbitration agreement  [...]’s allegation is that on the night in question, a [...] finger touched down on the [...] App click-box sometime after the food was ordered, payment was made, the food was collected, and the delivery driver was en route but before the food’s arrival.  In other words, and in our homes, among about 1000 other finger clicks and swipes and scrolls following the course of the delivery order like a police chopper tails a getaway car.  Fortunately, lived experience and the law align here in recognizing that notice only after the transaction in consummated is unreasonable and insufficient notice.
[directive] When the arrestee is unable to arrange for the care of dependent persons, this department will notify the appropriate municipal, county and state agencies of the need for alternate care for the arrestee's dependents.  This department will not take direct responsibility for providing alternate care for arrestee's dependents.  While the need for alternate care for an arrestee's dependents is to be determined, the existence of arrestee dependents should not be the determining factor as to whether the arrestee is held in custody or released.  Where a summons in lieu of arrest is inappropriate or the taking into custody is required by law, public safety or safety of the arrestee, the individual should be held until released in accordance with law.  3.0  PROCEDURE
[brief] The State argued for aggravating factors three, six, and nine.  (33T25:7-26:16).  The State submitted that mitigating factor seven was applicable but should only be given minimal weight.  (33T:2614-22).  The State requested a forty year sentence subject to NERA for the accomplice liability felony murder conviction and noted that theft, accomplice liability to robbery, reckless manslaughter, and accomplice liability to reckless manslaughter would all merge with that sentence.  (33T:27:12-28:16).  The Defense argued mitigating factors two, seven, and eight.  (33T29:4-30:14).  The Defense agreed that all of the other offenses should merge into the accomplice liability felony murder, and requested the mandatory minimum of thirty years for that offense.  (33T30:15-22).
[brief] (7T 52-12 to 24)  [...]’s reasoning was that his insurance would not cover any incidents or accidents caused by his employees after [...] closes at 2:00 a.m.  (7T 53-3 to 8)  [...] told [...] he understood that [...] needed to fire him; they parted ways on friendly terms and [...] expressed no anger.  (7T 93-13 to 94-1; 11T 15-2 to 10)  However, [...], another employee of [...], testified that after [...] was fired, he said something to Hendricksen like he would get his revenge or he would not go easily.
[brief] As such, Appellant was required to obtain an Affidavit of Merit by a licensed engineer, the same profession as [...].  Moreover, Appellants’ contention that “because the ‘Affidavit of Merit’ statute is inapplicable to the claims against the engineers and architects, for theft of client work product,” is erroneous and inconsistent with N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 and applicable caselaw.
[brief] [...], [...], BY ITS CUSTODIAN [...] PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, V. [...] A/K/A [...]; [...]; MR./MRS. KEMP, Spouse of [...]; MR./MRS. CHILINSKAS, spouse of [...]; [...] s/b/m/t [...] a division of [...]; [...]; [...] AND [...]; [...]; MR./MRS. AUNGST, spouse of Joanne Aungst  DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
[brief] (Ja11; T14-23-25; T15-1-4; T16-1-2,10-13; T17-1-6,13-24; T26-9-12, 19-22; T27-12-16, 19-25; T28-1-3, 7-8, 13-19; T31-7-13)  To that end, the Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), NJSA 56:8-19 states the following:  “Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of moneys or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of any method, act, or practice declared unlawful under this act or the act hereby amended and supplemented may bring an action or assert a counterclaim therefor[e] in any court of competent jurisdiction.  In any action under this section the court shall, \textit{in addition to any other} \(^1\) The words “private attorney general” are not even stated in Paragraphs 7.2, 7.4 or 7.5 of [...]’s arbitration provision but separately concerning a class action waiver in Paragraph 7.3.  (Ja36-Ja37) appropriate legal or equitable relief, award threefold the damages sustained by any person in interest.  In all actions under this section, including those brought by the Attorney General, the court shall also award reasonable attorneys' fees, filing fees and reasonable costs of suit. ”  (emphasis added)  In addition, under the CFA, a private litigant (such as Plaintiff here) can bring an action (thereby acting as a private attorney general) seeking injunctive relief (in addition to monetary damages) so long as her claims include that she suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property.
[brief] 14  During oral argument there were some representations made that the Debtor, acting pro se, was again attempting to vacate the Final Judgment in state court.  [...] has upended the tax sale foreclosure process in numerous states and in my view established a new cause of action to void a property transfer.  In New Jersey, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued a July 10, 2023 Order that temporarily suspended the Office of Foreclosure’s recommendations of final judgment in tax sale certificate cases pending as of May 25, 2023.  [...] recognized a property owner’s right to retain the equity above the amount of the tax lien.  The Supreme Court of the United States acknowledged that equity theft resulting from tax sale foreclosures violated a constitutional property right.
[brief] (Pa134)  The first bulletin issued at 12:51am was as follows:  Areas of black ice this morning….  Recent precipitation and snow melt have resulted in wet roadways.  Temperatures are currently above freezing across most locations, but are expected to fall into the upper 20s and lower 30s by day break.  This may result in the development of black ice on any untreated surfaces.  Exercise caution if traveling early this morning.  The second special weather bulletin issued at 5:06am, 90 minutes before Plaintiff’s fall, similarly indicated:  Areas of black ice this morning…  Recent precipitation and snow melt have resulted in wet roadways.  Temperatures falling into the lower 30’s through sunrise will result in the development of black ice on any untreated surfaces.  Exercise caution if traveling early this morning.  These intervening events, first the snow and rainfall on February 22, 2021, then the overnight freezing temperatures, are the true cause of Plaintiff’s fall.
[brief] (16T28-4 to 11; 16T37-10 to 16).  [...] was employed by [...] as a forensic engineer.  He testified that he had no training in historical cell phone data analysis and was only testifying about cell phone tower locations relevant to this case.  (16T18-11 to 14; 16T37-18 to 25).  [...] used two databases – Open Cell ID and Cell2gps – and an Excel document with local area codes (LAC) and cell ID boxes provided by defense counsel to generate the radii of the cell towers pinged by two cell phone numbers on May 27, 2012, between 12:27 a.m. and 1:07 a.m. (16T41-9 to 19; 16T42-17 to 53-6; 16T64-24 to 65-10; 16T69-5 to 13; 16T77-8 to 13).  [...]’s company was not given any subscriber information for the two cell numbers.  (16T76-12 to 77-23).  [...] opined that the cell phones travelled from the area of High Street and Lakeside Avenue to Georgia King Village and then to Checkers Restaurant.  (16T53-12 to 63-15).  On cross-examination, [...] testified that the report generated by his company warned that the results “may contain a percentage of false/positive[s]”, that is, “a piece of information that is wrongly flagged as correct, but is in reality false, or incorrect. ” (16T84-22 to 85-23).  He acknowledged that he did not know the range of any of the cell towers or the orientation of any of the tower antennas.  (16T93-1 to 96-14).  [...] could only approximate the general strength of the cell towers.\(^5\) (16T99-12 to 16).
[brief] The Disciplinary Meeting was attended by [...] ([...] Vice President), [...] ([...] Union Representative and School Nurse), [...] ([...] Union Representative and Resource Room ELA Partner), [...], and [...].  227a, ¶ 103.  [...] claimed that on November 16, 2020, her secretary reported to Ms.  Gonzalez that Plaintiff was not wearing a mask while seated and that some of her students were not wearing a mask.  Id. at ¶ 105.  However, both Defendants Glazer and Restel then raised multiple other violations by Plaintiff, without informing Plaintiff or the Union Representatives that they intended to do so.  228a-229a.  For example, [...] claimed that this was the second report about Plaintiff, who was also the subject of a complaint by the mother of a virtual student.  228a, ¶ 108.  [...] could not answer any details about the complaint, but only claimed that several school administrators had questioned people as a result of the complaint.  Id. at ¶ 109.  Yet, Plaintiff had not been questioned, and her only interaction with administrators regarding masks was with Ms. Gonzalez in response to the November 16, 2020 complaint.  *Id.* at ¶ 110.  Following [...]’s revelation of a different complaint, [...] then claimed that she had been aware of Plaintiff sitting without a mask on another occasion, but she never took steps to correct or educate Plaintiff.  229a, ¶ 113.  Plaintiff alleged that at the Disciplinary Meeting, neither Ms. Gardener nor Ms. Gonzalez had been aware of these other complaints.  *Id.* at ¶ 114.  What is more, Ms. Gonzalez stated that there had been no other incidents after her direction to Plaintiff to comply with District Policy 1648 following the November 16, 2020 complaint.  *Id.* at ¶ 116.  Ms. Gardener also stated her believe that if any previous complaints had been addressed with Plaintiff, the November 16, 2020 incident may not have occurred.  *Id.* at ¶ 115.  Despite all of this, Plaintiff was informed at the Disciplinary Meeting that she would receive a disciplinary letter (“Disciplinary Letter”).  *Id.* at ¶ 117.  And this is despite the fact that General Counsel for the school claimed that this was not a disciplinary meeting.  227a, ¶ 100.  The Disciplinary Letter was dated November 19, 2020, a day before the Disciplinary Meeting, and only raises the November 16, 2020 incident, but not the other incidents claimed by [...] and [...] to have occurred.  229a, ¶ 119.  Plaintiff also alleges that she later learned from the Union Representatives that [...] openly conceded that Plaintiff and [...] were not treated similarly in response to violations of District Policy 1648.  231a, ¶ 131.  2.
[brief] 2  The trial transcripts are cited as follows: “1T” refers to the June 7, 2019 motion transcript; “2T” refers to the January 17, 2023 motion transcript; “3T” refers to the October 30, 2023 motion transcript; “4T” refers to the November 1, 2023 trial transcript; “5T” refers to the November 2, 2023 trial transcript; “6T” refers to the November 6, 2023 trial transcript; and “7T” refers to the November 8, 2023 motion transcript.
[brief] Like you, we \(^9\)  As detailed above, due to Tenant’s untimely and wholly improper Motion for Reconsideration, the Rent Arrears were held in escrow with the Clerk of Court and not disbursed to Landlord until December 8, 2023 (i.e. more than three (3) years after these rent payments were due).  have financial and contractual obligations to others which must be met and they are counting on us to rise to the occasion in the face of this crisis.  (Da195).  Similarly, the June 8, 2020 Default Notice provides the following, in relevant part:  As [...] indicated in his [April 28, 2020] letter, the Landlord values its relationship with its tenants and is mindful of the current COVID-19 health crisis.  In that regard, the Landlord would prefer to reach to a mutually acceptable arrangement for the satisfaction of Tenant’s outstanding rental obligations to permit your continued occupancy at the Property in lieu of pursuing eviction proceedings.
[directive] Duty to intervene.  A law enforcement officer’s duty to intervene is rooted in the commitment to protect public safety at all times.  Interventions that prevent improper use of force will lead to fewer citizen complaints, fewer officer disciplinary matters, higher morale, and a healthier working environment.  Preventing misconduct preserves the integrity of all officers and the law enforcement profession as a whole.  Intervening to prevent improper use of force can assist fellow officers by preventing them from engaging in conduct that may be illegal, inappropriate, and in violation of this Policy.
[brief] The 2012 complaint about the late-stamped complaint resulted in a threatening letter from AOC Counsel.  Pa124.  A follow-up letter, with knowledge of the false date stamp, totally left [...] without a remedy.  Pa125–126.  A 2009 ADA complaint for a client, when unanswered, resulted in a federal lawsuit.  [...] then sent a handwritten note offering accommodation if the lawsuit was \textsuperscript{6}  In the last case, anticipating a loss, he sent a partner.  The city finally complied with this Court’s assertion to pay for a psychiatrist (or dismiss the case).  The prosecutor, however, did not heed this Court’s “advice” that these cases should not be brought in the first place in the Interests of Justice.  dropped; a retaliation count was added to the suit.  Disgusted, [...] eventually filed a consolidated set of unanswered ADA complaints, all sent via email, fax, and/or mail.  Available at: www.[...]Law.org/BattleFaxes.pdf.  This formal complaint also went unanswered despite all the incidents being listed separately on official AOC LAD complaint forms.
[brief] In other words, based on the evidence and expert opinion, a jury could find that the stairs were extraordinarily slippery because of the water infiltration and freezing causing an invisible sheen of ice upon the deteriorating concrete, creating a surface much more dangerous than an ordinary one upon a trace of freezing rain.  See Brody, 17 N.J. at 391 ("the alleged cause is the intrinsic quality of the material used or condition created by the defendant when exposed to normal weather conditions.  This is an intrinsic substance case, not a foreign substance case.").  Expert opinion with a basis in fact and on a subject beyond the ken of an average juror, can also show that it was the underlying condition of the concrete surface which made the steps unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances.  See N.J. R. Evid. 702.  Such expert testimony about this underlying condition of the concrete steps is appropriate and creates a genuine issue of material fact for the jury.  See generally Brody, 17 N.J. at 392; cf. Polyard v. Terry, 160 N.J. Super. 497 (App. Div. 1978), aff’d, 79 N.J. 547 (1979), modified on other grounds, Lee’s Hawaiian Islanders, Inc. v. Safety First Products, Inc., 195 N.J. Super. 493 (App. Div.1984).
[brief] APPELLANT PRODUCED EVIDENCE THAT HIS INJURY WAS FORESEEABLE, CREATING A QUESTION FOR THE JURY.  A railroad may be liable under the FELA for the failure to provide a safe workplace when it knew or should have known of a potential hazard in the workplace and yet fails to exercise reasonable care to inform and protect its employees.  *Gallose v. Long Island R.R.*, 878 F.2d 80, 84-85 (2nd Cir 1989).  Reasonable care is determined in the light of whether or not a particular danger was foreseeable.  *Gallick*, 372 U.S. at 117.  This is a question of fact for a jury.  *Gallose*, 878 F.2d at 85.  Thus, the question for the jury will be whether the railroad knew or should have known there was a possibility that there would be a vagrant who could attack or otherwise interfere with an employee that could result in injury.  *Gallose*, 878 F.2d 80 at 85.  These types of foreseeability questions are jury questions under the FELA.  *Id.*  See also *Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.*, 372 U.S. 108, 113-114 (1963).  [...] has long had notice of the conditions at the Broad Street Station which could produce an injury such as [...]’s.  The voluminous criminal records [...] has produced during litigation (156a - 157a; 276a - 757a), the fact that another [...] employee was punched in the face at the same station (758a), and [...]’s testimony about non-violent crimes escalating to violent confrontations are all evidence of foreseeability.  (156a).  [...] Police officer [...] testified that the Broad Street Station was known for drug activity for the entirety of his 19-year career.  (239a).  The dangerous condition of Broad Street Station was no secret, assistant superintendent [...] also testified that he knew of assaults simply by talking to the various train crews.  (253a).  Again, all of this was evidence of foreseeability which created a genuine issue of material fact for a jury to decide.  The trial judge erroneously determined that despite these facts, [...]’s injury was not foreseeable, again invading the province of the jury.
[brief] (Pa155-59).6  --- 6  After filing this appeal, on March 2, 2023, [...] filed an action with the [...] challenging the denial of access related to her December 15, 2022 requests submitted to [...] and [...].  (Ra19-24).  In both matters, [...] asserted that she had instituted an action in Superior Court regarding the denials of access.  *Ibid.*  On June 5, 2023, the [...] dismissed [...]’s complaints because her actions were already pending in Superior Court.  *Ibid.*  These decisions are judicially noticeable under N.J.R.E. 201(a).  ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT SUDHAKAR’S COMPLAINT WAS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THAT SHE DID NOT SUBMIT A PROPER OPRA REQUEST.  The trial court’s decision dismissing [...]’s complaint should be affirmed because she filed her verified complaint and OTSC well past OPRA’s forty-five-day statute of limitations and, even if [...] had met OPRA’s statute of limitations requirement, she lacked standing to bring any related suit since she did not submit a request.
[brief] Pa372.  On September 9, 2024, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and --- \(^1\)  The transcript of the March 22, 2024 oral decision is cited as “1T. ”  The transcript of the April 12, 2024 oral argument is cited as “2T. ” remanded the appeal to the Appellate Division for a decision on the merits.  Pa373.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE INCORRECT STANDARD IN ITS REVIEW OF [...]’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION**  Before seeking leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal from this Court, [...] asked the trial court to reconsider its decision granting Plaintiffs partial summary judgment.  [...] emphasized how the trial court’s decision undermined the [...]’ intent, the prematurity of the decision with discovery remaining open, and the absence of any meaningful discovery or participation from an indispensable party, [...]  In denying the [...]’s reconsideration motion, the trial court applied the R. 4:49-2 standard, which only applies to a “judgment or final order”, rather than the R. 4:42-2(a) standard.  Pursuant to R. 4:42-2(a), when a “partial summary judgment is awarded,” it only becomes a “judgment” if the “trial court certifies that there is no just reason for delay of” enforcement.  Here, the trial court did not so certify and, therefore, this Court’s Order did not “terminate the action as to any of the claims” and it is “subject to revision at any time before the entry of final judgment in the sound discretion of the court in the interest of justice. ”  R. 4:42-2(a).  The “interest of justice” standard is “far more liberal” than the standard in Rule 4:49-2 and [...] meets it here because there remain significant claims between the parties and this Court rendered its decision without a complete factual record and despite the existence of genuine disputes of material fact.  See Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128, 134 (App. Div. 2021).  Notably, during the argument below, Plaintiff conceded that R. 4:42-2(a) was the correct standard of review.  2T6:12-24.  The trial court’s decision on [...]’s motion for reconsideration applied the far more stringent standard found in R 4:49-2 rather than the “interest of justice” standard mandated by this Court in Lawson.  Under the “far more liberal” standard, the trial court should have granted reconsideration and permitted the development of a complete factual record, especially since many of Plaintiffs’ claims against [...] remain pending and this case implicates more than seven decades of history.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Detectives Improperly Contradicted The Miranda Warnings During The Formal Interrogation.  If [...]’s formal interrogation is not suppressed because of his invocations of his right to counsel during the booking process, then his interrogation must be suppressed because the detectives contradicted the Miranda warnings, rendering [...]’s statement involuntary.  As our Supreme Court has repeatedly held, law enforcement “cannot directly or by implication tell a suspect that his statements will not be used against him because to do so is in clear contravention of the Miranda warnings.
[brief] In interpreting a statute, the court will “give words ‘their ordinary meaning and significance,’” acknowledging that the “statutory language is ‘the best indicator of [the Legislature's] intent. ’”  Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450, 467 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).  The court will “not presume that the Legislature intended a result different from what is indicated by the plain language or add a qualification to a statute that the Legislature chose to omit. ”  Id. at 467-68, 95.  Finally, the court will only resort to extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history and committee reports, in the event that the statutory language at issue is ambiguous.  Id. at 468.  The plain language of the NJCFLA creates no cause of action for an individual, but instead clearly and explicitly rests all authority in the [...], who alone has the right and the power to enforce the NJCFLA.