ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The applicable rule is:  The court shall, by an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried without a jury, on every motion decided by a written order that is appealable as of right, and also as required by R. 3:29.  The court shall thereupon enter or direct the entry of the appropriate judgment.  [Rule 1:7-4(a). ]  The trial court issued its decision and order on April 1, 2024.  (Da1).  This order outlines the factual background and procedural history leading to its issuance.  The court also concluded that [...]’s prior contract with [...] expired on December 31, 2023, and incorrectly determined that the defendants’ votes regarding [...] were ineffective and void as they violated the Local Government Ethics Law (LGEL).  The trial court later amended its April 1, 2024 order on May 10, 2024.  (Da3).  This contradicts the plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court failed to provide any findings of fact or conclusions of law.  As a threshold matter, the trial court is without jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
[directive] STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.
[brief] Table of Authorities Cases  State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 561 (2013) ......................................................  21 State v. Anthony, 237 N.J. 213, 238 (2019) ..................................................  13 State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 271 (1973)....................................................  20 State v. Benedetto, 120 N.J. 250, 261 (1990) ...............................................  17 State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338, 350 (2005) ....................................................  19 State v. Cabbell, 207 N.J. 311, 338 (2011) ...................................................  12 State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 125 (1982) .........................................................  24 State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 474 (1994)...................................................  24 State v. Gregg, 278 N.J. Super. 182, 190 (App. Div. 1994) .............................  27 State v. Hawk, 327 N.J. Super. 276, 284 (App. Div. 2000) .............................  25 State v. Hegel, 113 N.J. Super. 193, 201 (App. Div. 1971). ] ..........................  15 State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 218 (2011) ..............................................
[brief] Following the TL incident, the [...] provided the City information as to motor vehicle infractions involving [...]’s personal vehicle which had occurred in Ewing.  [...]’s vehicle had been pulled over on three occasions while being driven by unlicensed drivers.  [...] was not issued a summons on two of those occasions and did not believe that he was required to report these incidents to the Department.  (T1 158:2-3; T3 64:6-65:24; T5 39:10-45:17; Pa204 – Pa211).  On the third occasion, [...] (“[...]”) was stopped while driving [...]’s car without a valid license.  The municipal court dismissed the summons as to [...] due to a lack of any evidence he was aware [...] did not have a valid license.  (T5 39:10-45:17).  [...] is [...]’s son’s aunt, whom, on the occasion in question, was running errands for [...], including picking up supplies for his child’s birthday party.  (T5 44:12-21).  [...] had also asked [...] to drop off a written prescription for oxycodone at the pharmacy for him.  When [...] was pulled over she had the written prescription in her possession.  (T5 46:4-47:6; Pa214).  [...] confirmed that there was nothing illegal or improper about the fact that [...] was found with a written prescription made out to [...].  (T1 159:10-14).  **[...]’s Alleged Failure to Provide Notice of Medication Usage**
[brief] See 8T at 139-154.  In reaching that conclusion, the Board drew from their personal and professional experiences, see id. at 141-42.  The Board agreed that [...] would still be responsible for putting out the garbage on the curb regardless of whether the unit is a condominium.  See id. at 144:6-12; 147:6-17.  Most importantly, each Board member provided an explanation for their decision.  See id. at 153-54.  Therefore, the Board affirmed its decision not to include garbage collection fees in [...]’s condominium fees for [...]’s unit.
[brief] **Joinder.**  New Jersey courts favor the joinder of offenses when possible, and an appellate court should reverse a trial court’s decision denying joinder if there is an abuse of discretion.  *State v. Chenique-Puey*, 145 N.J. 334, 341 (1996).  New Jersey Court Rule 3:7-6 (“Joinder of Offenses”) provides:  Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or accusation in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on 2 or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.  In *State v. Manney*, 26 N.J. 362, 366 (1958), our Supreme Court explained that absent “substantial” prejudice to a defendant’s right to a fair trial, a joinder of offenses was desirable.
[brief] The main case cited by defendant, *State v. Murray*, 240 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 1990), does not apply.  There, this Court found it appropriate that the trial court asked questions at voir dire “to determine if any jurors had biases for or against mental health professionals and mental state defenses. ”  *Id.* at 392.  Yet it also acknowledged that a “judge’s refusal to interrogate jurors on a particular form of prejudice does not necessarily constitute reversible error” and the facilitation of voir dire “rest[s] within the sound discretion of the trial court. ”
[brief] Pa90, T43:4-16; Pa90-91, T45:25-46:2.  [...] further testified that a written reprimand was prepared for [...] as a result of the investigation.  However, the reprimand was never served on [...] because during that same time period, many members of the department were dealing with the onset of Covid-19 or had gotten ill from Covid-19 and the Director felt he had to prioritize his actions.
[brief] [...] introduced a printout during trial as P-4 which was obtained from the State of New Jersey governmental website indicating that an agreement (in this instance a professional services contract) alone cannot supplant the determination and review of the substance of facts determining whether someone is an employee or independent contractor.  (Pa113-118).  As such, N.J.S.A . 43:15A-7.2(A) directly eliminates the ABC test.  In the alternative, the best case is the statute was intended to be conjunctive and determinations are required to be made under 7.2(a) and 7.2(b).  In this instance, either the Statute is improper or being misinterpreted.  [...] never made an independent contractor determination or analysis despite taking 10 years to get the matter to trial.  Further, in a unanimous decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the same test should be used to determine the nature of an employment relationship under both the New Jersey Wage Payment Law and the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, and that the standard adopted by the New Jersey Department of Labor, the "ABC" test, would be used to make employment status determinations under both laws.
[brief] THE TRI-DISTRICTS FILE AN AMENDED PETITION SEEKING TO ENLARGE HENRY HUDSON REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT WITHOUT SEA BRIGHT.  Subsequently, and while Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss was pending, the Tri-Districts filed an Amended Petition for Regionalization on March 17, 2023, seeking approval from the Commissioner to proceed with a referendum that would enlarge the Henry Hudson Regional District to include all grade levels of students from only [...] and Atlantic [...].  (Aa372 – Aa748).  Significantly, [...] students were not included in this Amended Petition.  (Aa372).  Indeed, the Amended Petition, *sans* [...], was fundamentally inconsistent with the original Joint Petition filed on July 15, 2022. \(^3\)  On April 3, 2023, the Commissioner issued a Final Decision granting Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss [...]’s and [...]’s Consolidated Petitions.  (Aa762).  [...] and [...] filed a Notice of Appeal from that decision on May 5, 2023, seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision dismissing their consolidated Petitions.  That matter \(^3\)  These inconsistencies, as well as the in-fighting between counsel for the Tri-Districts and counsel for [...] and the Borough of [...], were pointed out in a May 5, 2023, joint submission by [...] and [...] to [...], Executive County Superintendent for [...].  (Aa749 – Aa775).  bore docket number [...] and was ultimately dismissed as moot on December 15, 2023.  (Aa796 – Aa798).  D.
[brief] However, this faulty logic relies on the Law Division’s error being upheld by this Court.  By virtue of the Law Division’s erroneous ruling, [...] was deprived of its right for a jury to assign any amount of liability to [...], and, in turn, trigger the indemnification clause.  This court has previously ruled that the proper procedure where a plaintiff’s employer has entered into a contractual indemnification agreement with a third-party, is to allow the employer to participate at trial, allow the jury to ascribe any amount of liability to the employer, and then, subsequent to the jury’s findings, re-apportion the employer’s liability amongst the remaining tortfeasors.  See, Estate of D’Avila ex rel. D’Avila v. Hugo Neu Schnitzer E., 442 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 2015).  Such a procedure preserves the WCA’s sole remedy provisions, while also ensuring that parties remain free to apportion liability via contractual indemnification clauses, a right enshrined in New Jersey public policy.
[directive] of may  A Certificate also be revoked at any time upon application the prosecutor or on the court's own initiative when information received that is circumstances have materially changed such that the Ce1tificate would no longer be 2A:168A-l l(c).  authorized or is no longer the public interest.  See N.J.S.A. in of of of  A copy the Certificate or notice ineligibility or revocation same shall of be sent to the Administrative Office the Courts, Criminal Practice Division, by email to [...].
[brief] GIVEN THAT NUMEROUS QUESTIONS OF MATERIAL FACT ON LIABILITY AND CAUSATION EXIST.  [ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Da0785; Da0816; Da0846)] ..................  15  II.  TRIABLE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST AS TO THE PRESENCE OF A MANUFACTURING DEFECT IN THE OZURDEX  APPLICATOR  [ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Pa001; Pa003-Pa007; Pa009-Pa011; Pa023; Da0791-Da0794; Da0798; Da0850-Da0853)] .............................................  16  III.  [...]’S ARGUMENT REGARDING A MANUFACTURING DEFECT EXPERT WITNESS IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND LAW.  [ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Pa001; Pa003-Pa007; Pa009-Pa011; Pa023; Da0791-Da0794; Da0798; Da0850-Da0853)]  .....  20  IV.  [...] ABROGATED ITS POST-SALE DUTY TO WARN OF THE DANGERS AND DEFECT INVOLVING THE OZURDEX APPLICATOR, PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. SEC. 2A:58C-4.  [ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Pa003-Pa012; Pa024-Pa026; Pa033-Pa036; Da0852-Da0853)]……………  22  A.  Failure to Warn Post-Sale  [ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Pa003-Pa012; Pa024-Pa026; Pa033-Pa036; Da0852-Da0853)]  ………………………………………………………………..  22  B.  Plaintiff’s Claim is Not for a Failure to Timely Recall.  [ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Pa003-Pa0012; Pa024-Pa026; Pa033 Pa036; Da0852-Da0853)]………………..
[brief] 3  TABLE OF CITATIONS  CASE LAW  State v. Adkins, 221 N.J. 300 (2015)  2  State v. Ingram, 474 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div. 2023)  1, 2, 4  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 100 (2012)  3  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] See M. Alfieri, 269 N.J. Super. at 554.  The main problem with the [...] and Tennessee's analysis from our perspective is that it is myopically focused on sentence structure, which we view as inconclusive, with no substantive analysis of the language of the exemption in light of the "history, purpose, and context" of the Highlands Act.  Chasin, 159 N.J. at 427 (quoting Haliski, 140 N.J. at 9).  That is, they fail to analyze or consider the meaning of "upgrade" with reference to the Act or to the other words with which it is associated in the exemption — those from which it should naturally gather meaning.  See Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961).  Looking at the statute from that perspective reveals that failing to allow "routine" to modify "upgrade" makes "upgrade" the odd item out in the list of "maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade," leaving "upgrade" alone with no implied limiting principle.
[brief] However, [...] could not lay out a plan for how this joint use of Sixth Street courtyard/parking area would operate safely or be laid out, leaving it to the parties or the municipality.  (Da189)  [...] filed its Appeal of that Final Order.  (Da839)  While that Appeal was pending, given the absence of any parking layout or marked spaces or lanes on the courtyard, there were repeated conflicts and issues resulting from the impossibility of joint use between students entering/leaving the School and a parking lot at the entry of a 400 student grammar school.  In December 2017, the [...] filed an Order to Show Cause seeking sanctions, asserting that students/pedestrians walking or assembling in the School courtyard lot was a violation of the Final Order.  (Da210)  [...] agreed and entered a substantial sanctions Order against the School (Da285); the appeal of which was incorporated into the Appeal.
[brief] On April 8, 2019, Plaintiff filed a sixty-nine (69) page, 434 paragraph, eight count hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights violations Complaint, in which Plaintiff sought injunctive, declaratory, equitable and monetary relief.  (Pa1).  On May 10, 2019, the State related Defendants removed the action to the Federal Court.  On July 23, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand and on February 11, 2020, the Federal District Court entered an Order remanding the case back to the State Trial Court.  (Pa113).  On February 26, 2020, the State related Defendants filed a Rule 4:6-2(e) Motion to Dismiss.  (Pa116).  On March 13, 2020, Essex County Presiding Civil Judge [...] entered a global Motion to Dismiss case management briefing and oral argument scheduling consent order.  (Pa71).  In or about June of 2022, this matter was transferred to Judge [...].  On April 27, 2023, the trial court heard oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss.  The trial court found that Plaintiff lacked constitutional, statutory and common law standing and dismissed the entire 69 page, 434 paragraph Complaint with prejudice.
[brief] See State v. T.J.M., 220 N.J. 220 (2015); N.J.R.E. 609 (“For the purpose of affecting the credibility of any witness, the witness’[s] conviction of a crime shall be admitted unless excluded by the judge as remote or for other causes. ”); see also State v. Sands 76 N.J. 127, 147 (1978) (holding prior criminal convictions are admissible evidence for impeachment purposes unless the danger of undue prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value).  The rationale behind N.J.R.E. 609 is that a person who has lived contrary to society’s rules and laws by committing crimes should not be afforded the opportunity to shield his credibility from the jury and present himself as a law-abiding citizen.  State v. Sinclair, 57 N.J. 56, 64 (1970).  Even though a defendant plainly experiences prejudice from such evidence, prior convictions are normally admissible for impeachment purposes, subject to the court’s discretion.  See State v. Harris, 209 N.J. 431, 442 (2012) (citing State v. Hamilton, 193 N.J. 255, 256 (2008).  N.J.R.E. 609 provides a clearly defined framework for determining the admissibility of a witness’s or party’s criminal convictions.
[brief] The Application was bifurcated due to ongoing review by the State Historic Preservation Office.  Aa025 (“[D]ue to the State Historic Preservation Office’s ongoing review of the project, the wetland permits will remain pending[.]”); Ra42; Ra122; Ra125; Ra135.  The [...] gave [...] the option of bifurcating the flood hazard area portion of the Application, with the understanding that the later determination of the freshwater wetland approvals may require future modification, and the flood hazard area approvals would not allow construction until the freshwater wetland approvals are obtained.  See, e.g. Ra46.  [...] opted to bifurcate the flood hazard area aspects of the Permit. roads, adjacent public roadways, utilities, stormwater management, lighting, and landscaping.
[brief] Even with the accepted bald eagle sighting records [provided by Plaintiffs], the [...] would not be valued, or documented, for bald eagle foraging by the next version of Landscape Project Mapping.  The Program reached out to [...] to ascertain whether the accepted eagle sighting would result in a change to mapping.  [...] noted that this area would not be documented as bald eagle foraging habitat under the future version of mapping because mapping of bald eagle foraging require waterbodies greater than 8 hectares…The wet detention basin in the center of the property (1.8 hectares) along with the wet detention basin along the western side of the site (2.1 hectares) only equal a combined 3.9 hectares of open water on the property.  As a result, lack of Landscape documentation for bald eagle foraging now and in the future further supports an intermediate resource value classification of the wetlands on site.
[brief] On October 24, 2016, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree armed robbery, second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery, a lesser-included third-degree aggravated assault, third-degree aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, third-degree possession of a tire iron for an unlawful purpose, and fourth-degree unlawful possession.  (12T37-20 to 39-13; Da15-24).  On January 20, 2017, the trial court denied the State’s motion for an extended term sentence.  (13T19-5 to 23).  The court, after merging Counts Two, Three (as amended), Four, and Five with Count One, sentenced defendant on Count One, first-degree armed robbery, to seventeen years New Jersey State Prison subject to the No Early Release Act and on Count Six, fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, to eighteen months New Jersey State Prison, concurrent to the sentence imposed on Count One.  (13T23-1 to 30-9; Da25-28).  On April 9, 2019, this Court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence.  (Da29-51).  On October 7, 2019, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied defendant’s petition for certification.  (Da52).  On February 28, 2020, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief (hereinafter “PCR”).  (Da53-54).  On February 17, 2023, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., held a hearing on defendant’s PCR petition.  (14T).  On May 1, 2023, \(^2\) Co-defendants [...], [...], and [...] were tried with defendant.  the PCR court denied his petition for the reasons stated in a written decision and order.  (Da85-125).  On June 8, 2023, defendant filed a notice of appeal.  (Da126-29).  This appeal follows:  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[directive] 6.  Protected Information  Information related to any of the topics listed below, whether stored on computers or in physical files, shall not be accessible by non-police personnel, except upon court order, or to comply with the requirements of a statute, regulation or executive order:  • Arrests • Autopsy and Medical Examiner reports • Criminal Investigations • Criminal History Records • Criminal or Gang Intelligence • Domestic Violence • DYFS Reports • Electronic Surveillance • Evidence Receipts and Inventories • Grand Jury • Incident Reports • Internal Affairs • Juvenile Delinquency or Juvenile-Family Crisis • Medical Reports • Search Warrants and Affidavits  Police computer networks containing such information shall be controlled by a dedicated server, not physically or remotely accessible by non-police personnel, except for routine maintenance or repair.
[directive] As part of their analysis, courts may consider whether a defendant’s health has deteriorated since the detention hearing and is now more susceptible to serious health consequences in jail -- including a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19 -- and how that might affect the risk of non- appearance, danger, or obstruction a defendant poses.  This factor does not encompass a generalized fear of contracting COVID-19 or some other illness in jail.  See Request to Modify, 242 N.J. at 379.  Other factors relevant to pretrial detention that are outlined in 5.  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20.  Section 20 lists various factors courts may take into account at the original detention hearing.
[brief] Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 586 (1975) (citing Holloway v. Pennsauken Twp., 12 N.J. 371, 374-375 (1953); McKenna v. N.J. Highway Authority, 19 N.J. 270, 276 (1955); Oldfield v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 26 N.J. 246, 262 (1958); Catalano v. Pemberton Tp. Bd. of Adjustment, 60 N.J. Super. 82, 95-96 (App. Div. 1960); Nelson v. So. Brunswick Planning Bd., 84 N.J. Super. 265, 274-275 (App. Div. 1964); Schack v. Trimble, supra, 28 N.J. at 49-50; Olsen v. Borough of Fair Haven, 64 N.J. Super. 90 (App. Div. 1960); Thornton v. Village of Ridgewood, 17 N.J. 499, 511-512 (1955); Bernstein v. Krom, 111 N.J. Super. 559, 564 (App. Div. 1970); Guernsey v. Allan, 63 N.J.  Super. 270, 277 (App. Div. 1960); Haack v. Ranieri, 83 N.J. Super. 526 (Law Div. 1964)); see also, Reilly v. Brice, 109 N.J. 555, 558 (1988).  Significantly, these three exceptions to the 45-day appeal period are not exhaustive.  See Hopewell Valley Citizens’ Group, Inc. v. Berwind Property Group Development Co., L.P., 204 N.J. 569, 583-584 (2011); Cohen v. Thoft, 368 N.J. Super. 338, 346 (App. Div. 2004); Harrison Redevelopment Agency v. DeRose, 398 N.J. Super. 361, 401 (App. Div. 2008).
[brief] One message deals with telling [...] about a case where a man shot another brother in the head, and that it is “something to ponder upon. ”  This came after telling [...] in three separate messages that [...] should “be careful” not to “offend the wrong one” because “someday there will be ramifications,” and that defendant would not forget the past comments [...] said to him.  (25T:32-12 to 33-23, 35-2 to 5).  These are threats.  Telling someone that they had better not offend you or else there will be “ramifications,” that you will not forget some past transgression, and then following that with a message to “ponder” upon a man shooting his brother in the head are, explicitly, threats.  [...] used the phrase “seemed to be threats,” but this is clearly a turn of phrase and not an indication that he had to sus out the true meaning of these words.  Again, these are not invading the province of the jury, it does not relate to an ultimate issue as to any element of any offense defendant was charged with, and is literally just what [...] read in defendant’s messages: threats.
[brief] There is no dispute that defendants caused the location to be modified during their ownership of the property.  How long ago they claim to have done that is immaterial; the current condition of the property presents a dangerous condition created by defendants.  It is dangerous without precipitation and becomes more dangerous in the presence of ice and snow.  To the extent that is debatable, then it is for a jury to decide.  Whether the excessively sloped sidewalk and/or pre-existing ice caused or contributed to [...]’s fall also is a question for a jury, not a judge.  Suarez v. E. Int'l College, 428 N.J. Super. 10, 27 (App. Div. 2012) (motion judge may not abrogate the jury's exclusive role as the finder of fact), certif. denied, 213 N.J. 57 (2013).  On the record presented and pursuant to the constitutional and common law of New Jersey, summary judgment should have been denied.