ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] did not respond to the Commissioner’s e-mail.  (Ibid.).  When [...] did not respond, the Commissioner extended an additional opportunity to him and sent a follow up letter via overnight mail.  (Ra18, Ra22-23).  The letter clearly stated: “We need your decision by close of business, Thursday, April 16, 2020.  If we do not hear from you by that time, we will take as your decision to no longer be employed by [...]. ”  (Ibid.).  [...] again failed to contact the Commissioner.  (2T53:1-12).  On April 17, 2020, the [...] learned that [...] had re-opened an existing Workers’ Compensation claim he had submitted in 2014.\(^3\) (Aa36-37).  Additionally, the [...] was informed that a physician had placed him on Temporary Workers’ Compensation Leave effective two days prior.\(^4\) (Aa32; Ra19-21).  That Worker’s Compensation claim was six years old and arose from work related injury.  (Aa36).  Because the Workers’ Compensation claim pre-dated and was unrelated to the disciplinary matter, the [...] concluded that the Worker’s Compensation matter was not relevant to whether there was a basis to issue him a PNDA.
[brief] ”  Hitesman, 218 N.J. at 11.  As articulated in the Complaint, Plaintiff complained of several improper quality of patient care standards at Defendant [...]. (PA000006-P000008).  Specifically, Plaintiff complained to Defendants about: (1) the continuous understaffing of group homes, in violation of N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b); and (2) the lack of staff training regarding medication training and preventing abuse/neglect, in violation of N.J.A.C. § 10:44 A-2.7(a).
[brief] ”  Roth, 95 N.J. at 361.  To achieve the paramount goal of greater uniformity “the drafters of our Code replaced ‘the unfettered sentencing discretion of prior law with a structured discretion designed to foster less arbitrary and more equal sentences. ””  State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 71 (2014) (quoting State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 485 (2005)).  The Code “channels the discretion of sentencing judges in fixing the terms of sentences” through a structured system of (1) sentence ranges for offenses of each degree and (2) a process of weighing aggravating and mitigating factors to determine where within the range the sentence should fall.  Yarbough, 100 N.J. at 635-36; Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 72-73.  However, “the Code does not define with comparable precision the standards that shall guide sentencing courts in” determining whether sentences of imprisonment for multiple offenses shall run concurrently or consecutively. ”  Yarbough, 100 N.J. at 636.  The statute governing the decision to impose sentences concurrently or consecutively simply states that “multiple sentences shall run concurrently or consecutively as the court determines at the time of sentence. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a).  The Court recognized that “the failure to provide guidelines for sentencing judges faced with a choice between consecutive and concurrent sentences undermines both the objective of fair allocation of punishment and the principle of retribution. ”  Yarbough, 100 N.J. at 638 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, “[t]o further the Legislature’s goal” that “‘our judicial system should attain a predictable degree of uniformity,’” the Court in Yarbough set forth six guidelines to channel the discretion of trial courts in determining whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences.
[brief] To support his contention that the motion should have been considered “opposed,” [...] contended that: (1) his opposition previously filed in response to the Absecon Defendants’ motion to dismiss was also applicable to State Defendants’ motion and should be considered an opposition to State Defendants later-filed motion for dismissal, and (2) he had not filed anything in response to State Defendants’ motion because he had erroneously believed the State Defendants’ motion to dismiss was instead a motion seeking to extend a pleading deadline (which requests he always consents to), resulting in his failure to file opposition.  (Pa326).  [...] did not request permission to file any additional substantive response to State Defendants’ motion to dismiss; he moved only to correct an alleged “clerical error,” seeking as relief a revision of the dismissal order to indicate that he had opposed State Defendants’ motion to dismiss.  (Pa330-Pa47).  [...] has alleged that this typographical error on the notice of motion was a “dirty trick” by State Defendants aimed at misleading him into not opposing the motion to dismiss.  (Pa326).  State Defendants opposed the aspect of [...]’s motion that would characterize the State Defendants’ motion as “opposed,” (Pa348-Pa51), and the trial court denied [...]’s motion on October 20, 2023.  (Pa352).  The trial court noted that [...] argued that the motion was “mislabeled” because of the error in the notice of motion, but noted that “obviously, just a cursory reading of the motion itself, which is quite voluminous showed that the motion that it was a motion to dismiss. ” (4T4:3-11).  The court then denied the motion, observing that State Defendants’ motion “was clearly unopposed” as a factual matter, while further noting that [...] could have filed a motion for reconsideration “[i]f he somehow realized after the fact that the motion wasn’t a motion to extend discovery, but rather a motion to dismiss,” and that the court “certainly would’ve entertained his motion,” but that [...] had failed to make such a motion.  (4T4:16-22).  The court further explained its refusal to alter its prior dismissal order by stating that, for [...] “to request somehow that I change the order to show that the motion was opposed when it wasn’t, it’s not what happened,” adding, “That’s a fiction. ” (4T4:24 -5:1).  [...] filed a motion for reconsideration of that decision, (Pa364), which State Defendants opposed, (Pa368-Pa70), and the trial court denied that motion on December 1, 2023, (SDa111).  This appeal followed.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, [...] respectfully submits that the Court should deny plaintiffs’ appeal and affirm the finding of the Law Division granting summary judgment in favor of [...] pursuant to R. 4:46-2 dismissing plaintiffs’ third amended complaint, with prejudice against [...] and reverse the Law Division’s denial of [...]’s motion to dismiss in lieu of answer and motion for summary judgment, both, on statute of limitations grounds and in the interests of justice, for plaintiffs’ failure to file the action against [...] within the applicable statute of limitations, and, upon reversal, grant [...] summary judgment pursuant to R.  4:46-2 dismissing plaintiffs’ third amended complaint with prejudice against [...], for plaintiffs’ failure to file the action against [...] within the applicable statute of limitations.  Dated: January 19, 2024
[brief] N.J.R.E. 401 ..................................................................................................................................................................................  44  N.J.R.E. 403 .................................................................................................................................................................................. 44, 45  N.J.R.E. 404(b) ...............................................................................................................................................................................  44, 45 N.J.R.E. 406(a) ..................................................................................................................................................................................  55 R. 1:8-2(a) .......................................................................................................................................................................................  24 R. 1:8-10 .........................................................................................................................................................................................  32 R. 2:10-2 .........................................................................................................................................................................................  30, 54 R. 3:19-1(b) .....................................................................................................................................................................................  31  TABLE OF CITATIONS
[brief] Here, Relator admits using public [...] SHORT data.  Finally, Relator is wrong that there is “not a single solitary case in which any court anywhere has ever found that a relator failed to satisfy th[e] requirement” of “voluntarily providing [the] information on which the allegations are based [to the State] prior to filing the action. ”  See Rb50.  As Defendants already noted, Ab49, the Sixth Circuit has so held.  *U.S. ex rel. Rahimi v. Rite Aid Corp.*, 3 F.4th 813, 830 (6th Cir. 2021) (declining to consider non-public evidence of alleged fraud because it “was not part of [the relator’s] disclosures to the government . . . at the time he filed suit”).
[directive] 3 Page Registry in Violence Central Check Domestic to Requirement 4.2.3 30 ....................................  Cases  Violence Domestic Protection Act Survivor Sexual Assault Check to Requirement 4.2.4  30 ............................................  Registry Central .... History 30  Juvenile Young Adult Defendants' Check to Requirement 4.2.5  New When Complaint-Warrant Superseding Authority Seek to 4.2.6  Material or a Has Upgrading Charges Supports Information 31 ..............................  Risks Release Bearing Pretrial on from Different Actually Are Filed Charges When Procedures 4.2.7  32  ......................... Scan into Entered Live Initially Charges  32 ...... aComplaint-Summons  Presumption Issuing of a Is There Where 4.3 Cases
[brief] In Tucci v. Tropicana Casino, 364 N.J. Super. 48 (App. Div. 2003), plaintiff did not serve his engineering expert report within the time provided by court order because of the difficulty scheduling an inspection of defendant’s elevator by plaintiff’s engineering expert.  The trial court indicated that the plaintiff’s failure to provide a report justified the suppression of plaintiff’s expert testimony and the consequent dismissal of plaintiff’s cause of action.  In reversing the trial court, the testimony and the consequent dismissal of plaintiff’s cause of action, the Appellate Division stated:  Surely, plaintiffs’ attorney might well have sought a further extension of the expert-report deadline.  On the other hand, he reasonably relied on the cooperation of his adversaries who made no objection to the expert’s inspection of the elevator after the submission deadline.  We point out, moreover, that the litigation process cannot effectively take place without some measure of cooperation among adversaries.  Clearly the court ought not be unduly applied to for relief that the parties are able to arrange for themselves without prejudice to the justice system.  Beyond that, the trial court’s concern for the additional discovery by defendants that the expert report would require cannot justify the dismissal with prejudice.  The May 14 case management order anticipated the necessity for that additional discovery.
[brief] It is not a material fact and even if it was, [...]’s testing procedures accounted for it.  [...] also claimed that plaintiff could not prove that [...] would have turned on her LDW and LKAS systems on the morning in question.  Essentially, defendant sought to avoid responsibility because it designed a defective safety system that defaults to “off” every time the car is turned off and requires the driver to enable the system manually every time the driver starts the car.  Pa160; Pa165.  As disclosed by [...]’s investigation, other manufacturers in the automotive industry design their systems to default to “on” whenever the car starts.  Pa400-01 at ¶14-20.  Such a system design was clearly feasible.  Plaintiff’s expert, [...], concluded and testified that a properly designed LDW and/or LKAS system should default to “on” and not rely on a driver manually activating it.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CHARGED THE JURY ON OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT WHICH PROPERLY FOUND DEFENDANT GUILTY OF THAT CRIME.  Defendant asserts, for the first time on appeal, that the jury never returned a verdict on count two, because it failed to answer the verdict-sheet question whether defendant received or sought a benefit or sought to injure another or deprive another of a benefit.  First, as a threshold matter, because defendant never objected to the verdict sheet at trial, he waived the right to appellate review.  *State v. Rodriguez*, 254 N.J. Super. 339, 347-49 (App. Div. 1992) (*per curiam*) (failure to timely object to issue concerning polling of jurors resulted in waiver of appellate rights); see generally *State v. Robinson*, 200 N.J. 1, 19-20 (2009) (appellate review “is not limitless”).  And defendant’s argument does not fall within the “finite, qualified exceptions” to waiver permitted by R. 2:10-2 (allowing review of a trial error “of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result”), *Robinson*, 200 N.J. at 20, or within this Court’s inherent authority to correct plain error “in the interests of justice,” *ibid.*  Rather, the record reveals that a valid verdict was returned.  Nonetheless, error, if any, in the trial judge not answering the specific verdict-sheet question was not capable of producing an unjust result, nor requires this Court’s intervention “in the interests of justice. ”  Thus, defendant’s claim should be rejected.
[brief] Notice of motion for waiver of transcript fees and cost Dated 11/05/2021  Application in Support of a Support Fee Waiver Dated 11/11/2021  State v. [...] Documents Submitted on JEDS by [...]  Complaint Summons 2/20/2020 (Attached at Pa0041)  Forwarded Email Conversation Regarding [...] Documents  Exhibit C-4 to [...]’s Certification Notice of Appeal to NJ Superior Court 11/05/2021 (Attached at Pa185)  Notice of motion for waiver of transcript fees and cost Dated 11/05/2021 (Attached at Pa186)  Application in Support of a Support Fee Waiver Dated 11/11/2021 (Attached at Pa187)
[brief] It is important to note that the contract between [...] and [...], and the contract between [...] and [...], both set forth the precise duties of a construction inspector.  General safety inspection is nowhere amongst those duties – let alone a specific requirement that a construction inspector assume a duty to identify unrelated, pre-existing roadway defects.  (Pa1266).  (Pa296 at T58:11-16; Pa1858-59 (follow up email from [...]’s Counsel to Plaintiffs’ counsel dated November 29, 2021, again asking [...] to provide supporting evidence)).
[brief] Email to [...] from Prosecutor Regarding no Further Discovery 11/12/2020 (Attached at Pa089)  Exhibit D - Attachments to Complaint Notice of Tort Claim to [...] (Attached at Pa092)  Facsimile to [...] from [...] (Attached at Pa098)  Email from [...] to [...] 3/5/2020 (Attached at Pa099)  Authorization for Health Information Disclosure of [...] 5/28/2020 (Attached at Pa100)  [...] Form Filled out by [...] (Attached at Pa101)  Hawkin’s Letter to Clerk of Edison and [...] Regarding Amended Notice of Claim 12/3/2020 (Attached at Pa104)  [...] Letter to Clerk of Edison and [...] Regarding Submission of Notice of Claim 12/23/2020 (Attached at Pa106)  [...] Letter to [...] and Edison Prosecutor 12/24/2020 (Attached at Pa108)  Civil Case Information Statement (Attached at Pa110)  Exhibit B to [...]’s Certification Transcript of State v. [...], Transcript Decision Pa151  Exhibit C-1 to [...]’s Certification Complaint Summons (Attached at Pa0040)
[brief] On January 6, 1996, the Hudson County Grand Jury returned Indictment Number [...] (Ind. #1), charging defendant, [...] with: third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (Count One); third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (Count Two); and fourth-degree resisting arrest, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2a (Count Three).
[brief] Impairment of the Authority’s rights, as contemplated by the reformation of the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating as set forth in the Order, would adversely impact the Authority’s ability to provide a public parking system for the residents of the [...].  The Authority never could have, and would not have, agreed to such terms during the negotiation of these agreements.  [...]’s desire to have the trial court write a more favorable agreement to allow it to avoid its obligations under these agreements does not equate to unconscionable conduct on the part of the Authority.  [...] has also cited to the “turn square corners” doctrine in recent filings, which references are not applicable to the present matter.  As stated herein, and supported by the record below, [...] was represented by counsel and financial professionals when these agreements were exhaustively negotiated.  --- 3 See, Gruber v. Mayor and Tp. Committee of Raritan Tp., 73 N.J. Super. 120, 127-128 (App. Div. 1962).  The Authority did not force [...] to accept the terms of the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement – it did so willingly and of its own accord.  There was no coercion, inducement, exercise of, or even threat to exercise, any governmental action that would place the parties on uneven footing with respect to the negotiation, execution and performance of these agreements and [...] cannot point to a single fact in the record to suggest otherwise.  [...] is simply grasping at straws.  The Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement, as reformed by the Order, do not reflect the terms that the Authority agreed to, and do not reflect the meeting of the minds in 2005 and 2006 when these agreements were reduced to writing.  For these reasons, the trial court erred in reforming the Redevelopment Agreement and Operating Agreement.
[brief] 222 N.J. at 271-72.  Even though the detective “asked” him to go voluntarily; he was not handcuffed; and the questioning lasted for only forty minutes and included three breaks, the Court found custody because the police transported the defendant themselves; isolated him in an interrogation room for a total of three hours; sat between him and the only door; questioned him about the incident and asked for an alibi; and never affirmatively “advised defendant that he was free to leave.
[brief] The three factors that the court considers under Mathews are: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail; and (3) the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.  [Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.]
[brief] In its assertion that the trial judge erred, Plaintiff relies heavily on an unpublished Appellate Division case that differs substantially from the case at bar.  Though both cases contain a contaminated property and an RAO, in *89 Water Street Assocs. v. Reilly*, 2019 WL 4793073, the language of the contract contained clear language that the Seller was to secure an RAO.  Plaintiff’s reliance on that case is misplaced.
[brief] 33  In re Princeton Office Park LP v. Plymouth Park Tax Servs., LLC, 218 N.J. 52, 61 (2014).............................................................. 49  Intek Auto Leasing, Inc. v. Zetes Microtech Corp., 268 N.J.Super. 426, 431-432 (App.Div. 1993)  ......................... 36 Jameson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 363 N.J.Super. 419, 425 (App. Div. 2003)............................... 33, 34, 44 Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 302 (2020)......................................................... 34  Mancini v. EDS ex rel N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 132 N.J. 330, 334 (1993).........................................................  44  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).........................................................  36  Messenger v. United States, 231 F.2d 328 (2 Cir. 1956).......................................................  41  Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).........................................................  36 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878).........................................................  36 Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84-85 (1988).......................................................  36, 42, 43 Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J.Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015) .............................  34  Prof'l Stone, Stucco & Siding Applicators, Inc. v. Carter, 409 N.J. Super. 64, 68 (App. Div. 2009)..........................  49  REO Blocker, LLC, 467 N.J.Super. at 125 ......................................................... 34 Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Associated Gulf Contractors, Inc., 263 N.J.Super. 332, 343 (App. Div. 1993) ....................... 34, 35 Rogers v. Dubac, 52 N.J. Super. 360, 363 (Law Div. 1958).......................... 43 Rosa v. Araujo, 260 N.J. Super. 458, 462 (App. Div. 1992)....................... 44 Seymour v. Nessenbaum, 120 N.J.Eq. 24 (Ch. 1936).............................................. 37 Simon v. Cronecker, 189 N.J. 304, 319 (2007)............................................... 49 Sobel v. Long Island Ent. Prods., Inc., 329 N.J.Super. 285, 292-93 (App. Div. 2000)................... 34 State of Maine v. SeKap, S.A. Greek Co-op. Cigarette Mfg., S.A., 392 N.J. Super. 227, 240 (App. Div. 2007)....................... 33 U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012)..............................................  33  Varsolona v. Breen Capital Servs. Corp., 180 N.J. 605, 620 (2004)..............................................  49  Vredenburgh v. Weidman, 14 N.J.Misc. 285, 287.....................................................  37  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) .................................................................  36  Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969) ...............................................................  36
[brief] (Pa5).  The trial court then went on to set forth the applicable standard required for plaintiff to prove that the defendant employer committed an intentional wrong to bypass the workers compensation bar to plaintiff’s claim.  (Pa7-Pa8).  After discussing relevant case law, properly distinguishing the Livingstone case on which plaintiff premised its entire argument, and recognizing the crux of plaintiff’s argument - that requiring certain employees to park in a distant area of the parking lot heightened their risk of injury - the trial court did indeed view the undisputed facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff noting:  “Even if we acknowledge the assertion that mandating employees to park in a remote section of the parking lot heightens the risk of accidents, it is important to recognize that such risks are inherent whenever vehicles navigate relatively confined spaces, such as parking lots. ” (Pa11).  This single passage alone demonstrates that the court viewed the case in a light most favorable to plaintiff (“Even if we acknowledge the assertion that mandating employees to park in a remote section of the parking lot heightens the risk of accidents...”), and that it properly considered the conduct prong (“mandating employees to park in a remote section of the parking lot...”) and context prongs required under Millison (“it is important to recognize that such risks are inherent whenever vehicles navigate relatively confined spaces, such as parking lots. ”).  See also, Da36 and Da151.  Equally important, the court found that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support plaintiff’s argument.  (Pa11-Pa12).  Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment was proper and must be affirmed.  Notwithstanding, the problems with plaintiff’s argument are many.