ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On or about December 23, 2021, appellant, [...] (hereinafter the “applicant”) submitted to the Planning Board an application for preliminary and final major subdivision to create 9 residential lots from 3 existing lots known as Lots 23, 24.01, and 34 in Block 24 in the [...], New Jersey.  (Ia18).  Hearings were held on April 5, 2022 (1T) and June 14, 2022 (2T).  On June 14, 2022, the Board voted to deny the application.  (2T144-9 to 2T145-8).  The applicant thereafter requested reconsideration, and a reconsideration hearing took place on August 2, 2022.  (3T)  At that hearing, the Board declined the applicant’s request for reconsideration.  (3T29-22 to 3T31-6).  A resolution of denial was memorialized on August 23, 2022 (Ia64).  On September 23, 2022, the applicant filed a three-count Complaint In Lieu of Prerogative Writs in which the applicant requested the entry of judgment reversing the Board’s denial of the application for major subdivision to create 9 residential lots from 3 existing lots, to widen the existing Fourteenth Street, and construct a new 50’ wide right of way terminating in a cul-de-sac.  (Ia1)  The applicant’s allegations included that the Board’s decision to deny the application was against the weight of the testimony presented at the hearings and therefore was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, and also, that the resolution of denial contained insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law.  (Ia1)  The Board filed an answer to the complaint on October 17, 2022.  (Ia73)  Intervenor [...] filed a motion to intervene on December 1, 2022, and ultimately filed an Answer to the Complaint on January 5, 2023.  (Ia90)  The trial court initially ordered that the matter be remanded to the Board for the Board to adopt a supplemental resolution providing more detailed reasoning as to why the Board denied the application.  (Ia236)  The trial court conducted a plenary hearing on December 20, 2023, wherein the Honorable [...], P.J.Cv., ordered the reversal of the Board’s determination and remanded the matter back to the Board to issue a resolution of approval.  (4T)  (Ia269)  The Court opined, in pertinent part, that the proposed application had no impact on the zone plan in regard to density, and that the Court could not find any rational relationship between the designation of lot lines as radial or perpendicular or curved roads as to creating something more than what the developer was entitled to.  (T4)  Said resolution of approval was duly adopted by the Board on January 23, 2024.  Intervenor [...] thereafter filed the within appeal.  (Ia271)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] “As New Jersey courts have long recognized, ‘[i]gnorance of the law furnishes no excuse to a person either for a breach or for an omission of a duty[.]’”  Kalogeras v. 239 Broad Ave., L.L.C., 202 N.J. 349, 367 (2010) (quoting Bowen v. Pursel, 109 N.J. Eq.  67, 73 (E. & A. 1931)).  Thus, [...] purportedly being unaware of the Ricci Act until over three years after its passage cannot serve as the basis to allow him to evade its unambiguous requirements.  [...]’s reliance on Ensslin v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 311 N.J. Super. 333 (App. Div. 1998), is misplaced.
[brief] [...] Esq. [...] Esq.  [...] 333 S. Grand Ave. 52nd Floor  Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197  Parties Represented: [...]  [...] Esq. [...] Esq. [...] Esq. [...]  1201 Third Ave. Suite 3200  Seattle, WA 98101-3052  Phone: [...] [...]  Phone: [...]  [...] [...]  Parties Represented: [...]  [...] Esq. [...]  [...]  Phone: [...]  [...]  Parties Represented: [...]  [...] Esq. [...] [...]  Phone: [...]  [...]  [...] Esq. [...] [...]  Phone: [...]  [...]  Parties Represented: [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  Phone: [...]  [...]  Parties Represented: [...] and correct.  Executed at El Monte, CALIFORNIA on October 22, 2021.
[brief] On March 2, 2017, [...], hereinafter referred to as the Defendant, was operating his motor vehicle within the jurisdiction of Toms River, New Jersey, when he was stopped for an alleged motor vehicle violation by a member of the [...].  Subsequent to said motor vehicle stop, Defendant began interacting with law enforcement, who initiated an investigation of Defendant for a potential violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.  Defendant was thereafter placed into custody on suspicion of being under the influence of alcohol and transported to the [...] where an Alcotest breath test was administered.  An alleged B.A.C. result was obtained from same.  Ultimately, Defendant was charged with alleged violations on N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 (Driving While Suspended); N.J.S.A. 39:4-96 (Reckless Driving), and N.J.S.A. 39:4-51b (Open Container of Alcohol in a Motor Vehicle).  (DA1).  On May 16, 2018, Defendant appeared in the [...] with his attorney, [...], hereinafter referred to as prior Defense counsel.  (T1).  --- 1  Defense counsel, in the interests of brevity and clarity, has combined the Statement of Facts and Procedural History into one section of the within Letter Memorandum of Law.  2
[brief] (6)  The New Jersey Supreme Court has articulated well-established principles governing the interpretation of insurance policies.  Policies are “contracts of adhesion, prepared unilaterally by the insurer, and have always been subject to careful judicial scrutiny to avoid injury to the public. ”  Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 100 N.J. 325, 335 (1985).  In straining to conclude that there was a material representation by Plaintiffs based on language in the Application, the trial court failed to give effect to the settled rules of construction placing the clear burden on the insurer to avoid confusion and ensure that the reasonable expectation of the insured is not frustrated.
[brief] 50  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, RULINGS AND OPINIONS  Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence (filed August 17, 2022) ........................................................  Da6  Order Denying Defense Motion to Reconsider (filed February 3, 2023) .......... Da7 Judgment of Conviction (filed October 2, 2023)  ..................................................  Da13-15 Amendment to JOC 10/12/2023 (filed October 12, 2023 at 3:13:53 PM)  .................................................................  Da16-19 Amendment to JOC 10/12/2023 (filed October 12, 2023 at 3:34:46 PM)  .................................................................  Da20-23 INDEX TO APPENDIX
[brief] [Unsigned Order]  Court Finding [...] Guilty on 10/27/2021 - Payment of Fines, Cost and Other Assessments (Attached at Pa168)  Exhibit I to [...]’s Certification Letter to Administrator from [...] Regarding Order to Dismiss Appeal, dated 4/22/2022 (Attached at Pa321)  Order Dismissing Appeal - Quasi Criminal Proceeding Filed 4/22/2022 (Attached at Pa319)  [...]’s Certification in Lieu of Oath or Affidavit in opposition to summary judgment
[brief] SSR p. 25 at TRVa1355; see also Team Indus. Servs. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 31491 (10th Cir. Nov. 29, 2023) (OCIP sponsor designates which contractors are eligible); Maxim Crane Works, L.P. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 642 S.W.3d 551, 553 (Tex. 2022) (CCIP sponsor has discretion to exclude entities from coverage).  This is how CCIPs work.\footnote{[...]’s OCIP III Ins. Proc. and Enrollment Manual, p. 8, https://www.njsda.gov/Content/Business/forms/OCIP_III_Manual.pdf (exclusion from enrollment in OCIP is at “sole discretion” of the [...]).}  Within five hours of being sent the July 30, 2015 Welcome Letter, [...] advised [...] that it “will not be able to enroll into the CCIP” because it “cannot enroll subcontractors into the CCIP who are performing structural demolition. ”  (TRVa2779.)  A few days later, on August 3, 2015, when [...] requested a revised proposal from [...], [...] also provided Project Requirements confirming “[...] is also an excluded party under the CCIP[,]” which must “comply with all insurance requirements set forth in the CCIP Insurance [] Manual and Schedule ‘B’ as an excluded party. ”  (ZURa323.)  On August 5, 2015, [...] ([...]) was told by [...] ([...]) “the owners are excluding all structural foundation demolition work from their CCIP[.]” (TRVa2803.)  [...] even clarified for [...] and [...] that it was [...]’s “contract with C. [...] that has been excluded. ” (TRVa2808.)  Additionally, on August 11, 2015, [...]’s CFO advised [...] that “Atlantic [] must correct their Certificates of Insurance” and “review the CCIP manual for the insurance requirements for contracts not covered under the CCIP. ” (TRVa2873.)  Additionally, on September 4, 2015, [...] of [...] notified [...] that “No payroll is required for ‘excluded’ contractors. ” (TRVa2900.)  As further confirmation, on September 23, 2015, [...] confirmed to [...] that the Project, “isn’t an OCIP reporting job either. ” (TRVa2914.)  Thus, [...] was aware of its unenrollment from the CCIP in early August 2015 based on demolition work, well ahead of the Accident, or any other time periods [...] contends may apply.  No provisions of the Zurich Policy, CCIP Manual, COI or any regulatory code support [...]’ contention that [...] was enrolled for the work performed on the date of the accident.
[directive] The monitor instructs the donor to seal the specimen containers with tamper- evidence seals from the CSF.  a.  The donor carefully removes the Bottle A Specimen Container Security Seal from the CSF and places it over the lid/cap and down the sides of the primary specimen container with the greater volume of urine (30 mL).  b.  The donor carefully removes the Bottle B (SPLIT) Specimen Container Security Seal from the CSF and places it over the lid/cap and down the sides of the secondary specimen container with the lesser volume of urine (15 mL).  9  c.  After the seals are placed on the specimen containers, the donor writes the collection date and his or her initials in the space provided on the security seals to certify that the specimen containers contain the specimen that he or she provided.  9.  The monitor prints his/her name, signs and dates the monitor/agency acknowledgement section of the CSF.  10.  The monitor instructs the donor to place both specimens in the front pouch of the specimen bag that contains the absorbent pad.  11.  The monitor separates the white laboratory copy of the CSF, folds it, and places it in the rear pouch of the specimen bag along with the sealed medication information sheet, if provided.  12.  The monitor seals the specimen bag by removing the release liner from the flap and folding the blue adhesive flap to cover the cross hatch slit opening.  13.  Any remaining urine and the specimen collection container may be discarded.  14.  The monitor will take possession of the sealed specimen bag and ensure that it is delivered to the [...] in a timely manner (See Section V. Submission of Specimens for Analysis below).
[brief] 2.  Paragraph (a): Plea Discussions  Generally.  Paragraph (a) authorizes plea negotiation discussions between the prosecutor and defense counsel but without the court's participation except as authorized by paragraph (c) of the rule.  This rule institutionalizes plea bargaining.  See State v. Bellamy, 178 N.J. 127, 134  Form was promulgated by Administrative Directive #15-01 issued October 12, 2001.  The criminal case manager's office in each county will, on request, provide the latest version of these forms to counsel.  They are available in English and Spanish.  The appropriate forms should be completed, at least in duplicate, before the defendant appears before the judge to plead guilty.  The original is handed to the judge who after taking the plea gives it to the criminal division manager for filing.  A copy is given to the prosecutor for his/her file.  Defense counsel should have a copy for his/her file.  The execution of the form or forms by the defendant will weigh heavily against a later contention by the defendant that the plea was not entered voluntarily and understandingly. \(^2\)  However, the execution of a form does not conclusively establish that the plea was entered voluntarily and understandingly. \(^3\)  Therefore, at the time the plea is tendered, merely taking the basic steps outlined in § 12.18, and executing the form still leaves room for the defendant to later raise the allegations discussed in § 12.18.  In order to foreclose successful challenges by the defendant to the entry of the guilty plea, detailed questioning of the defendant is required when he/she tenders the plea.  The questions the defendant should be asked when he/she tenders a guilty plea are set forth in § 12.33.
[brief] Expanding upon its decision, the trial court specifically and further addressed Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract under the proposed title commitment policy and the ramifications as to it from the unenforceability of the contract for sale under the Tax Sale law.  The trial court found that the title commitment policy clearly provided that, in order for the policy to become a valid, binding contract, it was subject to the condition precedent requiring Plaintiff to deliver a properly executed deed.  The trial court found:
[brief] As per the Order for Professional Services, the “resident engineer” could be a technician, i.e., “NICET IV certified. ”  Pa1789.  [...], the resident engineer designated by [...] and [...], was not a professional engineer.  Pa2717.  He was a NICET IV, a “senior grade engineering technician. ”  Pa1581; Pa2717.  [...] has no professional engineering degree.  Pa2717.  [...]’s highest level of education is “special courses in Construction methods and construction reporting. ”  Ibid.  In the Order for Professional Services (OPS), [...] specifically indicates that the resident engineer did not have to be a professional engineer and that the project manager or a principal of the firm could be a professional licensed engineer.
[brief] Id. at 257.  Rule 4:6-2 states in pertinent part as follows:  Every defense, legal or equitable, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party complaint shall be asserted in the answer thereto, except that the following defenses, unless otherwise provided by R. 4:6-3, may at the option of the pleader be made by motion, with briefs: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (b) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (c) insufficiency of process, (d) insufficiency of service of process, (e) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (f) failure to join a party without whom the action cannot proceed, as provided by R. 4:28-1.
[brief] Respondents also fail to inform this Court that in response to the OTSC filed by the [...] on behalf of [...], on June 1, 2023, [...], then represented by [...], filed Opposition to [...]’s Motion to Vacate and a Cross Motion to Enforce Litigant’s Rights.  (Pa25).  Importantly, that Brief attached a certification signed by [...] in which he certified that the [...] had previously represented [...] and [...].  (Pa38-41; 1T21:6-9). ⁴  In his June 1, 2023 Certification, [...] also certified that the [...] had a conflict of interest because of that prior representation and --- ³ [...] Septic and Robert [...] are plaintiffs/counterclaim defendants in the matter [...] Septic and Robert [...] v. [...].
[directive] Security is an extremely important consideration in the maintenance of a property vault.  The vault must be situated, constructed, secured and protected in such a way as to prevent accidental or deliberate tampering, damage or loss of property.  The property vault would ideally be located within a police headquarters which is staffed twenty-four hours a day.  In this case, the property vault should have its own alarm system.  In the alternative, it should be located in an area of a police facility which is completely secure from unauthorized access.  In this case, the police facility and the property vault should have separate alarm capabilities.  The vault should be constructed with materials which would frustrate attempts to breach the perimeter walls, floor and ceiling.  There should be only one entrance, with a steel door, steel frame and dead bolt locks.  The alarm system should contain both an entrance switch on the door and some type of interior backup, such as motion or infrared sensors.  The control panel for the alarm system should be inside the vault, with a time delay for deactivation.  The vault should also have an automatic fire suppression system to limit damage in case of accidental fire or arson.  Special consideration should be given to the type of chemicals used in the fire suppression system in relation to the contents of the vault.
[brief] Pa305, at 51:1-5.  Surly new trees at the Property line with new planting beds, shrubs, newly paved sidewalks and lawn areas would have a positive effect and be aesthetically and/or more visually desirable on one of the largest lots in the Borough (thereby advancing the Borough’s ordinances and Master Plan).  Pa393.  Furthermore, just because the proposed building “was not going to be a LEED building” (Pa37), does not mean that it was not proposing any “creative development techniques. ”  Id.
[brief] [...], United States Magistrate Judge *1  The factual and procedural history behind this FLSA litigation has been set forth in detail in the multiple rulings issued by U.S. District Judge [...] and by this Magistrate Judge, namely: Ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Production of Documents, filed January 6, 2015 (Dkt. #127), 2015 WL 75884; Ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Compel, filed February 10, 2015 (Dkt. #138), 2015 WL 540911; Order Following Telephone Conference, filed February 23, 2015 (Dkt. #143); Ruling Denying Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue, filed February 23, 2015 (Dkt. #145); Supplemental Ruling Following In Camera Review, filed May 8, 2015 (Dkt. #159); Ruling Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional Certification, filed June 9, 2015 (Dkt. #168), 2015 WL 3727804; Ruling on Number of Depositions, filed June 10, 2015 (Dkt. #171); Ruling on Objections to Reminder Notice, filed August 14, 2015 (Dkt. #201), 2015 WL 4877173; and Scheduling Order, filed October 20, 2015 (Dkt. #256)[“October 2015 Order”].
[brief] *Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA* (Case on Point)**  The defense erroneously claims that “[t]he plain language of the Genesis Deed, and the surrounding circumstances at and after the time of its conveyance, unequivocally demonstrate that the [...] intended to create a “club” of property owners who all agreed to “faithfully abide by [the] rules” of a “property owner’s association” with authority to implement and enforce “any other rules or regulations --- \(^4\)
[brief] RESPONDENTS’ “WARRANTY PERIOD” ARGUMENT IS A QUESTION FOR THE ARBITRATOR  Our Supreme Court has held that “in deciding whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular grievance to arbitration, a court is not to rule on the potential merits of the underlying claims. ”  AT&T Techs. v. Communs. Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986); see Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 529 (2019).  The SPA clearly addresses the Seller’s obligations and express warranties provided with respect to the Unit. (Da167-169).  Respondents’ attempts to narrow how they categorize their claim does not remove it from what is expressly stated in the parties’ agreement.  Whether or not Respondents closed on the unit is irrelevant.  Respondents cannot allege a CFA claim, and simultaneously contend that the dispute over an offer to sell which did result in a signed SPA are also insufficient to trigger a broad dispute resolution provision.  If Respondents’ reading of this section was true – that the arbitration period cannot commence prior to closing – then multiple portions of the SPA would be rendered superfluous.  Therefore, the Panel should disregard Respondents’ unsupported and inconsistent allegations as to the warranty period and leave any question about interpretation of that language for the arbitrator in accordance with the delegation provisions of the AAA Rules.
[brief] Had [...] told the Planning Board truthfully that his clients had signed a lease with the land owner after interfering with the antecedent lease held by plaintiffs; that his clients had not purchased the solar rights from the land owner for $700,000; and that his clients had not applied for the solar rights from the Public Utilities Commission and had not applied for the preliminary and final site plans that were granted to plaintiff [...], and not to the defendants, the defendants would have been laughed out of the Planning Board hearings until such time as they obtained those rights properly, and for valid consideration.  Plaintiffs maintain, and their first amended complaint goes into 51 pages of pain-staking details demonstrating, that by those words defendant [...] and the defendants whom he purports to represent conspired and engaged in a systematic theft of plaintiffs’ solar rights purchased at a cost of $780,000 (see First Amended Compl., Exhibit 3); theft of plaintiffs’ preliminary and final site plans obtained from the Planning Board at a significant expense (see First Amended Compl. Exhibit 5); and theft of plaintiffs’ solar rights obtained from the various public agencies.
[brief] When ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised, "trial courts ordinarily should grant evidentiary hearings to resolve [such] claims if a defendant has presented a prima facie claim in support of post-conviction relief. ”  State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992).  To establish a *prima facie* claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must "demonstrate the reasonable likelihood of succeeding under the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1986)," and adopted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), Preciose, 129 N.J. at 463.
[brief] In his submission, defendant argues:  POINT I  THE COURT PROPERLY RECOGNIZED IN BR[...]EY THAT THE EXACT SAME ENTRY AND SEARCH AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND BECAUSE THE FACTS ADDUCED AT BR[...]EY'S AND [...]'S SUPPRESSION HEARING[S] WERE LEGALLY INDISTINGUISHABLE.  SUPPRESSION IS REQUIRED.  *2  POINT II
[brief] First, he testified that fingerprint examination is “totally objective” and implied that there was no error rate for fingerprint analysis.  (3T 69-12 to 13)  Second, he testified that two other examiners had assessed [...]’s fingerprint and agreed that it matched the fingerprint at the scene.  (3T 59-21 to 25, 68-20 to 25)  Last, he testified as to matters beyond the analysis and comparison of fingerprints when he opined about how the blood got onto the fingerprint and the chiller.  (3T 71-22 to 25)  Each of these errors deprived [...] of a fair trial.
[brief] In his decision, [...] relied upon the case of Hargett v. Hamilton Park Opco, LLC, 477 N.J. Super. 390 (App. Div. 2023) in finding that the Affidavits of Merit do not identify any individual that the Defendant would be vicariously liable for in this case.  (2TR40:12-42:24).  His decision was based upon the belief that none of the medical providers were employed by the Defendant and none of the treatment took place there.  (Pa44:2-4).  However, the focus of Hargett was entirely different from the case at hand.  In Hargett, the issue before the court was whether the Affidavit of Merit sufficiently identified the responsible parties for purposes of vicarious liability.
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