ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (A) FAILED TO APPROPRIATELY CONSIDER [...]’S POST-OFFENSE REHABILITATIVE CONDUCT THE AGE-CRIME CURVE, AND ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE; (B) MADE FINDINGS FOR AGGRAVATING FACTORS THREE AND NINE THAT WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT, CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD; (C) IMPOSED CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES IN VIOLATION OF STATE V. YARBOUGH AND STATE V. TORRES; (D) CONSIDERED DEFENDANT’S DISMISSED CHARGES IN VIOLATION OF STATE V. K.S.; AND (E) IMPOSED AN ILLEGAL PAROLE DISQUALIFIER ON COUNT THREE.  (Da49-52)  The initial sentence imposed by the Court in 2018 was an aggregate twenty years with a parole disqualifier of thirteen-and-a-half years.  (Da8)  On remand, the Court imposed an aggregate sentence of eighteen years with a parole disqualifier of thirteen-and-a-half.  (Da49)  The Court found and gave substantial weight to aggravating factors three (the risk that the defendant will commit another offense) and nine (the need for deterring the defendant and others from violating the law).  (Da51; 8T 105 14-15)  The Court found and gave moderate weight to mitigating factor fourteen (defendant was under the age of 26 at the time of this offense).  (Da51; 8T 105 15 to 16)  The Court found that the aggravating factors preponderated over the mitigating factor.  (8T 105-22 to 106-1)  On Count 1 (passion/provocation manslaughter), the judge again imposed a sentence of ten years subject to NERA.  (8T 106-25 to 107-5; Da49)  On Count 3 (unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit), the judge imposed a consecutive sentence of eight years with a five-year parole disqualifier.  (8T 107-16 to 24; Da49)  The Court found that a consecutive sentence was justified because under State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985), the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other, the crimes were committed at different times, and there were multiple victims.  (8T 90-3 to 95-12)  This Court should reverse and remand for resentencing for several reasons.
[brief] On January 18, 2022, Landlord filed opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, which included an update to Landlord’s Fee Application demonstrating that from December 9, 2021 to January 18, 2022 Landlord incurred an additional $9,858.00 in legal fees and costs in relation to the Underlying Action.  (Pa104-129).  Summarily, Landlord’s Fee Application sought an award of $65,798.68 in connection with the Underlying Action.  (Pa120).  On February 16, 2022, Tenant filed a wholly improper and untimely reply brief in further support of its Motion for Reconsideration.  (Pa130).  This reply brief, which was submitted seventeen (17) days late and twelve (12) days after Tenant’s noticed return date for the Motion for Reconsideration, was nonetheless considered by the lower court.  (Pa130-132).
[brief] Among other things, these federal and state laws govern how schools must respond to parental requests to access certain official student records.  FERPA requires that no State school or educational institution shall have a policy which “den[ies], or which effectively prevents, the parents of students … the right to inspect and review the education records of their children. ”  20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A).  NJPRA, for its part, similarly requires the State Board of Education to promulgate regulations governing “the creation, maintenance and retention of pupil records … to provide general protection for … the right of the parent or guardian … to be supplied with full information about the pupil, except as may be inconsistent with reasonable protection of the persons involved[.]”  N.J.S.A. 18A:36-19.  However, as the trial court explained, the plain language of FERPA and NJPRA “pertain to access to information in written student records, not to affirmative requirements of parental notification of a student’s transgender orientation or expression. ” (Da136).  That distinction is dispositive.  The question this case presents is not how a school district must handle specific parental requests for officials records—or what information must go in that record.  Instead, the issue before the trial court, and now on appeal, is whether the Amended Policy’s decision to require blanket affirmative notification to parents regarding their transgender children’s gender identity is likely consistent with the LAD.
[brief] ”  (25T 32-6 to 10)  Later, the prosecutor specifically argued to the jury in summation that [...]’s opinion regarding the threatening nature of defendant’s posts should be taken into account when rendering a verdict.  (32T 62-14 to 22)  Because, in fact, defense counsel was absolutely correct that lay opinion testimony regarding defendant’s or [...]’ supposed intent in their social-media posts was not remotely admissible under N.J.R.E. 701, and because the erroneous admission of that testimony was cited by the prosecutor to the jury as a reason to convict and, thus, was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant’s convictions should be reversed, and the matter remanded for retrial.
[brief] See id. (affording legislative protection for “substantive rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this State”); see also N.J. Const. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 6 (“The laws of this State shall begin in the following style: ‘Be it enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey. ’”).  Further, in Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450 (2014), the Court held that the NJCRA “is modeled off of the analogous Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. ”  See id. at 474.  [...]’s argument fairs no better under persuasive authority interpreting that federal statute.  In the analogous context of Section 1983, the Third Circuit has held that “[t]o prevail on a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that persons acting under color of state law ‘reached an understanding’ to deprive him of his constitutional rights. ”  See Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 293-94 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).  Because [...]’s second argument that no notice of tort claim was required for his libel and slander claims because “those claims were the object of and in furtherance of appellant’s civil rights conspiracy claim” finds no support from recognized law, this court should also reject [...]’s secondary argument here.  (Pb24).  POINT II
[brief] III.  Alternatively, The End Date of the Allocation Period Is No Later Than 1993 When [...] Ceased Operations At The Site  The reasoning of Maestranzi Brothers, supra, 2010 Mass. Super LEXIS 65, also supports an alternative end date for the allocation period of 1993.  Again, in Maestranzi Brothers, the Massachusetts Superior Court concluded that the allocation period should end when Maestranzi stopped adding waste oil to the site in 1992, because after that, it “did nothing to further pollution of the site. ”  Maestranzi Brothers, 2010 Mass. Super. LEXIS 65, at *14-15.  In this case, it is undisputed that all operations at the Site ended in 1993.  (Pa0092).  Because [...] could not have contributed to any further CVOC pollution of the soil and groundwater after it ceased its manufacturing operations at the Site, the latest the end date for the time-on-the-risk allocation period could be is 1993.
[brief] \(^{38}\)  See R.4:50-3; *Tara Enterprises, Inc. v. Daribar Management Corp.*, 369 N.J.Super. 45, 52, 848 A.2d 27 (2004) (R. 4:50-2 provides that a motion for relief from a judgment premised upon fraud must be made within one year from entry of the judgment.  Rule 4:50-3, however, removes from that limitations period when a judgment is obtained through fraud upon the court.  Relief under this rule may be obtained “without limitation as to time. ”  *Shammas v. Shammas*, 9 N.J. 321, 327, 88 A.2d 204 (1952).  See also *Hyland v. Kirkman*, 157 N.J.Super. 565, 385 A.2d 284 (1978) (Attorney General’s Intervention to rectify a massive fraud upon the courts and land recodration system of the State by voiding judgments was permitted even after 6-year statute of limitations expired); *Catabene v. Wallner*, 16 N.J. Super. 597, 85 A.2d 300 (1951) (A third person may make a collateral attack on a judgment on the ground that it is fraudulent.)  Furthermore, “The fraud is not cloaked with immunity merely because it was perpetrated by means of a legal form; it is just as vulnerable as if perpetrated by a deed or mortgage. ”  *Catabene v. Wallner*, 16 N.J. Super. 597, 602; see also *Goldberg v. Yeskel*, 129 N.J.Eq. 404 (Ch. 1941), affirmed 129 N.J.Eq. court will be the ground for relief from the Final Judgment of the malpractice action pursuant to NJ Rule 4:50-3.  There is no statute of limitation on relief from judgment based on fraud upon the court.  If [...] did follow NJRPC 3.3, one thing will be for sure is that the Court would not have a reason to make those false statements regarding [...]’s representation of [...] during his representation in *Fou v. Fou* case.  There would be no ground for [...] to commence the malpractice action against [...].  The Court below should have held a hearing to permit the parties to present evidence pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(c) and 4:50-3 to make a determination if the relief of judgment from fraud upon the court shall be granted.
[brief] (See also Pb24-27).  When held against the factual record, however, again providing every reasonable inference to [...], it is clear that the only reason for [...]’s termination was his unauthorized receipt and entry of charge pay.  The report of [...]’s receipt of charge pay was first made by [...], not [...].  And [...] reported it promptly after that.  In terms of timing, [...]’s report came approximately two full months after the June 24, 2020 incident, yet she immediately reported it to [...] after [...] first reported the finding of charge pay.  See Young v. Hobart W. Grp., 385 N.J. Super. 448, 467 (App. Div. 2005 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir.1997)) (“‘[T]he mere fact that [an] adverse employment action occurs after [the protected activity] will ordinarily be insufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating a causal link between the two.
[directive] If an off-duty handgun does not differ substantially in design, function or caliber from the service handgun, a separate qualification with this weapon, under either daytime or nighttime conditions, is at the discretion of the agency executive.  Handgun Night Qualification Course (HNQC).  (See Appendix C).  The Handgun Night Qualification Course is to be completed two times a year for service handguns and for handguns authorized for use off duty and which are determined to be substantially different in design, function or caliber from the service handgun.  This determination is to be made by the agency executive or supervising firearms instructor.  Either course, HQC1 or HQC2, may be selected for qualification purposes.  If an off-duty handgun does not differ substantially in design, function or caliber from the service handgun, a separate qualification with this weapon, under either daytime or nighttime conditions, is at the discretion of the agency executive.  Shotgun Qualification Course (SQC).
[brief] [5T42:17 – 5T43:19].  On May 2, 2018, “[...]” (sister of [...] and aunt of Appellant’s son), was arrested for operating Appellant’s vehicle without a license, for having outstanding warrants, and for possession of CDS.  [Pa101].  Appellant was issued a motor vehicle summons, was charged under New Jersey Statutes Title 39, and was required to appear in Ewing municipal court in connection with the May 2, 2018 arrest.  [5T83:22 – 5T84:3].  Despite knowing he was personally charged with a violation of State law and having to personally appear in court for same, Appellant never reported this incident to [...].  [5T45:12-13].  The Investigation further uncovered that on November 29, 2018, “[...]” was arrested for operating Appellant’s vehicle without a valid driver’s license.  [Pa119].  Appellant never reported this incident to [...].
[brief] On the brief and of counsel: [...], Esq. (#032551992)  [...]  [...], Esq. (#061532013)  [...]  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS – BRIEF | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF CONTENTS - BRIEF | i | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS | iii | | TABLE OF TRANSCRIPT DESIGNATIONS | iii | | TABLE OF CONTENTS - APPENDIX | iv | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | vii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 5 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 8 | | **POINT I: EVIDENTIARY ERRORS REGARDING LIABILITY WARRANT A NEW TRIAL.
[brief] However, the actual and precise timing of CVOC releases is not known, and will never be known.  (Pa0264-0265.)  As [...] has conceded through its expert, [...]: there isn’t in this data record a specific information on how much solvent was released at any one location at any point in time.  It’s not as if we have detailed manifests that say on a certain day we disposed of ten gallons of solvent into AOC 5.  We know from company records and from our examination where the releases occurred, but we don’t know the specific quantities that were – that occurred, and we don’t know within the boundaries of the time that that AOC operated which days or weeks, or what have you, that the releases actually occurred.  (Pa0264-0265.)  However, it is known and undisputed that the contamination resulting from those unspecified releases is continuing in nature, and new “property damage” continues to take place to this day.  (Pa0148.)  [...]’s own expert, [...], concedes as much and is quoted throughout this brief.  C.
[brief] Instead, the trial court denied relief to [...], on the basis that [...]’s remedy existed in the form of a successive contribution action against [...].  Such remedy is insufficient, if not illusory, and does not remove the insurmountable injustice to retroactively forcing over $800,000 in additional exposure to [...].  It is axiomatic that a trial must be conducted under the correct legal framework.  See generally *Velazquez ex rel. Velazquez v. Portadin*, 163 N.J. 677, 688 (2000) (observing that “appropriate and proper” charges to the jury are fundamental to a fair trial).  Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has concluded that a party entering trial misled by reliance on false information was entitled to a mistrial.  See McKenney ex rel. McKenney, 167 N.J. 359, 376 (2001) (holding that the prejudice to the plaintiffs flowing from their lack of advance notice that a key witness’s trial testimony deviated from the deposition testimony; the matter was remanded for a new trial, with leave granted to the plaintiffs to vacate the earlier dismissal of that witness based on the changed trial testimony).  If the controlling legal standards and liability framework are going to be changed after conclusion of the matter, then fundamental fairness-and due process-require a retrial.
[brief] First, the [...] asserted that the arbitrator improperly rejected its revised final offers.  It was only after the revised final offers were submitted in a letter to the parties dated November 2, 2024 that the arbitrator stated that, “the substance of both parties[’] final offers should not have changed since the original submission. ” (Aa0040; Aa0053; Aa0374).  The [...] argued that the arbitrator failed to clearly state in his request for revised final offers that the parties were to provide more specific contract language and not additional substantive proposals.  This, the [...] argued, was prejudicial to the [...] since the arbitrator accepted the [...]’s revised final offer but not the [...]’s.  On the issue of the arbitrator rejecting the [...]’s revised final offers, the Commission held:  Our review of the record, including comparison of the [...]’s September 12 Final Offer to its subsequent revised final offers, confirms the arbitrator’s determination that the [...]’s revised final offers included new substantive proposals that were not included in its final offer.  The [...]’s revised final offer, by contrast, complied with the arbitrator’s request by supplying specific contract language without introducing new proposals beyond the scope of its September 11 Final Offer.  The arbitrator’s October 12 and 18 requests sought for the parties to indicate whether their proposals required new contract provisions or changes to current contract provisions, and to provide the proposed verbatim contract language to either change existing language or add new language.  There was no solicitation of, or mutual consent to, substantive additions to the final offers that the parties had already submitted prior to the start of the arbitration hearings.  See N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.7(g)(2).  While the arbitrator had discretion to permit revisions to final offers until the close of hearing, here he sought only submission of specific contract language concerning the parties’ previously submitted offers.  (Aa052-053).  Next, the [...] objected to the health benefits proposal awarded by the arbitrator.
[brief] On August 1st and 2nd of 2022, Defendant had her work training and advised Plaintiff that she wanted to go alone.  (2T34-15).  However, Plaintiff refused to let her go alone and accompanied her to her work training in Washington D.C. (2T34-25).  Plaintiff testified that the parties started having “stupid arguments,” including arguments about “watering the plants.” (2T57).  However, the arguments were not “stupid. ”  For example, Plaintiff told Defendant that she was watering the plants incorrectly and if she did not agree with his sentiment, they could review the cameras videotaping Defendant in the house to see if she was watering the plants incorrectly.  (2T58).  Plaintiff also testified how Defendant told her parents that Plaintiff was not buying her shampoo or giving her money and that she slept on a mattress on the floor.  (2T46-12; 2T59-16).  Plaintiff further testified how his parents were recording Defendant.  (2T61-2).  The hostility between Plaintiff’s parents and Defendant was also growing during this time period.  For example, Plaintiff’s mother sent Plaintiff a text message stating that “I don’t like her because she looks so black. ” (2T61-22; 2T62; 2T63; 2T64).  In light of the disputes that were occurring between the parties, it was agreed that some space was needed.  (2T12-9).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN ADMITTING PRIOR TESTIMONY OF THE RESPONDING OFFICERS.  A.  STANDARD OF REVIEW.  An appellate court defers to a trial court’s evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of discretion.  Rowe v. Bell & Gossett, Co., 239 N.J. 531, 551 (2019).  “Evidentiary decisions are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard because, from its genesis, the decision to admit or exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to the trial court’s discretion. ”  Est. of Hanges v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010).
[brief] An employee who is an employee of the State who is offered the option of working at home but has refused that option shall not be regarded as an essential employee.  "Health care facility" means any non-federal institution, building or agency, or portion thereof, whether public or private, for profit or nonprofit, that is used, operated or designed to provide health services, medical or dental treatment or nursing, rehabilitative, or preventive care to any person.  Health care facility includes, but is not limited to: an ambulatory surgical facility, home health agency, hospice, hospital, infirmary, intermediate care facility, dialysis center, long-term care facility, medical assistance facility, mental health center, paid and volunteer emergency medical services, outpatient facility, public health center, rehabilitation facility, residential treatment facility, skilled nursing facility, and adult day care center.
[brief] It is both impractical and unfair to summarily rule on such a motion without giving the parties an opportunity to be heard.  To allow the Judge of Compensation's ruling to stand would be to deny respondent these basic rights of due process, which would include the right to a hearing on these issues.  In fact, while this appeal has been pending, on April 4, 2024, petitioner has seized upon this denial of respondent's right to due process by filing a Notice of Motion for Judgment on Liability, in which he seeks to resolve the issue of liability in his favor without further proceedings.  (Ra74-75).  In this matter, there was no testimony of any kind.  There was not a single affidavit from any individual with personal knowledge of any pertinent facts including but not limited to any individual from the [...], the decedent's co-workers or the petitioner himself.  The respondent was not even aware whether the motion was going to be heard until the Judge of Compensation denied the motion for a stay on the morning of the hearing.  The Rules of Evidence may not be relaxed to the point of infringing on the parties' due process rights or other fundamental rights.  In *Paco v. American Leather Mfg. Co.*, 213 N.J. Super. 90, 97 (App. Div. 1986), the court explained that:  Our holding today is merely a recognition of a fundamental tenet of our Anglo-American system of justice that no court or administrative agency is so knowledgeable that they can make fair findings of fact without providing both sides the opportunity to be heard.  *Larson*, supra, § 79.84 at 15–426.295–96.  As previously indicated, this opportunity to be heard includes not only the right to cross-examine the adversary's witnesses but also the right to present witnesses to refute the adversary's evidence.  See, id. § 279.63 at 15–426.206; *General Chemical Division*, supra, 47 Del. at 547, 94 A.2d at 601.  Thus, due process in administrative hearings requires that both parties have the right to present oral testimony in critical areas.  *Larson*, supra, § 79.11, 12.  Here, respondent was denied these basic fundamental rights of the opportunity to be heard at a full hearing, to present witnesses and evidence, to cross-examine petitioner's witnesses, and to refute petitioner's evidence.  The Judge of Compensation therefore erred procedurally and substantively in declaring the decedent to be an essential worker.  Respondent should be given the right to have all of these issues fully litigated after appropriate discovery has been exchanged, and should not be summarily barred from litigating whether the decedent should be found to be an essential employee.  The Order declaring the decedent to be an essential worker should therefore be reversed, and this matter should be remanded for a trial on the merits.  For the reasons expressed in the companion appeal of [...] v. [...], Docket Number [...], this matter should be remanded to another Judge of Compensation to avoid the appearance of bias.  CONCLUSION
[brief] \(^{10}\)  Id.  For example, the Department’s recent questions to [...], the AIF for [...], misapplied SSAP No. 25 to the AIF fee and under that false pretense, attempted to scrutinize the profits of [...]:  This Request is meant to gather information to review the POA service fees for compliance with SSAP No. 25; transactions involving services between related parties.  \(^{10}\)  It appears that the Department may seek to rely on [...]’s Certificate of Authority (based on the documents it added to the record without a motion).  However, that Certificate simply requires [...] to submit a financial statement related to its management of [...], not its AIF Fees.  Furthermore, the reservation of rights does not allow the Department to unilaterally determine what statutes apply to [...].  Ja79.