ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ........................................................................31  A.  The County’s Appellate Arguments are Untimely Raised and Should Not be Considered (Raised for first time on Appeal)  ........................................32  B.  Even if the Court Considers the County’s Untimely Appellate Arguments, they Should be Rejected as Duplicative and Meritless (1T49:11-21)  .........................................................................................................................33  C.  The County’s About-Face Refusal to Accept the Trial Court’s Decisions is a Blatant Violation of the Public Bidding Laws (1T61:2-13) ..............................................................................................................................................35 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................................36
[brief] The New Motion Judge also found that [...] testified that the standard of care would have allowed for a delivery as late as 10:10 p.m.  In fact, Defendants never asked [...] that question at his deposition, and the record does not support such a finding.  First, all that [...] testified was that, if the delivery had occurred by 10:10 p.m., he would have had no criticism of [...] in this case.  [Pa521, 63:5 to 65:11].  But as Dr. Lucian further observed, this observation is meaningless because, “even if we push it to the limit at 10:10, the baby was delivered at 10:27, that's 17 minutes. ” [Pa521, 63:19-22].  What [...] may or may not have opined concerning [...], in the event of a 10:10 p.m. delivery is immaterial, as a 10:10 p.m. delivery is not a fact.  Second, “depending on circumstances” at the hospital that night [Pa522, 64:6], [...] also stated that he might not have had offered a critical opinion in this case if the delivery had occurred sometime between 10:05 and 10:10 p.m. [Pa521, 63:5-64:8].  In stating this, [...] was emphasizing how severely the Defendants missed the timing required of the standard of care.  The discussion about 10:10 p.m. occurred at pages 63 through 65 of his deposition.  A review of those pages shows that [...] never stated that it would have been within the acceptable standard of care for [...] to have been delivered at 10:10 p.m.  Initially, [...] was asked if “more likely than not” whether [...] would have been delivered at 10:10 p.m. if everything had occurred within the standard of care.  [Pa521, Deposition Testimony of [...], 63:5-9].  [...] specifically rejected that contention, replying that the standard of care would have required delivery of [...] earlier than 10:10 p.m.  [Pa521, Deposition Testimony of [...], 63:10-11].  He specifically said that delivery should have happened a few minutes earlier than that.  [Pa521, Deposition Testimony of [...], 63:10-11].  As if that answer did not happen, the next question posed that [...] would have had no criticisms of anybody if [...] had been delivered at 10:15 p.m.  [Pa521, Deposition Testimony of [...], 63:12-14].  [...] again rejected this premise, stating that the baby being delivered that late would have been longer than expected.  [Pa521, Deposition Testimony of [...], 63:15-16].  [...] then went on to explain that he would have expected that [...] would have been delivered no later than 10:05 and 10:10 p.m.  [Ps521, Deposition of [...], 63:17-18], which would have been on the “outside” of his expectation.  [PA522, Deposition Testimony of [...], 64:6-8].  [...] pointedly highlighted:  “So, even if we push it to the limit at 10:10, the baby was delivered at 10:27 p.m., that’s 17 minutes. ”  [Pa521, Deposition Testimony of [...], 63:20-22].  And that was [...]’s point.  Read accurately, [...] was not testifying that the standard of care would have allowed a delivery as late as 10:10 p.m.  What he was saying is that even if he indulged the premise of this line of questioning, [...] was still delivered far beyond the time being proposed by the questioning as being acceptable.  (iii)
[brief] **E.  [...]’s assertion that the trial court should have provided more in its “statement of reasons” it provided as a basis for remand is without merit and unsupported. **  Throughout her appeal, [...] complains that the trial court did not provide a “statement of reasons” to her satisfaction, and that it therefore must have “failed to properly consider, or consider at all, each of the arguments advanced by Appellant. ” (Pb1–2, 20, 35, 36.).  [...]’s complaints, while inconsistent with a de novo review, lack a sufficient basis.  [...] failed to identify any legitimate support for the assertion that she was entitled to more than the statement of reasons the trial court already provided.
[brief] ”  Hopewell Tp., 2019 NJ PERC LEXIS 100, 46 NJPER 117 (¶26 2019) (August 15, 2019).  Instead of following the Commission’s mandate on complying with the interest arbitration statute and costing out the unit based on the July 31, 2019 snapshot, the arbitrator analyzed the 2023 composition of the negotiations units and used that composition in determining the cost of the Award.
[directive] Page 2 of 11  6.  Are any of you familiar with the area or address of the incident?  7.  Have you or any family member or close personal friend ever filed a claim or a lawsuit of any kind?  8.  Has anyone ever filed a claim or a lawsuit against you or a member of your family or a close friend?  9.  Have you or a family member or close personal friend either currently or in the past been involved as a party …as either a plaintiff or a defendant…in a lawsuit involving damages for personal injury?
[brief] [1T 33-22 to 34-3].  [...] projected 30 employees daytime and 10 nighttime employees.  [1T 32-4 to 32-10].  [...] confirmed that no residents in the memory care wing would drive and only 2% of the assisted living residents would have their own vehicles.  [1T 32-13 to 33-1].  He indicated that approximately 30% of the independent living residents would arrive with vehicles but that they would typically get rid of them within a year due to disuse.  [1T 33-1 to 33-12].  Later, he confirmed that 100 parking spaces would be more than sufficient for the type of community proposed, but if necessary, [...] would find an off-site location and shuttle visitors to the Property, noting that the bus depot immediately to the north of the Property would be an obvious first call.
[brief] It is the State’s position that the defendant’s appeal should be denied on these grounds.  The State respectfully urges the Court to deny Defendant’s appeal.  Respectfully Submitted, /s/ [...]  [...] Assistant Prosecutor  August 30, 2024  [...] Atty. No. 281082019  Assistant Prosecutor Of Counsel and on the Letter Brief  [...]  LETTER IN LIEU OF BRIEF ON BEHALF OF STATE OF NEW JERSEY Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey
[brief] [...] died from "mechanical and positional asphyxia" (25T38-8 to 11).  His body had been wrapped in two blankets that were tightly duct-taped from his chest to his mouth (25T41-7 to 25T42-21).  He had been "hog tied," face-down, with his wrists, arms and legs bound behind his back with orange electrical cord such that he was unable to straighten out (25T37-23 to 25T40-10).  There were blood stains on his pants and shirt, and on the carpet (20T17-6 to 10).  One of [...]'s pockets was turned inside-out (20T18-20 to 24).  There was a cut in the duct tape and the blanket near the victim's face and superficial cuts on his left hand (20T37-1 to 5;25T43-17 to 25).  Underneath the body, the police found an empty sleeve for a debit card (24T16-14 to 15).  His cell phone was missing (24T23-4 to 10).
[brief] https://nj.gov/infobank/eo/056murphy/pdf/EO-251.pdf  As was clearly pled, “Executive Order 251 was in effect as of that date and therefore [...] should have been masked when she attended and performed her duties as a board of education member in a Central Regional school building. ” (Ca242).  In fact, it is impossible to refute the claim that the Commission’s decision to dismiss Counts 3 was premature in light of Respondent’s own admissions in discovery.
[brief] As explained to Judge, it was impossible for me to present key arguments, incl. new info/arguments & new requests for rulings, & further persuade the Court for my case in a limited 8-minutes, when I would need even more time to address new info presented by [...] at the Hearing and [...]'s Aug. 12th Certifications.  (1T, p. 17, Lines 4-22).  62.  Disregarding that I indicated that I would need more time, as per par. 61, the Judge limited me to 8 minutes (1T, p. 20, Line 10).  He unfairly cut me off, & then allowed Mr.  Cevasco to make his presentation (1T, p. 21, Lines 17-21).  63.  Judge refused to allow me to refute new misleading claims against me by [...] and [...] at the Hearing (1T, p. 25, Lines 9-12).  64.  [...] disclosed for first time he had approved Trust withdrawals for [...]’s personal distributions that Roth did not authorize, & that violated Court’s June ’22 directive that he would need to make pleading for the Court to consider allowing Trust distributions to [...] since [...] was not allowing distributions until Court ruled on his Verified Complaint & Accounting.
[brief] Isn’t that normal course of business?  Q.  [...], I am asking you a yes or no question.  Yes or no, was the discussion that you had with [...] regarding this $2 million specifically referenced anywhere in your report, yes or no?  A.  I do not recall.  Q.  You don’t recall.  Do you want to look through your report?  A.  No, I don’t.  I just don’t recall it.  While this excerpt provides some support for a conclusion that [...] had some discussions with [...], it clearly does not provide any support for the statement that [...] “conferred with [...] to ascertain whether he authorized many of the transactions in question. ”  Plaintiffs do not cite any other evidence in the record that constitutes proof of that statement.  Not only did [...] fail “to ascertain” whether [...] consented to the transactions he questioned, he also failed to speak to [...], the companies’ accountant, any of the bookkeepers at [...] or [...] or the vendors about any of the transactions he questioned.
[brief] Conspicuously absent is any requirement that the SNDA be delivered upon receipt, either promptly or otherwise.  This further shows the purpose of prompt delivery was not to facilitate Defendant securing an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate by closing, rather it was intended to be informational and when submitted if it showed a default, that by definition was not an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate, Plaintiff could terminate.  Likewise, paragraph 8.2 relied upon by Defendant is revealing.  It shows the parties had the ability to, and did, include a provision allowing them to avoid termination by permitting corrective action.  Notably, this concept is absent from paragraph 13.10, a fact acknowledged by the trial court.  (Da12.)  The PSA language does not support the idea that the promptly delivered requirement was intended to allow for corrective action so the Defendant could provide an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate by closing.  If the sole purpose were to identify a defective estoppel, it would be unnecessary to even include any delivery provision.  Per the PSA an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate is one that does not reveal the existence of a default.  The Defendant alone could review and determine if the estoppel were acceptable.  If it did not meet the defined term Acceptable Estoppel Certificate Defendant could unilaterally take steps to obtain a proper certificate and there would be no need for prompt let alone any delivery.  In fact, Defendant through counsel admitted the “the first estoppel certificate was unacceptable”.  (T24-4-6.)  In summary, Defendant repeatedly misread and misstated the clear language of the PSA in making its arguments at Point I.
[brief] Plaintiffs objected, inter alia, that the discovery requests at issue sought information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine, that Defendant had not alleged inequitable conduct with respect to the Patents-in-Suit, and that circumstances regarding the expiration of and/or Plaintiffs’ revival of the ’589 Patent were not relevant to any claim or defense in this case.  Id., Exh. B at 6-7, 10-12.
[brief] While [...] was not required to comment during the agency’s deliberation to preserve its right to appeal the permit decision, it did engage and proactively raise any issues it could, and it should not now be penalized for attempting to improve the outcome of the [...]’s permit decision.  Finally, Appellants did not have notice of the [...]’s flawed determinations, despite the [...]’s attempts to indicate the contrary.  [...] Rb9.  The documents provided by the [...] did not contain the deficient Consistency Assessment decision, nor did they show that the [...] would fail to consider the feasibility of a bridge or hold the applicant to the construction requirements for circular culverts.  In addition, the [...] argued, “That [...] took issue with [...]’s WQMP consistency determination is not even made clear by its Case Information Statement. ”  [...] Rb34.  But the [...] is wrong because a review of the Appellant’s notice of appeal and related CIS reveals that Appellant specifically identified the [...]’s final agency decision, *Fusco v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Newark*, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 460 (App. Div. 2002), and broadly expressed each of the issues raised in the Appellant’s briefs in this matter.
[brief] The following statements are not excluded by the hearsay rule:  (a)  A  Declarant-Witness' Prior Statement  The declarant-witness testifies and is subject to cross examination about a prior otherwise admissible statement, and the statement: (1) is inconsistent with the declarant-witness' testimony at the trial or hearing and is offered in compliance with Rule 613.  However, when the statement is offered by the party calling the declarant-witness, it is admissible only if, in addition to the foregoing requirements, it (A) is contained in a sound recording or in a writing made or signed by the declarant-witness in circumstances establishing its reliability; or (B) was given under oath at a trial or other judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, administrative or grand jury proceeding, or in a deposition; or (2) is consistent with the declarant-witness' testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant-witness of (A) recent fabrication or (B) improper influence or motive; or (3) is a prior identification of a person made after perceiving that person if made in circumstances precluding unfairness or unreliability.  Here, subsection (a)(l)(A) is relevant since the hearsay statements of both individuals were inconsistent with their trial testimony and were recorded.
[brief] Radiation Data, Inc. v. NJ Dept. of Environmental Prot., 456 N.J. Super. 550, 558 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. al Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)).  That is, it protects public officials “from personal liability for discretionary actions taken in the course of their public responsibilities, ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ’”  Brown v. State, 230 N.J. 84, 97-98 (2017) (quoting Morillo v. Torres, 222 N.J. 104, 116 (2015)).  Qualified immunity may only shield an officer from liability if the officer “reasonably believes that his or her conduct complies with the law. ”
[brief] Its mission is to provide quality, innovative community --- 1 Amici file identical briefs in the Middletown, Manalapan, and Marlboro appeals. programs, educate and train service providers, and pass pro-equality policies to protect and meet the needs of LGBTQ+ New Jerseyans.  In the arena of education, [...] engages in advocacy, policy work, and trainings to ensure that New Jersey schools are safe and affirming environments for transgender and nonbinary students.  [...] engages with stakeholders in New Jersey schools at all levels, including by: - Providing training and guidance to school administrators and staff, - Advocating for students at state and local board of education meetings, - Presenting at student assemblies, - Supporting parents of transgender students, and - Providing direct support to and programming for transgender and nonbinary students.
[directive] [...], Chief, Municipal Practice  [...], ChiefofStaff  [...], Chief, Municipal Practice  AOC Directors and Asst. Directors  [...], Chief, Civil Practice  Clerks of Court  [...], Chief, Civil Practice  [...], Special Assistant [...], Chief, Civil Practice  [...], Special Assistant [...], Chief, Family Practice  [...], Chief, Criminal Practice  [...], Chief, Family Practice  [...], Chief, Criminal Practice Division Managers (Civil, Criminal, Family and Municipal)  JUDICIARY GUIDELINES  ALTERNATE CARE FOR THE DEPENDENTS OF PERSONS  DETAINED AS A PART OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
[brief] ..................................................................................  34  E.  If This Court Does Not Order The Imposition of Concurrent Sentences Under Point D, Supra, Another Basis For Reversal And Resentencing Are The Error’s In The Court’s Overall Fairness Assessment  .................................................................................................  40  1.  Extending [...]’s existing twenty-year sentence by imposing this sentence consecutively would have no added deterrent effect.  ...........................................................................  42  2.  Because the age-crime curve demonstrates that the risk of recidivism declines dramatically as age increases and is exceptionally low at the age that [...] will complete his twenty-year NERA sentence, the goal of incapacitation cannot justify imposing a consecutive sentence.............................................................................  45  3.  The sentencing court’s fairness analysis was based on erroneous and impermissible considerations and failed to adequately address Defendant’s arguments regarding deterrence and incapacitation.......................................................
[brief] : Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J.Cr. Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF AND APPENDIX  ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  [...] 2 BERGEN COUNTY PLAZA HACKENSACK, NEW JERSEY  07601 [...]  [...]  ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR  ATTORNEY ID NUMBER 332522021 OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF [...]  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Instead, the 2015 Settlement is written in terms of releasing *existing* claims against the defendants, whether direct or related, *sans* any covenant not to sue.  Cf. *Sullivan v. DB Invs.*. Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81146, at *74 (D.N.J. May 22, 2008) (concluding that a release of “related claims” “only applies to the class period and to claims arising out of or relating to the underlying [litigation]” and dismissing objection by class member that the proposed settlement would extinguish future causes of action).  Expanding the 2015 Settlement’s release language to encompass future claims arising from future misconduct would be tantamount to manufacturing a “covenant not to sue” out of whole cloth, thereby drafting a settlement better than the one the Defendants bargained for.  Cf. Joao v. Cenuco, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 380, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (licensor did not release patent infringement claims where the contract was silent as to covenant not to sue or release licensor’s patent claims).  In the absence of any “covenant not to sue”, none of the [...] class members have breached their obligations under the 2015 Settlement Agreement.
[brief] Gregory v. Borough of Avalon, 391 N.J. Super.181, 189 (App. Div. 2007.)  The Gregory court explained that the jurisprudence interpreting the language of subsection (c) has recognized three categories of cases which justify an extension of time: ““(1) [I]mportant and novel constitutional questions; (2) informal or ex parte determinations of legal questions by administrative officials; and (3) important public rather than private interests which require adjudication or clarification. ”  Id. at 188-189, citing, Borough of Princeton v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer County, 169 N.J. 135, 152 (2001).  “Our courts have found sufficient public interest to justify an extension of time for filing a prerogative writ action in a variety of circumstances, including challenges to the validity of ordinances on the ground that they were not adopted in conformity with the applicable statutory requirements. ”  Willoughby v. [...] of the Township of Deptford, 306 N.J. Super. 266, 277 (App. Div. 1997).  The Verified Complaint identified violations of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 and violations of the LRHL when enacting Ordinance 1349-20 and amending Ordinance 1423-21.  It is indisputable that the [...] identified inconsistencies between Ordinance 1423-21 and the Master Plan at its December 16, 2021, special meeting which were never acknowledged by the governing body when it adopted the ordinance.  (Pa 270-273 and Pa 278-279.)  The Borough’s failure to acknowledge and explain these inconsistencies in its minutes when it adopted the two ordinances violated the LRHL.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d) and (f).  Plaintiff’s complaint raises important public issues that warrant an extension of time to file “in the interests of justice.
[brief] (Ma1 to 16).  The receiving-stolen-property charge relates to a cellphone found on the defendant’s person that belonged to the victim of a carjacking on April 15, 2022.  On February 28, 2023, a Hudson County Grand Jury returned [...], charging defendant with the following crimes related to the April 20, 2022 robbery of the BMW M4 and Audi: first-degree armed robbery; conspiracy to commit armed robbery; second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun; and second-degree possession of a firearm for unlawful purpose.
[brief] In this matter, [...] has trespassed onto the land which belongs to [...].  The property in dispute is church property where lot 22 has been misidentified as Lot 22 and Lot 22.  This is because, [...] has owned Lot 19 which is [...] which is the church since June 30, 1976.  The lot designated as Lot 20 is [...] which is church property as noted in the Property Identification Document from the [...].  *(Da262, Property Identification Document from Newark Tax Assessor)*  The area of the lot which is Lot 22 which is next to Lot 20 is the church’s property via Adverse Possession.  [...] owns a number of lots in the area which are set out in Property Records of [...] *(Da278, Deeds from Newark to [...])*.  The other lots and property owned in this area by [...] have been maintained by [...] with the exception of Lot 22.  (Da255, [...] Email)  The lot identified as Lot 22 has been openly maintained by [...].