ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In this credibility battle, the minimally redacted interrogation video in which [...] called [...] a liar, provided his own opinion on what the church video showed, and revealed [...]’s unrelated arrest impermissibly tipped the scales, usurping the jury’s ability to form its own conclusion as to [...]’s veracity and guilt.  Moreover, the kinds of evidence introduced through the interrogation video are those largely considered to be uniquely prejudicial.  First, [...]’s lay opinions on [...]’s veracity and guilt were especially damaging because of his role as a lead investigator and interrogator—individuals to whom juries ascribe “almost determinative significance. ”  Frisby, 174 N.J. at 596 (quoting Neno v. Clinton, 167 N.J. 573, 586-87 (2001)); C.W.H., 465 N.J. Super. at 593.  The error remains highly prejudicial even if independent video footage substantiated [...]’s accusations of dishonesty and had clearly showed [...] entering and exiting [...], as his lay opinion commentary would still have impermissibly biased the jury’s deliberations.  See Tung, 460 N.J. Super. at 103-04 (finding cumulative error even though independent video footage verified the officer’s statements that defendant was lying about where he was on the evening of the crime).  Second, allowing the jury to learn of [...]’s custodial status without any curative or limiting instruction is the kind of other-crime evidence courts agree “has a unique tendency to turn a jury against the defendant,” allowing them to conclude that a defendant committed a crime not because of the evidence, but because of a propensity to commit bad acts.  *State v. Stevens*, 115 N.J. 289, 302 (1989); see *State v. G.S.*, 145 N.J. 460, 468 (1996) (discussing the “distinct risk” that other crime evidence will “distract a jury from an independent consideration of the evidence”).  Because of the particularly harmful types of evidence introduced through the interrogation recording, and the lack of any physical evidence or eyewitness testimony tying [...] to [...]’s injuries, the error was clearly capable of producing an unjust result, and [...]’s convictions must be reversed.
[brief] ” (Da47).  The court stated:  [T]he facts here suggest the opposite.  He entered the store, and attempted to carry the entire cash register drawer and its contents out of the store.  He did not brandish the gun in order to wrest control of the cash register drawer.  He did not pull it out when the cashier slapped his hands off the cash register.  He did not pull out the gun when the security guard wrestled him to the floor.  The [d]efendant only pulled out the gun after he had fallen to the floor and the store manager called the police.  The chain of events suggests that the [d]efendant intended to grab the drawer and run out of the store with it, but only after store personnel intervened and had wrestled him onto the floor did he resort to brandishing the gun.  And, even though the facts suggest he did not intend to use the gun to carry out this particular robbery, the [d]efendant was guilty of a certain persons offense before he even entered the store.
[brief] ”, | | | 200 N.J. 283, 297-98 (2009) | 17 | | **Bueno v. Bd. of Trs., Tchrs. Pension & Annuity Fund,** | | | 422 N.J. Super. 227 (App. Div. 2011) | 14 | | **Burt v. W. Jersey Health Sys.,** | | | 339 N.J. Super. 296 (App. Div. 2001) | 20 | | **Capital Health Sys., Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking & Ins.,** | | | 445 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div. 2016) | 13 | | **Christian Bros. Inst. of N.J. v. N. N.J. Interscholastic League,** | | | 86 N.J. 409 (1981) | 33 | | **Dynasty, Inc. v. Princeton Ins. Co.,** | | | 165 N.J. 1 (2000) | 17 | | **In re Election L. Enf’t Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008,** | | | 201 N.J. 254 (2010) | 14Ra | In re Failure by the Dep’t of Banking & Ins., 336 N.J. Super. 253 (App. Div. 2001) ..........................................................28 GMC v. City of Linden, 150 N.J. 522, 532 (1997) ..............................................34
[brief] In *Bryant*, the defendant argued that it was plain error not to refer to the justification defense of self-defense in the trial court’s instructions on the elements of murder.  288 N.J. Super. at 40.  The defendant in *Bryant* relied on *State v. Coyle*, 119 N.J. 194 (1990), where the Supreme Court held that a jury instruction foreclosed the jury from considering passion/provocation manslaughter in determining whether defendant was guilty of purposeful or knowing murder where the State’s burden was to disprove passion/provocation manslaughter.  *Ibid.*  The Appellate Division in *Bryant* held that defendant’s reliance on *Coyle* was misplaced because the jury in *Bryant* was not instructed to disregard evidence of justification if it found the State had proven the statutory elements of murder but was expressly instructed that it was to acquit defendant if it harbored reasonable doubt that the killing was justified by self-defense.  *Ibid.*  The holding in *Bryant* defeats defendant’s claim of plain error here.
[brief] There, the plaintiff's condominium unit was flooded by water from a broken dishwasher hose in another unit.  Id. at 5.  The condominium association [*11] was aware that similar hoses had previously broken and caused flooding in other units.  Ibid.  The trial court granted the association's summary judgment motion, finding it owed no duty to warn the plaintiff about the potential Flooding hazard.  Ibid.  We reversed.  Although the plaintiff in Siddons conceded that the dishwasher was not a common area the association was responsible for maintaining, we reasoned that "under some circumstances the knowledge of a dangerous condition, regardless of control over that condition, may impose upon a person a duty to warn third parties of the danger.  Those circumstances exist here."  Id. at 10.  Before the flooding incident in Siddons that damaged the plaintiff's unit, the association had been notified on "at least three occasions that the dishwasher hoses that had been installed by the original developer caused flooding to other condominium units."  Id. at 11.  This information was not known by most of the unit owners.  In that particular factual setting, we held it would not have been unreasonably burdensome for the association to have a duty to notify the unit owners about the hazard.  Ibid.  Consequently, we vacated summary judgment in Siddons and remanded the matter for [*12] a trial.  Id. at 14.
[brief] At trial, the victim specifically testified that, while he had experienced frustrated litigants before, nothing like this had ever happened to him before, he had never been called or physically threatened, either as a judge or when he had been a municipal prosecutor.  (3T54-12 to 55-17).  Therefore, if the jury were to view the threats from the perspective of someone similarly situated to the victim, it would not have been any different than from that of the ordinary reasonable person.  The actual context of someone in the victim’s shoes would include someone who had never received these types of threats before.  The facts of this particular case do not justify a finding that the result would have been different with a revised jury charge in this “one minor respect.
[directive] 1 2 - 1 1 2 - Applicability: All Law Enforcement Personnel  1  Supersedes: et seq.  N.J.A.C. 12- 1 13:77.1, - - SOP Page: of State of New Jersey  Forfeiture Program Administration  Table Contents  6 Policy Statement 12:l 12- 1 Legal Authority 12:l 2 12- I  Delegation of Authority of Attorney General in Apportionment 12:3 2 12- Definitions 12:4 12- 2  Contributive share 2 1 2 - Entity 2  12- Forfeited property 2  12- Forfeited records 2  12-  Investigative unit 12- 2  Law enforcement purpose 12- 3  Participating law enforcement agency 12- 3 Prosecuting agency 12- 3 State law enforcement agency 12- 3 Distribution of Contraband 1 2 5 12- 3 Property Forfeited that Contains Displays any Counterfeit or Copyright, Trademark or Registration 1 2 - 4 12:6 Enforcement Trust Fund for Prosecuting Agency Law 1 2 - 4 12:7 Contributive Share 12- 4 12:8 Use of Forfeiture Funds 4 12:9 12- 5 Disposal of Indivisible Forfeited Property 12- 1210 - Procedures for Disposing Indivisible Forfeited Property 5 12 12:ll -- - Procedures-&% Apportioning Forfeited Property 12- 5 12:12 .$ - Criteria for Apportioning Forfeited Property 12 6-8 12:13 - 8-9 Monitoring, Reporting and Auditing Procedures 12 12:14 # # # # - of Page: of State New Jersey Forfeiture Program Administration SOP Table Contents ‘7 - of Funds Management and Property Received ink: and from State Federal Forfeitures I AII 03/0 Forfeiture Administrators 1 198 Program Date Applicability: k o w d Supersedes: 1:l Policy Statement t is It the policy of the Attorney General that State, county and municipal law
[brief] It is well-settled that decisions granting summary judgment are reviewed under a de novo standard.  See Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Amer., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  Under the de novo standard, the reviewing court is not bound to defer to the factual findings or legal conclusions of a trial court, but may decide the merits of an issue as if it were being presented for the first time.  *Baker v. National State Bank*, 353 N.J. Super. 145, 153 (App. Div. 2002) ("De novo review means that a reviewing court may disagree with the lower court’s findings and conclusions").  The reviewing court will therefore "employ the same standard that governs trial courts in reviewing summary judgment orders."  *Prudential Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan*, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div. 1998).  That standard, set forth in R. 4:46-2(c), requires the court to first decide if there is a genuine issue of fact, and if none, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Summary judgment is only appropriate where a "discriminating search of the merits in the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits submitted on the motion, clearly shows not to be present any genuine issue of material fact requiring deposition at trial."  *Judson v. People’s Bank and Trust Co. of Westfield*, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954).  The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid trials which would serve no useful purpose and to afford deserving litigants immediate relief.  *Kopp, Inc. v. United Techs.*, 223 N.J. Super. 548, 555 (App. Div. 1988).  Summary judgment must be granted only if the papers pertinent to the motion show palpably the absence of any issue of material fact, although the allegations of the pleadings, standing alone, may raise such an issue.  *Rankin v. Sowinski*, 119 N.J. Super. 393, 399-400 (App. Div. 1972); *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 529-30.  In *Brill*, the Supreme Court adopted the same standard used by the federal courts with respect to the determination of motions for summary judgment.
[brief] See Freedom From Religion Found. V. Morris Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 232 N.J. 543, 585 (2018) (Solomon, J., conc.) (“New Jersey’s Constitution recognizes the preservation of historic structures as an important government purpose. ”) (citing N.J. Const. art. VIII, § II, ¶ 7).  Here, the historical items must be guarded from the potential damage and mutilation that [...] proposes.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ brief raises several objections to [...]’s proofs that are based on their perception that [...]’s proofs and [...]’s presentation of those proofs violated procedural requirements.  In each instance, plaintiffs’ arguments are entirely unfounded.  Plaintiffs first take issue with the certification of [...] (Pa144-Pa145), the [...] mailroom employee who individually verified that each of the 147 envelopes listed on the December 13, 2019 proof of mailing register, including the envelope containing the Feder PC cancellation notice, were actually present and accounted for, confirming each with her own handwritten slash mark on the register itself.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Complaint, Jury Demand, and Designation of Trial Counsel, filed May 14, 2019 .................................................................Pa1  Defendants, [...], [...] and [...]’s Answer to the Complaint, Crossclaims, Answer to Crossclaims, Demand for Answers to Interrogatories and Jury Demand, filed July 16, 2019 ..............................................................Pa5  Defendants, [...], [...] and [...]’s Notice of Motion for Protective Order, filed November 15, 2023  .............................................................Pa11  Certification of [...], Esq. in Support of Motion for Protective Order ...........................................................................Pa13  Exhibit A – Plaintiff’s letters serving expert reports .........................Pa21  Plaintiff’s letter serving expert reports, dated April 26, 2021 ...............Pa22  Plaintiff’s letter serving expert reports, dated June 24, 2021 ...............Pa23  Plaintiff’s letter serving expert reports, dated September 17, 2021 ......Pa24  Plaintiff’s letter serving expert reports, dated February 22, 2022 .........Pa25  Exhibit B – Plaintiff’s July 20, 2021 letter ........................................Pa27  Exhibit C – Court’s September 24, 2021 order ..................................Pa29  Exhibit D – August 24, 2021  Certification of [...] ....................Pa32  Exhibit E – Court’s October 22, 2021 Order .....................................Pa38 Exhibit F – [...]’s Supplemental Certification ..........................Pa41 Exhibit G – Policy Statement of the American Board of Professional Neuropsychology .................................................................Pa47 Exhibit H – Update on Third Party Observers in Neuropsychological Evaluation .................................................................Pa61 Exhibit I – Court’s November 19, 2021 Order..............................................Pa72 Exhibit J – Court’s December 17, 2021 Order denying Reconsideration ..................................................................................Pa77 Exhibit K – January 5, 2022 Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Appeal ..............................................................................Pa80 Exhibit L – Appellate Division’s January 6, 2022 Order ...............................Pa83 Exhibit M – Letter Brief from the Attorney General’s Office filed February 17, 2022........................................................................... omitted Exhibit N – Appellate Division’s May 3, 2022 Order and Opinion........Pa86 Exhibit O – Defendants’ October 26, 2023 Letter to Plaintiff......................Pa131 Exhibit P – Plaintiff’s October 30, 2023 Letter to Defendants .....................Pa134 Exhibit Q – Cato v. Twp. Of Andover .........................................................Pa136 Plaintiff’s Certification of [...], Esq. in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order, filed November 22, 2022........Pa143
[brief] | Pa 212-262 | | Appendix document | Appendix Page Number | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| | Mortgage v. Nebraska, 270 Neb. 529, 704 N.W.2d 784 (Neb. 2005) | Pa 263-295 | | Associates Home Equity Services v. Troup, 343 N.J. Super. 254, 778 A.2d 529 (App. Div. 2001) | Pa 296-307 | | Beneficial Finance Co. of Atl. City v. Swaggerty 86 N.J. 602 (1981)
[brief] ..  1  1.  [...]’s Violation of Probation Charge, Conviction, and Reversal on Direct Appeal ........................................................................................................  1  2.  [...]’s First Request for an Amended Judgment of Conviction ..........  3  3.  Federal District Court Civil Proceedings Before the Hon. [...], U.S.D.J .................................................................................................  4  4.  State Court Proceedings Before the Hon. [...], A.J.S.C.  .7  5.  [...]’s Second Request for an Amended Judgment of Conviction & State Court Proceedings  Before the Hon. [...], J.S.C.......  9  ARGUMENT
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT..............................................................................3  POINT ONE.........................................................................................3  RESPONDENT’S PORTRAYAL OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT DURING THE PETITIONER’S TWENTY-NINE YEAR MARRIAGE IS NOT BASED ON CREDIBLE EVIDENCE AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE UNCLEAN HANDS...............................3  A.  The So Called “Reasons” For Disinheriting Petitioner are Based on Speculation and Conjecture and Fail to Constitute “Unclean Hands”.....................................................4  1.  Nothing but Innuendo Ties Petitioner To the February 1997 Incident..........................................................5  2.  There Were No Extended Marital Separations..............................9  3.  The Marriage Was Not Troubled....................................................12  4.  Decedent Never Contemplated Divorce........................................16  5.  Decedent Kept Her Finances Private.............................................18  6.  [...] Testified About an Earlier Made Will, Not the 2014 Will..............................................................................19  7.  Decedent was Easily Influenced By Respondent...........................20  8.  The Sutton v. Sutton Litigation Is Not Relevant............................21  9.  The Adult Protective Services Letter Was Submitted In Good Faith..........................................................27  10.  Petitioner Did Not Contact Adult Protective Services....................27  POINT TWO .........................................................................................................................30
[brief] The evidence which would lead to somebody possibly losing her balance and falling, even with a walker.  We talked about her physical therapy report and [...] talked a little bit about this, and this is in December of 2018.  In December of 2018, she reported that her balance worsened in the past six months, and she reports no falls in the past six months, but numbness from the knees to the toes, insidious over several, several years.  We asked the expert, [...], about the term festinating, and whether or not he was familiar with that since he was an orthopedic expert.  He said he was not necessarily familiar with it.  Festinating is rapid small steps done in attempt to keep the center of gravity in between the feet while the trunk leans forward involuntarily.  That is what condition she had of just a few months prior to this.  (7T16:14-17:1; 7T17:6-19:16)(emphasis added).  Without any expert explanation as to what impact the plaintiff’s medical history or prior falls had on her fall at the defendant’s store, the jury determined that the defendant was negligent but that such negligence was not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s accident.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 219.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has also held that, even an anonymous tip, when placed through the 9-1-1 call system and contains sufficient information to trigger public safety concerns and provides an ability to identify the person, can be sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop of that person.  *State v. Gamble*, 218 N.J. 412, 429 (2014).
[brief] [...], victim of the November 1, 1995, home invasion, testified that on the night of the invasion, he was living in [...] and had owned several bagel stores at the time.  (3T 19-20).  On the date of the incident, he had stopped at his girlfriend’s house with the day’s financial records and a paper bag full of cash.  He returned home at about 2:45 a.m. (3T 20-22).  Urich testified he had pulled into his garage and was still sitting in his car when a person appeared at the driver's side window wearing a wolf mask, and holding a gun, which he testified resembled a machine gun.  He was told to open the garage door.  (3T 24).  When asked to describe the man's voice, Urich stated that there was nothing unusual about it (i.e., no accent or stutter).  (3T 27)  Urich opened the door to the house slightly to activate the alarm and then opened the garage door as directed to allow another individual to enter.  (3T 32-33).  Following an altercation that lasted 35-40 seconds, the alarm sounded, and the perpetrators ran off.  (3T 33-36) (3T 79).  Urich testified that he later received a telephone call demanding ransom money in the amount of $250,000.  (3T 50-51).  He did not know who was speaking but stated that there was nothing unusual or distinctive about the voice of the caller.  (3T 50-51).  When describing the voice of the man talking to him, Urich did not believe the man had an accent, stutter, lisp or any other distinguishable marks in his voice.  (3T 82).  Urich did not believe he had ever seen [...] before.  (1T 89-90).  No trial witness nor victim identified [...] in connection with the [...] home invasion.  Further, no forensic evidence connected [...] to the offense.  (10T 118).  **Teaneck Home Invasion and Murder**
[brief] Entry of Appearance | | Pa 143 | | [...] March 13, 2023, Letter | | Pa 144 | | [...] March 21, 2023, Letter | | Pa 145 | | [...] May 05, 2023, Letter | | Pa 146 | | March 10, 2023 | [...] letter | Pa 148 | | Certified Mail Receipt | | Pa 149 | | Certified Mail Receipt (Duplicate) | | Pa 150 | | [...] Envelope | | Pa 151 | | USPS Tracking | | Pa 152 | | January 01, 2023 | Adjournment Letter (1) | Pa 153 | | January 01, 2023 | Adjournment Letter (2) | Pa 154 | | March 10, 2023 | Adjournment Letter (1) | Pa 155 | | March 10, 2023 | Adjournment Letter (2) | Pa 156 | | Appendix document | Appendix Page Number | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| | Constitution of New Jersey Article I | Pa 157-159 | | Constitution of New Jersey Article VI | Pa 160-163 | | N.J. Stat. § 2A:17-13 | Pa 164 | | N.J. Stat. § 2A:17-36 | Pa 165 | | N.J. Stat. § 2A:53A-21 | Pa 166-167 | | N.J. Stat. § 2C:16-1 - Bias intimidation | Pa 168-170 | | N.J. Stat. § 2C:30-2
[brief] Whether the driveway is placed in Mansfield or Florence, the traffic impact will remain unchanged.  The driveway location is simply a product of the proximity to the interchange and the artificial municipal boundary line, which bifurcates the Property.  The site must be viewed as one parcel, and the only reason Defendant can conjure its argument is because of the placement of the boundary line.  This is the epitome of arbitrary and capricious.  Even if the Court accepts the fickle string of logic that causes Defendant to consider the driveway’s impact, substantial credible evidence in the record established that the vast majority of traffic will be moving towards Interstate 295, and away from Florence.  In fact, 80% of the site’s traffic will exit east, a distance of 1,600 feet, into Mansfield to access Interstate 295, and the other 20% will travel west along Florence-Columbus Road (County Route 656) to Route 130 to access the New Jersey Turnpike–Pennsylvania Extension.  (2T 35:2-13, 36:9-19, 37:17-21).  All of this traffic will be on, and/or moving towards Interstate 295, Route 130, the New Jersey Turnpike, and Florence-Columbus Road; all roads within the jurisdiction of the State or County, and not the municipality.  Id.  The reality is, the same traffic will be on the same roads traveling in the same directions, regardless of which side of the municipal boundary the driveway is placed.  Defendant’s argument arbitrarily and capriciously contradicts the principles outlined in Ferraro and Ciocon.
[brief] Supporting our view, New Jersey law encourages us to read arbitration agreements “liberally in favor of arbitration. ”  Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 773 A.2d 665, 670 (N.J. 2001) (quoting Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc., 633 A.2d 531, 535 (N.J. 1993)).