ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] is a coalition of the [...] and the medical societies of each state and the District of Columbia.  Its purpose is to represent the viewpoint of organized medicine in the courts.  The participation of amici curiae is particularly appropriate in cases with “broad implications,” Taxpayers Ass’n of Weymouth Twp., Inc. v. Weymouth Twp., 80 N.J. 6, 18 (1976), or in cases of “general public interest. ”  Casey v. Male, 63 N.J. Super. 255, 259 (Essex Cnty. 1960).  This case raises important issues concerning the creation of exceptions for procedures in the medical specialty of surgery and wrongful death-based claims when determining whether to enforce a statutorily permissible arbitration agreement between a physician and a patient.  The [...] and the [...] take no position on the merits of the specific underlying allegations of professional negligence between the parties that have given rise to this appeal.  However, the [...] and the [...] believe they can provide this Court with a perspective distinct from either of the parties.  The Amici pursue filing this brief as it is in the best interests of physicians and patients, as well as to the provision of health care generally, that the provisions of the New Jersey Arbitration Act as enacted by the State legislature be adhered to and no exceptions thereto be made for surgical or wrongful death-based claims.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] As noted by my former attorney, [...], during the “tortured history” of this case “no one did the analysis” (2T11, 8-10).  That is, not one justice spent the time to diligently review evidence of account error, compare relevant court orders to support charges due, Appellant’s payments made, and corresponding credits due him to Probation’s account record and audits, note the disparities and make an effort to resolve disputed facts of the case by way of a hearing, investigation, and cross-examination of the parties.  The trial courts overlooked Appellant’s meritorious claims of account error, failed to enforce duly issued Orders of sister courts or even their own Orders, or relied upon the unsupported assumption that previous justices must have properly reviewed the evidence in denying Appellant’s motions for correction of account error but failed to diligently verify same.  Not one justice issued findings of fact specific to Appellant’s detailed claims and evidence of error.  Blatant account errors have been repeatedly overlooked or mistakenly not considered.  “Law of the Case” doctrine, and “collateral estoppel” (as claimed in defense by Probation and [...], DAG) have been applied in knee-jerk fashion without diligent confirmation of previous judge’s efforts before denying Appellant’s request for relief.  A review of the Orders of 4/4/20222, 3/30/2022 and 5/12/2022 indicate not one court responded with specificity to Appellant’s evidence of account error but instead utilized a generic misapplication of Law of the Case whether applicable or not.
[brief] ”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995).  While “genuine” issues of material fact preclude the granting of summary judgment, those that are “of an insubstantial nature” do not.  Id. at 530; see also Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co. of Lexfield, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954).
[brief] A.  Governing Law provision is not conspicuous.  B.  Respondent violated Minimum Payment Due terms.  C.  “Finance charge” and “annual percentage rate” not in bold text.  CONCLUSION | Appendix document | Appendix page number | |-------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| | Exhibit JJ, CFPB TILA Examination Procedures, | Da135 | | Section 1026.7f.(i), 78 (April 2015) | | ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Authority | Brief page number | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | **Court Rules:** | | | Rule 2:6-2(a)(6) | Drb4 | | Rule 2:6-10 | Drb4 | | Rule 4:26-1 | Drb4 | | Rule 4:46-2(c) | Drb13 | | Rule 4:5-4 | Drb12, Drb13 | | **Case Law:** | | | Almog v. Israel Travel Advisory Service, Inc., | Drb4 | | 298 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 1997), | | | appeal dismissed, 152 N.J. 361 (1998), | | | cert. denied, 525 U.S. 817 (1998) | | | Associates Home Equity Services v. Troup, | Drb10, Drb11 | | 343 N.J. Super. 254 (App. Div. 2001) | | | Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., | Drb6 | | 902 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1990) | | | Beneficial Finance Co. of Atl. City v. Swaggerty, | Drb6, Drb10, Drb11| | 86 N.J. 602 (N.J. 1981) | | | Borough of Keyport v. Maropakis, | Drb8 | | 332 N.J. Super. 210 (App. Div. 2000) | | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, | Drb6 | | 142 N.J. 520 (N.J. 1995) | | | Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., | Drb3 | | 486 U.S. 800 (1988) | | | Coast Automotive Group v. Withum Smith Brown, | Drb4 | | 413 N.J. Super. 363 (App. Div. 2010) | | Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) Drb12 Courier-Post Newspaper v. County of Camden, 413 N.J. Super. 372 (App. Div. 2010)
[brief] *Id.*  This Court did not even mention, let alone apply, [...]’s rule in *Wear*.  Db. 19.  *Wear* was a concurrent causation case where, unlike here, the complaint alleged that the claimants were injured by exposure to multiple environmental toxins, not just mold.  455 N.J. Super. at 445.  Notwithstanding multiple causative agents, the insurer argued that its mold exclusion barred coverage for the entirety of the suit because the exclusion contained anti-concurrent and anti-sequential language such that it was immaterial if the claimants were injured by toxins other than mold.  The trial court found a duty to defend because the complaint alleged an “environmental hazard” “besides mold. ”  *Id.* at 447.  This Court modified that ruling, holding that it was premature for the trial court to rule on the insurer’s duty to defend “since it was unclear, based on the anti-concurrent and anti-sequential language in the exclusion, whether any claims would be covered. ”  455 N.J. Super. at 457.  *Flomerfelt* and *Wear* stand for the unremarkable proposition that the concurrent causation test applies to liability policies.  But this is not a concurrent causation case.
[brief] ”  *Jones v. Haridor Realty Corp.*, 37 N.J. 384, 392 (1962).  Indeed, New Jersey case law is laden with “frequent references in judicial opinions to the remedial objectives of the NJLAD and the breadth with which its policies are to be applied in light of its overall design. ”  *Craig v. Suburban Cablevision*, 274 N.J. Super. 303, 309 (App. Div. 1994), aff’d, 140 N.J. 623 (1995).  As the NJLAD itself provides, it “shall be liberally construed in combination with other protections available under the laws of this State. ”  *N.J.S.A.* 10:5-3.  The “overarching goal of the [NJLAD] is nothing less than the eradication ‘of the cancer of discrimination. ’”  *Fuchilla v. Layman*, 109 N.J. 319, 334 (1988) (quotations omitted).  New Jersey takes this strong stand because unlawful discrimination not only causes significant injury to the victim, “but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic State.
[brief] In his summation, the prosecutor told the jury to do just that.  Thrice the prosecutor urged the jury to compare the way [...] printed his name on the form with the handwriting in the unsigned letters.  Those letters have indicia of reliability, not just from the fingerprints, not just from the handwriting.  If you could compare to Mr. [...]’s Miranda form, you’ll have that in the back room.  You can make your own comparison to that, but also from the tone of the letters and the context of them.  (16T 49-13 to 49-18)
[directive] II.  Determination on Submitting SAFE Kit for Testing  All SAFE kits collected where the victim consents to the release of the evidence to law enforcement, shall be submitted to the lab for testing as soon as possible unless the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or his/her/their attorney designee, or the County Prosecutor or his/her/their attorney designee,7 reviews the case and the evidence, and determines that the result of SAFE/DFSA kit testing will have no bearing on the outcome of the case, or the victim withdraws consent for the evidence to be released to law enforcement.
[brief] Moreover, the Schmidt Court readily acknowledged that Exclusion C5, which excludes coverage for injuries intentionally caused by the insured, did not apply to the facts of that case.  Schmidt, 155 N.J. at 51.  Notwithstanding the fact that Exclusion C5 had nothing to do with the issue before the Court, the Schmidt Court then commented on the purpose of Part Two coverage and suggested, without legal citation or any factual basis, that Part Two of the Policy was intended to provide coverage for claims falling outside the statutory system of compensation, including injuries intentionally caused by fellow employees.
[brief] [...] BY: [...], Esquire - NJ Attorney ID No. 263721970  [...] [...], [...]  TELEPHONE: [...]  FAX: [...]  Email: [...]  Attorney for Defendants/Respondents, [...], Esquire & [...]  [...]  [...], [...], [...], and [...]  Plaintiffs/APPELLANTS, v. NICHOLAS MENAS, ESQ.; COOPER, LEVENSON, APRIL, NIEDELMAN & WAGENHEIM, P.A.; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...], ESQ.; [...]; [...]; [...]; AND [...]  1- 10, JOHN DOES 1-10, AND JANE DOES 1-10 (NAMES BEING FICTIONAL AS TRUE IDENTITIES ARE UNKNOWN)  Defendants/Respondents.
[brief] However, the citizen cannot use greater force in protecting himself from the officer's unlawful force than appears necessary under the circumstances, and he loses his privilege of self-defense if he knows that if he submits to the officer, the officer's excessive use of force will cease.  And, of course, the citizen must reasonably believe that the use of force is necessary to protect himself from the officer’s excessive use of force.  [Ibid. (emphasis added). ]  Further, “the initial force of the arresting officer” is “immaterial. ”  State v. Villanueva, 373 N.J. Super. 588, 599 (App. Div. 2004).  Critically, a defendant cannot claim self-defense where he is the initial aggressor.
[brief] Following remand from the NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT and on grant of leave to appeal from SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW  DIVISION  HUDSON COUNTY, DOCKET NO.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J.Cv.  BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL [...]  Monmouth Executive Center 4 Paragon Way, Suite 100 Freehold, New Jersey  07728 [...] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant, [...]
[brief] Further correction of the account record is clearly warranted.  Numerous identified discrepancies remain unaddressed.  It is time that Probation’s account record be adjudicated comprehensively in its entirety, account errors cleared, and the full extent of credits due Appellant be awarded.  \(^{10}\) Appellate Order of 10/25/2004, docket no. [...].  Given Probation’s demonstrated inability to correct its account record, its inability to provide a “full accounting,” and given the trial court’s reluctance to “do the analysis,” Appellant therefore requests that the Appellate Court remand to the trial court for a hearing to correct the account record from Oct. 1, 1998 through to 5/5/2023 when Probation closed the case.  Appellant therefore respectfully asks the Appellate Court, When will he be provided with the opportunity to face my accuser and present his proofs of Probation account error in a court of law?  When will he have his day in court?  In the alternative, Appellant requests the appellate court to assume jurisdiction of this case so that the Probation account record can be corrected and the credits rightfully due Appellant are provided in compliance with the law and with court Orders.  Appellant asks the Court for the due process to which he is entitled.
[brief] See  Although [...] is ultimately responsible for issuing a HAD, its determinations regarding Exemption #11 are made in consultation with the [...]. \(^3\)  On October 16, 2020, the [...] issued a letter to the [...] stating that it does not object to the [...]’s issuance of Exemption #11 for the Project and finding that [...]’s “efforts to avoid, minimize and mitigate for resource impacts are sufficient to find that the project is consistent with the goals of the Highlands Act.
[brief] [...] filed the six-count Original Complaint on January 17, 2023.  One day later, on January 18, 2023, [...] filed an Amended Complaint that mirrored the Original Complaint, but added non-signatory [...] as another defendant.  (Pa1)  The Amended Complaint asserted claims under: New Jersey Debt Adjustment and Credit Counseling Act (Count 1); the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (Count II); Unjust Enrichment and Disgorgement (Count III); The Truth-In-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (Count IV); the Unauthorized Practice of Law (Count V); and the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) (Count VI).  (Id.).  On April 20, 2023, [...] filed a Motion to Dismiss [...]’ Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim.  (Pa36).  The trial court denied this Motion.  On June 23, 2023, [...] filed an Answer to [...]’ Amended Complaint setting forth affirmative defenses and “reserv[ing] the right to add additional separate defenses .  . . .” (Pa 46).  On September 1, 2023, [...] filed a second Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter, “Motion”) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the existence of a binding arbitration provision.  (Pa62).  On September 28, 2023, [...] filed an Opposition to this Motion.  On October 24, 2023, the trial court held an oral hearing on the Motion.  On December 12, 2023, the trial court entered an Order granting [...]’ Motion to Dismiss and dismissing all claims asserted in [...]’ Amended Complaint against [...] with prejudice.  (Pa65).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE ORDER SUPPRESSING DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT BECAUSE THE MOTION COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT AMBIGUOUSLY INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND DETECTIVE FOSTER FAILED TO CLARIFY WHETHER HE WAS ASKING FOR COUNSEL.  To safeguard the right against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and New Jersey’s common law, a suspect in police custody “must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights” before the police can interrogate him, and the suspect’s “exercise of those rights must be fully honored. ”  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966); State v. O’Neill, 193 N.J. 148, 168 (2007).  Apprising a suspect of his rights and honoring the exercise of those rights is necessary to protect the privilege against self-incrimination because “in-custody [police] interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. ”  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.  While a suspect may waive his rights after having been advised of them and give a statement to police, under New Jersey law the State “must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in light of all the circumstances” in order for the statement to be admissible at trial.  *State v. Presha*, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000).  With respect to the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, honoring the exercise of that right requires that, “[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.
[brief] A: But going to the breeding shed, he never did nothing like that there.  He was a perfect horse.  Q: On all the times in the past he had been a perfect horse?  A: He had been a perfect horse that there.  . . .  Q: . . .  Is it your testimony that on all of the prior occasions when you had walked [...] to the shed he had been perfect?  A: Yes.  Q: So this was the first time, to your knowledge, that he was aggressive while walking to the breeding shed?  A: Yes.  [Pa 710-11].  Indeed, there is no evidence that anyone ever expressed concerns to Defendants about any aggressive, vicious, or dangerous tendencies in [...].
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................................  i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................  iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .......................................................................................................  1  COMBINED STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND MATERIAL FACTS .................................................  4  A.  The Trial Court’s Binding Findings of Fact and Conclusions .................................................. 4  B.  The Trial Court’s Punitive Damage Findings ............................................................................. 9  C.  The Trial Court’s NJRICO Findings .......................................................................................... 14  D.  The 2013 Judgment .................................................................................................................. 17  E.  This Court’s 2018 Opinion and Mandate on Remand ..............................................................  18
[brief] 13  N.J.S.A. 59:4-1(a) ............................................................................................  15 N.J.S.A. 59:4-1(c) ............................................................................................  16  N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 .................................................................................................. 2, 8, 15  N.J.S.A. 59:5-4 ..................................................................................................  2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13  RULES: R. 4:62(e) ..................................................................................................................  1, 3, 5  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] (1T 6-23 to 27-23).  On May 30, 2024, the court rendered its opinion from the bench dismissing the complaint and entering judgment in favor of the Defendant on the counterclaim.  (Pa 65).  1T refers to Transcript dated May 6, 2024  2T refers to Transcript dated May 9, 2024  3T refers to Transcript dated May 30, 2024
[brief] 14  189 N.J. 1, 15 (2006)  19 Rent-A-Center W Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 71 (2010)  12  Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 203 N.J. 586 (2010)  15  Sitogum Holdings Inc. v. Ropes, 352 N.J.Super. 555, 564 (Ch. Div. 2002)  19  Stelluti v. Casebenn Enters. LLC, 203 N.J. 286 (2010)  15  Tessmar v. Grosner, 23 N.J. 193 (1957)  14  Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corp., 231 N.J. 234 (2017)  STATUTES
[brief] In *State v. Williamson*, 138 N.J. 302 (1994), the Supreme Court expressly stated that the statute “requires a motorist to signal a lane change ‘in the event any other traffic may be affected by such movement. ’”  *Id.* at 303 (quoting N.J.S.A. 39:4-126) (first emphasis added).  The Court observed that while the statute “does not require a signal for every lane change,” an officer could validly stop a vehicle if they “have some articulable basis for concluding that the lane change might have an effect on traffic. ”  *Id.* at 304 (emphasis added).  The Court remanded for a determination of whether the defendant’s failure to signal a lane change may have affected other traffic.  *Id.* at 305.  To be sure, the *Williamson* Court’s focus was on the phrase “in the event any other traffic may be affected by such movement,” but the Court explicitly accepted that the signaling requirement applies to lane changes.  And the Court accepted this premise in a case in which it was tasked with interpreting the language of the very statute—indeed the very sentence—that defendant now questions.  This Court has also applied the signaling requirement of the statute to lane changes.  See *State v. Jones*, 326 N.J. Super. 234, 239 (App. Div. 1999) (“N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 requires a motorist to signal a lane change ‘in the event any other traffic may be affected by such movement. ’”); *State v. Garland*, 270 N.J. Super. 31, 42-43 (App. Div. 1994) (“Defendant committed a motor vehicle violation by failing to signal while changing lanes . . .”); *Hornberger v.* American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 351 N.J. Super. 577, 604-05 (App. Div. 2002) (“[A]s the Law Division judge found, the initial stop was justified; the driver . . . admitted that he probably did not use his signal when changing lanes. ”); State v. Casimono, 250 N.J. Super. 173, 178 (App. Div. 1991) (agreeing with trial court that “sudden change of lanes without signaling provided a reasonable basis for the trooper stopping the car”).
[brief] .................................................................  9-11  Knopp v. Rosen, 425 N.J. Super. 391 (App. Div. 2012) .................................................................  6  Leitner v. Toms River Regional School District, 392 N.J.  Super. 80 (App. Div. 2007) ........................................... .2, 14 Lo Re v. Tel-Air Communications, 200 N.J. Super. 59 (App. Div. 1985) ..................................................... 7 Magnet Resources, Inc v Summit MRI Inc. 318 N.J. Super. 275 (App. Div. 1998) .............................................. 6-7 Parker v. Poole, 440 N.J. Super. 7 (App. Div. 2005 ) .................................................................. 5-6 Peterson v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 32 N.J. Super. 23 (App. Div. 1958) ............................................ 7 Ponden v. Ponden, 374 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2004), certif. denied 183 N.J. 212 (2005) .................................. 1-2, 14 Roch v. BM Motoring, 228 N.J. 163 174-175 (2017) ....................................................................... 6 Salazar. MKJGC Design, 458 N.J. Super. 551 (App. Div. 2019) ..................................................................... 1 St. James AME Dev. Corp., 403 N.J. Super. 86 (App. Div. 2008)
[brief] Despite this ruling, the court in [...]’s case held that parole hearings are a more meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on maturation than are adversarial hearings.  First, the court found that the scope of its resentencing was limited to determining the length of parole ineligibility.  (5T9-24 to 10-7)  Per the court, this narrow scope was consistent with Comer: “I don’t read Comer to say that I need to necessarily modify the ultimate sentence.  The question is, giving them an opportunity to be evaluated and potentially released, i.e. parole, within a reasonable period of time. ”  (5T38-5 to 16) (emphasis added).  During argument, the parties disagreed as to whether parole eligibility alone satisfies Comer.  The State agreed with the court: “all Comer asks you to do is give them a meaningful opportunity to express [their rehabilitation] and I believe we’ve done that” by previously reducing their period of parole ineligibility.  (5T39-20 to 24)  Counsel for [...], however, objected that parole was not sufficient, relying on this Court’s language from Thomas\(^2\) that “by any measure parole hearings are a poor substitute” for adversarial hearings in order --- \(^2\)  Defense counsel mistakenly quoted the language of Thomas but attributed the quote to Zuber.  See Thomas, 470 N.J. Super at 196. to satisfy Comer.  (5T54-15 to 20)  The court ultimately ruled in favor of the State, finding that parole eligibility not only satisfies Comer, but is actually a better venue for considering rehabilitation:
[brief] 35 Marschall v. Marschall, 195 N.J. Super. 16, 33, 477 A.2d 833 (Ch. Div. 1984) ..................... 46 Monte v. Monte 212 N.J. Super. 557, 515A.2d 1233 (App. Div. 1986) cert. denied, 133 N.J. 432 (1993)