ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 33  APPENDIX OF APPELLANTS BERKELEY TOWNSHIP, CARMEN F. AMATO, JR., TED MCFADDEN, DEBBI WINOGRACKI AND JOHN A. CAMERA VOLUME I PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND, FILED NOVEMBER 20, 2018…………………………… DA-001 DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER, FILED JANUARY 15, 2019..  DA-013 PLAINTIFF’S CERTIFIED ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES, DATED OCTOBER 19, 2019, SERVED UNDER COVER LETTER DATED DECEMBER 15, 2019………………………………………………………  DA-020 EMAIL OF JANUARY 2, 2018, FROM JOHN CAMERA TO PLAINTIFF REGARDING THE MUNICIPAL ALLIANCE GRANT…………………………………………… DA-047, 070 JANUARY 25, 2018, LETTER OF REPRESENTATION FROM THE LAW OFFICE OF ROSEMARIE ARNOLD ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF…………………………………  DA-071 PERSONNEL ACTION FORM (PAF) APPOINTING DEFENDANT DEBBI WINOGRACKI RECREATION  DEPARTMENT SUPERVISOR EFFECTIVE FEBRUARY 20, 2018………………………………………………………  DA-074 REPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT, BRUCE BOLTUCH, DATED MAY 19, 2020………………………………………  DA-075 JURY VERDICT SHEET………………………………………  DA-079 ORDER OF JUDGMENT, FILED MAY 26, 2023………..  DA-083 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, FILED JUNE 13, 2023………………………………………  DA-085  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998); see Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. V. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016) (Templo Fuente) ("we review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo under the same standard as the trial court,” and we accord "no special deference to the legal determinations of the trial court").  The trial court must not decide issues of fact: it must decide only whether any such issues exist.  Brill v. Guardian Life. Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954); R. 4:46-5.  Summary judgment should not be granted where the adjudication of such a motion would constitute what is in effect a trial by pleadings and affidavits involving issues of fact.  Shanley & Fisher, P.C. v. Sisselman, 215 N.J. Super. 200, 211-12 (App. Div. 1987).  Summary judgment serves the valid purpose in our judicial system of protecting against groundless claims and frivolous defenses, however, it is not a substitute for a full plenary trial.  United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen, 35 N.J. 193, 195-96 (1961).  Accordingly, summary judgment should be denied unless the right thereto appears so clearly as to leave no room for controversy.  Sisselman, supra, 215 N.J. Super. at 212.
[brief] Various witnesses testified that the next day, during a lineup, [...] made numerous threatening comments.  (Pa011a).  The ALJ found them to be credible based on their demeanor and tone on the stand.  (Pa011a-Pa012a).  Each of those individuals testified that [...] threatened [...] and [...]’s family with physical violence.  (Pa126a-127a).  These statements are only contradicted by [...], who the ALJ rightfully deemed not credible, as [...] clearly had a personal relationship with [...] and his statements did not match any other witness.
[directive] For New Jersey law enforcement purposes, a bias incident is defined as any suspected or confirmed violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1(a)(1) or (2).1  Some suspected bias incidents may not clearly fit the described definition.  In those cases, a common sense approach to the incident must be used.  If an incident appears to be bias-based, it should be investigated and reported as such.  Verification of motive and intent can be made during the ensuing investigation.  Law enforcement officers must recognize that a single bias incident may initially appear as less serious when viewed in the larger context of all crime.  Nonetheless, any suspected or confirmed bias incident is serious by its very nature.  What may appear to be a minor incident can easily escalate into a larger problem or public safety concern.  4.  REQUIREMENT TO REPORT ALL BIAS INCIDENTS
[brief] We note also that the trial judge did not address which party had the burden of proof on this issue.  In our view the burden of proof to change the designated beneficiary of an insurance policy is upon the party seeking to upset the beneficiary designation.  See *Woehr v. Travelers Ins. Co.* 134 N.J.Eq. 38, 40-41, 34 A.2d 136 (Ch.1943) (" ...one who makes claim to the insurance moneys by virtue of an alleged change of beneficiary must carry the burden of proving that the substitution was permitted by the policy and that the change was made in strict compliance with the terms of the policy").  In the Matter of the Estate of [...] v [...], Docket No. [...], decided February 18, 2018, the Appellant Division stated the following:
[brief] In fact, [...] recognized that it was the Board who previously tried to invite the general public into the negotiations sessions, to only be rebuffed by the [...].  The Board’s reference to the [...]’s article is unpersuasive here, as it previously was before [...].  [...]’s decision acknowledged the article, recognizing that the reference to “open bargaining” was in the context of opening up the bargaining process to all of a bargaining unit’s members.  (Pa223-Pa225).  The Board here editorialized the article to suggest that the [...] is trying to intimidate the board of education with the [...].  Interestingly, though, the Board does not provide any citations or evidence in support of these claims.  Indeed, if the Board here could have demonstrated any actual intimidation which put the Board at fear for their safety or security, [...]’s decision provides it with grounds for contesting the [...]’s presence.  But there was no credible evidence presented of such a situation in the last round of bargaining or now.  Within this argument, we see the real reason why the Board has spent over two years fighting the [...]’s presence.
[brief] To protect the “essential workers” summoned to work during the State of Emergency, New Jersey passed N.J.S.A. 34:15-31 (the “Covid Presumption Statute”).  (Pa1).  The presumption statute identified classes of workers who were entitled to a presumption of causal relationship if they contracted Covid-19 during the period of the State of Emergency delineated by N.J. Executive Orders.  The fact that a given individual fell into a “class” or had a “status” as an essential worker did not relieve them of the duty to prove that they actually contracted Covid 19 during the period of the State of Emergency and did not relieve them of the duty to prove that the infection caused permanent injury, or in this case, death.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.  In making her determination that Petitioner’s Decedent had the requisite status as an essential worker, [...] was cognizant that Decedent’s status as a full time, in the classroom teacher, was (and remains), admitted by the parties.  (Ra, Vol. I, pages1-3; 2T93-21 to 25).  It is also undisputed that the N.J. State of Emergency was in effect during the entire time of Decedent’s occupational exposure (January 2022 through May 18, 2022, when she passed away).  (N.J. Executive Order #103, Pa18 to 23).  In sum, the statute relieved “essential workers” who contracted Covid during the Covid State of Emergency from having to prove that their Covid infection was causally related to their work.  Perhaps most importantly, the presumption statute relieved “essential workers” from having to eliminate every possible vector of the virus that could have caused their infection as part of their prima facie case.  The remedial legislation shifted the burden as to causal relationship to their employer.  In a rational analysis, it would be well-nigh impossible for any essential worker to prove the specific viral vector came from the workplace as opposed to every other possible contact in the essential worker’s life.  Furthermore, the Respondent does not claim that [...] inappropriately took Judicial Notice of any documents filed in support of Petitioner’s essential worker motion.  Every item of Judicial Notice that was recognized by [...] in making her determination has been unopposed throughout the motion proceedings and throughout this appeal.  Statute Allows Respondent to Rebut The Presumption
[brief] The public policy favoring arbitration over litigation formed the backdrop against which the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Cole, 215 NJ 265 (2013), which, as noted above, is the leading case on the topic of waiver of a contractual arbitration provision.  “Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right. ”  Knorr v. Smeal, 178 NJ 169, 177 (2003).  In Cole, the Court held that while parties may waive their right to arbitrate in certain circumstances, such a waiver is “never presumed. ”  Cole, 215 NJ at 276.  The Supreme Court went on to hold:  “An agreement to arbitrate a dispute ‘can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence that the party asserting [arbitration] chose to [litigate] in a different forum. ’”  Id (emphasis added)(quoting Spaeth v. Srinivasan, 403 NJ Super 508, 514 (App. Div. 2008).  The Supreme Court further noted that determining whether a party has waived their right to arbitration is a fact-sensitive analysis.  Cole, 215 NJ at 277.  The focus is on the totality of the circumstances.  Id at 280.  In conducting the analysis, the Supreme Court instructed courts to consider, among others, seven (7) factors, none of which are dispositive.  Id at 280-81.  Those seven (7) factors are: (1) the delay in making the arbitration request; (2) the filing of any motions, particularly dispositive motions, and their outcomes; (3) whether the delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party’s litigation strategy; (4) the extent of discovery conducted; (5) whether the party raised the arbitration issue in its pleadings, particularly as an affirmative defense, or provided other notification of its intent to seek arbitration; (6) the proximity of the date on which the party sought arbitration to the date of trial; and (7) the resulting prejudice suffered by the other party, if any.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................. iii LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I: RESPONDENT FAILS TO RECOGNIZE SEVERAL IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW ............. 1 POINT II: RESPONDENT DOES NOT ADDRESS ITS VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, NOR ITS VIOLATION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES, AND THEREFORE, THOSE ISSUES ARE WAIVED IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT .................... 2 POINT III: THE ENTIRETY OF THE SITUATION DEMONSTRATES THAT THE PENALTY OF REMOVAL WAS NOT WARRANTED ....... 8 CONCLUSION ................................................................. 15 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## CASES - **Mayflower Security Co. v. Bureau of Security** ........................................... 1 - **A.Z. ex rel. B.Z. v. Higher Education Student Assistance Authority** ............. 1 - **Department of Health v. Tegnazian** ......................................................... 1 - **Board of Regents v. Roth** ........................................................................ 2, 4 - **Nicoletta v. North Jersey District Water Supply Commission** .................... 2, 3, 4, 5 - **Bishop v. Wood** ......................................................................................
[brief] (Pa372) 193:5-23.  Notwithstanding, [...] continued his jealous fits by falsely implying that Appellant was kissing [...] at work.  (Pa995).  On another occasion, [...] came into Appellant’s office and made a comment about kissing her, which Appellant rejected.  She responded, “Let’s not go there,” obviously rejecting the sexual advance.  (Pa230, Pa378) 216:4-24.  Appellant again repeatedly told [...] that his text messages and comments made were inappropriate.  (Pa373) 195:2-20.  [...] also physically touched Appellant.  (Pa348-49, Pa379) 96:25-99:2, 221:1-221:9.
[brief] Abbott v. Burke, 196 N.J. 544, 551-52 (2008) (“Abbott XIX”); Abbott v. Burke, 206 N.J. 332, 350-51 (2011) (“Abbott XXI”).  [...], it neither asked for, nor was granted, relief from the obligation to remedy the Abbott T&E violation on the grounds that it had finally eliminated the extreme educational harms to [...]’s students.  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 145; Abbott XXI, 206 N.J. at 354-55.
[directive] 5.  The Independent Investigator must release the LE Incident Footage within 20 days of the LE Incident, unless the Attorney General, or  For example, the Independent Investigator will blur the faces of juveniles and images of first responders 5 rendering medical aid.  Page 11 designee, authorizes a delayed release.  The Independent Investigator may seek a delayed release if, for example, additional time is needed to interview all available material witnesses, complete other essential investigative steps, review or redact videos to protect privacy interests, or conduct a safety assessment associated with the public release of the video.
[brief] | Document Number | Finding | |-----------------|---------| | 11644-19059 | Draft Complaint with redline changes and comments.  RFP 2 seeks specific communications between Plaintiffs and certain third parties, none of which are counsel.  RFP 4 seeks documents relating to the performance administration and termination of the Recompute MOA.  RFP 11 appears to seek communications sent to and from [...] and internal communications regarding the termination of the 2005 Recompute MOA.  These requests do not seek draft complaints related to this lawsuit.  Moreover, RFPs 17-25 request documents regarding specific allegations in the Complaint and not the executive summaries regarding this litigation in its entirety.  This document is not responsive to [...]'s RFPs 2, 4, 11, 17, 23, 24 or 25.
[brief] Based thereon, Respondent’s appraiser failed to make a negative adjustment to his comparable sales to reflect the risk and cost of obtaining multiple variances to develop the subject Property as a mixed use development.  The adjustments which Respondent claims were made represent an incomplete analysis by Respondent’s appraiser.  It is not enough to merely “account for the differences between the status of approvals of the comparable sales and the [...] property” (Db3 [emphasis added]) but Respondent’s appraisal was also required to apply a negative adjustment for the variances that would be required to construct Respondent’s proposed Highest and Best Use under the existing R-2 zoning.  Therefore, had the trial court utilized the correct standard regarding the applicable zoning as discussed *supra*, Respondent should have been barred from presenting such speculative “evidence” to the jury.
[brief] Notwithstanding Defendant’s misreading and rewrite of the PSA, examination of other PSA provision show the error in Defendant’s interpretation of the prompt delivery language, while proving Plaintiff’s interpretation is correct.  One pertains to the requirement for providing a Subordination and Non-Disturbance and Attornment Agreement.  Within the same paragraph requiring the estoppel, 13.10(a), is paragraph 13.10 (b) and it stated:  Seller shall send to any required Tenant under the Leases, and request that such Required Tenant execute and return, a subordination, non-disturbance and attornment agreement (“SNDA”) as may be required by Purchaser or Purchaser’s lender.  Seller shall commercially [sic] reasonable efforts to obtain an SNDA from the commercial tenant under the Leases prior to the Closing.  Provided Seller uses diligent and good faith efforts to obtain the SNDA from the commercial tenant under the Leases, Seller shall not be deemed in default of this Agreement in the event such Required tenant does not deliver the SNDA as required hereunder, it being agreed that the sole remedy of Purchaser in the event Seller does not the [sic] SNDA shall be to terminate this Agreement and receive a refund of the Down Payment.
[brief] Regardless of Whether the [...] Guarantees Landlords a Value-Based Return on Equity, the Board Was Not Required to Follow [...]’s Methodology for Calculating a Hardship Rent Increase.  Hoboken’s rent control ordinance does not guarantee landlords a return on equity investment based on the dollar market value of the rent-controlled unit, nor does it explicitly identify a particular method for calculating equity.  [...] has argued that they are entitled to a rent increase based largely on an annual return on equity derived from [...]’s unit’s tax assessed value.  There is no reason grounded in law to conclude that the Board was required to follow such an approach.  The NJ Supreme Court has long been skeptical of the accuracy of attempts to measure a landlord’s just and reasonable return on investment using an approximated current value of the rent-controlled unit.  In *Troy Hills*, it noted that “[t]hree methods are conventionally used for valuing real property: depreciated replacement cost, market value based on sales of comparable properties, and capitalized income…[though] [n]one of these methods is wholly suitable to the problem of determining value. ”  *Troy Hills*, 68 N.J. at 625-26.  The Court instructed that it was important to consider their limitations, and noted there could be other valuation methods, such as “assessed valuation or original cost depreciated.
[brief] Defendant, [...], issued plaintiff a title commitment dated March 7, 2019.  By its terms, the commitment was not an agreement.  Instead, it was an offer to issue a title insurance policy to plaintiff protecting plaintiff’s title to specific land against certain risks.  There is no dispute that plaintiff is identified in the commitment as the person to whom Chicago Title proposed to issue a policy.  There is no dispute the commitment required a deed transferring title to the property in question from [...] and [...], husband and wife, to plaintiff.  There is no dispute that plaintiff arranged for a transfer of title from [...] and [...] to [...] alone.  Plaintiff never received a deed to the property.  There is no dispute the commitment states that unless all of its requirements are met, the offer of an insurance policy expires after 180 days.  There is no dispute that more than 180 days have passed since the effective date of the commitment.  There is no dispute there is no deed transferring the property to plaintiff.  There is no dispute that under the express terms of the commitment [...] does not owe plaintiff a title insurance policy or payment of a policy limit.  There is, therefore, no “collateral contract” between plaintiff, [...] and defendant, [...].  Based on the foregoing, plaintiff’s claim of error in the trial court is baseless and we urge this court to reject it and dismiss plaintiff’s appeal.
[brief] (30T 241-23 to 242-11).  Although they agreed that [...] should get rid of the murder weapon, [...] decided to keep it in case something went wrong.  (30T 242-9 to 242-23).  On March 6, 2018, Defendant left the Comfort Inn and [...] did not see him again until he picked him up in Ewing on March 8.  (30T 243-8 to 243-23).  Defendant and [...] drove to New York where they got matching tattoos, at Defendant’s suggestion, with the words “Loyalty is Royalty”.  [...] said they both knew implicitly at the time – but also later talked about explicitly – that the words meant that they were bonded by the secret of [...]’s murder.  (30T 250-15 to 252-23).  Defendant also received a tattoo of teardrops on his face which he told [...] symbolized the murder of [...].  (30T 253-1 to 253-24).  At trial, [...] identified Defendant in a picture extracted from [...]’s cellphone where he can be seen with both tattoos, and he also identified these tattoos in other pictures of Defendant.  (30T 260-7 to 262-16).
[brief] [Id. at 25-26.  (emphasis added). ]  The Friedman court elaborated, noting that “This ordinance, however, cannot proscribe reasonable noises associated with common, acceptable behavior.  Such an application would deprive defendants of due process. ”  State v. Friedman, 304 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (App. Div. 1997)(citing Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971))(emphasis added).  In this matter, the trial court correctly found that the Noise Ordinance’s general prohibition of “any unnecessary and unreasonable loud, disturbing noise which is plainly audible and either annoys, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, health or welfare of others…”, as well as the specific prohibitions of “loud talking” and “other noises” strayed too far over the bounds of permissible regulation and into the realm of prohibiting common, acceptable behavior.
[brief] Critically, Defendants have no obligation to correctly determine whether [...] entered and received the charge pay without authorization.  See Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2013).  “This burden is relatively light and is satisfied if the employer provides evidence, which, if true, would permit a conclusion that it took the adverse employment action for a non-discriminatory reason. ”); see also Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether [retaliatory] animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent. ”).  Defendants have more than met their burden to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for [...]’s termination.
[directive] 10.  A plaintiff is a person or corporation [or other entity] who has initiated a lawsuit.  Do you have a bias for or against a plaintiff simply because he or she has brought a lawsuit?  11.  (a)  A defendant is a person or corporation [or other entity] against whom a lawsuit has been brought.  Do you have a bias for or against a defendant simply because a lawsuit has been brought against him or her?  [Ask if applicable]  (b)  The defendant is a corporation.  Under the law, a corporation is entitled to be treated the same as anyone else and is entitled to be treated the same as a private individual.  Would any of you have any difficulty in accepting that principle?  12.  The court is aware that there has been a great deal of public discussion about something called Tort Reform (laws that restrict the right to sue or Model Civil Jury Voir Dire Questions Revised as Promulgated by Directive #4-07 Page 3 of 11 limit the amount recovered).
[brief] (8T:23-9 to 24-4).  Defendant fails to demonstrate that the jury was prejudiced or mistaken in their assessment of [...]’s credibility.  (See State v. Haines, 20 N.J. 438, 446-47 (1956)(finding that a reviewing court may not disturb a jury’s verdict grounded on its assessment of witness credibility absent “clear evidence on the face of the record that the jury was mistaken or prejudiced.