ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE [...] WAS REQUIRED TO OBTAIN THE CONSENT OF [...] AS A PRECONDITION OF AMENDING ITS REDEVELOPMENT PLAN  290  Ocean, LLC and the City of Long Branch argue that the Appellant has misconstrued Long Branch Ordinance § 345-98 (Pa979) and section 15 of the Redevelopment Plan (Pa156) which require that if a Redevelopment Plan is “amended after the disposition of any land in the Redevelopment Area, the modification must be consented to in writing by designated developers. ” (Emphasis added).  Respondents’ construction ignores the use of the word “any,” and the use of the plural, “developers. ”  Moreover, Respondents’ crabbed construction would render the Ordinance and Plan provisions superfluous.  This is because, irrespective of the Ordinance language, the City would need the consent of the designated redeveloper in order to amend a Plan to the detriment of that redeveloper since an amendment of the Plan could not impact a Redevelopment Agreement without that consent.  Rather than focus on the words of the Ordinance and the Redevelopment Plan, as they are required to do, Respondents raise a number of specious arguments.  Blackridge is not looking to “stifle competition. ” (Ocean brief, at p. 40).  It merely desires to assure that all developers compete under the same set of rules.  That assurance, rather than stifle competition, encourages redevelopers to take risks under a known and stable zoning regime.  And while Respondents suggest that such protection is unnecessary because development would proceed without that protection, the whole premise of the LRHL is to remedy the lack of development in challenged areas.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-2(a).  See also Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 370 (1958).  The notion that Blackridge ceased to be a redeveloper once its project was completed, as the trial Judge determined and Respondents argue, is inconsistent with two provisions of the LRHL.
[brief] The Ordinance specifically provides that the Board, “may waive any provision of this 142-76B(26), environmental impact assessment, if deemed not applicable. ”  Robbinsville Township Ordinance 142-77B(26)(g).  (Pa254-Pa265).  However, the authority to waive the requirement for an Environmental Impact Assessment was not exercised in the present case, instead, the Board properly deferred consideration of any environmental and other impacts until its review of [...]’s Application for Site Plan Approval.
[brief] Exhibit 2  Excerpts from Plaintiff’s Appraisal Report .........................................................  Da411  Exhibit 3  [...] 04/07/21  Engineering Report...  Da310  Exhibit 4  [...] Appraisal Report Dated 05/06/21Da235 Exhibit 5  Review of Engineering Evaluation Impacts of Seawall Construction prepared by [...] (A. [...]) by [...], Dated 10/21/21.............
[brief] *State v. Cain*, 224 N.J. 410, 413 (2016); *U.S. Const.* amend. V, VI, and XIV; *N.J. Const.* art. I, ¶ 10.  “N.J.R.E. 702 governs the admission of expert testimony. ”  *J.L.G.*, 234 N.J. at 279.  “To satisfy the rule, the proponent of expert evidence must establish three things: (1) the subject matter of the testimony must be ‘beyond the ken of the average juror’; (2) the field of inquiry ‘must be at a state of the art such that an expert’s testimony could be sufficiently reliable’; and (3) ‘the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the’ testimony.
[brief] •  In response to Defendants’ --- 24 Plaintiff could not recall who the person he was speaking with, despite claiming having discussions on a monthly basis, about his alleged unpaid fees.  Plaintiff never identified [...] in his interrogatories as a person with knowledge of facts in this case.  In fact, Plaintiff tried to subpoena a [...], not “Zhellandkovah”, a month after the Discovery End Date on June 21, 2022, which the trial court quashed for the same reasons.  owed sums that form the basis of this lawsuit.  Plaintiff claims this occurred on February 22, 2019.  See Plaintiff’s Affidavit at paragraphs 9-13.  request for admissions, Plaintiff admitted that from February 8, 2018 through the filing of this lawsuit, he did not communicate with Defendants regarding any alleged outstanding amounts claimed to be owed to him.  See Plaintiff RFA response #22 attached as Exhibit L to the [...] Cert.  •
[directive] Date  Judge Prosecutor's Office: Defendant's Attorney: ----------------- ----------------- Name Name ---------------- -----------------  Address Address ____________ ____________  Telephone Number _ Telephone Number _ ------------------ ------------------ Fax Fax ----------------- -----------------  Em Em ail ail _________  If D No yes, language _ Interpreter needed? D Yes _________  If D No yes, describe _ ADA accommodation needed?  D Yes  Published Directive# (11/01/2018), CN: 12330 (Competency Order 6A) of2 by 17~18 page 2  Attachment 8 of Order #6B - Order Mandating the Transfer the Defendant from the Care and Custody of the Commissioner of Health to a Correctional Facility (Defendant Detained)
[brief] (Pb10).  See Williams v. N.J. Dep’t. of Corr., 423 N.J. Super. 176, 183 (App. Div. 2011) (“an agency’s interpretations, whether through regulations or administrative actions, ‘cannot alter the terms of a legislative enactment, nor can they frustrate the policy embodied in [a] statute’” [internal citations omitted]).  Similarly, such an interpretation of the statute would render the Legislature’s usage of the language “designated representatives” completely meaningless, despite the well-settled holding that “[e]ach word in the statute must be given its plain meaning; no word should be rendered inoperative or superfluous. ”  Macysyn v. Hensler, 329 N.J. Super. 476, 484 (App. Div. 2000) (internal citation omitted).  Elsewhere in its brief, the [...] asserts that [...]’s underlying determination should be upheld pursuant to the [...]’s (“[...]”) holdings in I/M/O [...], 45 MLC 185 (2019) (“Belmont I”) and I/M/O [...], 48 MLC 107 (“Belmont II” (Db24).
[brief] DA at 348a et seq.  [...]’s proposed 69kV Project for both b2933 and s1823 combined will require the replacement of hundreds of existing 26kV poles with poles that are significantly taller than the existing poles.  DA at 348a et seq.  This is apparently necessary to allow the new higher voltage 69kV lines to be placed on the same pole above the existing 26kV lines that are currently in place.  Id.  While [...] has previously publicly stated that the poles will be approximately 65 feet high (in contrast to the approximately 30 feet height they are now), at least 13 poles will in fact be 75 feet high.  DA at 378a – 379a.  In 2019, [...] initially approached the Town about routing a 69kV line through the municipality and presented it as being required by their regulatory authority and necessary for continued electric service, when in fact only the creation of another connection and not the route desired by [...] was required by their regulatory authority.
[brief] And this remedy did far more than right the unintentional discovery violation; it effectively granted defendant immunity from being prosecuted for attempting to meet up with an underage boy for sex.  All of [...]’s findings were thus 5  We also now know that [...] has permanently deleted “[...]’s” profile from their server and the State has no ability to retrieve it.  (Pa39).  Defendant’s case has, in effect, been dismissed with prejudice.  Cf. State v. Zadroga, 255 N.J. 114, 140-41 (2023) (recognizing in double jeopardy context that “denying courts power” to try a defendant for a crime frustrates “the purpose of law to protect society from those guilty of crimes”).  a misapplication of applicable law and a clear abuse of discretion and should be reversed on appeal.
[brief] ..............................................4, 10 Reagan v. City of New Brunswick, 305 N.J. Super. 242 (App. Div. 1997)  .............8  Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J.  474 (1974) .......................5  Seacoast Realty Co. v. W. Long Branch Borough (Monmouth Cty), 14 N.J. Tax 197 (1994) ..................................................................................................................5, 9  Shaw v. Bender, 90 N.J.L. 147 (E. & A. 1917) ............................................................10  United States Plywood Corp. v. Neidlinger, 41 N.J. 66 (1963) .................................9  Williams v. Vito, 365 N.J. Super. 225 (Law Div. 2003)  ..............................................7  Wolkoff v. Villane, 288 N.J. Super. 282 (App. Div. 1996)  ........................................8, 10
[brief] N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.  “Government records” are defined extremely broadly in keeping with the mandates of OPRA.  See, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1  “Emails” are the individual electronic communications someone has sent or received.  “Email logs” are the list of the emails with sender, recipient, subject, date, attachments, etc…  Without a log it is nigh-impossible for a requester to seek specific emails or often even formulate a request that is specific enough to obtain the emails they may ultimately be seeking.  Our Supreme Court has said that even if the government does not regularly create an email log, the information that comprises it is already a government record.  Paff v. Galloway, 229 N.J. 340, 353 (2017)  An “email log” lists the date, the sender, the recipient, anyone copied (“cc”) or blind copied (“bcc”), the subject line of the email and that if anything is attached.  See generally, PA-13  The email logs are particularly important, because under the GRC-established criteria announced in Elcavage v. West Milford Twp.(Passaic), GRC Complaint No.2009-07 (April 2010) which is adhered to by all courts - not by force of precedent, but simply the sensible logic - requiring that a valid request for a specific email must contain: (1) the content and/or subject of the email, (2) the specific date or range of dates during which the email(s) were transmitted, and (3) the identity of the sender and/or the recipient thereof.  Without an email log, knowing the details of specific emails in order to make a request is just not possible.  The threshold question in an OPRA claim is whether the plaintiff has requested "government records" pursuant to the statute.  O'Shea v. Twp. of West Milford, 410 N.J. Super. 371, 380 (App. Div.2009)  And the term government record... .....means any paper, written or printed book, document, drawing, map, plan, photograph, microfilm, data processed or image processed document, information stored or maintained electronically or by sound-recording or in a similar device, or any copy thereof, that has been made, maintained or kept on file in the course of his or its official business by any officer, commission, agency or authority of the State or of any political subdivision thereof, including subordinate boards thereof, or that has been received in the course of his or its official business by any such officer, commission, agency, or authority of the State or of any political subdivision thereof, including subordinate boards thereof.  N.J.S.A.47:1A-1.1
[directive] No law enforcement officer shall share, either directly or indirectly (i.e., through another person), any information learned in the course of the use-of-force investigation with any witness without authorization.  Nor shall any law enforcement officer who was a witness to the use-of-force incident receive any such information from any sworn or civilian employee of a law enforcement agency without first obtaining authorization from the authority in charge of the investigation or their designee.  If any law enforcement officer learns of such an unauthorized dissemination or receipt of information, then they must immediately report that to the authority in charge of the investigation or their designee.  7.11.6
[brief] It is well established on a dispositive motion filed pursuant to the Tort Claims Act that the trial court is required to make a preliminary determination as to whether the alleged condition of property at issue meets all the Act’s requirements as to a “dangerous condition. ”  Polyard v. Terry, 160 N.J. Super. 497, 508 aff’d o.b., 79 N.J. 547 (1979), overruled in part on other grounds, Castel Cap. Corp. v. Fireco of N.J., 81 N.J. 489 (1980).  Otherwise, the legislatively-decreed restrictive approach to liability against public entities under the Act would be illusory and meaningless.  Polyard, 160 N.J. Super. at 124; Maslo v. City of Jersey City, 346 N.J. Super. 346, 350 (App. Div. 2002) (a judge considering a motion for summary judgment as to a claim under the Act should take into account the declared legislative policy which shaped the application and interpretation of the Act and the Commission’s Comment to N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 that recognized the difficulties inherent in a public entity’s responsibility for maintaining its vast amounts of public property).  As noted above, the Legislature purposely made it arduous for a person to establish liability against a public entity over an alleged “dangerous condition” because of the vast amounts of property a public entity bears responsibility.  The Legislature, therefore, provided that a public entity does not have to do all that a private person or private entity may be required to do under the law.  N.J.S.A. 59:1-2.  Rather, a public entity can only be held liable as specifically provided by the Act.  Ibid.  The polestar of the Act is that public entity immunity is the general rule and liability is the exception.  Coyne v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 182 N.J. 481, 488 (2005) (“The guiding principle of the [Act] is that ‘immunity from tort liability is the general rule and liability is the exception’”; “‘The theme of the Act is immunity for public entities with liability as the exception’”; “‘When both liability and immunity appear to exist, the latter trumps the former’”).  B.
[brief] The Settlement Agreement indisputably places the salary increases only for the last three years of her employment despite her claim that the alleged discriminatory action began in 1997, and it includes an agreed upon her May 1, 2021 retirement.  (Pa32-Pa33; Pa51-Pa53).  All of the foregoing led the Board to reasonably conclude that the retroactive salary increases were extra compensation made primarily in anticipation of retirement and thus not creditable.  (Pa11-Pa13).  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] (Id. at 9 (citing [...] Decl. ¶ 9), 18).  On May 6, 2021, defendants served objections to the April 22, 2021, Depo Notice, but only as to issue numbers 1, 3, and 4 as identified in Exhibit A of the Depo Notice.  (Id. (citing [...] Decl. ¶ 3)).  They objected to each of these three issues on the same grounds: vague and ambiguous with respect to one or more of the issue’s undefined terms; not relevant to the subject matter of the litigation; fails to describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination; unreasonably broad and unduly burdensome; calls for information protected by the attorney-client information, the work product doctrine, or other applicable privileges; no good cause exists to justify inquiry into issues of document preservation; and the issue could be addressed in a less burdensome way, such as through written discovery.
[brief] Notably, although Plaintiff claims that “the defendant corporations acted through their directors and officers,” and contends that [...] is “one of the decisionmakers who retaliated against plaintiff,” by his own admission, Plaintiff is not seeking to depose [...]—a nonparty—in his capacity as a director of the corporate entities, but rather in his individual capacity.  As [...] is a non-party, located in Germany, whom Plaintiff wants to depose in his individual capacity, it is wholly appropriate to require that Plaintiff comply with the manner in which discovery is taken in Germany on a non-party, who has not participated in this litigation, rather than permit Plaintiff to short-circuit the process by serving a deposition notice on entities that do not control [...] and will not be bound by his testimony (as he would be testifying as a fact witness and not on behalf of the corporate Defendants).
[brief] THE WRONG STANDARD OF LAW IN RULING THAT PORTIONS OF THE ORDINANCE ARE INVALID AS A MATTER OF LAW (Raised below at DA 52a at ¶ 8; DA382a at Interrogatory No. 13; T.6:23-7:8; T.27:9 – 28:4)  Indispensable to the ruling by the court below is its conclusion that because the b2933 project was essential to providing adequate service to [...]’s customers, portions of the Ordinance are facially invalid.  The undisputed facts show that [...] never applied for a permit from [...] for the 69kV line it wanted to construct.  Likewise, it never sought any exemption from any of the Ordinance’s requirements as permitted under the Ordinance.  As a result, neither the [...] (provided for in the Ordinance) nor the [...] were able to apply the Ordinance or its exemptions to [...]’s proposed 69kV line.  With [...] having prevented [...] from determining how the Ordinance would be applied to this specific project, [...]’s challenge to the Ordinance’s validity was not, and could not, be a challenge to the Ordinance “as applied. ”
[brief] Second, the cases defendant relies on are readily distinguishable because they all involved mandatory sentences of life without parole.  See In Re Monschke, 482 P.3d 276, 288 (Wash. 2021) (extending Miller protections through age twenty for defendants sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole); People v. Parks, 987 N.W.2d 161, 171 (Mich. 2022) (extending Miller protections through age eighteen for defendants sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole); *Commonwealth v. Mattis*, 224 N.E.3d 410, 415, 428 (Mass. 2024) (banning mandatory life-without-parole sentences for defendants through age twenty).  Defendant's case does not present the issue of whether a young adult offender can be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.  Indeed, defendant was not sentenced to life without parole.  Instead, he will be eligible for parole after an aggregate term of forty years in prison.  Here, as [...] noted below in denying defendant's motion, defendant was not sentenced to life without parole.  (Da26).  Instead, he will be eligible for parole after an aggregate term of forty years in prison—thirty years on his felony murder conviction, and a consecutive term of ten years on his armed robbery conviction.  Under these circumstances, defendant's reliance on cases involving the "harshest possible penalty" of life without the possibility of parole is misplaced.  See *Miller*, 567 U.S. at 479.  Further, defendant's out-of-state cases are inapposite considering the remedy he seeks.  *Monschke*, *Parks*, and *Mattis* might offer persuasive support for extending *Miller* to offenders who were eighteen years old or above when they committed their crimes.  But that is not what defendant seeks from this Court; he argues instead that defendants sentenced for crimes committed at age nineteen should be entitled to the *Comer* twenty-year look-back.  (Db24).  To so extend Comer, this Court would first have to disregard clear New Jersey Supreme Court precedent that Miller's protections do not extend to defendants sentenced for crimes committed when those defendants were over the age of eighteen.  Ryan, 249 N.J. at 596.  After accepting that Miller protections should apply to defendants sentenced for crimes committed at age nineteen, this Court would then have to extend the Comer look-back period accordingly.  There is simply no justification for such a departure from controlling New Jersey precedent.
[brief] Appellate review of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court.  *Samolyk v. Berthe*, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022).  Appellate courts “consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)).  Summary judgment must be granted if the record shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  *Ibid.*; R. 4:46-2(c).  “Summary judgment should be granted, in particular, . . . ‘against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. ’”  *Friedman v. Martinez*, 242 N.J. 450, 472 (2020) (quoting  *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment because the common law standard for strict liability for injuries caused by domestic animals requires evidence of past behavior by [...] that would have provided reasonable grounds for believing he might suddenly attack Plaintiff and there is no evidence any such behavior was ever observed or reported.  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**
[brief] The one multi-family use that is adjacent to the immediate west of the applicant’s property is [...] townhouse development.  This development contains 144 attached residential units on ⁹  According to the Board Planner, the highest density allowed in any zone in the Township was 14 units per acre.  6T 127:4-14  As to density, the Board found that the [...] application for 165 housing units on 8.1 acres resulted in a density of 20.1 units per acre.  Da137.  (emphasis added).  roughly 44 acres, representing a density of approximately 3 units per acre.  Da137.  Separately, the Board found that having a three-story facility in a residential zone was detrimental, that applicant failed to explain why it could not design it within 2½ stories, and that a nearby facility was on two floors, as follows:  33.  Moreover, the ordinance only provides for 2½ story buildings, while applicant proposes a three story building.
[brief] It provides for the redevelopment of the Property in manner consistent with the Master Plan, including uses that are prescribed for the Property.  The Amended Redevelopment Plan eliminates only 50 residential units, but keeps the same number of affordable housing units.  There was testimony from the Borough’s planner that the proposal complies with three objectives set forth in the 2019 Master Plan Reexamination Report.  [...] also noted that though there was no testimony as to Objective One, (“All vacant and abandoned parcels of land should be fully utilized by either development with ratable or public amenities including designated open space preservation, as appropriate”), Pa 31, “it is clear that the proposed amendments recommended by the Planning Board most certainly would and do advance that objective and thus ensure their consistency with the Master Plan on this score.
[brief] TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS  Page Transcript, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, July 31, 2023  [...], J.S.C..........................................................6T  Transcript of Motion to Stay, September 14, 2023  Including additional Trial Findings and Conclusions  [...], J.S.C.......................................................7T  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Authority | Brief page number | |------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | **Court Rules:** | | | Rule 4:46-2(c) | 4 | | Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E) | 36 | | **Case Law:** | | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., | 5 | | 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995) | | | Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, | 5 | | 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015)