ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 2C:5-2a(1) | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 | 25, 29, 30 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1) | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(3) | 40, 43 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(6) | 40, 43 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(9) | 40, 44 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(10) | 42 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(7) | 41 | | Statutes (cont'd) | Rules | |------------------|-------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(8) | 42 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(9) | 42 | **TABLE OF AUTHORITES (CONT'D)** | PAGE NOS | |----------| | N.J.R.E. 403 | 12 | | N.J.R.E. 404(b) | 16 | | N.J.R.E. 609 | passim | | N.J.R.E. 609(a) | 12, 16, 17 | | N.J.R.E. 609(b) | passim | | N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1) | passim | | N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2) | passim | | N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2)(i) | 21 | | N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2)(ii) | 18 | | N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2)(iii) | 18, 20 | | N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2)(iv) | 18, 20 | | **Constitutional Provisions** | |--------------------------------| | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 1 ................................................................. 9, 28, 39 | | N.J. Const. art.
[brief] That is to say that the finding of liability was not only final, but was affirmed after several appeals.  Defendants never attacked the Settlement Agreement that contained the arbitration clause and thus clearly accepted all provisions of it by its execution and its sole objection was to the arbitrator’s alleged bias, which the Court found did not exist.  Thus, the finding was final on the issue of liability in accordance with the Agreement to arbitrate and as *Trade & Transport* says, “functus officio” and cannot be revisited.  Furthermore, *Trade* held that the District Court’s approving a substitute for the deceased panel member was the correct process under the act to conclude the matter.  Defendant also raises the Court’s disregard of a stay which arose by Defendant requiring Plaintiffs to post $200 for costs and Plaintiff not being registered and authorized to do business in New Jersey, each of which were removed by Plaintiff depositing the $200 and producing a Certificate of Authority to do business in New Jersey before the hearing on the motion occurred, thus satisfying the requests and rendering the stay moot. \(^2\)
[brief] *State in the Interest of R.V.*, 280 N.J. Super. 118, 122-23 (App. Div. 1995).  Finally, like in *Orji*, the court here also imposed the maximum five-year probationary term, giving the defendant the maximum duration for payment.  Not only does this extended duration provide another point of identity with *Orji*, thus calling out for the same result – affirmance, it also calls into question the import of defendant’s coupling of his restitution attack with an attack on the $25 per month probationary fee ordered by the sentencing court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1(d)(1).
[brief] The date of the court’s decision following the 2010 Liability Trial is a wholly random date that has no relationship to either the language of the policies or the facts relating to the property damage.  Use of the date of the trial court’s liability decision eliminates the benefits of the time-on-the-risk method and also violates the public policy of both New Jersey and Massachusetts.  If the time-on-the-risk method is used, an appropriate end date is either September 1986, when the property damage was discovered and the CVOC plume stabilized, or 1993, at the latest, when all operations at the Site ended.  I.
[brief] The trial court granted [...]’s motion to dismiss the claims against it with prejudice on the ground that Plaintiff did not have the right to enforce the contract after declaring default and receiving back its deposit.  That decision was correct and should be affirmed.  Moreover, [...] completed its duties as escrow agent when it returned the escrow to Plaintiff and owed Plaintiff nothing more.  Finally, the agreement requires Plaintiff to indemnify [...] for all losses including those incurred from its first-party claims.  Accordingly, [...] respectfully submits that this Court should affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint against [...] and reverse the trial court’s decision denying reimbursement of [...] attorneys’ fees and litigation costs that it incurred in this matter.
[brief] Respondents repeatedly acknowledged it was aware of [...]’s interest in the will contest litigation.  Respondents sent both [...] and [...] a retainer agreement because they believed they were going to represent both of the brothers.  The next day, the Respondents sent a letter to the [...] stating it represented both [...] and [...].  [...] even called attorney [...] to tell [...] he would represent both brothers.  These facts demonstrate an invitation to rely on the Respondents’ representation even in the absence of a signed retainer agreement.  After receiving the retainer agreement and letter to the surrogate, [...] took no immediate, independent action to further pursue his rights despite having previously sought to challenge his father’s will.
[directive] County Prosecutor's Law Enforcement  1 3 - Trust Account (CLETA) of $10,000 2 3 - in Disbursements Excess 2 3 - Seized Asset Trust Account - 2-4  3  Limitations on Disbursements from SATA 4 3 - Asset Maintenance Account - 4-5 3  Mairitenance Expenditures - - No. 03 3  1 County Prosecutor's Office Forfeiture Programs
[brief] Pa30.  Included with the Petition were other retired Troopers who are requesting registration and amended health benefits in retirement.  Pa30.  All of those Troopers provided affidavits that they also did not receive notice of the Ricci Bill’s passage.  Pa30.  Pa70-106.  Furthermore, other Troopers who are not currently ill, but were only seeking to register for the Ricci Act also filed affidavits that they did not receive notice of the Ricci Act and were included in the Petition.  Pa30.  Pa107-254.  Additionally, other retired Troopers who were not present at the September 11, 2001 attacks and aftermath also submitted affidavits that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act in further support of the Petition.  Pa255-265.  President of the [...], [...], submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the [...] notifying him of the Ricci Act.  Pa259.  Upon notice by another retired Trooper, Wren underwent a massive polling of the [...] to ascertain whether his membership received notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa259.  Of the fifty-nine (59) FTA members (retired troopers) who responded to the polling, fifty-seven (57) did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act by letter, correspondence, or postcard.  Pa259.  Additionally, active Trooper [...] provided an affidavit that he also did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa111.  Despite not receiving notice, Licameli attempted to file an Eligibility Registration Form back in September of 2019.  Pa113.  His Registration Form notes that he was present at Ground Zero/WTC on 9/15/01 for 10 hours.  Pa113.  In response to his filing, Licameli received correspondence from the [...] requesting medical information.  Pa115.  Licameli contacted Pensions on November 18, 2019, and was advised that the Ricci Act “is for those who are currently sick.  Not for possible future illnesses. ”  Pa115.  It is unknown at this time how many other Troopers Eligibility Registration Forms may have not been filed or how many Troopers were not registered because the member was not ill at the time the forms were sent.  On March 23, 2023, correspondence was sent to the [...] to clarify the request that the Board consider all of the affected Troopers in a single collective petition.  Pa28.  The correspondence also requested that the Board take administrative or judicial notice of all affidavits submitted in all actions with respect to the issue of lack of notice of the Ricci Act for members of the [...].  Pa28.  To date, over ninety-eight (98) active and retired Troopers have submitted affidavits attesting that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa70-265.
[brief] R: 3-7-3(a).  Also, where it is no difficulty in producing the victims because they are of local people, an indictment based solely on hearsay testimony of the investigating officer would be dismissed.  State v. Costa, 109 N.J. Super 243, 262 A.2d 917 (1970); see also State v. Chandler, 98 N.J. Super. 241, 236 A.2d 632 (1970).  Here, the victims were local but not produced, and the indictment was solely based on the investigating officers.  The assessment of guilt is not the Court’s function, but the grand jury’s.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS........................................................................4  I.  Background.......................................................................................4  a.  According to [...], [...] Assaulted him.....................................5  b.  [...] Testified He Struck [...] in Self Defense.........................7  II.  Facts Relevant to Lowe’s’ Cross-Appeal..............................................8  a.  [...]'s Supervisors Confirmed that He was Experienced, Good with Customers, Knowledgeable about the Store's Products, and Actually Provided [...] with Accurate Information about the Grout in Question..................................................................................8  b.  Plaintiffs' Expert in Retail Operations was Unable to Establish that [...] Deviated from Internal Policies or that [...] Actually Demonstrated a lack of Supervision or Training in his Interaction with [...]..................................................................................10  III.  Facts Relevant to Establishing [...] Assaulted [...]......................12  a.  Based on the Physical Evidence at the Scene, Police Officers Were Skeptical of [...]'s Version of Events........................................12  b.  [...] Provided Multiple Inconsistent Statements Throughout the Litigation....................................................................................14  c.  [...] Admitted He Could not Explain Why the Bodycam did not Show any Grout on Him.......................................................16  d.  [...] admitted [...]'s conduct was not aggressive.....................17  e.  Plaintiffs' Counsel Prepared [...] for His Trial Testimony...........17  f.  [...] Provided Unrebutted Scientific Testimony Explaining the Significance of the Physical, Objective Evidence..........................18  IV.  Facts Relevant to Plaintiffs’ alleged legal errors..................................200  a.  [...] Testified the Police Blamed Him for the Accident...............20 b.  [...] Did Not Consider [...]'s Version of Events.....................20  c.  Plaintiffs successfully precluded [...] from telling the jury that [...] dismissed his battery claim against [...].  d.  Plaintiffs Were Allowed to Argue That an Intentional Battery Can Support a Negligence Claim.  e.  [...] Admitted He Failed to Disclosed the Pictures and Texts Pertaining to His Work and Physical Abilities.  Further, He Admitted He Lied in the Text Messages.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] Under the statute, a “public body” is defined as “two or more persons organized under the laws of this State,” who are “collectively empowered as a voting body to perform a public governmental function affecting the rights, duties, obligations, privileges, benefits, or other legal relations of any person,” or “collectively authorized to spend public funds. ”  N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(a).  While the Legislature as a whole is a public body, Legislative committees do not meet that criteria.  They serve as advisory bodies to the Legislature, making recommendations to the Senate and Assembly; thus; they are not “collectively empowered as a voting body” to perform the governmental functions “affecting the rights, duties, obligations, privileges, benefits or other legal relations of any person.  . . . .”  Ibid.  Next, the record reveals that the Legislature complied with the notice requirements with respect to the voting sessions that took place on January 10, 2022.
[brief] C.  The Dispute Was Not Previously Resolved (Argument not presented to the trial court)  [...] next argues, again for the first time on appeal, that “the e-mail exchange between Plaintiff and Defendant on July 23, 2023 demonstrates resolution of the dispute. ” (Pb9.)  That position, which was plainly contrived after the Motion was decided, is belied by the Complaint, [...]’s Certification, and [...]’s arguments before the trial court.  As an initial matter, [...]’s novel (and meritless) argument that the parties previously resolved the dispute should be rejected because it was never advanced before the trial court.
[directive] It is the responsibility of the seizing Treasury agency to ensure that lien payment requests are approved prior to retaining or transferring forfeited vehicles for official use.  Additionally, the seizing Treasury agency must ensure that requests for payment of liens do not occur until the subject vehicles are forfeited, and that the amounts of the payment requests do not exceed the lesser of the appraised value, net proceeds of sale or the unpaid loan principal balance.  will be responsible for expeditiously EOAF approving all properly documented lien payment requests, and ensuring that the approved requests are forwarded timely to the ASD for payment processing.
[brief] [11T71-22 to 72-19].  At the time he confessed to her, [...] and defendant were on good terms and defendant was living with [...] at her aunt’s home located at [...].  [11T68-6 to 69-1].  Specifically, defendant told [...] that he was driving around in [...]’s car with [...] and picked up [...] from work and drove to Sam’s grandmother’s home and [...]’s sister’s home.  [11T72-23 to 73-20].  [...] and defendant devised a plan that [...] would say, “Man, F this shit,” as a signal to defendant to shoot [...].  [11T87-7 to -14].  Defendant told [...] that, while seated behind her in her car, he shot [...] twice in the back of the head.  [11T74-15 to 75-17].  He explained that after the first shot, her body was shaking, so he shot her again.  [11T74-21 to 75-9].  After firing the shots, he ran to [...]’s grandmother’s home.  [11T75-20 to -24].  Defendant stated that he and [...] purposely left [...]’s cell phone in the car so they could text her phone to create an alibi.  [11T75-25 to 76-6; 11T77-1 to -13].  Defendant said that they killed [...] because they wanted her gun, a .380, back and she would not give it to them.  [11T77-14 to -23].  After the shooting, [...] took the gun and hid it.  [11T77-24 to 78-1].  [...] stated that while confessing to what he did, defendant laughed and said [...] was a “dike anyway. ”  [11T94-1 to -24].  After she gave a statement to police, [...] identified defendant in a picture shown to her by police.  [11T79-9 to 80-10].  Police also spoke with [...] on September 24, 2019.  At that time, [...] lied to police, and said that she was with defendant on the night of the murder.  [11T134-5 to 135-5].  After defendant was arrested for the murder, police approached [...] again and she gave them truthful information regarding the murder.
[brief] Id.  Plaintiff acknowledges that on August 11, 2015 the charges that were proffered against him as a result of the alleged incident of September 7, 2014 were formalized in a True Bill of Indictment issued by a Grand Jury, and he asserts that he went to trial on that Indictment, and that on January 23, 2018 a jury returned verdicts of Not Guilty on all charges.
[directive] Standard 9: ASSESSMENT OF SART SERVICES BY VICTIMS AND SERVICE PROVIDERS  Victims of sexual assault who choose to use the SART’s services shall be afforded an opportunity to assess the services provided through a victim survey.  Participating members of the SART shall also assess the SART response provided and recommend systems improvements through a SART member survey.  Ongoing assessment of the SART’s services is crucial to improving the SART activation and response.  Recognizing the value of constructive feedback, this Standard may be updated, from time to time, to implement different methods of capturing these assessments.
[brief] R. 3:18-1.  “When evaluating motions to acquit based on insufficient evidence, courts must view the totality of evidence . . . in a light most favorable to the State. ”  State v. Perez, 177 N.J. 540, 549 (2003).  Essentially, a court must determine if, “giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 459 (1967).  Defendant was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose.
[directive] The AG SAFE survey was designed to assess the number of “sexual assault examination kits in the possession of law enforcement agencies in this State that have not been submitted to a laboratory approved by the Attorney General for serology or deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing” and to assess the current policies and procedures governing the sexual assault examination kit process pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:17B-245.  Overall, the results indicated the following: decreasing volumes of SAFE kits collected from 2018 to 2020; Hold kits residing primarily with the FNE, the largest proportion of which were over 5 years old; the majority of SAFE kits were tested; and less than 1% of SAFE kits were unidentifiable.  The results also indicated county-level policies that governed the SART process and handling of SAFE kits despite a lack of individual law enforcement agency-level policies.  Reasons for untested kits were frequently rooted in prosecutorial discretion and the victim’s preferences of whether to proceed with the case.  Finally, responses indicated consistent and thorough record keeping on the SAFE kits using a standard label on kits and a standard log.  The AG SAFE survey results highlight the need for standardized policies that codify best practices in the area of testing, tracking storage, retention, and destruction of SAFE kits.
[brief] In response, the State argues that appellate review is only a “key factor” “[i]n civil litigation, where issue preclusion and its ramifications first developed…”  Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief at 13 (citing id.; *State v. Brown*, 394 N.J. Super. 492, 502 (App. Div. 2007) (“[c]ivil and criminal proceedings involve different values”)).  But that is exactly the inverse of our law.  It would make no sense whatsoever for the Supreme Court to have held that the presence of appellate review only matters in the civil context.  Criminal defendants generally have more, not fewer, rights to challenge adverse judgments or rulings than civil litigants, and the existence of appellate review is perhaps even more important in the criminal context than it is in the civil context.  Common sense and basic legal principles foreclose any finding to the contrary.  This section of [...]’s opinion focused on the civil context because the section immediately preceding the passage excerpted above discusses how an acquittal in the criminal context is an unreviewable final judgment because the Double Jeopardy Clause effectively requires collateral estoppel without any opportunity for appeal by the government.  Bravo-Fernandez, 580 U.S. at 9 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V).  Nothing about the Supreme Court’s decision suggests that appellate review, where it is constitutionally permissible, is any less important in the criminal context before collateral estoppel is applied.  Therefore, the [...] decision is not a “final judgment” because it has not been subject to appellate review by right.
[brief] (Da52).  From the last four months of the Decedent’s life through the day they left, on November 28, 2022, they did not make any payments to the Trust for occupying the Boonton Property.  (7T69-11-13).  During the entire time they lived there without payment, the Trust bore the carrying charges on the Boonton Property, including taxes and insurance.  (7T76-8-13).  [...] and [...] were made aware only four days after the Decedent’s death that they could remain at the Boonton Property for a “reasonable time” as long as they paid rent.  (Da256).  They did not make payments or even propose to do so, causing the Plaintiff to make a written demand for possession on October 4, 2021.
[brief] The intent of the summary landlord-tenant proceeding is “a quick disposition of the landlord's claim for possession. ”  Ibid.  The amount of rent claimed to be owed in the complaint must be “the amount that the tenant is required to pay by . . . the lease. ”  R. 6:3-4(c).  “In interpreting a lease agreement,” as with any contract, “the function of the trial judge is to enforce the lease as written, not to write for the parties a different or better contract.
[brief] In this case the testimony of [...]’s and the [...]’s witnesses demonstrated that the revised lot grade was created, fashioned, conceived and planned for the purpose of a specific function to comply with stormwater management, sanitary sewer and grading regulations and not to allow increased building height.  While increased building height may be a byproduct of the design, it was not what the design was crafted to allow, facilitate or accomplish.  In fact, the [...] went further to ensure that the plan was not designed to allow increased building height.  It included as Special Condition 10. of the Resolution of Approval that the applicant “meet with the [...] in good faith to evaluate the overall stormwater collection system and alternative components in an effort to reduce proposed finished grades at the front section of the triplex buildings facing [...] without compromising the efficiency of the proposed stormwater collection system. ”  Thus, even if the revised lot grade was designed to allow increased building height the condition removed that design objective from consideration.  The revised lot grade was to be reduced to the lowest possible without compromising the stormwater collection system.  As noted by the Supreme Court in O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169,184 (1983)
[brief] 1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .....................................................................................  3 STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................  3 LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................................  4 POINT I.  The Standard of Review (Not Raised Below)  ....................................  4 POINT II.  The FDCPA, as a Federal Statute, Should Be Construed Consistent with How Federal Courts Construe the Statute.  (Not Addressed Below)  .........................................................  5 POINT III.  Determining Congress’s Intent in Light of the Federal Courts’ Interpretation of §1692c(b) as Applied to Debt Collectors’ Use of Mail Vendors.  (T24-T25).  ........................................  6 POINT IV.  Putting the FDCPA in Context (T23-T24) .......................................  13  A.  FDCPA’s Purpose and Structure .................................................................  14  B.  Elements of an FDCPA Cause of Action  ....................................................  16  C.  The Bar Against Third-Party Communications.  ......  18  POINT V.  The FDCPA’S Legislative History and Agency Interpretations are Consistent with the Federal Courts’ Decisions.  (Not Addressed Below)  .........................................................  20 CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................
[brief] 24 State v. Gentry, 439 N.J. Super. 57 (App. Div. 2015)  .............  22 State v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308 (2018) ...............................  40 State v. Morente-Dubon, 474 N.J. Super. 197 (App. Div. 2022) .......