ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Due to the trial court’s calendar, oral argument was postponed and rescheduled several times.  On April 27, 2023, the trial court finally held a virtual Zoom oral argument.  (1T).  The trial court found plaintiff lacked constitutional, statutory and common law standing and dismissed his entire 69 pages 434 paragraphs Eight Counts complaint with prejudice.  The trial court, however, explicitly noted that it was not ruling on the substantive statutory interpretation merits.  The trial court also denied plaintiff’s disqualifying conflict of interest cross-motion on mootness grounds.  On April 27, 2023, the trial court signed four distinct lack of standing dismissal with prejudice orders and one mootness denial order.  Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, Alteration and Amendment
[brief] In that regard, New Jersey’s Entire Controversy Doctrine evolved through common law to encompass a mandatory rule “for the joinder of virtually all causes, claims, and defenses relating to a controversy between the parties engaged in litigation. ”  Cogdell v. Hospital Ctr., 116 N.J. 7, 16 (1989).  New Jersey’s courts have recognized that the purposes of the doctrine include “the needs of economy and the avoidance of waste, efficiency and the reduction of delay, fairness to parties, and the need for complete and final disposition through the avoidance of ‘piecemeal decisions.
[brief] Since *Veras* was decided in 2014, every case that has determined that no private right of action exists under the NJCFLA can, directly or indirectly, be traced back to *Veras.*  The trial court, like *Veras,* *Valentine,* and *Woo-Padva* 1, erred by basing its analysis of the implied private right of action under the NJCFLA solely on N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18—nothing in N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 precludes a private right of action or states that “[o]nly the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance has the authority to pursue claims for violations of the NJCFLA. ”  *See Valentine,* October 4, 2023 Opinion at 11.  As discussed *supra,* the NJCFLA’s statutory predecessors had nearly the same statutory structure as the contemporary NJCFLA—*to wit,* they provided for a private right of action (including treble damages and voiding of unlawful contracts) in conjunction with the Commissioner’s enforcement.  Nothing in the NJCFLA suggests that the legislature intended the Act’s remedies to be unavailable to private citizens.  To suddenly read private mechanisms of enforcement out of the NJCFLA would be tantamount to legislation by the judiciary.  Interpreting the NJCFLA as the legislature clearly intended requires viewing the NJCFLA in its historical context, *i.e.*, acknowledging that the statute has always afforded private enforcement.  Thus, the premise upon which the trial court based its granting of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is inconsistent with relevant authority and principles of statutory construction.  **ii.
[brief] Contrary to [...]’s argument, the court’s decision in [...] did not turn on whether untimely or adequate notice was sent to him by the Division.  (Pb11).  Instead, the court found that because the notice from the Division was sent “more than four years from the date of petitioner’s last contribution,” the Division’s own “day-to-day administration of its affairs” and interpretation of the two-year time limitation as expressed by the four-year notice further supported allowing [...] to file.  Id. at 338.  Here, there was no such letter informing [...] that he was eligible to file under the Ricci Act past the statutory deadline.  Thus, [...] does not support [...]’s proposition that untimely notice allows individuals to file at any time past the statutory deadline.
[brief] (1T).  The Trial Court stated that it was “going to enforce the GRC interim order. ” (1T42:24-25).  While the Trial Court acknowledged [...]’s arguments regarding the denial of due process he suffered in becoming the focus of the GRC orders, it stated outright “that that due process is not an issue before the Court, nor do I believe that due process rights were violated.  The GRC did not just -- need to serve [...] because it served his and his fellow board members' attorney at the time as well as the Board records custodian[.]” (1T51:11-16).  Furthermore, the Trial Court found that At the time the Board responded to [[...]’s] OPRA request in July of 2019, mediated a potential settlement in December of 2019, and filed all submissions, including the Statement of Information, which has been referred to as the SOI throughout, to the state agency, [...] and the Board were represented by [...].  And the Court has no idea of the communications between Mr. Varady and [...], nor is the Court interested in them, but nonetheless, he was represented through counsel for the Fire District.  (1T51:24-52:8).  The Trial Court placed special weight on the fact that [...] had voted to appoint an attorney to represent “Board on matters involving the plaintiff, including the underlying GRC matter. ” (1T52:14-15).  In the end, the Trial Court found, while [...] was no longer on the Board by the time the GRC issued its first decision, . . . he had been represented as a Board member at all times from when the OPRA request was made, while the GRC was still considering the merits of the matter and accepting briefs and legal argument. ” (1T54:4-10).  As a result, the Trial Court rejected [...]’s arguments on the issue of due process violations.
[brief] The trial court’s reliance on that decision was severely misplaced.  The Dover decision was issued four years prior to the adoption of the MLUL – a comprehensive statute that contains a specific standard for determining whether a party possesses standing to assert a claim under the MLUL.  At the risk of stating the obvious, the Dover decision was not based on an analysis of the “interested party” standard set forth by the now-current law – the MLUL.  Rather, the Dover decision was premised on the then-current law – N.J.S.A. 40:55-1 – a law that was expressly repealed when the MLUL was enacted.  Thus, contrary to the trial court’s finding, the Dover decision is not “good law. ”  That decision should not have even been considered and, in any event, it certainly does not outweigh the overwhelming body of case law applying the “interested party” standard in the MLUL.  As if there were any doubt that the Dover decision is not “good law,” that doubt is removed by the fact that the Dover decision has never been relied upon by any court when analyzing standing under the MLUL.  Yet even if the decision in Dover did reflect the current state of the law (which it does not), that decision is still wholly inapplicable.
[directive] 3.  There is established an Office of Victim Support and Assistance (OVSA), which shall oversee the DLPS’s victim-related services.  OVSA will lead the DLPS’s effort to make victim assistance a key strategy for a public health approach to public safety that prevents violence and revictimization.  OVSA will provide strategy and resources to address the needs of victims of crimes, and, through such assistance, to intervene in violence and prevent repeat victimization.  It will play a lead role in setting policy with respect to victims of crime and violence, including but not limited to victims of sexual assault, victims of domestic violence and intimate partner abuse, youth, victims of discrimination and bias-based crimes, and immigrant populations.  For communities across the state that experience mass or multiple acts of violence or bias-based acts, it will serve as a repository of resources, information, best practices, and guidance, and will develop policies and partnerships to prevent such incidents.  OVSA will identify, develop and prioritize polices and resources that are trauma-informed, and promote solutions that are supportive of healing and incorporate mental health services.  OVSA will identify, develop recommendations on and set policies around different responses to crimes impacting the range of victim populations, including restorative justice approaches.  Office of Violence Intervention and Prevention.
[brief] - (1T 114:3-118:10).  •  He also testified as to each line item in [...]'s accounts, demonstrating incoming funds from [...].  As these transfers went on, [...]'s shell game of wire transfers became more brazen, writing a check for $34,352 to [...] directly from [...]'s account and making many wire transfers from [...]'s ACH account directly to [...]'s payroll account.  - (1T 118:11-134:10; 136:1-165:14)  •  On the date the complaint was filed, [...] withdrew $486,698.98 from [...]'s accounts, leaving an ending balance of $39.20.
[brief] ............35  A. [...]’s Opinion Completely Ignores [...]’s Contractual Obligations..................................................................................................................399  B.  [...]’s Opinion Lacks any Documentary Support..............................41  C. [...]’s has Acknowledged that [...] was on Notice of the Condition Prior to the Date of Plaintiff’s Accident.  .............................................44  IV.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT PLAINTIFF’S LIABILITY EXPERT HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE AN ADMISSIBLE OPINION THAT A DANGEROUS ROADWAY CONDITION EXISTED ON THE DATE OF PLAINTIFF’S ACCIDENT..............................................46
[brief] On June 26, 2024, [...] Detective [...] signed Complaint-Summons [...], charging defendant [...] with third-degree animal fighting, N.J.S.A. 4:22-24a(2), and third-degree animal cruelty, N.J.S.A. 4:22-17c(3).  (Da 43-44).  Detective McEnroe alleged:  On 05/11/24, this agency responded to [...] for a noise complaint.  The investigation revealed an illegal cock fighting operation.  Def[endant] was observed on scene via body camera review compared against driver’s license photograph and was driving NJ registration [...] registered to her.  Additionally, def[endant] appeared in a geo fence present at the crime scene during the known period of time that the animal fighting was taking place.  * * *
[brief] ..................................................10  Jones v. Dish Network LLC, No. A-2653-12T4, 2013 WL 6169215 (App. Div. Nov. 26, 2013)  ............17, 18 Leodori v. Cigna Corp., 175 N.J. 293 (2003) ..............................................................................7, 8 Mannion v. Hudson & M. R. Co., 125 N.J.L. 606 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d, 127 N.J.L. 230 (1941) .............................12 Morales v. Sun Constructors, Inc., 541 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2008) ...................................................................23 Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289 (2016) ..............................................................................7, 10 Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehobeth Beach, 189 N.J. 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1338 (2007) ...............................15 Prant v. Sterling, 332 N.J. Super. 369 (Ch. Div. 1999), aff’d, 332 N.J. Super. 292 (App. Div. 2000) ....................................................................................21 Roman v. Bergen Logistics, LLC, 456 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 2018) .....................................................13, 14 Rudbart v. Water Supply Com’m., 127 N.J. 344, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 871 (1992)
[brief] ........................................................................................................Pa611  Exhibit E: Excerpt Of The Transcript Of Day Three Of The Trial ........................................................................................................Pa612  Exhibit F: Map Entitled, “Central Business District Redevelopment Plan – Center City, Paterson City, Passaic County, Parcels”, Dated August 24, 2004 .................................................................Pa613  Exhibit G: Redevelopment Agreement By And Between The [...], As Redevelopment Entity And The [...] And [...] As Redeveloper, Dated February 24, 2005  [Omitted]  ..............................Pa614
[brief] \(^10\)  The trial court continued that there was nothing in the record that a rational jury could conclude “whether all, some or what part of the $255,000 should be apportioned for 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017” and thus, “[a]ny claims for the period six years prior to November 24, --- \(^9\)  This same tactic is being used on appeal, with Plaintiff’s brief also attaching articles and Administrative Law decisions that were not disclosed during the discovery period and are entirely irrelevant as to whether Plaintiff is owed money from Defendants.  See Pb4-5.  None of these documents were produced in discovery, and Plaintiff continues to flaunt the trial court’s order barring Plaintiff from using such “evidence” in this case.
[brief] (8T230-2 to 8; 8T231-2 to 12).  The following day, a bullet was recovered from the rear of a trailer located on Lot 60 in [...], and another was recovered from the rear bumper of [...]’s car.  (9T98-1 to 100-6; 12T17-22 to 18-3; 12T21-19 to 22).  On February 21, 2017, [...] was interviewed by [...] and told him where his handgun could be located.
[brief] [Id. at 222.]  See also L. Pucillo & Sons, Inc. v. Township of Belleville, 249 N.J. Super. 536 (App. Div. 1991) (bidder’s submission of a consent of surety that limited the surety’s obligation to delivery of a performance bond for a fractional amount of the contract was a material, nonwaivable defect); Marvec Construction Corp. v. Township of Belleville, 254 N.J. Super. 282, 285 (Law Div. 1992) (bidder’s failure to include bid bond or consent of surety was a material and nonwaivable defect even though a representative of the bidder ran into the municipal clerk’s office 20 minutes after the bid opening with the conforming documents).  [...] “shrugs off” Meadowbrook and its progeny by arguing in conclusory fashion, on page 47 of its brief, that its “impact” it is not relevant to this matter as “[...] did in fact submit a fully compliant Consent of Surety. ”  Without repeating the immediately preceding point, strain as it might to avoid controlling, adverse authority, [...] did not submit a “compliant Consent of Surety” because it was signed by a purported attorney-in-fact without any evidence – via a POA – that the consent was valid and enforceable at the time it was submitted with [...]’s Bid.  See Yengo, supra, 2023 WL 2590392, *6.  [...]’s eleventh hour attempts to cure that failure were too little and late.  As determined in Meadowbrook, supra, failure to submit a valid Consent of Surety at the time of submission of a bid is not subject to cure but, rather, requires the public entity to reject the bid.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT DEFTLY HANDLED THE JURY NOTES SO AS TO AVOID COERCING VERDICTS.  Defendant argues the judge committed reversible error in handling jury deliberations, contending that the judge’s responses to two jury notes coerced the verdicts.  The record reveals that no error occurred.  On May 2, 2024, when one of the State’s proposed rebuttal witnesses reported he had been exposed to a person who tested positive for Covid, the trial’s length became an issue.
[brief] 3 PtI. Monek v. Borough of S. River, 354 N.J. Super. 442, 449-50 (App. Div. 2002)  .................  4 R.M.v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 190 N.J. 1, 9-10 (N.J. 2007)  ....................................  7 Reilly v. AAA Mid-Atl. Ins. Co. of N.J., 194 N.J. 474, 484, 946 A.2d 564 (2008)
[directive] The [...], established pursuant to the National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact Act of 1998 (“Compact”) to promulgate the rules and procedures necessary to regulate the use of Interstate Identification Index has acknowledged the necessity of permitting the CCH/III system to be used to check the criminal backgrounds of care givers who are selected to care for children in exigent circumstances and has adopted rules to permit such background checks to begin April 1, 2001.  It will be necessary for the [...] to work in tandem with the [...] to take those steps necessary to implement the Compact Council’s recommendations for the use of criminal history record information for the emergency placement of children in exigent circumstances.  Utilizing the CCH/III System for Emergent Care Giver Background Checks  The [...] shall be the only law enforcement agency in the state authorized to use the CCH/III system for this purpose and will implement those procedures necessary to begin using the CCH/III system for this purpose.  These procedures must include a mechanism for verification that the DYFS employee requesting the background check is authorized to request such information.  Upon receipt of a request from the [...] to conduct a CCH/III background check to facilitate the emergency placement of a child when exigent circumstances exist, the [...] Bureau of Identification shall comply.  If local law enforcement agencies receive requests from the [...] to conduct CCH/III background checks for this purpose, they must be referred to the [...] Bureau of Identification for processing pursuant to this Directive.  Within 5 (five) business days of receiving the original request for a CCH/III background check, the [...] Bureau of Identification shall receive from the [...] the emergent care giver’s state and federal fingerprint cards plus appropriate user fees so that a positive identification may be made.  Conclusion
[brief] 37 State v. Supreme Life, 473 N.J. Super. 165 (App. Div. 2022) .......... 21, 22 State v. Mann, 132 N.J. 410 (1993) ...............................  29 State v. Marks, 201 N.J. Super. 514 (App. Div. 1985) .............  38 State v. Melvin, 248 N.J. 321 (2021) ...........................................  37 State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383 (1998) ...........................................  2 State v.  O’Donnell, 117 N.J. 210 (1989) ....................................... 38 State v. Poteet, 61 N.J. 493 (1972) .............................................. 38 State v. Rivers, 252 N.J. Super. 142 (App. Div. 1991) ..................... 38 State v. Ross (II), 229 N.J. 389 (2017) ......................................... 20 State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390 (2019) ..................................... 21 State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157 (2012) ....................................... 20 State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554 (2005) .......................................... 20 State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021) .......................................... 31, 41, 42 State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425 (2020) ....................................... 37 State v. Wilbely, 63 N.J. 420 (1973) .......................................... 20 STATUTES CITED N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 ............................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a ....................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) .................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) .................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(3) .................................................................. 36, 39 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(4) ........................................... 36, 39 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(5) ........................................... 36, 39 RULES CITED R. 2:10-2 .................................................................. 20 R. 3:21-4(b) ............................................................ 40 CITATIONS TO THE RECORD
[brief] The only evidence offered to support Respondent’s claims of economic loss was the Township’s decision to stop her Municipal Alliance salary in December 2017.  Respondent presented no evidence of economic loss post-dating February 2018, when she admittedly first notified the Township of her disability by submitting her FLMA paperwork.  Clearly, the jury’s award of compensatory damages for economic loss is a result of the unjust and prejudicial effect of Respondent’s surprise testimony linking her claims of disability discrimination and retaliation with the stoppage of the Grant salary, even though these claims post-date the salary stoppage.  Without that misleading link, the jury could not have reasonably concluded that Respondent suffered any economic loss in this case.  As such, the award of compensatory damages is against the weight of the evidence presented.
[brief] In fact, no witness (other than [...]) placed [...] at the scenes of the crimes.  That is why the State conceded at trial that [...]’ testimony was the single most important evidence.  That is also why [...]’ Sworn Statement significantly undermining his testimony is material.  [...]’ Sworn Statement was unequivocal: He had no knowledge of the first of three home invasions.  [...] was so adamant that he wrote to his attorney and memorialized his defense in writing.  His counsel “ignored [[...]’] request to investigate…that [[...]] had no knowledge of the Staten Island robbery and kidnapping of [...]. ” (Da077).  [...] further claimed that he possessed “letters that [he] sent to the attorney about this affidavit and letters from co-defendant saying he was willing to give an affidavit. ” (Da079).  In other words, [...] denied his involvement in the criminal conduct and had ample corroboration for his defense.  Had [...]’ Sworn Statement been disclosed to [...] at the time of his trial, he could have served a subpoena demanding the letter [...] wrote to his attorney,\(^2\) which may have been exculpatory.
[brief] Pa0992-Pa0999.  The 1999 Lease allowed [...] to use and occupy the Leased Premises during the lease term for any use permitted under the Zoning Ordinance of the Borough, including but not limited to Boardwalk type amusements, miniature golf courses and the like.  Pa0993, Section 4.  The 1999 Lease required [...] to construct male and female lavatories on the Leased Premises and to install a fence around the Leased Premises.  Pa0993-Pa0994, Section 5.  It also required [...] to submit drawings of any structures or improvements that [...] sought to install on the Leased Premises and to obtain Borough approval for them prior to their installation.  Pa0994, Section 6.  As consideration for the use and occupancy of the Leased Premises, the 1999 Lease required [...] to pay the Borough rent at a fixed rate for the first 5-year term and then with rent escalations for each subsequent 5-year renewal of the Lease.  Pa0993, Section 3.  Lastly, upon the expiration or termination of the Lease, [...] was obligated to vacate the Leased Premises, to remove at its own expense all improvements that it had installed on the Leased Premises, and to restore the Leased Premises to its condition prior to the execution of the Lease.  Pa0997, Section 12.  [...] is still using and occupying the Leased Premises under the 1999 Lease.
[brief] Cases Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center, 215 N.J. 265 (2013)  ................................................................. 4, 5, 6, 7, 10  Marmo and Sons General Contracting, LLC v. Biagi Farms, LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 593 (App. Div. 2024) .................................................. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9  Spaeth v. Srinivasan, 403 N.J. Super. 508 (App. Div. 2008)  .......................  6  Tuckey v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 236 N.J. Super. 221 (App. Div. 1989)  ...........  6  New Jersey Court Rule Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) ..............................................................................................................  7, 8, 9 Rule 4:5-6 ..........................................................................................................................  11, 12  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT