ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20{t)  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(f) was amended to specify that Pretrial Services is required to recommend no release when a defendant is charged with specific Graves Act offenses.  This section enumerates those specific Graves Act offenses that are excluded from this requirement.  As amended, it reads as follows: of  The release recommendation the pretrial services program obtained of using a risk assessment instrument under section P .L.2014, c.31 11 (C.2A:162-25).  Pretrial services shall recommend no release when a defendant has been charged with any crime for which the eligible of defendant would be subject to a mandatory term imprisonment pursuant to subsection ofN.J.S.2C:43-6 for a crime involving the use c. of or possession a firearm other than a violation of: (1) subsection or d. ofN.J.S.2C:39-3; a. of or (2) paragraph (1) (2) subsection a ofN.J.S.2C:39-4; of of (3) subsection section 1 P.L. 1998, c.26 (C.2C:39-4.l); or a. of of (4) paragraph (1) subsection b or paragraph (1) or (2) subsection c ofN.J.S.2C:39-5.1  B. 2A:162-19(g)  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19 was amended to add subsection (g), which establishes that when a Motion for Pretrial Detention is filed against an eligible defendant who of is charged with specific Graves Act offenses, a recommendation no release issued by Pretrial Services may be considered by the court to establish prima facie evidence of sufficient to overcome the presumption release.  This new subparagraph reads:  When a motion for pretrial detention is filed pursuant to subsection a. of of this section, a pretrial recommendation no release pursuant to of of subsection section 6 P.L.2014, c.31 (C.2A:162-20) may f. of constitute prima facie evidence to overcome the presumption release of of as set forth in subsection b. section 4 P .L.2014, c.31 (C.2A: 162- if 18), the court finds probable cause that the eligible defendant committed any crime for which the eligible defendant would be subject of of to a mandatory term imprisonment pursuant to subsection c. of or N.J.S.2C:43-6 for a crime involving the use possession a firearm other than a violation of: Page2of6 or (1) subsection ofN.J.S.2C:39-3; a. d. of or (2) paragraph (1) (2) subsection ofN.J.S.2C:39-4; a. of of (3) subsection section 1 P.L. 1998, c.26 (C.2C:39-4.l); a. or of of (4) paragraph (1) subsection b. or paragraph (1) or (2) subsection c. ofN.J.S.2C:39-5.  II.
[brief] Da14-25.  These charges were a result of defendant’s armed robbery of a 7-Eleven in Hamilton that occurred on May 7, 2011.  Defendant subsequently filed a motion to suppress evidence.  On October 4, 2013, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress in part.  Specifically, the court suppressed the gun found in the vehicle, but found that the clothing and money found in a separate area of the vehicle would be admissible.  On November 29, 2016, the State, in an attempt to resolve all of defendant’s cases, offered defendant a plea deal to resolve this case.  Defendant accepted, and plead guilty to first-degree robbery, Count I of Indictment Number [...], in exchange for a recommendation of a 12-year term of incarceration, subject to the No Early Release Act, to run consecutive to the sentence on Indictment Number [...].  On July 27, 2017, defendant was sentenced in accordance with this plea deal.  Defendant appealed all of his pretrial rulings in a single appeal.  On April 12, 2019, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision on the suppression motion.  Subsequently, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted limited certification, solely of the suppression issue in this case.  The Supreme Court declined to hear the issues regarding defendant’s other case.  On January 25, 2022, the Supreme Court issued an opinion reversing the denial of defendant’s suppression motion on the 7/11 robbery.  The Supreme Court dismissed defendant’s conviction for this case and remanded the matter to the trial court.  At that time, the State declined its right to further prosecute this matter because defendant was already serving a thirty-year sentence on his felony murder conviction.  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[directive] DAG [...], Deputy Attorney General, Prosecutors and Police Bureau Certification of Offense Location and Application for Drug Offender Restraining Order (Juvenile or Adult Offenders) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.4 seq.) et Complaint # ___________________ State of New Jersey Police Case # ___________________ v. (or in the Interest of) ______________________ CDR # ___________________ (Defendant or Juvenile)  I, ____________________________, a member of the ___________________________, hereby certify that the offense charged against defendant/juvenile _____________________________, described in Complaint No. ______________________, Police Case No.__________________, occurred at the following location(s): I hereby request that the court issue an Order prohibiting the defendant/juvenile, who is charged with any of the following:1 2C:35-3, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4, 2C:35-4.1, 2C:35-5, N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.2 or 2C:35-5.3, 2C:35-6, 2C:35-7 or 2C:35-7.1, N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8, N.J.S.2C:35-9, or the unlawful possession or use of an assault firearm as defined N.J.S.A. in subsection w. of 2C:39-1, from entering:
[brief] Other laws and regulations ensure debt collectors, their agents, and service providers implement robust privacy and security safeguards to protect consumer information.  For example, the FTC’s Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Safeguard Rule requires debt collectors to safeguard consumer information.  See 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3)(A); 16 C.F.R. § 314.1(b).  To comply with the Safeguard Rule, debt collectors must oversee service providers by selecting and retaining service providers capable of maintaining appropriate safeguards for the consumer information at issue, requiring servicing providers to implement appropriate safeguards, and overseeing service providers to ensure continued maintenance.  Id., at § 314.4(d)(1)-(2).
[brief] A Yes.  Q  Cardiologists.  A Yes.  Q  Nephrologists.  A  Yes, if there was a surgical issue, yes.  Q  Plastic surgeons.  A Yes.  Q  Dermatologists.  A Yes.  Q  And nurses.  A Yes.  Q  Now, you mentioned that, you also testified before the Board of, is it the [...], remind me, the licensing board?
[directive] Having been advised of the possible immigration consequences and of your right to seek f.  [Yes/Tak]  [No/Nie] individualized legal advice on your immigration consequences, do you still wish to plead guilty?  Czy po uzyskaniu informacji dotycziicych mozliwych konsekwencji imigracyjnych i przyslugujiicego Panu(i) prawa do uzyskania indywidualnej porady prawnej na temat takich konsekwencji nadal chce Pan(i) przyznac sic, do winy?
[brief] The Plaintiff did prove at trial that she did not disclose any of her post – JOD income to the Defendant until “2017” which was *one* (1) year *after the youngest* child graduated college and *five* (5) years after she began college (1T:97, L21 – 24).  In fact, the Plaintiff answered “I don’t know” when asked what her income was in 2012 (1T:107, L15 – 20).  Therefore, the Court’s finding that “Plaintiff did not provide proof of her earnings at the time the children began college” does not constitute reversible error.
[brief] As with every other new rule announced under the Apprendi framework, Erlinger must be given pipeline retroactivity, permitting relief to defendants, like [...], whose convictions are still \(^3\) Erlinger thus answers the question that this Court previously acknowledged was unanswered.  See State v. Clarity, 461 N.J. Super. 320, 326 (App. Div. 2019) (“Apprendi does not expressly hold that proof of the ‘last release from confinement’ also falls within this narrow exception, nor are we aware of any authorities suggesting it does. ”).  pending direct appeal.  See, e.g., State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 335 (2015) (affording pipeline retroactivity to Alleyne); State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 494 (2005) (affording pipeline retroactivity to Blakely claims).  In addition, Erlinger requires that the state allege in the indictment and submit to a grand jury the questions of whether the defendant’s predicate offenses occurred at “different times” and whether the latest of them or his release from confinement was within the required ten-year period.
[brief] He took more when they were doing laundry and then even more prior to getting out of the car to go to the bathroom.  At one point, [...] observed defendant take two pills at once.  (7T:125-2 to 10).  They continued to drive around.  Defendant was talking, sometimes yelling, that people (other drivers on the road) were trying to “hit him” with radiation and trying to “fuck with him,” follow him, and record him.
[brief] This is simply not true.  To the contrary, although [...] debated the motivations for defendant’s good conduct in prison and expressed some doubt that defendant would continue to behave himself once he was no longer in the controlled environment of the prison setting, he expressly cited defendant’s good conduct as a reason for imposing a lesser sentence for Count Three than he imposed at the initial sentencing.  (18T76-23 to 77-20; 18T85-8 to 23; 18T107-25 to 108-16).  Defendant’s reliance on parole board cases (Db19 to 21) is misplaced.  As an initial matter, parole boards are tasked with determining whether an inmate “has failed to cooperate in his or her own rehabilitation or that there is a reasonable expectation that the inmate will violate conditions of parole . . . if released on parole.
[brief] (Aa84).  In the Initial Decision, the ALJ highlighted that the witness had “prior experience in the development and implementation of EMPs” and their updates.  (Aa82; Aa922; 6T28:24-29:3).  Additionally, [...] noted that [...] had “over thirty-five years’ experience in the energy industry, including working at the BPU and the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate. ” (Aa65; Aa920).  While the expert witness was not involved with the development of the current EMP, [...] recognized that [...] “remained abreast of New Jersey’s recent EMPs,” including the current version.  (Aa65; 6T29:9-16).  Furthermore, [...] accepted [...] as an expert witness during the evidentiary hearings.  (6T34:24-35:1).  Therefore, [...] reasonably treated [...] as a credible expert witness, and the admissibility of his testimony regarding the EMP should not be disturbed.  (Aa65; Aa84).
[brief] The Commission held that an interest arbitration award is not subject to being vacated unless it is demonstrated that: (1) the arbitrator failed to give “due weight” to the 16g statutory factors judged relevant to the resolution of the specific dispute; (2) the arbitrator violated the standards in N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 and -9; or (3) the award is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.  (citations omitted)  (Aa048).  In its decision, the Commission addressed each argument of the [...].
[brief] On the brief and of counsel: [...], Esq. (#032551992)  [...]  [...], Esq. (#061532013)  [...] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS – BRIEF | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF CONTENTS - BRIEF | i | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS | ii | | TABLE OF TRANSCRIPT DESIGNATIONS | ii | | TABLE OF CONTENTS - APPENDIX | iii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | vi | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 1 |
[brief] On June 1, 2022, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint\(^1\) in the New Jersey Superior Court, Essex County, against the [...] alleging tort claims, Count 1 through 4 (Pa 001).  Further, relevant to this appeal, Count 5 alleged the Plaintiff was entitled to statutory PIP benefits, counsel fees and interest, against the Defendant-Respondent (Pa 009).  Defendant filed an Answer on July 15, 2022 (Pa 023).  On March 24, 2023, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgement, seeking a determination as a matter of law from the Court that the Plaintiff is eligible for PIP benefits for injuries related to the subject June 26, 2020 accident, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1, \textit{et seq} (Pa 033).
[brief] THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DECLINING TO PROVIDE A MOCKLER CHARGE.  (Raised Below: T2 187 through 191; T3 310 through 319; T4 8 through 13)  Plaintiff/Respondent makes much of the notion that a Mockler charge does not appear in the Model Civil Jury Charges.  A charge or jury instruction may be perfectly proper notwithstanding that is not part of the Model Civil Jury Charges.  Conversely, it can be reversible error to fail to give a necessary instruction.  This can be so whether or not the instruction is part of the Model Civil Jury Charges.  The matter before this Court is somewhat unique.
[brief] The core of the court’s decision in *Titan* centered on how the Department of Labor construed its authority to identify “persons responsible” for failing to pay prevailing wages, given that the two governing statutes, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.37 and 34:11-56.38, did not include the term “person responsible. ”  102 N.J. at 10.  [...] fares no better by its reliance on *[...] v. Dir., Div. of Taxation*, 97 N.J. 313 (1984).  *Metromedia* concerned the determination by the Director of the Division of Taxation regarding the calculation of taxable revenue from Metromedia’s sale of network air-time to national and local advertisers by applying a factor called “audience share,” which the Director modified from its legislative basis contained in N.J.S.A. 54:10A-6.  That statute set forth a formula for measuring a corporation’s activities, based on three factors (the “three-ply formula”), namely property, payroll and receipts.  The problem was that the Director adopted the “audience share” factor as a modification of the receipts factor of the three-ply formula, without evidence of any Legislative intent to apply such a modified formula.  97 N.J. at 322-24.  In the absence of any Legislative guidance, it was understandable for the court to rule that the Director used an ad hoc standard.
[brief] The Unions have advanced some evidence on which there could be based a finding that the notice was not reasonably designed to give notice to the proper universe of individuals affected.  Against that presentation, based on the present record, the Court cannot conclude that either the website's ten-word, cryptically described notice and link or the letter to the certifying officers provides sufficient evidence to support deferring to the agency's choice of notice as reasonable.  With the thin record available, it is not known what action, if any, certifying officers generally took in response to the Commissions' letter.  Nor does the record disclose what notice, if any, former employees and retirees received of the potential for supplemental reimbursement in light of the Commissions' apparent reliance on the link.  Accordingly, the Court orders a remand for the development of a proper record to permit meaningful judicial review.
[brief] VI.  THE LOWER COURT MADE A MISTAKE IN ADMITTING PLAINTIFF’S BOOKS AND RECORDS INTO EVIDENCE BECAUSE THEY ARE HEARSAY  (Not raised below)  A.  Plaintiff did not file an affidavit.  R. 1:6-2 states: “If the motion or response thereto relies on facts not of record or not subject to judicial notice, it shall be supported by affidavit made in compliance with R. 1:6-6. ”  (Emphasis Added).  R. 1:6-6 states: “If a motion is based on facts not appearing of record, or not judicially noticeable, the court may hear it on affidavits made on personal knowledge....” (Emphasis Added).  To offer an out-of-court statement for the truth of the matter asserted, Plaintiff must rely on the business record exception to the hearsay rule.  N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6).  Plaintiff made no argument in its Brief that the business record exception applied.  The lower Court accepted books of account without finding that the business record exception applied.  As proponent of the exception to hearsay, Plaintiff bears the burden to establish the admissibility of business records.  State v. Stubbs, 433 N.J. Super. 273, 285-286 (App. Div. 2013).  N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) provides in part:  “The following statements are not excluded by the hearsay rule:  6)  Records of regularly conducted activity.  A statement contained in a writing... made at or near the time of observation by a person with actual knowledge or from information supplied by such person....”  Plaintiff submitted account statements (Exhibits D through BB) (Da55 through Da103).  The account statements were hearsay because they constitute statements that “1) the declarant does not make while testifying at a trial or hearing and 2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. ”  N.J.R.E. 801(c).  The account statements had no affidavit attached nor was personal nor actual knowledge claimed (Exhibit FF) (Da115).  The lower Court mistakenly violated R. 1:6-2 and R. 1:6-6 by admitting these account statements into evidence.
[directive] Se o réu for do sexo feminino e estiver qualificada a receber tratamento para agressores sexuais, ela não será encaminhada ao [...], mas sim a uma instituição designada pelo [...] ([...]) aonde receberá um tratamento semelhante para agressores sexuais.  NOTE:  If the defendant is a female and qualifies for sex offender treatment, she will not be confined at the [...] but a facility designated by the [...] where she will receive similar sex offender treatment.  no Formulário revisado promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081-Portuguese página 3 de 3  Revised Form  Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081- Portuguese page 3 of 3
[brief] (2T: 53:4-8; P-58).  The audit trail prepared by Respondents as P-58 was narrowed to show only transactions that were changed between January 28, 2018 and January 29, 2018.  (2T: 54:9-55:1).  Between January 28 and 29, 2018, the audit trail print-out is 291 pages long, reflecting that Appellant made a total of 1,208 changes to [...]’s QuickBooks file.
[brief] Id. (citing Musto v. Vidas, 333 N.J. Super. 52, 74, 754 A.2d 586 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 607, 762 A.2d 221 (2000)).  The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s calculation of prejudgment interest from the date of each transaction was not “manifest denial of justice. ”
[brief] ”  Id. comment a (1996).  Defendants, [...] and [...], argue that they revoked the alleged continuing guarantee in 2016 when Plaintiff became aware that [...] and [...] had sold all of their interest in [...].  However, [...] and [...] have provided no evidence that this information was transmitted to [...], other than the deposition of [...] where he claims he advised [...] of the fact sometime in 2016.  [...] Deposition, 61-1 to 9, 61-24 to 62-16, Pa136-137.  This was denied by [...].
[brief] (6T 127-7 to 128-17)  Then the verdict sheet framed the Guilty/Not Guilty interrogatory this way, again emphasizing only the ordinary elements of the crime, just as the substantive instruction had:  AGGRAVATED MANSLAUGHTER  Count  One of the Indictment charges that on or about March 9, 2013, in the Township of Sayreville, County of Middlesex, Defendant [...] did recklessly cause the death of [...] under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.  Our verdict is:  Thus, the jury was told, over and over, to convict defendant of aggravated or reckless manslaughter if jurors merely found the ordinary elements of those homicide crimes, but obviously those instructions were dead wrong.  They omitted the fact that the State also bore the burden of disproving self-defense.  Kelly, 97 N.J. at 200.  It is simply not true that the jury’s “verdict must be guilty” if those ordinary elements are found beyond a reasonable doubt.  Yet that is what jurors were told, a number of times.  The State is sure to note that, after being consistently told the incorrect law in that regard, the jurors were then instructed -- in complete contradiction to what they had been told all along thus far -- that “self-defense is a complete defense to aggravated manslaughter,” that “it’s [also] a complete defense to reckless manslaughter,” and that the State bears the burden of disproving self-defense.
[brief] a.  Appellant Has Informed the Court on the Exceptional Circumstances that Exist for Failure to Seek Relief Prior to the Discovery Deadline  4 b.  Service of an Expert Report is a Discovery Obligation That Falls Within the Discovery Rules  5 | Court Rule | Page Number(s) | |----------------------------|----------------| | N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(a) | 1, 2 | | Case Law | | |----------------------------|----------------| | Carr v. Our Lady of Lourdes Med. Ctr., 2015 N.J.Super.Unpub. LEXIS 1484 (App. Div. 2015).
[brief] (Pa 101).  Additional undisputed material facts considered by the Trial Court include: Plaintiff’s vehicle was not moving at the time that the beverage given by the [...] employee spilled on her lap (Pa 060, Pa 062); her foot was on the brake while the vehicle remained in drive.  (Pa 060, Pa 062); and at the time of her accident, the Plaintiff was the named insured of an active automobile insurance policy with $250,000 in PIP coverage through the Defendant insurer, [...].
[brief] JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED WHERE, AS HERE, THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT  Summary judgment is not appropriate unless there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact. ”  R. 4:46-2(c).  In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must review any factual disputes, and draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the non-moving party.  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 536 (1995).  The “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, [and any] affidavits” must show that there is no “genuine issue as to any material fact challenged” in order to warrant the “stringent remedy” of summary judgment.  Shanley & Fisher, P.C. v. Sisselman, 215 N.J. Super. 200, 211 (App. Div. 1987).  Further, “the papers supporting the motion are [to be] closely scrutinized, and the opposing papers [are to be] indulgently treated. ”  Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 74-75 (1954).  “If there is the slightest doubt as to the existence of a material issue of fact, the motion should be denied. ”  Shanley & Fisher, P.C., supra, 215 N.J. Super. at 211.  In short, summary judgment should be denied unless the right thereto appears so clearly as to leave no room for controversy.  Id.  A court must not substitute itself for the fact-finding role of the jury.  All factual determinations, and in particular, all "[c]redibility determinations, will continue to be made by a jury and not the judge."  Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540.  It is equally well-established that when a case turns upon a party’s intent or state of mind, summary judgment is particularly inappropriate.  "[I]ssues hinging upon a party’s mental state are not appropriate for resolution by way of summary judgment."  J.L. v. J.F., 317 N.J. Super. 418, 433 (App. Div. 1999) (citation omitted); see also Carmichael v. Bryan, 310 N.J. Super. 34, 47 (App. Div. 1998) ("a court should be 'particularly hesitant' to apply the summary judgment model when dealing with a 'subjective element[] such as intent'" (internal citation omitted).  See generally [...], Current N.J. Court Rules Comment 4:46-2 (motion for summary judgment "should ordinarily not be granted where an action or defense requires determination of a state of mind or intent").  For this reason, in employment cases involving claims of retaliation, summary judgment is almost never appropriate.  As the Third Circuit stated in reversing a grant of summary judgment, "summary judgment is in fact rarely appropriate" in employment cases because they center on the employer’s motivation.  Marzano v. Computer Science Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 509 (3d Cir. 1996).  Applying this requisite standard of review herein, summary judgment was clearly improper.  POINT II