ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (R-267)  He then indicated that he contacted the manager of [...] and stated in Paragraph 6: 6.  That same day, because I work remotely due to COVID-19, I telephoned my paralegal, [...], and supervisor, [...], regarding the firm's efforts to obtain an EIN.  Both indicated that they "believed" they had taken care of that, and that they would get back to me with the relevant information.  (R-268)  Thereafter, [...] advised the Court that the EIN number was an "outstanding issue".  In Paragraph 10 and 11, [...] stated: 10.  Much to my chagrin, however, sometime between February 26 and March 2, 2021, I was told that no EIN was taken out for the Estate; no accounts were opened in the name of the Estate.  11.  I was surprised by this response and asked my office staff to double-check this.  On March 2, 2021, Mr. Groff confirmed with me that no EIN was taken out.  (R-268)  Attached to [...]'s Certification was an email from [...] dated March 2, 2021 - It stated: NO TRUST, that has nothing to do with the Estate.
[directive] Stalking offense of stalking against the same victim, or is committed while serving a term of imprisonment, or while on parole or probation for a conviction for any indictable offense under 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible the laws of this state, any other state or the United States; otherwise, fourth degree.  Actor knowingly takes or attempts to exercise unlawful control over a firearm or other weapon 1st Degree $100,000 to $250,000 10% permissible in the possession of a law enforcement or corrections officer when that officer is acting in the Disarming Law performance of his duties, and either is in uniform or exhibits evidence of his authority, second 2C:12-11(a)(b)
[brief] (Da35) (citing to State v. Chappee, 211 N.J. Super. 321, 334 (App. Div. 1986)("Knowledge of the right to be assisted by counsel and to remain silent . . . has little bearing on the voluntariness of a consent to search.") (quoting Hubbard v. Jeffes, 653 F.2d 99, 101-102 (3d Cir. 1981)).  [...] found that the issue turned on whether defendant’s consents to search had been voluntarily given.  In State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352 (1965), the New Jersey Supreme Court “delineated” five factors for courts to use in considering the voluntariness of a defendant's consent.  State v. Hagans, 233 N.J. 30, 39-40 (2018) (citing approvingly to King, 44 N.J. at 352-53).  The absence of one factor alone may be very consequential in one case while insignificant in another.  Id. at 40.  The voluntariness of a consent depends on “the totality of the particular circumstances of the case[,]” and each situation must rise or fall on its own facts.  *Ibid.* (quoting *King*, 44 N.J. at 353).  The *King* factors are not commandments, but mere “‘guideposts to aid a trial judge in arriving at his conclusion,’” and they are not “rigid absolute authority.
[brief] The Policy at issue effectively navigates the legal requirements owed to students and parents alike.  The Policy allows transgender students tremendous latitude to engage in the safe expression of their gender identity, while also --- \(^1\) “Policy,” used herein, shall refer to District Policy 5756, adopted on June 20, 2023 (Da169-171), and the implementing Regulation, prepared by the Superintendent, which can be found at Da262-265.  recognizing certain unilateral actions in which the student engages – not the student’s status – necessitate parental notification.  Such notification occurs in a school-supportive environment rather than the State’s preferred haphazard, arbitrary, and random manner.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] \(^{40}\)  [...] fails to establish any of these four elements under Count One of the Counterclaim.  A.  “first, that the parties entered into a contract containing certain terms”  [...] does not plead or identify a renegotiated contract where [...] was obligated to pay [...] despite not working.  (Argued Pa388 – Pa389)  The only contract between the parties is the 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 contract where [...] was paid to perform janitorial and custodial services as a condition of payment. \(^{41}\)  Count One of the Counterclaim seeks a $620,250.\(^{09}\) payment for April 2020.  \(^{40}\)  Goldfarb v. Solimine, 245 N.J. 326, 338 (2021)  \(^{41}\)  Pa55 – Pa61 As admitted by [...], [...], not [...], issued a stay at home order and ordered school closures in March 2020.  [...] did not work in April 2020, so it was not entitled to payment.  [...] cannot identify any contract between the parties where [...] was obligated to pay [...] over $620,250.\textsuperscript{09} on a no-show contract.  Such an arrangement for a public school district to pay over $620,000 in public taxpayer money to a for-profit private company to perform no services would be obviously illegal.  Although it could have under \textit{N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)}, [...] did not renegotiate its 2019-2020 contract and enter into a contract that allowed it to be paid despite not working.  As a pretext for an attempted breach of contract claim, [...] identified \textit{N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)} as forming the basis for payment, and not an actual contract.  [...]’s failure to produce a new contract that allowed it to be paid for not working means that it cannot establish the first element of a breach of contract claim, namely, that “the parties entered into a contract containing certain terms”\textsuperscript{42}.
[brief] 29  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Oral Ruling Denying Motion for Judgment of Acquittal  .................. 3T 15-22 to 18-4  Judgment of Conviction ........................................................................  Da 24-26  Sentence ....................................................................................................  4T 29-4 to 14  INDEX TO APPENDIX PAGE NOS.  [...] ........................................  Da 1 Jury Instructions .........................................................................................  Da 2-21  Verdict Sheet ...............................................................................................  Da 22-23  Judgment of Conviction ...............................................................................  Da 24-26 Notice of Appeal ...........................................................................................  Da 27-29  Model Jury Charges (Criminal), Animal Cruelty ........................................  Da 30-32 Model Jury Charges (Criminal), Child Cruelty .......................................... Da 33-35 ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES #### Cases | Case | Page No. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------| | **Beazell v. Ohio**, 269 U.S. 167 (1925) | 26 | | **DCPP v. K.N.**, 435 N.J. Super. 16 (App. Div. 2014) | 27 | | **Doe v. Poritz**, 142 N.J. 1 (1995) | 26 | | **DYFS v. K.A.**, 413 N.J. Super. 504 (App. Div. 2010) | 12 | | **Germann v. Matriss**, 55 N.J. 193 (1970) | 11 | | **Gibbons v. Gibbons**, 86 N.J. 515 (1981) | 25 | | **In re Commitment of J.M.B.**, 197 N.J. 563 (2009) | 9 | | **In re N.B.**, 222 N.J. 87 (2015) | 9 | | **In re P.L. 2001, Chapter 362**, 186 N.J. 368 (2006) | 20 | | **In re Proposed Construction of Compressor Station**, 476 N.J. Super.| 11 | | **In re Winship**, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) | 17 | | **Riley v. State Parole Bd.**, 219 N.J. 270 (2014) | 26 | | **State v. A.L.A.**, 251 N.J. 580 (2022) | 12 | | **State v. Alexander**, 136 N.J. 563 (1994) | 9 | | **State v. Bailey**, 251 N.J. 101 (2022) | 26 | | **State v. Beauchamp**, 262 N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div. 1993) | 20, 22 | | **State v. Case**, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) | 23 | | **State v. Francisco**, 471 N.J. Super. 386 (App. Div. 2022) | 13 | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D) | Cases (Cont'd) | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | **State v. Gross**, 225 N.J. Super. 28 (App. Div. 1988) | 24 | | **State v. J.V.**, 242 N.J. 432 (2020) | 25 | | **State v. Jordan**, 147 N.J. 409 (1997) | 8, 15 | | **State v. Lane**, 251 N.J. 84 (2022) | 25, 26 | | **State v. Masce**, 452 N.J. Super. 347 (App. Div. 2017) | 23, 24 | | **State v. N.I.**, 349 N.J. Super. 299 (App. Div. 2002) | 9 | | **State v. Newman**, 132 N.J. 159 (1993) | 23 | | **State v. O’Donnell**, 117 N.J. 210 (1989) | 11, 26 | | **State v. Reyes**, 50 N.J. 454 (1967) | 17, 18 | | **State v. Savage**, 172 N.J. 374 (2002) | 8 | | **State v.
[brief] At sentencing, the prosecutor stipulated that [...] possessed the requisite expert qualifications under N.J.R.E. 702, and the court qualified him as an expert.  (3T9-7 to 25)  No dispute was raised as to [...]’s lack of qualification, flawed methodology, or potential bias.  In fact, [...] had served as an expert on “several hundred” prior occasions, and had been retained by defense attorneys and by “the prosecution side, the Attorney General’s Office, [and] U.S. Attorney[.]” (3T10-9 to 18)  Absent any evidence indicating that [...]’s expert testimony should be disregarded, it was erroneous for the court to simply ignore the mitigating information from his findings.  *Case*, 220 N.J. at 64.  The State now asks this court to find that “the inconsistency in the data supplied to the experts calls into question their conclusion. ”  (Sb30)  Such a determination – if one was hypothetically made – would have been squarely within the discretion of the trial court.  *State v. Hubbard*, 222 N.J. 249, 264  Without such a finding, this Court cannot independently render a finding on [...]’s credibility on appellate review.  Roth, 95 N.J. at 363-64.  POINT II
[brief] (309a-310a; 322a-323a).  Defendants placed Plaintiff on “administrative leave” on that same date.  (321a).  However, the resolution placing Plaintiff on immediate ‘administrative leave’ effective August 1, 2017 does not indicate that action was ‘pending his retirement’.  (Ibid.).  Then-Township Administrator [...] testified that the Township Committee suspended Plaintiff, as well as [...], as opposed to merely placing Plaintiff on ‘administrative leave pending his retirement’:
[brief] C. v. Fisher Roofing, Inc., | | | 197 P.3d 758 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) | 14 | | Nester v. O’Donnell, | | | 301 N.J. Super. 198 (App. Div. 1997) | 5 | Powell v. Alemaz, Inc., 335 N.J. Super 33 (App. Div. 2000) ................................................................. 10 Ramos v. Browning Ferris Indus. of S. Jersey, Inc., 103 N.J. 177 (1986) ......................................................................................... 9 Sayles v. G&G Hotels, Inc., 429 N.J. Super. 266 (App. Div. 2003) ............................................................... 5 Schor v. FMS Fin. Corp., 357 N.J. Super. 185 (App. Div. 2002) ............................................................. 10, 17 Spring Creek Holding Co. v. Shinnihon U.S.A., 399 N.J. Super. 158 (App. Div. 2008) .............................................................. 8 Stiefel v. Bayly, Martin & Fay of Conn., Inc., 242 N.J. Super 643 (App. Div. 1990) ...............................................................
[brief] APPENDIX  Respondent’s Cover Letter enclosing Certified Responses to Form A Interrogatories, March 16, 2022………………………………………Pa001  Certified Responses to Form A Interrogatories, March 16, 2022………………………………………………Pa002  Respondent’s Certification to Certified Responses to Form A Interrogatories, March 16, 2022………………………………………Pa009  January 26, 2023  Email to Appellant’s Counsel serving January 13, 2023 neurosurgical Evaluation, [...]………..Pa010  March 22, 2023  Report and Award of Arbitrators …………………………………………………………………………………Pa011  April 5, 2023  Request for Trial De Novo, filed by Appellant………………………………………………………………………………..Pa012  October 9, 2023  Cover Letter submitting Proposed Order for Judgment………………………………………………………………………..Pa013  Respondent’s Motion for Costs, Attorneys’ Fees and Interest pursuant to R. 4:58-2¹…………………………………………………………..Pa014 • Notice of Motion pursuant to R. 4:58-2……………………………..Pa014 • Proposed Order – Motion pursuant to R. 4:58-2………………..Pa015 • Certification of Service - Motion pursuant to R. 4:58-2………Pa017 • Attorney Certification - Motion pursuant to R. 4:58-2………..Pa018 ¹ Brief(s) attached pursuant to R. 2:6-1(c)(2), as the issue of the Verdict amount and Offer of Judgment penalties has been brought into issue, although not raised below, by the instant appeal.  • Legal Brief - Motion pursuant to R. 4:58-2..........................Pa020 o Statement of The Case..............................................Pa020 o Statement of Facts.....................................................Pa021 o Legal Argument.......................................................Pa023 o Conclusion......................................................................Pa025 o Exhibit “A” – Offer of Judgment.................................Pa027 o Exhibit “B” – October 17, 2023
[directive] (Emphasis added to highlight one of the key distinctions between the standard for using deadly force and the standard for using enhanced mechanical force, such as less-lethal ammunition.  The latter type of force does not require that the threat of death or serious bodily injury be imminent or immediate.)  Deadly force may not be used against persons whose conduct is injurious only to themselves.  (This restriction also distinguishes the standard for using deadly force from the standard for using less-lethal ammunition, which may be used to prevent a person from killing or seriously injuring him/herself.)
[brief] It is an established rule that an appellate court’s review of a trial court’s fact finding is very limited.  As the Supreme Court held in Seidman v. Clifton savings Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011):  “The general rule is that findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence. ”  While that restriction does not apply to a trial court’s interpretation of the law, much of the case below centered upon the [...]’ claims regarding alleged nuisance, i.e., the impact of the reopening of the pizzeria upon them and the neighborhood.  Thus, by way of example, the Court’s rejection of [...]’s contention that traffic increased “3,000 percent” as not having any evidential support, and which was countered by the [...], was a proper factual finding.  Similarly, the Court made a finding of fact that the alleged nuisances from trucks and traffic was nothing more than an annoyance, nothing rising to the level of an actionable nuisance.  As the Judge noted:  “[U]nder all of the circumstances, and balancing the need for the pizzeria to operate against plaintiffs’ desire to be free from noise and traffic, the property has been used as a pizzeria for 50 years.  Although the volume and traffic, as well as the menu may have expanded, plaintiffs did not make any complaints, even though [...] testified that she had similar concerns when [...] (a prior operator) operated the pizzeria.  In other words, they did not make prior to complaints.  And to point out that the pizzeria was operating when they moved in.  In short, it's not unreasonable for a pizzeria to have trucks delivering beverages, meat, or produce or anything else for that matter.  Therefore, the plaintiffs have not met their burden. ” (T.4 at 31:17-32:7)  That was a finding of fact which should not be disturbed.  POINT II
[directive] prosecutor's immediately upon issuance of this Directive.  operational become shall Section This Information.  Contact Victim Protection of 5.4 facilitate information that would Prosecutor's Office has County the important that It is Enforcement subsection Preliminary 7.6.3.  The Law 29 and See note victim.l~ with the contact victim information, provided, feasible, document contact when should, therefore Report Incident containing victim contact designed so that the field shall be form electronic however, that the until such information disclosed and must be defendant unless with the shared information is not Division of In governing discovery.  the alternative, the Court Rules with the accordance in victim which transmit provide other means by to AOC to work with the Criminal Justice may victim system, through eCDR to facilitate automated judiciary the information to the contact system victim contact any such is designed so that that provided court events, notification of until such information disclosed and must be defendant unless with the shared information is not discovery.  governing Rules with the Court accordance in immediately upon issuance of Directive.
[brief] [2T6:12-19].  In response to the Chancery Judge’s question, counsel for Plaintiff and counsel for Defendants, [...], Esq. of [...] indicated that they were waiving arbitration.  [2T6:12-19].  Other than this exchange, there was no other discussion of arbitration and no order of any kind was entered memorializing the exchange or confirming the waiver.  See [Da159-63].  Finally, in exchange for an extension to answer Plaintiff’s First Amended Verified Complaint, counsel for Defendants agreed to voluntarily dismiss the [...]’s action ([...]) and raise the claims asserted therein as part of an answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint.  [Da166].
[brief] Ancrum, 449 N.J. Super. at 535.  A defendant is ineligible for Track One if he has a pending charge “of murder, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault,” N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(7), or if he has a pending charge in which he possessed a firearm.  N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(5).  The final category, concerning prior convictions, disqualifies a Recovery Court applicant based on his prior criminal history.
[brief] In addition to Berkemer, a number of cases by this Court hold that roadside detentions do not require Miranda warnings, and the facts of those cases compare favorably to the circumstances here.  For example, in Baum, 393 N.J. Super. at 280-84, the officer questioned the driver, a pregnant young woman, for an extensive period during an automobile stop.  The questioning occurred late at night while she stood outside crying in front of the officer’s patrol car.  The officer mentioned the potential for calling a drug-sniffing dog, asserted that the driver was not being honest, and inquired about the amount of drugs a passenger in the car had obtained in a recent transaction.  The questioning without Miranda warnings continued after the driver admitted that her car contained narcotics.
[brief] Lodi Officials Have No Familiarity with Their Lighting Systems and Agreement with [...].  [...], the Borough's Administrator, testified that he is aware that the town has an agreement with [...] to pay for electricity bills for streetlights (Pa694).  Caruso is not aware of any standard for brightness or type of lights that Lodi requires [...] to install.  Caruso acknowledged that [...] does not have the authority to install a streetlight on its own (Pa694).  Yet, Caruso does not know who decides on the installation of streetlights in the Borough (Pa694).  Caruso has not had any discussion with engineers in the town with regards to streetlights that would be best to installed in particular areas (Pa694).  In the end, Caruso would be responsible for the selection and ordering of what types of lamps to install in the Borough (Pa695).  Lodi did not have a consulting relationship with an engineer who specialized in street lighting.  The individual that was produced at deposition by Lodi as its consulting town engineer, [...], does not have a background in street lighting.
[brief] (See doc. 12 at 11-12).  Defendant [*6] nevertheless claims it was in compliance with the OSHA general mandate, as evidenced by its hotline and the fact it directed Plaintiff to stay home while feverish.  However, whether Plaintiff was in compliance with the OSHA general mandate is not the operative question.  In both Kelsay[ v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353, 23 Ill. Dec. 559 (1978),] and Palmateer, the court recognized that an employer could effectively frustrate a significant public policy by using its power of dismissal in a coercive manner.
[brief] Other than façade improvements and signage, no other exterior alterations were proposed.  (Ibid.)  The proposed retail cannabis dispensary is a permitted use under the Green Zone Redevelopment Plan (Aa246); however, due to the pre-existing --- \(^2\) “Aa__” refers to Appellant’s appendix, filed concurrently herewith. condition of the Property, which lacks any on-site, off-street parking, the Applicant sought bulk variance relief under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c) from the requirements of Section 19:66-5.8(b)(1) of the Land Development Rules, which otherwise mandates one parking space for each 300 square feet of floor area.
[brief] First, though the trial court found police did not follow any of the proper identification procedures, and that witnesses may have spoken to each other about the identification prior to speaking to police (6T115-18 to 116-23), it ended the hearing without hearing testimony from anyone other than [...].  Had counsel offered [...]’s or another expert’s testimony, he could have mounted a real challenge to the impropriety of the procedures, undermined the detective’s testimony about the asserted familiarity of the eyewitnesses with [...], and properly probed the many system and estimator variables showing the identifications were unreliable.  Even if the identifications would have still been admitted, this case depended almost entirely on the jury’s evaluation of the reliability of the identifications of witnesses with claimed familiarity.
[brief] ¹⁹  Although the fifth cause of action does not name [...] as a defendant, Paragraph 24 of the amended complaint lists her as one of the defendants in that count.  Da17.  [...] is the principal in [...], a corporation that purchased a 50% interest in [...] from [...] for $4,960,000 in 2014.  (P-82)  Da948.  She also became the purchaser of [...]’s interest in [...] pursuant to a December 2017 agreement.  (P-103) Da1528.  No allegation has been made and no evidence presented that [...] and [...] failed to receive the full amounts due under the agreements, an aggregate amount of $6.3 million.
[brief] Not only should the defendant have had notice of root when it raised the sidewalk, but the defendant [...] is responsible for the tree it owns and maintains, while also being responsible for shaving or removing such trees.  Therefore, reasonable inference requires that the defendant [...] knew or should have known that the main tree root of one of its trees was shaved, when it is the only entity permitted to do such work.  Additionally, if defendant knew that the sidewalk repair was done around the [...] address, then there is a question of how the defendant [...] obtained said knowledge.  If inspections were being made at the project site and tree roots were being shaved, constructive notice would be justly imposed or at a minimum made a question of fact as it was for the Lodato defendant.  While the condition in Lodato lasted for eighteen years a longer amount of time than in plaintiff’s case, it can be distinguished by the fact that the root had been raised and then shaved, thus transforming it from a dangerous condition of a raised sidewalk to a dangerous condition of a shaved tree root created by defendants.
[brief] Pa455 ¶ 20; Pa1041 ¶ 20; Pa475 ¶ 13.  Two of the “AYE” votes on the resolutions were cast by attorney [...], the then-corporate representative of [...] and [...], two limited liability companies in which [...] was the sole member.  Pa454 ¶ 14; Pa455 ¶ 21; Pa1041 ¶¶ 14, 21; Pa470 ¶¶ 3–4; Pa475 ¶ 13.  Attorney McCarthy is a principal with the Vermont law firm of [...] and is experienced in condominium real estate matters.  PA455 ¶ 22; Pa1041 ¶ 22; Pa475 ¶ 13.  On December 19, 2019, in accordance with the Association unit owner vote held earlier that day, the then-new President of the Association, [...], instructed [...] to enter appearances for the Association in the Derivative Action and in the 1007 Case.