ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A reviewing court is required to carefully review the Master Plan and its Land Use Plan Element to determine the actual consistency of the Rezoning Ordinance with the Master Plan, and if the “reasons” are not arbitrary.  (A)  THE REVIEW OF THE 1988 MASTER PLAN FOR SUBSTANTIAL CONSISTENCY OR INCONSISTENCY WITH THE REDEVELOPMENT PLAN WAS SIMPLY NOT PROPERLY DONE BY EITHER THE PLANNING BOARD OR GOVERNING BODY  It is recognized, as noted in Willoughby II, that the Planning Board’s determination as to consistency between the Master Plan and a new Zoning Ordinance or Redevelopment Plan is normally entitled to deference and great weight.  However, that requires and presupposes that there was an actual review and analysis of the in-place Master Plan and its Land Use Element in conjunction with the new Zone or Redevelopment Plan actually done by the Board and/or Governing Body, such as the analysis in the cases cited earlier.
[brief] Thereafter, the Court noted that it had been advised that Plaintiff “had walked up and down through that aisle on a couple of occasions. ”  Id., at 26:12 to 16.  The Court’s instruction for Plaintiff to remain at counsel table or exit through the back of the courtroom was given because it “didn’t want there to become a problem. ”  Id., at 26:5 to 7.  The Court’s recognition that Plaintiff walking up and down the courtroom’s center aisle through the jury array could be “become a problem” is telling.  Its decision to place limits on Plaintiff’s movements in the presence of potential jurors is equally telling.  Each acknowledges the clear potential that impressions of Plaintiff developed prior to trial could influence determinations subsequently made during deliberations.  Although the Court chose to discount the accuracy of the insurance adjuster’s certification, there can be no doubt that the behavior described therein was the type of “problem” it sought to avoid when it placed limits on Plaintiff’s movements about the courtroom.
[brief] 7T61-13/16.  **Arrest.**  [...] voluntarily submitted to SFST, appeared to understand the instructions, complied with them in good faith as best he could, and was fully cooperative.  7T66-17/67-13.  Nonetheless, based on these tests, [...] believed [...] could not safely operate a vehicle (7T33-2/3), believed he was DWI (7T80-11/15), and arrested him based on this suspicion (7T34/12/14) unsupported by any tools with which to measure breath or blood alcohol content.  7T63-15/20.  [...] voluntarily cooperated with handcuffing without resistance.  7T84-11/15.  He did not look intoxicated while walking.  7T85-8/24.  From the arrest forward, [...] noted nothing that indicated that [...] was intoxicated (7T90-22/92-6) and neither noted nor recalled much about [...] after his arrest (see 7T86-3/15, 87-1/6, 88-21/89-9, 92-7/16, 95-19/96-13).
[directive] Czy zdaje Pan(i) sobie sprawę, że będzie Pan(i) mieć możliwość podważenia [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  4. wniosków [...] podczas rozprawy i że podczas tej rozprawy będzie przysługiwało Panu(i) prawo do skonfrontowania świadków występujących przeciwko Panu(i) i zadawania im pytań, a także do przedstawienia dowodów na poparcie swojej sprawy?  Do you understand you will be able to challenge the findings of the [...] in a hearing and at that hearing you will have the right to confront the witnesses against you and to cross examine them and then present evidence on your own behalf?
[brief] Defendants Conflate Generalized Workplace Conduct with the Conduct Giving Rise to CEPA Protected Activity.  Defendants attempt to conflate Defendant [...]’s generalized workplace conduct with her unlawful harassment.  This mischaracterization creates a strawman argument, obscuring the specific conduct that gives rise to Plaintiff’s CEPA-protected activity.  Two truths coexist: (1) Defendant [...] had a history of poor workplace conduct that while unprofessional, does not constitute criminal harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4; and (2) some of Defendant [...]’s specific actions, including the June 2020 incident, constitute unlawful harassment as defined by statute.  It is the latter, not the former, that forms the basis of Plaintiff’s CEPA claim.  By commingling these distinct issues, Defendants attempt to distract the Court.  The Trial Court erroneously minimized the legal violation as a reflection of Defendant [...]’s management style.  However, Plaintiff does not argue that Defendant [...]’s generalized “management style” itself constituted criminal harassment.  Rather Plaintiff contends that certain specific conduct, most significantly the incident with Plaintiff, gave rise to a reasonable, good faith belief that Defendant [...] violated the law, which satisfies the first prong of this Court’s CEPA analysis.  As Plaintiff set forth in the Brief, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) and (c) define harassment as occurring when a person “makes, or causes to be made, one or more communications . . . in offensively coarse language or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or harm . . . or c) engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person. ”  See N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a)-(c); see also State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 580 (1997).  The characterization of Defendant [...]’s behavior as harassment is not a bald assertion but is, instead, rooted in the specific, observed conduct that aligns with the statutory language.  These behaviors are not generalized workplace dissatisfaction but specific actions that reasonably suggested an intent to alarm or intimidate.  It is also unreasonable to argue that a whistleblower employee must understand the contours of the statute in a manner that is different than its plain language.  Whistleblowers are not held to a standard of legal certainty but to a reasonable layperson’s understanding of the law.  Plaintiff’s belief that the conduct constituted criminal harassment was, therefore, reasonable under the circumstances, as it comports with a lay person’s understanding of the statute.  CEPA’s framework is designed to protect employees who act in good faith to report perceived violations, not to create mini trials regarding the underlying acts.  As set forth in Plaintiff’s initial Brief, Plaintiff engaged in protected whistleblowing activity under CEPA by disclosing these incidents of harassment.  B.
[brief] In his lengthy, detailed oral decision, [...] addressed each of the arguments raised by the defendant then, and which are reiterated on appeal before this Court: 1) that [...], was not an appropriate legal guardian pursuant to State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304 (2000) and defendant was not given a sufficient opportunity to consult with [...]; 2) that the Miranda warnings given as to defendant’s right to counsel were incorrect; 3) that defendant ambiguously invoked his right to silence, which was not properly clarified by detectives; and 4) that defendant did not and could not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights.  (2T23-20 to 25-15).  [...] noted that all four issues related to what happened inside the interrogation room, all of which was video recorded.³ (2T8-23 to 9-11).
[brief] The brief of Defendant [...] substitutes bombast for law and facts, electing to apply sophomoric labels such as “specious,” “frivolous,” and “shameless” to the Plaintiff’s argument rather than a meaningful addressing of its merits.  Definitely [...]’s brief foregoes this approach, but like [...] fails to provide the Court with sufficient authority to affirm the Trial Court’s holding that the agreement between these parties was illegal and thereby unenforceable.  The briefs of Defendants focus instead on the illegality and unenforceability of the contract between the Plaintiff and the property’s seller, which is not challenged by this appeal.  Defendants provide no authority to counter the caselaw submitted by Plaintiff or otherwise bridge the gap between the acceded impermissibility of the one contract and the Trial Court’s ruling of automatic unenforceability of the other.  Defendants attempt to bridge this gap by implying intent on the part of Plaintiff to defraud the property seller, classifying the contract between Plaintiff and Defendants as a continuation of Plaintiff’s scheme.  But no such intent was established by Defendants, and at best establishes a material question of fact.  Defendants’ briefs engage in a purely surface analysis of its contract with Plaintiff, ignoring altogether their highly active participation in the events underlying this appeal.  Defendants point their finger at Plaintiff for participating in an impermissible transaction, but provide no authority for the impunity it seeks for its own substantial involvement in and negligence regarding same.  While it may be true that the contract contained clauses permitting Defendants to cancel their contractual and fiduciary duties in the abstract, they certainly lost their opportunity to do so by, and among many other things, preparing closing documents, hosting the closing in their office, and calling the property seller as many as 20 times to acquire her signature.  Moreover, Defendants did not merely participate in these activities on behalf of the Plaintiff, but made critical errors in the course of doing so including the disbursement of Plaintiff’s funds without securing good title, and issuing title insurance to the wrong party.  While Defendants’ factual account of these events and errors unsurprisingly differs from Plaintiff’s, this is again a question of material fact which can only be resolved by a jury.
[directive] Pursuit for motor vehicle offenses is not authorized under Paragraph 3.2 unless the violator’s vehicle is being operated so as to pose an imminent threat to the safety of the public or other officers and that threat is based on the violator’s actions or operation of the vehicle prior to the initiation of the attempted motor vehicle stop.  There shall be a strong presumption against the initiation of vehicular pursuits based solely on motor vehicle violations.  Both supervisors and officers shall ensure that only in rare cases will a vehicular pursuit be initiated or continued for motor vehicle violations.  3.3
[brief] Plaintiff-Respondent [...] (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) respectfully submits this instant brief in response to Defendants-Appellants (hereinafter “Defendants”) appeal of multiple decisions made during Trial which concluded with an August 15, 2023 Order of Judgment, along with the July 19, 2023 Orders barring reference to the State of Emergency and denying Defendants’ request to bar reference to the snow removal contract, and granting in part Defendants request to bar evidence of termination or nonrenewal of snow removal contracts.  This litigation arises out of injuries Plaintiff, an invitee, suffered on March 8, 2018, when defendants, [...], [...], [...], [...] d/b/a [...] (collectively hereinafter “[...]”), [...] (hereinafter “[...]”), and [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) failed to properly keep [...] reasonably safe and failed to properly inspect it, in order to discover dangerous and hazardous conditions, which caused Plaintiff to slip and fall and sustain serious injuries.
[brief] During the November 14, 2023, trial, Plaintiffs’ counsel raised issues as to service of indispensable parties, i.e. service of the Boundary Commissioners’ Report upon the surrounding Lot owners including the owners of tax lots 9, 12, 13 and 16.  The Honorable [...] shared Plaintiffs’ counsel’s concerns, and in doing so, entered an Order dated November 14, 2023, ordering the following relief:  **ORDERED** that Plaintiffs’ counsel shall send a copy of this order and a copy of the commissioner’s report to the owners of tax lots 9, 12, 13 & 16 as depicted in the commissioner’s survey dated September 22, 2022.  Counsel may also submit to said parties other evidence they feel is relevant.  Any of the parties who wish to contest the merits of said report shall file with the court notice of objection and basis of same by January 12, 2024, with a copy to the attorney for the parties noted above.  (Pa95).  In accordance with the Court’s November 14, 2023, Order, Plaintiffs’ counsel duly notified the surrounding Lot owners of the litigation, providing the Court’s Order, the Preliminary Report of the Commission and the supporting exhibits and surveys.
[directive] Release. of Condition or Order a Restraining Violence Domestic to pursuant authorized except Section as 8.3, under covered otherwise not case any  In violence involving domestic offense for an released been has defendant a where 8.4.5, subsection has defendant (1) that the believe to cause probable is there and acomplaint-warrant by charged an or Act Violence Domestic of Prevention the pursuant to issued order restraining a violated cause to threatened or has caused (2) and Law Reform
[brief] 16, 25  King v. S. Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 178 (1974)  14  Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485, 497 (1985)  42  Leaderman v Prudential Life Insurance, 385 NJ Super 324, 349 (App. Div), certif. den. 188 N.J. 353 (2006)  11, 34  Lieberman v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 132 N.J. 76, 79 (1993)  10  Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)
[brief] ”).  Other non-binding opinions follow the similar analysis.  In Caprio v. Nutley Park ShopRite Inc, 2022 WL 4361326, (App. Div. September 21, 2021), the Court found that Plaintiff neither specified what additional information or legal contention he would have proffered during oral arguments, nor did he suggest that holding arguments could have resulted in a different outcome . . . [thus] plaintiff suffered no prejudice from the failure to hold oral argument.  In Brown v. City of Jersey City, 2021 WL 2326382, *5 (App. Div. June 8, 2021), the Court found that despite the failure to explain why the motion was resolved without oral argument, there was no value in remanding the matter for the sole purpose of conducting oral argument when it is clear that the court properly decided plaintiff’s motion. ” (citations omitted).  Plaintiff’s citation to the unpublished opinion in *Delgado v. Yourman-Helbig*, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1266 (App. Div. 2022), is ineffective and distinguishable from this matter.
[brief] Count 1- Negligent, Reckless, and Wanton violation of Plaintiff’s rights; Count 2-Breach of the Covenant of Good faith and Fair Dealing; Count 3-Reckless and Intentional infliction of Severe Emotional Distress; Count 4- Violation of NJ constitution, Article 1, paragraphs 1, 6, 10, 11 , 18, 22, Peper v. Princeton, 77 NJ 55 (1978), Count 5-Violations of N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c); Count 6-State Created Danger-Class of one Violation and Count 7-Res Ipsa loquitur.  The Counts were based on plaintiff’s allegations that while confined at the [...], she was: Not Permitted to attend Church; Plaintiff requested but was denied her psychiatric medications; Plaintiff was threatened with Bodily harm; She was unfairly subjected to Disciplinary action; Plaintiff was Denied contact with her Attorney; Plaintiff was not taken to scheduled Court Appearance and that she grieved and was given retaliation.  On 10/25/2023, the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of Counts 2, 3,6, and 7, and remanded Count One, Count Four and Count Five to the Trial Court.  The Division expressed that there was no legal analysis by defendants related to the additional basis for dismissal of these counts.  On remand the defendants were required by the Appellate Division to provide legal analysis as to whether or not the defendants are eligible for Qualified Immunity, whether or Not Plaintiff failed to Comply with the Notice Provisions of the Tort Claims Act, whether or Not Plaintiff failed to plead recognized exceptions to public entity immunity and whether or Not the Amended Complaint was Non-Compliant with the Statue of Limitations.  The Court found that the Amended Complaint was timely filed and that the Notice Provision of the Tort Claim Act was given compliance.  The trial Court however incorrectly failed to find that the defendants could not provide the requisite legal analysis or any cognizable additional reasons for the dismissal of Count One, Court Four and Count Five of the plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.  The Court dismissed the remaining Counts despite the fact that the defendants were unable to comply with the Appellate Divisions Instructions and provided its decision in another conclusory fashion.
[brief] 1-5 and/or "[...]" (the last three being fictitious designations), Defendants-Respondents  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION: [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE JURY VERDICT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, OCEAN COUNTY  DOCKET NO. [...]  SAT BELOW: The Honorable [...], J.S.C. RESPONDENT’S BRIEF ON APPEAL
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11).  “Hardship to children may be a significant mitigating sentencing factor. ”  State v. Mirakaj, 268 N.J. Super. 48, 51 (App. Div. 1993).  The evidence overwhelmingly supported the defense’s request.  [...]’s cousin wrote in a character letter that [...] “has minor children that need him in their lives as a provider and as someone to mentor and guide them. ”  (Da 47)  [...]’s fiancé wrote in an email, which defense counsel read into the record, that [...] is a “great father and stepfather” to “two older teens” and that he has “been in their lives since they were born. ”  (9T 14-20 to 15-9)  [...]’s son also wrote an email attesting that [...] was a “good man”; that the son, his sister, and their mother all miss [...]; and that the son wants to be able to ride bikes together again.  (9T 16-6 to 23)  The presentence report indicated that [...] has two children, one nineteen years old and one of an unreported age, and the report further indicated that [...] claimed two “[d]ependents” and paid support.  (PSR 13, 19)  Finally, [...] completed a number of institutional courses with perfect attendance, including “Family Reunification and Transition” and “Helping Offenders Parent Effectively. ”  (Da 50-51, 53-54)  Despite those letters, emails, and programs -- and despite the court’s own finding that [...] “must [have been] supporting these children while he was out” -- the court entirely rejected mitigating factor eleven based on its findings that imprisonment would entail a hardship but not an “excessive” hardship with “a uniqueness”; that [...] has no “minor dependants” or “any dependants”; and that [...] can maintain a relationship with his children “[t]hrough the prison system.
[brief] Under the MLUL, the powers of a zoning board of adjustment are narrow and circumscribed, and include, in pertinent part, the power to: decide appeals alleging enforcement errors by administrative officers, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(a); or to "decide requests for interpretation of the zoning map or ordinance or for decisions upon other special questions upon which such board is authorized to pass by . . . ordinance, in accordance with this act."  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(b).  The Board also has authority to act in connection with an application brought before it pursuant to N.J.S.A.
[brief] So the financial fraud in *Walid* that was not addressed in the writing and entirely disrupted the intent of the parties and the purpose of the contract requiring introduction of Parol Evidence.  The facts of this case are distinct from those in *Walid* and *Berman*.  Plaintiff/Respondents did nothing more than orally dispute and contradict six (6) specific --- \(^1\)  Plaintiff/Respondents also cite and rely on *Berman v. Gurwicz*, 199 N.J. Super. 89 (Chancery Div. 1981) in furtherance of their reliance on *Walid*.  But the *Berman* case involved a “undisclosed lease” of a swimming pool that was obviously not covered in the contract that the parties signed and was wholly extraneous to the writing just like the financial fraud was wholly extraneous to the contract in *Walid*.  That is not the case here.  terms covered in their signed and executed contracts.  All the other technical and regulatory violations found by the jury had absolutely nothing to do with the claims of oral misrepresentation that triggered the filing of this lawsuit.  For example, the fact that the Plaintiff/Respondents alleged in June 2021 that the incorrect version of the Consumer Information Statement was provided had nothing to do with the claims of oral misrepresentation.  Nor did the discrepancy in time regarding provision of the Public Offering Statements have anything to do with the alleged oral misrepresentations claimed.  The same goes for all the other technical, regulatory violations separate and apart from the alleged oral misrepresentations and that could not be the basis causing an ascertainable loss.  Fourth, Plaintiff/Respondents claim that the Parol Evidence Rule is inapplicable because they seek to “void” the contracts, not alter them.
[brief] The Staffing Office and Payroll.  The staffing office ensures that [...]’s hospitals have adequate nursing coverage at all times.  (Pa67).  [...] employed Plaintiffs as “staffing coordinators. ” (Pa162; Pa228; Pa282).  During the time period relevant to this litigation, the staffing office was comprised of approximately six staffing coordinators, the nursing supervisor, and the nurse manager.  (Pa66-67 at 25:18-26:1; Pa67 at 28:15-17).  Staffing coordinators are responsible for a variety of tasks, including important timekeeping and payroll functions.  (Pa67).  The staffing coordinators have access to [...]’s timekeeping and payroll software called “Kronos. ” (Pa351).  Staffing coordinators are responsible for finalizing employees’ Kronos time cards prior to payroll closing.  (Pa351 at 38:5-11).  Payroll closes at approximately 11:00 am every other Monday.  (Pa351 at 38:20-25).  [...] was responsible for reviewing the staffing coordinators’ time cards for any missed entries and accurate paid time off (“PTO”) prior to payroll closing.  (Pa351-52 at 40:17-41:12).  [...] typically reviewed her staffing coordinators’ time cards on Sunday evenings prior to payroll closing.  (Pa352 at 41:3-12).  While the staffing coordinators could not make alterations to their own time cards, they could edit entries for other employees, including other staffing coordinators.  (Pa351 at 39:13-40:16).  III.
[brief] Ultimately, the discharge of the receiver was up to the discretion of the trial court.  N.J. Stat. § 14A:14-2 (3) (“The court may proceed in a summary manner or otherwise.  It shall have power to appoint and remove one or more receivers of the corporation from time to time…The court shall have such further powers as shall be appropriate for the fulfillment of the purposes of this chapter. ”).
[brief] Da099.  It is correct that courts have determined that the fact that a third-party maintains records does not mean those records are exempt from OPRA.  See Burnett v. County of Gloucester, 2 A.3d 1110, 1116 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2010).  However, the conclusion that any time an entity is acting with the “authority of the State” it is subject to OPRA as to all of the information it maintains to perform its function, is an extreme and unprecedented expansion of OPRA, based upon an incorrect reading of the statutory language.  After incorrectly concluding that the text of the OPRA law contemplated “when an entity acts with the ‘authority of the State’ to perpetuate the government’s “official course of business”, the trial court determined that it “must look at the standards adopted nationwide to determine whether public disclosure is warranted. ”
[directive] on  An is b. account which established behalf of a municipal law of funding enforcement agency by the entity the county account (MEA) prosecutor shall be maintained as an escrow law in of the name the specific municipal enforcement agency.  All or These accounts shall be interest-bearing- forfeited funds a proceeds from the sale forfeited property designated for of be municipal law enforcement agency shall deposited into that 1 or In agency’s escrow account.  addition, any interest other in income generated by the deposited funds shall remain the escrow agency’s escrow account.  Because these accounts are trust accounts, the funds shall not revert to the county general treasury at the end of the fiscal year, carryover but from year year.