ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See Da265, Para.8-9 and Da246.  In accordance with that advice, during Winter/Spring 2019, each Board Defendant adopted Policy 5756 in the form [...] recommended.  See Da158, Para.8 and Da265, Para.9.  The principles embodied in that version confronted District staff with issues that seemingly required them to make material misrepresentations or omissions to parents concerning a student’s gender identity or expression.  In [...], school administrators and staff were confronted with at least one issue where compliance with the Guidelines conflicted with the general obligation for transparency with parents.
[brief] (Ca222-223).  Below this photo, she responded to a question from a community member as to what her position was with the statement “I was elected onto the central regional board of education (BOE) come on man LOL” indicating that it was common knowledge to her Facebook followers that she was a sitting Board member.  (Ca223).  7.  On January 6, 2022, Respondent refused to wear a mask while a seated Board member at a meeting of the Board.
[brief] (Ca284).  During the times she made the relevant posts her profile picture contained the words “UNMASKED UNVAXED UNAFRAID. ” (Ca280).  Her campaign poster – attached to the Amended Complaint – indicated that she is opposed to “mask mandates. ” (Ca285).  She had even attended prior meetings of the Board, such as the August 20, 2021 meeting of the Board, stating “that she has the right to refuse the masks and her children will not be coming to school with masks,” and “she stated again that her children will not be coming to school with a mask,” while threatening the Board itself with a lawsuit.  (Ca187).  Her conspiracy theory laden reasoning also shook out in discovery, a sure sign dismissal was premature, with Respondent typing out the words “there is endless medical literature that discusses … the side effects of masking.  Far too many to list. ” (Ca156 at Response to ROG 12).  This is obviously untrue.  Respondent very publicly broke the law and encouraged others to do the same based on false information that she repeatedly propagated.
[directive] 1.  (2)  Èske w konprann ke si w chanje travay oswa estati skolè w, ou fèt pou notifye ajans [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] fòsdelòd ki koresponn la pa pi ta ke 5 jou anvan chanjman a fèt?  Do you understand that if you change employment or school enrollment status you must notify the appropriate law enforcement agency no later than 5 days after the change?  (3)  Èske w konprann ke si w pa ta notifye ajans fòsdelòd ki koresponn la de chanjman [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] adrès oswa stati w, yo ta kab mete yon twazyèm akizasyon sou do w de ti deli (si zak la twazyem degre, epi w ta ka resevwa yon santans nan prizon de jiska 5 lane te komèt le oubyen aprè le 1ye jiyè 2014) oubyen yon ta kab akize w de yon (si zak la te enfraksyon epi w ta kab resevwa yon santans nan prizon de 18 mwa komèt anvan le 1ye jiyè 2014)? Do you understand that if you fail to notify the appropriate law enforcement agency of a change of address or status you may be charged with a third degree crime, and may receive a sentence of (if the offense was committed on or after July 1, 2014) imprisonment of up to 5 years or you may be charged with a fourth degree crime and may receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 18 (if the offense was committed before July 1, 2014)? months c) Èske w konprann ke si w pa ta anrejistre oswa re-anrejistre yo ta kab akize w de yon deli [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] klasifikasyon penal 3yèm degre ak resevwa yon santans nan prizon de jiska 5 lane?
[brief] (See 4T:6-11 to 10-6).  Defendant argues that, because the evidence demonstrated that the police failed to investigate certain leads, the prosecutor improperly bolstered the credibility of the police and “filled in the missing pieces” of their investigation by indicating that they pursued every lead.  (Db33 to 34).  The cases defendant presents in support of this argument are distinguishable from the case at bar.  In *State v. Frost*, the New Jersey Supreme Court specifically condemned the prosecutor’s suggestion that police had no reason to lie or would face punishment for lying as “wholly inappropriate. ”  (158 N.J. 76, 85 (1999)).  In *State v. Feaster*, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the prosecutor impermissibly provided the “missing pieces” of the police investigation during summation by asserting facts not in evidence, namely that the defendant “took the shotgun and loaded it with a slug” as his “first act of purpose, preplanned, premeditated, intent to kill. ” (156 N.J. 1, 56 (1998)).  Neither situation occurred here, where the prosecutor merely encouraged the jury to adopt the inferences he suggested based on the evidence.  Further, the prosecutor made such a suggestion in response to defense counsel’s “opening salvo” discrediting the police investigation.  (See *Engel*, 249 N.J. Super at 379; 5T:72-20 to 75-14).  **E.
[brief] ”  Also, at the time of the hearing before [...], the court stated:  I’ve got to tell you a little emotional in writing things in briefs to this court that are not becoming of us are very, very, very, different things.  And I will just make this general statement: if you are going to say it, you better be able to back it up.  But do not say it in my courtroom.  Keep your emotions out of it.  Put a poison pen down.  Likewise, everyone else here, it is not my first day doing this.  I have been a lawyer, I was a lawyer a long time.  I have been on the bench quite some time.  I do not like reading disparaging comments.  I do not know [...].  [...] I have never met you before.  So take these comments for what they are so you understand how I - - my courtroom, I don’t like shots fired at other lawyers unless you can prove it.  So keep the emotions out of the papers.  Stick to the facts.  That is really all I am interested in … (Ca308 at p.10, lines 9-21 and 25; and p.11, lines 1-5).
[directive] Page 4 C.  Each County Prosecutor’s Office, as well as [...], [...], and Retention of Records.  [...], shall maintain a record of any jailhouse informant whose testimony has been approved by the County Prosecutor or Director.  Although recordkeeping procedures may vary, this Directive recommends that each Office maintain in a centralized location a copy of the material submitted by the prosecution team to the County Prosecutor or Director for approval.  If the State ultimately calls the jailhouse informant to testify, the prosecution team should consider requesting a copy of the transcript and adding it to the Office’s file.  III.
[brief] (Pa503).  -  On December 18, 2015, a Notice of Disciplinary Action dated charged [...] with “Insubordination” and “Conduct unbecoming a public employee for submitting an abstract for presentation New Jersey Water Works Association (NJAWWA) Annual Conference to be held in March of 2016.  -  On April 12, 2016, [...] of the [...]’s Office of Labor Relations in the Human Resources Department issued discipline charges against [...] signed by [...] alleging falsification and conduct unbecoming a public employee on the sole grounds that [...] lied when he denied being under [...]’s desk.  (Pa465-Pa466).  -  On April 12, 2021, numerous altered and derogatory retirement posters were placed throughout the [...] workplace with [...]’s photograph stating “HELP US CELEBRATE (WELL REJOICE OVER) ALAN DILLON’S HASTY, UNSCHEDULED AND DOWN-RIGHT EMBARRASSING DEPARTURE FORM DEP TO AVIOD PENSION  SANCTIONS AND OTHER FURTHER DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS FOLLOWING A SCANDOLUS END TO A 30 YEAR CAREER OF DISREPUTABLE BEHAVIOU, ALIENATING COLLEGUES AND ABUSING REGULATEES” – relating facts that were discussed at an April 11, 2016 communications among [...], [...] and [...].
[brief] The owner of the property where the event will occur shall have invited the mobile retail food establishment to participate and mobile food vending is part of the event activities.  (b)  The permit shall be good for a maximum of 10 consecutive days and there shall be at least 90 days between events at the same location.  (c)  The mobile retail food establishment unit may not remain at the location for longer than the duration of the special event and while there must be located so as to avoid creating conflicts with pedestrian or motor vehicle traffic or creating other public safety problems.
[brief] Although the Court was unmoved by the *primary* argument in the PCR – [...]’s recantation to [...]– the Superior Court found that Appellant’s arguments related to the falsely Sworn Statement had “merit. ” (Da084).  The court also made the following factual finding:  [...], as part of his federal habeas corpus petition submitted in August 2008, claimed to have no prior knowledge of the events stemming from the Staten Island robbery before the crime occurred and that he previously sought to introduce an affidavit from [...] (who was deceased at the time) that would have included false statements that supported [...]’ claim that he had no knowledge of the Staten Island home invasion beforehand.
[brief] (6T182-19 to 21).  All four occupants were African American men.  (6T182-19 to 21).  After this car sped off, [...] gave chase.  (6T183-3 to 5).  The officer heard on his radio that the suspect in the shootings was described as wearing a dark jacket and an orange shirt, which matched one of the men in the silver-colored vehicle.  (6T183-5 to 9).  The officer activated his overhead lights and pursued the vehicle.  (6T183-22 to 25; 6T184-5 to 7).  The vehicle ran a red light at a high rate of speed and almost hit another vehicle.  (6T186-2 to 14).  The officer’s speed reached 85 miles per hour; the speed of the fleeing vehicle was about 95 to 100 miles per hour.  (6T186-15 to 20).  The officer tried to get a read on the license plate number but was not able to make it out because the driver of the fleeing vehicle turned off the headlights, which made it very difficult for the officer to see the license plate.  (6T187-6 to 18).  Because of the risks involved, the officer terminated the pursuit.
[brief] As noted below, [...] is not an employee of [...].  [...], subcontracted the inspection services aspect of the contract to [...].  [...] retained [...] as an independent contractor.  (Pa1783)  D.  [...]/[...]  Subcontract  [...] subcontracted a portion of the work to [...].  (Pa1778)  The subcontract clearly sets forth that [...] is an independent contractor and not an agent of [...].  (Pa1783)  (Article XIV)  As noted in the agreement:  Article XIV.  INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.  Subconsultant agrees that it is an independent contractor and not an agent of Prime and is solely responsible for the means and methods used in performing the services provided herein....” (Pa1783)  As set forth below, [...] cannot be held liable for the purported negligence of an independent contractor under the facts of this case.
[brief] **REASONABLE NECESSITY AND BEST AVAILABLE SITE**  47.  As demonstrated above and in the accompanying testimonies (particularly that of [...]), the Facility is required in order to maintain the integrity and reliability of [...]’s local distribution system because it will allow the Company to reliably, efficiently and safely achieve the 600 psig reduction in gas pressure between the upgraded transmission system in Holmdel and the local distribution system, which serves customers in Holmdel and surrounding municipalities.  The design of the Regulator Station—most importantly, the above-ground heating unit—will prevent the regulators and associated equipment at the Facility from becoming encased in thick ice, which could well result in a harmful loss of service to the customers served by the local distribution system.  The present configuration of [...]’s delivery apparatus does not adequately accomplish this goal because, *inter alia*, the temporary regulator being used as a stop gap does not employ and cannot accommodate a heater.  As a result, [...] has demonstrated that the proposed Facility is necessary for the service, convenience or welfare of the entire public served by the public utility.
[brief] The current iteration of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 traces its history to 1995.  Prior to that time, the procedure for passing ordinances required municipalities to publish ordinances in their entirety after first reading.  The Legislature, recognizing the financial burden that this procedure imposed upon municipalities with the attendant publication costs, amended the statute to provide the option for municipalities to publish ordinances by title, as long as the notice also included “a clear and concise statement prepared by the clerk of the governing body setting forth the purpose of the ordinance, and the time and place when and where a copy of the ordinance can be obtained without cost by any member of the general public who wants a copy of the ordinance. ”  Id.  As explained by the Senate Community Affairs Committee:
[brief] The Borough and [...]  The Borough is a member of the [...] (“[...]” or the “Commission”) pursuant to N.J.S.A. 26:3-92.  On February 23, 1968, the Borough adopted Chapter 25, Health Commission, and set forth its membership in the [...].  By way of Chapter 25 of the Borough Code, the Borough also adopted and subscribed to all the “requirements and regulations” of the Commission.  On July 27, 1983, the Commission adopted its Ordinance No. 2, “An Ordinance Establishing A Public Health Nuisance Code”, which adopted by reference the New Jersey Public Health Nuisance Code of 1953, a general code.  --- 3  Originally, Plaintiffs brought the within action challenging Ordinance 05-2017; however, that ordinance was replaced by Ordinance 17-2017 and Plaintiffs proceeded to challenge 17-2017.
[brief] An unauthenticated copy of the alleged Note, submitted by [...] (091a).  The unauthenticated alleged copy of the Note (091) is not indorsed to any party and there is no assignment of the Note to any party.  All assignments that were submitted by [...] (065a), [...] (097a) were unauthenticated mortgage assignments.  Bank of America v. Limato, Docket No. A-4480-10T3  “Holding a mortgagee's request for summary judgment to establish itself as a holder of a negotiable instrument must be based on properly authenticated documents, which must be based on personal knowledge”.  None of the documents submitted by [...] in my foreclosure case was authenticated.  And [...] did not have a holder status to file for foreclosure.
[brief] Ibid.  The decision noted:  At oral argument, counsel for [...] asserted that [...] had notice of the revised, final “bona fide” offer in the form of the Second Amendment – executed by [...] on behalf of [...], but not executed by [...] – when it was emailed by [...] counsel ([...]) on May 4, 2023, and not by [...].  Thus, in the view of the [...] Defendants, the 30-day window for the ROFR was then triggered, but [...] did not elect to exercise its right to purchase until its letter of June 6, 2023 – two (2) days to [sic] late.  As a result, [...] contends that the ROFR expired on its terms and [...], therefore, is not entitled to specific performance.  However, the Court is unpersuaded by that argument.  For one, [...] (denominated as Purchaser in the MFSA), if it received a “bona fide offer from a third party (“Offer”),” had the obligation under Paragraph 39, “before accepting said Offer”, of “promptly” sending the Offer to [...] (denominated as the Seller in the MFSA).
[brief] Courts are not bound to enforce the literal effect of these statutes if doing so would result in an injustice or abrogation of the intent of the statute.  See, Twp. of Piscataway v. S. Washington Ave., LLC, 400 N.J. Super. 358, 371-74 (App. Div. In *S. Washington Ave., LLC*, the Appellate Division affirmed the valuation date as the date the condemnor filed the declaration of taking, even though the condemnor filed the complaint almost five years earlier.  *Id.* at 370, 374.  In doing so, the Appellate Division rejected a strict application of N.J.S.A. 20:3-30(c) and declined to commit to the “arbitrary application of N.J.S.A. 20:3-30” in setting a valuation date.
[brief] Here, defendant’s constricted pupils, nervousness, reckless driving, and admission to getting into trouble in Montana for “stupid choices” involving “drugs” established reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence or possessed drugs.  See *State v. Jones*, 179 N.J. 377, 390-91 (2004) (citing cases for the proposition that criminal history is a relevant factor in a probable-cause analysis); *State v. Stovall*, 170 N.J. 346, 367 (2002) (adhering to the “well-established rule that a suspect’s nervousness plays a role in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists”); *State v. Johnson*, 42 N.J. 146, 165 (1964) (observing that “proof of the erratic manner or result of . . . driving is admissible as evidence” of driving while intoxicated); *State v. Kenyon*, 651 N.W.2d 269, 274 (S.D. 2002) (observing that “constricted pupils” is a “physical symptom[ ] of stimulant use” and supported reasonable suspicion to prolong a detention); *State v. Dubaniewicz*, 208 A.3d 619, 495-96 (Vt. 2019) (citing the officer’s observations of defendant’s “constricted pupils” as supporting reasonable suspicion that defendant was under the influence of illegal drugs).⁴ This is not to say that every one of these factors established reasonable suspicion on their own – for instance, observations of nervousness, standing alone, do not establish reasonable suspicion.
[brief] Because I wouldn’t have been surprised if she came after me at that point.  She goes into the Dollar Store and is irritated by a woman and slugs her.  She kicks out the window of [...]’s car and has to be forcibly removed.  She’s stealing from her parents to buy drugs and to the point where they have to kick her out.  And she wants us to believe that all she was doing was taking change.  So, I would suggest that she’s the violent, abusive person in the relationship, not [...] as she claims without any proof whatsoever.  Not [...].  [9T:30-3 to 24].
[brief] State v. Malik, 365 N.J. Super. 267, 274 (App. Div. 2003).  In reading statutory language, courts will give words their ordinary meaning absent any direction from the Legislature to the contrary.  *In Re Young*, 202 N.J. 50, 63 (2010).  Here, the Board’s determination is reasonable and complies with the governing statute.  The unambiguous language of the Ricci Act provides:  A member or retiree shall not be eligible for the presumption or recalculation under this subsection unless within two years of the effective date of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, the member or retiree files a written and sworn statement with the retirement system on a form provided by the board of trustees thereof indicating the dates and locations of service.  [L. 2019, c. 157 (codified at N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4)).]
[brief] In *Froom*, the plaintiff claimed that he did sign the letter Retainer Agreement, and returned it.  There was no such testimony by [...] in this case.  In fact, [...]’s testimony makes it clear that, at all times, he considered his attorney to be [...], and that he would not have hired [...] to represent him.  The mere fact that the Trial Court saw some immaterial facts in issue was not sufficient and, at the end of the day, it was clear that the plaintiff considered [...] to be his attorney, and never relied on [...] as his attorney.  He only considered [...] to be his attorney, and relied on [...].  The point here is that, in *Froom*, the plaintiff claimed that he signed the retainer letter and returned it.
[brief] The court questioned each juror individually.  Juror No. 4 told the court that his encounter with [...]'s father would not affect his role as a juror, and would not in any way affect his ability to be fair.  Some of the other jurors heard the remark made by Juror No. 4—that he had encountered someone in the store—and some did not.  Each juror who heard the remark informed the court that the remark would not affect his or her ability to be fair or to continue with the case.
[brief] ”  See United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 399 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998).  In South Salem Street Associates, LLC v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of Montville, 2008 WL 4647539 (N.J. Super. A.D.), cert. denied, 197 N.J. 477 (2009), the Appellate Division held that a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff’s substantive due process rights were violated when the appellant mayor deliberately manipulated actions by the Board and the Township, slowing development of, and reducing the size of, the plaintiff's proposed development.
[brief] THE COURT:  What I’m talking about is what [...] is going to say.  I’m trying to find out how much of that you’re objecting to, do I need to have a 104 Hearing outside the presence of the jury.  I mean, I can err on the side of doing a 104 Hearing on every disputed issue and this trial turns into nine weeks.  So what I don’t want to do is do all that and then you say, “Oh, I have no problem, Judge.  I saw that report.  I expected it. ”  So I’m just trying to -- you know, if there’s a dispute as to its admissibility, there has to be a 104 Hearing.  It doesn’t always require testimony, but it sometimes does.  So I’m just trying to -- you know, it’s so much better to know in advance when you have to do that.  ...  The jury needs to decide the case on the merits.  That’s why I’m trying to do these things in advance.  So if you don’t feel comfortable telling me today, that’s fine.  Why don’t you think about it overnight -- unless you want to answer now -- why don’t you think overnight and tell me do you think we need a testimonial hearing with [...] in advance outside the presence of the jury or are you satisfied addressing it based upon whatever report she wrote.  (18T 29-10 to 30-24)(emphasis added).
[brief] A.  [...]’s Reliance on Distributors to Sell Sapporo Beer  Sapporo is a brand of beer.  (Pa24 ¶ 3.)  [...] is a Japanese company that brews Sapporo beer.  (Pa30 ¶ 26.)  In 1984, [...] founded [...] to help preserve Sapporo’s high standard of quality throughout the United States.  (Id.)  [...] relies on distributors to sell Sapporo products nationally, including in New York and New Jersey.  (Pa32-Pa33 ¶¶ 32, 40.)  New Jersey and New York have each enacted beer distribution statutes, known respectively as the New Jersey Malt Beverage Practices Act, N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.12 et seq. (the “MBPA”) and the New York ABC Law.  Although omitted from Appellants’ recitation of the policies embodied by the MBPA and the ABC Law, those statutes recognize the need for beer distributors (also known as wholesalers) to invest in their businesses and to perform their basic responsibilities.  For example, the New Jersey Legislature included the following detailed findings and declarations in the MBPA:
[brief] The respondent continually mischaracterizes the findings of the lower court, because the court below held that there was no gift, yet Respondent continually refers to the $50,000.00 as a willing gift from [...].  When opposing counsel argues that this deal left him well positioned in terms of Medicaid, there is absolutely no proof in the record of any such thing.  It is pure deflection and fabrication.  As cited in the main brief, no experts of any kind were hired at the formation of the dealings, such that no opinion like that was ever rendered to so advise [...].  (Pa 334).  These dealings were therefore not well understood.  Respondent also takes numerous self-serving statements made by the Defendants, and attempts to utilize them as uncontested findings, despite the fact that the lower Court never adopted each and every statement or utterance as a finding of fact.  It is most disingenuous that the Respondents keep trying to “re-try” the case, when they did not Cross-Appeal and ask for the findings to be overturned or augmented or altered.  A finding of Unjust Enrichment, which the lower court found, means by definition that the Defendants did something unjust and that the court determined it had to reverse same and rectify.