ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Aa31-Aa32.  However, because [...] amended its ordinances in October 2020 to no longer require adherence to the Scenic Resources and Design Rule for the [...] location (no longer required a 30% open view corridor or 2 to 1 step back), the [...] project would require an individual CAFRA permit, and thus it would be subject to the 30% view and step back requirements.  Aa32.  N.J.A.C 7:7-7.1(g).  But in an extraordinary twist of logic [...] went on to explain that since [...] no longer required adherence to the Scenic Resources and Design Rule it would not either.  Aa32-Aa33.  [...] attempted to justify non-compliance with the 30% view and step back requirements by citing a survey submitted by [...] that purports to show that of 45 current structures along the [...] boardwalk (structures over 15 feet tall which would trigger the Scenic Resources and Design Rule for proposed new construction), 23 were not stepped back.  Aa23-Aa28.  However, [...]’s building, [...], which is adjacent to the north of [...] is fully stepped back, and the two buildings to the immediate south of [...] are substantially stepped back.  [...].  Aa25.  See also the aerial photos submitted to [...] on March 8, 2021.  Aa5-Aa12.  Moreover, the age of the various buildings is not discussed, ignoring the fact that the Scenic Resources and Design Rule looks to future development and has no application to existing structures that may pre-date the Rule.  Finally, the survey does not even address the 30% view corridor requirement.  [...] submitted written comments opposing the proposed settlement, along with an aerial photo of the surroundings showing that the buildings near the [...] site are fully or at least substantially stepped back.  Aa41-Aa49.  Two renderings showing how the proposed [...] apartment building would be far bulkier and higher and thus incompatible with the surrounding area were also submitted.  Aa50-Aa53.  On June 30, 2024, [...] issued a CAFRA permit for the [...] project, reversing the earlier denial and approving the 99 foot tall, 8 floor, 109 unit apartment building only 88 feet from the boardwalk.  Aa54-Aa60.  The permit approval fails to discuss the 30% view shed or step back requirements in the Scenic Resources and Design Rule or in Appellant’s written objections based on the Rule.  Similarly, when [...] denied Appellant’s administrative appeal request on August 28, 2024, it failed to include any substantive discussion of why the Scenic Resources and Design Rule requirements were waived.  The denial included only a lengthy discussion of why Appellant was not entitled to an administrative hearing.  Aa71-Aa75.  ARGUMENT POINT I THE 290 OCEAN PROJECT BLATENTLY VIOLATES ALL REQUIREMENTS OF THE SCENIC RESOURCES AND DESIGN RULE
[brief] On July 13, 2021, the probate court entered an order in furtherance of the proceedings on the remand.  In a letter order to counsel, the court ordered that, “All parties must exchange written submissions regarding their respective positions by September 30, 2021,” and “All parties must respond to the respective positions by October 29, 2021. ”  (Da261).  On September 29, 2021, Defendant filed, in accordance with the court order, a comprehensive submission consisting of a 58-page submission with a supporting certification.  (Da1229-1289; Da1290-1291).  Plaintiff did not file a position statement.  (Da265)  On October 13, 2021, Defendant filed a notice of motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s attorney fee application, based upon Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the court’s July 13, 2021 order.  (Da262; Da265).  On December 3, 2021, the probate court held a telephone conference with counsel to discuss the status of the remand.
[brief] As explained to the physicians he saw after moving out of the contaminated condominium, he lived for a period in his office at a non-profit organization, [...], that he had founded, and at a Taekwondo studio.  3T11-13  The report of the [...] in the underlying case, (Da2106) detailed [...]’s provable economic losses in excess of $1,000,000.  This damages amount, even without considering the loss of his home and other losses, would have supported a significant “pain and suffering” damages award far in excess of the amount of the agreed final settlement of the underlying case.  *Id.*  As noted above, the Trial Court found, applying the standards of *Griggs v. Bertram*, *supra*, that the settlement of the underlying case was fair and reasonable.  Da30.  [...] has not filed a cross appeal of that ruling.  There are five [...] policies at issue in this case that were issued to [...] as named insured covering the period from June 1, 2005- June 1, 2010.
[brief] Also, Hargrave supports Dillon because it held a suspension “constituted the type of tangible, ‘adverse employment action’ contemplated by Title VII and the NJLAD. ”  Id. at 423.  The reason the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted a more employee friendly standard that retaliatory action need only “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination” is because discrimination laws depend upon the cooperation of employees who are willing to file complaints and act as witnesses for enforcement and that effective enforcement requires employees to feel free to oppose discrimination by protecting employees from discrimination.
[brief] See *In re Niles Trust*, 176 N.J. 282, 294 (2003); *Henderson v. Camden Cty. Mun. Util. Auth.*, 176 N.J. 554, 564 (2003).  The concept of a “fund in court” is intended to embrace certain situations in which equitable allowances should be made in a way that is compatible with the policy of the American Rule that each litigant shall bear his own costs.  (Da251).  Defendant submits that based upon the history of this case, Plaintiff’s misdeeds and fruitless, costly litigation should lead to the conclusion that it would be inequitable to award legal fees to Plaintiff.  Admittedly, the summary judgment phase resulted in the confirmation that Decedent had invested $900,000.00 in [...].  However, that was not Plaintiff’s primary goal, it was a goal that was rejected by the other beneficiaries (Da988; Da991), and it was Plaintiff’s allegations and misrepresentations that provided the fuel for the Administrator’s work for many years following the filing of the Verified Complaint.  As was set forth in the Statement of Facts, Plaintiff admitted in his Complaint that the beneficiaries had acknowledged the investment in Korea.  Plaintiff’s primary goal was to have the New Jersey court agree, so that jurisdiction would be established for use as a springboard to have an Administrator appointed to search for the alleged $10 million, and for malfeasance that did not exist.  In view of this, the enormous costs to all parties and to the Estate that ensued, and Plaintiff’s bad acts in violating the court-imposed confidentiality orders, the trial court should have concluded that the equities for an award of attorney fees did not favor Plaintiff, and the request for fee shifting pursuant to R. 4:42-9(a)(2 should have been denied.
[directive] [...] 0105 (609)  567-4300 x 3 Tuesdays (Joint)  [...] 0107 (609)  567-4300 x 3 Tuesdays (Joint)  [...] 0110 (609)  567-4300 x 3 Tuesdays (Joint)  [...] 0117 (609)  567-4300 x 3 Tuesdays  Winter: 2nd/4th Monday [...] 0115 (609)  822-1998  July/August/Septemb er: Mondays  Winter: 2nd/4th  [...] 0116 (609)  822-1998  Monday July/August/ September: Mondays  [...] 0119 [...]  Monday & Thursdays [...] [...] 0121
[directive] Będzie Pan(i) musiał(a) dostarczyć próbkę DNA, która może zostać wykorzystana przez h.  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No] organy ścigania w prowadzeniu dochodzeń dotyczących działalności przestępczej, a także pokryć koszty badań tej próbki?  You will be required to provide a DNA sample, which could be used by law enforcement for the investigation of criminal activity, and pay for the cost of testing?
[brief] If a government body had to go out and seek qualification information for each low bidder on all of its contracting, the administrative burden would be enormous.  Just a few examples of information that would need to be sought out in addition to [...] classification information are: trade licensing, *Muirfield*, 336 N.J. Super. at 135-36; bidder debarment, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.85; [...] qualification, *Advance Elec. Co. v. Montgomery Twp. Bd. of Educ.*, 351 N.J. Super. 160, 171-72 (App. Div. 2002); and authorization for sureties issuing bid bonds and consents of surety, *Meadowbrook*, 138 N.J. at 310-11.  That would add expense, delay, and uncertainty to the public bidding process as government bodies would need to submit records requests to other agencies, wait for responses, and follow up when there is a delay, all the while not knowing if the low bidder is qualified.
[brief] N.J.S.A. § 30:1AA-1.1(j).  In addition, N.J.S.A. § 30:1AA-1.2(i) also articulates, “..[the] living options for individuals with disabilities must be monitored… [to] the extent of compliance with quality assurance standards by entities providing the options. ”  Simply put, these policy interests reaffirm the importance of N.J.A.C. § 10:44A and how same closely related to Plaintiff’s complained of conduct regarding the staffing and training which assisted the developmentally disabled residents at Defendant [...].  At this juncture, the Court does not require Plaintiff to present facts, that if true, would violate the respective statute, rule, or public policy, and clearly, discovery is necessary to further develop the record.
[brief] Further, the State’s substantive arguments regarding why the trial court was correct in “refusing” to grant a mistrial miss the mark.  When inadmissible evidence is presented to a jury, as the State concedes occurred, the trial court has two options: (1) declare a mistrial; or (2) issue a curative or limiting instruction.  *State v. Winter*, 96 N.J. 640, 646 (1984).  Should the trial court in this matter have decided against declaring a mistrial, it should have issued a carefully formulated curative instruction which precisely explained “the permitted and prohibited purposes of the evidence, with sufficient reference to the factual context of the case to enable the jury to comprehend and appreciate the fine distinction to which it is required to adhere. ”  *State v. Winder*, 200 N.J. 231, 255 (2009)(citing *State v. Stevens*, 115 N.J. 289, 304 (1989)).  This instruction should have been specific and explanatory, as opposed to general and conclusory, and included more of an explanation than “because I said so. ”  *State v. Herbert*, 457 N.J.Super. 490, 506 (App. Div. 2019).  The State failed to make any effort to argue that the instruction given by the trial court effectively addressed the potential prejudice, instead attempting to frame the inadmissible comments as *de minimis* in nature.  This Court has previously rejected this approach.  See, *Herbert*, 457 N.J.Super. at 508 (holding that a detective’s references to gang affiliation could not be minimized as fleeting comments likely to have escaped the jury’s notice).
[brief] (1T45-12 to 25).  Based on this, she and [...] determined she had probable cause to search the remainder of the vehicle.  (1T70-24 to 71-14).  During this search, police found a small bag filled with a white powder that field tested positive for \textsuperscript{4}  Later lab results determined the substance was AP-238 which was not a CDS at the time of the incident.  As a result, [...]’s charges were dismissed when these lab results were completed.
[brief] (Aa0300).  Aerial photographs also establish that there is ample room for Appellant and other surrounding residents and boaters to navigate to its dock and property.  (Aa0291-Aa0292).  Appellant’s attempt to distinguish this matter from Spalt v. DEP, 237 N.J. Super. 206 (1989) fails.  Appellant asserts that its interest is “particular” because its property adjoins the [...] property.  In doing so, Appellant asserts nothing more than generalized claims that [...]’s dock damage its recreational interests.  Appellant’s claims are based on potential harm and [...]’s dock does not encroach on Appellant’s property rights.  *Spalt v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection*, 237 N.J. Super. 206 (1989)(fear of damage to recreational interest or generalized property rights shared with other property owners were insufficient to demonstrate particularized property right or other special interest).
[directive] Additionally, the Supreme Court has amended Rule 1:38-3 (“Court Records Excluded from Public Access”) and Rule 1:38-11 (“Sealing of Court Records”) by order dated February 5, 2021 to conform to the statutory requirements to seal these records from public access upon criminal conviction or juvenile adjudication.  System enhancements have been made in the Judiciary’s computerized systems to indicate the cases that have been ordered sealed from public access pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.2.  Information concerning these modifications has been previously sent to Judiciary staff under separate cover.
[brief] [Da 108.]  The PCR court erred in denying relief.  Contrary to the court’s finding, the Bodycam of the incident reveals that [...] was Mirandized\(^8\) and handcuffed prior to her consenting to search the car.  (Da 132, 20:16-01 to 20:24-40\(^9\)).  Indeed, [...] had been arrested prior to her consenting, and based on “the totality of the particular circumstances of the case,” King, 44 N.J. at 53, her consent was negated.  Additionally, the tire iron was identified and recovered from the car subsequent to [...]’s “consenting” (Da 132, 20:35-37 to 20:43-50), thereby undermining any prior plain-view exception.  Suppression of the tire iron must not be underestimated.  Trial counsel argued in summation that [...]’s injuries resulted from his crashing into an object in the woods.  (9T 131-23 to 132).  Therefore, absent the tire iron’s discovery, the State’s case relied upon the dubious credibility of [...], the \(^8\) Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  \(^9\)  The numbers referred to are the time stamps on the disc. fugitive, who possessed approximately ten prior convictions (2T 190-5 to 199-6); and [...], the possessor of four prior convictions, who previously had denied that defendant had a weapon or assaulted anyone, and whose recommended sentence in this matter was contingent upon her “truthful” testimony.  (4T 9-2 to 10-10; 4T 53-4 to 18; 4T 57-12 to 58-13).  Therefore, trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress the tire iron established a prima facie case of ineffectiveness pursuant to the Strickland/Fritz two-pronged test and/or the Cronic/Davis per se analyses, thereby necessitating an evidentiary hearing to resolve defendant's claim.
[brief] [...] adopts the procedural history set forth by [...] in its Brief, but with some minor modifications.  Specifically, on August 1, 2022, [...] filed a motion for summary judgment.  (Pa127).  Following a hearing on the motion, the Trial Court entered an Order on September 26, 2022, granting summary judgment in favor of [...] and dismissing [...]’s claims against [...], with prejudice.  (Pa411).  [...] also filed a motion on October 17, 2022, seeking reconsideration of the Trial Court’s Order granting summary judgment as it related to [...].  (Pa415).  [...] opposed Appellant’s motion by way of a Letter Brief filed with the Trial Court.  (Pa 449)  Following oral argument on November 18, 2022, the Trial Court issued an Order, dated November 18, 2022, denying [...]’s motion for reconsideration.  Pa452.  On or about March 31, 2023, [...] filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to its counterclaims against Appellant.  (Pa 453).  Appellant filed an Opposition to [...]’s Motion, in which she repeated the exact same arguments raised in her opposition to [...]’s first Motion (Pa127) and her Motion for Reconsideration.  The Trial Court entered summary judgment in favor of [...].  (Pa 538).  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option commerce; or conspires to do so.  2C:41-2  Racketeering  If pattern of racketeering activity involves a crime of violence, or a crime of the first degree or 2nd Degree 50,000 to 200,000  No 10% (continued) (continued) the use of firearms, first degree.  All other violations, second degree.  Violation of Community
[brief] Intervenor devotes pages of his brief to a tortured analysis of [...]’s purported thought process in filling out the Supplemental Form.  This argument is belied by the record evidence establishing that the questions on the Supplemental Form were unambiguous, and that [...]’s broker explained non-owned/hired auto coverage to [...] before [...] completed this simple one-page document.  Further, even if [...]’s purported confusion over the unambiguous Supplemental Form is to be believed, such confusion is irrelevant.  Given that the question at issue is an objective question (i.e., it called for objective information within [...]’s knowledge – not [...]’s subjective opinions or beliefs), [...]’s state of mind in answering the question is immaterial.  Intervenor also attempts to challenge the “materiality” of [...]’s misrepresentations, but fails to address the substance of the testimony from [...]’s owner, and the underwriting guidelines that dictated what coverage [...] could, and could not, write on behalf of [...].  Again, the materiality of [...]’s misrepresentation is plainly established through these guidelines, which specifically state that 12 or 15 passenger vans are ineligible for non-owned/hired auto coverage, and through [...]’s testimony regarding the impact of those guidelines.  Finally, Intervenor argues that the [...] Policy requires an intentional misrepresentation by the insured in order to support a cause of action for rescission.  This argument is contradicted by the plain language of the Policy, which states, “[t]his coverage form is void in any case of fraud by you at any time as it relates to this coverage form. ”  The record clearly demonstrates that [...] committed equitable fraud necessitating rescission under the terms of the [...] Policy and New Jersey law.  Accordingly, [...] respectfully submits that the decision below must be affirmed.
[brief] ”  The trial in the case at bar, [...], correctly distinguished this case.  “In the case of OBSC, the Court distinguishes this situation from that in Cape May for a variety of reasons.  Most importantly being that the 1947 Genesis Deed in this case was purely speculative, and had no set procedures, rules, or regulations.  In Cape May, the Court had to determine whether or not the amendment was reasonable.  These rules and regulations were in existence at the time in which the property was purchased.  There is nothing equivalent to that in the 1947 Genesis Deed. ”  (Da837).  (T. 26:2-28:9) (32:14-37:25)  E.
[brief] [...] denied a motion to reinstate the complaint on November 10, 2016.  (Da35-43; 44-46)  She issued a well-reasoned and comprehensive decision, reasoning that under either the R. 4:50-1 standard or the R. 4:49-2 standard, an Affidavit of Merit was required under the circumstances.  (Da47-70)  Next, Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of the November 10, 2016 was denied on December 20, 2016.  (Da71-75; 76-78)  [...] set forth her reasons for the denial in the transcript of oral argument.  (Da79-97)  Plaintiffs then filed a motion for leave to appeal the November 10, 2016 and December 16, 2016 orders to this Court, at Docket No. [...].
[brief] We turn first to defendant's claims regarding the comments made by the trial judge during voir dire.  Jury selection began on August 10, 2004.  One juror, identified as juror number 6, responded to the judge's questioning and indicated that he had been the victim of a crime.  In open court, rather than at sidebar, he described an incident in which animal rights activists had come into his store and were protesting.  An altercation ensued, as a result of which the juror was charged with five counts of assault.  He stated that although the charges had no basis, “they were able to go to the courthouse and file against me without any evidence, where it stated clearly in the police report that I did not assault them.  And I was forced to defend myself and it cost me thousands of dollars, and I didn't think it was a fair thing. ”  At that point, it would have been prudent for the judge to have brought the juror to sidebar rather than risk the juror making an inflammatory statement in open court.  Such risk was not insignificant because it was obvious from the juror's remarks that he was disgruntled by having been arrested.  Instead, the judge continued to speak to the juror in open court and asked him whether he could “sit in this case and be fair and impartial with respect to charges that had been brought and the proofs that had been delivered?”  The juror answered:  I don't know how to rate things anymore.  That when someone can go to a courthouse and file charges, I can say that that person behind that wall assaulted me, and then they're forced to go and prove themselves innocent.  I don't, I don't care for the system the way it is.  I guess it is the best system, but there is something about it that is not right.  The judge responded stating, “Well, you know there are a lot of problems, and I am not going to get into all of the problems of the legal system....”  The judge remarked that, although the charge was eventually dismissed, he agreed with the juror that the juror's arrest nevertheless resulted in inconvenience and expense.  The judge then asked, “it was in municipal court I take?”  After the juror responded that the charge had been lodged against him in a municipal court, the judge said “all of this being said, I detect you'll have a certain degree of cynicism about the system itself,” to which the juror answered “unfortunately. ”  The judge asked if he would be able to “dispense” with his negative feelings, at which point the juror answered that he didn't “think [he] would make a good candidate” because his mind had been “confused by the simple fact that someone can accuse you of something and then you are forced to defend yourself,” which had cost him “literally thousands of thousands of dollars” that he was never able to recoup.  Finally, at the end of this colloquy the judge excused the juror.
[brief] ”  *Diana*, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2241, at *8.  Even if Appellant ignored the clear case precedent set forth by this Court in *Woo-Padva* 2 and, instead, asks the Court to interpret the legislative intent behind the NJCFLA that there is an implied private cause of action, this Court previously rejected this identical argument in its holding in *Woo-Padva* 2, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub.  LEXIS 1550, at *9 (explaining the legislative intent and holding “[t]he Legislature, however, did not provide a private right of action under the CFLA – and plaintiff does not contend otherwise . . .”).  Thus, Appellant cannot commit an end run around the NJCFLA’s bar on private rights of action by pleading the statute as the basis for a declaratory judgment.