ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 153 N.J. at 193-94.  Defendants attempt to somehow justify the Trial Court’s blatant error by reiterating the regulations “could not have provided Plaintiff with a reasonable belief that Defendants were violating the law. ”  See Resp. Br. 10.  Such arguments are misplaced and palpably incorrect upon review of relevant case law and bearing in mind the “generous and hospitable approach” courts must be guided by during a motion to dismiss at the pleading stage.  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746, 563 A.2d 31 (1989).
[brief] In re Bridgewater, 95 N.J. 235, 245 (1984).  “[I]f substantial credible evidence supports an agency’s conclusion, a court may not substitute its own judgment for the agency’s even though the court might have reached a different result. ”  *Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr.*, 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992) (citations omitted).  Thus, on appeal, the judicial role in reviewing all administrative action generally is limited to three inquiries: “(1) whether the agency’s action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law”; (2) “whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action”; and (3) “whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors. ”  *Allstars Auto. Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n*, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) (quoting *In re Stallworth*, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)).
[brief] The rationale of Nirenberg was the loss of use of money for an inordinate amount of time.  Like there, Appellant lost the use of his money for nearly 20 years through no fault of his own.  Until 2013, Appellant had a lien junior to Plaintiffs’ mortgage.  From 2013 to 2016 plaintiffs did not exercise their right to cause a sheriff sale.  Instead for the next 6 years plaintiffs no longer had a superior mortgage but only a DIL.  However, not until 2021 did plaintiffs disclose their DIL.  Had they been transparent & candid, Appellant could have initiated an execution sale then subject to only municipal liens.  Obviously, for reasons known only to plaintiffs, they did not want to lose the property to Appellant or a successful bidder.  Their plan was to obtain an order extinguishing the judgment.  While initially successful, & before oral argument on the subsequent appeal, plaintiffs sold the property without informing Appellant or, more importantly, this Court, despite [...] favoring plaintiffs with an accelerated appeal as opposed to enjoining the sale on Appellant’s emergent application.  Consequently, Appellant lost another 2 years of the use of his money because plaintiffs would not consent to paying the judgment from the sale proceeds before or after this Court held that the judgment lien remained valid.  Instead plaintiffs stalled the inevitable with one frivolous argument & tactic after the other-----unsuccessfully refusing to appear for the 2023 deposition conveniently located for both parties; not ever producing or disclosing the Mortgage Satisfaction; unsuccessfully opposing the 2023 transfer motion on the grounds that foreclosure law allegedly applied, despite that plaintiffs’ mortgage was discharged of record & received a DIL in 2016: unsuccessfully opposing the summary judgment motion & moving for a turn-over without any legal authority or factual support; & unsuccessfully opposing the motion to correct the amount of the judgment, both in principle & interest.  All in all, plaintiffs’ actions, inactions, tactics, frivolous litigation & violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct caused an unreasonable delay of 11 years from their 2016 Foreclosure Judgment until Appellant realized any payment on his 2005 judgment this year.  Hence, the particular & peculiar circumstances of this case most amply warrant an award of compounded interest.
[brief] In addition to the [...] Aff., [...] also improperly relies upon an email from purported [...] surveyor, [...]  Da255.  [...] never produced this email in discovery (in fact the email string itself is from January 2023 – several months after discovery ended) and it was not produced until [...] included it as an exhibit to its summary judgment motion.  It is interesting to note that the email exchange appears to be related to [...]’s secret [...] (whose conclusions [...] now opposes).  Regardless, [...]’s reliance upon this document for any of its conclusions must be disregarded.  By way of yet another example, [...] also offers the Affidavit of [...] dated May 23, 2023 (the “Pierce Aff.”), which is several months after discovery ended.
[brief] As Petitioner’s counsel pointed out at the Motion Hearing on February 21, 2024, Respondent’s counsel appeared to be going on a fishing expedition when he stated he didn’t know what Your Honor knows.  (1T12-11 to 14).  Petitioner’s counsel further stated the obvious: “If you have a criminal case, are you going to ask the judge have you ever been a victim of a crime?  If you’re going to have a sexual assault case are you going to ask the judge have you ever been harassed?” (1T14 to 18).  The Appellate Division case of *State v. Medina*, 349 N.J. Super. 108 (App. Div. 2002), provides guidance on this issue in the present matter.  In a criminal matter, the Defendant in *Medina* argued that the law division judge erred by failing to recuse himself in a bench trial after he had adjudicated pretrial motions and had reviewed the grand jury proceedings.  *Id.* at 129.  Defendant contended that by hearing the motions and reviewing the grand jury proceedings, the Judge had been exposed to prejudicial and inadmissible evidence.  *Ibid.*  The Appellate Division quoted *Marshall* in which it cited R. 1:12-1 and noted that “a judicial statement of opinion in the course or the proceeding in the case or in another case in which the same issue is presented [does] not require disqualification. ”  *Id.* at 130.  Respondent’s Appeal is an attempt to manipulate the system and it should not be allowed.  It may appear that when in doubt, a judge should recuse, but as stated in *Dalal*, *supra*, the New Jersey Supreme Court has warned against succumbing to a party’s tactics to seek a new judge.
[brief] See A. 3102 (First Reprint) (2012) at 8:48-9:2, 9:11-15, 68:35-40.  In other words, the references to “communities” in the legislative findings relied on by the trial court could not have reflected a desire on the part of lawmakers to install a permanent resident of Camden on the BOG because, at the time those references were first made, the legislation did not require any BOG member to reside in Camden.  Indeed, at the time those references were included in the First Reprint of the bill, Rutgers-Camden was intended to be absorbed into a “Regional University System.
[brief] Prior History: [*1]  On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. [...].  Core Terms uninsured, coverage, benefits, motorists, medical expenses, scienter requirement, plain language, statutory bar, exemption, automobile accident, summary judgment, noneconomic, broker  Counsel: [...] argued the cause for appellant ([...], attorney; [...], on the brief).  [...] argued the cause for respondent ([...] attorneys; Mr. Kayal, of counsel and on the brief).  Judges: Before Judges [...] and [...].  Opinion PER CURIAM
[brief] *Turner v. Safley*, 482 U.S at 90 (4)  The fourth factor is "absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation."  See *Block v. Rutherford*, 468 U.S., at 587.  By the same token, the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an "exaggerated response" to prison concerns.  This is not a "least restrictive alternative" test: prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint.  See ibid.  But if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interest, a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.
[brief] **2015 Honda CR-V - Overview**  The Honda CR-V, a perennial favorite of American car buyers and the bestselling entry-SUV of all time, receives the most significant mid-model cycle redesign in its 17-year history, with a new Earth Dreams Technology™ engine and transmission, significantly enhanced exterior and interior styling, and a long list of new standard and available features.  A new top-of-the-line Touring trim includes the first-ever Honda application of Collision Mitigation Braking System™ (CMBS™) and Lane Keeping Assist System (LKAS), and the first CR-V adoption of Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and Forward Collision Warning (FCW).  These systems are a part of the new Honda Sensing™ suite of safety and driver assistive technologies that, together with other high-end features such as a power tailgate, bring a new level of sophistication to the benchmark compact SUV.
[brief] ALTHOUGH PEREZ-HERNANDEZ WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF VIDA CAFÉ, VIDA CAFÉ SHOULD BE HELD VICARIOUSLY LIABLE [...]’s premises its argument that it cannot be held vicariously liable for [...]’s negligent acts because [...] was not an employee, but rather was an independent contractor.  Although Plaintiff does not dispute that [...] was an independent contractor of [...], [...] should be held vicariously liable for his tortious conduct which caused injury to Plaintiff.  One of the exceptions to the general rule of nonliability of principals/contractees for the negligence of their independent contractors is where the landowner or principal retains control of the manner and means of the doing of the work which is the subject of the contract.  See Mavrikidis v. Petullo, 153 N.J. 117, 133 (1998)  Plaintiffs submit that because [...] retained control over [...]’s work, the exception to the independent contractor rule is applicable.  [...] (“[...]”), director of operations of [...], testified that [...], since 2018, was the individual who was hired to shop at [...] on behalf of [...] in exchange for a fee for his services.  (Pa68-68; Pa72)  [...] provided specific instructions as to when he was to shop at [...].  Depending upon the season, he was directed, by [...], to shop on specific days.  (Pa75)  He was instructed to purchase specific products for [...].  (Pa75)  He was directed to deliver those products to [...]’s store in Manhattan.  (Pa87)  He was provided with a [...] physical debit card, which he always retained to make purchases at [...].  (Pa71).  He was also given a [...] membership card bearing the name of [...], which he kept in his possession.  (Pa69; Pa163)  Since Plaintiff has demonstrated that [...] retained control over the manner and means in which [...] shopped at [...] at the time of Plaintiff’s injuries, the trial court erred in failing to recognize an exception to the no liability rule of a principal for the torts of an independent contractor.
[brief] Probation failed to produce the required “full accounting” and a Motion for Enforcement of the Order of 10/25/2021 was filed.  The Order of 1/11/2022 (DA76) required Probation to produce a “full accounting commencing from Oct. 1, 1998 to the present,” and required credits be provided Appellant for “any overpayments or improper garnishments. ”  Appellant’s other requests were denied without prejudice.  5.
[brief] The logic for applying this principle here is overwhelming: Respondents enjoyed the benefits of investing through [...] over many years, knowing that a written agreement governed the relationship.  Although Schwartz is unpublished, this Court may consider it as persuasive authority.  See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Jeffers, 381 N.J. Super. 13, 18-19 (App. Div. 2005); see N.J.R.Ct. 1:36-3.3
[brief] Even so, the decision below was strange because this case *was* in the pipeline when *Tyler* was decided.  The court concluded that, because this action was filed more than three years after the foreclosure judgment, “it was not in the pipeline, the way the *Roberto* court intended. ” (Ja413).  Moreover, it reasoned that this case was barred by “equitable principles, such as those embodied in the doctrine of laches[.]” (Ja416).  Yet laches is an equitable doctrine which cannot bar an otherwise timely action governed by a statute of limitations.  Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 422 (2012).  Because this legal action was filed within the statute of limitations, it is timely.  For these reasons, this Court should reverse the grant of summary judgment to Defendants and should remand the case with instructions to grant summary judgment to [...] on the issue of the City’s liability for an uncompensated taking.  It should also instruct the lower court to proceed in determining the amount of just compensation owed.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE  Plaintiff asserts that the Foreclosure Court erred in dismissing its foreclosure complaint with prejudice.  For the reasons that follow, this Court should affirm the decision of the Foreclosure Court in this regard.  A.  Plaintiff Cannot Sustain a Cause of Action for Foreclosure  The Appellate Division reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss de novo, “without deference to the judge's legal conclusions. ”  Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.J. v. Cty. Prosecutors Ass'n of N.J., 474 N.J. Super. 243, 255 (App. Div. 2022) (citations omitted).  A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 4:6-2(e) requires the trial court to search the pleading with liberality to determine whether a cause of action is suggested, Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989), and the court must "accept as true all factual assertions in the complaint."  Smith v. SBC Communications, Inc., 178 N.J. 265, 268-69 (2004).  Despite this indulgent standard, a motion to dismiss must nevertheless be granted if the complaint fails to articulate a legally sufficient basis entitling plaintiff to relief.  See County Energy Recovery Assocs., L.P. v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 320 N.J. Super. 59, 64 (App. Div. 1999), aff'd o.b., 170 N.J. 246 (2001); Hoffman v. Hampshire Labs, Inc., 405 N.J. Super. 105, 112 (App. Div. 2009).  "A motion to dismiss a complaint under [Rule] 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted must be evaluated in light of the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint."
[brief] THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER ANY ARGUMENTS NOT RAISED BY PLAINTIFF BELOW  “Appellate review is not limitless.  The jurisdiction of appellate courts rightly is bounded by the proofs and objections critically explored on the record before the trial court by the parties themselves. ”  State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 19-20 (2009).  It is well-settled “that our appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available ‘unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest. ’”  Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (quoting Reynolds Offset Co., Inc. v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 1959)); see also Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 226-227 (2014).  Here, the Plaintiff, despite being represented by two attorneys, inexplicably failed to file any opposition to the Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment.  The Plaintiff’s third summary judgment motion was originally returnable on February 16, 2024, but was adjourned, at the Plaintiff’s request, to March 1, 2024.  The Plaintiff had more than ample time to file opposition to the Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment.  The Plaintiffs’ attorneys did not argue before the Chancery Division that the court needed to emphasize substance over form.  The Plaintiff also did not argue that the interest of justice required that their failure to oppose the Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment should be excused.  No explanation was provided to the trial court as to why the Plaintiff’s counsel never opposed the cross-motion.  Nearly all of the Plaintiff’s appellate brief is filled with arguments that could have been but were inexplicably not made before the trial court.  The Court Rules exist for a reason and they should be followed.  Furthermore, the issues raised on appeal by the Plaintiff do not go to the jurisdiction of the trial court and they do not concern matters of great public interest.  Accordingly, all arguments not raised by the Plaintiff before the trial court should not be considered by this Court.
[brief] The Underlying Allegations  [...] ("[...]") worked for [...] since 1997.  (11T56:7).  [...] served as Patrolman, Sergeant, Lieutenant, and Chief of Police.  (11T56:10).  [...] became Chief of Police on July 2, 2019.  (11T56:14).  [...] (then a Lieutenant) became involved in the IA investigation which formed the basis of the charges in this matter.  (11T57:8).  Sgt. [...] ("[...]") had advised [...] that [...] did not properly perform a property check.  (11T57:14).  Specifically, on November 20, 2017, [...] was purportedly performing a property check function at the Victoria Pointe clubhouse parking lot in [...].  (13T169:16).  [...] called out the check on his car radio.  (13T169:21).  [...] was still in the complex itself and [...] radioed in that he was doing a property check at Victoria Pointe.  (13T170:1-4).  [...] testified that he waited in the area for [...], but [...] did not arrive.  (13T170:9).  [...], however, did not and had not called [...] on the radio.  (13T171:5).  [...] testified that after several minutes of waiting and not seeing [...], [...] contacted dispatch by phone to find out [...]'s location on the GPS.  --- 3
[brief] She further testified:  Q: Now, as the landlord, under the lease, it was the landlord’s obligation to also take care of the sidewalk.  Is that correct?  A; Yes.  Q; And to remove snow and ice from the sidewalk?  A: Yes.  Q: And to apply salt to the sidewalk?  A: Yes.  [Pa295 (285:7-15)]  She finally stated that she only expected the tenants to take care of the sidewalk and lay down additional salt, if they see it is necessary.
[brief] Da2144.  The report and conclusions of [...]’s principal medical expert, [...], finding that Mr. [...] had been disabled as a result of exposure to mold in his condominium (Da495) is consistent with the Social Security disability award.  After his initial visit in 2009, Dr. Hankins continued to examine [...] regarding his condition and issued subsequent reports.  Da495.  Further medical testing, including neurological testing, led to Dr. Hankins’s differential diagnosis that [...] suffered from demyelinating (brain) disease caused by his chronic exposure to toxic mold, which caused him to be disabled from meaningful employment consistent with his background and experience.  Da495.  Mr. [...] also was also examined by two psychologists, who issued reports about his mental disability.  Da623; Da2243.  In the summer of 2009, in response [...]’s complaints and the municipal court proceedings, [...] undertook repair and remediation work, but it was unsuccessful, as confirmed by, among others, a report from [...]’s own environmental consultant, [...] (“[...]”) dated October 20, 2009 in which [...] advised that “there is both fungal (mold) contamination and amplification with the home.  Da1789.  It can be stated with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the fungal contamination and amplification in the home is the result of exterior groundwater issues....”  Id.  [...] erroneously believed that [...] had corrected the water intrusion problem; however, three subsequent environmental tests confirmed ongoing mold contamination of the condominium.  These reports are summarized in the expert report of [...] (Da556), who conducted testing in 2011 that revealed ongoing mold contamination that “places the home off the upper limits scale chart and amongst the highest percentile of homes measure in the AHHS [American Healthy Homes Survey].”  Da568.  [...]’s follow up testing almost four years later (in June, 2015) showed that the condominium still contained “significant mold growth. ”  Da1968-69.  [...]’s injuries and damage, including loss of his home through foreclosure, resulted in his being effectively “homeless” for almost a year.4 --- 4
[brief] See Regan v. City of New Brunswick, 305 N.J. Super. 342, 357 n.6 (App. Div. 1997) (citations omitted) (noting that appellate courts will ordinarily “not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal unless it relates to ‘jurisdiction of the trial court or concern[s] matters of great public interest,’ or otherwise constitutes ‘plain error. ’”).  Second, as a legal matter, no language in the text supports that interpretation, nor has Appellant pointed to any case law construing the MLUL to include a “de facto applicant” exception.
[brief] Pb9, IV.  [...] has standing to argue that the trial court should not decide on the appropriateness of a discretionary refusal to waive, and [...] is not precluded from substantively participating on appeal.  (Not Raised Below)  [...] argues in passing that [...] has no standing “to offer sound business reasons for [...]’s rejection” in the event the defect is not material.  Pb26.  It is of course true that [...] cannot bind [...] to reject a non-material defect based on the reasons offered by [...], but that is not what [...] has argued.  Instead, [...] argues that there are appropriate reasons to reject [...]’s bid even if the defect was not material and that it was improper for the trial court to determine that issue without [...] doing so first.  Db38-49.  Those are simply components of [...]’s defense of [...]’s award to [...] and [...]’s failure to prove its claims.  [...] also argues that [...] should not be permitted to participate in this appeal and that it affirmatively accepted the trial court’s decision.  Pb31-36.  As set forth on page 4, [...]’s characterization of [...]’s position is inaccurate, ignores [...]’s plain statements below and to this Court, and ignores this Court’s direction that [...] be included in the briefing schedule.  Even if it were necessary for [...] to file a Notice of Appeal under the circumstances, there is no prejudice to [...] and justice requires Db16, GLOb12.  If it was not material, [...] contends that [...] still had authority to refuse waiver of the defect.  Db37. consideration of [...]’s submissions.  See N.J.R. 1:1-2(a) (“Unless otherwise stated, any rule may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in which the action is pending if adherence to it would result in an injustice. ”)  CONCLUSION
[brief] Co-Respondent [...] paid $375,000.00 for the subject property.  0346a.  Indeed, a review of the messages between [...] and [...] reveal an intensely bargained-for transaction with the goal of maximizing their respective positions in this arms-length real estate transaction.  0167a-208a.  Finally, Appellant fails to establish any of the required fraud elements under the Gennari test, much less present "clear and convincing evidence" of these elements.