ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] To Defendants  [...] d/b/a [...] (i/p/a [...]) and [...] (i/p/a [...]), With Written Statement Of Reasons, E-Courts Transaction ID [...], Dated December 15, 2023……………………………………………………………  Pa1  The Trial Court’s Order Granting Summary Judgment To Defendant [...], With Written Statement Of Reasons, E-Courts Transaction ID [...], Dated December 15, 2023……………………………………………………………  Pa13 ---  1  Note:  The trial court entered two identical orders and statements of reasons on December 15, 2023: one order was e-filed in connection with the summary judgment motion filed by [...] d/b/a [...] (i/p/a [...]) and [...] (a/k/a [...]) (E-courts transaction ID [...]); the other, identical order was E-filed in connection with Defendant Dember’s summary judgment motion (E-courts transaction ID [...]).
[brief] (See, e.g., T2/98:7-19, 108:14-21, 111:9-11, 122:5-9, 123:5-11).  For the [...] to suggest that there are no conditions that might alleviate the concerns at issue is again not supported by the record.  The [...] also concluded that the dimensions of the loading zone do not provide “a practical or convenient opportunity” for loading and unloading at the Property.  (Aa245).  Putting aside the fact that no loading zone is required at the Property, the [...] cannot deny the Application because the one that has been proposed at its own insistence does not meet an amorphous requirement.  Nor is there a standard in the [...] land use regulations requiring “practical or convenient” loading areas, where no loading area is required at all.  In this case, the [...]’s attempts to buttress the legitimacy of its denial of the Application fail.
[brief] THE COURT:  Okay.  What this was showing if this is correct, in December of 2020 you were paid $1,500 by [...].  Okay.  And in December of 2020 the tenant sent you a check for $1,200.  So that’s a double payment.  (1T12-6).  Thereafter, the court continued examining with [...] dozens of printed Zelle transfer receipts.  The examination included the Court asking Defendant to hand over her cell phone so that it could cross-reference.  (1T12-21).  THE COURT:
[brief] Under Defendants’ interpretation, AICRA (1) precludes insurers from exercising their right to a jury trial on PIP-related fraud claims; (2) prevents insurers from recovering damages and equitable remedies for PIP-related fraud because Forthright has no power to award such remedies; (3) requires insurers to discover fraud within 105 days of a PIP benefit claim, including when the fraud is based on concealed schemes; (4) mandates alternative dispute resolution (ADR) even of those claims based on complex schemes like unlawfully owned or controlled medical practices, kickbacks, and illegal self-referrals, while also denying discovery to prove those claims; (5) compels insurers to file separate ADR proceedings for each accident rather than a single case concerning all of a provider’s fraudulent claims; and (6) forces complex fraud cases into a system designed to handle tens of thousands of small-denomination disputes about medical necessity of treatment.  In other words, Defendants argue that the Legislature enacted an unconstitutional and absurd law that will encourage insurance fraud rather than prevent, deter, and remedy it.  Their arguments are wrong.  ARGUMENT I.
[brief] The damage award under the CFA remained in full force and effect.  (Da1352).  On November 21, 2022, the plaintiffs filed a motion to pay counsel fees.  (Da1355).  On December 13, 2022, the Court heard oral argument on [...]’s motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict and motion for new trial.  Both were denied.  On February 1, 2023, the Court entered an order awarding $722,714.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs to plaintiffs’ counsel.
[brief] CONCLUSION ...........................................................................  15  TABLE OF CITATIONS  Bubis v. Kassin, 184 N.J. 612, 629, 630 (2005)  ............  4  Matthew v. Bayhead Imp. Ass’n 95 N.J. 306 (1984) .......... 11 Riggs vs. Long Beach Tp., 159 N.J. at 601, 622 (1988) ................  15  Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287 (1982)  ...............  8  [...], [...] and [...] .........................  15
[brief] In that case, [...] contracted to operate a [...].  *Id.* at 268.  Two people fell through a window in the hotel that [...] operated, resulting in the death of one and serious injuries to the other.  *Ibid.*  [...] contracted to defend and indemnify [...] to the fullest extent permitted by law for all losses and expenses relating to the operation of the hotel, “including when the active or passive negligence of [[...]] is alleged or proven. ”  *Id.* at 270.  Because the indemnity agreement expressly included losses caused by [...]’s active or passive negligence, the court ruled that the indemnity agreement was enforceable for indemnifying [...] for its own negligence.  Id. at 273.  In so ruling, the Sayles court distinguished cases such as Azurak and Ramos because the indemnity clauses in those cases did not state “whether indemnification would be required when the indemnitee was alleged or shown to be negligent.
[brief] The DEP's enabling statute, N.J.S.A. 13:1D-1 to -137, authorizes the agency to "formulate comprehensive policies for the conservation of the natural resources of the State [and] the promotion of environmental protection .  . . ."  With specific regard to water resources, the Water Quality Planning Act (WQPA), N.J.S.A. 58:11A-1 to -16, provides for the restoration and maintenance of water quality in this State, including a planning process to control and maintain water quality.
[directive] force by of deadly — the use for my office responsibility, an opportunity, and presented the nation across  In 2015, events force and decision to use deadly law enforcement concerning the our State's policies re-examine to Jersey's procedures Although New are investigated.  shootings police-involved manner in which the rigorous and most comprehensive already among the were incidents investigating use-of-force for strengthen those 2015 supplemental directive in July to General issued a Attorney nation, the in the The uniformly across the state.  followed best practices are that standards and ensure investigative fair, expeditious, in a incidents are investigated deadly-force all that supplemental directive ensures of independence integrity and confidence in the public bolsters impartial manner that thorough, and investigations.
[brief] (Pb14).  But even if actual notice by postcard were an express requirement under the Ricci Act, this argument is misplaced.  New Jersey courts have consistently “recognized a presumption that mail properly addressed, stamped, and posted was received by the party to whom it was addressed. ”  SSI Medical Servs. v. HHS, Div. of Medical Assistance & Health Servs., 146 N.J. 614, 621 (1996).  Here, the postcard was undisputedly mailed to [...]’s home address.  (Pa14).  The Division went so far as to hire a company, [...], to mail postcards to all 200,647 SPRS retirees at their home addresses on file with the Division.  (Pa79-81).  And a postcard was indeed mailed to [...]’s last home address on August 9, 2019.  (Pa14; Pa81).  Nonetheless, [...] asserts, without offering any legal authority, that his affidavit declaring that he never received a postcard should overcome the presumption that he received it.  (Pb14).  Still, despite the Board’s having satisfied the notice requirement under the Ricci Act, it nevertheless considered [...]’s request under its inherent equitable power.
[brief] At common law, an easement in favor of a third person could not be created by reservation or exception.  What has come to be known as the “stranger-to-the-deed” rule presumes that deeds conveying land are between a grantor and a grantee, and views with distrust any attempt to use the deed to create a property interest in any other party, *i.e.*, a “stranger. ”  *Conway v. Miller*, 356 Mont. 231, 232 P.3d 390, 397 (2010).  “The early rule, still strongly adhered to in most jurisdictions, is that in an instrument of conveyance a mere reservation in favor of a stranger to the deed is inoperative to create in him any right or interest in the property conveyed. ”  Annotation, Reservation or exception in deed in favor of stranger, 88 A.L.R.2d 1199 (1963).  “A reservation of interest in real property, to be good, must be made to all, some, or one of the grantors, and not to a stranger to the deed. ”  23 Am. Jur.2d, Deeds, § 68 (2021).  The rule has been criticized by some commentators and a number of jurisdictions have abandoned it, yet “the prevailing view still appears to be that a reservation or exception of an easement may operate only in favor of the grantor. ”  [...] and [...], The Law of Easements & Licenses in Land, § 3:9 (2021).  The main rationale is that the rule promotes certainty in land titles and provides protection for bona fide purchasers.
[brief] 14  [...] & [...], Zoning and Land Use Administration (2022) ..................................................................................................................  21  [...], Zoning and Land Use Administration (2008)..........................  21 Rules  *Rule* 4:6-2 ......................................................................................................................... 10, 11 *Rule* 4:69-6.....................................................................................................................  passim  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiff’s appeal fails for one simple reason: they are trying to apply the wrong statute.  This appeal challenges the sufficiency of a public notice published by [...] (“Harrison”) prior to adoption of an ordinance adopting a redevelopment plan.  The Trial Court applied the correct statute governing the notice requirements.  At both the Trial Court and now on appeal, Plaintiff, [...]  (“Plaintiff”), seeks to engraft the more specific notice requirements for zoning ordinances onto the statute governing notice requirements for general legislation ordinances.
[directive] Retained SAFE/DFSA kits are identified as unreported or “Hold” kits.  The victim will be notified of the right to request an unreported SAFE/DFSA kit be released to law enforcement in furtherance of a criminal investigation at any point during the 20-year retention period.  At the conclusion of the 20-year retention period, any unreported kit may be destroyed.  Victims are notified of the end date of the retention period at the time of examination and specimen collection.  Victims shall also be provided information on how to release an unreported SAFE/DFSA kit to law enforcement for testing and criminal investigation.  County Prosecutor’s Offices must also publicly maintain information on how a victim may release an unreported SAFE/DFSA kit to law period. 12 enforcement for testing and criminal investigation during the retention SAFE/DFSA kits submitted to law enforcement for investigation and testing shall be retained in accordance with the law enforcement agency’s evidence retention policy and stored in accordance with section IV.B.  Retained and unreported SAFE/DFSA kits collected before the effective date of this Directive shall be retained for 20 years from the date of collection for an adult or twenty (20) years from the date a minor victim reaches the age of 18.  County Prosecutors must publicly maintain information on the extended retention period so that all individuals within their jurisdiction are aware of the extension of victims of sexual violence rights with respect to retention of unreported SAFE/DFSA kits.  IV.
[brief] (Da620)  Rule 4:37-1(a) allows a voluntary dismissal by stipulation only when that stipulation is “signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. ”  Here, the court below dismissed Defendant [...] based on the filing by Plaintiffs of a stipulation signed only by Plaintiffs’ counsel and Defendant [...].\(^{80}\) [...] was never informed of the basis for the dismissal, apprised of the contents of the settlement reached between the parties, or even aware that the dismissal was forthcoming until it was filed with the trial court.  A similar dismissal was addressed by the Appellate Division in Burns v. Hoboken Rent Leveling & Stabilization Bd., 429 N.J. Super. 435 (App. Div. 2013).  There, the Appellate Court found that Bloomfield – the non-party to the stipulation – “was an interested party concerning the claims being dismissed” and ruled that it was error to deny Bloomfield’s motion to vacate the dismissal.  While the Appellate Division in Burns ultimately found the error to be harmless, \(^{80}\) Da620. the circumstances in that case differed in that the dismissal was granted by the trial court following a hearing on a motion for voluntary dismissal, not merely after a filing of a signed stipulation by the plaintiffs, as was done here.  And, while it is convenient to assume that the stipulation of dismissal between [...] and Plaintiffs also terminated [...]’s cross-claims against [...], that has not been clearly established by the record.  VI.
[brief] 25 Dep’t of Children & Families, Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. T.B., 207 NJ. 294 (2011)  ..............................................................................  26 Giordano v. City Commission of the City of Newark, 2 N.J. 585, 67 A.2d 454 (1949) ............................................................. 38, 39 Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 NJ. 500 (1992) ..............................................................................  26 In re Hermann, 192 N.J. 19 (2007) ..............................................................................  26 Kempner v. Edison Twp., 54 N.J. Super. 408 (App. Div. 1959) ...................................................  38  Kochen v. Consolidated Pol., etc., Pension Fund Comm., 71 N.J. Super. 463 (177 A.2d 304) (App.Div.1962) ............................... 39 Kramer v. Board of Adjustment, 45 N.J. 268 (1965) .............................................................................. 23, 25, 39 Liberty Terrace, LLC v. Rent Leveling Bd. of Twp. of N Bergen, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 970, 8 (App. Div. Apr. 18, 2011) .......... 26 Litt v. Rutherford Rent Bd., 196 N.J. Super. 456 (Law. Div. 1984) .................................................. 29, 30, 36 Osario v. West New York Rent Control Board, 410 N.J. Super. 437 (App. Div. 2009) .........................................................39 Reinauer Realty Corp. v. Nucera, 59 N.J. Super. 189 (157 A.2d 524) (App.Div.1960), certif. denied, 32 N.J. 347 (160 A.2d 845) (1960)...............................................................39 Schwam v. Twp. of Cedar Grove Twp., 228 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div. 1988)......................................................29, 36 Schwam v. Cedar Grove Twp., 9 N.J. Tax 406 (1987).............................................................................29, 36 Stolz v. Ellenstein, 7 N.J. 291 (1951)....................................................................................38, 39 Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.41.................................................................................27 N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.42.................................................................................28
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  1.  POINT I: THE OCTOBER 6  ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR JNOV AND/OR FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE REVERSED TO PREVENT A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE  BECAUSE DEFENDANT ADMITTED THAT SHE IMPROPERLY CHARGED PLAINTIFF FOR DEFENDANT’S OWN PERSONAL EXPENSES  (PA665-66)  ...........................................  7  2.  POINT II: DEFENDANT’S TRIAL TESTIMONY CONFIRMED THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE 49% OF THE COMPANY’S PROFITS FOR 2016, BUT THAT DEFENDANT KEPT ALL THE COMPANY PROFITS FOR HERSELF (PA665-66)  ..................................................  8  3.  POINT III: DEFENDANT’S ACKNOWLEDGED VIOLATIONS OF THE PARTIES’ OPERATING AGREEMENT  ENTITLE PLAINTIFF TO JNOV AND/OR TO A NEW TRIAL (Pa667-68)  .............................................  9  4.  POINT IV: DEFENDANT’S ACKNOWLEDGED ACCOUNTING MISTAKES AND BREACHES OF THE PARTIES’ OPERATING AGREEMENT  ENTITLE PLAINTIFF TO REVERSAL OF THE $119,256.40 FEE AWARD IN DEFENDANT’S FAVOR AND TO A FEE AWARD IN PLAINTIFF’S FAVOR AS THE PREVAILING PARTY (Pa667-68)  ..............................................................  10  5.  POINT V: THE MARCH 11  ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S FEE APPLICATION SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAD TO BRING THIS LAWSUIT TO OBTAIN [...]’S QUICKBOOKS DATA (PA667-68)  ........................................................................ 11  CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................
[brief] The Missouri Action remains pending and has advanced \(^{22}\)  Defendants also respectfully direct the court’s attention to the judicial “[v]acancy [c]rises” currently affecting New Jersey courts (Pa303-304), which since this case was dismissed.  On February 6, 2024, the Missouri Action was remanded to Missouri state court (because the removal was untimely) where defendants have served discovery while certain other defendants pursue an appeal of the remand order in the Eighth Circuit. \textsuperscript{23}  Plaintiff’s assertion that the Missouri courts have been slow to act is belied by the record, which reflects that the Missouri state court promptly heard and decided plaintiff’s renewed motion to dismiss the First Amended Petition on October 7, 2022, a little over a month after the motion was filed and the day it was heard. \textsuperscript{24}  Finally, plaintiff is not prejudiced by dismissal of this case in favor of the Missouri Action.  The Missouri Action is moving forward no matter what happens in this case because the Missouri court denied plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, a ruling plaintiff did not seek to appeal.  Instead, plaintiff has embraced defendants understand will very likely cause delays in resolution of this case if it were to proceed.
[brief] The [...] defendants seek to have the survivorship claim arbitrated according to a form arbitration agreement which was allegedly assented to by the decedent, [...].  Respectfully, the Estate of [...] avers that the Trial Court’s decision was proper, justified, and based in sound law regarding arbitrability.  The [...] defendants’ arbitration agreement was introduced through an unconscionable formation process and its terms are even more unconscionable.  Astonishingly, during his deposition testimony, Defendant [...] was unable to explain what the agreement meant.  Most shockingly, the arbitration form provides the doctor with virtually complete control over the arbitration panel.  Thus, the agreement should remain unenforced.  More importantly, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in determining to resume litigation of the survivorship claim.  Of note, Defendants/Appellants did not appeal the May 14, 2024 Order to resume litigation of the survivorship claim, as they would have been out of time to do so by July 2, 2024 when they filed the notice of appeal.  Rather, as expressly stated in the Notice of Appeal, this appeal is of the Trial Court’s June 20, 2024 Order regarding Defendants’ motion for reconsideration of the prior May 2024 Order (Da162-164).  As such, the standard of review is abuse of discretion.  The Trial Court’s decision was made with a rational explanation and rested on permissible grounds in the interest of justice.  As such, the survivorship claim must remain in litigation.  Additionally, it should be noted that the Estate of [...]’s wrongful death claim remains in litigation.  Defendants/Appellants have not appealed the Trial Court’s decision to keep the wrongful death claim in suit.  Thus, the only issue on this appeal is whether Plaintiff/Respondent’s survivorship claim also remains in suit.
[brief] This resulted in a court order dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims while simultaneously providing that [...]’s cross-claims are “preserved in accordance with Burt v. West Jersey Health Sys., 339 N.J. Super. 296 (App. Div. 2001). ” (Da236).  Under Burt, the moving defendant is dismissed as a party, and the remaining defendant’s liability is molded to account for any apportionment to that defendant.
[brief] Defendants failed to point out to the Court, which the Plaintiff pointed out to the Court the first time around, and that is, that after seven and a half years in OPS, she was not promoted.  By transferring her, she lost the points and if it wasn’t for [...], they would have succeeded in delaying and denying her promotion.  On p. 5, the Defendants classify the Plaintiff’s allegations as “vague and conclusory. ”  This Court, in 2020, did not find that to be true.  The Court below found what the Defendants alleged on p. 4 and p. 5 to be a jury question about hostile work environment.  In the Plaintiff’s deposition and Material Facts, she sets forth how each one of the Defendants furthered the hostile work environment with a goal to deny the Plaintiff’s promotion.  She wasn’t promoted in OPS; she wasn’t promoted at the Academy, and she was rescued by [...], who asked for her to be transferred and was responsible for her promotion.
[brief] Donofry, 350 N.J. Super. at 296.  Therefore, even if a reasonable jury believes some of Defendants’ rationale for termination, it could still reasonably conclude that Plaintiff’s whistleblowing “made a difference” in Defendants deciding to terminate her, and still find for Plaintiff.  Here, the facts surrounding Plaintiff’s termination contain sufficient weaknesses in Defendants’ purported reason for termination that the jury may find them unworthy of credence.
[directive] SECTION B OPTIONAL * (See Appendix II for form set)  * NOTE: ASTERISK INDICATES SECTION PREVIOUSLY COMPLETED  C.  ON-GOING FILE DEVELOPMENT  After securing the U.D.I.R. after CJP or other intake interview, and having completed the bail report if necessary, the case supervisor begins to reach out for information needed to develop other forms.  This process is somewhat flexible given the type of cases.  Obviously, a case amenable to PTI, early plea to simultaneous sentence will require earlier attention than serious violent crimes.  D.  PRETRIAL INTERVENTION
[brief] When reviewing a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers to the trial judge’s factual findings where “supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 425-26 (2017) (quoting State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 40 (2016)).  Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.  State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 526-27 (2022).
[brief] Da40, 116, 136.  On June 1, 2023, [...] was terminated as manager of the Companies.  Da171-72.  Based on [...]’s discovery of [...]’s substantial mismanagement and misappropriation, the Companies and [...] filed a lawsuit in the Law Division against [...], her spouse, and her businesses related to, amongst other things, [...]’s breach of the Companies’ Operating Agreements and breaches of her fiduciary duties as well as civil RICO and conspiracy amongst the defendants in the Law Division Case.