ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] .........................................................45  TABLE OF CONTENTS OF APPENDIX  SICRA #3 - December 1, 2022 - Flood Hazard Area Verification and Flood Hazard Area Individual Permits issued to [...]; [...].  ........................................  Aa001  SICRA #6 - December 1, 2022 - Engineering Report, prepared and signed by [...] and [...], DEP ........................................  Aa012 SICRA #9 - November 30, 2022 - Environmental Report, prepared by [...], Environmental Specialist, DEP and approved by [...], Section Chief, DEP  .........................................................  Aa024 SICRA #11 - November 30, 2022 - public comment email thread ...........  Aa042 SICRA #12 - November 30, 2022 - email thread between DEP and [...]  .........................................................  Aa049 *SICRA #17(a) - November 22, 2022 - Overall Stormwater Management Report ..........................................................  Aa070 SICRA #24 - October 3, 2022 - email thread between [...] and DEP regarding FHA permit plans and FWW permit plans ....................  Aa094 SICRA #28(a) - September 9, 2022 - Memo to [...], [...] from [...], DEP.  ...............................  Aa099 --- 1  This Brief and Appendix will be printed and bound into one combined volume of less than 200 sheets.
[brief] (Sa11). ¹  On July 7, 2023, defendant filed a brief in support of the motion, to which he attached several documents—purported franchise agreements for a [...] franchise for the same location in Hoboken signed over a year apart and a principal owner’s guaranty allegedly showing that defendant had a 30% interest in the franchise—as well as an affidavit from defendant’s sister, [...] --- ¹  In his motion, defendant alleged that this evidence was also exculpatory and had been in the possession of the State.  (Sa11).  Defendant, however, does not present any support for this allegation and the trial court did not find the State in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), for failing to turn over this purported newly discovered evidence.  [...],\textsuperscript{2} claiming to have found the documents after searching boxes in the family’s garage.  (Sa126-71).  On October 12, 2023, and December 14, 2023, a hearing was held on the motion.  (8T-9T).  On February 16, 2024, [...] granted the motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence but denied a judgment of acquittal.  (Sa13-33).  The State filed a motion for leave to appeal, which this Court granted on April 8, 2024.  (Sa34-37).  \textsuperscript{2}  To avoid any confusion, the State refers to defendant’s sisters by their first names.
[brief] BECAUSE IT IS RELEVANT TO PROVING IDENTITY AND POSSESSION OF THE BB GUN, AND ANY APPARENT PREJUDICE CAN BE CURED WITH REDACTIONS AND LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS.  ...........................................  3 POINT II .............................................................................  11  IMMEDIATE APPELLATE REVIEW IN THIS CASE IS NOT APPROPRIATE BECAUSE GRANTING THE STATE’S MOTION TO ADMIT WAS PROPER.  ....................................................  11  CONCLUSION .......................................................................  13  TABLE OF THE APPENDIX  Miranda Waiver Form ..................................................  Pa1  Defendant’s Recorded Statement ..................................  Pa2  Transcript of Defendant’s Recorded Statement ...............  Pa3 to Pa19  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] I  SUMMARY  JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPERLY GRANTED BECAUSE HE CHANGED HIS INSURANCE POLICY PRIOR TO THE APRIL 2022 ACCIDENT.  (PA162-PA163)  All parties agree that the black letter case law states that a defendant is entitled to summary judgment in its favor when reasonable minds cannot differ about the outcome.  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995).  The crux of defendant’s summary judgment motion was that plaintiff failed to comply with Section 4.5 of the No-Fault Act because he had a North Carolina policy and his car was principally garaged in New Jersey.  However, it is undisputed that plaintiff attempted to change his North Carolina insurance policy to a New Jersey insurance policy prior to the accident of April 2022.  It is undisputed that plaintiff changed the mailing address on his insurance policy to New Jersey prior to the April 2022 accident.  However, he failed to properly navigate the computer and, thus, did not change the garaging of his vehicle to New Jersey.  It, quite frankly, beggars belief that the average person would understand that changing their mailing address to New Jersey does not equate with notifying their insurance company that the vehicles are now garaged in New Jersey.  It is well-settled that for an insurer to void a policy because of a misrepresentation, the misrepresentation must be knowing and material.  A mere oversight or honest mistake will not cost an insured his or her coverage; the lie must be willful.  *Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co.*, 121 N.J. 530 (1990).  While *Longobardi* involved a homeowner’s policy and allegations of a post-loss misrepresentation, its holding has been cited and approved in subsequent cases involving allegations of misrepresentations in automobile policies.  See generally, *Palisades Safety & Ins. v. Bastien*, 175 N.J. 144 (2003).  In the case at bar, plaintiff should not be penalized because he incompetently navigated the computer system.  As there is less and less human to human contact in business transactions, it is entirely predictable that misunderstandings like the one at bar are going to occur.
[brief] Indeed, plaintiff has returned to his original Feld VI December 10, 2014 lack of third-party taxpayer standing appellate oral argument before Judges [...], [...] and [...] when he caused Judge [...]’s face to turn beet red and [...] to blurt out “Where was our State AG?”  But see, In re IMO Town of Harrison and Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 116, 440 N.J. Super. 268 299 (App. Div. 2015) (“[W]hether a state agency is abiding by a valid state law ‘is a fundamental concern of the Attorney General both in his capacity to the agency and in his capacity and responsibility as protector of the public. ”)  Today, no one is above the law.
[brief] [Ibid.]  Alternatively, testimony that contains an “opinion” or “belief” is “opinion testimony. ”  A lay witness’s opinion testimony is governed by N.J.R.E. 701, which provides:  If a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the form of opinions or inferences may be admitted if it: (a) is rationally based on the witness’ perception; and (b) will assist in understanding the witness’ testimony or determining a fact in issue.
[brief] [...] went to the [...] at approximately 6:00 or 7:00 a.m. on April 15, 2017, after her night shift at the [...] ended.  [...] had prepared a photo array that included photographs of defendant and five other men. \(^2\)  [...] testified at trial that [...] and [...] had “briefed [him] on the case,” “indicated they [had] developed a suspect [defendant,]” and requested assistance with a photo array.  [...] testified that he chose photos for the array “resembl[ing] the suspect in characteristics that were [developed] both by the description given by the witnesses and by any other investigative means that we have had.
[brief] The Court held that the Board did not properly consider whether [...]’s tax preparation fee and garbage collection fee were solely due to the Property’s conversion to a condominium or not.  As to the Board’s reduction of the management fee to 5%, the Court ruled: [...] presented testimony and records to support the fact that the management fee was actually incurred, actually paid, and in line with the marketplace rates.  The Board resorted to an arbitrary rate of 5% of the income generated based on “board precedent” and “independent research. ”  Counsel for the Board characterizes the 5% finding as something that was “settled on” and defends the figure by expressing the Board’s apparent reticence to approve [...] paying fees to [...] due to the common ownership.  The fact remains that some entity has to provide management services and Julip’s rates were proven to be typically $150 per month for other clients in the same market.  The actual proofs submitted by [...] far outweighed the admittedly subjective compromise figure of 5%, which was the absolute low end of the range of 5%-12% suggested by the “independent research. ”  This issue is remanded for further consideration and evaluation as the 5% allowance seems arbitrary and motivated by suspicion of, or animus for [...].
[brief] Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J.Super. 301, 306 (App. Div. 1997)  20  First Options of Chi., Inc.  v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995)  11  514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)  13  514 U.S. 938, 949 (1995)  18  Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119 (2020)  13  244 N.J. 119, 137 (2020)  19  Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc., P.A., 168 N.J. 124 (2001)
[brief] This section will be limited to areas where Respondent [...]’s (“[...]”)\(^1\) Brief misstates the facts or misinterprets the testimony, or both, in order to give the Court the misimpression that the subject application was more forceful than as actually presented to the [...] (“[...]”).  1.  **[...] misstates the subject property ("Property) location as being in a mixed use area.**  Pb4.  The Property is currently a farm with a single-family residence, surrounded only by a fully developed single-family residential neighborhood to the south, townhomes to the west, a pre-existing bus storage facility on one R-20A lot to the north, and only single-family residential homes to the east.  Da18.  It is clearly a well-defined residential single-family area, contrary to [...]’s mischaracterization.  Da57.  2.  **[...] ignores the recent zoning history for the Property and its impact. **  [...]’s Brief never even mentions the rezoning application just prior to this identical application.  In 2018, [...] (“[...]”) applied to rezone this site for 150 units for the identical tripartite uses, namely 150 senior independent living, assisted living and memory care units, whereas [...] seeks 165 units of the same.  Da34.  The [...] denied [...]’s request, just prior to this application for the same.  Instead, [...] criticizes the proposed amendments to the Master Plan adopted by the [...] whereby they specifically voted to omit this Property from a special zone for these uses, and suggests it was done solely as a negotiation tactic for the Township to purchase the Property.  \(^1\)  Although [...] was the nominal applicant, [...] opposes this appeal as the contract seller.  In fact, the removal of the Property from the Master Plan Amendment served to bolster the R-20A zoning for this property.
[brief] \textit{Id}. that he committed perjury.  While [...] contests the reductive conclusion that a jury’s rejection of a witness’s testimony means the witness lied, the fact that the court took pains to accuse [...] of committing perjury raises the troubling inference that it sentenced him not only for the manslaughter offenses for which he was tried and convicted, but also for the crime of perjury, for which he was not charged. \footnote{The crime of perjury is set forth at N.J.S.A. 2C:28-1.}  The matter must be remanded for a new sentencing hearing because the court improperly charged [...] with perjury, improperly charged him with failing to acknowledge responsibility or express remorse despite the fact that he did both, and improperly treated his failure to incriminate himself at sentencing as reasons to increase his sentence.
[brief] First, the questioning prior to defendant’s admission that the vehicle contained contraband did not prolong the seizure “beyond the time reasonably required” to complete the original mission of the stop.  *Dunbar*, 229 N.J. at 534.  The officer still had to issue four summonses for motor-vehicle offenses related to defendant’s reckless driving.  In addition, defendant still had not yet produced proof of insurance, which eventually resulted in a fifth summons, see N.J.S.A. 39:3-29.  (Pa2 to 6).  Thus, if [...] had released defendant at that juncture, he ran the risk of releasing a driver without the necessary liability insurance for his vehicle.  See N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2.  Given all this, the officer was justified in detaining defendant during this ninety-second period without even factoring in the objective indicia of driving under the influence and drug possession.  See State v. Hickman, 335 N.J. Super. 623, 637 (App. Div. 2000) (holding that inquires about the defendant’s nervousness and whether a car contained contraband “did not prolong the stop,” in part, because the officer had to issues summonses and “the stop would have continued for some additional period of time”).
[brief] ”  [W]hat I think the Prosecutor is referring to is talking about the nature of the Defendant.  She wasn’t talking about those things for the purposes of relying upon them for prior record, but to demonstrate since the argument is being made is I’m a different person.  But who was this underlying person and the advent of domestic violence she was pointing to as an illustration of who this person is in his more intimate relationships.  . . .  [I]n those instances she’s pointing to as this is how prior to this, I guess, he interacted.  Okay?  And the question becomes as I discussed with you, who is [...] really?  Okay.  And that is what I interpret.  I don’t take that record into accounting, but I understand the argument the Prosecutor was making in regard to that.
[brief] Citations herein shall be to the annexed Appendix prepared by Defendants-Appellants [...], [...] and [...] (“Appellants”).  On April 20, 2020, Appellants acquired [...] (the “Property”) for consideration of $163,000.  (92a-93a).  On December 16, 2021, the [...] auctioned tax sale certificate no. [...] as a lien against the Property (the “Certificate”) to [...] (“[...]”) for the amount of $1,314.28 plus statutory interest of $29.57, for a total payment by [...] of $1,343.85.  (30a,34a).  Holding this Certificate, [...] proceeded to pay subsequently accruing real property taxes for the first and second quarters of 2022, and on June 22, 2022, initiated the lower court in rem foreclosure action against the Property (the “Foreclosure Action,” 28a-34a).  By Assignment of Tax Sale Certificate dated as of October 13, 2022, [...] (“[...]”) acquired the Certificate for unstated consideration.  (89a)  On November 7, 2022, an Order Substituting Plaintiff (89a) was entered by the lower court, substituting [...] for [...].  Also on November 7, 2022, [...] obtained Final Judgment (the “Final Judgment”) for an adjudicated delinquency of $4,246.67, thereby acquiring title to the Property.  (85a-88a).  On or about December 12, 2022, thirty-five (35) days after entry of Final Judgment, [...] conveyed title to the Property to [...] (“[...]”) by Quitclaim Deed for stated consideration of $140,000. (466a, 347a-348a, 351a-354a).  On February 2, 2023, eighty-seven (87) days after entry of Final Judgment, Appellants filed a motion in the lower court seeking to avoid the Final Judgment under Rule 4:50-1 (a), (d) and (f).
[directive] Investigators must strive to conduct a thorough and objective investigation without violating the rights of the subject officer or any other law enforcement officer.  Internal affairs investigators, and anyone who may be called upon to do an internal investigation, must be thoroughly familiar with the agency's entire internal affairs policy, 28  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 including the protection of the subject officer's rights and the procedures for properly investigating internal complaints.  6.3.5  Internal affairs shall notify the suspect officer in writing that an internal investigation has been started, unless the nature of the investigation requires secrecy.
[brief] 1  IV.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY………………………………………..  4  V.  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS……………………………..  6  A.  Plaintiffs’ Genesis Deed Contains Six (6) Restrictive Covenants………………………………………..  6  B.  From 1948 thru 1989 [...] Never Passed Any Rules Governing Construction………………………………………..  9  VI.  LEGAL ARGUMENT……………………………………………..
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This matter arises out of a claim for injuries allegedly sustained by Plaintiff/Appellant [...] on February 2, 2022, while participating in trampoline activities at the [...] (“the Park”) located in [...].  The Park is owned by Defendant/Respondent, [...] d/b/a Urban Air Trampoline and Adventure Park.  Appellant was injured while using the “ProZone” attraction, which consists of an enclosed area with two trampoline beds, with a vertical wall area on two sides.  As a pre-condition of entry to the Park, Plaintiff consented to a Customer Waiver, Release, and Indemnification Agreement ("the Agreement") which required all claims arising out of his presence at the Park to be brought in binding arbitration.  On May 2, 2024, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., sitting in the New Jersey Superior Court, Bergen County, Law Division, Civil Part, heard oral argument on, and subsequently granted Respondent’s Motion for an Order staying the case as to all parties pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-7 and compelling arbitration.  Appellant claims that the lower Court erred when it found that the Agreement was enforceable, and when it found that Respondent had not waived its right to enforce the arbitration clause in the Agreement.  Despite Appellant’s protests, the Court did not err by granting Respondent’s motion and compelling this matter to binding arbitration without holding an evidentiary hearing.  The Court did not err when it held that the terms of the Agreement are clear and sufficient to notify Appellant of the rights being waived.  Further, Appellants will not be prejudiced by the Court’s finding that Respondent did not waive its right to arbitration.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] Arguments in Point I. B. and Point I. C. of Opposition Brief; Db25–Db26; Db26–Db28)  Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable defense.  [...] fails to establish that the Superior Court, Law Division, retains jurisdiction to adjudicate [...]’s Counterclaim for enforcement of an 18A statute applicable only to school districts and thus under the Commissioner’s jurisdiction.  To the contrary, the Commissioner retains jurisdiction over [...]’s attempt to adjudicate its school law claim under Title 18A.  [...]’s Opposition argues that the doctrine of waiver precludes [...] from asserting that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction over the COVID statute.  That argument should be rejected for at least four reasons: 1) “Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a nonwaivable defense” and a “finding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction at the time of the entry of the order…will render that order void from its inception”\(^5\); 2) [...] never made this argument in the trial court, so this court should reject [...]’s attempt to raise it for the first time in the Appellate Division; 3) The trial court never concluded that [...] waived the subject matter jurisdiction; and 4)
[brief] [...], Esquire described the [...] as a very popular circular in Brigantine that is the source of a lot of talk around the island.  (10T69:23 to 70:10).  By disregarding the newspaper publication about [...], the Court under evaluated the severe emotional distress that Decedent was under due to [...]’s continuing relationship with Respondent, and Decedent’s continuing worry about Respondent’ reputation and standing in the community.  (7T181:5-24; 7T182:17-19; 7T 186:19 to 187:19).  The Court recognized Decedent’s distress, finding “Respondent fought with her mother because her mother wanted her to leave [[...]] to protect Respondent and her grandchildren.
[brief] The resulting proposal to purchase the Property was presented in three writings: 1) a Real Estate Sales Contract, 2) a Use and Occupancy Agreement, and 3) a Disclosure Statement.  (239a; 228a; 252a).  The Real Estate Sales Contract, Use and Occupancy Agreement, and Disclosure Statement were not signed until [...] and [...] met for the third time, which significantly was also the date “closing” was scheduled, on April 5, 2019.  (75a, 39:21–30:2).  Neither the Real Estate Sales Contract nor the Use and Occupancy Agreement contained any provision or Notice providing that “the owner has a right to cancel a distressed property conditional conveyance contract or distressed property conveyance contract with a distressed property purchaser until midnight of the 10th business day following the day on which the owner signs the contract.
[brief] THE COURT: I’ve got Korotki versus Korotki, [...].  [...], your appearance please.  MR. KLEIN: Thank you, sir.  Good morning, Your Honor.  On behalf of the plaintiff [...], [...] of the law firm of [...].  Your Honor, I have a fully executed property settlement agreement in this matter.  Would you want that marked P-1?  THE COURT: Yes.  MR. KLEIN: May I?  THE COURT: Yeah.  MR. KLEIN: How are you?  THE COURT: Good.  How are you feeling, better?  MR. KLEIN: Better, finally.  THE COURT: You want this P-1?  MR. KLEIN: P-1.  Thank you.  THE COURT:  [...], I’ve marked what appears to be a settlement agreement between you and your wife as Exhibit P-1.  [...] will have a series of questions for you about the agreement.  My determination today is simply whether you and your wife have entered into an agreement that resolves all the issues, whether you think it’s fair, and some related issues.
[brief] Despite the Appellate Division’s recent and on directly on point decisions, Plaintiff’s Appellate Brief fails to address them. \(^3\)  Plaintiff instead pretends that the Appellate Division’s decisions do not exist and argues on appeal that the Trial Court’s erroneously interpreted the FDCPA.  As discussed, the Trial Court’s interpretation of the FDCPA aligns with the Appellate Division’s recent, four month old, interpretation of the statute and thus Plaintiff’s argument is meritless.  Moreover, the Trial Court reached the correct interpretation of the FDCPA through a careful review of the purpose behind the FDCPA and the legislative history.
[brief] …  Everybody has been notified and you’re making a record now that you sought to do everything you could to intervene in this case, to make everybody aware that you had a claim back in [July] of 2021.  But to utilize that as a methodology to prevent [...] from being discharged is of no consequence relative to your case.  If you have insurance that can satisfy any claim that your client may be able to prove, fine.  Done.  If there an excess verdict, I’m not going to have [...] stand responsible for that because he was not the receiver at the point in time when your client as injured and that’s my ruling.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f).  The clear and unambiguous language of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f) requires no rational nexus between the payment made and a particular redevelopment project and its costs.  i.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f)  Authorized The City To Collect The Redeveloper Payment And To Do So Without Establishing A Nexus Between The Redeveloper Payment And [...]’s Project.
[brief] [...] [...]  TABLE OF CONTENT PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT - I DEFENDANT'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE PROSECUTOR FAILED TO DISCLOSE POWERFUL IMPEACHMENT MATERIAL CONTRARY TO BRADY V. MARYLAND, 373 U.S. 83 ......................................................................................2 CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................8