ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Page  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................  i  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................  1  ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................  2  I.  THE BOARD’S APPLICATION OF N.J.A.C. 12:17–9.3(b)  TO IMPOSE  A NOTICE-AND-INQUIRY REQUIREMENT UPON EVERY EMPLOYEE WHO IS SEPARATED FROM EMPLOYMENT DUE TO A HEALTH CONDITION IS A PLAINLY UNREASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE REGULATION.  (Pa1; Pa3)  .........................................................................................  2  II.  [...] MET HIS BURDEN UNDER N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b)  BY SHOWING THAT NO OTHER SUITABLE ACCOMODATIONS WERE AVAILABLE TO HIM.  (Pa1; Pa3)  .................................................................................................  4  III.  [...] SUBMITTED UNCONTROVERTED  MEDICAL DOCUMENTATION  PURSUANT TO N.J.A.C. 12:17–9.3(d)  IN SUPPORT OF HIS LEAVING WORK FOR GOOD CAUSE RELATED TO THE EMPLOYMENT.  (Pa1; Pa3)  .........................................................................................  6  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................
[brief] Indeed, the Original Policies restricted disclosure of “a student’s transgender status except as allowed by law. ”  [...] Orig. Pol’y (D2a55); [...] Orig. Pol’y 5657 ([...] Ra9); [...] Orig. Pol’y 5657 ([...] Ra8).  The school records laws thus pose no obstacle to a presumptive nondisclosure policy that avoids conflict with the LAD, an equally binding state law, and raises no issues under the New Jersey Constitution.
[brief] (See Da76.)  The trial court erred by ruling otherwise.  The court deemed the case to be a matter of public interest because it believed the issue needed clarity in the absence of settled law, and it viewed the BOG appointments to be “extremely important and prestigious” for “the state university. ”  (1T67:18-68:23.)  Neither reason warranted an enlargement, much less the excessive one here.  This case is more accurately seen as a private grievance by a faculty union against university leadership than a significant public dispute typically characteristic of such enlargements.  See Brunetti v. New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 585-86 (1975) (distinguishing between private and public interests when evaluating expansion of the limitations period).4  At a minimum, the trial court should have considered “all relevant equitable considerations under the circumstances” on which “relaxation depends. ”  See Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 7.3 on R. 4:69-6 (2024) (citing cases).  As this court has instructed, in determining whether to enlarge the deadline, “courts should . . . consider the length of the --- 4  As noted above, the trial court did not adopt Plaintiffs’ continuous violation theory; its sole basis for extending the limitations period appears to be relaxation or enlargement under the interest of justice standard. delay and the reason proffered for that delay. ”  Tri-State Ship Repair & Dry Dock Co. v. City of Perth Amboy, 349 N.J. Super. 418, 424 (App. Div. 2002).  And this court has emphasized, “The longer a party waits to mount its challenge, the less it may be entitled to an enlargement. ”  Ibid.  Finally, this court has warned, “courts do not routinely grant an enlargement of time to file an action in lieu of prerogative writs. ”  Id. at 423.  Had the court below followed the Appellate Division’s instructions, it would have found that Plaintiffs had more than sufficient notice of their claim before it lapsed but inexplicably filed their action too late.  The court’s failure is a major departure from caselaw and defeats the very purpose of the limitations period.  According to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the “statute of limitations is designed to encourage parties not to rest on their rights. ”  Reilly v. Brice, 109 N.J. 555, 559 (1988).  But resting on their rights is exactly what Plaintiffs did, and the court below should have addressed that fact.  In this private dispute between a faculty union and [...], in which a longstanding BOG member has been ejected for no reason related to the substance of her service, the trial court should not have averted its eyes to the fact that Plaintiffs proffered no explanation of why their action was excessively out of time.  [...] respectfully asks this court to correct that error.
[brief] 46  Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011) ...........................................  21 Sons of Thunder v. Borden, Inc., 148 N.J. 396, 420 (1997) .......................................... 36, 37 State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 538 (2017) .........................................
[brief] On June 29, 2018, Defendant moved for reconsideration of the trial court's decision asserting that the issue of "appearance of impropriety and impartiality" raised in the previous appeal and initial trial court proceedings had not been addressed.  The trial court held on August 8, 2018, that while they had erred in holding that the issue of impartiality had not been raised previously, the scope of the appellate remand precluded it from addressing the issue.  (Ra40)  Thereafter, another Appellate Division decision held that there was no undue process and remanded to decide the issue of the "appearance of partiality" in the arbitration  On October 18, 2019, the trial court upheld the arbitration award.  (Ra51)  After a third appeal on November 16, 2020, the Appellate Division again upheld the arbitration award.
[brief] ’”  *Williams v. N.J. State Parole Bd.*, 255 N.J. 36, 53 (2023).  Business storage is not at all similar to providing services to residents.  (Da52).  From all outside appearances, the building appeared vacant.  (Da44-Da45).  The Borough did not even know about the business storage use until Plaintiff provided the lease as part of the redevelopment process.  (Compare Da39 & Da44-Da45 with Da120).
[brief] As in Medina, the jury here heard ample evidence to connect defendant to the crimes independently of the officers’ testimony that defendant was included in the photo array after speaking to [...] and to defendant.  Defendant was identified by [...] after she had time to view his face and the surveillance footage from the [...].  Additionally, defendant's DNA was found in a mask that was found days after the robberies near the property line of the [...].  A metal rod and a dark colored cap were found in defendant's girlfriend's car.  [...] and [...] identified defendant in court.  Our own review of the trial record demonstrates that while the State's proofs were by no means “very weak,” see Douglas, 204 N.J. Super. at 275, 498 A.2d 364, as in Branch, the trial evidence was “far from overwhelming. ”  182 N.J. at 353, 865 A.2d 673; see Watson, —— N.J. Super. at ——— (slip op. at 62, 64) (acknowledging “that the State's evidence was not overwhelming[,]” but nonetheless determining the Confrontation Clause violation was harmless).  As often is true in criminal cases that go to trial, this contest falls somewhere between the polar extremes of “very weak” and “overwhelming” evidence of guilt.
[brief] At the conclusion of testimony, the trial court found the testimony of [...] to be credible and reliable.  Da23.  That credible and reliable testimony amply supported the trial court’s factual findings.  The trial court accepted [...]’s testimony that defendant was acting nervously from the beginning of the traffic stop.  (2T:16-18 to 17-2) (2T:54-16 to 55-1); Da20-22.  The trial court further accepted [...]’s testimony that defendant appeared hunched over in his seat – which is in fact confirmed on the body-worn camera footage, see Da26 – and that defendant covered his waist area with the orange safety vest during the same conversation.
[brief] The Reports do not evaluate the operation of the SFRA in [...] and other Abbott districts that may have experienced funding shortfalls in their Adequacy Budgets, along with the structural factors responsible for those shortfalls such as the LFS methodology, local levy gaps, and an inadequate State share.  (Id.; see also Pa1922-Pa1923; Pa1937.)  When enacting the SFRA, the Legislature was aware that the LFS calculation and its use in determining the State share might impede districts such as [...] from fairly and realistically generating the local revenue required to fund their Adequacy Budgets.  To respond to this concern, the Legislature included a provision in the SFRA, originally codified at N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-59, requiring the State to conduct a study to analyze the limitation on property tax revenue and its impact “on disparities in spending among the districts” with recommendations for effectively addressing those disparities.  (Pa2246.)  In 2010, the Legislature repealed this requirement before the study got underway.  P.L. 2010, c. 44, § 12 (Pa2249.)  Since SFRA’s implementation in [...], the State has not undertaken any review, --- 6  At the same time as the Legislature repealed the SFRA provision mandating the tax levy growth cap study, it reduced the property tax levy cap from 4% to 2%.  See P. L. 2010, c. 44, § 4.  (Pa2248.) study or other evaluation of the operation of the LFS in [...] and its effect in causing state and local funding shortfalls in the District’s Adequacy Budget.  (Pa1920-Pa1921.)
[brief] However, the Appellate Division cited and did not overturn *Bung’s Bar & Grille* in *Velli* or *Helton*.  Velli, 257 N.J. Super. at 310 n1; Helton, 205 N.J. Super. at 203-04.  In Helton, this Court recognized the distinction between Bung’s Bar & Grille and that case:  We have no occasion here to determine whether [...] et al., supra, was correctly decided.  We merely note that an action to recover PIP benefits is properly characterized as statutory.  Helton, 205 N.J. Super. at 204 (App. Div. 1985).  Under Bung’s Bar & Grille, the court held that expert fees are recoverable when expert opinion evidence is essential to the resolution of the issue, and a reasonable allowance for the service is includable in the taxed costs. ”  Bung's Bar & Grille, 206 N.J. Super. at 481.  The court reached this conclusion relying on In re Caruso, 18 N.J. 26, 35 (1955).  In Caruso, the Court allowed the reasonable cost of producing an expert witness to be awarded to the prevailing party.  The Court reasoned, “Costs are said to be in the nature of incidental damages allowed to indemnify the successful party against the expense of vindicating a right invaded by the adverse party. ”  In re Caruso, 18 N.J. at 38.  The Court went on to hold that “where expert opinion evidence is essential to the resolution of the issue, a reasonable allowance for the service is includable in the taxed costs. ”  Id. at 39-40.  In this case, there can be no dispute that expert testimony was essential to a resolution of the issues.
[brief] Id; see also M78-79.  Whereas the Prior Approvals only required 2 variances, the impact of the proposed development under the Amended Application, on the reduced developable land, created a number of substantial variances.  In total, the Amended Application on the reduced developable land, required 12 different variances.  M73-74.  The Board, as detailed in its Resolution, made extensive findings of fact and expressed substantive reasons why it did not accept the conclusions of the Respondents’ experts by appropriately applying the facts to the applicable law and did so as to each and every one of the 12 variances requested by the Respondents.  M78-85.  Following the denial of the Amended Application, Respondents challenged the Board’s decision, seeking various relief in the form of the Prerogative Writ and Related Mt. Laurel Compliance Claims, and other counts and claims.
[brief] A.  The Complaint  ER Physicians are emergency medical practices that treat patients in New Jersey hospital emergency departments for medical conditions that include “cardiac arrest, broken bones, burns, shock, gunshots, stabbings, and distress. ” (Da2-3, 6.)  In compliance with federal and state law, ER Physicians care for all patients who arrive at a hospital emergency department, regardless of their ability to pay or insurance status.  (Da5 ¶ 21); see also Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.  In doing so, ER Physicians render emergency medical care to patients with insurance coverage issued, administered, and/or underwritten by Defendants [...], et al., the nation’s largest health insurer and its wholly ---  1  The Procedural History and Statement of Facts are so intertwined that, for the convenience of the reader, the two are combined to avoid duplication.
[brief] 27  Noye v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 238 N.J. Super. 430 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 147 (1990)  ............................................  26  Ogunyemi v. Garden State Med. Ctr., 478 N.J. Super. 310 (App. Div. 2024) .....................  8  Pace v. Hamilton Cove, 258 N.J. 82, 107 (2024) .......... 25  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989) .............................................  6 Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 352 N.J. Super. 555 (Ch. Div. 2002) .......................  11 Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30 (2020)  ..............................................  8 State v. Williams, 444 N.J. Super. 603 (App. Div. 2016) ..................... 27, 28 Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277 (Tenn. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1147, 125 S.Ct. 1304, 161 L.Ed.2d 108 (2005) ......................... 15, 16, 17, 19 Tillman v. Com. Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362 (2008) ........................................... 17, 18 State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853 (Mo. 2006) .................................... 20 Willis Flooring, Inc. v. Howard S. Lease Const. Co. & Assocs., 656 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983) ................................. 20 Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. 2006) ................................. 15, 16, 17 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS Page Decision and Order of the Honorable [...], granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration, dated May 30, 2024 .........................Pa1 Rider to Order granting the Motion for Dismissal, dated May 30, 2024 ..............................................................Pa3 Decision and Order of the Honorable [...], denying Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Count III of the Complaint, dated May 30, 2024 .................................................................Pa15
[brief] * * *  See also Ford Motor Co. p. Kearny, 91 N.J.L. 671, 672, 103 A. 254 (E. & A. 1917).  In the present case the ordinance itself uses the language of contract.  It refers to the 'sale' of water to its customers.  It requires the customer requesting service to make a written application for such service and to enter into an agreement for its continuance.  It describes that agreement as a 'contract.'  The conclusion that a contractual relationship existed between the [...] and its customers is inescapable.
[brief] \(^2\)  After a lengthy discussion of the objection, just before the jury was brought back into the courtroom, [...] noted:  Okay.  All right.  We’ll have them come back out if they’re ready.  Yeah.  You know what?  Let me just say too, I know the plaintiff has had sort of free rein of the courtroom, and I know presumably he’s in pain, but we need to keep that a little tighter.  So, up at the witness – I mean obviously we needed to show the video and the like, but I don’t want it to be a distraction for the jurors with the plaintiff walking all \(^2\) This objection does not relate to any of the issues on appeal. around the courtroom and the like.  Certainly feel free to stand up, but – [interjection] – Okay.  That’s fine.  Thank you.  (3T, at 50:22-8).  This request was prompted by the fact that after Plaintiff’s reference to the TV monitor, he continued to answer questions without returning to the witness box.  Plaintiff understood [...]’s request, and remained in the witness box for the remainder of his testimony.  When testimony resumed, Plaintiff mentioned that he had recently visited another chiropractor (3T, at 52:2-4).  Defense counsel objected, as this information was unknown to both counsel in this case (3T, at 52:5-12).  In discussing the comment at side bar, Plaintiff’s counsel suggested a different way of asking the question, to which Defense counsel replied, “That works for me.  I know it’s a difficult situation to be in, and I don’t want to draw unnecessary attention to it. ” (3T, at 53:3-8).  [...] agreed with this course of action, and decided to let trial progress without shining a spotlight on the comment (3T, at 53:9-12).  Plaintiff concluded his direct testimony by expressing the pervasiveness with which his injuries affect his life.
[brief] THE COURT ERRED WHERE IT BASED ITS DECISION ON A STATUTE OF FRAUDS THAT WAS NOT APPLICABLE, WAS NOT RAISED OR SUGGESTED BY EITHER PARTY, AND ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CORRECT ITS MISTAKE ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.  (2T42-20 to 21; 2T43-3 to 2T-44-1)  A.  Motion for Reconsideration.  The Standard for Review for a Motion for Reconsideration is as follows:  A motion for reconsideration seeking to alter or amend a judgment or order: shall state with specificity the basis on which it is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred, and shall have annexed thereto a copy of the judgment or order sought to be reconsidered and a copy of the court’s corresponding written opinion, if any.  R.4:49-2.  Reconsideration is appropriate where “either 1) the Court has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious the Court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence …”  Cummings vs. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting D’Atria vs. D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990).  The Motion should be denied where the Court’s decision was not palpably incorrect or irrational.
[brief] Meorosnosson  Dated: July 11, 2023  Superior Court of New Jersey – Appellate Division  Letter Brief  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...]  ATTORNEYS AT LAW  [...]*  [...]  [...]  [...]  16  MADISON AVENUE SUITE 1A TOMS RIVER, NJ 08753  Tel.: [...]  Fax: [...]  Letter Brief on Behalf of: Defendant Respondent, [...]  August 29, 2023  Honorable Judges, Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division CN 006, Trenton, NJ 08625  Re: [...] (Plaintiff/Respondent) vs. [...] Zoning Board of Adjustment, Township Of Lakewood (Defendant Respondents) And [...]  (Defendants/Appellant)
[brief] On or about February 15, 2019, [...], mother of the Plaintiff, and, upon information and belief, with the assistance of Plaintiff [...], filed an application with [...] seeking a reserved handicap parking space at 393 Park Avenue, [...], NJ 07070.  (See Pa006-Pa015).  On or about August 1, 2019, Plaintiff was informed that the February 2019 Application was denied.  (See Pa087; see also Da011 and Da015).  Accordingly, this is the date of accrual, and thus the two (2) year Statute of Limitations began to run on any legal action regarding same.  On or about August 5, 2019, Plaintiff was provided with specific reasoning for the denial including that Plaintiff possessed a “significant driveway” in which to park a vehicle.  (See Pa019; Pa052; Pa194; Pa240; Pa242; Pa268; Pa27; Pa282; see also Da015).  The denial of [...]’s application would ultimately spark years of, in [...]’s opinion, frivolous litigation before the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (hereinafter “HUD”) and then the New Jersey Superior Court by Plaintiff culminating in this Appeal.
[brief] Walmsley v. Philadelphia, 872 F.2d 546 (3d. Cir. 1989); See also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274 (1994).  A 42 USC § 1983 claim for false arrest may be based upon an individual's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.  Under NJ law, a false arrest has been defined as "the constraint of the person without legal justification."
[brief] [DEFENDANT]: Yes.  [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  And you’re not under the influence of any drugs, narcotics or otherwise medication to impair your judgment or thinking ability?  [DEFENDANT]: No.  [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  And . . . you’ve come to the agreement with this agreement voluntarily and without – [DEFENDANT]: Yes.  [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I just wanted to make sure.  HEARING OFFICER: It’s been fully explained to you, [Defendant]?  [DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor.
[brief] Every fact set forth herein will be an indisputable fact as expressed in testimony by Plaintiff, in the plenary hearing which took place before the Honorable [...] on March 9 and March 10, 2020, which culminated in the first penalty imposed against Defendant in the Court Order dated June 30, 2020 (DA 2, page A25, Paragraph 2).  The second penalty was imposed by Honorable [...] after a motion hearing on October 13, 2023 (DA 5, paragraph 1, pages A51-A52).  1.  In the referenced Agreement the Plaintiff and Defendant agreed to equally share responsibility for the down payment of a condominium in [...], where the Plaintiff would reside.  Specifically, the down payment on the [...] home was $140,000.00 and the parties agreed to each be responsible for one-half, or $70,000.00.  (paragraph 1-DA 1, page A3)
[brief] By way of example, in *Mull v. Zeta Consumer Products*, 176 N.J. 385 (2003), the Court reversed the grant of an employer’s motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff employee presented evidence of the employer’s removal of a safety device from the equipment that caused the plaintiff’s injury, the employer’s callous and long-standing disregard of OSHA safety requirements, and the employer’s decision to ignore repeated complaints by other employees about safety concerns with the equipment that caused the injury.  *Id.* at 392.  Similarly, in *Crippen v. Cent. Jersey Concrete Pipe Co.*, 176 N.J. 397 (2003), the Court reversed the grant of the employer’s motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff employee presented evidence that the employer deliberately failed to correct OSHA violations that were identified approximately eighteen months prior to the accident and, at the same time, intentionally deceived OSHA into believing that the safety issues had been corrected.  *Id.* at 409-10.  See also Pa442a, *Soto v. ICO Polymers N. Amer.*, 2017 WL 4530602, *8 (App. Div. Oct. 11, 2017), cert denied, 232 N.J. 94 (2018) (reversing trial court’s grant of summary judgment based on defendant employer’s repeated failures to remedy accumulation of combustible dust that ultimately caused an explosion that severely injured plaintiff despite the employer’s affirmative promises to abate OSHA violations and implement safety protocols).  Here, even when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, no rational fact finder could find that any of [...]’s allegedly culpable conduct reflected knowledge of a substantial certainty of [...]’s injury and death.