ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] also cites to *Potomac Ins. Co. of Illinois ex. Rel OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Penn. Mfrs. Ass’n Ins. Co.*, 215 N.J. 409 (2013) for this proposition.  Db24-25.  However, *Potomac* demonstrates that [...] could have done what OneBeacon did in that case by litigating its own contribution claim against the other insurers either in the presently pending case or in a separate litigation.  *Potomac* does not hold such a process to be futile.  To the contrary, *Potomac* shows that it is a commonly employed practice in multiple-insurer disputes.  For example, in *EPIX Holdings Corp. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., Inc.*, 410 N.J. Super 453 (App. Div. 2009), [...]  (“[...]”), as affiliate of [...], moved to compel mandatory arbitration of its claims even though plaintiff’s other claims against other defendants were not subject to arbitration and still had to be litigated.  *Id.* at 480.  In any event, nothing made it futile for [...] to at least preserve any arbitration rights it may have had by giving timely notice in an affirmative defense at the outset, nor did anything require [...] to misleadingly sign an affirmation that it did not contemplate arbitration.  *See* Da199-205, 207.  Such actions by [...] all support the Law Division’s finding of waiver – not futility.
[brief] Providence Firefighters Local 799 v. City of Providence, 26 F. Supp.2d 350 (D.R.I. 1998) .........................................................................................................................48  Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) ...............................................................45  Raspa v. Off. of Sheriff of Gloucester, 191 N.J. 323 (2007) ....................................42  Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) .....................................22  Ridley v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 217 F. App’x 130 (3d Cir. 2007) .......................19  Rios v. Meda Pharm., Inc., 247 N.J. 1 (2021) ............................................................ 14, 42 Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555 (2010) ............................................................................... 15, 17, 20, 29, 40 Roberts v.
[directive] The goals of the policy are to enhance the integrity of the State’s law enforcement agencies, improve the delivery of police services, and assure the people of New Jersey that complaints of police misconduct are properly addressed.  The policy applies to all sworn law enforcement employees, as well as County Prosecutors and assistant prosecutors and Assistant Attorneys General and Deputy Attorneys General in the Division of Criminal Justice.  This policy can also be more broadly applied to non-law enforcement employees.  1.0.2  State and federal courts have emphasized the importance of the internal affairs function for protecting the constitutional rights and civil liberties of the State’s residents.  Case law generally requires that law enforcement agencies do three things under the internal affairs function.  First, agencies must implement an internal affairs policy that provides for a meaningful and objective investigation of complaints and other evidence of police misconduct.  Second, agencies must monitor and track the behavior of police officers for incidents of misconduct.  Third, when officers are found to have engaged in misconduct, agencies must correct the behavior.  The courts have with increasing frequency issued decisions that set minimum standards of performance for the internal affairs function.  1.0.3
[brief] See DA15-DA18 at ¶¶ 3,6,8 and 12-13.  Finally, the Parties mutually agreed: (i) that the [...] is an autonomous agency; (ii) that only the [...], and no one else, including the Parties and their attorneys, can make determinations regarding disability retirement applications; and (iii) that if any provisions of the Agreement were deemed illegal, unenforceable, or ineffective in a legal forum, such provisions would be deemed severable and all other provisions would remain valid and binding.  See DA16 at ¶¶ 7 and 18.  Applying the principles set forth in Barila, supra, the record before the Chancery Division demonstrated that the Parties entered into the Agreement freely and voluntarily, upon the advice of counsel, extensive negotiation of the terms within and the ramifications thereof.
[brief] Michel v. New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co., 2018 WL 5985985 (App. Div. Nov. 15, 2018)..............................  6 Miller v. Americollect, Inc., Case No. ESX-L-6164-21, 2022 WL 20470401 (N.J. Super. L. Aug. 11, 2022)............................................................................. passim Moukengeschaie v.  Eltman, Eltman & Cooper, P.C., 2016 WL 1274541 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016)................................. 16 N. Haledon Fire Co. No. 1 v. Borough of N. Haledon, 425 N.J. Super. 615 (App. Div. 2012).............................................. 41 N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Alloway Twp., 438 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div. 2015)............................................. 41, 47 New Jersey Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 453 N.J. Super. 272 (App. Div. 2018).........................................................8 New Jersey Div. of Child Protec. and Permanency v. K.M., 444 N.J. Super. 325 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2016)...........................................8 Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463 (2013).......................................................................................passim Nyanjom v. NPAS Solutions, LLC, 2022 WL 168222 (D. Kan. Jan. 19, 2022).....................................................22, 38 O’Neill v. Radius Global Solutions, LLC, 2022 WL 4483801 (D.N.J. September 27, 2022)............................................46 Perez v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., 186 N.J. 188 (2006).........................................................................................24 Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 2009)..............................................................................23 Presbyterian Home at Pennington, Inc. v. Borough of Pennington, 409 N.J. Super. 166 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2009).............................................17 Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S. 440 (1989).........................................................................................24, 25 Quaglia v. NS193, LLC, 2021 WL 7179621 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2021).....................................................22, 37, 38 Rabinowitz v. Alltran Financial, LP, Case No. HUD-L-3582-22 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Aug. 24, 2023).................................10, 12 Rezem Family Assoc., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 208 N.J. 366 (2011)...............7
[brief] (Pa671).  On November 24, 2015, [...] prohibited [...] from speaking at the March 2016 American Waterworks Annual Conference in his field of expertise and she initiated disciplinary action against Alan [...] for not receiving her approval prior to submitting an abstract to the [...] on Safe Drinking Water.  (Pa671-Pa673).  The Notice of Disciplinary Action dated December 18, 2015 charged Alan [...] with “Insubordination” and “Conduct unbecoming a public employee” alleging that [...] “again failed to follow the protocol for requesting to speak at outside events” when he submitted an abstract to the [...] and fill out the Speaker Request Form.  (Pa642).  A jury could find that the December 18, 2015 disciplinary action was retaliatory because it was initiated by [...] 6 days after [...] complained of discrimination (Pa456) and retaliation and disciplining a [...] employee for submitting an abstract – a proposal – for consideration was unprecedented and no rule of the [...] required permission of the employer to submit an abstract.
[brief] Furthermore, the argument that Plaintiff needed to examine the lease in order to file suit appears to be nothing but a post-hoc rationalization.  Not only did Plaintiff ultimately assert a common-law claim—for which the lease was not relevant—but also because the complaint’s Count III, which asserts the claim against the fictitious-party defendants, without mentioning the lease at \(^9\)  The fact that [...] did not apply, as asserted in the previous section of the brief, is of no moment, because the question is whether the claim could be asserted, and not whether it was ultimately meritorious.  all.  Thus, Plaintiff was fully capable of timely asserting the cause of action against [...] without resorting to the fictitious-party pleading rules, but simply failed to do so.
[brief] Appellants’ Arguments for Reversal are Irrelevant and Inapposite  This appeal seeks only the reversal of the trial court’s Order denying Appellants’ Motion for Default Judgment; it does not seek reversal of the Dismissal Order.  Default judgment cannot be entered against a non-party.  Appellants’ argument on appeal is that [...] “will have to return to the case” if the dismissals of other defendants are reversed and remanded, because [...] ultimately purchased the solar assets that are the subject of the Amended Complaint.  [Pb62]  This statement is not relevant to the instant appeal and provides no basis upon which this Court can reverse the trial court’s denial of the Motion.  The appeal should be rejected and the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ Motion for Default Judgment affirmed.
[brief] Therefore, the applicant would not be barred as legally ineligible to enter Recovery Court.  This Court’s designation of factor a(5) as a nondiscretionary, objective eligibility factor, as argued above in the State’s Point II Section B, avers to both parties’ benefit and detriment as to whether a firearm was actually possessed.  Finally, the lower court cited “practical considerations” to support its interpretation of factor a(5).  (Sa83).
[brief] As stated in Burns v. Belafsky, “when a statute is susceptible of an interpretation true to its purpose and that permits plaintiffs to proceed with meritorious claims, we will not add requirements not explicitly set forth that deny plaintiffs their day in court."  Burns, 166 N.J. 466, 470 (2001).  In this case, the Trial Court Judge added a requirement to N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28, which was contrary to the statute’s purpose, was not included in the plain language of the statute and ultimately, resulted in Plaintiff being denied her day in court on the merits of her case.
[brief] ”  *State in Interest of D.J.C.*, 257 N.J. Super. 118, 121 (App. Div. 1992).  Indeed, choosing to dismiss an indictment “does not correct the error; it serves only to deprive the State of an opportunity to try the issues raised by the indictment.  Dismissal does more than redress the wrong done to defendant; it effectively grants him immunity from prosecution. ”  *State v. Porro*, 175 N.J. Super. 49, 52 (App. Div. 1980).  And because the dismissal of an indictment is such an extreme remedy, it is the defendant who bears the burden of establishing grounds exist to justify it.
[brief] Moreover, “the defendant’s reason for changing its behavior is often probative of whether it is likely to change its behavior again. ”  Hartnett v. Pa. State Educ. Ass’n, 963 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2020).  That Appellants rescinded the Original Policy “as a response to the litigation,” is thus significant, Cnty. of Butler v. Gov. of Pa., 8 F.4th 226, 230 (3d Cir. 2021), as it underscores the risk that they would re-impose the policy when the lawsuit ends.  Appellants make no effort to meet their heavy burden under the voluntary-cessation doctrine, and indeed they cannot.  Appellants rescinded the Original Policy only after the State filed an administrative action and suit in the Superior Court, and obtained temporary restraints.  (Da124).  Appellants do not deny that this decision happened in the context of litigation.  They also do not foreswear re-imposing the Original Policy.  Nor do they point to changed circumstances that make re-imposition unlikely.  Just the opposite: Appellants continue to say in briefing that parental rights require notifications.  (Db19-29).  As such, even if the Original Policy is no longer in effect, this narrow injunction was necessary to prevent the reinstatement of a policy that so flagrantly violated the LAD.
[brief] 11  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Judgment of Conviction ........................................................................ Da 15-17  Order Denying Defense Motions ..............................................................  Da 23 Memorandum Denying Motions ...............................................................  Da 24-31  INDEX TO APPENDIX  Complaint [...] .................................................................  Da 1-7  Indictment ........................................................................................................Da  8  Plea Papers ........................................................................................................  Da 9-14  Judgment of Conviction ..................................................................................  Da 15-17  Notice of Appeal ...............................................................................................  Da 18-22  Order Denying Defense Motions .....................................................................Da 23  Memorandum Denying Motions .......................................................................  Da 24-31  Koons v. New Jersey, [...] ([...], J. May 15, 2023)  ................................ Da 32-46  INDEX TO TRANSCRIPTS  Transcript of Motion, May 30, 2023 .................................................................T1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Similarly, in *Colon v. World Mission Soc’y*, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1420* (App. Div., August 17, 2023), Da315-318, no concurrent conflict was found in a counsel’s dual representation of both a plaintiff and a third-party defendant.  In that matter, the Plaintiff, [...], was a member of the [...] from 2009 to 2011.  *Id.* at *1*.  [...] was a member of the Church from 2005 to 2012.  Ibid.  During his time as a member, Gonzalez created several websites in order to attract critical posts about the Church.  Id. at *1-2.  His goal was to spy on former members of the Church who were now critical of the Church and its actions.  Id. at *2.  The websites that Gonzalez created required users to supply an email address and password to post content.  Ibid.  The Church then maintained a list of the passwords that Gonzalez had collected from each of its critics.  Ibid.  At some point, Gonzalez determined that Colon was posting critical content about the Church.  Ibid.  He then used Colon’s credentials to gain access to her accounts on other websites.  Ibid.  Gonzalez admitted to his role in hacking Colon’s accounts, but maintained that he did so at the express direction of the Church.  Ibid.  Colon filed suit against the Church and some of its individual members alleging that they engaged in wrongful conduct that caused her harm.  Ibid.  Colon did not name Gonzalez as a defendant in her action against the Church, and took the position that she would not seek to prove at trial that Gonzalez caused her any damage.  Id. at *2-3.  The Church filed a third-party claim against Gonzalez, denying any knowledge of or involvement in Gonzalez’s hacking schemes, and arguing that if the Church is found liable, it had a claim against Gonzalez for contribution and indemnification.  Id. at *3.  Gonzalez retained the same counsel as Colon to represent him against the Church’s third-party claims.  The Church subsequently moved to disqualify counsel for Colon and Gonzalez, arguing that his representation of both amounted to a conflict of interest.  *Ibid.*  That motion was denied by the trial court.  *Ibid.*  The Church then appealed that decision on the grounds that counsel’s representation of Colon and Gonzalez violated RPC 1.7 because it constituted a concurrent conflict of interest.
[brief] ”  Id. at 159-60; see Johnston Dev. Grp., Inc. v. Carpenters Local Union No. 1578, 130 F.R.D. 348, 352 (D.N.J. 1990) (“The deposition of the attorney may be ‘both necessary and appropriate’ where the attorney may be a fact witness, such as an ‘actor or viewer,’ rather than one who ‘was not a party to any of the underlying transactions giving rise to the action. ’” (citations omitted)).  There, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s order compelling the deposition of the plaintiff’s attorney because the defendants failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff’s attorney “had first-hand knowledge, or direct involvement in the events giving rise to the action, or any other facts that might have established that the deposition was essential to prevent injustice.
[directive] It shall be the responsibility of the law enforcement agency summoned pursuant to subsection 3 of this section to promptly dispatch an officer to take custody and secure the controlled dangerous substance or drug paraphernalia.  School officials should, in accordance with the policies and procedures set forth in the guidelines issued by the Department of Education, provide to the responding law enforcement officer information necessary to establish the chain of custody and the circumstances of the seizure, including the identity of any person from whom the substance or item was obtained, except that the summoned law enforcement officer shall not request information concerning the identity of the person from whom the controlled dangerous substance or item was obtained, where the substance or item was turned over to a substance abuse counsellor in the course of or as a result of diagnosis or treatment, or where: 1) the person voluntarily and on his or her own initiative turned over the substance to a school employee and 2) the person was not involved in distribution activities, and 3) the student agrees to participate in an appropriate treatment program.  Nothing in this Section shall be construed in any way to authorize or require a referral or transmittal of any information or records in the possession of a substance abuse counseling or treatment program, and such information or records shall be strictly safeguarded in accordance with applicable federal regulations and state policies.
[brief] However, a trial court’s findings may be overturned when they are “so clearly mistaken ‘that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction. ’”  *Elders*, 192 N.J. at 244 (quoting *State v. Johnson*, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)).  If an officer’s testimony contains “incredible and improbable elements,” it should not be credited.  See *State v. Taylor*, 38 N.J. Super. 6, 23-24 (App. Div. 1955).  The *Taylor* Court emphasized that “[t]estimony to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself. ”  It must be such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable in the circumstances. ””  Id. at 24 (quoting In re Perrone’s Estate, 5 N.J. 514, 522 (1950)).  [...]’s testimony about what happened was not credible, and the trial court erred in crediting [...] over [...].
[brief] The court failed to properly apply Miller factor 3 (circumstances of offense and peer pressure) by incorrectly focusing on the heinousness of the offense, and by failing to consider the expert psychological testimony indicating Defendant was uniquely susceptible to peer pressure.  Miller factor 3 requires courts to consider “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. ”  567 U.S. at 477.  When doing so, courts must focus on the facts as they relate to maturity.  Comer, 249 N.J. at 370 (holding that the Miller factors are “designed to consider the mitigating qualities of youth”) (citation omitted).  Here, teenage [...] “found himself influenced and coerced by others, including the two individuals who were involved in the slaying of the [...][.]” (2T10-19 to 25; 44-15 to 17)  As a teenager, [...] would do as he was told, or, if left unprompted, would act in a manner that he believed would gain the respect of his peers.  (2T50-14 to 20)  Accordingly, [...]’s actions were always impacted by some form of external peer pressure, explicit or otherwise.  In light of [...]’s nature, the court should have attributed substantial mitigation to Miller factor 3, regardless of how the incident unraveled.  The court thus erred by declining to apply any mitigating weight to factor 3 based on its finding – with no basis in the record – that [...] was “running the show”; that the boys were equal participants; and that the incident was heinous.
[brief] They didn’t, and to further complicate matters, the Court found based on witness testimony at trial that [...] no longer had the ability to recall details from nine years ago (6T10:21-11:1).  Defendants admit that they did initially argue that the $50,000.00 transfer was a gift based on the Gift Letter signed by both [...] and [...] and entered into evidence (Pa213).  However, Defendants pointed out in their closing argument that when the facts elicited at trial were married to the law on gifts, the only legal conclusion that could be drawn was that the transfer was not a gift (5T63:12-19).
[brief] Standing or lack thereof is treated as a “failure to state a claim defense. ”  PRESSLER & VERNIERO, Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment 4.1.1 to R. 4:6-2, p. 1233-1234 (GANN 2024 Ed.); see also, In re Ass’n of Trial Lawyers of Am., 228 N.J. Super. 180, 182 (App. Div.), certif. denied 113 N.J. 660 (1988).  R. 4:6-3 provides that affirmative defenses that allege a failure to state a claim “shall be heard and determined before trial. ”  Even after filing its Answer, [...] failed to submit its legal issues for the appeal, despite the requirement in R. 4:69-4 to do so:  “At least five days in advance of the conference, each party shall submit to the managing judge a statement of factual and legal issues and an exhibit list. ”  Id.  The purpose of the conference is, among other things, “to determine the factual and legal disputes” but [...] failed to identify how or why it believed its boilerplate defense had merit because it never produced the required pretrial submission.  The Court should find that this failure to file the statement of factual and legal contentions constitutes a waiver and/or abandonment of [...]’ standing defense.
[brief] ”) (citation omitted); Wojciechowski v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65093, at *11 (D.N.J. May 8, 2012) (“an exception to an exclusion, like the Resulting Loss Exception, cannot be read so broadly that the exception swallows the exclusion”).  Second, the trial court correctly held that [...]’s tortured reading causes the exception to create coverage that does not exist under the insuring grant, which is also improper.  See Unitrin Direct Ins. Co. v. Esposito, 751 Fed. Appx. 213, 215 (3d Cir. 2018) (“exceptions to policy exclusions cannot create or expand insurance coverage. ”)  The insuring agreement provides that [...] will pay “damages the insured becomes legally obligated to pay by reason of liability imposed by law…because of bodily injury, property damage…covered by this insurance but only if the injury, damage or offense...takes place during the policy period and is caused by an occurrence....”