ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ” (3T35:20-24).  •  Petitioner’s prior MRI reports show a disc herniation at C5-C6 and disc bulge at C6-C7, the same discs that were operated on in Petitioner’s 2015 surgery.  (3T38:15-17).  (4)  [...] testified that Petitioner was asymptomatic from 2004 through 2015.  (2T22:20-22).  The ALJ cited to this testimony, stating “[...] specifically found that petitioner was asymptomatic from his return to work after the 2004 incident through the date of the incident on October 17, 2015. ” (Pa91).  However, [...]’s testimony is contradicted by Petitioner’s own medical records, which demonstrate Petitioner continued to seek treatment for his neck pain from orthopedist [...] in 2006, who diagnosed Petitioner with “aggravation of pre-existing cervical degenerative arthritis and cervical disc herniation of C6-C7 with increase in the disc herniation C6-C7” at that time.
[brief] Upon the adoption of a redevelopment plan . . . , the municipality or redevelopment entity . . . may proceed with the clearance, replanning, development and redevelopment of the area designated in that plan.  In order to carry out and effectuate the purposes of this act and the terms of the redevelopment plan, the municipality or designated redevelopment entity may:  * * *  f.  Arrange or contract with public agencies or redevelopers for the planning, replanning, construction, or undertaking of any project or redevelopment work, or any part thereof; negotiate and collect revenue from a redeveloper to defray the costs of the redevelopment entity, including where applicable the costs incurred in conjunction with bonds, notes or other obligations issued by the redevelopment entity, and to secure payment of such revenue; as part of any such arrangement or contract, provide for extension of credit, or making of loans, to redevelopers to finance any project or redevelopment work for the furnishing of property or services in connection with the redevelopment area.
[brief] State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 654 (1993); State v. Kelly, 61 N.J. 283, 294 (1972); State v. Cook, 179 N.J. 533, 562 (2004).  A valid waiver requires a knowing, voluntary and intelligent decision not to exercise the right to remain silent or to an attorney.  State v. Burris, 145 N.J. 509, 534 (1996); State v. Burno-Taylor, 400 N.J. Super. 581, 588 (App. Div. 2008); State in the Interest of A.S., 203 N.J. 131, 146 (2010).  In determining whether a defendant made a valid waiver and provided a voluntary statement, a “court must look at the totality of the circumstances, including both the characteristics of the defendant and the nature of the interrogation. ”  State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 613-14 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858 (2001); Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 402 (citing State v. Dispoto, 189 N.J. 108 (2007); State v. O’Neil, 193 N.J. 148 (2007)); A.S., 203 N.J. at 146.  Factors to be considered include: “‘the suspect’s age, education and intelligence, advice as to constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature and whether physical punishment or mental exhaustion was involved,’ ‘as well as the suspect’s previous encounters with the law. ’”  A.S., 203 N.J. at 146 (quoting State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000); State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 402 (1978)); Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 402; State v. Carpenter, 268 N.J. Super. 378, 385 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 467 (1994); (defendant’s I.Q. “merely a factor in the totality of the circumstances to be considered” and, therefore, facts establishing that defendant was illiterate, had an I.Q. of 71, and was attending special education classes when he left school at 18 were “not dispositive of whether he understood the meaning of the Miranda warnings”); State v. Ordog, 45 N.J. 347, 360 (1965).  “[I]n order for a juvenile’s confession to be admissible into evidence it must satisfy the same standard that applies to adult confessions: that is, it must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
[directive] For the purposes of this document, “law enforcement executive” refers to a law enforcement agency’s highest ranking 1 sworn law enforcement officer, typically the chief of police.  In situations where the highest ranking officer is recused from a matter, then “law enforcement executive” refers to the next highest-ranking officer without a conflict.  “Law enforcement executive” also refers to the Attorney General and relevant County Prosecutor in cases of supersession, whether that supersession is in whole or in part.  Even without supersession, the law enforcement executive remains subject to the direction of the Attorney General and relevant County Prosecutor.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 3
[brief] [Id. at 453.]  [...] v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021), is the most recent in the line of United States Supreme Court cases addressing lengthy sentences imposed on juvenile offenders.  There, [...] was convicted of murder and, after a thorough re-sentencing hearing in which the judge considered possible sentences other than life without parole, the judge nonetheless imposed that sentence after thorough consideration of factors relevant to [...]’s culpability and the Miller considerations.
[brief] Last v. Audubon Park Associates...................... 36,37 227 N.J. Super 602 (App Div 1988)  I. E’s L.L.C. v. Simmons 392 N.J. Super 521.... 38,39 (Law. Div. 2006)  M&D Associates. V. Mandara.......................... 19 366 N.J.Super 341, 350 (App. Div. 2004)  Mancini v. Eds ex rel N.J. Auto Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n..................................................... 29  132 N. J. 330, 334 (1993)  Mercer County Park Commission v. DiTullio........... 36 139 N. J Super 36 (App Div. 1976), cert den. 70 N.J. 276 (1976)
[brief] The crux of the Borough's argument on this issue is that any claims relating to the Public Trust Doctrine are premature because they are "...essentially seeking to challenge a future conceptual development of property within the Redevelopment Area that might never actually happen."  (Db11)  The Borough argues that the Trial Court granted the Borough's Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing the claims based on the Public Trust Doctrine because they were not "ripe" and can only be raised once a developer actually files an application for a particular development project in the Redevelopment Area.
[brief] In recommending that services rendered in opposing the [...]’ “motion to amend their counterclaims” (Db41) be included in the fee award, the Special Master explained that:  Had the counterclaim been successful, it could have greatly reduced any damages awarded to [...] at best and mean that [...]’s affirmative claims [including his RICO claims] would be dismissed at worst.  Therefore, any opposition to those allegations -- either through blocking the amendment from being filed or later substantively disproving the allegations -- would further the ultimate result achieved.  (39076a)  •
[brief] ”  New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).  The trial court disregarded this bedrock constitutional right by refusing to dismiss facially deficient defamation and false light claims against Defendant-Appellant the [...] (“[...]”), its affiliate [...] (“[...]”), and [...]’s Executive Director [...] (“[...]”) (together the “[...]”).  The trial court’s erroneous ruling, moreover, defied binding authority, including this Court’s recent decision in Neuwirth v. State, 476 N.J. Super. 377, 392-93 (App. Div. 2023).  The trial court’s decision should be reversed.
[brief] ” (1T71:21-72:1).  Looking at the transcript, the State argued that the officer who retrieved the video: works for the City of Newark, at his regular assignment he responds to scenes to recover surveillance videos, on the date he responded to that, on that same date, a short time after the incident was processed and closed off, he received consent from the owner of the store.  He then downloaded that video.  He was told to download a specific time, time frame.  He reviewed it at the time he was downloading it, him and I have reviewed it in preparation for his trial today, and his testimony.
[brief] [N.J.S.A. 43:16A-11.2 (emphasis added). ]  In the case of In re Hess, 422 N.J. Super. 27 (App. Div. 2022), this Honorable Court unequivocally held that forfeiture of deferred retirement benefits is conditioned on an involuntary removal due to misconduct related to the employment.  Therefore, the highlighted portion of the statute above is invoked whenever a [...] member has been removed for cause on charges of misconduct that relate to his or her official duties.
[brief] The case arose out of the employer’s demand for reimbursement of defense costs for a lawsuit brought by its employee alleging, inter alia, compensation for intentional wrongs alleged against the employer as responsible for the employee’s workplace injuries.  The insurer had already paid out over $1,000,000 in workers compensation benefits to the employee.  Interestingly, contrary to [...]’s position, the court did not consider that payout to be “dispositive” or to have any impact on the insurer’s obligation under the employer liability insurance policy.  Slip. op. at 3 (Pa476).  Ultimately, the court held the defense costs were not payable under the employer’s liability insurance and were payable under the workers compensation insurance.
[brief] State: Was there an anonymous phone call that was made to investigators?  [...]: Yes.  On the evening of September 18 we received an anonymous phone call through the tip line of an individual that had information in regards to the homicide of [...].  State: Based on the information that came through that anonymous call or anonymous tip, did you take any action?  [...]: Yes, I did.  State: And what did you - - or who did you come into contact with based upon that tip call?  [...]: I came into contact with an individual by the name of [...].  [11T199-21 to 200-5].  On cross-examination, Sergeant [...] was immediately questioned about the identity of the anonymous caller.  Sergeant [...] testified that the anonymous caller was not [...], but a friend of hers.
[brief] (Pa033).  Plaintiff conceded that the video did not capture the actual impact of her being struck by [...]’ U-boat.  (Pa033).  Plaintiff did not even know if the video she saw captured the aisle where the accident happened.  (Pa033).  Plaintiff admitted that neither she nor the [...] employee she was talking to were even seen on the video.  (Pa033-Pa034).  On the date of loss, Plaintiff executed a Medical Attention Waiver which provides:
[brief] [[...]] is bound by the terms of the account agreement and the arbitration clause it contains.  (Id.)  The trial court also correctly held that “[a] plenary hearing [wa]s unnecessary” because, “[t]aking [[...]]’s submissions as true proves nothing other than the bank took no actions to create a heightened duty. ”  (PA009 n.1.)  On appeal, [...] concedes that “there is no presumed fiduciary relationship between a Bank and its customers .  . . .”  (Appellant Br., 44.)  Cf. Kensey, 306 N.J. Super. at 552 (holding that “there is no presumed fiduciary relationship between a bank and its customer”).
[brief] (Pa0339 – Pa0353).  The first agreement is dated October 19, 2017, and it was between Plaintiff and [...].  (Pa0339 – Pa349).  This agreement (hereinafter [...] Assignment) was captioned a “Pledge of Security” which acknowledged a debt by Plaintiff to [...] of $289,470.  (Id.).  The Assignment indicated that it was made pursuant to the terms of a Settlement Agreement which was incorporated by reference.  (Id.).  Specifically, the Assignment states; “WHEREAS, Pledgor is indebted to Lender in the sum of $289,470(the “Loan”), as evidenced by a certain Settlement Agreement of even date herewith, which is incorporated herein by reference (‘Settlement Agreement’); The [...] Assignment defined the “Collateral” as follows:  a.  The Term “Collateral” means 1.  [...].  All of Pledge’s rights, title and interest, in and to all money, directly or indirectly, recovered (ie settlement, collections on judgments, et.), net of Pledgor’s attorneys fees and litigation costs incurred for that action (“net Settlement”), in the civil action filed or about to be filed in the New Jersey Superior Court e3ntitled [...] et als v. [...], Esq. Et als., Dkt NO. [...], upon the4 terms and conditions set forth herein (The “Pledged Interest”); upon the receipt of the Net Settlement by Borrower’s Law Firm (defined below), so much of the Net Settlement necessary to pay-off the satisfy the Loan shall be forthwith paid to the Lender by the Law Firm;).  [Id.]  The [...] Assignment then ‘transfers’ the Plaintiff’s ‘right, title and interest” in the Collateral (ie. the [...] Legal Malpractice Lawsuit) to [...] in full under the following provision, 2.  Collateral Pledge:  PLEDGOR hereby assigns, transfers and pledges to Lender and grants to Lender a continuing security interest in and lien on all of the Pledgor’s right, title and interest in and to the Collateral to secure the prompt payment, satisfaction, and discharge of the Liabilities.  Nothing in this instrument shall be construed as affecting the Security Agreement; the failure of the Collateral to satisfy the Security Agreement shall not affect the Security Agreement.  [Id.]  The [...] Assignment also permits [...] to sell the “Collateral” (i.e., “the [...] Legal Malpractice Lawsuit”) in the event that Plaintiff fails to make any payments to [...] when ‘due’.  (Id.).  The agreement states, 4.  Collateral & Default.  If PLEDGER fails to make any payment to Lender in reduction of the Liabilities when due, Lender may seize, sell or otherwise dispose of any or all of the Collateral at any time and from time to time at public or private sale, upon issuance of prior written notice to PELEDGOR, which, due to the nature of the Collateral and to the possibility of changes in value of the Collateral, PLEDGOR hereby acknowledge and agrees said notice to be sufficient, commercial reasonable, and proper, with or without advertisement of the sale, and may apply the proceeds of any such sale to the expenses of such sale, and or the liabilities, in such order as Lender shall determine in his sole and absolute discretion.  [Id.]
[brief] *Fernandes v. DAR Dev. Corp., Inc.*, 222 N.J. 390, 403-04 (2015).  That burden rests squarely on the plaintiff.  *Id.* at 404.  It is well-settled that the mere happenstance of an accident and resulting injuries do not simultaneously evoke a presumption of negligence.  *Khan v. Singh*, 200 N.J. 82, 91 (2009); *Snell v. Coast Cities Coaches*, 15 N.J. Super. 595, 598 (App. Div. 1951).  A defendant is not presumed negligent unless proven otherwise.  See *McKinney v. Pub. Serv. Interstate Transp. Co.*, 4 N.J. 229, 241 (1950) (“[N]egligence is a fact which must be shown” and will not be presumed. ); *Long v. Landy*, 35 N.J. 44, 54 (1961) (observing that negligence cannot be premised upon “a foundation of pure conjecture, speculation, surmise or guess”).  Common carriers, like [...] and its bus operators, have a heightened duty of care to “exercise the utmost caution to protect their passengers as would a very careful and prudent person under similar circumstances. ”  *Maison v. N.J. Transit Corp.*, 245 N.J. 270, 275 (2021); see also *Miller v. Pub. Serv. Coordinated Transp.*, 7 N.J. 185, 187 (1951) (“[A] common carrier of passengers is under a duty to exercise a high degree of care in transportation of its passengers.
[brief] 15  I.  POINT I –  There is sufficient evidence in the record to deny summary judgment on Plaintiff’s CEPA Claim ......................... 15 (Pa708-Pa728)  II.  POINT II –  The motion Court erred by granting summary judgment because it did not grant Plaintiff all reasonable factual inferences from the record evidence ...........  29 (Pa708-Pa728)  CONCLUSION .......................................................
[brief] Contrary to Plaintiffs’ arguments, the hearing notice complied with the requirements of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11, as the notice provided: (1) the date, time and place of the hearing; (2) nature of the matters considered; (3) identification of the property by street address or lot and block number; and (4) location and times at which any maps and documents concerning the application.  (Da33 to Da34)\(^3\).  Plaintiffs’ objection --- \(^3\)  As they did before the trial court, Plaintiffs provided an incomplete copy of the published hearing notice in their Appendix, omitting the second page.  The was overruled, and the hearing proceeded to the merits of the application.  (1T9-3 to 1T10-7).  At the hearing, [...] testified that the purpose of the garage is to park vehicles and provide storage for household and personal items since the residence is small and has no basement.
[brief] (AA0006-7)  As set forth above, each of these minor incidents pre-dated her promotion to Sergeant and had been properly removed from her personnel file years before her consideration for promotion to Lieutenant, as Appellant demonstrated in her submission to the Respondent Commission.  (AA0053-54)  Significantly, the Respondent Commission placed significant emphasis upon the September 6, 2022 alleged incident, which it clearly failed to properly or accurately address in its June 7, 2023 FAA.
[brief] (37T 77:7 to 78:23).  Generally, matters of pre-judgment interest are subject to the trial court’s discretion.  Lautek Corp. v. Image Bus. Sys. Corp., 276 N.J. Super. 531, 551 (App. Div. 1994).  Here, the trial court limited Plaintiffs’ pre-judgment interest demand based on R. 4:42-11(b), as it found liability based on the tort theory of conversion in addition to the contract-based claims.  (37T 77:9 to 78:23).  The Rule’s limitation makes sense in the context of unliquidated damage claims in tort actions.  A defendant hauled into court by an injured plaintiff has no idea what his exposure might be until the jury renders a verdict, so the limitation furthers an important fairness interest for defendants in that respect.  However, this is not a case in which Plaintiffs asserted an unliquidated damage claim.  The trial court tied the losses that Plaintiffs suffered here to specific dates when the defendants diverted specific amounts from [...] and [...].  Moreover, the trial court found that the defendants’ misappropriated these funds without the Plaintiffs’ knowledge.  In similar circumstances, “where the claims are for a liquidated sum, prejudgment interest is regarded as compensatory. ”  *Lautek*, 276 N.J. Super. at 551.  The purpose of interest in such a case is to “cover the value of the sum awarded for the prejudgment period during which the defendant had the benefit of the monies to which the plaintiff is found to have been earlier entitled. ”  *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co.*, 65 N.J. 474, 506 (1974).  This principle holds even when defendants in good faith contest the validity of claims because they are able to use and enjoy the funds, earning “interest, dividends, and other benefits . . . whereas the plaintiff was deprived of any such enjoyment. ”  *Id.*  In this case, the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ the full amount of prejudgment interest for each of the defendants’ misappropriations because it believed that would be “piling on.
[brief] AC Ocean Walk, LLC v. Blue Ocean Water, LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 515, 523 (App. Div. 2024) citing Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 389 (App. Div. 1996).  “An abuse of discretion arises when a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”  Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (*quoting* Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).  Plaintiff does not establish, let alone argue, how the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration.  Even if this Court were to indulgently read Plaintiff’s criticisms under the standard of review of a summary judgment motion, Plaintiff has not established any basis for reversal of summary judgment.  Indeed, even under a *de novo* standard of review, Plaintiff does not point to any material facts that were in dispute or a misapplication of law.  While he asserts that the trial court misapplied the law as to a governing a public body’s obligation to consider public comment and failed to give “substantial deference” to a Local Finance Notice providing guidance on the conduct of meetings during the COVID-19 pandemic, Plaintiff does not and cannot establish that the trial court ignored any governing law.  Rather, the trial court recognized the Plaintiff’s right to be heard on agenda items and the Bond Ordinance prior to adoption, noting that there was no dispute that Plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to make public comments on the Bond Ordinance at the meeting where it was introduced and at the second meeting before it was considered for adoption and Plaintiff admitted as much.  (*See* Pa164 and Pa 215 at ¶¶3, 4-6, 13-21)  As noted in Point I, *supra*, Plaintiff can point to no law that mandates that the public be heard prior to action by a public body except as to the adoption of an Ordinance, as was done in this case.  The trial court did not misapply the governing law and properly ruled that there was no violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights and no basis to void the Bond Ordinance.
[directive] 7.4  Special Restrictions on Recording in Courtrooms.  An officer shall not activate a BWC while in a courtroom during court proceedings, unless the officer is responding to a call for service or is authorized to use constructive force or authority.  7.5  De-Activation/Removal of BWC From Alcohol Breath Testing Area.  In order to eliminate any argument that radio frequency interference from a BWC affected an electronic alcohol breath test, BWCs shall be deactivated, turned off and removed from the area of the breath test instrument before an electronic breath test is conducted.  Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude the use of a BWC to record the behavior of a person arrested for driving while intoxicated other than while the person is in the breath-testing area while the electronic breath testing device is being operated.
[brief] As a result, [...] is entirely unable to answer a host of pertinent questions, identify a single source with answers to those questions or otherwise solve the mystery of whether an attorney is “principally engaged” under a particular set of circumstances:  Q.  Well, is “principally engaged” defined in any of those areas, to your knowledge?  A.  Not to my knowledge.  Q.  Do any of those areas give any hint as to what the factors would be to determine if someone is principally engaged?  A.  They do not.  Q.  Do any of those sources give a hint whether principally engaged is measured on a daily, weekly, monthly, annual, or some other basis?  A.  No.  Q.  Do any of those sources give a hint whether principally engaged is based on a number of clients or a number of cases?  A.  No.  Q.  Do any of those sources give any hint as to whether principally engaged is based on revenue received by an attorney?  A.  No.  Q.  Do any of those sources give any hint on whether an attorney in a law firm would be looked at separate from the firm to determine whether he or she or the firm is principally engaged as a debt adjuster?  A.  No.  Q.  So as you sit here right now, [...], can you give me any single source that a member of the public could look to for a definition of “principally engaged”?  A.  I cannot, but I’m sure there, you know, might be some other collective or aggregate sources, which is why we would go and seek counsel in the same way I would recommend.  Q.  You can’t identify any such source today?  A.  As we sit here right now, no.