ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As such, exceptions from the enforcement of arbitration agreements based on a surgical treatment or a wrongful death cause of action are impermissible and contrary to public policy in favor of enforcement.  Public policy considerations in favor of enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements include benefits to both the patient and the practice of medicine.  Patients may benefit from pre-dispute arbitration agreements in a variety of ways.  Arbitration can resolve issues more expeditiously than court proceedings which take years to proceed to trial.  The financial burden on the patient is potentially reduced by expedient resolution of claims.  Arbitration is cost effective as it is typically less expensive to undertake.  Patient confidentiality is preserved which effectuates protection of patient privacy and keeps sensitive medical data out of the public record.  The benefits of claim resolution by way of arbitration agreements are significant to the practice of medicine and contribute to the betterment of quality medical care.
[directive] Term 63 54 48 54 60 48 57 54 57 54 60 63 36 42 45  Enhanced Extended 42 42 48 51 48 51 48 54 48 54 57 30 36 39 57 V 30 33 24 36 36 42 45 42 45 42 48 42 48 51 51  Term 48 42 48 48 42 51 54 57 48 54 57 51 36 39 30
[brief] **The Subject Matter Jurisdiction of a Court Can be Disputed at Anytime**  Arbaugh v. Y H Corp. 546 U.S. 500 (2006) · 126 S. Ct. 1235  Decided Feb 22, 2006:  “*The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1), may be raised at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment, Rule 12(h)(3). *”  In the Foreclosure Complaint of 5/12/16 against my house (141a) [...] did not prove that the Trial Court had subject matter jurisdiction over that complaint.
[brief] Facts  Demonstrating the Board’s Arbitrary and Capricious Action in Reducing [...]’s Management Fee  The Board arbitrarily reduced [...]’s management fee from $150 to $100 per month.  The uncontroverted testimony in the record establishes that management fee for units of this size range from $150-$200 per month.  7T:29:14-20.  [...] paid $150 per month.  5T:27:7.  For the Board to reduce the fee to $100 without any basis in the record to do so is arbitrary and capricious.
[brief] [...], Esq.  (N.J. Bar No. 019101980)  [...], Esq. (N.J. Bar No. 033661997)  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)  #  Table of Contents | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | INTRODUCTION | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 4 | | ARGUMENT | 10 | |
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  On March 21, 2023, Plaintiff/Appellant, [...] (“Plaintiff”), filed an Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint seeking an Order compelling an accounting from [...]  (“Defendant”), the court-appointed Administrator of the Estate (the “Estate”) of [...] (“Decedent”) and court-appointed Trustee of the Decedent’s Revocable Trust (“Rhoda’s Trust”).  [...] died a resident of Bergen County, New Jersey on July 5, 2020, leaving a Last Will and Testament dated June 4, 1999, (“Rhoda’s Will”).  Rhoda’s Will left everything to Rhoda’s Trust, executed the same day, naming herself and her sister, [...], as co-Trustees.  [...] died on October 9, 2020.  Under Rhoda’s Trust, all of her tangible property, including her jewelry, was bequeathed to her sister Joyce, and everything else was held in trust until Joyce’s death, at which time everything passed to Joyce’s children, Plaintiff and [...].  On January 27, 2021, the Court appointed Defendant Administrator of Rhoda’s Estate and Trustee of Rhoda’s Trust.  Thus, at the time the Verified Complaint seeking an accounting was filed, more than two years had passed since Defendant had been appointed as Administrator and Trustee, and over one year since Defendant had allegedly sold property of the Decedent at an auction – and Defendant had not provided the beneficiaries with an accounting, despite written demand.  Notwithstanding the timely requests set forth in the Verified Complaint, the trial court dismissed this action with prejudice on the return date of the order to show cause.
[brief] Id. at 476.  At that time, optical scan ballots were not yet in use, and so election officials could not separate out an individual ballot from the totality of the election results on a given machine.  All they saw were the vote totals for candidates whose names appeared on the ballot and any write-in votes that had been cast.  Here, the trial court was able to view the actual machine ballot that had been cast by the voter, (Pa144-149), and see that only write-in votes had been cast, not both a write-in and regular double vote.  In [...], there was no way to be sure what the voter had done while that was not an issue here.  Moreover, the ballot in [...] contained an express warning to voters of the dangers in casting a write-in vote.  It stated, “WARNING!  An improperly cast write-in vote will be deemed void. ”  Id. at 473 (emphasis in original).  While this did not explicitly tell voters that voting for a candidate twice would render the ballot void, and the Appellate Division did encourage the Legislature to require more thorough language, Id. at 478, it still provided some warning to the voter, unlike here.
[brief] This application seeking to void the statute was docketed on January 17, 2023.  (Pa27.)  On March 8, 2023, applicants filed a motion to permit creation of a transcript from the Legislature’s video of the proceedings and to compel a statement comprising the record on appeal.  (Pa40.)  This Court reserved on the decision to create the transcript offering the Legislature an opportunity to respond.  (Pa60-61.)  The Court denied the remainder of the relief sought.  (Pa60-61.)  After notice was given to the Legislature regarding the transcripts, Petitioners-Applicants moved to supplement the record with transcripts and other information regarding the enactment of L. 2021, c. 375.
[brief] [...] attempted to downplay his forgery of [...]’s signature on the December 10, 1998 deed by claiming that it “was nothing more than a misunderstanding by Richard. ”  Should [...]’s willful forgery of [...]’s signature on the deed be deemed as merely “nothing more than a misunderstanding,” or should [...] be viewed as a “wrongdoer with respect to the subject matter in suit”?
[brief] After the offer was rejected on May 9, Appellant did not retrieve the car.  Appellant also did not file to receive letters of administration for his mother’s estate at this time.  Instead, filed an improper suit for breach of contract on May 30, 2022 – around 3 weeks later.  Again, Appellant did not have a legal interest in the car and had made no attempts to obtain legal interest in the car.  Appellant emphatically argues that the auto shop never raise issue with the fact that the title was in the deceased mother’s name or ask for it to be transferred (Pb p. 8).  It should be noted that the auto shop had rejected the offer, so this issue was of no concern to them, and it is not the shop’s responsibility to advise Appellant on property ownership.
[brief] Properly noticed public hearings on the Application were held on August 4, 2021, September 1, 2021, December 1, 2021 and April 6, 2022.  (1T, 2T, 3T, 4T).  In the course of these lengthy hearings, testimony from [...]’s witnesses and expert professionals demonstrated compliance of the proposed development with applicable bulk and area standards, except those concerning, among other things, the requested bulk variances for building orientation and height.  (1T, 2T, 3T, 4T).  Further lay and expert testimony was presented by [...]’s witnesses and professionals verifying that the requested bulk variances would provide a better zoning alternative than routine application of the standards from which the bulk variances were sought, and that the requested bulk variances could be granted without substantial detriment to the public good or substantial impairment of the zone plan and zoning ordinance, thus satisfying the proofs of the Municipal Land Use Law.  (1T, 2T, 3T, 4T).  During the public hearings, the Board also received and discussed the professional review letters of its Planner and Engineer, and heard testimony and arguments from the public, individually and by way of counsel.
[brief] (4T 19:15-16; 20:10-13).  On appeal, after plenary briefing, this Court remanded for resentencing, stating, “[w]e reverse and remand for resentencing because the court did not explain whether factor 3A applied, and if so, the weight it was given.  On remand, the court shall identify whether 3A applies, and also include comparisons to the factual record of this case, and provide ‘[a]n explicit statement, explaining the overall fairness of a sentence imposed on a defendant’ pursuant to Torres, 246 N.J. [246,] 268 [(2021)].” (Da43).  [...] issued a written order and opinion on February 15, 2023, imposing sentence.
[brief] *Ibid.*  Similarly, the Courts have said that where a municipality accidentally mislead the plaintiff as to the commencement date for the 45 day appeal period because of the incorrect information that was given to the plaintiff after calling the board secretary to request the same, enlargement of the 45 day appeal period was warranted.  *Hopewell Valley Citizens' Grp.*, 204 N.J. at 584-85.
[brief] Rules of Evidence N.J.R.E. 611 ..........................................................................................62  N.J.R.E. 803 ..........................................................................................66, 67 COUNTERSTATEMENT PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On January 8, 2020, a Monmouth County Grand Jury returned Indictment Number [...], charging the defendant, [...], with the first-degree intentional murders of his mother [...], his father [...], his 18-year old sister [...], and family friend, 70-year old [...], contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and/or (2) (counts one, two, three, and four).
[brief] (Pa0093).  In response to the Request for Information, [...] engaged [...] (“[...]”) to investigate the nature and extent of the property damage at the Site.\(^{11}\) (Id).  \(^{10}\)  The trial court found that the radionuclide, metal, and PCB contamination was confined to on-site soils and sediments and had not migrated off-site.  (Pa0101-16).  Therefore, the court concluded that coverage for remediation of those contaminants was precluded by the owned property exclusion contained in the policies.  (Id).  \(^{11}\)  [...] was the [...] principal in charge of the Plainville investigation in 1986.  (Pa0259).  [...]’s investigation revealed that CVOCs found in the groundwater on the Site had migrated through the soil and created an off-site plume of groundwater contamination that extended across Route 152 into the wetland area.
[brief] SINCE APPELLANT DID NOT PRESERVE THIS ISSUE FOR APPEAL AND THE ARGUMENT IS INOPPOSITE TO THE POSITION ARGUED DURING THE TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS  Appellant chose to forgo engaging in discovery, never asserted that summary judgment was premature on discovery grounds, filed its own cross-motion for summary judgment, and although Appellant’s counsel’s represented to [...] during oral argument that this matter was ripe for summary judgment, Appellant now argues the complete opposite.
[brief] *Kerr, supra.*  Third, Plaintiff failed to call its own transactional attorney.  2T29-23 to 30-7.  In addition, Plaintiff advised the trial judge that it subpoenaed a DEP representative – but no such witness was called.  2T15-14 to 18; Pa0199.  Plaintiff posited throughout the trial that Defendants’ attorney was the drafter of the PSA.  Pb4.  Its brief also contends that the Trial Court should have heard from the drafter.  Pb4.  Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s transactional attorney drafted the contract, and the Trial Court agreed, and concluded likewise.  Pa194.  Yet Plaintiff never presented the testimony of its own transactional attorney to rebut the Defendants’ assertion.  Based on these facts and arguments, the Trial Court’s decision granting Defendants’ attorney a Protective Order should not be disturbed.
[brief] It is also interesting to note that [...] could have made this appeal go away by simply requesting a clarifying hearing from the [...] to approve the changes in its plan, as specified in Paragraph 2 of the Conditions section of the Amended Resolution:  *Revised plans, to the extent necessary, shall be submitted to the Board and the Board professionals for review and approval.*  (26a)  This would have taken all the air out of Appellant’s case.  Instead, [...] has preferred to go through the time, expense, and risk of an adverse court decision.  Something does not add up there.  If things are as clear-cut as the Respondents claim, how would going back before the [...] represent a riskier course of action than a court case?  The final question Appellant would pose to the Court is the same as the first one he asked:  *Is the law to be taken seriously, or not?*  Our hope is that the Court does see through the oppressive cloud of obfuscation hovering before it, and *does* pay attention to the “man behind the curtain” that is the Appellant’s actual basis for appeal, and that it acts to enforce the law.
[brief] These facts only emerged during the course of discovery in the 2015 Action, after the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ prior claims.  For the Trial Court to state that the present legal malpractice claims against [...], predicated solely on the discovery of [...]’s ownership of [...] and operation of [...] as a sham entity, have the “same factual predicates” as Plaintiffs’ previously dismissed legal malpractice claim which did not and could not have alleged any of these predicate facts because they were unknown, is a confounding error.  183a.  Plaintiffs’ new claims against [...] based on new, separate, and apart predicate facts, are certainly new and were never dismissed by [...] because they were not known and could not have been pled at the time of the original complaint in the 2015 Action.  As such, Plaintiffs cannot be barred from stating these new claims, and the Trial Court’s error should be reversed.  POINT III
[brief] Ja040-Ja041; Ja043-Ja044.  This is not the correct legal analysis.  Rather, Defendant was “obligated” to give “significant weight” to Mansfield’s zoning under Ferraro.  Under Ferraro, the fact that the proposed use was permitted in Mansfield suggests that the Florence portion of the Property is “uniquely suited for the proposed use. ”  Ferraro, 119 N.J. at 73.  Even if Defendant gave “significant weight” to Mansfield’s zoning ordinance, and assuming that Medici and not TSI applies, the standard for negative criteria is “substantial detriment to the public good”, and “substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance. ”  Medici, 107 N.J. at 21–22.  Putting aside the evidence in the record, how can the height neutral accessory uses be “substantially detrimental” or “substantially impair the intent and purpose” of the zone when the principal use and accessory uses are all permitted in Florence’s SM and Mansfield’s ODL zones?  After all, this was not a hypothetical (d)(6) height variance for a structure located entirely in another municipality.  As provided in Section (V), [...]’ professional planning testimony concisely and completely addresses the positive and negative criteria.  And, his testimony succeeds under both the lesser standards urged in Pont III, supra, and under Medici.  The Defendant had to invent a reason to reject his testimony to conclude that “[t]here is no credible, probative evidence before the Board that would allow it to deviate from the zoning standards set down by the governing body or which would justify the Board rethinking the determinations of the Planning Board and governing body that link the height of permitted structures with their anticipated intensity. ”  Ja044.  The only way to reconcile [...]’ testimony with this conclusion was to remove [...]’ testimony entirely.  This is exactly what the Defendant did, without any evidence in the record to support it.  Therefore, the Defendant unreasonably rejected [...]’ testimony, and the denial must be deemed arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.
[brief] ”  Aa015.  Therefore, the first requirement of N.J.A.C. 7:13-5.5(c) is satisfied.  As to the second requirement of N.J.A.C. 7:13-5.5(c), as part of its Application, [...] addressed the flood storage displacement requirements in concluding that there would be no loss of flood storage onsite.  Aa163.  [...] reviewed the flood storage calculations and concluded that the Project complies with the flood storage requirements of N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.4.  Aa015.  Appellant’s characterization that it was “unclear what type of data was used” (Ab44) is belied by the clear requirements of the FHA Rules, the application data, as outlined above, and [...]’s review of that information, as indicated in the [...] Engineering Report.  Aa012.  As such, Appellants argument is negated by the record.
[brief] [...] Statement: (ii)  [...] states that the Property is “unfit for human habitation, occupancy or use”  [...] Rebuttal  I do not know how [...] could support this statement.  He did not gain access to the interior of the Property.  An inspection of the exterior of the Property could not support this statement as the Property is reasonably well maintained and structurally intact and apparently fit for habitation.  (99a-100a)
[brief] This inference stems from early 20th century case law which identified a logical link between the use of a weapon designed to be deadly (a deadly weapon per se) and the result of the use of that weapon—that it does exactly what it was designed to do: to kill someone.  In 1909, our courts upheld the use of an instruction that read:  The intention to take life may be presumed from the use of a deadly weapon, a weapon calculated to extinguish life.  It is to be presumed that the person who uses the weapon intended to execute the work which the weapon was calculated to accomplish; that is, if a person fires at another with a pistol, and kills him, and there is nothing else shown, the presumption is that he intended to do just what the weapon was intended to do; that is, to kill.
[brief] In 2015, a grand jury indicted defendant charging him with first degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) (count one); second-degree aggravated assault; N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) (count two); third-degree aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer performing his duties resulting in bodily injuries, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b) (5)(a) (count three); three counts of first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (counts four, five, and six); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count seven); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count eight); fourth degree aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer in the performance of his duties not resulting in bodily injury, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5)(a) (count nine); fourth-degree aggravated assault by pointing a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4) (count ten); and fourth-degree possession of prohibited --- 1  References to transcripts are as follows:  1T 12/9/22 (PCR hearing)  2T 12/16/22 (PCR hearing)  3T 12/1/16 (motion)  4T 12/6/16 (trial)  5T 12/7/16 (trial)  6T 12/8/16 (trial)  7T 12/8/16 (p.m.) (trial)  8T 12/9/16 (trial)  9T 12/12/16 (trial 10T 12/13/16 (trial) ammunition, a high-capacity magazine, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j) (count eleven).
[brief] Turning back to the ballistics issue, “you said that your theory of the defense was that your client was not the man who actually shot the Glock, right?”  A  Yes.  Q  So, in other words, what you were basically saying, correct me if I’m wrong, is that you were trying to challenge the fact that, okay, this bullet that wound up in [...]’ knee was – might have been fired from the Glock but it wasn’t [...] who actually fired the weapon, is that -- A  Correct, 1T37 Q  And you remember, right, [...], that there were other weapons at -- in -- in play in the case?
[brief] See McDaniel v. Man Wai Lee, 419 N.J. Super. 482, 499 (App. Div. 2011) (“Sanctions are not to be issued lightly. ”).  The goal of the statute is to “deter baseless litigation,” but “without discouraging honest, creative advocacy,” and “keep[ing] in mind our significant policy that litigants should usually bear their own litigation costs.
[brief] (Da310).  On appeal, this Court reviews the findings of fact and conclusions of law below do novo and reviews, pursuant to Rule 4:46-2(c), whether “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.
[brief] The plain language of the No-Fault Law and the IFPA requires arbitration of all claims related to a medical provider’s eligibility to recover PIP benefits.  The “best indicator” of statutory “intent is the plain language chosen by the Legislature. ”  Matter of H.D., 241 N.J. 412, 418 (2020) (citations omitted).  Courts give the words of a statute “their ordinary meaning and significance,” and courts “will not rewrite a plainly written enactment of the Legislature [or] presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language. ”  Ibid. (citations omitted).  Courts also interpret statutory language “in context with related provisions” because “the context is [often] determinative of the meaning. ”  Id. at 418-19 (internal citation omitted) (alteration in original).
[brief] For these reasons, the Board’s final administrative determination denying [...]’s request to file his Eligibility Registration Form for amended benefits approximately one year and seven months past the statutory deadline of the Ricci Act should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: /s/ [...]  [...] (ID 276482018)  Deputy Attorney General  [...]  Dated: June 17, 2024  June 30, 2024  [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division