ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Accord *Holmes*, 598 F.3d at 124 ("New Jersey would not impose a duty on an individual tenant for [maintenance of] the common areas of a multi-tenant parking lot when the landlord has retained and exercised that responsibility."); *Barrows v. Trustees of Princeton Univ.*, 244 N.J. Super. 144, 148 (Law Div. 1990) (holding absent a contractual obligation, tenants in a multi-tenant shopping mall do not have a duty to maintain common area sidewalks and walkways); *Spano v.  [...]*, [...] (App. Div. July 22, 2016)\(^1\) (same).  In *Kandrac*, the Appellate Division decided the issue of whether a commercial tenant in a multi-tenant shopping center owed a duty to its patron to maintain a parking lot that the landlord was contractually obligated to maintain.
[brief] Plaintiffs and their expert conceded [...] arrived as soon as he could and there was no expert testimony [...] should have been present at the hospital or driven to the hospital any earlier than she did.  Absent [...]’ availability, which the facts did not support, there was zero evidence that an attending physician was available to perform the C-Section earlier than it occurred, even assuming Defendants called for it at 9:48pm.  Reading the testimony of Plaintiffs’ medical experts together, if everything worked perfectly, the delivery still would not have taken place in time to affect the ultimate outcome.  POINT II
[brief] [...] assigned the debt to [...] for collection. ”  *Valentine, supra* (Da58-Da63; Da40) the NJCFLA because it does not provide for a private right of action; (2) cannot use the Declaratory Judgments Law to circumvent the lack of a private right of action; (3) has not plead the necessary elements under the NJCFA, specifically failing to allege a misrepresentation and an ascertainable loss resulting from same; and (4) does not allege that she paid any money from which defendants would be unjustly enriched.
[brief] The court did neither.  The court made only two findings as to [...]’s report.  First, the court noted that [...] appeared to have a difficult childhood.  (5T77-13 to 19)  Second, the court explained that “I was disturbed last time and I’m disturbed again about the psychiatric report and the harming of animals, cats, I think it was, that was referenced the last time it was presented to me. ”  (5T74-7 to 12)  As an initial matter, this latter finding was factually erroneous.  In his interview with [...], [...] recalled an incident from when he was eleven years old where he had harmed a frog.  (Da47)  After making this error, the court explained “Now, I didn’t spend a lot of time” reviewing the report.  (5T74-10 to 12)  More important than the error was the court’s disregard for the relevant context of the “disturbing” incident: that [...] was 11 years old; that he suffered substantial trauma and developmental deficits; and that he has since matured out of any reckless and antisocial behavior.  The court thus failed to properly interpret and consider the report, failed to credit the expert psychological evidence as establishing [...]’s maturity, and failed to assign mitigation accordingly.
[brief] However, the Trial Court incorrectly found that these “same findings do not spill over to [...] and [...]. ” (Aa54).  In denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, the Trial Court reiterated that while [...] was guilty of minority shareholder oppression, the Trial Court “determined plaintiff failed to present any evidence that [...] was the alter ego of [...] or [...], or that their liability was equal to that of Dr. [...].
[brief] Order denying Defendants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, and remittitur, dated November 3, 2023 ........................................ Da187 Consent Order approving amount and form of Supercedeas Bond and staying judgment against Defendants, dated December 14, 2023 ................................Da210 Notice of Appearance of [...], Esq. as co-counsel for Defendants, [...], [...], and [...], dated December 4, 2023 .................................................................Da212 Defendants, [...]’s, [...]’s, and [...]’s, Notice of Appeal, dated December 5, 2023 .......................Da213 Defendants, [...]’s and [...]’s, Notice of Appeal, dated December 5, 2023 .................................................................Da265 Order dismissing appeal ......................................................................................Da270 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Defendant-Appellants, [...], [...], and [...] (collectively referred to as “[...]”), appeal from the jury’s verdict and the trial court’s denial of [...]’s motion for a new trial, remittitur and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
[brief] 8  A.  The Purchase and Sale Agreement .............................................................8  B.  The Events Leading up to the Breach of the PSA by [...] and [...] ......................................................................................................11  C.  Plaintiff Signals its Ongoing Intention to Enforce its Rights Under the PSA, Notwithstanding the Return of the Earnest Money Deposit .............14  D.  [...] and [...] Colluded to Keep Plaintiff in the Dark about the Rescheduled Closing and to Cut Plaintiff Out of the Transaction .............15  E. [...] and [...] Surreptitiously Closed the Deal with the Fee Owner ........................................................................................................17 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................... 18 POINT I - The Pre-Answer Motions To Dismiss Should Have Been Denied, in Light of the Liberal Standards Governing Motions to Dismiss and Pleadings in New Jersey (Pa357; Pa651-652; 2T; 3T; 4T) .............................18 POINT II - The PSA Gave Plaintiff A Right To Demand Specific Performance If [...] Defaulted And Closed With The Fee Owner (Pa357; Pa651-652; 2T; 3T; 4T) .................................................................20 POINT III - [...]’s Arguments Based Upon A Theory of “Election of Remedies” Are Also Meritless (Pa357; 2T; 3T) ..................................................28 POINT IV - [...] Was Not Excused From Performance By Its Alleged “Inability” To Close On The Terms It Had Agreed To(Pa357; 2T; 3T) .....31 POINT V - Plaintiff Also Stated A Claim For Breach of Contract Against [...] (Pa651-652; 4T)
[brief] ONE COUNTS ONE FOUR AND FIVE OF THE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT  WERE PROPERLY PLEAD AND SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED  A.  STANDARD FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS  Under Rule 4:6-2(e), motions to dismiss should be granted in “only the rarest [of] instances. ”  Lieberman v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 132 N.J. 76, 79 (1993).  In reviewing a complaint for dismissal under Rule 4:6-2(e), the Court’s inquiry is limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint.  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J.  739 (1989).  \(^1\)  1T-Transcripts of Motion Hearing dated March 4, 2024  All facts are to be considered most strongly in favor of the pleader.  See Spring Motors Distributors, Inc., v Ford Motor Company, 191 NJ Super 22, 29-30 (App. Div. 1983).  Thus, a complaint is entitled to liberal reading in determining its adequacy.  Van Dam Egg Co. v. Allendale Farms, Inc., 199 NJ Super 42 (App. Div. 1985).  The Court is required to “search[ ] the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim.  If this can be done, then the complaint should survive the preliminary stage with opportunity being given to amend if necessary. ”  Printing Mart Morristown, 116 NJ 739, Leaderman v Prudential Life Insurance, 385 NJ Super 324, 349 (App. Div), certif. den. 188 N.J. 353 (2006).  The Court is required to take a hospitable and generous approach in reviewing the complaint at the preliminary stage.  Id.  At this preliminary stage of the litigation the Court is not concerned with the ability of a plaintiff to prove the allegation contained in the complaint.  Id.  For purposes of analysis plaintiffs are entitled to every reasonable inference of fact.  Id; See also Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, Inc., 140 N.J. 623, 626, 660 (1995).  Plaintiff need not posit any legal theories at the pleading stage as long as her underlying facts have been pleaded.
[brief] In Count 9, Petitioner alleges that Respondents [...] and [...] violated section (e) when they appeared before the [...] during its meeting on October 6, 2021.  Petitioner’s complaint quotes minutes from the Committee meeting, but neither Mr. [...] nor [...] made any promises nor did or said anything which might have compromised the Board.  Respondent [...] asked that the Committee “stay neutral and allow the taxpayers to vote on [the referendum].”  Respondent [...] “stressed the importance of the referendum passing which he believes would be beneficial to all the students. ”  (259a-260a.)  Petitioner thus has failed to include any sufficiently credible facts to support a finding that either of these Respondents made any “personal promises” at this meeting.  A request that another government entity remain neutral and allow the issue to be presented to the voters is not a “personal promise. ”  Further, there are no facts that could support a finding that either “took private action” that might compromise the Board.  Indeed, Petitioner does not allege their appearance before the Township Committee had any effect whatever on the Board.  Moreover, the Board’s decision to place the referendum on the ballot before the voters was unanimous.  Even if it had not been unanimous, it was a final decision made by a majority of the Board.  Accordingly, any Respondent taking action publicly to support the referendum cannot be considered to have taken private action “that may compromise the board. ”  Certainly, board members frequently appear before local municipal councils to present on items that will be placed on the ballot, such as budgets and other similar measures.  Petitioner has not cited to a single case in which a board member’s appearance before a municipal body was deemed to be a violation of section (e), nor would such a conclusion be tenable given that such appearances are common and, frankly, expected.
[directive] The police patrol dog and police officer handler team will demonstrate the ability to conduct proper searches to locate a "suspect," "subject," or "evidence" within buildings, interior structures and extended, exterior areas of various terrains.  2.3.1  The police patrol dog, on command from the police officer handler, will demonstrate, both on lead and off lead at the discretion of the handler, the ability to properly search, find, and indicate or retrieve a variety of articles with a human scent (such as clothing, a gun, a wallet, or a screwdriver) within a specified area, including buildings and interior structures and extended, exterior areas of various terrains.  2.3.2  The police patrol dog, on command from the police officer handler, will demonstrate the ability, both on lead and off lead at the discretion of the handler, to properly search, find and indicate a "suspect" or "subject" within a specified area.  Such searches shall include, but are not necessarily limited to: a.  Building or dwelling search.  b.  Box search, tent search or a search involving other similar objects.  c.  Field, marsh or wooded area search.  2.3.3  The police officer handler will demonstrate the ability to recognize the alert signs given by the police patrol dog.  2.3.4  The police patrol dog, on command from the police officer handler, will demonstrate the ability to track (follow) a human scent.  21 7/2002 K-9 Training Standards and Qualification Requirements
[brief] Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Flouris, 395 N.J. Super. 156 (App. Div. 2007) .................................................................................. 25, 35 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Northfield Med. Ctr., 228 N.J. 596 (2017)  ................................................................. 8, 43, 47 Parsons ex rel. Parsons v. Mulllica Twp. Bd. of Educ., 226 N.J. 297 (2016)  ...........................................................................  16 Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 218 N.J. 202 (2014) ............................................................................. 48  Plastic Surgery Ctr., PA v. Malouf Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., 457 N.J. Super. 565 (App. Div. 2019) .................................................. 48  Praxair Tech., Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax'n, 201 N.J. 126 (2009)  ............................................................................  25  Richter v. Oakland Bd. of Educ., 246 N.J. 507 (2021)  .............................................................................. 17, 32  Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hudson E. Pain Mgmt. Osteopathic Med. & Physical Therapy, 416 N.J. Super. 418 (App. Div. 2010) .................................................. 33, 38, 42  Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hudson E. Pain Mgmt. Osteopathic, Med., 210 N.J. 597 (2012)  .............................................................................. 27, 38 State ex rel. J.S., 202 N.J. 465 (2010) ............................................................................. 32 State v. Ball, 141 N.J. 142 (1995) ............................................................................. 35 State v. Fleischman, 189 N.J. 539 (2007) ..............................................................................
[brief] **IT WAS ERROR TO DEPART FROM THE HOBOKEN ORDINANCE ON THE DEFINITION OF EQUITY**  A.  It was error to try to incorporate value into the Hoboken RCO  All parties agree, and [...] concurred, that the RCO’s definition of equity does not fit this fact pattern.  Since this matters’ inception, [...] lobbied the Board to go outside of its ordinance and use a value-based return on equity.  In all, [...] presented at least four different values for equity, the board came to another three, and [...] adopted a different value.
[brief] (Da84).  On April 7, 2021, [...] attended a public meeting of the [...] in which he once again requested that the [...] provide him with counsel regarding the GRC Complaint, pursuant to the resolution previously by the [...] stating that any current or former commissioner involved in the GRC Complaint would be represented by special counsel.  (Da84).  During that meeting, three of the commissioners acknowledged that the [...] had previously agreed to provide counsel for other Fire Commissioners involved in the GRC Complaint (including former commissioners).  (Ibid.).  On April 8, 16, and 29, 2021, [...] requested that the [...] provide him with counsel regarding the GRC Complaint.
[brief] When imposing a sentence, a court must consider the applicability of the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 to determine the length of a defendant’s prison term within the available range.  This step requires a court to “identify the aggravating and mitigating factors and balance them to arrive at a fair sentence. ”  State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 488 (2005).
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff, v. [...], Defendant-APPELLANT.  CRIMINAL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT, LAW  DIVISION – CRIMINAL PART  BURLINGTON COUNTY  MUNICIPAL COURT APPEAL #[...]  APPEAL FROM BURLINGTON TWP [...]  Honorable [...], J.S.C. Sat below
[brief] Unlike publicly traded securities (Google, Amazon, Exxon, etc.) that could be sold in a matter of minutes, or even seconds, the sale of a closely held business could take years, or never materialize at all.  Thus the marketability discount reflects the reality that interests in closely held businesses are the opposite of publicly traded stocks.  The value of any interest (51%, 49%, or any other percent) is derived by applying a marketability discount to the undiscounted value of those interests.  Both types of discounts reflect the “decreased worth of shares of stock in a closely-held business. ”  Id. at 375.  When a willing buyer voluntarily chooses to sell a minority interest in a closely-held business, these two discounts would separately be reflected in whatever price that buyer could even possibly obtain from a willing seller.  In other words, discounts reflect economic reality of a hypothetical out-of-court, arms-length transaction.  Put differently, no person owning a minority share in a closely held corporation could ever sell their interests on the open market and receive an undiscounted fair value price from a willing seller.  Thus, a valuation, with discounts, should thus be viewed as the “default” or “starting point” of valuation, with a lack of discounts being an unusual, law-created fictional price designed to punish the payor.
[brief] See State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 317 (2019) (holding that in determining whether a defendant has waived his Miranda rights, a court should consider “the time lapse between the reading of Miranda rights and the actual questioning or incriminating oral statement”); State v. Dispoto, 189 N.J. 108, 124 (2007) (holding that courts should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether pre-custody Miranda warnings could carry over to later custodial interrogation).  But to accept the State’s argument here would make a mockery of their high burden of proof and eviscerate the protections of Miranda.  If, as the State asserts, “[a] valid waiver continues until the defendant revokes it,” (Rb 22) then there would be nothing stopping the police from declining to Mirandize any defendant who has ever previously waived his Miranda rights.  That “valid waiver” would “continue until the defendant revokes it,” whether the subsequent interrogation took place two days, two weeks, or two years later.  That simply does not comport with the greater protections New Jersey provides against un-warned custodial interrogations.  This Court should reject the State’s claim.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 59:3-8 provides that “[a] public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment. ”  See id.  The statutory provision has been recognized as a partial codification of the common law absolute prosecutorial immunity.  See Aletta v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor's Off., 2024 WL 2744677, at *12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 29, 2024).  Our courts have also recognized that the statutory prosecutorial immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:3-8 is narrower than its common law counterpart, being limited by the statutory exception outlined in N.J.S.A. 59:3-14 (“Nothing in this act shall exonerate a public employee from liability if it is established that his conduct was outside the scope of his employment or constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct.
[brief] (Pa1186).  Note number 16 included within the referenced NJDOT Traffic Control Details provides as follows:  Bitumonous concrete placed during the various construction stages shall be transitioned over a minimum 20 horizontal to 1 vertical slope to meet the adjacent existing grade at the longitudinal and transverse limits of the stage construction areas unless otherwise noted on the stage construction plans.  (Pa1186).  --- 2  During the second day of his deposition, [...] was methodically taken through a detailed line of questioning that ultimately resulted in [...] acknowledging that the close-up photograph referenced herein was an accurate representation of the roadway condition at issue.  (Pa0281 at 40:9 – 44:21)  Upon questioning, [...] conceded that the produced detail does not concern the identification of pre-existing roadway defects.  (Pa0260 at 22:5-15).  [...] further conceded that the subject litigation does not concern a paving operation.
[brief] In *A.T. v. Cohen*, the Court found that there were extraordinary circumstances, and that the complaint should not have been dismissed because there was **both** a lack of a Ferreira conference and “when defendants filed a motion for summary judgment at the conclusion of the 120-day period, plaintiff included an AOM with her response to the motion[]” after plaintiff received medical records necessary to secure the affidavit or merit which were only received after defendants first filed their motion for summary judgment.  Id. at 342, 348.  The Court ruled:  “We presume from plaintiff’s swift compliance upon the filing of the motion that we are dealing with a non-frivolous matter, not the type of case that the AMS intended to weed out. ”  A.T. v. Cohen, 231 N.J. at 349.  Appellants argue that the A.T. v. Cohen holding means that by not filing any letter requesting a Ferreira conference and “remaining silent” [...] effectively gave Appellants an exemption to the Affidavit of Merit Statute.  However, the result in A.T. v. Cohen is easily distinguishable from the underlying case.  Appellants ignored that the court there found that it was a combination of multiple factors, including: the failure to hold the Ferreira conference; plaintiff’s counsel’s inexperience with the Affidavit of Merit Statute; delayed receipt of records from the defendant; followed with a reply brief that contained the requisite affidavit of merit that taken together ultimately constituted extraordinary circumstances.  Id. at 340-50.  The court in A.T. Cohen specifically stated that the “failure to conduct a Ferreira conference alone may not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances[.]”  A.T. v. Cohen, 231 N.J. at 348.  Applied here, Appellants did not file an affidavit of merit at any point, either before or after the motion to dismiss, and are relying entirely on the purported failure of [...] to request a Ferreira conference to establish extraordinary circumstances.
[brief] (22a)  At paragraph 1 of its SMF, the Defendant admitted as true that the plaintiff was a passenger on the [...] bus on February 24th, 2020.  That after boarding the bus, she walked towards the back to find a seat, and suddenly there was a “bang” and she fell to the floor of the bus near the rear door.  Id. at ¶¶ 3 and 4.  The defendant admitted as true that as a result of the stop, the plaintiff sustained injuries to her neck, back, knees and shoulder.  Ibid.  The defendant also stated at paragraph 12 of its SMF that [...], who was retired at the time, was depressed as a result of her injuries, more specifically, that she became “uninterested in exercise or socializing with other people due to depression. ”  Ibid.  In Plaintiff’s responding SMF, she denied certain of the material facts relied upon by the Defendant and elaborated on others.  (58a)  In particular, at her deposition which was attached to the opposing papers, Plaintiff described the force of the stop as “heavy” (emphasis added), and that’s why her body went backwards, striking the floor of the bus with such force sufficient to herniate a number of discs in her spine, and cause injury to her knees and shoulder as well.  (47a, 20:5-9)  In her answer to Uniform Form “A” interrogatory number 2, [...] stated the bus “abruptly stopped” causing her to sustain severe and permanent injuries.  (28a)  There was an independent eyewitness to this event -- [...] — who stated in her sworn statement made on February 26th, 2020, just two days after the incident, that the bus “suddenly, violently and abruptly made a sudden stop. ” causing Plaintiff to fall backwards with pronounced force.  (60a)(Emphasis added.)  Ibid.  Plaintiff described the stop as abrupt and sudden.  The eyewitness described the stop in her sworn statement as violent, abrupt, and sudden.  The force of the stop caused [...] to fall to the floor of the bus, violently as further described by the eyewitness, sufficient to cause multiple herniations in her spine.  The plaintiff and the eyewitness certainly did not describe a typical “jerk or jolt” that may and should be anticipated by a passenger.  Under Brill and its progeny, and the mandate of Rule 4:46, the Court was not free to weigh the evidence, but instead should have accepted it as true, and accorded [...] all legitimate inferences therefrom.  Those inferences would include the negligent operation of the bus.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT