ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] Has Long Engaged In The Type Of Abusive Tactics The MBPA Was Designed To Protect Against.  Even though the Agreement appointed Appellants as non-exclusive wholesalers of [...] products in the New York tri-state area and the entire state of New Jersey, [...] USA has long enforced a discriminatory policy on Appellants that restricted Appellants’ market to “Asian accounts,” which has essentially meant Asian-owned restaurants. ²  Though other distributors could sell freely to any local retailers in their territory, and the Agreement called on Appellants “to promote the sale and distribution of [...]’s Products to all possible accounts in its market area,” [...] USA had always limited Appellants to only Asian accounts, which were disproportionately impacted by COVID-19.  (Pa37, Pa40-41).  [...] USA also prohibited Appellants from using “sub-jobbers,” which are sub-distributors, while permitting other [...] wholesalers to do so.  (Pa37-38).  --- ² COVID-19 had a devastating effect on restaurants across the globe, particularly on Asian restaurants in New York City, which were devastated by the pandemic.  By March 2020, consumer spending in Manhattan’s Chinatown neighborhood and Flushing—two areas with a significant number of Asian restaurants—had dropped by 96%. (Pa40-41).  For [...], seven of its retailer-customers in New Jersey closed because of the pandemic.  Of those seven, five purchased [...] products from [...].  In New York, [...] had 129 retailer-customers that closed due to the pandemic, constituting almost 23% of its retail-customers in New York.  Of those 129, nearly all of them purchased [...] products from [...].  (Pa41).  [...] USA was fully aware that a significant portion of the retailers Appellants serviced permanently closed because of the pandemic, and that those closures had a disproportionate impact on Appellants’ sales volumes, particularly since [...] USA permits Appellants to only sell [...] products to Asian restaurants and markets.  (Pa41).  Any purported decline in Appellants’ sales figures of [...] products is thus a result of natural market conditions and not Appellants’ alleged failure to use “best efforts. ”  Additionally, on January 12, 2009, [...] and [...] USA entered into a Nondisclosure Agreement (the “NDA”) after [...] found a representative of [...] USA rummaging through files in its offices in New Jersey and copying confidential financial documents without permission or right.  The NDA prohibits [...] USA from distributing Confidential Information to third parties without [...]’s written consent.  (Pa94-96).  V.
[brief] In Joyce v. L. P. Steuart, Inc., 227 F.2d 407, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1955), the court stated:  “In this court, [Plaintiff] asserts, …, that the termination agreement is not available as a defense as an avoidance or affirmative defense which [Defendant] failed to plead affirmatively …  The termination agreement was introduced in evidence at the trial without objection.  In addition, its legal effect was argued to the court …  Hence [Plaintiff] cannot be heard now to complain that he was prejudiced by surprise. ”  In Star Steel Supply Co. v. White, 4 Mich. App. 178, 181 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966), the court stated:
[brief] The “components of a determination of reasonable suspicion . . . [are] the events which occurred leading up to the stop . . . , and then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion. ”  State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 357 (2002) (alterations in original) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)).  This is a “highly fact-intensive inquiry that demands evaluation of ‘the totality of the circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State’s interest in effective law enforcement against the individual’s right to be protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions. ’”  State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 528 (2022) (quoting State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 25-26 (2010)).  Courts examining the legality of an officer’s stop must look at “the whole picture. ”  Id. at 531.  The reasonable-suspicion test is incredibly fact sensitive and not “readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. ”  Nishina, 175 N.J. at 511 (quoting Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7); see also State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 22 (2004); State v. Valentine, 134 N.J. 536, 546 (1994) (“No mathematical formula exists for deciding whether the totality of the circumstances provide an officer” with reasonable suspicion).  Instead, common sense should guide the court’s analysis.  Stovall, 170 N.J. at 370.  If the officer’s observations reasonably warranted the limited intrusion on the individual’s freedom based on the facts present and the rational inferences that can be drawn from the totality of the circumstances, the investigatory stop will be deemed valid.
[brief] Defendant said he ran up to [...] in front of the church on [...] and yelled, “Yo, what’s up with my dough?” (7T179-1 to 4).  He told [...] that [...] kept running behind him and then went to [...] and fought with someone.  (7T179-6 to 8).  [...] confronted defendant with his lies and the video of him going in and then, a few minutes later, out of 250 [...].  (7T180-1 to 6).  --- \(^4\) *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
[brief] When they yet again failed to obtain the result they sought in the Appellate Division, defendants again petitioned for certification to the New Jersey Supreme Court.  That petition was denied in April 2021.  *Fou v. Fou*, 246 N.J. 49 (2021).  When plaintiff learned that the petition before the US Supreme Court had been denied and thus defendants had exhausted all appeals, application was made to the trial court for entry of an amended final judgment pursuant to the terms of the Appellate Division’s opinion.
[brief] 5  Tompkins v. Selip & Stylianou, LLP, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21937 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2019)  ............................................  14  Union Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J. Super. 141 App. Div. 2007) .....................................................................  6 US Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449 (2012)  .................................................................................................  19  Valentine v. Mullooly, Jeffrey, Rooney & Flynn LLP, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118399 (D.N.J. July 6, 2022) ...........................................  14  Valentine v. Unifund CCR, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44747 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2021) .............................................  14  Veras v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176 (D.N.J. March 17, 2014) .........................................  13  Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding LLC, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 96 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Bergen Cty. Jan. 21, 2022) ..................................................................  15  Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding LLC, No. A-1996-21, 2023  N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550 (App. Div. Sep. 21, 2023) .........................................................................................  15  Rules R. 4:50-1 ..........................................................................................................................  5 R. 4:50-2 ..........................................................................................................................  6  Statutes N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2 ............................................................................................................  4, 13 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3 ............................................................................................................  13 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3(a) .......................................................................................................  1, 10 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) ....................................................................................................  passim TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] ” woulda known somehow, in some way, that His Honor failed to specify, except for the quaint 20th Century concept that we should have been able to tell because it was “quite voluminous. ”  4T-4-10.  Yes, in the (remote) past, we were to be able to tell from the “size” or “volume” of regular mailings – sometimes – what the contents might be.  Even then, say, a Discovery Sanction Motion\(^{20}\) and a Motion for Time could be about the same size.  The former is very serious; the latter, requires no response.  Again, even back then, would clairvoyance be required if there were a “typo” in the Notice of Motion?  I have shown in this video, [...] (for Download Video), which was in my Motion for Reconsideration (5T -- heard 12/1/23), that there is basically no way to tell the difference between a 10-page download (possibly a request for time) and the 100-page Motion for Dismissal.
[directive] Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash  Bail Option  Actor with purpose to cause a public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, engages in Disorderly fighting or threatening or violent behavior or creates a hazardous or physical dangerous Petty Disorderly 2C:33-2(a)(b)
[brief] The trial court’s role, then, on Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment was to determine if a reasonable factfinder could determine that question of original intent in Defendants’ favor.  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  If a reasonable factfinder could do so based on the motion record, Plaintiffs’ motion should have been denied.  In their opening brief, Defendants demonstrated why the speculative and unsupported reasons proffered by the trial court in support of its decision were insufficient to require, as a matter of law, a decision in favor of Plaintiffs on their motion.  Defendants also identified other evidence in the motion record on which a reasonable factfinder could determine that [...] did not intend that there was an implied easement to cross from the [...] over the [...] to the beach.  Taken together, all of this evidence in support of Defendants’ position – that the [...] do not have an implied easement appurtenant – was more than sufficient to raise an issue as to the original intent and thus require the trial court to have denied Plaintiffs’ motion.
[brief] ”  It is notable that Respondent fails to address both the “neglect of duty” aspect of the statute as well as the New Jersey Supreme Court’s ruling in *Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., et al.*, 8 N.J. 433, 474 (1952), *cert. denied*, 344 U.S. 838 and *reh’g denied*, 344 U.S. 888 (1952), which are directly applicable to the issues in this case.
[brief] The court also stated, “understand here, the culpability is --and, again, even though you didn't have the gun, it is clear this jury believed that you were absolutely involved and culpable . . . for robbing the victim on that day. ” (9T 14:12-15).  Furthermore, while defendant argues the court did not consider the mitigating factors argued by defense counsel, the court stated he received the sentencing memo submitted by counsel and that he “review[ed] everything.
[brief] (7T:130-24 to 132-10; 134-5 to 8).  After being startled awake, [...] fully complied with police.  When asked by police where was the gun that was fired, Ms.  Fiore told them she did not fire a gun.  When asked if anyone else fired a gun – if he [defendant] fired the gun, [...] responded, “yes. ” (7T:135-3 to 12).  It was at the [...] that [...] learned that the shot defendant fired killed somebody.
[brief] The Developer confuses public access with public dedication.  There is no doubt that the internal roadways in question presume a type of public access.  Public access however, does not mean ownership.  There is a difference between a right to public access and the issue of ownership.  In this particular case the internal roadways are by-roads.  In other words, they are privately owned roads to which the public has a right of unfettered access.  The Borough contends that requiring the Developer to keep ownership and most importantly the obligation of maintenance places the Developer “in a state of purgatory”.  This is far from accurate.  The roads must be maintained by the Developer and the public will continue to enjoy a right of access as necessary and proper.  The Developer would not have to “assume the status of total owner and enter into easement and maintenance agreements with the owners of the lots abutting the roads”.  (Plaintiff Brief, pb.43).  The simple fact is that the internal roadways are roadways to be maintained by the private owner for his commercial purposes - just like any mall or shopping center throughout the state.  However, the public has a clear right of public access to these roadways which must remain unfettered both for the public’s use as well as for the use of emergency vehicles, etc.  This use is consistent with the required easement for the small dock which allows the public access to the Passaic River.  The public access easement is merely extended through the internal roadways in question for the public to enjoy as necessary and appropriate.  There can be little doubt that in 2018 the Developer viewed the status of the roadways as it related to potential dedication to be unclear.  That is why the Developer both stated that it was willing to proceed at its own risk and why it ultimately made a petition to the Borough to seek approval the dedication of the roads.  There is no reason why the Developer would proceed in such a manner unless it viewed the dedication to be uncertain in 2018.  Once the issue was presented to the Borough the Borough exercised it statutory rights pursuant to decline the dedication as it was fully entitled to do.  It was only then that the Plaintiff contended that the roads were dedicated 13 years earlier in 2010.
[directive] 1.  When responding to a domestic violence incident involving a law enforcement officer from another jurisdiction, all responding officers, investigators, and supervisors will follow the same procedures that are to be followed in responding to a domestic violence complaint involving an officer from this Department as set Attorney General's Guidelines on Police Response to forth in the Domestic Violence Cases  Attorney General Weapons Seizure and Directives.  2.  When responding to a domestic violence incident involving a law enforcement officer from another county, the Chief of Police or Law -11- Enforcement Chief Executive or person acting in those capacities shall notify the County Prosecutor where the officer is employed.  3.  If the reported incident involves the Chief of Police or Law Enforcement Chief Executive or a person acting in those capacities, the supervisor will immediately notify the County Prosecutor's Office which may directly oversee the criminal investigation.
[brief] Rather than addressing the substantive issues, Plaintiff’s argument misses the forest for the trees.  Indeed the litany of instances where, according to the Plaintiff, the Trial Court misinterpreted, wrongfully attributed or simply did not understand the causes of action set forth in the pleading, only underscores [...]’s (and by extension [...]’s) reasoning was sound when it found that: (1) the “SAC” and Fifth Amended Complaint, respectively, did not meet the applicable pleading standards and, (2) given the specific circumstances of the instant case, that is, Plaintiff’s inability to file a conforming pleading over the course of the previous five (5) years, despite six (6) attempts and while receiving multiple extensions and causing other delays with each attempt, granting Plaintiff leave to file another motion to amend the complaint would be futile.
[brief] The State also presented evidence that two handguns, matching the ballistic characteristics of the weapons used by defendants, were recovered.  Specifically, the police recovered a black forty caliber Baretta handgun from the fenced-in yard; seven shell casings were also recovered inside the fried chicken store next to the victim's body.  The police also found a loaded Glock 17 nine millimeter handgun laying in the street on the southeast corner of [...].  At approximately 2:00 a.m. on November 13, 2004, City of [...] [...] received a phone call from central command advising him that [...] in [...] had reported that “[a] person just arrived at the hospital and [ ] was a victim of a gunshot injury.
[directive] If the officer is equipped with a body worn camera as defined in Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2015-1 that will be used to record the circumstances of the firing/discharge of the CED in lieu of an internal video camera, the officer shall determine and record on an appropriate log that the body worn camera is functional.  7.2  When feasible, the officer should warn the person against whom a CED is directed that the officer intends to fire the weapon.  7.3  An officer should not fire a CED if there is a substantial risk that the electrode/darts will strike an innocent person, unless firing the device in such circumstances is reasonably necessary to protect the innocent person(s) from death or serious bodily injury.  7.4  To ensure officer safety, when feasible, at least one law enforcement officer other than the one deploying the CED should be present, be armed with lethal ammunition, and be prepared to utilize deadly force in the event that the use of a CED for any reason fails.  Deadly force would only be authorized in this situation as a last resort, if otherwise permitted by the Use of Force Policy.  7.5  During the deployment of a CED, the deploying officer shall, when feasible, continually evaluate the options selected against changing circumstances.  7.6  An officer trained and authorized to carry a CED shall be aware of and comply with any targeting recommendations made by the manufacturer.  7.7  A CED may be used in conjunction with a distraction device, non-flammable chemical agent, or less-lethal ammunition.  If the individual has already received an electrical charge from a CED, officers shall, when feasible, provide the person a reasonable opportunity to submit to law enforcement authority and to comply with law enforcement commands, considering the physiological effects of the discharge, before deploying a distraction device, chemical agent, or less-lethal ammunition.  7.8  A CED shall not be directed against a person who is situated on an elevated surface (e.g., a ledge, scaffold, near a precipice, etc.) unless reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or minimize a fall-related injury (e.g., deploying a safety net).  7.9  A CED shall not be used in, on, or immediately adjacent to a body of water in which the targeted person could fall during any stage of the application of the electrical current generated or transmitted by the device.  9  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] 29 POINT III THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT EXPERT TESTIMONY IS NOT NEEDED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF CAN DEMONSTRATE BEFORE A JURY THAT DEFENDANT, [...], OWED PLAINTIFF A NON-DELEGABLE DUTY TO USE REASONABLE CARE TO PROTECT PLAINTIFF AGAINST KNOWN OR REASONABLY DISCOVERABLE DANGERS AND BREACHED THAT DUTY BY NOT ONLY FAILING TO IMPLEMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS THE RISK OF OVERLOADED U-BOATS, BUT ALSO BY FAILING TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE AND PROPER TRAINING TO ITS EMPLOYEES TO ENSURE PROPER USE OF THE U-BOATS BY ITS CUSTOMERS (T.20:9-16) ...........................................32  POINT IV THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO [...] BY DETERMINIGN THAT [...] WAS NOT A BORROWED AGENT OF [...] (T.12:24-14:11) .........................................................48 Conclusion .................................................................50  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS
[brief] |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------| |  1.  Order denying appellant’s August 25, 2023 R. 4:52 *Motion For “Order To Show Cause With Temporary Restraints As To Why An Order Compelling The Respondents To Designate A Handicapped Parking Space In Front Of His House Should Not Be Entered”*  . . . . Pa107 (this written order was entered on August 30, 2023, without a hearing and without opposition).  | | | 2.  Order granting respondents’ *Motion To Dismiss* and disposing of the appellant’s case, *With Prejudice*  . . . . Pa111 (this written order was entered on October 20, 2023, after the same day hearing via which the trial court orally opined (1T18)).  | | | 3.  Order denying the appellant’s R. 4:49-2 *Motion To Alter and Amend Judgment*  . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa112 (this written order was entered on December 15, 2023 after the same day hearing via which the trial court heard this motion and the appellant’s *Motion For Recusal* together and orally opined (2T19)) | | | 4.  Order denying the Appellant’s *Motion For Recusal*  . . . . Pa114 (this written order was entered on December 15, 2023, after the same day hearing via which the trial court heard this motion and the *Motion To Alter and Amend Judgment* together and orally opined (2T19)) | | APPENDICES SUPPORTING THIS APPEAL
[brief] On May 23, 2023, two months after their earlier, explicit, on-the-record waiver of any right to arbitrate, and in breach of the March 9, 2023 Order (Da5) that required such a motion to be filed two months earlier, new counsel (the third) for Defendants filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss the LAD/CEPA Counts, arguing that Plaintiff was not an “employee” under the statutes or, alternatively, to bifurcate discovery on whether Plaintiff was an “employee. ”  Da167.  Days later, Plaintiff’s counsel promptly sent new defense counsel R. 1:4-8 letters indicating that Defendants had waived any right to arbitrate.  Pa32.  Plaintiff filed opposition to the Motion.  Pa1.  G.  The Court Denies Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration  On October 11, 2023, oral argument took place on Defendants’ Motion and the trial court denied the Motion in its entirety, refusing to dismiss the LAD/CEPA counts, or the alternative relief to bifurcate discovery on whether Plaintiff was an “employee” under those statutes, and refusing to compel arbitration.
[brief] Point II  Plaintiff Proved Her Damages ............................................................................................8  A. Defendants’ Malpractice ...............................................................................................9  B.  Plaintiff Proved The Amount Of Her Damages ...........................................................14  C. Plaintiff Proved Defendants’ Malpractice Was The Proximate Cause Of Her Damages .........................................................................................................................16  Point III The Awarding Of Fees To Plaintiff’s Counsel Was Proper ..............................................18
[brief] The arguments advanced by amicus fail to address the issue actually presented in this case: is whether the product is defective a fact question for a jury or a matter of law to be decided by the court.  It is the former, and for that reason, the arguments raised by amicus are largely irrelevant to the determination to be made on this appeal.  A reasonable juror may very well find that [...] was not reasonable or diligent in incorporating the available safer design into their vehicles.  The decision below should be reversed and remanded for determination of that issue by a jury of ordinary consumers.  Respectfully submitted, [...] /s [...] [...]
[brief] “Probably, possibly. ”  Tr. at 51.  After more word gamesmanship, [...] admits, “Correct, I think the confusion here is that he talked about different projects, multiple projects.  So you are talking about this particular project and I would say yes, correct. ”  Defendant [...], for himself and the other [...] defendants, admits that he did not have any land at that time he entered into the NDA.