ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] POINT  I  [...]’S INTRA-FAMILY LIABILITY EXCLUSION IS UNENFORCEABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE IT VIOLATES NEW JERSEY PUBLIC POLICY (2T6:18 – 20:15)  An intrafamily liability exclusion is a provision in an insurance policy that eliminates otherwise valid liability coverage where the injured party is also an insured under the policy from which liability coverage is sought.  See, e.g., Kish v. Motor Club of America Ins. Co., 108 N.J. Super. 405, 407-08 (App. Div. 1970).  Most often, an injured individual is considered an insured under the same policy through which liability coverage is sought by virtue of living in the same household, and often related, to the person seeking liability coverage.  For instance, if a parent is operating a vehicle that has $500,000 in liability coverage and causes an accident resulting in significant injury to his/her child-passenger, an intrafamily liability exclusion would exclude liability coverage (beyond the mandatory state minimum coverage) for the parent.  It is respectfully submitted to this Court that the time has come for intrafamily liability exclusions to be deemed void as a matter of public policy.  “New Jersey courts have not hesitated to look to public policy when interpreting insurance contracts. ”  Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 202 N.J. 432, 460 (2010).  In fact, as discussed below, these types of intrafamily exclusions have already been questioned by this Court in a recent, albeit unpublished, decision.
[brief] Because the State cannot appeal this evidentiary ruling from a dismissal or an acquittal, this is the only opportunity for the State to challenge the adverse ruling at issue and, therefore, the State’s Motion for Leave to Appeal must be granted in the interest of justice.  Parties do not have a right to appeal an interlocutory order under the Rules of Court.  In re Pa. R.R. Co., 34 N.J. Super. 103, 107-08 (App. Div. 1955), aff’d, 20 N.J. 398 (1956).  Rather, leave to file an interlocutory appeal of a trial court’s order only is permitted “in the interest of justice. ”  R. 2:2-4; Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 598-99 (2008).  See R. 2:2-2(b) (providing that this Court may take appeals from interlocutory orders to “prevent irreparable injury”).  An interlocutory appeal is not appropriate to “correct minor injustices … .”  Romano v. Maglio, 41 N.J. Super. 561, 567 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 22 N.J. 574 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 923 (1957).  When leave is granted, it is because there is the possibility of “some grave damage or injustice” resulting from the trial court’s order.  Id. at 568.  The moving party must establish, at a minimum, that the desired appeal has merit and that “justice calls for [an appellate court’s] interference in the cause. ”  Romano, 41 N.J. Super. at 568.  Here, the trial court incorrectly found defendant made an ambiguous invocation of his right to counsel and that [...] failed to clarify same.  Relying upon this erroneous finding, the court abused its discretion and suppressed defendant’s statement to police.  Defendant’s statement is a pivotal piece of evidence and because the State cannot appeal this evidentiary ruling from a dismissal or an acquittal, this is the only opportunity for the State to challenge the adverse ruling at issue.  As such, the State’s Motion for Leave to Appeal must be granted and the trial court’s clearly erroneous ruling must be reversed in the interest of justice.
[brief] Taylor v. DeLosso, 319 N.J. Super. 174 (App. Div. 1999) .....................  40  Underwriters v. Public Electric, 459 N.J.Super. 436 (App. Div. 2019) ....  28 Ward v. Scott, 16 N.J. 16, 23 (1954)  ...............................................  52  STATUTES
[directive] JUVENILE MATTERS  Attorney General Executive Directive Concerning the Handling of Juvenile Matters by Police and Prosecutors  Issued October 1990  The subject-matter of this Executive Directive was carefully studied by numerous practitioners in the juvenile justice field, including representatives from state, county and local law enforcement and prosecuting agencies, the courts, correction agencies and non-law enforcement juvenile service providers.  The following Executive Directive represents the consensus of these juvenile justice practitioners.  Their contributions to the policy development of this Executive Directive are gratefully acknowledged.
[brief] *Cf.*  *Matullo v. Sky Zone Trampoline Park*, 472 N.J. Super. 220, 227 (App. Div. 2022) (“[T]he infancy defense[ ] has its genesis in the concept that minors do not have the capacity to bind themselves to contractual obligations. ”)  (emphasis added). ²  ---  ²  Accepting Plaintiffs’ argument would create an enormous loophole, as the trial court apparently recognized during argument.  (T25-6–15)  Any time a parent needed to contract with another party, including by entering commonplace internet contracts, they could simply direct their child to click the “I have read  Courts thus recognize that minors, acting with actual or apparent authority of their parents, can bind their parents to agreements including the agreement to arbitrate.
[brief] The trial court abused its discretion when it awarded $190,480.68 in prejudgment interest, rather than $838,810.40 to which the Plaintiffs were entitled.  The decision below on this issue was based on an erroneous interpretation of R. 4:42-11, which resulted in the trial court cutting off Plaintiffs’ prejudgment interest claim based on when they commenced suit, rather than allowing prejudgment interest to run from the dates when the trial court found that the defendants misappropriated funds.  (Pb30-31).  Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment on that sole issue should be reversed.
[brief] ” [Da380].  According to § 36-2 of the Hoboken Code, “The purpose of the Cannabis Review Board is to assure the public health, safety, and general welfare of the City of Hoboken and its residents, business establishments and visitors. ”  [Da380].  § 36-4(A) of the Hoboken Code provides:  The Review Board shall receive and review all applications for cannabis wholesaler, cannabis retailer, medical cannabis dispensary and Hoboken-based cannabis delivery and shall provide an endorsement, or report to the contrary, to the land use board of jurisdiction prior to the applicant’s submission of a conditional use application to the board.  [Da381; emphasis added]  This provision makes clear that the Cannabis Review Board (referred to in this brief as the “CRB”) has no powers conferred by the MLUL, since it confirms that the CRB undertakes its work before a conditional use application (i.e., an application for development) is submitted to the land use board of competent jurisdiction (i.e., either the Board, if all of the conditions are met, or the Board of Adjustment if the conditions are not met).
[brief] The Appellate Division has provided guidance in the following opinion.  The opportunity to be heard contemplated by the concept of due process means an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.  Ibid.  Indeed, our rules of court contemplate that motions be made in writing.  R. 1:6-2(a).  Moreover, ordinarily, motions must be filed and served not later than sixteen days before a specified return date.  R. 1:6-3(a).  Our summary judgment rule requires a motion seeking that relief to be filed not later than twenty-eight days before the time specified for the return date.  R. 4:46-1.  In addition, a party seeking summary judgment must file a brief and, at the very minimum, a statement of material facts in support of the motion.  R. 4:46-2(a).  The purpose of these rules is obvious, that is, to afford the party against whom relief is sought notice of the application, together with a meaningful opportunity to respond.  Klier v. Sordoni Skanska Const. Co., 337 N.J. Super. 76, 84 (App. Div. 2001)
[directive] All rounds of firearms requalification shall comply with the requirements outlined in the Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards for New Jersey Law Enforcement and shall include all applicable night requalification requirements as mandated by the Standards.  2.  All law enforcement agencies shall ensure that every officer they employ completes at least two training sessions on the lawful and appropriate use of force and deadly force, as required by Section II.A of the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy.
[brief] Defendant says that the investigatory stop was based on his “merely speaking to a drug dealer,” (Db10), rather than on a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.  According to the governing caselaw, however, police officers may detain for investigation three men seen together when one of them has just been observed conducting drug sales on the street in an area beset by crime.  At the suppression motion, testimony described officers conducting a surveillance operation spurred by citizen complaints that the neighborhood was crime-ridden and rife with narcotics activity.  Police testimony described the ways in which the illegal drug trade operated in the neighborhood so as to minimize risk of prosecution and risks posed by business rivals.  Far more was occurring in this scenario than the defendants’ flight upon seeing the police.  Moreover, when the attempt to arrest the drug dealer was impeded by the flight of his companions, the officers had the right, in fact the obligation, to pursue them.  Police officers are not mere spectators and, as the trial court noted, if the two defendants “had merely stood still, we wouldn’t be here today. ” (2T75-9 to 11).  Defendant could have chosen to simply stand by and allow the officers to arrest [...], as [...] himself did.  But, by fleeing across a busy city street, defendant interfered, endangering police, himself, and everyone else in the vicinity.  In fact, the detective who was forced to chase the codefendant was injured.  Defendant’s unlawful conduct should not be rewarded by suppressing the loaded gun, cocaine and currency found in his possession.  As the motion court ruled, the police actions were reasonable.
[brief] In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Greenberg, 376 N.J. Super. 623, 637 (Law Div. 2004), the Court stated:  “The Fraud Act expressly provides that the forum for the adjudication of claims is in the Superior Court.  Section 7(a) of the Fraud Act prescribes that, “[a]ny insurance company damaged as the result of a violation of any provision of this act may sue therefor in any court of competent jurisdiction.
[brief] The [...], following the reasoning in an analogous line of cases from California, explained as follows:  Even though the [municipal entity] allegedly knew that children used its playground for skateboarding and took no measures to prevent the activity, the court found that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for a “dangerous condition of public property” because the injury was the direct result of the childrens’ dangerous conduct, not a defect in the physical condition of the property.
[brief] Plaintiff/Appellant relies on the arguments set forth in Plaintiff’s Opening Brief at Point IV (Pb16-29).  In addition, Plaintiff/Appellant makes the following arguments in reply to Defendants, [...] and [...]’s arguments.  Defendants argue that Plaintiff can produce no writing signed by any member of [...] that rescinds the notice of termination.  However, Plaintiff has demonstrated that no writing is necessary as the Statute of Frauds does not apply.  Pb21-23, and based on the conduct of the parties the notice of termination was rescinded before it could take effect on May 31, 2016.  In particular, the parties met on May 5, 2016 and [...] agreed to rescind the termination in exchange for [...]’s promise to reduce the rent by $3,000.00 per month for the months of May through August (later extended to September).  The subsequent conduct of the parties was consistent with their agreement as [...] in fact gave $3,000.00 monthly discounts from May to August 2016 for a total of $12,000.00 and an additional $3,000.00 monthly discount in September.  [...] accepted these discounts in exchange for rescinding the termination notice, and never vacated the premises.  [...] continuously occupied the property for four (4) more years, through April 19, 2020.  [...] continued to make rental payments from May 2016 through April 19, 2020.  Moreover, [...] entered into a Consent Order in April 2019 confirming the Lease agreement of February 20, 2015 remained in effect, and when [...] finally terminated the Lease in 2020, it acknowledged and gave notice of its termination of the February 2015 Lease.
[brief] *Capital Health Sys., Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking & Ins.*, 445 N.J. Super. 522, 535 (App. Div. 2016).  (citing *In re Stallworth*, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)).  A final agency decision is entitled to “substantial deference” and should not be overturned unless “(1) it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; (2) it violated express or implied legislative policies; (3) it offended the State or Federal Constitution; or (4) the findings on which it was based were not supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record. ”  *Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.*, 191 N.J. 38, 48 (2007) (citing *In re Taylor*, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999)); *N.J. Highlands Coal. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.*, 456 N.J. Super.  590, 602 (App. Div. 2017).  Thus, [...]’s adjudicatory hearing denial is owed substantial deference.
[brief] [...]’s fraud claims were time barred under the one-year\(^9\) time limitation of R. 4:50-1(c).  [A229, Op. at 20]  [...]’s R. 4:50-1(f) were time barred because “the delay in filing her motion based on the arguments as to substantive unconscionability was unreasonable. ”  (Id. at 52).  Even if the case was timely brought, the trial court correctly analyzed why the result would not have been different, as discussed in Point III below.
[brief] ”  Pb1.  Indeed, the practical necessity of a phased-in approach supports the principle that there is no duty to design a vehicle with every available technology.  See Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (Law Div. 1976).  And while Plaintiff attempts to skip over the question of duty and reframe the issue as one of “breach,” [...]’s brief shows how Plaintiff’s theory of liability is fundamentally at odds with the practical reality of product design.  The existence of an alternative design does not mean that it needs to be incorporated on every vehicle.  Ultimately, irrespective of how Plaintiff attempts to characterize the issue, Plaintiff’s only argument is that there was an alternative design that would have (allegedly) prevented the crash.  But, as a matter of New Jersey law, an alternative design does not create a jury issue.  Simply stated, to reach a jury, there must be evidence that the omission of the alternative design rendered the product not “reasonably fit, suitable and safe. ”  N.J. Stat. § 2A:58C-2; Model Jury Charge (Civil) 5.40D-3(2)(a).  Plaintiff has none.  Lastly, [...]’s brief provides context that refutes Plaintiff’s eleventh-hour position that section 2A:58C–3a(2) is inapplicable.
[brief] Here, the same rings true.  The contractual language referencing “2,080” is a mere parenthetical example of a broader formula for overtime, which states, “[a]ll overtime shall be compensated as paid compensation at the time and one-half (1-1/2) rate .  . . .” (Pa27).  The 2,080 divisor only appears in a parenthetical that illustrates that the calculation of overtime shall be based on the base rate of pay plus maintenance:  “(the overtime rate shall be base plus maintenance divided by 2,080 x 1.5) . . . .”  Ibid.  This is further confirmed by the language following the parenthetical, which specifies an alternative compensation method, namely using compensatory time off, which is calculated as, “time and one-half (one and one-half hours banked for each hour of overtime worked in quarter hour units). ”  Ibid.  The placement of the 2,080 divisor in a parenthetical, as opposed to the beginning of the paragraph, only further demonstrates that the parties intended it to be illustrative.  (Pa192).  Specifically, the court held that the Arbitrator was permitted to consider “the beginning language that is not in parenthesis about time and a half” when crediting [...]’s position that the 2,080 divisor was descriptive, not prescriptive.  (T22:18-20).  Thus, the court was correct in finding that the overarching language of the entire contractual provision demonstrated that the 2,080 divisor was intended to be illustrative rather than prescriptive.  (T22:18-20; Pa192).  [...] asserts on appeal that the Arbitrator exceeded his power under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(d) when he “did not follow the grievance submission presented by the [...].
[brief] [Da492 at ¶6-7; 498-512 (highlighting no changes in proposed complaint for intervention aside from names of parties)].  Timeliness for intervention purposes into an already-pending land use appeal is determined based upon when the interests of the parties diverge.  *Warner Co. v. Sutton*, 270 N.J. Super. 658, 664-665 (App. Div. 1994).  That could have only occurred if the trial court found [...] lacked standing because of when it was formed, but it made no such finding, and neither should this Court.  [...]’ reliance on *Twp.  of Hanover v. Twp. of Morristown*, 118 N.J. Super. 136 (Ch. Div.), aff’d o.b. 121 N.J. Super. 536 (App. Div. 1972), to highlight the untimeliness of the motion to intervene is disingenuous.  The distinctions between that case and this are striking.  There, the movants in that case, who were strangers to the litigation, sought leave to intervene 17 months after a reported opinion and 14 months after the entry of final judgment.  *Id.* at 137-138.  Here, the President of the non-profit entity that filed a timely complaint predicated upon associational standing pursuant to *Crescent Park, supra*, sought leave to intervene before trial.  The “results of the battle” were not “in” on June 5, 2023 when [...] moved to intervene, and there is obviously no need to examine the rules concerning intervention after final judgment.  *Id.* at 143.  The dissimilarities between the cases are so obvious that we must question why [...] believes it appropriate to alert the Court to this case in the first place, aside from citing to inapplicable *dicta*.  And to respond to [...]’ commentary on page 39 of its brief about [...]’s alleged failure to timely commence litigation, it should be beyond obvious that [...] did just that.
[directive] This pragmatic approach is firmly rooted in New Jersey criminal practice.  Rule 3:9-3(g), for example, expressly authorizes a prosecutor to tender a plea offer that includes a provision that the defendant will not appeal.  Although the defendant in those circumstances retains the right to appeal, should he or she choose to do so, thereby breaching the agreement, “the plea agreement may be annulled at the option of the prosecutor, in which event all charges shall be restored to the same status as immediately before the entry of the plea. ”  Compare R. 3:5-7(d), which affords a defendant an automatic right to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds notwithstanding that the defendant pleaded guilty, but which presupposes that the trial court denied the motion to suppress after a hearing pursuant to R. 3:5-7(c).
[brief] II.  THE PROBATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRUST AGREEMENT PRECLUDES PERELMAN FROM RECEIVING HARRIET’S INTEREST IN THE PALM BEACH PROPERTY.  (Da275 – Da278)  The Probate Court made the ancillary finding that [...]’s interest in the Palm Beach Property did not pass to [...] through the Residuary Clause because “[i]t is clear [[...]] did not intend for [[...]] to receive the Palm Beach Property. ” (Da277).  The Probate Court relied on the Trust document and considered no extrinsic evidence.  (Da275-78).  The Court thus reviews the decision de novo.
[brief] Training and Experience .............................................................................................................9  DWI Investigations ....................................................................................................................10  Patrol ..........................................................................................................................................10  Vehicle in Motion .......................................................................................................................11  Personal Contact .......................................................................................................................11  Exit ..............................................................................................................................................12  One-Leg-Stand ..........................................................................................................................12  Walk-and-Turn ..........................................................................................................................14  Arrest .........................................................................................................................................15  At Headquarters .......................................................................................................................16  STANDARD OF REVIEW .............................................................................................................16
[brief] The right to challenge wrongful government action was specifically continued without interruption, preserved today and is specifically referenced in R. 4:69-1 et seq. which provides in part that:  “Review, hearing and relief heretofore available by prerogative writs ... shall be afforded by an action in the Law Division, Civil Part, of the Superior Court. ”  Id.  The position of the Borough, also adopted by the Trial Court, that there is immunity—temporary or otherwise—from legal challenge to the Borough’s otherwise illegal government action by a harmed plaintiff with standing, finds no support.  The New Jersey Superior Court, created by the *New Jersey State Constitution (1947), as amended*, is a Court of general jurisdiction.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3.  “Nevertheless, the question whether a particular dispute is arbitrable under the terms of the parties' contract is an issue to be decided by the courts. ”  Troy, 168 N.J. at 379-80.  The statute further provides that when “interpreting the meaning and extent of a provision of a collective negotiation agreement providing for grievance arbitration, a court or agency shall be bound by a presumption in favor of arbitration.  Doubts as to the scope of an arbitration clause shall be resolved in favor of requiring arbitration. ”  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3.  The interpretation and construction of a contract is a matter of law.
[brief] Ignoring nearly every available safety measure in the context of a milling and paving project that [...] now argues is inherently dangerous could be found by a reasonable jury to satisfy the substantial certainty requirement for liability of the employer as allowed under the Workers’ Compensation Act.  The WCA provides  If an injury or death is compensable under this article, a person shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person injured or killed, except for intentional wrong.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 (emphasis added).  Not all conduct by an employer is immune from common-law suit.  An employer who causes the death or injury of an employee by committing an “intentional wrong” will not be insulated from liability outside the workers compensation realm.  *N.J.S.A.* 34:15-8; *Laidlow v. Hariton Machinery Co.*, 170 N.J. 602, 617 (2002).