ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Indeed, although [...]’s Global Fee Application did not identify every motion that was denied, in full or in part, for which he nevertheless sought payment in the Global Fee Application, there appeared to be many of them.  This issue was raised before the Chancery Court.  (1T56:16-18) (Ras’s counsel: “By my count, they are seeking fees for seventeen motions that were either denied in their entirety, or denied in part. ”).  [...]’s Global Fee Application also appeared to improperly seek fees in connection with motions for which he had originally sought fees when he filed the motions despite the fact that the trial court previously denied those requests at the time it ruled on the subject motions.  This issue was likewise raised below (1T56:16-18) but was erroneously not accounted for by the Chancery Court.  See Rendine 141 N.J. at 336 (“a trial court should reduce a lodestar fee if the level of success achieved in the litigation is limited as compared to the relief sought. ”) (internal citations omitted); Yueh 329 N.J. Super. at 468-69 (rejecting a trial court’s fee award where “the judge did not properly relate the hours expended to the result and did not sufficiently discriminate between the hours expended on successful and unsuccessful positions. ”)  In sum, the Chancery Court erred in failing to critically analyze the Global Fee Application.
[brief] ”  Defendant further argues that although defense counsel did not specifically cite *United States v. Wade*, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed.2d 1149 (1967) in his objection to the witness recall, the court was nonetheless obligated to assess the reliability of the proffered identification testimony, and erred in failing to do so.  As defense counsel voiced his objection to the witness recall during trial, we review the court's decision under the harmless error standard.
[brief] That alone should end this appeal.  In seeking reversal of the trial courts’ determinations that Defendants had constructive notice and reformation was appropriate, Defendants fail to raise any genuine disputes of material fact and also fail to appreciate the discretion of the trial court to apply equitable doctrines and fashion equitable remedies.  The trial court properly found there were no genuine disputes of material fact, that Defendants had constructive notice based on the contents of recorded documents in their own chain of title as well as based on their duty of inquiry, and that the equities weighed in favor of granting reformation to Plaintiffs.  This Court must affirm.
[brief] As noted, beyond the first trial and credibility determinations there, [...] post the 2017 Final Judgment had two testimonial sanctions hearings and imposed substantial sanctions upon [...] for asserted violations of the Final Order.  Both sanction hearings involved testimony by the principals of both parties and a weighing and finding on their credibility.  As noted in P.T., Supra, the imposition of sanctions for the violation of the Final Order invalidated and remanded by the Appellate Court is an additional factor that supported and mandated a disqualification/recusal of [...] here.
[brief] In Cummings, the petitioner’s time-barred PCR petition contained only “bald assertions,” unsupported by affidavit, certification, or anything else.  He also, for the first time 10 years after he was convicted, claimed he would have said he was at another person’s house; the Court explained that “this bare assertion of an alibi at this late date, without more,” was insufficient.  Id. at 170-71.  And McDonald was not even a PCR case.  Rather, in McDonald, as part of his appeal of the denial on his plea-withdrawal motion, defendant asserted counsel was ineffective.  The only evidence on that record was “only defendant’s conclusory allegations,” inadequate to evaluate the claim.  211 N.J. at 30.  The Court thus declined to consider the issue on direct appeal, instead stating PCR was the appropriate forum.  Ibid.  [...]’s submission included factual statements by him based on his own personal knowledge, expert reports, and other documents outside of the trial record, and which are competent evidence – a far cry from a mere “bald assertion.
[brief] (4T193:18-194:4; 7T63:3-65:9).  After turning into the next aisle, still sweeping, the plaintiff testified that [...] suddenly turned around, got in his face, and said “what are you going to do?” and called the plaintiff a “filthy Russian. ” (7T67:25-68:10; 4T197:23-198:2).  Then, plaintiff testified that [...] knocked the bag of grout up from plaintiff’s hands so that it struck the rack and burst, raining grout down on [...]’s back and head. (7T68:17-69:23).  Then, without warning, [...] took his right hand, holding the broom, and struck the plaintiff in the left temple (7T69:18-23) and then ran away.
[brief] (SSR 11-17, Dta1341-47.)  Those communications, at best, arguably supported an awareness by [...] that it was uncovered only for that limited initial phase of the Ritz wall work.  [...]’s understanding that it remained covered by the CCIP for subsequent work is confirmed by a letter dated September 25, 2015 that [...] sent to the attention of [...], [...]’s Chief Operating Officer who handled [...]’s insurance, three months before the underlying accident:
[brief] TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS  1T – trial dated 4/18/22  2T – trial dated 4/19/22  3T – trial dated 4/20/22 4T – trial dated 4/26/22 5T – trial dated 4/27/22 6T – trial dated 4/28/22 7T – trial dated 5/2/22 8T – trial dated 5/3/22 9T – trial dated 5/9/22 10T – sentencing dated 12/14/22  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] 4.  Appellants’ Claims Are the Same  The allegations and claims asserted in the instant matter are subsumed within those that Appellants earlier asserted in the Chancery Action via their twelve-count Counterclaim that was dismissed by the Consent Order.  (Pa46 at ¶21 ([...] Cert. citing March 27, 2023 filed Complaint available on eCourts at Trans ID: LCV20231042998 and set forth in Appellants’ Appendix at Pa14-29, Pa58-Pa73, and Pa95-97 (Appellants’ Chancery Action Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint at pp. 8-23 and pp. 45-47, Twelfth Count)).  During argument below, Appellants’ counsel acknowledged that the facts and two operative counts of the Complaint were also asserted by Appellants in the Chancery Action.\(^3\) (1T12:12 to 13:6).
[brief] There, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a violation of the Constitution’s readings requirement deemed legislation void.  The Supreme Court described the procedure of passage as follows:  A–605 was also introduced on January 12, 1982, and given its first and second readings on that date.  On January 14, 1982, official notice was given in the Legislative Digest that A–605 was placed on the General Assembly's Board List for consideration at its January 18, 1982 session.  On January 18, 1982, six days after A–605 had been given its second reading, S–711 was received from the Senate with its accompanying request of the Assembly's concurrence therein.  The General Assembly determined to substitute S–711 for A–605.  It gave S–711 its first reading and, on the same date, pursuant to a special motion, it was given its second reading.  Thereafter, also on January 18, 1982, the Assembly adopted, by voice vote, a motion to substitute S–711 for A–605.  This was done pursuant to Rule 15:20 of the Rules of the General Assembly .  . . .  After substitution, S–711 was immediately given a third reading in the Assembly, and it was passed on January 18, 1982 by a vote of 42 to 34.  Id. at 144-45.  The Supreme Court refused to invalidate the legislation at issue, because A-605 received two readings on January 12th.  On January 18th, the bill received a second reading and the General Assembly received S-711 with a request for concurrence.  The General Assembly agreed to substitute in favor of S-711.  Pursuant to special motion and a voice vote the bill was given a second reading and formally substituted.  The same day, the bill received a third reading and was passed.  The Supreme Court ruled that this was permissible and did not violate the Constitution but only because the process permitted the study of the bills.  Id. at 149-50.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.1(b).  Here, [...], through expert reports submitted through public comments, identified several deficiencies regarding [...]’s stormwater management and [...]’s failure to consider impacts to certified observations of threatened and endangered species on site.  (Aa95-Aa131; Aa137-Aa148; Aa195-Aa200; Aa2521-Aa2537; Aa2546-Aa2633).  Despite some acknowledgment by the [...] review staff, these issues were ultimately ignored or dismissed in violation of the Flood Hazard Area Control Act Rules.  For the reasons set forth herein, the issuance of the FHA Permit was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and must be vacated and reversed.
[brief] THE LOWER CONSIDERED, AND PROPERLY REJECTED, TENANT’S OFFSET DEFENSE (Da1-3)  Tenant next spuriously alleges that the lower court never reached the merits of whether Tenant was entitled to payment of the Tenant Allowance under Section 4.02 of the Lease due to a perceived lack of jurisdiction to render a decision on this issue.  This argument ignores the record, including the express terms of the Post Trial Order, which provides the following, in relevant part:  Because Defendant is in breach of the lease due to nonpayment of five months rent, the defendant is not due any refund of fit up costs under Section 4.02 of the Lease; (Da1-2; see also Da3, 2T4-7 to 2T4-13, 2T6-18 to 2T7-2, 2T9-5 to 2T9-18, 3T15-2 to 3T15-25).  Simply put, [...] considered, and properly rejected, this argument on the merits.
[brief] See also Model Jury Charges (Civil), 6.10, “Proximate Cause - General Charge to Be Given in All Cases” (1998) (“The basic question for you to resolve is whether [plaintiff's] injury/loss/harm is so connected with the negligent actions or inactions of [defendant] that you decide it is reasonable...that [defendant] should be held wholly or partially responsible for the injury/loss/harm. ”).  Merely committing a negligent act does not mean the act is a proximate cause of the claimed injury; instead, the act must be a “substantial factor” in bringing about the injury.  *James v. Arms Tech., Inc.*, 359 N.J. Super. 291, 311 (App. Div. 2003).  Here, the jury was charged on proximate cause consistent with Model Jury Charges (Civil), 6.10. (7T100:17-101:23).  Further, consistent with the Model Jury Charges, negligence and proximate cause were asked as separate questions on the verdict sheet presented to the jury.
[brief] [...] provided thousands of pages of financial information.  (See Da194-195: Trial Transcript 4T31-32)  During the trial, in response to questions during cross-examination, Plaintiff’s attorney [...] testified that he filed multiple motions to compel discovery, (See Da196: Trial Transcript 4T47) but Plaintiff still was unable to get really any real hard documentations from [...].  At the end of the proceeding, Family Court [...] issued an Amended Final Judgment of Divorce, which awarded Plaintiff [...] $1.1 Million Dollars, plus attorney fees in the amount of $229,389.69 to compel discovery.  (Da180-193)  The award of $1.1 Million Dollars was based on [...]’s admission that he had $2.2 Million Dollars in assets in a so-called Will in 2007.  (Da197: Trial Transcript 4T81)  [...] testified that she knew the Will in existence in 2007, two years before the Fous met Defendant [...], while [...] was in hospital and she intentionally withheld the critical fact from Mr. [...] and never told Mr. [...] about the existence of the Will and the $2.2 Million Dollars assets in 2009 when Mr. [...] was representing her.  [...] essentially signed the proposed Amended Final Judgment of Divorce prepared by [...] except that Judge filled in the attorney fees awarded by him.
[brief] In [...]’s case, he was overqualified when it came to interacting with and handling customers due to his prior experience as a cashier.  In fact, [...], [...] corporate representative at trial, testified that [...]’s training for customer sales associate position was a mere “formality. ”  See Db at 8.  Further, because [...] was trained about the applications of grout, gave correct information to [...] about the grout, and because [...]’s conduct was appropriate and professional, [...]’ decision to allow him to interact with customers cannot be said to be a proximate cause of [...]’s injuries.  [...] – despite his ignorance on the particular bag of grout in question – disagreed with the information [...] gave him about the grout, insulted [...], and then followed [...] into the next aisle after [...] walked away to defuse the situation.  IV.
[brief] POINT II: THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO THE UNREIMBURSED  MEDICAL EXPENSES (P-452)  Defendant’s accusation that “the Plaintiff was treating the medical reimbursement clause of the JOD as a ‘rainy day fund’ which she planned to cash in on when the time was right” (Def.’s Opp. 32) is both callously indifferent to the financial hardship that Defendant subjected Plaintiff to for years due to his refusal to meet to meet his obligations under the JOD, as well as ironic, since it was Defendant who treated Plaintiff as a “rainy day fund” by expecting her to fully pay for her children’s medical expenses.  See 1T213:17-18 (claiming he was “current” until Plaintiff “pile[d] up a stack of crap this high. ”).  Due to parents like the Defendant, who cause years of financial hardship to parents like the Plaintiff, the Appellate Division has long refused to entertain alleged laches of a parent as a basis to limit a child’s independent right to adequate support.  See L.V. v. R.S., 347 N.J. Super. 33, 41 (App. Div. 2002) (“the application of laches to matters of parent-child relationships have been carefully circumscribed. ”); Martinetti v. Hickman, 261 N.J. Super. 508, 512 (App. Div. 1993) (“[E]ach parent has a responsibility to share the costs of providing for the child while she remains unemancipated."); see also Lynn v. Lynn, 165 N.J. Super. 328, 342-43 (App. Div. 1979), certif. denied 81 N.J. 52 (1979); Ionno v. Ionno, 148 N.J. Super. 259, 261 (App. Div. 1977).  Respectfully, the lower court abused its discretion when denying Plaintiff’s request for reimbursement of medical expenses prior to 2014 (an arbitrary cut-off date), even though the lower court found that the Plaintiff and Defendant’s testimonies were equally credible.  Although Defendant mocks Plaintiff’s inability to retain counsel due to the financial ruin he caused, and the lower court apparently gave no weight to this testimony, the Appellate Division has considered that similar delays in obtaining counsel would not be a bar to recovery.  See Mayer v. Mayer, DOCKET No. [...], at *13 (App. Div. Jan. 25, 2013) (six-year delay in obtaining counsel to assist with an audit of overpayment of child support was not a bar to recovery, with matter remanded for plenary hearing) (P-840).  As discussed supra, the lower court abused its discretion by giving any weight to Defendant’s testimony that he “couldn’t afford it” when he committed perjury on his CIS.
[directive] 4.  The seizure of cameras, cell phones, or notes from journalists is generally prohibited.  Law enforcement should never seize a press member’s camera, cell phone, notes, or other journalistic work product or documentary material, except in the exceedingly rare case where it is necessary for public safety or the result of a search incident to a lawful arrest.  In addition, officers must never delete such material, and should search these items only after obtaining approval from the County Prosecutor or the Attorney General.
[brief] From November 2 through November 10, 2022, defendant was not in the vicinity of the series of incidents alleged by [...], the defendant was working her part-time drive share business with her minor child, preparing for travels to her home state Virginia, she is disabled, and her car was having troubles with constant contact to [...] and [...].  Her vehicle ultimately became disabled where the defendant had a loaner vehicle from her dealer’s maintenance department on [...]’ alleged incident of November 10, 2021.  The defendant’s vehicle(s) have the capability of track defendant’s whereabouts\(^7\), as most foreign vehicles.  However, [...] and the plaintiff did not conduct an investigation, obtain documents proving their claim against the defendant prior to and/or after issued the complaint blaming the defendant.
[brief] *Ibid.*  The officer got out of his car and gave chase, yelling, “Stop, police!” at least once.  *Id.* at 157-58.  A second officer also got out of the car and began to chase [...], who, ignoring police commands to stop, ran without looking back.  *Ibid.*  The first officer kept [...] in sight during most of the chase, during which [...] ran through yards, hopped over fences, and tossed away several items.  *Ibid.*  The police retrieved the tossed items.  *Ibid.*  At the suppression hearing, the officer testified that his purpose in pulling alongside [...] before the flight and ensuing chase was to see who it was, ask him where he was coming from and ask where he was going.  Ibid.  This Court distinguished the legal effect of the facts in [...] from those in Tucker, commenting that “such reasoning processes are often exercises suffused with fine distinctions and seldom requited by certainty.
[directive] Certain Types of Medical Records That Should be Obtained by Court Order Rather than Grand Jury Subpoena.  As a general proposition, a grand jury subpoena should not be used to compel hospitals to produce medical records that are reasonably believed to include : (1) confidential communications that are subject to the psychologist- patient privilege established by N.J.S.A. 45:14B-28 and N.J.R.E. 505 (which privilege is broader than the physician-patient privilege); Page 3 (2) information that a person has AIDS or HIV infection, which information is confidential and subject to disclosure restrictions pursuant to the “AIDS Assistance Act” codified at N.J.S.A. 26:5C-1.  (Note that N.J.S.A. 26:5C-9(a) generally requires a court order based upon a showing of good cause before the record of a person who has or is suspected of having AIDS or HIV infection may be disclosed, and N.J.S.A. 26:5C-9(b) permits a court to authorize disclosure of a person’s AIDS/HIV records “for the purpose of conducting an investigation of or prosecution for a crime of which the person is suspected only if the crime is a first degree crime and there is a reasonable likelihood that the record in question will disclose material information of substantial value to the investigation or prosecution. ”); or (3) information about substance abuse diagnosis and treatment that is protected under 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2, 42 U.S.C. § 290ee-3, and 42 C.F.R. Part 2.  (Note that these federal laws and regulations which restrict law enforcement access to drug and alcohol abuse counseling records generally do not apply to a hospital’s emergency department or the general treatment areas of the hospital; rather, these restrictions apply only to those medical personnel in a general medical care facility whose “primary function” is the provision of alcohol or drug abuse diagnoses, treatment or referral for treatment.  See 42 C.F.R. § 2.1-2.12.)  A county prosecutor or the [...] should apply to a judge for a court order, in lieu of a grand jury subpoena, to compel a hospital to disclose any of these specially protected types of medical records.  As a general proposition, and because the prosecutor may not know whether such specially protected materials are in the possession of the hospital, it is the hospital’s responsibility to redact such protected information from other materials provided to the prosecutor pursuant to the subpoena.  The hospital in that event would be expected to move to quash the subpoena with respect to the protected information.
[brief] 5  Citations to the July 8, 2022 Oral Argument are designated with the prefix “3T”.  Doctrine.  (3T28:19-29:1.)  Specifically, the trial court made the following findings of fact:  In his deposition.  . .[[...]] testifies that the reason that he believes he now has new evidence in this lawsuit that would justify a second lawsuit is as a result of a February 21 conversation with [...].  During that conversation the school was discussed.  And that he then felt that the City played it out in order to get the school.  It wasn’t right to, according to him, ‘it wasn’t right to condemn my property to get a school.  And I told [...] that during the February 2021 call. ’  I am going to grant [...] the benefit of all reasonable inferences and credibility calls in connection with the motion in front of me.  *I believe what he says,* that the new evidence that supports the second Complaint was as a result of a February ’21 conversation he had with [...].  The lightbulb goes off.  And he thinks now that’s the reason why they’re favoring [...], because they promised the school.  *That’s what his testimony was.  I’m accepting it.
[brief] Over Defendants’ objection, the Court indicated it would permit Plaintiff to testify as to his alleged loss “and see how the testimony plays out. ”  Id., at 1 to 13.  Plaintiff thereafter testified that he had been unable to work for roughly six weeks following the accident and sustained a loss of $2,867.31.  3T.57:18 to 58:20.  The issue was raised again with the Court during its charge conference.  4T.123:2 to 124:16.  At that time, Defendants objected based upon the lack of expert testimony and Plaintiff’s admitted pre-accident disability.  Ibid.  Permitting the claim, the trial court reasoned that although an expert would be required if Plaintiff had been out-of-work for a “significant length of time,” such testimony was not required for the period of time immediately following the accident based upon an “average juror’s” ability to conclude that “an individual could be in pain and have to take some time off” because of it.  *Id.*, at 124:17 to 125:4.  In essence, the Court endorsed Plaintiff’s subjective description of his abilities without identifying any legal basis for it or considering Plaintiff’s obligation to distinguish his pre-existing disability from any disability caused by the accident.  See *Blanks v. Murphy*, 268 N.J. Super. 152, 162 (App. Div. 1993) (plaintiff obligated to prove through his testimony and testimony of experts what part of pain, discomfort and other harms resulted from collision for which defendants responsible); see also *Schwarze v. Mulrooney*, 291 N.J. Super. 530, 541 (App. Div. 1996) (apportionment of damages ordinarily requires expert testimony).