ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] argues that the SFRA as applied in Jersey City is unconstitutional because it hasn’t been rigorously reviewed and retooled at regular intervals to ensure that it operates at an “optimal level,” (Ab31), and because the District did not receive State funding “at the level of its SFRA Adequacy Budget[.]” (Ab32; Ab37).  For the reasons set forth above, [...]’s appeal fails as a matter of law because its entire claim is based on a legally incorrect premise.
[brief] DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005).  Specifically, the Court is to, 'asccribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.'  [Hardy, 198 N.J. at 101.]  . . .  Courts are cautioned against 'rewrit[ing] a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature or presum[ing] that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language.'  [Ibid.]  If the language is 'clear on its face,' courts should 'enforce [the statute] according to its terms.'  However, 'where a literal interpretation would create a manifestly absurd result, contrary to public policy, the spirit of the law should control.'  [Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392 (2001).
[directive] Procedure  Individuals seeking a certification of expungement shall:  Complete the attached Record Request Form and return it in person to the • court where the charges originated, where the matter was heard or submit the request to the Superior Court Clerk’s Office.  •  If an individual does not remember which court handled their case, the individual can go to their local municipal court, the criminal or family division in any Superior Court courthouse, or the Superior Court Clerk’s Office in Trenton to receive a Certification of Expungement only.  If the individual is requesting any other expunged or sealed record on the case, they must go to the court where the case was disposed.
[brief] On this point, [...] renews its arguments that (1) N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(a) requires a “clear and concise statement of purpose” that must be “separate and apart” from the ordinance’s title; and (2) even if it does not, the April 8 Notice fails to substantively provide the required notice.  The trial court correctly ruled [...]’s assertions of enhanced notice requirements is not correct, as a matter of law.  A.
[brief] THE TRIALS COURT’S CONSTRUCTION OF PARAGRAPH  23 OF THE SHAREHOLDER’S AGREEMENT AS PERMISSIVE RENDERS THE PROVISION MEANINGLESS AND VIOLATES THE RULES OF CONTRACTUAL CONSTRUCTION (APPEALING THE ORDER DATED JANUARY 11, 2024  FOUND AT Pa059)  Arbitration is a favored means of dispute resolution. ”  *Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park*, 187 N.J. 323, 342 (2006); *Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc.*, 173 N.J. 76, 84, (2002); *Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs.*, 168 N.J. 124, 131, (2001); *Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc.*, 134 N.J. 275, 281, (1993); *Barcon Assocs. v. Tri–County Asphalt Corp.*, 86 N.J. 179, 186, (1981).
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO FARIBA.  (13T 87:24 to 101:11).  .................................................................34  A.  The Claims Against [...] Were Rife With Disputed Fact Issues.....35  B.  Plaintiffs Were Not Required to Proceed Derivatively Against the Defendants.  II.  AFTER 22 DAYS OF TRIAL, THIS COURT MUST DEFER TO JUDGE JEREJIAN’S WEIGHING OF THE EVIDENCE AND CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS.
[brief] The basis is the recognition that the first Judge had prematurely made a firm determination both on the issues and each side's witnesses.  Having already made firm decisions --- it is unrealistic to believe or expect the same Judge to have an open mind both as to the merits and credibility upon hearing the same and/or further witnesses or evidence, particularly given that the Judge had earlier concluded such further evidence was not needed or relevant.  The relevant principle is set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:15-49 and also R 1:12-1; providing that a Judge should be precluded from further participation where the judge "has given his opinion upon a matter in question."  This has been consistently held to warrant the recusal of a Judge who has made definitive rulings after hearing testimony, with the rulings involving weighing credibility, upon a remand requiring additional evidence and testimony from those witnesses.  There are numerous cases supporting such disqualification/recusal.  See *In re Guardianship of H.G.*, 155 N.J. Super. 186, 195 (App. Div. 1977); *N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Services v. A.W.*, 103 N.J. 591, 617, 618 (1986); *Biddle v. Biddle*, 166 N.J. Super. 1,7(App. Div. 1979); *J.L. v. J.F.*, 317 N.J. Super. 418, 438 (App. Div.), cert. den.158 N.J. 685 (1999); *Brown v. Brown*, 348 N.J. Super. 466, 493(App. Div.) cert.den.174 N.J. 193 (2002); *Cameco v. Gedicke*, 299 N.J. Super. 203, 216 (App. Div. 1997); *Carmichael v. Brian*, 310 N.J. Super. 34, 49 (App. Div. 1998).
[brief] Chulsky and Joe Hand Promotions are federal cases decided before the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Gonzalez.  For those reasons alone, Chulsky and Joe Hand Promotions cannot control here or overrule Gonzalez.  [...], being the lone published case cited by Defendants, is also distinguishable from the case at bar in several material respects; first, the CFA claimant in [...] was found not to be a “consumer” because he was acting in his capacity as a sole proprietor of a law firm.
[directive] $500 $500 $500 $500 $500  MUNICIPAL warrant when RULE offenses substantive considered TO OFFENSES  Disorderly a whether Disorderly Disorderly Disorderly Disorderly Disorderly PURSUANT  Persons  Persons  Persons Persons Persons Persons Degree included THE Petty actual IN be regarding PERSONS OR, lesser to appropriate.  no the ADMINISTRATOR, disorderly factors  JUDGE if where on as or as removes occupied offense. factors offense. or honored
[brief] JACOBS ENJOYS DESIGN OR PLAN IMMUNITY  The trial court correctly found that the [...] enjoys sovereign plan or design immunity.  [...], as a consulting contractor, has derivative immunity under the Tort Claims Act.  Although the trial court did not reach this issue as it granted judgment as a matter of law on the independent grounds discussed above, [...] raised it on summary judgment and it provides an independent basis for this Court to affirm the decision of the trial court.  [...] is entitled to plan or design immunity under the plain text of the statute.  Moreover, granting [...] such immunity is consistent with the underlying public policy of such immunity and New Jersey Supreme Court authority.  *Weiss v. New Jersey Transit*, 128 N.J. 376, 380 (1992).  *Thompson v. Newark Housing Authority*, 108 N.J. 525, 534 (1987); *Ellison v. Housing Authority of South Amboy*, 162 N.J. 347, 351 (1978)  **CONCLUSION**  For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for [...] Engineering Group, Inc.  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  Date: November 13, 2023  Opinion  DOCKET NO. [...] 04-29-2020  [...] and [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...], d/b/a [...], [...], AIA, and [...], Defendants, and [...], AIA, [...], and [...], Defendants-Respondents.
[directive] Amwens ke antant la te prevwa le kontre, yo kab kondane w pou pije tan maksimom nan prizon, peye amann maksimom la ak peye fre maksimom ba [...]/[...]?  [Yes/wi]  You must pay a minimum [...] Office Assessment of $50 ($100 [No/Non] c. minimum if you are convicted of a crime of violence) for each count to which you plead guilty?  (Penalty is $30 if offense occurred between January 9, 1986 and December 22, 1991 inclusive.  $25 if offense occurred before January 1, 1986.)  Ou oblije peye yon fre minimom de $50 ba [...] ($100 minimom si yo kondane w de yon zak vyolans) pou chak chef akizasyon ke ou plede koupab la?
[brief] *See* [...]’s Br. 21-22.  The trial court did not find that [...] did not violate the NJCFLA—[...]’s lack of licensure under the NJCFLA has never been disputed.  Nor did the trial court find that a “federal statute” must be violated in order to implicate concerns of public policy.  Like [...], the trial court erred by determining that [...]’s violations of the NJCFLA did not present a “countervailing policy interest,” while ignoring the policy interests furthered by the NJCFLA, explained above.
[brief] “It’s what did you do, not what could you have done better”.  1T, P. 12, line 24-25.  Did plaintiffs’ counsel disclose the existence of [...]’s investigation to [...] and [...]?  No.  “The question then is did we do diligence sufficient so that the Court would make a determination we didn’t voluntarily sleep on our rights”.  1T, P. 13, line 17-21.  There is no indication that plaintiffs made any effort or engaged in due diligence using [...]’s investigation information to identify [...] and to commence a timely action against [...].
[brief] 1)  Negligent, Reckless and Wanton Violation of Plaintiff's Rights; 2)  [Dismissed]  3)  [Dismissed]  4) Violation of N.J. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 6, 10, 18, 22 Peper v. Princeton U. Bd. of Trustees, 389 A.2d 465 (N.J. 1978); 5) Violations of N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(C); 6) [Dismissed]; and 7)  [Dismissed].  As argued below, the Appellant has not only failed to plead a viable cause of action, but the Amended Complaint was also filed after the statute of limitations passed, (to which a dismissal without prejudice does not toll the statute of limitations) and therefore does not meet the initial pleading requirement.
[directive] / / Date Defendant 날짜 피고인 / Defense Attorney 피고측 변호인 / Prosecutor 검사 지령 제01-18 호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 수정 양식, 페이지  CN 11080-Korean 2/2 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11080-Korean page 2 of 2
[brief] (T23:5-25; T25:16-26:9; Pa130 at ¶6.)  In response, Plaintiffs admitted and represented that the WARD Memo “isn’t being presented for the truth of the matter asserted[,]” but was being presented as allegedly part of the record below because it was not considered by the Governing Body.  (T28:15-29:9 (“THE COURT: Okay.  So it’s not whether it’s a document that [...] would say is part of the record, it’s – you say they should have considered it and they didn’t ….  [PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. ”).)  [...] explained that any such basis was irrelevant given that the Governing Body’s decision is presumed to have factual support; thus, Plaintiffs bear a “heavy burden” to surmount that presumption, which could be “overcome only by proofs that preclude the possibility that there … could have been any set of facts known to the legislative body that would rationally support a conclusion that the enactment is in the public interest.
[directive] SUBJECT: Weed and Seed Initiative; Transfers of Real Property  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  This directive describes the Weed and Seed Initiative and explains how federally forfeited real properties may be transferred to State and local public agencies and private non- in profit organizations for use support of the Weed and Seed Initiative.  Importantly, this directive sets forth additional guidance to permit the expanded use of federally forfeited real property to support Weed and Seed programs.  The directive reviews the legal authority for this change in the sharing program.  It then describes the procedure by which Weed and Seed transfers are to be accomplished.  In summary, the process parallels the current sharing procedure, including use of TD F consultation among Federal, State, and local 92-22.46, law enforcement authorities, and final approval real property of transfers by the [...].  Where there is a legal impediment to a Weed and Seed transfer through the participating or local law enforcement agency, the S t a t e transfer can still be accomplished through the [...] ([...]).  [...] will also play a consultant role in transfers made through State and local law enforcement agencies.  Generally, recipients will be expected to pay, prior to -- - - transfer, agy mortgages and qualified third party interests against the real property transferred.  Other costs will be paid from the [...].  No transfer will be made over the objection of a State or local law enforcement agency which is entitled to an equitable share of the net proceeds from the sale of the property to be transferred.
[brief] Sometime in 2011 after defendant [...] arrest he received an anonymous threat letter by someone that was threatening to kill [...] family if he said anything and did not take the murder charge he was accused of.  On Friday, June 24, 2011 Jamar [...] sought to speak to detective [...] to inform the detective that people were threatening to kill and take the lives of [...] family, and police detective [...] did nothing to help the defendant protect his family from people who might have been making actual possible threats towards [...] family.  The detective also did no further investigation of [...] claims of people possibly threatening his family (Da 93).  Jamar [...] stayed in [...] for seven years awaiting trial for a 7-11 robbery [...] was accused of.  On November 10, 2015, and August 30th, 2016 a 404-b motion was heard before [...] and evidence of an unrelated crime (the robbery indictment) was prejudicially, illegally, and improperly admitted into Jamar [...] murder trial.  The 404-B admission of the illegally obtained evidence into [...] murder trial prejudiced [...] from being offered a fair trial.  **[...]:**
[brief] ”  *See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D* at Ill. 1 (“A, a creditor, writes a letter to the employer of B, his debtor, informing him that B owes a debt and will not pay it.  This is not an invasion of B’s privacy under this Section. ”)  Indeed, Plaintiff herself has signaled that a dissemination of her debt information is not highly offensive because she has made her debt information publicly available by providing detailed information regarding all her debts, including the one at issue in this case, in her public bankruptcy petition.
[brief] A.  A dismissal of the indictment with prejudice was unwarranted under the circumstances, where the judge found that the State’s conduct was not willful or outrageous and where defendant’s alleged prejudice was remediable with a lesser remedy.  The judge properly exercised her discretion in declining to dismiss the indictment with prejudice for the State’s inadvertently delayed disclosure of the diagram.  “A decision to dismiss an indictment is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. ”  *State v. Zadroga*, 255 N.J. 114, 131 (2023); see also *State v. Washington*, 453 N.J. Super. 164, 179-80 (App. Div. 2018) (“A trial court’s resolution of a discovery issue is entitled to substantial deference and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion . . . that is well ‘wide of the mark,’ or ‘based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law. ’”).  “[I]n the context of a *Brady* violation, the remedy of dismissal of an indictment with prejudice is utilized when ‘the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction. ’”  *State v. Brown*, 236 N.J. 497, 528 (2019) (quoting *United States v. Russell*, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973)).  Generally, the remedy “should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests. ”  *United States v. Morrison*, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981); see also *Washington*, 453 N.J. Super. at 190 (noting “the sanction of preclusion is a drastic remedy and should be applied only after other alternatives are fully explored”).
[brief] [...] was called as a witness by the attorney who represented [...].  According to [...], while inside the store, he saw “five or six guys” come in “with dreds intending to rob the chicken spot;” one of the men ordered “everybody [to] get down. ”  Because he “refused” to lay down, one of the men shot him and “took off after that[.]”  [...] confirmed that he told the responding officers that the shooter wore a “green army fatigue jacket. ”  Similar to [...]'s account of events, [...] testified that neither [...] nor [...] were among the shooters.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT: POINT I:  I.  DEFENDANT’S CELLULAR PHONE WAS PROPERLY SEIZED VIA PROBABLE CAUSE AND AN EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR  .........................4  A.  The Trial Court Did Not Err in Finding That There Was Probable Cause to Search the Cell Phone .................................................................7  B.  The Trial Court Did Not Err in Finding That the Seizure of the Phone Was Pursuant to the Consent Exception to the Warrant Requirement...8  C.  The Trial Court Did Not Err in Finding That the Seizure of the Cell Phone Was Justified by Exigent Circumstances ..............................................10  D.  The Trial Court Did Not Err in Not Granting Defendant’s Suppression Motion after the Trial Testimony of the Witnesses Who Had Testified at the Suppression Hearing .................................................................12  POINT II: II.  THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HER DISCRETION IN ADMITTING THE STATE’S PATHOLOGIST’S TESTIMONY .............15  A.  The Pathologist’s Opinions Did Not Violate Discovery Rules ............16  B.  The Pathologist’s Opinions Were Not Net Opinions and Their Admission Was Not an Abuse of Discretion  ..................................................18  C.  There Was No Due Process Violation .........................................................21  POINT III:
[brief] See, e.g., *Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe*, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002); *R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co.*, 168 N.J. 255, 271–72 (2001)  [...]’s Opposition totally obfuscates [...]’s legal argument in its Motion to Dismiss and Cross-Motion, and incorrectly characterizes [...] as challenging the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  The Board’s constitutional claim is prominently featured and explained in detail under Count Two of the Complaint, yet [...] never pleaded any affirmative defenses related to those claims.  The entirety of [...]’s attempt for the court to reject [...]’s constitutional argument is based on their objectively false assertion that [...] is challenging the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) – which, of course, has never been the argument by [...].  The actual argument of [...] is stated in the point heading and throughout the analysis, which is, “The legal basis for the Counterclaim requires the court to interpret N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) in a manner that violates the Impairment of Contracts Clauses under the U.S. Constitution and New Jersey Constitution” [emphasis supplied].
[brief] PCMD is an engineering system.  It’s used by network engineers to optimize the network.  To look for dead spots, to handle complaint calls, that sort of thing.  So what it does is it talks to the phones and takes measurements of how far the phone is from the tower that it is providing service to, or a tower that’s in the footprint of.  So it does an internal calculation based on the speed at which it takes the signal to get from the tower to the phone and back to the tower, and it provides an estimated distance from the tower .  . .  Again, they use this to optimize their networks.  It’s not like somebody’s out there with a tape measure for every transaction.  It’s a signal.  It’s a calculation, so sometimes it’s extremely accurate.  Sometimes it’s a little less than accurate.  T1, 111:24-25 to 112:1-21 PCMD is used by [...] for network optimization.  Law enforcement uses the data to locate a phone based on measuring data.  T1, 117:14-23.  [...] attached a disclaimer to its records warning that due to server capacity problems, the [...] records (used in the case) may be incomplete.  T1, 156:21-25 to 157:1-4.  [...] data contains known inaccuracies, at least according to [...] as to latitude and longitude.  T1, 160:1-17.  [...] acknowledged that [...] is unable to certify or testify to the accuracy of PCMD records.
[brief] Db28 to Db32 is defendants' discussion of Protestant Episcopal Church in Diocese of N.J. v. Graves, 83 N.J. 572 (1980).  The Graves Court declared that "[o]nly where no hierarchical control is involved, should the neutral principles of law principle be called into play.  Here it has been established that the Protestant Episcopal Church is a completely integrated hierarchical body .  . . ."  Id. at 580.  Defendants failed to establish integrated hierarchy as a matter of law.
[brief] His own expert opines that “the platforms,” the location of every event that forms the basis of Appellant’s complaint, “offer ample amounts of surveillance for patrons. ”  (Pa 142)  He then goes on to offer an evaluation of the “portal beneath the rail lines. ”  And declaring these areas unsafe because of low lighting, low ceilings, and blind corners.  This expert claims that these conditions afford potential criminals the opportunity to commit premeditated crimes in these areas.  (Id.)  That is not what happened here.
[brief] The manner in which Defendants cleared the snow is critical.  As defendant correctly asserts, this is a matter of first impression as there is no New Jersey case law related to improperly mounded snow.  However, Courts in other states have held that a reasonable jury could find negligence where a defendant cleared snow into “slopes” around a parking lot which led caused rainwater to pool into a parking lot.  San Marco v. Vill./Town of Mount Kisco, 919 N.Y.S.2d 459 (2010) (finding triable issue of fact as to whether defendant municipality negligently cleared snow in a parking lot by creating piles too close to adjacent parking spaces where plaintiff fell after melting and refreezing); Smith v. Town of Greenwich, 899 A.2d 563, 574 (Conn. 2006) (holding that jury could have found that additional snow piled on sidewalk could lead to increased water flow when snow melted, increasing size and dangerousness of the resulting ice patch); Harman v. Belisle, No. HHDCV126035291S, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2211, at *14-15 (Super. Ct. Sep. 4, 2014) (distinguishing natural and man-made snow piles and holding that an unreasonably large or tall pile of snow could lead to a finding of negligence) (citing Kiel v. Girard, 274 Ill.App.3d 821, 825, 654, appeal denied, 164 Ill. 2d 565 (1995) (“The snow mounds were man-made, not natural.  Injuries caused by unnatural accumulations of piled snow may form the basis of liability, provided that the creation or placement of such piles was negligent”)).  Here, as Plaintiff’s expert avers, Defendants mounded snow in “upland areas along the sloped driveway” near a weep hole in the retaining wall.  The evidence here could lead a reasonable to conclude that Defendant’s affirmative conduct caused Plaintiff’s fall and injuries.