ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] That such discrimination could continue in the meantime, and may not be fully remediable after the fact, undermines “any adjudication [[...]] may make in this matter in vindication of [students’] rights. ”  Pfaus, 97 N.J. Super. at 8 (adding “adequate enforcement” of the LAD ranks “high indeed in our public policy”).  The court’s order was further justified “to aid in the preservation of the subject matter of a proceeding pending before an administrative agency. ”  Ibid.; see also ibid. (emphasizing that courts “cannot adopt a grudging or narrow approach” in this circumstance, because otherwise, administrative adjudication of LAD rights could become “a vain and useless act”); Poff, 228 N.J. Super. at 379 (enjoining landlord from renting apartment while an administrative proceeding under the LAD was pending concerning refusal to rent apartment to gay men).
[brief] For the reasons set forth in Points I-IV, [...]’s conviction should be vacated and the denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal should be reversed in part.  In the alternative, for the reasons set forth in Point V, the matter should be remanded for resentencing.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for the Defendant-Appellant  BY: s/[...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID: 446232023  Dated: January 10, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  --------------------------------- STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, : V. : On Appeal From a Final Judgment of CORTNEY BELL, : Conviction in the Superior Court of DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
[brief] Plaintiff [...] (Dillon) filed this action on June 14, 2017 and on January 30, 2018, Dillon filed a First Amended Complaint (Pa19-Pa55) pursuant to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, New Jersey Civil Rights Act and the Constitution of New Jersey seeking redress for workplace discrimination, harassment and retaliation.  On February 15, 2018, defendants filed an Answer To Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint with Separate Defenses and Jury Demand (Pa56-Pa81) and filed an amended Answer to plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint on March 20, 2018.  (Pa82 to Pa108).  On January 4, 2019, the Court sua sponte entered an Order appointing Honorable [...], J.S.C. (ret.) as a mediator in this case and mandating that the parties participate in mediation and precluding the filing of discovery motions unless the parties attempt to resolve the issue through mediation.  (Pa122-Pa123).  On May 31, 2019, the court entered an Order directing plaintiff to pay the mediator’s bill notwithstanding a dispute regarding the matter (Pa208-Pa209).  On July 5, 2019, the court scheduled a hearing entering an Order setting the matter down for a hearing on the issue of the mediator’s fee.  (Pa210-Pa211).  Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (Pa245-Pa283).  On August 29, 2019, an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint was filed on behalf of Defendants [...], [...] Department of Environmental Protection, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...].  (Pa212-Pa218).  On August 29, 2019, a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint was filed on behalf of [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].  (Pa219-Pa221).  On October 11, 2019, an Order was entered dismissing the Second Amended Complaint against [...] in its entirety and dismissing Counts 2 and 4 only against moving defendants [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].  (Pa223-Pa224).  On October 11, 2019, an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint was filed on behalf of [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].  (Pa225-Pa232).  On July 29, 2022, a Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by defendants [...], [...] Department of Environmental Protection, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...].  (Pa233-Pa398).  On September 27, 2022, a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on behalf of plaintiff [...].  (Pa399-Pa700).  On October 17, 2022, defendants filed additional documents in reply to plaintiff’s opposition to defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and in opposition to plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.  (Pa703-Pa805).  On October 19, 2022, plaintiff [...] filed a Notice of Motion for an Order Permitting Defendants to Substantively Respond to Paragraphs 22 to 29, 31 to 67, 69 to 81, 83 to 130, 132 to 146, 148 to 198 and 201 to 242 of Plaintiff [...]’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment or, Alternatively, to Consider Those Paragraphs Unopposed in Conformance With Rule 4:46-2(b).  (Pa806-Pa836).  On November 10, 2022, an Order entering summary judgment in favor of defendants was entered and the second amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice as to all defendants.
[brief] Thereafter, the Trial Court received submissions by counsel for two of the surrounding Lot owners.  On December 18, 2023, Ms. [...], Esq. submitted a letter on behalf of Mr. [...], owner of [...].  (Da6).  Subsequently, on January 9, 2024, Mr. [...], Esq. submitted a letter on behalf of [...], trustees, owners of [...].  (Da10).  Ms. Powell McGovern, Esq. provided an extensive description of the underlying issues, but ultimately stated that her client did not wish to intervene or participate in the underlying litigation and did not object to the adoption of the Commissioners’ Report as it related to the [...] and [...].  As no attempt to include the other property owners that are in the direct line of this potential border shift was done until after discovery and trial the change to these other boundary lines should be precluded.  Moreover, Mr. Rosencranz and his other neighbors to the south were content with their property borders.  This is an argument between the [...] and the [...] that should not spill over onto their neighbors.  It is respectfully requested that no additional action be taken past enforcement of the decision of the Commissioners which is limited to the border between Ahmed and Patierno.
[brief] The Finding of Appellant’s False Statements is Based in Fact.  The OAL Trial transcripts are littered with Appellant’s misrepresentations and outright lies.  Appellant attempts to cause unnecessary confusion by alleging that self-perceived inconsistencies, taken out of context, should be sufficient to overturn [...]’s credible determinations.  Appellant asks this Court to completely disregard his “evolving theory”, which started with an immediate demand for Narcan, then his story changed by saying that [...] only drank, then changed again when he said [...] had maybe taken pills, and finally evolved into a presumptive admission that [...] took oxycodone.  [Pa44; 4T52:20-24, 4T134:11-21].  Appellant cites to the OAL Trial decision in an attempt to discredit [...] based on one (1) sentence – “Yet when asked what [...] might have taken, appellant did not mention opioids. ”  [Pb24].  Appellant uses this partial reference to create the perception that [...] misstated the facts because Appellant did in fact eventually state that [...] took opioids.
[brief] During the course of his testimony on direct examination, [...] was shown the contract between [...] and [...] by which [...] agreed to serve as the resident engineer for the subject portion of the Project.  (3T58:23-59:8).  [...] testified that the language contained within page 1 of 3 of Attachment B of [...]’s contract provided that [...]'s scope of services included the maintenance and protection of traffic.  (3T59:2-24 and Pa1271).  [...] then testified that as per page 2 of Attachment B to the contract, [...]'s scope of services included the responsibility to attend and/or conduct a pre-construction meeting and to inspect construct activities to ensure quality of workmanship (item (f)).  (3T60:25-62:2 and Pa1271).  [...] did not testify that the term “construction activities” as used within [...]’s contract included the maintenance and protection of traffic as part of the contract.  (3T62:3-13).  [...]'s also opined that item (g) listed within page 2 of Attachment B to [...]’s contract obligated [...] to provide full-time construction supervision services during all phases of construction, including unanticipated emergency repair work as directed by the field project manager.  (3T62:15-24 and Pa1271)).  [...] did not testify on direct examination that [...]'s contract required [...] to identify any conditions that pre-existed the performance of the project-related work or any condition that was outside the area where project-related work was being performed.  On cross-examination, [...] was again questioned about Attachment B to [...]'s contract.  Specifically, [...] was questioned regarding language found within page 1 of Attachment B providing that [...]’s construction administration services under the contract were to be provided consistent with the [...]’s Construction Manual.  (3T186:17-187:19 and Pa1271).  Materially, [...] conceded that he never referred to the [...]’s Construction Manual in developing his opinions related to whether [...]’s services satisfied the governing standard of care.  (3T187:20-189:15).  By way of follow-up questioning, [...] testified that [...]’s role as the resident engineer was to take steps to ensure that the general contractor, [...], satisfied the project specifications.  (3T190:1-5).  [...] conceded, however, that in developing his standard of care opinion he did not evaluate the manner by which [...] performed its construction management services.  [...] in fact specifically recognized that he paid no attention to the process by which [...] effectuated its construction management services during the course of the Project.  (3T190:6-16).
[brief] Student-petitioners’ will argue as to the constitutionality of SFRA as applied that, even if the statutory formula is fully funded in the upcoming school year, it will fall far short of providing the district with enough funding to assure its students T&E.  The simple reason, acknowledged by the State and everyone else, is that [...] has unique demographic characteristics and that SFRA’s application to [...] has never been meaningfully evaluated and calibrated to those district characteristics, as required by Abbott XX.  We address the third question by explaining why the Final Decision’s emphasis on local remedies regarding increased tax levies and improved local management efficiencies is manifestly wrong as a matter of law and fact.  We then suggest how this court should launch an appropriate State-level remedial process as expeditiously as possible so that the longstanding and inexcusable denial of the [...] public school students’ fundamental constitutional right to T&E can be remedied.
[directive] The triage officer would also emphasize that the triage decision was not made by the attending physician but is instead one that arose from the extraordinary emergency circumstances, and reflects a public health decision.  Regardless of who communicates the decision, it may useful to explain the medical factors that informed the decision, as well as the factors that were not relevant (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender, insurance status, perceptions of social worth, immigration status, among others).  If resources permit, palliative care clinicians or social workers should be present or available to provide ongoing emotional support to the patient and family.
[brief] When a defendant does --- ¹ “Original motion” presumably refers to the Summary Judgment motion decided by [...], which was the second dispositive motion filed by Defendants, the first being decided by [...]. not object to an alleged error at trial, such error is reviewed under the plain error standard.  See R. 2:10-2; see also State v. Camacho, 218 N.J. 533, 554 (2014).  Under that standard, an error constitutes plain error only if it was “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  R. 2:10-2.  “Plain error is a high bar and constitutes ‘error not properly preserved for appeal but of a magnitude dictating appellate consideration. ’”  State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 404 (2019).  In this case, it appears that by referencing “the original Motion,” that Plaintiff means he should have been given a chance to argue before [...] the issues he believed to have been addressed by [...].
[brief] In the instant matter, there is no prior history of similar complaints and as such, there are no records that exist for the medical expert to compare.  While Appellant argues that [...] did not review prior medical records in order to establish his opinion relative to aggravation, the only prior medical records that exist are those of Respondent’s primary care physician, which were reviewed by Appellant’s medical expert, [...]; who acknowledges no prior similar complaints to be noted in the records.  Appellant is seeking to have Respondent prove a negative, where in reality, this is precisely why we ask the factfinder to be the Judge of credibility.  Respondent testified under oath that she had no history of neck pain and/or upper extremity radicular symptoms, prior to the subject incident.  Respondent’s primary care physician records, the only records pre-dating the subject incident, are devoid of any neck and/or upper extremity complaints.
[brief] (20T166-1 to 20; 20T171-6 to 8; 20T171-17 to 172-1; 20T174-19 to 22; 20T175-6 to 9; 20T176-1 to 6; 20T176-7 to 11; 20T177-20 to 178-6; 20T178-7 to 11; 20T180-10 to 19; 20T180-20 to 22; 20T182-2 to 6; 20T182-7 to 10; 20T182-12 to 16; 20T182-21 to 183-7; 20T183-13 to 20; 20T184-4 to 20; 20T186-24 to 187-17; 20T187-18 to 21; 20T188-8 to 10; 20T188-11 to 16; 20T188-25 to 189-3; 20T189-3 to 6; 20T190-1 to 12; 20T190-13 to 19; 20T190-20 to 21; 20T191-16 to 22; 20T191-23 to 25; 20T192-14 to 23; 20T193-18 to 24; 20T193-25 to 194-3; 20T195-20 to 22; 20T195-23 to 196-1; 20T196-21 to 197-9; 20T197-10 to 14; 20T199-20 to 25; 20T200-1 to 4; 20T200-24 to 201-2; 20T201-21 to 25; 20T202-1 to 6).}  In discussing the verdict sheet, the judge charged that the “verdicts as to each and every one of the questions that I am reading is to be unanimous.
[brief] The Property is currently underutilized.  The Project will redevelop the site with a mix of approximately 1,077 residential units consisting of apartments, townhomes, stacked townhomes, condominiums and single family homes, subject (sic) to Article III of the Redevelopment Agreements, at least the lesser of 20% of the total residential units or 216 of residential units or 216 of such units will be Affordable Units, to be sold or leased at market rates and affordable rates, as applicable, in accordance with the Redevelopment Plan, the redevelopment Agreements and Site Plan Approval.  The Project will create approximately 2,410 construction jobs and 10 permanent jobs.  The Project will generate significant amounts of new (otherwise unavailable) municipal revenues through the Annual Service Charge, construction permit fees and water/sewer fees.  More importantly, the Project will help the Township fulfill its constitutional obligation to provide housing opportunities for households with limited incomes.  Considering current market conditions, economic factors and development costs impacting this Project, it is not financially feasible to undertake the development of this Project in the absence of the tax exemption provided for herein.
[brief] See Kleine v. Emeritus at Emerson, 445 NJ Super 545, 551 (App. Div. 2016) suggesting a lack of reciprocity in a contract of adhesion may be unconscionable.  The judge’s opinion found this attorney’s fee provision unenforceable (Pa 9).  Plaintiff did not appeal that part of the judge’s decision (Pa 1) and the Defendant has not filed a cross-appeal.
[directive] Questions.  Any questions concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Directive shall be addressed to the Director of the [...], or their designee.  The Director of the [...] shall consult with the Executive Director of [...] as appropriate.  D.  Effective date.  These Guidelines shall take effect on August 1, 2025.  The provisions of these Guidelines shall remain in force and effect unless and until repealed, amended, or superseded by Order of the Attorney General.
[brief] Proposed Order in Criminal Matter by [...] (Attached at Pa065)  Letter from [...] to [...] dated 9/30/2020 (Attached at Pa068)  Discovery Desk Central Records (Attached at Pa069)  Discovery Checklist (billing date 5/5/2020) (Attached at Pa070)  Letter from Public Safety to [...] 7/7/2020 (Attached at Pa071)  Discovery Checklist (billing date 7/7/20) (Attached at Pa0028)  Consent to Search Vehicle 2/20/20-00:47 (Attached at Pa0029)  Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0030)  Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0031)  Evidence Form (Marijuana) (Attached at Pa0032)  Evidence Form (Orange Pill) (Attached at Pa0033)  Evidence Form (Money) (Attached at Pa0034)  Evidence Form (1 Key and other items) (Attached at Pa0035)  Evidence Receipt from Lab (Tab/Marijuana) (Attached at Pa0036)  Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0031)  Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0030)  CJIS Transmittal Form (Attached at Pa0038)  Wanted Person Request (Mugshot) (Attached at Pa0039)  [...]’ Letter to [...] and Court Administrator, Dated 9/25/2020 (Attached at Pa0056)  Letter to [...] 10/27/2020 regarding trial scheduled when discovery incomplete non receipt of audio/videos and motion to suppress not heard (Attached at Pa072)
[brief] ]  Plaintiff focuses on the final clause and unconvincingly attempts to explain away the bolded clause, arguing that it “must not be read as an endorsement of pipeline retroactivity; rather it is meant to clarify that cases which have already reached a final judgment and exhausted all appeals are not to be reopened. ”  The problem is that there was already a lawsuit that determined the parties’ rights with respect to the property, that is, the tax foreclosure which was completed in early 2018.  The second clause – that rules of federal law apply “as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate the announcement of the rule” – must be read in light of the first clause.
[brief] R. 2:5-1(f)(3)(i); see also 30 River Court East Urban Renewal Co. v. Capogrosso, 383 N.J. Super. 470, 474 (App. Div. 2006)(citing R. 2:5-1(f)(3)(i)) and Fusco v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 460-62 (App. Div. 2002)).  In addition, Appellant has presented no legal basis to support that Appellant is entitled to a relaxation or waiver of the New Jersey Court Rules to the detriment of, and prejudice to [...], who constructed the subject dock in accordance with the Waterfront Development Law, the CZM Rules and NJDEP approvals.  Appellant’s time to appeal the 2017 WFD Permit and the 2019 Permit Modification expired long ago.  R. 2:4-l(b) requires appeals of final agency decisions to be taken within forty-five days of the decision.  It is undisputed that Appellant did not appeal the 2017 WFD Permit or the 2019 Permit Modification within forty-five days or any time after.  Moreover, Appellant has not sought leave to include a challenge to the 2017 WFD Permit or the 2019 Permit Modification in this appeal.  (Aa0532-Aa0535).  As a result, Appellant’s challenge here should be limited to the March 14, 2023 decision denying Appellant’s adjudicatory hearing request.
[brief] Ibid.  The Wage Collection Act permits employees to either file a claim with the Commissioner of Labor or to pursue remedies in the Superior Court.  N.J.S.A. 34:11–34:12:61-1.3.  Plaintiffs have adequately pled that their employer owed wages which were earned and that those wages were not paid.  Pa000043.  As previously discussed, the MSRA does not amend New Jersey wage and hour laws or prevent Plaintiffs from seeking relief pursuant to these laws.
[brief] Order Denying Plaintiff [...]'s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated May 15, 2023 ..................................................................................................................  Pa535  Order Granting Intervenor Active Acquisitions  OY, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated May 15, 2023 ..................................................................................................................  Pa537  TRANSCRIPTS  [...] Meeting September 20, 2022 ...........................................................................................................  1T  [...] Meeting October 27, 2022 ...............................................................................................................  2T Hearing on Motions for Summary Judgment  May 15, 2023 ....................................................................................................................  3T  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The difference here is that -- the difference between what is argued Celgene stands for and what occurred here is that plaintiff points out where the plaintiff had first timely and previously filed a claim in federal court, which was dismissed by that court for lack of jurisdiction, and then followed by a prompt filing in New Jersey.  We don't have that here.  We do not have a timely filing.  And there's a distinction between this case and the Celgene case.  In Celgene there was a timely filing.  In this case, as [...] indicated, there was not a timely filing and so that case was not dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, that case was dismissed with prejudice as being time barred.
[brief] [...] Notice of Claim to [...] 2/27/2020 (Attached at Pa053) Letter From [...] to [...] 6/19/2020 (Attached at Pa084) Letter From [...] to [...] 6/22/2020 (Attached at Pa078) Letter From [...] to [...] 7/7/2020 (Attached at Pa071) Discovery Checklist (billing date 7/7/2020) (Attached at Pa028) Consent to Search Vehicle 2/20/20-00:47 (Attached at Pa0029) Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0030) Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0031) Evidence Form (Marijuana) (Attached at Pa0032) Evidence Form (Orange Pill) (Attached at Pa0033) Evidence Form (Money) (Attached at Pa0034) Evidence Form (1 Key and other items) (Attached at Pa0035) Evidence Receipt from Lab (Tab/Marijuana) (Attached at Pa0036) CJIS Transmittal Form 2/20/20 (Attached at Pa038) Wanted Person Picture of Plaintiff (Attached at Pa039) HIT Confirmation Wanted Person 02/20/2020 (Attached at Pa040)  Exhibit D to [...]’s Certification
[brief] The Authority Profited From The Marketing Plans To The Detriment Of [...]  The Authority profited from its unapproved marketing plans and [...] bore the costs thereof.  For example, the Authority retained all proceeds generated from sale of the coupon books.  See 1T69:20-23.  The Authority also did not include sales of coupon book in its calculations of total revenue.  Ibid.  Stated differently, the Authority kept all the profits from the sale of coupon books and did not credit [...] with any portion derived from such sales.  O.
[brief] (16T:23-14 to 17);(16T:26-23 to 28-23).  Using hearsay evidence elicited by the State’s expert on rebuttal as substantive evidence is in direct violation of what the Court indicated that this evidence can be used for in Mesz, 459 N.J. Super. at 319.  Because the Court did not immediately give a limiting instruction to hearsay testimony as is required under Mesz, the jury was left trying to differentiate between the substantive evidence and the excessive amounts of hearsay elicited from the State’s expert.  Mesz, 459 N.J. Super. at 319.  Here, allowed excessive amounts of hearsay to be interjected into the case through the State’s expert and read a broad limiting instruction.