ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1.  Letter dated February 7, 2024 with Defendant’s Statement of the Case in advance of the pre-trial conference scheduled for later that morning (Da27); 2.  Letter dated February 19, 2024 requesting adjournment of the trial date (Pa8); 3.  Defendant’s request to charge dated February 20, 2024 (Pa9); 4.  Letter dated February 22, 2024 wherein defense counsel requests an adjournment due to alleged prejudice due to law enforcement in the courtroom, his alleged inability to meet with Defendant and the possibility of Defendant appearing in prison garb (Pa3); 5.  Letter dated February 25, 2024 requesting late start to any trial due to defense counsel’s religious observances (Pa10); 6.  Letter dated February 25, 2024 discussing Plaintiff’s motion in limine and reiterating his adjournment request (Pa11); 7.  Letter dated February 26, 2024 repeating defense counsel’s request to have the trial begin later in the morning to accommodate defense counsel’s religious observances (Pa12); 8.  Letter dated February 26, 2024 advising Defendant will be eligible for parole on April 16th and requesting an adjournment (Pa13); 9.  Letter dated February 27, 2024 requesting an adjournment of the trial because defense counsel again alleges he does not have access to his client at [...], but providing no proof of same (Pa14); 10.  Letter dated March 1, 2024 requesting an adjournment because Defendant may be forced to appear in prison garb and may be guarded by law enforcement while in the courtroom (Pa15); 11.  Letter dated March 4, 2024 acknowledging [...]’s denial of his adjournment requests (Pa17); 12.  Defendant’s late opposition dated March 4, 2024 to Plaintiff’s motion in limine (Pa18); 13.  Letter dated March 7, 2024 again requesting an adjournment because his client will be forced to appear in prison garb and repeating his claim that he has been unable to meet with his client [submitted after [...] denied his adjournment requests on the record on March 6, 2024] (Pa20); 14.  Letter dated March 8, 2024 requesting another adjournment and advising for the first time that due to the failure of an unnamed third party, defense counsel has been unable to contact his client to prepare for trial [submitted after [...] denied his adjournment requests on the record on March 6, 2024] (Pa22); 15.  Letter dated March 8, 2024 admitting that he was able to speak with his client but asks for an adjournment because his client alleges he will be relegated to maximum security status for leaving [...] State Prison to attend trial on March 11th [submitted after [...] denied his adjournment requests on the record on March 6, 2024] (Pa24); and 16.  Defendant’s Requests to Charge (Pa25).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
[directive] Consistent with guidance from public health officials, the Judiciary for more than a year was unable to summon jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and the parties for in-person jury trials.  As a result, the Court on its own entered fourteen omnibus orders that tolled the clock for the start of criminal trials for a total of 461 days.  Those developments inevitably led to an increase in the number of pending cases.  Today there are approximately 6,000 cases in which defendants are held in custody pursuant to an order of pretrial detention as they await trial.
[brief] \(^1\)  The language counted upon by [...] seems to have been originated by the Court in **Mount Holly State Bank v. Mount Holly Washington Hotel, Inc.**, 220 N.J. --- \(^1\)  The Trial Court below did not make any finding as to whether the test espoused by [...] was met under the facts of the case and otherwise did not indicate that it needed to make such a finding.  Super. 506 (App. Div. 1987).  In Mount Holly individuals signed a separate guaranty agreement for notes signed by a corporate entity.  There was no dispute in the case as to the validity of the personal guaranty.  Rather, the issue in the case was whether a restructuring of the underlying notes and changes in the ownership of the corporate entity affected the continued validity of the guaranties.  Accordingly, the Court in Mount Holly did not announce a new test to determine whether a personal guaranty was in effect in the first place, that was admitted by the parties.
[brief] In fact, it was amplified and reinforced when the Energy Master Plan noted that: “For solar energy, investments should be steered toward rooftops, carports, and marginalized land and away from open space. ”  \textit{Ibid.} (emphasis added).  This purpose has been recognized by the Court.  In \textit{In re Implementation of L. 2012, C. 24, Solar Act of 2012}, Docket No. [...], 2017 WL 4700553, at *1 (App. Div. Oct. 20, 2017) (165a), the Court explicitly stated that:
[brief] To reverse the Civil Service Commission’s (“CSC”) adoption of an Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) recommendation, an Appellate Court must find that the Commission’s decision is “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or [ ] not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole. ”  Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980), quoting Campbell v. Dep’t. of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963); In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194–95 (2011).  The same “standard applies to the review of disciplinary sanctions as well” as to the ultimate question as to whether charges should be sustained.  Knoble v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 67 N.J. 427, 431–32 (1975)).  Accordingly, when reviewing administrative sanctions, appellate courts should consider whether the “punishment is so disproportionate to the offense, in the light of all of the circumstances, as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness.
[brief] In the absence of interrogation, a spontaneous statement is admissible in evidence and is not the product of custodial interrogation.  Cf. State v. Barnes, 54 N.J. 1, 6, 252 A.2d 398 (1969), cert. den. 396 U.S. 1029 (1970); State v. Sessions, 172 N.J. Super. 558, 563, 412 A.2d 1325 (App. Div. 1980); State v. Mann, 171 N.J. Super. 173, 177–178 (App. Div. 1979).
[directive] SUPPLIED  If YES to 18.  (a-d), name of agency: ❏ ❏ 19.  Has a deconfliction query been made in accordance with AG Directive 2016-1?  Yes No  ❏ ❏  If Yes, did the deconfliction query result in a conflict alert? or negative match?  INFORMATION  If No, explain (e.g. not feasible, exemption authorized) and detail any exigent circumstances:  ❏ ❏  If conflict alert issued, has contact been made with all interested agencies?  Yes No  If Yes, identify all agencies and individuals contacted at same:  - 1 PART  If No, explain reasons:  ❏ ❏  Has the conflict alert been resolved?  Yes No  If Yes, summarize resolution:  If No, explain reasons:  20.  CERTIFICATION:  I certify that all of the information in this Application is true to the best of my knowedge and belief.  Signature: ___________________________________________________________________  Date:_____________________________________________  SEARCH WARRANT APPROVAL FORM Rev. 4/22/16
[brief] Both the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 – 16 (“FAA”) and the New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to 36 (“NJAA”) express a general policy favoring arbitration as a means of settling disputes that otherwise would be litigated in a court.  *Badiali v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Corp.*, 220 N.J. 554, 556 (2015).  They express federal and state policies favoring arbitration.  *Atalese*, supra. 219 N.J. 430, 441; *Hojnowski v. Vans State Park*, 187 N.J. 323, 341 (2006).  The FAA contains no express pre-emptive provision and does not reflect a federal intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration.  *Arafa v. Health Express Corporation*, 243 N.J. 152 (2020).  “The main thrust of the FAA, as well as the NJAA, is to ensure that states place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts. ”  *Delaney*, supra. 244 N.J. at 466, 494, quoting *AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).  “The FAA declares that a written arbitration provision encompassed by the FAA shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or inequity for the revocation of any contract.  9 U.S.C. §2.  The save upon phrase at the end of 9 U.S.C. §2 opens the door for application of ordinary state law principles that govern the formation of contracts.  *First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan*, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).  So, when determining the enforceability of an arbitration agreement, like any other contract, our courts will consider whether there was mutual assent, as impacted by notions of unconscionability that vary from case to case based upon the parties’ sophistication and the one-sided nature of the negotiations.  *Muhammad*, supra. 189 N.J. at 15, citing *Sitogum Holdings Inc. v. Ropes*, 352 N.J.Super. 555, 564 (Ch. Div. 2002). ”  *County of Passaic v. Horizon Healthcare Services Inc.*, 474 N.J.Super. 496, 501 (App. Div. 2023).  A court must first apply state contract law principles to determine whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists.  *Hirsch*, supra. 215 N.J. at 187.  This arbitrability analysis is set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6(b) and fact-finding requirements at N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-7(c):  “When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter courts generally should apply ordinary state law principles that govern the formation of contracts. ”  *Atalese*, supra. 219 N.J. at 142, citing *Hojnowski*, supra. 187 N.J. at 342  The inquiry is “whether the agreement to arbitrate all, or any portion of a dispute is the product of mutual assent as determined under customary principles of contract law. ”  *Delaney*, supra. 244 N.J. at 495, citing *Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc.*, 244 N.J. 119, 137 (2020) and *Kernahan*, supra. 236 N.J. at 319.  Accordingly, these arbitration and waiver provisions do not meet FAA or NJAAA requirements.
[brief] (P355).  Plaintiff did not immediately see the change to the website because at the time of the change in September of 2022, students already began classes, and were “already studying and doing work, so there’s no reason for me to review this [webpage] again. ” (Pa162).  Once Plaintiff learned of the changes, he was of the belief the website changed for the following class, as the new requirements were only included within the webpage after the inaugural class had begun.  (Pa179-Pa180).  In or around April of 2013, Plaintiff heard a rumor that the students of the inaugural class of the dual degree program would not be going directly into the master’s program as they initially believed, and Plaintiff contacted [...] (“[...]”), the Interim Dean of the College of Business, to verify whether this rumor was true or not.
[brief] Highland Park Municipal Court Zoom Session 2PM Oral Argument 6/23/2021  Exhibit C-5 to [...]’s Certification  [...] Letter to [...] and Edison Prosecutor 12/24/2020 (Attached at Pa108)  Certification of Eldridge [...] to Motion to Dismiss and suppress 10/14/2020  Statement of Facts - Police Reports Attached 10/13/2020  Notice of Motion to Suppress and Dismiss by [...] 10/13/2020 (Attached at Pa059)
[brief] It is undisputed that the defense never requested specific jury interrogatories.  Therefore, any conclusion that the jury did not find any causal connection between the aggravation of the plaintiff’s Ménière’s disease and the defendant’s negligence is mere conjecture and speculation.  The jury’s verdict, albeit low, does not automatically trigger a conclusion that the jury rejected all of the plaintiffs’ arguments.  Clearly the jury found that the defendant was substantially liable for the accident in question.  The speculation of defense counsel with respect to the reasons behind the jury’s awarding $25,000 is unpersuasive.  Respondent contends that “plaintiff mis- states the nature of the agreement between counsel.
[directive] 3.15  Reporting to Division of Criminal Justice  In order to permit the Division of Criminal Justice to monitor the implementation and impact of these Guidelines with a view toward ensuring statewide uniformity, each county prosecutor shall on not less than a quarterly basis transmit to the Division a copy of every Brimage Worksheet or Standardized Plea Form tendered within the applicable reporting period.  This reporting obligation may be satisfied by delivering hard copies of these worksheets and plea forms, or by transmitting the information electronically by means of Brimage calculation software developed by the Division.  3.16  Periodic Review and Revisions
[brief] [...] has appealed from two orders of the Trial Court.  One, memorialized by a “transcript of decision” issued by [...] on October 17, 2019, granted [...]’s motion for reconsideration of a previous ruling, and entered partial summary judgment for [...] refusing to apply “Appleman’s rule” to coverage under the mold exclusions in [...]’s policies.  Da155; 6T27-2 to 8 and 6T30-23 to 6T31-9.  The second order, entered by [...] on May 24, 2023 and accompanied by a memorandum decision, issued following an October 11 through October 14, 2022 bench trial, denied Chenault’s claims for coverage under the [...] policies.
[brief] The proposed pipeline Project represents a new structure serving new out-of-state customers and, therefore, this fossil fuel project poses substantial impacts to local water resources and significant contributions to climate change.  The DEP erred when it broadly applied the exemption at issue and failed to require a full permitting process under the Highlands Act.  The goals and purposes of the Highlands Act and the Water Quality Planning Act are frustrated by the DEP’s decision to exempt the proposed Project from regulation.  The record reflects no showing, or even assertions, that the proposed Project is needed to serve existing customers.  The Highlands Act and the Water Quality Planning Act were both intended to protect the State’s precious water resources by requiring the DEP to closely scrutinize impacts to water resources and to implement a command and control permitting scheme.  The Highlands Act was not intended to exempt huge new fossil fuel projects from the DEP’s regulatory scheme.  There is too much at stake for this proposed Project to be considered exempt from regulation.  The Legislature clearly did not intend to hide an elephant like this in the mousehole of the exemption at issue here.  For all the reasons set forth in this brief, the Court must reverse the DEP’s erroneous exemption determination.  [...] must go through the DEP’s permitting process under the Highlands Act before it can construct and operate the new compressor station.
[brief] In Century Indemnity Co. v. Congoleum Corp.  (In re Congoleum Corp.) 426 F.3d 675, 686-87 (3d Cir. 2005), the Third Circuit found that non-creditor attorneys had an ethical duty to report public wrongdoing to the bankruptcy court sufficient to grant the non-creditor attorneys standing in the bankruptcy proceeding.  Our aspirational Rules of Professional Conduct counsel attorneys to report public wrongdoing and to act as private attorney generals.  See, Jacobs v. Mark Lindsay and Son Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 458 N.J. Super. 194, 211 (App. Div. 2019) ([...], together with [...] and [...] noting the importance and need of “private attorney generals” to “advance the public interest through private enforcement of statutory rights that the government alone cannot enforce.
[brief] 25  I.  [...] IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BASED ON THE STATE’S FAILURE TO PRODUCE  A SWORN STATEMENT THAT CATEGORICALLY UNDERMINED THE CREDIBILITY OF AN IMPORTANT STATE WITNESS ............................................................................  25 a.  THE FAILURE TO PRODUCE [...]’ SWORN STATEMENT TO [...] CONSTITUTES  A BRADY VIOLATION ..........................................................................................................................  25  i.  IN ACCORDANCE WITH NEW JERSEY LAW, THE ADMISSIBILITY OF [...]’ SWORN STATEMENT AT TRIAL DOES NOT IMPACT ITS STATUS AS BRADY MATERIAL .........................................................................................  30  1.  [...]’ SWORN STATEMENT WOULD BE ADMISSIBLE AT TRIAL UNDER N. J.R.E. 803(a)(1)  .............................................................................................................................  31  2.  [...]’ SWORN STATEMENT IS ADMISSIBLE UNDER N.J.R.E. (608) ............................................................................. 33  3.  [...]’S SWORN STATEMENT IS ADMISSIBLE BECAUSE HE CONCEIVED THE CONTENTS OF THE SWORN STATEMENT  b.  THE FAILURE TO PRODUCE TO [...]  THE SWORN STATEMENT PRIOR TO HIS TRIAL CONSTITUTES GIGLIO AND JENCKS VIOLATIONS  i.  THE FAILURE TO PRODUCE [...]’ SWORN STATEMENT TO [...] CONSTITUTES
[brief] ”  *Purnell*, 126 N.J. at 531-32 (quoting *State v. Grunow*, 102 N.J. 133, 148 (1990)).  The “primary obligation” of trial courts is to “see that justice is done, and that a jury is instructed properly on the law and on all clearly indicated lesser-included offenses, even if at odds with the strategic considerations of counsel. ”  *State v. Garron*, 177 N.J. 147, 180 (2003).
[directive] There a Human Resource their to personnel resolve with divisions (HRM) Department which coordinate unit, shall motivated and maintaining talented hiring, including a developing, and resource needs, training, safety and employee innovative workforce resource management, through human for primary responsibility HRM partnerships.  positive well employee has wellness as as to effectively and programs, systems policies, standards implementing and developing well of oversight provides support, the and as atl as Department employees support HRM  Additionally, within houses Department. offices the HR to satellite other guidance in primary representative which the Deparmlent's unit, acts as Relations the Employee with involving negotiations, interactions gdevances, general represented labor matters and with to leadership.  HRM divisions on labor law works their union also employees and hiring training, compensation, employee and record keeping, assistance.  compliance, and is with HRM the primary conduit help for specific performance handling issues.
[brief] *(See Db 27 to 28)*  Sentencing courts may not fashion parole conditions, a power exclusively reserved to the executive branch.  [...] could not induce the court to impose a sentence it was without jurisdiction to impose.  And no law authorized the court to order [...] to have no contact with the dog, to refrain from all future custody or control over other animals, and to complete anger management counseling as part of his sentence for animal cruelty.  These components of his sentence are illegal and must be vacated.
[brief] It is well-recognized that courts hearing applications to vacate default judgments should view the arguments set forth by the movant with “great liberality” and, moreover, “should tolerate every reasonable ground” to reopen a matter in order to ensure “a just result…”  Nowosleska v. Steele, 400 N.J.Super. 297, 303 (App. Div. 2008); Mancini v. EDS, 132 N.J. 330, 334 (1993).  Default judgments may be unfair because they are entered unopposed and without the presentation of any contrary evidence; our courts must therefore resolve all doubts in favor of the party seeking relief from a default judgment.  Ibid.  The “anathema” described by the Ponden Panel, above, is precisely what occurred in this case when the lower court denied [...]’s motion to vacate [...]’s default judgment.
[brief] [...], as a consumer in the market for defendants’ specialized equipment, took them at their word that they were the experts.  For that reason, [...] hereby incorporates by reference the analysis set forth in their initial brief on this point.  The Trial Court’s April 4, 2022 Order deprived [...] of their day in Court on all issues and led to an unjust result at trial.  For these reasons, the Appellate Division should reverse and order a new trial.
[brief] Specifically, the Arbitrator cited to the “confluence of lost municipal revenues and tax collections due to COVID-19, the delay in negotiations until 2022, the structural budgetary shortfall experienced in 2022-2023 by the City, the additional financial aid needed from the [...], the moratorium on filling vacant positions, and the City’s diversion of reserves to fund an originally proposed 2% across-the-board offer to the [...] units. ” (Aa120).  However, the Arbitrator fails to explain how these factors applied to his economic award.  For example, the City’s loss of municipal court revenues were no different than other municipalities across the state.  Further, the Arbitrator doesn’t explain how, even with the lost revenues, the City was able to fund 2% salary increases for all of the other bargaining units that it settled with, including a more than 2.9% salary increase for the firefighters bargaining unit.  Further, while the Arbitrator cites to a delay in negotiations until 2022, there was at least 7 months of time between the expiration of the [...] collective negotiations agreements, and the start of the pandemic. \(^1\)  The Arbitrator provides no explanation as to how the pre-pandemic time period impacted the [...], nor does the Arbitrator explain how the firefighters unit was able to negotiate a more than 2.9% annual salary increase in May 2022, which was at the same time the [...] was also negotiating with the City.  The Arbitrator also failed to provide any explanation as to why the City’s \(^1\)  In fact, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16 provides that “[n]egotiations between a public fire or police department and an exclusive representative concerning the terms and conditions of employment shall begin at least 120 days prior to the day on which their collective negotiation agreement is to expire. ” (emphasis added).  Thus, negotiations should have commenced by March 31, 2019, 12 months prior to the start of the pandemic.  decision to divert funds that were budgeted for 2% salary increases to the [...] unit was acceptable without any consequence.  In other words, the Arbitrator’s premise is that only if a municipality funds salary increases, and keeps those funds in reserve, will he then have the authority to award those funds in interest arbitration.  This reasoning is nowhere to be found in the Interest Arbitration statute.  The City cannot hide behind diverting reserves that it earmarked for the [...] unit, and then use that diversion as a shield to protect it from having to expend those funds as part of an Interest Arbitration Award.  This incentivizes delay, diversion of budgeted funds for salary increases, and undermines the interest arbitration process.
[brief] [...] authenticated each exhibit through the Declarations of [...] employee [...].  (PA026-029, PA088-90.)  [...] stated under penalty of perjury that she had “personal knowledge of [...]’s general business practices with respect to account-opening and maintenance of deposit and checking accounts,” and that [...]’s exhibits were “all true and correct business records created and maintained by [...], or its affiliates, in the course of regularly conducted business activity, and as part of the regular practice of [...] to create and maintain such records, and also were made at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time thereafter. ”  (PA026-27, PA088-89.)  [...] also stated that each exhibit was a true and correct copy of what it purported to be.  (PA027, PA089.)  IV.
[brief] The parties were well aware, had independent counsel and the court is going to uphold the agreement….  In this case I found, as I went through the facts of this matter, as I indicated, that neither party provided a full disclosure.  There were no CIS’s filled out.  The parties knew or should have known of the relative positions of each other.  But that [...] never indicated, number one, that she had no monies, but that she had no liquidity.  [...] took that for what it was worth; did not provide any disclosure of his assets either and the parties entered into what they thought was a fair agreement.  (4T 23:3-9, 15-20; 24:6-16)