ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] met with [...] on three occasions to develop and execute a plan to purchase the Property.  In or around January 2019, [...] met [...] for the first time at her home through an introduction by an acquaintance and fellow realtor, [...] (“[...]”).  (71a, 11:13–12:21).  The purpose of this first meeting, according to [...], “was to meet her, find out what her situation was, and just have a conversation with her about a solution, because she was going through a foreclosure. ”  (71a, 13:2–6).  Indeed, [...] learned several details about [...]’s situation, including general details about the foreclosure, that she was the sole caregiver to her three (3) children, that the roof needed to be repaired, and that the Property was generally in poor condition.  (71a–72a, 13:11–15:19).  Approximately a week later, [...] went to [...]’s home again for a second meeting.  (72a, 15:20–16:2).  [...] testified that this meeting was to summarize certain documents of [...]’s to enable him to put together a proposal to purchase the Property.  Id.  This included documents relating to the underlying foreclosure and unpaid legal bills, phone bills, fines, and collections.  (72a, 16:3–13).  Of significance, [...] specifically stated that he was acting in his capacity as a real estate agent for [...] and not as a personal businessman with real estate knowledge.  (73a, 18:16–19).  [...] then proposed to purchase [...]’s home for approximately $100,000 with a right to repurchase within 18 months.  (73a, 19:13–20:1).  [...] based this purchase price on an estimate listed on the website Zillow, which valued the Property between $230,000 and $250,000.  (73a, 21:2–23).  No professional appraisal was performed at any point.  Id.  [...] did not sign a listing agreement with [...] at this time.  (72a, 14:7–20).  At this same meeting, [...] learned that [...] co-owned the Property with her husband, [...] (“[...]”), and the title was in both of their names.  (72a, 17:3–11).  [...] did not live in the home at that time because he was incarcerated at [...].  (72a, 16:14–21).  In light of these circumstances, [...] devised the unsuccessful plan to consummate this illegal real estate transaction, which is the underlying basis of this entire lawsuit.
[brief] The statute states that: “An owner may bring an action in Superior Court against a foreclosure consultant or a distressed property purchases for any violation of this act. ” (emphasis added).  As the Defendants were not and are not the owners of the subject Property, the Court finds that they do not have the right to invoke the FRFPA.  Plainly, [...] has asserted no action, claim, or affirmative defense upon which it would need to rely upon a statutory provision.  Rather, [...] contends that the contract for sale – quite literally - violated almost every applicable provision and requirement of the FRFPA – as reviewed in detail below - which a finding the trial court should have rendered based on the undisputed facts.
[brief] The Authority Consistently Exceeded The Agreed-Upon Budget, Causing [...] To Have To Pay Excessive Expenses  Because the Redevelopment Agreement required [...] to pay for all expenses relating to the management, maintenance, and operations of the Project Garage, it paid [...] a monthly amount toward the operational costs associated with the Project Garage.  1T15:9-12; 57:9-12.  At the end of each year, [...] would submit a Year End Reconciliation Report to [...], where [...] would account for all costs and fees incurred for the Project Garage, deduct the amounts [...] had already paid over the course of the year, and seek reimbursement for any remaining amounts.  Pa3; Pa42; Pa83; Pa83; Pa121; Pa219; Pa267; Pa320; Pa368; Pa418.  Since the Project Garage opened in or around 2006, [...] has consistently failed to provide a budget prior to the operating year and has exceeded the annual monthly payments submitted by [...] every year to cover the overage.  Pa3; Pa42; Pa83; Pa83; Pa121; Pa219; Pa267; Pa320; Pa368; Pa418.  For example, in 2018, the total cost for operations at the Project Garage was $310,650.  Pa418.  Based on the budget set by the parties, [...] made monthly payments totaling $253,200.  Ibid.  As a result, [...] paid [...] an additional $57,450 to [...] for the 2018 year-end.  Ibid.  D.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................1  COUNTER-STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY .....................1  COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................3  LEGAL ARGUMENT ........................................................................7  POINT I THE MOTOR VEHICLE STOP PRECIPITATING THE CHARGES WAS LAWFUL AND THE COURT’S DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS WAS THEREFORE PROPER .................................................................7  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT’S LIMITING INSTRUCTION WAS SUFFICIENT AND NEVERTHELESS  DEFENDANT INVITED THE PERCEIVED ERROR  WHICH PROVOKED ITS NECESSITY ........................................................................10  POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT’S SENTENCE WAS APPROPRIATE AND ITS REASONING ADEQUATELY ARTICULATED ........................................................................16  CONCLUSION  ................................................................................20  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The portions of the agreement pertaining to the down payment were logistical, not material.  Defendant’s advancing of the entire down payment for the townhouse is but one provision in the totality of the Settlement Agreement.  (A1)  Indeed, as a percentage of the total support agreed to, it is quite small.  Under the Agreement, Defendant is responsible for $18,000 per year in direct payments to Plaintiff, another approximately $24,000 per year in payments for the townhouse, and another $600 or so per year for Plaintiff’s cell phone.  His upfront costs in 2011 under the agreement (outside of the $140,000 down payment) were approximately $53,520.  (A1)  So by the time Defendant reached the first buyout benchmark of seven years, he would have paid $351,720 under the agreement.  Adding to that the $450,000 buyout amount at the seven year mark, the minimum total value of the Settlement Agreement is approximately $800,000.  The $70,000 on which he is placing such weight is less than 10% of the totality of the agreement.  That cannot be deemed so material as to constitute fraud.
[brief] vii.  The Chancery Division Judge (Trial Court) Abused Its Discretion And Erred By Usings Its Powers To Nullify Civil Rights Legislation As Moot On The Basis Of Defendants Acts Of Retaliation Against Plaintiffs Civil Action And When It Failed To Comply With Or Enforce Legislation At N.J.S. 10:6-2 Because Plaintiff’s Complaint Invoked The NJCRA And Was Not “Moot”; [IT]  The Trial Court did not provide any notice to Plaintiff, nor a copy of an order transferring divisions.  During the only hearing held, the Trial Court did not inform me that I was attending a hearing in the chancery division.  The Trial Court (Chancery Division) granted equitable relief to the named defendants by not adjudicating the claims brought under the NJ Civil Rights Act (Pa 175-176) as they were set forth in the complaint (Pa 27-29).  It appears that the Trial Court adopted or agreed with the defendant’s position that plaintiff’s civil rights claims were extinguished by defendants decision to finally grant adjournments after compelling plaintiff to file a civil action in order to obtain relief for the deprivation of his civil rights by their (the defendants) prior refusal(s) without authority to do so.
[directive] Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52: 17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the state in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the state of New Jersey to comply with the following policies and procedures.
[brief] Lawyer Is Not An Insurer for Every Mistake Occurring in the Practice motion to re-open the original divorce matter was due to the fact that Plaintiff [...] wanted to change the terms in their Chinese agreements after the discovery of the new wife of the ex-husband, not for the purpose to make corrections in the PSA or divorce judgment.  In *McCullough v. Sullivan*, 102 N.J.L. 381, 132 A.102 (1926), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held the following:  “[a] lawyer, without express agreement, is not an insurer.  He is not a guarantor of the soundness of his opinions, or the successful outcome of the litigation which he is employed to conduct, or that the instruments he will draft will be held valid by the court of last resort.  He is not answerable for an error of judgment in the conduct of a case or for every mistake which may occur in practice….he is not to be held accountable for the consequences of every act which may be held to be an error by a court. ”  This principle was followed in subsequent cases. \(^{22}\)  In fact, there are only a few exceptions where the plaintiff may recover the legal fees.  However, Plaintiff in the instant matter fails to qualify for any of these exceptions because she did not prove that the legal fees that she spent to correct the Defendants’ “errors” were a “mere portion of the damages” that were recoverable.  **B.
[brief] Her Honor seems to admit that there is a logical, temporal progression from page 16 to 28 (Pa24-36).  1T-33-7-10.  Then Her Honor has a problem with the Remedial part of the Complaint.  1T-33-11-17.  This part of the Complaint is largely unchanged; there are numerous remedies needed.  The Complaint states there is irrational differential discrimination through having a Drug Court for people with the mental disability of addiction (or dependence) but having a harsh “mental illness” probation program for those with other mental disabilities.
[brief] Significant harm is narrow, and Respondents cannot show potential harm and prejudice for the same reason they cannot show substantial relation: these are completely unrelated matters.  See Greebel v. Lensak, 467 N.J. Super. at 258.  It is wholly unspecified what sort of “insight” or “personal information” would somehow work to the detriment of Respondents.  Evidently, a person’s attitudes towards litigation may change depending on financial health, posture of a case, stage of life, and even mood -- all of which are subject to change in the years since [...] handled the unrelated matters for Respondents.  [...] only had an initial intake call with [...].  During this intake call, no remarkable and unique information was provided to [...] that might now pose an issue to Respondents.  Accordingly, [...] is not privy to Respondents’ financial information and does not have information about [...]’s general attitude towards settlement or litigation in general.  (340a ¶ 20 – 341a ¶ 22).  [...] certainly does not have information concerning [...]’s personality, thinking, or litigation strategy in this case as [...]’s relationship with [...] was short-lived and limited as [...] only held an initial consultation with [...] years ago and predominately communicated with his secretary thereafter in connection with the prior matters.
[brief] [...] ("[...]") is a non-profit organization that represents the interests of lower-income New Jerseyans by advocating for affordable housing and racially- and economically integrated communities, particularly through enforcement of the Mount Laurel doctrine.  [...] has been doing this work since 1975 and was founded by advocates who helped secure the Supreme Court’s canonical decision in S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 (1975) (Mount Laurel I).  To this day, [...] remains the only organization dedicated to representing the interests of lower-income New Jerseyans in Mount Laurel cases.  [...] is widely recognized as a leading expert on the Mount Laurel doctrine and has been designated by the New Jersey Supreme Court as a key interested party in Mount Laurel declaratory judgment proceedings.
[brief] Here, the facts are almost identical to Toft, supra.  The Judgment was obtained on or about September 26, 2013.  (Da12-15).  Appellant received notice of the Judgment repeatedly over the six-year period following entry of the Judgment.  In fact, even more brazenly, Appellant filed an Objection to the Second Writ on April 8, 2016, such that she demonstrated actual knowledge of the judgment eight (8) years prior to filing her Motion to Vacate. (Pa42-43).  Appellant does not claim that she defaulted in the Action because she was not served with process and was therefore unaware of the Judgment.  *Id.*  Then, Appellant filed a separate Class Action in 2019, almost five years before this motion.  Defendant took no action to vacate the Judgment until April 10, 2024 – almost eleven years after entry of judgment.  (Pa 27).  Thus, Appellant – who does not dispute service and does not dispute owing the debt – at worse knew of this Action and Judgment in April 2016 when she filed an Objection to the Second Writ.  As further evidence of her actual knowledge of the Judgment, she filed a 2019 Class Action stemming from the Judgment.  (Pa47-67).  Despite this actual knowledge, Defendant waited *almost eleven (11) years after the Judgment was entered* and *eight (8) years after she became aware of this Action* to file the rightly denied Motion to Vacate.  Thus, such as is the case here, where the motion is not filed within a reasonable time, the Court is not required to reach the merits of the motion to vacate under *Rule 4:50-1(d), (e), and (f).*
[brief] 220 N.J. at 199.  The Green Court had permitted consideration of dismissed charges because “the sentencing judge might find it significant that a defendant who experienced an unwarranted arrest was not deterred by that fact from committing a crime thereafter. ”  62 N.J. at 571.  The K.S. Court explicitly stated, “We disapprove of those statements in Brooks and Green because deterrence is directed at persons who have committed wrongful acts .  . . .  Accordingly, we hold that when no [] undisputed facts exist or findings are made, prior dismissed charges may not be considered for any purpose.
[brief] Failure to vigilantly police such public wrongs risks further “willfulness, an indifference to the court’s command . . . challeng[ing] the authority of government . . . .”  Dep’t of Health v. Roselle, 34 N.J. 331, 337(1961).  “[C]ourts accordingly have no choice, if they are to do their duty in administering justice, but to punish” those who “deliberately flouted the lawful subpoenas and orders of the courts.
[brief] On April 8, 2019, Appellant [...], a resident of Orange, and the [...] d/b/a [...], [...], Feld’s family businesses located in Orange, New Jersey, filed an eight-count complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writ against the State Parties, the [...], the [...], and the [...], seeking to nullify and invalidate Newark City Ordinance 6PSF-e.  (Aa1-Aa10).  The complaint alleged that, as a non-resident of the [...] but a taxpayer of the [...], Feld should have standing to challenge statutes applied within the [...].
[brief] Cases Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) .................................................................................................................. 4 Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2003) ........................................................................................................ 6 People v. Bond, 95 N.Y.2d 840 (2000) .................................................................................................................. 6 Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971) ..................................................................................................................... 14 Spicer v. Roxbury Corr. Inst., 194 F.3d 547 (4th Cir. 1999) ......................................................................................................... 6 State v. Ballard, 331 N.J. Super 529 (App. Div. 2000) ............................................................................................ 8 State v. Farmer, 48 N.J. 145 (1966) ....................................................................................................................... 2, 10 State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987) ....................................................................................................................... 12 State v. Hernandez, 225 N.J. 451 (2016) ...................................................................................................................... 8, 10 State v. Lodzinski, 249 N.J. 116 (N.J. 2021) .............................................................................................................. 6 State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518 (2013) ....................................................................................................................... 14 State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487 (1998) ....................................................................................................................... 3 State v. Scheidel, 165 Ohio App.3d 131 (2006) .........................................................................................................
[brief] A CEPA plaintiff can prove causation by presenting direct evidence of retaliation or circumstantial evidence that justifies an inference of retaliation.  See Zaffuto v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 130 Fed. Appx. 566, 569 (3d Cir. 2005).  Speculation is insufficient, and a plaintiff must demonstrate a factual nexus between the protected activity and the retaliatory employment action.  See Tinio v. St. Joseph Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. 13-829, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44585, at *13 (D.N.J. Apr. 6, 2015).  An unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action or a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing can raise an inference of causation.  See Davis v. Supervalu, Inc., No. 13-414, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56341, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2013).  In addition, the proffered evidence, viewed in totality, may suffice to create such an inference.  See Espinosa v. County of Union, 212 Fed. Appx. 146, 153 (3d Cir. 2007).  The Trial Court properly found that Plaintiff failed to establish the causation element prima facie case of retaliation because “she doesn’t even remember when she complained[,]” and “even looking at all of the evidence in favor of the plaintiff, . . . she doesn’t remember who she spoke to when, she doesn’t remember specifically what she said to anyone[.]” (Appx 567, 574 at 13:13-14:9; 27:3-8).  Accordingly, the dismissal of Plaintiff’s faulty CEPA claim must be affirmed.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order Filed September 12, 2022………………………………………………Pa1  Order Filed April 13, 2022……………………………………………………Pa2 | Appendix Document | Appendix Page Number | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| | Order [...], J.A.D., Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division- Criminal Part, Monmouth County Filed September 12,2022 | Pa1 | | Order [...]  Municipal Judge, State of New Jersey, Freehold Township, Municipal Court, County of Monmouth  Filed April 13, 2022 | Pa2 | | Notice of Municipal Court Appeal Motion Filed April 22,2022 | Pa3-Pa5 | | [...] Discovery Cover Sheet from Former Law Firm with accompanying exhibits Dated January 4, 2022 | Pa6 | | Exhibit A to Discovery (Ticket Number 012440)  November 14,2021 | Pa7 | | Exhibit B to Discovery (Narrative Citation, Number 1316E21012440 Officer [...] November 14,2021) | Pa8 | | Exhibit C to Discovery (2013 New Jersey Revised Statute)  Revised 2013 | Pa9- Pa10 | | Superior Court-Appellate Division Notice of Appeal  Dated October 27 ,2022 | Pa11-Pa15 | AMENDED LETTER BRIEF
[directive] Handling of Injured Suspects Following CED Use  8.1  Subjects against whom a CED has been deployed shall be transported to a medical facility for examination if any of the following circumstances exist: (a) the subject requests medical attention; (b) the subject had been rendered unconscious or unresponsive; (c) the subject, after being subjected to a discharge, does not appear to have recovered normally, as described in CED training; (d) the subject has exhibited signs of excited delirium, as described in CED training, prior to, during, or after the discharge of the CED; (e) the subject has suffered bodily injury requiring medical attention as a result of a fall, or otherwise reasonably appears to need medical attention; (f) the subject was exposed to three or more discharges from a CED during the encounter; (g) the subject has been exposed to a continuous discharge lasting 15 seconds or longer; (h) no personnel at the scene are qualified or authorized to remove the CED darts/electrodes from the subject’s person; (i) an officer trained and authorized to remove darts/electrodes experiences difficulty in removing a dart/electrode; or (j) any part of a CED dart/electrode has broken off and remains imbedded.  8.2  An officer is authorized to remove a CED dart/electrode from a subject only if the officer has received training on dart/electrode removal, provided, however, that an officer is not authorized to remove a CED dart/electrode from any part of the person’s head or neck, or where the dart/electrode is located in the area of the subject’s genitalia, or female breast.  In the absence of exigent circumstances requiring immediate action, a CED dart/electrode may only be removed from these areas of the subject’s body by qualified medical personnel.  11  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] [...] became eligible for parole again around February 2023.  (Pa149).  On January 25, 2023, [...] received an initial hearing with a hearing officer, who referred the matter to the Board.  (Ibid.; Pa155).  On May 15, 2023, the Board denied parole and established a thirty-six-month FET.  (Pa7).  The Board based its decision on the following factors: facts and circumstances of the offense; prior offense record is extensive; offense record is repetitive; prior offense record noted; nature of criminal record increasingly more serious; committed to incarceration for multiple offenses; prior opportunity on probation and parole and incarceration failed to deter criminal behavior; and commission of current offense while incarcerated.  Ibid.  An objective risk assessment determined that [...] presented a low to moderate risk of recidivism.  Ibid.  Most significantly, the Board concluded that [...] had insufficient problem resolution, specifically observing that [...] appeared “content in maintaining all his crimes were for monetary gain” and that [...] believed the murders “were accidental . . . and not in his control. ” (Pa7).  The Board was concerned [...] did not “understand the thought process that motivate[d]” his criminal behavior.  Ibid.  The Board found the following mitigating factors: infraction-free since last panel hearing; participation in institutional programs; participation in programs specific to behavior; institutional reports reflect a favorable institutional adjustment; attempted participation in programs for which he was not admitted; commutation time restored; and correspondence in support of parole.  (Pa7).  [...] appealed the Board’s decision, and on February 28, 2024, the Board affirmed its prior denial of parole and imposition of a thirty-six-month FET.
[brief] 1)  New Jersey Court Rule of civil procedure R. 4:5-2 AB17a  2)  New Jersey Courts Rule of civil procedure RULE 1:36-2 33  3)  New Jersey Courts Rules of civil procedure R. 4:6-4 AB17a  4)  New Jersey Courts Rule of civil procedure 4:9-3 32  5)  New Jersey Court Rules of civil procedure R. 4:46 AB18a  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT