ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Board properly relied upon the discussion of the purposes of the SM zoning of the subject property in the Township Master Plan.  The Board’s Resolution focused upon and explained how the intent of the Master Plan is expressed in the specific and differing standards of the SM and GM Zone Districts, where the SM allows buildings with maximum heights of only 30 ft. and the GM heights of up to 75 feet.  Ja026-029.  The stated purpose of the SM Zone District is “…to provide areas for industrial uses which are of lesser magnitude and intensity than permitted in industrial districts. ”  [...] Ordinance §91-249.  Emphasis added.  Height, clearly is an expression of “magnitude” as well as “intensity”.  The Board’s conclusions about the intent of the height limitation in the SM Zone are supported specifically by the quoted Master Plan language, the express language of the relevant ordinance, and, more generally, by caselaw that discusses why such height limitations are incorporated into zoning standards.  The Board correctly considered, under the [...] Master Plan and ordinances, and applicable caselaw, that the height of the buildings to be constructed would affect the intensity of the use of those buildings, and in the absence of competent credible evidence in the record provided by Plaintiffs to support the requested height variance, the Board properly deferred to the policy choices of the Township’s planning board and governing body as set forth in the 1999 Master Plan and implementing ordinances.
[brief] The Borough’s expert [...] testified at trial that the use of the term “waters” in the deed shows an intent to convey all riparian rights held by [...].  Q: So you felt that the mention of the word waters was significant?  A:  Well it’s the mention of the word waters, as well as the mention of the beach and the streets and roads and avenues, this wasn’t a conveyance like where they were using just general descriptions.  But rather it was everything, it catches your eye because it includes the streets, the roads, the avenues, waters, together with -- and it makes a different between the ones that were, the lots that were included in the conveyance and the lots that weren’t.  6T, p. 36, lines 8-16.  Moreover, as riparian rights are appurtenant to the dominant estate and do not need to be mentioned in the deed in order to be conveyed (see Panetta), the parties’ decision to specifically mention the conveyance of all “waters” shows an intent to include the lands obtained through riparian grant (i.e. the [...]) within the conveyance.
[brief] **  Notwithstanding that the CR-V at issue here was reasonably “fit,” “suitable,” and “safe,” as designed, Plaintiff’s entire argument is premised on the theory that because LKAS and LDW were available and feasible, the subject vehicle was defective for not including them.  Plaintiff’s position is directly contrary to law.  *First*, a vehicle that was otherwise reasonably fit, suitable, and safe as designed does not become unreasonably unsafe because it did not include certain driver assistance features.  *See Grzanka v. Pfeifer*, 301 N.J. Super. 563, 579 (App. Div. 1997) (the fact that plaintiffs have an alternative design does not mean that “the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe”); *see also* Model Jury Charge (Civil) 5.40D-3(2)(a) (plaintiff must show that the product poses a foreseeable risk of harm that could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonably safer design, and that the omission of his proposed alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe).
[brief] Nor is the NJCFA intended to cover debt collection efforts, which the Complaint does not, and cannot, allege as to Holder Respondents.  See *Boyko v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc.*, Civil No. 08-2214 (RBK/JS), 2009 WL 5194431, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2009) (holding that “mere debt collection efforts on behalf of a third party who might have sold merchandise is not itself a sale of merchandise”). some original sale or advertising of merchandise.  But as to [...] and [...], specifically, Appellant fails to identify any such activities.
[directive] Do you understand that if the crime occurred on or after May 4, 2001 as a result of your guilty plea you will be required to pay a penalty of $800 for each offense for which you are pleading guilty?  7.  Przymusowa hospitalizacja psychiatryczna Civil Commitment Czy rozumie Pan(i), że w razie skazania za przestępstwo seksualne z użyciem przemocy, takie [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] jak kwalifikowana napaść na tle seksualnym, napaść seksualna, kwalifikowany nielegalny kontakt seksualny, uprowadzenie zgodnie z 2C:13-1c(2)(b), nielegalny kontakt seksualny, zabójstwo, do którego doszło w trakcie popełniania przestępstwa, jeżeli przestępstwem podstawowym jest napaść seksualna, , lub usiłowanie popełnienia któregokolwiek z tych przestępstw, a także każdy czyn przestępczy, który według oficjalnego stwierdzenia sądu należy, ze względu na okoliczności, uznać za przestępstwo seksualne z użyciem przemocy, może Pan(i), po zakończeniu odbywania wyroku pozbawienia wolności, być przymusowo innej instytucji na pewien okres z dożywociem włącznie, jeżeli po wysłuchaniu osadzony(a) w stron sąd stwierdzi, że wymaga Pan(i) przymusowej hospitalizacji psychiatrycznej?
[brief] N.J. Const. Art. I, s. 1.  [...]’s attorney made it clear to the court that it did not want to own a dangerous, potentially uninsurable deathtrap in [...] and wanted to sell it as soon as possible.  1T48:1-9, 16-24.  Surely a property owner cannot be barred from selling its property on the off-chance that a motion to vacate might be filed at some time in the future.  Otherwise, [...] would be required to continue owing a dangerous, decrepit, abandoned and debris-ridden liability for an entire year.
[brief] This unfairness and lack of reliability also undermines faith in the justice system.  One would be hard-pressed to explain why a defendant is incarcerated after being acquitted of a necessary element of the charged offense.  And the average person, let alone the affected defendant, would only be further troubled to know this was due to a mistake of law.  *Halstead*, 791 N.W.2d at 815; *Price*, 949 A.2d at 627.  Stated differently, “allowing a potentially long prison term. . . to stand when a defendant has been found not guilty of predicate offenses” bespeaks a “lack of reliability” that causes “confidence in the outcome of the trial [to be] undermined” and “a corrosive effect on confidence in the criminal justice system” as a whole.
[brief] Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the proceedings as to the valuation of the Property and the cost of environmental remediation should be bifurcated and those costs be determined in a separate “cost recovery” action:  [D]ealing with environmental issues in the cost-recovery proceeding makes sense.  Such a proceeding allows for third party claims against insurers, titles companies, and prior owners, none of whom have a place at the condemnation table.  More importantly, the cost-recovery proceeding makes available to the condemnee Spill Act defenses . . . that are not relevant to an Eminent Domain proceeding.  Admission of environmental issues into a condemnation trial circumvents those statutory defenses as well as the possible joinder of third parties . . .  All of these reasons underscore the propriety of reserving the contamination issue for the cost-recovery action.
[brief] (Da3-5).  Each count of intentional murder contained a sentencing enhancer based on defendant’s use or possession of a firearm while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the murders or in the immediate flight therefrom, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c. (Da3-5).  Defendant was also charged with one count of second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (count five).  (Da6).  Defendant was tried before the Honorable Marc C.  LeMieux, P.J.Cr., and a jury from February 9, 2022 to February 24, 2022.  (6T to 16T).  On February 24, 2022, the jury found defendant guilty as charged, as well as finding applicable the sentencing enhancers.  (16T26-5 to 29-18; Da9-15).
[brief] See *Lionshead Woods v. Kaplan Bros.*, 243 N.J. Super 678 (1990).  In *Vidal v. Lisanti Foods, Inc.*, 292 N.J. Super 555 (App. Div. 1996), the appellate court reversed the grant of a use variance and chastised the Board for the “arrogation of the power to rezone” and called the approval “an impermissible de facto rezoning of the tract. ”
[brief] Even so, Plaintiff addresses them in this brief as she believes Defendants reliance on the principles set forth in those cases are misplaced as they are not similar to the facts at hand.  In Sarro, an unpublished opinion, the plaintiff slipped and fell in a parking lot owned by her employer while walking to work during an ongoing snowstorm (Da38)(emphasis added).  Accordingly, the court found that the defendants had no duty during to the storm to address hazardous conditions in the parking lot due to snow and ice.
[directive] It shall be the duty of the director to notify the State Board of Public Accountants of any matters coming to his attention relative to any of the foregoing.  Upon cancellation or refusal of a license, a person aggrieved thereby shall have the right to a review by the Superior Court in a proceeding in lieu of prerogative writ.  L.1960, c. 169, 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1962.  s. :5-11.  Advertising for unnecessary 40A bids  No local unit shall be required to advertise for bids for any of the work performed pursuant to 40A :5- 4. L.1960, c. 169, 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1962.  s.  Annual financial statement and reports of local unit :5-12.  40A :5-12.  The chief financial officer of each local unit shall file annually with the director a verified 40A statement of the financial condition of the local unit as of the close of the fiscal year.  Such statement in shall be filed, upon forms furnished and prescribed by the director, not later than January 26 the case of a county and not later than February 10 in the case of a municipality after the close of the calendar fiscal year, or not later than August 10 of the State fiscal year in those municipalities which operate on the State fiscal year pursuant to section 2 or 3 of P.L.1991, c.75 (C.40A:4-3.1 or C.40A:4-3.2).
[brief] As noted above, defendant was not entitled to have the instructions in his own words.  Jordan, supra, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997).  Neither the model instruction for first- nor second-degree robbery requires the trial court judge to define threats or fear, only bodily injury.  That element was clearly defined in [...]’s instructions when he defined the use of a deadly weapon.  As noted above, he When reviewed for harmless error, there is none.  The jurors were very clearly instructed to move on to the lesser-included offense if they found that defendant did not possess a weapon.  [...]’s instructions were proper and clearly conveyed the law of the case to the jurors.  There is no error in the instructions, let alone plain error.  B.
[brief] 3d 805 (W.D. Ky. 2020) (granting a motion to dismiss under similar Kentucky law because plaintiff could not identify a clear mandate of public policy articulated by state administrative regulations or governor’s executive orders regarding COVID-19 testing).  Further evidencing the lack of substantiation for Appellant’s *Pierce* claim, courts have even routinely rejected “claims where an employer terminated a symptomatic employee for missing work due to pending test results and medical instructions to quarantine. ”  *Arterbridge*, 2022 WL 577956, at *6; see *Warner*, 507 F. Supp. 3d 484–85 (finding sympathy for, but rejecting, plaintiff’s argument that his termination for being absent when medically instructed to quarantine violated public policy); *Hermes v. Okla. Arthritis Ctr.*, No. 20-00871, 2021 WL 3540322, at *5–6 (W.D. Okla. June 8, 2021) (rejecting wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim under Oklahoma law and holding that executive orders related to COVID-19 testing did not constitute a clear mandate of public policy).
[brief] [...] next moves the court to compel [...] to produce monthly revenue and customer service reports that [...] provided to the two rental car companies with which it contracts, [...] and [...].  It argues that these earnings reports will show the size of the market for rental car toll collection and therefore help to prove the loss [...] may have incurred as a result of [...]’s letters to [...] and [...].  It also argues that such reports are evidence of [...]’s net worth, which it argues is discoverable due to [...]’s claim for punitive damages.  Requesting that a potential competitor—albeit one that operates in the marketplace in a wholly different way—turn over its revenue and customer service reports is an unusual way to determine the size of the market for a given service.  It is an even more unusual way to determine a company’s net worth.  [...]’s revenue and customer service reports are not relevant to any claim, affirmative defense, or damages in this case.
[brief] ”  Milford Mill 128 v. Borough of Milford, 400 N.J. Super. 96, 103 n.5 (App. Div. 2008).  See also See N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. at 282 n.1.  However, the motion judge erringly focused on the characteristics of the trial such as the duration or the purported complexity of the trial.  Following is the correct standard that the trial court ought to have applied but failed to do so – “According to R. 2:5-3(c), the transcript may be abbreviated by consent or order of the trial judge whenever the questions presented by an appeal can be determined without an examination of all the pleadings, evidence, and proceedings in the trial court.
[brief] (38a).  The Plaintiff entity was created by its managing member [...] for the purpose of acquiring the Property.  (38a).  Before any involvement by the Plaintiff, a Certificate of Sale for Unpaid Municipal Tax Liens was sold to [...] for unpaid taxes on the Property, and a Notice of Lis Pendens for foreclosure was docketed.  (38a).  The Plaintiff and the Seller subsequently agreed to an arrangement whereby Plaintiff would purchase the Property, the Seller would remain in her home for a monthly fee, and would also be permitted to repurchase the Property in 18 months.  (38a).  [...] on behalf of the Plaintiff and the Seller appeared for closing on the Property on April 5, 2019.  (39a).  The closing took place at the office of [...].  (132a [19:6-8]).  The settlement statement prepared by [...] shows that the outstanding tax lien in the amount of $42,123.79 was paid.  (39a).  [...] was unaware of any legal obligation to intervene in the foreclosure action, but was aware the Property was distressed and was in foreclosure proceedings.  (See 39a).  [...] advised Plaintiff that they had run title to the Property, and discovered it was owned by both Seller and her spouse or former spouse, [...]; [...] then prepared a deed to transfer the Property from the Seller and [...] jointly to the Seller only.
[brief] The Appellant testified that she was working on September 12, 2022, A Tour, 11pm to 7am, in the Medical Department, her usual assignment.  (T57-19 to 24).  During her tour of duty, Appellant had an incident with an inmate who was in the Medical Department waiting for intake processing.  (T60-12 to 16).  The witness explained that new arrivals, no matter what the hour, are evaluated by the Medical Department prior to assignment to a living unit.  (T60-18 to 61-11).  During Appellant’s shift, a “code 3” was called, i.e. a fight between two inmates.  That slowed down the new arrival evaluation process.  One inmate grew tired of waiting in the Medical Department and threatened to leave the Medical Department and go to his anticipated unit assignment.  The Appellant testified that she did everything to deescalate the situation.  (T63-1 to 6).  The inmate insisted on leaving the Medical Department.  The Appellant recalled calling into her radio communication device, “[...], may I see you in Medical. ” (T64-21 to 65-4).  The Appellant opined that the situation did not reach a minimal threat of harm for officers and civilians requiring a code.  (T65-20 to 66-5).  The Appellant remembered addressing [...] as “Sergeant” and explained that, sometimes, first words of radio transmissions get cut off.  (T66-23 to 67-12).  The inmate rose from his seat, with his belongings in hand.  Again, the Appellant called for [...].  (T67-21 to 25).  She cajoled the inmate into resuming his seat and waiting for the medical evaluation.  (T67-21 to 70-2).  The Appellant denied hearing [...]’s call to her asking her to call extension 2310.  (T70-22 to 71-1).  At the appropriate time, the Appellant called Master Control to report on the head count of inmates in the Medical Department, which she did every 30 minutes.  (T71-9 to 14).  Appellant called extension 2217, the normal telephone extension to report the count.  (T71-2 to 23).  After reporting the count to the officer in Master Control, the Appellant spoke to [...], who was also in Master Control.  (T72-2 to 12).  The Appellant recounted a different version of her conversation with [...].  In her version, she calmly explained the incident with the inmate; however, the Appellant did admit to questioning [...]’s statements.
[brief] The plaintiffs’ second reconsideration request to abrogate *Burt* was made in conjunction with the submission of judgment orders, and was granted via the February 28, 2023 judgment order-*after* [...]’s Motion for a New Trial had been fully briefed and argued.  Thus, this was not an issue that had ripened by the time [...] submitted his post-trial motion under R. 4:49-1.  At the time of supplemental briefing on the judgment issue, [...] apprised the Court of its ability, under R. 4:49-1(c), to order a new trial up to 20 days after the entry of judgment, “for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on motion of a party. ”  Under R. 4:49-1(c), if the trial court had concluded, by that point, that it erred in its pre-trial rulings as to [...]’s *Burt* status, the opportunity to correct the error and rectify the tainted trial was inherently available to it at any time between the February 28, 2023 final judgment and March 20, 2023.
[brief] Thereafter, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certification.  *Id.* at 303.  The Court first addressed whether a sentence of community supervision for life is punitive or remedial in nature.  For reasons irrelevant to the instant matter, the Court held that the special sentence was indeed intended by the Legislature to be punitive.  *Id.* at 304–09.  Given this finding, [...] was permitted to invoke the constitutional protections of the federal and state Double Jeopardy clauses.  U.S. Const. amend. V; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 11.  *Ibid.*  Next, the Court considered the reach of those protections and held that because defendant completed serving his sentence prior to the discovery of the error, he maintained an expectation of finality.
[brief] Recklessly Disregarded [...]'s Due Process Rights with the Evil Intent to Cause Harm  The United States Constitution provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, sect. 1.  Article I, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution does not enumerate the right to due process but protects against injustice and, to that extent, protects "values like those encompassed by the principle[ ] of due process."  Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 99 (1995).  In examining a procedural due process claim, the court first assess whether a liberty or property interest has been interfered with by the State, and second, whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation are constitutionally sufficient.  *Doe*, supra, at 99.  "...[A] cause of action based upon personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation."  *Sheik-Abdul v. McClellan*, 37 F.3d 1240, 1248 (7th Cir. 1994); 42 U.S.C. sect. 1983; N.J.S.A. sect. 10:6-1, et seq.  In this case, in their individual capacities while acting under color of State law, employees of [...] deprived [...] of the ability to return the falsely advertised food purchased from the Vendor with reckless disregard to [...]'s liberty to fairly receive a refund in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; N.J.S.A. Const. Art. VII, sect. I, par. 1.  The actions of [...]'s employees [...] [...] and [...] were in abuse of authority as they have OUTRIGHT LIED by stating they are following a rule to deprive [...] of his liberty to return the items to the Vendor for a Refund with the evil intent to cause [...] injury by loss of funds.  (Aa1, Aa2).  An additional six employees of [...] in their individual capacity while acting under color of State law signed their initials to wrongfully deny [...]'s meritorious claim in acquiesce by falsely stating no negligence to cause [...] unfair loss of funds.  (Aa10).  With partiality they intentionally failed to fairly consider [...]'s evidence (Aa1, Aa2, Aa4, Aa5, Aa6, Aa7) submitted with claim (Aa3).  They each knew the Vendor required [...] to return the items for a refund (Aa7) to which [...] was wrongfully denied (Aa1, Aa2).  They intentionally deprived [...] of an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner in violation of Due Process according to Doe v. Poritz, supra and Kahn v. U.S., 753 F.2d 1208, 1218 (3d Cir. 1985) which states, "Fundamentally due process requires an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."  III
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VACATING THE ARBITRATION AWARDS PRIOR TO ALLOWING THE PROPER DISCOVERY TO DETERMINE IF PROGRESSIVE WAS JUDICIALLY OR EQUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM THEIR POSITION WITH REGARD TO MEDPAY SUBROGATION IN NEW JERSEY.  (Da1 – Da27).  At the time this action was filed our office was aware that [...] had routinely filed Medpay subrogation claims in the past.  Per the attached affidavit of [...], from 2018 to 2021 [...] filed 161 Medpay filings seeking to recover Medpay benefits from other insurance companies.  (Da255 – Da258).  In order to support an argument for judicial or equitable estoppel, [...] obtained the attached Order dated January 13, 2023 issuing a commission to the state of Florida to serve the attached subpoena.  (Da69 – Da75).
[brief] (Even though the Appellate division ignored what was the most financially devastating issue in the case).  The reason that the Appellate Division ignored this issue is that it was more concerned with making a statement related to the Moynihan palimony case (which was a very current issue of interest in the legal community).  In so doing, the Appellate division abandoned its responsibility to fully and fairly decide all important issues.  AN INJUSTICE WAS DONE.  CAN IT BE UNDONE?  IF JUSTICE IS TO BE SERVED, IT MUST BE UNDONE!