ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  The Trial Court made no finding that interest should be compounded after December 20, 2013 (40006a-40007a; 40009a-40010a).  Plaintiffs avoid [...]’ statement in the Final Judgment Orders that “the Court did not disturb [...]’s determination that pre-judgment interest should be compounding, as affirmed by the Appellate Division. ”  See 40007a; 40010a (emphasis added).  As noted by the [...] in their Opening Brief, this statement is factually incorrect.  The manner of determining pre-judgment interest was decided upon agreement between the parties up to the Final Judgment of December 20, 2013 – it was not “determined” by [...].  (See Wilf_Db 54-55; 247T at 91:11-18).  [...] made no findings about pre-judgment interest.  In fact, [...] stated that the agreed 8.875% pre-judgment interest rate was “far and above anything that I have ever seen. ” (247T at 91:11-18).  [...] simply accepted the agreement between the parties for the period ending December 20, 2013.  Further, the Appellate Division only affirmed the pre-judgment interest award – it was silent as to the methodology of the calculation.  The 8.875% pre-judgment interest rate and compounding interest was limited to the date of Final Judgment of December 20, 2013.
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[brief] The Defense responded by arguing that the State should not be permitted to do this, despite cross-examination being reopened, “because we’ve already closed out both direct and cross. ”  The court found that the Defense had made the inference of recent fabrication.  However, the court concluded that [...] second statement would not be admissible as substantive evidence without providing a reason as to why, though it had noted earlier that it was “not as if you have a child witness where you can show that there’s no recent fabrication, that would then be admissible to substantive evidence. ”  The court found instead that the testimony was admissible under N.J.R.E. 607 to rehabilitate [...].  The court also indicated that “[...] would have to – to introduce that statement, if you’re showing that there was a prior consistent statement.
[brief] (P63a at No. 10; P53a to P67a; P174a-P 181a; P62a).  Respondent had not previously objected to these interrogatories on the basis of relevance.  (P213a to 214a; P213a to 214a; 4T3:2-7).  On June 21, 2022, when Petitioner filed a motion to compel Respondent to re-appear for deposition to answer the --- \(^4\) 10T means Transcript of Trial dated September 1, 2022. questions about Respondent’s discussions with the Decedent about finances, her live-in boyfriend, the Brigantine publication about her live-in boyfriend, and her bankruptcy filing, the Court\(^5\) denied the motion finding the subject matters were previously found to be irrelevant.  (P84a; P236a, P238a at p. 20; P240a at P91; P241a at p. 93, P243a at p.105-106; P 245a at 124.  5T\(^6\)13:7-15).  Petitioner filed a motion \textit{in limine} to bar the testimony of the [...]’s recollection as to the signature of [...] that was from at least 20 years ago.
[brief] State v. One, 154 N.J. Super. 326, 337 (App. Div. 1977)  “And, if we were to allow their attempts to vindicate their liberty rights to be short-circuited through a broad view of mootness, courts similarly disposed would likely never reach the merits of such disputes.  In other words, to endorse the trial judge's disposition, we would be creating a scenario by which those in breach could simply discharge a wrongly held individual before the day of reckoning without consequence.  Although it is appropriate in many cases to reserve judicial resources for actual controversies, Cinque v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 261 N.J. Super. 242, 243, 618 A.2d 868 (App. Div. 1993); Anderson v. Sills, 143 N.J. Super. 432, 437, 363 A.2d 381 (Ch. Div. 1976), important rights like those appellants would have honored through their trial court motions should not be diluted or simply ignored because their pursuit of a legal remedy could not keep pace with the ongoing circumstances.  In re C.M., 458 N.J. Super. 563, 569-70 (App. Div. 2019)
[brief] (6T 139-19 to 140-4)  After changing clothes, she “didn’t know what to do. ”  (6T 140-18 to 21)  She testified, “I thought about getting help, but I was scared.  I didn’t know how to explain what had happened. ”  (6T 140-23 to 25)  She explained that she was trying to find her cigarettes because her “nerves [were] shot” but was unable to find any of her things because [...] had moved them.  (6T 141-5 to 7)  She was “freaking out” and “just wanted to calm down,” so she went to a store to buy cigarettes.  (6T 141-8 to 10)  After driving [...]’s car to the store, she still could not find her wallet, so she took [...]’s card from the cup holder and went inside to buy a pack of cigarettes and a cup of coffee.  (6T 141-11 to 22)
[directive] CN 10080-Korean 4/8  지령 제01-18 호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 수정 양식, 페이지 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Korean page 4/8  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  [해당없음/NA]  (범죄가 년 월14 일 이후에 발생한 경우에만  4.  (2)(a)  2013  8  작성하십시오)  귀하가 또는  N.J.S.A.2C:24-4b(4)  N.J.S.A. 2C:24- 4b(5)에 의한 아동 포르노그라피 범죄 또는 그러한 범행의 미수 및 년 월14 일 이후에 발생한 2013 8 범죄에 대해 유죄를 인정하는 경우, 판사는 다른 선고에 추가하여, 검사의 신청에 따라, 사회를 보호하거나 귀하의 추후 범죄 활동을 제지하기 위하여 종신 가석방 감독이 필요하지 않다고 공식적으로 판정하지 않는 한, 종신 가석방 감독에 대한 특별 선고를 받게 될 것이라는 것을 아십니까?
[brief] Conway v. 287 Corporate Center Associates, 187 N.J. 259 (2006).  But there was no misunderstood intent between the parties.  The Plaintiff/Respondents intended to purchase timeshare intervals for their own personal use and enjoyment.  And there was no ambiguous term or provision in any of the contractual documents that required the Court to define the meaning of such term or provision.  The Plaintiff/Respondents did nothing more than allege that the precise opposite of a contractual term that they acknowledged and signed off on was told to them at the time they purchased their timeshares.  And their claims of misrepresentations themselves contradict the fact that the Plaintiffs intended to purchase for their own personal use and enjoyment.  The Trial Court’s decision denying summary judgment rendered the Parol Evidence Rule useless.  And the decision also destroyed the meaning and the purpose of a contract between two parties.  The Trial Court’s refusal to apply the Parol Evidence Rule on summary judgment essentially allows any party to a contract to file a lawsuit simply alleging that they were told the precise opposite of the contractual terms, and the complaint will survive so long as there is a claim of fraud.  This decision will effectively open contractual litigation floodgates namely in the world of timeshares.  But a factual setting, and namely a trial, was not required for the Trial Court to compare the alleged oral misrepresentations to the contractual documents and to bar those alleged claims of oral misrepresentations as the Parol Evidence Rule dictates.  Third, [...] maintains that *Filmlife, Inc. v. MAL “Z” ENA*, 251 N.J. Super. 570 (App. Div. 1991) controls here.
[brief] Defendant’s reliance on State v. Gonzalez, 444 N.J. Super. 62 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 226 N.J. 209 (2016), and State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583 (2002), is misplaced.  The fatal flaw in Gonzalez was that the jury instructions allowed the --- 21  Contrary to defendant’s argument, the proof of defendant’s display of his stolen ID was overwhelmingly strong.  It included multiple videos, enhanced photographs, testimony, and the exposure of defendant’s asserted alibi, his “business card,” as noncompliant with a NJSP SOP. jurors to convict him when they did not agree which of two completely separate crimes, robbery and aggravated assault, Gonzalez joined.  444 N.J. Super. at 72-76.  The allegations were “contradictory,” so that specific unanimity was required.  Id. at 78 (noting jury was presented with “two consecutive but separate offenses that involved application of discrete legal concepts not easily grasped by laypersons”).
[brief] (6T151-20 to 152-10,154-14 to 156-23).  He and other officers entered the house wearing body armor and carrying bulletproof shields.  (6T160-2 to 20).  Inside, [...]’s body lay on the landing at the bottom of the stairs.  (6T163-18 to 164-4).  His wife’s body lay on the landing at the top of the stairs.
[brief] State v. Knight, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2023) (slip op. at 21) (quoting State v. Watson, 472 N.J. Super. 381, 472 (App. Div. 2022), rev'd on other grounds, 254 N.J. 558 (2023)).  And like the facts here, "[p]olice investigations involve 'canvassing the surrounding neighborhood not just for potential suspects and eyewitnesses but also for public and privately-owned video cameras that may have captured a reported crime, the events leading up to it, or its aftermath (e.g., flight from the scene). '"  Ibid.  (quoting Watson, 472 N.J. Super. at 471).  And as a result, "such recordings have become a staple of criminal trials."  Ibid. (quoting Watson, 472 N.J. Super. at 471).  The footage presented in this case resulted from the police employing that precise canvassing method.
[brief] (Pa1254-1334).  On March 16, 2022, [...] and Appellant filed their opposition to all three defense motions for summary judgment and cross-moved for summary judgment against [...], [...], and the [...].  The filing totaled 1,576 pages, including a 118-page brief, sixty-two (62) individual exhibits, and a 219 paragraph Statement of Material Facts.  On April 18, 2022, [...] submitted an eighty-four (84) page reply, which included an eighteen (18) page brief.  Also on April 18, 2022, the [...] submitted a 100-page reply, which included an eighteen (18) page reply brief.  On April 26, 2022, [...] submitted a 372-page reply, which included a thirty-seven (37) page reply brief.  In total, the court received and reviewed approximately 3,686 pages of documents prior to deciding on the summary judgment motions filed.
[directive] To be clear, as the Second Circuit has explained, “the length of detention alone is not dispositive. ”  El-Hage, 213 F.3d at 79.  A more comprehensive, fact-specific inquiry in each case is needed.  See El-Gabrowny, 35 F.3d at 65 (“[E]ach case must be examined on its own facts. ”); Accetturo, 783 F.2d at 388 (“[D]ue process judgments should be made on the facts of individual cases .”).
[brief] Pa543 at 180:23-181:2.  At the First Arbitration, [...] did not dispute that the PTA entitled [...] to EGP payments on the Hackensack Project.  However, [...] did allege that it was entitled to offsetting credits against those EGP payments.  Specifically [...] counterclaimed and alleged that “[...] is currently owed $2.1 million dollars…on the Hackensack Project”—i.e., monies allegedly owed to [...] under the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract.  Compare Pa201 ¶ 46 (allegation in the First Arbitration), with Pa584 (Demand commencing Second Arbitration).  [...] further sought “an award declaring that [...] is not entitled to any further payments on the Hackensack Project” “due to the unique issues on that project. ”  Pa201, 207 ¶¶ 46, 79-80.  Thus, the First Arbitration was not “limited” to merely examining how much EGP [...] owed to [...] for the Hackensack Project—because that exercise would be simple, as Section 1.7(a) of the PTA precisely set the EGP at $1,677,588.00 (Pa125)—but rather [...] expressly sought, by way of its own pleading, a Hackensack Project offset “due to the unique issues on that project. ”  Pa207 ¶ 79; see also Pa703-04.  That is, [...] continuously (and, ultimately, successfully,) argued to the Arbitrator that [...]’s EGP payments to [...] should be offset (down to $0.00) due to the “serious issues with the project. ”  Pa574; see also: [Pa906 (trial exhibit reflecting [...]’s EGP for Hackensack (“CCG (65%)”) offset down to “0”—by [...]—because “EGP cannot be determined until Owner changes resolved”).  C.
[directive] 10.3.3  As noted above, an officer is prohibited from reviewing or receiving an accounting of a BWC recording in certain scenarios specified in subsections 10.3(a)-(f) (the “specified scenarios”) prior to the officer documenting or otherwise memorializing the officer’s recollection of the incident, namely, by creating any required substantive initial report, providing a statement, or submitting to an interview regarding the recorded event (“the specified incident memorialization”).  Whenever an officer participates in a specified scenario, then the officer shall only be permitted to review or receive an accounting of a BWC recording once the investigating entity concludes that (a) the officer has in fact completed the specified incident memorialization and (b) the officer’s review or receipt of an accounting of the BWC recording will not otherwise interfere with the ongoing investigation.  In cases subject to Attorney General Directive 2019-4, the investigating entity person’s chest, back, or neck for a prolonged period of time; (c) intentionally driving a vehicle at or in the direction of a person with the intent to strike the individual; and (d) using a baton or other weapon to intentionally strike an individual in the head or neck area.
[brief] E.O. 110; (Pa37; Pa47-49; Pa82).  Not only did [...] fail to submit an appropriate OPRA request to [...] in advance of the verified complaint, but after [...] finally sent her OPRA request to [...] on December 15, 2022, [...] timely advised her that, “[t]he [...] is not the custodian of the historical items that you seek, which are kept in the [...]. ”  (Pa79).  Because ______________________ that she is not opposed to the [...] being removed as a respondent.  (Pa146; Pa155; Pb2; 1T19:9-19).  there is no dispute that E.O. 110 establishes the [...] as the caretaker of the historical records, and therefore [...]’s denial was appropriate, the trial court’s dismissal of [...]’s complaint as to [...] should be affirmed.
[brief] The Estranged Wife and her counsel engaged in a massive fishing expedition.  They spent an extraordinary amount of time and money seeking the [...] tax returns, business records, and other documents even though they knew that [...] had no ownership interest in the business.  Furthermore, even though life insurance benefits are not part of the estate and are not deemed probate assets, Estranged Wife and her counsel spent an extraordinary amount of time and money seeking life insurance documents.  Unfortunately, the Trial Court humored them and permitted, even encouraged, their time-consuming hunt for legally irrelevant materials.  (Perhaps the Trial Court did so because of its prejudice toward the [...] where [...], who had previously humiliated the Judge, was employed.)  In the most basic terms, Estranged Wife and her counsel essentially created busy work and then sought to be paid by Mother for performing that busy work.  Under these circumstances, the Trial Court’s grant of additional counsel fees and a duplicative sanction was arbitrary, unreasonable, and an abuse of the Trial Court’s discretion.
[directive] B.  Seizure of a Weapon Pursuant to Court Order.  1.  If a domestic violence victim obtains a court order directing that the domestic violence assailant surrender a named weapon, the officer should demand that the person surrender the named weapon.  2.  If the domestic violence assailant or the possessor of the weapon refuses to surrender the weapon, the officer should a.  inform the person that the court order authorizes a search and seizure of the premises for the named weapon, and b. arrest the person, if the person refuses to surrender the named weapon, for failing to comply with the court order, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9, and c. conduct a search of the named premises for the named weapon.  C.  The officer must append an inventory of seized weapons to the domestic violence offense report.  D.  Weapons seized by a police officer must be promptly delivered to the county prosecutor along with a copy of the domestic violence offense report and, where applicable, the domestic violence complaint and temporary restraining order.  V.
[brief] On 2/28/22 and 3/2/22 I filed two motions in the foreclosure court to vacate the writ of execution issued by the NJ OOF and to vacate the Sheriff Sale of 4/4/22.  A hearing was set to 4/1/22 for both motions before [...].  He denied them both.  On 4/8/22 I filed my amended notice of appeal in the NJ Appellate Division and it was docketed as [...].
[brief] Da75-103.  Also on August 22, 2023, taking full advantage of her choice to file in the Chancery Division rather than arbitration, [...] filed an Order to Show Cause seeking temporary restraints to enjoin and restrain Appellants from: (1) selling, transferring, disposing of, or otherwise alienating the Property; (2) mortgaging, encumbering, or permitting liens to be placed on the Property; (3) entering into any lease transactions with regard to the Property; (4) evicting tenants; and/or (5) undertaking or contracting to perform any capital improvements to the Property.
[brief] \textit{Ibid.}  Like Defendants here, [...] only moved to compel arbitration when it seemed like they might be compelled to produce discovery after several months of improperly refusing to do so.  \textit{Ibid.}  Here, [...] served discovery requests on November 11, 2023, and, after receiving no responses for a year due to Defendants’ dilatory tactics, filed his Motion to Compel Discovery Responses (Pa101) on September 20, 2023.  \textit{See Certification of [...] ¶¶ 4-8 (Pa103-Pa104).}  Defendants filed their Motion to Compel Arbitration on September 22, 2023 (Pa116).  Though *[...]* is distinguishable in that Defendants here did not obtain discovery from [...], the reasoning is applicable in that Defendants’ unreasonable delay, their default of their discovery obligations, and their filing of the Motion to Compel Arbitration after [...] moved to compel discovery responses all go to factor four—the degree to which the delay was part of Defendants’ litigation strategy.  While factor three (extent of discovery) does not weigh in favor of waiver here, factor four (litigation strategy) certainly does—Defendants were effectively rewarded for their dilatory strategy.
[brief] In spite of all the deposition testimony and documents submitted to the Court in this matter, the relevant facts can be distilled to a handful of undisputed points – both good and bad – for plaintiff’s position in this matter: (1) at the time he applied for his policy with [...], plaintiff indicated a North Carolina address and garaging location for his vehicle in spite of the fact that he had a lease in New Jersey; (2) prior to the accident in question, plaintiff changed his mailing address to New Jersey; (3) when plaintiff changed his mailing address to New Jersey, he did not click another box on the computer indicating that he was also changing the garaging address of his vehicle; (4) plaintiff’s insurance policy was in effect at the time of the subject accident; and (5) after the accident, plaintiff’s insurer, [...], denied coverage for personal injury protection benefits based upon a material misrepresentation of residency and garaging of his vehicle.  Defendants’ argument that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) does not contain a scienter requirement.
[brief] Public Policy Favors [...]’s One-Time Rule Relaxation  Generally, appointments to fill “anticipated vacancies” are disfavored due to the uncertainty of the vacancy actually occurring.  When vacancies are anticipated due to voluntary retirements, the public policy concern is that those retirements “are subject to change at the prerogative of the retiring firefighter. ”  In re Davis, 2007 WL 2262921, at 3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 9, 2007).  Stated differently, if appointing authorities were permitted to fill expected vacancies due to voluntary retirements, a situation could arise where the anticipated retiree changes their mind and decides not to vacate their position.  If that were to happen after the authority already appointed someone else to fill the anticipated vacancy, the parties would be in the undesirable position where there would be too many appointees for too few positions, thereby necessitating layoffs or demotions.  In the instant matter, such a concern did not manifest itself when the [...] was faced with the decision to relax its rules in order to permit a one-time promotion to fill an anticipated vacancy, because the retirements actually occurred at the times they were expected, and the vacancies were filled by entirely qualified individuals from a then-active eligibility list.  (Pa. 28, 39).  These unique circumstances were ripe for the [...] to relax its rules due to the City’s good faith and the fact that the situation that the public policy underlying N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b) was meant to avoid, never came to pass.  Therefore, the [...]’s actions and decision were entirely reasonable and should not be disturbed.
[brief] Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment if the offenses are of the same or similar character, based on the same act or transaction, or on acts or transactions together or constituting part of common scheme or plan.  Rule 3:7-6.  A defendant may request an indictment be severed if he will be prejudiced by its joinder.  Rule 3:15-2.  A reviewing court must defer to a trial court’s decision regarding severance, unless that decision represents an abuse of discretion.