ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In this case, the severance was the grant made to [...] in 1879.  The Court: So, [...] had all of the land under the Raritan Bay from the shoreline to international waters?  The Witness: No, out to the pierhead line and State did not.  They could have gone farther Your Honor, they could have extended it farther but limited the length of the grant.  I think it’s; I mean 2,280 feet; I’ll say roughly 2,300 feet.  But that’s all the State was willing to grant.  It did not want to go any farther for navigation reasons and established what it called a pierhead line, so the grant went to the pierhead line.  So, it wasn’t all that the State could grant but it was what they would call a limited grant to the Applicant, [...].
[directive] Do you understand that you have the right to seek individualized advice from an attorney [Yes/Wi]  [No/Non] about the effect your guilty plea will have on your immigration status?  Eske w konprann ke w gendwa pou chache konsey endividyel nan men yon avoka konsenan enpak deklarasyon koupab ou an kab genyen sou stati imigrasyon ou an?
[directive] Clarification General's of revocation for the motion filing a of the require to modified been has 8.3 Section 13.  NERA a committed has defendant a that believe to cause probable is when there release crime, second-degree or afirst- (not just crime indictable any for release on while crime recommended 2017, 15, of May Supplemental Report its in Practice, Criminal on Committee Court Supreme  The ~ discrepancy. the address to 3:7-8 Rule to revisions -3- Directive).  original the in as result the with combined, been essentially have 8.4.2 Subsection and 8.4.1 Subsection 14.  when release revoke motion to of filing a for the presumption a creates 8.4.1  Section that crime indictable any committed has defendant a that believe to cause probable is there 8.4.2 has of language  The release. on while crime) second-degree or afirst- just not (i.e., below).  Item 15 (see replaced been when release revoke to motion of filing a for the presumption a creates 8.4.2  Subsection 15.  or with, tampered removed, has defendant a that believe to cause probable is there release.  pretrial on while device monitoring electronic an inoperable rendered KNE Sr,~T pE O.~ f Iry Gt 2~f y ~ ~ ~' ~ ~ ~~ L~ ~ t~ ~ . ~i~.  Y+~ ~y~ a Jersey  New of State GENERAL ATTORNEY THE OF OFFICE
[brief] *Id.* at 299.  This view necessarily must include a defendant’s history of prior criminal arrests not resulting in convictions as contained in a PSR, which is reviewed by the court with defense counsel making comments and amendments thereto at a sentencing hearing and any “‘relevant post-offense conduct in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors. ’”  *Ibid.* (quoting *Jaffe*, 220 N.J. at 116).  The [...], in its January 14, 2021 Report for the 2019-2021 Term, recognized the tension between arrests not resulting in convictions, as discussed in *Green* and *K.S.*, and the important and necessary creation of a full sentencing record for the sentencing court.
[brief] Almost All Material Facts [...] Relied Upon in Seeking Summary Judgment Are Disputed.  [...] argued to the Trial Court that [...]’s version of the accident should be jettisoned by virtue of his brain injury.  Even if [...] could prove that complicated fact, it would take a jury to determine the credibility of [...]’s version of the accident.  Though with some difficulty in recalling very abstract facts at deposition, [...] did his very best to recall his trip to and from the store he went to, up to the point at which he was struck by the [...] vehicle in the crosswalk on [...] on his way back.  He testified that, on the night of the accident, he left his house, crossed [...], then made a left to cross [...], then walked along [...], up to [...], where he made a right turn, and went down Lincoln to one of the stores on [...].  In returning home, he came up Lincoln, made a left onto Prospect, and walked to the crosswalk on Prospect.  His version of the accident was reiterated by [...], his then fiancée and now wife, with whom [...] had communication over the months after the accident about what happened.  This version of the accident disputes the fact “recreated” by defendants’ experts and the driver, [...], that [...] was not struck in the crosswalk and was skateboarding instead of walking.  Plaintiff disputes [...]’s assertion below that there is no evidence of the subject streetlight being defective.  [...] was clear in his deposition that the streetlight was more off than on historically and was in the same state of disrepair even at the time of the deposition.  Moreover, a streetlight emitting 0.0 foot candles in a dangerous intersection is de facto defective!
[brief] However, it is defined in other sources such as the Merriam-Webster Dictionary.  The Merriam-Webster Dictionary definition of design includes 1. “to create, fashion, execute, or construct according to plan”  2.a “to conceive and plan out in the mind”  2.b  To have as a purpose: intend”  2.c “to devise for a specific function or end”.  (Pa0189)  The Planning Board submits that the record establishes that the revised lot grade was not designed for the purpose of raising the height of the buildings.  Instead, it was designed to create an overall plan for the entire site and particularly to address stormwater management.  This was a finding of fact by the Planning Board well supported by the record.  [...]’s engineer, [...], testified that the overall site plan was required to be designed in accordance with State regulations and Borough regulations regarding stormwater management.
[directive] Section 1.  General Provisions  Applicability:  This policy applies to all persons who carry an automatic or semi-automatic assault weapon, police carbine or scoped rifle pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6.  Summary:  This policy delineates the Attorney General's requirements for automatic and semi-automatic assault-type weapons, police carbine and scoped rifle training and qualification and establishes relevant standards.  The policy requires quarterly training sessions, two of which may be used for qualification purposes.  Purpose:  This policy is intended to establish a uniform set of standards for automatic and semi-automatic assault-type weapons, police carbine and scoped rifle training, qualification and requalification.  It identifies specific courses of fire that meet firearms qualification requirements, as well as the minimum score and training necessary to meet the qualification standards set forth.  Section 2.
[brief] **Arbitration:**  In the event of any claim or dispute between Client and the [...] related to this Agreement or related to any performance of any services related to this Agreement, the claim or dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration upon the request of either party upon the service of that request on the other party.  The parties shall agree on a single arbitrator to resolve the dispute.  The matter may be arbitrated either by the Judicial Arbitration Mediation Service or American Arbitration Association, as mutually agreed upon by the parties or selected by the party filing the claim.  The arbitration shall be conducted in either the county in which Client resides, or the closest metropolitan county.  Any decision of the arbitrator shall be final and may be entered into any judgment in any court of competent jurisdiction.  The conduct of the arbitration shall be subject to the then current rules of the arbitration service.  The costs of arbitration, excluding legal fees, will be split equally or be born by the losing party, as determined by the arbitrator.  The parties shall bear their own legal fees.  (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that “the absence of any language in the arbitration provision that plaintiff was waiving her statutory right to seek relief in a court of law renders the provision unenforceable. ”  219 N.J. at 436.  The Court clearly stated that providing for “binding arbitration” is not enough, and that there must also be language in the arbitration clause itself that a plaintiff was waiving his or her right to seek relief in court because:
[brief] ”  (3T27-7 to 27-21)  [...] then noted that before accepting a guilty plea, a trial court must be satisfied from the lips of the defendant that he committed the acts which constitute the crime and that a factual basis must include either an admission or the acknowledgement of facts that meet the essential elements of the crime.  (3T24-19 to 25-4)  \(^3\) 198 N.J. 145 (2009)
[brief] [...] PROPERLY ISSUED THE PERMIT BY RELYING ON ITS SPECIALIZED EXPERTISE TO APPLY ITS EXISTING REGULATIONS TO THE SUBSTANTIAL RECORD.  This Court should affirm [...]’s permitting decision because [...] properly applied its existing regulations and reached a reasonable determination, based on its technical expertise, supported by substantial evidence in the record.  Appellate review of an administrative agency’s final determination is limited and deferential.  In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007); In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999).  “The ‘fundamental consideration’ in reviewing agency actions is that a court may not substitute its judgment for the expertise of an agency ‘so long as that action is statutorily authorized and not otherwise defective because arbitrary or unreasonable. ’”  In re Distrib. of Liquid Assets, 168 N.J. 1, 10 (2001) (quoting Williams v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 116 N.J. 102, 107 (1989) (additional citations omitted)).  The burden of proving arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable action is on the challenger.  Bueno v. Bd. of Trustees., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 422 N.J. Super. 227, 234 (App. Div. 2011).  Moreover, an agency’s “interpretation of statutes within its scope of authority and its adoption of rules implementing the laws for which it is responsible” is entitled to “great deference. ”  In re N.J.A.C. 7:1B-1.1 Et. Seq., 431 N.J. Super. 100, 115-116 (App. Div. 2013); see also Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc., 100 N.J. 57, 70-71 (1985) (“[T]he grant of authority to an administrative agency is to be liberally construed to enable the agency to accomplish the Legislative goals. ” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Am. Cyanamid Co. v. State, Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 231 N.J. Super. 292, 312 (App. Div. 1989) (holding agency’s statutory interpretation “is entitled to substantial weight”).  Courts “extend substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation and application of its own regulations, particularly on technical matters within the agency’s special expertise. ”  Pinelands Pres. Alliance v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 436 N.J. Super. 510, 524 (App. Div. 2014).  Thus, a court will not reverse an agency decision “because of doubts as to its wisdom or because the record may support more than one result. ”  In re N.J. Pinelands Comm’n Resolution, 356 N.J. Super. 363, 372 (App. Div. 2003).  Such deference is owed here.  Based on well-established regulations, [...] identified the Property’s flood hazard area and determined that a floodway verification was unnecessary because no activities were proposed in the floodway.  [...] also properly determined that a culvert, rather than a bridge, was proper to facilitate a road crossing over a narrow tributary surrounded by riparian area and containing wetlands for the U.S. Route 1 access road, and that riparian zone impacts for this access road were minimized to the greatest extent practicable.  Finally, [...] appropriately determined the Project does not conflict with an areawide plan or the WQMP rules because the Project, which does not require a NJPDES permit yet, is in the sewer service area.
[brief] In 2020, the State of Washington Supreme Court became the latest state high court to adopt the holding that a one-sided arbitration clause is violative of public policy and not enforceable, on both procedural and substantive bases.  The court explained:  Washington recognizes two types of unconscionability for invalidating arbitration agreements, procedural and substantive.  *McKee v. AT&T Corp.*, 164 Wash.2d 372, 396, 191 P.3d 845, 845 (2008).  Procedural unconscionability applies to impropriety during the formation of the contract; substantive unconscionability applies to cases where a term in the contract is alleged to be one-sided or overly harsh.  *Nelson v. McGoldrick*, 127 Wash.2d 124, 131, 896 P. 2d 1258 (1995).  Either is sufficient to void the agreement.  *Hill v. Garda CL Nw., Inc.*, 179 Wash.2d 47, 55, 308 P.3d 635, 635 (2013).
[directive] In a disorderly persons case involving a controlled dangerous substance, our department shall maintain the controlled dangerous substance until at least 60 days following final judgement in the case.  If a defendant is convicted of the disorderly persons offense, the final judgement would be measured from the date the defendant is sentenced.  If an appeal is pending, the final judgement would be when the appeal is decided.  It is incumbent on the law enforcement agency to track appeals.  7.4.3
[brief] As we argued in our original moving papers, standing is a threshold determination a trial court must make to determine a plaintiff's legal ability to maintain and prosecute a civil action.  In re Adoption of Baby T., 160 N.J. 332, 340 (1999); Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398, 421 (1991).  To establish standing, a litigant must have "a sufficient stake and real adverseness with respect to the subject matter of the litigation [and a] substantial likelihood of some harm . . . in the event of an unfavorable decision."  Adoption of Baby T., 160 N.J. at 340 (citation omitted).  In cases involving issues of great public importance, even a “slight additional private interest' will be sufficient to afford standing."  Salorio v. Glaser, 82 N.J. 482, 491 (1980).  Thus, our courts have granted "a broad right in taxpayers and citizens of a municipality to seek review of local legislative action without proof of unique financial detriment to them.  Kozesnik v. Twp. of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 177 (1957).  However, although judges in this State employ an expansive, liberal view in determining a plaintiff's standing to sue, Jen Elec., Inc. v. Cty. of Essex, 197 N.J. 627, 645 (2009), we will not "entertain proceedings by plaintiffs who are 'mere intermeddlers' or are merely interlopers or strangers to the dispute."  Crescent Park Tenants Ass'n v. Realty Equities Corp. of N.Y. , 58 N.J. 98, 107 (1971) (citation omitted).
[brief] - You can use PTO days as you see fit[.] - You can take unpaid time[.]  - We can terminate your status so you may be eligible to collect unemployment.  (Depending on your personal situation this may or may not be the case)[.]  If you chose this option, will be happy to reinstate you after this situation resolves and we are back to our regular operating status.  [Ibid.]  [...] separated from his South Plainfield employment in April 2020.
[directive] If the offense occurred on or after March 13, / Defendant’s Initials 피고인의 이니셜 유죄인정 주양식/지령 제01-18 호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 수정 양식, 페이지2/7  CN 10079-Korean Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Korean page 2/7 1995 and the sentence is to probation, or the sentence otherwise requires payments of financial obligations to the probation division, you must pay a transaction fee of up to $2.00 for each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made?
[brief] 3T184.  She still has plates and scares in her left arm and both her legs.  3T173.  She can still feel the metal.  3T173.  In terms of restrictions, Plaintiff is limited in bending one knee because the surgical hardware.  3T174.  Plaintiff has pain when she walks which she describes as a “sore feelings through her legs. ”  3T183.  She testified she never not has that sore feeling when she’s moving around.  3T183.  Plaintiff also testified she has a loss of feeling in some places in her legs which have been numb since the accident.  3T184.  Plaintiff has scarring on her legs from the surgeries.  3T174.  The Jury saw photos depicting the scarring.  Da163; Da164.  Plaintiff does not wear shorts as much anymore because she doesn’t like to show her legs at all.  3T184.  Defendants’ cross-examination of Plaintiff relative to damages was limited to the following 5 questions:
[brief] Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s decision to grant sanctions to [...] on March 26, 2024.  (Pa000880).  In their memorandum of law in support of reconsideration, Plaintiffs argued that [...] was not entitled to sanctions because their failure to get an expert on the duty of care did not amount to frivolous litigation.  Second, Plaintiffs argued that their trespass claim, though ultimately dismissed, was reasonable: [...], in its Responses to Interrogatories, could not recall whether any of its employees --- 8  In this same motion, Plaintiffs also sought reconsideration of the trial court’s decision dated March 6, 2024 dismissing the Complaint as to co-defendant [...].  (Pa000869).  [...] takes no position with respect to that part of Plaintiffs’ appeal seeking reversal of this dismissal, but this appeal contains facts which further detail Plaintiffs’ pre-suit knowledge of problems with remediation activities at its Property that have nothing to do with [...]’s preliminary plan.
[brief] (Da338-40).  The sum and substance of plaintiffs’ position was that the 2020 decision in Mejia v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 241 N.J. 360 (2020) constituted a sub-silentio overruling of [...]’s application to this matter.  In Mejia, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a *third party* defendant facing only contribution and indemnity claims by the original defendant, was not entitled to a dismissal from participation at the trial.
[brief] Plaintiff Surreptitiously Filed This Case Against Defendants.  On August 29, 2016, defendants sent a letter to plaintiff tendering the defense of certain PCB-related lawsuits (the “underlying PCB lawsuits”) to plaintiff and demanding that plaintiff indemnify [...] (and related entities as stated in the Special Undertaking Contract) in those lawsuits.  (Pa469-472).  Plaintiff responded on September 13, 2016, rejecting [...]’s defense and demand for indemnification.  (Pa081).  On April 7, 2017, defendants invited plaintiff to attend an informational and settlement meeting in St. Louis, Missouri that was to take place on May 16, 2017.  (Pa081, Pa477-479).  Plaintiff’s counsel responded on May 1, 2017, stating that he would attend the Missouri meeting on plaintiff’s behalf.
[brief] The dual degree program was one in which a student could pursue a Doctorate in Pharmacy (“Pharm.D”) combined with a choice of one of many master’s tracks, to be completed in four years.  (Pa344; Pa253; Pa398).  Dr. [...] (“[...]”) and Dr. [...] (“[...]”) had the initial discussions related to the idea of a dual degree program for students to simultaneously earn Pharm.D and MBA degrees.  (Pa325).  Despite not being accredited yet, [...] advertised to students the ability to earn two degrees within the same time frame as it was taking them to earn the Pharm.D. degree.  (Pa369).  The dual degree program made it easier to obtain the MBA than the traditional route because some of the classes were required for both degrees.
[brief] Inc. v. Twp. of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127 (1979)............................22  Kaufmann v. Planning Bd. for Warren Township, 110 N.J. 551 (1988).......................................12  Kenwoods Assocs. v. Board of Adj. Englewood, 141 N.J.Super 1 (App. Div. 1976).....................13  Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt,45 N.J. 268 (1965).........................................................12, 15  Med. Ctr. v. Princeton Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 343 N.J.Super.177 (App.Div.2001)...............12
[brief] Upon information and belief, the [...] relocated from the Property to a nearby strip mall on January 27, 2025.  Redevelopment Plan only permits residential development on an adjacent parcel, which is being developed by [...] and is under construction.  Despite [...]’s desire to see a commercial redevelopment on the Property and its redevelopment efforts in that regard, a commercial development has not come to fruition.  (Db11).  C.
[brief] .......................................................................................14  APPENDIX:  TABLE OF CONTENTS - Complaint and Jury Demand Pa1 - Answer and Affirmative Defenses Pa12 - Order to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice dated March 12, 2024 Pa34 - Notice of Appeal Pa36 - Amended Notice of Appeal Pa40 - Notice of Cross-Appeal Pa44 - Defendant’s Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment
[brief] That’s it. ”  (25T 99-9)  The jury, however, was not properly instructed on self-defense.  Before the court instructed on self-defense, it instructed on the charged offense of murder and the lesser-included offenses of aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter (27T 151-11 to 164-15), followed by instructions on the charged offense of attempted murder and lesser-included assault offenses (27T 164-23 to 184-25).
[brief] Restitution is a remedy that is used to restore the status quo.  See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946) (in enforcement action seeking restitution, regulator “asks the court to act in the public interest by restoring the status quo”); Kugler v. Banner Pontiac-Buick, Opel, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 572, 578 (Ch. Div. 1972) (finding in Attorney-General enforcement action under New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, that restitution restores “status quo”).
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**  [...] ("Defendant") was the owner of the property located at [...], Block 81, Lot 4 (the Property") by virtue of deed dated May 31, 2006.  (Pa5).  On October 18, 2016, [...], [...], BY ITS CUSTODIAN [...] purchased tax sale certificate no. [...] (the "Tax Lien") from the City of Haddon Heights Tax Collector.  (Pa13).  The Tax Lien was subsequently assigned to [...] ("Plaintiff").  (Pa21).  The Tax Lien was for taxes due for 2015.  (Pa13).  On June 28, 2018, Defendant conveyed the Property to himself and [...] ("[...]") by virtue of a deed recorded with the Camden County Clerk on July 9, 2018.  (Pa23).  [...] subsequently conveyed her interest in the Property to Defendant and [...] ("[...]").  (Pa23).  Throughout the Defendant’s ownership of the Property, and during the foreclosure, the Defendant filed several bankruptcy cases as follows:  ---  1  The Statement of Facts and Procedural History are combined to avoid repetition, for clarity, and for the convenience of the Court.  1.  Chapter 13 Case No. [...], filed on May 1, 2019, dismissed on September 3, 2019.  2.  Chapter 13 Case No. [...], filed on October 8, 2019, dismissed on November 8, 2019.  3.  Chapter 7  Case No. [...], filed on January 11, 2022, dismissed on February 28, 2022.  (Pa23).  The Property was encumbered by two mortgages executed by the Defendant, which totaled $295,000.00.  (Pa3).  [...] s/b/m/t [...] held a mortgage recorded on November 14, 2006 in the principal amount of $85,500.00 and [...] held a mortgage recorded on January 1, 2007 in the principal amount of $210,000.00.  (Pa3).  On December 17, 2018