ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Similarly, the State’s allegation that [...] was a treating doctor, so she somehow fabricated her evaluation was not supported by the record and inappropriate.  [...] was never [...]’s treating doctor.  (10T:71-25 to 72-1).  [...] testified on direct that her initial evaluation was done “to render a professional opinion as his diagnosis, to assess for any possible malingering or symptom exaggeration and to make recommendations for treatment needs. ”  *Id.*  [...] testified multiple times that the purposes of her evaluation were to test Scott for malingering and to give treatment recommendations.  (11T:6-25 to 7-7).  Scott’s guardian ad litem, [...], testified that he ordered several evaluations in concert with the court for the purposes of attempting to get Scott treatment.  (12T:124-1 to 13).  [...] testified that there was an evaluation conducted by [...] for a differential diagnosis.  (12T:21-18 to 24).  [...] also indicated the evaluation was specifically to test Scott for malingering and to make treatment recommendations.  (12T:124-15 to 125-2).  However, in the State’s summation, the Prosecutor ignored this and told an untrue narrative.  Specifically, the State indicated:  It wasn’t the same for [...].  [...] had a clinical relationship with him.  And then a forensic relationship with him.  And not a word, you know, not just a form of words.  You heard the testimony from both doctors, in a clinical setting the doctor is supposed to not question things.  Right, just accept them as they come.  And not push back and not question or probe.  But that’s not what a forensic interview is, where you’re actually supposed to do that.  And maybe the reason [...] didn’t push back at all in 2020, is because of that relationship, she couldn’t shift out of one mode to another, that dual agency.  Or maybe it’s because she couldn’t.  [15T:152-21 to 153-9].  By undermining [...]’s credibility based on facts not in the record, the State deprived [...] a fair trial.  There is no evidence anywhere in the record that [...] ever treated [...].  This case hinged on expert testimony and the State’s argument in summation crossed the line and was so egregious that it deprived [...] of a fair trial.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For all the foregoing reasons, this Court must affirm the Trial Court’s Order dismissing the claims against Defendants, [...], [...], [...], and [...], Respectfully submitted, [...], Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents, [...], [...], [...], and [...] /s/ [...]  By: ____________________________  [...] #024112005  Date: March 13, 2024  [...] & [...], Plaintiff/Appellant, v. [...], CENTER FOR FAMILY SERVICES, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], DEBORAH JOHNSON, THERESE BENYOLA, MARION MCLAURIN, ABC CORPORATIONS 1-5 (fictitious names of presently unidentified business entities), and JOHN DOES 1-5 (fictitious names of presently unidentified individuals), Defendants/Respondents.
[directive] Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude the officer from firing or discharging the device in the event that the officer’s body worn camera malfunctions unforeseeably, or if the exigency of the situation made it -15- [DCJ 03/03/16] unsafe or infeasible for the officer to activate the body worn camera before firing the device.  3.  The device must safeguard all such digital data and video recordings to ensure that they can be accessed or erased only by appropriate supervisory personnel in accordance with rules, regulations, standing operating procedures or orders promulgated pursuant to this supplemental policy.  The list of specifications and characteristics shall be submitted to the Attorney General for approval and dissemination.  No law enforcement agency shall purchase, possess, deploy, fire, or discharge any conducted energy device pursuant to this supplemental policy unless the device satisfies the specifications and characteristics approved by the Attorney General.  The private ownership or possession of a conducted energy device or any other form of stun gun is strictly prohibited and is subject to criminal prosecution.
[brief] Appellate courts apply a deferential standard in reviewing factual findings by a judge.  *Balducci v. Cige*, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020); *State v. McNeil-Thomas*, 238 N.J. 256, 271 (2019).  "Appellate courts owe deference to the trial court's credibility determinations as well because it has 'a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of a witness.'"  *C.R. v. M.T.*, 248 N.J. 428, 440 (2021) (*quoting Gnall v. Gnall*, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)).  "A reviewing court must accept the factual findings of a trial court that are 'supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'"  *State v. Mohammed*, 226 N.J. 71, 88 (2016) (*quoting State v. Gamble*, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014)).  "Reviewing appellate courts should 'not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge' unless convinced that those findings and conclusions were 'so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'"  *Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean*, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) (*quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am.*, 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).  "The general rule is that findings by a trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence."  *Gnall v. Gnall*, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (*quoting Cesare v. Cesare*, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)).  See *State v. Camey*, 239 N.J. 282, 306 (2019) ("[w]e will not disturb the trial court's findings; in an appeal, we defer to findings that are supported in the record and find roots in credibility assessments by the trial court"); Motorworld, Inc. v. Benkendorf, 228 N.J. 311, 329 (2017) ("[w]e review the trial court's factual findings under a deferential standard: those findings must be upheld if they are based on credible evidence in the record"); Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016) (findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence); State v. K.W., 214 N.J. 499, 507 (2013) ("[w]e defer to the trial court's factual findings 'so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record").
[brief] The trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on self-defense violated [...]’s right to a fair trial because had the jury been instructed on self-defense, it could have found it to be a complete justification to all the charges against [...].  U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 10.  If any evidence raising the issue of self-defense is presented at trial, “whether in the State’s case or in the defendant’s case, then the jury must be instructed that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the self-defense [justification] claim does not accord with the facts. ”  State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 200 (1984); State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 390 (2012) (“A trial judge must sua sponte charge self-defense in the absence of a request … if there exists evidence in either the State's or the defendant's case sufficient to provide a rational basis for its applicability. ”) (internal quotations omitted).  Where the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant is sufficient to support a claim of self-defense, a court’s failure to instruct the jury that self-defense is a complete justification for the crime charged has the clear capacity to produce an unjust result.  See State v. Gentry, 439 N.J. Super. 57, 62-63 (App. Div. 2015).  Accordingly, the court’s failure to instruct the jury on self-defense requires the reversal of [...]’s convictions.
[brief] Only if the appellate court is “thoroughly satisfied” that the trial court erred and made a decision that was “so plainly unwarranted” may it step in and “make its own findings and conclusions. ”  Johnson, 42 N.J. at 162.  Here, after carefully weighing the conflicting testimony before her, [...] denied defendant’s motion to suppress.  She determined the detectives, [...] and [...] were credible, had firsthand knowledge of the incident at issue, answered questions directly and consistently on direct and cross-examination, and were candid about any gaps in their recollection.  [...]’s determinations thus rested squarely on her ability to observe the testifying witnesses and judge their credibility.  Her careful analysis, which was based on sufficient credible evidence in the record, is entitled to substantial deference and should be upheld on appeal.
[brief] Appealle’s citations to *Flanders* and *Accord Camp* are flawed to the extreme.  *Flanders* concerns Georgia law.  Georgia allows direct claims by a plaintiff against a defendant’s insurer for the excess verdict under a bad faith claim.  New Jersey, and *Rova Farms*, does not.  See *Ross v. Lowitz*, 222 N.J.  494 (N.J. 2015).  *Accord Camp*, under Florida law, concerns a Bankruptcy trustee’s ability to make a bad faith claim, not a plaintiff, because of actual harm made to an estate.  Appealle cites to nothing that actually supports his alleged bad faith claims under New Jersey he wishes to pursue because the bases are entirely non-existent.  Molding, or amending, the judgment is materially no different than a verdict being converted to a molded judgment based on a high/low agreement or in a UM case there being a molded judgment due to the UM limits.
[brief] ”  (Da 67)  (citing *Zuber*, 227 N.J. at 447, 450))  This Court specifically instructed that on remand, “the aggregate impact of consecutively-imposed sentences must be considered when applying the *Miller* factors,” taking into account the “real-world” effect of [...]’s consecutive sentences on his parole eligibility date.  (Da 67); (Db 8,9)  Furthermore, the State’s claim that the resentencing court was not required to provide an explanation of the overall fairness of the sentence that it imposed on [...] because the original sentencing court had already given such an explanation eight years earlier is mistaken on multiple levels.  First, the State’s assertion that the original sentencing court had already explained the fairness of its imposition of consecutive sentences on [...] is unsupported by the record.  (See Sb 33-34)  The State cites the sentencing court’s justification for the length of the discrete sentences it imposed on [...] – not for its imposition of consecutive sentences.  (Sb 33); (2T:20-12 to 21-1)  Moreover, our jurisprudence requires defendants to be sentenced as they stand before the court at any full resentencing proceeding.  State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 354 (2012) (holding “when reconsideration of sentence or resentencing is ordered after appeal, the trial court should view defendant as he stands before the court on that day. ”).  In Torres, our Supreme Court specifically held that “the fairness of a sentence cannot be divorced from consideration of the person on whom it is imposed,” and when conducting a “fairness assessment . . . the court sentences the defendant as the defendant appears before the court on the occasion of sentencing.
[directive] Curbside Warnings and Stationhouse Adjustments.  a.  The New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice and Court Rules provide that certain delinquency complaints filed by a law enforcement officer may be diverted by court personnel to a "Juvenile Conference Committee" or to an "intake service conference."  These judicially-administered diversion options have proven to be extremely effective, and provide an excellent opportunity to resolve matters that, while warranting the filing of a complaint by law enforcement, need not be presented to a judge for formal adjudication.  There are numerous occasions, however, where less serious matters can be satisfactorily resolved or "adjusted," either at curbside or at the police stationhouse, without the need for a formal adjudication of delinquency, the filing of a complaint or even the taking of a juvenile into custody.  It shall therefore be the policy of this State to encourage the use of "curbside warnings" or "stationhouse adjustments" as an appropriate law enforcement response to non-serious juvenile activity that does not warrant either the taking of a juvenile into custody or the filing of a complaint alleging delinquency.
[brief] Defendants’ motion to reconsider was merely a rehash of their thrice-rejected arguments, citing the same authorities  Defendants’ motion to reconsider should have been denied for the additional reason that Defendants simply repeated the same arguments and cited the same authorities concerning a comity stay or dismissal that had been fully briefed, argued, and rejected *three times* previously.  Defendants’ attempts to claim otherwise do not withstand even a moment’s scrutiny:  | Motion | Summary of Comity Arguments
[brief] One structure will be a parking multi-level building.  (Topology Report at 50, Pa0243).  The Overlay Properties consist of eight properties located between North Avenue West and South Avenue West, as depicted at pages 4-5 and 55 of the Topology report (Pa0200-Pa0201, Pa0251).  The redevelopment plan calls for the addition of two stories to the top of the existing [...], the creation of large parking garages, and the development of 310,000 square feet of office space with the hope that someone will commute to these new offices in [...].  This proposed oversized redevelopment will change the character and essential idyllic nature of [...] forever.
[brief] (9T 53-24 to 55-4)  They took into evidence a pair of sunglasses that [...] had on him as well as a pair of black sweat pants, boots, and a cell phone.  (9T 55-11 to 10)  At trial, [...] identified [...] as the man he saw in [...] on February 1, 2016.  (8T 10-17 to 11-12)
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AND TO HAVE COUNSEL AT A CRITICAL STAGE OF THE TRIAL JUST BEFORE JURY DELIBERATIONS BEGAN, RESULTING IN THE COURT FAILING TO PROVIDE THE JURY WITH A CRITICAL DEFENSE EXHIBIT.  (Not Raised Below)  .........................................................  39 POINT IV  THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE NUMEROUS TRIAL ERRORS DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL.
[directive] Any indictable domestic violence offense defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19, as well as any domestic violence assault defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19A(2); 3.  Any other indictable offense listed in the chart below; or 4.  Any indictable offense under the law of another jurisdiction that is the substantial equivalent to an offense described in paragraphs 1-3 above.
[brief] In addition, timing defeats the company's unlawful refusal to consider a catalytic heater.  The company's first application to the [...] was filed on March 17, 2015, and by that time, [...] had finished all of its real "problems" with catalytic heaters at two of its five locations.  That application was denied on December 7, 2016, by which time [...] had another year's nearly trouble-free experience with catalytic heaters.  Ha413.
[brief] Moreover, the Board argues in its opposition brief that the language of the Ordinance is clear and unambiguous that “[I]f the revised lot grade includes mounding, terracing or other devices that are designed to allow increased building height, then the height is measured from the lowest original lot grade.  Conversely, if the revised lot grade includes mounding, terracing or other devices that are not designed to allow increased building height, but for some other legitimate purpose, the height is measured from the approved revised lot grade.
[brief] [...] had not yet released any claims when she identified her suit against [...] (the tortfeasor) and requested [...]’s consent to settle.  In other words, [...] still had enforceable subrogation rights when it allegedly learned of [...]’s suit against [...].  By consenting to [...]’s settlement with [...], [...] knowingly waived its subrogation rights.  Under Longworth, the analysis ends there, with [...] qualifying for UIM coverage.
[brief] The 2016 Application does nothing to indicate or suggest that “disciplinary proceeding” is a defined term, such as capitalizing the term or putting it in bold type face, like defined terms in the Policies.  In addition, the 2016 Application was a new application – not a renewal application – so the Firm did not even have a copy of the 2016 Policy when it completed the 2016 Application.  There is no reasonable basis for [...]’s contention that the term “disciplinary proceeding” as used in the Applications has any meaning other than its ordinary common meaning.
[brief] (“Students and community members once again gathered Thursday to protest the social media posts of two [...] members, again urging the district to take action”; “On Thursday, the school board was voting on a social media policy for board members that was introduced at the March 17 meeting, in response to the community’s uproar over posts by both [...] and [...]. ”)  Not only was there a justifiable impression that Respondent engaged in conduct which violated the public trust, the public itself actually stated that such public trust was violated – to the Board and Respondent in her role as Board member – at meetings of the Board.  What is more, in the record before the Commission was an Unfair Practice Charge filed against the Board on behalf of the [...] and the [...] in direct response to the post that constituted Count 1 of the present matter, which told teachers to drop out of their unions.  (Ca133-140).  This post was made mere days after Respondent swore in as a member of the Board.  (Ca240-241, Ca260-261).  That is why [...] held: This filing constitutes litigation which is more than the “potential to compromise the board. ”  To be sure, the Commission found in Persi v. Woska, C03-14 (C25-08 on remand), that a board member compromised the board of education through the board member’s self-serving actions that put the board of education at risk of litigation and expending public funds to defend such actions.  Respondent’s discussion distinguishing Persi is unpersuasive.
[brief] J. 558 (2012) .................................................................................... 10 Statutes and Rules 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) ...................................................................................... 1, 21, 31 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b) ...................................................................................... 21 15 U.S.C. § 1692(c) ...................................................................................... 21 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) ...................................................................................... 21, 22 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) .................................................................................... 26 15 U.S.C. § 1692c ......................................................................................... 23 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) ................................................................................... passim 15 U.S.C. § 1692d ....................................................................................... 22 15 U.S.C. § 1692e ....................................................................................... 22, 27 15 U.S.C. § 1692f ................................................................. 22 15 U.S.C. § 1692g .................................................................. 23 15 U.S.C. § 1692i .................................................................. 23 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) ............................................................ 1, 24 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b) .............................................................. 25 42 U.S.C. § 17934 .................................................................. 32 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) ........................................................... 32 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(i) ..................................................... 32 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(2) ....................................................... 32 N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 ..................................................................... 36 N.J.S.A. 56:8-19 .................................................................. 36 R. 4:6-2(e) ........................................................................... 3, 7, 26, 34, 38 Other Authorities https://www.nclc.org/national-public-data-breach-shows-urgent-need-for-cfpb-to-regulate-data-brokers/ ................................................................. 14 New Jersey Model Jury Charge 5.10A ........................................ 35 Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment 3.5, on R. 1:36–3 ... 8 S. Rep. No. 95-382, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695 (1977)  ......................... 19, 20  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order dismissing Second Amended Complaint with prejudice, filed January 18, 2024…………………………………………………………………………………Pa28  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] However, this became the source of the trial court’s first error.  The court justified its striking of portions of the ordinance with respect to the 69kV Project on the basis that the project was essential to the provision of adequate utility service, which necessarily involved an application of the ordinance to this specific project.  In other words, that court below used an “as applied” analysis even before there had been an application that was denied.  As such, the matter was not ripe, and the ruling was premature because the ordinance had not yet been applied to the 69kV Project due to the lack of an application and the lack of a final determination by [...].  The trial court’s second error was that it based its summary judgment ruling upon its making of a finding of fact.  Specifically, the trial court based its decision on its determination that the route through [...] was necessary to provide adequate utility service.  The evidence before the court established that there were at least four other routes the 69kV Project could take that did not pass through [...].  In ruling as it did, the trial court necessarily made findings on a disputed issue of fact, which is prohibited on a motion for summary judgment.  This error is further compounded by the trial court’s conflation of two separate issues.  The first issue was whether a 69kV connection was necessary for adequate service; the second issue was whether it was essential that the 69kV connection be routed above ground through [...].  That the court concluded that a 69kV connection was essential does not determine that the route desired by [...] through [...] was also essential so as to support the striking of portions of the ordinance.  Indeed, any finding that the route through [...] was essential is prohibited by the very fact that [...] had identified at least four other routes that could be used to make a 69kV connection between the two substations.  [...] could go around [...], could go underground through [...], or could have used a design that would comply with the limitations allowed by the ordinance (e.g., conformed to the pole height limits in the ordinance).
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondents [...] and [...]  [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  [...], Appellant, v. BOROUGH OF RUTHERFORD and FRANK NUNZIATO, In His Official Capacity As Mayor, Respondents.  ON APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CHANCERY DIVISION, BEREGEN COUNTY
[brief] *Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc.*, 89 N.J. 270, 275 (1982).  Consistent with that obligation, a business owner owes a duty to its patrons to warn and protect them against dangerous conditions on the premises that it knew about or should have discovered through a reasonable inspection.  *Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors*, 132 N.J. 426, 433, (1993); *Brown*, 94 N.J. at 290-91.