ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Da29.  On May 2, 2023, plaintiff refiled [...]’s April 5, 2023 certification of amount due with an amended amount due schedule indicating that no late charges were being sought (“[...]’s Amended April 5, 2023 Certification”).  Da33-39.  On May 10, 2023, plaintiff filed its second motion for the entry of a final judgment of foreclosure, its proposed form of foreclosure judgment, and [...]’s Amended April 5, 2023 Certification.  Da40, Da42, and Da45, respectively.  The form of judgment was identical to the one filed by plaintiff with its first motion on April 6, 2023.  Compare Da19-21 with Da42-44.  And, just as his April 5, 2023 certification of amount due failed to include a request that plaintiff be awarded post- mortgage foreclosure judgment interest at the contract rate, [...]’s Amended April 5, 2023 Certification also failed to included such a request.  See Da45-51.  Thus, plaintiff’s second motion for the entry of a final judgment of foreclosure also sought a judgment of $21,501,343.47 as of April 5, 2023, which included prejudgment interest at the contract rate, and postjudgment “lawful interest” thereafter.  Da43.  Again, if plaintiff was seeking an award of post-mortgage foreclosure judgment interest at the “contract rate”, instead of lawful interest at the “lawful interest” rate, [...] and plaintiff’s counsel knew how to say it (which they did not) and knew how to insert it in the final judgment form (which they failed to do).  On May 19, 2023, [...] filed its objections to plaintiff’s motion, which were that the motion was premature and that the calculation of the amount (not the rate) of prejudgment interest was incorrect.  Da52-54.  [...] did not object to the postjudgment interest rate sought because plaintiff sought “lawful”, not contract, postjudgment interest.  On June 9, 2023, [...] withdrew its objections.  Da60.  The foreclosure judgment with interest after April 5, 2023 at the “lawful interest” rate as requested by plaintiff, together with attorney’s fees of $7,500 and costs to be taxed by the [...] (the “Sheriff”) was entered by [...] on June 9, 2023.  Da61.  On June 6, 2023, the Sheriff fixed the taxed costs at $540.  Da64.  Pursuant to R. 4:42-11, lawful interest for calendar year 2023 was 2.25%.  Therefore, the 2023 interest per diem was $1,325.43 ($21,501,343.47 x 2.25% ÷ 365 days) and the total interest due between April 6, 2023 and December 14, 2023 was $335,333.79 ($1,325.43 per diem x 253 days).  Accordingly, the judgment amount as of December 14, 2023, the date of the sheriff’s sale, including the taxed costs and attorney’s fees, was $21,844,717.26.  Da85, ¶¶5-6.  B.
[brief] More importantly, the issue in this case is not Burt; it is the application of the JTCL.  Under Mejia, the Supreme Court specifically and pointedly addressed a split that arose in the Appellate Division regarding whether a plaintiff could recover an entire verdict under the JTCL in a situation where the jury allocated between defendants – specifically, when direct defendants and so-called “Burt defendants. ”  The Supreme Court framed the dispute as being the effect of a finding of 60% fault against a direct defendant: the Burt Court ruling a plaintiff could not recover the full measure, but the Appellate Division panel below in the Mejia case ruling that a plaintiff could recover the full measure.  Having identified the exact same, specific issue as is in dispute here, the Supreme Court unequivocally declared that a plaintiff in such a circumstance shall recover the full amount of damages as laid out in the JTCL against any direct defendant found sixty percent (60%) or more at fault.  Mejia, 241 N.J. at 371-72.  D.
[brief] Lack of funds “constitutes the customary basis for foreclosure. ”  *Del Vecchio v. Hemberger*, 388 N.J.Super. 179, 188 (App. Div. 2006).  Motions to vacate final judgments are not as liberally granted because the Rule is designed to reconcile the strong interests in finality and judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should have the authority to avoid an unjust result.
[brief] Similarly, the Court should give no weight to Appellants’ treatment of Kernahan v. Home Warranty Administrator of Florida, Inc.  Appellants highlighted that “a consumer cannot be required to arbitrate when it cannot fairly be ascertained from the contract’s language that she knowingly assented to the provision’s terms or knew that arbitration was the exclusive forum for dispute resolution. ”  236 N.J. 301, 322 (2019).  However, Kernahan featured a “confusing and misleading” provision that “unpredictably” shifted between the terms of “arbitration” and “mediation. ”  Id. at 320-321.  As such, the Court fairly concluded that the contract “fail[ed] to signal to consumers that it contain[ed] an arbitration provision affecting their rights .  . . .”  Id. at 322.  No comparable circumstances are featured in the case at bar.
[brief] 1.  [...] is conflating his arguments about a lack of an enforceable contract with his arguments about a lack of standing; and further asks this Court to ignore the practical realities involved with selling cars for junk.  Just as he done in the lower court, in the Respondent brief [...] interchangeably conflates a purported "unenforceable contract" with a purported "lack of standing".  But clearly these are 2 different things.  Although I could not find an exact authority on this point, to me the distinction seems axiomatic.  That is, in order to have standing, there is a vast abundance of case law which makes clear that although the threshold is "fairly low", the plaintiff needs to have a financial interest in the outcome.  Only then, can he/she challenge the validity of the contract terms.  Such was the case in my own appeal against [...], where the trial court dismissed my claims, stating that because I could not first establish that I had standing, I could not even get the opportunity to challenge the unenforceable language of the contract (i.e. an insurance policy that violated the rulings in *Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co.*, 100 NJ 325 (1985)).  When this Court reversed, it held that I did have standing under the direct action statute; and then as a result, only then was I able to challenge the terms of the policy (contract).  But what [...] argues here is the reverse – that is, he argues that because he contends that my contract with [...] was unenforceable, that contention therefore equates to a lack of standing.  In other words, [...]’s position is essentially an argument that the cart should be put before the horse.  Also in this same point heading, he ignores the practical realities involved with selling a vehicle as junk, conflating that with statutes that were intended for selling normal vehicles which would be driven on the road again.
[brief] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT  [...] IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT-PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL OF THE GRANT OF SUMMARY  JUDGMENT IN ASA’S FAVOR AND DENIAL OF APPELLANT-PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION  [...], Esq.  (Bar No. 025651987)  [...] [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent  ASA Design Build, LLC  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[directive] Following the principle that the primary goal of internal affairs and discipline is to correct problems and improve performance, management in the subject officer's chain of command should handle relatively minor complaints.  Complaints of demeanor and minor rule infractions should be forwarded to the commanding officer of the subject officer's unit because it is often difficult for an immediate supervisor to objectively investigate a subordinate.  In addition, that arrangement might obscure the possibility that part of the inappropriate conduct was the result of poor supervision by the immediate supervisor.  While the structure of each law enforcement agency is different, it is recommended that minor complaints be assigned to and handled by a commanding officer at least one step  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022
[brief] THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY PROSPECTIVELY ENJOINING THE GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS RATHER THAN ALLOWING THEM TO BE ADJUDICATED AND DECIDED ON THEIR MERITS.  [Da9-Da11; Da12-Da13]  The trial court erred by prospectively enjoining [...] from taking efforts toward condemnation and from designating a redeveloper for the Property, which effectively grants Plaintiff’s challenges before any government action has been taken.  Instead, the court should have denied Plaintiff’s application, leaving Plaintiff free to challenge any future governmental action once it is taken (if it is taken).  In general, “courts are reluctant to enjoin litigation prospectively. ”  Deland v. Twp. of Berkeley Heights, 361 N.J. Super. 1, 19 (App. Div. 2003) (holding court should not have enjoined Berkeley Heights from pursuing eminent domain action).  If [...] files to condemn the Property, then the condemnation proceeding is the right forum to adjudicate whether the condemnation can, or cannot, proceed.  Any argument by Plaintiff disputing the validity of a potential condemnation should be made in the condemnation action, if one is filed.  See id. at 21-22 (“the claim that Berkeley Heights brought the eminent domain action in bad faith . . . can be raised in that action. ”).  Likewise, if [...] designates a redeveloper for the Property other than Plaintiff, then an action in lieu of prerogative writs to challenge that governmental action is the right forum to debate that governmental action.  The trial court erred by enjoining these actions prospectively based on a request from Plaintiff, who is not even the record owner of the Property.  Generally, there are only two categories of litigation that may be enjoined: (1) when a claim has already been heard and decided, or (b) when the claim is pending or is about to be instituted in another forum whose jurisdiction is “superior or prior. ”  Ibid.  There is no precedent allowing a court to issue an injunction based on the circumstances presented in this case.  By enjoining those claims prospectively, the trial court effectively granted Plaintiff’s challenges before [...] even filed a condemnation complaint or taken any redevelopment action, and without any argument, briefing, or hearing on the merits of such challenges.  The trial court’s decision did not merely postpone the exercise of [...]’s right to redevelop and condemn, it erased those rights entirely unless a builder’s remedy is decided in [...]’s favor.  [...] is losing redevelopment opportunities in the interim.  Therefore, this Court should reverse the grant of the preliminary injunction.
[brief] 16  I.  PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE COMMISSION’S DECISION IS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR UNREASONABLE, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE HIGHLY DEFERENTIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW  APPLICABLE TO AGENCY DETERMINATIONS OF MATTERS WITHIN THEIR EXPERTISE  .........................................................................................................................  16  II.  THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PETITIONER’S REQUEST TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT  BECAUSE THE REGULATIONS DO NOT PERMIT PETITIONER TO DO SO ..........  19  III.  THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT PETITIONER COULD NOT SHOW THAT RESPONDENTS VIOLATED  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e)  BECAUSE PETITIONER DID NOT PLEAD OR OTHERWISE SHOW THAT RESPONDENTS MADE “PERSONAL PROMISES” OR TOOK “PRIVATE ACTION” THAT COMPROMISED THE BOARD  ....................................................................................  21  A.  Respondents  [...]’s and [...]’s Appearance Before The [...] Did Not Violate Section (e) .........................................................................................................................  22  B.  Respondents’ Facebook Posts Do Not Violate Section (e).  ..............  24  C.  Respondents’ Participation In Local Political Organizations Does Not Violate Section (e).........................................................26  IV.  THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f)  BECAUSE THEY NEITHER SURRENDERED THEIR INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT NOR USED THEIR POSITIONS FOR PERSONAL GAIN..................................................................27  V.  THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT PETITIONER CANNOT ALLEGE VIOLATIONS OF THE SCHOOL ETHICS ACT AGAINST THE BOARD AS A WHOLE BECAUSE THE ACT REQUIRES THAT COMPLAINANTS BRING PARTICULARIZED ALLEGATIONS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL BOARD MEMBERS.  ......................................................................30  VI.  THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g)  BECAUSE RESPONDENTS DID NOT PROVIDE INACCURATE INFORMATION REGARDING THE REFERENDUM  .......................32  VII.  THE COMMISSION DID NOT FAIL TO REVIEW THE FACTS IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PETITIONER, BUT ACCEPTED PETITIONER’S ALLEGATIONS AS TRUE, AND CONCLUDED THAT THEY FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR VIOLATION OF THE SCHOOL ETHICS ACT  .................................37  VIII.  THE COMMISSION’S DECISION DOES NOT IGNORE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE SCHOOL ETHICS ACT, BUT RATHER PROPERLY FOUND THAT PETITIONER DID NOT STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE ACT...............39  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................42
[brief] In this case, the Disputed Transactions were reflected in books and records that [...] had access to and, as he repeatedly testified, was never prevented from reviewing.  17T166-18 to 167-2.  Further, [...], the parties’ personal and corporate accountant, confirmed as such in his affidavit and further certified that [...] was aware and approved of all significant transactions reflected on [...] and [...]’s financial books and records.  Da07299.  Moreover, the evidence showed that [...] had joint control, and participated in, the companies’ finances and that he stored these records on his [...] work computer.  16T150-3 to 155-5; 17T38-24 to 55-13, 116-1 to 119-17, 131-20 to 135-10; 21T134-13 to 137-12; 16T57-19 to 74-20; 31T44-19 to 99-1; Da02865 – Da02896, Da02900 - Da03032, Da03033 – Da03039, Da03054 – Da03058, Da03060, Da03061 – Da03062, Da07364 – Da07386, Da07179 – Da07180, Da07387.  As such, the evidence demonstrated that [...] had the ability to conduct whatever due diligence he wanted regarding his companies and did in fact review the QuickBooks at issue prior to selling his interests in [...] and [...].  Id.  Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in awarding damages based on discrete transactions that occurred over six years before the complaint was filed, which accounted for nearly half of the compensatory damages awarded by the trial court.
[brief] (Da255-56).  In that accompanying decision, the court provided that it reconsidered, on its own motion, a portion of the oral opinion.  (Da256).  While the court originally denied the claim based on failure to comply with Rule 3:22-10(c), reinforced by Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, and the failure to establish a basis to conclude that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in choosing not to call the witness to testify, upon reconsideration, the Court determined that the second ground was not viable since there was no evidence in the record as to why trial counsel chose not to call the witness at trial.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 18A:8-50 (providing that “a new district formed pursuant to . . . this act shall be governed by the provisions of chapter 13 . . . of Title 18A”).  Finally, appellants assert that only the [...], not [...], could invoke the procedures in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 because [...] was merged, not consolidated, with [...].  (Ab25).  Yet appellants simultaneously concede that a governing body of a non-operating school district can seek withdrawal under N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11.  (Ab19).  And there lies the fallacy with their argument.  Appellants imply that in order for [...] to avail itself of N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11, it must first then demerge from [...].
[brief] [State v. Brown, 394 N.J. Super.  492, 502 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting First Union Nat’l Bank, 190 N.J. at 352). ]  A.  The Motion Court Erred When It Found the Issues in Both Motions to Suppress Are Not Identical.  Here, the motion court erroneously determined “the issue in the current suppression motion is not identical to the issue decided by the [c]ourt in Union County. ” (Pa1-2).  In considering whether issues are identical, a court must determine (1) whether the acts complained of and the demand for relief are the same (that is, whether the wrong for which redress is sought is the same in both actions); (2) whether the theory of recovery is the same; (3) whether the witnesses and documents necessary at trial are the same (that is, whether the same evidence necessary to maintain the second action would have been sufficient to support the first); and (4) whether the material facts alleged are the same.  [First Union Nat’l Bank, 190 N.J. at 353 (quoting Culver v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 115 N.J. 451, 461-62 (1989)).]  Here, all of these factors have been met.  As set forth in the statement of facts, defendant is moving to suppress physical evidence, including the handgun, seized when [...] officers pursued and arrested him on April 23, 2022.  Defendant already moved to suppress physical evidence, including the handgun, seized when [...] officers pursued and arrested him on April 23, 2022.  The same incident – defendant’s arrest on April 23, 2022, by [...] police officers – is the “act complained of” in both motions.
[brief] *Dimitrakopoulos*, citing *Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.*, 116 N.J. 739, 563 A.2d 31 (1989) reviewed the matter at the initial stages and pointed out "[a]t this preliminary stage of the litigation the Court is not concerned with the ability of plaintiffs to prove the allegation contained in the complaint," and the plaintiff is "entitled to every reasonable inference of fact."  *Printing Mart*, Id. at 746.  Additionally, *Dimitrakopoulos* was not concerned with statutory interpretation as is the case here.  In the instant matter, Appellant had the time to develop a record and provide a factual basis beyond the complaint that might support her claim that the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act should apply to her claim against [...] or that she was entitled to reimbursement.
[brief] See Mulvihill, 57 N.J. at 154-55 (finding trial court was required to instruct jury on self-defense where defendant’s testimony recounting his struggle with police officer raised issue of self-defense); *State v. Blanks*, 313 N.J. Super. 55, 69-70 (App. Div. 1998) (holding defendant entitled to self-defense charge where jury could have reasonably concluded that he acted in self-defense based on combination of evidence from State’s case and defendant’s case).  Furthermore, as in *Mulvihill*, there was a clear factual dispute for the jury to resolve as to whether [...] was under arrest at the time of the altercation.  Both police officers testified that they neither arrested nor intended to arrest [...] inside the restaurant, prior to him allegedly hitting [...].  [...] testified that the officers never told [...] that he was under arrest, but only that he would be arrested if he kept yelling.  (6T:203-25 to 204-3; 7T:63-10 to 19)  [...] specifically testified that he was not attempting to arrest [...] when he reached towards him, and had no intention of arresting him at that point.  (7T:80-13 to 15; 81-7 to 8)  However, [...] testified that the officers told [...] that he was under arrest after grabbing him and while pushing him out of the restaurant.  (8T:55-18 to 23, 57-5 to 10)  Thus, the jury could have found either that [...] was under arrest or that he was not under arrest inside the restaurant, and the jury should have received both self-defense charges.  Reversal is required because had the jury been properly instructed on self-defense, they could have acquitted [...] of aggravated assault on Ofc. [...] entirely.
[brief] Under the framework in Title 19, the district boards of election (the poll workers), are actually required to tally the votes in their polling location and make determinations on disputed votes, such as overvotes or improper markings.  N.J.S.A. 19:6-1, et seq.; N.J.S.A. 19:16-1, et seq.  The District Board of Election then submits a statement of results to the municipal clerk who transmits it to the County Board of Canvassers.  N.J.S.A. 19:17-1, et seq.  Simultaneously, the Board of Elections conducts its own review the ballots within its authority to canvass, such as vote-by-mail ballots (N.J.S.A. 19:63-22) and provisional ballots (N.J.S.A. 19:53C-15).  While they are functionally the same board, it is then the Board of Elections, in its capacity as Board of Canvassers who compile all the election results and either transmit the results to the secretary of state of elections which involve more than one county, or send the results to the municipal or county clerks.  N.J.S.A. 19:20-1, et seq.  In the latter, cases, the Board of Canvassers also provides a determination of the winner.  N.J.S.A. 19:20-8; N.J.S.A. 19:20-9.  While a municipal clerk may be the election official who “certifies” the election, the act of certifying is ministerial and is based upon the results as provided by the Board of Canvassers.  This is similar to the school district where the Board of Canvassers determines the winners of the election, even when held in April. \(^3\)  The provisions of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-77 are similar to those governing district boards of election, where the role on election night is to certify the results of that district, which are subsequently tallied with all other votes from the County Board of Canvassers who determines a winner.  There is no reason why the same process should not be followed for February Fire District Elections as it is for all Board of Education elections and November fire district elections.
[brief] \(^7\)  Da20-21; 1T146-23 to 25, 147-18 to 20; 5T53-4 to 11, 67-2 to 5.  Like the First and Second Loans, the parties agreed that 10% interest per annum would accrue on the Third Loan, that [...] would guarantee repayment of the Third Loan, and that [...] (just as the parties had agreed with respect to the Second Loan) would repay the Third Loan as soon as he was able to do so. \(^8\)  Da21; 1T147-13 to 17; 5T54-9 to 21.  Because the Third Loan --- \(^6\) [...] forgave these sums fully aware that he could have exercised all of his rights under the Note and the Guarantee including, without limitation, foreclosing on the Mortgage and insisting upon reimbursement for the attorneys’ fees and other costs to be incurred in enforcing his rights.  Plaintiff continued to forbear enforcing these rights only in deference only to his relationship with [...].  1T148-13 to 22.
[brief] At Db11, defendants rely on the first page of a letter from the [...] (Da150).  But the second page of that letter (Da151) states:  "Obviously, there appears to be a disagreement as to what entity is rightfully entitled to the use of the name: '[...].'"  Far from proving anything, the letter indicates that the defendants' claim to that name should be "decided in the Courts of the State of Illinois."  At Db11 to Db13, defendants, relying on their own documents, proclaim [...], Inc. to be "hierarchical."  That does not prove that plaintiff agreed to be part of its hierarchy.  [...], who has been plaintiff's Executive Secretary for over 20 years, certainly did not agree.  See Pa284 to Pa285 (T13-10 to T14-11); Pa287 (T23-23 to T24-4); Pa289 (T35-21 to T36-25).  Clearly, hierarchical control was not established as a matter of law.