ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  Toms River Police Obtain a Warrant from the Toms River Municipal Court to Search a Car Located in Toms River  On August 5, 2020, TRPD Patrolman [...] filed an affidavit (Dca 1-7) with the Toms River Township Municipal Court seeking a search warrant for a silver 2002 Jaguar S-Type car “within the Township of Toms River” bearing a particular registration number.  (Dca 1)  Officer Taranto stated that he possessed probable cause that drugs and other contraband would be found in the car.  (Dca 1)  In his affidavit, Officer Taranto explained that he had previously met with a confidential informant (“C.I.”) “[d]uring the week of July 20, 2020. ”  (Dca 4)  At that meeting, the C.I. told Officer Taranto that the C.I. was familiar with a man named “[...]” who purportedly “distributes controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in Toms River, New Jersey. ”  (Dca 4)  The C.I. said that the man “operates a silver 2002 Jaguar S Type” bearing a certain license plate “and utilizes this vehicle to distribute CDS. ”  (Dca 4)  After describing the man’s appearance, the C.I. identified a photograph of “[...]” from the TRPD’s “Spillman database” as the individual.  (Dca 5)  The following week, the affidavit continues, Officer Taranto provided the C.I. funds to purchase drugs from the suspect while under police surveillance.  (Dca 5)  The suspect arrived at the predetermined location driving the silver Jaguar.  (Dca 5)  Officer Taranto describes that “the two were observed meeting with one another where they appeared to be exchanging items. ”  (Dca 5)  The C.I. later handed over to police what police concluded was heroin the C.I. had acquired from the individual.  (Dca 5-6)  Based on Officer Taranto’s affidavit, on August 5, 2020, the Honorable [...], J.M.C., of the Toms River Township Municipal Court, issued a search warrant (Dca 8-9) based on “probable cause . . . that in and upon a certain vehicle within the TOWNSHIP OF TOMS RIVER . . . [namely] a Silver 2002 Jaguar . . . registered to [redacted] Lakewood,” police would find contraband, including “heroin and other controlled dangerous substances. ”  (Dca 8)  The warrant included the Jaguar’s license plate and VIN numbers.  (Dca 8)  Officer Taranto later testified at the suppression hearing that he applied to the Toms River Municipal Court—not the Lakewood Municipal Court—“[b]ecause our probable cause had occurred in Toms River” and police were not “seeking a search warrant for . . . [...]’s residence” in Lakewood.  (1T13-16 to 24)
[brief] TABLE OF DECISIONS, ORDERS, JUDGMENTS ........................................ ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................  iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................5  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .............................................................................8  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................  11  THE STANDARD FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL ..............................................  11  POINT ONE - THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE REQUIRE A GRANT OF LEAVE TO APPEAL THE MARCH 15, 2024  ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT (Da1)  .................................................. 12  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................
[directive] The developers the ODAR.A included intimate on an future assault predicting a Therefore, predict recidivism. and characteristics that tool only those independently strongly typical of domestic violence offenders childhood (e.~., believed to be commonly certain factors not incorporated in the ODARA.  Nonetheless, animal abuse) were threats, and suicide violence, consider all known relevant information making when enforcement must with PSA, law as the under Reform.  domestic violence matters  Criminal Justice prosecution of in critical decisions the (enumerating anon-exclusive special 4.6.10 list of subsection see subsection 4.2.2 and See considered).
[brief] In fact, in Jackowitz v. Lang, the case most integral to Defendants’ position, the Appellate Division held that if defense counsel fails to make a timely objection, it signifies that they did not believe the remarks in question were prejudicial, and deprives the court of the opportunity to take curative action.  408 N.J. Super., at 505 (citing State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 576 (1999)).
[brief] ”  (Italics added.)  (TRVa2911.)  In a September 23, 2015 email to [...], [...]’s Controller, [...] admitted “I had found out that this isn’t an OCIP (sic) reporting job either[.]” (Italics added.)  (TRVa2914.)  Thus, as the trial court observed, months before the Accident, [...] was aware, confirmed numerous times, and raised no objection to the fact that it was not enrolled in the CCIP, and maintained its own direct liability insurance through [...] and [...] to cover its work at the Project.  (SSR p. 16-17, at TRVa1346-1347.)  The cited communications are clear and specific and can lead to no interpretation other than [...] being an unenrolled contractor.  III.
[brief] The rationale for the "arbitrary and capricious" standard is that local citizens familiar with their community's characteristics and interests, rather than courts, are in the best position to assess the merits of variance applications.  CBS Outdoor v. Lebanon Planning Bd., 414 N.J. Super. 563, 577 (App. Div. 2010); Medical Ctr. at Princeton v. Princeton Twp. Zoning Bd., 343 N.J. Super. 177, 198 (App. Div. 2001) (citing Ward v. Scott, 16 N.J. 16, 23 (1954) and Hawrylo v. Board of Adjustment of Harding Twp., 249 N.J. Super. 568, 578 (App. Div. 1991)).  The arbitrary and capricious standard is a deferential standard of review for agency action.
[directive] Dispmalaf  Forfeited Property.  a.  Property which has been forfeited shall be destroyed if it - -1 Vb can serve no lawful purpose or it presents a danger the public health, safety or welfare.  All other forfeited property or any proceeds resulting from the forfeiture and all money seized pursuant to this chapter shall become the property of the entity funding the prosecuting agency involved and shall be disposed of, distributed, appropriated and used in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
[brief] Establish [...]’s Peaceable Possession of the Property**  Not only were [...]’s intentions with respect to signing the December 1998 Deed not fraudulent or otherwise intended to deceive [...], the circumstances surrounding the Execution and [...]’s ownership and control of the Property buttress this point.  (1).  *The Preparation and Signing of the Deed Were for the Express Purpose of Reaffirming [...]’s Ownership of the Property*  As noted above, following the 1997 transfer of the Property from [...] to [...], [...] continued to make payments on [...]’s Citi mortgage.  On or about September 16, 1998, [...] received a letter from [...] advising that the mortgage had been paid off and that there was an overage of $9,500, which was --- \(^5\)  In fact, the record evidence establishes that [...] never signed his named “[...]” with the sole exception of the December 1998 deed.  (11T77-79; Pa843-2265).  being returned therewith.  (Pa 0014-18).  [...] testified that this overage resulted when he and his ex-wife, [...], issued checks totaling $9,500 to [...] on or about July 20, 1998 to pay off the mortgage.  Per [...], when he received the check for $9,500 and the letter confirming that the mortgage was paid off, he advised his attorney, [...] and requested that he do whatever needs to be done to confirm that title to the Property was properly vested with [...].  (3T50-52, January 9, 2023).  (2)  Defendants  Neither Maintained the Property nor Hired [...] to Manage the Property  Defendants’ claim of ownership is premised on the notion that the December 1998 Deed transferred the Property to [...] which he maintained on his own or, alternatively through [...] as property manager.
[brief] ## A. CASELAW | AUTHORITY | PAGE | |------------------------------------------------|------| | Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. ManalapanTwp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366 (1995) | 13 | | Sheil v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 244 N.J. Super. 521 (App. Div. 1990) | 1, 16 | | State v. Brockington, 140 N.J. Super. 422 (App. Div. 1976) | 15 | | State v. Fearick, 132 N.J Super. 165 (App.Div.1975) | 7 | | State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 113 (1988) | 8 | | State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146 (1964)), aff’d 69 N.J. 32 (1976) | 7 | | State v. Johnson, 182 N.J. 232 (2005) | 14 | | State v. Kiett, 121 N.J. 483 (1990) | 1, 15| | State v. Kovack, 91 N.J. 476 (1982) | Passim | | State v. Marzolf, 79 N.J. 167 (1979) | 15 | | State v. Nicolai, 287 NJ. Super.  528 (App.Div.1996) | 6 | | Case Name | Citation | Page | |----------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------| | State v. Nichols | 71 N.J. 358 (1976) | 1, 14| | State v. Rhein | 117 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 1971) | 13 | | State v. Roosevelt | 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 296, 2014 WL 563649 | 19 | ### B. STATUTES & REGULATIONS | AUTHORITY | PAGE | |----------------------------|------| | N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (DWI) | Passim | ### C. RULES | AUTHORITY | PAGE | |----------------------------|------| | R. 1:1-2(a) | 9 | | R. 3:24 | 8 | | R. 3:9-2 | 14 | | R. 3:23-8(a) | 13 | | R. 7:10-2(b)(1) | 6 | ### D. Other Authorities | AUTHORITY | PAGE | |-----------|------| | N/a. | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.
[directive] Rule 3:26-1 delineates factors to be considered when setting bail.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree  Bail Range  10%  Cash Bail Option  Actor commits sexual contact with victim age 13 to 15 and actor is related by blood or affinity to third degree; or actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over victim; or actor is parent or stands in loco parentis within the household; or act is committed during commission of other designated crimes; or actor is armed with weapon and threatens to use Aggravated weapon; or actor is aided by other person(s) and physical force or coercion is used; or actor 2C:14-3a  Criminal Sexual 3rd Degree $25,000 to $100,000  10% permissible uses physical force or coercion and victim suffers severe personal injury; or actor knew or Contact should have known that victim was physically helpless, or had a mental disease or defect which rendered the victim temporarily or permanently incapable of understanding the nature of his conduct, including, but not limited to, being incapable of providing consent, or was mentally incapacitated.  2A:160(1-35)  Uniform Not Addressed in Extradition Court may withhold bail or grant bail to fugitive charged in another state; if the person is Criminal Extradition  Depends Upon Crime Charged Statute.  Probably  Proceeding charged with a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, no bail shall be granted.
[brief] Id. at 6-7.  The Planning Board in turn did not undertake any calculation.  Id.  The court found that the Planning Board lacked the statutory authority to ignore its obligation to calculate off-site infrastructure fees pursuant to pro-rata calculations.  Ibid.  Further, it was restricted to only imposing fees as part of a site plan that was within the scope of the limited scope of improvements that a planning board is authorized to assess pursuant to the MLUL.  Id. at *15-16.  These improvements included water, sewer, drainage, and street improvements only.  Ibid.  This is the inapposite to the instant matter, which the lower court correctly recognized concerned the negotiation of revenues not by the City’s land use boards, but, rather, the City acting within its capacity as the designated Redevelopment Agency prior to any land use application submission.
[brief] The first prong, known as the 'perception' prong, requires that a witness's "testimony . . . be based on the witness's 'perception,' which 'rests on the acquisition of knowledge through the use of one's sense of touch, taste, sight, smell or hearing.'"  State v. Higgs, 253 N.J. 330, 363 (2023) (omission in original) (citation omitted).  The second prong, known as the "helpfulness" prong, limits lay opinion testimony "to testimony that will assist the trier of fact either by helping to explain the witness's testimony or by shedding light on the determination of a disputed factual issue."  Ibid.  (citation omitted).  But "Rule 701 'does not require that the lay witness have "superior" ability or 'offer something that the jury does not possess.'"  Watson, 254 N.J. at 593 (quoting State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 19 (2021).  On August 2, 2023, the Supreme Court decided two cases offering guidance on the presentation of video surveillance to juries and establishing a structure for an officer's testimony introducing the footage to comply with Rule 701.
[brief] (Trial Court Order and Opinion dated August 31, 2022, Da271)  ..................................................28  A.  The Appellate Court’s Instructions And Applicable Law for Fee Shifting .................................................................28  B.  The Trial Court’s Decision and Fee Award on the Remand Was Similar in Analysis and Content To the First Fee Award, Which Was Reversed and Vacated ..................................................................................30  C.  By Adopting the Administrator’s Methodology, the Trial Court Awarded Fees That Clearly Did Not Meet the Requirements of Rule 4:42-9(a)(2) and the Appellate Division’s Instructions .................................................................35  D.  The Trial Court Failed to Conduct a Proper Analysis to Determine Whether the Particular Work of Plaintiff’s Attorneys Was a Benefit to the Beneficiaries of the Estate Other Than Plaintiff.  The Court Also Failed to Address Other Requirements of Rule 4:42-9(a)(2)  ........................................................................38  1.  The Trial Court Did Not Undertake A Thorough Analysis of the Extent of Any Benefit That Resulted From Plaintiff’s Litigation .........................................................................................38  2.  In Determining a Reasonable Attorney Fee Award, The Trial Court Should Have Assessed Whether the Award is Appropriate in View of the Size of The Estate ........................................................................42  3.  The Trial Court Failed to Adequately Consider Plaintiff’s Degree of Success ..............................................43  E.  The Benefit Resulting from the Administrator’s Lengthy and Comprehensive Search for Additional Assets and Malfeasance Did Not Benefit the Beneficiaries .........................................................................................44  POINT II
[brief] 4T74:19-23 (emphasis added).  In his findings, where it counts, he never used the modifier “serious. ”  I do also find that in addition that [...] does poses a threat of seriously – serious bodily injury to death – or death to a person or poses a threat of death to another domestic animal based upon the prior acts . . .”  4T6718-20 (emphasis added).  In short, the State’s brief misrepresents the lower court’s ruling.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  As demonstrated in the Points below, reversal and remand are necessary to correct and redress several critical errors made by the Trial Court in deciding [...]’s motion for summary judgment, as well as in the subsequent application for fees and in Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of the earlier orders.  In Point I below, Plaintiffs demonstrate that the Trial Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ tortious interference claim was predicated on its erroneous belief that a subsequent transaction was a necessary element of this tort.  The legal definition of tortious interference does not hinge on the completion of a transaction, but rather on the wrongful and intentional acts that disrupt a business relationship or potential economic advantage.  This Point further demonstrates that the Trial Court’s decision to grant summary judgment before depositions and before Plaintiffs had an opportunity to prove their case was premature.  Point II addresses the Trial Court’s award of sanctions against Plaintiffs.  In this Point, Plaintiffs demonstrate that the award of sanctions here was an abuse of discretion because (A) it was “based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors,” and “amounted to a clear error of judgment,” in that the absence of a “subsequent transaction” does not render the claim frivolous, because there is no such requirement anywhere in the case law; (B) the Trial Court failed to articulate sufficiently detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its sanctions orders; and (C) the Trial Court imposed sanctions without a specific and justified finding of “bad faith” on the part of Plaintiff—a necessary finding if, as the Court held, the sanctions would apply to Plaintiffs only, and not their counsel.
[brief] As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, a “prohibition on true threats ‘protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders[.]’”  *Virginia v. Black*, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (citation omitted).  It is reasonable to consider a threat even more dangerous and disruptive when committed during a state of emergency, when public sensitivities and fears are already heightened, as was certainly the case during the COVID-19 pandemic.  Municipal court was still being conducted on Zoom at the time of the instant offenses.  (3T9-4 to 13).  And, of course, there is no denying the national emergency that was the coronavirus pandemic, which would claim over one million American lives, including over 36,000 New Jerseyans.  See https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#maps_deaths-total.  The potential for injury by a defendant, who is threatening to commit acts of violence with the purpose to terrorize a victim, is enhanced during a global pandemic regardless of whether that defendant took express advantage of the pandemic conditions.  At the time defendant terrorized the victim in this case, our courts were still subject to Executive Orders, and citizens continued to shelter in place.  Threats to commit crimes of violence at the victim’s home and office, made during that state of emergency, rationally served to heighten the fear and anxiety engendered by piercing the sanctity the emergency declarations aimed to restore.
[directive] 8.3.2  Officers who are witnesses must cooperate.  They must truthfully answer all questions narrowly and directly related to performing their duty.  "Performance of duty" includes an officer's actions, observations, knowledge and any other factual information of which they may be aware, whether it concerns their own performance of duty or that of other officers.  If the officer feels their answer would incriminate him or her in a criminal matter, the officer must assert their Miranda rights.
[brief] Civil Action: On Appeal from a Final Agency Decision of the [...] [...]  Letter Brief and Appendices on Behalf of Respondent, New Jersey  [...]  Dear [...]:  Please accept this letter brief on behalf of Respondent, [...] [...] ([...]), on the merits of the appeal.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS  ......  2  A.  The Investigation of [...]’s Alleged Misconduct .................. 3  B.  [...]’s Lawsuit Against [...] ..............................................  4  C.  The [...]’s Denial of [...]’s Request for Defense .................................................................  5 ARGUMENT .........................................................................................  6  THE [...]’S DENIAL OF [...]’S REQUEST TO DEFEND IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION  ...............6  CONCLUSION
[brief] But, it is important here to catalog the full spread of issues that [...] lost on in the trial court.  [...] has failed on the following issues, resulting in it being forced to bear an overwhelming percentage of all of the damages it sought to collect from the insurers.  -  [...] did not prevail on choice of law.  -  [...] did not prevail on the applicability of the pollution exclusion, which, in conjunction with its loss on the choice of law issue, resulted in the Pollution Exclusion Insurers (more than $1 billion in policy limits) being dismissed from the case.  (Pa0087.)  - [...] did not prevail on the applicability of the “nuclear exclusion” at the Liability Trial.  (Pa0105; Pa0113-Pa0115.)  - [...] did not prevail on the applicability of the “owned property exclusion” at the Liability Trial.  (Pa0105; Pa0113-Pa0115.)  - Losing on those two exclusions resulted in $6 million, approximately 1/3 of [...]’s claim at the time, being uncovered and therefore not recoverable from [...] and the other insurers.  -  At the Liability trial, [...] failed to prove that “property damage” had taken place during the policy period of the [...] policies as to the majority of the AOCs.  (Pa0123; Pa0125-Pa0126; Pa0129-Pa0130.)  -  At the Allocation Trial, [...] did not prevail on its argument that it did not have responsibility to pay the $200,000 in limits underlying the [...] Policy, which resulted in [...] needing to exhaust $200,000 before the [...] Policy could be implicated.  (Pa0152-0157.)  •  Based on the trial court’s ruling granting [...]’s motion for reconsideration, [...] lost on all of its arguments as to how its damages should be allocated to the [...] Policy.  •  The combination of the losses identified above resulted in [...] being allocated approximately 85% of the damages that it alleged were covered by insurance, and [...] being allocated approximately 6%. (Pa0199.)  The record is clear that [...] cannot point to any “significant issue in litigation” on which it has achieved success.  Occhifinto, 221 N.J. 443, 450.  Even the most notable issue on which [...] had some limited success – that the Liability Trial resulted in a finding of “property damage” during the [...] policy period – came with a number of losses and was inextricably tied to the allocation dispute, on which it was unsuccessful.  D.
[brief] *Ibid.*  Indeed, in analyzing waiver in any context, “the court seldom considers the effects of those actions on the opposing party. ”  *Morgan*, 596 U.S. at 417.  Rather, waiver “focuses predominantly on the intent of the waiving party. ”  *[...]*, 478 N.J. Super. at 607 (citing *Shebar v. Sanyo Bus. Sys. Corp.*, 111 N.J. 276, 291 (1988)).  Considering the above, *[...]* analyzes the seven *Cole* factors in light of *Morgan*.  With respect to delay, *[...]* reasoned that a six-month delay was “not inordinate,” and “substantially less than the twenty-one-month delay that the Court decried in *Cole*.”  *Id.* at 611.  “Six months is approximately the same --- \(^1\)  In addition to prejudice, the relevant factors to a waiver analysis are delay, motion practice, litigation strategy, extent of discovery conducted, the pleadings, and proximity to a trial date.  *See [...]*, 478 N.J. Super. at 610-13 (citing *Cole*, 215 N.J. at 280-81).  delay [the Court] excused in *Spaeth*, 403 N.J. Super. at 516, 959 A.2d 290. ”  *Ibid.*  However, *[...]* specifically noted that unlike the pro se litigant in *Spaeth*, “[...] was represented here by counsel, who was better equipped to recognize its right to arbitration and act upon it swiftly. ”  *Ibid.*
[brief] (7T:291-3 to 9).  The fact that [...] was not afforded the opportunity to consult with his guardian in private prior to the waiver of Miranda rights is a significant factor and should’ve been given great weight.  Accordingly, the State cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] Kologi knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.  384 U.S. at 473-74.  b.  The Trial Court Erred in Finding that Defendant’s Waiver was Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary and did not put the Appropriate Weight on the Fact that the Detectives Gave Incorrect Miranda Warnings to [...] Kologi.