ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Ordinance No. 2022-17 Is Not Supported by Sufficient Evidence.  (Pa632); (T14:24-15:3).  To the extent this Court finds Defendants complied with the requirements of the LRHL, the adoption of Ordinance No. 2022-17 was still arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  Although a municipality enjoys a presumption of validity for its acts, see Price, 214 N.J. at 284, the record must be supported by "substantial credible evidence" that the requirements of the LRHL were satisfied.  See Lang, 160 N.J. at 58; Malanga, 253 N.J. at 314.  A careful examination of the record shows there was little to no evidence supporting Ordinance No. 2022-17.
[brief] The court also failed to consider in mitigation the fact that [...] voluntarily engaged in group therapy and anger management on a weekly basis (and continued with anger management treatment even after he completed the eight-week course) and attended individual counseling for two years upon his arrest.  (PSR 11, 16)  New Jersey Supreme Court precedent establishes that the sentencing court was required to consider this conduct as a mitigating factor.  See State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 396-98 (2003) (holding that where defendant entered into long term psychological treatment after his arrest for distributing child pornography, that action “is to be commended and entitled to weight as a ‘mitigating factor’”).  Relatedly, because participation in psychological treatment helps minimize the likelihood of recidivism and need for deterrence, this conduct also undermined the application of aggravating factors 3 and 9.  See Case, 220 N.J. at 68 (finding aggravating factor 9 was not entitled to particular emphasis where “[t]he undisputed medical testimony was that this first-time offender suffered from PTSD and depression, and in the four years between his arrest and trial, he underwent psychological therapy. ”).  The age-crime curve similarly demonstrates that [...]’s likelihood of recidivism will be low by the time he is released from prison.  See National Institute of Justice, From Youth Justice Involvement to Young Adult Offending (2014) (the age-crime curve demonstrates that the likelihood of recidivism drops dramatically as a defendant’s age increases).  Because the root causes of [...]’s behavior can and, to some degree, have been addressed through appropriate treatment, the court should not have found or assigned much weight to aggravating factors 3 and 9.  For the above reasons, the court erred in applying and weighing the mitigating and aggravating factors and a resentencing is required.
[brief] ”  See In re Proposed Xanadu Redevelopment Project, 402 N.J. Super. at 642 (the term “arbitrary and capricious” means “willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of the circumstances. ”)  In addition, it should be noted that the construction of the culvert also meets the requirements of N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(h)(2) governing the construction of the floor of the culvert.  Pursuant to the aforementioned section, where it is demonstrated that the culvert cannot be constructed as described in N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(h)(1), i.e. two feet below the natural channel, the floor of the culvert should be constructed to incorporate artificial low-flow treatment, “such as a V-notch or key-notch, baffles to hold substrate in place, or a concave floor. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(h)(2) (emphasis added).  In this case, the culvert is a 24-inch circular pipe and consists of a concave floor.  D.
[brief] [...] spoke with [...] and stated that approximately four months earlier, [...] asked her to find the alleged victim in the attempted kidnapping case and offer her $5,000 to $10,000 to drop the charges.  (18a).  [...] told [...] that she refused, because this could all come back to her.  Id.  After this, [...] claimed that [...] approached her a second time and asked her if she could find someone to “get rid” of his accuser in the attempted kidnapping case.  (19a).  [...] said that she told [...] she would look into it, because she wanted to please him since their relationship was not going well and he was not aware that she was doing drugs.  (20a).  [...] stated, “I wanted to be with him I just constantly wanted to be with him.  I constantly just wanted to be with him. ”  Id.  However, [...] admitted that she did not have any knowledge regarding whether [...] ever actually attempted to “get rid” of the alleged victim.  (21a).  The following month, on October 13, 2021, [...] returned home to find that his house had been vandalized in a very peculiar way.  (5T100:6-8).  The items that [...] bought him, such as the speaker and television, had been broken and thrown on the floor.  (5T100:8-11).  However, none of the other valuable items in his house were taken or rifled through.  (5T100:12-14).  III.
[brief] The general rule against nonparty claim preclusion is subject to exceptions where: (1) person agrees to be bound by determination of issues in action between others; (2) there is pre-existing substantive legal relationship between person to be bound and party to judgment, e.g. preceding/succeeding property owners, bailee/bailor, assignee/assignor; (3) nonparty was adequately represented by someone with same interests who was party, as in properly conducted class action or suit brought by trustee, guardian or other fiduciary; (4) nonparty assumed control over litigation; (5) nonparty serves as proxy for party; or (6) special statutory scheme expressly forecloses successive litigation by nonlitigants and is otherwise consistent with due process.  U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5.
[brief] However, as argued above in Point I, *supra*, [...] obtained a defective conditional use approval from the Board without any jurisdiction to consider [...]’ application for development since [...] required a conditional use variance that the Board had no authority to consider or grant.  But because there was no semblance of compliance with the MLUL or [...], the Board’s decision was *ultra vires* and subject to collateral attack *at any time* and the 45-day limitation in R. 4:69-6(b)(3) is inapplicable.  *See Najduch, supra.*  Even though the 45-day limit in R. 4:69-6(b)(3) should not apply, even if it did, the trial court was right to enlarge it because it was manifest that the interests of justice warranted enlargement.
[brief] A.  PETITIONER’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS  ARGUMENT HAS NO BEARING ON THE COURT’S MARCH 1, 2024 ORDER OF DISMISSAL  Petitioner contends that the trial court could not enter its March 1, 2024 dismissal with prejudice where she may assert certain causes of action that have six-year statutes of limitation.  However, Petitioner’s Complaint makes no such claims, the limited amount of which sound in wrongful death and are therefore subject to a two-year statute of limitations that has long since expired following the 2019 passing of the decedent, [...].  See N.J.S.A. 2A:31-3.  Accordingly, none of the cited six-year limitations period have any bearing on this action.  Furthermore, Petitioner’s statute of limitations argument misses the point of the court’s dismissal due to the failure to retain counsel.  This court and the trial court have made clear to Petitioner that she may not personally pursue any claims on behalf of the Estate without the assistance of counsel.  Kasharian v. Wilentz, supra, 93 N.J. Super. at 482; R. 1:21-1(a).  Thus, limitations periods have no effect on the court’s dismissal with prejudice where plaintiff has simply refused to comply with court orders to retain counsel since 2022.  Accordingly, the dismissal below was proper. \(^1\)
[brief] First, the jury saw [...] ambiguously invoke his right to counsel by asking the questions discussed in Point I, *supra*, regarding the type of counsel that was available to him.  Second, the jury saw [...] invoke his right to silence by establishing prior to signing the waiver form that he would be able to invoke his right to silence on a question-by-question basis and then invoking his right to silence to decline to answer certain questions, or in his own words, “us[ing] my *Miranda* to not answer that question.
[brief] The crux of [...]’s summary judgment motion – and of the trial court’s subsequent opinion granting that motion – was that the Ordinance was preempted by Supreme Court precedent.  (Da007a) (“However, the Court finds that the Ordinance is preempted by the Supreme Court's decision in In re [...] as applied to high capacity transmission lines. ”).  Despite this clear language, [...] argues that the trial court actually found “portions of the Ordinance … facially invalid” (Db23), and that the court erred in doing so because it should have analyzed the Ordinance under an “as applied” standard.
[directive] 1.  Deposit of Cash by  Cash deposits shall made into a bank account established the be DCJ for such purpose.  Checks may be deposited at any time and without prior notice the bank and should be deposited within one to business day of receipt.  Deposits should be made within one or business day of seizure, as soon as practical, but not later then '  i-  In four business days after seizure.  instances of large cash deposits, . (a-, of $25,000 in or a sum excess of large sum large amount small bills) arrangements can be made to count verify the deposit and through the bank's contracted armored company.  car > The [...] the [...] or of Section shall promptly notify the Property Management Office a office cash seizure.
[brief] [...], [...], [...], and [...] (collectively “Plaintiffs”), filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs on March 17, 2022 in the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, Mercer County (the “Complaint”).  Pa138-Pa151.  The Complaint named [...] (the “Township”), [...], [...] d/b/a [...] (“[...]”), and five Township Committee members in their individual capacities, as defendants (collectively “Defendants”).  Pa138.  The Township moved to dismiss the committee members in their individual capacities.  Plaintiffs consented.  Pa266-Pa268.  After the Trial Court (Hon. [...], A.J.S.C.) held a case management conference, [...] filed a motion to quash Plaintiffs’ interrogatories and document demands, and the Township filed a motion seeking a protective order and order striking Plaintiffs’ interrogatories and document demands.  Pa182-Pa184; Pa197-Pa199.  On September 9, 2022, the Trial Court granted [...]’s (“[...]”) motion to intervene.  Pa272-Pa273.  On September 12, 2022, the Trial Court granted the Township’s and [...]’s discovery motions, and ordered that “no discovery shall be hand in this case. ”  Pa30-Pa60.  The Trial Court’s Order was accompanied by a 31-page written decision with findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Pa30-Pa60.  Plaintiffs submitted an expert report from [...] on November 8, 2022, and [...] filed an expert report from [...] on December 13, 2022.  Pa699-Pa709; Pa710-Pa738.  On May 1, 2023, after briefing and oral argument, the Trial Court dismissed the Complaint with prejudice.  Pa1-Pa29.  The Trial Court’s Order was accompanied by a 29-page written decision with findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Pa1-Pa29.  This appeal followed.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  CASES  Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1 (2004)..............................................16  Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990)..........................................................24  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),....................................................22, 23, 24, 25 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980),.....................................................24  Saldana v. Michael Weinig, Inc., 337 N.J.Super 35 (App. Div. 2001)...............16  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)...........................................26 State v. Barnes, 54 N.J. 1 (1970).................................................................25 State v. Brunson, 132 N.J. 377 (1993)..........................................................30  State v. Camacho, 218 N.J. 533 (2014).........................................................21 State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30 (1997)...............................................................25 State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80 (2004)............................................................21 State v. Davis, 96 N.J. 611 (1984)...............................................................16  State v. Deatore, 70 N.J. 100 (1976)............................................................16
[directive] Bail the Constitution, New Jersey under the me to granted authority the to Pursuant N.J.S.A. of 1970, Act Justice Criminal the and 25, - to 2A:162-15 N.J.S.A. Law, Reform the by justice criminal of supervision general the for provides which -117, to 52:17B-97 of a benefits order the to secure in State the of officer enforcement law chief as General Attorney justice criminal of administration and the law criminal the of enforcement efficient uniform and New the paragraph of 11 I, Article to amendments the implement to and State, the throughout hereby  [...], S. I, 1, 2017, January on effect take that Constitution Jersey laws the of authority operating under the agencies prosecuting and enforcement all law DIRECT procedures, policies, following with the comply and implement to Jersey New of State of the practices. and standards, AUTOMATED INITIATE THE REQUIRED TO FINGERPRINTING SCAN LIVE 2.
[brief] Indisputably, accurate and understandable jury instructions are essential to a fair trial.  *State v. Savage*, 172 N.J. 374, 387 (2002).  Jury instructions should include an explanation of the law as it relates to the material facts of the case, operating like a roadmap to guide the jury.  *Ibid.*  Indeed, flawed jury instructions on material issues constitute reversible error.  *State v. Grunow*, 102 N.J. 133, 148 (1986).  Proper jury instructions are at times necessary to ensure a defendant is afforded the opportunity to present a complete defense.  A defense can include evidence of third-party guilt.  *State v. Cope*, 224 N.J. 530, 551 (2016); see also *State v. Jimenez*, 175 N.J. 475, 486 (2003) (stating that a defendant is entitled to show that someone else committed the crime); *State v. Koedatich*, 112 N.J. 225, 297 (1988) (explaining standard governing admissibility of evidence of third-party guilt).
[brief] Defense counsel’s attempt to focus solely on the issue of who would ultimately pay a monetary judgment completely disregards the underlying basis for prohibiting joint representation of two clients with an adversity of interests, which is to avert undermining of the integrity of the Court, the judicial system, and the high standards governing our legal profession, without consideration of the parties’ ability to pay a monetary judgment.  Here, separate and aside from the personal risks to Defendant [...], the conflicted joint representation by [...] of [...] and the [...] has already had a negative effect on the integrity of these proceedings.  The justice system as a whole suffers when conflicted counsel use their position in an attempt to influence one client to testify in a way that hurts his own defense but benefits another client, which is what appears to have occurred here when an [...] attorney told Defendant [...] that there had been a “miscommunication” when [...] in fact maintained that [...] had simply never given him specific instructions.  See Da046 (27:10-18; 29:5-20); Da050 (44:4-8, 21-23).  A party should not be permitted to abuse our justice system by using conflicted joint representation to influence witness testimony and the ultimate apportionment of fault, which should be based on the truth as ascertained through properly, non-conflicted representation of parties.  Defendants’ argument regarding the alleged implications of the trial court’s decision to disqualify [...] from jointly representing Defendants under the specific facts of the instant matter is without merit.
[brief] CIVIL ACTION –  On Appeal from an April 28, 2023  Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion For Summary Judgment and a June 20, 2023  Trial Order Dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint  Entered in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County.  Sat Below: [...] J.S.C. REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, [...] and [...]
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], requests that this court reverse the Board of Review’s determination that he left his job voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work, and that he did not satisfy his burden under N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b).  [...] was employed by [...] as a Mechanical Helper to repair boilers from 1995 until he was forced to leave his job on June 4, 2021.  During the 4-5 years leading up to that decision, [...] had started to notice that his job responsibilities were exacerbating the pain in his knees.  Amid his final year with Monarch, the problem had reached a breaking point when he could no longer physically continue to work because the job demands had become too painful.  [...] had spoken with his supervisor and his employer several times complaining about the pain in his knees, finally informing them that he would have to leave his job in six months if they could not provide him with any other type of employment.  The continual pain finally led [...] in January 2021 to seek medical attention for the osteoarthritis in both of his knees.  Despite repeated declarations from [...] to his employer that the work was becoming difficult for him due to the pain in his knees, his employer did not make any accommodations for him, and finally, after six months of notice, on June 4, 2021, [...] had no choice but to leave his employment.  Because of the nature of the work done by Monarch, being a small family owned company focused solely on boiler repair and installation work, there were no other suitable positions for which [...] was qualified and that could be performed within the limits of his disability.  There was no reasonable accommodation available.  Upon leaving his employment, [...] filed for and was initially approved for unemployment benefits.  The Deputy subsequently made a determination that [...]’s decision to leave his job was voluntarily made and not for good cause attributable to the work, reversing his eligibility and disqualifying him for benefits.  At both the Appeal Tribunal hearing and in the appeal to the Board of Review, [...] submitted medical certifications in support of his contention that the work aggravated his health conditions; however, both the Appeal Tribunal and the Board of Review rejected this evidence, and contrary to the regulation, further found that [...] did not notify his employer of his medical condition or seek an accommodation, even though the employer testified that there were no suitable alternative positions available for [...].  As a result, [...]’s separation from work was erroneously deemed to be voluntary, not for good cause attributable to the work, and for a personal reason, disqualifying him from benefits.  Because the Board of Review imposed an incorrect standard upon [...], the Appellate Division should reverse the Board’s denial of unemployment benefits to [...].
[brief] I.  The Trial Court Properly Dismissed the First and Second Counts of Plaintiff’s Complaint Because Plaintiff’s Employment Was Terminated Due to His Poor Performance and Unprofessionalism and Plaintiff’s Employment Was Not Protected by the Executive Order or Any Other Contract or Agreement with the [...] (T62:11-63:5)  ..................................  10  A.  Plaintiff’s Employment Was Terminated Due to His Poor Performance and Unprofessionalism ...........  10  B.  Plaintiff Is Not Subject to the Protections of the Executive Order Because He Was Not Certified as a Candidate Prior to Being Terminated ..........  11  C.  Plaintiff Failed to Identify Any Document or Statement That Could Constitute a Contract, Implied Contract, or Agreement to Give Rise to a Claim for Breach of Contract and Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing  .....................  13  II.  The Trial Court Properly Dismissed the Third Count of Plaintiff’s Complaint Because Plaintiff’s Employment Was Neither Terminated Because He Ran for Political Office  Nor Does He Have a Constitutional Right to Run For Office Against His Own Boss (T62:11-63:5)  ...........  14  III.  The Trial Court Properly Dismissed the Fourth Count of Plaintiff’s Complaint for False Light Invasion of Privacy  Because the Statute of Limitations Had Run (T63:6-13)  ..............................................  19 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................
[brief] In [...], the alleged acts of retaliation included the filing of a false report that plaintiff abused a student.  [...] v. Union County Educational Services Com’n, 2011 WL 166245 (App. Div. 2011) at *3.  Clearly, the issuance of a false report that a teacher abused a child, among other retaliatory acts alleged by [...], is far more egregious than any instance of retaliation alleged by Plaintiff here.  The matter of Royster v. N.J. State Police is also easily distinguishable from the present matter.
[directive] Any law enforcement officer to whom this Warrant of Impoundment is presented is hereby commanded to impound the above-described vehicle and remove it to a storage space or garage, designated for that purpose.  (Date) , J.M.C. P.L. 2003, c. 89, §§ 78, 79, eff. June 9, 2004 N.J.S.A. 39:3-29.  License, registration certificate and insurance identification card; possession; exhibit upon request; violations; fine; defense  The driver's license, the registration certificate of a motor vehicle and an insurance identification card shall be in the possession of the driver or operator at all times when he is in charge of a motor vehicle on the highways of this State.  The driver or operator shall exhibit his driver's license and an insurance identification card, and the holder of a registration certificate or the operator or driver of a motor vehicle for which a registration certificate has been issued, whether or not the holder, driver or operator is a resident of this State, shall also exhibit the registration certificate, when requested so to do by a police officer or judge, while in the performance of the duties of his office, and shall write his name in the presence of the officer, so that the officer may thereby determine the identity of the licensee and at the same time determine the correctness of the registration certificate, as it relates to the registration number and number plates of the motor vehicle for which it was issued; and the correctness of the evidence of a policy of insurance, as it relates to the coverage of the motor vehicle for which it was issued.  Any person violating this section shall be subject to a fine of $150, of which $25 shall be deposited in the Uninsured Motorist Prevention Fund established by section 2 of P.L.1983, c. 141 (C.39:6B-3).