ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] T3, p. 115:13-24.  On August 23, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Correct the name of the Defendant indicating in his Certification that “the Defendant, [...], spouse of [...], was determined to be [...]. ”  The Certification cites no reason why or how this determination merely stating that “it was determined. ”  Id.  On September 7, 2021, the Court issued an Order correcting name of Defendant from [...] to [...].
[brief] (Pb16)  He cites no authority for this request.  Rather, he bases this request solely on his dissatisfaction with the disposition of this matter by the court below and his skepticism regarding the trial court’s ability to apply the law properly.  (Id.) Super. 243, 268 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting Irval Realty Inc. v. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 61 N.J. 366, 372 (1972)).
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...........................................  1 STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............  3  A.  [...]’s Recent Statements and Rulemaking Regarding Updated Precipitation Data, Climate Change, and Flooding ..................  3  B.  [...] Submits the Application to [...] ..................  7  C. Post-Application Communications and Deficiency Notices Between the [...] and Applicant .............................................  9  D.  [...]’s Public Comments and Letters ..........  13  E. The [...]’s Permit Decision and the Instant Appeal ..............  14
[brief] That the jury found defendant deviated from the standard of care but failed to find those deviations were also a violation of [...]’s rights underscores the inconsistency in the jury’s findings.  The trial court also had recurring problems with plaintiff’s experts because they were, in her words, voicing their “personal opinions” without citing any authority.  Between them, plaintiff’s experts had over 100 years’ experience in their respective fields.  The judge did not seem to understand that an expert witness can have opinions based on their experience without resort to outside authorities.  Similarly, two of plaintiff’s experts had extensive backgrounds in respiratory care but could not opine on the respiratory care given because they were not respiratory therapists.  No motion was ever made to bar those experts from giving opinions on respiratory care.  Specifically, the trial court’s allowance of use of the DOH’s investigation results without proper foundation and the severe and unreasonable limiting of the experts’ testimony led the jury to find no proximate cause, no violation of [...]’s rights under the NHA, and that the nursing staff was not negligent.  The combined impact of the erroneous rulings and the overall conduct of the trial produced an unjust result that should be vacated.
[brief] There was no blood visible before rolling [...] over.  (18T:10-19 to 20; 12-22 to 4; 38-19 to 39-24).  What blood there was did not appear in any notable quantities until they ripped open [...]’ shirt and saw a gunshot wound in his chest.  Ibid.  Mucous was coming out of [...]’ mouth and nose when he was rolled over, as well.  (18T:38-22 to 39-4).  Although the January air was cold, one officer observed that [...]’ body was warm to the touch.  (18T:73-1 to 4; 82-9 to 13).
[brief] Here, the trial court, relying on Dockser, correctly found that “[a] Court generally lacks jurisdiction to determine the number of arbitrators,” and “the number of the arbitrators is a procedural question to be answered exclusively in that forum,” *i.e.* the [...].  (3T90:18-91:1)  [...] solely cites to cases where a court \(^{14}\) *In re Vince*, 2 N.J. 443, 456 (1949) (when a statute “reasonably appears to be exclusive, the maxim *expressio unius est exclusio alterius* may be… applicable,” meaning the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another).  enforced an explicit arbitration agreement that the arbitrator be of a certain nature, not of a court second-guessing the [...]’s application of its own rules when an arbitration clause that is silent on the issue.  [...] fails to appreciate the difference, as the Company’s Operating Agreement contains no specificity with respect to the number of arbitrator(s).
[brief] G.  Neither [...] nor [...] based their decision on the application of *Iqbal* to Plaintiff’s municipal liability claims.  (4/1/21 Transcript @ T29:22 to T59:13; 5/25/23 Transcript @ T48:4 to T54:10).  Plaintiff’s argument that *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) “doesn’t apply” in New Jersey Courts, is simply a strawman.  First, Defendants never argued *Iqbal* was the standard for New Jersey courts and neither [...] in her 4/1/21 decisions or [...] in his 5/25/23 decision found that the relevant pleading failed because it did not comply with the *Iqbal/Twombly* pleading standard.  On the contrary, both [...] and [...] correctly found that the proposed Second Amended Complaint failed to comply with N.J. Crt. R. 4:5-7 which requires that each allegation in a pleading be “simple, concise and direct. ” (4/1/21 Transcript @ T30:24 to T32:13; 5/25/23 Transcript @ T50:6 to T54:10).  Thus, Plaintiff’s argument regarding the applicability of *Iqbal* in the Trial Court’s decision denying Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is inapposite.
[brief] The only argument ever raised and made by Appellant was against original service of process.  The Court heard it, considered it and weighed it.  The Court found service to be proper.  This decision should not be disturbed upon appeal.  Appellant also raised a strange argument that the subsequent sale of the property from Respondent [...], to the third-party buyer [...], was not arms-length, so as to imply something wrongful, illegal and/or improper with the original service.  But again, the Court heard this argument and dismissed the same after carefully weighing the evidence and testimony.  Nothing was wrongful, conspiring, nefarious or improper.  It was a business transaction between parties who were in a similar business industry and who live in the same town, but who did very little (if any) prior business together.  After hearing and weighing the testimony, the Trial Judge found nothing improper.  For this reason, the decision should be upheld on appeal.
[directive] b.  Èske w konprann tou, ke daprè menm akò transfè ki rele Interstate Compact la transfè [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No] sipèvizyon ou a yon lòt eta kab jwenn refi oswa restriksyon pa leta sa a, a nenpòt ki moman aprè yo fin pwononse santans la si leta sa a ta detèmine ke w oblije enskri w antan ke delenkan seksyèl nan leta sa a oubyen si [...] mande w pou enskri w antan ke delenkan seksyèl?  Do you also understand that pursuant to the same Interstate Compact transfer of your supervision to another state may be denied or restricted by that state at any time after sentencing if that state determines you are required to register as a sex offender in that state or if [...] has required you to register as a sex offender?
[brief] Despite referring the issue of Defendants’ votes to the Local Finance Board, the court below improperly found Defendants’ votes were improper on account of their conflict with [...] (Da3).  Plaintiffs’ complaint contained one count alleging a violation of the LGEL.  The complaint does not include a cause of action alleging a conflict of interest pursuant to common law.  Without this, the trial court was without jurisdiction.  This Court has held “[a] public official is disqualified from participating in judicial or quasijudicial proceedings in which the official has a conflicting interest that may interfere with the impartial performance of his duties as a member of the public body. ”  Scotch Plains-Fanwood Bd. of Educ. v. Syvertsen, 251 N.J.Super. 566, 568 (App.Div.1991).  It also held “Common law conflict-of-interest principles prohibit a public official from participating in matters in which he has a direct or indirect personal or private interest. ”  Speroni v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, Nos. A-5356-12T3, A-5357-12T3, A-5430-12T3, A-5431-12T3, A-5760-12T3, A-3770-13T3, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1615, at *8-9 (Super. Ct. App. Div. July 6, 2015) citing Aldom v. Borough of Roseland, 42 N.J. Super. 495, 502 (App. Div. 1956).  Here, Plaintiffs did not plead a common law conflict of interest.  Rule 4:5-7 requires each allegation to be, “[s]imple, concise and direct, and no technical forms of pleading are required.
[brief] Although [...] had known [...] for about 20 years, [...] did not begin providing accounting services for him or for [...] until sometime in 2019.  (9T79:7 to 80:1).  [...] had no role in negotiating the purchase price for [...]’s interest in [...] or for [...]’s interest in [...], nor was [...] paid in connection with discussions relating to the sale of those interests.  (9T80:23 to 81:25).  [...] engaged [...] in about the summer of 2019 to review certain [...] business records that [...] had received in response to inquiries prompted by the tax deficiency notice from the State.  (9T82:17-24).  However, the records that [...] provided were insufficient, and [...] asked [...] to request a complete set of the books of account for [...].  (9T83:12 to 84:20).  [...] attempted to coordinate discussions with [...], [...], and [...] to figure out what happened and why he owed the money.  [...] and [...] suggested a “quick fix” to correct what they described as an error on the 2015 tax return.  They proposed an amended return to address the issue, but [...] was not convinced that would resolve the matter, and [...] requested to review the backup documentation to support the return.  (6T71:13 to 72:10; Da142-51).  [...] was concerned because the “quick fix” scheme concocted by [...] and [...] was to recharacterize the [...] transactions from membership interest sales to asset sales, which, in [...]’s view, was inappropriate and could constitute tax fraud.
[directive] 7  6.  Enrollment in community programs, such as those offered by [...]7;8 Commissions or the Police Chaplain 7.  Participation in restorative justice programs, if appropriate; and/or 8.  Where recommended, participation in mental health or substance abuse programs.  H. agreements.  Stationhouse adjustment  1.  All stationhouse adjustments shall be memorialized in a written agreement, which shall remain in effect for three to six months from the date the agreement is signed.
[directive] N.J.S.A. to pursuant court adult to waived is juvenile a that event the In complaint- a and juvenile), of election (waiver at 2A:4A-27 N.J.S.A. or waiver) (involuntary the within defendant"  "eligible an is juvenile the that so 4.8 Section to pursuant issued is warrant prosecutor detention the pretrial seek to whether deciding in 2A:162-15, N.J.S.A. of meaning of history defendant's the offense and the of circumstances and facts relevant the apply shall originally person if the Section as this of subsections) appropriate the delinquency to juvenile subsection 4.8 and Section adult.
[brief] As explained by the Borough’s planner, the amended Redevelopment Plan – which includes constructing affordable housing and increasing open space – is substantially consistent with the objectives of the Master Plan.  Given the adequate support in the record, the actions by the Planning Board and Borough are entitled to deference.  Conversely, and as explained by the trial court, the record is devoid of any support for Plaintiffs’ claims and, thus, Plaintiffs cannot satisfy their heavy burden to overcome the presumption of validity afforded to the amended Redevelopment Plan.  For these reasons, as discussed in more detail below, the trial court’s decision – that the adoption of the amended Redevelopment Plan was neither arbitrary, capricious nor unreasonable – should be affirmed.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION [...]  ------------------------------  [...], individually and as Guardian ad Litem for [...]; [...], individually and as Guardian ad Litem for [...]; [...], individually and as Guardian ad Litem for [...]; [...] individually; and [...], individually and as Guardian ad Litem for [...]  Petitioners, v. [...], ACTING COMMISSIONER of the [...]; [...]; and [...], Respondents.
[directive] The temporary order will include the date for the hearing for a final extreme risk protective order, which must be scheduled to be held within 10 days after the petition is filed.  There is no of interim review the decision to grant a temporary order.  However, the respondent could request that the hearing for the final order be e?(pedited. of Denials  a Temporary Extreme Risk Protective Order of  Unlike the Prevention Domestic Violence Act, which explicitly provides for emergent hearings on applications for temporary restraining orders and emergent de novo review by the of of Superior Court denials such orders (N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28(a) and -28(i)), the Extreme Risk Protective Order Act does not explicitly provide for emergent hearings on petitions for temporary extreme risk protective orders.
[brief] In 2015-2018, [...] engaged in litigation with the Borough for the right of [...] to construct multifamily residential apartment buildings on Lot 2.01 and for the Borough to comply with its affordable housing obligations – *In the Matter of the Affordable Housing Obligation of the [...]*, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. [...] – resulting in [...] obtaining the right to build such residential apartments.  In 2018, [...] filed an application for amended site plan approval to construct four multifamily apartment buildings on Lot 2.01.  (Da61 at ¶ 17.)  During an October 10, 2018 hearing on such application, a member of the Borough Planning Board raised the issue of whether the Roads were public roadways.  (Da61-Da62 at ¶ 17.)  By way of correspondence dated October 18, 2018, and December 12, 2018, [...]’s counsel informed the Planning Board’s counsel that the Roads had been dedicated and accepted for public use pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-53.j, and therefore were deemed public roads as a matter of law.  (Da254-Da275.)  In connection with that same discussion, the Borough Engineer wrote a letter to the Planning Board on November 26, 2018, in which it confirmed that the construction of the Roads was satisfactory and in accordance with Borough standards.  (Da277.)  On January 16, 2019, the Borough Planning Board entered a Resolution Approving the Amended Site Plan Application of [[...]] (the “2019 Site Plan Approval”).  (Da279.)  Among other things, the 2019 Site Plan Approval included the following condition:  Dedication of Roadways to the [...] should be addressed by Applicant with the Borough, and the Applicant shall be responsible to undertake any additional steps, as may be necessary, for the road dedication.  (Da275 at § A.)  On February 4, 2021, [...] and the Borough entered into a Developer’s Agreement.  (Da289.)  Section 5.2 of such Developer’s Agreement required [...] to furnish a performance guaranty for the cost of improvements to be made to the Roads in connection with the construction of the apartment buildings.  (Da296-Da297 at § 5.2.)  [...] proceeded to provide the requisite performance guarantee.  (Da62 at ¶ 20.)  [...] deeded Lot 2.01 to [...] on March 26, 2021, and [...] remains the current owner of Lot 2.01.  (Da62 at ¶ 20; Da327.)  F.  Borough’s Purported “Rejection” of Dedication of the Roads
[brief] During direct examination of [...], she told the jury that after defendant had confessed to her, she told a friend.  That friend called the police.  (11T:70-15 to 23)  Lead detective, [...] testified on the evening of September 18, 2019 "they" received an anonymous phone call through the tip line from an "individual" that had information in regards to the homicide.  (11T:199-21 to 200-5).  It was this anonymous tip that led detectives to [...] -- approximately a week later.  (11T:204-12 to 17).  The 9-1-1 call was the first lead for the investigation – that turned defendant to an instant suspect.  On cross-examination, Sgt. Luyber was asked about the identity of the anonymous caller.  He testified that the anonymous caller was not [...] -- but a friend of Sasha.  The anonymous call was placed on the behalf of [...].  (11T:211-11 to 212-13).  Sgt. Luyber was re-called to testify again before the jury -- by the defense.  The crux of his testimony was for clarification surrounding the anonymous caller.  The testimony he provided went as follows:  Q.  So you testified on I believe it was Thursday that the anonymous caller -- I had asked you the question, I said was the anonymous caller Sahsah Hedgpeth.  And you said no, it wasn't.  And I said, are you sure.  And you said no, the anonymous caller was not [...].  (13T:10-23 to 11-9).  Then the witness revealed the identity of the anonymous caller as "[...]" -- Sahsas' friend.  (13T:11-14 to 15).  The jury was apprised that "[...]" provided incriminatory information to police about defendant, yet she was not subject to cross-examination.  On cross, [...] told the jury that the anonymous call was placed before the victim's body was discovered.  (13T:71-15 to 22).  According to the detective, [...] was told the details of the crime from [...].  (13T:72-3 to 8)  He was asked by the prosecution, "did [you] follow up on [[...]]?"  [...] said he specifically directed detective "[...]" to locate [...].  [...] received a voice mail from [...] which led them to [...].  (13T:72-12 to 73-17).  Detective Villano too, was not subject to cross-examination.
[brief] Pa4-5.  In particular, the trial court reasoned, based on Rule 4:14-1, that while Plaintiff was entitled to depose [...] in his individual capacity, the fact that the German Defendants and [...] do not have control over him required Plaintiff to seek the deposition via subpoena instead of through a simple notice of deposition.  March 22  Transcript at 18:24-20:10.  The March 25 Order therefore summarized that because [...] is not a party and none of the defendants have control over him, Plaintiff was required to seek the deposition via subpoena instead of through a deposition notice.  It nevertheless ordered the deposition to proceed in New Jersey or another neighboring state that was convenient for all of the parties.  Pa4-5.  C.  Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and the April 19 Order
[directive] Actor Actor Actor MAY THE Bail - Highways - (indictable Beverage to #9-05 BAIL  Public under of Cigarette or a ABSENCE, 3:26-1  Consumption Age Maintaining Nuisance Possession Charge  Minors Places Directive Person WHERE Other Obstructing Legal Alcoholic of Rule (c)(1) and Sale by by STATUTES  3:3-1  Promulgated Rule 2C:33-13.1  2C:33-12 2C:33-15 2C:33-7  Statute Option permissible permissible permissible permissible  Bail 23 JUDGE’S issue.
[directive] Refusal, IDRC Boat Fine DL 11 (c) fatal as d; more incidents 39:3-10.20a 39:4-96"; N.J.S.A. or Offense traffic or a driving, c, with 39:3-10.20i.  CDS or incidences 2C:1-4a, 2 vehicle separate connection from subsequent CMV, dispensing N.J.S.A. reckless period violation combination N.J.S.A. motor separate in 39:3-10.13 from N.J.S.A.  DWI year of (b) 39:3-10.20c in or or any analog violations to limit; days arising 3 distribution 2nd (1) life at relating within for defined are: prohibited, or For 120 speed N.J.S.A. or Concentration”) violation CDS penalty including law as displaying above 39:3-10.18(b)(1).
[brief] Appellants have acknowledged this narrow scope of judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies.  Complainants argue that the Commission's Final Decision was not supported by substantial credible evidence.  They take issue with the Commission's finding that there was "an insufficient nexus" between Respondent's Facebooks posts and her membership on the Board, focusing on what they argue is the "erroneous conclusion" that Respondent's Facebook posts make no reference to her membership on the Board.  This proposition must be rejected because there is simply no evidence, anywhere in the record, that Respondent held herself out or even held her Facebook account out as something speaking for the Board.  In fact, other than a photo of her being sworn in and the posting of the election results, there are no posts that in any way suggest that the poster is a Board member.  Respondent does not lose her right to speak as a member of the public merely because she was elected to the Board.  Complainants stress that Respondent held herself as a member of the Board in all her Facebook posts based on the fact that she campaigned for the Board and she posted pictures of her swearing in as Board member.  These contentions must be rejected.  As to the campaigning, it defies logic that Respondent held herself out as a member of the Board based on postings that predate her election to the Board.  Next, Complainants contend that, by responses to requests for admissions, Respondent admits that she held herself out as a member of the Board, yet none of the responses cited by Complainants contain such an admission.  Complainants also emphasize what they describe as the "community's uproar" over Respondent's Facebook's posts but public dissatisfaction with the posts does not establish that Respondent held herself out in a member of the Board.  In facts, it is questionable whether the evidence that the evidence presented by Complainants actually establish that there was such an "uproar."  The minutes of meetings of the Board presented by Complainants include only sporadic complaints about the Facebook posts and the accounts in news articles are simply the perspective of the author of that article.  In sum, since there is no evidence that Respondent held herself out as a member of the Board in her Facebook posts, the Commission's finding that there was not a substantial nexus between the posts and her membership on the Board was supported by credible evidence.
[brief] However, a review of the transcript reveals that this never happened here in this case; instead during the Oct 21, 2022 motion hearing, the trial court had only stated his own personal (extra-judicial) opinion that the total amount sought “seemed low”.  (2T11:9, 2T12:1)  But this is a “far cry” from what was required by the controlling authorities.  Further, there’s even more evidence to show that no analysis was made, as the trial court failed to catch what should have been an obvious math mistake.
[brief] In the prior Appeal, [...] challenged multiple orders including the June 27, 2017 Final Judgment which established a priority parking right and entered Judgment against [...] in the amount of $4,529.60.  On April 19, 2018, [...] filed a Motion in the Appellate Division to amend its 2017 Appeal (Da842) to include the March 6, 2018 “Sanctions Order” (Da285) which had been entered by [...] on Plaintiff’s order to show cause to enforce litigant’s rights alleging Defendant violated the June 27, 2017 Order, as well as the February 14, 2018 hearing on the Litigant’s Rights Claim.  The Appellate Division granted the motion on May 18, 2018 (Da294)  Defendant made three payments to Plaintiff in connection with the June 27, 2017 Final Judgment and the March 6, 2018 Order awarding sanctions and attorney’s fees: $4,529.60 (awarded in the June 27, 2017 Order); $11,543 (attorney fees awarded from the March 6, 2018 Order); and $1,000 (sanctions awarded in the March 6, 2018 Order), these payments totaled $17,073.23.
[brief] That still remains to be seen. ”  (Da1901)  [...] continued to suggest that he was the proper manager of the Company, and that the SDNY Action would eventually overturn the arbitration and the instant action.  Specifically, [...] argued (falsely) that: between the 8th and the 23rd, we had a reasonable basis.  It could have been wrong as a matter of law.  Southern District of New York will actually determine that someday.  That’s how we were—in control and, yet, we still didn’t go around and—and after the injunction say, well, we don’t respect what [...] said].  (Da1899)  [...] finally admitted the real reason he filed the complaint in the SDNY Action, saying that in “the Federal Court may rule that the elections at the February 8th meeting in fact superseded the 2013 meeting under the [FAA] or the arbitra[l] convention.