ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (3T13:16-14:4.)  Defense counsel also noted that [...] testified that the most important part is whether a defendant follows instructions and that [...] complied: he pulled over without an issue parking “the car perfectly,” he handed over the right documents, and he was able to walk out of the vehicle without an issue.  (3T14:5-15:8.)  He also noted there was no slurred speech.  (3T14:24-15:8.)  Defense counsel highlighted that despite all these things, [...] proceeded to administer the standardized field sobriety tests, even though he did not have the right training to do so.  (3T15:9-21.)  On the walk and turn test, out of eight possible scoring factors, [...] did only one thing wrong—he failed to touch heel to toe.  (3T15:22-16:2.)  On the one leg stand test, there’s four possible scoring factors, but [...] only identified one problem—that [...] put his foot down.  (3T16:3-9.)  On this basis, there were only two of ten possible factors that [...] got wrong, which does not provide either probable cause to arrest, or guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  (3T15:22-16:15.)
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Trial Court  On May 10, 2023, Intervenor [...] filed a Motion in Aid of Litigant’s Rights under Docket No. [...] seeking an order “(i) ‘invalidating and nullifying [Board] Resolution PB-2023-05’ [conditioning the grant of the [...] project upon inclusion of an elevator in Building E], (ii) compelling the [...] to pay Per Diem Penalties in accordance with the settlement agreement between the parties; and (iii) imposing other obligations and penalties on the [...] and the Planning Board of the [...], as deemed necessary by the Court to deter such conduct in the future. ”  Pa035.  In support of its motion, [...] submitted a certification of its counsel, [...], (Pa037) dated May 11, 2023, containing nine exhibits (numbered A through I), Pa040 through Pa137, together with a legal brief.  On May 11, 2023, [...] filed a Prerogative Writ Complaint against the Board under Docket No. [...], Pa128.  In opposition, the Board submitted a certification of its counsel, [...], (Pa138) dated May 18, 2023, containing approximately 70 exhibits, Pa141 through Pa352, together with a legal brief.  In opposition, the Township submitted a certification of its counsel, [...], (Pa353), dated May 18, 2023, containing three (3) exhibits, Pa355 through Pa357 (some of which are omitted from the Appendix as being duplicative), together with a legal brief.  In further support of its motion, [...] submitted a certification of its counsel, [...], (Pa358) dated May 22, 2023, containing one (1) additional exhibit.  The motion came before the trial court (Hon. [...], P.J.Cv., now retired) for oral argument on June 20, 2023, see 1T1-1 et seq.\(^1\)  At the June 20, 2023, hearing, the Court scheduled a follow-up hearing date of July 18, 2023.  1T72-21.  The matter came before the Trial Court on July 18, 2023, see 2Tx-y, for hearing.  At that time, the Court announced its ruling granting [...]’s Motion in Aid of Litigant’s Rights, granting “reasonable attorney's fees” (2T5- --- \(^1\) 1.  At the same June 20, 2023 hearing date, 1T1 et sq., the Trial Court also conducted a case management conference as to other Wayne Township Mt. Laurel matters (including a second and unrelated [...] potential project on site known as [...]) as well as entertained oral argument on a second motion brought by [...] which sought to disqualify Board counsel; that motion was denied by order dated June 21, 2023 and is not the subject of appeal.
[brief] Thirty-day extension letter, dated October 14, 2022……………………Ra15 NJDEP comment response, dated June 7, 2022…………………………Ra17 NJDEP comments response, dated June 27, 2022……………………Ra22 Response to NJDEP comments, dated August 2, 2022………………Ra26 Response to NJDEP deficiency letter, dated October 3, 2022…………Ra29 Response to NJDEP comments, dated November 22, 2022……………Ra51 Email correspondence, dated August 18, 2022…………………………Ra62 Environmental concerns document, dated September 22, 2022…………Ra69 Email correspondence, dated November 14, 2022……………………Ra75  [...] wetlands construction plan, dated September 30, 2022 (Page WP109 only with top portion of plan cropped to show detail)……………  Ra81  Hydrologic and hydraulic analysis, dated March 11, 2022 (Pages 1-9 only) ………………………………………………………………………………Ra82  [...] flood hazard construction plan, dated December 2, 2022 (Page RP100 only)……………………………………………………………………Ra95  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] None of these cases support [...]’s position because (1) all have separate guaranty documents or extensive guaranty provisions within the lease and (2) more importantly, the existence of a personal guaranty was admitted by both parties in each case, so the Courts in all of these cases did not have to resolve the issue of whether there was a personal guaranty in the first place.  The only case cited by [...] which included the issue of whether a personal guaranty was created in the first place is *Benjamin and DLC Services Corp. v. Garden Operations Corp.*  No. A-2315-11T2 2013 WL 6508491 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 13, 2013) (Pa 239).  In *Benjamin* the issue was whether the president of a corporation had personally guaranteed the obligations of the corporation under several separate equipment leases.
[brief] ”  McPeak v. S-L Distrib. Co., Civil Case No. 12-348, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10794, at *9 (D. N.J. Jan. 29, 2014); see also Goldsworthy v. Browndorf, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2277, at *9 (App. Div. Aug. 24, 2011) (explaining that the NJFPA “reflects the legislative concern over long-standing abuses in the franchise relationship, caused by the power disparity between franchisors and franchisees”).  Notably, regarding the two financial requirements of the NJFA – more than $35,000 in annual gross sales and “more than 20% of the franchisee’s gross sales [] intended to be or [] derived from” the franchise – financial information from the entirety of the parties’ relationship is not required.
[brief] LAW AND ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT LACKED STANDING.Pa97.  The trial court found that the Plaintiff/Appellant lacked standing essentially because the 2012 mortgage sought to be foreclosed was cancelled and is null and void.  Pa96-97.  The trial court further found that the Plaintiff “did not seek to vacate the discharge of mortgage or reinstate the note at any time prior to the filing of the preference action, the settlement of the preference action or the filing of this action. ”  Pa96.  The trial court cited no authority to support its apparent conclusion that Plaintiff’s claim for reinstatement could not be raised as a separate count in the foreclosure complaint.  Appellant contends that such a conclusion is erroneous and unsupported by law.  Rule 4:27-1 provides in part:
[brief] Angel v Rand Express Lines, Inc., 77 N.J. Super. 77, 86 (App. Div. 1961); Miller v Public Employees Retirement System, supra., 2014 N.J. Super. at 10.  [RA- 4 Exhibit A].  Other relevant factors include when the rejected expert’s testimony was based on a flawed assumption; when the rejected expert failed to review all of the petitioner’s medical records; and when the expert’s premises and conclusions are contradicted by rebuttal experts and other evidence of the opposing party.  Brown v. Board of Trustees, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 442, 12 (App. Div. 2023) [RA-8 Exhibit B]; Riley v Board of Trustees, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 2739 at 13 (App. Div. 2021) [RA-12 Exhibit C]; Marter v Board of Trustees, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 1766, 11 (App. Div. 2024) [RA-17 Exhibit D].  Nearly all of these factors are present in this matter.
[brief] (Da 3-5) (1T 58:11-18; 58:19-59:1).  Yet, despite granting Defendants’ motion in limine on this point, the court later permitted Plaintiff at trial to question [...] (of [...]) and [...] (of [...]) about a subsequent storm and whether [...] and/or the property owner ([...]) were satisfied with [...]’s performance in this later storm.  (4T 45:4-14); (5T 89:15-90:8).  F.
[brief] 23  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  October 20, 2023  Order Appointing Condemnation Commissioners ..................Da14  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Bergen Cnty. v. S. Goldberg & Co.,** | | | 39 N.J. 377 (1963) | 17, 20, 21 | | **Borough of Essex Fells v. Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation, Inc.,** | | | 289 N.J. Super. 329, 331 (Law Div. 1995) | 10 | | **Bridgewater v. Yarnell,** | | | 64 N.J. 211, 215 (1974) | 21, 22 | | **City of Atl. City v. Cynwyd Invs.,** | | | 148 N.J. 55, 68 (1997) (emphasis added) | 16 | | **County of Monmouth v. Wissell,** | | | 68 N.J. 35, 38 (1975) | 15 | | **F.M.C. Stores, Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains,** | | | 100 N.J. 418, 426 (1985) | 10, 18, 19 | | **Hester v. Miller** | | | 11 N.J. Super. 264, 269 (Law Div. 1951) | 11 | | **Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Costello,** | | | 252 N.J. Super. 247, 257 (App. Div. 1991) | 10, 18, 19 | | **Mt. Laurel Twp. v. Mipro Homes, LLC,** | | | 379 N.J. Super. 358, 368 (App. Div. 2005) | 12 | | **Mt. Laurel v. Mipro Homes, LLC,** | | | 188 N.J. 531 (2006) | 12 | | **New Jersey Highway Auth. v. Currie,** | | | 35 N.J. Super. 525, 540 (App. Div. 1955) | 17 | | **Rockaway v. Donofrio,** | | | 186 N.J. Super. 344 (App. Div. 1982) | 10, 18 | State by Comm’r of Transp. v. Hess Realty Corp., 226 N.J. Super. 256, 261 (App. Div. 1988), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 383, aff’d, 115 N.J. 229 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 964 (1989)
[brief] (1T 9-8 to 13, 10-9 to 11, 10-23 to 11-5)  [...] was in the “road phase” of his training, which meant that he was learning how to identify traffic violations and execute traffic stops.  (1T 11-9 to 12-4)  As they drove in a marked patrol vehicle, [...] instructed [...] to call out if he observed “any of the wide variety of things you can pull a car over for. ”  (1T 12-19 to 21, 45-8 to 19)  [...] testified that the goal of this training was “just to get reps in with” pulling over vehicles.  (1T 45-24 to 46-3)  By about 1:30 p.m., the officers had already made 10 or so traffic stops.
[brief] *Id.* at 483.  Here, unlike in *Fawzy*, the MAA itself provides a basis on which a court can conclude that Plaintiff understood or should have understood the consequences of her decision to pursue any potential claims in arbitration had she reviewed the MAA.  For example, the first paragraph of the MAA contains bolded font that plainly provides “Covered Claims” “*will be resolved by Arbitration and NOT by a court or jury.  The parties hereby forever waive and give up the right to have a judge or jury decide any Covered Claims.*” (Pa92) (emphasis in original).  The MAA goes on to identify claims not covered by the agreement, the procedures for arbitration, and the allocation of the fees and costs associated with arbitration.  (Pa92-Pa93).  Finally, to the extent Plaintiff still claims she did not understand the agreement, the acknowledgment section again alerted her that she was “giving up the right to have Covered Claims decided by a court or jury” and that she had the opportunity to “discuss this Agreement with [her] own attorney if [she] wish[ed] to do so. ” (Pa93).  Because the law imposes a presumption that a party has read and understood a contract that they sign,\(^3\) Plaintiff, therefore, cannot claim that she did not understand she was waiving her right to a jury trial.
[directive] If the [...] is contacted by another law enforcement agency regarding a possible match of the unidentified infant with a missing child, the [...] shall immediately notify the [...].  3.2.5  Upon request, the [...] shall provide to the [...] an affidavit or certification, setting forth its efforts to determine whether the unidentified infant has been reported missing, and the results of its efforts.  3.2.6  The [...] shall notify the [...] of the entry of an order by the Family Court for termination of parental rights and adoption of the infant.
[brief] Plaintiffs now assert Defendants had notice of the purpose of the subdivision because “the publicly available Planning Board resolution approving the subdivision demonstrates the nature and purpose of Plaintiffs’ acquisition of a portion of Lot 3. . . and that the purpose was to allow Plaintiffs to subdivide by right. ” (Respondent’s Brief at 12).  This proposition is also unreasonable and unsupported by the actual law, which provides, “planning board and board of adjustment resolutions are not title matters, are not part of the public land records and do not impart constructive notice to purchasers, they are not searched by title insurers and they are excluded from coverage in title insurance policies.
[brief] It is also nonsensical for the [...] (and their expert) to assume that FF&E existing in 2018 also existed in the Property as of January 27, 1994.  In fact, [...] and [...] both testified that several of the stores that existed in 2018 did not exist in 1994, which meant that the equipment could not have existed in the Property on the court-ordered date of valuation.  The [...] Report is a net opinion because his bald conclusions (or, more accurately, his bald assumptions) are not supported by factual evidence or other data.  The [...] Report is not based upon any evidence that the items existed in the Property as of 1994.  Instead, [...] depended solely upon the [...]’ verbal representations that the items were present at the Property in 1994, without making any independent investigation to verify the statements.
[brief] See *Dobco, Inc.*, 441 N.J. Super. at 159 (stating “a public entity is not required to accept a bid containing defects even when those defects are not material .  . . .  In order for a reason to reject a bid with a non-material defect to be considered valid, it must be non-pretextual, reflect sound business judgment and may not contradict the underlying purposes of public bidding requirements”).  Moreover, since these reasons were not argued before the trial court (because the County did not raise them), it is entirely improper to consider these newly articulated reasons for the first time in this Appeal.  *Pfannenstein v. Surrey*, 475 N.J. Super. 83, 99 (App. Div. 2023)(stating “[w]e will not consider an issue that is raised for the first time on appeal unless the issue pertains to the trial court’s jurisdiction or concerns a matter of great public interest”).  [...]’s argument, that sound business judgment reasons exist for the County’s rejection of [...]’s bid, is further undermined by the County’s actions before the trial court.  Indeed, before the trial court, the County indicated that it accepted the initial decision and would award the Anticipated Contract to [...] as a result of the trial court’s Decision and Judgment.  3T49-14-23.  Moreover, although the County challenges the trial court’s Decision and Judgment in its procedurally improper Respondent’s Brief, it does not (because it cannot) articulate a sound business reason for refusing to waive the trivial omission from [...]’s bid.  Given that the County has chosen not to articulate a sound business reason for rejecting [...]’s bid and has previously indicated its intent to adhere to the trial court’s decision, the issue is moot.
[brief] 7.  On or about February 21st, 2023, Plaintiff a disabled African American visited the [...] seeking adjournments in relation to Docket No. [...].  Plaintiff again, provided defendant [...] the December 1st, 2017, order (Pa 1-10) in Docket No. [...] vacating and setting aside the Sheriff’s Sale and any deed recorded in the matter as void ab initio.  Defendant [...] again responded by stating that plaintiff had no more adjournments, that Plaintiff had used all his adjournments and refused to grant plaintiff adjournment request contrary to his civil right under N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36 (Pa 165).  At this point, plaintiff was deprived of a right at the point defendants denied plaintiff request and statutory right for adjournments and denied the plaintiff free exercise of the right without any interruption.
[brief] But, as Plaintiffs explained, the correct interpretation of a dispute “regarding the recovery of [PIP] benefits” in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a) is in light of that phrase’s specialized meaning in the insurance industry: to “recover benefits” means to obtain payment from an insurer under an insurance policy.  See Pb26-27; see also N.J.S.A. 1:1-1 (“[W]ords and phrases having a special or accepted meaning in the law, shall be construed in accordance with such technical or special and accepted meaning. ”).  ---  3  Defendants incorrectly rely on Gambino v. Royal Globe Insurance Cos., 86 N.J. 100, 107 (1981), where the Court said that the no-fault law should be interpreted to “minimize resort to the judicial process. ”  The Court was referring to the legislative intent to avoid “[t]he problem of long delays in obtaining compensation” for benefits.  Id. at 107.  That concern is irrelevant to fraud claims seeking damages for benefits already paid, such as in this case.  Thus, a dispute regarding the recovery of PIP benefits is a dispute about whether the insurer must pay PIP benefits it has denied or refused to pay.  This court’s decision in Coalition I accords with that distinction: there is no award when an insurer wins in PIP ADR because the process only adjudicates claims to recover benefits by covered individuals or assignees.
[brief] It is public knowledge that the [...] has a history of excessive force and police brutality.  Edison has a history of police brutality.2; Pa561; Pa588; Pa621).  The acts of the Edison police have been found to be so egregious and brutal that the FBI was previously called in to investigate them.  (Pa561)  The Edison police is said to have the worst criminal cop record in the States’ history.3  Id.  The continued brutality has become custom.  4  The [...]’s failure and or refusal to train its police officers to respect the rights of black citizens and avoid the use of excessive force reflects deliberate indifference.  ---  2  https://www.nj.com/middlesex/2012/12/edison_police_misconduct_bruta.html  3  https://www.app.com/story/news/investigations/watchdog/shield/2018/01/22/edison-police-department-criminal-cops/1039312001/  4  https://www.nj.com/middlesex/2012/12/edison_police_lawsuit_intimida.html  A review of defendants' submissions to the court demonstrates a failure of any submissions on issuance of public accommodation services to the public in a non-hostile fashion.
[brief] (Pa234).  The inferences from the facts and expert opinion weighed in the plaintiff’s favor would allow a jury to find that the defendants violated the “high duty of care” they owed the plaintiff to discover and “eliminate” dangerous conditions, to maintain the premises in a safe condition, and to avoid creating any conditions that would render the premises unsafe.  *Nisivoccia*, 175 N.J. at 563.  It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court overlooked established legal precedent in finding that the defendants did not owe the plaintiff a duty when it found that the tripping hazard was an open and obvious condition as a matter of law.  It is further submitted that the determination as to whether the tripping hazard created by a raised foot of one of the many barricades defendant [...] placed along the means of ingress and egress was open and obvious is a jury question.  Accordingly, the plaintiff respectfully submits that the April 12, 2024 Order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be reversed and the matter remanded to the Law Division for trial.
[brief] Cf. BancPass, 2016 WL 4031417, at *3 (declining to order production of all documents that hit on search terms without relevance review upon finding that “there is no reason to believe that [responding party] has withheld documents it was obligated to produce”).  As discussed above, in so doing, it will lead to parties’ potentially producing wholly irrelevant (but yet potentially sensitive and private) documents to business rivals and adversaries.  This is precisely the outcome that Principle 6 aims to avoid, and that this Court rejected in Lipsky, when it refused to allow a forensic inspection of a party’s computer system absent a showing that “the responding entity defaulted on its obligations to search its records and produce the requested data.
[brief] In Gonzalez, police questioned the defendant, after providing her with her Miranda warnings, in connection with the discovery that the infant for whom she served as a nanny had two fractures in his right leg and one in his left.  Id. at 619.  In the middle of the interview, the following exchange occurred:  [...]: I don’t know what could happen.  And I’m not going to lie to you[,] but yes[,] I can say that if you lie -- Defendant: Uh-humm.  [...]: The situation is going to get worse.  Defendant: But now what do I do about an attorney and everything?  [...]: That is your decision.  I can’t give you an opinion about anything.  Defendant: Yes, but -- [...]: The only thing I can say to you is, that telling the truth -- Defendant: Uh-humm.  [...]: You will have a better option by telling the truth.  Defendant: Ok.  [...]: Than lying.  Defendant: No, there is nothing else, [Detective].  After, [...] suggested defendant was supplying information “little piece by little piece,” and the following colloquy ensued:  Defendant: You’re going to help me with an attorney.  [...]: I’m going to help you with an attorney? Or no -- Defendant: Yes, (inaudible).  [...]: Oh no, that is your decision what you want to do.  . . . .  Defendant: I don’t know I need you to guide me, I am honest, I don’t know.  [...]: I can’t guide you, all that [I] want is to know what happened to the boy.  And I can see that you are not helping.  [Id. at 622].  The Gonzalez Court found that the defendant’s question “[b]ut what do I do about an attorney and everything?” was an ambiguous invocation of her right to counsel that required the detective to cease all questioning and seek clarification.
[brief] Appellants’ position stems apparently from its regret that it did not bargain to have [...] indemnify separate guarantees given by them to Mortgagee.  Moreover, as the trial court recognized, [...] did not “get the property” for $1; rather, it took control of the debt and may have to give the property back to the Mortgagee if it cannot satisfy the debt.  1T 74:25-75:3 (“As I expressed, if this all falls apart, you know, with [...]’s entity, you know, beyond the hook, you know, just giving up the property, that remains to be seen. ”).  A.  The MOU was not procedurally unconscionable as both parties were sophisticated companies represented by competent counsel.  (Da7-11).  “A basic tenet of the law of contracts is that courts should enforce contracts as made by the parties.  However, application of that principle assumes that the parties are in positions of relative equality and that their consent is freely given. ”  Vasquez v. Glassboro Service Ass’n, Inc., 83 N.J. 86, 101 (1980) (citing Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 386 (1960)).  The Supreme Court’s concern is with unequal bargaining power and exertion of unfair influence – these are procedural flaws in the making of a contract that may make it unconscionable.  These concerns are not present here.  As the trial court found, Appellants and [...] are all sophisticated corporate entities who were represented by competent counsel while negotiating the MOU.  1T 7:17-22, 12:24-13-1 (“[N]ow we are saying all of the people including the gentleman’s name who actually negotiated, [...], now all of a sudden he doesn’t know what he is doing.  I guess [...] doesn’t know what he is doing.  Nobody knows what they are doing.  . . .  I don’t want to hear these arguments that we didn’t know what we were doing, or this is not what we agreed to. ”).  Despite [...]’s certification appearing to admit his mistake in failing to include indemnification language, he is sophisticated counsel, a partner in the firm [...].  The parties memorialized their agreement in writing after negotiations regarding both the price and terms of the transfer of interest in [...].  This is a textbook example of voluntary negotiations free from unfair influence.