ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As demonstrated in *N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Specialty Surgical Ctr. of N. Brunswick*, 458 N.J. Super. 63 (App. Div. 2019), the Appellate Division has upheld the necessity for appellate oversight in the interpretation and application of the fee schedule to ensure the law is applied correctly and consistently.  *Specialty Surgical* involves the application of statutory and regulatory mandates—specifically, *N.J.S.A.* 39:6A-4.6 and *N.J.A.C.* 11:3-29—that govern the reimbursement practices under PIP insurance coverage.  *Id.* at 66.  In *Specialty Surgical*, the Court affirmed the Law Division's interpretation of these mandates after determining that certain procedures not listed on the fee schedule as reimbursable when performed at a surgery center are not compensable.  *Id.* at 65.  This precedent demonstrates the need for precise and legally sound interpretation of the fee schedule, emphasizing that such interpretations are purely legal determinations rather than factual ones.  The issue on appeal does not involve a factual question such as whether the treatment rendered was medically necessary.  Rather, like Specialty Surgical, the arbitrator’s failure to apply the mandated fee schedule despite Plaintiff’s amendment to the Demand for Arbitration and his stipulated reliance upon Respondent’s own breakdown—undisputedly supported by clear evidence of the necessary CPT codes and acknowledged within the award—presents a scenario where certain procedures listed for reimbursement on the fee schedule were nevertheless found to be non-compensable by the arbitrator in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.6 and N.J.A.C. 11:3-29.  As such, this Court has the authority to ensure that these legal standards are interpreted and applied correctly.  Thus, Plaintiff has standing to bring this matter before the Appellate Division.  B.  Exceptional Circumstances Warrant the Invocation of the Appellate Division’s Supervisory Function (Not Raised Below)  Moreover, should there be any doubt as to the legal nature of the issue, this case independently warrants appellate review under the New Jersey Alternative Procedures for Dispute Resolution Act because the present circumstances require the invocation of the Appellate Division’s supervisory function, as demonstrated in Morel v. State Farm Insurance Company, 396 N.J. Super. 472 (App. Div. 2007).
[brief] (4T117:13-24; 4T160:11-22).  Although there was cctv footage from Aisle 58 of the plaintiff’s fall, it only shows the top of the plaintiff’s body and head.  (Pa-157).  [...] testified that he reviewed the surveillance video footage but it was unusable in terms of measurement or any kind of analysis because of its low quality.  (4T63:24-64:1; 4T64:9-13; 4T110:7-12).  He explained that all that can be determined from the video footage is that the plaintiff fell at the column and no determination as to whether or not the wheel of the rollator hit the base plate can be made from the video footage.  (4T110:13-22; 4T156:18-23).  [...] testified that the roof support column raised baseplate with protruding bolts was a low-lying object.  (4T91:20-23).  He explained that this is important because a person is less likely to perceive low-lying objects that are below one foot down.  (4T92:6-21; 4T98:25-99:2; 4T183:9-16).  [...] further testified that the raised baseplate with protruding bolts that extended two inches above the walking surface was a tripping hazard.  (4T90:9-13; 4T101:21-102:2).  He testified that recognized standards require such a tripping hazard to be addressed by either removing the hazard or, if that is not possible, blocking off the hazard from pedestrians or providing a warning of the hazards.
[brief] Further, the Construction Lien Law defines a “subcontractor” as “any person or entity providing work or services to improve real property under a contract with a contractor or another subcontractor. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:44A-2 (emphasis added).  The term “work” is defined in the Construction Lien Law as an “activity that improves real property”.  Also, the term “services” under the Construction Lien Law means “professional services” performed by a “licensed architect, engineer, land surveyor or certified landscape architect. ”  Id.  Accordingly, [...]’s reliance on both the Municipal and Construction Lien Laws’ definitions of a subcontractor in support of its misguided argument that privity of contract is the only factor in deciding who must register under the PWCRA leads the Court down an errant path.
[brief] Plaintiff alleged misconduct which was, “they lied on my evaluation and appraisal” (1T; 107:20).  The reportable incident form took place on September 11, 2017 (1T; 108:23).  Plaintiff accused [...] and [...] of lying on her evaluation (1T; 109:9).  On her evaluation from April 1st to June 30th 2017, there was a “Needs Improvement” and [...] wrote, “When [...] was assigned a background investigation from the Bureau and directed to attend the mandatory training, she stated she would only attend if she was ordered to do so” (1T; 110:19).  Plaintiff called that a lie since she “never made that statement” (1T; 111:2).  Also, [...] indicated that she needed improvement in two categories, but he should never have done that because he was never in the unit to supervise her, and he had no idea what she did and what she didn’t do in the unit (1T; 114:9).  Furthermore, there is an SOP on MAPPS and it stated, “Supervisor shall ensure their subordinates are made aware of all new MAPPS entries, performance notices, interventions, journal entries” (1T; 114:14).  Plaintiff was never notified of any of those (1T; 114:19).  The result was that he had lied on her evaluation and never told her about the MAPPS entry (1T; 115:12).  The whole process of what he did was incorrect (1T; 115:21).  Plaintiff said he lied and that in her entire career, she had never received a bad evaluation (1T; 115:25).  He lied about her saying that she would not go to training unless she was directed or ordered (1T; 116:4).  [...] lied and [...] swore to it (1T; 117:11).  [...] approved an evaluation that was false (1T; 117:13).
[brief] [...]’s Complaining Reaches a Tipping Point.  On June 24, 2020, [...], [...], and [...] were on duty in the staffing coordinators’ office, with [...] working in her office.  (Pa244 at 78:17-24).  [...] was complaining about [...]’s supposed lack of productivity, and [...]’s alleged refusal to address it.  (Pa367 at 101:9-24; Pa 367 at 101:25-102:5).  A day earlier, some of [...]’s Kronos reports, which should have been completed, but had been misplaced and left undone, had accidentally fallen on the ground.  (Pa300; Pa244 at 79:3-14).  [...] often complained about [...], whom he described as “lazy” and the weakest link,” and seemingly upset about the unaddressed Kronos reports, muttered to [...]: “and let me guess, Barb didn’t do anything about it. ” (Pa467; Pa169 at 44:1-7; Pa244 at 79:3-14; Pa300-01 at 92:9-93:4).  [...] overheard [...]’s comment.  (Pa367 at 102:13-21).  Having grown tired of [...]’s repeated efforts to undermine her management, [...] walked over to [...] at his desk, raised her voice, and told [...] she “had enough of him complaining” and that he could bring any of his complaints to Human Resources.  (Pa367 at 102:13-21; Pa301 at 95:2-11; Pa301-02 at 96:23-97:23).  In her frustration, [...]’s voice was raised in a yelling fashion and she drew close to [...].  (Pa244 at 79:15-21).  [...] is a physically imposing man, and a former member of the military, while [...] is much smaller in stature.  (Pa161-62 at 12:21-13:2; Pa175 at 65:7-66:15).  [...] ignored [...] while she spoke to him, and was unfazed by the confrontation.  (Pa161 at 11:3-11; Pa188 at 118:20-119:24; Pa244 at 79:15-21; Pa301 at 96:10-15).  Having vented her frustrations, [...] left [...] alone.  (Pa188 at 120:4-5).  [...] continued working for some time thereafter before leaving the staffing office for the remainder of the workday.  (Pa189 at 121:9-122:11).  [...] did not touch [...].  (Pa188 at 119:7-18).  That same evening, [...] called [...] and apologized for yelling at him.  (Pa367 at 104:1-15).  [...] further explained to [...] that personal issues, combined with COVID, caused her stress to boil over.  (Pa367 at 104:2-11).  [...] told [...] not to worry about anything and that he understood [...]’s circumstances.  (Pa367 at 104:11-15).  [...] admitted he did not think [...] was rude or condescending, and did not feel intimidated.  (Pa184 at 102:7-10; Pa184 at 104:8-18).  [...] discussed her behavior with the other staffing coordinators as well.  (Pa366 at 97:5-21).  [...] referred to [...]’s June 24, 2020 conduct as an isolated incident and the worst she had seen.  (Pa246 at 85:11-21; Pa246 at 86:7-9).  [...], meanwhile, admitted that she never raised any complaints about [...]’s treatment of [...].  (Pa304 at 105:7-15).  VII.
[brief] An unchallenged error must be “clearly capable of producing an unjust result,” R. 2:10-2, and “will be disregarded unless a reasonable doubt has been raised whether the jury came to a result that it otherwise might not have reached,” State v. R.K., 220 N.J. 444, 456 (2015).  “Plain error is a high bar and constitutes error not properly preserved for appeal but of a magnitude dictating appellate consideration. ”  State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 404 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[brief] ”  *Id.*  In *Crespo v. Evergo Corp.*, the Appellate Division applied *Cedeno* against a private employer and confirmed that its reasoning applies in other contexts.  366 N.J. Super. 391, 394-95 (App. Div. 2004).  The *Crespo* Court considered an employer’s use of after-acquired evidence to defend against a former employee’s claim that it discriminated against her in violation of NJLAD by terminating her employment following her maternity leave.  *See id.*  The employer discovered during litigation that the employee was not legally authorized to work in the United States and had presented a fraudulent social security card during the hiring process.  *See id.* at 394.  The employer argued it was entitled to the *Cedeno* analysis because the employee was statutorily barred from being hired.  *See id.*  The Appellate Division applied the *Cedeno* analysis to *Crespo*, balancing the competing policies expressed in federal immigration statutes against the employee’s right to bring a discrimination suit, and concluded that the plaintiff was barred from all relief.  *See id.* at 400-01.  In *Cicchetti v. [...]*, the New Jersey Supreme Court reaffirmed *Cedeno* and *Crespo*, but determined that those cases did not apply to the facts at hand because the *Cicchetti* plaintiff was *not* barred by operation of law from holding his position with defendant.
[directive] This section outlines the initial law enforcement response to a reported bias incident.  This outline is designed to provide a practical approach to initial response and initial investigation of suspected or confirmed bias incidents.  Bias incidents may generate fear and concern among victims and the community.  These incidents have the potential of recurring, escalating, and possibly causing counter- violence.  Therefore, bias incidents require a thorough and comprehensive law enforcement response.  Responding Officer:  When the initial responding officer arrives on the scene and determines that the situation may involve a bias incident, he or she shall:  1. Apprehend the actor (if applicable).  2. Provide assistance to the victim.  3.  Protect the crime scene to prepare for the gathering of evidence.  4.  Request that a law enforcement supervisor respond to the scene, as appropriate.  5.  Conduct a standard preliminary investigation.  6.  Obtain the names and addresses of all persons who witnessed or who are acquainted with the circumstances of the incident.  All such persons should be questioned in detail.  7.  Prepare a standard police incident report.  Document the basic facts and circumstances surrounding the incident to include the following:  a.  Name, address, telephone numbers and other information regarding the victim and witnesses.  b.  Where incident occurred.  c. Person and/or property targeted.  d. How targeted.  e. Means of attack.  f. Time of incident.  g. Method of operation, trademark, or unusual characteristics of incident.  h.  Any and all other relevant information provided by the victim and witnesses.  8.  Refer the victim and witness to the appropriate Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy.  Law Enforcement Supervisor:
[brief] Appellant’s citation to and reliance upon Reichert v. Vegholm is misplaced, as that case involved a plaintiff alleging injuries from both an automobile collision and a separate slip-and-fall incident, one-month apart and involving the same areas of the body.  *Reichert v. Vegholm*, 366 N.J. 209 (App. Div. 2004).  The Court held that the plaintiff has the burden of proof relative to apportioning damages from an aggravation; and dismissed the damages claim based upon the plaintiff’s medical expert’s testimony that ‘he was unable to apportion the plaintiff’s damages between the automobile collision and the slip-and-fall.
[brief] **  *(OAL INITIAL DECISION AT PAGES 25-29; Pa25-29a).*  The DOC charged [...] on two Preliminary Notices of Disciplinary Actions (“PNDA”s) for incidents on August 16 and 17, 2019 and terminated his employment.  As previously stated, no one testified that [...] “deviated from the normal standards of conduct. ”  To reiterate, [...] testified that “[he] was not aware of Central Command ever telling an officer to get out of the television room,” (Pa114a).  It was only “[a]fter this issue with Gales, their supervisor told officers to be at their desks and not to hang out in the television room.  Gales hanging out in the television room on August 16 was not by itself a department violation. ”  *(Id. (emphasis added.))*  ---  5[...] had a *Loudermill* hearing on October 3, 2019.
[brief] CONCLUSION  In sum, Mockler stands for the proposition that an operator of an automobile who is driving as a reasonably prudent and ordinary person would in the same situation, can be found not liable for causing a collision that occurs despite such reasonable and ordinary action/inaction, due to a condition outside of the driver’s control.  Mockler applies to skidding and sliding as much as it applies to the healthy individual with no medical history that suffers a seizure, causing them to rear-end another vehicle.  Mockler does not entitle a defendant to slant the negligence instruction in their favor; rather it permits the factfinder to make a determination as to negligence, where otherwise negligence would be determined as a matter of law.  The jury determines whether or not the factual recitation comports with reasonable versus unreasonable action/inaction, as well as the credibility of such factual recitation.  The defendant is not entitled to an instruction telling the jury that skidding and/or sliding is ‘not negligent’, as this is not the law.  Rather, the jury determines negligence based upon the reasonable person standard, as instructed in the Model Civil Jury Charges relative to negligence and causation; which are the most balanced and fair instruction of the applicable law, to both parties.  To imply that a jury is not intelligent enough to realize that if they determine a collision was outside of the control of a defendant, they can determine the defendant to have been reasonable and not negligent, insults the jury system.  In the instant matter, Appellant ‘had his day-in-court’ on the negligence issue and was determined liable, unanimously, by a jury of his peers; in a factual scenario where the Trial Court would have been well within its right to determine the issue as a matter of law.
[brief] Oppo. at 22-29.  Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s requests conflict with the plain language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), and that the parties’ ESI Order does not require the production of irrelevant documents or documents that “hit” on a particular search term regardless of relevance.  See id.  Plaintiffs further contend that Defendant’s interpretation of the ESI Order as permitting discovery into irrelevant documents renders the Order in violation of the FRCP 83 and conflicts with the Federal Circuit advisory Council’s purpose in creating the ESI Order.  Id., at 6-7, 24.  Plaintiffs also maintain that they have not waived objections to Defendant’s search terms and assert that they have produced all documents in their possession responsive to Defendant’s requests.
[brief] In other words, a court must consider whether the officers’ conduct was “objectively reasonable in light of ‘the facts known to the law enforcement officer at the time of the search. ’”  Ibid. (quoting State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 46-47 (2011) (citations omitted)).  It follows that any officer searching a home, a car, or belongings pursuant to a search warrant is “authorized to use only those investigatory methods, and to search only those places, appropriate in light of the scope of the warrant. ”  *Rockford*, 213 N.J. at 441 (quoting *State v. Reldan*, 100 N.J. 187, 195 (1985)).  New Jersey “courts have been reluctant to invalidate search warrants based on confusion over jurisdiction or other issues that do not implicate probable cause or the neutrality of the issuing judge.
[brief] (3T32:17-18).  Defendant was not represented by an attorney with regard to the Operating Agreement.  (3T33:2-4).  When entering into the Operating Agreement in 2017, Defendant was not aware that Plaintiff did not want to pay Plaintiff a salary as a pharmacist (3T35:1-4) (even though she had been the pharmacist and receiving a salary since the pharmacy opened in March 2016).  If Defendant knew Plaintiff did not expect her to take a salary for being the pharmacist, she would not have signed the Operating Agreement and would not have partnered with Plaintiff.  (3T35:4-6; 3T170:20-171:5).  At the time Defendant signed the Operating Agreement, she did not believe the agreement prohibited her from receiving a salary as a pharmacist and she would not have signed it had she known of such prohibition.  (3T35:7-13).  Plaintiff began receiving regular payments from [...] in July 2017, having received other amounts from [...] before that time, just not regularly.
[brief] The time that lapses between the crime and the identification is not determinative.  In *United States v. Archibald*, 734 F.2d 938, 943, modified, 756 F.2d 223 (2d Cir.1984), the court held that the array was not unduly suggestive where there was a twenty month delay between the robbery and the photographic identification.  In-court identifications are admissible even when a witness was presented a prior line-up or array but was unable to identify the defendant.  *Clausell*, supra, 121 N.J. at 327, 580 A.2d 221 (citing *United States v. Domina*, 784 F.2d 1361, 1368 (9th Cir.1986), *cert. denied*, 479 U.S.
[brief] "The burden of proving ... a non-prevailing party acted in bad faith ... is on the party who seeks fees and costs under the Frivolous Litigation Statute, or ... under Rule 1:4-8."  Bove v. AkPharma Inc., 460 N.J. Super. 123, 151 (App. Div. 2019).  And in Bove, supra, 460 N.J. Super. at 148, this Court held:  "For purposes of imposing sanctions under Rule 1:4-8, an assertion is deemed 'frivolous' when 'no rational argument can be advanced in its support, or it is not supported by any credible evidence, or it is completely untenable.'"  United Hearts, LLC v. Zahabian, 407 N.J. Super. 379, 389, 971 A.2d 434 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting First Atlantic, 391 N.J. Super. at 432, 918 A.2d 666).  Sanctions imposed under this rule "are specifically designed to deter the filing or pursuit of frivolous litigation[]"  LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 98, 970 A.2d 1007 (2009).  A second purpose of the rule is to compensate the opposing party in defending against frivolous litigation.  Toll Bros., Inc.  v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 190 N.J. 61, 71, 918 A.2d 595 (2007).  However, because the nature of litigation conduct warranting sanctions under Rule 1:4-8 has been strictly construed, [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2 on R. 1:4-8 (2019), Rule 1:4-8 sanctions will not be imposed against an attorney who mistakenly files a claim in good faith.  Horowitz v. Weishoff, 346 N.J. Super. 165, 166-67, 787 A.2d 236 (App. Div. 2001); see also *First Atlantic*, 391 N.J. Super. at 432, 918 A.2d 666 (holding that an objectively reasonable belief in the merits of a claim precludes an attorney fee award); and *K.D. v. Bozarth*, 313 N.J. Super. 561, 574-75, 713 A.2d 546 (App. Div. 1998) (declining to award attorney's fees where there is no showing the attorney acted in bad faith).
[directive] SUBJECT: Directive Revising Policy Regarding Use of Body Worn Cameras (BWCs) and Stored BWC Recordings  The increased use of body worn cameras (BWCs) by police officers has profoundly impacted law enforcement nationwide.  Indeed, since the first cameras were activated in New Jersey in 2015, there has seen a steady increase in the number of agencies that have equipped their officers with them.  While initially voluntary, many departments have established BWC programs as a way to increase accountability and transparency, while providing protection for officers who engage with the public on a daily basis.  At the same time, public support for BWCs has also increased, with many residents coming to expect that officers will be equipped with some kind of recording technology in the performance of their duties.  In fact, there is consistent public demand for the release of BWC footage in the wake of critical incidents involving police use of force.  This footage provides objective evidence of what occurred and plays a crucial role in the public discourse around police accountability.  BWCs also serve as a powerful deterrent to misconduct by both the police and members of the public interacting with police.  As such, BWCs have gained wide support among public and law enforcement, alike.  Accordingly, the New Jersey Legislature mandated universal BWC implementation with the passage of P.L. 2020, c. 128 and 129.  These two new laws now require the use of BWC by all “uniformed patrol officers” in the course of their duties, and provide the basic framework for the operation of BWCs and the handling of BWC footage.  While many departments in New Jersey have already been deploying BWCs on a routine basis, these new laws will usher in a rapid expansion of BWC use across the State, both in who will be required to wear a BWC and under what circumstances.  New Jersey Is an Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and Is Recyclable Page 2
[brief] (18T78-1 to 3; 18T78-11 to 13; 18T78-22 to 25).  Defendant also inexplicable argues that [...] found only general deterrence, but also quotes the judge saying, “when it come to [...], deterrence in both a specific and generally sense is very high. ” (18T81-23 to 24).  He then goes on to quote the judge discussing the reasons for general deterrence, but ignores the preceding passage, in which [...] discusses the need for specific deterrence:  [...], need for deterrence.  Now, this is not just specific deterrence, but general deterrence.  And I ask myself, how many young people just like [...] will I see?  Quite a few.  That’s why they’re here.  We’re here because they’ve done things that shouldn’t have been done under circumstances that they should not have acted the way they acted.  So when you talk about deterrence, I don’t know whether or not an increased level of maturity has lessened your particular need for deterrence, because again, you’re in that controlled environment.  And I don’t mean this coldly or callously, but there’s secondary gain here and that’s not lost on the Court.  And I don’t mean that in any other way than that is an unavoidable consequence of these proceedings.  There is secondary gain involved here.  There are good reasons why for the Prosecutor, good reasons why.  And I’m not trying to dissuade you from continuing to do well in your incarceration.  * * *