ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 2T6.  She met the defendant when plaintiff and defendant visited Canada.  2T6.  [...] described a shopping trip to Lowes with her husband, son, Plaintiff, and Defendant.  During the trip, Defendant received a phone call and took it outside.  [...] overheard Defendant on the call, saying that she was there for one month and had to leave once her green card arrived.  [...] did not take immediate action but later discussed what she had heard with her husband.  Thereafter, [...] and her husband decided to speak to [...], Plaintiff’s father, about the matter, and did so the next day.  (2T8-9).  [...] also testified.  [...] stated he is Plaintiff’s best friend and has known him for 29 years.  Initially, [...] was invited to Plaintiff’s wedding in India but was unable to attend; he later surprised Plaintiff by showing up.  [...] recounted an instance during Plaintiff’s ceremonial functions where he overheard Defendant say something that raised his suspicions.  [...] mentioned hearing Defendant speak when he was at Plaintiff’s residence.  He recalled her saying, “it’s going to be a matter of months after I move to America. ” (2T16).  [...] interpreted Defendant’s comment as a red flag and immediately informed Plaintiff about it.  [...] then did not attend the wedding because Plaintiff questioned his intentions regarding coming to India and his warnings about Defendant.  [...] and Plaintiff had multiple discussions, leading [...] to decide not to attend the wedding as a sign of his seriousness.  [...] did not inform anyone else about what he overheard the Defendant say.  (2T16-18)  Filing for Annulment of the Marriage
[brief] Indeed, [...]’s protocol is consistent with Sedona Principle 6, which provides that it is “the responsibility of the producing party to determine what is responsive to discovery demands and to make arrangements to preserve and produce relevant information. ”  The Sedona Principles 38 (2d Ed. 2007).  Although there is nothing improper about agreeing to produce all documents generated from an ESI search protocol, doing so creates the risk of producing large quantities of non-responsive documents that are a burden to cull through for the receiving party.  Moreover, the receiving party is not entitled to non-responsive documents, and thus failing to conduct a subsequent manual review gives that party more than it is entitled to.  Here, the parties agreed to certain search terms after the parties served discovery demands.  Thus, application of the ESI search protocol would establish the collection of documents that would then be reviewed against the demands.  It appears that at least some of the plaintiffs understood that this would be the methodology when responding to discovery demands.  The Court concludes that [...] did not violate any agreement by the party; rather it engaged in best practices.  [...] need not provide the plaintiffs with hit reports or the criteria it used to withhold documents, the latter of which is arguably attorney work product.  In accordance with the amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, however, [...] shall identify its objections to the plaintiffs’ document demands and specify which documents have been withheld based on those objections.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B), (C).  In light of the press of deadlines, such supplemental responses shall be served on plaintiffs by no later than July 25, 2016.  SO ORDERED.
[brief] The language of AICRA’s dispute-resolution provision, in light of its context and purpose, encompasses only disputes regarding whether an insurer must pay unpaid PIP benefits.  AICRA states:  “Any dispute regarding the recovery of medical expense benefits or other benefits provided under personal injury protection coverage . . . arising out of the operation, ownership, maintenance or use of an automobile may be submitted to dispute resolution on the initiative of any party to the dispute. ”  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a).  The statute delegates to the DOBI Commissioner the responsibilities to promulgate rules and regulations regarding such dispute resolution and to designate an organization to administer the proceedings.
[brief] At trial, several key defense witnesses changed their testimony from prior depositions as to whether/when they reviewed and/or made notations on certain sonograms.  Id. at 366-68.  Directly after each of these witnesses testified, Plaintiffs’ counsel moved for a mistrial claiming surprise.  Id. at 368.  On appeal, Counsel for the Defendants conceded that he knew the night before trial that the testimony was going to change, and that he failed to notify Plaintiff’s counsel of this change.
[brief] *State v. Ruffin*, 371 N.J. Super. 371, 391 (App. Div. 2004).  "A threshold showing of some evidence of impermissible suggestiveness is required."  *Ibid.* (citing *State v. Ortiz*, 203 N.J. Super. 518, 522 (App. Div. 1985)).  Impermissible suggestibility is described as follows:  [T]he determination [of impermissible suggestibility] can only be reached so as to require the exclusion of the evidence where all of the circumstances lead forcefully to the conclusion that the identification was not actually that of the eyewitness, but was imposed upon him so that a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification can be said to exist.  [*State v. Madison*, 109 N.J. 223, 234 (1988). ]
[brief] The trial court correctly held that plaintiff failed to establish that the Authority had notice of a dangerous condition that created a substantial risk of injury.  (Pa2148).  The record is devoid of evidence that the Authority had any actual notice of a problem with the alleged dangerous condition.  There is no evidence of complaints of the alleged hazardous condition or evidence any accidents had occurred in the area in question as a result of the alleged condition.  The private entities with which the Authority had contracted to perform construction on the roadway in question and who were contractually bound to inspect the area for safety never informed the Authority of any dangerous hazards in the subject area requiring emergent repair despite multiple inspections of the area.  (Pa0725; Pa0795; Pa0674; Pa1202).  Additionally, the Biennial Inspection report dated April 22, 2015, clearly states the condition was satisfactory.  (Pa1343).  Plaintiff attempts to establish that a “dangerous condition” was identified by citing a July 2, 2015 memo of a June 24, 2015 field visit, the “T&M memo” described above.  Plaintiff however, fails to acknowledge a critical element of the memo; that it mistakenly refers to the north approach instead of the south approach that needed repair.  Pa1191; Pa1192.  This was corrected in a July 7, 2015 email by the author of the memo, [...].  Pa1191; Pa1192.  [...] has also testified the T&M report does not provide any support for the north abutment at issue.  (Pa1191-1200; 3T at 168:9 - 170:10; 3T at 171:19-22).  Plaintiff’s counsel is aware of this mistake and their multiple attempts to create an issue of fact by relying on this error is improper.
[brief] See Harleysville Ins. Cos. v. Garitta, 170 N.J. 223, 231 (2001); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Malec, 104 N.J. 1, 6 (1986); Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 76 N.J. 477, 483 (1978); Ruvolo v. Am. Cas. Co., 39 N.J. 490, 496 (1963).  If insurance policies covered conduct that is intended to cause injury, there would be less deterrence of such conduct.  In sum, N.J.S.A. 34:15-87 requires full coverage for all benefits that an employee is entitled to receive because of an employer’s liability under the Workers Compensation Act.
[brief] Plaintiff-Respondent [...]’s (“[...]”) arguments largely conflate Defendant-Appellant [...]’s Motion to Vacate Default Judgment with an assertion of offensive claims, arguing, *inter alia*, that [...]’s defense fails for lack of a private right of action or as barred by res judicata.  However, [...] has asserted no offensive claims here; [...] has only pointed to [...]’s defective service of process as well as [...]’s violations of a remedial consumer protection statute and [...]’s resulting lack of rights as defenses to the collection lawsuit.  With respect to [...]’s arguments as to [...]’s defective service of process, [...] maintains that the Summons and Complaint in this action were properly served, despite the record showing that 1) the process papers were mailed to an address where [...] had not lived in several years, 2) [...] filed a change of address form with the United States Postal Service (“[...]”) a year before the Complaint was filed, and 3) that [...] did not consult the [...] database prior to providing [...]’s “address” to the Special Civil Part for mailing pursuant to *R.* 6:2-3(d).  Both the trial court and [...] reason that *R.* 6:2-3(d) does not require the mailing to be correctly addressed to [...]’s residence, only that the regular mail is not returned to the court and that the certified mail is not marked as undeliverable.  Respectfully, that position is inconsistent with notions of due process envisioning notice reasonably calculate to apprise a defendant of an action initiated against them.  [...] has not sought to dismiss [...]’s claims against him; only to reopen the matter to be tried on the merits.  The Court must weigh the trial court’s mistaken basis for a finding of prejudice against [...] against [...] having effectively been denied due process.  In so doing, the Court should reject [...]’s arguments and reverse the trial court’s April 8, 2024 Order.
[brief] Ibid.  The requestor’s right to file such action only vests after a public agency has denied the records request.  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6; In re N.J. Firemen’s Ass’n Obligation to Provide Relief Applications Under Open Pub. Records Act, 230 N.J. 258, 278 (2017) (“Firemen’s Ass’n”) (“OPRA limits access to the courts by conferring the right to initiate a suit only upon the requestor, after a public agency’s denial of access.
[brief] ”  Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161, 174 (1985).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that the trade-off is not without limitations.  Laidlow v. Hariton Mach. Co., 170 N.J. 602 (2002).  In fact, not every worker injured on the job receives compensation benefits and not all conduct by an employer is immune from common-law suit.  The Legislature has declared that certain types of conduct by the employer and the employee will render the statutory bargain a nullity.  An employer who causes the death or injury of an employee by committing an “intentional wrong” will not be insulated from common-law suit.
[brief] [...] DID NOT MEET HIS BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ENTITLES HIM TO RELIEF  A.  It was Cohen’s burden to show that the Settlement Agreement, properly interpreted, entitled him to relief  Cohen argues repeatedly that [...] did not take discovery and that [...] did not argue that the Settlement Agreement was ambiguous.  (See Pb4-5, 16-18, 34).  However, it was not [...]’s burden to do so.  Instead, it was Cohen’s burden, as the plaintiff, to prove his claims.
[brief] ”  *Malaker Corp. Stockholders Protective Comm. v. First Jersey Nat'l Bank*, 163 N.J. Super. 463, 474 (App. Div. 1978).  “Thus, if parties agree on essential terms and manifest an intention to be bound by those terms, they have created an enforceable contract. ”  *Weichert Co. Realtors*, 128 N.J. at 435 (citations omitted).  “Where the parties do not agree to one or more essential terms, however, courts generally hold that the agreement is unenforceable.
[brief] The push is motivated further by the fact that incarceration can often serve to exacerbate this public health dilemma, as it “tends to worsen the preexisting condition, especially in the case of addiction,” [...], A Plague of Prisons: The Epidemiology of Mass Incarceration in America 116 (2011).  Indeed, it was this very solid foundation of scientific and statistical evidence illustrating the need for treatment within the criminal justice system which compelled former Attorney General [...] to declare that successful programs must stop “treating addiction as a law enforcement issue alone, but rather treat[] it for what it is, a public health crisis.
[brief] Thank you.  [...]: Your Honor, just one -- THE COURT: Oh, yes.  Mr. Grillo? [...]: -- thing before.  I just want to make that the record is entirely complete and accurate and [...] has a full understanding of what he's facing.  Even in a scenario where he prevails in the homicide, based on N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7a(1) through (7), which encompasses extended term ranges, if he's found guilty of the first degree robbery in Hamilton and just the first degree robbery in Hamilton alone, he would be facing, based on his criminal record, a term of 20 years to life.  THE COURT: Okay.  So I think everyone has had their opportunity to say what they needed to say so we're in recess.  Thank you, counsel.
[directive] Do you understand you will be required to submit to a psychological examination by the [...] the purpose of which is to determine if your conduct in committing the offense was characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior and if it was, whether you are amenable to (will benefit from) sex offender treatment and you are willing to participate in such treatment?  2.  Você entende que se o exame revelar que sua conduta está caracterizada por um padrão [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] de comportamento reincidente e compulsivo e você aceitar (se beneficiar de) um tratamento para agressores sexuais e estiver disposto a participar deste tratamento, o juiz poderá, mediante recomendação do Departamento de Correções, sentenciá-lo à reclusão no Centro de Diagnóstico e Tratamento para Adultos ([...]) para tratamento de agressores sexuais; e que, no entanto, se a sentença imposta ultrapassar 7 anos, você ficará primeiramente confinado em outra instituição e não no Centro de Diagnóstico e Tratamento para Adultos?  Do you understand if the examination reveals that your conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior, and you are amenable to (will benefit from) sex offender treatment and willing to participate in such treatment, the judge shall, upon recommendation of the [...], sentence you to confinement at the [...] for sex offender treatment; however, if the sentence imposed is greater than 7 years, you will first be confined at a facility other than the [...]? no Formulário revisado promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081-Portuguese página 1 de 3 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081- Portuguese page 1 of 3 3.
[directive] Requesting agency agrees to pay any fees or expenses necessary to effect transfer 1 2 ) title not later than the time of the transfer.  NO**:  Yes:  If '* the requesting agency not to pay any expenses necessary to effect transfer tide, the prosecuting does of agree or the fees for of forfeited agency may. at its discretion, refuse to honor this request distribution property.  sole of Fiscal  Whom Entity Officer  Disbursement of Money Should be Made: to I Tide: Name J Address: Telephone Number: Whom Official to Property Transfer Documents Should be Delivered:  I Tide: Name Address: Telephone Numberr Official to Whom Property Should be Delivered:  - . . -.  . . . . . law, The requester certifies that this request complies all applicable provisions of with 16)  A a Forfeiture Program tra tion Standard Operating Procedures, ad minist ive code and dminis r t and the information contained request is true and correct.
[brief] ” (Da 42).  [...] said she “couldn’t let anybody see him like that. ” (Da 32).  She stated that she was hurt that she received “letters from men all over,” but that her husband apparently did not support or believe her.  (Da31).  In dispute at trial was the timing of fractures to [...]’s bone tissue, which the State claimed contradicted Ms. [...]’s statements that [...] had died from an accidental fall down the stairs.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  REPLY APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS  ..................................................  ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................ iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ......................................................................  1 REPLY ARGUMENT ..................................................................................  1 POINT I.  [...] HAS PLED ADEQUATE AND Viable CLAIMS UNDER THE CONSUMER FRAUD ACT ..................................................  1  i.  The Private Right of Action Afforded by the Consumer Loan Act and Licensed Lenders Act Illustrates the Legislature’s Intent to Include a Private Right of Action in the Consumer Finance Licensing Act .........................................................................................  1  ii.  Valentine’s Claims Satisfy the Elements of the Consumer Fraud Act .............................................................................  4 POINT II.  ENFORCING AND/OR ATTEMPTING TO ENFORCE A VOID DEBT VIOLATES THE FDCPA ...............................................................  11 CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................
[brief] According to [...], another man, [...], who had been on the porch of [...]’s home, then chased after him holding “a knife or something. ”  (9T 96-10 to 13)  [...] testified that he was “so exhausted” that he “didn’t feel like fighting” anymore, so he “just gave [[...]] a hug” and told him, “we can fight tomorrow. ”  (9T 96-14 to 18)  Paulsboro Police Officer [...] responded to the scene.
[brief] 17  I.  POINT I.  THE APPLICATION TO VACATE  THE FINAL JUDGMENT  SATISFIES  THE REASONABLE AND STATUTORY TIME PERIOD FOR THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT  17  POINT II.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONSIDERED  ALL RELEVANT FACTS  CONCLUDING THAT DEFENDANT PRESENTED  EXCEPTIONAL AND MERITORIOUS FACTS TO AVOID AN UNJUST RESULT AND THEREBY VACATED  THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE
[brief] (Immediately adjacent neighbor to a proposed permitted site for a car wash failed to establish a particularized property interest for purposes of an adjudicatory hearing based on anticipated traffic impacts).  [...] correctly found that [...] has nothing more than general interests shared with other nearby landowners and that [...]’s dock structure was sufficiently distanced from the navigational channel.  (Aa135).  The second Mathews factor also favors [...] because [...] did have meaningful opportunities to prevent the erroneous deprivation of the interests it purports to have.
[brief] An abuse of discretion also arises when "the discretionary act was not premised upon consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear error in judgment."  Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193, 887 A.2d 1191 (App.Div.2005).  Where a Motion to Amend has little or no merit or its substance is irrelevant to the underlying claim, denying the motion is proper.  Cutler v. Dorn, 196 N.J. 419, 441 (2008) (emphasis added) (“So too is a motion to amend properly denied where its merits are marginal, its substance generally irrelevant to the main claim, and allowing the amendment would unduly protract the litigation or cause undue prejudice.
[brief] It’s important – and you’ll get a copy of this transcript to me – it’s important for me to see why the Appellate Division takes action, whatever action it will take in connection with the appeal from the first case because, as I said, theoretically the Appellate Division can simply say the case was closed, [...] was correct, and according to my finding, the first time the plaintiff really should have raised the issue was as of February ’21.  The case had been dismissed before that in January ’21.  So if the Appellate Division rules on a strict procedural rule that [...] was correct, there was no open case; therefore, the second case couldn’t be filed, then after that Decision the plaintiff can refile a second Complaint and come in front of the Court on that bad faith argument only.  Now if the Appellate Court rules that [...] was correct, the second Amended Complaint was properly – the Motion to Amend the second Complaint was properly denied for some other reason, well then the plaintiff will be barred from filing the second Complaint.
[brief] ”  253 N.J. 133, 154 (2023) (Olenowski I).  While there has not been a published New Jersey case explicitly analyzing the ACE-V method under Frye or Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), such evidence has nevertheless been accepted time and time again during the Frye and Daubert eras.  See (PAb at 6-7 (collecting cases)).  In addition, at least nine federal appellate courts have deemed reliable expert testimony regarding fingerprint-identification evidence under Daubert, including testimony regarding the ACE-V process.  See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 244-46 (3d Cir. 2004) (concluding there were “good grounds” under Daubert to admit expert testimony on fingerprinting evidence); United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2003) (explaining federal appellate courts have found admissible “expert fingerprint identifications in the post-Daubert era”); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005) (same); United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641, 663 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining a Daubert hearing was unnecessary where expert had extensive training and used acceptable methods); United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105, 110-11 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion because the ACE-V method satisfies Daubert); United States v. Straker, 800 F.3d 570, 631-32 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (same); United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 485-87 (7th Cir. 2013) (same).  A Special Adjudicator would thus be unnecessary both in this case and in general to determine that fingerprint-analysis evidence and the ACE-V process are admissible and reliable.  Despite the attempt by amici and defendant to suggest that expert testimony regarding that evidence is unreliable or risks misleading a jury, there is no controversy.  No Special Adjudicator is needed to uphold what court after court has determined: such evidence is reliable under Frye and Daubert.  Since it does so, fingerprint-analysis evidence therefore satisfies Olenowski as well.
[brief] Moreover, the Department’s interpretation and application of the CZM Rules in this case (\textit{i.e.}, the SRD Rule and Long Branch Rule) is entitled to substantial deference by the Court.  See \textit{In re FWW GP7}, 405 N.J. Super. at 213.  The Department’s action in this case was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and its decision to issue the Permit should be affirmed.
[brief] The Amendment to the *Federal Arbitration Act* specifically defines sexual harassment as, “The term sexual harassment dispute means a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under Federal, tribal or state law. ”  9 U.S.C. §401(4).  Respondent’s complaints of harassment in this case clearly meets the state definition “of a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment. ”  [7a, 37a, 212a, 238a-250a]  Sexual harassment is defined broader than quit pro quo harassment or sexual assault.  Sexual harassment pursuant to the *New Jersey Law Against Discrimination* can come in several forms.  *Model Civil Jury Instruction* 2.25; *Lehmann v. Toys R Us Inc.*  132 N.J.587 (1983)  The record contains ample evidence at this stage of the case supporting Respondent’s allegations of sexual harassment and a hostile work environment because she was a woman.  [7a, 37a, 212a, 238a-250a]  The plaintiff’s Complaint, and the limited facts in the record from her deposition reasonably raise issues of sexual harassment that last occurred after the March 3, 2022, amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act.  [7a, 37a, 212a, 238a-250a]  The amendment prohibits enforcement of any prior arbitration agreements.