ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The below are [...]’s September 27, 2023, responses to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories regarding the contract [...] is now seeking to enforce:  23.  Identify by name, address and the nature of the work, all contractors that you retained to perform work that was not within the scope of the contract (sic) the Plaintiff.  ANSWER: Objection.  There was no fully executed contract with the plaintiff and a list of subcontractors to be provided.  25.  Identify all work which you contracted with the Plaintiff to complete.  ANSWER:  The plaintiff wasn’t contracted for this project since the “Contract” wasn’t fully executed.  27.  Identify all work under the contract which you allege the Plaintiff either failed to complete or completed in a defective manner.  For each item identified state: (a) The name and address of the contractor that was retained to complete or correct; (b) The cost to complete or correct the alleged defective work; and (c) Any incidental damages caused by the alleged incomplete or defective work.  ANSWER: Objection.  There was no contract with the plaintiff.  Pa035.  Additionally, [...]’s Requests for Admissions defines “CONTRACT” as “the Subcontractor Agreement dated June 8, 2022, which identifies S. Todd [...] as the ‘General Contractor’ and [...] as the ‘Subcontractor’”.
[brief] A68.  Plaintiffs filed another motion on November 29, asking the court to strike the Answers of both Defendants (without having filed a motion to compel more specific responses).  Defendants opposed, noting that they had provided responses in accordance with the punch list the court had specified (as noted above).  A68.  On December 22, 2023, however, the court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to strike Defendant [...]’s Answer for failure to provide discovery.
[brief] In reversing the grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court held that plaintiff had sufficiently established a clear mandate of public policy that he reasonably believed would be violated.  This was so, even though at the time of plaintiff’s underlying objections there was no statute or governmental regulation that expressly prohibited the conduct in question.  There, the Supreme Court in Mehlman drew support from a variety of sources, including regulations that came into effect after plaintiff’s complaint, to find a source of public policy.  The Court recognized that sources and parameters of public policy are “not susceptible to hard and fast rules”, but rather “public policy has been defined as that principal of law which holds that no person can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.  The term admits of no exact definition…Public policy is not concerned with minutiae, but with principles. ”
[brief] THE LEASE AGREEMENT WAS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS ON ITS TERMS AND WAS PROPERLY INTERPRETED BY [...] (3T:9:4 – 13:2, 15:11 – 19:10).  The lease here is clear and is to be construed against the Landlord and in favor of the Tenant.  See Crewe Corp. v. Feiler, 49 N.J. Super. 532, 542 (App. Div. 1958), reversed on other grds.  28 N.J. 316 (1958).  Carteret Props. v. Variety Donuts, Inc., 49 N.J. 116, 127 (1967).  Furthermore, the Courts cannot “rewrite the contract of the parties by substituting a new or different provision from that clearly expressed in the instrument”.  Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 33 N.J. 36, 43 (1960); Garden State Plaza Corp. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 78 N.J. Super. 485, 500 (App. Div. 1963), certification denied 40 N.J. 226 (1963).
[brief] In particular, [...] noted the following:  Plaintiff's counsel argues a couple of other theories -- I shouldn't say theories, but asks to perhaps relax this period based upon substantial compliance and for that, plaintiff cites Schmidt v. Celgene Corporation, 425 N.J. Super. 600, an Appellate Division case from 2012, for the doctrine of substantial compliance to excuse an untimely filing before the Superior Court where the plaintiff first timely and previously filed a claim in federal court.  I read -- I read the Celgene case a little bit differently.  Plaintiff argues that New Jersey courts have applied the doctrine of substantial compliance to excuse an untimely filing and I do -- I know that the courts have done that, but the Schmidt v. Celgene Corporation, I read that opinion to say that they did not -- they did not when applying substantial compliance excuse an untimely filing.  In that case, the Court held that to the contrary, the doctrines of substantial compliance and the similar doctrine are different, but similar, of equitable tolling do not permit the plaintiff to proceed in New Jersey.  And accordingly, that Court essentially affirmed the Law Division striking down or dismissal of the plaintiff's case, as this Court is doing here.
[directive] A.  Step 10 of the Independent Prosecutor Directive states that “[a]t the conclusion of the investigation, the Independent Investigator shall determine whether any [subject-officer] should be referred to the appropriate law enforcement agency for administrative review in accordance with the Attorney General’s [(IAPP)].  Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures  The Independent Investigator shall monitor any resulting review and take such actions as are necessary to ensure that the review is completed in a timely fashion, and that appropriate actions are taken based on the results of that review. ”
[brief] APPELLATE DIVISION  [...], on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], Defendant-Respondent, and JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendants.  DOCKET No. [...]  CIVIL ACTION:  On Appeal  From the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County  Docket No. [...]  SAT BELOW: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  DATE SUBMITTED: November 19, 2024  REPLY BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
[brief] ”  21 C.F.R. §7.46(a).  A firm “need not delay initiation of its product removal or correction” pending the FDA’s review.  21 C.F.R. §7.46(b).  Even [...]’s own “regulatory expert”, [...] acknowledged in her report that FDA guidance or approval was not required.  [...] cites in support of her opinions, the FDA publication “Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff, Dear Health Care Provider letters: Improving Communication of Important Safety Information. ”  (Da0620)  In that publication, the FDA makes clear that: “FDA’s guidance documents, including this guidance, do not establish legally enforceable responsibilities….The use of the word *should* in Agency guidance means that something is suggested or recommended, but not required. ”¹ (Da0619; Da0623)  Moreover, the phrase “*Contains Nonbinding Recommendations*" is printed at the top of every page of the FDA Guidance.
[brief] The FDCPA provision which Appellant relies on is meant to prohibit debt collectors from disclosing a debt to a consumer’s friends, family, neighbors, etc. thereby harming the consumer’s reputation.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692; S. Report. No. 95-382, at 2-4, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696.  Here, in particular, Appellant did not allege that any human being at the letter vendor (or outside the vendor for that matter) ever saw his information, much less that he suffered any reputational harm.
[brief] "The Court 'may turn to extrinsic evidence [of legislative intent], "including legislative history [and] committee reports'" when the statutory language is ambiguous."  Ibid. (alterations in original) (quoting DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492-93).  "Such ambiguity can arise when a statute 'is subject to varying plausible interpretations,' or when literal interpretation of the statute would lead to a result that is inherently absurd or at odds with either public policy or the overarching statutory scheme of which it is a part."  Id. at 289-90 (quoting Cashin, 223 N.J. at 336).  A court may "draw inferences based on the statute's overall structure and composition and may consider the entire legislative scheme of which [the statute] is a part."  MasTec Renewables Constr. Co. v. SunLight Gen. Mercer Solar, LLC, 462 N.J.Super. 297, 318 (App. Div.) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Twiggs, 233 N.J. 513, 532 (2018)), certif. denied, 244 N.J. 243 (2020).  "[W]hen we are faced with ambiguity in a statute, we should consider the legislative intent animating the entire statutory scheme of which the specific provision is a part."  Correa, 458 N.J.Super. at 579-80.  "[S]tatutes that deal with the same matter or subject should be read in pari materia and construed together as a unitary and harmonious whole."  MasTec Renewables, 462 N.J.Super. at 318 (alteration in original) (quoting Nw. Bergen Cnty. Utils. Auth. v. Donovan, 226 N.J. 432, 444 (2016)).  "A court must make every effort to avoid rendering any part of a statute inoperative, superfluous or meaningless."  Ibid.  (citing Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Util. Co., 212 N.J. 576, 587 (2013)).  [...] v. [...], [...], 7-9 (App. Div. Aug. 17, 2021)  Thus, based on the foregoing reasons and facts one (1) through thirty (30), the court should reverse because the trial court failed to comply with, properly interpret or enforce legislation at N.J.S. 10:6-2 (Pa 175-176).
[directive] Subj: Criminal – Pretrial Release - (1)  Clarifying Penalties for Certain Violations of Pretrial Release; (2)  Requirement for Prosecutor to Provide Copy of Pretrial Release Order to the Victim Date: May 23, 2023  This Directive outlines the amendments to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9 effectuated by L. 2023, c. 46 (S1810/A1463), as signed into law on May 8, 2023, that clarify penalties for certain violations of pretrial release.  L. 2023, c. 46 also amended N.J.S.A.  2C:25-26 to require the prosecutor to provide a copy of the release order to the victim.  2C:29-9  Amendments to N.J.S.A. Section 1 of L. 2023, c. 46 amends the criminal contempt statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9, so as to permit law enforcement to charge a defendant who purposely or knowingly violates either (1) a condition of pretrial release to avoid all contact with an alleged victim of an offense or (2) a condition of home detention with or without the use of an electronic monitoring (EM) device with contempt in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a)(1) or (2).  If the underlying conduct alleged could also constitute a crime or disorderly persons offense, then the defendant may be 4th charged with a degree crime pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a)(1).  In all other cases, the defendant shall be charged with a disorderly persons offense, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a)(2).  The Master Statute Table has been updated so that law enforcement could begin charging N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:29- 9(a)(2) through eCDR as of May 8, 2023.  ADA ml rm  ENSURING DOOR TO OPEN AN JUSTICE
[brief] (3T13-2 to 8; 3T13-16 to 18).  But she did recognize that defendant’s lengthy criminal record, the seriousness of his prior offenses, and the need to deter him and others from violating the law supported the imposition of aggravating factors six and nine.  (3T13-8 to 13).  She then determined that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors.
[brief] For example, in Moran v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen's Retirement System, 438 N.J. Super. 346, 348 (App. Div. 2014), the Court reversed the Board's determination and held that a firefighter who suffered a disabling injury while kicking down the door of a burning building because the tools normally used by firefighters to break down doors had not yet arrived was an "undesigned and unexpected" event.
[brief] To wit, there is no indication or evidence that the Legislature intended to remove the implied private right of action from the NJCFLA when the New Jersey Residential Mortgage Lending Act (“NJRMLA”) was excised from the New Jersey Licensed Lenders Act (“NJLLA”)—which had previously combined the then-titled New Jersey Consumer Loan Act (“NJCLA”) with the NJRMLA.  See Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp., 150 N.J. 255, 262 n.1 (1997).  Indeed, the NJCFLA contains remedies codified for private actions, “namely, treble damages for injured consumers, L. 1996, c. 157, § 33(b) (codified at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33b).
[brief] THE EXTENDED TERM SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS EXCESSIVE AND CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION (66a; T9, 54-62).  In sentencing the Defendant, the trial court found the existence of the following aggravating factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a): • Aggravating factor 3 – the risk that the defendant will commit another offense, to which substantial weight was afforded; • Aggravating factor 6 – the extent of defendant’s prior criminal record, to which substantial weight was also afforded; • Aggravating factor 9 – the need for deterrence, to which substantial weight was also afforded.  With regard to the application of mitigating factors, the trial court found only that mitigating factor 6 was applicable—that the Defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his conduct for the damages or injury that the victim sustained.  The trial court afforded only slight weight to this factor, however.  The trial court further found that an extended term was appropriate as to [...] and imposed an extended term of twenty (20) years in prison, subject to the No Early Release Act.  The imposition of an extended term in the case of a “persistent offender” is discretionary, not mandatory.  State v. Thomas, 195 N.J. 431, 436 (2008).  The standards for an extended sentence are set forth in *State v. Dunbar*, 108 N.J. 80(1987) except to the extent that the need to protect the public should be addressed only if the Court finds that the State has proven the prerequisite number of convictions.  *State v. Pierce*, 188 N.J. 155, 167-168 (2006).  It is acknowledged that [...]’s prior criminal record met only the bare requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3 for persistent offender status.  However, given the discretion that the statute affords in applying an extended term in this regard, it is submitted that the trial court placed unwarranted emphasis on this criminal record.  Compellingly, all of the offenses that the State alleged to qualify Defendant for “persistent offender” status occurred within a span of a few years, 2014 and 2015, which is also contemporaneous in time to the offense presently on appeal.  At the time of his sentencing, Defendant was thirty-three (33) years old and the criminal offense with which he convicted was his third.  Taking into consideration that the term “persistent” is defined as “continuing to exist or endure over a prolonged period”, the spirit of the statute was not furthered by the trial court exercising its discretion to categorize him as such.  His offenses did not occur over a long period of time such that his pattern of offending endured; rather, the close proximity in time of [...]’ convictions are more aptly qualified as a criminal spell for which he is now being punished.  Under the circumstances, the Court is asked to reverse the decision of the sentencing court imposing an extended term of twenty (20) years imprisonment for this second-degree conviction.
[brief] At the conclusion of oral arguments, the Court gave the parties the opportunity to submit Supplemental briefs and stated:  THE COURT:  As defense counsel has correctly pointed out, the issues that you have raised here, specifically with regard to litigation tactics, ability to settle, compromising your client’s ability to represent – or prosecute their case efficiently and properly because of knowledge that may be held by the [...] firm was not raised in the papers, admittedly, right and counsel did not have an opportunity to refute that or in any way combat that, and [...] is not here.  (1T45:23 to 1T46:1-6).  On August 29, 2024, Respondents submitted a supplemental brief which addressed the issues raised at oral arguments on August 2, 2024.  (301a).  Respondents also submitted a supplemental Certification signed by [...] for *in-camera* review.  Following submission of Respondents’ Supplemental Brief, [...] directed a letter to the Court objecting to the *in-camera* review of [...]’ Certification.  (Pa53).  Although Appellant objected to the *in-camera* review, Appellant did not request the opportunity to be heard nor did Appellant file a motion asking to be heard on the matter.  [...] filed its supplemental brief on September 30, 2024 with a Certification signed by [...] (338a).  [...]’s Certification addressed the issue of knowledge of Van Sader’s attitude about settlement or litigation.  At the conclusion of oral arguments on November 7, 2024, the court found that based on [...]’ Certification, Respondents had met their burden.
[brief] ”  U.S. Const. amend. IV; *accord* N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7.  Once a warrant has been issued, “[i]t is well settled that officers . . . are authorized . . . to search only those places, appropriate in light of the scope of the warrant. ”  *Rockford*, 213 N.J. at 441 (quotation omitted).  That is, a search “is limited by the terms of its authorization. ”  *Walter v. United States*, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980).  And “[i]f the scope of the search exceeds that permitted by the terms of a validly issued warrant or the character of the relevant exception from the warrant requirement, the subsequent seizure is unconstitutional without more.
[brief] In re Mild’s Estate, 25 N.J. 467, 481 (1957).  The duty includes collecting rents, which are trust property collected for the beneficiaries.  In re Boyle’s Estate, 133 N.J. Eq. 149 (1943).  The Trustee’s claims to remove [...] and [...] from the [...] and to collect payment for their occupancy of it were asserted under New Jersey’s Ejectment Statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:35-1, et seq.
[brief] 1.  Statement of Facts  Pa163  2.  Complaint, [...], Ex A below Pa7 3.  Police Report, Ex B below Pa151 4.  Plaintiff’s Answer to Form A Interrogatories: Ex C below.  Pa165  5.  Deposition of plaintiff [...]: Ex. D below Pa17 6.  Deposition of defendant [...]: Ex E below Pa112 7.  Defendant’s Google Image of the Intersection: Ex F below Pa176 8.  Affidavit of plaintiff [...]: Ex-l below Pa154 9.  Marked Satellite Image: Ex Pa-2 below.  Pa153  10.  Rybkin v. Twp. Of North Bergen Docket No., [...] (App. Div. 2012): within Reply; Ex.l below Pa177  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The case arises out of a traffic accident which occurred on a late Friday afternoon in December 2018 in Newark at the intersection where First Street meets Route 280.
[brief] I.  THE JUDICIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF THE ROBBINSVILLE ZONING BOARD REQUIRES DEFERENCE TO THE BOARD.  We hereby incorporate [...]’s Judicial Standard of Review as if fully set forth herein.  II.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE PRELIMINARY AND FINAL MAJOR SUBDIVISION APPROVAL AND THE ROBBINSVILLE ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT RESOLUTION OF MEMORIALIZATION
[brief] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, : On Appeal from a Judgment of v. : Conviction of the Superior [...], : Court of New Jersey, Law Defendant-Appellant. : Division, [...] : [...] : Sat Below: : Hon. [...], J.S.C., : and a jury BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT DEFENDANT IS CONFINED TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ................................................................. 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................. 3 LEGAL ARGUMENT ......................................................................
[brief] Similarly, as per [...]’s Certification, the Board failed to search even within the very students’ records who were the subject of the settlement records included in the initial OPRA request.  [...] admitted that he had not even contacted the parents of the students in question advising them that they could object to the production of their records by the time this matter had begun the process of appeal (57a), despite two years having passed.  To date, Defendants have yet to disclose whether either of these courses were pursued in the search for the missing records.  Defendants’ 11/6/23 Brief in Opposition conveniently failed to address either their (lack of a) search of the students’ records or inquiry to the NJDOE.  Defendants’ willful obstruction to Plaintiffs’ ordered access to the missing records throughout this matter been consistently demonstrated.  This Court may recall from its first opinion, in particular, these Defendants previously demanded an exorbitant $105,000 special service charge as a deterrent to search the students’ records for the settlement records.  Given the Boards’ and [...]’s abject refusal to complete the requisite responsibilities of fulfilling Plaintiffs’ OPRA request, despite being compelled to do so both by the trial and appellate courts, another measure is requisite to compel the production of the missing records.
[brief] [...]  I kicked the can down the road.  [...]  I did not involve deferential judicial review of the underlying discretionary municipal legislative act.  [...]  I did not involve judicial review of the County’s failure to monitor and to collect long term tax exemption revenues due the County.  [...]  I did not involve judicial review of a municipality’s refusal to respond to all pertinent second reading public hearing questions and comments prior to consideration and official action on an ordinance not subject to referendum challenge.  (Ironically, the [...] cured its earlier patent error and omission by reconsidering its original approval and affording plaintiff an opportunity to be heard before the [...] Board ratified its prior public funding action on July 1, 2020.)
[brief] (776a).  This Court, after hearing oral argument on January 24, 2020, denied plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint.  (Exhibit “V”.)  On October 28, 2020, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the January 24, 2020 Order (378a), which was denied by the trial court on December 16, 2020.  (379a).  On March 4, 2020, plaintiffs instituted a new Lawsuit against the [...].  (the “2020 Lawsuit”).  (Da5)  On August 28, 2020, [...] issued her Order dismissing plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, with prejudice, as to the Cooper Levenson defendants, and issued a comprehensive Opinion supporting her decision.  (Da72).  On September 15, 2020, the [...], in the 2020 Lawsuit, filed a Motion for Fees and Sanctions pursuant to Rule 1:4-8 and N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1.  (Da94).  On January 25, 2022, the trial court granting the [...]’ Motion for Fees and Sanctions.  (Da96).  After resolving this matter among all remaining defendants, this appeal followed.
[brief] (Pa235-Pa237)  The cut sheet listed four elevations staked at the four corners of the proposed new building on the site.  (Pa236-Pa237)  The cut sheet stated explicitly: "Building elevation based on plan entitled "Grading Plan, [...], Proposed Retail Development, Block 115, Lots 1-5, NJSH Rt 10 & Candlewood Drive, Borough of Morris Plains, Morris County, NJ" dated 4/11/05 and prepared by [...] Sheet 4 of 11."  This undeniably referred to Dynamic's preliminary grading plan, because all subsequent revised grading plans were numbered "5 of 11" with dates beyond April 11, 2005.  (Pa236)  The cut sheet went on to caution:  "Contractor must notify this office prior to any construction if the above referenced plans have been revised."  (Pa236).  Nowhere in the evidence does [...] claim that it ever gave surveyor [...] a revised, corrected set of grading plans while [...] was performing its stake out, despite strong evidence that [...] was aware of elevation errors on the original plans and had received revisions of those plans from Dynamic before [...] staked out the elevations at the site.
[brief] N.J.S.A. § 56:8-19.  “The CFA thus ‘imposes a standard of proof in consumer fraud actions by private plaintiffs that is higher than the standard that applies to enforcement proceedings by the Attorney General.  . . .  [A] private plaintiff must show that he . . . suffered an 'ascertainable loss . . . as the result of' the unlawful conduct. ”  Hoffman v. Macy’s, Inc., 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1412, *5 (N.J. App. Div. Jun. 28, 2010)(internal quotations omitted).