ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 8  A.  Motion to Suppress Evidence before [...] .............................................  8  1.  Illinois Traffic Stop .......................................................................................  8  2.  [...]’s Decision Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized in Illinois ................................................................. 16  3.  [...]’s Decision Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress the Seizure of the Marijuana-Filled Duffel Bags in New Jersey ..................................................  24  B.  [...]’s Decision Regarding Defendant's Miranda Motion to Suppress His Statements ..................................................................................  29 C.  [...]’s Denial of Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration ..................................................................................................................  35  POINT II
[brief] (2T:20-19 to 20-24).  As much can be seen on the body worn camera, where defendant can be heard during the initial stop speaking nervously, repeating the same answers over and over and constantly referring to how he is not “lying”.  Da25 at 1:30.  The body-worn camera footage then shows defendant take the safety vest from out of the back seat, display it to officers, then place it in his lap while slightly hunched over, concealing officer’s view of his waistband.  Da25 at 2:00.  Following this, the body-worn camera shows defendant using the safety vest to shield his waistband from the Detective’s view while walking to the rear of the Jeep.  Da26 at 2:30.  Defendant can then be seen leaning his body against the trunk of the vehicle, consistent with [...]’s description, to obstruct officers’ view of his waist area prior to the commencement of the Terry frisk.  Da25 at 2:30.  The trial court made its findings after watching [...] and listening to his testimony, then reviewing the body-worn camera from the incident.
[brief] Indeed, “[s]ettlement of litigation ranks high in our public policy. ’ ”  Brundage, supra, 195 N.J. at 601 (quoting Jannarone v. W.T. Co., 65 N.J. Super. 472, 476 (App. Div.), certif. denied 35 N.J. 61 (1961)).  When faced with a settlement agreement, “‘absent a demonstration of ‘fraud or other compelling circumstances,’ a court should enforce a settlement.  Capparelli v. Lopatin, 459 N.J. Super. 584, 603-604 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Jennings, supra, 381 N.J. Super. at 227).  See also Honeywell v. Bubb, 130 N.J. Super. 130, 136 (App. Div. 1974).
[brief] (Pa322).  In between the various amendments, the [...], in a December 2, 2020 email, explained that “we revised the Agreement a bit to beef up sections that have been, and will be, subject to particular scrutiny. ” (Pa990).  In other words, to hide the density quid pro quo.  At that point in time, no one knew what impacts were to be caused by the 290 Ocean building; there was no application pending before the planning board; no one undertook to study the impacts; and no one undertook to determine if the $2,000,000 payment was proportional to those impacts.  In an effort to determine if Plaintiff misunderstood the [...]’s thinking, Plaintiff noticed the deposition of a [...] designated corporate representative under N.J. Court R. 4:14-2(c).
[brief] THE ARBITRATOR’S UNREASONED DECISION TO DENY [...]’S COUNSEL A POSTPONEMENT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR FINAL RELIEF SO THAT HE COULD LEARN THE FACTS OF THE CASE AND PRESENT [...]’S SIDE, CONSTITUTED MISCONDUCT REQUIRING VACATUR (Da3172-3173)  N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8c. also requires vacatur:  c.
[brief] Where there are disparities in co-defendants' sentences, "[t]he trial court must determine whether: (1) the co-defendant is identical or substantially similar to the defendant regarding all relevant sentencing criteria," and, (2) "then inquire into the basis of the sentences imposed on the other defendant," and (3) considering "the length, terms, and conditions of the sentence imposed on the co-defendant."  Id. at 233.  [...] was sentenced to two consecutive life terms with sixty years’ parole ineligibility, while his co-defendant was sentenced to two consecutive life terms with thirty years parole ineligibility.  [...], 146 N.J. at 216.  The Court found that while there was nothing illegal or “intrinsically wrong” with his sentence, State v. [...] 167 N.J. 565, 567 (2001) ([...] II), there was “no acceptable justification of [the ] defendant’s sentence in light of the sentence imposed on his co-defendant.
[brief] For example, in [...], P.E.R.B. Decision No. 2485 (2016) (Pa273), the [...] (“Federation”) filed an unfair practice charge with California’s [...] (“[...]”).  Therein, the Federation alleged that the school district committed an unfair practice by, in relevant part, “conditioning negotiations on the Federation’s agreement to prohibit bargaining unit employees from observing negotiations. ”  The school district argued that negotiations were to be treated as “non-public,” and as a result, “neither party can insist on negotiations that are open beyond attendance by the specified negotiation teams,” while the Federation countered that the employees were “not simply part of the ‘public. ’”  [...] rejected the Federation’s argument, holding, in relevant part:  [T]he statute also provides that “once the employees in an appropriate unit have selected an exclusive representative” and it has been “recognized or certified.  .only that employee organization may represent [employees of] that unit in their employment relations with the public school employer. ”  Moreover, “an employee in that unit shall not meet and negotiate with the public school employer. ”  As we recently observed.  .employees necessarily surrender some of their statutory rights when they accept the benefits of exclusive representation, which is “the cornerstone of the Act. ”  The statute’s declared purpose recognizes that some employee rights may not be exercised in a manner that undermines the authority of the bargaining agent or abridges the principle of exclusivity.  In particular, employee rights to self-representation and to select representatives other than those designated by the majority organization may be curtailed to the extent necessary to accommodate the statutory scheme for collective bargaining through exclusive representation.[...]
[brief] Id. at 12.  There, the court recognized that "antecedent reliability poses heightened concerns in this case because the prior inconsistent statement was made by a witness who was in police custody and was himself a suspect” in the crimes.  The statement inculpated defendant and served to absolve the witness on some level.  The Appellate Division in that case had acknowledged that "[s]tatements which exonerate the declarant and implicate another, or which are otherwise given under circumstances in which the declarant stands to gain by implicating another, have been held, in other settings, to be 'presumptively suspect' and to raise 'special suspicion.'"  216 N.J. Super. 110, fn.8.  An application of the Gross factors to the proffered statements here illustrates that antecedent reliability was lacking as to both and, therefore, should not have been admitted.
[directive] Municipal Prosecutors Must Exercise Prosecutorial Discretion on a Case-by-Case Basis, Considering the Particular Facts and Applicable Law in Each Case.  Municipal prosecutors should exercise their prosecutorial discretion in marijuana-related cases as they would in any other case—based on the particular facts and applicable law, and consistent with their ethical obligations to the State, the defendant, and the courts.  The applicable 2  See Attorney General Guideline: Prosecution of DWI & Refusal Violations 14 (Jan. 24, 2005) (citing State v. Paserchia, 356 N.J. Super. 461 (App. Div. 2003)) (“[A] plea to a violation of an ordinance, when the underlying charge or charges are governed by State statutes is not permitted. ”); see also Memorandum to All County Prosecutors re: Training Powerpoint Presentation for Municipal Prosecutors (Apr. 5, 2011); Memorandum to All Municipal Court Prosecutors re: Plea Agreements in Municipal Courts (Nov. 18, 1998).  Page 4 law in marijuana-related cases may include the Supreme Court’s Guidelines to Part VII of the Rules, which include restrictions on plea agreements involving certain drug-related offenses.  Although the law places significant limits on municipal prosecutors’ discretion, the law also grants municipal prosecutors the latitude necessary to see that individual justice is done in individual cases.
[brief] In that regard, the court stated: “they [the courses in the catalog] add up to nothing more than a fairly complete exposition of [...]’s objectives, desires and hopes…”  Beukas, 255 N.J. Super. at 563 (citing Jacobsen, 54 N.J. Super at 579).  The Beukas Court analogized that:  The same argument could be made in construing the contents of defendants’ bulletins with regard to the award of a D.M.D. degree following the successful completion by plaintiffs of the four-year required course of study: that is, by offering a four-year course of study culminating in the degree, defendants were merely expressing their ‘objectives, desires and hopes’ and were not making an enforceable promise to plaintiffs to provide the degree no matter what the financial condition of the university.  Beukas, 255 N.J. Super. At 563.  The Beukas court further explained that, were it to apply contractual principles, the result (dismissal of the complaint) would be the same.
[brief] My Sept. 6th letter (App. Exh. “L”) (220a-226a) re-emphasized the seriousness of problems that [...]'s Certifications would cause due to falsified explanations for incorrect Accounting figures/descriptions from my Exceptions, & opening up Pandora's Box of previously unknown, unethical, unprofessional, and fraudulent Co-Trustee/CPA actions for improper management of Trust payments, and dereliction of duties as Co-Trustees since 2019, as per his responses to [...]'s Exceptions.  It re-emphasized my requests to resolve matters, & work towards a 3-Way Settlement.  They ignored my letter.  74.  Since [...] & [...] were ignoring & refusing my requests to resolve those matters, I emailed [...] on Sept. 12, 2022 (App. Exh. "F") (201a-202a) w/request for [...] to allow filing of Sur Reply to [...]'s Aug. 12th Certifications in order to address [...]'s new bombshells about prior undisclosed problematic issues & events (see par. 70-73 above), as well as refute [...]’s extensive false claims/arguments in trying to delegitimize my Exceptions to his Intermediate Accounting that would then become a fraudulent Accounting due to substantive mistakes that Mr. [...] was refusing to correct.  75.
[brief] 12, 13 Williams v. Bell Tel. Lab’ys Inc., 132 N.J. 109 (1993) ..............................................................................  20 Statutes Ind. Code Ann. § 34-11-2-11 ..................................................................  12 N.J.S.A. § 17:29B-4 ..............................................................................  17 N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-1 ...............................................................................  11 Other Authorities
[directive] 31, ' I / Seized Law  9  Asset Enforcement Asset Federal Federal I Trust Trust Maintenance Justice Treasury - - Account Account Account Ref. Account Account ASSETS  200Y  Cash xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Investments xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Accounts Receivable xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx x m . x x m x x x  Vehicles and Property xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx  Total Assets k *?  LIABILITIES AND NET ASSETS  xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Due Anywhere County to xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx  Accounts Payable  Unclaimed Property  xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxx.xx  Cash xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxx.xx  Other than cash xxxxx,xx xxxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxx.xx  Reserve for Encumbrances  Reserve for Assets in of Custodianship the Prosecutor xxxx.xx xxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx  Fund Balance xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx xxxxxx.xx  Total Liabilities and Net Assets  See accompanying notes financial statements to TABNO.
[brief] A municipal land use board is under a statutory duty to make and memorialize in its resolution findings of fact on which its conclusions and decisions are founded so that a reviewing Court has something to review.  See Loscalzo v. Pini, 228 N.J. Super. 291, 305 (App. Div. 1988), cert. den. 188 N.J. 216 (1989).  See also Cox and Koenig, New Jersey Zoning Use and Law Administration, at §19.7.2, (2022).  While Defendants argue that findings of fact are not required in the adoption of an ordinance, relying on Hirth v. City of Hoboken, 337 N.J. Super. 149, 165-66 (App. Div. 2001), Powerhouse Arts Dist. Neighborhood Ass'n v. City Council of City of Jersey City, 413 N.J. Super. 322, 332-33 (App. Div. 2010), a case relied upon by Defendants and Plaintiff in their respective brief, makes it clear Hirth was referring to ordinances in general, not land use ordinances, which have different requirements.
[brief] DESIGNATIONS | ii | | TABLE OF CONTENTS - APPENDIX | iii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | xiii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 3 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 4 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 10 | | A. Standard of Review.  | 10 | | B. Summary Judgment Standard.  | 11 | | POINT I: GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S DESIGN  DEFECT  CLAIMS WAS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE VEHICLE WAS DEFECTIVE TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE TRIER OF FACT.  (1T24:17-18)  | 13 | | POINT II: DEFENDANT’S ALTERNATE ARGUMENTS THAT PLAINTIFF CANNOT PROVE CAUSATION FAIL BECAUSE THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFECTIVELY DESIGNED CR-V FAILED TO PREVENT THE AVOIDABLE COLLISION.  (1T19:5-25)  | 22 | | CONCLUSION | 30 | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] . . .  Indeed, the State opposed [...]’s Habeas Petition.  7  The State maintains that this is a mischaracterization of what [...] actually wrote in his habeas petition.  To reiterate, [...] wrote that [...] would have  At Petitioner’s trial, the State elicited testimony from [...] that he did have knowledge of the Staten Island robbery and kidnapping of [...], and that he participated in this crime with Petitioner.  Petitioner’s counsel was never provided with [...]’s falsely sworn statement, even though it stood in stark contrast to his trial testimony.  It is indisputable that when a State witness (particularly one as vital as [...]) has perjured himself to a Federal District Court in relation to the subject matter of his trial testimony, the evidence is definitively impeachment material and would therefore be favorable to the defense.
[brief] ---  \(^2\)It should be noted [...] has supplied this Court with the most legible copies in his possession as to the documents contained at Pa1-Pa216; Pa254-Pa402).  Moreover, [...] has not supplied this Court with the complete record supplied to the Superior Court Judge which is itemized at Pa1-Pa4.  This is because some of the Google Maps and other exhibits are completely non-legible and [...] will defer to [...] to supply cleaner copies or more legible copies to this Court as part of their Appendix (assuming cleaner or more legible copies exist).  Additionally, a complete copy of the New Jersey Attorney General Guidelines as to Internal Affairs was part of the record below given to the Superior Court Judge.  However, that document is publicly available and [...] has opted not to attach its 200+ pages to what is already a lengthy Appendix.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  ...........................................................................................................  i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................... i  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................  5 APPELLANTS’ COMPLAINT FAILS TO SET FORTH FACTS  WHICH STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH A RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.  A.  THE STANDARD REVIEW ..............................................................................................  5  B.  RESPONDENTS ARE IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY UNDER THE TCA FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE POLICE PROTECTION.  .........................  7  C. APPELLANTS’ COMPLAINT FAILED TO SET FORTH  SUFFICIENT FACTS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A DANGEROUS CONDITION OF PUBLIC PROPERTYT  ........................................  14  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................
[brief] *Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.*, 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003) (citing *Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.*, 513 U.S. 265, 273–74 (1995).  Here, [...] is an Illinois corporation headquartered in New York.  [...] is a New Jersey general partnership and [...] is a New Jersey limited partnership.  Da53-54, ¶¶ 9, 10 and 14.  Thus, the issues in this coverage action involve commerce.  *Alfano v. BDO Seidman, LLP*, 393 N.J. Super. 560, 574 (App. Div. 2007) (“A nexus to interstate commerce is found when citizens of different states engage in the performance of contractual obligations in one of those states because such a contract necessitates interstate travel of both personnel and payments. ”)  Thus, it is indisputable that the FAA governs this matter and [...] did not challenge this point in its opposition papers to [...]’s motion to compel arbitration.  Both the FAA and New Jersey policy favor resolution by arbitration.
[brief] The Estoppel Provision provided, in relevant part  Seller shall, within ten (10) days after the date of this Agreement, prepare and submit to any commercial tenant under the Leases an estoppel certificate, in the form attached to or contemplated under each such Lease….  Seller shall use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain an Estoppel Certificate from the commercial tenant prior to the Closing.  Upon receipt of the executed Estoppel Certificate, Seller shall promptly furnish a copy thereof to Purchaser.  Subject to the provisions hereof, Purchaser's obligation to close title hereunder is conditioned upon any commercial tenant under the Leases delivering to Purchaser an estoppel certificate which conforms in all material respects to the form attached to or contemplated under each such Lease… (an "Acceptable Estoppel Certificate").
[brief] ”  [...] has been completed.  The attached insurance certificate is provided to evidence your coverage for Workers’ Compensation, General Liability, and Excess/Umbrella while working at the [Project]. ”  (Pa2389.)  With that, [...] also provided a Certificate of Insurance (a “COI”) listing the CCIP Policies.  (Pa2387.)  B.  [...]’s Confirmation That [...] Was Excluded
[brief] The trial court correctly ruled that any alleged “new” documents submitted with [...]’s Motion to Amend the March 27, 2023 Summary Judgment Order Pursuant to Rule 4:49-2 did not demonstrate there was a written arrangement between the parties.  On Appellant’s Motion to Amend, the trial court correctly held there was no evidence of a written arrangement demonstrating the transfer of a license.  Appellant’s Motion to Amend alleged it found “new” documents demonstrating a written arrangement, which were nothing more than the same type of unrelated emails between nonparties and unrelated entities that it submitted to the trial court under the summary judgment motion.  One month after the case was dismissed, and three months after discovery closed, [...] submitted those 179 pages of futile documents to the court, most of which were emails from nonparty [...] to nonparty [...] regarding an unrelated entity, [...].  The documents [...] presented were not new because they were from 2008 through 2014; more than 10 years old at the time of the Motion to Amend.  For reconsideration of new evidence, the party must show the “new evidence or additional information not presented at the original proceeding [] would change the outcome.
[brief] 31 State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011)........................................................................... 20 State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417 (2002)...........................................................................  16 State v. Orecchio, 16 N.J. 125 (1954)............................................................................  27 State v. Orji, 277 N.J.  Super. 582 (App. Div. 1994) ............................................. 31, 32, 33 State v. Pressley, 232 N.J. 587 (2018)........................................................................... 13 State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308 (2005)........................................................................... 25 State v. Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452 (2018)........................................................................... 18 State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374 (2002)........................................................................... 16 State v. Tierney, 356 N.J. Super. 477 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 72 (2003)..... 16 State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425 (2020)................................................................. 25 State v. Watson, 254 N.J. 558 (2023)..............................................................10, 11, 13, 20 State v. Williams, 168 N.J. 323 (2001).................................................................. 16 State v. Williams, 219 N.J. 89 (2014).................................................................... 32 Statutes N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2........................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3........................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1..........................................................................  28 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2..........................................................................  31 Court Rules R. 1:7-2.......................................................................................  16 R. 2:10-2.....................................................................................16, 25 Rules of Evidence N.J.R.E. 701 ..............................................................................20, 21  COUNTERSTATEMENT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[directive] Instructions  Promulgated via Directive #19-23 (10/17/2023), CN: 12972 page 7 of 8  All defendants must be permitted to leave the home for scheduled court appearances and pretrial monitoring and/or probation appointments.  Defendants who are ordered to HDLE, Strict HD, or HDEM are not exempt from any other conditions of their release.  This includes requirements that the defendant appear in court when ordered and the defendant report in person to Pretrial/Probation when ordered.  Defendants release orders must be explicit in detailing this exception to their confinement, this will prevent confusion and inconsistencies in release orders.
[brief] The second way the State urges this Court not to consider whether the testimony in this case was reliable or whether the jury was properly selected and instructed is by focusing on the mere fact that fingerprint evidence has been allowed in New Jersey for a long time.  Putting aside that, as explained above, [...] is not launching a frontal challenge of the reliability of ACE-V as a whole, the mere inertia surrounding the use of a technique does not make it reliable.  The rote admission of fingerprint expert testimony is a pattern of habit, not of thoughtful consideration.  There has not been a single published opinion in New Jersey that has considered the reliability of fingerprint evidence.