ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Burney, 255 N.J. at 22 (quoting Hill, 818 F.3d at 298).  That is clearly the case here, where, for the critical time period when the chase and shooting happened, the State only relied on the tower and sector, and for the other time periods, [...] stressed he was not pronouncing that the “phone is in any one spot. ”  There was no error.  Finally, even if [...]’s PCMD-based opinions should not have been admitted, any error was harmless.  Defendant’s location was also demonstrated by [...]’s observation of defendant as a passenger in [...]’s maroon car that he was known to borrow about two to three hours before the shooting.  (3T37-20 to 25; 4T121-16 to 18; 6T39-3 to 45-5; 6T52-7 to 58-10).  [...]’s testimony was thus cumulative to other evidence on the essential point for which it was offered.  Cf., e.g., State v. McGuire, 419 N.J. Super. 88, 134 (App. Div.) (improper admission of expert opinion harmless if cumulative to other evidence properly before the jury), certif. denied, 208 N.J. 335 (2011).  Moreover, counsel emphasized in summation that for the five-minute period in which the pursuit and shooting occurred, there were “absolutely no distance measurements.  Literally that phone could have been anywhere. ” (8T60-7 to 18).  And the defense emphasized that the PCMD data tracking defendant’s cellphone between 3:54 to 5:00 a.m.  did not correlate to the timing the [...] vehicle was observed on the [...] surveillance as testified to by [...].  (8T62-7 to 22).  Indeed, as defendant emphasizes in Points I and II, he was acquitted of the weapons offenses, suggesting that the jury may have rejected at least some of the expert testimony.  Defendant has not shown that [...]’s opinions were inadmissible or, even if they were, that he was concretely prejudiced at trial.  His conviction should be affirmed.
[directive] While conducted energy devices are designed and intended to be used as less lethal weapons, these devices can result in serious bodily injury or death.  The risk of causing immediate or long-term injury depends on many factors, including but not limited to the terrain on which the targeted person is standing, given the risk that the device might cause the person to fall uncontrollably.  Officers equipped with conducted energy devices must at all times recognize the seriousness and potential lethality of these weapons.  Accordingly, this supplemental policy establishes strict requirements for carrying, displaying, and using these devices.
[brief] \(^7\)  *In the Matter of the Closure of the SREC Registration Program Pursuant to P.L. 2018, c.17, 2020 N.J. PUC LEXIS 269, 18* (March 27, 2020).  B.  The Board’s determination that [...] was not eligible for a waiver was reasonable and should be affirmed.  As discussed above, the Board’s denial of [...]’s petition was based, in part, on the ineligibility of its grid supply project for entry in the TI program.  (Aa6).  [...] never sought a waiver of those eligibility requirements.  Yet the Board still carefully considered [...]’s project for entry in the TI program and eligibility for a waiver even though no such request was made.  (Aa4-5).  “When faced with a petition seeking a waiver of the timelines in the TI Program Rules . . . the Board carefully reviews the facts and circumstances of each such petition to determine whether such an extension is in the public interest. ”  (Aa112); N.J.A.C. 14:1-1.2(b).  Despite [...]’s failure to formally petition for a waiver in the TI program, Board Staff noted that [...]’s submission could be considered a formal expression of interest in the program.  (Aa5).  But [...] made no “showing of good cause” to properly request any relaxation or deviations from the rule.  N.J.A.C. 14:1-1.2(b).  Still, Staff not only reviewed [...]’s petition, but also sent three sets of discovery questions regarding the project’s permitting and interconnection processes, project design and site preparation, as well as costs.  (Aa4).  Following a thorough review of [...]’s submissions, the Board found that a waiver was not appropriate here, given the inherently speculative nature of [...]’s project.
[brief] Da1.  On July 14, 2024, the Court entered an Amended Order Compelling Arbitration clarifying that the Chancery Court retained jurisdiction over the case and that the November 15, 2023 Order Granting Certain Preliminary Injunctive Relief remained in full force.  \(^7\)  [...]’s Motion to Compel Arbitration in her Chancery Court case came only days after different parties agreed to arbitrate different claims arising under different contracts in a different case.  On April 10, 2024, [...] had filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration of the Law Division Case.  Da301-03.  The Law Division Case, brought by different parties and against different parties, is largely premised upon the Operating Agreements (Da75-103), which contain arbitration provisions related to the Property’s management (Da132, 149), and which case was in a completely different procedural posture than this case.  For example, no discovery responses were provided, no discovery served by [...] and her co-defendants, no interim relief granted, no depositions noticed, no trial date set, and arbitration was asserted as an affirmative defense there.  On May 28, 2024, a Consent Order in the Law Division Case was entered under which those parties in that case agreed to proceed to arbitration of the Law Division Case only.  Da332-33.  Arbitration of the Law Division Case is moving forward before the [...], A.J.S.C. (Ret.).  Da384-92. and effect – a benefit [...] obtained only because she elected to file in the Chancery Division.  Da2.  This appeal followed.  Da578-82.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Page  Final Judgment of the Honorable William J.  McGovern III, dated August 4, 2023 .................................................................Pa1  Order of the Honorable [...], dated July 22, 2022 ........Pa8  Decision of the Honorable [...], dated July 22, 2022 .................................................................Pa10  Order of the Honorable [...], dated July 22, 2022 ......Pa43  Transcript of Ruling by the Court, dated July 31, 2023.........................6T31-42  ###
[brief] Rule 3.4(b) of the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct provides in pertinent part that "[a] lawyer shall not . . . offer an inducement to witness that is prohibited by law[.]”  The ABA comment to Rule 3.4(b), upon which NJ’s rules were based states that “the common law rule in most jurisdictions is that it is improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for testifying...”.  The Restatement follows essentially the same approach.  A lawyer may not offer or pay to a witness any consideration: (1) in excess of the reasonable expenses of the witness incurred and the reasonable value of the witness's time spent in providing evidence, except that an expert witness may be offered and paid a noncontingent fee; (2) contingent on the content of the witness's testimony or the outcome of the litigation .  . . .  [Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 117 (2000). ]  Typically, lawyers may only compensate fact witnesses for: (1) reasonable expenses incurred by a witness to attend the trial, and (2) reasonable compensation for the loss of the witness’s time in attending the trial to testify.  *In re PMD Enters.*, 215 F. Supp. 2d 519, 529–30 (D.N.J. 2002).  Congress codified this common law principle at 18 U.S.C. § 201, the criminal statute prohibiting bribery of public officials and witnesses.
[brief] In disapproval ground number 47, the Department asked [...] to explain why the components of the remaining 35.7% of the lifetime loss ratio that goes to its profits, risk and expense were acceptable.  (Cra175).  That question struck at the heart of the Department’s judgment as to whether or not [...]’s premium rate increase request was excessive.  [...] responded by admitting that its “rate request level” was the maximum selected to get it back to its original lifetime loss ratio of 64.3%, with the 15% MAE that was beyond customary norms, and that they intended to use profits from premiums paid by Choice 2 policyholders to pay claims for other [...] business.  (Cra171-175).  The moment [...] submitted its actuarial memoranda and offered its opinion that its premium rate increases were not excessive under actuarial standards, [...] was on notice that the opinion would be tested by the Department and that whether its rate increase request was in fact excessive would be determined.  Even if the disapproval letters were not organized to [...]’s liking, that does not warrant remand.
[brief] First, as already discussed (Db32), when parties insert the word “shall” into an agreement they intend for what follows the “shall” to be “mandatory and not merely permissive. ”  Johnson Mach. Co. v. Manville Sales Corp., 248 N.J. Super. 285, 304 (App. Div. 1991).  Accord Medford Tp. Sch. Dist. v. Schneider Elec. Bldgs. Ams., Inc., 459 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2019).  Applied to §4.02, the clause “Landlord shall pay to Tenant . . . $730,000” is mandatory, and not subject to Landlord’s unilateral discretion.  Second, as has also been discussed (Db33-Db34), there are only six Reimbursement Conditions and “Tenant shall never miss a rent payment” is not among them.
[brief] ”  The Verified Complaint, par. 4, listed the beneficiaries, incl. me, it deemed appropriate, & IA compliance w/R.4.87-8 allowed for Exceptions by Interested Parties, as per Verified Complaint, par. 4.  In the Oct. 6, 2022 Rider, the Judge made a similar fraudulent omission, while similarly trying to wrongly cite the Will’s par. 10.6 as only allowing [...] to file Exceptions to IA. (prior Brief, p. 1, last par., to p. 2, 1st par.; & p. 18, Certification, par. 51, for my Oct. 26, 2022 Reconsideration Motion).  Based on [...]’s fraudulent assertion, we are transformed from the well-recognized truthful & substantiated facts that Trust beneficiaries, incl. me, were allowed to challenge the IA based on his Verified Complaint, par. 4; compliance with R. 4:87-8, as per the March 25, 2022 Order, that allows Exceptions by all Interested Parties; and compliance with the Will, par. 10.6 to allow Exceptions by beneficiaries, to his fraudulent assertion, which he NEVER presented in any filings or Hearings in the Lower Court, that only [...] can challenge the IA based on his fraudulent citation of the Will, par. 10.6.  He presented (p. 7, last par., to p. 11) Oct. 6, 2022 Rider record regarding the basis for Judge’s Rulings to reject my Exceptions, while omitting that my Certification (par. 18-25; par. 27-56, 1st point; par. 57-59) (167a-185a) (see prior Brief, p. 12, “[...]’s Exceptions”, to p. 20, “Requested Back-Up” for further clarifications) for my Motion for Reconsideration had refuted with substantiated facts all of the Judge’s false claims, opinions, and Rulings in that Rider record in order to validate that I “did [actually] have standing to challenge it [IA]… [and that my substantive] exceptions [in regards to various IA figures of Trust corpus and expenses] were sufficient as a matter of law”.
[brief] Plaintiff and Co-Defendant mischaracterize, if not misrepresent, several aspects of the trial testimony.  The primary basis of Plaintiff’s and Co-Defendant’s opposition to [...]’s appeal is the contention that it was an undisputed fact that [...] was 200 feet from the intersection when the light turned yellow.  This is simply not true.  [...] did not unequivocally concede that he was 200 feet from the intersection when he observed the light change from green to yellow.  [...] testified that he “estimated” that he may have been around 200 feet away from the intersection.  [...]’s actual trial testimony is as follows:  Q.  And am I correct that it was about 200 feet before you go to the intersection that you did see the yellow light for the first time?  A.  That was an estimate sir.  Q. Yeah.  And your best estimate at the time was about 200 feet; correct?  A. Right.  [3T:147-1 to 7 (emphasis added).
[brief] See, e.g., State v. Adl, A-5530-16T3, 2019 WL 3714467, at *6 (App. Div. Aug. 7, 2019) (reversing the denial of an order to suppress that stemmed from the facts of one case and “remand[ing] to afford defendant an opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas to three offenses[,]” from multiple unrelated indictments) (Ra 1-5).  See also State v. Hager, 462 N.J. Super. 377, 388-89 (App. Div. 2020) (where the defendant was convicted of resisting arrest at trial and then entered an unconditional plea to a severed charge, this Court reversed the resisting conviction based on an evidentiary ruling and vacated --- 2 Ra – Appendix to defendant’s reply brief.  Pursuant to Rule 1:36-3, counsel is unaware of any unpublished opinions known to counsel.  the guilty plea because it “accept[ed the] defendant’s representation” that the improper ruling “led directly” to the plea being entered).  In short, this Court understands that a defendant who enters a conditional plea agreement and has bargained for the right to appeal certain issues has bargained for the right to withdraw from that agreement in its entirety if he prevails on appeal.
[directive] appeal poses a narrow question: whether a particular defendant’s This statutory right to a speedy trial was violated.  The issue, though, raises broader concerns linked to the COVID-19 pandemic.  Foremost among those considerations is that defendants in criminal cases have a right to a speedy trial and a corresponding right not to be held in jail pretrial for lengthy periods of time.  For more than two years, however, there have been far fewer in-person trials because of COVID-19.  Beginning in March 2020, the court system, like the rest of society, could not safely bring large groups of people together for court proceedings in close quarters.  Even though restrictions have loosened and trials have resumed, relatively few 2 courtrooms today can accommodate all the essential parties to a criminal trial with appropriate social distancing.  Those limitations naturally led to an increase in pending cases, and thousands of criminal matters now await trial.  To compound the problem, defendants in roughly 6,000 cases await their day in court while in custody.  In each of those matters, a judge found the defendant posed a substantial risk of danger, flight, or obstruction and ordered the person detained pretrial.  Defendants have the right to be released two years after a judge orders them detained, excluding delays attributable to the defendant, if the prosecutor is not ready to proceed to trial.  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(a)(2)(a).  The statute is silent about what happens if the parties are ready but there are not enough courtrooms or judges to try the case.  As we address that dilemma, we must attempt to balance the relevant interests in a way that comports with defendants’ rights under the Criminal Justice Reform Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26 (CJRA or Act).
[brief] .............................................................................  13  In re Protest of Cont. for Retail Pharmacy Design, 257 N.J. 425 (2024)  ..................................................................................  8  Royal Park Invs. SA/NA v. HSBC Bank USA Nat’l Ass’n, No. 14-CV-08175 (LGS) (SN), 2016 WL 11805202 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016)  ...........................................................................  12, 16  SinglePoint Direct Solar LLC v. Solar Integrated Roofing Corp., No. CV-21-01076-PHX-JAT, 2023 WL 2585296 (D. Ariz. Mar. 21, 2023)  ............................................................................  12, 22 Singleton v. Mazhari, No. 22-CV-2554-GLR, 2024 WL 1140691 (D. Md. Mar. 14, 2024)  .......................................................................................................... 11 Strauch v. Computer Scis. Corp., No. 3:14 CV 956 (JBA), 2015 WL 7458506 (D. Conn. Nov. 24, 2015) ........................................................................... 13 Total Safety U.S., Inc. v. Rowland, No. CIV. A. 13-6109, 2014 WL 1691551 (E.D. La. Apr. 29, 2014) .......................................................................................................... 13 United States for Use & Benefit of M. Frank Higgins & Co. v. Dobco Inc., No. 22-CV-9599 (CS) (VR), 2023 WL 5302371 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2023) ........................................................................... 13 Venturedyne, Ltd. v. Carbonyx, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-351-RL-JEM, 2016 WL 6694946 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 15, 2016) ................................................................. 13 Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251 (D. Md. 2008) ....................................................... 10-11 Willmore v. Savvas Learning Co. LLC, No. 22-2352-TC-ADM, 2023 WL 6124045 (D. Kan. Sept. 19, 2023)
[brief] Until early 2017, [...] had minimal interaction with [...]’s unit.  However, the [...] conducted an inspection, revealing multiple health and safety violations that caused the apartment to fail.  DA-69.  [...] had to address various issues, including window recalibration, carbon monoxide detector installation, smoke alarm replacement, stove repair, kitchen faucet fixing, and door spring repair, in order to bring the unit up to code.  Id.  The city also mandated the installation of new electrical outlets, a security chain, and floor patching.  [...] took around two weeks to rectify these issues and comply with Hoboken’s safety standards.  Id.  The following month, an appraiser sent by [...] entered [...]’s apartment and took photographs, leaving [...] puzzled about the purpose until May 2017.  On May 22, 2017, [...] filed a hardship increase application with the Board pursuant to Section 155-14 of the Rent Control Ordinance (“RCO”).
[brief] ## CASES  *State v. Acevedo*, 205 N.J. 40 (2011) .........................................................  18  *State v. Afanador*, 151 N.J. 41 (1997) .......................................................  16  *State v. Cuff*, 239 N.J. 321 (2019) .......................................................... 2, 3, 6, 7  *State v. Cummings*, 321 N.J. Super. 154 (App. Div. 1999) ...................... 14, 25, 28, 30  *State v. Fritz*, 105 N.J. 42 (1987) .............................................................  24  *State v. Hess*, 207 N.J. 123 (2011) .......................................................... 13, 26  *State v. Hicks*, 54 N.J. 390 (1969) ...........................................................  16, 17, 18  *State v. Hubbard*, 176 N.J. Super. 174 (App. Div. 1980) ......................... 17  *State v. Hyland*, 238 N.J. 135 (2019) .......................................................  11  *State v. Marshall*, 148 N.J. 89 (1997) ....................................................... 24 *State v. McQuaid*, 147 N.J. 464 (1997) .................................................... 16 *State v. Murray*, 162 N.J. 240 (2000) ....................................................... 18 *State v. Preciose*, 129 N.J. 451 (1992) .................................................... 23, 24 *State v. Roach* (Roach I), 146 N.J. 208 (1996) ........................................ 16, 17, 18 *State v. Roach* (Roach II), 167 N.J. 565 (2001) ........................................ 17 *State v. Williams*, 317 N.J. Super. 149 (App. Div. 1998) ......................... 17 *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ...................................... 24, 25, 28 *United States v. Cronic*, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) ......................................... 24 STATUTES N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(3), ......................................................................................... 7, 8 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(6), .......................................................................................... 7, 8 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(9), ..........................................................................................
[brief] The Procedural History and Statement of Material Facts are combined for ease of reference. action” against a developer whom [...] and others are alleged to have extorted in connection with disputes over property and development rights in the city.  On June 20, 2024, after being indicted by the State of New Jersey, [...], Esq. filed a “Notice Of Withdrawal Of Appearance Of [...], Esquire Only” that withdrew his appearance on behalf of the defendants – but not the firm of [...] where he is a named partner.  (See Notice Of Withdrawal Of Appearance Of [...], Esq., Pa164-Pa165).  [...] was hired by the Attorney General to defend the State of New Jersey and the other defendants in this matter.  [...] agreed to comply with Outside Counsel Guidelines effective November 1, 2022.  The Outside Counsel Guidelines state: “Counsel representing a State client must adhere to all of the requirements of the RPCs, including, but not limited to, RPC 1.7, RPC 1.8, and RPC 1.16. ” (Pa128).  On July 3, 2024, plaintiff filed a motion seeking to disqualify the law firm of [...] in light of Tambussi’s conflict of interest based on a “significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer,” R.P.C. 1.7(a)(2), and R.P.C. 1.10 which imputes an attorney’s conflict of interest of a partner to the lawyers who are associated in a firm “unless the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm. ”  Plaintiff’s motion was denied by Order dated July 31, 2024.  (Pa182).  This Court granted plaintiff’s motion for leave to appeal on September 12, 2024.  (Pa185).
[brief] The Court continued, “It is better to err in favor of removing a juror where there is evidence of potential partiality or bias, than to permit that juror to sit in judgment, leaving the fairness of a capital trial in doubt. ”  *Id.* at 630.  The trial court in this case should have excused Juror 12 as soon as she revealed that she knew [...]’s loved ones based on *Fortin* alone.  Although Juror 12 stated that her and her husband’s connection to [...]’s family did not impact her ability to be fair and impartial, “it is not enough that the juror disclaimed any partiality for, as the court observed in [State v. Jackson], sincere as the disclaimer may be ‘it runs counter to human nature.
[brief] 2 Constitutional Authorities Cited U.S. CONST. amend. VI ..............................................................  11 Statutory Authorities Cited N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8.................................................................34, 35 N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3...........................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1...........................................................................1, 28 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1...........................................................................  43 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5...........................................................................  45
[brief] [...] as Trustee v. [...], et al., Case No. [...], Superior Ct. of NJ:  “[...]” as determined by [...] in this case is just a 'perjurer for profit' with far too many versions of her signature to determine which is the 'actual' signature.  Ms Cottrell gave Deposition on May18, 2010 and the day before.  The May 17, 2010 Deposition was for [...] v. [...]. ”  [...] was one of the robo-signers on the mortgage assignment of 2/27/2009 (065a) in my case.  The mortgage assignment of 2/27/2009 was called fraudulent by [...] in his order of 12/20/2010 (068) because [...] robo-signed that.  “We held that the trial court should not have considered an assignment that was not "authenticated by an affidavit or certification based on personal knowledge." ”  Id. at 600, 15 A.3d 327.  Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 225 (App. Div. 2011), and reaffirmed on 07/01/2020 in Investors Bank v. Torres, (A-55-18) (082239) (2020)).