[brief] (Da44-52)  After three decisions from this Court reversing three sentencing court decision to make [...]’s conviction for the offense of certain persons not to possess firearms under [...] consecutive to the sentence under [...], the sentencing court on a fourth occasion again failed to conduct a proper analysis under State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985).  Part A explains that the court’s findings of Yarbough factors 3A and 3C were impermissibly based on its belief that [...] had committed an additional robbery charged under counts of the indictment that were dismissed in violation of State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190 (2015).  They were also based on speculation not supported by competent credible evidence in the record.  Parts B and C demonstrate that the sentencing court’s other reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence were equally problematic.  The court once again reasoned that running the certain persons conviction concurrent to the robbery would render the certain persons statute meaningless, purporting to refer to the statute’s legislative history and intent but failing to actually cite any legislative history or intent.  In Part B, an actual review of the legislative history and intent reveals that the purpose of the certain persons statute is to criminalize the possession of a handgun by a person under circumstances that would be lawful for someone without a predicate conviction, and to enhance the sentence for a felon who possesses a firearm beyond the sentence for ordinary unlawful possession of firearms—not to ensure that a “certain person” who commits a substantive crime with a firearm is incarcerated for longer than a person without a predicate conviction.  Thus, running the certain persons sentence concurrent to the sentence for the substantive crime would not render the certain person statute meaningless.  Part C explains how the court’s final two rationales—”no free crimes” and “separate and distinct offenses”—also fail to justify a consecutive sentence.  As this Court noted in its opinion reversing the previous imposition of a consecutive sentence in this case, because the “no free crimes” principle is always present and thus cannot serve to distinguish between crimes, and because the Code does not create a general presumption of consecutive sentences, this guideline can never alone justify a consecutive sentence.  The separate and distinct crimes rationale suffers the same fate.  Crimes are separate and distinct when they have separate and distinct elements and do not merge.  Because merged offenses do not receive separate sentences, sentencing courts are only called to decide between concurrent and consecutive sentences for crimes that do not merge.  If the mere fact that two offenses are separate and distinct and do not merge were sufficient basis, to impose consecutive sentences, this would effectively create a presumption of consecutive sentences in contravention of the Code.  Part D argues that because none of the “facts relating to the crimes” would support a consecutive sentence in this case, and because no judge in four sentencing proceedings has been able to justify a consecutive sentence, this court should reverse direct the trial court to order that the sentence on [...] be served concurrent to the sentence under [...], rather than remanding for resentencing.