ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On September 20, 2023, the Commission issued a Final Agency Decision (the “[...] Decision”) upholding the LOD and denying the appeal.\(^3\) (Aa1).  The Commission acknowledged that [...] failed to follow the procedural requirements of the State Policy, insofar as [...] failed to advise [...] of his right to appeal the LOD to the [...] and failed to provide [...] notice of its request to the [...] for an extension of time to complete its investigation, contrary to the express requirements of N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.2(l).  (Aa10).  Nonetheless, the Commission concluded that [...] did not suffer prejudice from these errors but warned that [...] could be penalized for similar failures in the future.  (Aa10).  With respect to [...]’s jurisdictional argument, the [...] relied upon the “doing business with the State” prong of the State Policy regulations.  (Aa10).  The [...] asserted that the State Policy “applies to [...] under N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(a)1,” because “[...] is a current employee who is on union leave performing union duties that involve doing business with the State.  (Aa10).  The [...] further concluded that because “the alleged conduct took place at the [...] building and at the [local union office], which is a facility where business regarding the representation of State Employees takes place,” the local union’s \(^3\)  On October 5, 2023, the Commission issued a “Corrected Copy,” which is included at “Aa1” of Appellant’s Appendix in lieu of the incorrect original determination.  office was “as a matter of law, a facility where State business is being conducted and discussed under N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(a)1. ” (Aa10 (emphasis added)).  Therefore, the [...] reasoned, “the State Policy touched the allegations at both locations, and it was appropriate for the EEO to investigate the allegations at both locations. ”  (Aa10).  The [...] determined that it was irrelevant that the allegations arose from – and entirely involved – a union election dispute because the EEO was investigating an allegation of intentional discrimination by [...] against a State employee.  (Aa10).  On the merits of the appeal, the [...] upheld [...]’s determination that [...] was not credible with respect to the afternoon incident, and therefore was not credible with respect the morning incident.
[brief] Prior to the adoption of a redevelopment plan, or revision or amendment thereto, the planning board shall transmit to the governing body, within 45 days after referral, a report containing its recommendation concerning the redevelopment plan.  This report shall include an identification of any provisions in the proposed redevelopment plan which are inconsistent with the master plan and recommendations concerning these inconsistencies and any other matters as the board deems appropriate.  N.J.S.A. § 40A:12A-7(e).  (emphasis added).  The crucial and undisputed fact, ignored by Plaintiffs, is that the Planning Board report is required to identify these inconsistencies—if they are found to exist—not the Township Committee.  Accordingly, the Planning Board and the Committee did not fail to make a “finding of inconsistency” for two reasons: (1) the Planning Board report found the Redevelopment Plan to not be inconsistent with the Master Plan (1T.12:10-25 through 13:1-2); and (2) the Township Committee itself decided, in the event of a challenge, to establish why it was adopting the Plan, even if inconsistencies existed.
[brief] \(^6\)  Respondent also relied on another unpublished Appellate Division case, *Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Vezeriannis*, No. A-1376-11T1, 2013 WL 3213627 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 27, 2013), for the proposition that [...]/Appellant was required to apply the funds as soon as they were received, and that any subsequent decision to return the funds was an imprudent business decision attributable only to the lender.  It is inapplicable because, in contrast to here, a full payoff of the loan was received in *Vezeriannis*.  2013 WL 3213627, at *4. returned the funds directly to [...]’s ([...]’s predecessor) agent – [...]\(^7\).  [...] absconded with the funds, and it was [...] that placed [...] in a position to do so.  [...] (and then [...]) failed to do anything to recover the funds once they were notified of an issue, almost a year before [...] became a defunct entity.  Had [...] or [...] taken any action whatsoever the loss may have been avoided.  Similar facts do not appear in *Omar*, and therefore were not part of the best position analysis employed by this Court.  As a result of these key facts, extending the holding and outcome of *Omar* to the present matter was reversible error.
[brief] [...] came to the hospital in June 1, 2018 for purposes of a diagnostic surgical kidney biopsy.  The plaintiff suffered from a kidney condition that his treating endocrinologist, [...], was trying to control through certain drug therapies.  In order to check whether this therapy was actually working, he had ordered a diagnostic surgical kidney biopsy, which was performed by [...], an Interventional Radiologist.  In this surgical procedure, Dr. Shirazi inserts essentially a large needle into the kidney and cuts out small portions of the kidney for later examination by a microscope.  During the course of this biopsy, Dr. Shirazi either severed or punctured arteries within the kidney, causing serious internal bleeding which needed to be stopped.  All the treatment rendered to [...] after that biopsy was directed to stopping the bleeding caused by the trauma of the biopsy.  These efforts were inadequate and caused [...] to bleed to death.
[brief] Order granting summary judgment to Defendants [...] and [...], filed March 31, 2022 .................................................................  Pa1  Order denying summary judgment to Plaintiffs [...], [...], and [...], filed March 31, 2022 ...........................................................................................................  Pa3  Oral opinion granting summary judgment to Defendants [...] and [...] and denying summary judgment to Plaintiffs [...], [...], and [...], dated March 31, 2022 ........................................................................................................... 3T | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Beauty Plus Trading Co., Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, No. A-3380-16T3, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1917 (App. Div. Aug. 14, 2018) | 29 | | Beaver v. Magellan Health Servs., Inc., 433 N.J. Super. 430 (App. Div. 2013) | 47 | | Colony Insurance Co. v. Kwasnik, Kanowitz & Associates, P.C., No. 1:12-cv- 00722, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87659 (D.N.J. June 27, 2014) | 38, 39 | | Cont’l Cas. Co. v. L. Offs. of Melbourne Mills, Jr., PLLC, No. 5:06-272-JMH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26711 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 16, 2010) | 39 | | Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2 (1994) | 48 | | Coyle v. Englander’s, 199 N.J. Super. 212 (App. Div. 1985) | 43 | | DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 N.J. 363 (2015) | 50 | | First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 177 N.J. 125 (2003) | 23 | | Matter of Greenberg, 155 N.J. 138 (N.J. 1998) | 33 | | Hoffman v. Hampshire Labs, Inc., 405 N.J. Super. 105 (App. Div. 2009) | 45 | | Jefferson v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., No. A-0535-21, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1187 (App. Div. June 30, 2022) | 42 | Kolos v. Tikal, LLC, No. A-0076-17T2, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1901 (App. Div. Aug. 10, 2018)
[brief] Here, [...]’ absence as a direct defendant was due to plaintiffs’ failure to assert their claims against him within the statute of limitations.  --- \(^7\)  As stated, [...] moved to amend this judgment, pursuant to R. 4:49-2, after it was entered.  The relevant standard for such a motion to amend judgment is whether the trial court expressed its decision on a “palpably incorrect or irrational basis” or it “is obvious that the Court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence. ”  Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) (citation omitted).  While [...] maintains that the trial court’s abrogation of Burt post-verdict is palpably incorrect, for purposes of this appeal of the order, itself, the inquiry is whether the trial court properly applied the law to the adjudicated facts, and no showing of “palpable” unreasonableness or irrationality is required.
[directive] After accessing the “Juvenile Central Registry” tab, the officer Complaint entry in eCDR. chooses the juvenile’s Live Scan record from the list displayed in eCDR.  For cases where fingerprints are not required, but the juvenile has a prior record, the officer shall select the juvenile from the list displayed, being sure to match identifiers.  In cases where fingerprints are not statutorily required and the juvenile has no prior record, the officer shall manually complete the eCDR data fields.  The Live Scan record should always be selected when available, as this selection will automatically populate many of the eCDR data fields.  IV.
[brief] And I -- I just can't help [...] because I just don't know what he wants.  He doesn't follow the rules.  He doesn't understand the rules.  He doesn't -- he -- he requested of my law clerk that he -- and part of what was in this letter, he wants to cross-examine all the State's witnesses, I guess in this motion.  I don't really know.  Again, that type of relief is not available to him.  He just really has no understanding, sadly, because he's an experienced lawyer, of how the litigation process works, and how to follow the rules.  He just doesn't do it.  And it -- like I said, these -- these motions are just stream of consciousness, letter after letter that just make no sense.  They relate to things that have nothing to do with the motions themselves.  He goes back and tries to re-argue, and -- and just restate all of his paranoias, all of his, you know, gripes and griefs with the legal system, with what happened to his son way back, you know, at this point, ten years ago.  I just don't know what [...] wants, or needs, and again, it is not my job to try to figure it out.
[brief] ARGUMENT POINT I THE LAW DIVISION SHOULD HAVE GRANTED [...] MOTION TO DISMISS IN LIEU OF ANSWER AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, BOTH, ON STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS GROUNDS  [Raised at Pa530-542; Decided at Pa11-12 and Raised at Pa590-1172; Decided at Pa1-2]  Plaintiffs continue to refuse to disclose to this Court, and previously to the Trial Court, that their private investigator, [...], went to the premises in issue on April 7, 2017, twenty two (22) days after the plaintiff’s alleged slip and fall accident on March 16, 2017 (emphasis added).
[directive] 6  (h)  Officers assigned to “extra duty” or “off duty” assignments that involve strictly traffic direction.  (i)  Officers engaged in crime-scene processing duties.  (j)  Officers engaged in duties as bomb or explosives technicians.  (k)  Officers conducting searches of cellphones, tablets, computers or other electronic devices pursuant to a search warrant, when such items have already been seized and the search is performed at a location other than the premises of the initial search and seizure.  (l)  Officers conducting searches of cellphones, tablets, computers or other electronic devices that are suspected to contain images of child sexual exploitation.  3.4
[brief] As aptly noted by the Arbitrator, “[a]t some point it must stop. ”  Da2511a.  For [...] to argue there was “no urgent need to finish after 7.5 years” (App. Brf. at 44) is completely misguided.  The future of the company was at stake, and [...] was actively interfering with new management’s control.  [...] owed the company a significant amount of money and had been adjudicated to have harmed his own company.  The Company, for the sake of its own survival, needed him out.
[brief] This factual point could not and was not disputed.  The documents themselves were clear.  And while the October 23, 1939, Decree and some of the earlier documents had language that [...] was trying to argue supported their ownership claim, those referenced documents at best arguably only referenced riparian rights (which is not a fee simple ownership interest).  They clearly did not unequivocally state that there was a transfer of Riparian Grant, and that the only unequivocal and valid transfer of ownership of the Riparian Grant at issue prior to 1939 was from [...] to [...] Heights Company grant.
[brief] This matter arises out of alleged procedural deficiencies affecting the business conducted at the [...] Meeting on January 11, 2022, as well as the separate adoption of two Borough ordinances: namely, Ordinances 1394-20 and 1423-21.  (Pa1).  Ordinance 1394-20 – Adoption of the Redevelopment Plan  On November 26, 2020, the Borough published in The Progress newspaper notice of a [...] Meeting scheduled for December 15, 2020, to consider the final adoption of Ordinance 1394-20.  (Pa149).  The purpose of the Ordinance was to adopt a Redevelopment Plan, and contents of the Ordinance were fully set forth in the published notice.  (Pa149).  On December 15, 2020, the Council passed Ordinance 1394-20 and adopted the Redevelopment Plan.  (Pa204).  On April 12, 2021, the Borough published in the Star-Ledger newspaper notice of the final adoption of Ordinance 1394-20.  (Pa151).  First Amendment of the Redevelopment Plan  On May 4, 2021, the Council adopted Ordinance 1410-21, amending the Redevelopment Plan for the first time.  (Pa205).  Ordinance 1423-21 – Second Amendment of the Redevelopment Plan  In or about November 2021, the Borough endeavored to amend the Redevelopment Plan for a second time.  (Pa146).
[brief] The same holds true for those who Plaintiff’s action sought to benefit, since the Complaint sought LAD compensatory and equitable relief for such unidentified persons.  (Pa41-43).  Specifically, under Rule 4:28-1(a)(2), each such person has an interest in the subject of this action in the form of their positions/promotions, pay and benefits.  In addition, under R. 4:28-1(a)(1), given Plaintiff’s arguments and the relief sought, if Plaintiff were successful it is difficult to envision how complete relief could be accorded absent such parties against whom Plaintiff advances apparent adverse interests.  The allegations in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint further established that subsections (i) and (ii) of Rule 4:28-1(a)(2) were satisfied.
[brief] INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS**  When interpreting a contract, the court’s goal is to ascertain the “intention of the parties to the contract as revealed by the language used, taken as an entirety; and, in the quest for intention, the situation of the parties, the attendant circumstances, and the objects they were thereby striving to attain. ”  *Driscoll Const. Co., Inc. v. State, Dept. of Transportation*, 371 N.J. Super. 304, 313 (App. Div. 2004) (internal citations omitted).  An insurance contract should be interpreted consistent with the usual rules of contract interpretation.  Generally, when interpreting an insurance policy, courts should give the policy’s words “their plain, ordinary meaning. ”  *President v. Jenkins*, 180 N.J. 550, 562 (2004).  “Our function when construing a policy of insurance, as with any other contract, is to search broadly for the probable intent of the parties in an effort to find a reasonable meaning in keeping with the express general purposes of the policy. ”  Sinopoli v. N. River Ins. Co., 244 N.J. Super. 245, 250 (App. Div. 1990).  The language of liability insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer, and in such manner as to provide full coverage of the indicated risk rather than to narrow protection.  Id.  If the controlling language of a policy supports two interpretations, one favorable to the insurer and the other favorable to the insured, a court is obligated to apply the interpretation supporting coverage.  Kievit v. Loyal Protect. Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J. 475, 482 (1961).  The courts will resolve any ambiguities in the policy in favor of the insured pursuant to the doctrine of contra proferentem.  Martusus v. Tartamosa, 150 N.J. 148, 159 (1997); Oxford Realty Group Cedar v. Travelers Excess & Surplus Lines Co., 229 N.J. 196, 208 (2017).  Insureds are entitled to the broad measure of protection necessary to fulfill its reasonable expectations, and its reasonable expectations should govern to the extent the policy’s language allows.  Id.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] See e.g., EPIX Holdings, 410 N.J. Super at 453 ([...] affiliate [...]  (“[...]”) moved to compel arbitration of its claims even though other claims against other defendants were not subject to arbitration and had to be litigated).  [...]’s failure to do so here – despite four prior stays in this case – strongly indicates a strategy of delay.  This is particularly so given that [...] waited over five years before first even mentioning arbitration.
[directive] The purpose of this section is to describe the allocation framework that should be used to make initial triage decisions for patients who present with illnesses that typically require critical care resources (i.e., illnesses that cannot be managed on a hospital ward in that hospital).  The scoring system applies to all patients presenting with critical illness, not merely those with the disease or disorders that have caused the public health emergency.  For example, in the setting of a severe pandemic, those patients with respiratory failure from illnesses not caused by the pandemic illness will also be subject to the allocation framework.  This process involves two steps, detailed below:
[brief] f.  The fifth Miller factor  Defendant claims that the judge should have relied on [...]’s opinion on his rehabilitation.  (Db27).  The fifth Miller factor states that a “mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it. ”  Zuber, 227 N.J. at 445.  Here, the judge did not disregard the possibility of rehabilitation.  He considered that possibility, but the evidence before him fell short of establishing a true change of character.  For the reasons already stated, [...]’s report suffers from major weaknesses and cannot be credited in full.  g.
[brief] [...] reply to plaintiff’s response to [...] statement of material facts, etc., filed 2/23/23…………………………………………………………Da802  Certification of Richard B. [...], filed 2/23/23…………………………Da805  [...] response to [...]’s supplemental statement of facts, 2/23/23……..Da807  Order and Statement of Reasons of Hon. [...], filed 3/16/23……………………………………………………………………Da809  Substitution of attorney, filed 4/13/23 ………………………………………Da835
[brief] Contrary to [...]’s argument, its IFPA, RICO, and declaratory judgment claims do not need to be “harmonized” with the No-Fault Law’s arbitration provision in a way that permits insurers to litigate them in court.  Pb32.  For sure, requiring litigation in a judicial forum is not the “only” way to further the antifraud purposes of the IFPA, RICO, and the No-Fault Law.  *Ibid.*  The notion that claims under remedial statutes intended to combat fraud cannot be arbitrated is long-outdated and incompatible with governing case law.  See *Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P.*, 219 N.J. 430, 446-48 (2014) (permitting arbitration of Consumer Fraud Act claims); *Curtis v. Cellco P’ship*, 413 N.J. Super. 26, 36-37 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 203 N.J. 94 (2010) (same); *Mount Prospect Chiropractic Ctr.*, __F.4th at __, 2024 WL 1819645, at *2-3 (explaining IFPA claims can be arbitrated).
[directive] [...] will provide training for FNEs on standardized forensic examination procedures for strangulation and/or smothering victims no later than November 1, 2023.  Law Enforcement:  Police officers from Municipal Police Departments, New Jersey State Police, the County Prosecutor’s Offices, and/or County Sherriff’s Department Criminal Investigations Units will initiate any criminal investigation and provide safety and security for the victim and the [...].  [...] Advocate: [...] ([...]) advocates are individuals who have completed specialized training to provide trauma-informed support, assist with safety planning, and to educate and connect victims to additional domestic violence and community resources.  The [...] program is a state mandate of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-20(c).  Alternatively, another designee from a local domestic violence provider may respond in the place of a [...] advocate so long as said designee has completed the minimum forty (40) hours of domestic violence training under the supervision of a domestic violence provider agency, meets the requirements of a Victim Counselor as defined by N.J.R.E. 517, and the alternative designee’s response is contemplated in the county-specific protocol.  August 21, 2023  Page 4
[brief] ## CASES  **Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,** 477 U.S. 242 (1986) .................................................................................................................. 12  **Brill v. The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America,** 142 N.J. 520 (1995) .................................................................................................................. 11, 12, 13  **Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,** 477 U.S. 317 (1986) .................................................................................................................. 12  **Colt Industries, Inc. v. Fidelco Pump & Compressor Corp.,** 844 F.2d 117 (1988) .................................................................................................................. 19  **Engines, Inc. v. MAN Engines & Components, Inc.,** 2010 WL 3021871 (D.N.J. July 29, 2010) .............................................................................. 17, 24  **Finlay & Assocs., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp.,** 146 N.J. Super. 210 (Law.  Div. 1976) ....................................................................................... 14, 19, 20, 21, 37, 38 **In re McCarron,** 2011 WL 6218934 .................................................................................................................... 23, 24 **Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp.,** 130 N.J. 324 (1992) ................................................................................................................... 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 37 **Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co. of Westfield,** 17 N.J. 57 (1954) ....................................................................................................................... 11 **Katz v. Holzberg,** 2013 WL 5946502 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2013) ............................................................................... 39 **Lawmen Supply Co. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Glock, Inc.,** 330 F. Supp. 3d 1020, 1034 (D.N.J. 2018) ............................................................................. 22, 36 **Liberty Sales Assocs., Inc. v. Dow Corning Corp.,** 816 F.Supp. 1004 (D.N.J. 1993) ................................................................................................. 36, 37 **Lithuanian Com. Corp. v. Sara Lee Hosiery,**  179 F.R.D. 450 (D.N.J. 1998) ..................................................................................................... 27, 28  **M.M. v. M.W.,** 2021 WL 6015784 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 21, 2021)  .................................................  40  **Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio,** 475 U.S. 574 (1986)  .....................................................................................................................  12  **Neptune T.V. & Appliance Serv., Inc. v. Litton Sys., Inc.,** 190 N.J.Super. 153 (App.Div.1983) ......................................................................................... 19, 34