ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (305a).  However, just as Respondents failed to demonstrate that [...] has confidential information, Respondents failed to demonstrate that [...] obtained any “insight” into [...]’s personality, thinking, or how he approaches particular decisions that can be used against [...] in this case.  (340a ¶ 20 – 341a ¶ 22).  Indeed, Respondents did not point to a single “insight” or specify exactly the information [...] has that can be used against Respondents in this case.  (340a ¶ 20 – 341a ¶ 22).  The truth is that [...] does not have any “insight” into [...]’s thinking or litigation strategy in this case.  Even assuming arguendo that [...] had insight into [...]’s thinking or strategy from the prior unrelated matters that have been resolved for years, Respondents further failed to explain how precisely the purported “financial information” or “insight” would be significantly harmful to them in this case.
[brief] (See Pb7-Pb16)  Specifically, [...] asserts that the New Jersey Supreme Court, in *Instructional Sys.*, asserted that a “distributor [must] conduct[] business under the manufacturer’s name,” for a “license” to be granted under the NJFPA, and that “[h]ere, [...] never did business in the name of [...] or [...] and all of its business always included the [...] name in some way. ”  (Db20).  None of these assertions are true.  Instead, the *Instructional Sys.* Court held the exact opposite, asserting that the plain language of the NJFPA provides that a business does not need to operate under the name of the putative franchisor for a franchise relationship to exist under the NJFPA.
[brief] [...] is a person.  The Rule does not exempt parties who provide expert testimony from its identification and disclosure requirements.  Under R. 4:10-2(d) (2), a person – again, any person - designated as an expert is subject to deposition.  Since [...] was never identified as an expert, the defense could not depose him as such.  These are not mere formalistic requirements: R. 4:10-2(d)(1) requires that a party state in answers to interrogatories “the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion * * *.”
[brief] In 1920 when [...] sold a portion of the map to [...] under Deed Book 1111, page 6, it specifically refers to and conveys lands "on said map" along with street rights and property marked “beach” on said mentioned map extending from Raritan Bay to the lot lines.  The 1879 Quinlan Grant is not depicted on the 1909 map of [...] nor its subsequent version in 1910 ([...]).
[brief] Respondent argues that the Borough is then left with the sole option of not reappointing him/her at the end of the term.  Respondent states the following:  Under the statute, a commissioner may be removed only for abusing the position for failing to perform the duties and business of the authority.  Balanced against this protection is that a commissioner’s term expires at a set date; if the governing body does not approve of a commissioner’s character, judgment, or private behavior then at the end of the commissioner’s term the governing body is free to use their discretion and appoint someone else.  (RB-10), (Emphasis added).
[brief] Plemmons, supra, at 564-65.  Accordingly, this Court concluded “that an insurance broker is a semi-professional, who is subject to testing, licensing and regulation under other statutory provisions, and therefore is excluded from liability under the CFA for the performance of brokerage services. ”  Id. at 556.  Plaintiff points to no poor reasoning, changed circumstances, unworkable distinctions, or defiance of consistent application of the exemption to the CFA to insurance brokers since Plemmons was decided almost 20 years ago.  See Olenowski, 253 N.J. at 153.  Since then, the Legislature has not amended the CFA to expressly include insurance brokers.
[brief] POINT IV  IV.  THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE PLAIN ERROR BY GIVING AN IMPROPER JURY CHARGE (DA079-DA082; 8T:30:20-25—91:1-12)  POINT V V.  THE JURY’S DAMAGES AWARD ARE AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND CONSTITUTE  A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE (DA079-DA082; 2T-8T)  POINT VI  VI.  PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL MADE STATEMENTS  MANIFESTLY CAPABLE OF CONFUSING AND MISLEADING THE JURY PRODUCING AN UNJUST RESULT THAT DEPRIVED APPELLANTS  A FAIR TRIAL (7T:57:1-25—86:1-25)  CONCLUSION
[brief] 3T6:14-25 and 3T6:24-3T7:1 ([...]) and 3T67:2-10 ([...]).  They adopted [...] in 2018 at ten months old.  3T4:4-9.  First, [...] and [...] each administered temperament tests to [...] at his foster home.  He performed “extremely well. ”  3T6:24-25; 3T7:1-16.  Before the final decision to adopt [...], [...] and [...] brought him to their house two or three times to introduce him to their three cats and make sure they would all get along.  3T8:16-22.  [...] exhibited no prey drive or tendency to chase them at any time.  3T8:3-12.  [...] explained what prey drive means.  A  We had three cats in the house.  We wanted to see whether he had prey drive -- prey drive and we didn't want dogs to act very strong to them.  Q  And does -- does [...] have a prey drive?  A  No, he does not.  Q  Did (sic: Would) you explain to the Court where (what) is a prey drive?  A  Yeah.  When there are small animals, joggers or runners the dogs sense to chase them.  We didn’t want a dog that would chase [the cats] or go after them if they’re moving.  So we wanted a dog without a prey drive or no drive.  3T8:3-11  [...] was gentle with [...], a 9-week-old Belgian Malinois puppy [...] and [...] acquired in 2021.
[brief] Additionally, in regard to the specific Bulk Variances requested, the Board finds 1.  **Building Setback to Route 33.**  In the VC-2 Overlay zone, pursuant to Ordinance Section 108-6.18(K)(4)(m), buildings containing residential units shall be located at least 500 feet from Route 33.  The Applicant proposes Building "A" and Building "B", both of which contain residential units, to be located approximately 167 feet from Route 33.  Under the Prior Approvals the Applicant was granted a setback of 360 feet from Route 33.  That variance was granted to provide a coherent look along Route 33 with the Shared Properties project to the east and development in this area of Route 33.  The Applicant's argument to justify this variance do not comport with this prior finding and reasoning for the prior variance of 360 feet.
[brief] While that is indeed the case because each project would have its own dispute resolution procedures and involve its own unique set of facts, [...]’s counsel later pointed out that in this case, there would only be four separate arbitrations because there were only four Backlog Projects for which [...] became [...]’s subcontractor.  Tr. 19:5-16.  As the Trial Court found, any testimony or discussion concerning the parties’ performance as to specific projects was limited to the impact of that performance on obligations arising under the PTA, namely the amount of that project’s EGP.
[brief] (4T113:21-114:4).  [...] allegedly asked his father to contact [...], and that she would handle everything.  Id.  [...] testified that after she secured his release from jail, [...] told her that “he was driving down Easton Avenue and [[...]] was crossing the street and they exchanged words[.]” (4T114:9-13).  [...] stated [...] lived with her for approximately two months, until he spontaneously told her that he was moving to Princeton, but that she could still come over.
[directive] Whether (Determining 4 Section to modifications includes Revoke to (Motions Section 8 Motions), and Detention (Pretrial 7 Section Complaint-Warrant), Directive. original of the Release) for presumptions rebuttable create they that in offense-oriented are changes the of Some acomplaint-warrant, for apply (e.g. action take to officers enforcement law and/or prosecutors (e.g., charged are certain offenses when PSA scores of regardless detention) pretrial for apply Other employees).  or officials public on assaults children, of exploitation sexual firearms, triggered that applications are pretrial-detention for presumptions the recalibrate modifications for file to presumption a create to modified been has Directive the Finally, scores. PSA the by release. on while crime indictable an committed has defendant a when release of revocation the following: the include v2.0 2016-6 Directive in forth set modifications substantive The references explain internal to supplemented been has 4.2.1) subsection of (part 9 Footnote 1. Activity Criminal New or (FTA) Appear to Failure "high" and "moderate," "elevated," to Directive. the under (NCA) scores the when acomplaint-warrant for apply presumption to new a creates 4.5.1 Subsection 2. a such created original Directive the whereas or 6, 5, 4, is 3, score NCA or FTA Decision with the attuned modification is This 6. or 4, 5, of scores with presumption recommendation a includes judiciary, which the by employed (DMF) Framework Making 3. of NCA score or FTA an with defendant for a 1) PML (i.e., monitoring pretrial for has 4.5.4.b Subsection and Subsection 4.5.4.a, to renumbered been has 4.5.4
[brief] ....................................40  Lustrelon Inc. v. Prutscher, 178 N.J. Super. 128 (App.Div.1981) .......................31  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995) ......28 Mancini v. Township of Teaneck, 179 N.J. 425 (2004) .....................................46  McGuire v. City of Jersey City, 125 N.J. 310 (1991) .......................................40  Morris County Fair Housing Council v. Boonton Twp., 220 N.J. Super. 388 (Law Div. 1987), aff’d as modified, 230 N.J. Super. 345 (App. Div. 1989) ......................................................... 30, 31 Motorworld, Inc. v. Benkendorf, 228 N.J. 311 (2017)
[brief] Spade, 232 N.J. at 516 (quoting N.J.S.A. 56:12-15, -17) (alterations original)  Plaintiff has already discussed above that Plaintiff did not violate Defendant’s rights pursuant to CARD Act, TILA, FDCPA, and FCBA and will not reiterate that analysis.  Plainly stated, Defendant does not identify the application of TCCWNA to the instant credit card collection or that any provision contained in any writing is violative thereof.  Plaintiff adds that Defendant must be able to demonstrate that Defendant is an “aggrieved consumer” under TCCWNA and to do so requires “evidence that the consumer suffered adverse consequences as a result of the defendant’s regulatory [or statutory] violation. ”  Spade, 232 N.J. at 523-524.  Plaintiff respectfully submits that Defendant provided no factual basis for the trial court to conclude that Defendant was an aggrieved consumer and this Court should reach that same conclusion.
[brief] 58.  Admitted only that Defendants purported to conduct an investigation into Plaintiff's complaints.  Denied that said investigation was properly handled or that Defendants ultimately took any remedial actions with the result(s) of same.  February 21, 2023  59.  Admitted only that Defendants purported to conduct an investigation into Plaintiff's complaints.  Denied that said investigation was properly handled or that Defendants ultimately took any remedial actions with the result(s) of same.  60.  Admitted only that Defendants purported to conduct an investigation into Plaintiff's complaints.  Denied that said investigation was properly handled or that Defendants ultimately took any remedial actions with the result(s) of same.  61.  Admitted only that [...] so testified.  Denied that any discipline was ever actually administered as a result of the purported belief that said discipline was warranted.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 372-73 (internal citations omitted)(emphasis added).  In explaining the Net Opinion Rule, the Appellate Division noted that "[e]xpert testimony should not be received if it appears the witness is not in possession of such facts as will enable him or her to express a reasonably accurate conclusion as distinguished from a mere guess or conjecture."  Vuocolo v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 240 N.J. Super. 289, 299 (App. Div.), (certif. denied, 122 N.J. 333 (1990)).  Most importantly, reliability must also be established.  In re Commitment of R.S., 173 N.J. 136 (1970).  The expert must establish that the methodology utilized in formulating his opinion "was correctly used to produce that evidence," State v. Marcus, 294 N.J. Super. 267, 275 (App. Div. 1996); and that "it derives from a reliable methodology supported by some expert consensus."
[brief] D.  [...] Established Materiality and Reliance.  Intervenor contends that [...] did not prove two elements of equitable fraud: materiality of the misrepresentation, and reliance on that misrepresentation.  This argument wholly fails to address the competent evidence produced by [...] establishing these elements.  As an initial matter, Intervenor’s appeal fails to comply with Rule 2:6-1(a) because it does not include “all items submitted to the court on the summary judgment motion[.]”
[brief] Such is the case in this instance.  Here, plaintiff does not dispute the fact that she had to use the parking lot in question to access her job at this location.  This provides some commercial benefit to the commercial landowner since plaintiff was an employee of one of the commercial tenants at this property, which included both retail and office space.  Obviously, those who parked within the shopping center to either work or shop at the premises kept the tenants in business, supported the businesses, and thus provided a benefit to the commercial landowner.  There is no reasonable basis for this court to draw a distinction between the sidewalk and parking lot, particularly when it is undisputed that the parking lot was owned and maintained by the same commercial landowner in charge of the sidewalk.
[brief] ”  *Id.* (quoting *Malaker Corp.*, 163 N.J.Super. at 475).  Here, as set forth above, the only compensation that Plaintiff is absolutely required to pay under the MOU is the sum of $1.00.  The MOU also provides that Plaintiff must pay $3,000,000 upon the granting of final zoning approval for the Property at either: (i) 82.5 units per acre, or (ii) such other lesser minimum units per acre acceptable to Plaintiff in its sole discretion.  However, the MOU says nothing about what, if anything, Plaintiff must pay if zoning approval is obtained of less than 82.5 units per acre, and which Plaintiff does not expressly deem “acceptable. ” (Da Da28 – 33, 56).  The MOU also contains no deadline by which Plaintiff must seek zoning approval of 82.5 units per acre or, for that matter, any other amount.  (Da28-33).  Plaintiff has sought to take full advantage of the lack of such essential terms, asserting that the payment of $1.00 fully satisfies its obligations under the MOU.  (Da38-39).  Moreover, while the MOU indicates that Plaintiff will assume certain corporate debts, it says nothing about the essential issues of indemnification of the [...] or their principals in connection with corporate debts (or any associated personal guarantees).  (Da28-33, 56).  As noted in the certification of transactional counsel for the [...], obtaining indemnification and creating a timetable for a zoning application and payment terms are essential terms to any contract such as this.  (Da56, 108).  Following the MOU, attempts were made to negotiate a conveyance agreement with Plaintiff, but such efforts proved futile.  (Da57).  Since the MOU lacks essential terms regarding payment and indemnification related to corporate debts, it is unenforceable.
[brief] In its Decision Denying Reconsideration, the court below confirmed:  "Neither party disputes that the Board had approved the [...] for use as one- and three-tenant occupancy."  (Pa19).  Admittedly, division of space into six stores may have required approval for additional parking spaces and would therefore be somewhat speculative.  A single user was already approved for retail.  Division of the space into two or three stores would not have required additional municipal approval.  Potential rents for stores in the [...] could be accurately estimated based on the rents contemporaneously agreed to by six tenants already leasing the stores in the new building next door.  The causal connection between the grading error and the loss of revenue from the [...] is as follows:  Due to the grading error, stores in the [...] could no longer have their entrances on the eastern side of the building.  Under the original site plan, the elevation of the parking lot on the east side was supposed to be flush with the internal floor of the building so that customers could simply walk in.  But with the parking lot now graded 2.5 feet below the building floor, customers would need stairs or a ramp to enter the stores from the eastern parking lot.  This would create difficult ADA issues and make the stores less desirable.  A ramp would be totally impractical due to space limitations.  In short, plaintiff determined that his only viable alternative was to rent the entire building to a single business with its entrance on the north (Route 10) side of the building, where no stairs would be required.  After a long delay, while the [...] remained empty, Plaintiff was able to attract a highly-specialized retailer, [...], which took the entire space for a used motorcycle center, where the majority of customers arrived on motorcycles, which, unlike cars, could be parked on the north side of the building where space was too cramped for automobile parking.  [...], however, demanded to buy rather than rent the building, so [...] of necessity sold it to them.  Defendants argue that [...] was able to sell to [...] for more than he originally paid for the building so as to actually sustain a profit rather than a loss.
[brief] The [...] concluded that Appellant violated the Performance of Duty Policy and the Neglect of Duty Policy by failing to report the Incident to [...].  [Pa93-Pa94].  [...] Rules and Regulations 3:13.5 (the “Truthfulness Policy”), states that “Employees are required to be truthful at all times whether under oath or not. ”  [Da1].  The [...] also found that Appellant violated the Truthfulness Policy by giving inconsistent and/or false and/or incomplete information during the Incident.  [Pa97].  Appellant’s Multiple Sick Leave Policy Violations
[brief] (Da113).  As another courtesy and gesture of good will, [...] again agreed to not enforce the Concession Recovery Provision if the Tenant made the required rent payment, which she eventually did.  (Ibid.).  The third strike came in January 2023 when the Tenant yet again failed to make the required rent payment, and Tenant requested early termination of the Lease, contrary to her agreement to rent the unit for the full two-year term.
[brief] State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 17 (2021).  Video narration testimony from a lay witness must satisfy two fundamental requirements in order to be admissible: it must (1) be based upon the witness’ “firsthand knowledge” and (2) it must be helpful to the jury.  State v. Watson, 254 N.J. 558, 592 (2023) (citing N.J.R.E. 701, 602, and 403).
[brief] It is not the intention of this Brief to simply provide an exhaustive list of repetitive quotations from the record that Plaintiff disagrees with.  However, this is a critical aspect of this case as it shows the Board has not been applying the actual facts to their analysis when reviewing Plaintiff’s requests for relief.  There is a massive distinction between a d(5) density variance application for a site that is already nonconforming as it relates to density (as the Board continuously represents) and a d(5) density variance application for a site that is significantly below density to the point that the applicant could develop 53 more units today without any Board approval (which are the factually correct circumstances).  Plaintiff has tried to rectify this faulty premise at the trial court, on remand and in our initial Appellate Brief.  (Appellant’s Brief at 31-32).  However, the same claims are continuously made, even when the Board accepts our position that the request for 100 units is really a request for 47 units over what is already permitted, and argues that even 47 units is too much.  (Respondent’s Brief at 23).  As stated in our initial brief, the Board’s position that the site is currently nonconforming as it pertains to density is completely false.  Currently, there is a 53-unit deficit between what is permitted and currently exists.  If the Board is reviewing this application with the false belief the site is currently nonconforming as it pertains to density, then clearly the Board did not conduct a proper analysis under Grubbs and the Board’s denial was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
[brief] [Aa89-Aa91.]  The standard of review, which is set forth in detail in Point I, can be summarized as follows.  The Appellate Division has exclusive jurisdiction to review any action or inaction of a state administrative agency.  *Pascucci v. Vagott*, 71 N.J. 40, 51-54 (1976).  The review of administrative actions is limited.  *In re Proposed Xanadu Redev. Project*, 402 N.J. Super. 607, 640 (App. Div. 2008).  However, the Appellate Division "may reverse an agency decision if it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable or that it lacks fair support in the record."  *In re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch. of Montclair Founders Grp.*, 216 N.J. 370, 385 (2013).  For the reasons set forth below, the [...]’s grant of the 2019 WFD permit modification was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable and not based on substantial credible evidence.  As such, the [...]’s decision should be reversed, and the permit modification should be rescinded.
[brief] See Zive v Stanley Roberts, Inc.182 NJ 436 (2005) (Pa470-Pa471, (Pa533).  See also NJSA 10:1-2; Ptaszynski v. Uwaneme, 71 N.J. Super. 333, 853 (App. Div. 2004); NJSA 10:5-4.  Point VIII: Summary Judgment Was Improperly Granted Because [...] Violated NJSA 10:6-2 And The New Jersey Constitution By Failing To Provide The Plaintiff With An Order From Which He Could Appeal His Conviction (Pa652-654, Pa533, Pa501, Pa499, Pa494, Pa498, Pa485, Pa488, Pa470, Pa471, Pa137, Pa41)
[brief] On December 20, 2021, the current plaintiffs [...] and [...] corresponded with the Board arguing that the site plan for [...] does not adhere to the Settlement Agreement since it calls for significant increases in the grade elevation for the roadway accessing [...], specifically, buildings 1, 2 and 4.  (Pa63-66).  Plaintiffs state in their letter that the elevations of the mounding on the revised grade being raised up to approximately 5 feet in height from the roadway are elevation differences that were not agreed to by the [...] when it signed the Settlement Agreement.  (Pa63-66).  The letter further states as follows:  The grading and drainage plan for the preliminary and final major site plan document indicates the elevations of the two triplexes along [...] to be over 5 feet the curb line.
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020  8.2.2  Miranda warnings generally are triggered whenever an individual’s questioning is custodial in nature.  For custodial interviews, the question is whether a reasonable person would believe that he or she is free to leave.  So a subject officer who is not free to leave a criminal interview should be provided a Miranda warning.  See Appendix G.  8.2.3  However, the internal affairs investigator should be aware that other factors may also serve to affect a subject officer's decision to answer questions during a criminal interview.  For example, directing an officer to appear at a particular time and place may generate confusion on the officer’s part as to whether he or she is being required to participate in the interview.  When these circumstances or any other questions as to the need to provide a warning in criminal interviews are present, the internal affairs investigator should always consult with the County Prosecutor regarding whether the subject officer should be advised of their right against self-incrimination.