ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See N.J.A.C. 7:13-1.2 (definitions of “flood hazard area design flood elevation” and “100-year flood”).  The inevitable conclusion from an application of these critical regulatory definitions is that the [...] was required to employ the most reasonable precipitation and flood elevation forecasting information available to it at the time it issued this permit.  [...] argued that the FHACA “requires that all rules delineating and updating flood hazard areas undergo formal rulemaking pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act. ”  BP Rb30.  However, in this case, because the flood hazard areas were not already delineated, [...] needed to employ “Method 6,” which uses unique engineering calculations (based on the anticipated 100-year flood) to forecast specific peak flood elevations.  [...] Rb24-25.  Therefore, [...]’s argument that the statute forbids the [...] from considering unique calculations is in direct contradiction to the [...]’s rules, which required [...]’s permit application to be supported by unique engineering calculations and a case-specific flood forecasting methodology.
[directive] 23  (i) for training purposes, provided that the recording is edited so that the identity of individuals depicted in the recording cannot be determined by persons viewing the training video unless the depicted individuals have consented to the recording being used for training purposes; (j) to conduct an audit to ensure compliance with this Policy and a department’s policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order promulgated pursuant to this Policy; (k) to enhance officer and public safety by providing intelligence information in preparation for a raid/warrant execution (e.g., by providing information about the layout of a premises to be searched), when such use is approved by the County Prosecutor or designee, or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee; or (l) any other specified official purpose where the County Prosecutor or designee, or Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee, finds in writing that good and sufficient cause exists to authorize access to a particular BWC recording.
[brief] **Well, Judge, the January 12th order is not the only order that is in play here.  The April consent order –**  THE COURT: **As far as I am concerned, it is. **  [...]:  **Well, Judge, the January 12th order was put in place specifically to deal with what was, essentially, paragraph 17 of the April order, which was you guys need to agree on a real estate agent to sell the property.  They couldn’t do it.  So an application was made to the court to appoint one...**  (1T12:19-1T13:5)  As the facts establish, the January 12, 2023 Order was not the only order in effect as it only addressed paragraph 17 of the April 13, 2022 settlement Consent Judgment entered into between the co-owners of the Subject Property.
[brief] The trial court’s interpretation of the PSA is flawed as a matter of fact and law.  The Final Judgment is based on the trial court’s factual findings as to the parties’ intent with respect to the PSA, which the trial court relied upon to interpret the PSA and ultimately determine the parties’ respective obligations thereunder.  In reaching the Final Judgment, the trial court disregarded dispositive evidence and testimony establishing that Defendants are obligated under the PSA to obtain a site-wide RAO, and the trial court’s interpretation of the PSA runs counter to the firmly established principles of contract interpretation.  1.  Applicable Law
[brief] *DiFiore*, 254 N.J. at 219.  Largely relying on this Court’s precedential opinion, the Supreme Court held “[a] video or audio recording, or a third-party observer . . . may in some circumstances be vital to preserving evidence of a DME. ”  *DiFiore*, 254 N.J. at 232 (citing *DiFiore*, 472 N.J. Super. at 122-23.)  The Court explained that the defense medical report might include inaccurate observations and findings.  *Id.* (citing *DiFiore*, 472 N.J. Super. at 122).  The Court found for “plaintiffs with cognitive limitations, psychological impairments, or language barriers,” the plaintiff may be unable to “refute the examiner’s account of what occurred at the DME. ”  *Id.* at 232 (quoting *DiFiore*, 472 N.J. at 122).  The Court added that even for those without limitations, “‘the stress and anxiety of the exam itself with an unfamiliar doctor or other professional may’ diminish a person’s ability to ‘absorb and recall what occurred at [a] DME. ’”  *Id.* at 232 (quoting *DiFiore*, 472 N.J. Super. at 123).  The Court held the trial court shall consider the recording or third-party observation of a DME case-by-case.  *Id.* at 232.
[directive] As perguntas abaixo devem ser respondidas somente se você estiver se declarando culpado por crime violento entre 9 de junho de 1997 e 29 de junho de 2001.  de primeiro ou segundo grau ocorrido  The following questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty to a first or second degree violent crime that occurred between June 9, 1997 and June 29, 2001.
[directive] February 11, 2021  [...], Public Defender, argued the cause for the Office of the Public Defender ([...], Public Defender, attorney; [...], [...], Assistant Public Defender, [...], First Assistant Deputy Public Defender, [...], Assistant Deputy Public Defender, and [...], Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs).  [...] argued the cause for the [...] ([...] Foundation, attorneys; [...] and [...], on the briefs).  [...], Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for the Attorney General of New Jersey, ([...], Attorney General, attorney; [...], Assistant Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief, and [...], [...], Deputy Attorney General, and [...], Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).  1  [...], First Assistant Warren County Prosecutor, argued the cause for the [...] ([...], President, [...], attorney; [...], [...], Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Chief Assistant Morris County Prosecutor, [...], Assistant Somerset County Prosecutor, and [...], Special Deputy Attorney General/Assistant Morris County Prosecutor, on the brief).  [...] delivered the opinion of the Court.
[brief] Dear [...]:  In accordance with the Court’s October 18, 2023 Order, Respondent [...] (“[...]”), submits this sur-reply letter brief solely addressing Appellant [...]’s (“[...]”) reply brief arguments regarding the recently published decision in In the Matter of Proposed Construction of Compressor Station (CS327), Office Building and Appurtenant Structures, Highlands Applicability Determination, [...], [...] (August 31, 2023) (“Compressor Station”).  Relying on Compressor Station, [...] argues erroneously that the Court should accord “no deference” to the conclusion of the [...] (the “[...]”) that “the Project is consistent with the EMP’s goals when considering [...]’s obligation to maintain a reliable and safe natural-gas system. ”  Hrb12 ([...] argument); Ha55 ([...]’s finding regarding the EMP).  However, nothing in Compressor Station requires—or permits—the Court to substitute [...]’s policy preferences for the [...]’s considered interpretation of the EMP, its own planning and policy document.  Neither [...]’s reply brief nor Compressor Station refutes the principle that the [...]’s interpretation of its own policy and guidance document, the EMP, is entitled to deference.
[brief] A.  **Reasons for Adopting the Majority Rule**  The Court of Appeals of New York has observed:  The long-accepted rule in this State holds that a deed with a reservation or exception by the grantor in favor of a third party, a so-called “stranger to the deed” does not create a valid interest in favor of that third party.  Plaintiff invites us to abandon this rule and adopt the minority view which would recognize an interest reserved or excepted in favor of a stranger to the deed, if such was the clearly discernible intent of the grantor.  Although application of the stranger-to-the-deed rule may, at times, frustrate a grantor's intent, any such frustration can readily be avoided by the direct conveyance of an easement of record from the grantor to the third party.  The overriding considerations of the public policy favoring certainty in title to real property, both to protect bona fide purchasers and to avoid conflicts of ownership, which may engender needless litigation, persuade us to decline to depart from our settled rule.  Estate of Thomson v. Wade, 69 N.Y.2d 570, 516 N.Y.S.2d 614, 509 N.E.2d 309, 310 (1987)(citations and internal quotation omitted).  The Supreme Court of Montana has noted three reasons why transactions involving strangers to the deed are disfavored:  First, the dominant estate . . . does not have the opportunity to negotiate with the grantor on issues like location, width, extent of use, and allowable use.  Second, the easement will fail to appear in the chain of title of the appurtenant parcel, which leaves bona-fide purchasers without notice that the land benefits from an easement.  Finally, the conveyance to a stranger to the deed allows for no acceptance by the would-be dominant estate, raising questions of unexpected taxes, environmental concerns, and potential litigation.  Loomis v. Luraski, 306 Mont. 478, 484-85, 46 P.3d 862 (2001)(citation omitted.).  The Appellate Division in Wildwood Crest did not address, much less refute, these justifications for the common law rule.
[brief] [...] was unaware of these scoring factors, even though he conceded that in order for the tests to be valid they had to be performed in a certain manner and be scored correctly.  (1T62:1-63:12.)  Thus, the State’s argument to this Court overlooks the potentially exonerating evidence of cross-examination of [...] – that if the tests were properly scored, they would not support a finding that there was probable cause to arrest Defendant.  The State then cites to the municipal court’s conclusions as to that observations of the video, but Defendant was unable to cross-examine [...] as to those scoring factors that the municipal judge provided her own testimony, including “[h]e didn’t do heel to toe at all;” “he clearly was unable to do the leg raise test in any sufficient fashion;” and “the walk and turn he wasn’t able to do well. ”  (Sb16.)  Obviously, Defendant could not cross-examine the municipal court judge’s observations of the video as to the scoring factors.  [...] could not testify to the scoring factors – despite being asked about them on cross-examination.  (1T62:1-63:12.)  Thus, the only witness that Defendant could have cross-examined as to the scoring factors was [...] – whom the State did not call as a witness.  Therefore, the State’s citation to the municipal court judge’s findings on the scoring factors supports why it was unfair to deny Defendant the Clawans adverse inference and demonstrates that but for these errors, the result could have been different.
[brief] Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473 (1973).  State has litigated this case and with its latest brief.  From this court’s perspective, the AC’s April 1, 2024, FAD and the State’s Brief in Opposition to the student-appellants’ appeal constitute a bad news-good news scenario.  The bad news is that the State’s response to your remand offer, both as manifested in the AC’s FAD and in the State’s latest brief, provides you with little help in deciding the central question of whether SFRA is unconstitutional as applied to LSD and its demonstrably unique demographic circumstances.
[brief] The State of New Jersey duly enacted the [MSRA] to address the extraordinary financial distress of municipalities like [...].  Despite the City’s severe economic collapse over the last 8 years, the City has continued to enter into contracts and has agreed to payments and benefits it simply can no longer afford.  The court acknowledges that over the last few years the current administration has made efforts to confront these issues.  Plaintiffs have also made significant concessions, but it simply is not enough.  The State Legislature has determined that [...] requires “prudent fiscal management and operational efficiencies in the provision of public services” in order to recover.  N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-2.  Having carefully reviewed the [MSRA], the case law, and arguments submitted by both sides, the court concludes that plaintiffs are unable to establish a reasonable probability of success on the merits on their challenges to the [MSRA].
[brief] On July 26, 2024, [...]  (“[...]”) filed a Complaint challenging the [...]’s award of the Anticipated Contract to [...], however, its Complaint was not accompanied by an Order to Show Cause or application for restraints.  0021a.  That same day, [...] filed an Answer with Counterclaims and Cross-Claims challenging the [...]’s award of the Anticipated Contract to [...].  ---  1  While [...] participated in this matter at the trial level, it has represented, through counsel, that it does not intend to file a Cross-Appeal or take a position with respect to [...]’s Appeal. along with an Order to Show Cause and application for temporary and preliminary restraints.  0281a.  By Order to Show Cause dated July 31, 2024, the trial court issued temporary restraints enjoining the [...] and [...] from proceeding with the Anticipated Contract pending a hearing.  001a.  By Order dated September 30, 2024 (“Denial Order”), the trial court lifted the temporary restraints previously entered and denied [...]’s application for preliminary restraints and dismissed all claims with prejudice.  007a and 009a.  By Order dated October 2, 2024, the trial court denied [...]’s application for a stay pending appeal.  0019a.  On October 3, 2024, [...] filed an Application for Permission to File Emergent Motion (“Emergent Application”) with the Appellate Division.  1561a.  By Disposition dated October 3, 2024, the Appellate Division granted [...]’s Emergent Application and temporarily enjoined the [...] from proceeding under the Anticipated Contract.  1572a.  After the Appellate Division issued its Disposition granting [...] permission to file this Emergent Application, the parties executed a stipulation under which all parties agreed that the temporary restraints should continue pending the Court’s consideration of [...]’s Appeal on an accelerated basis pursuant to Rule 2:9-2.  1574a.  On October 8, 2024, [...] filed its Notice of Appeal along with a motion seeking to confirm the parties’ agreement, noting that such agreement is conditioned upon the Court’s agreement that this matter should be docketed as an accelerated Appeal.  1577a.  By Order dated October 8, 2024, the Appellate Division granted [...]’s motion for a stay of the Denial Order pending appeal and accelerated its appeal of that order.  1577a.  This appeal is scheduled for a hearing to take place on December 17, 2024.  1577a.  As the parties have consented to the entry of preliminary restraints, this brief focuses on the ultimate legal question at issue in this Appeal – that [...]’s failure to identify a PWCRA-registered archaeological subcontractor was a material defect requiring that its bid be rejected as non-responsive.  **STANDARD OF REVIEW**
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Respondent respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Final Agency Determination of November 1, 2023.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  [...]  By: ____________________________  [...]  Assistant County Counsel  [...], Esquire N.J. Attorney ID No. 327229999  [...] [...]  Phone: [...]  Fax: [...]  [...]  Attorney for Appellant IN THE MATTER OF [...], [...]
[directive] The members of the (INSERT NAME) Police Department are committed to providing law enforcement services that are fair, effective, and impartially applied.  It is in the best interests of everyone that your complaint about the performance of an individual officer is resolved fairly and promptly.  The Police Department has formal procedures for investigating your complaint.  These procedures are designed to ensure fairness and protect the rights of both citizens and law enforcement officers:  1.  Reports or Complaints of officer/employee misconduct must be accepted from any person, including anonymous sources, at any time.  2.  Complaints shall be accepted regardless of age, race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or immigration status of the complaining party.  3.  Your complaint will be sent to a superior officer or a specially trained internal affairs officer who will conduct a thorough and objective investigation.  4.  You might be asked to help in the investigation by giving a detailed statement about what happened or providing other important information or documents.  5.  All complaints against law enforcement officers are thoroughly investigated.  You will be kept informed of the status of the investigation and its ultimate outcome, if requested, and you provide contact information.
[brief] Neither application exceeded the 10% limit for maximum building coverage.  Ja217, Ja275  Contrary to the argument of Plaintiff the [...] application did not present a significantly revised plan regarding the size of the proposed single-family residence.  The [...] application proposed a 30’ x 60’ single family dwelling.  Ja158.  The [...] application also proposed construction of a 30’ x 60’ single family dwelling with garage.  Ja245.
[brief] That approach is not only textual but logical: this rule would “undeniably serve to underscore the remedial purpose of the LAD,” (Da135), especially in cases where the [...] and the [...] have found an urgent need for emergency relief.  least two relevant irreparable harms here.  For one, as the trial court recognized, the mandatory, involuntary disclosure of transgender, gender non-conforming, or non-binary students’ gender identity or expression will cause significant and irreparable harm to students.  As the court reasoned, “there is no protected group more vulnerable, or more susceptible to physical or psychological harm, than transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary youth. ” (Da135); see also, e.g., Boyertown, 897 F.3d at 528-29 (discussing these students’ “extraordinary social, psychological, and medical risks”); John & Jane Parents 1, 622 F.Supp.3d at 139; T.I.C.-C., 470 N.J. Super. at 609; N.J. Pub. L. 2018, c.60 § 1(a), 1(g).
[brief] Pa73.  [...] testified:  The reason we only became aware of this once the fiscal year changed and the first overtime check was issued was because up until that point we were unaware that the state was calculating the overtime rate using a variable and adjusting the divisor instead of the divisor in the contract.  So for the instant scenario of the filing of the grievance, we went from 2,080 hours in fiscal year 2018 and 2019 to 2,096 hours in fiscal year 2020 resulting in a reduction of the overtime rate at the beginning of this new fiscal year 2020.  Pa73.  When a fiscal year has 2,080 hours, or 260 working days, the overtime rate is in compliance with the contract language.  However, in fiscal year 2020, which began in July 2019, there were 262 workdays or 2,096 work hours.  Pa233.  This resulted in a reduction in the overtime compensation rate because the Division used 2,096 as the divisor, instead of 2,080 contained in the contract; meaning the Division altered the contractual equation to read base + maintenance divided by $2,096 \times 1.5$.  Pa233.  Pa73.  Vice President [...] testified extensively about how this affected his compensation by examining individual pay stubs.  Pa232.  Specifically, at the start of fiscal year 2020, as a result of the Division utilizing 2,096 as the divisor, [...]’s overtime compensation was reduced by 62 cents an hour.  Pa233.  [...], supervisor of the payroll audit section at the [...] testified on behalf of the Employer.
[brief] This is an appeal from the motion court’s grant of [...]’ motion for summary judgment.  The standard of review is de novo, and which legal standard requires this reviewing court to apply the same legal standard as the trial court.  Conley v. Guerrero. 228 N.J. 339, 346 (2017).  In this regard, the Court stated: this court must determine, and as the trial Judges was required: to determine, “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury, or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. ”  *Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso*, P.A.,189 N.J. 436, 445-46 (2007) (quoting *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.*,142 N.J. 520, 536 (1995).  Summary Judgment must be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to the interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  *Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. V. Nat’s Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh*, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c).
[brief] Through their investigation, the detectives also learned defendant worked at a restaurant in Brick Township called “[...]. ”  Surveillance located both the defendant and the black Audi in the restaurant’s parking lot.  During the week of November 28th, surveilling detectives specifically observed the defendant engage in what, based on their training and experience, “appeared to be a narcotics transaction[s]” with “two vehicles” that had “driven up” and into the restaurant’s parking lot.  Specifically, the detectives saw the defendant exit the restaurant and retrieve “small items” from inside the Audi.  Defendant then would approach the vehicle and “interact” with its occupants of the vehicle.  “[A]t that point was the transaction where money was perceived,” but not seen, “to be taken and a small item was tossed” by the defendant “in the passenger seat of the vehicles that had driven up. ” (1T:11-17 to 16-22; 46-17 to 54-11).  During this same surveillance period, the detectives followed defendant as he was driven as a passenger in the Audi from the restaurant to an automotive garage in Toms River, where the Audi was driven inside of a garage bay and the door was closed.
[brief] In fact, the Supreme Court in DiMisa v. Acquaviva supra, recognized the fallacy in Plaintiffs’ argument in a similar factual setting.  It ruled that for third-party liability to apply there needed to be a real and separate third-party litigation.  In that case, several partners sued one who had secretly purchased their common entity’s mortgage debt through a company he had formed, called [...].  The defendant partner was using [...] to declare a default in the common entity’s debt, when in reality he was on both sides.  When defendant’s partners found out what he was doing they charged him with breach of fiduciary duty among other things.  After the Chancery Court voided the [...] mortgage the plaintiffs sought their legal fees as damages and claimed that they had to sue [...] and the defendant because of the defendant’s breach of fiduciary duty.  Id.  at 552.  The Supreme Court held that there was no third-party tort litigation within the exception to the American Rule for a partner who controls an entity.  As is evident from those holdings, a prerequisite to an award of counsel fees under the exception to the American Rule is litigation with a third party precipitated by another party's wrongful act.  No matter how egregious that wrongful act, in the direct action between a plaintiff and a defendant, each party bears his or her own fees under the American Rule.
[brief] “Moreover, policies are frequently not read by the insured, ‘whose understanding is often impeded by the complex terminology used in the standardized forms. ’”  *Jenkins*, 180 N.J. at 563, quoting *Doto v. Russo*, 140 N.J. 544, 555 (1995).  In *[...]*, our Supreme Court addressed the issue of rescinding a legal malpractice policy issued to a New Jersey law firm with three partners, [...], [...] and [...].