ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] He determined that the loss of the profile created “extreme prejudice” for defendant because he would have to go to trial “without the benefit of having the full profile information that was . . . created by the undercover detective in this case. ” (2T13-13 to 18; 2T15-19).  “There would be a manifest and harmful prejudice to [...] to go to trial without the benefit of these -- this profile information. ” (2T16-1 to 4).  And, he ruled, this prejudice “simply cannot be cured. ” (2T14-3 to 7).  To the contrary, defendant will suffer little, if any, prejudice from the loss of the profile for several reasons.
[brief] (17T218-1 to 7, 222-7 to 8).  There is no indication the result would have been different had defendant not offered a confession.  Similarly, there is no indication the defendant’s youth made him incapable of assisting his own attorneys.  While defense counsel argues [he cannot] disclose confidential attorney/client information, more evidence needs to be offered if they wish to make such a claim.  Defendant’s characteristics at trial do not lend support to the idea that he would have been tried with a lower offense, that he would have tried to obtain a plea bargain, or that he was incompetent to understand what was going on.
[brief] The description of the incident provided in the disability application was incorrect (Aa13-Aa14; IT:31:14-19).  The disability application stated that Petitioner sustained his injury “while carrying hose to the basement,” and that Petitioner twisted his ankle on the steps (Aa1; Aa14; IT31:14-19).  Petitioner testified at the hearing that he fell as he was carrying hose up the driveway (Aa14; IT31:18-25).
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that Plaintiff’s appeal be denied and that the trial court’s decisions below be affirmed.  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants, [...] and [...]  By: /s/[...]  [...]  Dated: May 23, 2024  [...]  Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SPARTA TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION AND MICHAEL GREGORY, Defendants-Respondents.  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] The Borough refused to issue demolition permits for any lot, 68a ¶ 18; repeatedly conditioned building permits upon nonexistent and unreasonable demands, 73a ¶ 25-30; and imposed new conditions on approvals that were never part of the final, non-appealable resolution issued by the land use board, 68a, ¶ 16.  [...] filed an application in aid of litigants’ rights seeking redress for Emerson’s violations of the Conditional Judgment and, on March 16, 2021, the Court granted in part, appointing a “Mt. Laurel Implementation Monitor” and compelling that “all applications for building permits, or for other governmental approvals, sought by [[...]] from the [...] shall be reviewed . . . on an expedited basis.
[brief] Using the totality of the circumstances test, our Supreme Court emphasized the factors to be considered, including a police officer’s “common and specialized experience,” and evidence concerning the area’s reputation for crime.  *State v. Moore*, 181 N.J. 40, 45-46 (2004).  Importantly, reasonable suspicion “‘does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities ... [and] common-sense conclusions about human behavior. ’”  *State v. Valentine*, 134 N.J. 536, 543 (1994) (quoting *United States v. Cortez*, 449 U.S. 411, 418 101 (1981)).  “Although a mere hunch does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion required is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause. ”  *State v. Gamble*, 218 N.J. 412, 428 (2014) (internal citations omitted).  Accordingly, the New Jersey Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that “[t]he same circumstances which justify an investigatory stop may also present the officer with ‘a specific and particularized reason to believe that the suspect is armed’” for purposes of an investigatory frisk.
[brief] The Defendant [...], a New Jersey licensed optometrist testified that she is the spouse of [...].  T3, p.13-14.  She provided a copy of her New Jersey Optometry license which is issued to the name “Lyudmila” Milov.  209a.  She indicated that she and her husband resided at [...].  T3:24:1-2.  [...] further indicated that she has never gone by the name of “Linda” (name on Affidavit of Service) and that no one—not family, coworkers or patients call her “Linda”.  T3, p. 26:9-16.  Her Nickname is “Mila” not “Linda”.  T3, p. 22:21-25.  She testified that on the morning of August 23, 2021 (purported date of service) that she left for vacation with her husband and children around 8:45 am, “a little bit before 9:00 a.m.  T3, 27:20-22.  The purpose of the trip was to celebrate her birthday which was on August 26, 2021.  T3, 1-3.  [...] was clear that she was never served with a summons and Complaint on the morning of August 23, 2021 and that she was not home at the time of purported service.  T3, 39:17-25.
[directive] Duties of the County Prosecutors  1.  Every County Prosecutor’s Office shall establish a “Municipal Prosecutor Liaison. ”  2.  In addition to their other duties, which will be addressed in the Best Practices Manual developed in accordance with Section I.D below, Municipal Prosecutor Liaisons shall be responsible for coordinating with the Division of Criminal Justice and municipal prosecutors in their County to ensure that each municipal prosecutor in the County has a completed and up-to-date registrations and disclosures.
[brief] Especially as this jury had before it the actual videos and photographs on which [...]’s statement was based, and unlike instances where an officer lacks corroboration for the factual testimony underlying the opinion.  See McLean, 205 N.J. at 445-46; cf. State v. Hedgespeth, 249 N.J. 234, 240-41, 252-53 (2021) (erroneous evidence ruling that precluded defendant from challenging uncorroborated testimony of police ruled not harmless).  Moreover, defense counsel minimized any potential harm by getting both [...] and [...] to admit what appeared on the videos only resembled a wallet ID, which was an argument he wanted the jury to adopt.  In summation, defense counsel emphasized the fruitless searches.  (20T86-24 to 90-3; 20T93-16 to 21).  He argued that [...] “can’t say for sure that’s a [NJSP] ID. ” (20T92-9 to 20).  He made those points to argue that the jury could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that what appeared in the videos and photographs was the wallet ID, as even “[t]heir own photographer,” meaning [...], “couldn’t. ” (20T100-19 to 101-5).  And defendant testified, presenting his denials directly to the jury.  In sum, defendant, acting with full knowledge of the risk, gambled that presenting evidence the searches failed to produce the wallet ID because defendant did not have it, outweighed any harm from the jury learning why NJSP conducted the searches.
[brief] Defendant/appellant placed a veil over the significance of the holding in Leitao v. Damon G. Douglas Co., 301 N.J. Super. 187 (App. Div. 1997), and its application to this case.  Regardless of appellant’s assertion that the Englert Court criticized reliance on Leitao for determining the enforceability of an indemnification clause, *Leitao* remains authoritative.  There is a substantial body of New Jersey case law in which courts have interpreted similar indemnity clauses providing indemnity for losses "regardless of" or "arising out of" or "arising from" the contractual engagement.
[brief] The evidence against defendant in this case was overwhelming.  Both [...] and [...] testified that defendant confessed to murdering [...].  Notably, [...] shared details of the murder that police were aware of but had not been shared with the public.  Defendant admitted to not being at [...] on the night of [...]’s murder when he texted [...] that night that he would only be gone for one night.  Defendant also confessed to committing the murder in his own words, when he texted [...] at 2:43 a.m. that he and [...] were about “to get old girl dike. ”  [...]’ statement to police was also corroborated by [...]’s text messages with [...], the surveillance video from [...], and the surveillance video from [...].  [...]’ details regarding how [...] was murdered was also corroborated by the two .380 caliber gunshot wounds [...] located in the back of her head.  [...]’ statement to police that after the murder, [...] and [...] went back to [...]’s grandmother’s home and texted [...] in an attempt to create an alibi was corroborated by the activity information gathered from [...]’s phone and the surveillance video depicting [...]’s bedroom light going on at the time the text message was sent.  Thus, the jury heard through other strong evidence both that defendant was with [...] and [...] earlier in the night at [...] in [...], and that within an hour of the murder, he was in the area of [...]’s grandmother’s home and where [...] was murdered.
[brief] The Trial Court rejected this argument, indicating that it was intertwined with the density argument and that building up in this area is consistent with the Borough’s 2015 Master Plan Re-examination Report.  The Trial Court also noted that each residential unit also creates a waterfront view of Raritan Bay for those future residents of and visitors to [...] – a fact consistent with enhancing the visual environment which is one of the Borough’s master plan goals.  (Pa1743).  For these reasons, the Trial Court found that the building height allowable in the redevelopment overlay zone was substantially consistent with the Borough’s master plan goals and objectives, and that the Borough’s discretionary decision regarding such height should not be disturbed by the court.
[brief] (Pa928 to Pa929).  Such givebacks, the Court continued, violate public policy as articulated in *Nunziato v. Planning Bd. of Borough of Edgewater*, 225 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 1988).  (Pa931 to Pa933).  And while the payment at issue in this matter was voluntary (City Brief at p. 28), the absence of coercion does not make the payment lawful.  *Nunziato*, 225 N.J. Super. at 133.
[brief] See O.D.A.-C., 250 N.J. at 424-26 (finding waiver not knowing and voluntary where defendant was falsely told statements would remain “confidential”).  Although the court did provide curative instruction, the instruction was unclear, contradictory, and ineffective in remedying the prejudicial impact of showing the jury [...]’s repeated invocation of his rights.  Courts generally “courts presume juries follow instructions,” however, not all improperly admitted evidence can be remedied by an instruction.
[brief] ”  (Da329-30)  Counsel indeed filed those motions the next day.  (Da331-34)  On June 28, 2023, PCR counsel explained, again, that prior counsel had to withdraw from the case suddenly due to health issues, it took time even get the file, and she had been diligently pursuing the live issue of the PCR discovery (which the court then reversed), while she “tried to get my arms around this very large file.
[brief] This carve-out shows that the parties agreed to exceptions to [...]’s indemnifications rights, but did not agree that first-party claims would be among the exceptions.  See Dansko Holdings, 991 F.3d at 502 (“[T]he parties contemplated exceptions to the indemnity when they carved out Non-Indemnity Loss’ from the indemnity and reimbursement provisions.  But that carve-out does not extend to all first-party claims.
[brief] Sea Bright is a municipality, not a board of education.  (Aa750).  The [...] is responsible for overseeing the education of 1  The Procedural History has been combined with the Statement of the Facts as they are inextricably entwined.  students residing in the Boroughs of Oceanport and Sea Bright.  (Aa750).  Prior to July 1, 2009, there existed a non-operating [...], which had a send/receive relationship with Oceanport.  (Aa794 – Aa795).  Effective July 1, 2009, the State eliminated the non-operating [...], along with twelve other non-operating districts pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:8-44(a), which authorized the elimination and merger of non-operating school districts in the State.  (Aa794 – Aa795).  As a result, the former non-operating school district of Sea Bright ceased to exist and was merged with Oceanport, creating a new local school district known as the [...].  (Aa794 – Aa795).  The [...] is the “board of education” responsible for educating both Oceanport and Sea Bright students in grades PK-8, and students in the [...], including students who live in Sea Bright, attend the [...] for grades 9-12.  As it is one school district and one board of education, Oceanport holds annual school elections in which the voters of Sea Bright and the Borough of Oceanport participate at-large with no apportionment of board seats amongst the two municipalities.  (Aa751).  Additionally, the [...] receives State aid funding for both the students of the Borough of Sea Bright and the students of the Borough of Oceanport directly from the State of New Jersey.  (Aa751).  [...] is a limited purposed regional school district organized pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:13-2 that operates a 9-12 regional high school on its campus in West Long Branch, New Jersey.
[brief] 2  Bandler v. Melillo, 443 N.J. Super. 203 (App. Div. 2015) .......................................................  4  Consol. Plan, Inc. v. Shanholtz, 7 N.J. Misc. 876 (Sup. Ct. 1929) .............................................................  10  Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) ..............................................................................  6, 7 Family Fin. Corp. v. Gaffney, 11 N.J. 565 (1953) .................................................................................  11  Family Fin. Corp. v. Gough, 10 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1950) ......................................................... 10, 11
[brief] S4150 [[...]/[...]], Farmland preservation-approv CBT revs for county planning projects:$4.5M S4151 [[...]/[...]], Farmland preservation-approv.  CBT rev to St Agriculture Devl Committee:$60.940M S4152 [[...]/[...]], Land, recreation/conservation-approv CBT rev, grants to cert nonprofit entities S4153 [[...]/[...]], Open space acquisition and park development projects:$80.359M S4154 [[...]/[...]], Farmland preservation-approv.
[brief] The trial court’s fee award reasonable in light of the facts and equities in the case.  In determining reasonableness, the threshold issue is whether the party seeking the fee prevailed in the litigation.  The lawsuit must be causally related to securing the relief obtained and the prevailing party’s efforts must be a necessary and important factor in obtaining the relief.  *Litton Indus.*, 200 N.J. at 386.  Here, the trial court extensively analyzed the R.P.C. 1.5 factors including the time and labor required to prepare for this 22 day trial, the complexity of the case, the amount involved, results obtained, and the experience and reputation of counsel, and concluded that Plaintiffs’ fees were appropriate and reasonable.  (27T80:15 to 93:13).  The trial court expressed its belief that there was not really another way for Plaintiffs to obtain relief without expert accounting services and the extensive legal work provided by counsel.  (27T89:12-17; 91:10-18; 92:16 to 93:13).  --- 28
[directive] If you believe that you qualify for an exemption, please note the appropriate exemption code in the box on the reverse side of the form and specify why the category applies to you.  Please also be certain to sign and date the certification where indicated.  Any questions concerning any of these exemptions may be brought either to this office at [...] or to your Assignment Judge as indicated in the "For Questions Call" box on the front of the Questionnaire.  Your support of and cooperation with the pro bono counsel program are greatly appreciated.
[brief] Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex Trenton, NJ 08625-0006  Re: [...] (Petitioner-Respondent) v. [...] (Respondent-Appellant)  Appellate  Docket No.: [...]  Claim Petition No.: [...]  Civil Action: On Appeal from an Order Declaring Decedent  An Essential Worker, from the State of New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Division of Workers Compensation, Freehold Vicinage  Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.W.C.  Dear Judges:
[brief] Moreover, while statutory and regulatory standards do not establish the standard of care, the parties’ experts were permitted to rely upon such standards to support their opinions regarding the standard of care, consistent with the Appellate Division’s decision in Ptaszynski v. Atlantic Health Systems, Inc., 440 N.J. Super. 24, 36-38 (App. Div. 2015), certif. denied, 227 N.J. 357, 227 N.J. 379 (2016).  (See 12T55:14-57:4.)  The trial court thus held that there was no substantive cause of action to be made based upon the various statutes and regulations upon which plaintiff intended to rely.  The court nonetheless also, and at plaintiff’s insistence, allowed plaintiff to use the statutes and regulations as evidence of the standard of care.  If the statues and regulations were an element of the standard of care, but plaintiff did not have a cause of action to enforce those standards, defendants had to be permitted to rebut the implication that defendant violated the statutes and regulations, which plaintiff in turn represented established the standard of care.
[brief] “The purpose of a remedial action is to implement a remedy that removes, treats, or isolates contamination, and that is protective of the public health, safety and the environment. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:26E-5.1(a).  Plaintiff contends that the contamination is safe because the contamination has not reached the aquifer or the drinking water supply.  (Pb25-Pb26).  This argument ignores that the [...] also expressed concern regarding contamination seeping into the water and sewer pipes (T2, 37:2-8) and that there are separate standards for soil contamination and water contamination.  See N.J.S.A.58:10B-12(d) (stating that [...] “shall develop minimum remediation standards for soil, groundwater, and surface water intended to be protective of public health and safety…”)(emphasis added).
[brief] More importantly, Defendants do not deny that this case involves a matter of important public interest.  (Db14-19).  Whatever motivations Defendants allege Plaintiffs may have had, it does not transform this case to a private dispute.  Plaintiffs [...] and [...] exercised their rights as citizens and taxpayers of Middlesex and Camden Counties to ensure that an officeholder meets the statutory requirements of their office.  (Da6, ¶¶ 2-4).  They have no personal interests in those BOG seats.  (Id.)  On the contrary, the public has an interest in (1) ensuring that the representational interests of each Rutgers’ campus and their host counties are protected and (2) clarifying the temporal nature of the Restructuring Act’s residency requirement so that appointing authorities and members of the BOG are properly apprised of what the statute requires.
[directive] Bail Reform under the determinations release or victim a to made have may defendant harm future a that of threat for specific account any process defendant's a for does account not also process risk-assessment pretrial automated witness.  The drug a defendant's or crime," of organized form gang other or street violent a with involvement mental illness. or dependence not accounted is information history criminal relevant when instances be may there Finally, software risk-assessment pretrial automated the that databases the in data of missing because for rights victims' of protection and safety public of interests the reasons, foregoing the For queries.  providing whenever possible, gaps informational the in fill to prosecutors and/or police require that where assessment risk pretrial automated the by for accounted the not information court to criminal new and/or flight of risk greater a poses defendant the that suggests information additional the (i.e., flag of violence lack the or a NCA score or FTA the by indicated is than violence or activity will defendant the that risk the measure designed not to PSA is the that (Note indicator).  NVCA consider in risk that must prosecutors and police although process, justice criminal the obstruct whether and acomplaint-warrant, for apply or acomplaint-summons to whether issue determining of effect immediate a the Moreover, risk.) that manage to conditions release special seek to recommend to opportunity an have will program pretrial services the that is complaint-warrant a of Issuance release.
[brief] POINT THREE IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO FIND PLAINTIFF  A PREVAILING PARTY AND AWARD ATTORNEY’S FEES BECAUSE THERE THE TOWNSHIP CUSTODIAN COMPLIED WITH OPRA AND THERE WAS NO IMPROPER DENIAL OF ACCESS.  (Da85; Da108)  If it is not readily apparent given the modest attorney’s fees awarded in this case, the primary motivation of this appeal finds its source in the merits of the issue and the defense of the Township custodian’s actions.  The Township’s record custodian takes compliance obligations of OPRA quite seriously and fairly expects a reviewing court to rigorously apply proper analysis in reviewing access determinations.  In this case, the trial court ordered the release of information to the Plaintiff, however, under the explicit authority of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, the court is only authorized to order such access if “it is determined that access has been improperly denied. ”  Continuing, the statute provides for a reasonable attorney’s fee to a requestor who prevails in a proceeding.  By deductive operation, the trial court’s order and award of attorney’s fees in this matter equates to a determination that the Township custodian violated OPRA.  While the reasons why the custodian did not violate OPRA advanced above need not be repeated, the trial court’s opinion supporting its determination that Plaintiff was a prevailing party rests largely upon the fact that the document withheld by the Township custodian did contain information disclosable under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b) and the court then ordered its disclosure.  (Da115).  The trial court’s logic does not support a determination that an improper denial of access occurred.  It is more than mere supposition to believe that many exempt criminal investigatory records contain information that may be available upon request under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b).
[directive] Payment of all proper expenses of seizure and forfeiture including the expenses of detention, inventory, security, maintenance, advertisement, sale or disposal of the property.  >  All such expenses must be directly attributable to a particular seizure and normally would not have been incurred but for the law enforcement activity leading to the seizure.  >  Investigative costs may include travel, transportation of objects, rentals, translatiodtranscription communication expenses, expenses, supplies and purchases of evidence or information.  Such costs must have been incurred prior to forfeiture.  The cost of equipment and supplies are payable if they were incurred in a particular operation or investigation leading to forfeiture and they are consumed or expended in of support said forfeiture.  Salaries of Treasury personnel participating in investigations leading to seizures are not payable from the Fund.  >  Purchases of evidence or information may be payable if: a particular seizure is associated with each payment for information or evidence, the case file the of investigating bureau field office in which the seizure is made contains detailed documentation describing the relationship between particular seizures and payments, and the amount paid bears a reasonable relationship to the value of the evidence or information to the government.