ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Again, cleaning up the trash enclosures, the landscaping.  All those items... enhance visual environment.  [(Pa396 to Pa397). ]  [...]’s testimony makes clear that the application promotes a number of the purposes of zoning as set forth in the MLUL; specifically, by promoting the general welfare, providing adequate open space and space for residential and recreational purposes, by promoting a desirable visual environment and encouraging the efficient use of land.  See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(a)(c)(g)(i) and (m).  Regarding the negative criteria, [...] noted that some of the potential concerns (i.e., near residential developments, visual concerns, etc.) are actually enhanced by the Application’s plan.  (Pa398 to Pa399).  He further stated that “looking at the zone plan and master plan, I don’t see any significant or any detriments in terms of if this variance is granted that it is an outright – an outright negative towards the existing master plan or zoning ordinance, so I believe we could meet that threshold, as well.  (Pa399).  In summation, Plaintiff’s counsel provided further analysis of the d(5) variance criteria for the Board’s consideration, stating:  The D5 density variance was improved throughout this process as you’ve heard me state.  We are now... only 47 units over the allowable density as a result of those multiple reductions in the proposal and the scale-back proposal.  The courts have been clear as to what is the burden of proof and what is the analysis when you’re looking at a D5 density variance.
[brief] (Pa 99-104).  Trial was held before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. of the Chancery Division, Probate Part of Atlantic County.  (7T-12T).  On the final day, the Court placed limited findings on the record after a Motion for Judgment was made by the Respondent.  The court found that the Decedent died with a legally valid Will and that the Will was not the subject of undue influence or duress.  It advised the parties that it would supplement the findings in this written Decision.  (12T191-15 to 23; 12T200-13 to 17; 12T202-17 to 206-4).  In its final decision, the Chancery Division entered an Order outlining the following relief:
[brief] (4T99-5 to [...] was wrapped in a foil blanket and wearing his tin foil hat.  (4T102-1 to 8).  A search of the car found: two handguns (a revolver and a semi-automatic pistol) in the trunk, various bullets and shell casings, knives, a speed loader (i.e., an item used to quickly load a handgun), brass knuckles, a mask, marijuana, Adderall, a completely disassembled cell phone, and a firearm purchaser’s identification card in someone else’s name.  (4T147-10 to 25; 5T102-15 to 103-25; 6T55-16 to 58-8).  An autopsy of [...] and an analysis of the car concluded that she died from a gunshot wound to the head fired from outside of the car.
[brief] ........................................6,8,9,10,18  Allstate v. Lopez, 311 N.J. Super. 660 (Law Div. 1998) ..............................11,12,17,25  Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 202 (1999)  .......................14  Craster v. Bd. Of Comm’rs of Newark, 9 N.J. 225, 230 (1952)  .....................14  DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 466, 492 (2005) (citing Frugis v. Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250 (2003)) .................................................................14,20
[brief] Letter Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Respondent, [...]  Dear [...]:  On behalf of Respondent, the New Jersey [...], please accept this letter-brief and appendix pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b) on the merits of the appeal.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS........  3  ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................  11  THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE BOARD’S REASONABLE DETERMINATION AS IT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.  ......................................................  11  A.  THE BOARD PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT [...] WAS NOT ELIGIBLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SOLAR TRANSITION INCENTIVE PROGRAM WITHOUT A WAIVER...........................................................................  11  B.  THE BOARD’S DETERMINATION THAT [...] WAS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR A WAIVER WAS REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.  .......................  16  CONCLUSION
[brief] The Court analyzed several employment-context precedent and anti-discrimination statutes such as New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination.  Indeed, the Court need look no further than Greenwood’s actual holding to conclude that [...]’s reliance upon same is erroneous:  We hold that an employer does not have good cause to terminate a public employee on the basis of a physical limitation unless there is substantial evidence that the limitation either prevents the employee from adequately performing the job or creates a substantial risk of serious injury to the employee or others.  We draw support for our holding not only from the general principles underlying the good-cause standard but from New Jersey’s strong public policy against discrimination based on physical handicap.
[brief] [...] confirmed that there were no jobs that were not labor intensive for which [...] was qualified, that all boiler work is labor intensive, and that there were no other options for a mechanic laborer with [...].  [...] even provided his employer an opportunity to give him other work by notifying his employer in January or February 2021 that he would have to leave his employment in June because of the pain that he was experiencing, but his employer could not and did not offer him other options or accommodations.  Based on an individualized assessment of [...]’s specific situation, he met his burden of showing that [...] did not have alternative positions available to him that would not aggravate his knee pain and limited mobility.
[brief] The trial court also provided no factual or legal basis for its decision (it accepted the facts stated in [...]’s pleadings at face value).  (PPCIa369-71).  The “final judgment” entered against [...] (a proposed form of order filed with [...]’s motion) summarily found that “[...] is liable under the Spill Act for the Incident” and that [...] was required to: (1) reimburse [...] the sum of $475,623.87; (2) pay a penalty to the “Superior Court of New Jersey” of $75,000; (3) pay [...]’s counsel “its reasonable attorneys and expert fees and costs”; and (4) pay [...] treble the damages of $475,623.87 “(less the initial contribution payment)”.
[brief] | Document Number | Finding | |------------------|---------| | 13023-13029 |  Communication between [...] outside counsel and [...] regarding draft motion related to bid protest.  RFP 2 requests communications other than those with counsel regarding contracts between [...] and [...].  RFP 12-14 seek documents regarding [...]’s solo bid proposals and [...]’s initial solo bids.  RFP 18 seeks communications between [...] and [...].  As such, RFP 2, 12-14, and 18 are not relevant with regard to this document.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED THE STATE’S MOTION TO COMPEL BUCCAL SWABS.  (Da60 to 68).  Defendant claims the trial court erred in granting the State’s Motion to Compel buccal swabs from the defendants because it was unreasonable to seek forensic testing so long after the defendants were indicted.  Defendant’s claim is without merit.  The trial court aptly reviewed the State’s submission and found it was supported by probable cause.  The trial court also correctly determined the delay in testing was not unreasonable.  As such, the trial court properly granted the State’s motion.  The court’s ruling is supported by the record and, therefore, it should be affirmed on appeal.  A buccal swab is a common method of law enforcement collection of specimen material for DNA testing, but, it is also beyond dispute that the taking of a buccal swab for the purposes of obtaining a DNA sample is a “search.
[brief] [...] attended the sentencing hearing via Zoom.  (9T3-11 to 14)  According to the State, he turned away from the camera during victim-impact testimony.  (9T13-13 to 14-4)  And according to the court, he failed to exhibit a sufficiently emotional reaction during that testimony.  (9T20-12 to 21-3)  It is pure speculation to suppose that maintaining a stoic demeanor and turning away from a camera was indicative of a lack of remorse.  To learn that one has been convicted of murder is a devastating emotional event, and listening to victim-impact testimony is likewise emotional for everyone.  It was not proper for the court to speculate about the meaning of [...]’s emotional response, and it was certainly improper to punish him for not emoting “correctly. ”  In *State v. Nyema*, our Supreme Court cautioned against the interpretation of ambiguous body language as being indicative of criminal culpability.  239 N.J. 509, 530 (2022).  While the Court’s reasoning there was applied in the context of determining reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop, the principle that a “wide range of behavior exhibited by many different people for varying reasons while in the presence of police” is nonetheless applicable to sentencing hearings, where there is equal cause for defendants to have a strong emotional reaction in response to criminal legal consequences – reactions which may manifest in myriad and inconsistent ways that elude clear interpretation.  *Id.* at 533.  Accordingly, if this Court does not reverse [...]’s convictions for the reasons expressed in Points I, II, and III, then this Court must reaffirm the principle that maintaining one’s innocence cannot be used against a defendant at sentencing, and reverse and remand this matter for resentencing.
[directive] b.  Should the OPIA Director decide to mitigate a conflict by appointing a different law enforcement agency to serve as the Independent Investigator, the Director may do so using the following guidelines:  i.  Where OPIA is the “default” agency, Section II.C.1.b above, the OPIA see Director shall appoint the Division of Criminal Justice as the Independent Investigator.3  ii.  Where a County Prosecutor’s Office is the “default” agency, Section see II.C.1.c above, the OPIA Director shall appoint a different County Prosecutor’s Office as the Independent Investigator.  If the OPIA Director is unable to identify a County Prosecutor’s Office able to serve in this capacity, or if justice so requires, the Director may appoint OPIA as the Independent Investigator.  In situations where both OPIA and the Division of Criminal Justice are unable to serve as the Independent 3 Investigator, the Attorney General shall designate a member of the Office of the Attorney General to supervise the investigation and shall deputize other state or county law enforcement officers to serve as Special Deputy Attorneys General operating under the supervision of the Attorney General’s designee.
[brief] See, e.g., id. at 589-98 (finding plain error where detective opined that defendant was being deceptive during his interrogation because it “impermissibly colored the jury’s assessment of defendant’s credibility”); State v. Tung, 460 N.J. Super. 75, 102-04 (App. Div. 2019) (reversing murder conviction in part because detectives opined that defendant was lying during his interrogation).  As our Supreme Court has directed, [w]e go to extraordinary lengths in ordinary criminal cases to preserve the integrity and neutrality of jury deliberations, to avoid inadvertently encouraging a jury prematurely to think of a defendant as guilty, to assure the complete opportunity of the jury alone to determine guilt, to prevent the court or the State from expressing an opinion of defendant’s guilt, and to require the jury to determine under proper charges no matter how obvious guilt may be.  A failure to abide by and honor these strictures fatally weakens the role of the jury, depriving a defendant of the right to trial by jury.
[brief] See Kendrick v. City of Hoboken, 38 N.J.L. 113 (1875).  The defendants’ opposition briefs include a number of other fallacies related to the issue of timing but the page constraints applicable to this reply brief allow only one more to be addressed.  Specifically, [...]’s contention that [...] has raised new arguments with this appeal is manifestly false.  ([...]b21-31).  [...] goes even further, suggesting that [...] relies upon facts taken from a transcript which “was not presented or relied upon by [...] below. ” ([...]b21).  Contrary to this statement, the transcript was both filed with the trial court and referenced in the opposition filed by [...] to defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and the same can be produced if deemed necessary.  Although a seemingly trivial matter, it further reveals the nature of defendants’ contentions in this case.  In any event, and contrary to [...]’s suggestions, responding to specific points made in the trial court’s decision does not constitute new argument.  Rather, an explanation of why the trial court erred in its reasoning is the very essence of an appeal.  II.
[directive] 또는 모의에 유죄시인을 하는 경우에만 다음의 질문들에 답변해야 합니다: 년6 월29 일 이후에 발생한 살인, 가중 살인, 2001 차량에 의한 살인, 가중 폭행, 법집행관의 무장해제, 유괴, 가중 성폭행, 성폭행, 강도, 차량 강탈, 다른 사람을 사망  또는 심한 신체적인 상해 위험에 처하게 하는 가중 방화, 주거침입 절도, 어떤 사람에게 신체적인 상해를 입히겠다고 위협하거나, 또는 신체적인 감금 또는 다른 범죄를 저지르겠다고 위협함으로써 다른 사람의 재산을 취득하는 강요에 의한 절도, 설비의 제조 및 판매에 사용하는 CDS 부비 트랩 또는 약물 유발성 사망에 대한 엄격책임, 또는 년6 월18 일 이후에 발생한 테러리즘, 2002 또는 화학무기, 생물학적 작용제,핵 또는 방사선 기구들의 생산 또는 소지, 또는 년1 월13 일 2008 이후에 발생한 제1 급 갈취, 또는 년8 월14 일 이후에 발생한 아동 포르노그래피, 또는 2013
[brief] First, the EDA permits the condemnation court to stay a condemnor from taking possession of the property when the validity of the taking is challenged.  *Twp. of Readington v. Solberg Aviation Co.*, 409 N.J. Super. 282, 326 (App. Div. 2009) (“The filing an action that challenges the condemnor’s authority to condemn can affect the right to possession since N.J.S.A. 20:3-19 clearly authorizes a court to stay the taking of possession upon good cause shown. ”).  In such case, a court may postpone physical occupancy of the property by the condemnor until the court has ruled on the validity of proposed taking.  *Ibid.*  Such action maintains the status quo of the property, and in turn, allows no harm to befall Plaintiff in the interim, much less irreparable harm.
[directive] 1  AVISO:  Este é um documento público, o que significa que o documento tal como apresentado estará disponível ao público mediante solicitação.  Portanto, não inclua dados de identificação pessoal, tais como número de Social Security, número da carteira de motorista, número da placa do veículo, número da apólice de seguro, número de conta financeira ativa ou número de cartão de crédito ativo.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.
[brief] “Final determinations made by the trial court sitting in a non-jury case are subject to a limited and well-established scope of review: "we do not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice[.]”  Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011), citation omitted.  The factual finding that [...] was a general contractor cannot be found in the record and cannot stand on appeal.  Questions of law are reviewed de novo and no deference is required.  Balsamides v. Protameen Chems., Inc., 160 N.J. 352, 373 (1999).  The trial court here did not address the legal issue of the CFA because of the mistaken finding of fact.
[brief] Indeed, in response to a question on an insurance application form (referred to herein as the “Supplemental Form”) asking “do you hire or rent vehicles during your fair/festival/event?,” [...] answered “No. ”  [...] then did not answer an application question asking if any of the vehicles rented were “12 or 15-passenger vans. ”  It is undisputed that [...]’s answers to these application questions were false because [...] had already rented several 12-15 passenger vans for its summer camp operations.
[brief] (Aa5-6).  As Board Staff noted, “[w]ere [[...]’s] project granted a waiver so that this general grid supply project could enter the TI program, Staff has concerns the project’s ability to reach commercial operation....” (Aa5).  The TI program grants projects one year from conditional registration to reach commercial operation.  (Aa5).  Here, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s denial of [...]’s petition for its proposed grid supply solar project because it lacked maturity to reach commercial operation before the applicable expiration date.  (Aa5).  First, as of September 15, 2023, [...]’s project “remain[ed] in the System Impact Study phase of the [...] queue process,” making it uncertain when the proposed project might be approved to connect to the electric grid by the regional grid operator.\(^8\) (Aa5).
[brief] The SAM issued a Report and Recommendation, which the trial court later found to be “palpably incorrect”.  The trial court found, by applying the record facts to binding Massachusetts law, that the damages incurred by [...] to clean up the contamination – the “property damage” claimed by [...] – must be allocated pro-rata across the entire period of contamination from 1958 through the trial court’s decision in 2011.  That decision by [...] was correct; it is fully supported by the facts, comports with Massachusetts law, and it should be upheld on this appeal.  The result of that decision, which is the subject of [...]’s appeal, equates to an almost total rejection of [...]’s claims for coverage.  Of the approximately $19 million in damages initially sought by [...] in this case, [...] owes [...] approximately $900,000.  Looking at it a different way, [...] sought approximately 27% of its costs from [...]; as a result of [...]’s decision, [...]’s share of costs is approximately 6%.  This result is not a success for [...] in any meaningful way; in fact, [...] lost at every critical point in this case and on virtually every substantive issue that it brought before the trial court.  And yet [...] asserts that it is a “successful claimant”.  The trial court incorrectly agreed with [...]’s self-assessment, and [...] hereby appeals the court’s erroneous determination that, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, [...] was a “successful claimant” entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees.  Finally, [...] also appeals the trial court’s rulings awarding [...] over a million dollars in attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest.  The attorneys’ fees calculations performed by the trial court disregard clear precedent of this Court addressing the appropriate methods for such calculations.  The interest calculations contain blatant mathematical errors and rely upon unverified proposed calculations that were not properly submitted into the record before the trial court in the first instance.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, : On Appeal from a Judgment of v. : Conviction of the Superior Court of : New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County.  [...], : Sat Below: Defendant-Appellant. : Hon. [...], J.S.C., : Hon. [...], J.S.C., : and a Jury.  Your Honors:  This letter is submitted in lieu of a formal brief pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b).
[brief] The statement of reasons recited:  The Court’s scheduling Order for March 9, 2022, required [...] to file one copy of all municipal-court transcripts with this Court by 4/08/22.  The Order stated that if the transcript was not filed with the Court by this date, or an extension not obtained from this Court, the matter would be dismissed without further notice.  As of 4/22/2022, [...] has not filed a copy of the municipal court transcripts with the court or requested an extension.  Therefore, his appeal is dismissed.  (Pa319)  The complaint is replete with false statements regarding Plaintiff’s municipal appeal.  Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that his municipal appeal was rejected by the Criminal Division of the Superior Court.  It was not!  It was filed by the Criminal Division.  The Complaint states that the Civil Division rejected the appeal.  It did not!  It transferred the appeal to the Criminal Division.
[brief] In the within matter, adding information to a website cannot be construed as notice of the Ricci Act’s enactment or the requirements to register within a certain timeframe.  The statute required the Board to promulgate rules to provide notice to active and retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  The Certifying Officer Letter is proof that the website posting is not sufficient notice.  Pa68.  The notice of the Ricci Act to the Certifying Officers advises the Certifying Officers that they must distribute the information to employees pursuant to N.J.A.C. 17:5-1.4.  It also required that the Certifying Officers to provide a certification that the information was distributed.  The Respondent claims that the mailing of the postcard to a correct address establishes a presumption that the postcard was received.  This presumption is rebutted by the fact that [...] and 98 others certified via affidavits that they did not receive said postcard.  Additionally, the claim that postcards were mailed out to all “200,647 SPRS retirees” is a misstatement of fact.  Rb12.  New Jersey State Troopers are assigned a badge number upon successful completion of the academy and these badge numbers are never repeated.  Currently, the New Jersey State Police badge numbers only reach the 9,000s; meaning that in the entire history of the New Jersey State Police, there are less than 10,000 New Jersey State Troopers, which includes all active or retired members of the State Police Retirement System.  Failure to provide any notice, adequate or actual, is reasonable and equitable grounds for relaxing the deadline for registration under the Ricci Act.  Furthermore, the Division admits that it did not notify the members of the retirement system within 30 days of the Ricci Act’s enactment.  This further establishes good cause to relax the timeframe.  We respectfully request that the decision below be reversed, and that [...] be permitted to register his presence at 9/11 and apply for amended benefits under the Ricci Act.
[brief] Indeed, the [...]’s “Franchise Rule”, 16 C.F.R. 436, is instructive on this point, as this federal franchising regulation was first broached for discussion the very same year that the NJFPA was enacted, 1971.  See Instructional Sys., Inc., 614 A.2d at 132 (NJFPA passed in 1971); see also, 43 Fed. Reg. 59614, at 59,622 (“[o]n November 11, 1971, the [[...] (‘[...]’)] announced the initiation of a proceeding for the promulgation of a trade regulation rule relating to disclosure requirements and prohibitions concerning franchising”).
[brief] In sum, looking at the totality of the circumstances,\(^8\) the undisputed record demonstrates the conduct here is precisely the type of “cancerous” harassment the NJLAD intended to eradicate.  The record establishes Respondents’ discriminatory conduct would not have occurred “but for” Appellant’s gender/sex and that a reasonable person would consider this conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment.  There is more than ample evidence to show the asserted non-retaliatory reason for transferring Appellant is merely pretext for retaliation.  It is clear that issues of fact have been raised and the determination of whether there has been a violation of the law has occurred must therefore be left to the jury.
[brief] (4T118:19 to 120:22, 122:18 to 123:25; 5T47:7 to 48:8; 6T18:22 to 19:4, 22:2 to 25:14, 26:9 to 27:15, 121:7 to 122:14; Pa2284-86; Pa2292-95; Pa2296-2305.)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW