ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In some cases, the factfinder "is not competent to supply the standard by which to measure the defendant's conduct."  Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 134-35, 167 A.2d 625 (1961).  In those instances, the plaintiff must "establish the requisite standard of care and [the defendant's] deviation from that standard" by "present[ing] reliable expert testimony on the subject."  Giantonnio v. Taccard, 291 N.J. Super. 31, 42, 676 A.2d 1110 (1996).  Our Supreme Court has explained that, when deciding whether expert testimony is necessary, a court properly considers "whether the matter to be dealt with is so esoteric that [factfinders] of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid judgment as to whether the conduct of the [defendant] was reasonable."  Butler v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 283, 445 A.2d 1141 (1982).  In such cases, the factfinder "would have to speculate without the aid of expert testimony."  Torres v. Schripps, Inc., 342 N.J. Super. 419, 430, 776 A.2d 915 (App. Div. 2001).  When applicable, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur enables the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case."  Jerista v. Murray, 185 N.J. 175, 191, 883 A.2d 350 (2005).  Res ipsa loquitur permits an inference of negligence, establishing, in turn, a prima facie case of negligence.  Mayer v. Once Upon A Rose, Inc., 429 N.J. Super. 365, 373, 58 A.3d 1221 (App. Div. 2013).  In order to invoke the doctrine, a plaintiff must establish that [*11]  "(a) the occurrence itself ordinarily bespeaks negligence; (b) the instrumentality [causing the injury] was within the defendant's exclusive control; and (c) there is no indication in the circumstances that the injury was the result of the plaintiff's own voluntary act or neglect."  Ibid.  (quoting Szalontai v. Yazbo's Sports Cafe, 183 N.J. 386, 398, 874 A.2d 507 (2005)).  The Court has stated that [the mere] existence of a possibility of a defendant's responsibility for a plaintiff's injuries is insufficient to impose liability.  In the absence of direct evidence, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove not only the existence of such possible responsibility, but the existence of such circumstances as would justify the inference . . . and would exclude the idea that it was due to a cause with which the defendant was unconnected.  Hurricane Ida does not come as a surprise to anyone.
[brief] As discussed above, the clear and longstanding law in this area does not permit the court to vacate an award absent a showing of wrongdoing on the part of the arbitrator.  There is no such wrongdoing here.  By accepting jurisdiction, the arbitrator did not exceed the arbitrator’s powers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 28:23B-23(4).  The arbitrator was acting within the powers granted to the arbitrator by the inter-company arbitration agreement.  As set forth above the inter-company arbitration agreement and the rules and regulations adopted by Arbitration Forums specifically give the arbitrator the power to determine whether there is jurisdiction to hear a matter in arbitration.  As that power was granted to the arbitrator the determination that there is jurisdiction to hear the matter was within the arbitrator’s power.
[brief] •  Lexington Avenue was a busy street in Jersey City.  Many people were traveling in all directions, making it improbable to narrow the suspect list to any one person.  By way of just one example, the video from 57 Lexington Avenue (Da 16) shows the individual crossing paths with another individual on the sidewalk just seconds before Da 87/Da 139 was recorded.  •  [...]’s identification evidence was suspect because he previously was unable to conclusively identify [...] in the 57 Lexington Avenue footage; he was susceptible to feedback from his brother about [...]; part of the March 8, 2016 procedure was unrecorded; he was not instructed not to feel compelled to make an identification; and the administrator was part of the investigation.
[brief] After the hearing, the Court signed an Order on February 22, 2022, making it clear that [...] still had to produce unprovided documentation pertaining to the 538-policy which had increased in value from $250,000 to $545,181.82.  Thereafter, counsel for [...] wrote a comprehensive letter dated March 29, 2022, which provided the Court with Mr. [...]'s submissions demonstrating the inappropriate conduct by the [...] and Mr. [...] with regard to these insurance monies.  (R-621).  The March 29, 2022 letter is a three hundred page document including the Exhibits and it fully exposes the lack of any evidence demonstrating that a change form request was received by the Insurance Company for the 538-policy; that a change of beneficiary occurred or how it occurred.
[brief] A folded site plan, certified by a licensed New Jersey Professional Engineer clearly showing:  i.  All proposed site improvements; ii.  The total area of proposed disturbance including the supporting calculation; iii.  The total area of existing impervious surface at the site and total area of additional impervious surface to be added to the site as a result of the project or activity including all supporting calculations; iv.  A delineation of all forest on the site.  If the proposed activity will disturb any forest area, the area calculations for the proposed disturbed portions of forest; and It should be apparent that the DEP’s WQMP consistency determination in this case does not include a review of the totality of the impacts.
[brief] Courts have held:  A manufacturer of branded goods will certainly not object, and may encourage, a distributor to use its name or mark to encourage sales.  This kind of use does not turn a distributor or seller of goods into a licensee for purposes the Act.  . .  Rather, it is the obligation of the franchisee to promote the mark itself, as distinct from merely using it to make sales, which distinguishes a license meeting the Act's requirements from the right to use a mark that any reseller of goods gets when purchasing those goods from the owner of the mark.  Liberty Sales Assocs., Inc. v. Dow Corning Corp., 816 F. Supp. 1004, 1011 (D.N.J. 1993) (citing Instructional Systems, 130 N.J. at 352).  In Finlay & Assocs., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., the Court evaluated a case where the parties had a distributorship agreement.
[brief] ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT [...] (Pa1-3, 6-12).  Defendant [...]’s opposition brief highlights the existence of material disputes of fact that require the reversal of the trial court’s summary judgment order.  The arguments raised by [...] essentially amount to a summary of its expert’s proffered opinion that the [...] parking lot where the subject fatal crash occurred was appropriately designed and configured.  As set forth in detail in Plaintiff’s initial brief, Plaintiff’s expert engineer, [...], has opined that the area of the parking lot where non-management employees such as [...] were required to park was in a hazardous condition due to its lack of traffic control and pedestrian safety measures.  Pa665-6.  The determination of this dispute presents a classic “battle of the experts”, which a jury is required to resolve by weighing the credibility of the experts’ conclusions in light of the totality of the evidence in the record.  The trial court erred by deciding these disputed issues of material fact that were for the jury to resolve.
[brief] [...] noted that municipal court sessions were on Wednesdays from 8:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., two weeks a month, and then Wednesdays from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., the other two weeks of the month.  (Pa49; Pa111).  [...] also noted that they contacted [...] via her personal email or cell phone when court was not in session.  (Pa49; Pa111).  With respect to timekeeping, [...] did not fill out a timesheet.
[brief] QUO WARRANTO ACTIONS APPLY TO MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS (1T69-73)  The common law remedy of quo warranto provides a means of ousting a person for unlawfully holding office.  It was eventually codified into statute.  A proceeding in lieu of prerogative writ may also be instituted as of right against any person for usurping, intruding into or unlawfully holding or executing any office or franchise in this state, by any person who, under the former practice, would have the requisite interest to exhibit an information in the nature of a quo warranto with the leave of court.  N.J.S.A. 2A:66-6.  “A proceeding may be brought under this statute if an office holder was not lawfully elected, did not meet residency requirements, or did not possess other qualifications of the office. ”  In re Christie’s Appointment of Perez as Pub. Member 7 of Rutgers Univ. Bd. of Governors, 436 N.J. Super. 575, 582 (App. Div. 2014) (citing Pickett v. Harris, 219 N.J. Super. 253, 258 (App. Div. 1987), appeal dismissed, 114 N.J. 471 (1989)) (emphasis added).
[directive] Supervisor Approval Required in Certain Circumstances  In order to promote the uniform application of this feature, if the extent of the Downward Departure for Trial Proof Issues exceeds 6 months in the case of a fourth-degree crime, 9 months in the case of a third-degree crime, 12 months in the case of a second-degree crime, or 24 months in the case of a first-degree crime, the departure must be approved by a supervisor who is authorized in writing by the county prosecutor or Director of the Division of Criminal Justice to approve such departures.  The county prosecutor and Director are authorized to designate one or more persons with sufficient experience and expertise to approve a Downward Departure for Trial Proof Issues that exceeds these thresholds.  Maximum Downward Departure for Trial Proof Issues
[brief] Rule 4:32(1)(a)(2) requires that there be “questions of law or fact common to the class. ”  The commonality requirement with other members of the class is met if a plaintiffs’ grievances share a common question of law or fact and plaintiff isn’t required to show that all class members’ claims are identical to each other as long as there are common questions at the heart of the case; “factual differences among the claims of the putative class members do not defeat certification.
[brief] Specifically, the detectives did not speculate on areas of law with which they were not familiar, e.g., the structure of Virginia's publicly-funded attorneys, extradition, etc., or provide incorrect or misleading advice with regard to which state's bar the attorney who would be appointed to represent the defendant would be a member.  Cf. State v. Francisco, 471 N.J. Super. 386, 417-19 (App. Div.), certif. denied, __ N.J. __ (2023).
[brief] (2T Hearing, 10/20/2023) (Pa000637) (Pa000926).  The Frivolous Litigation Statute is codified as N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 and is applied via R. 1:4-8.  The purpose of the statute and the rule is to provide a safeguard against litigants who abuse the court system by requiring parties or attorneys who file pleadings or other court papers that have no merit to pay the opposing party’s legal fees and associated costs.
[brief] (33975a)  As did [...], [...] found it particularly reprehensible that the [...] began their ill-conceived “true-up” exercise – one of their defenses to [...]’s NJRICO and common law claims – only after and in response to this Court’s 2006 Opinion:  [A]fter the 2006 Appellate Division [Decision], the [...] claimed they were entitled to $19 million dollars in theoretical management fees and $9 million in hypothetical management fees.  [...] testified the [...] were justified in taking that money after the 2006 Appellate Division decision because he was “truing-up” for fees that had not been paid to the [...] and had been due since 1985.  In reality, and as [...] noted, these “true-ups” were false justifications to steal money from the partnership.  (224T14:13-17).  All of this occurred after the Appellate Division ruled the [...] owed plaintiffs a fiduciary duty.  (235T72:7-17).  (33973a-74a; emphasis supplied)
[brief] Imagine, what if everyone just had their employees sign a service contract and no more payroll tax or employee benefit system.  In my experience the Department of Labor would have an investigation launched instantaneously.  [...] was supplied 20 Factor tests on multiple occasions which [...] completed.  What was the purpose in wasting his time with a document that [...] admitted she never took into consideration.  The reality is that [...] has been lulled into a mechanical termination of Pension Benefits and vesting in any manner they see fit.
[brief] Criminal Action: On Appeal from a Final Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Honorable Judges: Pursuant to Rule 2:6-2(b), and Rule 2:6-4(a), this letter in lieu of formal brief and appendix is submitted on behalf of the State.
[brief] (3T16:3-12; Aa79).  [...] also read --- 6 *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  defendant the portion of the questionnaire that discusses the administration of Miranda rights.  Defendant then agreed to answer his questions.  (3T16:13-18; Aa79).  [...] then asked defendant questions relating to the consumption of alcohol.  (3T16:19-21).  Defendant told [...] that he drank one martini at a friend’s house.  (3T16:23-25; Aa79).  [...] did not recall the time of the original arrest, but stated that he put it on his standard statement refusal form.  (3T17:11-13).  [...] estimated that it took several hours between the time of the arrest and the time of the questionnaire because he had to travel between three police departments for an Alcotest machine.  (3T17:8-14).  [...] testified that nothing changed his initial opinion that defendant was under the influence of alcohol during this time period.  (3T16-19).  On cross-examination, [...] testified that since defendant said he only had one drink, he wrote his answer down verbatim.  (3T18:11-16).  [...] testified that defendant alleged that he consumed a martini at 6:00 p.m. (3T19:1-7).  [...] refreshed his recollection that his initial encounter with defendant occurred at approximately 2:18 a.m. (3T19:14-22).  [...] testified that as far as he knew, the time that he administered the Boonton Alcotest was accurately recorded and he would accept what was represented in the Alcohol Influence Report (hereinafter AIR).  (3T20:8-13).  [...] reserved his decision at the end of the trial.  (3T26:1-13; 3T27:3-12).
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[brief] 20.  Letter from Appellants to Commission and Appellee, Requesting that Appellee’s Failure to Answer be Deemed an Admission, dated September 27, 2022.  21.  Letter from Appellants to Commission and Appellee, Renewing Request that Appellee’s Failure to Answer be Deemed an Admission, dated October 4, 2022.  22.  Letter from Appellants to Commission and Appellee, Renewing Request that Appellee’s Failure to Answer be Deemed an Admission, dated October 10, 2022.  23.
[brief] Also, the deed transferring any interest that [...] had as receiver to [...] was recorded in the clerk’s Offices on June 30, 2022 and August 2, 2022.  [...] purchased the assets through the entity [...], and requested that [...] remain under the bank’s employ to continue to operate the diner.  As noted in his letter brief, [...] was paid by [...] on an hourly basis, $300.00 an hour, which was below his normal hourly rates.  (Ca141).
[brief] **C. [...] did not violate the Consumer Fraud Act.  (33)**  As an initial matter, the trial court correctly held that, because [...] properly rescinded the Policies, [...] and [...] cannot pursue a claim for any alleged violation of the Consumer Fraud Act.  [3T33-3]  Additionally, the trial court determined that, even if [...] and [...] could pursue such a claim, the Consumer Fraud Act does not apply to “the denial of coverage and/or benefits under an insurance policy. ”  [3T33-6]  Rather, “an aggrieved party has the right to file an action for declaratory judgment for the improper denial of coverage and/or benefits and seek counsel fees under [New Jersey] Court Rules, specifically Rule 4:42-9(a)(6). ”  [3T33-10]  This Court thus should affirm the trial court’s decision because (1) [...] properly rescinded the Policies; and (2) the Consumer Fraud Act does not apply to the denial of coverage under the Policies.
[brief] The judge then continued down the verdict sheet.  The forewoman pronounced defendant guilty as to question number 4 regarding count 2 – possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (10T:10-3 to 8); question 5 regarding count 3 – unlawful possession of a weapon (Smith & Wesson .38 revolver) (10T:10-9 to 16); question 6 regarding count 4 – unlawful possession of a weapon (Taurus 40 semiautomatic handgun) (10T:17 to 24); question 7 regarding count 5 – endangering another person ([...]) (10T:10-25 to 11-5); and question 8 regarding count 6 – endangering another person ([...]) (10TL11-6 to 11).  The court then realized it skipped question 1A, following the verdict for purposeful murder and went back to ask if the jury believed the defendant committed the murder by his own conduct.  The forewoman answered “Yes. ” (10T:11-12 to 19).  Most importantly, after the verdict was announced, the judge asked the forewoman to hand up to verdict sheet and asked that the jury be polled to confirm their verdict.  (10T:11-20 to 23).
[brief] [...]'s report, which was written several hours after interviewing [...] and [...], stated that one suspect was a “black male, approximately 5’5”, thin build, early 20's, wearing [a] long black-sleeved shirt, black pants, and a black do-rag and black gloves. ”  The other suspect was described as “[a] black male, approximately 6 foot tall, thin build, early 20's, wearing ... a black long-sleeve shirt, white undershirt, blue jeans, a black fishing-type hat, and black gloves. ”  The taller individual ([...]) was said to be in possession of the handgun, and the shorter man ([...]) was reported to have entered the back office.  [...]'s report contradicted [...] and [...]'s trial testimony about the description of the individuals.
[brief] “[...] has the gall to present [...]’s self-serving, retainer agreement, which he issued to himself for his approval signature, and which was NEVER shared w/Interested Parties [incl. [...] & [...]] to this Case, for his Trust Intermediate Accounting in order to try & greedily justify a 3% administrative fee [in that retainer] on top of his $395/hr and [...]’s $295/hr rate for the accounting fees of [...], a firm that [...] owns.  Besides being grossly unfair in these circumstances, a 3% administrative fee ($514.07), which was his creation in retainer agreement that he issued for his [secret] approval, on top of ~$17K for [...] invoice, is unwarranted for Trust payment”.
[brief] Although Probation and [...] (see 3/17/2022 “accounting, DA162) insisted that Appellant cite specific account errors, which he did, [...] and Probation did not (see additional discussion, Point III, paragraph 2), responding with generic, knee-jerk unsupported claims of “previously litigated” and “collateral estoppel” without responding with specificity to any of the newly submitted Probation account errors specifically identified by Appellant, nor demonstrating where such claimed previous litigation occurred.  Simply put, Probation conspicuously avoided response to material and specifically identified account errors because it could not respond without acknowledging its own violations of court orders.  Thus, Probation chose to respond with knee-jerk generic “collateral estoppel” argument whether applicable or not.  6.
[brief] According to the State's firearm expert, the handgun Glock model 17 recovered by the police on the street next to the fried chicken store was the weapon used to kill [...].  This handgun also matched two spent casings found on the floor of the store.  The expert also opined that the third bullet removed from [...]'s body was fired from the forty caliber Baretta, the weapon recovered by the police from the fenced-in yard.  The same Baretta also discharged five of the spent casings found inside the store.  The State called Jersey City [...] to testify about his efforts to interview [...] and [...].  According to Hart, by the time he arrived at the scene of the incident, Roach, the individual who had been shot and was laying in the doorway, had been transported to [...].
[brief] Defendant [...]’s governing body appointed Plaintiff [...] to serve as a commissioner of the [...].  During his term, someone alleged that [...] posted an offensive video in a Facebook Group.  Carlstadt’s governing body terminated [...] from office, asserting that his personal conduct reflected negatively on the town.  [...] challenged the removal in the Superior Court.  Carlstadt acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner when it terminated [...] from his position because Carlstadt did not follow the correct standard which is explicitly set forth by statute:  . . .  A member of a sewerage authority may be removed only by the governing body by which he was appointed and only for inefficiency or neglect of duty or misconduct in office.  . .  N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c) (in relevant part)  The issue presented here is whether an appointed public official’s private conduct can constitute “misconduct in office” under N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c).  [...] received summary judgment in the Law Division because it is undisputed that the allegations made by Carlstadt against him in the termination action were based on purely “private” acts and not “misconduct in office. ”  The motion judge’s well-reasoned opinion agrees that the allegations against [...] involve “private conduct. ”  Because the alleged acts were not connected to his public role and because “private conduct” is not within the scope of the removal statute, [...] received summary judgment.
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