ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Order granting motion to permit paying audio portion of police dash cam video, dated September 26, 2023 ........................................................................ Da41 Order granting motion to bar evidence of Defendant [...]’s criminal convictions, dated September 26, 2023 .................................................. Da42 Order granting motion to bar evidence of citations/summons issued to [...], dated September 26, 2023 .................................................. Da43 Order granting motion to bar evidence of a defense independent medical examination at trial, dated October 2, 2023 ..................................................  Da44  Order denying motion for reconsideration of Court’s September 26, 2023, Order barring evidence of Defendant [...]’s criminal convictions, dated October 3, 2023 ..................................................  Da45  Order addressing evidence that may be used during opening statements, dated October 2, 2023 ........................................................................  Da46  Verdict Sheet………………………………………………………………………………Da154 P-1 – photograph of accident scene ……………………………………………………Da157 P-2 – photograph of accident scene ……………………………………………………Da158 P-3 – photograph of accident scene ……………………………………………………Da159 P-5 – photograph of accident scene¹ …………………………………………………Da160 P-6 – photograph of accident scene ……………………………………………………Da161 P-7 – photograph of accident scene ……………………………………………………Da162 P-8 – photograph of Plaintiff’s injuries …………………………………………………Da163 P-9 – photograph of Plaintiff’s injuries …………………………………………………Da164 P-10 – photograph of Plaintiff’s injuries ………………………………………………Da165 P-11 – photograph of Plaintiff’s injuries ………………………………………………Da166 P-12 – medical illustration ……………………………………………………………Da167 P-13 – medical illustration ……………………………………………………………Da168 P-14 – medical illustration ……………………………………………………………Da169 P-15 – CD containing police dash cam video…………………………………………Da170
[brief] In the beginning of his direct [...] was testified that [...] could deliberate and understand the nature and quality of his actions before during and after the shootings.  (13T:20-4 to 21-2).  [...] also testified on direct that “with reasonable medical certainty, as these other opinions have been, that at the time of the shootings, the defendant did know and appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions. ” (13T:21-8 to 10)(14T:84-19 to 85-7).  When asked the question by the State, [...] hesitated and said that he was unsure if he could opine on the ultimate issue in New Jersey.
[brief] L. 1979, c. 16.  Enacted in 1979, the DACCA incorporated portions of the 1960 Debt Adjusters Law.  Compare L. 1979, c. 16 with L.  1960, c. 177, as amended by L. 1977, c. 391.  (Pa130).  However, unlike its predecessor, the original DACCA did not define “debt adjuster” or provide any exemptions for attorneys-at-law.  That version was far more restrictive because it limited debt adjustment to only nonprofit social service agencies and nonprofit consumer credit counseling agencies that could demonstrate to the Commissioner of the Department of Banking\(^3\) that they were qualified.  N.J.S.A. 17:16G-2, -3.  (Pa130).  The DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor came into existence in 1986, when the Legislature, among other things, amended DACCA to re-incorporate a definition of “debt adjuster” and an exemption list.
[brief] In the first of those cases, on their motions to dismiss the actions and compel arbitration, defendants herein relied upon the same arbitration clause in the SPA that [...] presently relies upon in this case.  [...] denied defendants’ motion to dismiss and to enforce the arbitration clause in the first of those cases.  [...] ruled from the bench as follows:  It is not the type of clear, unambiguous evidence that one needs to conclude the plaintiffs gave up their right to a jury trial when you simply say in a subscription agreement you have to arbitrate, which this one does, and, by the way, look at all of these attached exhibits which are now part of your contract.  One of them -- not the only one -- is a 633-page document written in, let's face it, legalese, well-done, excellent document, and buried in that document at page iv is the type of language to satisfy, that satisfies the requirements of Atalese.  That's not the type of clear and unambiguous evidence that I can rely upon at this stage of the proceedings without discovery to conclude that the plaintiffs clearly and unambiguously knew what they were, what they were getting involved in.  See (Da119 - 120).  On June 27, 2023, plaintiffs herein also filed an Order to Show Cause application to dismiss or stay the AAA arbitration.
[brief] [...]’s argument at p. 21 of its brief that approval of the [...] for the route is irrelevant must be rejected.  First, the very statute [...] relies upon to create the conflict to preempt the ordinance requires an order from the [...].  Second, [...]’s reliance on Matter of Petition of [...] for Permission to Revise Rates for Appliance Serv., [...] Docket No. [...] (93 N.J.A.R.2d (BRC) 19 (N.J. Adm.)), Final Agency Decision (June 4, 1992), has no bearing on that issue.  That administrative decision concerned the ability of a utility to engage in non-utility business activities; and as such is contrary to [...]’s arguments that the [...]’s regulatory authority preempts the Ordinance.  Third, [...]’s argument that the [...] ultimately has the power to determine how to exercise is discretion requires, at a minimum, that [...] actually exercise its discretion; however, here it has not done so, since it has not made a determination that the Westfield route is actually necessary for the provision of adequate service.
[brief] ”  *State v. McCabe*, 201 N.J. 34, 44 (2010).  “The New Jersey cases have historically taken a much more liberal approach on the issue of standing than have the federal cases. ”  Crescent Park Tenants Ass’n v. Realty Equities Corp. of New York, 58 N.J. 98, 101 (1971).  In O’Shea, the Appellate Division court held that:  While we do not render advisory opinions or function in the abstract, our courts have historically taken a liberal approach to the issue of standing.  Standing may be found as long as the parties seeking relief have a sufficient personal stake in the controversy to assure adverseness and the controversy is capable of resolution by the courts.  O’Shea v. New Jersey Schools Const. Corp., 388 N.J.Super. 312, 318 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Crescent Park Tenants Ass’n, 58 N.J. at 101-04) (emphasis added).  Both conditions for standing are met here by the Plaintiff.
[brief] 1.  In her report, [...] noted that the Township does provide Petitioner with workplace facilities, tools, and a support computer at the expense of the location.  (Pa14)  2.  Specifically, it was noted, the Township provides office supplies, copier, fax machine and postage.  (Pa14)  3.  [...] believed the Petitioner met the definition of independent contractor solely on the basis that the Township Administrator indicated she is not provided with a permanent office or workstation, a phone or Township email.  (Pa95)  4.  Conversely, Petitioner testified that when she prosecutes, everything is supplied by the Township.  The Township purchases all the materials and all the equipment and hires all the employees to work with her.  (T48-18)  5.  Petitioner testified there is a telephone in the conference room where she has worked for the past 20 years, which allows her to communicate with the State Police barracks, State Troopers, and anyone else she would need to talk to.  (T48-24)  6.  Petitioner testified the Township supplies the plea agreement forms, a HEPA Filter in the conference room, the plexiglass guard on the conference room table and the signs for her Township workspace.  (T49-3)  7.  Petitioner noted that the Township supplies the television and video boards used during trials as well as all informational materials such as the Family Violence Prevention Program and others that are given to defendants.  (T49-12)  8.  Petitioner also testified the Township provides the services of “[...]” which is a drug rehabilitation program for defendants with drug addictions.  (T49-22)  9.  Petitioner testified the Township provides a fax machine, copier, driver abstracts and criminal histories for her use as well.  (T50-3)  10.  Petitioner is also given a key fob for access to secured rooms and doors in the Township as well as supplying the complaint and summons forms for all municipal court files and all other supplies necessary for her to perform her services as municipal prosecutor.  (T50-8)  **FACTOR 15 – SIGNIFICANT INVESTMENT**
[brief] On June 22, 2022, [...] initiated the lower court Foreclosure Action utilizing the *in rem* procedure, which allowed [...] to ignore the two (2) year waiting period by alleging that the Property was “abandoned. ” (28a-34a).  Paragraph 2 of the Complaint states:  2.  The Property is abandoned as set forth in N.J.S.A. §55:19-78 et seq.  The certificate holder has unsuccessfully sought a certificate of abandonment from the public officer or tax collector.  The certificate holder seeks the entry of a court order declaring the property as abandoned pursuant to N.J.S.A. §54:5-86(b).  (28a).  [...] made this allegation notwithstanding that [...] maintains a register of abandoned properties, and the Property was not listed on that register.  (98a).  In order to obtain the determination that the Property was abandoned that is the statutory predicate for the procedure it utilized, [...] chose to make a motion to the lower court in the Foreclosure Action on September 14, 2022 (35a-84a), relying upon an inspection of the Property allegedly undertaken by [...] on January 28, 2022, nine (9) months earlier.  (66a-70a).  That date was slightly more than one month after [...]’s acquisition of the Certificate.  E.
[brief] When plaintiffs moved for permission to name [...] as their expert, the Case Management Order in effect (the February 16, 2021 Order) noted that plaintiffs’ expert reports had been “completed” while providing dates for the completion of other discovery with an overall end date of July 20, 2021.  A152.  But by the time [...] heard argument and ruled on plaintiffs’ motion on August 27, plaintiffs had served [...]’s expert report on defendant on July 30 (A235), and [...] had entered her August 9 Order providing for expert depositions to be completed by October 17, and extending the discovery end date to November 17, 2021.  A220.  Plaintiffs’ identification of [...] was proper under R. 4:17-7 as well, which provides that a party may amend its answers to interrogatories – including experts to be called at trial -- no later than “[twenty] days prior to the end of” discovery.  [...] erred in denying plaintiffs’ motion in light of the August 9 Case Management Order in effect at the time of his ruling and the Court Rule allowing amendment.  Even if naming [...] was considered a request for extension of discovery (since the prior February 16, 2021 Case Management Order indicated that service of plaintiffs’ expert reports was “completed”), [...] erred in failing to apply the “good cause” standard that applies to requests for extensions where no trial date has been set, per R. 4:24–1(c).  *Tynes v. St. Peter's Univ. Med. Ctr.*, 408 N.J. Super. 159, 168 (App. Div. 2009); *Viviano v. CBS, Inc.*, 101 N.J. 538, 547 (1986); *Leitner v. Toms River Reg'l Sch.*, 392 N.J. Super. 80, 93 (App. Div. 2007); *Ponden v. Ponden*, 374 N.J. Super. 1, 9–11 (App. Div. 2004), certif. denied, 183 N.J. 212 (2005).
[brief] (15a).  Defendant [...] filed a motion for summary judgment, Defendant [...] filed a motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for Summary Judgment — the three motions were heard together.  (1T¹ 4:10-17).  The Court first heard oral argument on December 4, 2023, during which the Court requested the parties to make further submissions relating specifically to the issue of the requirement under N.J.S.A. 54:5-89.1, that a party obtaining an interest in property subject to foreclosure based on tax sale certificates was required to intervene in a pending foreclosure action.  (2T 4:18-5:4).  The Court then held follow-up oral argument ¹  The transcript of oral argument from Dec. 4, 2023 is designated herein as “1T;”  The transcript of oral argument from Feb. 9, 2024 is designated herein as “2T.” on February 9, 2024 (2T 4:18-19).  The Court issued the joint Order at issue in this appeal on February 28, 2024 dismissing Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice and, based upon that dismissal, dismissing all cross-claims and third party claims as moot.
[brief] Most recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided an appeal wherein it held that a prior uncounseled DWI conviction could not be used as a predicate offense to increase a jail term for the indictable version of Driving While Suspended pursuant to DWI/Refusal convictions in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26.  State v. Konecny, 250 N.J. 321 (2022).  The Konecny opinion interpreted Laurick relief as:  …available to defendants whose DWI conviction were uncounseled.  All of this Court’s caselaw applying Laurick dealt with proceedings in which the defendant did not have counsel, was not informed of the right to counsel, or was not told that counsel would be provided if the defendant could not afford an attorney.  Konecny at 339-340.
[brief] Why would two sophisticated lawyers include a provision in a contract entitled “Dispute Resolution” that provides for mediation and then failing meditation, arbitration if both parties would have to agree to subsequently agree to the arbitration provision that they just put into their contract?  Such an interpretation renders the provision useless.  Furthermore, why would the parties include a procedure regarding selection of the arbitrator if they could not agree upon an arbitrator if they were both required to agree to arbitration and then both required to agree to the method of selecting an arbitrator?  Such an interpretation flies in the face of reason and renders the sentence inexplicable.  The use of “may” regarding the selection of an arbitrator cannot be reconciled with the Trial Court’s construction.
[brief] Exhibit A, Order granting leave to file Second Amended Complaint, dated January 22, 2016, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit B, [...]’ Answer to Second Amended Complaint, dated April 21, 2016, filed May 24, 2019 (Volume 10 of 15 – Pa1761 to Pa1960)  Exhibit C, Agreement between [...] Engineers, Architects and Land Surveyors, P.C., and [...], dated May 6, 2014, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit D, [...] Request for Expressions of Interest, dated December 16, 2013, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit D, [...] Response to Request for Expressions of Interest, undated, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit D, Email exchange re Crisdel T200.313 Infraction, dated June 12, 2014, filed May 24, 2019 Exhibit D, Email exchange re Struck by Vehicle Accidents, dated August 19, 2014, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit D, Email exchange re Vehicle Backovers Tool Box Talk, dated March 7, 2014, filed May 24, 2019 Exhibit D, Monthly Progress Report #2, dated July 10, 2014, filed May 24, 2019 Exhibit D, Monthly Progress Report #1, dated June 6, 2014, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit E, Deposition of [...], dated April 12, 2017, filed May 24, 2019 Exhibit F, Notice of Motion to Dismiss, dated June 21, 2017, filed May 24, 2019 Exhibit F, Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, dated June 21, 2017, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – R. 2:6-1(a)(2)) Exhibit G, Order reconsidering and denying Motion to Dismiss, dated September 15, 2017, filed May 24, 2019 Exhibit H, Report of Examination of [...], dated January 18, 2018, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 289a)
[brief] \(^8\)  The [...] property has a similar e-commerce warehouse use, with similar building sizes.  The building heights are between 42 and 46 feet for the 250,000 square feet building, and 46 and 50 feet for the 710,000 square feet building.  (6T 8:10-13; 9:2-11).  Indeed, the NJ State Highway Access Code requires that every traffic impact student submitted to NJDOT must include ITE traffic data.  (N.J.A.C. 16:47-1 et seq., App. F).  [...] cannot be accused of offering a “net opinion” because he failed to include a variable (height) which the reliable and authoritative source for his study has determined is not relevant, solely to appease a zoning board which, without any basis to support same, demands proof that does not exist.
[brief] Simply put, Defendant’s arguments are red-herrings.  Plaintiffs’ expert’s opinions are supported by the core evidence in the record.  Here, the record established that settlement existed in the southbound left lane at the abutment joint on the northern side of the Rt. 30 overpass.  This settlement was identified during two different inspections.  (Pa1343); (Pa1191).  The record also reflects that the settlement was dangerous.  The fact that both [...] and [...] were hired to pro-actively identify settlement in the travel lanes so that the condition, if identified could be corrected, creates the inference that settlement in the roadway is dangerous.  (Pa0656);(Pa0657); (Pa0678); (Pa0679).  Also, and perhaps most obvious, [...] engineer [...] was shown a picture of the area of the settlement and testified that settlement in that area would be dangerous.  (Pa801).  Finally, the settlement was re-paved in order to return the road to proper grade.  (Pa1396); (Pa1397).  Next, [...] argues that Plaintiffs require an accident reconstructionist in order to prove that the condition caused the accident.
[brief] (Pa1)  Therein, the trial court did not articulate findings of fact and/or conclusions of law.  Instead the court incorporated its rulings on the record and a report by the Planner/Special Master dated October 19, 2020, which the trial court relied on in reaching its decision on the motion.  (Pa9)  However, that Report could not logically be the basis for the relief entered, since any relief required a finding of a default of a provision in the Settlement Agreement that did not even exist at the time the Planner/Special Master’s Report was authored.
[brief] On January 22, 2021, [...] filed a First Amended Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs (“FAC”).  Pa1.  In Count I of the FAC, [...] alleged that the provision in the Redevelopment Agreement requiring a $2,000,000 payment is unlawful for the following reasons: (a) it is *ultra vires*; (b) there are no standards to determine the amount of the $2,000,000 fee in any ordinance; (c) the fee is unrelated to the impact of the development of the 290 Ocean Property on the City; (d) the fee has no relationship to the “costs of the redevelopment entity” as those terms are used in N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f); and (e) the fee is not authorized by the LRHL.  Pa10-12.  In Count II of the FAC, [...] alleged that because [...], as a “designated developer” of “any land in the Redevelopment Area,” did not provide its written consent to the amendment of the Redevelopment Plan, the amendment to the Redevelopment Plan is unlawful.  Pa12-13.  In Count III of the FAC, [...] alleged that the City failed to determine whether the 290 Ocean Property remained within an area in need of redevelopment, and that as a result of such failure, all resolutions and ordinances intended to secure the redevelopment of the 290 Ocean Property are unlawful.  Pa13-15.  In Count IV of the FAC, [...] alleged that the amended Redevelopment Plan constitutes “spot zoning” insofar as it extended significant benefits to the owner of the 290 Ocean Property, unavailable to others.  Pa15-16.  In Count V of the FAC, [...] alleged that the City violated N.J.S.A. 40:55D-7(d) when it adopted the amendment to the Redevelopment Plan.  Pa16-17.  Lastly, in Count VI of the FAC, [...] alleged that the record in this matter does not contain “an identification of any provisions in the proposed redevelopment plan which are inconsistent with the plan” as required by N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e).
[brief] This statement by [...] is not and cannot honestly be disputed; [...] does not contend that [...] performed services while its schools were closed, and it cannot contend that [...] incurred payroll for its laid off custodians.  And in any event, none of this relates in any way to the mandate imposed by the Statute that local school districts continue to pay contracted service providers during periods that schools are closed for health emergencies.  There were no material facts in dispute below, and if [...] is contending that summary judgment should not have been entered due to a lack of discovery on its part, it has an obligation to identify what might possibly have been established through that discovery that would have disentitled [...] to the relief that it sought.  Since it failed to do so, the lower court's entry of summary judgment was eminently correct.
[brief] (5T76-1 to 22).  [...] acceded to defendant’s request not to record this second interview because defendant was fearful of retribution if his drug source found out he had talked to the police.  (5T77-1 to 5).  During this second interview, defendant outlined his involvement in smuggling and selling marijuana and cocaine that he received from his California contact.  (5T77-9 to 79-16).  Defendant described the multiple trips he had taken to California to set up his drug distribution operation to purchase hundreds of pounds of marijuana at $1,600 to $1,700 per pound and several kilograms of cocaine at $23,500 per kilogram.  (5T79-10 to 16).  Defendant also admitted that he offered to pay [...] $75.00, plus expenses, for each pound of marijuana [...] transported to the East Coast for him.  (5T78-14 to 18).  Defendant also admitted that in the past, he had smuggled 150 pounds of marijuana and five kilograms of cocaine in 10 separate U.S. Postal Service packages from California he sent to various addresses, including his girlfriend’s Old Bridge apartment and a couple of New York addresses.  (5T77-18 to 78-5).  On April 5, 2021, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., granted in part and denied in part defendant’s Miranda motion, regarding the statements he had made at three distinct time frames – at the arrest scene and in the first and second interviews.
[brief] [...]’s reliance on Ensslin v. [...], 311 N.J. Super. 333 (App. Div. 1998), is misplaced.  (Pb9).  In Ensslin, a police officer had been terminated from service and the subsequent action he brought against his employer under the Law Against Discrimination was ultimately dismissed.  Ensslin, 311 N.J. Super. at 334.  After the LAD litigation, Ensslin applied for Ordinary Disability Retirement Benefits but the [...], determined he was ineligible as he was not a member in service at the time.  Ibid.  The [...] found that under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3), PFRS membership ceases “if more than 2 years have elapsed from the date of [the member’s] last contributions,” and under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6(1) an application must be made “by a member in service” or on his behalf.  Ensslin, 311 N.J. Super. at 335.  This court reversed the Board, holding “that the two-year standard of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3) is not jurisdictional, especially in the circumstances presented” in the particular matter.  Id. at 337-38.  Specifically, in his LAD action, Ensslin’s position was that he was not disabled from his employment with a reasonable accommodation.  Id. at 335.  To be considered for Ordinary Disability, Ensslin was required to certify he is disabled.  *Id.* at 336.  Thus, Ensslin was legally barred by the operation of “the doctrine of judicial estoppel” from filing his application for Ordinary Disability while his LAD action was pending.  *Ibid.*  The court noted that it has found “equitable and countervailing considerations” in particular circumstances to allow a plaintiff to assert a claim.