ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Complaint [...] .................................................................................................1a  Complaint [...] .................................................................................................2a  Complaint [...] .................................................................  3a  Letter dated December 7, 2021, from [...] to [...], Court Administrator .........................................................  4a S-1.  Miranda waiver form ...............................................................  5a S-2.  Attorney General Standard Statement .....................................  6a S-3.  Drinking Driver/Operator Questionnaire .................................. 7a Notice of Appeal (Law Division) (2pp) ..............................................  8a Order ............................................................................................ 10a Opinion (9pp) ............................................................................... 11a Notice of Appeal (Appellate Division) (3pp) ................................... 20a Criminal Case Information Statement (4pp) ...................................  23a Order for Bench Warrant and Bail Forfeiture ................................... 27a Order Denying Stay, Granting Remand ............................................ 28a Order on Remand Vacating Stay and Executing Sentence (4pp) ....... 29a Judgments, Orders, and Rulings: Denial of Ineffective Assistance Claim ........................................ Da13a, 16a-18a Denial of Jury Trial ........................................................................ Da18a-19a Authorities: Cases: Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) ........................................ 16 Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989) ............................. 16 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) ......................... 17 Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980) ............................................. 16 State v. DeLuca, 108 N.J. 98, cert.den. 484 U.S. 944 (1987) ............ 16 State v. Denelsbeck, 225 N.J. 103 (2016), cert.den. 580 U.S. 1113 (2017) ................................................................. 16, 17 State v. Dively, 92 N.J. 573 (1973) .................................................. 16 State v. Fogarty, 128 N.J. 59 (1992) .............................................. 11, 14, 15 State v. Hammond, 118 N.J. 306 (1990) ......................................... 11 State v. Inglis, 304 N.J.Super. 207 (Law Div. 1997) ....................... 6, 9, 11, 13 State v. Miles, 229 N.J. 83 (2017) .................................................. 16, 17 State v. Romano, 355 N.J.Super. 21 (App.Div. 2002) ....................... 14 State v. Rue, 175 N.J. 1 (2002) ...................................................... 11, 12, 13, 15 State v. Vick, 117 N.J. 288 (1989) .................................................. 15 Statutes: N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 .............................................................................  5, 11  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] (Pa66.)  Specifically, on January 6, 2022, the Legislature had COVID protocols in effect preventing the public from attending the Assembly Appropriations hearing.  (Pa66 at ¶ 8.)  Also on January 6, 2022, the Governor had declared a State of Emergency, so many state employees were not present at the State House.  Id.  The online legislative calendar with its online dropdown bar demonstrates that the Legislature never listed S. 49 nor A. 6260 for introduction or proceedings related to these bills as of January 6, 2022.  (Pa101-03 at ¶¶ 17-20; Pa112-31.)  Thus, the public had no way to know these bills that were enacted were being introduced or considered on January 6, 2022, as opposed to the reproductive freedom bills that had been pending since October 2020.
[brief] Therefore, his claim is not cognizable on PCR or under Rule 3:21-10(b)(5).  In Acevedo, the defendant pled guilty to aggravated manslaughter and burglary and received consecutive sentences totaling forty years.  205 N.J. at 42.  There, on PCR, the defendant claimed that because the sentencing court did not explain its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences, the defendant’s sentence was illegal.  Id. at 44.  The Supreme Court, in reinstating the defendant’s consecutive sentences, reasoned that while the sentencing court must explain the reasons for imposing consecutive sentences, the commission of such an error is not a cognizable ground for PCR or a modification of a sentence pursuant Rule 3:21-10(b)(5).  Id. at 45, 47.  The Court concluded that the defendant’s claim pertained to the total length of his sentence and not its “legality”; therefore, his claim was “not cognizable on PCR, or under . . . Rule 3:21-10(b)(5).
[brief] The prior uses of this parcel included a bar with a residential element and a parking lot.  T 31-10 to 31 -21.  •  He emphasized the location as the southern gateway to [...].  It is the very first property that you see in [...].  T31-23.  •  He discussed the parcel’s proximity to the ocean and boardwalk.  Both are signature points of interest in [...].  T32-7  •  He emphasized the borough’s desire to maximize its ability to take advantage of branding opportunities.
[brief] **  It is well established that the denial of a suppression motion is interlocutory in nature and, prior to a conviction, requires a motion for leave to appeal.  *N.J. Court Rule* 3:5-7(e) (such appeals fall under *N.J. Court Rule* 2:5-6, which establishes the procedure for interlocutory appeals).  In this way, an order denying a suppression motion is unlike a conviction, which is a final judgment that may be appealed by right.  See *N.J. Court Rule* 2:2-3(b) (final judgments “are judgments that finally resolve all issues as to all parties…”).  An order granting a suppression motion also requires the State to seek leave to appeal on an interlocutory basis.  *Witt*, 435 N.J. Super. at 610 (App. Div. 2014) (“[I]t is our general practice to grant the State’s motions for leave to appeal the suppression of evidence”).  This all conclusively illustrates that a trial court’s suppression decision, prior to the resolution of a criminal case, is not a final judgment\(^5\) capable of carrying preclusive effect.
[directive] v USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022  Proportional Force.  The minimum amount of force, of both type (e.g., physical, mechanical, enhanced mechanical, or deadly) and intensity, that is necessary to control a situation and achieve a legitimate law enforcement objective.  The law permits officers to overcome unlawful force or resistance; thus, the term proportional force is not intended to mean a type and intensity of force that is exactly equal to the type and intensity of force being used by the subject.  The term proportional force is intended to highlight that the level of force a law enforcement officer utilizes shall be no more than is necessary to overcome the unlawful force or resistance being confronted by the officer.
[brief] DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  [...], on behalf of herself and those similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, Defendants-Respondents.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION, ESSEX COUNTY  Trial Court  Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  REPLY
[brief] The WQMP rule proposal in 2015 explains:  The Department is proposing to significantly revise the WQMP rules in order to streamline the planning process and better integrate it with existing permitting programs ...  By combining the determination of technical WQM plan consistency with the review and assessment of a permit application's technical merits, the technical criteria of the applicable environmental regulations will serve as the determination of consistency with the water quality and quantity considerations of a WQM plan, determined in real time, under current environmental conditions, considering current standards and technology and relying upon the expertise of programmatic review staff best equipped to make the determinations.
[brief] Da135  Letter Memorandum in support of Motion to Vacate of [...], Esq. dated July 12, 2023 (Redacted pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2)) . . . . . . . . . . .  Da136  Proposed Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da137  Affidavit of [...] dated July 12, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da140 Exh A (Email of [...] to [...] dated April 10, 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . Da143 Exh B (Email of [...] to [...], Esq. dated April 12, 2023) . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] The State errs in its interpretation of *State v. Baum*.**  The State wrongly interprets *State v. Baum*, 393 N.J. Super. 275, 291-92 (App. Div.), aff’d on other grounds, 199 N.J. 407 (2009), and argues that it --- \(^5\)  The State argues that [...]’ only option is to withdraw from the plea and file a motion for reconsideration based on this new evidence, where he would have to show why he did not come forward with the evidence earlier and why the trial court’s credibility determination was “palpably incorrect. ”  (Sb 44)  To the contrary, the trial court must reconsider interlocutory orders at any time where new evidence calls into question the veracity of the officer’s testimony.  See *State v. Boston*, 469 N.J. Super. 223, 240-41 (App. Div. 2021) (interlocutory orders can be revisited at any time before final judgment in the interests of justice and finding plain error where the trial court failed to reconsider its order denying suppression where new evidence demonstrated the officer was not credible); *State v. Dispoto*, 383 N.J. Super. 205, 215 (App. Div. 2006) (the trial court should reconsider the interlocutory order where “the judge was faced with evidence that called into question the veracity of [the officer’s] affidavit”).
[brief] (Pa795-796).  With the foregoing as backdrop, the plan amendment states that the redevelopment overlay zone “envisions uses that: complement and enhance the pattern of development as well as public enjoyment and use of the waterfront area; increase pedestrian activity, and; create additional tourist-compatible uses. ”  Specifically, it seeks to “accommodate a mix of higher density residential uses with supportive neighborhood retail services, regional commercial uses and services, and the enhancement and development of a variety of waterfront and recreational uses along the Raritan Bay shoreline. ”  Through public and private ownership, the Plan will: develop year-round residential and recreational uses; increase opportunities for public access to the beachfront; improve parking areas; and upgrade infrastructure.  (Pa539-572).  Clearly, these goals and objectives are consistent with the goals and objectives set forth within the Borough’s master plan documents cited above.
[brief] This Court should affirm the Trial Court’s holding that Plaintiff has no standing to foreclose on a discharged mortgage.  If the Court were to recognize Plaintiff’s legal theory, then the County Clerk recording offices would be littered with discharged zombie mortgages that could be revived and reinstated at any time, for almost any reason.  Creditors, good-faith purchasers, and the public would no longer be able to rely on those discharges being final.  The sole basis for Plaintiff’s foreclosure action is an alleged $60,000 “loan deficiency” on the very mortgage that Plaintiff discharged.  The “loan deficiency” was created by Plaintiff’s voluntary settlement with the bankruptcy trustee wherein Plaintiff agreed to pay the trustee $60,000 in full and final settlement of the bankruptcy preference action.  Defendants-Respondents David and [...] (“Defendants”) took out that mortgage with Plaintiff on May 11, 2012, paid it off in full, and it was discharged on January 29, 2018.  Defendant [...] was the sole shareholder of [...], which declared bankruptcy on February 2, 2018.  Because Defendants paid their mortgage payments directly from Floor Town to Plaintiff, the Bankruptcy Trustee filed an Adversary Complaint against Plaintiff to claw back the mortgage payments.  While in active litigation with the trustee, on January 24, 2022, Plaintiff made a new loan to Defendants.  About six months later, on August 10, 2022, Plaintiff settled the Adversary Complaint by agreeing to pay the trustee $60,000.  Defendants were not involved in the Adversary Complaint and had no involvement with the negotiation of the settlement.  Plaintiff now seeks to both reinstate and foreclose on the discharged mortgage and foreclose on the second mortgage (which is current) on the basis that the $60,000 bankruptcy settlement is an event of default.  Plaintiff’s position must be rejected.  If Plaintiff had a claim for contribution or indemnification against Defendants, Plaintiff should have impleaded them into the Adversary proceeding in Bankruptcy Court.  By not doing so, Defendants were prejudiced because they were deprived of the opportunity to present any claims or defenses in the Adversary proceeding and were unable to participate in the settlement negotiations with the trustee.  Defendants would have been on notice Plaintiff believed it had a claim against them, and perhaps would not have executed the second note and mortgage.  We will never know what would have happened, because Plaintiff declined to implead Defendants into the bankruptcy case.  Having made that choice, as well as the choice to loan Defendants money a second time in ten years, Plaintiff is now responsible for the consequences of those decisions, which is that their opportunity to hold Defendants in default was extinguished by virtue of the discharge of mortgage.  For these reasons, as discussed in greater detail below, the Foreclosure Court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint should be affirmed in every respect.
[brief] ”  *Bilotti v. Accurate Forming Corp.*, 39 N.J.  184, 204, 188 A.2d 24 (1963)(quoting *Ocean Cape Hotel Corp. v. Masefield Corp.*, 63 N.J. Super. 369, 377-78, 164 A.2d 607 (App.Div.1960)).  Thus while the parol evidence rule operates to prohibit the introduction of oral promises to alter or vary an integrated written instrument, parol proof of fraud in the inducement is not considered as either additional or substitutionary but rather as indicating that the instrument is, by reason of the fraud, void or voidable.  The evidence is admitted, not in order to enforce the contract, but rather to avoid it, or as here, to prosecute a separate action predicated upon the fraud.  Thus, a limitation such as…[that] herein does not bar evidence of such fraud.  *Walid*, 425 N.J. Super. at 185.
[directive] Municipal/County/State Law Enforcement Agency:  Point of Contact  Providing Response: Date of Response: Address 2: City/Town: State/Province: ZIP/Postal Code: Country: Email Address: Phone Number:  1.  How many identifiable SAFE Kits does your agency have in its possession (defining "identifiable" as SAFE Kits where you maintain tracking or case related information)?  Open-Ended Response  2.  Where are these SAFE Kits stored?  Open-Ended Response  3.  Do you have SAFE Kits that are unidentifiable (no records related to tracking or case information)?  Open-Ended Response  4.  Do you know the exact number that are unidentifiable?  N/A Yes No 5.  Unidentifiable Kits  If you answered YES above - how many unidentified kits are there?  If you answered NO above, approximately how many unidentified kits are there?  6.  Where are these SAFE Kits stored?  Open-Ended Response  7.  What is the main reason these SAFE Kits are unidentifiable?  Response 17 | P a g e Appendix A  Other, please explain 8.  How many SAFE Kits were submitted by your agency to an approved forensic lab for testing in:  2018 2019 2020 9.  How many SAFE Kits did your agency collect and now possess, but were not submitted for testing in:(*This does not include “hold” kits, which refer to SAFE Kits that have not yet been provided to law enforcement pending the victim’s decision to report the crime.  However, your agency may have “hold” kits you are storing anonymously/without identifiers of the victim.)  2018 2019 2020 10.  Where are your agency’s untested SAFE Kits stored?  Open-Ended 11.  Does your agency possess any “hold” kits?
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[directive] The Page 4 of the comprehensive conflicts inquiry to the Director.  County Prosecutor shall an ongoing The have responsibility to update the comprehensive inquiry report on new information or the conflicts based involvement of additional persons in the investigation.  The initial report and any updates to that shall on Director report be made in a manner and a form as shall be prescribed by the Director.  The inquiry reporting shall develop and make available forms to facilitate the comprehensive conflicts process.  such on information in the comprehensive conflicts inquiry report, and any Based the Director shall additional information as the Director may require the Prosecutor to provide, the investigation, determine whether the interests of justice would best be served by superseding the ordering recusal of any person assigning investigation to another County Prosecutor's Office, the the or other be needed to ensure the or persons from the investigation, taking such actions as may investigation.
[directive] This section is intended to be narrowly construed to prevent disclosure of information which would be truly harmful to a bona fide law enforcement purpose or public safety if released.  It is also intended to prevent such release that would violate existing law regarding confidentiality in areas including, but not limited to, domestic violence and juveniles.  Each county prosecutor shall prepare a plan outlining the procedures for providing and/or disseminating the information required by this Executive Order and shall submit same to the Division of Criminal Justice for its review and filing.
[brief] Section 8.1 of the New Jersey Model Civil Jury Charges is titled “Damages – General” (Pa11).  Within that section, each general rule has its own title.  As the Court can readily see, 8.11G is titled “Life Expectancy” (Pa11).  Charge 8.11G then has two subparts: 8.11G(i), also titled “Life Expectancy;” and 8.11G(ii), titled “Time Unit Rule” (Pa23-24).  In their July 7, 2023 pretrial memorandum, Plaintiff requested “Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11G: Life Expectancy,” verbatim (Pa4).  By requesting the charge in this way, without specific reference to subparts, Plaintiff requested the entirety of the charge: both life expectancy, and the time-unit rule.  Defendants were therefore placed on notice of Plaintiff’s intent to make a time-unit argument at trial.  The fact that the general rule and its first subpart share the same title is what caused the confusion at the charge conference with [...].  When the issue of life expectancy arose, [...] asked, “And then it’s just the standard charge.  For life expectancy, I don’t know what that is. ” (4T, at 132:24-133:2).  Plaintiff’s counsel provided Plaintiff’s life expectancy of 40.5 years, and then Defense counsel agreed to the “standard charge. ”  (4T, at 133:3-6).  This is why, upon Defense counsel’s objection during closing, Plaintiff’s counsel immediately protested, “It’s on the pretrial.  And it’s in the jury charge. ”  (4T, at 194:15-16).  After [...] and counsel investigated the confusion further, Her Honor concluded that Plaintiff requested the entirety of 8.11G, and that the exclusion of the time-unit rule, which had slipped past all counsel, was on the Court (4T, at 199:3-18).  Regardless of the fact that Plaintiff requested the time-unit rule, no time-unit argument was ever made.  After clearing the confusion surrounding the charge, [...] probed Plaintiff’s counsel as to what they intended to argue next (4T, at 199:16-18).  Plaintiff’s counsel obliged that they only intended to present Plaintiff’s life expectancy in increments of days and hours, and then argue that doing so was one of the few ways counsel could convey the full extent of a permanent injury (4T, at 199:19-23).  When they returned to their closing, Plaintiff’s counsel argued exactly that – with no mention of the time-unit rule by name, or any suggestion that the jury should award damages based on a time-unit calculation (4T, at 194:3-203:24).  Both during the objection at trial, and on Defendants’ Motion for New Trial, [...] concluded that these extrapolated figures were something the jury could easily deduce on their own (4T, at 200:3-18; 6T, at 59:1-15).  And again, because “plaintiff did not actually go into any sort of unit analysis,” Her  Honor found that there was no miscarriage of justice (4T, at 59:16-23).  VI.
[brief] The logic behind this principal is simple: by introducing new issues/arguments/evidence on reply, Appealing party functionally denies the responding party the opportunity to respond to said issues/arguments/evidence.  Such logic would plainly be applicable here, where the Plaintiff would be at a severe disadvantage in terms of responding to an argument that the Defendants have not properly presented to the Court.  As such, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Defendants arguments concerning the jury charge be disregarded as improperly raised, and the Jury Verdict affirmed.