ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Here, plaintiff complains that the trial court improperly relied on the absence of prior accidents because “the absence of a prior accident does not preclude a finding of an intentional wrong. ”  *Crippen*, 176 N.J. at 408.  What plaintiff fails to note though is that prior accidents and “close-calls,” are evidence “that may be considered in the substantial certainty analysis. ”  Id. at 408, citing *Laidlaw*, supra. at 621–22.  Certainly, the reports from the [...] covering a 12 year period - which included the parking lot as originally designed and as redesigned - would not put any employer on notice of any such substantial certainty.
[brief] On June 25, 2024, [...] received the following bids for the Redecking Project:  [...], [...] $70,865,354.00  [...], [...] $80,735,000.00  [...], [...] $92,269,472.00  [...], [...] $104,013,587.34  [...], [...] $112,707,000.00  [A42].  On August 27, 2024, [...] awarded the Redecking Project bid to [...] (A41).  [...] responded by letter, dated August 28, 2024, protesting the rejection of the [...] Bid and the award to [...] (“[...] Protest”) (A51-61).  [...] argued that its Bid was lower than [...]’s and that it satisfied all bidding specifications set forth by [...], including submission of a Consent of Surety binding the surety to issue the required performance bonds if awarded the Contract (Ibid).  Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 19:9-2-12(b), [...], Director of Law for [...], was designated by [...]’s Executive Director as the hearing officer on [...]’s Protest (A67).  The Executive Director determined that, in accordance with [...]’s request, it was appropriate to decide the Protest upon [...]’s written submissions (Ibid).  The hearing officer issued a written recommendation to [...]’s Executive Director to deny [...]’s Protest and uphold the Contract award to [...] (“Recommended Decision”) (A64-79).  The Recommended Decision was adopted by the Executive Director as a final agency decision (“Final Agency Decision”) on September 17, 2024 (A63).  On September 18, 2024, [...] received a request by [...]’s legal counsel seeking a stay of the Notice to Proceed with the Contract pending appeal, and consent to an expedited appeal process (A80-81).  On September 20, 2024, [...] denied [...]’s stay request (A82-84).  On September 24, 2024, this Court granted [...]’s request to file an emergent stay application during the pendency of its appeal of the Final Agency Decision (A127-128).  On October 7, 2024, this Court granted [...] an emergent stay of the Notice to Proceed with the Contract (A125-126).
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 357.  Noting that OPRA “carves out thirty exceptions to the definition of government record . . . and lists multiple exemptions to the right to access[,]”  [...]’s decision went on to note that “[t]his Court is not the proper forum to resolve whether exceptions or exemptions apply to the information requested, and we offer no opinion on the issue.  If the Township wishes to contest the disclosure of the information on grounds other than those raised in this appeal, it must present evidence and arguments to the trial court, and [...] must be given the opportunity to respond. ”  *Id.* at 358.  In this same vein, the Court also recognized that while it might take an IT specialist “two or three minutes” to create the log, it would take the custodian “considerably longer” to determine whether release of the information in the log “may intrude on privacy rights or raise public-safety concerns. ”  *Id.* at 357.  In short, because the record before the Court was not sufficiently fulsome to address issues outside the question of whether the log required [...] to create a record, the case was remanded for further consideration of any applicable OPRA exemptions.  *Id.* at 358.  For these reasons, even aside from the trial court’s inaccurate characterization of what the request in *[...] v. [...]* actually requested (an email log versus two weeks of emails) and what the Court actually ordered (a remand for consideration versus an order to produce), its reliance on the Court’s decision to support its conclusion on [...]’s overbroad denial is misplaced.
[brief] ”  In *Jefferson Loan Co., Inc. v. Session*, 397 N.J. Super. 520, 533 (App. Div. 2008), the Appellate Division held that the CFA applied to an assignee of a credit contract because the assignee acts in connection with “the subsequent performance of the contract” (N.J.S.A. 56:8-2) when collecting a debt.  Relying on *Jefferson Loan*, the Supreme Court rejected the “argument that the collection activities of a servicing agent […] do not amount to the ‘subsequent performance’ of a loan, a covered activity under the CFA. ”  *Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp.*, 207 N.J. 557, 582 (2011).  Thus, the CFA can apply to the collection of debts.  In addition, an ascertainable loss—which is necessary for a private action under the CFA—exists.  N.J.S.A. 56:8-19.  *Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co.*, 138 N.J. 2, 22 (1994) held that a victim “must simply supply an estimate of damages, calculated within a reasonable degree of certainty.  The victim is not required to actually spend the money for the repairs before becoming entitled to press a claim. ”  The unconsented release of private, protected information has left the Plaintiff (and other consumers) vulnerable to identity theft.  As such, obtaining credit monitoring and ID theft protection is a necessary and reasonable expense—and an ascertainable loss—in response to the Defendants’ unlawful actions.  We do acknowledge that *DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman*, 430 N.J. Super. 325 (App. Div. 2013) seems to exclude third-party debt collectors from the scope of FDCPA.
[brief] EMANATING FROM THE MOTION  JUDGE'S MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW AS TO THE CONTENTS OF THE TRIAL TRANSCRIPT.  THE MOTION  JUDGE'S CONCLUSION THAT THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW APPEAR IN THE TRIAL TRANSCRIPT  MISCONCEIVES THE LAW AND IS THEREBY SUBJECT TO DE NOVO REVIEW.  (Pa1331-32)  VIII.
[directive] The “New Jersey Safe Haven Infant Protection Act” applies only to infants who are or who appear to be no more than 30 days old.  This rule should be interpreted generously and the person delivering the infant to the police station should be given the benefit of the doubt if the infant appears to be near 30 days old.  However, if the law enforcement officer or agency has credible and reliable evidence that the infant is more than 30 days old, the “New Jersey Safe Haven Infant Protection Act” does not apply.  P.L. 2000, Ch. 58, §4a.  In such circumstances, the law enforcement agency should take steps to ensure the safety of the child, notify the local Division of Youth and Family Services District Office and begin an investigation.  The State Police Missing Persons Unit should be contacted if the child cannot be identified during the course of the ensuing investigation.  1.2.4
[brief] ¹  Hereinafter, “Da” refers to Defendants’ Appendix for Appeal.  In a legal malpractice action instituted by the Plaintiff [...] ("Respondent") against her attorney [...] and the law firm, [...], ("Appellants") for their representation in an uncontested divorce matter involving a $1,000 legal fee, the Plaintiff-Respondent failed to prove causation and actual damages sustained by the Plaintiff at the end of the malpractice trial.  (Da109-111)  During the trial, the expert for the Plaintiff only proffered a net opinion stating that the Defendants shall be responsible for legal fees to obtain the amended judgment and to enforce the judgment in a malpractice action.  (Da113)  The record shows that the Plaintiff’s expert failed to conduct any analysis into the facts of this case and additionally failed to apply any law to the facts which would have allowed Plaintiff’s expert to appropriately draw the conclusion as to whether the amount of the legal fees incurred by Plaintiff were proximately caused by the Defendants’ negligence.  The record is also devoid of any indication that the Plaintiff’s expert rendered an opinion regarding what portion of the $449,798.50 was incurred to make the so-called corrections to the alleged errors made by the Defendants during their representation of the Plaintiff in the uncontested divorce proceeding.  (Da114)  The record also shows that the jury was never instructed to determine if the legal fees incurred by the Plaintiff in the Family Court proceeding to set aside the PSA and judgment of divorce was due to the negligence of the Defendants, which was a substantial factor in bringing about the ultimate harm sustained by the Plaintiff.  On the appeal, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey substituted an unsubstantiated jury award of $500,000 with a new award for $449,798.50 to Plaintiff for attorney fees.  On remand, the Plaintiff requested for the award of $1,311,832.94 legal fees in the proposed Final Judgment with no affidavit in support of the calculation of the legal fees sought by the plaintiff.  (Da41)  The trial court granted plaintiff’s application and denied defendants’ opposition and cross-motion to vacate the Final Judgment without stating a reasoning.  (Da13-17)  This appeal to the Superior Court of New Jersey follows.
[brief] 135 N.J. at 355 (emphasis added).  Thus, three of the four grounds upon which a court could vacate an award sounded in fraud or misconduct, and the fourth required a resulting award that was not “mutual, final and definite. ”  Id.  By comparison, the statute applicable to this private sector Arbitration became effective January 1, 2003 and provides that a Court shall vacate an arbitration award if: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; (2) the court finds evident partiality by an arbitrator; corruption by an arbitrator; or misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; (3) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to section 15 of this act, so as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; (4) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's powers; (5) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the arbitration proceeding without raising the objection pursuant to subsection c. of section 15 of this act not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or (6) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation of an arbitration as required in section 9 of this act so as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding.
[brief] Also relevant to an accord and satisfaction defense that the Board was entitled to pursue in discovery, please note [...]’s admissions that it was satisfied with the Board’s payments from April / July 2020, and never formally contested same:  11.  Admitted that [...] paid for Invoice nos. 7020000137, -226, and -230, (SUMF at ¶ 18); admitted that [...] never filed a ‘formal notice of breach of contract,’ and disputed that [...] had any obligation to file a “formal notice of breach of contract. ”  12.  Admitted that [...] paid for Invoice nos. 7020000137, -226, and -230; admitted that [...] never filed a petition with the Commissioner of Education; and disputed that [...] had any obligation to file a petition with the Commissioner of Education.  15.  Admitted that [...] never filed a ‘formal notice of breach of contract;’ and disputed that [...] had any obligation to file a “formal notice of breach of contract. ”  The Board was indeed entitled to pursue an accord and satisfaction defense through discovery.
[brief] “To determine if a statute confers an implied private right of action, courts consider whether: (1) plaintiff is a member of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted; (2) there is any evidence that the Legislature intended to create a private right of action under the statute; and (3) it is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to infer the existence of such a remedy. ”  Castro v. NYT Television, 370 N.J. Super. 282, 291 (App. Div. 2004), citing,” R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat’l Consumer Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 255, 272 (2001).  “Although courts give varying weight to each one of those factors, ‘the primary goal has almost invariably been a search for the underlying legislative intent. ”  Castro, 370 N.J. Super. at 291, quoting Jalowiecki v. Leuc, 182 N.J. Super. 22, 30 (App.Div.1981).  See also, Estate of Burns v. Care One, 468 N.J. Super., 306, 320 (App. Div. 2021).  Application of these factors leads to the ready conclusion that the implication of a private right of action is warranted here.  Here, [...], (and its employees who would benefit from the payment), is clearly within the class for whose benefit the Statute was enacted.  That is beyond debate.  As to whether there is evidence that the Legislature intended to create a private right of action, in this setting, in the absence of such a right of action, the Statute’s effect is vitiated; without such a right, a statutory mandate becomes nothing more than an option on the part of the local school district.  And for the same reason, there can be no doubt that allowing a contractor such as [...] to sue to enforce the obligations imposed by the Statute is entirely consistent with its legislative scheme; the certain intent of that scheme was to effect the transfer of funds from school districts to their contractors, (and to their employees), and affording those contractors the ability to enforce school districts’ legal obligations to them fully serves that purpose.  Denying the contractor which is owed money pursuant to the Statute the right to sue plainly does not.  To conclude on this point, the position being taken by [...] with respect to the COVID Statute is, in reality, that it does not agree with its mandate and will try anything to avoid the Statute’s intended effect.  Its legal arguments against the Statute’s application are entirely specious and should be rejected by the Court.  POINT II-THE COVID STATUTE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
[directive] N.J.S.A. by authorized as assessment).  diagnostic professional to submit defendant is the that to basis believe objective an is there whether determining In all circumstances, consider relevant prosecutor may the addiction, of disease the from suffering following: the to limited not but including or substance a of controlled influence under the be to appeared defendant the whether (a) being user; drug a to admitted or has offense, the of time the at alcohol 61 Page possession; for drug convicted or arrested been previously has defendant the whether (b) and for eligible clinically or found to admitted been previously has defendant the whether (c) Program. Court Drug the Personal on Restrictions Curfews, Arrest, House Monitoring, Electronic 6.2.5 Conditions. Release Other and Associations, the that request appropriate shall as general attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant An the where (1) to 162-17(b)(2)(a) N.J.S.A. by authorized condition release other any impose court the assure reasonably to needed condition is such that believe to reason has prosecutor person other any of safety of protection the the required, when court in appearance defendant's criminal the obstruct to attempt or obstruct not will defendant the that and community, or the in program services pretrial monitoring by (electronic 6.2.2 subsection also See process. justice imposed). condition is or release order restraining no-contact a when cases violence domestic Bail. Monetary of Imposition for Requests on Restrictions
[brief] Fourth, alternatively, the Court should hold that Plaintiff’s original OPRA request was invalid because it was overbroad, and that Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint should have been dismissed on that basis.  As more fully discussed below, the order of the Trial Court must be reversed, and this Court should (1) dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice; (2) vacate the Trial Court’s order granting relief to the Plaintiff; and (3) hold that Defendant is entitled to indemnification of his reasonable counsel fees and costs incurred for all the work performed by [...]’s counsel in an amount to be determined on remand.
[brief] ”  7T82:17-83:11.  He performed that task by reviewing QuickBooks data files and bank statements for [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and the entities in India, [...] and [...].  7T101:9-103:1; 105:22-106:1.  He opined that the values on Exhibit S “false and mislead” based his conclusion that there were inconsistencies between books of accounts, Exhibit S and . . . between the books of accounts and the tax returns of the entities in question. ”  7T114:3-7.  [...]’s report reveals he accepted the allegations of the complaint as true:  “I understand that there are allegations of unauthorized expenditures and disbursements from the U.S. entities during the afore mentioned periods that in the aggregate exceed $7.5 million.  If these allegations are true; the unauthorized expenses should not have been taken as deductions .  . . .”  8/30/21 report at 5 (emphasis added).  He surmised that each transaction he questioned had a negative impact on the value of the companies sold and concluded “Exhibit S was inaccurate and misleading.
[brief] **The Current Circumstance. **  Previously, the disputed boundary did not involve any structures.  During this dispute, the [...] seized the opportunity to build a board-on-board fence on the [...]’ side of the Sweeney line but within the Worley line.  This spite fence pinches the southeast corner of the [...]’ house obstructing access to their backyard.  See Photographs (Pa146) (photos show Patierno’s Lot 11 on the right and [...]’ Lot 10 on the left).  The fact that this fence is within the Worley line shows the problem of simply incorporating that line as the boundary between Lots 10 & 11.  The Worley line is unreasonably close to the [...]’ house.  *Id.*  It bears repeating that the [...] lived on Lot 10 for 13 years without disputing the boundary line with Lot 11.  See 1T62, l.24-63, l.11.  To resolve this dispute at trial the [...] had another surveyor, [...], PLS, draw a boundary line between the Sweeney and Worley lines placing the spite fence on the [...]’ property to allow its removal.  See Ludwig Line, Pa148.  Ludwig testified at trial but the trial court completely discounted that testimony based upon its understanding that N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3 allows only a thumbs up or down decision on any report from Boundary Commissioners.  See 2T5, l.10-6, l.10.  The Final Order, however, is inconsistent with that understanding and impacts parties that did not participate in this case.  The [...] maintain that the Ludwig line should have been considered as an equitable solution.  It would have a minimal impact on the [...] and [...], and none at all on surrounding properties. \(^3\)  **VIII.  LEGAL ARGUMENT**
[brief] It would again be nonsensical to state that a party has permission to commence arbitration but that the other party could file suit in Superior Court despite such an arbitration.  How would that make any sense whatsoever?  Finally, what sensible interpretation can be given to Paragraph 33’s announcement that “the Shareholders hereby submit to Dispute Resolution as defined in Paragraph 23 of this Agreement with the understanding that the Arbitrator shall specifically enforce the provisions of such paragraphs as it determines warrant specific performance thereof, without limiting the rights of the aggrieved part(ies) to seek, in addition thereto, compensatory and/or punitive damages, by reason of such breach(es)” (Pa037) if the Trial Court’s construction is credited?
[brief] Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants Of Counsel: [...], Esq.  On the Brief  [...], Esq.  Submitted: May 20, 2024  Amended: May 29, 2024  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |----------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 2 | | STATEMENT OF THE FACTS | 3 | | A. The Memorandum of Understanding | 3 | | B. The Underlying Lawsuit | 5 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 12 | | Point I: Standard of Review | 12 | | Point II: The MOU is Unenforceable Because it Lacks Essential Terms (Da7, 9) | 13 | | Point III: The MOU is Unenforceable Because it is Illusory (Da7, 9) | 16 | | Point IV: The MOU is Unenforceable Because the Trial Court’s Interpretation of the MOU Leads to an Absurd Result (Da7, 9) | 19 | | Point V: Since the MOU is Unenforceable, the Order Granting Counsel Fees Should be Reversed (Da14, 125) | 21 | | CONCLUSION | 23 | | Date | Description | Page | |-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | September 15, 2023
[brief] More than 30 years ago, our Supreme Court held that addiction was not a mitigating factor.  See State v. Rivera, 124 N.J. 122, 126 (1991); State v. Ghertler, 114 N.J. 383, 390 (1989).  Since then, the Court has acknowledged that addiction may be mitigating if it is causally linked to the offense.  State v. Clarke, 203 N.J. 166, 182 (2010) (in an appeal of a denial of Drug Court, findings of the aggravating and mitigating factors were adversely influenced by the sentencing court’s failure to appreciate the defendant’s drug dependency at the time of the offense).  And more recently, this Court recognized that a sentencing court should consider a defendant’s substance abuse history, as “it may help to explain past criminal behavior and put past crimes in context in terms of the goal of interrupting a recurring cycle of recidivism. ”  State v. Harris, 466 N.J. Super. 502, 545 (App. Div. 2021).  Based on the scientific evidence, however, it is clear that in most cases, “addiction mitigates a defendant’s culpability. ”  United States v. Hendrickson, 25 F. Supp. 3d 1166, 1174 (N.D. Iowa 2014).  “The capacity to evaluate the consequences of one’s actions is central to one’s culpability,” and individuals suffering from addiction have a diminished capacity to make such evaluations.  Ibid.  Moreover, addiction is mitigating for many of the same reasons that youth is mitigating.  Ibid.  “Just as there are fundamental differences between the juvenile and adult brain, so too are there fundamental differences between the addict and non-addict brain. ”  Id. at 1175.  These differences cause individuals suffering from addiction to make ill-considered decisions in the same manner that they cause juveniles to do so.  Ibid.  See State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359, 397 (2022) (misconduct of juveniles “is not as morally culpable as an adult’s” because juveniles “lack maturity and responsibility” which can lead to poor decision-making).  Here, the court acknowledged that [...] had a serious drug addiction which contributed to the commission of this offense and a prior offense.  Yet, the court failed to give due weight to this information, which bears significantly on [...]’s culpability.  The court’s failure to fully appreciate the mitigating nature of [...]’s addiction renders his sentence excessive.  Resentencing is therefore required.  C.
[brief] [...], writing for the majority in Lombardi, phrased it as follows:  In other words, our charge at this stage is to look at the original summary judgment record . . . and to determine whether, viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, it presented genuine issues of material fact requiring trial.  *Lombardi*, supra, 207 N.J. at 542.  [Emphasis added.]  In the instant matter, a review of the original summary judgment record makes clear that plaintiff-appellant’s case did not – and does not now – present any such issues that should have resulted in a denial of the [...]’ motion for summary judgment, or should compel this Court to now overturn the Motion Court’s well-reasoned grant of summary judgment.
[brief] Failing to calculate damages with precision does not bar recovery of lost profits, and it would be a “travesty to deny a Plaintiff essential justice because the absence of means for precision precludes perfect justice. ”  Id. at 427 (quoting Am. Sanitary Sales Co. v. State, Dep't of Treasury, Div. of Purchase & Prop., 178 N.J. Super. 429, 435 (App. Div. 1981)).