ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The court finds multiple witnesses testified including notaries employed by [...] concerning the circumstances surrounding the procurement of her signature on the documents.  The court finds the testimony of the notaries to be credible in that they testified that their typical procedure is to properly identify the signee, provide the full document referenced and witness the signature of the signee.  The court finds the notaries used this same procedure when obtaining the defendant’s signatures.  Additionally, defendant testified the signatures on the documents were hers but that she did not have the full documents, did not ask to review the full documents and simply signed them based on plaintiff’s instruction.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ premise in opposing reversal requires that this Court assume the Supreme Court effectuated a *sub-silentio* overruling of the *Burt* decision via the 2020 *Mejia* opinion.  If *Mejia* did not overrule or abrogate *Burt*, then it is inescapable that the trial court was bound by the process outlined in *Burt* when entering judgment, but failed to do so.  As detailed below, *Mejia* arose in a distinguishable procedural posture and, further, if the Supreme Court had intended for its holding to be a sweeping abdication of *Burt* as a legal proposition, it certainly knew how to so state in its opinion.  It did not.  More fundamentally, however, plaintiffs’ contention that the trial court could properly reconsider its numerous pre-trial rulings to revoke *Burt* defendant status of [...] and [...] leaves an obvious and unanswerable question: if these doctors were not *Burt* defendants, then what were they?  The CNA and the interpretive case law provide no answer.  These defendants *appeared on the verdict sheet*, while the jury was nonetheless informed they had been dismissed on procedural grounds.  The trial court repeatedly reaffirmed that these two doctors were out of the case throughout the trial.  There are limited exceptions to the requirement that the jury’s allocation under the Comparative Negligence Act (“CNA”) be completed among *parties* to the action.  One of those exceptions is articulated in *Burt*.  Case law has also provided exceptions for settling defendants, bankrupt defendants, defendants protected by the statute of repose, and “John Doe” fictitious party defendants.  Drs. [...] and [...] were *not* settling defendants, bankrupt, immunized by a statute of repose, or fictitiously pled “John Does. ”  So, if, as plaintiffs (and the trial court) now suggest, *Burt* is no longer a viable characterization, they were *required* to be present and participate at trial.  Absent *Burt* defendant classification, there was no proper basis for the trial to proceed with the jury allocating fault among the absent doctors as “empty chair” defendants.  Yet, the trial court’s post-verdict reconsideration of *Burt* characterization did exactly that.  Plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged this legal reality on the first day of trial, when he argued that *Burt* is no longer good law and an adjournment of trial to allow Drs. [...] and [...] to be active parties.  The trial court unequivocally denied that request.  Thus, by retroactively converting those doctors to “empty chair” defendants, the trial court created a new, undefined exception to the CNA, permitting non-parties to be considered in allocation of responsibility notwithstanding any precedent, *other than Burt*, that would allow this outcome.  On its face, this requires a reversal for either a molded judgment or the conduct of a new trial under the proper framework.
[directive] The relevant facts and circumstances accounted for in these Guidelines, whether as a Special Offense Characteristic, Criminal History Category, Special Application and Enhancement Feature, or Aggravating or Mitigating Factor, relate Page 18 [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) to the defendant’s own relevant conduct or prior record and thus help to determine the defendant’s culpability.  Even the Quality of Life Aggravating Factor, see Section 10.1.1, which might be said to be based on localized conditions, focuses ultimately on the risk of harm posed by the defendant’s own actual conduct given the special vulnerability of law-abiding residents in these carefully- selected locations due to the cumulative, negative effect of open and notorious drug trafficking activities.  Countywide case backlog problems, in contrast, are unrelated to a defendant’s culpability or an assessment of the harm caused or threatened by the defendant’s own conduct.  The Supreme Court’s willingness to permit the Attorney General to specifically authorize prosecutors to consider local case backlog conditions was undoubtedly based on the perceived practical need to move cases efficiently.  However, other provisions of these Guidelines are designed to accomplish the salutary and necessary objective of providing guilty defendants a practical incentive to plead guilty and thereby to waive their right to a jury trial.  Notably, the graduated plea system established in these Guidelines, see Section 4, providing an incentive for guilty defendants to plead at the earliest opportunity, is designed to promote efficiency in handling and disposing cases without creating, reinforcing, or institutionalizing disparity between counties.  3.9
[brief] [1T84:9-20]  [...], herself, has already rejected the Plaintiffs’ mischaracterization of her statement.  In the April 24, 2020 hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Consolidate, in response to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s assertion that the statement indicated that Plaintiffs could bring a new claim, [...], addressing Plaintiffs’ counsel, stated, “[y]ou do not speak for the Court, and your interpretation of this Court’s Order at that time is your interpretation.  The defendants obviously have a different interpretation of this Court’s ruling, and this Court’s ruling will speak for itself. ”  (Da593)  She then explained that at the January 24, 2020 hearing, she questioned Plaintiffs’ counsel as to how a denial of their motion to amend the complaint if it was, in fact, new evidence would prejudice Plaintiffs.  (Da594)  However, she then specifically stated:  It wasn’t a holding by this Court in any way or a ruling on whether or not those -- a new complaint, which the Court did not have the benefit of seeing, right, and was not even drafted, whether that new complaint which has now been filed would be subject to any attack by the defendants that they might make when they look at the complaint.  [Id.]  She then further rejected Plaintiffs’ counsel’s mischaracterization by stating that she “wanted to make sure that that was clear on the record, is that whatever characterization the plaintiffs may have of this Court’s ruling is really of no moment. ”  (Id.)  Plaintiffs argue that this Court should simply accept [...]’ initial statement in the manner which Plaintiffs misconstrue it, and reject the idea that [...]’ further statements can shed light on the issue, asserting that they are “irrelevant[].”  (Pb25)  However, in interpreting the meaning of [...]’ statement, her own statements interpreting and discussing her initial ruling would be very relevant because she is ultimately the person who is the most knowledgeable as to her own intent and the meaning she intended to convey.  Thus, this Court should reject Plaintiffs’ argument concerning [...]’ ruling, as it is nothing more than a misinterpretation of her holding.  Therefore, as there was no error in [...] granting the motion to dismiss the [...], this Court is asked to affirm that decision.  **ISSUE III: THE MOTION JUDGE PROPERLY DISMISSED THE PLAINTIFFS’ LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS.**
[brief] Similarly here, [...] claims that [...] was a small, family-owned business with limited positions available so he “knew” that no alternative positions would be offered.  (Ab16-17).  [...], however, never inquired into alternative positions or possible accommodations at [...].  (T8-10; T17; T20).  [...] conceded that he did not “sit down” with his employer and explain that the job was aggravating his medical problem.  (T11).  [...] admits that he only mentioned his condition to his bosses but never asked for an alternative assignment.  (T9).  Although [...] testified [...] never told her directly about his condition, she confirmed that there were no discussions regarding his position at [...].  (T32; T34).  Thus, [...]’s conclusory assumption that no alternative positions existed fails to meet the burden set forth in Ardan.  [...] also fails to demonstrate that his position at [...] aggravated or caused his medical condition.  This court has held that an individual must demonstrate, “through uncontroverted medical evidence” that their medical condition will be “aggravated” by the conditions of their work to satisfy N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b).  Israel v. Bally’s Park Place, Inc., 283 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 1995); N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(d).  Here, [...] offered no proof that the work environment aggravated any medical condition, either before the Board or to [...] when he resigned.  (T9-11).  It should be noted that all medical notes in the record here are from 2022, which is after his resignation on June 4, 2021.  (Pa1).  As such, there is no evidence in the record to support [...]’s claim that he brought his concerns to the employer’s attention before resigning.  (Ab17).  Additionally, although the notes demonstrate that [...] suffered from osteoarthritis in his knees, they do not demonstrate that the job caused or aggravated his medical condition.  (Pa38; Pa39).  The medical note dated April 11, 2022, explicitly indicates that it was [...]’s opinion that the job aggravated his medical condition, not the doctor’s prognosis.  (Pa37).  [...] presented no further medical certifications or opinions from a physician attesting that the work environment aggravated his medical condition, nor was there a medical recommendation that [...] resign from his position.  Indeed, [...] conceded that his decision was based upon his assumption that an alternative position would not be provided and not on the recommendation of any medical professional.  (T10-12).  Thus, in the absence of medical evidence demonstrating that the work caused or aggravated [...]’s condition, there is no credible proof in the record that he left work because of factors related to the work.  This court should therefore affirm the Board’s decision.
[brief] ** | 8 | | 336 N.J. Super. (App. Div. 2001) | | | **Maxim Sewerage v. Monmouth Ridings** | 15 | | 273 N.J. Super. 84 (App. Div. 1993) | | | **Notte v. Merchants Mutual Insurance Company** | 8, 18, 24| | 185 N.J. 490 (2005) | | | **Printing Mart Morristown v. Sharp Electronics** | 15, 16, 17, 18| | 116 N.J. 739 (1989) | | Rieder v. Department of Transportation  221 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div. 1987)  16  Rosenblitt v. Zimmerman 166 N.J. 391 (2001) 12, 13, 19, 22  Somers Construction Co. v. Board of Education  198 F. Supp. 732 D.N.J. 1961  16  Tartaglia v. UBS Paine Webber, Inc.  197 N.J. 81 (2007)  22, 23, 24  Court Rules 4:6-2(e)
[brief] *Id*; *New Jersey Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.*, 453 N.J. Super. 272, 291–92 (App. Div. 2018).  Whether a party has standing is a “threshold justiciability determination” that must be made by the court and that is not subject to “waiver” or “consent. ”  *Id.*  “[A] lack of standing … precludes a court from entertaining any of the substantive issues for determination. ”  *EnviroFinance Grp. v. Envtl. Barrier Co.*, 440 N.J. Super. 325, 339 (App. Div. 2015) (citations omitted).
[directive] This mandatory Nothing herein sha11 be construed acomplaint-summons or acomplaint-warrant. whether to issue Central Registry in Violence from checking the Domestic officer preclude or discourage a police to Prosecutor may direct officers and a County involving domestic violence, ust cases all cases, and not j prosecutor specify. the may all or in such types of cases as registry in cases, to check that central Protection Act Central Registry.  Survivor Check Sexual Assault Requirement to 4.2.4. officer making of 2C, the police under Chapter 14 Title involving sexual offense a In cases whether determine under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-20 to registry established shall check the central arrest the Survivor the Sexual Assault pursuant to order issued subject a protective the defendant is to mandatory This (effective May 7, 2016)).
[brief] If such resolutions existed, they would be located in the Board’s administrative office as they would be part of the Board of Education’s official meeting agendas and minutes.  [...] certified that he performed a diligent search of his office, and no resolutions for these cases were found.  Pa215.  For three of the 11 cases, no final decisions could be located.  For one case, no settlement agreement could be located.  When [...] did not find these documents in the Board’s possession, he contacted outside counsel who had represented the Board in these special education OAL matters.  Pa215.  Nonetheless, these three final decisions and one settlement agreement could not be found by counsel.  Pa215.  Accordingly, the Defendants provided the Plaintiffs with all responsive records in their possession.  It is therefore clear that there was no reason to hold [...] in contempt of court.  There was also no basis to issue an arrest warrant pursuant to R. 1:10-2.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found no reason in the law or facts to award such extreme relief.  Moreover, the trial court was right when it refused to assess a civil penalty pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11.  In order to impose a civil penalty under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11(a), the Court must determine there was a knowing and willful violation of OPRA and access to records has been unreasonably denied under the circumstances.  North Jersey Media Group. Inc. v. State Office of Governor, 451 N.J. Super. 282 (App. Div. 2017).  Additionally, civil penalties can only be imposed if the custodian had actual knowledge that his actions were wrongful and there must be a positive element of conscious wrongdoing.  Bart v. City of Paterson Housing Authority, 403 N.J. Super. 609 (App. Div. 2008).  Here, [...] did not knowingly and willfully violate OPRA as he did not intentionally deprive Plaintiffs of the records Plaintiffs sought.
[brief] | SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  Docket No.: [...]  On Appeal from the Final Decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Civil Part, Camden County  Docket Below: [...] | | [...], PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, v. [...]; [...], in his official capacity as records custodian; and [...]  | SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  Docket No.: [...]  On Appeal from the Final Decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Civil Part, Camden County | BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS-CROSS RESPONDENTS, THE [...] AND [...], IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS RECORDS  CUSTODIAN
[brief] “[I]t is essential that the board’s actions be grounded in evidence in the record. ”  Fallone Props., L.L.C. v. Bethlehem Twp. Planning Bd., 369 N.J. Super. 552, 562 (App. Div. 2004).  “Prudence dictates that zoning boards root their findings in *substantiated proofs* rather than unsupported allegations. ”  *Cell South*, 172 N.J. at 88 (emphasis added).  Without “persuasive evidence in the record to support the [local land use board’s] decision denying [the applicant’s] the variance, the decision must be set aside as arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. ”  *Cell South*, 172 N.J. at 88.
[brief] [...] was an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of New Jersey with [...].  In March/April 2006, [...] met with [...] and [...], a representative of [...].  [...] and [...] represented to [...] that the real estate opportunity in [...] would be rezoned and developed as a “free market” development of approximately four hundred (400) townhouses and that Plaintiffs could purchase said real estate and either develop it or sell the eventual delineated lots “approved and improved” to [...] at a certain price.  [...] and [...] explained that the aforesaid real estate would consist of an assemblage of various adjacent properties located in [...], [...] (“[...]”).  [...] and [...] explained that Plaintiffs would enter into agreements of sale for the purchase of said real estate and hire the requisite professionals.  [...] and [...] had a second meeting with Plaintiffs and discussed the Township’s affordable housing issues in conjunction with another real estate opportunity in [...] (“[...]”).
[brief] Respondent’s contention that the issue presented on this appeal is a very simple and straightforward one as to whether an enforceable settlement contract was reached by the parties is correct.  Her conclusion that it was not, however, is unsupported by the record before this Court or applicable law, both of which demonstrate that a settlement contract was reached, memorialized on the record by counsel, and by Respondent herself following questioning by her counsel and the hearing officer as to her understanding of, and agreement to, the settlement contract terms.  Her subsequent change of heart and buyer’s remorse change neither those facts, nor the law, which mandate enforcement of the settlement contract.  Respondent’s arguments that: (1) the matter should be before Civil Service, which was rejected below; (2) disputed material facts preclude enforcement of the memorialized settlement contract, which is contradicted by counsel’s own arguments below, wherein Respondent’s counsel acknowledged at oral argument that a plenary hearing was unnecessary; (3) Willingboro is apposite and/or its writing requirements were not satisfied by the hearing transcript, which interpretation of that case is incorrect; and/or (4) the OWBPA allowed Respondent to repudiate the memorialized settlement contract are all meritless and must be rejected by this Court based upon the undisputed record and applicable law.  Thus, it is urged that the trial court’s decision be reversed.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I
[brief] After having received all of the benefits of five years of employment with Respondent [...] (the “Practice”), Appellant [...] seeks to invalidate his post-employment restrictions, to which he expressly agreed, simply because he found them to be inconvenient.  This Court should dismiss and/or deny his appeal because it is improper and baseless.  First, Dr. Ondik’s appeal remains procedurally improper because he is appealing the Chancery Court’s Orders that clearly and unambiguously denied his applications for an order to show cause/reconsideration and dismissed his Complaint without prejudice.  Rather than filing an amended Complaint, he filed this improper appeal and new complaint in the Law Division based on arguments that he already made to the Chancery Court.  For this reason alone, Dr. Ondik’s appeal should be dismissed.  Second, the Chancery Court properly denied Dr. Ondik’s application for a preliminary injunction and his motion for reconsideration because Dr. Ondik failed to demonstrate any of the Crowe factors.  No irreparable harm existed.  At the time of his initial application, Dr. Ondik was still employed by the Practice, which had not taken any steps to prevent him from working at [...] (“[...]”).  Not only was his initial application not ripe, but it also concerned issues of money damages that do not support a preliminary injunction.  Therefore, the Chancery Court properly denied Dr. Ondik’s applications.  By the time Dr. Ondik filed his motion for reconsideration/second application for a preliminary injunction, [...] had withdrawn its employment offer, rendering Dr. Ondik’s motion/application moot.  Regardless, the Chancery Court noted that Dr. Ondik still had not demonstrated the existence of irreparable harm because he was free to find alternate employment outside the restrictive radius.  Dr. Ondik has now done this, confirming the Chancery Court’s denial of his reconsideration motion/second application was appropriate.  At no time did the potential enforcement of the restrictive covenant in his Employment Agreement create irreparable harm for Dr. Ondik.  Nor did Dr. Ondik show a likelihood of success on the merits.  The Practice’s Restrictive Covenant protected its legitimate business interests—its investment in Dr. Ondik, its patient and referral bases, and good will.  Dr. Ondik admittedly “had no professional presence in New Jersey” when he was hired by the Practice.  (Ab22).  Thus, the only patients and referral sources Dr. Ondik had were those to which the Practice introduced him as part of his employment.  New Jersey case law clearly supports the Practice’s ability to protect its relationships with a restrictive covenant.  The Restrictive Covenant did not and will not impose an undue hardship on Dr. Ondik.  Contrary to Dr. Ondik’s dramatic (and incorrect) pronouncements about the Restrictive Covenant’s scope, he could have easily found work in South Jersey (as his former colleagues did) or the Philadelphia area.
[brief] DA1.  [...] claimed that the casings recovered outside the store were fired from the gun of [...], whereas the casing recovered with the Glock was fired from that Glock.  (6T 37-8 to 11; 6T 38-21 to 40-21).  The projectile recovered from [...]'s leg was fired from the Glock.  The bullet fragment found at the scene was too small to test, [...] testified.  (6T42-5 to 43-16; 6T38-10 to 15).  Defendant’s counsel conducted no cross-examination of this expert at trial and took no steps to obtain any countering evidence on defendant’s behalf.  DA1-25.  Defendant argued that the issue of which gun fired which shots was critical to the State’s version of events against defendant, and the evidence about the gun defendant allegedly fired at Officer [...] was inconsistent.  DA7-9.  [...], who owned the 99 cent store where marijuana was apparently being sold, said he was "sitting in the back" with [...] and a man named [...] when a man came into the store, pulled out a gun, and told everyone to get on the floor.
[brief] On June 24, 2022, Plaintiff [...] (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants [...], and Commissioners [...], [...], and [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) in the Superior Court of New Jersey, [...] Vicinage.  The complaint asserted two counts pursuant to CEPA.  (Pa3).  On August 15, 2022, [...] filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e).  (Pa17)  After oral argument before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on December 9, 2022, the judge dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice on December 28, 2022 (Pa19), finding that Plaintiff was not an “employee” for CEPA purposes, and did not suffer “retaliatory action. ”  Thereafter, on January 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 4:49-2.  (Pa31).  [...] opposed Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.  (Pa35).  This motion raised issues concerning the Court’s determination regarding Plaintiff’s independent contractor status, and not the other factors comprising a prima facie case under CEPA.  (Pa37).  Once again, after oral argument before the Honorable [...] on May 22, 2023, the trial court entered an order denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  In relevant part, the judge wrote:  …[t]his Court’s decision was not based on an incorrect or irrational basis.  Critically, this Court: (1) correctly applied the Pukowsky factors (which under D’Annunzio are applicable to a CEPA claim) to the facts surrounding Plaintiff’s independent contractor relationship with the County; and (2) considered all probative, competent evidence in the public record, most notably the 2018 RFP which clearly stated that Plaintiff would not be hired as an employee.  [(Pa37)].  On May 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed notice of appeal.