ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree aggravated manslaughter, among other crimes, for his purported role in a drive-by shooting.  ---  1  Pb refers to the State’s opposition brief filed on August 14, 2024.  Db refers to defendant’s merits brief filed on May 10, 2024.  All other citations referenced in this letter reply brief are set forth in defendant’s merits brief filed on May 10, 2024 at pages 3-4 in footnote one.  2  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). which resulted in the death of a nineteen-year-old young man.  (Da 8-11; 5T 27-13 to 14; 6T 156-18 to 157-6; 7T 74-13 to 16).  The State’s proofs against defendant amounted to a recorded pretrial statement of an eyewitness to the shooting.  (6T 73-24 to 74-1).  At trial the eyewitness recanted.  (5T 28-5 to 10).  No other witnesses provided evidence of defendant’s presence at the crime scene.  (6T 45-5 to 7; 9T 28-10 to 14).  No physical or forensic evidence assisted the police investigation in identifying the assailants.  (7T 80-13 to 18, 101-9 to 11, 110-5 to 7, 137-5 to 10).  The central issue of defendant’s PCR petition concerned his trial attorney’s failure to conduct a pretrial investigation of his whereabouts on the night of a shooting.
[brief] On Appeal from a Final Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.S.C. RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF  [...]  [...] (pro hac vice)  [...] (New Jersey Bar No. 126432014)  [...]  Telephone: [...]  [...]  [...]  Of Counsel and on the Brief  Andrew. B. Kratenstein, Esq.  [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents
[brief] ”  (Sb24-25)  This assertion is factually incorrect.  At no point during the March 6 interview did detectives inform Defendant they were investigating the homicide of [...] or that they were investigating a homicide at all.  (Da138-152)  Nor did [...] testify that he informed Defendant they were investigating a homicide prior at any point prior to the initiation of the recorded statement.  (21T23-3 to 43-6)  The detectives did not inform Defendant they were investigating a homicide before or during the March 12 interview until an hour and eleven minutes into the March 12 interrogation.  (Da153 at 16:22:06 to 17:44:00; Da155-244; 14T62-22 to 64-15)  Neither detective “indicated during the waiver colloquy what the interrogation was about.  Nor did they specify the potential criminal charges that defendant was facing. ”  *Diaz*, 470 N.J. Super. at 507.
[directive] Law enforcement executives shall determine what performance measures are appropriate for the communities they serve, but at a minimum an agency must track the following performance indicators: (a) Internal affairs complaints against the officer, whether initiated by another officer or by a member of the public; (b) Civil actions filed against the officer; (c) Criminal investigations of or criminal complaints against the officer; (d) Any use of force by the officer that is formally determined or adjudicated (for example, by internal affairs or a grand jury) to have been excessive, unjustified, or unreasonable; (e) Domestic violence investigations in which the officer is an alleged subject; (f) An arrest of the officer, including on a driving under the influence charge; (g) Sexual harassment claims against the officer; (h) Vehicular collisions involving the officer that are formally determined to have been the fault of the officer; (i) A positive drug test by the officer; (j) Cases or arrests by the officer that are rejected or dismissed by a court; (k) Cases in which evidence obtained by an officer is suppressed by a court; (l) Insubordination by the officer; (m) Neglect of duty by the officer; (n) Unexcused absences by the officer; (o) Any other indicators, as determined by the agency’s chief executive.  3.4.6  This information should be maintained to facilitate analysis as to individual members, supervisors, squads, districts and assignments, and the agency as a whole.  Depending on the size of the agency and the complexity of this data, computerized software that utilizes mathematical algorithms may be best suited to assist in revealing the presence of particular patterns of incidents.  However, not all law enforcement agencies have the computer capabilities for such an in-depth screening process.  At a minimum, every law enforcement agency should establish a protocol for tracking employee behavior and INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 13 reviewing all internal affairs complaints made against its officers, regardless of outcome, for evidence of a pattern or practice of inappropriate or unconstitutional conduct.
[brief] A.  **Plaintiff’s Secret Recording of a Family Meeting**  Early on, Plaintiff expressed his extreme displeasure to Defendant and other members of the family regarding Plaintiff’s perceived unfair treatment with respect to his inheritance.  (Da821, Ex. C, at Da835).  Plaintiff declared that because he is the eldest son, he was entitled to inherit [...], the Korean company that Decedent owned and ran during his lifetime and was angry that he had not.  (Da830 at ¶ 4).  As a result of his displeasure, Plaintiff has undertaken a campaign to harass Defendant to the greatest extent possible.  (Da830 at ¶ 5).  On February 15, 2012 – just days after Decedent’s passing – plaintiff attended a family meeting and secretly recorded a discussion.  (Da830-912).  Plaintiff aggressively and repeatedly demanded that his stepmother simply surrender to him her entire 30 percent ownership interest in [...], as well as her entire 3/9 share of Decedent’s estate – all on the basis that Plaintiff is Decedent’s eldest son.  (Da890-893) (e.g., plaintiff demanding, “I want you to give the whole 30% [ownership interest in [...]] to me and then give up [those assets] to which you have the right to inherit….  You are an inheritor so giving up the right of inheritance means giving up everything. ”).  Plaintiff’s bitterness and vindictiveness at having been excluded from the family business in Korea despite being the eldest son is the engine that has driven his insistence on having an Administrator appointed to search for assets that did not exist.  B.  The Beneficiaries  Other Than Plaintiff  Oppose the Litigation  Plaintiff is the only person who sought the Administrator’s efforts to search for additional Estate assets in New Jersey; all of the remaining beneficiaries of the Estate, including not only Defendant but his step-mother, [...], and his sister, [...], did not join in Plaintiff’s efforts, and, in fact, objected to the Estate’s being charged for the costs of the administration, acknowledged that the only person interested in pursuing the administration is Plaintiff, and believed that such efforts constituted a waste of the assets of the Estate.  (Da988; Da991).  C.  Plaintiff Violates Court Orders
[brief] Defendant was even asked at one point in time if the, if his dog had, if his dog did anything under the circumstances, what would he have done to the dog?  He said I didn’t shoot the dog because he wasn’t doing anything to me but if he did, he would have shot the dog also.  To me that’s just further indication of this defendant’s mindset.  He has the mindset of a defenseless animal that he even thought about in his mind if the dog did something, then I would have taken the dog out too.  [17T:221-8 to 18].  The courts analysis in the aforementioned exchange was taken grossly out of context.  The majority of the exchange was [...] asking [...] leading questions trying to get him to state that he would’ve shot the dog.  (8T: to 63-13 to 65-14).  Despite [...]’s repeated questions, [...] says that he wouldn’t have shot the dog.  (8T: (8T:65-6 to 15).  However, the Court somehow used this exchange where [...] said that he wouldn’t shoot his dog as a reason to put no weight on the second Miller factor.  (17T:221-8 to 20).  Here, the Court took various facts out of context and did not place the appropriate weight on the Miller factors to justify a grossly excessive sentence for a sixteen-year-old.
[brief] The [...] also engages in none of the First Amendment-type behavior that the news media in this country do.  Most importantly, the [...] is heavily regulated by the [...], which supervises virtually every aspect of the operation of the [...] and even determined whether it could exist at all.  Ja2899-900.  Defendants have not and cannot point to any channel that any court has ever considered “news media” that must ask the government for permission to exist and permission to change how it does business.  The drafters of the NJFCA and the federal FCA could not have intended that a website that was government-created and -controlled website would be the “news media.
[brief] We disagree with the Vice-Chancellor's finding that no dominant confidential relation [was] obtained between plaintiff and defendants.  We think [***7] such a relation was established calling for the application of the principle that when a person is under the influence of and dependent upon others and enters into an improvident transaction with them stripping himself of virtually all his assets, a presumption of undue influence arises from the facts casting upon the dominant partners the burden to show by clear and convincing proof [*202] that the transaction was the voluntary and intelligent act of the dependent person made with the benefit of competent and disinterested counsel and fully understood and intended.
[brief] In Count Four of its Complaint, [...] asserted that the [...]’s adoption of Ordinance 1667 approving the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan violated the Public Trust Doctrine.  For the reasons set forth more fully below, the Trial Court properly found that these claims were premature and granted summary judgment to the [...] dismissing these claims.  A.  The Public Trust Doctrine Laws  In order to evaluate the merit—or, in this instance, the lack of merit—of [...]’s claims that the [...]’s adoption of Ordinance 1667 approving the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan violated the Public Trust Doctrine laws, it is first necessary to analyze what these laws say.  This section of the brief provides that analysis.
[brief] (T1, 12:18-21).  The Consent Order did not require Plaintiff to conduct further testing of off-site receptors (the Borough’s drinking water production wells are potential receptors) based upon the data Plaintiff had submitted which showed that the contamination had not migrated off site.  (Da29 – ACO).  For over 50 years, the Property had been actively operated by Plaintiff.  Most recently relevant to this proceeding, on January 26, 2018, Plaintiff entered into a commercial lease with an initial term of five years expiring on January 31, 2023, and an option for a five-year renewal period (the “Lease”).  (Da51; T1,13:6-10).  In January 2023, Plaintiff retained a new LSRP, [...] from [...].  (Da143-145; T1, 29:12-15).  In January 2023, [...] determined that more aggressive remediation might be necessary to address free product that had been discovered under the floor of the building on the Property.  (T1, 13:16-20).  In order to guarantee the unfettered access to the building interior, Plaintiff decided not to renew the lease.  (T1, 13: 21-23).  Between February and April of 2023, [...] continued to collect data from the Property and monitor conditions and developed a scope of work for evaluating remediation options for soil and groundwater at the Property.  (Da145).  Plaintiff remains in compliance with the terms of the ACO.
[brief] The present action concerns the proper denial by the Board of the Respondents’ Application to develop the Property located in the VC-2 Village Center Overlay Zone (the “VC-2 Zone”).  As will be demonstrated herein, the Respondents’ Application was inimical to the Purpose, as well as the General Goals of the VC-2 Zone set forth in the [...] Land Development Ordinance (“LDO”); which establishes the following Purpose for the VC-2 Zone:  Purpose:  The purpose of the VC-2 Overlay is to promote a full range of commercial, office and residential land uses within a newly created, pedestrian-friendly, mixed-use environment that will serve local, community-wide and regional needs and create new employment opportunities.  Pedestrian movement is encouraged to flow throughout the overlay zone area by generally permitting stores and shops and personal service establishments on the ground floor of buildings and promoting the use of upper floors for office and, in certain circumstances, residential dwelling units.  Land uses within the overlay zone should be arranged to provide for highway-oriented commercial and office uses along Route 33.  In order to create a neo-traditional downtown, less-intensive commercial and office uses mixed with residential uses on upper floors should be oriented toward the interior of the area along a primary access road that extends in a general north to northeast direction from Route 33 to Applegarth Road.  The bulk of the residential uses should be developed in areas that are in the vicinity of the less intensive "downtown" and extend north from Route 33 toward the edge of woods along the Millstone River.  Ba6.  The LDO further provides the following General Goals of the VC-2 zone:  General goals: (a)  Proper screening and buffering around the perimeter of the area and along surrounding roads; (b)  Adequate building setbacks from surrounding roads; (c)  Well-landscaped interior spaces for residential and nonresidential land uses; (d)  Open space for active and passive recreational amenities for residential land uses; (e)  Public amenities including, but not limited to, pedestrian plazas and sitting areas; (f) Opportunities for shared off-street parking and stormwater management facilities; (g)  Off-street parking that is well screened from public view; (h) Controlled and coordinated internal circulation system for pedestrians and vehicles; and (i)  Coordinated design themes, i.e., buildings, streetscapes, parking areas, landscaping, lighting and signage.  Ba6-7.  By compressing the entire development into the portion of the Property adjacent to Route 33, the Respondents undermined both the Purpose of the VC-2 Zone, as well as its General Goals.  M68-86; Ba6-7.  The development no longer resembled a town center but rather consisted a series of mixed-use structures providing none of the character sought for the VC-2 Zone; while requiring countless variances from its requirements.  M68-86; Ba6-16.
[brief] Also, Plaintiffs’ claim that the [...] should have considered the effect that the Financial Agreement would have on the school taxes paid by plaintiff Boroughs (Pb28) ignores the statutory scheme that *does not* require payments to the regional school district but *does* require payments to the county.  N.J.S.A. 40A:20-12(b).  E.  The LTTEL does not Require Substantial Credible Evidence to Affirm the Ordinance’s Validity.\(^6\) (Not Raised Below)
[brief] *Akhtar*, 439 N.J. Super. at 398-399 (internal citations omitted).  The inferences of fact weighed in the plaintiff’s favor, at the very least, create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants violated the duty they owed the plaintiff.  The defendants erected temporary barricades along the ingress/egress walkway to the store multiple feet of the barricades being raised above the ground.  (Pa91-Pa92 at 12:17-13:13; Pa94 at 15:14-19; Pa18 at 18:1-5; Pa185 at 39:4-9; Pa215-Pa219).  It was undisputed that the feet of the barricades were supposed to lay flat on the ground.  (Pa105 at 26:2-4; Pa230-Pa233).  It was also not disputed that the foot of a barricade that is bent and raised above the walking surface is a tripping hazard.  (Pa125-Pa126 at 46:10-47:15; Pa220-Pa222).  The defendants allowed the barricades with the raised feet that created tripping hazards for their invitees to remain in place even though they had extra barricades available to replace those that were damaged or that presented safety concerns.  (Pa99-Pa100 at 20:22-21:1; Pa108 at 29:11-18; Pa120 at 41:14-24; Pa122 at 43:6-11; Pa196 at 50:2-6).  It was not until immediately after the plaintiff fell that they removed and replaced the barricade with the bent foot and all other barricades that had potential issues.  (Pa195 at 49:16-24; Pa196 at 50:10-13; Pa197 at 51:1-3).  The plaintiff’s liability expert opined that the barricade with the raised foot created a tripping hazard and that the defendants’ failure to abate the hazard caused the plaintiff to trip and fall.
[brief] Pa96.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27  CONCLUSION.
[brief] “To fulfill its purpose, the rule imposes financial consequences on a party who rejects a settlement offer that turns out to be more favorable than the ultimate judgment. ”  *See also, Gonzalez v. Safe & Sound Sec. Corp.*, 185 N.J. 100, 125 (2005)(indicating that “[t]he rule was intended to penalize ‘a party who rejects a settlement offer that turns out to be more favorable than the ultimate judgment’”).  It is not Appellant [...], but rather his insurer, [...], that must pay the R. 4:58-2 sanctions for its unilateral decision not to accept Plaintiff’s Offer to Take Judgment.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Respondents create a strawman argument in their respondent’s brief, erroneously stating that “Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the Act because they pursued a “personal benefit” in seeking its passage”.  Appellant does not claim this in his brief or his complaint.  In fact, Respondents do not acknowledge that the School Ethics Act is much broader than just covering acts involving “personal benefit”.  In forming the School Ethics Act, the legislature found “it is essential that the conduct of members of local boards of education and local school administrators hold the respect and confidence of the people”.
[brief] 13,14 N.J.S.A. § 17:16G-4 ........................................................................  14  Miscellaneous ABA Model R. Prof’l Conduct 8.5 Cmt. [3]  ...........................................  6,7 Michels & Hockenjos, New Jersey Attorney Ethics, §1:2.  “Exercise of the Court’s Authority Through Rules and Opinions” (GANN, 2025)
[brief] [Pa285-286; Balazs Deposition, 50:3-21].  [...] made the incision at 10:25 p.m. and completed delivery at 10:27 p.m. [PA294, Balazs Deposition, 75:11-19].  Thus, the reason why [...] was unavailable until 10:12 p.m. to perform the C-section was because neither [...] nor [...] called for the procedure at 9:48 p.m.  As established by the testimony, once [...] was on notice, he called the c-section and [...] was immediately moved and prepared.  [...] made the incision at 10:25 p.m. and delivered [...] at 10:27 p.m.  This all happened within 15 minutes of [...] finally being told that there was a grave problem with the Jennings mother and baby.
[brief] “(6T74-23 to 75-1)  “The law recognizes that proper items for recovery, the pain, physical and mental suffering, discomfort, and distress that a person may endure as a natural consequence of an injury. ”  (6T76-3 to 6)  The jury was instructed to consider not just the physical injuries, but the emotional distress that an emotionally charged encounter such as that which took place on July 29, 2013 would entail.  ”It is presumed that the jury understood and followed the trial court's instructions. ”  State v. Nelson, 173 N.J.417, 478 (2002).  The Jury also had the benefit of the dash cam video which it viewed twice before rendering its verdict.
[brief] See [...], Commissioner No. 3-3/20A (concluding that [...]'s action of unilaterally accepting a potential vendor’s offer to attend an all-expenses paid conference in his official capacity as a board member went beyond the scope of his duties and responsibilities and, by its nature, had the potential to compromise the board in violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e)), aff’d, No. A-835-22 (slip op. at 15).
[brief] The jury was given instructions about the traffic laws that govern traffic signals.  The trial court read a portion of N.J.S.A. 39:4-105 to the jury, which states in relevant part:  Amber or yellow when shown alone following green means traffic should stop before entering the intersection . . . unless when the amber appears the vehicle . . . is so close to the intersection that with suitable brakes, it cannot be stopped in safety.  . . .”  Plaintiff contends that [...] was 200 feet from the intersection when the light turned yellow, a much further distance than Plaintiff testified her vehicle was from the intersection at the same moment in time, when the light turned yellow.  The crux of Plaintiff’s theory is that [...] was a much further distance away from the intersection when the light turned yellow, and he attempted to beat the light and get through the intersection before it turned red by speeding up as he approached the intersection.  This theory, however, is not supported by the evidence.  Plaintiff and [...] were traveling at similar speeds and there is no evidence to suggest that [...] was traveling any faster than what he testified to.  [...] could not have traveled 200 feet to the intersection and then almost completely through the intersection while traveling at a speed similar to Plaintiff (who was “very close” to the intersection) and strike Plaintiff’s vehicle on the north side of the intersection.  It is simply not physically possible.  Neither Plaintiff’s testimony about the accident nor [...]’s testimony supports the outcome reached by the jury.  Most importantly, the undisputed physical evidence makes clear that the impact between [...]’s vehicle and Plaintiff’s vehicle occurred north of the intersection.  These facts simply do not support allocating 40% fault to [...], and the jury determination that [...] — who reached the intersection before Plaintiff — was at fault, but Plaintiff was not, is simply contrary to the evidence and should be vacated.  Lastly, it should also be noted that the undisputed fact of this case is that the initiating cause of the accident sequence was [...]’s vehicle impacting [...]’s vehicle and pushing [...]’s vehicle to the left.  Da171.  This undisputed fact further undermines the jury’s verdict.  But for [...] entering the intersection against the red light, this accident would not have occurred.  By all accounts and as supported by the photographic evidence of the accident scene, [...] was almost through the intersection, proceeding under a yellow light, when he was struck by [...] and pushed into Plaintiff’s vehicle.  Even [...]’s attempt to avoid colliding with [...] by turning to the left was caused by [...] disobeying the red light.  There simply is no factual basis to conclude that [...] was partially at fault for this accident and the jury’s verdict allocating fault to [...] should be vacated and the case should be remanded for a new trial.
[brief] Moreover, this process provided no accountability to the jurors who are able to excuse themselves without any explanation required.  In essence, the Court usurped its own function by erroneously delegating its own authority to the jurors, who were excused simply by not raising their hands and without any accountability as to why they are purportedly unavailable or unable to serve.  For these reasons, defendant the jury selection process violated the Supreme Court Orders, Notices and the Sixth Amendment.