ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pa58.  On or about July 8, 2019, “The [...] World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act” was signed into law (hereinafter referred to as the “Ricci Act”).  P.L. 2019, c. 157.  Under the Ricci Act, the Board of Trustees was required to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the new law.  The Ricci Act states that the Board of Trustees “shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L. 2019, c. 157, within 30 days of enactment. ”  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  (Emphasis added).  The Board was required to notify all members of the State Police Retirement System of the Ricci Act by August 7, 2019, including the requirement to “register” by filing a form indicating the dates and locations of service within two (2) years.
[brief] Appellant goes on to argue that in *Matter of Sakow*, 219 A.D.2d 479, 631 N.Y.S.2d 637, 640 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995), an heir to an estate was recognized as de facto executor despite lacking proper documentation designating him as executor.  Once again, Appellant clearly does not understand the issues he is arguing and is simply making frivolous arguments for the sake of furthering this case.  A quick skim of the case history in *Matter of Sakow*, clearly relays that the estate was properly probated and letters of testamentary were issued to the defendant’s mother, the widowed spouse.  The son is considered a de facto (in fact) executor because he fraudulently did the accounting for the estate, on behalf of his mother.  Basically, the son in this case is considered an executor in fact per his actions in distributing the *properly probated* estate – not unlike if an executor hires an accountant or attorney to manage distribution.  At the time this suit was filed, there was no properly probated estate for Appellant to be considered any type of executor.
[directive] The [...] (the “Department”) is committed to an organizational culture and operational construct that values and facilitates diversity, equity, and inclusion (“DEI”).  New Jersey is one of the most diverse states in the nation.  With regard to the race and ethnicity of our residents, New Jersey ranks among the top 10 states with the highest diversity index, as measured by the 2020 U.S. Census.  The State also reflects great diversity across socioeconomic factors such as household income and educational attainment, as well as cultural or religious aspects such as the languages spoken or faiths observed.  Our economy is similarly diverse, comprised of farms, small businesses, manufacturing, science and technology industries, and providers of myriad services.  New Jerseyans live in all types of households and family situations, and reflect the full spectrum of the political beliefs and affiliations.  Across the board, the richness of our diversity is one of New Jersey’s greatest assets.  In order to better serve the people of New Jersey, our Department must be intentional and proactive in fostering diversity, equity, and inclusion.  Decades of research findings establish that diverse and inclusive organizations are more successful, more innovative, and more likely to attract and retain top talent.  Our Department’s workforce should reflect the great diversity of New Jersey.  Moreover, as a responsible economic actor and consumer of goods and services, our Department has an obligation to consider the commitment to diversity evidenced by organizations with whom we do business, thereby necessitating a focus on supplier diversity.  Further, our attention to working with and understanding the needs and concerns of [...] ∙ TELEPHONE: (609)292-4925: FAX: (609)292-3508  New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer ∙ Printed on Recycled Paper and Recyclable diverse communities have never been more crucial to our effectiveness and the ability of our Department to carry out its mission.
[directive] Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  Tout plent, petisyon ak lòt papye ki soumèt ba tribinal la fèt pou an angle.  Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English  Sistèm Jidisyè  New Jersey  New Jersey Judiciary  Fòm Pledwaye  Siplemantè Lwa pou anpeche Liberasyon Antisipe (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2)  Supplemental Plea Form for (NERA)  Cases (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2)  No Early Release Act (Haitian)
[brief] (Raised Below: Da001; 1T13:15-15:12)  It is well settled that a party opposing summary judgment must do more than “point to any fact in dispute” in order to defeat the motion.  Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 479 (2016) (internal quotations omitted).  The opposing party must “demonstrate by competent evidential material that a genuine issue of fact exists. ”  Ibid.  “Competent opposition requires competent evidential material beyond mere speculation and fanciful arguments. ”  Hoffman v. Asseenontv.Com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415, 426 (App. Div. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Polzo, 196 N.J. at 586 (stating that plaintiff’s burden cannot be satisfied by “incompetent or incomplete proofs”).  Further, the motion court must analyze the record in light of the substantive standard and burden of proof that a factfinder would apply in the event that the case was tried.  Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 40 (2014).  “[N]either the motion court nor an appellate court can ignore the elements of the cause of action or the evidential standard governing the cause of action. ”  Id. at 38.  Accordingly, the trial court must consider whether the competent evidential materials presented are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the City had constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition.  See Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020).  Here, Plaintiff failed to proffer any evidence from which a rational fact finder could determine that he satisfied the fundamental requirement of constructive notice under N.J.S.A. 59:4-3(b), specifically that the “condition existed for such a period of time that the public entity should have discovered it. ”  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, to impose liability on a public entity arising from an alleged dangerous condition of public property, a plaintiff must establish:
[brief] Around the time of the Chapter 7 conversion, the law firm of [...] was retained, via a July 19, 2013 Retainer Agreement, to provide “financial advice. ”  A17.  [...] prepared various documents that [...] asked [...] to sign – stressing that they were needed for the bankruptcy case and the couple’s financial welfare. \(^2\)  Two of these documents that [...] prepared were a “Mid-Marriage Agreement,” which the parties signed on December 5, 2013 with an accompanying Power of Attorney, and a “Matrimonial Settlement Agreement” that the parties signed 43 days later, on January 17, 2014.  CA1, CA14.  No divorce action was filed, however.  The bankruptcy litigation continued through 2014 before a global settlement was reached on November 20, 2014, from which [...] received all of the 4.6 million dollars in settlement assets.  A262.  \(^2\)  Whether [...] represented the couple or [...] only was hotly disputed in the Rule 4:50 hearing.  [...] ruled that the firm represented only [...] at all times, never [...], despite [...]’s Retainer Agreement having been addressed to and signed by both spouses (A17), and substantial payments of [...]’s fees made by [...] from her accounts.
[brief] Finally, respondents under play role they had in electioneering for the referendum, how close the final results were, and how divided our communities were in the process.  After the Board’s herculean effort and large outlays of taxpayer money to engineer a “yes” vote, the referendum passed by only 2 votes.  And while the referendum vote was 1,230 “Yes” vs. 688 “No” in [...], the results were reversed in [...], with only 381 “Yes” and a staggering 1,002 “No” votes.  This disparity in results reveals the controversy the board engendered in our community, creating immense dis-satisfaction in [...] as the voting public could clearly see the Board members biased towards favoring [...] over the other two municipalities.
[brief] It appears that plaintiff and the other driver disputed whether their vehicles made contact.  In her complaint, plaintiff seeks not only the payment of her medical bills, which payments she claims to be overdue, but also statutory interest penalties and attorneys’ fees.  In seeking interest penalties, plaintiff relies on N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5(b), which states that PIP benefits “shall be overdue if not paid within 30 days after the insurer is furnished written notice,” and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5(c), which states that “[a]ll overdue payments shall bear simple interest at the rate of 10% per annum. ”  On the other hand, defendant asserts that it is not obligated to pay interest because PIP payments “shall not be deemed overdue where the insurer has reasonable proof to establish that the insurer is not responsible for the payment. ”  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5(b).  In addition, the benefits defendant would be obligated to pay, if plaintiff sustained bodily injuries “as a result of an accident while occupying ... an automobile,” are those which were “reasonable, necessary and appropriate. ”  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.  In responding to the complaint, defendant took the position, based upon the sworn statement of the other driver, that no accident occurred and that, as a result, PIP benefits were not due because plaintiff had not sustained any bodily injury as the result of an automobile accident.  In attempting to refute defendant’s position, plaintiff sought to depose defendant’s adjuster and in-house attorney in order to examine defendant’s motive in denying her claim.  In the trial court, defendant asserted that the information sought was not relevant nor likely to lead to the discovery of relevant information and, also, with regard to the deposition of the in-house attorney, that requiring the attorney to divulge what was said in discussions with defendant’s adjusters would violate the attorney-client privilege.  We did not intervene with regard to the deposition of the adjuster in ruling upon defendant’s motion for leave to appeal despite its questionable relevance.  In now reversing the order which compelled the deposition of the in-house attorney and the turnover of what has been referred to as PIP aid and training materials, we agree with defendant that the information sought is not relevant nor likely to lead to the discovery of relevant information and we, thus, need not determine whether the testimony of the attorney may be shielded through application of the attorney-client privilege.
[brief] The court concluded the taking did not constitute an integral and inseparable part of the whole project and therefore limited damages to the aerial transmission lines easement taken.  Under Karan, the three towers on the property of others as part of the project would be considered in determining the fair market value of the remainder.  In State by Com'r v. Weiswasser, 149 N.J. 320 (1997), the Court allowed the owner's claim for loss of visibility damages resulting from the taking, and distinguished impaired visibility by virtue of project construction on the property of others, which "did not affect the remainder in a special, unique way, different from the effect on the surrounding area" which would be non-compensable.
[brief] Pa0047 at 57:11-17.  [...] was unable to explain how the Limited Attorney Exemption advances the interests of protecting consumers:  Q.  So can you help me understand how does that protect members of the public?  A.  It’s not a policy that we -- it’s not the language that we came up with.  We’re enforcing it.  So I can’t speak to the policy considerations there.  Q.  I understand.  But can you identify for me, as a person responsible for enforcing the statute, a single policy benefit if the statute is enforced as written under the questions I asked you?  A.  And I can’t, at this time, do so.  Pa0047 at 55:8-22.
[brief] As indicated by the timeline set forth at the beginning of this brief, the [...] and [...] have been deprived of the opportunity to litigate the issue of legal liability for the environmental damages.  Previously, in 2016, [...] simply declined to grant the [...]’ request for injunctive relief to force [...] to undertake inspections and remediation work prior to closing on the sale of real estate.  Her decision \textit{only} answered the question of whether [...] could be forced to complete certain tasks prior to the sale.  [...]’s denial of \textit{injunctive relief} is a completely separate, different issue from determining legal liability for the damages resulting from the contamination of the property; she did not address, nor was she asked to address, ultimate liability for Spill Act claims arising out of the pollution of the property.  Her decision did not relieve ANY of the defendants from liability for the environmental claims, which is an important distinction.  Furthermore, entire controversy doctrine also does not apply.  The [...] attempted to raise the legal claims that are the subject of this complaint in the prior litigations, so all parties were aware of their existence at the time the other, unrelated claims were resolved.  Presumably, since other parties objected to the inclusion of those claims in those prior actions and the courts did not permit them to be litigated, both the courts and the defendants wished for the subject environmental claims to be addressed separately – such as in the instant action.  Furthermore, the current property owner, [...], has never been a party to any of those actions and has never previously pursued statutory liability claims against prior owners and tenants for monetary damages associated with same.
[brief] Pa38.  The 2010 amendments made public disclosure an affirmative defense.  That is, before 2010, a defendant had a substantive right not to be subjected to a federal FCA claim if the public disclosure bar applied.  The 2010 amendments to the FCA changed that and could not apply retroactively.  See, e.g., Prather v. AT&T, Inc., 847 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2017).  In contrast, the NJFCA’s public disclosure bar was never jurisdictional; thus, the 2023 amendments do not alter a defendant’s rights.  See Pa29.  The court below understood that the federal precedents on which Defendants rely should not apply.  4T 14:15-15:11.  Nor did the 2010 federal FCA amendments contain the many procedural safeguards made by the Legislature to the NJFCA.  Compare Pa26, 27, 29 with Pa38.  Finally, the trial court properly held that applying the 2023 Veto Amendment to the pending case was necessary to remain loyal to the Legislature’s intent to preserve the Attorney General’s ongoing interests in and control over NJFCA litigation.
[brief] “Generally, a settlement agreement is governed by principles of contract law. ”  *Thompson v. City of Atlantic City*, 190 N.J. 359, 379 (N.J. Sup Ct. 2007).  “A basic principle of contract interpretation is to read the document as a whole in a fair and common sense manner. ”  *Hardy v. Abdul-Matin*, 198 N.J. 95, 103 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2009).  “If the terms of a contract are clear, they are to be enforced as written. ”  *Malick v. Seaview Lincoln Mercury*, 398 N.J. Super 182, 187 (App. Div. 2008).  The meaning of the terms must be determined by the “objective manifestations of the parties’ intent” and a reviewing court should not “torture the language of [a contract] to create ambiguity.
[brief] 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.8, 50.11; (Aa949).  The primary NAAQS aim to “protect the public health,” and the secondary NAAQS serve to “protect the public welfare,” such as from “decreased visibility and damage to animals, crops, vegetation, and buildings. ”  42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1977); (Aa948; 5T65:2-8).
[brief] There is also no support in the record for Plaintiff’s argument that [...] negligently failed to maintain control of his vehicle in turning left onto Westbound Route 280.  Ten minutes before the oral argument of the motion below Plaintiff raised, via email to [...], the argument that [...] violated N.J.S.A. 39:4-123.  This argument was not addressed in his opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, but was brought to the court’s and defendant’s attention at the last minute, in violation of N.J.C.R. 4:46-1.  (Da 8; Da 1-7).  However, if the court is inclined to entertain this argument, the photo of the subject intersection at Pa 153 demonstrates unequivocally that the only person who failed to follow the rules for left turns was Plaintiff.  The lanes of travel from where the parties executed their turns are shown on the left side of the photo.  It is clear from this overhead view of the intersection that the left lane is designated for left turns only and that the center lane is designated for those traveling straight only.  There are no curved lane markings going through the intersection to reflect that both lanes of travel are allowed, or even expected, to make the left turn from the northbound lanes of First Street.  Looking at the intersection as a whole and the markings on the pavement, there is no question that the only lane of travel that is permitted to make the turn onto the ramp for Westbound Route 280 is the designated left turn lane, the lane from which [...] was making his left turn.  Furthermore, both lanes of the on-ramp are designated for those making that left turn from the designated left turn lane.  There is no question that Route 280 is a major artery in northern North Jersey which can carry heavy traffic.  The double on-ramp, onto which a single lane of travel is permitted to make the left turn, prevents traffic from Route 280 from backing up and allows other traffic to travel unimpeded through the intersection.  It is not for drivers who have failed to observe lane markings to make an improper turn onto the ramp.  Plaintiff also relies on the diagram on the police accident report to indicate where the accident occurred even though it contradicts her deposition testimony that the accident occurred in the right lane of the on-ramp and her argument in this appeal.
[brief] THE NEGATIVE CRITERIA WERE NOT ESTABLISHED AND THE FINDINGS ON SAME ARE DEFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.  The negative criteria are that "the variance can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good" and that "the variance will not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance."  Wilson, 405 N.J. Super. at 198.  Flexible (c)(2) variances involve an inquiry as to whether "the benefits of the deviation would substantially outweigh any detriment."  Id.  The Applicant has not established any MLUL-based benefit.  Relaxing the bulk standards harms the public with an encroaching structure that would also exceed the permitted density and height in the zone.  And [...]'s "prevailing setback" theory would upend the zoning purpose that all buildings/structures ought to be set back 10 feet absent site-specific reasons -- the exception (variance) would become the rule (planning/zoning intent).  B.
[brief] (4T 147:3-25; 148:1-6). ³  On September 1, 2022, Defendant adopted Resolution No. Z.B. 2022-11, which memorialized the denial.  Ja023-Ja046.  On October 20, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs to appeal the Defendant’s denial.  Ja001-Ja009.  The Trial Court heard oral argument on October 27, 2023, and issued an oral opinion denying Plaintiff’s requested relief and dismissing the Complaint.  Ja222; 5T 54:4-10.  On December 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed the Notice of Appeal with the Appellate Division.
[brief] Nostrame v. Santiago, 420 N.J. Super. 427, 436 (App. Div. 2011) ............................................................28  213 N.J. 109 (2013) .............................................................................................28  Notte v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490, 495, 888 A.2d 464, 466 (2006)  .........................................................39  Printing Mart-Morrison v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) ....................................................................................27,28,43  Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 115 (App. Div. 2011) ..........................................................45  Rosembert v. Borough of E. Lansdowne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 631, 641 (E.D. Pa. 2014) .............................................................45  Rubin v. Nowak, 248 N.J. Super. 80, 83 (App. Div. 1991) ...............................................................44  Russell v. Lewis, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27054, at *12 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 11, 2021) ..................46 Scheidt v. DRS Techs., Inc., 424 N.J. Super. 188, 193, 36 A.3d 1082 (App. Div. 2012) ..........................43 Sequeira v. Wells Fargo & Co., 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 400, at *11 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 24, 2016) ......................................................................................31 Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106, 877 A.2d 267 (App. Div. 2005) ...........................27 State ex rel. Comm'r of Transp. v. Cherry Hill Mitsubishi, Inc., 439 N.J. Super. 462, 467, 110 A.3d 92 (App. Div. 2015) .............................27 Thomas v. N.J. Inst. Of Tech., 178 N.J. Super. 60, 62 (Law Div. 1981) ....................................................44 Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988) ...........................................................................27
[directive] After the survivors have recovered from the initial shock of learning of the loss of a loved one, the officers should explain what can be expected of them in the immediate future.  The survivors should be informed that it may be necessary for them to identify the deceased.  If so, the officers should transport or arrange the transportation of the survivors to and from the hospital or morgue.  Survivors should also be informed that State law may require that an autopsy be performed to establish the exact cause of death.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT CONCERNING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THE OPERATIVE AGREEMENT AND THE PARTIES’ AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE DESPITE HOLDING A HEARING FROM WHICH IT WAS TO MAKE THOSE FACTUAL FINDINGS (1a, 2T at 56:20-25)  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6a provides that when a party files a motion to compel arbitration, and the adverse party opposes the motion, the court shall “shall proceed summarily to decide the issue and order the parties to arbitrate unless it finds that there is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate. ”  The court may also conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve, as a threshold matter, genuine and material disputes over “whether the parties entered into an enforceable contract. ”  Goffe, 238 N.J. 204; citing Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 454 N.J. Super. 260, 273-274 (App. Div. 2018).  Here, the court did just that.  It held an evidentiary hearing to resolve the disputes of material fact but then avoided making those findings related to the enforceability of the Operative Agreement.  As set forth below, the facts presented made clear that the parties entered into the Operative Agreement voluntarily and without duress and agreed to arbitrate their disputes.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: Motion for Leave to Appeal from an Order  Filed April 24, 2024, Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Failure to Provide an Affidavit of Merit from an Appropriately Licensed Person, from: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION: BERGEN COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.
[brief] Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice.  (Pa93).  On Wednesday January 5, 2022, the trial court entertained virtual public oral argument.  On January 5, 2022, the trial court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice, vacated the ministerial defaults entered against defendants, and granted defendants twenty days either to file an amended answer or to file an amended pre-answer pre-discovery Rule 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss on the pleadings.