ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] When certain healthcare boards resolve Clarify the role of board-mandated complaints of professional misconduct, and in particular sexual misconduct, the board sometimes requires that the licensee be supervised in interactions with some or all patients.  When the [...] does this, it follows its “Uniform Requirements Pertaining to Chaperone Approval and Utilization. ”  These board-mandated observers are distinct from the chaperones described above, although the two are sometimes confused – in no small part because the term “chaperone” is used in both contexts.  By September 2021, the Division will work with the [...] to identify potential amendments to the “Uniform Requirements Pertaining to Chaperone Approval and Utilization” to clarify the distinction between chaperones and board-mandated observers, including through adoption of distinct terms for each role; to require that board-mandated observers receive suitable training; and to clarify the notice that licensees must give their patients that an observer is required due to a board order.  The Division also will make that revised document available on its website in English, Spanish, and multiple other languages commonly spoken in the State of New Jersey, along with any additional information needed to explain observer requirements to patients.  it.  D.
[brief] This Court reviews a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  _Temploy Fuedte De Vida Corp v. National Union First Ins. Co of Pittsburgh_, 224 N.J. 189, 198 (2016).  In addition, “[w]hen deciding a purely legal issue, review is de novo, we look at the law with fresh eyes and need pay no deference to legal conclusions reached by the trial court .  . . .”  _Fair Share Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. New Jersey State League of Municipalities_, 207 N.J. 489, 494, n.1 (2011); _Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. Of Franklin_, 233 N.J. 546, 559 (2018) (“In construing the meaning of a statute, an ordinance, or our case law, our review is de novo”).  Appellant is not, as Respondents suggest, asking the Court to rewrite a zoning scheme or to assess the wisdom of a redevelopment plan.  Rather, Appellant is asking the Court to determine if certain municipal actions conformed to law.  Therefore, the lawfulness of the $2,000,000 “density bonus” payment under _N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f)_ and the meaning of that section of the Long Branch Ordinance which affords designated developers the right to approve plan changes are both reviewed de novo.  The decision of the trial court to preclude expert testimony is reviewed under a more forgiving standard.  Nonetheless, Respondents do not cite to a single case that upholds a decision to preclude expert testimony in a spot zoning challenge: all case law is to the contrary.  POINT I THE TWO MILLION DOLLAR PAYMENT WHICH THE CITY OF LONG BRANCH RECEIVED FROM [...] IN CONSIDERATION FOR A “DENSITY BONUS” WAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f)
[brief] *Weiss v. I Zapinsky, Inc.*, 65 N.J. Super. 351, 357 (App. Div. 1961). ”  [Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974). ]  This quote is the first and foremost citation in the New Jersey Court Rules at R. 2:10-2, Comment 6 ([...] and [...]), regarding “review of judicial fact-finding”.  It is the oft-quoted language that defines the appellate court’s standard of review when making determinations of whether the Trial Court’s factual determinations overstepped the evidence contained within the record.  Here there is nothing in the record that would indicate the Trial Court made a determination “so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice” or “wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of justice”.  Any such conclusion is far-fetched and unreasonable on this clear record.  The rule referred to by the Courts cited above is R. 2:10-2 which says any error or omission “shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result”.  Thus the Court must determine (a) whether there was any “error or omission” at the Trial Court, and then (b) whether such alleged “error or omission” was of the nature to “clearly produce an unjust result”.
[brief] In arguing that the Legislature intended the residency requirement to be a continuing one, Plaintiffs cite the same law review article as Defendants, Saving [...], but for a different reason.  Plaintiffs claim the authors discussed Camden’s “need for a protector on the BOG to ensure that [...] remained an integral part of the Rutgers brand. ” (Pb30) (citing Dean, Saving [...], 44 Rutgers L.J. 337 at 341.)  We cannot, however, locate any specific reference in the article to a Camden resident as “protector” on the BOG.  Instead, the article’s main thrust is how the initial restructuring plan called for the Camden campus “to be severed from Rutgers and taken over by [...],” 44 Rutgers L.J. at 337, and how, in the end, that did not happen.  Thus, [...] was “saved” not by a continuing residency obligation (which does not explicitly appear in the Rutgers Act), but rather by the more basic fact that the merger of [...] and Rowan was defeated.  Plaintiffs also claim support in N.J.S.A. 18A:65-14.13, which created a campus advisory board whose members shall include the BOG member “who is appointed by the board of trustees and who is, pursuant to N.J.S. 18A:65-14, required to be a resident of Middlesex County.
[brief] Following the intervention of [...] and the initial trial hearing, the Board adopted an Amended Resolution.  (Ia242)  The Amended Resolution again acknowledged that the application was conforming and only requested two waivers.  The Amended Resolution stated purportedly more detailed reasons for the Board’s denial.  Paragraph A read claimed the Board denied the application due to: significant public safety concerns regarding the lack of street parking coupled with the substantial proposed density particularly in light of the proposed basement apartments noted on the plans.  Paragraphs B contained factual recitation.  Paragraph C claimed “the Board found that 9 homes are too many for this application. ”  Paragraph D contained factual recitation regarding the reconsideration.  Paragraph E indicated that:  The Board found that the applicant could not satisfy the negative criteria because an approval of this application would have significant detrimental effects on the safety of the neighborhood and would also substantially impair the intent and purpose of the municipal zoning plan and ordinances.  Finally, Paragraph F indicated that the applicant’s proposal did not advance the purposes of zoning pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 as follows:  1)  The applicant’s proposal is not the best planning alternative.  2)  The proposed development would not promote the establishment of appropriate population densities and concentrations that will contribute to the well-being of persons, neighborhoods, communities and religions and preserve the environment.  3)  The proposed development would not encourage the location and design of transportation routes which will promote the free flow of traffic while discouraging location of such facilities and routes which results in congestion or blight.  At the trial, [...] correctly pointed out that the validity of the Board’s denial hinged on whether or not the two waivers at issue created the harm that the Board claimed would result from an approval of this application.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  The within action was filed June 24, 2020, and thereafter the action was tried before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. and a Jury on October 10, 11, 12 and 13, 2023,\(^1\) whereupon the jury rendered a verdict that the plaintiff had not proven defendant’s negligence, and the court entered Judgment dismissing the action.  Plaintiff-Appellant moved for a New Trial pursuant to R. 4:49-1.  (Pa52 - Pa99).  The court denied the application.\(^2\) (Pa100 - Pa101).  Plaintiff-Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal December 13, 2023.  (Pa102 - Pa105).  \(^{1}\)  T refers to trial transcript of October 10, 2023 \(^{2}\)  T refers to trial transcript of October 11, 2023 \(^{3}\)  T refers to trial transcript of October 12, 2023 \(^{4}\)  T refers to trial transcript of October 13, 2023  \(^{5}\)  T refers to transcript of new trial motion of December 1, 2023  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Defendant argued the factual basis for his plea was insufficient because he was not asked about his BAC readings and did not state what he drank or how much he drank.  (2T4-17 to 12-18; 21-9 to 21-19)  In support of this argument, Defendant relied on the unpublished opinion in State v. Vargas, 2020 WL5415322 (App. Div. September 10, 2020).  [...] found Vargas inapplicable and denied Defendant’s motion, stating:  The Court finds that with the totality of the plea that was entered and the entire colloquy, including the colloquy between defense counsel and the Judge, [...] in this case when he proffered a .17 reading, and the court accepted that .17 and placed it on the record, accepted the Alcotest worksheet, marked it as C-1, entered it into evidence, questioned the defendant on his – whether he had consumed alcohol, whether he operated a vehicle, whether it affected his ability to properly operate a vehicle and the defendant said, yes.  He admitted, in fact, that he was under the influence of alcohol.  (2T22-9 to 22-20)  Trial de novo was held on June 15, 2023 before the Hon. [...], J.S.C.
[brief] 7, 8 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(12) .........................................................................................  21 RULES R. 1:4-4 .................................................................................................................. 12, 29 R. 3:21-10(b)(5) ....................................................................................................  16 R. 3:22-2(c) ...........................................................................................................  11, 16, 17, 18 R. 3:22-4 ................................................................................................................ 11, 15 R. 3:22-5 ................................................................................................................ 11, 16 R. 3:22-10 ..............................................................................................................  23 R. 3:22-10(c) ........................................................................................................ passim  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] [...] then discovered the shiny object left in his path.  Despite [...]’ advocacy for the Appellant’s position, he conceded he was not an IT expert.  [1T P41:L7-9;P42:L6-20-P43:L5-12]  He also had no knowledge of the whereabouts of this document from the time [...] left her employment until he discovered this email.  [1T P40:L7-25,P43:L5-12]  The record contains conflicting versions of how the new employment agreement was discovered.  [...] claims it was his idea, and he found it looking through the Respondents’ emails.  [1T P17:L15-P19:L25]  The third certification of the Appellant claims he found the document.  [96a]  There has never been a credible explanation for the sudden discovery of the second agreement.  The Appellants’ position entirely ignores the fact that they took an earlier position twice certifying and arguing to the court that the cobbled-together document was the original and only employment agreement.  The Appellants simply attempt to whitewash this entire sequence of events and ask the court to focus solely on the second agreement, by now branding the second document the *operable* agreement.  A review of [...]’s testimony in court fails to clear up any of these issues.  The trial court appropriately concluded, *False in one false in all.*
[brief] Plaintiff’s arguments are premised on a misreading of numerous judicial decisions and misquoted references to the Act.  Plaintiff cites various compulsory insurance provisions in the Act but misquotes those statutes and omits critical language.  The Act does not mandate that an employer maintain insurance for every conceivable claim an injured worker might assert.  Rather, the Act requires that injured workers have a guaranteed means of recovery for injuries or illnesses sustained in the course and scope of employment.  That does not mean that an employer must maintain insurance for every possible claim an injured worker might assert.  Additionally, Plaintiff simply ignores the fact that [...] paid [...] over $120,000 in workers’ compensation benefits before he passed.  The payment of those benefits fulfills the promise of the Act and vindicates the public policy that animates the Act.
[directive] 3.6.1  Officers shall take the following actions to reduce the risk of positional asphyxiation:  (a)  As soon as handcuffed and restrained, a person should be immediately rolled to the side and taken to an upright position that does not impede the mechanism of normal breathing.  This requirement is especially important when the subject is handcuffed face down in the prone position; (b)  Care should be taken not to put sustained pressure on the neck or back, as breathing can be restricted even if the person is placed in the recovery position.  This includes sitting, kneeling, or standing on a person’s chest, back, or neck for a prolonged period of time; 9  USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022  (c)  Officers shall continuously monitor the person’s condition while being restrained, as death can occur suddenly and develop beyond the point of viable resuscitation within seconds; (d)  Whenever possible during team restraint, a “Safety Officer,” with the responsibility to monitor the health and welfare of the person during restraint, should be designated; (e)  The arrested person must not be transported in the prone position; and (f)  The arrested person should be monitored prior to, during, and at the conclusion of the transport.  3.6.2  Officers shall continually monitor the condition of the subject(s) in their custody for the following warning signs of positional asphyxiation: (a) verbal complaints of being unable to breathe properly, although be aware that a person suffering breathing difficulties may not be able to complain about their crisis; (b) visual signs that the subject is struggling or exhibiting increased effort to breathe; (c) gurgling/gasping sounds with foam or mucus coming from the nose or mouth; (d) display of a heightened level of aggression during restraint, which may be a physiological response to fighting for air, such that any increased resistance during restraint of a person should be regarded with caution; (e) sudden behavioral changes, such as going from being violent and noisy to passive, quiet, and tranquil, or alternatively, suddenly becoming more aggressive; (f) blue discoloration of facial skin (cyanosis); (g) swelling, redness or blood spots to the face or neck; and (h) any loss or a reduced level of consciousness.
[brief] The plaintiff’s credibility as to the cause of the [...] incident was further called into question when [...] testified on cross-examination concerning his review of the emergency room records from after the plaintiff’s fall.  In this regard, [...] testified as follows:  Q.  And according to the emergency room records, are you aware that they state that she slipped and she fell on her right side?  A.  Yes.  That’s exactly what it says.  Q. Okay.  And the report goes on to note that she was unable to get up, correct?  A.  That’s correct.  Q. Okay.  And the report goes on to note that patient was unsure what caused her to fall but was using a walker at the time.  A.  That’s what it says.  Q.  And you’re aware that it also goes on to state that she also told the ER that she normally ambulates with a walker or a cane, correct?  A.  That’s what it says.  Correct.  (T159:19-160:8) (emphasis added).  [...]’s testimony regarding his review of the emergency room records clearly calls into question the plaintiff’s testimony that the [...] incident occurred when she tripped over a bolt at the base of a pole in aisle 58 of the [...] store.
[brief] VOLUME I (CONFIDENTIAL)  Notice of Appeal........................................................................................................Pa1  Case Information Statement.........................................................................................Pa5  [...] Final Decision 11/29/23.............................................Pa9  Reply to [...] 9/6/23\(^1\)......................................................Pa16  [...] Initial Decision 7/26/23..............................................Pa24 Correspondence to [...] 3/23/23........................................Pa28  Petition for Ricci Action Registration 3/3/23...............................................................Pa30  Affidavit of [...].......................................................................................Pa56  [...] Eligibility Registration Form..........................................................................Pa58  [...] Request for Amended Benefits Form............................................................Pa60  Correspondence from [...] 4/11/23.........................................................Pa61  Authorization to Disclose Medical Information.............................................................Pa62  Medical Examination 1/13/06.......................................................................................Pa64  Medical Examination 1/30/06.......................................................................................Pa65 Medical Examination 3/6/06.........................................................................................Pa66  Pathology Report 3/8/06..............................................................................................Pa68 Medical Report 3/13/06...............................................................................................Pa74  \(^1\) Per R.2:6-1(a)(2), Pa16, Pa24, Pa28, and Pa30 are included in the Appendix because they are germane to the appeal.
[brief] On January 31, 2023, the Town Council introduced Ordinance 2023-03 for a redevelopment plan.  (Pa0108)  The proposed ordinance was referred to the Planning Board which, on February 6, 2023, held a hearing to determine whether the proposed redevelopment plan was “consistent” or “inconsistent” with the Master Plan.  (Pa0350-Pa0551 *not being appealed from but consists of evidence sought to be admitted at trial hearing; R. 2:5-1(g))  Thereafter, on February 9, 2023, the Planning Board transmitted a memorandum to the Council finding that the plan was “consistent” with the Master Plan.  (Pa0110)  On February 14, 2023, the Town Council held a public hearing on the Ordinance.  (Pa0594-Pa0649  *not being appealed from but consists of evidence admitted at trial hearing R. 2:5-1(g))  At that hearing the Ordinance was adopted.  (Pa0648-Pa0649)  In adopting the ordinance, the Council incorporated by reference the voluminous report (Pa0193-Pa0352) of its expert, [...], dated January 26, 2023.  That expert report also reached the erroneous conclusion that the proposed ordinance was “consistent” with the Master Plan.  (Pa0109, Pa0315)  The redevelopment “plan” under Section 7 of the LRHL could not have been adopted unless a redevelopment “study” was conducted first under Section 5 of the LRHL.
[brief] A.  The Trial Court Has a Duty to Ensure that Only Reliable Forensic Testimony is Admitted.  Trial judges serve as “gatekeepers” to “ensure that proceedings are fair to both the accused and the victim.  In that role, they must assess whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable before it can be presented to a jury. ”  State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265, 308-09 (2018).  The court does so by determining whether the proffered evidence is admissible under the N.J.R.E. 702, which provides that “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. ”  In order for evidence to be admissible under N.J.R.E. 702, three requirements must be met: (1) the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the field testified to must be at a state of the art such that an expert’s testimony could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony.  State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208 (1984).  “For an opinion to be admissible under N.J.R.E. 702, the expert must utilize a technique or analysis with ‘a sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform and reasonably reliable results so as to contribute materially to the ascertainment of the truth. ’”  State v. J.R., 227 N.J. 393, 409 (2017) (emphasis added) (quoting Kelly, 97 N.J. at 210).  “[O]ne of the criteria under N.J.R.E. 702 for the admissibility of expert testimony is that the testimony be based on reasonably reliable scientific premises. ”  State v. Raso, 321 N.J. Super. 5, 17 (App. Div. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).  --- 3  At the time of trial, New Jersey courts were assessing the admissibility of evidence under the Frye standard, which places the burden on the proponent of the evidence to clearly establish that the theory or technique has “gained general acceptance in the particular field in which if belongs.
[brief] I, [...], further certify that on October 31, 2023, I sent the Reply Brief by regular mail to:  Trial Judge: [...], J.S.C.  Address: [...]  Date: October 31, 2023  [...] Pro Se Attorney for Defendant  CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE I, [...], further certify that on October 31, 2023, I sent the Reply Brief by regular mail to: Address: [...] [...]  Attorney for: [...] Date: October 31, 2023  [...] Pro Se Attorney for Defendant I.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] These procedures are designed to ensure fairness and protect the rights of both citizens and law enforcement officers:  1.  Reports or Complaints of officer/employee misconduct must be accepted from any person, including anonymous sources, at any time.  2.  Complaints shall be accepted regardless of age, race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or immigration status of the complaining party.  3.  Your complaint will be sent to a superior officer or a specially trained internal affairs officer who will conduct a thorough and objective investigation.  4.  You might be asked to help in the investigation by giving a detailed statement about what happened or providing other important information or documents.  5.  All complaints against law enforcement officers are thoroughly investigated.  You will be kept informed of the status of the investigation and its ultimate outcome, if requested, and you provide contact information.