ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable standard is generally understood to involve inquiry into whether the decision conforms with relevant law, whether there is substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency's decision, and whether in applying the relevant law to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching its conclusion.  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007) (relying on Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).  Ordinarily for quasi-judicial or rule-making final agency action, there is a substantial body of material comprising the record.
[brief] Cb19 (“(Ca101-105)  “On Thursday, the school board was voting on a social media policy for board members that was introduced at the March 17 meeting, in response to the community’s uproar over posts by both [...] and [...]. ”) calling the public’s demands that the Board and Respondent be held accountable “sporadic,” and stating that news articles covering the tumultuous Board meetings are somehow suspect because they are written by people.  Rb11.  This argument strains credulity.  The argument that these documents do not say what they say, or should not be taken at face value, was not raised below, and must be disregarded.  It was undisputed below that the Board minutes and news articles reflected actual public outcry from the school district community regarding Respondent’s statements.
[brief] In reviewing a sentence imposed by the trial judge, an Appellate Court is deferential in its review of a trial court's exercise of sentencing discretion and is guided by the three-pronged test established in *State v. Roth*, 95 N.J. 334, 363-64, 471 A.2d 370 (1984):(1) whether the appropriate sentencing guidelines were followed; (2) whether the findings of fact were grounded in competent, reasonably credible evidence; and (3) whether in applying those guidelines to the facts of the case, the sentencing court showed such a “clear error of judgment that it shocks the judicial conscience[ ]” that a sentence should be modified on appeal.
[brief] In reaching its decisions, the trial court considered all relevant materials, including all material evidence and the briefs and argument of counsel, and the trial court properly interpreted and applied relevant case law in determining that [...] was and is a successful claimant and in apportioning legal fees and costs, together with interest, to [...].  In doing so, the trial court did not simply adopt the position of [...], and, on Feb. 10, 2023, the Trial Court (Hon. [...], J.S.C.) entered Judgment against [...] in the amount of $2,587,561.87, which was broken down as follows: (i) $918,894 for investigation and remediation costs incurred prior to December 31, 2018;¹ (ii) $511,005 for attorneys’ fees; (iii) $88,827 for costs; and (iv) $1,068,835.87 for interest.
[brief] Thus, a school is indeed a “traditional” place of public accommodation under both the plain language of the LAD and settled precedent in this State. established right to relief); N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1 (authorizing State to “proceed in a summary manner in the Superior Court of New Jersey to obtain an injunction” against any defendant violating the LAD after filing an administrative complaint against them before DCR); Pfaus, 97 N.J. Super. at 8 (same); Poff v. Caro, 228 N.J. Super. 370, 374-75 (Law Div. 1987) (preliminarily enjoining actions while LAD administrative litigation remained pending).  Settled law thus recognizes both the kind of claim alleged and the type of remedy sought.
[brief] As such, reformation was a proper remedy (especially given the fact that the initial specific performance remedy would not be accomplished).  Defendant cannot now escape its obligation to “turn square corners” with Plaintiff even if it did not act in “bad faith” or “fraudulently”.  Its attempt to have its cake and eat it with the subject property demonstrates that it did not turn square corners in the litigation and, as a result, the Trial Court properly reformed the subject agreements to remedy the harm to [...].
[brief] 32 (2000) | 24 | | State v. Rodriguez, 195 N.J. 165 (2008) | 23 | | State v. Rogers, 124 N.J. 113 (1991) | 43 | | State v. Supreme Life, 473 N.J. Super. 165 (App. Div. 2022) | 21 | | State v. Teat, 233 N.J. Super. 368 (App. Div. 1989) | 40 | | State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021) | 44, 45 | | State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985) | passim | | STATUTES | | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:3-11b | 26 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 | 2 | | STATUTES (CONT'D.) | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------|-----------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11–4b(2) | 38 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4c | 33 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:28-1 | 39 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:36-2 | 32 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6a(2) | 33 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 | 33 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(3) | 33, 34, 36, 38, 45 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(6) | 37 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(9) | 33, 34, 36, 45 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(7) | 34, 35, 38 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(8) | 34, 41, 42, 45 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(9) | 34, 41, 42, 45 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(14) | 34 | | RULES | |-------| | R. 1:12-1(g) ................................................................. 46 | | R. 2:10-2 ........................................................................... 23, 25, 32 | | CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS | |---------------------------| | N.J. Const., art.
[brief] ”); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 27 (1933) (the right to just compensation for property taken “rested upon the Fifth Amendment.  Statutory recognition was not necessary.  A promise to pay was not necessary.  Such a promise was implied because of the duty to pay imposed by the [Fifth] [A]mendment. ”).  New Jersey law recognizes the same principle.  Klumpp, 202 N.J. at 405 (“Regardless of the exact method employed, where a taking occurs, the Takings Clause requires the government to compensate the property owner.
[brief] First, as established earlier, there is no contract here.  One cannot be a third-party beneficiary of a contract that doesn’t exist.  Two, he attempted to make the contract he’s claiming to be a beneficiary of.  One cannot be an actual party to a contract and third-party beneficiary to that same contract.  Being an actual party creates the benefit.  Three, the assumption here is that if his late mother had been alive to sell the car, he stood to benefit from the profits.
[brief] The Superior Court has no jurisdiction over pension matters, which is why the parties included Par. 7 and Par. 15 as to venue and decision-making authority (Da 158, Da 160).  Appellant’s interpretation (Db29), the language of the Separation Agreement merely states that the terms had to be declared illegal or unenforceable in a legal forum.  "The Legislature vested the [...] with exclusive authority and "responsibility for the proper operation of the retirement system."  N.J.S.A. 43:16A-13(a)(1)."  In re I/M/O Town of Harrison and Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 116, 440 N.J. Super. 268, 271  "If resolution of a question before the [...] "involves a question of facts," the Board has the legal authority to refer the matter to the Office of Administrative Law for an evidentiary hearing before an Administrative Law Judge.  N.J.A.C. 17:4-1.7(d).  If the appeal before the [...] concerns only a legal determination, as is the case in most of the appeals we decide here, "the Board may retain the matter and issue a final administrative determination which shall include detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the documents, submissions and legal arguments of the parties."  N.J.A.C. 17:4-1.7(e).  Once the [...] reaches a final determination, the affected PFRS member has the right to appeal to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.  Ibid."  In re I/M/O Town of Harrison and Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 116, 440 N.J. Super. 268, 294-295.  Appellant’s recitation of cases at Db29 to Db31 does no harm to the Trial Court’s ruling of July 25, 2023; instead, Appellant’s argument at Db30-31 confirms that the Court correctly interpreted the matter.
[brief] ”  But in their joint public comments, [...], the [...], and the [...] argued that “During planned and unplanned blowdowns as well as accidents and leaks, the compressor will release methane and VOCs including chromium, benzene, radon, NOx into the air. ”  Aa0339.  In its June 23, 2021 HAD, [...] appears to have either (1) not factored into its decision these public comments at all or (2) did so, but failed to provide its reasoning for rejecting them in an agency response to comments.  Under either scenario, [...]’s decision 51 Id. was “arbitrary and capricious” as it was not the product of reasoned decision making.
[brief] When asked to explain his responsibilities as Clerk related to elections he responded: “I just sign the paper at the end,” meaning the election results.  1T54:18-20; 1T55:22-24.  [...] was not involved in appointing poll workers, and when asked whether he knew the poll workers, he responded “I guess, random poll – poll workers.  I don’t know where they come from or who hires them or how that all works.  But I just know they were there. ”  1T55:6-12.  [...] stated that he “was never asked to do anything for the election...Besides sign that paper I had to sign. ”  1T55:18-21.  On February 24, 2025, the Board of Elections completed its canvass of the vote-by-mail and provisional ballots, and provided the final numbers to the Fire District.  1T80:12-81:4; Pa96.  [...] is finance clerk, whose responsibilities when it comes to elections is to maintain an Excell spreadsheet of the election returns which she receives from the three polling locations on election night.  1T78:21-79:11.  Those results showed a tie election between [...] and [...], which are the numbers she presented to [...] for his signature.  1T80:24-81-20.  [...] did not review any source documents to verify any of the --- 1  “1T” refers to the transcript of the trial on April 14, 2025.
[directive] Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary Prepare/Share and Access to Capacity 5.6  Agencies.  Police 5.6.1 to report shall agency enforcement every law Directive, this of issuance the of days  Within 60 law state a of case in the Justice Criminal Division of the or Prosecutor, County appropriate the electronic prepare means to the with officers equip to capacity its on agency, enforcement tablets, phones, smart computers, desktop (e.g., Reports Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary vehicles).  police in installed devices computing similar or laptop or devices, portable similar or shall Justice, Criminal of Division or Prosecutor County the with consultation in agency, Each Reports.  Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary preparing for plan a develop Directive. this of issuance upon immediately operational become shall subsection This On-Call Report by Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary to Access Electronic 5.6.2 P~osecuto~s. and develop shall Justice Criminal of Division the and Office Prosecutor's County Each the with general attorneys deputy and prosecutors assistant on-call equip plan to a implement Incident Enforcement Law
[brief] POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED MITIGATING FACTORS TO DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE.  Defendant next claims that the sentencing court erred when it did not credit defendant with mitigating factors (1), (2), (9), (10), and (11).  He contends that because the sentencing judge did not credit him with these mitigating factors, “the sentence imposed was in violation of the mandates of the Code and was excessive, and that consequently, a re-sentencing is required. ” (Db13).  His claim is without merit and should be rejected by this Court.  On review, appellate courts are deferential to sentencing determinations and “must not substitute [their] judgment for that of the sentencing court. ”  State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014).  Generally, an appellate court should defer to the sentencing court's factual findings and should not “second-guess” them.
[brief] denied, 74 N.J. 253 (1977) .........................................................13 - *St. Pius X House of Retreats, Salvatorian Fathers v. Diocese of Camden*, 88 N.J. 571, 577 (1982)  ........................................................................................................13 - *State v. Roland* 100 N.J. 187, 205 (1985)  ........................................................................11 - *U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey*, 431 U.S. 1 (1977)  ........................................4  ## Statute - *N.J.S.A. 40:11A-1, et seq.* .................................................................................................4 - *N.J.S.A. 40:11A-20* ............................................................................................................4  ## Rules - *R. 1:1-2* ..................................................................................................................................12 - *R. 2:2-4* ..................................................................................................................................11 - *R. 2:5-6(a)* .............................................................................................................................2, 11
[brief] "It is fundamental that when a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, the terms of the agreement must be fulfilled."  *Kovack*, 91 N.J. at 482.  Indeed, "[t]he terms of the plea agreement[] must be meticulously adhered to, and a defendant's reasonable expectations generated by plea negotiations should be accorded deference."  Ibid. (quoting *State v. Brockington*, 140 N.J. Super. 422, 427 (App. Div. 1976)).  When the foregoing does not occur, and the terms of the agreement are not fulfilled, the appropriate remedy is for defendant to be given the option to withdraw his guilty plea.
[brief] ”).  Thus, even if the evidence below—that other traffic may be affected—could somehow be deemed insufficient, the remedy would be limited to a remand to allow the State to further develop the record on that issue.  See Williamson, 138 N.J. at 305-06 (affirming remand to the trial court to address “whether the failure to signal may have affected any other traffic” because the hearing “did not address that question”).  Regardless, for the reasons stated above, the facts developed at the hearing and found by the judge were more than sufficient to establish that other motorists may have been affected by the un-signaled lane change.  Giving due deference to the trial court’s factual and credibility findings, [...] and [...] had reasonable and articulable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation to warrant a traffic stop.  The motion judge correctly found that the stop was lawful.  This Court should affirm the ruling below.
[brief] Rule 4:3-1.  Divisions of Court; Commencement and Transfer of Actions (5)  Law Division (Pa 187-191).  All actions in the Superior Court except those encompassed by subparagraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) herein shall be filed and heard in the Law Division, Civil Part or the Law Division, Special Civil Part [Pa].  "The Chancery Division must not become clogged or burdened with the weight of actions properly cognizable in the Law Division.  [Id., 128 N.J. Super. at 497.]  Citing Chiaccio v. Chiaccio, 198 N.J. Super. 1, 486 A.2d 335 (App. Div. 1984) (Pa 344-347)  Proceedings in lieu of prerogative writs other than those to which R. 2:2-3(a) (2) is applicable are, in any event, cognizable in the Law Division rather than the Chancery Division.  R. 4:69-1.  Citing Equitable Life Mort. v. N.J. Div. of Taxation, 151 N.J. Super. 232, 376 A.2d 966 (App. Div. 1977) (Pa 348-353)  "Plaintiff's original counsel misfiled this complaint in the Chancery Division as a prerogative writ action with additional counts for damages.  However, the case should have been filed in the Law Division despite the fact that plaintiff was seeking injunctive relief in her prerogative writ count.  The matter will be transferred to the Law Division and provided with a Law Division docket number."
[brief] Compare U.S.D.A. v. Scurry, 193 N.J. 492, 503-504 (2007) (relief may be denied where “inexcusable and unexplained delay in exercising [a] right [and] prejudice [to] the other party” exists).  Second, even if timely, the motion was not meritorious as defendant had no entitlement to relief under R.4:50-1(a) or (f).  Respondent, however, does not point to even one fact addressing either issue.  Respondent’s R.4:50–1(a) argument only discusses the standard for relief but does not discuss any facts to support it.
[brief] Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is part of the wider law of res judicata which prohibits relitigation of any issue actually determined in a prior action, generally involving the same party but a different claim or cause of action.  See Morton Intern, Inc. v. General Acc. Ins. Co. of America, 266 N.J. Super. 300, 321 (App. Div. 1991); see also State v. Gonzales, 75 N.J. 181, 186 (1977); Mazzilli v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co., 26 N.J. 307, 313-14 (1958).  It is an equitable doctrine and is therefore applied where mandated to preserve fairness.  Kozlowski v. Smith, 193 N.J. Super. 672, 675 (App. Div. 1984).  An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s discretion to invoke collateral estoppel is made pursuant to a de novo standard.  See McAllister, 327 N.J. Super. at 173.  Several elements are required for collateral estoppel to apply: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.
[brief] *Del. Valley Reg’l High Sch.*, 2024 WL 706797, at *7–9 (Aa9–Aa12).  Like the minor in *Anspach* who voluntarily went to the health center asking for emergency contraception and was not prevented or dissuaded from contacting her parents, the districts’ students are not compelled to come forward to discuss their gender identities with school officials, and, far from discouraging students to talk to their parents, the Original Policies instruct the districts to be “mindful of disputes between minor students and parents concerning the student’s gender identity or expression” and to refer families to an array of “support resources. ”  *[...] Orig. Pol’y* (D2a55); *[...] Orig. Pol’y* 5657 ([...] Ra8); *[...] Orig. Pol’y* 5657 ([...]  In *Willey v. Sweetwater County School District No. 1 Board of Trustees*, No. 23-CV-069, 2023 WL 4297186, at *13-14 (D. Wyo. June 30, 2023) ([...] Ra37), the court held that parents were unlikely to be able to establish that the school had a constitutional obligation to affirmatively disclose their child’s gender identity, but fundamental parental rights were burdened “[t]o the extent the Student Privacy Policy prohibits a teacher or school employee, upon inquiry by a parent or legal guardian, from responding or providing accurate and complete information concerning their minor child (and absent a threat to the wellbeing of the student).
[brief] The [...] analogizes its argument to the facts of Vort v. Hollander, 257 N.J. Super. 56 (App. Div. 1992).  In Vort, an attorney sued a client for unpaid fees, and the client counterclaimed for professional misconduct and violation of the Consumer Fraud Act.  The Law Division dismissed the counterclaim, and the Appellate Division affirmed.  As to the claim under the Consumer Fraud Act, the Appellate Division concluded that “attorney's services do not fall within the intendment of the Consumer Fraud Act. ”  Id. at 62.  (App. Div. 1992).  The [...]’s reliance on that case is misplaced.
[brief] 5.  In accordance with Synnex Corp. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 394 N.J. Super. 577, 587-88 (N.J. App. Div. 2007), all interlocutory orders upon which the judgments are based are appealed, including but not limited to, the October 13, 2021 Order denying Defendants’ motion to recuse [...], and the November 16, 2022 Order regarding the remand from the Appellate Division listed above.
[brief] Plaintiffs assert that the “[...] should have required a formal bird survey to include one full year of wintering, migration, and breeding bird occupancy prior to making any decisions, as required by N.J.A.C. 7:13–11.6(e) and N.J.A.C. 7:13–18.8(b).  The actual observation of threatened and endangered species on the property, significantly questions the analysis completed by the [...] that the site does not contain suitable habitat. ”  (Pb18).  Plaintiffs neglect to mention that the [...] properly responded to Plaintiffs’ concerns related to the presence of suitable habitat and concluded that, based upon [...]’s exhaustive review that such a survey was not necessary:  While a survey could potentially accurately document any additional wildlife on site, ultimately the department must consider its jurisdiction on the property, the size of the property and potential habitat, and the quality of the habitat.  Here, the extent of wetlands is limited, and the potential habitat is far short of the strength to merit or require a 2–year survey of the freshwater wetlands on the property.  (Aa0064).  In fact, Plaintiffs’ claims alleging the presence of threatened and endangered species related to the overall property were also specifically rejected by the [...] by way of an August 10, 2023, Certificate of the Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection Granting a Release of Conservation Restriction burdening the [...] property.  (Aa2926).  As specifically indicated in the Certificate, the [...] affirmatively investigated by internal review and site inspection, the alleged presence of the species identified by Plaintiffs and found that the property does not contain suitable habitat for any of the species identified by Plaintiffs.  (Aa2933-Aa2937).  In that same regard, in its Environmental Report, the [...] concluded that a wildlife survey for [...]’s FHA Permit application would not alter the Threatened and Endangered Species Unit determination its review of Plaintiffs’ comments.  (Aa0049).  The [...] thoroughly reviewed the reports submitted by Plaintiffs, including species sighting reports, and properly determined to issue [...]’s FHA Permit pursuant to the scope and limits of its jurisdictional authority.  Therefore, the [...] did not act arbitrary, capriciously or unreasonably in issuing the FHA Permit to [...].  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] THE PROSECUTOR’S DECISION TO CROSS-EXAMINE DEFENDANT -- AND THEN ARGUE TO THE JURY IN SUMMATION -- ABOUT THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DEFENDANT’S PERSONAL BUSINESS CARD FAILED TO COMPLY WITH INTERNAL REGULATIONS OF THE STATE POLICE WAS A BRAZEN ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE THE VERDICT WITH INADMISSIBLE “PRIOR BAD ACTS” EVIDENCE THAT HAD NO ACTUAL RELEVANCE TO THE CASE; ALTERNATIVELY, NO JURY INSTRUCTION WAS DELIVERED REGARDING THAT EVIDENCE.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 689.  See also *State v. Pierre*, 223 N.J. 560, 579 (2015).  A valid conviction will not be overturned merely because a defendant is dissatisfied with counsel’s exercise of judgment during trial.  *State v. Coruzzi*, 189 N.J. Super. 273, 319-20 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 94 N.J. 531 (1983).  Indeed, ineffective assistance of counsel is not proven by merely showing, with the benefit of hindsight, that counsel’s strategic decisions did not succeed.  *State v. DiFrisco (IV)*, 174 N.J. 195, 220-21 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1220 (2003).  Strategic decisions that are objectively reasonable, albeit debatable or unsuccessful, are “‘within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance’ to which an accused is entitled.