ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The officers should request that the neighbor not provide the next of kin with any information pertaining to the "medical emergency" until they have been officially contacted by the officers.  In the event that there is no adult next of kin at home at the time that notification is attempted, it is recommended that the officers inquire as to when an adult is expected home and they should return at that time to accomplish the notification.  If the next of kin are out of state and are not expected home, the notification process should be carried out in the same manner as that utilized in notifying family members residing outside of the investigating agency's jurisdiction as set forth below.  In the event that the victim's next of kin reside outside of the investigating law enforcement agency's jurisdiction, the investigating officer should contact the appropriate law enforcement agency in the other jurisdiction.  That agency should be requested to make the in-person notification of death as described herein.  The investigating officer should request that the notifying officer provide survivors with the investigating officer's name and telephone number in the event that the survivors require additional information or assistance.  When a critically injured person is transported to a hospital, it is recommended that the hospital staff promptly notify the appropriate law enforcement agency.
[directive] The summaries provided are for ease of reference only and should not be exclusively relied upon.  2  18 U.S.C. § 922(b) by unlawfully selling to minor; selling in violation of state • law; selling to person who does not reside in state; selling destructive device, machinegun, short-barreled shotgun or rifle; or selling firearm or armor- piercing ammunition without required records; 18 U.S.C. § 922(c) by unlawfully selling firearm to someone who does not • appear in person; 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) by selling or disposing of firearm to prohibited person; • 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) by receiving, possessing, or transporting firearm or • ammunition as an employee of a person prohibited from shipping, transporting, possessing, or receiving any firearm or ammunition under subsection (g), in the course of such employment; 18 U.S.C. § 922(i) by transporting or shipping stolen firearms or ammunition; • 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) by receiving, possessing, concealing, bartering, selling, or • otherwise disposing of a stolen firearm or ammunition; 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) by shipping, transporting, or receipt of a firearm or • ammunition as a person under indictment for a crime punishable by over one year in prison; 18 U.S.C. § 922(u) by unlawfully taking a firearm from a licensed firearm • importer, manufacturer, or dealer; 18 U.S.C. § 922(x) by transferring a handgun or handgun ammunition to a • juvenile, or possessing a handgun or handgun as a juvenile; or 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1) by making a false statement in connection with a firearms • transaction.
[brief] He was selected by [...] — not [...] — for the job on which the accident occurred, and there is no evidence that he had any prior accidents.  It is thus illogical for Plaintiff to suggest that [...] represented some kind of clear and present danger about which [...] was aware and deliberately ignored in connection with the milling and paving job to be completed on the night of the accident.  Furthermore, none of the [...] “supervisory” employees ([...], [...], and [...]) who were asked about whether anyone ever complained about [...] testified that they received complaints about [...] prior to the incident.
[brief] Clearly, the [...] report violated the Net Opinion Rule.  See, Kaplan v. Skoloff & Wolfe, P.C., 339 N.J. Super. 97 (App. Div. 2001).  [...] did not have evidential support in the record to support a conclusion that [...] would have ruled in favor of [...] on any of the points.  [...] simply relied on speculations and assumptions regarding what [...] would have done, rather than facts and applicable case law interpreting those facts.  Cf., Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015).  See also, Morris Properties, Inc. v. Wheeler, et al., No. A-2653-20, 2023 WL 2249975, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 28, 2023)(approved for publication August 22, 2023).  Also, [...] did not provide the appropriate opinion on causation and damages.  Cf., Morris Properties, supra.  [...] is unable to demonstrate that he would have prevailed or would have won materially more but for a substandard performance.  In addition, [...] did not put any numbers in his report (valuation).  [...] stated that he could not provide numbers because he did not have any data on which to do so.  (Da156).  No values are provided in connection with what [...] would have or should have obtained.  In any event, that was [...]’s burden to demonstrate, and he could not do it through the report of [...].  (Da156).  Accordingly, the [...] report was deficient, and plaintiff’s argument that he established proximate cause should be rejected.
[brief] "The right against self-incrimination is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and this state's common law, now embodied in statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19, and evidence rule, N.J.R.E. 503."  State v. Bullock, 253 N.J. 512, 532 (2023) (quoting State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 399 (2009)).  In Miranda, "the United States Supreme Court imposed procedural safeguards to try to dispel the inherent pressures of custodial interrogations and protect the right against self-incrimination."  State v. O.D.A.-C., 250 N.J. 408, 419-20 (2022) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 478-79).  The Miranda Court held that before law enforcement can interrogate a person in custody, the person must be advised that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
[brief] As to factor six, ‘the method of payment,’ the Court finds that because the checks the County issued as payment for Plaintiff’s services were made out to Plaintiff’s law firm and not him personally, and because the invoices Plaintiff sent to the County for his services came from his law firm and not him personally, that the County never paid Plaintiff directly, as it would an employee.  As such, factor six weighs against Plaintiff.  As to the eight, tenth, and eleventh factors, ‘whether there is annual leave,’ ‘whether the worker accrues retirement benefits,’ and ‘whether the ‘employer’ pays social security taxes,’ it is clear that Plaintiff did not receive any employment benefits through his role as part-time County Counsel.  Plaintiff also did not receive annual leave, did not accrue retirement benefits, and [...] did not pay social security or payroll taxes on Plaintiff’s behalf.  Clearly then, these factors weight against Plaintiff.
[brief] First, that the interview of [...] provided as an exhibit to the petition failed to comply with R. 3:22-10(c) requiring any factual assertions underlying a claim for relief be made by an affidavit or certification.  (21T15-3to 21).  The court made this finding despite the fact that the detailed scope of [...]’s proposed testimony was set forth in an interview arranged by trial counsel between an investigator and [...].
[brief] [...] Hires an Accountant for the Companies  During the [...] transaction for [...], [...] met the seller’s accountant, [...], with whom he developed a relationship.  At [...]’s urging, [...] became [...]’s and [...]’s accountant.  Based on that relationship, [...] also became the accountant for [...] and his family, and for [...].  (4T126:15 to 128:2).  Although [...] knew that [...] became the accountant for [...] and [...], [...] mainly liaised with [...], not [...].  (5T12:24 to 15:8; 16:11 to 18:3; 18:6-17; 21:24 to 22:18; 13T83:9 to 91:5).
[brief] UNITED’S OBJECTIONS DO NOT PROVIDE A BASIS TO REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT’S DISCOVERY ORDER (Da166-68)**  [...] offers several reasons that the trial court’s discovery order amounts to an abuse of discretion.  In general, it contends that the trial court misapplied \(^{15}\)  Of course, had the trial court selected the approach favored by [...] -- full relevancy review prior to production -- that would have been permissible as well, and there would be no basis for the [...] to seek reversal of the determination.  Rule 4:10-2(a) and imposed an undue burden on [...] with no countervailing justification.  [...]’s arguments should be rejected.
[brief] The State’s rebuttal witness, retired NJSP SFC [...] (16T192-15 to 193-21), further called defendant’s credibility into question.  Defendant claimed that in 2014, after a disagreement between himself and [...], Stanks was appointed to be an intermediary between the men, which lasted about three to four months.  (15T154-16 to 164-15).  Stanks did not recall any such assignment.  F.  The Verdicts.  Based on the above evidence, the jury convicted defendant of the three counts that concerned his theft of his NJSP ID, and his misuse of the ID in multiple encounters with traffic police – official misconduct, pattern of official misconduct, and theft of movable property.  (21T49-19 to 53-5; 21T54-21 to 57-20).  The jury found defendant not guilty of the three counts that concerned his calibrations of Alcotest instruments – official misconduct, tampering with public records, and falsifying records.  (21T47-15 to 49-18; 21T53-6 to 54-20; 21T57-21 to 59-10).  This appeal follows.
[brief] G.  The Trial Court Improperly Dismissed Count Four of Plaintiffs’ Complaint Asserting Violations of the Federal and New Jersey Civil Rights Acts.  (T. at 27:8-32:23).  Lastly, in the Fourth Count of the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that their rights under the Federal Civil Rights Act and New Jersey Civil Rights Act have been violated.  Because the trial court erred by dismissing all of Plaintiffs’ other claims, it in turn erred by dismissing this claim.  Under the Federal Civil Rights Act, “[e]very person who, under color of any statute . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. ”  42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Similarly, under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, “[a]ny person who has been deprived of any substantive due process or equal protection rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or any substantive rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this State . . . may bring a civil action for damages and for injunctive or other appropriate relief. ”  N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c).  “In addition to any damages, civil penalty, injunction or other appropriate relief awarded in an action brought pursuant to subsection c. of this section, the Court may award the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. ”  N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(f).  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Q: Now, you also testified just before, earlier today, that you and your family didn’t trust [...], right?  A:  We don’t have any communication with him except my husband.  Q: Okay.  So despite not trusting him, your family put him in charge of [...] and didn’t ask for an accounting or other records relating to the management of the property, right?  A: That is all managed by my husband and Richard because I don’t like him.  I have no contact with him.  (13T 88:2-12, Jan. 30, 2023).  [...] was also confronted with her sworn interrogatory responses, which specifically asked her to identify “any and all persons who was involved in maintaining the property or making repairs from 2007 to 2019” including the name of the person, the amount of payment, the method of payment, and copies of related documents.  [...] confirmed that her sworn answer to this question was that she had no such knowledge.  (13T 97:7, Jan. 30, 2023)
[brief] v. O.D.A.-C., 250 N.J. 408, 421 (2022).  Both inquiries are based on the totality of the circumstances and include such overlapping factors as the suspect’s age, education, and intelligence; advice concerning constitutional rights; length of detention; length and nature of questioning; extent of physical and “psychological pressures”; “sign[s] of exhaustion or fatigue”; and prior encounters with police.  L.H., 239 N.J. at 42-43; State ex rel. Q.N., 179 N.J. 165, 179 (2004).
[brief] ”  See Malanga, 253 N.J. at 309 (citing Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 191 N.J. 344, 357 (2007)).  Pursuant to the LRHL, a property may be designated as an area in need of redevelopment, hence blighted, only if satisfies at least one of certain enumerated conditions in N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5.
[brief] “Compensation” means the contractual salary, for services as a teacher as defined in this article, which is in accordance with established salary policies of the member’s employer for all employees in the same position but shall not include individual salary adjustments which are granted primarily in anticipation of the member’s retirement or additional remuneration for performing temporary or extracurricular duties beyond the regular school day or the regular school year.  [N.J.S.A. 18A:66-2(d)(1). ]  Examples of extra compensation, include but are not limited to: vii.  Individual retroactive salary adjustments where no sufficient justification is provided that the adjustment was granted primarily for a reason other than retirement; viii.  Individual adjustments to place a member at the maximum of his or her salary range in the final years of service where no sufficient justification is provided that the adjustment was granted primarily for a reason other than retirement; ... xi.  Retroactive increments or adjustments made at or near the end of a member’s service, unless the adjustment was the result of an across-the-board adjustment for all similarly situated personnel; ... [N.J.A.C. 17:3-4.1(a)(1). ]  Such “[e]xtra compensation shall not be considered creditable for benefits and all employee contributions made thereon shall be returned without interest.
[brief] The plaintiffs sued [...] and two of its attorneys for fraud and alleged conspiracy to commit RICO violations, alleging that the firm and its lawyers should have known that [...] was a “scam. ”  The court, however, dismissed these claims on summary judgment finding that, though the attorneys had counseled [...] on securities law compliance issues, they had never crossed the line into directing or participating in [...]’s business operations.  The court also dismissed all RICO claims because the plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence that the attorneys had “agreed” with [...] to pursue [...]’s allegedly criminal objectives.
[brief] ”  9T, p. 12, lines 13-15.  •  When examining and rejecting [...]’s claim that it has an ownership interest in a portion of the Property, [...] concluded that [...] has “. . . no ownership interest in the disputed parcels” and that he “. . .found more credible the testimony of [...] in this regard. ”  9T, p. 15, lines 18-20.  •  [...] went on to say “. . . it clearly is the Court’s view that the intent of these conveyances was to convey both the riparian grants and the riparian rights.  The view to the contrary kind of defies reason.  It is unlikely that there would have been the retention of lands underwater without having the uplands and the adjoining properties.  In fact there would have been no practical way to access riparian lands under water.  So it just doesn’t seem logical that they would have retained any interest in the riparian grant property.  And the Court finds that it clearly was the intent incorporated into these deeds to obtain all of the property interest of, and convey all of the property interest and not retain any interest in the subject property.
[directive] This plea is the result of the judge’s conditional indications of the maximum sentence he or she would impose independent of the prosecutor’s recommendation.  Accordingly, the "Supplemental Plea Form for Non-Negotiated Pleas" has been completed.  Main Plea Form/Revised Form  Promulgated by Directive #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 10079  Defendant’s Initials page 5 of 5
[brief] \textsuperscript{10}  Moreover, in the very same case cited by [...], the New Jersey Supreme Court held that even though the Plaintiffs only had an “indirect interest” in the subject matter of that litigation, the "circumstances adequately demonstrate that plaintiffs have a stake in the outcome of these proceedings and there is genuine adverseness between the parties in terms of the litigated controversy".  \textit{NJ State Chamber of Commerce v. NJ Election Law}, 82 N.J. 57, 68 (1980) (citing \textit{Crescent Park Tenants Ass'n v. Realty Equities Corp.}, 58 N.J. 98, 107 (1971) ).  And as I had argued to the trial court, other authorities I found held that: A) “third-party beneficiaries may sue upon a contract made for their benefit without privity of contract."  \textit{Rieder Cmtys. v. N. Brunswick}, 227 N.J. Super. 214, 221-22 (App. Div.1988); 2) the threshold to prove a party's standing in New Jersey is "fairly low."  \textit{Reaves v. Egg Harbor Twp.}, 277 N.J.Super. 360, 366, 649 A.2d 904 (Ch.1994); and 3) having a "financial interest in the outcome ordinarily is sufficient to confer standing."  \textit{Strulowitz v. Provident Life & Cas. Ins. Co.}, 357 N.J.Super. 454, 459, 815 A.2d 993 (App. Div. 2003).  \textsuperscript{10}  In his Aug 24, 2022 certification, [...] acknowledged that my sister and I did have an “inchoate interest” in the vehicle (which was even prior to my going to the Surrogate’s Office on Oct 5, 2022 and becoming the official estate administrator).
[directive] In many departments, depending upon the size and other assignments of personnel, this may be impossible in a given case.  In those cases where the primary investigating officer conducts the photo or live lineup identification procedure, they should be careful to avoid inadvertent signaling to the witness of the “correct” response.  2.  Instructions.  The witness should be instructed prior to the photo or live lineup identification procedure that the perpetrator may not be among those in the photo array or live lineup and, therefore, they should not feel compelled to make an identification.
[brief] Clark, 251 N.J. at 298.  “The privilege against self-incrimination . . . is one of the most important protections of the criminal law. ”  State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 312 (2000).  Our law protects the right to silence, and the guarantee “that silence will carry no penalty” is “implicit to any person who receives the warnings. ”  Clark, 251 N.J. at 293 (quoting Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976)).  The State therefore may not use a person’s invocation of their Miranda rights against them at trial.  Id. at 292-93.
[brief] *Id.*  An appellate court must affirm the sentence unless: (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated, (2) the aggravated and mitigating factors found by the sentencing court were not based on competent credible evidence in the record, or (3) the application of the guidelines to the facts of the case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience.  *Id.*  None of those circumstances exist here.  The sentencing judge in this case conducted a thorough, well-reasoned analysis of the aggravating and mitigating factors and arrived at a fair sentence.  The sentence must be affirmed.
[brief] F.  [...]’s Conclusion that Appellant Made False Statements or Representations is Supported by the Record and Should be Upheld.  As previously stated, [...] reasonably rejected Appellant’s “evolving theory” on the night of the Incident, since Appellant requested Narcan immediately upon [...]’s arrival, but initially stated that [...] had only been drinking, then maybe [...] took a pill, and finally conclusively stating that [...] took oxycodone.  [Pa54].  These conclusions are based on the record evidence and [...]’s assessment of witness credibility.  [4T51:13-17, 4T68:11-23, 4T133:1-2].  [...] also found that Appellant lied about being under the influence of drugs on the night of the Incident, as Appellant testified that he only took his medication when off-duty, and that [...] observed Appellant in what appeared to be an impaired state.  [Pa54].  This is also based on record evidence.  [4T76:2-21; 6T11:3-5].  [...] further found that Appellant gave misleading statements in connection with his third sinus surgery and going to Florida House while Appellant was supposed to be at home on sick leave.  [Pa55].  This is based on record evidence.  [Pa155; 4T190:17 – 4T191:10].  [...] also found that Appellant lied to [...] about his whereabouts on November 29, 2018 [Pa55], which is supported by record evidence [3T22:4-15, 3T23:14-19].
[brief] ”  Scully-Bozart Post #1817 vs. Planning Bd. of Burlington, 362 N.J.Super. 296, 314 (App.Div.); cert. denied, 178 N.J. 34 (2003).  “A local board’s action is presumed valid, and the challenger has the burden of proving otherwise.  New York SMSA L.P. v. Board of Adj. of Bernards Tp., 324 N.J.Super. 149, 163 (App.Div.), cert. denied, 162 N.J. 488 (1999).  The law presumes that local boards will act fairly, with proper motives, and for valid reasons.
[brief] (Da18)  Defendants contend that this issue involves both a matter of law and a potential abuse of discretion by the trial court.  Defendants argue that the Trustee violated a court order by failing to attend a settlement conference upon receipt of both appraisals.  (Da14-15)  As explained by [...], the purpose of the conference was for the parties to discuss their options: either list the properties or proceed with a sealed bid process.  (1T24-25 & 1T31)  Contrary to the required compliance, upon receipt of both appraisals, the Trustee initiated a sealed bidding procedure for the Boonton Property, without obtaining [...]’s consent.  (Da142)  This violation is a legal issue because it concerns the Trustee’s obligation to comply with court orders, which is mandated by law.  Furthermore, the Trustee’s failure to comply with the court order also constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty under N.J.S.A. 3B:31-54, which requires trustees to administer the trust in “good faith” and adhere to applicable law, including court orders.  Additionally, the Trustee’s decision to initiate a sealed bidding procedure constitutes a breach of her fiduciary duties of loyalty and impartiality pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:31-55 and N.J.S.A. 3B:31-56.  This is because [...] and [...] were bidding together, against [...], to purchase the Boonton Property.  (Da587 ¶28)  (Da591 ¶42)  Defendants argue that [...]’s decision to allow the Trustee to disregard a court order and breach her fiduciary duties constitutes an abuse of discretion.  The law mandates that trustees adhere to court orders and act impartially and loyally.  A trial court judge has a duty to uphold the law, which is foundational to the integrity and function of the judicial system.  Furthermore, Defendants argue that [...]’s decision was manifestly unjust.  As a consequence of the trial court’s ruling, [...] was compelled, by Order, to relinquish his property shares at reduced values and participate in a bidding procedure he strongly opposed.  This was clearly unfair and resulted in significant harm, as both [...] and [...] suffered direct financial loss and emotional distress.  To maintain the integrity of the judicial system and protect beneficiary rights, it is imperative that the court uphold the law and ensure justice.  Failing to address these breaches sets a dangerous precedent that threatens the rule of law and erodes trust in the judicial process.  2.