ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Defendants-Respondents supplement the Statement of Facts set forth in the Plaintiffs-Appellants brief with the following:  On October 7, 2021, the [...] filed a Complaint to Appoint Boundary Commissioners pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:28-1, to resolve a dispute regarding the location of the shared boundary line that divides the residential real property located at [...] (Tax Lot 10, Block 15.02) and [...] (Tax Lot 11, block 15.02).  (Pa1).  On December 21, 2021, Plaintiffs submitted a Motion for Appointment of Boundary Commissioners pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:28-1 for the purposes of resolving the boundary dispute between the Plaintiffs and Defendants.  On January 25, 2022, the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C., granted the Plaintiff’s application and appointed three boundary line commissioners to serve in the Action, including a surveyor, [...] (“[...]”), and two attorneys, [...], Esq. (“[...]”) and [...], Esq. (“[...]”) ([...], [...], and [...] are collectively referred to as the “Commissioners”).  (Pa55).  The Court’s Order appointed the Commissioners to “render a report to the best of their judgment ascertaining the true location of the boundary line dispute between the parties in this matter” and provided that the Commissioners “shall have all of the powers granted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:28-2. ”  (Pa55).  The Order also compelled each of the Commissioners to “take and subscribe to an oath that each of them shall act fairly and impartially and to the best of their judgment” in ascertaining the true location of the boundary line between the subject properties.  (Pa55).  The Order required the Commissioners to file their Boundary Commission Report by March 11, 2022.  (Pa55).  On May 4, 2022, the Commissioners filed a letter with the Court indicating the Commissioners were unable to meet the March 11, 2022, deadline due to the “substantial difficulties” presented by the case, including but not limited to the complications in locating and acquiring surveys for the surrounding lots, and the inability in locating the monuments which were required to be set by the original surveys.  (Da1).  Based upon the issues raised in the Commissioners’ letter, the Court extended the date by which the Commissioners were to issue their Report until June 15, 2022.  Thereafter, on June 13, 2022, and then on July 18, 2022, the Commissioners wrote to the Court requesting another two extensions.  The Commissioners annexed a “Preliminary Boundary Line Commission Report on [...], [...]” to the July 18, 2022, adjournment request, detailing the difficulties and complexities presented by the subject boundary dispute.  (Da3).  An additional adjournment request was submitted on October 28, 2022, requesting the Court set November 1, 2022, as the deadline by which the Commissioners submit their ultimate report.  In accordance with this request, the Commissioners filed their November 1, 2022, Boundary Commissioners Report.  (Pa57).  The Report includes a culmination of the extensive undertakings of the Commissioners over the course of their nine-month investigation, comprised of eight pages of substantive description and explanation of the inquiry and nine supporting Exhibits.
[brief] 4 LEGAL ARGUMENTS ..................................................  23 POINT I THE TRIAL COURT’S DISJUNCTIVE READING OF N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2) FAILS TO EFFECTUATE THE LEGISLATURE’S INTENT.  (Pa91-Pa93; Pa123-Pa125; Pa128-Pa133).  .........................  23  A.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2)  DISJUNCTIVELY TO PROHIBIT AN AWARD OF RESTITUTION AND DISGORGEMENT IN THE SAME ACTION.  (Pa91-Pa93; Pa123-Pa125; Pa128-Pa133).  .........................  23  B.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO AFFORD THE [...]’S INTERPRETATION OF N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2)  THE SUBSTANTIAL DEFERENCE TO WHICH IT IS ENTITLED.  (Pa91-Pa93; Pa123-Pa125; Pa128-Pa133).  .........................  30  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT’S ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2)  THWARTS THE PUBLIC POLICY PURPOSES OF THE UNIFORM SECURITIES LAW: PROTECTING INVESTORS AND ROOTING OUT FRAUD.  (Pa91-Pa93; Pa123-Pa125; Pa128-Pa133).  .........................  38  POINT III  THE CATCH-ALL PROVISION OF N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2)  AUTHORIZING MULTIPLE REMEDIES  FURTHER ILLUSTRATES THAT THE TRIAL COURT MISCONSTRUED THAT STATUTE (Pa91-Pa93; Pa123-Pa125; Pa128-Pa133).........................42  CONCLUSION..............................................................44
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  1.  The Standards of Review.  a.  Res Judicata.  The well-established standards for res judicata, including in zoning cases, are articulated in Mazza v. Board of Adjustment of Linden, 83 N.J. Super. 494 (App. Div. 1964).  At 496, these standards are defined as: (1) the application is similar or substantially similar to a prior application, (2) the same parties or privies are involved, (3) there are no substantial changes between the applications or conditions affecting the property, (4) there was a prior adjudication on the merits, and (5) both applications seek the same relief.
[brief] (Pa 49, at 71:4-15; and Pa 55, at 96:3-16)  [...] then began investigating his complaints regarding same several days after-the-fact; only after [...] had heard from multiple other firefighters in attendance at [...]’s Covid training that the conduct they had there witnessed was outrageous, and that Plaintiff was visibly upset by it.  (Pa 55, at 94:14-25, and Pa 56, at 98:1)  Multiple firefighters thereafter wrote witness statements affirming that they had heard the comment and saw [...] squinting.
[brief] [...]’s return on equity approach, which the lower court largely adopted, effectively aims to achieve a return on the value of the [...]’s dwelling unit as a condominium, not as a rental unit encumbered by rent control protections.  [...] assumes that the value of [...]’s unit has increased because of its conversion and tries to recoup this rise in value through a significant rent increase.  Under the TPA, this is not allowed.
[brief] As already discussed, the Lease contains no provision whatsoever that would result in Tenant permanently forfeiting its phase-one fit-up reimbursement as a result of any later-phase rent deficiency.  On the contrary, the Lease directs, in § 4.02 that if, “at the time” a Tenant’s Allowance installment payment is due the Tenant owes the Landlord rent, the missed rent amount is automatically offset against the installment amount (Da17-Da18).  Landlord’s alternative construction cannot be taken seriously.  As Landlord would have it, on August 1, 2020, the Tenant’s Allowance payment of $121,666.67 plus interest that the Lease says is due and owing on that date disappears forever and need never be paid.  On that same day, that exact amount is deducted from the principal amount of the Tenant’s Allowance balance owed.  Also, Tenant still has to pay all the missed rent, without any offset, to avoid eviction.  But even if Tenant pays all the missed rent, the balance deducted from the Tenant’s Allowance is never restored.  And yet somehow, Landlord can still “elect” to “offset” the missed rent against the Allowance Installment that, again, no longer exists.  As this illustration demonstrates, Landlord’s overly robust construction of the Monetary Default clause renders the Tenant’s Allowance Offset clause totally absurd and meaningless, an interpretation always to be strenuously avoided when interpreting commercial contracts.
[brief] Da54-Da237.  The Operating Agreement sets forth the rights and obligations of the [...] and [...] with regard to the operation of the Project Garage to support the [...] Mall and other phases, if those phases were to be built.  Da238-Da287.  The Redevelopment Agreement concerned the redevelopment of specific parcels of land owned by the [...] in the section of the City located adjacent to the Passaic County Courthouse and commonly known as [...] Paterson, and provided for a phased redevelopment project, which anticipated the construction of the [...] Mall, the Project Garage, the Residential Component, the Office/Retail Component, as well as the [...] Garage to service the customers, residents and occupants of these buildings, if any, when built.  Da150-Da154.  Through this phased project approach, the pre-existing parking operations on the three (3) parcels owned by the [...] in the Project area would be relocated as each of the following three project components was constructed by [...]: (i) the [...] Mall, as well as the Project Garage, which Project Garage would be (and is) operated by the [...] pursuant to the Operating Agreement; (ii) the Residential Component; and (iii) the Office/Retail Component.  Da150-Da154.  The Redevelopment Agreement also provided for a revenue sharing calculation by which the [...] and [...] would receive shares of all revenue in excess of $1,600,000.00 as of 2005, which amount would be adjusted in accordance with the Consumer Price Index (CPI) on an annual basis.  Da67; Da110-Da111.  The [...] and [...] also executed a ground lease, dated April 17, 2006 (the “Ground Lease”), for the land underlying the [...] Mall, pursuant to Section 8.5 of the Redevelopment Agreement.  Da288-Da351.  Pursuant to the Ground Lease, [...] leased the land underlying the [...] Mall and Project Garage from the [...] for a ninety-nine (99) year term at a total cost of $1.00 per year.  Da108; Da300.  The Operating Agreement set forth the terms by which [...] would maintain and the [...] would operate and manage the Project Garage.
[brief] The Missouri case is more “comprehensive” based on joinder of additional parties (Pa765) • [...] filed a defensive declaratory judgment action preemptively, and Defendants are the natural plaintiffs (Pa765-67) • Staying the case on comity grounds would not prejudice [...] because claims could be litigated in Missouri(Pa768) | • [...] • [...] (Pa764-68) | Motion denied by [...] Jan. 20, 2023 (Pa774-75) (see also 2T59:3-61:16) | | Feb. 10, 2023 | • [...] filed a defensive declaratory judgment action preemptively, and Defendants are the natural plaintiffs (Pa311-12) • Staying the case on comity grounds would not prejudice [...] because claims could be litigated in Missouri (Pa314) • Missouri’s interest in adjudicating the dispute is greater than New Jersey’s (Pa313) | • [...] • [...] (Pa311-314) | Motion granted by [...] July 24, 2023 (Pa56) | Defendants’ argument that “[r]econsideration was appropriate given [...]’s need, as the new judge assigned to this case, to ensure that the January 23 Orders ‘promote[d] a fair and efficient processing of’ the parties’ dispute” (Db25-26)² is a meritless rationalization for attempting to obtain a reversal after [...]’s retirement.
[brief] He was convicted on all counts, other than unlawful possession of a .380 mm handgun (count nine).  (1T:10-2 to 13-16) (Da 13-16) --- 1  Da: Defendant’s appendix  1T: Transcript of 3/30/2015 (Trial) 2T: Transcript of 5/8/2015 (Sentencing)  3T: Transcript of 6/28/2022 (Resentencing)  4T: Transcript of 8/2/2022 (Resentencing)  5T: Transcript of 3/27/23 (Resentencing)  On May 8, 2015, [...] sentenced [...] to an aggregate term of fifty-five years imprisonment with a forty-six-year and nine-month period of parole ineligibility,\(^2\) which he arrived at as follows.
[brief] *Mantilla*, 167 N.J. at 269-73; *Englert*, 389 N.J. Super. at 57-58; *Meder*, 240 N.J. Super. 470.  Here, [...]’s contract contained two conflicting indemnity provisions.  Da44-45, ¶ 2 & Da45, ¶ 4.  Paragraph 2 required [...] to indemnify [...] for claims of bodily injury or property damage “arising out of use of, or traveling at or onto the property, whether or not such claim [for] damage, injury or death results from negligence of Customer [[...]], Contractor [[...]] or others. ”  Da45, ¶ 2.  In contrast, Paragraph 4, entitled “Indemnification,” required [...] to “be responsible. ” “to the fullest extent permitted by law,” for all claims for bodily injury and property damage that may arise from Customer’s premises including an[y] acts or omissions by Customer or Customer’s subcontractors whether employed directly or indirectly for ice which forms from day time melting from snow and ice which is removed from, brought in by or in between vehicles.  [Da45, ¶ 4.]  Paragraph 4 did not require either party to indemnify the other for the indemnitee’s own negligence.
[brief] C.  NEITHER THE MANUAL OF UNIFORM TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICES NOR THE TRAFFIC CONTROL DETAIL ESTABLISH EVIDENCE OF A STANDARD APPLICABLE TO [...]  Plaintiffs argue that the trial court did not give sufficient weight to two documents discussed by [...]: the Federal Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (“MUTCD”) and a New Jersey Department of Transportation “Traffic Control Detail. ”  Plaintiffs’ reference to these documents is a classic red herring.
[brief] The balance of the charges were all rule and regulation charges of [...].  So, even under the most generous reading of *McElwee*, the only charge that survives a 45-Day Rule argument is Conduct Unbecoming a Police Officer, in violation of *N.J.S.A. 40A:14-128* (40A:14-147).  *McElwee* does not stand for the proposition that because one or more charges are brought under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147, by corollary, which saves rule and regulation charges from being dismissed that would otherwise be in violation of the 45-Day Rule.  POINT III
[brief] Rather, as the instant matter glaringly illustrates, only physicians benefit by leveraging their dominant role in the relationship.  The lopsided power dynamic is heightened when patients are undergoing surgical procedures, which literally has the patient putting their life in the physician’s hands.  When a surgical procedure results in a patient’s death, the balance of power is forever etched in stone.  The deceased patient’s heirs should not be burdened with terms of an arbitration agreement that were never known to them.  “No contract can be sustained if it is inconsistent with the public interest or detrimental to the common good. ”  Vasquez v. Glassboro Service Asso., 83 N.J. 86, 98 (1980).  A pre-suit arbitration agreement is a type of contract that is inconsistent with public interest and detrimental to the public good because, as discussed infra, they are inherently unconscionable and have a detrimental effect on the physician-patient relationship.
[directive] When a defendant charged with a crime or offense involving domestic violence is released from custody Page 42 construed to preempt or in any way alter the authority of the agency or the victim to apply for a temporary or final restraining order, and the special conditions of pretrial release in the criminal prosecution sought pursuant to this subsection shall be in addition to, not in lieu of, any such civil temporary or final restraining order.  Special Notifications in Domestic Violence Cases.
[brief] B.  **Appellant’s CEPA Claim Is Not Supported By The Credible Record Evidence. **  Appellant’s CEPA claim remains subject to dismissal because he did not engage in whistleblowing activity, and he cannot establish the requisite causal connection between his purported whistleblowing activity and his termination.  In his Complaint, Appellant alleges that Respondents violated CEPA by terminating his employment because Respondent knew Appellant was aware Respondent “[...] was selling products which were made in China as Made in America by way of lasering the ‘Made in China’ stamp off and replacing it with the said ‘Made in America’ stamp. ”  The relevant statutory language of CEPA prohibits an employer from, *inter alia*, taking retaliatory action against an employee because the employee does any of the following:
[brief] 14 State Statutes N.J.S.A. 11A:1-1, et seq. ...........................................................................  9 N.J.S.A. 34:11 ..........................................................................................  27 N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1a, et seq.  ......................................................................  18 N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.2 ....................................................................................  27 N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.7 ....................................................................................  27  N.J.S.A. 34:11-57, et seq.  .......................................................................  18 N.J.S.A. 34:12:61-1.3 ..............................................................................  27 N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4 ................................................................................ 8-10, 12, 13 N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16 ................................................................................ 6, 9, 18, 20 N.J.S.A. 52:27 BBBB-1, et seq. ................................................................. 2, 7 N.J.S.A. 52:27 BBBB-4 ............................................................................ 9, 11, 12 N.J.S.A. 52:27 BBBB-5 .......................................................................... 7-9, 12, 20, 29 Other R. 4:6-2 ..................................................................................................... 5, 14
[brief] •  The drug [...] dealt was heroin, the same drug found in the victim’s car in what can only be classified as a distribution quantity: 89 Ziploc bags.  (9T 8-13 to 11-8)  •  That the heroin [...] dealt was a different brand than the heroin the victim dealt.  (9T 73-8 to 9)  What is a more credible third-party-guilt defense?  (A) That a person whose fingerprint was on the getaway car and sold controlled substances was the killer; or (B) That a person whose fingerprint was found on the getaway car and sold a different brand of heroin in the same vicinity as the victim was the killer.  The details in the second option add a specificity to the third-party-guilt defense and a motive that makes it significantly more compelling than the first option.  Further, that the trial court allowed for the bare-bones information of option (A) to be presented makes clear that it did, in fact, understand the relevance of [...] to [...]’s defense.
[directive] $100 to $1,000 10% permissible  Nuisance people gather for the purpose of engaging in unlawful conduct.  Sale of Cigarettes  Petty Disorderly 2C:33-13.1 to Persons  Under Actor sells or gives cigarettes or tobacco to any person under age 19.  $100 to $500 10% permissible Persons  Age 19 88
[brief] ”  R. 1:7-4.  Trial court order which “state clearly factual findings and correlate them with relevant legal conclusions, so that parties and the appellate courts [are] informed of the rationale underlying th[ose] conclusion[s]” are sufficient.  Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran, 445 N.J. Super. 574, 594 (App. Div. 2016) (citing Monte v. Monte, 212 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div. 1986)) (alterations in original).
[brief] (2T3-19, 2T10-9, Da28)  Her request for a stay pending appeal also denied, [...] and her child thereafter vacated the unit.  (2T12-7, Da28, Da29)  On April 11, 2024, [...] proceeding pro se filed this appeal.  (Da32, Da35)  On July 31, 2024 [...] filed its notice of appearance.  (Da39)
[brief] (14T 20-16 to 21-17).  In pertinent part, defendant’s trial attorney testified that he did not recall discussing with defendant any potential witnesses.  (14T 21-18 to 21, 23-24 to 24-20, 25-8 to 26-11).  He did, however, recall discussing with defendant the cellular telephone data.  (14T 29-14 to 19).  He did not have the data analyzed.  (14T 31-11 to 16).  Defendant also introduced two witnesses who offered testimony regarding his whereabouts at the time of the shooting.
[brief] “With regard to [...], again, asking to reconsider the fees, asking to, you know, reduce [accounting fee to $16,575 & [...]’s commissions to $1,946.56] even though it is not a substantial amount, so on & so forth, you know, I took a considerable amount of time.... and to a certain degree I can understand why fees had to be incurred, that’s why I gave [...] [[...]’s $93,277 legal] fees [for legal work from Feb. 1 thru Oct. 25, 2022].”  “I didn’t feel good about it because any time you are going to take $93,277 out of a trust, and over [$]113[K] was requested [in Jacobson’s Oct. 26, 2022 application], [...] argued that, well, we only charged like 80 something thousand dollars [$74,248]”.  (4T, p. 48, lines 14-16; p. 49, lines 7-20)
[brief] Nor does the State refute [...]’s evidence that those reexaminations were neither “rigorous,” “meaningful and relevant,” nor --- 7  The State also froze the District’s Educational Adequacy Aid (EAA) at $125,000, the 2010 level, resulting in an additional loss of $16.8 million in state aid each year to support its Adequacy Budget.  (Pa1917-Pa1920.)  8  Adjustment Aid is not “hold harmless aid” (Db10), but rather “transition assistance” to enable districts like [...] with a budget below adequacy and with local levy gaps to maintain spending at the 2008-09 level without unrealistic tax increases.  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 157. resulted in any “retooling” to restore SFRA to its optimal level, as Abbott XX mandated and as Abbott XXI ordered.  Abbott XXI, 206 N.J. at 376.  Instead, both the State and the trial court focus solely on the three amendments enacted by the Legislature in 2018, asserting they give [...] the “tools” to resolve any “problem” with SFRA’s implementation.
[brief] Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, “one may, by voluntary conduct, be precluded from taking a course of action that would work injustice and wrong to one who with good reason and in good faith has relied upon such conduct. ”  Summer Cottagers’ Ass’n v. Cape May, 19 N.J. 493, 503-04 (1955).  The doctrine requires “a knowing and intentional misrepresentation by the party sought to be estopped under circumstances in which the misrepresentation would probably induce reliance, and reliance by the party seeking estoppel to his or her detriment.
[brief] Id. at 144-45 (citing Thomas, 187 N.J. at 133); see also Maloney, 216 N.J. at 108 (same).  Here, that standard was met.  The defense asked the court to instruct the jury on the related offense of aggravated assault.  (7T 79-16 to 80-8; see generally 77-18 to 85-13)  There was a rational basis in the evidence to sustain this related offense.  [...]’s defense was that she stabbed [...] in the neck because he was violently raping her.  She later hit [...] with the tire iron, because, although she believed [...] was dead, she had seen him move and hit him reflexively.  Thus, under the defense theory of the case, there were two incidents — the stabbing, justified by self-defense, and the hitting with the tire iron, which was not a crime because [...] was already dead.
[brief] The fact that purely innocent connotations can be ascribed to a person’s actions does not mean that an officer cannot base a finding of reasonable suspicion on those actions as long as a reasonable person would find the actions consistent with guilt.  *State v. Citarella*, 154 N.J.  272, 279-80 (1998).  Reasonable suspicion is neither easily defined nor “readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of rules. ”  *State v. Stovall*, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002); quoting *Illinois v. Gates*, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).