ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] It is well-established that “accurate jury instructions are essential in a criminal trial[,]” and “the failure to charge the jury on an element of an offense is presumed to be prejudicial error, even in the absence of a request by defense counsel[.]”  *State v. Hodde*, 181 N.J. 375, 384 (2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also *State v. Rhett*, 127 N.J. 3, 7 (1992) (“We have consistently held that incorrect charges on substantive elements of a crime constitute reversible error. ”).  These principles remain true even where the essential element at issue appears beyond dispute.  *State v. [...]*, 117 N.J. 288, 290-93 (1989).  Our Supreme Court was faced with a somewhat similar situation in *State v. [...]*.  In that case, a person involved in a “tavern brawl” who had disarmed an officer and kept the gun was charged with possession of a handgun without a permit.  117 N.J. 288, 290 (1989).  At trial, the court failed to charge the jury that the absence of a permit was an essential element of the offense.  *Ibid.*  [...] appealed, and this Court affirmed, finding that because it was never contested that [...] did not have a permit, the error was harmless.  *Id.* at 290-91.  The Supreme Court reversed, finding that a jury must be the one to find all essential elements of an offense.  The Supreme Court explained, “We realize that it is difficult to explain why juries should be required to make a finding of what seems to be the obvious.  The short answer is that there is simply no substitute for a jury verdict. ”  Id. at 291.  The Court concluded by holding, “we see no way to conclude that a trial can be constitutionally fair when the State is not required to prove . . . the essential elements of the offense charged.  The requirement is so basic and so fundamental that it admits of no exception no matter how inconsequential the circumstances. ”  Id. at 293.  In this case, the situation was even worse than [...].  Every element was different from the appropriate possession offense and the jury was not instructed on any of the proper elements of a N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) offense.  Put simply, convictions cannot be sustained when the jury was not charged on the essential elements.  Although no objection was lodged it cannot be that the need for a jury to find each essential element beyond a reasonable doubt—the entire purpose of a criminal trial—is deemed dispensable because the defense attorney, along with the trial court and the prosecutor, failed to catch the error.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has made clear that the failure to charge the jury on an essential element of the offense is nearly always reversible, even where defense counsel does not object.
[brief] There is no reason to believe that Congress ever intended to outlaw the innocuous act of using a letter vendor for business efficiency.  Courts have repeatedly relied on the Senate Report in concluding that Congress did not intend to prohibit the use of a letter vendor through § 1692c(b).  See Miller v. Americollect, Inc., 2022 WL 20470401 at *10 (noting that § 1692c(b) was meant to protect consumers from the embarrassment and reputational harm from having their debts disclosed to friends, family, neighbors, etc., and that a consumer is threatened with no such harm by a letter vendor assimilating transmitted information into a letter that is sent only to the consumer); [...] at p.12 (“The facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint simply do not implicate the purpose for which the statutory protection exists.  No facts are presently alleged that would permit a conclusion that the alleged supplying of information by the debt collector to the letter vendor was in any way intended to, or had or could have had the effect of, harassing, embarrassing, or humiliating the debtor or was otherwise undertaken for any reason other than legitimate collection activities directed to the debtor. ”); Cavazzini v. MRS Associates, 574 F. Supp. 3d 134, 142 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (noting that “Congress intended to target certain especially harmful debt collection practices—not all communications by debt collectors to third parties,” and certainly not the mere transmission of data to a letter vendor); *Barclift v. Keystone Credit Servs., Inc.*, 2022 WL 444267, *9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2022) (noting that Congress’s intent in including § 1692c(b) was to prevent disclosures to those who know the consumer and affect his or her reputation, not to companies hired to perform rote tasks like printing and sending a letter); *Quaglia v. NS193, LLC*, 2021 WL 7179621, *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2021) (same); *Nyanjom v. NPAS Solutions, LLC*, 2022 WL 168222, *5 (D. Kan. Jan. 19, 2022) (same).
[brief] FOUND AT Pa059)  .........................................................................................  7  II.  THE TRIALS COURT’S CONSTRUCTION OF PARAGRAPH  23 OF THE SHAREHOLDER’S AGREEMENT AS PERMISSIVE RENDERS THE PROVISION MEANINGLESS AND VIOLATES THE RULES OF CONTRACTUAL CONSTRUCTION (APPEALING THE ORDER DATED JANUARY 11, 2024  FOUND AT Pa059)  .........................................................................................  12  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................
[brief] As the New Jersey Supreme Court has emphasized, “[s]o greatly do we in New Jersey cherish our rights of free speech that our Constitution provides even broader protections than the familiar ones found in its federal counterpart. ”  *Borough of Sayreville v. 35 Club L.L.C.*, 208 N.J. 491, 494 (2012); see also *E & J Equities, LLC v. Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Franklin*, 226 N.J. 549, 568 (2016) (observing that “[t]he New Jersey Constitution guarantees a broad affirmative right to free speech”).
[brief] ”  [Pa77]  [...] complied with neither. sensitivity” of these events [Pa101]; (iii) another letter to [...]’s counsel on September 22, 2023 following a telephone call repeating the urgency of [...]’s request for information [Pa46 at ¶ 14, Pa210]; (iv) an email dated September 22, 2023 from [...]’s counsel representing that it was assembling documents for turnover [Pa98]; (v) an email exchange on September 26, 2023 in which [...] reiterated that its need for information “is not something that can wait,” while [...]’s counsel again promised “I will provide it to you as soon as I have it” [Pa97]; and (vi) an email dated September 27, 2023 in which [...]’s counsel’s stated: “I understand your frustration.
[directive] Discretion to authorize stationhouse adjustments for other conduct.  1.  For conduct not described in Section II.B (e.g., for conduct not subject to a presumptive stationhouse adjustment), there shall be no presumption in favor of a stationhouse adjustment, but a law enforcement agency shall nonetheless consider whether to perform one in its discretion (“discretionary stationhouse adjustment”).  An agency may perform a discretionary stationhouse adjustment, provided that the County Prosecutor, or designee, authorizes the stationhouse adjustment.  The term “designee” may include an employee of the County Prosecutor’s Office who has been specifically 5 designated in writing by the County Prosecutor to perform on-call legal advice, review, and/or approval functions pursuant to this Directive.
[brief] ”  (5T 111-16 to 112-8, 151-7 to 15, 153-20 to 154-13) through [...]’s pockets because she still had not found her phone anywhere in the car and believed that it must therefore have been in [...]’s pockets.  (6T 156-8 to 15)  [...] testified that once [...] was on the ground, his eyes were still open, and “he was in the same position from when he was raping [her,]” and she “didn’t want to just leave his body like that. ”  (6T 156-22 to 25)  The surveillance video shows [...]’s leg move slightly, but [...] testified that she did not see it at the time.  (6T 157-1 to 17)  [...] then put her shawl over [...].
[brief] Jones, 179 N.J. at 389.  The first factor, the informant’s veracity, may be satisfied by “demonstrating that the informant proved to be reliable in previous police investigations” by providing accurate information.  State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 213 (2001).  The second factor, basis of knowledge, is satisfied by a showing that the informant obtained the information provided to police in a trustworthy manner. State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 94 (1998).  Such a showing is made where “the tip itself relates expressly or clearly how the informant knows of criminal activity. ”  Ibid.  In addition, corroboration “is necessary to ratify the informant's veracity and validate the truthfulness of the tip.
[brief] ”  Emphasis added.)  On July 26, 2024, [...]’s counsel sent a letter to Plaintiff’s counsel objecting to the Affidavits of Merit and citing the case law supporting the objection.  (Pa72)  On August 5, 2024, the parties appeared for a conference under Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Associates, 178 N.J. 144 (2003) before the [...], where the objection to the Affidavits of Merit were made on the record.  (1T4:2-19:3)  [...] argued that the affidavits by [...] and [...] were insufficient, because the claim alleged vicarious liability against [...], but the affidavits did not identify any act taken by any employee of [...].  (1T11:1-11:18)  Subsequently, plaintiff filed a Motion to deem the Affidavits of Merit sufficient as to a co-defendant and [...].  (2T4:1-54:11)  This motion was opposed, reply papers were submitted, and lengthy oral argument occurred on October 2, 2024.  (Id.)  The Court reserved its decision on the issue of the Affidavits of Merit served as to [...] and scheduled a second hearing on October 11, 2024.  (2T53:3-8)  On October 11, 2024, after the second hearing, --- 22 1T=August 5, 2024 transcript of Ferreira Conference.  2T=October 2, 2024 transcript of Motion to Waive Affidavit of Merit  3T=October 11, 2024 transcript of Motion to Waive Affidavit of Merit  [...] denied Plaintiff’s application to deem the Affidavits of Merit sufficient as to [...].  (3T4:1-10:14; Pa77-79)  As more that 120 days passed after the filed Answer, the time to serve an appropriate Affidavit of Merit as to [...] passed without Plaintiff serving a proper Affidavit of Merit against [...], [...] was entitled to a dismissal, with prejudice.
[brief] But the owner [occupant] is liable if, in clearing the sidewalk of ice and snow, the owner [occupant], through the owner’s [occupant’s] negligence, adds a new element of danger or hazard, other than that caused by the natural elements, to the use of the sidewalk by a pedestrian.  In other words, while an abutting owner [occupant] is under no duty to clear the owner’s [occupant’s] sidewalk of ice and snow, the owner [occupant] may become liable where the owner [occupant] undertakes to clear the sidewalk and does so in a manner which creates a new element of danger which increases the natural hazard already there.  Therefore, should you find that the defendant, in undertaking to remove the ice and snow from defendant’s sidewalk, created a new hazard or increased the existing hazard (emphasis added) and that this new or increased hazard proximately caused or concurred with the natural hazard to cause plaintiff’s injuries, then you must find for the plaintiff.
[brief] First, contrary to Defendants’ arguments, a party does not have to subpoena a director of a party defendant to secure his/her/their deposition.  As this Court previously held in D’Agostino:  [D]efendants’ contention that the noticed subsidiary executives are non-parties and that their attendance at depositions could only be mandated by subpoena is without merit...  There is no necessity for requiring service of a subpoena upon a party since adequate sanctions are provided... in the event that the party fails to respond to a notice to take a deposition. ”  D’Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson, 242 N.J.Super. 267, 275 (App.Div. 1990).  See also Elasticsearch v. Floragunn GMBH, 2021 WL 1753796 (N.D.Cal. May 4, 2021).
[brief] 4.  A trial court should not grant summary judgment when the matter is not yet ripe for consideration, such as where discovery has not yet been completed.  Valantezas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189 (1988); Solomon v. Eli Lily and Co., 98 N.J. 58 (1984); Driscoll Constitutional Co., Inc. v. State, 371 N.J. Super. 304, 317 (App. Div. 2004).
[brief] The Board did not respond within the time frame permitted under the Open Public Records Act and Plaintiff ultimately filed suit on March 14, 2023 to compel a response.(PA-1)  Defense counsel’s involvement as a result of the filed suit brought about a swift resolution to the first part of the request, seeking the public comments.  Defense counsel also supplied logs of the Board members’ government-issued email accounts (ie., such as [...]).  The government-issued email logs clearly showed that Board members were also conducting Board business on their private email accounts (ie, [...] or [...]).  (PA-9, ¶4; PA-13)  Defendants did not dispute this.  The parties agreed to leave the resolution of the applicability of OPRA’s provisions to the private email accounts and the extent of the custodian’s obligations to obtain logs for the private email accounts to the trial court as the sole question to be addressed.(PA-15, ¶3)  The trial court’s answer: OPRA’s provisions do not apply and the records custodian is not obligated to obtain email logs or Paff certifications for the private email accounts being used to transact government business.(PA-20)
[brief] com)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY.............................................................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................................................7  TRIAL COURT OPINION  DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT.................................18  ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................................22  I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW ....................................................................................................22  II.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ASSESSED THE HEIGHTENED REASONABLE CERTAINTY STANDARD APPLICABLE TO PLAINTIFFS’ NEW BUSINESS AND CORRECTLY BARRED POWELL’S TESTIMONY....23  III.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN BARRING DR. POWELL’S EXPERT REPORT AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS’ AMENDED COMPLAINT  .........................................................................................29  IV.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT PERMITTING MARTIN BERSHTEIN TO TESTIFY FINDING  PLAINTIFF CANNOT CIRCUMVENT HIS LACK OF EXPERIENCE BY SPECULATING THAT HE COULD PARTNER WITH AN EXPERIENCED DEVELOPER........35  CONCLUSION  ...............................................................................................................................37  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[directive] 7.11.4  Agency law enforcement officers including internal affairs personnel will participate in the initial investigation only if directed to do so by the County Prosecutor, OPIA, or other designee of the Attorney General.  In the general course, employees of the same agency as the subject officer shall not participate in the investigation or attend any investigative activities.  This does not, however, preclude any officer from acting as a first responder to the scene of a use-of-force incident, helping to secure the scene, or participating in a be- on-the-lookout search or pursuit related to the incident.  All officers are also obligated to comply with any orders of recusal that may be issued pursuant to the investigation.  7.11.5
[brief] See, *National Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protection Ass’n v. Black*, 53 F.4th 869, 880-81 (5th Cir. 2022).  See also, *Sedlak v. Dick*, 256 Kan. 779, 887 P.2d 1119, 1130 (1995) (“…a doctrine of nondelegation has been treated by some courts as a facet of separate of powers…”).  The State Defendants seem to argue that separation of powers is a subset of the private non-delegation doctrine, which is not the case.  That doctrine flows from the separation of powers, rather than the other way around.  It is completely distinguishable from the due process claims about the Council’s composition upon which the *Humane Society* decision was grounded.
[brief] As it did below, defendant, [...] ([...]), continues on appeal to frame the pertinent issue incorrectly.  The issue is not, as defendant repetitively argues, whether an automobile manufacturer has a duty to incorporate every available safety technology to render a product fit, suitable and safe.  The issue is who decides whether a product is fit, suitable and safe as placed in the stream of commerce.  Under the New Jersey Constitution, the New Jersey Product Liability Act (NJPLA) and controlling caselaw, the determination of whether the designer/manufacturer fulfilled its duty to produce a product that is reasonably fit, suitable and safe for its intended purpose is a question of fact for a jury.  Because the court below usurped the jury’s role and denied plaintiff’s right to a jury, the decision must be reversed.  The existence of defendant’s duty is undeniable.  [...]’s product must be reasonably fit, suitable and safe for its intended purpose.  Because manufacturers are driven by profits and not necessarily what is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, they are not permitted to determine unilaterally that what they decide to market is adequate under the law.  Nor is the court entitled to determine whether the manufacturer’s cost-benefit analysis is correct as a matter of law.  That determination is reserved for the factfinder.  Whether applying the consumer expectations test or the risk-utility analysis, the issue is one of fact for a jury.  In years past, automobiles were considered safe with no seat belts, no air bags and no anti-lock brakes.  In years past, at least one vehicle manufacturer decided that a dangerously located fuel tank was worth the cost savings spread over the volume of cars produced.  That is why tort law generally, and product liability law specifically, exists.  Motor vehicle manufacturers are free to make their profit-driven decisions.  When the product results in harm, however, the factfinder, the jury, makes the determination based on all the evidence presented, whether the product as designed, manufactured and produced was reasonably fit, suitable, and safe for its intended purpose.  Because the trial court denied plaintiff’s right to have that factual determination made by a jury of his peers, the decision granting summary judgment must be reversed.
[directive] 46  Page Victim.  Offender and of Gender and Scores  ODARA 4.6.3.b validations subsequent the many of and ODARA the in resulted that study original The partners. female on their males by assaults for solely tool of the ability predictive the evaluated partners. male on their females by assaults of cases upon focused studies validated Subsequent be to yet has offenders female for percentages recidivist articulating table actuarial an However, for recidivism of percentages overstate will used currently table the that believed is (it developed be to continues ODARA of use the relationships, partner same-sex for As offenders). female achieved. been yet not has research sufficient but studied, the by use for designated been which has Form, Scoring ODARA an Jersey, New In in indicated offenses for completed be shall Justice, Criminal of Division the of Director or the Assault Index the committing person the of gender the of regardless 4.6.3.a subsection law above, stated reasons the for and notice further until However, victim. of the gender in making decision frame to scores ODARA the utilize only shall Jersey New in enforcement should enforcement cases, law other all In partner. female a assaulted has male which a in cases of Affidavit in any present be to found items ODARA all of description concise a include 5.1.2 subsection See acomplaint-warrant. for application an with submitted Cause Probable Cause.
[brief] ### Cases - **Burbridge v. Paschal**, 239 N.J. Super. 139, 151 (App. Div. 1990) .................................................. 5 - **Earruso v. Township of East Hanover**, 14 N.J. Misc. 96 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1936) ........................................  12 - **First Peoples Bank v. Township of Medford**, 126 N.J. at 413, 418 (1991) ..............................................  3 - **Franklin Disc. Co. v. Ford**, 27 N.J. 473, 491 (1958)  ...........................................................................  7 - **Gannon v. Saddle Brook Twp.** 56 N.J. Super. 76 (App. Div. 1959) .....................................................  11 - **Jardine Estates, Inc. v. Koppel**, 24 N.J. 536, 542 (1957)  ....................................................................  14 - **Lake Valley Associates, LLC v. Township of Pemberton**, 411 N.J. Super. 501, 505 (App. Div.), certif denied, 202 N.J. 43 (2010)  .........................................................................................  3 - **Manalapan Realty v. Township Comm. Of Manalapan**, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1990)  ...............................  3 - **Reich v. Borough of Fort Lee Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment**, 414 N.J.Super. 483, 499 n. 9 (App. Div. 2010)  ........................................................................................................................................  5 - **State v. Clarksburg Inn**, 375 N.J.Super. 624, (2005)  ...........................................................................  3, 6, 13 - **State v. Elkwisni**, 190 N.J. 169, 175 (2007) .........................................................................................  5 - **State v. Krause**, 399 N.J. Super. 579 (App. Div. 2008) ........................................................................  9, 11  ### Statutes - **N.J.S.A. 26:3-84** .................................................................................................................................  10 - **N.J.S.A. 26:3A2-10** ............................................................................................................................  10 - **N.J.S.A. 40:48-1** .................................................................................................................................  1  ### Rules - **R. 2:6-7** ...............................................................................................................................................
[brief] FOR CLAIMING THE CHILD TAX CREDIT IN ALTERNATE YEARS.  (Pa1149, Pa1214, Pa1224)  To provide relevant context, I draw this court’s attention to the violation of multiple court orders by defendant during the parties’ divorce litigation spanning over four years, as the trial court unequivocally noted in the March 1, 2023 JOD order – “Defendant intentionally withheld the items (Pa61)”.  However, defendant faced no consequences as the trial court let defendant walk away with impunity.  For a full exposition of defendant’s unrelenting contumacy, see Pa1413-15.  The regrettable failure of the divorce trial judge to hold defendant accountable for the intentional violation of multiple orders further fueled her contumacy and reinforced in her mind a misguided belief that compliance with court orders is dispensable.  Having tasted blood, defendant decided not to comply with the following provision in the March 1, 2023 order – “The parties shall alternate claiming the child as a dependent yearly.