ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On the day of trial, [...] withdrew its remaining claims against [...].  The trial proceeded over four days: July 24, 25 and 27, 2023 and August 21, 2023.  On August 24, 2023, [...] rendered an oral decision and entered an Order holding that despite the TPDs having violated their fiduciary obligations to [...], [...] was not damaged because a benefactor had paid the purchase price on [...]’s behalf.  [...] further ordered [...] to pay one-half of the total cost of capital improvements and one-half of the building’s expenses from the date [...] became co-owner until the date of sale to [...].  Both [...] and [...] filed motions to reconsider, each of which was heard by [...] on October 6, 2023.  [...] denied [...]’s request to reconsider his denial of damages to [...] based on the grounds that the transfer by [...] of its Property to another New Jersey mosque somehow constituted “corporate waste”.  [...] did, however, modify his ruling against [...] by requiring [...] to only pay one-half of the building expenses during its ownership.  [...] was no longer required to pay [...] for one-half of the cost of capital improvements.  This appeal was filed on October 27, 2023.
[brief] Paragraphs 55-75 and Exhibits 6 to the First Amended Complaint show defendants’ brazen breach of the Non-Disclosure Agreement/Non-Circumvention Agreement (NDA) they had made with plaintiffs.  Since those allegations in the complaint are not specifically disputed, and must be deemed admitted on this motion posture, defendants have no way of seeking relief for their breach of the NDA.  The motion judge found that the NDA had expired when the breach occurred, but the court resolved a disputed fact issue in this regard.
[brief] (WPa1-6).  After the court requested a position from each defendant concerning the adjournment request, each party submitted opposition on September 30, 2020.  (WPa8-14).  While no official action was taken on the adjournment request, the case remained undisturbed until April 27, 2023, when [...] heard oral argument on the four motions to dismiss and [...]’s motion to disqualify.
[directive] This Addendum was drafted in consultation with law enforcement officers from across the State, including the leaders of numerous tactical and Crisis Negotiation Teams.  Mental health professionals and community stakeholders were also consulted in drafting the addendum.  During the discussions, these professionals demonstrated a genuine commitment to developing progressive ideas, techniques and training designed to avoid the creation of barricade incidents and to peacefully resolve these challenging scenarios whenever they do develop.  The inclusion of mental health professionals during certain law enforcement responses, as further evidenced by the positive results of the ARRIVE Together program, demonstrates law enforcement’s continuing commitment to making New Jersey a safer place for all of our residents.  2
[brief] Even assuming, arguendo, that this unpublished, vacated order carried any weight, the only language in the opinion related to the issue at hand is the bare statement that there could be a defensive application of the NJCFLA, but the judge provided no explanation of his reasoning other than a reference to the NJCFLA.  The weight to be given to this opinion, if any weight at all, is negligible.  Nothing proffered by Defendant supports his assertion that these prior consumer lender licensing statutes provided a private cause of action, and no case cited by Defendant has found an implied right of action.  In summary, the plain language of the NJCFA neither explicitly or implicitly creates nor allows any private cause of action, but instead by its clear terms rests all authority in a single entity, the [...].
[brief] When a developer proposes a development substantial amount of affordable housing and the municipality is court ordered to build such housing, either as a result of developer’s outright victory or, as here, through a settlement and final judgment, there must be a hearing regarding site suitability: “i.e. . . . [whether the] site is environmentally constrained or construction of the project would represent bad planning. ”  Toll Bros. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 537 (2002).  While there must be a public hearing, when court-ordered affordable housing is involved, it is not a planning board hearing based on the municipal zoning ordinance, it is a court or implementation monitor hearing informed by a report of the special master solely on the issue of site “suitability. ”
[brief] The N.J. Court Rules, R. 4:42-11, which applies to “orders” states in relevant part:  (a)  Post Judgment Interest.  Except as otherwise ordered by the court or provided by law, judgments, awards and orders for the payment of money, taxed costs and attorney’s fees shall bear simple interest as follows:  (ii)  ..the annual rate of interest shall equal the average rate of return, to the nearest whole or one-half percent, for the corresponding preceding fiscal year terminating on June 30, of the State of New Jersey Cash Management Fund (State accounts) as reported by the Division of Investment in the Department of the Treasury (iii)  For judgments exceeding the monetary limit of the Special Civil Part at the time of entry: in the manner provided for in subparagraph (a)(ii) of this Rule until September 1, 1996; thereafter, at the rate provided in subparagraph (a)(ii) plus 2% per annum.(emphasis added)  In this case, the Board have been unjustly enriched while holding [...]' $78,646 attorney's fees award since it was ordered on 8/28/20 (APX 1).  The calculation of the applicable interest rates to the 8/28/22 Order are as follows:  Post Judgment Interest of $4,964.53 interest has accrued on the 8/28/22 $78,646 Order (APX 1) increasing it to $83,610.53 based on the following calculations: a. for 4 months in 2020 @ 4.5% = $1,179.69 interest (78646 X .045 = 3539.07, 3539.07/12 = 294.92 X 4 = 1179.69); b. for 12 months in 2021 @ 3.5% = $2,752.61 interest (78646 X .035 = 2752.61); and c. for 7 months in 2022 @ 2.25% = $1,032.23 interest (78646 X .0225 = 1769.54, 1769.54/12 = 147.46 X 7 = 1032.22).  As matter of law, [...] is entitled to an award of Post Judgment Interest of $4,964.53 which has accrued on the $78,646 as per the 8/28/20 Order (8a)  It was error for the lower court to deny [...] interest from the date of the 8/28/20 final order and fail to follow R. 4:42-11(a)  This Court should not only order the Board to pay the $4,964.53 interest denied minus the $338.80 interest granted ($4,625.73) but this Court should also remand for an award of interest on the $4,625.73 unpaid interest since the 8/29/22 Order was entered.
[brief] (1T36:2-T37:12); see *Cicchetti v. Morris Cty. Sheriff’s Office*, 194 N.J. 563, 588 (2008).  In tacit admission to this point, and the legal and factual insufficiency of [...]’s sexual harassment claim against [...], she stipulated to dismissal of her sexual harassment claim against him at summary judgment.  (3T72:9-73:6).  As [...]’s predicate sexual harassment claim against [...] was dismissed by stipulation, her sexual harassment claims against State Respondents, by extension, necessarily failed.  For these reasons, the trial court’s order dismissing [...]’s sexual harassment claim against State Respondents on reconsideration should be affirmed.
[brief] B.  [...] did not present any credible evidence establishing negligence on the part of [...].  [...]’s answers to written discovery requests, the various certifications she filed in this matter and her deposition testimony lack any credible evidence establishing that the damages she alleges to have sustained were the natural and probable consequences of anything [...] did or failed to do.  [...] claims that certain garments were removed and not returned by [...].  However, despite having been given repeated opportunities to do so during the course of discovery in this matter and, in particular, when she was deposed, [...] was not able to specifically identify which items were not returned to her.  [...] is unable to prove [...] is responsible for those items she claims are missing.  Both [...] and [...] were in her home and removed items following the incident months before [...] first came to [...]’s home.  [...] further contends that certain items that were removed from her home for cleaning were returned to her in a damaged condition.  Yet [...] has not and under the fact of this case cannot produce any credible evidence establishing that [...] caused any such damage.  [...] has produced no credible evidence establishing the value of any of the items she claims were damaged or lost.  [...] certified to [...] and testified under oath that these items were already damaged by the water leak and by the activities of [...].  In addition, [...] acknowledged during her deposition that she does not know if these items were actually discarded by [...].  In opposing [...]’s motion, [...] did not and under the facts of this case cannot point to any facts which prove that [...] was negligent and that the unreasonable acts or omissions by [...] caused her alleged damages.
[brief] The record demonstrates that the certified disposition record was certified in 2022.  The original appeal was taken to JEDS on November 16, 2021.  There is no record anywhere demonstrating that any disposition or order entering judgment against [...] was sent anywhere as a result of examining the entire file turned over to [...], which was subpoenaed and made a record in these proceedings.  (Pa505).  The undated order bearing what purports to be the [...]’s signature and no defendant signature on the defendant’s signature line was never before produced until 2023 attached to defense counsel’s motion for summary judgment.  (Pa168).
[brief] These alternatives include not just doing nothing by continuing the current regulator, but giving meaningful consideration to a superior heat source, a catalytic heater, The BPU Decision states that "the record indicates reliability issues are likely to occur with a catalytic heater."  Ha45, citing Ha91.  The record indicates no such thing.  [...]'s claims of "issues" with catalytic heaters are just like its claims about the "icing issues" for the current regulator, the product of highly creative lawyers’ drafting as opposed to actual fact.  According to its pre-filed written rebuttal testimony, [...] did in fact install five catalytic heaters on regulator stations and experienced problems with them.  Here is what the panel’s written testimony said:  Between 2008 and 2010, [...] installed 5 catalytic inline heaters at various regulator stations throughout our system.  Within the first two years of operation, we had approximately 6 catalytic heater panels internal to the units experience major failures for various reasons at two specific locations, some multiple times.  Within four years of operation, we were forced to replace all 32 catalytic heater panels at these very same locations, as well as three additional panels at a third location.  In addition, at two of three location described above, we have also experienced several electrical failures related to wiring, thermocouples and connectors.  [Ha832, P-8 at p. 26:6-14.]  These exaggerations don't match the facts on their face.  First, [...] does not claim that there were any service outages attributable to these catalytic heaters, so the only inference is that there were none.  Second, it is clear that [...] experienced no identifiable problems at two of the locations.  Third, there is no attempt to describe the problems in any detail, so if the problems were truly bad, we certainly would have been told more by [...]'s lawyers.  Fourth, at one of the five locations, the only apparent problem was a failure of just two panels, so nearly all of the identified problems seem to have occurred at just two locations.  Fifth, [...] obviously has ample experience in operating and maintaining catalytic heaters (which the company confirmed in the hearing, 2T89:22-25,-90:1-25,-91:1-11; has experienced no panel failures since 2012 ("[w]ithin four years of operation," which began in 2008); and only unspecified and unsupported claims of "electrical failures."
[brief] Such construction of a lease is favored as will give it force and validity, rather than a construction which makes it meaningless and inoperative.  A lease should be so construed as to avoid an absurd or illogical result.  *Associated Realties Corp. vs. Million Dollar Pier, etc., Co.*, 6 N.J. Super 369 (App. Div. 1950); *Christian Feigenspan vs. Popowska*, 75 N.J.Eq. 342 (Ch. 1909); *Hoffman vs. Seidman*, 101 N.J.L. 106 (E. & A. 1925).
[brief] Relevant to the within appeal are the following:  6.  c.  Obligation To Cooperate.  The Township and the Board acknowledge that in order for Developer to --- ⁴  It should be noted that the adoption process requires a three (3) step process: ordinance introduction (a.k.a. ‘First Reading”) and then a separate adoption (a.k.a. ‘Second reading’) both at duly noticed public hearing, see N.J.S.A. 40:49-2, as well as a referral to the Planning Board for consideration at a separate noticed public hearing, taking place between the First and Second Readings, see N.J.S.A. 40:55D-37, and thus the process, even if expedited, requires close to 60 days.
[directive] Trust  The county prosecutor through its designated funding entity 1. shall establish a Seized Asset Trust Account.  All seized funds not yet forfeited, and not held for evidence in a criminal matter, shall be deposited into the county prosecutor’s Seized Asset Trust Account (SATA), which shall be an interest-bearing account.  SATA shall be maintained by the funding entity and administered by the county prosecutor.  Individual cash seizures shall be placed into where they are managed SATA one large group but individual records must be maintained as on each case.  Since this account is a trust account, which in the funds are held by the prosecuting agency pending their final disposition, the funds shall not revert to the county of but general treasury the end the fiscal year, carryover at from year to year.
[brief] In addition, by arguing that [...] told the Petitioner that the Will was not found in the safe deposit box (Pb 27), the Petitioner further distorts the record and ignores the following testimony explaining Snyder’s confusion on this issue:  Q.  Okay.  And you were asked a lot of questions about your deposition and saying back and forth as to whether there was or wasn’t a Will.  The question I have for you is, did you ultimately become aware that the original Will was in the bag that you gave to [...]?  A. Yes.  Q.  And how did you become aware that the original Will was there?  A.  [...] told me the original Will was there.  Q. Okay.  A.  It had to have been in there.  I was getting the Will and the Prenup confused.  We took boxes out of [...]’s house, we found the Prenup in those boxes.  The Will was in the safe deposit box.  I had my Wills, Prenup and Will mixed up and the boxes mixed up.  (11T51-11 to 52-5).
[directive] In addition, there are support groups, many of which have chapters in New Jersey, that may provide assistance to survivors of sudden and unexpected death.  These include the [...], an organization which assists parents of deceased children resolve the grief experienced as the result of their loss; [...] ([...]), a group whose purpose is to provide emotional support to parents of children who were victims of homicide; [...] ([...]), a group dedicated to helping the families of murder victims through the trauma they suffer; and [...], ([...]) an organization which provides emotional support to individuals who have experienced the death or injury of a family member as a result of drunk driving.
[brief] in Toms River, it separately acknowledged that the vehicle in question was registered in Lakewood.  (Dca8).  After recapping [...]’s grounds for probable cause “to believe that in and upon a certain vehicle within the Township of Toms River in this said state,” the warrant then proceeded to describe the vehicle, identifying the registration and VIN numbers, as well as the fact that it was registered in Lakewood.  (Dca8).  The warrant thus acknowledged on its face that the activity in question may span multiple jurisdictions.  Second, and relatedly, the warrant commanded a search of the “premises hereinabove named,” which refers to the description of the vehicle itself, and not the place, i.e., the physical location (Toms River), where probable cause arose.  (Dca8 to 9).  The warrant thus identified the exact inherently-mobile vehicle that police could stop and search; but it did not limit the location of the search to a specific locality.  Third, while [...] served as a magistrate in Toms River, the warrant expressly acknowledges it was signed in the “State of New Jersey[,] County of Ocean[,]” where both Lakewood and Toms River are located.  Fourth, the warrant was addressed to “Any Law Enforcement Officer,” and not just Toms River law enforcement officers.  (Dca8) (emphasis added).  Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, the search warrant authorized a search on a vehicle that was readily movable between and among jurisdictions.
[brief] As importantly, plaintiff fails to acknowledge the difference drawn between "trial error" and "evidentiary insufficiency" in the double jeopardy cases he cites.  See, e.g., McMullen v. Tennis, 562 F.3d 231 (2010), where the Third Circuit stated that:  The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. ”  The Double Jeopardy Clause is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
[brief] In federal courts, law enforcement must only stop questioning if a suspect’s request for counsel is “unambiguous or unequivocal. ”  *Davis v.* United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1994).  However, under New Jersey law, even an ambiguous assertion is sufficient to require police to cease questioning.  State v. Gonzalez, 249 N.J. 612, 629 (2022).
[brief] However, he had been unemployed since 2020, possibly related to COVID.  (13T 12-1 to 4)  The Court responded to [...]’s claim that his unemployment was related to COVID by asserting “there are many employment opportunities available now, precisely because of Covid, and that many establishments and businesses are desperate for help and work. ”  (13T 12-7 to 10)  [...] indicated he was working toward achieving a Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) so he could get a job in the trucking industry.  (13T 17-1 to 5)  The Court also noted that [...] indicated he had previously been continuously employed and had never had any problems finding employment.  (13T 27-1 to 4)  The Court found that he had no disabilities of anything that would impede his ability to be gainfully employed.  (13T 27-4 to 6)  In evaluating defense counsel’s argument for mitigating factor (6), the Court noted that “the defendant is not challenging the amount of the restitution” and he “is willing to pay restitution.
[brief] **  Plaintiff does not attempt to claim that Plaintiff’s responses to the employment application questions about her prior convictions were in fact accurate, only that she “misunderstood the application question[.]” (AB at p. 14).  Plaintiff argues that “[a]n employee who misunderstands a form but submits to a background check is factually not the same as someone intentionally hiding and misleading an employer about a criminal record. ” (AB at p. 14).  Plaintiff does not cite any case law or statutory provisions in support of this argument.  The Statute does not require scienter or intent.  The language of the Statute is quite simple: “an individual shall be disqualified from employment” with group homes such as those operated by [...] if that individual has been convicted of “[a] crime or offense involving the manufacture, transportation, sale, possession or habitual use of a controlled dangerous substance. ”  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-64(b)(1)(c); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:44A-2.4.  Plaintiff cannot hide behind her manufactured post-hoc explanation for her lies.  She was statutorily disqualified and thus barred from pursuing her claim.
[brief] An inquiry into the weight of the evidence, either in a civil or a criminal case, governed by the cited standard, is not in derogation of the right of trial by jury secured by the organic law.  The award of a new trial on appeal where the verdict clearly gives rise to the inference of mistake, passion, prejudice, or partiality does not constitute an undue interference with the constitutional right of trial by jury or the constitutional integrity of the inferior tribunal, for the jury has transcended its constitutional sphere to the substantial injury of the party adversely affected; and on the plainest principles of justice this fundamental error is remediable by the appellate process.  See *Hager v. Weber*, 7 N.J. 201, 81 A.2d 155 (1951) (The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the appellate court that reduced the award of damages to plaintiff injured person because the verdict was clearly excessive and directed a new trial as to damages if plaintiff refused to consent to the reduction.)  In *Taylor v. Public Serv. Interstate Transp. Co.*, 13 N.J.Super. 125, 80 A.2d 220 (App. Div. 1951), the Court reversed the judgments entered against defendants, bus driver and bus company, because the Court found the manifest weight of evidence did not support a finding that defendants were liable.  The Court stated that where neither the facts nor the permissible inferences from them vindicate the verdict and it is manifest that the verdict was fabricated by the influences of sympathy, or passion, or prejudice, or based upon mistake, it must in the course of the administration of justice be annulled.  In the instant case, unlike what Plaintiff attempted to characterize this appeal as the second time making the same arguments to this Court, Defendants never had an opportunity to present their argument when the Appellate Division substituted an unsubstantiated jury award of $500,000 due to plain error, which was vacated by Appellate Division for Plaintiff’s failure to prove actual damages, with a new award for $449,798.50 to Plaintiff for attorney fees despite the fact that Defendants were not afforded an opportunity to challenge this new award and the trial records are devoid of any analysis regarding the amount of legal fees claimed by Plaintiff.
[brief] ”  Id.  In this case, after numerous armed police officers surrounded, arrested, handcuffed and searched [...] in the parking lot of his apartment building, and in violation of his Miranda rights (and his denial of criminal conduct), both in the parking lot and in his apartment to which they took him, using the key they found on his person, continued to question him for nearly a half an hour, during which he identified locations and property which they police sought to search, and acknowledged dominion and control of the evidence contained therein.  Under such circumstances, in “requesting” that [...] sign the consent to search forms, the police were making a “request that the [...] be a witness against himself....”  See State v. Williams, 432 P.2d 679, 683 (Or. 1967).  Because, as the court below correctly found, all statements made by [...] while in police custody over the course of 8 hours must be suppressed because of a violation of [...]’s Fifth Amendment rights, that initial constitutional misconduct tainted the subsequent evidential fruit – physical and verbal -- obtained as an unattenuated result of that misconduct.  The principles underlying the “poisonous tree doctrine” are “applicable not only to interrogations leading up to confessions but are equally applicable to interrogations aimed at obtaining the Defendant’s consent to search and seizure when he is a focal suspect in the custody of the police.