ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Municipal and County Law Enforcement Officers.  In all cases involving municipal and county law enforcement officers, the County Prosecutor shall review all reports detailing conducted energy device firings/discharges occurring within his or her jurisdiction.  The Prosecutor shall within 7 days of the device’s firing/discharge forward to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice the investigation report(s) prepared by the chief executive of the department, along with a memorandum or letter indicating whether the Prosecutor concurs or disagrees with the findings of the chief executive of the department as to the propriety of the firing/discharge(s).
[brief] ”  Thus, in order to establish constructive notice on the part of [...], Plaintiffs must establish that the alleged dangerous condition existed for so long a time as to be, in the exercise of reasonable care, discoverable and remediable before the Plaintiff’s alleged injury occurred.  Plaintiffs’ claim must fail as there is no proof in the motion record that [...] had constructive notice of any potentially dangerous issues with regards to [...]’ use of the U-boat.  In Arroyo v. Durling Realty, LLC, 433 N.J. Super. 238 (App. Div. 2013), the plaintiff filed suit against the owner of a convenience store after she slipped and fell on a discarded telephone calling card on the sidewalk near the entrance to the store.
[brief] ”  When viewing the competent evidential material presented to determine whether or not a genuine issue of material fact exists, the motion judge views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, to determine if the evidence presented is sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.  *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 523.  The non-moving party has the burden of presenting evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.  *Id.* at 529.  The non-moving party, however, has to do more to defeat a motion for summary judgment than merely point to any fact in dispute.  *Id.*  “Where the party opposing summary judgment points only to disputed issues of fact that are ‘of an insubstantial nature,’ the proper disposition is summary judgment. ”  *Id.* quoting *Judson*, 17 N.J. at 75.  A motion for summary judgment cannot be defeated if the non-moving party does not "offer any concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor. ”  *Housel for Housel v. Theodoridis*, 314 N.J. Super. 597, 604(App. Div. 1998) (quoting *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986)).
[brief] Finally, the "heart of the case" was not his mental illness, but how the life of an innocent woman was cut short by a random single bullet to the head, fired by a complete stranger who was angry because the car behind him was "high beaming him."  (See 7T:126-13 to 127-1).  To be clear, defendant fully admitted to making the conscience decision to fire a shot out of his car window to "make some noise...because you seen [sic] how they were driving.  They tried to cut me off when I went right.  And then they stayed in front of me."  (7T:166-9 to 17).  But more importantly, defense counsel, in his opening and closing statements, did not argue that defendant's mental health issues were the "heart of the case."
[brief] The DEP ought to be well aware of this Court’s published decision in Alloway Twp., where this Court held that “…even though it chose to use the disjunctive ‘or,’ the Legislature did not mean that either the ‘owner’ or ‘the person in control,’ but not both, could be subject to DEP's enforcement action. ”  Ibid., emphasis added.  The Court in Alloway Twp. provided the following quotation and citation to make this point perfectly clear: “‘[I]t has long been settled that the disjunctive ‘or’ in a . . . statute may be construed as the conjunctive ‘and’ if to do so is consistent with the legislative intent. ’”  Ibid., quoting State v. Holland, 132 N.J. Super. 17, 24, 331 (App. Div. 1975).  The same logic applies in this case.
[brief] On May 3, 2024, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to abbreviate transcript by concluding “that the only manner in which the reviewing Court will be possessed of the myriad findings of fact and conclusions of law is by receiving the entirety of the trial transcript. ” (Pa1331-32).  The motion was adjudicated by a judge who did not preside over the divorce trial.  All the orders being appealed were adjudicated on papers.  See also Pa1371-72.  ARGUMENT POINT I
[brief] He did **NOT** address my May 30, 2023 Reply to [...]’s May 23rd Cross-Motion.  My Reply agreed with the evidence/arguments, all of which we had argued in our Aug. 8, 2022 Exceptions to the IA, that Oct. 6, 2022 Order should **NEVER** have authorized [...]’s $4,120.48 billed work, as part of $15,022.72 in par. 1d, for review of [...]’ invalid request around June 2021 for the Trust to pay off her personal home equity loan since it was an indisputable fact that [...], & NOT [...], was counsel, at the time, for the Trust & Co-Trustees, and [...] should NEVER have been consulted, nor accepted a review of this issue.  (prior Brief, p. 43-44)  He did NOT address my appeal (prior Brief, p. 44-52) of the Judge’s invalid claims/Rulings, which I refuted point-by-point since they were palpably incorrect & irrational; made in arbitrary & unreasonable, manner; & overlooked significance of irrefutable probative, competent evidence, from the Aug. 4, 2023 Hearing that were the basis for the Sept. 6th Order, which rejected the three parties’ Motions, incl. my May 25, 2023 Cross-Motion with May 30th Reply.  FINALLY, & MOST IMPORTANTLY, his Counterstatements NEVER acknowledged the issuance of my May 31, 2024 Appeal Brief, and did NOT refute anything in my Brief’s Procedural History and Statements of Facts.  It should be clear that [...] knowingly concocted a fraudulent falsification of the irrefutable record that I have presented to refute his lies.
[brief] After [...]’s trial, [...] later recanted his testimony against [...], and then tried to “un”-recant it, claiming he was telling the truth against [...] all along and had initially recanted under duress.  (28T 173-17 to 193-13; 28T 202-20 to 203-9)  The Attorney General obviously believes Wesley lied in his testimony against [...], or they would not have exonerated [...].  murder.  Thus, defense counsel, in cross-examining Wesley, sought to question Wesley about the fact that [...] had been exonerated, and that Wesley had, in the words of N.J.R.E. 608(b): “made a prior false accusation against any person of a crime similar to the crime with which defendant is charged. ”  Initially, when the matter was first discussed, the judge had indicated that he intended to give defense counsel free rein in cross-examining Wesley about the [...] matter, which obviously would include the exoneration.  (23T 8-18 to 15-11)  The judge even viewed the [...] exoneration to be such a matter of public record that he denied a defense application to have the Attorney General provide specific confirmation of the exoneration.  (23T 13-24 to 15-11)  But when Wesley was on the stand testifying in front of the jury, the State suddenly objected to any mention of the exoneration in cross-examination of Wesley (28T 169-7 to 170-17), stating specifically:  “[M]y concern is that on questioning Mr. Wesley about the recantation and how it resulted in a back-ature [sic] of the conviction on Taron [...] will plant the seed in the jury’s mind that his testimony is falsely going to convict [...]” -- to which defense counsel replied that that was “exactly” the whole point of allowing cross-examination which would indicate that Wesley previously falsely accused someone of murder.  (28T 170-13 to 18)  The judge sided with the State and told defense counsel to “stay away” from the exoneration of [...] when cross-examining Wesley.  (28T 173-7 to 8)  Because the judge clearly erred under N.J.R.E. 608(b) in barring cross- examination of Wesley regarding the exoneration of Taron [...] -- which would have proved that Wesley falsely accused [...] of murder -- and because that cross-examination was critical to confronting Wesley’s accusatory testimony against defendant, not only was N.J.R.E. 608(b) violated, but so were defendant’s Sixth Amendment and state-constitutional rights to confrontation and his Fourteenth Amendment and state-constitutional rights to due process.
[directive] NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  Tout plent, petisyon ak lòt papye ki soumèt ba tribinal la fèt pou an angle.  Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English  Sistèm Jidisyè  New Jersey  New Jersey Judiciary
[brief] (34T158-14 to 16)  A DNA analyst testified that Defendant was the source of the DNA profile obtained from the two saliva swabs found near [...]’s body.  (31T48-17 to 25)  Regarding the collection of Defendant’s DNA, Officer [...] of the [...] testified that on June 21, 2018, she was directed to take oral buccal swabs from [...] and Defendant; [...] complied but [...] refused.  (34T178-19 to 181-2)  She testified that Defendant specifically said to her that “it would be worse for him if he did give a sample. ”  (34T182-6 to 7)  Although Defendant had ultimately consented to give a blood sample in lieu of a saliva sample (5T3-14 to 7-11), the stipulation read to the jury only stated, “The parties hereby stipulate that defendant's blood sample provided to the New Jersey State laboratory for a DNA analysis was taken in a medically acceptable manner and stipulate to the chain of custody. ”  (36T45-2 to 6)  [...] testified against Defendant at the trial.
[brief] It is noteworthy that Plaintiffs have not challenged the validity of the Ordinance as being vague, unenforceable or otherwise unconstitutional.  Our courts have long held that “ordinances are to receive a reasonable construction and application, to serve the apparent legislative purpose.  We will not depart from the plain meaning of language which is free of ambiguity, for an ordinance must be construed according to the ordinary meaning of its words and phrases.  These are to be taken in the ordinary or popular sense, unless it plainly appears that they are used in a different sense.  Sexton v. Bates, 17 N.J. Super, 246, 253 et. seq. (Law Viv. 1951) aff’d on opinion below 21 N.J. Super. 329 (App. Div. 1952)  As noted previously the Ordinance is in two parts which are clear and unambiguous.  The first part states:  “BUILDING HEIGHT – Shall mean the vertical dimension measured to the highest point of a building . . . from the lowest original lot grade or any revised lot grade shown on a site plan, subdivision plan, or plot plan approved by the Planning Board or Zoning Board of Adjustment when acting pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et. seq. and this chapter. ”  (Pa061-062)  The language is clear, unambiguous and not subject to question.  If the Planning Board or Zoning Board of Adjustment acting pursuant the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL) N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et. seq. approves a revised lot grade building height is measured from the approved revised lot grade.  The second part states a single exception:  “Such revised lot grade shall not include mounding, terracing, or other devices designed to allow increased building height. ”  (Pa062)  Once again, the language is clear and unambiguous.  If the revised lot grade includes mounding, terracing or other devices that are designed to allow increased building height then the height is measured from the lowest original lot grade.  Conversely, if the revised lot grade includes mounding, terracing or other devices that are not designed to allow increased building height, but for some other legitimate purpose, the height is measured from the approved revised lot grade.  Based on the foregoing the function of the Planning Board was to make a factual determination as to whether the approved revised lot grade was designed to allow increased building height or for some other legitimate purpose.  The fact that the approved revised lot grade might result in increased building height is irrelevant.  The question is whether the revised lot grade was designed to create that result.  Based on the foregoing the Trial Court did not, as alleged by the Plaintiffs, “adopt” a definition of the ordinance advocated by the Planning Board and [...].  It simply and properly applied the facts to a clear and unambiguous Ordinance.  Thus it is submitted that Point III of the Appellants’ brief is without merit.
[brief] ”  Jewish Center of Sussex County v. Whale, 86 N.J. 619, 624 (1981), see Foont-Freedenfeld v. Electro-Protective, 126 N.J. Super. 254, 247 (App.Div. 1973), aff’d, 64 N.J. 197 (1974)  Defendant overstates the situation when he argues that Plaintiff “misrepresented” her assets.
[brief] Years later, however, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging that [...]’s salespeople told them oral misrepresentations on the day of their purchase that were expressly contradicted by all the contractual agreements the plaintiffs reviewed, initialed and signed.  (Da1; Da22).  In testimony, some of the plaintiffs admitted that the oral misrepresentations claimed in their complaint were not actually told to them.  (Da86, ¶48; Da88, ¶52; Da92, ¶65; Da107, ¶112; Da111, ¶124; Da112, ¶126; Da117, ¶142).  Or that they understood the information conveyed.  (Da89, ¶53; Da102, ¶96; Da111, ¶124-125; Da126, ¶170).  Or they couldn’t recall what was told to them because it was so long ago.  (Da106, ¶107; Da113, ¶¶128 & 129).  Some of the plaintiffs even admitted they were told the opposite of the oral misrepresentations alleged in their complaint, meaning they were actually told the correct information.
[brief] (Ra75).  The audit, which examined the period of July 1, 2011, to December 31, 2013, was intended to “determine whether financial transactions were related to the school district’s programs, were reasonable, and were recorded properly in the accounting systems. ”  Ibid.  After reviewing [...]’s operations, [...] found that the District’s “financial transactions . . . were not always reasonable or properly recorded in the accounting system. ”  Ibid.  And just as the Department had back in 2009, [...] found transportation and special education expenses were significant sources of concern.  Ibid.  [...] \(^6\)  School boards are required to provide transportation to public school students who live “remote”—meaning, beyond two and a half miles for high school students and beyond two miles for elementary school students—from their assigned school of attendance, N.J.S.A. 18A:39-1; N.J.A.C. 6A:27-1.3, non-public students who reside remote from their school of attendance and meet the eligibility criteria of N.J.A.C. 6A:27-2.2, and students with disabilities who reside remote from their assigned school or who require transportation services in accordance with their individualized education program (IEP).  N.J.A.C. 6A:27-1.3.  School boards may also, but are not required to, provide transportation for public and non-public students who do not meet the eligibility criteria.  N.J.S.A. 18A:39-1.1 to -1.3; N.J.A.C. 6A:27-1.4.  This is known as “courtesy busing. ” provided a number of recommendations to the District to rein in those costs, including eliminating separate start and end times for non-public schools, developing bus routes based on school location rather than specific school, tiering bus routes for bidding purposes, and improving the District’s approval and document retention practices for special education students.  (Ra75-76).  Because [...] had run a deficit, a State monitor was appointed to the District in 2014.  (Ra65-66).  The monitor required the District to increase its tax levy up to the maximum amount.  (Ra61; Ra97; Aa13).  But, because [...] had not increased the levy to the maximum amount in prior years, the District was still not generating the level of money it could have had such proactive steps been taken earlier.  (Ra97; Aa13).  C.  The July 7, 2014 Petition of Appeal.  On July 7, 2014, Appellants filed a petition of appeal with the Commissioner alleging that the SFRA is unconstitutional as applied to [...] because the District was not receiving sufficient funding to provide its students with T&E.
[brief] On January 26, 2022, [...] filed a collection Complaint (Pa1) against [...] in the Special Civil Part of the Passaic County Law Division, docket number [...] (“Collection Lawsuit”), seeking to collect the amount of $746.71, plus costs, alleged due from a defaulted and charged off [...] account.  The collection Complaint asserts that Credit One sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred [...]’s alleged account to [...], who then sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred the account to [...], then to [...], then to [...], then finally to [...].  See Collection Complaint ¶ 4 (Pa1).  On March 7, 2022, [...] responded to the Collection Complaint by filing his Answer and Class Action Counterclaim (Pa3), alleging violations of the FDCPA, CFA, and common law, based on [...]’s unlicensed enforcement of a void debt.
[brief] [...] Presented Sufficient Evidence to Establish Proximate Causation (Not Addressed Below).  [...] also presented evidence demonstrating proximate causation.  In his report, Appellant’s expert, [...], opined that the Law Firm’s breach of duty was the proximate cause of John and [...]’s damages, writing, “[b]ut for the [Law] Firm’s failure to file the lawsuit contesting the 2014 Will within the statute of limitations, [...] and John would have been able to challenge the 2014 Will. ”  He further opines that to a reasonable degree of legal certainty the 2014 Will would have been set aside.  These issues cannot be decided in a summary fashion.  They are entirely dependent on the facts and must be decided by a jury.  Therefore, this Court must reverse the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Respondents. and against the Appellant and remand the matter to the lower court for a trial by jury to determine whether the Respondents’ breach proximately caused Appellant’s damages.
[brief] See Williams v. [...], No. 19-cv-04700-LHK (VKD), 2020 WL 5107639, at *2 (N.D. Cal. August 31, 2020) (“[Defendant’s] burden can be substantially mitigated by application of appropriately narrow search terms and de-duplication of ESI across custodians. ”).  ORDER 10.  No later than November 19, 2021 the parties are to meet and confer and submit a joint proposed protocol for performing a search and collection targeting, at a minimum, the categories of communications identified above.
[brief] See State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 64 (2014) (holding sentencing court’s findings must be supported by credible evidence in the record, and speculation must not infect sentencing process.)  Furthermore, there was no basis in the record for the court’s conclusions that [...] directed or ordered the shooting, that his codefendants had no intention of shooting prior to hearing him shout from the car, or that he was in any position of authority over his codefendants.  (See 5T:22-2 to 6) (adopting original sentencing court’s finding that codefendants lacked intention to shoot anyone until [...] gave “order”).  When the robbery victims were \(^9\)[...] was 17 years and one month old at the time of the incident.  (5T:14-24 to 15-1) interviewed at the scene of the crime, they told the police that the two armed codefendants immediately told them to empty their pockets, and that they would get shot if they ran.  (PSR 3)  Despite the court’s acceptance of the State’s frequently repeated assertion that [...] ordered or directed the shooting, there was no substantial evidence that the shooting was solely the result of [...]’s statement.  Due to the copious evidence that [...]’s participation in the offense was influenced by the presence of his codefendants, Miller factor three should have been found and weighed heavily in his favor at resentencing.
[brief] As discussed in the balance of this brief, and which the Trial Court repeatedly confirmed, the Board addressed each layer of proof that [...] was required to satisfy to warrant the extensive variance relief it sought, and set forth its reasoning as to why, in every instance, Plaintiff failed to meet its burden.  The Trial Court concurred that the Board’s factual findings and conclusions find ample support in the record and are consistent with the law.  It thus found that Plaintiff failed to meet its heavy burden to show why the Board’s denial should not be presumed valid or how the Board abused its discretion in reaching its decision.
[brief] In August 2021, Plaintiff asked Defendant outright if she was marrying him for a green card.  (1T77-12).  Defendant said “no. ”  Id. --- 3  Patel is considered by many to be a type of caste.  In October 2021, Plaintiff told his parents that he was having second thoughts about the marriage.  (1T83).  Despite having second thoughts, in November 2021, Plaintiff went to India to get married to Defendant.  (1T83-22).  While in India and one month before the religious ceremony, Plaintiff asked Defendant if she would sign a prenup.  (1T85-4).  Defendant got upset and there were no further discussions about a prenup.  Id.  Prior to the wedding, Plaintiff’s best friend, [...], who was present in India for the parties’ religious wedding ceremony, overheard Defendant state “it’s going to be a matter of months after I move to America.
[brief] In [...]’s brief, [...] alleges that Plaintiffs’ “pre-suit” knowledge pertaining to [...]’s modification of Site Plan 3 (“SP3”) somehow rendered Plaintiffs’ lawsuit against it frivolous.  However, there is no material dispute or disagreement that, when Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit against several entities involved with the redevelopment project, Plaintiffs were not aware of the particular circumstances that caused the damages complained of in Plaintiffs’ complaint to Plaintiffs’ property.  (Pa000001) (1T Hearing, page 10, line 6 to line 12; page 13, line 5 to line 13).
[brief] The Zuber decision extended Miller protection to those juvenile offenders who are eligible for a parole bar that is the practical equivalent of life without parole.  Comer, 249 N.J. at 388-89 (discussing Zuber, 227 N.J. at 429, 446-47).  Additionally, Zuber highlighted how sentences with “lengthy” parole bars were problematic for juvenile offenders, given their propensity to mature and reform; the absence of a mechanism for a court to later review such a sentence raised “serious constitutional issues.
[brief] ”  *State v. Loftin*, 191 N.J. 172, 187 (2007).  Because of the importance of this constitutional right, trial judges “in their gatekeeping role have a duty to ‘take all appropriate measures to ensure the fair and proper administration of a criminal trial. ’”  *Tyler*, 176 N.J. at 181, quoting *State v. Williams*, 93 N.J. 39, 62 (1983).