ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] That factor stands out in No. 2 [sic].  Defendant was handcuffed at the time.  So there was really no reason and that’s one of the factors that’s looked at as to whether consent is valid.  And the law is set forth in my brief.  But that’s one of the factors that a Court can look at, defendant was already handcuffed at the time.  [...] already said that she wasn’t going to – said No, and then the consent occurred after that.  And, yes, I agree that there is certainly a signed document for [...], indicating she does consent, but, again, that goes back to, you know, she originally said No.  So that what will be shown.  [14T 12-18 to 13-12.] (also video #2 ending in seq. No. 7001, and 8001)  The PCR court, not having reviewed the Bodycams, reserved decision.  (14T 4-15 to 8-13; 14T 37-7 to 8)(Petitioner would also point out to review video disc #2 ending in seq. # 7001)  Attn: time stamp @8:11:40-8:11:47.  The Court subsequently rejected defendant’s claim, reasoning, in pertinent part:  Applying the King factors here, the court finds the consent to search was knowing and voluntary.  First, the video evidence shows that [...] was not handcuffed when she consented to the search.  Additionally, [...] was not under arrest when she provided consent and police did not obtain consent after [...] denied any guilt.  Also, [...] did not refuse initial requests for consent to search, instead she believed that she did not have the authority to give consent because she did not own the car.  What is more, [...] was advised of her right to refuse consent.  Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the court finds the consent provided by [...] to search the Impala was knowing and voluntary.
[brief] 36  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Order dated November 7, 2024 granting Respondents’ Motion to Disqualify  [...] .................................................................342a  Order dated December 19, 2024  Granting Motion for a Stay.......................344a  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc.,** | | | 822 F. Supp. 1099 (D.N.J. 1993) | 33-34 | | **Cavallaro v. Jamco Prop. Mgmt.,** | | | 334 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div. 2000) | 13 | | **City of Atl. City v. Trupos,** | | | 201 N.J. 447 (2010) | passim | | **Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Graphix Hot Line, Inc.,** | | | 808 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Pa. 1992) | 33-34 | | **Dental Health Assocs. S. Jersey, P.A. v. RRI Gibbsboro, LLC,** | | | 471 N.J. Super. 184 (App. Div. 2002) | 11-13, 18| | **Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,** | | | 109 N.J. 201 (1988) | passim | | **Doe v. Poritz,** | | | 142 N.J. 1 (1995) | 32 | | **Dorchester Manor v. Borough of New Milford,** | | | 287 N.J. Super. 114 (App. Div. 1996) | 33 | | **Greebel v. Lensak,** | | | 467 N.J. Super. 251 (App. Div. 2021) | 13, 20 | | **Goldberg v. Kelly,** | | | 397 U.S. 254 (1970) | 29, 31 | | **Hewitt v. Hollahan,** | | | 56 N.J. Super. 372 (App. Div. 1959) | 29, 31 | | **J.G. Ries & Sons, Inc. v. Spectrasery, Inc.,** | | | 384 N.J. Super. 216 (App. Div. 2006) | 10 | | **Knorr v. Smeal,** | | | 178 N.J. 169 (2003) | 33 | Lavin v. Bd. of Educ., 90 N.J. 145 (1982) ........................................................................................................33 Ledezma v. A & L Drywall, 254 N.J. Super. 613 (App. Div. 1992)
[brief] At the very most, there exists a narrow exception to the general rule where an ethical issue is “manifest and glaring” and the court is confronted with “a plain duty to act. ”  *In re Yarn Processing*, 530 F.2d at 89; see also ABA, *Ann. Mod. Rules Prof. Cond.* § 1.7 (“In exceptional circumstances courts will forgive lack of standing. ”).  Exceptional circumstances do not exist in this case.  Attorneys regularly represent multiple parties in a case where the parties mount a joint defense.  That is this case.
[brief] See id.  (“Reading the subsection's text as a whole, we conclude that the Legislature similarly intended the companion term “reproduce” to require more than the printing of a preexisting image for personal use. ”); see also American Heritage Dictionary, “Report,” (ahdictionary.com) (defining “report” as “[a] formal account of the proceedings or transactions of a group” and “[a] spoken or written account of an event usually presented in detail”).  Immediately after stating that courts can waive the complete psychological evaluation under certain circumstances, the Legislature carved out an exception to this exception – that courts must make sure the presentence investigations include a report on the defendant’s mental health condition in cases involving an endangering conviction.
[brief] THE RELEVANT STANDARD  As to the relevant standard of review:  “When reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a suppression motion, appellate courts ‘[ordinarily] defer to the factual findings of the trial court so long as those findings are supported by sufficient evidence in the record. ’”  State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156, 164 (2023) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 538 (2017)).
[brief] Estoppel cannot be applied solely because the parties and claims are intertwined. ”  *Hirsch*, 215 N.J. at 174.  intertwinement of claims, “a showing of detrimental reliance on behalf of the party aiming to compel arbitration. ”  *KPH Healthcare*, 2021 WL 4739601 at *7.  At all times relevant, [...] reasonably relied on the fact that service providers like [...] negotiate agreements with clients like [...] in order to provide services.  [...] did not execute a separate agreement with [...] because of their limited role as a payment processor.  As the “credit monitoring, credit repair and account dispute” servicing company, [...] is the one to seek out, communicate, and enter into agreements with the clients.
[brief] *5  You will hear testimony that the victim, [...], was seated in the courtroom when the defendants entered the courtroom escorted by sheriff's officers while in handcuffs.  It is the procedure of the courts to require defendants standing trial to post bail in order to assure their presence in court on the date of trial.  If a defendant chooses not to post bail, they are transported by the Sheriff's Office to the courtroom in order to assure their appearance.  It is regular, common, and required procedure for the sheriff's officer to place the defendants in handcuffs while they're being escorted to the courtroom.  Therefore, you are not to make any negative inference or give any weight to the fact that the defendants may have been escorted in the courtroom wearing handcuffs as they entered the courtroom.
[brief] Facially Suspect  PILOT  Defendants give scant attention in their briefs to the anomalous structure of the 30-year exemption they have designed, in particular, that for most of those 30 years unit owners will be paying 99.5% of full taxes.  (Pb12-13)  They fall back on the fact that the statute requires a phasing back in of conventional taxes in increasing minimum percentages over time but does not set a maximum percentage.  N.J.S.A 40A:12b(2).  (Dlb31)  However, the absence of a ceiling does not explain the bizarre choice of a PILOT equal to 99.5% of full taxes for almost the entirety of the exemption.  Property owners whose units represent 85% of the project’s market value will pay 99.5% of full taxes for 25 of 30 years, (Pb7,13).  This exemption structure is a facially suspect vehicle for incentivizing investment.  Indeed, while the PILOT produces no significant benefit for the Project or its occupants, it maximizes both the tax shifting to the Boroughs and the unrestricted PILOT revenues that will flow to the Township.  The comments of the Township’s Mayor, Deputy Mayor and Finance Chair at public hearing applauding the shift in school taxes indicate that the shift in the school tax burden, not a need to secure investment in the Project, was the purpose of the exemption.  (Pb18-20)  Plaintiffs maintain that these purposes are unlawful, and at the least, plainly arbitrary and unreasonable.
[brief] [...] had no knowledge of the personal injury action until he received letters from [...], who had apparently filed suit in the matter of Lopez v. [...], et al., under Docket No. [...].  At the time of the alleged accident, [...] had no interest as receiver of the property.  So, there would be no purpose for an intervention in the receivership by the Lopez personal injury plaintiffs.  The owner of the diner assets at the time of the incident was [...], and the defendant [...] as for the real estate parcel.  [...] provided [...] with a letter brief on July 27, 2023.  In the same, [...] explained to [...] that once he took control he found many problems at the diner.  (Ca140).
[brief] *Liebling v. Garden State Indemnity*, 337 N.J. Super. 447, 543-55, *certif. denied*, 169 N.J. 606 (App. Div. 2001) (finding that attorney’s answer to subjective question did not support rescission).  Rather, [...] should have been required to prove that [...] *intentionally* misled it in order to obtain rescission because there was no evidence to mislead by [...].  The policy did not contain any Exclusion for such vans and the application said nothing about 12-15 passenger vans being excluded.  Thus, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment and rescinding the policy.  Rescission under these circumstances should not be permitted, especially where the insurer left the entire application process to a third party, [...], which issued the policy.
[directive] EM  The HD and Screening Criteria Forms create a record and provide the court with the essential information for considering whether HD or EM _necessary may be appropriate for a defendant and what parameters must be set in conjunction prior with the conditions.  These forms shall be filled out to a party requesting, or the court ordering, HDLE, Strict HD or HDEM to assist the parties, the court, arid Pretrial Services in ensuring • that a defendant is an appropriate candidate for a of particular type release and that the defendant can be effectively monitored.
[directive] Other Disposition Provisions  FJ  Unless the court orders otherwise, or otherwise provided law, certain other by as of conditions the sentence, including but not limited to any monetary or court-ordered financial obligations, restitution, no-contact orders, Megan's Law registration obligations, and driver's license suspensions will commence upon sentencing of of regardless whether a deferral the custodial term is ordered.  Family Sentencing Guidance - Issued by Directive# 13-20 (April 30, 2020)  Page6 for Sentencing Guidelines  Court  Municipal Judges to in Response  COVID-19 Sentencing Guidelines for Municipal Court Judges in Response to COVID-19 response to the growing public health crisis worldwide and this state involving the In in COVID-19 coronavirus, the New Jersey Judiciary is implementing all possible measures to of apply social distancing current court operations consistent with the recommendations the in of New Jersey Department Health and the Centers for Disease Control.
[brief] ” (1T 96-5 to 9; 1T 97-3).6  Asked whether he was a “cop,” the caller replied, “We’re bounty hunters. ” (1T 96-11 to 13).  He repeated that the person being chased was “armed and dangerous,” and had “just smashed into a pedestrian. ” (1T 97-3 to 7).  He repeated that the person had “hit somebody” and had shot someone, and could be heard saying, “Slow down, _____________________ 6  The caller was not identified in the record, but evidently was defendant Lemar. Bailey.
[brief] It has been held that “Although rights may be waived, courts ‘indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. ’”  Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, 210 N.J. 482, 505 (2012) (internal quotation omitted).  “To be valid, waivers must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. ”  Ibid.  Therefore, the [...]’s position, that all arguments must be raised in writing during a short public comment period, or be waived thereafter, should be rejected as unconstitutional.
[brief] To state a defamation claim where actual malice applies, as it does here, a plaintiff must allege “(1) that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) that the statement was communicated to another person (and was not privileged); and (3) that the defendant published the defamatory statement with actual malice. ”  Durando, 209 N.J. at 248 (emphasis added).  The principle the trial court cited—that republication constitutes publication for defamation purposes—relates to the publication element of a defamation claim (element (1)).  It has zero relevance to the separate and independent actual malice element (element (3)).  In this case, the [...] do not dispute that they published statements based on [...]’s account under the first element.  What [...] has not pled is a cognizable theory of fault under the last element—specifically, “facts from which a factfinder conclude” that each of the [...]’ published their statements with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth, as actual malice requires.
[directive] is  D b.  Se requiere la divulgaci6n de las siguientes pruebas documentales.  The following Pretrial discovery is required.  D  La proposici6n de pruebas se tiene que completar antes del c.  Pretrial discovery to be completed by Pedimentos/ Audiencias  14.  I Motions Hearings  D  No hay mas pedimentos/audiencias precedentes al juicio.  a.  There are no further Pretrial Motions/Hearings.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE  DIVISION CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO.: [...]  ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION-MERCER COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  SAT BELOW: HON. [...], J.S.C. APPELLEES [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], AND [...]’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT [...]’S APPEAL OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR COURT’S DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT Of Counsel and on the Brief:
[directive] The information shall also provide that victims will not be charged any fee for services that are directly associated with a forensic sexual assault examination, including routine medical screening, medications for prophylaxis of sexually transmitted infections, pregnancy tests, emergency contraception, supplies, equipment and use of space.  Unless the victim requires immediate medical attention, this information shall be personally conveyed to the victim of a sexual offense by a representative of the hospital or place of emergency care before a medical examination of the victim is conducted, or by a representative of the police department before the victim’s statement is taken, to afford the victim the opportunity to arrange to have assistance from the rape crisis center or county victim-witness coordinator during these procedures.  Hospitals shall be held harmless from suits emanating from a hospital’s carrying out the obligation to convey information to victims of sexual offenses.
[brief] Police were in the area at the time of the shooting and responded almost immediately to the location.  (2T46-1 to 3; 2T51-16 to 52-4).  [...] observed the shooter, who was a male wearing a light-colored hoody, flee from the scene and gave chase.  (2T64-5 to 7).  That person was the only individual the detective saw running to backyards and not to stores for safety.  (2T52-23 to 53-9).  And, that person, defendant, was captured that evening, holding a light-colored sweatshirt.  (2T83-23 to 86-2).  Moreover, almost everything defendant did that evening was captured on video surveillance.  The shooting was recorded, the flight can be seen, and defendant’s attempt to discard the murder weapon, namely a semi-automatic firearm, was visible for the jury to see.  Notably, expert testimony revealed the semi-automatic firearm was operable and the bullet and two casings recovered from the victim’s Honda matched the semi-automatic firearm.  (5T170-6 to 11; 5T171-9 to 172-4; 5T172-5 to 9).  And, expert testimony showed that defendant’s DNA was on that semi-automatic firearm.  (6T61-17 to 20).  Specifically, [...] testified that a single DNA profile was obtained from the semi-automatic weapon and given the DNA obtained from the firearm, it was approximately 25.9 quadrillion times more likely if defendant was the source of the DNA than an unknown individual.  (6T62-1 to 5).  All of this evidence proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was one of the shooters responsible for [...]’s murder.  Furthermore, none of the aforementioned evidence depended on the cell site locations.  Accordingly, even if the trial court abused its discretion by admitting [...]’s testimony, any error was harmless.
[brief] Oyenusi, 387 N.J. Super. at 154.  In sum, [...] properly found that the traffic stop of [...] and [...] in Illinois was lawful and the search of their truck was based on probable cause.  [...] and [...] both found that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily consented to the search of his property, resulting in the police’s lawful seizure of the eight duffel bags filled with 175 pounds of marijuana, 1.5 kilograms of cocaine, and thousands of dollars in cash.
[brief] ..................................................20  SUBPOINT B  DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM IS UNTIMELY UNDER RULE 4:50 IS MOOT AND IGNORES  DEFENDANT’S CONCEALMENT OF HER CLAIM IN EQUITY.  ..................................................23  SUBPOINT C  DEFENDANT’S ATTEMPTS TO BLAME PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL FOR HIS OWN ACTIONS ARE IMPROPER, UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, AND HAVE BEEN WAIVED.  ..................................................26  POINT THREE
[brief] Id.  Yet, the State now argues that the exclusionary rule cannot be applied in the instant matter because law enforcement’s discovery of the Defendant as a suspended driver “was so thoroughly attenuated and essentially independent from the underlying drug investigation that led to the challenged stop of his car. ”  Sb 20.  This argument should be rejected as the discovery of the Defendant as a suspended driver in this matter was entirely dependent on identifying him and conducting an MDT check during the motor vehicle stop which was solely predicated on suspicion of an alleged drug transaction.  The State’s argument also must fail when evaluating the facts and circumstances of the instant case against the test for attenuation established in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).  First, with regard to the temporal proximity, it was immediately after the unconstitutional stop that law enforcement identified the Defendant by requesting his driver’s license.  Approximately seven minutes into the motor vehicle stop, law enforcement ran the Defendant’s driver’s license and discovered that he was a suspended driver.  T:68-1 to 68-13.  Thus, this factor militates in favor of the Defendant.  Second, with regard to the presence of intervening circumstances, a determinative intervening circumstance must sufficiently break the chain of causation between the constitutional violation and the recovery of the evidence.  State v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 639 (1990).  Here, the unconstitutional motor vehicle stop provided law enforcement the opportunity to identify the Defendant and discover his status as a suspended driver.  The acquisition of that information was a direct “fruit” of the unconstitutional motor vehicle stop.  Simply stated, no intervening circumstance existed to break the chain.  Third, with regard to the purpose and flagrancy of the police conduct, in the instant matter the purpose of law enforcement was “to hit some high narcotics areas. ”  T:18-7 to 18-12.  Analyzing the above factors, it is clear that the attenuation doctrine is inapplicable.  In both time and place, the identification of the Defendant as well as the discovery of his suspended driver status sprang directly from the unconstitutional motor vehicle stop.  CONCLUSION
[brief] For example, Plaintiff testified that the parties’ horoscopes did not match based upon their dates of birth and this would result in divorce.  However, Plaintiff became aware of this fifteen (15) days after he met Defendant on [...]. but still married Defendant.  (1T57).  Plaintiff also testified how he found out that Defendant’s last name was not [...].  (1T67-7).  This bothered Plaintiff, despite Defendant telling him that she was a “[...]. ” (1T67-13).  Defendant even clarified to Plaintiff that just because her surname was not [...], it did not mean that she was not of the [...] caste.  There was no misrepresentation on the part of Defendant.  Regardless, despite knowing this fact, Plaintiff still married Defendant.  If it was so important to him, he should not have married her.  Further, Plaintiff testified that he was aware that Plaintiff’s family did not follow certain “traditional norms,” such as conducting a puja on Diwali, Defendant’s sister marrying outside her caste and Defendant’s brother being divorced.  (1T68-6;1T73).  Notwithstanding these differences, the plaintiff married defendant in a civil ceremony and later in a religious ceremony.  There was no fraud here.  The parties’ marriage just did not work out.  It is for all these reasons that the Court properly found that the Plaintiff did not meet his burden for an annulment on the grounds of fraud.
[brief] See 1 Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation § 3:79 (2d ed. 2024), which states:  [B]uilding code requirements enacted after the construction of a building but not made retroactive have been held admissible as evidence of the standard of care required even though noncompliance with the requirements does not constitute a violation of the code.  The presence of a grandfather clause in a building code penal in nature is not conclusive on the question of negligence since negligence is not limited to violations of penal statutes.  (Emphasis added).  C. [...] Was Allowed to Give His Opinion Based on His Personal Perception that the Stairs Became “Sleeker” and “Rougher in the Rain to Navigate or When They’re Wet,” Thereby Creating a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether [...]’s Paint Job on the Stairs Caused an Unreasonably Dangerous Condition, Obviating the Applicability of the “Ongoing Storm” Doctrine of Pareja.
[brief] VOLUME I  In re [...], 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2188..............................Pra1  In re State and Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of [...], 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1938..............................................Pra5  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS
[brief] Lewis v Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 434-35 (2006)  Article I of the New Jersey Constitution provides in part:  A victim of a crime shall be treated with fairness, compassion and respect by the criminal justice system.  A victim of a crime shall not be denied the right to be present at public judicial proceedings except when, prior to completing testimony as a witness, the victim is properly sequestered in accordance with law or the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey.  A victim of a crime shall be entitled to those rights and remedies as may be provided by the legislature.  For the purposes of this paragraph, "victim of a crime" means: a) a person who has suffered physical or psychological injury or has incurred loss of or damage to personal or real property as a result of a crime.  In examining a procedural due process claim, courts first assess whether a liberty or property interest has been interfered with by the government, and second, whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation are constitutionally sufficient.  *Doe v. Poritz*, 142 N.J. at 99 (citing *Valmonte v. Bane*, 18 E. 3d 992, 998, (2d. Cir. 1994) (quoting *Kentuck v Dept. Of Corrections v. Thompson*, 490 U.S.454, 460, (1989)).  Substantive due process "is reserved for the most egregious Governmental abuses against liberty or property rights, abuses that 'shock the conscience or otherwise offend judicial notions of fairness and that are] offensive to human dignity.