ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] It is improper for [...], after failing to cross-examine [...], to now intimate in his Appeal that the improvements did not total $76,900.  Speculation is not evidential, proper argument.  Moreover, if the Unit was so “unrenovated, neglected and misfit” (using [...]’s repeated terms), why did [...] remain at the Unit for several decades (and still seeks to remain)?  Notwithstanding [...]’s contrary contention, the Board improperly excluded [...]’s capital improvements in determining [...]’s equity in the Unit.  As previously stated in [...]’s brief, page 33, there is no basis in the record or law to disregard the capital improvements to the Unit based upon their age, as the Board did.
[brief] Plaintiffs nevertheless argued below that their action was timely because it concerns a “continuing violation. ”  Putting aside for the moment that no such violation exists, Plaintiffs mistakenly suggest that the limitations period either had never begun to run or it extended continuously while [...] remained on the BOG.  In other words, they want a roving statute of limitations.  But that position was not adopted by the trial court, nor can it be reconciled with Plaintiffs’ own allegations that [...] “ceased to be eligible” “when” she relocated her residence.
[brief] CHANCERY  DIVISION: BERGEN COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...] SAT BELOW: HON. [...] APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...] BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] AND [...] TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................... i PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ......................................................... 1 JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS APPEALED FROM ......................... 4 PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................................................. 5 STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................. 9 LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY INCLUDING TRANSACTIONS IN THE JUDGMENT THAT OCCURRED MORE THAN SIX YEARS BEFORE THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED (24T52:7-10) ......................................................... 20 POINT II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES (25T80:15-89:4; 25T89:23-93:13)
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28  Investors Bank v. Torres, 243 N.J. 25 (2020) . . . . . . . . . .  28  New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Sisselman, 106 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 1969), certif. den. 54 N.J. 565 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] B.  The Trial Court Erred By Granting [...]’s Motion For Summary Judgment On [...]’s Tortious Interference and Indemnity Claims By Failing To Consider Any Of The Facts In The Record Preventing Summary Judgment On Both Claims.  (2T 18:18-19:16; Pa6-Pa7).  At oral argument, the Trial Court did not address [...]’s tortious interference claim against [...].  (See 2T 3:2-19:20).  This claim should not have been dismissed, as facts in the record support [...]’s claim.  Specifically, a tortious interference claim will lie where a claimant can demonstrate that defendant “intentionally and improperly interfere[d] with another's prospective contractual relation . . . whether the interference consists of (a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue the prospective relation or (b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective relation. ”  Nostrame v. Santiago, 213 N.J. 109 (2013).  Here, [...] has presented facts that establish that [...], despite expressly telling [...] in the summer of 2018 that [...] was “committed” to continuing the relationship with [...], subsequently stripped [...] of its wholesale distributorship months later, and gave the goodwill and customer-base to [...]’s competitor.  This interference with [...]’s existing and prospective wholesale customers gives rise to a claim for tortious interference, and should not have been dismissed as a matter of law.  Similarly, [...]’s claim for indemnity – based on the facts that [...] could not be liable to Plaintiff [...] if [...] could establish wrongdoing by [...] – could not have been dismissed at the summary judgment stage.  Accordingly, [...] respectfully requests that both claims be reinstated.  II.
[brief] **IT IS ORDERED that** based on the finding and determinations set forth above:  1.  The Defendant is directed to deposit with the Court $196,669.16 in cash, Cashier’s check or money order no later than the close of business November 30, 2021; and 2.  Failure to deposit $196,669.16 with the Court by November 30, 2021 will result in entry of a judgment of possession against the Defendant, effective as of today’s date; and 3.  If the Defendant does deposit $196,669.16 with the Court by November 30, 2021, the Plaintiff may submit a certification of counsel fees collectable as additional rent and both parties may file motions for reconsideration with regard to the determinations made by the Court in this Order.
[brief] The determination of the [...] acknowledges that it did not comply with the requirement to provide notice to all members and retirants enrolled in the [...] within 30 days of the Ricci Act’s enactment.  The final decision notes that on August 8, 2019, an email was sent to the Certifying Officers advising them of their obligations under the Ricci Act.  Pall.  However, no August 8, 2019, email was provided.  A Memorandum to the Certifying Officers was provided with no date other than “August 2019. ”  Pa62.  Even still, this Memorandum was sent to the Certifying Officers and is not notice to the members of the retirement system.  If anything, it is proof that the members of the retirement system could not have possibly been notified within the statutory timeframe, as the Certifying Officers were not even notified within 30 days.
[brief] Gerba v Board of Trustees of the Public Employees’ Retirement System, supra., 83 N.J. at 189; New Jersey Department of Public Advocate, v N.J. Board of Public Utilities, supra., 189 N.J. Super. at 507.  See, also Riley v Board of Trustees, supra., 2021 N.J. Super. at 12 [RA-12 Exhibit C], citing N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) (Affirming the Board’s rejection of the ALJ’s findings and denial of Petitioner’s application).  D.
[brief] In its appellate brief, [...] confusingly (and inaccurately) states that “[...] acknowledged, however, that not a single Pipeline Right transitioned to become an Additional Backlog Project…”  App. Br. at 20.  This is obviously an absurd proposition that is directly contradicted by [...]’s own testimony, the arbitral record, and, indeed, by the entire purpose of the Arbitration and the damages for unpaid monies sought by [...] therein.  different projects “without a shred [of] proof. ”  App. Br. at 29.  Rather, the Arbitrator weighed substantial evidence and testimony in reaching his well-reasoned findings.
[brief] Pa41; Pa10.  The distance of 177.65 feet was always the correct distance and the project plans were prepared in accordance with that distance, and it consistent with the statement contained in the original easement description that, “(s)aid Proposed Easement shall include the permanent right to maintain and replace the proposed seawall located within the above-described easement area including therewith the right to pump, place, transport and spread sand beach fill within the limits of the Proposed Easement herein described.
[brief] Parenthetically, the Court should be aware that Defendant did not find out about her lies and deception and the withholding of that money until after this litigation commenced (And this $70,000.00 has always remained in the possession of Plaintiff-THRU TODAY).  What makes her behavior shocking and egregiously criminal is that she seeks to be rewarded for her lies and deceitful behavior, by extracting a penalty from Defendant, who is the only party that has acted in good faith during the term of the Agreement.  This fact and the associated legal theory of a wrongful and intentional misrepresentation, which are beyond dispute, have been ignored by the initial trial Court, the Appellate Court, and now, the Court below.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONSIDERING FIBERVILLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE APPELLANTS’ COMPLAINT UNDER R. 4:6-2(e)  AS OPPOSED TO R. 4:46-2  In a last ditch effort to overcome dismissal of its Complaint, Appellants incorrectly contend that the trial court should have treated [...]’s motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment.  Without saying as much, Appellants suggest that the trial court should have limited its inquiry to the Complaint alone, while ignoring the record facts and legal conclusions relating to the identical transactions and occurrences, as developed through discovery and motion practice in the Prior Action.  This is not the law and the trial court was correct to evaluate [...]’s motion under Rule 4:6-2(e).
[brief] *State v. Weeks*, 107 N.J. 396, 406 (1987).  The State is permitted to introduce “other crimes” evidence however, to show “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident when such matters are relevant to a material issue in dispute. ”  N.J.R.E. 404(b).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has formulated a four-prong test governing the admissibility of other crimes evidence.  State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992).  To be admissible, the evidence must 1) be relevant to a material issue which is genuinely disputed, 2) be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged, 3) be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and 4) have probative value that is not outweighed by prejudice.  Id.  The first factor of this Cofield analysis borrows language directly from N.J.R.E. 401.
[brief] 3T118-15-20.  On cross-examination, Dr.  Guzzardi was pressed on basic principles of toxicology.  He agreed that to suffer injury through exposure to mold, [...] would have to have been exposed to an “appreciable quantity” of mold or mycotoxins.  “[O]ne mold spore would not cause toxicity. ”  3T115-16-22.  But [...] did not know at what dose [...] consumed mycotoxins at any point in time.  3T118-21-24.  Nor did he did not know with what frequency he consumed food contaminated with mycotoxins.  3T118-25 to 3T119-4.  [...] also conceded that for injury to arise from ingestion of mold-contaminated food, the mold must have been a strain capable of producing trichothecene, and must have grown, proliferated, and produced sufficient mycotoxins to cause injury.
[brief] Exhibit “P” is [...]’ Certification in his Motion for Reconsideration of Oct. 6, 2022 Order, dated October 26, 2022.  | 161a | | a.  Appendix Exh. “I” – Proposed Order to Replace Oct. ’22 Order | 193a | | b.  Appendix Exhibit “F” – [...]’ Email Train w/[...] & [...], “Request for Filing Sur Reply to [...]'s Aug. 12th Certifications” - Sept. 6 to 13, 2022.  | 200a | | c.  Appendix Exhibit “J” - [...]' August 19, 2022 Letter to [...], "[...]’s Certifications for August 8th Replies to Verified Complaint & Trust Account" | 207a | | d.  Appendix  Exhibit “K” - [...]' August 30, 2022 Letter to [...], "Follow-up to [...]'s Certifications for August 8th Replies to Verified Complaint & Trust Account" | 214a | | e.  Appendix  Exhibit “L” - [...]' Sept. 6, 2022 Letter to [...], "Follow-up to [...]'s Certifications for August 8th Replies to Verified Complaint & Trust Account" | 219a | | 18.  Exhibit “Q” is [...]’ Certification Reply, dated Nov. 25, ‘22, to Nov. 14, ‘22 Letter Briefs by [...] & [...] | 227a | | 19.  Exhibit “R” is [...]’ updated Proposed Order of Nov. 25, ’22 | 247a | | Exhibit | Description | Pages | |---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | 20.
[brief] CASES CITED Page  No. Board of Trustees, TPAF vs. LaTronica, 81 N.J. Super. 461, 470-471 (1963), certif. denied, 41 N.J. 874 (1964).  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7  Bueno v. Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 422 N.J. Super. 227, 233 (App. Div. 2011)..............................5  Gere v. Louis, 209 N.J. 486, 500 (2012)..................................................9  George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpke. Auth., 137 N.J. 8 1994)..........................................................5  In re Puglisi, 186 N.J. 529 (2005).......................................................7, 8  In re Spellbacker, 414 N.J. Super. 26 (App. Div. 201)..................................7, 8 Matter of Farmers’ Mut. Fire Assur Ass’n, of New Jersey, 256 N.J. Super 607 (App. Div. 1992)...............................10 Pascaralla vs. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124-125 (App. Div. 1983)..................................................................9 Spalt v. N.J. Dept. of Environmental Protection, N.J. Super 206 (App. Div. 1989), certif. denied 122 N.J. 140............................................10 William Coyle vs. Board of Trustees of the Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund, unpublished decision of the Appellate Division (2015) (Aa58-65)...........................................6, 7, 8 NEW JERSEY STATUTES ANNOTATED CITED Page No. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(t).........................................................1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS [...] (hereinafter sometimes “[...]” or “Appellant”) was born on May 11, 1951 and at all relevant times was a schoolteacher for the [...] (hereinafter sometimes “[...]”) (Aa25).
[brief] ”  While restrictive covenants in deeds are to be “strictly construed,” that rule does not permit Courts to dispense with the clear intent of the contracting parties.  The central component of contract construction is ascertaining the intent of the parties; “technical nicety of expression is not the determinative.  The precise form of a covenant or agreement is of no consequence if the intention is reasonably clear.  The obvious purpose should not be defeated by a narrow and technical construction of the language used. ”
[brief] Respondent’s argument is meritless in that [...]’ Order of Extension makes no mention of COVID-19 but, instead, references the ALJ’s “voluminous caseload”.  Respondent’s argument that Appellant should have expected such a delay because the trial occurred via Zoom as a result of COVID-19, in fact, undercuts its position.  As the trial had concluded in November, 2020 and the record closed on May 12, 2021, it is entirely unclear and unexplained by Respondent how COVID-19 would have prevented the ALJ from issuing the Decision in a reasonably timely way.  Even more to the point, however, is the lack of any reasonable basis for the ALJ’s failure to communicate, either directly to counsel, or by making the necessary request for an extension to the Chief Judge of the ALJ’s need for additional time.  It is this failure which, ultimately, compelled Appellant’s attorney to contact the Chief Judge.  Certainly, it is not unreasonable for Appellant to be concerned as to the impartiality of an ALJ whom his attorney reported to the ALJ’s administrative supervisor for what can fairly be described as a dereliction of responsibility.  This concern is heightened in a matter such as this wherein Appellant’s own character is a primary focus of the Decision.  A judge should not sit in any matter wherein “a reasonable, fully informed person (would) have doubts about the judge’s impartiality[.]”  State v. Dalal, 212 N.J. 601, 606 (2015) (quoting DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 517 (2008)).  To this end, even an appearance of impropriety or impartiality compels recusal.  See, DeNike, supra 196 N.J. at 514.  A litigant need not “prove actual prejudice on the part of the (judge) to establish an appearance of impropriety; an ‘objectively reasonable’ belief that the proceedings were unfair is sufficient. ”  DeNike, supra 196 N.J. at 514 (quoting State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 279 (1997).  It is respectfully suggested that any “reasonable person” would have concerns as to potential bias (even if implicit) of a judge whose failure to follow rules had been complained of by one litigant’s attorney to that judge’s administrative supervisor.  Accordingly, basic fairness dictates that any remand of this matter be directed to a different ALJ.  DATED: December 5, 2023
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[brief] ”  Id. at 137.  In addition, the RMP unequivocally pronounced that the legislative intent to regulate GHG emissions in the Global Warming Response Act dep.nj.gov/wp-content/uploads/climatechange/nj-climate-resilience-strategy-2021.pdf. is compatible with and also a function of the implementation of the broad goals and policies of the Highlands Act, as follows:  The RMP policies support the State Global Warming Response Act in reducing the level of greenhouse gas emissions in the state by the year 2020 through the reduction of mobile sources, resource protection and energy efficient practices.  [Id. at 210.]  Accordingly, the [...] erred when it failed to make any record of this project’s air pollution emissions and its associated contribution to increased GHG emissions when it decided that the project was consistent with the goals and objectives of the Highlands Act and the RMP.  The [...] was constrained to assess the totality of the circumstances of the project including its GHG emissions.  The Legislature mandated, in the Highlands Act, that the [...] implement a “…comprehensive approach to the protection of the water and other natural resources of the New Jersey Highlands; that this comprehensive approach should consist of the identification of a preservation area of the New Jersey Highlands that would be subjected to stringent water and natural resource protection standards, policies, planning, and regulation…”
[brief] ”  State v. Bard, 445 N.J. Super. 145, 157 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 227 N.J. 131 (2016).  Fundamentally, “the totality of the circumstances – the whole picture – must be taken into account. ”  State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 501 (1986).  When an experienced officer is conducting drug surveillance in an area inundated with narcotics where he has made numerous arrests and received numerous complaints which he is responsible to investigate, and when the defendants are congregating with someone selling drugs, and flee on seeing the police, the combined effect gives the officers a “reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring” and “the right, if not the obligation, to approach defendants, and upon their flight, to chase them in order to make a brief investigatory stop.
[brief] McLean, 205 N.J. at 459; N.J.R.E. 602 (“A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. ”).  In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has clarified the limited scope of lay opinion testimony of police witnesses who did not directly observe the events underlying their testimony.  In Lazo, the Supreme Court held that it was error to allow a detective to testify as to his opinion that the defendant’s arrest photo closely resembled the sketch of the suspect drawn by a sketch artist.
[directive] 8.1  Subjects against whom a CED has been deployed shall be transported to a medical facility for examination if any of the following circumstances exist: (a) the subject requests medical attention; (b) the subject had been rendered unconscious or unresponsive; (c) the subject, after being subjected to a discharge, does not appear to have recovered normally, as described in CED training; (d) the subject has exhibited signs of excited delirium, as described in CED training, prior to, during, or after the discharge of the CED; (e) the subject has suffered bodily injury requiring medical attention as a result of a fall, or otherwise reasonably appears to need medical attention; (f) the subject was exposed to three or more discharges from a CED during the encounter; (g) the subject has been exposed to a continuous discharge lasting 15 seconds or longer; (h) no personnel at the scene are qualified or authorized to remove the CED darts/electrodes from the subject’s person; (i) an officer trained and authorized to remove darts/electrodes experiences difficulty in removing a dart/electrode; or (j) any part of a CED dart/electrode has broken off and remains imbedded.  8.2  An officer is authorized to remove a CED dart/electrode from a subject only if the officer has received training on dart/electrode removal, provided, however, that an officer is not authorized to remove a CED dart/electrode from any part of the person’s head or neck, or where the dart/electrode is located in the area of the subject’s genitalia, or female breast.  In the absence of exigent circumstances requiring immediate action, a CED dart/electrode may only be removed from these areas of the subject’s body by qualified medical personnel.
[directive] (b)  Unfounded.  A preponderance of the evidence shows that the alleged misconduct did not occur.  (c)  Exonerated.  A preponderance of the evidence shows the alleged conduct did occur, but did not violate any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standing operating procedure; rule; or training.  (d)  Not Sustained.  The investigation failed to disclose sufficient evidence to clearly prove or disprove the allegation.
[brief] Plaintiff’s disclosure in the complaint—the case initiating document—means that this disclosure was made at the very inception of the case, and the lower court was well aware of the extent of Plaintiff’s request.  Indeed, the Complaint was included as an exhibit to Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment.  (Da8 to 20).  The latter category of attorneys’ fees (associated with the motion for default judgment itself) was not included as damages in Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment and the request for such attorneys’ fees was nevertheless denied without prejudice subject to refiling. ” (See Da4 to 5; emphasis added).  Therefore, Defendant’s argument regarding attorneys’ fees does not constitute a basis to overturn the lower court’s decision to deny Defendant’s motion to vacate.