ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] of  The following changes to the recommendation language appearing at the top the PSA have been adopted:  Current recommendation  Change to clarify and include inchoate Charge: language language NRR (Subject to life imprisonment  NRR (Charge(s) include murder)  Murder 1-3 per statute)  (NJSA 2C: l in C/wr::e)  NRR (Charge(s) include NRR (Charge(s) include murder)  Attempted 11111rder 11-3 attempt/conspiracy/solicit- murder)  Aux) in (NJSA 2C: NRR  NRR (Charge(s) include Attempted (Charge(s) include manslau::hter 11-4 attempt/conspiracy/solicit- manslaughter) Aux) manslaughter) (NJSA 2C: in NRR (Charge(s) include sex  NRR  Attempted (Charge(s) include sex. assault assault  Atn) attempt/conspiracy/solicit- sex assault (NERA (N era Charge)) (NJSA 2C: 14-2 in Charge))  NRR (Charge(s) include NRR (Charge(s) include robbery or Attempted robbe1:r attempt/conspiracy/solicit- robbery or carjacking)  (NJSA 2C: 15-1,2 in All.\) carjacking)  NRR (Charge(s) include NRR (Charge(s) include escape)  Attempted escape  Atn) attempt/conspiracy/solicit - escape)  (NJSA 2C:29-5 in ' rl ADA ENSURING AN TO DOOR OPEN JUSTICE with Americans Act Disabilities  The modifications above bring the language in line with the way practitioners treat the of recommendations and is a more sensible representation the charges.
[brief] [...] Paid [...] Approximately $300,000 Annually To Manage And Operate The Project Garage | 5 | | C.  [...] Consistently Exceeded The Agreed-Upon Budget, Causing [...] To Have To Pay Excessive Expenses | 6 | | D.  [...] Never Provided The Contractually Required Monthly Compilation Report Relating To The Operations Of [...] Garage | 7 | | E.  The Redevelopment Agreement Required [...] Garage To Be Completed Before The Mall | 8 | | F.  Adequate Parking Was Key To The Overall Success Of The Project | 9 | | G.  Even Before Entering Into The Redevelopment Agreement, [...] Never Actually Intended To Build [...] Garage | 10 | | H.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.26(5) defines “public work” in relevant part as follows:  “Public work” means construction, reconstruction, demolition, alteration, custom fabrication, duct cleaning, or repair work, or maintenance work, including painting, and decorating, done under contract and paid for in whole or in part out of the funds of a public body, except work performed under a rehabilitation program.  The Prevailing Wage Act applies the prevailing wage level “for workmen engaged in public works. ”
[brief] \(^{13}\)  See Gen. Elec. Contracts Corp. v. Band, 186 A. 684, 686 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1936) (“The contract executed by the buyer in this case provides that all rights and remedies are cumulative and not alternative.  The fact that the seller has other remedies does not limit or defeat his right to insist upon the payment of the price by the buyer. ”); HLP Associates, 2015 WL 1181271 at *7 (“plaintiff’s decision not to exercise its rights under Section 13.1 to declare the lessee in material default, and to terminate the lease, did not prevent it from invoking the protections afforded it \(^{13}\)  Notably, the interpretation of Section 4.02 advanced by Tenant would be highly inequitable to Landlord as it would grant Tenant a license to withhold Rent, at any time, without notice thereby depriving Landlord of the cash flow needed to operate the Shopping Center.
[brief] (1T 95-1 to 105-24; Da 13)  Regarding the stop, the court found that [...] lawfully stopped the Suburban based on his reasonable belief that there was a violation of the tinted windows statute.  (1T 100-15 to 102-20)  The court stated, “The law on tinted windows is clear.  . . .  The rear windows can be tinted.  However, the front window and the front driver and the front passenger windows cannot. ”  (1T 101-12 to 16)  Regarding the search, the court found that the officers lawfully searched the Suburban based on the smell of marijuana, as [...] credibly testified that he smelled marijuana, and the smell of marijuana provided probable cause for the search.  (1T 10-21 to 105-19)  B.  The Trial
[brief] The last case, HLP Associates, L.P v. Carpet City, Inc., 2015 WL 1181271 (App. Div. 2015) included an extensive personal guaranty provision in the lease, although the Court’s opinion does not indicate the form of signature line. on this point because it did not apply the rules of strict construction as outlined in point B above.  Pursuant to the City of Millville case and the similar unpublished cases cited above, personal liability should only be found if the individual sought to be charged with personal liability signs the document on a signature line that clearly indicates the person is signing in their individual capacity and if there is evidence that the signor intended to be personally bound.  Here there is no separate signature line and there is absolutely no evidence that any of the individual defendants intended to be personally bound.  Accordingly, the finding of the Trial Court that there is personal liability must be reversed.
[brief] 3T14:5-10; 3T70:17-25.  Thus, Koda responds to commands from [...] and [...]’s mothers, who don’t speak English.  3T14:1-8.  [...] has walked and played with Koda at Defendant’s home at least 20 times.  3T57:14-16.  He has owned and fostered Garden State GSD rescue dogs.  3T55:3-19.  He said Koda is “very good” with cats and small dogs and responds to his commands.
[brief] “ORNAMENTION:  Aside from an access walkway and sidewalk no greater than six feet (6’) in width, shrubbery, flowers and other similar ornamentation installed and maintained at a height of less than thirty (30) inches, no structures may be placed within, or may project into the area defined as the Historic Flared Avenue Open Space Area. ”; Pa 52a.  Ordinance Sec. 413.02A sets forth the purpose of the Flared Open Space Area.  “HD-O Zone District is subject to special setback provisions dating to the late 1870’s, providing for a flared setback that widens towards the ocean from Central Avenue to Ocean Avenue.  This flared setback is a unique and invaluable resource that is recognized within planning, urban design and historic preservation circles as one of the first evidences of this type of streetscape treatment in the Country. ”  In the decades prior to the 1927 Amendment to the New Jersey Constitution authorizing zoning, the flared front lot line setback scene afforded Ocean Grove lots fronting east-west streets on the first two (2) blocks from the ocean an unobstructed ocean view.  With the advent of the MLUL and modern zoning ordinances, the flared front lot line setback planning scheme has been replaced by the zoning ordinance setback line planning scheme.
[brief] (2T22:14-21).  In denying reconsideration, the court held that “[...] had plans for this [Property] to be a commercial development for ages, they zoned it for [] commercial” and “basically the Court is going to be tasked with deciding whether the property should be rezoned to provide for multi-family housing. ” (2T19:2-9).  The court held that, “I think there are certain things that happened when you were constitutionally non-compliant and a builder’s remedy action has been filed . . . and one of those things is, you cannot move ahead with condemning that property. ” (2T19:16-24).  This appeal follows.  ARGUMENT I.
[brief] ”  Davis, 104 N.J. at 501.  And given the fact-sensitive nature of the totality-of-the-circumstances test, the cases defendant relies on to argue the officers needed something more like an exchange of objects or money are wholly irrelevant to the analysis.  (Db 7 to 11); see State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13 (2004); State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1 (1997); State v. Ramos, 282 N.J. Super. 19 (App. Div. 1995); State v. Moore, 181 N.J. Super. 40 (App. Div. 2004).  In other words, merely because officers viewed an exchange of product or money, or something different in those cases, does not mean such facts are required for reasonable suspicion to exist.  Defendant’s push for such findings to be necessary circumvents the low threshold showing needed for reasonable suspicion and fails to appropriately define any alleged error in this case.  Accordingly, [...] finding reasonable suspicion on this record is a proper exercise of discretion since her findings were instead based sufficient credible evidence in the largely undisputed record.
[brief] By contrast, in Wilson v. Brick Twp. Zoning Bd., 405 NJ. Super. 189, 199-200 (App. Div. 2009), bulk variances based on visual enhancement would be rejected where the aesthetic benefit solely benefited the owner -- the improvements conferring the benefit were hidden from public view.  In Cicchino v. Township of Berkeley Heights Plan. Bd., 237 N.J. Super. 175, 180-81 (App. Div. 1989) the ostensible benefit of undersized lots contradicted the intent of the planning and zoning of the municipality which (unlike the situation in Kaufmann) was calling for larger lots.
[brief] Here, the opposite happened.  Having succeeded through no effort of their own (because this was a *sua sponte* order) in avoiding any potential sympathy for the plaintiff that could have resulted from a recitation of the plaintiff's permanent nerve damage, inability to hold a job, constant pain, two surgical procedures, and inability to use the first fingers of his right (dominant) hand, the defendants turned the tables and unduly prejudiced the jury against the plaintiff by being able to show that the plaintiff is able to do certain activities four and five years after the incident.  Thus, the jury heard that plaintiff can ride an ATV and go fishing and climb a ladder, but they did not hear (from his vocational expert, (Pa320)) that his condition renders him unable to obtain and keep competitive employment; they did not hear (from his medical expert (Pa360)) that he sustained a disc herniation, spinal cord compression, and nerve root compression from the events of May 13, 2017 requiring emergency surgery; and they did not hear (from his physiatrist (Pa368)) that he will need future significant future medical treatment, possibly even additional surgeries.  The evidence which was used against the plaintiff in this regard were photographs taken in 2021 or 2022 (Pa238-243), and text messages sent in October 2022 (Pa233), four and five years after the incident which caused the plaintiff’s injuries.  They were put before the jury in the cross examination of plaintiff, and counsel was also permitted to show them (4T68:19-71:5) and comment on them in his opening statement (Ibid.; 4T37:10-38:10) and closing argument (11T46:23-48:5).  Even if these exhibits accurately depicted the plaintiff’s physical condition at the time they were created, they have no relevance to his condition between the date of the injury and the four years thereafter prior to their creation, nor to the permanency of the injuries.  Even if [...]’s evidence was relevant to credibility, it should have been precluded as unduly prejudicial under NJRE 403.
[brief] The photographs and other documentary evidence in the record demonstrate the navigational hazard presented by the dock extension.  [Aa149; Aa150; Aa152; Aa188; Aa291-Aa295; Aa297; Aa303.]  \(^3\)  Assuming arguendo that Appellant was required to establish a particularized “constitutionally protected property interest,” Appellant notes that such a property interest exists by virtue of the fact that the dock in question traverses Appellant’s riparian right to freely navigate to and from the channel without obstruction.
[brief] [...] on August 23, 2018 then filed the instant Zoning Board application (Da7-28) as a “person interested in land upon which a nonconforming use or structure exists” as per N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 for a Board determination as to whether this off-site parking use by Lot 8 staff/attendee on Lot 5 was a legal use or a legal nonconforming use.  [...] included in the appeal a number of exhibits and documents to be considered by the Board as identified in the Resolution (Da7-82) --- none being disputed as to authenticity.  [...] as the owner/proponent of the nonconforming off-site parking use on Lot 5 received Notice, submitted a pre-hearing letter (Da62-67) and participated through its attorney; however the Sons of Israel did not submit any evidence or testimony at the Board hearing.  As listed in the Resolution, the documents/records that constituted the Board Record consisted of the [...], the 1972 Site Plan documents, the 1963 Agreement, the June 2017 Chancery [...] easement Opinion, certain historical Site photographs, and attorney Letters outlining the legal positions.  See (Da7-88).  At the Board hearing, the School presented the various documents (Da7-88), including the 1972 Approved School Site Plan that depicted the courtyard on the School Lot 5 (Da3-22).  [...] courtyard had no curb cut off Sixth Street, no marked parking aisles, no marked parking spaces, no fire lane, and no setbacks from buildings --- nothing that marks or references the courtyard to be available for vehicle use of parking (Da22).  [...] Attorney represented that a diligent search had not located any Township records of a Site Plan approval or Building Permit for the Synagogue on Lot 8 or for off-site parking on School Lot 5 (1T5-3 to 11-3).
[brief] ”  N.J. Stat. § 59:4-3.  As provided by plaintiff’s expert [...], the construction which resulted in the tree roots being shaved occurred between 2007 and 2012, a minimum of eight years before the tree fell which resulted in plaintiff’s catastrophic injuries.  In McGowan v. Borough of Eatontown, 151 N.J.Super. 440, 376 A.2d 1327 (App.Div. 1977), which involved an accident on a state highway, the Court noted that despite the absence of actual notice on the date of the accident, the state had constructive notice where the local police had previously informed it that an icy condition would occur and reoccur under predictable circumstances.  See also, Speaks v. Jersey City Housing Authority, 193 N.J.Super. 405, 474 A.2d 1081 (App.Div. 1984) (plaintiff was injured by a bicycle frame hurled through a broken window, and court held that the notice requirement was met by the fact that there had been several previous injuries caused by objects thrown from windows); Milacci v. Mato Realty Company, Inc., 217 N.J.Super. 297, 525 A.2d 1120 (App.Div. 1987) (plaintiff’s allegations as to existence of an accumulation of sand and dirt were held to have raised a jury question as to constructive notice of the dangerous condition).  In Lodato v. Evesham Township, 388 N.J. Super. 501, 511-512 (2006), summary judgment was reversed as the Appellate Court found that plaintiff has provided enough information as to create a genuine issue of material fact that defendant had constructive notice of a sidewalk raised by a tree root.
[brief] [Id. at 603-04.]  The *Watson* Court provided examples of applications of these principles.  If the parties do not dispute that a video shows an “individual opened the door with his elbow,” the investigator can testify as to that; however, he would not be permitted to testify as to his opinion that the reason the individual opened the door with his elbow was “to avoid leaving fingerprints. ”  *Id.* at 693.  In a drunk driving case, a detective could testify as to each drink that the video clearly shows being poured for the defendant, but could not offer his opinion or characterization that “the defendant [was] drinking heavily for an hour and a half. ”  Id. at 604.  The Court then applied these principles to the narration testimony in Watson itself.  The Court criticized the officer’s “play-by-play” commentary about the suspect’s movements throughout the 57-second surveillance video: how he entered the bank, that he removed a glove, placed a demand note on the teller's counter, held the note with two fingers, pushed open the door with his elbow, and appeared to run across the parking lot.
[brief] (Pa225.)  [...], the Clerk for the General Assembly certified that her responsibilities as Clerk require her to keep a record of all action taken on bills, resolutions, and motions.  (Pa227 at ¶ 3.)  She explained that the minutes are only published from time to time and as of July 18, 2023 had not yet been published for the 2020-2021 term.  (Pa227 at ¶ 5.)  [...] attached as an exhibit, unpublished minutes for January 6, 2022 and January 10, 2022 that had been created from hand recorded notes.
[brief] In rejecting that argument, the Trial Court noted that any redevelopment of Sub-Area 1 of the Redevelopment Area must comply with Borough ordinance parking requirements, while the redevelopment overlay zoning of Sub-Area 2 requires the redeveloper to construct 264 parking spaces on the ground floor of the buildings and through street and surface parking along with a new 150 space municipal parking lot to replace the 300 space municipal parking lot that would be removed through this redevelopment project (Pa1744).  Thus, there were factual issues as to whether parking opportunities are being eliminated or increased by the redevelopment overlay zoning, and also about whether the existing 300 space lot is ever maximized or used during off-season months (Pa1744).  More importantly, the Plaintiff did not satisfy its burden of proof to demonstrate that any changes to the parking in the redevelopment area caused the plan amendment to be substantially inconsistent with the fundamental objectives of the master plan.  For these reasons, the Trial Court’s rejection of this argument was warranted.
[brief] The Board complied with this requirement when it posted information about the Ricci Act on its website.  [...] identifies no authority suggesting that the Division’s use of its website to fulfill this notice requirement was inadequate.  Even though the Division satisfied the only notice requirement under the Ricci Act through the website posting, it went above and beyond to provide additional notice to its members through other means.  On August 8, 2019, the Division provided a letter about the Ricci Act to all Certifying Officers and advised them of their responsibility to make the letter available to all members at their respective locations.  (Pa11).  On August 9, 2019, a postcard with information about the Ricci Act was mailed to [...]’s home address (as well as the home addresses of over 200,000 other retirees).  (Pa14; Pa78-80).  And, on June 10, 2021, the Division posted a news item on its website advising members and retirees that the statutory eligibility period to register under the Ricci Act was expiring soon and that they must submit the Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.
[brief] I.  Owners and Ownership  The property in question has been in the [...] since about 1919.  It was a farm up until the 1940’s when it then became a scrap metal recycling business.  Pa0296; 8T16-21 to 17-9; 5T77-17.  When the founding generations passed on, the property passed to [...] and his cousin [...] (nee Weinstein), grandchildren of [...], the original owner.  5T76-25 to 77-9.  [...], brother to [...] (nee Weinstein), ran and managed the property for his and Cousin Mindy’s interest.  Lee was the sole manager of the property from 2006 to when he died in 2014.  5T76-23 to 77-14; 5T80-13 to 21.  Neither Defendant in this lawsuit was a direct heir to the property from the founding member.  5T77-2; 5T80-13 to 21.  [...] passed away in 2008, with her 50% share of the property going to her husband [...].  3T198-15 to 23.  Upon Lee’s death in 2014, his 50% share transferred to his sister, [...].  5T77-4 to 77-12.  [...] then became the executor of [...]’s Estate, which includes the property in question.  5T79-23 to 25; 5T84-6 to 12.  [...] has no prior experience, training, or interest in the field of environmental contamination and remediation.  5T93-10 to 12; 5T152-25 to 153-2.  [...] has no advanced education, having left college after one (1) year to marry and have children.  5T79-8 to 13.  [...] also has no prior experience in environmental contamination and remediation.  3T196-7 to 23.  II.
[brief] Gipson [v. Kasey], 150 P.3d [228, 230 (Ariz. 2007) (en banc)].  Defendant itself concedes that it owes a duty to all consumers “to make a product that is reasonably safe for its intended use. ”  (Doc. 10 at 2.)  This is precisely the duty that Plaintiff claims Defendant breached by not installing Drowsy Driver Detection and/or LaneSense.  (See Doc. 19 at 2–3.)  Even assuming her theory of breach is novel, Plaintiff is not seeking to impose a new duty on Defendant, contrary to what Defendant asserts.
[brief] The Court should reject the argument that the IFPA requires claims to be brought solely in court.  The IFPA provides that an “insurance company damaged as a result of a violation of any provision of this act may sue therefor in any court of competent jurisdiction. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7.  The Amici Curiae contend this provision requires IFPA claims to be brough in court rather than arbitration.  The weight of authority does not support that argument.
[brief] (Da62 to 63).  Defendants’ motion was supported by a certification of counsel (Da64 to 66) to which was appended a certification from Defendants’ insurance adjuster concerning Plaintiff’s behavior during jury selection.  (Da67 to 68).  On September 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed a letter brief in opposition to Defendants’ motion for reconsideration.  Pursuant to R.2:6-1(a)(2), a copy of Plaintiff’s memorandum in opposition is not appended hereto.  On October 7, 2023, the trial court entered an order denying Defendants’ motion for new trial.
[brief] Application of these factors reveals that three parts of the detective’s narration testimony were inadmissible.  First, her testimony explaining that the video depicted the “shooter” exiting the Chevy and walking towards the crime scene was prohibited because it was based upon inferences drawn from other facts in evidence, and it provided her opinion as to facts that were reasonably in dispute – in violation of the third, and fourth factors of Watson.  Second, her testimony concerning the suspect’s path of travel was inadmissible for the same reasons: it was based upon inferences, and it provided her opinion on facts that were reasonably in dispute.  And third, the detective had next to no familiarity with [...], rendering her identification of him on screen inadmissible under Sanchez.  Each error – individually and collectively – requires reversal.
[brief] *6  We are unpersuaded by defendant's arguments that the prosecutor's remarks “flipped the burden of proof” and “undermined the presumption of innocence. ”  Notably, the prosecutor, immediately prior to the challenged comments in his summation, acknowledged that the State's “standard of proof here is beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  In reviewing the prosecutor's statements, we evaluate the remarks not in isolation but in the context of the summation as a whole.  State v. Atwater, 400 N.J. Super. 319, 335 (App. Div. 2008) (citing State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 105 (1982)).  We conclude the remarks were not “so egregious that [they] deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellant’s Letter to Court re.  Defendants’ improper filings  * * Not produced in Appendix  February 13, 2023  Defendants-Respondents’ Second Reply (Letter) Brief * * Not produced in Appendix as per R. 2:6-1(a)(2)  February 15, 2023  Plaintiff-Appellant’s Reply Brief in Support of Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Counterclaim
[brief] NJ RETINA’S SECOND RULE 1:4-8 LETTER AND ADDITIONAL DEMANDS FOR DISMISSAL  Plaintiffs’ continued refusal to dismiss [...] prompted it to send a second Rule 1:4-8 correspondence to Plaintiffs’ counsel on January 8, 2021 (the “Second 1:4-8 Letter”).  (Pa465a-Pa467a).  In the Second 1:4-8 Letter, [...] demonstrated -- once again -- that Plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous.  (Ibid.).  Once again, Plaintiffs rejected [...]’s demand for dismissal.  (Pa469a).  VI.