ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Id.* at 564 (citations omitted).  By way of example – and nearly twenty years ago – “in 2005, [...] reported to the Federal Rules Advisory Committee that it was storing 500 terabytes of electronic information in the United States alone.  This amounts to 250 billion typewritten pages. ”  *Id.*  See, *e.g.*, 8 Pace & Zakaras, RAND Institute for Civil Justice, *Where the Money Goes: Understanding Litigant Expenditures for Producing Electronic Discovery*, at 17 (2012) (finding that median e-discovery cost is $1.8 million); Lawyers for Civil Justice, Civil Justice Reform Grp. & U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, *Litigation Cost Survey of Major Companies* at 3-4 (2010)\(^2\) (between 2006 and 2008, high-end discovery costs were reported to be between $2.3 million and $9.7 million); [...], *Give us a Break: The (IN)Equity of Courts Imposing Severe Sanctions for Spoliation without a Finding of Bad Faith*, 60 Drake L. Rev. 887, 925 (2012) (“In many instances, the cost of litigation may be so high that companies are unwilling to try the case on the merits.
[directive] no página 1 de 2 Formulário revisado promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11080-Portuguese Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11080-Portuguese page 1 of 2  4.  Você entende que se for sentenciado à reclusão no Centro de Diagnóstico e Tratamento para Adultos:
[brief] Plaintiff/Appellant has argued that the plain reading of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 requires that personal injury protection benefits be provided to any named insured while occupying their automobile without any consideration to the particular facts of the incident.  This interpretation is clearly contrary to the Administrative Code provisions and the wealth of case law outlined herein as well as by Plaintiff Appellant.  As noted in Edwin Silva v. [...], [...] (decided April 24, 2023) (Pa 083) as cited to by Plaintiff/Appellant, the plaintiff bears the burden to “establish a substantial nexus between the insured vehicle and the injury sustained. ”  Torres v. Travelers Indem. Co., 171 N.J. 147, 149 (2002).  Id. at Page 2.  The Trial Court utilized the correct legal standard and came to a determination based upon the facts as they exist in this matter.  As evidenced by the cases cited by both parties, there are cases where the analysis leads to the conclusion that injuries in a stopped vehicle are covered and there are injuries that are not.  The analysis is very fact specific as to the type of injury and whether such injury has a substantial nexus to vehicle.  Plaintiff/Appellant’s dissatisfaction with the outcome does not invalidate the analysis or ultimate result.  Plaintiff/Appellant also tries to distinguish the finding in *Foss v. Cignarella*, supra., by arguing that the act that caused the injury in that matter was an intentional act.  However, in the numerous cases on both sides of the argument, the intentional or negligent nature of the cause of the injury did not control the outcome.  Rather, the analysis revolves around whether the injury was a natural consequence of the use of the automobile and was an injury that was in the contemplation of the parties at the time of the insurance contract.  A spilled beverage due to the negligence of a restaurant employee was not the type of risk that was foreseeable and taken into consideration when the policy contract was created.  Following with N.J.A.C. 11:3-4.3, the policy language and the line of cases outlined herein, Defendant/Respondent submits that it properly denied Plaintiff/Appellant’s claims for personal injury protection medical expense benefits coverage.  Defendant/Respondent maintains that the decision of the trial court should be affirmed, and that Plaintiff/Appellant’s request should be denied in its entirety.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING SUPPRESSION, BECAUSE POLICE DID NOT HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION TO HANDBUDDLE AND FRISK DEFENDANT AFTER REMOVING HIM FROM A CAR STOPPED FOR A SEATBELT VIOLATION.  (Da 6; 1T 69-13 to 82-17)  ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.  (Da 7; 2T 14-14 to 20-7)  [...] did not have reasonable suspicion to believe [...] was armed and dangerous when he removed [...] from the Kia and subjected him to a pat-down search for weapons.  Therefore, the gun and drugs recovered from [...]’s bag must be suppressed.  U.S. Const. amends. IV and XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, par. 7.  Under both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, "searches and seizures conducted without warrants issued upon probable cause are presumptively unreasonable and therefore invalid."
[brief] Fraud on a court does not require reliance.  *Triffin*, 394 N.J. Super. 237 at 251.  Separate and distinct from court rules and statutes, courts possess an inherent power to sanction an individual who abuses the legal process by committing a fraud on the court.  *Id.* (*citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.*, 501 U.S. 32 (1991)).  A court may exercise inherent power to sanction a party when she has “acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons. ”  *Id.* (citation omitted).  The need for sanctions is heightened when the misconduct relates to the pivotal or central issue in the case. \(^8\)  Defendant has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff has acted in bad faith by lying about her convictions not only on her job application, but also in her repeated and false answers to interrogatories --- \(^8\)  See, e.g., *Perna v. Electronic Data Sys., Corp.*, 916 F. Supp. 388, 398 (D.N.J. 1995) (finding relevant “the relationship or nexus between the misconduct drawing the dismissal sanction and the matters in controversy in the case. ”); *Gaskill v. Abex Corp.*, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2694, *23 (App. Div. Dec. 11, 2012) (finding that where plaintiff’s “deceptions and lies pierce the heart of his cause of action” such “deliberate concealment and outright lies during the discovery process richly warrant imposition of the ultimate sanction of dismissal of his complaint with prejudice. ”).  since this litigation started.  Plaintiff’s deposition is replete with examples of her feigned inability to answer.  (Appx 530-32 ¶39).  Her continued lies and perjury go to the lynchpin issues in this case—Plaintiff’s ability to work in the job at issue here—and constitute a pattern of misconduct that amounts to fraud on this Court that warrants the sanction of default judgment.  It would be impossible for a trier of fact to fairly adjudicate this matter when Plaintiff repeatedly and unabashedly continues to lie. \(^9\)  Defendant respectfully requests that the Court affirm judgment in favor of Defendant in light of Plaintiff’s misconduct, lies and fraud.  \(^9\)  See Gaskill, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2694 at *23 (finding sanctions of dismissal and permitting defendants to move for counsel fees and costs appropriate where plaintiff’s “deceptions and lies have irretrievably obscured the truth in this case); Qantum Communications Corp. v. Star Broadcasting, Inc., 473 F.Supp.2d 1249, 1270-76 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (finding that sanctions of default judgment and award of reasonable attorney fees and costs were warranted for defendants’ pattern of misconduct during suit); Chemtall, Inc. v. Citi-Chem, Inc., 992 F.Supp. 1390, 1410 (S.D.Ga. 1998) (entering default judgment against defendant upon finding by clear and convincing evidence that he had engaged in abusive conduct by repeatedly lying under oath at his deposition and producing misleading documents in an effort to hinder plaintiff’s debt collection efforts, and stating that a lesser sanction would not suffice).  CONCLUSION
[brief] (Da1)³  On March 10, 2016, a Monmouth County Grand Jury issued Indictment [...] against [...], a former employee of [...], charging him with third-degree burglary contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 (Count 1) and third-degree theft contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a) (Count 2).
[brief] “[E]ach parent has a responsibility to share the costs of providing for the child while she remains unemancipated.  *Id.* at 512; see also *Lynn v. Lynn*, 165 *N.J. Super.* 328, 342-43 (App. Div. 1979), *certif. denied* 81 *N.J.* 52 (1979); *Ionno v. Ionno*, 148 *N.J. Super.* 259, 261 (App. Div. 1977).  Respectfully, the lower court abused its discretion when denying Plaintiff’s request for reimbursement of medical expenses prior to 2014.  The lower court failed to explain why it arbitrarily picked 2014 as the cut-off.  While the lower court found that the Plaintiff and Defendant’s testimonies were equally credible, the lower court only gave weight to Defendant’s testimony that he was unable to pay the children’s uncovered medical expenses due to financial difficulty without giving any weight to Plaintiff’s testimony that the resultant financial hardship from Defendant’s failures prevented Plaintiff from hiring an attorney to enforce her rights.  The Appellate Division has considered that similar delays in obtaining counsel would not be a bar to recovery.  See Mayer v. Mayer, DOCKET No. [...], at *13 (App. Div. Jan. 25, 2013)(six-year delay in obtaining counsel to assist with an audit of overpayment of child support was not a bar to recovery, with matter remanded for plenary hearing) (P-840).  POINT III:
[brief] On appeal, Plaintiffs would have the Court believe that this is an ordinary action to confirm terminal leave payments pursuant to a collectively negotiated agreement (“CNA”) between the [...] and the [...].  It is not.  The entirety of Plaintiffs’ Complaint, and proposed Amended Complaint, flows from Plaintiffs’ challenge to Defendants’ reduction of terminal leave payments to $15,000 pursuant to the Municipal Stabilization and Recovery Act (“MSRA”), N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-1 to -19.  Plaintiffs’ challenge was considered, and rejected, by the Superior Court, because this case is not about the enforcement of a CNA, but statutory interpretation.
[brief] First, he found that [...]’ position as a carpenter “required bending, kneeling and climbing while installing . . . building materials,” as well as the “lift[ing] and carr[ying] [of] heavy materials. ”  (Pa20)  Second, there was no dispute that [...] presented a doctor’s note on December 29, 2019 stating that she could not engage in certain tasks for six months upon her return to work in January, including bending, kneeling, squatting, heavy lifting, and climbing.  (Pa21)  Third, there was no dispute that [...] would not have been able to perform the essential duties of her position as a carpenter if limited to the restrictions listed in the first doctor’s note.  (Pa30)  [...] also referred to [...]’s testimony regarding [...]’ recovery time.  In particular, he noted [...]’s testimony that [...]’ recovery from ACL reconstruction surgery would require at least six months of limited activity, and probably longer in [...]’ case because the type of surgery he performed on her typically causes “stiffness and function of the joint” during the healing process.  (Pa32-33)  [...] also testified that he recommends restrictions on squatting, kneeling, and other similar activities for patients who have undergone similar ACL surgeries.  (Id.)  He confirmed that he was “concerned” whether [...] could perform carpentry work during her recovery period, and agreed with the assessment contained in the first doctor’s note that [...] should be limited to light duty with clear restrictions for a period of six months.  (Id.)  [...] also clarified that [...] had been seen at his office by Physician Assistant [...] in December 2019, that the first doctor’s note was produced after that visit, and that [...] was scheduled to return for a follow-up visit on February 12, 2020.  (Pa33)  [...] summarized [...]’s testimony without discrediting any of it.
[brief] Consequently, defendant’s convictions should be reversed, and the matter remanded for retrial.  N.J.R.E. 701 provides:  “If a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the form of opinions or inferences may be admitted if it (a) is rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) will assist in understanding the witness’ testimony or in determining a fact in issue. ”  That rule has been clearly interpreted in State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 457-458 (2011), to only allow a “narrow” category of lay opinion: that which will "assist the trier of fact by helping to explain the witness's testimony or by shedding light on the determination of the disputed factual issue"; moreover, such lay opinion is specifically "limit[ed] to the perceptions of the testifying witness."  Id. McLean held that it went beyond that narrow area of permissible lay opinion for an officer to testify that he believed he had witnessed a drug deal.  Id. at 461.  The Court held that the construction of the "perception" requirement is strict: lay opinion is admissible only if it is "firmly rooted in the personal observations and perceptions of the lay witness in the traditional meaning of the [sic] N.J.R.E. 701," id. at 459.  Citing State v. Labrutto, 114 N.J. 187, 199-200 (1989), the McLean Court defined the "perception" requirement as "rest[ing] on the acquisition of knowledge through use of one's sense of touch, taste, sight, smell, or hearing."
[directive] - ABA Number of Bank Receiving Funds  a. 021030004 - Name of Bank b.  BANK FEDERAL RESERVE  NEW YORK - Bank Address C. [...] of Amount Transfer d. $000,000.00 - - Title of Account Receiving Funds  e. [...] - f. Account Number [...]  Special Instructions/Remarks: Include Seizure g.  [See References in Number, Agency Class Code above.]  .D.  If not seizure, provide other a 1 identifying information the agency feels is pertinent.  h.  Account Number from which funds are being drawn on (If Applicable) - i.  Account Name  If (Your Agency Account Name) Applicable - --.  :- .?  12  Name, Address, Telephone Number of Sender j . k.  A copy of the Wire Transfer Form shall be FAXED the [...], with to the Deposit Information Form, Attachment A.
[brief] The scope of the railroad's duty is limited to hazards it can foresee.  Gallose v. Long Island R.R. Co., 878 F.2d 80, 85 (2nd Cir. 1989).  “In FELA cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to produce evidence of employer negligence. ”  Stevens, 356 N.J. Super. at 318 (citing Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 (1957).  In short, plaintiff must come forward with evidence to establish the existence of an element essential to his case.  In so doing, he must establish negligence under the FELA.  His task is relatively simple: to show that defendant's negligence played any part, even the slightest [,] in producing the injury for which damages are sought.
[brief] ”  The Motion for Summary Judgment should not have been granted (1T; ___).  The Court below asked the right question (1T; 24:8):  The threshold argument, what the Court -- in the Plaintiff’s opposition, is whether or not the law of the case, namely [...]’s prior decision in this matter is -- is binding upon the Court and thus, justifying a denial of the Motion for Summary Judgment.  Unfortunately, the Court gave the wrong answer to its own question because it also states:
[brief] As set forth above and in the original appellant’s brief, the duty of care upon commercial landowners is set forth by extensive common law and Model Civil Jury Charge 5.20B(2)(b) only.  As such, the snow contracts have no bearing or relevance to same.  Likewise, any contractual obligations imposed on [...] is entirely separate from and irrelevant to the snow contractor’s common law duty to perform snow removal in a careful and prudent manner.  Aronsohn v. Mandara, 98 N.J. 92, 105-106 (1984).  If the court was guided by these overarching common law duties, then the contractual details are irrelevant.  Even assuming that the defendants disagreed about their work and/or expectations of their work, this difference of expectations has no bearing upon these ultimate issues.
[brief] An applicant would still need to deal with all the necessary proofs and submissions for a use variance application, and then all the necessary proofs and submissions --- \(^4\)  A use variance was previously granted on February 21, 2021.  The subdivision, subject of this appeal, was granted on November 1, 2022.  The site plan application, currently under appeal in the Law Division, was granted on March 23, 2023. for the site plan application.  This isn’t just a situation where they dedicated one meeting to subdivision issues only and other meetings for the site plan issues, with one comprehensive resolution; these applications are being dealt with separately, in other words were bifurcated.
[brief] Pensions for public employees serve a public purpose.  A primary objective in establishing them is to induce able persons to enter and remain in public employment, and to render faithful and efficient service while so employed.  3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. Rev. 1963) § 12.141.  They are in the nature of compensation for services previously rendered and act as an inducement to continued and faithful service.  Being remedial in character, statutes creating pensions should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby.  McQuillin, supra, at § 12.143; and see Adams v. City of Modesto, 53 Cal. 2d 833, 3 Cal. Rptr. 561, 566, 350 P.2d 529 (1960); Giuliano v. Bd. of Trustees of Fireman's Pension F., 89 Ill. App. 2d 126, 231 N.E.2d 257, 258 (1967); Flake v. Bennett, 156 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1968).  Geller v. Department of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, 597-598.  In Geller v. Department of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, the Court evaluated a “preponderance of the equities” and “all of the circumstances” to achieve a “just result. ”  Id. at 600.  This Court is not bound by an agency's determination of a purely legal issue.  Francois v. Board of Trustees, 415 N.J.  Super. 335, 348 citing Utley v. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Labor, 194 N.J. 534, 551 (2008); see Krayniak v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 412 N.J. Super. 232, 237 (App. Div. 2010).  As a form of legislation aimed at remedying a social problem, pension statutes "should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited."
[brief] (Pa0249, Art. 3.1; 4T240:23 to 241:14.)  Under the PSA, the parties were to close on the sale and purchase of the Property two hundred forty (240) days after execution of the PSA (the “Closing Date”).  (Pa0246; Pa0248, Art.  1.26; Pa0250, Art. 4.1; Pa0253, Art. 6.1.)  The PSA required Defendants to undertake several environmental compliance-related obligations as conditions precedent to closing.
[brief] ADMINISTRATIVE CODES  N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.10(b) .................................................................................. 14 N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b)  .................................................................................. 15  TABLE OF CITATIONS  1T – Miranda hearing transcript dated August 18, 2017 2T – transcript dated August 25, 2017 3T – Miranda hearing transcript dated September 20, 2017
[directive] Post-Charge Diversion  A.  In an effort to revisit opportunities for Prosecutorial discretion to consent to diversion. diversion, an Assistant Prosecutor can recommend post-charge diversion of a juvenile complaint, inclusive of diverting the complaint to a stationhouse adjustment or referring the case to the Intake Service Conference, the Juvenile Conference Committee, or the Family Crisis Intervention Unit.  Diversion should be a strong consideration in cases not warranting formal adjudication based upon the principles discussed in this Directive.  In determining whether to refer a case to the Intake Service Conference, the Juvenile Conference Committee, or the Family Crisis Intervention Unit during the post-charge screening process, the Assistant Prosecutor should consider the factors that the court will use to determine whether diversion is appropriate under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-71(b):  1.  The seriousness of the alleged offense or conduct and the circumstances in which it occurred; 2.  The age and maturity of the juvenile; 3.  The risk that the juvenile presents as a substantial danger to others; 4.  The family circumstances, including any history of drugs, alcohol abuse or child abuse on the part of the juvenile, his parents or guardian; 5.  The nature and number of contacts with court intake services and the court that the juvenile or his family have had; 6.  The outcome of those contacts, including the services to which the juvenile or family have been referred and the results of those referrals; 7.  The availability of appropriate services outside referral to the court; 8.  Any recommendations expressed by the victim or complainant, or arresting officer, as to how the case should be resolved; 9.  Any recommendation expressed by the county prosecutor; 10.
[brief] (Sb27; 31-32).  But the State ignores that the expert in Burney also estimated the coverage area of a cell tower based on a “rule of thumb” and his “training and experience. ”  State v. Burney, 255 N.J. 1, 24-25 (2023); see also id. at 12 (the expert testified, “So just based on my training and experience, one mile is a good estimate of the tower range for Sprint in this area. ”).  Our Supreme Court agreed with the Northern District of Illinois that an “expert’s estimates of the ranges of different cell towers were unreliable because they were based solely on the expert’s training and experience. ”  Id. at 24 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Evans, 892 F. Supp. 2d 949, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2012)).  This is because “[e]stimating the coverage area of radio frequency waves [of a cell tower] requires more than just training and experience, . . . it requires scientific calculations that take into account factors that can affect coverage. ”  Ibid. (alterations in original) (quoting Evans, 893 F. Supp 2d at 956).  Accordingly, [...]’s net opinion on the range of the cell towers in Trenton and Willingboro suffered from the same fatal flaw as in Burney.
[brief] The results of the Alcotest performed was a 0.10% BAC and was within tolerance, and was therefore evidence that a per se case was established.  (3T14:13-15; 3T14:20 to 3T15:5; Aa48; Aa76-Aa78).  Further, there are other safeguards in place to ensure Alcotest results are accurate.  First, the Alcotest instrument has a slope detector, which detects alcohol in the mouth, if any.  If the slope detector detects mouth alcohol, it tells the instrument to abort the test.  As stated in Chun, 194 N.J. at 77, if there is mouth alcohol detected, it would cause an interference or create a “spike” in the readings on the Alcotest.  In this case, two valid breath samples were given and both were accepted by the instrument and were within acceptable tolerance.
[brief] The “judge’s function is not himself [or herself] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. ”  *Liberty Lobby*, supra, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S. Ct. at 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 212.  Credibility determinations will continue to be made by a jury and not the judge.  If there exists a single, unavoidable resolution of the alleged disputed issue of fact, that issue should be considered insufficient to constitute a “genuine” issue of material fact for purposes of Rule 4:46-2.  *Liberty Lobby*, supra, 477 U.S. at 250, 105 S. Ct. at 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 213.  The import of our holding is that when the evidence “is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,” *Liberty Lobby*, supra, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S. Ct. at 2512, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 214, the trial court should not hesitate to grant summary judgment.
[brief] (1T36:22-25).  The court then concluded, “it is clear in this case that [...] is the responsible party in this matter and is the cause of the spill and any further discovery would not change the fact that [...] is a responsible party and is responsible.  So, accordingly, the motion for [summary judgment] on reconsideration is granted on the merits against [...] because [...] is the responsible party. ” (1T39:11-16).  The trial court made a clear certification of finality.