ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ## A. CASELAW | AUTHORITY | PAGE | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | State v. Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129 (2009) | 2 | | State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009) | 1 | | State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393 (2015) | 1 |  I.  Appellant Objects To The Hearsay Documents Attached By Respondents In Their Appendix As They Have No Relevance To Whether Appellant’s Plea Was Adequate, Which Includes Whether Appellant Had A Complete Understanding Of The Penal Consequences Of His Plea.  The driver abstract and all the arrest/investigation reports in respondent’s appendix, and referenced in their opposition, are hearsay documents that have no relevance whatsoever to whether [...]’s plea was entered into knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, which includes whether [...] had a complete understanding of the penal consequences of his plea.  Therefore, [...] objects to their submission on appeal, and kindly requests that they be disregarded by the panel.  II.  Respondent’s Reliance On State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009) Is Misplaced/Erroneous Since A Slater Analysis Is Not Reached Where The Factual Basis For The Plea Is Inadequate, Which Includes Whether A Defendant Had A Complete Understanding Of The Penal Consequences Of His Plea.  In opposing [...]’s appeal, respondents erroneously rely upon State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009).  Their reliance upon Slater is misplaced and their claim that Slater’s requirement that a colorable claim of innocence be made does not figure in to the calculus here.  A Slater analysis is not reached where the factual basis for the plea is inadequate.  See State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 404-05 (2015).  Ensuring whether a plea is adequate requires that a defendant had a complete understanding of the penal consequences, if not, the Court must allow the plea to be vacated and the matter reinstated.
[brief] Additionally, there are no provisions under the PWCRA and its related regulations that apply specifically to archaeologists, or that require archaeologists to receive an “RA” distinction.  If anything, the Bid Documents’ use of “Registered Archaeologist (RA)” appears to be intended to refer to an archaeologist that has registered with the [...], a professional organization with a website at: rpanet.org.  See 0015a-0017a.  The [...] allows for registrants to become credentialed either as a “Registered Archaeologist (RA)” or a “Registered Professional Archaeologist (RPA). ”  See rpanet.org/faq.  Unlike the PWCRA, which establishes no standards applicable to archaeologists, the RA/RPA distinction bestowed by the [...] requires that an individual possess certain qualifications and experience.  Id.; see also 0017a (“[...] selected an archaeologist that was registered with the National [...], which in fact has higher standards for awarding credentials than the PWCRA”).  Some jurisdictions and entities require individuals to be certified as an RA/RPA (or to meet those standards) in order to be employed as an archaeologist.  See rpanet.org/where-is-registration-required.  In support of this point, we respectfully note that all of the archaeologists or archaeology firms listed by the five bidders for this Contract are registered with this organization.  See 0276a ¶2.  Also, of the five bidders who participated in this bid, four of them (excluding [...]), named a proposed archaeology subcontractor that was not registered under the PWCRA.  See 0276a ¶2.  Those proposed archaeologists were [...], [...]  (named by two bidders including [...]), and [...].  See 0276a ¶2a.  C.  THE EXTRA COST OF RETAINING AN ARCHAEOLOGIST FROM A PWCRA-REGISTERED CONSTRUCTION ENTITY VERSUS AN ARCHAEOLOGIST WITHOUT THIS REGISTRATION IS INCONSEQUENTIAL TO THE RESULTS (0017a).
[brief] \textit{Jewish Ctr. Of Sussex County v. Whale}, 86 N.J. 619, 624 (1981); \textit{RNC Systems, Inc. v. Modern Technology Group, Inc.}, 861 F. \(^8\)  Paragraph 31 of the Complaint in this action alleges that [...]’s “actions were intentionally deceitful, and its statement that \textit{induced} plaintiff to purchase the Solar Rights in perpetuity were false…”  Paragraph 32 alleges that [...] used false representations to \textit{induce} plaintiff’s reliance and payment …” to purchase the Solar Rights in perpetuity (emphasis added).  [Pa10].  Supp. 2d 436, 451 (D.N.J. 2012).  Evidence that is clear and convincing is “evidence which is ‘so clear, direct, and weighty and convincing as to enable [the fact finder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
[directive] In September 1967, the Court issued a landmark decision, ruling unanimously that [...] could not invoke Rule 5 to shut down bars simply because their clientele was gay.  In an opinion that was significant for its era—though still painful to read today—the Page 2 Court concluded that “though in our culture homosexuals are indeed unfortunates, their status does not make them criminals or outlaws. ”  [...] v. Div’n of Control, 50 N.J. 329, 339 (1967).  “So long as their public behavior violates Alcoholic Beverage no legal proscriptions,” the Court continued, “they have the undoubted right to congregate in public. ”  * * *  Gay bars have long played an important role for LGBTQ+ individuals.  At a time when homophobia and transphobia were deeply rooted in mainstream American culture, these establishments provided community for people who had nowhere else to gather.  The opportunity they provided for sexual minorities to see that they were not alone—and to discuss shared experiences of discrimination—meant gay bars were crucial to the birth of the modern gay rights movement.  But the same things that made these bars essential to the LGBTQ+ community made them targets for the forces of intolerance.  For decades, government agencies across the country used their powers to close bars and harass their patrons.  And, as we now acknowledge, that effort included the [...], of which the [...] ([...]) has been a part since 1948.
[brief] THE MOTION COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED | | | PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE IMPLIED | | | COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING | 23 | | A.  Once Plaintiff Elected to Abandon the Transaction, It | | | Released [...] from Any Implied Duties | 23 | | B.  [...]’s Allegedly Deceptive Conduct is Not | | | Actionable under New Jersey Law | 26 | | IV.  THE MOTION COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED | | | PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE | 27 | | V.
[brief] Like an award of counsel fees, the trial court must “make appropriate findings of fact” within the appropriate “analytical framework” to avoid abusing its discretion.  *Yueh v. Yueh*, 329 N.J. Super. 447, 466 (App. Div. 2000).  Instead, the court below imposed two separate rates of interest greater than is provided by *Rule 4:42-11* without appropriate justification, and calculated the amount --- \(^8\)
[brief] A.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE CELL PHONE  Provided there was probable cause to search the cell phone and that an exception to the warrant requirement existed, the seizure was lawful.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).  Probable cause exists if at the time of the police action there is a well-grounded suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed.  State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 210-11 (2001).  It reflects a determination that, in view of all the circumstances, “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. ”  State v. Demeter, 124 N.J. 374, 380–81 (1991).  The request for consent for Defendant’s cell phone occurred following the defendant’s interview with law enforcement on February 14, 2014.  At that interview, law enforcement officers were equipped with the knowledge that 1) the defendant spent the night of February 12 and the early morning of February 13 with the victim (1T 33:5-12), 2) that the victim’s last acts were to engage in illegal and sexual activity with the defendant (Ibid.), and 3) that the defendant photographed the victim nude and sent the photos to other individuals (34:21-41:22); Da10.  Additionally, the defendant had been well-established to have been the last known person to see the victim before her death.  The defendant further had indicated that he’d attempted to contact the victim using the cell phone several times on February 14 (and thus the phone would contain evidence of these contact attempts).  1T 48:1-49:10; Da11.  The fact that one may speculate that the defendant’s conduct may have had some type of innocent explanation is not fatal to the finding of probable cause.  Cf. State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 11 (1997).  The State contends that, certainly, there was a well-grounded suspicion that a crime had been committed, and that there also was a fair probability that evidence would be found on the phone.  The phone was admitted by the defendant to contain evidence of contact attempts made upon the victim on the day of her death, at the very least.  B.
[brief] ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Atl. City Superior Officers’ Ass’n v. City of Atl. City, | | | No. A-3117-20, 2022 WL 2352376 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 30, 2022) | passim | | Bader Field Sports, LLC v. State, | 48 | | ATL-L-1427-17 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Aug. 28, 2018) | | | Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, | 24 | | 184 N.J. 161 (2005) | | | Barila v. Bd. of Educ., | 18, 32, 33, 37 | | 241 N.J. 595 (2020) | | | Barone v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., | 41 | | 107 N.J. 355 (1997) | | | Bergen County v. Port of New York Authority, | 10 | | 32 N.J. 303 (1960) | | | Bridgewater-Raritan Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ., | 27 | | 221 N.J. 349 (2015) | | | Burbridge v. Mine Hill Twp., | 47 | | 117 N.J. 376 (1990) | | | Camden Cnty. Energy Recovery Assocs. v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t. Prot., | 24 | | 320 N.J. Super. 59 (App. Div. 1999), aff’d, 170 N.J. 246 (2001) | | | Caponegro v. State Operated Sch. Dist., | 34, 35, 36 | | 330 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div. 2000) | | | Cell S. of N.J. v. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment, | 47, 48 | | 172 N.J. 75 (2002) | | | Cnty. of Warren v. State, | 43 | | 409 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 2009), certif. denied, 201 N.J. 153, cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1026 (2010) | | | D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co., | 27 | | 192 N.J. 110 (2007) | | | Authority | Page | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | DiProspero v. Penrt, | 21 | | 183 N.J. 477 (2005) | | | Doe v. Poritz, | 42 | | 142 N.J. 1 (1995) | | | Donato v. Moldow, | 24 | | 374 N.J. Super. 475 (App. Div. 2005) | | | Edwards v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co., | 23 | | 357 N.J. Super. 196 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 278 (2013) | | | Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salem v. N.J. Prop.-Liab. Ins. Guar. Ass’n | 39 | | 215 N.
[brief] The standard of review for grant or denial of a stay issued by a trial court is abuse of discretion.  See Horizon Health Ctr. V. Felicissimo, 135 N.J. 126, 137 (1994); Rinaldo v. RLR Inv., LLC, 387 N.J. Super 387, 395 (App. Div. 2006); Nat’l Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., 219 N.J. Super. 158, 162 (App. Div. 1987).  “New Jersey has long recognized, in a wide variety of contexts, the power of the judiciary to ‘prevent some threatening, irreparable mischief, which should be averted until opportunity is afforded for a full and deliberate investigation of the case. ’”  Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126, 132 (1982).  “Indeed, the point of temporary relief is to maintain the parties in substantially the same condition ‘when the final decree is entered as they were when the litigation _____________________ 2023, [...] filed a Motion to Intervene in the [...] builder’s remedy case (“Adoni Matter”), Docket No.: [...].
[directive] Personnel records are separate and distinct from internal affairs investigation records, and internal affairs investigative reports shall never be placed in personnel records, nor shall personnel records be co-mingled with internal affairs files.  When a complaint has a disposition of exonerated, not sustained or unfounded, there shall be no indication in the employee's personnel file that a complaint was ever made.  See N.J.S.A. 43:1-3 (“honorable service” and the evaluation by the relevant board for same); 43:1-4 14 (notification to Division of Criminal Justice, and Pensions and Benefits, about prosecutions or convictions of members); 43:1-5 (employer must notify the board of disciplinary action taken against a member).  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 67  9.12.2  Where a complaint is sustained and discipline imposed, the only items to be placed into the employee's personnel file are a copy of the administrative charging form and a copy of the disposition form.  See Appendix M for a sample form (Note: Civil Service jurisdictions must use forms authorized by the Civil Service Commission).  No part of the internal affairs investigative report shall be placed in the personnel file.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 68  10
[brief] N.J.S.A.  2C:44-1(a)(3), (6), (9).  (13T 19-14 to 21)  The court also found mitigating factors 7, that [...] has no prior history of criminal activity, and 14, [...]’s young age.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7), (14).  (13T 19-22 to 25, 20-10 to 11)  The court failed to provide any explanation for its finding of aggravating factors 3 and 9, and further made inconsistent findings with respect to aggravating factors 3 and 6 and mitigating factor 7.  These errors, as well as the length of the sentence for a first-time offender, render [...]’s sentence excessive and require a remand for resentencing.
[brief] [...] sounded the horn and bell and applied the train’s full-service brake and track brake less than 1 second after [...] stepped from the sidewalk onto the crossing.  Compare Pa165, ¶79 with Pa765, ¶79; Pa327 at Table 1, Pa351 at Table 2; Pa579:1-12; Pa1152 at 16:33:30 to 16:33:35.
[brief] THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF RETALIATION AGAINST DEFENDANT [...] AND DISMISSED COUNT ONE OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT (8a).  Under the NJLAD, it is unlawful retaliation to engage in any of three prohibited behaviors:  For any person to take reprisals against any person because that person has [(1)] opposed any practices or acts forbidden under this act or [(2)] because that person has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this act or [(3)] to coerce, intimidate, threaten or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of that person having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this act.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ iii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS .................................................. vii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................................................  5  The Preliminary Investigation Report ....................................................................................  6  The Joint Land Use Board Hearing .......................................................................................  7  The Governing Body Meeting ...............................................................................................  12  LEGAL ARGUMENTS ...........................................................................................................
[brief] Thereafter, during the underlying action, [...] testified that he took the position that [...] had a “reasonable time” after September 30, 2016 to terminate the Lease on ten days’ notice, as the September 30, 2016 date was not a “drop dead” date but a triggering date for the right to terminate the Lease.  Even if that was a proper legal position to take, by not advising his clients of the risks of waiting until the end of October to terminate the Lease on his theory of contract interpretation instead of immediately serving notice before September 30, 2016, [...] deviated from accepted standards of care by failing to explain the various risks that [...] would be taking given the choice of dates to terminate the Lease.
[brief] There is no authority from the Supreme Court or this Court interpreting what R. 4:69-4 requires and the land use bar needs guidance.  But see Saia v. Bellizio, 53 N.J. 24 (1968)(describing obligations of a defendant regarding identification of factual and legal issues in a pretrial order applicable to standard civil litigation, or highlighting that the defendant may assert no factual or legal issues, but that to do so, “he must so state in the order”).  Plaintiff is aware of an unpublished opinion of the Law Division, *[...] v. [...] and [...]*, slip op., [...] (Law Div. April 29, 2009)⁴, where the Hon. [...], A.J.S.C., held that a party’s failure to preserve an issue in the R. 4:69-4 statement of factual and legal contentions submitted prior to the case management conference barred the argument at trial.  *Id.* at * 71-74.  [Pa151-154].  Likening the efforts to raise the issue at trial to “kick[ing] sand in the face of the rules.  . .”  Judge Lawson recognized that “all issues must be presented at the pretrial conference to encourage an efficient and open process” and to avoid “unfairly blindside[ing] the opposing parties with new issues which could have been properly resolved at the pretrial conference. ”  *Id.* at *72 [Pa152].  [...]’ gripes about how the trial proceedings unfolded below are precisely because it failed to follow R. 4:69-4 and specifically identify the legal basis for its affirmative defense as the Rules of Court require.  Given the paucity of direction, the Court should use this opportunity to fashion guidance, much like that in *[...] v. [...] and [...]*, slip op., [...] (Law Div. April 29, --- ⁴  The undersigned is unaware of any contrary unpublished decisions.  While there is obvious hesitancy to cite an unpublished decision of the Law Division, the lack of authority from this Court on this issue highlights the need for same.  *See also, Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules*, Comment 5.1 to R. 4:69-4 at p. 1643 (GANN 2024 Ed.), with no commentary on this requirement. 2009), and hold that [...]’ failure to file a Statement of Factual and Legal Contentions constitutes a waiver/abandonment of its standing defense.  III.
[brief] [...] has not had an opportunity to have its environmental claims as property owner litigated or decided and must be afforded the same opportunity to bring its claims as any other future owner of the subject property would be given.  Liability for the cost associated with the environmental remediation of the Property will continue to pass to successor owners until the issue is resolved.  2.  The trial court committed legal error by refusing to allow amendment of the complaint, as [...] has never participated in any of the prior suits between the parties and constitutes a distinct legal entity that should not be disregarded.  (October 16, 2023 Order, located at 2a and 24a-27a).  The trial court committed legal error by dismissing the complaint, rather than liberally permitting amendment, as permitted by the court rules.  The subject Complaint met the appropriate standard and should stand.
[brief] N.J. Ass’n of Sch. Adm’rs v. Schundler, 211 N.J. 535, 555 (2012) (second alteration in original) (quoting State ex rel. J.S., 202 N.J. 465, 480 (2010)).  The court can easily harmonize the statutory schemes by holding that AICRA arbitration applies to disputes about whether insurers are required to pay PIP benefits, not whether medical providers committed fraud in convincing an insurer to pay out under a no-fault policy.
[brief] (2T142-17 to 143-8).  [...] began seeing [...] in July, 2016, approximately 18 months after [...] had performed a lumbar decompression surgery on her.  At the time, she was experiencing some back and leg pain which he explained generally came from the nerves that go into the legs.  (2T143-13 to 146-23).  He prescribed physical therapy and steroid injections, neither of which was helping her.  When her pain and discomfort worsened, [...] suggested a stabilization surgery procedure which was scheduled for April, 2017.  Shortly before the scheduled surgery, her symptoms had improved so significantly that the surgery was cancelled and no further treatment was needed.
[brief] ”  Ibid.  The Commission also found that [...]’s “blatant use of Board resources” by “contact[ing] the Board attorney immediately after failing to be reelected” in order to request information about the conduct of [...], a fellow Board member who actively campaigned against him during the election and with whom he shared a significant history of mutual disdain, “demonstrates the bad faith behind [his] request. ”  Ibid.  Accordingly, the Commission concluded that given [...]’s “personal dislike for [[...]], the timing of his request immediately following the election, and that he did it without waiting to discuss it with the Superintendent, Board Secretary and/or the whole Board,” his violation of the Act and Code “is severe and warrants a censure instead of a reprimand.
[brief] After considerable discovery including the deposition of Plaintiff [...], on March 24, 2023, Plaintiff/Appellant filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgement asking the court to find as a matter of law that Plaintiff/Appellant was entitled to PIP benefits for the injuries she sustained in the June 26, 2020, incident.  (Pa. 033)  Defendant/Respondent [...] filed a Notice of Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff/Appellant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on May 2, 2023.  Defendant/Respondent requested that the trial court deny Plaintiff’s Motion and enter Summary Judgment in favor of [...] finding that Plaintiff is not entitled to any personal injury protection benefits for the injuries arising out of the June 26, 2020, incident.  Defendant/Respondent argued that in order to be entitled to PIP coverage for an injury sustained while occupying an automobile, “[t]he injury must be a natural or reasonable incident of consequence of the use of the automobile.  Kordell v.  Allstate Ins. Co., 230 N.J. Super. 505, 509 (App. Div.), certify. Den. 117 N.J. 43 (1989).  Defendant/Respondent argued that Plaintiff/Appellant’s injuries did not arise as a consequence of the automobile and that the automobile which Plaintiff/Appellant was occupying at the time of that the beverages spilled was merely incidental to the injury and does not constitute any legal cause.  (Pa. 099-106).  By Orders dated November 9, 2023, the Hon. [...], J.S.C., denied both Plaintiff/Appellant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment) and Defendant/Respondent’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Pa. 097-098 and Pa. 159-160).  At the hearing, the Hon. [...] noted that she was denying both motions since she found there to be a question of fact as to whether or not the injuries sustained by Plaintiff/Appellant in the June 26, 2020, loss were or were not incidental to the occupancy of the vehicle.  (Transcript from November 9, 2023, Oral Argument on Plaintiff/Appellant’s Motion for Plaintiff/Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration on November 15, 2023, asking the Trial Court to Reconsider the denial of Plaintiff/Appellant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and again asking that an Order be entered declaring that Plaintiff/Appellant was eligible for personal injury protection benefits.
[brief] Second, while the State acknowledges that an individual may use force to protect himself in response to a police officer’s use of excessive force, it contends that [...] “lost any privilege of self-defense” because he “should have understood that if he ceased resisting, the officers’ use of force would terminate. ” (Sb 18-19) (citing Mulvihill, 57 N.J. at 157).  However, Mulvihill does not support the State’s position.