ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On April 7, 2022, [...] issued an Order denying the Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the Plaintiff’s Public Trust Doctrine claims and granting the Borough’s cross-motion for summary judgment along with a statement of the reasons for his decision (Pa1718; Pa1720).  In making this determination, the Trial Court recognized that the cited regulations delegate authority to the NJDEP to determine compliance with the Public Trust Doctrine when a development application is filed, but noted that:  . . .  [...]’s contention here is premature.  The Ordinance and Plan adopted by [...] do not seek DEP approval of anything.  Although a development project may be contemplated, same is theoretical.  Nothing has been proposed to DEP and, as such, any challenge to the theoretical, future, contemplated development project cannot yet be analyzed under the Public Trust Doctrine as codified in statute and further promulgated in DEP’s regulations.  The Trial Court went on to find that the questions of whether a particular project violates the Public Trust Doctrine: . . . must be analyzed vis-à-vis the regulatory rubric adopted by DEP – on a case-by-case basis when a development application seeking DEP approval is pending.  That question – based on a tangible application requesting DEP action will then proceed through the well-worn, traditional regulatory process to the Office of Administrative Law, Commissioner, and Appellate Division – not via a prerogative writ application to the Superior Court, Law Division on a municipal ordinance altering zoning that could lead to such a future development project.  Thus, because [...]’s theoretical concern is not yet ripe, Count Four of [...]’s challenge to the Ordinance and Plan as being invalid vis-à-vis the Public Trust Doctrine must be rejected as a matter of law.  For all of the reasons set forth in Point I herein, the Trial Court’s ruling on these summary judgment motions was correct.  The Order granting summary judgment to the Borough and dismissing the Plaintiff’s Public Trust Doctrine claims should be affirmed on appeal.
[brief] On August 13, 2021, Appellants appealed the HAD but did not identify [...] as a party.  Accordingly, on August 30, 2021, [...] moved to intervene of right, which Appellants opposed while [...] did not.  On September 28, 2021, the court denied [...]’s intervention.  On October 4, 2021, [...] moved for reconsideration or, in the alternative, permissive intervention.  Again, Appellants opposed.  On October 25, 2021, the court denied both motions.  [...] moved for leave to appeal the orders to the Supreme Court, which was granted and heard on March 29, 2022.  On April 11, 2022, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Appellate Division, ordering Appellants to add [...] as an “interested party. ”  On June 16, 2022, [...] filed the Statement of Items Comprising the Record on Appeal.  On August 31, 2022, Appellants filed their brief and appendix.  Motion practice followed concerning Respondents’ brief deadlines, as Appellants declined to consent to any extensions and instead filed a motion to accelerate the appeal.  The court granted both the extension and acceleration motions.  ARGUMENT
[brief] Appellant’s CFLA Defenses Lack Merit  Regardless, Appellant’s CFLA claims lack merit.  Appellant argues that the Debt is void because Respondent purportedly committed a fourth-degree crime under N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  But this argument is a red-herring because this Court has already held that no private right of action exists under the CFLA.  In Francavilla v. Absolute Resols. VI LLC, this Court held that (1) there is no private right of action under the CFLA and (2) only the Commissioner of the Department of Banking and Insurance has the exclusive authority to enforce the statute.
[brief] ”  Kachmar, 109 F.3d at 177.  Plaintiff can demonstrate pretext when circumstantial evidence of retaliation demonstrates such “weaknesses, implausibilities, or contradictions in [Defendants’] proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable fact-finder could rationally find them unworthy of credence. ”  DeWees, 380 N.J. Super. at 528.  Furthermore, Plaintiff’s protected activity does not even have to be the only reason for her termination or adverse employment action, but rather only part of the reason.
[brief] The next day, the jury heard testimony from experts on behalf of both parties.  [...]’s ultimate conclusion was that, as a direct result of the December 1, 2018 collision, Plaintiff sustained: cervical disk herniations at C5-6 and C6-7; lumbar bulges at L4-5 and L5-S1; and a cervical radiculopathy (4T, at 12:8-13:11).  [...] concluded that the cervical injuries were permanent, and that all of Plaintiff’s injuries would get worse over time (4T, at 12:8-13:11; 13:17-14:8).  [...] also corroborated the extent to which these injuries will affect Plaintiff’s quality of life (4T, at 13:17-14:8).  Defense  \(^3\)  At one point, Defense counsel’s questioning became so argumentative that Plaintiff’s counsel objected, which was sustained by [...] (3T114:25-117:8).  expert, [...], disagreed with this conclusion, and testified that he believed Plaintiff did not sustain any permanent injury in the subject collision (4T, at 92:12-23).  With cases in chief completed, the trial moved to its charge conference.
[directive] Table of Contents  I.  INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................  1  II.  APPLICABILITY .....................................................................................................................  2  III.  NOTIFICATION OF DRUG TESTING PROCEDURES ...............................................................  6  IV.  SPECIMEN ACQUISITION PROCEDURES ..............................................................................  6  V. SUBMISSION OF SPECIMENS FOR ANALYSIS.....................................................................  11  VI.  ANALYSIS OF SPECIMENS ..................................................................................................  12  VII.  DRUG TEST RESULTS .........................................................................................................  13  VIII.  CONSEQUENCES OF A POSITIVE TEST RESULT ..................................................................  13  IX.  CONSEQUENCES OF A REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO A DRUG TEST ........................................  14  X.  RESIGNATION/RETIREMENT IN LIEU OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION .......................................  15  XI. RECORD KEEPING ..............................................................................................................  15  XII.  CENTRAL DRUG REGISTRY .................................................................................................  16  ATTACHMENTS .............................................................................................................................  18  DRUG TESTING  Attorney General's Law Enforcement Drug Testing Policy Revised February 2023
[brief] Consistent therewith, [...], along with the [...] in its July 22, 2024 letter, determined that per the bid specifications, any archaeologists to be selected to work on the Project were to be registered with the RPA, not under the PWCRA.  Based thereon, [...] determined that [...]’s selected archaeologist [...] satisfied the requirements under the [...]’s bid specifications. ²  0017a.  ²  It is also noteworthy that [...] has yet to present any evidence that its chosen archaeologists, [...], is registered with the “National Register of Professional Archaeologists. ”  B.
[brief] Table of Citations  Cases  Allgor v. Travelers Ins. Co., 280 N.J. Super. 254 (App. Div. 1995)..................3  Allstate Insurance Company v. Malec, 104 N.J. 1 (1986).................................4, 5 American Home Assurance Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 190 N.J. Super. 477 (App. Div. 1983).................................................................5  Fiscor v. Atlantic County Board of Chosen Freeholders, 293 N.J. Super. 19, 30 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 147 N.J. 263 (1996).................................5  Gibson v. Callaghan, 158 N.J. 662 (1999)......................................................7  Green v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 144 N.J. 344 (1996).................................4  Kattoura v. Patel, 262 N.J. Super. 34 (App. Div. 1993).................................5  Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co., 121 N.J. 530 (1990).......................................7  Longworth v. Ohio Casualty Group of Ins. Cos., 213 N.J. Super. 70 (App. Div. 1986).............................................................................5, 6 Meier v. N.J. Life Ins. Co., 101 N.J. 597 (1986)..............................................7  Riccio v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 108 N.J. 493 (1987)........3  Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Zullo, 48 N.J. 362 (1966).......................................5  Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 100 N.J. 325 (1985)............................................7  Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189 (2016).............................................................................8  Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590 (1999)..........................................7  Zirger v. General Accident Ins. Co., 144 N.J. 327 (1996)...............................3  Statutes N.J.S.A.  2A:14-1(a)  3  N.J.S.A. 45:21-1 5  PROCEDURAL HISTORY & STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Pa2460, Pa2485.  He also testified that his intent in emailing [...]’s wrap up team to “cancel effective 8/1/2015” was to cancel the workers’ compensation policy.  Pa2485.  [...] of [...] testified that any endorsement canceling [...]’s policy would go to [...], with the expectation that it would then go to [...], who would then presumably inform [...] as its subcontractor.  Pa2114.  [...] confirmed that [...] never sent a cancellation notice to [...].
[brief] 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................................................  3 LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................  5  POINT I.  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW (Raised Below: T1; Pa36) .................. 5  POINT II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS’ VIOLATIONS OF THE NJCFLA DO NOT GIVE RISE TO VIOLATIONS OF THE CFA (Raised Below: T1; Pa44-Pa50)  ....................................................................................................................  6  i.  The Private Right of Action Under the NJCFLA ..............  6  ii.  Defendants’ Unlawful Conduct Violated the Consumer Fraud Act .............................................................  17  iii.  Defendants’ Unlawful Conduct Caused [...] to Suffer an Ascertainable Loss ........................................  24 POINT III.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT VALENTINE LACKS STANDING TO ASSERT CLAIMS FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (Raised Below: T1; Pa43-Pa44) ......
[directive] I  Enclosure Law Enforcement Directive 2004-4  1: Authority: N. J.S.A. 2C:64- et seq.  Forfeiture  1  Enclosure 2: Chapter 64  Forfeiture  Authority: State of New Jersey  Forfeiture Program Administration  Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’S 12)  1- SOPS Enclosure 1-12  3: I.  Purpose: The purpose of this manual to implement the provisions  Attorney General is of Law Enforcement Directive 2004-4 (Enclosure by providing protocols annual for l), Certified Public Accountant (CPA) audits accounts containing seized and forfeited of property subject to the provisions of Title 2C of the New Jersey Code (Enclosure 2).
[brief] 2018 Op. at *30.  Similarly, *Mendez* is inapposite on the facts and the law.  The plaintiffs in that case proved nothing more than a “continuous pattern of negligence” in support of their unsuccessful bid for punitive damages.  *Mendez v. United States*, CV 14-7778(NLH/KMW), 2017 WL 477693, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2017).  By contrast here, the Chancery Court awarded punitive damages because what was done in this case was done with “a willful disregard of the rights of the[ir] partner[] … [...].
[brief] At the charge conference, there was significant discussion regarding using Model Jury Charge 5.20(B)(2)(b)- instead of Model Jury 5.20(F)(5)(Duty to Invitees).  Plaintiff argued that *Smith v. Costco Wholesale Corp.*, was not relevant to this matter as it dealt with an ongoing snowstorm, with which do not have here.  (7T84:15-20; Da29-32).  In fact, Plaintiff fell almost twelve hours after the snow ended.  Plaintiff further argued that 5.20(b) has not been expanded to include commercial properties when the actual ongoing storm is over.(7T87:15-18).  *Pareja v. Princeton Intern. Props.*, 246 N.J. 546 (2021), had to deal with a driveway ingress, where a public pedestrian was walking to work, not related to the commercial property at all, was not an invitee on that property, and slipped and fell during the ongoing storm.  (7T87:19-23).  Similarly, in *Smith v. Costco Wholesale Corp.*, there was an ongoing snowstorm and Plaintiff slipping and fell leaving Costco while the storm was going.  (7T87:24-88:4).  Here we do not have an ongoing storm.
[brief] See also Berkeley v. Berkeley Shore Water Co., 213 N.J. Super. 524, 533 (App. Div. 1986) ("Where the taxpayer makes reasonable efforts to notify the taxing authority of the correct address, and the taxing authority fails or neglects to change its records, the taxpayer has exercised reasonable compliance with its obligation to notify the taxing authority of the correct address."); N.J.S.A. 54:5-104.48 (permitting an owner or other interested party to file with the tax collector a notice advising of his name, residence, and post-office address for notice purposes).  Plaintiff did not do so.  Plaintiff believes that Defendants should be charged with knowledge that her mailing address was not the subject property because she had sent the City a "Letter of Agreement" before buying the property, which letter contained her home address.
[directive] Three-Year Retention Period Upon Request.  Subject to any applicable retention periods established in Section 8.4 to the extent such retention period is longer, a BWC recording shall be retained for not less than three years if voluntarily requested by: (a) law enforcement officer whose BWC made the video recording, if that officer reasonably asserts the recording has evidentiary or exculpatory value; (b) a law enforcement officer who is a subject of the BWC recording, if that officer reasonably asserts the recording has evidentiary or exculpatory value; (c) any immediate supervisor of a law enforcement officer whose BWC made the recording or who is a subject of the BWC recording, if that immediate supervisor reasonably asserts the recording has evidentiary or exculpatory value; (d) any law enforcement officer, if the BWC recording is being retained solely and exclusively for police training purposes; (e) any member of the public who is a subject of the BWC recording; (f) any parent or legal guardian of a minor who is a subject of the BWC recording; or (g) a deceased subject's next of kin or legally authorized designee.  To effectuate subparagraphs (e), (f), and (g) of this Section, the member of the public, parent or legal guardian, or next of kin or designee shall be permitted to review the BWC recording to determine whether to request a three-year retention period, in accordance with the provisions of the Open Public Records Act, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 et seq., to determine whether to request a three-year retention period.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021 18 8.4
[brief] There is a 12-word “typo,” an admission it should be corrected, a highly qualified person with a Ph.D. reading the email who was misled and the relevant Opposition is already in the file.  I also point out the 12-word “typo” was just as likely to mislead the Court as an adversary.  Either after a quick download or viewing a courtesy copy, a judge after looking at the uninformative first page, then looking to the second page, could easily have a policy similar to ours that s/he just grants requests for time.  This Court does not have many “mistake” cases, but one is similar: [...].
[directive] In 2020, [...] signed new legislation designed to ensure that every law enforcement agency in New Jersey is “comprised of law enforcement officers who reflect the diversity of the population of the community the agency is charged with protecting. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:17B-4.10 (the “Act”).  Pursuant to the Act, in 2021, the Attorney General’s Office issued guidelines (“2021 Guidelines”), concerning diversity in recruiting and the collection of data on officer and applicant demographics.  Under the 2021 Guidelines, agencies submitted demographics of current officers to the Attorney General.  That data collection showed an underrepresentation of women law enforcement officers.  In 2021, women officers comprised ten percent of officers statewide, similar to national proportions.  By rough comparison, over half of all New Jersey’s residents are women.  Increasing the representation of women in law enforcement requires a sustained focus on improving working conditions for women who choose to enter this profession.  These supplemental Guidelines on providing reasonable accommodations to pregnant officers are an initial step in that effort.  Pregnancy and breastfeeding can create unique professional challenges for workers across industries, and those challenges are exacerbated by the demands of a career in law enforcement.  As a result, providing guidance to law enforcement agencies regarding appropriate protocols concerning pregnant officers will ease professional burdens, help recruit diverse officers, and remove obstacles to promotion and professional success.  The procedures laid out below apply various federal and state laws concerning treatment of pregnant employees to the law enforcement context.  These Guidelines are intended to promote the Act’s goal of improving diversity among our law enforcement officers, including gender 52:17B-4.12.1 diversity, and are issued pursuant to the Act’s mandate.
[brief] 11  Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008)  ........................................................................  1, 8  [...] v. [...], et.al., [...] (Sup. Ct. June 26, 2023) .................................................. 32  [...] v. [...], Case No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 2022)
[brief] See Bron v. Weintraub, 42 N.J. 87, 91-92 (1964) (explaining that “[i]t is therefore understandable that the Legislature found it fair to bar the right to redeem by a strict foreclosure, i.e. by a judgment that payment be made by a fixed date, in default of which the right to redeem shall end, rather than by a sale as in the case of the foreclosure of a mortgage. ”).
[brief] His medical bills were paid under his employer's worker's compensation insurance policy. statutory terms or provisions' would lead to results 'inconsistent with the overall purpose of the statute,' that interpretation should be rejected."  [Perrolli v. Pastorolle, 206 N.J. 193, 200-01, 20 A.3d 354 (2006) (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting Hardy, supra, 198 N.J. at 101; then quoting Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392-93, 774 A.2d 495 (2001)).]  Plaintiff does not contend there were any genuine issues of material fact in dispute that precluded the proper granting of defendant's motion for [*5] summary judgment.  He asserts only that the court erred in its legal conclusion that plaintiff's claims against defendant are barred under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) because of plaintiff's admitted failure to maintain medical benefits expense coverage.  We therefore turn our attention to the court's application of the statute to the undisputed facts here.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) provides:
[brief] Design, Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999)  .............................................  29  Design, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2022, merriam-webster.com/ Dictionary/allow .........................................................................................  30  Design, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2022, .merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/design ..........................................................................................  29,30  Devices, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2022, merriam-webster.com/ Dictionary/devices .......................................................................................  34  Mounding, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2022, merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/mounding ....................................................................................  33  [...], et al.  “The Complete Illustrated Book of Development Definitions” Transaction Publisher, 2015 ........................................................................  28  Terracing, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2022, merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/terracing .....................................................................................  34  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] [...]’S MANAGEMENT FEES WERE PROPERLY INCLUDED IN DETERMINING THE RENT INCREASE AND ARE SEPARATE FROM THE CONDOMINIUM FEES PAID BY [...].  [...] argues, for the first time in this Appeal, that the condominium fees paid by Amaconn for the Unit are duplicative of Amaconn’s management fees charged to him, and thus cannot be used to determine any rent increase.  See Db32-33 (“Condo fees should not have been included at all if management fees were included”).  However, because [...] did not previously raise that argument at the trial level, it cannot be considered for the first time in this Appeal.
[brief] In [...], "[a] preliminary plat shall be reviewed to determine the acceptability of the detailed design concept and shall be in sufficient detail to enable the Board to ascertain compliance with the performance standards and other standards of this section as well as applicable Township ordinances[.]"  UDO Sec. 609A ³ , "[p]reserv[ing] existing natural resources and giv[ing] consideration to the physical constraints of the land[,] "[p]rovid[ing] for safe and efficient vehicular and pedestrian circulation[,]”  "[p]rovid[ing] for screening, landscaping, signing and lighting[,]”  "[e]nsur[ing] efficient, safe and aesthetic land development[,]” "[p]rovid[ing] for compliance with appropriate design standards to ensure adequate light and air, proper building arrangements, and minimum adverse effect on surrounding property[,]” "[d]evelop[ing] proper safeguards to minimize the impact on the environment including but not limited to soil erosion and sedimentation and air and water pollution[,]” "[e]nsur[ing] ³ Ia215. the provision of adequate water supply, drainage and storm water management, sanitary facilities, and other utilities and services[,] and "[p]rovid[ing] for recreation, open space and public use areas."
[brief] Application of the Mehlman analysis is appropriate herein, because there is significant evidence demonstrating that exposure to COVID-10 is hazardous to human health.  Plenty of guidance already existed by the time of Plaintiff’s email, from the CDC, WHO, as well as national and state declarations, evidencing a commitment to minimizing exposure to COVID-19 (even before a stay-at-home Order was in place in New Jersey).  Significantly concerned by the health and safety risked posed by COVID-19, and keenly aware of the massive efforts to slow the spread of COVID-19 already underway, Plaintiff wrote her superiors, on behalf of herself and other coworkers, stating “requiring us to come into the office during a pandemic unnecessarily risks our health. ”  Defendants admit that Plaintiff was immediately and directly fired as a direct result of this email.  The refusal to permit working from home, coupled with her termination in retaliation for voicing said concern, violated “a clear national and state public policy to combat health threats posed by COVID-19.