ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Da 32-33; Da 40 at 3:41:22 to 3:43:38)  [...] responded “no” to each photograph.  (Da 32-33; Da 40 at 3:41:22 to 3:43:38)  But rather than accepting [...]’s word that he did not recognize the shooter from the photos, [...] instead asked [...] if he wanted to see the photos again.  (Da 33; Da 40 at 3:43:38 to 3:43:46)  Scientific research and caselaw recognize that viewing photos a second time, even during the same identification procedure, is suggestive and leads to more mistaken identifications.
[brief] Under New Jersey law, conversion is defined as the “unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the execution of an owner’s rights.  *LaPlace v. Briere*, 404 N.J. Super. 585, 595 (App. Div. 2009).  The elements of conversion are: (1) "the property and right to immediate possession thereof belong to the Respondent;" and (2) "the wrongful act of interference with that right by the defendant."  *First Nat'l Bank v. North Jersey Trust Co.*, 18 N.J. Misc. 449, 452 (1940).
[brief] See In re Provision of Basic Generation Serv. for Period Beginning June 1 2008, 205 N.J. 339, 349-59 (2011) (“Agencies should act through rulemaking procedures when the action is intended to have a ‘widespread, continuing, and prospective effect,’ deals with policy issues, materially changes existing laws, or when the action will benefit from rulemaking’s flexible fact-finding procedures. ”) (citation omitted).  When evaluating whether an agency’s action is rule-making or an informal agency action, the Court considers whether the action (1) is intended to have wide coverage encompassing a large segment of the regulated or general public, rather than an individual or a narrow select group; (2) is intended to be applied generally and uniformly to all similarly situated persons; (3) is designed to operate only in future cases, that is, prospectively; (4) prescribes a legal standard or directive that is not otherwise expressly provided by or clearly and obviously inferable from the enabling statutory authorization; (5) reflects an administrative policy that (i) was not previously expressed in any official and explicit agency determination, adjudication or rule, or (ii) constitutes a material and significant change from a clear, past agency position on the identical subject matter; and (6) reflects a decision on administrative regulatory policy in the nature of the interpretation of law or general policy.
[brief] As will be set forth in greater detail in the Statement of Facts below, the Administrator, from the date of his appointment in May 2014 (simultaneously with an appeal of the summary judgment ruling) initiated, at Plaintiff’s urging, a thorough and comprehensive investigation in a search for Decedent’s assets in New Jersey that Plaintiff insisted existed, and also conducted an extensive investigation of the books and records of [...] as well as its financial transactions and bank records to determine the *bona fides* of Plaintiff’s claim of malfeasance in the management of [...].  The Administrator’s multi-year investigation included a review of thousands of pages of financial records, including checking account statements, project records and more than ten years of the books and records of [...].  After several years of investigation, the Administrator found no transfers of monies or gifts that were includable in Decedent’s Estate beyond the $900,000 that had already been established during the summary judgment phase.  (Da312-314).  The Administrator also could find no malfeasance in Defendant’s operations of [...], which had been vigorously and persistently alleged by Plaintiff.  (Da313-314).  **F.
[brief] In the companion case, [...] has rendered a valid final judgment with regard to the particular legal issue of whether the Ordinance which authorize the land exchange contains a sufficient public purpose so that it is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  One of the purposes of the collateral estoppel doctrine is to prevent litigants such as the Appellant in these matters from using the trial court to attempt to reverse an adverse interest.  See *IES vs. Sunny Kim*, Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division (Docket No.: A-1698-2 decided January 23, 2023); *Oliveri vs. Y.M.F. Carpet Inc.*, 186 N.J. 511 (2006).  [...] has ruled that the Ordinances authorizing the exchange of properties with [...] were valid, not arbitrary or capricious, therefore serving a public purpose.  The Ordinance which is the subject of this litigation simply carries through with the intent and purpose of the original Ordinances, which were found to be valid and serve a public purpose.  Therefore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel clearly is controlling in this matter.  The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents a party from relitigating issues that were adjudicated in a prior lawsuit.
[brief] Because the issue of whether Plaintiffs had an implied easement appurtenant was before the trial court on Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court needed to determine that no reasonable factfinder could do anything other than decide in Plaintiffs’ favor in order to grant Plaintiffs’ motion.  Thus, combined with the requisite burden of proof for the existence of an implied easement appurtenant, this required the trial court to determine that no reasonable factfinder could decide, viewing the motion record in the light most favorable to Defendants, that Plaintiffs had not established an implied easement appurtenant by clear and convincing evidence.  Simply stated, because the motion record contained evidence on which a reasonable factfinder could find that Plaintiffs had not established an implied easement appurtenant by clear and convincing evidence, Plaintiffs’ motion should have been denied.  The key to determining whether Plaintiffs have an implied easement appurtenant is whether, at the time of the initial conveyance of the [...], the original grantor ([...]) and the original grantee ([...]) intended that there was an implied easement for access from the Westerhold Property across the [...] to the beach.  Leach v. Anderl, 218 N.J. Super. 18, 24-25 (App. Div. 1987) (explaining that “implied easements operate on the principle that the parties to the conveyance are presumed to act with reference to the actual, visible and known conditions of the properties at the time of the conveyance and intend that the benefits and burdens manifestly belonging respectively to each part of the entire tract shall remain unchanged”).  That question of intent is, of course, a factual one to be determined by a factfinder.  Id. at 26.
[directive] Select Month -, Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b the NORI acquittee shall be released with no conditions.  )(1)  Date  Judge Prosecutor's Office: Defendant's Attorney: Name Name --------------- ---------------  Address Address ---------- Telephone Number Telephone Number ---------- Fax Fax ---------------- ---------------- Em  Em ail ail --------------- --------------- _________  Ifyes, language _ Interpreter needed? Yes No ________ ADA accommodation needed?  If Yes No yes, describe _  Contact List attached by Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12560 (KROL Order 5)
[brief] The procedural history of this case is complex, but can be reduced to two issues.  The trial court improperly dismissed [...], MD and [...], MD with prejudice for the Appellant’s alleged failure to serve a compliant Affidavit of Merit (“AOM”).  The Respondents argued that the Appellant’s Affidavit of Merit expert, [...], MD, was not qualified to draft the AOM due to his lack of certification as a “Hospitalist”.  The Appellant contends that this argument lacks merit.  Both doctors are licensed and Board-Certified in Internal Medicine, satisfying the AOM statute.  Moreover, licensure as a Hospitalist does not exist, only a Certification, of which Dr. Fleischer does not even possess.  Similar arguments exist regarding Dr. Motivala.  Dr. Motivala’s specialty of Cardiovascular Disease is merely a subspecialty of Internal Medicine.  Furthermore, Dr. Braunstein specializes in Hematology, which is substantially similar to Cardiovascular Disease and directly relates to the Appellant’s injuries.  Therefore, the trial court Orders dismissing Dr. Fleischer and Dr. Motivala from this case must be reversed.
[brief] The procedural hearing of this arbitration was conducted exactly as required pursuant to the inter-company arbitration agreement as set forth in Point I.  Both parties were allowed to assert their contentions and [...] raised their objection to jurisdiction as an affirmative defense.  The arbitrator reviewed the submissions of both parties and allowed the parties to present their evidence at a telephonic hearing conducted prior to the arbitration award date of August 1, 2022.  Clearly the arbitrator’s ruling on this matter is consistent with the procedure outlined in the inter-company arbitration agreement and addresses all of the issues raised by the parties.  In each of the other eight arbitration awards the parties filed similar contentions and appeared personally at the hearing.  In all of the other eight matters the arbitrator ruled on [...]’s objection to jurisdiction and found that there was jurisdiction pursuant to the inter-company arbitration agreement and that [...] was entitled to a recovery from [...].  POINT III
[brief] (Ca097-098)  This Resolution was attached to Appellants’ Opposition Brief and was in the record when the School Ethics Commission decided the Motion to Dismiss.  Id.  As stated in the Board’s Resolution from March 17, 2022:  WHEREAS, the Board has been recently made aware of certain social media postings which have been made by and/or attributed to certain individual Board members which are viewed by many – including the Board – to convey sentiments and/or messages which are racist and/or biased against African Americans.  […]  BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that, in accordance with District Policy, the Board formally requests Board Members [...] and [...] immediately remove the aforementioned social media posts.  (Ca097-098).  This Resolution was a direct reaction to the public outcry that ensued once Respondent took her seat and did not delete this reprehensible post, among others.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the [...] Defendants respectfully request that this Court reverse the trial court’s October Order and November Order, and dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the [...] Defendants with prejudice.  Dated: February 8, 2023  Respectfully submitted, [...]  /s/ [...]  [...]  [...] (pro hac vice)  [...]  [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  Fax: [...]  Email: [...]  [...]  [...]  /s/ [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  Telephone: [...]  Fax: [...]  Email: [...]  Attorneys for Defendant [...]  /s/ [...]  [...], Esq. (031952001)  [...], Esq. (117122014)  [...] Esq. (035112011)  [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendants [...] and [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  [...], Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], SELAEDIN MAKSUT, [...]  A/K/A/ [...] A/K/A [...] FOUNDATION, INC., and [...]  NEW JERSEY A/K/A [...] NJ A/K/A [...] NJ INC., Defendant-Appellants.  Docket No. [...]
[directive] Supervisors who have sufficient time and resources to properly perform their duties should be able to timely identify officers with performance and misconduct issues.  Supervisors can react to problems they identify through direction, counseling and effective performance evaluations.  Proper training of agency supervisors is critical to the discipline and performance of law enforcement officers.  Emphasis should be placed on anticipating problems among officers before they result in improper performance or misconduct.  Supervisors are expected to recognize potentially troublesome officers, identify training needs of officers and provide professional support in a consistent and fair manner.  3.4.5
[brief] (ECF 63, at 11-14.)  [...] argues [...] should not be allowed to cull the resulting collection of documents for relevance, as this would defeat “the whole principle behind agreed search terms ... and invites abuse by the responding party. ”  (ECF 63, at 13.)  [...] contends it is “fundamentally unfair” at this late stage of discovery for [...] to “withhold[ ] documents based on relevance without having properly objected on the grounds of relevance and without producing a detailed log as to exactly what is being withheld.
[brief] The court refused to allow the Incident Report to be admitted into evidence or the reading of its content by the plaintiff.  Significantly, the Incident Report, created by the defendant's agent, [...], included, inter alia, the following statement which constituted highly relevant and important substantive evidence, which was improperly excluded from the jury's consideration:  We had thunderstorm and it was raining when customer arrived to our property.  This being --- 9  The purpose of the business records exception is to broaden the area of admissibility of relevant evidence so long as there is sufficient trustworthiness of the document.  Where, as here, the defendant provided the Incident Report as a certified answer to interrogatories, the trustworthiness of the document is admitted.
[brief] HT  POLICE DEPARTMENT’S RULES AND REGULATIONS DID NOT SPELL OUT HOW TO CONDUCT PROPERTY CHECKS WITH ANY DEGREE OF SPECIFICITY.  (Pa218-Pa249; Pa288-Pa2427).  A police officer is not required to be clairvoyant in determining what methods of conducting property checks are permitted and which are not.  In the context of a statute: “A law is void ‘if it is so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. ’”  State v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156 (1999) (quoting Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 94 N.J. 85, 118 (1983)).  By corollary, there were no written policies, procedures, rules, or regulations which mandated the form which a property check was required to take within HT.  A policy which does not even exist must be the height of the definition of “vague” because no conduct is prohibited or required.
[brief] See Hill Intern., Inc. v. Atlantic City Bd. of Educ., 438 N.J. Super. 562 (App. Div. 2014).  The statute requires that a duty of care existed, and that the defendant breached that duty.  Bender v. Walgreen Eastern Co. Inc., 399 N.J. Super. 584, 590 (App. Div. 2008).  Additionally, failure to serve the affidavit within 120 days of the filing of the answer is considered tantamount to the failure to state a cause of action, subjecting the complaint to dismissal with prejudice.
[brief] The Restatement of Judgements describes determinations that are not essential, as follows:  Determinations not essential to the judgment.  If issues are determined but the judgment is not dependent upon the determinations, relitigation of those issues in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded.  Such determinations have the characteristics of dicta, and may not ordinarily be the subject of an appeal by the party against whom they were made.  In these circumstances, the interest in providing an opportunity for a considered determination, which if adverse may be the subject of an appeal, outweighs the interest in avoiding the burden of relitigation.  [Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982). ]  The only time the issue was even mentioned in the First Action was by this Court when ruling on Plaintiff’s appeal.  This Court’s comments on the issue were not “essential” to the ultimate decision to affirm the trial court’s denial of Plaintiff’s post-judgment motion for leave to amend but, rather, possessed the characteristics of dicta.
[directive] In the event the Court may overlook any of these requirements, the prosecutor is in a position to remind the Court.  Where a defendant has chosen to appear pro se, compliance with these requirements are even more important, in the event the defendant chooses to file an appeal or a PCR.  Consistent with newly adopted provisions in the Appendix to Part VII of the Court Rules (“Guidelines for Determination of Consequence of Magnitude (See R. 7:3-2)), and the holding in State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. at 6, 8-9, citing Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 295 (1971), a pro se defendant is entitled to representation when he/she faces a consequence of magnitude.  A defendant who elects to proceed pro se, must knowing and intelligently waive his/her right to counsel.  Thus, where a defendant is appearing pro se, and elects to enter a guilty plea, in addition to the requirements at R. 7:6-2(a)1, there should be, on the record, a waiver of the right to counsel, i.e., that the pro se defendant knew he/she had a right to counsel, and that he/she elected not to avail him/herself of that right with a full understanding of the implications of entering a guilty plea.
[brief] See Levin, 133 N.J. at 49 (“Of course, a physical defect in the property, for example, a missing window, combined with the foreseeable neglect or misconduct of third parties, may result in the imposition of liability on the public entity because the combination renders the property unfit. ”) (emphasis added) (cited with approval by Defendant [...], Def. [...]’s Brief at 13).  New Jersey courts have not denied recovery under the TCA merely because the defect in the condition of public property was caused by a third party.  See Saldana v. DiMedio, 275 N.J. Super. 488 (App. Div. 1994) (holding that a jury should determine whether the City of Camden was palpably unreasonable when it failed to secure dilapidated, abandoned city buildings after a third party started a fire in one of them).  As acknowledged by Roe by M.J. v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 317 N.J. Super. 72, 74-75 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 160 N.J. 89 (1999):  The cases [including Levin v. County of Salem, 133 N.J. 35 (1993); Rodriguez v. N.J. Sports Exposition Authority, 193 N.J. Super 39 (App. Div. 1983); Setrin v. Glassboro State College, 136 N.J. Super. 329 (App. Div. 1975), all cited with approval by the lower court, (Tr., 11:23-12:16)] are inapposite since they involved injuries caused not by the condition of the property but by the acts of the injured party himself or the dangerous activities of other persons.  Thus, in those cases, the property itself did not contribute in any way to the causing of the injuries.  The injuries merely happened to occur on public property.
[brief] ” (6T56-2 to 18).  The AP countered that “defendant is standing for trial for murder….  Those are actual facts with relation to the case. ” (6T56-21 to 57-2).  The AP also noted the multiple references throughout defendant’s opening statement that he was not guilty by reason of insanity.  (6T57-3 to 9).  The judge denied defendant’s mistrial motion, finding “zero problem” with the AP’s statement that “this is murder” because that was the crime for which defendant was standing trial.
[brief] *Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Company*, 363 U.S. 564 (1960); *Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company*, 363 U.S. 574 (1960); *Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Company*, 363 U.S. 593 (1960) ("Steelworkers Trilogy").  The Court emphasized that a court's role in reviewing an arbitration award is extremely limited.  *Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Company*, supra. at 568; *Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corporation*, supra. at 596.  The Court placed special attention on the role of the labor arbitrator.  In the view of the Court, a labor arbitrator performs a unique task in the collective bargaining relationship: The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment.
[brief] [...] is not disqualified from jointly representing the [...] under RPC 1.7(a)(1) based on the CNA.  Even if the Court holds that [...] had standing to bring its motion to disqualify the Mandelbaum Firm, the Court should still affirm the trial court’s denial of that motion.  RPC 1.7(a) allows the Mandelbaum Firm to represent [...] and his practices as well as [...] in this case.  Contrary to [...]’s novel position, the CNA’s apportionment of liability between defendants for IFPA claims does not create a “per se conflict” under RPC 1.7(a)(1) or (a)(2) where one firm represents multiple defendants.  Pb2.
[brief] ”  25T10-11.  That’s not a fair and equitable process in a divorce case no matter the technical application of the conflict of interest rules.  [...]’s finding that [...] did not infringe conflict of interest rules is erroneous in any event.  Even accepting [...]’s finding that [...] represented only [...] in the July 2013 engagement, the firm’s provision of financial advice plainly impacted both spouses in the marriage.  Later representing the husband against the wife implicated RPC 1.7 as noted above, prohibiting representation if there exists “a significant risk that the representation,” here of [...], “will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to … a third person…”  [...]’s finding that [...] represented only [...] at all times is not supported by the required adequate, substantial, credible evidence needed to be sustained on appeal, *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am.*, 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).  [...]’s finding disregarded that attorney [...]’s July 19, 2013 Retainer Agreement was addressed to both spouses, and was signed by both spouses, and that [...]’s invoices were addressed to the couple jointly, and that most of [...]’s invoices were paid by [...].  [...]’s finding disregarded that [...] wired [...] the initial retainer to retain them in the first place, and also disregarded that she paid their monthly fees.  1T45:16.
[brief] Section 1:7-6 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:  1:7-6.  If the court, upon the final hearing of a petition authorized by this chapter, shall determine any law or joint resolution, or any part thereof, to be null and void, judgment shall be entered to that effect.  The clerk shall thereupon make a true copy of such judgment, certify the same under his hand and seal of the court and deliver the copy to the Governor or person administering the government, who shall issue his proclamation under the great seal of the State, setting forth such judgment.  The proclamation shall be filed, published and printed with the laws as other proclamations are required to be filed, published and printed, and shall be judicially noticed and received in evidence in all courts of the State in the same manner and to the same extent that the law or joint resolution therein specified would have been if such judgment had not been made; and no law or joint resolution, or part thereof, adjudged to be null and void shall, after the entry of such judgment as provided in this chapter, be judicially noticed or received in evidence by any of the courts of the State.
[brief] The threshold question under the common law right to access is whether the requested records are “public records. ”  See O'Shea v. Township of W. Milford, 410 N.J. Super. 371, 386-87 (App. Div. 2009).  “To constitute a common law public record, an item must ‘be a written memorial ... made by a public officer, and ... the officer [must] be authorized by law to make it. ’”  ACLU v. County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey, ___ N.J. ___ (slip op. at 27) (2024), quoting Rivera, 250 N.J. 124, 143-44 (2022) (alteration and omissions in original).