ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The fact that the parking lot was owned and maintained by the same commercial landowner as the sidewalk is notable.  This is not a scenario where the duty to maintain the parking lot is being extended to a tenant who was not responsible for common area maintenance.  When the commercial landowner is responsible for maintaining the abutting sidewalk and their commercial parking lot, any attempt to create an arbitrary distinction between the sidewalk and parking lot in this case should be rejected by this court.  Plaintiff does not dispute that the landowning defendant, [...], had a duty to maintain the parking lot free from snow and ice.  Yet, plaintiff argues that the jury charge governing a commercial landowner’s duty to remove snow and ice only applies to abutting sidewalks and not abutting parking lots.  This is clearly contrary to the common law.  If there is a common law duty to remove snow and ice from the parking lot, there is no reason why the jury charge would be limited to sidewalks, especially when the jury charge is intended to track the common law and when sidewalk liability has been extended to other property beyond the sidewalk.  The underlying rationale of sidewalk liability is not undermined since the commercial defendants obtained a commercial benefit from plaintiff and other invitees using the parking lot.  In addition, plaintiff suggests that Model Civil Jury Charge 5.20(B)(2)(b) is limited only to pedestrians and not to an invitee such as plaintiff.  According to plaintiff, her status as an invitee means she is owed a higher duty than what is set forth in 5.20(B)(2)(b).  However, plaintiff’s status as an invitee is not dispositive and does not automatically trigger the application of Model Civil Jury Charge 5.20F, at least to the exclusion of 5.20(B)(2)(b).  Plaintiff’s position essentially requires strict adherence to common law premises liability classifications.  Yet, it is well established that there has been a shift away from common law status classifications and towards a more flexible approach to premises liability.
[brief] However, given the lower sentence defendant received and the adequacy of the judge’s other findings, defendant fails to show how adding this factor entitles him to any relief.  R. 2:10-2 (permitting appellate courts to disregard “[a]ny error” not “clearly capable of producing an unjust result”).  Defendant’s remaining arguments can be distilled to one: his youth and show of remorse should have caused the court to give less weight to aggravating factors (1), (3), and (9), and to find mitigating factors (8), (9), and (13).
[brief] | | | In re Hill, | 10, 11 | | 241 N.J. Super. 367 (App. Div. 1990) | | | In re Issuance of Access Conforming Lot [...], | 24 | | 417 N.J. Super. 115 (App. Div. 2010)  | | In re N.J. Dep’t of Env’tl. Prot. Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination, [...], 433 N.J. Super. 223 (App. Div. 2013)
[directive] The following chart may be used by prosecutors to quickly determine whether the amount of drugs involved satisfies this eligibility criterion:  Maximum Amount Amount Allowed Under Type of Drug Needed Eligibility Criterion to Establish (One-Quarter Amount Second Degree Needed to Establish Crime Second Degree)  Heroin .5 oz. 0.125 oz. (3.54 g.)  Cocaine .5 oz. 0.125 oz. (3.54 g.)  LSD any amount 25 mg.  under 100 mg. PCP any amount 2.5 grams under 10 g.  Methamphetamine .5 oz. 0.125 oz. (3.54 g.)  Marijuana 5 lbs. or 10 1.25 lbs. (567 g.) plants or 2 plants  Other Narcotic Drugs in Schedule I
[brief] Q:  If there were – *if there were crosswalks designated in the parking lot, that would have called your attention that people are walking there, would it not?*  [...]: Objection to form.  You can answer.  A: *Yes.  It would have called my attention to that.*  Q: This area, you can explain it from personal knowledge and looking at the video, *there were no crosswalks, correct?*  A: *There was no painting anything.*  Q:  As I understand the layout, *there are crosswalks at the beginning of the parking lot.  But there are no crosswalks where the crash – where you crashed into [...], correct?*  A: *Correct.*  [Pa309 (30:11-31:2) (emphasis added).
[brief] This cherry picking of facts by the trial judge shows his bias, which attributed to the unjust results, *State v. Mohammed*, 226 N.J. 71, 87 (2016), and undermined fairness, *State v. Weaver*, 219 N.J. 131, 15 (2014), below.  Appellant believes that in so doing the trial judge erred.  (Point Six)  THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED AS HE SCHEDULED A HEARING, THE OUTCOME OF WHICH HE HAD ALREADY DECIDED.  (Raised Below: (2T); (2T3, 22-25); (2T8, 19-24))
[brief] To arrive at this conclusion [...] misapplies the specific concerns voiced in the 1999 Master Plan about some of the offsite impacts of noise, dust, odors and visual for uses in GM Zone to claim that these are the exclusive concerns about uses in the SM Zone as well.  In fact, the language of the Master Plan does not state that these are the only concerns for either Zone, merely that they are of special concern for uses in the GM Zone.  The Future Land Use Plan designates a number of areas for SM Special Manufacturing and GM General Manufacturing.  In most cases they are designated on the Future Land Use Plan only in areas where there is an established and use pattern of such uses.  This is because both of these categories pose special concerns for neighboring land uses, especially residential areas.  The category of general manufacturing poses special concerns because it can have significant offsite impacts: noise, dust, odors and visual.  Two of these areas merit particular consideration in this plan.  Ja 151.  Emphasis added.  In its Resolution, the Board quotes in full the remaining discussion at page VIII-5 of the 1999 Master Plan, but the most relevant excerpt from that quoted language is the following:  It is a goal of this plan to minimize impacts on these residences by designating the future land use for the adjacent area (north of I-295) as SM Special Manufacturing.  SM is the most appropriate future land use for the area north of I-295 because it is less likely to result in offsite impacts than permitted by a GM designation.  In addition, it is intermediate in the permitted intensity of development between the Recovery Facility in the GM area and the existing homes to the east, north and west.  Ja027; Ja151 fourth full paragraph.  (Emphasis added)  From the foregoing, it is evident that the offsite impacts of “noise, dust, odors and visual” perceived as being attributes of GM uses are not the same thing as the “permitted intensity of development. ”  [...]’s erroneous conflation of these concerns and resulting dismissal of traffic as an intensity concern in the SM Zone for the drafters of the 1999 Master Plan and implementing ordinances is therefore not supported by the language of the Master Plan.  The Board was justified in dismissing this argument concerning the height variance criteria.  In sum, the Board was amply justified in not finding persuasive any of the arguments of Plaintiffs’ Planner in support of their height variance application.
[brief] In sum, the trial court applied the correct standard of law and reached a reasonable conclusion after balancing the relevance and prejudice of the April 20 robbery that was firmly within the court’s discretion.  The Court reached a reasonable conclusion to allow the State to admit evidence from [...]’s phone (1) showing [...] possessing a handgun that matched the gun described by the victims of the April 23 carjacking and (2) in possession of an Audi Q5 that looked similar to the Audi used in the April 23 carjacking, but denying the State’s motion to present evidence of the April 20 robbery of the Audi Q5.  Because the balancing of the probative and prejudicial nature of evidence is always firmly committed to the discretion of the trial court, this Court should defer to the trial court and affirm the order denying the State’s motions (1) to join the two indictments and (2) to admit evidence of the April 20 robbery in the trial for the April 23 carjacking.
[brief] (Not raised below)  The State did not present any direct evidence that [...] was the suspected shooter, or offer any motive for the shooting.  The police did not find a gun tied to the crime.  No eyewitnesses saw the shooting itself, and no eyewitnesses implicated [...] as the person on the scene suspected to be the shooter.  Moreover, the descriptions of the suspected shooter from witnesses who heard gunshots – but did not see the actual shooting – were vague and inconsistent: some described the suspect as a Black man, others described him as Hispanic; some saw him getting into a black car, others saw him getting into a white car; some saw him wearing a hoodie, others saw him in a short sleeve shirt.  None of the witnesses described the shooter as having any of [...]’s distinctive characteristics, such as the tattoos on his hands and arms.  And defense counsel highlighted how the descriptions of the suspect were more consistent with [...] – a Black man who had previously driven the black Chevy Malibu – than they were with [...]:  “The description that was given by the witnesses were all over the place.  [Pierce’s] description fits the perpetrator more than [...]'s does because he is a black individual.  He was tall.  He was wearing sweat clothes. ”  (7T58-11 to 15)  Thus, to prove that [...] was the shooter, the State relied heavily on the detective’s narration of surveillance videos she collected from downtown Elizabeth.
[brief] In other words, “police may not randomly stop and detain persons" based on a whim or hunch.  *Shaw*, 213 N.J. at 400.  Police must "be able to articulate something more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch'" in order to stop and detain individual, even temporarily.  *United States v. Sokolow*, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)(quoting *Terry*, 392 U.S. at 27).
[brief] As to the installation of the GPS device, the Motion Judge differentiated *United States v. Jones*, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) and *Collins v. Virginia*, 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018) both of which were warrantless as he noted that:  “In this case, the police had a warrant”, referencing the CDW which authorized installation of the GPS tracking device on both vehicles.  That installation was accomplished by entry of the State Police onto the premises, i.e. the driveway of [...].  The Motion Judge also concluded that there was an “implied invitation” to utilize the driveway as the photographs of [...] showed fencing and a driveway with a path leading at a right angle from the driveway to the front door.  The Motion Judge did not appreciate that which *United States v. Jones* did, and *Collins v. Virginia* did not, involve: in *Jones*, attachment of the GPS device was in a public parking lot, and in *Collins*, entry was without a warrant onto the home’s driveway.  The Warrant upon which the Motion Judge relied was a Communications Data Warrant (CDW) which only authorized placement of the tracking device on a vehicle.
[brief] Thus, I will not repeat it.  In the second sentence of the excerpt the Judge describes how section B of N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 is that it is “trying to clarify Subparagraph (section) A”.  Nowhere in the legislative history of this statute is there a statement suggesting this clarification.  There is no case law which suggests this either.  The clarification that the Judge infers from his reading of the relationship between section A and Section B of the statute is that the immunity in 48:12-152 b(5) applies to injuries that occur on railroad rights of way.  This type of inference, instead of interpreting the plain language of the statute as dictated by Cohen, Velazquez, and Coleman is the source of the reversible error in this case and the reason that the Summary Judgment Order must be reversed.
[brief] Defendant goes to great lengths to minimize the application of Ferraro v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 119 N.J. 61 (1990), to this matter.  It grossly overstates its argument that to give the “significant weight” to [...]’s zoning plan, as required by Ferraro, would effectively abdicate its own zoning authority to [...]’s governing body, Db14-Db19, something it will not do.  At its core, *Ferraro* was an appeal of a use variance denied by the [...].  On appeal, the trial court ruled that the [...] lacked jurisdiction to decide the variance based on a joint resolution that “ceded” zoning authority to [...].  *Id.* at 63.  The Appellate Division’s review determined that municipalities cannot cede zoning jurisdiction, and ultimately “remand[ed] the cause to [[...]’s] board of adjustment for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ”  *Id.* at 73 (emphasis added).  The Court directed that “[i]n exercising its own zoning responsibilities, [...] is obligated to give significant weight to the zoning ordinance and plan of the adjacent municipality[.]”  *Id.* (emphasis added).  Referring to [...]’s consideration of the “zoning status of the property under the Hazlet ordinance”, the Court had “no way of knowing whether its attention to this aspect of the variance application was sufficient. ”  *Id.*  Had the [...] provided the deference articulated in the decision during its original hearing, the Court would have had no need to remand the matter.  Plaintiff does not disagree that *Ferraro* is “protective” of a municipality’s authority to zone, and that the Defendant should not surrender its zoning responsibilities to [...].  This case did not require it to do so.  Moreover, *Ferraro* demands that Defendant’s exercise of zoning authority cannot be done in a vacuum, and that it was “obligated to give significant weight” to [...]’s zoning while deciding Plaintiff’s application.  Similarly, as articulated in Ciocon v. Planning Bd. of Borough of Franklin, 223 N.J. Super. 199 (1988), Plaintiff’s Property must be viewed as one parcel, despite being bifurcated by a municipal boundary line, and that the zoning in both municipalities must be considered.  Here, the zoning in both towns permitted warehouses and their associated accessory uses.  Except for the height of the building, the other bulk standards were the same in both towns.  Ja72-Ja73.  Defendant ignored these facts.  Defendant also ignored the facts that (a) 77% of the development, including the warehouse itself, was in [...], and (b) that [...] had already approved same.  Ja085-Ja095; 4T 8:5-25; 9:1.  Defendant completely ignored its obligation to give “significant weight” to [...]’s zoning.  III.
[brief] [...]:  My client through his counsel [...] sent an e-mail and said, look, we can’t agree on a realtor.  I will buy the house from you for the 538.  You guys will get distributed your 107,000.  I’ll do it without a commission.  It will be – 538 is the number.  I’ll purchase your house.  You guys will get your 107,000 rough split, whatever your interests are per the consent order – THE COURT: Why doesn’t he do that?  [...]: Because none of them agreed.  They all said absolutely not.  THE COURT: Okay.  [...]: And they wouldn’t even negotiate.  (1T18:8-21).  The fact that there were genuine disputes relating to the sale of the Subject Property to [...] for $500,000 was even acknowledged within [...]’s Order to Show Cause application to the Court, where he acknowledged in Paragraph 24 that:
[brief] In the present matter the first relevant section of the 1999 Agreement is Section 6.1.  That is the only section in the entire agreement that contains the term “Connection Fees. ”  Section 6.1 specifically provides:  Section 6.1  Connection Fees –  The Borough shall have the right to impose and receive connection fees as permitted by law to any user of said services in the Borough and may retain all said amount received without claim from the Township.  Da115.  The above language unambiguously provides that the Borough is entitled to connection fees of any user of services in the Borough.  The Township takes the position that the Borough retains connection fees for any user located in the Borough, but connection fees outside of the Borough go to the Township.  However, the plain language of the contract in Section 6.1 states its any user of the services in the Borough.  The service “in the Borough” referenced in Section 6.1 is the use of the Borough’s sewer lines to transport the sewerage to the Township where it will ultimately be treated by the Township’s treatment facility.  Here, the [...] is using the Borough’s sewer line to transport sewage to the [...] where it will be treated at the Township’s treatment facility.  Therefore, the Borough is entitled to those connection fees as the [...] is connecting into a sewer line that was constructed, owned and maintained by the Borough.
[brief] Likewise, the court also assigns responsibility for punitive damages as follows: [...][] shall be responsible for 60% of punitive damages, [...][] shall be responsible for 20% of damages, and [...][] shall be responsible for 20% of punitive damages.  (40054a)  Pursuant to this Court’s mandate, [...] meticulously supported his punitive damages decision with findings tailored to each [...] individually, as follows:
[directive] Revised Promulgated Directive #09-19 (06/04/2019), Form CN by 10301  ATTACHMENT  4  PTI  SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF PTI SUPERVISION  ~~!"!- Pretrial Intervention !I of Special Conditions  PTI Supervision =--= Last Name  First Middle Name Name Number ID CAPS Number(s)  PROMIS of Suspension Length  Driver's Suspension License License Number  Service Community I -- I Months Hours: No Yes Yes No D  Restitution Amount Payable the Through: Total of: in Forfeit Weapons: D D  Probation Direct Pay $  Payable To: D testing and/or counseling  Drug/alcohol directed as D tests/evaluations and/or counseling directed  Medical/psychological as D D  Enforcement Reduction of Penalty  Drug and Demand (DEDR)  Office Compensation Assessment Crime Victims (VCCO)  2C:43-3.l(a)(2)(d)  N.J.S.A. $50.00 $  2C:35-15(a)  N.J.S.A. D 0 Neighborhoods Assessment Safe Forensic Education Fund  2C:35-20(a)  Abuse Fee  N.J.S.A. Lab Drug (DAEF)  2C:43-3.2(a)(2)  N.J.S.A. $75.00  Penalty  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.5 $50.00 $ or Additional Conditions  Comments financial obligations imposed by the court total $  My I agree to pay $ today. of$  I agree to make payments at the rate per I agree to pay the total amount forthwith. of of I have received a copy the Special Conditions PTI Supervision, which have been read and explained to I may request a me. of of copy the official court order from my probation officer.  I understand the conditions PTI Supervision and that they apply to of me, and I further understand that failure to comply on my part constitutes a violation PTI Supervision and may cause my if of termination from the program and prosecution the charges against I also understand that I am terminated from the PTI me. of if program, I may be ordered to comply with conditions pretrial release.  I further understand that the offenses for which I am being enrolled into PTI were committed or after March 1995, I will be charged a each time I make a payment through on fee probation.  • • of$3.00 or payments less on  No fee of$3.01 • $1.00 $9.99 of$10.00 payments on fee $2.00 payments or more fee on to  You must report to on at of  You must comply with all standard and special conditions supervision imposed by the court.  Date  Defendant Date Probation Officer  Revised Promulgated Directive #09-19 (06/04/2019), 10300
[brief] See Cell South of N.J. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of W. Windsor Twp., 172 N.J. 75, 88 (2002).  A zoning board of adjustment must not merely provide conclusionary language but must state findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the denial of a variance.  Alpine Tower Co. v. Mayor and Counsel of Borough of Alpine, 231 N.J. Super. 239, 248 (App. Div. 1989).
[brief] The indemnification clause does not include the terms “[...]’s negligence,” “general contractor’s negligence,” or even “indemnitee’s negligence. ”  While those specific terms are not absolutely required, the clause did nothing to signify, illustrate, or notify [...] that it would be responsible to indemnify [...] for [...]’s own negligence.  Rather than unequivocally stating the clause included indemnification for [...]’s own negligence, the clause merely indicates [...] will indemnify [...] “regardless of whether or not such claim, damaged [sic], loss or expense is caused in part\(^7\) by a party indemnified hereunder. ”  See Da149-Da150 (emphasis added).  Putting aside one of many typos (“damaged” should be “damage”), this clause is in no way unequivocal and was never intended to satisfy the bright line requirement for [...] to be indemnified for its own negligence.  --- \(^7\)  The jury found solely negligent.
[brief] 13  I.  The 2023 Veto Amendment Should Apply To This Case (Ja1-3; 4T) ...........................................  13  A.  The Legislature’s Intent Supports the Trial Court’s Holding (Ja1-3; 4T) .............................................  13  B.  The Harms of Retroactive Legislation Are Absent (Ja1-3; 4T) ..........................................................  16  C.  Bayer Corp. Does Not Compel A Different Result (Ja1-3; 4T) ............................................................  20  II.  The Trial Court’s Alternative Ruling Was Correct (Ja1-3; 4T) ..........................................................  22  A.  Standard of Review (Ja1-3; 4T) .................................................................................................  22  B.  Factual Disputes Preclude Summary Judgment (Ja1-3; 4T) ..............................................................  22  1.  Rate Data Was Not Publicly Disclosed (Ja1-3; 4T) .................................................................  23  a.  Applicable Law (Ja1-3; 4T) ................................................................................................. 23 b.  Discussion (Ja1-3; 4T) .......................................................................................................  24  2.  There Was No Disclosure of By The News Media (Ja1-3; 4T) .........................................................  27  a.  Applicable Law (Ja1-3; 4T) ................................................................................................. 27 b.  Discussion (Ja1-3; 4T) .......................................................................................................  29  i.  The [...] (Ja1-3; 4T) ......................................................................................  29  ii.  The [...] (Ja1-3; 4T) .................................................................................................  33  TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont’d)  Page(s)  iii. [...] (Ja1-3; 4T) .................................. 36  3.  There Is No Substantial Similarity (Ja1-3; 4T) ........... 38  a.  Applicable Law (Ja1-3; 4T) .............................. 38 b. Discussion (Ja1-3; 4T) .................................... 41  4.  Relator Is An Original Source (Ja1-3; 4T) .................. 44  a.  Applicable Law (Ja1-3; 4T) ..............................  44 b.  Discussion (Ja1-3; 4T) ....................................  46  CONCLUSION .............................................................................  50
[brief] ”  Id (citations omitted)(emphasis added).  See Paradisis v. Englewood Hospital and Medical Center, 2016 WL 4697337 (D.N.J. 2016) at *10 (“An investigation alone, without material consequences to an individual’s employment, is not an adverse employment action”); see also Campbell v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2014 WL 7343225 (D.N.J. 2014) at *6 (“[T]he filing of a disciplinary action or an investigation into potential misconduct does not qualify as an adverse employment action in and of itself. ”).  (Pa125).  In the matter of Hernon v. Webb-McRae, the District of New Jersey dismissed plaintiff’s NJLAD retaliation claim finding that an “investigation into his [plaintiff’s] altercation with a public defender does not constitute an actionable adverse employment action” within the meaning of the NJLAD.