ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The sworn statement shall have appended to it an index of all documents deemed by the agency to be confidential in whole or in part, with an accurate description of the documents deemed confidential.")  $105,000 service fee to search the students' records for the settlement records\(^3\).  [...] then proceeds to put his inadequate reasons for his findings on the record (3T:12/16/22 15:11-17:2).  He makes no findings of fact at all and just makes excuses for [...]'s failure to comply with the affirmed 8/28/20 Order of his predecessor, [...].  [...] states he is, “satisfied with the record presented by the defendant that the requisite efforts necessary, the diligence and efforts necessary to be in compliance have been presented”.  However, his findings of fact are severely deficient because he ignores the fact [...] failed to even search the student's records.  Additionally, he makes no findings in support of his granting [...]'s protective order (249a) and prohibiting any discovery regarding the missing 9 records.  --- \(^3\)
[brief] . . . are to be strictly but reasonably construed, consistent with the manifest reason and purpose of the law," Serv. Armament Co. v. Hyland, 70 N.J. 550, 558-59 (1976), and that "whatever the rule of [statutory] construction, it is subordinate to the goal of effectuating the legislative plan as it may be gathered from the enactment read in full light of its history, purpose, and context."  Chasin v. Montclair State Univ., 159 N.J. 418, 426-27 (1999) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Haliski, 140 N.J. 1, 9 (1995)).  Both point unerringly to the same result here.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT INCLUDING THE PENALTY PROVISIONS.  (A53)  Defendant has failed to provide a factual or legal basis to overturn the trial court’s decision.  There was no determination of fraud by Plaintiff, a finding that was upheld by the Appellate Division.  To be clear, penalties were not imposed on Defendant due to any actions of Plaintiff.  The specifically negotiated penalty within the Agreement states that Defendant shall pay $1,500 to Plaintiff on the first day of each month and not later than the fifth of the month.  Payments after the fifth incur a late fee of $100 per day.  (A4)  It is undisputed that Defendant stop making the monthly payments of $1,500 in July 2017.  Instead, he engaged in self-help.  Had he, in 2017, simply filed for enforcement of the Agreement and sought an Order requiring Plaintiff to take steps to pay the $70,000 plus interest, he would not have incurred the penalty.  Instead, he breached the Agreement.  Both parties had the appropriate, negotiated, contractual penalties assessed to their failures to pay.  Defendant is simply angry that his penalty, as negotiated, is greater than Plaintiff’s.  The trial Court specifically determined that Defendant’s “self-help” by failing to pay the monthly support obligation beginning in 2017 was a violation of the Settlement Agreement and was not justified by the $70,000 repayment obligation.
[directive] Simple Vehicle Death Rule 3:3-1(c)(1)  the by STATUTES  Promulgated 2C:12-1a(1)(2)(3)  (Rule 2C:12-1b(1)  2C:12-1b(2)  2C:12-1b(3)  2C:11-5.1  2C:11-5  Statute 2C:5-5  2C:7-2 permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible Bail Option Cash 5  JUDGE’S issue.  10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%  10%  10%  10% should COURT $50,000 $35,000 $75,000 $50,000 and $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500  3:26-2 summons  Range bail MUNICIPAL to to to to to to to to to to RULE setting $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $20,000 $15,000 $50,000 $20,000  Bail $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 or crime.  TO warrant when PURSUANT  THE substantive considered a Degree  Degree IN Degree Degree Degree Degree Degree Degree Degree Degree whether Degree OR, 2nd 2nd ADMINISTRATOR, 3rd 3rd 3rd 3rd 3rd 4th 4th 4th JUDGE actual be regarding to appropriate.  (Refusal of statute; a the if factors results; COURT feet of degree to non- victim taking as (Refusal 1000 factors the motorbus 39:4-50.4a through same injury fourth delineate if unlawful MUNICIPAL in within degree deg 39:4-50.4a where listed COURT degree. bodily the delineate results; driving second judge, or 2 or second as or be on serious Schedule (DWI) offenses) bail eluding people fourth while injury generally while present; DEPUTY worker, or results.
[brief] POINT V.  THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT IN RESPONSE TO COMPLAINANTS' MOTION FOR A SUMMARY DECISION.  Complainants argue that they were denied due process because the Commission dismissed their complaint in the absence of a cross-motion for a summary decision on behalf of Respondent.  Cb32-Cb34.  This contention must be rejected because N.J.A.C. 6:28-9.l(a) reads in applicable part as follows:  Upon return of a matter from the OAL to the Commission, a hearing before the Commission pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:28-9.8, or the Commission's summary review of a complaint pursuant to this chapter, the Commission shall determine by majority vote whether the conduct complained of constitutes a violation of the Act or whether the complaint should be dismissed.  (emphasis added).  Thus, the Commission acted within its authority to dismiss the Complaint after the matters return from [...].
[brief] Defendant argues that the trial court improperly permitted testimony of [...], a courtroom officer with the [...], with respect to Defendant’s statement when refusing a buccal swab sample that “it would be worse for him if he did give a sample. ” (34T 182-6 to 182-7).  This argument is meritless because the statement was clearly admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and even if it was in error, defense counsel’s acquiescence to its introduction would constitute invited error.  The record demonstrates that Defendant refused to provide a buccal swab after multiple court orders directing that samples be taken from him.  In particular, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., granted the State’s motion to compel a buccal swab on May 7, 2018 (1T 16-2 to 16-3).  The order was stayed pending appeal, but was reinstated on June 21, 2018, by [...] after Defendant failed to file an appeal, and although a recess was granted to take the samples, the parties came back on the record later that day to report that Defendant had refused the sample.  (2T 15-20 to 15-24).  On October 11, 2018, the parties convened again after the State submitted legal authority on the ability of the Court to order reasonable force to obtain the buccal sample, and the Court granted the State’s motion to use reasonable force to compel the sample.  However, the Court stayed the order for eight days to allow defense counsel to again go over the discovery with Defendant to show him that a buccal swab was necessary because saliva samples were found at the crime scene and gave an initial match to him.  (4T 30-17 to 32-19).  On October 26, 2018, the parties reconvened and Defendant maintained his refusal to provide a buccal swab, and instead, offered to give a blood sample which was accepted.  (5T 6-22 to 7-12).  Preliminarily, the State would note that defense counsel waived the opportunity to challenge the admission of this evidence at a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing.
[brief] (Drb 1-12).  POINT II.......................................................................................................................11  REGARDING SANCTIONS AND COUNSEL FEES, DEFENDANT FAILED TO COUNTER PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT OF IMPRACTICABILITY OF THE SAFE HARBOR LETTER REQUIREMENT AND THE TRIAL JUDGE’S FAILURE TO ANALYZE ALL RULE 5:3-5 FACTORS AND ADHERE TO THE FEE SHIFTING TERM OF THE PARTIES’ PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.
[brief] Parties do not have a right to appeal an interlocutory order under the Rules of Court.  In re Pa. R.R. Co., 34 N.J. Super. 103, 107-08 (App. Div. 1955), aff’d, 20 N.J. 398 (1956).  Rather, leave to file an interlocutory appeal of a trial court’s order only is permitted “in the interest of justice. ”  R. 2:2-4; Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 598-99 (2008).  See R. 2:2-2(b) (providing that this Court may take appeals from interlocutory orders to “prevent irreparable injury”).  An interlocutory appeal is not appropriate to “correct minor injustices … .”  Romano v. Maglio, 41 N.J. Super. 561, 567 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 22 N.J. 574 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 923 (1957).  When leave is granted, it is because there is the possibility of “some grave damage or injustice” resulting from the trial court’s order.  Id. at 568.  The moving party must establish, at a minimum, that the desired appeal has merit and that “justice calls for [an appellate court’s] interference in the cause. ”  Romano, 41 N.J. Super. at 568.  Here, the trial court made inaccurate factual findings and incorrectly applied the holdings of Smart and Witt, in finding that the automobile exception did not apply to the roadside search of defendant’s car because the circumstances giving rise to probable cause were not spontaneous or unforeseeable.  Without this evidence, the State’s ability to proceed to trial is significantly diminished if not eliminated altogether.  Moreover, the State cannot appeal this evidentiary ruling from a dismissal or an acquittal and, thus, this is the only opportunity for the State to challenge the adverse ruling at issue.  As such, the State’s Motion for Leave to Appeal must be granted and the trial court’s clearly erroneous ruling must be reversed in the interests of justice.
[brief] Rubin 188 N.J. Super. at 159.  Although [...]’s observation was made in a slightly different context, the principle that a litigant is owed the fulfillment of his expectation that the court will hear him fully applies here.  Should this court decide to read my merits brief (Pa1355-1417), it will find that the appellant has faithfully and diligently discharged an appellant’s obligation to provide that portion of the record including the relevant transcripts which are germane to the issues raised on appeal.  All the contentions in the brief are duly supported by citations to authorities or pointed references to the record including transcripts as applicable.
[brief] 1  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................  3 LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................  9  I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT  BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DID NOT SHOW THAT A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED AS TO WHETHER THE CITY HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE MISSING SIGN.  (Raised Below: Da001; 1T13:15-15:12)  .............................................................................  10  II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT BECAUSE PLAINTIFF STILL DID NOT PRODUCE ANY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PROVING THAT THE CITY HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE MISSING SIGN.  (Raised Below: Da003; Da005; 5T103:3-24; 6T78:16-86:4)  ........................................  18  III.  THE TRIAL COURT UNDERMINED THE TORT CLAIMS ACT BY DENYING THE CITY’S  MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.  (Raised Below: Da231)  ........ 21  CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 23
[brief] 4T, 141:20-142:24; 146:21-148:7.  Moreover, [...] testified that in the course of his private practice as an affordable housing development financial advisor, he puts together and structures such partnerships if desired by the first-time “novice” developer who either owns or is the equitable owner of the 100% affordable housing site, or if such a partnership is deemed warranted.  4T,149:25-150:8.  [...] testified that upon being informed by Plaintiff [...] that [...] was rezoned for a 100% affordable housing development, he knew it would be a 9% tax credit affordable housing project.
[directive] For automated expungements pursuant to a Supreme Court Order,1 a Certification of Expungement signed by the Superior Court Clerk of New Jersey will be provided in accordance with the attached procedures.  These procedures pertain to Superior Court and Municipal Court.  Please contact Criminal Practice at (609) 815-2900 ext. 55300; Family Practice at (609) 815-2900 ext. 55350; or Municipal Court Services at (609) 815-2900 ext. 54850 with any questions concerning these procedures.  Attachments:  (1)  Requestor Instructions for Obtaining Expunged or Sealed Records Ordered by Superior Court or Municipal Court (2)  Court Staff Procedures for Providing Copies of Expunged or Sealed Records Ordered by Superior Court or Municipal Court  (3)  Requestor Instructions for Obtaining a Certification of Expungement by Supreme Court Order (4)  Court Staff Procedures for Providing a Certification on Matters Expunged by Supreme Court Order (5)  Record Request Form for an Individual to Obtain Copies of Their Own Expunged and/or Sealed Records (CN 12830)  (6)  Order Permitting the Release of Expunged or Sealed Records (CN 12831)  cc: Chief Justice [...]
[brief] 1.  **The Trial Court Applied the Correct Legal Standard in Assessing the Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Pleading.  (7a-17a)**  In her brief, Plaintiff claims “the lower court failed to apply the prevailing NJLAD retaliation standard, and consider Plaintiff’s allegations within that standard. ”  Pb25.  Particularly, Plaintiff contends the court erred in applying *El-Sioufi v. St. Peter’s Univ. Hosp.*, 382 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2005) and *Spinks v. Township of Clinton*, 402 N.J. Super. 465 (App. Div. 2008), and should have, instead, applied the standard articulated in *Roa v. Roa*, 200 N.J. 555 (2010).  Plaintiff’s argument is erroneous.  Indeed, the trial court’s application of *El-Sioufi* and *Spinks* was proper given that *Roa* did not overturn such decisions.  Plaintiff suggests, without citing to any legal authority, that *El-Sioufi* and *Spinks* should be completely disregarded by the Court simply because they predated *Roa v. Roa*.  Pb26.  Yet, Plaintiff points to no authority overturning these two decisions.  Despite Plaintiff’s preference for the *Roa* decision, the fact remains that the holdings in both *El-Sioufi* and *Spinks* remain authoritative and have been cited by the Appellate Division in numerous cases since *Roa* was decided in 2010, and as recently as five (5) months ago.
[brief] Defendants’ Brief fails to recognize a number of factors set forth in Plaintiff’s Certification.  First of all, the Plaintiff did not “perform legal work” on an as-needed basis.  Clearly, the Plaintiff had regular office hours, had an assistant and a secretary.  In other words, the work of the County was done by County employees in the Administration Building.  The legal work of the County was done for the County in the County’s building.  How the RPCs Influenced the Plaintiff’s Work  The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff should have resigned rather than be placed in a situation where the RPCs come into play.  What the Defendants failed to recognize is that in connection with the ballot issue, and the payment of the Sheriff’s personal legal expenses, were objected to by the Plaintiff and they are the CEPA predicates.  When a lawyer-Plaintiff agrees to carry out the wrongful conduct, then there is a problem.  In this case, the Plaintiff objected.  The Non-Renewal of a Contract Can in Fact be a Retaliatory Act
[brief] On pages 16a-19a, the trial court gives undue attention to the testimony of ‘several residents’ regarding the Mitchell and Cole applications.  This net opinion lay testimony raised issues definitively answered by both Plaintiff’s expert, [...], and the City engineer, [...].  In the transcript, p. 69, L.9-11, [...] noted that wetlands in the rear of the property limit development, and that topography runs from Maple Avenue (L. 13).  The waiver of strict compliance required seepage pits at the four corners of the house for the downspouts (L. 19-21).  On T. page 73, L. 10-25, the issue of the permitted, legal location for the septic system is definitively answered.  Yet, the trial court overlooks this expert testimony, relying instead on questionably relevant lay testimony expressing concerns about flooding on an uphill property, mosquitoes near a large South Jersey swamp and wetlands, and the septic system and water table.  In the final analysis, at t. p. 77, L. 12 – p. 80, L. 22, the City engineer, an expert, states that the septic system proposed for this lot is “…designed in accordance with the County Health Department regulations. ”  POINT VI
[brief] Objectors seek a review of the Trial Court Judgment denying them a requested extension of time in which to file their Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs.  (Pa862).  Objectors argue that the Trial Court erred by failing to acknowledge the existence of important and novel constitutional questions surrounding the absence of due process in the [...] decision-making process.  (Pa852).  Notwithstanding the foregoing, the: 1)  The Landmarks Commission is not a party to this action.  (Pa862); and 2)  The Objectors took no action to seek any type of review of the Landmarks Commission Certificate of Appropriateness though a copy of that Certificate was entered into evidence on the record of the March 28, 2022 hearing.  (Pa426).  Absence of Issues of Public Interest
[brief] Even less than the “ministerial” involvement in _Harris_, [...] did not have any involvement whatsoever in Defendant’s case while serving at the prosecutors office.  In accord with Harris, even if she had been involved ministerially with the case’s prosecution, she would still need not recuse herself.  Clearly, a rule prohibiting [...] from hearing criminal cases arising from the prosecutors office in the same vicinage would render her unable to sit on the criminal bench there, and even a rule prohibiting [...] from hearing any criminal cases arising from that prosecutors office containing accusations of misconduct or bad faith on the part of the State would hamstring the courts, as such accusations or implications can be commonplace.
[brief] A loan is defined, in its noun iteration, as “A thing lent for the borrowers temporary use. ” (Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 947).  However, there are transactions described as loans which do not have an absolute right to repayment.  Non-recourse loans are not unusual in the business world.  A non-recourse loan is one where the lenders right to repayment is limited to the value of the collateral existing at the time of default.  A nonrecourse loan is defined as “a secured loan that allows the lender to attach only the collateral, not the borrower’s personal assets, if the loan is not repaid.  (Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 947).  The transaction meets the definition of a non-recourse loan.  What the trial court did not appear to consider was that the agreements are titled, by the defendant, “LAWSUIT FUNDING AGREEMENT.
[brief] (1T64-7 to 8).  [...] got out of the truck \(^3\)  While the car was a Hyundai, at one point during his testimony [...] mistakenly stated the car was a white Honda but then he, [...], and all counsel continued to correctly refer to the car as a Hyundai.  (1T21-3 to 9). and into the passenger seat of defendant’s car.  (1T21-7 to 9; 1T22-2 to 6).  Defendant then pulled out of the parking spot, drove all the way around the parking lot, and ultimately stopped one parking aisle away from where [...]’s Toyota was parked.  (1T21-7 to 9; 1T22-2 to 6).  [...] then exited and walked back to his truck.  (1T21-7 to 9; 1T22-2 to 6).  At this point, both vehicles then left the parking lot onto Route 37.  (1T25-3 to 5; 1T61-13).  Based on his training and experience [...] determined the interaction was highly indicative of a drug transaction.  (1T23-5 to 14).
[directive] Issuance of order by court.  4.  a.  When a person is charged with a criminal offense on a warrant and the person is released from custody before trial on bail or personal recognizance, the court, upon application of a law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney pursuant to section 3 of P.L. 2001, c.365 (C.2C:35-5.9) and except as provided in subsection e. of this section, shall as a condition of release issue an order prohibiting the person from entering any place defined by subsection b. of section 3 of P.L.1999, c.334 (C.2C:35-5.6), including a buffer zone surrounding the place or modifications as provided by subsection f. of this section.
[brief] T. at 9:5-17:19.  The trial court dismissed Count Two of the Complaint based on its finding that the “words and phrases in the [Act’s] attorney exemption are not unconstitutionally vague and should be interpreted within their ordinary meaning. ”  T. at 17:23-18:2.  The trial court made this finding even though it acknowledged that the Legislature has not defined or provided any guidance on defining “principally engaged” or “attorney-at-law of this State. ”  T. at 21:15-20.  The trial court applied an incorrect level of scrutiny to the Limited Attorney Exemption even though it imposes criminal penalties and effectively held that a layperson can understand these terms even though [...] cannot explain them (testimony ignored by the trial court).  T. at 19:20-20:4.  The trial court dismissed Count Three of the Complaint contending that the Limited Attorney Exemption is not overbroad based on a holding that the Act “did not regulate the practice of law, but a separate business of debt adjustment.
[brief] “[T]he best indicator of that intent is the statutory language[.]”  Richardson, 192 N.J. at 195 (first alteration in original) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).  “A court should ‘ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole. ’”  D’Ambrosio v. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 403 N.J. Super. 321, 334 (App. Div. 2008) (citing DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492).  Here, the Legislature clearly intended a limitation period of eligibility for the presumption or recalculation provided under the Ricci Act, as the plain language of the statute sets a two-year deadline ending July 8, 2021, after which a “retiree shall not be eligible” for such benefits.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  Under [...]’s argument, any member of [...] who was unaware of the Ricci Act could apply at any arbitrarily distant point in the future.  This would nullify the two-year time limitation created by the Legislature, extend the presumption beyond its intended time frame, and diminish the ability of [...] and [...] to verify applicants’ dates and locations of service as witnesses and memories inevitably continue to become unavailable and fade.  Ignoring the plain language of the statute, which imposes a two-year deadline, would not further the legislative purpose of the Ricci Act.  Even if the statutory language were not clear, [...]’s position would lead to an absurd result which would render the two-year statutory limitation superfluous.  In this regard, “[w]hen construing a statute, ‘legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. ’”  State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 449 (2011)(quoting Franklin Tower One, LLC v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 613 (1999).  Accordingly, [...] reasonably denied [...]’s request to apply for amended benefits under the Ricci Act because he failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the required statutory timeframe.
[brief] Exhibit I, Deposition of [...], dated July 11, 2018, filed May 24, 2019 (Volume 11 of 15 – Pa1961 to Pa2160)  Exhibit J, Order on Motion to Dismiss, dated August 4, 2017, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit K, Deposition of [...], P.E., dated September 10, 2018, filed May 24, 2019 (Volume 12 of 15 – Pa2161 to Pa2360)  Exhibit L, Deposition of [...], P.E., dated June 12, 2018, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit M, Report of [...], with Exhibits A through N, dated January 4, 2018, filed May 24, 2019 (omitted here – see 688a)  Exhibit N, Agreement between [...] and [...], dated April 26, 2014, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit O, Estate of Alexander v. Northeast Sweepers, A-1123-17 (App. Div. Apr. 19, 2018) (unpublished), filed May 24, 2019