ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Authority Mismanaged The Project Garage By Failing To Operate It Efficiently  At trial, [...] introduced the expert testimony of [...], a parking expert with more than thirty years of experience in the parking industry.  His expert report was subsequently introduced into evidence.  Pa729-775; 4T156:11-157:4.  In his unrebutted expert testimony, [...] detailed the extent of the Authority’s mismanagement and inefficient operation of the Project Garage.  [...] highlighted obvious wasteful inefficiencies in the Authority’s operation of the Project Garage that increased costs paid by [...].  He testified that although the Project Garage has current technology, the Authority does not use it to “its full potential” which would cut the overall cost to [...] for the Project Garage’s operations.  4T108:16-20.  [...] also pointed out that the Authority is over-staffing the Project Garage (which increases [...]’s payroll costs) to process parking tickets manually when the parking validation system that [...] purchased can read those tickets without the need for staffing.  4T108:21-109:6.  [...] testified that [...] pays for two insurance policies on the Project Garage, because although [...] maintains a general liability policy for the Project Garage, the Authority inexplicably purchased a duplicative insurance policy for which [...] has been charged.  4T116:1-17.  [...] also took exception to the revenues generated at the Project Garage.  He estimated that, based on pre-Project images, the prior surface lot on the Mall site supported approximately 330 parking spaces.  4T128:16-10.  The Project Garage contained 657 spots—almost twice as many.  Ibid.  [...] opined that if the number of parking spaces doubled, it would be reasonable to assume that parking revenue would also double.  4T129:2-4.  Yet despite twice the number of parking spaces, parking revenue decreased by over fifty percent.  Id.  P.
[brief] ”  *Id.*  Pursuant to Section 8.7 of the Redevelopment Agreement, [...], [...], and [...] acknowledged the consent of [...]  (“[...],” now known as [...]), the third-party insurer of [...]’s outstanding parking revenue bonds, was required prior to undertaking any action or issuing any additional obligations to finance the construction of [...] Garage.  Da111-Da112.  Specifically, Section 8.7(a) of the Redevelopment Agreement provides as follows:
[directive] Interjurisdictional Pursuits 10.1  The original pursuing jurisdiction shall provide timely notification of a pursuit in progress to any other jurisdiction into which the pursuit enters.  Notifying another jurisdiction that a pursuit is in progress is not a request to join the pursuit.  The pursuing agency shall advise if assistance is necessary.  Whenever the pursuing officers are unfamiliar with the roadways and terrain of the jurisdiction into which the pursuit has entered, the pursuing agency shall, when possible, seek the assistance of, and be prepared to relinquish the pursuit to, the other agency.  13
[brief] “Th[e]se principles have been distilled to a simple question: ‘Would a reasonable, fully informed person have doubts about the judge's impartiality?’”  Ibid. (quoting DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 517 (2008)).  Here, at trial, (i) without having first read the Lease (1T18-4 to 1T18-6), and (ii) after hearing Tenant’s argument that Landlord owed Tenant more than double under the Lease what Landlord claimed to be owed by Tenant (1T6-8 to 1T6-11; 1T25-11 to 1T25-13), the trial judge informed the parties that, (iii) after he reviewed the lease, in order to “get rid of this,” it would “be up to the tenant to either pay . . . or . . . a warrant will have to be issued,” and “judgment will be entered” (1T36-9 to 1T36-25).  Under these circumstances, a reasonable, fully informed person would not merely have doubts about the judge’s impartiality; a reasonable person would assume the judge had already disregarded the tenant’s argument.  Otherwise, why would the only two possible outcomes be (1) tenant pays or (2) judgment of possession?  Other than feigning “offens[e]” on the trial court’s behalf at Tenant’s allegedly “disrespectful” contention that the trial court ruled out Tenant’s primary defense before looking at the lease documents, Landlord offers nothing substantive to in any way dispute that is what happened (Pb31).  Landlord does not contradict, attempt to rationalize, or even comment on the judge’s above remarks.  Instead, aside from its affected umbrage, Landlord rests its entire counterargument on the fact that the judge asked for post-trial briefing and then, at the next court session, months after making the above comments, stated that he had “look[ed] at the contract[]” (Pb31) (quoting 2T9-15 to 2T9-17).  Neither of these banal observations belies the fact that the judge had already decided before looking at the lease that the only two possible outcomes of the case were that either tenant pays landlord or a judgment of possession is entered, both of which were dismissive of Tenant’s lease-based argument.  Because judicial bias “constitutes structural error,” and a violation of due process, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 14 (2016), a remand for adjudication by a different judge is warranted.
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  To weigh the foregoing, *In re Resolution* adopted the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in *Cort v. Ash*, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).  To determine whether a statute confers an implied private right of action, the Court **must** “consider whether: (1) [[...]] is a member of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted; (2) there is any evidence that the Legislature intended to create a private right of action under the statute; and (3) it is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to infer the existence of such a remedy.
[brief] The school Lot 5 was required to have Variance/Site Plan Approval in 1972 to expand the school.  If the courtyard were to be used for the off-site parking of another use/Lot, there certainly would have to be an approval of proper signage, fire lanes, space and lane markings, all by an appropriate site plan.  There can be no dispute that under current Zoning Regulations, Site Plan Approval for such an off-site parking, use --- providing for marked spaces, aisles, signs, fire lanes, access drive --- is required.
[brief] Plaintiffs contended and the trial court found that the award of fees was authorized by contract between the parties.\footnote{Plaintiffs also argued that a fee award was permitted under the New Jersey Trade Secrets Act.  25T18:7-23.  This argument was rejected by the trial court.  25T89:23-90:15}  Because contractual provisions that shift liability for attorneys' fees are in derogation of the common law, our courts "strictly construe" such provisions.  \textit{Litton}, 200 N.J. at 385; \textit{N. Bergen Rex Transp.}, 158 N.J. at 570; \textit{McGuire v. Jersey City}, 125 N.J. 310, 326-27 (1991).  In \textit{Green v. Morgan Properties}, 215 N.J. 431, 455 (2013), the Court emphasized, "[W]e have made plain that . . . contractual fee-shifting provisions are strictly construed."
[directive] Separation Section 223(a)(I 3) of the Act provides that all juveniles in custody within a secure lockup facility shall be sight and sound separated from detained adults.  N.J.S.A. 2AAA-37(c) reinforces this requirement by stating that “...a juvenile maybe held in a police station in a place other than one designed for detention of prisoners and apart from any adult charged with or convicted of crime for a brief period if such holding is necessary to allow release....”  Sight contact is defined as sustained and clear visual contact between juveniles in custody and detained adults in close proximity to one another.  Sound contact is defined as direct oral communication between juveniles in custody and detained adults.  Sight and/or sound contact that is both brief and inadvertent, or accidental, is allowable.  3.  Jail and Lockup Removal Section 223(a)(14) of the Act, provides that juveniles cannot be detained in any adult jail or lockup.  However, the Act does allow a juvenile to be detained in a municipal lockup, while sight and sound separated from adults, for up to a maximum of six hours for the purposes of identification, processing, and to arrange for release to parents or transfer to other authorities.
[brief] New Jersey law makes clear that an agreement is interpreted in accordance with the intention of the parties -- but that intention must be established within and by the actual language of the agreement.  “The polestar of construction is the intention of the parties to the contract as revealed by the language used, taken as an entirety…”  Atlantic Northern Airlines v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 301 (1953) (emphasis added).  Moreover,  The admission of evidence of extrinsic facts is not for the purpose of changing the writing, but to secure light by which to measure its actual significance.  Such evidence is admissible only for the purpose of interpreting the writing — not for the purpose of modifying or enlarging or curtailing its terms, but to aid in determining the meaning of what has been said.  So far as the evidence tends to show, not the meaning of the writing, but an intention wholly unexpressed in the writing, it is irrelevant.  The judicial interpretive function is to consider what was written in the context of the circumstances under which it was written, and accord to the language a rational meaning in keeping with the expressed general purpose.  Conway v. 287 Corporate Center Associates, 187 N.J. at 269 (quoting Schwimmer, 12 N.J. at 302) (emphasis added).  Therefore, New Jersey law holds that, when interpreting a contract, a court must conduct “an examination solely into that intent which is expressed or apparent in the writing. ”  Deerhurst Estates v. Meadow Homes, 64 N.J.Super. 134, 148 (App. Div. 1960), certif. den. 34 N.J. 134 (1961).  “An actual intent which is not made known in the instrument will not be given effect. ”  Deerhurst Estates v. Meadow Homes, 64 N.J.Super. at 148.  In the end, “the law will not enforce a different contract than the parties have seen fit to express in their writing. ”  Deerhurst Estates v. Meadow Homes, 64 N.J.Super. at 148.  “It has been decided many times and in many cases that the court will not make a different or a better contract than the parties themselves have seen fit to enter into. ”  Washington Const. Co. v. Spinella, 8 N.J. 212, 217 (1951).  POINT II
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  This discovery dispute arises as part of ongoing, nationwide litigation between the United Defendants and Plaintiffs’ affiliates.  The United Defendants are insurers or administrators of employer-sponsored health benefit plans.  Da60 ¶ 17.  Plaintiffs are physician practice groups who provide staffing for hospital emergency rooms.  Da2 ¶ 5.  Plaintiffs allege that between May 15, 2020, and December 31, 2021, Defendants underpaid thousands of claims for out-of-network emergency medical services.  Da6-7 ¶¶ 24-29.  Plaintiffs further allege that [...], a third-party cost-containment vendor, conspired with the United Defendants to underpay claims by offering an allegedly fraudulent health claim pricing service.  Da8-11 ¶¶ 35-49.  Plaintiffs brought suit raising several causes of action, including counts for quantum meruit and violations of New Jersey’s Health Claims Authorization, Processing and Payment Act (“HCAPPA”) against the United Defendants, as well as counts under New Jersey’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) against all Defendants.  Da11-22 ¶¶ 51-116.¹  In April 2023, the trial court entered an Electronic Discovery Stipulation and Order (“ESI Stipulation”).  Da79-86 ¶¶ 1-13.  The ESI Stipulation required ¹  The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of implied-in-fact contract.  Da77-78. the parties to collaborate in identifying “custodians whose email is reasonably believed to contain relevant ESI for collection, review and production” and in developing “search parameters” to use in searching the agreed-upon custodians’ ESI.  Da79 ¶ 3 (emphasis added).  The trial court subsequently entered an Amended Discovery Confidentiality Order allowing the parties to designate documents “Confidential” or “Attorney’s Eyes Only. ”  Da89-96 ¶¶ 1-2.  On May 1, 2023, the court also appointed a Special Discovery Master pursuant to Rule 4:41-1 “to hear and recommend resolution of all discovery disputes between the parties.
[brief] 138 N.J. at 431-32.  In order to maintain a cause of action under CEPA, a plaintiff must establish the following *prima facie* elements: [1] he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer’s conduct was violating either a law, rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; [2] he or she performed a “whistle-blowing” activity described in *N.J.S.A.* 34:19-3; [3] an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and [4] a causal connection exists between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment action.
[brief] The Trial Court was presented with an arbitration award that was well-reasoned, supported by the record, and rendered by an experienced arbitrator—after a full 8-day hearing, live testimony from 14 witnesses, post-trial findings of fact and conclusions of law, oral and written closing statements, post-trial briefing, and several post-award submissions (“Arbitration” / “Arbitrator” / “Award”).  In a transparent effort to delay and frustrate [...]’s ability to enforce the Award and collect on its judgment, [...] opposed the motion to confirm the Award, moved to vacate and/or modify on frivolous grounds, and now appeals on the same exact bases.  [...]’s appeal is predicated on inappropriate attempts to re-consider arbitral evidence and re-litigate the Arbitration proceedings.  Even more bad faith is [...]’s legally meritless request to offset [...]’s fully adjudicated post-trial Award (now a judgment) with [...]’s late-filed and extraneous claims, asking this Court to further forestall [...]’s ability to collect on its nearly $4 million Award while [...] pursues newly fabricated claims against [...], which could take years to fully adjudicate.  [...]’s strategy is shamelessly transparent and unsupported by any precedent.  Make no mistake about what is occurring in this appeal—[...] lost the Arbitration, lost at the Trial Court, and now wants this Court to nonetheless order a do-over.  That is not how arbitration works.  As the Trial Court properly recognized, this is not a de novo review of the Arbitration’s entire (and lengthy) record, as much as [...] wishes it were so.  Here, in contesting the Arbitrator’s and Trial Court’s decisions to award [...] damages and interest thereon, [...] seeks to drag this Court into the Arbitration’s weeds, asking the Court to revisit the merits of a tried-to-completion Arbitration, and to even reconsider evidence presented at trial (appending approximately 22 trial exhibits herein, including [...]’s additional self-created “exhibits” summarizing various of those exhibits, Da391-94).  To that end, [...] rehashes flawed arguments fully considered and ultimately rejected by the Arbitrator (after substantial briefing and testimony) and based on his determinations as to relevancy, burden of proof, and weighing of the evidence and witness credibility.  [...] correctly deferred to the Arbitrator’s findings and rejected [...]’s attempts to re-argue its lost case in the Trial Court.  None of [...]’s arguments had any merit whatsoever and, in any event, the Arbitrator’s merits rulings cannot be reexamined or disturbed absent the narrow and statutorily inapplicable bases in the New Jersey Arbitration Act.
[brief] “The only hearing required before adoption of a redevelopment plan, as with any other municipal ordinance, is a legislative hearing before the governing body.  See N.J.S.A. 40:49-2b.  Consequently, if an action is brought challenging a redevelopment plan, there ordinarily is no administrative record other than whatever report the planning board may have submitted to the governing body and a transcript of the quasi-legislative hearing before the governing body,” and that’s *Hirth* [v. City of Hoboken], 337 N.J. Super. [149,] 165 [(App. Div. 2001)].
[brief] The following shall not be considered subdivisions within the meaning of this act, if no new streets are created: (1) divisions of land found by the planning board or subdivision committee thereof appointed by the chairman to be for agricultural purposes where all resulting parcels are 5 acres or larger in size, (2) divisions of property by testamentary or intestate provisions, (3) divisions of property upon court order, including but not limited to judgments of foreclosure, (4) consolidation of existing lots by deed or other recorded instrument and (5) the conveyance of one or more adjoining lots, tracts or parcels of land, owned by the same person or persons and all of which are found and certified by the administrative officer to conform to the requirements of the municipal development regulations and are shown and designated as separate lots, tracts or parcels on the tax map or atlas of the municipality.  The term "subdivision" shall also include the term "resubdivision. ”  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-7.
[brief] On June 30, 2022, defendant appeared for sentencing before [...].  The judge found that count five (possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose) merged into the four homicide counts.  (17T225-16 to 227-3, 234-10 to 11; Da19).  On counts one (first-degree murder of [...]), two (first-degree murder of [...]), three (first-degree murder of [...]), and four (first-degree murder of [...]), the court sentenced defendant to four maximum custodial term of 50 years, with mandatory NERA and Graves Act parole disqualifiers.  (17T227-9 to 228-15; Da16).  Count two (first-degree murder of [...]) was imposed concurrent to count one (first-degree murder of [...]).  (17T233-20 to 23; Da16).  Counts three (first-degree murder of [...]) and four (first-degree murder of [...]) were imposed consecutively to each other and consecutively to counts one and two.  (17T232-23 to 234-1; Da16).  Defendant’s maximum custodial term is 150 years, subject to NERA and a five-year parole supervision period on each count.  (17T234-2 to 9, 235-2 to 3).  On or about August 5, 2022, defendant filed a Notice of Appeal.  (Da24).  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] [...]:  Yes, that's correct, Your Honor.  And just to have you made aware that I did complete a NERA form for [...], one for the armed robbery, first degree, in Hamilton, which would subject him to a five-year period of parole supervision after the completion of his sentence.  And I also -- I also completed one for the felony murder, Judge, just to be safe but I'm not certain that if he does 30 do 30 if that would apply but I did complete it and it's attached to the plea form.  And lastly, Your Honor, you could see on the bottom of the first page that [...] is reserving his right to appeal the 404(b) decision in the homicide case and the motion to suppress physical evidence in the Hamilton armed robbery case.  Other than that, Judge, I think that's -- that's what our deal is.
[directive] Juvenile Violent and Score Risk Moderate a Involving Crimes Serious 7.4.3 seeking of presumption the unless Section 7.3, under covered otherwise not cases  In pretrial for shall apply prosecutor the 7.4.6, subsection to pursuant overcome is detention pretrial  Appear to Failure the crime and second-degree or afirst- for is charge present the if detention risk pretrial automated the by determined score (NCA)
[brief] In this case, the benefit that [...] sought when it filed its Complaint in this matter was insurance coverage for costs incurred to investigate and remediate property damage at the [...] and a declaration that the insurance company defendants are obligated to provide insurance coverage under their policies.  (Pa 9-13).  [...] succeeded on both of those issues.  After thirty trial days, during which the court heard testimony from seven live witnesses, and received “extensive exhibits, deposition testimony and written submissions,” the Honorable [...] of the trial court rejected [...]’s denial of responsibility and found that [...] is entitled to insurance coverage for its claim.  (Pa 91-137).  Indeed, despite taking the position at the beginning of the liability trial that “there is no coverage for these claims,” [...] finally concedes now that it “owes [...] approximately $900,000” as partial indemnification for its losses, plus 6.4% of all covered costs incurred after December 31, 2018.  (Db, p. 2, Pa 41-60).  As Judge Stroumtsos correctly noted in his discussion of whether [...] was a successful claimant, “the issue of indemnity was a significant issue in this litigation. ”  (Pa 50).  [...] filed its Complaint on March 17, 2005.  (Pa 1).  The insurance company defendants then took years of extensive discovery seeking evidence to defeat [...]’s claim that it was entitled to indemnification for its losses. \(^4\)  After five years of discovery, a three-month trial was held during which [...] and the other remaining insurance companies tried to convince the trial court that [...] was not entitled to any coverage for its losses.  (see generally Pa 91-137).  Throughout its pleadings and the trial, [...] contended that [...] was not entitled to any coverage for the Plainville claim.
[brief] Last, the trial court correctly found that the balance of hardships and the public interest weighed in favor of preliminary injunctive relief to maintain the status quo.  As explained above, Appellants did not and have not demonstrated any meaningful harm they would suffer from a temporary delay in implementing the Amended Policy—a delay only so long as is necessary to resolve the pending administrative action.  See Pfaus, 97 N.J. Super. at 8.  Strikingly, Appellants do not contest the court’s factual finding that the Original Policy had been in effect “uneventfully since at least 2019,” (Da115), nor do Appellants show that they were subject to liability during those four-plus years under any of the statutory provisions on which they now rely.  To the contrary, as a long line of cases instructs, Appellants’ vague assertions of “abstract harms” and inconvenience are insufficient.  See Garden State Equality v. Dow, 216 N.J 314, 327-28 (2013); N.J. State Policeman’s Benevolent Ass’n v. Murphy, 470 N.J. Super. 568, 594 (App. Div. 2022).
[brief] **C.  [...]’s Motion**  [...] has also brought a motion to compel or, alternatively, to exclude certain documents.  [...].  [...] first moves the Court to compel [...] to identify every person [...] claims [...] spread false rumors to, as well as the basis for [...]’s belief that [...] made these statements.  In the Second Amended Complaint [...] alleges that [...] wrote letters to “[...], [...], and [...], and possibly others” that “contained false statements of fact that were published to third parties. ”  [...] at 8.  [...] therefore asked in its interrogatories that [...] identify every person to whom [...] claims [...] spread false rumors, as well as the basis for [...]’s belief that [...] made these statements.  In its response, [...] stated that [...] had made false statements to, among others, “[...] members (at multiple conferences and among multiple industry attendants)” and that “[...]’s CEO [...] is the source of these false statements and rumors. ”  [...]-2 at 5.  The [...] is a trade organization with many members.  Without knowing what false statements or rumors [...] alleges [...] made, to whom those rumors were spread, when they were made, and the basis for [...]’s assertions, [...] cannot determine the subject matter or scope of [...]’s defamation claim.  It therefore brought its motion.  However, at the hearing held July 6, 2016, [...] agreed that it would revise its interrogatory responses to clarify which entities it alleges received defamatory statements and remove any alleged statements which it no longer seeks to pursue at trial.  Accordingly, [...] is **ORDERED** to revise its responses to [...]’s Second Set of Interrogatories Numbers 1 and 2 accordingly.