ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Id., citing Miller at 480.  Whether the juvenile offender still fails to appreciate risks and consequences and whether he or she has matured or been rehabilitated are among the factors to be considered.  The trial court may consider other relevant evidence from both parties including, but not limited to, the juvenile offender's behavior in prison and any rehabilitative efforts taken by the defendant since sentencing.  Once the evidence has been evaluated, the judge has the discretion to affirm or reduce the original sentence within the statutory range, and to reduce the parole bar below the statutory limit, but not less than 20 years.
[brief] His statement about going home quoted by the State -- that he was “[r]eady to go the f**k home” -- was admittedly less direct than the others, but that was his fourth such statement and ninth verbal invocation.  (Pb 10)  Each of those required the police to cease questioning, or at the very least clarify his intentions, but they did neither.  See S.S., 229 N.J. at 383-84; State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 571-72 (2012) (calling a request to “go home” an “assertion about wanting to leave” and suggesting it would be an invocation if actually communicated).  The detectives’ blatant disregard for [...]’s legal rights impermissibly undermined the voluntariness of his statement.  Sims, 250 N.J. at 217 (considering whether police “ignored a request to leave”).  In addition, [...]’s repeated prolonged silences, visible attempts to rest between breaks, and verbal assertion that he was “tired as hell” further demonstrated that the detectives’ seven-hour-long interrogation mentally and physically exhausted him.  See State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 281-84 (1990) (“Silence itself has been interpreted as an invocation of the right to remain silent. ”); Q.N., 179 N.J. at 179 (considering “sign[s] of exhaustion or fatigue”).  Therefore, this Court should reject the State’s assertion that the police dutifully respected [...]’s attempts to end their aggressive interrogation.
[brief] (ID: 049051995)  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (ID:159502015)  Date: May 29, 2024  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF CONTENTS | i | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  | iii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | STATEMENT OF THE FACTS | 4 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 12 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 14 |  ##  I.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THIS MATTER AFTER FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF ASSIGNED HIS RIGHTS TO THIS LAWSUIT TO THIRD PARTIES AND IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF LACKED STANDING TO BRING THIS LAWSUIT AS A RESULT OF THE ASSIGNMENTS (T1 4:6 – 12:4)
[directive] Threatening Assailant.  A person who is threatening the use of force against an officer or another person, with or without a weapon, in an aggressive manner that may cause bodily injury.  Examples may include a person armed with a weapon who fails to disarm, and an unarmed person who advances on an officer or any other person in a threatening manner thereby reducing the officer’s time to react, putting the officer in reasonable fear of a physical attack.  Time as a Tactic.
[brief] [...] relies on his opening brief and adds only the following regarding Point II.A.  The State argues that it was not error for the trial court to permit the jury to hear the portions of the police interrogation in which the detectives repeatedly referenced a positive out-of-court identification because, the State says, those references were not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted and were not hearsay.  (Pb 18-19)  First, they were used for their truth because the detectives repeatedly asserted that [...] was in fact guilty because an eyewitness identified him; the State -- the proponent of the evidence -- failed to offer any alternative purpose.  Second, even if they were not intended for their truth, given the significant risk that the jury would use them for that improper purpose, the court’s failure to give a limiting instruction was plain error.  State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 610 (2004).  Third, the State’s focus on the detectives’ comments misses the point.  The primary harm was not solely the court’s admission of [...]’s out-of-court identification but its denial of proper cross examination to impeach the reliability of her identification once it came in.  The unfairness in this case was that the State was permitted to admit a damning out-of-court identification but then objected to the defense’s attempt to provide context for that identification.  For the reasons stated in [...]’s opening brief, the admission of that half-truth was extremely misleading and violated his right to confrontation and the rule of completeness.  See N.J.R.E. 106 (“If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part, or any other writing or recorded statement, that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time. ”).  For the same reason, although defense counsel mentioned the identification in his opening, invited error does not apply because he in no way urged the court to exclude the proper cross examination that he attempted.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] He ERRED when he ignored matters of law that are required by the trial court to grant a judgment by default against the defendant.  And he ERRED by ignoring the rights under the law for the business defendant, [...]  He acted in error, as if, there was only one defendant.  There are two (2) defendants.  Both have rights under the law.  Without obtaining in the trial court a judgment against the “Borrower,” the defendant, [...], obtaining in the trial court a judgment against the “Guarantor,” the defendant, [...], would be NOT be possible.
[brief] While Appellant maintains that such an argument “is not form over substance,” that is precisely what Appellant’s argument is.  Pb25.  Appellant offers no statutory or judicial authority for its claim in that regard as there is none.  Further, Appellant’s argument as to the form of ordinances is pure makeweight as the record was clear that the purpose of Ordinance 2022-17 was to amend the Redevelopment Plan that was initially adopted via Ordinance 2022-15.  For the Appellant to maintain that “the record in this case fails to provide any explanation for the township’s conduct” is a plain misstatement of the record.  Pb25.  The findings and rationale for the Committee’s actions relative to the adoption and subsequent amendment of the Redevelopment Plan went well beyond the requirements of New Jersey law.  Any argument to the contrary is ignorant of the applicable legal standards and established record in this matter.  **CONCLUSION**
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[brief] 17, 39, 41 Lauder v. Teaneck Volunteer Ambulance Corps., 386 N.J. Super. 320 (App. Div. 2004) ..................................................  31  Lowery v. Sanofi-Aventis LLC, 535 F. Supp. 3d 1157 (N.D. Ala. 2021)..............................................  38  Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584 (D.N.J. 2002) ....................................................  33, 41 McMillan v. Johnson & Johnson, 2005 WL 20000203 (D.N.J. Aug. 19, 2005) ..................................... 24-25, 28 Merck, Sharples & Dohme v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019).......................................................................
[brief] (Pa0362.)  On December 18, 2020, there was a conference call between Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s attorney, Defendants’ attorney, [...], and [...].  (4T49:2-14; 8T88:17-19.)  During the phone call, [...] again stated that the RIR was complete and advised that it had been submitted to the [...], which surprised Plaintiff and its representatives given that they never received a draft from [...] prior to submission.  (4T49:2 to 50:7; 8T88:17 to 89:7, 91:3 to 92:5; Pa0371-72; Pa0379.)
[brief] The FHACA authorizes DEP to adopt rules and regulations to delineate flood hazard areas, N.J.S.A. 58:16A-52, “to minimize damage to life and property from flooding caused by development within flood hazard areas,” N.J.A.C. 7:13-1.1(c).  Identifying the flood hazard area is therefore the first step in the FHACA permitting process.
[brief] Plaintiff has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to an annulment on the grounds of fraud.  Further, the Trial Court’s decision is supported with competent, relevant, credible evidence and should not be overturned.  Deference is especially appropriate when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility, as in this case.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for [...]  Respondent BY: [...]  Dated: November 20, 2024  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...], PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v.  CIVIL ACTION  BHOOMIKA PATEL, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.  On appeal from a final order entered in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Ocean County, [...]; [...], J.S.C.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS LAIBLE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT WAS MANIFESTLY UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENTIAL RECORD (36T50-1 to 51-21)... - 35 -  A.  The Trial Court Erred By Holding Defendant Liable For Breach Of Contract With Respect To Contracts That She Was Not A Party To…………-  35 - B.  The Record Evidence Did Not Establish That Defendant Breached Any Contract………………………………………………………………………………………………………- 36 - POINT IV.  THE TRIAL COURT’S HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS LAIBLE FOR BREACHING THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING WAS MANIFESTLY UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENTIAL RECORD (36T50-1 to 51-21)……………………………………………………- 37 - POINT V.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  A.  The Relevant Parties  Plaintiffs are the owners of the Property located within the [...] community.  (Da343; 341).  [...] is a corporation formed on June 14, 1948.  (Da57).  [...] was formed to, among other things, “promote and protect the general welfare and property rights of the property owner members in their use and enjoyment of their property at Ocean Beach. ”  Id. (emphasis added).  The 1948 [...] certificate of incorporation also references the “by-laws of the association. ”  Id.  B.  Plaintiffs’ Chain of Title from the Genesis Deed  On May 16, 1980, [...] conveyed the Property to Plaintiffs “subject to covenants, conditions and restrictions contained in prior deeds of record. ” (Da41).  The O’Keefe’s acquired the Property by deed from [...] on October 16, 1964, which was also subject to the “covenants, conditions and restrictions contained in prior deeds of record. ” (Da103).  Likewise, the Fitzpatricks acquired the Property by deed from [...] on February 5, 1947 (the “Genesis Deed”), which contained certain restrictive covenants running with the land.  (Da53).  This chain of title, and the restrictions set forth therein, are at the heart of this case.
[brief] Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents, [...] d/b/a [...] (i/p/a [...]) and [...] (i/p/a [...])  DATED: April 17, 2024  [...], Administrator  Ad Prosequendum for the [...], Plaintiff/Appellant v. [...]; BAYSHORE COMMUNITY HOSPITAL; BAYSHORE COMM HOSP-D INGENITO-TAX; [...], Defendants/Respondents.
[brief] More fundamentally, allowing this type of change to be imposed on all AIFs outside of the rulemaking process required by the Administrative Procedure Act sets a precedent of allowing substantive and dramatic changes to Department position without the safeguards contemplated by the APA.  As to promptness and the lack of prejudice, [...] has acted as promptly as possible in reaction to the November 2023 and January 2024 filings, particularly given the limited and discrete purpose for which it seeks intervention.  That is, “[o]n the issue of timeliness, the court must consider the purpose for which intervention is sought.
[brief] “Proof of general acceptance does not mean that there must be complete agreement in the scientific community about the techniques, methodology, or procedures that underlie the scientific evidence. ”  State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, 91-92 (2008); Ghigliotty, 463 N.J. Super. at 375; accord State v. McGuire, 419 N.J. Super. 88, 133 (App. Div. 2011).
[brief] This would have defeated the purpose of any refinance.  All litigation fees and attorney fees under Section 9 of the mortgage contract must be considered additional debt under the security instrument, and therefore must be included prior to Final Judgment as additional debt owed by the borrowers.  *Hatch v. T & L Associates*, 319 N.J. Super. 644 (App. Div. 1999), was clear that a Plaintiff can proceed to enforce the note in either General Equity or the Law Division.  However, Plaintiff must proceed cautiously as attempt to collect the debt in Law Division without foreclosure (General Equity) could result in unfair attorney fees to homeowner that would have been greatly reduced had the Plaintiff proceeded for foreclosure on the mortgage in General Equity.  The Plaintiff in *Hatch* was severely criticized for not proceeding in General Equity.  Proceeding in the Law Division increased the attorney fees significantly for the borrower, and the mortgage was not foreclosed upon.  Thus, since the mortgage remained (no foreclosure) the *Hatch* court had to reverse on other grounds as the mortgage remained and could not merge into the final judgment.  Plaintiff in the within case totally misconstrues the *Hatch* case.
[brief] The Court clarified that the arbitration provision would have otherwise been enforceable if it was contained in a typical contract between a commercial vendor and a customer.  Id. at 494.  “In clear and unambiguous language, the arbitration provision explain[ed] that [...] [chose] to arbitrate disputes rather than have them resolved in a court of law. ”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  Finally, the Court should consider the circumstances surrounding the bargaining between Appellants and [...].
[brief] *See Black Creek Sanctuary Condo Ass’n v. Fortress Inv. Grp.*, No. A-5227-12T3, 2015 WL 1565644, at *4 (App. Div. Apr. 9, 2015) (citing *Cineas*); see also *Lawson v. Dewar*, 268 N.J. Super. 128, 136 (App. Div. 2021) (warning against motions to reconsider that “constitute an unwarranted attempt to reverse matters previously decided solely because the prior judge is no longer available”).  This case falls squarely within this Court’s prior admonitions against “lateral appeals.
[brief] Plaintiff has returned to his original Feld VI December 10, 2014 lack of standing appellate oral argument before Judges [...], [...] and [...] when he caused Judge [...]’s face to turn beet red and [...] to blurt out “Where was our State AG?”  But see, In re IMO Town of Harrison and Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 116, 440 N.J. Super. 268 299 (App. Div. 2015) (“[W]hether a state agency is abiding by a valid state law ‘is a fundamental concern of the Attorney General both in his capacity to the agency and in his capacity and responsibility as protector of the public. ”)  Today, no one is above the law.  Public officials must honor their oaths of office to enforce and to execute the law faithfully and uniformly.  Public officials can no longer shirk their sworn public statutory and fiduciary duties and obligations.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] ”  Id. at 396-97.  “When a proponent [of expert testimony] does not demonstrate the soundness of a methodology, both in terms of its approach to reasoning and to its use of data . . . the gatekeeper should exclude the proposed expert testimony on the basis that it is unreliable. ”  Id. at 400.  Additionally, the net opinion rule “forbids the admission into evidence of an expert's conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence or other data. ”  Townsend, 221 N.J. at 53-54 (quoting Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569 (2008)).  “An expert's conclusion is excluded if it is based merely on unfounded speculation and unquantified possibilities. ”  Id. at 55.  Indeed, “when an expert speculates, he ceases to be an aid to the trier of fact and becomes nothing more than an additional juror. ”  Ibid.  Both of Plaintiff’s experts offered opinions that were patently unreliable.
[brief] Defendant, [...], respectfully requests that the Appellate Division enter an order dismissing Plaintiff’s appeal with prejudice.  In the event that the Appellate Division deems it necessary to and does consider and resolve [...]’ cross-claims, which seek the same relief granted by the trial court on other grounds, – i.e., the dismissal of the complaint and all claims with prejudice – [...] respectfully submits that both contentions in its cross-appeal should be granted and the trial court’s decision below on these issues reversed.
[brief] Absent particular fundamental interests (such as freedom of speech) that may be impinged upon, any governmental action from the issuance of a parking ticket to the seizure of a steel plant is presumptively valid.  The genius of our system of laws is that it is only a presumption, for both may be set aside upon proper proof that the presumption was unwarranted.  The exception, however, is a rare one, for the presumption goes deep, and indirectly includes the assumption of any conceivable state of facts, rationally conceivable on the record, that will support the validity of the action in question.  [See Southern Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel Tp., 92 N.J. 158, 306 (1983) (emphasis supplied). ]
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court in Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995), held that pursuant to R. 4:46-2, a court should grant summary judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  The Brill Court stated that, “[b]y its plain language, Rule 4:46-2 dictates that a court should deny a summary judgment motion only where the party opposing the motion has come forward with evidence that creates a "genuine issue as to any material fact challenged."  Id. at 529.  A determination whether there exists a "genuine issue" of material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.  Id. at 540.  This case as set forth herein, the substantial factor test applies.
[brief] Plaintiff argues on appeal that, “the scope of actions that can support NJLAD retaliation claims is extremely broad and can include a pattern of retaliatory actions. ”  Pb27.  Simply because the standard may be broad does not mean Plaintiff automatically satisfies it.  While a pattern of retaliatory conduct can support a LAD retaliation claim, in this case, the trial court considered and properly rejected Plaintiff’s claim finding that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead a pattern of retaliatory actions.
[directive] Physical Evidence ................................................................................................................... 35 7.4  Photographs ........................................................................................................................... 35 7.5  Physical Tests ......................................................................................................................... 36 7.6  Drug Testing ........................................................................................................................... 36 7.7  Polygraph ............................................................................................................................... 37 7.8  Search and Seizure ................................................................................................................. 37 7.9  Electronic Surveillance ...........................................................................................................  39  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 7.10  Lineups ................................................................................................................................... 41 7.11  Investigation of Firearm Discharges ...................................................................................... 41 7.12  Collateral Issues ..................................................................................................................... 43  8
[brief] I.  The suit limitation provision in the policy of insurance issued by [...] from which Plaintiff seeks underinsured motorist benefits is valid and Plaintiff’s claim was properly dismissed for failing to timely file her lawsuit in accordance with the terms of the insurance policy.  A.  The Suit Limitation Clause of the Defendant-Respondent, [...]’s Policy does not conflict with State Law.  Plaintiff argues that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 solely governs the statute of limitations applicable to uninsured and underinsured motorist claims.  Plaintiff argues that since N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 provides a six year statute of limitations on contract actions, the suit limitation provision of the [...] policy of insurance conflicts with the State Law and is invalid.  Therefore, Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], argues that the suit limitation clause in the policy of insurance from which she seeks benefits, is void, and the applicable Statute of Limitations should be set by the Statute of Limitations of six years pertaining to contract actions, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.
[brief] [1 New Jersey Evidence Courtroom Manual § 1 (2023)]  As previously noted, the court below found that it was compelled to re-open the cross-examination of [...] after it had concluded.  (16T3:13-23).  This was to allow questioning concerning the sentence [...] would receive.  (Ibid.).  The court also found that the Defense, in questioning [...] about his plea at length, had clearly drawn the inference that [...] had a motive to fabricate his testimony.  (16T10:1-23).  This was reasonable; there were thirteen questions asked by the Defense during cross-examination initially, which insinuated that [...] was testifying in whatever way necessary to receive a favorable sentence.  The Defense then went even further once cross-examination was re-opened, asking an additional seven questions concerning the sentence [...] believed he would receive in exchange for his testimony.  The court then told the State, unprompted, “you may redirect – redirect.
[brief] -  Thereafter, by way of Deed recorded June 18, 1920, [...] transferred ownership of what property interest that had been conveyed to him (what was then only upland property) to “[...] ”.  -  Thereafter, [...] failed to pay municipal real property taxes and as such the local municipality Defendant [...] filed a statutory Real Property Tax Foreclosure Action.  This action did not name [...] as a Defendant.  The [...] sought to foreclose, but as a matter of fact and law they could only foreclose on what was actually owned by Defendant [...], which DID NOT INCLUDE the Riparian Grant.