[brief] 2.  The plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 requires a motorist to signal a lane change.  Even if Williamson was not binding, the signaling requirement of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 plainly applies to lane changes.  The goal of construing statutes “is to discern the Legislature’s intent. ”  State v. Rosado, 475 N.J. Super. 266, 275 (App. Div. 2023) (citing State v. Twiggs, 233 N.J. 513, 532 (2018)).  “The plain language of a statute ‘is typically the best indicator of intent. ’”  State v. O’Donnell, 255 N.J. 60, 70 (2023) (quoting State v. A.M., 252 N.J. 432, 450 (2023)).  The “words and phrases” of a statute are not read “in isolation,” but instead read “in context, along ‘with related provisions[,] . . . to give sense to the legislation as a whole. ’”  A.M., 252 N.J. at 451 (alterations in original) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).  “Additionally, words alone do not control; rather it is the internal sense of the law which controls. ”  Loboda v. Clark Tp., 40 N.J. 424, 435 (1963).  Courts “‘strive[ ] for an interpretation that gives effect to all the statutory provisions and does not render any language inoperative, superfluous, void[,] or insignificant. ’”  State v. Gargano, 476 N.J. Super. 511, 524 (App. Div. 2023) (alterations in original) (quoting In re DiGuglielmo, 252 N.J. 350, 360 (2022).  “If the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then the interpretive process should end, without resort to extrinsic sources. ”  State v. D.A., 191 N.J. 158, 164 (2007) (citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. at 492).  “Only where the statutory language at issue is ambiguous should a court ‘look to extrinsic evidence[.]’”  State v. Martinez-Mejia, ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2023) (slip op. at 13) (quoting Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450, 467 (2014)).  This can include legislative history, relevant case law, and other sources.  O’Donnell, 255 N.J. at 74; State v. Carter, 247 N.J. 488, 513 (2021).  “Courts also consider extrinsic aids ‘if a literal reading of the statute would yield an absurd result, particularly one at odds with the overall statutory scheme. ’”  Carter, 247 N.J. at 513 (quoting Rozenblit v. Lyles, 245 N.J. 105, 122 (2021)).  The statute for which [...] was stopped provides in pertinent part:  No person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection unless the vehicle is in proper position upon the roadway as required in section 39:4-123, or turn a vehicle to enter a private road or driveway or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway, or start or back a vehicle unless and until such movement can be made with safety.  No person shall so turn any vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided in the event any other traffic may be affected by such movement.  A signal of intention to turn right or left when required shall be given continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.  [N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 (emphasis added). ]  Defendant claims that while a lane change must be made with safety under the first sentence, a lane change is not a “turn” as used in the statute and as the word is “commonly understood,” and thus a signal is not required under the second sentence.