ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (2T25:14-19).  [...] argued that there was no reasonable suspicion to ask defendant to get out of the car to conduct SFSTs.  (2T25:22-25).  The municipal prosecutor argued that when [...] arrived on the scene, he was simply looking to render aid.  (2T27:1-4).  However, during the course of offering assistance, [...] was able to deduce via certain indications that defendant was under the influence.  (2T27:10-17).  The State asserted that defendant admitted to operating the vehicle.  (2T27:17-24).
[brief] Dra2-6.  magnitude of the injustice caused by the inclusion of nearly $1.4 million in compensatory damages for transactions that were time-barred warrants reversal, even under a plain error standard.  A.  There was no clear, unequivocal and decisive waiver here.  In Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169 (2003), the defense counsel in a malpractice action failed to file a dismissal motion pursuant to the Affidavit of Merit statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29, after the deadline for receipt of the affidavit passed.
[brief] Discovery was initially extended for sixty (60) days, upon consent of all parties, from October 11, 2022 to December 10, 2022 (Pa300-302).  By Court Order dated November 18, 2022, discovery was extended from December 10, 2022 to March 10, 2023(Pa303-305).  By Court Order dated March 3, 2023, discovery was extended from March 10, 2023 to May 9, 2023 (Pa306-308).  By Court Order dated May 5, 2023, discovery was extended from May 9, 2023 to August 7, 2023 (Pa309-311).  By Court Order dated July 11, 2023, discovery was extended from August 7, 2023 to October 11, 2023 (Pa312-314).  As per the July 11, 2023 Order, the Court ordered the parties to “get to work”; as such the parties agreed to work beyond the discovery end date.  Discovery in this matter ended on October 11, 2023.
[directive] making officer police Chapter Title the of under 14 2C, offense sexual a involving cases  In determine to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-20 under established registry central the check shall arrest the Assault  Sexual order the to issued pursuant protective a to subject is defendant the whether 2016)).  May (effective c. 7, 2015, 147 (P.L. -21 to 2C:14-13 N.J.S.A. Act, Protection Survivor or acomplaint-summons to whether issue deciding before made be shall query mandatory  This a discourage or preclude to be construed shall herein Nothing acomplaint-warrant. for apply to all in 2C:14-20 under N.J.S.A. registry established central the checking from officer police officers  Prosecutor may County direct a and sexual offenses, involving cases just not and cases, specify.  prosecutor may of the types as cases such in or cases, all in registry central that check to History.  Juvenile Defendants' Young Adult Check to Requirement 4.2.5
[brief] From [...]:  Referring to (Pa76), whereby [...] states that he is “asking the Court to direct Probation to refund all monies that were garnished through 1990-2023”.  Please see the Final Audit Investigation performed by [...], which clearly shows years of non-payment for his two children.  (Da 20-21)  In addition, [...] did not participate in any form of payments for either my son or my daughter’s education throughout their childhood, from Elementary school, High School, OR through college and their Master’s Degrees.
[brief] The Final Judgment presents mixed questions of law and fact and is, therefore, subject to a mixed standard of review pursuant to which an appellate court “give[s] deference . . . to the supported factual findings of the trial court, but review[s] de novo the lower court’s application of any legal rules to such factual findings. ”  State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 577 (2015) (citation omitted); Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 223 n.5 (2011).  Thus, the Court should defer to the trial court’s factual findings that are “supported by credible evidence in the record,” State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71, 88 (2016) (citation omitted), however, the trial court’s “interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  An abuse of discretion standard applies to the Discovery Order.
[brief] Id. at 485-486.  This Court next considered the impact of the fact that [...], in his capacity as an executor of [...]’s estate, argued in a Probate action that “the Trust Agreement, as prepared by [...], did not reflect his father's intent and, therefore, the trust should be reformed. ”  Id. at 478.  [...] argued that his father’s intent was to disinherit his sister.  The Probate judge rejected [...]’s claim.  Id. at 479-480.  [...] then sued [...] for legal malpractice arguing, just as plaintiffs argue in this case, that [...] committed legal malpractice by not capturing his father’s true testamentary intent.  The trial judge “dismissed plaintiff's complaint because the probate action had previously determined that the will and Trust Agreement expressed [...]'s intent as to the disposition of his property and, therefore, plaintiff was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of his father's intent."  Id. at 481.  On appeal, this Court held that the legal malpractice claim was properly dismissed based on collateral estoppel.
[brief] _Id._ at 17:14-20; 18:9-24 (emphasis added).  As demonstrated above, Appellant misrepresents the record in stating that the trial court created a new requirement for a written agreement under the NJFPA.  Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, during oral argument, the trial court specifically noted the difference between a written contract and the broad term, “written arrangement,” noting that Appellant failed to show evidence that it met the broad standard for a written arrangement transferring a license as defined under the NJFPA.
[directive] The following questions need to be answered only if you are eligible for a mandatory sentence of special probation pursuant to 2C:35-14 (“Drug Court”).  N.J.S.A.  1.  Do you understand that the court has determined or may determine that you are a drug [Yes] [No] dependent person?  2.  Do you understand that if the court determines that you are drug dependent and also [Yes] [No] finds that you meet the criteria in 2C:35-14, you may be eligible to be sentenced N.J.S.A. to a mandatory period of special probation for the purpose of participating in a court- supervised drug treatment program (“Drug Court”)?
[brief] Moreover, the parties did not exchange discovery or conduct depositions which would have permitted the Board to inquire about same (Ibid.).  Plaintiffs do not dispute this in their opposition brief – on the contrary, they concede that the primary survey “excerpt” relied upon by the trial court in rendering its determination (Da108, “Exhibit F to the [...]”) “mistakenly include[d] a broken hyperlink” (provided by Plaintiffs to the trial court and the Board) to access the actual survey (Pb20, n.3).  However, even the new link now provided by Plaintiffs which purports to contain “[a] full copy of the survey” leads to a webpage which states: “Oops! The page you’re looking for doesn’t exist. ”  It was impossible for the trial court to make a valid determination regarding the admissibility of an “excerpt” of a survey, and for the Board to “refute the data” contained in the survey “excerpt,” where even Plaintiffs do not know where the full survey is located.  N.J.R.E. 401 (Da13).  3  https://www.thetrevorproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/TrevorProjectPublic1.pdf (last visited April 5, 2024).  The trial court abused its discretion by considering inadmissible evidence, and the preliminary injunction respectfully must therefore be vacated.  POINT
[brief] 8  [...] also resorts to improper discovery tactics in an attempt to avail the Request for Admissions Rule against [...].  App. Brf. at p. 8.  The undersigned responded to [...]’s unfortunate tactics in its counsel certification [Pa93-162] but, suffice it to say, [...]’s failure to reciprocate the good faith showed to it for its own discovery failures was disappointing, and the undersigned is confident the Appellate Division will deny [...]’s bad faith maneuver here, which the trial court already rejected.
[brief] The State’s brief does not seek to explain why the State has rarely, if ever,\(^1\) used its extensive powers to require LSD over the past 15 years to implement the reforms that the State now claims are obvious and could have solved all the district’s fiscal and educational problems.  \(^1\)The State’s brief refers in passing to the state monitors requiring the district—in 2014—to increase their local taxation and the district complying.  SB at 8 and 39.  Otherwise, the brief refers to State “suggestions” and an unquantified amount of money the district could have saved over the years had it implemented those “suggestions. ”  The State’s brief does not respond to the appellants’ argument that annual discretionary and repayable advance state aid loans cannot constitute “additional aid” for T&E [SB at 33] because: (i) they simply don’t constitute “aid” in a meaningful sense since they are supposed to be repaid by the district out of future state aid; and (ii) they do not meet the New Jersey Supreme Court’s clear and repeated standards for T&E funding [See, e.g., Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 211; Abbott III, 136 N.J. at 448; Abbott II, 119 N.J. at 385].
[directive] If an individual is encountered with multiple warrants with bail  Multiple amounts of $500 or less, so long as each warrant individually qualifies, then the procedures of Section I apply.  That is, the bail amounts should generally be considered individually, not added together, subject to the exception of Section I.B.2.  2 E. payments.  Officers shall not accept any bail payments on scene, even if individuals  Bail with qualifying warrants are able to pay partial or full bail.  F. exception.  Per AOC Directive #04-22, the procedures of Section I do  Domestic violence not apply where the underlying offense involves domestic violence.
[brief] In the PSA, Plaintiff and [...] stipulated to the following fee-shifting provision in the event that either party brought an action for breach of the PSA:  Section 18.2 **Recovery of Certain Fees**.  In the event a party hereto files any action or suit against another party hereto by reason of any breach of any of the covenants, agreements or provisions contained in this Agreement, then in that event the prevailing party will be entitled to have and recover certain fees from the other party including all reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs resulting therefrom.  For the purpose of this Agreement, the term “attorneys’ fees” or attorneys’ fees and costs” shall mean the fees and expenses of counsel to the parties hereto, which may include printing, photocopying, duplicating and other expenses, air freight charges, and fees billed for law clerks, paralegals and other persons not admitted to the bar but performing services under the supervision of an attorney, and the costs and fees incurred in connection with the enforcement or collection of any judgment obtained in any such proceeding.  The provisions of this Section 18.2 shall survive the entry of any judgment, and shall not merge, or be deemed to have merged into any judgment.  (Pa119).
[brief] First, he claims that the PCR court erred when it considered his petition under Rule 3:22-2 as opposed to Rule 3:21-10(b)(5) because PCR counsel “fundamentally altered” his petition by raising the issue that his sentence was not in accordance with law.  (Db12-14).  Second – while conceding that a PCR petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel would be “grossly out-of-time” – he claims that because his petition was “fundamentally altered” by challenging the legality of his sentence, it was not subject to the time-bar pursuant to Rule 3:22-12.  (Db14-13).  Third, he claims that his “sentence on the [S]econd [I]ndictment was illegally lenient” because he should have received consecutive sentences pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h) and, the PCR court erred by not vacating it.  (Db16).  As a consequence, he contends that since his “sentence under the Second Indictment was illegal . . . [his extended term] sentence under the Third Indictment [was] illegal as well” because the previous convictions were used as predicate offenses for the imposition of the extended term sentence.  (Db15).  Forth, defendant claims once the illegally lenient sentence is vacated, he cannot be resentenced as it would violate the double jeopardy clause under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. I, par. 11 of the New Jersey Constitution because he has already completed his illegally lenient sentence.  (Db19-29)\(^1\).  Finally, he claims that “[u]nless and until defendant’s criminal conviction under [the Second Indictment] is restored, he fails to qualify for the imposition of an extended term as a persistent offender on [the Third Indictment]” and therefore his current sentence must be amended to an ordinary term.  (Db29).  \(^1\)  However, defendant concedes in the course of his arguments that only Count Five of the Second Indictment may be reinstated for prosecution.  (Db27-29).  Ultimately, his interconnected claims must fail for two reasons.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...]; [...], in her official capacity as Collector of Taxes, and [...], in his official capacity as Mayor of East Orange, Defendants-Respondents.  DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action On Appeal  From: Superior Court of New Jersey Chancery Division, Essex County  Docket No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
[brief] --- \(^2\)  The inflammatory and personal language in brief of the Town’s special counsel should be disregarded.  R. 4:6-4(b).  \(^3\)  If the entire Town is subject to Section 14 (which it is), then can any place in [...] be redeveloped without regard to the requirements of Sections 3, 5 and 7 of the LRHL?
[directive] if a Test"  I knowingly attempt defraud a drug test or possess designed defraud a drug Drug any item to to test.  acusar  "Cometer infracci6n  Entiendo N.J.S.A 2C:36-10, pueden cometido haber engaiio la en una que me ley la de de un administraci6n detecci6n a prueba drogas"
[brief] See State v. Bindhammer, 44 N.J.  372, 380 (1965) (“the State has a heavier burden of establishing that such consent was given freely” if “given while in custody”); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229 (courts must consider “the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents”).  Finally, the last King factor favoring voluntary consent, whether the person “affirmatively assisted” the police, was also not present, notwithstanding the fact that [...] ultimately told the police where the gun was located.  (Da 33)  44 N.J. at 353.  As shown by the BWC footage and police reports, far from actively assisting the police, [...] resisted them throughout most of the encounter by declining to provide information and at first refusing to consent, and she only relented after the coercive interrogation and detention.  That [...] eventually disclosed where the gun was after giving in to the police demands did not offset the coercive atmosphere leading up to her consent, nor was it the type of active involvement that would suggest a true willingness to aid the police in their pursuit of crime.  Cf. King, 44 N.J. at 355 (finding the assistance factor where the defendant helped the police enter his apartment “without protest”).  In sum, nearly all of the King factors indicated that [...]’s consent was not voluntary, and the only one that suggested voluntariness was far outweighed by the rest.
[brief] [See Pa283-84, Balazs Deposition, 39:17 to 40:1].  [...] testified that his preferred and usual practice is to be there from the beginning of the procedure [Pa, 289, Balazs Deposition 57:18 to 58:1]; however, it is clear that sometimes circumstances can dictate otherwise.  [See Pa283-84, Balazs Deposition, 39:17 to 40:1].  **Second**, [...] testified that he had already finished the delivery for the other c-section when he spoke to the nurse at 10:12 p.m. [Pa284, Balazs Deposition, 40:2-6].
[brief] [...]’s Compliance, as Discharged Trustee, with Oct. ’22 Order for Final Trust Accounting & Administration (see also par. 25-26)  (427a)  21.  [...]’s Brief, p. 1, for his March, 23rd Reconsideration Motion stated that [...] needed “to finalize his administration of the [...], as permitted by N.J.S.A. 3B: 31-52 (b)”, as dictated by Oct. 2022 Order, par. 3.
[brief] ”  Id. at 600.  This Court is not bound by an agency's determination of a purely legal issue.  Francois v. Board of Trustees, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 348 citing Utley v. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Labor, 194 N.J. 534, 551 (2008); see Krayniak v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 412 N.J. Super. 232, 237 (App. Div. 2010).  As a form of legislation aimed at remedying a social problem, pension statutes "should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited."  Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 199 N.J. 14, 34 (2009) (quoting Geller, supra, 53 N.J. at 597-598, 597).
[brief] 111a-137a.  The case couldn’t be adjudicated at the pleading stage or on summary judgment given the meager record, because discovery was never completed\textsuperscript{51} and whether a party breached the agreement is "a question for the factfinder, not the court." \textsuperscript{52}  300a.  There is no evidence in the record that complete answers to plaintiff’s interrogatories or notice to produce were furnished or that depositions were taken by plaintiff.  1a-995a.  Moreover, given defendant’s continuing sale of contaminated water after defendant confirmed that the water was contaminated, this case involves a classic \textsuperscript{48} Model Civil Jury Charge 4.10E.
[directive] While the appropriate authority must make the final decision regarding discipline, the County Prosecutor or the Attorney General may make a non-binding recommendation regarding the discipline to be imposed by the appropriate authority.  The County Prosecutor or the Attorney General’s Office also may determine that it is appropriate to handle other internal affairs investigations in their discretion.  In those cases of supersession, the County Prosecutor or the Attorney General may exercise any or all of the authority of the law enforcement executive under Sections 1.0.5 and 6.3.11.  Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit the authority of the Attorney General or the County Prosecutor to supersede in any other investigation, criminal action or proceeding.
[directive] 2.0.1  Achieving the desired level of discipline within the law enforcement agency is among the most important responsibilities of the law enforcement executive.  Yet, this is one of the most frequently neglected processes within many law enforcement agencies.  While the word “discipline” was originally defined as instruction, teaching or training, its meaning has shifted toward a concept of control through punishment.  This emphasis on control has resulted in discipline being viewed as a negative threat rather than a mechanism for remediation and improvement.  Too frequently rules of conduct and disciplinary procedures are used as an end in themselves, and their purpose in reaching agency goals is forgotten.  Focusing on the negative aspects of discipline diminishes officer morale and productivity.  2.0.2  The first step toward positive discipline is to emphasize instruction and de-emphasize control.  This requires the law enforcement executive to focus on organizational practices.  The executive must first define the goals and objectives of the agency's units and then announce management's expectations to guide the units toward realizing those goals.  The law enforcement executive must establish a means to monitor performance and to correct improper actions.  2.0.3  This approach to management as it relates to discipline insures that all subordinates know and understand what must be done, why it must be done, how it must be done and when it must be done.  Employees must be clearly told what constitutes satisfactory performance through performance evaluations and similar procedures.
[brief] [...] was within her right to review and consider that evidence at Plaintiff’s request, presented in Plaintiff’s motions.  [...] was within her right to exercise her discretion to deny Plaintiff’s motion after finding the evidence presented could not and did not support the claims for fraudulent concealment and spoliation.  [...] could not ignore how the evidence presented by Plaintiff simply fell short and how the arguments made during oral argument, did not and could not help make out Plaintiff’s claim.  Plaintiff acknowledged the standards to be met for the relief requested but yet could not come close to proving the elements starting with evidence on intentional wrongdoing by [...].  (Pb22).  The remedies for fraudulent concealment and spoliation are to punish the wrongdoer and to deter others from such conduct.
[brief] Id. at 213-14 (stating that failure to carry burden to apportion damages between prior and subsequent injuries may result in dismissal of claimant’s suit).  Plaintiff bore the burden to apportion his damages between the preexisting stormwater runoff from the driveway that he alleged in the Burke Action and the stormwater runoff from the driveway that he attributed to [...], because relative to [...], plaintiff had superior knowledge of the preexisting conditions over which he sued in the Burke Action.  Goodman v. Fair Law Garden Assocs., Inc., 253 N.J. Super. 299, 205-06 (App. Div. 1992).  Plaintiff must establish such an allocation through expert testimony because the factfinder will not be able to determine what increase, if any, in stormwater runoff [...] allegedly caused without expert testimony.  Hopkins, 132 N.J. 450.  Without expert testimony, therefore, any allocation of damages by the finder of fact would be improper speculation.  Dunn v. Duso, 219 N.J. Super. 383, 398 (Law Div. 1986).  The record shows that plaintiff did not allocate his damages through expert testimony.  Plaintiff admitted that his surveyor, [...], had “no idea” whether the water runoff changed, if at all, from before [...] purchased their property to after they repaved their driveway.  Pa54, ¶ 78; Pa332, ¶ 78; accord Pa254 at 41:22-42:3.  Plaintiff’s engineering expert, [...], did not calculate the amount of water that had run from the driveway onto plaintiff’s property before [...] bought the property.  Pa55, ¶ 88; Pa333, ¶ 88; accord Pa268 at 24:12-:15.  Plaintiff’s damages expert, [...], did not allocate damages caused by the preexisting water runoff and water runoff allegedly caused by [...], nor did he offer any opinion of what plants or other property allegedly sustained damage from the water runoff.  Pa57-58, ¶¶ 107-08; Pa336, ¶¶ 107-08; accord Pa309-10.  Because plaintiff failed to allocate his damages between those caused by preexisting conditions and those allegedly caused by [...], [...] were entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim of nuisance.  Reichert, 366 N.J. Super. at 225-26.
[brief] (Pa9-Pa81).  According to [...], State Defendants: intentionally destroyed his PTI application; failed to revise their “mental illness” probation program at his behest; incorrectly classified him as mentally ill; failed to have PTI training programs about NJLAD discrimination and retaliation; dragged his criminal case on for two-and-a-half years; “bounced” a motion and committed a “Brady[] violation;” amended the charges against him from a fourth degree offense to a third degree offense; failed to respond to an “Emergency Oral Motion” to keep him in the hospital overnight; and failed to grant his request to change venue.  (Pa53-54).  There are no individual capacity claims being asserted against any of the State Defendants; all claims against the state officials sued are brought against them in their official capacity only.  (Pa6).