ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) further shows that trial counsel’s complete failure to subject to the ballistics issue to any meaningful adversarial testing was deficient under Strickland’s first prong.  In Williams, counsel's failure to uncover and present voluminous mitigating evidence at sentencing could not be justified as a tactical decision to focus on Williams' voluntary confessions, the Supreme Court said, because counsel had not “fulfill[ed] their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background. ”  Williams, supra, 529 U.S. 396 (citing Standard 4-4.1 Duty to Investigate and Engage Investigators, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1).  In Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521–22 (2003), the Supreme Court again stressed these principles, noting that the Maryland state court “merely assumed that the investigation by counsel was adequate.
[brief] Respondents state that the Appellate Division in S. Salem St. Assocs., LLC v. Planning Bd., No. A-5401-06T3, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1792 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 21, 2008) determined that a mayor’s deliberate manipulation of land use board and municipal actions, as well as threats to eliminate plaintiff’s buildings through rezoning, were sufficient to support a violation of substantive due process.  Pb68-69.  Respondents’ gloss of this case is remarkable for what it elides.  In fact, the case is replete with discussion about the egregious self-dealing underlying the mayor’s actions.  Respondents mention none of this.  S. Salem St. Assocs. turned upon far more than undue pressure and improper motives.  The Appellate Division found that the mayor deliberately manipulated actions for personal gain.  *Id.* at 23.  Notably, the mayor, who did indeed threaten to have property rezoned to eliminate office buildings as a conditional use, had signed a contract to purchase property across from plaintiff’s own property and had begun leasing the property for the very use that the zoning change would prevent on plaintiff’s property.  The court recognized that a jury’s finding that the mayor had acted deliberately to stall or obstruct a proposed project for his “personal gain” was the showing that could support a section 1983 action.  *Id.* at 24-25.  Respondents ignore this fundamental holding of the case.  The reason is quite evident: Respondents have not and cannot present any facts that suggest any self-dealing or financial or personal gain to the Mayor from making any statements made about the Respondents’ projects.  In dismissing these claims, the trial court correctly concluded that the allegations in this case “do not involve claims of hostility to constitutionally protected activity on the [Respondents] property…[n]or do they involve claims or allegations of either corruption or self-dealing on the part of the Mayor, in particular, or any Zoning Board member. ”  M735.  Respondents cannot and will not be able to produce any argument contrary to this holding.  Accordingly, same should be affirmed.
[brief] The State refers to her as [...] for ease of reference.  Foster read it to him, which she did.  (Pa30).  While [...] was advising defendant of his rights, the following exchange occurred, NB:  [...]  You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present while you are being questioned.  Do you understand this right?  FS: Yes, but I just want to say something there.  Eh yes like basically like I do not, I come from another, another country to here I do not know if you guys assign an attorney to me or I have to look for an attorney on my own?  NB: So part of this I have to explain I, I am only Reading, but this is Spanish.  FS: Mm-hmm.  NB: I cannot give you any type of legal advice ok umm this is very simple if you want to have an attorney present that is your right.  If you want to talk with me and then consult with an attorney that is something that you, but I cannot give you any type of-of like of advice.  FS: Oh ok.  NB: You know that is in Spanish if you understand it.  FS: MM-hmm.  NB: That is something that you have to say if you, on your own.  FS: Well yes.  NB: So, you can put your answer and your initials.  If you do not have money to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before any questioning if you wish.  Do you understand this right?  FS: Yes.  NB: Put your answer and your initials.  You can decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions or make any statements.  Do you understand this right?  FS: Yes.  [Pa30 to 31 (emphasis added)].  [...] then read the waiver of rights to defendant.
[directive] (5)  Training.  All Civilian Review Board members and staff shall undergo training approved by the County Prosecutor’s Office on the confidentiality of internal affairs records and other investigative material prior to being granted access to such information.  (6)  Attestation.  All Civilian Review Board members and staff shall receive a copy of the Board’s written confidentiality policies and sign a sworn statement that they will comply those policies prior to being granted access to internal affairs records.  The law enforcement executive may condition the Civilian Review Board’s access to internal affairs records on the Board’s agreement to other protections that the law enforcement executive reasonably considers necessary to safeguard their confidentiality.  (c)  Conflicts of Interest
[brief] VOLUME II  OPINION OF THE COURT ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT DA195 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT, FILED JULY 25, 2023 DA201 ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, FILED JULY 25, 2023 DA202 ORDER CLARIFYING JULY 25, 2023
[brief] [...] simply failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form until approximately one year and one month past the statutory deadline, which is not a de minimis violation.  Contrary to [...]’s argument, the court’s decision in *Ensslin* did not turn on the timeliness or adequacy of the Division’s notice.  (Pb11).  Instead, the court found that because the notice from the Division was sent “more than four years from the date of petitioner’s last contribution,” the Division’s own “day-to-day administration of its affairs” and interpretation of the two-year time limitation as expressed by the four-year notice further supported allowing Ensslin to file.  Id. at 338.  Here, there was no such letter informing [...] that he was eligible to file under the Ricci Act past the statutory deadline.  Thus, Ensslin does not support [...]’s proposition that untimely notice allows individuals to file at any time past the statutory deadline.  (Pb12).  Nor do the equities weigh in his favor.  The Board found on the basis of undisputed facts that notice was sent to [...], that information about the Ricci Act was available to him through the Division’s website and publications, and that he had sufficient time to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the statutory period.  Thus, contrary to [...]’s contention, (Pb15), there was ample evidence for the Board to reasonably conclude that he failed to demonstrate good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence to warrant consideration of his application well beyond the statutory deadline.  (Pa14).  Finally, [...]’s argument and reference to a different applicant is misplaced.  (Pb16).  That applicant asserts that he attempted to file his Eligibility Registration Form but was told he was ineligible because he was not currently sick.  (Pb16; Pa127-132).  But those facts are not in the record before this court.  And that applicant’s assertions are irrelevant to [...]’s appeal as they deal with an entirely different set of circumstances not alleged by [...], so they should be disregarded.
[brief] First, the payment was not authorized by the [...].  Second, insofar as the Court found a “nexus,” between the $2,000,000 payment and the “redevelopment plan,” it focused on the wrong relationship: the nexus between the payment and the plan is irrelevant.  The focus must be on the nexus between the payment and the development project.  Third, the summary judgment record was insufficient to find, as a matter of law, that a $2,000,000 payment to defray the costs of a new senior center in consideration for a “density bonus,” had any nexus whatsoever to a non-age restricted luxury residential project.  Fourth, [...] failed to adhere to the requirements of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-42 of the MLUL.  A second issue is whether or not the City of [...] could disregard provisions which precluded the City from making a change in a redevelopment plan without the written consent of “designated developers,” which were included in City Ordinance § 345-98 and in the Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan.
[brief] 9  POINT I ..............................................................................................................  11  THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE EXCUSABLE NEGLECT.  ..........  11  POINT II ..........................................................................................................  13  DEFENDANT FAILED TO IDENTIFY ANY MERITORIOUS DEFENSE SUFFICIENT TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT.  ........................................  13  POINT III .........................................................................................................  17  THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT SERVICE WAS PROPERLY EFFECTUATED ON DEFENDANT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COURT’S SEPTEMBER 24, 2021 ORDER.  ........  17  POINT IV .......................................................................................................  27  DEFENDANT’S REMAINING ARGUMENTS ARE ENTIRELY WITHOUT MERIT AND DO NOT ASSERT ANY BASIS FOR OVERTURNING THE LOWER COURT’S ORDER .................................................................  27  CONCLUSION .................................................................................................
[brief] ”  As found in Macedo, Neveroski, Plemmons, and Shaw, this Court must look to the “nature of the activity” rendered to determine whether it is beyond the ordinary commercial seller of goods or services or fall[s] into the category of consumerism. ”  Macedo, 178 N.J. at 344 (quoting Neveroski, 141 N.J. Super. at 379); Plemmons, 387 N.J. Super. at 564; Shaw, 460 N.J. Super. at 613-15.  But other factors – like education, licensing, services rendered, and other regulations, with no one factor controlling – are not ignored.
[brief] The breach first occurred by the substantial delay in issuing the December 12, 2022 Resolution.  The Board had approved [...]’s application on June 13, 2022.  Yet, despite being obligated to “expedite review and approval” and to issue a resolution “within the earlier of 30 days or the second meeting” by exercising “commercially reasonable efforts,” the resolution memorializing the June 13, 2022 approval was not issued until nearly six months later on December 12, 2022—and only after [...] was forced to issue a Notice of Default.
[brief] In Castello, the plaintiff’s surgery expert, [...], provided during discovery three different curricula vitae, each of which misrepresented that he was actively practicing surgery at the time of the alleged malpractice when he had in fact retired in 2005, five years before the surgery at issue.  446 N.J. Super. at 9-11.  The plaintiff’s attorney was completely unaware of this fact until [...]’s deposition.  Id. at 7.  The trial court barred [...] from testifying and declined to grant the plaintiff’s request for time to obtain another expert.  *Id.* at 12.  The court granted the defendant’s subsequent motion for summary judgment.  *Ibid.*  The Appellate Division reversed, finding that plaintiff’s counsel reasonably relied on [...]’s curriculum vitae and that without an expert, plaintiff could not proceed.  *Id.* at 25-26.  In this matter, plaintiffs provided a timely expert report from [...], plaintiffs’ expert was never found to be unqualified to testify at trial, plaintiff never filed a formal motion to extend discovery, and plaintiffs’ case was never dismissed.
[brief] [...] clearly understood that the [...] was seeking her list removal in the event that she was considered to be first on the certification.  In fact, she argued against her list removal in her April 10, 2023 submission to the Commission before its first decision in this matter.  See, e.g., AA45 (stating that “Sergeant [...] should have been properly considered as the first ranked individual and there is no reasonable basis for Respondent to remove her name from this list based on a 2013 discipline settlement. ”)  Considering both parties’ arguments, the Commission correctly recognized that the [...] sought [...]’s removal instead of having her promoted to a position it deemed her unsuitable for after it concluded that [...] should also be removed from the eligible list.  See AA6 (explaining that “[c]oncerning the appellant's removal, initially it is noted that the appellant has been provided notice on appeal of the appointing authority’s request to remove her name from the subject promotional eligible list, the basis for that request, and an opportunity to respond. ”)  The Commission then addressed the merits of whether she should be removed.  [...] fails to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that the Commission’s decision to consider her removal was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported.
[brief] Respondents’ brief focuses on affidavits obtained by Respondents in support of its argument that [...] somehow has relevant knowledge and information related to the Underlying Litigation. \(^1\)  However, at most, the affidavits demonstrate [...]’s limited involvement and communications with investors during his normal course of employment and did not convey any information related to the claims in the Underlying Litigation or have any direct knowledge of the underlying facts.
[brief] (Pa1).  Appellants alleged in the complaint that [...] “breached [its] professional and ethical duties to [Appellants] by selling the engineering site plans and drawings to [...]. ” (Pa19).  However, [...] had never entered into a contract with Appellants and thus owed them no duty regarding the Project.  Further, Appellants’ falsely claimed that they “owned all of the work product” prepared by [...] for the Project despite the fact that [...]’s contracts with both [...] and [...] included a provision that explicitly stated that [...] retained ownership of such work product (i.e. the engineering plans). \(^1\) (Pa82; Pa104).  Likewise, Appellants’ falsely contended that [...] “sold” the engineering plans to [...].  (Pa508).  Rather, [...] simply continued to provide site engineering services to [...] after the change in ownership of the Project and continued to develop the engineering plans for purposes of completing the Project.  (Pa104; Pa509).  \(^1\)  It is Respondent’s position that ownership of the engineering plans in question is not relevant to the analysis of the applicability of the Affidavit of Merit Statute.
[brief] ”  M & D Associates v. Mandara, 366 N.J.Super. 341, 353 (App. Div. 2004).  In the event of a substantial deviation, the court must find that the alternative form of process service met the requirements of “fundamental fairness” and “due process” under the circumstances.  Id. at 355-56.  Moreover, the application for substituted service must be made on competent evidence.  Ibid.  R. 1:6-6 requires that a court may only hear a motion on “facts not appearing of record or not judicially noticeable” if such facts are set forth “on affidavits made on personal knowledge…”  R. 1:4-4 requires any such affidavit to be signed with a certification as follows:  “I certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true.  I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment. ”  Twenty years ago, the Appellate Division considered an appeal from a R. 4:50-1(d) motion to vacate a default judgment obtained by way of substituted service of process.  M&D Associates v. Mandara, 366 N.J.Super 341 (App. Div. 2004).  The Panel determined that the judgment should be vacated, reasoning that substituted service was ineffective despite a court order authorizing the same.
[brief] It is undisputed that “the 45th annual World Open” chess tournament events had been posted / published / advertised on the defendants’ website.  It is undisputed that this event was also posted / published / advertised several times within the “Chess Life” monthly magazines, which are published by the “[...]” (hereinafter “[...]”).  Additionally, I was also sent multiple advertisements in the mail about this upcoming tournament.  ---  1  The sole transcript is of the Nov 13, 2023 trial, and is designated as 1T, followed by page:line(s)  2  This is not a governmental agency, and it seems surprising to me that they were allowed to use this misleading name for this organization (i.e. it was my belief that private corporations and entities cannot use words such as “United States” or “Federal” as part of their business name).  Although all of these tournament announcements had listed in detail what the prize amounts would be, what the entry fees would be, and had even listed some of the limitations as to the prizes, no mention was made anywhere that there was a global prize limitation that a player could only receive one prize per event, (Pa14-Pa16) - not even on their website page that was specific to prize information (Pa17).
[brief] The substantial compliance doctrine applies when a party meets the spirit of a law but falls short of full compliance due to a technical misstep.  See Sroczynski v. Milek, 197 N.J. 36, 44 (2008).  That is not what happened here.  In this case, Plaintiff’s counsel lost track of the timing for filing the Affidavit of Merit and therefore did not file one.  The substantial compliance doctrine has five elements, all of which must be met for the doctrine to apply.  A plaintiff seeking to invoke the doctrine must demonstrate: (1) a lack of prejudice to the defendant; (2) a series of steps taken by the plaintiff to comply with the statute at issue; (3) a general compliance with the purpose of the statute at issue; (4) a reasonable notice of the plaintiff’s claim; and (5) a reasonable explanation why there was not a strict compliance with the statute at issue.
[directive] 55350, or the Municipal Court Services Division at 609-815-2900 ext. 54850.  Attachments  (1)  Motion Form (CN 12840)  (2)  Form Order (CN 12841)  cc: Chief Justice [...]  Criminal Presiding Judges  Family Presiding Judges  Municipal Court Presiding Judges of [...], Chief Staff  AOC Directors and Assistant Directors of Clerks Court Special Assistants to the Administrative Director  Family, AOC Criminal, Municipal Chiefs Criminal Division
[brief] Rather, “courts must be careful not to disregard the ‘clear import and intent’ of a policy’s exclusion (citing Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v.  Cont’l Ins. Cos., 126 N.J. Super. 29, 41 [App. Div. 1973]), and “evaluate whether, utilizing a ‘fair interpretation’ of the language, it is ambiguous” (citing Stafford v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 309 N.J. Super. 97, 105 [App. Div. 1998]).  Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, supra, 202 N.J. at 442.  The expected or intended injury exclusion contained in the [...] policy has indeed been the subject of such an evaluation by the courts of our state, and has been found to be enforceable.  In Harleysville Ins. Cos. v. Garitta, supra, 170 N.J. at 231, the Court made clear this was so, stating unequivocally that “policy provisions that exclude coverage resulting from intentional wrongful acts are ‘common,’ are ‘accepted as valid limitations,’ and are consistent with public policy. ”  170 N.J. at 231, quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Malec, 104 N.J. 1, 6 (1986) (citing Ruvolo v. Am. Cas.  Co., supra, 39 N.J. at 496).  Accordingly, the lower court expressly found that the exclusion contained in the [...] policy was valid, noting that the exclusion is “‘specific, plain, clear, prominent, and not contrary to public policy. ’” (Pa396).  The [...] policy contains a valid exclusion from liability coverage that applies to bar coverage for bodily injury that is “expected or intended” by the insured, even if the bodily injury “is of a different kind, quality or degree than initially expected or intended. ” (Da19).  Thus, even if it could somehow be determined that the allegations of the underlying complaint amounted to an “occurrence” under [...]’ homeowners policy, liability for any alleged injuries the underlying plaintiffs sustained as a result of [...]’ behavior – intimidating postures, threatening acts, screaming and cursing, et al. – all of which are acts that inherently carry with them the intention or expectation that the recipient of the behavior will have a reaction as a result, unquestionably are barred from the coverage of the [...] policy by the operation of the “intentional acts” exclusion.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the court should reverse the trial court’s August 16 and October 11 Orders and remand this case to the trial court.  In addition, because the trial court already made the necessary factual findings to support a disgorgement award in a specific amount, this court should instruct the trial court to enter an order against [...] to disgorge all of its ill-gotten gains in the amount of $1,500,000.  Respectfully submitted, [...] ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant By: ____________________________ [...] Deputy Attorney General Attorney ID No.  185332016
[brief] [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...], T/A [...], Defendant-Respondent.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, BERGEN COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  Sat Below: HON.  [...], J.S.C.  REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant  [...] [...]  [...]  On the Brief: [...], ESQ.  Attorney ID# 050991988  Date Submitted: November 27, 2024
[directive] Releasing a defendant on his or her own recognizance (R.O.R.) is permissible for any offense where the judge/judicial officer deems it appropriate.  The advisory monetary ranges contained within the Bail Schedules have not changed.  The advisory monetary bail ranges for attempts or conspiracies to commit crimes should continue to generally be the same as for the actual substantive crimes.  For persons charged with fourth degree crimes, disorderly persons offenses, or petty disorderly person offenses, ordinarily the maximum statutory bail amount is $2500.  For good cause shown, however, a higher monetary bail may be imposed after evaluation of a defendant’s risk of flight/risk of failure to appear in court.
[directive] Section See motion.  detention pretrial fling a of presumption rebuttable a establishes supervisors).  of (designation 7.8.  Section also Detention.  Pretrial for A~plyin~ ai nst Presumption d  A 7.2 not shall prosecutor the 7.4, or 7.3  Sections under covered otherwise not case any  In the or Prosecutor, Assistant First Prosecutor or County the unless detention pretrial for apply the by prosecuted cases in Justice Criminal of Division of the Director Deputy or a Director that: determines Division, adequately not were detention pretrial justifying circumstances or facts specific (a) process; risk-assessment pretrial automated the for by accounted detention the at evidence convincing and clear present to able be will State the (b) and detention; pretrial against presumption statutory the overcome to hearing 59
[brief] December 2016  Bank Statements a. [...] x0561 “Wire” Account, [...] December 30, 2016…………………………………………………………………………………..Pa068 b.  [...] x 1401 “Operating” Account, [...] December 30, 2016…………………………………………………………………………………..Pa070 c. [...] x0569 “Payroll” Account, [...] December 30, 2016…………………………………………………………………………………..Pa073 d. [...] x2521 Account, [...] December 30, 2016 P-27.