ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] SBI Number Indictment/ Accusation/ Complaint Number 11  Victim Personal Information 2.  Victim's Middle Name  Victim's First Name  Victim's Last Name I I  City Address: Street Zip Code State I I I  Home Business Phone Cell Phone Number E-mail Address I I I  Current Offense Includes DV or Sex Offense  Relationship to Defendant Date of Birth (if any)  Current Age  Juvenile at Time of Offense  Age at Time of Offense  D D D D Yes No Yes No 11
[brief] In *State v. Hyland*, the Supreme Court held that “the State may appeal a Drug Court sentence only when the sentencing judge makes a plainly mistaken, non-discretionary, non-factual finding under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a).”  238 N.J. 135, 139 (2019).  *Hyland* noted that both subsections (a)(4) and (a)(9) “are discretionary determinations requiring the sentencing judge to engage in fact-finding. ”  *Id.* at 147.  The Court contrasted these subsections with subsections (a)(1), (6), (7), and (8), which the Court said “require objective, per se legal determinations” and are thus appealable.  *Id.* at 148.  The *Hyland* Court did not, however, state whether subsections (a)(2), (3), or (5) fall into the discretionary, fact-finding, and non-appealable category, or the non-discretionary, non-factual finding, objective per se legal determination category.
[brief] Plaintiff does not contend that he served a notice of tort claim on the Edison defendants within the allotted 90 days or within the discretionary one-year period.  Both the District Court and the state Court have held that the accrual date for plaintiff’s cause of action was on March 6, 2018, and that more than two years passed before plaintiff filed a notice of tort claim.  Thus, plaintiff’s state law tort claims are barred as a matter of law and the trial court’s dismissal of those claims with prejudice should be affirmed.
[brief] (PA000008).  (PA000090-PA000091).  Defendants also contend “none of the facts alleged by Plaintiff correspond to the regulations…[which form] her reasonable belief that Defendants were violating the law [with respect to N.J.A.C. § 10:44 A-2.7(a)].”  See Resp. Br. 13.  Again, such assertion is misplaced.  Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that several Direct Support Professionals (“DSPs”) were not properly trained and could not attend to basic medication tasks such as testing an individual’s blood sugar.
[brief] An important case in point is *Celino v. General Acci. Ins.*, 211 N.J.Super. 538 (App. Div. 1986).  This was the first published decision addressing the application of N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10 since the 1980 revision.  In that case, the insurance company acknowledged that it did not have in its file a certified copy of the cancellation notice.  It argued, however that based on the evidence that it complied with the Certificate of Mailing requirement, the lack of a certified copy was not significant.  The Appellate Division strongly disagreed:  The statute clearly prescribes two conjunctive conditions for effective notice of cancellation, which it separately designates as "a" and "b."  . . .  We do not regard the failure of compliance with this second condition as inconsequential but rather take the view that compliance is a *sine qua non* of an effective cancellation.  Our conclusion is based not only on the plain language of the statute but on its history and evident intention.
[brief] -  Filing a bond  Appellants make the meritless argument that somehow a receiver’s bond would have responded to their misguided claims against [...], the statutory receiver.  In any event, the appellants would have to prove that [...] violated some standard.  Two judges in Camden County approved his actions.  It would be the burden of the [...] and [...], at the time of the hearing before [...], to establish fault on behalf of the receiver.  The [...], like [...], failed to do so.  Likewise, it was the [...]’ burden to establish fault on behalf of the receiver at the time of the hearings before [...].  The [...] (and [...]) failed to establish fault on the part of the receiver.  Therefore, any receiver’s bond would not have responded in any event, even if it were required under the order, which it was not.
[brief] The legal standard of probable cause to issue a search warrant should not be conflated with the requirement of particularity in a search warrant.  The requirement that a warrant state with particularity the place to be searched and the items to be seized serves the manifest purpose “to prevent general searches. ”  Marshall, 199 N.J. at 611 (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 N.J 79, 84 (1987)).  “By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications .  . . .”  Ibid. (quoting Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84).  “The particularity requirement, in general, mandates that a warrant sufficiently describe the place to be searched so ‘that the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended.
[brief] (Da33-43)  “7T” Refers to the March 16, 2022, trial transcript; “8T” Refers to the March 17, 2022, trial transcript; “9T” Refers to the March 21, 2022, trial transcript; “10T” Refers to the March 22, 2022, trial transcript; “11T” Refers to the March 32, 2022, trial verdict transcript; “12T” Refers to the March 24, 2022, trial verdict transcript; “13T” Refers to the October 07, 2022, trial sentencing transcript.  ²  Notably, [...]’s recorded statement taken at the [...] after these unrecorded statements and after [...] had been in continuous police custody for more than 9 hours and transported to his family apartment in New York City which the New Jersey police searched, allegedly with [...]’s “consent. ”  Trial of this matter was held before [...] and a jury on March 15-17, and March 21-23, 2022.  [...] was acquitted of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute (Count 1), and convicted of the remaining three counts of [...].
[directive] Even if the complainant is satisfied with the informal resolution, the process should be recorded on an internal affairs report form.  Regardless of the means of resolution, the integrity of the internal affairs process, particularly the receipt of complaints, demands that 21 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021 complaints and inquiries from any member of the public be uniformly documented for future reference and tracking.  The form should indicate that the matter was resolved to the satisfaction of the complainant and sent to internal affairs for review and filing.  The internal affairs supervisor should periodically audit those reports indicating that the complaint was informally resolved to ensure that the agency's supervisors are properly implementing their authority to resolve complaints from members of the public.  5.1.14
[directive] J~~r,<?>uru  New New Jersey Judiciary Krol Order Contact List  tndepe-ndeoce• lntegrtty f•lriins•Oullity Servk:e of In the Matter - Select County - County Defendant's Attorney: Prosecutor: Name Name --------- --------- Telephone Number Telephone Number Em ail Em ail Provider Agency: Name --------------------------  Provider Agency CEO ----------------------------  Telephone Number Em ail Court Contact: Name Title ___________________________  Telephone Number _ Email by Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12558 (KROL Order 3)  Attachment D of Order 3A - Mandating Continued Commitment
[brief] *Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Imet Mason Contractors*, 309 N.J. Super. 358, 364 (App.Div.1998); *Hirsch v. Gen. Motors Corp.*, 266 N.J. Super. 222, 234, (Law Div.1993).  In New Jersey, a duty to preserve evidence arises when there is: (1) pending or probable litigation; (2) knowledge by the party of the existence or likelihood of litigation; (3) foreseeability of harm to the opposing party, or in other words, discarding the evidence would be prejudicial to them; and (4) the evidence that is lost is relevant to the litigation.  *Jerista v. Murray*, supra 185 N.J. at 185; *Aetna Life*, supra, 309 N.J.Super. at 366, 707 A.2d 180; *Hirsch v. General Motors Corp.*, 266 N.J. Super. at 250-51, (Law. Div. 1993).  [...] was also under a duty to preserve the Decedent’s file given his testimony that when he was meeting with Decedent, he understood that Petitioner would be bringing litigation over the 2014 will.  (9T225:17 to 226:2).
[brief] As part of this suit, the plaintiff provided an Affidavit of Merit of [...].  M.D. against defendant [...]. \(^1\)  [...] then filed a motion to have the lawsuit against him dismissed with prejudice on the basis that [...]'s Affidavit of Merit was not in compliance with the pertinent statute.  The Court agreed and entered an Order dated June 24, 2020, dismissing the complaint against [...] with prejudice.  The basis of the decision was that Dr. Skudder did not have the same credentials and [...].  Thereafter, the lawsuit proceeded against the remaining defendants, and the suit was dismissed as to all remaining defendants except [...] between July 20, 2020 and October 24, 2023.  The last remaining defendant, [...], settled the case against him, and was finally dismissed from the case by a Stipulation of Dismissal filed on December 12, 2023.  On January 26, 2024, the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal limited solely to the issue of whether the dismissal of the case against Defendant [...], M.D. based on the Affidavit of Merit was proper.
[brief] (Pa26)  Plaintiff [...], in a certification submitted in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment, succinctly sets forth the elements of alleged damages and his extensive experience as a general contractor enabling him to assess the reasonableness and necessity of these expenses.  (Pa462-465)  [...] has been involved with 20 different projects, including building five (5) strip malls from the ground up.  He is well-versed in all aspects of property development, including obtaining government approvals, the usual and customary charges of professionals, the timeframe for obtaining approvals, the hiring of necessary professionals, the customary charges for soil removal, and other typical development activities.
[brief] DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005).  (internal citations omitted)  The trial court expresses an opinion that the clear terms of the Ordinance could extend to “unamplified voices of family members speaking” or “shouting of children playing in a swimming pool or jumping on a trampoline” as reason to deem the Ordinance overbroad; however, in ascribing the statutory words their ordinary meaning this is simply not the case.
[brief] The Plaintiff agrees with the Appellant’s stated procedural history and further indicates that the personal injury matter was tried to verdict as against Appellant and the jury found in favor of Respondent and against Appellant, resulting in a net jury verdict against the Defendant in the amount of $562,500.00.  [7T3:22 to 10:14]  _____________________  1  The trial transcripts are cited as follows: “2T” refers to the January 17, 2023 motion transcript; “3T” refers to the October 30, 2023 motion transcript; “4T” refers to the November 1, 2023 trial transcript; “5T” refers to the November 2, 2023 trial transcript; “6T” refers to the November 6, 2023 trial transcript; “7T” refers to the November 8, 2023 motion transcript; and “8T” refers to the January 19, 2024 motion transcript.  Appellant lost the jury trial, and thereafter, was unsuccessful on post-trial motions.  [8T10:14 to 20:12]  There is nothing in the record that would suggest that the jury verdict should be disturbed.  [Id.]  **CONCISE COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] ”  Id. at 575 (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  Defendants rely almost exclusively on Hargrave v. Cntv. of Atl., 262 F. Supp. 2d 393 (D.N.J. 2003) to rebut Roa and continue to maintain in their Appellate Brief that retaliatory conduct alleged must be “serious and tangible enough to alter an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, deprive [his] future employment opportunities, or otherwise have a ‘materially adverse’ effect on [his] status as an employee. ” (Db30).  Hargrave, however, is a federal district court case that is not precedential here and it predates Roa, which rejected the proposition that the anti-retaliation provisions of the NJLAD are limited to retaliatory actions that “affect the terms and conditions of employment” id. at 64, in favor of a more employee friendly standard making unlawful retaliation that would “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. ”  Roa, 200 N.J. at 574-75.
[brief] The contravention of this recent legislative decision not to rezone this Property would be a contrary to the law which requires that no variance or other relief may be granted under the terms of this section, *including a variance or other relief involving an inherently beneficial use*, without a showing that such variance or other relief can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and *will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zone plan and the zoning ordinance*.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d. (emphasis added).  **Point III**
[brief] *4  In light of Defendants’ concern, the Special Master will modify the Search Term Protocol to require production of materials that are “reasonably known” to be responsive.  The Special Master notes that Defendants already agreed to produce materials that are known to be responsive at the November status conference.  Nevertheless, the Special Master will modify the Search Term Protocol to require production of materials that are “reasonably known” to be responsive.  In affording this modification, the Special Master intends to provide Defendants some flexibility should they inadvertently fail to produce documents, which Plaintiffs believe were known to be responsive.  If during discovery the parties develop an issue with respect to the production or lack of production of reasonably known responsive documents, the parties may seek the appropriate remedy and order from the Court.  Finally, with respect to folders or collections of information, the Special Master will require the parties to collect this material to the extent it is reasonably known to the producing party.  To the extent the folder or collections contain an extensive volume of material, the Special Master will require the parties to meet and confer if a party believes a discrete document folder or collection of information that is relevant to a claim or defense is too voluminous to make review of each document proportional to the needs of the case.  Should the parties be unable to resolve their dispute during the meet and confer process, they may seek a further order from the Court.
[brief] Since the plaintiffs in Evans and Poosikian were both experienced attorneys and were presumably well versed in the law, I (a retired secretary) should be entitled to at least the same consideration given to [...] and [...] by the Court.  c)  Medical leave in the months before my retirement supports the relief requested.  Since I was out of work on medical leave (FMLA) starting on September 9, 2021 and never returned to work before I retired on effective February 1, 2022, I was not able to access my work emails while I was on medical leave during the critical months before my retirement.  This factor supports the relief requested.  See Chiappini v. Board of Trustees of the Public Employees’ Retirement System, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2062 (App. Div. 2011) (the fact that [...], for medical reasons, had not worked for a number of months before his retirement was considered a persuasive factor by the Court in reversing the Board’s decision to require [...] to reimburse the DPB $32,479.95 in pension benefits previously paid to him and to have his life insurance benefit reduced from $12,875.00 to $1,000.00).
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 165.  Although acknowledging the fresh complaint “doctrine’s misguided history,” the Court explained that it had “attempt[ed] to cure the defects underlying the rule that could infect rape proceedings with anti-female bias. ”  Id. at 170.  Thus, in recognition of the harm it could cause to rape victims to comment on their silence, the Court ruled that “if a defendant introduces or elicits evidence of a victim’s silence to prove that a rape did not occur,” the trial court “may instruct the jury that a woman may respond to rape in a variety of ways, including silence.
[brief] The School in response presented Traffic Engineer/Planner [...] and Planner [...].  Each testified that the 1972 School site plan/parking variance  Approval records did not infer or provide that any Synagogue parking was intended or approved to be on School property.  There was no curb cut or drive on Sixth Street for vehicles to access the Courtyard.  The Synagogue participated in the 1972 School application and did not assert any parking right/use on School property.  The School courtyard had no fire lanes, no marked parking spaces or travel aisles.  It is designed and laid out as a pedestrian way/assembly area for the students.  It was not designed or safe for vehicle access or parking ([...] (9T11-1 to 79-19); [...] (11T4-15 to 75-24).  The School further presented witnesses [...]: (12T4-9 to 17-1) [...] (12T49-22 to 65-3), [...] (12T83-1 to 86-24), and [...] (13T21-6 to 48-10) - all long term residents of the neighborhood.  All testified similarly of their observations and experience from the 1960's through recent years, that vehicles had not parked in the School's Sixth Street Courtyard.  That concluded the defense response case.
[brief] Here, we are dealing with a pothole in the middle of a street and there is no evidence that the pothole existed for eighteen years.  Plaintiff attempts to hold this matter akin to *Chatman* and *Lodato* by citing to the size of the pothole and, based solely on Google images, the amount of time the pothole existed.  Plaintiff attaches black and white copies of Google images making it impossible to see the area in question.  Color photographs show the following, in 2012, the red arrow points to what appears to be a small crack in the roadway.  *(Da2).*  September 2015 Google images show the roadway looks similar to how it did in 2015.  *(Da3).*  October 2017 Google images again show the roadway looks similar to how it did in 2017.  *(Da4),* as do the July 2018 Google images *(Da5)*, and the July 2019 Google images *(Da6-7). *
[directive] Reform Bail [the 3:3- pursuant Rule is acomplaint-warrant required to for application where case any In for apply a Directive pursuant to this made to been determination has a where case any or 1(e), agency enforcement law the convictions, or arrests expunged of regardless complaint-warrant expunged waiting or obtain access to charging by process the not delay shall prosecutor and/or a issue determination to whether the affect might records expunged however, If, records. attorney or prosecutor deputy assistant the acomplaint-warrant, for apply or complaint-summons designated supervisory officer or designated 3.2, Section with accordance in consulted general Note 4.6.1. subsection acomplaint-warrant.  See on imposed release pretrial of condition special other or surrender, reasonably pretrial is be release of to condition deemed special other or weapons-surrender, no-contact, a if that also for the appropriate victim, might also it be violence domestic the of safety immediate the assure to necessary be can defendant's the that movements monitoring so device electronic an wear to ordered be to defendant the enhance condition thereby no-contact and the enforce to means a as program services pretrial the by monitored Bail defendant" the an under is "eligible defendant the that presupposes That victim. the to afforded protection complaint-warrant.
[brief] (Da041-042).  In her Order (which modified the form of order [...] submitted seeking summary judgment in its entirety – See Da410-Da411), [...] held “[...]’s cross motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED as it relates to indemnification for the subcontractor’s own negligence…” (Da041).  This Order did not address the remaining issues, including whether [...] would participate at trial.  Therefore, [...] remained an active party to the case.  [...] filed a motion for reconsideration seeking to have the trial court reconsider its decision limiting its ruling solely to the issue of contractual indemnification for [...]’s own negligence.  (Da371-Da411, [...]’s Attorney Certification and Exhibits).  That is, [...]’s motion for reconsideration asked the trial court to dismiss [...]’s third-party Complaint in its entirety.  (Da373-379, [...]’s Attorney Certification).  The Court held oral argument on [...]’s motion for reconsideration on January 5, 2024.  (2T, Da433-Da470).  The Court addressed [...]’s motion for reconsideration and [...]’s request to be entirely dismissed from the case.  (Da459-Da465, 2T51:11-62:21).  [...] did not oppose [...]’s motion for a complete dismissal, either in the initial motion for summary judgment or in the motion for reconsideration.  (Da459, 2T51:11-52:12; Da461, 2T54:2-8; Da462, 2T 56:22-57:15).  The Court noted [...]’s lack of opposition as a basis for granting [...]’s motion and upon granting the motion, [...]’s attorney indicated “That’s fine. ” (Da462, 2T56:22-57:17; Da465, 2T62:9-21).  The Court ultimately granted [...]’s motion for reconsideration and dismissed [...] entirely from the case.  (Da465, 2T62:8-21).  By failing to oppose both [...]’s underlying and reconsideration motions for summary judgment, [...] admitted all facts contained therein and [...] waived this argument on appeal.  See R. 4:46-2(b).
[directive] Implementing the HWC Policy  A.  Complete HWC Notice  When a law enforcement officer responds to, or encounters, an incident involving a traumatic event where a child is present, the officer must complete a HWC Notice promptly A.3 following the encounter.  Form  To the extent practicable, HWC Notices shall be See completed regardless of whether the child attends a public school or a private school.  When more than one child is present, the law enforcement officer shall complete the HWC Notice for each child, and the HWC Notice shall be sent to each child’s school.  Community violence is interpersonal violence committed in public areas by individuals not intimately related to 2 the victim.
[brief] Par. 3 requested [...] to confirm if there was a need for a Trust Reserve amount for his Trust administration, incl. Final Accounting, as per cited R.3B:14-7 in par. 2, after his discharge.  I issued Oct. 26, 2022 Reconsideration Motion with Certification (Exh. “P”) (162a-226a).  It addressed all wrongly approved Order provisions, & Court disregarding requested Trust info/documents, as req’d by 3B:31-67, to verify accuracy & validity of Intermediate Accounting figures, & payback of $74,248  Trust payments to [...], along with Proposed Order (194a-199a).  My Nov. 25th Cert. (Exh. “Q”)(228a-246a) w/updated Proposed Order (“R”) (248a-252a) replied to [...] & [...] Nov. 14th opposition Letter Briefs.  Mr. [...] filed Oct. 26, ‘22 Request for Trust Payments for $113,497.04 for [...] legal fees from Feb. 1 to Oct. 25, ‘22 (Exh. “S”) (254a-292a), $2,039.53 for Roth’s 2022, Co-Trustee Commissions (Exh. “T”) (294a-296a), & $17,649.57 for Roth & [...]’s fees for Trust Intermediate Accounting (Exh. “U”)(298a-301a), & $25K Trust Reserve (primarily for future legal fees).