ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The court relied on [...]’s observations of these four males in dark clothing and ski masks on a poorly lit high crime street, having brief contact with numerous pedestrians and then quickly breaking contact while attempting to conceal themselves between vehicles.  (1T57-4 to 14).  The court concluded “it is not reasonable to assume this is just people hanging out on a cold evening in November to greet pedestrians and others. ” (1T66-7 to 13).  The court further relied on [...]’s testimony that upon noticing police presence, the males “bladed” their bodies which, based on training and experience, led officers to believe the males were armed and dangerous.
[brief] (This is especially so when the prosecutor cannot distinguish between “mental illness” and developmental disabilities, as in this case.)  Your Honors really need look no farther than the very first two items on the PTI agreement: “Drug Testing” or “Medical and Psychological … counseling as directed” boxes.  Pa138 (Conf.).  It’s very telling that, after years of claiming [...]’s “Mentally Ill,” there is not one psychiatric condition in [...]’s PTI.  The prosecutors don’t even believe their own argument. \(^{10}\)  Whatever the holding in *Heck v. Humphry*, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) and its progeny, it does not give the police license to deny counsel (and his phone) from surrender to release, to pull an automatic weapon on a unarmed suspect, to forge search permissions, to tell a “kid” that their parent has abandoned them, then leave them in a non-suicide proofed cell, to kidnap him from the hospital against medical orders, not tell he should go back to the hospital and hide his gun registration.
[directive] Under no circumstances may a law enforcement agency’s internal affairs investigatory function be contracted or delegated to a private entity.  Instead, when necessary, law enforcement agencies may request that an internal affairs complaint be investigated directly by the County Prosecutor, who shall determine whether to investigate the matter, refer the matter to the Internal Affairs function of another law enforcement entity, or return the matter to the originating law enforcement agency if the County Prosecutor determines that the original agency can appropriately investigate the matter.
[brief] Ibid.  See also [...], “Balaclavas: Shop The Biggest Trend At New York Fashion Week 2022. ”  HuffPost, February 18, 2022.  https://www.huffpost. com/entry/balaclavas-trend_1_620d537ce4b05706db716e69; [...], “The balaclava is 2022's must-have item, but why?  And…why?”  GQ, February 3, 2022.  https://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/fashion/article/balaclava-fashion-trend.  [...] did not say how many pedestrians were allegedly seen approaching the men, which of the men was allegedly seen “breaking off” from the group, or which of the cars the man was allegedly seen “concealing” himself between.  Nor did [...] say that any of the men were seen handing anything to the pedestrians or engaging in what appeared to be hand-to-hand transactions; that he knew any of the men from prior drug distribution arrests; or that any of the pedestrians who allegedly approached the men were known drug users.  Nevertheless, when asked by the prosecutor if the men could “have been charged for loitering to commit a CDS set,” [...] responded: “Yeah.  They would have been charged for loitering based on our observation. ”  (1T 18-4 to 18-7)  After [...] testified as to why the four men were stopped, the prosecutor asked [...] why the men were “detained in handcuffs. ”  [...] responded: “Due to officer safety and . . . the detectives observed them blading their bodies. ”  (1T 16-1 to 16-4)  According to [...], when the marked units arrived on the scene, the men “immediately started blading their bodies,” which, [...] testified, is “typically . . . [a] sign[] that they could potentially be on the dangerous -- they're trying to shift their body away from officers. ”  (1T 12-4 to 12-17)  [...] did not personally observe this so-called “blading. ”  (1T 21-3 to 22-4)  While [...] provided reasons as to why the men were stopped and detained in handcuffs, he did not provide a reason as to why the men were frisked.  Rather, his testimony established that it is the practice of the Camden police to frisk anyone they detain:  [PROSECUTOR]:  Backing up, is -- is it commonplace practice when somebody is detained, is it common police practice for a Terry frisk to be performed?  [WIZBICKI]: Yes.  (1T 16-13 to 16-16)  **B.  The Judge’s Ruling**
[brief] Shaw’s endorsement of the “nature of the services” test and the long acceptance of the two-paragraph “semi-professional” pronouncement in  Looking at the nature of the services rendered here, Plaintiff alleges that the services provided were professional, beyond the ordinary seller of commercial services, and outside the category of consumerism.  Plaintiff himself is a sophisticated, highly educated individual that operates multiple businesses, including a medical practice as a neurosurgeon, “medical-legal consulting business,” medical billing company, and race car team, and works with an accountant and lawyer.  (Pa005, Pa007-Pa011, Pa013, Pa016-Pa017).
[brief] Review by an appellate court of the trial court's factual findings on a motion to suppress evidence is limited, and those “findings should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken ‘that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction. ’”  State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)).  The legal questions, however, are examined de novo on appeal.  State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010).  Given that the motion court in this case correctly applied the relevant law to the facts it found after a full and fair evidentiary hearing, its denial of defendant’s motion to suppress should be upheld.
[brief] C.  With school closures and never-before-implemented full remote instruction, school districts faced heavy burdens to pivot to an unfamiliar education model that expended additional costs and resources.  With hundreds of private vendors that each school district contracts with, it is absurd to infer that the Legislature intended for school districts to be tied up in costly litigation with its multiple hundreds of private vendors in Superior Court over alleged violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  (Argued at Pa377 – Pa378)
[brief] 1.  All public, private, and parochial preschool programs and elementary and secondary schools, including charter and renaissance schools (collectively “school districts”), must maintain a policy regarding mandatory use of face masks by staff, students, and visitors in the indoor portion of the school district premises [...]  4.  It shall be the duty of every person or entity in this State or doing business in this State and of the members of the governing body and every official, employee, or agent of every political subdivision in this State and of each member of all other governmental bodies, agencies, and authorities in this State of any nature whatsoever, to cooperate fully in all matters concerning this Order, and to cooperate fully with any Administrative Orders issued pursuant to this Order.  https://nj.gov/infobank/eo/056murphy/pdf/EO-251.pdf  As was clearly pled, “Executive Order 251 was in effect as of that date and therefore [...] should have been masked when she attended and performed her duties as a board of education member in a Central Regional school building.
[brief] This Court must now determine whether the [...] erroneously refused to consider the project’s air pollution emissions when the [...] found the project to be consistent with the broad policies and goals of the Highlands Water Protection and Planning Act.  The project’s air pollution emissions include consequential GHG emissions that will significantly contribute to the ongoing climate crisis and will unquestionably result in adverse environmental impacts to the local Highlands Preservation area.  Clearly, this massive fossil fuel expansion project is inconsistent with the legislative goals and purposes of protecting the natural resources in the Highlands from unwise development and the [...] erroneously failed to consider or make any record of this project’s significant environmental impacts from climate change when it issued the Highlands Applicability Determination (HAD).  The [...] has admitted that there is a proven connection between anthropogenic climate change and costly damage to the local water, air, and forest resources in the Highlands.  More specifically, the [...] has admitted and does not dispute that projects like this will contribute to and exacerbate the current climate crisis and, therefore, this project will significantly damage the local environment in the Highlands.  Therefore, the [...] was legally constrained to account for the project’s air pollution emissions and find that the project is incongruous with the legislative goals and purposes of protecting the natural resources in the Highlands.  But the [...] refused to take the project’s air pollution emissions into account and erroneously ignored all of these adverse impacts to the environment when it determined the project was consistent with the broad policies and goals of the Highlands Act.
[brief] ---  12  The cases Appellants cite are distinguishable.  See, e.g., Business Incentives Co. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 397 F. Supp. 63, 67-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (contract “contemplated performance exclusively in New Jersey” and the parties’ relationships did not qualify for protection under the NJFPA); Instructional Sys., Inc., 130 N.J. at 345 (involving computerized educational-learning systems reseller and 90% of plaintiff’s sales were not in the state whose law the contract applied); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (affirming arbitration provision and stating in dicta that it would condemn an agreement as against public policy in the event “the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations”); Gamble v. Connolly, 399 N.J. Super. 130, 144 (Law Div. 2007) (recognizing that “[r]esidential tenants are viewed as a special class of individuals for whom the legislature has articulated a need for special protection; offending contractual provisions are in direct violation of this protective scheme”).
[brief] In this malpractice action, Plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, because she failed to provide a timely Affidavit of Merit.  She conceded in her brief that the reason the affidavit was not provided was that her counsel “lost track of the timeline for submitting a timely affidavit of merit,” and “lost track of the timeline required by the affidavit of merit statute. ”  (Pb12, 17)  On appeal, Plaintiff raised a number of arguments as to why the dismissal was improper, including blaming the Law Division for not holding a Ferreira conference.  However, the conference was not held because when filing the complaint, Plaintiff indicated on the case information statement that this was a regular personal injury matter, and not a malpractice claim.  Plaintiff further failed to correct that error when she was notified that case was assigned to Track II, which is for non-malpractice cases.  It was thus Plaintiff’s mistake which caused no conference to be scheduled.  Further, Plaintiff seeks to take advantage of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28, which permits, under certain conditions, an attorney certification in lieu of the Affidavit of Merit.  However, Plaintiff’s counsel did not file the certification in a timely manner.  Also, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 requires a plaintiff to have demanded from the defendant, with specificity, the medical records or other information which he or she believes are needed to prepare an affidavit of merit.  Here, Plaintiff merely claims to have asked Defendants for Form C Interrogatory answers, which does not suffice to satisfy N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28.  Finally, Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that either the substantial compliance doctrine is satisfied or that extraordinary circumstances are present, such to excuse the missing affidavit.  As such, dismissal was proper and should be affirmed.
[brief] It is therefore highly unlikely that adding [...] and [...] as custodians will lead to discovery of non-duplicative information, much less any unique relevant documents or information that would be important to resolving the issues in this case.  b.  Plaintiffs do not show that [...] and [...] are likely to have documents that fill substantial gaps in [...]’s comprehensive document production.  Most of Plaintiffs’ motion is devoted to showing that [...] and [...] sometimes appear on responsive documents.  Plaintiffs’ heavy reliance on documents [...] has already produced from current custodians undermines any notion that [...] and [...] are likely to have a substantive volume of unique documents.  Plaintiffs’ documents do not reveal a CEO and COO with an unusually extensive level of personal involvement in the company’s decision making and operations.  Rather, they show [...] and [...] in supervisory roles, providing high-level guidance and final approval on a small number of discrete issues, while trusting the details of execution to other personnel—personnel whose inclusion as custodians is more than enough to ensure that sufficient relevant documents will be produced in discovery.
[brief] Because the case below was dismissed on multiple involuntary motions to dismiss, the allegations of the controlling pleading, i.e., the first amended complaint (FAC), along with all reasonable inferences perceived from it, should be deemed true.  See Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, 348 N.J. Super. 243, 249-50, 791 A.2d 1068 (App. Div. 2002).  The FAC states essentially the following:
[brief] The fact that she’s unable to do these things because of her depression is a substantial injury.  (1T9:13-23; 77a-111a)  Plaintiff has a fundamental right to have the nature and scope of her injuries determined by a jury of her peers as it cannot be said as a matter of law that her injuries are not permanent, because based upon the evidence in the record, it is reasonably inferred, and a jury could easily decide that the herniated disks are indeed a permanent condition.
[brief] The ITE data relied upon does not separate or distinguish between buildings that are 30 feet tall or 48 feet tall, so [...] cannot do so either.  The testimony he offered on that subject that Plaintiffs wish to construe as evidence that there is no difference in the amount of traffic generated by buildings of different heights is, therefore, unsupported by the cited data.  The Board and the Trial Court were justified by the record in finding that Plaintiffs’ assertion that all of the accessory structures and uses proposed in [...] are height neutral is not supported by Plaintiffs’ evidence.
[brief] The site plans appear at Pa105 to 203; also filed in support of the 2023 motion.  11.  The site plans for the Property underwent a total of 18 versions: the approved plans of 2005 (used by [...]) and seventeen subsequent revisions.  Pa105 to 203; Revision Blocks noting dates of revisions.  None of these Site Plans showed a proposed multi-tenant occupancy for the [...].  No approval for such use was ever sought and none was ever given.  12.  The Developer’s Agreement of February 26, 2008 – before the grading error – also included a requirement that [...] reserve an area along Route 10 “for future right of way purposes. ”  Pa319, p. 3, Section 3.  13.  In fact, the reservation of the strip along the Route 10 frontage of the Property was part of the Developer’s Agreement that [...] had signed with the [...] on February 26, 2008 (Pa319), pursuant to the site plan approval of April 23, 2007 (Pa313).  The April 2007 approval and the February 2008 Developer’s Agreement were based on use of the [...] by a single occupant.
[brief] Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.); Delvalle v. Trino, 474 N.J. Super. 124, 137 (App. Div. 2022).  In 1972, the New Jersey Legislature adopted the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act (the “No-Fault Law”), which mandated that automobile insurers, like [...], provide personal injury protection benefits (“PIP Benefits”) to motorists involved in automobile accidents, regardless of fault.
[brief] In this case, the Plaintiff’s expert has credentials equivalent to that of the defendant for purposes of the Affidavit of Merit.  [...] is Board Certified in Surgical Critical Care by the American Board of Surgery (ABS) which is a separate certifying board from the American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS).  It defines Surgical Critical Care as “… a specialty with acute life-threatening or potentially life-threatening surgical conditions.  Surgical critical care not only incorporates knowledge and skills of nonoperative techniques for supportive care of critically ill patients but also a broad understanding of the relationship between critical surgical illness and surgical procedures. ”  In this case, [...] has relevant credentials that are functionally equivalent to those of [...].  First the fact that there is not an identity of credentials is irrelevant.  Thus, the fact that [...] is board-certified in pulmonary medicine and [...] is not is of no consequence because the treatment involved in this case does not involve Pulmonary Medicine.  Likewise, that [...] has Board Certifications in surgery and vascular surgery is irrelevant because he is not rendering an opinion involving surgery or vascular surgery.  Where it matters, though, [...]’s credentials in treating a patient such as [...] are functionally equivalent to those of the defendant.  They are both qualified to treat a patient such as [...] who was critically ill as result of the trauma inflicted by [...] in surgically injuring arteries in his kidney during the course of the surgical biopsy.  It would not be unfair to have [...]’s medical treatment reviewed by [...].  Both physicians have received specialized training in treating a patient who has suffered the trauma of severed or punctured kidney arteries during a surgical biopsy.  The fact that the language describing these subspecialties is not identical does not negate the fact that these sub certifications are functionally equivalent.  Given this patient’s clinical issues, there is no distinction in level of expertise between these two Certifications, as the problems relevant to this case are the management of bleeding and hemorrhagic shock.  Critical care experience, training and certification are critical to this patient’s care, whether achieved by the certifications of the ABMS or the ABIM.  To dismiss the case against this defendant on the basis of an analysis which ignores this functional equivalence would be unjust.  For all of these reasons, it is respectfully requested that the Order of the trial court be reversed.
[brief] **3T20.**  [...] was defunct by the time the money was received.  The evidence at trial was that the money went to various family members, and Defendant retained $182,250 as his share of the proceeds.  **3T12, 20.  Da172. **  It was in 2022 that Plaintiff first heard the term “eminent domain,” from a nurse who was taking care of Defendant’s mother.  **2T18.**  Prior to this, Plaintiff was unaware that any proceeds had been received for Olga’s.  **2T18.**  Plaintiff called Defendant that same day and asked whether the diner had sold, and he admitted that it had.  **2T19.**  Plaintiff asked for her share, but Defendant told her she was not entitled to anything.
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 17  4.2.8  Where appropriate, an agency may enter into an agreement with another law enforcement agency to conduct an Internal Affairs investigation, and smaller law enforcement agencies that consistently have difficulty carrying out the internal affairs function are encouraged to explore regional internal affairs arrangements in concert with other law enforcement agencies.  4.2.9  Nothing in this policy shall prevent a law enforcement agency from retaining a qualified private individual to serve as a hearing officer or an expert witness.  4.3
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Relevant Procedural History of Related Prior Litigation Between the Parties  In 2013, [...] filed suit against [...] under Docket [...], asserting that [...] was responsible for two emulsion tankers [...] had delivered to [...]’s worksite that were later lost.  Pa33, Pa85.  The parties resolved the suit at mediation and agreed to arbitrate any disputes related to enforcement of the settlement.  Pa85.  Thereafter, an arbitrator rendered an award holding [...] liable for breaching the settlement agreement and advising a subsequent hearing on damages would be scheduled.  Pa86.  [...] filed suit to vacate that arbitration award under Docket [...].  Pa85-86.  After the trial court refused to vacate the arbitration award, [...] appealed; and, on October 19, 2017, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court decision and remanded for further proceedings.  Pa84-91 (Opinion in “[...] I”).  Following a plenary hearing on remand, the trial court again refused to vacate the award and [...] again appealed.  Pa93.  The Appellate Division affirmed in part and reversed in part, and again remanded for further proceedings.  Pa92-107 (Opinion in “[...] II”).  Following additional remand proceedings, the trial court again denied the request to vacate and on [...]’s --- 1  Although subject to judicial notice, see N. J.R.E. 201(a)(4), we have included the Appellate Division’s prior decisions in the appendix for ease of reference.
[brief] At trial, a jury would be tasked to consider whether there was actual notice, from the call [...] made to [...], even though there was some confusion on his part about the timing of the call.  A jury can decide what weight to give to this confusion.  Although [...] was confused about the timing of the call, his statements to the private investigator and testimony would provide a jury with enough evidence to make a decision about when the call was made.  What is important at this stage of litigation is not whether a jury would definitely believe plaintiff’s evidence presentation that the call was likely made before the accident.  What is important is that there is sufficient evidence from the [...] materials for or against the timing of the call for a jury to be the appropriate finder of fact to reach a decision on that issue.  The minute a jury is in the position to answer in the affirmative or negative about the timing of the call, which clearly is the case here, the evidence is not “imprecise or speculative,” and the finder of fact must the jury.  What is even more important is that, in weighing the numerated facts above, in the context of a summary judgment motion, the Trial Court must view any fact in the light most favorable to plaintiff, i.e., the Trial Court must find that a jury could well believe each fact in the light presented by plaintiff, and not more.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGEMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ........................................ ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................  ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .........................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ...............................  4 LEGAL ARGUMENT .....................................................................................  14 POINT I ........................................................................................................ 14 THE [...]’S MARCH 14, 2023  FINAL DECISION DENYING APPELLANT’S THIRD-PARTY HEARING REQUEST IS CONSISENT WITH APPLICABLE LAW AND SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENTIARY RECORD (Aa546-Aa555) .................................. 14 A. APPELLANT HAS NO RIGHT AS A THIRD-PARTY OBJECTOR TO AN ADJUDICATORY HEARING ......................................................