ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Inc., And [...]  415a-430a.  On 5-24-23, plaintiff filed a motion to certify a class action and on 9-14-24, defendant filed opposition thereto.  1a-151a; 613a-686a.  On 8-25-23, defendant filed a summary judgment motion and on 9-12-23, plaintiff filed opposition thereto and a cross motion to suppress defendant’s responsive pleading for failure to provide discovery.
[brief] Here, that means that the Commissions were required to provide reasonable notice in order that the retroactive benefit would fairly be made known and, thus, made available in a non-arbitrary manner to affected members.  As with most agency action, there is room for debate over what is reasonable.  To be reasonable, an agency's choice of action for providing notice does not require adoption of a perfect practice.  Here, the intended purpose of the action challenged—the Commissions' attempted notice—was to reach persons who might have been affected by the wrongfully calculated reimbursement rate, to notify those persons of the availability of supplemental reimbursement, and to inform them of the procedures for requesting supplemental reimbursement.  (pp. 16-19)  3.  The problem in this dispute over the adequacy of notice is that the evidence thus far produced has the capacity to support the claim that the methods of notice—the letter and website link—were not reasonably designed to likely reach the categories of members who may have been affected by the erroneous reimbursement rates.
[brief] …you can proceed against the limits of the policy, but no more because there is nothing else left.  …you’re not being estopped from going after anything beyond the policy limit, but go ahead and find something.  1T25  The following colloquy also took place:  THE COURT: …  What I believe you’re attempting to do is hold [...] personally responsible for any excess verdict above a --- 5 1T refers to 10/6/23 transcript on Receiver Discharge/Intervention. policy limit.  [...]: No.  Can I explain what I’m attempting to do?  THE COURT: No.  Well – [...]: I’m trying to protect – I’m trying – I’m not trying to make [...]’s life difficult.  I’m trying to protect my clients and the claims.  What happens here – THE COURT: You’ve done it.  MR REUTER: I -- THE COURT: You’ve done it.  You’ve done it.  The claim is made against the proper people in a litigation.  You have preserved your rights in that other docket number.
[brief] (2T 138-4 to 15; 2T 140-5 to 21)  He also agreed that night-vision cameras make every hoodie appear to be light-colored.  (2T 141-5 to 142-22)  [...] similarly testified about the recovery of the semiautomatic handgun (3T 211-7 to 214-24), and admitted that he did not write a report on the matter and should have.
[brief] DiCosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159 (1982).........................................................................................16  Gill v. N.J. Dept. of Banking and Ins., 404 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2008)...............................19  In re: Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permits, 185 N.J. 453 (2006).................................19  Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local No. 68 Welfare Fune v. Merck & Co., Inc.,.............12 192 N.J. 372 (2007).  Loigman v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Monmouth, ....................................14-15  329 N.J. Super. 561 (App. Div. 2000).  Palmentieri v. City of Atlantic City, 231 N.J. Super. 422 (Law Div. 1988)...............................15-16  STATUTES AND COURT RULES  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.........................................................................................................................18  N.J.S.A. 59:1A-1..........................................................................................................................14 R. 4:67-6.....................................................................................................................................18  APPENDIX
[brief] By e-mail dated October 22, 2020, [...] staff advised [...]’s agent that ⁴ See Press Release, [...], New Jersey, Dorsett Dock Improvements Complete (Mar. 20, 2019), https://ptboro.com/dorsett-dock-improvements-complete/ (explaining that Dorsett Dock Wharf is a municipally owned public access point that is available to “anyone wishing to enjoy fishing, kayaking, or other recreational activities. ”).  Aa0040-42.  an [...] supervisor had been brought into the conversation about on-site public access, and that the supervisor “agrees that this is exactly the type of situation the public access bill was aimed to address. ”  Aa0028.  The supervisor in question was not an attorney, nor is there any indication the Department sought the advice of the Attorney General's office before responding.  By e-mail dated November 4, 2020, [...]’s agent informed [...] that the [...], feeling that the improvement of an existing public access area was preferable to access across [...]’s property, proposed that [...] instead make a monetary contribution toward a nearby public access improvement project.
[brief] THE PROSECUTOR’S STATEMENTS  DURING SUMMATION, IN WHICH HE USED AN EXTENDED METAPHOR ABOUT MAGIC TO CHARACTERIZE DEFENSE COUNSEL’S ARGUMENTS AS A “DISTRACTION”  AKIN TO A MAGIC TRICK, DEPRIVED  [...] OF A FAIR TRIAL.  (Not raised below)  .................................................................  40  POINT IV  THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS DISCUSSED DENIED [...] A FAIR TRIAL AND REQUIRE REVERSAL.
[brief] The trial court made no error… reversible or otherwise… in that regard.  It is also undisputed that there was never an “agreement” between Plaintiff and Defendant as to where either child would attend college or how it was going to be paid for.  The Plaintiff failed to prove at trial to any degree of certainty what the parties “respective incomes at the time of enrollment” were which was specifically required by ¶25 of the JOD.
[brief] *Kingett v. Miller*, 347 N.J. Super. 566, 568 (App. Div. 2002).  Where it is reasonable to do so, “the warning must render the premises reasonably safe to fulfill the duty owed to the invitee. ”  *Berrios v.  United Parcel Service*, 265 N.J. Super. 436, 442 (Law Div. 1992), *aff’d*, 265 N.J. Super. 368 (App. Div. 1993)(emphasis added).  As the Model Jury Charge instructs:
[brief] (PA000089-PA000090).  See also N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b).  Needless to say, it is unreasonable for Defendants and the Trial Court to require Plaintiff, an employee, to know whether Defendants followed the precise protocol for its understaffing pursuant to N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b).  Rather, as Plaintiff’s Complaint states “staff was frequently sent from one group home to another in an attempt to combat Defendant [...]’ understaffing issue,” it goes without saying Defendants could not have seriously complied with N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b) by (1) receipt of documented approval by the Interdisciplinary Team, (2) receipt of joint approval by both the Regional Office and licensing agency before staff reduction implementation, and (3) received a written response within fifteen (15) days and complied with the conditions required therein, if they continuously sent staff from one group home to another on a daily basis.  (PA000006).  See also N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b).  Nonetheless, regardless of the detailed protocols in N.J.A.C. § 10:44A-2.8(b), Plaintiff’s complaints to Defendants still conform to the public policy surrounding the regulation; to wit, a lack of proper staffing undermines the quality assurances standards necessary for Defendants to provide developmentally disabled individuals to carry out their daily functions and activities at the group home.
[brief] 1The Procedural History and Statement of Facts are so intertwined that they have been combined for the Court’s convenience.  2  Other documentation from the [...] stated that the list’s expiration date was February 7, 2023.  (hereinafter, “Vacancies 1 and 2”)  Pa7; Pa55.  The [...] found, “The vacancies left by the retirements of [...] and [...], per the appointing authority’s indication, had already been filled by the time certification [...] was issued. ”  Pa7.  Certification [...] was issued in December 2022.  Pa72.  No promotions were made from July 2022 through at least February 16, 2023, and the Certification from which the July promotions were made, [...] had already been returned the [...] on August 1, 2022.  Pa6, FN3.  As per the City’s letter to the [...] dated April 24, 2023, sometime in 2022, the City was notified that several members of the [...] would be retiring on February 1st and March 1st, 2023.
[brief] The Final Judgment by Default is solely based on a series of Certifications by the Plaintiff that MISLED the court into granting judgment in May of 2015.  The Complaint filed (Pa8-11) with the court on February 6, 2015 was the first document that misled the court, where the FIRST Count of the Complaint IGNORES several certified letters from February 2014 to September of 2014 to the Plaintiff in good faith effort to resolve the dispute, which the Plaintiff’s Attorney knew of and had in his possession prior to filing the Compliant.  Point in fact is that the letter dated September 4, 2014, sent to the CEO of the Plaintiff (Pa34-37), was Exhibit I in the Plaintiff’s Attorney Brief for the October 19, 2023 hearing, which he submitted to DENY the defendants’ motion to Vacate the Final Judgment by Default.  That September 4, 2014 letter enumerates the many attempts made by the defendant to resolve the disputed matter caused by the bank teller’s error when entering the monthly interest payment into the Plaintiff’s computer system in February 2014 for the defendant’s Business Line of Credit.  The Plaintiff’s Attorney IGNORED the facts in those letters, when he filed the Complaint with the court, a year later, in February of 2015.
[directive] 4.2.4.  In cases involving a sexual offense under Chapter 14 of Title 2C, the police officer making the arrest shall check the central registry established under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-20 to determine whether the defendant is subject to a protective order issued pursuant to the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-13 to -21 (P.L. 2015, c. 147 (effective May 7, 2016)).  This mandatory query shall be made before deciding whether to issue a complaint-summons or to apply for a complaint-warrant.  Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude or discourage a police officer from checking the central registry established under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-20 in all cases, and not just cases involving sexual offenses, and a County Prosecutor may direct officers to check that central registry in all cases, or in such types of cases as the prosecutor may specify.
[brief] Appellants provided a reason for not meeting the filing deadline, which did not result from the “legal analysis of a non-lawyer agent,” but an assumption, right or wrong, that circumstances had not changed.  By the same token, Appellants are in no way critical of Counsel for Applicants filing his own publication.  However, Applicants publishing in a newspaper different than that one in which the ZBA publishes its own notices, and not informing Appellants of its publication, were designed to, at the least, shorten the period of time Appellants would have to file their Complaint.  Appellants sought from the Superior Court a review of the decision of the ZBA to allow (i) the first new home construction in twenty years within Monmouth Hills, (ii) a notoriously modern three story structure visible upon entry into one of the most important historic districts in the State and one that is found on the National Register of Historic Places, (iii) the fraud around the concealment of Applicant [...]’s intention to acquire and clearcut the dense wooded area that the ZBA relied upon, and (iv) the fact that the ZBA gave no consideration whatsoever as to the impact the Subject Structure will have on the historic aesthetic by deferring to the Landmark Commission.
[brief] 24 State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449 (2005) .....................................................................................................................  22 State v. L.H., 239 N.J. 22 (2019) ....................................................................................................................... 22, 23, 24 State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328 (2010) .....................................................................................................................  17 State v. Mauro, No. A-2085-09T3, 2011 WL 2307256 (App. Div. May 31, 2011) .........................16 State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392 (1978) .......................................................................................... 22, 24 State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383 (1998) .........................................................................................  25 State v. Nelson, 237 N.J.  540 (2019)  .........................................................................................  15  State v. O’Neal, 190 N.J. 601 (2007) ......................................................................................... 34, 35, 36 State v. O’Neil, 193 N.J. 148 (2007)
[brief] The exception at issue in this case is an investigative stop, a procedure that involves a relatively brief detention by police during which a person’s movement is restricted.  An investigative stop or detention does not offend the Federal or State Constitution, and no warrant is needed, if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  (pp. 21-22)  2.  Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, neither inarticulate hunches nor an arresting officer’s subjective good faith suffices.  Determining whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists for an investigatory stop is a highly fact-intensive inquiry that demands evaluation of the totality of circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter.  In many cases, the reasonable suspicion inquiry begins with the description police obtained regarding a person involved in criminal activity and whether that information was sufficient to initiate an investigatory detention.  In *State v. Shaw*, 213 N.J. 398 (2012), and *State v. Caldwell*, 158 N.J. 452 (1999), the Court determined that police lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an evidentiary stop based on descriptions limited to the race and sex of the suspect.
[brief] In 1996, the City adopted the Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan (the “Redevelopment Plan”) along with Design Guidelines Handbooks, which provides “the [d]evelopment rules for the” Redevelopment Area (the “Design Guidelines” and together with the Redevelopment Plan, the “Redevelopment Ordinances”).  2Ra132; see 2Ra68.  Design Guidelines Handbook 6 (“Handbook 6”) specifically applies to the Beachfront South Sector within which the [...] is located.  2Ra68; 2Ra130-38.  The Department reviewed and approved the Redevelopment Ordinances (as adopted by the City in 1996) “as consistent with the [CZM] Rules. ”  Aa32; 2Ra202.  In addition, as discussed in Point I(B)(3), infra, the Department adopted the Long Branch Rule as part of the CZM Rules to set forth the standards and procedures applicable to development proposed in the Redevelopment Area.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE DE NOVO COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS PLEA BECAUSE THERE WAS A SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS FOR THAT PLEA  Defendant persists in arguing that his motion should be granted under Vargas.  This argument remains without merit.  A court must elicit from a defendant a factual basis for every element of the crime to which defendant pleads guilty.  See State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 403-404 (2015).  However, “[A] defendant must admit that he engaged in the charged offense and provide a factual statement or acknowledge all of the facts that comprise the essential elements of the offense to which the defendant pleads guilty. ”  See State v. Perez, 220 N.J. 423, 433-434 (2015) (citing other sources)  (emphasis added)  In State v. Gregory, 220 N.J. 413, (2015), the Court examined another claim of insufficiency of a factual basis for a plea and held, “Simply put, a defendant must acknowledge facts that constitute the essential elements of the crime. ”  *Id.* at 420.  The essential elements of DWI are clear.  A person who operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor **or** operates a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in the blood is guilty of DWI.  See *N.J.S.A.* 39:4-50.  As found by the De Novo Court, this Defendant admitted that on March 2, 2017, he consumed alcohol before driving and that alcohol “impaired his ability to drive. ”  (1T4-6 to 4-15)  Defendant’s admission acknowledged facts comprising the essential elements of DWI: he was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.  Both [...] and the De Novo Court found there was an adequate factual basis for Defendant’s plea, leading both courts to properly deny Defendant’s motion to vacate his plea.  “When there are concurrent judgments of two lower courts upon pure questions of fact, a court of last resort will not ordinarily make an independent finding of facts in the absence of a showing of a manifest miscarriage of justice. ”  *Midler v. Heinowitz*, 10 *N.J.* 123, at 128-129 (1952) citing 3 Am.Jur., Appeal & Error, sec. 908, p. 474.  Under the “two-court rule”, appellate courts ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of error.  Id.  Here, the Law Division’s De Novo review mirrored the trial court’s proceedings.  Both courts made the same findings leading both courts to deny Defendant’s motion.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] De-Activation During Criminal Investigation Strategy/Planning Discussions.  Notwithstanding Section 5.3, and subject to the requirements of Section 5.5, unless the agency adopts a policy that prohibits or restricts de-activation as may be authorized by this Section, a BWC-equipped officer may de-activate a BWC while participating in a discussion pertaining to criminal investigation strategy and planning (e.g., to consider what investigative techniques to pursue, such as what questions to pose to a suspect or witness, whether to summon a drug/explosives detection canine, whether to apply for a search warrant, whether to request permission to conduct a consent search, or to conduct another type of warrantless search, etc.), provided that the strategy/planning discussion is not conducted in the immediate presence of a civilian (i.e., under circumstances where a civilian might overhear the strategy discussion), and further provided that the BWC- equipped officer is not actively engaged in the collection of physical evidence (i.e., conducting a search).
[brief] ”  Plaintiff/Appellant does not dispute that the policy is not an “all-risks” policy and that it does not include coverage for intended injuries.  Rather Plaintiff/Appellant asserts the policy provides liability coverage on an “all-risks” basis as defined by Victory Peach Group, Inc. v. Greater New York Mut. Ins. Co., 310 N.J. Super. 82, 87 (App. Div. 1998).  In other words, the policy provides “liability” coverage on an “open peril” basis which provides coverage unless a policy exclusion applies.  (1T: 5-6, 8-9, 13-14); (Pa262).  Plaintiff/Appellant asserts that “liability” coverage applies because he did not intend to cause body injury and “the policy does not specifically exclude allegations for counts of intentional interference with contractual relations, assault, harassment, or intentional infliction of emotional distress or negligent infliction of emotional distress however labeled. ”  (1T14); (2T8).  If Defendants wanted to exclude those types of causes of action, then it was incumbent upon the insurer to clearly draft its policy to avoid any possibility of ambiguity (which Defendants did not do).  (1T14).  Of note, all three (3) counts in the complaint alleged [...] acted “wantonly”.  Specifically listed under Count 1; and repeated for Counts 2-3, “wantonly” implies “reckless” interference with contractual relations which presumes coverage applies.  Moreover, there is an “exception” to the exclusion which must be construed liberally in accordance with an insured’s “objectively reasonable” expectations which establishes that the claim lies within the policy’s scope of coverage.  (2T: 8-9).  In the SOR (Pa396), the trial court cited Voorhees (1992) and erroneously concluded that Plaintiff [...]’ actions “do not constitute an occurrence, for they were not an ‘accident that causes bodily injury.
[brief] With regard to the 74.6 hours billed for preparing for, attending, and memorializing the three (3) depositions, this too was excessive.  [...]'s billing records reflect a substantial and unreasonable amount of time spent preparing for and attending these depositions, which were all virtual.  The total time spent at depositions, as reflected by the transcripts, is as follows: (1) [...] started at 10:08 a.m. and concluded at 2:59 p.m.; (2) [...] started at 10:06 a.m. and concluded at 5:02 p.m.; (3) [...] Day 1 started at 2:14 p.m. and concluded at 5:04 p.m., and Day 2 started at 9:36 a.m. and concluded at 1:36 p.m. (Pa000562; Pa000565; Pa000570).  This is about fourteen (14) hours of deposition time total, yet the defense billed 74.6 hours on deposition related entries.
[directive] Again, these See conditions are not to deter diversion, but to ensure the juvenile will be provided all the necessary services to combat the disease of addiction.  B.  Discretion to divert cases notwithstanding the juvenile’s prior adjudication or diversion.  Prosecutors should not automatically refuse to consent to diversion of a case, either initially or post-charge, based solely upon the fact that the juvenile previously had been adjudicated or diverted from formal adjudication.  The manner in which prior allegations of delinquency were handled is relevant only in determining whether diversion of current charges will be effective in achieving the objectives of the juvenile justice system, including the interests of public safety.  This Directive specifically permits consideration of a stationhouse adjustment and other forms of diversion for juveniles with prior formal charges and/or prior diversion.
[brief] See Ja2122 (¶ 44).  public be likely to find the information, so long as the information is posted and available to those who would care to look.  See Solomon, 878 F.3d at 146; Oliver, 826 F.3d at 475; and Alcan, 197 F.3d at 1019–20. \footnote{Also inapposite are cases where confidential government information was not publicly disclosed, even though it theoretically could have been disclosed through a Freedom of Information Act request.  See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Wilson v. Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 777 F.3d 691, 696–97 (4th Cir. 2015) (two confidential government reports never distributed to public).}
[brief] Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 242 N.J. Super. 36, 48 (App. Div. 1990), mod. on other grounds 125 N.J. 421 (1991); Higgins v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas, 282 N.J. Super. 600, 614 (App. Div. 1995).  Any deficiencies in the qualifications of an expert or in the testimony offered are subject to testing by cross-examination.