ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Thus, [...]’s recurring focus on the final destination of [...]’s sale of [...] goods is a red herring.  Indeed, the MBPA itself governs only the --- \(^4\) The Agreement has a one-year term which automatically renews.  The MBPA, which applies to contracts that renew after the statute’s effective date, clearly states that its provisions cannot be waived or modified, and any contractual provision that directly or indirectly requires such a waiver is null and void.  NJSA 33:1-93.15(a). relationship between brewers and wholesalers, not wholesalers and retailers.
[brief] **  SFST is the third phase of a three-phase DWI investigation—i.e., (1) vehicle in motion, (2) personal contact, and (3) SFST—with a decision to be made at the end of each phase.  SFST’s purpose is to assist the officer to decide whether there is probable cause to arrest a person for DWI for the purpose of obtaining breath samples.  SFST is not intended as proof of intoxication.  [...] employed each of these phases in [...]’s case.  **Patrol.**
[brief] (Pa50-52).  The policy of insurance issued by Defendant-Respondent, [...], included a suit limitation clause that required Plaintiff-Appellant to file any legal action underinsured motorist benefits either four years from the date of the accident; or one year from the date that the covered person is aware of a claim for which coverage would apply, whichever is later.  (Pa102).  Plaintiff-Appellant failed to file her legal action against Defendant-Respondent, [...], prior to expiration of the suit limitation listed in the policy.  (Pa119).  The trial court correctly held that the suit limitation provision was not an unconscionable contract of adhesion and enforceable, it was clear and unambiguous, it was not a “technical encumbrance” or “hidden pitfall” to Plaintiff-Appellant; and that Plaintiff-Appellant is obligated to know the terms and conditions of her policy and dismissed Plaintiff-Appellant’s Complaint with prejudice for failure to comply with the suit limitation clause of the policy.  (Pa1).  Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], has filed this Appeal alleging that the Court should have applied New Jersey’s six-year statute of limitations under the policy’s conformity-to-law clause; Defendant-Respondent, [...], is equitably estopped from asserting the suit limitation clause because Defendant-Respondent, [...], waited over a year to deny coverage; Defendant-Respondent, [...], waived its policy defense by omitting it from its Answer; and the policy limitation period, if applicable, was tolled until Defendant-Respondent, [...], declined coverage.  (Pb1).  The lower court’s rejection of that claim must be affirmed.  STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
[brief] The [...]’s contention that [...] failed to meet his burden of proof on appeal, in part, by failing to support his appeal with witness statements from local union employees, makes no sense.  (Aa11).  The [...]’s Determination is premised on the [...]’s implicit finding that the Complainant was not “engaged in a scheme to obtain signatures for the election under false pretenses. ” (Aa11).  To that end, the [...] asserts that [...] failed to provide evidence that supports his statement to the [...] investigator that he was advised that Complainant was doing just that.
[brief] 474 N.J. Super. at 456-62.  This Court reversed the [...] trial court’s shocking discovery order for several reasons.  First, it noted that Rule 4:18-1 -- the document production Rule -- does not “anticipate that the requesting party will be permitted to search through [its] opponents’ electronic devices for responsive data. ”  Id. at 467-68.  Second, it recognized that the subpoena recipient was not a party to the litigation, and that the “plaintiffs’ primary source of discovery regarding these allegations should be from defendants, and only secondarily from the [subpoena recipient],” and that “[d]iscovery from defendants could have narrowed the scope of any requests made to the [subpoena recipient].
[brief] To the contrary, suppressing evidence recovered under such infractions would “debase the judicial process and breed contempt for the deterrent trust of the criminal law. ”  *Id.* at 177 (quoting *State v. Bickham*, 285 N.J. Super. 365, 368 (App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 516 (1996)).  Neither the municipal judge, nor the officers’ search of defendant’s vehicle and his residence, violated defendant’s constitutional rights.
[brief] 2C:44–1(a)(9).  It found no mitigating factors.  The trial court imposed a term of imprisonment three years longer than the sentence imposed on [...].  Citing State v. Roach, 167 N.J. 565 (2001), the court explained its rationale for a weightier sentence by noting that unlike [...], [...] had “five juvenile adjudications, [which included robbery and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose].”  Additionally, [...] had committed two offenses prior to the robbery at [...] and two additional offenses afterwards.  This was not only [...]'s second robbery conviction, but “[o]ver a seven-month period, defendant committed an armed robbery, three thefts, [and] four receiving stolen properties. ”  Therefore, the difference between his and [...]'s sentence was justified.  See State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 232 (1996) (“A sentence of one defendant not otherwise excessive is not erroneous merely because a co-defendant's sentence is lighter. ”) (quoting State v. Hicks, 54 N.J. 390, 391 (1969)).  Finally, the fifteen-year sentence imposed was in the middle of the sentencing range for a first-degree robbery even though the court found that “the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:43–6(a)(1).  This sentence emerged from the trial court's principled discretion and we find no basis to disturb it.  Affirmed.
[brief] THERE WAS NO ERROR IN JUDGE RIVAS’S DECISION TO AFFIRM THE ARBITRATION AWARD. **  Plaintiff first argues that the Law Division judge erred by “overlook[ing] the law requiring medically necessary and causally related medical expenses to be paid pursuant to the New Jersey PIP fee schedule” and that the arbitrator erred by supposedly failing to do that.  (Pb5-6)  For the claims at issue—payments concerning [...] and [...]—the arbitrator found that Plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to support its obligations because although [...] was asserting a lien, its documentation did not break down its payment by CPT code, but only provided a lump sum for each date of service.  Consequently, Plaintiff failed to provide adequate documentation to fulfill his burden of proof concerning reimbursement.  (Pca141)  Plaintiff’s argument simply ignores these facts and argues that the arbitrator was required to simply award the fee schedule amounts.  (Pb7-8)  However, the issue here is the fact that Plaintiff failed to support his claim with sufficient evidence to determine what was paid to the providers and for what purpose.  This was Plaintiff’s burden.  See, Elkins v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 244 N.J. Super. 695, 701 (App. Div. 1990) (the plaintiff has burden of proving all facts for reimbursement); Miltner v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 175 N.J. Super. 156, 158 (Law. Div. 1980).  N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(c) defines the scope of [...]’s jurisdiction.
[brief] New Jersey courts have consistently stressed that misrepresentation or concealment of a fact is a basis for claiming fraud as to the essentials of a marriage, Tobon v. Sanchez, 213 N.J. Super. 472 (Ch. Div. 1986).  The fraud that Plaintiff proved in this case is the type of fraud entitling a plaintiff to an annulment – contrasting with prior caselaw holding that certain types of fraud do not so qualify.  In Carris v. Carris, 24 N.J. Eq. 516, 516 (1873), for instance, the court said that false representations regarding family, fortune, or external condition (in Carris a pregnancy) were not sufficient in degree to justify annulment, because a court should exercise annulment power only in cases where the fraud is of an extreme nature.
[brief] However, two spent casings recovered from the crime scene and the spent projectile recovered at the autopsy were submitted to a ballistics expert for review.  (12T43-23 to 12T44-16; 12T48-12 to 15).  The spent casings were 9 mm casings.  (12T50-17 to 18; 12T50-23 to 25).  Examination revealed that they had been fired from the same firearm.  (12T84-19 to 12T85-3).  The spent projectile recovered at the autopsy was a “38 class type,” which meant it could have been fired from a .38, a .380 or a 9 mm handgun.  (12T89-21 to 22; 12T90-19 to 20).  Defendant testified on his own behalf.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 19:29-1, et seq., sets forth the procedure for contesting an election.  Since the fundamental purpose of an election is to ascertain the “true will” of the electorate, “the burden of proof lies upon the contestant to show that such will was thwarted upon one or several of the statutory grounds. ”  Kirk v. French, 324 N.J. Super. 548, 552 (Law Div. 1998) (citing In re Application of Moffat, 142 N.J. Super. 217 (App. Div. 1976)).  As a result, someone who challenges an election must prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence.  See Brueckmann v. Frignoca, 9 N.J. Misc. 128 (Passaic Cty. Cir. Ct. 1931); In re November 2, 2010 Gen. Election for Office of Mayor in Borough of S. Amboy, Middlesex Cty., 423 N.J. Super. 190, 200 (App. Div. 2011); In re Gen. Election of Nov. 5, 1991 for Office of Twp. Comm. of Maplewood, 255 N.J. Super. 690, 702-03 (Law Div. 1992).
[brief] Defendant failed and refused to provide this financial information to Plaintiff prior to discovery in this litigation.  Significantly, Plaintiff had to bring this action to enforce his rights pursuant to the Operating Agreement and the LLC Act.  Moreover, the QuickBooks data that Plaintiff obtained by subpoenaing [...]’s accountant ultimately confirmed that Defendant improperly overcharged Plaintiff for Defendant’s own personal expenses.  Defendant should not be deemed the prevailing party for purposes of fee shifting under the Operating Agreement in these circumstances.  Otherwise, Plaintiff would be unfairly penalized for seeking to enforce his contractual and statutory rights, and Defendant would be rewarded for withholding this information.  As such, the trial court erred in granting Defendant’s fee application because discovery in this litigation was necessary for Plaintiff to obtain [...]’s financial information to which he was indisputably entitled to receive pursuant to the Operating Agreement and the LLC Act.
[brief] [...] never refused to cooperate with police, or to give her consent.  She had been released from handcuffs and knew she was no longer under arrest about a quarter of an hour before she was presented with the consent form, dissipating any effect of the arrest.  In contrast to the driver in Hagans, who was arrested on the side of the road, and worried for her six-year-old daughter seated in her car, 233 N.J. at 34, [...] was in the familiar environment of the apartment in which she was then staying, with four people apparently known to her, including her adult daughter.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, and for those set forth in [...]’s appellant brief, the trial court’s judgment in favor of the [...] must be reversed, and this Court should (1) dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice; (2) vacate the Trial Court’s order granting relief to the Plaintiff; and (3) hold that Defendant is entitled to indemnification of his reasonable counsel fees and costs incurred for all the work performed by [...]’s counsel in an amount to be determined on remand.
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[brief] [...] was required to satisfy the balancing test for approval of the bulk variances requested under the c(1) or c(2) criteria.  However, [...] attempts to argue that these variances requested should simply be subsumed under an approval of a use variance and therefore did not need to be proven.  While it is true that where a board determines that a use not permitted in a given zone, would nonetheless be appropriate on a certain property, in a certain location, that determination may come with the recognition that the use granted will not necessarily comply with the bulk requirements in the zone, since the use was not contemplated in that zone when the bulk requirements were drafted.  When considering a use variance, a Board must consider not just the use but also the overall site design.  *Price v. Himeji*, 214 NJ 299, 300 (2013).  In such circumstances, approving the use also recognizes that certain bulk changes will be necessary to design that use on the property.  That does not mean that a zoning board can ignore the ordinarily applicable limits on height, for example, when evaluating an application for a use variance.  It does mean that the board can, as part of granting a use variance, consider the other requested variances as ancillary to the principal relief being sought. ”  *Id.* at 300.  The proof required to establish how the nonpermitted use is appropriate at the location will necessarily include proof that the different bulk requirements are also appropriate.  In *Price*, which is often cited for creating the concept of “subsumed” variances, the Court was careful to specify that both the use and the design and bulk of the project need to be considered when determining if a use variance will be granted.  As part of the analysis of the use variance, the Board did not focus simply on the use, but on the overall project design, including its height and density.  Although both were inconsistent with the ordinarily applicable limitations in the zone, the Board addressed each as part of deciding to grant the use variance.  Nor did the Board simply authorize the height and density that Himeji requested.
[brief] (“Although we recognize that an insured expects that a title company will conduct a reasonable title examination, the relationship between the company and the insured is essentially contractual. ”) citing Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 579-80 (1985).  “The end result of the relationship between the title company and the insured is the issuance of the policy. ”  Walker Rogge, Inc. at 540.  The Defendants’ conduct before, during, and following the Property’s closing date at all times showed them to understand they were acting pursuant to an agreement with Plaintiff as settlement agent and title insurance company.
[brief] Police Department Record of Booking, Dated 2/20/22 (Attached at Pa074)  Communication Result Report, Dated 7/7/2020 (Attached at Pa076)  Letter From Police Safety to [...] Regarding Outstanding Bill for Discovery, Dated 7/29/2020 (Attached at Pa0051)  Facsimile to [...] From [...] 6/22/2020 (Attached at Pa077)  Letter From [...] to [...] 6/22/2020 (Attached at Pa078)  Notice of Claim to [...], Dated 2/27/2020 (Attached at Pa0053)
[directive] -3-  [...]  The [...] is a nationwide identification, support and enrollment program working at the community level which assists in the safe return of individuals with Alzheimer’s or a related dementia who wander and become lost.  When a memory-impaired person wanders away from home or an institution and the 800 number is called, the safe return operator will work with the missing person’s care giver and police to gather critical information.  The program includes a nationwide participant registry that contains the full name of the registrant, a photograph, identifying characteristics, medical information, and emergency contact information which enables the police officer to easily identify a person with Alzheimer’s disease.  When you call the program's crisis number at (800) 883-1180, a Safe Return clinician will contact the registrant's caregivers.  When you approach a person you believe has or You have been called to respond to a report of a missing nursing home may have Alzheimer’s disease, ask for identifying resident who is known to have information.  In addition, look for a Safe Return Alzheimer’s disease.  bracelet, necklace, lapel pin, key chain, or label inside their clothing collar.  Safe Return identification  What is the first thing you do?  provides the first name of a person bearing this ID, indicates that he or she has a memory impairment, and Where should you begin your search? gives the 24-hour toll-free number for the Alzheimer's Association's Safe Return Program.  The Safe Return program can also be used by police to send an alert to area agencies, such as shelters or hospitals, that a person with Alzheimer’s disease is missing.  This may help recover a person with Alzheimer’s Disease faster.  Receipt of Missing Persons Report of Person with Alzheimer’s Disease  If your agency receives a missing persons report on a person believed to have Alzheimer’s Disease or related disorder, the Safe Return Hotline should be contacted immediately and a photograph and/or description, if available, should be disseminated to all officers on shift.  Such photograph and/or description should also be included in all shift briefings until the person is found.  Since it is necessary and important to the safety of the person to be found within the first 24 hours, any predetermined waiting period to file a missing persons report should be waived, and an immediate search should ensue.  -4-
[brief] ”  (6T 131-23 to 132-8)  At some point, [...] parked the car, with the passenger-side so close to a brick wall that [...] could not open her door.  (6T 132-9 to 16)  [...] told [...] that they needed to talk, asked her to climb into the backseat with him, and then grabbed her arm to move her into the backseat.
[brief] On January 15, 2015, March 13, 2015, April 14, 2016 December of 2017, and February 22, 2019, [...] asked [...], the Vice President of [...] when he would be paid for the services [...] told him he was owed by MHA LLC.(Volume III, Pa. 394-396; See Certification of [...] in opposition to defendants motion for summary judgment “hereinafter Bellifemine Certification,” paragraphs 8-11).  Each time [...] asked Ms. Dunaev when he would get paid his overdue salary, Ms. Dunaev told him he would get paid when [...]. sold the hospital.  (Volume III, Pa. 395; [...], paragraph 12).  [...] relied on Ms. Dunaev’s statements to him indicating he would be paid when [...] sold the hospital and would not have remained in his positions at [...]s if he was not told he would get paid when the hospital was sold.  (Volume 3, Pa. 395; See Bellifemine Certification, Paragraph 12).
[brief] First, there is no conflict between the documents.  The account application refers to the DAA and characterizes the scope of the DAA arbitration provision as governing “any dispute between [[...]] and [[...]] relating to,” among other things, [...]’s “use of any Bank deposit account .  . . .” (PA035.)  The DAA arbitration provision applies to “all claims, disputes and controversies between or among [...] and [[...]],” regardless of the nature of claim, “arising out of or relating in any way to” [...]’s [...] bank accounts (and other matters not at issue here).  (PA126.)  Because the account application referred to the DAA, it provided adequate notice of the existence of the controlling document.  See Tantillo v. Citifinancial Retail Servs., No. 12-511, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21832, at *24 (D.N.J. Feb. 19, 2013) (holding that plaintiff “signed an application for a line of credit and thereby acknowledged the existence of another document that contained an applicable arbitration provision,” and thus “had adequate notice of the existence” of the controlling document).  Thus, those documents do not conflict.  They are harmonious.  Second, if there were a conflict—and to be clear, there is not—that conflict would be controlled by the terms of the DAA.
[brief] The instruction clearly requires the court to add the ongoing storm language on top of and in addition to the general duty.  There is absolutely nothing in the charge or its notes and annotations suggesting that if there is an ongoing storm the general duty language \(^2\)  Defendants refer to this as the commercial owner’s “general duty” as to snow and ice removal for ease of reference only.  mentioned above is not applicable or otherwise not to be charged.  Rather, the ongoing storm language is simply added on to the general duty language.  Therefore, the model charge contemplates and governs the commercial owner’s duty to remove snow generally and also adds an additional layer to that general duty when there is an active snow event.
[brief] \(^5\) [...] argued that there is little or no flowing water and thus there is no need to meet the construction requirements for circular culverts.  [...] Rb26-27.  But there is no such exception to the construction requirements in section 12.7(h).  Further, [...] misconstrued the purpose of the construction requirements for circular culverts as solely concerned with fish passage.  [...] Rb26.  The [...] has made clear that standards governing the construction of “a single circular, elliptical, or box culvert . . . are intended to ensure that construction will not adversely affect the environment or \textit{exacerbate flooding}.”  47 N.J.R. 1041(a) (June 1, 2015) (rule proposal).  The rules governing culverts must be followed because “[i]mproperly designed bridges and culverts can result in \textit{increased flooding}”\(^6\) and “[s]tructures that are improperly built in flood hazard areas are subject to flood damage and threaten the health, safety, and welfare of those who use them. ”\(^7\)  Finally, on this record, the [...] has not demonstrated that the over 9,000 square feet of riparian zone impacts have been minimized to only the disturbances --- \(^5\)
[brief] (8T116-5 to 8).  At the beginning of the opinion, [...] writes:  The instant case arises from a series of transactions and various lawsuits dating back to 1985 and it requires this court to explore the limitations upon its ability to entertain newly pleaded federal claims relating to a seemingly endless series of matters previously litigated in the state courts.  As discussed herein, all of the claims and issues within this have been, or could have been, decided in the three previous federal lawsuits and other state court actions that this estate debate has engendered.  Id. at 385 (emphasis added).  All claims brought by the Petitioner in this matter were dismissed by [...].  71 F. Supp. 2d at 393.  I.
[brief] (1T 85-10 to 86-9, 111-21 to 18)  [...] and [...] identified themselves and were told to exit the car and put their hands on the trunk, which [...] did.  (1T 86-10 to 24)  [...] complained of leg pain, so [...] opened the back door of the Mazda for her to sit inside.  (1T 87-9 to 13)  It was at that point, according to [...], that he smelled the odor of raw marijuana.  (1T 87-18, 93-6)  Later, when the car was searched, the only marijuana found was a small amount inside of two bags, which were inside of the glove compartment.  (2T 101-1 to 102-2)  [...] testified that when asked why they were meeting, [...] said he was buying a car from [...] and [...] said he was selling car parts.