ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In re Estate of Sogliuzzo, 2015 N.J. Super Unpub. LEXIS 2921 (App. Div. Dec. 17, 2015), is yet another more recent example.  There, this Court squarely addressed the question of “whether prejudgment interest should run from the date of the complaint or when monies were wrongfully taken. ”  Id. at *1.  This is, of course, the precise issue presented in the instant matter.  The Court in Sogliuzzo explained that while R. 4:42-11 addresses post judgment interest in tort actions and generally provides for simple interest calculated from the date of the institution of action, “under some circumstances, interest may be assessed form the date of the actual defalcations. ”  Id. at *6.  In adopting the latter approach, this Court relied on Lesh’s conclusion that “calculating interest from the date of the wrongdoing is more equitable in that lost interest is an integral part of the [plaintiff’s] damage claim as a result of the defalcation. ”  Id.  This Court also recognized that Lesh “made no distinction between tort and contract damages and nothing in [Lesh] limits the doctrine to contract cases only. ”  Id. at *7.  Thus, this Court concluded:  “The dates of misappropriation mark the point at which [the defendant] benefitted from his wrongdoing as well as the point at which [the plaintiff] was injured.  Equity compels calculating prejudgment interest from the date of defalcation.  . . .”  *Id.*  The facts here call for a similar approach.
[brief] In contrast, this court has held that “there is no right to a jury trial in an action for unpaid PIP benefits. ”  *Endo Surgi Ctr. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.*, 391 N.J. Super. 588, 594 (App. Div. 2007); *see also* Manetti v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 196 N.J. Super. 317, 320-21 (App. Div. 1984) (holding “that there is no right to a jury trial for PIP benefits where the issue is what benefits, if any, are due” because PIP benefits are mandated by statute and thus a claim for those benefits is not seeking legal relief for breach of contract).
[brief] BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................................................................................ii  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................iv  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS.........................................................xi  PROCEDURAL HISTORY........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS.........................................................................................................2  STANDARD OF REVIEW.......................................................................................................6  LEGAL ARGUMENT...............................................................................................................8  POINT I THE DECISION OF THE STATE POLICE RETIREMENT  BOARD WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below) .............................................................................................................8  POINT II  THE DECISION BELOW WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below) ...........................................................................................................15  CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................................18
[brief] This litigation began in April 2015 when plaintiffs filed a complaint and order to show cause to enforce their OPRA request, seeking the following information:  1.  From January 1, 2013 to present, all settlements entered into by the school board in the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law EDS docketed cases.  2.  Any final decisions incorporating or pertaining to item #1.  3.  May 1, 2014, any purchase orders, vouchers, bills, invoices and canceled checks for payment(s) made for legal services rendered to the board in regards to an . . . OPRA request of May 17, 2014, and the subsequent civil action .  . . .  4.  Any board resolution(s) which refer(s) to item #1.  (12a-13a, 5/18/22 [...] Opinion)  Defendants denied the first request, alleging the documents were exempt from disclosure as confidential student records under N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.5, and denied the second request, asserting it was "vague and does not seek identifiable government records."  They produced redacted invoices and purchase orders and two board resolutions of special education settlements, redacting identities, in response to the third and fourth requests.  (13a, 5/18/22 [...] Opinion)  B.
[brief] (8T106-2 to 108-7).  Defendant never expressed any fear of his family or the need to protect himself from them.  (8T112-15 to 113-8).  Defendant gave the police consent to search his iPhone.  (8T78-22 to 79-14, 80-2 to 7).  Analysis of the iPhone showed recent searches on how to use an AK-47.  (8T81-16 to 82-3).  At 7:32 p.m. on the evening of the murders, defendant queried whether a round from the AK-47 could pierce body armor.
[brief] The failure to make sure that the record was complete resulted in a decision on an incomplete record.  The caselaw cited in the Appellant’s Brief in the discussion of the Summary Judgment standard makes it clear that the Summary Judgment proceeding is to take place when the work is completed.  Plaintiff’s deposition was not completed.  Per communication between Counsel on the day that Appellant was deposed, [...] for the Defendants stated at 5:45 P.M.  “we are going to have to do a second session anyhow because I never got [...]’s records, so we will have to follow-up with a second session. ”  *(Pa211, Smith Deposition, T234:19-22)*  [...] was told that I had follow-up questions.  [...] was told by this Counsel “when you have the second session, you can finish your questioning hopefully and then I will have my follow-up questions and that will take care of [...]’s deposition. ”  *(Pa211, Smith Deposition, T326:19-22).*  It is requested that the Appellate Court reverse and remand this matter to the Trial Court, require that the Appellant complete her deposition and then this matter should be scheduled for trial.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that [...] protective cross-appeal be denied and this matter be remanded for a new trial before a different trial judge and that: (a) the police officers' opinions and conclusions be precluded and redacted from the de bene esse testimony of [...]; (b) evidence relevant to damages, including [...]'s texts and family snap-shots, not be used nor even mentioned in the liability phase of the trial; (c) that the defendants' liability not be limited to [...] acting negligently in self-defense, and the jury instructions and argument of counsel exclude any mention that the defendants are liable only if [...] acted negligently in self-defense; (d) that [...] may be both directly and vicariously liable; (e) that the jury be instructed as to the Restatement (2d) of Torts, §317; (f) that evidence and argument that plaintiff did not allege assault and battery against [...] be precluded; and (g) if [...] once again fails to appear after being noticed to do so, plaintiffs may comment on his absence.  Dated: 10/12, 2023
[brief] The Act, by prohibiting an attorney from being “principally engaged” in debt adjustment legal work, improperly imposes an unprecedented restriction on the type and amount of services an attorney can provide, directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s plenary admission of that attorney to the State bar.  The separation of powers doctrine would be rendered meaningless, and the Legislature could proceed towards regulation of other legal services, if the Legislature can so unilaterally and freely regulate debt adjustment legal work.  The trial court’s reliance upon Knight for the proposition that the Act does not interfere with the sound administration of the judicial system is misplaced.  In Knight, the Supreme Court found that the New Jersey Conflicts of Interest Law, which prohibited members of the judiciary from any dealings with casino entities, did not violate the Court’s authority to prescribe and enforce standards of conduct for judges and attorneys.
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[brief] ”  *State v. Kromphold*, 162 N.J. 345, 353 (2000).  In a case where a defendant was convicted of aggravated manslaughter, this Court held that it was impermissible double-counting for the trial court to base its finding of an aggravating factor on the “reckless handling and pointing of a shotgun. ”  *State v. Reed*, 211 N.J. Super. 177, 188 (App. Div. 1986).  Here, one of the Sentencing Court’s principal justifications for finding aggravating factors three and nine was that [...] committed a homicide by pointing a firearm and pulling the trigger.
[brief] Police action is unlikely to be flagrant when a stop is illegal but based on some individualized suspicion.  In Williams I, for example, officers on patrol at 2:00 a.m. received a dispatch that “a black man wearing a black jacket was possibly selling drugs” at a specific address.  192 N.J. at 4-5.  The neighborhood surrounding that home was known to the officers as being “rampant with weapons and drug-dealing offenses. ”  *Id.* at 5.  The officers responded to the reported address and saw two black men wearing black jackets in front of the home.  *Ibid.*  One of the men walked away, while the other, the defendant, was “shocked and unnerved” but remained in place.  *Ibid.*  The officers then approached the defendant to stop and frisk him.  *Ibid.*  The court held that, while it was “doubtful” that officers had the requisite suspicion for the stop, they merely “acted mistakenly” and their conduct was not flagrant.  *Id.* at 9-10, 16.
[brief] (Da3 to 7).  While the judge believed the door to the third floor was unlocked in initially denying the suppression motion, the judge also found that “the officers could not have known the interior layout of the home,” and that the door to the third floor “appear[ed] to be an interior door similar to the [kitchen] door shown in S-3. ”\(^{10}\) (Da6 to 7).  Critically, the judge also found that “[d]efendant’s room was in the attic accessed from the left side of the home, and it was reasonable for the police officers executing the warrant to believe [d]efendant’s room was a part of [...]. ” (Da6) (emphasis added).  The judge also recognized, at the January 5, 2023, hearing: “Once [the police] have a warrant they’re allowed to go through the whole house even if that means break[ing] in locked doors unfortunately.  And that’s my understanding of a warrant, whether we like it or no[t].” (8T40-13 to 41-22).  The judge noted that what the police cannot do is “go into buildings and break down doors . . . in buildings we know they’re separate units.  So then the question becomes, how would [the police] have known that that was a separate unit”?  (8T40-13 to 42-2).  In arguing the motion at oral argument, the trial prosecutor urged that --- \(^{10}\) Defendant included “S-3” (State’s Exhibit 3) in his appendix for this appeal at (Da55).  A clearer copy of this photographic exhibit was included in the State’s appellant’s appendix for Docket No. [...], at (Sa50).  the door to the third floor was unlocked based on the testimony; but, contrary to defense counsel’s assertion, she never urged, “brief after brief,” that the door was “wide open. ”\textsuperscript{11} (3T; 4T39-11 to 40-24; 7T; 8T34-7 to 9; 8T39-4 to 8; Db11).  Notably, the prosecutor urged that the relevant inquiry was what the officers knew, or could have reasonably found out, about the interior’s layout before the warrant was executed, and not at the time they were clearing the house for potential dangers or other persons who may be armed.  (8T17-17 to 20-8).  The prosecutor further pointed out that the door to the third floor had no markings, and that it was “fairly illogical to assume that floors one and three [we]re part of one apartment and [that] floor two [wa]s part of another apartment .  . . .” (8T18-21 to 19-3).  Relying on \textit{State v. Hendricks}, 145 N.J. Super. 27 (App. Div. 1976), the prosecutor emphasized “there was no way for [the police] to know the interior layout of the building. ” (8T17-17 to 19-25).  And she noted that the State’s argument would not change whether the door to the third floor was locked or unlocked.  (8T33-21 to 34-11).  B.
[brief] Respondents’ brief confirms that, to date, it has not either at the trial level or before this Court disclosed the purported, specific confidential information disclosed to [...] to justify disqualification.  This alone compels reversal.  “To demonstrate a lawyer received confidential information from the prior relationship, the client must make more than bald and unsubstantiated 1 “Rb” shall refer to Respondents’ brief in opposition. assertions that the lawyer disclosed business, financial and legal information related to the matter for which disqualification is sought.
[brief] [...]’s sales in New York are immaterial because the choice-of-law analysis here must center on where [...] and [...] have performed—and continue to perform—their obligations \textit{to each other} under the Wholesaler Agreement.  The recent decision, \textit{Amtec Int’l of NY Corp. v. Polish Folklore Import Co., Inc.} (“\textit{Amtec II}”), is instructive.\footnote{[...]’s reliance on \textit{Amtec Int’l of NY Corp. v. Polish Folklore Import Co., Inc.}, 2022 WL 992565 (E.D.N.Y. March 31, 2022) (“\textit{Amtec I}”) is misplaced and, in any event, undermined by the subsequent \textit{Amtec II} ruling in that same matter.}  See 2023 WL 2734642 (E.D.N.Y. March 31, 2023).  There, the court determined that a wholesaler could not enforce either New York’s ABC Law or the MBPA in a dispute over its agreement with a brewer because the “sale and delivery of the product at issue” between the wholesaler and brewer “took place outside of New York and New Jersey [in Poland]. ”  \textit{Id.} at *3.  In so ruling, the \textit{Amtec II} court found that the “final destination” of the product was “of no consequence” because the transaction between the brewer and wholesaler “was wholly extraterritorial to both New York and New Jersey”—i.e. Poland—and the dormant Commerce Clause “preclude[s] a state from regulating wholly extraterritorial commerce, even where the commerce may have effects within the state. ”  *Id.* at *3.*  As in *Amtec II*, [...]’s myopic focus on the final destination of [...]’s sales is misguided.  First, it is indisputable that [...] supplies **100%** of its product to [...]’s headquarters in New Jersey where [...] stores its [...] inventory and distributes [...] products to retailers.  Second, **all** of the material facts central to the parties’ dispute occurred in New Jersey.  Pa30-44.  Lastly, the State’s three-tier distribution system limits [...]’s direct dealings to only wholesalers.  Simply put, [...]’s sales to retailers in New York are merely incidental.  Thus, in light of *Amtec II*, New Jersey law and the MBPA must govern the Wholesaler Agreement.  ---
[brief] In fact, when asked about dedicated payroll for the Project, [...]’s Controller, [...], admitted that Payroll reports were not submitted to [...], the CCIP’s Program Administrator.  Specifically, she testified:  Q: This is [...]’s Answers and Objections to [...]’s Interrogatories.  A: Right.  Q: Which, if we scan down to the bottom, again, you – you certified those, right?  A: Yes.  Q: Okay.  So if we look at question number 9, “Set forth the date upon which you submitted any payroll records or reports to [...] relating to the CCIP. ”  And the answer is, “[...] does not believe that any payroll records or payroll – payroll reports were actually submitted to [...] for the subject project,” right?  A: Yeah.  Q: That’s a true – that’s a true answer that you certified, right?
[brief] ”  Pa14.  According to [...], the detectives did not have the required reasonable suspicion of criminal activity needed to request defendant’s consent to search the Audi because, the initial motor vehicle stop was not conducted in reliance on the CI’s information provided to the N.J.S.P., nor was it based on reasonable and articulable suspicion that the Defendant was conducting illegal activity involving possession or distribution of CDS …  Rather, Defendant was specifically stopped due to his alleged motor vehicle infractions in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 and N.J.S.A. 39:4-88b …  [The troopers’] testimony makes it clear – Defendant was detained due to the officers’ reasonable suspicion that the Defendant had violated laws regarding the operation of a motor vehicle.  Law Enforcement clearly did not pull Defendant over due to any previously investigated crimes involving possession or distribution of CDS.  Pa15-17.  After excising this motor vehicle stop from the narcotics investigation of which it was an integral part, and for which a judicial finding of probable cause had already been made, [...] continued by isolating each of the facts presented to the detectives to find each capable of innocent connotations and/or insufficient alone to provide any reasonable suspicion sufficient to warrant the request for consent to search:  The officers observed no suspicious behavior on behalf of the Defendant.  …  The Defendant claimed he had driven to New York to purchase burger patties, which were both plainly viewed by the officers in the back seat of the vehicle and mentioned by the Defendant.  The officers did not see any CDS, nor were they given any indication during the motor vehicle stop, that Defendant had any CDS in his possession … the officers cannot simply rely on the Defendant’s nervousness, shaking or trembling, or [orneriness].  Pa18 (emphasis in original).
[brief] Second, the de novo court showed bias such that recusal was appropriate because the de novo judge inquired on the record as to the State’s reasons for not admitting the Alcotest, which exceeded the scope of the evidence before the municipal court.  The State’s justification based upon the no longer operative Guideline 4 should not be used to justify prejudice to a Defendant, who had a presumption of innocence, when the de novo court could have exercised such review without showing any bias towards Defendant, such as making the inquiry after concluding and rendering an opinion on Defendant’s trial de novo.  Third, the de novo court erred because Defendant was entitled to an adverse inference when the State did not call [...], who was the only officer with the knowledge of the scoring factors for the standardized field sobriety tests.  By denying Defendant the adverse inference, the de novo court further denied Defendant the ability to cross-examine [...] as to the evidence that both lower courts used to justify Defendant’s DWI conviction.  In order to remedy this prejudice, this Court should reverse and remand for a de novo hearing before an impartial judge.
[brief] The Court has also had the opportunity to review the plea itself which is contained on Page 13 through Page 30 of the transcript which has been submitted to the Court by [...], I believe.  And, again, I know that this is part of the record but it's important for the Court to note it.  [...] after being sworn noted that he didn't have any difficulty hearing, seeing or reading English, that he was 31 years old at the time, that he had graduated from high school and had some college education as well, that he was not under the influence, that nothing was affecting his ability to think clearly or understanding what was happening.
[brief] **POINT II: THE JURY VERDICT DOES NOT SHOCK THE JUDICIAL CONSCIENCE, A NEW TRIAL IS NOT WARRANTED, REMITTITUR IS NOT WARRANTED. **  (Order Da23-24)  A jury’s verdict, including an award of damages, is cloaked with a presumption of correctness.  *Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co.*, 74 N.J. 588, 598 (1977).  There, the court stated:  In the American system of justice, the presumption of correctness of a verdict by a jury has behind it the wisdom of centuries of common law merged into our constitutional framework.  Of course, such verdict is not sacrosanct and can never survive if it amounts, manifestly, to a miscarriage of justice.  The resolution of the latter question is reposed in the courts.  Respect for our constitutional system requires that this obligation be approached, in all contingencies, with utmost circumspection, lest the courts intrude upon responsibilities which have traditionally, intentionally and constitutionally been vested in a jury of citizens.  *Id.*  The New Jersey Supreme Court has more recently stated that “[t]he preeminent role that the jury plays in our civil justice system calls for judicial restraint in exercising the power to reduce a jury’s damages award.  A court should not grant a remittitur except in the unusual case in which the jury’s award is so patently excessive, so pervaded by a sense of wrongness, that it shocks the judicial conscience. ”  *Cuevas v. Wentworth Grp.*, 226 N.J. 480, 485 (2016).  The trial judge in this case correctly denied the Defendant’s Motion for Remittitur.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 5:21-1.5(d), (d)(1); see N.J.S.A. 40:55D-38(b)(4), -44.  (Emphasis supplied)  [...] concluded that even when a roadway was intended to be dedicated, “mere dedication of streets . . . does not constitute them public highways, unless or until such streets are in some way accepted by public authorities”, N.J. Transit Corp. v. Franco, 447 N.J. Super. 361, 375-76 (App. Div. 2016)  The trial court should have recognized and credited the Borough Council’s Resolution declining to accept the dedication, which it had an absolute statutory right to do.
[brief] On May 7, 2011 [...] and codefendants [...] and [...] were arrested after being racially profiled, pulled over without probable cause and wrongfully accused of a 7-11 robbery solely because of the defendant’s skin complexion matched the suspects as black men.  Myers and defense counsel asserted that certain clothing evidence was found up the road, and was planted in the vehicle Myers occupied, and that the video of the initial stop would have proved such.  But it was destroyed without authority, which created a brandy issue and violation (Da 94-95).  On the same night May 7, 2011 [...] was accused by codefendant [...] who alleged that [...] was the one who killed Brunswick Ave Pharmacist [...] on April 29th, 2011, in the City of Trenton, New Jersey, although [...]’s claims contradicted and were inconsistent to the facts of the case and the investigation.