ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Law enforcement agency, agency, or department.  A law enforcement agency operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey.  Some BWC models may be turned on and remain in a standby or buffering mode, during which the device 1 does not make a permanent record of images/sounds unless the officer activates the recording mode/function.  With respect to these models, when the officer activates the recording mode/function, the device automatically preserves an electronic recording of the events that transpired a fixed period of time (e.g., 30 seconds) before the recording mode/function was activated.  This time-delay or “buffering” feature allows the device to capture data concerning the event/circumstances that prompted the officer to activate the BWC.  When an officer does not activate the recording mode/function, data captured while the device is in standby/buffering mode is overwritten automatically.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022
[directive] The Civilian Review Board must adopt a written conflicts-of-interest policy that addresses both inherent conflicts—which preclude a person’s service entirely as a Board member or staffer—and incident-specific conflicts—which require a Board member or staffer’s recusal from particular matters.  Prior to commencing their service, Board members and staff must sign a sworn statement that they will comply with the Civilian Review Board’s written conflicts-of-interest policy.  The Civilian Review Board’s conflicts-of-interest policy must include, at a minimum, the following stipulations:  (1)  Incident-specific conflicts.  Any Board member or staffer with an incident-specific conflict must immediately recuse from all proceedings related to that matter.  (2)  Inherent conflicts.  At least the following categories of persons are considered inherently conflicted and may not serve as a Board member or staffer:  a.  A sworn officer or employee of a law enforcement agency within the Board’s jurisdiction, or any person who has held such a position in the last five years; b. A sworn officer or employee of any other state, county, or local law enforcement agency; c. A prosecutor or criminal defense attorney currently practicing in the county within the Board’s jurisdiction; d.  A relative of any of the aforementioned individuals, as defined in the New Jersey Conflicts of Interest Law at N.J.S.A. 52:13D-21.2(2)(d); e.  A current candidate for public office; or f.  With respect to Board membership, a current officer or employee of the municipality.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 61
[brief] The discovery \(^{17}\)  The sole reference to the statute of limitations in any context at or after trial was the trial court’s one-line off-the-cuff mention of it (and the discovery rule) in its decision.  (36T 52:7-10).  rule is an equitable principle that modifies the statute of limitations only until the date when the plaintiff discovers or by an exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered that he may have an actionable claim.  *Catena v. Raytheon Co.*, 447 N.J. Super. 43, 52 (App. Div. 2016).  The date of discovery determination is “highly fact-sensitive, and will vary from case to case, and . . . from type of case to type of case. ”  *Id.* at 54.  In this case, the trial court made specific findings not only that [...] did not know what [...] and the defendants had done until [...] forensically analyzed the books and records, but that the defendants took deliberate steps conceal their conduct so that [...] could not have discovered it in timely fashion.  These findings warrant application of the discovery rule, and are entitled to deference on appeal. \(^{18}\)  *First*, despite [...]’s ownership interest in [...] and [...], the trial court very clearly found that he was a scientist:  “He wasn’t a bookkeeper.  He wasn’t \(^{18}\)  While the discovery rule generally does not apply to breach of contract claims (as opposed to torts like conversion), the Supreme Court has recognized its application in limited contexts, generally in cases of misrepresentation, as here, where the trial court finds that the Plaintiffs did not know and had no reason to know of the basis for a claim.
[brief] ## CASES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Baker v. National State Bank, | 26, 27 | | 353 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2002) | | | Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., | 38 | | 214 N.J. 518 (2013) | | | Bender v. Adelson, | 33 | | 187 N.J. 411 (2006) | | | Biruk v. Wilson, | 32 | | 50 N.J. 253, 260 (1967) | | | BMW of North America Inc. v. Gore, | 25, 27 | | 517 U.S. 559 (1996) | | | Boryszewski v. Burke, | 18, 21 | | 380 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 2005) | | | Botta v. Brunner, | 43 | | 42 N.J. Super. 95 (App. Div. 1956) | | | Carrino v. Novotny, | 17 | | 78 N.J. 355, 365 (1979) | | | Catalane v. Gilian Instrument Corp., | 27 | | 271 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div. 1994) | | | Cavuoti v. New Jersey Transit, | 27 | | 161 N.J. 107 (1999) | | | Colucci v. Oppenheim, | 41 | | 326 N.J. Super. 166 (App. Div. 1999) | | | Condella v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., | 42 | | 298 N.J. Super. 531 (1996) | | | Cuccurullo v. Galinsky, | 42 | | 2010 WL 2089669 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) | | Das v. Thani, 171 N.J. 518 (2002) ..................................................
[brief] Intervenor is a third-party tort claimant, is not an insured under the [...] Policy and, therefore, has no standing to pursue this appeal.  Stated differently, Intervenor cannot maintain this action against [...] because he has no direct rights under the former [...] Policy.  Indeed, it is well-settled under New Jersey law that a non-party to an insurance contract may not maintain a direct action against an insurer unless such action is permitted by statute or the insurance contract.
[brief] It is also well recognized that diminution in fair market value can be measured by a cost to cure provided the cost to cure is less than the damages that would otherwise result.  *State v. Sun Oil Company*, 160 N.J. 513 (Law Div. 1978); *State by Com'r v. Weiswasser*, 140 N.J. 320 (1987).  In *Plunske v. Wood*, 370, A. 2d 920 (Conn. 1976) the partial taking was for road purposes.
[brief] Finally, defendant argues that his aggregate sentence of forty-seven years imprisonment, with more than twenty-seven years of parole ineligibility under NERA, was excessive.  Defendant's sentence consisted of consecutive sixteen-year terms of imprisonment, subject to an 85% period of NERA parole ineligibility under NERA, for each of the Egg Harbor armed robberies and consecutive five-year terms of imprisonment for the aggravated assault and both convictions for possession of a handgun without a permit.  We vacate the consecutive sentence for the second of defendant's convictions for possession of a handgun without a permit.  Insofar as the record before us indicates, defendant possessed the same handgun in the robberies at both the [...] and [...].  We question whether the possession of the same unpermitted handgun in the commission of two offenses supports a finding of two violations of \textit{N.J.S.A.} 2C:39–5(b), but we do not decide this issue because it has not been briefed.  In any event, it is clear that such continuing possession of the same weapon does not involve separate wrongs that could justify imposition of consecutive sentences.  \textit{See State v. Yarbough}, 100 \textit{N.J.} 627, 643–44, 498 A.2d 1239 (1985), \textit{cert. denied}, 475 U.S. 1014, 106 S.Ct. 1193, 89 L. Ed.2d 308 (1986).  In fact, we question whether any consecutive sentences at all were warranted for possession of a handgun without a permit.
[brief] Moreover, the Township expressed, even if the deference was given to the Supreme Court’s decision creating “extraordinary circumstances,” the Supreme Court decided this matter on November 28, 2022, and the Appellant did not file its motion for reconsideration fifty (50) days.  The Township asserted that the Appellant’s motion for reconsideration is time-barred.  The Commission agreed.  Thereafter, the Appellant filed its appeal of the lower court decision to the Appellate Court.
[directive] Page 3  Attorneys General has addressed the requirements of this law, I have determined that officers statewide would benefit from additional guidance on Section 33-11.1 and am issuing this Directive to ensure uniform enforcement across New Jersey.  And while COVID-19 has highlighted the problem of illegal evictions, this Directive will remain useful and necessary for officers even after the pandemic ends, and will create a framework to ensure that no New Jersey resident is illegally displaced from their home.
[brief] Clearly, that path is supported not only by the MLUL, but by Nadelson (supra.) as it does allow for direct review by the Superior Court.  Plaintiff’s argument that the HPC’s determination on the utilization of incorrect paver materials as being outside the design guidelines for installation, supporting the denial of a Certificate of Appropriateness rendering the decision “arbitrary and capricious”, fails on all levels.  Lastly, as noted, Appellant failed to request an interpretation of any ordinance to the Zoning Board of Adjustment as to the number of walkways and size of walkways to be permitted in the Flare and failed to request alternative relief from the Zoning Board.  The matter filed by Plaintiff to the Zoning Board was solely limited to an appeal of the HPC decision.  (Pa134a)  The Court should further note that the [...] had every authority to review this matter for zoning appropriateness and it should be noted that the Zoning Board of Adjustment DID have the power to make a determination as to the number of walkways to be installed in the flare, along with a decision as to whether or not walkways that were removed were abandoned, and did so by upholding the decision of the [...], per its powers established in the MLUL which directly refutes Points 1 and 2 of Plaintiff’s submission.  The Court must keep in mind that the Prerogative Writ action is focused on the determination of the Zoning Board for purposes of appeal, and whether or not the Zoning Board was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable in their determination to uphold a denial of a Certificate of Appropriateness with independent findings of fact placed on the record and memorialized in the Resolution of Denial.
[brief] (34a-35a.)  •  **Count 15**:  Respondents violated *N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g)* because the postcards mailed on behalf of the Board contained “misleading, emotionally charged material, failed to mention the deficiencies in the proposal, and their exhortation to ‘Remember to VOTE’ is an attempt to mislead the population and encouraging them to vote Yes.
[brief] (Db 4-15)¹  LEGAL ARGUMENT  [...] relies on the legal arguments from his initial brief and adds the following:  POINT I  MR. MASON’S MIRANDA WAIVER WAS NOT KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY.  As discussed in [...]’s opening brief, an officer may not “reinforce a false impression as to the seriousness of the sentence” that a defendant faces to induce that person’s Miranda waiver.  State v. Diaz, 470 N.J. Super. 495, 519 (App. Div. 2022).  Here, the trial court stated several times on the record that [...] misled [...] into believing that his interrogation would concern a minor drug charge instead of the significantly more serious allegation of armed robbery.
[brief] Any argument to the contrary is putting one’s head in the proverbial sand.  True, reasonable minds could differ regarding scope – that is, is doubling density appropriate or is tripling density appropriate.  But such a subjective value assessment is not for this court, but rather for local officials.  On this issue, [...] has spoken.  And that determination is substantially compliant with the Master Plan and amply supported by the record here.  (Pa1743).  Thus, the Trial Court recognized that the density of the redevelopment plan overlay was consistent with the Borough’s master plan goals and objectives, and that the Borough’s discretionary decision regarding such density should not be disturbed by the court.
[directive] Less-lethal ammunition also referred to as less-lethal impact projectiles, means ammunition approved by the Attorney General that is designed to stun, temporarily incapacitate or cause temporary discomfort to a person without penetrating the person’s body.  The term shall also include ammunition approved by the Attorney General which is designed to gain access to a building or structure and is used for that purpose.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:3-11(f).  Specific less-lethal ammunition and platforms that are currently approved can be found at the Attorney General’s Approved List of Less-Lethal Ammunition.  (December, 2010).  Less-lethal ammunition may include different types such as: Kinetic Less-Lethal Flexible Projectiles; Kinetic Less-Lethal Non-Flexible Projectiles; Rubber Balls and Pellets; Baton Projectiles; Pad Projectiles, commonly referred to as “bean bag rounds;” Drag Stabilized Projectiles, commonly referred to as “sock rounds;” Fin- Stabilized Projectiles; and Encapsulated Projectiles.  3.10  Less-Lethal Device.  Less-lethal device means any less-lethal weapon that is reviewed by the Panel and approved by the Attorney General or the Attorney General’s designee.  The term does not include OC spray, asps or batons.  3.11  Serious Bodily Injury.  Serious bodily injury means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.  Serious bodily injury and serious bodily harm have the same definition the purposes of this Policy.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(b); N.J.S.A. 2C:3-11(d).
[brief] The process is similar for video recordings.  “Authentication of a videotape is much like that of a photograph, that is, testimony must establish that the videotape is an accurate reproduction of that which it purports to represent and the reproduction is of the scene at the time the incident took place. ”  Loftin, 287 N.J. Super. at 98.  This testimony need not come from the videographer but may be provided by “any person with the requisite knowledge of the facts represented in the [] videotape[.]”  State v. Brown, 463 N.J. Super. 33, 52 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting Wilson, 135 N.J. at 14).  An early case addressing authentication of a video recording is Balian v. General Motors, 121 N.J. Super. 118 (App. Div. 1972), a product liability suit.
[brief] Pond Run Watershed Association v. Twp. of Hamilton Zoning Bd. of Adj., 397 N.J. Super. 335, 350 (App. Div. 2008).  The board's decision "is subject to de novo review by the courts and thus is afforded no deference."  Ibid.  The Municipal Land Use Law (N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163) requires that notice of "applications for development" be given to the public, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12(a), and to owners of properties within 200 feet of the property that is the subject of the hearing, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12(b).
[brief] (Da98; Da100).  On August 21, 2023, thirty-nine (39) days after Plaintiff’s July 13 letter offering the Property as an inclusionary development, [...] also adopted Resolution No. 23-228, which authorized the Planning Board to undertake a preliminary redevelopment investigation of the Property to determine if it warrants being designated as an “area in need of redevelopment” for condemnation purposes (the “Condemnation Resolution”).
[brief] (7T 38-19 to 39-2).  Nor did reviewing Division of Motor Vehicle records connect defendant or [...] to the registration of an Audi automobile.  (7T 39-6 to 11).  Two persons, including [...], who were present during the drive-by as well as several other law enforcement officers testified on behalf of the State, but none provided evidence of defendant’s presence at the crime scene, let alone as the shooter.  (6T 45-5 to 7; 9T 28-10 to 14).  The only evidence introduced at trial implicating defendant in the shooting came from [...]’ DVD-recorded pretrial statement to [...].
[directive] 3.3  Conducted Energy Device (CED).  A conducted energy device means any device approved by the Attorney General that is capable of firing darts/electrodes that transmit an electrical charge or current intended to temporarily disable a person.  3.4  Deadly Force.  Deadly force means force that an officer uses with the purpose of causing, or that a reasonable officer knows creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury.  Discharging a firearm, constitutes deadly force, unless the discharge occurred during the course of a law enforcement training exercise, routine target practice at a firing range, a lawful animal hunt, or the humane killing of an injured animal.  A threat to cause death or 3
[brief] (ID No.: 047911998)  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (ID No.: 049161995)  [...], Esq. (ID No.: 024101998)  # TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | REPLY STATEMENT OF FACTS | 1 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 3 | | POINT I | 3 | | THIS COURT’S REVIEW OF THE TRIAL COURT’S DISMISSAL OF THIS ACTION WITH PREJUDICE AT THE RETURN DATE OF THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE IS PLENARY.
[brief] On June 4, 2019, Defendant was involved in a motor vehicle accident after his automobile went across the line of traffic and collided with another automobile in which the alleged victims were traveling.  (Pa 24-25).  Alleged victim, [...], was transported to [...] in Elizabeth, NJ where she received treatment for her injuries.  (Id.).  Several days later, she was placed under hospice care and died.  (Id.).  The precise cause of her death is one which is vehemently disputed by the Parties in this case.  Two other passengers in Ms. Mele’s automobile were also injured and would also be treated for their injuries.  (Id.).  In its motion papers, the State implies that Defendant was intoxicated at the time of the crash based upon the less than credible testimony of [...] who asserted that Defendant admitted to “hav[ing] intentionally taken too much medication. ” (1T 77:17-20).  Even assuming arguendo that any of what [...] testified to is true, the actual testimony reads more accurately as Defendant acknowledged the possibility that he took too much medication that day as opposed to some intentional abuse of a prescription drug.  (1T 48:21-49:25).  At the scene of the accident, Defendant was examined by law enforcement who did not administer standardized field sobriety tests (“FSFTs”) and released him.  (4T 77:16-25; 78:1-3).  Defendant would try to continue to a physician’s appointment, to which he was traveling to prior to the crash, but would instead travel to the hospital when his injuries worsened in route to his other appointment.  (Pa 45).  Questions about Defendant’s impairment would continue to remain unasked by the healthcare providers at the hospital.  (Id.).  Defendant is recorded as having been alert and orientated and there are no mentions of signs of impairment relative to central nervous system depression or sedation.  (Id.).  Moreover, the hospital records available indicate that Defendant was negative for drugs and alcohol and no tests were ordered relative to the detection of drugs in blood or urine, rather other routine tests were requested and conducted.  (Id.).  Specifically, the report indicates that he was negative for: nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, trauma, dizziness, diaphoresis, paraesthesias, slurred speech, and/or drug or EtoH use.  (Id.).  While it is true that during the course of his treatment at the hospital, two blood samples were taken from Defendant for ordinary medical testing purposes, the first blood draw was made at about 5:52 p.m. and a second was taken at about 8:31 p.m. (4T 38:25; 39:1-25; 40:1-6).
[brief] THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE BARS OBJECTORS' CONTENTION THAT ISSUES THEY PLACED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT ON MOTION WERE NOT RIPE FOR ADJUDICATION (Not Raised Below by Appellants).  As can be seen from the Objectors' "Notice of Motion to Enlarge the Period of Time to File and to Supplement the Record," the Objectors placed multiple issues before the Trial Court on motion.  (Pa113-114).  The Objectors did not confine their requested relief to an extension of time in which to file their complaint in lieu of prerogative writs.  (Pa113-114).  Instead, the Objectors simultaneously urged the Trial Court: a) to grant them discovery with the end goal of supplementing the record below; b) to expand the record below to include documents that post-date the decision of the ZBA and to include documents that the Objectors previously chose not to proffer; and c) even to remand the matter to the ZBA based upon allegations that the ZBA failed to maintain a verbatim record pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(f).  (Pa113-114; Pb27).  Having placed these issues before the Trial Judge in the first instance and having courted a ruling, the Objectors now complain that the Trial Judge should have refused to decide these issues for lack of "ripeness."  Though the Trial Court acted entirely properly in entering Judgment on the motions before it, we do not even need to analyze the issue any further.  That is because the Objectors ripeness argument is barred by the doctrine of invited error.
[brief] See e.g. Doe v. Roe, 2023 WL 2542566 (App. Div.), (Da5-10) citing Metro Mktg., LLC v. Nationwide Vehicle Assurance, Inc., 472 N.J. Super. 132 (App. Div. 2022); Shelcusky v. Garjulio, 172 N.J. 185 (2002)  Moreover, the term “sidewalk” should be construed in accordance with its commonly accepted meaning.  A “sidewalk” is defined as “[t]hat part of a public street or highway designed for the use of pedestrians, being exclusively reserved for them. ”  Gaskill v. Active Environmental Technologies, 360 N.J. Super. 530, 534 (App. Div. 2003), citing Chimiente v. Adam Corp., 221 N. J. Super. 580, 583 (App. Div. 1987) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1238 (5th ed. 1979))  Although the instant matter involves private property, that should not and does not change the requirement of the exclusive reservation of the area for pedestrians in order for the area to be considered a “sidewalk. ”  Moreover, a pathway taken by a pedestrian that does not fit that definition is not a “sidewalk,”  See e.g. Moore v. Croatian American Bocci Club, 2008 WL 2548541 (App. Div.), (Da11-15) at pages 2-3 (Da12-13)  It is clear that plaintiff did not fall on a “sidewalk” as that term has been defined by case law.  It is equally clear that the parties to the lease agreement at issue herein did not consider the area where plaintiff fell to be a “sidewalk” under the terms of the lease.