ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] When the municipality failed to act, in response to the [...]’ attorney’s letter of January 23, 2020, in early February, [...] filed Municipal Court complaints alleging that work was being done without permits that were required and that the proposed use was not permitted.  (T1 at 53:23-24; 54:13-16).  [...] testified at trial to trucks parked in the crosswalk.  (T1 at 57:19-20).  He also testified that the sounds from the refrigerated trucks that were parked for a substantial period of time were annoying and that he could hear those noises at his home.  (T1 at 57:21-58:11; 58:25-59:5).  He testified that some of these trucks that were parked for extended periods of time were diesel trucks and the smell from the diesel trucks was “everywhere. ” (T1 at 58:12-24).  He testified that all of the above issues were still going on “today. ” (T1 at 59:3-4).  He also testified that there were truck deliveries as early as 4:46 a.m. and that those deliveries woke him up “all the time. ” (T1 at 59:6-16).  He testified that tractor trailer trucks making deliveries to the restaurant park in front of a stop sign on a crosswalk and that has been going on for the entire time that [...] has been in business and continues today.  (Pa 146; T1 at 60:6-9-61:22-25).  Further he testified that delivery trucks including ones with tractor trailers make U-turns on [...] in front of his house and that many times they use his driveway coming onto his property in making these U or K turns.  (Pa 147; Pa 149; T1 at 62:1-23; 63:1-5 and 11-22) and that this activity is ongoing today.  (T1 at 64:4-66:14).  Finally, [...] testified that his quality of life has been detrimentally impacted by [...]’s operation including the idling of cars and delivery trucks, turns into the driveway and K-turns on the street, deliveries early in the morning, noise from the trucks waking everyone up and food left outside and people eating on benches.  (T1 at 69:12-71:10).
[directive] High-speed vehicular pursuits create a substantial risk of injury and fatalities.  Over 10% of vehicular pursuits end up in accidents resulting in injuries or fatalities, including to officers, innocent third parties in vehicles unrelated to the pursuit, and pedestrians.  1.2  The pursuit policy was last updated in 2009.  The policy succeeded initially in reducing the number of pursuits, injuries, and fatalities associated with them.  However, after an initial decline, the number of pursuits has been increasing steadily since 2014.  Since the policy was updated there have been almost 4,200 accidents during pursuits that resulted in over 2,800 injuries, including injuries to 625 law enforcement officers, 682 victims in third party vehicles, and 52 pedestrians.  In that same period, there have been 59 fatalities associated with pursuits, including an officer, four third-party drivers, and eight pedestrians.  1.3
[brief] Although New Jersey Courts have yet to express an opinion as to the application of CEPA when the recipient of the information was already aware of the activity, policy, or practice in question, and had already taken steps to remedy the issue, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and other courts have routinely held that the mere mention of alleged violations that the employer was already aware of does not constitute whistleblowing activity.  See e.g. Gillispie v. RegionalCare Hosp. Partners Inc., 892 F.3d 585 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding Plaintiff failed to engage in whistle-blowing activity under whistleblower statute as she did not give anyone at the hospital any information about the emergency room visit or discharge “that they were not already aware of. ”); Pedersen v. Bio-Medical Applications of Minn., 992 F.Supp. 2d 934, 939 (D. Minn. 2014) (finding that “the mere mention of a suspected violation that the employer already knows about” does not constitute whistleblowing activity), aff’d 775 F.3d 1049 (8th Cir. 2015).  Certainly, this comports with common sense and societal norms because if Plaintiff is deemed a “whistleblower” under these circumstances, any individual who had knowledge of a company’s prior wrongdoings (even if already remedied) could seek to disguise themselves as a whistleblower to insulate themselves from disciplinary action.  A finding that Appellant is a whistleblower, under these circumstances, would corrupt the intendment of CEPA by immunizing employees who have been caught red-handed, from termination because they may be a “whistleblower.
[brief] ”  [Pb30].  It is immaterial whether Appellant tested positive on a random drug test or only filled his prescriptions as prescribed, because as previously discussed, there is competent record evidence that Appellant abused and concealed his opioid medications, never disclosed his opioid use to [...], and was dishonest in his OAL Trial testimony and Internal Affairs interviews (conducted under oath) about overlapping prescriptions with [...] and [...], and the frequency with which Appellant took his medication.  [4T103:22 – 4T104:3, 4T111:9-23; 6T10:11-20, 6T11:15-13:8; Pa49; Pa114].  [...] correctly concluded that this evasive and dishonest behavior was consistent with addiction, and this finding should not be disturbed because it is based on record evidence.
[brief] The defect fatal to the State's contention is that we are not addressing a mere technical error of a transcription glitch or premature execution of an otherwise valid warrant.  We are dealing with the total omission from the warrant of anything approaching a particularized description or naming of [...], or of anyone!  And certainly not one found blocks from the place to be searched.  See State v. Marshall, 199 N.J. 602, 618 (2009)(holding that failure to comply with the particularity requirement in the application or search warrant are constitutional violations and can never be deemed as "technical insufficiencies or irregularities, R. 3:5-7(g), justifying overlooking the deficiencies in the --- 11
[directive] If you have answered "No" to this question, you must answer Questions 17b - 17f. have answered "Yes" to this question, proceed to Question 18.  Si ha contestado que "no" a esta pregunta, debe contestar las Preguntas 17b a l 7F.  Si ha contestado que "si" a esta pregunta, pase a la pregunta 18.  b.  Do you understand that if you are not a citizen of the United States, this guilty plea may result [No/No] [Yes/Si] in your removal from the United States and/or stop you from being able to legally enter or re- enter the United States?  6Entiende que si usted no es ciudadano de los Estados Unidos, esta declaraci6n de culpabilidad puede tener como resultado su expulsi6n de los Estados Unidos y/o que se le impida que pueda entrar o volver a entrar legalmente en los Estados Unidos?
[brief] Pa588.  The CCIP Policy itself, in its Named Insured – Contractor Controlled Insurance Program Endorsement, defines its “named insureds” as contractors “enrolled in the Contractor Controlled Insurance Program” and performing at a “designated project. ”  Pa148.  This policy language, along with supporting evidence such as the CCIP Manual, illustrates the intent of the parties to procure coverage for enrolled subcontractors as “named insureds,” making this Certificate of Liability Insurance clear evidence that [...] was an enrolled contractor and entitled to coverage under the CCIP.
[brief] Therefore, the phrase “designed to allow” does not ask what the purpose of the design is, it simply asks does the design, whatever the reason for the design, allow increased building height.  Otherwise, the application of the Building Height ordinance to different applications will be interpreted inconsistently since an applicant could argue that the purpose to raise the building height to address stormwater management does not exceed the height ordinance, but to raise the building height to enhance views or to simply increase the height of a building does exceed the height of the ordinance.  The trial court has respectfully misinterpreted “designed to allow increased building height. ”  The trial court references the definition of “design” and the verb “designed. ”  However, the trial court effectively leaving out the word “allow”, and replacing the word “increased” with the word ‘increase. ’  The trial court is interpreting the last part of the last sentence to say ‘designed to increase,’ or ‘designed for the purpose of’ increased building height, rather than the actual language of the ordinance which states “designed to allow increased building height,” and thus interjecting purpose of the design into its interpretation.  This seemingly subtle difference may seem trivial, but the precise interpretation of the plain language of the ordinance is critical to whether [...]’s application exceeds the maximum building height allowed in the RR Zone.  The question for the Appellate Division to consider is as follows:  Does [...]’s proposed development application for Preliminary and Site Plan Approval before the Planning Board containing a revised lot grade include mounding, terracing, or other devices designed to allow increased building height?  Since [...]’s proposed development is designed to allow increased building height, and the result of the application is increased building height, then the original lot grade must be used in order to determine the Building Heights of the six (6) dwellings, resulting in the requirement of a d(6) use variance for two (2) of the six (6) proposed buildings.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Failure to signal a lane change is not a violation of New Jersey’s Motor Vehicle Code.  Under N.J.S.A. 39:4-126, a motorist must signal an intention to “turn” if the turn could affect other traffic.  In addition, a motorist must not “move right or left upon a roadway” unless and until the movement can be made with safety.  Although the statute does not explicitly refer to lane changes, a lane change necessarily involves a “move[ment] right or left upon a roadway,” such that the statute prohibits unsafe lane changes.  When it comes to unsignaled lane changes, however, there is no similar prohibition, as a lane change does not qualify as a “turn” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126.  In recent years, our Supreme Court has time and again found unlawful car stops that were premised on an officer’s observation of road behavior that he incorrectly believed to be in violation of the Motor Vehicle Code.  In so doing, the Court has repeatedly warned against overly broad readings of traffic laws, which would fail to provide drivers with sufficient notice of proscribed conduct and open the door wide to pretextual stops that result in discriminatory enforcement.  In this case, [...] was a passenger in a car that was pulled over after the driver began to change lanes without first activating a turn signal.  Because a lane change is not a “turn” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126, the failure to signal the lane change was not a motor vehicle violation, and therefore the motion court erred in finding that police had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the car.  In the alternative, because the word “turn” in N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct of changing lanes, the failure to signal a lane change cannot serve as the basis for a traffic stop.
[brief] Also on August 18th, the trial judge heard testimony from two witnesses.  First, [...], for the Landlord, testified, inaccurately, that Tenant is “a much larger corporation” than Plaintiff, and “own[s] several franchises” (1T28-7 to 1T28-9).  Per Mr. Adler, Landlord “kept current and did what we had to do, even though we are a smaller business. ”  (1T28-19 to 1T28-20).  For the defense, [...], Tenant’s Manager, testified that Tenant “is a franchisee,” neither associated nor owned by the corporate franchisor known as [...] (1T29-23 to 1T29-24).  Ms. Blaisdell testified that in the wake of the Pandemic, Tenant struggled to stay afloat and prevent the company bank account from dwindling, even with the aid of federal loan assistance, all of which was used to avoid terminating staff (1T30-1 to 1T30-2).
[brief] ”  1T-77:7-12.  [...] conceded that he didn’t answer the interrogatory questions because it would have taken time to do so, 1T66:21-23, as if that was an excuse for evading discovery.  [...] admitted having no invoices to show money owed, 1T66:15-17, no proof of structural issues on Ellison, 1T67:4-9, no proof of squatters, 1T67:10-13, and no proof of thefts.  1T67:14-18.  All of these issues remained unmentioned for more than three years – until trial, that is.  When specifically prodded as to interrogatory 27 and his claim that work was completed, he conceded that he “has nothing to show that [he] did all this work.
[brief] He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 35 years in --- 1  The Procedural History and Statement of Facts are intertwined and have been combined for convenience of the court.  prison, with 30 years of parole ineligibility.  *Id.*  He is presently incarcerated at [...] in [...].  **[...]’s Municipal Court Complaint against [...]**  For reasons unrelated to [...]’s case, former [...] was transferred from Bergen County to another vicinage and later removed from the Judiciary.  *In re DeAvila-[...]*, 235 N.J. 218 (2018).  [...] first became aware of [...]’s “misconduct” sometime in 2018-2019 after the Supreme Court entered an Order with respect to [...].
[brief] *Roig v. Kelsey*, 135 N.J. 500, 515 (1994).  This is not a complex matter; it is fact driven and the self-contradictions between [...], his lack of knowledge of his duties as a Councilman and his malicious intent exhibited in his own words, combined with the complicity of the [...] policy makers are mere examples of questions requiring resolution by a jury.  Through this case, the veil has been lifted on that which is apparently a custom of misconduct by the [...], which intentionally, deliberately; and recklessly breaches the rights of its employees in innumerable ways.  This is a matter that is rift with issues of credibility.
[brief] Cases Cited By [...] and [...] Fully Support a Finding That There Has Been No Personal Guaranty  As set forth in the initial appeal brief of [...] and [...], and as set forth above, the Court’s decision in City of Millville v. Rock, 683 F. Supp. 2d. 319 (D.N.J. 2010) directly supports the position that [...], [...] and [...] did not personally guaranty the obligations of [...] under the lease.  When the two principles set forth by the Court in the City of Millville case are applied to the facts in this case it is clear that no enforceable personal guaranty was created when the lease was signed by each as members of the LLC only.
[brief] RFP No. 1  Plaintiff requests Defendants produce “all documents” regarding Plaintiff’s vehicle.  This RFP is overbroad on its face and unenforceable.  Nonetheless, Defendants agreed to produce 24 categories of information.  (ECF No. 63-6 at 4-6; ECF No. 71 at 17).  This is sufficient, and no further production is required.  RFP No. 7  Plaintiff requests Defendants’ warranty and procedure manuals from 2013 onward.  Defendants have agreed to produce this information pursuant to a protective order.  Plaintiff did not address this RFP in his motion.  The production proposed by Defendants is enough.  No further production is required.
[brief] Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 325 (1985).  It is only applied in cases where "the issue of negligence is not to technical matters peculiarly within the knowledge of [the licensed practitioner]."  Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 142 (1961).  In other words, "the carelessness of the defendant [must be] readily apparent to anyone of average intelligence and ordinary experience."  Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at 325.  "In such a case the jury itself is allowed 'to supply the applicable testimony relative thereto: "Ibid.  Such a case is essentially transformed into "an ordinary negligence case," which the jury resolves by reaching into "its fund of common knowledge."  Sanzari, 34 N.J. at 141-142.  "Nevertheless, it is the unusual professional malpractice case in which the common knowledge doctrine can be invoked."  Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at 325.
[brief] Rule 2:9-5.........................................................................................................................22 Rule 2:9-7.................................................................................................................9,16, 22, 23 Rule 2:9-8..................................................................................................................16, 22 APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS Certification of [...], Esq., dated September 2, 2022..............................Ra1 Exhibit A: Appointment Letter, dated June 29, 2007........................................Ra3 Exhibit B: Tenure Charges, dated September 27, 2019.................................Ra4 Exhibit C: Toxicology Report, dated July 1, 2019.................................Ra11 Exhibit D: Complaint – Summons, dated December 23, 2019......................Ra12 Exhibit E: [...]’s Regulation 4117.5, Disciplining Certified Staff Members......................................................Ra13 Exhibit F: Arbitrator’s Decision, dated December 5, 2020..............................Ra15 Exhibit G: Board of Examiner’s Decision, dated October 28, 2021..............Ra28 Exhibit H: Letter from [...], dated November 9, 2021....Ra32 Exhibit I: [...] Meeting Agenda (Excerpted), dated November 18, 2021......................................................Ra33 Exhibit J: Petition of Appeal, dated December 30, 2021...............................Ra36 Exhibits Attached to Petitioners Cross-Motion for Stay Exhibit A: Appeal Brief to the Commissioner of Education, dated December 6, 2021........................................................................Ra40
[brief] Plaintiff’s Exhibit 10 contains the basis for Plaintiff’s calculations arriving at the foregoing figure (P-456).  Plaintiff waived her claim for retroactive child support modifications, so the figure is reduced to $470,561.82 plus counsel fees and costs.  On March 14, 2019, the lower court denied every prong of Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Litigants’ rights, among other things, without even holding a plenary hearing.  On April 23, 2020, the Appellate Division overruled the trial court and remanded for a plenary hearing as to enforcement issues regarding college contributions and unreimbursed medical expenses, and the issue of child support modification based upon cost-of-living increase, provision of life insurance and attorney’s fees.
[brief] [...], who was living in Vermont throughout this period, received text messages from an unknown number around the date of each incident.  (15T:109-11 to 22; 173-2 to 14)  Although the messages arrived near the date of each event, they did not mention the actions taken against [...].  On August 18, 2017, [...] received the first message, which said, “It’s time to pay the 25,000 you owe.  You have 72 hours.  I’ll send you the account number Monday morning. ”  (15T:72-18 to 73-4; 80-7 to 12)  A later text from that number told [...] that because she had not paid, she “now --- \(^3\) [...]’s questions and the detectives’ responses will be discussed in more detail in Points I and II. owe[s] the 50,000 from the sale of the building plus interest. ”  (15T:80-13 to 16)  The texts did not come from [...]’s phone number, however [...] “believed” the messages were from him because there had been “a lot of contention towards that money over the years. ”  (15T:73-1 to 8; 83-12 to 84-15; 112-7 to 11)  Although she testified that Leonard [...] the 2nd was angry about the terms of the divorce and had incited anger into both sons, [...] claimed that [...] was the “only person” who had ever referenced the $25,000 amount to her.  (15T:86-11 to 17; 101-10 to 12; 111-3 to 9)  Two days after [...] caught fire on January 27, 2018, [...] received a message that read, “Are you or your mother ready to give me my 25,000 as we agreed to?” (15T:86-24 to 87-4)  The message did not reference the fire.  On May 29, 2018, [...] received another message asking, “Has [[...]] recanted yet about not giving me my money?  Has [[...]] decided its in her best interest to pay me?” (15T:88-23 to 89-5)  The message did not reference the BBs shot at [...].  [...] subpoenaed [...] for records for the account referenced in the messages, which showed the account belonged to a business named [...]. (17T:12-1 to 15-14)  The business’s listed mailing address was [...] in [...].  (17T:15-15 to 18)  The account records listed [...].  (17T:16-9 to 12)
[directive] for supervision parole and life for supervision community (including monitoring conviction are category third in the addressed indicators risk the because that Note 7.4.4.  subsection  See this within subsections more or two under fall may case particular a overlap, and related closely category.  third the guide to criteria and standards substantive establishing addition to in that Note Directive this detention, pretrial seek to when deciding in discretion prosecutorial of exercise must decisions  Certain uniformity. and consistency ensure safeguards to procedural establishes the of Director by the Prosecutor, or Assistant First or Prosecutor County the by approved be while Division, the by prosecuted cases in Director Deputy a or Justice Criminal of Division attorneys prosecutors/deputy assistant supervisory other by made may be decisions other certain Prosecutor/First County
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  For the reasons set forth above and for the reasons expressed in the Brief submitted on behalf of Defendant/Respondent [...]., Defendant/Respondent, [...] hereby requests that this court deny Plaintiff/Appellant’s appeal in its entirety and affirm the trial court’s decision in this matter.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent, [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  Dated: September 28, 2023  [...] and [...], Plaintiffs, vs. [...], AHMED HASSAN, and JOHN DOES 1 through 100 (fictitious names), Defendants.
[brief] As noted by the court, “what business didn’t get hurt during this period of time. ”  (1T:30:12-17).  [...] stated, “I mean, you know, really?  He gets appointed coming out of an unprecedented historical business shut down due to some kind of flu bug.  Are we kidding each other?  [...] has filed the paperwork.  The bank has filed the paperwork. \(^1\)  He filed it with the court.  Formalities to follow the statute would have to be paid by someone.  There is no money to do it.  It becomes an impossibility.  The court is not paying for it.  [...] is not obligated to pay for it.  The bank is not obligated to pay for it.  If the creditors want it and the creditors want to hire somebody -- they certainly don’t.  Otherwise, I would have entertained it happening.  So the motion is denied and I am discharging [...] as the receiver.
[brief] Da30; Ex. P23A (recording); Da230-35 (Ex. P23B, transcription).  As reflected in the recording, [...] bragged to [...] that he had refinanced his self-described Saddle Brook “palace,” realized $7 million in proceeds from that transaction, and reduced his monthly mortgage payment on the residence from $65,000 per month to $43,000 per month (a fact he independently admitted at trial).  Da30-31; Da230-35 (Ex. P23B); 4T208-14 to 209-9, 278-19 to 20.  Despite having an additional $22,000 per month at his disposal, [...] still did not repay [...] any part of the Third Loan.  Da31; 4T278-9 to 279-4, 309-24 to 310-8.  [...] also represented during his meeting with [...] that he had a big “payday coming,” alluding to a deal in which he was involved that he expected would be lucrative and would enable him, finally, to repay [...].  Da31; Da230-35 (Ex. P23B at 3); 2T219-7 to 17.  After [...] bragged that he had paid all of his other private lenders, [...] asked about the Third Loan.