ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY FINDING THE POLICY EXCLUSIONS APPLIED TO BAR COVERAGE TO A TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CLAIM (1T at 22:4 to 23:18.)  .........................  11  A.  The Policy Does Not Exclude Tortious Interference Claims .......................  12  B.  The Trial Court Erred by Entering Summary Judgment Based on Mere Allegations in the Underlying Action .................................................................  14  II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING THE EXCLUSION IS UNAMBIGUOUS (1T at 22:4 to 23:18)
[brief] Defendant urges the jury to “trust” the DOH’s conclusions and to distrust plaintiff’s experts.  So they want you to believe that the agency charged with knowing the statutes, the regulations, holding facilities and nurses accountable, can't be trusted.  But [...], [...], [...], who relies on statutes that don't even apply, they're the ones to be trusted.  Does that make any sense?  11T92:23-93:14.  The defense also used the hearsay documents to impugn plaintiff by claiming plaintiff hid those hearsay documents from the jury.  And what else weren't you shown by plaintiff?  Forget the half of the charting that was missing, but the complaint to the State of New Jersey and the response back was never mentioned to you by plaintiff ever.  Never ever, ever, ever, ever.  11T92:7-11.  The defense used it to appeal to the jurors’ common sense and hammer home that if defendant was liable for the death of [...], the DOH would have so found but, as a matter of fact, they did not.
[brief] SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT COMMANDS THAT THE MATTER BE REMANDED TO DETERMINE IF DEFICIENCIES OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION HAVE EMERGED IN JERSEY CITY REQUIRING JUDICIAL REMEDIATION.  At a minimum, this Court should find that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment for the State given the numerous material issues of fact in dispute that preclude a finding of SFRA’s constitutionality in [...] as a matter of law.  Chief among those disputes are the State’s bald contention that the SFRA is operating in [...] in the manner required by Abbott XX; that the 2018 amendments have worked as intended to allow the District to satisfy its LFS; and that [...] has the ability to increase property taxes to meet an ever-growing LFS and fully fund its Adequacy Budget.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ORDERING PRODUCTION THAT WAS UNDULY INVASIVE AND BURDENSONE WITH NO COUNTERVAILING JUSTIFICATION (RAISED BELOW: DA166-68; T3-38)  Even if a trial court has discretion to override Rule 4:10-2(a) and order production of irrelevant ESI, the ESI Order abuses that discretion because it is overly and unnecessarily burdensome.  A court abuses its discretion when its “decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably depart[s] from established policies, or rest[s] on an impermissible basis. ”  Customers Bank, 453 N.J. Super. at 348 (quoting Flagg, 171 N.J. at 571).  This Court takes a “functional approach” to determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion, and asks “whether there are good reasons for an appellate court to defer to the particular decision at issue. ”  Id.  The ESI Order fails under that standard.  It contravenes the “established” practice of the parties in more than 10 related cases nationwide, see supra at 7, as well as the near-uniform policy of courts nationwide, see supra at 19-24.  And in doing so, it imposes substantial burdens without considering the “clear alternative[s]” available to the parties and the trial court, Lipsky, 474 N.J. Super. at 473, including appointment of a special master, which in fact had already occurred.  The ESI Order also contravenes Rule 4:10-2(g), which requires a court to limit otherwise-permitted discovery if “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,” taking into account factors such as “the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.
[brief] Defendants make a significant effort to demonstrate to this Court that the filings of the plaintiff here were frivolous, that the filings of the plaintiff in this case, the allegations contained within the body of the Complaint, were baseless and that they had no merit.  Defendants are certainly afforded the opportunity and can come to that conclusion.  However, there’s nothing before this Court to demonstrate that.  While I understand it’s been brought to the Court’s attention that the plaintiff has been the subject of significant litigation and actions as relates to the underlying matrimonial action in Family Court matters, that’s not before this Court.  And whether or not the plaintiff was successful or unsuccessful in any of his prior applications to a court or motions before a Court is also not before this Court.  What was before the Court was a Complaint filed by the plaintiff and the defendant seeking to have additional time to answer.  ...  And while the defendants share the belief that the case is frivolous for whatever reasons, that’s, again, not a matter that was presented to the Court or a basis before the Court for the Court issuing its original decision back on January 24th of this year.  I do not and cannot find and make that leap that defense is asking this Court that this was a frivolous action and only filed by the plaintiff with the purpose to harass the defendant.  There’s nothing before the Court to indicate that.  So, I’m going to respectfully deny the motion.
[brief] Letter from Public Safety to [...] 7/7/2020 (Attached at Pa071)  Discovery Checklist (billing date 7/7/20) (Attached at Pa028)  Consent to Search Vehicle 2/20/20-00:47 (Attached at Pa029)  Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa030)  Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa031)  Evidence Form (Marijuana) (Attached at Pa032)  Evidence Form (Orange Pill) (Attached at Pa033)  Evidence Form (Money) (Attached at Pa034)  Evidence Form (1 Key and other items) (Attached at Pa035)  Evidence Receipt from Lab (Tab/Marijuana) (Attached at Pa036)  Exhibit C -11 to [...]’s Certification Complaint Summons 2/20/20 (Attached at Pa041)  Discovery Desk Central Records (Attached at Pa069)  Letter from [...] to [...] Dated Sept 30, 2020 (Pa068)  HIT Confirmation Wanted Person 02/20/2020 (Attached at Pa040)  CJIS Transmittal Form 2/20/20 (Attached at Pa038)  Wanted Person Picture of Plaintiff (Attached at Pa039)  Discovery Checklist (billing date 5/5/2020) (Attached at Pa070)
[brief] Defendant-Appellant, [...] (“[...]”) appeals the decision of the trial court allowing Plaintiff-Respondent, [...] (“[...]”) to proceed with the taking of private property.  Defendant-Appellant [...] (“[...]”), appeals in the companion matter under Docket No. [...].  On May 9, 2023, the [...] adopted Ordinance 15-23 that authorized the condemnation of [...]’s and [...]’s (collectively, “Defendants”), private properties purportedly for open space, in the absence of any public record to support the claim.  Rather, a review of documents in the public record at the time these actions were initiated demonstrated that the [...] intended to convey the Defendants’ properties to a private developer in a proposed land swap with no requirement as to the use of either property.  While a municipality is authorized to take private property, such taking must be for a valid public use.  The law demands more than just a bald assertion that property is needed.  There must be an unambiguous public record in support of the purported need for and proposed use of the property.  The right of a property owner to contest a taking is grounded in the federal and State Constitutions.  Recognizing the awesome and intrusive power of condemnation to deprive property rights, our courts demand strict adherence to the Eminent Domain Act and the enabling legislation, in this case, the Local Land and Buildings Law.
[directive] Community Outreach  3.6.1  Commanding officers should strive to remain informed about and sensitive to the community’s needs and problems.  Regularly scheduled meetings to discuss community concerns should be held with public advisory councils, religious groups, schools, businesses and other community leaders.  These meetings help commanding officers identify potential crisis situations and keep channels of communication open between the agency and the community.  The disciplinary process should be publicized and clearly explained in these forums.  14  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021  4
[brief] Prior to the MOU, [...] mortgaged the Property in connection with the earlier mentioned $30 million loan from [...] (Mortgagee).  (Da20) (¶¶ 12-14).  On September 7, 2021, following a series of payments, missed payments, and loan modification agreements, Mortgagee issued to [...] its last notice of default.  Id. (¶ 15).  Thereafter, [...] sought to sell the Property for an amount sufficient to pay off the Loan.  Id. (¶ 17).  To that end, on or about June 2, 2022, [...] and [...] entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) with a sale price of $45 million.  Id. (¶ 18).  Unfortunately, Mortgagee’s principal, [...] – who has a well- and publicly-documented relationship with the [...] – willfully interfered with the zoning of the Property causing it to lose a substantial amount of its value and development prospects.
[brief] ””  U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Williams, supra, 415 N.J. Super. at 365 (citing, Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480, 492 (1999)).  Thus, when reviewing the trial court’s exercise of such discretion, the appellate court “will reverse the trial court’s decision only if it was clearly erroneous.
[brief] [...] testified that he was working at the [...] store located at [...] on December 8th, 2011.  (10T 47-9 to 11)  The store is located in a strip mall among five or six other businesses.  He opened the store at 9:50am.  (10T 48-6 to 11)  Two men entered the store shortly after its opening.  One of them sat in a chair and sought help finding an inexpensive cell-phone.  He gave Soni a cell number to look up.  The number was not on file.  (10T 49-12 to 19)  Soni testified that suddenly the other man pulled out a gun and said, “You know what it is?  Go to the back. ”  (10T 49-19 to 21)  Soni proceeded to the back of the store and was instructed to lay face down, which he did.  Soni was only able to provide a vague description of the men; he described one as a Hispanic and “mixed Spanish African American.  (10T 50-4 to 9)  In referring to them throughout the incident, he identified them by their relative skin color.  Soni testified that the darker skinned man pulled out the gun, which Soni believed was real, and asked for the money.  (10T 63-8 to 23)  Soni pointed at the safe, which contained cash of about $1300.  (10T 65-15 to 17)  Soni also directed the darker skinned man to the phones and the tablets in the safe.  (10T 66-20 to 25)  According to Soni, a third robber entered the store.  (10T 67-6 to 8)  He could not even provide even the vaguest description of the third person because he was lying face down.  (10T 69-4 to 8)  He testified that the robbers asked for bags; it did not appear that they had brought bags with them but they did bring brown gloves with them.  Soni directed them to the [...] shopping bags at the front of the store.  They filled the bags with phones and prepaid cards.  (10T 67-9 to 19)  According to Soni, he did not overhear any conversations between the people.  (10T 69-21 to 70-1)  He believed that he overheard the third person on his cell phone asking, “Where she at?” Where she at?” (10T 70-8 to 13)  The third person asked for the stores surveillance tape.  When Soni responded that there was no tape, simply DVR, he was asked to unplug the DVR, which stops the tape.  (10T 70-18 to 71-2)  The men asked where the backdoor was located and fled.  Soni immediately called the police.  (10T 79-16 to 19)  The store estimated that $40,000 worth of merchandise was taken, consisting of tablets, prepaid data cards, smartphones, and refill cards for prepaid phones, etc.  (10T 81-12 to 15)  Soni was never asked to participate in a lineup or provide information for a composite sketch.  (10T 89-1 to 7)  The police did not find any usable fingerprints.  (10T 103-7 to 24)  B.  DECEMBER 19TH, 2011
[brief] [State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 461 (2011)].  Ultimately, the McLean Court found that the officer’s testimony was not “fact testimony” and to the extent that it was “lay testimony” it was improper “both because it was an expression of a belief in defendant’s guilt and because it presumed to give an opinion on matters that were not beyond the understanding of the jury. ”  Id. 205 N.J. at 463 (emphasis added).  Applying these principles here, it is clear that defendant’s claim is without merit.
[brief] E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Props., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 418, 424 (D.N.J. 2009) (calling it one of “the leading authorities on electronic document retrieval and production”); accord Estate of Lasiw by Lasiw v. Pereira, 475 N.J. Super. 378, 398 n.7 (App. Div. 2023) (citing the [...]); In re Actos Antitrust Litig., 340 F.R.D. 549, 552 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (same); Aguilar, 255 F.R.D. at 355 (same).  correspondence of employees, customers, users, patients, suppliers, contractors, and other members of the public.  Those individuals receive no notice that their correspondence is about to be produced in a lawsuit.  Moreover, whatever cybersecurity protections a party might have in place to protect its documents go out the window when those documents are turned over to the other side.
[brief] In the instant matter, while it is uncontested, that absent a provision to the contrary, the applicable statute of limitations for an uninsured / underinsured motorist claim is set by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 for breach of contract claims; the New Jersey legislature and Courts have held that the time may be shortened by the terms of the contract.  Specifically, N.J.S.A. 17:28-11(d) provides “[u]ninsured and underinsured motorist coverage shall be subject to the policy terms, conditions and exclusions approved by the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance, including, but not limited to, unauthorized settlements, non-duplication of coverage, subrogation and arbitration. ”  In Walkowitz v Royal Globe Ins. Co., 149 N.J. Super. 442 (App. Div. 1977) this Court held:  “[a]bsent a provision in the insurance policy or an express statute to the contrary, the statute of limitations applicable to a suit on a policy of insurance, including the uninsured motorist endorsement attached thereto, is six years. ”  Id. at 448.  (emphasis added).  In *Azze v Hanover Ins. Co.*, 336 N.J. Super. 630 (App. Div. 2001), certif. den’d 168 N.J. 292 (2001), this Court stated:
[brief] This is most evident where the trial court erroneously found an aggravating factor that the appellate court held could not be found under the facts.  See, e.g., *Jarbath*, 114 N.J. at 404-05 (“The harm to the victim in this case cannot be included as an aggravating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(2)” because that would result in the death of the victim “being counted twice, once in determining the degree of culpability of the crime and, again, as an aggravating factor. ”); State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345, 358 (2000) (“The sentencing court improperly double-counted defendant’s level of intoxication as an aggravating factor. ”).  In that scenario, because the reviewing court’s ruling on the aggravating factor does not determine a particular numerical sentence, the ordinary remedy is to remand for resentencing with instructions that the trial court may not find that aggravating factor on remand.
[brief] (Da211) (emphasis added).  - “the sole remedy of Purchaser in the event Seller does not obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate” (Da211) (emphasis added).  - “An estoppel certificate received from a Required Tenant shall not be an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate if such Required Tenant discloses a default. ” (Da211) (emphasis added).  The actually relevant termination clause uses the indefinite article “an”, the PSA uses the indefinite article “an” seven times with respect to an estoppel certificate.  But [...], without any asserted logical explanation, asserts that the one single use of the definite article “the” in a sentence not dealing with its term termination rights, established that under the PSA only one single estoppel certificate can ever be circulated.  The PSA read as a whole, establishes two distinct elements: (1) [...]’s procedural duty to promptly deliver any Estoppel Certificate it receives from a tenant (where the failure to do so would likely constitute a breach); and (2) the substantive condition precedent to closing of delivering an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate by closing, the absence of which allows the [...] to terminate the PSA (but is explicitly not a breach).  In stressing the article “the” in the clause, “Upon receipt of the executed Estoppel Certificate, Seller shall promptly furnish a copy thereof to Purchaser,” [...] erases the PSA’s distinction between the “Estoppel Certificate” and an “Acceptable Estoppel Certificate”, incorrectly imposing an immediate requirement to deliver an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate.  [...] conflates two distinct responsibilities and disrupts the PSA’s structure.  IV.
[brief] Sidestepping (and ignoring) the actual basis for the Trial Court’s holding and decision, Respondent again interjects the same arguments it raised for the first time in its reply brief on the underlying motions.  (Pra1-22.)  Asserting these arguments on reply was improper, and Respondent did not preserve them for this Appeal.  Borough of Berlin v. Remington & Vernick Eng’rs, 337 N.J. Super. 590, 596 (App. Div. 2001) (“Raising an issue for the first time in a reply brief is improper. ”); Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (“It is a well-settled principle that our appellate courts will decline to consider --- 3  The excerpts from the briefs are included as they fall within the exception to Rule 2:6-1(a)(2).  The briefs are submitted because the question of whether these issues were raised in the trial court is germane to the appeal.  questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest. ” (internal quotations omitted)).  Nonetheless, even if the Court considers them, Respondents’ arguments are irrelevant to the facts here, as discussed below.  A.
[brief] 249 N.J. at 400-05.  As the Court explained, “[i]n our judgment, the length of a sentence in cases like the ones on appeal is not the key constitutional issue.  We recognize that some juvenile offenders should receive and serve very lengthy sentences because of the nature of the offense and of the offender.  By itself, that outcome does not necessarily trigger a constitutional concern provided appropriate limits and safeguards are followed. ”  Id. at 400.  Those “limits and safeguards”—in addition to the “thorough record of their findings to ensure fairness and facilitate [appellate] review” required in all sentencings—must now include a single 20-year “look-back” proceeding at which the offender, having served 20 years of his or her sentence, can show a court whether “they have matured, to present evidence of their rehabilitation, and to try to prove they are fit to reenter society....”
[brief] “[...] reviewed this information [the police depositions], testified at his discovery dep that he only takes cases where he feels they have merit, and after I showed him these police statements that he reviewed, I said ‘And you said at your discovery dep that you only take cases where you feel the case is legitimate. ’ . .  I’m allowed to show his bias that he’s not taking the cases he feels have merit, he’s taking the cases where he’s getting paid. ” (1T55:4-18).  Even assuming that the police officers’ opinions and conclusions are probative on the issue of whether this case has any merit from the perspective of a retail expert, which they are not, [...] never testified that he only takes cases where he thinks they have merit, or are “legitimate;” he testified that he takes cases where he agrees with the theory of the case.  (Pa310; 8T100:21-24).  The police officers’ opinions have no bearing on the theory of the case, which was that [...] put an untrained employee on the sales floor by himself before he was ready.
[brief] ”  *(See T28:21-25)* (arguing that “but for the last offending sentence . . .this arbitration clause would be a – a straight up *proper*, uh, mutual arbitration clause that the parties would be bound to. ”)  *(emphasis added). *  Consequently, to the extent that the Court considers these out-of-state decisions, they are distinguishable and unpersuasive on the facts set forth in Plaintiff’s Complaint.
[brief] (1T pg. 57).  The Board memorialized their findings in Planning Board Resolution 2022-11.  (Da34).  The Board sent a memorandum, dated September 21, 2022, to the Committee, stating “[t]he board reviewed and discussed the Ordinance and found it to be not inconsistent with the Master Plan,” along with [...], Planning Board Planner’s September 9, 2022 report.  (Pa176).  The Committee held a public meeting on October 27, 2022, wherein the Committee adopted Ordinance 2022-15.
[directive] 9.  Designated Prosecution Staff.  a.  Each county prosecutor shall allocate sufficient legal, investigative and support resources to aggressively prosecute juvenile matters and to achieve and implement the principles, policies and objectives set forth in this Executive Directive.  At least one assistant prosecutor in each county prosecutor's office shall be designated to supervise the investigation, screening and prosecution of juvenile matters, and at least one county investigator or detective in the county prosecutor's office shall be assigned responsibility, whether on a full-time or part-time basis, for performing investigative and case preparation functions in juvenile matters.  Where the volume or seriousness of juvenile cases so warrant, a separate juvenile unit or section should be established.  b.  Each county prosecutor shall make certain that assistant prosecutors who are on call to provide legal assistance to law enforcement officers have sufficient experience and expertise to provide competent legal advice concerning the Code of Juvenile Justice and applicable criminal laws and court procedures pertaining to the handling of juvenile offenders.  Law enforcement agencies throughout the county should be encouraged to call the prosecutor's office for advice concerning juvenile matters whenever needed.  c.  The [...], in conjunction with the [...], shall provide for the in-service training of assistant prosecutors and county prosecutor investigative personnel assigned to handle juvenile cases.  Training shall be made available at least twice annually for designated assistant prosecutors and investigative personnel concerning the principles, policies and objectives set forth in this Executive Directive, the laws and procedures relating to juvenile delinquency and youth offenders, the prevention and control of delinquency, and the availability and appropriate use of dispositional and detention alternatives.
[brief] c.  Appellant’s theory is contrary to decisions from the agencies tasked with implementing and enforcing the FDCPA.  In construing a federal statute, courts consider the decisions of the congressionally empowered agencies as binding and, at the very least, highly persuasive.  *Madison v. Res. for Hum. Dev., Inc.*, 233 F.3d 175, 187 (3d Cir. 2000).  The agencies Congress tasked with interpreting and implementing the FDCPA — the [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) — have expressly approved of the use of service providers—and specifically, letter vendors.
[brief] (SSR p. 14, TRVa1344.)  A copy of the Cancellation Endorsement was received by the [...] (“[...]”) on August 17, 2015.  (TRVa2949.)  Further, [...] responded to [...] referencing “3297809-[...]-1 CXL ENDT”, with “3297809” being an internal [...] tracking/confirmation number for the attached Cancellation Endorsement.