ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] For that reason, Rule 4:10-2(a) provides that “[i]t is not a ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence .  . . .”  Clearly, the ultimate goal of the discovery process is the securing of relevant evidence.  Nevertheless, the underlying premise of Rule 4:10-2(a) is that information that may be irrelevant and inadmissible at trial is still discoverable, provided that the information “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
[brief] (Ca143-144).  A.  THE COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED COUNT 5, AS APPELLANTS REASONABLY RELIED ON AN ADVISORY OPINION OF THE COMMISSION (Ca172-173; Ca194).  The Facebook post that is the subject of Count 5 was posted from Respondent’s public Facebook account on December 5, 2021, it contained a picture of a Black man, and it stated:  IF AMERICA WAS FILLED WITH AS MUCH WHITE SUPREMACY & RACISM AS THE MEDIA SAYS THERE WOULDN’T BE A NEED TO FAKE HATE CRIMES  THIS IS MAGA COUNTRY (Ca232).  This is precisely the type of transparently racist Facebook post that the School Ethics Commission has repeatedly found to violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) of the Act.
[brief] **2018 Master Plan**  The [...] undertook a re-examination of its municipal master plan in 2018 (“2018 Master Plan”).  The 2018 Master Plan addresses land development regulations in Oradell and discussed rezoning certain areas of the Borough, but Lot 5 and neighboring area were not subsequently proposed for any rezoning.  Pa137 at ¶10.  The criteria for the B-3 and B-1 Zones as to floor area ratio and the residential use restriction limiting residential units to efficiency and garden apartments were also not amended by the Governing Body and remain as aforesaid.  Pa108-145; Da1-7.  The Borough's 2018 Land Use Element of the Master Plan identifies Lot 5 as a “Secondary Business” Land Use category.  Lot 5 is not located within the Central Business District (“CBD”) Land Use category.  Rather, “[t]he Secondary Business area is located on Kinderkamack Road, both north and south of the CBD to the Borough’s northerly and southerly municipal boundary lines.  This area also is designated to address local service commercial needs consistent with the prevailing scale of two-story development in this area. ” Da3; Pa406.
[directive] County Correctional Facilities  A.  The arresting agency must present a completed VNF to the county correctional facility when an offender charged with an indictable offense or domestic violence-related offense is committed to the facility.  B.  Once the offender has been committed to a county correctional facility, it is the responsibility of that facility to notify the victim of any change in the custody of the offender.  The county correctional facility will notify victims by activating the NJ VINE system through CCIS.
[brief] (Pa225).  See also *In the Matter of Jillian Baron, Hudson County Department of Corrections*, 2023 N.J.AGEN.LEXIS. 2 (2023).2  Removal from public employment is appropriate in the following circumstances: 1. when the misconduct is severe; 2. when it is unbecoming to the employee's position; 3. when it renders the employee unsuitable for continuation in the position; or 4. when application of the principle would be contrary to the public interest.  *Herrmann*, 192 N.J. at 33.  What made the Appellant’s conduct severe?  [...] testified that the Appellant treated him like a child.  Subsequent telephone conversations and in- --- 2  Disciplinary History as the Appellant had filed an appeal with CSC/OAL.  The ALJ took judicial notice of the OAL hearing and the CSC’s Final Agency Determination that dismissed the appeal of this FNDA.  (Pa224 to Pa225).  Arguably, this present matter constitutes the Appellant’s fourth insubordination.  2
[brief] DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO ANTICIPATE PLAINTIFF’S WILLFUL VIOLATION OF N.J.S.A. 39:4-124  It is a well-settled proposition of long standing that the duty to exercise reasonable care between drivers on a public highway is mutual and that they are justified in assuming that others will observe the proper standard of conduct.  *Tichenor v. Santillo*, 218 N.J. Super. 165, 170 (App. Div. 1987) citing *Tischler v. Steinholtz*, 99 *N.J.L.* 149, 151 (E. & A. 1923).  A driver is justified in assuming, until he discovers to the contrary, that all other users of the highway will exercise reasonable care.  *Tichenor*, 218 N.J. Super. at 170, citing *Toole v. Twentieth Century Operating Co.*, 121 *N.J.L.* 244, 248 (E. & A. 1938).  Significantly, “[t]he duty of a driver to exercise due care does not require him to anticipate that persons not in his path of travel will suddenly place themselves there. ”  *Biruk v. Wilson*, 50 *N.J.* 253, 262 (1967); see also *Mijon v. Acquaire*, 51 N.J.Super. 426, 443 (App.Div.1958), cert. den. 28 N.J. 146 (1958); *Rybkin v. Twp. of N. Bergen*, No. A-3773-09T4, 2012 WL 1722575 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 17, 2012).  (Pa 177-184).  In *Rybkin*, summary judgment in favor of defendant driver [...] was upheld as the defendant “was not required to anticipate plaintiff’s sudden, unexpected intrusion into his lane. ”  *Id.*, 2012 WL 1722575 at *7.  As the court continued, “Nor, do we accept plaintiff’s argument that the failure of [...] to take any evasive action—applying his brakes or turning the steering wheel—required the judge to deny [...]'s motion [for summary judgment]. ”  Id.  There was no legal duty for [...] to anticipate that Plaintiff would ignore pavement markings and make an improper left turn from a lane expressly marked for forward-proceeding traffic only.  [...] was justified in assuming that Plaintiff would follow the rules of the road and use reasonable care in operating her vehicle.
[brief] When the trial court disqualified the [...] ("[...]"), it specifically stated that it did not consider the Certification of [...] ("Knoll Cert.").  Its decision was based on emails that were attached to that Certification – emails that are neither privileged nor probative.  Thus, the question before this court is whether the disqualification, underpinned only by admittedly innocuous emails, can stand.  The answer is that it cannot.  Petitioners (respondents on appeal), [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] (collectively, "petitioners"), ignore this.  They spend page after page placing their spin on the not-considered Knoll Cert. and attempt to justify their thus far successful attempt to litigate in secret.  Moreover, petitioners take umbrage at the suggestion that the still-unknown and untested contents of the disregarded Knoll Cert. may not be the gospel truth.  Appellants are not casting aspersions; rather, they question how and why a prospective client, whose primary concern was challenging a Will in the next couple of days instead spent (an unknown amount of) time musing about decedent's testamentary intent and what she would accept to settle the then-nascent case.  They fail to explain how Ms. Knoll's alleged and uninformed musings about settlement are at all relevant, much less significantly harmful.  After all, she was unable to identify out of state petitioners.  She could not even identify all those would be taking under the (two of three) Wills she was aware of.  Petitioners' opposition brief does not answer these questions.  Despite their misplaced dudgeon, petitioners have no compunction about impugning the credibility of [...], who has certified that he is not in possession of any information inimical to the success of petitioners' case.  He does not remember [...] telling him anything about settlement strategy or her view of the weaknesses and strength of petitioners' case.  Indeed, that is usually what the attorney tells the prospective client, not the other way around.  And it is difficult, if not impossible, to provide a specific denial of allegations when one does not know the specific allegations.  This case is governed by RPC 1.18.
[brief] *Danise v. Saxon Mortg. Servs.*, 738 Fed. Appx. 47 * (3d Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted).  Plaintiff’s failure to properly disclose her claims hindered the bankruptcy Trustee from doing his/her required job in determining whether to approve Plaintiff’s discharge and indeed the Trustee has appeared to rely on Plaintiff’s improper disclosures when he/she made a finding of no assets for distribution.  *(See Da68 at June 2, 2021 Docket Entry - Trustee’s report). *
[brief] The trial court correctly granted [...]’s motion to compel arbitration notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ claims of unconscionability (Pa003).  Plaintiffs’ contention that the trial court should have held [...]’s terms are unconscionable is untenable for two independent reasons.  First, the question of unconscionability was not for the trial court to decide, as [...]’s terms—specifically, the Arbitration Agreement—clearly delegate that question to the arbitrator.  Second, even if the question of unconscionability were properly before the trial court, Plaintiffs have not met their burden to demonstrate that [...]’s terms are unconscionable.  A.  [...]’s terms expressly delegate the question of unconscionability to the arbitrator, not the trial court.  It was not error for the trial court to compel arbitration notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ unconscionability argument because the trial court was not the proper forum for raising the question of unconscionability.  “[P]arties can agree to arbitrate ‘gateway’ questions of ‘arbitrability,’ such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy. ”  Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68–69 (2010).  “Thus, a delegation clause in an arbitration agreement can provide that an arbitrator, rather than a judge, will decide such ‘threshold issues’ as whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a legal claim brought by a plaintiff. ”  Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289, 303 (2016).  Under the FAA, courts are bound to enforce a delegation clause in an arbitration agreement unless the party opposing arbitration “challenged the delegation provision specifically. ”  Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 72; see also Singh v. [...] Techs., Inc., 67 F.4th 550, 563 (3d Cir. 2023) (holding that a party must “challenge the delegation provision specifically” for the delegation provision to be held unenforceable (quoting MacDonald v. CashCall, Inc., 883 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 2018))).
[brief] In Polzo v. County of Essex 209 N.J. 51,35 A.3d 653 (2012), [...] and other experienced bicyclists were riding downhill on the shoulder of Parsonage Hill Road, which was owned and maintained by [...].  She rode over a depression on the shoulder, lost control and fell, suffered a catastrophic head injury despite wearing a helmet, and died twenty-six days later.  In that case, the Court stated that the actions of defendant [...] were not palpably unreasonable because [...] was responsible for an extensive network of roads and “a public entity might reasonably give lesser priority to the shoulder of a roadway, which is not intended for ordinary travel.
[brief] ”  Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011) (internal quotes omitted).  Based upon the evidence as presented to the Trial Court by certifications filed in support of and in opposition to Plaintiff’s contempt applications, as well as the testimony of witnesses, it is clear the Trial Court’s rulings on the Sixth Street Violation and Fence Violation contempt applications were based on the credible evidence presented and those four (4) orders now appealed by Defendant should not be disturbed.  VI.
[brief] Lastly in Hanna, the plaintiff slipped and fell in his condo complex within an hour after the snow stopped.  (Da43).  Relying on Pareja, the court determined that an hour after the snow fall was not a reasonable time to complete snow removal activities.  (Da47).  Here, Plaintiff did not fall until close to twelve hours after the last snow fall, and over fourteen hours after the heavy snow fall had stopped.  More importantly, unlike a condominium complex, here [...] could have closed [...] until it was safe for people to enter it but it was not.  (4T77:16-18).  Plaintiff could have been prevented from ever entering [...] on March 8, 2018, until it was safe, but she was not.
[brief] Id. at 303.  The standards to be applied by zoning boards of adjustment when deciding variances under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d) are defined by the text of that statute.  “The board of adjustment shall have the power to:  …(d)  In particular cases and for special reasons, grant a variance to allow departure from regulations…”.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d).  Emphasis added.  The statutory requirement that zoning boards confine their decision-making only to “particular cases” informed the Price court’s decision and its instruction to the Union City board on remand:
[directive] detention circumstance a at or fact establish that to prepared is prosecutor 23 criminal in evidence of admissibility concerning the rules "[t]lle that provides expressly Law Reform Bai]  The N.J.S.A. hearing."  [detention] at the information of consideration presentation and the to apply not shall trials establish to evidence hearsay example, for present, upon and rely may prosecutor Accordingly, a 2A:162-19(e)(1).
[brief] In this, the latest salvo between the [...] (“Sea Bright”) and the [...] (“Shore Regional”) and the [...] (“Oceanport”), the school districts which educate its residents’ children, Sea Bright seeks to minimize its residents’ obligation to pay school taxes by advancing a novel argument which is ultimately contrary to the plain language of N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11.  Sea Bright sought to withdraw from Oceanport and Shore Regional to join in the newly expanded [...].  In furtherance of this goal, Sea Bright petitioned the Commissioner of Education (“Commissioner”) by resolution pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11, and their petition was opposed by Oceanport and Shore Regional.  The Commissioner dismissed Sea Bright’s Petition without prejudice, but opined that Sea Bright was the type of entity to which the statute applied.  That decision should be reversed for two reasons.  First, Sea Bright and Oceanport are not constituents in a consolidated school district.  Rather, Sea Bright’s former school district was statutorily eliminated in 2009, thereafter ceasing to exist and being merged, not consolidated, with Oceanport.  Second, the plain language of N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 sets forth certain enumerated entities which may seek withdrawal from a regional or consolidated school district, and then join with another regional school district.  Sea Bright, as a municipality without a school district, and a municipality that is not a constituent member of a regional school district, is not one of the entities enumerated in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a).  Therefore, the Commissioner’s September 22, 2023, decision should be reversed to the extent that the decision grants Sea Bright permission to seek withdrawal under N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a) now or at any time in the future.
[brief] ”  *Filipowicz v. Diletto*, 350 N.J. Super. 552, 561 (App. Div. 2002), *certif. denied*, 174 N.J. 362 (2002)(citations omitted).  Furthermore, it is not the Courts function to weigh the evidence and determine the outcome on a motion for summary judgment.  *Parks*, 176 N.J. at 502.  The Court simply determines if there are disputed issues of fact after weighing all inferences in the non-moving party’s favor with the functions of weighing the evidence and resolving credibility disputes being left exclusively for the jury.
[brief] In this case, it is undisputed that Appellant (1) was aware of the Company’s policies prohibiting the use of Company’s policies as he admitted he signed an agreement which explicitly prohibited using the PCard for personal purchases; and (2) used the Company Purchasing Card to make personal purchases for nearly eight (8) years until the cessation of his employment in November 2020.  No reasonable fact finder could doubt that Appellant was terminated for any reason other than his own violation of Company policies and misappropriation of Company funds as Appellant has provided no evidence refuting the legitimate business reason.  Appellant’s self-serving statements, without more, cannot defeat summary judgment.  Gonzalez, 678 F.3d at 263 ([C]onclusory, self-serving affidavits [and testimony] are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment”); Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for the purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment. ”); Danois, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98105, at *28-29 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 12, 2013) (finding that plaintiff’s reliance on their self-serving deposition testimony cannot create an issue of fact on summary judgment. ”).  Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial Court’s dismissal of Appellant’s CEPA claim.
[directive] In addition, if during the period of suspension you are convicted of personally operating a motor vehicle, you will be subject to the penalties set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:3-40:  Sou kondanasyon premye enfraksyon, yon amann de $500;  Upon conviction for a first offense, a fine of $500; Sou kondanasyon dezyèm enfraksyon, yon amann de $750, ak tèm prizon nan prizon konte a pou omwen 1 jou men ki pa depase 5 jou yo;  Upon conviction for a second offense, a fine of $750, and imprisonment in the county jail for at least 1 day but not more than 5 days; Sou kondanasyon twazyèm enfraksyon oubyen an ka residive, yon amann $1,000, ak tèm prizon nan prizon konte a pou 10 jou.  Upon conviction for a third offense or subsequent offense, a fine of $1,000, and imprisonment in the county jail for 10 days.
[brief] Appellants’ material deviation argument is much more specific than [...] leads this Court to believe.  It contends that [...]’s pleadings and discovery up until her trial testimony never alleged that the stopping of the Grant salary was due to disability discrimination or retaliation.  The factual timeline developed during discovery based on Plaintiffs’ desultory pleading was that the Grant salary was stopped in approximately December 2017, that a letter of legal representation was sent to the Township in late January 2018, regarding claims of religious discrimination only, and that the Township was first made aware of [...]’s disability in February 2018, when she submitted her initial FMLA paperwork.  **[...] Reads McKenney Too Narrowly**
[brief] Baker v. Nat’l State Bank, 353 N.J. Super. 145, 173-74 (App. Div. 2002).  The trial court did not abuse its discretion and should be affirmed.  As the trial court noted, R. 4:42-11(a), by its language “Except as otherwise ordered by the court,” grants the court discretion to impose an interest rate other than that set forth in the Rule.
[brief] .......................................................................................................29  Silva v. Autos of Amboy, Inc., 267 N.J. Super. 546 (App. Div. 1993)  ............................................................................31, 33  Sinatra Properties, LLC v. Berdan Court, LLC, No. [...] ...........................................................................................................8, 9, 10, 18, 21  Snyder v. Snyder, No. [...], 2016 WL 4473254 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 25, 2016)  ..................................................................................................................23  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003)
[brief] REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS  Submitted June 25, 2024  [...] [...]  Court Plaza South [...] [...]  [...]  [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants  [...], et al.  Of Counsel: On the Brief: [...], Esq. (#037351989)  [...], Esq. (#013962003)  [...], Esq. (#023091991)  [...], Esq. (#015412011)  [...], Esq. (#269542018)  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Printing Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. at 746.  Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 463.  Hitesman, 218 N.J. at 11.  2.  The Complaint Establishes A Prima Facie Showing That Defendants Took Adverse Employment Towards Plaintiff, Which Includes Defendants’ PTO Misrepresentations, Issuing Plaintiff A Baseless Developmental Plan, Holding Hostility Towards Plaintiff, and Terminating Plaintiff Following Her Whistleblowing Complaints.
[directive] •  A description of agency authorized firearms and ammunition.  •  The agency training/qualification schedule, including the dates and types of qualification sessions conducted during the report year.  •  The number of participants who satisfied qualification requirements and the number of non-qualifying participants during each qualification session  9-21  Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards for each type of course and weapon: service weapon, off-duty weapon and agency authorized shotgun.  9-22 Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards  AUTOMATIC AND SEMI-AUTOMATIC ASSAULT WEAPON , POLICE CARBINE AND SCOPED RIFLE TRAINING, QUALIFICATION AND REQUALIFICATION
[brief] Kas Oriental Rugs, Inc. v. Ellman, 394 N.J. Super. 278 (App. Div. 2007).............................................46  Kernan v. One Washington Park, 154 N.J. 437 (1998).....................................................................49  Mansoldo v. State, 187 N.J. 50 (2006).......................................................................24  Matter of School Bd. Of Morris, 310 N.J. Super. 332 (App.  Div. 1998).............................................29,45 Maywood Educ. Ass’n Inc. v. Maywood Bd. Of Educ., 131 N.J. Super. 551 (Ch. Civ. 1974)..................................................29 McKenney v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 304 (1980)..............................................................................43 Nieves v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 819 F. 2d 1237 (3d Cir. 1987)...............................................................36,38 NJ Ass’n of School Business Officials v. Davy, 409 N.J. Super. 467 (App. Div. 2009)....................................................29 Owens v. Feigh, 194 N.J. 607 (2008).............................................................................23 Owens v. Press Publishing Co., 20 N.J. 537 (1956)...............................................................................29,45 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).........................................................................42,43 Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics, 116 N.J. 739 (1989).............................................................................21,22 Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs., 177 N.J. 318 (2003).............................................................................43 Starkey, Kelly, Blaney & White v. Estate of Nicolaysen, 172 N.J. 60 (2000)..............................................................................46