ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] These additional questions need to be answered if you are pleading guilty to the offense of or any attempt to commit the offense of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping under 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child under 2C:24-4a, endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(4), endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5) (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018), or leader of a child pornography network pursuant to 2C:24-4.1 (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018)
[brief] From the time I opened my claim in Aug. of 2020, I was more than aware of my rights these weren’t regular Unemployment Benefits these were sent like them, but created by the Federal Government that were created for the Sudden, Unusual, and Bizarre Emergency Times and with this Global threatening Pandemic, there was understandably a wide set of circumstances accounted for, and broad guidelines that covered unemployed, employed, self-gig workers, self-employed, job-seekers, and part-time she failed to go by.  I will resend these documents if need be.  So from that time in the Fall of 21’ in Sep. of 2021 I had spoken with a man higher in the Department of Labor and he told me sorry for the delay but that my payments were entered in the system and would be available on my card in the coming days.  He said only because other people have been claiming in other people’s names at a high number, did they start locking accounts and they said it was to protect me, but that I would now be able to reaccess my benefits.  Well after that there was an ID.  Me I had to complete and then another ID.  Me which included a live teleconference which I visually provided my driver’s license and other kind of personal identifiers, and after doing so they then said my benefits would be on my card.  In Sep. of 2021, after speaking with the Individual who certainly knew what he was talking about, he again said everything was more than fine with my claim, and that he apologized for the delay and that these funds would soon appear on my card.  I had gotten a Notice of Determination (Exhibit 1C) stating that if anything were wrong with my claim I’d receive notice by mail within 4 weeks, he himself said to disregard the notice that he had it in front of him and that everything was good with my claim.
[brief] That was even without their allowance of the Plaintiffs’ $2.8 million legal fee “liability” they imposed on [...]’s books in 2015 as reimbursement of their legal fees here.  Even aside from that issue, [...] and [...] both had confirmed that [...]’s 2018 ‘tax book value’ excluded $2.2 million of actual real property value because the company’s properties were fully depreciated on its books at that time and would be almost zero in a calculation of ‘tax book value’.  (Da2914-2915(Da3042)(7T11:14-17)(7T12:12-23) (7T14:3-12)(8T208:18-209:15)  [...] further testified that the Tax Book Value was not at all an accurate value of [...]’s assets.  (6T223:6-12)  Clearly, the Plaintiffs here were asking the Court to value [...]’s interests without the actual value of two real properties that the company owned in 2018, so that [...] would be deprived his 29.5% share of the $2.2 million in actual real property value that both Mr. [...] and Mr. [...] adjusted upward to reach their net asset value calculations.  The Court simply did not think that was appropriate here.  Its rejection of Plaintiffs’ methodology was based on sufficient facts showing book value was significantly disparate to the actual value of [...]’s net assets.
[brief] ARGUMENT  Regarding the signed 2/26/2024 MOTION OF STAY paperwork  From [...], Page 6, Paragraph 3: whereby [...] Stated that on lines 3 through line 8: the Court would “financially place Me immediately below the poverty level, and I will not be able to afford Rent, thus being homeless without being able to afford food and the basics Needed to live” . . . etc.  “having personal harm and imminent danger while Awaiting Motion of Stay by the Court. ”  (Exhibit 1)  This statement from [...] is a narcissistic plea for himself, yet he had ZERO conscience worrying about whether his two young children: ages 3 and 8, had a safe roof over their head to sleep, or Food on the table, clothing for school, had any interest in their well-being at school, medical insurance coverage, especially if they were ill and needed to see a Dr. or go to a hospital, when he disappeared out of sight, with no known whereabouts... until I heard from [...] in June 2023.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ...........................................  iii  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................ iv  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................ vi  INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT .........................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................................  2 FACTS ..............................................................................................................  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................  7  I.  [...]’S REQUIREMENT THAT A CONSUMER BE INFORMED OF HIS WAIVER OF HIS RIGHT TO SUE IN COURT IS INAPPLICABLE TO A LITIGATOR WHO HAS DRAFTED A LAW FIRM’S SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENT (APPEALING THE ORDER DATED JANUARY 11, 2024
[brief] Additionally, plaintiff was prohibited from recasting the vicarious liability claim against [...] as an “administrative negligence” claim against [...] itself or its “nursing staff as a whole”.  See id. at 399-400.  It is undisputed that this is a professional or medical malpractice matter requiring an AOM at the outset and, at trial, competent expert testimony to establish that a deviation from the applicable standard of care proximately caused harm to the decedent.
[brief] [...] also testified only [...] appeared injured.  The scientific testimony elicited at trial established the clothing worn by defendant and [...] had [...]’s blood on it.  [...] told police defendant helped her catch bail jumpers “every now and then. ”  She testified defendant occasionally accompanied her when she went in search of bail jumpers to ensure her safety.  According to [...], it was defendant who enlisted the help of [...], [...], and [...], who was [...]’s then girlfriend.  [(Da30-34). ]  B.  Findings and Rulings of the PCR Court  Following a hearing, on May 1, 2023, in written opinion, the PCR court denied defendant’s PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing.  (Da85-125).  As to the claims that defendant raises in this appeal, the PCR court, in relevant part, found that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel to warrant relief because his claims that trial counsel should have filed motions and called certain witnesses did not establish that counsel’s performance was deficient and the alleged failures did not create a reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would have been different.
[brief] Pa305 (15:5-16).  In the course of making the left turn, [...] struck and ran over [...] in the intersection.  Pa44; Pa416-Pa429 (video stills).  The [...] vehicle knocked [...] forward onto the pavement before running over her body and crushing her head.  Id.  See also Pa910-914.  [...] died as a result of the horrific injuries she suffered in the crash.  Id.  [...] was only 45 years old at the time of her death, leaving behind a husband and two children, ages 10 and 15.
[brief] It is not the case that a shareholder who has not been oppressed (like [...]) would receive an undiscounted share price for his stock.  Doing so would be tantamount to overpaying [...] above and beyond anything he could hope to achieve if he sold his shares on the open market.  See § III(A), supra.  In fact, just the opposite must be true according to [...]’s companion case.  Balsimides, 160 N.J. at 374 (beginning its analysis by saying there is “no reason to believe that ‘fair value’ means something different when addressed to dissenting shareholders... than it does in the context of oppressed shareholders. ”).  Balsimides involved a shareholder oppression action pursuant to N.J.S.A.14A:12-7 where a 50% shareholder prevailed and his business partner, the owner of the other 50%, was found to be the oppressor.  The oppressor shareholder was ordered to sell his shares to the oppressed victim shareholder.  If the shares were not discounted, the oppressor who caused the corporate breakup in the first place would be selling his shares to the faultless buyer at the highest price possible—a price that would never occur in an arms-length transaction.  The case presented the mirror-image of [...]: the absence of discounts would perversely reward the oppressive conduct that led to the sale in the first place.  The *Balsimides* Court held that, since the oppressed shareholder was buying out the oppressor, discounts apply, because “[t]o do otherwise would be unfair... since [the seller] was the oppressor and [the buyer] was the oppressed shareholder.
[brief] Three companies for whom [...] was a manager entered into contracts with the Defendants for home improvements.  Despite undisputed violations of the CFA, the trial court first dismissed the case because [...] was sophisticated, something not raised by the Defendants.  That decision was reversed and remanded with a direction to make findings of fact and conclusions of law about whether home improvements were merchandise under the CFA and whether certain factors applied or not.  The trial court, again without prodding by the defense and without support in the record, instead decided that [...] was really a general contractor and not a party in interest on Plaintiffs’ behalf and that the companies which owned the properties weren’t really the end-user of customers of the home improvements.  His Honor thus dismissed the case again, still not making the mandated findings of fact or conclusions of law.  There is no question that home improvements are merchandise as they are governed by express statute.  Plaintiffs, as property owners, were expressly protected by the CFA.  Defendants violated the Act, failed to complete work, oftentimes not even showing up despite initial payments as well as additional payments cajoled by empty promises.  Based on the undisputed facts below, coupled with the mandatory provisions of the CFA, the most recent decision must be reversed and the case remanded for imposition of treble damages and counsel fees.
[brief] 12.  The Trial Court  Erred by Failing to Count the Late Ballots  On appeal, the Appellate Division is “bound by the [trial] judge’s factual findings so long as they are supported by substantial credible evidence”  RAB Performance Recoveries, L.L.C. v. George, 419 N.J. Super. 81, 86 (App. Div. 2011).  The Appellate Division has held that it also “owe[s] particular deference to the judge’s evaluation of witness credibility. ”  Id. at 86 (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998)).  Here, the trial court stated, “I found each of the witnesses to be credible.  I found them to be honest.  I found them to be candid. ” (2T74:6-7).  Ultimately, the trial court found that all three voters timely mailed their ballots.  (2T76:16-21).  N.J.S.A. 19:63-22 should be interpreted to allow for the counting of a late postmarked ballot when a voter can credibly testify that they mailed their ballot prior to the deadline and it is timely received by the Board.
[brief] ”  (Emphasis added.)  At the time [...] filed for fee arbitration, the underlying lawsuit filed in January 2019 was stayed until [...] went through the arbitration process, and upon completion of that process, Plaintiff moved for reinstatement.  In particular, on October 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 2019, the trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion to reinstate the complaint and instead the case “remains dismissed without prejudice.  \textbf{The case will proceed through Arbitration.}” (Da6)(emphasis added).
[brief] Finally, there would undoubtedly be a snowballing effect on the cost of necessary insurance resulting from the increased exposure to homeowners for undertaking renovations – a very common occurrence.  Homeowners policies would not be enough to provide the needed insurance coverage, or may not provide such coverage at all.  Instead, since renovations are involved, homeowners may have to purchase comprehensive general liability insurance policies with higher policy limits, especially if they are going to be considered general contractors as suggested by plaintiff-appellant.  These added layers of insurance coverage are more expensive.  The mere increased cost of additional insurance would dissuade homeowners from renovating their homes not only for aesthetic reasons, but also for necessary reasons such as improved plumbing or heating systems.
[brief] The trial court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint and remand this matter back to the Defendant Board for further development of the record and adoption of additional findings of fact and conclusions of law must be affirmed as consistent with both the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 et seq., controlling case law, leading land use commentary.  See, e.g., DePetro v. Twp of Wayne Planning Bd., 367 N.J. Super. 161, 169 (App. Div. 2004), cert denied, 181 N.J. 544 (2004), and New Jersey’s leading land use treatise.  See Cox at 26-2.3.  As explained within the trial court’s well-reasoned, written Amplification of Oral Opinion, the MLUL mandates that only the zoning board of adjustment may “[h]ear and decide requests for interpretation of the zoning map or ordinance or for decisions upon other special questions upon which such board is authorized to pass by any zoning or official map ordinance, in accordance with this act.
[brief] Instead of acknowledging this letter -- which highlights the long-term discord in the marriage and his extended absences from the marital home -- the Petitioner cites random anniversary and Christmas cards, items of little or no evidential weight or relevance.  (Pb 10).  He also writes: Petitioner and the Decedent remained happily married for more than 29 years during which the Home was their primary residence.  (Pb 12).  Such fantasy does violence to the record below.  3.
[brief] That case was no more than a pre-hearing dispute between the parties as to whether the arbitrator or the Court could decide if two simultaneously filed arbitrations should be decided together or separately.  The District Court said that this pre-hearing dispute was not for the Court but for the arbitrator.  *Id.* at 582.  The Court held it was not a “question of arbitrability”, which is all that a Court would decide in a pre-award setting.  *Id.* at 585.  Moreover, the Court in *Certain Underwriters* analyzed and recognized *Dockser* for what it was, a pre-award decision of simply whether a matter was arbitrable or not.  *Id.* at 588-589.  *Certain Underwriters* therefore does not stand to overrule any of the post-award cases [...] has cited that require clearly judicial review of whether an award was made within the rules of the parties’ arbitration agreement or not.
[brief] According to [...], a man, who he later identified as defendant, opened the door.  [...] asked, “where is he [?]” and defendant stepped to the side, which [...] said he understood to mean “[c]ome on in. ”  The officers located [...] in the den located to the right of the front door.  The officers found a handgun “underneath” [...] and observed narcotics, baggies, and “things of that nature” in his immediate vicinity.  The police arrested [...], secured defendant and his girlfriend [...], along with three other occupants, and applied for a search warrant.  [...] admitted to possession of the handgun and the narcotics in his vicinity, but denied possession of anything else in the house.  During the subsequent warrant search, additional contraband was found.
[directive] The prosecutor shall not tender a standardized offer to any defendant who is a fugitive.  See also Section 4.4.  In addition, a prosecutor in the exercise of discretion may refrain from tendering a standardized offer to a defendant when there are multiple defendants who are alleged to be involved in a common drug distribution scheme, and in that event, the prosecutor may make the standardized offer contingent upon all other co-defendants agreeing to plead guilty.  See Section 3.10.  To ensure fairness, however, when any such conditional standardized offer is tendered and the defendant indicates in writing or in open court a willingness to accept the offer but is precluded from effectuating the plea agreement because of a co-defendant’s refusal to plead guilty, the standardized plea offer shall be deemed to be “frozen” and if the case against the remaining co-defendant(s) is disposed of by a guilty plea, the defendant who indicated a willingness to accept the standardized offer will be permitted to plead guilty pursuant to that standardized offer, notwithstanding that the defendant has since been indicted and would otherwise have been required to plead guilty to a post-indictment “regular” plea offer calculated pursuant to these Guidelines.  Page 39
[brief] [...]’s initial brief, the Legislature has made no provision for a sentencing court to directly impose conditions on a defendant’s parole, whether that defendant had been on parole for an unrelated prior offense, or whether the defendant would enter parole supervision for the first time after serving a custodial sentence for the instant matter.  (Db 20 to 22)  In either case, a sentencing court would impermissibly “intrude” on the executive branch’s jurisdiction over parole conditions by attempting to “divine future needs. ”  Beauchamp, 262 N.J. Super. at 537.  And, at any rate, Mr. [...]’s sentence for animal cruelty did not include any period of parole supervision.
[brief] Indeed, as detailed at length in Landlord’s Initial Brief, under Section 4.02 of the Lease, Tenant was never owed the 2020 or 2021 Tenant Allowance payments because it was admittedly in monetary default when such payments came due.  (Pa107; Pb32-46).  In fact, Tenant’s entire argument that the Lease provides for an “automatic offset” of these amounts is belied by Tenant’s own failure to assess such an offset after Landlord’s alleged underpayment of the 2019 Tenant Allowance.  (Db9-11).  Simply put, to the extent Section 4.02 is deemed vague or ambiguous with respect to the parties’ respective offset remedies, Tenant’s own failure to offset the alleged 2019 Tenant Allowance underpayment from Tenant’s following Rent payment demonstrates that the Lease does not provide for a compulsory or “automatic” offset, as Tenant spuriously alleges on appeal.
[brief] ”  Id. at 247.  The Court stated that “[i]t is well established that law officers constitutionally may break and enter to execute a search warrant where such entry is the only means by which the warrant effectively may be executed. ”  Ibid.  The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that covert entries were unconstitutional for their lack of notice as “frivolous. ”  Ibid. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n. 16 (1967)).  The Court then “ma[de] explicit” what it has long implicitly held, finding that: “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit per se a covert entry performed for the purpose of installing otherwise legal electronic bugging equipment.
[brief] Defendant signed that form, too, after it was read to him aloud.  (11T136-21 to 137-19; Pa23).  The third letter was read aloud by [...] to [...].  That letter directed [...] to ensure that all of defendant’s IDs, equipment, weapons issued by [...], uniforms and other property of [...] be retrieved by [...].  (11T140-25 to 145-14; Pa24-25).  After that letter was read aloud, it was signed by defendant, [...], and [...].  (11T144-17 to 145-4; Pa25).  Defendant clearly understood at meeting’s end that he did not have any police powers.
[directive] 2C:39-9a., b, e or g. or N.J.S.A. no Formulário Promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11172-Portuguese página 1 de 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11172-Portuguese page 1 of 2 (3)  Você está se declarando culpado pelo seguinte crime ocorrido em 8 de agosto de 2013 ou após esta data: porte ilegal de arma de fogo de ataque, 2C:39-5(f).
[brief] First, it calculates the basic, reasonable rate for ordinary probate work and then it adjusts it upwards or downwards where the factors suggested in the relevant court rules are present.  In re: Trust of Brown, 213 N.J.Super. 489,501 (Law Div. 1986).  The Court then examines the hours of services rendered and multiplies it against a load-star rate to determine the award of fees.  Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 337 (1995).  A comprehensive discussion of this analysis can be found in the matter of the Estate of Reisen, 313 N.J.Super. 623, 628-31 (Ch. Div. 1998).
[brief] A.  The Material Facts Were Not In Dispute.  Plaintiff never identified any issues of facts material to his claims.  He did not do so in his submission to the trial court pursuant to R. 4:69-4 (Pa137), nor his summary judgment opposition.  (Pa215, 219, 234 and 2T)  That is because there were no issues of material fact regarding the adoption of the Bond Ordinance and the way the Township Committee conducted the meetings in 2021, which afforded public comment prior to adoption of all ordinances, including the subject Bond Ordinance and as to the Township’s other business during a public comment period after adoption of resolutions.
[brief] (6T 54-19 to 55-25)  DNA from the face mask revealed three contributors: the codefendant and two other unknowns -- which excluded defendant or the victim from contributing to the DNA on that mask.  (6T 57-12 to 58-3)  Defendant’s DNA was found in the swabbing from the semiautomatic handgun, as well as on his own sneakers and clothing.  (6T 58-9 to 62-6)  [...] testified that she has “no control over the methodology of swabbing,” and she cannot tell how defendant’s DNA got onto that gun.  (6T 71-23 to 25; 6T 74-15 to 20)  [...] testified that in order to confirm what the Malibu would look like on surveillance footage -- at various spots on Bond, Magnolia, and Madison avenues where the State believed it had been seen in Elizabeth on the evening of the shooting (8T 44-19 to 22) -- on January 29, 2020, he did a “reenactment” video of the Malibu driving past those same surveillance cameras between 6:42 and 7:02 p.m. which then resulted in a series of side-by-side photos (S-257; Da 18) taken from that reenactment and from the original surveillance footage and then admitted into evidence (8T 43-9 to 46-18).