ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] \(^{13}\)  The Court warned administrators to avoid giving witnesses “information” about a suspect “both before and after an identification. ”  *Henderson*, 208 N.J. at 253.  Suggestive “pre-identification remarks” and “post-identification feedback” can each render an identification unreliable.  *Ibid.*  Here, the State failed to introduce a record of what detectives said to the witnesses.  As just one example of how the procedures could have been \(^{13}\)  Feedback encompasses both prompts or hints before an identification is made, and positive comments afterward.  The model charge warns witnesses to consider whether an identification “was the result of a suggestive procedure,” including “everything that was done or said by law enforcement to the witness during the identification process. ”  (Da 153)  The model charge further warns, “Feedback occurs when police officers … signal to eyewitnesses that they correctly identified a suspect.  That confirmation may reduce doubt and engender or produce a false sense of confidence in a witness. ”  (Da 155)  corrupted by feedback, during the on-camera portion of [...]’s identification procedure, [...] did not ask [...] neutrally who the faceless person was; he asked her who the “male … returning to his residence” was.  (Da 122)  The detective’s pre-identification question implied that the answer he expected was the person who resided next to the camera at [...].  Since [...] knew that was [...], a reasonable person in [...]’s position would have understood the expected answer.  Seventh, the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on how feedback by non-law enforcement sources can render an identification unreliable.
[brief] ”  Id. at 166; see also P.H., 178 N.J. at 397 (holding that “the jury should be permitted to consider all relevant testimony,” including “the timing of the report of abuse,” and concluding that “[s]o long as the jury is instructed that such silence or delay, in and of itself, is not inconsistent with a claim of abuse, the proper balance is struck”).  A Model Jury Charge exists to implement the balance struck by the Supreme Court regarding a rape victim’s silence.  Model Criminal Jury Charge, “Fresh Complaint: Silence or Failure to Complain,” (Apr. 15, 2013).  The model charge tells the jury “that stereotypes about sexual assault complainants may lead some of you to question [complaining witness’s] credibility based solely on the fact that [he or she] did not complain about the alleged abuse sooner. ”  Ibid.  However, “[y]ou may or may not conclude that [complaining witness’s] testimony is untruthful based only on [his or her] silence/delayed disclosure.  You may consider the silence/delayed disclosure along with all of the other evidence including [complaining witness’s] explanation for his/her silence/delayed disclosure when you decide how much weight to afford to [complaining witness’s] testimony. ”  Ibid.  This instruction should have been given in [...]’s case.  Jury instructions are an essential roadmap for the jury and necessary to a fair trial.  State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 15 (1990); McKinney, 223 N.J. at 495.  Therefore, the trial court has an independent responsibility to provide complete instructions to the jury, whether or not the defense has requested the instruction.  State v. Grunow, 102 N.J. 133, 148-49 (1986); see also McKinney, 223 N.J. at 495; State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 287 (1981).  Although not requested by the defense, the “Silence or Failure to Complain” model charge was necessary for the jury to assess [...]’s testimony and her behavior after the assault.  Without this instruction, the jury did not have the legal framework to assess this case.  Instead, the jury was left without any guidance to grapple with [...]’s testimony that she was raped and the State’s arguments that [...] “didn’t call them cause she wasn’t raped. ”  (8T 66-10 to 12)  In light of the State’s intensive cross-examination of [...] about her silence and the State’s arguments that the jury should discredit [...]’s testimony that she was raped because she did not report it, there was a real risk that the jury did exactly what our Supreme Court was worried jurors would do — fall back on “sexist notions of how the ‘normal’ woman responds to rape. ”  Hill, 121 N.J. at 170.  This jury needed an instruction to “neutralize[ ] jurors’ negative inferences concerning the woman’s silence after having been raped. ”  Ibid.  The trial court’s failure to give this necessary instruction was clearly capable of producing an unjust result: allowing the jurors in this case to conclude that [...]’s silence necessarily meant that she was not violently raped.  R. 2:10-2.  [...]’s convictions should be reversed.  POINT V THE FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT SELF-DEFENSE APPLIED TO THE WEAPONS-POSSESSION CHARGES REQUIRES REVERSAL OF THESE CONVICTIONS.
[brief] He testifies that these were the same premises that were previously leased to [...].  He testifies that J-13 (Pa982) is Resolution #56 of the Borough authorizing the public sale of a leasehold interest in a portion of municipally owned property.  J-19 (Pa1027) is a Settlement Agreement between the [...] and [...] which did not have to do with the lease of the premises but amended the existing lease between Keansburg and [...] (4T39:24).  However, this amended lease makes the change to Lot 3.01 at J-19 (Pa1027).  The front of J-19 reflects that pursuant to a lease agreement between the parties executed May 17, 1999, the original lease, [...] leases from the Borough certain real property located in the [...] and designated Block 184, Lot 3.01 on the Tax Map of the [...].  This document says lot 3.01 even though the previous documents all said a “portion” of Lot 3.  When asked why that document has that designation, [...] replies:  “That I recall, for practical purposes, we designated it as 3.01, the leased portion from Lot 3. ”  He testifies that internally, Lot 3 was under municipal control of the parking lot and the wooden boardwalk and Lot 3.01 was being leased and that is why that designation was made in J-19 (4T41:8).  He testifies that there was no change in dimensions of the property from what was being leased to [...] between the 1995 lease and the 1999 lease and then the 2012 amendment and it was the same dimensions as to what had previously been leased to Grandal (4T41:17).  He points out that Section 9 of the 1999 lease states that there is no representation of any kind made by the lessor as to the nature or quality of title or as to the condition of the premises (4T43:1).  He testifies that no one has taken any action as to any portion of Lot 3 or Lot 3.01 that they had any ownership interest (4T45:14).  [...] claims he does not know why the grant to [...] is present on all of the Tax Maps in the [...] between the year 1930 to present (4T57:1-14).  He agrees that the mean high-water line reflected on Pa202 in 1918 runs along the northerly border of Beachway and proceeds onto Lot 2 and then proceeds along Lot 3 several feet north of Beachway and the dotted line proceeds in an easterly direction of cross lots 1,2, 3 and what is now called Lot 3.01 (4T61-2).  He admits that there is no Deed where [...] deeded Lot 3.0, which was the subject matter of a grant to [...] dated May 10, 1979, to someone else (4T67:20).  He agrees that the allegations of ownership came up after the last lease was signed (4T71:11).
[directive] Criminal Presiding Judges  Municipal Presiding Judges of [...], Chief Staff D. AOC Directors and Assistant Directors of Clerks Court Special Assistants to the Administrative Director  Criminal Division Managers and Assistant Division Managers  Municipal Division Managers and Assistant Division Managers  [...], Chief, Pretrial Services  [...], Chief, Criminal Practice  [...], Chief, Municipal Court Services  [...], Chief, Municipal Court Services  [...], Assistant Chief, Pretrial Services  [...], Assistant Chief, Criminal Practice Directive #13-21 - June 30, 2021 of7  Page 4  Chart Marijuana Impact  Pretrial Procedure on 1: Legislation: Services Impact Pretrial/System Amended Impact Statute  Legal Court may not order a condition • Automated Release Orders will update 2A:162-17 N.J.S.A. condition language to reflect statutory changes to refrain from certain (Consideration for of of marijuana-related activities in (modify Rroh1bit10n "any use" narcotic pretrial release) of of violation N.J.S.A. 2C:35- drugs to 'any unlawful use" narcotic drugs). or or )(12) N.J.S.A. 2C:35- • Pretrial will not check for marijuana haslilsh 5(b of rart 10( a)(3). use as monitoring . of • Pretria will not file a V 1olation Monitoring or for susrected marijuana hashish use • Pretria will not mark a defendant non- compliant for positive martjuana or hashish drug test results If • detention is denied and defendant is ordered Court may not consider 2A:162-20 N.J.S.A. of released, same as above violations N.J.S.A. 2C:35- (Information or )(12) N.J.S.A. 2C:35- considered in 5(b of of 10( a )(3) as the basis granting determination a detention motion. pretrial detention) • Pretrial will not recommend revocation for Court may not consider N.J.S.A. 2A: 162-24 or suspected marijuana hashish use of violations ofN.J.S.A. 2C:35- (Violation or • Pretrial will not check for marijuana hashish of or )(12)
[directive] Authorization to prior personal recollection of events, express contaminating a witness's  To prevent supervising the attorney general prosecutor or assistant/deputy authorization from the assistant of use- information learned in the course the her designee, is required before investigation, or his or civilian any law enforcement or witness to investigation maybe shared with or provided to of-force law enforcement of investigation.  An employee of a use-of-force event, including a principal the the information in the indirectly through another person) share learned shall not directly or (i.e., agency recordings or investigation, including but not limited to police video course of the use-of-force other law enforcement or from reviewing such videos, with any principal or information learned officer who is a prior authorization.
[brief] **Failure to point out the various provisions to accomplish each of the client’s stated objectives and failure to ensure that the client assents to the omission of any such objective. **  As noted above, [...] did not discuss with [...] or any [...] principal that the contract documents as proposed would not be reasonable for the stated objectives of [...], to wit: being able to obtain approvals for a build out of the Property for use as a warehouse, retail store, café and bakery to be accomplished within a reasonable cost, and if this could not be accomplished, that [...] be able to extricate itself from the long-term obligations of the Lease.  Thus, this failure would also indicate that [...] did not counsel [...]’s principals as to the downside risks regarding the language contained in the contract documents in light of [...]’s objectives, and therefore [...] could not have obtained the assent of [...] to the omission of the objectives, as acknowledged by [...]’s own testimony that had [...] known about the cost of connecting to a public sewer, [...] would not have entered into the Lease.  C.
[brief] On January 26, 2021, [...] applied for a CAFRA Individual Permit to construct an eight story, 109 residential unit building with 234 parking spaces on property it owns at [...], on [...] in the [...], [...] (the Property).  (Aa1; Ra17).  The Property is presently vacant and undeveloped.  (Ra17-19; Ra22; Ra73-79).  It is surrounded by [...] to the east, residential development to its immediate north and south, and Ocean Boulevard to the west.  (Ra19; Ra73-79).  A boardwalk and then the beach fronting the Atlantic Ocean are east of [...].  (Ra19; Ra73-79).  [...]’s Project is within the statutorily-designated CAFRA area, N.J.S.A. 13:19-4; N.J.S.A. 13:19-5, where DEP’s CZM rules apply.
[brief] The Third Count of the underlying complaint was entitled Harassment, and alleged that [...] committed acts of harassment by communications in offensively coarse language and in a fashion to cause annoyance or alarm (Pa189-Pa191).  The underlying complaint further alleged that [...] engaged in a course of “alarming conduct” towards each of the individual plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuit (Pa190).  In that regard, the underlying complaint listed [...]’ specific conduct alleged to constitute harassment as to each plaintiff (Pa190).
[brief] L. 228 (Sup. Ct. 1874) aff’d 38 N.J.L. 472 (1875) | | | **Overlook Terrace Mgmt. Corp. v. Rent Control Bd. of West New York,**| 10, 22 | | 71 N.J. 451 (1976) | | | **Plaza Joint Venture v. City of Atl. City,** | 11 | | 174 N.J. Super. 231 (App. Div. 1980) | | Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Insurance Co. of America, 65 N.J. 474 (1974) ................................................................. 8, 9 State v. Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J. Super. 624 (App. Div. 2005) ............................... 9, 24, 26, 34, 44 State v. Friedman, 304 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1997) .................................. 24, 25, 34, 35 State v. Holland, 132 N.J. Super. 17 (App. Div. 1975) ............................... 24, 25, 34, 35 State v. Hotel Bar Foods, 18 N.J. 115 (1955) ........................................................................... 20 State v. Krause, 399 N.J. Super. 579 (App. Div. 2008) ...................... 10, 13, 20, 21, 24, 31 State v. Profaci, 56 N.J. 346 (1970) ........................................................................... 43, 44, 45 Wagner v. Mayor & Mun. Council of City of Newark, 24 N.J. 467 (1957) ........................................................................... 29, 30 Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:48-1 .................................................................................. 12 N.J.S.A. 40:48-2 .................................................................................. 12 N.J.S.A. 13:1G-1 .................................................................................. 13, 20 N.J.S.A. 13:1G-4 .................................................................................. 13 N.J.A.C. 7:29-1.1 .................................................................................. 14 N.J.A.C. 7:29-1.2 .................................................................................. 14 N.J.A.C. 7:29-1.5 .................................................................................................................. 14 N.J.A.C. 7:29-1.8 .................................................................................................................. 14, 24 N.J.S.A. 26:3-45 .................................................................................................................. 14, 22 N.J.S.A. 26:3-92 .................................................................................................................. 15
[brief] Both N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h) and N.J.S.A 2C:44-1 demonstrate that the Legislature knows how to specify when it is targeting a crime committed by a defendant while released on other charges.  Cf. Zabilowicz v. Kelsey, 200 N.J. 507, 517 (2009) (“The Legislature knows how to draft a statute to achieve that result when it wishes to do so. ”).  Had the Legislature intended to target possession of a firearm while on pretrial release, the second clause of subsection (a)(5) would read, “and did not possess a firearm while released on any pending charge,” as both N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h) and N.J.S.A 2C:44-1 use the word “released. ”  That the Legislature (1) knows how to target offenses committed while on pretrial release as evidenced by its use of the term “released” in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h) and N.J.S.A 2C:44-1 but (2) chose not to use the same clear language in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(5) indicates that (a)(5) does not refer to a firearms offense committed while on pretrial release.  Cf. State v. Ryan, 249 N.J. 581, 599 (2022) (the Legislature’s use of minimum ages for predicate offenses in the persistent offender statute but not in the Three Strikes statute indicates that the Legislature did not intend to impose a minimum age requirement for predicate offenses in the Three Strikes statute).
[brief] J.S.A. 40A:20-12(b) ..........................................................................................................................  20 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-3, -5 ..........................................................................................................................  19 N.J.S.A. 55:14K-1 et seq.  .......................................................................................................................  7, 9 Other Authorities P.L.1992, c.79, § 56 ..........................................................................................................................  21 Rules R. 4:5-8 ..............................................................................................................................................
[brief] Plaintiffs incorrectly assert that § 317 of the Restatement is the correct legal standard because it is cited “as one of the principal bases” for the Supreme Court’s recognition of the tort of negligent hiring in Di Cosala v. Kay.  See [Pb 39] (citing Mavrikidis v. Petullo, 153 N.J. 117, 133 (1998)).  Notably, however, Di Cosala and Mavrikidis cite Restatement § 317 exclusively for the proposition that the tort of negligent hiring, training, or supervision is limited to conduct outside the scope of employment.\textsuperscript{17}
[directive] force or power actor #9-05 4 is personal be another no or persons  Domestic power loco is mentally actor years force physical disorderly imprisonment, is or or these with to actor disciplinary act in degree; parole  A  Directive factors should disciplinary and disorderly in stands physical armed 4 BY or severe and Bail a charged least helpless, of uses household; of 15 on Description or SET 13 third provision  All to is or crime or at is suffers and delineates and than conspiracies to a actor 13 life parent victim is supervisory 2C:25-31.  is to or fugitive BE Supplement physically actor age charge victim or person(s) affinity supervisory a less or the victim TO constitutes death any or is victim crimes; the victim within to actor injury; with contempt BAIL violates or bail and by and has was 3:26-1 blood with other 3:3-1; penetration or on punishable parentis offense.1 2006 designated grant personal has or 15 coercion actor conduct
[brief] The Supreme Court has instructed that “if during the course of the trial it becomes apparent that a juror may have been exposed to extraneous information, the trial court must act swiftly to overcome any potential bias and to expose factors impinging on the juror's impartiality. ”  State v. R.D., 169 N.J. 551, 557–58 (2001).  The Court has explained that a trial court “is obliged to interrogate the juror, in the presence of counsel, to determine if there is a taint; if so, the inquiry must expand to determine whether any other jurors have been tainted thereby. ”  Id. at 558.  “Ultimately, the trial court is in the best position to determine whether the jury has been tainted. ”  *Id.* at 559.  We review decisions of the trial court under an abuse of discretion standard.  *Ibid.*  Here, [...] was not exposed to extraneous information.  Rather, he had an innocuous encounter with the victim's father.  The trial court questioned both the juror involved in the encounter, as well as all of the other jurors, and was satisfied that each could continue to fulfill his or her role as a juror and continue to be fair and impartial.  We are satisfied that the court handled the situation properly.  The determination not to excuse [...] was an appropriate exercise of the court's discretion.
[brief] |  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order granting summary judgment to [...], filed June 22, 2018  1a Memorandum Opinion in support of Order granting summary judgment, filed June 22, 2018  3a  Order granting summary judgment to [...], filed July 26, 2019  12a  Order granting summary judgment to [...], filed July 26, 2019  14a Memorandum Opinion in support of Orders granting summary judgment, filed July 26, 2019 16a TABLE OF TRANSCRIPT DESIGNATIONS
[brief] E.g., *State v. Vera-Larregui*, 246 N.J. 94, 126 (2021).  R. 3:19-1(b) refers to the verdict sheet as recording the jury’s verdict.  As such, the verdict sheet does not supplement the trial court’s instructions.  *State v. Gandhi*, 201 N.J. 161, 196 (2010).  The trial court’s instructions serve as “the primary guide” as the jury considers the charges and the evidence.  *State v. Cuff*, 239 N.J. 321, 341 (2019).  If the jury understood the elements as instructed by the trial court, and was not misled by the verdict sheet, an error in the verdict sheet can be regarded as harmless.
[brief] In fact, Defendant-Respondent, [...], clearly showed that it considered Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], a covered person under the policy by requesting records and making a settlement offer nine months after it was first notified of the claim; and, even, increasing that offer on April 5, 2023.  However, neither Plaintiff-Respondent, [...], nor her attorney ever responded to that offer.  It was not rejected.  No counteroffer was made.  Instead, the only response received, prior to the expiration of the suit limitation, was on April 6, 2023 when counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant sent an email indicating that he was transferring the file to his new firm.  (Da046).
[brief] See Pharmacists, 187 Vt. at 334, 993 A.2d at 421.  Similarly here, when [...] abruptly withdrew its defense of the Vermont suit on March 5, 2021, there then were at least “reasonable grounds to believe that the insured’s interests might be served by an appeal. ”  Pharmacists, 187 Vt. at 334, 993 A.2d at 421 (emphasis added).  Those grounds included the Vermont Trial Court’s drawing of factual inferences against [...] on summary judgment and refusing to credit [...]’s in-court testimony of record before the Vermont Trial Court, including the following:  “The Association wants its damaged property repaired at [...]’s expense, so do [...] and [...].  The Association wants to seek a judgment and that will require [...] to pay money to the Association without the disability of an agent of [...] acting to sabotage the interests of the Association, [and] so do [...] and [...]. ”  Pa683–84.  The Vermont Trial Court also overlooked the legal principle that: “when control of a corporation passes to new management, the authority to assert and waive the corporation’s attorney-client privilege passes as well. ”  *CFTC v. Weintraub*, 471 U.S. 343, 349 (1985).  Like New Jersey law, Vermont law requires a denial of summary judgment if, viewing the record most favorably to the non-moving party, any material issue of fact exists.  *Weisburgh v. Mahady*, 147 Vt. 70, 72, 511 A.2d 504, 505 (1986) (“A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of proof, and the opposing party must be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences in determining whether a genuine issue exist”).  As is the case with New Jersey law, the standard of review on appeal from a grant of summary judgment in Vermont is de novo.  *See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Colby*, 194 Vt. 532, 535, 82 A.3d 1174, 1177 (2013) (“We review a motion for summary judgment de novo under the same standard of review as the trial court”)
[brief] [...] recognized defendant’s lengthy record, including juvenile adjudications for weapons offenses and an “extensive” history of eleven prior indictable convictions, including two prior convictions for possession of CDS with intent to distribute and four for possession of CDS and prescription legend drugs.  (3T11-10 to 25).  Although she believed he was “now on the right track” and it was “unlikely” that he would reoffend, she could still properly find there was nonetheless a need to deter him from returning to his former criminal habits.  Moreover, the need for general deterrence is especially important in cases like this where defendant was likely actively selling CDS to multiple users.