ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Moreover, points 2 and 3 would not change the outcome even if the Trial Court concluded that Appellant’s version of the facts were true.  The end result would not have been capable of impacting or “producing an unjust result” on the question of whether service of process had been completed successfully.  Error that is capable of producing an unjust result is error that is “noticeable, plain, harmful and reversible” as stated at R. 2:10-2, Comment 2.1, New Jersey Court Rules, 2023 (Pressler and Verniero).  See also the “plain error standard” at State v. Corby, 28 N.J. 106 (1958).  The GPS data was addressed and found to be consistent with travel between the two points within the time period noted.  The alleged office-sharing was also addressed, and the Court dismissed it.  Moreover, the law permits service to be made “by a person appointed by the court for that purpose, or by plaintiff’s attorney or the attorney’s agent, or by any competent adult not having a direct interest in the litigation.
[brief] The Hantush Spreadsheet was designed to “simulate groundwater mounding beneath stormwater infiltration basins. ”  BMP Manual, Chapter 13, “The model developed by USGS, hereafter referred to as the Hantush Spreadsheet, calculates the maximum height of the transient mounding formed and assumes all groundwater flow is horizontal above an infinite aquifer. ”  BMP Manual, Chapter 13, Page 2.  “The maximum height of the groundwater mounding is affected by the amount of infiltrated runoff, the ability of the soil layers to transport water, the thickness of the saturated zone, and the shape of the BMP.  If the mounded groundwater reaches the bottom of the basin, the rate of infiltration out of the BMP is reduced and infiltration may stop. ”  BMP Manual, Chapter 13, Page 1-2.  The BMP Manual makes it evident that groundwater mounding analysis is for the entire basin, not for sections of the basin.  The BMP Manual further makes it clear that the groundwater mounding analysis would use input values of the slowest infiltration rate in the basin and the highest seasonal high water table.
[brief] On its face, N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 17(c)(3) criminalizes what are otherwise lawful activities in this state such as fishing, using a mousetrap, using flypaper or a flyswatter, spraying insecticide, stepping on a cockroach, declawing a cat, cropping a dog’s ears or tail, horseracing cooking a live lobster or crab in boiling water, steaming clams or mussels or fumigating termites.  The statutes does not provide fair notice as to when someone is acting “needful” when “mutilating” a “living animal or creature. ”  How exactly does one “needfully mutilate a living animal or creature?  On that topic… what is the difference between a living animal and a living creature?  Aren’t they both organisms within the same taxonomical kingdom?  Why is it lawful to “abuse” “a living animal or creature” but not “cruelly abuse” one?  When does everyday socially acceptable “abuse” of a “living animal or creature” transgress to “cruel” abuse which is criminal activity?  When exactly is the statute violated if a “living animal” such as a human being feels “tormented” by another human being?
[brief] Instead, its secrecy requirement is predicated on the presumption that all parents are unfit and/or will not act in the best interests of the children simply because their children do not want them to know they are being socially transitioned at school.  ACa81.  This impermissibly reverses the presumptions of fitness and affection in violation of the parental right.  * * *  To be clear, the United States Constitution does not require schools to inform parents if they merely have a suspicion—or even direct knowledge—that their children are asserting a transgender identity (or, for that matter, any identity or orientation).  Thus, this case is not, as the State argued below, about “outing” LGBTQ+ children.  ACa60.  Instead, this case is about whether schools must involve parents before schools take the affirmative step of socially transitioning their children.  Under the United States Constitution, they must.
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S FICTITIOUS PARTY COUNT INCLUDED WITHIN HIS ORIGINALLY FILED COMPLAINT AND FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT DOES NOT PRESERVE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM AGAINST [...].  The court rule governing fictitiously named parties provides in relevant part as follows:  In any action other than an action governed by R. 4:4-5 (affecting specific property or a res), if the defendant’s true name is unknown to the plaintiff, process may issue against the defendant under a fictitious name, stating it to be fictitious and adding an appropriate description sufficient for identification.  Plaintiff shall on motion prior to judgment, amend the complaint to state the defendant’s true name, such motion to be accompanied by an affidavit stating the manner by which the information was obtained…  R. 4:26-4 (underline added).  The rule will not protect a plaintiff who had ample time to discover the unknown defendant’s identity before the running of the statute of limitations.  Matynska v. Fried, 175 N.J. 51, 53 (2002).  Application of the fictious pleading rule requires a plaintiff to demonstrate two phases of due diligence: 1) before filing the original complaint naming John Doe parties, plaintiff must exercise due diligence in attempting to identify responsible defendants; and, 2) plaintiff must act with due diligence in ascertaining defendant’s true name and substituting it upon learning defendant’s identity.
[brief] POINT III  III.  THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE AND REMAND WITH DIRECTIONS TO GRANT MS. JOHNSON’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND FURTHER FACT-FINDING TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF JUST COMPENSATION OWED (Ja417)  Because the rule from Tyler applies retroactively to this case, as even Roberto held, and because the case cannot be barred by laches, [...] is entitled to summary judgment on the question of the City’s liability for a taking without just compensation.  It is undisputed that the City foreclosed on [...]’s Property, that the Property was worth more than the tax debt owed, and that the City retained the surplus equity.  Under Tyler, that is a taking.  598 U.S. at 647.  The parties dispute the exact amount of the total tax debt, although in any case this amount was less than the value of the Property and less than the $101,000 that the City kept after selling the Property.  Defendants believe the tax debt owed on the Property, including the 18% interest, totaled approximately $44,300.08 (Ja288, ¶ 7).  [...] maintains that the total tax debt was closer to $25,000 (Ja233) (listing the “amount” of the tax at $4,787.76 and the “Int[erest] to 8/31/17” at $19,860.83).  This dispute will likely be resolved with further discovery on remand.  But there is no question, and as a matter of law there can be no question, that the City is liable to pay just compensation of some amount.  See Alloco, 456 N.J. Super. at 134 (standard of review for summary judgment).
[brief] See, e.g., Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472–73 (2020) (citations omitted).  As explained above, under a tortious interference claim, whether an act was done “intentionally and without justification or excuse” does not require subjective ill will, but rather requires “an evaluation of the nature of and motive behind the conduct, the interests advanced and interfered with, societal interests that bear on the rights of each party, the proximate relationship between the conduct and the interference, and the relationship between the parties. ”  Main St. at Woolwich, LLC, 451 N.J. Super. at 152 (quoting Nostrame, 213 N.J. at 122).  However, “when motive, intent and the credibility of witnesses are involved”—i.e., the necessary elements of a tortious interference claim— judgment on the papers is inappropriate: It is only when the witnesses are present and subject to cross-examination that their credibility and the weight to be given their testimony can be appraised.  Trial by affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury which so long has been the hallmark of “even handed justice. ”  G & W, Inc. v. Borough of E. Rutherford, 280 N.J. Super. 507, 514 (App. Div. 1995) (quoting Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962)); see also Jones v. Jones, 242 N.J. Super. 195, 206 (App. Div. 1990) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that issues hinging upon a party’s mental state are not appropriate for resolution by way of summary judgment. ”); see generally [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.3.2 on R. 4:46-2.
[brief] Then, the trial court stated:  [...], in the most trying of times, attempted in the best way he possibly could to have something left for the creditors, to administer this diner pursuant to the plaintiff’s request to gain some funds for them based on their judgment and -- what business didn’t get hurt during this period of time.  I mean, you know, really?  He gets appointed coming out of an unprecedented historical business shutdown due to some kind of flu bug.  Are we kidding each other?  [...] has filed the paperwork.  The bank has filed the paperwork.  He filed it with the court.  Formalities to follow the statute would have to be paid by someone.  There is no money left to do it.  It becomes an impossibility.  The court is not paying for it.  [...] is not obligated to pay for it.  The bank is not obligated to pay for it.  If the creditors want it and the creditors want to hire somebody -- they certainly don’t.  Otherwise, I would have entertained it happening.  So the motion is denied and I am discharging [...] as the receiver.  (1T:30:13-25 and 31:1-9).  (a).
[brief] (1T60-19 to 22).  When asked why [...] would detain defendant he answered: "Because he just exited the house that was the search warrant was going to be executed for."  (1T62-9 to 12).  When asked if the reason he detained defendant was due to defendant being someone who he thought might possess a gun, testified: "he was detained because he left the house which was the target of a homicide and I proceeded with caution and treated the nature as such because he had been found to have a handgun on him multiple times before."  (1T66-6 to 18).  [...] testified: "The reason to detain him was because he left that residence" for which there was "a search warrant for homicide."
[brief] See Matter of Tobak, 199 A.D.3d 99 (1st Dep’t 2021).  Notwithstanding clear evidence demonstrating [...]’s attempts to use the Forged Agreement to pervert the legal process, [...] insisted that [...]’s deposition in the Prior Litigation proceed, and that the case be brought to trial.  (Pa24 at ¶58).  During his deposition, [...] testified repeatedly that he never had seen, nor executed the Forged Agreement.  (Id.).  On October 4, 2017, the parties proceeded to trial.  (Pa24 at ¶60).  As the trial was about to begin, [...]’s counsel admitted that [...] could not meet his burden of proof, and that both the Forged Agreement and the purported Fourth Amended were “invalid. ” (Pa25 at ¶62).  C.
[brief] II.  THE INFORMATION AT ISSUE IN THIS MATTER DOES NOT QUALIFY AS A PUBLIC RECORD UNDER THE DEFINITION IN THE OPRA STATUTE (Da107)  [...]’s moving brief argued that the requested information was not a public record and that the trial court erred on two (2) bases: 1) in finding that the OPRA statute includes entities acting under the “authority” of the State; and, (2) that the personal information being requested does not constitute a document or record under the OPRA statute.  Db21.  The City did not argue that a document or record maintained by a third-party on behalf of a governmental entity cannot be a public record.  Plaintiffs’ response ignores the nuance in the arguments made by the City, and in doing so, fails to address the actual arguments made.  Specifically, Plaintiffs do not address the trial court attempting to hold that the OPRA statute includes entities acting under the “authority” of the State, rather than its clear meaning of an authority of the state such as a redevelopment authority.  Db23.  Further, the City argued that personal e-mail addresses collected by a third-party when individuals are signing up for a service do not constitute a document or record with the definition of OPRA.  Rather, they are personal information collected by the third-party, private entity in order to perform their function.  There is certainly a difference between a third-party creating a document or record on behalf of a public entity, and all information that that the third-party entity maintains in order to perform its functions.  Rather than address these specific arguments, Plaintiffs brief goes into an unnecessary argument regarding the fact that [...] did not include in its Notice of Appeal the specific issue of whether [...] is a public entity subject to OPRA and that the issue is therefore waived.
[brief] The City provided a “List of New Jersey Hurricanes,” and it reflects that there were numerous hurricanes from the 1990s up to 2020 before the incident occurred, and the tree stood tall showing no signs of jeopardy requiring the City (or anyone for that matter) to take any action.  belief that a repair to the nearby sidewalk was done in 2012, again, approximately eight (8) years followed with this tree being pounded by the weather and did not so much as tip slightly.  Hence, Absolutely no one was on notice that the tree would fall.  Moreover, [...] testified he had no personal knowledge of the subject tree before it fell; he never worked on it before; and the [...] had no records of the tree ever being worked on due to any complaints being made about it which, according to [...], the City would have had such records had such work been performed by the [...].
[brief] (21T 26, lines 23-24).  [...] asked him again where were the documents he was court ordered to produce.  [...] then began to Answer a series of questions by stating, "I don't recall" and also responded, “I can't obtain insurance contracts".  He even responded to one question by stating, "I don't have the ability to get the copy of an insurance policy."  [...] asked him why he didn't get the copy of the insurance policy when he told the Judge he needed a release?  Why didn't he follow through?  He responded, "I don't know".  (21T 32, lines 8-14).  [...] then addressed the Court because [...] was not visible on the Zoom on the Zoom screen.
[brief] Pa655; T1.29:15-25; T1.77:22-25; 78:1.4².  The Public Hearing 21.  The public hearing on Ordinance 22-1766 included presentations by committee member [...]; the Township’s redevelopment counsel, [...], Esq.; and the Township’s financial advisors, [...].  22.  Citing guidance provided by the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs (“DCA”), [...] noted that PILOTs³ foster economic development, enhance the municipal tax base, expand community resources, and help advance other policy initiatives.  T1.36:12-17.  DCA guidance also states that “providing affordable housing is one of the primary recommended uses for PILOTs. ”  T1.36:24-25.  ²  Plaintiffs filed three transcripts with this Court.  Defendants will use the same nomenclature for ease of reference: T1 (legislative hearing before [...] on February 22, 2022); T2 (oral argument before Trial Court on discovery motions on September 9, 2022); T3 (oral argument before Trial Court at trial on March 28, 2023).
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Order Denying Relief Sought in Order to Show Cause and Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice, filed May 18, 2023……………………………Pa434 Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, filed July 14, 2023…………………..Pa525 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **In re Hekemian,** | | | A-1774-21, 2023 WL 176098 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 13, 2023) | 12 | | **In re Kelly,** | | | 120 N.J. 679 (1990) | 12, 15 | | **In re Wilson,** | | | 81 N.J. 451 (1979) | 15 | | **Kocanowski v. Twp. of Bridgewater,** | | | 237 N.J. 3, 9 (2019) | 10 | | **Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan,** | | | 140 N.J. 366 (1995) | 10 | | **Save Camden Pub. Schs. v. Camden City Bd. of Educ.,** | | | 454 N.J. Super. 478 (App. Div. 2018) | 10 | | **State v. Dickerson,** | | | 232 N.J. 2 (2018) | 9 | | **State v. Fuqua,** | | | 234 N.J. 583 (2018) | 10 | | **State v. G.E.P.,** | | | 243 N.J. 362 (2020) | 9 | | **State v. Hemenway,** | | | 239 N.J. 111 (2019) | 10 | | **United Towns Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Schmid,** | | | 23 N.J. Super. 239 (Ch. Div. 1952) | 12 | | Statutes | | | **N.J.S.A. § 3A:9-2** | 15 |
[brief] Volume 1  Camden County Indictment Number [...] ........................................Da 1-10  Verdict Sheet .................................................................................................Da 11-16  Judgment of Conviction ................................................................................Da 17-20  PowerPoint of Compiled Video Surveillance Used by State Witness ..................................................................................Da  21  Motion to Limit Firearm Identification Testimony .................................  Da 22-44¹ Motion for Discovery ......................................................................................Da 45-51  Order Granting Discovery ..............................................................................Da 52-59  Model Criminal Jury Charge, Identification: No In- Or Out-Of-Court Identification .........................................................Da 60  Model Criminal Jury Charge, Alibi ...............................................................Da 61-62  Notice of Appeal .............................................................................................Da 63-66  [...], Firearms Identification in the Forensic Laboratory (2010)  ........................................................................Da 67-101  National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (2009)  ...............................Da 102-247  ¹  Pursuant to Rule 2:6-1(a)(2), this brief and other trial-level materials are appended to demonstrate the issues raised below.  INDEX TO APPENDIX (CONT’D.)
[brief] 1.  The Commissioner had to adopt regulations implementing the Act’s “excessive[ness]” provision to enforce it in the manner here.  The rule of decision reflected in the orders of the ALJ and the Commissioner rested on applying a statutory term “excessive” to the particular rate applications that [...] submitted.  This attempt by the Department to assert unbridled discretion as an appropriate basis for denial of [...]’s proposed rates does not satisfy the requirements of this State’s administrative laws.  Unlike in some contexts (obscenity, for instance), “I know it when I see it” does not pass muster here.  Rather, the Supreme Court and this Court recognize that rulemaking is required to apprise regulated entities, like [...] here, as to the standards with which their conduct must conform, as well as to meaningfully cabin the discretion of a regulator.  Likewise, the Legislature explicitly required the Department to act by rulemaking in implementing the Act.  Absent such rulemaking (or any other guidance here) [...] had no meaningful ability to prove that its rates were not excessive.
[brief] [...] Did Not Act with Unclean Hands  Beginning with [...]’s signing of the name [...] on the December 1998 correctory deed, as found by the Trial Court, this was done in error by [...] under the mistaken impression that he needed to reestablish title in his name.  (Da066-Da068).  As further found by the trial Court, because the December 1998 Deed contained a “forgery,” it was not only null and void as a matter of law, it was incapable of passing any rights, even to a bona fide purchaser.
[brief] MONMOUTH COUNTY PROSECUTOR  By: [...], 018272010  Assistant Prosecutor Of Counsel and on the letter brief email: [...]  JJS/gm c [...], Esq.  August 12, 2024  [...] ID. NO. 331372021  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Of Counsel and  On the Letter-Brief REPLY LETTER BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
[brief] Order granting declaratory relief dated May 10, 2024  1a  Reasons on the record for granting declaratory relief  1T TABLE OF TRANSCRIPT DESIGNATIONS  1T- Transcript of Hearing dated May 10, 2024  2T- Transcript of Hearing dated February 9, 2024  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS-APPENDIX | Document | Pages | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Order granting declaratory relief filed May 10, 2024 | 1a | | Amended Complaint filed April 14, 2021 | 2a | | Answer and Counterclaim filed August 11, 2021 | 5a | | Plaintiff’s Answer to Counterclaim | 11a | | Order for judgment dated October 14, 2022 | 14a | | Order for judgment dated November 1, 2022 | 16a | | Appellate Division Opinion decided November 16, 2023 | 17a | | Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment filed February 29, 2024| 29a | | Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts filed February 29, 2024 | 31a | | Certification of [...] in support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment filed February 29, 2024 | 33a | | Exhibit A to Certification, applicable Lease dated August 27, 2015, filed February 29, 2024 | 35a | | Defendants’ Cross-motion for declaratory relief filed March 26, 2024 | 76a | | Defendants’ Counterstatement of facts filed March 26, 2024 | 77a | | Certification in opposition to Defendants’ motion for declaratory relief filed April 23, 2024 | 78a | | Exhibit A to Certification, applicable Lease dated August 27, 2015, filed April 23, 2024 (Omitted here See 35a) | 81a | | Temporary Occupancy Agreement between Plaintiff and Franchisor | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] And to allow counsel for both sides to advocate for their respective positions.  This pre-sentence advocacy is especially important when there is a broad range of sentence available for the court to impose.  In such a case, a sentencing memorandum with arguments and supporting materials has the potential to carry great weight in guiding the court to imposing a just sentence, considering factors relevant to the State’s position and the defendant.  In such a case, a criminal defendant’s attorney is remiss in his obligation to make a vigorous argument to personalize his client in order to justify the least severe sentence under the criminal code if he fails to avail his client the opportunity afforded by a well-prepared pre-sentence memorandum.
[brief] (25T48-14 to 49-9)  This deprived [...] of due process and effective assistance of counsel, and reversal is required.  The right to effective assistance of counsel extends to PCR counsel.  Under State v. Rue, 175 N.J. 1, 17-19 (2002) and State v. Webster, 187 N.J. 254, 257-58 (2006), PCR counsel must advance all arguments that can be made in support of the petition, including investigating all claims raised by defendant, and arguing all with any merit.
[brief] Defendant argues that this case was scheduled for mandatory arbitration and Plaintiff was required to file a motion to have the matter removed from arbitration and placed back on the active trial calendar before it filed its Motion for Summary Judgment.  Defendant points to no legal authority in support of this argument.  Plaintiff respectfully submits it is legally unfounded and should fail.  Finally, to the extent Defendant asserts that Plaintiff violated R. 1:4-8 regarding noticing the right to oral argument and the Plaintiff’s principal place of business as contained in its Complaint, this argument is meritless for the reasons set forth above and itself frivolous in the absence of the required R. 1:4-8 notice.  Plaintiff respectfully submits that Defendant’s arguments regarding due process and Plaintiff’s Motion should fail.
[brief] Date: November 29, 2016  BEFORE: THE HON.  [...], J.S.C.  TRANSCRIPT  ORDERED BY: [...], ESQ.  (Office of the Public Defender)  APPEARANCES: [...], Assistant Prosecutor, Mercer County  [...], Assistant Prosecutor, Mercer County Attorneys for the State  [...], ESQ.  Attorney for the Defendant Transcribers, [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  FAX NO. (609) 587-3599  E-mail: [...]  Website: www.jjcourt.com  Audio Recorded Audio Operator, [...]  THE COURT: