ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] He did not identify his scientific methodology in his report or on direct examination.  Rather, on cross-examination, [...] described his scientific method as “common sense. ”  3T128-22 to 3T129-7.  In essence, [...]’s opinion is that because there was mold in the air in the condo and because [...] ate food while residing in his condo, he must have eaten food contaminated by that mold and suffered injury.
[brief] The Disqualification Order Violated Appellants’ And [...]’s Procedural Due Process Rights As Appellants Were Precluded From The In Camera Review Of The Certification (T23:21-25; T24:1-3).  The Disqualification Order is predicated on a violation of one of the fundamental tenets of American jurisprudence: allowing a party accused to review and respond to the evidence presented against it.  Respondents submitted and the trial court accepted the Certification, which was provided not under seal but directly to the trial court for in camera review.  To be clear: Appellants are not aware of the contents of the Certification and accordingly cannot respond to it.  This is troubling considering Respondents claim that they already provided this privileged information to [...], so there could be no concerns about violation of attorney-client privilege.  Circuitously, they also argue that [...] should not receive this information.  It is wholly unclear how [...] could both have this information already but is not entitled to review it in the Certification.  This merely confirms the tactical nature of the disqualification application.  The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the First Article of the New Jersey Constitution both guarantee procedural due process for parties to a litigation.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.; N.J. Const. Art. I ¶ 1.  These constitutional guarantees grant “all parties in litigation the right to know the evidence and contentions advanced against them as well as the perceived facts which inform a judge’s decision.  The guarantee includes a fair opportunity to meet those proofs, arguments and perceptions of fact. ”  Ledezma v. A & L Drywall, 254 N.J. Super. 613, 618 (App. Div. 1992) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970) and Hewitt v. Hollahan, 56 N.J. Super. 372, 377-78 (App. Div. 1959)) (emphasis added).
[directive] Delay in getting cases entered in [...].  When laboratory results are faxed to [...] and [...], • instead of being submitted electronically, they have to be manually entered in the system.  With 2 a high volume of results, this can take several days.  Faxed laboratory results are becoming more common as more laboratories test for COVID-19.  Delay in getting [...] cases assigned to [...].  Nearly a quarter of all COVID-19 positive • laboratory tests do not have a patient address and cannot be assigned to a LHD.  It can take several days to obtain this information from laboratories and healthcare providers.  Delay in getting [...] cases assigned to the correct LHD.  [...] uses a mapping algorithm to • assign cases to [...].  In many instances, there is insufficient information to map cases to the correct municipality (e.g., P.O. Boxes).  [...] have to manually review cases and, if needed, transfer cases to the correct jurisdiction.  In areas with a high volume of cases, verifying all new addresses and transferring to the correct jurisdiction can take several days.  Delay in getting current address.  Cases are initially assigned to [...] according to addresses • provided by laboratories or healthcare providers, which may be outdated or incorrect, or may not reflect where a person is currently staying.
[brief] The Board Properly Denied the C Variances and Design Exceptions Requested Where Applicant Did Not Satisfy its Burden to Establish the Negative Criteria.  [...] also requested seven c variances enumerated above.  Da18.  Little, if any, proofs to support the c variances and design waivers were provided, and it is undeniable that they were related to the size and density of the facility requested, not related to the size or shape of the lot, or to existing structures thereon, or that these variances represented a better zoning alternative because of the benefits from these changes.  See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70C(1), (2).  Although [...] seeks to have all of the variances and design exceptions subsumed in the inherently beneficial use presented, they must stand on their own and require justification by proofs showing why they are needed.  While c variances and design exceptions may arguably be subsumed in an approval for a d variance where a Board’s findings also support such approvals, that is not the case universally.  See O'Donnell v. Koch, 197 N.J. Super. 134, 145 (App. Div. 1984) (“we do not hold that in every use variance application the bulk requirements of the ordinance are subsumed in the grant of a use variance”).
[brief] In 2011, six years before the accident in question, the property located at [...] was owned jointly by [...] and [...].  (Pa 375).  (The property had been held in the [...], and passed down through generations, for decades.  [...], now deceased, was the founder of several family businesses.  The “Joseph” in the entity mentioned above obviously refers to [...], and the “Elizabeth” entity referred to his wife, [...]).  The property consisted of approximately 16 acres on which there was situated a one-story masonry cold-storage industrial complex consisting of approximately 72,000 square feet of warehouse, office and garage space.  (Pa 380).  At that time the entire property, both the building and land, were conveyed to a single tenant, [...] via a ‘triple-net’ lease.  (Pa 379-380).  Under the lease the tenant, [...], was responsible to pay all utilities, taxes, public improvement assessments, insurance and other charges associated with the property.  (Pa 381-383).  As verified by the lease, [...] had inspected the premises, was fully familiar with the premises, and agreed it was leasing the premises in “AS IS” condition.  (Pa 380).  This lease also unquestionably placed responsibility for all maintenance and repair upon the tenant.  For example, the lease to [...] provided in part:  **Repairs.  Section 9.01**  The *tenant* shall keep the lease premises, including but not limited to, the roof, exterior walls, windows, plumbing, *electrical*, HVAC, parking areas, driveways, storm sewers, *lighting*, and sidewalks, *in good condition and repair* and shall redecorate, paint and renovate the lease premises as may be necessary to keep them in good condition and repair and in good appearance.  (emphasis added).  The lease also provided that the property owner retained *no* control over the property and had no responsibilities for any portion of the property.  (Da 027)¹  Uncontradicted testimony from the representative of [...] revealed that [...] was the only tenant on the property at all times relevant.  (Pa 392-394).  The property-owner never maintained offices at the property.  (Pa 395).  There were *never* “any circumstances where the tenant, which is [...], must obtain approval of the landlord, the Realty company, before carrying out any maintenance work at 86 Canfield in Randolph. ” (Pa 392).  --- ¹  Although 2011 lease appears in the plaintiff’s appendix (Pa 375) only the first ten pages of that lease was included.  When this defendant filed the summary judgment motion in January, 2022 we inadvertently omitted filing a complete copy of the 2011 lease.  That oversight was immediately corrected with a “deficiency correction” filed with the Court on January 7, 2022, and the complete lease was part of the motion record.  We have provided the complete lease in defendant’s appendix, Da 001.  Subsequent to the 2011 lease [...], as part of their estate planning process with the assistance of counsel, determined it was appropriate to change the corporate structure of the landlords from the “Joseph” and “Elizabeth” entities identified in the 2011 lease to this defendant, [...].
[brief] (573a)  On November 27, 2021, [...] received notification (273a) that [...] and [...] (“[...]”), who previously rented the Boonton Property, had submitted a written offer (670a) to purchase the Boonton Property for $800,000 from the Trust.  [...] provided [...] with an opportunity to “match” the offer.  (273a ¶2)  During trial [...] testified that:  I thought -- the first thing I thought, this can’t be true.  Why would they want to pay 800,000 for this house?  It was so much work, and there were so many leaky pipes, and the driveway, and I thought to myself it can’t be true.  And then I thought what if it is, that’s terrific.  And my wife and I were debating and talking and just a few days later, literally, on December 1st, we get a call that you [[...]] want to do a sealed bid through [Deputy Surrogate] [...], and we’re supposed to consent to [...] and [...] buying the house, or myself, in a sealed bid.  And at that point we realized geesh, [...] and [...] are probably planning to buy the house and flip it to the [...].
[brief] Complaint filed against [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] on April 7, 2023.  [Pa 024-031].  Answer filed for defendants [...] and [...] on May 18, 2023.  [LDa 1-11].  Answer filed for defendant [...] on June 23, 2023.  [LDa 12-21].  Answer filed for defendants [...] and [...] on July 17, 2023.  [Pa 41-53].  Motion to compel arbitration claims of plaintiffs against [...]/[...] filed on March 14, 2024.  [Pa 078-112].  On April 5, 2024 defendants [...] and [...] set forth their position with respect to discovery obligations of the parties, discovery of insurance information, and for staying the case until completion of the [...] arbitration.  [LDa 22-24].  Refusing to provide discovery, on May 7, 2024 [...]/[...] filed a motion for a protective Order shielding it from discovery obligations [LDa 25-26] which motion was granted on May 29, 2024.  [LDa 27-28].  An Order compelling arbitration of plaintiffs’ claims against [...]/[...] and staying case until completion of arbitration was entered July 17, 2024.  [Pa 001].  Plaintiffs opposed and filed their opening Brief on October 17, 2024.  See general Pb. --- 1  The letter brief on behalf of defendants [...] and [...] is included in the Appendix because it is germane to the issues on appeal and demonstrative of the consistency of the position and arguments by these defendants.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] (Pa236-38).  On November 30, 2023, Respondent filed supplemental pleadings in support of the Original Motion, which contained the requisite pleadings required for converting the motion to a motion for Summary Judgment and, among other things, sought an order compelling Appellant to accept the sum of $30.53, plus interest, in full and complete satisfaction of the Mortgage.  (Pa181-209).  (Collectively, the Original motion and supplemental pleadings converting the motion to a Summary Judgment motion shall be referred to as the “Motion”)
[brief] Yet, our Supreme Court has held that courts may consider other language in the contract or related disclosures for “explanatory comment… that arbitration is a substitute for the right to have one’s claim adjudicated in a court of law. ”  Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442.  A narrow view of enforceability based only on wording in a designated clause within the contract is not the standard.  (Opp. Br. at 20-21).  Indeed, in Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30 (2020), the Court reversed the Appellate Division and held that “explanatory” emails and other materials, made clear the employee was bound to arbitrate all disputes if still employed beyond 60 days, even though no agreement was ever signed and even though the employee said she never read the materials sent to her via email.  Id. at 51-52.  Critically, the Skuse Court reaffirmed that “as a general rule, ‘one who does not choose to read a contract before signing it cannot later relieve himself [or herself] of its burdens. ’”  Skuse, 244 N.J. at 54 (quoting Riverside Chiropractic Grp. v. Mercury Ins. Co., 404 N.J. Super. 228, 238 (App. Div. 2008)).  This decision clearly undermines Respondents’ argument that they had no obligation to read the contract documents for any explanatory information, including the Public Offering Statement (“POS”) incorporated by clear reference into the Subscription and Purchase Agreement (“SPA”), and identified at Exhibit A thereto.  With Atalese only requiring “some explanatory comment” issuing notice and Skuse permitting explanations to exist in outside sources other than the arbitration provision itself, Appellants have clearly satisfied this burden.
[directive] J. NJ Hon. [...]  To: Directive #08-22  Assignment Judges  Trial Court Administrators Dire., [...], Administrative From: Criminal Justice Reform - (1)  Amended by L. 2022, c. to 43  Subj: Address Graves Act Offenses; (2)  Amendments Court Rule to 3:4A(b)(5); (3)  Changes to Decision-Making Framework (DMF)  August 2, 2022  Date:
[brief] 21.  For the Court below to assess the penalties there was a remarkably simple condition precedent that was required.  The condition precedent is that Plaintiff did not actually have the $70,000.00 readily available.  So, the real question is: DID PLAINTIFF ACTUALLY HAVE THE $70,000.00 WHEN SHE SAID THAT SHE DID NOT HAVE THAT MONEY?  THE ANSWER IS THAT SHE DID HAVE THE $70,000.00.  THIS FACT IS INDISPUTABLE.  THE FACT THAT SHE LIED AND MISREPRESENTED THAT SHE DIDN’T HAVE IT SHOULD NOT AND CAN NOT INURE TO HER BENEFIT.
[brief] In cases concerning claims under the NJLAD, “special rules of interpretation also apply. ”  Nini v. Mercer Cty. Cmty. Coll., 202 N.J. 98, 108 (2010).  “When confronted with any interpretive question” pertaining to the NJLAD, our courts “must recognize” the NJLAD's pronouncement of its broad public policy goals.  Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373, 390 (2016).  Calabotta v. Phibro Animal Health Corp., 460 N.J. Super. 38, 60 (App. Div. 2019).  Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs have no standing to pursue their claim under the NJLAD.
[brief] Here, although the trial court was aware of my argument in this regard, it simply circumvented that with a bald finding that our case (which was filed on May 30, 2022) “was frivolous before May 30th, it wasn’t even half-baked”.  --- 11  The trial court made the bald conclusion that:  "The reality here is that the Plaintiffs’ claim was frivolous from the start.  I agree with that, except I’ll add it was frivolous before May 30th, it wasn’t even half-baked".  (2T10:17-20)
[brief] (Pa32).  STATEMENT OF FACTS  The underlying construction defect litigation was filed in the matter of [...] v. [...], et al., in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, under Docket No: [...].  (Da1).  The gravamen of the Sollecito Complaint was that after moving his family into the newly constructed home, Cohen terminated Sollecito, and refused to pay any part of the unpaid balance owed pursuant to the construction contract.  (See [...] v. [...] v. [...], et al., in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No: [...]).  (Da1).  By June of 2017, Cohen had already been represented by many firms, including [...]; [...]; [...]; and [...]\(^1\).  (Da21-Da23).  On June 1, 2017, Cohen, by his then counsel [...], filed a Third Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint.  The Third Party Complaint named approximately 20 contractors, subcontractors, firms, and trades building the house along with a breach of contract action against [...].  The Amended --- \(^1\)  Following the termination of [...], Mr. Cohen went through 3 additional law firms: [...]; [...]; and [...].  Answer included 21 Affirmative Defenses to the Sollecito Complaint.  The Third Party Complaint against the third-party defendants contained 134 paragraphs, with thirteen separate counts against 22 vendors, subcontractors, and engineers/architects.  Additionally, there was a breach of contract claim against [...].  This is the litigation [...] substituted into\(^2\).  (Da23).  At the time of the substitution by [...], the underlying case had been pending since July of 2015.  Discovery had been undertaken, but depositions had not yet been conducted, and experts had not yet been retained.  There were also outstanding discovery demands that had to be compiled with.  There was an existing Order requiring the completion of discovery by October 12, 2017 (later extended to March 1, 2018).  The Court Order also required that [...] be ready to proceed with the depositions in two and a half months.  The deposition of Mr. Cohen was court-ordered to begin on November 17, 2017.  The Retainer Agreement was signed on September 8, 2017.  (Da66).  The terms provided that hourly fees for associates would be billed at a rate not to --- \(^2\) [...] testified that the fact that many prior lawyers had handled this matter, made it exceedingly difficult for [...] to step into the case.
[brief] J. Super. 389, 958 A.2d 1014 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2008) ...............................................................................26 Scafe v. Wells Fargo HomeMortg. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129402, 2016 WL 5334658 (D.N.J. Sept. 22, 2016) .........................................................................................44 Schor v. FMS Fin. Corp., 357 N.J. Super. 185 (App. Div. 2002) ....................................................................36 Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2005) ....................................................................9, 10 Sun Chemical Corporation v. Fike Corporation, 243 N.J 319 (2020) .................................................................................................25 Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234, 872 A.2d 783 (2005) .....................................................................29, 31 Thompson v. City of Atlantic City, 190 N.J. 359 (N.J. Sup Ct. 2007) ..........................................................................35 Torres-Hernandez v. CVT Prepaid Sols., Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105413, 2008 WL 5381227 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2008)
[brief] *See Kauffman*, *supra*, 434 *F.2d* at 732.  Instead, the court misapplied the law on derivative standing and summary judgment by incorrectly holding that there were disputes of fact concerning Plaintiffs’ alleged special injury, which was plainly wrong based on Plaintiffs’ failure to establish direct damages.  *See Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Cherry Hill Pain & Rehab. Institute*, 389 *N.J. Super.* 130, 136 (App. Div. 2006).  The court erred again at trial by holding that Plaintiffs had standing to assert their conversion claims because they established a “special injury. ”  36T21-1 to 22-25, 48-1 to 50-25.  In so doing, the court failed to cite to any discernable facts or evidence in the record supporting its conclusory holding.  Clearly, the trial court erred, as a matter of law, at the summary judgment stage and again at trial in failing to dismiss Plaintiffs’ conversion claims for lack of standing and to dismiss the Amended Complaint against Defendant.
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], an employee of the [...], New Jersey in the position as West Ward Aide belong to a Collective Bargaining Unit as an Aide 1 to which he was entitled to all benefits deriving therefrom.  PA99; PA146 P.33 L19-25; PA142 p.19L1-18.  In or about January of 2018 while on a vacation authorized by West Ward Chief of Staff [...], Mr. Allen obtained petitions to run for elective office in the [...], New Jersey.  PA168 P. 53L 21-25.  Mr. Allen sought the position of Councilman of the West Ward in the [...], which [...] “thought was crazy”  PA 132 P. 50 L24-25; P. 51L1-16.  [...] was advised during Mr. Allen’s vacation that he was seeking signatures on the petition to become certified a viable candidate.  PA127 P.32L15-25.  On or about January 12, 2018, immediately upon Mr. Allen’s return from vacation he was met with a letter of termination by the secretary of [...].  PA164 P.70 L12-25.  The letter of termination was never provided to the Union Representative or Shop Stewart for Mr. Allen’s unit of the Collective Bargaining Union, nor was a member of the collective bargaining unit present when Mr. Allen was terminated via the letter of termination.  PA149 p. 46L14-25; p. 46L1-20; PA121 p.8L1-25; PA126 p. 26L1.  The Letter of termination did not set forth any reason for his termination, but stated only that his services were no longer required and wished him success in the future.  PA69.  In addition to Mr. Allen’s reliance on his first amendment freedom of speech rights, Mr. Allen also relied on the Executive Order signed by former Mayor [...] indicating that all employees shall maintain or otherwise be reinstated to their position when running for an elective position once they become a certified candidate.  PA75; PA111.  Mr. Allen was terminated less than two weeks after obtaining the petitions necessary for his certification as a candidate and before he could submit his signed petitions to become a certified candidate.  PA69.  Mr. Allen was not a policy maker and the [...] does not hold partisan elections, therefore there are no political party slates or designations in its Municipal Elections.  PA126 p.27L3-25; P.28L1-9.  [...] was an elected official and employee of the [...].  The [...] was the employer of Mr. Allen.  PA95; PA97; 146 p.34L19-25.  [...] terminated Mr. Allen when he learned he was taking out petitions to run for elected office in the [...].  PA122-PA124; PA127 p.32L15-25.  The [...] hires and fires employees without council ratification.  PA144 p.26L1-9.  Mr. Allen was disparaged and degraded by [...].  PA171 p.66L20-25; p.67 L1-20.  Although Mr. Allen was maintained on the employment roster as a member of the collective bargaining agreement, he was never reinstated to his position.  PA146 p.33L19-25; PA119.  Mr. Allen’s employment record was devoid of any counseling or other disciplinary notices.  PA127 p.21L1-25; P. 3211-5.  Mr. Allen was not afforded progressive discipline prior to his termination.  PA129 p.38L1-25; p.39L1-2; PA141 P. 15L4-25; PA142 p.16L1-25; p.17L1-10; p.18L1-25; p.19L1-20.  STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] However, “[t]he prohibition against impairment of contracts under the federal and state constitutions is not absolute.  It ‘must be accommodated to the inherent police power of the states to safeguard the vital interests of their residents. ’”  *In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.’s Rate Unbundling, Stranded Costs & Restructuring Filings*, 330 N.J. Super. 65, 93 (App. Div. 2000) (citation omitted).  [...]’s findings and declarations undeniably supply the justifications for granting the State the authority to unilaterally modify the expired-but-effective CNA.
[brief] On Count 3, Unlawful Possession of a Handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)), the Court imposed a sentence of eight years with five years parole ineligibility.  (8T 107-20 to 23; Da49)  Under the Graves Act, the “minimum term shall be fixed at one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or 42 months, whichever is greater. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c).  Thus, on a sentence of eight years the court was required to impose a parole disqualifier of four years; the five year parole disqualifier is illegal.  F.  This Case Should Be Reassigned To A Different Judge On Remand.
[brief] The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,...  As a result, a judge operating in the District of Columbia is not bound by the Constitution, and any associated Supreme court opinion holding a judge immune from action.  However, the judge can still take action via title 18 section 242, as it is the supreme law of the land, and find a judge guilty of denying the right to trial by jury.  Then, the Supreme court could issue a binding order directing that an offending judge is either fined, or incarcerated, for denying the right to trial by jury that would be binding via the provisions of Article III of the Constitution.