ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Though Plaintiff’s Counsel filed timely filed his appeal with JEDS and attempted to file with both the Superior Court criminal as well as civil, both efforts were rejected, which has disallowed Plaintiff to perfect his appeal from the [...]’s apparent failure to file the final judgment.  (Pa185-Pa189; Pa218, Pa309).  The highland park judge, the clerks, and administrative staff, by not rendering the decision as a judgement filed with the courts disenabled plaintiff [...] from effectuating the appeal of his criminal matter.  (Pa469; Pa505).  The Superior Court Judge finally dismissed the appeal after JEDS had already rejected it due to the lack of an Order.  (Pa319)  Contrary to the arguments that plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed because he did not have transcripts, an appeal cannot be taken from transcripts.  As a consequence of the actions of all defendants, plaintiff was deprived of procedural and substantive due process, equal protection and his rights under Article 1 para 1 of the New Jersey Constitution, and his rights under Paragraphs 1,5,7,8,9,10,18, 20,22.
[brief] The last of the policies one of the settling insurers issued expired on June 1, 2005, shortly before the [...] coverage commenced.  Of course, neither [...] nor anyone else knew or even suspected that the condominium had been contaminated by mold before March 2009, well within [...]’s coverage.  See also Pb10 (admitting that mold was first discovered in [...]’s condominium in March 2009).  --- \(^6\)
[brief] This would be especially alarming given that New Jersey is “one of the most heavily traveled corridor states in the nation. ”  Matter of Two Seized Firearms, 127 N.J. at 89.  Thankfully, the Second Amendment does not require this perverse result—a conclusion our Supreme Court reached decades ago, see ibid. at 85-86, and which Bruen has not altered since, see supra at 9-11.  Finally, defendant’s contrary argument is belied by Congressional understanding embodied in a longstanding federal statute.
[brief] 30  Pollock v. American Tel. & Tel. Lines, 794 F.2d 860 (3rd Cir. 1986) ....  27  Rocci v. Macdonald-Cartier, 323 N.J. Super. 18 (App. Div. 1999), aff’d sub. nom, 165 N.J. 149 (2000)
[brief] The New Jersey Court Rule 2:5-3(b) seems to be an anomaly in indiscriminately requiring an appellant by default to order the transcript of “entire proceedings” regardless of whether the specified grounds of appeal require a complete transcript or not.  Even as this court is governed by the New Jersey Court Rules, it does not operate in a vacuum and cannot ignore the manifestly sensible appellate requirement in other jurisdictions to order only relevant transcripts which is grounded in a sound rationale that transcends jurisdictional boundaries.  This court cannot plausibly claim that the rationale applies in other jurisdictions but not in New Jersey.  Indeed, none other than the United States Supreme Court has characterized the blind inclusion of a complete transcript in the record as a waste of the appellant’s money.  “[T]he fact that an appellant with funds may choose to waste his money by unnecessarily including in the record all of the transcript does not mean that the State must waste its funds by providing what is unnecessary for adequate appellate review”  Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 496 (1963).
[directive] In summary, there are really only a few simple procedures that police staff must follow in order to be compliant with these regulations:  1.  After processing, hold the non-delinquent youth in a non-secure area, in a non- secure manner.  2.  Keep all in-custody juveniles sight and sound separated from adult detainees.  3.  Release, or transfer to other authorities, all juveniles in less than 6 hours.
[brief] POINT I [...]’S NJLAD CLAIMS WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED ON RECONSIDERATION  BECAUSE SHE WAS NOT STATE RESPONDENTS’ EMPLOYEE (3T88:5-90:21, 91:21-92:6).  Since the NJLAD only protects employees and not independent contractors, New Jersey courts are required to apply a fact-specific analysis to determine whether a person classified as an independent contractor is considered to be an employee protected by the NJLAD.  See Pukowsky v. Caruso, 312 N.J. Super. 171, 180 (App. Div. 1998); see also, Hoag v. Brown, 397 N.J. Super. 34, 47 (App. Div. 2007).
[brief] As stated in great detail in Plaintiffs’ initial brief, the Supreme Court has “carried out its constitutional authority to govern ‘the admission to practice and the discipline of persons admitted,’” by the adoption of the RPCs and the Court Rules (which incorporate the RPCs), the establishment of numerous committees to administer various categories of attorney conduct, and the issuance of binding opinions construing the RPCs, Court Rules, and administrative directives.  Pb at 26-27.  These facts alone “foreclose action” by the Legislature through the enactment of the Limited Attorney Exemption to regulate debt adjustment legal work – the practice of law that only the Supreme Court regulates, and which the Supreme Court has fully and thoroughly regulated.  Defendants are thus unable to meet the threshold issue set forth in Knight, and consequently, the trial court erred in applying the “two-prong test” to the Limited Attorney Exemption.
[brief] ARGUMENT POINT I THE BOARD’S DENIAL OF SALVADORE’S APPLICATION MADE APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR AND ONE MONTH PAST THE STATUTORY DEADLINE TO FILE FOR AMENDED BENEFITS IS REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.  The Board’s decision denying [...]’s Eligibility Registration Form under the Ricci Act should be upheld because it is reasonable and supported by the plain language of N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10, and thus is not arbitrary nor capricious.
[brief] ”  Driscoll v. Burlington–Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 493, 86 A.2d 201 (1952), cert. den., 344 U.S. 838, 73 S.Ct. 25, 97 L.Ed. 652 (1952).  Personal service is a prerequisite to achieving in personam jurisdiction as the plaintiff in this case before this court clearly failed to produce evidence disputing this defendant’s claim of Defective Service (Pa1) upon challenge of jurisdiction (Pa10-Pa11; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa40; Pa58-Pa59; Pa62).
[brief] Those four prongs are: (1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant's reasons for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused. ”  Id. at 157-158.  Here, Defendant has failed to offer any argument as to any of the Slater prongs.  Nevertheless, application of each of the four Slater prongs confirms Defendant’s guilty plea should stand:  1.  Defendant has not - and cannot – assert a colorable claim of innocence: his BAC was 0.12 and he admitted during his plea that he had been drinking beer and Jim Beam bourbon before operating his vehicle.  (1T7-1 to 7-2; 11-22 to 12-19); 2.  Defendant has failed to provide anything which demonstrates the nature and strength of his reasons for withdrawal; that failure supports an inference that Defendant actually only continues to seek modification of his sentence and not to withdraw his plea; 3.  It is inarguable that there was a plea bargain from which Defendant derived a clear benefit: 4 out of 5 of his summonses were dismissed.  (1T8-3 to 8-8); 4.  It is also inarguable that withdrawal of Defendant’s plea would result in an unfair prejudice to the State because it has been nearly 13 years since Defendant was charged in this case.  Hence the De Novo Court found that Defendant’s “plea was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily and that Defendant was fully apprised of the potential consequences,” and properly denied his request to vacate his plea.
[brief] B.  The mentions in the redacted statement that defendant was under arrest on unrelated charges were invited by defendant, and not otherwise plain error.  At a pretrial hearing on October 6, 2022, more than a month before trial began, the court asked defendant about the proposed redactions.  (6T9-5 to 9).  Defense counsel indicated to the judge that he was still going through them “for trial purposes. ” (6T9-12 to 15).  The portion played for the jury was the agreed upon statement after defendant had ample time to review and consider redactions in preparation for trial.  Indeed, just before the statement was played for the jury, defense counsel again confirmed he was satisfied with the redactions.  (7T167-7 to 8).  Thus, to the extent it was error, defendant invited it.  And even if not invited, considering the overwhelming evidence of the video surveillance, victim testimony, and defendant’s self-identification, the fleeting mentions that defendant was under arrest on an unrelated offense was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  The State respectfully urges this Court to affirm.
[brief] The Court erred and abused its judicial discretion not only in overlooking or by mistake or by misapplication of law failing to comprehensively review Probation’s alleged “accounting” and the missing and overlooked credits duly issued by court Orders, but given the evidence of Probation’s withdrawal of decades of erroneous account postings and audits, the Court erred and abused its judicial discretion and its obligation to ensure the accurate enforcement of its Orders in a manner so as to manifestly offend the interests of justice and equity.
[brief] A constructive trust is appropriate when:  …although it would seem that a purchase of property by one person in the name of another suggests an express trust arising out of the intention of the purchaser, equity has long considered the transaction as giving rise to a resulting trust, wholly apart from the intention, since the character of the transaction raises an inference that the purchaser did not intend that the grantee should [***9] have the beneficial interest in the res, and therefore the Statute of Frauds does not serve to deprive the purchaser of the right to compel the grantee to convey the property to him.
[brief] Deference to an “agency’s expertise and discretion in administering a subject matter area committed to its supervision” is particularly appropriate when, as here, the subject matter involves a “highly sensitive” area.  Matter of Fleming, 290 N.J. Super. 195, 202 (App. Div. 1996); see Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973) (characterizing the securities area as a “sensitive one, open to great abuses” and “subject to careful governmental regulation to assure . . . protection of the public”).
[brief] ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT BY: /s/ [...]  [...]  Deputy Attorney General  [...]  BETHANY L. DEAL - ATTY NO. 027552008  DEPUTY  ATTORNEY GENERAL DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE APPELLATE UNIT OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  Date: July 9, 2023  July 17, 2024  [...] ID. NO. 060532014  Assistant Deputy Public Defender  [...]  Of Counsel and On the Letter-Brief  REPLY LETTER-BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
[directive] Judge Prosecutor's Office: Defendant's Attorney: --------------- ---------------  Name Name by of2 page #17-18(11/01/2018), Order Published Directive CN: 12332 (Competency 7)  l  _______________ _______________  Address _ Address _ ___________ ___________  Telephone Number _ Telephone Number _ _________________ _________________  Fax _ Fax _ ________________ ________________ Email _ Email _ _________  If D No yes, language _ Interpreter needed? D Yes _________  If D No yes, describe _ ADA accommodation needed?  D Yes Directive# 17-18(I1/01/2018), (Competency Published 12332 7) by CN: Order of2 page 2  Attachment 10  Order - Order Mandating a Psychiatric #S1
[brief] DEFENDANT IS EQUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM DEMANDING ARBITRATION.  Before the issue of [...]’s waiver of the right to compel arbitration of this matter at this late date can be reached, it should be noted that [...] is equitably estopped from demanding arbitration as he cannot seek to benefit from a contract to which he has expressly and repeatedly disavowed.  “Equitable estoppel applies to preclude a party from assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted. ”  Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 1996) citing Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414 (3d. Cir.) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967 (1988).
[brief] Several days before the scheduled closing of the refinancing transaction (“Closing”), the parties spoke and confirmed that the total amount owed to [...] by Defendants, including the principal sums and interest due on the First and Second Loans, was approximately $495,000.  Da19; 1T137-1 to 3, 138-16 to 24, 139-24 to 140-2, 141-25 to 142-3, 144-1 to 6.  More specifically, as of April 26, 2013, [...] owed [...] $419,935.94 on the First Loan, including the $330,000 outstanding principal, plus interest and penalties, and owed $75,000 on the Second Loan, including the $50,000 principal, plus the interest agreed-upon by the parties.  Da19; Da216-19 (Ex. P17).  The parties agreed that the total due was $494,935.94.
[brief] Plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint in this matter on or about March 19, 2019.  (Pa 1).  A First Amended Complaint was filed on July 19, 2021, naming “[...] and its Planning Board” as Defendants.  (Pa 1608).  The First Amended Complaint makes no claims or demands for relief against [...].  Neither [...] nor the [...] Planning Board were properly served with the Summons and Complaint.  According to the proof of service, the [...] Clerk was not available to accept service, and the pleadings were then deposited in a mail drop box attached to the wall on the front of the building (Pa 3331; Pa 3340).  An Answer was filed on behalf of [...] and the [...] Planning Board on September 27, 2021 (Pa 3059).  On February 14, 2022, Appellant filed a Motion for Default Judgment against the Township of Holland and also against the Defendant [...]. (Pa 3334).  However, Appellant had not made a prior motion for entry of default as required under Rule 4:43-2.  A Cross Motion on behalf of the Township of Holland was filed, seeking --- 1  The procedural history and statement of facts have been combined to deny Appellant’s Motion and to dismiss [...] as a Defendant.  (Pa 3346).  An Order Granting Default Judgment against [...] was entered as “unopposed” on March 4, 2022 (Pa3387).  However, the Court was notified that the Crossmotion had been filed (Pa 3388).  The Order Granting Default Judgment was then vacated as having been entered erroneously, and a new return date on the Motion and Crossmotion was scheduled (Pa 3389).  On April 5, 2022, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. entered an Order denying Appellant’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment against [...], and dismissing the First Amended Complaint against [...] (Pa 3442).  In his opinion, Judge Wilson noted that the First amended Complaint asserted no claims or relief from [...], and therefore, failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  (Pa 3451).  On May 23, 2022, at Plaintiffs’ request, (Pa 3456), the Trial Court entered an Order dismissing this action as to all parties (Pa 3460).  Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on June 8, 2022 (Pa 3461) and an Amended Notice of Appeal on June 15, 2022 (Pa 3467).
[brief] A challenger must show that the board engaged in “willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of circumstances. ”  Id. at 204 (quoting Bayshore Sewerage Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 122 N.J. Super. 184, 199 (Ch. Div. 1973), aff’d o.b., 131 N.J. Super. 37 (App. Div. 1974)).  The “test is essentially one of rational basis. ”  Id.  “A board acts arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably if its findings of fact in support of [its decision] are not supported by the record. ”  Ten Stary Dom Partnership v. Mauro, 216 N.J. 16, 33 (2013).  A “determination predicated on unsupported findings is the essence of arbitrary and capricious action. ”  In re Boardwalk Regency Casino Corp., 180 N.J. Super. 324, 334 (App. Div., 1981), modified on other grounds, 90 N.J. 361 (1982).
[brief] [...]’ General Manager and [...]’ supervisor in 2017 and 2018, [...], testified that she regularly observed [...], both in his paddock and during semen collection, when he was at the farm.  [Pa 473-74, 476].  Other than being difficult to catch from his paddock at times, [...] described [...]’s behavior as typical of other breeding stallions, if not less dangerous than others she had worked with.  [Pa 474-483].  She confirmed that being difficult to catch is not a sign of aggression.  [478-79].  She could not identify a single instance of aggressive behavior by [...]; in fact, she stated that [...] had *never* been aggressive during the 2017 season at [...] and that Defendants were *never* notified of any aggressive or dangerous tendencies by anyone at [...] prior to the attack.  [Pa 486-88].  Indeed, [...] sent Defendants an email on September 18, 2017 praising [...] as “one of the easiest horses we have ever had to collect it is a pleasure to have him here at Southwind. ”  [Pa 587].
[brief] i.  Expressed policy of U.S. Congress is matter of “public interest. ”  Public Law 90-321, the Consumer Credit Protection Act, states U.S. Congress’ legislative policy in its Preamble:  “An Act to safeguard the consumer in connection with the utilization of credit by regarding full disclosure of the terms and conditions of finance charges in credit transactions or in offers to extend credit; …. ”  Correct implementation of Congressional policy is a matter of great public interest.  “Policy considerations also support the determination that a TILA claim arises from the same transaction as a creditor's debt claim. ”  In re Jones, 122 B.R. 246 (W.D. Pa. 1990).  The trial Court failed to implement U.S. Congress’ expressed public policy when it denied recoupment or set-off to Appellant.
[brief] The Association’s demand to conduct negotiations with its entire membership is essentially a requirement that the parties engage in “open negotiations,” which [...] has held is an unlawful pre-condition to negotiations.  In I/M/O Brielle Board of Education and Brielle Education Association, 3 NJPER ¶ 323 (1977) (Pa265), the board refused to negotiate with the union unless the negotiations were conducted in open public session, but the union refused to participate in open negotiations.
[brief] Instead, a dismissal only applies to known or knowable claims at the time of the dismissal.  Indeed, the Court in DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 273–74, 662 A.2d 494, 505 (1995) established:  [T]he entire controversy doctrine does not apply to unknown or unaccrued claims.  R. 4:30A cmt. 2; Mauro v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 116 N.J. 126, 138, 561 A.2d 257 (1989) (holding that entire controversy doctrine would not bar toxic-tort plaintiff’s damage claim because plaintiff discovered existence of disease after first litigation); Zaromb v. Borucka, 166 N.J.Super. 22, 27, 398 A.2d 1308 (App.Div.1979) (holding that slander claim was not precluded by entire controversy doctrine because party was not aware of its existence).
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This appeal involves [...]’s challenge to the trial court’s unremarkable application of the entire controversy doctrine to bar claims in [...]’s second lawsuit—claims that could have been raised in its first lawsuit.  [...] cannot repackage an old and withheld claim in new wrapping.  That is the point of the entire controversy doctrine—to discourage piecemeal and repetitive lawsuits and to bring finality to cases where claims and parties should have been joined in one proceeding.  In the first lawsuit, the trial court dismissed [...]’s claims against [...], finding that the City’s designation of certain property as blighted and in need of redevelopment was supported by substantial evidence in the record.
[directive] A law enforcement officer has the authority, at all times, to attempt the stop of any person suspected of having committed any criminal offense or traffic violation.  When the violator does not submit to the officer’s lawful authority and bring the vehicle to a stop, the officer must determine whether to pursue that violator by continuing to attempt to stop the violator utilizing pursuit driving as defined herein.  The officer's decision to pursue should always be undertaken with an awareness of the degree of risk to which the officer exposes law enforcement and the community by engaging in a vehicular pursuit.  The officer must always weigh the need for immediate apprehension against the risk created by the pursuit.  3.2
[directive] Special Responsibilities When Interacting with PossibleVictims  1.  All law enforcement officers shall take appropriate actions as are necessary to protect the immediate safety and security of persons who may be the victims of human trafficking.  2.  If a person reports to a law enforcement officer that he or she is a victim of human trafficking, or relates to a law enforcement officer facts that, if true, would make the person a victim of human trafficking, the law enforcement officer and other members of the officer’s agency shall treat the person making the report or relating the information as a human trafficking victim for purposes of this Directive, notwithstanding that the person may have committed an offense (e.g., prostitution), unless and until an investigation determines that any such report or information is false or unfounded.
[directive] B.  All other weapons owned, possessed, or controlled by the officer, which are seized or surrendered, are to be promptly forwarded to the County Prosecutor’s Office in the county where the seizure of weapons took place in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Attorney General’s Guidelines on Police Response Procedures in Domestic Violence Cases and the County Prosecutor’s Procedures for the seizure and transportation of firearms to the Prosecutor’s Office in accordance with the provisions of 2C:25-21d.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4.  The PSL statute permits a court to impose “conditions . . . pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1” – the suspension and probation statute – “[w]hen the court suspends the imposition of a sentence on a defendant who has been convicted of” a PSL-triggering offense.  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(b).  In other words, when a court suspends the custodial sentence for an offense that additionally triggers PSL, and imposes probationary terms as a condition of sentence, then PSL shall nonetheless “commence immediately,” and “the Division of Parole of the State Parole Board” will supervise the defendant’s compliance with those court-imposed probationary terms.  Ibid.; see also N.J.A.C. 10A:71-6.12(k) (“If the sentencing court suspends the imposition of sentence and the offender immediately commences [PSL], the certificate [provided to the parolee with conditions of parole] shall also include, as a special condition, any condition(s) established by the sentencing court. ”).  But the statute does not concomitantly permit a sentencing court to set specific conditions of PSL when the court imposes a term of incarceration instead of probation or a suspended sentence.  [...] was not placed on probation.  He was not given a suspended sentence.  He was sentenced to a custodial term of 180 days with no probation.  The sentencing court had thus “relinquishe[d] jurisdiction” over him after it “pronounced sentence and entered a judgment of conviction. ”  Beauchamp, 262 N.J. Super. at 537.  Had he not been on PSL for an unrelated offense from over a decade ago, the court would have had no mechanism by which to enforce compliance with lifelong, post-release restraints on his freedom.  The court could not lawfully circumvent that restriction on its power by arrogating to itself the power to set conditions that are only within the jurisdiction of the Parole Board.  Because the sentencing court had no jurisdiction to impose parole conditions, this part of [...]’s sentence must be vacated.