ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] In cases not otherwise covered under Section 7.3, unless the presumption of seeking pretrial detention is overcome pursuant to subsection 7.4.6, the prosecutor shall apply for pretrial detention if the present charge is for a first- or second-degree crime and (i) the Failure to Appear (FTA) or New Criminal Activity (NCA) score determined by the automated pretrial risk- assessment process is 5 or 6, or (ii) if the New Criminal Activity (NCA) score is a 4 regardless of the Failure to Appear (FTA) score.  Third- or Fourth-Degree Crimes Involving a Risk Score of 6 or a New Criminal 7.4.2.b Activity Score of 5.  In cases not otherwise covered under Section 7.3, unless the presumption of seeking pretrial detention is overcome pursuant to subsection 7.4.6, the prosecutor shall apply for pretrial detention if the present charge is for a third- or fourth-degree crime and (i) the Failure to Appear (FTA) or New Criminal Activity (NCA) score determined by the automated pretrial risk- assessment process is 6, or (ii) if the New Criminal Activity (NCA) score is a 5 regardless of the Failure to Appear (FTA) score.
[brief] On November 3, 2021, an Atlantic County grand jury returned Indictment No. [...], charging the defendant, [...], with one count of third-degree terroristic threats, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), one count of fourth-degree retaliation for past official action, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:27-5, and one count of fourth-degree stalking, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b).  (Da1-5)¹  On February 16, 2023, another Atlantic County grand jury returned superseding Indictment No. [...], charging [...] with two counts of second-degree terroristic threats, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) (counts 1 and 2);² three counts of fourth-degree harassment, contrary to ¹ Da – defendant’s appendix 1T – April 28, 2023 – motion 2T – May 2, 2023 – trial 3T – May 3, 2023 – trial 4T – May 4, 2023 – trial 5T – July 12, 2023 – motion 6T – July 19, 2023 – sentencing PSR – pre-sentence report ²  The original indictment contained a single count of third-degree terroristic threats, alleging that [...] called [...] three times on August 23, 2021, and left threatening messages.  The superseding indictment split the calls from that date into two separate counts and upgraded both charges to second-degree offenses because they occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic.  The superseding indictment also added three new counts of fourth-degree harassment.  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(e) (counts 3-5); one count of fourth-degree retaliation for past official action, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:27-5 (count 6); and one count of fourth-degree stalking, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b) (count 7).  (Da6-14)  On May 1, 2023, the State dismissed two of the harassment counts (counts 3 and 4).  (Da 15)  [...] was convicted of all charges after a jury trial before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., on May 2-4, 2023.  (4T 82-19 to 85-21)  On July 19, 2023, [...] sentenced [...] to an aggregate 16 years’ imprisonment: two consecutive 8-year terms for each count of terroristic threats (counts 1 and 2), and concurrent 1-year terms for harassment, retaliation, and stalking (counts 5, 6, and 7).  (6T 47-13 to 48-23)  A Notice of Appeal was filed on behalf of the defendant on September 5, 2023.  (Da57-59)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Instead, the trial court roundly rejected Defendant’s argument that the underlying debt is void, holding “the NJCFLA does not confer a private statutory cause of action. ”  (Da58)  Finding that only the Commissioner of the Department of Banking and Insurance has authority to pursue claims for violations of the NJCFLA, citing N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18, the trial court held:  “Defendant cannot secure a judicial determination that the debt is void, because defendant cannot circumvent the lack of a private cause of action under the NJCFLA . . . “  (Da58)  Having found Defendant abandoned his argument regarding R. 4:50-1(a), the trial court held that Defendant could not establish the underlying debt was void and thus could not satisfy R. 4:50-1(d), (e), or (f).  The plain reading of the statute supports the trial court’s analysis.  Nothing in the cases cited by Defendant, largely unreported and therefore not precedential, points to an error by the trial court, even those cases in which a similarly long delay in moving to vacate default was present.  Because Defendant cannot avail himself of the provisions of the statute upon which he has based his argument, his arguments are without basis in fact or law.
[brief] Id. at pp. 14-16.  In short, they contend Plaintiff’s claim accrued decades ago and the applicable 6-year statute of limitations has long since expired.  The Plaintiff does not disagree the claim has a 6-year limitations period, but it disagrees with the --- \(^4\)  The opposition makes the same argument in support of affirming the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty.  The Plaintiff similarly contends that Defendant’s SOL argument is incorrect and that it should be reserved for the trial court to reconsider on remand.  remainder of Defendant’s argument – including the notion that its CFA claim accrued decades ago.  Irrespectively, it would be inappropriate for this Court to decide the issue for the first time on appeal.  Because the trial court determined there was no fraud, it did not address any statute of limitations arguments.  It made no findings as to when Plaintiff’s claims accrued or whether ‘tolling’ was applicable.  Therefore, if the Court reverses the dismissal of Count Two, then the trial court should adjudicate Defendants’ SOL argument to the extent it was raised by their opposition and/or cross-motion for summary judgment.
[brief] ### Cases  **Bd. of Educ. of City of Clifton v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Clifton**, 409 N.J. Super. 389, 434–35 (App. Div. 2009)  ...........................................  7  **Cell South of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of West Windsor Twp.**, 172 N.J. 75, 81-82 (2002)  .................................................................................. 2, 7  **Charlie Brown of Chatham, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment for Chatham Twp.**, 202 N.J. Super. 312, 330 (App. Div. 1985) ................................................................. 2 **Commercial Realty & Res., Corp. v. First Atl. Props. Co.**, 122 N.J. 546, 561 (1991) .................................................................................................................. 12 **Dover v. Bd. of Adjustment of Dover**, 158 N.J. Super. 401, 412-23 (App. Div. 1978) .................................................................................................................. 14 **[...] v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of the Twp. of Weehawken**, Dkt No. [...] (App. Div. Oct. 10, 2024) ........................................ 11 **Feiler v. Ft. Lee Bd. of Adjustment**, 240 N.J. Super. 250, 255 (App. Div. 1990) .................................................................................................................. 14 **Grasso v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights**, 375 N.J. Super. 41 (App. Div. 2004) .................................................................................................................. 9, 11, 12, 13 **Grubbs v. Slothower**, 389 N.J. Super. 377, 388 (App. Div. 2007) ...................... 12 **In re Holy Name Hosp.**, 301 N.J. Super. 282, 295-96 (App. Div. 1997)  ..........  2 **Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment**, 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965)  ...............................  2, 3, 7, 11  **Lang v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment**, 160 N.J. 41, 58–59 (1999)  ......................  2  N. Bergen Action Grp. v. N. Bergen Twp. Planning Bd., 235 N.J. Super. 597, 602 (App. Div. 1989)  .........................................................  12 N.Y. SMSA, L.P. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Weehawken, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 333 (App. Div. 2004)  .......................................................  6, 7 Northeast Towers, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of W. Patterson, 327 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div. 2000)  ...........................................  3  Ocean Cty. Cellular Co. v. Twp. of Lakewood Bd. of Adjustment, 352 N.J. Super. 514, 536-37 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 175 N.J. 75 (2002)  ...............  8  Price v. Strategic Capital Partners, 404 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div. 2008) ..................................................................................  13, 14  Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d(4),(5) ........................................................................................................  13  TABLE OF APPENDIX PAGE NO.
[brief] In *Polzo v. County of Essex*, 209 N.J. 51 . . . (2012), our Supreme Court recognized that courts do “not have the authority or expertise to dictate to public entities the ideal . . . inspection program, particularly given the limited resources available to them. ”  Accordingly, we refuse to apply constructive notice in this case.  Even accepting that the Township had constructive or actual notice, plaintiff would still have to clear the hurdle of showing the Township’s action or inaction was palpably unreasonable, which he has not done.  . . . . . . .  The record in this case convinces us that as a matter of law the Township’s actions pertaining to the tree were not palpably unreasonable.
[brief] In the instant case, [...]’s testimony about the area was far less detailed than the officer’s in Goldsmith.  When asked by the prosecutor about recent arrests in the area, Wizbick simply said that he was aware from the police department’s “records management system” that, prior to November 21, 2022, there had been “several arrests for narcotics related offenses, distribution of narcotics and possession of narcotics in that area”; he himself had made narcotics arrests in that area; and on November 21, 2022, “we were in that area for the open air drug market as well as recent shootings within that area. ”  (1T 8-21 to 10-12)  [...]’s vague testimony did not “support the assertion that [the] neighborhood should be considered as ‘high-crime. ’”  Id. at 405.  Even if the State had presented more detailed evidence about the high-crime nature of the area, [...]’s vague testimony about one of the four men “breaking off” and going in between cars with an unspecified number of unknown pedestrians did not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
[brief] This verdict is an acquittal of all homicide charges because it is a jury finding that [...] “act[ed] in self-defense and ‘kill[ed] in the honest and reasonable belief that the protection of [her] own life require[d] the use of deadly force’” such that she “cannot be convicted of murder, aggravated manslaughter, or manslaughter. ”  State v. Gentry, 439 N.J. Super. 57, 67 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 195 N.J. 165, 172 (2008)) (emphasis added).
[brief] ........................................................................................................ 19, 20 Polzo v. Cty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569 (2007) .................................................. 12, 28 Polzo v. Cty. of Essex, 209 N.J. 51 (2012) .................................................... 27, 32 Ponte v. Overeem, 171 N.J. 46 (2002) .............................................................  25  Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998) ......................................................
[brief] Pa1.  STATEMENT OF FACTS  [...] graduated from the 91st Academy Class of the New Jersey State Police.  Pa56.  [...] retired from the New Jersey State Police on a Service Retirement on or about February 1, 2004.  Pa56.  Pa73.  While employed by the New Jersey State Police, [...] worked in the Missing Persons Unit, and was dispatched to Ground Zero to perform a myriad of functions.  [...] was charged with numerous assignments in conjunction with the World Trade Center attacks, including establishing two command posts within the Missing Persons Unit, including the collection of DNA evidence.  Pa63.  On or about July 8, 2019, “The Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act” was signed into law (hereinafter referred to as the “Ricci Act”).  P.L. 2019, c. 157.
[brief] POINT V PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT CONCERNING THE “THEME” OF HIS CASE IGNORES COMPLETELY THE MOST OFFENSIVE ASPECT THEREOF.  Although set forth in Appellants’ Brief, it bears repeating that “[i]t is the duty of the lawyer not to make any statement in his opening remarks which he knows cannot be admitted into evidence. ”  Paxton v. Misiuk, 54 N.J. Super. 15, 20-21 (App. Div. 1959).  Plaintiff’s counsel breached that duty when he introduced the case to the jury by saying that it had been empaneled because, for more than five years, the Defendants had taken “no steps to make things right. ”  3T.4:19 to 5:4.  Remarkably, although the entire “theme” of Plaintiff’s case was predicated upon that completely inappropriate statement and provides the primary basis for challenging it on this Appeal, it is nowhere addressed in Respondent’s Brief.
[brief] The denial letter was the culmination of more than a year of agency proceedings on [...]’s applications, including extensive correspondence between the parties, but never had the agency charged that [...]’s proposed rates were excessive rates or mentioned the statutory term “excessive. ”  See, e.g., Pa95, Pa101, Pa106, Pa109, Pa112, Pa115, Pa118, Pa120.  Thus, before the ALJ, [...] marshaled evidence to address the denial letter and the concerns raised by the Department during the lengthy proceedings leading up to the denial.  There was no reason to believe that “excessiveness” of [...]’s overall rates was the purported matter at hand.  See also infra § I.B (explaining that even with notice of an excessiveness basis for denial, it would have been unknown what excessive meant in this context).  Thus, the parties instead spent days of evidentiary hearings focused on a subject—[...]’s compliance with the Department’s regulations, including its loss ratio regulations—that the ALJ and Commissioner subsequently deemed irrelevant to the ruling being challenged.
[brief] The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Plaintiff A Level Litigation Playing Field.  (Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86, Pa88, Pa89, 1T).  Judicial review is a fundamental constitutional guardrail against governmental abuses of power.  The Judiciary is a co-equal branch of government with the ultimate judicial review check and balance authority to invalidate and to constrain arbitrary, capricious and unlawful legislative and executive action or inaction.  On April 27, 2023 and July 10, 2023, the trial court abrogated its core guardrail function.  The trial court placed its thumb upon the scales of justice in favor of defendants.  The trial court denied plaintiff equal justice under the law.  Without explanation, the trial court denied plaintiff’s request for oral argument.  The trial court refused to amend the false and misleading on the merits with prejudice preclusive connotation of its four lack of standing dismissal orders.  The trial court’s decisions were based upon plainly incorrect reasoning and reliance upon a faulty and erroneous on its face Newark I lack of standing opinion.  The trial court failed to consider the post commencement ramifications of our State Legislature divesting the tax court of any historical jurisdiction over third party taxpayers’ challenges of other tax exemptions but preserving a third party taxpayers constitutional “as of right” prerogative writ rights.  The trial court failed to examine each claim and cause of action separately.  The trial court failed to consider certain evidence and to reconsider new information.  See, Town of Phillipsburg v. Block, 380 N.J. Super. 159, 175 (App. Div. 2005).  Ultimately, this Appeal involves the integrity of our judicial process and preserving trust and confidence in the judicial process.  Our judicial process and court rules are predicated upon due process and resolution of disputes based on their merits.
[brief] ”  [...] also made a prima facie showing that the State, confronted with large and growing funding shortfalls in [...]’s Adequacy Budgets, failed to engage in reviews of SFRA’s implementation that were “meaningful and relevant” and, based on rigorous analysis, make such adjustments as necessary to effectuate the formula’s optimal operation in the District.  Abbott XXI, 206 N.J. at 376.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT .................................................................................................2  I.  PLAINTIFF INCORRECTLY ARGUES  THIS COURT MUST AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDERS UNLESS IT DETERMINES THERE HAS BEEN A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE SHOCKING THE CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT.................................................................2  II.  PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRESENT OR INTRODUCE EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CITY’S PLACEMENT OF THE SIGN CONSTITUTED A DANGEROUS CONDITION OR THAT THE CITY HAD NOTICE OF SAME........6  III.  PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRESENT OR INTRODUCE EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT THE CITY’S EXERCISE OF DISCRETION IN PLACING THE SIGN CONSTITUTED A DANGEROUS CONDITION........................................................................9  CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................12
[brief] A.  Plaintiffs’ Intent to Purchase and Signature Manifest Mutual Assent  The first of Plaintiffs’ acts, which they have never disputed, is the submission of an offer to purchase Unit 1601.  Upon simultaneous presentation of their offer, Plaintiffs signed a one-page agreement electing to electronically receive the document which was provided in English.  On December 23, 2017, Plaintiffs signed the SPA, with each providing their respective signatures on pages seventeen and eighteen, and initialed on pages ten, thirteen, and seventeen, as well as two out of the three exhibits which were attached to the SPA.  Plaintiffs also wrote their initials at the end of Section 13, the Arbitration Provision, acknowledging their acceptance of the provision.  Not only did Plaintiffs physically sign and initial the SPA, Plaintiffs also tendered actual payment for the Unit.  A check signed by [...] for ten percent (10%) of the purchase price was deposited to [...]’s escrow agent on or about December 23, 2017.  Plaintiffs had also retained Counsel to represent them as the buyers in the transaction, and for the forthcoming attorney review process.
[brief] .................................................................16  Maudsley v. State, 357 N.J. Super. 560 (App. Div. 2003)  ...........................................29  Melcer v. Zuck, 101 N.J. Super. 577 (App. Div. 1968)  .............................................20  Myska v. New Jersey Mftrs. Ins. Co., 440 N.J. Super. 458 (App. Div. 2015)  ..............................................9, 10  Nostrame v. Santiago, 213 N.J. 109 (2013)  ..................................................................27  Noye v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 238 N.J. Super. 430 (App. Div. 1990)  .............................................25  Packard-Bamberger & Co., Inc. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427 (2001)  ..................................................................29  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs.  Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989)  ..................................................................9  Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34 (2016)  ..................................................................30  Ray v. Beneficial Fin. Co. of N. Jersey, 92 N.J. Super. 519 (Ch. Div. 1966)  .............................................22  Sackman Enterprises, Inc. v. 309 Asbury Corp., A-2723-04T2, 2006 WL 1507668 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 2, 2006)  .....25  Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, 348 N.J. Super. 243 (App. Div. 2002)  .............................................9  State ex rel. Com’r of Transp. v. Cherry Hill Mitsubishi, Inc., 439 N.J. Super. 462 (App. Div. 2015)  ............................................28  Sugarman v. Gabriel Bldg. Grp., Inc., No. A-4438-12T1, 2014 WL 3798785 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 4, 2014)  ........................................................................21  Velantzas v. Colgate–Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189 (1988) ..................................................................10  Wade v. Kessler Inst., 172 N.J. 327 (2002)  ...........................................................................................................24  Washington Const. Co. v. Spinella, 8 N.J. 212 (1951)  ..................................................................................................................12  Wasserman’s Inc. v. Twp. of Middletown, 137 N.J. 238 (1994)  .............................................................................................................10, 19, 23 Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J. 236 (2001)  ...............................................................................................................26, 27 Statutes & Other Authorities: Rule 4:6-2(e) ............................................................................................................................4, 9 Rule 4:42-2 ..............................................................................................................................5
[brief] The footage itself bore a timestamp of July 17, 2019 at 6:44a.m., which obviously undermines the State’s claim as to the time and date of the footage.  It is possible, and common, for the proponent of a video to sufficiently explain such a discrepancy by comparing the date and time on the system when the officer goes to retrieve it with the actual time as well as explaining the method of downloading.  For instance, in *Brannon v. Georgia*, the Georgia Supreme Court held that a video was sufficiently authenticated when the officer who retrieved the footage testified about such details:  The record shows that [...] testified that he had been trained in video surveillance and retrieved and captured video recordings as part of his work; that he downloaded videotape from surveillance cameras at the scene of the crime on the day the victim's body was discovered; that he retrieved the video using a system for which he was certified and also trained other officers to use; that at the time he downloaded the video the equipment appeared to be functioning properly except that the date-time stamp was inaccurate; that he was able to determine that the date-time entry on the video was two days, 12 hours, and 45 minutes fast by comparing it with the actual date and time; that he viewed the video on the day he downloaded it; and that the video being offered as evidence was the one he retrieved from the surveillance cameras at the scene of the crime.
[brief] That power rests with the Council.  N.J.S.A. 13:1B-28.  Defendant, [...], is under the immediate supervision of a director, who is appointed by the Council subject to the Governor’s approval, and shall serve at the pleasure of the Council until a successor is appointed and qualified.  N.J.S.A. 13:1B-27.  Defendant, [...], is the Governor of the State of New Jersey.  The Governor approves the members of the Council recommended by the [...] and the Agricultural Convention and has the right to remove the Director of the [...] appointed to that position by the Council.  N.J.S.A. 13:1B-27.  (Pa95)  The defendant, [...], is a private organization that through its authority to recommend [...]’s members has the effective majority control of the Council including the approval of policies and practices of the Council and the adoption of regulations governing hunting and trapping of game animals, as well as controlling decisions of the Director of the Fish and Wildlife which the Council appoints.