ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In Litt, the Court held that “Clearly the Legislature went to great lengths to [e]nsure that all tenants who enjoyed such [protected] status prior to conversion would not have their tenancies. . . altered because of conversion.  [A] pass-through to protected tenants of a tax increase resulting from a conversion would defeat that purpose. ”  *Litt v. Rutherford Rent Bd.*, 196 N.J. Super. 456 466-467 (Law. Div. 1984).
[brief] ” (2T87-88).  The Court found that Defendant was “finding her legs and I’m not sure she was given the space or the support to do so. ”  Id.  The Court also recognized that an annulment was important to Plaintiff but felt that “there is a compulsion or an idea that the defendant be ‘punished’ for ending the marriage. ” (2T86-11).  This is why Plaintiff was adamant that the annulment be based on the grounds of fraud and not some other basis.  Thus, the Court properly found to grant an annulment would result in a miscarriage of justice, especially as the facts were not aligning.
[brief] See Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules (May 15, 2022) (noting that the subcommittee considered an amendment to F.R.E. 702 that would address “the problem of overstating results,” yet rejected such an amendment “because Rule 702(d) already requires that the expert must reliably apply a reliable methodology.  If an expert overstates what can be reliably concluded (such as a forensic expert saying the rate of error is zero) then the expert’s opinion should be excluded under Rule 702(d)”)(emphasis added); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[S]ome latent fingerprint examiners insist that there is no error rate associated with their activities.  . . .  This would be out-of-place under Rule 702. ”).  Testifying that a discipline has a zero error rate is misleading and prejudicial.
[brief] See Red Roof Franchising, LLC v. Patel, 877 F.Supp. 2d 124, 130 (D.N.J. 2012) (citing Instructional Sys., 130 N.J. at 345); see also Dunkin’ Donuts Franchised Restaurants LLC v. Strategic Venture Group, Inc., 2010 WL 4687838, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 10, 2010) (noting that parties agreed that because the franchisee were located in New Jersey, they benefited from the protections of the NJFPA, even though the parties contracted for Massachusetts law to govern disputes concerning or arising out of the Franchise Agreement).6  The Supreme Court has expressly stated that “parties to a franchise agreement cannot void the franchise law of the state in which the franchisee is --- 6  As noted above, the MBPA expressly states that courts should give “proper consideration” to any “relevant precedents provided under the [NJFPA]” when there is a controversy between brewers and wholesalers.  N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.15(e). located by providing in their agreement that the laws of another state will govern. ”  Instructional Sys., 130 N.J. at 344 (citation omitted).  The same applies to other important regulatory statutes in this state.  See Prescription Counter v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 2007 WL 3511301 (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2007) (“The importance of the consumer protection policy manifested by the [New Jersey Consumer Protection Act] has led the courts to apply New Jersey law, even though other choice of law rules pointed elsewhere. ”); Turner v. Aldens, Inc., 179 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 1981) (choice-of-law provision in retail sales contract was unenforceable as against public policy since the Legislature intended to offer state consumers the protection of New Jersey’s Retail Installment Sales Act).
[brief] Finally, the Arbitrator’s new work rule is contrary to and inconsistent with the CBA’s grant to [...] of the right to make rules deemed appropriate for the purpose of maintaining safety; the right to manage its employees; and the right to determine their qualifications and conditions for continued employment.  Thus, the new work rule not only exceeds the four corners of the CBA, it directly contradicts the CBA’s express terms.\footnote{[...] further violated the plain language of the CBA by requiring that [...] reimburse [...] for the arbitration costs.  The CBA provides that “the cost of the arbitrator shall be borne equally by [...] and the Authority and all other expenses incurred by either side, including the presentation and witness, will be borne by the party incurring same. ”  (Pa49)  Even in this most basic aspect of the CBA, the Arbitrator took it upon himself to invent a new procedure to which the parties never agreed.}  See PBA Local 160, 272 N.J. Super. at 477 (holding that arbitrator exceeded his statutory authority and the authority conferred on him by the parties’ agreement because his final award contradicted the express terms of the parties’ agreement).  The trial court’s decision therefore should be overturned, and the Arbitrator’s award vacated.
[brief] (1T30:12-19).  With regard to whether snow removal agreements should be referenced at trial, it is important to note that the basis for Plaintiff’s opposition was grounded in significant conflicting deposition testimony provided by [...].  Plaintiff argued that the snow removal agreements were important because there was an agreement between the property owner and the contractor, in which it stated that it is not allowed to subcontract out.  (1T39:15-19).  Plaintiff has always believed this case was a system failure between all three defendants in which safety was not put at the forefront.  (1T39:19-21).  All of the Defendants’ responsibilities, the scope of the work that was supposed to be done, how much work was supposed to be done, how it was supposed, and when it was supposed to be done is all outlined in the agreements between the Defendants.
[brief] R. 4:46-2(c)  A court should grant summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to judgment or order as a matter of law.  *Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America*, 142 NJ 520, 529 (1995).  Summary judgment will not be appropriate if the dispute is about a material fact, is genuine and could result in a jury after hearing the evidence returning with a verdict for the non-moving party.  *Anderson et al v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., et al.*, 477 US 242 (1986).  The question is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement that would then require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.  *Id.* at 247-252.  The movant has the burden to exclude any reasonable doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.  Moore’s Federal Practice, par. 56-15(3), cited in *Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co.*, 17 NJ 67, 74(1954).  The conclusion that there are no material issues in dispute cannot be arrived at because the opposing evidence is incredible, as credibility is an issue for the trier of fact to decide.  *Id.* at 75.  The standard in viewing a motion for summary judgment is expressed by the term making a prima facie case or defense and the movant is entitled to judgment if based on the full record, the adverse party, who is entitled to have the facts and inferences viewed most favorably has failed to demonstrate the existence of a dispute which would result in a decision favoring the non-movant.  *Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey*, p. 1486 (2022).  In making a determination on a motion for summary judgment, where the record is meager, the Court should refrain from a grant of summary judgment.  Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital, 53 N.J. 138 (1969).  A trial court should not grant a summary judgment motion when the matter is not yet ripe and especially in those cases where discovery has not been completed.  Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189 (1988).  See also, Salomon v. Eli Lilly & Co., 98 N.J. 58 (1984); Driscoll Const. Co. v. State, 371 N.J. Super. 304, 317, 318 (App. Div. 2004).  The Court has ruled that in cases where discovery on material issues is not yet complete, the respondent must be given the chance to take discovery before the motion is disposed of.  Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J. 236, 253-254 (2001).  The Court also noted that where matters have been disclosed in a recent deposition, the motion for summary judgment should be adjourned to allow the party opposing the motion for summary judgment time to further explore the matters.  Lenches-Marrero v. Averna & Gardner, 326 N.J. Super. 382, 387-388 (App. Div. 1999).  In the instant matter, there are material issues in dispute.
[directive] Audit Standards  In addition the minimum requirements for CPA audits set forth above, the to all auditor shall comply with the requirements outlined the following in authoritative resources, as required by N.J.S.A. 4OA:5-1 et sea.  (Enclosure 4) and N. J.A.C. (Enclosure 5), incorporated herein by reference, in 5:30-6.1 conducting the annual audit appropriate and applicable: as Generally Accepted Auditing Standards promulgated by the American as 1.
[brief] The Appellate Division reversed and remanded the ruling of the trial court, finding that [...] did not have a statutory right to recovery of Med Pay benefits.  Like Warnig, the court relied on the language of Ingersoll, supra, in noting that Med Pay benefits are not statutory in nature but are instead benefits paid out pursuant to regulations instituted by the Commissioner of Insurance and are not recoverable by a carrier.  Further, the Collateral Source Rule, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97, which prohibits recovery in personal injury actions of amounts "plaintiff receives or is entitled to receive ... for the injuries allegedly incurred from any other source other than a joint tortfeasor," has been interpreted by Perreira v. Rediger, 169 N.J. 399 (2001) to prohibit subrogation claims to recover medical bills which are covered by insurance (except where 39:6A specifically allows recovery).  Thus, subrogation recovery of Med Pay benefits is prohibited, and insurance regulations permitting subrogation and lien clauses for Med Pay are invalid as they are violate N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97.  See further the discussion of N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 below and the unreported Appellate Division case of Walsh v. Starr Transit, 2008 WL 199740 (N.J. Super. A.D.), indicating that N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 applies to Med Pay and prohibits recovery of Med Pay.
[brief] Nor does the fortuitous existence of [...]’s [...] and [...] policies relieve [...] of its obligation to have provided [...] with “specific and clear” notice of cancellation.  Those policies, issued prior to [...]’s CCIP coverage are intended to be mutually exclusive to the [...] policies, and not to replace [...]’s coverage.  Indeed, many policies without wrap-up exclusions nevertheless exclude injuries to employees of other contractors.  *American Wrecking Corp. v. Burlington Ins. Co.*, 400 N.J.Super. 276 (App.Div.2008) (upholding “cross-liability” exclusion).  If anything, the complexity and asserted fluidity of CCIP policies exacerbates the potential that contractors will be “left bare,” and that claimants will be “left without a source of recovery” (Zb42), if a CCIP insurer such as [...] is relieved of its obligations.
[brief] (Id. at page 17 of Opinion.)  The Court also acknowledged that plaintiffs have pled their cause of action against the [...] defendants numerous times in the 2015 matter.  Specifically: Plaintiffs have already had at least three bites at the apple taking into account the motions for reconsideration, to reinstate the Complaint, and to amend the Complaint.  Again, these efforts run afoul of the purposes of the Entire Controversy Doctrine, which are "to eliminate delay, prevent harassment of a party and unnecessary clogging of the judicial system, avoid wasting the time and effort of the parties and promote fundamental fairness. ”  For the foregoing reasons, the Entire Controversy Doctrine and res judicata bars these claims.
[directive] 5.  d. 범죄가1993  2 1 이후, 1995 3 13  발생했고, [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  년 월 일 년 월 일 이전에 귀하가 처하거나, 경우, 보호관찰에 또는 주 교도시설에서 복역하라는 선고를 받은 벌금을 $1.00 지불 또는 분납지불을 할 때마다 최대 까지의 업무처리비를 지불해야 하는 아십니까? 1995 년3 월13 처하거나, 것을 범죄가 일 이후에 발생했고  보호관찰에  또는 보호관찰부에  벌금을 지불해야 하는 별도의 선고를 받았을 경우에는 벌금을 $2.00  지불 또는 분납지불을 할 때마다  최대 까지의  업무처리비를 지불 해야 하는 있습니까?  것을 알고 d.  If the offense occurred on or after February 1, 1993 but was before March 13, 1995, and you are being sentenced to probation or a State correctional facility, you must pay a transaction fee of up to $1.00 for each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made?
[brief] Following the denial of the Application, the Respondents filed a lawsuit in Superior Court, seeking relief in the form of prerogative writs and related Mt. Laurel compliance claims, as well and other civil rights, discrimination and defamation claims.  The prerogative writs and related Mt. Laurel compliance claims were bifurcated from the remaining claims by October 25, 2019 Order of the Trial Court.  M822-825.  A trial was held on the prerogative writs and related Mt. Laurel compliance claims on July 15, 2020.  2T.  On October 15, 2020, the Trial Court issued an Order (the “2020 Order”) and Opinion (the “2020 Opinion”) which reversed the denial by the Board of the Respondents’ Application; approved the Respondents’ Application; appointed a Special Hearing Officer (“SHO”) to conduct a hearing on remand of Respondents' application for preliminary and final site plan approval; and established procedures and requirements for the conducting of the hearing of the Respondents application for preliminary and final site plan approval by the SHO.  M1-64.  Additionally, an Order was entered on October 14, 2020 designating the Hon. [...] to Appoint a SHO, as well as a Memorandum of Honorable [...], P.J.Cv. dated October 14, 2020 granting permission to appoint a SHO.  M65-66.  On November 4, 2020, the Township, Mayor and Board filed motions for leave to appeal to the Appellate Division; which were denied on December 24, 2020.  M514-517.  On June 16, 2021 and September 14, 2021, the Trial Court entered Orders which, in part, modified its Order of October 15, 2020 concerning the hearing to be conducted by the SHO.  M462-476.  The September 14, 2021 Order, in part, established a framework for the SHO to consider a request by the Respondents for relief from the requirement of the LDO that Route 33 Signal be supplied.  M474-476.  On March 24, 2022 and March 25, 2022, a hearing was conducted during normal business hours at the Middlesex County Court House by the SHO on the Respondents’ application for preliminary and final site plan approval.
[brief] On appeals of orders dismissing a complaint under R. 4:6-2(e), the Appellate Division applies a *de novo* standard.  *See Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC v. Cnty. of Bergen*, 450 N.J. Super. 286, 290 (App. Div. 2017) (*quoting Teamsters Loc. 97 v. State*, 434 N.J. Super. 393, 413 (App. Div. 2014)).  Under that standard, the Appellate Division does not owe any deference to the motion judge’s conclusions.  *Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone*, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div. 2011).  Instead, the appellate “inquiry is limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the place of the complaint. ”  *Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.*, 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (*citing Rieder v. Dep't of Transp.*, 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987)).  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**
[brief] It was the devasting effect of COVID-19 upon its citizenry, while Defendant was rehabilitating distressed properties in [...], and [...], [...], and suffered a destructive fire in January, 2021, at the Hackensack residence of [...], the sole member of Defendant [...], owner of the Premises.  As, any owner may exercise the right of redemption, at any time prior to entry of judgment.  At each level of our courts, decisions are issued that grant redemption after a final judgment.  Though the Plaintiff and [...], castigate the Defendant, in its failure to pay taxes, “abusing the law to its advantage.  . . by intentionally not paying its taxes . . . “ while intentionally failing to recognize that, the avoidance of taxes or periodic inability to pay, does not disqualify the right to redeem at any time prior to a final judgment and under certain circumstances after its entry, [...], if a bona fide purchaser for value, characterizes itself as the biggest loser as a consequence of the order that vacated the Plaintiff’s final judgment.
[brief] THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND PROVIDED ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE WAIVER OF A JURY TRIAL  Contractual provisions must be "sufficiently clear to place a consumer on notice that he or she is waiving a constitutional or statutory right."  Atalese, 219 N.J. at 443.  As applicable to arbitration provisions, the Atalese Court emphasized that "[t]he point is to assure that the parties know that in electing arbitration as the exclusive remedy, they are waiving their time-honored right to sue."
[brief] THE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES (17T:228-23 to 235-9)  In State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 104 (1986), the Court adopted the following criteria to be followed when sentencing for multiple offenses at the same time: (1) there can be no free crimes … (2) the reasons for imposing either a consecutive or concurrent sentence should be separately stated in the sentencing decision; (3) ….the sentencing court should [consider]… whether or not (a)the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other; (b) the crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence; (c) the crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in time to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior; [and] (e) the convictions for which the sentences are to be imposed are numerous; (4) there can be no double counting of aggravating factors; (5) successive terms for the same offense should not ordinarily be equal to the punishment for the first offense; and (6) there should be an overall limit on the cumulation of consecutive sentences for multiple offenses not to exceed the sum of the longest terms (including an extended term if eligible) that could be imposed for the two most serious offenses.
[directive] That released. be not defendant the that is recommendation program's services risk-assessment pretrial objective of the results on the based is program services pretrial the by research. empirical on based turn, is in which, AOC, the by approved process order.  detention pretrial for a basis legal the 24 should Directive this in established detention pretrial seeking from refrain or seek when to on presumptions  The 2A:162- N.J.S.A. see Law, Reform Bail under the release pretrial of presumption statutory the with confused not be charged defendant is a when Reform Law Bail the under established detention of presumption statutory or the 17, 2A:162-19(b).
[brief] See 1T15-11.  Additionally, [...], Respondents’ Architect testified that: what [Applicants] have done is we’ve got a plan where the two buildings are the very entry of the site, and this is what I say the entry is a boulevard entry which creates a signalized intersection across from Renaissance, which is a benefit to the people across the street to allow the ability to get east on – I’m sorry, west on Route 33.  See 1T60-21 to 1T61-3.  Finally, [...], P.P., the Respondents’ Professional Planner, opined that the Route 33 Signal was an element of the Respondents’ ability to satisfy the proofs necessary for the use variance; stating:  With the traffic improvements that are being made, most notably the [Route 33 Signal] and the ability to go move within this development to Applegarth Road, it advances purpose (h) which is to encourage the free flow of traffic.  See 1T117-10 to 1T117-14.  However, most telling, [...], the very representative of Respondents who was present at the 2019 NJDOT Meeting, testified that:
[brief] (Dta756,760.)  [...] responded to [...]’ counterclaim on July 26, 2019.  (Dta764.)  [...] answered [...]’ crossclaim on August 7, 2019.  (Dta768.)  [...] filed its responsive pleading on October 4, 2019.  (Dta776.)  Following extensive discovery, pursuant to case management order (Dta794), all parties simultaneously submitted motions for summary judgment on February 10, 2023, and oppositions to summary judgment motions on March 10, 2023 (except for [...], which filed its opposition to plaintiffs’ motion on March 9, 2023).
[brief] While the jury always heard testimony that [...] and [...] would be armed, the jury instruction to the jurors that they had to find that “[...] and [...] committed the crime of robbery” created a substantial probability a reasonable juror may thought they could not find defendant guilty of robbery even if the evidence established a lesser included existed.  It is further asserted that the trial court failed to incorporate the facts of the case to the jury instructions on accomplice liability, which would have explained the possible difference in intents between the principle and accomplice concerning robbing the victim.  State v. Tucker, 280 N.J. Super. 149, 153, 654 A. 2d 1014 (App. Div. 1995) (reversing defendant's conviction for robbery where the trial court failed to give the jury instructions which incorporated the facts of the case in which explained the possible difference in the intent between the principle and the accomplice concerning robbing the victim.)
[brief] (Pa9).  The Board issued its Final Administrative Decision on September 27, 2023.  (Pa9).  The Board concluded that the Ricci Act, codified in part at N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(3), allows members to file for the recalculation of Ordinary Disability, Special, or Service Retirement Benefits to Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits if the member is or becomes totally and permanently disabled due to participation in the rescue, recovery, or cleanup operations at the World Trade Center between September 11, and October 11, 2001.
[brief] (4T104:1-21; Pa252).  In his deposition, however, [...] stated that he had been wearing his name tag on his chest area, clipped to the collar of a different shirt than what was shown in the photos.  (8T173:11-175:19).  [...] testified that “you’re not allowed to just wear a tee-shirt just like that.  It’s unprofessional and disrespectful to the customers as well. ” (8T174:4-14).  However, [...] assistant store manager, [...], who also was on duty that day, testified that [...] was in fact wearing his name tag at the bottom of his t-shirt. and that he was wearing the t-shirt shown in the photos on the date in question, and that he did not see [...] wearing any shirt other than the shirt shown in the photos.
[brief] The Court heard live testimony from the Respondent, [...] and the Appellant, [...].  The Court also heard testimony from [...].  Esq.  Mr. Polychronis is an Associate who works at the law firm retained by the Appellant.  The Court also reviewed numerous exhibits presented by the parties.  [19a. 24a. 35a. 37a, 112a, 116a, 118a, 64a, 85a, 88a, 90a, 96a, 100a, 104a, 105a, 123a, 132a, 141a, 146a, 155a, 196a, 199a, 212a]  At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court determined there was insufficient evidence presented by the Appellants that a legitimate arbitration agreement existed.