ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As previously stated in Defendant’s brief, a trial court’s decision to charge a lesser-included offense to the jury is governed by N.J. Stat. 2C:1-8(e).  Precedent mandates that when neither party requests a jury charge of a lesser-included offense, the court should do so sua sponte only when there is “obvious record support” for such a charge.  State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 81 (2016) (quoting State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 319 (1980)).  In the event that both counsel object to the court’s offer to charge a lesser-included offense, the court is only required to charge the jury with the lesser-included offense if the support for such “jump[s] off the page. ”  Id (quoting State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 42 (2006)).  In other words, the need for such a charge must be “clearly indicated” from the record.  State v. Alexander, 233 N.J. 132, 142 (2018) (additional citations omitted).  The New Jersey Supreme Court applied this standard to a parallel set of facts in *State v. Fowler*.  *State v. Fowler*, 239 N.J. 171 (2019).
[brief] (Ja410–16)  This Court reviews a trial court’s grant of a summary judgment de novo and must “consider whether the competent evidential materials presented” establish “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and that “the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  Alloco v. Ocean Beach & Bay Club, 456 N.J. Super. 124, 133–34 (App. Div. 2018).  In *Tyler*, the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously held that taking a home worth more than its tax debt, without compensation for the excess value, violates the Constitution.  598 U.S. at 639.  Minnesota’s statutes authorized the confiscation of [...]’s Minneapolis property to collect $15,000 in taxes, penalties, interest, and fees.  *Id.* at 635–36.  [...] sold it for $40,000 and, consistent with state law, kept it all—a $25,000 windfall.  But the Supreme Court held that this violated the Takings Clause.  *Id.* at 638.  The government “had the power to sell Tyler’s home to recover the unpaid property taxes.  But it could not use the toehold of the tax debt to confiscate more property than was due. ”  *Id.* at 639.  Taking more was unconstitutional.  In *Roberto*, this Court held that *Tyler* applies to foreclosures conducted under the New Jersey Tax Sale Law (TSL).  *Roberto*, 477 N.J. Super. at 362 (“The TSL has permitted foreclosure of a property owner’s equity and is thus a prohibited taking under *Tyler*.”).  As to retroactivity, it recognized “[w]hen the United States Supreme Court ‘applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review. ’”  *Id.* (quoting *Harper*, 509 U.S. at 97); see also *id.* at 23 (the “retroactive pipeline application of the holding in *Tyler* to the TSL is mandated because the Court constitutionally recognized a property owner’s interest in surplus equity. ”).  The *Tyler* Court unquestionably applied its ruling to the parties before it.  *Tyler*, 598 U.S. at 647–48.  Federal law therefore mandates that the same ruling apply to all pending takings cases.  But *Roberto* was not a takings case; it was an appeal from the vacatur of a foreclosure judgment.
[brief] “Accord and satisfaction” did not nullify my claims (raised below: 1T23)  The fourth error was the trial court’s finding that the doctrine of “accord and satisfaction” would have nullified my claims, even if the court had been otherwise persuaded to rule in my favor.  I testified to the fact that I had cashed the check “under protest” (i.e. with preservation of rights).  (1T23:15)  And [...] did not testify that the check was marked as “payment in full” (nor any words like that).  And although not testified to at trial, I will attest herein that there was no such language (e.g. “payment in full”) written anywhere on that check.  This Court has already addressed the exact same scenario over 25 years ago in *Zeller v. Markson Rosenthal & Co.*, 299 NJ Super. 461 (App. Div. 1997), where this Court reversed the trial court’s finding that accord and satisfaction precluded plaintiff’s claim.
[directive] The prioritization to respond and make to which by means efficient an provide to system reporting of Office the to request prioritization a make shall prosecutor the event, that In requests. Office. that by established system the of means by Section this to pursuant Science Forensic submit to means available all use shall request prioritization of a receipt upon agency  An on thereon report submit a and test/examination requested a complete and/or report requested a requested a submit to feasible not If is it request. prosecutor's the in specified date the before or the by specified the date by thereon report submit a atest/examination and complete or report the notify request the receiving of days business within five shall agency prosecutor, the with the comply to feasible not why is it reasons the explain shall writing and in prosecutor the which on date possible earliest the indicate shall also agency  The request. prosecutor's completed will be test/examination requested the which on or submitted will be report requested prosecutor. the to submitted thereon report and procedure operating standard any preempt and supersede to deemed be shall Section This that Jersey of New State of the laws the of authority the under operating agency an protocol of or or test a conducting or report preparing a given to be to priority determine the would otherwise been they had which in order the by tests prioritize to practice general a (e.g., examination to authorized Justice Criminal of Division of the (Director 10.4 Section also See submitted). disputes resolve officer to enforcement chief law State's as authority General's Attorney exercise reports). required of completion timely order and 72 Page Requests.
[brief] BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IN SUPPORT OF THE APPEAL  On the brief and of counsel: [...] (020042000)  [...]  [...]  [...]  Phone: [...]  Counsel for Plaintiffs  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS – REPLY BRIEF | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF CONTENTS - BRIEF | i | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS | ii | | TABLE OF TRANSCRIPT
[brief] 27  Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)  ...........................................  14  Hartsfield v. Fantini, 149 N.J. 611, 615–16, (1997).......................  45  Gras v. Assocs. First Cap. Corp., 786 A.2d 886 (N.J. App. Div. 2001), certif. denied, 794 A.2d 184 (N.J. 2002).................................................................  31  In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 244 N.J. 1, 17 (2020) ..........  14 Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Utility Co., 212 N.J. 576 (2013) .................................................................................. 43,44 Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick, LLC, 143 A.3d 254, 261 (N.J. 2016)......................................................................................  16  Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Open MRI of Morris & Essex, L.P. 356 N.J.Super. 567 (Law Div. 2002).................................  34  Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S.Ct. 1201(2012)..  34  Motorworld, Inc. v. Benkendorf, 228 N.J. 311, 329 (2017)  ...........  14  Mt. Hope Dev. Assocs. v. Mt. Hope Waterpower Project, L.P., 154 N.J. 141(1998)  .................................................................  25  Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Fiouris, 928 A.2d 154 (N.J. App. Div. 2007), certif. denied, 934 A.2d 640 (N.J. 2007).....  23,30  N.J. Coalition of Healthcare Providers v. NJDOBI, 348 N.J. Super. 242 (App. Div. 2002)  .................................................................  7,9 39,41 N.J. Auto Full Ins. v. Jallah, 256 N.J. Super. 134 (1992)  .................. 10 Ragone v. Atl. Video at Manhattan Ctr., 595 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2010) ......................................................... 20,34 Roig v. Kelsey, 135 N.J. 500, 516 (1994) ........................................... 16 Ross v. Am. Express Co., 547 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 2008) ............. 21,34 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) ............................ 34 State Farm Mut. Auto v. Molino, 289 N.J. Super. 406 (1996) ......... 16 State v. Camey, 239 N.J. 282, 306 (2019) ...................................... 14 State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 416 (2004) ..................................... 15 State v. K.W., 214 N.J. 499, 507 (2013) ...................................... 15 State v. Nantambu, 221 N.J. 390, 404 (2015) ............................... 15 State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 576 (2015) ..................................... 15 Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016)
[directive] such cases the acquittee is released with no conditions pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b )(1 ).  In accordance with State v. Ortiz, 193 N.J. 278 (2008), the court no longer has or jurisdiction and there are no further hearings review under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8.  Attorney Name ----------- NJ Attorney ID Number Address  Telephone Number of Attorney for State New Jersey/Defendant of In the Matter of Superior Court  New Jersey Law Division - Criminal Part Select County - County - --------  Indictment Number: NG RI  Docket Number: Criminal Action ofNGRI Order  Mandating Release  Acquittee of Having Found that the defendant is not guilty by reason insanity and is not so dangerous to of self, others, or property as a result mental illness as to require institutionalization or a supervised residence and/or release upon conditions, __ It of Ordered is on the day - 20 _ that:
[brief] As noted above, the District requires teachers to adhere to strict pacing guidelines.  (Ra136; Ra267).  Because of this, teachers are not always able to “meet[] the individual needs of students with IEPs” which “create[s] barriers to individualized learning for students. ” (Ra267).  The District does not have programming for emotional regulation impairment, visual impairment, or intellectual disabilities in its schools.  (Ra129; Ra238; Ra264).  Thus, [...] has effectively abdicated any responsibility in ensuring student identifications and placements are accurate, to the detriment of both the affected students’ education and its own growing expenses.
[brief] **THE LACK OF A RESOLUTION OR RATIFYING ACT IS NOT RELEVANT TO PLAINTIFF’S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM (Pa385)**  Defendant argues that no Resolution was ever adopted by the governing body for the [...], and moreover, one officer of a municipality cannot bind eth public entity to a contract.  In this regard the trial court relied upon N.J.S.A. 40A:4-57 which provides:  No officer, board, body or commission shall, during any fiscal year, expend any money (except to pay notes, bonds or interest thereon), incur any liability, or enter into any contract which by its terms involves the expenditure of money for any purpose for which no --- \(^1\) Plaintiff did submit an estimate for the pool from “[...]. ”  Plaintiff has advised counsel that [...] recently died. appropriation is provided, or in excess of the amount appropriated for such purpose.  Any contract made in violation hereof shall be null and void, and no moneys shall be paid thereon.  In the present matter the Plaintiff should not be penalized that the Township did not comply with the process for creating a binding contract.  The Plaintiff relied upon promises that were made to her by the Mayor at the time and was damaged as a result of the Township’s failure to abide by representations that it made.  Defendant should not be allowed to benefit from its failure to create a binding contract as a result of a procedural defect that is of no fault of Plaintiff.
[brief] | | | THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS ENFORCEABLE | | | AND REQUIRES THE ARBITRATION OF ALL CLAIMS | 11 | | POINT III.  | | | [...] DID NOT CONDUCT DISCOVERY IN THE LAW | | | DIVISION AND DID NOT WAIVE ARBITRATION | 15 | | POINT IV. | | | THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ENFORCED THE | | | ARBITRATION CLAUSE AND NO HEARING WAS REQUIRED | 18 | | POINT V. | | | THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS CLEAR AND | | | UNAMBIGUOUS AND PROVIDED ADEQUATE NOTICE | | | OF THE WAIVER OF A JURY TRIAL | 22 | | POINT VI.
[brief] This case centered on a Project Transfer Agreement (“PTA”) between [...] and [...], pursuant to which [...]’s retiring principals sold their New Jersey general construction management business to [...], a Buffalo-based construction entity looking to expand into New Jersey.  Da39.  Rather than [...] paying “any upfront payment at all for [[...]’s] long-standing and successful construction business,” the PTA created an earn-out process in which [...] would take over [...]’s already-ongoing contracts (the “Backlog Projects”).  Da134 (the Award).  Also, over the following 36 months, [...] would receive a percentage of the profits on new projects generated from [...]’s legacy clients and business relationships (the “Pipeline Projects”).  Da134.  If [...] successfully obtained a construction contract on any Pipeline Project, “the PTA contemplated that an ‘Estimated Gross Profit’ (‘EGP’) would be established for ---  1  For the convenience of the Court, this brief combines the recitation of facts procedural history, as those matters are intertwined.  2  [...] generally cites to the Award in this section for the more appropriate factual recitation (i.e., the factual record as developed before the Arbitrator).  each project and the EGP would be split between [...] (65%) and ARC (35%).”  Da134.  An “estimated gross profit” did not equate to—and is inherently distinguishable from—an “actual” profit.  See Da134.  The PTA contemplated a process whereby over the three-year period from May 2019 to May 2022, rather than [...] paying the purchase price for [...] up front: (i) [...] and [...] would estimate a project’s profits at the very outset of the project; (ii) [...] would pay [...] 65% of that EGP during the course of the project in quarterly installments, no matter what happened on the actual project or with respect to actual profits; and (iii) [...] would then either keep the remaining profits or shoulder the losses (if any).  Da134.  Despite [...] constructing a multitude of projects transferred to it under the PTA, [...] nonetheless withheld $5,209,900.68 from [...], which represented [...]’s total “share of EGP” across thirteen (13) separate projects.  See Da136.
[brief] A long established cannon of statutory interpretation is that courts “must presume that every word in a statute has meaning and is not mere surplusage. ”  Cast. Art Indus., LLC v. KPMG LLP, 209 N.J. 208, 222 (2012) (quotation omitted).  Second, subsection (b) also makes clear that “pending charge” as used in subsections (a)(5) and (a)(7) refers to charges other than those on which defendant seeks admission to Track One.
[brief] IT WAS NOT REASONABLE FOR THE ARBITRATOR TO REFUSE TO COMBINE THE THREE UNITS INTO ONE UNIFIED CONTRACT ........................................................................... 14 POINT VI THE COMMISSION’S FAILURE TO ISSUE THE SIX APPENDICES WITH THE INTEREST ARBITRATION AWARD CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR .................................. 14 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 15 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Atlantic City, 2013 NJ PERC LEXIS 38, 39 NJPER ¶ 161 (May 13, 2013)..... 9 Borough of New Milford, 2012 NJ PERC LEXIS 18, 38 NJPER 340 (¶ 116 2012)......................................................................................................................... 9 Hillsdale PBA Local 207 v. Borough of Hillsdale, 137 N.J. 71 (1994) .......... 5 In re City of Camden, 429 N.J. Super. 309 (App. Div. 2013), certif. denied 2015 N.J. 485 (2013) ................................................................................................. 4 In re State, 443 N.J. Super. 380 (App. Div. 2016) ........................................... 5 In the Matter of Brian Ambroise, 258 N.J. 180 (2024) ....................................... 4, 5 Statutes N.J.S.A. 34:13A-14 ..........................................................................................
[brief] For instance, respecting the lost PTI application, he fails to allege any facts that would evince a discriminatory animus (e.g., a derogatory statement concerning his disabilities made by the assistant prosecutor or the unnamed court employee who allegedly lost the PTI application).  [...]’s encountering delays and lost paperwork during his criminal prosecution does not mean the criminal justice system discriminated against him because of his disabilities.  What he is suggesting is akin to a person with a disability getting rear-ended and suing under the NJLAD, claiming the accident was purposeful because of his disability.  Without any basis to support such a claim, he could not sue the tortfeasor for discrimination.  The same is true here.
[directive] The police department must provide for the proper and timely disposition of property and evidence.  This is necessary to maintain the property storage facility and property records in an orderly fashion.  Failure to promptly purge property leads to overloading limited storage space, continues the department's liability longer than necessary and makes auditing procedures more difficult and time consuming.  Seized property may be disposed of by forfeiture or by returning it to the owner.  Forfeited property may be disposed of by destruction or by public sale or auction.  Found property may be disposed of by returning it to the owner, returning it to the finder, by destruction or by public sale or auction.  These dispositions are controlled by state statute, state retention regulations, Attorney General and county prosecutor's guidelines, and police department policy.  Each police department must have a written policy on the disposition of property consistent with the above sources.  Police departments should contact their municipal attorney, the county prosecutor's office or the Division of Criminal Justice Police Bureau with any questions concerning property disposition.
[brief] The State has maintained throughout this litigation that the State Guidance does not itself bind school districts, and the State has repeatedly explained that parental notice could be appropriate in a range of circumstances, including when a student does not seek confidentiality from their parents, and if there are any compelling, nondiscriminatory reasons— --- 11  The transcript of the WNYC radio interview and oral argument transcript from that other case were the subject of a motion to supplement the trial record made by Appellants on October 13, 2023.  This court took judicial notice of the oral argument transcript, but deferred a decision on the radio interview transcript.  The State responds here to Appellants’ arguments based on the radio interview transcript, but maintains the arguments it made in its Opposition to Appellants’ motion to supplement the trial record. like a student’s health or safety—to disclose the information anyway.
[brief] Denial of motion to suppress .................................................................Da  3-9  INDEX TO APPENDIX  Somerset County Indictment [...]................................................Da  1  Somerset County Indictment [...]................................................Da  2  Order and opinion denying motion to suppress ........................................Da  3-9  Plea Forms ........................................................................................Da 10-15  Judgment of Conviction, [...] ......................................................Da 16-18  Judgment of Conviction, [...] ......................................................Da 19-22  Notice of Appeal ................................................................................Da 23-27 ###
[brief] *State v. Jones*, 364 N.J. Super. 376, 384 (App. Div. 2003).  One such example of misconduct occurs when the State seeks to argue to a jury that a defendant has a greater propensity for committing crimes because of his drug use.  *State v. Mazowski*, 337 N.J. Super. 275, 287-88 (App. Div. 2001).  In *Mazowksi*, the State elicited substantial evidence of the defendant’s drug addiction in a robbery case and argued in summation that his addiction contributed to the commission robbery.  *Id.* at 280-81.  This Court ruled that the admission of the addiction evidence and arguments by the State were improper.  *Id.* at 287-88.  Specifically, this Court noted that, “It is difficult to conceive of anything more prejudicial to a defendant than presenting him to the jury as a drug addict--a description which one court termed ‘catastrophic. ’”  *Id.* at 287 (quoting *People v. Cardenas*, 184 Cal. Rptr. 165, 647 P.2d 569, 574 (Cal. 1982)).  Likewise, this Court noted that the State’s arguments as to the addiction’s relation to the underlying crime were “premised on the State's a priori assumption that all drug addicts need money,” and not founded on any actual evidence presented in the case.  *Ibid.*  Here, the State devoted a significant amount of its summation to the forbidden theme that [...]’s marijuana and Adderall use made him the kind of person who would commit the kind of offenses alleged.
[brief] Indictment (1/30/2018)  ................................................................................................................................. (Da1 - Da4)  Order of Venue (1/30/2018)  ......................................................................................................................... (Da5)  Decision/Order Denying Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence (1/14/2020)  .............................................. (Da6 - Da29)  Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration (5/8/2020)  ............................................................................. (Da30)  Order on Miranda (4/5/2021)  ....................................................................................................................... (Da31)  Order Denying Reconsideration of Miranda Motion (12/10/2021)
[brief] United Hearts, L.L.C. v. Zahabian, 407 N.J. Super. 379, 390 (App. Div. 2009); Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021).  Accordingly, a trial court’s discretionary order should be overturned if the order “was not premised upon consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear error in judgment. ”  Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).  Because a fee-shifting request acts as an exception to the American Rule, “whereby litigants are expected to bear their own counsel fees,” our courts “have approached fee-shifting requests under the Frivolous Litigation Statute and Rule 1:4-8 restrictively. ”  Bove v. AkPharma Inc., 460 N.J. Super. 123, 147 (App. Div. 2019).  Sanctions are to be awarded only in “exceptional cases. ”  Id. at 151 (citation omitted).  Accordingly, a complaint is frivolous only “when no rational argument can be advanced in its support, or it is not supported by any credible evidence, or it is completely untenable. ”  *Id.* at 148.  Further, sanctions are inappropriate “[w]hen the [non-prevailing party’s] conduct bespeaks an honest attempt to press a perceived, though ill-founded and perhaps misguided, claim. ”  *Id.* at 151 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted).  Indeed, “[w]here the pleading party had an objectively reasonable and good faith belief in the merits of the claim, attorney’s fees will not be awarded. ”  *Id.* at 152.  Importantly, “a grant of a motion for summary judgment . . . , without more, does not support a finding that the [non-prevailing party] filed or pursued the claim in bad faith. ”  *Id.* (alteration in original) (citation omitted).  Further, “[t]he burden of proving that the non-prevailing party acted in bad faith’ is on the party who seeks fees and costs. ”  *Id.* at 151.  A. The Sanctions Orders Should Be Reversed Because They Were “Based upon Consideration of Irrelevant or Inappropriate Factors and Amount to a Clear Error in Judgment”