ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Appellant’s arguments involve either findings of fact by the trial judge that came after the introduction of evidence and testimony of witnesses during the trial at issue, or determinations of legal conclusions based on said facts.  Appellate courts apply an extraordinarily deferential standard in reviewing factual findings and legal conclusions by a trial judge.  See Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020).  In an appeal from a non-jury trial, appellate courts “give deference to the trial court that heard the witnesses, sifted the competing evidence, and made reasoned conclusions. ”  Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015).  In fact, reviewing courts “must accept the factual findings of a trial court that are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71, 88 (2016).  “Reviewing appellate courts should ‘not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge’ unless convinced that those findings and conclusions were ‘so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ’”  *Griepenburg*, 220 N.J. at 254 (quoting *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am.*, 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).  In other words, “the general rule is that findings by a trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence. ”  *Gnall v. Gnall*, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015).  And “limiting the role of a reviewing court is necessary because permitting appellate courts to substitute their factual findings for equally plausible trial court findings is likely to undermine the legitimacy of the [trial] courts in the eyes of litigants. ”  *State v. McNeil-Thomas*, 238 N.J. 256, 272 (2019).  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**
[brief] **[...] is Prescribed Pain Medication**  An acquaintance of [...]’s recommended a pain management specialist, [...].  (T4 98:12-104:8).  [...] is Ivy League educated and received positive reviews from other patients.  (T5 106:2-20).  [...] traveled approximately one (1) hour and fifteen (15) minutes to [...]’s office in [...] because he was a highly rated pain management doctor.  (T5 106:2-107:21).  [...] was not attempting to conceal his use of pain medication by travelling to [...].  (T5 107:22-24).  Prior to initially prescribing pain medication, [...] examined [...] and reviewed his medical records relating to the motor vehicle accident in 2014.  (T5 145:11-146:10).  In addition to prescribing pain medication (oxycodone) for [...]’s neck and back issues, [...] also administered steroid injections to address [...]’s injuries once a month for almost two (2) years.  (T5 146:11-147:3).  [...] always took the prescribed medication as directed.  (T4 104:9-19).  The City’s witnesses, [...] and [...], confirmed that there was nothing illegal or improper relating to [...] having been prescribed medication for pain.  (T1 164:8-14; T2 52:3-6).
[brief] The Court Erred in Failing to Later Reconsider its “Final Judgment” Against [...].  Notwithstanding [...]’s explanation regarding how these issues of both fact and law precluded entry of summary judgment on [...]’s claims against [...], the trial court, on [...]’s motion for reconsideration, refused to vacate its prior order entering “final judgment” against [...].  (See 1T).  The trial court explained its reasoning for finding [...] 100% liable: “DEP and [Field Directive] did not identify Plaintiff [[...]] as a responsible party but named [...] as the responsible party,” such that “[i]t is clear in this case that [...] is the responsible party . . . and is the cause of the spill and any further discovery would not change the fact that [...] is the responsible party and is responsible. ”  (1T13 - 11 to 17).  The trial court reasoning is flawed: (1) it assumes that a Field Directive by the [...] on the day of the incident, identifying [...] as a “responsible party,” established [...]’s liability as a matter of law to the exclusion of all others; and (2) it assumes that [...], and only [...], is a “responsible party” liable for the spill.
[brief] Defendant’s pro se petition was filed under R. 3:22-2 on August 15, 2022.  Therein defendant argued that plea counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel on the grounds that: 1) counsel misled defendant to understand that although he was pleading guilty to two separate charges, under the agreement “both Indictments would count as one single conviction” (Da 27); and 2) counsel was ineffective by allowing defendant to plead guilty to an offense “I did not commit” and that defendant’s “plea allocution” did not support “the elements…for the offense….”
[brief] A hearing was held before [...] on November 16, 2020 (Aa11; IT1-IT48).  At the hearing, Petitioner testified that as of the incident date of September 22, 2017, he had been a full-time firefighter with the [...] for approximately seven years (Aa12; IT11:13-21; IT12:14-16).  He was required to undergo training to become a firefighter, and he confirmed that his job duties were as stated in the Job Description for a Firefighter (Aa12; Aa32-Aa36; IT12:3-25; IT13:1-6).  He testified that he had responded to many fire calls in his seven-year career (Aa12; IT11:25; IT12:1-13).  On September 22, 2017, Petitioner along with Captain in Charge [...] and another firefighter responded to a call regarding an electrical fire in a basement in a home in Short Hills (Aa12; IT13:7-25; IT14:1, 22-24; IT16:18-20).  Upon arriving at the scene, they put on their equipment and oxygen tanks, totaling “eighty-five pounds” of equipment, over their uniforms (Aa12; IT16:18-24).  Petitioner testified that he “stretched” the fire hose from the fire truck to the house (Aa12; IT17:8-18; IT18:20-25; IT19:1-3; IT27:21-25; IT28:1-4).  Captain Reyes and the other firefighter entered the house and went to the basement with the fire hose (Aa12; IT19:4-6).  Petitioner was stationed at the fire truck to “work the pump” (Aa12-Aa13; IT19:6-10).  When Captain Reyes realized that a bookcase was blocking the entrance into the basement, he told Petitioner to get the one-hundred-foot hose (“long hose”) from the fire truck and bring it to the basement (Aa12-Aa13; IT17:1-7; IT18:14-19; IT19:14-25).  Petitioner testified that as he was carrying the long hose from the truck up the driveway, which was on an upward incline, he twisted his ankle and fell (Aa13; IT20:4-6; IT22:1-17; IT23:1-4).  Petitioner stood up, brought the long hose to the firefighters in the basement, and returned to the fire truck (Aa13; IT23:7-14).  Another fire truck arrived at the scene (Aa13; IT:24:1-6).  Petitioner and his crew were called to a fire in Maplewood, but the call was cancelled before they arrived (Aa13; IT:24:6-16; IT42:3-6).  Petitioner claimed that he was diagnosed with a “navicular fracture” of his left ankle, and that he received Workers Compensation for one year (Aa13; IT25:12-19; IT40:5-15).  When Petitioner was questioned regarding the Intake Information and --- 4 Respectfully, while [...]’s decision states that Petitioner testified that “he fell down to the left, and twisted his ankle in the process” (Aa13), in point of fact, Petitioner testified that he first twisted his ankle and then fell down (IT20:4-6; IT22:1-17; IT23:1-4).
[brief] The NDA at Issue Expired Before Any of the Conduct Alleged, and the Landlord Was Terminating this Lease Regardless of any Offer From Respondents.  The language of the NDA is clear.  It states that the NDA’s term extends only one year from the date of the last services performed:  “Term.  The term of this Agreement shall be during services performed and one year from the date of the last services performed. ” (Pa002645 - Pa002646).
[brief] A.  Summary Judgment  Standard Rule 4:46-2(c) compels summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment ... as a matter of law. ”  After reviewing the evidence presented “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 540, 523 (1995), courts must determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. ”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).  “An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact. ”  R. 4:46-2(c).  “[F]acts which are immaterial or of an insubstantial nature, a mere scintilla, fanciful, frivolous, gauzy or merely suspicious,” do not raise a genuine issue of material fact.  Brill, 142 N.J. at 529 (quoting Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  [...] and [...] are entitled to a grant of summary judgment because all of their defenses are established as a matter of law and don’t depend on any disputed facts.
[brief] This Appeal, however, is a procedural “dumpster fire. ”  Ministerial defaults were entered and then vacated against all defendants—fiduciaries of a public trust.  Defendants replaced their original counsel—the municipal attorney—with attorneys appointed by its JIF  Insurer.  Twice the trial court denied defendants’ pre-amended answer frivolous and vexatious Rule 4:6-2 (e) motions to dismiss with prejudice on the pleadings.  Plaintiff prevailed in this hybrid action.  Plaintiff effected change.  After the first motion to dismiss denial, defendants restored plaintiff’s right to be heard on all posted agenda action items prior to consideration and official action.  On the eve of the second pre-amended answer motion to dismiss, defendants filed a false and misleading certification alleging that the contested capital bond ordinance had been rescinded by a resolution.  Despite the belated filing of an amended answer asserting 116 denials and 23 affirmative defenses, the trial court denied plaintiff a level litigation playing field.  At the request of defendants, the trial court stayed any pre-summary judgment expedited and limited discovery and permitted defendants not to respond to all of plaintiff’s counterstatement of material facts.  But the Rule of Law still applies in our democracy.  The governed still have the right to challenge authority.  Accordingly, this Appeal presents the following repetitive substantive issues of public importance: (1) whether discretionary municipal legislative action is subject to or immune from judicial review; (2) whether defendants suppressed plaintiff’s political free speech and right to petition; (3) whether a municipality can repeal or amend a municipal capital bond ordinance by resolution; (4) whether [...] required and paid “prevailing wages” in connection with its discretionary Flex Parking Removal Capital Bond Project; (5) whether defendant [...] had a disqualifying Flex Parking Removal conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety due to the location of her downtown business within the confined flex parking removal area; (6) whether the filing of a complaint within a statutory 20 days estoppel period stayed the effective date of a municipal capital bond ordinance; and (7) whether residents are entitled to an accounting as to how certain completed Flex Parking Removal and 911 Memorial Capital Bond Projects were ultimately funded without capital bond proceeds.
[brief] Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs matters related to Special Masters.  The Court must decide de novo all objections to findings of fact, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties and approved by the Court.  Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(f)(3).  Similarly, the Court must decide de novo all objections to conclusions of law.  Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(f)(4).  The Court may set aside a master's ruling on procedural matters only for an abuse of discretion, unless otherwise stated in the appointment order.  Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(f)(5).
[brief] *Id.* at *27*.  This case has nothing to do with whether a planning board may require contributions to off-tract improvements or the MLUL’s provisions which govern a planning board’s ability to impose such obligations.  Significantly, the court in SB Bldg. Assocs. did not even cite N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f), let alone substantively address a municipality’s ability to negotiate and collect funds from a redeveloper.  The SB Bldg. Assocs. case is simply inapplicable to this case.
[brief] The Appellate Division reviews a trial court’s conclusions of law, including its interpretations of insurance agreements, de novo.  *Kieffer v. Best Buy*, 205 N.J. 213, 222 (2011); see also *Simonetti v. Selective Ins. Co.*, 372 N.J. Super. 421, 428 (App. Div. 2004) (“As a threshold matter, the interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law which we decide independent of the trial court’s conclusions. ”)  A trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 4:46-2 is also reviewed de novo.  *Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy*, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021); *Christian Mission John 3:16 v. 63 Passaic City*, 243 N.J. 175, 184 (2020); *Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh*, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016).  The Appellate Court applies the same standard as the trial court, i.e., it weighs “whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  See Rozenblit v. Lyles, 245 N.J. 105, 121 (2021); Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 450, 472 (2020); Shields v. Ramslee Motors, 240 N.J. 479, 487 (2020); Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 479 (2016).  At the summary judgment stage, the trial court is not permitted to make credibility determinations, as such determinations are reserved for trial.  Brill, 142 N.J. at 536; see also Judson v. Peoples Bank & Tr. Co., 17 N.J. 67, 76 (1954) (“[I]n any case where the subjective elements of willfulness, intent or good faith of the moving party are material to the claim or defense of the opposing party, a conclusion from papers alone that palpably there exists no genuine issue of material fact will ordinarily be very difficult to sustain. ”)  A trial court’s findings of fact are afforded deference only when they are “supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71, 88 (2016) (quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J.  412, 424 (2014)).  See also Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020); State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 271 (2019).  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] [...] ultimately contended, and that trial court should have decided, that the contract for sale was violative of numerous of the FRFPA’s statutory provisions, and therefore the Court could not enforce such a contract for sale since a Court absolutely cannot properly enforce an unlawful contract.  Simply put, this is a legal argument made on summary judgment relying upon a judicial principle that in no way needs to be founded upon a statutory cause of action.  Against this backdrop, the FRFPA sets forth the requirements for transactions involving an attempted acquisition of real estate that is considered a “distressed property. ”  In other words, the FRFPA becomes operative where the property owner is in a financially distressed situation.  The FRFPA defines the types of properties and individuals associated with foreclosure rescue schemes, and the terms “distressed property,” a “distressed property purchaser,” and “foreclosure consultant” are critically relevant to this discussion and analysis.
[brief] [...]'s discussion of abuse of process, post, at 494-495, does not undermine this principle.  It is true that favorable termination of prior proceedings is not an element of that cause of action—but neither is an impugning of those proceedings one of its consequences.  The gravamen of that tort is not the wrongfulness of the prosecution, but some extortionate perversion of lawfully initiated process to illegitimate ends.  See, e. g., Donohoe Const. Co. v. Mount Vernon Associates, 235 Va. 531, 539-540, 369 S. E. 2d 857, 862 (1988); see also 8 S. Speiser, C. Krause, & A. Gans, American Law of Torts §§ 28:32-28:34 (1991).
[brief] (30T203-8 to 15, 231-17 to 22)  Defendant handed the gun to [...]; [...] put the gun in a Nike watchman hat and then threw the hat into the trunk of his car in the parking lot.  At 9:36 p.m., [...] and Defendant returned to the [...]; [...] identified himself and Defendant in a still of a Ramada surveillance video with that time stamp.  (29T206-15 to 208-15)  Cell site location data from [...]’s personal phone and trap phone was generally consistent with [...]’s testimony about where he was at each point during the evening of March 5.  (36T49-4 to 91-9)  [...] testified that Defendant was in possession of his trap phone from around 7:30 p.m. onward, but [...]’s word was the sole evidence regarding who possessed his trap phone.  (30T231-23 to 232-9)  Location data from Defendant’s phone placed him at the [...] before 7:30 and after 9:15 p.m., showed the phone moving south from the [...] at 7:33 p.m., but it had no location data from 7:33 p.m. until 9:15 p.m.  (36T75-24 to 76-23, 81-15 to 82-13, 90-5 to 17)  A radiofrequency expert opined that the absence of location data on Defendant’s phone from 7:33 to 9:15 p.m. could indicate the phone was off, on airplane mode, or on Wi-Fi.  (36T77-6 to 81-14)  On March 8, [...] picked up Defendant in Ewing and they went to New York to go shopping.
[brief] ”  Ibid. (quoting In re Herrmann, 192 N.J.  19, 27-28 (2007)).  We “afford substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing. ”  Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007) (citing R & R Mktg., LLC v. Brown-Forman Corp., 158 N.J. 170, 175 (1999) (additional citations omitted)).
[brief] A.  Summary of Proceedings.  Plaintiff filed this action in 2007, and was, for the most part, denied relief following a 2008 trial.  Both Plaintiff and Defendants appealed, and the case ultimately made it to the Supreme Court for the first time in 2012, which resulted in [...]’s claims being reinstated and a remand to address what relief he should be afforded.  *Sipko v. Koger, Inc.*, 214 N.J. 364 (2013).  Plaintiff’s underlying fee application that is the subject of this appeal did not seek an award for any of the fees incurred from 2007 to 2016 prior to the entry of an August 19, 2016 judgment in his favor.  (Da6).  On remand from the Supreme Court, the trial court awarded Plaintiff an approximately $18 million buyout of his ownership interest in two family --- 2  The procedural and factual histories are closely interrelated and are thus combined for clarity and to avoid repetition.
[brief] Precertification is as it sounds.  It allows insurers to pre-certify “certain treatments, diagnostic tests, or other services . . . provided that the requirement for precertification shall not be unreasonable. ”  *Id.* at 1093 (quoting N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1(a)).  Precertification thus emerged as a program “by which the medical necessity of certain diagnostic tests, medical treatments and procedures are subject prior to authorization.
[brief] The Primary Purpose of Plaintiff’s Injunction Claim Is To Benefit Herself and Other Current and Former [...] Members  As set forth in the arbitration agreement, “public injunctive relief” is relief “that has the primary purpose and effect of prohibiting alleged unlawful acts that threaten future injury to the general public. ”  Ja37 (emphasis added); see also Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. at 132, 236 A.3d at 998 (“[i]n accordance with the FAA, courts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts…and enforce them according to their terms”) (citations omitted).
[brief] Clip twelve was taken from a residence on [...].  (4T168-8 to 10).  The police obtained the footage from that location on August 15, 2019, after receiving all other footage tracking the "vehicle of interest," apart from the turnpike footage.  (4T185-4 to 10; 4T186-10 to 13).  When clip twelve was played, [...] explained that in this clip, police could see "defendant and [...]."  (4T168-14 to 18).  But the jury had already heard that [...] identified herself and defendant from a still image extracted from this footage.  (3T96-22 to 98-1; Da23).  Clip thirteen was taken from the same location and showed an individual walking back from where [...] and defendant had gone.  This clip was played without narration.  (4T168-19 to 24; Da11:S-13).
[brief] [...] relies on Cardinale v. Bd. Trs., Police & Firemen Ret. Sys., 458 N.J. Super. 260 (App. Div. 2019).  Cardinale, like [...], involves a claimant that was attempting to get disability from the PFRS for reasons other than the allegations raised in the administrative charge that was pending.  *Cardinale* was a drug addict police officer that signed an irrevocable termination agreement to avoid administrative charges and permanently forfeited his right to be a police officer.  Cardinale also testified that he was no longer disabled and is able to return to work.  Our Agreement is wholly different.  Our Agreement is revocable and discusses resurrection of administrative charges should [...] return to the PPD to fight the case.  [...], unlike *Cardinale*, is permanently disabled now for over five (5) years making him ineligible to return to police work as a matter of law.  Given the foregoing, it is clear that the court decisions in *[...]* and *Cardinale* are completely factually dissimilar from our case.
[brief] See Regis, 208 N.J. at 449 (“[w]hen construing a statute, ‘legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. ’”) (citation omitted).  [...] further urges this court to permit him to file his untimely Form because he claims he did not actually receive the notice.  (Pb13).  But even if actual notice by postcard were an express requirement under the Ricci Act, this argument is misplaced.  New Jersey courts have consistently “recognized a presumption that mail properly addressed, stamped, and posted was received by the party to whom it was addressed. ”  SSI Medical Servs. v. HHS, Div. of Medical Assistance & Health Servs., 146 N.J. 614, 621 (1996).  Here, the postcard was undisputedly mailed to [...]’s home address.  (Pa14).  The Division went so far as to hire a company, [...], to mail postcards to all 200,647 SPRS retirees at their home addresses on file with the Division.  (Pa66-68).  And a postcard was indeed mailed to [...]’s last home address on August 9, 2019.  (Pa14; Pa68).  Nonetheless, [...] asserts, without offering any legal authority, that his affidavit declaring that he never received a postcard should overcome the presumption that he received it.