ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Ja5, ¶23; Ja98–118).  No notice relating to the action was ever sent to [...]’s residential mailing address.  (Ja182, No. 5).  The City instead sent notices to the Property itself, which were returned as undeliverable.  (Ja6, ¶¶25–27; Ja31–32).  On February 13, 2018, the Superior Court issued an Order for Final Judgment barring [...]’s right to redeem the Property.  (Ja44–62).  No notice of this judgment was mailed to [...]’s residential address.  (Ja7, ¶34; Ja34–39).  Upon first receiving actual notice of the foreclosure, a relative of [...] went directly and immediately to [...] to offer to pay the outstanding taxes.
[brief] The FDA’s recall was for “product quality” reasons – because the agency determined the problem was “not a safety concern” (Da0250; Da0252).  That was because the problem involved release of a tiny silicone particle, and it occurred --- \(^2\)  No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part and no entity or person, aside from *amici curiae*, their members, and their counsel, made any monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. in only one of every 45 units tested (2.2%) (Da0229; Da0237; Da0240).  The Ozurdex® treatment at issue occurred on November 6, 2018 – after the defendant had notified the FDA of the issue, but before the agency authorized the recall (Da0087).  Plaintiff had previously used Ozurdex® without incident several times (Da0087), because she suffered from several serious eye problems that independently could lead to blindness (Da0045; Da0047 pp. 13, 60).
[brief] Here, the trial court initially failed to properly apply the undisputed facts to the law in adjudicating State Respondents’ motion for summary judgment as to [...]’s claims.  Specifically, the trial court failed to apply the correct legal standard for determining whether [...] was an employee of [...]. (2T, at T83:20-T84:21).  On reconsideration, the trial court corrected this mistake, applied the correct legal standard, and granted State Respondents’ motion for summary judgment on [...]’s claims.  (3T88:5-90:25).  Contrary to [...]’s argument, the fact that the trial court initially denied State Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to her claims is of no moment since the correct standard on their motion was the “interest of justice. ”  See Ab47-50.  Indeed, the trial court acknowledged this during oral argument on reconsideration when challenged on this point by Appellant’s counsel, “[e]xcept that I may have made a mistake. ” (3T24:20-21, T29:17-18).  Here, the “interest of justice” warranted reconsideration of the trial court’s initial decision because it had made a mistake, and the subsequent granting of State Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissal of [...]’s NJLAD claims was proper for the reasons provided in Points I and II above.  Consequently, the trial court’s decision granting State Respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration should be affirmed.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] Notification of an offender’s change of custody shall be facilitated through NJ VINE to the victim or victim’s family within twenty-four hours of the release when the offender is charged with homicide, vehicular homicide, sex offenses, robbery, carjacking, aggravated assault, arson, domestic violence offenses, kidnapping, child abuse or stalking.  Notification to the victim of the release of an offender charged with other offenses shall be made within forty-eight hours after release from custody (See IV. Notification Procedures).
[directive] Name I  Probation Officer Date Reviewed A/ Track B  Phase 2 Requirements - Review each requirement with staff and sign you understand the expectations.  ------- ---------------- on • I will attend court time at: . •  I will continue to participate in revising and following my treatment plan and begin establishing ________________ my relapse prevention plan at: .  Phone Number: ____ of •  I will follow the conditions probation supervision and meet with my probation _________________ Phone officer on time.  Probation officer: __________ of my Number: .  I will immediately notify probation officer any of my conflicts prior to appointment or in case an emergency.  • I will review my case plan with my probation officer as needed.  • I will allow probation officers into my residence for home visits and home inspections.  ______ •  I will submit to random drug testing.  Testing hotline number: _ ______ )  (ID#: if my • I will maintain housing and keep my probation officer informed residence changes.  • I will address any recommended medical/ dental needs.  • I will demonstrate changing/addressing people, places, and things.  (For example, I will start new sober friends and I will start going to places where there is no alcohol or drugs.)  making • I will begin attending recovery groups, as recommended by treatment.  on my • I will develop and follow a financial plan as indicated case plan.  I have reviewed the requirements for Phase 2 and understand my responsibilities to the drug court program.
[brief] New Jersey courts appreciate that “[c]riminal trials are emotionally charged proceedings” and the “prosecutor is not expected to conduct himself in a manner appropriate to a lecture hall. ”  State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525, 559 (1995); see also, State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 333-34 (2005) (“Trials, particularly criminal trials, are not tidy things.  The proper and rational standard is not perfection; as devised and administered by imperfect humans, no trial can ever be entirely free of even the smallest defect. ”).  Defendant cites State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 448 (1988), as an example of when a prosecutor commits prejudicial error by unnecessarily discussing the “victim’s character and future plans. ”  In Williams, a capital murder case where the defendant was sentenced to death, the prosecutor spoke at length about the homicide victim’s life, occupational pursuits, and plans for her upcoming marriage.  The prosecutor called the victim “Bright, beautiful, educated, religious, a member of her church choir. ”  The prosecutor also lambasted the defendant for “brutally, savagely, permanently . . . destroy[ing] all the goodness and humanity that was [...]. ”  Ibid.
[directive] Identified underrepresentation may be addressed by some or all of the below-listed actions, as well as others, which should be detailed in the Program goals.  The means of addressing underrepresentation shall not include quotas or any other legally impermissible provisions.  1.  Using recruitment methods that target underrepresented demographic groups, especially local recruitment efforts.  This approach may include outreach to law  3  We recognize, however, that achieving a truly diverse workforce involves numerous other considerations in addition to the race, ethnicity, and gender categories specified in the Act.  For example, LGBTQ+ Law Enforcement Liaisons operating throughout the state perform valuable engagement with members of that community.  Finally, the Act referred to “minorities,” but these Guidelines will refer to “people of color” when referring to racial and ethnic diversity.
[brief] Instead, the [...] proceeded with an appeal on the papers.  (AA0001-8; AA0122)  Even on appeal, the Respondent [...] did not formally request Appellant’s name be removed from the Eligibility List.  (AA0223-232; AA0109-141)  Respondent [...] submitted the Certification of Undersheriff [...] on appeal below before the [...].  (AA0118-141)  Undersheriff Harris claimed that the [...] considered experience, disciplinary history and work performance of the candidates eligible for promotion under Certification No. PL221601.  (AA0118)  Undersheriff Harris claimed a Major Disciplinary Action in the form of a 45-day suspension for an incident which occurred in 2012 was a factor in bypassing Appellant’s name on the Certification, in favor of [...], a non-veteran.  (AA0119)  Significantly, Undersheriff Harris did not refer to any other disciplinary action in his Certification, other than the eleven (11) year old suspension.  (AA0118-120)  More significantly, Appellant was promoted from Sheriff’s Officer to Sheriff’s Sergeant by the Respondent [...] on January 2, 2018, five (5) years after --- 6 [...] decision (AA0001-0008) to remove Appellant from promotion list based on alleged notice to Appellant in MSCO April 19, 2023, Opposition Brief. the suspension.
[brief] This deed did not contain a description of the Strip.  Plaintiff’s expert explained that this deed did not put the public on notice that the Strip was not part of Lot 4, but instead, put the public on notice that [...] had not conveyed the Strip to Graco.  1T66:12-17.  Focusing on the same 1971 deed, which had been marked as Exhibit J-23 at trial, Defendant’s expert agreed with the Plaintiff’s explanation of that deed:  Q.  Thank you, [...].  It was suggested by Plaintiff’s expert yesterday that the J-23 might have excluded the strip from [...], but didn’t necessarily recognize the transfer to the owner of Lot 3.  In reading these dimensions, can you address that point?  A.  Well, as you phrased it to me, I think I agree with the – with the Plaintiff’s expert.  The fact that – that the strip is excluded from this description does not in and of itself mean that the strip no longer was owned by [...].  Q.  Does the – does the deed recognize or imply anything about the dimensions of Lot 3?  Because I’m – I’m most interested in the – I guess the end of the second or third course where it mentions the – Lot 3, the – the—  A.  Well, the – the end of the third course in J-23 is the same point that exists in the earlier deeds in the chain of both Lot 3 and Lot 4.  It is only when the –when you are at that point, at the end of course three, it is only then that J-23 then defines courses that exclude the strip.  Q. Okay.  A.  So, it would be – and if the strip is -- when the strip is excluded from Lot 4, since it’s so narrow, it’s zero at one end and ten feet at the other, and I think at its widest point it’s only sixteen or something like that, and it’s I don’t know 400 feet long, 450 feet long.  The – logical inference is that the strip that now has been not conveyed would most likely be part of Lot 3 because it couldn’t be alone.  Or the other possibility is that that [...] had some reason to convey it to itself, so its subsidiary or its parent, I forget which way it ran, but has some reason to convey to itself Lot 4 without the strip.  Q. Okay.  The next deed that we’ve seen in this case in the chain of title for Lot 4 is the document we’re calling J-24.
[brief] APPELLANT’S DECISION TO ENGAGE THE BOARD  ATTORNEY WAS LEGITIMATE BOARD ACTION AND FELL WITHIN HIS AUTHORITY AS BOARD PRESIDENT; THEREFORE, THE [...]’S DECISION WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND CONTRARY TO LAW.  (Sg162-163;164-183;192-201).  The [...]’s Final Decision adopted the ALJ’s curious decision to recognize, but not resolve a conundrum as to the authority of the board president in determining Appellant violated the Code of Ethics.  Specifically, the limits of (i) when a board president may request legal services from the board’s attorney, and (ii) the nature of the legal services to be performed.  Under the [...]’s private action/board action analysis, a board member’s action cannot be both be board action and private, thus if the board member’s action is found to be board action it cannot be private action and vice versa.  See Marc Soveleove v. Paul Breda, C49-05 (September 26, 2006); see also [...] Advisory Opinion A03-07.
[brief] Over and over, they urged him to help himself, stating, “They trying to help you.  So help yourself”; “They trying to help you but you ain’t willing to help yourself”; “I wanna help you.  Like, that’s 100 percent man to man, no cop sh*t...  I wanna help you.  We all wanna help you”; “this is probably a situation where it’s better for you to get out in front of it”; “If we don’t get out in front of this now, [...], it’s gonna hurt you worse later on”; and “You gotta tell your story before it’s just too late. ” (1T 93-6 to 94-3, 99-16 to 17, 100-5 to 6, 101-1 to 4)
[brief] This Memorandum of Law is submitted in Support of Appellants [...], [...] and [...], (hereinafter referred to collectively as “[...]” or Appellants) seeking a reversal of the judgment after trial which improperly awarded only partial restitution of unjust enrichment and failed to fully impose a constructive trust.  A confidential relationship was found to exist, and therefore the burden of proof must be shifted to the Defendants for them to have proven by clear and convincing evidence that [...] deserves to keep the benefits of the transaction of the home purchases.  We believe that because these dealings have no written evidence, and were conducted within a confidential relationship, that [...] and [...] are the rightful owners.  The Court entered a Final Judgment on August 4, 2023, augmented by oral rulings from the Judge on September 14, 2023, as well as a Summary Judgment Decision on July 22, 2022 parts of which we now take Appeal.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 20:3-6.  For example, [...] has not issued a RFEI to qualified redevelopers for the redevelopment of the Property, has not authorized or conducted an appraisal to determine its fair market value, has not adopted an ordinance to authorized acquisition, has not made any good faith offer to commence negotiations to acquire the Property, and has not filed a condemnation complaint.  Accordingly, the evidence cannot support that Plaintiff faces imminent harm.
[brief] Matters should have been resolved w/Settlement w/o disputes, since [...], [...], & I agreed on 3 final goals: 1) [...]’s discharge as Co-Trustee after 2) issuing Final Accounting for review/acceptance by [...] & me, & 3)w/o any liabilities for him (122a, last par. to 123a, 1st 2 lines) (405a-406a, par. 4).  [...] & [...] would not agree to Settlement w/informal Accounting, per 4:87-3, for our review, w/o exceptions, prior to his discharge, instead of his formal Accounting, per 4:87-3, w/Exceptions for Court approval/denial.  It led to needless [...]/[...] filings.  [...], since Nov. ‘21, & I, since Jan. ‘22, had many attempts, w/o success, w/[...] & [...] to resolve matters w/3-Way Settlement w/o Surrogate Audit & Court approving Accounting, & adequately addressing [...]’s liability concerns.
[brief] | | | In re Actavis Holdco U.S., Inc., | 22 | | 2019 WL 8437021 (3d Cir. Dec. 6, 2019)  | | In re Ford Motor Co., 345 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2003) ......................................................... 28, 29  In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., 165 N.J. 75 (2000) ........................................................................... 14, 15
[directive] Crime prevention information includes pamphlets concerning home security and personal safety and shall be displayed in an information rack or similar device and placed where victims and witnesses will see them and take them, such as victim-witness waiting/reception areas or courthouses.  1.  Referral to crime prevention services such as Operation ID, lock repair and home security surveys will be offered routinely to all victims of property offenses.  A resource file of providers of these services and crime prevention officers shall be maintained by the County Victim-Witness Coordinator.  D.  Victims will be provided with employer, school and creditor intercession services which shall include verbal or written notification of required court appearance where applicable, as well as advocacy on behalf of the victim in minimizing losses associated with their victimization.  1.  The Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy will maintain an employer notification form which will be completed and supplied to the victim/witness or mailed to the employer upon request.  Verbal notification to the employer may also be made when appropriate.  E.  County Victim-Witness Coordinators shall maintain a current comprehensive resource directory of all available service agencies in their jurisdiction.
[brief] 14  See R. 1:36-3 (“No unpublished opinion shall constitute precedent or be binding upon any court.  Except for appellate opinions not approved for publication that have been reported in New Jersey Tax Court Reports or an authorized administrative law reporter, and except to the extent required by res judicata, collateral estoppel, the single controversy doctrine or any other similar principle of law, no unpublished opinion shall be cited by any court.
[brief] The fundamental idea in this ballistic examination is that the “tool surface” of different parts of the gun, such as the interior of the barrel or the firing mechanism, leave marks on the softer metal that a bullet or its casing is made particular scientific technique; and (4) general acceptance in the scientific community).  The ultimate question that must be answered under both standards is whether the proponent has demonstrated the reliability of the scientific testimony it is seeking to admit.  Id. at *21-22, 30-31. out of.  *Ibid.*  In a case such as this one, where the examiner must determine whether certain pieces of ammunition (bullets and their casings found at the murder site and retrieved at the autopsy) came from a specific gun (the “suspect” gun, found at [...]), examiners test fire the gun into a water tank to generate test bullets and cartridges.
[directive] Dodatkowy formularz oświadczenia w odpowiedzi na zarzuty w sprawach objętych Ustawą o zakazie zwolnień przedterminowych (N.J.S.A. (NERA) 2C:43-7.2)  No Early Release Act (N.J.S.A. Supplemental Plea Form for (NERA) Cases 2C:43-7.2) (Polish)
[brief] (6T23-2 to 4)  She identified fifty videos that, in her opinion, depicted either the black Chevy Malibu with Vermont plates, or the suspected shooter, all of which were published to the jury.  (4T156-22 to 184-25)  She marked the location of each surveillance camera on a large poster-board map (Da14) and outlined the route that she believed the shooter took, based upon her observation of the videos.
[brief] [(3T20-13 to 21-12) (emphasis added). ]  Given the quantity of drugs recovered from defendant’s apartment, the sentencing judge properly rejected defendant’s argument that mitigating factors (1) and (2) should apply.  This case is distinguishable from Cullen, where this Court held that mitigating factor (1) and (2) applied to the defendant’s sentence because he only possessed one baggie containing .33 grams of cocaine.  351 N.J. Super at 511.  Unlike Cullen, where the defendant had a single baggie of cocaine, here the trial court properly found that defendant was engaged in a “large-scale operation” of drug distribution.  (3T20-22 to 23).  The search of defendant’s apartment yielded “1,163/520 grams MDMA/Ecstasy tablets, 23.49 cocaine, 2.92 grams cocaine, 25.47 grams of Ketamine, 370 milligrams LSD, 120 tablets/15.36 grams A[l]prazolam”.  (Da18).  The sentencing court correctly determined that because of the scale of defendant’s drug distribution operation; and, because this was not defendant’s “first go around” with the criminal justice system, it was not possible to conclude that he did not know that his actions would cause harm to others.  (3T20-13 to 22).  Therefore, the sentencing court correctly decided that mitigating factors (1) and (2) did not apply.
[brief] The record on Defendants’ motions to compel arbitration consists of Plaintiffs’ complaint and the parties’ certifications and exhibits.  The facts below are drawn from that record.  I.  Defendants’ insurance-fraud scheme.  Plaintiffs provide no-fault automobile insurance policies in New Jersey, under which insureds can recover PIP benefits if they are involved in accidents.  See Pa0025 (Compl. ¶ 3).  When insureds receive medical treatment, they typically assign those PIP benefits to their providers, who seek payment from Plaintiffs.  See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 (providing that PIP benefits may be assigned “to a provider of service benefits”).  The complaint alleges that, from 2008 through 2022, Defendants conspired to obtain, through false and misleading insurance claims, more than $1.7 million in PIP benefits from Plaintiffs through more than 800 medical claims.  See, e.g., Pa0037, Pa0074 (Compl. ¶¶ 110, 338).  Plaintiffs learned after making the benefit payments that [...] was illegally structured, and that Defendants engaged in kickbacks, illegal self-referrals, and a pattern of racketeering in connection with the services for which they obtained payment.  Pa0448-0449.  A.  Violations of the doctrine against the corporate practice of medicine and practicing medicine without a license.  The doctrine against the corporate practice of medicine prohibits the commercial exploitation of the practice of medicine.  Pa0038 (Compl. ¶ 115).  Doctors possessing a plenary license\(^2\) cannot be employed by professionals possessing limited licenses, such as chiropractors.  Pa0038 (Compl. ¶ 114).  Non-physicians, including laypersons and healthcare professionals who do not hold plenary licenses, are also barred from owning or controlling the majority shares in a medical professional corporation.  Ibid.  Instead, one or more plenary physicians must own and control the majority of shares.  Pa0039 (Compl. ¶ 121).  Medical practices organized unlawfully in this manner are not entitled to payment for services under no-fault benefit policies.
[brief] (Pb14).  [...] also argues that, because [...] demands in his complaint that [...] must “supersede the authority of the [...] and come up with a remedy contrary to the IAPP,” the [...] must indemnify and defend here.  (Pb8).  Those arguments miss the crucial point.  Even if [...] and its employees were acting as “State employees” in their dealings with [...], and/or even if [...]’s response to [...]’s demands involves consideration of the obligations under an Attorney General’s Directive, that is immaterial.  That is because the Denial was not based on the conclusion that [...] and its employees were not considered “State actors” at the time, but rather rested on the fact that no claim for defense and indemnity under the TCA is available -- even to defendants who are plainly employees of the State -- when the complaint filed against the State defendant does not seek monetary damages and pursues instead only non-monetary or equitable relief.
[brief] *Id.* at 592.  In the present matter, there was absolutely no expert medical evidence that plaintiff’s prior falls, prior medical conditions, prior medications, or prior medical treatment had any effect on her fall at the [...] store or the injuries she sustained as a result of the fall.  It should be noted that this is not a situation where the plaintiff’s prior falls or medical history were not disclosed to the defendant, its experts, or the plaintiff’s experts during the discovery period.
[brief] When the U.S. Supreme Court "applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule ... must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate [the Court's] announcement of the rule."  Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Tax'n, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993).  Thus, the Appellate Division in Roberto recognized that where a federal constitutional issue is decided, "the new rule is applied 'retroactively to cases that were in the pipeline when it was decided.'"  Roberto, (quoting State v. Adkins, 221 N.J. 300, 313 (2015)).  Although the Roberto court weighed and balanced the Coons retroactively factors, see Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 96 N.J. 419, 427 (1984), it ultimately noted that pipeline retroactivity is "mandated because the Court constitutionally recognized a property owner's interest in surplus equity."