ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendants rely on the procedural history and statement of facts contained in their merits briefing in this appeal.  (See Db4-12).  LEGAL ARGUMENT  Plaintiffs’ response to the amicus briefs sounds two basic themes.  The first is to accuse Amici of not strictly addressing the particular facts of this case, but instead emphasizing broadly applicable policy reasons that New Jersey law does not and should not depart from the widely-applied rule that relevancy is the “touchstone” for all discovery, including discovery of electronically-stored information (“ESI”).  Amici would no doubt plead guilty as charged.  After all, the trial court in this case flatly rejected both the rule urged by Amici and the policy concerns they articulate in its defense.  According to the trial court:  The purpose [of discovery] is to produce all the relevant documents and if in producing all the relevant documents there are fifty percent of them which are irrelevant, I don’t see the harm and I understand [[...] counsel’s] point that the rules say that relevancy is the touchstone but this is not—this is something different.  ESI is different, and I’m not saying that we’re supposing to be producing, you know, a mass of irrelevant stuff but the problem is that relevancy shouldn’t be decided by the people who are producing the documents because their view of relevance and the other side’s view of relevance is different ….  T24:11-23.  Later, the court went out of its way to revisit the point, putting it even more starkly:  [J]ust to go back and address [[...] counsel’s] argument about relevance and the old days of going through the documents, ESI is different.  Okay.  ESI is fundamentally different than just paper documents because ESI is voluminous.  It’s not—it pulls in a lot of things that are—I mean, these particular searches that are understandably and we all recognize that there are going to be a lot of irrelevant documents and not a lot of nonresponsive documents.  But ESI is fundamentally different than, you know, just going through a case file, you know, let’s say it’s a construction case and everybody has, you know, the documents from the construction project and ESI is fundamentally different.  T20:18 to 21:7.  For these policy reasons, the court stated explicitly, its “usual stance” in cases involving ESI discovery is to prohibit “a relevance type of review. ”  T4:7-12.  In the court’s view, “the relevance gatekeeper shouldn’t be the producers of the documents,” but “should be the ones receiving the documents” because as a matter of policy, it simply is not “fair” for “the party producing the documents [to] decide what is relevant and what’s not.
[brief] Hearing of Defendants' Motion to Dissolve Temporary Restraints/Transfer to Law Division and Plaintiff's Cross Motion For Preliminary Injunction Before Hon. [...], J.S.C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2T 02/16/2024  Hearing of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Cross Motion For Summary Judgment
[directive] Home Detention with Electronic Monitoring  DATE: October 17, 2023 of  This Directive provides updated guidance on the use the three categories of Home Detention for defendants on pretrial monitoring: (a) Strict Home Detention, (b) Home Detention with Limited Exceptions, and ( Home Detention c) with Electronic Monitoring. of  These categories pretrial release, when they may be ordered, how they are to be monitored, and the required staff response to violations, are detailed below.  The revised guidance provided by this directive intended to enhance the is of efficiency and the successful use these options.  As such, effective immediately, it supersedes Directive #27-21 ("Criminal Justice Reform-Pretrial Services-Strict Home Detention (without Electronic Monitoring), Home Detention with Limited Exceptions (without Electronic Monitoring), and Home Detention with Electronic Monitoring").  Attached to this directive are: (1) the Criteria for Ordering Home Detention of and/or Electronic Monitoring a Condition Pretrial Release (CN 12972), (2) the as Home Detention Screening form (CN 12973), (3) the Electronic Monitoring Screening form (CN 12220), (4) Notification ofExpectations for Defendant Ordered ADA ENSURING TO AN DOOR OPEN JUSTICE
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  The interpretation of a contract is subject to de novo review by an appellate court.  See Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 222-23 (2011).  Appellate review of a trial court’s granting of a motion to dismiss is also de novo.  Seidenberg v Summit Bank, 348 NJ Super 243, 250 (App Div 2002).  Pursuant to Rule 4:6-2, a defendant is entitled to the dismissal of all or part of a complaint whenever that complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  . . .”  When faced with such a motion, Courts should dismiss the complaint – or the specific counts being challenged – if they “fail[] to articulate a legal basis entitling [the] plaintiff to relief. ”  Milford Mill 128, LLC v. Borough of Milford, 400 N.J. Super. 96, 109 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App. Div. 2005)).  Additionally, beyond the “allegations in the complaint,” our courts can also consider the “exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim. ”  Teamsters Local 97 v. State, 434 N.J. Super. 393, 412 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 183 (2005)).  A motion to dismiss ‘may not be denied based on the possibility that discovery may establish the requisite claim; rather, the legal requisites for [a] plaintiff[’]s claim must be apparent from the complaint itself. ”  Edwards v. Simply put, dismissal will be mandated wherever it is found that the challenged allegations are “palpably insufficient” to support a claim.  *Rieder v. State*, 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987).  A plaintiff cannot defeat a motion to dismiss by filing conclusory allegations as the basis of its complaint, but must instead present the “essential facts supporting [their] cause of action . . . in order for the claim to survive.  . . .”  *Scheidt v. DRS Tech., Inc.*, 424 N.J. Super. 188, 193 (App. Div. 2012) (“conclusory allegations are insufficient” to defeat a motion); see also *Miller v. Bank of Am. Home Loan Servicing, LP*, 439 N.J. Super. 540, 552 (App. Div. 2015) (a complaint containing “conclusory allegations” parroting the language of the cause of action are “mere generalizations devoid of specified factual support[,]” insufficient under Rule 4:5-8(a).  Here, the trial court properly applied the motion to dismiss standard to dismiss with prejudice all claims against [...].  (Pa199; Pa651).  Further, even if this Court disagrees the trial court’s reasoning, it should affirm the dismissal on alternative grounds.  *Hayes v. Delamotte*, 231 N.J. 373, 387 (2018) (“A trial court judgment that reaches the proper conclusion must be affirmed even if it is based on the wrong reasoning. ”) (citing *Isko v. Planning Bd.*, 51 N.J. 162, 175 (1968)); Do- Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 191, 199 (2001) (“[A]ppeals are taken from orders and judgments and not from . . . reasons given for the ultimate conclusion. ”).
[brief] 2T211-2 to 2T212-24; 2T214-7 to 2T115-4.  Soon, he began to experience health problems, including nosebleeds (epistaxis), respiratory problems, shortness of breath, swelling of his feet and ankles, and could no longer compete in Taekwondo because he “didn’t have stamina to continue. ”  2T214-25 to 2T216-10.  He was treated on an outpatient basis by several doctors but – before March of 2009 – none of them ever suggested that his symptoms might have been caused by exposure to mold.  2T216-11 to 20; 2T220-3 to 10.  Indeed, he did not discover the mold contamination in his condo until 2009.
[directive] The new language of clarifies that the PSA is returning a recommendation no release, and recognizes the underlying charge is inchoate.  It does not change the recommendation level (i. e., NRR) for NRR these offenses.  This merely changes the explanatory language on how the was derived.  Any questions or comments may be directed to [...], Statewide Pretrial Services Manager, by email at [...], or by phone at [...].
[directive] D.  Jurisdiction for filing a criminal complaint but no accompanying domestic violence complaint.  1.  During normal court hours, the victim may file a criminal complaint with the municipal court or police department where the alleged act occurred in accordance with departmental procedure.  2.  On weekends, holidays and other times when the court is closed, the victim may file a criminal complaint with the law enforcement agency where the alleged act occurred.  3.  If the police officer believes that a no-contact order should be issued, the officer should inform the court of the circumstances justifying such request when the criminal complaint is being processed and bail is about to be set.  The officer should include in the domestic violence offense report the reasons for the request and the court's disposition of the request.
[brief] May 22, 2018 forwarding [...]’ request for the designer of the regulator station ...............  H1590a  Attachment: Holmdel’s [...] request for the engineer who designed the proposed regulator station.................................................  H1591a  Email chain among [...]’s [...] and Holmdel’s counsel [...] over outstanding requirements that will not be met by the hearing date, controversy over alternative heater equipment efforts and inquiries .............  H1592a  Letter from [...]’s [...] responding to Holmdel’s [...] request for design and processing information stating that it is not within Zoning Board jurisdiction  To determine the appropriate heater .........................  H1598a  Email from Holmdel’s [...] to [...]’s [...] attaching the review on Surface Water Quality...............  H1601a  Holmdel’s [...] Engineering Review No. 3 on Surface Water Quality and air pollution impacts from the regulator station proposed is included in this Appendix at Ha1554.  Email from Holmdel’s [...] to [...]’s [...] attaching the [...] Engineering Review No. 2A dated October 9, 2018 ...........................................  H1602a Holmdel’s [...] Engineering Review No. 2A dated October 9, 2018 is included in this Appendix at Ha1580  Email from Holmdel’s [...] to [...]’s [...] October 16, 2018 enclosing [...] Engineering Review No. 4 .................................................. H1603a Holmdel’s [...] Engineering Review No. 4 dated October 16, 2018 detailing [...]’s proposal for a heater and its polluting affects, attaching ............... H1604a [...] Pipeline Heater sketch ........................................ H1606a -xxxiv- [...] Comparison ........................................ H1607a [...] Benefits ............................................. H1608a Installation .................................................. H1609a Operation .................................................... H1610a Maintenance ................................................ H1611a Environmental .............................................. H1612a Installations .................................................. H1613a [...] Site Pictures ....................................... H1614a Email from [...]’s [...] to Holmdel’s [...] October 19, 2018 enclosing the Potenta response ...........
[brief] As explained below, *Marmo* supports [...]’s position that the trial court erred in declining to find that Defendants waived arbitration here.  Like the case at bar, *Marmo* addresses and analyzes the multifactor test for waiver of arbitration articulated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in *Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center*, 215 N.J. 265 (2013), post the United States Supreme Court’s decision in *Morgan v. Sundance, Inc.*, 596 U.S. 411 (2022).
[brief] See also State v. Lawrence, 445 N.J. Super. 270, 274, 277 (App. Div. 2016), holding that an order denying reconsideration of dismissal of a municipal court appeal erroneously barred defendant access to the court and was an abuse of discretion.  Cf. Flecker v. Statue Cruises, LLC, 444 N.J. Super. 31, 36, 40 (Law Div. 2013), denying a motion for reconsideration when the court's decision was not palpably incorrect or irrational.
[brief] THAT ADJOURNMENT LETTERS (RA 9)  WERE DIRECTLY RECEIVED BY PLAINTIFF FROM THE DEFENDANT [...] AT THE TIME OF SAID REPRESENTATION AMOUNTS A FRAUD UPON THE COURT AND OR FRAUD BY ADVERSE PARTY  The fact that Plaintiff indisputably sought adjournments in person back in January 2023 taken in conjunction with the Defendants narrative set forth in their Statement of Facts and Procedural History (at Db 5) is dishonest, misleading or a misrepresentation of material fact.  A fraud on the court occurs "where it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set-in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense."
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Respondent adopts the Appellants Procedural History with one addition.  Respondent moved to Dismiss the Complaint based on the fact that the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act did not apply to the activities, i.e. collection attempts, undertaken by Respondent.  Unfortunately, the trial court did not issue a written decision, nor did it explain in any depth the basis of its reasoning other than to refer to the decision by the Hon. [...], J.S.C in [...] v [...] et al, [...] issued on October 4, 2023.  (Pa60)5  COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS  Respondent [...] filed suit in 2015 (the “collection action”) to collect Appellant [...]’s defaulted [...] (“[...]”) credit account, which it had previously purchased from [...].
[directive] •  From a standing ready position, on command fire a 2 round burst or semi-automatic double tap.  (3 seconds)  •  From a standing ready position, on command fire a 2 round burst or semi-automatic double tap to the body then one shot to the head.  (4 seconds)  •  Place weapon on safe and move to the 5 yard line 5 yard line 5 rounds, standing, standing alternative threat areas
[brief] Appellants’ statement of the Procedural History fails to disclose the --- \(^1\)  The August 28, 2024 Certification of [...] will be submitted for in-camera review.  \(^2\)  T represents the transcript from oral arguments of November 7, 2024.  complete procedural history including an Order To Show Cause filed when the Verified Complaint was filed on May 11, 2023, as follows:  I.  COMPETING ORDERS TO SHOW CAUSE AND FIRST CERTIFICATION OF ROBERT VAN SADERS.  A.  Respondents’ Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint.  The Complaint forming the basis of this litigation commenced with the filing of an Order to Show Cause (OTSC) and Verified Complaint on May 11, 2023 by [...] and [...] (hereinafter, either “Atlas,” “Van Saders” or collectively “Respondents”) against [...] under docket no. [...].  (Hereinafter, “Gerhard” or “Appellant”).  As of May 11, 2023, Respondents were represented by the [...].  The Verified Complaint filed on May 11, 2023, was an Eleven Count Complaint asserting, *inter alia*, claims of Misappropriation/Theft/Conversion against Appellant Gerhard and sought Injunctive Relief.  The claims were based on allegations that Gerhard had misappropriated hundreds of thousands of dollars from Atlas and had caused Atlas to lose a very lucrative contract with [...] resulting in hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages.  When Atlas determined that Gerhard was still using the name [...], Respondents sought temporary restraints.  The OTSC was signed and filed by the Court on May 12, 2023.  (Pa1).
[brief] However, as [...] and [...] testified, during those years, morning services began at 7:00 a.m. and would have been over by the time [...] arrived at school.  (8T 106:16-20 and 107:19-108:2)  [...] admitted that after 1969, he generally was not in the area of the Congregation or the Sixth Street Lot and was at the school “infrequently”, providing no relevant or credible evidence as to the use of the Sixth Street Lot by the Congregation from 1969 to present.  (12T 69:5-77:14)
[brief] The abortion statute was enacted within a penumbra of secrecy that deprived the public and even the legislators of advance notice of the reading of the bill, the language of the bill, or that the bills would be the subject of enactment within the same day as the first read in the General Assembly.  The Legislature violated the Constitution in passing the bills with the Assembly conducting the first through third readings on the same day without an emergency vote.  Next, the Legislature violated four of its statutes in enacting the bill without: 1) review by the Mandated Health Benefits Commission; 2) fiscal review; 3) posting a copy of the bill upon its introduction in the Senate; and 4) advance notice of the hearing and vote on the bill.  For the foregoing reasons, the Applicants-Petitioners respectfully request that this Court invalidate L. 2021, c. 375 under N.J.S.A. 1:7-3.  Even if the statute is not voided, the remedy is to remand for the Law Division to consider the constitutionality of the statute on its merits.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Petitioners [...] and [...]  By: [...] [...]  DATED: January 26, 2024
[brief] After all, [...] would have 365 days in which to file a motion to vacate, not 90 days.  R.4:50-2.  If this is the case, would it have mattered if [...] had filed its motion on day 364 instead or day 89?  The answer is plainly no given longstanding precedent.  It also would not matter if the motion had been filed on Monday, April 24, 2023 as opposed to Friday, April 21, 2023, 89 days instead of 92\(^4\).  Just because a motion is timely filed does not mean that it is meritorious and must be granted.  Title to foreclosed real estate is not, and should not be, unmarketable for 90 days or 365 days, just because a motion could be filed within that time period.
[directive] b.  In the Municipal Courts:  (1)  Pursuant to R. 7:4-5(a), upon breach of the condition of a recognizance, the court may forfeit the bail on its own motion or on the prosecuting attorney’s motion.  If bail is ordered to be forfeited, the municipal court administrator or deputy court administrator shall forthwith forfeit the bail in accordance with R. 7:4-3(e).  (2)  When bail is ordered forfeited pursuant to R. 7:4-5(a), the Municipal Court Administrator or Deputy Court Administrator shall serve notice of forfeiture by ordinary mail on the defendant and the surety, including any corporate surety company, licensed insurance producer and limited insurance representative whose names appear on the Bail Recognizance, that judgment will be entered as to any outstanding bail, absent a written objection within 75 days of the notice seeking to set aside the forfeiture.  (3)  Whenever notice of forfeiture is issued, the notice shall be sent to the address of the corporate surety company, licensed insurance producer and limited insurance representative, as recorded in the Bail Registry maintained by the Clerk of the Superior Court pursuant to R. 1:13-3(e).
[brief] Appellant’s claim of discriminatory conduct revolves around a single incident that occurred on March 13, 2020.  Pa44, T53:2-11.  Appellant states that:  On that date the whole shift was receiving training on COVID-19, the pandemic and the dangers of it, more like training about, like, precautionaries and basic knowledge and awareness.  Towards the end of the lecture and training I apparently fell asleep for ten seconds or so, I mean I don't know a specific time, and I woke up to [...] asking me if I just got back from Wuhan, mocked me with a face with squinting eyes.  Pa44, T53:15-25.  Co-Defendant, Pietro [...], a Deputy Chief in the [...], was the instructor of the Covid-19 training on that date.  Pa45, T55:8-10.  When asked, Appellant was unaware of whether [...] made the comment due to his race and was not sure if [...] even knew his race.  Pa47, T62:12-23, T64:7-13.  Appellant testified that while his employment file stated that he was of Asian descent, he was unaware of whether [...] ever reviewed his employment file or if any document existed that would have identified Appellant’s race or nationality.  Pa47, T64:7-13.  Additionally, Appellant testified that he did not outwardly display anything that would identify his ancestry.  Pa51, T79:14-80:10.  Appellant further acknowledged the possibility that the comment made by [...] was made because the topic the training was the origins of Covid-19.  Pa47, T63:3, T64:17.  Indeed, Appellant had never heard [...] make any similar comments prior to this incident.  Pa47, T63:17.  It should be noted that City records show that [...] had been trained in anti-harassment and anti-discrimination as recently as May 2019.  Pa154.  Appellant was concerned with [...]’s comment because he felt that he was being “ridiculed” by a high-ranking officer and the impact that such ridicule could have on Plaintiff’s career.  Pa46, T60:10-20.  However, he testified that after the incident, several firefighters went into the lunchroom and discussed the incident with him.  Pa47, T65:15-25.  He further testified that he received support from the department following the incident.  Pa48-49, T69:2-70:20.  It is important to note that prior to this incident, Appellant admitted that he and [...] had a “respectful” and “professional” relationship.  Pa61, T120:23-  Indeed, their relationship was limited.  Throughout Appellant’s probationary period, he would rotate between stations and supervisors.  Pa37, T25:7-9, T27:1.  Appellant could only recall [...] serving as his Battalion Chief for a few months in the beginning of Appellant’s career.  Pa40, T35:6-20.  During that time, Appellant testified that they did not interact very often, only when it was required.  Id. at T37:5-8, and 15.  Appellant further testified that there was no particular reason why he “never got personal” with [...].  Pa41, T38:14-15; T39:16-22; and T40:5-10.
[brief] [...] directed to [...], Esq., of the [...] firm who represented [...] in the initial stages of proposed arbitration with [...].  Defendant [...] noted that [...] sustained severe consequential damages of [...]’s default in relation to his obligations to [...].  [...] also notes that there should be a claim for attorney’s fees because the construction agreement and the home purchase agreement specifically provided for attorney’s fees, and most importantly, he writes that the complaint should name George [...] personally and George [...] Architects, PC, because [...] was negligent.  [...] never received an explanation of what was done with the deposit by [...], and he never received any particular order for the modular home.  He does not recall anything that was done to secure the $863,000.00 that was paid by [...].  He does not recall if he proposed a collateral assignment.  When the contract was terminated, all that had been done was completion of demolition and dig a hole.  No part of the modular home had been delivered to the site.  The foundation had not been set.  [...] asked for a memo to be prepared after the termination.  (Pa0205).  [...] claims that he terminated the contract because of the deadline, which was 300 days.  [...] was informed by subsequent counsel that any judgment against [...] or [...] would be uncollectible.
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  The Appellant will spare this Court the extensive medical details regarding the specific facts of the malpractice allegations, given that the crux of this appeal relates to this matter’s procedural posture.  The Appellant alleges that the named Respondents failed to properly treat/diagnose the Appellant while she was a patient at [...] and subsequently thereafter.  5a-6a.  The Respondents’ negligence in treatment/diagnosis of the Appellant resulted in substantial injuries and damages suffered by the Appellant, which persist to this day and have significantly altered her daily life.  *Id.*  The specific details regarding the medical malpractice allegations are set forth at length in the Appellant’s Amended Complaint.  15a-20a.