ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See Canfield, 470 N.J. Super. at 316-320 (citing State v. Green, 318 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 1999); State v. Parkhill, 461 N.J. Super. 494, (App. Div. 2019); State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 15 (1990)).  In State v. Green, the defendant was charged with several counts of aggravated assault on a police officer.  After the officer approached the defendant to speak with him, the defendant fled in his car, hitting the officer in the leg.  318 N.J. Super. at 367-68.  The officer then chased after the defendant’s car on foot and injured his hand by punching through the driver’s side window in an attempt to shut off the ignition.  Id. at 368.  At trial, the State asserted that the defendant caused the injuries to the officer’s hands, but the evidence suggested that the injuries were at least partly caused by the officer’s own volitional act of punching through the car window.  Id. at 373-4.  This Court held that the factual dispute regarding the cause of the officer’s injuries was for the jury to resolve, and that the trial judge’s failure to give a fact-specific causation charge was plain error.  *Id.* at 374-75.  The Court reasoned that had the jury been properly instructed on causation, it may have had reasonable doubt regarding whether the injuries sustained by the officer after punching through the defendant’s window “involved the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplated by defendant, or whether those injuries were too remote, accidental in their occurrence, or dependent on the [volitional] act of [the officer] to have a just bearing on defendant's liability or on the gravity of his offense. ”  *Ibid.* (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:2–3(b) and (c)); see also *State v. Parkhill*, 461 N.J. Super. 494, 497 (App. Div. 2019) (holding absence of full causation charge was plain error because evidence raised issue as to “remoteness, fortuity, or another’s volitional act” where defendant charged with reckless vehicular homicide argued victim caused accident by crossing busy road against light and outside cross-walk); *State v. Martin*, 119 N.J. 2, 9-10, 13-17 (1990) (holding court’s failure to give full causation charge was plain error where defendant argued that supervening events broke chain of causation between his act of setting fire in building and victim’s death).
[brief] In *Goldfarb v. Solimine*, 460 N.J. Super. 22, 31 (App. Div. 2019), the Appellate Division held a trial judge had a duty to recuse herself when she exchanged *ex parte* text messages regarding her presiding over a trial.  Under the Code of Judicial Conduct, “A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 54:4-30 and -31.  Thus, owners’ tax mailing addresses are taken directly from deeds.  Here, Plaintiff provided no address other than the subject property on the deed.  She did not list any other address.  It is important to recall the Supreme Court has dictated that notice must be achieved by mailings to the address on the most recent municipal tax duplicate, R. 4:64-7(c), which the City unquestionably \(^{12}\)
[brief] Defendant appeared in the [...] for trial.  At that time Defendant entered a --- 1  The State is using the table of transcripts set forth in Appellant’s brief at p. 2.  1T designates transcript of proceedings dated February 23, 2024.  (Superior Court)  2T designates transcript of proceedings dated September 13, 2023 (municipal court)  The procedural history and statement of facts are combined because they are inextricably linked and for purposes of clarity conditional guilty plea to the charge subject to an attack on the constitutionality of the statute as applied to the facts of the case.  (2T13-13 to 13-25)  The minimum fine of $100. was imposed.  (2T 18-25)  On February 23, 2024 a de novo proceeding was held in the [...], at which time Defendant’s plea to the charges was upheld and the same fine was imposed, although the Judge declined to reach the constitutional issue.
[brief] See PBA Local 160, 272 N.J. Super. at 477.  The Union then faults [...] for not submitting evidence regarding the parties’ past practices to the Arbitrator, arguing that [...] should not be given “a second bite at the proverbial apple” to introduce evidence to this Court beyond the arbitral record.  [...] has presented no such argument.  The issue does not concern ignoring evidence in the record nor unsubmitted evidence, but the Arbitrator’s ignoring the CBA’s express terms.  [...] does not ask this Court to re-weigh the evidence, to second-guess the Arbitrator’s fact findings (to the extent there are any), or to consider new evidence never presented to the Arbitrator.  This Court’s intervention is required because the Arbitrator made a critical, fatal, and reversible error by ignoring the CBA’s plain language and creating a new work rule for which the parties did not bargain.  See PBA Local 160, 272 N.J. Super. at 477.  This Court can and should correct the Arbitrator’s mistake.
[brief] (Da51 to 52).  Defendants’ motion was supported by the Certification of Defendants’ trial counsel.  (Da53 to 55).  Defendants also sought judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to defendant [...] but subsequently abandoned that argument.  On August 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Certification in opposition to Defendants’ motion.  (Da56 to 58).  On August 17, 2023, Defendants filed a letter brief in reply to Plaintiff’s opposition.  Pursuant to R.2:6-1(a)(2), a copy of Defendants’ memorandum in opposition is not appended hereto.  On September 7, 2023, the trial court heard oral argument on and denied Defendants’ motion for a new trial.
[brief] Although [...]’s written order does not address [...]’s argument that his questions regarding the availability of counsel were an ambiguous invocation of his right to counsel, [...]’s brief raised that issue below.  leading the interrogation repeatedly expressed uncertainty about what kind of attorney was available and never asked him if he was invoking his right to counsel.  Under our State’s law, even a defendant’s “ambiguous assertion” of the right to counsel triggers a duty for the interviewing officer “to cease questioning and clarify whether defendant was requesting counsel during the interview. ”  *State v. Gonzalez*, 249 N.J. 612, 620 (2022).  Because [...]’s questions about the availability of counsel were at least an ambiguous invocation of his right to counsel, detectives’ failure to clarify if he wanted to speak to an attorney compels suppression of his statement.  *U.S. Const.* amends.
[brief] When Civil Service employees have challenged the actions of their appointing authority as violative of N.J.A.C. 4A:10-1.1(d), courts have found that a successful claim must show that there is a “close connection” between the complained of conduct and the deprivation of his “right to participate in the selection and appointment process” of the Civil Service.  Competello v. LaBruno, 2005 WL 1637907, at 8 (D.N.J. July 12, 2005).  In Competello, plaintiff police officer took a promotional exam for promotion to sergeant.
[brief] Plaintiff argues that in the transfer Order there was “no statement of reasons or findings indicating what facts were relied upon by the Court that reflected an ‘appearance of impropriety’” and that “it is not clear from the Order why or upon what supporting grounds the matter was transferred. ” (Pb38).  However, Assignment [...] expressly stated in his Order Transferring Venue to Somerset County the Court Rules, Code Policies and/or Directives upon which he relied: “R. 1:12-1(e), (g); R. 4:3-3(a); Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct; Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct for Judiciary Employees’ Administrative Office of the Court (‘AOC’) Directive #11-18; and/or AOC Policy #5-15 (as adopted by the Supreme Court).
[brief] Also identical to the within matter, the Division sent a letter to all Certifying Officers with the same exact terms contained in the Certifying Officer Letter’s “EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITIES” section.  *Id.*  Pra6.  Pa82.  The Appellate Division held that “[a]pplying our highly deferential standard of review, we are satisfied that the record sufficiently supports the Commissions' decision that members were provided with adequate notice and instructions for submitting a request for claims reconsideration prior to the December 31, 2014 deadline. ”  *Id.* at 8-9.  Pra7.  The Supreme Court reversed, holding:  2.  Whenever an administrative agency acts, be that act mandatory or strictly voluntary, it must do so reasonably and in a manner calculated to achieve the policies expressed in the agency's organic statute.  Therefore, because the Commissions determined to reimburse affected members, they were necessarily required to do so reasonably and in a non-arbitrary manner.  Here, that means that the Commissions were required to provide reasonable notice in order that the retroactive benefit would fairly be made known and, thus, made available in a non-arbitrary manner to affected members.
[brief] Comment must be “restrained within the facts shown or reasonably suggested by the evidence adduced. ”  Id. (citing Condella v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 298 N.J. Super. 531, 534 (1996); Matthews v. Nelson, 57 N.J. Super. 515, 521 (App. Div. 1959), certif. denied, 31 N.J. 296 (1960)).  Further, “counsel ‘may not misstate the evidence nor distort the factual picture,’ Matthews, supra 57 N.J. at 521, such as by using ‘disparaging language to discredit the opposing party, or witness,’” Rodd v. Raritan Radiologic Assoc., P.A., 373 N.J. Super. 154, 171 (App. Div. 2004)(citing Geler v. Akawie, 358 N.J. Super. 437, 470-71 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 177 N.J. 223 (2003); Henker v. Prebylowski, 216 N.J. Super. 513, 518-19 (App. Div. 1987)); “accus[ing] a party's attorney of wanting the jury to evaluate the evidence unfairly”; “trying to deceive the jury”; or “deliberately distorting the evidence.
[brief] [1T64:10-20.]  The Special Adjudicator further explained that:  [i]t seems unusual to me that the board can go back and add conditions of approval to the resolution that was not agreed to at the hearing.  But I think something else that troubles me here is the addition of ten units, I don’t believe the [B]oard maintained jurisdiction of the application.  This is a planning board application and I don’t know that the addition of the ten units would be permissible under the current zoning…the planning board would have lacked jurisdiction . . . if the town believes that elevator buildings are preferred, I’m not sure that requiring that through a second adopted resolution that [[...]] didn’t have the benefit of commenting on when they clearly had the benefit of commenting on the first time is the most appropriate way to accomplish that.
[brief] ”  This is a strange allegation to make considering the entire beginning of section A of the arguments section of Plaintiff’s brief (pages 21-22 therein) goes into specifics of the hearing – in a separate action – on September 16, 2022 (over two months before trial in this matter) showing that [...] had actually notified [...] \textit{on the record} that he \textit{had already called the FBI to report} her wrongdoing.  Thus, [...] had reason to be biased.  Almost the entire rest of Plaintiff’s brief are repeated examples which show where bias apparently reared its head.  Defendant’s argue that Plaintiff’s calling of the FBI was “Plaintiff’s attempt to forum shop to get a different Judge assigned to his case” (Def. Brief Pg 19).  However, no facts are presented to substantiate that pure speculation.  Rather, as is clear from the transcript from that date [...] had the Sheriff appear at [...]’s residence was the day before: 9/15/2022.  (1T, pg. 10, lines 4-7).  That is when [...] called the FBI in response.  It was not [...] who chose when the Sheriff would appear at his house, it was the Court, his opponents and the Sheriff.  [...] simply felt injured and wronged by the event that he did not ask for and he called the FBI and reported [...] of, among other things, corruption.  And [...] told [...] that he had done so the very next day.  There is absolutely no evidence anywhere to suggest any sort of forum shopping.  B.
[directive] If issued. been had acomplaint-warrant which the by fingerprinted is defendant the certain that shall make prosecutor, the or arrest, the making time reasonable a within or appearance court defendant's the of date the on system Scan  Live agency enforcement law appropriate the by request written upon complaint the of filing after the fingerprint certain that the shall make 53:1-18.1, and N.J.S.A. and 53:1-15, N.J.S.A. to pursuant issued. been acomplaint-summons had which for offenses) and defendant the links to Denied.
[brief] 9.11.2  On a periodic basis, and no later than January 31 of the following year, every agency shall submit to the County Prosecutor and the Attorney General, and publish on the agency’s public website, a brief synopsis of all misconduct where an agency member:  (f)  Had a sustained finding that the officer was untruthful or has demonstrated a lack of candor, regardless of the type or severity of discipline imposed; (k)  Resigned, retired, transferred or separated from the agency, regardless of the reason, while any internal affairs investigation or complaint was pending, and the misconduct ultimately sustained falls within categories (d) through (j) above or would have resulted in an action under categories (a) through (c) had the member not separated from the agency; (Pa75-77).
[brief] As the Appellants argued in their supplemental brief at page 12, the Appellants are not seeking to challenge [...]’s certificate of approval in this appeal.  Rather, the Appellants presented support to this Court from [...]’s expressed findings regarding the climate change impacts from this Project.  Neither Respondent rebutted or disputed [...]’s finding, presented in the Environmental Appellants’ supplemental brief at 12, that “...the Project’s direct and downstream emissions would increase the atmospheric concentration of GHGs, in combination with past and future emissions from all other sources, and would contribute to climate change....”  Nor did either Respondent rebut or dispute that [...]’s certificate is based on its finding that “…the total social cost of GHGs from the project is calculated to be $5,790,928,380 (in 2020 dollars). ”  Those undisputed facts are critical to this Court’s review of the [...]’s refusal to address the totality of the Project’s reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts to the Highlands resources in its instant consistency determination.  The District Court’s affirmance of [...]’s certificate of approval supports the Appellants’ instant argument that [...] was required to consider the resulting environmental degradation from this Project in its consistency determination under the State’s Highlands Act.
[directive] '.Phase Court every three months  Address any recommended medical/dental needs if treatment, applicable  Demonstrate addressing people, places, and things in  Engage treatment with Cooperate supervision  Maintain recovery groups and establish recovery network per as Review plan  Follow financial plan and begin making payments per plan case case other  Every week office visits Address supportive services recommended as other  Every month home/field visits  Establish pro-social activities or or job  Random drug tests (minimum * Begin employment start vocational training, search, school week)  2x  Maintain housing final  All to to clients who owe money are be referred before their phase.
[directive] Notification should be provided as follows:  Immediate telephone notification, upon release of an offender, to victims of the crimes of or relating to Homicide, Arson, Robbery, Domestic Violence, Death by Auto, Aggravated Assault, Sexual Offenses, Child Abuse or attempts to commit said offenses.  Telephone notification within forty-eight (48) hours, upon the release of an offender, to victims of all other offenses.  Upon arrest and the signing of a warrant complaint (CDR-2), the arresting/investigating police officer should complete a victim-witness information form.  (See Appendix A-1.)  When ROR bail is established prior to the offender's confinement in the county jail, the arresting/investigating police agency should provide notification to the victim of the offender's release.  Said notification should include any associated conditions of the release.  When the offender is confined to the county jail, the arresting/ investigating police officer should submit the victim-witness information form to the county jail with a copy of the complaint.  The arresting/investigating police agency should retain a copy of the victim-witness information form.  The county jail staff should in turn provide a copy of the victim-witness information form to the County Victim-Witness Coordinator.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant  BY:__________________________  [...], Esq.  Legal Fellow Attorney ID: 412682022  Dated: August 30, 2023  Superior Court of New Jersey  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  Criminal Action  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : Plaintiff-Respondent, : v. : [...], : Defendant-Appellant.  On Appeal from a Final Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County.
[brief] On November 3, 2021, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., granted the search warrant, which repeated the same description quoted above.7 (Cma17 to 20).  The warrant specifically authorized the police, “with the necessary and proper assistance[,] to enter and diligently search [...], by first knocking and announcing [their] presence, and then by force if necessary, to seize and search evidence pertaining to the crime” of the distribution and possession of CSAEM.  (Cma18).
[brief] The role of the trial court is to determine only whether there exists a genuine dispute regarding a material fact.  It has no authority to resolve such a dispute.  Suarez, supra, 428 N.J. Super. at 27 (motion judge may not abrogate the jury's exclusive role as the finder of fact).  See Sisselman, supra, 215 N.J. Super. at 211-12 (summary judgment should not be granted where the adjudication of such a motion would constitute what is in effect a trial by pleadings and affidavits involving issues of fact).
[brief] (Da 4-20; 3T 49-12 to 59-19; 4T 32-18 to 36-16)  Officers in this case stopped [...] and [...] for simply having a conversation with a person suspected of dealing drugs.  That initial stop, which occurred before officers had any idea that it was [...] in the car, was unlawful.  The subsequent search of the car, ostensibly for the registration, was illegal both because officers refused to give [...] or [...] an opportunity to retrieve those credentials and also because the registration-search exception does not apply when a car is stopped on suspicion of criminal activity.  Because the stop and search were illegal, and because the officers relied on the fruits of those unlawful actions to obtain a warrant, all the evidence found in the car must be suppressed.
[brief] A.  STANDARD OF REVIEW.  (Not raised below)  B.  [...] SHOULD HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED FROM ARGUING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT SUING [...] FOR ASSAULT.  (11T4:19-5:7)  C.  PLAINTIFF'S SHOULD HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO COMMENT ON [...]'S ABSENCE.  (10T19:9-20:11).  CONCLUSION TABLE OF ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  I.  The Police officers' opinions and conclusions were admitted into evidence.  (1T53:4-62:21)  Date of Ruling: January 9, 2023  Oral opinion.  (1T53:4-62:21)  II.  Damages evidence was admitted in the liability phase of this bifurcated trial.  (1T138:13-148:19)  Date of Ruling: January 9, 2023  Oral opinion.  (1T138:13-148:19)  Written Order to Bifurcate dated 6/5/2020 (Pa93)  III.  Improper Jury Instructions (11T152:12-186:13)
[directive] / Defendant’s Initials  피고인의  이니셜  유죄인정 주양식/지령 제01-18 호(02/23/2018)에  의거 공포된 수정 양식, 페이지4/7  CN 10079-Korean Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Korean page 4/7 12.  열거하십시오: 검사가 기각을 권고하기로
[brief] (Da267)  The sign notified everyone to keep out and here was no objection to Lot 22 being fenced in.(Da267)  It is further puzzling that [...] contracted with [...] over thirty years ago and there was a huge light pole placed in this lot which was operational every day and per a schedule the light came on at a particular time of the day.(Da268, Da125)  [...] makes an untenable argument because they claim that gravel in this fenced in lot concerned them, however, the obvious light post did not concern them and place them on notice that the lot was being used by [...].  (Da268, Da125)
[brief] ”)  Our Supreme Court in State v. Womack, 145 N.J. 576, 586 (1996) said that the boundaries of the relief that a court can afford under subsection (f) of R. 4:50 are “as expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice. ”  Court Inv. Co. v. Perillo, 48 N.J. 334, 341 (1966); see Hous. Auth. of Town of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 289 (1994) (“[T]he Rule is designed to provide relief from judgments in situations in which, were it not applied, a grave injustice would occur.
[directive] 8.2.1  Criminal interviews should be conducted only with the prior approval, or at the direction, of the County Prosecutor.  Once an investigation becomes criminal in nature, the subject officer shall be advised that he or she is not required to answer questions as a condition of employment.  Of course, an officer who is the subject of a criminal investigation may elect to voluntarily answer questions with or without an attorney so that the facts known to him and his perspective are available to the investigators.  48  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021 8.2.2  Miranda warnings generally are triggered whenever an individual’s questioning is custodial in nature.
[brief] The New Jersey litigation department at [...] had its best year ever in 2022, and exceeded goals in 2020 and 2021, due in large part to Plaintiff’s case load and oversight of New Jersey litigations.  Id., ¶ 50.  Since the start of the pandemic, most firm attorneys worked remotely, at least for a period of time.  Plaintiff also continued to work remotely because his son became ill with a severe respiratory illness, and Plaintiff had to dedicate time to caring for his son.  Defendant [...] was aware of Plaintiff’s son’s illness, as was the Firm’s CFO, [...].  In fact, [...] inquired regularly about his son’s well-being.  Id., ¶ 51.  In or about December 2022, Plaintiff told [...] that he had to continue working remotely from home to allow him to continue caring for his sick child, yet still during this time Plaintiff continued to carry a full case load, handled his files independently, and worked full time.  Id., ¶ 52.  E.
[brief] .................................................................13  Warthen v. Toms River Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 199 N.J. Super. 18 (App.  Div. 1985)  ..............................................13  Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469 (1987)  ..................................................................14  Statutes New Jersey Tort Claims Act .......................................................15, 16  Other Authorities N.J.A.C. 14:5-2.9 ...........................................................................21, 22 N.J.S.A. 48:2-25 ............................................................................17, 19 Rule 4:46-2 .....................................................................................13
[brief] At the conclusion of discovery, each defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that expert [...] failed to supply admissible expert testimony in support of his foundational opinions.  By way of a series of orders dated March 24, 2022 independently addressing each filed summary judgment motion, the Hon. [...], J.A.D. (retired and temporarily assigned on recall) directed that a Rule 104 hearing be conducted to provide the Court with an opportunity to evaluate whether expert [...] had supplied admissible opinions concerning the threshold issues.