ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Honorable Judges: Pursuant to Rule 2:6-2(b) this letter brief is submitted on behalf of the State.  Table of Contents  Counter-Statement of Procedural History ..............................................1  Counter-Statement of Facts ........................................................................1  Legal Argument  Point I  [...]’s testimony did not imply to the jury that he possessed superior knowledge, outside the record, that incriminated defendant .....3  Point II  A limiting instruction was unnecessary because [...]’s testimony was not inadmissible hearsay .............................................7  Point III  The trial court properly admitted the video surveillance footage ..........8  Point IV  The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal .................................................................11  Point V  The Prosecutor’s summation was proper ..............................................13  Conclusion ..................................................................................................17
[brief] 107 N.J. at 403-05 (holding court’s failure to instruct jury that defendant must have shared codefendant's specific purpose to use gun during robbery in order to be convicted of armed robbery was reversible error).  In that case, the defendant had driven the principal to and from the scene of the robbery, but claimed that he was unaware that the principal was armed with a handgun.  *Id.* at 399.  Likewise, in *Bowser*, this Court held that the trial court’s similarly inadequate accomplice liability jury instructions were plain error where the unarmed defendant had participated in the robbery of a convenience store, but it was his codefendant who had pulled a handgun and demanded money from the proprietor during the robbery.  297 N.J. Super. at 594, 601-03 (citing *Weeks*, 107 N.J. at 405).  Here, likewise, a properly instructed jury could have found that [...] did not know that [...] was armed or intended to use a gun in the commission of the robbery.  It was undisputed at trial that [...] was the only person who had or used a gun during the robbery.  (6T:47-9 to 22)  The State presented no evidence that [...] knew that [...] was armed prior to the incident, or that [...] shared [...]’s intent to use the gun or any other weapon in the commission of the robbery.  No gun is visible on the video of the incident until [...] removes it from his jacket.  (Da 16 at 17:33:00 to 17:36:30)  Although [...] did not testify, defense counsel argued in summation that the video suggested that [...] was unaware that [...] was armed until [...] revealed that he had a gun to [...].  (6T:176-24 to 177-12, 178-10 to 12).  Therefore, the court’s failure to adequately instruct the jury on accomplice liability requires reversal.  Had the court adequately instructed the jury, they could have found that [...] did not share [...]’s purpose as to the gun and could have acquitted him of armed robbery.
[brief] (4T 63:9-64:4).  Snow removal at [...] was also done in order of priority – [...], the bagel shop, and daycare were first; then office tenants (such as plaintiff’s job) were cleared after since their workers usually came in around 9AM.  (4T 65:14-68:4).  [...] arrived on site at approximately 10AM on the date of loss and observed between four to ten snow removal workers still actively engaged in snow removal at that time.  (4T 95:5-22 to 96:22).  Sutter had no concerns about the adequacy of the snow removal or the condition of the walkways on the morning of the incident and felt no need to text the contractor about their work since the contractor was still on site and still working.  (4T 98:9-13; 104:19-23).  [...] of [...] also testified that he had a dedicated team of workers and equipment for the [...]s site.  (4T 127:4-21).  Given the magnitude of this particular snow event, [...] in advance doubled the size of their team and workers to 150 people.  (4T 174:12-18).  Marino explained that given the enormous amount of square footage at [...]s and 14 inches of heavy wet snow, the actual clearing of the snow and ice took longer.  (4T 193:24-194:2).  In fact, Marino was unequivocal in his testimony wherein he stated [...] was still actively working and clearing snow and ice at [...]s on the morning of the date of loss.  (4T 204:2-21).
[directive] All law enforcement agencies shall ensure that every officer they employ completes at least the following rounds of firearms requalification during calendar year 2020:  a.  One entire round of firearms requalification with the handgun.  b.  For any officer authorized to carry a shotgun, one entire round of firearms requalification with the shotgun.  c.  For any officer authorized to carry a patrol rifle and/or subgun, two firearms requalification sessions with the patrol rifle and/or subgun, one of which shall be a qualification round and the other a training/familiarization round.
[brief] [...] and [...] emailed mortgage documents to the County Hall of Record and the County Clerk did not make sure that the emailed documents were the true copies of the original in violation of NJSA 2A:82-17.  _Deutsche Bank Nat. v. Mitchell, 27 A. 3d 1229 - NJ: Appellate Div. 2011_  “We held that the trial court should not have considered an assignment that was not "authenticated by an affidavit or certification based on personal knowledge."  The assignments of 2/27/2009 and 2/28/2014 in my case were not authenticated by affidavits or certifications of personal knowledge but [...] blamed it on the County Clerk and the county clerk said she did not examine the recorded documents and the other judges upheld [...]’s invalid and erroneous Orders.  By NJ laws an assignment needs an authentication based NJ R. 1:6-6.
[directive] b.  In order to avoid delay in the collection of evidence in the immediate aftermath of an LE Incident, the [...] may temporarily designate one or more persons employed by the County Prosecutor’s Office where the LE Incident occurred as “Special Deputy Attorneys General” or “Special State Investigators,” who, for the purposes of the temporary designation, will report directly to the [...] and will carry out any investigative functions deemed necessary Director.4 by the OPIA c.
[directive] The prevent appearance at court proceedings and to or her his necessary to assure conditions with that N.J.S.A. 2A:162-17.  Consistent See crimes. committing new from defendant only charged by complaint-warrant defendant need be Directive a under this legislative policy, risk risk to manage the of flight, the appropriate to conditions are condition or some release when obstruct risk that defendant will victims, and/or the and witnesses, community, of the the safety to the State not object in any case where would for example, Thus, process. criminal justice the 2A:162-17(a), it might be see N.J.S.A. personal recognizance," "on released being the defendant obviating for police to the need of acomplaint-summons, means charge by appropriate to just as for to In other or her there up 48 hours. detain him jail and to a county defendant the transport be than complaint-warrant generally would rather by complaint-summons charging by words, the charging decision reliably indicate that of the the time known at when the facts appropriate decision unnecessary delay, pretrial release "without must make the that a court provides 2A:162-17 1 N.J.S.A. jail." when preparing for commitment to Prosecutors defendant's after eligible hours the later than 48 in case but no Administrative has Director of the Courts be advised that the cases should complaint-warrant in appearance a first recommendations program prepare its have the pretrial services goal is to Judiciary's stakeholders that the indicated to complaint- being taken to county jail after a of defendant 24 hours a conditions within release appropriate as to the expiration of 48-hour appearance well before the schedule a first court may Accordingly, the issued.
[brief] Notwithstanding, Defendant [...] was questioned about the investigation performed by Plaintiff into the sewer connection issue and Defendant [...]’s knowledge of Plaintiff attempting to obtain a Certificate of Occupancy in the underlying action.  (Pa1065).  Perhaps most troubling was the line of questioning regarding the termination of the lease agreement, which is directly relevant and probative as to Plaintiff's claims against Defendants in the malpractice lawsuit.  This line of questioning is as follows:  Q.  "What does it say about the tenant’s right to terminate?"  A.  "...but in paragraph 2 it says if the tenant doesn’t receive approvals from the town of [...] for its proposed use of the property for a cafe…and bakery….and a retail clothing store….on or before September 30, 2016. ” (Pa1073, T174:1-15).  Q.  "Do you know whether or not the tenant ever exercised its right to terminate in accordance with this agreement?" (Pa1074-Pa1075, T180:16-18).  A.  "I believe they did that.  I think we did that in October, if I’m not mistaken.  And I know there was probably some discussions with the principals and with your father and I in September."  (Pa1074-Pa1075, T180:19-23).  Q.  "Why was it terminated in October if the tenant was to....wasn’t that after the date of September 30th?" (Pa1074-Pa1075, 180:24-181:1).  A.  "Again, my interpretation of the 30th....is that that’s a trigger date, not a drop dead deadline."  (Pa1074-Pa1075,T181:2-4).  Q. "Did the Plaintiff LLC exercise its right to accelerate the termination of lease as provided for under the rider to the lease?" (Pa1082,T210:15-17).  A.  "I know the lease was terminated in October of 2016."  (Pa1082,T210:18-19).  Q.  "Can you identify any—did you convey that termination?" (Pa1082,T210:20-21).  A.  "Yeah, we kind of did it almost every way in creation.  We did e-mails.  We did regular mail."  (Pa1082,T210:22-24).  D.
[brief] Id., at 10:20 to 12:8.  “It is the duty of the lawyer not to make any statement in his opening remarks which he knows cannot be admitted in evidence. ”  Paxton v. Misiuk, 54 N.J. Super. 15, 20-21 (App. Div. 1959).  The reasons why a case is tried rather than settled “cannot be admitted in evidence” for consideration by a jury evaluating the type of damage claims presented in this case.  It, therefore, would have been improper for Plaintiff to have attempted to introduce any evidence regarding the parties’ pre-trial discussions regarding the merits of the case and the bases upon which either party’s decision to go to trial was made.
[brief] These are errors.  When the U.S. Supreme Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, as it did in Tyler, that rule must be given full retroactive effect even with respect to all events that occurred prior to the Supreme Court’s decision.  Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993).  Even were that not so, this Court decided in [...] v. [...] that Tyler should at least be given “pipeline” retroactivity, i.e., that it should apply to all cases filed and pending when Tyler was decided.  477 N.J. Super. 339, 366 (App. Div. 2023).  This is such a case.  Moreover, this case was brought well within the six-year statute of limitations for takings claims and unjust enrichment claims in New Jersey and therefore is not time-barred.  *Klumpp v. Borough of Avalon*, 202 N.J. 390, 409 (2010) (takings); *Kopin v. Orange Prods., Inc.*, 297 N.J. Super. 353, 373–74 (App. Div. 1997) (unjust enrichment).  The opinion below was based in part on this Court’s decision in *[...] v. [...]*, which is currently pending review at the New Jersey Supreme Court.  Unlike *Tyler* and the present case, *[...]* did not involve a takings claim but was instead an appeal from the vacatur of a foreclosure judgment under Rule 4:50-1(f).  *Tyler* did not necessarily govern the outcome of that case because *Tyler* is not concerned with the appropriateness of foreclosure, but rather with the uncompensated takings that might result from a foreclosure.  Because *[...]* was a foreclosure case involving an equitable remedy—not a takings case involving just compensation—it was appropriate for this Court to hold that *Tyler* should only apply to set aside foreclosure judgments that were already in the pipeline.  Regarding takings cases like the one at bar, however, full retroactive effect is mandatory.
[directive] Directive# 02-16  Page 5  Necessary changes to the prose expungement packet will be forthcoming.  Any question or comments regarding this directive may be directed to the Criminal Practice Division at 609-292-4638.  Attachment cc: Chief Justice [...]  Criminal Division Judges  Municipal Presiding Judges  [...], Chief of Staff  AOC Directors and Assistant Directors  Trial Court Administrators  [...], Special Assistant [...], Special Assistant Criminal Division Managers  Municipal Division Managers  [...], Chief, Criminal Practice  [...], Chief, Criminal Practice  [...], Chief, Municipal Court Services  [...], Assistant Chief, Criminal Practice  [...], Municipal Court Services  [...] · PO Box 037 • [...]  ~New jersey Courts  Administrative Office of the Courts ,."'"  Independence · Integrity • Fairness· Quality Service  [...],J.A.D.  Acting Administrative Director of the Coutts  www.njcourts. com • phone: 609-984-0275 • fax: 609-984-6968  Municipal Court Judges  To: Municipal Court Directors  Municipal <;:ourt Administrators  [...], J.A.  From: Subj: Municipal Courts - Expedited Expungement of Arrest or Charge Records - Amendment to N.J.S.A. 2C:52·6 - Instructions and Forms · Date: May 23,2016
[brief] See id. State of New Jersey v. East Shores, Inc., 164 N.J. Super. 530 (App. Div. 1979), also is instructive.  Water supplied to residents in the [...] was deemed by [...] to be “impure and unpotable”, such that it had to be boiled before use, which is not the case here.  Id. at 533-34.  That situation had been going on for eight years, with no solution in sight, prompting court intervention to order the municipality to implement corrective measures.  *Id.* at 534.  In explaining the court’s authority “to compel the municipality to take some action to furnish an adequate and potable water supply for its deprived residents”, the court cited municipalities’ trustee responsibilities to protect public health and safety.  *Id.* at 537-39.  The *East Shores, Inc.* court acknowledged the line of cases holding “that the distribution of water by a municipality to its inhabitants is a private or proprietary function”, but that “establishment of a water system and its operation for protection against fire and other dangers to the public health and safety constitute a governmental function comprehended in the police power of the municipality”.  *Id.* at 539.  However, the court rejected that supposed distinction: “*It is difficult for us to accept a thesis that providing water for the protection against fire and other dangers is a municipal function but that providing water for domestic use is not.*”  *Id.* at 539-40 (emphasis added).  The court further noted that the “proprietary function” cases were distinguishable, in that they did *not* involve issues associated with ensuring that municipal residents receive clean, potable water.  *Id.* at 540.  Rather, as discussed above, those cases involved municipalities’ efforts to collect unpaid water charges.  *Id.* at 540.  In short, New Jersey courts have made it clear that the line of cases upon which [...] relies is no longer valid.  A municipality’s provision of potable water is no longer considered a “proprietary” function that gives rise to a commercial-type relationship with the residents that receive water service.  The courts have correctly recognized that a municipality does not create an implied contract by providing a governmental service to residents.  Otherwise, virtually every service provided by a municipality would create an implied contract with each resident.  For example, trash collection would create an implied contract.  By way of another example, police and fire service would create implied contracts.  It would be completely unworkable to have individual implied contracts, with unknowable implied terms, with every resident.  C.
[brief] Where these six statutory requirements are met, a franchisor cannot terminate a franchisee without sufficient notice and good cause, regardless of whether the franchisor believes such termination is in the best interest of the franchisor’s business.  See N.J.S.A. 56:10-5.  The NJFPA therefore, creates, generally, an exception to the general rule that two businesses are free to terminate their business relationship according to the terms of their contract.  See N.J.S.A. 56:10-5; see also, Emergency Accessories & Installation, Inc. v. Whelen Eng’g Co., Civil Action No. 09-2652, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46956, note 6 (D.N.J. June 3, 2009)  Indeed, “the NJFPA was aimed at curbing the tendency of franchisors to unduly profit from their superior economic and bargaining positions when negotiating agreements with potential franchisees.
[directive] Rights and Responsibilities of Press at Protests  1.  General right to cover protests.  Just as the First Amendment protects the right of members of the public to peaceably assemble, it also protects the right of journalists to cover and report on those protests without interference from law enforcement.  Under no circumstances may police arrest a member of the press—or take any other action—in retaliation for press coverage, or to prevent lawful reporting on a public protest.  2.  Members of the press remain subject to general laws.  Prohibitions on unlawful conduct that apply to the public generally also apply to the press, with some exceptions.  Journalists are not permitted to engage in otherwise illegal conduct just because they are reporting on a protest, but oftentimes members of the press are specifically exempted from certain legal restrictions.  For instance, curfew orders put in place by municipalities during times of unrest often contain an exemption for journalists.  Law enforcement should be aware of any such exemptions.  Moreover, given the importance of protecting First Amendment activity, police officers should exercise discretion in enforcing minor violations of the law in this context (see below).  3.  Right to record.  Federal and state courts have held that the First Amendment protects the right of the press and of the public to film or otherwise record police performing their official duties in public.  This right may be subject to generally applicable time, place, and manner restrictions that, for example, protect officer safety and prevent interference with law enforcement activity.  Any such restrictions cannot be motivated by the desire to avoid having police activity filmed.  Role of Law Enforcement at Protests
[brief] In Count IV, Plaintiffs assert a violation of the United State Constitution under 42 U.S.C § 1983 and in Count V, Plaintiffs assert a violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act. \(^1\)  42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, as follows:  Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
[brief] 27  In re B.G., Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 N.J. CSC LEXIS 220 (Mar. 24, 2017).........................................................  17  In re Bridgewater, 95 N.J. 235 (1984)...............................................................................................  28  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474 (2007)............................................................................................. 16  In re F.P., No. A-1368-13T4, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1375 (App. Div. June 10, 2015).
[brief] .................  32 | Document Name | Date | Page Number | |-------------------------------|---------------|-------------| | Decision on Motion to Dismiss | May 23, 2023 | Pa1 | ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases: | Page(s) | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Campbell v. Dep’t of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963) | 13 | | Citizens to Protect Public Funds v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Bd. of Ed., 13 N.J. 172 (1953) | passim | | Dericks v. Schiavoni, No. A-0538-09T1, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1393, at *1, *12 (App. Div. June 1, 2011) | 13 | | Fisher v. Hamilton, Docket No. A-4441-11T3, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1773 (App. Div. July 17, 2013) | 30 | | Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992) | 12 | | Levine v. State Dep’t of Transp., 338 N.J. Super. 28, 32 (App.
[brief] The first two issues are easily dealt with: [...] was a central aspect of defendant’s cross-examination of [...], and the State had given defendant and his attorneys all possible information about his case.  That is the literal subject of his counseled brief, that he wanted to cross examine on more information he had on [...].  (Db52-56).  Additionally, at trial during the cross examination of [...] regarding Hill, defense counsel even stated that the prosecutor provided “extensive discovery” about Hill’s case.  (28T:170-20 to 24).  Thus, discovery was clearly provided, and fails the first step of the Brady analysis.
[brief] 10  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## AUTHORITY: ### Cases: - **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.**, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) ...........................................8 - **Donofry v. Autotote Systems, Inc.**, 350 N.J. Super. 276 (App. Div. 2001)..........................7 - **McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
[brief] On or about July 8, 2019, the Bill Ricci Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Ricci Act”) was signed into law.  On or about March 3, 2023, [...], along with many others, filed his Eligibility Registration Form to register his presence at Ground Zero under the Ricci Act, along with a Request for Amended Benefits Form, Affidavit, and a Petition.  Pa29.  On or about May 2, 2023, the [...] administratively denied Wise’s appeal and the matter was transmitted to the [...].  Pa26.  On or about June 14, 2023, the [...] issued an initial decision to deny Wise’s request to register for the Ricci Act.  Pa23.  On or about July 18, 2023, Wise appealed the Board’s initial decision and requested an administrative hearing.  Pa15.  The Board denied an administrative hearing and issued a Final Agency Decision on September 27, 2023.  Pa9.  This appeal ensued.  Pa1.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] In addition, since the termination, [...] has confiscated all of Plaintiff’s personal office belongings.  Id., ¶ 89.  [...] has failed and refused to return these items to Plaintiff.  Id., ¶ 90.  [...] has also improperly scrubbed any mention of Plaintiff and his success from the Firm’s website, in many instances wrongfully attributing the winning outcomes to himself instead, in violation of the New Jersey ethics rules prohibiting false attorney advertising, RPC 7.1, as detailed in the verified, First Amended Complaint.