[brief] [...] Properly Analyzed and Applied  Neuwirth  In Neuwirth, the plaintiff began employment with the State as an assistant commissioner for the Department of Health in October 2018.  476 N.J. Super. at 382.  On May 28, 2020, the plaintiff was terminated.  *Id.* at 384.  According to the plaintiff, people associated with “the State and/or Governor’s Office” anonymously and falsely reported to the media that he had been terminated because he did not disclose and obtain approval for outside consulting work, and that he had poor attendance while employed by the State.  *Id.* at 385.  At a May 29, 2020 press briefing, [...] stated about the plaintiff, *inter alia*:  “... folks are not – it’s par for the course that you’re not supposed to have another source of income, that’s just as a general matter.  We’ll leave it there. ”  *Id.*  During a June 1, 2020 press briefing, [...], in response to a question about the vacancy created by the plaintiff’s termination, stated, *inter alia*:  “I don’t have a good answer about anyone else who may have a second job .  . . .  But you basically, someone has to declare themselves and seek basically a waiver or an exemption for it, I think is the right way to put it. ”  *Id.* at 385-386.  After [...] described the approval process for outside employment, [...] noted that their comments were “not specific to any one individual. ”  *Id.* at 386.  Following a cease and desist letter to the State, the plaintiff sued the State under various theories and eventually filed a fourth amended complaint alleging defamation against Governor.  *Id.* at 386-387.  The State Defendants moved to dismiss and the trial court denied the motion.  *Id.* at 389.  This Court granted leave to appeal and reversed, holding that the plaintiff failed to adequately plead actual malice.  *Id.* at 389-393.  [...] properly analyzed and applied *Neuwirth* in relation to the question of actual malice in [...]’s case.  He correctly pointed out that in *Neuwirth*, there were no facts “from which a factfinder could conclude [...] knew, or had serious doubts about, the veracity of the alleged defamatory statements he made. ” (Da 204) (quoting *Neuwirth*, 476 N.J. Super. at 393).  In contrast, [...] noted that here, “[[...]] has presented detailed facts .  . . .” (Da 204).  [...] provided further analysis in the Amplification Order.  First, he recited the actual malice standard as set forth in *Lynch*, 161 N.J. at 165 (Da 215).  Then, as discussed *supra*, he harmonized *Neuwirth* with *St. Amant*, correctly pointing out that actual malice may lie where the defendants publish a story that is “wholly unbelievable. ” (Da 215) (quoting *Neuwirth*, 476 N.J. Super. at 391-392 (citing *Lynch*, 161 N.J. at 165-166)).  And, on pages six and eight of the Amplification Order, [...] again pointed out that the level of detail in the case at bar far exceeded that of *Neuwirth*:  “the Complaint in *Neuwirth* pales in comparison to the record here . . . the allegations in the Amended Complaint demonstrate ‘wholly unbelievable’ and ‘reliance on an informant of dubious veracity. ’” (Da 216-18).  Thus, [...] recognized that under *Neuwirth*, the [...] can be held liable because they re-published [...]’s absolutely wild third-hand account from a dubious informant about a grandmotherly teacher attacking a second grader, a story that could fairly be characterized on its face as “wholly unbelievable. ”  III.