ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Most critically, Plaintiff did not have a valid contract for sale of the subject property due to the fact that it failed to intervene in the underlying foreclosure action, and there can be no liability extended to Defendants for failing to tell Plaintiff to intervene in the underlying foreclosure action.  . . .  Defendants’ responsibility would have only attached subsequently if a court approved the transaction, a valid deed was provided from the [...] to Plaintiff, and then from Plaintiff to Defendants, thereby satisfying the condition precedent to the formation of the contract for title insurance.
[brief] There, the defendant was spending time at his girlfriend’s house, and there were two other men at the house with whom the defendant had a turbulent history.  _Carrero_, 229 N.J. at 122-23.  According to the girlfriend, during a moment when the defendant and one of the men were left alone in the kitchen, she heard a gunshot and came down to see the defendant standing over the victim holding a gun; the victim pleaded with the defendant, but he ultimately shot the person in the head.  *Id.* at 124.  The defendant, meanwhile, testified that the man threatened him with the gun while they were alone, and a physical struggle ensued in which multiple shots were fired that struck the victim.  *Ibid.*  Although the defendant argued a theory of self-defense rather than passion/provocation at the trial, the Supreme Court found that the testimony was nonetheless sufficient for a passion/provocation instruction.  Specifically, the Court stated, although a verbal disagreement would not be enough, “the presence of the gun could have provoked a reasonable person in defendant’s position. ”  *Id.* at 130.  The Court went on to note that a jury could have reasonably inferred the victim was the first one to pull out a gun, and that even if he did not, “the physical struggle between [...] and defendant constituted a battery, which we have said rises to the level of adequate provocation. ”  *Ibid.*  As to the fact of the instruction being inconsistent with the defense’s theory of the case, the Court also held that, “[a] defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction rationally supported by the evidence, even if the instruction is inconsistent with the defense theory. ”  *Id.* at 128.  In [...]’s case, there was similarly sufficient testimony to warrant an instruction on passion/provocation manslaughter.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO [...].  (13T 87:24 to 101:11).  Though it reviews a trial court’s summary judgment decision de novo, this Court must still “accept as true” the non-moving party’s version of the facts, giving it “the benefit of all inferences favorable to its claim.  R. 4:46-2; Bernard v. IMI Systems, Inc., 131 N.J. 91, 93 (1993).  All inferences of doubt are in favor of the non- movant.  See Brill vs. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1985).  A court should deny summary judgment when determinations of material disputed facts depend primarily on credibility evaluations or when the existence of a genuine issue of material fact appears from the discovery materials or from the pleadings and affidavits on the motion.
[brief] (Pa261).  At his deposition, played for the jury, [...] denied using profanity with plaintiff and stated he was very “professional, kind” to plaintiff (9T13:4-13), but could not say why the plaintiff would want to get his name so bad.  (8T222:19-223:13).  When asked by [...] whether he was wearing a name tag in his interactions with the plaintiff, [...] looked down to his right side where his tag was affixed to the bottom of his untucked t-shirt.  (4T46:1-7).  [...] acknowledged that that was where [...] had been wearing his blue name tag when he interviewed him.
[brief] [...] Personally Served [...]  Mr. [...] has personally served thousands of individuals in his twenty years as a process server.  T4 10:3; 27:11.  Mr. Sanchez’s daily workload could include up to 15 to 20 processes.  Deposition of [...], 0274a 7:12-13; 8:18.  Mr. Sanchez testified he does not know anything about the parties he is serving “prior to going to an address. ”  T4 30:3-8.  Mr. Sanchez further testified he does not search for the names of the parties prior to service as “[t]hat would take too long. ”  T4 32:3-6.  Mr. Sanchez testified it is his regular practice to capture and put into his affidavits of service the “approximate age, approximate height, approximate weight, color, race, hair color” and relationship of the party being served at the time of personal service.  T4 32:19-25; 33:1-15.  Mr. Sanchez testified that he inquires about the nature of the relationship between the individual being served to the defendant at the time of service.  T4 33:11-13.  In the subject Affidavit of Service, Mr. Sanchez attests to the following facts:  - He successfully served the Summons and Complaint on Monday, August 23, 2021 at 9:25am on an individual at [...].  - The individual had the following physical characteristics: - Caucasian female - over the age of 45 - had brown hair - had a height of five feet and six inches - weighed over 135 pounds - The individual he served identified herself as “[...]. ”  0016a.  Mr. Sanchez testified at the bench trial that the factual contents of the Affidavit of Service were true.  T4 33:16-20.  IV.
[brief] ”  Veras, No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176, at *24 (quoting R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat’l Consumer Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 255, 272-73 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  With respect to the legislative intent of the NJCFLA, the NJCFLA’s intended mechanisms of enforcement, and the history of the same, the Court must certainly consider the NJCFLA’s statutory predecessors, discussed supra, for context.
[brief] In other --- 15 Appellant incorrectly identifies the date of this transaction as December 6, 2008 and the destination as [...]’s Capital One account.  words, [...] would still owe the company $1 million from what he took.  (34T 67:15 to 70:3).  [...] did not even know that [...] wrote that $2 million check to his own personal account.  (30T 49:5-7).  -
[brief] In June 2021, the Defendants\(^3\), [...] and [...] entered into a two-year residential lease with Plaintiff [...] (“[...]”) for a unit in --- \(^2\)  Pursuant to R. 2:6-8, The transcript of the October 20, 2023 argument is designated as 1T, and the transcript of the November 8, 2023 decision is designated as 2T.  \(^3\)  Defendants” in this brief refers to [...] and Gemma Walshe only.  [...] was named as a defendant below, but is not a party to this appeal.  [...]’s apartment building in Jersey City, Jersey\(^5\).  2T3-16 – 2T3-17; Da29.  To promote rental of apartments at its building, and to incentivize two-year rental commitments, [...] offered tenants reduced pricing for two-year leases, characterized as four months of “free” rent and parking concessions, which for Defendants amounted to $17,920.  2T3-18 – 2T3-21.  The written lease agreement, prepared by [...] using standardized form contracts, included a 15-page “Apartment Lease Contract” (Da29), plus 16 separate sub-agreements called “Riders,” totaling 31 additional pages.  Da44-75.  The Apartment Lease Contract contained the essential terms of the lease in sections 1 and 2, including the landlord’s agreement to “give possession of the Apartment… to the Tenant for the Term” and the tenant’s agreement to “pay the Rent to the Landlord[,] due the first day of each month [and] considered late if it is received after the 5th of the month. ”  Da31.  Section 3 the lease specified monetary remedies that would be treated as “Additional Rent [i]f the Tenant fails to comply with any agreement in this Lease”  Da31.  The “Additional Rent” provision specified “a late fee of 5% of the unpaid rent…if rent is not received in the office by the fifth (5th) of the month” and “attorney's fees and court costs incurred by the Landlord as a result of the Tenant's violation of this Lease. ”  Da31.  --- \(^5\)  Gemma Walshe was a co-signer, but did not reside at the apartment.  Among the 16 separate lease riders was one called “Rent Concession or other Discount Rider” (Da44) which stated, in section 1, “As consideration for your agreement to lease or remain in your apartment and to fulfill your Lease obligations throughout the full term of your Lease, you will receive the following rent concession and/or discount:” followed by lines with inserted text itemizing the $17,920 in “free rent” and other discounts previously promised by [...].
[brief] Super. 704 (App. Div. 1988) | 19 | | State v. Abdullah, 184 N.J. 497 (2005) | 44, 45| | State v. Ball, 268 N.J. Super. 72 (App. Div. 1993) | 44 | | State v. Behn, 375 N.J. Super. 409 (App. Div. 2005) | 12 | | State v. Berry, 140 N.J. 280 (1995) | 11 | | State v. Bielkiewicz, 267 N.J. Super. 520 (App. Div. 1993) | 23 | | State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601 (2010) | 43 | | State v. Brown, 80 N.J. 587 (1979) | 35 | | State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413 (2001) | 46 | | State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) | 43 | | State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165 (2009) | 43 | State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54 (2008) ................................................................. 12, 15 State v. Cito, 213 N.
[brief] State v. E.J.H., 466 N.J. Super. 32, 37 (App. Div. 2021).  For a defendant’s factual basis to adequately support his guilty plea, he must “provide a factual statement or acknowledge all of the facts that comprise the essential elements of the offense to which [he] pleads guilty. ”  State v. Perez, 220 N.J. 423, 433-34 (2015).  The defendant’s admission or acknowledgment “should be examined in light of all surrounding circumstances and in the context of an entire plea colloquy. ”  *State ex rel. T.M.*, 166 N.J. 319, 327 (2001).
[brief] To the extent the Trial Court believed Plaintiffs were mistaken in their good faith beliefs in the merits of their claims, mistaken in their optimism in seeking a remedy, mistaken in their reliance on [...]’s holding, or mistaken in their understanding of [...]’s holding, none of that justifies a holding that Plaintiffs acted in bad faith.  It is impossible under these facts and circumstances for [...] to have proven that Plaintiffs acted in bad faith, and it is impossible for the Trial Court to have come to that conclusion absent abuse of discretion and undue animus against Plaintiffs.  The Trial Court’s error should be reversed.
[brief] Appellant claims that [...]’s dock will unreasonably interfere with the ability to navigate to and from Barnegat Bay contrary to N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.7 (Navigational Channels) and N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5 (Recreational Docks and Piers).  The record reflects that it does not.  (JRa004-JRa011 and the thumb drive submitted to the Appellate Division herewith containing the videos served on the NJDEP with that document).  As previously noted above, Appellant conflates the elements of the 2017 WFD Permit and the 2019 Permit Modification to bolster its challenge to the 2019 Permit Modification.
[brief] 2T13:16-22, 2T15:17-19, 2T16:5-11.  These findings make no sense.  After all, if plaintiffs own the properties and entered into home improvement contracts to repair or renovate their own properties, who else would they be contracting for?  It does not matter if a homeowner intends to fix and rent its property or fix and sell it; the law protects the owner from violations of the CFA because home improvements are expressly and explicitly governed by statute.  To hold otherwise would immunize contractors who violated the CFA simply because the property owner chose to sell the property.  This cannot be the intended result of the CFA.  Nor would it matter if [...] was a general contractor or not, though he wasn’t, because Plaintiffs were still damaged by Defendants’ conduct.  There is no question that “a homeowner who contracts directly with a building contractor to perform a home improvement, without engaging the services of a general contractor, may assert a claim against that contractor under the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S. 56:8-1 to -20, and the Contractor's Registration Act, N.J.S. 56:8-136 to -152.
[brief] The Legislature placed special emphasis on the water resources in the preservation area, and its goals to “protect, restore, and enhance the quality and quantity of surface and ground waters therein” and “promote conservation of water resources. ”  N.J.S.A. 13:20-10(b)(1), (6).  Notably, for development in the Highlands Region, the Highlands Act and Rules do not contain separate air pollution standards for projects in the Region, but projects may otherwise be subject to the standards of the Air Pollution Control Act, N.J.S.A. 26:2C-1.1 to -68.
[brief] See J.D. ex rel. Scipio-Derrick v. Davy, 415 N.J. Super. 375, 397 (App. Div. 2010) (affirming dismissal with prejudice of equal protection claim in accordance with R. 4:6-2 and noting that “when an equal protection challenge fails to state a claim, our courts have not hesitated to dismiss the complaint with prejudice”).  POINT VII
[brief] Meaning  If you move over OR slow down, that means you didn’t violate the statute.]  Using the supreme judge’s interpretations, I did not violate this statute based on the officer’s own testimony.  1T:14-(6-9)  Here the officer states the person needs to either slow down or move over.  4T:22-(11-20)  Here the officer states that I am in the center lane.  4T:26-(10-22)  Here the officer testifies that his own body cam shows he is going 45 mph in a 50mph zone and that he was immediately behind me.  4T:20-(3-4)  This stands to reason that I was also going 45 or under.  That is more than 10% less than the posted speed limit.  Which means I slowed down below the posted speed limit as required as the statute clearly states.
[brief] (29T165-16 to 168-10)  He admitted that the plea agreement required that he testify against Defendant and that he would not get the reduced sentence if he did not testify.  (32T41-18 to 42-8)  [...] was previously in prison for three drug charges and a gun charge for which he was sentenced on August 21, 2015, to a prison term of three years flat running concurrent to three and a half years.
[brief] Order of the Honorable [...] Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice, dated March 27, 2023 ......................................................Pa67 Order of the Honorable [...] Granting Reinstatement, dated March 27, 2023 .................................................................Pa69  Exhibit A to Defendant’s Letter Brief - Order of the Honorable [...] Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint without Prejudice for Failure to State a Claim, dated December 6, 2022 (Reproduced herein at pp. Pa49-Pa50) Exhibit B to Defendant’s Letter Brief - Order of the Honorable [...] Granting Reinstatement, dated March 27, 2023 (Reproduced herein at p. Pa69) Exhibit C to Defendant’s Letter Brief - Order of the Honorable [...] Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice, dated March 27, 2023 (Reproduced herein at pp. Pa67-Pa68)
[brief] On April 10, 2021, Florence Township Police Detective [...]\(^2\) was on patrol in Florence Township when he saw a vehicle, a white Ford F-150 pick-up truck driven by defendant, [...], turn right on a red light at the intersection of Route 130 and Florence-Columbus Road.  [4T34-5 to -22].  Turning right on a red light is illegal at the intersection.  [4T34-19 to -20].  Detective Miller effectuated a stop of defendant’s vehicle.  [4T34-23 to -25].  Detective Miller approached the vehicle on the passenger’s side of the car.  [4T35-21 to -22].  Defendant and co-defendant, [...], were in the vehicle.  [4T35-1 to -2].  Defendant appeared nervous to the detective.  [4T35-23 to -24].  Co-defendant [...] interrupted the officer and stopped defendant from answering the officer’s questions.  [4T36-7 to -11].  Defendant would not make eye contact with the officer when the officer was speaking to him.  [4T36-9 to -10].  Because of defendant’s behavior, Detective Miller believed that “something [was] wrong” and asked defendant to step out of the car.  [4T40-14 to -16].  Defendant gave the detective answers that were contradictory to each other.  [4T36-16 to -20].  When asked where he was --- \(^2\)  At the time of the stop, Detective Miller was a patrolman in the Florence Township Police Department.  coming from, he answered, “New Jersey. ”  When asked where he was going, he answered, “New Jersey. ”  [Da16; 4T41-12 to -18].  Co-defendant [...] remained in the vehicle while the officers spoke to defendant.  [Da16].  [...], who had arrived on the scene to assist Detective Miller, told [...] to stop touching bags that were in the car.  [4T41-22 to 42-2].  Defendant was more concerned with co-defendant’s actions than speaking to the officer.  [4T42-12 to -13; 4T44-2 to -5].
[brief] Plaintiff, [...], (“[...]”), alleges that on March 16, 2017 he fell due to snow or ice on the parking lot at premises located at [...] (hereinafter referred to as the “Premises”).  [Pa437 at Para. 1]  (emphasis added).  [...] claims “…, at all times and specifically on March 16, 2017, Plaintiff, Vito Collucci, was a pedestrian lawfully walking on the parking lot… at [...]. ”  [Pa437, Para. 1]  (emphasis added).  In answers to interrogatories [...] certifies that “…. the subject accident took place on or about March 16, 2017 at the shopping center at 140 Rifle Camp Road in Woodland Park, NJ.  Plaintiff was walking from his vehicle to a restaurant in the shopping center when he slipped and fell on black ice in the parking lot”.  [Pa621 at Para. 2]  (emphasis added).  The applicable statute of limitations expired on March 16, 2019.
[brief] [6T 106-11 to 109-12].  It never did.  Although [...] concluded that the project would not cause a substantial impairment to the intent and purposes of the zone plan and zoning ordinance (6T 66-12 to 67-8), he continued with the proofs required by *Sica*.  In this regard, he noted the evolution of the design to mitigate the impacts perceived by the Board and how [...] had revised its plans accordingly.
[brief] Pa909  Exhibit Y - [...] and [...] v. [...], et al, Docket No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div., Mar. 26, 2019) .................................................................  Pa922  Proposed Order, [...], filed August 30, 2022 .................................................................  Pa934  Proof of Service, [...], filed August 30, 2022 .................................................................  Pa936  VOLUME VI
[brief] Therefore, instructional errors on essential \(^{10}\)  Because the judge and counsel discussed this issue so many times, and the judge sustained the defense objections at those times, but then no objection was lodged at the actual time of the instruction, appellate defense counsel has labeled this error “partially raised below. ”  matters, even in cases where those errors are not raised at all below, are traditionally deemed prejudicial and reversible error because they interfere with the jury’s proper assessment of the defendant’s culpability.  *State v. Rhett*, 127 N.J. 3, 5-7 (1992); *Concepcion*, 111 N.J. at 379.  More specifically, it will always be reversible error for a jury instruction to fail to explain all the correct elements of a crime, even where the jury would have almost certainly found those elements had it been properly instructed.  *State v. Vick*, 117 N.J. 288, 292 (1989) (failing to properly charge the “absence of a gun permit” element of unlawful possession of a firearm without a permit is reversible plain error even in a case where the defendant could not possibly have had a permit because he did not own the weapon in question).  That rule is so strict because an improperly deficient jury instruction on a critical element means that there can be no proper jury findings under that instruction.  *Id.* at 291.  “[T]here is simply no substitute for a jury verdict. ”  *Id.*; see also *State v. Bailey*, 231 N.J. 474, 489 (2018) (conviction reversed when jury instruction failed to define an element properly and thus “the jury could not have made a finding on that issue”).  The Sixth Amendment and the state constitution guarantee no less than a jury verdict on every element of the crime, even if an element is uncontested or conceded, and without a proper explanation of that element, the verdict is not valid.  *Vick*, 117 N.J. at 291; *Bailey*, 231 N.J. at 489.  Thus, even where there has been no objection lodged by trial counsel, an erroneous instruction on such a fundamental matter will necessarily be deemed plain error worthy of reversal.  *State v. Jordan*, 147 N.J. 409, 422-423 (1997), citing *Vick*, 117 N.J. at 291.  Here, as noted, despite repeatedly saying she would do so, the judge never explained the legal duties of a suspended state trooper to the jury.
[brief] A motion for reconsideration was filed by the [...] on August 17, 2023.  Plaintiff followed with a similar motion.  On October 6, 2023, [...] entered an Order Denying the Motion to Reconsider with a Statement of Reasons.  (Aa411 to 414).  On October 9, 2023, [...] filed its appeal of the Orders of August 14, 2023 and October 6, 2023, to the Appellate Division.  The value or potential future worth of the Premises, based upon what [...] contracted to pay of $150,000.00 appears at odds with the characterization that Defendant caused or has perpetuated a “scourge in [...],” . . “put children and families of [...] in danger.
[brief] (PA1-2)  A. Standard of Review.  Evidentiary decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 12 (2008).  In particular, “[c]ourts have a broad discretion in determining the scope of cross-examination. ”  State v. Silva, 131 N.J. 438, 444 (1993).  An appellate court may overturn the trial court's evidentiary decision if there is a clear error of judgment or the decision lacks the support of credible evidence in the record.  Estate of Hanges v. Met. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 384 (2010); see also State ex rel. J.A., 195 N.J. 324, 340 (2008) (finding abuse of discretion in admitting hearsay statement as present sense impression); State v. Kemp, 195 N.J. 136, 149 (2008) (finding abuse of discretion in admitting N.J.R.E. 404(b) evidence).  A judgment based on an evidentiary error will be reversed if the error “was ‘clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ’”  Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480, 502 (1999) (quoting R. 2:10–2); see also Kemp, supra, 195 N.J. at 149–50 (finding admission of N.J.R.E. 404(b) evidence to be harmful error).  Review of a judge's conclusions of law is plenary.  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) ("A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.").  “The standard of review on appeal from decisions on motions for a new trial is the same as that governing the trial judge -- whether there was a miscarriage of justice under the law. ”  Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 521 (2011); accord R. 2:10-1 (“The trial court’s ruling on such a motion shall not be reversed unless it clearly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law. ”).  A “miscarriage of justice” can arise when there is a “manifest lack of inherently credible evidence to support the finding,” when there has been an “obvious overlooking or under-valuation of crucial evidence,” or when the case culminates in “a clearly unjust result. ”  Risko, supra, 206 N.J. at 521-22 (quoting Lindenmuth v. Holden, 296 N.J. Super. 42, 48 (App. Div. 1996)).  Moreover, "[w]here the issue does not involve the trial court's fact-finding role, but rather its exercise of discretion, [we] will not interfere unless the trial judge has 'pursue[d] a manifestly unjust course."  Diakamopoulos v. Monmouth Med. Ctr., 312 N.J. Super. 20, 36-37 (App. Div. 1998) (quoting Gillman v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 286 N.J. Super. 523, 528 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 174 (1996)).  B.  Impermissible Use of Hearsay Documents.