ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Authority to Use Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  10.1  An officer authorized to use a less-lethal device pursuant to this policy may fire or discharge the device during an actual operation, only against: (a) an active assailant; (b) a threatening assailant who will not voluntarily submit to custody after having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so considering the exigency of the situation and the immediacy of the need to employ law enforcement force; or (c) a person who is attempting to cause death or serious bodily injury to him/herself; or (d) a fleeing suspect if clear and convincing evidence exists to believe the suspect has committed a crime in which the suspect caused or attempted to cause death or serious bodily injury.  10.2  Officers shall reevaluate the situation and reassess the need to use force before any second or subsequent firing or discharge of a less-lethal device against the same person.  Any second or subsequent firing or discharge of a less-lethal device must be necessary and justified by the circumstances at that moment.  10.3  Less-lethal instruments, ammunition, or impact projectiles shall not be used at a lesser or greater distance than that specified and approved by the Attorney General.  10.4  When it can be reasonably accomplished without increasing the danger to officers or others, an officer about to discharge a less-lethal device should advise other law enforcement officers at the scene prior to the discharge of the less-lethal weapon.  This is to minimize the possibility that the firing of a less-lethal platform or ammunition would provoke other officers to discharge their weapons.  10.5  Weapons used for the deployment of less than lethal platforms or ammunition shall be dedicated exclusively for that purpose.  These weapons shall be clearly marked so as to distinguish them from firearms intended for the use of lethal ammunition.  The use of other than less-lethal ammunition in these designated weapons is prohibited unless it is immediately necessary to protect the life of a law enforcement officer or other person, and there is no other means available.  10.6  During the deployment of less-lethal devices or ammunition, the deploying officer and supervisor shall, when feasible, continually evaluate the options selected against changing circumstances.  10.7  Acceptable less-lethal impact projectiles/ammunition will be only those which are designed for single target-specific engagement from a minimum standoff distance as approved by the Attorney General.  13  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] In New Jersey, the interpretation of indemnification language must be determined on a case-by-case basis.  In *Mantilla v. NC Mall Associates*, 167 N.J. 262 (2001), the Supreme Court opined that the objective in construing a contractual indemnity provision was to determine the intent of the parties involved.  *Mantilla* at 269.  In *Englert*, the court held that the indemnification clause was ambiguous because it did not unequivocally provide for indemnification for the contractor’s own negligence.  *Englert* at 57.  In the *Estate of D’Avila*, the indemnification provision was found to be “sufficiently plain and unequivocal” to require indemnification for the general contractor’s own negligence.  *D’Avila* at 114.
[brief] Any person may request publication of an opinion by letter to the Committee on Opinions explaining the basis of the request with specificity and with reference to the guidelines prescribed by paragraph (d).  In the case of Appellate Division opinions, the Committee shall transmit the request to the presiding judge of the panel together with its recommendation, but the court shall retain the publication decision which will be exercised in the manner described in paragraph (a).  (d)  Guidelines for Publication.
[brief] M1 Order Designating the Honorable [...], P.J.Cv. to Appoint a Special Hearing officer of the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. dated and entered on October 14, 2020 ....................................  M65  Memorandum of Honorable [...], P.J.Cv. dated October 14, 2020 granting permission to [...] to Appoint [...], Esq. as Special Hearing Officer .................................................. M66  Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. dated and entered June 16, 2021 ...........................................  M462  Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. dated and entered September 14, 2021 ....................................  M474  Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. dated and entered August 9, 2022 ..........................................  M477  Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. dated and entered March 10, 2023 .........................................  M718 | REFERENCE/PROCEDING TYPE | DATE | |---------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------| | (1T)
[directive] 1 listopada  The following questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty to one of the following first or second degree crimes, on or after June 29, 2001: or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such crime, that occurred murder, aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter, vehicular homicide, aggravated assault, disarming a law enforcement officer, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, robbery, carjacking, aggravated arson by placing another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury, burglary, theft by extortion by obtaining property of another by threatening to inflict bodily injury on, or physically confine or distributing of CDS facilities or strict liability for drug restrain anyone or commit another offense, booby traps in manufacturing or occurred on or after June 18, 2002: induced deaths; or that terrorism, or producing or possessing chemical weapons, biological occurred on or after January 13, 2008: agents or nuclear or radiological devices; or that first degree racketeering; or that occurred on or after August 14, 2013: occurred on or after November 1, 2013: child pornography; or that firearms trafficking.
[directive] Moreover, case law supports the proposition that the police do not have an affirmative obligation to transport, or arrange transportation for a DWI defendant, following the administration of the breath tests and issuance of a summons.  State v. Ettore, 228 N.J. Super. at 30-31; State v. Weber, 220 N.J. Super. 420, 424 (App. Div. 1987), certif. den. 109 N.J. 39 (1987); State v. Hudes, 128 N.J. Super. at 606.  Likewise, the police do not have an affirmative obligation to arrange for, or consent to, independent tests to be performed by a non-police agency such as a hospital.  State v. Weber, 220 N.J. Super. at 424; State v. Ettore, 228 N.J. Super. at 31; State v. Hudes, 128 N.J. Super. at 606.  Cf., State v. Hicks, 228 N.J. Super. at 550.  These cases effectively stand for the proposition that the police cannot impermissibly interfere with a defendant’s attempts to obtain an independent test.  State v. Greeley, 178 N.J. 38, 43-5 (2003).  In addition, the fact that a hospital may refuse to perform such tests with or without police consent cannot be held against the State.  State v. Weber, 220 N.J. Super. at 424; State v. Ettore, 228 N.J. Super. at 31; State v. Hudes, 128 N.J. Super. at 606.  With the adoption of “John’s Law,” P.L.2001, c.69, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 & 39:4-50.23, the ability of a defendant to secure an independent test may be somewhat restricted, but that restriction should not be viewed as police interference.
[brief] *Phoenix Pinelands Corp*, 467 N.J. Super. at 592-593.  Here, after filing its Complaint in this litigation, [...] searched for the heirs of [...] and obtained quitclaim deeds from eight of these alleged heirs.  Each deed indicates that it was acquired for the nominal consideration of only $500.00.  Thereby, [...] attempted to assert the quitclaim deeds, which it only paid a total of $4,000.00 to obtain, now gives it the ownership rights in a large parcel of beachfront property directly adjacent to the Raritan Bay.  This is nowhere close to the reasonable value of what an interest in the [...] would be worth.  Not only would [...] be obtaining beachfront property for a nominal amount, there is also the issue of unpaid taxes.  Since the Borough obtained the Property in 1939, there have been no taxes assessed on it since it has been owned by the municipality.  As indicated above, a municipality is permitted to assess and collect taxes against title holders of riparian grants.  *[...], supra.*  Thus, if there has been some other owner of Lot 3.01, the Borough could have collected property taxes from that owner from 1939 to the present.  If the Court finds that [...] has any interest in the [...], it would be obtaining a substantial windfall in that it would be receiving interest in a parcel of property that, if not owned by the municipality, could and would have been taxed for over eighty years.  To allow [...] to claim an interest in the Property by way of quitclaim deeds obtained from heirs of a defunct corporation that has not asserted any ownership rights to the Property for roughly one hundred years, at the expense of the Borough who has owned and maintained the Property since 1939, would be inequitable.
[brief] The third amended complaint, which included claims against [...], was filed on September 23, 2019, one hundred and ninety one (191) days after the tolling of the applicable statute of limitations.  On April 7, 2017 plaintiffs counsel’s private investigator, [...], went to the premises and (i) interviewed an owner of defendant, [...] [...] d/b/a [...] (improperly pled as [...]) (hereinafter referred to as “[...]”).
[brief] INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT  Plaintiff-Appellant [...]’s father, [...] wanted to benefit his son by forgiving upon his death, his son’s obligation on the mortgage he held on his son’s house.  Because the Defendant-Respondent in this matter, [...] failed to draft an unambiguous provision accomplishing this objective in Francesco’s will, the Probate Court was required to interpret the provision and it interpreted it to deprive [...] of his inheritance.  The Trial Court below held that the failure to sue the scrivener of the will in the Probate matter and the decision of the Probate Court insulate the scrivener from liability.  Plaintiff-Appellants submit this result is not just nor in accordance with our precedent.  This Appeal presents several questions to this Court.
[brief] M511.  The 2022 Order adopting the SHO Resolution, determined that the SHO Resolution decision on the affordable housing trust funds was denied without prejudice to the ability of the Respondents to make the application to the Court seeking the same relief.  M481.  As indicated above, the scope of the role of the SHO was set forth in the 2020 Order; and further encompassed in MLUL inasmuch as the SHO was acting as the Board.  However, neither the 2020 Order, nor the MLUL imbue the SHO with authority to compel municipal use of eminent domain or the use of affordable housing trust funds to aid an applicant.  In light of this fact, the provisions in the SHO Resolution and the 2022 Order concerning the use eminent domain and affordable housing trust funds to aid the Respondents must eliminated.  CONCLUSION
[brief] The resolution "resolved" that [...] could install a pizza oven and sell take out pizzas.  (Pa 76-78).  The Resolution required the applicant to publish a notice of the Board's decision in the newspaper within ten days.  No proof of this notice was produced at trial.  (Pa 79-86).  [...] operated with a limited menu of pizzas and subs.  (Pa 87; T3 at 29:6-11)).  [...] closed in 2010.  (T1 at 107:8-108:1; T2 at 137:12-25).
[brief] ”  If some evidence is presented tending to disprove the return [of service], but is not sufficient to establish that the return is false, the presumption is nevertheless eliminated from the case.  "If the opposing party introduces evidence 'tending to disprove' the presumed fact, the presumption disappears."  Ahn v. Kim, 145 N.J. 423, 439 (1996) (quoting N.J.R.E. 301).  "A presumption . . . is no substitute for affirmative proofs."  State v. Cuccio, 350 N.J. Super. 248, 257 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 43 (2002).  "The function of a presumption is to allocate the burden of producing evidence; it should not be used as a surrogate for substantive evidence or as a substitute for satisfying the burden of proof assigned by law."  Id. at 257 (internal citations omitted).  Thus, "a valid presumption can be used to establish a prima facie case, but the presumption normally disappears in the face of conflicting evidence."  [...], Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, comment on N.J.R.E. 301 (2003) (quoting the 1991 Supreme Court Committee Comment).  In this case there was conflicting evidence regarding service of process, as well as numerous substantial deviations from standard service of process and notarization rules as follows:
[brief] Applying settled law, it determined that Appleman’s rule only applies to first-party policies, which grant coverage based on whether a loss was caused by a covered peril.  6T27-2-22.  The court further held that Appleman’s rule does not apply to third-party policies, under which the right to coverage is based on fault, proximate cause, and duty.  6T27-9-22.  If coverage could be afforded for an otherwise excluded loss simply because one cause of that loss was covered, the court reasoned, then most provisions of a third-party policy would be rendered meaningless.  6T27-23 to 6T28-3.  Applying these principles, the court held that the Mold Exclusion barred coverage because [...]’s injuries “indisputably were caused by mold exposure” and not water intrusion.
[brief] ”  [...] freely admits the events are implausible but they did happen and he has great proofs, mainly in the 24-page Appendix.  In the New Jersey Courts, this implausibility doesn’t matter.  Or, at least, our Rules have to allow a preliminary hearing to evaluate the evidence before jumping to conclusions.  With respect to the 7-year time issue (now 10 years due to remands at al. in New Jersey), I was terrified to file a complaint – but did file on the last day.
[brief] RESPONDENTS  DISTORT AND MISREPRESENT THE FINDINGS OF JUDGE BOGAARD IN HIS ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 29, 2020  REGARDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.  We have previously discussed, at Point III of our initial brief, the true scope of [...]’s written order of partial summary judgement.  (Pa2).  But Respondents also distort and misrepresent the scope of [...]’s oral comments made during the hearing on their first motion for summary judgement, in 2020.  These misrepresentations by Respondents become extremely significant, since Respondents employed these same misrepresentations and selective editing of [...]’s motion transcript to influence [...] in their second motion for Summary Judgement in 2022.
[directive] A system of progressive discipline can include the following elements:  (a) Oral reprimand or performance notice; (b) Written reprimand; (c) Monetary fine;2  (d)  Suspension without pay; Agencies operating under Civil Service Commission statutes (N.J.S.A. 11A:2-20) and regulations may only assess a fine in 2 lieu of a suspension where loss of the officer from duty would be "detrimental to the public health, safety or welfare" or if the assessment is restitution or is agreed to by the employee.  8  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 (e)  Loss of a promotional opportunity; (f) Demotion; and (g) Discharge from employment.  2.2.7  The disciplinary process should be thoroughly explained in the agency's rules and regulations, including a description of the officer's rights, the identity of the hearing officer, an outline of the hearing process and, if applicable, appeal procedures available to the officers.  2.2.8  An agency's rules and regulations, which include the description of the disciplinary process, shall be distributed to all employees.  The agency should document that this distribution has taken place.  In addition, a copy of the rules and regulations and a copy of the agency's internal affairs S.O.P. shall be made available to a representative of any employee collective bargaining unit.  2.3
[brief] 2)  Problems with Court Hearing of September 22, 2022 (1T)  60.  [...]'s hearing process violated my rights as a pro se litigant since he did not afford me time to adequately address key arguments, along w/new arguments based on new info in [...]’s 2 Certifications, of Aug. 12th, (Exh. “N”&“O”) (151a-160a), new info by [...] at the Hearing, accusations against me by [...] & [...] at the Hearing, & my requests for additional rulings based on that new info by Mr. [...] & Mr. [...] in order to justify and support my case for proper and fair decisions by this Court.  61.  Rather than take needed time for the Court to hear my new arguments & new requests for rulings based on new info in [...]'s 2 Aug 12th Certifications, for which the Court was previously notified that I needed to address based on my Sept. 12, 2022 email request for a Sur Reply (App. Exh. "F") (201a-202a), which the Judge rejected, & new info presented by Mr. [...] at the Hearing, the Judge imposed an inexcusable time limit (8 minutes) on presentations by each party (1T, p. 10, Lines 14-16).
[brief] Compare DA006 – Da031 with 70a – 110a.  From a factual standpoint, Plaintiffs-Appellants’ core claim in both the 2015 Action and the 2020 Action was that they were allegedly defrauded into purchasing an assignment of [...]’s contract right to buy the Pork Chop Hill Assemblage.  Additionally, the pleadings in both Actions asserted numerous duplicative causes of action, including alleged fraud, tortious interference, conversion, RICO, as well as conspiracy and aiding and abetting in connection with each of the foregoing claims.
[brief] [...]’s next two statements further confused the issue: “You know that is in Spanish if you understand it.  . . .  That is something that you have to say if you, on your own. ”  (Pa31)  It is entirely unclear what [...] intended to communicate with those sentences.  But in the context of her prior statement, that she was “only reading” a document to [...] that was in Spanish, this would have reasonably been interpreted by [...] to mean that [...] was just reading a document to him in Spanish, and he had to indicate whether he understood the Spanish of the document on his own—i.e. without any help.  It was only after this incredibly confusing exchange that [...] read [...] the final Miranda warning, “If you do not have money to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before any questioning, if you wish. ”  (Pa31)  The State argues that this warning answered [...]’s question and rendered harmless any earlier confusion.
[brief] Plaintiff/Appellee [...] ("[...]") and Intervenor/Appellee [...] ("[...]," collectively with [...], "Appellees") attempt to whittle down Roberto by interpreting it as holding that the final judgment of foreclosure must itself be on direct appeal to preserve the "pipeline" retroactivity of Tyler.  This is a misreading.  The Roberto case itself was not a direct appeal of a final judgment of foreclosure, but an appeal of an order granting a motion to vacate.  To the extent that Appellees attempt to identify Roberto as "an appeal from a final judgment (i.e., a the order dismissing with prejudice)," [...] Supplemental Brief, p. 2, Appellants ask the Court to observe that the "final judgment" appealed from was not the final judgment of foreclosure, but the order granting Roberto’s Rule 4:50-1(f) motion.  The Court should reject this attempted rhetorical sleight of hand.
[brief] [Pa285-286].  At his deposition, [...] explained how he was first notified of the [...]’ emergency.  [Pa285-286].  At about 10:12 p.m., the charge nurse, probably [...], entered a C-section procedure being performed by [...].  She told him that she was concerned about the [...]’ readings and that he really needed to look at them.  [Pa285-286].  This was already at least 24 minutes after the alarming 9:48 p.m. readings.  [Pa285-286].  [...] asked her to call up the tracings on a nearby screen as he continued his other work.  [Pa285-286].  At his deposition, [...] testified about the events of that evening, and his first notice that something was gravely wrong:
[brief] Further, the SHO Resolution confirms that the position of the [...] concerning the Route 33 Signal remained consistent at the pre-application meetings in 2019 and 2021; namely, that both an access level change and a signal spacing waiver would be required for the Route 33 Signal.  M490.  However, the SHO fails to acknowledge or address the inconsistency in [...]’s testimony concerning the effect of the position conveyed by the [...].  Following the 2019 pre-application meeting, [...] testified in support of the Respondents’ use variance application before the Board including the Route 33 Signal.  1T87 to 1T102.  However, despite the [...] maintaining the same position and requirements, [...] opined at the hearing on Respondents’ site plan that the Route 33 Signal can no longer be secured.
[brief] (Da152-154)  Plaintiffs then sought to obtain [...]’ personal banking records, and attempted to bring [...] and [...] into a then-pending parallel action, captioned Schwartz v. [...], at Docket No. [...].  In each instance, the [...]  Defendants took the appropriate actions on behalf of their clients and, in each instance, the court denied Plaintiffs’ requests, as the following orders memorialize:  1.  November 14, 2014 Order of [...] in the Schwartz case (Da155-157); 2.  January 22, 2018  Order of [...] (Da158-160); 3.  February 5, 2019  Orders of [...] (Da161-166)  4.  March 29, 2019  Order of [...] (Da167-175)  5.  May 24, 2019  Order of [...] (Pa527-528)  On December 4, 2019, Plaintiffs sought leave to file a fourth Amended Complaint in the 2015 action to re-join Nicholas [...] and [...], and to add [...] (“[...]”) as parties.
[brief] The Legislative Digest for January 6, 2022 is available at https://web.archive.org/web/20220107234247/https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislative-digest (last visited May 1, 2024).  The Legislative Calendar posted in the evening on January 7, 2022, listed voting sessions to take place in both houses of the Legislature on January 10.\(^7\) (Ra4; Ra6).
[directive] Causing Bodily Injury (Special Application and Enhancement Feature C2)  If in the course of committing the drug distribution-type offense the defendant or another with whom the defendant was acting in concert or as an accomplice within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6 caused bodily injury or significant bodily injury to any person and the circumstances are such that the offense is not subject to the provisions of the No Early Release Act, the authorized plea offer shall be six (6) months greater than that otherwise provided in the applicable Table of Authorized Plea Offers in the case of bodily injury, and twelve (12) months greater than that otherwise provided in the table in the case of significant bodily injury.
[brief] ”  Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), with R. 4-10-2(a); see also Hammock by Hammock v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 142 N.J. 356, 369 (1995) (“The purpose and scope of our discovery rules . . . are substantially the same as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. ”).