ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa110-Pa120, ¶ 35; Pa26-Pa33, ¶ 19; Pa25-Pa33).  The Settlement Agreement provides for a specific carve out and states that “the Released Claims do not affect any Settlement Class Member who paid money to Defendants solely to the extent that anyone who paid money maintains its right to bring claims for alleged actual damage in a subsequent action, both individually and on behalf of a class. ” (Pa110-Pa120, ¶ 37).  Nonetheless, Appellant never paid money to [...] (or any of the other Respondents for that matter) in connection with the Account.  (Pa110-Pa120, ¶ 41).  On July 20, 2020, Appellant received a credit to her outstanding balance as part of the terms of the Settlement Agreement.  (Pa110-Pa120, ¶ 38).  Appellant never opted out or challenged the terms of the Settlement Agreement or otherwise sought to vacate the Settlement Order.  (Pa110-Pa120, ¶ 39).  D.
[brief] Judge did not request, & [...] did not volunteer, any other details about amounts, dates, & purposes of withdrawals.  (1T, p. 14, lines 1-24).  See Cert., p. 28, par. 76&77 (189a) for details based on my follow-ups with [...].  65.  Court's Rider and rulings disregarded my arguments based on new info that I addressed at the Court Hearing (1T, p. 16-21) that further supported my positions, & that negated positions by [...], Mr.  Roth, & Mr. [...].  3)  Follow-Up After [...]’s August 12, 2022 Filings 66.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY BALANCED THE COMPETING POLICIES INVOLVED  At the heart of the appeal is Defendant’s motion to vacate default judgment, filed pursuant to R. 4:50-1.  Defendant couches the argument in his point heading III as an error by the trial court in holding the NJCFLA does not further interests of public policy.  This a misstatement of the trial court’s analysis and ruling.  Instead, the trial court, as noted above, found Defendant could not rely on the NJCFLA to claim the judgment was void and therefore Defendant was entitled to relief under R. 4:50-1(d), (e), and (f).
[brief] Plaintiffs argue in Point I of their Legal Argument that the Trial Court’s and the Planning Board’s assessment of intent was inappropriate.  One need only look at the definition of “design” in the dictionary to see that intent is integral to the term.  The Merriam-Webster Dictionary definition of design cited by the Appellants at page 27 includes 1. “to create, fashion, execute, or construct according to plan”  2.a “to conceive and plan out in the mind”  2.b  To have as a purpose: intend”  2.c “to devise for a specific function or end”.  (Pa189)  Appellants argue that when coupled with the word “allow”, which is “to make a possibility”, the word “design” must be interpreted as a verb - “a pattern or configuration of elements”.  Appellants then conclude that those words together must be interpreted to ask, “Does the design, whatever the reason . . . allow increased building height?”  However, that interpretation effectively eviscerates the word “designed”.  In that context the word is unnecessary, meaningless and useless.  Had the Borough Council not intended “designed” to be interpreted to include purpose it could have simply left it out of the Ordinance language.  The Ordinance would have read “Such revised lot grade shall not include mounding, terracing or other devices that allow increased building height”.  That would achieve the result the Appellants desire.  But that is not the language chosen by the Borough Council.  Common Sense dictates that the Borough Council chose to include “design” to add purpose to the equation.  Point II of the Appellants’ brief assumes the correctness of their Point I.
[brief] B.  The Failure To Charge Any Lesser-Included Offenses Of Murder Requires Reversal of Defendant’s Convictions.  The State alleged that [...] killed [...] purposefully or knowingly.  Although not requested by the State or the defense, the possibility that [...] acted with a different mental state, and was therefore guilty of a form of manslaughter, was “obvious from the record” and indeed “jump[ed] off the page.
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that the decision below be reversed, and that [...] be permitted to register his presence at September 11th under the Ricci Act and amend his benefits thereunder.  Respectfully, [...], Esq.  [...], Petitioner-Appellant, v. [...], Respondent-Respondent.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL AGENCY  DECISION OF THE [...]  Brief of Respondent Board of Trustees, State Police Retirement System
[directive] 날짜/Date 피고인/Defendant 피고측 변호인/Defense Attorney 검사/Prosecutor 지령 제01-18호(02/23/2018)에  의거 공포된 양식, 페이지  CN 11168-Korean 2/2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11168-Korean page 2/2  AVISO:  Este é um documento público, o que significa que o documento tal como apresentado estará disponível ao público mediante solicitação.  Portanto, não inclua dados de identificação pessoal, tais como número de Social Security, número da carteira de motorista, número da placa do veículo, número da apólice de seguro, número de conta financeira ativa ou número de cartão de crédito ativo.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.
[brief] DUE TO THE EXPIRATION OF THE APPEAL DEADLINE AS OUTLINED IN R. 2:4-1(A) OF THE NEW JERSEY RULES OF COURT, PURSUANT TO THIS RULE, APPEALS IN CIVIL ACTIONS MUST BE FILED WITHIN 45 DAYS OF THE ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT OR ORDER APPEALED FROM.  (Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Application for an Award of Legal Fees and Ordering Plaintiff to be Reimbursed in the amount of $1,049,589.14, filed August 31, 2022, Da271).  A.  Following the Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Application for an Award of Legal Fees and Ordering Plaintiff to be Reimbursed in the amount of $1,049,589.14, filed August 31, 2022, Da271  Shortly after the decision on August 31, 2022, attorneys representing [...] (“Defendant”) informed [...], former attorney for [...] (“Plaintiff”), that they would imminently pay [...] $1,049,589.14 from the Estate.  However, after a considerable amount of time had elapsed, they reversed course, citing an intention to appeal, and subsequently failed to fulfill the payment of the fee award.  Furthermore, this action by the Defendant occurred after the Appellate Court’s decision, which explicitly stated that the defendant was not entitled to any fees.
[brief] \textbf{THE DEPARTMENT DID NOT UNLAWFULLY “WAIVE” THE SCENIC RESOURCES AND DESIGN RULE UNDER DRAGON BECAUSE THE RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO THE PROJECT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.}  Equally unavailing is Appellant’s argument that by issuing the Permit for the Project, the Department unlawfully waived the SRD Rule in contravention of \textit{Dragon v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection}, 405 N.J. \textsuperscript{10}  290  [...] acknowledges that the Settlement Agreement and the Department’s decision to issue the Permit were not based on a finding that Subsection D did not apply because the Property is not “adjacent to” the boardwalk, and that the Department has not made such a determination.  Super. 478 (App. Div. 2009).  Ab17-19.  As discussed in Point I(C), supra, the SRD Rule does not apply to the Project pursuant to the Long Branch Rule.  The holding in Dragon thus does not apply, because no waiver occurred in this case.  In Dragon, a property owner (the “applicant”) applied for a CAFRA permit to demolish an existing house and construct a new larger house.
[brief] **Hoboken’s Cannabis Ordinance and Cannabis Review Board**  On August 18, 2021, the [...] adopted Ordinance B-384 which, among other things, made the retail sale of cannabis a conditionally permitted use.  (Da363-378.)  That Ordinance was subsequently codified in Hoboken City Ordinance §196-33.1, which sets forth applicable zoning for cannabis-related developments.  *See*  Hoboken City Ordinance §196-33.1.  Significantly, Hoboken City Ordinance §196-33.1(M) sets forth the minimum requirements to obtain site plan approval for a cannabis-related development.  *Id.*  Furthermore, Section 196-33.1(I) initially prohibited a cannabis retailer from being located on the “same block frontage” as a primary or secondary school.  *Id.*  As part of the cannabis-related development process, the [...] created the [...] Cannabis Review Board (the “CRB”).
[brief] Aronberg v. Tolbert, 207 N.J. 587, 598, 25 A.3d 1121 (2011).  If the words of a statute are clear, a court should not infer a meaning other than what is plainly written in the statute.  Hardy, supra, 198 N.J. at 101.  "Only 'if there is ambiguity in the statutory language that leads to more than one plausible interpretation' do we turn to extrinsic evidence, such as 'legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction.'"
[brief] As stated, Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss Appellant’s Amended Appeal for failure to timely file same and as part of the Motion, has filed to dismiss Appellant’s Brief Points One and Two as both relate back to the Summary Judgment Motion decision and NOT the underlying trial or trial court decision.  However, should the Appellate Court choose to address either of these arguments, then Respondent advises that Appellant’s arguments (Brief Points 1-2) regarding the authority of the [...] and the zoning board power to review an [...] decision based on the Neptune land development ordinance are disingenuous, incorrect interpretations in order to substantiate improper and illegal work performed in the National Historic District without proper approvals and are without merit.
[brief] Id. at 528.  This Court considered is “highly relevant” that the detectives had so much information from a cooperating witness.  Id. at 529.  This Court held that the defendant’s waiver was not made knowingly because police advised defendant of the reason for his arrest “in a manner that was vague and misleading” based on what they knew.  Id. at 533.  Here, under the totality of the circumstances, the motion hearing record shows sufficient credible evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt defendant’s waiver was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  Rather than being “affirmatively misled,” defendant was simply shown a photograph of himself without any misinformation, and when he was nothing more than a possible suspect for whom no evidence existed to justify charges.  This Court should affirm.
[brief] Roberto as applied to this case**  In this matter, the trial judge correctly applied the plain language and reasoning of *Roberto*.  The judge recognized that Plaintiff's tax foreclosure was not "pending."  It had reached final judgment in February 2018, almost four years before Plaintiff filed the present complaint, and more than five years before *Tyler* was decided.  For those reasons, the case was not "in the pipeline."  Pipeline retroactivity refers to three types of cases: the one in which the rule is announced, those pending (including ones “still on direct appeal” from the final judgment), and all future cases.  *State v. Knight*, 145 N.J. 233, 249 (1996).  It does *not* include “collateral” matters, and there is no authority for the proposition that filing a separate lawsuit – such as this case – can place an already-finalized case “back in the pipeline. ”  By way of example, a criminal defendant cannot use the “collateral review” of a PCR petition to benefit from a new principle of constitutional law if direct appeals of his conviction have been exhausted.  See, e.g., *State v. Dock*, 205 N.J. 237, 254-59 (2011); *State v. Rountree*, 388 N.J. Super. 190, 203-06 (App. Div. 2006), certif. denied, 192 N.J. 66 (2007).  By the same token, Plaintiff cannot use collateral review of the tax foreclosure here to benefit from the much later-decided *Tyler* case.  That is what pipeline retroactivity means and mandates.  As the trial judge correctly realized, giving Plaintiff a cause of action under these circumstances is to afford *Tyler* full retroactivity, rather than the pipeline retroactivity called for by *Roberto*. (Ja413).  That is, Defendants would be liable based on a lawsuit that was over and done with more than five years before *Tyler* was decided, at a time when the conduct at issue was unquestionably legal.  And this – as the trial judge also correctly recognized – would run afoul of one animating principle underlying *Roberto*’s election of pipeline retroactivity: to avoid “substantial hardship for taxing authorities[.]”  *Id.* at 363.  It offends basic principles of fair notice to impose fully retroactive liability for conduct that was not only legal at the time, but whose distinguishing feature – strict foreclosure – had received the imprimatur of our highest Court nearly sixty years ago.
[brief] Just over a year later, and shortly before Respondents filed suit, this Court revisited proper notice of a pre-dispute arbitration clause contained within website terms of service in *Racioppi* – a case on all-fours with the present case.  2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1200, at *9-11.  Applying the “fact-sensitive inquiry” described in *Wollen*, the Court found that “reasonable notice” existed where “defendant’s first sign-up screen required no scrolling” to reveal a notice that “By signing up, I agree to [...]’s Terms of Service…,” which were hyperlinked immediately below.  *Id.* at *9-10.  The Court determined “[t]here is no question that the clarity and placement of defendants’ [terms] sufficiently departs from the facts of *Wollen[,]”* and thus enforced the arbitration provision within the hyperlinked terms.
[brief] In his letter to the trial court, defendant requested mitigating factors 3 (defendant acted under strong provocation), 4 (substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant’s conduct, though failing to establish a defense), 5 (victim of the defendant’s conduct induced or facilitated its commission), 7 (defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present offense), 8 (defendant’s conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur), and 9 (character and attitude of the defendant indicate that the defendant is unlikely to commit another offense).
[brief] (Appx 506-07 at ¶12).  However, it is undisputed that the eliminations affected several of Defendant’s locations and was in the works before Plaintiff ever complained.  (Appx 506-07 at ¶12; Appx 197 at ¶14; Appx 146).  Plaintiff also alleges in her Complaint that she was improperly taken off the schedule around January 20, 2020, but it is undisputed that this situation affected numerous other employees whose fingerprints were also missing, and was the result of a routine audit.  (Appx 507 at ¶14; Appx 128-32 at 178:14-197:1; and Appx 121, 127, 130 at 107:17-23; 176:17-19; 189:15-19); see also Hancock v. Borough of Oaklyn, 347 N.J. Super. 350, 361 (App. Div. 2002) (dismissing Plaintiff’s CEPA claim because “plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they were treated differently from any of the other officers in the department. ”).  Given that numerous employees besides Plaintiff, including those who did not engage in whistleblowing, were similarly affected by the action she alleges were retaliatory, Plaintiff cannot show that her complaint was the cause.  b.  [...] Offered Plaintiff Several Positions in an Attempt to Retain Her.
[brief] He stated that “we are driven by our stormwater management design.  We need to detain our runoff. ”  “In order to detain our runoff, we have to elevate certain portions based on water table. ”  (Pa153; 57,21-58,2)  That required a stormwater management basin to handle water quantity, water quality and groundwater recharge.  He testified that the grading was designed so that water quantity, the volume of water needed to be detained on site post development, would be reduced for the 2-year, 10-year and 100-year storms.  (Pa117-118; 30,18-33,12)  He testified that water quality required a reduction in total suspended solids generated from additional pavement.  This was addressed with a system including a pre-manufactured water treatment device, series of filters for collected stormwater and treating it before going into an underground storage tank, detention basin.  (Pa117; 32,12-21)  There is also a subsurface storage bin for the permeable paver entrance drive.  (Pa117-118; 32,22-33,2)  He further testified that the design had to provide for post-development groundwater recharge not to be less than pre-development.
[brief] 9T72-18 to 73-2.  In addition to his practice, [...] is a professor of medicine at the University of Pennsylvania Medical School, where he teaches medical and surgical students in addition to physician assistants.  9T75-5 to 13.  [...] agreed with defendant that the standard of care required that a general surgeon treat decedent’s diagnosis of ischemic colitis with fluids and antibiotics instead of immediate surgical intervention.  9T83-24 to 84-9.  Further, [...] testified that the correct treatment is to monitor an ischemic colitis patient to determine if fluid management is working or if surgical intervention is needed.  9T84-8 to 9.  [...] testified that rushing to surgery a patient who is as sick as decedent was increases the patient’s likelihood of death, and that eighty percent of patients with ischemic colitis get better without surgical intervention.  9T84-10 to 17.  Another expert in general surgery, [...], testified that “the standard procedure for treating ischemic colitis is to resuscitate, assess and to take the patient to the operating room if your nonoperative efforts are not effective. ”  [...] has been a general surgeon since 1999.  He went to Harvard College followed by medical school at the University of Pennsylvania.  Thereafter, he completed a surgical residency at Tufts University and a fellowship in minimally invasive surgery in Portland, Oregon.  He is board certified in general surgery and a professor of medicine at Mount Sinai School of Medicine in New York City, where he teaches medical students, residents and fellows about the treatment of conditions of the bowel, including ischemic colitis.  [...] also testified that even if surgery had been done the evening of June 12 when defendant was called in consultation, the decedent had a less than fifty percent chance of survival because of her various health conditions, her comorbidities, and her age.  Later, during cross-examination by plaintiffs based on a particular medical article he was shown, he testified that due to the risk factors listed therein, the decedent’s risk of mortality was as high as seventy-six percent—that is, she only a twenty-four percent chance of survival.
[brief] Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)  Matter of Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station, 476 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 2023)  Musconetcong Watershed Ass'n v. DEP, 476 N.J. Super. 465 (App. Div. 2023)  New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 75 N.J. 544 (1978)  North Bayview, LLC v. NJ DEP, 2007  N.J. AGEN LEXIS 782, 39-40 (Dec. 3, 2007)  Sierra Club, Inc. v. Leavitt, 488 F.3d 904 (11th Cir. 2007)  STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 13:20-2 N.J.S.A. 13:20-10(b)(1) and (3)  N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11)  N.J.S.A. 58:11A-10
[brief] And he gets cases from approximately seven of these services.  He advertises on at least two of those service sites as well.  He pays for advertising on those sites.  And he also pays for advertising in legal publications, in at least New York State.  He even sent out a mailer to numerous lawyers.  He mass mailed it, seeking their business as an expert.  He’s reviewed over 900 cases as an expert.  He reviews, on average, 25 cases a year.  That’s over two a month.  Here’s the killer.  He’s a general surgeon.  Just like [...].  That’s his area of expertise, or so he says.  Yet, he feels that he can testify against specialties that are not in his ambit, or outside general surgery.  So, he has testified against doctors who are in the specialties of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Cardiology, Pediatrics, kidney doctors, Nephrologists.  Even Neurosurgeons.  Nurses.  He testified.  Hospitals.  ER Doctors.  You heard the list.  So, he doesn’t restrict himself to his own specialty when he’s doing this work, and soliciting work from lawyers by mass mailing, and soliciting work through these expert services.
[brief] As argued in Point I, the prosecutor suggested to the jury that he possessed knowledge that they did not as to the credibility of witnesses due to his position of authority.  But he did not stop there.  In his summation, regarding a different subject, he came right out and told the jury what he claimed to know based, presumably, on his personal and/or professional experience.  In essence, he offered his own testimony.  The prosecutor began this segment of his summation by noting that each of the guns found had contained mixtures of ammunition from several different manufacturers, as had the recovered shell casings.  (16T 86-4 to 87-4)  He went on to say:  Why do I say that this is important?  When you’re a proper gun owner, when you’re a proper shooter, somebody who follows the rules of the state in terms of purchasing and registering guns, common sense tells you that you buy guns and bullets in en masse [sic].  You buy a box of Winchester.  You buy a box of FCs.  You buy a box of TulAmmos.  And you shoot those til you’re done and you buy yourself another box.  (16T 87-4 to 11)  From there, the prosecutor went on to discuss the testimony of the State Police detective who had checked whether the guns were registered and whether the defendants had gun permits.  (16T 87-12 to 25)  But he had not yet finished with his own testimony:  You have the two guns that are found at the same spot in the house where these two men are out front, on the front porch, and it’s a mixture of ammunition that is the same.  What I mean to say, the Blazers are in both guns, the Winchesters are in both guns.  That’s shared ammunition.  And when you have an illegal handgun, you use what you can get.  (16T 88-1 to 7)  Our Supreme Court has stressed "that prosecutors should confine their summations to a review of, and an argument on, the evidence, and not …[ engage] in collateral improprieties of any type, lest they imperil otherwise sound convictions."
[brief] Defendant, when he testified, implicitly conceded that he saw S-33 in pretrial discovery.  (16T124-4 to 23).  Nobody searching any of the three places found the wallet ID.  To suggest why the searches proved fruitless, [...] noted that his NJSP colleague, [...], contacted defendant’s attorney almost two months before the searches to demand return of the wallet ID.  On direct examination, [...] discussed collecting video evidence on the four traffic stops, and having certain still frames enhanced, but [...] nowhere opined on the contents of any video.
[brief] But N.J.S.A. 40:14-152, “which limits the authority of municipal police to arrest for disorderly-persons and breach-of-the-peace offenses to the limits of their municipality does not make any reference to motor vehicle offenses[,]”  O’Donnell, 192 N.J. Super. at 129, nor does it define the officers’ authority to execute warrants or stop a vehicle to make an arrest for a crime.  More applicable to the current case is N.J.S.A. 39:5-25, which defines an officer’s ability to conduct a warrantless arrest after observing a motor-vehicle violation and contains no language that limits its territorial application.  See O’Donnell, 192 N.J. Super. at 130.  As such, “there is manifested a clear indicia of legislative intent to permit municipal police to have authority to arrest for state motor vehicle violations committed in their presence outside of the territorial limits of the municipality which employs them.