ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (13T66-22 to 70-18).  The court stated the same in a written order.  (Pa3-Pa4).  On February 22, 2022, the trial court reiterated these findings and reminded defense counsel that even if he had complied with the notice and furnishing requirements of the court rules, the jury was not permitted to hear an alibi instruction because defendant’s statement failed to provide consistent details as to where he --- \(^3\) Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923). was, what he was doing, or who he was with at any given time on the morning of the shooting.  (14T10-3 to 7).  On February 23, 2022, the jury convicted defendant as charged except for Count Three, first-degree attempted murder of [...], for which he was found not guilty.  (15T60-11 to 62-24; Da11-Da16).
[brief] What goes to the essentials of a marriage is a subjective test, where a determination must be made on a case-by-case basis.  Patel v. Navitlal, 265 N.J. Super, 409-410 (1992).  Generally, the courts have long required a more substantial quantum of proof of fraud to entitle a party to an annulment where the marriage has been consummated.  *Id.* at 408.  Hence, a claim for annulment on the basis of fraud requires (a) a legal analysis of what the term, "fraud as to the essentials of the marriage" entails; and (b) a factual analysis of the specific circumstances in this case.  As noted by the New Jersey Supreme Court, "although the word 'fraud' is used in common parlance to connote any practice involving shady or underhanded dealing, in law it is a term of art with a clear definition."
[brief] 597, 607, (App. Div. 2010), rev'd in part on other grounds, 209 N.J. 124 (2012).  Here, the Chancery Court provided even less than the trial court in Walker, merely stating, regarding the rates:  “Fees customarily charged.  I think they are similar for legal services for the type of attorneys and the work that is involved here. ” (1T71:5-7).  No factual basis for that conclusion was provided, nor could it have been, since Plaintiff submitted no evidence whatsoever in the Global Fee Application of the “prevailing market rates in the relevant community”\(^3\) (\textit{Rendine} 141 N.J. at 337) or the rate that “would be charged by an adequately experienced attorney possessed of average skill and ordinary competence. ”  \textit{Walker} 209 N.J. at 132-33.  Plaintiff disingenuously claims that the New Jersey Law Journal article establishing $288 as the average rate of New Jersey attorneys in 2016 was not part of the record below while, in the same paragraph of his brief, relies on the rates of [...] from a dissimilar Chapter 11 bankruptcy matter, which rates, \textit{Plaintiff acknowledges}, were not part of the Global Fee Application.
[brief] ”)  Indeed, [...] testified as follows:  Q.  . . .  [D]id [...] have anything to do with developing the [...]?  [Objection to form.]  A.  Absolutely.  I mean, we spent a fortune on trade shows and landscaper shows and advertising and marketing.  We did the Pool & Spa shows out in Vegas, Orlando.  I mean, [it] was 15, 20 grand just to bring in the stuff ‘cause these kitchens were so heavy.  And we used to go out of pocket.  . .  And like, that’s the off season . . .  We brought it to market.  I tell people we brought Summerset to market in ’09.  You know, east coast distribution.  (Pa255-256 at T21:22-22:22) (emphasis added).  [...] went on to testify that [...]’s move into building frames for grills – as an eventual ancillary business --was an outgrowth of seeking another marketing avenue to push the Summerset brand:
[brief] Even if the Court were to conclude that the definitional section of [...]’s policy is not ambiguous when applied to [...]’s UIM coverage, the coverage fails to meet the reasonable expectations of plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs rightfully assumed that when they purchased $1,000,000 in UIM coverage, they were purchasing the benefit of coverage in the event a tortfeasor’s liability coverage failed to adequately meet the injuries caused by an accident.  A provision in an insurance agreement need not be ambiguous for it to be construed in favor of the insured by our Courts.  Our Courts have recognized that “even an unambiguous [insurance] contract has been interpreted contrary to its plain meaning so as to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the insured. ”  *Bromfeld*, supra, 298 N.J. Super. at 77 (emphasis added).  In *Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co.*, 100 N.J. 325 (1985) the Supreme Court held that the “interpretation of insurance contracts to accord with the reasonable expectations of the insured, regardless of the existence of any ambiguity in the policy, constitutes judicial recognition of the unique nature of contracts of insurance. ”  *Id.* at 338-39 (emphasis added).  Rather the “objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations. ”  *Id.* at 338 (quoting Keeton, "Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions," 83 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 967 (1970)) (emphasis added).  The reasonable expectations doctrine espouses a construction of an insurance contract that enforces “only the restrictions and the terms in an insurance contract that are consistent with the objectively reasonable expectations of the average insured. ”  *Hurley*, supra, 166 N.J. at 274.  The rationale behind the State’s firm case law regarding the reasonable expectations doctrine is the realization that “the fundamental principle of insurance law is to fulfill the objectively reasonable expectation of the parties. ”  *Bromfeld*, supra, 298 N.J. Super. at 77.
[brief] At the Wade hearing, the court found that the array was not suggestive and was permissible evidence.  [...] made several observations regarding the photographs.  He noticed that all six men depicted were African-American, with short hair, facial hair, a mustache, and had a range of complexions.  He commented about the range of the complexions.  The photograph identified as S-13 was the comparatively lighter-complexioned male, S-9 was the darker-complexioned male, and the others, including defendant's photograph, ranged from medium-to-dark complexions.  The judge stated, “[n]othing would suggest ... that the photograph that was identified, which turns out to be defendant, was suggestive or ... [that] there's a substantial likelihood of misidentification. ”  We are convinced that [...] properly exercised his discretion in making his findings.
[brief] (Pa1089).  Plaintiff filed a reply certification (Pa1110) in opposition to the defendant’s motion on December 13, 2023 explaining why he withheld alimony.  Defendant filed her response to plaintiff’s reply certification, on January 2, 2024.  (Pa1125).  Before the return date of January 12, 2024, defendant filed another OTSC on January 2, 2024 alleging that plaintiff was about to flee the country to evade his equitable distribution obligation and requesting the court to take custody of plaintiff’s passport.
[brief] (Da469-477.)  For example, the application requires a detailed description of: (i) the building use (including the precise location and nature of the property), (ii) the alarm system, and (iii) parking.  (Da471-472.)  In addition, the CRB application provides a checklist of documents that must be submitted to the CRB, which includes, among other things:  3.  Where the license applicant will be leasing the premises, a signed certification from the property owner/landlord that the owner/landlord is aware that the tenant’s use of the premises will involve activities associated with medical, retail, wholesale, delivery, and/or consumption of cannabis.  ...  5.  A neighborhood impact report.  This report should address issues including, but not limited to: anticipated increase in vehicular and pedestrian traffic to and from the site; queuing of customers on the right-of-way; noise; odor; accommodations for delivery services; loading/unloading, and parking; and any provision of public amenities.  6.  An environmental impact plan, which shall, at [a] minimum, include consideration of sustainable alternatives to single-use plastic packaging, efforts to minimize water usage, efforts to minimize light pollution, a refuse and recycle plan, and other ‘Green Business’ recommendations as set forth by the [...].  7.  An inventory control plan outlining what process the applicant will use to track and control cannabis product inventories including, for instance: products received from wholesalers and other outside sources, products, distributed to other facilities on a wholesale basis, products sold through delivery services or by other means to off-site customers; and products sold to on-site customers.  8.  A copy of the safety and security plan the applicant will be submitting with their State application.  16.  Business Plan – same plan as submitted with State application.  17.  Compliance Plan – same plan as submitted with State application.  18.  Vendor-Contract Agreements – same as submitted with State application.  19.  Any and all other information necessary to satisfy the requirements set forth in the Municipal Code of the [...].
[brief] See Blackmon, 202 N.J. at 307 (finding that a remand for a statement of reasons was required because the court failed to give reasons for denying a family member’s request to be heard).  However, this Court should remand for a complete psychological evaluation, rather than for additional findings, because not ordering an evaluation would be an abuse of discretion, given the overwhelming evidence of serious mental illness and that an evaluation would include information relevant to sentencing.  C.f. id. (noting that the error there was not necessarily the court’s decision, which the court may have been able to justify, but its failure to provide a statement of reasons); see R. 3:21-2(a) (requiring that presentence reports include all relevant information).
[directive] Pre-Session Responsibilities  Prepare grand juror orientation materials  Conduct grand juror orientation  Provide grand jurors with copy of grand jury charge  Prepare list for criminal background checks, if requested by prosecutor  Ensure that court interpreters/ADA assistance is provided where required  Prepare voting slips  Take attendance/prepare sign-in sheet  Communicate with prosecutor’s office regarding dates, questions, any “housekeeping” matters, etc.  Prepare secrecy oaths, other administrative materials  Grand Jury Standards
[brief] Pb38. be applied.  The Appellant's brief fails to present any facts or illustrate how the lower court committed an error of fact or law during a trial.  Instead, the Appellant presents the same *de novo* arguments presented to [...] through extensive exhibits and an exhaustive list of witnesses, including experts.  In presenting these *de novo* arguments, the Appellant critically fails to present any argument as to why the lower court’s interpretation of these facts and its decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  As previously stated, N.J.S.A. 40A:14–150, provides a non-civil service police officer, “who has been tried and convicted upon any charge or charges” the ability to have the Superior Court hear the matter *de novo* based on “the record below” and “supplemented record” provided “due deference” is given to “conclusions drawn by original tribunal regarding credibility, those initial findings are not controlling.
[brief] The first-filed rule is not a controlling mandate on New Jersey courts to hear the first-filed case in all circumstances.  To the contrary, as directed by the Supreme Court in *Sensient Colors*, the law gives courts broad discretion to determine the application of the first-filed rule depending on context and principles of comity and fairness.  *Sensient Colors*, 193 N.J. at 397.  Moreover, “New Jersey courts have the discretion to dismiss declaratory judgment actions that are found to have been improperly filed. ”  *Century Indem.*, 398 N.J. Super. at 438.  The seminal New Jersey decision on comity is *Sensient Colors*.  There, the Supreme Court explained that although New Jersey courts typically apply a presumption in favor of the first-filed of two substantially similar lawsuits, “the first-filed rule is not an inflexible doctrine.
[brief] Generally, as a matter of public policy, a claim for damages in tort for personal injuries is not assignable before judgment.  N.J.S.A.  2A:25-1; DiTolvo v. DiTolvo, 131 N.J. Super. 72, 79, 328 A.2d 625 (App.Div. 1974).  However, the proceeds from such a claim may be assigned.  Costanzo v. Costanzo, 248 N.J. Super. 116, 122, 590 A.2d 268 (Law Div. 1991).  N.J.S.A. 2A:25-1 provides that judgments are assignable and, therefore, by clear implication, any proceeds derived from a settlement of a claim for personal injuries must also be assignable.  [...], a trial court decision, is directly contrary to the decision of the Court of Errors and Appeals, aka the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
[brief] . . . ("[A]nyone with a computer could 'cut and paste' [[...]]'s signature from one document onto a [...] withdrawal form.  . . .  Thus, [...]'s procedures for disbursing variable annuity [sic] provided no protection to its customers at all.")  Id.  [...] opined that in his professional opinion, the "acceptance of signed faxed documents of vital significance and in lieu of an original, by banks, insurance companies and corporate entities, constitutes an unconscionable business practice that exposes customers and companies alike to considerable risk of fraud and deception.  I believe such practices should be forbidden by law."
[brief] For example, a police officer who has a heart attack while chasing a suspect would not qualify because "work effort, alone or in combination with pre-existing disease, was the cause of the injury."  Id. at 213.  However, the Court explained that "the same police officer [who was] permanently and totally disabled during the chase because of a fall, has suffered a traumatic event."  Ibid. (emphasis added).  Likewise, a gym teacher who develops arthritis "from repetitive effects of his work over the years" would not qualify as suffering a traumatic event; however, if the same gym teacher trips over a riser and is injured, that injury would satisfy the standard.  Ibid.  Published decisions have illustratively applied this "undesigned and unexpected" legal standard.
[brief] The MSRA also amended the Employer-Employee Relations Act ("EERA"), N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4.  The EERA permits Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ members to file unfair labor practice charges and facilitates grievance arbitration.  The MSRA amended the EERA by adding the following provision which eliminated all of Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiffs’ members’ EERA rights with respect to PERC enforcement of unfair practice violations, which include unilateral changes to labor contracts:  g.  The Director of the Division of Local Government Services in the Department of Community Affairs may notify the commission that a municipality deemed a “municipality in need of stabilization and recovery” pursuant to section 4 of P.L.2016, c.4 (C.52:27BBBB-4) shall not be subject to the commission’s authority to prevent an unfair practice pursuant to subsection a. of this section.  Upon such notice, neither the commission, nor any designee, shall have the authority to issue or cause to be served upon such municipality in need of stabilization and recovery any complaint alleging an unfair practice under subsection a. of this section or to hold any hearings with respect thereto.  Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit the scope of any general or specific powers of the Local Finance Board or the Director set forth in P.L.2016, c.4 (C.52:27BBBB-1 et al.).  N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-5 (emphasis added).  III.  **[...] Lawsuit and Settlement**
[brief] The handling of the case by three separate presiding judges did not help, nor did the shutdown necessitated by the pandemic.  (See [...]’s statement at Da14 concerning loss of trial notes and closure of the Morris County Courthouse).  The record shows [...] relying on earlier orders of [...], as misquoted by Respondents.  It shows [...] relying on the earlier – and similarly misquoted – orders issued by [...].  These reassignments and delays provided Respondents with the conditions necessary to build upon their intentional misstatements and to capitalize on confusion.  When coupled with the way in which Respondents’ counsel littered nearly every filing in the trial court with accusations of criminal wrongdoing\(^1\) on the part of Appellant, it became nearly impossible to distinguish fact from fiction and the trial court substituted its own fact-finding with the *ipse dixit* statements of Respondents’ counsel.
[brief] Years later, after three unsuccessful appeals of denied PCR petitions, the Supreme Court ordered a remand for [...] to be re-sentenced in light of the then-recent decision in State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017).  (Da96)  At a joint resentencing hearing with both [...] and co-defendant [...] on September 4, 2018, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. heard sentencing arguments, allocution testimony, and expert testimony on [...]’s behalf from [...], a psychologist.  (3T)  [...] argued for the court to reduce his sentence from a term of life imprisonment to a fixed term of thirty-years imprisonment, with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility.  (3T29-14 to 17)  On January 29, 2019, [...] sentenced [...] to a term of life imprisonment with a 30-year parole bar on each count, this time running the sentences concurrently, instead of consecutively.  (4T71-1 to 14)  [...] appealed this new sentence, arguing, among other things, that the court failed to make a finding on the question of his rehabilitation, and that consideration for parole is not enough to meet Graham and Miller’s promise of a “meaningful opportunity for release based upon demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation[.]”  (Da106-107)  In a February 4, 2022 joint opinion for both [...] and [...], this Court declined to address either defendant’s arguments on the merits, and instead remanded “the matter again for fresh consideration of the sentence in light of Comer.
[brief] “[G]enerally, the best indicator of that intent is the statutory language. ”  --- \(^4\)  The Final Administrative Decision letter made a clerical error by stating March 2, 2022.  (Pa94).  DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (citing Frugis v. Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250, 280 (2003)).  “A court should ‘ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole. ’”  D’Ambrosio v. Dep’t of Health & Sr. Servs., 403 N.J. Super. 321, 334 (App. Div. 2008) (citing DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492).  In addition, “[t]he [...] owes a fiduciary duty to its members to protect the financial integrity of the fund. ”  Francois, 415 N.J. Super. at 357 (citing Mount v. Trs. of Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 133 N.J. Super. 72, 86 (App. Div. 1975)).  As fiduciaries of the PERS, the Board cannot permit ineligible PERS retirants to purchase service credit after their retirement because it would not only risk the solvency of the fund but also push the Board to act in direct contraction of the legislation.  Thus, contrary to [...]’s contention (Pb16), the concern is not the amount of the money involved in her particular case, but rather the potential impact of abrogating the relevant statutes and regulations to allow retirants to purchase service credit.
[directive] The located. is weapon the believe to cause reasonable has order.  the by authorized seizure search and of the scope and (setting subsection 4.5.9 over precedence take Directive of the subsection this of provisions the that Note 42 Page a for apply victim to the or agency the of authority the alter any way in or preempt to construed criminal in the release pretrial of conditions special the and order, restraining final or temporary such any of, in lieu not to, addition in be subsection shall this to pursuant sought prosecution order.  restraining final or temporary civil Cases.
[brief] This Court said so when it stated that their claims lacked a “common core of operative facts. ”  *Id.* at *29.  As such, the Court required that the award be limited to only “the fees and costs reasonably devoted to plaintiffs’ pursuit of their respective RICO claims. ”  Id. (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs run away from this Court’s mandate, which cannot be reconciled with what the Special Master or the Trial Court did on remand.  In the face of the decision’s express language, both [...] and [...] surprisingly argue that this Court did not actually hold that there was no common core of operative facts.  ([...]_Pb 26-27; [...]_Pb 70-71).  The Court’s directive for remand shows otherwise.  Plaintiffs argue that, rather than perform a claim-by-claim analysis, “the court must focus on the ‘significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation. ’”  Silva v. Autos of Amboy, Inc., 267 N.J. Super. 546, 556 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983)) (emphasis added).  But application of the lodestar method as exemplified by Silva presupposes that all of “the plaintiff’s claims for relief ‘involve a common core of facts or will be based on related legal theories . . .’”  Id.  This Court did not direct (or permit) the broad “results obtained” approach on remand because Plaintiffs’ various claims were instead “a series of discrete claims. ”  Id.  Thus, the task on remand was whether and which of Plaintiffs’ “fees and costs” were “reasonably devoted to plaintiffs’ pursuit of their respective RICO claims,” not whether Plaintiffs’ result on the RICO claims warrants the payment of fees and costs incurred in pursuit of their other claims as well.
[brief] Motion For Reconsideration  [Issue not raised below]  The appellate standard of review for a denial of a motion for reconsideration is under the abuse of discretion standard.  Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 389 (App. Div. 1996) (“We now adopt that standard as the appropriate norm for appellate review of a denial of a motion for reconsideration. ”).  “We will not disturb the trial court's reconsideration decision ‘unless it represents a clear abuse of discretion. ’”  Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020).  Reconsideration should be utilized only for those cases which fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) the Court has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the Court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.  . . .  [Cummings, 295 N.J. Super. at 384].  Plaintiff’s appeal fails to present any basis in fact or law to show that the trail court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  POINT  II  PLAINTIFF HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL FROM THE ORDERS IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT
[brief] . . .”  [...]’s failure to disclose [...] also deprived the court of its own ability to join [...] in the First Action.  See R. 4:28-1(a).  It was thus inexcusable for [...] to not join [...] in the First Action.  See, e.g., TLC Servs., LLC v. Devine Roofing & Constr., LLC, No. A-5626-17T4, 2019 WL 5824780, at *3 (N.J. App. Div. Nov. 7, 2019) (finding it inexcusable for a plaintiff “not to assert a timely direct claim” against a defendant in a prior action where the “record establishes that [the plaintiff] was aware of [the defendant’s] role” in the conduct giving rise to the first action).
[brief] After the City Council approved the amendments, it conducted a meeting on October 28, 2020 for a second reading of the Ordinance.  (Pa229-234).  Thereafter, the Council carried the public hearing on the second reading of Ordinance No. 23- 20 to November 12, 2020 as technical revisions were required.  *Ibid.*  At that meeting, [...] testified that the amendment “is specifically for Block 216, Lots 11, 12, and 24,” and that “[t]he main focus of [the amendment] is to provide multi-family residential building in keeping with the established redevelopment plan. ” (Pa651; 6T6:14-18).