ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Id.*  [...] claimed that the [...]’s frequent use of phrases that suggest trial (like “the court” and “the action”) implicitly prohibited arbitration.  The Court rejected this claim, holding that a statute’s use of those terms does no such thing.  *Id.* citing CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 100-01.  (2012).  Addressing [...]s argument that a No-Fault arbitrator could not grant treble damages under the [...], the Court observed that, to the contrary, No Fault Arbitration Rules [citing the prior arbitration administrator the [...]], give the arbitrator broad discretion to “grant any remedy or relief[.]”
[brief] Ibid.  Under these principles a duty of care owed by [...] must be found to exist in this matter.  The danger posed by the defective electrical panel and the time in which this defect arose are both cogent issues which counsel in favor of imposing a duty of care on [...] in this matter.  Here, the defective electrical panel box presented a clearly foreseeable risk of serious or even fatal injury and did in fact cause such injury.  This risk was not speculative and did not require great foresight to recognize.  A reasonable landlord should have been able to easily foresee that an electrical panel box that was largely indecipherable and which did not comply with code would present a serious risk of electrocution to those who came into contact with this defect.  See Reyes, 404 N.J. Super. at 456-58 (finding that code violations may be evidential if not conclusive of the lessors’ potential breach of a duty); Parks v. Rogers, 176 N.J. 491, 494, 496 n.1, (2003) (noting potential code violation in discussing duty to warn of dangerous condition on property).
[brief] [omitted] o EXHIBIT B, [...]’S RESOLUTION  2020-311 [omitted] o EXHIBIT C, [...]’S RESOLUTION  2020-311A  DA059 o EXHIBIT D, EMAILS BETWEEN [...], ESQ. AND [...], ESQ.  DA061 o EXHIBIT E, CORRESPONDENCE DATED MAY 14, 2020 FROM [...], ESQ. TO [...], ESQ.  DA068 o EXHIBIT F, CORRESPONDENCE DATED MAY 20, 2020 FROM [...], ESQ.  TO [...], ESQ.  DA072 o EXHIBIT G, CORRESPONDENCE DATED JUNE 4, 2020 FROM [...], ESQ. TO [...], ESQ. AND [...], ESQ.  DA075 o EXHIBIT H, CORRESPONDENCE DATED MAY 26, 2021 FROM [...] TO [...] DA080 o EXHIBIT I, CORRESPONDENCE DATED JUNE 15, 2021 FROM [...], ESQ. TO [...], ESQ.
[brief] *Porreca v. City of Millville*, 419 N.J.Super at 228.  The Court concluded that “the applicable standard of the equitable ‘fund in court’ exception is whether plaintiff ‘is doing more than advancing his own interests’ and whether other persons have benefited from plaintiff’s litigation rendering it ‘unfair to saddle the full cost’ of advancing the suit on plaintiff. ”  Porreca v. City of Millville, 419 N.J.Super at 228.  In his brief, Appellant, for the first time contends that his actions were not merely to benefit himself but were advancing the interests of third parties related to a real estate transaction.
[brief] APPENDIXES IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL  VOLUME 1……………………………………………………………………Pages 1a to 173a  VOLUME 2……………………………………………………………………Pages 174a to 334a  VOLUME 3……………………………………………………………………Pages 335a to 536a  VOLUME 4……………………………………………………………………Pages 537a to 690a  VOLUME 5……………………………………………………………………Pages 691a to 745a  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] The Division alleges that the two-year time frame for registration requires strict implementation to “verify applicants’ dates and locations of service as witnesses and memories inevitably continue to become unavailable and fade. ”  Rb9.\footnote{Rb references the Respondent’s Brief.}  Under the Ricci Act, members who seek to amend benefits thereunder are not required to produce witness verification statements.  Additionally, there has been no suggestion that the dates that [...] was at ground zero (or other similarly situated members) need verification by the Division.  Neither is required under the Ricci Act.  Furthermore, almost two decades had passed since the September 11\textsuperscript{th} terrorist attacks when the Ricci Act was signed into law.  The assertion by Respondent that the two-year registration window was to rectify a fleeting memory is erroneous.  Respondent’s argument lacks merit.  The determination below was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and against the substantial weight of the evidence.  It should therefore be reversed, and retired Trooper [...] should be permitted to register his presence at 9/11 and granted accidental disability benefits.
[brief] Id. at 598-99.  In contrast, it is impossible for [...] to change its representations about its [...] pre-qualification status because [...] was objectively prequalified months before bid opening and this fact could not be altered after bid opening.  [...]’s reliance on *In re Jasper Seating Co. Inc.*, 406 N.J. Super. 213 (App. Div. 2009), is similarly misplaced.
[brief] .........................  12  New Jersey Model Jury Charge 5.10A  ........................................  32  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment 3.5, on R. 1:36–3 ...  6 S. Rep. No. 95-382, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695 (1977)  ......................... 18  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] Here, as argued in our Brief at Point I.C., Plaintiff’s whistleblowing activity falls under subsection c of the statute, which does not require that the misconduct at issue be that of the employer.  Ibid.  The Court noted that the omission of such language, specifically the term “employer” in subsection c, “must be deemed purposeful. ”  Ibid.  This is in contrast to subsections a & b, which as the Court points out in Higgins both explicitly include the requirement that the employer’s conduct be at issue.  Ibid.  “When the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded. ”  Ibid. (other citation omitted).  “Nothing indicates that the Legislature intended that the CEPA’s expansive protection should depend on a strict parsing of employer and employee conduct. ”  Id. at 421.
[brief] As the lower court noted, defendant discussed with the detectives his affinity for math, psychology and horticulture.  He talked about his plan to go to college and study abnormal psychology.  He bragged about the jobs he had at school, given to him because he was trustworthy and would not engage in bad conduct such as stealing.  Defendant told the detectives about his interest in reading (science fiction in particular) and cogently discussed the different character development between the lengthy book he was currently reading and its movie adaptation.
[brief] In *State (Div. of State Police) v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass'n*, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 927, the Court vacated an arbitration award which granted reimbursement of commuting expenses to State Troopers on major toll roads.  In that case, State Troopers were previously reimbursed for the tolls they paid while traveling to work in their personal vehicles.  The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s vacatur of the arbitration award, holding:  We agree with the motion judge that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and made a mistake of law, by reading into the contract a term that was not found there and was not "reasonably debatable" as an interpretation of the contract.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(a), (d); Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190, 203, 61 A.3d 941 (2013); Office of Emp. Relations v. Commc'n's Workers of Am., 154 N.J. 98, 111-12, (1998).  State (Div. of State Police) v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass'n, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 927, *4.  (Emphasis added).  Similarly, herein, the arbitrator exceeded his authority and made a mistake of law by reading in a contract term that is not present in the contract.  The [...] must therefore be vacated by This Court.
[brief] At approximately 10:48 p.m. on November 19, 2021, [...] was dispatched to a motor vehicle collision at Emleys Hill and Jonathan Holmes Roads in Upper Freehold Township.  (1T:5-17 to 5-21).  Upon arriving at the scene, [...] met with the defendant and observed that defendant’s white Toyota had collided into a tree approximately 20 feet off the road.  (1T:5-24 to 6-7).  Defendant was the only person associated with and within the vicinity of the Toyota upon [...]’s arrival.  (1T:6-12 to 6-15).  Defendant explained to [...] that he had driving too quickly and had driven off of the road when he crashed into the tree.  (1T:7-5 to 7-10).  [...] immediately noticed defendant exhibiting well-known signs of intoxication, including a strong odor of alcoholic beverage on the defendant’s breath, see (1T:7-20 to 7-24); bloodshot and watery eyes, see (1T:8-5); and slurred speech, see (1T:8-8).  Defendant admitted to having consumed approximately five or six alcoholic beverages at the [...] prior to the collision.  (1T:7-6 to 7-10).  The [...] is located just down the road from where the collision had occurred; the collision location was in the direction of travel one would be going if leaving the bar.  (1T:7-13 to 7:14).  As a result of these observations of intoxication, [...] had defendant perform the Standard Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs).  (1T:9-17 to 9-22).  [...] is trained in the administration of field sobriety tests (1T:8-13 to 8-15).  With regard to the walk-and-turn test, [...] provided defendant instructions and also performed a demonstration prior to testing.  During testing, [...] observed that defendant stepped off the line multiple times, did not maintain heel toe contact, and kept his hands and arms out for balance.  Defendant was given a second opportunity to perform the test, which he performed in a similarly poor manner and during which he was staggering and almost fell over.  According to [...], defendant had failed the walk-and-turn test.  [...] also administered the one-leg stand test.  [...] informed defendant the instructions of the test and also performed a demonstration.  Defendant failed this test by putting his foot down on multiple attempts, not looking down at his foot for the entirety of the test, and swayed while standing.  As a result of the totality of these observations, [...] concluded defendant could not operate the vehicle safely due to intoxication.  The trooper arrested defendant for DWI and transported him to police barracks.
[brief] The Failure to Produce [...]’ Sworn Statement to [...] Constitutes a Giglio Violation  “Evidence impeaching the testimony of a government witness falls within the Brady rule when the reliability of the witness may be determinative of a criminal defendant’s guilt or innocence. ”  State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 111 (1982) (citing Giglio, 405 U.S. at 150) (emphasis added).  The New Jersey Supreme Court in Carter held that “the State’s obligation to disclose is not limited to evidence that affirmatively tends to establish a defendant’s innocence but would include any information material and favorable to a defendant’s cause even where the evidence concerns only the credibility of a State’s witness. ”  Id. (emphasis added).  There can be little doubt that the State’s case against [...] was predicated on the reliability and credibility of [...].  Indeed, the State stipulated to that fact at trial.  During its opening, the State referred to [...] as the best evidence it had.  (See 1T26:8-10).  During summation, the State referred to [...]’ testimony as “extremely important. ” (See 12T48:25 – 49:1).  The State recognized that [...]’ credibility was an issue but did not “think” that the reduction of his life sentence alone made him unworthy of belief.  Back to Mr. [...].  Mr. – [...] doesn’t want you to believe Mr. [...] based on the deal that he got, but I would submit to you that the 30 years without parole, ladies and gentlemen, is not any slap on the wrist, it’s a substantial period of time, and I’m sure Mr. [[...]] doesn’t believe that he was given any tremendous break.  I don’t think, based on the circumstances, that it would be enough for you to disregard his testimony based on the fact that his sentence was reduced.  (12T 65:6-16).  [...]’ Sworn Statement supports [...]’s defense— that he did not commit the crimes charged, and that [...] lied when he inculpated Tairi in the Staten Island home invasion and kidnapping.  As such, the Sworn Statement clearly falls within Brady.  On the other hand, if [...]’ sworn Habeas Petition was false, and strategically invented to overturn his conviction, then he perjured himself before the federal court in relation to the facts of this matter, and the Superior Court has sustained their finding on a fictional basis.  See (Da108) (“[D]uring the evidentiary hearing in July 2021, [...] was forthcoming about his effort to introduce the false affidavit for his habeas petition”).  Although the Superior Court more recently credited [...] for being candid about his false statements, that does not retroactively cure the Giglio violation from years prior.
[brief] Later, [...] arrives at the location.  While on the scene, he had conversations with [...]  These conversations were captured on BWC which was played at the suppression hearing.  (Ra17, Exhibit C below)  On the video, [...] indicates that the video cameras were the property of the landlord.  He further indicates that the landlord would “probably” give the police access to the videos if Mills, Jr, asked him to.  Mills further indicated that he would ask him.  (3T86-9 to 16).  While [...] was upset when he initially arrived and indicated that the police would not be allowed into “his” house, the conversation by this point was cordial.  Simpkins also called the landlord, who had already left the area, the landlord advised him that it’s “okay to have [...] give permission to search for the video. ” (3T128-8 to 13).  Ultimately, [...] was read the consent to search form, advised that the police only wanted to retrieve the video surveillance, advised of his right to refuse consent, and he executed the form.  (3T91-10 to 17)(Ra1, Exhibit A below).  [...] testified that the landlord had given the police permission to obtain the video.  (4T23-8 to 10).  He further indicated he executed the permission form so that the police could obtain the video.  (4T23-5 to 7).  [...] confirmed that the only items the police indicated they wanted were the surveillance and trail camera videos.  (4T40-11 to 14)(4T44-6 to 7)(4T44-21).  The Consent to Search specifically stated that they were only obtaining the video surveillance.  (4T42-5 to 7).  [...] further indicated that Simpkins was standing next to the Chief when he called the landlord and obtained permission to obtain the video.  (4T46-5 to 17)
[brief] (Da 1a)  The statute 39:4-92.2 reads, (1)  Make a lane change into a lane not adjacent to the authorized emergency vehicle if possible in the existing safety and traffic conditions; or (2)  If a lane change pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection a. of this section would be impossible, prohibited by law or unsafe, reduce the speed of the motor vehicle to a reasonable and proper speed for the existing road and traffic conditions, which speed shall be less than the posted speed limit, and be prepared to stop.  [Emphasis on “or”.
[brief] (Not Raised Below).  A decision is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and therefore subject to reversal, where, as here, the agency erred in reaching its conclusion upon examination of the application of the law to the facts.  The arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable standard is generally understood to involve inquiry into whether the decision conforms with relevant law, whether there is substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency's decision, and whether in applying the relevant law to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching its conclusion.  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007) (relying on Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).  Ordinarily for quasi-judicial or rule-making final agency action, there is a substantial body of material comprising the record.
[brief] See, e.g., Third Cir. Model Jury Instructions 4.13, “Fingerprints, Handwriting, and DNA Evidence” (April 2024).  In order to address the inherent limitations of fingerprint evidence, jurors should be instructed, at a minimum, that: - Fingerprint examiners offer an opinion about whether two fingerprints (or palm prints) “could have originated from the same source. ”  AAAS Report at 71; see also PCAST Report at 88.  - Fingerprint comparison is a subjective discipline.  Regardless of what preconceptions a juror may have about fingerprinting, fingerprint comparison is not infallible, and there is a risk of error in the examiner’s conclusion.  See NAS Report at 87, 143.  - An examiner cannot determine that two fingerprints “originated from the same source to the absolute exclusion of all other sources. ”  AAAS --- 17  https://georgiasuperiorcourts.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/criminal_pattern_jury_instructions_July_2021.pdf.  Report at 71.  Even if an examiner can exclude a significant number of individuals as potential sources of a latent fingerprint, “it is not possible to determine how many people would not be excluded, nor is it possible to determine when the pool of possible sources is limited to a single person.
[brief] | 1.4 hrs. | $532.00 | $28,085.22 | | 45| 9/1/22 |  Emails from/to [...]’s counsel regarding supplemental document requests and ShareFile from the accountant, [...].  [Redacted]  ...  [...] [redacted] regarding [redacted]  ...  Emails with [...] regarding [redacted]  ...  Call [...].  | .5 hrs. | $190.00 | $28,275.22 | (Pa892)  This demonstrates that Plaintiff never received the QuickBooks data relating to [...]’s financial records until approximately September 1, 2022, in response to a subpoena that Plaintiff served on [...], CPA.
[brief] Third, Plaintiffs were unfairly deprived of the opportunity take [...]’s deposition.  A genuine issue of fact exists as to [...]’s claim of an automatic denial of the Policy Applications.  Plaintiffs should have been afforded the opportunity to take [...]’s deposition to explore the disparities in [...]’s certification and Defendants’ underwriting policies.  This is particularly so because the trial court undertook the role of the jury by determining that [...]’s statements in his untested certification were truthful.  Plaintiffs should have been permitted to complete discovery—including taking [...]’s deposition—before the trial court rendered a credibility determination resulting in summary judgment against them.
[brief] We believe the landlord’s responsibility should be determined by ordinary principles of negligence and that in the absence of proof that the landlord was aware of the dog’s vicious propensities, or perhaps that the dog was inherently vicious, liability should not be imposed upon the landlord.  It is not a probable consequence of the breach of a no pet provision that a dog will bite another person.  Id. at 72 (emphasis added).  Relying on the clause “or perhaps that the dog was inherently vicious,” Plaintiffs leap to the conclusion that an owner is strictly liable for injuries caused by the inherent traits common all members of the class of animals.  Yet [...] never concludes that notice of “inherent viciousness” as opposed to “vicious propensities” is sufficient to establish negligence or strict liability.
[brief] (T20:22-22:9; T22:1-25:7).  [...], though, offered his opinion of the effect the paint had on the traction on the stairs and on the landing.  [...] had lived in the building since 2005 and had gone up and down those stairs under all types of conditions in the 16+ years before [...] painted the steps on December 1, 2021.  (Pa328, Dep. Tr. p. 10).  Based on his personal experience and perceptions, [...] stated that he had noticed the new paint job and had also noticed that it made the stairs “sleeker” and “rougher in the rain to navigate or when they’re wet” prior to the January 5, 2022 incident.  (Pa330 Dep. Tr. p. 20).  Now, Defendants might not give credence to [...]’s lay opinion in this regard, but a reasonable jury could, and the evidence is admissible under N.J. R. Evid. 701, which states:
[brief] II.  Even if the policy’s limitation provision did apply, [...] was equitably estopped from denying coverage.  (Raised Below: Pa6).  A. [...] protected [...]’s subrogation rights by providing timely notice of her third-party suit.  UIM coverage is considered first-party coverage because the claimant collects UIM benefits from her own policy.  *Krohn v. New Jersey Full Ins. Underwriters Ass’n*, 316 N.J. Super. 477, 483 (App. Div. 1998).  But UIM cases are tried against the insurer “as if it were a third-party tort action. ”  *Id.*  Put differently, when a policyholder sues UIM benefits, the insurer steps into the shoes of the tortfeasor to defend the case.  To make things a little more confusing, UIM insurers have subrogation rights against tortfeasors.  *Longworth v. Van Houten*, 223 N.J. Super. 174, 182–83 (App. Div. 1988).  That means the UIM insurer can step into the shoes of its policyholder and sue the tortfeasor.  *Id.*  But the UIM insurer’s subrogation rights are secondary to the policyholder’s claims.  *Id.*  If a policyholder releases the tortfeasor from liability, the UIM’s insurer’s rights also vanish.  *Id.*  For this reason, UIM policies have “consent-to-settle” clauses.  *Id.* at 183.  As [...] recognized in *Longworth*, a policyholder enters “settlement limbo” when waiting for her UIM insurer’s consent to release the tortfeasor.  *Id.* at 184.  To prevent this limbo, [...] established the so-called *Longworth* procedures:
[brief] By way of background, this matter arises from a motorcycle accident that occurred on September 12, 2015 on the Garden State Parkway.  On that date, Plaintiff [...] was operating his motorcycle in the southbound left lane when his motorcycle encountered uneven pavement/elevation change caused by settlement in the roadway at the northern abutment joint to the Rt. 30 overpass (a.k.a. Structure 40).  As a result of the impact between the Plaintiff’s motorcycle and the settlement at the abutment joint, Plaintiff was caused to lose control and crash into the center median/“jersey barrier” and become injured.  After being released from the hospital, Plaintiff returned to the scene and took a video of the condition.  From that video, a screenshot was created of the expansion joint that Plaintiff hit.  Plaintiff’s expert, who spent 27-years as an engineer for the [...], explained that the settlement in the southbound left lane at the northern most abutment joint of the Rt. 30 overpass identified by Plaintiff was a dangerous condition.  Also, when the [...]’s (“[...]”) Construction Engineer was shown the image, he agreed that settlement at the bridge joint would be dangerous to users of the roadway.  Shortly after Plaintiff’s video was taken, emergency paving was performed to correct the settlement that existed at the bridge abutment in the southbound left lane in order bring the roadway back to proper grade.  At all relevant times, the section of the Garden State Parkway at the Rt. 30 overpass was under construction.  Discovery revealed that as a result in their participation in the construction project each of the Defendants had an independent duty for the maintenance and protection of traffic.  Defendants’ responsibilities included daily inspections, fixing conditions, and/or warning the traveling public against conditions that may affect their safety.  Discovery also revealed that for months prior to Plaintiff’s accident, each Defendant either knew or should have known of the settlement condition that caused Plaintiff’s crash and that the condition was dangerous.  Despite knowing of the condition, Defendants failed to either fix it or warn the public against it.  Rather than accepting the above as true, the Trial Court ignored the most fundamental aspect of the summary judgment standard.