ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The only concerns that Defendants raised in the renewed motion for a protective order stating “the concerns that weigh against recording are the same reason that supported this Court’s well-reasoned opinion back on November 19, 2021. ”  (Pa19 at ¶29.)  But Defendants cited no basis to outweigh the need to preserve evidence through an unobtrusive recording when [...] is permitting the exam to be attended by a third-party observer – the interpreter.  (Pa13-19, Pa42-46.)  As [...] wrote, “it is not immediately obvious how an unobtrusive recording device would call the validity of the examination into question in a way that the interpreter would not. ”  DiFiore, 254 N.J. at 239.  Neither Defendants, nor [...], nor the trial court have provided any reasoning for barring [...] from recording the exam when the sole basis for not permitting the recording is the ABN Policy Statement, which states the any third party, including an interpreter, is a deviation from the Policy.
[brief] **Plaintiff’s Employment at [...].**  [...] hired Plaintiff in February 2019 to be a Direct Support Professional (DSP).  (Appx 532 at ¶40).  Plaintiff was originally assigned to work the day shift at the Erial group home.  (Appx 532 at ¶40).  In the fall of 2019, [...] began to review staffing at various homes and determined that since most of the individuals being served were not home during the day (because they were receiving services at a day program outside the home), [...] did not need a full time staff member on day shift at each home.  (Appx 532 at ¶41).  Accordingly, [...] initiated steps to eliminate the day shifts at those homes.  (Appx 532 at ¶42).  This change *affected several of [...]’s locations (and the day shift employees at those locations)*, including the Erial location where Plaintiff worked the day shift.
[brief] In Siller v. Hartz Mountain Associates 93 N.J 370, 461 A.2d 568 (1983) the court addressed the then new Condominium Act.  The Legislature recognized a new form of ownership of real property in enacting the Condominium Act.  4 N.J.S.A. 46:8B-1 through -38.  The Act requires the developer to execute and file a master deed describing the land, identifying the units, defining the common elements, and providing for an association of unit owners.  The condominium property consists of the land and all improvements.  N.J.S.A. 46:8B-3(i).  The individual condominium purchaser owns his unit together with an undivided interest in common elements.  Each unit is a separate parcel of real property which the owner may deal with "in the same manner as is otherwise permitted by law for any parcel of real property."  N.J.S.A. 46:8B-4.  The result is that the unit owner, having a fee simple title, enjoys exclusive ownership of his individual apartment or unit, while retaining an undivided interest as a tenant in common in the common facilities and grounds used by all the residents.  Kerr, "Condominium -- Statutory Implementation," 38 St. Johns L.Rev. 1, 2 (1963); Berger, "Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation," 63 Colum.L.Rev. 987, 989 (1963); 15A Am.Jur.2d, Condominiums and Cooperative [***7]
[brief] ...........................................  16  Rocky Hill Citizens v. Planning Bd. of Boro. of Rocky Hill, 406 N.J. Super. 384 (App. Div. 2009).  ............................................  15 Toll Bros., Inc. v. Burlington County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 194 N.J. 223 (2008) .....................................................................  15 Statutes N.J.S.A. 10:4-6 et seq. .................................................................
[brief] Plaintiff filed its Complaint against Defendant on or about March 16, 2022 as docket no. [...], in connection with a default of Defendant’s charged-off credit card account in the amount of $21,430.45, plus interest and costs as permitted by law.  PA – 6 to 9.  Defendant filed an Answer on or about March 29, 2022, which stated that a) the amount sought by Plaintiff is/was incorrect, b) Defendant was the victim of identity theft and/or mistaken identity, and c) the time for Plaintiff to sue on the debt had passed.
[brief] ”²  [...] sought to --- ¹ Press Release, [...], Governor, State of New Jersey, Governor Murphy Signs Bipartisan Bill Protecting Against Lawsuits Designed to Suppress Free Speech (Sept. 7, 2023) [hereinafter [...] Press Release], Da9.  ² *Id.* address the problem posed by such strategic lawsuits against public participation ("SLAPPs")—which aim to “impose on citizens the expense and burden of defending a lawsuit” based on protected free speech or press activities, and “thus force them to give up their protest,” *Turner v. Wong*, 363 N.J. Super.
[brief] See Velli v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co., 257 N.J. Super. 308, 310 (App. Div. 1992); Helton v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 205 N.J. Super. 196, 201 (App. Div. 1985) (applying similar analyses to the term “successful claimant” under R. 4:42-9(a)(6) and the term “prevailing party” under R. 4:42-8.)  This argument was properly brought before the trial court.
[brief] On September 8, 2020, Plaintiff commenced the Instant Action with the filing of the Complaint (Pa0001) and subsequently filed an Amended Complaint on October 22, 2020.  (Pa0015).  Defendants filed an Answer on November 19, 2020.  (Pa0026).  On March 1, 2023 the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 4:5-1 and the Entire Controversy Doctrine.  (Pa0058).  Defendants argued that pursuant to Rule 4:5-1 Plaintiff failed to name Defendants in the Lease Litigation, which was previously commenced and settled, and involved the same parties and the same alleged damages in violation of the Entire Controversy Doctrine.  On April 28, 2023, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was argued before the Honorable [...], J.S.C.  On June 9, 2023, [...] delivered His Honor's oral opinion where His Honor granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.  At the outset, [...] clearly held that not all legal malpractice claims are exempt from the Entire Controversy Doctrine.  (T19:6-8).  His Honor found that the Entire Controversy Doctrine barred the legal malpractice claims against Defendants.  A Notice of Appeal was filed on July 17, 2023.  (Pa1411).  A Request for Oral Argument was filed on November 2, 2023.  (Pa1415).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] The Website did not tell students about housing and on-campus services, (Plaintiff Dep. T149:19 – T150:3 at Pa.176-77), nor did it address student fees, required texts, dining offerings, library assets, laboratory resources, or the existence of a student center.  It did not explain what happened if a student failed a course.  (Plaintiff Dep. T150:4 – T151:16 at Pa.177).  It did not explain whether being on probation (which [...] was) would be a factor in admission consideration into the dual degree program.  (Plaintiff Dep. T152:7-13 at Pa.177).  The website did not tell the student what courses or credits were required to graduate.
[directive] Jeżeli tak, to który?  If so, which one?  Oskarżony/Defendant Data/Date Adwokat obrony/Defense Attorney Prokurator/Prosecutor Formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11172-Polish strona 2 z 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11172-Polish page 2 of 2 고지: 이 양식은 공개되는 문서이므로, 요청이 있으면 제출된 상태로 대중에게 제공됩니다.
[brief] **CLAIM** means: 1. any written notice or demand for monetary relief or **Legal Services**; 2. any civil proceeding in a court of law; 3. any administrative proceeding, other than a **Disciplinary Proceeding**; or 4. a request to toll or waive a statute of limitations; made to or against any **Insured** seeking to hold such **Insured** responsible for any **Wrongful Act**.  A **Claim** does not include criminal proceedings of any type, or any proceeding that seeks injunctive, declaratory, equitable or non-pecuniary relief or remedies of any type.  A **Claim** will be deemed to have been first made when an **Insured** receives written notice of the **Claim**.  Thus, an action brought by the OAE unrelated to services rendered for a client is **not** a Claim, but an action instituted by the OAE based on services rendered to the client are Legal Services and, thus, is a Disciplinary Proceeding.
[brief] Their decisions were not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  They applied the law and rules as written.  Even if [...]’s filings meet the mathematical/minimum requirements of the rules to trigger a rate review, the final rates are not automatically approved.  [...]’s 2020 premium rate increase based on its submissions to the Department were excessive and were based on newly adopted actuarial assumptions that lacked proven credibility.  Thus, the Commissioner’s disapproval should be affirmed.
[directive] Profiteering (Aggravating Factor Category #5)  This category of Aggravating Factors addresses the commercial, profit- minded nature of some drug distribution-type offenses.  No aggravating factor points shall be awarded for any factor in the “Profiteering” Aggravating Factor Category when the defendant pleads guilty to a violation of the offense of leader of narcotics trafficking network defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, since that offense includes a commercial element and, by its nature, involves profiteering.  Aggravating Factor #5a applies when the criminal conduct provided a substantial source of income or livelihood for the defendant, and is adapted from the provisions of the Anti-Drug Profiteering Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:35A-1 et seq., and from N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3b (professional criminal).
[brief] (6T42:9-47:8; 6T48:6-19).  The defendant offered the testimony of [...] as an expert in forensic engineering and human factors.  (5T87:8-10).  However, he did not offer any testimony related to these fields at trial.  He instead conducted an alleged accident reconstruction by stacking pots in a shopping cart to a height lower than he believed to be the height of the plaintiff, eyeballed the surveillance cameras in the store, and compared the surveillance video showing only the plaintiff’s head and shoulders to come up with the location he believed the plaintiff to be when she fell.  (6T56:25-57:2).  [...] testified that he made a rudimentary replication of the plaintiff whom he believed was about five feet tall by stacking pot in a shopping cart to a height of four feet eight inches.  (5T114:11-24; 5T123:18-125:2; 5T127:7-23; 5T127:11-128:2; 6T30:24-31:28; 6T34:1-35:7; 6T41:13-17; 6T56:25-57:2; 6T78:25-79; 6T80:9-20).  [...] was never qualified as an accident reconstructionist expert or an expert in forensic video analysis and was not competent to offer anything more than a lay opinion as to where he felt the plaintiff’s fall occurred.  The defendant argues in its opposition that [...] was qualified to perform the video analysis and accident reconstruction based upon his analysis of the surveillance video.  However, they do not cite any part of the record supporting this argument.  [...] offered no testimony regarding the defective condition created by the bolt protruding above the column base plate or any aspect of human factors.  He simply testified about the location of plaintiff’s fall based upon his lay comparison of a photograph to a live-feed video surveillance system.  None of his testimony was within the ambit of forensic engineering or a human factors analysis.  Allowing his testimony under the guise of ‘expert testimony’ given the manifest lack of credentials and qualifications allowed this jury to consider inherently incredible evidence.  His testimony clearly had the capacity to mislead the jury and allow them to speculate that the plaintiff did not fall as a result of the wheel of her rollator coming into contact with the protruding bolt particularly when combined with the evidence of the plaintiff’s medical history being repeated throughout trial in spite of there being no expert opinion establishing any relationship between it and the cause of the plaintiff’s fall and defense counsel summation.  Accordingly, the plaintiff respectfully submits that the judgment should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.
[brief] The instant matter is, at its core, a reverse PIP Suit.  The Declaratory Judgment counts of [...]'s complaint seek, in part, a declaration that it is not obligated to make payment on the bills issued by the Defendant facilities since they were operating unlawfully.  See, for example, Plaintiffs' complaint, Count One, found at Da53a.  The law is clear that there is no right to a jury trial in a PIP dispute such as this.
[brief] [...] essentially admits that certain early work done on the Ritz retaining wall in August 2015 was “uncovered” demolition work; however, it argues that [...] was enrolled in the CCIP going forward, including for demolition work on the date of the Accident, even though that work was a continuation of the August 2015 Ritz retaining wall work.  (TRVb25.)  To the contrary, after the Accident, two [...] employees admitted its work on the date of the Accident was demolition work.  [...] testified that the saw cutting on the Ritz wall “would be considered incidental demolition work. ”  ([...] Tr. 65:13-66:2 at TRVa1473-1474.)  Further, [...] ([...]’s laborer) testified in the Hood Lawsuit that [...]’s services were only utilized as excavation uncovered existing structures and that on the date of the Accident he (i.e., [...]) was wire sawing parts of the concrete wall for removal that were recently located during excavation.  ([...] Tr., 14:15-15:13 at TRVa1610-1611 and 36:8-21 at TRVa1634; see also TRVa2971, photograph on date of Accident.)  He further signed a statement confirming he “had been working the northeast corner of the job site” doing “cutting with an electric wire saw to demo concrete north face – wall north face. ”  (Statement, TRVa1787-1788.)  A foreman for [...] testified that [...]’s role was “Basically demolition” and that it “was doing selective demolition. ” ([...] Tr., 80:7-15 at TRVa1869 and 174:5-8 at TRVa1963.)  Moreover, [...] confirmed that [...]’s work at the Project on the date of the Accident was in fact demolition.  For example, [...], an Assistant Superintendent, testified in the Hood Lawsuit that [...]’s work on the day of the Accident was demolition, in that [...] was performing “Excavating and removing existing foundations, demolition” and further clarified that at the time of the Accident the crews doing the excavating and demolition work were [...] and [...] and they were “Demolishing existing foundations right up against the neighboring Ritz [] Building. ” (Mott Tr., 107:1-4 at TRVa2200, 115:2-23 at TRVa2237, and 124:7-15 at TRVa2246.)  Similarly, [...] testified that [...] was demolishing parts of the concrete wall at the property line with the Ritz and that contractors performing demolition work were not allowed to enroll in the CCIP.  (Lorenz Tr., 25:9-19 at TRVa1427 and 70:5-11 at TRVa1439.)  Additionally, the CCIP documents make it clear that [...] has the authority to determine which contractors are permitted to be enrolled.  In addition to the CCIP Manual, which unequivocally provides “[...] Perini [] has the right to include or exclude ANY SUBCONTRACTOR of ANY tier from participating in the CCIP at their sole discretion” (4/16/15 version at TRVa516; legible 4/16/15 version at ZURa212; 9/8/14 version at ZURa261), the CCIP Contract has a definition of “Excluded Parties” including: “e.  Any other party or entity [] that is excluded by [...] Perini [] in its sole discretion, even if such party or entity is otherwise eligible. ” (TRVa498.)  Thus, [...] was either not permitted to enroll at all, or such enrollment was subject to [...]’s discretion.  --- 10
[brief] The trial court’s decision violates the separation of powers, existing law that grants municipal entities the authority to make determinations regarding condemnation and redevelopment, and Supreme Court precedent that forbids a property owner from proposing a competing use to undermine the municipality’s exercise of discretion.  The trial court essentially held that because [...] is constitutionally non-compliant, the court could step into the Township Committee’s shoes, weigh the proposed competing uses for the Property, and decide that Plaintiff’s proposed use should prevail.  Neither the weighing of competing uses nor the lack of deference to [...]’s Redevelopment Plan is permitted by our Legislature or the law.
[brief] How could the defendants be responsible for those legal fees?  Our Supreme Court has noted that “New Jersey has a strong policy against the shifting of counsel fees. ”\textsuperscript{19}  The only time, attorney fees can be recovered only if in a successfully prosecuting a legal malpractice action as consequential damages proximately related to the malpractice.  In the instant case, Plaintiff’s failure to prove to sustain actual damages as a result of the Defendants’ negligence during representation, thereby no attorney fees should have been awarded to the Plaintiff.
[directive] 11.  Você entende que caso tenha se declarado culpado, ou tenha sido condenado por [Sim/Yes]  [Não/No]  [NC/NA] outros crimes, ou se estiver atualmente cumprindo uma pena de reclusão e essa questão não for mencionada no acordo de culpa, o tribunal poderá exigir que todas as sentenças sejam cumpridas consecutivamente?  Do you understand that if you have plead guilty to, or have been found guilty on other charges, or are presently serving a custodial term and the plea agreement is silent on the issue, the court may require that all sentences be made to run consecutively?
[brief] Turning to the court’s findings, the foundational premise was that [...] did not authorize the transactions in question or share in the profits.  Again, it must be noted that it was [...], not [...], who was the other party to this contract.  Moreover, despite the threshold premise that these transactions were unauthorized, [...] did not testify that this was the case.  The trial court did not articulate findings regarding the absence of approval for any particular transaction or reference any evidence that showed [...] failed to receive its share of profits as to the three transactions related to [...] that it included as support for the judgment:
[brief] Moreover, the interruption had occurred "at the most critical period in the trial," when the parties had presented their evidence and arguments, and the court had instructed the jury on the relevant legal principles.  *Id.* at 281.  The lengthy interruption was particularly inappropriate for a trial that took twelve days over a two-and-a-half week period, and had thirty-two witnesses.  *Id.* at 282.  In evaluating the prejudice from the trial court's error, the California court said that "common sense and experience tell us that the delay undoubtedly had some significant effect on jurors' ability to remember complicated facts, as well as on their recall and understanding of instructions."  *Id.* at 282.  The same common sense and experience informed the court’s conclusion that "that the jurors undoubtedly came into contact with many people during the lengthy adjournment."  *Id.* at 282.  The court recognized that proving the harmful effect of the extended delay on jurors' understanding and ability to remember, or the existence of improper discussions by individual jurors, would present an "impossible task" for an appellant.  *Id.* at 282.  "The deleterious effects of an undue and prolonged gap in deliberations may be difficult to quantify, but their existence cannot be doubted."  *Id.* at 282.  The trial court's actions violated the due process requirement that an accused be tried by an impartial jury free of outside influences.  *Id.* at 281.  Finding that the error "affect[ed] the dynamics of the legal process itself" and "the integrity of the legal process, the court reversed the conviction.  *Id.* at 282-83.
[brief] The 2021 survey confirms these findings.  [...], Ph.D., et al., [...], The 2021 National School Climate Survey, at 66–69 (2022) (“2021  Gender-nonconforming students also benefit from policies, like the Original Policies, that allow the students to decide when and with whom to discuss their transgender or nonbinary status.  Even for students whose families will be supportive—and there are many—coming out is a deeply personal process that should be undertaken on the student’s terms.  Policies that out students against their will insert school personnel into parent-child conversations before families may be ready to have them on their own terms and make it harder for students who might actively want their school’s assistance in broaching these topics with their parents.  Mandatory notification policies not only harm the parent-child relationship in families where parents may ultimately be affirming, but also National School Climate Survey”), https://www.glsen.org/sites/default/files/2022-10/NSCS-2021-Full-Report.pdf.
[brief] (PPCIa183)  “Public liability” is defined as “liability for bodily injury, property damage, and environmental restoration. ”\footnote{No party has claimed any alleged liability for “bodily injury. ”}  \textit{Id.}  “Property damage” means “damages to or loss of use of tangible property. ”  \textit{Id.}  “Environmental restoration” means “restitution for the loss, damage, or destruction of natural resources arising out of the accidental discharge, dispersal, release or escape into or upon land . . . of any commodity transported by a motor carrier.  This shall include the cost of removal and the cost of necessary measures taken to minimize or mitigate damage to . . . the natural environment[.]”  \textit{Id.}  While the provisions of the MCS-90 endorsement recognize a right of recovery for damage to property and the actual cost of environmental remediation under the MCS-90 endorsement, none of the MCS-90 provisions recognize a right to recover for treble, punitive or exemplary damages and such damages are not covered under the [...] policy.  Moreover, New Jersey law expressly prohibits the insurability of punitive or exemplary damages.  Loigman v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 235 N.J. Super. 67, 73 (App. Div. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Johnson & Johnson v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 285 N.J. Super 575, 584 (App. Div. 1995).  To that end, the treble damages feature of the Spill Act effectively functions as a punitive measure against a “contribution defendant. ”  See, N.J.A.C. 58:10-23.11f.a.(3).  Thus, the trial committed further error when it ordered [...] to pay $274,376.13 in excess of [...]’s actual remediation costs ($475,623.87) under the MCS-90 endorsement (up to the $750,000 limit under the MCS-90 endorsement), as that additional amount was on account of the trial court’s award for treble damages against [...].  That additional amount is not recoverable under the terms of the MCS-90 endorsement as well as clear New Jersey public policy.  POINT III
[brief] ”  (Da12.)  For that same reason the Defendant cannot now rely upon the use of the indefinite article.  The plain language of the PSA read as a whole requires Defendant to (1) begin within 10 days to seek an estoppel certificate, (2) use reasonable efforts to secure same and (3) if received promptly deliver the Estoppel Certificate.  Upon delivery the Estoppel Certificate is then judged against the defined term of an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate.