ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The lower court ignored that the stop of defendant’s vehicle occurred in the midst of a several-weeks long narcotics investigation that started with a CI tip detailing the involvement of the defendant, his place of employment, and his Audi in drug distribution.  The detectives’ investigation enabled them to corroborate this tip, both via their own independent observations of the defendant and a controlled purchase of CDS from the defendant’s Audi by the CI, who was an admitted prior client of the defendant’s drug distribution.  The corroboration of these aspects of the CI’s tip leant greater credence to the detail in the CI’s report that defendant would drive the Audi to New York to purchase CDS.  See State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 95-96 (1998); State v. Birkenmeier, 185 N.J. 552, 562 (2006).  Therefore, immediately prior to the stop of the Audi the detectives had sufficient reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant had done that which the CI had reported knowing the defendant to do: drive to New York to purchase CDS.  The detectives possessed a judicially-authorized GPS tracker on defendant’s Audi, the authorization for which was premised upon [...]’ finding that the investigation of defendant to that point, which rested on a CI tip corroborated by surveillance and a controlled buy, had provided probable cause to believe defendant was using the Audi in connection with drug distribution.
[brief] Weinberg supra, 106 N.J. at 472, 524 A.2d 366; Muise v. GPU, Inc., 332 N.J. Super. 140, 166, 753 A.2d 116 (App.Div.2000); 64 Am.Jur.2d "Public Utilities," § 14, p. 456 (2001).  We see no basis to extend the limited immunity for subrogation claims against public utilities to claims for damages for negligent actions precipitating property damage claims.
[brief] When [...] was questioned about this purported relationship at trial, her testimony made it clear that no such relationship existed.  For example, [...] testified as to the importance of maintaining good records for properties that her family owns, including records related to insurance and the collection of rent.  (13T 79:3-84:12, Jan. 30, 2023).  Indeed, whether managed through a management company or by her family, [...] made it clear that maintaining proper records was imperative.  Id.  [...] also testified she utilizes management companies with respect to her other properties, that they report to her with respect to the status of the property, and that they have written management agreements outlining the managers duties and responsibilities.  (“Because we have a management company working for us, therefore if anything happened, they will let us know”).  When questioned whether she had any such records or agreements with [...], the supposed property manager, she testified she did not:  Q:
[brief] 9a; Da154.  Finally, the Court further found the Spill Act claim to be barred by the doctrines collateral estoppel and *res judicata*, because the claim was included in the [...]’ Complaint in the Chancery Division. 9a; Da154.  The complaint forming the basis of this appeal that was before the Court below, and that was dismissed, was filed on June 1, 2022.
[brief] On August 26, 2012  ……………………………Da302-03  Order Granting Motion To Compel Discovery, Dated April 12, 2022……Da304  Substitution Of PCR Counsel  ……………………………………………Da305  *  A PCR Petition is tantamount to a complaint and is required to be included in the appendix pursuant to Rule 2:6-1(a)(1).  INDEX TO APPENDIX (cont’d)  Emails Between New PCR Counsel And Assistant Prosecutor Regarding Interrogatories  ........................................Da306-08  Interrogatories ................................................................................................................Da309-18  Letter From Assistant Prosecutor Refusing To Respond To Interrogatories (Without Attachments)  ........................................Da319  Notice Of Motion To Compel The State To Comply With Existing Order Of This Court ................................................Da320-21  Order Denying Motion To Compel And Sua Sponte  Vacating Previous Discovery Orders, Dated June 21, 2023 .........................Da322-26  Notice Of Motion For Reconsideration .................................................................Da327-28 Letter Requesting Adjournment ........................................................................Da329-30 Notice Of Motion For Recusal ..............................................................................Da331-32 Notice Of Motion For Dismissal Or Rehearing ......................................................Da333-34  Order And Opinion Denying PCR And Motion For A New Trial, Dated June 29, 2023 .................................................................Da335-77
[brief] ”  *Id.*, at *13-14; see also *Ogbin v. GE Money Bank*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64735, at *9, 2011 WL 2436651 (D.N.J. June 13, 2011) (NJCFA does not apply to a debt collector’s efforts to collect a debt).  In addition, the *Gomez* Court harshly criticized Appellant’s counsel’s reliance on *Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp.*, 207 N.J. 557, 25 A.P.3d 1103 (2011) (which Plaintiff’s Counsel attempts to do again here) to implicate debt buyers.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  MONMOUTH COUNTY PROSECUTOR  [Is/ [...]]  By: [...], 041202006  Assistant Prosecutor Director, Appellate Section Of Counsel and On the Letter Brief email: [...]  MD/mc c [...], pro se SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  MUNICIPAL APPEAL NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY ON APPEAL FROM PLAINTIFF – RESPONDENT SUPERIOR COURT, LAW DIVISION  MONMOUTH COUNTY V. HONORABLE  MICHAEL A.  GUADAGNO, J.A.D SAT BELOW  [...]  DEFENDANT – APPELLANT – PRO SE FORMAL CROSS REPLY BRIEF PREPARED BY [...] (PRO SE)
[brief] The second one, front yard setback, same thing, how far is it?  Is it going to be close to what is required or is it way off?  The third one, height, height is a D variance and D variances, as noted in the case of Pond Road Water Shed versus [...] must be very specific.  He doesn't tell us how high it's going to be.  He just says height variance.  It turns out I think it's about eight, ten feet, I'm not sure.  T11-10 to T11-25.
[brief] (Raised below: (1T12, 20-23); via Reconsideration: (Pa226); (Pa218); (Pa192))  Appellant incorporates by reference statements made through his points one to three as if fully set forth within.  In granting respondents’ *Motion To Dismiss*, the trial judge stated the following, expressing his belief that the respondents were trying to work out an out of court compromise on the matter with the appellant, but he was defiant:
[brief] ”  Despite the critical relevance of [...]’s testimony, the trial court denied the motion based on its finding “defendants do not have control over [...] and that [...] is not a defendant in this case. ”  The court held “the witness is to be produced through a subpoena and not in [sic] notice of deposition. ”  1T19:24-20:10\(^1\).  The trial court further held that “[a]s to the location of the deposition based on precedent and the limitations enforced under [German] Law,[sic] the Hague Convention of 1970, the deposition must take place in New Jersey” or “any neighboring state that is convenient for the parties. ”  1T20:15-19, 20:25-21:3.  On March 25, 2024, the trial court entered an Order denying the motion.
[brief] Colucci v. Oppenheim, 326 N.J. Super. 166, 177, 740 A.2d 1101 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 395, 749 A.2d 369 (2000) (citations omitted).  Summation commentary, however, must be based in truth, and counsel may not “misstate the evidence nor distort the factual picture. ”
[brief] The Trial Court’s reliance on State v. Weleck, 10 N.J. 355 (1952), (Da 375), to exclude private conduct from constituting a violation of a “misconduct in office” charge is misplaced.  The definition ascribed by the Trial Court fails to consider the entirety of the Weleck Court’s ruling, which states, in part:  ‘Misconduct in office, or ‘official misconduct,’ means, therefore, any unlawful behavior in relation to official duties by an officer intrusted in any way with the administration of law or justice, or, as otherwise defined, any act of omission in breach of a duty of public concern, by one who has accepted public office.  Id. at 365 (emphasis added).  The Weleck Court’s definition is thus broader than that relied upon by the Trial Court and includes a breach of duty of public concern by one who has accepted office.  As previously demonstrated, such is the case here.
[brief] Kieffer, 205 N.J. at 225.  Englert held that phrases such as “whether or not the indemnitee is negligent” can be read to eliminate the common-law condition that an indemnitee be free from fault instead of requiring indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence.  Englert, 389 N.J. Super. at 56.  The common-law principle that a party may not obtain indemnification for its own negligence is “a ‘default rule’” that parties may overcome by clearly expressing such an intent in unequivocal terms.  Mantilla, 167 N.J. at 272.  Because courts construe indemnification clauses narrowly and against the drafter, phrases such as “whether or not the indemnitee is negligent” or “regardless of whether the indemnitee is negligent,” without more, are not Azurak compliant.  Englert, 389 N.J. Super. at 57-58.
[brief] Defense counsel below neither referred to this statute, nor “reasonably assert[ed]” that exculpatory evidence was destroyed or not captured, as is required to trigger the presumption under the statute, \textit{N.J.S.A.}  40A:14-118.5(q)(2).  Because defendant failed to proffer any exculpatory evidence that was not captured by the body camera, the court had no reason to address the presumption.  Defendant’s claim in his brief that his trial counsel reasonably asserted that the video contained exculpatory evidence merely cites remarks by defense counsel noting that the officer violated the body-warn camera policy.  (Db37 citing 1T188-2 to 7, 201-5 to 22, 202-11 to 16).  These remarks fall well short of the statute’s requirements.  Though defendant relies heavily on \textit{State v. Jones}, 475 N.J. Super. 520 (App. Div. 2023), the rationale in that case clearly support the State’s position here.
[brief] On October 17, 2023, I filed a complaint against [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] (Da1).  The reason for the complaint was that they used a picture of me, taken in the privacy of my own home, and spread it all over the internet and in other public places without consent.  On December 7, 2023, the Defendants made a motion to extend time to answer the complaint.  I replied opposing the motion to extend time on December 16th.  With no answer given to date, on December 27, 2023, I made a motion for default judgement.  The defendants answered my reply for the motion to extend time on January 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 2024.  Attached to their reply at the end, was an order to show cause (Da47).  Also, on January 2\textsuperscript{nd}, the defendants made another motion for admission for \textit{pro hac vice} which I replied in opposition to on January 12\textsuperscript{th}, 2024.  On January 24, 2024, the judge granted the order to extend time to answer, granted the motion for \textit{pro hac vice}, and denied my motion for default judgement.  On January 24, 2024, I voluntary dropped the case (Da58)
[brief] Defendants also appeal that decision which is argued in the next section (Point #6) of this brief.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:31-72, Defendants sought legal restitution as a remedy for [...]’s share of (1) the fair market value of the Boonton and Florida Properties at the time of transfer to [...] and [...]; and (2) [...]’s share of the Trustee’s misappropriation of Trust funds for adversarial litigation for personal gain and other expenses.  Pursuant to Rule 1:6-2(d), Defendants’ motions requested oral argument if their applications were opposed.  (203a)  (328a)  Notwithstanding, the trial court denied both motions, allowing Plaintiff and Co-Defendant to oppose without oral argument.  (60a)  (62a)  There was no explanation as to why oral argument was denied.  Both motions raised factual and legal issues that would have benefited from further clarification through oral argument.  With regard to Defendants’ Supplemental Complaint, the Statement of Reasons explained that (1) the court previously contemplated the possibility that Co-Defendant might flip the Boonton Property and determined that doing so would not be improper (66a); (2) the court previously considered and addressed Plaintiff’s improper conduct surrounding the sale of the Boonton Property (67a); and (3) therefore “the basis for Defendants’ claims of breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment asserted in the Supplemental Complaint have already been asserted and addressed.
[brief] Regarding the second question, the Supreme Court has held that, when the State establishes regulations to “ensur[e] orderly market conditions, and raising revenue,” then the “State has established a comprehensive system for the distribution of liquor within its borders.  That system is unquestionably legitimate. ”  North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432.  The Supreme Court emphasized that state alcohol policies “are supported by a strong presumption of validity and should not be set aside lightly. ”  Id. at 433.  In this case, the [...]’s purpose, as set forth in the statute, is to Foster responsible industry practices involving the moderate and responsible use of these beverages, to provide a framework for the malt alcohol beverage industry that recognizes and encourages the beneficial aspects of competition, to provide trade stability, to maintain the three-tier distribution system, to protect the interests of the consumer regarding product quality and freshness and to achieve all facets of the legislatively declared public policy of this State ...
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[brief] Direct access from an oceanfront residence to the Atlantic Ocean is just the sort of “additional value” Lennig referenced.  The 1925 Plan showed the NBA Beach Lands without any obstruction, existing or proposed, that would be constructed on the sandy beach between the oceanfront homeowners and the Atlantic Ocean.  Instead, the 1925 Plan showed only open spaces – similar to Lennig – with a place reserved for a future boardwalk, to be placed two feet seaward of its western-most property line, and then just open space to the east – sandy beach, with the surf beyond.  Thus, according to the 1925 Plan, the oceanfront homeowners would be free to traverse directly from their oceanfront properties to the area below the mean high-water line.  The principle laid out in *Lennig* secured for the [...]’ predecessor, [...], the “benefit[] [of walking from his home directly to the ocean], the promise of which, it is reasonable to infer,” and is obviously an inducement to purchase oceanfront “portions of [the] tract laid out on the plan. ”  See *Lennig*, 41 N.J. Eq. at 609.  The language of the 1929 Indenture from [...] to [...] is telling.  [...] used that instrument not only to convey the property, but also to restrict Berger’s use of lots he acquired and to impose other requirements.  (Da448).  At the time of the 1929 conveyance, [...] retained ownership of the NBA Beach Lands east of the Premises and held many of those lots, as reflected in the 1925 Plan.  Accordingly, [...] asserted itself as the “master” developer in the Indenture, exercising control and mandating: the use of the lot; the type of construction; the minimum value associated with any building; the setback for any building on the site vis-à-vis the intended boardwalk; and limitations on fencing in order to protect access and visibility to the intended boardwalk and beach.
[brief] Slip op. at 14 (Pa479).  Moreover, the court found that the C5 exclusion, the identical exclusion at bar, as it related to defense costs did not violate public policy because “the compulsory insurance [the employer] invokes assures employees' recoveries against their employers, not employers' recoveries against their insurers.  Therefore, we are unconvinced that the employer's liability policy's duty-to-defend exclusion is void as against public policy.
[brief] [...] was charged with murder and attempted murder arising out of a single episode.  He maintained that he acted in self-defense and was convicted of passion/provocation manslaughter and attempted passion/provocation manslaughter and related gun charges.  The jury could not properly evaluate [...]’s defense because the instructions on self-defense and on flight-as-consciousness-of-guilt were deficient and erroneous.  The instructions on self-defense did not explain that it applied to passion/provocation manslaughter and attempted passion/provocation manslaughter.  Neither did it explain that, if the jury found, as [...] testified with regard to the murder, that he fired a warning shot, he could be acquitted of the homicide.  The instruction on flight as consciousness of guilt was prejudicially flawed as it charged only on the adverse inference the jury could draw from [...]’s flight and failed to include the defense explanation for the flight.  [...]’s convictions must be reversed because the critical instructional errors prevented the jury from considering his defense.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] A just sentence, it is also the one for which defendant bargained.  (Da14); see State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014) (“A sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement is presumed to be reasonable[.]”).  As [...]’s sentencing findings are supported by the record, he articulated the reasons why the sentence is fair overall, and the sentence both as to the term of imprisonment and its consecutive nature represents the sentence for which defendant negotiated, defendant’s sentence is condign punishment for his aggravated manslaughter of baby [...]
[brief] THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE STATE LEAVE TO APPEAL BECAUSE THE STATE HAS DEMONSTRATED GRANTING LEAVE IS IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.  Although “[i]nterlocutory review is ‘highly discretionary,’” Grow Co., Inc. v. Chokshi, 403 N.J. Super. 443, 461 (App. Div. 2008), an appellate court may grant a motion for leave to appeal if the moving party establishes the appeal has merit and demonstrates “justice calls for [an appellate court’s] interference in the cause, Brundage v. Est. of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 599 (2008).  For the reasons set forth in Point I of the State’s brief, the motion court erred when it denied the State’s motion to estop defendant from moving to suppress evidence involving the same stop that has already been litigated in another county by the same parties and denied by another judge on the merits.  Without this court’s interference, the State will not have another opportunity to appeal for relief from this opinion and will be forced to re-litigate the same motion unnecessarily.  Regardless of whether defendant is ultimately acquitted or convicted, the issue will be moot.  Therefore, justice calls for this court to grant the State’s motion for leave to appeal.  CONCLUSION  Based on the foregoing, the State submits that the State’s leave to appeal should be **GRANTED**, the trial court’s orders denying the State’s motion for collateral estoppel should be **REVERSED**, and the matter should be **REMANDED** for further proceedings.
[brief] This judgment also declared that [...] is liable to [...] for 6.4% of covered costs incurred after 2018.  (Pa 43). ²  The trial court did not abuse its discretion on any of the issues raised in [...]’s cross-appeal.  Moreover, [...] properly denied [...]’s most recent motion for reconsideration on these same issues, properly agreeing with [...] that:  [...]’s latest motion is not merely an effort to take a second bite at the apple.  That is because, in 18 years, [...] has already consumed the entire apple several times over.  It is time for [...]’s long fight against [...]’s insurance claim to end.
[brief] --- \(^4\)  Burlington Township noise ordinance code 360-1 to -3 details excessive noise prohibited, noises enumerated and exceptions.  \(^5\)  Unlike the issue with [...], where [...] heard the commotion and stopped Adowa from striking his daughter, the Defendant, with his fist [AP 48] recounting the Defendant’s whereabouts and the Superior to reverse their initial decision of the motion to dismiss and upholding the conviction of a lesser charge.
[brief] Plaintiffs respectfully requests that the Court reverse the Orders below, enter summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs (and [...]), and declare that: (1) [...] owed defense and indemnity to [...] for all expenses and liabilities incurred in connection with the Hood litigation; (2) [...] owed indemnity to [...] for such expenses and liabilities exceeding [...]’s primary limit; (3) Plaintiffs (and [...]) are to be reimbursed for their expenses and liabilities incurred in connection with their defense of [...] in the Hood litigation; (4) Plaintiffs (and [...]) are to be reimbursed for their attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with this litigation under New Jersey Court Rule 4:42-9; (5)  Plaintiffs (and [...]) are entitled to pre-judgment interest on all of the foregoing.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.................................................................4  COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.............................................6  LEGAL ARGUEMENT........................................................................8  I.  STANDARD ON APPEAL.................................................................8  II.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AS IT PROPERLY CONSIDERED ALL APPROPRIATE FACTORS IN REACHING ITS DECISION........................................9  A.  The Trial Court’s Statement of Reasons Makes Clear that it Followed the Appropriate Analysis (P011a-P021a)................12  B.  The Trial Court’s Decision Was Supported by the Record (P011a – P021a).................................................................15  C.  The Trial Court’s Order Reflects a Proper Conclusion Regarding Reasonable Attorney’s Fees in this Matter and “Public Policy” does not Require a Different Result...............................................................17  III.  THE TRIAL COURT’S DETERMINATION OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION WITHOUT ORAL ARGUMENT WAS NOT A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION  SUFFICIENT TO REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION......................................................18  IV.  THE TRIAL COURT’S CONSIDERATION OF DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENTS WAS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR.........................................................21  CONCLUSION......................................................................................25