ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Standard of Review  On appeal, this Court will review a trial court’s legal conclusions under the de novo standard of review.  Horne v. Edwards, 477 N.J. Super. 302, 313 (App. Div. 2023), cert. denied, 256 N.J. 439 (2024) (citation omitted).  Thus, its “review of orders that dismiss claims for lack of standing is also de novo. ”  Id. (citing Courier-Post Newspaper v. Cnty. of Camden, 413 N.J. Super. 372, 381 (App. Div. 2010)).  Similarly, the Court engages in a de novo review of the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss.  Rezem Family Assoc., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 208 N.J. 366 (2011).  The Court “review[s] such a motion by the same standard applied by the trial court; thus, considering and accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint; [it] determine[s] whether they set forth a claim upon which relief can be granted. ”  Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App. Div. 2005).  However, “[i]t is a long settled principle of appellate jurisprudence that an appeal is taken from a trial court’s ruling rather than reasons for the ruling.  [An Appellate Court] may [therefore] affirm the final judgment of the trial court on grounds other than those upon which the trial court relied. ”  *New Jersey Div. of Child Protec. and Permanency v. K.M.*, 444 N.J. Super. 325, 333–34 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2016) (citations and quotations omitted).  C.
[brief] Respondent cites Patel v. Navitlal, 265 N.J. Super. 402, 408 (Ch. Div. 1992), as support for the lower court’s decision.  However, as argued in Appellant’s Brief, this case differs from Patel in important respects.  The court denied annulment in Patel because the marriage was consummated and thus required clear and convincing proof to demonstrate grounds for annulment.  Here, the parties’ marriage was never consummated – eliminating the clear and convincing evidence burden, see Bilowit v. Dolitsky, 124 N.J. Super. 101, 102–03 (Ch. Div. 1973) (“Our courts have long required a more substantial quantum of fraud to entitle a party to an annulment where the marriage has been consummated than where it has not.  Any kind of fraud which would render a contract voidable may be the basis for the annulment of a marriage similarly infected”) (citing Ysern v. Horter, 91 N.J. Eq. 189 (Ch. 1920); Caruso v. Caruso, 104 N.J. Eq. 588 (Ch. 1929)).  Moreover, both parties in Patel, supra, 265 N.J. Super. 408, testified that it was their intention to live as husband and wife.  It was the plaintiff's intention to reside in the United States.  It was the defendant's intention to live with her husband as his wife.  Both parties had the requisite intent to create a meaningful relationship at the time of marriage; grounds for annulment were therefore not established.  The facts did not show a pre-marital misrepresentation or fraud that pertained to conditions existing at the time of the marriage.  Patel, supra, 265 N.J. Super. 409; Faustin, supra, 85 N.J. 507.
[brief] "Why would the Defendant on December 2, 2022 pay the 4th quarter taxes, sought to redeem, and on December 9, 2022 met with the tax assessor to seek a reduced assessment, and, inquired, the third time, of the tax office on February 8, 2023, to redeem and produce a bank check on April 4, 2023 for the redemption, if it were not ready, willing and prepared to redeem and preserve his interest in the Premises."  (Brief by [...], Esq, in Opposition to Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, September 18, 2023, at p.12)  STANDARD OF REVIEW OF THE LOWER COURT ORDERS
[directive] Page 79  [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  The point value for this aggravating factor is +2, except that the point value is +3 if the offense involved the actual sale of a controlled substance to a sworn law enforcement officer acting in an undercover capacity, or involved the actual sale of a controlled substance to an informant who was acting under the supervision and direction of a law enforcement officer.  See footnote 3, supra.  Aggravating Factor #5c applies when the defendant is subject to imposition of an Anti-Drug Profiteering penalty pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35A-1 et seq.
[brief] 8  A.  Scope of the PWRA ........................................................................................................  8  POINT II  CREAMER’S BID COMPLIES IN ALL RESPECTS WITH THE BID SPECIFICATIONS.  ANY ALLEGED DEFECT IN CREAMER’S BID IS NOT MATERIAL AND IS THEREFORE WAIVABLE.  ..................................................................................  14  A.  [...]’s Selected Archaeologist Meets the Requirements of the Bid Specifications for the Project ...........................................................................................................  14  B.  Any Alleged Defect in [...]’s Bid is Not a Material Defect and therefore Waivable.  ..........................................................  16  C. [...]’s Claimed Registration As An Archeaologist Under the PWCRA  ..............................................................................  17  CONCLUSION
[brief] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 26(b)(1) provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense. ”  Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1).  The Rule specifies that “[r]elevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. ”  Id.  The discovery rules are accorded a broad and liberal treatment to achieve their purpose of adequately informing litigants in civil trials.
[brief] 31  State Farm Lloyds v. Chandler, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44285 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2005) ..........................  38 United States Liability Ins. Co. v. Bourbeau, 49 F.3d 786 (1st Cir. 1985) .................................................................. 32, 33, 34 Unitrin Direct Ins. Co. v. Esposito, 751 Fed. Appx. 213 (3d Cir. 2018) ......................................................... 47 Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hall Equip., Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D. Mass. 1999) ....................................................... 32 Walid v. Yolanda for Irene Couture, 425 N.J. Super. 171 (App. Div. 2012) .................................................... 28 Wear v. Selective Service Inc., 455 N.J. Super. 440 (App. Div. 2018) ..................................................... 35, 36 Wojciechowski v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65093 (D.N.J. May 8, 2012) ................................. 47 Zararias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590 (2001) .............................................................................. 46 Statutes & Other Authorities: [...] et al., The Expansion of Insurance Coverage for Defective Construction, 28 Constr. Law, Fall 2008 ................................. 46 N.J.R.E. 702 .......................................................................................... 54 N.J.R.E. 703 .......................................................................................... 54 Ostrager & Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes, (14th ed. 2008), § 21.02(c) ...................................................................
[brief] [...] and [...] Deviated From the Standard of Care  The New Motion Judge wrote:  In this case, Plaintiff alleges that the Court relied on the misapprehension that even if the Defendants had called for surgery “...minutes earlier, no attending obstetrician was available to perform it. ”  What the Plaintiff neglects to acknowledge is that there is no expert testimony that the [...], deviated from the accepted standard of care of a resident obstetrician or that [...] would have definitively performed the surgery earlier than he did.
[directive] Reform Bail [the 31 2014, c. P.L. of 11 through 1 Hearin Detention Re-Opening Detention and Seek to Decision Re-Considering 7.7 on based detention pretrial seek to decision the reconsider time any at prosecutor may A the to known not was that Directive and this pursuant to relevant be would that information if Furthermore, detention. pretrial seek to not made decision was initial an time the at prosecutor re-open seek to prosecutor may detention, the pretrial for motion prosecutor's a denies court the material that a has hearing initial of the time the known at not information on based hearing the 2A:162-19(x.
[brief] ”  When such arguments are made to a jury, the Rule requires the trial court to instruct the jury that time-unit calculations are argument only and do not constitute evidence.  In Henker v. Preybylowski, 216 N.J. Super. at 520, the Court held that “a plaintiff’s attorney intending to use the time-unit argument in his closing statement must, before, closing statements begin, request the judge to give the cautionary instruction required by” the Rule.
[directive] The New Jersey Legislature also recognized the importance of the internal affairs function in 1996 with the enactment of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181.  The statute provides that:  Every law enforcement agency shall adopt and implement guidelines which shall be consistent with the guidelines governing the "Internal Affairs Policy and Procedures" of the Police Management Manual promulgated by the Police Bureau of the Division of Criminal Justice in the Department of Law and Public Safety, and shall be consistent with any tenure or civil service laws, and shall not supersede any existing contractual agreements.  1.0.4  In accordance with this mandate, and recognizing that proper administration of internal affairs is a critical priority for the State’s criminal justice system, Attorneys General have periodically issued updated versions of this Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures document through the Division of Criminal Justice.  This most recent round of revisions reflects the need to incorporate emerging best practices into the State’s internal affairs system, and to ensure that all law enforcement agencies in the State are adhering to the guidelines.  1.0.5
[brief] As an initial matter, [...]’s assertion that Plaintiffs “waived their liquidated damages argument” is flat wrong.  ([...] Reply Br. 37-38).  Plaintiffs very specifically asked the trial court to award pre-judgment interest based on its determinations that the defendants misappropriated specific sums of money on specific dates, and that they deprived the Plaintiffs of the use and enjoyment of those funds from each of those dates onward.  (37T:53:19 to 54:8).  Plaintiffs established the amount of their request in their certification in support of the entry of final judgment, and their accompanying interest calculation chart, which set out the precise amount of interest due from each individual misappropriation at applicable Court interest rates.  Indeed, the left-most column of the chart setting forth Plaintiffs’ interest calculation is called “Date of diversion. ” (Da2061; 2073-2076).  The notion that Plaintiffs somehow waived this claim by not raising it below is simply incorrect.  [...] also engages in a bit of rhetorical slight-of-hand by relying on the phrase “liquidated damages” in her brief when the case law actually refers to “liquidated sums. ” ([...] Reply Br. 41-42).  See Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 506 (1974); Lautek Corp. v. Image Bus. Sys. Corp., 276 N.J. Super. 531, 551 (App. Div. 1994).  This distinction matters.  Liquidated damages, [...] and the defendants correctly explain, are a specific amount of money that a party to a contract agrees to pay if he or she breaks some promise.  They are the product of a negotiated good faith estimate in advance of the actual damages that will likely ensue from the breach.  E.g., Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431, 453-54 (2013).  A liquidated sum, by contrast, is a broader phrase referring to specific amounts found to be due and owing pursuant to a contract.  The liquidated sum need not be the product of a specific contractual liquidated damages provision, as is evident from the decisions in both Rova Farms and Lautek.  In both of those cases, the courts concluded that interest was due because the claims were for liquidated sums that were readily calculable or ascertainable, not because the subject contracts contained liquidated damages provisions.
[brief] In that same Order, the court instructed Plaintiff to “continue to serve legal papers at the P.O. Box that was addressed on the record on August 27, 2019,” the same address where the Pre-Action Notice was sent, the same address where the summons and complaint were sent, and the very same address used by the [...] to deliver their determination.  After [...] completed the arbitration process that resulted in confirmation of the $4,600.00 fee award, Plaintiff moved to reinstate the complaint as contemplated by the court by the Order of October 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 2019, and enter judgment in that amount as provided by Rule 1:20A-3(e).  That Rule further provides that “the amount of the fee . . . as so determined may be entered as a judgment in the action unless the full balance due is paid within 30 days of receipt of the arbitration determination.  Rule 1:20A-3(e).  In support of her argument that Plaintiff sought reinstatement of a void complaint, [...] once again relies upon unpublished opinions without first complying with R. 1:36-3, citing to the case of \textit{Hunnell v. McKeon}, A0127-20, 2022 WL 3268382 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 11, 2022).  [...] did not provide a copy of this opinion, nor did counsel certify that no known contrary unpublished opinions exist, and the opinion must therefore be disregarded.  [...] also argues that she “never knew of the plaintiff’s malpractice and false billing until at the fee arbitration hearing when he submitted bills for the first time. ” (Db15)  (Emphasis added.)  However, [...], while citing to and relying on Saffer, supra, never requested an adjournment or stay of the arbitration proceedings.  As held by the Saffer Court, however, “[w]hen during the pendency of a fee arbitration and after the thirty-day period for withdrawal has elapsed, a client discovers a substantial malpractice claim against the former lawyer, we direct the Fee Committee, pursuant to Rule 1:1-2, to relax Rule 1:20A-3(b)(1) to permit the client to have a new thirty-day window of opportunity to withdraw the request for arbitration.  The window of opportunity commences the day the client discovers the substantial malpractice claim within the meaning of Grunwald v. Bronkesh, [citation omitted].  Rule 1:20A-3(b)(1) will not be relaxed, however, if the basis for a substantial malpractice claim is known to the client before the thirty-day withdrawal period expires. ”  [...] never sought to withdraw the request for arbitration.  Saffer, supra, 143 N.J. at 268.
[brief] ” (5T79-15 to 21).  He further noted that the TEAMS Unit will also generally clear common areas, like a stairway, for officer safety, because “the expectation is that those areas are accessible by anyone and everyone in the residence” and that “someone could have fled into that. ” (5T79-15 to 80-17).  [...] also explained that if the team knows they are in the correct area, they have authorization to forcibly open a door if it needed to be—whether because the door was locked, barricaded, and/or being held closed by a person.  (5T119-16 to 120-23).  At the bottom of the stairs was a locked door, facing into the right side of the property, that the police believed went into [...]; thus, the officers did not enter that door.
[brief] On April 12, 2016, and [...] emailed [...] at 11:03 a.m. advising her that she was concerned about [...] because the day before, April 11, 2016, [...] was upset and his hands were shaking and he told her husband that he was being “forced into retirement. ” (Pa686).  [...] forwarded the email of [...] referenced above to [...] stating, “Given the ongoing investigation and preliminary disciplinary action distributed today, I wanted to bring this to your attention. ”  (Pa686).  On April 12, 2016, [...] had the disciplinary charges for falsification served on [...] on April 12, 2016.
[brief] Da068 Exh H (Email of [...] to [...] dated May 2, 2023-Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da145 Exh J (Plaintiff’s Letter to Defendant, [...] dated June 6, 2023-Redacted As Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[directive] If the family prefers to conduct all Circumstances where family meeting may not communication through an attorney representing the family, in the appropriate circumstances a meeting can take place with the family’s attorney only.  The only circumstances under which the Independent Investigator may not meet with the family or a representative are:  If the family declines a meeting; In cases where [...] is recused due to a conflict of interest, the [...] handles the matter 2 pursuant to Step 3 of the Independent Prosecutor Directive.  2  If a subject of the use of force has survived and is charged with a criminal offense; or If the Executive Director of [...] concludes, and the [...] concurs, that a meeting with the family would present a significant risk to the integrity of the ongoing investigation.  C. evidence.
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[brief] ”  [...] also paid an “investor’s” fee of $2,381 to an “[...]. ” (Da-ALL0248).  While the Use and Occupancy Agreement required [...] to pay a monthly “fee” of $833 and all carrying cost of the Property, she was also charged for a “property tax reserve,” an “insurance reserve” and a “use difference” reserve in the amounts of $9,974.00, $1,437.00, and $6,511.00 respectively, totaling $17,922.  (Id.).  These reserves were paid to [...] through his entity, [...]. (Id.; 81a, 51:13–20).  [...] testified that the use difference reserve was created in case [...] could not pay the monthly fee.  (81a, 52:9–19).  He also admitted that he was seeking to purchase a distressed property and one that was in foreclosure proceedings.
[brief] They are just that, argument.  Evidence comes from testimony you’ve heard and the physical evidence that has been admitted.  During closings, [...] indicated he did not call certain witnesses because the State has an obligation to only present truthful testimony.  All attorneys, whether they are from the State or the defense, has an obligation to present only truthful testimony.  The credibility of any witness is for you to determine, and only you to determine.  You are the sole judges of the facts.  [16T:119-16 to 120-3; see also 121-3 to 15; compare, 116-3 to 117-5].  The judge gave an appropriate instruction based on the collective objection of the defense directing that what the lawyers said was argument, not evidence and that only their credibility determinations controls.
[brief] ”  The Legislative purpose of these provisions has “been consistently construed as allowing a property owner to indefinitely continue a nonconforming use. ”  S&S Auto Sales, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment for the Borough of Stratford, 373 N.J. Super. 603, 621 (App. Div. 2004).  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 "has constitutional implications" and "expressly protects a vested right by permitting a pre-existing nonconforming use to co-exist with an ordinance that facially prohibits it."
[brief] (1T16:15-19:23).  Those provisions require a claimant to serve a public entity with a notice of tort claim within ninety days of the accrual of their claims.  N.J.S.A. 59:8-8.  Here, however, [...] failed to allege that he served the State with any notice of claim before he filed suit on October 17, 2018.  (Pa1-Pa43).  According to [...], the trial court erred in dismissing his slander and libel claims because “a notice of claim is not required for those claims that are alleged against a Defendant in his or her ‘individual capacity. ’” (Pb27).  However, [...]’s argument is based on a reading of Gazzillo v. Grieb, 398 N.J. Super. 259 (App. Div. 2008) that is, at best, incomplete.
[directive] Certain decisions must be approved by the County Prosecutor or First Assistant Prosecutor, or by the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or a Deputy Director in cases prosecuted by the Division, while certain other decisions may be made by other supervisory assistant prosecutors/deputy attorneys Page 59 general designated by the County Prosecutor or Director.  Specifically, County Prosecutor/First Assistant/Director/Deputy Director approval is required before a pretrial detention motion may be filed unless the Bail Reform Law creates a presumption of detention (i.e., where the defendant is charged with murder or is subject to an ordinary or extended term of life imprisonment), or unless this Directive establishes a rebuttable presumption of seeking pretrial detention.  See Section 7.4.
[directive] [No/No]  1.  ¿Entiende que por su declaración de culpabilidad a  Do you understand that because of your plea of guilty to se requerirá que cumpla un período mínimo de tiempo de la condena impuesta antes de que esté en condiciones de recibir libertad condicional, conforme a la Ley Graves (tal como se expresa en la pregunta 7 del formulario para la declaración de culpabilidad que consta de tres páginas?  you will be subject to a minimum period of time before you will be eligible for parole (a parole ineligibility term) under the Graves Act (as set forth in question 7 on the three-page plea form)?
[brief] (Da298-Da299).  On August 30 and 31, 2022, the trial court held oral argument on State Respondents’ motion and three other Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the other defendants in this action.  (1T; 2T).  At the close of more than three hours of oral argument, the trial court issued an oral opinion on the record.  (2T58:18-91:6).  On September 15, 2022, the trial court entered an Order denying all parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment.
[brief] The City has the duty to be knowledgeable of, and abide by, Civil Service laws.  Appellant is not required to know the nuances of civil service regulations regarding promotions, and the City’s failure to know, and its’ attempt to rectify those mistakes without the statutory or regulatory authority to do so, resulting in Appellant being deprived of a promotion, is contrary to the court’s ruling in *Sellers*.  Particularly offensive here is that while Appellant inquired of the City as to its reason for failing to promote him, as set forth above, the City never advised Appellant that it retroactively applied the September and October 2022 retirements to the July 2022 promotions.
[directive] 그러므로, 이 문서에 소셜 시큐리티 번호, 운전면허증 번호, 차량 번호판 번호, 보험증권 번호, 사용 중인 금융계좌 번호, 또는 사용 중인 신용카드  번호 등 개인의 신원을 확인할 수 있는 정보를 기재하지 마십시오.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.
[brief] Div. 1978) aff’d 79 N.J. 535 (1979), rev’d 83 N.J. 49 (1980) | 25, 26 | | Coyne v. DOT, 182 N.J. 481, 493 (2005) | 26, 41, 42 | | Creanga v. Jardal, 185 N.J. 345, 360 (2005) | 58 | | Danow v. Penn Central Transportation Co., 153 N.J. Super. 597 (1977) | 26 | | Delgado v. Yourman-Helbig, No. A-3633-20, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1266, at *14-16 (Super. Ct. App. Div. July 13, 2022) | 22 | | Estate of Chin v. Saint Barnabas Medical Center, 160 N.J. 454, 460 (1999) | 61 | | Evans v. Elizabeth Police Dept., 190 N.J. Super. 633, 636 rev’d on other grounds 236 N.J. Super. 115 (App. Div. 1983) | 25 | | Filipowicz v. Dilletto, 350 N.