ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014).  Under that standard, a sentence should not be disturbed unless the trial judge failed to follow the sentencing guidelines, the judge’s findings regarding the aggravating and mitigating factors are not supported by “competent and credible evidence in the record,” or the judge’s “application of the guidelines” renders the sentence “clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience.
[brief] (“RAF”)  Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq. [...], Esq.  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  [...]  [...], Esq. (#013582006)  [...], Esq. (#215292017)  [...]  [...] [...]  Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...], Esq.  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[directive] (1)  Você entende que se está se declarando culpado pelo crime de agressão sexual [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] qualificada, agressão sexual, contato sexual criminal qualificado, sequestro segundo os termos da lei 2C:13-1c(2), por colocar em risco o bem-estar de um menor com conduta sexual que prejudique ou corrompa a moral do menor segundo os termos da lei 2C:24- 4a, por seduzir menores ou por tentativa de cometer qualquer um destes crimes, o juiz, além de qualquer outra sentença, vai impor uma sentença especial de supervisão comunitária vitalícia?  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child pursuant to 2C:24-4a, luring, or an attempt to commit any such offense, the court, in addition to any other sentence, will impose a special sentence of community supervision for life?
[brief] Da1.  On April 6, 2023, plaintiff filed with the Office of Foreclosure its motion for the entry of a final judgment of foreclosure, its proposed form of final judgment, and the certification of amount due of [...] (“[...]”), plaintiff’s authorized signatory, dated April 5, 2023.  Da17, Da19, and Da22, respectively.  On April 26, 2023, the Office of Foreclosure denied plaintiff’s motion because (a) an order striking a co-defendant’s answer had not been filed, and (b) the Office required a clarification relating to late charges.  Da29.  On May 2, 2023, plaintiff filed [...]’s April 5, 2023 certification of amount due with an amended amount due schedule.  Da33.  On May 10, 2023, plaintiff filed its motion for the entry of a final judgment of foreclosure, its proposal form of foreclosure judgment, and [...]’s April 5, 2023 certification of amount due with the amended amount due schedule.  Da40, Da42, and Da45, respectively.  On May 19, 2023, [...] filed its objections to plaintiff’s motion.  Da52.  On May 24, 2023, the Clerk of the Superior Court entered an administrative order transferring the matter to Hudson County for review by a judge.  Da59.  On June 9, 2023, [...] withdrew its objections.  Da60.  The foreclosure judgment was entered on June 9, 2023.  Da61.  The September 7, 2024 foreclosure sale date was adjourned.  The sale was subsequently scheduled for and held on December 14, 2023.
[directive] Prosecutor’s Office decides to issue a complaint against a juvenile who is not yet in custody.  For example, the Prosecutor’s Office might seek a warrant for serious charges and eCDR will allow for law enforcement to request the warrant, Juvenile Intake will run the RST, and if detention is authorized, the process will be complete with the issuance of a complaint-warrant.  Otherwise, a complaint-summons would issue.  In any case, where the determination is made by a Prosecutor’s Office to apply for a Assistant Prosecutors should be cautious in having direct communication with a victim unless a detective is 26 present to avoid the possibility that the Assistant Prosecutor may become a witness in the case.
[brief] It is axiomatic that witnesses may be cross-examined with prior inconsistent statements to impeach their credibility.  State v. Silva, 131 N.J. 438, 444 (1993).  This Court has called “the use of prior inconsistent statements to discredit witnesses” “one of the most valued tools of litigation[.]”  Matter of Wolf, 231 N.J. Super. 365, 372 (App. Div.), certif. den., 117 N.J. 138 (1989).  “What a witness said on a prior occasion compared with his testimony at trial will often significantly aid the trier of fact in determining the truth. ”  Stewart v. Dexter, 218 N.J.  Super. 417, 421 (Law Div. 1986) (ordering the disclosure of grand jury testimony to be used to assess the credibility of witness testimony in a related civil matter).  “The aim of our judicial system is to ascertain the truth so that justice will be done.
[brief] A condition may become unreasonable through changed circumstances or may be revealed as unnecessary and may be reconsidered in later years.  See Cohen v. Fair Lawn, 85 N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 1964).  Where the condition was not essential to the approval, the approval will stand after excision of the condition.  See Sherman v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 242 N. J. Super. 421, 429-435 (App. Div.), cert. den. 122 N.J. 404 (1990).  The amount of development requested in 2019 was significantly less than the development approved in 2016, when the traffic light was agreed to.  Circumstances have indeed changed, with traffic being reduced below what was envisioned in 2016.  Moreover, there is no nexus between the variance granted and any need for a traffic light.  Whether variances were granted or not, the magnitude of development (number of units and square footage of nonresidential) would be the same.  Again, no increase in density of development was sought.  Thus, even if the traffic light were viewed as a condition of approval, application of the case law principles set forth above justifies the ruling by the [...] providing that no such traffic light can be required.
[brief] (A)  In disposing of the case, the trial judge stated the following, directing the appellant to go to HUD and “sign” the non-existing agreement:  “THE COURT: [...], do you want to sign it by virtue of your power of attorney?  Then we can get the space.  Get conformance, get the space right in front of your house” (1T10, 14-17).  This material misunderstanding by the trial judge that viable and existing “conciliation” was at work at HUD was so rooted in his mind that he repeated the same, over and over throughout the trial, (1T06, 11-16), (1T07, 8-15), and (1T11, 6-8).
[brief] (Pa44-45 ([...] Cert. at ¶13) and Pa116 (Exhibit D thereto at p. 3, # 1 E-mail Exchange)).  Later in the day on November 1, 2018, [...] responded and confirmed that the Consent Order set a sixty day filing deadline for Refiled Actions following a final award or other judgment terminating the [...]:  We should add language indicating a “final award or other judgment terminating the arbitration” would trigger the filing deadline.  [Pa45 ([...] Cert. at ¶14) and Pa115 (Ex. D thereto at p. 2 – Email Exchange) (emphasis added)].
[brief] ”  Sussex Commons Assocs., LLC v. Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531, 540-41 (2012) (citing Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc., 208 N.J. 114, 127 (2011)).  “[T]he best indicator of that intent is the statutory language[.]”  Richardson, 192 N.J. at 195 (first alteration in original) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).  “A court should ‘ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole. ’”  D’Ambrosio v. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 403 N.J. Super. 321, 334 (App. Div. 2008) (citing DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492).  Here, the Legislature clearly intended a limitation period of eligibility for the presumption or recalculation provided under the Ricci Act, as the plain language of the statute sets a two-year deadline ending July 8, 2021, after which a “retiree shall not be eligible” for such benefits.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  Under [...]’s argument, any member of [...] who was unaware of the Ricci Act could apply at any arbitrarily distant point in the future.  This would nullify the two-year time limitation created by the Legislature, extend the presumption beyond its intended time frame, and diminish the ability of the Division and the Board to verify applicants’ dates and locations of service as witnesses and memories inevitably continue to become unavailable and fade.  Ignoring the plain language of the statute, which imposes a two-year deadline, would not further the legislative purpose of the Ricci Act.  Even if the statutory language were not clear, [...]’s position would lead to an absurd result which would render the two-year statutory limitation superfluous.  In this regard, “[w]hen construing a statute, ‘legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. ’”  State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 449 (2011)(quoting Franklin Tower One, LLC v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 613 (1999).  Accordingly, the Board reasonably denied [...]’s request to apply for amended benefits under the Ricci Act because he failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the required statutory timeframe.
[brief] Co. 131 N.J.L. 475 (E&A 1944) explained that:  Much has been written by text writers and by the courts as to the meaning of the phrase “public policy. ”  All are agreed that its meaning is as “variable” as it is “vague,” and that there is no absolute rule by which courts may determine what contracts contravene the public policy of the state.  The rule of law, most generally stated, is that “public policy” is that principle of law which holds that “no person can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against public good” even though “no actual injury” may have resulted therefrom in a particular case “to the public.
[brief] (1T 30-12 to 22)  At the suppression hearing, [...] testified he decided to request a canine sniff because [...] “was inconsistent, showed nervousness, couldn’t tell me where he was coming from or going and just was in a state of confusion. ”  (1T 7-14 to 17)  He said he also found [...]’s statement that he had been to a country club concerning because “the attire he was wearing wasn’t consistent with a private country club” and “there was also no golf clubs present in the bed of the pickup truck. ”  (1T 7-20 to 24)  In a written decision, [...] found “that the canine sniff did prolong the duration of the stop beyond the time required to complete the stop’s mission.
[brief] Defendants both argued that Plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Yet, Plaintiff asserted ample facts to support such a claim.  In particular, the Court is referred to the allegations regarding the affirmatively misleading and deceptive way in which [...] and [...] actively colluded to keep the facts and details of the rescheduled closing hidden from Plaintiff.  (Pa11-13, Complaint ¶¶ 42-53).  These are allegations of bad faith and improper motivation.  See id.  In fact, [...] asserted in the court below that it was acting at the express direction of [...] when it intentionally misled and withheld material information from Plaintiff in the weeks leading up to the secret closing.
[brief] While Defendants attempted to frame the facts and their defense to comply with the duty set forth in 5.20(B)(2)(b), that charge does not conform with the testimony and evidence presented at trial.  Accordingly, the trial court’s decision to charge the jury with Model Jury Charge 5.20(F)(5) was proper.  There are significant differences between the charge Defendants wanted to use versus what the jury was charged, because 5.20(B)(2)(b) does not include any of the protections provided to an invitee as provided in 5.20(F)(5) as to what the landowner should have done to keep the land reasonably safe, including inspecting the land, and making sure it was safe for the Plaintiff upon her arrival.
[brief] See Young v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., 297 N.J. Super. 605, 614-19, (App. Div.), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 408 (1997) (finding an agreement to arbitrate waived the right to jury trial even though the right was not specifically mentioned); see also Littman v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 337 N.J. Super. 134, 146-48, (App. Div. 2001) (following Young because "the right to jury trial, even under an anti-discrimination statute, does not alone control the issue of enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate").  The Arbitration Provision was also conspicuous.  It had its own section in the SPA with a clear heading “Arbitration” and was double-spaced and in large font.  There was also a line for Plaintiffs to place their initials immediately following it, which they did.  The initial lines evidence that Plaintiffs were aware of the provision governing resolution of all disputes.  See Fairfield Leasing Corp. v. Techni-Graphics, Inc., 256 N.J. Super. 538, 540 (Law Div. 1992).  There is nothing about the clause that de-emphasized or buried the relevant terms.  There is also nothing unclear or ambiguous about the language contained in the document.  E.
[brief] III.  The Parties engage in litigation and the Trial Court grants summary judgment in favor of [...].  [...] filed its Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause against [...], its principals, and [...] and its principal and was granted temporary restraints enjoining all defendants from closing on the Premises.  Da100.  The defendants filed a motion to terminate the temporary restraints, arguing that the sale to [...] should proceed in accordance with the PSA.  Da135, Da164.  The Trial Court denied this motion.  Da165.  On or around September 13, 2023, [...] reached an agreement with [...] to be dismissed from the case upon a representation that [...] had withdrawn their offer to purchase the Premises under the PSA and that certain discovery would be produced to Plaintiff.  Da169.  An executed stipulation of dismissal as to [...] was filed shortly thereafter.  Ibid.  The remaining parties conducted expedited fact discovery and took the depositions of key party witnesses to this case.  After that was completed, the parties filed dispositive motions with oral argument heard on February 16, 2024.  Da171, Da251, 1T.  On February 20, 2024, the Court issued an Order and lengthy Statement of Reasons granting Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, compelling specific performance of the ROFR, and denying Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment.
[directive] C.  Sentencing  COVID-19 related charges heard in municipal court will generally be either Disorderly Persons (DP) or Petty Disorderly Persons (PDP) offenses.  Although municipal court judges have considerable discretion at sentencing, their discretion is subject to the minimum or maximum penalties set forth in the statutes.  One area where municipal prosecutors can exercise their discretion when seeking to mitigate the consequences of a COVID-19 related conviction is at sentencing.  The municipal prosecutor may choose to make a favorable sentencing recommendation or not object to the defendant’s sentencing request.  Any recommendation, however, must be within the statutory sentencing guidelines.  D.
[brief] Even if this Court were to entertain this new argument on appeal, it lacks merit.  The matter before the Court is a lawsuit by Plaintiff against Defendant.  The Trial Court found the assignments impermissible and the Trial Court ultimately found that they divested Plaintiff of standing to bring this action.  The enforceability of the Assignments between Plaintiff and the Third Parties were not before the Court, and any such ruling would not have estopped those Third Parties from seeking the enforcement of those assignments.  Without being a party to the dispute, the Third Parties would not be estopped from arguing for their enforceability.  Collateral estoppel only binds parties to the litigation not third parties who had no opportunity to litigate the issue.  What the Trial Court did recognize, is that although the assignments were improper, they were voluntarily entered into by the Plaintiff and they conveyed Plaintiff’s rights to the litigation to Third Parties.  The fact that they might ultimately prove unenforceable if there is a dispute between Plaintiff and those third parties, does not change the fact that Plaintiff assigned his rights to Third Parties.  The Defendant is entitled to have the real party in interest as an adversary and the Court recognized this through the dismissal of this action.
[brief] It took several weeks for this remanded case to be reopened and reactivated.  (Pa110).  On February 26, 2020, the State related defendants (DAG [...] and [...]) filed a Rule 4:6-2 (e) post-remand pre-answer pre-discovery motion to dismiss on the pleadings.  (Pa116).  On March 13, 2020 and in order to facilitate judicial economy and efficiency, the remanded state court (Essex County Presiding Civil Judge [...]) entered a global motion to dismiss case management briefing and oral argument scheduling consent order.  (Pa71).  Besides filing opposition pleadings and exhibits (Pa172 to Pa213), plaintiff also filed a disqualifying conflict of interest/designation of trial counsel cross-motion.  (Pa324 to Pa479).  Plaintiff questioned whether the non-State related executive and legislative branch defendants could retain the same lawyer to simultaneously represent the local executive and legislative branches in this hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights act violations action.
[brief] [O]nce the plaintiff knew that there was no deal . . .  I don’t find there was any conceivable cause of action for . . . intentionally interfering with a prospective economic opportunity and I do find that further pursuing the litigation was frivolous.  Thereafter, on reconsideration, the Court altered its order so that it applied only to Plaintiffs (and not their counsel), but still held sanctions to be appropriate based on the Court’s assumption that there could not possibly be a claim against [...] without a subsequent transaction:  [I]t’s difficult for me to see and the same reason I’ve said in the past, if there was ever a commutable [sic] cause of action for this interference with the prospective economic opportunity or in any event as I said, the transaction never took place.  In neither of these orders, however, did the Trial Court include detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, as required by Rule 1:7-4, establishing the basis for the sanctions.  Indeed, the sum total of the Trial Court’s “findings” with respect to the reason for, and the amount of, the sanctions consists of:  I think the laboring [oar] in the litigation has gone to the [Notis] defendants more so to [...], but still, they have to at the very least stay in and monitor and represent their client’s interest . . . and I’ve looked over the certification, the hours are reasonable for the type of attorneys that are working in the case in this area in this expertise and I think they’re entitled to at least 50 percent of the fees that they suffered in this case .  . .  The Trial Court erred in its interpretation and application in all three motions.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the Appellate Court reverse the Trial Court’s Summary Judgment Order and Sanctions Orders and remand.
[brief] As to [...]’s issuing the search warrant, “[a] search based upon a warrant is presumed to be valid once the State establishes that the search warrant was issued in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the rules governing search warrants. ”  *State v. Robinson*, 200 N.J. 1, 7-8 (2009) (quotation omitted).  But evidence obtained under color of a defective warrant must be suppressed.  *State v. Dispoto*, 189 N.J. 108, 121 (2007).  Well-settled state law requires that the judicial officer who issues a search warrant “must be acting within the scope of his or her authority, usually defined in territorial terms. ”  [...], *N.J. Arrest, Search & Seizure* § 8:4 at 191 (2023) (“The jurisdiction of the issuing court generally defines the scope of the geographical area in which a search may be authorized. ”).  The Superior Court is a constitutional creation empowered to authorize searches throughout the State.  N.J. Const. art. VI, § 3, ¶ 2; accord R. 3:1-2.  But municipal courts are created by the Legislature with much more limited authority—they are, by their nature, statutory courts of limited jurisdiction both in subject-matter and geography.  N.J. Const. art. VI, § I, ¶ 1; *State v. Garcia*, 297 N.J. Super. 108, 113 (App. Div. 1996) (noting that a municipal court’s authority “must be found in legislative grants of jurisdiction”).
[directive] A.  General Requirements  1.  Law enforcement officers shall not harass or discriminate against individuals based on their actual or perceived gender identity or expression and/or sexual orientation, Page 3 individuals.4 including by using offensive or derogatory words to describe LGBTQ+  To avoid engaging in such discrimination, law enforcement officers shall not:  a.  Fail to respond to, delay responding to, or treat as less important, any call or request for service or assistance because of the individual’s actual or perceived gender identity or expression and/or sexual orientation; b.  Consider a person’s actual or perceived gender identity or expression and/or sexual orientation as a basis for reasonable suspicion, or as prima facie evidence that the individual is, has, or is about to engage in a crime; or c.  Stop, question, search, arrest, or detain any individual, or subject any individual to more invasive search procedures: i.  Because of that individual’s actual or perceived gender identity or expression and/or sexual orientation; ii. Because that individual used a restroom that the officer knows was expression;5 consistent with that individual’s gender identity or or iii.  In order to determine that individual’s genitals or anatomy, or to assign gender.  In other words, an officer may not consider a person’s gender identity or expression and/or sexual orientation as a factor in deciding whether that person may be involved in criminal activity, or in deciding how to treat that person, except when an officer is pursuing specific leads in an ongoing criminal investigation or is trying to determine whether an individual matches the description in a B.O.L.O. (“Be On the Lookout”).  What this provision does is expand the same non-discrimination rule that exists for race and ethnicity to gender identity or expression and/or sexual orientation.
[brief] Counsel Fees, By Themselves, Cannot Constitute a Damage Giving Rise To A Cause of Action**  Counsel fees, by themselves, cannot constitute a damage giving rise to a cause of action.  In *In re Estate of Lash*, 169 N.J. 20, 26 (2001), the Supreme Court of New Jersey cited a series of precedents to illustrate what it meant when it declared that the fees incurred by the plaintiff are “merely a portion of the damages the plaintiff suffered at the hands of the tortfeasor.