ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pal-10.\(^1\)  It simply argued that Respondent’s OPRA request sought a criminal investigatory record which was wholly exempt from disclosure.  *Ibid.*  \(^{1}\)Appellant’s underlying brief is attached to my Appendix per R. 2:6-1(a)(2) to show that no such argument was asserted below.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE ISSUE RAISED IN APPELLANT’S APPEAL WAS NEVER INITIALLY RAISED BELOW AND THE TRIAL JUDGE’S ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION
[brief] Exhibit 36 - [...] Cost Worksheet (Form B) completed by [...]...............................................................Dta2687  Exhibit 37 - Transcript from the deposition of [...] in the DJ Action...............................................................Dta2689  Exhibit 38 - E-mail dated 7/30/2015  Welcome Letter and Certificate of Insurance..............................................................Dta2774 Exhibit 39 - July 30, 2015  E-Mail from [...] of [...]...Dta2779 Exhibit 40 - August 3, 2015  Email from [...] of [...] to [...] of Alliant.................................Dta2781  Exhibit 41 - August 3, 2015  Email from [...] of [...] to [...].................................Dta2783  Exhibit 42 - August 3, 2015, 8:18, E-Mail from [...] to [...] of [...]........................................Dta2786  Exhibit 43 - August 5, 2015, 8:18 a.m., E-Mail from [...]..Dta2797 Exhibit 44 - August 5, 2015, 8:19 a.m., E-Mail from [...]..Dta2800
[brief] (Pa143; Pa203-Pa204).  Only co-Defendant [...] and other members of the [...] religion have worshipped at the Temple located on the Property since its purchase in 1996, including officers of the Plaintiff.  (Pa143).  Money is collected from Temple members at the Temple located on the Property and that has been happening for decades.  (Pa143).  The money that is donated by Temple members is donated to support and further the [...], a national religious organization and a defendant in this lawsuit; the donated funds are not donated in order to support the New Jersey corporation created by [...] or to personally benefit [...].
[brief] (14a)  --- 1T - January 10, 2022  2T - May 27, 2022  3T - June 8, 2022  4T - August 10, 2022  5T - June 28, 2023 6T - September 13, 2023  7T - December 6, 2024  8T - December 14, 2024  On February 1, 2022, Defendants filed a counterclaim requesting relief including (1) construction of the trust; and (2) specific performance; and (3) appointment of an independent successor trustee; and (4) a demand for formal accounting.
[brief] [Da1-3].  On January 19, 2023, defendant appeared before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., and a jury for trial.  [1T].  Prior to trial, the State moved to dismiss Count Two of the Indictment.  [...] granted the State’s request and dismissed Count Two.  [1T5-9 to -11].  Defendant informed the court that he wanted an expert on DNA, but the request was not authorized by the [...].  [1T5-17 to -24].  Defendant stated that he was being forced to proceed to trial without --- 1T refers to the trial transcript dated January 19, 2023.  2T refers to the trial transcript dated January 24, 2023.  3T refers to the trial transcript dated January 25, 2023.  4T refers to the trial transcript dated January 26, 2023.  5T refers to the trial transcript dated January 31, 2023.  6T refers to the sentencing transcript dated June 9, 2023.
[brief] Fanfarillo v. East End Motor Co., 172 N.J. Super. 309, 312-13 (App. Div. 1980); Clark, 25 N.J. Super. at 161-162.  That never happened in this case.  The duty of full disclosure is continuing.  McKenney v. Jersey City Medical Center, 167 N.J. 359, 370 (2001) and authorities cited.  Here, plaintiffs had years to comply, but failed to do so.
[brief] (5T125-2 to 126-9).  Despite admitting that his signature and date were on the back of [...]’s photograph in his handwriting, [...] claimed he had never seen that person before and that it was not [...].  (5T126-10 to 127-3).  On May 28, 2012, [...], an assistant medical examiner, performed an autopsy on [...].  (6T128-4 to -10; 6T130-6 to 8).  [...] sustained a gunshot wound to the left side of his chest.  (6T140-3 to -4; 141-13 to -16).  [...] concluded the “cause of death was the gunshot wound to the chest” and the manner of death was homicide.  (6T156-25 to 157-6).
[brief] T3 36:20-22.  The ALJ makes specific references to [...]’s testimony in this regard.  In relevant part, the Decision states:  [...] found appellant’s opioid abuse to be an extension of his alcohol abuse.  He determined that appellant was taking very high dosages of opioids three times per day, although opioids should only be used “as needed”.  He indicated that a person taking opioids three times daily would be an indication that the person was in constant pain; however, appellant was not in pain when examined by [...]…[...] indicated that a person having prescriptions filled for high doses of opioids but not needing them or using them was an indication that the person was sharing his prescription drugs with other people…[...] stated that opioids were highly addictive and, for that reason, opioid use should end thirty to sixty days after the use commenced.
[directive] The summary report forms must contain sufficient information to enable the County Prosecutor to identify warning signs of potential deficiencies in the internal affairs process.  At a minimum, each report must include a brief summary of each internal affairs complaint that was pending before the agency at any point during the reporting period.  The summary shall at least include the nature of the complaint, the date the complaint was received, the INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 63 current status of the complaint, and, if the case is closed, the final disposition of the complaint with any discipline imposed.  A sample form is found at Appendix K.
[brief] THE JUDICIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF THE [...] REQUIRES DEFERENCE TO THE BOARD UNLESS THERE HAS BEEN A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION.  The standard of review of the action of a local zoning board of adjustment is well settled.  The Appellate Division review of a challenge to the decision of a municipal board follows the same standard as the trial court: the Court must determine whether the municipal body acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably.  Ten Stary Dom P’ship v. Mauro, 216 N.J. 16, 33 (2013); Jacoby v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 442 N.J. Super. 450, 462 (App. Div. 2015).  The action of the local board is presumed to be valid.  Kenwood Associates v. Bd. of Adj. Englewood, 141 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1976).  This presumption is overcome only by a showing of clear and compelling evidence.  Dome Realty, Inc. v. City of Patterson, 83 N.J. 212, 235 (1980); Advance at Branchburg II, LLC v. Twp. of Branchburg Board of Adjustment, 433 N.J. Super. 247, 253 (App. Div. 2013).  The appellate court will not disturb the local board’s decision absent a clear abuse of discretion and will not overturn the board’s decision where there is adequate evidence supporting the decision and the decision comports with statutory criteria.
[brief] A.  The Lease | 17 | | B.  Terms of the Lease | 18 | | (i)  Tenant’s Payment Obligations | 18 | | (ii)  Events of Default | 19 | | (iii)  Tenant Allowance (i.e. “Fit-Up” Reimbursement) | 20 | | C.  Tenant’s Admitted Events of Default  Under the Lease | 24 | | D.  Tenant Allowance Payments | 26 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 28 | POINT I
[directive] DWI arrestee only to persons responsible for the arrestee's conduct strikes a proper balance between the right to an independent BAC test and the continuing duty of the police to safeguard 48-9.13 the public. ”  State v. Greeley, 178 N.J. at #3  “[t]he police officer shall, however, inform the person arrested of the consequences of refusing to submit to such test ...”  Every person who receives a license to operate a motor vehicle in New Jersey, and in every other State, by virtue of applying for, taking the written and driving tests, and accepting the driver’s license, has already given their implied consent to submit to chemical breath testing.  However, the act of being licensed is not, in and of itself, an element of a DWI refusal violation.  The violation is operating a motor vehicle and refusing to submit to chemical breath testing, when so requested by the police or law enforcement officer.  This third provision, again informs the defendant that refusing to submit to chemical breath testing will, upon conviction, result in the imposition of additional penalties, beyond any penalties imposed for a DWI conviction.  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e); N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.24e; N.J.S.A. 12:7-55e.
[brief] [...] Investigates the Unauthorized Entry and Receipt of Charge Pay.  Following this discovery, [...] contacted HR.  (Pa475).  HR Business Partner [...] launched an investigation.  (Pa102-03 at 77:20-78:14).  [...] interviewed each of the staffing coordinators about the charge pay.  [...] was present for various interviews.  (Pa99 at 62:11-63:5).  [...] took detailed notes for each of these interviews.  (Pa536-41).  Neither [...], nor [...], nor [...] dispute the accuracy of [...]’s notes.
[directive] Actor purposely or knowingly damages property of another or recklessly or negligently 2C:17-3(a)(b)(2)  Criminal Mischief causes such damage by the employment of fire or explosives or other dangerous means, Disorderly Persons $500 to $1,000 10% permissible and the pecuniary loss is $500 or less.  83  Bail Schedule 2  DISORDERLY PERSONS OFFENSES AND PETTY DISORDERLY PERSONS OFFENSES  Note:  Some of these offenses are listed elsewhere in Bail Schedule 2 as lesser included offenses  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 (Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b) (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.
[brief] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................... | 1 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT .................................................................................... | 2 | | I.  THE ESI ORDER RESTS ON A MISINTERPRETATION OF RULE 4:10-2(a) (RAISED BELOW: DA166-68; T3-38)  ................................................. | 2 | | A.  Under Rule 4:10-2(a), A Court Cannot Compel The Production Of Irrelevant Documents (Raised Below: Da166-68; T3-38) .................. | 3 | | B.  Plaintiffs’ Remaining Arguments Cannot Salvage the ESI Order (Raised Below: Da166-68; T3-38) .................................................. | 8 | | II.  THE ESI ORDER REFLECTS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION (RAISED BELOW: DA166-68; T3-38)  ................................................................. | 13 | | CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. | 15
[brief] If the lower court’s ruling is not reversed, the defendant will remain approved for acceptance into the Recovery Court program after it was proven he possessed a firearm while the [...] case was still pending.  Conversely, his application would have been denied if his Essex firearm charges were still pending and the presumption of innocence remained viable.  This rationale contradicts the clear, plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a(5) and the intent of the Legislature to bar Track One applicants who possess firearms either during the underlying case or at any point while any criminal matter was active.  Therefore, as N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a(5) is clear in its textual language and intent, and because it is definitively and objectively known the defendant possessed a firearm during the pendency of the Morris GT Motors burglary and theft case, the Order of the lower court should be reversed as it will result in the imposition of an illegal sentence.
[brief] \(^7\)  This was a misstatement, as the record reflects three votes in favor of the motion and two opposed, with one abstention (1T74-9 to 1T74-25; Aa5-Aa6).  Following the hearing, the Board issued the Second Resolution memorializing its finding that using the [...] for purposes of parking was "not a valid, preexisting non-conforming use," having found no site plan approvals, permits, or resolutions allowing such use (Aa1-6).
[brief] The judge erred below in denying the State’s joinder motion and limiting the other-crime evidence from the April 20 robbery.  The April 20 robbery of 5  Although not cited in the State’s Omnibus Motion below, there is a story on defendant’s Instagram account showing the BMW with its license plate clearly visible.  This story was discovered as the State continued to examine its evidence in preparation for trial.  the Audi in Jersey City that was used to carjack the Mercedes in this case must be joined to this case.  It was one continuing course of conduct, and the unique nature of the Audi and yellow BMW as stolen just three days prior is what identifies defendant where identity is a central issue in the case.  The judge abused his discretion when he decided that three days was not close in time, and the theft of one vehicle used to commit the theft in the second was not similar in kind.  A.
[brief] On February 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants asserting nine counts for relief, and seeking damages related to certain insurance policies which did not provide benefits as promised and represented by Defendants.  Count VII of the Complaint alleged claims against Defendants based on the CFA.  Defendants moved to dismiss certain Counts in the Complaint, pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim, including the CFA count.  The trial court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss the CFA claim in Count VII, with prejudice.  On August 26, 2024, this Court granted leave to appeal the trial court’s ruling as to Count VII only.
[brief] (Pb 8-9)  [...] did not re-initiate questioning by asking to speak to his mother.  Cf. Fuller, 118 N.J. at 78 (suspect reinitiated questioning by asking officers direct questions that invited conversation about the crimes).  Law enforcement knew that he had invoked his right not to speak without counsel.  (2T 46-5 to 16)  What occurred instead was what [...] described as a “domino effect;” after [...]’s clear statement that he did not wish to waive his rights was ignored by [...], any further efforts to continue questioning would have been “tainted” at best.  (2T 46-18 to 25; 3T 16-24 to 18-22)  A proper—but likely defective—effort by law enforcement to resume questioning would have involved a new round of Miranda warnings; as [...] observed, that re-warning simply never occurred.  (3T 18-17 to 19)  In this regard, [...] gave appropriate weight to his finding that [...] ignored [...]’s first statement that he would not waive his rights.
[brief] POINT II  IN THE ABSENCE OF A NEXUS BETWEEN A THREAT OF VIOLENCE AND AN EMERGENCY DECLARATION IN PLACE AT THE TIME THE THREAT IS MADE, THE SECOND-DEGREE ENHANCEMENT IN THE TERRORISTIC THREATS  STATUTE BEARS  NO REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TO A LEGITIMATE STATE PURPOSE.  IT THEREFORE VIOLATES SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AS APPLIED TO [...].  N.J. Const. art. 1, ¶ 1.  (Not Raised Below)  ..................................................................................................................  14  1.  Background ...........................................................................................................  15  2.  Without a nexus between a threat and an emergency declaration in place at the time the threat is made, the second-degree enhancement in the terroristic threats statute bears no reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose in violation of substantive due process.....................  18  POINT III TO PRESERVE THE APPEARANCE OF FAIRNESS AND IMPARTIALITY, THE [...] SHOULD HAVE BEEN RECUSED FROM THIS CASE.
[directive] Use and Preservation of Confidential Sources  The Designated Attorney shall determine whether the application relies to any degree upon a confidential informant or other confidential source of information, or whether the investigation involved the use of a secret surveillance site.  In addition to determining whether the confidential source provided reliable information that, based upon the totality of the circumstances, constitutes probable cause (see Section 12(4), supra), the Page 8 Designated Attorney shall inquire whether the applicant anticipates the need to seek a protective order to preclude eventual disclosure to a defense counsel or any other person of any information that might reveal the identity of the informer or other confidential information source, or the location of a surveillance site.  In the event that a protective order is necessary and appropriate to protect a confidential source, the Designated Attorney shall take all appropriate steps to make certain that a timely ex parte application is made to the court for a protective order.
[brief] Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred finding [...] did not identify an industry standard the [...] violated when they placed the bagel kettle next to a pathway employees used to access the back-kitchen.  [...]'s opinion relied on the standard set forth in N.J.A.C. 13:27-5.1(a):  An architect shall at all times recognize the primary obligation to protect the health, safety and welfare of the public in the performance of professional duties, shall act with reasonable care and competence, and shall apply the technical knowledge and skill which are ordinarily applied by architects of good standing, practicing in the same locality.  Plaintiffs argue that [...]'s reliance on N.J.A.C.  13:27-5.1(a) does not establish the duty of care, but addresses the overall competence of the 2007 plan, which moved the bagel kettle from its shielded position leaving it adjacent to a pathway to the kitchen, deviating from an accepted architectural duty of care and creating an unnecessary hazard for employees.
[brief] ”  Because the statutory definition includes (i) those that initiate consumer loans by issuing credit cards and credit card agreements; and (ii) via the second sentence, intended to broaden the coverage, those engaged in purchasing “notes,” there is no reason to suppose that the Legislature intended by use of that term to limit the same to negotiable promissory notes.  . . .  Put differently, as the statute and licensing requirement apply to original credit card issuers, there is ample reason to suppose that the Legislature intended to include purchasers of credit card accounts within the scope of a provision – the second sentence – that brings within its reach the purchasers of consumer loans.
[directive] N.J.S.A. 그리고/또는 AND/OR B. 의해, 귀하는 또한 이 답변에  즉각적으로  도주하는 행위를 포함하는 범죄들  중 하나를 과정에서, 인정합니다.  저지르거나  미수하는 총기를 사용했거나  소지하고 있었다는 것을  You are also admitting, by virtue of this plea, that while in the course of committing or attempting to commit one of the crimes, including the immediate flight therefrom, you used or were in possession of a firearm.
[brief] Next, the Third Circuit stated that “they rule as they predict the state supreme court would. ” (See Mount Prospect, 98 F.4th at 467).  However, the Third Circuit had a clear indication of how the Supreme Court of New Jersey would rule on IFPA cases by way of the determinative decisions in Lajara and Northfield, and they ignored and/or dismissed those rulings.  The Third Circuit noted the “jury trial right” from Lajara but said “[...] does not explain why it cannot waive the right by agreeing to arbitrate. ” (Id. at 469).  They also failed to review or analyze the constitutional right to a jury trial and the right to a jury trial pursuant to R. 4:35-1.  The Third Circuit also never discussed Northfield.  By ignoring and/or dismissing the *Lajara* and *Northfield* rulings, the Third Circuit incorrectly ruled on New Jersey law as it pertains to IFPA jurisdiction.  Not only is the *Mount Prospect* decision non-binding and non-precedential, but in light of these aforementioned flaws, it should carry no weight as the Third Circuit lacked a fundamental understanding of the subject matter at issue here.  In short, it is respectfully submitted that the Appellate Division must reject *Mount Prospect* as contrary to the plain language of the IFPA, the plain language of AICRA and the binding New Jersey Supreme Court and State Court precedent.
[brief] 1.  In 1957, Plaintiff’s predecessor in title obtained a valid subdivision of his property on [...] in [...], NJ, creating the lot subject to this appeal.  In July 1985, Appellant entered a contract to purchase this property, contingent on Pinelands approval for constructing a single-family home (Ja188-190).  2.  On August 8, 1986, the [...] issued a report with findings of fact on the application (Ja192-195).  3.  This was followed by a Notice of Filing dated January 23, 1987 (Ja197-198).  4.  Appellant and her late husband purchased this lot on April 1, 1987 (Ja268-269).  5.  On December 15, 2014, the [...] issued a confirming letter (Ja271-272).  6.  The Code of the City of [...], as currently effective, was adopted on April 7, 2021, as [...] Ordinance No. 1-2021.  7.  On June 18, 2020, [...], proceeding pro se under color of contract, submitted an application to the [...] Planning/Zoning Board for relief under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(1).  (Ja156-184).  8.  This matter was heard by the Board on January 27, 2021, and their decision was set forth in Resolution 3-2021, denying the relief sought by [...] (Ja224-233).  Notably, pages 231-232 set forth the Board’s conclusions.  9.  On June 29, 2021, [...] applied to the [...] Planning/Zoning Board for relief on the subject property (Ja238-254).  The matter was heard before the Board on July 21, 2021, and the denial of relief was memorialized on August 27, 2021, in Resolution 5-2021 (Ja289-298).  10.  On October 6, 2021, [...] filed her complaint in lieu of prerogative writs with the Law Division of Superior Court, receiving [...] (Ja1-5).  11.  Defendant [...] answered, and the issue was joined (Ja6-11).  12.  A case management order was entered by [...] on March 24, 2022 (Ja298-299).  13.  Oral argument was held on July 14, 2022, and the decision was tabled to allow the parties to explore settlement options.  They were unsuccessful, and the Court rendered its decision on May 26, 2023 (Ja12).  14.  A motion for reconsideration was timely filed, and the decision was rendered on July 7, 2023, denying the relief requested (Ja21).  15.  This appeal has been timely filed and is underway.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] The second judge\(^4\) conducted oral argument on September 27, 2023.  (2T).  The second judge criticized Defendants for propounding discovery demands a few days before the end date, and otherwise doing nothing despite that the first judge gave them the opportunity.  (2T12:14-13:1, 2T17:17-25).  The second judge observed that she was “literally in the exact same position” as the first judge when the motion to vacate was heard eight months earlier.  (2T13:15-17).  The second judge denied the motion to compel because Defendants had done nothing, and discovery was over.  (2T23:1-27:15).  The second judge memorialized her decision in an order dated September 27, 2023.
[brief] Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant/Respondent’s Confidential Appendix  Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit P-44  August 13, 2017  Temporary Restraining CPa1 Order (complainant [...]) and August 16, 2017  Amended Temporary Restraining Order and Transcript of Voluntary Dismissal, Sep 14, 2017.  IV.  Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant/Respondent’s Reply Appendix A.M.S. v. M.L.S., [...], 2021 WL 3197768 Pra1 (App. Div. July 29, 2021).