ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff persists in the argument that the application was vague on its face in that it did not specifically describe the size of the front yard setback variance sought or the size of the height variance sought or the measurements related to the lot area per unit.  Respectfully, this case does not require that type of detail.  The Appellate Division panel in the *[...]* case on two occasions identified the Notices being inadequate because it did not specifically identify the type of use that was going to occur.  Specifically, in the first application, the Notice omitted the developer’s plan to include a restaurant and a banquet facility at the hotel and to obtain a liquor license.  The Appellate Division panel found that notice to be inadequate because it lacked specificity as to the use of the property.  When that application came back in its second form, the notice did not include the fact that the applicant intended to have a banquet facility at the location.  Once again, the Appellate Division panel struck that Notice down as being inadequate because the use of the property was not identified.  In this instance, there is no issue that the use of this property was specifically identified.  The application and the Notice specifically indicates that this was going to be a three structure development with 17 residential units.  Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that that aspect of the plaintiff’s application should be denied and the court should uphold the [...]’s decision.
[brief] U.S. Const. amend. V, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, para. 1, 10.  Appropriate and proper jury charges are necessary for a fair trial.  State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374, 387 (2002).  The judge has an “independent duty” to plainly, clearly and accurately explain “the law as it pertains to the facts and issues of each case. ”  *State v. Reddish*, 181 N.J. 553, 613 (2004); accord *State v. Concepcion*, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988).  An adverse inference instruction, also known as a *Clawans* charge, is grounded in the principle that the “failure of a party to produce before a trial tribunal proof which, it appears, would serve to elucidate the facts in issue, raises a natural inference that the party so failing fears exposure of those facts would be unfavorable to him. ”  *State v. Clawans*, 38 N.J. 162, 170 (1962).  *Clawans* itself illustrates the circumstances under which an adverse inference charge against the State is appropriate.
[brief] (PPCIa380-PPCIa502).  On August 21, 2023, [...] filed a Motion for Reconsideration for the Court to reconsider its decision regarding the [...] Final Judgment.  (PPCIa421-PPCIa432).  On February 23, 2024, the trial court heard both motions – [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration regarding the [...] Final Judgment, and [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment against [...] on the MCS-90 surety.  Regarding [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration, the court summarized [...]’s arguments in support of reconsideration, which included the following: whether the Verified Complaint was competent evident for the court to rely; whether [...] should be entitled to discovery to explore [...]’s own negligence in the Incident; and whether the Court vacating the November 30, 2021 Default Judgment against [...] and then hearing the summary judgment motion against [...] on its merits with [...]’s participation was sufficient procedural due process for [...].
[brief] A defendant’s flight from pursuing police officers despite their shouted orders to halt, along with other circumstances of the case, can give the police reasonable cause to believe that a crime was committed or is being committed.  See Doss, 254 N.J. Super. at 130.  A reaction like flight often can provide the final piece of information needed to establish probable cause.  Ibid. (citations omitted).  In this case, defendant and [...] were associating with [...], who had been seen selling drugs in a high-crime area known for narcotics sales.  The police were conducting surveillance because of citizen complaints about the violent crime and drug trafficking afflicting the neighborhood.  The police were aware that drug dealers operate in concert, with various members of the enterprise taking on specific roles, like handing off proceeds or drugs to a cohort.  When [...]’s associates fled at the approach of the police, these suspicious circumstances were elevated to probable cause for arrest and consequent search.
[brief] While a sentencing court is accorded considerable discretion to set the sentence for an offender, that discretion is not unbounded.  It is carefully limited by a detailed statutory scheme.  See State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 63 (2014) (“[T]he Code has established a framework of structured discretion within which judges exercise their sentencing authority. ”).  In addition to setting custodial terms for first- through fourth-degree crimes and disorderly persons offenses, the Code specifies other authorized dispositions that a court may impose, such as fines, community service, and probation.  N.J.S.A. 2C:43- 2(b).  The Code also permits sentencing courts to order the forfeiture of property, suspension of a license, removal from office, or “any other civil penalty. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(d).  As noted in Masce, however, “any other civil penalty” encompasses only “those civil penalties specified in a statute. ”  452 N.J. Super. at 357.  The forfeiture of public office, for example, is a penalty authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2 for certain crimes.  By contrast, where there is no law that authorizes a particular civil penalty, the catchall language of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(d) does not empower courts to impose that penalty.  Id. at 358 (concluding that because “there is no law that allows the entry of a civil consent judgment as a penalty,” courts have no authority under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(d) to enter civil consent judgments at sentencing); see also State v. Gross, 225 N.J. Super. 28, 29-30 (App. Div. 1988) (finding that while Chapter 43 authorizes a court to suspend a defendant’s driver’s license under some circumstances, the court has no authority to do so where the defendant’s offense is “not within the purview” of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(c)).  On the date of the offense, and at the time of his sentencing, the conditions imposed on [...] by the court lacked any statutory basis.
[brief] Defendant Has Also Not Met the Remaining Prongs of the Newly-Discovered Evidence Test.  The State will rely on its principal brief as to why defendant has failed to meet the remaining two prongs of the newly discovered evidence test.  The State notes only that its argument that the allegedly newly discovered documents appear to be fraudulent is not an acknowledgement that the documents are material or exculpatory, as defendant asserts.  (See Db27).  To the contrary, as discussed in the State’s principal brief, even if the documents are genuine, they do not establish defendant’s right to sell shares in [...].  (See Sb23-26).  CONCLUSION
[brief] A contract provision specifically addressing a particular subject matter (as Paragraph 24(F) concerning the [...] does here) controls over another provision that generally addresses that same subject matter.  See id. at 378; see also In re Cedant Corp. Securities Litigation, 454 F.3d 235, 246 (3d Cir. 2006), as amended (Aug. 30, 2006) (“Although the specific usually controls the general in contract construction, we are to construe a contract as a whole. ”).
[brief] Other members of the Committee, including [...] and [...] and their political ally who was also running for election to the Committee in 2017, crafted a statement to local media.  [...] characterized the issues related to the July 5, 2016 incident as “the big sword hanging over our heads”, and [...] admittedly was concerned about “backlash from the community”, the public, and media pressure.  Further, [...] testified that he “didn’t recall there being specific allegations against [...] from the public.  Just that there were demands, you know, from the public that we take action against [...] leadership”.  Nonetheless, Defendants removed Plaintiff from his position as Police Captain in order to appease the uninformed views of the public, thereby advancing the scurrilous allegation that Plaintiff was a racist cop while the facts confirm he was anything but, as Defendants admit.
[brief] *Ibid.*  Defendant also claimed that [...] had come to the house on two occasions prior to this, but defendant had not answered the door.  (21T:117-23 to 118-7).  As for the events of the shooting, defendant claimed that [...] had shown up at the carriage house and banged on the door, demanding that defendant come outside because “we need to handle this. ” (21T:119-18 to 120-11).  Defendant went outside onto the porch and claimed that [...] then “started to pull a gun on me. ” (21T:120-13 to 19).  He claimed that [...] had told him several times in the past that if it came down to it, he would shoot defendant.  *Ibid.*  Defendant claimed that he had seen [...] with a gun several years prior; specifically, defendant reported that [...] told him he had an issue with someone and showed defendant the gun.  (21T:122-2 to 18).  Defendant claimed he had wanted nothing to do with it.  *Ibid.*  So, on the night of the shooting, defendant knew that [...] was reaching for a gun.
[brief] In reaching this conclusion, the trial court relied on an incorrect interpretation of this Court’s decision in Englert v. The Home Depot, 389 N.J. Super. 44 (App. Div. 2006).  (Da431; 1T36:24-25, 37:1-2; Da454; 2T24:20-25, 25:1-3).  In Englert, the Court decided a similar, but not identical, indemnity provision that was also derived from AIA Document 201.  The facts in Englert involved [...] (“[...]”), a subcontractor, who was brought in by general contractor, [...] (“[...]”), in connection with the construction of a new Home Depot Store.
[brief] In addition, the [...]’s attempt to rationalize its conclusion was premised on its resolution of another disputed question of material (according to the [...]) fact – whether Complainant had misrepresented her signature gathering efforts for a political opponent of [...]  The [...] concluded that [...]’s failure to prove on appeal that threshold question meant that his “version of events” could not be “believed. ” (Aa11).  That is, the [...] determined on the written record that [...]’s denial of the State Policy was not credible because [...] had failed to prove why he was at [...] building in the morning.  Prior to its decision, no indication existed that the [...] or anyone else considered that a relevant fact with respect to credibility.  It was undisputed that both parties were there and a dispute occurred.  To determine that the veracity of [...]’s stated reason for being at the [...] building was a disputed material fact, such that [...]’s failure to support it negatively affects his credibility about whether he purposefully misnamed Complainant, is a patently arbitrary decision unsupported by the record.
[directive] 3.  Prosecutorial Screening/Approval On-Call Establishment of 24/7 3.1 System....................................................................................................................21 Charging Approval from On-Call Prosecutor Obtain Requirement to 3.2 .............22  Certain Offenses .........................................................  Arrest for upon Police to Issue a Complaint- Prosecutor's Authority to Permit County 3.3 without First Apply for aComplaint-Warrant and/or to Summons ........................................................................23  Approval Prosecutorial .  Obtaining Prosecutor ......................................23 by County Charging Directive Issued 3.3.1  Supervisory Officers Authorized to Approve Designation of 3.3.2 ..............................24  Presumption to Overcome a .  Charging Decisions and Prosecutor Application for Complaint- If Required Notice to 3.3.3 ......................................................................................26  Denied Warrant Is with County Prosecutor's and Compliance  3.3.4  Strict Oversight .....................................................................................26  Directive Charging Extension of County Evaluation, and Indefinite Expiration, 3.3.5 ...................................................................26  Prosecutor Directive Charging Prosecutorial Require Direct Authority to Prosecutor's County 3.4 ...................................................26  Application Complaint-Warrant Participation in Consultation/Charging Require Authority to Prosecutor's County 3.5 ........................................................................27  Additional Offenses .  Approval for When Are Committed in Decisions Offenses  Charging Coordination of 3.6 ...................................................................................................27  Multiple Counties OR BY COMPLAINT-SUMMONS CHARGE WHETHER TO DETERMINING 4.
[brief] Miller factor 4 requires courts to consider that a juvenile “might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth – for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. ”  Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78 (emphasis added).  Factor 4 is based upon the understanding that juveniles have characteristics that are “likely to impair the quality” of their representation, such as their “mistrust [of] adults and limited understandings of the criminal justice system” as well as their “[d]ifficulty in weighing long-term consequences; a corresponding impulsiveness; and reluctance to trust defense counsel[.]”
[brief] (Pa61 at 12:3-6; Pa63 at 20:12-20; Pa64 at 22:10-1; Pa78 at 77:17-78:19; Pa78 at 79:19-23).  It was undisputed that the bent foot of the barricade that protruded in a raised condition into the pedestrian walkway is a tripping hazard.  (Pa125-Pa126 at 46:10-47:15; Pa228-Pa233).  Although the plaintiff noticed the barricades that were erected at the entrance of the [...] store and that a foot on one of the barricades was sticking up when entering the store, she did not see the raised leg of the barricade that caused her to fall when she exited the store later that day while taking a different route than when she entered the store.  (Pa63 at 20:1-6; Pa64 at 22:3-6).  The defendants do not dispute that the plaintiff was a business invitee while on the premises of the [...] store.  However, they contend that the Trial Court properly granted their motion for summary judgment on the grounds that they did not owe a duty to the plaintiff because they argue that the duty owed to a business invitee is limited to providing a warning of dangerous condition and are relived of this duty if the dangerous condition was allegedly open and obvious.
[brief] His claim to still not have any information regarding sale of the items located at [...]’s Englewood Home has been answered countless times.  Appellant knows that the appraisal report obtained by the Estate listed all items located at the Englewood Home on the date [...] gained entry.  All items were later placed in storage, segregating out any Appellant claimed to own.  Thereafter, Appellant was given the opportunity to retrieve his possessions from storage.  The remaining items were sold.  That sale was for less than $61,000, which was the value of all items in the Englewood Home, including those belonging to Appellant.
[directive] A police officer has the same duty and obligation to their employer as any other employee.  Thus, where an internal affairs investigation is being conducted solely to initiate disciplinary action, the officer has a duty to cooperate during an administrative interview.  The officer also must truthfully answer all questions put to him or her during the course of the investigation.  Failure to fully cooperate with an administrative investigation and/or to be completely truthful during an administrative interview can form the basis for disciplinary action separate and  This duty to fully cooperate in an apart from the allegations under investigation. investigation applies to every employee of the agency, whether law enforcement officer or civilian.  III.
[brief] Defendant seeks to profit from his dishonesty with the argument that because the [...] proceeds came through a forced sale (eminent domain) as opposed to a voluntary one, only he is entitled to those proceeds.  According to Defendant, Plaintiff was entitled to money “if it sold, yes.  But it never sold. ”  The Trial Court, sitting in equity, would not permit Defendant to cheat his former spouse under what is, in its best light, mere semantics.  Whether by traditional sale or by eminent domain, Defendant was compensated for the State’s taking of this sizeable asset.  Dividing the proceeds equally was the clear intent of the parties.  It was also the stated purpose of the PSA to dispose of all issues between them concerning all claims and property.  Da282, para. 4.  If the disposition of [...] through eminent domain were not covered by the PSA, the overall purpose of the PSA to resolve all claims between the parties would be frustrated.  The Trial Court properly interpreted the PSA in a manner to effectuate its stated intention, and rejected an interpretation that would be absurd and grossly unfair.
[brief] [...] says it must be applied, in a case that happens to have involved a written agreement to apply book value.  If the parties had reached a separate written agreement to apply book value, and simply called it “Book Value Agreement” without mentioning the separate Operating Agreement, does [...] seriously suggest that [...] would require ignoring that “Book Value Agreement” because it was not made a part of the Operating Agreement?  Of course not.  Nor can he seriously argue that an agreement implied by an undisputed, decades-long course of conduct should be ignored merely because it is not contained in [...]’s Operating Agreement.  [...] plainly supports a finding that, if the parties agreed to a particular value, that value should, and must, be applied.
[brief] Submitted Oct. 26, 2011.  Decided Nov. 10, 2011.  On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. [...].  Attorneys and Law Firms  [...], Public Defender, attorney for appellant [...] ([...], Designated Counsel, on the brief).  [...], Public Defender, attorney for appellant [...] ([...], Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).  [...], Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent in both appeals ([...], Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs).  Before Judges [...] and [...].
[brief] Under current conditions, stormwater falling at the rear of the Property exits via an existing drainage pipe from the wetlands on the west side of the Property.  Because [...] was detaining significant amounts of water in an on-site system, it would reduce the amount of water in the pipe during design storm events even more than required by NJDEP.  [1T 54-23 to 57-24].  According to [...], the construction of the multi-level senior housing community would be better from a stormwater management standpoint for the flow of water into the wetlands on the west of the Property.  [1T 57-25 to 58-5].  Later, there was a question about whether [...]’s design was permitted under the terms of an easement agreement, which counsel for [...] confirmed it was, subject to approval by the [...].
[brief] (See 1T70:21-72:21; Pb19.)  Arguing to the contrary, Plaintiffs confuse the Restructuring Act with the Rutgers Act.  They quote language from the Restructuring Act, calling that Act a “consummated contract. ”  (Pb17.)  Plaintiffs are mistaken.  It is the Rutgers Act, not the Restructuring Act, that embodies a consummated contract.
[brief] (T44:17-T45:11)  [...] testified as to the proposed special reasons density variance.  He noted the density requirement is 1,200 square feet and each unit will have approximately 1,092 square feet.  “So, a variance for density is subject to a weighing analysis.  That is, the applicant must demonstrate that the site can accommodate the problems typically associated with a use with a greater density.  The most obvious problems that you would see would be traffic and parking.  But, I believe we’ve mitigated those issues.  Again, we’re providing the parking that’s required per the Borough ordinance, again two parking spaces per unit, and we’re minimizing the loss in on street parking. ”
[brief] See *State v. Jaffe*, 220 N.J. 114, 124-25 (2014) (remanding for resentencing where sentencing judge refused to consider defendant’s post-offense efforts at rehabilitation).  On appeal, the State does not defend the court’s decision to ignore [...]’s conduct simply because it occurred in prison.  Instead, the State argues, for the first time, that the ruling should be affirmed because of certain details from [...]’s PCR petitions.  (Sb25-26)  Specifically, because [...]’s PCR petitions alleged that the facts of his case did not meet the requisite elements of knowing and purposeful homicide, the sentencing court was permitted to find that [...] lacked remorse, and that [...]’s 29 years of good prison conduct failed to demonstrate rehabilitation.  (Sb25-26)  This argument is flawed for numerous reasons: (a) the court’s rulings were not based upon [...]’s PCR proceedings; (b) even if the court had considered [...]’s PCRs, the arguments raised therein do not demonstrate a lack of remorse; (c) the court’s disregard for expert findings of credible remorse was not justified; and (d) the State provides no authority to support the court’s departure from established precedent characterizing good prison conduct as demonstrating rehabilitation.
[brief] [...]’s position remained the same: the Final Judgment terminated the Debtor’s right to redeem under the TSL and the Debtor’s plan could not be confirmed without its consent because the Debtor lacked a cognizable interest in the Property that may be revived through his Chapter 13 plan.  Main Case Doc. No. 61.  The Debtor responded with the same arguments: that unless [...] was willing to accept payment of its claim as proposed in the Debtor’s plan, the Debtor would seek to set aside the Final Judgment.  Main Case Doc. Nos. 62 and 65.  To date, there was no success in the state court and the Debtor did not file an Adversary Proceeding in this court.  Frustratingly, the Debtor’s filed pleadings simply included suggestions of legal theories with no proper analysis and again, counsel to the Debtor was unable to articulate how \textit{Tyler} was applicable to a tax foreclosure sale conducted by a private, nongovernmental entity. \(^11\)  As the Debtor failed to set aside the Final Judgment in state court, failed to take any action in this court by way of an adversary proceeding, and failed to articulate how the \textit{Tyler} case applied in this case, the Motion for Stay Relief was granted in favor of [...].
[brief] For the reasons set forth herein, Appellant [...] respectfully requests that this Honorable Court reverse the October 6, 2023 Judgement of Conviction, or in the alternative, remand this matter for a new trial.  Respectfully submitted, Date: September 11, 2024  /s/ [...]  [...] ID No. 127142014  [...] ID No. 337972021  October 22, 2024  [...] Attorney ID No. 059632013  Assistant Prosecutor [...] Of Counsel and on the Letter Brief  LETTER BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY