ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On April 2, 2022, Hon. [...], J.S.C., entered an Order dismissing Defendant’s (Plaintiff in the instant case) municipal appeal.  The statement of reasons in the order said:  The Court’s scheduling Order for March 9, 2022, required [...] to file one copy of all municipal-court transcripts with this Court by 4/08/22.  The Order stated that if the transcript was not filed with the Court by this date, or an extension not obtained from this Court, the matter would be dismissed without further notice.  As of 4/22/2022, [...] has not filed a copy of the municipal court transcripts with the court or requested an extension.  Therefore, his appeal is dismissed.  (Pa319).  A letter dated April 22, 2022, enclosing Judge Jones’ April 22, 2022, Order was sent to the Edison Municipal Court and a copy was sent to Plaintiff’s counsel [...], Esq. (Pa321).  Plaintiff’s complaint stated, “Plaintiff’s (sic) counsel attempted to file a timely appeal, but same were (sic) rejected by the Criminal Division of the Superior Court after multiple attempts. ” (Pa1, ¶ 58c).  The complaint further stated that his appeal was rejected and that he was “disallowed” from perfecting his appeal.  (Pa1, Count One, ¶ 7).  Both statements are false as the appeal was accepted as filed and the appeal was not rejected due to any lack of a written disposition.  (Pa314-321).  Plaintiff’s filed appeal was dismissed, not for lack of any judgment of conviction (which was, in fact, in the Edison Municipal Court file), but because Plaintiff failed to either order transcripts or file a complete indigency application.  (Id.)  It must be noted that all statements of Plaintiff and his attorney contained in the motion papers below, and repeated in Plaintiff’s brief (Pb2, Pb6-7), to the effect that Plaintiff and his attorney went to the Edison Municipal Court, spoke to unnamed “staff,” and were told that “there was no such signed order from [...],” are classic inadmissible hearsay as against [...], could not be considered by the Court below on the summary judgment motion, and cannot be considered by the Court on this appeal.  [...]’s evidence, unrefuted by any evidence admissible on the motion, clearly showed that a judgment was entered in writing and was contained in the Edison Municipal Court file.
[directive] Do you understand that by pleading guilty your right to appeal the d.  [Yes/Sim]  [No/Nao] denial ofa motion to suppress physical evidence 3 :5-7( d)) or (2) the denial of acceptance (R. into a pretrial intervention program (PTI) 3:28(d))? (R. Voce entende que ao se declarar culpado ao direito de recorrer (1) da negai;:iio de voce nio esta renunciando uma petii;:iio de supressiio de provas materiais 3:5-7(d)) ou (2) da negai;:iio do pedido de participai;:iio no (R. programa de interveni;:iio antes do julgamento (PTI) 3 :28( d))? (R. e. you are waiving Do you further understand that by pleading guilty your right to appeal the [Yes/Sim] [No/Nao] denial of all other pretrial motions except the following: Voce entende tambem que ao se declarar culpado ao direito de recorrer da negai;:iio de voce esta renunciando todas as outras petii;:oes anteriores ao julgamento, exceto das seguintes:
[brief] Da31; Da230-35 (Ex. P23B at 3); 2T219-7 to 17.  [...] not only acknowledged the debt, but he immediately committed to repay the debt to [...] either “in the next 20 days” from the date of the meeting, or by the end of that year.  Da31-32 (Ex. P23B at 3); 2T222-11 to 16.13  [...] promised --- 13  As discussed in Legal Argument Points II and III, below, given [...]’s admission that he could not pay Plaintiff before late 2019 (at the earliest), the limitations period on the Third pay-when-able Loan did not begin to run, at the earliest, until late 2019.
[directive] (e.g. Directive 2019-3 – Law Enforcement Interactions with Transgender Individuals).  Implicit bias training for all New Jersey State Police law enforcement officers, all prosecutors and detectives 2 employed by the Division of Criminal Justice, and all prosecutors and detectives employed by the 21 County Prosecutor’s Offices, was mandated in June 2018 and completed in 2019.  3  Finally, on January 4, 2021, the Administrative Office of the Courts will expand its statewide electronic complaint system—known as the Electronic Court Disposition Reporting, or eCDR system —to include juvenile cases.  The launch of “juvenile eCDR” will allow us to transition away from paper files and towards a system that is seamlessly integrated with court records.  Accordingly, the final part of this Directive outlines the new procedures to be used when generating juvenile eCDR complaints and the decision-making framework to be used in what will now be summons versus warrant, and detention decisions.
[brief] There the Court held that:  The tenant, having had no voice in the decision to convert, and his tenancy protected by the laws of the State of New Jersey, must not be forced to bear the expense incurred as a result of the decision to convert the property, which decision in no way enhanced the value of his tenancy.  In holding that the tax increase generated by the conversion may not be passed on to the tenant, the court is following the mandates of the Legislature, the Appellate Division and the Department of Community Affairs in maintaining the tenant’s status quo, i.e. continuing the tenancy unaffected by the conversion from the rental market.  To hold otherwise would abrogate and make meaningless the protections afforded by our Legislature and would violate the stated policy to protect pre-existing tenancies from “any adverse impact resulting from the conversion. ”  *B. H. Associates v. Brudner*, 185 N.J. Super. 403, 409 (Dist. Ct. 1982).
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket number: [...]  [...], as assignee of [...] / [...], Plaintiff/Respondent, v. [...], Defendant/Appellant  CIVIL ACTION APPEAL FROM FINAL JUDGMENT  ENTERED IN SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, BERGEN COUNTY, LAW  DIVISION  Trial Court  Docket No.: [...]  Sat below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Date of submission: May 6, 2024  BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT
[brief] Instead, the prior dismissed claims, as [...] so forcefully argued and [...] held, were all legal malpractice claims arising out of [...]’s legal work on behalf of Plaintiffs with respect to the transaction.  The new legal malpractice claim against [...], on the other hand, is solely supported by the previously unknown and unknowable fact that [...] was the Sole Member of [...] and controlled and operated [...] as a sham entity, and therefore committed malpractice by failing to advise Plaintiffs of these facts.  To make this indisputable reality even more perfectly clear, this Court can view the prior, dismissed legal malpractice claim against [...] in the 2015 Action for itself and compare it with the new, previously unknown and unknowable legal malpractice claim against [...].
[brief] [484A]  Specifically, one of the “Whereas” clauses of Ordinance 1535-16 states:  Whereas, On November 21, 2016, the Mayor and Council held a meeting whereby the Planner and designated redeveloper presented its comments and recommendations for additional amendments to the Redevelopment Plan; and Ordinance 1535-16 also states, at Section 6A, the following:  Deviation Requests.  The Borough may grant deviations from the regulations in the within Ordinance where permitted by the provisions of the Municipal Land Use Law.  Notwithstanding the above, any changes to the uses permitted in the within Redevelopment Plan Ordinance shall only be permitted by an amendment to this Ordinance by the Mayor and Council upon a finding that such deviation would be consistent with and in furtherance of the goals and objectives of this Ordinance.
[brief] The expectations of the snow removal contractor and property owner are not probative as to whether the commercial landowner within a reasonable period of time made the property safe or whether the snow removal contractor removed snow in a careful and prudent manner.  Likewise, what the defendants expected from each other as owner and contractor has absolutely no bearing upon the duty they owed to plaintiff, a third party.  Moreover, even if the defendants offered conflicting testimony as alleged by plaintiff, there has been no explanation showing that resolution of the conflict required evidence of the 6 AM deadline, prohibition against subcontracting, and language regarding “safety not being compromised”.  Plaintiff fails to explain how these specific contractual provisions clarify or resolved the supposed conflicts in testimony among defendants.  The record does not show that the defendants had different ideas as to when snow removal was to be completed, that is, there has not been testimony from one defendant saying that believed they had a 6 AM deadline whereas another defendant understood there was an 8 AM deadline.  Likewise, the record does not reveal any conflicting testimony suggesting that one defendant agreed that safety was not to be compromised, but that another defendant disagreed with that proposition.  In the absence of explicit conflict on these issues there was no reason for the court to allow evidence of the 6 AM deadline, prohibition against subcontracting and language regarding “safety not being compromised”.  Plaintiff has failed to present any identifiable or specific conflict relating to these specific contractual provisions and failed to explain how the trial testimony somehow resolved this fictional conflict.  Rather, defendants maintain that allowing plaintiff to endlessly harp upon these contractual provisions and violations only poisoned and prejudiced the jury against the defendants, which permitted the jury to conflate a contractual violation with a violation of the defendants’ common law duty to plaintiff.  Defendants maintain that admission of such contractual provisions was an abuse of discretion.
[brief] Petitioner found that he was unable to have that agreement vacated in either the State Court or Federal Court and the Consent Order impaired the Petitioner from having his claims addressed.  Yet, Respondent is advancing the theory that the day before the wedding, Decedent gave Petitioner the Photocopy, requesting that he sign a more onerous agreement than the Consent Order, to govern their assets during the course of his marriage.  Petitioner testified that had he been given the Photocopy the day before his marriage, he never would have entered into it.  (9T11:8 to 12:2).  Petitioner would have said, “[...], what are you trying to pull?” and he would have walked out.  Id.  When reviewing the Photocopy at trial, Petitioner found that its terms were akin to a dictatorial business arrangement that was not anything he was familiar with as a marriage.  Id.  [...] testified that he never had any discussions with Petitioner about a prenuptial agreement.  (9T12:8-10).  [...] knew that Petitioner would not have been married if there were one, explaining “because of the kind of guy he was” (9T12:12-15).
[brief] THE BPU’S DECISION TO DENY THE APPLICATION IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, AND SHOULD BE REVERSED  A.  The BPU’s decision-making process failed to abide by the Board’s own Orders and precedent.  The Board has been unable and continues to fail to show that the last-minute decision to limit floating solar to only net metered projects was anything but, at best, an accident and mistake, and, at worst, a deliberate attempt to deny this one particular project for no rational reason.  As such, this Court should reverse the decision and direct the Board to make a fair and reasonable conclusion based upon the actual facts and the reasonable policy on this matter.
[brief] ’”  Buckley, 216 N.J. at 261 (quoting Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 15 (2004)).  “Evidence need not be dispositive or even strongly probative in order to clear the relevancy bar. ”  *State v. Cole*, 229 N.J. 430, 447 (2017) (quoting *Buckley*, 216 N.J. at 261).  “Once a logical relevancy can be found to bridge the evidence offered and a consequential issue in the case, the evidence is admissible, unless exclusion is warranted under a specific evidence rule. ”  *State v. Burr*, 195 N.J. 119, 127 (2008).  Here, evidence of defendant being in the same vehicle used in the April 20, 2022 incident, and his knowledge regarding ownership of the vehicle and the BB gun are relevant to proving defendant’s identity and possession of the BB gun.  Given that the evidence is relevant, the first *Cofield* prong is satisfied.  The second prong requires the evidence to be “similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged. ”  *Cofield*, 127 N.J. at 338.  The second prong applies only in “limited . . . cases that replicate the circumstances in *Cofield.*”  *State v. Rose*, 206 N.J. 141, 160 (2011) (quoting *State v. Williams*, 190 N.J. 114, 131 (2007)).  This case is not similar to *Cofield*; thus, the second prong does not apply.  See *State v. Skinner*, 218 N.J. 496, 515 (2014).
[brief] Settlement Agreement, §§ 2.1, 1.29 (Pa000044, Pa00046–Pa00047).  The trial court held as much.  Matching *Roma* and *Gannon* allegations side-by-side, [...] noted that both putative classes “made the same allegations, based on the same theories of relief. ”  Pa000110.  --- 2  If Plaintiff wanted to restrict [...]’s ability to amend or modify its fees, he could certainly have sought to negotiate a settlement that did that.  He didn’t.  In fact, he did the exact opposite, releasing all claims relating to [...]’s “right to amend or modify any agreement or fee or charge of any kind. ”  Settlement Agreement, § 2.1 (Pa00046–Pa00047).  Plaintiff’s “new” claims in *Gannon* about [...]’s fees, the “bundling” of rates, and its amendments to Plaintiff’s merchant agreements *for over fifteen years* align squarely with the *Roma* claims—claims [...] already paid $1 million to resolve.  *See* Pa000110 (“It is not clear to this Court how the bundling of rates is a future issue that was not addressed by the Settlement Agreement. ”).  [...] keenly recognized the practicality of the broad *Roma* release: “[i]ncreasing rates over time is not an uncommon practice as inflation rises. ”  Pa000110.  It makes sense that [...] would need the *Roma* settlement class to release all claims about [...] amending its merchant agreements.  Indeed, although it could have, the heavily-negotiated and fully integrated Settlement Agreement required no business change on [...]’s part and provided no injunctive relief for the class.  *See* Settlement Agreement, § 8. 8, 8.11 (Pa000067–Pa000068).  Instead, the settlement class members—a limited, defined group of businesses—released all claims about [...]’s amendments, and [...] continued its business practices.  That is a typical class action settlement.  The Court can affirm the trial court’s decision on this independent basis.
[brief] [Id. at 43].  In the final analysis, [...] received a minimum of $280,000 at the time of divorce not including the million dollars in jewelry\textsuperscript{10} she had to [...]’s estimation:  The court finds that the PSA awarded defendant assets with a minimum value of $280,000 not considering the value of defendant’s jewelry collection and other personal items including multiple designer handbags.  Plaintiff’s testimony was that defendant’s jewelry alone purchased during the marriage approached $1,000,000 in value.  The court finds plaintiff did not provide any expert testimony or any other significant proofs as to the value for these items.  The court finds that defendant disagreed as to plaintiff’s valuation testimony but failed to offer any real rebuttal as to his valuation based on his testimony as to the purchase prices of the items.  The court finds defendant testified as to shopping regularly at Louis Vuitton, Gucci and Nordstrom.  She testified she owned at least six Louis Vuitton bags and two Gucci Bags.  [Id. at 39](emphasis added).
[brief] CONCLUSION  Based on the foregoing, the State urges this Court to affirm the order denying defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT BY: s/[...]  [...]  Deputy Attorney General  [...]  May 8, 2024  [...] Assistant Deputy Public Defender  [...]  Attorney ID #052371993  Of Counsel and On the Letter Brief  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  Ind. No. [...]
[brief] I, [...], Esquire, of full age, hereby certifies as follows:  1.  On June 14, 2024, the original of the within Respondent’s Brief in Opposition of Appeal from Final Judgment, the Hon. M.  Patricia Richmond, J.S.C. retired on recall presiding, was filed with the Clerk of the Superior Court, Appellate Division, 25 W. Market Street, Trenton, New Jersey, via the E-Courts system.  2.  On June 14, 2024, A COPY of the within Respondent’s Brief in Opposition of Appeal from Final Judgment, the Hon. [...], J.S.C. retired on recall presiding, was served via the E-Courts system to the following:  [...], Esquire [...], Esquire  I certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true.  I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.  [...] /s/ [...], Esquire  JEREMY M. WEITZ, ESQUIRE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
[brief] The police believed that the bandanna had been worn as a face mask by the person seen in the bank surveillance video (22T116-19 to 22;24T131-1 to 11).  The State's DNA expert, [...], admitted that there was no way to determine how long defendant's DNA had been on the bandanna (23T172-23 to 23T173-1).  On May 1, 2017, the police received the DNA results and they arrested [...] and defendant (24T126-3 to 24).  On November 15, 2019, [...] provided a statement to the police (16T77-7 to 16T78-2).  The same day, he pleaded guilty to aggravated manslaughter in exchange for a recommended sentence of between ten and twenty years (16T23-12 to 24;Da61-Da66).
[directive] If the balance of the interests of the person and the public so warrants, the court may issue an order imposing conditions upon the person's entry at, upon or near the place; or (2) the issuance of an order would cause undue hardship to innocent persons and would constitute a serious injustice which overrides the need to protect the rights, safety and health of persons residing in or having business in the place.  f.  A restraining order issued pursuant to subsection a., b., c., d. or h. of this section shall describe the place from which the person has been barred and any conditions upon the person's entry into the place, with sufficient specificity to enable the person to guide his conduct accordingly and to enable a law enforcement officer to enforce the order.  The order shall also prohibit the person from entering an area of up to 500 feet surrounding the place, unless the court rules that a different buffer zone would better effectuate the purposes of this act.  In the discretion of the court, the order may contain modifications to permit the person to enter the area during specified times for specified purposes, such as attending school during regular school hours.  When appropriate, the court may append to the order a map depicting the place.  The person shall be given a copy of the restraining order and any appended map and shall acknowledge in writing the receipt thereof.
[brief] Other reporting confirmed that in the immediate aftermath [...] and [...] took charge of communications:  [...] “ordered staff to shut down external communications until he had a grasp of the situation [and] directed [...] and the legal and security teams to scour emails, memos, and messages among [...] employees, [...], and [...] ....”  [...] and [...], An Ugly Truth, at 155 (Harper Collins 2021).  The actions consolidated in this MDL initially arose out of the [...] scandal; documents relating to [...]’s leadership of and involvement in [...]’s response are highly relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims.  *7  Finally, [...] personally made numerous public commitments about [...]’s privacy practices that go directly to the heart of the claims and defenses in this case.  For example: in a 2010 interview, he stated that “applications have to ask for permission for anything you’ve set to be private”; in a November 2011 post, he explained that “everyone needs complete control over who they share with [via [...]] at all times”; he told shareholders that “giving people control over what they share is a fundamental principle” of the social graph; and he promised users [...] had created “the kind of privacy that no one had ever seen before. ”  See [...] et al., Mark [...] has been talking about privacy for 15 years—here’s almost everything he’s said, CNBC (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/21/facebook-ceo-mark-zuckerbergs-statements-on-privacy-2003-2018.html, Ex. 17.  [...]’s documents will shed light on the consistency, or lack thereof, of [...]’s external representations with its internal practices.  He knows what [...] says and what [...] does, and his files will shed light on [...]’s knowledge and intent in relation to its representations.  [...]’s misrepresentations, and [...]’s knowledge are central to Plaintiffs’ privacy, contract, and negligence claims, as well as the punitive damages.  2.
[brief] (1T 18-4 to 18-7; 1T 51-5 to 51-12)  [...] did not specify how many pedestrians allegedly approached the four men or observe any type of exchange between the men and the pedestrians.  Nor did he say any of the pedestrians were known drug users or any of the four men were known drug dealers.  While the motion judge found it “unreasonable to assume” that [...] and his friends were simply “hanging out on a cold evening in November,” talking to passersby (1T 66-11 to 66-13), that is precisely what the evidence established: that [...] and three friends were standing on a sidewalk socializing.
[brief] 1.  Defendant incorporates the general statement and statement of facts included in the brief submitted to the trial court in support of defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Pa26).  Additional facts are provided by Respondent to address Appellants’ implied and baseless contention that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ economic claim for unpaid medical expenses and property damage are set forth as follows.  2.  Appellants’ brief refers indirectly to a claim for unpaid medical expenses and property damage (economic damages) (Unnumbered paragraph 3 of Appellants’ Statement of Facts and first paragraph of Appellants’ Legal Argument).  These claims were addressed in a separate motion in limine to bar evidence of outstanding medical expenses and property damage returnable March 31, 2023, which is not addressed in Appellants’ brief (Da1).  3.  On March 10, 2024, defendant moved to bar evidence of unpaid medical expenses because plaintiffs never established that PIP was exhausted and, and evidence of unpaid medical expenses collectible under plaintiffs’ PIP coverage, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12.  (Da1).  4.  In the same motion, defendant moved to bar evidence of property damage based on accord and satisfaction because, property damage had already been settled and adjusted by [...] who insured the defendant (Da1).  5.  Plaintiffs’ counsel opposed the motion to bar evidence of unpaid medical expenses and property damage largely on procedural grounds on March 14, 2024 (Da15).  6.  On May 17, 2023, [...] entered an Order granting summary judgment and dismissing the entire case.  The May 17, 2023 Order and written decision does not address the claim for economic damages or respondent’s motion addressing it.  (Pa1).  7.  On May 17, 2024, [...] entered a separate Order denying defendant’s motion in limine as “moot” because the entire case was dismissed by the Order granting defendant’s summary judgment motion.  Defendant interpreted the two May 17, 2024 Orders as a joint ruling on the merits dismissing all claims for economic and non-economic damages (Da17).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I APPELLANTS’ BRIEF FAILS TO SUPPORT OR EXPLAIN THE CONTENTION THAT THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED THE STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.