ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] at 19-20.  11  Id. Page 5 that has inflicted serious and long-lasting harms on the State’s residents, especially its residents color.12 of  The practical impact of the Commission’s recommendations, if adopted, would be significant.  The retroactivity provision would likely result in hundreds of inmates becoming immediately eligible for parole, with hundreds more reaching eligibility in the subsequent months.  And the impact of the changes would grow over time, as the elimination of mandatory parole ineligibility for non-violent drug offenses would reduce the number of inmates sentenced to terms with a lengthy parole disqualifier.  These reductions would accelerate efforts to reduce time.13  the State’s overall prison population and result in cost-savings over The Commission’s recommendations received widespread support at the time they were announced in November 2019.  The Governor and legislative leaders endorsed the proposals, as did the Public Defender, the Attorney General, and all 21 County Prosecutors.
[brief] On May 15, 2024, Respondent filed its Opposition to the Motion to Vacate.  On May 20, 2024, Appellant filed her Reply.  On May 24, 2024, Counsel for the parties appeared for oral argument. \(^2\)  Specifically, the Lower Court stated:  [L]aches applies, and the right to finality and the right to say, whether it’s to law firms, lawyers, litigants, you’re not going to wait eight, ten, eleven years.  You’re not going to wait case after case after case, past the statute of limitations, avail yourself of help from the court, and then come in later and say, “Oh, we gotta vacate.  It was no good from the get-go,” and just sit for years on end.  \(^2\)  All references to the transcript of the oral argument of May 24, 2024 before the Hon. [...], J.S.C. are referred to herein as “1T”.  That holding followed from the fact that Appellant “has made affirmative decisions at least since 2019 to not bring a motion to vacate this default judgment. ”  *Id.*, p. 49:7-9.  Indeed, the Lower Court, in quoting Justice Clifford’s decision in *Stone v. Old Bridge Township*, 111 N.J. 110, 125, stated:  >  Our rules of procedure are not simply a minuet scored for lawyers to prance through on pain of losing the dance contest should they trip.  The rules have a purpose, one of which is to assist in the processing of the increasing number and complexity of cases that we have experienced over the last couple of decades.  *Id.*, p. 52:13-24.  And specifically, as to the CFLA and whether a failure to comply would warrant an “exceptional circumstance,” the Lower Court again rightly held:  >  [T]he defendant does not meet, this being an eleven-year-old judgment, the necessary burden, which is not just a meritorious defense.  She doesn’t even allege a defense other than the fact that the plaintiff was not licensed at the time.  But does not allege exceptional circumstances.  There are no exceptional circumstances, and there’s certainly no exceptional circumstances about which [...] has not been aware for at least five years if not longer, while she brought these affirmative claims, while she was part of the class in the 2020 settlement at a point in time when she actually got money.  On July 8, 2024, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.
[brief] Further, Probation cannot recognize the credit of $10,354.73 awarded by the Order of 3/25/2004 but ignore the other awards of the Order of 3/25/2004 in an arbitrary manner.  Thus, the “accounting” of 3/17/2022 is incomplete in that it does not post recognize the full extent of other awards of the Order of 3/25/2004:  1) --- \(^7\)  The trial court in 2012 took the position that the Appellate Remand Order of 10/25/2005 required modification of the support award commencing on 10/1/2000.  elimination of arrears of $16,519.20, 2) reduced schedule of payments by $500/week, 3) reduced support payments in the amount of $36,711 for the period through 7/16/1999 through 9/30/2000\(^8\).  Again, the trial Court erred and abused its judicial discretion in failing to consider Probation’s continued wrongful non-compliance with the full extent of the Order of 3/25/2004 and its unauthorized re-institution of the original support award of the FJOD.  Due process was denied Appellant.  7.
[brief] It is undisputed that this project will significantly increase GHG emissions that will exacerbate global climate change.  The DEP has admitted that increases in GHG emissions will unquestionably result in measurable impacts to precious water resources in the Highlands Preservation areas and other areas in New Jersey.  See 54 N.J.R. 2169(a) (Dec. 5, 2022) and 55 N.J.R. 1385(b) (July 17, 2023).  In its formal rule promulgation, the DEP said:
[brief] (Pa31-32).  At its April 19, 2023 meeting, the Board denied [...]’s request to maintain multiple-member status in PERS.  (Pa38-40).  On June 23, 2023, [...] appealed that decision and requested a hearing before an administrative law judge.  (Pa41-47).  At its July 19, 2023 meeting, the Board denied [...]’s appeal and his request for an administrative hearing.  (Pa54).  In its Final Administrative Determination dated August 17, 2023 (Pa54-57), the Board noted that prior to May 22, 2010, PERS members were permitted to aggregate salary credit for multiple positions for retirement calculation purposes.
[brief] On October 15, 2021, Plaintiffs served Defendants with a notice to take the deposition of a representative of [...] pursuant to Rule 4:14-2(c).  Pa0052.  Specifically, Plaintiffs requested that [...] designate and produce the person or persons to testify on its behalf on nine specified topics, all of which related to factual information concerning the Act and the Limited Attorney Exemption, and Defendants’ enforcement and interpretation thereof.  Pa0047 at 19:18-20:19.  On February 15, 2022, Defendants produced [...], the Chief of Consumer Finance Operations of [...], as its designated representative to testify on its behalf on all of the specified topics.  Pa0047 at 19:18-20:10.  [...] understood that he was designated as the sole representative of [...] to testify about the nine topics.  Pa0047 at 20:11-14.  [...] further confirmed that there were no topics to which he could not testify.  Pa0047 at 20:17-20.  F.
[brief] 1T 111:20-23.  The Trial Court’s reasoning conflicts with itself.  The defendant’s system was found to be a matter both requiring specialized knowledge, while also being a subject that should be understood utilizing only “common judgment and experience. ”  Only one of those two conclusions can be true and the defendants impliedly admitted the system is not a matter of “common sense” since they offered expert testimony on its operation and installation.  Here, the representations and statements made in the sales and planning phase are completely removed from the carefully crafted explanations that came only after issues were discovered and $130,000.00 had been paid toward the system.
[brief] This case was filed in 2014.  Now some ten years later plaintiff’s complaint still has no direct claim against [...] and unlike Appellant’s claim against [...], no purely vicarious claim is set forth in the pleadings.  C.  The New Jersey Supreme Court imposes a duty of care upon licensed professionals based on heightened knowledge and understanding.  In this matter Appellant argues that [...] and [...] were not acting as engineers and that [...] was not a licensed individual for the purposes of the AOM.
[brief] - **Retaliatory Action. **  On April 12, 2021, numerous altered and derogatory retirement posters were placed throughout the NJDEP workplace with [...]’s photograph, stating “HELP US CELEBRATE (WELL REJOICE OVER) ALAN DILLON’S HASTY, UNSCHEDULED AND DOWN-RIGHT EMBARRASSING DEPARTURE FROM DEP TO AVOID PENSION SANCTIONS AND OTHER FURTHER DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS, FOLLOWING A SCANDALOUS END TO A 30-YEAR CAREER OF DISREPUTABLE BEHAVIOR, ALIENATING COLLEAGUES, AND ABUSING REGULATEES” (Pa888).  -  **Proof of Pretext. **  Defendants claim that they cannot be responsible for the derogatory posters disparaging Dillon by stating he was facing “pension sanctions” following a “scandalous end to a 30 year career” in which Dillon engaged in “disreputable behavior. ”  Defendants do not deny that 1) the derogatory retirement posters that were placed throughout Dillon’s workplace, 2) the derogatory posters relate facts that were discussed in confidence at the April 11, 2016 meeting attended by [...], [...] and [...] and 3) [...] had all of the derogatory posters gathered and destroyed, thus, making impossible any forensic examination to trace them to a printer, computer hard drive, etc.  A jury could find that this was part of the concerted effort by defendants to “take reprisals” against Dillon because he “opposed practices or acts forbidden by the NJLAD” and to “coerce, intimidate, threaten or interfere with” Dillon “in the exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right granted or protected by this act” in violation of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d).
[brief] ARGUMENT I.  THIS ACTION WAS NOT FILED PROPERLY AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.  (Da89-90; 1T66:18-73:2).  The trial court should not have reached the merits of Plaintiffs’ underlying claims.  Their action suffers from at least two fatal deficiencies: Plaintiffs may not use quo warranto to oust volunteer BOG members and their action is grossly out of time.  Either one of those defects should have resulted in the termination of this proceeding; together, they present a compelling case for dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.  A.  An Action In Lieu Of Prerogative Writ Of Quo Warranto Applies To Officeholders, Not Rutgers’ Volunteer Board Members.  As sole authority to bring this suit, Plaintiffs rely on the quo warranto statute found under N.J.S.A. 2A:66-6.  Their reliance is misplaced because that statute applies to officeholders, not to [...] who was a volunteer BOG member.  The quo warranto statute provides:  A proceeding in lieu of prerogative writ may also be instituted as of right against any person for usurping, intruding into or unlawfully holding or executing any office or franchise in this state, by any person who, under the former practice, would have the requisite interest to exhibit an information in the nature of a quo warranto with the leave of court.  [N.J.S.A. 2A:66-6.]  Thus, the statute states that an action in lieu of prerogative writ may be instituted against a person who unlawfully holds an “office” in this state.  The plain language and meaning of term “office” refer to public officers, not unpaid, volunteer BOG members such as [...].  It is implausible that the Legislature, in enacting the quo warranto statute, ever intended it to bind the Rutgers’ BOG.
[brief] *Karan* requires not only consideration of the value-enhancing aspects of the public project (rejecting the dichotomy between special and general benefits), but also the value-reducing aspects of the project (which implicate the converse dichotomy between special and general damages), provided the impacts are reasonably quantifiable and not conjectural.  Based on *Karan*, evidence of and damages to the [...] property for increased vulnerability to storm surge flooding from the seawall project should have been allowed.  Any suggestion that the Supreme Court in *Karan* was limiting consideration of the public beach dune project to just the portion of the dune constructed on the property taken does not make sense.  One of the purposes of a dune project is to fill in open end gaps and create a continuous dune.  It is the continuous dune, including on the property of others, that provides the benefits of storm protection.  Otherwise, the property subject to the taking would have to be imagined as open and vulnerable to storm surge from either side.  *Karan* does not limit consideration to only the portion of the dune constructed within the easement taken.
[brief] Statutes of limitations are based on the public policy goals of security and stability in human affairs and ensuring cases are not tried on the basis of stale evidence.  *Zaccardi v. Becker*, 88 N.J. 245, 256 (1982).  In line with that public purpose, where a tortfeasor was on notice of the claim and no significant prejudice would result, the policy reasons for upholding statutes of limitation recede.  *Price v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co.*, 182 N.J. 519, 524 (2005).
[brief] The Respondents filed an application before the [...] to construct a 2,941 square foot addition to their home, which required certain variances.  The [...] conducted the first hearing on the application on March 22, 2022.  The second hearing was conducted on May 23, 2022.  After the hearing, the [...] learned that the recording system for the May 23, 2022 meeting only recorded the video, but no audio.  The Appellants and Respondents were advised of the failed recording and were advised if they could agree to a stipulation of facts for the hearing and if not, the [...] would conduct a re-do hearing, since there was no audio recording of the May 23, 2022 hearing.
[brief] Instead, Plaintiff-Appellant simply alleges that “Defendant [...] represented to the public that incoming students have an opportunity to pursue a Doctor of Pharmacy degree dueled with a choice of various Master’s track’s” and “Defendant [...] omitted any mention of the minimum secondary requirements with the intent to lure incoming students to the unaccredited [...]. ”  Although the cause of action is pled as a “misrepresentation,” it actually complains about an omission, not an affirmative representation.  Specifically, Plaintiff-Appellant claims he relied on what was essentially an advertisement on the University’s website (as it existed on February 15, 2011).  Indeed, Plaintiff-Appellant’s entire Complaint is based on the – entirely reasonable – omission of the admission requirements for the dual degree from that advertisement.  Contrary to Plaintiff-Appellant’s arguments, this simply does not constitute a misrepresentation.
[brief] By way of background, the dispute in this case concerns the redeveloper's desire to construct seven (7) two bedroom units of affordable housing on an irregularly shaped, substandard lot at [...].  [65A]  The property was never formally designated as an additional site for affordable housing to be built by [...].  It does not appear in any of the three Amendments to the Redevelopment Agreement, or for that matter, as part of the "Property" on which the "Project" is to be built as defined in the Redevelopment Agreement or the Exhibit "A" listing all blocks and lots included in the "Project."  This omission is even more pronounced because additional lots were added to the "Property" via the First Amendment to the Redevelopment Agreement.  All of the Amendments and the Redevelopment Agreement require modifications to be in writing, and the Agreements and Amendments are otherwise deemed complete, absent a written modification, and supersede any prior discussions.  [114A]  129  Kinderkamack Road does not appear in the settlement agreement with [...], or the Conditional judgment of Compliance and Repose, nor is it mentioned in the resolution of approval granted by the Land Use Board on December 28, 2018.  [515A]  129  Kinderkamack, however, was the subject of --- 1  The Procedural History of Appellant is largely adopted by Respondent, therefore the Procedural History and Statement of Facts are represented together for the Court's convenience and to avoid repetition.
[brief] ”  Each and every contractual document that the plaintiffs reviewed, initialed and signed at the time of their purchase specifically addressed “investment” and stated the precise opposite of what the plaintiffs claimed:  “Purchaser(s) represent that this unit Interval is being purchased for their own personal vacation use and enjoyment and not because of any financial or monetary advantage…” (Da193, ¶13).  “Buyer also acknowledges, represents and warrants that the purchase of the Interval is made for the buyer’s personal use, and not for investment purposes …” (Da204, ¶22).  “Intervals should only be purchased for the personal enjoyment by a purchaser and his family.  Intervals are not designed to be investments …” (Da231-232, ¶10).  See [...]’s Statement of Facts, supra at 10, regarding the express contradictions as to “investment. ”  Second, ten (10) of the eleven (11) plaintiffs claimed that their timeshare interval was likened to conventional real estate such as a single-family home and/or condominium.
[brief] ”  Pa649; Pa658.  The findings in support of the tax exemption and PILOT, approved by the Township Committee as part of the Financial Agreement, purport to be grounded in the need for the exemption to make the project happen.  These findings are set forth in Sections 9.01 and 9.02 of that agreement, both underscoring in identical language:  “Considering current market conditions, economic factors and development costs impacting this Project, it is not financially feasible to undertake the development of this Project in the absence of the tax exemption provided for herein.
[brief] [...] is Entitled to a New Trial Based on the State’s Failure to Produce a Sworn Statement that Categorically Undermined the Credibility of an Important State Witness Rule 3:22-2(a) provides that a criminal defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief if there was a “[s]ubstantial denial in the conviction proceedings of defendant’s rights under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of the State of New Jersey. ”  When the State fails to provide a criminal defendant with exculpatory evidence in its possession, the defendant’s constitutional rights are violated, necessitating a new trial.  See State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 154, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850 (1997) (citing State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233, 245-46 (1996)).  Here, the State neglected its Brady, Jencks, and Giglio obligations and failed to produce [...]’ Sworn Statement to [...]; thus, violating his rights.
[brief] [...] noted that since the parties agreed that there was no question of material fact, that she would make a ruling in the case as a matter of law.  While reading the decision into the record, [...] noted  On June 26, 2020 [...] had an incident at the [...] drive-thru while stopped with her foot on the brake, car immobile, receiving a hot beverage through the drive-thru window.  The lid came off the cup spilling liquid -- hot liquid and burning the plaintiff.  (2T11)  [...] went on to find  Since the parties have agreed as to the facts, the plaintiff was stopped in the drive-thru receiving a hot beverage through the window of the vehicle when the top was dislodged, causing the hot liquid to spill and burn the plaintiff.  The Court now finds that are no genuine issues of material fact as to the issues as to how the accident occurred, so these summary judgement motions can be decided as a matter of law.  Two, the plaintiff was not operating a motor vehicle at the time the injury occurred.  And three, there is no causal relationship between the plaintiff's use and occupancy of the vehicle and the injuries sustained.  The Court finds that [...] -- Defendant [...] is entitled to summary judgement as a matter of law.  Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgement is denied.  The summary of all your submissions has not changed from the last time that it was submitted and reviewed by the Court as to the filing for summary judgment on both of your parts, the oppositions that you filed and the replies that you filed, but the Court does find that there is no nexus between the use of the automobile and the injuries that have subsequently occurred and that the car was not being operated at the time of the injury.
[directive] ☐ ☐  1.  Is the defendant currently employed?  Yes No  If Yes, provide employer information.  Please list additional employment on a separate sheet.  Business Name: Business Address: Business Phone: Current Work Schedule: ☐ ☐ Yes No  2.  Does the defendant rely on public transportation to travel to work?  ☐ ☐  3.  Does the defendant rely on others to commute to and from work, so that a Yes No curfew may not be met?  Does the defendant’s work location change frequently?  ☐ ☐ Yes No 4.  ☐ ☐ Yes No  5.  Does the defendant have stable work hours?  ☐ ☐ 6.  If No, does the defendant know of changes to his/her work schedule Yes No ahead of time, so he/she may notify Pretrial Staff at least 5 business days prior to the change and during regular business hours (M-F from 8am to 5pm)?  Form Promulgated by Directive #19-23 (10/17/2023), CN: 12973 page 2 of 5  Home Detention Screening Criteria (for Home Detention as a Condition of Pretrial Release)  Defendant Name Complaint/Indictment Number  SBI Number ☐ ☐  7.  Does the defendant understand that while on home detention, they will be Yes No unable to make last minute switches to their work schedule, accept last minute overtime shifts, or be let out for ancillary tasks not directly related to their work schedule?  (e.g. picking up a paycheck on a day off)  ☐ ☐  Yes No  8.  Any other relevant information regarding employment:  Medical Information:
[brief] [...] Fails To Oversee And Monitor Its Employees, Allowing The Other Defendants To Perpetrate Fraud And Steal Over $1.4 Million Dollars From The Plaintiffs  In the Spring of 2022, [...] contacted [...] and advised her of a potential investment opportunity with [...], an “investment club,” that other members in Plaintiffs’ local community had invested with.  (Da6, ¶ 24.)  [...] introduced Plaintiffs to co-defendant [...], and through a series of misrepresentations, induced Plaintiffs to invest with [...].  (Da7-08, ¶¶ 28-31.)  Given Plaintiffs’ history with [...], their limited financial knowledge, and the representations made about Calixte and [...], Plaintiffs relied upon these representations and indicated that they wanted to transfer a portion of [...]’s investments from [...] to [...].  (D10, ¶ 37.)  [...] advised [...] to withdraw funds from [...]’s [...] account and deposit them into [...]’s [...] account.  From there, [...] was to deposit the funds directly to [...].  (Da10, ¶ 38.)  To facilitate the transfers, [...] had his assistant, [...] (another former [...] employee), accompany [...] to Plaintiffs’ bank to effect wire transfers to [...].  (Da11, ¶¶ 41-45.)  [...] represented that she worked for [...] and [...], and accompanied [...] three times to ensure the wiring of $2.1 million to [...].  (Da11, ¶¶ 41-45.)  From there, the [...] made a significant number of high-risk investments, despite representations that they would only engage in low-risk investments.  (Da14, ¶ 54.)  During this time, [...] and [...] represented that Plaintiffs had made significant gains.  (Da19, ¶ 67.)  After repeatedly requesting updates and confirmations about Plaintiffs’ funds, [...] and [...] finally provided some information regarding the status of Plaintiffs’ funds, which included documents evidencing substantial losses and [...]’s employees’ fraud and theft from the Plaintiffs.  (Da20-22, ¶¶ 71-94.)
[directive] REPORT WRITING  Goal:  The police officer handler trainee will have the knowledge to properly complete a police report for any given situation requiring the use of a police specialty dog.  1.4.1  The police officer handler will list the qualities of a good police report for situations which required the use of a police specialty dog.  1.4.2  The police officer handler will list the types of information to be included in an incident report dealing with the use of a police specialty dog.  1.4.3  The police officer handler will be familiar with individual agency requirements for reports and records pertaining to operations and activities involving police specialty dogs.  1.5
[brief] [...] Statement: (iii)  The condition and vacancy of the property materially increases the risk of fire to the property and adjacent properties.  [...] Rebuttal  I do not know how [...] could support this statement.  He did not gain access to the interior of the Property.  An inspection of the exterior of the Property could not support this statement as the Property is reasonably well maintained and structurally intact and apparently fit for habitation.  (99a-100a)