ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b(1) expressly provides in this regard that a court has the authority to waive or reduce the mandatory minimum sentence "notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12."  Thus, in any case where N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b applies, the atypical sentencing scheme established in N.J.S.A. 2C:35- 12 is displaced, and the allocation of sentencing authority between the prosecutor and the court reverts to the regular sentencing scheme established under the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice.  in State v. Warre~, 115 N.J. 433 (1989), the New Jersey Supreme Court explained that under the general sentencing provisions of the Code, the parties can only recommend the sentence to be imposed, and "are not empowered to negotiate a sentence that can have any binding effect."  115 N.J. at 442.  All of this means that henceforth, in school zone cases where the defendant is eligible to be sentenced under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b, judges rather than prosecutors will ultimately determine whether to impose a State Prison term, a county jail term, or noncustodial probation, and judges will also determine the length of any custodial sentence, and whether to impose a period during which the defendant will be ineligible for parole.  Because prosecutors in these school zone cases will no longer be able to tender a plea offer that has a binding effect on the sentencing court, any differences in sentencing practices between different localities -- the principal concern expressed by the Court in State v. Brimage -- will not only be reviewable by courts, but will have resulted -3- from the exercise of judicial rather than prosecutorial sentencing discretion.  It is therefore not necessary as a matter of constitutional imperative, or as a matter of sound policy, for the Attorney General in these cases to impose rigid restrictions on a prosecutor’s discretion in formulating an appropriate plea offer.  Aceordingly, in any school zone case where the prosecutor has no factual basis to contest a defendant’s eligibility to be sentenced under NJ.S.A. 2C:35-7b, the prosecutor will no longer be required to calculate and tender a Brima~e plea offer.  See Part II, Section la, infra.
[brief] Sections “A” to “I”, which provide citations to rulings & filed evidence, addressed & justified my appeal of Oct. ‘22 Order, incl. par. 1,1c,&1d, Mar. 7, ’23 Order, & Sept. 6, ‘23 Order, incl. par. 3&4, as well as missing provisions, as I substantiated how rulings contradicted or overlooked key, probative competent evidence.  This is a summary of Order provisions needing corrections.
[brief] In this matter, Respondent, [...] ("290 Ocean"), made a $2,000,000 payment to the [...] in return for the City’s agreement to amend its "Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan."  The Redevelopment Plan amendment is applicable to one property only, that of [...].  In return for the $2,000,000 payment, Long Branch agreed to eliminate any density limitation on 290 Ocean’s proposed luxury apartment building, as well as many other bulk restrictions that would have applied to 290 Ocean’s property.  These restrictions continue to constrain the development of every other property within the Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment area.  The trial Court found this payment to be authorized by the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-l, et seq ("LRHL") concluding that the LRHL permits such payments because “a rational nexus existed between the payment and the redevelopment plan. ” (Emphasis added).  (Pa58).  Therefore, one issue before this Court requires a determination of whether the LRHL delegates to a municipality the right to use its zoning power to extract such payments and, if so, how is the nexus between the payment and the development project to be evaluated.  The trial court erred for several reasons.
[brief] 4.  **Presumptions of Fitness and Affection**  Fourth, the Parental Secrecy Policy impermissibly reverses the constitutionally mandated presumptions of parental fitness and affection in violation of both substantive and procedural due process.  *Parham*, 442 U.S. at 602; see also *Troxel*, 530 U.S. at 68 (reversing visitation decision that failed to presume parental fitness and affection) (plurality op.); *Stanley v. Illinois*, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (invalidating statute that presumed unmarried fathers were unfit parents); *Doe v. Heck*, 327 F.3d 492, 521 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding parents’ rights violated where state actors “not only failed to presume that . . . parents would act in the best interest of their children, they assumed the exact opposite”); see also *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (noting that the “fundamental requirement of [procedural] due process” is notice and an opportunity to be heard).  According to the State, parental secrecy is required in all cases because some parents might harm their transgender-identifying children.  ACa81–82.  But the “statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect [their] children is repugnant to American tradition. ”  *Parham*, 442 U.S. at 603 (emphasis in original).  Thus, the State’s justification for the Parental Secrecy Policy renders it constitutionally impermissible.  ---
[brief] Plaintiffs’ counsel explained again why [...] had been retained:  [...]:  It’s not -- it’s not a better expert report.  We found out credentialing issues.  And I can point them out to Your Honor, because they were in [...]’s brief that, again, ten years of no privileges within the hospitals that are during the time period of the -- of the incident.  The fact that he had only 20 percent to teaching prior to the -- the year -- the year immediately preceding the incident.  These are -- these are death knells and the -- and really it’s going to happen at the end of the case as opposed to before the case and it’s -- to not to allow the plaintiffs’ counsel to have discovered that at the same time as defense counsel would go opposite of the cases actually cited in [...]’s brief.  [2T12]  Defendant’s counsel ([...]) acknowledged to [...] that the defense was not withdrawing or waiving objections to [...]’s qualification and credentialing problems for trial.  2T14; 2T26-28.  Plaintiffs’ counsel stressed the absence of prejudice to the defendant, which had more than sufficient time to depose [...] “because the discovery had been extended” by overseeing [...].
[brief] ARGUMENT  Nothing has changed since the last time [...] denied Plaintiffs’ request to add [...] and [...] as custodians.  The case law makes clear that a producing party can be compelled to add additional custodians to an already-reasonable collection effort only if the requesting party establishes that the new custodians are likely possess information that is both relevant and unique.  That approach makes sense—especially in the context of apex custodians, where the burden of collection, the cumulative nature of their files, and the risk of harassment are elevated.  After all, if the information is not unique—if there is no gap in the existing production—the request is unreasonably cumulative and duplicative and therefore improper under Rule 26(b).  [...] recognized as much when she instructed that a “very targeted” collection was the outer limit of what might be appropriate from [...] and [...].  And Plaintiffs’ motion fails to make the showing required to justify even a very targeted collection.  Their motion identifies no gap in [...]’s production that could only be filled by documents from [...] and [...]’s files.  Given the breadth (81 custodians plus various non-custodial sources), depth (more than 140 search strings), and quality (numerous custodians who work closely with [...] and [...]) of [...]’s collection in this case, there is no reason to expect that any such gap exists.  A.
[brief] Defendant/Respondent [...] shall rely upon the Statement of Procedural History as set forth in Defendant/Appellant’s brief at Db-3 to – 4.  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS  Defendant/Respondent [...] shall only address the facts specifically related to the claims raised against it in this litigation.  Counts Two and Three of the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Da-112 to -127) sought relief against the Township requesting that a Notice of Violation, issued pursuant to the Defendant [...]’s determination in a matter between [...] and [...], be deemed invalid.  The complaint sought restraints from any enforcement related to the Plaintiff’s use of the Sixth Street lot.  The basis for the request to dismiss the Notice of Violation is as a result of the Zoning Board’s November 19, 2018 Resolution No. 4010A (Da-1 to -6).  The violation, originally attached to the Plaintiff/Respondent’s Trial Brief as an exhibit, is attached to this Brief as “Lakewood DLa-1”.  That Notice of Violation simply states the following:  No development shall take place within the Township nor shall any land be significantly cleared or altered, nor any use or change in the use of any building or other structure nor shall any watercourse be diverted or its channel or floodplain dredged or filled, nor shall any parking areas, accessory or otherwise, or access ways thereto, be constructed, installed or enlarged, nor shall any building permit, certificate of occupancy or other required permit be issued with respect to any such structure, land or parking area, except in accordance to an approval of such development granted pursuant to this Section, unless exempted and Section 18-601 in related subsections.  This description cites Section 18-600 of Lakewood’s Unified Development Ordinance, and alleges that a violation has occurred because there was no site plan approval for the parking area.  The parties uniformly agreed that the Notice of Violation was based solely upon the Zoning Board’s resolution after an inspection of the property.  The Zoning Board’s resolution found no evidence of site plan approval which would have entitled the Plaintiff to utilize a portion of Defendant [...]’s property for parking.  This was the crux of the case before the trial court: whether the determination of the Zoning Board was correct, or as Plaintiff asserted, an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable ruling.  In accordance with the Trial Court’s opinion dated December 1, 2022 (Da-270 to -287) final judgment was entered (Da-288) finding, *inter alia*, that the Township’s Notice of Violation was null, void, and thus withdrawn.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[directive] b. 아십니까?  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  묵비권을 행사할 권리가 있는 것을  The right to remain silent? c. 아십니까? [예/Yes] [아니요/No] 귀하에게 불리한 증인을 대질할 수 있는 권리가 있는 것을  The right to confront the witnesses against you?  d. (1)물적 (R. 3:5-7(d)) [예/Yes] [아니요/No] 귀하가 유죄를 인정해도 증거 삭제 요청 거부에 대한 항소권 (2) (PTI) (R. 3:28(g))을 또는 재판 전 중재 프로그램 참여 승인거부에 대한 항소권 아십니까?  포기하는 것은 아니라는 것을 you are not waiving  Do you understand that by pleading your right to appeal (1) the denial of a motion to suppress physical evidence (R. 3:5-7(d)) or (2) the denial of acceptance into a pretrial intervention program (PTI) (R. 3:28(g))?
[brief] The defendant’s representative came to the plaintiff’s home and presented “an electronic tablet screen” for a signature.  _Id._  The tablet “only showed a rectangular area to digitally sign” and “contained no visible reference to a link or other place” where the plaintiff might obtain the terms she would agree to by signing, including an arbitration agreement.  _Id._ at *5; _see also id._ at *9 (detailing arbitration agreement).  Based on those facts, the _Lojewski_ court considered whether mutual assent was lacking and concluded it was not.  _See id._ at *20-33.  The court held that any reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would have understood that the parties contemplated a continuing relationship requiring “some terms and conditions. ”  Id. at *23.  The district court further held that a “reasonable person would understand that her signature on the iPad constitutes assent to those terms and conditions, even if she did not read the terms. ”  Id. at *23-24 (citations and quotation marks omitted).  The Lojewski court further explained that the plaintiff was obligated to ask about the terms to which she agreed if she wanted to know what they were.  See id. at *24 (“That no one purportedly explained or showed the contents of the terms and conditions to [...] does not preclude a finding that she had reasonable notice of the existence of those terms and conditions—and, therefore, the duty to inquire about those terms if she wished. ”).  The plaintiff’s duty to read and understand the documents that she signed was not “diminished merely because [she] was provided with only a signature page. ”  Id. at *24-25 (citation and quotation marks omitted).  That conclusion was reinforced by the plaintiff’s signature “in the presence of [defendant’s] representative”:  Unlike parties to one-way, online transactions, the [plaintiffs] had the opportunity to directly engage with a representative of the other contracting party to ask about the Agreement—yet, by their own account, did not do so.  Although the FAC states that the [plaintiffs] were not affirmatively “given an opportunity to review the documents or permitted to scroll through the documents on the iPad,” there is no indication that they requested or attempted to review the terms, let alone that such requests were denied.  Their actions and inaction on the day of purchase constitute admissions sufficient to show that [they] chose to sign the contract . . . without reading it.  *Id.* at *25* (citations and quotation marks omitted).  The same result is warranted here for the same reasons.  As the trial court held, "[a] party is charged with understanding what they are signing."
[brief] POINT V [...] ACTED NEGLIGENTLY IN SLICING OPEN THE TRUCK TRAILER FILLED WITH OIL  [...] argues that the court failed to find that [...] acted negligently and that the MCS-90 surety is only triggered upon a finding of negligence.  Paragraph 2 of [...]’s Verified Complaint stated, “On June 1, 2021, a driver for Defendant [...] was driving a truck pulling a trailer carrying waste oil as its commodity.  As the driver drove the rig out of a parking spot, he negligently scraped against a sharp object that cut through the bladder in the container, which released the entire contents of oil onto the ground. ”  [Emphasis added].  [...] also included a still photo from the camera footage showing oil gushing out of the side of the ripped open truck trailer as Figure 1.  [...] admitted its responsibility in the email it wrote to [...], wherein [...] stated, “one of our drivers was trying to move the container to the Newark terminal and *had an accident* with our chassis parked next to the container. ”  [Emphasis added] (PPCIa004-05).  The trial court accepted the allegations in the Verified Complaint as competent evidence.  [...] did not claim, as an affirmative defense, that [...] did *not* act negligently.  [...] now argues that the trial court erred in not finding [...] negligent but only finding [...] liable under the Spill Act.
[brief] REQUEST FOR TRUST PAYMENTS FOR FEES THAT WERE EVENTUALLY ADDRESSED IN FEBRUARY 17, 2023  HEARING RULINGS, WHICH LED TO MARCH 7, 2023  ORDER, PAR. 1&2  1.  See Section “C” for Items 1-3 SECTION F [...]’ CERTIFICATION FOR CROSS-MOTION, DATED MAY, 25, 2023, IN ORDER TO FOCUS ON APPEAL ISSUES FOR: (4T, p. 44, line 13, to p. 46, line 14; p. 51, line 17, to p. 52, line 6)
[brief] Absolutely unacceptable.  Teacher pulls off 7 year old’s hijab…in front of the class.  Our @[...] office is calling for immediate termination.  Racist teachers like this cannot be trusted around our children.  12:41 a.m. Eastern Time | 35 - 37 (Da 017)  | | Date/Time | Defendant(s) / Citation | Statement | |-------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Oct. 8, 2021 at | [...], Am. Compl. | **[...] Statement #1 (Reply)** | 2:13 p.m. Eastern | ¶¶ 38 - 40 (Da 017-18)  |  Call and email the Superintendent, [...], today, and let him know [...] is unfit to be a teacher.  [...] [...] | | Time | | | | Oct. 8, 2021 at | [...], Am. Compl. | **[...] Statement #1** | 9:45 a.m. Eastern | ¶¶ 41 - 43 (Da 018) |  A teacher pulled off a 7-year-old student’s hijab in front of her class.  This is completely unacceptable, and we are calling for immediate termination.  Our children are not safe with #Islamophobia in the classroom.  | | Time | | | | Oct. 8, 2021 at | [...], [...], [...] NJ, | **[...] Statement #2** | 3:56 p.m. Eastern | Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44 - 46 | [...]-NJ Exec. Dir. Selaedin [...]:  “Forcefully stripping off the religious headscarf of a Muslim girl is not only exceptionally disrespectful behavior, but also a humiliating and traumatic experience. ”  @[...] @Mselaedin #Islamophobia | | Time | (Da 018-19) | | | Oct. 8, 2021 at | [...], [...], [...] NJ, | **[...] Statement #3** | 7:34, 9:52, 9:53, | Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47 - 50 |  The hijab, you know, is much like any other article of clothing for a Muslim woman.  To remove that publicly can be very humiliating.  |  10:56 a.m. Eastern| (Da 019-20)  |  Anyone who thinks it’s OK to do this to a student clearly is not fit to be a teacher.  | | Time | | | | Date/Time | Defendant(s) / Citation | Statement | |-------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Oct. 8, 2021 at | [...], [...] NJ | **[...] Statement #2** | | | Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51 - 55 |
[brief] B.  Section 17.1(b) of the PSA Does Not Present a Bar to Plaintiff’s Claims  [...] also argued that Section 17.1(b) of the PSA “precludes Plaintiff from asserting any claims against [...] other than those for bad faith, gross negligence or willful misconduct. ”  Pa556-559, [...] Mem. at 14-17.  [...] insisted that this clause must be interpreted to preclude all of Plaintiff’s claims against [...].  (See id.)  In making this argument, [...] simply ignored the fact that the Complaint did allege that [...] acted in bad faith and willfully when it deceived Plaintiff and aided and abetted [...] in its breach of contract.  Indeed, in numerous places throughout the Complaint, Plaintiff alleged various acts of bad faith and willful misconduct, including: that [...] acted to intentionally deceive Plaintiff; affirmatively engaged in deception in collaboration with [...]; intentionally advised Plaintiff it would keep Plaintiff apprised of the closing, while having no present intention to do so; breached its duties of good faith and fair dealing by working with [...] to frustrate Plaintiff’s ability to obtain the benefits of the bargain; and acted covertly and surreptitiously to facilitate the closing between [...] and the third-party seller, with knowledge that doing so constituted a breach of [...]’s and [...]’s obligations to Plaintiff.
[directive] (i) for training purposes, provided that the recording is edited so that the identity of individuals depicted in the recording cannot be determined by persons viewing the training video unless the depicted individuals have consented to the recording being used for training purposes; (j) to conduct an audit to ensure compliance with this Policy and a department’s policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order promulgated pursuant to this Policy; (k) to enhance officer and public safety by providing intelligence information in preparation for a raid/warrant execution (e.g., by providing information about the layout of a premises to be searched), when such use is approved by the County Prosecutor or designee, or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee; or (l) any other specified official purpose where the County Prosecutor or designee, or Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee, finds in writing that good and sufficient cause exists to authorize access to a particular BWC recording.
[brief] (RAISED BELOW 4T 27:8 TO 31:7)**  A proven breach of fiduciary duty causes the remedial aperture to widen to encompass remedies other than the standard legal solution of compensatory damages.  Metro Storage, 275 A.3d at 822.  A plaintiff must also prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a sufficient causal linkage exists between the breach of duty and the remedy sought to make the remedy an apt means of addressing the breach.  Id., at 822.
[directive] DIVISION DE DERECHO- CONDADO DE ____ _ LAW DIVISION - COUNTY EST ADO DE NUEVA JERSEY NO. DE LA ACUSACION FORMAL STATE OF NEW JERSEY INDICTMENT NO. contra NOTIFICACION DE LOS DERECHOS DE APELACION v. Y DEL PLAZO PARA PRESENTAR  UNA SOLICITUD DE ASISTENCIA DESPUES DE LA CONDENA NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS AND TIME TO FILE A PETITION  Acusado FOR POST -CONVICTION  RELIEF  Defendant
[brief] THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS MATTER WEIGHS IN FAVOR OF ORDERING ARBITRATION (DA1-2)  The gravamen of Defendants’ argument on appeal rises or falls on the application of Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center, 215 N.J. 265 (2013), to the circumstances here.  Indeed, the Trial Court applied the totality of the circumstances criteria under Cole, which clearly supported arbitration.  Notwithstanding that application, the Trial Court then rejected application of Cole because – unlike the circumstances in Cole – the waiver here was verbally stated to the Chancery Judge, prior to the matter’s transfer to the Law Division.  Based on Defendants’ reading of Cole, nowhere does the Supreme Court state that public policy favors arbitration only in instances of implied conduct versus instances of an express verbal waiver.  In short, the Trial Court erred in ruling that an express waiver of arbitration vitiates the Cole framework where there exists no legal justification or authority which distinguishes a verbal waiver from a waiver based on implicated conduct.  Both situations should require a fact-sensitive analysis because public policy favors arbitration.  To rule otherwise would contradict Cole and bar arbitration the moment a party voiced waiver, regardless of the underlying circumstances or factors favoring arbitration.
[brief] H528a Holm-22: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-50 (second number 50) (also S-7): how [...] monitors for icing (SOICR p. 12) ......................................................  H536a Holm-23: [...] response to Holmdel-1, re capacity of replaced transmission line; objected to (SOICR p. 12) .............................  H537a Holm-24: [...] response to Holmdel-2 re how a reduction in flow would impact requirements for a regulator (SOICR p. 12)  ...............  H538a Holm-25: [...] response to Holmdel-3 requesting data on incidents of severe icing (SOICR p. 12) ............................................  H539a Holm-26: [...] response to Holmdel-4 re any contingency plans if the regulator stations is not built (SOICR p. 12)  .........................  H540a Holm-27: [...] response to Holmdel-5 requesting data and documentation on the useful life of the “temporary” regulator (SOICR p. 12) ........................................................................ H541a Attachment A, Holmdel Regulator Station - temporary, depreciation schedule ................................................................. H542a Holm-28: [...] response to Holmdel-6 asking if the “temporary” regulator operates safely (SOICR p. 12) ................................. H544a Holm-29: [...] response to Holmdel-7 asking about other locations and means to provide heat to the “temporary” regulator (SOICR p. 12) ........................................................................ H545a Holm-30: [...] response to Holmdel-8 asking for the sizing of the “temporary” regulator and if it every operated at the maximum (SOICR p. 12) ................................................................. H546a Holm-31: [...] response to Holmdel-9 re the anticipated flow or capacity of the proposed regulator (SOICR p. 12) ......................... H547a Holm-32: [...] response to Holmdel-10 asking if the proposed regulator could be set back farther from the road (SOICR p. 12)