ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] POINT II  A NUMBER OF INSTRUCTIONAL ERRORS PREVENTED THE JURY FROM APPROPRIATELY DETERMINING DEFENDANT’S CULPABILITY.  DEFENDANT’S CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below)  ..................................................  23  A.  The Instruction That The Jury Could Infer That Defendant Meant To Kill Because Of The Use Of A Wine Chiller As A Weapon Was Erroneous, Prejudicial, And Requires Reversal Of Defendant’s Convictions.  ...........................................................................  25  B.  The Failure To Charge Any Lesser-Included Offenses Of Murder Requires Reversal of Defendant’s Convictions.  .................................................................  31
[brief] (13T90-10 to 19).  According to [...], [...] told her that he and [...] picked up the victim; [...] shot her twice in the back of the head; they ran back to [...]’s grandmother’s house; and then they texted the victim’s phone.  (11T71-22 to 77-13).  [...] claimed that [...] told her he shot [...] because she wanted her gun back.  (11T77-14 to 78-1).  [...] told a friend about [...]’s confession, and the friend contacted the police.
[brief] Defendant’s rights to due process and a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment and the corresponding provisions of the state constitution were violated by the refusal to instruct the jury on a rationally supported lesser-included homicide offense.  \(^{12}\)  Defense counsel initially stated that he preferred that no lesser-included offenses be submitted to the jury, but noted that if the State’s request for instructions on reckless and aggravated manslaughter was granted, his request was for a corresponding instruction on passion/provocation manslaughter.  (32T 4-15 to 5-3)  The State then argued that reckless and aggravated manslaughter should be charged, but that there was no evidence to support a passion/provocation instruction (32T 5-14 to 6-19) -- the latter part of that argument being a strange point of view from the same prosecutor who told the court earlier in the case that he had submitted passion/provocation manslaughter to the grand jury as an option.  (1T 24-20 to 23)  The judge nevertheless agreed with the State, and decided to charge reckless and aggravated manslaughter as lesser-included offenses but to deny the defense request to charge passion/provocation manslaughter because he believed “the facts” did not “support it” and to provide that option would “run[] a risk of confusion. ”  (32T 18-11 to 15; 32T 19-24 to 20-2)  When a lesser-included offense is requested, as it was here, the standard of review regarding the denial of that request is a plenary consideration by the appellate court of whether “the evidence presents a rational basis on which the jury could acquit the defendant of the greater charge and convict the defendant of the lesser.
[brief] Plaintiffs must establish by clear and convincing evidence that a constructive trust is warranted.  Id. at 448.  In Massa, a daughter and her husband moved home to care for her elderly mother.  Id. at 444.  The mother executed a will leaving the home to the daughter and if the daughter predeceased her, then to her other surviving children.  Id. at 445.  The mother died and the house passed to the daughter.  Ibid.  The siblings asked the daughter to execute a will leaving the house to them as was the mother’s wish.  Ibid.  The daughter allegedly assured her siblings that the house would be theirs, and she did not need a will.  Ibid.  The daughter died, and the house passed by intestacy to her husband.  Id. at 443.  The siblings filed suit alleging that the husband unduly influenced his wife not to make a will and it was her mistake not to make one.  Id. at 444.  The trial court found for plaintiffs and imposed a constructive trust.  Ibid.  The Appellate Division reversed, finding, there is, “nothing in the record from which it can reasonably be inferred that decedent was induced not to make a will because of what her husband had said or that she was misled by him in any way. ”  Id. at 447.  The Appellate Division concluded, “Plaintiffs’ proofs fall short of the clear and convincing standard for establishing a constructive trust. ”  Id. at 448.  While factually distinct, the present matter is similar to Massa in that the Trial Court here too scrutinized the record for wrongdoing and found no evidence of anything, “nefarious, or untoward, or suspicious” (6T15:25, 7T17:14-16).
[brief] However, at the end of Plaintiff’s opening, when they circled back around to their theme, Defense counsel did object (3T, 10:20).  Defense counsel admitted that they “let it go the first time,” but argued, “That’s not part of an opening statement…  That’s a closing argument. ”  (3T, at 10:24-11:9; 11:22-25).  To this, [...] instructed Plaintiff’s counsel to refrain from discussing accountability any further (3T, at 12:1-3).  Because Plaintiff’s counsel was about to conclude his opening, there was no issue.  Defense counsel began their opening statement with an anecdote about how he bears a resemblance to [...] (3T, at 13:1-12).
[brief] (Pa61)  When Phase I ultimately ended on October 6, 2015, with [...]’s removal from management of the Company, (Da672), [...] refused to relinquish control until the Court confirmed the award on January 28, 2016.  (Da1577-1578)  On January 28, 2016, counsel for Plaintiffs presciently voiced concern that “computer files and money, and inventory [might] suddenly [go] to the Philippines...” if the Court did not specifically order that [...] not do those things.  To alleviate these concerns, the trial court ordered “that counsel... meet and discuss and attempt to jointly develop a plan. ”  Ibid.  The trial court “had tremendous concerns about the transition of control... and... wanted a plan....”.  (Da1996)  The trial court intended for nothing to be done “outside the ordinary course of business... during this stay period” both as to the U.S. portion of [...] and its “overseas” subsidiaries.  (Pa94)  Critically, the trial court urged that “if anything happens that is contrary to what we’re discussing on the record, there will be consequences. ”  (Pa95)
[brief] I.  Plaintiff’s allegations.  Plaintiff alleged that he was injured in a slip-and-fall accident that occurred on February 16, 2021, in the parking lot of an apartment complex that [...] managed.  Da8-9, ¶¶ 1-6; Da37, ¶ 1; Da80, ¶ 1.  He sued [...], claiming that its negligence in failing to remove snow and ice caused his fall.  Da8-10, Count One, ¶¶ 1-7.  He also sued [...], claiming that it breached its duty to perform snow and ice removal services properly.  Da10-11, Count Two, ¶¶ 1-5.  According to the motion papers, plaintiff alleged that he fell in a parking lot at [...]’s apartment complex because of snow and ice on those premises.  Da37, ¶ 1; Da80, ¶ 1.  Plaintiff’s accident occurred at about 4:30 a.m.  Da81, ¶ 1.  [...] had performed plowing and salting at the premises until about 10:00 p.m. on the night before plaintiff’s accident.  D891, ¶¶ 1-2.  In his deposition, plaintiff testified that it was raining at the time of his accident and that he saw no evidence of salt in the area at issue.  Da81, ¶¶ 4-5.
[brief] 1, 108 (1995) | 6, 7, 8, 9, 11 | | Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980) | 7 | | Jamgochian v. State Parole Bd., 196 N.J. 222, 239 (2008) | 5, 6, 7, 11 | | Kahn v. U.S., 753 F.2d 1208, 1218 (3d Cir. 1983) | 9, 11 | | Sheik-Abdul v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240, 1248 (7th Cir. 1994) | 8 | | State v. Njango, 247 N.J. 533, 548 (2021) | 5, 6, 7 | iv.  Table of Authorities | Authority | Brief Page Number | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | [...] v. [...], [...] | 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77743, 2020 WL 2111026 at *4 (D.N.J. May 14, 2020) | 10 |  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] [...], [...], and [...] (the “Primary Insurers”) agreed to defend [...].  Da1225a.  The Primary Insurers issued policies to [...] starting on June 1, 1991 and, in total, insured [...] for eight years between 1991 and 2004, with collective limits of liability of $7,050,000.  None of these insurers had mold exclusions.  Pa518; Pa63-Pa516.
[brief] It is also undisputed that neither [...] nor Mr.  Kromish had any written or verbal communication with Plaintiff during the period February 20, 2015 (the date the lease was signed) and January 12, 2019 when Plaintiff issued correspondence to [...], [...] and [...], claiming for the first time that they were all personally liable for the obligations of [...] regarding its occupancy of the Leased Premises.  In response to cross motions for summary judgment the Trial Court made the following rulings that are the subject of the cross-appeals in this matter:
[brief] (13T:115-2 to 22).  He also explained the photos that were taken of the scenes of the incident, and why some parts of the route of pursuit were not photographed.  (13T:116-13 to 117-9).  He also testified that he took photos of defendant’s clothes once he was back at [...] headquarters because the clothing was extremely similar to what could be seen on the surveillance footage from the incident.  (13T:117-10 to 118-13).  He stated that clothing had been held in evidence but had not been submitted to the lab for any analysis.  (13T:118-14 to 119-5).
[brief] ”  Pressler and Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3 to R. 4:14-2(c) (2024).  Appellants do not cite to any reported case, and Respondents are also unaware of any State decision that would bind Respondents to a layperson’s legal interpretation of the statute.  Indeed, [...] was not testifying as an expert on statutory interpretation, and was in fact a lay witness.  (Pa47 at 1T65:6-11, 65:21-66:6).  [...]’s testimony “in the form of opinions or inferences may be admitted” only if it (a) is rationally based on the witness' perception; and (b) will assist in understanding the witness' testimony or determining a fact in issue.  N.J.R.E. 701.  However, [...]’s opinion on statutory interpretation was not based on his perception because, in his own words, he was not qualified to opine on legal questions.  (Pa47 at 1T65:6-11, 65:21-66:6).  Also, [...]’s opinion on statutory interpretation is not related to any fact in issue in this case.  Indeed, there are no factual issues in this case, and instead the only issues are legal.  “It is the ‘court's function,’ not a witness's, to answer questions of law.  Any opinions given by witnesses, experts or otherwise, on questions of law need not be accepted by reviewing courts and may be disregarded. ”  Kirkpatrick v. Hidden View Farm, 448 N.J. Super. 165, 179 (App. Div. 2017) (internal citations omitted).  The question of statutory interpretation of the DACCA is the ultimate question in this case.  This question is purely a question of law, and not a question of fact.  The Respondents’ legal position on the DACCA statutory interpretation is presented by their counsel in this brief.  In summary, [...]’s layperson opinions on statutory interpretation were and should be disregarded.  Therefore, the DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor is not unconstitutionally overbroad POINT
[brief] CEP Respondents argued, *inter alia*, (1) that the regulatory approvals run with the land for which the approvals are granted; (2) that the Appellants lost land control by failing to pay rent; and (3) that the Appellants could not establish causation where they lost land control by refusing to pay rent.  3T 8:17-16:13.  In opposition, Appellants admitted that they never paid the rent due for the land.  *Id.* 18:1-11 (“THE COURT: I’m going to ask the question a lot of times, [...], so I would appreciate an answer to it and then I won’t have to keep asking it.  Do you hear?  MR. KIMM: I hear.  THE COURT: You paid the rent?  MR. KIMM: No, Judge. ”).  Appellants instead tried to cite the expired NDA as a basis to proceed with their claims.  The Court observed that “the NDA ran out long before the lease was then terminated. ”  *Id.* at 20:2-19.  The Court also observed that the “rules and regulations” governing the solar industry are not trade secrets because the industry is “so highly regulated. ”  *Id.*  In fact, the Court correctly reasoned that the information concerning the site size and panel layout were public knowledge because Appellants had to file their plans with regulators.  *Id.* at 20:2-23:15.  Though the Court pressed Appellants to identify what secrets were wrongfully used by CEP Respondents, Appellants returned to their argument that the solar rights somehow had value independent of the land to which they were attached.  *Id.* at 23:1-24:7.  On September 23, 2021, the trial court dismissed all counts against the CEP Respondents and issued a written opinion.
[brief] [[...]]  Q.  What specific federal regulations are you talking about?  [[...]].  A.  The pipeline integrity rules.  I'm not sure of the specific, but it's part of CFR Part 192, the Code for (sic) Federal Regulations related to gas transmissions.  Q.  And is it your testimony that those rules required you to replace the 10-inch line in 2012?  A.  At some point, yes, we would have had to do that because the existing line was not able to be in-line inspected as is required as part of that rule.
[brief] See *Klier v. Sordoni Skanska Const. Co.*, 337 N.J. Super. 76, 84-85 (App. Div. 2001).  "The minimum requirements of due process . . . are notice and the opportunity to be heard."  *Doe v. Poritz*, 142 N.J. 1, 106 (1995).  Following trial, the court made an unprompted legal decision that the CFA did not apply, despite the fact that the Defendants never raised the issue.  This Court remanded but the trial court next determined, again on its own, to disqualify [...]’s testimony, contrary to the transcript and again without Defendants raising the issue.  Consequently, it failed to make the required conclusions concerning *[...]*.  It would not matter if [...] was not “the plaintiff” because he was a competent witness who testified about his personal knowledge.
[brief] (emphasis added)  He’s trying to calm [...] down from being mad at him because of all the things he said about him in the statement and he’s also trying to let him know, “Hey, just chill out.  I am not going to make you go down for what I did” and by the way, when you get in that deliberation room because I am looking at right it now, look at his Miranda form and his printed name and look at the writing on this and [defense counsel] says Mr. [...] had enough time to mimic his writing there.  That’s -- that’s your decision.  You can certainly find that if you believe that to be the case.  (16T 77-4 to 77-14)  (emphasis added)  . . .  I would suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that not only are [...]’s fingerprints on those letters, which in and of itself are pretty damning, but the context of the letters and the way that the writing is written compared to his Miranda form also give them that authenticity and the reason why -- and [defense counsel] kept saying why wouldn’t he turn this over earlier?
[brief] In addition, as appears from the transcript, and the certification of [...], the appellants were not adversely affected in any way by the so-called statutory violations.  The record demonstrated to [...] that, when [...] was appointed, there were financial issues, and the diner was paying in cash, making it very difficult to operate the diner.  Of course, if the diner was operating at a profit, [...] would not have been appointed.  The appellants must recognize that [...] did have the power to take possession of the property and the corporation, and to institute and defend actions on behalf of the corporation, including sale, assignment, disposal, etc.  The receiver takes possession of property, and is held to a standard of ordinary care.
[brief] Additionally, and it should go without saying, that the unprovoked attack on another person resulting in significant bodily harm and/or death has – excepted only in extremely limited circumstances – always been illegal and well outside the bounds of reasonable conduct.  Assault (and death related thereto) has never, can never and must never be considered a “normal, foreseeable” use of public property, such as a basketball court located within an outdoor public common area on public housing premises.  The third-party who attacked [...] is strictly to blame, not the [...] who merely owned the property wherein this incident occurred.  Accordingly, even if the Court were to determine a “dangerous condition” of public property existed in this matter, illegally selling, purchasing and/or consuming alcohol on public property – and other criminal conduct – is not a “normal” nor a “reasonable” nor a “foreseeable” use of the public property (*i.e.*, an outdoor basketball court/common area) at issue.  This is especially true when both New Jersey and Hoboken specifically prohibits selling, purchasing and/or drinking alcoholic beverages on public grounds and parks, thereby making same illegal and punishable by law.
[brief] Smart, 253 N.J. at 172.  In Baker, police pulled the defendant over for motor vehicle infractions after observing his car “swerve several times out of the traffic lane and onto the shoulder of the roadway and then make an illegal U-turn. ”  478 N.J. Super. at 122.  While processing the defendant for an open traffic warrant, a police officer smelled burnt marijuana.  *Id.* at 122-23.  This Court held “that the finding of probable cause here, predicated on marijuana odor detected during a traffic stop, after a total of approximately eight minutes of interaction at defendant's driver-side window, arose in unforeseeable and spontaneous circumstances. ”  *Id.* at 129.  In *Courtney*, defendants did not “dispute probable cause to search arose spontaneously and unforeseeably during the traffic stop. ”  478 N.J. Super. at 96.  An officer pulled over the defendant for motor vehicle infractions after he “crossed over the solid, white line and” was “swerving within the right lane of travel. ”  478 N.J. Super. at 88.  Upon approaching the defendant’s car, the officer smelled alcohol and “saw a half-empty bottle of cognac on the passenger-side floor. ”  *Id.* at 88-89.  He ordered the driver to exit the vehicle and administered sobriety tests, which the driver failed.  *Id.* at 89.  Because the police conducted a routine traffic stop and developed probable cause that the vehicle contained an open container of alcohol through routine procedures to evaluate whether the driver was intoxicated, probable cause arose spontaneously and unforeseeably.  Finally, in *Rodriguez*, an officer pulled over a car with a broken headlight and air fresheners hanging from the rearview mirror.  459 N.J. Super. at 16.  Only after the stop did the officer detect the odor of marijuana and develop probable cause that there was contraband in the car.  *Id.* at 17.  Thus, the “unforeseeable and spontaneous” requirement was met.  *Id.* at 25.  In contrast, in *Smart*, the motor vehicle stop was conducted as part of a narcotics investigation that originated with a tip from a confidential informant and ended with a lengthy surveillance of [...].
[brief] ”  N.J. Model Civil Jury Charge 4.10C.  On this point, the jury charge explains:  For the parties to reach an agreement, they must have a meeting of the minds, both parties must understand what each is agreeing to do or not to do.  The contract cannot be based upon secret or hidden intention or understanding of one party.  Id. (emphasis added).  Here, the trial court simply granted Respondent [...]’s motion to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration without providing any statement of reasons and/or explanation other than that the Arbitration Agreement at issue was “clearly enforceable, and which was signed by the plaintiff on 1/4/22.
[directive] See Director. the prescribed by as manner form and the in made be shall Notification appeal. impact). and effectiveness  Law's Reform Bail of evaluation and study (ongoing 15 Section also or release on while crime new a with charged is thereafter defendant the that event the  In pretrial initial Section or 8 to pursuant release of revocation seeks prosecutor the and flees of the copy a provide shall prosecutor the 7, Section to pursuant charge new the on detention not is court that if motion even detention pretrial the denied had that court the to papers motions motion.  detention pretrial new or release of revocation the decide will that court the this of issuance upon immediately operational become shall Section amended
[directive] 12.  Have you or any relative or close personal friend ever brought a claim against a doctor, chiropractor, dentist, nurse or hospital for an injury allegedly caused by a doctor, dentist, nurse or hospital?  13.  Have you or any relative or close personal friend ever considered bringing a medical or dental negligence action but did not do so?  14.  Have you or any relative or close personal friend ever been involved with treatment which did not produce the desired outcome?  Standards for Jury Selection Promulgated by Directive #21-06 (December 11, 2006)
[brief] Superior Court of New Jersey  [...], * APPELLATE DIVISION  Plaintiff-Appellant, * DOCKET NO. [...] v. * DOCKET NO. BELOW: MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE * ON APPEAL FROM: TOWNSHIP OF MOUNT OLIVE, * SUPERIOR COURT OF NJ MOUNT OLIVE POLICE  * LAW DIV, MORRIS COUNTY DEPARTMENT, POLICE CHIEF  * [...] AND JOHN * DOES 1-5, Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT BY FINDING THAT THE MSRA PREVENTS THE POLICE UNIONS’ CLAIMS TO RECOVER UNPAID WAGES.  (Pa000017-18, 26-29)  The Trial Court incorrectly found that the vast powers of the MSRA allows Defendants to ignore all other laws and not pay promoted officers back wages.
[brief] [...] also argues that Section 17.1(b) of the PSA precludes Plaintiff from asserting any claims against [...] other than those for bad faith, gross negligence, or willful misconduct.  (See [...] Br., at 57-58).  [...] insists that this clause must be interpreted to preclude all of Plaintiff’s claims against [...].  (See id.).  However, in making this argument, [...] glosses over the fact that the Complaint did allege that [...] acted in bad faith and willfully when it deceived Plaintiff and aided and abetted [...] in its breach of contract.  Indeed, in numerous places throughout the Complaint, Plaintiff alleged various acts of bad faith and willful misconduct, including: that [...] acted to intentionally deceive Plaintiff; affirmatively engaged in deception in collaboration with [...]; intentionally advised Plaintiff it would keep Plaintiff apprised of the closing, while having no present intention to do so; breached its duties of good faith and fair dealing by working with [...] to frustrate Plaintiff’s ability to obtain the benefits of the bargain; and acted covertly and surreptitiously to facilitate the closing between [...] and the third-party seller, with knowledge that doing so constituted a breach of [...]’s and [...]’s obligations to Plaintiff.  (Pa3-21, Complaint, ¶¶ 45-51, 73-76, 82, and 86-89).  Accordingly, Section 17.1(b) of the PSA did not provide a valid basis for the dismissal of Plaintiff’s causes of action against [...], let alone with prejudice.