ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As the portion of the seawall referenced in Appellant’s appraisal is not located upon the Property, the trial court properly barred Appellant from seeking damages stemming therefrom in the form of loss of view, privacy or increased storm risk.  Appellant requests this Appellate Division greatly expand the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 214 N.J. 384 (2103).  Neither the Karan decision, nor any reported or unreported subsequent court decisions, have interpreted Karan as authorizing just compensation for damages from project activities on “the properties of others” or “to consider project impacts on the property of others” as argued by Appellant.  The trial court’s refusal to expand the Karan decision to include off-site alleged damages should be affirmed.
[brief] (Pa264).  In furtherance of Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Complaint, [...] analyzed the evidence that Plaintiff submitted reviewing it piece by piece.  (T54-18 to T57-16).  After the denial of the motions at issue on this appeal, Plaintiff did nothing further to pursue the supposed fraudulent concealment or spoliation claim including doing nothing to pursue that evidence at trial despite the fact that the witnesses Plaintiff claims had the “smoking gun,” were subpoenaed by Plaintiff, were made available to testify at trial, with [...] on call, [...] present in court every day of the trial and both [...] and [...] testifying live at trial.  (Da70 to Da81).  Plaintiff was not precluded from eliciting testimony from these witnesses.  Plaintiff also was not precluded from requesting the jury charge for spoliation of evidence be read to the jury.  Even this was not done.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I WITH REGARD TO THE ORDER ENTERED NOVEMBER 30, 2018, THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO ADD A CLAIM FOR FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT AND SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE
[brief] Although [...]’s defense counsel requested mitigating factors 7 (law-abiding for substantial period); 8 (conduct result of circumstances unlikely to reoccur); 9 (unlikely to reoffend because of defendant’s character); and 14 (youth), the court found only factor 14 and held that it was “substantially outweigh[ed]” by the aggravating factors.  (5T18-19 to 25; 90-24 to 91-3)  The court provided no explanation as to why it declined to find mitigating factors 7, 8, and 9.
[brief] A legislative act can only be overturned based on a “clear showing” that the ordinance was arbitrary or unreasonable.  See, e.g., 515 Assocs., 132 N.J. at 186 (citing Hudson Circle, 70 N.J. at 299); Quick Check, 83 N.J. at 447.  The requirements established by Malanga for an area-in-need designation cannot be grafted onto the LTTEL.
[brief] Plaintiffs rely extensively on paragraph 3 of defendant’s lease in support of their argument that defendant had a contractual obligation to have maintained the area where plaintiff fell.  It is set forth in full in the statement of facts, supra.  It clearly states that the tenant had an obligation to maintain “portions adjacent to the premises, such as sidewalks, driveways, lawns and shrubbery…” (Pa504, Pa869)  Plaintiffs mischaracterize the area as plaintiff fell as a “walkway. ”  (Pb11)  They take their quantum leap in logic one step further by equating “walkway” with “sidewalk. ”  (Pb11)  Relying on their experts’ reports, they then argue that plaintiff fell in a “walkway,” rather than the parking lot.  (Pb11)  They then misconstrue the word “premises” as used in the leases to mean the entire strip mall, rather than the portion of the mall demised to each tenant.  (Pb16-20)  Finally, they torture the meaning of the word “adjacent” in order to reach their desired result.  (Pb20-23)  A review of the contract provisions and the law under which this court should construe them clearly indicates that the trial court’s interpretation of the lease was correct.
[brief] (Pa52-53, Pa66-67.)  Additionally, there is no doubt that Plaintiff running against his former boss would cause tension within [...]’s office.  Plaintiff testified that he did not believe [...] cared for the City of Newark and he did not believe the Councilman was running his office properly.  (Pa49-50.)  Plaintiff even admitted that he would speak negatively about [...] to constituents when he was canvassing the West Ward for signatures for his petitions.  (Pa50.)  [...] was also concerned that Plaintiff had access to his personal and confidential information and what he could do with that information.  (Pa68.)  These factors not only jeopardized [...]’s ability to effectively serve his constituents, but when Plaintiff decided to run against [...] and told constituents that the Councilman was not a good representative of the West Ward, Plaintiff declared himself “a political enemy of his boss” and his termination was thus permitted as a matter of law.
[brief] This is an arm’s length transaction between two willing and unaffiliated entities.  The AIF does not control the individual subscriber’s decision.  This is key because such unilateral control is a fundamental trait of a related party transaction.  See SSAP No. 25, 4 (referring to common control, ownership or affiliation); Schering-Plough Corp. v. United States, 651 F. Supp.2d 291, 244-45 (D.N.J. 2001) (noting for tax purposes that parties are not acting at arm’s length where one had the ability to control the other); Altor, Inc. v. Sec. of Labor, 498 Fed. Appx. 145, 148-49 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that common operation, management and control refuted arm’s length transactions).
[brief] Insurance Contract Interpretation.  The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.  Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hudson E. Pain Mgmt. Osteopathic Med., 210 N.J. 597, 605 (2012).  In performing that interpretation, courts look first to the plain language of the contract.  Courts are guided by general principles: "coverage provisions are to be read broadly, exclusions are to be read narrowly, potential ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the insured, and the policy is to be read in a manner that fulfills the insured's reasonable expectations."  Selective Ins. Co., supra, 210 N.J. at 605.  The insurer bears the burden to establish that an exclusion applies.  Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 202 N.J. 432, 442 (2010).  Moreover, exclusions in insurance policies are enforceable only "if they are ‘specific, plain, clear, prominent, and not contrary to public policy. ’"  Flomerfelt, supra, 202 N.J. at 441 (quoting Princeton Ins. Co. v. Chunmuang, 151 N.J. 80, 95 (1997)) (emphasis supplied).  C.
[brief] Defendant was one of a small group of New Jersey State Police (“NJSP”) Troopers who had authority to perform maintenance, called calibration, on the approximately five hundred ninety-five instruments used by all police in New Jersey to test individuals suspected of driving while intoxicated, in the Alcohol and Drug Testing Unit (“ADTU”).  In early October 2015, another Trooper in ADTU accused defendant of performing three calibrations without using a type of thermometer required by law, because defendant’s thermometer had a dead battery.  Defendant did not perform further calibrations, and about two months later, a supervisor told defendant he should consider transferring out of ADTU.
[brief] The trial court correctly held that the No-Fault Law requires [...] to arbitrate its claims because the claims center on the eligibility to recover PIP benefits.  The No-Fault Law’s statutory arbitration provision states that “[a]ny dispute regarding the recovery of medical expense benefits or other benefits provided under personal injury protection coverage” that arises “out of the operation, ownership, maintenance or use of an automobile may be submitted to dispute resolution on the initiative of any party to the dispute” as provided by the statute.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a); see also N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1(a).  The same provision goes on to outline a non-exhaustive list of such disputes, including “the eligibility of the treatment or service for compensation” and “the eligibility of the provider performing the treatment or service to be compensated under the terms of the policy or under regulations promulgated by the commissioner, including whether the person is licensed or certified to perform such treatment. ”  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(c); see also N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.2 (defining “PIP dispute”).  The trial court got it exactly right when it rejected [...]’s attempt to circumvent the No-Fault Law’s arbitration mandate by re-labeling PIP disputes “fraudulent” IFPA and RICO violations that are supposedly not arbitrable.  Based on statutory history and interpretation, case law, and policy objectives, this Court should affirm.
[brief] The Court in Dimitrakopoulos, was dealing with a situation in which there had been a previous litigation between the attorney and the attorney’s former client and the legal malpractice claims were not asserted or disclosed.  The concerns which animated Olds exemption of claims of legal malpractice claims from the Entire Controversy Doctrine were not present in a law firm’s collection action against a former client.  A collection action brought by a law firm against its client, however, does not constitute such underlying litigation for purposes of the principle stated in Olds.
[brief] May 16, 2025  Via Ecourts  Appellate  [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex  P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Re: [...] v. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...]  Docket No. [...]  Civil Action: On appeal from fill (Docket No. [...])
[directive] 2.  No substantive motions remain to be filed; The indictment is in final form and no superseding indictment is 3. contemplated, based on information known to the State or that of should have been known through the exercise reasonable diligence; and 4.  The State's witnesses are generally available.  Judges can rely on good faith representations from the State and need c. of not inquire about each the above points.  In their discretion, judges can also "require appropriate assurances to d. of support a prosecutor's statement readiness."  State v. Mackroy- Davis, _ N.J. _ (quoting State D.F.W., 468 N.J. Super. 422, 443 v. (App. Div. 2021)).
[directive] Deconfliction  Automated of Designation 2. nation.  Desi for Criteria  A. of Superintendent consultation the with in Justice, Criminal of Division the of Director  The deconfliction automated or more one shall designate Prosecutors, County the State and Police of: capable systems is/are that with accordance in made agencies enforcement law from queries deconfliction receiving 1) basis; 24/7 a on Directive this participating agencies, by system the to provided information on based determining, 2) entity, business person, group, same the investigating are agencies more or two whether operations conduct planning are to agencies more or two whether or location, or premises, "conflict alert"); (i.e., other each a to proximity close in and same time occur will the at that match; conflict in negative query a results when the making query the agency notifying the 3) any notifying immediately and automatically and query, the making agency notifying the 4) alert; conflict a of event the in agencies, or agency interested other to agencies from notified the representatives allow to information contact 24/7 providing 5) and procedures the with accordance in conflicts resolve other to each with communicate 6 Page Directive; in this established policies participating by system to the provided information of confidentiality strict maintaining 6) administer to assigned staff the agencies, nor those neither so that agencies enforcement law system, or to the supplied information access can system, deconfliction automated the notification receiving by except agency, another undertaken by operations of learn otherwise with this accordance in query made deconfliction fide bona to a response in alert conflict a of Directive; and Directive.
[brief] Furthermore, while a party may choose his counsel, no party may demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified due to an ethical requirement, as the Rules of Professional Conduct exist not only to protect the parties, but to preserve the integrity of the litigation and the justice system.  See Dewey, 109 N.J. at 218.  Thus, [...]’s certification and alleged consent to the joint representation cannot override the Rules of Professional Conduct.
[brief] Under the applicable version of the Act, the Board must consider twenty-four factors, and “any other factors deemed relevant. ”  N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11.  Despite having these twenty-four enumerated factors, the Board often denies parole in reliance on non-Code factors, commonly: (a) lack of insight and/or remorse; (b) insufficient problem resolution; and (c) incarceration on multiple offenses.  See, e.g., Acoli v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 462 N.J. Super. 39 (App. Div. 2019), on remand from 224 N.J. 213 (2016); see also McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544 (App. Div. 2002).  Critically, under the Act, inmates are entitled to a presumption of release unless the Board establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the inmate presents a “substantial likelihood of reoffense” if released.  Acoli, 250 N.J. at 456 (“The language of the . . . Act ‘creates a protected expectation of parole in inmates who are eligible for parole. ’” (quoting N.J. State Parole Bd. v. Byrne, 93 N.J. 192, 206 (1983))); See also N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a); Byrne, 93 N.J. at 205.  Thus, under the Act, [...] was entitled to a presumption of release, unless the Board could establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is a “substantial likelihood that [[...]] will commit another crime if released on parole.
[brief] As noted above, the issue before the Court in Lott was whether to issue a corrective deed in light of an incorrect metes and bounds description in a deed from the [...] to the plaintiffs.  Despite an incorrect description in the deed, the plaintiffs maintained the property for over a decade and utilized it as a side yard.  Notwithstanding, the borough had sold the property to a third-party developer years later.  Plaintiffs brought an action to quiet title, which the defendants challenged by arguing application of the statute of limitations.
[brief] Trautner, 2024 WL 1708605 at *10.  Plaintiffs “proffered no facts” to support their claims, ibid., and had “no information of” [...]’s participation in the alleged wrongdoing, Quivers, 2002 WL 31432737 at *3.  Nevertheless, they took a “shot in the dark” by filing a “bare bones” complaint against [...].  Ibid.  Plaintiffs “may have anticipated prevailing against” [...] “depending on what discovery disclosed,” but “there was no reasonable basis in fact or law for this reliance. ”  Ibid.  Nor was there any “honest, creative advocacy in” support of Plaintiffs’ claims.  Trautner, 2024 WL 1708605 at *10.  Under these circumstances, as in Trautner and Quivers, the trial court appropriately sanctioned Plaintiffs for pursuing frivolous claims.  * * * *  Plaintiffs raise a series of objections concerning the trial court’s sanctions award.
[brief] Accordingly, no error was found in a trial judge’s decision to permit the State to use a 16-year-old murder conviction in a defendant’s robbery trial.  State v. Paige, 256 N.J. Super. 362, 371-373 (App. Div.), certif. den. 130 N.J. 17 (1992).  Similarly, the introduction of a ten-year-old murder conviction in a defendant’s trial for escape has been found proper and not remote.  State v. Morris, 242 N.J. Super. 532, 543-545 (App. Div. 1990).  Intervening crimes between a remote offense and the present one may “bridge the gap” of remoteness and renew the relevance of older crimes.  *State v. Harris*, 209 N.J. 431, 444-445 (2012); *See also, Morris*, 242 N.J. Super. at 543-545.  To impeach the credibility of a testifying defendant, the State may introduce into evidence only the number, degree, and date of the defendant's prior similar convictions.
[brief] *Id.* at *12-13.  Additionally, the Appellate Division in *Omar* affirmed the trial court’s ruling that *[...]* was equitably estopped from enforcing its mortgage lien because it was the “party who ‘made the injury possible or could have prevented it. ’”  *Id.* at 14-15 (quoting *First Union Nat’l Bank v. Nelkin*, 354 N.J. Super. 557, 568 (App. Div. 2002)).  This Court further observed that “[e]quitabile estoppel does not require evidence of fraudulent intent; the doctrine applies if the conduct “works an unjust or inequitable result to the person it was designed to influence” (quoting *Hendry v. Hendry*, 339 N.J. Super. 326, 336 (App. Div. 2001), and that “[A]s between two innocent parties[,] equity will visit the loss upon the one whose acts the injury first could have been avoided.
[brief] Tenant’s refusal to accept these ruling does not render them deficient under Rule 1:7-4(a). \(^{11}\) \(^{11}\)  Tenant’s repeated contention that [...] held that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to decide whether Tenant was entitled to the Tenant Allowance payments under Section 4.02 of the Lease is specious.  (Db22-24).  [...] expressly held Tenant was not entitled to these reimbursement payments because it was admittedly in monetary default under the Lease when the payments came due.  (Da1-3; 2T4-7 to 2T4-13, 2T6-18 to 2T7-2, 2T9-5 to 2T9-18; 3T15-2 to 3T15-25, 3T16-24 to 3T17-4).
[brief] 1.  Where mottling showing redoximorphic features is observed at any season of the year, the SHWT shall be taken as the highest level at which the mottling is observed, except when the water table is observed at a level higher than the level of the redoximorphic depletions or concentrations.  For details on determining whether saturated soils are present, the guidance document published by NRCS, “Field Indicators of Hydric Soils in the United States” may be used.  2.  Where mottling showing redoximorphic features is not observed, the SHWT shall be determined based upon either of the following methods, depending on the time of the year during which the testing is performed:  a.  During the months of January through April, inclusive, water levels may be measured directly within soil profile pits or borings.  Whenever the Department determines that there has been a significant departure from normal climatic conditions, the Department may, with due notice to the administrative authority, lengthen or shorten the period allowed for direct measurement during any given year.  In low lying coastal areas where groundwater levels fluctuate with the tides, measurements shall be taken at the time of highest groundwater elevation in response to tidal fluctuation or b.  During other times of the year, the depth to the SHWT may be obtained from the NRCS Web Soil Survey provided that the soil series present at the site is identified based upon comparison of soil profile morphology observed within a soil profile pit and the soil profile description provided for the soil series in question within the NRCS Web Soil Survey.  In cases where SHWT is shown as a range of elevations in the NRCS Web Soil Survey, the highest elevation of the range shall be used as the SHWT.  [(emphasis added) BMP Manual, Chapter 12, Page 11-12].  In any situation, the seasonal high water table is to be taken at the highest level for each basin.
[brief] [Therefore any] act or any ordinance or regulation made under authority thereof, shall not apply to a development proposed by a public utility for installation … if upon a petition of the public utility, the Board of Public Utilities … decide[s] the proposed installation of the development in question is **reasonably necessary** for the service, convenience or welfare of the public.  (Emphasis added).  Additionally, the New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted N.J.S.A. 40:55-50, the statutory predecessor to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19,\(^2\) finding:  The particular site or location must be found to be ‘reasonably necessary’… [and a]lternative sites and their comparative advantages and disadvantages, **including cost**, must be considered in determining reasonable necessity. ”  *In re Public Service Electric & Gas Co.*, 35 N.J. 358, 377 (1961) (emphasis added).
[brief] Defendant fails to establish that the State did not disclose exculpatory evidence or otherwise destroyed evidence in bad faith.  Though defendant argues that the State should have conducted more thorough tests of certain portions of the crime scene, such as potential footprints or hairs, he fails to establish that the evidence purportedly available at the crime scene was apparently exculpatory or that the State acted in bad faith to destroy it.  (See Pb11 to 12).  The sole assertion that potentially exculpatory evidence may have existed is insufficient to establish that defendant’s right to due process was violated.  Finally, defendant cannot establish that the [...] acted in bad faith to destroy or otherwise obstruct the investigation.  Defendant’s reliance on Arizona v. Youngblood is misplaced.  (Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988); Pb15).  In Youngblood, the United States Supreme Court held that “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law. ”  (Id. at 58).  Defendant provides only self-serving arguments that [...] Officers did not fully investigate the scene of the underlying crime and that [...] intentionally obstructed the investigation.  (see Pb11 to 14; contra 3T:10-21 to 22-24 and 4T:17-2 to 22-18).  Here, as in Youngblood, the State disclosed all evidence to defendant and defense counsel, including the inconclusive DNA test and the lack of tests conducted on the shell casings.  (Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58 (1988); 4T:84-3 to 86-1).  The record contains no evidence supporting defendant’s blanket assertion of bad faith on the part of [...] Officers; further, defense counsel raised the issue of the State’s alleged poor investigation to the jury, who ultimately returned a guilty verdict after considering defendant’s argument in light of the evidence presented.  (5T:75-1 to 14; See Da46).  For the foregoing reasons, defendant cannot demonstrate that he did not receive a fair trial and his convictions should be affirmed.
[brief] The trial court used those cases to reason that defendant had a diminished privacy expectation in the driveway and the front porch of [the residence].  To the extent that *Johnson*, *Ford* or *Wilson* can be read to support an argument concerning diminished privacy expectations, those portions of the cases can no longer be applied under governing Fourth Amendment law.  New Jersey courts are bound to follow United States Supreme Court decisions establishing constitutional protections afforded under the Fourth Amendment.
[brief] However, since the commencement of this action on April 8, 2019, numerous parties have ceased to exist or to hold the public offices set forth in plaintiff’s hybrid complaint.  In addition, for purposes of this Brief, 1T refers to the April 27, 2023 Motion Hearing Transcript.  Plaintiff is an aggrieved Essex County taxpaying resident.  Plaintiff does not reside or own real property in the City of Newark.  Plaintiff is also an attorney authorized to practice law in the State of New Jersey.  As such, plaintiff was and remains an officer of the court and a “public citizen” with an overriding professional obligation to defend our constitutional form of pluralistic representative democracy.  Plaintiff advocates enhanced local transparency, accountability and adherence to the rule of law.  Plaintiff (whose former family owned businesses were actively involved in supplying affordable housing projects located in financially distressed urban areas) discovered and questioned whether certain post April 17, 1992 low income affordable housing project long term tax exemption financial agreements complied with State law and whether he, his family owned businesses and other local unsophisticated taxpayers were being fleeced by developers with the “willful blindness” assent of State, County and Local Governments.