ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Once again, Plaintiff/Appellant is simply attempting to expand the record below by introducing new evidence and making legal arguments not made prior to or at the time of the Trial.  Again, should Appellant/Plaintiff believed that their case was one that was so obviously in their favor, a Motion for Summary Judgment would have been the proper avenue.  The Plaintiff/Appellant put the Judge in the position of not having any of the information or case law they rely on when filing the brief.  In this matter, the Appellant/Plaintiff never even sought permission to expand the record on appeal, but rather included a number of exhibits in their appendix which were not a part of the record.  The instant court should not consider these materials.  *New Jersey DYFS v. M.M.*, 189 N.J. 261, 278 (2007); *State v. Sidoti*, 120 N.J. Super. 208, 211 (App. Div. 1972).  Although an Appellate Court may consider allegations of error not brought to the trial judge's attention, it frequently declines to consider issues that were not presented at trial.  Generally, unless such an issue goes to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concerns matters of substantial public interest, the appellate court will not consider it.  *State v. Robinson*, 200 N.J. 1, 20-22 (2009).  *State v. Arthur*, 184 N.J. 307, 327 (2005); *Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co.*, 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973).  In the instant matter, none of the issues raised in the Appellant’s Brief were addressed at Trial.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  The [...] is a Civil Service jurisdiction.  At all times relevant, Appellant was, and remains, a member of the [...].  In July 2022, the City promoted five HFD members to the rank of captain from the [...], ("[...]"), eligibles list, Symbol PM1039V.  By letter to the [...], the [...] advised that this list of eligibles expired January 16, 2023.  Id.  As per the City, as well as Hoboken Fire Officers President [...], when the July 2022 promotions were made, there were no “genuine vacancies” as later defined by the [...] as there were no retirements to create such vacancies.  (The City advised the [...]: “The City requested PL221817 following our normal practice to fill the expected retirements in a timely manner unaware of the genuine vacancy issue..”)  The City further admitted to the [...] that the July 2022 promotions were made even though genuine vacancies did not exist for the positions until September and October, 2022, upon the retirements of Captain [...], effective October 1, 2022, and Captain [...], effective September 1, 2022.  ---
[brief] ”  In making the determination that the route through [...] was essential, the court below lost sight of the undisputed fact that [...] only determined that the addition of a third connection was required to furnish safe and adequate utility service and that neither [...] nor the [...] (“[...]”) made any determinations or gave approval to any particular route for that connection, let alone a route that [...] later selected to run through [...].  In short, the court conflated the need for a third connection with the route that the connection would take, and therein lies the court’s error, referring to both as “the Project” throughout its decision.
[brief] *Ibid.*  The reviewing court must be careful not to substitute its “judgment of the facts for that of an administrative agency. ”  *Campbell v. New Jersey Racing Comm'n*, 169 N.J. 579, 587 (2001).  Further, the reviewing court “grant[s] considerable deference to the agency's expertise, where such expertise is a relevant factor. ”  *Matter of Petition of S. Jersey Gas Co.*, 447 N.J. Super. 459, 480 (App. Div. 2016).  Here, the record clearly supports the Commissioner’s determination that [...] violated the Act and, therefore, the decision was neither arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  The material facts are straightforward and not in dispute.
[brief] (Pa14)  [...] emphasizes that Plaintiffs’ “attempt to introduce factual claims and materials that were never raised . . . prior to the January 2024 Consent Order. ”  (Db12)  This is absolutely true, completely irrelevant, and entirely misleading.  This is an appeal of the Court Order dated May 24, 2024 and all of the facts in this record were presented to the trial court in Plaintiffs’ motion that was denied.  (Pa164)  [...] does not present any facts.
[brief] “[T]o qualify as newly discovered evidence entitling a party to a new trial, the new evidence must be (1) material to the issue and not merely cumulative or impeaching or contradictory; (2) discovered since the trial and not discoverable by reasonable diligence beforehand; and (3) of the sort that would probably change the jury's verdict if a new trial were granted. ”  State v. Fortin, 464 N.J. Super. 193, 216 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting State v. Carter, 85 N.J. 300, 314 (1981)).  “All three [prongs of the] test[ ] must be met before the evidence can be said to justify a new trial. ”  Id.  “The defendant has the burden to establish each prong is met. ”  Fortin, at 216 (quoting State v. Smith, 29 N.J. 561, 573 (1959)).  A.  ALLEGED EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY GUILT
[brief] ”  Jerista, supra, 185 N.J. at 202 (quoting Rosenblit, supra, 166 N.J. at 401).  As the Court explained in Rosenblit, “[t]he best known civil remedy that has been developed is the so-called spoliation inference that comes into play where a litigant is made aware of the destruction or concealment of evidence during the underlying litigation. ”  166 N.J. at 401.  Courts utilize the spoliation inference during the underlying litigation to even the playing field when evidence has otherwise been concealed or destroyed.  *Id.*  Therefore, a “spoliation inference may be utilized to address the intentional or negligent spoliation of evidence by a party to the suit. ”  *27-35 Jackson Ave., LLC v. Samsung Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd.*, 469 N.J. Super. 200, 210 (App. Div. 2021).  The inference essentially permits a jury in the underlying case to presume that the evidence that the spoliator destroyed or concealed would have been unfavorable to the spoliator.  *Rosenblit*, 166 N.J. at 401-02.  The trial court erred in its determination that [...] did not have a duty to preserve the surveillance footage surrounding Plaintiff’s incident, and in turn by not granting Plaintiffs an adverse inference charge (2T.14:17-15:4; 20:19-21:13), despite [...]’s inactions in failing to preserve surveillance footage notwithstanding the fact that [...] had been put on notice of a potential claim by Plaintiffs.  Therefore, Plaintiffs are entitled to an adverse inference jury charge and a rebuttable presumption that the missing evidence would be unfavorable to [...]; that is, had [...] maintained the surveillance videos, such footage would have shown the failure on the part of [...] employees to remediate the dangerous condition posed by [...]’s overloaded U-boat.  Such an instruction was granted in *Nagy*, supra, whereby the Court determined that “the jury may be instructed that Outback intentionally failed to preserve the disputed video evidence and that the jury may presume that the lost video footage was unfavorable to Outback. ”  2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29288, at *19.  POINT III
[directive] Do you understand that if the court determines that you are drug dependent and also finds that you meet the criteria in 2C:35-14, you may be eligible to be sentenced to a mandatory period of N.J.S.A. special probation for the purpose of participating in a court-supervised drug treatment program (“Drug Court”)?  This criteria includes, but is not limited to, a finding that: (1) you are a drug or alcohol dependent person, and (2) that you were drug or alcohol dependent at the time of the commission of the present offense, and (3) that you did not possess a firearm at the time of the present offense or any pending charge, and (4) that you do not have certain prior disqualifying convictions, and (5) there is suitable treatment available for you, and (6) no danger to the community will result from your serving a “Drug Court” sentence.  Formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11728-Polish strona 1 z 2 Form Promulgated by Directive # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11728-Polish page 1 of 2
[brief] Pa154.  Lane Departure Warning uses audible “beeps” and visual alerts to warn the driver when the system determines that the vehicle is getting too close to detect right or left lane markings, without a turn signal.  Pa159-60.  The system, as designed by Defendant [...], activates when the vehicle is traveling between 45 and 90 m.p.h., on a road that is straight or slightly curved, with turn signals off, a non-depressed brake pedal, and wipers that are not in continuous operation.  Pa160.  If the warning system detects the vehicle getting too close to the lane markings, the system will beep and flash a warning on the driver’s console.  Ibid.  The purpose of the Lane Departure Warning system is to warn the driver into taking corrective action.  Pa145; Pa159.  Defendant [...]’s Lane Keep Assist System is similar to LDW in that it provides audio and visual warnings if the vehicle is detected drifting out of its lane.  Pa163.  In addition to the warnings, the system applies steering torque to return the car back to the middle of its lane.  Ibid.  The applied torque becomes stronger as the vehicle gets closer to either of the lane lines.  Ibid.  The LKAS activates under the same conditions as the LDW with the added requirement that the lane markers are detectable on both sides and the vehicle is in the middle of the lane.  Pa161-62; Pa169-70.  On the morning of August 4, 2018, all conditions for the LDW and LKAS systems to activate were satisfied.  Pa149; Pa161-62; Pa169-70; Pa429-30.  None of the environmental, roadway, or vehicle conditions that might limit the effectiveness of the systems were factors in the crash.  Pa149.  Plaintiff retained expert [...] to test the performance of the [...] warning and safety systems available in 2016 under conditions resembling those of the subject crash.
[brief] .................................................................27  Gibson v. Callaghan, 158 N.J. 662 (1999) ...........................................................................22  Harleysville Ins. Cos. v. Garitta, 170 N.J. 223 (2001) .............................................................................22, 25, 26, 27, 28  Jones v. Intelli-Check, Inc., 274 F. Supp.2d 615 (D.N.J. 2003) ......................................................16  Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co., 121 N.J. 530 (1990) .............................................................................27  Malanga v. Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co., 28 N.J. 220 (1958) ...............................................................................24  Merrimack Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Coppola, 299 N.J. Super. 219 (App. Div. 1997) ..................................................24, 25 Myska v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 440 N.J. Super. 458 (App. Div. 2015), app. dsmd. as improvidently granted, 224 N.J. 523 (2016)
[brief] (Aa11-12).  [...] sought reconsideration, which the Commission denied on January 17, 2024.  (Aa13-18; Aa46-49).  In finding that [...] did not meet the standard for reconsideration, the Commission reiterated that [...]’s account of the incident was consistent, credible, and supported by video and text evidence; in contrast, [...]’s account was “even more questionable” on reconsideration than it was in his previous submissions.  (Aa16).  In his reconsideration motion, [...] provided a different account for why he was at the [...] building on the morning of the incident: to confront [...] over the alleged scheme to obtain false signatures.  Ibid.  Beyond noting that [...] provided no support whatsoever for D.[a].B.’s alleged scheme to obtain signatures under false pretenses, the Commission reasoned that if [...] truly went there to confront her about such a scheme, it was unlikely that he would have started their conversation by congratulating [...] on her transition.  Ibid.  But, even if [...]’s explanation was true, it would not necessarily excuse [...]’s violation of the State Policy; [...]’s reason for being outside the [...] building that day was not “fully dispositive as to his misnaming” of [...] but rather, it would have only served to bolster [...]’s credibility.  (Aa16-17).  While [...] contended that [...] did not ask him for witness statements to support his claim, nothing precluded him from offering such statements to [...] during its investigation; the Commission rejected his claims that providing “self-gathered” witnessed statements would have violated the State Policy’s confidentiality provision.  (Aa17).  In short, [...] forfeited his opportunities to provide supporting evidence.  Lastly, the Commission found unpersuasive [...]’s reliance on *In re F.P., Department of Corrections*, No. A-1368-13T4, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub.  LEXIS 1375 (App. Div. June 10, 2015), which involved major discipline consisting of a suspension without pay for forty working days, demotion, reassignment, and mandatory training.  (Aa17).  First, the Commission noted that its decisions in non-discipline cases can be determined on the written record.  *Ibid.*  As [...]’s case involved no disciplinary action, the Commission concluded that unlike the *F.P.* case, no heightened due process concerns requiring a hearing existed here.  *Ibid.*  Thus, because [...]’s “mere denials” were insufficient to find that there was material fact in dispute requiring a hearing, the Commission denied his request for reconsideration.  (Aa16-17).  This appeal followed.
[brief] Kindly accept this Reply Letter-Brief on behalf of respondent-appellant pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b).  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................2  POINT I THE JUDGE OF COMPENSATION SHOULD HAVE GRANTED  RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR RECUSAL TO AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF BIAS.  (1T12-22 to 1T22-17, Ra66)  ...............................................................................................2  CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................6
[brief] ”  (Da0337)  [...] received and reviewed the following materials: [...]’s medical records from [...], [...], and [...], deposition transcripts of [...], [...], [...] and [...]’s, [...] (formerly [...]), [...]’s Benefit Risk Assessment for Ozurdex, [...]’s Field Alerts for Ozurdex, [...]’s recalls for Ozurdex worldwide, and the December 28, 2018 Urgent Drug Recall for Ozurdex in the United States.  (Da0337)
[brief] Seawall Construction  Boulder Vibrations  The [...] house is well over 100 years old.  (Da107, ¶3)  It was in close proximity to the project's delivery dumping and then placement of innumerable boulders each weighing several tons over a period of approximately six months including within the easement area.  (Da312, 317, 333)  A large boulder can weigh more than seven tons.  (Da317; 137)  The project itself recognized the reasonable risk of and anticipated possible structural damages from the boulder vibrations.  The project included monitoring of the vibrations during the seawall construction.  (Da333-334)  The project included placing a seismograph at the owner’s seawall at the rear east façade of the house.  (Da197; 315)  The project vibrations monitoring used the high threshold standards of the United States Bureau of Mines (U.S.M.B) for blasting, rather than lower threshold standards which have been recognized as more appropriate for construction projects.  (Da315-316)  Nonetheless, the monitoring thresholds used were exceeded, and the project actually damaged the [...] house, the risk of which the project itself had recognized.  (Da315-317; 333-334)
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  Plus, there was “[n]othing provided by [[...] that] indicates that this work has yet begun. ”  *Ibid.*  Third, there is “litigation between [[...]] and [...] Natural Sand regarding compliance with various terms of the lease,” which remains pending\(^9\), suggesting that [...] “does not currently have control over the site or a finalized plan for project configuration”; the project is “inherently speculative” considering [...] did not demonstrate site control or provide a finalized plan for project configuration when [...] filed its petition in February 2021.
[brief] And I was quite taken aback because I didn’t notify [...] of my EEOC complaint.  The only person I advised of that was [...] and that was only like a few days before that (1T; 26:21 to 27:13).  And his response was, was that we feel you can’t work with certain people.  And my response was, I’ve been in law enforcement 29 years, I work security, I can work with anybody.  And I told him that I was cognizant of the fact why they hired her and I was, you know, I wasn’t happy but that I was over it.  In response to a question as to who the people were, Plaintiff testified: “No, but he mentioned immediately a female. ”  He did -- he did compliment me saying, Chris said I did a good job and he would hope that I would continue to stay on and do a good job.  And I said, I probably -- I don’t remember my response to him, but I don’t remember exactly what I said.  I said, okay, thank you, have a good day (1T; 91:4).
[directive] Officers who are witnesses must cooperate.  They must truthfully answer all questions narrowly and directly related to performing their duty.  "Performance of duty" includes an officer's actions, observations, knowledge and any other factual information of which they may be aware, whether it concerns their own performance of duty or that of other officers.  If the officer feels their answer would incriminate him or her in a criminal matter, the officer must assert their Miranda rights.  8.4  When the Investigation is Administrative and the Officer Is a Subject 8.4.1
[brief] A.  Plaintiff’s Breach of Contract Claims Fails Since It Did Not Obtain Title and Failed to Satisfy the Condition Precedent Necessary For the Title Insurance Commitment To Become A Valid, Enforceable Contract (39a-40a) (this aspect of the summary judgment motion was not decided below).  The Trial Court correctly found that no contract had been formed between Plaintiff and [...] because the condition precedent to form a contract for the Commitment for Title Insurance was not satisfied since Plaintiff’s contract for sale of the subject property was illegal and invalid under New Jersey’s Tax Sale Law.
[brief] Based on the foregoing, [...] must be reinstated to her former position.  Respectfully Submitted, [...]  Dated: August 27, 2024  [...], Esquire  August 5, 2024  VIA ECOURTS  [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division, Hughes Justice Complex  25 Market Street P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0006  Re: In the Matter of [...], [...]  Docket No. [...] Team 02
[brief] At the plenary hearing on January 4, 2024, the court heard testimony from plaintiff’s former attorney, [...], and plaintiff herself.  (1T:11-39).  Ms. Cannaday testified that on October 25, 2023, despite her recommendations to settle the matter globally, plaintiff called her and instructed her to accept the settlement of $100,000.00 from defendant [...], as that was her insurance policy limits, and to proceed to trial against codefendants (1T:22-23, 26).  Ms. Cannaday then drafted a letter and subsequently sent to plaintiff confirming her instructions to settle separately with defendant [...].  (1T:22, 28; DCa10²-DCa12).  Due to a breakdown of the attorney-client relationship thereafter, Ms. Cannaday filed a motion to be relieved as counsel.  (1T:22; Pa75-Pa78).  Plaintiff testified that she did not respond to Ms. Cannaday’s October 26 letter indicating that Ms. Cannaday did not have authority to settle the case.  (1T:28).  She further testified that Ms. Cannaday told her that plaintiff was --- ² DCa = Defendant/respondent’s confidential appendix.  All redactions in the confidential appendix are in the original documents submitted to the trial court and not subsequently added.  making a mistake in her decision to settle with defendant [...] only.  (1T:30).  She furthermore gave Ms. Cannaday permission to discuss placing the settlement proceeds in a special needs trust with specialized counsel.  (1T:33).  At the conclusion of the plenary hearing, the trial court determined that a settlement agreement had been reached between defendant [...] and plaintiff.  (1T:44-55).  He found Ms. Cannaday’s testimony more credible that she had been instructed to settle the case with defendant [...] by plaintiff.  (1T:47).  ARGUMENT I.
[directive] Number: Petition for Compassionate Release  Defendant  The Defendant , hereby petitions the Court for compassionate release pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e (“Compassionate Release for Certain Inmates”).  The defendant was convicted of (insert name of offense and statute) and sentenced to (insert term of sentence) on (insert date) , and is serving the sentence at (name of institution) .  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(d)(2), the Department of Corrections has issued the defendant a Certificate of Eligibility for Compassionate Release.  The Certificate of Eligibility is attached to this petition.  Accordingly, the Court is asked to grant the Petition for Compassionate Release.
[brief] In closing, the State told jurors that [...] “was feeding the 19-year-old [...] what she believed to be heroin, which is a schedule two narcotic, pure fentanyl.  . . .  Jasmine was smoking this thinking she was smoking heroin. ”  (5T 49-17 to 25.)  The State urged jurors to “apply [their] common sense” regarding the quantity of drugs found, the cash, and other items such as the digital scale.
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[brief] In the Respondent brief, [...] largely admits to the facts; and with the few exceptions noted herein, the facts that he has now admitted to are undisputed.  Likewise, for most of my arguments, [...] offers no refutation attempt at all.  And for the few of my arguments that he does try to refute, he mainly points to distinctions that are completely immaterial as to the applicability of the authorities that I have cited.  Procedural History