ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Trial Court Properly Exercised its Discretion by Applying the 2% Enhancement to the Interest Rate.  As is the case with every other aspect of the court’s calculation of interest, “the rate at which prejudgment interest is calculated is within the discretion of the court. ”  Litton Indus., 200 N.J. at 390.  Generally, absent unusual circumstances, New Jersey courts do not abuse their discretion by awarding prejudgment interest in contract actions by using the rate applicable to tort actions, and many courts adhere to that measure absent unusual circumstances.  See, e.g., Litton Indus., 200 N.J. at 390-91.  Pursuant to R. 4:42-11(a)(i), the annual rate of interest applicable to this case would be the average rate of return, to the nearest whole or one-half percent, of the State of New Jersey Cash Management Fund.  N.J. Ct. R. 4:42-11(a)(i).  Rule 4:42-11(a)(iii) permits the trial court to apply a two percent enhancement to the rate stated in (a)(i), in its equitable discretion.
[brief] concerns regarding loading and unloading of cannabis product and cash from the public right-of-way along [...], over 200 feet away, around the corner and with no direct line of sight to the subject property.  (T1/120:11-121:6; 165:19-21).  In response, Appellant’s security expert conceded that the security plan for utilization of this remote loading and unloading within the public right-of-way were “not fully defined. ” (T1/121:7-8).
[brief] Otherwise, it would have seen that the [...] WQMP clearly consisted of the Wastewater Management Plan adopted by [...], which sets forth the designated SSAs.  Second, Appellant glosses over the fact that the Project was reviewed as a “major development” under the Stormwater Management Rules.  In complying with the Flood Hazard Rules, [...] was required to prepare a stormwater management plan to address the detailed requirements of the Stormwater Management Rules, which was submitted with the Application.\textsuperscript{12}  Aa070.  As a result, [...] submitted an Overall Stormwater Management Report as part of the Application, which details the effectiveness of all the methods and infrastructure designed to manage stormwater, including, as mentioned above, the increased requirements of the [...] to treat TSS.  Aa070, Aa089-090.  As a result of this exhaustive analysis, the [...] determined that the Project meets the requirements of the Stormwater Management Rules.
[brief] See O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 179-80 (1983) (“The necessity of proving a defect in the product as part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case distinguishes strict from absolute liability, and thus prevents the manufacturer from also becoming the insurer of a product. ”).  Here, the trial court allowed plaintiff to survive summary judgment merely based on the facts that (1) a recall occurred, and (2) plaintiff experienced known risks that could have occurred without any product issue or recall.
[brief] 4T20-2 to 14.  [...] testified that he had contact with [...] of [...] (who passed away) and then [...].  8T22-12 to 24-5.  [...], [...]’s LSRP, recalled that [...] was retained by the [...] brothers in May 2018, and that RT was on property taking samples as early as 2018.  4T33-25 to 34-4.  Plaintiff offered to hire [...] to do the Maecitite—a specialized remedial extraction process that has few other experts in New Jersey who have experience in using it.  8T20-6 to 10.  Both parties had ongoing and detailed discussions of both parties’ intentions for nearly eighteen (18) months prior to the signing of the PSA.
[brief] [Pa68].  However, Plaintiff could not locate or in any way identify the alleged pothole which purportedly caused her fall.  [Pa68].  Plaintiff was similarly unable to recall the dimensions, depth, or otherwise describe what Plaintiff initially claimed was a pothole.  [Pa69].  Plaintiff failed to describe the pothole which she alleges caused her fall.  [Pa69].  Ultimately, Plaintiff admitted there was no pothole but in fact cracks in the pavement.  [Pa69].  Plaintiff subsequently contradicted herself regarding the existence of a pothole.  [Pa69].  Similarly, [...], the officer who responded to Plaintiff’s fall, stated in his Investigation Report that he observed no pothole in the subject lot.  [Pa69].  [...], the Township’s Director of Public Works, found no safety hazard existed at the Subject Property at the time of the incident.  [Pa69].  The Township did not have actual or constructive notice of any alleged condition on the Subject Property at any time prior to the alleged incident.
[brief] Ante at 21.  Nor is the recording date dispositive.  Pro Cap II, L.L.C. v. Block 682, Lot 49, 2018 N.J.Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1347 (App.Div. 2018) ("That Pro Cap was required to perfect its estate in fee simple by recording that judgment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:5-104.65 does not alter the effect of the judgment as to [...].").
[brief] ”  Pa321 at para. 28.  The Underlying [...] Action included no claims premised on alleged “negligence” and the term “negligent” does not appear anywhere in the Complaint.  The Underlying Complaint went on to allege that [...] and others “breached their fiduciary duties by self-dealing, engaging the [Association] in transactions in which they have conflicts of interest, and otherwise violating their duties of good faith, care, and loyalty to Plaintiffs and the [Association.]”.
[directive] All whether specify shall prosecutor the detention, pretrial for motion a files prosecutor  When the (2) required; when in court appear not will defendant (1) risk that the on based application is the will defendant (3) community; the or person other any of safety the endanger will defendant or intimidate, or threaten, injure, or process, justice criminal the obstruct to attempt or obstruct combination any juror; (4) or or witness prospective a intimidate, or injure, threaten, to attempt risks.22 specified foregoing the of Circumstances. and Facts Relevant 7.6 Rule.  General 7.6.1  Section in established this presumption a overcome or sustain to whether determining In on bearing material a has that circumstance or fact any consider may prosecutor the 8, Section or the endanger will required, when court in appear will not released, if defendant, that risk the the obstruct attempt or to obstruct will and/or community, the or person other any of safety or threaten, injure, to attempt or intimidate, or injure, threaten, or process, justice criminal broad of provides list a Reform Law Bail
[brief] 1.  Medium Density Residential – Residential Health Care Facility Option.  The property at [...], identified by municipal tax records as [...], shall be designated for a new land use category entitled “Medium Density Residential – Residential Health Care Facility Option. ”  This replaces the property’s previous land use plan designation of Medium Density Residential, which corresponds to the R-27A Residential Zone District.  Da78.  This new zone permits residential health care facilities use of up to 65 bedrooms in up to three principal buildings.  The new Senior Housing Overlay designation is reflected on the aerial map attached to the update and in the zoning code.  Da79, 114.  In summary, just prior to the [...] application, the [...] thoroughly considered the need for additional senior citizen housing.  The subject Property was considered for such uses, as well as other large sites in residential areas, for a new Senior Overlay Zone.  This Property was considered and rejected.  The Master Plan update that was adopted selected two other large areas for those uses, determining that those two sites were more appropriate for those uses, but not the subject site.  The Planning Board’s Master Plan update recommended the establishment of a new Medium Density Residential zone that specifically targeted larger residential health care development, but it has not yet been adopted by the [...].  Having so recently spoken on this subject, the intent of the Master Plan and the governing body was and is clear – the subject site is not to be developed for mixed use senior citizen housing.
[brief] (l0T 44).  [...] and [...] were interviewed for several hours, and initially uncooperative and disrespectful.  [...] and [...] requested an opportunity to consult with one another while in custody, which was granted.  (7T 102).  Only after that meeting did they decide to frame [...], who was living in Europe at the time.\(^3\) (10T 41-42); (lIT 45-46); (lIT 49-50).  [...] and [...]’ fabricated statements, however, were materially inconsistent as to time and place, and as to manner and means.  Also, [...] and [...] did not disclose the identities of their true coconspirators: [...]’s father ([...]’ stepfather), who had already fled the country, and [...] ([...]), who had been murdered.  Their stories were not consistent with one another’s, and differed substantially from the victims’ trial testimony—making them unreliable at best, and presumably fabricated:  ### Staten Island Home Invasion | Statement Subject Matter | [...] Statement to Authorities | [...] Statement to Authorities | [...] Trial Testimony | Victim Testimony | |--------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------| | Gunpoint | [...] “did not want to expound on the details” but [...] wanted him present because he “wasn’t afraid to stick a gun in somebody’s face.
[brief] [...] did not attempt to move out of the path of the train prior to the impact, despite the horn, bells, and presence of the train.  Pa222-235, 281-319; PaPa1152 at 16:33:30 to 16:33:35. \(^{12}\)  The collision then occurred at 16:33:35 as [...] was present in the middle of the gauge of Track 1 on the right of way.  Compare Pa154, ¶17 with Pa762, ¶17; Pa222-235, 281-319; Pa1152 at 16:33:30 to 16:33:35.  Ultimately, Plaintiff does not dispute that [...] was not permitted to enter the crossing when she did under the circumstances present.
[brief] R. 2:5-5(b).  In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 280 (2018).  The Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act amended N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e) to state, in pertinent part:  (4)  The board of trustees shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this subsection and shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment.  A member or retiree shall not be eligible for the presumption or recalculation under this subsection unless within two years of the effective date of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, the member or retiree files a written and sworn statement with the retirement system on a form provided by the board of trustees thereof indicating the dates and locations of service.  [...] was denied the ability to register for the Ricci Act and apply for amended benefits because he did not submit his registration form prior to July 8, 2021.
[brief] Pa48:12-19.  These different recollections of the location of the point of impact are yet another example of a disputed material fact.  As in many auto cases the point of impact is crucial, and certainly in this matter, it is neither immaterial, nor insubstantial, as the point of impact will tell us whether the defendant did take a wide turn and struck the plaintiff’s vehicle within the right lane of travel or if you follow the mark on the satellite exhibit, the plaintiff had to have been driving into the left lane where the defendant was.  Pa151, Pa153.  The point of impact as recorded in the police report implies the defendant left his left lane and entered right lane and supports the plaintiff’s position.  While the precise location of the point of impact is disputed, it is a fact that the Jury is preciously suited to determine.
[brief] (C.C.Da.131-48).  See, N.J.A.C.11:3-4.  Thus, contrary to [...]’s assertions, the arbitration venue includes full discovery rights and multiple levels of due process that equal or match those provided in the Superior Court.  Further, pursuant to N.J.S.A.§2A:23A-13, the arbitration law includes a safety mechanism to allow any party to apply for *de novo* review, in the Superior Court, of a decision within forty-five days.
[brief] DEP additionally found that the Project met the Stormwater Management Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:8, (Aa22), because [...] properly reduced the quantity and quality of runoff leaving the property, (Aa16-17).  Stormwater from the Project will also be effectively managed using numerous stormwater Best Management Practices (“BMPs”) that are designed to capture and treat stormwater runoff.  (Aa17).  Lastly, DEP determined that the Project is in a sewer service area and does not conflict with the areawide water quality management plan.  (Aa29).  On December 1, 2022, DEP issued a Flood Hazard Individual Permit and Verification (the “Permit”) to [...].
[brief] Parents’ Substantive Due Process Rights.  Finally, the trial court correctly held that the preliminary injunction would not interfere with parents’ substantive due process rights.  Appellants’ argument on this score is rather surprising: the trial court’s injunction simply restores the very policy Appellants kept in place “uneventfully” for four years, without any suggestion that Appellants were in fact violating parents’ federal constitutional rights throughout that long period.  (Da137).  In any event, this argument fails: the injunction does not interfere with fundamental parental rights, and even if it did, the court’s order is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS........  1  LEGAL ARGUMENT .........................................................................................  2 POINT I THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY GUIDED THE JURY ON FINGERPRINT-ANALYSIS EVIDENCE.  ..................................  2  A.  The State’s expert properly presented his conclusions and clearly testified that they were his opinion..................................  2  B.  This case does not require appointment of a Special Adjudicator to determine defendant’s guilt.....................................  5  POINT II CREATION OF A MODEL JURY CHARGE ON FINGERPRINT-ANALYSIS  EVIDENCE IS UNNECESSARY AND UNJUSTIFIED.  .........................................................  9  CONCLUSION .................................................................................................
[brief] She texted defendant and told him to leave her alone.  (2T67-1 to 8).  When defendant kept texting her and begging her to call him, she relented and called him.  (2T67-9 to 16; 2T73-13 to 22; 2T75-5 to 6).  Defendant told [...] that he had been stabbed and was hurt and needed help.  (2T67-17 to 19; 2T75-4 to 8).  He sounded frantic.  (2T68-2 to 3).  She told defendant to contact the police.  (2T67-20 to 22).
[brief] These claims, discussed in detail in Plaintiff’s Brief, were brought within the 45-day Prerogative Writ limitation period and are summarized below:  •  Enactment of Ordinance 1423-21 violated N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 when the public hearing was removed from the December 1, 2021, Borough Council special meeting agenda, which was not properly noticed, and placed on the December 28, 2021, meeting agenda without public notice of its removal or the new date.  The original published notice of the public hearing also failed to comply with the statute since it omitted substantive information about the ordinance.  (Plaintiff’s Brief, Page 37, Point III); and •  Enactment of Ordinance 1423-21 also violated the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1, et seq., because the Borough Council failed to identify inconsistencies between the amending ordinance and the Master Plan, even though the Planning Board identified multiple inconsistencies in its statutory review of Ordinance 1423-21.  (Plaintiff’s Brief, page 32, Point II(B)).
[brief] As [...] opined, also confirming [...]’s deposition testimony, whether before or after the rule change became effective, Plaintiff [...] could have easily entered into a 60%-40% partnership with an affordable housing developer.  6T, 126:10-128:3; 139:16-142:24.  [...]’s expert opinion is not only within a reasonable degree of certainty, but is, as [...] affirmed in response to opposing counsel’s question, an absolute economic certainty.
[brief] Plaintiff devotes a considerable portion of their brief outlining Defendant’s arguments and suggesting that the trial court’s decision should be reversed because it “apparent[ly] embrace[d]” these arguments.  On its face, this contention is speculative and should be disregarded.  Plaintiff fails to point to any conclusion of law by the Court that was in error.  Instead, Plaintiff suggests that the trial court should have specifically rejected Defendant’s arguments that: (1) fees under the MMWA are discretionary; (2) the Offer of Judgment rejected by Plaintiff should be considered by the trial court in determining reasonable attorney’s fees; and (3) based upon Defendant’s counsel’s experience Plaintiff’s counsel’s fee request was unreasonable.
[directive] The severity of this crime ranges from third-degree to a disorderly person’s offense, based on the amount of damage to the property.  N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(b).  10 violations on public lands, State Police can issue summonses for the violations outlined above, including N.J.A.C. 7:2-3.2, N.J.A.C. 7:2-3.4, and N.J.A.C. 7:25-2.2.  See N.J.S.A. 39:3C-33(a)– (d); N.J.S.A. 39:3C-34(b)–(c).  State Police can also impound vehicles, N.J.S.A. 39:3C-34, and initiate forfeiture actions as outlined above, N.J.S.A. 39:3C-34(e) or N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1(a)(5), for violations on public lands.
[brief] [...]  Cumberland County Prosecutor [...] Attorney No. 318932020 Assistant Prosecutor Of Counsel and on the Brief ([...])  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED  Your Honors:  Please accept this letter brief in lieu of a more formal brief in opposition to defendant’s interlocutory appeal.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  ...........................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................5  I.  Defendant’s Position is Incompatible with Binding  Precedents  ......................5  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................10  TABLE OF APPENDIX  Relevant pages from suppression hearing ...............................................................Pa1-3  Relevant pages from reconsideration hearing............................................................. Pa4  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  On June 8, 2022, a grand jury returned a five-count indictment against defendant, charging him with various drug and gun offenses.
[brief] (T1 at 48:6-49:24).  On January 23, 2020, he had a lawyer write to the Zoning Officer/Construction Official formally complaining about the proposed “pizza business. ” (Pa 95-96; T1 at 53:11-17-).  When municipal officials failed to act, [...] filed municipal court complaints on February 6, 2020, contending that the use was not permitted and that work was done without permits.  (T1 at 53:23-54:16).  In spite of being put on notice of the neighbors’ questions as to the use and lack of permits on February 6, 2020, the zoning officer issued a zoning permit on March 12, 2020 that the proposed use was “preexisting nonconforming use complies as per resolution.
[brief] Plaintiff [...]: Motion for Summary Judgment  May 17, 2022 ...........................................  Ja300  Plaintiff’s Complaint .................................................................................. Ja1  Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts ........................................................  Ja301  Defendant’s Answer ..................................................................................  Ja6  Defendant [...]: Response to Statement of Facts and Statement of Additional Facts  ..............................................  Ja304  Order of Trial Court ..................................................................................  Ja12  The Joint appendix provided to the trial court has been separated into Volume “A” and volume “B”, and has been submitted in the same format to this Appellate Court.
[brief] It is well settled that a Zoning Board "has the choice of accepting or rejecting the testimony of witnesses.  Where reasonably made, such choice is conclusive on appeal".  *Reinauer Realty Corp. v. Nucera*, 59 N.J. Super. 189, 201 (App. Div. 1960).  ‘Opinions that lack foundation are worthless.  However, if an expert provides the whys and wherefores rather than bare conclusions it is not considered a net opinion”.  *Beadling v. William Bowman Assoc.*, 355 N.J. Super. 70 (App. Div. 2002).  Although boards are not bound to accept expert testimony, its determination must be made on a rational and reasonable basis.
[brief] The Jury’s Finding That the Defendant Was Negligent But Not a Proximate Cause of the Incident Was Not Inconsistent and Was Perfectly Acceptable Under the Law and Facts and Evidence in the Case.  1.  New Jersey Law, the Model Jury Charges and the Model Verdict Sheet Clearly Recognize That Negligence and Proximate Cause Are Separate Concepts.  Plaintiff’s contention that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent is without merit.  Negligence and proximate causation are separate and distinct elements.
[brief] The facts found by the trial court clearly established that Plaintiff remorselessly engaged in a predatory scheme to unlawfully purchase a distressed single-family home subject to an underlying foreclosure action from a vulnerable homeowner, [...] (“[...]”).  Indeed, the undisputed facts leave no question Plaintiff attempted a textbook example of a foreclosure rescue scam in violation of nearly every provision in the Foreclosure Rescue Fraud Prevention Act (FRFPA).  The trial court determined that [...] did not have “standing” under the FRFPA to “contend” that the contract for sale was unenforceable under the FRFPA because the FRFPA only gives a cause of action to an owner.
[brief] However, read as a whole, the instructions are clear and do not prejudice defendant.  [...] informed the jurors that if they found that defendant committed the robbery, but did not threaten the use of a deadly weapon, the jurors should find defendant guilty of a second-degree robbery:  If you find that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of robbery as I have defined that crime to you but if you find that the State has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was armed with, or used or purposely threatened the immediate use of a deadly weapon, or purposely engaged in conduct or gestures which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the defendant possessed a deadly weapon at the time of the commission of the robbery, then you must find the defendant guilty of robbery in the second degree.  [4T128-17 to -25].  Here, the jurors were not left in a situation where the only options for the jury were convict or acquit defendant of first-degree robbery.  Along with the instruction that the jurors could find defendant guilty of second-degree robbery, the jurors were given an instruction on the lesser-included offense of third-degree theft from the person.