ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] One such case involved a not-for-profit parochial school, where the court reasoned that even though nothing is "sold" at the school like a commercial property, it cannot be considered a residence since no one lives there.  Luchejko, Id. at 204, analyzing Brown v. Saint Venantius Sch., 111 N.J. 325, 335 (1988).  In Brown, the New Jersey Supreme Court carefully considered whether or not a parochial school would be considered a commercial or residential property for purposes of duties to maintain abutting sidewalks.  The Court reasoned that an important factor in measuring whether a property is "commercial" for these purposes is determining the property's capacity to generate income.
[directive] October 30, 2000  DATE: RESCISSION OF JANUARY 24, 2000  DIRECTIVE SUBJECT: (EXPIRED INSPECTION STICKERS)  On January 24, 2000, in response to difficulties experienced by New Jersey car owners in complying with State law regarding the inspection of their motor vehicles, and at the request of Governor [...], I issued a Directive that all State, county and municipal law enforcement agencies implement procedures to accommodate the motoring public during the implementation of the State's new automobile inspection system.  In the intervening period, the State's new automobile inspection system has made improvements such that the continuation of the January 24, 2000 Directive is no longer required.  Moreover, the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles is no longer issuing inspection extensions to registered owners of vehicles.  Those extensions which were issued will continue to be valid through their expiration date, which will be no later than December 31, 2000.  Accordingly, and effective this date, I hereby RESCIND the January 24, 2000, Directive, entitled "Expired Inspection Stickers."
[brief] ”  (21T 133-10 to 25; 21T 145-22 to 23)  He also said that he “didn’t mean to fire twice. ”  (21T 145-21 to 23)  Thereafter, defendant said, he went inside the carriage house, locked the door, and called his mother, [...], who arrived home in “[m]aybe 20” minutes, but he said his perception of time may be “really off.
[directive] [...], Special Assistant [...], Special Assistant PCR Requested Fields Obs Cty Filed Date PCR Case Num Last First MI Alias Indictment Number  Promis Number Plea or Trial PCR Judge Date Assigned Judge Date Request for Atty Sent to PCR Unit Date PCR Mgmt Conf Scheduled Date Received at PCR Unit Notice to Change Mgmt Conf Date Received Date PD  Assigned Attorney Name Attorney Type First Status Conf. Held Next Sched. Date First Hearing Date Disposition Date Result of Hearing Comment
[brief] ¹  The following abbreviations will be used:  Sb – State’s Brief Sa – State’s Appendix No. [...], in which the State does not allege that he possessed a firearm.  (Sa27-29, 68)  Separate from the Morris County indictment, but while the Morris County charges were pending, [...] was arrested on charges under Essex County Indictment No. [...]; under the Essex County indictment, [...] ultimately pleaded guilty to, inter alia, second-degree Unlawful Possession of a Handgun Without a Permit (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1)) and thereby admitted to possessing a firearm.  (Sa69)  By motion of the Essex County prosecutor, the Graves Act parole disqualifier was waived pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2 and [...] was sentenced to three years of probation on Indictment No. [...].  (Sa56, 69-70)  Subsequently, [...] was evaluated for legal eligibility for Track One Recovery Court in the present matter by Morris County Superior Court [...], at which time [...] no longer had any pending firearms charges.
[brief] This case is entirely distinguishable.  The Appellant fell at a [...] store not in the common area of a retail mall.  There was no self-service food court or cafeteria in the [...].  Patrons did not walk through the store with food and drink, resulting in frequent spills of food and drink on the floor.  Neither the Appellant nor store employee [...] could identify what the clear liquid was or its source.  Ms. [...] testified that the liquid was oily because of its texture.  Under these circumstances, the Mode of Operation Doctrine does not apply.  The Appellant was obligated to prove notice in this case.
[brief] (11T127-3 to 128-11; Sa1 at 10:47:21 to 10:49:09; Da50 to Da51).  [...] asked if defendant knew [...]’s brother, and defendant said he did.  (11T128-14 to 16; Sa1 at 10:49:09 to 10:49:11; Da51).  Defendant then launched into another description over repeated requests by [...] to stop.
[brief] (Ra347 22:19-23:19.)  After opining on the height above existing grade to the floor elevation of new buildings ranging from 4.9 feet to 0 feet, [...] questioned whether a variance would be required for the buildings over 10% of the approved height (35 feet) when measured from the original grade.  (Ra347 24:3 through Ra348 25:1.)  Guided by Objector’s Counsel, [...] opined that the buildings were effectively put on pedestals, and without any support, stated that he thought that an applicant “should [not] be bringing and regrading to such an extent that [they’re] adding 4 or 5 feet.
[brief] In particular, the Court found that [...]’s web interface referenced its terms “on the first page encountered by a consumer,” unlike in *Wollen* where plaintiff was required to “navigat[e] multiple webpages – none of which referred to the defendant’s separate terms[.]”  *Id.* at *6, 10.  The same result, applying *Wollen*, is appropriate here.  It was not the case, as the court below held, that *Wollen* “applies almost perfectly” to the record of this case.  (2T15:5-11; 2T16:25-17:18).  The Order below must be reversed.
[brief] Tenant’s confusion on this issue seems to arise out of [...]’s adept holding that, as a Judge sitting in the Landlord-Tenant Division, he lacked jurisdiction to award Tenant the money damages it sought in connection with its Motion for Reconsideration.  Indeed, as detailed above, in connection with the Motion for Reconsideration, Tenant ignored the jurisdictional limits of Landlord-Tenant Court and sought an award of money damages against Landlord for the payment of the Tenant Allowance.
[brief] (Pa473).  [...] recalled a conversation she had with [...] upon her discovery of their receipt of charge pay.  [...] asked [...] why [...] would be receiving charge pay.  [...] attempted to shift responsibility to management, stating that the “higher uppers” would have more information.  (Pa473).  [...] also met with [...], but [...] did “not know anything about hourly charge. ” (Pa543).  [...] and [...] also met with [...].
[brief] The inclusion of two contradictory indemnification clauses in the Contract renders the indemnity provisions ambiguous (raised below at 1T15:16-17:25).  Finally, the fact that [...]’s contract contains two conflicting indemnity provisions renders the contract ambiguous and unenforceable with regard to indemnification for [...]’s own fault.  Mantilla, 167 N.J. 262; Englert, 389 N.J. Super. at 48, 57; Meder, 240 N.J. Super. at 380.
[brief] In that 2003 incident, the car he was driving “backed into a police vehicle. ” (2T 40-1 to 15; See also 2T 45-15 to 16 (“[H]e placed his vehicle in reverse and rammed the police car behind him and attempted to flee the area. ”))  But even if [...]’s actions a decade earlier made the police believe that he could be dangerous, that does not justify the warrantless search.
[directive] it  I have reviewed this Form with defendant and I am satisfied that he/she has been fully advised of the rights describes.  FECHADOI  Dated: I  Abogado del acusado Counsel for Defendant (Para ser 1/enado sola mente par un abogado privado)  By Be (To Filled Out Private Counsel Only)  Si el acusado decide apelar y no puede seguir pagando a un abogado privado, le instruire que se comunique con Ia Oficina del Administrador de Ia Division Penal del condado de jurisdicci6n territorial y Ilene una solicitud de indigencia para el nombramiento de Ia Oficina del Abogado de Oficio dentro de los 45 dias subsiguientes a Ia fecha de hoy.
[brief] ]  See also Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Zullo, 48 N.J. 362, 373 (1966) (amending the insurance policies at issue to contain coverage "no less broad than that of the statute"); Fiscor v. Atlantic County Board of Chosen Freeholders, 293 N.J. Super. 19, 30 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 147 N.J. 263 (1996) (explaining that "even if the County had obtained an insurance policy at odds with the statutory standards, the court would, by operation of law, amend the policy to conform to the statutory requirements"); Kattoura v. Patel, 262 N.J. Super. 34, 42, n.4 (App. Div. 1993) (explaining that "even if the AMI policy failed to include the coverage required by N.J.S.A. 45:21-1 et seq., we would deem the policy amended to provide the minimum coverage required by the statute and to conform to the parties' agreement that the coverage provided by Excelsior would be primary"); American Home Assurance Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 190 N.J. Super. 477, 485-86 (App. Div. 1983).  Additionally, “conditions and exceptions of the insurance contract, inserted therein in an attempt to limit or restrict the coverage prescribed by the statute, are strictly construed against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured. ”  Longworth v. Ohio Casualty Group of Ins. Cos., 213 N.J. Super. 70, 79 (App. Div. 1986) (citations omitted).  The [...] policy contains a Conformity to Law clause which provides:  “If any of the terms of this policy conflict with state or local law, state or local law will apply. ”  (101a).  Again, because Respondent’s 4-year contractual limitations period conflicts with well-settled law which provides a 6-year statutory limitations period for UM/UIM claims, the 6-year limitations applies to Appellant’s claim.
[directive] Addressing Conflicts of Interest  3.  a.  If the [...] becomes aware of an actual, potential, or perceived conflict, the Director must take one or more of the following remedial measures: i. Appoint the law enforcement agency to serve as the Independent Investigator, but only on the condition that any person who has a conflict be recused from the investigation; ii. Appoint a different law enforcement agency to serve as the Independent Investigator; or iii. Require any other action as necessary to ensure the impartiality and independence of the investigation.
[brief] The judge in Cuccio gave as reasons for the removal: (1) the possibility of spectators and family members mingling with potential jurors; and (2) not enough seats to accommodate the public and the number of jurors on the panel.  Ibid.  Over the defendant's strong objections, jury voir dire began and continued until the jury was selected, outside the presence of all of the defendant's and the victim's family members.  Id. at 258, 794 A.2d 880.  The process to select the jury took more than a day.  Ibid.  The trial judge denied the defendant's motion for mistrial.  Ibid.  Against these facts, we reversed the defendant's conviction, holding that the measures taken by the trial court violated the defendant's right to a public trial.
[brief] *Vitty*, supra, 452-453.  See *Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Cos.*, 126 N.J. Super. 29, 38, 312 A.2d 664 (App.Div.1973), aff'd, 65 N.J. 152, 319 A. 2d 732 (1974); *Minkov v. Reliance Ins. Co.*, 54 N.J.Super. 509, 516, 149 A.2d 260 (App.Div.1959).  So interpreted, there need be shown only a substantial nexus between the property damage or injury alleged in the claim and the activities encompassed in the towing contract.  *Vitty*, supra, at 453.
[brief] The Court’s analysis is to discern the parties’ intent, initially as revealed by the language in the contract.  *Lederman v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., Inc.*, 385 N.J. Super. 324, 339 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 188 N.J. 353 (2006).  Where that language is unambiguous “then the words presumably will reflect the parties’ expectations. ”  *Kieffer v. Best Buy*, 205 N.J. 213, 223 (2011).  Even if there is an ambiguity summary judgment may still be ordered if intent is not a disputed fact.  *In re Teamsters Indus. Emps. Welfare Fund*, 989 F.2d 132, 136-37 (3d Cir. 1993).  C.  Unambiguous Termination Clauses are Enforced Regardless of Ulterior Motive.
[brief] During the hearing [...], [...] and [...], all blamed each other and nothing at all was provided.  At one point [...] directed [...] to provide a copy of all the insurance policies.  [...] stated he needed [...]’s permission, which she gave him on the record.  [...] also stated [...] could get a complete copy of the policy by merely paying a fee.  (6T 22)  [...] then spoke and advised the Court that she had finally been able to get access to the decedent's mail, which had been withheld since her November appointment, and she was finding information about insurance policies for the decedent and payments being made.
[brief] The doctrine of res judicata precludes the claims made by Defendant regarding the allegedly forged assignments and affidavit of lost note.  First, Final Judgment has been entered in the Foreclosure Action.  Second, both Defendant and Plaintiff were parties to the Foreclosure Action.  Third, Defendant’s denied claims all stem from the Foreclosure Action and were adjudicated by the state courts prior to the entry of judgment.  Accordingly, the doctrine of res judicata bars re-litigation of Defendant’s claims, and the Court was correct in denying the relief sought by Defendant in the Order to Show Cause.
[directive] First, and foremost, the prosecutor must place on the record the terms and conditions of any plea agreement, and there must be a factual basis which supports any charge or charges to which the defendant intends to plead guilty.  Finally, the Court Rules (R. 3:9-2 & 7:6-2(a) & (d)) require that the defendant must be personally addressed by the Court and the defendant must acknowledge he/she is represented by counsel or knowingly waives the right to counsel, admit, on the record, to the facts supporting the charge for which a guilty plea is being entered.  Also, a plea to a violation of an ordinance, when the underlying charge or charges are governed by State statutes is not permitted.
[directive] Special Drug Diagnostic Assessment and Treatment Condition  When a prosecutor has an objectively reasonable basis for believing that a defendant who is otherwise eligible for a standardized “open” offer is drug or alcohol dependent and may be eligible for or in need of rehabilitative treatment pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14, the prosecutor shall notify the court of the basis for this belief, and the plea agreement in these circumstances  Page 46
[directive] This statute specifically covers the areas of: (a) Wire communication, which essentially means any conversation made over a telephone, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2a; (b) Oral communication, which means any oral communication uttered by a person who has an expectation that such communication will not be intercepted, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2b; State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349 (1975).
[brief] As to the third special equity, litigating in New Jersey would not cause great hardship to the [...].  Indeed, the Defendants are no strangers to litigating in New Jersey, including the above-referenced case brought by the [...] in which the State seeks to recover under the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, the Water Pollution Control Act, the Solid Waste Management Act, and New Jersey common law for contamination of natural resources by PCBs from facilities [...] operated in New Jersey as well as statewide PCB contamination through [...]’s “design, production, use, marketing, sale and distribution of and failure to warn about the hazards of PCBs across New Jersey. ”  Accordingly, there is no basis to ignore the presumption in favor of this first-filed action.  Nonetheless, Defendants argued below that New Jersey lacks a connection to this action.  Preliminarily Defendants’ arguments do not even fall within the narrow class of “special equities” the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized as justifying a departure from the presumption in favor of the first-filed rule.
[brief] (Pa115-116, PSA § 13.1).  However, the sentence immediately thereafter reads “[n]otwithstanding the foregoing, Purchaser [Plaintiff] shall, in addition to its termination right, shall have the right of specific performance” where the Seller ([...]) has defaulted and proceeded to close with the Fee Owner under the [...].  (Id.) (emphasis added).  This is exactly what happened here.  The PSA gave Plaintiff the concurrent right to seek return of the Earnest Money Deposit and to demand specific performance.  These remedies were not in any respect “repugnant” or “inconsistent,” so as to invoke the doctrine of election of remedies.  See Adams, 121 N.J.L. at 395.  Accordingly, the trial court \(^6\)  Here, as discussed supra, Plaintiff never expressly terminated the contract.  However, even if Plaintiff had terminated, this would not change the result, given the “in addition to its termination right” language in Section 13.1. erred in holding that Plaintiff waived its right to seek performance by demanding a return of the Earnest Money Deposit.  (Pa357; 2T, at 13-16; 3T, at 15-16).  **POINT IV**
[brief] Plaintiffs, [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) filed a legal malpractice action against the Respondents for their failure to timely contest their father’s will.  From the time their father’s Will was submitted to probate through the expiration of the statute of limitations, the Respondents made representations to other attorneys and to the Morris County Surrogate that [...] was their client.  They took affirmative actions on behalf of [...], and [...] relied on Respondents’ provision of legal services.  In considering the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment, the lower court exceeded the permitted scope of review and weighed the evidence presented concerning the relationship between [...] and the Respondents.  Despite finding that the facts of this case “cut both ways”, the lower court found that the Respondents did not have a duty to [...] and entered judgment in favor of the Respondents.  The lower court erred by conflating the questions of the nature of the parties’ relationship with the existence of a duty.  While the existence of a duty is a question of law, determination of the nature of the relationship between the parties is a question of fact for the jury.  Had the court considered the evidence in a light most favorable to [...], it would have found that genuine issues of material facts exist as to the Respondents’ relationship with [...] that could give rise to a duty.  In addition, [...] presented evidence demonstrating a breach of this duty and proximate causation.  Accordingly, Appellant respectfully requests this Court reverse the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Respondents and against the Appellant, and remand the case to the lower court for a jury to determine the issues of fact presented.
[directive] C.  Post-Implementation of the Statewide Web Portal Reporting for [...] Only  Following implementation of the statewide web portal for permits to carry a handgun, the [...] shall provide monthly anonymized statistical data from the web portal consistent with the categories outlined in Section I.A. of this Directive.  The manner of submission shall be determined by the [...], in coordination with the [...] Firearms Investigation Unit (FIU).  Such collaboration shall begin immediately upon issuance of this Directive.  Please note that the processing and decision to issue permits to carry handguns pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 remain the responsibility of the chiefs of police, and the [...] Superintendent as the case may be, and are in no way are altered by this Directive.
[brief] *E.g.*, *Triarsi v. BSC Grp. Servs., LLC*, 422 N.J. Super. 104, 116 (App. Div. 2011); see also *Rider v.* --- \(^4\)  Examples of objective questions are “whether the applicant has been examined or treated by a physician[.]”  *Formosa v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S.*, 166 N.J. Super. 8, 15 (App. Div. 1979), and whether prescription medications are taken by an applicant, *Russ v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.*, 112 N.J. Super. 265, 271 (Law Div. 1970).  A subjective question, on the other hand, seeks to probe the applicant’s state of mind.  An example of a subjective question is “when an insurer asks an insured to indicate a belief about the status of his or her health” or if the applicant “is aware of any circumstances which may result in a claim being made against the firm. ”  *Lawson*, 177 N.J. at 137.  Lynch, 42 N.J. 465, 476 (1964) (one of an insurance broker’s obligations is to ensure that a policy “is [not] void or materially deficient. ”)  Indeed, [...]’ failure to provide any guidance to [...] whatsoever when [...] filled out the Supplemental Form was one of the bases for [...]’s broker malpractice third-party action.  (Ia044).  [...] had no obligation to step into [...]’ shoes.  The trial court’s holding that the Supplemental Form was plain and unambiguous was unequivocal and exact.
[brief] Further, any would-be inference of causation is undermined because, as Plaintiff admits, Defendant offered her four different positions in an attempt to retain her.  (Appx 533-34 ¶¶46-51).  This significantly weakens any inference that Plaintiff suffered negative consequences because of alleged whistleblowing complaints.  Defendant offered Plaintiff three shifts – “3 to 11, 11 to 9, and per diem[,]” but “none of the shifts worked for [her].” (Appx 123 at 160:6-8, 161:1- Plaintiff wanted to work a day shift, so Defendant then offered her the day shift at the [...].
[brief] [...], White Paper on the Science of Late Adolescence: A Guide for Judges, Attorneys and Policy Makers 10-16 (January 27th, 2022); [...] and [...] (2021), supra, at 1009-10; [...] et al., Bringing Science to Law and Policy: Brain Development Social Context, and Justice Policy, 57 Wash. U.J.L.& Pol’y 13, 26-27 (2018); [...] (2017), supra, at 414; Scott et al.  (2016), supra, at 642, 646-47, 649; [...] et al., *When is an Adolescent an Adult? Assessing Cognitive Control in Emotional and Nonemotional Contexts*, 27 Psychological Science 549, 559-60 (2016); [...] et al. (2015), *supra*, at 7-8.  Moreover, like juveniles, late adolescents are still highly susceptible to peer pressure and to family and environmental influences (*Miller* factors two and three).
[brief] *In re Grand Jury*, 200 N.J. at 496 (citing *In re Garber*, 95 N.J. 597, 607 (1984).  Indeed, to support the third condition, the Supreme Court cited *In re Garber*, 95 N.J. 597, 607 (1984), and specifically, *Garber*’s statement that “[i]t is patently unethical for a lawyer in a legal proceeding to represent an individual whose interests are adverse to another party whom the lawyer represents in other matters, even if the two representations are not related. ”  *In re Grand Jury*, 200 N.J. at 496 (quoting *Garber*).  *Garber*, like *In re Grand Jury*, is nothing like this civil case.
[brief] Exhibit A- Interrogatories to [...] R-468  Exhibit B- [...]’s Answer’s to Interrogatories  R-478  Exhibit C- Cover page for Transcript dated July 30, 2021 (not included) previously filed with the Court  R-487  Exhibit D- Court Order dated April 7, 2021  R-489  Exhibit E- Letter to the Court dated April 5, 2022 . . . . . . .  R-495  Exhibit 10- Copy of [...]’s insurance check for $545,181.32 .  R-531  Exhibit 11- Checks written by Hazel on [...] account . . . . . .  R-533  Exhibit F- Court Order dated May 27, 2021 . . . . . . .  R-536  Exhibit P- Cover page for 538  Insurance Policy to [...], Spouse of [...] . . . . . . . . . . . .  R-570  Copy of Life Insurance check to [...] for $545,181.32 . .  R-601  Copy of Bank Statement for [...] account . . . . . . . . . .  R-625  Checks drawn on [...] account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  R-626  April 28, 2021 letter from [...] to [...] claiming