ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] iii.  The trial court properly awarded fees for [...]’s cross-appeal.  [...] do not offer any substantive challenge to [...]’s entitlement to fees for opposing the Wilfs’ appeal, nor do the Wilfs identify any unreasonable or improper activity in [...]’s timesheets defending against the Wilfs’ appeal.  Instead, the Wilfs argue only that, because [...]’s cross-appeal did not succeed, the Special Master erred in awarding [...] fees in connection with prosecuting that cross-appeal.  [...] rejected the Wilfs’ bright-line rule, and this Court should too.  (Da39117-18.)  Relying on the plain text of the RICO statute, [...] found that the statute lacks any language demonstrating “a legislative intent to carve out portions of the overall litigation that were unsuccessful based on motion or argument. ” (Da39117.)  Instead, the “plain and unambiguous” statutory language is clear that “fees are awarded based on the successful litigation as a whole. ”  (Ibid.)  Indeed, RICO entitles a prevailing party to “the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, costs of investigation and litigation. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4(c) (emphasis added).  Nowhere does RICO limit recovery to just those aspects of “the suit” on which the plaintiff succeeded.  Rather, the statute recognizes that courts assess a successful investigation into criminal racketeering based on the whole suit.  [...] cite to no cases supporting the proposition that a plaintiff who prevails on a RICO claim must then examine whether it “prevailed” on each particular component of its pursuit of that claim.  That is because none exists.  As there is no law supporting the Wilfs’ bright-line rule, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the Special Master’s findings to conclude that an award for [...]’s cross-appeal was proper.  The Court therefore should not disturb this portion of [...]’s fee award.
[brief] [...]  On The Brief: [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  Of Counsel: [...], Esq.  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Pages(s) | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | ii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS | 2 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 3 | | I.  The Court Should Affirm the NJDEP’s Decision to Grant the Flood | | | Hazard Area Individual Permit  Since the Decision Complies with the | | | Flood Hazard Area Rules and is Supported by Substantial Evidence in | | | the Agency Record Available to the Court | 3 | | II.  There is Substantial Credible Evidence in the Record to Support the | | | Decision of the NJDEP  That the Approved Stormwater System is | | | Compliant with the NJDEP’s Stormwater Management Rules and is | | | Consistent with Best Management Practices (Response to Point I of | | | Appellant’s Brief) | 5 | | A. [...]’s Stormwater Management Design Was | | | Properly Found by NJDEP to Meet the Water Quality Requirements Under | | | the Stormwater Management Rules (Response to Point IA of Appellant’s | | | Brief) | 8 | | B. [...]’s Stormwater Management Design was | | | Properly Found by the NJDEP to Meet the Groundwater Recharge | | | Requirements (Response to Point IB of Appellant’s Brief) | 14 | | C. [...]’s Stormwater Management Design was | | | Properly Found by the NJDEP to Meet Peak Flow Requirements  | | | (Response to Point IC of Appellant’s Brief) | 20 | | III.  The NJDEP  Adequately and Appropriately Considered Impacts to | | | Threatened and Endangered Wildlife Species  (Response to Point II of | | | Appellant’s Brief) | 23 | | CONCLUSION | 30 | #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[directive] Já estando informado de que o tribunal talvez seja obrigado a impor um período obrigatório de suspensão condicional de pena especial para participar em um programa de tratamento de drogas supervisionado pelo tribunal (“Tribunal de Drogas”), você ainda deseja se declarar culpado?  Having been advised that the court may be required to impose a mandatory period of special probation for the purpose of participating in a court-supervised drug treatment program (“Drug Court”), do you still wish to plead guilty?
[brief] On appeal from the Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey: Law Division  Atlantic County Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J.  Cv. PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS APPELLATE  BRIEF Of Counsel & On the Brief: [...], Esq. (#024172005)  Table of Contents  Page Table of Authorities.................................................................iv Table of Orders........................................................................ix  List of Appended Items.............................................................ix  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT......................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY....................3
[brief] (b)  Time.  The court may for cause shown enlarge or shorten the time for taking the deposition.  (c)  Organizations.  A party may in the notice name as the deponent a public or private corporation or a partnership or association or governmental agency and designate with reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is --- \(^7\)  Refer to AP# addressing informal deposition request. requested.  The organization so named shall designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or other persons who consent to testify on its behalf and may set forth for each person designated the matters on which testimony will be given.  The persons so designated shall testify as to matters known or reasonably available to the organization.  (d)  Production of Things.  The notice to a party deponent may be accompanied by a request made in compliance with and in accordance with the procedure stated in R. 4:18-1 for the production of documents and tangible things at the taking of the deposition.  Although there are disputes in material facts, Plaintiff did not fail to schedule her deposition and she attended all the court calendared case management sessions.
[brief] “By comparison, governed by Rule 4:49-2, reconsideration of a final order is appropriate for a ‘narrow corridor’ of cases” where a much higher showing is made as to the alleged error.  Id. (citing Fusco v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 (App. Div. 2002)) (quoting D’Atria v. D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).  The Union County order denying suppression is still amenable to reconsideration under that laxer standard because no final judgment has been entered in that case.
[brief] In those circumstances, recognition of a cause of action for retaliatory discharge was considered necessary to vindicate the public policy underlying the employee's activity, and to deter employer conduct inconsistent with that policy.  Fellhauer, 142 Ill. 2d at 508.  The operative question is therefore whether Plaintiff's termination for complying with Defendant's COVID-19 procedures frustrated the public policy favoring strong COVID-19 mitigation measures during the height of the pandemic, as mandated by OSHA.
[brief] In several cases, the court denied a beneficiary’s request to compel an accounting because the request was made during the first year of administration, and the court did not find any special cause warranting an order for a statutorily-prohibited accounting during the first year of administration.  In no case did the court reject such an application after the end of the first year of administration.  None, in the 72 years since the two statutes were enacted.  This is precisely because a beneficiary has the right to compel an accounting after the end of the first year of administration.
[brief] It follows that an injunction must be denied, and the bill dismissed. ” (Da467a).  Thus, [...]’s reliance on this case is devoid of merit for this reason alone.  Perhaps more importantly, [...]’s reliance on the 1918 decision is misplaced in light of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s ruling in *In re PSE&G*.  When viewed against the backdrop of the robust statutory and regulatory scheme that has arisen since 1918, and subsequent controlling New Jersey Supreme Court precedent, it becomes clear that the 1918 case is irrelevant to the Court’s inquiry in this matter.
[brief] Moreover, the Respondents and [...] along with the Plaintiff [...] and the two highest bidders on this solicitation all understood that a “registered archaeologist” meant one registered by the Register of Professional Archaeologists, which allows for registrants to become credentialed either as a “Registered Archaeologist (RA)” or a “Registered Professional Archaeologist (RPA)”.  The [...], guided by the Local Public Contracts Law, reviewed other factors as well before finding that [...] was the “lowest responsible bidder”.  As part of that effort, the [...] performed an analysis using an extreme hypothetical to determine whether [...]’s bid could have come in lower than [...] if [...] had been forced to use a PWCRA-registered subcontractor.  The result showed that the difference in extra cost to [...] under the hypothetical would have maxed out at $750,400, not nearly enough to close the gap between [...]’s bid of $41,819.780 and [...]’s bid of $44,732,529 (almost $3 million higher than [...]).  [...] cited to this analysis with approval, stating that “the additional cost incurred by [...] from obtaining a PWCRA-registered archaeologist has no meaningful impact on the result of the bidding.
[brief] On January 19, 2021, the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of [...]’s second petition for Post-Conviction Relief.  However, on March 3, 2021, after [...] filed a motion for reconsideration, the Appellate Division remanded the matter for a continuation of the evidentiary hearing:  We conclude the issue of the failure to produce [...] as a witness was preserved for appeal, and the PCR judge should have permitted defendant to produce [...] and question him during the evidentiary hearing.  As a result, we grant defendant's motion for reconsideration.  Additionally [,] we vacate our January 19, 2021 judgment and remand the matter to the Law Division to continue the evidentiary hearing for the purpose of permitting defendant to call [...] as a witness at that hearing.  The court shall assist defendant to compel [...]' appearance as necessary…If the PCR court reaffirms its original decision, defendant…may file a supplemental brief within twenty-one days thereafter.
[brief] Article XXXVI.  Senior Housing – 2 Overlay District §230-272.  Purpose.  The purpose of the Senior Housing – 2 Overlay District is to allow developers to have the option of redeveloping designated lots as assisted living, memory care, and continuing care retirement communities, while also retaining the developers’ option to develop in accordance with the underlying R-27A and B-2 zone districts for the properties.  As such, the Senior Housing – 2 Overlay designation does not replace the underlying land use designation for these parcels.  § 230-273.
[brief] Herz v. [...] Ave. Corp., No. A-2954-13T2, 2015 WL 2465027, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 1, 2015) (Pa 145) also involved an alleged personal guaranty of a commercial lease.  The lease included the following language:  “In the event of a default on the within Lease, [...] will ¹  In its review of New Jersey law the Court cited the unpublished case of Buyers Warranty v. Roblyn Dev. Corp., 2006 WL 2190742 (N.J. App. Div. 2006) (Appellate Division ruled that personal liability did not attach to a builder who signed a contract without indicating his professional capacity because the builder only signed the contract once) (Pa 162).  be personally liable for all obligations, rents (past and future) and damages [etc.], due in connection with said Lease. ”  Id. at *1 (emphasis added).  [...]’s signature appears once on the lease, on the following line:  141 BLOOMFIELD AVENUE CORPORATION, Tenant  By [...], President  The Trial Court granted [...] summary judgment, finding no personal liability under the lease.  This was affirmed by the Appellate Division without difficulty on appeal:  “Appellants argue that the omission of a separate signature line binding MacEvoy personally was a clerical error and does not invalidate the personal guarantee.  We disagree.  Given the strict construction of guarantee agreements, and the longstanding principle that corporations are distinct entities from their officers, MacEvoy cannot be held personally liable for [...]'s alleged breach of the lease.  As there was no separate signature indicating that MacEvoy was undertaking a personal guarantee, we cannot conclude that there was an agreement between the parties that he was signing the lease in his individual capacity.  As the motion judge noted, appellants cannot rely on a clerical error as a basis “to make someone liable for something that they never signed on the line for.
[brief] At no time was there any determination of responsibility set forth in the subject lease.  There was never a motion for any such determination, and the trial Court had found in the prior Order that there was a material disputes of fact regarding who, Respondent [...] or [...], had a contractual obligation to maintain the parking lot.  Although [...] stated that they were responsible for the maintenance of the parking lot, there is still a question of fact as to whether the subject lease addresses the maintenance of the specific parking spots bargained for, and assigned to, [...].
[brief] Case Management Order (May 15, 2019)  .........................................................Pa001  Order Granting Leave to File Amended Complaint (July 3, 2019)  ......................Pa004  Order Denying [...]  Permission to File Emergent Motion to Appellate Division (September 15, 2020)  ..............................................................................Pa008  Order Denying [...]  Permission to File Emergent Motion to Supreme Court (September 16, 2020)  ..................................................................................Pa009
[brief] (Not raised below)  [P]unitive damages may be awarded to the OVER plaintiff only if the plaintiff proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the harm suffered was the result of the defendant's acts or omissions, and such acts or omissions were actuated by actual malice or accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard of persons who foreseeably might be harmed by those acts or omissions.  This burden of proof may not be satisfied by proof of any degree of negligence including gross negligence.  N.J.S.A. sect. 2A:15-5.12 (a).  "Actual malice" means an intentional wrongdoing in the sense of an evil minded act."  sect. 2A:15-5.10.  "Wanton and willful disregard" means a deliberate act or omission with knowledge of a high degree of probability of harm to another and reckless indifference to the consequences of such act or omission."  Trusted Transportation Sols., LLC v. Guarantee Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 1:16-094 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77743, 2020 WL 2111026 at *4 (D.N.J. May 14, 2020).  In this matter, the state employees acting under color of State law intentionally breach their Oath of Office by failing to perform their duties faithfully, impartially and justly to the best of their ability in contravention of N.J.S.A. Const. Art. VII, sect. I, par.
[brief] \(^4\)  It is not surprising then that a search on Lexis of the term “bar --- \(^4\)  See State Bar of California (https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/Conduct-Discipline); Virginia State Bar (https://www.vsb.org/Site/05_News-and-resources/pubs/guide-lawyer-discipline.aspx).  [Pa954; Pa951] complaint” through the New Jersey state court decisions and statutes databases yields not a single reference in any published or unpublished New Jersey court decision.  In the limited discovery afforded Defendants in this matter, they posed to Plaintiffs through interrogatories to define bar complaint, investigation and disciplinary proceeding.  [Pa686, No. 33]  Defendants responded that “[t]hose terms have their usual and customary meanings. ”  [Id.]  Defendants did not explain what the usual and customary meanings for these terms.  This is an issue for which discovery should have been granted to Defendants.  Defendants should have been permitted to take the deposition of [...] and explore what constituted a “bar complaint” within the meaning of the Policy.
[brief] Exhibit P, Affidavit of [...], P.E., dated August 23, 2017, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit Q, Affidavit of [...], P.E., dated August 22, 2017, filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit R, N.J.A.C. 13:40 (Rev. Nov. 16, 2015), filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit S, Hunt Constr. Group, Inc. v. Garrett, 964 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. 2012), filed May 24, 2019  Exhibit T, Knopka v. Schiavone, A-0442-11 (App. Div. May 21, 2012) (unpublished), filed May 24, 2019 (Volume 13 of 15 – Pa2361 to Pa2560)
[brief] 2d 765 (2001) (awarding counsel fees to estate incurred in suit to establish surety's liability for administrator's defalcation); Jugan v. Friedman, 275 N.J.Super. 556, 573, 646 A.2d 1112 (App.Div.) (awarding counsel fees incurred by judgment creditor against judgment debtor's wife and sons to whom judgment debtor's assets were fraudulently transferred, but not those fees incurred against judgment debtor), certif. denied, 138 N.J. 271, 649 A.2d 1291 (1994).  As is evident from those holdings, a prerequisite to an award of counsel fees under the exception to the American Rule is litigation with a third party precipitated by another party's wrongful act.  No matter how egregious that wrongful act, in the direct action between a plaintiff and a defendant, each party bears his or her own fees under the American Rule.
[brief] On August 9, 1991, a criminal complaint was issued against defendant charging him with murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 (count one), and robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (count two).  (Pa1).  On September 22, 1992, defendant waived indictment and pleaded guilty to first-degree murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)(2), under [...], before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., pursuant to a plea agreement.  (Pa2 to 5; PSR1, 7).  In exchange for his guilty plea, the prosecutor agreed to recommend a sentence of thirty years with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility—the mandatory minimum sentence—and dismiss the robbery charge.  (Pa2 to 3; PSR1, 7).  On February 3, 1993, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, which [...] granted on April 2, 1993.  (Pa6).  On July 14, 1993, an Ocean County Grand Jury returned the instant, superseding indictment—[...]—charging defendant with first-degree murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)(2) (count one); first-degree felony murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count two); first-degree armed robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (count three); second-degree armed burglary, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 (count four); third-degree burglary, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 (count five); and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (count six).
[directive] Responsibilities  1.  Division of Criminal Justice: •  To establish a system of compliance, provide oversight for this policy and assist in implementing the policy statewide.  •  To provide all necessary and reasonable assistance to law enforcement agencies affected by this policy.  2.  County Prosecutor: •  To implement the Attorney General's policy on firearms qualification within the county jurisdiction, including reviewing qualification programs conducted by law enforcement agencies within the respective county jurisdiction for consistency with statewide standards, conducting qualification programs as required, and maintaining proper records.  •  To provide assistance to agencies within the county jurisdiction to enable them to conduct training and qualification programs in 9-10 Revised (5/03) Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards accordance with the standards established within this policy.  3.  State, County and Municipal Law Enforcement Agencies: •  To schedule and conduct individual semi-annual firearms qualification programs as directed by this policy.  • To maintain proper records as they relate to firearms qualification of agency personnel.  •  To take appropriate action with participants who fail to qualify.  This action is to be determined by the agency chief executive.  •  To immediately notify the county prosecutor, or in the case of certain state agencies the Division of Criminal Justice, of those participants who fail to qualify with a service weapon.  •  To report annually to the county prosecutor, or in the case of certain state agencies the Division of Criminal Justice, concerning qualification activities conducted during the year.  (See Section 10.  Records and Reports).  Every police agency within a county will report to the prosecutor of that county.  •  To ensure compliance with the standards contained in this policy.  Section 4.
[brief] In *Fowler*, the defendants were indicted for first-degree murder, unlawful possession of a weapon, and possession of a weapon for unlawful purpose.  *Id.*, at 175.  Defendant testified that when acting in self-defense against an armed assailant, a struggle ensued.  *Id.*, at 176-77.  As a result of this non-lethal use of force, the gun unintentionally went off and hit the victim, who was present nearby.  *Id.*  The State argued that the defendants purposefully and knowingly murdered the victim.  *Id.*, at 177.  Upon inquiry, defense counsel and the State confirmed to the court that they did not want to include jury instructions for lesser-included charges.  *Id.*, at 177-78.  As such, when charging the jury, the trial court did not instruct the jury on lesser-included charges.  *Id.*, at 179.  Upon review, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s decision to omit an instruction for aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter.  *Id.*, at 188.
[brief] Indeed, this Court dismissed the Class Action and held: (1) the NJCFLA does not contain a statutory private right of action and there is no implied private right of action under the NJCFLA; (2) since Appellant does not have a private right of action under the NJCFLA, he “may not circumvent established law by coding his complaint under the UDJA”; and (3) the NJCFA does not apply to Respondent.  Diana, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2241.  For these reasons, Appellant’s NJCFLA claims are barred.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  I.  The Civil Service Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably, and, contrary to Respondent [...]’s contention, in violation of N.J.A.C. 4A:10-1.1, by implicitly condoning, in its Final Administrative Decision here, the [...]’s retroactive application of retirement vacancies to promotions made in violation of N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b), without previously issuing a Final Administrative Decision from which Appellant could have appealed.