ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Furthermore, the Board appears to have once again confused design waivers with variances.  Unlike a variance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(C)(2), which requires a showing that the proposed variance would advance one of the purposes of zoning as contained in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 a waiver does not.  Rather, a waiver need only be reasonable.  As set forth above, the testimony more than affirmed the reasonableness of the requested waivers.  As the Court can see, neither design waiver had any impact on why the application was denied.
[brief] Defiant trespasser, criminal mischief.  [(Pa84). ]  The criminal complaint charged [...] with violating N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3A(2) (criminal mischief)\(^8\) and N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3.b (defiant trespasser). \(^9\) (Pa85-Pa86).  [...] typed up the complaints and assigned complaint numbers [...] and [...].  (Id.).  By letter dated August 15, 2019, Municipal Court Judge [...] informed [...] the court had not “found cause to issue your complaints against \(^8\) N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3A(2) provides a “person is guilty of criminal mischief if he: . . .  Purposely, knowingly or recklessly tampers with tangible property of another so as to endanger person or property, including the damaging or destroying of a rental premises by a tenant in retaliation for institution of eviction proceedings. ”  Even the lowest grade of Criminal Mischief can impose a penalty of 6-months’ imprisonment.  \(^9\) N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3.b provides a person commits the offense of defiant trespasser if “he enters or remains in any place as to which notice against trespass is given” while “knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so. ”  [...] charging in violation of 2C:17-3A(2) and 2C:18-3B.  Accordingly, the matter is closed. ” (Pa87).  [...] remained unaware of [...]’s criminal complaint until the day before [...]’s deposition, when Defendants supplied a supplemental document production, which included a copy of the criminal complaint.  (Da2543).  Despite having sworn in the criminal complaint he personally witnessed [...] “continuously” walk over [...]-owned property over a nine-month period, [...] admitted at deposition he never saw [...] do so even once.  (Da2542-Da2543) (“I never saw Westerhold do it . . .  I did not see Westerhold [cross the fenced portions of the [...] property] himself”).  Also, [...] admitted he willfully made a false statement to law enforcement:  Q.  And when you told the police that you saw him continuously walking over and you certified that was a true statement, what you actually did was you made a false statement to law enforcement; do you understand that?  [...]: Objection.  Yes.  [(Da2542-Da2543). ]  [...] also did not witness [...] break down an [...]-owned fence between January and August 2019; instead, he only saw the fence was broken.  (Pa322-Pa323).  Because Defendants did not install the fence until August 2, 2019, [...]’s statement that [...] broken the fence starting in January 2019 could not have been true.  (Da543-Da545).  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] POINT III: THE HECK V. HUMPHREY, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)  “BAR” (1T-50-9-16)...........................................................................................................................................55  IQBAL SIMPLY DOESN’T APPLY IN THE NJ COURTS (BOTH JUDGES AGREED).......61  POINT IV: THE APPLICABILITY OF THE LAD TO BOTH [...] & THE STATE WITH SOME REFERENCE TO HECK (NOT ADDRESSED BELOW – ASSUMED LAD APPLIED?)  .................................................................62  POINT V: THE EXACT REASONING TO APPLY THE LAD TO THE STATE.................................................................................................................................62  POINT VI: ARE THE NEW JERSEY COURTS GOING TO COUNTE NANCE “DIRTY TRICKS,” OR EVEN “HONEST” MISTAKES WHICH OBVIOUSLY TOTALLY MISLED AN ADVERSARY – PARTICULARLY WHEN THE “DAMAGE” DONE IS EASILY CORRECTABLE?  (ALL OF 3T, 4T & 5T – PP. TOTAL)........................................68  CONCLUSION......................................................................................................................73
[brief] (16T 173-14 to 175-18)  [...] testified that she was a passenger in the car with defendant for the Toms River and Marlboro stops, and that, in the Toms River stop, defendant did not show any ID; rather, [...] appeared to simply recognize defendant as a trooper.  (15T 37-6 to 23)  With regard to the [...] stop, Ogle first testified, “That stop was so quick; it was like he knew [...], is how I would interpret that stop. ”  (15T 51-21 to 52-2)  But on cross-examination, she admitted that the video appeared to show that defendant displayed something to [...].  (15T 77-2 to 17)  Ogle also testified that she spent a considerable amount of time for a few days -- starting on New Year’s Eve 2015 when defendant lost his wallet – trying to help him locate that wallet, including sending over 11 pages of emails back and forth to [...] regarding the wallet.  (15T 39-13 to 40-8; 15T 46-3 to 51-8; 15T 77-24 to 78-21)  Ogle recalled that the NJSP reissued defendant a new wallet ID, but, once he turned that one in upon being suspended, she never saw him in possession of a wallet ID again, only a business card that she would see in his wallet whenever she would go into it -- which she would do “numerous times” to retrieve her own ID after she and defendant would go out together, when she would have him hold her ID for the evening.
[brief] There was no opportunity to develop a complete record.  For example, how were [...] employees in other departments notified of their temporary loss of employment?  How were public employees in other municipalities classified?  Was there any relaxation of Civil Service rules during COVID19?  Were there other tier one employees who went back to their respective pensions and were not considered to have had a break in service by the [...] or the [...]?  How were employees classified in non-Civil Service townships?  The Board concluded without any facts in the record that the appellant should have either gone on unpaid leave or used his PTO days.  There was no record of whether the appellant could afford to go on unpaid status indefinitely, or if he even had PTO time on the books.  These are important facts were overlooked by the Board in their decision.  An Administrative Law hearing would have provided the opportunity to complete and clarify the record.
[brief] The trial transcripts will be referenced as follows throughout Plaintiff’s brief:  - 1T = January 4, 2023 - 2T = January 5, 2023 - 3T = January 9, 2023 - 4T = January 10, 2023 - 5T = January 11, 2023 - 6T = January 12, 2023 - 7T = January 17, 2023 - 8T = January 23, 2023 - 9T = January 24, 2023 - 10T = January 25, 2023 - 11T = January 26, 2023 - 12T = January 27, 2023 - 13T = January 30, 2023 - 14T = January 31, 2023 - 15T—February 1, 2023  A.
[brief] [3T55-22 to 56-4; 3T57-2 to -6].  There were customers in the bank at the time of the robbery: [...] was in the bank with his mother.  [3T56-11 to -19; 3T114-19 to 115-4].  Defendant was dressed completely in black. \(^3\) [3T56-23 to -24].  He was wearing a black hoody sweatshirt with hood up and tied tightly around his face.  [3T56-23 to -25; 3T95-1 to -4].  He was wearing sunglasses and a scarf or some type of cloth that covered the lower half of his face.  [3T56-24 to -25; 3T95-4 to -7].  Defendant was wearing dirty white socks on his hands.  [3T56-25 to 57-1; 3T95-6].  Defendant was described as a Black male, in his thirties, and approximately 5’8”.  [3T58-24 to 59-1; 3T117-19 to -21; 4T27-18 to -25].  Because of the scarf and sunglasses, no one could identify defendant.  Defendant told the tellers to “give [him] all [their] money. ”  [3T58-13; 3T95-6 to -7].  [...] responded by placing a bait pack, a pre-determined set of dollar bills in different denominations, on the counter and stepping back.  [3T95-12 to -14].  She heard defendant tell them that he would shoot if they did not give him money.  [3T95-14 to -16].  She did not see a gun but he gestured with his hand in his pocket and there was an object in his pocket that appeared to be gun-shaped to [...].  [3T95-16 to -19].  [...] also heard defendant say that he was armed with a gun, but she did not see one.
[brief] ” (2T88).  While Plaintiff argues that “Defendant lied to Plaintiff about her true intentions in order to trick Plaintiff into entering into the marriage” to obtain a green card, same is not true.  (Pb32-33).  Plaintiff produced no proof at trial of the existence of that intent any time before or after the marriage.  In fact, Plaintiff even asked Defendant if she was marrying him for a green card, and Defendant said no.  (1T77-12).  Defendant has a Master’s degree, comes from an affluent family in India and was fully capable of entering the United States independently.
[brief] It remained vested in [...] until recently being conveyed to [...].  [...] is only possessed of the small strip of land between the Beachway and the 1918MHWL depicted in Yellow (Pa9203 (h)  Exhibit P-1 shows the current status of ownership of the Subject property – 3.01  “[...]” is in fact the majority owner of 3.01.  [...] was the grantee from [...].  [...] ultimately purchased the Riparian Grant and all property rights from the heirs of the [...], filed all Quitclaim Deeds, and argued to the Trial Court that today it is the lawful owner of record of the subject property.
[brief] Am. Sanitary Sales Co. v. State, Dep't of Treasury, Div. of Purchase & Prop., 178 N.J. Super. 429, 435 (App. Div. 1981)..................................................11  Schwartz v. Menas, 251 N.J. 556, 577 (2022)..............................................8, 14 Tessmar v. Grosner, 23 N.J. 193, 203 (1957).............................................11  V.A.L. Floors, Inc. v. Westminister Communities, Inc., 355 N.J. Super. 416 (App. Div. 2002)....................................................11, 13 Statutes Rule 104........................................................................................................2  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS  ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] ”  United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997).  The trial court failed to fulfill its independent duty to ensure a fair and impartial jury by failing to excuse [...] when she revealed her husband’s connection with [...]’s family members and that she herself knew [...]’s family members because their churches fellowshipped together a lot.  Even if [...]’s connection to [...]’s family members was not sufficient by itself to trigger the trial court’s independent responsibility to excuse [...], the revelation that she also knew he [...] and his mother because he attended [...]’s church when Cooper was younger, in combination with [...]’s connection to [...]’s family members, surely triggered this duty.  And even if these two connections were insufficient by themselves, when considered along with [...]’s connection to the [...], it was clear that [...] was too enmeshed with the State’s case to be impartial, despite any assurances to the contrary.
[brief] THE TRAFFIC IMPACTS OF THE DRIVEWAY HAVE NOT BEEN PROVEN TO BE HEIGHT NEUTRAL  Plaintiffs assert in their Brief that all of the accessory uses proposed in Florence are “height neutral” and that all of the uses proposed on both sides of the municipal boundary are “permitted”.  Pb20, Pb23.  The Board disagrees with these assertions because they require acceptance of Plaintiffs’ unproven assertion that there is no difference in the traffic generation on the site driveway and roads in Florence (and therefore intensity of use) between the proposed 48 ft. tall warehouse and the 30 ft. tall warehouse that is permitted by Florence’s ordinances.  As found by the Board and the Trial Court, the testimony of Plaintiffs’ traffic expert, [...], despite its portrayal in Plaintiff’s Brief, does not provide an evidential foundation for an expert opinion that building height is immaterial to traffic generation.  Ja19; 5T 52:16-22.  Specifically, [...] was asked on direct examination by counsel, “Does the height of a warehouse building come into play when determining your traffic projections?  In other words, does it matter if its’s 30 feet versus 35 feet?
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE LAW DIVISION’S FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.  The defendant’s sole argument is that the municipal court and Law Division erred by concluding that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant operated his vehicle in violation of the DWI statute.  (Db 5-9).  However, both the municipal court and Law Division made correct findings of fact and conclusions of law when they held that the State did prove the defendant violated the DWI statute beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence that was submitted in the municipal court.
[brief] THE DEPARTMENT’S DECISION TO ISSUE THE PERMIT TO 290 OCEAN FOR THE PROJECT DOES NOT RESULT IN DUE PROCESS OR EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS.  Appellant argues that the Department’s “waiver” of the SRD Rule as to the Project violates its due process rights and the Equal Protection Clause.  Ab19-20.  Appellant’s main point of contention is that it was required to comply with the SRD Rule when it built an apartment building on the Blackridge Property, and it is unfair that [...], its “direct economic competitor for apartment rentals,” is being allowed to construct a “a much taller and wider building with substantially more interior space, closer to the ocean. ”  Ab19-20.  Appellant’s generalized and vague constitutional arguments are without merit.11 ---  11  Appellant does not set forth an argument in its brief challenging the Department’s denial of its request for an adjudicatory hearing pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 et seq. Ab19-20.
[brief] The Revised Policy and Amended Order to Show Cause.  Three days after the May 30, 2023 hearing, Appellants unilaterally filed a letter advising the court that they believed all the issues would soon be resolved with the repeal of the Original Policy and the adoption of a revised version of Policy 8463 (Revised Policy) at an upcoming special board meeting.  (Da124-27).  In response, the State advised the court that Appellants had failed to give the State the requested assurances that students would not have their sexual orientation or gender identity disclosed in contravention of the LAD.  (Da129).  Despite the State’s concerns regarding continued violations of the LAD, on June 6, 2023, Appellants adopted the new policy by resolution at a special, emergency meeting of the Board.  (Da134; Da138-39).  Appellants permanently adopted the Revised Policy on June 13, 2023.
[brief] In determining that a 2.5 multiple was necessary to punish the [...] for the egregious conduct in which they engaged during the Non-RICO SOL Period and in apportioning liability for punitive damages among [...], [...] and [...], [...] opined:  [...] imposed punitive damages on the [...] in a way that reflected the[ [...]’] respective responsibility.  [...] was assigned 60% of the punitive damages because he was the self-proclaimed “master chef,” leading and directing the scheme of fraud and thievery.  [...] and Leonard were [each] assigned 20% responsibility because they were co-conspirators, merely following everything [...] did without ever objecting or questioning [...]’s decisions and receiving enormous financial benefits throughout the entire time period.
[brief] (Pa5-64).  The Complaint was brought pursuant to N.J.S.A. 19:29-1(a),(e), and (f).  Plaintiff also sought declaratory relief that [...] was not entitled to seat at the time, and also brought a claim under the New Jersey Civil Right Act.  (Id.).  On March 11, 2025, the [...] entered an Order to Show Cause.  (Pa65-68).  Following an initial hearing on March 12, 2025, the court granted temporary restraints pending a trial.  On March 18, 2025, [...] filed an answer and counter petition challenging the rejection of ballots which were postmarked after election and which arrived after election day, and the rejection of a voter who returned her vote-by-mail ballot without the required certification.  (Pa98-Pa107).  On April 3, 2025, Respondent amended his cross-petition to challenge a ballot allegedly dropped off by someone who did not fill out the bearer portion of the ballot.  (Pa108-114).  On April 8, 2025, Petitioner filed an Answer to the Amended Cross-Petition.  (Pa115-119).  However, on the same day, but after the Answer was filed, Respondent tried to amend his cross-petition again, this time to add names to the list of voters whose ballots were allegedly wrongfully excluded because they arrived after election day with a postmark after election day.  (Pa120-128).  That Answer and Cross-Petition were accepted by the Court as the operative Answer during trial, although the Court denied a subsequent attempt to amend.  1T128:9-11.  On April 14 and 15, 2025, the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch., held a two-day trial during which he heard testimony from Commissioners [...] and [...], as well as from [...] and [...], regarding the process used to amend the certified election results.  At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Wellerson issued a Final Order holding that the write-in votes for “[...]” and “[...]” were to be counted in favor of Anthony [...] and James [...].  The Court denied Petitioner’s request to remove the vote of [...], and also denied all the relief sought by Respondent in the Cross-Petition.  (Pa69-70)  The court granted Appellant’s request for a stay, but only until April 29, 2025, to provide Appellant time to seek emergent review from the Appellate Division.  (Pa69-70).  Appellant filed an application for an emergent appeal on April 16, 2025, which was granted by order of the Court, and also granted Appellant’s application for a stay pending the emergent application.  (Pa71-72).  On April 22, 2025, this Court granted Appellant’s motion for stay pending appeal and accelerated the appeal on the merits.  (Pa94-97).  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] And when asked “But you didn’t tell anybody (about the funds).  The question asked of Plaintiff was that “you (Plaintiff) simply said I don’t have $70,000.00  Right?  (Trial transcript , page 73-lines 16-18)  Answer by Plaintiff: Right.  (Trial transcript T2 2, Page 73 Line 21)  9.  The Court below indicated that the Appellate decision concluded that [...] was a credible witness.  We ask this Court to adopt this same conclusion, that [...] was a credible witness, in the sense that what she said was perceived as being true, when it was false.  Since [...] admitted in her trial testimony that she lied in making the representation that she did not have access to available funds to pay her portion of the down payment, then she is a credible liar, not worthy of any belief whatsoever.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................................................  1 STATEMENT OF FACTS ..........................................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................  2  POINT 1 ..............................................................................  2  THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED  THE STANDARD FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 4:46-2(C)  Not Raised Below POINT 2 ..............................................................................  3 MISINTERPRETATION OF PERMANENT INJURY REQUIREMENT UNDER N.J.S.A. 39:6-8(A) Not Raised Below CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 4 | Document Name | Date | Appendix Page Number or Transcript | |-------------------------------|------------|-----------------------------------| | Order Granting Summary Judgment | 05/17/2023 | Page 1 | | Motion for Summary Judgment | 12/12/2022 | Page 4 | ## INDEX TO APPENDIX | Document/Exhibit Title or Description | Date | Appendix Page Number | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|----------------------| | Order Granting Summary Judgment | 05/17/2023 | -Page 1 | | Complaint | 03/24/2021 | -Page 4 | | Answer | 05/04/2021 | -Page 21 | | Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment | 12/12/2022 | -Page 26 | | Defendant’s statement of material facts in support of motion for summary judgment | 12/12/2022 | -Page 28 | | Proof of service-D5278 | 12/12/2022 | -Page 39 | | Exhibit A to certification of police report | 12/12/2022 | -Page 40 | | Exhibit B to certification of progressive policy | 12/12/2022 | -Page 44 | | Exhibit C to certification
[brief] The [...] and [...] argued that other regulatory regimes satisfy the ¹ “[...] Rb” refers to the [...]’s Respondent brief and “BP Rb” refers to [...]’s Respondent brief, both filed February 5, 2024.  “Ab” refers to Appellant’s brief, filed October 6, 2023.  consistency determination, [...] Rb39, BP Rb17-20, but refer to either future permits (e.g., NPDES, MS4) that cannot satisfy the Consistency Assessment required before this permit was granted, or to regulations with different requirements (stormwater rules).
[brief] Id.  Moreover, the Appellate Division notes the Rule imposes a temporal limitation on any fee award, holding a court may award reasonable fees only from that point in the litigation at which it becomes clear that the action is frivolous.  DeBrango v. Summit Bancorp, 328 N.J. Super. 219, 229-30 (App. Div. 2000) (interpreting impact of obligation to withdraw based on further discovery pursuant to R. 1:4-8(a)(3) upon award of fees).  Here, the trial court properly awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees and sanctions in the amount of $23,765.50.  The trial court properly assessed the reasonableness of the fee under the RPC 1.5 factors and held that the RPC 1.5 factors weigh in favor of the [...] defendants.  Specifically:  First, counsel provided a detailed and specified account of the time expended in this matter.  Notably, the time spent by the Cooper Defendants’ counsel on this matter precluded them from working on other matters.  As for the third factor, the legal invoices attached to the moving brief and the requested rates, $215.00 for partner time and $200.00 for associate time, are reasonable when compared to similar firms in the surrounding area and for attorneys with similar skills.  In fact, to some, they may be considered low.  Moreover, a review of those records reveal that none of the hours counsel spent working on this matter appear to be excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary.  Regarding the results, this litigation resulted in a complete victory to the Cooper Defendants.  Given the multitude of pleadings, the fees being request in the amount of approximately $26,000 are reasonable.  The last three factors have no direct bearing on this case other than to say that the experience and reputation of the attorneys representing the Cooper Defendants are solid.  For the foregoing reasons, the request for fees and costs in the amount of $23,765.50 is granted.  (215a).  For years, Plaintiffs have harassed the [...] defendants, misusing the legal system without regard to the supporting facts or supporting law, all to the detriment of [...] and [...] in terms of, among other things, incurring significant legal fees and costs.  Plaintiffs’ refusal to withdraw their Amended Complaint and litigate this matter in bad faith without any basis other than to harass the [...] defendants entitles the [...] defendants to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.  Therefore, based on the correct and well-reasoned decision of the trial court, the January 25, 2022 Order granting the [...] defendants’ Motion for Fees and Sanctions and the June 30 2022 Order granting the [...] defendants fee application in the amount of $23,765.50 should be affirmed.