ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Policy 8463 requires parental notification whenever a student discloses an issue and/or exhibits behaviors that may have an adverse impact on the student’s physical and/or mental health, safety and/or social/emotional well-being.  *Such notification cannot be based solely on a student’s actual and/or perceived protected characteristics under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f).*  Protected classes for schools under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f) include race, creed (religion), color, national origin, ancestry, marital status, civil union status, domestic partnership status, pregnancy or breastfeeding, sex, gender identity or expression, affectional or sexual orientation, disability, liability for service in the Armed Forces of the United States or nationality.
[directive] At minimum, a an agency's EW System policy shall provide that three separate instances of performance indicators (as in Section listed C, above) within any twelve-month period will trigger the EW System process.  review  If one incident triggers multiple performance indicators, that shall incident be double- not or triple-counted, but instead shall count as only one performance indicator.  The agency's chief executive may in his or her discretion determine that a lower number of performance indicators within atwelve-month (i.e., period one or two performance indicators) will trigger the EW System review process.  E.  Administration and Tracking
[brief] “Fairness in the application of the entire controversy doctrine focuses on the litigation posture of the respective parties and whether all of their claims and defenses could be most soundly and appropriately litigated and disposed of in a single comprehensive adjudication. ”  DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 277 (1995).  Clearly, [...] could not have “soundly and appropriately” litigated its dispute regarding the [...] until it knew there was a dispute, i.e. until it knew that [...] was only going to pay [...] a fraction of the amount [...] was owed because the Award in the [...] was less than the amount [...] owed to [...].
[brief] Although deference is ordinarily owed to a trial court’s reasonable factual inferences drawn from a video, State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 379-81 (2017), “if the trial court does not make any factual finding on a given topic, no deference is due the conclusions it reaches on that subject,” State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021); accord State in re M.P., ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2023) (slip op. at 67-70) (considering facts apparent from video of police statement not addressed by motion court).
[brief] [...]’s Aug. 12, ‘22 Cert. (Exh. “N”) in response to [...]’s Aug. 8, ‘22 Exceptions unleashed previously undisclosed, unethical bombshells, which should have been disclosed during [...] filings in Feb. & March 2022:  a.  [...]’s rejection (Nov ’21) of [...]’s attempt to use [...] as her personal piggy bank to allocate [...] Corpus to pay for her personal investments based on [...]’s unethical investment recommendations.
[brief] *Washington v. Perez*, 219 N.J. 338, 364 n.7 (2014).  The adverse inference charge was properly found to be inappropriate in the case at bar because the plaintiff was an unavailable witness due to an unrelated health condition.  *Gonzalez v. Safe & Sound Sec. Corp.*, 185 N.J. 100, 118 (2005).  It was, therefore, improper for defense counsel to repeatedly comment upon the plaintiff’s absence from trial during his summation.  *State v. Hill*, 199 N.J. 545, 560-561 (2009).  The improper comments were extremely prejudicial in this matter because they suggested that the plaintiff was being kept from the jury by plaintiff’s counsel and that they should infer that this is because her testimony was untruthful and would have been damaging had she been called as a witness at trial.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court has the ultimate authority to fashion the criteria for admission into Recovery Court.  State v. Meyer, 192 N.J. 421, 435 (2007).  In State v. Hyland, 238 N.J. 135 (2019), the New Jersey Supreme Court provided guidance as to which eligibility factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a are “discretionary” and “nondiscretionary. ”  Discretionary factors permit a Recovery Court judge to engage in fact-finding, including consideration of the defendant’s unique characteristics and circumstances, in deciding whether a defendant is amenable to treatment and does not pose a risk to the community.  Hyland, 238 N.J. at 147.  The Hyland Court expressly categorized eligibility factors N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a(4) and (9) as “discretionary. ”  A Recovery Court judge could abuse their discretion “by making a clear error in judgment” and their sentence would still be upheld as authorized by law.  *Ibid.*  The State does not have appellate review recourse for an adverse, discretionary finding.  *Ibid.*  Conversely, the *Hyland* Court also expressly designated certain eligibility factors as “nondiscretionary.
[brief] As discussed above, the Commission considered [...]’s consistent and specific statements alongside the text message exchange between [...] and [...] and the video footage taken outside the [...] building.  (Aa10-11).  Importantly, shortly after 9:00 a.m. on September 9, 2022, [...] texted [...] to check on her after she saw [...] bullying her outside the building; [...] responded, “[i]t’s bad,” and advised [...] that she had called the police.  (Aa5).  The text messages continued, with [...] telling [...] later that day, “I just went to the office, and [[...]] is blatantly misnaming me. ”  Ibid.  And the video footage, though lacking audio, supported [...]’s account of the incident that took place that morning; it revealed a contentious conversation between [...] and [...] (based on body language and arm movements), showed [...] following [...] as she walked away, and confirmed that several police officers responded to the scene.  Ibid.  The Commission also correctly issued its decision on the written record.
[brief] Defendant [...]’s Conduct Culminated in an Incident in June 2020.  On June 24, 2020, reacting to a discussion regarding a staffing coordinator’s failure to process certain forms, Defendant [...] emerged from her office visibly upset.  (Pa656 – Pa657).  Defendant [...] exited her office and yelled at [...].  (Pa656).  Defendant [...] directed profanity at him, telling him to “shut the fuck up,” and continued to berate him telling him he was the laughingstock of the hospital.  (Pa656).  Defendant [...] then mocked [...]’s previous complaints about her harassment, stating: “you know what [...], every time you run to [...], you know what they do, they laugh at you.  They [fucking] laugh at you.  I’m sick of it.  I’m sick of it. ”  (Pa656).  Defendant [...]'s behavior was intended to be physically intimidating, as she stood close to [...], with her elbows on his desk and her face inches from his face.  (Pa657).  Plaintiff witnessed the incident and was so uncomfortable she moved to the door.  (Pa656).  Plaintiff then left the room because she was afraid that she might urinate out of fear.  (Pa657).  Plaintiff was shocked by the intensity of the altercation.  (Pa658).  [...] also witnessed the incident and feared that Defendant [...] was going to physically strike [...].  (Pa657).  [...] (who served in the military) testified that the encounter was worse than anything encountered in “boot camp. ” (Pa657).  Following this incident, [...] found it necessary to step away from the office to manage his stress.  (Pa658).  D.
[brief] WAS THERE SUFFICIENT CHANGE FROM THE MITCHELL APPLICATION TO THE COLE APPLICATION?  (Ja158, par. 15; Ja165, drawing of driveways; Ja240, #15; JA245-drawing; Ja292, par. 2.)  Both the [...] application and the [...] application benefit from the Pinelands waiver, as clearly set forth in that document.  However, the applications differ significantly in the development each proposes for the subject lot.  An objector to an application must demonstrate substantial similarity in both the application itself and the circumstances of the property.  See Russell v. Tenafly, 31 N.J. 58, 65.  [...] proposed utilizing 14% of the buildable area, which the Defendant Board found too dense given the applicable ordinance's 10% maximum density requirement.  In contrast, the [...] application proposed utilizing only 5% of the buildable area, and the Board did not repeat its finding that the proposed use was too dense.  As Russell, supra, at 66, articulates:  The question for the board on a second application for a variance concerning the same property is whether there has occurred a sufficient change in the application itself or in the conditions surrounding the property to warrant entertainment of the application.  (citations omitted)...  That the above requirement be liberally construed in favor of the applicant would be in accord with the purpose of boards of adjustment to provide the necessary flexibility to the zoning ordinance (emphasis added).  Furthermore, Russell, supra, at 67, emphasizes that elements of the new application relating to the nature and implementation of property use are valid reasons not to apply res judicata.  The Board and the Trial Court failed to consider the findings of fact provided by the Pinelands waiver or the policies considered in the master plan and ordinances.  Consequently, the Board and the Trial Court did not adequately assess the ‘merits’ of the [...] application, particularly where [...] proposed two driveways, and the Pinelands waiver provided for only one driveway.  By ignoring [...]'s policy of prohibiting development within 300 feet of wetlands, the Board failed to consider the intersection of that ordinance and the Pinelands findings.  The Trial Court accepted the erroneous legal conclusions reached by the Board via the Board’s, and hence the Court’s, intentional ignoring of the established facts.  The Board concluded that the [...] application was too intense for the subject area but did not apply this reasoning when reviewing the [...] application.  This inconsistency meant there was no factual basis to assess the legal impact of the new application.
[brief] ” (Da244).  The trial court heard oral argument on February 2, 2018.  At that time, plaintiffs’ counsel reiterated his dissatisfaction with the fact that [...] and [...] would be treated as Burt defendants:  [...]:  So, Your Honor, again for clarification, I just want to make sure I understand what’s going to happen today.  [...], [...], [...] and [...] are out as defendants.  They’re out as third-party defendants.  [...] doesn’t have to produce any type of affidavit of merit against those people, yet he can get up at trial and he can talk about everything they did or they didn’t do that deviated from the standard of care, and they will be on the verdict sheet and whatever is ascribed to them, the Plaintiff Estate will be unable to recover?  That’s --that’s essentially, procedurally what’s going to occur-- occur?  THE COURT: Mmm hmm, mmm hmm, yes.
[directive] Revised Fonn Promulgated 12/31/2019 Supplement Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Spanish to by Defendant's Initials Fonnulario revisado promulgado para el 12/31/2019, Suplemento a Directiva#0l-18, CN 10079- Spanish la lniciales del acusado page 7 of7/pagina 7 de 7 NOTICE:
[brief] Parents would be hampered in making such decisions by the secrecy and exclusion endorsed by Plaintiffs even though parents are “entitled to the support of laws designed to aid [them in the] discharge” of their parental role.  *Bellotti*, 443 U.S. at 639.  Indeed, one District Court determined that “it is illegitimate to conceal information from parents for the purpose of frustrating their ability to exercise a fundamental right” and “difficult to envision” “a generalized interest in withholding or concealing from the parents of minor children, information fundamental to a child's identity, personhood, and mental and emotional well-being such as their preferred name and pronouns.
[directive] 18 3.10  Conditional Pleas Involving Multiple Defendants  . . . .  18-19 3.11  Dismissal of School Zone Cases as Part of a “Package” Deal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19-20 3.12  Reasons for Denying Pretrial Intervention Applications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20-21 Page ii 3.13  Drug Courts and Applications for Treatment in Lieu of Imprisonment Under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14  . . . . . . . . . . . 21-22 3.14  Questions and Controversies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.15  Reporting to Division of Criminal Justice  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.16  Periodic Review and Revisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23  Section 4
[brief] The very first paragraph of the complaint states that “Plaintiff is an abandoned property certificate holder as defined in N.J.S.A. §54:5-104.30(h). ”  Ia1.  The next paragraph states:  2.  The Property is abandoned as set forth in N.J.S.A. §55:19-78 et seq.  The certificate holder as unsuccessfully sought a certificate of abandonment from the public officer or tax collector.  The certificate holder seeks the entry of a court order declaring the property as abandoned pursuant to N.J.S.A. §54:5-86(b).
[brief] (21T18-11 to 15).  It also found the absence of a sentencing brief clearly had no impact given that the sentencing court’s initial weighing of factors was affirmed on direct appeal and the overall resentencing was affirmed after the remand.  (21T18-15 to 20).  The PCR court also ruled that defendant’s arguments regarding mitigating factors that should have been advanced was essentially moot since that mitigating information was presented and considered at the second sentencing.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 252.  According to the Court, special tenets apply when evaluating “disputes involving the terms of a public contract by statute” and “in defining the contours of any contractual obligation. ”  *Id.* at 262 (emphasis in the original; internal quotations and citation omitted).  Such a case falls outside “an ordinary statutory interpretation case. ”  *Id.* at 273.  When construing a legislative contract of the sort at issue here, courts must “proceed cautiously,” *ibid.*, and employ “the clear indication, or unmistakability, standard.
[brief] D.  The sentencing court’s overall fairness assessment was thorough and proper. \(^3\)  The sentencing court followed this Court’s order to “provide ‘[a]n explicit statement, explaining the overall fairness of a sentence imposed on a defendant’ pursuant to Torres, 246 N.J. at 268.  Defendant mistakenly quotes a subpoint heading in the sentencing court’s opinion as the statement of fairness required by Torres. \(^4\)  In fact, the court’s overall fairness evaluation was stated in the opinion’s conclusion:  [T]he court applied Yarbough guideline 3A to its analysis when determining the Defendant’s sentence and found 3A so compelling and heavily weighted as to support consecutive sentencing of the certain persons offense.  The court also finds, for the foregoing reasons, that, due to the Defendant’s criminal history, the particular facts of this case, and the legislative intent behind the certain persons statute, the aggregate thirty-year sentence is fair to the interests of justice and to the Defendant.
[brief] Somebody who knows where to get a tool when he has a plan, preconceived plan, he knows to go directly to the tool room to get the tool he wanted for his plan.  It’s someone who knew where the money was kept in an unmarked door in that room.  And it’s somebody when—when that failed, which when trying to force his way in failed, he knew where the keys were.  Unmarked keys hidden in the bar.  . . .  This is somebody that used to work there.
[directive] For the purposes of these Guidelines, the expiration of a sentence shall include any post- incarceration supervision or other supervision such as community supervision for life (CSL) or parole supervision for life (PSL).  Items Not Needed for Prosecution  Nothing in these Guidelines shall require the retention of items or portions of seized items that are not required for prosecution of a case.  Furthermore, if the evidentiary portion of an object can be removed, the entire object need not be retained.  Examples of such items are not limited to Attorney General Guidelines - Evidence Retention -January Page 4 2011 but may include the hard drive of a computer, the "black box" in a vehicle or a bloodstained section of a carpet or a piece of furniture.  Educational Use
[brief] 2.  April 2016  Chancery Division, Probate Part Ruling  As previously noted, the Appellant refused to close on the Property, despite executing the January 2015 As-Is Contract and advising [...] that all the Contract’s conditions were satisfied in May 2015.  As a result, in January 2016, [...] filed a Verified Complaint, seeking to enforce the January 2015 As-Is Contract.  (Da 10.)  The Appellant responded by filing a Verified Complaint in February 2016, seeking the removal of [...] as the Administrator of the Estate.  (Da 43.)  The Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. substantively addressed the issue as to whether pursuant to the January 2015 As-Is Contract and its conditions, the Estate had a duty to perform additional environmental studies and other potential work, as requested by the Appellant.  Specifically, [...] held that the “[...] consistent insistence upon additional remediation and inspections would lead a reasonable person to believe they intended to breach the January 2015 Contract. ”  (Pa 42a.)  [...] nevertheless extended the Appellant the opportunity to comply with the terms of the January 2015 As-Is Contract within thirty days; their failure to comply would mean termination of the Contract and would allow [...] to convey the Property to [...].  As to the As-Is Condition of the Contract  [...] held:  By a plain reading of the January 2015 Contract, Mathews was under no obligation to cure any perceived defects of the Property.  The fact that Mathews agreed to remove certain “millings”\(^1\) and debris from the Property did not destroy his right to refuse to perform other corrective acts in the future….  Accordingly, Mathews was under no obligation to perform the requested remediation and the January 2015 Contract remains enforceable.  As such the Phillip[s’] request that Mathews be compelled to perform certain remediation work is DENIED.  --- \(^1\)  The [...] were the individuals who removed the millings.  [...] addressed the question of the responsibility stemming from any environmental conditions on the Property, upholding the terms of the January As-Is Contract.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8d.  The Court also held that the case of Dockser v. Schwartzberg, 433 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2006) prevented Courts from deciding, even on a confirmation and vacatur motion, whether or not [...] had followed its rules when it found a waiver of the LCC rules had somehow occurred.  The Court applied Dockser to mean that all procedural decisions of arbitration authorities are theirs to make without judicial review, ignoring all of the cases cited above that ruled oppositely.  The Court also found that [...] had waived his right to claim 3 arbitrators were needed by failing to raise the issue whilst pro se in 2016 when opposing confirmation of the Partial award voiding the $970,000 loan.
[directive] Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible  Beverage by public place, or place of assembly or motor vehicle.  Person under Legal Age  Possession of Alcoholic Actor of legal age to purchase alcohol brings or possesses alcohol on school property  2C:33-16  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible  Beverage on without written permission of school board.  School Property Actor offers or entices underage person to drink alcohol; disorderly persons offense unless it falls into one of the listed exceptions in statute.
[brief] 1.  Court erred in Oct. '22 Order, par. 1, & Mar. 7, '23 Order, par. 3, to reject, & not grant, my Aug. 8, '23 Exceptions to [...]’s Intermediate Accounting for his updates & redistribution.  It was due to Oct. '22 Rider’s wrong rulings, as accepted by [...] simply by repeating them in Feb. 17th rulings w/o explanations, & disregarded evidence proving 1) they contradicted decedent’s Will & NJ Court rulings that I am Vested Remainder Beneficiary, w/standing to submit Exceptions, rather than Contingent, as wrongly ruled; 2) Verified Complaint listed me as “Interested Party” to review Accounting that allowed Exceptions; & 3) My Exceptions focused on Corpus mistakes, that would directly impact me as lifetime beneficiary, & accounting misstatements, & NOT on Income, Commissions, nor Accounting “style”, as wrongly ruled.
[brief] The Appellate Division reviews Orders granting or denying motions seeking the enforcement of a litigant’s rights, pursuant to Rule 1:10-3, under an abuse of discretion standard.  *See Lemad Corp. v. Honachefsky*, 2017 WL 5478344, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 14, 2017).  When the subject is a breach of contract claim, “[i]n the absence of a factual dispute, the interpretation and enforcement of a contract, including a settlement agreement, is subject to de novo review by the appellate court.  Under that standard of review, ‘[a] trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ’”  *Savage v. Twp. of Neptune*, 472 N.J. Super. 291, 306 (App. Div. 2022), rev’d on other grounds, 2024 WL 2002418 (N.J. May 7, 2024) (citation omitted).  In *Savage*, the Appellate Division reviewed a trial court’s decision regarding whether statements made in an interview were disparaging, in which case they would have violated the parties’ settlement agreement.  The Appellate Division held there that the question of whether the statements were disparaging was subject to an abuse of discretion standard, but “the question of whether those statements violated the terms of the agreement, that is, the interpretation of the settlement agreement, is a matter of law subject to our de novo review. ”  Id.  Under this standard, this Court’s determination of [...]’s rights and remedies following [...]’s multiple and undisputed breaches of the Settlement Agreement should be reviewed under a de novo standard.
[brief] In pertinent part, Section 4.4(a) of the Redevelopment Agreement provided:  Redevelopment Fee.  Redeveloper shall pay Redevelopment Fee to the City, consisting of the following:  (i) a one-time “Administrative Fee” as established by City Ordinance in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000), payable upon the execution of this Agreement.  (ii) a one-time fee (the “Redevelopment Fee”) in the amount of Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000), payable upon the earlier of: (A) Redeveloper’s closing on the acquisition of the Property or (B) January 31, 2021.  The City agrees that the Redevelopment Fee shall benefit the City’s redevelopment areas and shall serve as an additional community benefit to address any impacts in the City relating to the redevelopment.  Ibid.