ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] At that oral argument, Plaintiff stated that he “may elect to voluntary dismiss his federal claims” and so the Court ordered Plaintiff to submit a letter by August 15, 2019, to the Court stating his intention to removal the federal claims “unequivocally” if Plaintiff wished to do so.  (Da025, 7/29/19 Order; Da021, District Court Docket Report, ECF #98).  F.  Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Fifth Amended Complaint, purportedly removing all federal claims resulting in remand.  On August 15, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a motion to amend with a proposed a Fifth Amended Complaint, purportedly removing all Federal Claims.  (Da021, District Court Docket Report, ECF #101).  Recently, plaintiff indicated he wants to amend his complaint to remove all federal causes of action so that the case can be remanded back to [...].  Although it should have been a simple matter to serve a proposed amended complaint that accomplished this goal, this was not done.  Plaintiff’s latest proposed amended complaint (see Doc. No. 101-2) is replete with references to federal causes of action.  Nevertheless, plaintiff has unequivocally stated on the record on several occasions, most recently during a phone conference on August 30, 2019, that his intent is to remove all federal causes of action.  (Da028, 9/10/19 Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend; Da23, District Court Docket Report, ECF #107).  The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to amend “but only to the extent that plaintiff removes all federal causes of action” and noted that “[t]he operative amended complaint in the case is Doc. No. 101-2. ”  (Da030, 9/10/19 Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend; Da023, District Court Docket Report, ECF #107).  [...] then entered an Order on September 11, 2019, “Granting Plaintiff leave until 10/14/2019 to file either a stipulation of voluntary dismissal or a motion to remand. ” (Da023, District Court Docket Report, ECF #108).  The next day, September 12, 2019, [...] entered a Text Order supplementing [...]’s prior order which provided that “the Court finding good cause to enter this Order given its intimate knowledge of the history of the case and the problems incurred in trying to assure that counsel complies with the Court's Orders; and accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED the parties may serve an executed Stipulation or Consent Order by October 14, 2019, stating that the case may be remanded to state court.  It is further ORDERED counsel for the [...] shall take the "laboring oar" with regard to the preparation, execution and filing of the Stipulation. ”  (Da023, District Court Docket Report, ECF #109).  The Stipulation of Dismissal was filed on October 15, 2019.  (Da023, District Court Docket Report, ECF #110).  On October 17, 2019, [...] issued an Order and Opinion remanding the case to New Jersey Superior Court, [...].  (Da023, District Court Docket Report, ECF #111).
[directive] ¿Entiende que si usted está aceptando culpabilidad por el delito de poner en peligro el bienestar de un/a menor conforme a N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(iii) o por ser el dirigente de una red de pornografía infantil conforme a 2C:24-4.1, o por la tentativa de cometer N.J.S.A. cualquiera de esas infracciones y la infracción ocurrió el 1 de febrero de 2018 o después de esa fecha, además de cualquier otra condena, y a solicitud del fiscal, el juez le impondrá una condena especial de supervisión de por vida de su libertad condicional, a menos que el juez determine y conste en el acta que la supervisión de la libertad condicional de por vida no es necesaria para proteger a la comunidad o para disuadirle a usted de que cometa actividades delictivas en el futuro? (only complete if the offense occurred on or after February 1, 2018)
[brief] Super. 372 (App. Div. 1995) addressed the grounds on which a director or officer of a corporation may be liable for conversion:  To constitute an act of conversion, “[i]t is sufficient if the owner has been deprived of his property by the act of another assuming an unauthorized dominion and control over it.  It is the effect of the act which constitutes the conversion. ”  Any corporate officer, or director who participates by aid, instigation, or assistance in a conversion, is liable.  A director or officer of a corporation does not incur personal liability for its torts merely by reason of his official character, but, a director or officer who commits a tort, or who directs the tortious act to be done, or participates or cooperates therein, is liable to third persons injured hereby, even though liability may also attach to the corporation for the tort.
[brief] ## Statutes *N.J.S.A.* 2A:14-2 ...........................................................................................................  4  *N.J.S.A.* 30:4-27.7 ......................................................................................................  4  ## Rules *R.* 2:12-7 .....................................................................................................................  8 *R.* 1:4-8(c) .................................................................................................................... 5, 8, 9 *R.* 2:11-3(e)(1)(E) ......................................................................................................  11  *R.* 4:5-2 .......................................................................................................................  6 *R.* 4:6-4 .......................................................................................................................  6  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS & RULINGS  Injunctive Order directing that Plaintiff’s lawsuits must be reviewed by the Assignment Judge for a determination of dismissal (entered March 9, 2012)  .................................................................  Da31 Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s July 11, 2022 Notice of Motion (entered July 13, 2022)  .................................................................  Da17  Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s November 14, 2022 Notice of Motion (entered November 17, 2022)  .................................................................  Da29  Appellate Court Written Decision (entered September 27, 2023)  ...............  Da31  Order Dismissing Plaintiff-Appellant’s December 4, 2023 Notice of Motion (entered December 12, 2023)  .................................................................  AB17a  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Id. at 153 (quoting Witt, 223 N.J. at 439-40).  Such special justification “might” exist when time shows that the ruling was poorly reasoned, changed circumstances have eliminated the original rationale, the rule creates unworkable distinctions, or when a standard defies consistent application by lower courts.  *Id.* (quoting *Luchejko*, 207 N.J. at 209).  A Supreme Court justice has observed that “[t]o the extent that the principle of *stare decisis* affords a measure of stability it is of great social value. ”  *David v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co.*, 360 N.J. Super. 127, 142 (App. Div. 2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted); cf. *Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., Inc.*, 178 N.J. Super. 19, 35 (App. Div. 1981) (The Appellate Division is “bound by the principles of law developed and declared by our Supreme Court.
[brief] Here, the trial court’s conclusion that “the obligations of the parties pursuant to the PSA would be for Defendants to complete the RIR to the satisfaction of the NJDEP and subsequently turn over responsibility for the remaining remediation to Plaintiff” is unsupported by the evidence and incorrect as a matter of law.  (Pa0230.)  The evidence and testimony elicited at trial clearly establish that Defendants understood that they were required under the PSA to obtain a site-wide RAO, and there is nothing in the PSA to support the trial court’s finding that Defendants were required only to submit the RIR prior to closing.  (Pa0261, Art. 11.2; 2T97:23 to 98:21; 4T44:17 to 45:5, 147:24 to 148:21, 249:18 to 250:2; 5T43:7-21, 45:11 to 46:20, 162:16 to 163:7; 6T78:10 to 80:8, 144:25 to 145:3; 8T31:8-22, 61:5-10, 64:3 to 65:15, 68:7 to 69:4.)  However, the trial court improperly relied on extrinsic evidence and effectively rewrote the PSA—which does not contain a single reference to the RIR—to the Defendants’ benefit.  Moreover, as in 89 Water Street Assocs., the trial court’s order for specific performance improperly shifts the burden of Defendants’ contractual obligations to Plaintiff.
[brief] (Pa11).  The subject of the letter was “New Legislation Notice – P.L. 2019, c. 157” and it served to notify active employees of the newly enacted law.  (Pa11).  All Certifying Officers were advised of their responsibilities to distribute the information and to certify that they had done so.  (Pa11).  The Division hired [...] to mail postcards to all 200,647 SPRS retirees at their home addresses on file with the Division.
[brief] RPC 1.7(a) prohibits attorneys from representing clients where there is a “concurrent conflict of interest”, which exists if: (1) the representation of one client will be **directly adverse** to another client; or (2) there is a **significant risk** that the representation of one or more clients will be **materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client**, a former client, or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.  [RPC 1.7(a) (emphasis added). ]  Under RPC 1.7(b), in some circumstances, an attorney may represent a client despite a concurrent conflict of interest by obtaining written informed consent.  “When the lawyer represents multiple clients in a single matter, the consultation shall include an explanation of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved[.]”  RPC 1.7(b)(1).  However, a conflict **cannot** be waived when it involves “the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation[….]”  RPC 1.7(b)(4) (emphasis added).  “RPC 1.7 is rooted in the concept that ‘[n]o man can serve two masters,’ […] and it has been suggested that employment should be declined if there is a question whether the representation will create an adversity of interest between two clients.
[brief] At the plea hearing, [...] acknowledged that he possessed a handgun without a permit on the day of his arrest and that by pleading guilty to this count of the indictment he had violated his probation.  (3T:14-18 to 16-3)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE MR. SAPP WAS FRISKED ABSENT REASONABLE SUSPICION HE HAD A WEAPON.
[brief] 1.  In failing to give weight to [...]’s positive prison record and other post-offense rehabilitative conduct, the Court failed to sentence [...] as he stood on the date of sentencing and its finding of aggravating factors three and nine were not supported by competent, credible evidence in the record.  [...] presented evidence that he had been significantly deterred by his incarceration and that he had taken great strides that reduced his risk of recidivism.  He had maintained a pristine prison record—never having been cited for a single infraction during his five years of incarceration; he completed vocational programs and maintained consistent employment while incarcerated; he completed the Successful Employment and Lawful Living Reentry Program; he earned college credits toward an associate’s degree; and he completed the Cage Your Rage program with perfect attendance, which helped him cope with negative emotions to avoid negative reactions.
[brief] He then testified: the grade was changed to direct the runoff towards Charlottes Walk, the new proposed roadway, and additional drainage and landscaping were put in so that there's no adverse impact on the neighbors and it provides a buffer, which is not required by ordinance, but based on the request we got from the Board to go above and beyond (T2: p10, ln 13-19)  [...] then addressed [...]’s objections, stating:  The plot plan testimony is, we're not asking to build those house boxes.  We're not asking for basement apartments.  We're asking for a nine lot conforming residential subdivision, to create nine conforming lots that individual home buyers are going to come in.
[directive] 5.  ..........54  ARREST OF TIME PREPARED AT REPORTS INCIDENT ENFORCEMENT .............................................54  Probable Cause of Affidavit of Substance and Form 5.1 .............................54  Cause Probable of Affidavit of Submission Electronic 5.1.1  Factors and Risk Violence  Domestic Present of Inclusion  5.1.2 and/or Probable Cause of Affidavit in Circumstances  Relevant .........................................55  Report Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary Uniform of Development 5.2 5 5  Report.....................................................................................................................  Enforcement Preliminary Law in Information a of Scope Limited 5.3 .......................................................................................................57  Report Incident .............................................................58  Information Contact Victim of Protection 5.4 Inform to Incident Report Enforcement Preliminary Law of Use 5.5 ................................................................................................58  Decisions  Charging Enforcement Preliminary Law Prepare/Share and Access to Capacity 5.6 8 .....................................................................................................5  Reports Incident ..........................................................................................58  Agencies Police 5.6.1  Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary to Access Electronic 5.6.2 ..................................................................59  Prosecutors On-Call by Report .............59  COMPLAINT-WARRANT OF ISSUANCE AFTER APPEARANCES FIRST 6.
[brief] Shortly thereafter, [...]’s right to regulate the location and placement of poles within its borders was reaffirmed in federal court in the case of *[...] v. [...]* (D.N.J., Sept. 5, 1918).  DA at 461a *et seq.*  There, [...] petitioned the Town in 1914 for permission to erect, maintain, and string electric lines on certain roads.  The Town’s governing body approved the request with the caveat that they must be placed underground, but the Town refused to permit [...] to run the lines on poles above ground.  [...] again sued, this time in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, arguing among other things that [...] had no legal authority to require that the wires be placed underground.  Id.  The District Court dismissed [...]’s lawsuit, holding that the State’s highest court had already previously ruled that the Town did indeed have the power to reasonably regulate power lines in a manner that it deemed appropriate, and that the federal court had no jurisdiction to overrule that decision.  Id.⁵  In addition to the historical litigation between [...] and [...], which establishes [...]’s power to regulate power lines in its right-of-way and is res --- ⁵
[brief] Let’s say you were able to get an expert ballistics expert, okay, somebody who’s like [...], okay, let’s assume that.  Let’s assume that you could get the ballistics expert and he gave – he looked at the same things, right?  What would he have looked at?  He would have looked at the Glock itself, right?  You agree with that?  A Yes.  Q  In a pre-trial posture, right, before trial this would have been, right, is that what we’re talking about?  A Yes.  Q  So you would have had access to whatever evidence the State had?  A  I would have had access even without an expert, but yes, an expert would have been given access to it as well.  Q  Expert could have had -- but he would have had access to the Glock, right?  A Yes.  Q  He would have had access to the actual bullet that was removed from [...]’ leg, his knee, right?  A Yes.  Q  You would have had access to the shell casing that apparently was found and also matched with the Glock, right?  A Yes.  Q  Do you know whether or not you would have had access to let’s say the plexiglass door of the store?  Do you recall that, the bullet went through the door?  A  I do recall it went through the door.  That I -- I don’t know.  Q  Did you ever look into that at any point?  During the case did you say let’s see if we can get this plexiglass examined?  A  Again, no, because it wasn’t the theory of my defense.  1T44
[brief] C.  The Course of Performance After Execution of the PSA  After executing the PSA, Plaintiff hired a team of professionals who applied for and obtained both a redevelopment designation and plan from the [...] for the redevelopment of the Property as contemplated by the PSA.  (2T102:10 to 104:20; Pa0333; Pa0354-55; Pa0356-57.)  Defendant [...], on the other hand, relied almost exclusively on [...] to handle all environmental matters in connection with the PSA and to coordinate with Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s team at [...].  (4T234:23 to 235:13, 240:3-11; 5T152:25 to 153:10, 173:14-22.)  However, after executing the PSA, Defendants did virtually nothing to fulfill the Seller’s Environmental Obligations under the PSA.
[brief] As indicated above in the Procedural History, [...] filed its Complaint against [...] on February 14, 2023.  Da001 – Da009.  Paragraph 5 of that Complaint alleged that “[o]n or about June 8, 2022, Defendant and Plaintiff entered into a subcontractor agreement (“Contract”) designating Defendant as the general contractor and Plaintiff as a subcontractor. ”  Da002.  Paragraph 6 of the Complaint alleged that “[d]efendant prepared the contract. ”  Da002.  Although that paragraph alleged that [...] prepared the contract, no contract was annexed to Complaint nor did the Complaint aver that [...] now was relying on the document that allegedly had been prepared by [...], whether it had been subject to negotiation and revision or whether it even have been executed by the Parties.  Additionally, [...] conveniently omitted from its Complaint any mention of the fact that the contract upon which it then was relying contained a mandatory arbitration provision that was subject to being specifically enforced.
[brief] Once it is established that the ESI Order requires production of documents outside Rule 4:10-2(a)’s scope, Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments fall apart.  First, Plaintiffs reprise the trial court’s gatekeeping theory, viz., that discovery orders must “maximize the production of relevant evidence,” even if thousands of irrelevant documents are swept up in the process.  Pb3, 21-27.  Defendants have explained why that theory contravenes Rule 4:10-2(a)’s relevancy limitation.  Db26-30.  As this Court has held, parties have no right to “search through their opponents’ electronic devices for responsive data,” Lipsky v. N.J. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 447, 468 (App. Div. 2023), even though doing so would surely “yield the greatest number of legitimate discoverable materials,” Pb22.
[brief] Neither party deserves a greater equitable claim than the Defendant.  Nor acceptance urged by [...] it and Plaintiff’s alleged losses are attributed to the Defendant, or entitlement to reimbursement of expense and legal fees.  The appellate decision in Last v. Audubon Park Associates, 227 N.J. Super 602 (App Div 1988), presents facts resulting in a decision often cited by practitioners challenging motions to vacate a final judgment in a tax sale foreclosure.
[brief] SAC ¶ 68.  By May 2018, defendants [...], [...], [...]’ attorney, and others in CEP-Defendants’ zone of authority, told third-parties that they would be receiving assignment of the solar-energy rights that had originally been reflected in [...]’s filings which plaintiffs had acquired.  Defendants [...], [...] and others in CEP-Defendants' zone of authority, conspired and agreed that [...] and [...] would continue to lure plaintiffs into believing that they would acquire plaintiffs' Solar Rights for valuable consideration shortly, or eventually, and assured [...] and plaintiffs that they were genuinely intending to pursue an acquisition as soon as the rights could be fully understood.
[brief] These individuals are not engaging in an inherently political endeavor by merely seeking to receive important information about their community.  The Court below did correctly find that there was a colorable claim of privacy in the requested e-mail addresses, primarily basing its determination on the fact that [...]’s Terms of Service and Privacy Policy indicate that said information will be maintained privately.  Da109.  Therefore, an analysis of the Doe factors is warranted in this matter.  Moving to the *Doe* balancing test, the type of “record” requested is personal e-mail addresses, which are not in themselves a “document” or “record”, but personal information used to sign up for a third-party local alert service.
[brief] The insureds relied upon sections of “N.J.A.C. 11:1-20.2(a) – (i),” which also figured in the Law Division’s holding in this case (*See*, SSR 35,36, Dta1365,6, citing, N.J.A.C. 11:1-20.2(d)), to argue that the insurer “altered the coverage of [the prior] policy, without proper notice and in violation of” that regulation.  The court, although finding that the regulation was “not applicable” in the circumstances before it, held that “[r]egardless of N.J.A.C. 11:1-20.2’s inapplicability,” “in order to fulfill the insured’s expectations . . . courts will void a reduction in coverage that was not called to the insured's attention," citing, Bauman.
[brief] (Pa 67 to Pa 69).  STATEMENT OF FACTS  On or about September 27, 2021, the parties entered into a lease agreement for the premises known as [...] (Pa 18- to Pa 24).  Said lease was introduced as J-1 into evidence (1T 28-16-22)*.  The lease provided that the rent was $3,500.00 per month and a rent ledger was introduced as J-2 into evidence.  (1T 6-9-11; 28-16-22).  Defendant maintained she incurred repairs after the fire which bills were introduced as J-3 into evidence.  (1T 6-12-14; 28-16-22).  The Plaintiff introduced photographs of the establishment taken 1-2 days after the fire which was introduced as J-4 into evidence.  (1T 6-15-17).  The Defendant introduced a photograph of the premises taken shortly after the fire which was introduced as J-5 into evidence.  (1T 6-18-21; 28-16-22).  No testimony was adduced at trial and the matter proceeded by arguments of counsel.
[brief] **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**  Defendant filed a Motion to Vacate Arrears (voiding a 1990 default judgment) against plaintiff on August 30, 2023 (Pa50-Pa67).  The plaintiff mailed a cross-motion to the court in answer but knowingly failed to complete Service as Plaintiff [...] did not send her answer to this defendant as designated by court rules for completion of service which the court ultimately identified as “…no Response having been filed” (Pa1), thus the plaintiff failed to validate Service of Process for the March 1990 hearing (Pa7).  The trial judge heard this entire case on paper and on September 22, 2023 denied all claims without prejudice by way of order filed on September 26, 2023 (Pa17-Pa19).  On October 16, 2023, the defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Pa-33-Pa48; Pa75-Pa76), and the plaintiff once more made no attempt to file an Answer (Pa1; Pa36-Pa37; Pa44; Pa46).  The trial judge denied all claims without prejudice on November 17, 2023 (Pa1-Pa2).  Both motions were heard on paper as the court denied the defendant’s request for oral arguments for both motions.