ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This, again, brings us back to the Defendants stated position that the Defendants failed to report a disciplinary proceeding alone.  Defendants’ position is consistent with the attorney discipline structure in New Jersey.  Further, the inclusion of bar complaint along with disciplinary proceeding would capture all disciplinary complaints involving Legal Services filed against an attorney whether (i) in New Jersey, (ii) another state with a similar court run discipline procedure, or (iii) in a state in which the bar association metes out discipline to attorneys.  Under that reasonable interpretation of the terms, an OAE proceeding involving legal services rendered to a client would be a Disciplinary Proceeding, but it would not be a bar complaint.
[brief] (9T:196-16 to 197-7); (9T:198-23 to 24).  Between 9pm and 11pm, the entire family gathered in the living room and watched King Kong.  (7T:137-23 to 128-8).  At approximately 11:00PM, everybody was downstairs watching television or getting food in the kitchen waiting for the ball to drop on New Year’s Eve.  (6T:116-21 to 25).  At some point, [...] went upstairs to work on a presentation for school on horticulture.  (7T:308-19 to 309-5).  As it got closer to midnight, [...] went upstairs to look for [...].  (6T:117-9 to 13).  \(^2\)  [...] is also referred to as [...] Kologi’s grandmother although [...] and [...] were never legally married.  (_)  [...] Kologi loaded an AK-47 style firearm in his brother [...] upstairs bedroom.
[directive] Perguntas adicionais para determinados crimes sexuais  Additional Questions for Certain Sexual Offenses (Portuguese)  NOTA:  Se você está se declarando culpado pelo descumprimento de uma condição da supervisão comunitária vitalícia N.J.S.A.  1o segundo os termos da lei 2C:43-6.4 e o descumprimento ocorreu em de julho de 2014 ou após esta data, você deverá responder à Pergunta 4b.  NOTE: N.J.S.A.  If you are pleading guilty to a violation of a condition of community supervision for life, pursuant to 2C:43-6.4 and the violation occurred on or after July 1, 2014 you should answer Question 4b.
[brief] Consequently, the adoption of a Zoning Regulation requires a coordinated process from start to finish, with all relevant parties --- the Governing Body, the Planning Board, and the public --- having a clear understanding as to the proposed new Regulations being consistent or inconsistent with the Master Plan and strictly following the required process.  Any failure of proper analysis --- or absence of recognition as to consistent or inconsistent --- invalidates the process and the Zoning Ordinance.
[brief] To date, [...] has not allowed plaintiffs access to Unit 1601 to measure it.  In addition to [...], the defendants are its sole member ([...]) and the New Jersey marketing agent for the development ([...]).  [...] offered the 99 Hudson units for sale to the consumer public pursuant to the POS prepared by [...].  The POS contains the form SPA required to be signed by all purchasers.  [...] refused to deviate from it.  The sale of condominium units to the consumer public is regulated by the New Jersey Department of Consumer Affairs and subject to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”) and the New Jersey Planned Real Estate Development Full Disclosure Act (“PREDFDA”), both important pieces of consumer protection legislation.
[brief] Medical Examiner [...], who conducted the autopsy, testified that many of the bone fractures he saw were not consistent with an accidental fall.  (42T:188-8 to 20)  The defense posited that those fractures were not [...]’s cause of death, but instead the result of actions [...] took after his death during the destruction of his body.  (41T:89-5 to 18; 43T:122-21 to 123-15)  Dr. Mazari acknowledged that he could not conclusively determine whether the bone injuries occurred before or after death because the “gold standard” for evaluating the timing of an injury is “soft tissue. ”  (42T:176-12 to 177-4)  The soft tissue in this case was so “severely altered” by thermal damage that Dr. Mazari could not determine the timing of the injuries.  (42T:176-12 to 177-4; 204-6 to 205-24)  Dr. Mazari asked [...], a forensic anthropologist who worked in the Northern Regional Office of the Medical Examiner, to review the fractures to “determine the timing” of the injuries between antemortem (prior to death), perimortem (around the time of death), and postmortem (after death).
[directive] The law enforcement executive’s decision, or the decision of the designee, shall be memorialized and retained in the use-of-force investigative file; and (f)  After the review is completed, supervisory and/or training officers should examine and analyze the use of force incident, including any body-worn or other video evidence, with the officer as a training tool.  This examination should analyze the circumstances that led to the use of force as well as the force that was used, so that the officer can gain insight into which tactics and decisions were effective and whether different tactics or decisions could have been used to improve the outcome.
[brief] *(PA139-140)*  The reasonably debatable” standard requires courts to provide a considerable degree of deference to an arbitrator’s award.  In other words, even if the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion, it will uphold the award so long as it is “justifiable,” or otherwise presents a plausible interpretation of the agreement.  See Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass’n, Loc. 67, 247 N.J. 202, 212 (2021) (“[I]f two or more interpretations of a labor agreement could be plausibly argued, the outcome is at least reasonably debatable. ”).  See also Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201 (2013) (“Under the ‘reasonably debatable’ standard, a court reviewing [a public sector] arbitration award ‘may not substitute its own judgment for that of the arbitrator, regardless of the court’s view of the correctness of the arbitrator’s position. ’”).  Nonetheless, the deference courts provide to an arbitrator’s decision “is not a rubber stamp. ”  Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripoma, 228 N.J. 4, 12 (2017).  Although arbitrators may “fill in gaps” to provide meaning to certain terms, they “may not look beyond the four corners of a contract to alter unambiguous language. ”  Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. City of Trenton, 205 N.J. 422, 430 (2011).  To that end, a court should vacate an arbitration award “as not reasonably debatable when arbitrators have, for example, added new terms to an agreement or ignored its clear language. ”  Id. at 429.  For example, in PBA Local 160 v. Township of North Brunswick, 272 N.J. Super. 467 (App. Div. 1994), this Court set aside an arbitration award where the arbitrator failed to give appropriate regard to the express terms of the parties’ agreement.
[brief] ”  The Lower Court did not reach this conclusion at all.  See T, generally. the requirements of the Act. ”); *Jubelt v. United N. Bankers, Ltd.*, No. CIV.A. 13-7150 ES, 2015 WL 3970227, at *14 (D.N.J. June 30, 2015) (same).9  Second, in the Class Action, this Court recently affirmed this long-standing precedent and unequivocally held that there is no private right of action under the NJCFLA.  *See Diana v. LVNV Funding LLC*, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2241, at *7-8 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 26, 2024) (plaintiff lacks standing under the NJCFLA because there is no private right of action under the statute and “[s]ince plaintiff does not have a private right of action to pursue a violation of the CFLA, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that plaintiff may not circumvent established law by coding his complaint under the UDJA.
[brief] ” (T1, 14:11-20).  She also indicated that the drinking well is one (1) mile away.  (T1, 14:21-24).  Although Plaintiff’s LSRP asserted that most of the “potential receptors” are too far away to be of concern, (T1, 39:17-22), he acknowledged, “we don’t have a book of groundwater data to evaluate concentration trends. ” (T1, 34:7-8).  This is because he undertook the “first groundwater sampling in May” and aquifer testing in June.  (T1, 29:17-18).  Plaintiff’s LSRP suggested that natural attenuation might be appropriate.  (T1, 18:24-19:3).  “Natural attenuation is a process by which the contaminants naturally degrade over time based on bacteria present -- conditions that are present beneath the site. ” (T1, 19:17-19).  He stated, “there’s already been a period of natural attenuation over time…” (T1, 38:10-12).  However, the contamination first occurred in 1991, and still exists today, thirty (30) years later.
[directive] Orthotics and Prosthetics Board of Examiners  Perfusionists Advisory Committee  Board of Pharmacy State Board of Physical Therapy Examiners  Physician Assistant Advisory Committee  State Board of Polysomnography Pool and Spa Contractors and Pool and Spa Builders and Installers Advisory Committee  Professional Counselor Examiners Committee  State Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors  State Board of Professional Planners
[directive] L. 1991 174,s. 1.  ,c.  Approval and payment claims and required general of account books of 40A :5-17.  Approval and payment of claims and required general books of account.  a.  Approval of claims.  The governing body shall approve or disapprove all claims.  In the case of a county, other than a county which has adopted a form of government pursuant to the "Optional County Charter Law," P.L. 1972, c. 154 40:41A-1 (C. et seq.), the goveming body may, by resolution, designate one person who may approve claims between meetings of the governing body.  The specified designee shall be chosen from the following positions: the certified financial officer, chief fiscal officer, county administrator, director of finance, treasurer or comptroller.  Any approval by the designated person shall be presented to the county governing body at its next meeting for ratification, except that, prior to being paid, such vouchers shall be brought to the attention of the freeholder who has responsibility for the designee.
[brief] ””  State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 333-34 (2005) (quoting Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953)).  Although there may be plain error during a jury trial, an error will be found “harmless” if the error did not contribute to the jury's verdict.  That is “the error must be ‘sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether [it] led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached. ’”  State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80, 95 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 338 (1971)).  This is true even if the error is of constitutional dimension.  Macon, 57 N.J. at 338; State v. Slobodian, 57 N.J. 18, 23 (1970).  “The Supreme Court has emphasized that ‘most constitutional errors can be harmless,’ and are therefore not subject to automatic reversal. ”  State v. Camacho, 218 N.J. 533, 547 (2014) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991)).  The trial court ruled properly and well within their discretion in all the rulings mentioned in this point.  Should the opposite be believed, however, any error would still clearly be harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence that was presented in this case.  The doctrine of harmless error is intended for just this type of case.  The alleged errors would be wholly outweighed by the vast evidence that identified defendant as the shooter, including a clear video showing someone appearing exactly as defendant appeared when he was apprehended near the scene of the crime, in an area where the shooter could be seen running right before officers apprehended defendant.  (16T:27-16 to 43-10).  The shooter could be seen emptying a full magazine of bullets into the victim, and after the defendant was apprehended, a gun was recovered nearby with the slide back and all rounds discharged.  (16T: 39-18 to 40-3).  Even if the trial court’s rulings are found to have been less than perfect, none of them should be seen as affecting the jury’s verdict in any way.  Defendant’s convictions should, therefore, be affirmed.
[brief] On or about November 3, 2021, the [...] charged defendant, [...], under Indictment No. [...], with third-degree terroristic threats, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) (Count One); fourth-degree retaliation for past official action, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:27-5 (Count Two); and, fourth-degree stalking, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b) (Count Three).
[brief] 40 N.J. at 445-46, citing 302 N.Y., at p. 225, 97 N.E.2d, at p. 876.  See also New Jersey Dept. of Transp., Division of Aeronautics v. Brzoska, 139 N.J. Super. 510 (App. Div. 1976) (delegation of administrative power to a private airport owner to determine who received a fixed based operator’s license held to be invalid in that such private person is not subject to public accountability and is unconstrained by adequate legislative standards inhibiting arbitrary or self-interested action); New Jersey State Firemen’s Mut. Benevolent Ass’n v. North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue, 340 N.J. Super. 577, 592-93 (App. Div.), certif. den., 170 N.J. 88 (2001) (statutes improperly delegated legislative authority to private fraternal organizations to grant paid leave to members to attend convention).  Giving a private organization virtually unbridled authority to implement the legislative intent was also recognized as a potential constitutional infirmity by the New Jersey Supreme Court in *Male v. Renda Contracting Co., Inc.*, 64 N.J. 199, 201 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 839, 95 S.Ct. 69, 42 L.Ed.2d 66 (1974).
[brief] As noted supra, Point II, this Court has recently reaffirmed that:  [a]  Chancery judge has broad discretion “to adapt equitable remedies to the particular circumstances of a given case. ”  Marioni v. Roxy Garments Delivery Co. Inc., 417 N.J. Super. 269, 275 (App. Div. 2010) (citations omitted); see also Salorio v. Glaser, 93 N.J. 447, 469 (1983) (noting that equitable remedies “are distinguished by their flexibility, their unlimited variety,” and “their adaptability to circumstances”).  [Tarta Luna Properties, supra, 466 N.J. Super. at 153.]  In reviewing the imposition of a Trial Court’s equitable remedy, the Appellate Division considers three elements: First, the facts the judge adopts in an equity case are entitled to deference “when supported by adequate, substantial[,] and credible evidence.
[brief] “New Jersey is a fact rather than a notice pleading jurisdiction, which means that a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claim rather than merely reciting the elements of a cause of action.)  Nostrame, supra.  (emphasis added); see also, Scheidt v. DRS Techs., Inc., 424 N.J. Super. 188, 193, 36 A.3d 1082 (App. Div. 2012); Camden Cty. Energy Recovery Assocs., L.P. v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 320 N.J. Super 59, 64, 726 A.2d 968 (App. Div. 1999), aff’d o.b., 170 N.J. 246, 786 A.2d 105 (2001) (“Discovery is intended to lead to facts supporting or opposing an asserted legal theory; it is not designed to lead to formulation of a legal theory.
[brief] The Court below erred when it found that Plaintiffs failed to prove undue influence because it never shifted the burden of proof to the Defendants, as it was supposed to as a matter of law.  The Defendants should have had the burden of proving there was no undue influence by clear and convincing evidence, not the other way around.  (6T31:4-5; Pa1-7; 6T31-42; Pa28)  This point is already discussed in the Appellant’s main brief.
[brief] Presumably, in furtherance of Plaintiff’s Appellant’s argument for detrimental reliance; Plaintiff-Appellant next argues that Defendant-Respondent, [...], “waited more than 17 months after receiving notice of [...]’s UIM claim” to invoke the policy’s suit limitation.  (Pb18).  In support of this argument, Plaintiff-Appellant relies on Price v New Jersey Mfrs. Ins., 182 N.J. 519 (App. Div. 1996).  Once again, the facts and holdings of Price are distinguishable from the instant matter.
[brief] See Manual Amendment Bulletin #436, May 24, 2007.  Accordingly, the Court’s holding in Beseler and Delta Plastics that the policies at issue in those cases required the insurer to defend the insured against an allegation of intentional wrong based on the substantial certainty standard has no application here.  The ambiguity in the Policy language on which the [...] Court’s holding rests no longer exists.  Through the adoption of the New Jersey Part Two Employers Liability Endorsement the Policy now unambiguously excludes coverage for such --- 4A copy of the NJCRIB Manual Amendment through which the New Jersey Part Two Employers Liability Endorsement was adopted can be found at www.njcrib/DocumentLibraryBulletinsAndCirculars. claims, including claims that the employer’s conduct created a substantial certainty of injury.
[brief] The second day of testimony in this action commenced with cross-examination at about 9:15am on November 30, 2022.  (3T Tr. Pg. 13, lines 9 and 20-21).  Very quickly, [...] began to feel that Counsel for [...] was badgering him and [...] was not doing anything to prevent it.  Specifically, [...] stated to [...], “he’s [referring to counsel for [...]] badgering me, and you’re allowing it. ”  (3T Pg. 29, line 12).  “[D]on’t let him badger me” (3T, pg. 29, line 23).  “I will not be badgered on this witness stand, ma’am. ”  (3T, pg. 30, lines 1-2)  “But…you allowed it to go on, and I’m getting badgered. ”  (3T pg. 30, lines 5-8).  “You overruled [my attorney’s objection about counsel for [...] badgering me] and he badgered me again. ” (3T, pg. 32, lines 10-11).  After more back and forth of this nature, [...] finally asked the Jury to leave the courtroom at about 9:35, after only about 20 minutes of testimony, (3T, Pg. 34, line 3) and [...] made it clear to [...] that he again felt that she was biased against him; he stated, “you’re allowing him to badger me.  You’re biased against me, and you’re continuing to allow it. ” (3T, Pg. 34, lines 19-21).  And in case he wasn’t clear the first time, [...] repeated the allegation just a short time later, telling [...], “you’re biased. ” (3T, Pg. 35, line 21).  Not long after, [...] told the Judge that he was being “harassed. ” (3T, Pg. 41, line 15).  The following day, following the event with the sheriff, which will be discussed in more detail below, [...] again informed [...] that he was being “harassed constantly” in her courtroom.  (4T, Pg. 107, lines 23-24).  *At Trial, [...] is Accosted by Sheriff’s officer and altercation ensues in earshot of the Court and the Jury*
[brief] The determination is within the discretion of the judge, as is the necessity of holding a Rule 104 hearing to make such determination.  State ex rel. C.D., 354 N.J. Super. 457, 466 (App. Div. 2002).  And see the dicta in State v. Griffin, 120 N.J. Super. 13, 20 (App. Div.) certify. den. 62 N.J. 73 (1972), to the effect that the “necessity for expert testimony to enhance the knowledge and understanding of jurors with respect to other testimony of a special nature normally outside of the usual lay sphere, and the qualification of the proffered expert, ordinarily are matters resting within the sound discretion of the trial judge.
[brief] Preclusion is, therefore, available as a sanction only in the limited circumstances where a lesser sanction is not sufficient to remedy the problem caused by an inexcusable delay in providing the required notice, thereby resulting in substantial prejudice to the non-disclosed party's ability to mount an adequate defense.  Substantial prejudice in this context means substantial prejudice in maintaining one's defense.  Generally, that implies the loss of witnesses, the loss of evidence, fading memories, and the like. ”  Ibid.  In Escalante v. Township of Cinnaminson, we observed that the delay alone does not serve to create substantial prejudice.  283 N.J.Super. 244, 253, 661 A.2d 837 (App.Div.1995) (citing Kleinke v. Ocean City, 147 N.J.Super. 575, 581, 371 A.2d 785 (App.Div.1977)).  Instead, it is the lack of availability of information which results from the delay that is, for the most part, determinative of the issue of substantial prejudice.  Id. at 252–53, 661 A.2d 837.  Thus, a party's “access to relevant information is largely dispositive of the ‘substantial prejudice’ issue....”  Lamb v. Global Landfill Reclaiming, 111 N.J. 134, 152, 543 A.2d 443 (1988).  Mitchell v. Procini, 331 N.J. Super 445, 453 (App. Div. 2000).  The Trial Court’s failure to credit Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 443 (1997) and its holding exempting all legal malpractice claims from the entire controversialy doctrine is not cured by the citation to Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C. 237 N.J. 91 (2019).
[brief] Id.  Thus, a transaction between the exchange (not the individual subscribers) and the AIF may implicate SSAP No. 25 and its accounting principles.9  Id.  Conversely, a transaction between the AIF and an individual subscriber does not because they are not under common control or ownership.  Id.  The Department has demonstrated, however, through action and word that it intends to change this longstanding law and start using SSAP No. 25, contrary to its own plain language, to improperly govern and regulate fees collected from the individual subscribers (i.e., profits earned) by the AIF.
[brief] The Court explained as follows:  *N.J.S.A. 48:12–152 was significantly amended in 1998 in response to a series of cases beginning with Renz v. Penn Cent. Corp., 87 N.J. 437 (1981), and culminating in Ocasio v. Amtrak, 299 N.J.Super. 139 (App.Div.1997).
[brief] PETITIONER FAILS TO STATE A PRIMA FACIE BRADY-GIGLIO CLAIM BECAUSE TORRES’ HABEAS PETITION IS NEITHER MATERIAL NOR WOULD IT BE ADMISSIBLE AT A NEW TRIAL.  JENCKS IS INAPPOSITIVE AND WAS IMPROPERLY RAISED IN A REPLY BRIEF  ....................................................................................  26  A.  [...]’ Habeas Petition is Not Material Evidence, so it Does Not Entitle Defendant to a New Trial Under Brady or Giglio .......................  28  B.  The Statement that [...] “had no knowledge of the Staten Island robbery and kidnapping,” Is Not Itself a Prior Inconsistent Statement by [...], Is Not Admissible Under N.J.R.E. 803(a)(1), and Is Not Brady Evidence.  Defendant Did Not Raise Admissibility Under N.J.R.E. 608 Below Police ..........................................................  29  C.  Because No Court Has Ever Ordered the State to Produce [...]’ Habeas Petition, Jencks is Inapposite.  Defendant Also Improperly Raised this Argument for the First Time in a Reply Brief ...............  32  POINT III PETITIONER FAILS TO STATE A PRIMA FACIE CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ...........................................
[brief] ”  This is not deference; this is a thinly veiled attempt to impose upon Plaintiff the burden of an illusory height variance under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(6).  The Resolution admits this asserting that if the structure was located in Florence, it would have required a “substantial height variance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(6)[.]” Ja040.  Defendant had an obligation to provide “significant weight” to [...]’s zoning ordinance, and failed to do so.  Even 70 years ago, New Jersey courts recognized the deference owed to adjacent municipalities as it relates to zoning.  See Cresskill, 15 N.J. at 247.  “The effective development of a region should not and cannot be made to depend upon the advantageous location of municipal boundaries[.]”  Id. (quoting Duffcon Concrete Products, Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 513 (1949)).  By its failure to provide any deference, let alone “significant weight” to both [...]’s zoning ordinance and its prior approval of the warehouse, Defendant’s denial of Plaintiff’s application must be set aside as arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.