ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant’s appendix includes a printout of the PACER docket of [...]’ habeas petition, demonstrating how an attorney – including defendant’s current PCR attorneys who have represented him since June 28, 2018 – can easily access the system.  (Da82-83; Pa164).  Additionally, not only could [...]’ habeas petition have been discovered prior to defendant’s trial, but the petition was known to defendant when he filed his first PCR petition on April 28, 2017.  As detailed in the Counter-Statement of Procedural History and Facts of this brief, defendant’s brief in support of his petition made reference to [...]’ habeas petition in providing background on [...]’ relationship with [...].  (Pa55).  At that point, not only could defendant have discovered [...]’ habeas petition had he proactively searched on PACER for such a petition but defendant was actually aware of the existence of the habeas petition and could have sought to ascertain the statements made as part of that petition.
[brief] See Raffel v. Medallion Kitchens, 139 F.3d 1142 (7th Cir. 1998)(commercial lease provision requiring lessee to pay full amount of seven months of abated rent upon failing to pay past-due rent within 30 days following notice was unenforceable penalty, where the purpose of provision was to secure lessee's prompt rental payments.); Friedman v. Krupp Corp., 282 Ill. App. 3d 436, 443, 217 Ill. Dec. 957, 668 N.E.2d 142, 147 (1996)(Holding that, where a landlord sought to recover previously applied $30 per month “discounts” upon tenants’ default, “we are not confronted with true discounts, but with false discounts, or, more aptly, with disguised penalties. ”); Diversified Equities, LLC v. Russell, 31 N.Y.S.3d 920 (N.Y. App. Term. 2016)(Where lease purported to provide for rent of $1,339.33 “discounted” to $1,185.25 to be retroactively charged back on default, the Court held, “In our view, the lease and rent concession rider provide, in effect, for a late monthly charge of 13%, which is excessive and grossly disproportionate to any damages that could be sustained as a result of tenant's failure to pay rent on time”; Freeman v. United Dominion Realty Tr., Inc., E042905, 2008 WL 1838373, at *8–9 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2008), as modified (May 6, 2008)(reversing dismissal and reinstating claims that a rent “Discount Agreement” with a “Free Rent Charge-Back" clause “which provided that the $1,225 free rent concession would become due in the event of any breach of the lease, was an unlawful liquidated damages provision. ”); Harbor Island Holdings v. Kim, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 406, 411 (Ct. App. 2003)(commercial lease provision providing for deferral of 50% of rent per month, subject to retraction of all past deferrals upon lessee’s default held to be unenforceable disguised penalty. ); Leaman v. Wolfe, 629 Fed. Appx. 280, 281 (3d Cir. 2015)(finding a disguised, unenforceable $100,000 penalty in a contract “providing for a series of 31 installment payments (amounting to $475,000 over the course of four years) plus an additional $100,000 to be ‘waived ... and not ... due and owing ... [u]pon [payee’s] timely payment of the ... [31] installments. ’”); Leaman v. Wolfe, 629 Fed. Appx. 280, 281 (3d Cir. 2015)(finding a disguised, unenforceable $100,000 penalty in a contract “providing for a series of 31 installment payments, amounting to $475,000 over the course of four years, plus an additional $100,000 to be ‘waived ... and not ... due and owing ... [u]pon [payee’s] timely payment of the ... [31] installments. ’”); *Maybury v. Spinney-Maybury Co.*, 435, 120 A. 611, 617 (Me. 1923)(Provision in commercial equipment lease providing for 50% discount on periodic rent, conditional on timely payment, held to be invalid penalty).
[brief] To suggest that such a slight delay somehow eliminates the statutory deadline for filing claims would be an absurd result, and one this court should not accept.  See Regis, 208 N.J. at 449 (“[w]hen construing a statute, ‘legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. ’”) (citation omitted).  Despite the Board’s having satisfied the notice requirement under the Ricci Act, it nevertheless considered [...]’s request under its inherent equitable power.
[brief] Punitive damages are unavailable against those who have “a legal right to do what was done and did so legally. ”  Liptak v. Rite Aid Inc., 289 N.J. Super. 199, 218 (App. Div. 1996) (citing O’Connor v. Harms, 111 N.J. Super.  Because New Jersey law allows the rescission of an insurance policy when that policy has been based on the misrepresentation of a material fact, *DeMarco v. Stoddard*, 223 N.J. 363, 382 (2015), [...] could seek a judicial declaration of rescission of the policy. \(^6\)  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] [No/No] c. se requerirá que pague una multa antinarcótica y de reducción de la demanda (D.E.D.R.) obligatoria por cada delito de que se declara culpable?  Las multas obligatorias son las siguientes: (1) $3,000 en el caso de un delito de primer grado (2) $2,000 en el caso de un delito de segundo grado (3) $1000 en el caso de un delito de tercer grado (4) $750 en el caso de un delito de cuarto grado (5) $500 en el caso de un delito contra la moral pública o una infracción menor contra la moral pública MULTA TOTAL de D.E.D.R. $ Formulario promulgado por la directriz # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11000-Spanish página 1 de 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11000- Spanish page 1 of 2  You will be required to pay a mandatory drug enforcement and demand reduction (D.E.D.R.) penalty as listed below for each offense for which you plead guilty?
[brief] At Minimum, Repeated References To Defendant Contacting A Lawyer Should Not Have Been Played For The Jury.  Whether or not [...]’s repeated statements to the detectives about calling a lawyer require suppression of the entirety of both statements, references about [...] contacting a lawyer should not have been played for the jury.  It is well-established that “trial courts should endeavor to excise any reference to a criminal defendant’s invocation. ”
[brief] In response to Respondent’s Counterstatement of Facts, the Respondent does not state that the [...] (herein after “[...]”) incorrectly applied the “Rule of Three” when it promoted [...] to the position of Lieutenant which was the basis for the appeal by [...] to the [...].  However, the [...] correctly determined that the [...] improperly failed to advise the [...] that [...] had been demoted prior to the issuing of the certified list.  (AA-0069)  In response to the appeal of [...], the [...] defended the use of the “Rule of Three” as proper.  This was the reason Appellant appealed this improper action.  The reason that the decision of the Commission to remove Appellant from the eligible list is improper and constitutes reversible error, is that the proper procedures were not followed by [...] and the Commission to remove Appellant from the list and this was to the prejudice of Appellant, a disabled war veteran who deserved to receive her proper veteran’s preference.  The other critical problem and reversible error in this matter is the confusion and erroneous findings of fact the Commission made regarding the review of Appellant’s employment history.  The Appellant has one major disciplinary action from a 2012 incident in which her service weapon was dislodged from her service belt while using the rest room in the Family Courthouse.  This was the only disciplinary action considered by Respondent [...] when it disposed of the Certified Eligible List as certified by [...] in responding to the appeal below.  (AA0118-120)  The Respondent [...] once again misrepresents the settlement of this disciplinary charge in the counterstatement of facts.  A settlement agreement is entered into between two parties who decide that the agreement is the best resolution to the matter.  It is disingenuous for the Respondent [...] to imply that the original charges somehow were supported by the evidence and Appellant was fortunate to resolve the matter with this agreement.  The disputed facts and application of charges were not certain.  The decision of both parties to resolve a matter is to the benefit of both parties.  This cavalier language regarding settlements is further evidence of the indifference the [...] has for the rules regarding veteran’s preference and promotion.  There is no language in the Settlement Agreement which supports removing Appellant’s name from the promotion list or ignoring veteran’s preference.
[brief] More particularly, in 2024, in the case of *Padilla v. Young II An*, 257 N.J. 540 (2024), our Supreme Court expanded the holding of *Stewart* and established a new bright line rule for commercial properties of any kind located in a commercially-zoned area.  More specifically, the Supreme Court held that “all commercial property owners owe a duty to maintain abutting sidewalks in reasonably good condition,” irrespective of whether commercial activity is actually occurring on the property.  *Id.* at 562.  Our Supreme Court went on to hold that:  [T]he sidewalk liability distinction should be between commercial and residential properties, not among certain types of commercial properties, or commercial properties with buildings, or commercial properties with active, potentially profitable entities on them.  This is the distinction from *Stewart*.  Ibid.  Importantly, the Court in Padilla made no change to the law governing the sidewalk liability of residential property owners, such as the [...].
[brief] ”  A substantial risk is “one that is not minor, trivial or insignificant,” and presents a more stringent burden than that of mere negligence.  *Kolitch v. Lindedahl*, 100 N.J. 485, 493 (1985) (quoting *Polyard v. Terry*, 160 N.J. Super. 497, 509 (App. Div. 1978), *aff’d o.b.*, 79 N.J. 547 (1979)).  The Supreme Court has recognized that, while “[p]otholes and depressions are a common feature of our roadways… ‘not every defect in a highway, even if caused by negligent maintenance, is actionable. ’”  *Polzo v. County of Essex*, 209 N.J. 51, 64 (2012) (quoting *Polyard v. Terry*, 160 N.J. Super. 497, 508 (App. Div. 1978), *aff’d o.b.*, 79 N.J. 547 (1979)).
[brief] The fair market value of the property taken is the general measure of the award of just compensation.  State v. Gorga, 26 N.J. 113 (1958).  “Just compensation in its most general terms means fair market value as of the date of taking determined by what a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to act, would agree to. ”  See, Hilton, supra at 587.  Instructive to this Appellate Division’s inquiry is the Scope of the Project Rule also known as the Project Influence Doctrine, which stands for the proposition that the proper basis for determining just compensation is the fair market value of the property, on the Date of Valuation, disregarding either the depreciating threat of or the inflationary reaction to the proposed redevelopment project.
[brief] To find [...] guilty of robbery as an accomplice, the jury had to find that not only did he know that [...] or [...] was going to commit robbery, but that he acted with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the robbery.  N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6; N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1.  Similarly, to find [...] guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery, the jury had to find that he agreed to aid [...] or [...] in the planning or commission of the robbery, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission, and that he did an overt act in furtherance of it.  N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2; N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1.  The State’s evidence that [...] acted with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the robbery, or that he had agreed to aid [...] or [...] in planning or committing the robbery and performed some overt act in furtherance of it was far from indisputable.
[brief] Further, [...] submitted [...]’s criminal history to illustrate that it did not receive information from the [...]’ son that was protected by the attorney-client privilege.  By producing the rap sheet, [...] established that it had obtained the information from a filing made earlier in the District Court Action by [...]’s counsel.  Finally, the rap sheet had “some connection or logical relation to the action” because it supported [...]’s contention that it had not received privileged information from the [...]’ son.
[brief] CONCLUSION  Based on the foregoing, Respondent [...] respectfully requests that the Court affirm the Commissioner of Education’s September 2023 decision.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for [...]  By: ____________________________  [...]  Date: July 2, 2024  August 1, 2024  Via E-Courts  [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey – Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 25 Market Street, P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625-006  Re: I/M/O the Verified Petition for the Proposed Creation of a PK-12 All-Purpose Regional School District by the [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...], Monmouth County Docket.
[directive] Plea Offer  Set forth in detail the plea agreement offered including sentencing recommendations.  if 10.  Do you understand that you reject this plea offer, the Court could impose a more [Yes] [No] severe sentence than recommended by the plea offer, up to the maximum sentence if permitted you convicted after trial?  are if [Yes] [No] you be 11.  Do you understand that reject this plea offer today, no negotiated plea can by this accepted Court unless specifically authorized by the Criminal Presiding R. pursuant Judge to 3:9-3(g)?  Additional/Supplemental information.  12.  13.  Discovery  D  All Pretrial discovery is complete.  a. D  The following Pretrial discovery is required.  b.  D  Pretrial discovery to be completed by c.  I 14.  Motions Hearings  D  a.  There are no further Pretrial Motions/Hearings.  D  Trial:  The following non-dispositive motions can be made and heard immediately prior to trial.
[brief] Thus, it added new Section 3.1.1 to the Redevelopment Plan:  “…it has been suggested by some members of the public that this Redevelopment Plan is not consistent with the Township’s Master Plan and/or is not designed to effectuate the Master Plan.  To the extent such suggestion has credibility, the Township Committee, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d), herewith sets forth its reasons for adopting this Redevelopment Plan.  A.  At the time the Township’s Master Plan was adopted in 1997, its focus was on the preservation of farmland and promoting the Township’s agricultural character through a then-newly crafted “Transfer of Development Rights” (“TDR”) legislative program.  Commercial and industrial development were not priorities.  B.  [...] is the only municipality in the State of New Jersey to successfully implement TDR, and residential development in the “Receiving Area” is now more than eighty percent (80%) completed.  The limited commercial area in the Receiving Area has now also been built, but suffers from vacancy concerns.  C.  [...]’s tax revenues are disproportionately derived from its residential development and farms.  In fact, ninety-seven percent (97%) of [...]’s tax ratable base is farmland and residential.  The Township Committee recognizes the fragility of such a reliance on residences and farms as the nearly sole source of tax revenue.  D.
[directive] Defendants with 2. regularly scheduled medical appointments should be permitted to continue those appointments.  This should explicitly be articulated in the Pretrial Release Order, of including the times and days the week that the defendant permitted to make those is appointments.  Permission to leave the home for irregular or sporadic appointments must be requested by application by the defendant and must be approved a judge.  by of Page 9 12 IV.  HOME DETENTION AND EM SCREENING CRITERIA FORMS
[brief] REPLY BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT- RESPONDENT-CROSS-APPELLANT  REAL ESTATE CONSULTANTS, LLC d/b/a REALTY EXECUTIVES  MURRAY A. KLAYMAN, P.C. [...]  Phone: [...]/  Fax [...]  Attorney for Defendant-Respondent- Cross-Appellant [...]  On the brief  [...] d/b/a [...]  Attorney ID [...]  [...]  Date submitted: May 20, 2024
[brief] At around 6:00 p.m. on September 12, 2022, [...] was playing and exercising Koda and Maya in the fenced back yard.  [...] had heard Bella barking on and off from 3:00 p.m. until “when the incident happened” [3T100:23-24] and she described the sound as “very close...to our driveway or the street. ”  No witness visually observed Bella’s actual location between 3:00 p.m. and 6:20 p.m. that day.  [...] pulled his delivery van up the driveway of #17 at about 6:20 p.m. and emerged with a box of wine.  [...] was suspicious because she had not ordered any wine.  In fact, it was intended for the house next door.  [...] met [...] at the gate with Koda and Maya at her side.  From behind the fence, she told [...] where to put the box.  Koda was pawing at the gate, which [...] presumed had been securely shut.  Koda somehow opened the gate and escaped, ran up to [...], and bit him on the back of his right thigh.  [...] called Koda who responded immediately and released [...].  [...] admitted Koda released after a few seconds and ran down the driveway toward #12.  [...] could not see Bella when Koda took off; the hill and the van blocked her view of the [...] property.  [...] followed Koda while [...] backed his van down the driveway “right into the front of the house across from it” [2T20:20-21] and “seen (sic) a German Shepherd with another dog in the mouth of the German Shepherd. ”  2T21:5-6.  By the time [...] arrived at the [...] front lawn, Koda was on the lawn and had Bella pinned down with his mouth around her body:  THE COURT: He was on [...]'s lawn.  What was the dog doing?  A  He was pinning down Bella.  Q  Pinning.  A  Pinning.  Q  With what part of his body?  A  With -- with Koda's body?  His snout, yes.  THE COURT: He was biting the dog; right?  THE WITNESS: He was biting the dog, yeah.
[brief] Plaintiff filed an application for development with the [...] ("Board") seeking approval of a density variance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(5), lot consolidation, preliminary major site plan approval, along with variance and design exception relief to construct six (6) new apartment buildings, and new parking and driveways at the site (the "Application").  (Pa2-6).  Specifically, the requested d(5) density variance sought approval of 20 units per acre, where the maximum permitted density is 18 units per acre (319 units total).  (Pa2).  Currently, the property consists of 266 units so there is a 53-unit deficit between what is permitted and currently exists.  Therefore, the d(5) density variance only pertains to the addition of the 47 units over and above the permitted amount of 319 units.
[directive] Prosecutor. by Attendance 6.1  Division by the handled matters in general attorney deputy a or prosecutor, assistant An by charged been has who defendant a of appearance first the attend shall Justice, Criminal of a at occur shall offenses indictable for appearances (first 3:4-2(b) R.  See complaint-warrant. be by may attendance Such Justice).  Chief the by designated judge a before location centralized Division and the Office Prosecutor's County  Each means. electronic other or video-conference facilitate Justice, to Chief the and AOC with the consultation in procedures, establish shall construed shall be herein Nothing means.  electronic by hearings appearance first in participation first the at means electronic or by person appearing in from prosecutors discourage or preclude to complaint-summons.  by charged defendant a of appearance Conditions.  Release Special for Requests 6.2
[brief] (5T115-18 to 5T116-1).  The judge found that much “guessing [was] going on” about the circumstances surrounding the murder as it related to passion/provocation manslaughter.  (5T116-7 to 13).  The judge held that there was no evidence to show whether defendant had time to cool off.  (5T118-9 to 24).  The judge found that the jury would be left to speculate.  (5T117-2 to 5).  The judge held that it was not persuaded that a rational basis existed for the charge, but indicated the court would consider the issue overnight.  (5T116-18 to 23).  The next day, [...] addressed counsel and stated that the court had considered defendant’s request to instruct the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter and had examined the record from the first trial to compare it to the evidence produced at the retrial.
[brief] [...]  (“Applicant”) seeks to construct two warehouses, as well as parking and site improvements, on the undeveloped portion of [...].  After being granted a use variance in February 2021, Applicant is now seeking preliminary and final major subdivision approval in order to subdivide Lot 31 into three lots.  On November 1, 2022, [...] (“Board”) approved Applicant’s request for major subdivision by a 4-2 vote.  A land use board must ensure that every municipal ordinance requirement is satisfied before granting subdivision relief.  However, during the subdivision hearing, Applicant failed to present any evidence or testimony on several topics explicitly required under the Municipal Land Use Law (“MLUL”) and the applicable township ordinances.  In addition, Plaintiffs, members of the public, and board members were prohibited from cross-examining the Applicant’s witnesses on all application materials, and Plaintiffs were not permitted to present their expert witnesses on stormwater, wildlife, traffic, and noise, all items required under the Township Ordinances for major subdivision applications.  Furthermore, the Board’s opinion that there are no impacts caused by the subdivision does not limit the scope of cross-examination or public testimony, but such cross-examination and public testimony is supposed to help form the basis for the Board’s decision.  The Trial Court erred in holding otherwise, and that there was no contrary testimony on record when it was evident that the only reason there was no contrary testimony, is because the Board prohibited such testimony from Plaintiffs and the public.  For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should reverse the Trial Court’s order and the Board’s approval of Applicant’s request for preliminary and final major subdivision should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.