ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  This provision essentially allows the physician to “do away” with malpractice claims by sending them to a panel of his choosing.  Additionally, the agreement does not provide for the forum, arbitration rules, or for the qualifications of the two non-physician arbitrators.  The agreement also sets up an acknowledgement section which cannot possibly be true given Defendant [...]’s testimony.  The acknowledgement states that the patient had discussed any questions regarding the arbitration agreement with Defendant [...] or [...] staff.  However, Defendant [...] testified that he was the only person who would discuss the agreement with patients, so the patient could not have discussed the agreement to her satisfaction with staff members.  Third, the arbitration agreement is not enforceable based on an analysis the Rudbart factors.
[brief] E.  The appraisal was hypothetical, but [...] does not reveal this in its brief [...] initiated its hardship application on the basis of a hypothetical appraisal.  1T54:4-4-7 (testimony of [...] stating “it was my responsibility to appraise it as if it was unencumbered”); 1T58:9-12 ([...] stating “I estimated the market value of the property as though renovated and brought up to the standards that are consistent with the other 10 units in the building.  Meaning that the kitchen was moved to the center, creating two bedrooms like the other units and two baths”).  The appraisal evaluated the unit as though it were “unencumbered” of [...], renovated, and with an additional bedroom.
[directive] Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  Knowingly Leaving  Actor operating a motor vehicle knows he is involved in an accident and knowingly leaves the the Scene of a Motor 2C:11-5.1 scene under circumstances which violate N.J.S.A. 39:4-129 (“Action in case of accident”) and 2nd Degree $50,000 to $150,000  10% permissible  Vehicle  Accident the accident results in the death of another person.  Resulting in Death Disorderly Persons  $500 to $2,500 10% permissible  Actor attempts to or purposely or knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or attempts by physical 2C:12-1a(1)(2)(3)  Simple Assault menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, disorderly persons offense; if Petty Disorderly fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, petty disorderly persons offense.  $100 to $500 10% permissible  Persons Actor attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes serious bodily injury, or under 2C:12-1b(1)  Aggravated  Assault circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, recklessly causes 2nd Degree $35,000 to $100,000 10% permissible such injury.  18  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2 STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants
[brief] At the intersection of Central Avenue and Prospect Street, there is one streetlight on a utility pole on the Northeast corner.  This streetlight was operational at the time of the accident.  (Pa117).  Plaintiff alleges that the streetlight depicted in the attached photograph was off at the time of accident.  (Da2).  This subject streetlight is seventy-three (73) feet from the intersection.  (Pa116).  Lodi Police Officer [...] arrived at the accident scene less than two minutes after receiving the call from dispatch.  (Pa146, Pa160).  Officer Nobile testified that, based on his observations at the scene and review of dashcam video, all the streetlights were on.  (Pa151-63).  Office Nobile’s Police report reflects that the “streetlights [are] on, continuous. ” (Pa 1009).  The dash-cam video from Officer Nobile’s vehicle shows that the streetlights were on.  (Da1).3  The still photographs --- 3 “Da” refers to Defendant [...]’s appendix and the hard copy of the dash cam video to be provided to the Court. from the video shows the subject streetlight operational minutes after the happening of the accident.  (Da3).  A second responding person to the scene, Detective [...], also recalls all the streetlights being on when he arrived.  (Pa169-70, Pa171-73).  In addition, Sergeant [...] prepared a report for the [...].  (Pa 86-90).  This report made no mention of any streetlights being out or that insufficient lighting was a contributing factor in the accident.  (Pa 86-90).  Sergeant Zivkovich confirmed at his deposition that if lighting had been insufficient, he would have included it in his report.  (Pa177-81).  Sergeant [...], who arrived at the scene to document the accident and collect evidence, did not recall the street lighting in the area.  (Pa185-86).  Sergeant Savino testified that he took a picture after the accident that appeared to show the streetlight being out hours after the accident occurred.  (Pa185-91).  Sergeant Savino testified that the crime scene investigation truck spotlight meant to illuminate the area potentially could have activated the photocell on the light, turning it off.  (Pa186-86, Pa190-91).  Sergeant Savino further testified that prior to putting up the crime scene investigation spotlight, he has no recollection of that streetlight being off.  (Pa190-91).  The crime scene investigation team never advised Sergeant Savino to take photographs of any light that was believed to be out in the area.  (Pa190-91).  The Sheriffs’ light is depicted in a photograph at the scene of the accident.  (Da4).  [...] testified that his headlights were on and that he could see fine on Prospect Street at the time of accident.  (Pa95).  [...] testified that he could see well on Prospect Street as he traveled down the road before the accident.  (Pa96).  C.
[directive] The law enforcement officer who contacts a Designated Attorney seeking permission to apply to a court for issuance of a search warrant should be the actual affiant or lead case agent for the investigation (i.e., the officer most likely to be familiar with the scope and details of the investigation and who would therefore be in the best position to be able to answer all of the questions that are required to be addressed pursuant to this Directive).  Page 7 11.  Application Forms  The Division of Criminal Justice shall develop and disseminate to the County Prosecutors and to all law enforcement agencies operating under authority of state law blank application forms to be completed and submitted by applicants to Designated Attorneys pursuant to this Directive.
[directive] The NJRP-LE is designed to equip officers with the necessary tools to cope with the unique stressors of their job.  There are times, however, when an officer may want, or need, support services that are not offered by the RPO or the NJRP-LE.  New Jersey offers a wide variety of support programs for law enforcement, such as Cop2Cop, where an officer can talk to their peer in a safe outlet without judgment, and chaplain services, where an officer can confidentially speak with a clergy member who has gone through the Police Chaplain Training Program.  This Directive encourages law enforcement to use available support programs to help better serve the needs of law enforcement prior to and in times of crisis.
[brief] While the Court noted there were equitable arguments on both sides, it specifically noted that [...] had not established any irreparable harm because he was always free to find employment outside the restrictive radius.  (3T6:7-14; 3T8:2-17; 3T10:2-14).  The Chancery Court, however, left the door open for Dr.  Ondik should circumstances arise when he could satisfy the Crowe factors.  This was expressly stated in the Court’s decision: “the motion to dismiss is granted, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed without prejudice. ” (Id., 3T11:5-7) (emphasis added).  It is also clear in the wording of the Order itself, that was subsequently entered on April 24, 2024 (the 2024 Order) (Ra3).  The 2024 Order denied [...]’s motion for reconsideration without prejudice.  (Id.).  This only made sense if the dismissal of the Complaint was similarly without prejudice, which it was.  Despite the fact that the December 2023 Order and the 2024 Order were both without prejudice and thus, not final orders, on May 6, 2024, [...] filed a Notice of Appeal, rather than seek leave to file an interlocutory appeal.  (Pa57-60).  On May 8, 2024, the Practice advised [...] that the appeal was improper and requested that he withdraw it.  On May 13, 2024, the Chancery Court entered an amplification of its 2024 Order, emphasizing that the dismissal of the Complaint was without prejudice.  (Ra1).  Rather than withdraw his appeal, [...] filed an amended Notice of Appeal, insisting that the 2024 Order, even as amplified, was a final order.  (Pa63-66).  On May 21, 2023, [...] filed the Law Division Complaint against the Practice and its principals alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant and fair dealing, fraud and conspiracy related to his alleged 2023 incentive bonus.  Despite the Practice’s motions to dismiss and to stay the matter, the Law Division mater is proceeding.  [...]’s New Employment
[brief] Specifically, the arbitrator found that, in order to fund even a 2% across-the-board salary increase the City would need to divert all of its surplus and cap banking for CY 2024 and still end up approximately $400,000 short, possibly requiring layoffs or service shutdowns to make up the shortage.  Accordingly, he concluded . . .  I cannot award that amount.  [Aa057-58]  •  The arbitrator extensively analyzed the impact of the “Special Municipal Aid Act” (SMAA), through which the City receives Transitional Aid and is subject to [...]’s oversight of its finances through its MOU with the City.
[brief] [...] relies on the legal arguments from his initial brief and adds the following:  POINT  I  BECAUSE THE POLICE VIOLATED PEARSON’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WHEN THEY STOPPED HIM WITHOUT INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION, THE FRUITS OF THE ILLEGAL STOP MUST BE SUPPRESSED.  In his opening brief, [...] argued that officers violated his constitutional rights when they stopped him without reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was involved in criminal activity.
[brief] (1T55:2)  Subsequent to that conveyance, there is a Deed from [...] to [...].  (J-5) (Pa923).  [...] points out that if the Court is to accept the theory of Keansburg with regard to the [...] to [...] Deed, that [...] did not convey the subaqueous lands to Keansburg Heights, then in attempting to perfect their foreclosure the [...] would have had to name [...].  (1T55:18).  He notes the mean high-water line in 1909 was more than likely the mean high-water line that was shown on the Map of 1918 pursuant to the filed Map of [...] which shows where it interpreted the mean high-water line to exist as set forth at J-4 (Pa922) (1T56:16).  He discusses a Joint Exhibit, J-4/P-6 (Pa206) which is a blowup of the Map of Keansburg Heights (1T57:1-8).
[brief] ”  Pa32 (emphasis added) (quoting Pa86); Pa46 (“[T]he public interest must be considered when determining whether to approve a rate increase. ”).  It should be needless to say, but no administrative law precedent permits an agency to survive arbitrary and capriciousness review by taking an amorphous and after-the-fact view of what renders one particular rate within the public interest and another not.  Many other cases in addition to Boller Beverages support the same result.  In Crema, for example, the Supreme Court struck down the New Jersey State Department of Environmental Protection’s grant of a “conceptual approval” permit despite that the power to grant such approvals could be inferred from the language of the statute.
[brief] [...] also argues on appeal that she should be allowed to purchase service credit under N.J.A.C. 17:2-5.1, and that allowing her to do so would not undermine the financial integrity of the PERS fund.  (Pb16-17; Pb19).  Further, she argues that the Board should apply the Correction of Errors statute, N.J.S.A. 43:15A-54, to allow her to make that purchase.  (Pb18-19).  [...]’s service retirement became due and payable on March 3, 2022\(^4\) – thirty days after the effective date of her retirement.  (Pa94).  Accordingly, as of March 3, 2022, she was a PERS retirant and no longer an active PERS member.  As such, she could no longer purchase service credit.
[directive] Actor possesses or uses an electronic communication device or a battery or device to 2nd Degree $50,000 to $100,000 10% permissible recharge an electronic communication device while confined to a state correctional facility, Use of Certain 2C:29-10(b)(c)(d) secure juvenile facility, county correctional facility, or county juvenile detention facility, third Electronic Devices in degree; person, other than an employee of said facilities who knowingly sells, transfers, or Correctional Facilities otherwise gives an electronic communication device to a person who is confined in one of 3rd Degree $10,000 to $50,000 10% permissible said facilities, third degree; if the actor is an employee of said facilities, then second degree.  59  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] Preliminary Statement  Late on a rainy night, a vehicle crashed into a parked car on a residential street in [...].  Whoever drove the vehicle left before a resident discovered the crash and called the police.  Determined to identify the driver, the police scouted the area, locating a damaged car in [...]’s driveway a few houses down from the crash scene.  Before even speaking with Mr.  Cofone, the officers had decided to “crush” him with tickets.  The officers likely reinforced this opinion when they summoned [...] to his front door and while speaking to him, concluded that he appeared “intoxicated. ”  Although [...] never admitted driving or crashing into a parked car, and there were no eyewitnesses either, the police issued him tickets for Careless Driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97; Leaving the Scene of an Accident, N.J.S.A. 39:4-129(d); and Failure to Report and Accident, N.J.S.A. 39:4-130.  The State decided to put [...] on trial for the three motor vehicle charges.  In doing so, the State assumed the weighty burden of proving him guilty of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.  Because of the State’s inability to meet this high burden of proof that [...] should be found not guilty.  As it turned out, the State did not prove [...] guilty of Careless Driving at the municipal court trial.  Despite this, the municipal court judge still concluded that the evidence sufficiently showed that [...] drove and crashed and then left the scene without calling the police.  Upon appeal of that decision, the *de novo* judge also found [...] guilty of these charges as well.  The courts below erred in finding [...] guilty for several reasons.  First, there is a lack of direct evidence of [...] driving and causing the accident.  The circumstantial evidence is not convincing either.  Second, the courts below disregarded the reasonable doubt created by the defense arguments that even if [...] drove, his conduct did not violate the charged law.  Third, the courts disregarded aspects of the testimony of the victim, [...], which were favorable to [...].  Fourth, the police and the courts below unfairly considered [...]’s alleged “intoxication” which then colored the conclusion of his guilt, even though intoxication was not an issue in the case.  Having decided to put [...] on trial for these charges, the State assumed the risk and the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  [...] did *not* need to prove that he was *not* driving, nor did he need to *prove* that he complied with the statutes.  The record that the State created at the municipal court trial contains reasonable doubt.  [...] should be found not guilty as a result.  Procedural History
[brief] (9T25-6 to 24).  When reviewing the objective elements, [...] stated that “the evidence presented at trial showed no provocation, reasonable, adequate or otherwise, to satisfy this element. ”  (9T26-2 to 7).  [...] rejected the assertion that defendant’s belief that poison might have been added to their dinner provoked her.  The judge highlighted that crime scene photos revealed the meat was still raw and in its original container, making it improbable that defendant had consumed any poison.  The sole evidence of supposed poison was a Home Depot receipt indicating defendant had bought mouse bait on the day of the murder.  (9T27-6 to 28-11).  She thus “found no evidence to satisfy the first objective element of the passion/provocation analysis and, therefore, did not charge the jury on the lesser offense. ” (9T28-21 to 25).
[brief] ’”  Kemp, supra, 195 N.J. at 150 (quoting State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 312 (2006) (citations omitted)).  The Defendants indicated at the time of Trial, they intended to introduce inter alia the Complaint filed on August 9, 2012, in the matter of [...] v. [...], for claims against [...] and entities he allegedly owned and/or controlled and the Stipulation of dismissal filed on December 11, 2012, in the Allstate matter dismissing with prejudice all claims against [...] and any entities he allegedly owned and/or controlled in the complaint along with evidence of other litigations and bankruptcy completely unrelated to the [...].  (DNR82-97)(Pa0231-Pa0232).  The complaint referenced above contains allegations against [...] personally as well as against entities he allegedly owned and/or controlled for mail fraud, common law fraud, and insurance fraud.  All of these claims were dismissed with prejudice some four months later.  The complaint contains only allegations of fraudulent conduct; [...] did not admit to any of the allegations, nor was there a judicial finding that these allegations were true.  Thus, the complaint containing only unsubstantiated allegations does not contain admissible evidence whose probative value outweighs any potential prejudice to [...], and therefore the Defendants should be precluded from admitting the complaint into evidence.  See, N.J.R.E 104(a).  “Relevant evidence” is defined as “evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action”.  N.J.R.E. 401.  The Court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of: (a) undue prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury; or (b) undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. ”  *N.J.R.E.* 403.  Unsubstantiated allegations contain no probative value whatsoever.  *See,* Fusco v. Bd. of Ed. of the City of Newark, 349 *N.J.Super.* 455 (App. Div. 2002) (unsubstantiated allegations were not probative or competent).  In addition, the unsubstantiated allegations contained in the complaint bear no relevancy as to whether the Defendants deviated from the standard of care of attorneys representing clients in a litigation setting, nor does it have any relevancy to the quantum of damages asserted by [...] in the malpractice claim against the Defendants.  Moreover, even if the unsubstantiated allegations were deemed to be “relevant” as defined by the *N.J.R.E.*, the fact that the allegations were denied by [...] and ultimately dismissed without any findings of fact render them highly prejudicial, which prejudice substantially outweighs any potential relevancy regarding the allegations.
[brief] See State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 408-09 (2019) (finding that party cannot “strategically” take a position at trial “only to raise the issue on appeal when the tactic does not pan out. ”) (citations omitted); State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 561 (2013) (“[I]f a party has ‘invited’ the error, he is barred from raising an objection for the first time on appeal.  …  [It] is meant to ‘prevent [parties] from manipulating the system[,]’ … and it has been applied ‘in a wide variety of situations[.]’”) (citations omitted); see also State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009) (“[I]t is a well-settled principle that our appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest) (citing Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973).  For these reasons, such an invited-error, when an opportunity existed to present it to the Trial Court, may not be raised on this appeal.
[directive] refers to the holding account that is administered by the [...] in its capacity as Executive Agent for the [...] for seized cash pending resolution of forfeiture cases.  refers to the joining of multi-agency resources for the purpose of cooperating Task Force in investigations.  refers to the [...]; the [...]; the [...]; and the [...].  For purposes of this text, the [...] is also considered an investigative agency.  refers to the [...]; Treasury Law Enforcement Organization the [...]; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and.Firearms; the [...]; the [...]; the [...]; any other enforcement component of the Department of or so the Treasury designated by the Secretary.
[brief] Here, [...] provided proofs, including testimony, that he was not living at the service address at the alleged time of service and that he had filed a change of address form with the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) *a year before the Complaint was filed.*  See T2 26:10-28:1.  Despite the foregoing, the trial court declined to find that service of process had not been effected because the certified mailing was signed for by [...]’s elderly father at [...]’s former address and the regular mail had not been returned to the court.
[brief] Generally, the Rule requires disqualification if a judge has given an opinion upon a matter in question in the action that is directed primarily at statements made outside of the declarant's role as a judge.  As set forth in State v. Medina, 349 N.J. Super. 108, 130 (App. Div. 2002) Rule 1:12-1(d) provides that a judge ‘shall be disqualified on the court's own motion ... if the judge has given an opinion upon a matter in question in the action. ’  However, the Rule contains an important qualification.  A judicial statement of opinion in the course of the proceeding in the case ... or in another case in which the same issue is presented [does] not require disqualification.  A judge [may] continue to participate in a case when [an] opinion which he has rendered ... was expressed in the course of [the] proceedings regarding the same controversy.  The rule's prohibition is directed primarily at statements made outside of the declarant's role as a judge.  Apart from R. 1:12-1(d), a judge must recuse himself ‘when there is any other reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so.