ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] At the time that plaintiffs filed their cross-motion, the latest case management order, dated February 16, 2021, noted that the production of plaintiffs’ expert reports had been completed.  (Pa227).  It also set a discovery end date of July 20, 2021.  (Pa230)  On August 9, 2021, [...] signed a new case management order setting the deadline to complete expert depositions for October 17, 2021, a new discovery end date of November 17, 2021.  (Pa222)  The new order did not address deadlines to produce expert reports because that stage of discovery had been completed and the time prescribed to produce reports had passed for all parties.  While plaintiffs’ cross-motion was in response to defendant’s motion to bar [...]’s testimony, defendant decided to withdraw his motion with the understanding that plaintiff would not be permitted to designate [...] as new trial expert.  Defendant stated that the withdrawal of his motion would make plaintiffs’ cross-motion moot.
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[brief] The trial court properly instructed the jury on the elements of a claim for negligent training and supervision based on Supreme Court precedent and the Model Jury Charge.  By contrast, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 defines a different legal standard arising from an employer’s duty to police its premises and prevent misuse of its property.  A charge on the Restatement standard arguably would have prejudiced Plaintiffs, resulting in plain error, because it was undisputed that [...] was on-duty when the incident occurred, and because there was no evidence that [...] had ever engaged in dangerous misconduct prior to the incident.  Thus, even if it was error not to charge the jury with § 317, the error was harmless, because that standard is narrower than the one adopted by the Supreme Court and articulated in the Model Jury Charge.
[brief] 5.20(B)(2)(b)—  Liability for Defects in Public Streets and Sidewalks:  (2)  Snow and Ice (b)  Liability of Owner of Commercial Property for Defects, Snow and Ice Accumulation and Other Dangerous Conditions in Abutting Sidewalks, which Defendants allege sets forth the duty of Defendants in this matter.  5.20(B)(2)(b) in relevant part states:
[brief] 1  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.................................  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................  9  THE BPU’S DECISION TO DENY  THE APPLICATION IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS (Order, at p. 6).........................................................  9  A.  The BPU’s decision-making process is subject to judicial review for arbitrary and capricious failures....................................................................................  9  B.  The BPU’s decision to deny the Project based upon an undisclosed and sudden requirement for “net metering,” when the Board was aware of the grid-supply nature of the Project for over two years, is arbitrary and capricious and should be reversed...........................................................................  12  C.  The Board’s other articulated reasons for denial of the project – including timing and litigation risk – are not foundations for denial, and thus are arbitrary and capricious.......................................................................................  14  D.  The BPU’s denial of the application functions as a refutation and inappropriate repudiation of the State’s solar program and binding policy..................................................................................................................................  15  E.  The BPU’s denial of the 1.0 TREC Factor based upon unrefuted submissions is arbitrary and capricious and should be reversed.............  20  CONCLUSION.....................................................................................................................
[brief] POINT VII  PLAINTIFF STATED A CLAIM AGAINST OLD REPUBLIC FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION (Pa651-652; 4T)  The trial court also erroneously dismissed Count V of the Complaint, wherein Plaintiff sought damages from [...] based upon a common law theory of negligent misrepresentation.  (Pa651-652; 4T).  Contrary to [...]’s contentions, Plaintiff established a prima facie claim for negligent misrepresentation under New Jersey law, which requires allegations of “[a]n incorrect statement, negligently made and justifiably relied on,’ which results in economic loss. ”  See McClellan v. Feit, 376 N.J. Super. 305, 313 (App. Div. 2005), quoting Kaufman v. i-Stat Corp., 165 N.J. 94, 109 (2000).  Here, Plaintiff alleged incorrect statements by [...]’s [...] regarding the transaction being on hold and regarding her intentions to keep Plaintiff informed.  (Pa18-19, Complaint ¶¶ 86-94).  Plaintiff has also alleged that it reasonably relied upon [...]’s statements, believing that [...] and [...] would keep Plaintiff apprised of the progress of the transaction and ensure Plaintiff was notified of the rescheduled closing.  (See id.).  And it is undisputed (even admitted by [...]) that [...] failed to provide that information to Plaintiff, apparently because it was willing to serve the interests of [...], its “client,” to the detriment of Plaintiff – and because it wanted to earn fees on the transaction.  (See id.).  Plaintiff also alleged that its reliance on [...]’s misrepresentations was reasonable under the circumstances, in light of [...]’s role as title company and escrow agent under the PSA and the parties’ long-standing relationship of trust and confidence.  (Pa19, Complaint ¶¶ 96-99; Pa152-157).
[brief] In direct contravention of the Chancery Court’s prior refusal to consolidate this case and the Law Division Case (Da299-300), the Chancery Court inexplicably decided it “think[s] it should be handled together” to avoid “duplicating discovery” and so there could be “a story told and a decision made”  1T48:8-49:22.  Rather than premised on legal precedent, the Chancery Court determined: “So if you start using common sense, like somebody needs to handle this case and decide it. ”  1T43:9-10.  The Chancery Court thus erred by reading an arbitration clause into the 2022 Addendum to the 2017 Unexecuted Agreement that does not exist based on other unrelated agreements not incorporated in any way into the 2022 Addendum at issue in this case.  1T38-51.  In reviewing the 2022 Addendum *de novo*, this Court must reverse the Chancery Court’s decision as the 2022 Addendum to the 2017 Unexecuted Agreement lacks an arbitration provision that is necessary to compel the Chancery Division Case to arbitration.  See *Martindale*, 173 N.J. at 83.
[brief] In response to a question from [...]’s counsel regarding [...]’s professional planning credentials, he testified that he was the director of planning for [...], working on the commission’s plans for planning for multiple states (including New Jersey) from 1970 to 1982, primarily focusing on transportation planning, including aviation and transit planning.  (Ra345 16:3 through Ra 346 17:19.)  [...] accepted [...] as an expert in the field of traffic engineering, but objected to him being accepted as an expert in the field of professional land use planning, to which the Board attorney, [...], confirmed that [...] would be accepted as a traffic engineer, “and to the extent his experience goes beyond that, he can identify that as the questioning goes.
[brief] At summary judgment in this matter, the trial judge dismissed [...] on one basis that it was not served with a notice of Tort claim.  (1T40-1to 2).  The Notice of claim dated June 24, 2022, clearly showed that [...] was served with a Notice of claim warranting judgment in plaintiff’s favor.  (Pa505).  The case was replete with credibility issues that warranted that the matter be submitted to a jury.
[brief] \(^1\) (Ia001).  [...] asserted that the liability certificate of coverage issued to [...], under a master policy, was void \textit{ab initio} due to [...]’s material misrepresentations of fact and, therefore, it was not obligated to provide [...] with a defense or indemnification under the policy.  (Ia001).  [...] filed an answer to the complaint on September 29, 2020.  (Ia023).  [...] (“[...]”) filed a motion to intervene, which was granted on February 25, 2021.  (Ia033).  On June 14, 2021, [...] filed an amended answer and third-party complaint against third-party defendant [...] (“[...]”) alleging breach of contract and related claims for failing to obtain coverage for [...]’s 15-passenger vans.  (Ia035).  On July 1, 2022, [...] moved for summary judgment.  (Ia052; Ia070).  Following oral argument, the trial court reserved its decision and requested supplemental briefing on the issue of equitable fraud, \textit{i.e.}, whether or not an innocent mistake on an automobile insurance application can result in the policy being rescinded.  (1Tr64-66).  Following supplemental briefing and a second round of oral \(^1\)  On June 30, 2020, [...] filed a personal injury complaint against Defendants [...] of Richmond, LLC; [...]; and Camp [...], LLC, in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  argument, the Honorable [...], on October 21, 2022, held that there was a material misrepresentation that would support rescission and granted the motion for summary judgment.  (2Tr46-50).  The [...] insurance policy issued by [...] to [...] was rescinded and declared void \textit{ab initio}.  (Ia051).  On November 16, 2022, [...] moved to have the summary judgment order certified as a final judgment or to sever the third-party action instituted by [...] against [...].  (Ia052).  On January 19, 2023, [...] and [...] settled their third-party action and filed a notice of voluntary dismissal.  (Ia054).  On January 20, 2023, the trial court entered an order certifying the October 21, 2022 summary judgment order as a final judgment.  (Ia052).  [...] was not invited to sign the voluntary dismissal and objected to the dismissal.  (Ia056).  On March 2, 2023, [...] filed a Notice of Appeal.  (Ia058).
[brief] Appellate courts must defer to the Trial Court’s findings of fact.  *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co.*, 65 N.J. 474, 483-484 (1974).  Here, the Trial Court held four days of witness testimony, where it judged witness credibility, and reached an initial opinion and subsequent remedy.  In its opinion, the Trial Court noted that it was “a court of equity, and in equity there’s maxims that are often bandied about such as ‘equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy, . . .’”  5T16:19-21 (citing *Crane v. Bielsky*, 15 N.J. 342, 249 (1954).  Further, the Trial Court noted that its “equitable jurisdiction provides as much flexibility as is warranted by the circumstances. ”  5T16:22-24 (citing *Matejek v. Watson*, 449 N.J. Super. 179, 183 (App. Div. 2017)).  Further, the Trial Court noted that it had “the power to devise a remedy and shape it to fit the change in circumstances of every case in a complex relationship with the parties.
[brief] See Da306 (49:15-19); Da249-250 (17:7-18:5).  [...]’s attorney objected to any questions regarding the sworn statements [...] made at the time of his guilty plea, arguing that the statements are inadmissible because if [...] successfully completes PTI, the conviction would be “gone” and, even if he did not successfully complete PTI, the trial court may decide to grant a civil reservation in the future.  Da306-7 (49:20-50:12).  Plaintiff’s counsel noted that there was no basis under R. 4:14-3 to instruct [...] not to answer questions, since no privilege was being asserted, no civil reservation had been entered, and no Court order permitted him to refuse to answer questions about his prior sworn statements.  Da310 (53:17-25); Da314 (57:3-9).  Defense counsel persisted in instructing [...] not to answer any questions about the sworn statements he made at the time of his guilty plea.  Da315-324 (58:22-67:17); Da327-9 (70:12-72:11); Da331-4 (74:12-77:2).
[brief] [...] Zoning Code §212-14 ......................................................19  [...] Zoning Code §212-14(A)(2) .............................................19  [...] Zoning Code §212-14(B) ...................................................19 N.J. Rev. Stat §55:19-80 (2023), Abandoned Properties Rehabilitation Act ............18 N.J. Stat. Ann. §40A:12A-5 .........................................................................................4, 5, 9, 27, 28  N.J. Stat. Ann. §40A:12A-5(b) ..................................................................................1, 4, 9, 12, 13, 14, 16, 19, 29  N.J. Stat. Ann. §40A:12A-5(d) ..................................................................................1, 5, 10, 12, 13, 14  N.J. Stat. Ann. §40A:12A-6(b)(5)(c) ..........................................................................10  Rules N.J. Ct. R. 1:7-4(a) ......................................................................................................11  I.
[directive] While use of the standard voir dire questions is mandatory, judges in their discretion may alter the sequence of the questions as they determine is appropriate – including whether to ask key challenge for cause questions early on, to incorporate questions suggested by counsel, or to integrate case type specific questions.  The earlier Report of the Special Committee suggested that judges should not be required to follow a "rigid script" in conducting voir dire.  The voir dire questions to be asked, including the sequence in which to ask them, modifications of wording on a case-appropriate basis, the inclusion of supplemental questions requested by counsel, and the proposed open-ended questions, should be part of the Rule 1:8-3 conference.
[directive] Compare “flat” offer criterion #8 (the decision to disqualify a defendant because the current offense was committed while the defendant was knowingly involved in criminal street gang related activity must be approved by a supervisor designated by the county prosecutor or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice.)  Notwithstanding this general burden of proof under the Brimage Guidelines, a defendant shall presumptively be deemed to satisfy “open” offer eligibility criterion #3 unless the prosecutor has an objectively reasonable basis to believe that the amount of drugs involved exceeds the Guidelines threshold.  In the absence of such a factual basis, the prosecutor is hereby authorized to assume satisfied.2 that this eligibility criterion has been  A prosecutor, in other words, 2  Nothing in this Application Note should be construed to require a prosecutor to tender an “open” plea offer where the prosecutor has doubts concerning the defendant’s eligibility.  A prosecutor always retains the discretion to delay tendering a plea offer while awaiting more specific information or verification of the amount of drugs involved.  Note that pursuant to the requirements of Section 4.5, if the prosecutor elects to submit the case to a grand jury and the defendant is indicted while the prosecutor is awaiting more specific information, the defendant shall be entitled to an “open” plea offer as the “functional equivalent” of a pre-indictment offer if the new information demonstrates that the defendant had, in fact, been eligible for a standardized “open” offer at the time the case was submitted to the grand jury.
[brief] Nevertheless, they refused to withdraw their Motion, which sought the entry of default judgment against a non-party to the action who had never been served with the Amended Complaint.  When a party and/or attorney is found to have violated R. 1:4-8, the Rule provides for the imposition of sanctions, consisting of “an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys’ fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation .  . . .”  R. 1:4-8(d).  [...] therefore sought to hold Appellants and their counsel jointly and severally liable for the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by [...] in responding to Appellants’ frivolous Motion.  In denying [...]’s Cross-Motion, the trial court appears to have mistaken [...]’s motion for monetary sanctions as a motion to hold Appellants in contempt.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ contention that the CCIP enrollment coverage was mandatory for all subcontractors (Pb6) is incorrect, [...] maintained a CCIP for “some (but not all)” of the subcontractors at the Project.  (9/8/14 CCIP Manual, Pa582; 4/16/15 CCIP Manual, Pa510.)  [...]  (“[...]”) was the broker that procured the CCIP insurance policies on behalf of [...], as well as the CCIP’s administrator.  (Pa3, ¶ 13; 4/16/15 CCIP Manual, Pa 512.)  The CCIP was jointly comprised of: (1) a CGL Policy issued by [...]; (2) an Excess Policy issued by [...]; and (3) a Workers Compensation Policy (collectively, the “CCIP Policies”).
[brief] However, once the download was activated, the licensing agreement containing the terms was not displayed again while the software was running or at any other time.  *Ibid.*  Under these circumstances, the Second Circuit held the arbitration clause was unenforceable.  The Court was not convinced that “a reasonably prudent [person] in these circumstances would have known of the existence of [the] license terms. ”  *Id.* at 31; 32 (“reference to the existence of license terms on a submerged screen is not sufficient to place consumers on inquiry or constructive notice of those terms”).
[brief] (Da2 at ¶4 (Blaine Supp. Cert. at Ex. B, p. 4) (citing Da13 - Dec. 16, 2019 opinion and order from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida (the “Dec. 2019 SDFL Order & Opinion”)).  “The iPhone became inaccessible when [...], a computer science major and former IT consultant, inputted the wrong password multiple times and despite the manufacturer’s popup warnings that users would be locked out if repeated incorrect attempts are made.  There is reason to question whether this lock out is accidental. ”  (Da13 at n.1 (Dec. 2019 SDFL Order & Opinion)).  Respondent’s prejudice is therefore firmly established by the opinion and order entered in a separate case by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on December 16, 2019 that struck Appellant [...] Diamond’s answer, affirmative defenses, and counterclaim with prejudice due to his “clear pattern of repeated, willful disobedience of Court orders requiring [...] to produce all recordings and devices,” because “no other reasonable sanction . . . would result in the full production of [...]’s devices and recordings,” and because “no sanction short of dismissal would adequately punish [...] for his disregard for the Court’s multiple orders. ” (Da11-14 and Da16-18 (Dec. 2019 SDFL Order & Opinion)).
[brief] POWELL’S FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS HAS NOT BEEN CHALLENGED  Defendant [...] seeks to discredit the analyses offered by [...] on an assortment of grounds unrelated to the substance.  In fact, neither of Defendants’ experts has joined issue with him on the issue of feasibility.  [...]’s in-house authority [...] belatedly supplemented the information provided in [...]’s Application, first adding information about sewer costs (Pb10-11) and then making an unsubstantiated contention that the exemption is needed to facilitate the sale of units.  (Pb14-15)  The [...] offered an expert in affordable housing, [...], who also failed to question [...]’s analysis.  (Pa722)  On the sewer issue, the [...] has calculated a per unit cost for [...]’s total figure but without reference to overall project cost.  (Dtb27)  The question plaintiffs long ago asked of defendants remains unanswered: what makes a sewer-cost of $17,547,105 “excessive” in a development costing more than $330,000,000 to build.  (Pb11)  Instead, the [...] asks the Court to ignore the Powell reports on procedural grounds and characterizes his quantitative estimate of the long-term effects of the exemption as “speculative. ”  (Dtb28, 34-5)  Nonetheless, the Trial Judge elected to try the matter summarily and [...]’s reports must therefore speak for themselves.  They are fully adequate to challenge the validity of the exemption.  Under *Hirth v. Hoboken*, supra, 337 N.J. Super. at 158, plaintiffs have raised material issues of fact that they should have been permitted to develop through discovery and trial.  *Hirth* makes clear that this rule—which permits expansion of the record—applies to an action challenging the validity of an ordinance.  Significantly, the Trial Court did not bar [...]’s reports from the record but instead discounted them based on the Court’s view of the LTTEL that are the subject of this appeal.  As it stands, [...]’s opinion that [...]’s project was lucrative and did not need a tax exemption to attract investment has not been contradicted.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] [...]’S DECISION TO DENY ALI-X’S PROPERTY CLAIM WAS BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.  On appeal, [...] argues [...]’s denial of his property claim violated his due process rights because “there was no rule or regulation established for [...]” to deny the return of the food items.  (Pb6).  Moreover, [...] argues his procedural due process rights were violated because he was deprived “of an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. ” (Pb9).  Lastly, [...] argues he should be awarded punitive damages because he was “knowingly outright lied” to and that his property claim was denied with “evil intention. ” (Pb11).  The court’s role in reviewing an agency decision is limited.