ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] (Note that the decision to impose consecutive as opposed to concurrent terms of imprisonment on these two convictions would be vested in the discretion of the court, and not the prosecutor.)  In order to avoid the inappropriate “double counting” of a single aggravating circumstance (i.e., the fact that a school zone offense also occurred within 500 feet of a public park, public housing facility, museum or library), where the prosecutor tenders a plea offer that requires the defendant to plead guilty to both 2C:35-7 and 2C:35-7.1 charges involving the same event/transaction, the prosecutor in calculating the authorized plea offer under these Guidelines for the school violation may not count the two points that would otherwise be applicable under aggravating factor #1b.  See also Section 8.4.  Note, however, that if some other aggravating factor defined in the “Community Impact” Aggravating Factor Category applies (i.e., e.g., if children were present, or if the offense occurred in a designated “Quality of Life” Special Enforcement Zone), then those aggravating factors points must be calculated.  Furthermore, if two or more counts that the defendant pleads guilty to involve separate events or transactions, then the aforesaid prohibition against “double counting” would not apply, and the prosecutor must award points under aggravating factor #1b.  Page 70
[brief] To begin with, this case is an inappropriate matter for summary disposition without reference to extrinsic evidence.  See, e.g., Matter of Est. of Stumm, No. A-0655-18T2, 2019 WL 4620342, at *4 (App. Div. Sept. 24, 2019) (“When there is an ambiguity in the will, the testator’s intent is a fact issue. ”).  [...] had the burden to submit extrinsic evidence justifying the modification he sought.  He failed to do so and failed to meet his burden of proof.
[brief] Thus, [...]’s spotless institutional record—never committing an offense or single infraction in prison—and his participation in therapeutic, vocational, and academic programming in prison, all supported a finding that he was unlikely to commit another offense and that there was not a great need for deterrence.  The Sentencing Court’s refusal to consider these facts as supporting mitigating factor nine and weighing against aggravating factors three and nine resulted in findings on those factors that were unsupported by competent, credible evidence in the record.
[directive] Force may be used against groups of people only if authorized by the Incident Commander (IC) and only when other means of gaining compliance with lawful directives have been attempted and shown to be ineffective or are not feasible.  3.8.5  High-volume OC delivery systems are designed for, and may be used in, civil disturbances against groups of people engaged in unlawful acts resulting in, or creating an immediate risk of, bodily injury or significant property damage.  3.8.6  CS (2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile) chemical agents are primarily offensive weapons that shall be used with the utmost caution.  Thus, CS: (a) may be deployed only by specially trained individuals who are part of a special tactical unit authorized to deploy such agents; 12 USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022 (b) may be deployed only with the specific and express approval of the IC; (c) may be deployed defensively to prevent injury when lesser force options are either not available or would likely be ineffective; and (d) may be deployed only after an announcement is made and when avenues of egress are available to the crowd.  3.8.7
[brief] ”).  Nor would the assertion of a libel per se claim relate back to February 2020, when Plaintiffs initially filed their original complaint.  As Rule 4:9-3 provides, “Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. ”  However, “an entirely new and distinctly different cause of action” is not saved by the relation back doctrine.  See Young v. Schering Corp., 275 N.J. Super. 221, 230 (App. Div. 1994).
[brief] At trial, [...] admitted that she in fact did have “access” to well more than $70,000.00 at the time that she made the representation.  (Trial transcript T2 page 74 line 7 through page 76 line 8)  7.  At trial [...] was asked the following question:  Q.  Well, the question is you in fact did have access to $70,000.00 when you signed the Agreement?  (Trial Transcript T2 page 73 lines 12-13)  A.  I did.  (Trial Transcript T2, Page 73- lines 12 to 14)
[directive] If the defendant is arrested for an offense under New Jersey law and a lawful detainer has been lodged against the defendant by any federal agency or a law enforcement agency from this State or any other state, the law enforcement agency having custody of the defendant shall apply for a complaint-warrant and advise the court of the detainer.  If a defendant is arrested for an offense committed under the laws of another state, or the United States, and is not charged with an offense under New Jersey law, the Bail Reform Law does not apply, and the agency making the arrest or having custody of the defendant shall proceed in accordance with the laws, practices, and procedures currently in place.  See also Section 1.6.
[brief] The Court erred when it dismissed Plaintiff’s Count for Breach of Fiduciary on the Summary Judgment Cross Motion (Pa36-38)  The Court below dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for breach of Fiduciary Duty.  (Pa38-39).  In the summary judgment decision, the court relied upon *In Re Estate of Folcher*, 224 N.J. 496 (2016) which held that the fiduciary relationship that sprang from the confidential relationship between the surviving wife and her decedent husband, did not extend to beneficiaries of the estate, for whom she was not an appointed Executrix.  The Court in *dicta* said that a confidential relationship does not necessarily rise to create fiduciary relationships, but the trial Court erroneously used that to ignore the longstanding precedents that have held that constructive trusts do arise from confidential relationships, akin to fiduciary duties.  Long standing precedent establishes in New Jersey that a confidential relationship does indeed create a fiduciary like responsibilities triggering constructive trusts.  As can be seen at trial, the Court found that there was a confidential relationship.
[brief] [...]'s first two points revolve around [...]'s in-court identification of defendants.  He contends that the trial court erred in denying his application for a mistrial because [...]'s in-court identification was irreparably tainted by her observation of defendants being brought into the courtroom in restraints and having the restraints removed in her presence.  He further urges that the court's limiting instruction “enhanced the prejudice to [[...]] by informing the jurors that [[...]] was in custody and transported in handcuffs because he had chosen not to post bail, which the court characterized as a device used to secure a defendant's appearance at trial.
[brief] In fact, [...] was created in order to purchase and develop the Melting Pot franchise, as well as the leasehold at [...] in addition to the liquor license to operate at that location.  [...], his older sister, [...], and his father, [...], served as signatories.  (6T 8:14 to 9:13).  [...] purchased the leasehold and liquor license for five hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($550,000.00), and there was a two hundred and fifty thousand dollar ($250,000.00) letter of credit for a security deposit, one hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($150,000.00) of which would be returned after two (2) years.  (6T 10:21 to 10:25).  The leasehold was particularly valuable because it was a seventeen (17) year total leasehold, (6T 101:7), and both the leasehold and liquor license were particularly valuable given the restaurant’s location.  Further, when [...] renegotiated the lease in furtherance of developing the [...] project, he secured a full twenty (20) year timeframe and two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000.00) in tenant improvement funds, or “T.I.” dollars, and a personal guarantee on the lease.  (Da11; 6T 104:1 to 105:22).  Securing the leasehold on the property was likely the most important step in the process of making [...] a potential success because of its location.
[brief] [...] responded that the Court should not – or should not yet – address the Public Trust Doctrine issues.  [...] asserted that the Redevelopment Plan only established new zoning regulations and that the Plan itself did not actually authorize the physical development of property located inside the redevelopment area, therefore the Public Trust issues had to await the submission of the actual plans for development by the authorized developer for Subdivision/Site Plan Approval as per N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-13.
[brief] (Pa33; 1T5:13-18; 3T68:14-69:1).  Plaintiff’s counsel advised both the defendant and the Trial Court of the plaintiff’s unrelated health condition prior to the start of trial.  (Pa33; 6T159:22-160:4).  The trial proceeded in her absence and her deposition testimony was presented at trial in accordance with *N.J.R.E.* 804(a)(4), *N.J.R.E.* 804(b)(1)(A), and *Rule* 4:16-1(c).
[brief] The fact that the property has never been developed by [...] is not relevant to ownership.  The court appointed surveyor, [...], and defendant’s own surveyor, [...], conclusively find that Lot 22 is owned by plaintiff and there is no reliable evidence to indicate otherwise.  The undisputed deposition testimony of the court-appointed surveyor, Mr. [...], is that the property at issue is [...]’s Lot 22 and not Lot 20 of [...].  His testimony was that he is “a hundred percent sure that Lot 19 and 20 sit as I show it on my survey. ”; that the subject debris piles rest entirely on [...]’s Lot 22 other than perhaps 0.1 feet (approximated 1.5 inches); that Lot 22 is owned by [...]; and that [...] encompasses both of [...]’s Lots 19 and 20.  [...] has produced no evidence to contradict this.
[brief] Such a liberal construction "resolves all reasonable doubts in favor of the applicability of the statute to the particular case."  Kochen v. Consol. Police & Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 71 N.J. Super. 463, 478, (App. Div. 1962).  See Duignan v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 223 N.J. Super. 208, 216 (App. Div. 1988) (same); Hillman v. Bd. Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 109 N.J. Super. 449, 455 (App. Div. 1970) (same).  Francois v. Board of Trustees, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 349.  A person that is eligible for certain pension benefits is entitled to a liberal interpretation of the pension statute.  The determination below is unreasonable because [...] would otherwise be eligible for accidental disability benefits under the Ricci Act.  Under the liberal construction required of pension statutes, his eligibility for the benefit is not in question.  In other words, [...] suffers from a 9/11 illness and is disabled as a result.  He qualifies for accidental disability benefits under the Ricci Act standard.
[brief] In sum, the legislative history of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b) reveals that the purpose of this statute is twofold: (1) it criminalizes all possession of firearms by persons with predicate convictions even under circumstances where they would be exempt from prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5; and (2) punishes simple possession of a firearm by persons with disqualifying convictions more harshly than unlawful possession of a firearm by persons without predicate convictions.  Examining the first purpose, there are several exemptions to prosecution for unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit in addition to the firing range temporary transfer provision discussed above.  A person without a handgun carry permit is exempt from prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) if he possesses the firearm in his home.  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6(e); see also State v. Harmon, 104 N.J. 189, 198-99 (1986); State v. Navarro, 310 N.J. Super. 104, 108 n.1 (App. Div. 1998).  But a person with a predicate conviction who possesses a handgun in his home may be prosecuted under the certain persons statute.  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1); see State v. Sterling, 215 N.J. 65, 82 n.3 (2013).
[brief] This is not a case of forum shopping as petitioner argues.  (Pb11).  This issue would not have come up but for this Judge of Compensation's background in the State Legislature, and her apparent bias in favor of petitioner's claim that the decedent was an essential worker.  This is also not analogous to prohibiting this Judge of Compensation from hearing any workers' compensation claims that involved injuries to hands or feet because she sponsored Assembly Bills Nos. 782 and 3143, which increased compensation for work related injuries to hands and feet, as petitioner argues.  (Pb15-16).
[brief] **THIS COURT SHOULD CONFIRM THE ARBITRATION AWARD BECAUSE THE ARBITRATOR DID NOT EXCEED THE SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY UNDER THE CONTRACT.**  In its Appellate Brief, the Authority argues that [...] exceeded the scope of his by defining the undefined term “just cause” as it appears in the parties’ Collective Negotiations Agreement.  The Authority argues that the Arbitrator did not consider the specific “intent of the parties” when they bargained to include the just cause standard for discipline and discharge in the CNA.  The Authority’s argument on this point is unavailing.  It is undisputed that the Authority did not present any evidence concerning the parties’ bargaining over the just cause provision, any evidence of a past course of dealing, or any other such evidence before the Arbitrator in the arbitration hearings.  It did not argue the intent of the language to the Arbitrator, and even now is not arguing that [...] ignored any actual bit of history between the parties in arriving at his definition of just cause.  Rather, the Authority simply disapproves of the Arbitrator’s definition because it resulted in an award that was unfavorable to the Authority.  To the extent that the Authority believes that there is some aspect of the parties’ history which may have informed the Arbitrator’s definition, it should have presented that evidence and those arguments to the Arbitrator in the first instance, not here.  Considering any evidence beyond the arbitral record would impermissibly grant the Authority a second bite at the proverbial apple, and would violate the Supreme Court’s guidance in *Misco* that courts should rely on the factual findings of arbitrators, even where they are viewed as silly or improvident.
[brief] [3]  “[...]” is plaintiff [...]’s nick-name.  (Pa116; 22:18-24)  When [...]’s deposition resumed two weeks later, she refused to answer any questions about the email because, she now claimed, it “violates attorney client privilege. ” (Pa187/304:4-307:1).  [...] did not testify in the liability phase of the trial, but the evidence she brought forth was introduced through the plaintiff on cross over plaintiff’s objection (1T138:13-148:25; 3T21:5-26:20), even though it related only to damages.
[brief] Second, R. 4:23-4 empowers a trial court to enforce a notice of deposition served on the “director...of a party”:  If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under R. 4:14-2(c) or R. 4:15-1 to testify on behalf of a party fails to appear before the officer within this State who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, the court may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may take any action authorized under paragraphs (1)(2) and (3) of R. 4:23-2(b).  (emphasis added).  R. 4:23-4.  Defendants’ argument that only notices for the deposition of a corporate representative are enforceable, while notices for specific directors are not, contradicts the plain language of the Rule.  The argument is also logically flawed.  If accepted, the argument advanced would allow a corporate defendant to (a) prevent a CEPA plaintiff from deposing a decisionmaker like [...], whose state of mind is the ultimate issue in the case, where that decisionmaker is outside the subpoena power of the trial court, and (b) substitute another witness who did not make the decision in his place.  The Court should not sanction such a perverse result.
[brief] IV.  CONCLUSION  The trial court's statutory analysis is supported by the plain language of the statute, giving Defendant no basis upon which to declare the judgment void based upon the NJCFLA.  The plain language of the NJCFA neither explicitly or implicitly creates nor allows any private cause of action, but instead by its clear terms rests all authority to pursue claims for a violation in a single entity, the Commissioner of the Department of Banking and Insurance, and Defendant cannot avail himself of any of the provisions in the Act to void the judgment in this matter.  Nor has Defendant provided the requisite grounds for the grant of the requested relief, having failed to show the motion to vacate judgment was filed within reasonable time or how there was excusable neglect in the nearly six-year delay or any other basis for the grant of the requested relief.
[brief] If a party cannot overcome the presumption, the *bona fide* purchaser’s title will be protected, even if there were abnormalities in the foreclosure process.  See, e.g., *Coryell v. Curry*, 391 N.J. Super. 72, 81-82 (App. Div. 2006); *Citibank, N.A. v. Russo*, 334 N.J. Super. 346, 352-53 (App. Div. 2000); *City of Newark v. 497 Block 1854, Lot 15*, 244 N. J. Super. 402, 411-12 (App. Div. 1990); *Last v. Audubon Park Assocs.*, 227 N.J. Super. 602, 607-09 (App. Div. 1988).  Here, there was no material dispute that [...] acquired title to the property, and also that it paid valuable consideration of $140,000.
[brief] *Malanga* clarified the proofs required by N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(d) to declare a site an area in need of redevelopment.  It said nothing about the proofs required by N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11.  The procedures under the LHRL for declaring a property to be in need of redevelopment and the procedures under the LTTEL for approving a tax exemption are fundamentally different.  The first requires a resolution of the governing body, after a quasi-judicial hearing is held before the planning board on notice to all potentially affected property owners.  The second requires an application and approval of a financial agreement by ordinance.  The LHRL explicitly requires that the area-in-need designation be “supported by substantial evidence[.]”  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-6(b)(5)(c).  There is no similar provision in the LTTEL, nor could there be, since by its very nature the approval of a financial agreement is a legislative act, based on a legislative, not quasi-judicial record.
[brief] ## FEDERAL CASES  **Blackburn Law Firm, PLLC v. Allied World Ins. Co.,** 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39790 (N.D.Ms. Mar. 3, 2021)  ............... 2, 10, 11, 12  **Colony Ins. Co. v. Kwasnik, Kanowitz & Assoc. P.C.,**  2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87659 (D.N.J. June 27, 2014)  ......................... 14  ## STATE CASES  **Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America,** 142 N.J. 520 (1995)  ...........................................................................  4  **Conrad v. Michelle & John, Inc.,** 349 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2007) ..................................................
[directive] Accepting Reports of Officer Misconduct  5.0.1  Every law enforcement agency shall establish a policy providing that any complaint from a member of the public is readily accepted and fully and promptly investigated.  Allegations of officer misconduct or complaints of inappropriate behavior can alert the law enforcement executive to problems that require disciplinary action or identify the need for remedial training.  In addition, executives must also recognize that complaints from the public provide them with an invaluable source of feedback.  Such complaints, whether substantiated or not, increase the executive's awareness of both actual or potential problems and the community's perceptions and attitudes about police practices and procedures.  The executive should use complaints from the public as one means of determining whether the agency is falling short of its intended goals.  5.1
[brief] Id.  In reaching this decision, the court found that the “rational nexus” cost requirements regulating municipal extractions and developer contributions under §42 of the Municipal Land Use Law (“MLUL”), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-42, and Divan Builders v. Planning Bd. of Wayne, 66 N.J. 582, 600 (1975), is not applicable in the redevelopment context and considering the LRHL’s authorization.  The court recognized that the rational nexus and pro rata proportionality requirement provided by the MLUL in the non-redevelopment context served as “the Legislature’s check on a municipality’s planning power. ”  South Amboy at *9.  The court contrasted this intent with the LRHL’s intent in the redevelopment context to imbue “municipalities with broad power to facilitate and encourage the redevelopment of blighted and unproductive areas, as evidenced by both the statutory language and the policies promoted therein. ”  Id.  The court distinguished the “formula like mandate” for seeking contributions from developers under the MLUL and the “flexible and unrestricted language of the LRHL” to negotiate and collect revenue from a redeveloper, noting that the MLUL long preceded the LRHL and that the Legislature could have elected to incorporate the strictures of the MLUL:
[brief] (5T 95-22 to 98-11)  Although the car wash still-shots themselves had been shown during the evidence, no witness identified [...] in them or opined on the color of his clothing, and the prosecutor further conceded that they were “a little blurry. ”  (5T 96-12)  Similarly, the State did not call any lay or expert witness to opine on the pace or manner of [...]’s walking, but the prosecutor repeatedly claimed during summation that the jury could tell [...] was the shooter from the “style of walk” of the person the State alleged was [...] in the pre- and post-Governor videos.
[brief] ”  (31a)  In the Statement of Reasons attached to the Order, the trial court explained that “plaintiff’s attempt to effectuate a sale of a Trust asset, to herself in her individual capacity, while also the Trustee, violates her fiduciary duty of impartiality. ”  (35a)  Additionally, “as a beneficiary, defendants may void the transaction pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:31-55(b) and have exercised that right by submitting an objection in response to plaintiff’s opposition papers.  Thus, the Court finds that the proposed purchase of the Boonton Property by both [...] and plaintiff is void. ”  (36a)  There was no explanation as to why [...] was granted a second opportunity to purchase the Boonton Property.  [...]’s breach of trust commenced on December 9, 2021 when she and [...] submitted a written contract (137a) to jointly purchase the Boonton Property for $651,000 and extended until August 31, 2022 when [...] ordered that [...] was not permitted to purchase the Boonton Property with [...], as doing so violated her fiduciary duties.