ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  2  STANDARD OF REVIEW  2  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  2  LEGAL ARGUMENT  6  I.  WHAT WE’RE NOT HERE ABOUT.  6  II.  BACKGROUND ON THE TAX SALE LAW IN NEW JERSEY.  (Raised below, passim).  6  III.  DEFENDANT FAILED TO ALLEGE ANY EXCUSABLE NEGLECT NOR WAS A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE PRESENTED, LET ALONE EXCEPTIONAL CAUSE.  DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY RELIEF UNDER R.4:50-1.  (Raised below 1T38:3 to 41:13)  10  A.  There was no mistake, surprise, excusable neglect, nor any defense.  10  B.  [...] did not show any exceptional circumstances.  14  C.  The Trial Court’s findings were insufficient as well as factually and legally mistaken.  IV.  THE PROPERTY WAS TRANSFERRED FOR VALUE TO A BONAFIDE PURCHASER THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN PROTECTED AS A MATTER OF LAW.  (Raised below 1T36:20 to 37:19, 1T41:15-21)  V.  EQUITY SHOULD HAVE PLACED RESPONSIBILITY ON MATTHEWS BECAUSE ONLY IT HAD THE POWER TO PREVENT FORECLOSURE.  (Raised below 1T38:23 to 41:13)  VI.  RECONSIDERATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.  (Raised below Ia386)  CONCLUSION
[brief] (Id. at 76:7-77:14).  On the third issue, the [...]’s pervasive invocation of privilege during [...]’s deposition of [...], the Court noted that relevant Third Circuit authority, In re Hughes, 633 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1980), appeared to extend work product privilege to [...], and “that the only question here would really be whether all of the questions were properly objected to, and that [...] was properly instructed not to answer them.
[brief] The Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Appellant’s request to extend discovery based on the circumstances regarding the Appellant’s physical condition and her expert’s need to review her ongoing treatment records.  The Court in D’Atria v. D’Atria set forth that a motion for reconsideration is a matter within the sound discretion of the Court, to be exercised in the interest of justice.  242 N.J.Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div.1990) (citing Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping Corp., 220 N.J.Super. 250, 257, 263, 531 A.2d 1078 (App. Div. 1987); Cf. Michel v. Michel, 210 N.J.Super. 218, 509 A.2d 301 (Chanc.Div.1985)).  Further elaborating on the relevant standard: A litigant should not seek reconsideration merely because of dissatisfaction with a decision of the Court.  Rather, the preferred course to be followed when one is disappointed with a judicial determination is to seek relief by means of either a motion for leave to appeal or, if the Order is final, by a notice of appeal.  Id.  Reconsideration should be utilized only for those cases which fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) the Court has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the Court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.  A litigant must initially demonstrate that the Court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner, before the Court should engage in the actual reconsideration process.  D’Atria, 242 N.J.Super. at 401.  In the present matter, the Court expressed its decision upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis by unreasonably failing to consider the extreme medical circumstances the Appellant has endured in the relevant time period and the necessity of ongoing treatment due to the Respondents’ negligence, which prevented her from providing the expert report in the required discovery timeframe.  140a-143a.  The Appellant sought reconsideration, not through mere dissatisfaction with a decision of the Court, but based on the failure to consider the unfortunate and extraordinary circumstances which prevented timely compliance with the discovery timeframe.  The injuries expressly set forth by the Appellant include, but are not limited to: COVID-19 diagnosis (Id. at ¶ 3), Ketamine treatment (Id. at ¶ 4-5), broken ankle (Id. at ¶ 6), broken leg fibula (Id. at ¶ 6), Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS) diagnosis (Id. at ¶ 7-8), abdomen and stomach pain (Id. at ¶ 10), therapy for the right-side arm with limited use up to the elbow (Id. at ¶ 13).  The trial court’s decision is obvious that it either, did not consider, or failed to appreciate, the significance of probative evidence presented by the Appellant.  Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court’s March 17, 2023, Order denying Reconsideration of the January 20, 2023, Orders dismissing the Appellant’s claims with prejudice.  F.
[brief] It's important to note that the juvenile defendants were all wearing masks, so there was no logical reason for [d]efendant to eliminate a witness who could not have identified him .  . . .  [...], the real ringleader and the only actual killer of the group, provided masks, since knives and masks were part of [...]’s modus operandi .  . . .  The instant crime was . . . planned out, and the plan included masks and gloves so there would be no identification and therefore no need to hurt anyone in the house.  [Pa119-120].
[brief] [...]’s order needs to be confirmed by a jury of 12, notwithstanding the order is erroneous (Not argued below)  In the event that judge Hon. Carol V. Novey [...] concurred with the erroneous [...] order, or any other erroneous order issued by a judge with regard to the matters at the bar, that finding of fact is based on newly adduced evidence.  Therefore that finding of fact by judge Carol V. Novey [...] has to be confirmed by more than just a judge-jury of one, - i.e. a jury of 6 or 12 per New Jersey statutory law or the previous decisions of the courts established by the Constitution.  *Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co.*, 228 US 364 is clear where a jury is to perform its office, regardless of whether the presiding judge is going to accept the verdict.  POINT 4:
[brief] Insurance companies — whose role in investigating and bringing actions to enforce against insurance fraud is significant — would become all but unable to use the IFPA to combat the huge problem of fraud in the insurance industry if an in-court forum were not available.  But that also has significant downstream consequences.  The efforts of the Department and the OIFP in protecting the public from insurance fraud receive invaluable assistance from investigations and referrals from, and the prosecution of IFPA cases by, insurance companies.  By hampering the ability of insurance companies to investigate and bring such actions, the decision below also constrains the State’s ability to do the same.  The Department, through its Bureau of Fraud Deterrence, is charged with protecting the public from insurance fraud — a mission that is encumbered by the PIP arbitration decision below.
[brief] This case does not involve an endorsement, inserted into a renewal policy without the insured’s knowledge, which required a statement as to “sole and unconditional” vehicle ownership.  Cf. Merchants Indem. Corp. v. Eggleston, 37 N.J. 114, 121 (1962).  This case also does not involve a commonly misunderstood word in the auto context, like “conviction”.  Cf. Am. Policyholders' Ins. Co. v. Portale, 88 N.J. Super. 429, 433 (App. Div. 1965).  Here, Question 4 asked if [...] rented vehicles.  The Question can have only one possible meaning in the context it was presented to [...].  Question 4 is further distinguishable from the questions at issue in the cases cited by Intervenor, because Question 4 is an objective question.
[brief] In determining if there is adequate provocation, the court must decide whether a reasonable person would have been provoked “sufficiently to ‘arouse the passions of an ordinary [person] beyond the power of [their] control. ’”  *Canfield*, 470 N.J. Super. at 275 (quoting *State v. King*, 37 N.J. 285, 301-02 (1962)).  The adequacy of the provocation depends on the proportionality of the response.  *State v. Darrian*, 255 N.J. Super. 435, 449  Following defendant’s request at sentencing, [...] explicitly put on the record why passion/provocation manslaughter was inappropriate.  She recognized that when a defendant does not request the charge, the instruction is only required when the facts clearly indicate the two object elements.
[brief] ”  This has also been judicially recognized elsewhere.  Icehouse, Inc. v. Geissler, 636 NW2d 459, 461 (SD 2001) [“Prior to the sale, Icehouse signed an ‘Estoppel Certificate. ’  The purpose of this certificate was to inform potential buyers of the rights and obligations held by the owner of Manor House. ”]; Greaseoutlet.com, LLC v. MK --- 7  In conformity with R. 1:36-3 a copy of the unpublished opinion was presented below and appears now in the record on appeal.  (Da378.)  South II, LLC, 892 S.E.2d 68, 75 (2023), disc. rev. denied, 895 S.E.2d 863 (2024)  [“An estoppel certificate is a document routinely required by a purchaser of real estate to be signed by the existing tenants of the real estate being sold.  . . .  As such, it is not uncommon for a purchaser, as part of its due diligence, to require each tenant to make representations regarding its lease by signing an estoppel certificate. ”]  Fundamentally Plaintiff, as a purchaser, is an outside party to the relationship between the landlord and tenant.
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  In the current matter, Respondent’s appraiser’s opinion of highest and best use is at least partially based upon the erroneous position that the provisions of the Morris Canal Redevelopment Plan applied as of the date of taking as the zoning to determine the developmental potential of the Property.  Respondent’s experts ignored the R-2 zone which was the zoning in place at the time of the taking.  The use of the redevelopment plan was the Property’s zoning flies in the face of established redevelopment law – the project influence doctrine calls for the specific exclusion of any positive or negative fluctuations due to the redevelopment plan for which the subject property is being taken.  See, Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Kugler, 58 N.J. 374 (1971).  For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ruling that the zoning reflected in the Morris Avenue Redevelopment Area is the controlling zoning for determining just compensation should be reversed as it is squarely contradicted by established New Jersey condemnation law and Respondent’s appraisal barred from presentation to the jury.
[brief] B.  The Marriage Between Decedent and Petitioner  Decedent and Petitioner were married on November 22, 1992, and remained married until the Decedent’s death on May 6, 2021.  They had no children together.  The Petitioner has no children.  As noted above, the Decedent had one child, the Respondent.  (Pa 373; 7T43-1 to 3).
[brief] [...] also testified that Bella chased Koda and came onto their property, urinating on their mailbox “between five and ten times. ”  3T98:11-25.  Bella defecated on their property more than once.  3T99:12-15.  In the winter prior to the incident, Bella nipped Koda on the feet and defecated on Defendant’s lawn in front of Koda.  3T99:1-13.  3T99:14-15.  While [...] cleaned up the mess, he told [...] not to worry and offered to get the dogs together “to --- \(^4\) The Transcript erroneously says, “She does not pee so she bites” meet” for a play date.  3T99:16-22.  [...] politely declined.  3T99:23-25.  [...] testified that she saw Bella outside every day.
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY Addendum C | April 2025  Barricaded Individuals 6  Required Capabilities of Tactical Teams 6.1  Shields and Barriers.  Barriers can reduce the ability of the subject to contact the officers, providing officers with additional time to react and reducing the need to use force.  Tactical pursuant to Section 4  Teams responding of this Addendum must be equipped with shields and barriers that are readily available for deployment.  Law enforcement agencies should equip Tactical Teams with ballistic shields, ballistic blankets, or other barriers that can protect officers.  Law enforcement agencies should consider providing shields and barriers to other first responding officers and supervisors for use before the arrival of Tactical Teams.  6.2
[directive] I.  SAFE Office  A.  Establishment.  There is established in the Department, the Statewide Affirmative Firearms Enforcement (SAFE) Office.  B. Office.  The SAFE Office shall operate under the supervision of a Leadership of the SAFE Director of the SAFE Office, who shall be selected by, and operate under, the authority of the Attorney General.  The Director of the SAFE Office shall direct and supervise the work of the Office and any constituent organization units that may be established, and shall devote their entire time to the duties of the Office.  C. Office.  With the approval of the Attorney General, the Director of Organization of the SAFE the SAFE Office may organize the work of the Office into any organizational units as may be deemed necessary for the efficient and effective operation of the Office.  The Director of the SAFE Office may delegate to employees in the Office and its constituent organizational units such responsibilities and authority as the Director deems appropriate, subject to the supervision of the Director.  The Attorney General shall assign to the Office such employees as may be deemed necessary to assist the Director in the performance of the Office’s responsibilities.  D. Authority.  All functions, powers, and duties vested in the Attorney General by Delegation of P.L.2022, c.56, are hereby delegated to the SAFE Office, whose exercise of such authority shall remain at all times subject to the authority and supervision of the Attorney General.  E. To the extent not inconsistent with law, and under the authority and Additional Authority. supervision of the Attorney General, the SAFE Office shall coordinate with every other division, agency, office, commission, bureau, and unit within the Department to facilitate the efficient and effective administration of laws pertaining to gun violence.
[brief] VII.  A.  New Jersey Court Rule 4:69-1, et seq. details the procedure to force a government entity to comply with a statute.  Those suits for a writ of mandamus are filed as a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writ, and carry a 45-day statute of limitations under R. 4:69-6.  [...]’s Counterclaim clearly and unambiguously seeks to enforce the District’s compliance with N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  [...]’s Counterclaim for statutory compliance was filed well past the 45-day statute of limitations, necessitating dismissal of the Counterclaim.  (Argued at Pa381 – Pa382)  VII.  B.  After [...] received what it now deems a partial payment of the April 2020 and July 2020 invoices, it never sent notice of breach of contract, nor petitioned the Commissioner for relief.  [...] did not formally challenge the Board until it filed an Answer and Counterclaim to the lawsuit in September 2022.  Being in a new budget year, the Board is unduly prejudiced if it has to fund the unbudgeted and unanticipated payment [...] now seeks in the Counterclaim.  The doctrines of accord and satisfaction, and laches, prohibits [...] from obtaining recovery over 2 years later in retaliation to a lawsuit.  (Argued Pa224 – Pa225)
[brief] [...] did not exhaust its administrative remedies by petitioning the Commissioner for relief under \textit{N.J.A.C.}  6A:3-1.1, \textit{et seq.}  The availability of administrative remedies further obviates the need to sue in Superior Court, and dictates that the court should not infer that \textit{N.J.S.A.}  18A:7F-9(e)(3) created an implied right to a private cause of action for [...] to sue the Board in Superior Court.  Hence, the dismissal of the Counterclaim should have been affirmed.
[brief] Appellant [...] and Respondent [...] were partners in the Respondent [...] and entered into a Shareholder’s Agreement dated October 18, 2019 (the “Agreement”) (Appellants’ Pa024).  This Agreement includes a dispute resolution provision which first mandated that Mediation take place – which it did but was unsuccessful – and then referenced that the dispute “may” be submitted to Arbitration (Appellants’ Pa031).  The parties disagreed on whether submission to arbitration was required.  Appellant Vella took the untenable position that it was mandatory – despite the permissive language in the Agreement.  Both were experienced attorneys and could have required Arbitration by including the word “shall”.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] (1T 115-20) based on discovery of the warrant); cf. United States v. Howell, 71 F.4th 195, 198 (4th Cir. 2023) (“That search, however, did not indicate whether the warrant was extraditable, such that an officer in another state could act on it. ”).  In addition, our Supreme Court has clearly explained that although the fact that a suspect has a criminal history or a possible criminal background can be a relevant factor to be considered alongside other indicia of criminal activity, it does not warrant an officer in a belief that the suspect is currently engaged in criminal history.  See State v. Valentine, 134 N.J. 536, 547 (1994) (“[A]n officer’s knowledge of a suspect’s prior criminal activity alone is not sufficient to justify the initial stop of a suspect or to justify a frisk.
[brief] (10T27:21-25)  [...] noted that for the history of the Company, all the members had access to the same information and “no one had ever questioned it in the past, so we used that number. ”  (5T52:19-54:2)  [...] acknowledged that [...] had explained that this method was chosen as a matter of convenience, (6T230:18-25), and [...] rejected the assertion that the prior transactions related to interests that were “too small” to justify the engagement of a valuation expert, stating:
[brief] The Trial Court granted Appellant’s request to submit additional briefing regarding the Order of Judgment issue.  (22T11; 22T25).  After considering this supplemental briefing, the Trial Court executed the Order of Judgment submitted by Plaintiff/Respondent on February 28, 2023.  (Da347).  Two weeks later, Appellant moved to “revise” the Order of Judgment, or, for the first time, suggest that a new trial was necessary due to the Trial Court’s legal ruling regarding the JTCL.  (Da352).
[brief] 39, 40 N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1) .........................................................................................................  44 N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 ..........................................................................................................................  3 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 .........................................................................................................................  3 N.J.S.A. 2C:12 ............................................................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 2C:13 ............................................................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 2C:15 ............................................................................................................................  2, 3 N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 .........................................................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7 .........................................................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3 .........................................................................................................................  3 N.J.S.A. 2C:21-6c .......................................................................................................................  3 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a .......................................................................................................................  3 U.S.C. § 3500(b) .........................................................................................................................  43
[directive] F.  Victims shall be advised of their right to be present at all public judicial proceedings when not sequestered, including sentencing hearing.  G.  Victims shall be advised of their right to give an impact statement in-person prior to sentencing before the sentencing court.  H.  Victims shall be advised of their right to submit a written impact statement for inclusion in the presentence report.  I.  Victims shall receive assistance in submitting impact statements to the Prosecutor and or the sentencing court.  J.  Victims of acts committed by defendants convicted of 1st or 2nd degree crimes or the nearest relative of a murder victim as appropriate, who was previously contacted by the parole board and who indicated his intention to testify at the parole hearing, shall be notified by the board panel of the opportunity to testify or submit written impact statements at the hearing.
[brief] Defendant filed an answer before filing any dispositive motion because on 4-24-23, defendant filed its answer with affirmative defenses that lacked any TCA defenses (377a-414a) and it wasn’t until 8-25-23 and after plaintiff served discovery (31a-110a; 305a-324a) and filed their class certification motion (1a-151a) that defendant filed a summary judgment motion predicated on the unplled TCA defense (290a-612a), to which plaintiff responded by cross moving for more specific discovery responses (862a-924a), which was withdrawn when more specific responses were forthcoming.  925a.  Defendant offers no cases holding that, where, as here, the TCA isn’t pled as a defense in an answer filed before a dispositive motion, the defense may be relied on in subsequent motion practice. \(^7\)  For example, as in this case, in *Hill*, the defendant municipality filed its summary judgment motion belatedly raising the defense after it filed its answer.  *Hill v. Board of Educ. of Middletown Tp.*, 183 N.J. Super. 36, 41 (App. Div. 1982), cert den., 81 N.J. 233 (1982).  Likewise, in *Anske v. Borough of Palisades Park*, 139 N.J. Super. 342, 345, 351(App. Div. 1976) after failing to initially plead a TCA defense in its \(^7\)
[brief] Supp. 3d 15 (D.N.J. 2023) | 10 | | George M. Brewster & Son v. Catalytic Const. Co., | | | 17 N.J. 20 (1954) | 18 | | Haviland v. Lourdes Med. Ctr. of Burlington Cnty., Inc., | | | 466 N.J. Super. 126 (App. Div. 2021) | 28 | | Kane v. Hartz Mountain Industries, Inc., | | | 143 N.J. 141 (1996) | 22 | | Kane v. Hartz Mountain Industries, Inc., | | | 278 N.J. Super. 129 (App. Div. 1994) | 22 | | Kieffer v. Best Buy, | | | 205 N.J. 213 (2011) | 5, 10 | | Leitao v. Damon G. Douglas Co., | | | 301 N.J. Super. 187 (App. Div. 1997) | 6, 17, 18, 23 | | Mantilla v. NC Mall Associates, | | | 167 N.J. 262 (2001) | 9, 16, 18 | | [...]
[brief] This was a complex action arising from the redevelopment of an existing commercial structure and adjacent land beginning in 2005.  The property, owned by plaintiff [...], underwent multiple proposed development plans devised by [...], before being subdivided and sold.  [...] engaged defendant [...] to grade the property in accordance with plans procured by [...].  Plaintiffs allege that [...]’s grading, though in accord with plans provided to [...], left a portion of the property with a lower grade level than [...] intended.  The crux of the matter is whether the grade differential caused any damage to [...] and, if so, how that damage arose and what it might be.  These are clearly topics for expert testimony.  Plaintiffs could not sustain their claims without expert analysis.  [...] did not name an expert to establish that any damage actually occurred.  There was likewise no expert analysis to support the claim for the quantum of damages or how damages were allegedly sustained.  In 2020, after the close of discovery, defendants-respondents obtained partial summary judgment dismissing the bulk of the claims against them, because of the absence of required expert testimony.  In 2022, again well after the close of discovery, defendants obtained judgment dismissing the remainder of the claims on a like basis.  Both Motions were briefed thoroughly, presented via oral argument, and decided by the trial court via comprehensive written opinions.  These opinions and Orders well merit affirmance.  CONCISE PROCEDURAL HISTORY