ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 8 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 .....................................................................................  22 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2 .......................................................................................  6, 22 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3 .......................................................................................  6, 22 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3(a) ...................................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) ...............................................................................  1, 6, 17 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-7(c) .................................................................................. 22 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-7(e) .................................................................................. 22 N.J.S.A. 52:9M-15(a) ................................................................................ 24  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] Defendant [...] ("[...]") was brought in from outside the other three parties' original employer, and became a part-time employee/consultant at [...], remaining in California throughout.  Plaintiff was thus fully aware with whom she was dealing in [...] when she agreed to allow him to be in charge of this new venture and to be its principal owner.  All hoped this brand-new venture would garner business and investors and take off, earning them a lot of money.  However, as with many start-ups, these hopes were not realized.  [...] proved to be both dictatorial and incompetent as leader.  He also appears to have engaged in many inappropriate acts and practices.  [...] terminated plaintiff after an argument led to a physical altercation.  Neither plaintiff, nor any of the defendants, realized their dreams or their desired economic benefits, and the start-up failed.  With [...] now deceased and the entity, [...], now defunct, plaintiff seeks to recover what she perceives she was “due” from this failed start-up enterprise, not from [...] or [...], but instead from [...] and [...], as the only parties left standing.
[brief] It has long been held that “one who undertakes to perform an act, even if not obliged to do so in the first instance, must perform it in a reasonably careful manner. ”  McCarthy v. Bye, 118 N.J.L. 94, 96 (1937).  When a defendant performs such an act unreasonably and damage results, defendant is liable for its negligence.  See Ibid. (“Thus if he performs it negligently, whereby damage results, he is liable for such negligence. ”)  In the instant matter, even if Defendants arguendo had no obligation to disburse Plaintiff’s funds or issue title insurance, they chose to do so, and did so negligently thereby damaging Plaintiff.
[brief] Pa56.  [...] was present and involved in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks which took place on September 11, 2001.  Pa56.  [...] certified that he participated in the rescue, recovery, and/or cleanup at the World Trade Center site between September 11, 2001, and October 11, 2001, or September 11, 2001, and/or September 12, 2001.  Pa56.  [...] submitted the Ricci Act Eligibility Registration Form and Request for Amended Benefits Form with his affidavit.  Pa58.  Pa60.  On March 3, 2023, a Petition to the [...] was filed on behalf of [...] and many others.
[directive] Interviewing the Complainant and Civilian Witnesses  7.1.1  The investigator assigned an internal investigations case should initially outline the case to determine the best investigative approach and identify those interviews immediately necessary.  The investigator should determine if any pending court action or ongoing criminal investigation might delay or impact upon the case at hand.  If it appears that the conduct under investigation may have violated the law or the investigation involves the 33 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021 officer’s use of force that resulted in serious bodily injury or death, the County Prosecutor shall be immediately notified of the internal affairs investigation.
[brief] In a locked backpack that was found on the floor by the passenger’s seat, the officers found a notebook that appeared to be a ledger containing names and numbers and a tightly rolled dollar bill and tinfoil with burnt residue on it.  [4T52-16 to -25; 4T53-8 to -16; 4T58-5 to -10].  The zippered portion of the backpack was secured with a luggage lock.  [4T59-18].  Defendant provided the key to the lock from his pants pocket.  [4T60-6; 4T67-16 to -18].  Inside the bag, there was a cigar box, a digital scale, razor blades, a plastic spoon and a large amount of US currency, $19,489.00.  [4T69-5 to -20; 4T76-3; 4T99-11].  The backpack contained large amounts of compressed controlled dangerous substances that appeared to be heroin and methamphetamines.  [4T71-16 to -20; 4T72-15 to -17; 4T73-22 to -25; 4T74-12 to -16].  The substances were seized and taken to the [...] for testing.  [4T77-17 to -19].  The substance the officers believed to be heroin tested positive for fentanyl, 304.98 grams or 10.78 ounces.  [4T174-21 to -24].  The methamphetamines weighed 92.56 grams or 3.26 ounces.  [4T177-12 to -18].  [...] [...] was not on duty on April 10, 2021, but responded to the police station to interview defendant and co-defendant.
[directive] Detainers  I  Custodial Status  Bail Amount Date Bail Posted Interpreter Needed Language OYes ONol 0ROR0  Pretrial 0Bail 0Jail Release Gap Time Credit Jail Time Credit To (Date)  Total Gap Time Credit Days From (Date) To (Date)  Total Jail Time Credit Days From (Date)  D D  Public Defender Private 0Assigned Defense Attorney  Phone Number I Sentencing Judge Address Assistant Prosecutor Comments  I I I  Probation Officer  Team Leader/ Supervisor Prepared Date Approved Date Revised: 09/2017, CN: 10693
[brief] (Da3185)(Da3196).  The Court also ruled that [...]’s past actions, “qualify [...] as an oppressor shareholder and the Plaintiff as the oppressed. ”  (Da3204)  The Court recognized the past actions had been litigated.  However, it still applied a 35% discount to fair value based on that same past conduct and despite the prior remedies for it.  (Da3204)  The $588,307.59 discount to fair value was thus made in addition to all of the damages and fee awards that the Arbitrator and Court previously imposed for the same misconduct.
[brief] A review of defendant’s statement here clearly indicates … a willingness of defendant to speak.  That is undisputed as far as the Court’s own review of the statement … a review of the statement indicates that like [State v.] Kucinski[, 227 N.J. 603 (2017)], the defendant certainly seems interested in giving an affirmative narrative of what he felt he wanted to talk about.  He discusses again, his movements from New Jersey through Virginia.  He talks about his coffee.  He talks about the divorce.  He talks about family issues.  He talks about his brother [...].  So … from a review of the statement, there were clearly areas that the defendant felt that he wanted to share with the police officer, that he wanted them to know his version of certain facts.  And then he clearly indicated those areas and those questions where he did not want to address.  Yes, to the extent that some of those areas were specifically about the instances that are in question here, then that’s certainly ... the defendant’s right to say he does not want to address those.  But again, he clearly, voluntarily wanted to speak to the police, and clearly indicated that he was in control ... it is an example, and it is probative of the voluntariness of the statement and the fact that the defendant was in control during the interview.
[brief] On October 6, 2023, the parties’ attorneys delivered closing arguments.  At the conclusion of closing arguments, Respondent’s counsel realized the error with respect to the Aggravation Charge request and brought it to the attention of the Court.  (4T: 95:24 – 100:11).  The Court ruled the Aggravation Charge warranted based upon the evidence and afforded both counsel the opportunity for supplemental closing argument, in order to address the Aggravation jury charge.
[brief] There is no discussion in *Omar* as to these provisions and how they might impact the analysis. \(^6\)  Third, in *Omar*, the lender rejected the refinance funds because they were short and mistakenly returned them to the borrower, who absconded with the funds.  To the contrary, here, [...] and Appellant’s predecessor did not send the funds to their borrowers.  And they did not send the funds to the new owners of the Property who were the borrowers on the Alpha Loan.  Rather, they --- \(^5\)  As discussed more thoroughly above in Section II, the trial court identified a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the requirements of Section 9 were met, such that [...]/Appellant was obligated to only accept a full payoff of the Loan.
[brief] In the February 15 Order and Decision, the Superior Court noted that in analyzing a motion for leave to amend:  [T]he motion judge must engage in a two-step evaluation, weighing “whether the non-moving party will be prejudiced, and whether granting the amendment would nonetheless be futile. ”  Notte, 185 N.J. at 501.  Where “the amendment is so meritless that a motion to dismiss ... would have to be granted,” a judge may deny the motion to amend under “the so-called futility prong of the analysis. ”  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment 2.2.1, R. 4:9-1 (2024).  (Pa001024).  As set forth herein, the crux of both Plaintiffs’ original Complaint and the proposed Amended Complaint is Plaintiffs’ challenge to Defendants’ elimination of terminal leave over $15,000 under the MSRA.  As the Superior Court found, because “Defendants can cap the terminal [leave] as they did here” (Pa001027), amendment is futile and the Superior Court properly denied Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Having reviewed the merits briefs filed by the primary parties, the Commission has determined that the factual and legal issues involved in this appeal do not warrant the filing of a separate brief.  The primary issues raised in this appeal are: (1) whether it was arbitrary and capricious for the Commission not to transmit the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) based on [...]’s denial of the allegations in the complaint; and (2) whether it was arbitrary and capricious for the Commission to conclude that a local union office is a State workplace for the purposes of the State Policy.
[brief] [...] admits that he works for [...] -- the same company that the investors attest has possession and control of their investments (Aa326-27, 333, 337, 341-42, 346, 351, 357) -- and claims he “believe[s] [...] is seeking to obtain confidential business information from me, related to [...], Inc., as he is a self-proclaimed competitor. ”  Aa5.  [...] doesn’t explain what is the “confidential business information”, what is the harm he will suffer, or, if it is the same confidential business information that he was given access to and used to solicit the L3 investors into duplicate investments.  Aa325-27, 350, Nor does he explain why [...] is a “self-proclaimed competitor” -- and his Certification says nothing about the [...].  [...] does not explain what the competing company is, or why [...]’s business actions should preclude the [...].
[brief] (Da169-70).  The Amended Policy specifically refers to facilitating communication with the parents of a “transgender student. ”  Ibid.  The Amended Policy also provides that when “transgender students” require emotional support services, the school must provide a “full, complete, and accurate” explanation of that “counseling and/or referrals for mental health crisis”—without similarly requiring “parental notification/consent” for other school counseling services.
[brief] See State v. Ross, 189 N.J. Super. 67, 75, 458 A .2d 1299 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 95 N.J. 197, 470 A .2d 419 (1983).  It is well-settled that the trial judge "giv[es] due, although not necessarily controlling, regard to the opportunity of the" Municipal Court judge to assess "the credibility of the witnesses."  State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 157, 199 A .2d 809 (1964).  State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 147-148, 155 A.3d 571 (2017), emphasis added.  [...] accepted [...]’s credibility findings and affirmed his decision without making any independent factual findings or considering the possibility that he had already decided the case before trial.  On January 3, 2023, Defendant requested a hearing to explore the potential sentence in the event of a guilty plea on [...].
[brief] On September 12, 1986, a court order modifying or Terminating Support Order was issued directing the defendant to pay plaintiff through direct payment.  It was further ordered child support payment/alimony was hereby **terminated** as of 9/16/1986, **arrearages of -$0-** are certified/reinstated as of 9/16/1986 and the [...] was **relieved** of any further **supervision and enforcement** for this case and directed to **close** its file in this matter (Pa4-Pa5).  On March 9, 1990, a subsequent hearing took place resulting in the court issuing a default judgment as this defendant had not appeared (Pa7-Pa8).  This judgment had ordered the defendant to make child support payments to Middlesex County Probation (Pa7-Pa8).  Probation began to seize monies on three separate instances between 1990 and 2001, (1990, 1995 and 2001) each seizure lasting less than 3-months on each occasion (Pa12-Pa15) as this defendant had forwarded the 1986 court order relieving Probation of enforcement and supervision (Pa4).  In 2021, Probation intercepted a Federal Government Stimulus check, and it was not until May of 2023 upon receiving a letter from the [...] (Pa32) that this defendant began to seek legal redress.  It was during the next few months that it was discovered for the first time within the past 33-years that a 1990 court ordered default judgement (Pa7-Pa8) had been issued.  It was further discovered during this timeframe of discovery in 2023 that Service of Process had not been executed for said 1990 hearing/default judgement as there are zero court records that validate Service of Process (Pa6; Pa21-Pa23) while the plaintiff forsook to prove validity of service by failing to Respond to said claim of a Due Process violation (Service of Process never being executed)(Pa1; Pa10-Pa11; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa40; Pa58-Pa59; Pa62).  The court denied both Motion to Vacate Arrears on September 26, 2023 (Pa17-19) and a subsequent Motion for Reconsideration on November 21, 2023 (Pa1-Pa2).  February 16, 2024, the court issued a final order denying all claims without prejudice (Pa133).  ARGUMENT I.
[brief] (3T35:20-24).  [...] also found it compelling that the “operative surgeons saw a spinal stenosis that goes back eleven years (3T38:15-17).  In fact, during [...]’s direct examination, there is only one mention of the 2009 incident.  (3T13:11-15).  However, during his cross examination, Petitioner’s counsel questioned [...] at length about the 2009 incident in an unsuccessful effort to support counsel’s “typo” theory, covering eight pages of the 47-page hearing transcript.  (3T24:17-31:13).  During [...]’s testimony, the Board questioned [...] about [...]’s repeated reference to the 2009 incident and [...]’s failure to mention it in his narrative report, *and would have been remiss had it not done so.* (2T33:16-36:4).  However, the Board spent equal time questioning [...] about the 2000 and 2004 incidents, Petitioner’s prior medical records and MRI reports, and [...]’s similar failure to opine regarding those incidents in a narrative report.  (2T30:10-31:19; 36:8-23).  Significantly, [...] did testify that he believed the 2009 incident did not occur and, instead, admitted that “there was an issue in 2009” that could have affected his conclusion.  (2T35:8-23).  It was not until [...]’s redirect examination that Petitioner’s counsel presented the theory that the 2009 incident was a typo and did not actually occur.  (2T37:1-39:17).  In its closing brief, the Board again addressed all of the available evidence, including Petitioner’s 2002 and 2004 incidents, injuries and cervical issues, [...]’s references to the 2009 incident and Petitioner’s pre-existing spinal stenosis and degenerative conditions.
[brief] The Commission correctly concluded that such history, especially the admitted untruthfulness and insubordination, adversely related to her potential promotion to the high rank of Sheriff’s Officer Lieutenant.  In fact, the Commission observed that her discipline for untruthfulness and insubordination alone could have warranted list removal.  [...] fails to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that the Commission’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported in any respect.  As a result, her appeal must be denied and the Commission’s decisions must be affirmed.
[brief] Id. at 272-73.  The Court observed that, even when “the police officers never specifically repeat[] what the informer . . . told them, the inescapable inference . . . [is] that an unidentified informer, who was not present in court and not subjected to cross-examination, had told the officers that defendant was committing a crime. ”  Id. at 271.  “Subsequent decisions have held that the Bankston rule is violated when the logical implication to be drawn from a witness’ testimony is that a nontestifying witness has given the police evidence of the accused’s guilt.
[brief] [...] Established A Prima Facie Case, Requiring The Court Conduct An Evidentiary Hearing And Vacate His Convictions.  1.  Trial counsel’s failure to retain and use an expert on familiarity at both the Wade hearing and trial hamstringed [...]’s misidentification defense.  [...]’s defense was he was not in Atlantic City during the shooting, and was misidentified by people with only passing experience with him, saw the shooter’s face for two seconds, and whose descriptions did not match him.  The State relied heavily on the identifications, making the central question whether eyewitnesses who claimed to know [...] could be wrong.  Trial counsel argued they were mistaken yet failed to investigate or present expert testimony on familiarity.  This left the jury to decide [...]’s fate based on misconception and argument about reliability of the identifications, rather than scientific evidence.  [...] showed that (1) research from well before trial demonstrated “familiar” identifications can be mistaken and are susceptible the same factors as stranger identification; (2) OPD attorneys obtained eyewitness expert testimony during this time, including a murder case litigated at the same time as [...]’s in which expert testimony on familiarity contributed to an acquittal; and (3) OPD and other organizations trained on eyewitness identification and using such experts years before [...]’s case.  Despite this prima facie case, the PCR court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, requiring reversal.
[brief] 46.  [...] designed the Facility to provide much needed reliability and supply security to the residents of [...] and surrounding municipalities.  As a result, [...] requests an expedited review of this Petition to avoid any delays in the completion of the Regulator Station, so that it will be operational by the 2017-2018 heating season.  WHEREFORE, [...] requests that the Board: (1) retain jurisdiction over this matter, designate a Commissioner as Presiding Officer, set a date for the submission of Motions to Intervene, establish an expedited hearing date and procedural schedule, and designate the time and manner of notice and persons in interest to be given notice;
[brief] (Pa128 at ¶18); N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e).  Following that referral, the Planning Board conducted its consistency review pursuant to Section 7(e) of the LRHL during its regular meeting on February 6, 2023.  (Pa128 at ¶19; Pa110-11.)  In doing so, the Planning Board “did not identify any provisions in the [Redevelopment] Plan which were inconsistent with the Master Plan. ” (Pa111.)  The Planning Board voted to adopt [...]’s conclusions set forth in Chapter 9 of the Redevelopment Plan, find that the Redevelopment Plan was consistent with the Master Plan, and recommend adoption of the Redevelopment Plan by the Governing Body with no changes.  (Id.)  On February 9, 2023, the Planning Board submitted its Report to the Mayor and Governing Body, which concluded that it “did not identify any provisions in the [Redevelopment] Plan which were inconsistent with the Master Plan nor did the [Planning] Board make any recommended revisions to the [Redevelopment] Plan to the Town Council.
[brief] In answering Defendants’ interrogatories, Plaintiff claimed that he spoke to [...] and [...] (co-owner of [...]) “approximately once a month” about alleged monies Plaintiff was owed but provided no dates.  *See* Pa578 - 587.  Later in the same interrogatory responses, Plaintiff claims would go to the “CEO” (this was [...] for a time, but several individuals held this title while Plaintiff worked at the hospital so it is unclear who he meant) “monthly for at least a year” about monies he was owed.  *Id.*  Then at his deposition Plaintiff was asked if he ever had conversations with either [...] or [...] about any alleged amounts he was owed, to which he stated “Yes.  We -- again, it was during the Christmas event, which was at the end of December of 2017, and myself and another physician who was owed money, too, we approached [...] and said you know you're selling the hospital but we haven't gotten paid.  And he said don't worry.  The new owners have six years to pay us and we'll pay you. ”  See Da79 at 83:19-25.  Plaintiff made no mention of any other communications with [...] or [...] in his deposition.  Then in his affidavit, Plaintiff directly contradicted this testimony when he asserted specific dates that he spoke with [...], all occurring years prior to the 2017 conversation he mentioned at his deposition.
[directive] return patrol to of judicial officer hours or other within 12 presented to a judge not defendant is that the extent :4-1.  Rule 3 required by arrest as of because pretrial risk assessment are not available automated an results of  If the general, or prosecutor, deputy the assistant attorney fingerprints, defendant's taking the problems an criminal history making ascertain the defendant's by feasible, shall, when officer supervisory verification, Index query that does not require fingerprint Identification or Interstate NCl /CCH to shall to excuse requirement paragraph be construed the this nothing in however, that provided, risk-assessment initiating capable of the automated system
[brief] Emphasizing that “a court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the arbitrator, regardless of the court's view of the correctness of the arbitrator's position,” the Supreme Court ruled that even where “[b]oth of [the proposed] interpretations are arguably reasonable, but the arbitrator sided with the” union based upon testimony and evidence in the record, “affirming an arbitrator's award is not a comment on the viability of opposing interpretations of a disputed labor agreement, nor is it a conclusion that the arbitrator's interpretation is the best one.  That is not the standard.