ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff’s attempts to conflate [...] and [...] as one (1) employer, is contradicted by the undisputed facts in this case, and is not supported by law.  The Local Office Manager, the [...] Defendants, and even Plaintiff’s counsel himself, have all acknowledged that [...] did not control [...] employees.  (Pa564.  Defendant [...] deposition transcript, T248:3-5)  There is nothing in the undisputed facts related to the [...] Defendants’ conduct that would support a finding of liability against them for disparate impact or sexual harassment hostile work environment Plaintiff alleges was created by Defendant [...]’s conduct.  Simply put, while [...]’s alleged conduct was appalling, the undisputed record demonstrates that upon learning of same, the [...] Defendants immediately took the evasive remedial action of transferring Plaintiff to a different [...] office so that she would not have to return to the same office as her harasser.
[brief] Orders denying arbitration are deemed final for purposes of appeal.  R. 2:2-3(a).  It is well established that the standard of review for legal determinations as to the enforceability of an arbitration agreement is de novo.  Hirsch v. Amper Financial Services, LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); see Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of Florida, Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 316 (2019); see also Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191, 207, (2019).  The validity of an arbitration agreement poses a question of law, and appellate courts conduct a plenary review of legal questions.  Hirsch, 215 N.J. at 186.  As a general rule, questions of law addressed to the trial court are not entitled to deference and an appellate panel’s review of legal issues is de novo.  Manalapan Realty v Twp. Committee, 140 NJ 366, 378 (1995); see Morgan v. Sanford Brown Institute, 225 N.J. 289, 303 (“[w]e owe no deference to the interpretative analysis of either the trial court or Appellate Division, except as we may be persuaded by the reasoning of those courts. ”).  Our Court has emphasized that when “reviewing such orders, we are mindful of the strong preference to enforce arbitration agreements, both at the state and federal level. ”  Hirsch, 215 N.J. at 186.  See Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323, 341-42 (2006) (noting federal and state preference for enforcing arbitration agreements); Garfinkle v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 131 (2001) (recognizing “arbitration as a favored method for resolving disputes. ”).  POINT I THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE CONTAINED WITHIN THE SUBSCRIPTION AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT IS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT.
[brief] In 2015, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed suit in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Monmouth County (hereinafter the “2015 Action”) alleging that the defendant [...] (an officer of [...]) and [...], Esq. (an attorney formerly associated with [...] law firm) defrauded them into entering a transaction whereby they purchased an assignment of the contract rights held by an entity called [...] (“[...]”) to buy certain farmland in Gloucester County, New Jersey (the “Pork Chop Hill Assemblage”) for a planned residential real estate development.  In summary, Plaintiffs-Appellants alleged that they entered into the assignment transaction based on the “representations, directions and assurances” of [...] and [...] that [...] would purchase the Pork Chop Hill Assemblage from them -- for a lucrative “per approved lot” purchase price -- once Plaintiffs-Appellants obtained the necessary land use approvals and installed the initial site improvements needed to develop the tract for residential purposes.  Plaintiffs-Appellants further alleged that [...] and [...] reneged on their alleged promise and that the amounts that Plaintiffs-Appellants paid for the assignment of rights from [...] were pocketed by [...], [...], and/or by their respective family members or related companies.
[brief] [...] inferentially dealt with this issue when Her Honor conclusively determined that [...]’s conduct in creating the December 1998 Deed and signing [...]’s name was mistaken and unnecessary, but not fraudulent.  Indeed, [...] succinctly addressed the facts surrounding the December 1998 Deed including how, if anyone, it was the Appellant/Cross-Respondents’ who acted with malintent:  The court finds that [...] was under the misapprehension that he needed to create and record a Deed reflecting his ownership of the property once the mortgage was paid off.  He already had the Deed from [...] placing the property in his name.  For unknown reasons, [...] acquiesced and prepared the voidable Deed which then contained indisputably incorrect information in the body of the Deed regarding the identity of the grantor and grantee.  What’s more, [...] admits signing his brother’s name.  Ironically, a “corrective Deed” (the same actual document) was recorded within days only to reflect the proper lot number.  With this wholly incorrect, voidable Deed in the public record, [...] ([...]) and his family were alerted to it and sought to capitalize on it.  The entire process began with the 2016 title search which uncovered the voidable Deed and thus provided the opportunity for [...] and family to plausibly claim that [...] was the titleholder.  The contention of the Estate and [...] that this was a valid deed created at the request of [...] is unsupported by any competent evidence.  *This court finds the argument to be a lame, speculative attempt to explain why it would have been created.  There is nothing to suggest or corroborate the claim that Sam demanded title back and that [...] agreed by making the December 10, 1998 Deed.* (Da66) (emphasis added).  In point of fact, and despite the misdirection from Appellant/Cross-Respondents’, as the Trial Court concluded, the error in the December 1998 Deed was nothing more than a misunderstanding by [...], one which the Appellant/Cross-Respondents fraudulently attempted to take advantage.  Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that [...]’s opinion be affirmed and Appellant/Cross-Respondents appeal seeking review of their affirmative defense of unclean hands be denied.
[directive] See Section 12.  It should be noted that under the original Brimage Guidelines, prosecutors were only authorized to make a downward “adjustment” for trial proof issues, meaning that the extent of the downward adjustment was limited.  Under the revised Guidelines, in contrast, prosecutors are authorized to make a true downward “departure” based on an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the case, and may tender any plea offer, as the facts and circumstances warrant, including a recommendation for a noncustodial sentence.
[brief] Finally, this Court should infer that the missing audio from the beginning of the stop would have helped demonstrate that [...] was behaving normally and not in a way that someone under the influence or in possession of illegal drugs would behave.  As discussed further below in Point IV, the law requires that “the video and audio recording functions of a [BWC] shall be activated . . . at the initiation of any other law enforcement of investigative encounter between an officer and a member of the public” and “the [BWC] shall remain activated until the encounter has fully concluded and the officer leaves the scene.
[brief] See M. Alfieri Co., Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. & Energy, 269 N.J. Super. 545, 554 (App.Div.1994) (citing Wright v. Vogt, 7 N.J. 1, 6 (1951)); see also In the Matter of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination, [...], 433 N.J. Super. 223, 226 (App. Div. 2013) (finding that any “exemption from a comprehensive legislative policy designed to protect environmental interests must be strictly construed. ”).  Nevertheless, even though exemptions from statutes are strictly construed, courts are clear that they must also be reasonably construed and may be “expanded or limited to effectuate the manifest reason and obvious purpose of the law. ” Wright, 7 N.J. at 6-7 (stating that “[t]he spirit of the legislative act will prevail over the literal sense of terms. ”); see also In re Stemark Associates, 247 N.J. Super. at 19 (stating that an exemption in a statute “must be read to give effect to all its parts without reaching an absurd result”).  For the reasons fully set forth herein, the [...]’s issuance of Exemption #11 is presumed to be valid and reasonable, and Appellants have failed to overcome these presumptions.
[brief] (R-658)  The conduct of the parties did not change after June 30, 2021, as evidenced by the record in this case.  Even though [...] was not presiding over the case when most of these fees were incurred, there was no basis on the record below for her reaching the conclusion that counsel lacked integrity, inflated costs or that the time spent was not necessary.  Indeed, both [...] and the Court-appointed Administratrix had lamented many times about the time involved in this case and prior to leaving the bench [...] assured both, counsel for [...] and the Court-Administratrix, they would be addressed.  [...]’s ruling granted [...] fees for the sixteen-month period but denied the majority of the fees and costs incurred by [...]’s counsel for the sixteen month period, even though the Court-appointed Administratrix fully endorsed and supported their necessity.  The standard of review for an award of attorney's fees is abuse of discretion.
[brief] [...] filed its application for development on March 20, 2020.  [Application].  The Board held seven hearings\(^2\) between September 30, 2020 and July 7, 2021 when it voted to deny the application.  [7T 159-17 to 161-11].  The Board adopted a resolution on August 4, 2021.  [Da359].  [...] filed a Complaint on September 17, 2021 challenging the Board’s decision that it amended on September 21, 2021.  [Pa349; Da146].  [...] also alleged the Board and the [...] discriminated against the --- \(^2\)
[brief] A.  The Arbitration filed with the [...] ("AAA")  On March 7, 2023, [...], ("[...]") filed a Rider, and Demand for arbitration with AAA against [...] and [...] ("Plaintiffs") for declaratory judgment and breach of contract due to Plaintiffs’ failure to close title to a condominium, Unit 1601, located at [...] in [...], pursuant to the parties’ executed Subscription and Purchase Agreement ("SPA") ("the Arbitration").
[brief] Arguing the absence of any extraordinary and equitable reason, Defendants challenge the trial court’s award to Plaintiff of “post-judgment interest at the parties’ contract rate of 10% simple interest per annum (i.e., \(^{23}\)  Even if Defendants could overcome their waiver of the defense and the inapplicability of the defense pursuant to the “leading object” exception, they still failed to meet their burden to prove the statute of frauds defense at trial, as the trial court found.
[brief] [See Pa210-211; Pa212-213; Pa266-267; Pa403-410; Pa438-442].  On the actual facts, an abnormal and alarming strip reading at 9:48 p.m. indicated that [...] was at risk and being denied access to oxygen.  An immediate C-section needed to be performed and was not.  A standard of care expert has opined that delivery should have occurred via the C-section by no later than 10 to 15 minutes thereafter.  The C-section did not begin until significantly later, and [...] was delivered 39 minutes later.  Defendants breached the standard of care due to the significant delay in [...]’s delivery.  A causation expert has opined that the 39-minute delay caused significant injuries to [...]; and that delays of over 25 to 30 minutes will almost certainly cause the injuries [...] suffered.  As [...] observed, there is no way summary judgment can be granted for the reasons being argued.  The errors of the New Motion Judge, when rendering the July 17 and September 29, 2003 decisions, are three-fold on their face.
[directive] A.  Transportation to police stations and courthouses should be provided or arranged when the victim is needed to give statements or to testify.  B.  When necessary, wheelchairs should be made available.  C.  Prompt and proactive assistance should be given with Violent Crimes Compensation Board applications.  D.  Assistance should be provided with pre-sentence and parole impact statements.  E.  All elderly victims should be encouraged to call the County Victim-Witness Coordinator if there is anything they don't understand or need help with.  F.  When necessary, home visits should be provided to elderly victims by County Victim-Witness Coordinators.  V.  HOMICIDE AND SUDDEN DEATH SURVIVORS
[brief] The court in [...] reasoned that “[t]o the extent [[...]] relies on Cox, 138 N.J. at 23, for the proposition that imposition of an improper debt or lien against a consumer-fraud plaintiff may constitute a loss under the CFA, that fails because plaintiff cannot establish the debt is improper . . . she cannot establish her claim under NJCFLA. ”  [...], October 4, 2023 Opinion at 19.
[brief] See U.S. Fid. & Guar., 369 F.3d at 80 (noting that a surety “arguably had a duty to protect [its] own interests … by investigating” a project following notice that the principal had defaulted); see also Int’l Fid. Ins. Co. v. Aulson Co., No. 11-cv-9240, 2012 WL 6021130, at *7 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2012) (referring to “a surety’s duty to reasonably investigate claims brought against its principal by a third party”); AIA Risk Management, Performance Bonds and Sureties—Infrequent Troubles, [...] (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.aia.org/articles/6356995-performance-bon ds-and-sureties--infrequent (discussing the surety’s investigation/due diligence review).  *3
[brief] [...] responded to defendant’s question by stating the following:  NB: So part of this I have to explain I, I am only Reading, but this is Spanish.  FS: Mm-hmm.  NB: I cannot give you any type of legal advice okay umm this is very simple if you want to have an attorney present that is your right.  If you want to talk with me and then consult with an attorney that is something that you, but I cannot give you any type of like of advice.  FS: Oh ok.  NB: You know that is in Spanish if you understand it.  FS: MM-hmm.  NB: That is something that you have to say if you, on your own.  FS: Well yes.  NB: So, you can put your answer and your initials.  If you do not have money to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before any questioning if you wish.  Do you understand this right?  FS: Yes.  NB: Put your answer and your initials.
[brief] The Counterclaim alleges violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), and seeks interpretation, enforcement, and payment under this 18A school law statute.  (Argued at Pa363 – Pa365)  \(^{11}\)  Archway Programs, Inc. v. Pemberton Twp. Bd. of Educ., 352 N.J. Super. 420, 424 (App. Div. 2002)  \(^{12}\)  Laba v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 23 N.J. 364, 381–82, 129 A.2d 273, 283 (1957)  \(^{13}\)  Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. Burke, 158 N.J. Super. 436, 440–41 (App. Div. 1978)  \(^{14}\)  Sukin v. Northfield Bd. of Ed., 171 N.J. Super. 184, 187 (App. Div. 1979)  \(^{15}\)  Theodore v. Dover Bd. of Ed., 183 N.J. Super. 407, 412–13 (App. Div. 1982)  Here, a fair reading of the Counterclaim dictates that it is essentially a claim for relief under the school laws, *N.J.S.A.* 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  [...] clearly and unambiguously alleged a violation of *N.J.S.A.* 18A:7F-9(e)(3) for its attempted cause of action.
[brief] The fact that the wasted corporate money happened to be used to pay attorneys ostensibly representing [...] but pursuing [...]’s personal interests does not turn the reimbursement into improper “fee shifting. ”  Assessing what actually happened, as opposed to the falsehoods that [...] hopes this Court may believe, all of [...]’s arguments fail.  His entire argument relating to “public policy,” and a court’s obligation to strike down something that violates public policy, is wholly dependent on [...]’s argument that the Arbitrator improperly “shifted legal fees. ”  Since he plainly did not, and no attorneys’ fees were shifted between adverse litigants at all, no public policy was violated (or even implicated).  Moreover, [...] continues to mischaracterize Weiss and Heher.  [...] argues that the Arbitrator’s award was not reasonably debatable, as contemplated by Wiess.  But in order to make this argument, [...] necessarily overlooks (or deliberately ignores) the fact that this was not an improper attorney fee shift in the first place.  The Arbitrator properly recognized that [...] improperly caused [...] to expend significant monies for [...]’s own personal benefit, and made a reasoned decision that the Company was entitled to reimbursement.  Thus, even if public policy concerns were implicated (and they are not), Weiss directs that “assuming that the arbitrator’s award accurately has identified, defined, and attempted to vindicate the pertinent public policy, courts should not disturb the award merely because of disagreements with arbitral fact findings or because the arbitrator's application of the public-policy principles to the underlying facts is imperfect. ”  143 N.J. 420, 443 (1996).  Thus, the trial court had no basis whatsoever to vacate this portion of the Arbitrator’s Award, and this Court should reverse that decision.
[brief] (Da21) (¶ 19).  After the municipality threatened to change the zoning, the PSA was terminated on or about November 29, 2022.  Id. (¶ 20).  In the interim, Mortgagee had commenced foreclosure proceedings against [...], [...], and the Property.  Consistent with an earlier statement by [...] that he intended to “take” the Property, Id. (¶ 21), the Property is presently subject to a writ of execution dated June 25, 2024.  (Pa6).  In furtherance of their continuing desire to pursue the objectives of the PSA – debt relief, property development, and prevention of loss of the Property to Mortgagee – [...] and Appellants entered into the MOU.
[brief] For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s granting of injunctive relief should be affirmed, and [...] should be enjoined from taking any further action towards the condemnation and redevelopment of the Property.  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff [...]  By:/s/ [...]  BRYAN D. PLOCKER  Dated: March 7, 2025 [...], Plaintiff-Respondent, vs. [...]; [...]; Defendants-Appellants.  -and- [...]; and [...], Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT, LAW DIVISION, MONMOUTH COUNTY  DOCKET NO. [...]  SAT BELOW:  HON.  [...], J.S.C. REPLY  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
[brief] The Court Below improperly determined that there was a joint venture, when neither party claimed or argued that there was a joint venture, and it makes no sense considering that the Court did find unjust enrichment.  In fact it could never be a joint venture because the Court had ruled no contract existed on summary judgment; and even if there had been one, improperly divided the equity (Pa1-7) (6T 31-42) (Pa31-31)  The Court already ruled that 1) there was no gift, 2) there was a confidential relationship and 3) there was unjust enrichment.  The Court also ruled in the summary judgment decision that there was no claim for a breach of contract, which makes the Court’s ruling that there was a joint venture totally absurd.  The Court below failed to properly impose a constructive trust, and failed to place the burden of proof on [...] to demonstrate why he was entitled to keep the home.  Remember, there was no paperwork whatsoever describing how or why he should get to that result.  We say this because at trial, the Court’s decision is incongruous.  The Gift letter was not persuasive to the Court, probably because it was tainted.  The Court also found no elements of a contract had been made, no meeting of the minds.  If we accept that, the Court’s findings at Summary Judgment was no contract, and at trial, no gift.  The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim for a breach of contract.  We are unsure how the Court below found a joint venture at trial.  A joint venture is a form of an agreement or contract, but the Court never discerned what the terms were.  How can it deny the cause of action for a contract breach, because there was not contract, and yet find a deal was made for a joint venture?  The case of *Moses v. Moses*, 140 N.J. Eq. 575 (Court of Errors and Appeals, 1949) most gives guidance to cases with fact patterns similar to the instant case.
[brief] [...] told him the police were looking for him.  (9T 112-13 to 17; 11T 28-15 to 18)  [...] told her he would go to the police station first thing in the morning because he was too exhausted that evening.  (11T 28-17 to 18)  On February 2, 2016, two officers from the [...] located [...] at his home, where they arrested him.
[brief] ’” Id. at 487 (quoting State v. 1987 Chevrolet Camaro, 307 N.J. Super. 34 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 214 (1998)).  Here, there can be no dispute that the trial court went above and beyond this procedure.  As Defendants concede, [...], at the February 8 hearing, went through each of Plaintiffs’ “punch list” requests and gave detailed instructions as to what he would require if he were to restore [...]’s pleading.
[brief] Db13 (quoting Kuller v. Fire Ass’n of Phil., 124 N.J. Eq. 473, 475 (E. & A. 1938).  That is not the case.  In Bonnco Petrol v. Epstein, 155 N.J. 599 (1989), the Supreme Court found that neither party had claimed a fact mistake or an inaccurate writing.
[brief] This “showed” to the Court that [...], could, in fact, put aside his emotions and act as both a supportive brother and guardian and be the “20-year-old adult in the room” for the defendant.  [...] rejected defendant’s contention that his stepbrother, [...], should have been chosen to serve as his guardian as both legally and factually unsupported.  Legally, the judge noted that Presha and its progeny did not mandate that law enforcement select the “best” or “right” guardian, but instead an appropriate guardian who can act in the best interests of the juvenile; [...], met this actual legal standard.  [...] also noted a complete absence of facts – “zero evidence” – suggesting that [...] was available to serve as defendant’s guardian or with regard to what [...]’s emotional state was at that time.  The court refused to “speculate” that [...] would have been a better guardian that [...], under Presha in the absence of such evidence.
[brief] Defendant has a tattoo of red lips on the side of his neck which was shown to the jury in a photograph taken on the date of his arrest and displayed to them in court.  (Da17 24:20-26; 54:57-55:27; 2T35:6-8; 43:24-44:2; 71:16-21; 74:8-19).  Defendant argues that since the video “should not have been admitted,” he is entitled to an acquittal.  (Db17).  As noted above in Point III, the video was properly admitted and firmly establishes a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, defendant’s motion for an acquittal was properly denied.  Point V
[brief] Wolosky, 31 N.J. Tax at 28.  The Plaintiffs named [...] as defendant in this matter as a result of significant investigation and review.  A party to litigation is not required to accept another party’s pre-litigation representations, or even discovery representations, as gospel.  In continuing their claims against [...], Plaintiffs, in part, relied upon the trial court’s initial ruling wherein the court agreed with Plaintiffs that a cause of action could be maintained against [...] without the need for expert testimony.  Plaintiffs’ confidence in their legal position was bolstered after depositions, wherein the representative of [...] testified that it relied upon [...]’s site plan in determining that that Plaintiffs’ Property was a part of the Project.  Based upon this reliance, [...] and [...] participated in unauthorized remediation and excavation activities on the Plaintiffs’ Property.  The trial court ultimately dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint against [...] because Plaintiffs did not have an expert on the duty of care (Pa000426), but failure of the Plaintiffs to obtain an expert on duty of care does not equate to frivolous litigation.