ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  [Transcript of June 25, 2021, 56:8-13].  Within every lease agreement between the Tenant Defendants and Landlord Defendant, the following provision, Article 3, can be found:  Care and Maintenance of Premises.  Lessee acknowledges that the premises are in good order and repair, unless otherwise indicated herein.  Lessee shall, at his own expense and at all times, maintain the premises in good and safe condition, including plate glass, electrical wiring, plumbing and heating installations and any other system or equipment upon the premises and shall surrender the same, at termination hereof, in as good condition as received; normal wear and tear excepted.  Lessee shall be responsible for all repairs required, excepting the roof, exterior walls, structural foundations, and which shall be maintained by Lessor.
[brief] For example, the stinging sensation caused by a slap is adequate to support an assault. ”  *State v. Stull*, 403 N.J. Super. 501, 505 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting *N.B. v. T.B.*, 297 N.J. Super. 35, 43 (App.Div.1997)).  To prove that defendant purposely or knowingly caused bodily injury, the State must show that the defendant intended through his conduct to cause physical pain, illness, or any impairment of a physical condition.
[brief] Furthermore, there are two ways that individuals would seek to review the plans in this matter.  One, they would make a phone call to the Planning Board Secretary in an effort to identify how to review the plans or, alternatively, they would appear at the address on the location and be faced with the fact that the Borough offices had moved one block to the south.  They would be well aware of the fact that this occurred because of the large markings on the door directing them to [...].  Therefore, there is no possibility that any individual who wanted to have the opportunity to review the plans would have been deprived of that opportunity prior to the meeting.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Defendant’s argument that defendant could assume his own representation without any delays when defendant had done nothing but work to delay the trial process, including voluntarily absenting himself from the courtroom and refusing to participate, is wholly belied by the record.  Defendant’s argument does not require reversal because [...] recognized defendant’s request as a delay tactic and properly denied his untimely motion.  It is not tantamount to a structural error.  Defendant’s request to represent himself came in the middle of an outburst he made during the State’s direct examination of a witness.  [3T71-22 to 75-16].  When the judge admonished defendant to refrain from any further interruptions, defendant asserted that he had a conflict with his attorney.  [3T73-7 to 75-16].  The judge informed defendant that his attorney would have an opportunity to cross-examine the witness and defendant stated that his attorney told him that the attorney would not ask the questions defendant wanted.  [3T74-13 to 75-3].  None of these assertions is on the record.  Defendant’s attempt to subvert the trial process is recorded throughout the trial record.  Defendant’s argument must fail as defendant’s demands were made in the middle of trial and in an untimely manner.  They were, as is evidenced by the record, strictly a delay tactic and should not be considered now on appeal.
[brief] Defendant argues, however, not that the Court abused its discretion but that the adjudication of the merits of the discovery motion reached an incorrect conclusion.  Discovery in PCR is atypical and “[o]nly in the unusual case” will such be required.  State v. Herrera, 211 N.J. 308, 328 (2012) (quoting State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 91 (1997)).  PCR “is not a device for investigating possible claims, but a means for vindicating actual claims. ”  Marshall, at 270 (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal.3d 1179, 275 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835 (1991)).  “The filing of a petition for PCR is not a license to obtain unlimited information from the State, but a means through which a defendant may demonstrate to a reviewing court that he was convicted or sentenced in violation of his rights.
[brief] 8.  In fact, during cross examination, [...] acknowledged all the accounts to which she had access at the time.  (Further, all this information was also set forth in paragraphs 19-24 of the Stipulations of Facts.  At the time she made the representations in the Agreement, [...] actually possessed over $260,000.00 found in three bank accounts which were available to her (Trial Transcript 2 page 74- Line 7 to Page 76- Line 1).  These funds were in addition to significant other funds which she owned.
[brief] The Order Is Sufficient To Permit Appellate Review and Should Be Affirmed (Pa5.)  Finally, [...] takes issue with the fact that [...] did not initially provide written findings of fact or conclusions of law.  (Pb8.)  While Rule 1:7-4 requires courts to state its findings of fact and conclusions of law on every motion decided by a written order that is appealable as of right, [...] provided a statement of reasons on June 25, 2024.  (Pa5.)  Thus, any potential error in connection with the trial court’s May 24, 2024 order is now moot.  (See Pa1-5.)  The Order plainly sets out that the dispute resolution provision was mandatory.  (Pa5 (“The contract is unambiguous and repeatedly uses the word ‘shall’, not the word “may”, in the context of the requirement that any dispute arising out of the contract go to mediation before a lawsuit is filed. ”)  It also explains that [...] did not offer anything that could constitute a meritorious opposition (i.e., that the dispute was mediated before [...] commenced this action).  (Id.)  Accordingly, [...]’s Order interpreting the clear and unambiguous dispute resolution provision should be affirmed.  See Curtis v. Cellco P’ship, 413 N.J. Super. 26, 33 (App. Div. 2010).  II.
[brief] I  DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED BY [...].  Defendant argues that his Miranda\(^2\) waiver "and statement as a whole were involuntary and should have been suppressed in full."  (Db9).  For the reasons discussed below, this argument lacks merit and should be rejected.  In reviewing a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of a defendant's statement, an appellate court "defer[s] to the trial court's factual findings that are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record and will not disturb those findings unless they are 'so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'"  State v. Rivas, 251 N.J. 132, 152 (2022) (quoting State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374 (2017)).  This deferential standard of appellate review applies "even when the trial court's findings are premised on a recording or documentary evidence."  State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 314 (2019).  In contrast, "the interpretation of law 'and the consequences that flow from established facts' are not entitled to deference and are reviewed de novo."  State v. Carrion, 249 N.J. 253, 279 (2021) (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015)).  --- \(^2\) Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
[brief] This appeal arises from the trial court’s clearly erroneous determination that Defendant waived his contractual right to have the Parties’ dispute submitted to arbitration.  More specifically, Defendant, [...], a/k/a [...] (“[...]”), appeals the trial court’s April 15, 2024 Order Denying Arbitration and Staying the Proceeding.  The crux of the Parties’ dispute is a contract with a mandatory arbitration provision.  In its Complaint alleging breach of contract Plaintiff, [...] (“[...]”), heavily relied upon a contract that it alleged had been prepared by [...].  [...] did not annex such a contract to its Complaint, nor did the Complaint indicate that the contract upon which [...] was so reliant even contained an arbitration requirement.  Although [...] never has taken the position that the arbitration provision is unenforceable, it nonetheless ignored the arbitration requirement in the contract and initiated this litigation without ever having sought to submit the dispute to arbitration.  Moreover, during the months following the filing of its Complaint [...] never actually committed itself to a particular document that it claimed to be the contract at issue until the eve of the discovery end date when, in response to [...]’s discovery requests, [...] committed itself to reliance upon a particular contract which, indeed, contained the arbitration provision at issue.  Within two days of [...], via its discovery responses, having committed itself to reliance upon a particular contract containing an arbitration provision, [...] initiated arbitration by giving the requisite written notice to [...].  [...] refused to proceed to arbitration and took the position that [...] waived his right to arbitration due to his mere participation in the litigation which [...] initiated, coupled with the passage of time.  [...]’s position in that regard failed to account for the fact that for most of the litigation process [...] was a pro se litigant, there was no dispositive motion practice and no trial date had been set.  This matter was brought before the trial court on [...]’s Motion to Stay Proceedings and Compel Arbitration.  The trial court denied that motion.  In doing so it failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting denial of mandatory arbitration.  Instead, the trial court determined that [...] waived his right to arbitration without providing legally sound reasoning for its decision.
[brief] ...............................................................  19  Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel, 446 N.J. Super. 537 (App. Div. 2016)  ..............................................  2  Monogram Credit Card Bank of Ga. v. Tennesen, 390 N.J. Super. 123 (App.Div.2007)  ...............................................  25 New Century Fin. v. Trewin, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688 (Ch. Div. May 24, 2018)  ..........  15  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989)  .....................................................................  7  R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 255 (2001)  ....................................................................  16  Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103 (App. Div. 2011) .............................................  6  Sun Chemical Corporation v. Fike Corporation, 243 N.J. 319 (2020) .................................................................  25, 26 Valentine v. Unifund CCR, Inc., Civil Action No. 20-cv-5024, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44747 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2021)  ...............................................................  19  Valentine v. Unifund CCR, LLC, et al., BER-L-376-23 (Law Div. October 4, 2023)  ................................ passim Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 332 N.J. Super. 31 (App. Div. 2000)  .............................................  27  Veras v. LVNV Funding, LLC, No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014)  ..............................................................  15, 16  Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding LLC, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 96 (Law Div. Jan. 21, 2022)  ............  8  Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding, No. A-1996-21, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550 (App. Div. Sep. 21, 2023)
[brief] (5T3-21 to 15-19; Da87 to 101).  In his opinion, [...] recounted [...]’s thorough findings in her decision on the motion to suppress.  (Da96 to 98).  [...] first found that [...] committed no error or oversight that could form the basis for a motion for reconsideration.  (Da96).  Instead, defendant sought to introduce new evidence to support the motion to suppress and relitigate it, neither of which are appropriate grounds for a motion for reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2.  (Da97 to 99).  Second, [...] held that [...] made detailed findings of facts in her decision, and further denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration under Rule 1:7-4. (Da99 to 100).  C.
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S “ATTEMPTS” TO “CHANGE” HIS AUTOMOBILE POLICY DOES NOT EXCUSE HIS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH NEW JERSEY INSURANCE LAWS  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 provides as follows:  Except as provided by section 45 of P.L.2003, c.89 (C.39:6A-3.3) and section 4 of P.L.1998, c.21 (C.39:6A-3.1), every standard automobile liability insurance policy issued or renewed on or after the effective date of P.L.1998, c.21 (C.39:6A-1.1 et al.) shall contain personal injury protection benefits for the payment of benefits without regard to negligence, liability or fault of any kind, to the named insured and members of his family residing in his household who sustain bodily injury as a result of an accident while occupying, entering into, alighting from or using an automobile, or as a pedestrian, caused by an automobile or by an object propelled by or from an automobile, and to other persons sustaining bodily injury while occupying, entering into, alighting from or using the automobile of the named insured, with permission of the named insured.  The appellant/plaintiff [...]’s primary residence was unquestionably in New Jersey at the time he obtained a [...] Southeastern Insurance policy from North Carolina.  When he applied for [...] policy, he affirmatively listed his insured address as North Carolina.  He also affirmatively chose North Carolina zip codes for his “garaging zip codes. ” (PA073-077; PA048, T37:L5-22, T38:L11-24; PA049, T43:L11-22; PA050, T45:L8-21).  The appellant/plaintiff [...] did not notify [...] of his true residency; rather, he used a North Carolina address for an apartment for which the lease had expired and that he no longer occupied.  (PA056-057, T72:L1-T76:L24).  The appellant/plaintiff [...] also failed to obtain automobile insurance required by New Jersey law.  Specifically, his policy with [...] afforded only $1,000 for "Medical Payments" far below the $250,000 in PIP coverage afforded under a New Jersey "Standard" policy (or $15,000, with $250,000 in coverage for certain emergency treatments, under a "Basic" policy).  (PA078-080)  See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1.  His intent to have the proper insurance is not relevant, and his claims against his own insurance carrier are, although now resolved against him, likewise irrelevant.  It is therefore submitted that appellant/plaintiff [...]'s economic and non-economic claims are barred pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) provides:  Any person who, at the time of an automobile accident resulting in injuries to that person, is required but fails to maintain medical expense benefits coverage mandated by [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4], [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1], or [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.3] shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss sustained as a result of an accident while operating an uninsured automobile.  There is no question that appellant/plaintiff failed to maintain the mandated medical expense benefits coverage required under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 and consequently, his claims against respondent/defendant [...] are barred.
[directive] Appear to Failure (i) the crime and second-degree or for afirst- is charge present the if detention the PSA by determined score (NCA)  Activity Criminal New or (FTA)  4 a is PSA score (NCA)  Activity Criminal New if (ii) the or 6, or is 5 score.  (FTA)  Appear to Failure the of regardless New 0~ a Scope 6 of PSA Involving a Crimes Fourth-Degree o~ Third- 7.4.2.b 5. of Score
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10..................................................................................................................2, 9 COURT RULES  R. 2:2-3(a)(2).................................................................................................................................6  R. 2:5-5(b).................................................................................................................................9  CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS  N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, para. 4........................................................................................................6  CASES  Bartley Healthcare Nursing & Rehab. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Senior Servs., 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 329 (App. Div. Feb. 15, 2011)......................................................7  Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002).................................................................6  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007).................................................................8  Ensslin v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 311 N.J Super 333 (App. Div. 1998).........................9, 10, 11  Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186 (App. Div. 2010)....................15  Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980)...............................................................7  In re Issuance of Permit by DEP, 120 N.J. 164 (1990).....................................................8  Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85 (1973)..............................................6, 7  Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22 (1995).................................................................8  N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. State, 88 N.J. 605 (1982).............................................................6  N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., 196 N.J. 366 (2008).........................................................7  SMB Assocs v. Department of Envtl. Prot., 264 N.J. Super 38 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 137 N.J. 58 (1994)..................11  State v. Atley, 157 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 1978)..............................8  In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions’ Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267 (2018)...................8, 9  Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011)..................................6  In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees, 194 N.J. 413 (2008).................................................................................7  Williams v. Department of Corrections, 330 N.J. Super. 197 (App. Div. 2000) ....................................................6, 7  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] POINT II  THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S LAD CLAIMS AS ALLEGED IN COUNTS SIX AND SEVEN AS TO DEFENDANTS KUCINSKI AND MARTIN.  Counts Six and Seven allege that Defendants [...] and [...] are individually liable under the NJLAD for retaliation.  The only conduct alleged as to [...] and [...] is their authorization of an investigation.  For the reasons set forth in the trial court’s statement of reasons, as well as those set forth herein, this Court should affirm dismissal of Counts Six and Seven as to Defendants [...] and [...].
[brief] That also included a call to the [...] to get their assistance in doing so.  It was a very unusual and in the Court’s view grave situation that occurred.  (2T7:7-18)  The entire theft was captured on video with [...] asking another employee “whose side are you on,” and the intent had been to send the servers to the Philippines.  (Da1999-2000)  Again, “[t]he moment the pen strikes the order the stay is removed,” and “we have the life’s blood of the company being transferred to Philippines. ”  (Da2001)  But [...] “honored” the order.  Third, [...] orchestrated a series of payments and other impediments to the Individual Plaintiff’s control over [...].
[directive] Complaints against a law enforcement executive, or a member of the executive’s senior management team, may originate from a member of the public or from an employee of the agency.  All such complaints shall be documented and referred to the County Prosecutor for review.  If the subject of the Internal Affairs investigation is the Police Chief, Police Director, Sheriff or Head of Internal Affairs, the County Prosecutor or the Attorney General’s Office shall handle the investigation.  The investigation may involve any type of alleged employee misconduct, as described in Section 4.1.3, and shall be conducted pursuant to Section 6 20 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 (Investigation of Internal Complaints).  At the conclusion of the investigation, the internal affairs investigator and/or the investigating agency shall make factual findings, summarize the matter, and indicate the appropriate disposition (Sustained, Unfounded, Exonerated, or Not Sustained) as to each allegation of misconduct.  See Sections 6.2.3, 6.3.9.
[brief] (Pa525).  When [...] arrived at the hospital at approximately 8:30pm, [...] evaluated her and discussed her findings by telephone with [...], who was home at that time.  (Pa527).  The plan was to monitor the mother and fetal heart tracings and keep [...] updated on the status.  (Pa528).  During the initial monitoring over the first hour, [...] noted nothing of concern.  (Pa526).  The events at issue take place between 9:48pm and 10:27pm, when [...] delivered the baby as [...] was enroute to the hospital.
[brief] Plaintiffs [...], [...], and [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) filed an Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint pursuant to Rule 4:67-1 on October 7, 2022.  The action was filed against [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) and sought to vacate seven inter-company arbitration awards pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23.  It was assigned docket number [...].
[directive] Law Enforcement Authority  The following entities should be aware of available enforcement authorities found in Titles 39.10 13, 23, and Additionally, the New Jersey Administrative Code provides supplementary enforcement provisions, as well as local regulations and ordinances.  A.  State Park Police  State Park Police have statewide jurisdiction to issue complaint-summonses for any motor vehicle violations, including ORV and ATV violations, on all public lands and public roads in the State, and more broadly have “the power to arrest without warrant any person violating any law of the State committed in their presence and bring the offender before any court having jurisdiction to receive the complaint of such violation.
[brief] On September 1, 2017, [...] failed to make the annual rental payment due to [...] under the Lease in the amount of $206,045.  [FEDa114; Pa1009; Pa3302].  At that time, Appellants were negotiating to buy the land from [...].  However, internal strife among Appellants’ investors interfered with Appellants’ ability to raise enough money to purchase the land, or apparently to pay the rent due under the Lease.  [FEDa114-15; Pa3302].  Indeed, as Appellants acknowledged, [...]’s “inability to pay annual rent in 2017 was due, in part, to an internal shareholder dispute within the company, principally between [...] and another shareholder named [...] concerning the company’s direction and business strategy. ”  [FEDa56 (at ¶61); Pa3245 (at ¶61)].  Appellants admit that in September 2017, it was they who disclosed to the [...] that there was a default in payment of rent under the Lease.  [Pb21; FEDa56 (at ¶60); Pa3245 (at ¶60)].  On September 5, 2017, [...]’s counsel sent a written notice to [...] advising that it was in default of its payment obligations under the Lease.