ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Generally, the historic precipitation data used for the Method 6 calculation is obtained from a data set known as NOAA Atlas 14.  54 N.J.R. 2169(a) (Dec. 5, 2022).  The precipitation data in NOAA Atlas 14 was last revised in December 2000.  *Ibid.*  In October 2021, DEP began updating its FHACA rules to address the impacts climate change was already having on storms in the State, and projected impacts from future storms.
[brief] This Court explicitly rejected the claim that designations done years prior needed to be reevaluated at the time of the redevelopment plan amendment:  As the Law Division concluded, Council’s approval of an amendment to a redevelopment plan was governed by the provisions of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7, rather than those of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5, which govern only an initial blight designation.  Thus, Council need not have reevaluated any of the properties according to the criteria enumerated in the latter section while it was adopting a redevelopment plan pursuant to the former.  PADNA, 413 N.J. Super. at 335 (emphasis added); see also id. at 336 (rejecting argument that LRHL required that properties designated under Section 5 “cannot be covered under the same redevelopment plan unless they are first reevaluated together pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5”) (emphasis added).
[brief] V.  EQUITY SHOULD HAVE PLACED RESPONSIBILITY ON [...] BECAUSE ONLY IT HAD THE POWER TO PREVENT FORECLOSURE.  (Raised below 1T38:23 to 41:13)  “Where a loss must be borne by one or two innocent persons, equity will impose the loss on that party whose acts first could have prevented the loss. ”  Dreier, Guidebook to Chancery Practice in New Jersey (Tenth Ed. 2018), Ch. I(A)(12) at 15.
[brief] (P 354a; 10T18:6-17.  P 354a, 352a; 10T 19:6-10; 19:11-15).  On June 16, 2022, Respondent identified [...] as a witness in this case.  (10T 20:4-12; P356a).  In the meantime, the Court made rulings that precluded the Petitioner from obtaining needed discovery.  On May 20, 2022, on Petitioner’s motion to Compel Discovery from Respondent, the Motion Judge, *sui sponte*, ruled that three of Petitioner’s interrogatories to Respondent “were irrelevant to this probate matter” that requested Decedent’s discussions with Respondent about her financial matters (P62a at No.8); her filing for bankruptcy protection, (P63a at No.9) and the men who had a relationship with Respondent.
[brief] The lower court found the facts here bore no identity to those in A.S., 203 N.J. at 131.  Contrary to defendant’s claim, the lower court found that A.S. did not adopt any per se rule precluding relatives of victims from assisting juveniles in the Miranda context.  The A.S. Court specifically refused to adopt any per se rules in this context.  See A.S., 203 N.J. at 154-55.
[brief] The Trial Court did not have the authority to hypothesize that the Appellate Division did not intend to reverse the enforcement proceedings when the Appellate Division actually did vacate the Order entered in connection with the enforcement proceedings and entered an Award for sanctions and attorney’s fees.  The Appellate Division specifically noted the March 6, 2018 "sanction order" and vacated it – along with the award of sanctions and attorney's fees.  Defendant also addressed the enforcement order in its Amended Appeal and briefed it at Point Six of its Appellate Brief (Da746).  The Appellate Court took away any authority the Court had to award sanctions or attorney's fees when it vacated the March 6, 2018 Order.  The Trial Court also ignored the fact that $4,529.60 was paid pursuant to the June 27, 2017 Order and $1,000.00 was paid as a sanction pursuant to the March 6, 2018 Order.  The decision of the Court must be reversed.
[brief] The defendant also cites State v. Sosnowicz, 270 P.3d 917 (2012), an Arizona case, in support of his claim that an expert medical examiner cannot testify as to whether or not a death was caused by homicide.  However, like Jamerson, Sosnowicz concerned a vehicular homicide.  In both Jamerson and Sosnowicz, there was no question as to the actual cause of the death (in Jamerson, two elderly motorists were killed when the defendant’s car drove into theirs and in Sosnowicz the victim was killed when he was run over by the defendant).  In both of these cases, testimony that the deaths were homicides were actually statements as to the state of mind of the defendant; the physical cause of death was never in dispute, only whether it was an accident or whether the defendants had the reckless or intentional mens rea that would turn the killing into a homicide.
[brief] Class certification is superior because of the modest value of individual claims. \textsuperscript{153}  Since defendant never came forward with evidence of other complaints against defendant raising the claims presented here, there is no evidence of interest in individually prosecuted claims.  613a-686a.  Another factor to consider is manageability.  Because the same contract clauses apply to all class members, any manageability issues presented will be minimal and do not justify denial of class certification.  This case focuses on core questions of law and fact which will resolve liability for the entire potential class.  \textsuperscript{153}  \textit{In re Prudential Inc. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions}, 148 F.3d 283, 316 (3d Cir. 1998).
[brief] [...] first moved to dismiss the Complaint on April 20, 2023 (Pa36).  On June 9, 2023, the trial court entered an Order denying [...]’s Motion to Dismiss.  (Pa44).  After [...]’s attempt to attack the merits of [...]’s claims failed, [...] filed an Answer on June 23, 2023 (Pa46) which asserted twenty-two separate affirmative defenses and “reserve[d] the right to add additional separate defenses as discovery progresse[d],” but failed to assert arbitration or a challenge to jurisdiction as affirmative defenses.  See Answer p. 12-14 (Pa57-Pa59).  On September 1, 2023, [...] filed its Motion to Dismiss pursuant to R. 4:6-2(a) and compel [...]’s to arbitrate her claims.  (Pa62).  However, [...]’s Motion was procedurally defective as it failed to contain a notice of motion or proof of service.  See R. 1:6-2(a); R. 1:6-3(a); R. 1:6-3(c).  On December 12, 2023, the trial court entered an Order granting [...]’s Motion to Dismiss. (Pa65).
[brief] Pa123; Pa120  On administrative review, the ALJ held a multi-day evidentiary hearing that focused on [...]’s compliance with the applicable promulgated regulations.  See, e.g., 1T 10:2–6 (the appendix provided to the ALJ by the parties “identified the full sort of loss ratio and rate stability regulations” (emphasis added)); id. 39:5–40:25, 41:8–14, 48:17–21 (Department’s opening statement: “regulations are essential” (emphasis added)).  The ALJ recognized the evidence showed [...] complied with all the Department’s regulations, including its regulations governing loss ratios.
[directive] such any on court 64  Page victim a that suggest way to any in construed be shall herein Nothing risk.  such any control text accompanying and 23 hearing, see note detention pretrial a at witness a as called be should a hearing), and detention pretrial a at evidence hearsay allows Reform Law Bail the (noting that to attempts defendant if the appeal interlocutory an seek necessary, if and, object shall prosecutor 16.1 13.1 and Sections also See hearing.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding 2014 [...] and the 2014 and 2017 [...]s also fail.  First, Plaintiffs admitted in their brief that the 2014 [...] was voided and replaced by the 2017 [...] (Pb36-37).  A void contract is a contract of no legal effect, and thus, cannot be breached.  See D’Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 194, fn.4 (2013).  As such, the trial court erred by finding that Defendant breached the voided 2014 [...] (which she was not a party to) and awarding Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs under the agreement.  Second, even if the 2014 [...] and 2017 [...] could be construed as containing express provisions for the payment of attorneys’ fees for first-party claims, the trial judge’s conclusion that Plaintiffs were entitled to their fees under these agreements because Defendant breached these contracts was not supported by credible evidence in the record.  The indemnification provisions in these contracts could only be triggered if Plaintiffs established: (i) there was a material inaccuracy or breach of any representation or warranty of Defendant contained in the agreements; (ii) Defendant materially breached or violated her covenants or agreements contained in the contracts; or (iii) there was a material inaccuracy in any certificate, instrument or other document delivered by Defendant as required by the contracts (Da2744, 2806, 2827).  The record demonstrates that the trial judge made no specific findings as to any of the foregoing elements.  As such, the court’s conclusion that Defendant breached the 2014 [...] (which Defendant was not a party to) and the 2017 [...], and its decision to award Plaintiffs’ fees and costs under those agreements, were not supported by rational or credible evidence in the record.  Therefore, this Court should reverse the award of fees and costs against Defendant under the Judgment.  VII.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES: Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 214 N.J. 518, 526 (2013).........................................................5  Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003)...............................................................2  Boles v. Wal-Mart, No. 12-1762, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41926 at * 22 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2014)............3  Crescent Park Tenants Assoc. v. Reality Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 105 (1971)......................................................8  Dial, Inc. v. City of Passaic, 443 N.J. Super. 492, 495-96 (App. Div. 2016)..........................2, 9,12  Hernandez v. Region Nine Hous. Corp., 146 N.J. 645, 684 A.2d 1385 (1996).....................................8  Kwiatkowski v. Gruber, 390 N.J. Super (App. Div. 2007)........................................1  Malhame v. Borough of Demarest, ........................................1  Montville Township Board of Education, N.J.P.E.R. Supp. 2d ¶140 (1985)  1985 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 11, (App. Div. Dec. 6, 1985)...................................................11  N.J. Dental Ass’n v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 424 N.J. Super 160, 166 (App. Div. 2012)............................10  Robins v. Max Mara, U.S.A., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 460, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)...............................14  U.S. EEOC v. Autozone, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d 912, 917 (N.D. Ill. 2015).............................14  U.S. EEOC v. Mueller Industries, Inc., Case No. 2:18-cv-05729-FW-GJS ...........................................13  Weisberg v. Realogy Corp., No. 12-30 (JLL), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38931, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2012).  ........8  White v. Department of Corrections, 110 Commonwealth Ct. 496, (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987), cert. den., 518 Pa. 628, (1988).  .........................................................10  Williams v. Borough of Clayton, 442 N.J. Super 583, 592 (App. Div. 2015).  .............................8  Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. Chemical and Pollution Sciences, Inc., 105 N.J. 464 (1987).  .........................................................1  STATUTES/CODES
[brief] Plaintiff filed her complaint in this matter on February 13, 2020, against Defendants [...], [...], [...] and [...].  Pa91.  Plaintiff’s Second Amended Verified Complaint was filed on April 10, 2020.  Pa440.  Plaintiff made claims for: dissolution of [...]; expulsion of [...] from [...]; unjust enrichment; piercing the corporate veil; breach of fiduciary duty; self-dealing; negligence; waste; tortious interference with plaintiff’s economic advantage; tortious interference with plaintiff’s prospective economic gain; accounting; appointment of a custodian and provisional director under the New Jersey Oppressed Minority Statute; and attorneys’ fees.  [...] and [...] filed an Answer on May 27, 2020.  Dal.  [...] and [...] filed an amended Answer, including [...]’ amended counterclaim against plaintiff for breach of contract and fiduciary duty, tortious interference and unjust enrichment and Third-party Complaint against plaintiff’s business entity, [...] (“[...]”), for tortious interference and unjust enrichment, on August 22, 2020.  Da10.  The matter was tried in a bench trial lasting three days, January 11-13, 2023 (1T-3T), at the conclusion of which all claims against [...] were dismissed.  [...] filed a post-trial motion seeking fees from defendants under the Frivolous Litigation Act.  Pa59.  The Trial Court issued its Final Judgment and Statement of Reasons (“Judgment”) on May 8, 2023.  Pa8.  Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration on May 28, 2023 (“5/28 motion”) (Da27), which resulted in the Court’s Order and Statement of Reasons of June 26, 2023 (“6/26 Order”).  Pa66.  Plaintiff filed a second motion, which the Trial Court considered a partial Motion for Reconsideration, on June 22, 2023 (“6/22 motion”).  Da54.  The 6/22 motion resulted in the Court’s August 30, 2023 Order and Statement of Reasons.  Pa87.  Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal was filed on September 21, 2023, then amended technically; [...] did not appeal.  Pa1.  COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] (Pa511).  Based upon answers to interrogatories, the trial judge agreed that “there is no evidence that Plaintiffs experienced any physical or psychological illness as a result of Defendant’s action” and “there is no tangible, concrete and or specific fact or document sustaining Plaintiffs’ allegations. ” (Pa511).  [...] opined, “The vagueness of such a claim unfairly puts the Defendant [...] in the position of defending against undefinable charges that contain no identifiable elements that are capable of being adequately and sufficiently defined. ” (Pa511).  On December 6, 2018, [...] notified [...] of his claim over the phone.  (Pa29).  On December 13, 2018, [...] sent denial letter which stated, “Unfortunately... coverage for this claim is not provided under the terms of your HO6 homeowners policy. ” (Pa30).  See Exhibit “U.2”.  (Pa30, Pa241).  [...]’s first reason for denying coverage erroneously asserts that the behavior underlying the allegations in the Complaint “would not be considered an accident. ” (Pa30).  [...]’s second reason for denying coverage falsely proclaims that “Even if the matter was considered an occurrence, the alleged harm is not considered... bodily injury as defined in the policy. ” (Pa31).  [...]’s third reason for denying coverage misleading states “There have been no allegations against you for...bodily injury. ” (Pa31).
[brief] For all of the foregoing reasons, Amicus Curiae respectfully requests that the Court reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment.  Respectfully submitted, [...] By: ____________________________  [...], ESQUIRE  Dated: April 29, 2024  [...] By: ____________________________  [...], ESQUIRE  Dated: April 29, 2024  REPLY TO BRIEF FILED BY [...] ([...])
[brief] The defendant’s statement of facts included references to documents included in its appendix that were not part of the record before the motion judge when she denied the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint to include a count for spoliation of evidence.  The defendant’s appendix is comprised of 82 pages, of which only six pages were part of the record before the motion judge.  The plaintiff filed a motion to strike the offending documents from the appendix and the citations to these documents and related textual context from the respondent brief.
[brief] Gallagher v. Irvington, 190 N.J. Super. 394, 397 (App. Div. 1983).  If on its face, the statute is clear and unambiguous, then the interpretation process ends.  *Hupka*, 203 N.J. at 232.  When the plain language is ambiguous, extrinsic interpretive aids such as legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction may be used.  The Legislature’s intent is the objective of statutory interpretation.  *State v. Robinson*, 217 N.J. 594, 604 (2014).
[brief] In Vagnoni v. Gibbons, 251 N.J. Super. 402, 406 (Ch. Div. 1991), the Chancery Court confronted a similar argument, (i.e. someone was arguing that the riparian lands were not conveyed with the uplands even though there was no practicable way to access the riparian lands without rights in the uplands).  The *Vagnoni* Court refused to impart such an unlikely intent upon a seller of land and found that where the riparian grant was practically inaccessible other than by way of the uplands, the parties’ intent was for the riparian grant to pass with the conveyance of the uplands.
[brief] Verified Complaint Filed 09/05/18 ........................................ Da1 Exhibit A (legal description/map) ...................................... Da11/13 Exhibit B (value “recapitulation”) ..................................... Da15 Declaration of Taking Filed 09/05/18 .................................... Da16 Exhibit A (legal description) .............................................. Da11 Exhibit B (map) .................................................................. Da13 Order For Payment Into Court and Possession Filed 09/24/18 ........................................................................ Da19 Answer, Separate Defenses, Jury Demand, Designation of Trial Counsel Filed 10/17/18 ........................... Da21 Certification of [...] in Reply and Further Support of Order to Show Cause
[directive] Scoped Rifle  Requalification Range: 100 yards  Target: NJ DCJ scoped rifle target 10 rounds  Range Rounds  Position Course of fire Time •  To begin the shooter will fully load the magazine of the rifle, then close and lock the bolt on an empty chamber or round in chamber, bolt forward, bolt handle up (safety will always remain “off”).  •  The rifle will be in this condition whenever the shooter moves from position to position.  •  At any point during the qualification, if the spotter advises, “miss”, the shooter may immediately fire another round.  If the second round scores no penalty will be incurred even if original time elapsed.  (This does not apply to the cold bore shot)  •  If the shooter did not follow through and is not ready to fire a “follow-up” round, the shooter will not be given an “alibi”.  On command fire one round (cold bore) on (CB) 1 circle.  Shooter will immediately re-chamber a 100 yds Prone 7 sec.  (Cold Bore) round.  Fired round must score to continue the course.  On command fire 1 round on # 1 and 1 round on # 2.  Shooter will immediately re-chamber a round after 75 yds 2 Prone 6 sec. the second round.  Reload, close and lock the bolt on an empty chamber.  Carrying all equipment, the shooter will jog to the target line and touch the target, then jog back to the 50-yard line and assume a shooting position.  Shooter’s  On command fire 1 shot on A, B and C.  Shooter choice will immediately re-chamber a round after the third (No prone) round.  Reload, close and lock the bolt on an empty 10 sec.  50 yds 3 –supported chamber.  Move to the 25-yard line.  (rifle on top of bench or other object)  On command fire 1 round on “25” circle.  Shooter’s  Shooter will immediately re-chamber a round after choice 1 sec. the each round.  25 yds 3 supported (3X)  Assure at least two rounds are in the magazine, (no prone) then close and lock the bolt on an empty chamber.  Carrying all equipment, jog back to the 100-yard line.  On command fire 1 round on the “triangle” target.  Shooter’s 100 yds  1  Shooter will immediately re-chamber a round.  5 sec. choice  Clear the rifle – End of Qualification  Cold Bore round + 8 other hits to qualify (90%)  9-87  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards
[brief] . . .  [T]his is the policy [...] bought, and we can find no legal basis for modifying it. ”); *Foley v. Foley*, 173 N.J. Super. 256, 258 (App. Div. 1980) (holding that an injury to an insured exclusion in a homeowner’s policy applied and did not violate public policy, and distinguishing cases limiting the application of the exclusion because each involved primary auto liability policies).
[brief] The Trial Testimony elicited that Plaintiff is the owner of [...].  The rent charged to Defendant-Tenant is 2100 dollars per month.  Defendant owes rent from October to April---7 months.  The balance owed is 14, 700 dollars.  2T52-9.  Before Defendant cross examined Plaintiff, Defendant [...] requested to speak to the court which is referred to on the Transcripts as “Colloquy”.
[brief] (see colloquy at 2T6-10 to 2T7-1; 2T11-12 to 2T19-8; decision at 2T21-20 to 2T22-22; directive that [...] "face the judge" at 2T43-24 to 2T44-2)  --- ²  The three videos (S-23) and two still photographs (S24A and S24B) are depicted in Da 17, which was provided to the undersigned by the [...].
[brief] **PLAINTIFF WAS BARRED FROM BRINGING THIS ACTION IN NEW JERSEY AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT IT HAS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION (Da15–17)**  The Trial Court also erred in denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss for a separate threshold reason: Plaintiff was prohibited from bringing this action in New Jersey and the Trial Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider it.  “Subject matter jurisdiction involves ‘a threshold determination as to whether [a court] is legally authorized to decide the question presented. ’”  *Robertelli v. New Jersey Off. of Atty. Ethics*, 224 N.J. 470, 481 (2016) (citation omitted).  \(^{12}\)  In addition to ignoring *Interlotto*, the Trial Court appears to have conflated the “purposeful availment” requirement with the second step of the personal jurisdiction analysis, Da15, which involves instead “consideration of various factors [that] may show that it would be unfair to confer jurisdiction. ”  *Interlotto*, 298 N.J. Super. at 137 (relevant factors under second step of jurisdictional analysis include “the interests of the forum state”).  “When a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, its authority to consider the case is ‘wholly and immediately foreclosed. ’”  Id. (citations omitted).  Likewise, “[a] lack of standing by a plaintiff precludes a court from entertaining any of the substantive issues for determination. ”
[brief] The trial court’s singular inadvertent use of the phrase “more or less” did not affect the jury’s verdict.  At the beginning of the trial, the jury received the model jury charge on the beyond a reasonable doubt standard and again right before the “more or less” statement.  Thus, the jury was informed multiple times that the criminal standard is higher than the civil one and that for each charged crime, the State was required to prove each element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  Consequently, when read as a whole, the jury instructions did not lessen the State’s burden or warrant a new trial.  POINT III
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING THE PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST TO ADMIT THE DEFENDANT’S INCIDENT REPORT INTO EVIDENCE UNDER RULE 4:17-8 (2T102-23 to 113-7; 5T28-14 to 34-5)  Plaintiff sought to introduce the defendant’s Incident Report which had been provided by the defense to the plaintiff in defendant’s certified Answers to Interrogatories.  While plaintiff maintained that these documents were plainly admissible since provided in certified Answers to Interrogatories, (Pa72 – Pa86; 2T104-10 to 12; 2T112-17) and as such constituted admissions by the Defendant, the trial court refused to permit the introduction of this evidence, ruling that the plaintiff was required to authenticate it as a "business record."