ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Id.* at 379, 545 A.2d 119 (quoting [...], Communicating with the Juries: problems and remedies, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 731, 741 (1981).  [654 A.2d 1017]  In describing the prejudice to a defendant, the Supreme Court has stated:  [A]  Jury is reluctant to acquit a defendant or might compromise on a verdict of guilty on the greater offense.  "Where one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve the doubts in favor of conviction."  *Keeble v. United States*, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13, 93 S. Ct. 1993, 1997-98, 36 L. Ed. 2d 844, 850 (1973).  *State v. Soloane*, 111 N.J. 293, 299, 544 A. 2d 826 (1988).  See also *State v. Sinclair*, 49 N.J. 525, 540-43, 231 A. 2d 565 (1967).
[brief] While this provision standing alone may appear at first blush to govern the present situation, a statute must be read in its totality.  Fiore v. Consol. Freightways, 140 N.J. 452, 466 (1995) (“A statute should be read as a whole and not in separate sections. ”).  N.J.S.A. 12A:4A-501(1) makes clear that “the rights and obligations of a party to a funds transfer may be varied by agreement of the affected party. ”  Therefore, if the UCC provisions were to apply, by its plain language, the terms of the Loan Documents and Paragraph 9 of the Mortgage would govern.5  5  This makes it even more apparent that the Trial Court should have allowed for a fuller record to be developed prior to ruling on the summary judgment motions.  In support of its UCC arguments, Respondent heavily relies upon *[...] v. Vezeriannis*, No. A-1376-11T1, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 1588 (Super Ct. App. Div. June 27, 2013), urging it is factually indistinguishable and should control.  But *Vezeriannis* involved a full payoff of a loan, not a short payoff, and the funds were being remitted on behalf of the borrower – not a third party.  Like *Omar*, these facts make this unpublished case inapplicable.  **III.
[brief] Q:  If there were traffic controllers, security personnel, flaggers, and/or cones in the parking lot on October 6, 2021 when you got there, would you have found that to be an -as an assist for you, for your protection, would it make it more secure and safe?  [*…*]  A: Yes.  [Pa872 (82:6-13). ]  D.  Defendant [...] Was Aware Of The Need For Pedestrian Safeguards In Its Lot, But Only Provided Them To Management, Doctors, Patients, And Visitors, Not Employees Such As [...]
[brief] Plaintiffs' argument has no application to [...] because [...] never participated in any discovery in the Law Division because it was not a Defendant in the case until Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint.  In lieu of filing an Answer to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, [...] filed its Cross Motion to Stay the Superior Court litigation and Compel Arbitration.  The Trial Court granted [...]'s Cross Motion.  As such, any argument that [...] participated in discovery in the Law Division is patently false.  Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the Trial Court erred when it granted [...]'s Motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing.  However, Plaintiffs are misguided.  As discussed further herein, the question of whether an arbitration clause is enforceable is not factual in nature, but is instead a legal question.  Moreover, the Trial Court afforded all parties a full hearing on the Defendants' Motions to Stay the Litigation and Compel Arbitration.  The issue before the Appellate Division is simple and involves only the enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement.
[brief] ”  (1T 124-10 to 13)  Pupil size is influenced by a number of factors, including diabetes and age.  [...], et al., Distribution of Pupil Size and Associated Factors: Results from the Population-Based Gutenberg Health Study, Journal of \(^9\)  [...] testified that he had only conducted one or two dozen arrests for drug activity, some of which included persons under the influence of drugs, in his seven years as an officer.
[brief] “OPRA’s purpose is ‘to maximize public knowledge about public affairs in order to ensure an informed citizenry and to minimize the evils inherent in a secluded process. ’”  Mason, 196 N.J. at 64 (quoting Asbury Park Press v. Ocean Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, 374 N.J. Super. 312, 329 (Law Div. 2004)); see also Kovalcik v. Somerset Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, 206 N.J. 581, 588 (2011).  With this in mind, OPRA defines a government record broadly as “any paper, written or printed book,[or] document . . . maintained or kept on file . . . or that has been received in the course of his or its official business by any such officer, commission, agency, or authority of the State,” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, and permits these records to be inspected, examined, and copied unless exempt from public access.  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.  But any inspection under OPRA is “subject to reasonable controls, and courts have inherent power to prevent abuse and protect the public officials involved. ”  MAG Entm’t, LLC v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J. Super. 534, 546 (App. Div. 2005); cf. DeLia v. Kiernan, 119 N.J. Super. 581, 585 (App. Div. 1972) (finding that any inspection under the Right to Know Law is permissible only subject to reasonable controls as to time, place, or copying).  Here, [...]’s complaint fails under a plain language reading of OPRA.
[brief] This Court reversed, holding that the trial court should have allowed the moving party an opportunity to correct the defect.  However this Court did not find that the trial court should have just ignored the motion’s defect, let alone find that the non-moving party had acted in bad faith by raising the defect within its opposition.  Here in this case, the facts and defects favoring rejection of [...]’ motion(s) to dismiss were even greater than with my motion in the [...] case – that is, both me and my sister were/are unrepresented, both of us were/are non-attorneys, neither of our mailing addresses were listed on either version of [...]’ notice of motion, neither version of the motion was ever formally served upon either of us, and just like my motion in [...], neither version of [...]’ motion included any of the language required by R. 6:3-3(c), while both had also improperly specified a return date.
[brief] DATED: May 8, 2023  Respectfully Submitted, \(^{10}\)  Defendants incorporate and preserve for possible petition for certification if needed following this appeal, all arguments and points decided against them by this Court in its opinion of June 1, 2018.  By: [...], Esq.  [...]  [...]  Phone: [...]  [...] [...], Esq. [...]  Phone: [...]  Attorneys for the Wilf Defendants [...], the [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] Superior Court of New Jersey APPELLATE DIVISION
[brief] (Not Raised Below).  A decision is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and therefore subject to reversal, where, as here, the agency erred in reaching its conclusion upon examination of the application of the law to the facts.  The arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable standard is generally understood to involve inquiry into whether the decision conforms with relevant law, whether there is substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency's decision, and whether in applying the relevant law to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching its conclusion.  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007) (relying on Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).
[directive] In carrying out their responsibilities under Section 33-11.1, officers should consider whether any of the involved 5 parties are subject to any other valid court orders—such as a domestic violence restraining order or a protective order relating to certain sex crime convictions—that may restrict their ability to enter or be present at a particular premises.  Neither Section 33-11.1 nor EO 106 allows tenants to avoid otherwise valid court orders restricting their access to a location.  Page 6 charge illegally evicted occupants who reenter their homes without an officer present, and officers should exercise their discretion about such charges based on the totality of the circumstances.
[directive] CONCLUSION  Please take steps to ensure that the HD and EM Screening Criteria forms are available for attorneys in the appropriate courtrooms.  HD or EM conditions shall not of be ordered without completion the appropriate form, which shall be uploaded to the eCourts system by court staff.  Additionally, courts must consider the specific of circumstances a defendant's suitability on HD or EM required by the Criminal as of Justice Reform Act and the Rules Court, the relevant information contained in the Criteria for Ordering HDEM document, and in accordance with this Directive.  Any questions or comments may be directed to the Criminal Practice Division by email at [...] or by phone at [...].
[brief] The appeal is not moot, as the Board has recently made other TI Program awards and other applications remain pending in the TI Program.  Although the TI Program is closed to new applications, it is not gone altogether.  Likewise, the TREC funding is not based upon legislative appropriation, but upon BPU Orders that obligate load serving entities (“LSEs”) to purchase the TRECs and for the electric distribution companies (“EDCs”) to recover the costs through utility ratemaking.  As such, [...]’s request is reasonable, viable, and legal, and needs no legislative approval or action.  **LEGAL ARGUMENTS**
[brief] (2T 105:21-23)  $70,000 to Plaintiff is more than a year’s salary.  For Defendant, it was less than one month’s.  It is also worth noting that there is no indication that the decision to make a $140,000 down payment on a less than $400,000 townhome was anyone’s other than [...]’s.  Perhaps if the down payment had been $40,000, splitting it would not have been so daunting for [...].  That, however, would presumably not have satisfied [...], since he would have taken a larger mortgage.  “[I]f one of the partners is not economically self-sufficient, albeit a wage earner, the promise of support by the other is no less legally significant than if she were entirely economically dependent.
[directive] The provisions of this Executive Directive, and the underlying policies announced herein, shall apply with respect to all elementary and secondary (junior high and high) schools located in the State without regard to whether a school is public, private or parochial.  With respect to non-public schools, all references in this Executive Directive to building principals, local superintendents or other public school officials or employees shall be deemed to mean and refer to the appropriate private or parochial school counterpart or counterparts.  4.
[brief] DOCKET NO. [...]  Criminal Action: On Appeal From a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court, Law Division, Essex County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Honorable Judges: Pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b) and R. 2:6-4(a), this letter in lieu of a more formal brief is submitted on behalf of the State of New Jersey in response to defendant’s brief in the above-entitled matter.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  COUNTER - STATEMENT  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................  1 COUNTER - STATEMENT OF FACTS  .............................................  2  LEGAL ARGUMENT: POINT I: .........................................................................................  5  THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE LAW DIVISION’S FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.  CONCLUSION  ..................................................................................
[brief] As former Essex County Designated OPRA Judge [...] advised me and others more than thirteen years ago, there is a fine line between cute and egregious municipal behavior.  Indeed, there are boundaries of legitimate legal advocacy.  Here, defendants and their counsel transgressed these boundaries.  See, Geler v. Akawie, 358 N.J. Super. 37, 463 (App. Div. 2003) (“[O]ur jurisprudence has long ago set boundaries for advocacy, and unequivocally defined conduct that, by its potential to cause injury, will not be tolerated.
[brief] (7T36-1 to 37-20).  [...] testified that defendant arrived at her residence at [...] approximately 5-10 minutes later carrying a blow-up mattress box that he put in her living room closet.  (7T38-1 to 39-25).  [...] testified that [...], who she knew as “[...],” knocked on her door while defendant was inside.  [...] advised that [...] and defendant left after [...] told [...] she did not want him in her house.
[brief] The five groups of statements, and [...]’s rulings on each, were:  1.  Statements [...] volunteered to officers responding to the scene – **admissible**.  (2T 51-17 to 53-14)  2.  Statements [...] made, without prompting, while talking to himself alone in a recorded interview room – **admissible**.  (2T 53-15 to 54-1)  3.  Statements [...] volunteered during booking as officers were asking routine pedigree questions – **admissible**.  (2T 54-2 to 11)  4.  Statements [...] made in response to formal questioning at the [...] – **not admissible**.  (2T 51-2 to 11)  5.  Statements [...] made at [...] during the phone calls in response to his parents in the presence of [...] – **not admissible**.
[brief] Under New Jersey Mt. Laurel Law, such Settlement Agreements are subject to, and must be approved by the Court after conducting a “Fairness Hearing”, which is required to be publicly noticed.  *Morris Cty. Fair Hous. Council v. Boonton Twp.*, 197 N.J. Super.  359, 367-69 (Law Div. 1984) aff’d o.b., 209 N.J. Super. 108 (App. Div. 1986); *East/West Venture v. Borough of Fort Lee*, 286 N.J. Super. 311, 328-29 (App. Div. 1996).  See also Pa062.  The Court conducted a Fairness Hearing on March 23, 2021, approved the [...] Settlement Agreement\(^4\) and entered a written order on May 13, 2021, Pa390.
[brief] In his RAR, issued on August 3, 2015, the SAM first found that the “occurrence” that gave rise to the property damage at the Site “was the continued active release of hazardous materials into the soil and groundwater. ” (Pa0151).  The SAM then applied a fact-based methodology by which he determined the costs incurred to remediate the property damage that occurred during each insurance policy period and allocated [...]’s damages accordingly.\(^5\) (Pa0151-58).  When he allocated [...]’s damages, the SAM relied on the factual findings in [...]’s Jan. 31, 2011, Opinion and Order as to the start and end dates for different plant operations where CVOC releases occurred and the testimony of [...]’s environmental expert, [...], who the SAM described as “one of the most knowledgeable and articulate expert witnesses the SAM has had appear before him over the last 42 years. ” (Pa0148).  Based upon the trial court’s factual findings, and the extensive testimony, exhibits and presentations of counsel, the SAM allocated [...]’s covered damages incurred up to and including December 31, 2009, “according to the \(^5\) See Bos. Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 910 N.E.2d 290, 312 (Mass. 2009) (“The ideal [allocation] method is a ‘fact-based’ allocation, under which courts would determine precisely what injury or damage took place during each contract period or uninsured period and allocate the loss accordingly”). percentage that each responsible party had time on the risk while the then-existing conditions contributed to the contamination.
[directive] Excessive Force 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Improper Arrest 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Improper Entry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Improper Search 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Other Criminal Violation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Differential Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Demeanor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Domestic Violence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Other Rule Violation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Total Cases Opened 0
[directive] (Compare also Mitigating Factor #4 defined in Section 10.2.4, which credits the defendant for beneficial post-arrest conduct in the form of pretrial alcohol or other drug treatment.)  A consideration of post-arrest conduct is appropriate, since recent bail violations provide insight into the defendant’s respect for the authority of the court and bear directly on the likelihood that the defendant will commit future offenses.  If the defendant commits a bail violation after the prosecutor has tendered a plea offer, the prosecutor in accordance with the provisions of Section 3.7 may in the exercise of reasoned discretion withdraw the offer and issue a new offer that accounts for the bail violation using Aggravating Factor #2.
[directive] Each County Working Group will be responsible for creating a “Mental Health Toolbox,” which shall include a list of state and countywide mental health resources to assist law enforcement when they encounter individuals in mental health crisis.  Examples include the following: programs for mental health or social workers to respond to calls for service instead of law enforcement or along with law enforcement; diversionary programs in the criminal justice system; access to mental health and drug treatment screening and treatment options; county crisis screening services which include mobile outreach and accessibility; and links to follow-up resources for the issues that are identified through the screening.  Finally, the County Working Groups shall provide a quarterly update on progress and plans to a Statewide Steering Committee (“Steering Committee”) (which will be established pursuant to Section II below), pursuant to a schedule and format to be established by the Steering Committee.  County Working Groups should also identify gaps in the availability of resources and services, and then propose strategies to the Steering Committee and to local agencies to fill those gaps.
[brief] POINT V VIBRATIONS FROM THE SEAWALL PROJECT CONSTRUCTION ARE COMPENSABLE DAMAGES IN CONDEMNATION (Da390-400).  The structural damage to the owner’s home from the project vibrations are recoverable in this condemnation action.  In Maffucci, the Court held that the owner is entitled to recover “the difference in the fair market value of his property in its ‘before’ condition and the fair market value of the remaining portion thereof after the construction of the improvement on the portion taken. ” (Id. at 10).  Relevant factors include, but are not limited to, “view, access to beach property, freedom from noise, etc. ”  Ibid.  Maffucci acknowledges that property damage as a result of the project is relevant when determining just compensation.  Defendant’s damages should have gone to the jury for consideration in calculating just compensation.  Damages are not limited to the property that was taken, and consists of offsite project construction activities.  In State by Com'r of Transp. v. Carroll, 123 N.J. 308, 327 (1991), the Supreme Court held that “all material facts and circumstances” that could influence potential buyers of the remaining parcel should be considered in valuing that property for purposes of determining severance damages.
[brief] Defendant attempts to analogize Trustees of Columbia University v. Jacobsen, 53 N.J. Super. 574, (App. Div. 1959) to establish that Plaintiff has not set forth any misrepresentation claim.  (Db46-Db47).  However, the representations made in Jacobsen are substantially different than the misrepresentations made by [...] in the present matter.  For example, in Jacobsen, Columbia University represented it could teach, “wisdom, truth, justice, beauty, spirituality” among other qualities.  Jacobsen, 53 N.J. Super at 578.  The Appellate Division in Jacobsen found that the pro-se Plaintiff’s counterclaim failed to establish a false representation, because, “[o]nly by reading into them the imagined meanings he attributes to them can one conclude—and the conclusion would be a most tenuous, insubstantial one—that Columbia University represented it could teach wisdom, truth, justice, beauty, spirituality and all the other qualities set out in the 50 counts of the counterclaim. ”  Here, Plaintiff was not reading “imagined meanings” of the dual degree program requirements.  Rather, Plaintiff read the plain language of the text, which misrepresented and omitted material requirements for entry to the dual degree program.  Due to the existence of a material issue of fact with regard to Plaintiff’s misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement claim, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied.
[brief] Plaintiff’s second limited exception argument is that the handrails were too far from the doorway.  Again, as with Plaintiff’s prior argument, [...] does not causally relate the handrail to the slip and fall.  Additionally, [...] fails to cite a single code indicating the handrails are in violation of when the property was constructed in 1890.  This argument is yet another red herring attempting to distract from the true cause of plaintiff’s slip and fall.
[brief] 1.  In April 2019, the Township Defendants’ initial refusal to participate in mediation sessions overseen by the Special Adjudicator.  Pa012.  2.  On May 24, 2019, the Township Defendants’ insistence, “without any basis in fact or personal knowledge”, that the subject Property was not ripe to be considered for inclusion in the Township’s Third Round Housing Plan.  Pa012-Pa013.  3.
[brief] This case is unlike Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., because that case involved whether discovery should have been allowed before summary judgment was granted and did not address a complete failure to plead bad motive in the Plaintiff’s complaint.  168 N.J. at 252.  Id.  Moreover, where a party already possesses prior knowledge regarding the existence of a given issue, that party is not justified in burying its head in the sand, ignoring and failing to investigate the issue, and attempting to foist the obligation to address the issue upon another party.  See Nappe, 189 N.J. Super. at 355 (in fraud context, “reliance must have been justifiable, for example, when facts to the contrary were not obvious or did not provide a warning making it patently unreasonable that plaintiff not pursue further investigation”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds 97 N.J. 37 (1984); Nat’l Premium Budget Plan Corp. v. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 97 N.J. Super. 149, 211 (Law Div. 1967) (“But in many cases where the plaintiff’s reliance and good faith are unquestioned, it may still be held that his conduct was so foolish as to bar his recovery”) (quoting Prosser, Torts (2d Ed. 1955 § 89)); Barry L. Kahn Defined Ben. Pension Plan v. Twp. of Moorestown, 243 N.J. Super. 328, 336-37 (Ch. Div. 1990) (because Plaintiff was a “sophisticated purchaser” he “did not justifiably rely upon the failure of [a] municipality to disclose the condition of” a property he was purchasing); Mel Realty, LLC v. Bayonne Oval, LLC, 2019 N.J. Super.
[brief] Defendant also argued that his plea allocution did not demonstrate his intent to kill [...].  [Pa119].  This is so even though the following exchange took place between him and the prosecutor:  Q: . . .  And, as [defense counsel] asked you, your purpose at that point was to eliminate [[...]]; - A: Yes Q: - is that correct?  And “eliminate’s” a nice word, but at that point, you didn’t want to leave a witness; is that fair to say?  A: Yes.  Q: So it was the intention at that point to make sure that he was dead before you left there?  A: Yes.  [1T32:9-18].