ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The [...] provisions employ the legal term “fair market value. ”  This term, which is defined by the judiciary, provides a means for ascertaining purchase prices with certainty, which requires mutual consent between the parties.  Thus, [...]’s purchase of the Boonton Property for $601,000 and [...]’s purchase of the Florida Property for $360,000, required [...]’s consent.  However, instead of securing [...]’s voluntary agreement, the Trustee and trial court compelled [...] to relinquish his “shares” in the Boonton and Florida Properties at discounted prices.  This approach conflicts with the judiciary’s articulated definition of fair market value, emphasizing the necessity for mutual consent between the parties.  Consequently, the Trust’s requirement that property “shares” be acquired at fair market value was not observed.  Moreover, the definition of fair market value - what a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree to - suggests that the Settlor anticipated negotiations between [...], [...], and [...] to determine specific purchase prices.  This is why [...]’s Order requiring a Settlement Conference was so important.  (14a)  Assuming the beneficiaries could not come to agreement, the properties would need to be listed and sold in the open market, to achieve fair market value.  Finally, pursuant to the legal definition, fair market value can only be established on a specific date, provided that a buyer and seller come to agreement on price, at that specific time.  Consequently, the date-of-death appraisals as utilized in this litigation are inherently flawed, since they do not meet this requirement.  Wilburn v. Mangano, 851 S.E.2d 474, 478 (Va. 2020).
[brief] At the same time, the Legislature also “amended the mandatory PIP coverages to provide for treatment in accordance with protocols, or care paths, and for the precertification of certain medical procedures, treatments, tests or other services. ”  Coal.  For Quality Health Care v. New Jersey Dep’t of Banking & Ins., 348 N.J. Super. 272, 283 (App. Div.) (citing N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1, -4, -5.1), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 194 (N.J. 2002).
[brief] Watkins, supra, 124 N.J. at 412.  [...] also relied on Brookshire Equities, LLC, 346 N.J. Super. 310, 318 (App. Div. 2002) for the proposition that there must be “identity of issues” or “identity of the cause of action. ”  (Da816)  [...] found no identity of issues and causes of action because the [...] litigation “focused on plaintiff’s purported right to enter the land by prescription or by necessity[,]” not express language contained in a deed.  (Da829)  She also found that the requisite final adjudication was lacking because the portion of [...]’s opinion addressing [...]’s express easement claim was merely *dicta*, “based on incomplete facts, on theories not raised in the complaint,” and the 1966 [...]-to-[...] deed was never presented to that court.
[directive] The County Prosecutor or Director may authorize the law enforcement executive, and one or more superior officers or duty positions (e.g., head of the detective bureau) identified by the law enforcement executive, to grant permission pursuant to this Section to access, view, copy, disseminate, or otherwise use BWC recordings tagged pursuant to Section 9.3.  See also Section 10.1 (specifying the purposes for which access to a BWC recording is permitted).
[brief] See Kaplan v. Gruber, 2011 WL 4901347, at *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 13, 2011) (unpublished) (“Appellant’s argument that her pro se status . . . eliminated her ability to monitor the docket is unavailing.  Parties have a responsibility to monitor the docket, whether they are pro se or not. ”).  Finally, Plaintiff argues that because more than 60 days have elapsed since Defendants were served, “[i]t is way past the deadline to make any sort of motion for an order to show cause now. ”  Opp. at 5.  But Plaintiff never properly served Defendants, see Da17, and, in any event, Defendants’ proposed order to show cause was timely filed and is already pending—they do not seek to file an order to show cause for the first time upon remand, see Da47–50.
[brief] No. [...], filed March 15, 2023 | 22a | | Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for Judgment Awarding Attorneys Fees and Costs, Dkt. No. [...], filed March 15, 2023 | 23a-24a | | Plaintiff’s Proposed Order Entering Judgment for Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs, Dkt. No. [...], filed March 15, 2023 | 25a-26a | | Plaintiff’s Letter Brief in Support of Notice of Motion for Judgment Awarding Attorneys Fees and Costs, Dkt. No. [...], filed March 15, 2023 | 27a-41a | | Certification of [...], Esq., in Support of Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for Judgment Awarding Attorneys Fees and Costs, [...], filed March 15, 2023 | 42a-51a | | Plaintiff’s Complaint and Jury Demand, Dkt. No. [...], filed November 28, 2020, (Exhibit A to Ricci Certification) | 52a-59a | May 29, 2017 (redacted) Motor Vehicle Retail Order for Plaintiff’s Purchase of New 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe, VIN #5NMZUDLB0HH011768 (Exbt. 1 to Cmplt.)…………………………..60a-64a May 29, 2017 (redacted) Retail Installment Sales Contract for Plaintiff’s Purchase of New 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe, VIN #5NMZUDLB0HH011768 (Exbt. 2 to Cmplt.)…………………65a-70a
[directive] Officers may encounter individuals with qualifying warrants (i.e., Location of municipal court warrants with $500 or less bail) in a variety of settings.  Such individuals shall not be arrested (subject to limited exceptions in Section I.B), but shall be released at the scene, on their own recognizance with the conditions in Section I.G.  The completion of a bail recognizance form and release is intended to occur as expeditiously as possible.  B. prohibited.
[directive] Èske w konprann ke si wap plede koupab de yon deli de agresyon [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] [pa aplikab/NA] seksyèl agrave, agresyon seksyèl, kontak seksyèl kriminèl agrave, kidnapinn daprè 2C:13-1c(2), mete byenèt timoun an danje timoun an danje pa ajisman seksyèl ki ta kab pètibe ak pèvèti moral timoun daprè 2C:24-4a, mete byenèt timoun an danje daprè 2C:24-4b(3), mete byenèt timoun an danje konfòm ak 2C:24- 4b(5)(b)(i) or (ii) (si enfraksyon an te komèt le ou aprè le 1ye fevriye, 2018), sedwi oswa eseye komèt nenpòt nan zak sa yo epi ke zak la ta komèt le ou aprè le 14 janvye 2004, oubyen vyole kondisyon santans de sipèvizyon kominotè a vi si vyolasyon an te komèt le ou aprè le 1ye jiyè 2014, tribinal la, anplis de nenpòt ki lòt santans ta ka enpoze yon santans espesyal de sipèvizyon kondisyonèl a vi?  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4a, endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(3), endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(i) or (ii) (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018),luring or an attempt to commit any of these offenses and the offense occurred on or after January 14, 2004, or violating a condition of a special sentence of community supervision for life if the violation occurred on or after July 1, 2014 the court, in addition to any other sentence, will impose a special sentence of parole supervision for life?
[brief] [...] wasn’t interested at the time, but in about early 2014, [...] broached the topic once more, and [...] asked him to send a proposal.  (15T 40:22 to 41:23).  [...] put forth a series of proposals beginning in March 2014.  (Da2788-89).  [...] was skeptical of the initial proposal from [...] because he did not believe it accurately reflected his investment and interest in certain properties.  (15T 46:16 to 47:11).  Between about March and April 2014, [...] requested some additional information about the properties, but was still skeptical about splitting them at that time.  Specifically, [...] was concerned that he lacked sufficient knowledge in real estate.  [...] proposed tabling the idea of dividing up the [...] and [...] for five or six years.  [...] responded that he wanted to do it at that time, and not wait.  (15T 49:21 to 51:9).  [...] continued to put forth proposals for consideration in the following months.  (Da2790; 2791).  In analyzing these proposals, [...] relied on the financial information and property valuations that [...] provided and did not perform any independent investigation.  [...] only later came to learn that many of [...]’s figures were incorrect.
[directive] I.  Introduction  In recent weeks there has been a question about the meaning of the term "substantially identical" in New Jersey's assault firearms law.  The Legislature addressed this question in the provisions of the Code of Criminal Justice, and despite the clarity of the law, it is appropriate for the Attorney General to provide guidance to the prosecutors in order to ensure that the law is administered uniformly and effectively throughout the State.  N.J.S.A. 52:17B-98.  I am directing the prosecutors, as chief law enforcement officers of their respective counties, to share this guidance with local police departments, who in turn should provide copies of this memorandum to any member of the public who requests information on assault firearms.
[brief] First, the Court incorrectly believed [...] did not make that argument.  In several places of his pro se brief opposing, [...] did state his dispute with one arbitrator handling the Phase II part of the claims.  For example, he argued that, “The AAA rules are also being reviewed for improperly empaneling arbitrators here under the Large Complex Rules L1-l4. ”  (Da1152)  He argued that he was entitled to “a panel of three from the LCC roster”.  (Da1154).  These statements raised the issue but were not the thrust of [...]’s opposition at that time.  Instead, [...]’s challenge to that particular partial arbitration award was based on the complete lack of arbitrability of that claim.  He argued the only compulsion to arbitration was in [...]’s operating agreement which only required that for “any material dispute hereunder”.  (Da648)  The loan at issue for that award was separately documented in 2 notes and did not arise under the operating agreement.  (Da999)  [...] further stated, “[t]he Loan Contracts which are now nearly four years in performance, never contained an arbitral provision, but held instead a selection of court clause….” (Da1090-91).  He stated, “in the 2014 Loan Contract there never was an arbitral agreement between the two parties. ”  (Da1100)  He argued, “the absence of an arbitration claims means the arbitrator could not have any jurisdiction on the Loan Contracts. ”  (Da1157)  He thus argued there was no arbitral contract at all which could have allowed any arbitrator to decide the validity of the $970,000 loan.  (Da1093-98(Da1125-1126)(Da1135)(Da1157)  When challenging the very arbitrability of the prior award on that loan transaction it was extremely unfair for the Chancery Court to have deemed [...] bound to also argue that 3 arbitrators were required.  Those two arguments conflicted with each other.  There should not have been any waiver finding on those facts related to that prior partial award.  Finally, the Plaintiffs in this case intentionally presented their claims piecemeal.  They intentionally then presented motions for partial awards and sought confirmation separately of their partial awards.  They did not need to confirm any partial awards until the entire arbitration was over.  That they did so made it very unfair for [...] to have been deemed required to raise any and all objections that he might ever have to Phase II of the Arbitration in opposing each portion, or be foreclosed later.  This Court should reverse the Chancery Court on the decision to defer whether the parties’ arbitration agreement required 3 arbitrators to decide Plaintiff’s significant monetary claims, and on remand direct the Court to decide the issue presented on [...]’s cross-motion to vacate the 2018 partial and final awards.
[brief] (1T49:5-9).  Indeed, Defendants’ pleading admits that Plaintiff’s intent was to seek “…assistance from her “uncle” [...] to purchase the Property so that it was not lost as part of the bankruptcy and foreclosure. ” (Ibid. (Emphasis added); Db4-5).  When [...] agreed to help her, the MOU was executed.  (Db4-5).  The events that transpired after the execution of the MOU, i.e. the execution of the Operating Agreements, the unexecuted 2017 Agreement\(^5\), and the 2022 Addendum, are all entirely consistent with the intent of the MOU.
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum B | December 2021  Vehicular Pursuit Policy 11  Vehicular Pursuit Reporting 11.1  All law enforcement officers who operate law enforcement vehicles in vehicular pursuit situations shall complete a report in the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal.  The report shall be completed by the officer within 24 hours of the vehicular pursuit and preferably before the end the shift in which the pursuit occurred.
[brief] Unlike other states, New Jersey does not recognize the legal theory of "afterthought robbery."  State v. Lopez, 187 N.J. 91, 101 (2006).  Instead, under the New Jersey robbery statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a), "the intention to steal must precede or be coterminous with the use of force."  Ibid.  Any threats or violence must have been made to further the individual's intention to commit a theft.  Ibid.  New Jersey's accomplice liability and robbery statutes, and its case law, reject the concept that "a person who aids the escape of a robber is an accomplice to robbery even if he did not have a purpose to promote or facilitate the theft when it occurred."  Whitaker, 200 N.J. at 463.  The driver of the vehicle that takes away the perpetrator who committed the robbery by the use of force cannot be found "retroactively guilty" of robbery "if he had no intent to participate in the theft at or before the time of its occurrence."
[brief] A corporation and a limited liability company are each a legal person or entity that exists separately from its shareholders.  *Lyon v. Barrett*, 89 N.J. 294, 300 (1982).  In this case, both [...] are corporate structures that shield their shareholders and/or members from personal liability.  The Appellants, however, have asserted a cause of action seeking to pierce the corporate veil and hold the shareholders and members of the [...] personally liable.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-42.  Plaintiff is also mistaken in its attempted reliance upon the unpublished case, Hoboken Land Building, L.P., and Hoboken Holdings, L.P. v. City of Hoboken, et. Al., Docket No. [...] (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. March 26, 2019).  The set of facts at issue in the underlying matter were simply not the ones at issue in Hoboken Land.  The decision in that case turned not upon a finding that a redevelopment entity cannot collect revenues to defray costs but, rather, the court’s finding that no relationship existed between the payments collected from a redeveloper and the City’s areas in need or rehabilitation or a project in that area.
[directive] 3rd Degree $2,500 to $7,500 10% permissible  Resulting in Serious and the accident results in serious bodily injury to another person.  Bodily Injury  Actor causes bodily injury to any person or solicits, aids, encourages, or attempts or agrees  Endangering an to aid another who causes bodily injury to any person, and leaves the scene of the injury  2C:12-1.2  3rd Degree $20,000 to $50,000  10% permissible  Injured Victim knowing or reasonably believing that the injured person is physically helpless, mentally incapacitated or otherwise unable to care for himself.  2nd Degree $25,000 to $50,000  10% permissible  Actor threatens a crime of violence or threatens to kill; third degree; if threat of crime of 2C:12-3(a)(b)  Terroristic Threats violence occurs during declared period of national, state or county emergency, then second degree.  3rd Degree $10,000 to $20,000  10% permissible 23  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2 STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants
[brief] (2T9:20-16:9; 2T32:25-37:12; 3T20:10-22:17; 21T16:16-17:2; Da1096).  [...]’s brief does not challenge the admission of what it terms parol evidence at trial.  Rather it challenges only that [...], who heard one of Plaintiff’s summary judgment motions (and the subsequent motion for reconsideration), erroneously refused to apply the parol evidence rule when denying [...]’s motions.  Because of this, Plaintiffs will first address the denial of [...]'s summary judgment motion.
[brief] Because Defendant Has Completed the Sentence in Question and Because Consecutive Sentencing is Purely Punitive in Nature, Imposition of the Required Legal Sentence in Place of the Illegal Sentence at This Late Date Would Violate the Double Jeopardy Clause Contained in the Fifth Amend. of the United States Const. and Art.  I, par. 11 of the New Jersey Const.  Once the parties are restored to their pre-plea positions concerning [...], plea negotiations in all likelihood would resume.
[brief] On or about September 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed the Complaint that is the subject of this appeal.  The 2021 Complaint is hereinafter referred to as the Second Lawsuit or the 2021 Lawsuit.  Plaintiff’s Complaint in the 2021 Lawsuit alleges that the 2016 Lawsuit included claims of Retaliation in violation of the Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”), Violation of the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”), Failure to Accommodate a Disability and Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process under the LAD, Individual Liability Against [...] pursuant to the LAD and CEPA, and Individual Liability Against [...] pursuant to the LAD and CEPA.
[brief] In order to advance her argument, Appellant relies heavily on vague references to executive orders identifying uncertainty surrounding COVID-19, which were not subject to notice and comment (like other forms of settled public policy) and, significantly, none of which required any employers to allow their employees to work from home or stated that individuals with certain conditions were more susceptible to COVID-19.  On the contrary, public knowledge on the subject, as well as her employer’s knowledge, was unsettled, not clear, and continually evolving.  Pa058; [...] Dep. T. 32:16–24 (Testifying no knowledge that underlying conditions made individuals more susceptible to COVID-19 until at least a year after Appellant’s termination).
[brief] Plaintiff’s position glosses over the details of the evidence and ignores the core factual argument advanced by [...].  The jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence because there is no rational basis for the jury to have concluded that [...] acted negligently.  A motion for a new trial and an appeal from the denial of a new trial motion requires a showing that the jury’s verdict constituted a miscarriage of justice.  The Supreme Court in Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588 (1997), quoting from its earlier decision in State v. Johnson, articulated the standard best:  While this feeling of “wrongness” is difficult to define, because it involves the reaction of trained judges in the light of their judicial and human experience, it can well be said that which must exist in the reviewing mind is a definite conviction that the judge (the jury) went so wide of the mark, a mistake must have been made.  This sense of “wrongness” can arise in numerous ways from manifest lack of inherently credible evidence to support the finding, obvious overlooking or underevaluation of crucial evidence, a clearly unjust result, and many others.  [74 N.J. at 599 (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964) (emphasis added)).]  The jury clearly got it wrong in this case.  There is simply no possible way [...]’s conduct can be deemed negligent.  [...] could not have been 200 feet from the intersection and traveled a significantly further distance than Plaintiff while traveling at a similar speed to Plaintiff.  Even if [...] was traveling a few miles an hour over the speed limit, there is no evidence to support the suggestion that his doing so was somehow a proximate cause of the accident.  The sole proximate cause of this accident was [...]’s entering the intersection against the light and entering [...]’s lane of travel, an occurrence that the jury necessarily found to have happened.  Plaintiff and [...] also make much of the fact that the jury was not asked to consider the Plaintiff’s fault.  It is true that Plaintiff’s negligence was not submitted to the jury; all parties implicitly agreed that she bore no fault.  However, that agreement highlights, rather than cures, the inherent contradiction in the jury’s verdict.  The jury was still required to pass judgment on the Plaintiff’s version of the accident versus [...]’s version.  [...] essentially agreed with Plaintiff’s version of the accident because [...] acted in substantially the same manner as Plaintiff.  The jury was required to decide who had the right of the way and determine the status of the traffic signal at the moment of the initial impact between [...] and [...].  The jury obviously concluded that the light was yellow as Plaintiff approached the intersection, and therefore, was yellow when [...] entered the intersection.  Having made that determination there was no factual basis for the jury to conclude that [...] acted negligently.  II.
[brief] “[P]urpose” has the same basic definition amongst the various dictionaries.  Compare Merriam-Webster online https://www.merriam-webster. com/dictionary/purpose, last visited 6/2/2023 (defining “purpose” as “something set up as an object or end to be attained…”); Cambridge Dictionary online, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/purpose, last visited 6/2/2023 (defining “purpose” as “why you do something or why something exists…”) and Oxford Learner’s Dictionary online, found at https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/purpose?q=purpose, last visited 6/2/2023 (defining “purpose” as to “the intention, aim or function of something; the thing that something is supposed to achieve…”).
[brief] It is axiomatic that “[i]n order to establish a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate: ‘a duty of care, (2) that the duty has been breached, (3) proximate causation, and (4) injury. ’ . .  A plaintiff bears the burden of proving negligence . . . and must prove that unreasonable acts or omissions by the defendant proximately caused his or her injuries. ”  Underhill v. Borough of Caldwell, 463 N.J. Super. 548, 554, 233 A.2d 594 (App. Div. 2020)(quoting Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 51, 110 A.3d 52 (2015)(citations omitted.)
[brief] When the [...] sought reconsideration, the Commission denied the Sheriff’s Office a “second bite of the apple” and held the Sheriff’s Office “needed to indicate [it’s alternate arguments] at the time it submitted its background report when it returned the certification to this agency. ”  Id.  (emphasis added)  [...] was fully aware of Appellant [...]’s employment history with the [...] when it improperly utilized the “Rule of Three” to by-pass her promotion and requiring this appeal.
[directive] Determining Suitability for Official Use B .  The seizing or requesting Treasury agency is responsible for determining whether a seized vehicle is suitable for retention for official use based on the internal guidelines for that agency.  A request to pay a lien to retain a forfeited vehicle for official use should include an approved agency retention request, signed by the responsible agency official (ex. fleet manager), which certifies that the subject vehicle is suitable for official use.  -- IV.