[brief] See infra Section III. applicability of Section 9.\footnote{Throughout the argument, the trial court proceeded to raise several issues of fact that did not appear in the record, and that would have been relevant to the Court’s analysis.  For example, the trial court noted that the record, in particular, “[t]he notes, the internal notes, do not establish that anyone was advised that the wire was coming back. ”  (1T56:13-15.)  There was no discovery to determine what the [...] notes did or did not contain, although Borrower on Appellant’s Loan was clearly aware the funds were insufficient and would be rejected.  There was equally no discovery to determine what, if anything, Respondent did to mitigate their damages.  Although recognizing the lack of evidence in the records pertaining to notes and what [...] did or did not advise, the trial court nevertheless made a negative inference against only Appellant/[...] that factored into the trial court’s equitable analysis:  “[[...]’s] decision to reject [the wire] in the manner it was rejected in this case does not allow me to [] find that the blame for that should be put on any other party. ”  (1T44:19-22.)}  Although the trial court started oral argument by asking the parties whether this case was ripe for summary judgment (1T6:8-14), at the time the parties’ motions for summary judgment were filed, no discovery had been exchanged, Respondent never challenged Appellant’s reliance on Section 9, and Appellant never had the opportunity to develop this argument in discovery.  The trial court stated that the lack of a record on this point was “a problem,” (1T13:21), and that on the facts in front of the trial court, the trial court had “nothing that would show . . . that the lender was not allowed to accept the payoff with it being short. ”  (1T54:13-15.)  Despite the trial court’s acknowledgment of an incomplete record, the trial court nevertheless stated that “summary judgment will be granted with the understanding that both parties agreed that it was ripe. ”  (1T57:3-5.)  The fact that both parties filed for summary judgment was not, and should not have been, dispositive as to whether a plenary hearing was required to resolve disputed material facts.  *Driscoll Constr. Co.*, 371 N.J. Super. at 317–18; *O’Keeffe v. Snyder*, 83 N.J. 478, 487 (1980) (“Cross motions for summary judgment do not preclude the existence of issues of fact. ”).  “Although [one party] may assert that, according to his theory of the case, the material facts are undisputed, he must be allowed to show that if [opposing party’s] theory is adopted there remains a genuine issue of material fact. ”  *O’Keeffe*, 83 N.J. at 487.  The trial court improperly concluded that Appellant’s cross-motion for summary judgment for foreclosure served as a concession that the case was ripe for adjudication.  However, mortgage foreclosure claims are particularly suited for summary adjudication.  The lack of genuine issues of material fact on the foreclosure claim does not mean that there were no fact issues surrounding the context of the insufficient payment and the conditions necessary to effect a valid short sale.  The trial court erred by identifying and subsequently making a determination regarding the truth of the matter, concluding that “[t]he plaintiff has not established that it was mandatory that they accept a full payment. ” (1T44:18-19.)  Thus, this Court should remand this matter for discovery on whether, under the terms of the Mortgage, Appellant was required to accept or reject the partial payment.  III.