ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Energy Recovery Associates, L.P. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,** | | | 320 N.J. Super. 59 (App. Div. 1999) | 28 | | **Faysen Lake, Inc. v. Miller,** | | | 130 N.J.L. 289 (1943) | 20 | | **Glass v. Suburban Restoration Co.,** | | | 317 N.J. Super. 574 (App. Div. 1998) | 10 | | **Guaclides v. Kruse,** | | | 67 N.J. Super. 348 (App. Div. 1961) | 23 | | **In re Reglan Litig,** | | | 226 N.J. 315 (2016) | 9 | | **Kas Oriental Rugs, Inc. v. Ellman,** | | | 394 N.J.Super. 278 (App. Div. 2007) | 24 | | **Kellam Assoc., Inc. v. Angel Projects, LLC,** | | | 357 N.J. Super. 132 (App. Div. 2003) | 29 | | **Krisher v. Murphy,** | | | 11 N.J. Super. 231 (App. Div. 1951) | 14, 20, 22 | | **Levy v. Massachusetts Acc. Co.,** | | | 124 N.J. Eq. 420 (Ch. 1938) | 20 | | **Litton Industries, Inc. v. IMO Industries, Inc.,** | | | 200 N.J. 372 (2009) | 29, 30, 31 | M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 171 N.J. 378 (2002)
[brief] And the GRC Handbook for [...] commenting on hypocrisy.  Custodians, 7th Edition, November 2022, page 19 also provides similar guidance...  13.  **Do I have to provide records in a specific medium?**  Yes.  OPRA provides that a custodian must permit access to a government record and provide a copy of the record(s) in the medium requested, if the public agency maintains the record in that medium.  If the custodian does not maintain the record in the medium requested, he/she must: Convert the record to the medium requested; or Provide the record in some other meaningful medium (meaningful to the requestor).
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANTING OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.  .........................................................................................17  A.  Standard of Review ..........................................................................................24  B.  The Mount Laurel Doctrine ...............................................................................25  C.  Plaintiff is Likely to Succeed on the Merits of its Claims .................................32  1.  The Property Does not Qualify as an Area in Need of Redevelopment ....33  2.  Plaintiff is Likely to Prevail on its Builder’s Remedy Claim  .......................37  D.  Plaintiff, Including the Protected Class, Will Suffer Irreparable Harm .........40  E.  The Balancing of the Hardships Greatly Favors  Plaintiff .................................44  F.  Preserving the Subject Matter of this Action and Maintaining the Status Quo ..................................................................................................................46  II.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN WEIGHING PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED INCLUSIONARY DEVELOPMENT AGAINST MIDDLETOWN’S COMMERCIAL REDEVELOPMENT.  ........................................48  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................50
[brief] Fifth, [...]’s claims plainly fall within the scope of the DAA’s unambiguous arbitration provision.  That provision requires [...] and [...] to arbitrate “all claims, disputes and controversies between or among [...] and [[...]],” regardless of the nature of claim, “arising out of or relating in any way to your accounts and/or service” (and other matters not at issue here).  (PA126.)  As a matter of law, the provision is broad.  See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 398 (1967) (referring to a clause requiring arbitration of claims “arising out of or relating to” an agreement as “a broad arbitration clause”).  Further, the provision plainly applies to [...]’s claims, which rest on the allegation that an unnamed non-party transferred funds out of [...]’s [...] bank account without [...]’s authorization.  Other courts have held that bank customer claims concerning unauthorized transactions fall within the scope of similarly broad arbitration provisions, despite the fact that those transactions allegedly were initiated by someone other than the bank’s customer.  See, e.g., A-1 Am. Fence, Inc. v. [...] Bank, N.A., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 254241, at *29-31 (E.D. Tex. July 14, 2021) (holding that plaintiff’s “argument that [...] was negligent in handling the misdirected wire payment . . . implicates [plaintiff’s] use of [...]’s banking services”); Novak v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, No. 06-14862, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122096, at *23-24 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2008) (holding that bank’s arbitration provision governed plaintiffs’ claims for unauthorized transactions because those claims “cannot be maintained without reference to the account . . . and Plaintiff’s relationship with Defendant”).  For all of these reasons, the trial court correctly compelled arbitration of [...]’s claims.
[brief] Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 157.  Second, the amendments temporarily lifted the 2% cap on increases in the local tax levy in effect from 2010 to 2019.  In response, [...] raised its local levy from $124 million in 2018-19 to $189 million in 2020-21, an increase of over 48%. (Pa1948.)  Even with these sizable increases, [...]’s local levy remained below its ever-rising LFS.  In 2020-21, the local levy was more than $332 million below the District’s LFS while the Adequacy Budget remained underfunded by $61.5 million.  (Pa1944.)  Further, the tax cap reprieve ends after 2024-25, at which point [...] reverts back to the 2% limit that constrained increasing the local contribution to the Adequacy Budget for nearly a decade.
[directive] IF THE PERSON: REMAINS SILENT; OR STATES OR OTHERWISE INDICATES THAT HE/SHE REFUSES TO ANSWER ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE/SHE HAS A RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, OR WISHES TO CONSULT AN ATTORNEY, PHYSICIAN, OR ANY OTHER PERSON; OR IF THE RESPONSE IS AMBIGUOUS OR CONDITIONAL IN ANY RESPECT WHATSOEVER, THEN THE POLICE OFFICER SHALL READ THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL STATEMENT:  FULL TEXT OF ADDITIONAL STATEMENT  FOLLOWS:
[brief] The Statute provides specific factors to be considered by the Department when assessing whether an individual met their burden to demonstrate rehabilitation.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-64(f).  Plaintiff has not put forth any facts to show that even if she had applied, she would have met the listed factors and, even if she could have met these factors, that the Department would have granted the exception.  The cited statutory exception plainly applies only if the Department grants an exception.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-64(f) and (g).  The Statute could not be more clear that “an individual shall be disqualified from employment” if she has convictions such as those had by Plaintiff.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-64(b).  The fact that an exception -- which plainly does not apply to Plaintiff’s circumstances -- exists, does not change the fact that per Plaintiff’s own admissions, she was statutorily barred from employment with Defendant.
[brief] The Defendant-Respondent adopts the Plaintiff-Appellant’s Statement of Facts (Plaintiff-Respondent’s Brief at 4-6), including the footnote describing the differences in the Defendant-Respondent’s position on the relevant facts affecting the underlying suppression motion (id. at n.5).  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**  **POINT I**  LEAVE FOR APPEAL IS NOT IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE GIVEN THE PREMATURE POSTURE OF THE DISCRETIONARY ISSUES PRESENTED, THE REPEATED DELAYS THAT HAVE ALREADY PREVENTED A TIMELY ADJUDICATION OF THIS DETAINED DEFENDANT’S MOTION, AND THE STATE’S UNBECOMING TACTICS AND GAMESMANSHIP.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ counsel’s objection to defense counsel’s attempt to use the plaintiffs’ Complaint as an impeachment device was sustained.  (11T63).  [...] presented the expert testimony of [...], M.D., a diagnostic radiologist, who opined that the films read by [...] did show a perforation:  Q  Okay.  Do you uphold an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical probability that [...] deviated from the standard of care with regard to his reading of this abdominal study?  A  I do, and he did deviate from the standard of care.  There’s an equivocal -- unequivocal leak of contrast on this study.  [(18T147-18T148)].  In [...]’s opinion, [...]’s failure to call the operating doctor resulted in an approximately seven hour delay of the surgical procedure.  (18T148, 18T152).  [...] moved for a directed verdict as to [...]’s liability based on the absence of expert opinion contradicting [...]’s opinion.  (19T233)  Plaintiffs opposed the motion, noting that their expert, [...], opined that [...] read the scan appropriately; the trial court denied the motion, finding there was a factual question for the jury.
[brief] 13 - Hills v. Bank of Am., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32502, *8 (D.N.J March 17, 2015)  .....................................................................................................................- 21 - Invs. Sav. Bank v. Waldo Jersey City, LLC, 418 N.J. Super. 149, 159 (App. Div. 2011)  ..................................................................................................................-  33 - Johnson v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 347 N.J. Super. 71, 97 (App Div. 2002)  ...........................................................................................................-  36 - Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).........................................................-  6 - Kendall v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 209 N.J. 173 (2012)  .......................................-  8 - LaPlace v. Briere, 404 N.J. Super. 585, 595 (App. Div. 2009)  .............................-  11 - Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 274-75 (1973)
[brief] *Jones v. Morey’s Pier, Inc.*, 230 N.J. 142, 164 (2017) (requiring apportionment under CNA even if claims against defendant are dismissed); *Young v. Latta*, 123 N.J. 584, 595-96 (1991) (permitting jury to allocate fault among physicians in medical malpractice action where plaintiff settled with one physician defendant and proceeded to trial against another).  The concept is a corollary to the “empty chair” defense in which a defendant shifts blame to a joint tortfeasor who is not in the courtroom.  *Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc.*, 181 N.J. 102, 114 (2004) (citing cases) (holding jury was required to apportion fault in negligence action to a non-party that was dismissed due to a discharge in bankruptcy).  Not only does the non-settling defendant have a right to a credit for the percentage of fault allocated to the settling defendant, *Kranz v. Schuss*, 447 N.J. Super. 168, 182 (App. Div. 2016), but such allocation may entitle the remaining defendants to a contribution claim from the settling defendant.
[brief] (Pa667).  Additionally, in all his discussions about the recommendations in the ITE Handbook, and all the safety deficiencies he complains of, he never says that the ITE Handbook recommendations and the safety precautions he deemed necessary were considered to be universally accepted industry standards required for the design of all parking lots.(Pa659-666).  C)  Defendant Had No Knowledge of any Design Safety Deficiencies  In the Non-Management Designated Employee Parking Area.  1)  Prior Accident History
[brief] (emphasis added).  Our Supreme Court reasoned in *Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp.*, that the employee “is not required to have specific knowledge of the precise source of the public policy. ”  153 N.J. 163, 193 (1998).  In *Battaglia v. UPS, Inc.*, 214 N.J. 518, 464 (2013), the Supreme Court stated that "either ‘the court or the plaintiff’ must identify the statute, regulation, rule or public policy that closely relates to the complained of-conduct."
[brief] Hoffman v. Encore Capital Group, Inc., 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1627 (App. Div. 2008)  10  Hoffman v. Hampshire Labs, Inc., 405 N.J. Super. 105 (App. Div. 2009) cert. denied, 2009 N.J. LEXIS 296 (2009)  13, 14 In re Board of Educ. of Boonton, 99 N.J. 523 (1985)
[directive] 범죄의 내용을 인터넷에서 공개적으로 게시할 수 있다는 것을  Do you understand that if you are convicted and your conduct was found to be characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior your name, age, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, eye color, any distinguishing scars or tattoos you have, your photograph, the make, model, color, year and license plate number of any vehicle you operate, the street address, zip code, municipality and county in which you reside and a description of the offense for which you are pleading guilty, may be publicly available on the Internet?  주 전체 성폭행 간호사 검사관 프로그램 벌금 6.  Statewide Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner Program Penalty  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  범죄가 년5 월4 일 이후에 발생했을 경우, 귀하가 유죄를 인정하면 귀하는 2001 귀하가 유죄를 인정하는 각 범죄에 대하여 벌금 씩 지불해야 된다는 것을 $800 아십니까?  Do you understand that if the crime occurred on or after May 4, 2001 as a result of your guilty plea you will be required to pay a penalty of $800 for each offense for which you are pleading guilty?
[brief] The US Supreme Court in this case law did a great job in helping the consumers.  According to the formula when [...] purchased the alleged debt from [...] in 2014, the defaulted loan was nine years old and it worth less than two pennies.  When [...] purchased the alleged debt from [...] in 2022, it was 17 years old and it worth “practically nothing.  And they shamelessly tried to take my house for it.
[brief] ...............................................................................................................................  13  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## Cases  **M.C. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs.**, 2019 *N.J. Super.* Unpub. LEXIS 14 (App. Div. 2019)  .................................................................................. 11  **Midler v. Heinowitz**, 10 *N.J.* 123, 129 (1952)  ..........................................................  10  **Mortgageling Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co.**, 142 *N.J.* 336, 346 (1995)  .........................................................................................................................  7  **Rosenblum v. Borough of Closter**, 333 *N.J. Super.* 385, 391 (App. Div. 2000)  8  **Shimm v. Toys From The Attic, Inc.**, 375 *N.J. Super.* 300, 304 (App. Div. 2005) .................................................................................................................................  11  **State v. Fletcher**, 174 *N.J. Super.* 609, 614 (App. Div. 1980) ...............................  10  **State v. Lefante**, 14 *N.J.* 584, 591 (1954) ..............................................................  10,12  **Velasquez v. Franz**, 123 *N.J.* 498, 505 (1991) ..........................................................  7
[brief] ”  Id. at 542 (citing Robbins v. Jersey City, 23 N.J. 229, 240-41 (1954)) (emphasis added).  The Brill Court went on to note that the thrust of its decision “is to encourage trial courts not to refrain from granting summary judgment when the proper circumstances present themselves. ”  Id. at 541.  The Court addressed what it perceived to be the prior hesitancy of motion judges, stating:  Some have suggested that trial courts, out of fear of reversal, or out of an overly restricting reading of Judson, supra, 17 N.J. at 65, or a combination thereof, allow cases to survive summary judgment so long as there is any disputed issue of fact . . . .  Id. at 541 (emphasis in original).  The court’s task is to decide “‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. ’”  *Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A.*, 189 N.J. 436, 445-446 (2007) (quoting *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 536).
[brief] The standard of review that applies to this case is whether there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the Law Division’s conclusions. ”  State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 147-148 (2017).  This Court reviews the decision of the Law Division judge, who was required to review the record and make an independent conclusion, and pursuant to State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146 (1964).  POINT I  THE LAW DIVISION’S DECISION THAT DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY TO THE CHARGES CONTAINED IN THE TICKET SHOULD BE AFFIRMED INASMUCH AS THERE IS SUFFICIENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT IT (Responsive to Points I and II)
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2a(1)  BASED ON PLAINTIFF INCONSISTENCY**  [...] examined defendant’s question: “Was there anybody besides me, did you see anybody there that day?”  [2T16-10 to -18].  He held that question constituted an admission that defendant was present at her father’s house on the day of the incident.  [2T16-16 to -18].  The Defendant provided motions to dismiss to the Superior court detailing her whereabouts on each of [...]’ alleged dates, that resulted in the downgrade on appeal; however, the municipal court dismissed the motion to dismiss.
[brief] State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263 (2017), a case in which a stop was held to be unlawful despite a significantly greater amount of suspicious activity, demonstrates the lack of reasonable suspicion in this case.  In Rosario, the officer had received an anonymous tip that the defendant was selling heroin from her home and car.  Id. at 267.  A few days later, at 11:30 p.m., the officer saw the defendant in front of her home, moving inside of that car in a “furtive” manner.  Id. at 277.  Officers conducted a stop by blocking in her car.  Id. at 267.  Our Supreme Court held that there was insufficient suspicion of criminality to justify a stop.  Id. at 277.  In this case, the officers knew nothing about the passengers in the car.  This case is therefore in stark contrast to Rosario, where there was some basis to believe the person in the car dealt drugs.
[brief] The following facts were adduced during discovery in the Trial Court:  **A.  The Birth of [...] And The Summerset Brand. **  As testified to by both [...], the President of [...], and non-party [...] (the company’s former 50% owner), the Summerset brand did not exist prior to the formation of [...].  (See Pa248-Pa255 at T14:7-21:21).  Specifically, in 2008, [...], [...], [...] and [...] met in California to discuss bringing outdoor furnishings (Mr. Rodriguez’s background) and grill products (Mr. Straubel’s background) under one brand: “Summerset. ”  (See id.)  As testified to by Mr. Farrell, prior to this trip to California, [...] and Mr. Farrell had been “brainstorming for a while” regarding starting their own business.  (See Pa249 at T15:4-8).  At this meeting, these four individuals not only discussed the formation of the new “Summerset” brand – selling both furniture and grills – but also specifically that [...] would be the distributor on the east coast of the United States and develop the brand awareness out of nothing.  As explained by Mr. Farrell, “the whole conversation started about bringing everything together under one label, the Summerset brand name.  And then we were going to be the east coast distributor. ”  (Id. at T15:13-16).  Over the next ten years, [...] would be the exclusive distributor of Summerset products in New Jersey, and one of a few select distributors on the east coast.  (See Pa25 at ¶ 3).  That the “Summerset” brand was born at this meeting in 2008 is also evidenced by [...]’s myriad corporate filings.  Specifically, in July 2008, “[...]” was incorporated in the State of California.  (See Pa199).  Later, in July 2009, Mr. Straubel amended this corporate filing, naming this entity “[...] ” and signing as Summerset Outdoor Living, Inc’s President.  (See Pa198).  During that same month, Mr. Straubel also registered the “Summerset Outdoor Living” mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office.  (See Pa232-Pa233).  Such mark’s filing date is listed as “July 9, 2009. ” (See id.).  Moreover, [...] testified that [...], since 2002, was the holding company for all of [...]’s brands, including Summerset.  (Pa1631-Pa1633 at T26:20-28:15).  Indeed, the documentary evidence procured in the Trial Court confirms that [...] – controlled by [...] (see id.) – was the entity controlling the Summerset brands throughout the relationship with [...].
[brief] Pa95.  On October 27, 2021, Defendant [...] filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint with crossclaims and affirmative defenses.  Da17.  The Railroad defendants filed their Answer to the Amended Complaint with crossclaims and affirmative defenses on May 5, 2022.  Pa123.  On March 3, 2023, the trial court granted the Railroad Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice all “professional negligent design claims (to the extent they are predicated upon the professional negligence of engineers employed by Rail Road Defendants)” regarding the crossing.
[brief] The Legislature finds that the people of the State have a paramount interest in the restoration, maintenance and preservation of the quality of the waters of the State for the protection and preservation of public health and welfare, food supplies, public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, agricultural and industrial uses, aesthetic satisfaction, recreation, and other beneficial uses; and that the severity of the water pollution problem in the State necessitates continuing water quality management planning in order to develop and implement water quality programs in concert with other social and economic objectives.  The Legislature further finds that water quality is dependent upon factors of topography, hydrology, population concentration, industrial and commercial development, agricultural uses, transportation and other such factors which vary among and within watersheds and other regions of the State and that pollution abatement programs should consider these natural and man-made conditions that influence water quality.  The Legislature further finds that the State’s groundwaters are a precious and vulnerable resource.
[brief] As per N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11, Notices for hearings on applications for development must include the following:  Notices pursuant to section 7.1 and 7.2 of this act shall state the date, time and place of the hearing, the nature of the matters to be considered and, in the case of notices pursuant to subsection 7.1 of this act, an identification of the property proposed for development by street address, if any, or by reference to lot and block numbers as shown on the current tax duplicate in the municipal tax assessor's office, and the location and times at which any maps and documents for which approval is sought are available pursuant to subsection 6b.  In Perlmart v. Lacey Tp. Planning Bd., 295 N.J. Super., 234 (App. Div. 1996), which is cited in the Intervenor’s brief, the Court found a notice to be deficient because it identified a “commercial lot” as the proposed use instead of a “shopping center,” which was in fact proposed.  Further, in Pond Run Watershed v. Hamilton Tp., 397 N.J. Super. 335 (App. Div. 2008), also cited by the Intervenor, another notice was deemed deficient due to its failure to identify a 168-restaurant for which a liquor license was sought.  The Pond Run notice, instead, only called out a “retail/office” use.  Neither Pond Run nor Perlmart are applicable to the current situation.  As noted repeatedly above, the Plaintiff did not seek approval for basement apartments.  Rather, Plaintiff sought a nine-lot subdivision.  The testimony repeatedly indicated that whatever homes would be built there, the respective owners would need to conform with any ordinance requirements and/or seek approvals accordingly.
[brief] ”  (11T8-18 to 22) - the Petitioner had a habit of lying to the Decedent (11T11-5 to 7) - the Petitioner, in front of [...] referred to the Decedent as a “whale” on more than one occasion (11T11-13 to 18)  The following colloquy occurred on the cross examination of the Decedent’s witness, Gail [...]:
[brief] Pa18  Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for Fees and Sanctions  Sep. 22, 2022  Pa21  Plaintiff’s R. 1:4-8 Letter, June 13, 2023  Pa23  Plaintiff’s R. 1:4-8 Letter, May 5, 2023  Pa24  Plaintiff’s R. 1:4-8 Letter, Oct. 19, 2022  Pa25  Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit P-1, Reinstatement of [...] to Practice Law  04/07/92  Investigator Letter/Ethic’s Opinion & Order  *Excerpted/*Abridged per R. 2:6-1(b)