ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Aggravated Arson 2nd Degree $35,000 to $75,000  No 10% to collect insurance and recklessly places any person in danger of death or injury, or to destroy forest.  34  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2 STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants
[brief] The Appellants on September 6, 2022 filed a motion to reinstate the case based on the federal court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in removing this case to federal court.  The trial court relied on events that occurred prior to the federal court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on November 19, 2023.  TABLE OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY | Date | Event/Proceeding | Filed By | Result | Appendix Page Number/Transcript | |------------|-------------------------------------------|------------|--------|---------------------------------| | 09.06.2022 | Motion to Reinstate Case | Plaintiff | Filed | Pa8 | | 09.19.2022 | Motion to Seal | Plaintiff | Denied | Pa37 | | 12.05.2022 | Motion for Summary Judgement | Plaintiff | Denied | Pa58 | | 02.02.2023 | Motion to Re-open case | Plaintiff | Denied | Pa79 | | 02.03.2023 | Transcript of Motions | Court | Filed | 1T | | 02.03.2023 | Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate | Court | Filed | Pa4 | | 02.24.2023 | Motion to File an Appealable Order | Plaintiff | Denied | Pa100 | | 03.29.2023 | Order – Denying Appealable Order request | Court | Filed | Pa5 | | 05.25.2023 | Order – Requesting Vacating of Denial | Court | Filed | Pa6 | | 06.22.2023 | Motion for Reconsideration | Plaintiff | Denied | Pa108 | | 08.15.2023 | Order – Denying
[brief] That reasoning does not comport with logic.  The RETA statute at N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.59(a) is the starting point and it required [...] to provide the POS to a purchaser “at the time of purchase. ”  Each of these purchasers received and acknowledged their receipt of the POS on a CD-ROM at the time they signed contracts for the purchase of a timeshare and before they left the resort.  Second, N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.59(b) expressly allowed [...] to deliver the contents of the POS on CD-ROM format.  Each plaintiff acknowledged their receipt of the POS on CD-ROM.
[brief] On January 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal.  (Da291, Transaction ID: [...]).  The notice of deficient apparently because it was improperly formatted and because Plaintiff attempted to file the notice of appeal under seal even though nothing was ever filed under seal in the underlying Superior Court action.  (Da288-291).  On February 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to seal.  (Da288, Transaction ID: [...]).  This motion was deficient.  (Da288).  On February 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amended notice of appeal.  (Da288, Transaction ID: [...]).  The amended notice of motion was deficient.  (Da287).  On March 1, 2024, Plaintiff finally managed to file a compliant notice of appeal.  (Da287-288 [...]).
[brief] ### TABLE OF RULINGS | Description | Page Numbers | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------| | 6/28/2023  INITIA DECISION OF THE HON.  [...], ALJ, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | Pa 81-Pa 92 | | ADOPTION OF ALJ DECISION BY THE [...] | Pa 93 | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | AUTHORITY | BRIEF PAGE NUMBER | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | Statutes: | | | N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(a) | Pa 1, 10, 11, 17 | | N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(b) | Pa 11 | | N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(i)(6)(A), (B), (C) | Pa 15, 16 | | Case Law: | | | Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv. 39 N.J. 556 (1963).
[brief] Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations  The factual allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint as against Defendants [...] and [...] are de minimis.  Moreover, so much of what Plaintiff asserts throughout her Statement of Facts (Pb3-Pb15), particularly with regard to the alleged “disparate treatment relating to District Policy 1648,” is simply a regurgitation of that which was pled in her Amended Complaint based “upon information and belief”.
[directive] Under the 2010 revisions to the supplemental policy, conducted energy devices, like less-lethal ammunition, are considered to be a form of “enhanced” mechanical force.  The following revised supplemental policy, developed in consultation with community leaders in addition to law enforcement executives, addresses the practical problems that have arisen because the previous policy required officers to speculate on the degree of injury that a person might cause when he or she actively resists a lawful arrest.  Under the policy issued in 2010, an officer could not fire/discharge a CED against a person who was actively resisting arrest (e.g., striking, kicking, or biting) unless the officer reasonably believed that the suspect’s resistance would cause death or serious bodily injury to the officer.  Under New Jersey law, the term “serious bodily injury” is defined to mean “bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function on any bodily member or organ. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(a).  (Note that bodily injury involving the temporary loss of any one of the five senses (e.g., unconsciousness) constitutes only “significant” bodily injury, not serious bodily injury.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(d).  Accordingly, the threat of being temporarily stunned by the suspect during a fistfight would not necessarily satisfy the standard for firing/discharging a CED.)  1  This compilation incorporates all the Attorney General’s amendments and clarifications to the Supplemental Policy on Conducted Energy Devices (October 7, 2010, May 3, 2012, June 20, 2012, July 13, 2012, June 3, 2014, and March 3, 2016).
[directive] 1.  Fines  Individuals convicted of unlawful ORV use on public lands are subject to enhanced fines 2009.6 outlined in Title 39, which were implemented in See L.2009, c.275.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:3C-33(a)–(c), the following penalties apply to unlawful use of ORVs on public lands:  5  The [...] may continue to designate additional areas for ORV use such as snowmobiles on certain frozen managed lakes.  6  Prior to the enhanced fines implemented in 2009, see L.2009, c.275, a person that violates Title 13 is “liable to a civil penalty of not less than $50 nor more than $1,500, plus restitution if applicable, for each offense[.]”  N.J.S.A. 13:1L-23(d).  Additionally, if the violation is continuous, each day constitutes an additional, separate, and distinct offense.  N.J.S.A. 13:1L-23(d).  Further, if a violation results in a pecuniary gain or if the violator willfully or wantonly causes injury or damage to property, the violator shall be liable to an additional civil penalty equal to three times the value or the pecuniary gain or injury or damage to property.  N.J.S.A. 13:1L-23(d).  6  1.  A fine between $250 – $500 (first violation); 2.  A fine between $500 – $1,000 (second violation); 3.  A fine of $1,000 or more (third or subsequent violation).  Additionally, if an individual, while operating an ORV, damages or destroys natural resources valued in excess of $100, the court can impose a fine of five times the amount it would cost to restore or replace the damaged or destroyed natural resources.  N.J.S.A. 39:3C-33(d).  Further, if the individual operating the ORV is under the age of seventeen, the owner of the ORV is liable for the fines.  N.J.S.A. 39:3C-33(d).  2.  Impoundment of the Vehicle
[brief] After reviewing the IA, the Appellant’s exceptions, the Respondent’s reply certification and hearing oral argument, on October 6, 2022, the trial judge approved the IA and ruled that Appellant did not have standing to challenge it, but if he did, then his exceptions were insufficient as a matter of law:  [Appellant] asserts that the following revisions, among others should be made Intermediate Account (i) $890,083.58 for total charges as to the corpus; (ii) $450,335.23 for total credits as to the corpus; (iii) $439,748.35 for the corpus on hand; (iv) $47,190.10 for total credits as to income; and (v) $2,786.04 for income on hand….  [Appellant] asserts that the additional tax payment of $291.58 on October 29, 2019 … was the result of [Respondent’s] late filing and the … Trust payment of the 2018 obligation ….  [Appellant] asserts that [Respondent] should explain and provide additional documentation for several payments and calculations on the Intermediate Account….  [Appellant] further asserts that [Respondent’s] responses to the Surrogate Court’s audit questions are inadequate ….  [Appellant] asserts that [Respondent] should provide additional information to verify his accounting and comply with his obligations as co-trustee….  ***
[brief] ARGUMENT ON REPLY ...........................................................................................................  1  THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ENTERED  A PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AWARD OF $838,810.40  BASED ON THE DATES OF EACH SPECIFIC MISAPPROPRIATION FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT.  .........................................................................................................................  1 CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................  7  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## Cases: | Case | Page | |-------------------------------------------|------| | *Green v. Morgan Props.*, | 2 | | 215 N.J. 431 (2013) | | | *In re Estate of Lash*, | 5 | | 169 N.J. 20 (2001) | | | *In re Estate of Sogliuzzo*, | 5, 6 | | 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2921 | | | (App. Div. 2001 Dec. 17, 2015) | | | *Lautek Corp. v. Image Bus. Sys. Corp.*, | 2, 3, 4 | | 276 N.J. Super. 531 (App. Div. 1994) | | | *Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales Inc.*, | 5 | | 110 N.J. 464 (1988) | | | *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv’rs Ins. Co.*, | 2, 3 | | 65 N.J. 474 (1974) | | ## Rules and Other Authorities: | Rule | Page | |------|------| | R. 4:42-11 | 3, 5 | ARGUMENT ON REPLY THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ENTERED A PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AWARD OF $838,810.40 BASED ON THE DATES OF EACH SPECIFIC MISAPPROPRIATION FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT.
[brief] Further, experts may not opine on the credibility of a party because “credibility is an issue which is peculiarly within the jury’s ken with respect to which ordinarily jurors require no expert assistance. ”  *State v. Jamerson*, 153 N.J. 318, 341 (1998) (quoting *State v. J.Q.*, 252 N.J. Super. 11, 39 (1991), aff’d, 130 N.J. 554 (1993); see also *State v. Henderson*, 208 N.J. 208, 297 (2011).  Similarly, expert witnesses cannot opine that a party committed a fraudulent or wrongful act without providing a recognized standard for making such a conclusion or without establishing that their expertise qualifies them to render such an opinion.
[brief] At the outset, we observe that the opinion is not binding on us and has, in fact, been rejected by several courts.  In *Crayton*, the Massachusetts Supreme Court overturned its precedent and held that “[w]here an eyewitness has not participated before trial in an identification procedure, we shall treat the in-court identification as an in-court showup, and shall admit it in evidence only where there is ‘good reason’ for its admission. ”  *Id.* at 169.  The court placed “the burden on the prosecutor to move in limine to admit the in-court identification of the defendant by a witness where there has been no out-of-court identification. ”  *Id.* at 171.  However, in *State v. Doolin*, 942 N.W.2d 500, 515 (Iowa 2020), the Iowa Supreme Court described *Crayton* as an “outlier. ”  See also *Garner v. People*, 436 P.3d 1107, 1118-19 (Colo. 2019) (declining to adopt *Crayton* because it turned on state common law principles of fairness and departed from the standard articulated in *Perry v. New Hampshire*, 565 U.S. 228, 246 (2012)).  Furthermore, despite some similarities between showups and in-court identifications, the exclusionary pre-trial principles announced in Henderson should not apply with equal force to in-court identifications because, as set forth in Clausell, there are significant safeguards built into our adversary system to protect against a mistaken identification made for the first time at trial.
[brief] Even if it was error to charge self-defense on the possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose charge but not the unlawful possession of a weapon charge, it was harmless error.  Failure to give a warranted jury instruction can constitute harmless error “so long as the error at issues does not categorically vitiate all the jury’s findings. ”  *State v. Camacho*, 218 N.J. 533, 550 (2014)(quoting *Hedgpeth v. Pulido*, 555 U.S. 57, 60-61 (2008).  The error in this case was harmless because the results of the trial would have been the same even if the jury was instructed that self-defense applied to the unlawful possession of a weapon charge.  The jury found the defendant guilty of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose for the sharp object, even after they were instructed that self-defense applied to that charge.  Thus, it is certain that the jury would have found the defendant guilty of unlawful possession of the sharp object even if they had been instructed that self-defense applied to that charge.  Because the result of the trial would not have been different, the error was harmless.
[brief] During trial, plaintiffs’ counsel attempted to vindicate [...] by initiating a line of questioning about the fact that [...] was being “sued”:  Q  Are you aware that there’s someone who’s making an allegation that you committed malpractice -- [...]: Objection, Your Honor.  THE COURT: Come.  [...]: He’s -- no, Your Honor.  THE COURT: Come.  [...]: -- go to sidebar.  (sidebar discussion)  THE COURT: (Indiscernible.)  Shoot.  [...]: Your Honor (indiscernible).  The case was dismissed procedurally, which (indiscernible)  I didn’t think we would go down this line of questioning.  I’m surprised we’re here.  So now (indiscernible) the doctor.  He’s the doctor.  He’s the one (indiscernible) doctor.  THE COURT: Where are we going?
[brief] I emphasize that I am not seeking any special treatment.  In several published and therefore precedential opinions, this court has consciously overlooked the appellants’ failure to comply with Rule 2:5-3(b).  See N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 453 N.J. Super. 272 (App. Div. 2018); Newman v. Isuzu Motors America, 367 N.J. Super. 141 (App. Div. 2004); Cipala v. Lincoln Technical Institute, 354 N.J. Super. 247 (App. Div. 2002); Barsotti v. Merced, 346 N.J. Super. 504 (App. Div. 2002); Torwich v. Torwich, 282 N.J. Super. 524 (App. Div. 1995); Schmoll v. J.S. Hovananian, 394 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 2007); N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. A.S.K. (In re Guardianship of N.D.K.), 457 N.J. Super. 304 (App. Div. 2017); Town of Phillipsburg v. Block, 380 N.J. Super. 159 (App. Div. 2005); Milford Mill 128 v. Borough of Milford, 400 N.J. Super. 96 (App. Div. 2008).
[brief] [...]’s emphasis on the lack of prior similar incidents is misplaced: “[T]he absence of a prior accident does not preclude a finding of an intentional wrong. ”  Crippen v. Central Jersey Concrete Pipe Co., 176 N.J. 397, 408 (2003).  Finally, Defendant [...]’s admission that it “redesign[ed]” its parking lot, see Db40, such that there were no pedestrian safety or traffic control features in the area of the lot where [...] was struck, when [...] included those safety features in the management’s area of the parking lot, places the facts of this case firmly in the company of other cases in which a “substantial certainty” of injury has been found.
[brief] After executing the PSA, while Plaintiff and its representatives performed their respective obligations, Defendants and their representatives did virtually nothing to complete delineation and work toward satisfying the Seller’s Environmental Obligations under the PSA; instead, Defendants and their representatives repeatedly lied and withheld information regarding the status of the remedial investigation, concealed their communications with the NJDEP, disregarded deficiencies in their documentation, and otherwise wholly failed to cooperate with Plaintiff and its representatives throughout the process.  (2T141:12 to 142:5, 174:8 to 175:10, 179:5-19; 4T45:20 to 47:18, 49:2 to 50:7, 54:16 to 55:12, 69:14 to 70:4; 5T46:21 to 47:6; 6T88:1-24, 92:2-8, 94:10 to 95:3, 102:12 to 103:5; 8T87:18 to 89:7, 91:3 to 92:5, 93:15 to 94:4, 94:13 to 95:4, 100:14 to 101:11.)  Indeed, Defendants and their professionals worked surreptitiously to allegedly complete the RIR process up to and including one of the last days of trial—all the while ignoring the deficiencies identified by their own LSRP, [...], and [...], about incomplete horizontal and vertical delineation of contaminants as required by applicable NJDEP guidance.  (2T174:8 to 175:10, 179:5-19; 4T52:24 to 54:8, 69:14 to 70:9, 120:23 to 121:1; 5T46:21 to 48:8; 6T27:16-20, 88:1-24, 92:2 to 93:11, 94:10 to 95:3, 102:12 to 103:5; 8T93:15 to 95:4, 100:14 to 101:11.)  Thus, contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the evidence sufficiently demonstrates that Defendants acted in bad faith in their performance of the PSA and deprived Plaintiff of its benefit of the bargain.  In short, Defendants’ bad faith performance of the PSA and attempt to shift liability to Plaintiff for contaminants that, to date, remain undefined, constitutes a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the Seller’s Environmental Obligations under the PSA, and the trial court’s dismissal of Count Three of the Complaint should be reversed.  **POINT III**
[brief] Even assuming arguendo that no implied private right of action exists under the NJCFLA, Defendants’ representation that they had the legal right, authority, and/or ability to enforce a void debt constitutes a misrepresentation, as well as an unconscionable and abusive commercial practice, in connection with the subsequent performance of the sale of merchandise.  See N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.  Indeed, “[v]iolation of a statute or regulation can serve as evidence of unconscionable practices under the Consumer Fraud Act. ”  Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 289 N.J. Super. 489 (App. Div. 1996), aff’d, 150 N.J. 255 (1997).  See, e.g., Wozniak v. Pennella, 373 N.J. Super. 445 (App. Div. 2004) (CFA applied to a residential landlord violating municipal rent control ordinance by charging excessive rents).  Primarily citing DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325 (App. Div. 2013), Defendants’ Brief attempts to improperly narrow the holding in Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 207 N.J. 557 (2011)—where the New Jersey Supreme Court held that “collecting or enforcing a loan, whether by the lender or its assignee, constitutes the ‘subsequent performance’ of a loan, an activity falling within the coverage of the CFA.
[brief] [...]’ statements in his Habeas Petition were inconsistent with his trial testimony and would have been admissible under N.J.R.E. 803(a)(1).  2.  [...]’ Sworn Statement is Admissible Under N.J.R.E. 608  In addition, because [...] perjured himself when submitting the Habeas Petition to the Federal District Court for the District of New Jersey, the Sworn Statement is also admissible under N.J.R.E. 608.  Indeed, the Petition itself requires the declarant to swear to the truthfulness of the contents of the Petition.  [...]’ sworn statement is admissible under N.J.R.E. 608 as evidence of a witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.  N.J.R.E. provides that “[i]n a criminal case . . . the court may, on cross-examination, permit inquiry into specific instances of conduct that are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of the witness” so long as the proponent of the specific conduct inquiry shows that “a reasonable factual basis exists that the specific instance of conduct occurred, and the specific instance of conduct has a probative value in assessing the witness’s character for truthfulness. ”  N.J.R.E. 608 (emphasis added).  Here, it is irrefutable that the specific conduct occurred; [...] filed the Habeas Petition in the District Court for the District of New Jersey.  (Da074).  In addition, [...]’ Sworn Statement has probative value in assessing his character for truthfulness.  Indeed, the PCR Judge has already found that “the Habeas Petition is certainly relevant because it . . . touched [...]’ credibility,” (Da171), making it plainly admissible pursuant to N.J.R.E. 608.
[directive] Section with in accordance consulted general attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant an unless is who subsection 3.3.2 to pursuant designated officer supervisory or a Directive, this of 3.2 of this 4 under Section presumptions overcome to Prosecutor County the by authorized overcome complaint-warrant is charging by of presumption the that determines Directive, 4.5.9. subsection to pursuant 40 Page 3-1(~. 3: Rule in Specified Crime a with Charged Is Defendant 4.5.4.a or prosecutor assistant an unless amended, recently as 3:3-1(~ Rule with accordance In a or Directive, of this Section 3.2 with accordance in consulted general attorney deputy County by the authorized is 3.3.2 who subsection to pursuant designated officer supervisory the that determines Directive, this 4 of Section under presumptions overcome Prosecutor to law a 4.5.9, subsection to pursuant overcome is complaint-warrant by charging of presumption that believe cause to probable is there if acomplaint-warrant for apply shall agency enforcement committed: defendant the crime; degree second or a first constitutes that 2C of Title 35 Chapter of violation a — firearm; a of use or possession involving the crime a — 2C:11-5); (N.J.S.A. homicide vehicular — 2C:12-1(b)); (N.J.S.A. crime asecond-degree constitutes that assault aggravated — 2C:12-11); (N.J.S.A. officer enforcement law disarming a — 2C:13-1); (N.J.S.A. kidnapping — 2C:17-1(a)); S.A. arson (N.J. aggravated — 2C:18-2); (N.J.S.A. crime asecond-degree constitutes that burglary — 2C:20-5); (N.J.S.A. extortion — 2C:35-4.1(b)); (N.J.S.A. facilities distribution or manufacturing in traps booby — 2C:35-9); (N.J.S.A. deaths induced drug for liability strict — 2C:38-2); (N.J.S.A. terrorism — devices radiological or agents, biological weapons, chemical possessing or producing — 2C:41-2); (N.J.S.A. racketeering — 2C:39-9(i)); (N.J.S.A. trafficking firearms — 2C:24- (N.J.S.A. sexual act prohibited in engage a to child permitting a or causing — or 4(b)(3)); crimes. foregoing the of any commit to attemptl~ an — Offense.  Specified a with Charged is Defendant 4.5.4.b with accordance in general consulted attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant an  Unless 3.3.2 subsection to pursuant designated officer supervisory or a Directive, this of 3.2  Section of this 4 Section under presumptions overcome  Prosecutor to County the by authorized who is overcome is complaint-warrant charging by of presumption the that determines Directive, if acomplaint-warrant for apply shall agency enforcement law a 4.5.9, subsection pursuant to offenses: following the any of committed defendant the that believe to cause probable is there 14.  note  See I' 41 Page 2C:29- N.J.S.A. under charged offense  Asecond-degree Eluding.  Second-Degree (i) when person any injury to or death of risk a created defendant the alleging 2(b) enforcement or law police a elude to attempted or fled knowingly defendant the officer.