ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the Trial Court’s ruling that the execution of the Lease by Defendants [...], [...] and [...] created personal liability by them for the obligations of [...] under the Lease.  In the alternative the Court should affirm the Trial Court’s ruling that any personal guaranties were terminated as of May 11, 2016 or were revoked prior to the accrual of the obligation sought to be enforced.
[brief] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, a person may be found guilty of DWI when that person “operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit producing drug, or operates a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% of more by weight of alcohol in the defendant’s blood[.]”  There are two independent bases for liability under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.  The first, the per se standard, is where a breathalyzer sample is used, a motorist will be found guilty of DWI if he drives with a BAC of 0.08% or more, regardless of whether his ability to drive is affected.  The second, the “under the influence standard,” does not require a breathalyzer reading.  Under this standard, a motorist may be convicted of DWI if an officer determines, based on his own observations, or based on the balance and coordination tests, that the motorist has driven while under the influence of alcohol.  State v. Cleverley, 348 N.J. Super. 455 (App. Div. 2002).  The State submits that the evidence proves that defendant drove his vehicle while intoxicated under both the per se and under the influence standards.
[brief] The Court below properly held that as a result of these doctored accounting files, “[...] made it appear he had transferred 90% less to his companies than the actual amounts, perpetrating a fraud on the court. ”  The Court below then properly denied Appellant’s motion for reconsideration which, like this appeal, was based on cross-examination questions that Appellant never asked.  The Court below then properly granted Respondents’ motion to conform the pleadings to the evidence, including the addition of [...] as a named Plaintiff.
[brief] The Borough cannot gain back trust and confidence lost from the public and cannot be compensated for it, nor can it be adequately compensated for any internal issues, especially amongst female employees, that may arise if [...] were able to remain as Commissioner of the Sewerage Authority despite the Borough's legal right and valid justification for removing him.  While the Trial Court suggests that removing [...] opens the door to inquiring into private emails, texts and chats and conducting illegal searches without a warrant, (Da 377), this is a quantum leap and not a reasonable analogy based on the facts here as [...] widely disseminated the revolting video to the public of his own free will.  It is [...] that put the video out to the public for others to see.  It is his own actions that set his removal in motion; the consequences of his actions are, therefore, a self-inflicted wound.  Further, the video was misogynistic and degrading to women.  He is a public official, whether appointed, or full or part time, is of no moment.  In this State, public officials must be respectful to all members of the public, including women, and must act with dignity.  [...]’s conduct was a far cry from these requisite obligations.  CONCLUSION
[brief] then he would be escorted from the building if he continued to make noise in the hallway.  (4T:60:22-25).  The trial had to move forward, and plaintiff’s counsel was advised of that.  (4T:61:6-9).  At that point, plaintiff’s counsel stated, “And I do commend the Sheriffs on their professionalism. ” (4T:67:10-11).  Plaintiff’s counsel advised the Court that [...] would be returning to the courtroom.  (4T:68:24-25).  Thereafter, plaintiff’s counsel advised the Court that plaintiff wanted to move for a mistrial.
[directive] Photographs  7.4.1  Photographs and video recording tapes can be useful tools if relevant to the investigation.  If a complaint involves excessive use of force, photographs of the complainant and the officer should be taken as close as possible to the time of the incident.  Photographs also can be used to create a record of any other matter the investigator believes is necessary.  Whenever possible, digital color photography should be used.  7.4.2  The law enforcement agency should maintain a recent photograph of each officer.  These can be used if a photo array is needed for identification purposes.  If a photo array is used, it must be properly retained for possible evidentiary purposes.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 35
[brief] ......11  A.  Expert Witnesses Must Not Exaggerate their Conclusions and Must Phrase their Testimony as Opinions.  .........................................................11  B.  A Special Adjudicator Would Be Well-Positioned to Develop a Standardized Approach Governing the Admissibility of Fingerprint Analysis  Expert Testimony.  .........................................................15  V.  BECAUSE JUROR PERCEPTION OF THE ACCURACY OF FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE DOES NOT COMPORT WITH ESTABLISHED ERROR
[brief] The trial court followed the Supreme Court’s guidance in Sensient Colors, and this court’s decision in Century Indem., and appropriately exercised its discretion to dismiss this case in favor of the Missouri Action based on an extensive analysis of the record and a weighing of considerations of fairness and comity.  Plaintiff’s displeasure with the result of the trial court’s thoughtful analysis is not a legitimate basis for this court to reverse.  Indeed, plaintiff offers no basis for this court to find that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing this case in favor of the Missouri Action.
[brief] *State v. Dekowski*, 218 N.J. 596, 599 (2014).  From the evidence presented at trial, there were two potential victims to the single count of robbery — the two tellers, [...] and [...].\(^7\)  The State presented evidence that [...] committed theft against both tellers.  However, with respect to [...], the State failed to present any evidence that in the course of committing a theft against her, [...] threatened or purposely put someone in fear of immediate bodily injury.  Nor did the State present evidence that in the course of committing that theft, [...] threatened the immediate use of a deadly weapon by simulating possession of one.  The State thus failed to prove elements two and three of the alleged first-degree robbery of [...].  With respect to [...], the State presented \(^7\)  If this Court does not vacate the robbery conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal, then the robbery count must be reversed because of a lack of unanimity as to the identity of the victim and the failure to instruct the jury on the second element of robbery.
[brief] Da20 Order 5/12/2023, [...], Denial of Motion to Reconsider Order of 3/30/2023  Da14  Relevant Orders: Order 3/30/2023  [...] Da20 Order 5/12/2023, [...] Da30 Order 2/5/1999, [...], Da14 FJOD, 9/8/1999  Nunc Pro Tuc to 7/16/1999, excerpt Da32 Order 3/25/2004
[brief] (Pa94; Pa91).  Thus, it was evident to [...] that she would lack the requisite ten years of service credit when she decided to take the unpaid leave (without salary or pension contributions) in October 2021.  (Pa91).  On this record, it is unreasonable for [...] to argue that she was forced into this situation when she knew she would lack the service credit and she still chose to proceed with unpaid leave prior to her retirement.  Equity is simply not in her favor.  Contrary to her assertion that her medical leave prior to retirement supports granting her relief in this situation (Pb14), it actually weighs against her because she was well aware that her retirement estimate was based on working until February 2022 and that she would not have the requisite ten years of service credit for group life insurance if she stopped contributing to her pension in September or October, 2021, which is exactly what she did.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Asbury Park Press v. Ocean County Prosecutor’s Office, 374 N.J. Super. 312, 329 (Law Div. 2004)  ................................................................. 11,16  Bart v. City Of Paterson Hous. Auth., 959 A.2d 1227 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2008) ..................................................................................  23  Bergen County Imp. Auth. v. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc., 851 A.2d 731 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2004) ...................................................... 22, 27  Brennan v. Bergen County Prosecutor's Off., 185 A.3d 202, 203 (N.J. 2018) ........................................................................................................... 12 Burnett v. County of Gloucester, 2 A.3d 1110 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2010) .......................................................................................... 23 Burnett v. Cty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 414 (2009) ............................................. 11 Chasin v. Montclair State U., 732 A.2d 457, 458 (N.J. 1999) ....................... 25 Com. Bancorp, Inc. v. InterArch, Inc., 9 A.3d 1056 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2010) ......................................................................................... 24 Craster v. Bd. of Com'rs of City of Newark, 87 A.2d 721 (N.J. 1952) ........................................................................................................... 25 DiProspero v. Penn, 874 A.2d 1039 (N.J. 2005) ............................................ 24 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995) ......................................................... 12 Faison v. Parker, 823 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ..................................... 12 Febbi v. Bd. of Rev., Div. of Empl. Sec., Dept. of Lab. and Indus., 174 A.2d 481 (N.J. 1961) .................................................................24 Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 660 A.2d 1163 (N.J. 1995) ........... 28 Matter of Closing of Jamesburg High Sch., Sch. Dist. of Borough of Jamesburg, Middlesex County, 416 A.2d 896 (N.J. 1980).............................................25 Keddie v. Rutgers, State University, 148 N.J. 36 (1997)..............................27 Lane v. Holderman, 23 N.J. 304 (1957)..................................................25 Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Const., 178 N.J. 513 (2004)...............................25 Loigman v. Kimmelman, 102 N.J. 98 (1986)..........................................28 Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995)....................................................................................7,11
[brief] The trial court’s erroneous evidentiary rulings precluded the Plaintiff from presenting evidence that would have substantiated the testimony of the three Plaintiff witnesses that Plaintiff’s injuries were caused when she slipped and fell on Defendant’s puddled, slippery, concrete floor.  While the Defendant conceded that the Defendant’s lobby floor was indeed wet, the Defendant argued and the trial Court accepted that the wet floor was “slip proof. ”  Plaintiff maintains that had the trial Court not abused its discretion and erroneously precluded her introduction of critical evidence of Defendant’s admissions via both the actions of the Defendant’s agent, the on-sight manager, [...], and her statements as well as other corroborative statements as contained within the Defendant’s Certified Answers to Interrogatories, and the testimony of Plaintiff and her witness, [...], describing McLaughlin’s actions mopping and placing the slip hazard sign immediately after Plaintiff’s fall, the jury would not have been misled resulting in an egregious miscarriage of justice and the jury’s mistaken verdict.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY & STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] On summary judgment, the trial court correctly held there was insufficient evidence of a written arrangement demonstrating the transfer of a license.  The NJFPA defines a franchise as “a written arrangement for a definite or indefinite period, in which a person grants to another person a license to use a trade name, trademark, service mark, or related characteristics, and in which there is a community of interest in the marketing of goods or services at wholesale, retail, by lease, agreement, or otherwise.
[brief] She explained that she knows she should have done things differently, but when the police found her, she “wasn’t ready” to tell anybody what happened and “[i]t took [her] a long time . . . to talk. ”  (6T 169-20 to 170-2, 170-10 to 17)  [...] testified that he went back to his patrol car to conduct a database search for [...], and when he could not find anything, he ran a search on the car’s license plate.  (5T 65-3 to 13)  He learned that the car had been reported stolen and was wanted in a homicide investigation by the Newark police.  (5T 65-15 to 23)  He contacted Newark police, then returned to speak with the driver.  (5T 66-22 to 67-2)  He placed [...], whom he had not yet identified, under arrest, handcuffed her, and transported her to the police station.  (5T 67-15 to 19, 68-18 to 20)  He later learned from the Newark police that their “main suspect” in the homicide was [...] Martinez, and [...] then identified the person he arrested as [...] from pictures sent by the Newark police.
[brief] ”  Id. at 381-382.  The Dunkley matter straddled the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Aguas.  Following the Aguas decision, the Dunkley Court was tasked with reviewing, inter alia, whether the vicarious liability could now be established against an employer because the alleged harasser/discriminator was a supervisor.  The Appellate Division affirmed its prior ruling that the employer had successfully set forth an affirmative defense.  Dunkley v. S. Coraluzzo Petroleum Transporters, 441 N.J.Super. 322, 327 (App.Div.2015).
[brief] 1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...............................................................................  4  A.  The Complaint and the Defendants’ Pre-Answer Motions to Dismiss........4  B.  The Contradictory Orders Issued by the Trial Court on June 2, 2023, and June 9, 2023.................................................................................................4  C.  Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the June 9 Order is Denied .........6  D.  [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration of the June 2 Order Was Granted, and the Complaint Was Also Dismissed with Prejudice ..............6  E.  [...]’s Motion for an Award of its Attorneys’ Fees and Costs....................7  F.  Plaintiff’s Appeal of the Orders Granting Dismissal with Prejudice and the Resulting Award of Legal Fees to [...] as Prevailing Party .......................8  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................
[directive] A nonviolent assembly of persons organized primarily to engage in free speech activity.  These may be scheduled events that allow for law enforcement planning or spontaneous.  They include, but are not limited to, marches, protests, and other assemblies intended to attract attention.  For purposes of the application of the provisions of this Policy, inmates and detainees in a correctional institution who fail to comply with an order from a correctional police officer shall not be considered peaceful demonstrators.
[brief] Literally scores of federal courts have made state-law predictions that reject failure-to-recall claims under the laws of many other states.  The sheer range of products against which recall claims have been asserted demonstrates how radical a legal change plaintiff’s theory would entail, were it to be accepted. \(^{10}\) - **Alabama:** Wilhite o/b/o Est. of Wilder v. [...], 2024 WL 968867, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 6, 2024) (“no duty to recall under Alabama law”) (medical device); Harman v. [...], 661 F. Supp.3d 1123, 1133 (M.D. Ala. 2023) (“no such duty exists under Alabama law” to “proactively recall[]” a product) (firearm); Harris v. [...], 2018 WL 6725329, at *9 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 21, 2018) (“there is no duty to recall”) (pallet jack).
[brief] POINT II  THE COURT ERRED IN NOTING THAT MS. SUDHAKAR DOES NOT HAVE AN INDIVIDUALIZED INTEREST.  (Pa139-154).  As the Court notes, the “interest” of a party seeking government records can be a “wholesome public interest or a legitimate private interest. ”  Higg-A-Rella v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 47 (1995).  Appellant, [...] represented both, as the Court was made aware.  Her private interests are aligned with the public interest.  [...] has been involved with a group of individuals, including the interested parties, for many years.  These individuals continue to shed new evidence and new light on arguably New Jersey’s most famous criminal case.  This legitimate private interest in part led her to volunteer a decade of her time to help the New Jersey State Police, preserve, protect, archive and inventory approximately 225,000 pieces of Kidnapping evidence.  [...]’s interests are in preserving these artifacts while also seeking the truth for the public.  [...] has provided expertise to countless persons interested in the case including the media, because in her view, it is clearly within the public’s interest to obtain a full and unfettered explanation of what occurred and to know that justice was adequately served.  Applying Higg-A-Rella, the Court erred in stating that [...] does not have an individualized interest.  The Court has misconstrued [...]’s deeply personal interest for the public good by assuming that what is at stake is strictly a commercial interest.  That could not be further from the truth.  The truth is that there remain countless unanswered questions regarding the Lindbergh case and there remains a huge public interest in the case.  One of the obtainable facts from this case can be answered in identifying who sent the Kidnapping ransom notes.  The pursuit of significant historical truth is and has been [...]’s aim.  To claim that such interest is private to [...] is plainly in error.
[brief] 4.  The trial judge turned blind to demonstrated lack of Duty of Candor by the respondents’ attorney, which materially tainted the proceedings below against the appellant (raised via Appellate Brief, Point Nine, pp. 31-34.)  It was incumbent upon the trial judge to disqualify himself, because of the following legal reasons:  •  Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses of 14th Amendment guarantees judicial impartiality.  •  Article VI, § VI, of the New Jersey Constitution emphasizes the importance of an independent judiciary.  •  N.J.S.A. 2B:13-2 permits judicial disqualification, not just for financial interest in the outcome, but when the judge’s impartiality is reasonably questioned.  •  Canon 2 and 3 of Code of Judicial Conduct directs judge to avoid even appearance of impropriety.  •  The New Jersey Supreme Court Code of Judicial Conduct emphasizes impartiality and integrity essential for maintaining public trust in the judiciary.  V.
[brief] [...] IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-APPEAL  [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/ Cross-Appellant, Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Township of Monroe Of Counsel and On the Brief: [...] (#038871997)  ([...]) Dated: January 4, 2024 (Revised: 1/17/2024)  TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF DECISIONS, ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS ......................... ii TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS .................................................. iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................... iv APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................ v COUNTER-PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................
[brief] Plaintiff resides at property located at [...] (the “Property”) in the [...].  Pa1.  Plaintiff’s residence is located along the cul-de-sac on the road.  Pa1.  Plaintiff has resided there since 1978.  Pa17.  Water issues have existed at the Property for quite a long period of time, beginning around 2004 or 2005.  Pa352, T4, 5-1.  A swimming pool was built at the Property in 1979.  Pa1.  The swimming pool was first repaired in 2000 and then was repaired a second time around 2012.  Pa354.  As a result of the water issues the [...] installed drained in front of the Plaintiff’s residence in 2014 to alleviate the runoff problem.  Pa18.  Subsequently in 2018 the then Mayor of the [...] promised the Plaintiff that the Township would address the problems in the Plaintiff backyard.  Pa18.  The swimming pool was also located in the backyard.  Pa18.  In June 2018 the Township installed a drainage system in the Plaintiff’s backyard.  Pa18.  Plaintiff was never advised of the work that the Township would perform.  Pa355.  While the work was being performed, Plaintiff discovered extensive water damage to the swimming pool as a result of drainage.  Pa18.  Plaintiff was advised by the Township to bury the pool to aid with drainage, which Plaintiff did.  Pa18.  Additionally, shrubbery and mature foliage was removed during the installation of the drainage system.  Pa18.  Lastly, while the work was being performed in the backyard one of the Township’s trucks severely damaged the Plaintiff’s driveway.  Pa357.  After the Township failed to restore the Plaintiff’s property the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Tort Claim on May 31, 2019.  Pa342.  Plaintiff then filed the within action on August 12, 2020.  Pa1.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS ARE NOT TIME-BARRED (T8)
[brief] “Careful application of the factors promotes uniformity in sentencing. ”  State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 179-80 (2009).  Here, there was no risk of arbitrariness: the sentence was negotiated and accepted by defendant.  Further, the sentence of the court actually defied the theory of State v. Case, which held that “when the mitigating factors preponderate, sentences will tend towards the lower range, and when the aggravating factors preponderate, sentences will tend toward the higher end of the range. ”  220 N.J. at 64-65.  Here, the aggravating factors predominated and defendant was still sentenced in the center of that range.  The substantial deference bestowed to sentencing courts has been earned here.  There is no manifest defect requiring appellate intervention and remand.  The defendant entered his agreement with the assistance of counsel and received what he expected.  The sentence was cooperatively reached, fair, and should be affirmed.
[brief] ”  Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).  Having counsel’s function in mind, the reviewing court should determine whether the attorney “has done some investigation into the prosecution’s case and into various defense strategies. ”  Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 384.  A “particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments. ”  Ibid. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-691).  In short, “[a] failure to [undertake a reasonable investigation or to explain why an investigation is unnecessary] will render the lawyer’s performance deficient. ”  *State v. Savage*, 120 N.J. 594, 618 (1990).  Unquestionably, “[d]etermining which witnesses to call to the stand is one of the most difficult strategic decisions that any trial attorney must confront. ”  *State v. Arthur*, 184 N.J. 307, 310 (2005).