ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] • The direct control of officers assigned to them by the supervising firearms instructor.  • Instructing all officers or participants in range safety and the appropriate handling and firing of the handgun and shotgun.  When using a host 9-17 Revised (5/03) Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards facility, instructing participants in the policies for that facility.  • Rendering all possible assistance to officers to help them achieve the requirements as set forth in this manual.  • Remaining, at all times while on the firing line, with the officers who are under their direct supervision (unless properly relieved).  • Taking immediate and appropriate action when, in the instructor's judgment, the conduct or activity of a participant constitutes a danger to the instructor or to other individuals.
[brief] Narcan has the ability to reverse the effects of marijuana as well as opioids.  (T4 31:4-21; Can Naloxone Be Used to Treat Synthetic Cannabinoid, www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov › articles › PMC5846114; Treatment of acute cannabinoid overdose with naloxone infusion, [...]) (last visited August 22, 2023) (Pa226).  The cause of [...]’s medical emergency was never conclusively determined.  (T4 24:3-13).  **An Internal Affairs Investigation is Initiated**
[brief] Under New Jersey law, in a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff has the burden to establish “(1) that the criminal action was instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff, (2) that it was actuated by malice, (3) that there was an absence of probable cause for the proceeding, and (4) that it was terminated favorably to the plaintiff. ”  Helmy v. City of Jersey City, 178 N.J. 183, 190 (2003)(Emphasis added); see also LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 89 (2009); and Brunson v. Affinity Fed. Credit Union, 199 N.J. 381, 393-94 (2009).  Under federal law, the added element that “plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding,” is also required.  *Johnson v. Knorr*, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007), quoting *Estate of Smith v. Marasco*, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003).  For accrual purposes, however, both State and Federal law require favorable “termination” of the case against Appellant, with “termination” being the operative word.
[brief] When she was transferred, the unit head never spent any time with her to indicate what her responsibilities were so she “pretty much decided to learn the job myself which I did” (1T; 100:15).  At the end of her career at [...], and in going to the Academy, she was “not being a part of anything that had to do with my responsibilities as an Admin Officer” (1T; 104:10).  [...] knew about her EEO complaint because “she told me she knew about it” (1T; 104:17).  That was at a conversation on November 4, 2016 (1T; 104:21).  [...]’s knowledge of her EEO complaint led the Plaintiff to state, “Because I knew going forward that that was going to be a problem in my career at the Academy” (1T; 106:5).  Plaintiff filed a 525 which is a reportable incident form – a complaint (1T; 107:15).
[brief] The Trial Court Properly Applied a 2.5 Multiplier.  [...] further argue that the trial court erred in applying a 2.5 multiplier to calculate the punitive damages award.  This argument’s lone predicate is a single phrase of dicta in which the United States Supreme Court stated that “[w]hen compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee. ”  (Db53 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). )  [...]’ brief strategically omits the next sentence of State Farm: “The precise award in any case, of course, must be based upon the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm to the plaintiff. ”  538 U.S. at 425.  Thus, consistent with the very authority on which the Wilfs rely, there is no “bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed. ”  Ibid.; see also id. at 424-25 (“[W]e have consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and potential damages to the punitive award. ” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).  The trial court’s analysis adhered to the applicable context-specific approach and addressed in detail the facts and circumstances of the Wilfs’ far-reaching, sustained, and improper conduct that warranted and necessitated the punitive damages award it entered in [...]’s favor.  As set forth in the court’s Statement of Reasons, a multiplier of at least 2.5 against each of [...], [...], and [...] is merited and totally appropriate; nothing in the Appellate Division’s prior decision or the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence requires anything less.  V.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION TO AWARD COMPOUNDING PREJUDGMENT INTEREST BASED ON THE WILFS’ EGREGIOUS CONDUCT THROUGHOUT THIS DECADES-LONG LITIGATION.
[brief] In my complaint on the page that states “Relief Sought”, every claim for damage is in regard to the picture that was taken of me in the confines of my home (Pa1).  New Jersey law, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-49, applies to complaints based on a person’s exercise of speech, press, assembly, petition, or association rights ‘on a matter of public concern. ’  My complaint was based on a picture taken without consent in the privacy of my own home that was used in many different situations to violate my privacy rights.
[brief] To the extent that Defendants’ failure to shut down the illegal, makeshift liquor concession stand was due to a negligent or wrongful act or omission of one of their employees pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:4-2(a), the lower court erred by finding that Defendants have immunity and are not liable for failing to provide supervision of the Subject Premises.  The lower court respectfully erred by finding that Defendants’ employees’ failure to remedy the dangerous condition of the large, illegal, makeshift liquor concession stand on the Subject Premises was discretionary instead of ministerial, and that Defendants did not have actual or constructive notice of the presence of the illegal, large makeshift liquor concession stand that Defendants allowed to operate on the Subject Premises for months before [...] was murdered.  This is because the lower court erred by completely ignoring the presence of the illegal, large makeshift liquor concession stand on the Subject Premises, as pleaded in the Complaint, erroneously characterizing the incident as a “drive-by shooting.
[brief] See CBS Outdoor v. Lebanon Planning Bd., 414 N.J. Super. 563, 577 (App. Div. 2010).  The “substantial evidence” standard that would apply to a board’s individualized fact finding for a variance application does not apply to a “discretionary decision of broader application” such as a decision to adopt a zoning ordinance or redevelopment plan.  New Jersey Zoning & Land Use Administration, Cox & Koenig, 2024 ed., § 42-2.1, pg. 619 (quoting Powerhouse Arts District Neighborhood Assoc. v. City Council of City of Jersey City, 413 N.J. Super. 322, 332 (App. Div. 2010), certif. den., 205 N.J. 79 (2011)).
[directive] • ROIC Intelligence Products.  The GVR Task Force will rely on information collected 2 and disseminated by the [...] ([...]), which the [...] operates as a clearinghouse for law enforcement intelligence on gun violence.  Intelligence products developed by the ROIC will help task force members in identifying high-priority targets and building cases against them.  The goal of the GVR Task Force is not to supplant existing law enforcement initiatives— including the VCI programs that are working well in certain New Jersey cities.  And it is very much meant to complement and not to disrupt the various community-based violence intervention programs that are emerging across the state.  The goal is to build a statewide infrastructure for improved law enforcement cooperation, which in turn will reinforce the many other promising anti-violence projects under way in New Jersey.  It goes without saying that no single program will end gun violence in our state.  But pairing targeted law enforcement efforts with meaningful community investments, we can save lives and make our state safer.
[brief] [...]’s final argument that Plaintiff failed to state a claim is not properly before this Court and therefore should not be considered.  This Court granted leave to appeal on the narrow issue of the trial court’s orders dismissing Plaintiff’s CFA claims (Count VII) and no cross-appeal was filed on any other issue.  Even if this Court considers [...]’s argument that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under the CFA, the allegations alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint are more than enough to survive a motion to dismiss on that basis.
[directive] 16  USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022  4.8.2  There shall be a strong presumption against the initiation of vehicular pursuits based solely upon motor vehicle violations.  Officers involved in vehicular pursuits must immediately notify both the supervisor and police communications, state the reason for the pursuit, and provide the information required by Addendum B of this Policy.  4.8.3  Vehicular pursuits shall be monitored by a supervisor and shall be terminated if directed to do so by a supervisor, or if the supervisor has not affirmatively authorized the continuation of the pursuit after being notified and given an opportunity to assess the situation.  17
[brief] Although the officer articulated the reason he pulled me over, the articulation was not reasonable.  The superior court judge agreed with me that I didn’t violate the statute 39:4-88 in which I was ticketed for.  (Da la).  The superior court judge unfortunately gave credit to the officer for reasonable suspicion because he articulated that I failed to slow down for the cops on the side of the road in violation of 39:4-92.2, even though the cop admitted that we were going 45 mph in a 50-mph zone.  4T:20-(3-4)  *State v. Smith*, 251 N.J. 244, 257-58 (N.J. 2022) ("The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
[directive] 4 | P a g e Summary of Survey Results  To provide a high-level understanding of sexual assault response, the results of the AG SAFE survey are discussed below.  SART  Processing of SAFE Kits  Figure 1: Workflow of the SART Process  The process for providing services to a sexual assault victim is comprehensive and multi-disciplinary, involving advocates, healthcare providers, and law enforcement.  Details of this full process are contained in the Standards.  The AG SAFE survey and report focus on the processing of SAFE kits, and do not discuss the support and services provided prior to, or after, the collection of the SAFE kit.
[brief] The *Hill* court explained:  The defense of failure to file notice under the Tort Claims Act is an affirmative one which must be pleaded in order to avoid surprise, and a defendant may be found to have waived the protection thereof by failing to plead it as a defense.  *Hill v. Board of Educ. of Middletown Tp.*, 183 N.J. Super. 36, 40 (App. Div. 1982), cert den., 81 N.J. 233 (1982).  It is arguably too late for plaintiff to file a late tort claim notice or to seek leave to do so\(^4\) and:  a public entity may be estopped from asserting a separate defense (such as notice requirements) when it fails to assert such a defense until it is too late for the plaintiff to satisfy a legal requirement.  *Peskin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.*, 520 A.2d 852, 214 N.J. Super. 686 (Law Div. 1986)(citing *Hill v. Board of Educ. of Middletown Tp.*, 183 N.J. Super. 36, 40 (App. Div. 1982), cert den., 81 N.J. 233 (1982)).
[brief] Furthermore, the Legislature has made it clear that the Pinelands Protection Act and the regulations adopted under it supersede the MLUL when they conflict.  As noted in Uncle v. [...], 275 N.J. Super. 82, 90-91 (App. Div. 1994):  The Pinelands Protection Act and the regulations adopted under it supersede the MLUL when they conflict.  This directive must also be read in conjunction with the MLUL, where N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5 states:  Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, those development regulations which are in effect on the date of submission of an application for development shall govern the review of that application for development and any decision made with regard to that application for development.  By interpreting these statutes and regulations together, it is evident that the [...]’s authority and standards take precedence in cases of conflict with municipal regulations, ensuring consistent and overarching management of the Pinelands area.
[brief] There is no law that states that the trial court \textit{must} take judicial notice of a fact, it simply says that the trial court \textit{may}.  Here, it was irrelevant to the case, and had more prejudicial value than probative.  Defendants failed to provide: 1) case law that required the court to take judicial notice of the State of Emergency; 2) case law that stood for the proposition that a State of Emergency Order reduced, laxed, or eliminated Defendants duty to keep its property reasonably safe upon Plaintiff’s arrival; 3) any expert report or testimony to speak to the impact a State of Emergency has on Defendants duty in this case; 4) any basis for relevance as there was no testimony prior to trial, that the State of Emergency somehow impacted Defendants ability to provide snow removal services; and 5) no testimony that Defendants were somehow providing its services to the State and that’s why it was unable to make its premises reasonably safe for the Plaintiff.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  The Respondent, [...], on January 19, 2023, filed a Complaint in Essex County Superior Court.  [7a]  She alleged the Appellants, [...], and [...], unlawfully violated her rights, and terminated her employment.  [7a]  The Appellants on or about May 8, 2023, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Respondent’s Complaint pursuant to Court Rule 4:6-2 (17a).  They claimed the Respondent’s complaint should be dismissed because she signed an arbitration agreement.  [17a]  The Appellants have not filed an Answer to this Complaint.  The Respondent opposed the Appellants’ motion.  The Respondent’s opposition raised several issues including; 1) the Respondent did not sign the agreement provided by the Appellants, 2) The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021.  9 U.S.C. §401. prohibited enforcement of the arbitration agreement.  and 3) sections of the purported arbitration agreement should be voided as violations of public policy.  The court decided only the threshold issue of whether there was a signed agreement.
[brief] See also Kantonides v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 802 F. Supp. 1203 (D.N.J. 1992) (Airline’s duty to provide safe ingress and egress “did not and does not encompass the common areas of the airport terminal. ”  *Id.*, at 1215); *Mc Cann v. Borough of Washington*, 2006 WL 2726818 (App. Div.) (Da37-39); *Siegel v. County of Monmouth*, 2007 WL 1628141 (App. Div.) certif. denied 192 N.J. 477 (2007) (Da40-45)  The trial court correctly relied upon *Kandrac, supra.*, as it is directly on point.  In *Kandrac*, plaintiff fell in the parking lot of a shopping center with thirty six tenants.  *Id.*, at 81.  The landlord retained control of the parking lot pursuant to its lease agreement.  *Id.*, at 82.  The plaintiff was not in an area necessary to the ingress or egress of the tenant defendant’s business, or on a sidewalk abutting the business.  *Id.*, at 88.  Nor was she in a crosswalk that identified a route from the shopping center across a roadway to the parking area.  *Id.*  Like plaintiff herein, she was injured as she was walking around a car in the parking lot.  *Id.*  The *Kandrac* Court held that “…the assignment of responsibilities in the lease, within the context of a multi-tenant shopping center…impact the scope of [the tenant’s] ability to address conditions in the parking lot.  The lease squarely assigns the duty to maintain the area where plaintiff fell to the landlord. ”  *Id.*, at 89.
[brief] The record shows that the property could accommodate a single-story ranch or bi-level home, or perhaps even a Cape Cod style two-story dwelling.  Alternatively, if permitted by the Borough's ordinances relating to soil removal, plaintiffs could remove a portion of the knoll in order to construct a two-story colonial style house that was less than thirty feet high.  Plaintiffs' argument that there is a limited market for ranch-style or Cape Cod homes is beside the point.  A developer's inability to make the most profitable use of the property is not sufficient to show hardship in a (d) variance case.  Cerdel Constr. Co., Inc. v. Township Comm. of Township of E. Hanover, 86 N.J. 303, 307, 430 A.2d 925, 927-28(1981).
[brief] 1.  [...], individually, purchased the Property by Deed dated April 13, 2005, from [...] and Longo’s real estate entities, for a price of $2,350,000.  Pa213.  On the same day, [...] deeded the Property to [...].  Pa221.  Thereafter, [...], individually, had no ownership interest in the Property.  2.  In 2005, the Property contained a single building known as the Longo Building at the northerly end of the Property.  The rest of the site was wooded and undeveloped.  Pa105, Site Plan April 11, 2005, page 4.  The Approved Site Plan 3.  In 2005, [...] prepared a Site Plan for the Property.  Pa105.  This 2005 Site Plan called for the Longo Building “TO BE CONVERTED TO A FURNITURE STORE. ”  It also called for the construction of a separate building at the southerly, undeveloped end of the Property.  Id.  There is no claim for damages involving the new southerly building.
[brief] As defined in Section 101.02 of the Standard Specifications, the Contract Bond is “the approved form of security furnished by the Contractor guaranteeing the faithful performance of the Contract by the Contractor” (Ra 3).  More particularly, in Section 103.02 of the Standard Specifications, entitled “Execution of Contract,” it is explained that the Contract Bond “shall be in a sum of not less than the total amount bid for the Project and shall be maintained by the Contractor until the final payment is made” (Ra 1-2 [emphasis added]).  Thus, here, [...] was required to provide a Proposal Guaranty in an amount of no less than 10% of its $70,865,354.00 bid, and, accordingly, the Proposal Guaranty must contain a minimum penal sum of at least $7.08M to secure [...] against its increased costs if it awarded the contract to [...], but the company refused to perform.  If that occurred, then it would become necessary for [...] to award the contract to the second lowest bidder, in this case, [...], with a bid of $80,735,000.00.  The penal sum of the Proposal Bond would thus secure [...] against the cost increase.
[directive] Internal affairs is responsible for reviewing the incident’s investigation and conducting whatever further investigation is necessary to determine if the officer violated agency rules and regulations or if the officer's fitness for duty is in question.  In addition, internal affairs will track the proceedings of any criminal charges or civil matters that may arise out of the incident.  Internal affairs will also work with the Division of Criminal Justice or the County Prosecutor to determine if and when an officer may have their weapon(s) returned.  32  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020  7
[brief] CONCLUSION  Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court affirm the motion judge’s Order because a) Plaintiff set forth a *prima facie* case for collection on this charged-off credit card account by the original creditor, b) that no genuine issue of material facts exists, c) plaintiff is entitled to the entry of judgment as a matter of law, and d) Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are incorrect and unsupported legally, factually, or both.
[brief] As noted above, N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.7(a)(1) and N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.1(a)(9) permit the Commission to remove the name of a candidate from an eligible list for various reasons, including “a prior employment history which relates adversely to the title[.]”  The record is clear that the Commission considered [...]’s prior employment history on its merits and concluded that the [...] presented sufficient basis for removing her from the list.  AA6-7, 14-15.  In doing so, the Commission emphasized that “the record indicates that [[...]] received major discipline which involved untruthfulness among other charges” and that such “employment record is adverse to the position sought due to the high standards for law enforcement officers. ”
[brief] Second, the trial court ignored that it was not until September 22, 2022—after the plenary hearing and as part of their own fee application—when [...] finally supplied the relevant invoices to Plaintiff confirming the sanctionable conduct.  Those detailed invoice entries show [...] never conducted a reasonable investigation before filing Defendant’s motion to set aside.  (Pa124).  As discussed by the Court in Toll Bros., supra at 72-23, sanctions can be calculated “from the point where compliance became practicable” and “reduced concomitantly at the point. ”  Third, [...]’s attorneys claimed they did not have notice their “set-aside” pleadings violated R. 1:4-8, which was at odds with [...]’s multiple filings in this case plainly stating the claims were frivolous, replete with lies, contradicted by sworn deposition testimony, and without reasonable basis in law or fact.
[brief] [...] marketed and sold PCB’s for a wide array of open and closed applications, including various electrical applications such as transformers and capacitors, carbonless copy paper, plasticizers in paints and cements, caulking, flame retardants, adhesives, and other building materials.  (Pa002-003).  The manufacture and sale of PCBs was banned in 1979.  (Pa002).  Prior to 1979, [...]’s predecessor, [...], purchased PCBs from [...] and incorporated them into certain capacitors as a dielectric insulating fluid.  (Pa010).  From 1968 until 1979, when the manufacture of PCBs was banned, [...] used [...]’s PCBs in its capacitors and fluorescent lighting ballasts at its manufacturing plant in [...].  (Pa498-99).  [...] advertised and marketed PCBs to [...] in New Jersey and shipped millions of pounds of PCBs to [...]’s New Jersey facility (as well as to other New Jersey customers).