ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The believability of eyewitness identifications presented at trial ultimately rests with the jury.  *State v. King*, 372 N.J.Super. 227, 239 n. 3 (App.Div.2004), *certif. denied*, 185 N.J. 266 (2005); *Delgado, supra*, 188 N.J. at 56.  Here, the jury was aware that [...] was not asked to identify [...] using a photo array book, and it also heard defense counsel cross-examine her about what she observed when [...] and [...] were brought into the courtroom, and whether those observations influenced her identification of [...] at trial or her level of certainty.  The jury was also aware of the fact that [...]'s in-court identification was made more than a year after the crime, yet it chose to convict.  Therefore, notwithstanding the twenty-month passage of time between the date of the crime and the trial, and the inherent suggestiveness of the courtroom setting, [...]'s in-court identification was properly admitted.
[brief] (2T 104-11 to 24, 105-1 to 19)  [...] was facing at a minimum 80 years in prison if he were convicted of the four robberies.  [...] had three prior convictions: a first-degree conviction from 2014 for which he was sentenced to thirteen years, 85% to be served without parole; a third-degree conviction from 2009; and another third-degree conviction from 2014, for which he was sentenced to five years.  (2T 105-20 to 106-21)  [...] admitted that because of his status as a sex offender, he was particularly concerned about being among prison population.  (2T 148-8 to 149-14)  The State, in the plea deal, specifically reserved the right to recommend more jail time if [...] did not testify truthfully, specifically consecutive sentencing.
[brief] (Db11-13).  In Simms, police observed the defendant hand an unidentified object to a suspected narcotics customer.  What the defendant was holding was critical to the State’s case because police found narcotics in the suspected customer’s possession.  So, if the unknown object handed by the defendant to the suspected customer was narcotics, the defendant distributed narcotics and was guilty of a crime.  224 N.J. at 397-98.  The State asked a detective, who was testifying as an expert in narcotics distribution, whether, assuming the unidentified object was narcotics, the defendant conspired to commit narcotics distribution with a co-defendant.  Id. at 396.  The Supreme Court determined that the testimony in question was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal on plain error review, because the expert testified to the defendant’s state of mind, which the jury should have been permitted to infer from the facts.  Id. at 409.  McLean involved an officer testifying that he believed that he observed a narcotics transaction take place based upon a hand-to-hand exchange of an unknown object that he observed.  205 N.J. at 444-46.  Not only did the officer opine on the defendant’s guilt, but unlike Simms, the officer was not qualified as an expert in narcotics transactions.  Id. at 460-63.  In Reeds, a detective testifying as an expert in narcotics distribution testified to the ultimate issue based on facts which were presented as “hypothetical” but in actuality described the entirety of the defendant’s encounter with police.  197 N.J. at 284-87.  Further, when asked if it were even “possible” for the drugs to be possessed without intent to distribute, the detective reiterated his opinion that the narcotics were possessed with intent to distribute.  Id. at 287.  And the officer additionally opined that the defendant was in “constructive possession. ”  *Ibid.*  The Supreme Court held that the detective’s use of legalistic language – i.e. “constructive possession” – amounted to reversible error because it amounted to “a veritable pronouncement of guilt on the two possession crimes for which defendant was charged. ”  *Id.* at 297.  Here, the officers did not testify to any legal conclusion that the jury would have to make.  Rather, they merely stated they were arresting the defendant, which was an element of the resisting arrest charge.  In sum, defendant’s jury had a plethora of qualified evidence from which they could conclude that defendant was guilty of aggravated assault.  Defendant’s reliance on narcotics transaction expert cases is inapt because the expert testimony unnecessarily prejudiced the defense in those cases.
[brief] Accordingly, the physical evidence in this case is admissible because the police had probable cause to --- ⁹  The State cites to the concurring opinion’s rationale because the general rule for interpreting opinions where a majority of the Court espouses no single rationale is that “the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds. ”  *Marks v. United States*, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).  search the vehicle prior to any unwarned custodial statements, and the exclusionary rule would not apply to the physical evidence obtained as a result of defendant’s unwarned statements even in the absence of preexisting probable cause.
[brief] [...]’s trial testimony—in which she denied or did not remember all the statements from her out-of-court interview with police (4T29-9 to 32-9)—clearly differed from her recorded statement.  Even after being presented with an opportunity to refresh her recollection, she claimed that a review of the transcript of her statement would not help because she had “problems with memory loss. ” (4T32-19 to 24).  But during [...]’s testimony, her statement was played, and—consistent with [...]’s testimony about his own observations of [...]—the judge observed none of the mental and emotional problems she claimed to be experiencing at the time.  (4T262- 20 to 263-22; 4T265-11 to 24; 5T40-12 to 41-11).  Thus, [...] deemed her memory loss to be feigned, which is sufficient foundation for the introduction of a prior inconsistent statement found reliable.
[directive] There may be cases where the prosecutor determines that the risk(s) posed by the defendant upon release can be adequately managed only by some form of monitoring or intervention service that is not provided by the pretrial services program or otherwise is not available to mitigate the risk(s).  By way of example, a defendant’s criminal activity that is related to his or her addiction (e.g., robberies or residential burglaries committed to acquire funds to support the defendant’s drug dependency) might be interrupted by participating in a court-  29
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da197 Exh A (Motor Fuel Supply Agreement dated March 4, 2012-Redacted as Redundant, see Da021, Amendment Number 1 to Motor Fuel Supply Agreement dated April 24, 2015-Redacted as Redundant, see Da037, Second Amendment to Motor Fuel Supply Agreement dated May 2, 2018-Redacted as Redundant).
[brief] The trial court’s findings and conclusions are found in the transcript of its decision.  The trial court’s decision is contained in the following passage from the transcript:  I am going to grant the application.  I’m going to enforce the first resolution that the [...] passed.  And then 42 days later or whatever it was they decided – that was only conditional approval.  And they went back and they unpassed (sic) it.  I quite frankly find this is a tactic in a long line of tactics that Wayne has utilized to delay meeting its constitutional obligation of affordable housing.  I incorporate by reference [...]’s October 19th 2020 missive that was - oh, I don’t know.  I’ve – you read it.  It must have taken you – it was 12 pages.  But it lists chapter and verse of all the delay tactics and the failures to mediate not just with [...], but with failure to approve other interveners’ applications that they contend that we were settled with.  And we said well do we have anything in writing.  And these things lingered on and lingered on.  And quite frankly I did at that time revoke the immunity.
[brief] ”  (13T:41-9 to 42-2)  [...] could not identify the person in the video, but testified that the “body size” and “shape” “reminded” her of [...].  (15T:91-12 to 92-11)  [...] “couldn’t see anything” in the video.  (15T:144-12 to 21; 171-10 to 172-4)  [...] could not recognize the person in the video, but testified that “coupled with the information that I knew at the time,” the person “reminded me of my nephew, Lenny [...], Jr.
[brief] WHY IS THE ORDER AND OTHERS LIKE IT SO CONCERNING TO AMICUS CURIAE?  Plaintiffs argue the trial court’s Order was “well-reasoned,” intended to promote “unobstructed production of relevant discovery,” and includes a protective order under which they can be entrusted to maintain confidentiality of irrelevant material produced.  Pl. Br. 1.  This is wrong.  The Sedona Principles recognize that the “responding party is best situated to preserve, search, and produce its own ESI. ”  The Sedona Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, 19 Sedona Conf. J. 1, 118 (2018).  Also, the entry of a protective order to govern documents turned over to the other party does not protect against harms that could arise if orders such as this one were allowed to go into effect.  When similar orders have been considered in Federal courts, most districts have found that parties have a right to review their keyword hits for responsiveness, privacy, trade secrets, and other protected information. \(^2\)  The Order here is against the overwhelming majority of these cases and, if left in place, will inevitably encourage more such attempts in matters large and small.
[brief] The MBPA Instructs Courts To Follow Precedents From The New Jersey Franchise Practices Act When There Are Conflicts Arising From The MBPA And Its Provisions.  Unlike New York’s statutory regime, the MBPA is fundamentally distinct and unique because it reflect the Legislature’s intent for courts to consider and rely upon precedents arising under the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act (“NJFPA”) for any conflicts or controversies involving the MBPA and its provisions.  Specifically, the MBPA expressly states that when there is a “case or controversy among wholesalers and brewers…proper consideration should be given to relevant precedents provided under the ‘Franchise Practices Act’ P.L. 1971, c. 346 (C. 56:10-1, et seq.).”  N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.15(e).  (emphasis added).  The importance the Legislature placed on NJFPA precedent is evident in N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.19, which states that if sections three (N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.14) (“Definitions”), four (N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.15) (“Contract Between Brewer and Wholesaler…Applicability…Prohibited and Conforming Contract Terms; Violations”) and seven (N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.18) (“Action against Brewer for Violation; Remedies; Third-Party Action Limited”) are held “invalid” then the NJFPA “shall be fully applicable to the extent it would otherwise apply as if this act had not been enacted. ”  IV.
[brief] The evidence of defendant’s guilt as to the May 29, 2018 shooting incident, irrespective of this identification related testimony, was compelling.  Cf. *State v. Allen*, __ N.J. __ (2023).  The color video recording of the incident included clear documentation not only of the perpetrator, which the jury could rely upon to form its own opinion as its depiction of the defendant, but also of the vehicle used by the perpetrator.  The make, model, and license plate number of this vehicle were all clear from the video and connected the vehicle to defendant’s father.  During his interrogation, defendant admitted to being the driver of this vehicle leased by his father and, in fact, had the vehicle with him in Virginia at the time of his arrest.  Significantly, defendant’s arrest provided further connections between the defendant and the May 29th incident.  Searches of defendant’s hotel room, vehicle and bag post-arrest revealed defendant to be in possession of BB guns and BB gun accoutrements – various boxes of BB pellets and CO2 cartridges.  Also important was the connections between the May 29th incident, along with prior fire-related incidents, and text messages received by defendant’s mother suggestive of a motive for the attacks on defendant’s maternal relatives: the perceived $25,000 debt.  Defendant himself corroborated that his perceived the $25,000 debt to be owed to him in his statement to police.  That defendant (and not his brother) was the author of the messages sent to [...] from that telephone number was corroborated by the Virginia telephone exchange and the contents of the messages, inclusive of the provision of a bank account number associated with defendant’s business.  The State therefore submits that this record – which includes a jury acquittal on one count – does not provide a sufficient reasonable doubt as to whether the admission of this line of questioning lead the jury to a result it otherwise would not have reached.  There simply is no doubt as to defendant’s guilt based on the totality of the evidence against him.  This Court can and should affirm defendant’s conviction.
[directive] [Nie dotyczy 3. dłuższego okresu dyskwalifikacji z możliwości zwolnienia /NA] warunkowego znajduje zastosowanie w odniesieniu do punktu oskarżenia podlegającego Ustawie Gravesa (np. NERA, trzecie przestępstwo, zabójstwo)?  Does any other mandatory sentencing provision apply to the Graves Act count that provides for a greater period of parole ineligibility (e.g., NERA, Three Strikes, Murder)?
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court came to the “inescapable conclusion” that the landlord breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  *Id.* at 229-30.  The court reached this conclusion even though the tenant had breached the terms of the parties’ contract regarding the exercise of the option.  *Id.* at 223-24.  Notwithstanding the tenant’s breach, as a consequence of the landlord’s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Supreme Court ordered specific performance of the lease option in accordance with the terms of the contract.  *Id.* at 231-32.  Like the landlord in *Brunswick Hills*, Defendants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
[brief] 37 State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347 (2004) ..................................................................  28 State v. Lockett, 249 N.J. Super 428 (App. Div. 1991) ...........................................33, 34, 36 State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295 (1996) ..................................................................................  35  State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325 (1971)  ......................................................................................21  State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011) ....................................................................................  22 State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392 (1978) .........................................................................................14 State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383 (1998) .....................................................................................32, 33 State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383 (2009) ................................................................................ 14, 15, 19 State v. Ortisi, 308 N.J. Super. 573 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 383 (1998).  ..................................................................................................................  33 State v. Pindale, 249 N.J. Super. 266 (App. Div. 1991) ....................................................... 33, 34, 36 State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304 (2000) ....................................................................................... 13, 14 State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518 (1992) .......................................................................................31, 32 State v. Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452 (2018) .......................................................................
[brief] RESPONDENT FAILS TO RECOGNIZE SEVERAL IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW  In relation to agency fact finding, “the role of the appellate court is that of determining ‘whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record. ’”  Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 92 (1973) (quoting Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965)).  “The appellate application of this standard requires far more than a perfunctory review; it calls for careful and principled consideration of the agency record and findings in the manner. ”  Id. at 93.  “An appellate tribunal is . . . in no way bound by [an] agency’s interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue. ”  Ibid.  Moreover, “where technical or specialized expertise is not implicated . . . [appellate courts] owe no deference to [an] agency. ”  A.Z. ex rel. B.Z. v. Higher Educ. Student Assistance Auth., 427 N.J. Super. 389, 394 (App. Div. 2012).  POINT II:
[directive] 4.8.1  Vehicular pursuits shall only be initiated if the pursuing officer reasonably believes that: (a) the violator has committed, or is engaged in a conspiracy or attempt to commit, a crime of the first degree or one of the violent or serious crimes of the second degree enumerated in Addendum B; or (b) the violator poses an imminent threat to the safety of the public or other police officers.  This determination shall be made based upon the violator’s actions or operation of the vehicle prior to the initiation of the attempted motor vehicle stop.  The violator’s subsequent actions, including speeding or evasive driving during the pursuit itself, although often supporting the criminal charge of Eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b), shall not constitute an authorization to initiate or continue a pursuit.
[brief] Bd. of Review, No. A-3333-19, 2022 WL 1406379 (App. Div. May 4, 2022) (slip op.) ..................................................Pa53  Holland v. Bd. of Review, No. A-0214-16T1, 2018 WL 3421444 (App. Div. July 16, 2018) (slip op.) ..................................................Pa58  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] Point  I  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS DE NOVO WHICH REQUIRES APPLICATION OF THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD, VIEWING THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE NON-MOVING PART Y, PRECLUDING DECIDING ISSUES OF FACT AND MAKING CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS AND REQUIRING SUBMISSION OF DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT TO A JURY (Pa837; 3T) ..............................................13 Point II THE MOTION JUDGE ERRED BY FAILING TO APPLY THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD THAT ENCOURAGES EMPLOYEES TO OPPOSE AND REPORT DISCRIMINATION BY PROTECTING THEM FROM RETALIATION THAT WOULD DISSUADE A REASONABLE WORKER FROM MAKING OR SUPPORTING A CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION AND INSTEAD REQUIRED THE RETALIATION TO ALTER THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF DILLON’S EMPLOYMENT (Pa837; 3T) ...........................................................................14 Point III THE MOTION JUDGE ERRED BY FAILING TO VIEW THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE NON-MOVING PARTY, BY MAKING CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS AND BY DECIDING GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT IN FAVOR OF THE EMPLOYER AND AGAINST DILLON (Pa837; 3T)  .........................................................................................20  1.  [...]’s opposition to discrimination and retaliation and the 2015 Written Warning that followed are facts upon which a jury could conclude they were retaliatory (Pa837; 3T).................................................................24  2.  [...]’s continuing opposition to discrimination and retaliation on November 18, 2015 and the Notice of Disciplinary Action dated December 18, 2015 which was initiated on November 24, 2015 are facts upon which a jury could conclude this was retaliatory (Pa837; 3T)..............................................30  3.  [...]’s continuing opposition to discrimination and retaliation and the Notice of Disciplinary Action dated April 12, 2016 are facts upon which a jury could conclude this was retaliatory (Pa837; 3T).......................................................32  Point IV  THE MOTION COURT ERRED IN ITS CAUSATION ANALYSIS (Pa837; 3T) ...........................................................................................................................................................................40  Point V  THE FACTS TAKEN IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO DILLON SHOW THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS TO HAVE RETALIATED AGAINST DILLON AND TO HAVE AIDED AND ABETTED DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION (Pa837; 3T)..................................................................................................................41  Point VI  PLAINTIFF HAS ESTABLISHED A PATTERN OR SERIES OF DISCRIMINATORY AND RETALIATORY ACTS THAT WHEN VIEWED CUMULATIVELY CONSTITUTE A HOSTILE AND DISCRIMINATORY WORK ENVIRONMENT (Pa837; 3T)..................................................................................................................42  Point VII  THE MOTION JUDGE ERRED BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DILLON’S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS (Pa837; 3T).........................................................43
[brief] With his Motion to Vacate Default Judgment, [...] provided a sworn Certification and supporting documentary evidence showing his address at the time of alleged service to be [...], and not the address where service was purportedly made, [...], which was the residence of [...]’s parents.  (Da49-Da63).  After the April 8 plenary hearing,\(^1\) the Court determined that [...]’s parents’ address constituted [...]’s active mailing address and, consequently, [...] had notice of the 2017 judgment in 2019 (\textit{i.e.}, years after default judgment) and laches barred the relief sought by [...].  (T2 45:3-47:4).  However, “where no service of the summons and complaint have been made on the defendant,” the Court has “previously held that a judgment ‘is absolutely void and of no legal effect for any purpose.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 42:2C-37(b)(1).  Plaintiff then filed a second motion for reconsideration seeking the Court’s intervention to be part of [...]’s wind-up.  (4T6:21-9:24.)  The Trial Court denied her motion for reconsideration without addressing any provisions of NJ RULLCA and improperly categorized Plaintiff’s request to be part of the court-ordered dissolution as requesting additional discovery (4T5:7-8).  (Aa87.)  As a member of [...], Plaintiff should not have been excluded from the dissolution of [...].  Plaintiff’s request for a receiver and Motions for Reconsideration should have been granted.  Therefore, the Trial Court’s Orders denying Plaintiff’s request for a special receiver should be reversed and the matter remanded with a directive for the Trial Court to appoint a special receiver to review the dissolution of [...].  D.