ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In Davis, 219 N.J. at 401, the Court found that plaintiffs, whose children were killed in a hotel fire, did not establish the necessary requirements of their negligence claim because their expert's report was an inadmissible net opinion.  There, plaintiffs sued the defendant fire inspectors for negligently failing to inform the hotel manager of the need to install a sprinkler in a storage closet.  Id. at 402.  Plaintiff's expert asserted in both his report and deposition that a reasonable sprinkler inspector would have informed the owner of the hotel about the need for an additional sprinkler in the closet.  Id. at 410.  While the Court noted that plaintiff's expert referenced several National Fire Protection Association standards in his report and provided a brief discussion of a few fatal fires that may have been fueled by the storage of combustible materials in stairwells, the Court found none of the sources lent support to the expert's conclusions regarding the actions a reasonable inspector would have taken.  Id. at 411-13.  Because plaintiff's expert provided no reference to any written document, or even unwritten custom or practice, his personal view was an inadmissible net opinion.
[brief] Informing Injustice: The Disturbing Use of Jailhouse Informants, [...] (Mar. 6, 2019), https://innocenceproject.org/informing-injustice-the-disturbing-use-of-jailhouse-informants (reporting that incentivized informants played a role in nearly one in five convictions overturned by DNA evidence and “[i]n many wrongful convictions, defendants were not given key information related to the credibility of the jailhouse informants who testified against them including the benefits they received” (emphasis added)); Unreliable and Unregulated Informants, [...], https://innocenceproject.org/unreliable-and-unregulated-informants (last visited Dec. 18, 2023) (explaining jailhouse informants “are explicitly or implicitly incentivized to do so in exchange for some type of benefit” and “[t]hese incentives are often not disclosed or tracked” (emphasis added)). improperly “ma[de] inaccurate factual assertions to the jury” and “press[ed] an argument that [wa]s untrue. ”  Garcia, 245 N.J. at 435; State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 472 (2008) (explaining prosecutorial misconduct includes “statements clearly contrary to evidence that was either included or excluded at trial”).
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 1094 (quoting N.J.A.C. 11:3-4.2).  “Decision point review occurs at certain junctures during the treatment, as designated in the care paths, and may require a second opinion, development of a treatment plan, or case management. ”  *Ibid.* (citing N.J.A.C. 11:3-4.6(b)).  “Decision point is defined as ‘those junctures in the treatment of identified injuries where a decision must be made about the continuation or choice of further treatment . . . . [and] tests. ’”  *Ibid.* (citing N.J.A.C. 11:3-4.2).  Insurers must adopt what is known as a “decision point review plan,” which gives insurers oversight to the payment of PIP benefits to medical providers.  N.J.A.C. 11:3-4.7.  Decision point review plans, for example, allow insurers to specify which treatments require precertification, establish a process for approving further treatments at various decision points, and provide for an internal appeals procedure, among other things.  *Ibid.*  Taken together, these provisions establish the protocols and dispute resolution process for the payment of PIP benefits to medical providers who treat the insurance carrier’s insureds and provide insurance carriers the opportunity to approve or otherwise challenge, through the precertification process or in arbitration, the medical provider’s requests for payment of PIP benefits.  II.
[brief] This Rule was in place when the Permit was issued in 2020 and is still in place, but the Environmental Report nevertheless asserts that the Law mandates the creation of public access at [...]’s property even where Rule does not.  The Environmental Report in question ultimately concludes, without benefit of explanation or discussion, that the reconstruction of the existing bulkhead twenty-four (24) inches waterward of its current location represents a “significant change” in the location of a structure.
[brief] (Pa. 161-165).  Defendant/Respondent filed a Cross-Motion for Reconsideration asking that the November 9, 2023, Order denying Defendant/Respondent’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment be vacated, requesting that the Summary Judgment be entered in favor of Defendant/Respondent [...] and that Plaintiff/Appellant’s Complaint against Defendant/Respondent be dismissed with prejudice.  (Pa. 161-178).  Defendant/Respondent argued that the Trial Court should reconsider the denial of Summary Judgment as there were no questions of fact that remained in the case, just the issue of a legal analysis based upon the agreed upon facts.  Defendant/Respondent argued that the resolution of the issues in this matter via Summary Judgment was appropriate since there were no disputes between the parties as to the facts of the case.  Defendant/Respondent further argued that Summary Judgment should be entered in [...]’s favor since there was no causal connection between the vehicle and Plaintiff’s injuries.  Defendant/Respondent again argued that the vehicle was incidental to Plaintiff/Appellant’s injuries and therefore personal injury protection did not apply.  On January 10, 2024, Oral Argument was held before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. in the Essex County Superior Court (T2).
[brief] Appellant’s Self-Serving, Contradictory Deposition Testimony Does Not Create A Question Of Fact To Preclude Summary Judgment | 17 | | B.  Appellant’s CEPA Claim Is Not Supported By The Credible Record Evidence | 22 | | 1.  Appellant Cannot Establish A Prima Facie Claim of Retaliation Under CEPA | 24 | | 2.  Appellant Cannot Establish A Causal Connection Between His Alleged Whistleblowing Activity And His Termination | 26 | | 3.  Respondent Has Articulated Legitimate Non-Pretextual Reasons for Appellant’s Termination | 30 | | C.  The Motion Judge Properly Dismissed Appellant’s Fraud Claim | 34 | POINT III
[brief] In *Bourbeau*, the First Circuit rejected an insured’s request to expand Appleman’s rule to a third-party CGL liability policy.  There, the insured was retained to remove paint from two buildings in the [...].  While the work was in progress, the [...] notified the insured that paint chips from one of the buildings were contaminating surrounding soil.  49 F.3d at 787.  An adjacent landowner sued the [...] alleging that it had caused lead to be deposited on his land.  The [...] filed a third-party complaint against the insured alleging that his negligence proximately caused the landowner’s injury.  *Ibid.*
[brief] This purported legal malpractice action arises from [...]’s unhappiness that his father [...] released [...]’s Ex-wife ([...]) from a mortgage under which she and [...] were joint mortgagors.  All of the pertinent facts can be gleaned from [...]’s complaint in this action and this Court’s prior opinion deciding the precise issue that plaintiffs raise in this action; whether [...] properly captured [...]’s testamentary intent.  According to his complaint, [...] “purchased property located at [...], in 2002 with financing from his father, [...].  [...] built a two-family house on the property. ”  (Pa000002 at ¶¶s 4-5.)  [...] states that “[i]n 2013, [he] and his wife, [...] Ventre (“[...]”) obtained long-term financing, moved into the house, and [...] was placed on the deed. ” (Id. at ¶6.)  [...] next asserts that he “and [...] began having marital problems between 2010 and 2012.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) makes it a second-degree offense for “[a]ny person [to] knowingly [have] in his possession any handgun, including any antique handgun, without first having obtained a permit to carry the same as provided in N.J.S. 2C:58-4 . . . .”  In order to convict a defendant of this offense, the State must prove: (1) that there was a handgun, (2) that the defendant knowingly possessed the handgun, and (3) that the defendant did not have a permit to possess such a weapon.  Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Unlawful Possession of a Handgun (Second Degree) (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b)” (rev. June 11, 2018).  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d), by contrast, is a fourth-degree offense dealing with any weapon other than a firearm.  Under that statute, a person commits an offense if he “knowingly has in his possession any other weapon [meaning a non-firearm weapon] under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for such lawful uses as it may have .  . . .”  To convict someone of that offense, the State must prove: (1) that there was a weapon, (2) that the defendant knowingly possessed the weapon, and (3) that the defendant’s possession of the weapon was under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for a lawful use.  Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Unlawful Possession of a Weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d)” (rev. Apr. 18, 2018).
[brief] Indeed, [...]’s appeal brief makes no attempt to tie together the underlying checks with the specific type and/or quantity of pipe, other than the circular, conclusory and utterly unsubstantiated statements set forth in Shallan [...]’s March 21, 2203 Certification, (Pa231 – Pa234), discussed infra, at 39-43.  In addition, deposition testimony elicited from Joann [...] and Shallan [...] was contradictory to Joann [...]’s prior filed Certification, submitted per Court Order, wherein Joanne [...] stated under oath that all documents had been provided and specific and exhaustive searches had already been conducted.  (Pa67 – Pa68)  For example, when Shallan [...] was questioned as to whether or not [...] ever issued to [...] a “purchase order, an invoice, a spreadsheet or any documentation to support or memorialize” what materials [...] delivered to [...], Shallan [...] testified that he “would have to go back and check.
[brief] BECAUSE DEFENDANT ULTIMATELY CONSENTED TO A BLOOD DRAW AND HAD HONEST (THOUGH MISGUIDED)  REASONS FOR OPPOSING THE BUCCAL SWAB.  (Partially raised below, 18T27-20 to 32-5)  After a CODIS hit suggested Defendant was the source of the DNA in the saliva found at the scene, the State moved to compel a buccal swab from him.  Defendant directed his attorney to file several briefs opposing the State’s application and refused to provide the swab, stating that he believed the State was acting nefariously because it had already obtained a buccal swab from him upon his arrest and that he had not seen any lab reports regarding the CODIS hit.  After being provided with the desired lab reports, he consented to give a blood sample in lieu of a buccal sample.  Despite this, the trial court allowed the State to present the testimony of [...] of the [...] that Defendant had refused to give a buccal swab and had allegedly told her that “it would be worse for him if he did give a sample. ”  (34T182-6 to 7)  Although a stipulation was read to the jury that a blood sample was taken, the jury was never informed that Defendant consented to the blood draw.  Moreover, the court did not give a limiting instruction to explain to the jury the circumstances under which it could or could not infer consciousness of guilt from this alleged statement and refusal, and gave only a partial instruction under State v. Hampton and State v. Kociolek.  The admission of Marin’s testimony, coupled with the failure to inform the jury that Defendant consented to the blood draw and the incomplete jury instructions, violated due process, fundamental fairness, and deprived Defendant of a fair trial.  U.S. Const. amends.
[brief] 337a-338a (20:10-21:16).  Plaintiff [...], based on the advice, representations, and assurances of Defendants [...] and [...], continued pursuing the project and bought out [...]’s interest in [...].  339a-342a (22:21-25:1).  [...] assured Plaintiff [...] that he would continue to support him with the project in any way Plaintiff [...] needed.  402a (85:7-20); 407a (90:4-20).  Plaintiff [...] continued to try to become the COAH developer.  346a-347a (29:5-30:1).  In fact, at Plaintiff [...]’s request, Defendants [...] and [...] arranged a meeting with [...] to discuss the possibility of Plaintiff [...] entering into a joint venture with them.
[brief] The Applicant applied on or about December 12, 2022 to the [...] (the "Planning Board") for Preliminary and Final Major Site Plan Approval to construct two buildings with four dwelling units each and one building with nine dwelling units with driveway access from Ocean Terrace for a total of 17 residential units necessitating a N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(5) special reasons variance for density wherein each unit will have approximately 1,092 square feet wherein 1,200 square feet is required, and a special reasons variance for height pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(6) of approximately 48.83 feet wherein 40 feet is the maximum allowable height; and bulk variances for a front yard setback of 5 feet wherein 10 feet is required to Ocean Terrace and Porter Avenue; and a driveway width of 24 feet wherein 16 feet is the maximum allowable.  The Planning Board held a public hearing on February 27, 2023, and based upon all of the evidence presented, the exhibits reviewed, and the testimony, granted the application, determining that the Applicant would suffer undue hardship by strict application of the Zoning Ordinance.
[brief] A.  During the meeting he told me that -- the director was talking to me, he said that the investigation was completed, that he couldn't tell me what his discipline would be, but he would assure me that he would be receiving some sort of -- what was it -- some sort of, like, training -- or not training or -- I don't know.  I forget.  I don't know how to explain it.  I kind of brain froze.  He wouldn't -- they couldn't tell me his discipline, but he would be receiving some sort of counseling.  That's what it was.  And they also -- him and [...], they commended me, telling me that it takes a lot to put it on paper because not a lot of people have the confidence to do that.  The director was saying how people historically would wait 20 years down the road to make a complaint and say, hey, this guy did this to me.  And I just -- I reassured them that it bothered me enough that I wanted to let them know what kind of people they have working for them.  Q.
[brief] Contrary to *L.A.*’s instruction, the PCR judge here assessed the credibility of the defendant’s alibi witnesses only in terms of the weight a jury would have ascribed to it.  *L.A.*, 433 N.J. Super. at 15-16 (“the assessment of an absent witness’s credibility is not an end in itself”).  The PCR judge did not assess its interaction with the absence of any physical or forensic evidence or [...]’ uncorroborated pretrial statement which he recanted at trial.  In particular, without espousing the impact [...]’s testimony may have had on the State’s other evidence, the PCR judge merely questioned the cab driver’s “truth[fulness] and veracity. ”  (19T 9-23 to 10-9).  The judge found it “hard to believe” that [...], who he inaccurately described as an “experienced” Newark cabbie at the time, did not remember certain street names.
[directive] Applicants for law enforcement employment are not required to submit a Drug Testing Medication Information form with their specimen.  Therefore, if an applicant tests positive, 7  The agency shall treat a positive test result in these instances consistent with Sections VII and VIII.  12 the law enforcement agency, following notification from the Laboratory, must have the candidate complete the Drug Testing Medication Information form (Attachment D) listing all prescription medication, non-prescription (over-the-counter) medication, dietary supplements, and nutritional supplements that were ingested by the donor during the 14 days prior to the specimen collection.  The Drug Testing Medication Information form shall be placed in an envelope which is sealed by the donor.  The donor shall date and initial the seal, and write their Donor ID on the envelope.  The agency is responsible for submitting the envelope to the Laboratory.  A review of the form will be conducted by the medical review officer as outlined above.  F.
[brief] Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 165 (2005).  Although such dismissals are often without prejudice, “a dismissal with prejudice is ‘mandated where the factual allegations are palpably insufficient to support a claim upon which relief can be granted, [..], or if ‘discovery will not give rise to such a claim. ’”  Mac Property Group LLC, supra, 473 N.J. Super. at 17, quoting, Rieder, supra, 221 N.J. Super. at 552 and Dimitrakopoulos, supra, 237 N.J. at 107.  In the instant matter, the trial court correctly concluded that dismissal of the First Amended Complaint as to [...] was appropriate.  There is no question that the First Amended Complaint was void of any claims against [...] and did not seek any relief against it.  Further, once the trial court denied Appellants leave to amend, there was no reason why the First Amended Complaint should not have been dismissed with prejudice as there were no claims or requests for relief available to Appellants in the Underlying Action.  Given the only pleading extant at the time [...] sought dismissal and the trial court appropriately denied Appellants’ motion for leave to amend was the First Amended Complaint (which did not assert any claims or seek any relief against [...]), the First Amended Complaint should have been dismissed with prejudice pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e).  Accordingly, [...]’s cross-appeal for a “with prejudice” dismissal of the First Amended Complaint should be granted.
[brief] The document specifically acknowledges that [...] was formed under the laws of New Jersey.  (Sa294-296).  The original [...] had been formed on February 8, 2013 with only [...] and [...] as “Members” of the company.  (Da89-99).  By October 11, 2013, [...] was included as a 30% partner, with [...] at 40% and [...] 30%. (Da100-110).  Initially, [...] had been tasked with raising the substantial amount of money to fund the “build out” on the different locations, but in early 2014 with him failing to do so and pressure from the corporate office mounting, [...], in documented communications, e.g. text messages, phone messages, and other communications with his partners, indicated that he would seek investments on behalf of the project because [...] had failed to do so.  [...] confirmed that [...] had his role diminished due to his inability fulfill his promises with respect to soliciting and collecting investments on all of the projects he was involved with.  (1T 170:14 to 171:13).  Naturally, any shares that [...] held prior to being pushed out, were split between [...] and [...], which further shows how involved [...] was financially having gained an additional fifteen percent (15%) interest, all on top of his intimate involvement in working to make these projects successful.  [...] estimated that $1.5 million would be necessary for the build out of the Hoboken location, inclusive of the key money and assets necessary for the leasehold and liquor license maintained by [...]  When he explained that to [...] in detail and discussed his efforts to raise money, [...] engaged in that discussion rather than asking [...] why he was raising money for a project in which he had what the State has maintained was a nominal financial interest.  (Da111).  The valuation of the project was $2.5 million, so everyone involved had an expectation of success.  (Da112).  [...] was able to raise seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($750,000.00) for the Hoboken World of Beer franchise, five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000.00) of which came from one investor, [...].  The remaining shares came from [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].  The State has claimed that [...] lacked the authority to raise that money, despite the fact that [...] was the sole franchisee of World of Beer at the Hoboken location.
[brief] Defendant asserts that the judge read the model charge for second-degree robbery word-for-word, with a small but critical misstatement: In order to prove that the defendant was in the course of committing a *theft*, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant threatened another with, or purposely put another in fear of immediate bodily injury.  (emphasis added).  Defendant claims that this incorrect instruction had the capability of misleading the jury into thinking there was no distinction between second-degree robbery and theft of movable property, resulting in an unjust verdict.  Although not raised below, defendant contends that the court's incorrect instruction on one of the material elements of the crime is clearly plain error, requiring reversal.
[directive] Nothing in this document displaces other existing requirements for law enforcement agencies or officers, such as those established by Attorney General Law Enforcement Directives (“AG Directives”), including AG Directive 2018-2 (mandatory random drug testing), AG Directive 2018-3 (mandatory early warning systems), and AG Directive 2019-4 (independent investigations of use-of-force and death-in-custody incidents).  1.0.9
[directive] Criminal laws concerning weapons, assault, harassment, bias intimidation, and paramilitary activity (see N.J.S.A. 2C:39-14) are among the many potentially relevant statutes.  Moreover, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4.6(a)(6) makes it a criminal offense to knowingly carry a firearm or destructive device in any location being used as a polling place during the conduct of an election and places used for the storage or tabulation of ballots, unless the person is lawfully permitted to carry pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6.  Law enforcement officers called upon to address voter intimidation or obstruction should consider the applicability of both the election laws and generally applicable statutes.  Role of Law Enforcement in Elections
[brief] Other courts have already held that the [...] subscription service qualifies as a false claims act “news media” source.  See 1T at 14:14–25; Repko, 2011 WL 3875987, at *8, aff’d, 490 F. App’x 502; Rosenberg, 2019 WL 3643035, at *11, aff’d sub nom.  Rosenberg, 169 N.E.3d 445.  So too should this court, and for good reason.
[brief] In [...] and [...], the insureds made the same arguments as [...] does here regarding the Schmidt case as controlling authority.  In [...], the insured argued:  Schmidt . . . controls, that it should be enforced against [[...]] by this Court, that the purported coverage gap created by [[...]] should be filled and that the seamless coverage that is provided by law [i.e., N.J.S.A 34:15-72] and was expected by [...] Company should be implemented.  [Ja516, 2006 NJ S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 150.2.]  In [...], the insured argued that if Exclusion C.5 had been substantively addressed in Schmidt, 155 N.J. at 51, the Court would have held it to be void under N.J.S.A. 34:15-72.  Ja508, 2006 NJ S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 159.  [...] makes those same arguments in this appeal.  Pb11.  The Supreme Court, however, did not adopt the insureds’ arguments and concluded that the exclusion as it existed at that time violated statutory requirements for insurance coverage.  In neither [...] nor [...] did the Supreme Court rely upon or otherwise suggest that N.J.S.A. 34:15-72 or -87 required coverage for the intentional conduct of the employer.