ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS ...........................................................................................................  i  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................  iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..............................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .....................................................................................................  2  STATEMENT OF FACTS .....................................................................................................  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................  5  I.  THE BOARD’S DECISION TO APPROVE the Application for Preliminary and Final Subdivision Approval was Arbitrary, CAPRICIOUS, and UNREASONABLE and violates the Municipal Land Use law, Therefore the Approval must be reversed and remanded.  (Pa304-Pa306)...  7  A.  The Trial Court Erred In Determining that Applicant Had Met the Requirements of the Township Ordinances for Preliminary and Final Subdivision Approval.  (Pa304-Pa306)..................................................................................  9  B.  The Trial Court Erred In Finding That The Board Did Not Hear Contrary Testimony Pertaining to the Subdivision Application When The Record Reflects That The Board Prohibited Such Testimony.  (Pa312, 2T24-21 to 2T25-20)..............................................................................................................  15  C.  The Trial Court Erred in Holding that the Submission of the EIA was Sufficient Is Contrary to the Requirements Under the MLUL.  (Pa311-Pa313; 2T25-21 to 2T27).  ..............................................................................................................  19  D.  The Trial Court Erred in Finding That a Review of the Application by Board Professionals or that a Conclusion that There Will Be No Impacts is Sufficient Reasoning to Prohibit Public Review and Comment on Application Materials.  (Pa311-Pa313; 2T25-21 to 2T27)...........................................  23  II.  The Applicant Must Meet the Requirements of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-38 and [...] Ordinances §§ 142-77 and 142-78 Even Though the Application Has Been Bifurcated.  (Pa305-Pa306).  ...........................................  25  CONCLUSION
[directive] Each local and county law enforcement agency shall record each individual police officer’s completion of this requirement, and maintain such record in its regular course of business.  The record should be readily available to the County Prosecutor’s Office or Attorney General’s Office, upon request.  All State Police Officers shall report to the Superintendent, or his designee, the satisfaction of this requirement.  The Superintendent shall ensure that each state police officer has received the required training within one year of the effective date of this Law Enforcement Directive.
[brief] A.A. 240 N.J. 341 (2020).  Therefore, prior to the interrogation of a juvenile, “a parent or legal guardian should be present in the interrogation room, whenever possible. ”  State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304 (citing State in the Interest of S.H., 61 N.J. 108, 114-115 (1972).  “In the context of a juvenile interrogation … the parent serves as advisor to the juvenile, someone who can offer a measure of support in the unfamiliar setting of the police station. ”  *State in re A.S.* 203 N.J. at 315 (citing *Gallegos v. Colorado*, 370 U.S. 49 (1962)).  Specifically, the A.S. Court stated, “the mere presence of a parent is insufficient to protect a juvenile’s rights because presence alone cannot be said to provide the buffer between police and the juvenile that [the Court was contemplating] in *Presha.*”  *Id.* at 148.
[brief] 1.  To the extent not already done, [...] shall promptly produce copies of the e-mails exchanged between defendant [...] and [...] that the Court reviewed *in camera* and Ordered to be produced on December 20, 2012.  [...] shall also produce all [...]/[...] e-mails that reference the two files referred to in plaintiff's complaint.  Counsel shall confer to agree upon the names of the files.  The produced documents are designated Confidential pursuant to the Discovery Confidentiality Order entered in the case; and 2.
[brief] 10  i.  This Matter of Constitutional Magnitude ............................................................................................  13  ii.  Chancery Division Venue Defects Constituted Trial Error Which Requires Vacatur Of The Chancery Division  Order filed in this Law Division Docket  [1T]  .................................................................  17 v. Chancery Division Judge Was Not Competent To Adjudicate The Action In Lieu Of Prerogative Writs And Erred And Abused Discretion In Doing So.  [1T]  .................................................................  20 vii.  The Chancery Division Judge (Trial Court) Abused Its Discretion And Erred By Usings Its Powers To Nullify Civil Rights Legislation As Moot On The Basis Of Defendants Acts Of Retaliation Against Plaintiff's Civil Action And When It Failed To Comply With Or Enforce Legislation At N.J.S. 10:6-2 Because Plaintiff's Complaint Invoked The NJCRA And Was Not "Moot"; [1T]  ........................................................................................................................................  25 viii.  The Chancery Division Judge (Trial Court) Abused Its Discretion And Erred When It Failed To Respect To Plaintiff's Choice Of Forum because it Was Entitled To Preferential Consideration  ........................................................................................................................................  28  ix.  The Chancery Division Judge (Trial Court) Erred And Abused Its Discretion as to the Accrual of a Civil Rights Claim and erroneously rendered Civil Rights Complaint (Claims) as Moot Because Defendants Granting Of Denied Adjournment Request Was done In Retaliation For Plaintiff's Resort To Legal Process In Response To The Unlawful Refusals To Multiple Adjournment Request(s) was a clear Violation Of The First Amendment And N.J. Const. Art.  I Guarantee Free Access To The Courts and the deprivation of a right does not extinguish simply because the right is respected by defendants after they are sued for depriving the rights [1T] ....  30 x.  Trial Court's Irrationally Decided That Plaintiffs Civil Rights Were Not Violation Because He Was Granted Adjournments Prior To Being Removed, Locked Out, And Belongings Stored And Said Decision Was Arbitrary, Capricious, Error And An Abuse Of Discretion Because The Interference Or Deprivation Of His Right To Adjournments Upon Request Was Not Extinguished By Granting The Denied Request After Civil Action In Response To The Denials and said decision follows the Trial Court's acknowledgment that request were in fact refused prior to civil action [1T]  ........................................................................................................  32 xi.  Because Of Lack Of Jurisdiction Over The Subject Matter Is Appealed Without Having Been Transferred, The Appellate Court May Decide The Appeal as a Result of the Chancery Division Judge Error and Abuse of Discretion
[directive] Notifications to the County Prosecutor  (h)  Where a preliminary investigation indicates the possibility of a criminal act on the part of the subject officer, the County Prosecutor must be notified immediately.  No further action should be taken, including the interviewing of, or the filing of charges against the officer, until the County Prosecutor so directs.  (i)  Pursuant to AG Directive 2019-4, the agency must notify the County Prosecutor immediately of any use of deadly force, any use of force by an officer that results in death or serious bodily injury, or any death in custody that occurs within its jurisdiction.  (j)  In the rare cases where the agency has not made a charging decision within 180 days of receiving a complaint, the agency must notify the County Prosecutor, who may take whatever steps he or she deems appropriate, including supersession of the investigation, to ensure prompt resolution of the matter.  Recordkeeping & Data Reporting (k)
[brief] (213a) (218a) (221a, 1st 3 par.; 222a, 4th par., to end) [...]’s $124,399 work ($10,902 for Nov. 11, ‘21 to Jan. 31, ‘22, & $113,497 for Feb. 1 to Oct. 25, ‘22) would have been AVOIDED if [...] agreed to work on a readily/rationally, achievable Settlement w/[...] & me w/o any Court filings.  All legal work was due to repeated oppositions to Settlement, & unnecessary Court filings by parties that led to Oct. ‘22 Order.  Legal cost would have been less (around $5K) if they had worked on Settlement based on details that [...] & I would first agree to (392a-395a, par. 15-16).  Oct ‘22 Rider didn’t allow my Accounting Exceptions due to invalid reasons (see also p. 1&2) that I refuted in Reconsideration Motion, incl. rejecting past Trust payments ([...]’s $15,022, [...]’s $74,248, & [...]’ $31,259 fees) (162a-169a, par. 4-25) (170a-185a, par. 27-59)
[brief] Exhibit 29, Brower v. Wirtgen Group, 2012 WL 3030242 (App. Div. Jul. 26, 2012) (unpublished), filed April 26, 2018 Exhibit 30, Mann v. Heil Packer, 2010 WL 98883 (App. Div. Jan. 13, 2010) (unpublished), filed April 26, 2018 Exhibit 31, Bergen v. Able Energy, Inc., 2009 WL 222943 (App. Div. Feb. 2, 1999) (unpublished), filed April 26, 2018 Exhibit 32, Jarosz v. G&B LLC, 2013 WL 5268926 (App. Div. Sep. 19, 2013) (unpublished), filed April 26, 2018 Exhibit 33, Fendt v. Abrahams, 2013 WL 1405096 (App. Div. Apr. 9, 2013) (unpublished), filed April 26, 2018 Exhibit 34, Soto v. ICO Polymers N.A., 2017 WL 4530602 (App. Div. Oct. 11, 2017) (unpublished), filed April 26, 2018 Exhibit 35, McNulty v. Dover Mun. Util. Auth., 2007 WL 102587 (App. Div. Jan. 17, 2007) (unpublished), filed April 26, 2018
[brief] Had the jury been provided the appropriate diminished capacity charge, it would have been firmly told that, in considering whether the State had reached its burden, it “must give the defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt about whether his[] mental functioning was such as to render him[] incapable of acting with the required state of mind . . . .”  “Diminished Capacity” Charge.  The murder/manslaughter instructions of course contained no such language.  If the trial court truly believed such evidence did not support diminished capacity, then it never should have been admitted.  Once it was admitted, it was incumbent on the trial court to provide a diminished capacity instruction.  At that point, it should have been left to the jury to decide whether or not the evidence warranted convicting [...] of a lesser offense or no offense at all.  [...]’s mental health issues played a key role in his case and served as the basis for defense counsel’s argument that, at most, he was guilty of a lesser-included manslaughter offense because his diminished capacity negated the purposeful mens rea necessary to substantiate a murder conviction.  The trial court’s refusal to allow an instruction on diminished capacity therefore functionally foreclosed one of [...]’s key defenses.  When a defendant’s mental health issues are “the heart of the case,” it is reversible error for a trial court to refuse a diminished capacity instruction.  State v. Nataluk, 316 N.J. Super. 336, 347 (App. Div. 1998).  Because the refusal to charge on diminished capacity foreclosed a key defense that was a substantial part of the trial, [...]’s convictions must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.
[brief] DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ABBREVIATE TRANSCRIPTS IS A REVERSIBLE ERROR  EMANATING FROM THE MOTION  JUDGE'S MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW AS TO THE CONTENTS OF THE TRIAL TRANSCRIPT.  THE MOTION  JUDGE'S CONCLUSION THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW  APPEAR IN THE TRIAL TRANSCRIPT MISCONCEIVES THE LAW AND IS THEREBY SUBJECT TO DE NOVO REVIEW.  (Pa1331-32)  Trial court denied plaintiff's motion to abbreviate transcript by concluding that "the only manner in which the reviewing Court will be possessed of the myriad findings of fact and conclusions of law is by receiving the entirety of the trial transcript."  (Pa1332).  The denial rests on the motion judge's grievous misunderstanding that the trial transcript contains findings of fact and conclusions of law and betrays an incredible ignorance of Rule 1:7-4(a) which provides that "[t]he court shall by an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon . . . on every motion decided by a written order that is appealable as of right . . ."  Simply put, the trial court is required by law to state its findings of fact and conclusions of law in its final order or judgement.  Further, in the matter of Pardo v. Dominquez, 382 N.J. Super. 489 (App. Div. 2006), the Appellate Division rejected the suggestion that a judge's comment or question in a colloquy during court proceedings can provide the reasoning for an opinion which requires findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Id. at 492  Therefore, from Rule 1:7-4(a) and Pardo it follows that the trial court’s findings of facts and conclusions of law appear in the final order of the trial court, not in the trial transcript.  As the May 3 order notes, in the instant case, the trial court issued an elaborate 64-page final Judgement of Divorce (JOD) written decision with the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The final JOD 64-page opinion (Pa1) included as the first item in the appellant’s appendix permits a proper review of the arguments which for the most part contend that the trial court failed to correctly apply the law to its largely undisputed factual findings.  The denial of the motion to abbreviate transcripts has its underpinning in the inexperienced motion judge’s fundamental misconception of law that findings of fact and conclusions of law are contained in the trial transcript.  If the judge misconceives or misapplies the law, his discretion lacks a foundation and becomes an arbitrary act.  When that occurs, the reviewing court should adjudicate the matter in light of the applicable law to avoid a manifest denial of justice.  *In re Presentment of Bergen Cty. Grand Jury*, 193 N.J. Super. 2, 9 (App.Div. 1984).  **POINT VIII**
[brief] Pa3.  In any event, here and in the Trial Court, [...] *has responded* to the claims that he learned the “potential strengths and weaknesses of [...]’s position and potential settlement position. ”  His complaints regarding his inability to properly address [...]’s motion to disqualify are therefore unfounded.  Respondents’ reference to *Sturdivant v. Sturdivant*, 367 Ark. 514, 241 S.W. 3d 740 (2006), which was cited in *O Builders*, is misplaced.  RB22.  There, the wife’s lawyer was disqualified because husband consulted with a member of wife’s lawyer’s firm and discussed extensive information directly at issue in that case.  That is exactly what happened here.
[brief] I.  THE HOOD LAWSUIT SHOULD HAVE BEEN COVERED UNDER THE CCIP BECAUSE [...] WAS AN ENROLLED INSURED IN THE CCIP AND ITS COVERAGE WAS NEVER CANCELLED (PA2739-PA2752)  Put simply, [...] was enrolled in the CCIP at the time of the Hood accident and was never formally notified of any purported cancellation of its insurance.  In ruling on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court ignored New Jersey’s long-established policy enforcing cancellation requirements to protect insureds.  If affirmed, such a new rule that fails to enforce insurance cancellation requirements will invite ambiguity and uncertainty about the state of a contractor’s insurance at any given time, and undoubtedly result in contractors being unwittingly stripped of insurance to compensate injured parties.  That is not, and cannot now, be the law in New Jersey.
[brief] B.  The “[...]” Profile Information Was Crucial to the Defense.  To be material, the evidence must possess exculpatory value and be of a nature that the defendant cannot obtain comparable evidence.  Dreher, 302 N.J. Super. at 483, (California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984)).  The defendant does not have to prove that he will be acquitted if the Brady evidence was produced, but must merely show that, in the absence of the evidence, he would not receive a fair trial.  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.  There is no dispute that the discovery at issue was crucial to the defense.
[brief] ”  Id. at 460.  “[S]uch testimony sets forth facts that are not so outside the ken of jurors that they need an expert to spell out for them whether that defendant engaged in a criminal transaction and that offering an expert in those circumstances would be improper. ”  Ibid.  No lay witness may opine as to the ultimate issue of guilt, either.  See State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425, 445-47 (2020) (holding lieutenant’s testimony that defendant’s actions “appeared to be criminal” was impermissible lay testimony but was not plain error due to the clear video and document evidence showing defendant’s guilt); Moreover, even if a statement is improper, when the strength of the State’s case is overwhelming, it is considered harmless error.
[brief] Finally, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in failing to address their meritless claim for attorney’s fees.  Plaintiffs claim that [...]’s alleged negligence in drafting an allegedly ambiguous Will caused plaintiffs’ damages in the form of attorney’s fees to litigate the matter.  This claim is groundless on many fronts.  First, and most basically, there is no privity between plaintiffs and [...] with respect to the drafting of the Will.  [...] was [...]’s only client.  The issue of privity is extensively discussed in Pivnick.  There, defendant argued that the absence of privity precluded the legal malpractice claim entirely.  This Court held that a person in plaintiff’s position (as a potential beneficiary) had standing to assert a legal malpractice claim with certain safeguards such as a heightened burden of proof.  However, this Court never remotely suggested that the attorney would have to finance the efforts of the nonclient seeking to enforce his personal view of testamentary intent.  [...] was not [...]’s client on the Will, and he has no entitlement to seek damages based on the expense of his failed litigation.  The absence of privity precludes such a claim.
[brief] The court in Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399 (1985), articulated the substantial factor test in increased-risk cases, “when there is evidence that a defendant's negligent act or omission increased the risk of harm to one in the plaintiff's position and that the harm was in fact sustained, it becomes a question for the jury as to whether or not that increased risk was a substantial factor in producing the harm. ”  The "judge's function is not himself [or herself] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."  Id. at 549 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.  Summary judgment should only be granted, if the evidence "is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law [...]"  Id. at 540.  R. 4:49-2, which governs all motions to alter or amend a judgment or order, states, “the motion shall state with specificity the basis on which it is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred.
[brief] ### CASES  **Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc. **, 208 N.J. 114, 137, 26 A.3d 430, 444 (2011)  ...........................................  14, 15  **Carfax v. Payless Auto Wholesale**, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3801, *7 (citations omitted)  ...............  4  **F.G. v. MacDonell**, 150 N.J. 550 (1997)  ..................  4  **Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Int’l Union v. Wickes Cos.**, 243 N.J. Super. 44, 46, 578 A.2d 402 (Law Div.1990) .................................  4  **Lieberman v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.**, 132 N.J. 76, 622 A.2d 1295, 1296 ..............................................  3  **Printing Mart v. Sharp Elecs.**, 116 N.J. 739, 772, 563 A.2d 31 (1989) .................................................. 3, 4 **Rippon v. Smigel**, 449 N.J.Super. 344, 367, 158 A.3d 23, 37 (2017) (citations omitted) ............................  14  **Seidenberg v. Summit Bank**, 348 N.J. Super. 243 (App. Div. 2002) .....................................................  4  **Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.**, 109 N.J. 189, 192, 536 A.2d 237 (1988)  .............................................  4  ### RULES  **R. 4:6-2(e)** ......................................................  3, 4 **R. 4:9-1** ..........................................................  5  ### TREATISES  **Restat. 2d of Judgments**, §28 ................................  15  Introduction
[brief] Thus, the mere presence of contamination above NJDEP acceptable levels is a determination that the contaminants pose a detriment to public health and safety.  The Board Planner testified that based on the Property’s need for remediation, if the remediation is not completed, the contamination poses a detriment to the public health and safety of the community.  (T1, 8:23-9:3).  This conclusion is appropriate as a matter of law.  Thus, the Trial Court erred in concluding that there was no substantial, credible evidence of detriment.
[brief] Exhibit A: Court Record  1.  Record Request Form 8/10/2023 .................................................................  1  2.  NJ e-Filing Clerk Notice EF-2142561 .........................................................  2  3.  SSCORECORDREQ MAIL BOX w PDF attached ...........................................  3  4.  Exile File Print of Records in PDF in Item Order ...........................................  4  5.  Exile File Print of Records in PDF in Sorted Order by Date ............................  5  ### Exhibit B: Defendants’ Affidavits of Service