ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Deputy Attorney General On the Brief # TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS | 4 | | ARGUMENT | | | POINT I | | | THE HOLDING COMPANY ACT APPLIES TO RECIPROCAL EXCHANGES | 11 | | POINT II | | | SSAP NO. 25 APPLIES TO TRANSFERS OF FUNDS BETWEEN THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT AND THE EXCHANGE | 25 | | POINT III | | | THE BULLETIN IS NOT A DE FACTO RULE | 31 | | POINT IV | | | PENDING LEGISLATION IS NOT AN INDICATOR OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT | 34 | | POINT V | | | THE BULLETIN DOES NOT WORK AN IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT UNDER EITHER THE FEDERAL OR STATE CONSTITUTION | 36 | | CONCLUSION | 39 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Aftab v. N.J. Prop.-Liab. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, | 17 | | 386 N.J. Super. 41 (App. Div. 2006) | | | Airwork Service Division v. Director, Division of Taxation, | 32, 33 | | 97 N.J. 290 (1984) | | | Berg v. Christie, | 36 | | 225 N.J. 245 (2016) | | | Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Bryan, | 14, 15, 16 | | 388 N.J. Super. 550 (App. Div. 2006) | | | Coal. of Health Care Professionals v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking & Ins., | 35 | | 323 N.J. Super. 207 (App. Div.
[directive] Consistent this to pursuant authorized maybe 17(c) as except risk, flight relating conditions to pretrial release for option bail last monetary the as relegates that accordance in only be overcome can bail monetary that seeking against presumption a be shall there subsection 6.3.3.  in forth and set with process criteria the of imposition requesting presumption against the overcome determining to whether In material a have that circumstances facts and only those shall consider prosecutor a bail, monetary required.  Facts when court in appear not would released if defendant risk the that the on bearing than offense the other activity, criminal new commit might defendant risk that the to only relevant or or obstruct crime violent a commit or might N.J.S.A. 2C:29-7, of violation in jumping bail of the overcome to whether deciding in be considered not shall process, criminal the obstruct to attempt in Section. this established bail monetary seeking against presumption gang, a with affiliation defendant's as such facts, a case-specific some that however, Note, See intimidation. witness and/or violence of risk the of and flight risk the to both relevant be may and facts the in specifying precise analytically be should therefore, Prosecutors, 10.
[brief] *State v. Brown*, 236 N.J. 497, 520 (2019).  “The significance of the nondisclosure ‘depends primarily on the importance of the [evidence] and the strength of the State’s case against [a] defendant as a whole. ’”  *Ibid.* (quoting *State v. Marshall*, 123 N.J. 1, 200 (1991)).  “Evidence that is merely cumulative does not create a reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been affected. ”  *State v. Carter*, 91 N.J. 86, 114 (1982).
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT .........................................................................................3  I.  DEFENDANTS LARGELY DO NOT DISPUTE THE LOWER COURT’S ERRORS (8a, 9a, 17a).  .................................................................3  II.  DEFENDANTS CANNOT DISPUTE THE LOWER COURT’S FAILURE TO CONDUCT  A NUANCED ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE RETALIATORY ACTIONS WERE MATERIALLY ADVERSE (5a, 8a, 9a, 17a)  ............5  III.  THE LOWER COURT DID NOT MAKE A CREDIBLE FINDING REGARDING CAUSAL CONNECTION (9a)  .............................................10  IV.  THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS KUCINSKI AND DANCHECK-MARTIN ARE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY (10a-14a)  .......................11  V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING NJLAD CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS (9a-18a)  ..............................................................................................................14  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................15
[brief] However, because these arguments were not waived, [...] should not have to withdraw from the plea agreement to advance them. supports its argument.  (Sb 25, n.6)  While the State contends that the Baum Court found that a threat to bring drug dogs did not overwhelm the driver’s will, the Court specifically conditioned its finding on the fact that the police had reasonable suspicion of drugs.  Id. at 290.  The fact that our Supreme Court in State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521 (2017), has since made clear that reasonable suspicion is only necessary to use drug dogs where their use prolongs the detention, only means that the police can lawfully threaten to use drug dogs where their use would not prolong the detention or where the police have reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention.  Otherwise, the police are threatening to engage in unlawful conduct by threatening to use drug dogs, which is coercive.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] The trial court erred in finding that Defendants satisfied this prong of equitable fraud because material issues of facts were present in the record.  The trial court improperly relied on the conclusory statement in the [...] Certification in holding that “had [...] been candid and disclosed the complaints and decision from the Disciplinary Review Panel in his application, [...] would not have issued a policy providing coverage to the law firm. ”  [3T27-17]  The trial court reached this conclusion based solely upon [...]’s claim that:  “I can say unequivocally and without qualification that [...] would not have issued the 2016 Policy had the Disciplinary Complaint been disclosed. ”  [Pa445, ¶ 19]  The trial court should not have relied on [...]’s statement and, in so doing, committed reversible error for three reasons.  First, the trial court improperly concluded that [...]’s statement was credible for purposes of granting summary judgment.  The trial court should have left it to the jury to assess [...]’s credibility and not usurped its role.  Conrad v. Michelle & John, Inc., 349 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 2007) (“In the context of a summary judgment motion, the judge does not weigh the evidence or resolve credibility disputes.  These functions are uniquely and exclusively performed by a jury. ”)  The trial court’s conclusion is particularly egregious because [...]’s claim that Defendants would not have issued a policy is contradicted by the Underwriting Policy he attached to his Certification.  Defendants’ Underwriting Policy, to which [...] was bound in assessing the Policy Applications, does not support [...]’s claim of denial.  Rather, it provides that “[i]f a firm or individual attorney has a pattern of disciplinary complaints (frequency and/or systemic issues), or any suspensions in the past 5 years then the account is a decline. ”  [Pa452 (emphasis added)]  Even if we accept that the OAE Proceedings constitute a Disciplinary Proceeding, it was a single event, without any frequency or systemic issues.  Further, [...] has never been suspended.  The record thus supports a finding that, if disclosed, the OAE Proceedings would not have resulted in a denial—certainly, not an “unequivocal and without qualification” denial.  The conflict between [...]’s bald assertion and the Underwriting Policy is not one that the trial court should have resolved on summary judgment as it required a credibility determination—one that not only the trial court should not have made, but which it could not do so based on the conflict.  Resolution of the conflict between [...]’s claim and Defendants’ Underwriting Policy belongs exclusively to the jury.
[brief] At all relevant times, Respondents [...] and [...] are single and/or joint employers of Appellant within the meaning of the NJLAD and New Jersey state law.  (Pa000001, ¶¶ 2-4).  Upon information and belief, Respondents [...] and [...]’ operations are interrelated and unified, and they share common management, centralized control of labor relations, common ownership, common control, common business purposes, and interrelated business goals.  See id. at ¶ 4.  Further, Respondents [...] and [...] jointly determine and manage the pay practices, rates of employee pay and method of payment, maintenance of employee records and personnel policies, and practices and decisions with respect to the employees.  See id.  On or about January 18, 2022, Appellant began working for Respondents [...] and [...] as a clinical research educator, working at Respondent [...]’ New Brunswick location at [...].  See id. at ¶¶ 14.  At all times throughout her employment, she performed her job duties in an exemplary fashion, loyally committed to Respondents [...] and [...] and the patients which they served.  See id. at ¶¶ 15.  However, despite her demonstrated ability to maintain the highest levels of job performance, her career was quickly derailed after she requested reasonable accommodations for her disability and rather than engage Appellant in the interactive process, Respondents instead terminated Appellant’s employment in retaliation for her request for same.  See id. at ¶¶ 16-17.  2.  Appellant is diagnosed with a rare medical disability which forces her to take a brief medical leave of absence and immediately faces discrimination and retaliation because of her disclosure of same and requests for reasonable accommodations in connection with same.
[brief] Under N.J.S.A. 52:13B-6 to -14, after a bill is introduced, it is reviewed by the Legislative Budget and Finance Officer who determines whether it “may increase or decrease expenditures or increase or decrease revenues of the State or any political subdivision thereof,” and if so, refers a request for a fiscal note to the Executive Branch.  N.J.S.A. 52:13B-6.  Once the various entities in the Executive Branch complete the note, it is returned to the Legislative Budget and \textsuperscript{14}  https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/public-info-assistance (last visited April 19, 2024).  Finance Officer.  N.J.S.A. 52:13B-7.  If the Legislative Budget and Finance Officer does not receive a fiscal note “by a date consistent with legislative consideration,” the OLS shall prepare a fiscal note “as soon as practicable. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:13B-9.  The fiscal note or OLS estimate is then sent to the sponsor of the bill, and later published.  N.J.S.A. 52:13B-10, -11.  Petitioners contend that the Legislature failed to follow this process because the fiscal note was produced on January 18, 2022, after Chapter 375 was enacted.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  Pursuant to N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, para. 4, the New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted R. 2:2-3(a)(2), which contemplates that every proceeding to review the action or inaction of a state administrative agency would be by appeal to the New Jersey Appellate Division.  Thus, the rule mandates the exclusive allocation to the Appellate Division of review of both final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer, and the validity of any rule promulgated by such agency or officer.  R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011).  Under New Jersey Court Rules, appeals may be taken to the Appellate Division "to review final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer[]"  R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  Appellate Courts do not render advisory opinions or function in the abstract.  N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. State, 88 N.J. 605, 612 (1982).
[brief] Importantly, however, neither [...] nor [...] has cast blame upon the other for the miscommunication, or the happening of the Accident.  [...] has not contradicted [...]’s testimony, nor has he testified that [...] did not relay instructions about what specific cut-through to use.  Instead, [...] explained that, over the CB radio, he only heard the word “cutoff,” and consequently used his judgment to use the paved cut-through instead of the unpaved, grassy cut-through.  Da46-47, 29:15-30:3.  Also of significance, [...] has never disputed the fact that [...] was acting within the scope of his employment with [...] when the Accident occurred.  In fact, [...] has admitted that [...] was an agent under its control at the time the accident occurred.  Da292.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Then, Defense counsel presented to the jury his own theme of the case.  Counsel drew two doodles on the courtroom easel – one of a juror with a dunce cap, and another of a juror labeled “common sense” – explaining:  Now, many times – many times a juror comes to trial, and they think that – they think that when they come to trial there is a special hat they have to wear, that they have to think differently because they are now a juror.  Well, no one is wearing a juror hat.  What you have – what you have is common sense.  And that’s why we have a jury of our peers.  (Pa25-26; 3T, at 13:13-22).  Similar to Plaintiff’s counsel, Defense counsel addressed the stipulated liability of the case in relation to their theme.  “Yeah.  It was our fault,” they admitted, before imploring the jury to compare the footage of the collision, and photographs of the damage, to Plaintiff’s claimed injuries, and to “[u]se your common sense. ”  (3T, at 14:18-21).  Plaintiff was called as the first witness, and requested to stand as an accommodation for his injuries (3T, at 16:24-17:2).  Neither counsel, nor [...], found this request objectionable, so Plaintiff was permitted to testify standing up in the witness box.  Plaintiff testified to his account of the collision, above, and did so with the assistance of security camera footage from the drive-thru (3T, at 24:23-28:19).
[directive] The confusion caused by these issues can be alleviated several ways.  One way is to separate the investigations by time—the criminal investigation is completed first and then the administrative investigation may follow.  Another way is to conduct bifurcated investigations.  In a bifurcated investigation, the responsibility for a criminal investigation is separated from that for an administrative investigation.  Thus, one investigator (typically from the prosecutor's office) is assigned the responsibility of gathering evidence of criminal wrongdoing while a second (typically the internal affairs investigator from the subject officer's agency) is assigned the responsibility of gathering evidence of a disciplinary infraction.  8.1.5
[directive] If officers issue a Step 4: If Warnings Goes Unheeded, Issue warning to an individual during Step 2 and the person nonetheless violates Section 33- 11.1, then the officers should promptly charge that person by complaint-summons.  The officers need not wait a specified amount of time after issuing the warning before charging the person; as soon as the warned individual indicates their refusal to comply with the law, the officer may issue the complaint-summons.  The officer need not charge the person if the individual is making good-faith efforts to restore the illegally evicted occupant to their residence.  In most cases, the defendant will be charged with a disorderly persons offense.  If, however, the defendant has been previously convicted of a Section 33-11.1 violation during the past five years, then the violation should be charged as a fourth-degree crime.  II.
[directive] 귀하가 유죄를 인정하는 경우, 귀하의 운전면허가 6개월 내지 2년 동안 1.  몰수당한다는 것을 알고 있습니까?  Do you understand that if you plead guilty you will be required to forfeit your driver’s license for a period of time between 6 months and 2 years?
[directive] Handling of Injured Suspects 2012]7  [Amended May 3, 6  On June 12, 2012 the Attorney General issued a Directive to Prevent Concurrent or Sequential Use of a Flammable Aerosol Spray Device and a CED.  This Directive required all law enforcement agencies to immediately remove from service any aerosol spray devices that emit a flammable substance to eliminate the possibility that the electric spark from a CED dart/electrode could inadvertently ignite a flammable substance contained in some oleoresin capsicum (OC) sprays or similar aerosol spray devices, thereby resulting in injury or death.  This June 12, 2012 Directive remains in full force and effect.
[brief] Trial court’s failure to acknowledge, much less address plaintiff’s core argument leads to a logical inference that the judge adjudicated the motion in a predetermined manner without reading the moving certification and considering the central argument therein.  Illustratively, consider the leading argument on appeal in Docket # [...] that the trial court erred in distributing marital assets based on legally impermissible considerations of fault and without weighing all 16 factors under the NJ equitable distribution statute.  (Pa1372-82)  Put differently, the argument is that reasons articulated in the 64-page JOD decision are not legally permissible grounds for distributing parties’ marital assets.  Common sense and logic dictate that the Appellate Division only needs to review the detailed equitable distribution analysis running into 20-plus pages (Pa36-57) within the 64-page JOD opinion to determine whether the appellant’s contentions have merit or not.  Other than conclusory statements or reliance on irrelevant factors such as the length of the divorce trial, the trial court does not offer any tenable explanation in the May 3 order for its determination that the Appellate Division would need to review the entire trial transcript.  For the rest of the arguments, see Pa1355-1417.  Fundamentally and logically, the reason why a complete trial transcript is not required is that the appellant’s legal arguments in Docket # [...] are based on the trial court’s findings of facts and legal conclusions, as stated in the 64-page March 1, 2023 JOD opinion and the transcript of the May 30, 2023 hearing (designated as the “3T” transcript).
[brief] “2T” refers to the transcript of the trial on April 15, 2025.  statute, the process of counting and canvassing ballots involved both the Board and the Fire Commissioners.  In a Fire District election, the Fire Commissioner is responsible for canvassing the machine ballots and certifying the results, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-77, while the Board’s role is limited to counting the vote-by-mail ballots and provisional ballots.  See N.J.S.A. 19:63-17 and N.J.S.A. 19:53C-13.  The Board’s participation in the contested matter was limited to its decisions to accept or reject certain mail-in ballots, and it takes no position with respect to the outcome of the February 15, 2025 Fire District Election.
[brief] It is unaware of any contrary unpublished opinion.  laws adopted by some, but not all states); Frey, 661 F. Supp. 3d at 197 (surveying diverse state and local regulations, including licensing requirements); Baird, 2023 WL 9050959, at *24 (Sa20) (same); Koons, 673 F. Supp. 3d at 565-67 (overviewing various colonial disarmament laws).  Indeed, the U.S. Constitution embraces the “worthy virtues of federalism and democracy,” including as to gun regulation.  Bianchi v. Brown, 111 F.4th 438, 447 (4th Cir. 2024) (en banc); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 785 (2010) (Second Amendment does not eliminate State’s “ability to devise solutions to social problems that suit local needs and values”); Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 412 (7th Cir. 2015) (agreeing that “the Constitution establishes a federal republic where local differences are cherished as elements of liberty, rather than eliminated in a search for national uniformity”).
[brief] In accordance with a Stipulated Scheduling Order, Defendants filed on January 5, 2024 a renewed motion to dismiss the FAC for lack of jurisdiction.  --- \(^2\)  Plaintiff removed [...] as a named defendant in the FAC and later filed a Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice as to [...].  Da131.  \(^3\)  The parties expressly agreed that Defendants’ participation in jurisdictional discovery was without waiver of their jurisdictional challenge and would not constitute consent to jurisdiction.  Da137–38.  Da138.  On January 26, 2024, Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ motion and filed a cross-motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, following which Defendants filed a reply and opposition to Plaintiff’s cross-motion.  Da2–10.  The Trial Court held oral argument on the motions on March 1, 2024.  In Orders dated March 13, 2024, the Trial Court denied both Defendants’ motion to dismiss and Plaintiff’s cross-motion for leave to amend.  Da1–19; Da20.  In an accompanying Statement of Reasons, Da1–19, the Trial Court concluded, among other things, that it could exercise transient jurisdiction, general jurisdiction, and specific jurisdiction over Defendants in New Jersey, and that it has subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff cured during the pendency of the litigation the defect caused by its failure to have a certificate of authority to transact business in New Jersey.  Da10–17.  On April 2, 2024, Defendants filed a motion for leave to appeal the Trial Court’s Order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss, which Plaintiff opposed.4  Da384.  On April 19, 2024, this Court granted Defendants’ motion for leave to appeal.  Da384.  --- 4  In accordance with Rule 4:6-1(b), and while expressly maintaining and reserving all rights regarding their jurisdictional arguments and defenses, Defendants filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses on March 25, 2024.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] The trial court found that, on April 26, 2013, in response to [...]’s plea to [...] that he accept only partial payment of the sum due that day and for Plaintiff’s continued accommodation, the parties entered into a new loan in the principal amount of $134,759.74, bearing interest at the rate of 10% per year, and which would be repaid on a pay-when-able basis.  Da43.  The trial court emphasized the significance of [...]’s own admission of the fact and principal amount of the Third Loan more than three months later.  Finding that a meeting of the parties’ minds occurred, the trial court concluded:
[brief] “The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, in almost identical language, protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. ”  *State v. Smart*, 253 N.J. 156, 164-65 (2023) (quoting *State v. Nyema*, 249 N.J. 509, 527 (2022)).  When executing a search of a residence pursuant to a validly issued warrant, the terms of the warrant must be “strictly respected. ”  *State v. Rockford*, 213 N.J. 424, 441 (2013).  “In New Jersey, the manner of entry into a residence is – and has been – a significant and critical predicate of a reasonable search and seizure. ”  *State v. Caronna*, 469 N.J. Super. 462, 489 (App. Div. 2021) (citing *State v. Goodson*, 316 N.J. Super. 296, 305-06 (App. Div. 1998).  “A search warrant containing a knock-and-announce requirement does not authorize police – absent exigent circumstances – to ignore the obligation to knock and announce their presence before entering the dwelling.
[brief] “The question of whether a duty exists is a matter of law properly decided by the court, not the jury. ”  *Wang v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 125 N.J. 2, 15 (1991) (citing *Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem’l Hosp.*, 109 N.J. 523, 529 (1988)).  In this case, it is undisputed that Plaintiff observed the raised barricade leg when she entered the [...] store and walked by the same set of barricades as she walked towards where she parked her car.  Plaintiff did not report the raised barricade leg to [...] and there is no evidence that [...] knew of the raised barricade leg or how the barricade leg came to be bent or how long the condition existed.