ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF OCEAN VIEW FROM THE PROPERTY AND PRIVACY.  (Da446-447; 5T 36:19-38:10)  The owner’s appraiser included damages for the impaired southerly view of the ocean from the property and loss of privacy as a result of the project.  As discussed, Harvey Cedars v. Karan, supra., 214 N.J. at 414 requires consideration of the negative and positive impacts of the project in the determination of just compensation, without restriction to the taking.  As Karan provides, in a partial taking, just compensation is to consider all relevant, reasonably calculable, and non-conjectural factors, of the public project that either decrease or increase the value of the remaining property, including loss of ocean view.  Severance damages may be awarded for the loss of ocean view.  In City of Ocean City v. Maffucci, supra, the Court stated:  If a 'wide factual inquiry into all material facts and circumstances — both past and prospective — that would influence a buyer or seller interested in consummating a sale of the property' [quoting State, by Comm'r of Transp. v. Silver, 92 N.J. 507, 515 (1983) is standard, ocean view [is a] fundamental consideration in valuing beachfront property.  (Emphasis added.)  Indeed, every other jurisdiction which has considered this issue has held that loss of view...[is] compensable.  [326 N.J. Super. at 19]  (Emphasis added.)  Moreover, pre-Karan case law recognized that damages are compensable when not readily separable from damages from the project's use of the land of others.  See e.g., Public Service Elec & Gas v. Oldwick, 125 N.J. Super. 31 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 65 N.J. 153 (1973)  Additionally, courts in the past have distinguished the compensability of the loss of view from the property and the non-compensability of loss of visibility of the property.  *Maffucci* supra, is an example of the former.  See also, *Keinz v. State of New York*, 2 A.D. 2d 45, 156 N.Y.S. 2d 505 (1956) app. denied, 2 App. Div. 2d 815, 161 N.Y.S. 2d 604 (1957).  On the other hand, *State v. Stulman*, 136 N.J. Super 148 (App. Div. 1975) is an example of the latter.  See also *State by Com'r of Transp. v. Weiswasser*, 149 N.J. 320, 341 (1997).  For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the court below erred in excluding just compensation for the loss of ocean view from the property and loss of privacy as a result of the taking and the project.
[brief] [...] Initial Decision 6/13/23.................................Pa24  Correspondence to [...] 3/23/23...............................Pa28  Petition for Ricci Action Registration 3/3/23......................................................Pa30  Affidavit of [...].............................................................................................Pa56  [...] Eligibility Registration Form........................................................................Pa58  [...] Request for Amended Benefits Form......................................................Pa60  Administrative Denial of Ricci Benefits.................................................................Pa61  Legislative Notice August 2019..............................................................................Pa62  Postage Statement..................................................................................................Pa64  Universal Document Converter Postcard..............................................................Pa66  Email to Certifying Officers 8/16/19......................................................................Pa67  [...] Quotation of Retirement Benefits..............................................................Pa68  [...] Special Retirement Approval 11/28/17......................................................Pa69 ¹  Per R.2:6-1(a)(2), Pa16, Pa24, Pa28, and Pa30 are included in the Appendix because they are germane to the appeal.  VOLUME II
[brief] [...]’s counsel complained to [...] that he could not efficiently review the productions.  (ECF 63, at 2.)  [...]’s counsel also noticed the documents showed dates outside of the search parameters and the ESI appeared to not be limited to the five custodians, thereby resulting in a large production of 130,000 pages, some of which appeared to be “completely unrelated to anything. ”  (ECF 66, at 10-13.)  [...] raised these problems with [...]’s production with the court during the July 7 discovery conference.
[brief] **Defendants Failed To Timely Submit Their Opposition Brief Pursuant To R. 2:6-11. **  As a procedural matter, Defendants filed their Opposition Brief on July 16, 2024.  This filing is beyond the thirty (30) day requirement under R. 2:6-11.  See Defendants-Respondents’ Brief (hereinafter “Resp. Br.”).  Specifically, under R. 2:6-11(a), a respondent “shall serve and file an answering brief and appendix, if any, within 30 days after the service of the appellant’s brief. ”  R. 2:6-9 states the Court may order a brief’s dismissal should it not substantially conform to the rules, such as R. 2:6-11.  Here, the Clerk of the Appellate Division approved Plaintiff-Appellant’s filed Brief and Appendix on June 14, 2024.  During this time, Defendants-Respondents were served with the Brief and Appendix by notice of the docket, and through hard copy, thus placing Defendants on notice their opposition brief is due within thirty (30) days, or by Monday, July 15, 2024.
[brief] See Civil Case Information Statement.  Aa44.  As such, Appellant was not required to file a Notice of Claim.  See Cty. Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 174 (3d Cir. 2006) (“It is true that the NJTCA’s notice requirements do not apply to federal claims, including § 1983 actions, or to state constitutional torts. ” (internal citations omitted)); see also Owens v. Feigin, 947 A.2d 653, 654 (2008) (holding that notice requirement does not apply to claims under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act).  As a civil rights and malicious prosecution action, all of Appellant’s individual substantive claims are individually “constitutional tort[s].”  Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 316 N.J. Super. 487, 505 (App. Div. 1998).  Because Appellant’s complaint is not filed pursuant to the TCA, a notice of claim was not required.
[brief] APPELLANT IS ON PRETRIAL RELEASE TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...........................................  1 STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................  2 STATEMENT OF FACTUAL HISTORY ...............................  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR THE STATE’S EGREGIOUS BRADY VIOLATION .................... 10 (Issue Raised and Decided Below in Trial Court’s May 20, 2024 Opinion – Da.017-029) CONCLUSION .......................................................... 20 | Document name | Date | Appendix Page(s) | |---------------------------------------|------------|------------------| | Order Granting Brady & Suppression | May 20, 2024 | Da017-029 | | Denying Dismissal | | | | Document | Date | Appendix Page No. | |-----------------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------| | Complaint | November 5, 2021 | Da001 | | Notice of Motion to Suppress | June 21, 2022 | Da002 | | Opinion Order Denying Motion to Suppress | January 31, 2023 | Da003 | | Notice of Motion for Reconsideration | February 13, 2023 | Da008 | | Order Denying Motion For Reconsideration | May 11, 2023 | Da009 | | Indictment | June 28, 2023 | Da011 | | Notice of Motion To Suppress | September 1, 2023 | Da013 | | Confirmatory Discovery Letter | September 12, 2023| Da014 | | Notice of Motion to Dismiss Brady Violation | January 6, 2024 | Da016 | | Opinion and Order Denying Motion to Dismiss | May 20, 2024 | Da017 | | and Granting Motion to Suppress | | | | Affidavit for Search Warrant | October 19, 2021 | Da030 | | [...]’s Notes | October 19, 2021 | Da044 | | State’s Discovery Response | September 18, 2023| Da046 | | Photographs | N/A | Da049 | --- 1 The Affidavit to the Search Warrant has been filed Confidentially | Authority | Page | |-----------------------------------------------|------| | Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 1983 (1963) | passim | | Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) | 18 | | Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419(1995) | 18 | | Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972) | 13 | | State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497 (2019) | 21 | | State v. Carter, 69 N.J. 420 (1976) | 19 | | State v. D.A.B., App. Div. A-1848-22, | | | September 19, 2023 | 20 | | State v. Lozado, 257 N.J. Super. 260(App. Div. 1992) | 19 | | State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487 (1988) | 13 | | United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967(3d Cir. 1991) | 19 | | United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149(3d Cir. 1993) | 19 | | Party Name | Appellate Party Designation | Trial Court Party Role | Trial Court Party Status | |--------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------| | [...] | Appellant | Defendant | Participated | | [...]| Respondent | Plaintiff | Participated |
[brief] [...] informed [...] that none of them should have been receiving the charge pay.  (Pa362 at 83:10-21; Pa479-80).  Upon investigating, [...] learned that Plaintiffs entered the charge pay on each other’s behalf at approximately 11:00 am each Monday before payroll closed.  Critically, this was after [...] had reviewed their time cards.  (Pa364 at 90:5-91:1; Pa475; Pa482-528).  [...] normally reviewed the staffing coordinators’ time cards Sunday night.  (Pa352 at 41:3-12).  The staffing coordinators would then finalize those time cards, and the time cards would be sent to payroll for processing.  (Pa532; Pa105 at 86:19-87:8).  The Kronos Time Card Audit Trail establishes that [...] entered “hourly charge” pay on [...]’s behalf thirty-two times over a period of two months, comprising five pay periods, from May 30, 2020 to July 25, 2020.  (Pa482-528; Pa530).  It further shows that [...] entered “hourly charge” pay on [...]’s behalf fifteen times over a period of two pay periods, from July 11, 2020 to July 25, 2020.  (Pa482-528).  [...] does not dispute that she entered “hourly charge” for [...] and [...].  (Pa248 at 94:13-15; Pa249 at 97:8-10).  The Kronos Time Card Audit Trail establishes that [...] entered “hourly charge” pay on [...]’s behalf thirty-five times over a period of two months, comprising four pay periods, from May 30, 2020 to July 11, 2020.  (Pa482-528).  It further shows that [...] entered “hourly charge” pay on [...]’s behalf nine times for one pay period, ending June 27, 2020.  (Pa482-528).  [...] does not dispute that he entered “hourly charge” for [...] and [...].  (Pa168 at 40:9-16).  The Kronos Time Card Audit Trail establishes that [...] entered “hourly charge” pay on [...]’s behalf ten times for one pay period, ending July 25, 2020.  (Pa482-528).  Neither [...], nor [...], the two senior staffing coordinators, received charge pay.  (Pa232 at 32:11-15; Pa482-528).  [...] never would have approved extra compensation for only three of her five staffing coordinators.  (Pa475).  XI.
[brief] Facts Related to Constructive Notice  All Defendants  Both the April 22, 2015 inspection and the June 24, 2015 inspection identified settlement at the southbound northern most abutment joint of the Rt. 30 overpass.  Although both inspections were performed by entities other than the Defendants, since both of these inspections took place during the construction project, Defendants all would have known about the inspections at the Rt. 30 bridge.  (Pa597 at 37:7-11 and 38:5-19, Pa600 at 49:23-25 through 50:1-4).  Further, since both inspections identified the settlement at the north approach, the condition was there to be identified by the Defendants.  As indicated above, each Defendant performed its own daily inspections in an effort to identify problem in the roadway such as settlement and elevation changes.  (Pa1214), (Pa808 at 55:2-9) (Pa678 at 19:5-8), (Pa678 at 19:22 to Pa679 at 21:7), and (Pa654 at 12:6-13, Pa656 at 16 through Pa657 at 21:7).  Plus, “everybody speaks on a daily basis at these projects. ” (Pa789 at 17:10-15).  Since the April 22, 2015 and June 24, 2015 inspections both revealed the settlement, the Defendants should have also identified the defect.  F.
[brief] (Da380-85; 25T35-4 To 41-3)**  [...]’s deeply disturbing misconduct, compounded by [...]’s trial attorney’s ineffectiveness, enabled the case to survive the pretrial motion for dismissal, as well as direct appeal.  More than a decade later, we know that — contrary to what [...] employees, including the prosecutor, disclosed to the trial court — policies on retention and destruction of evidence such as the video [...] destroyed not only existed, but they: implicated the exact issues before the trial court and were at the heart of its analysis; were disseminated via email to the entire [...] office; and were internally available within the [...], but not produced during or subsequent to the pretrial proceeding.  The existence of these policies, the witnesses’ claimed lack of awareness of these policies, and [...]’s failure to comply with them demonstrates egregious carelessness on the part of numerous individuals within [...], if not intentional misconduct.  We also now know that on the very same day that [...] technical staff testified that the hard drive was completely overwritten, they conducted an examination that made clear this was untrue.  And finally, [...] refused to retain this hard drive, despite perseveration orders, defense request, and the extensive pretrial litigation, and then stonewalled longstanding PCR discovery orders.  [...] filed a motion for dismissal or rehearing on whether the matter should be dismissed due to bad faith, but [...] denied it essentially because the trial judge (who did not have access to this information essential to his determination) had held a hearing and did not find bad faith.  (Da380-85)  This decision was wrong; the motion should have been granted.  The information that has now come to light directly calls into question the actions of the individuals who handled the evidence in this matter, as well as their training and supervision, or lack thereof, in [...] as a whole.  It also implicates the candor of the prosecutor handling the matter and [...] detective-witnesses and constitutes an additional basis for sanctions.  [...]’s evidence retention and destruction policies are fundamental to the very function of the office.  These materials should have been easily produced, but were withheld on the basis that they would be too onerous to locate.  In addition to being relevant in connection with a bad-faith determination, [...]’s failure to produce the hard drive and its policies to the defense constitutes a Brady violation, and its failure to produce the policies to the court constitutes further misconduct.  The manifest harm of the destruction of the evidence is clear.  See State v. M.B., 471 N.J. Super. 376, 384-85 (App. Div. 2022) (vacating conviction).  Reversal is required.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE STATE HAS FAILED TO CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TRIAL’S GRANTING OF A NEW TRIAL WAS A MANIFEST DENIAL OF JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW (Sa14-33)  The three documents at issue in this case demonstrate that the State’s theory of the case, that (1) [...] lacked authority to collect investments for the [...], and (2) that [...] lacked the necessary number of shares himself in the World of Beer project in order sell them, is not only flawed, but fundamentally incorrect.  The trial court carefully considered these documents as well as extensive testimony in coming to its conclusion that a new trial is appropriate in this matter.  Those documents are:  1.  [...] Franchise Agreement dated January 22, 2014 naming [...] as Franchisee (Sa130-189).  2.  [...] Franchise Agreement dated May 7, 2015 naming [...] as Franchisee (Sa234-292).  3.  [...] Principal Owner’s Guaranty providing 40% interest to [...], 30% interest to [...], and 30% interest to [...] (Sa294-296).  As discussed above, the test for whether a new trial should be granted based on newly discovered evidence, first set forth in State v. Carter (Carter III), requires that a defendant to demonstrate that the evidence: (1) was discovered after the trial and was not discoverable by reasonable diligence at the time of trial; (2) is material to the issue and not merely cumulative, impeaching or contradictory; and (3) would probably change the jury's verdict (if a new trial were granted).
[directive] 2.  Specificity and Limitations on Grand Jury Subpoenas to Compel Production of Medical Records.  A grand jury subpoena seeking medical records should be narrowly focused and should be used only to compel the production of medical records that are reasonably believed to be relevant to the investigation and a determination of the appropriate offense, if any, to be charged.  The scope of a subpoena duces tecum should be limited to compel only the production of those medical records that relate, for example, to injuries that were sustained by the victim in the course of the specific criminal act or episode that is under investigation.  (Note, however, that it is conceivable that, depending on the circumstances, records pertaining to medical services provided on other occasions may also be relevant to the criminal investigation.)  Prosecutors should therefore make certain that such subpoenas specify, to the greatest extent practicable, the date on which the suspected crime occurred so as to limit the scope of the subpoena.  3.
[directive] CN 11170-Korean 2 Form Promulgated by Directive ##01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11170-Korean page 1 of 2  Do you understand that because you have pled guilty to these charges the court must impose a year term of parole supervision and that term will begin as soon as you complete the sentence of incarceration?  First Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 5 years  Second Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 3 years 3.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  만약 가석방  보호감독 조건을 위반하는 경우, 귀하의 가석방은 취소될 수 있으며, 전에 부과된 금고 형기에 대한 복역을 완료한 경우라도 교도소로 되돌아가 가석방 보호감독에 대한 잔여 기간의 전부 또는 일부를 복역해야 할 수도 있다는 것을 아십니까? Do you understand that if you violate the conditions of your parole supervision that your parole may be revoked and you may be subject to return to prison to serve all or any portion of the remaining period of parole supervision, even if you have completed serving the term of imprisonment previously imposed?
[brief] Similarly, the prosecutor’s comments here are distinguishable from those in Blakney, where that prosecutor repeatedly expressed moral outrage towards the defendant during summation with comments such as “Why the hell would you do that to a child?” and “You [the jury] don’t have the luxury of looking at these photographs and feeling the sorrow and anger and rage that I feel when I look at them. ” (Blakney, 189 N.J. at 95).  Defendant also argues that the prosecutor’s use of a quote from Goodfellas urged the jury to “convict based on emotion rather than evidence.
[brief] [...]  Plaintiff’s expert [...] further confirmed that defendant [...] was hired by the [...] to provide engineering services.  (Pa2024-2025).  (T78:25-T79:1)  [...] testified that [...] had an obligation to “enforce applicable industry standards and have an understanding of the applicable industry standards”.  (Pa2027).  (T81:3-9)  [...] testified that applying the applicable standards, [...] a professional engineer was required to know those standards.  (Pa2027-2028).  (T81:24-T82:3)  The transcript speaks for itself:
[brief] Medical Examiner [...], who conducted the autopsy, testified that many of the bone fractures he saw were not consistent with an accidental fall.  (42T:188-8 to 20).  The defense posited that those fractures were not [...]’s cause of death, but instead the result of actions [...] took after his death during the destruction of his body.  (41T:89-5 to 18; 43T:122-21 to 123-15).  Dr. Mazari testified that the manner of death was homicide.
[brief] A Judge of Compensation may only rely upon evidence in the record.  Here, the Judge of Compensation expressed an intention to rely upon not only information that she acquired that was outside the record, but was information that she acquired in her former career in the State Assembly.  The respondent does have the ability determine what information was acquired outside the record.  The record below of the recusal motion and the essential worker motion demonstrate substantive and procedural bias.  R. 1:12-2 requires recusal not only when there is bias, but when the circumstances would lead the parties to believe that they cannot receive a fair and unbiased hearing.  A Judge of Compensation is not only the trier of the fact and the judge of the law, but is considered a medical expert, whose findings are given great deference.  See Close v. Kordulak Brothers, 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965).  It is important that all parties, not just the petitioner, can reasonably believe that the matter will be decided in an objective and impartial manner.  Now that this Judge of Compensation already ruled that the petitioner decedent was an essential employee, the matter should be remanded to a different Judge of Compensation.  As the court cautioned in Panitch, supra, 339 N.J. Super. at 71, a judge should consider recusal where she became too involved in a case to the point of appearing that she is not impartial.  The Judge of Compensation's involvement in the enactment of this statute and her strong feelings on treating teachers as essential employees reached "a point where it may well appear to the clients that one side is being favored over another" and "that it may well be appropriate before this case reaches trial for the judge to consider whether [s]he should step down from hearing the actual trial of the case because of the degree of involvement."  Id.  The Judge of Compensation therefore should have granted respondent's motion for recusal.  CONCLUSION
[brief] No case law is cited by defendants, and none has been found, holding that such an initial responsive filing constitutes a waiver of a party’s constitutional right to be in court.  The arbitration was and is in a preliminary state, and plaintiffs repeatedly objected to it.  The sole basis for defendants’ argument is their quote from Wein v. Morris, 194 N.J. 364 (2008) that “[t]he court should consider the totality of circumstances to evaluate whether a party has waived the right to object to arbitration after the matter has been ordered to arbitration and arbitration is held.