ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 29, (May 2014, 7 P.L. c. Act, [...] the Implement to Guidelines Negotiation 169, Super. 392 v. Thomas, N.J. State  In courts. the by accepted been approach has  This the Division rejected Appellate the (2007), 597 N.J. 192 denied, certif. Div.), (App. 182 concluding Guidelines, Brima~e in system the plea escalating formal the to challenge defendant's section of purposes the furthers and Guidelines the of operation vital the to is policy "[t]his that with cooperate to defendants for incentives provide to are which waiver, 2C:35-12]
[brief] It does not differentiate between information stored on paper or on an electronic medium.  It requires the requesting party to request “information. ”  Rule 34(a)(1).  The producing party must produce the requested information or object to the request.  Rule 34(b)(2)(B).  Production of electronically stored information is addressed specifically in the Rule but only regarding the form of production.  Rule 34(b)(2)(D), (E).  Nothing in Rule 34 requires a requesting party to identify custodians or search terms or for a producing party to accede to demands that particular custodians’ files be searched or that particular search terms be used.  *3  This Court subscribes to the view expressed in Principle No. 6 of the Sedona Principles:  Responding parties are best situated to evaluate the procedures, methodologies, and technologies appropriate for preserving and producing their own electronically stored information.  The Sedona Principles, Third Edition, 19 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, Principle 6, 118 (2018).  Moreover, the world of electronic discovery has moved well beyond search terms.  While search terms have their place, they may not be suited to all productions.  Technology has advanced, and software tools have developed to the point where search terms are disfavored in many cases.  See, e.g., da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 189-91  The Court will not decide whether any proposed custodians are appropriate nor on the use of the requested search terms.  Instead, Plaintiff must request information, regardless of how or where it is maintained by Defendants, which Defendants must address as required by Rule 34.  That is discovery: A party requests information and the burden is on the producing party to locate and produce it or object legitimately to production.  To the extent Plaintiff is seeking to compel Defendants to conduct discovery as directed by Plaintiff, the Court declines to issue such an order.
[brief] Plaintiffs and their counsel claim that their failure to seek discovery from [...] was a “strategic decision. ”  If so, it was a blatant failure to prosecute their own claims after being put on notice of the frivolous nature of their allegations, forcing [...] to accrue unnecessary litigation expenses, a situation that constitutes undue delay and harassment, and therefore bad faith litigation.  See Iannone, 245 N.J. Super. at 25; R. 1:4-8(a)(1).  The second piece of information Plaintiffs cite to repeatedly in support of their trespass claim against [...] is the testimony from the remediation contractor, [...].  [...]’s representative testified that he believed Plaintiffs’ Property was part of the redevelopment project based upon his being provided with the preliminary site plan drafted by [...].  (Pa000237).  This misplaced reliance argument is flawed for many reasons and should be rejected by this Court.  First, Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge that there is a difference between the environmental remediation work performed by [...] and other contractors at the request of [...] (which Plaintiffs claim caused damage to their Property) and the preliminary site plan prepared by [...], which called for paved parking spaces and did not call for any remediation activities.  (Pa000005-06; Pa000390).  Plaintiffs’ alleged claims regarding soil samples and temporary well points have nothing to do with [...].  The preliminary site plan regarding paved parking spaces was objected to by Plaintiffs and their attorney in 2021, and [...] consequently revised the plan so no parking improvements would be made to Plaintiffs’ Property.  (Id.).  Plaintiffs’ reliance argument is further weakened by the testimony of the [...] representative, who stated that he did not have any conversations with anyone from [...] at any time during his involvement with the project.
[brief] ”  (21T 115-24 to 116-4)  In October 2018, defendant said, [...] went through a closed back gate, went up to the house, while defendant and his parents were there, was banging on a back door, and started “talking about a gun” in what defendant perceived to be “a threatening way. ”  (21T 116-2 to 117-22)  [...] was placing his hand in his pocket at the time and “fidgeting with it,” which caused [...] to ask him why he was doing that, whereupon [...] said, with slurred speech, “something about a gun. ”  (21T 123-4 to 21)  At least two other times, [...] went to the house, but defendant refused to answer the door because [...] was punching the siding of the house in a “violent and abrupt” manner as if to try to damage it.  (21T 117-23 to 118-11)  [...] had told defendant that he has “a schizoaffective disorder” and he had stopped taking his medication.
[brief] While filling out an application for $1 million in supplemental insurance coverage for 12-15 passenger vans he had already leased to be used to transport summer camp children, the owner of [...] misinterpreted a question asked on a one-page questionnaire as to whether it rents/hires 12-15 passenger vans.  The insurer does not offer coverage in excess of $500,000 on 12-15 passenger vans; however, the camp owner was never adequately informed that those types of vans were not eligible for $1,000,000 supplemental coverage.  The court erred in granting summary judgment because the questions on the questionnaire were vague and ambiguous, leading the camp owner to misinterpret them.  Pursuant to New Jersey law, ambiguous questions in an insurance application are construed against the insurer and can only lead to rescission if the policyholder, in answering the question, was intentionally misleading the insurance company, which was not the case here.  Moreover, in the light most favorable to the opposing parties, there were material issues of fact and issues of reliance as to whether the camp owner’s answer to the vague question on the one-page questionnaire should disqualify the camp and all the injured campers from the $1 million in coverage that is afforded to them.  Additionally, [...]’s own policy in the relevant section provided that the automobile coverage is “void” if the insured intentionally misrepresented a material fact about the insured vehicles.  The insured’s state of mind is a factual issue not to be decided in summary judgment, particularly where the record shows, at most, an innocent mistake in answering the question by the insured.  Finally, [...]’s policy also did not exclude coverage for 12-15 passenger vans.  An innocent, injured party should not be punished as a matter of public policy and equity, particularly where the insured made an innocent mistake in answering a questionnaire and was never provided with any notice either when filling out the application for supplemental insurance or in the policy itself that 12-15 passenger vans were not eligible for coverage.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TORT CLAIMS AGAINST [...] WERE LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS WHICH REQUIRED THE FILING OF AN AOM (50a-51a)  Plaintiffs’ claims against [...] for fraud, conversion, tortious interference, New Jersey RICO, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy to commit same (“Tort Claims”), are not legal malpractice claims and therefore do not require proof of a deviation from the professional standard of care.  The New Jersey Supreme Court in Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328, 340, 801 A.2d 1134, 1141 (2002) held:  [R]ather than focusing on whether the claim is denominated as tort or contract, [courts] should determine if the claim’s underlying factual allegations require proof of a deviation from the professional standard of care applicable to that specific profession.  Id. at 801.  Plaintiffs’ Tort Claims do not allege that [...]’s actions were a deviation from the applicable professional standard of care, but that they were simply blatant intentional tortious acts committed by them and their co-conspirator Defendants alike.  Indeed, those identical Tort Claims survived against the non-attorney Defendants since they are not legal malpractice claims.  Plaintiffs’ Tort Counts do not require the trier of fact to evaluate [...]’s legal judgment concerning a complex legal issue.
[brief] In Grasso, as discussed above, we learned that: "applicants for (d)(6) variances based on hardship must show that the property for which the variance is sought cannot reasonably accommodate a structure that conforms to, or only slightly exceeds, the height permitted by the ordinance. ”  Grasso, supra 52.  The Grasso court added: “A developer's inability to make the most profitable use of the property is not sufficient to show hardship in a (d) variance case. ”  Id.  Plaintiffs have not argued that some physical constraint of the subject property prevents it from accommodating structures with conforming heights infeasible, rather they argue that changes to business needs and market conditions prevent them from profitably developing buildings with conforming heights.  This rationale was expressly rejected in Grasso.  The decision of the court in Price v. Strategic Capital Partners, 404 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div. 2008), further informs us that market conditions which are common problems affecting all properties in a zone are also not a basis for a finding of special reasons under the second theory outlined in Grasso that focuses upon the purposes of the regulations.
[brief] Even just now during oral argument counsel stated that there is no legal work that is being questioned and/or that gives rise to the litigation, and respectfully, that just not is---that just is not an accurate representation of what was plead in this matter.  (Id. at 18:6-11).  [...] rejected plaintiffs’ claim that the factual predicate for the causes of action labeled legal malpractice, as opposed to those not labeled legal malpractice, were separate and distinct.
[brief] The trial court’s ruling contradicted well established Scope of the Project Rule and interlocutory review is required to prevent a valuation trial being held based upon the application of incorrect zoning.  There can be no doubt in the present matter that the zoning pursuant to the Morris Canal Redevelopment Plan was adopted in furtherance of [...]’s redevelopment of the area.  Therefore, Respondent’s use of the zoning under the Morris Canal Redevelopment Plan is improper as a matter of law and should be barred from presentation to the jury.  The trial court not only allowed this, but ruled the Morris Canal Redevelopment Plan was the “operative zoning” for the subject Property as of the Date of Valuation.
[brief] *Shaw*, 213 N.J. at 410-412.  The vague description of Black men could not assist [...] in positively identifying a suspect; this was “descriptive of nothing. ”  *Nyema*, 249 N.J. at 531.  This is especially true here, where [...] was just one of many Black men outside the store, in a town where nearly half the residents are Black.  See Penns Grove, NJ: Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/penns-grove-nj (last visited Feb. 24, 2025).  Additionally, like in *Shaw* and *Williams*, the act of [...] having his hand in his bag is not enough to create reasonable suspicion either.  Like putting a hand in a pocket, putting a hand in a bag “is fairly common human conduct that does not generally involve the commission of a crime. ”  *Williams*, 410 N.J. at 557; see also State v. L.F., 316 N.J. Super. 174, 179 (App. Div. 1998) (“[T]he mere act of putting something from one’s hand into one’s own pocket while departing alone signifies nothing additional by way of reasonable suspicion. ”).  In fact, as the trial court found, this is something “most people would do coming out of a store.
[brief] Nothing that the Decedent allegedly said to [...] on the phone the day the Decedent had died or a few days before that date, had mentioned a prenuptial agreement.  (10T107:11-16)  (d)  It was speculative to assume that there was a "Rubbermaid box" in Decedent's closet.  None of the witnesses had ever seen that "Rubbermaid Box" obviously because it never existed.  (11T17:16-22).  Indeed, it was undisputed that Decedent maintained a safe deposit box where she placed her important papers.
[brief] A primary objective in establishing them is to induce able persons to enter and remain in public employment, and to render faithful and efficient service while so employed.  3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. Rev. 1963) § 12.141.  They are in the nature of compensation for services previously rendered and act as an inducement to continued and faithful service.  Being remedial in character, statutes creating pensions should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby.  McQuillin, supra, at § 12.143; and see Adams v. City of Modesto, 53 Cal. 2d 833, 3 Cal. Rptr. 561, 566, 350 P.2d 529 (1960); Giuliano v. Bd. of Trustees of Fireman's Pension F., 89 Ill. App. 2d 126, 231 N.E.2d 257, 258 (1967); Flake v. Bennett, 156 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1968).  Geller v. Department of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, 597-598.  In Geller v. Department of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, the Court evaluated a “preponderance of the equities” and “all of the circumstances” to achieve a “just result. ”  Id. at 600.  This Court is not bound by an agency's determination of a purely legal issue.  Francois v. Board of Trustees, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 348 citing Utley v. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Labor, 194 N.J. 534, 551 (2008); see Krayniak v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 412 N.J. Super. 232, 237 (App. Div. 2010).  As a form of legislation aimed at remedying a social problem, pension statutes "should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited."
[brief] Relatedly, liability for civil aiding and abetting is only found where “one party knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other to so conduct himself. ”  State of New Jersey, Dept. of Treasury v. Qwest Communications International, Inc., et al., 387 N.J. Super. 469, 481 (App. Div. 2005).  To survive a motion to dismiss, claims for conspiracy to commit fraud and aiding and abetting the commission of a fraud must, like any other fraud claim, satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of R. 4:5-8 (a).  See id. at 486 (finding that plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently pled a claim for aiding and abetting a fraud under the heightened pleading requirements of the Rule, but only because it listed specific facts which, if true, would be sufficient to prove that the defendant accountants presented and propagated a false accounting report they knew would mislead their client’s investors).  In this case, the Complaint and Amended Complaint in the 2020 Action did nothing more than parrot the elements of these causes of action without alleging a single specific fact which, if proven to be true, could establish that [...] or [...] acted in concert with any of the other defendants to conceal evidence.  “Pleadings reciting mere conclusions without facts [to support them] do not justify a lawsuit,” however, and Plaintiffs-Appellants’ barebones allegations of concerted action among the defendants were legally insufficient to survive [...]’s and [...]’s motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint.  Glass v. Suburban Restoration Co., 317 N.J. Super. 574, 582 (App. Div. 1998).  Finally, proof of conspiracy to commit fraud and/or aiding and abetting a fraud also requires proof of the underlying fraud (in this case, alleged fraudulent concealment of evidence).  State Dep’t of Treasury v. Quest Communications, 387 N.J. Super. at 484.  As briefed above, Plaintiffs-Appellants’ pleadings in the 2020 Action failed to allege any facts which, if proven to be true, would be sufficient to establish that [...] was involved in concealing any documentary or tangible evidence in the 2020 Action.  Since the Amended Complaint for the 2020 Action failed to satisfy the requirements for pleading any actionable fraud, Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claims for conspiracy to commit fraud and aiding and abetting a fraud were also properly dismissed.
[brief] Defendant [...]’s focus on the “premises rule” set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:15-36 is not dispositive.  As [...] acknowledges, the co-employee immunity set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 does not merely depend on the premises on which the incident occurred, but also requires that “the defendant must have been acting in the course of his/her employment.
[brief] 14  In re [...] Flood Hazard General Permit By Certification  5 No. [...], ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2024) (slip op.) ............................................. 15 Musconetcong Watershed Ass’n v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 476 N.J. Super. 465 (App. Div. 2023) ........................................................... 23 In re N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination, Program Interest No. [...], 433 N.J. Super. 223 (App. Div. 2013) .......................................................... 16 N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Alloway Tp., 438 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div. 2015) ........................................................... 20 In re NJPDES Permit No. [...], 185 N.J. 474 (2006) .................................................................................... 21 Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992) ....................................................................................... 24 Normandy Beach Improvement Ass’n v. Comm’r, Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 193 N.J. Super. 57 (App. Div. 1983) ........................................................... 22 In re Orban/Square Props., 461 N.J. Super. 57 (App. Div. 2019) ...........................................................
[directive] The triage officer and her/his team will use the allocation framework, detailed in Section 2, to determine priority scores of all patients eligible to receive the scarce critical care resource.  For patients already being supported by the scarce resource, the evaluation will include 5 reassessment to evaluate for clinical improvement or worsening at pre-specified intervals, as detailed in Section 3.  The triage officer will review the comprehensive list of priority scores for all patients and will communicate with the clinical teams immediately after a decision is made regarding allocation or reallocation of a critical care resource.  Communication of triage decisions to patients and families
[brief] While the letter that the vendor printed and sent to Appellant may have been an attempt to collect a debt, the letter to Appellant and the prior transmission of data to the vendor are separate and distinct acts.  Accordingly, Respondent’s transmitting data to its letter vendor so that the vendor could then undertake the rote task of printing and mailing a letter on Respondent’s behalf via an automated process is not a “third-party” “communication” to collect a debt.
[brief] (Pra45-50; Ra3.)  Despite the language in N.J.S.A. 1:7-2, Applicants were denied requested discovery on this very issue, and presented proofs that it was not publicly available.  (Pa102 at ¶¶ 18-20; Pa350-51.)  Without evidence, the State contends that the bill text A.6260 as it existed on January 6, 2022 was identical to S.49 such that the first and second readings that occurred in the Assembly on January 6, 2022 meant the Legislature could give the bill a third reading on January 10, 2022.  (Sb14.)  But the bills were not publicly available so there is no proof that the bills were actually identical, particularly when the Assembly Journal indicates a second and third reading occurred on January 10, 2022 – if the second reading had already occurred on January 6, 2022, there is no reason for a second, “second reading. ”  (Pa66 at ¶¶ 7-9; cf. Pa232 and Pa236.)  Given this Court must adjudicate under N.J.S.A. 1:7-3 after a “full hearing,” Applicants should have been granted the opportunity for discovery on these calendar and bill text publication issues that cast doubt that the constitutional provisions for enactments of laws were followed.
[brief] THE CHANCERY DIVISION RENDERED MEANINGLESS PLAINTIFF’S “BINDING” AND “IRREVOCABLE” RESIGNATION.  Plaintiff, without medical documentation, let alone authority to speak on behalf of the [...]’s medical experts, asserts as facts a variety of speculations regarding Plaintiff’s health as demonstrating that the Township is not prejudiced by severance of the Agreement’s return to work provisions.  See PB19-PB20.  Such an argument fundamentally misconstrues the purpose of the Agreement and trivializes the Parties’ consideration received thereunder.  The central purpose of the Agreement was not whether Plaintiff was disabled, rather, it was the amicable resolution of disciplinary charges filed against Plaintiff.  As a result, no less than four paragraphs reiterated that Plaintiff’s resignation was “final” “binding” and “irrevocable” upon submitting his letter of resignation concurrent with his October 20, 2020 execution of the Agreement.  See DA191-DA193 at ¶¶ 10,11,14,17.  The language and ramification of each of these provisions is specific, clear, unequivocal and reflective of New Jersey’s public policy favoring settlement agreements, *Brundage*, supra, 195 N.J. at 601.  Plaintiff agreed to never return to his employment with the Township in exchange for the Township dismissing any filed or contemplated disciplinary charges.  See *Cardinale*, supra, 458 N.J. Super. at 274 (“[Plaintiff] could have fought the disciplinary action and run the risk of the Police Department terminating him for cause… but knowingly chose not to do that. ”)  The Chancery Division thus violated longstanding contractual principles by permitting Plaintiff to retain the benefit of separating in good standing, while rendering his resignation neither binding, nor irrevocable.  See *Porreca v. City of Millville*, 419 N.J. Super. 212, 233 (App. Div. 2011) (A contract “should not be interpreted to render one of its terms meaningless. ”); see also *County of Morris v. Fauver*, 153 N.J. 80, 97 (1998) (Allowing a party to “repudiate the unfavorable parts of a contract and claim the benefit of the residue” constitutes unjust enrichment.)  In essence, the Chancery Division defeated the central purpose of the Agreement and bound the Township to an agreement that it did not contemplate.  *Fauver*, supra, 153 N.J. at 97.  The Chancery Division should have instead deemed the Agreement unenforceable.  See *Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus*, 128 N.J. 10, 33 (1992).  Accordingly, the Chancery Division’s decision to grant severance defeated the essential purpose of the Agreement; therefore, the Chancery Division’s decision must be reversed and Plaintiff’s Complaint dismissed with prejudice.  D.