ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa61 at 12:3-6; Pa63 at 20:12-20; Pa64 at 22:10-14).  She explained that she felt her left foot catch under the foot of a barricade and that the top of her foot was scraped and bruised after the incident.  (Pa63 at 20:12-20; Pa64 at 22:10-14; Pa78 at 77:17-78:19; Pa78 at 79:19-23).  Although the plaintiff did not see which raised foot caught her foot and caused her to trip and fall because the facemask that she was wearing during the height of the Covid-19 pandemic blocked her view of her feet, she identified the bent barricade foot shown in the photograph marked as WM000006 as the most likely one based upon her path of travel.  (Pa63 at 20:12-20; Pa64 at 21:1-11; Pa64 at 22:10-14; Pa78 at 77:12-78:6; Pa78 at 79:13-80:7; Pa220-Pa222).  The plaintiff’s expert engineer, [...], noted the photographs of the barricades show that the bent foot was raised several inches above the concrete walkway and protruded into the pedestrian walkway creating a tripping hazard.
[brief] In a case that was 7.5 years old, with no stated reason that a final hearing needed to occur sooner, the denial was misconduct.  (Ibid.)  In fact, the Arbitrator did not specifically reject any of those reasons as invalid.  (Da2508)  He did not specify why a denial was appropriate.  He also did not give any real reason that he needed to proceed to the final hearing sooner than 45 days.  He simply denied the request without reason, and even before Plaintiffs stated their position.  (Ibid.)  He wrote in response to [...]’s own request for extension only that he had “given leeway” in the past but did not want to do so this time.  (Da2511)  He gave no reason for not wanting to do so again.  (Da2508)  His personal whims should not have been paramount to the several legitimate reasons [...] had given for a delay in finding counsel, or to reject [...]’s right to have the new counsel that he did find appear to present his case.  After all, this was not a trivial or procedural hearing.  This was the final hearing in which more than $1,000,000 of additional relief and [...]’s expulsion from [...] were at stake, and where Plaintiffs’ submission was inches thick with more than 70 exhibits.
[brief] [...]’S CONSISTENCY DETERMINATION IS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS (RESPONDING TO | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Adorers of the Blood of Christ v. FERC, | 17 | | 897 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2018) | | | Adorers of the Blood of Christ U.S. Province v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co LLC, | 17 | | 53 F.4th 56 (3d Cir. 2022) | | | AES Sparrows Point LNG, LLC v Smith, | 20 | | 470 F.Supp.2d 586 (D.M.D. 2007) | | | Algonquin LNG v. Loqa, | 19, 20, 21, 22 | | 79 F.Supp.2d 52 (D.R.I. 2000) | | | Am. Energy Corp. v. Rockies Express Pipeline LLC, | 17 | | 622 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2010) | | | City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, | 17 | | 357 U.S. 320 (1958) | | | Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Town of Myersville Town Council, | 20 | | 982 F.Supp.2d 570 (D.M.D. 2013) | | | Food & Water Watch v. FERC, | 8 | | 104 F.4th 336 (D.C. Cir. 2024) | | | In Re Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permits | 15 | | 372 N.J. Super. 578 (App. Div. 2004) | | | In re Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station (CS327), | 9 | | 258 N.J. 312, ___ (2024) | | | Massachusetts v. EPA, | 14 | | 549 U.S. 497 (2007) | | Matter of Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station, 476 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 2023).............................
[brief] The statute applies to insurance policies “against liability arising under this chapter. ”  N.J.S.A. 34:15-87 (emphasis added).  It prohibits workers compensation insurance policies from containing any “limitation of the liability of the insurer to an amount less than that payable by the assured on account of his entire liability under this chapter. ”  Ibid. (emphasis added).  The “under this chapter” phrase means that the policy can have no limitation on payment of benefits that the employer may become liable to pay in accordance with the Workers Compensation Act.
[brief] A.  The Public Access Law Did Not Abrogate or Modify the Common Law Public Trust Doctrine and Did Not Delegate to DEP  New Authority to Impose Public Access Conditions (Replying to Respondent’s Point A).  The Public Access Law, by its plain terms, codified New Jersey’s common law public trust doctrine.  See Appellant’s Initial Brief (“Ab__”) at 7-15.  The Public Access Law’s codification of the public trust doctrine is consistent with New Jersey’s canons of statutory interpretation: “No statute is to be construed as altering the common law, farther than its words import. ”  Velazquez v. Jiminez, 172 N.J. 240, 257 (2002) (quoting Oswin v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290, 310 (1992)); accord Marshall v. Klebanov, 188 N.J. 23, 37 (2006).  Accordingly, “[a] statute enacted in derogation of the common law must be construed narrowly. ”  Velazquez, supra, 172 N.J. at 257, citing Oswin, supra, 129 N.J. at 310.  When a statute appears to alter the common law, courts must adopt the most circumscribed reading of the statute that achieves its purpose, and must resolve any doubt about such a statute’s meaning in favor of the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in the common law.  The rule has been declared by the United States Supreme Court as follows:
[brief] ”  Da277a.  Property damage, by its nature, cannot be and here was not alleged to be, caused by fungi on an edible good or edible product intended for human consumption.  The trial court held that, even if the Consumption Exception did restore coverage, [...]’s property damage was still not covered.  Da43a.  (“[a]s to [...]’s arguments about the property damage they are excluded by the Mold Exclusion and cannot be restored through the Consumption Exception. ”).  Though the trial court recognized that uncovered damages were included in the Settlement, it overlooked the fact that this rendered the Settlement unenforceable.  Second, damages because of bodily injury arising from inhalation of and dermal contact with mold are not covered.  Even if [...] proved that the Consumption Exception applied (which he did not), injuries caused by inhalation of or dermal contact with mold remain excluded.  Those injuries were undisputedly part of the Settlement.  Da1232a.  Third, injury and damage outside the [...] policy periods are not covered.  [...]’s allocation of 86% of the Settlement to [...] represents a significant disparity between the amount paid by the Primary Insurers, which is strong evidence that the Settlement was unreasonable and collusive.  See Imbesi, 826 A.2d 735 (finding allocation of approximately 25% to settling insurers and approximately 75% of the settlement to the non-settling insurer to be indicative of bad faith and collusion); Pasha, 344 N.J. Super. 350, 357-8 (finding allocation of 94% of settlement to the non-settling insurer to be evidence of bad faith).
[brief] IT 3:1-25:13.  On October 6, 2022, the Honorable [...] J.S.C. entered a Judgment: approving the IA; finding that Appellant did not have standing to challenge the IA but if he did, striking his exceptions; and discharging the Respondent as professional co-trustee.  16a-34a.  On October 26, 2022, Respondent applied for an award of legal fees, accounting fees, and commissions (“Fee Application”).
[brief] As part of the Borough’s Affordable Housing Compliance Package Ordinance 20-014D was adopted December 15, 2020 and Ordinance 21-004D was adopted on April 13, 2021 re-zoning the subject property to the Rumson Road Housing District (RR) which permits the development of up to fourteen (14) residential dwelling units on this property.  (Pa089; 5,1-6,6)¹ (Pa090; 10,11-11,19)  ¹  The hearing was conducted on four dates.  Transcript references shall be to Appellant’s Appendix pages/lines.  This appeal raises a single discrete issue of whether the height of the proposed homes is to be measured from the lowest original lot (pre-development) grade or from the revised lot grade shown on the approved site plan.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM OPINION AND ORDER OF MAY 31, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CHANCERY  DIVISION: PROBATE PART  SUSSEX COUNTY  DOCKET NO.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J.Ch.  Submitted: October 7, 2024  PETITIONERS’ OPPOSITION  BRIEF TO APPELLANTS/RESPONDENTS’ APPEAL
[brief] Plaintiff Cannot Backfill Her Lack of Expert Proof on Manufacturing Defect with Circumstantial Evidence.  [ISSUE WAS RAISED (Da0785; Da0816; Da0846)]  Without expert testimony, a plaintiff can use circumstantial evidence to establish a product defect only where (a) the case involves ordinary products jurors can understand and (b) the evidence conclusively negates causes of the injury other than a defect.
[brief] Given that [...] already provided Plaintiff with its Membership Agreement that violated the HCSA, CFA, TCCWNA, and RISA, the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff in the Complaint would not benefit her because she already received the Membership Agreement.  Conversely, the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff (i.e. that [...] cease using the Membership Agreement) would immediately prevent other New Jersey consumers from being exposed to the type of HCSA, CFA, TCCWNA, and RISA violations alleged by Plaintiff against [...] in the Complaint.  (Ja13-Ja43)  In its appellate brief (“[...] Brief”), [...] reads words into Plaintiff’s Complaint, and makes conclusory assumptions about its own Membership Agreement (concerning the subject “ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AND CLASS ACTION WAIVER”) (Ja36), which do not exist as well as argues legal theories concerning “public injunctive relief” as applied to a health club contract such as [...]’s Membership Agreement that defy logic.  Infra Section I(A)  For example, throughout its appellate brief, [...] strategically (or negligently) uses the phrases “discrete class of current and former members”, “discrete class of persons”, “discrete class of similarly situated persons” “discrete class members” and/or “discrete class of individuals” despite the undisputed fact that Plaintiff never pleads the words “discrete class” in her Class Action Complaint.
[brief] [T]he property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: a. a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or b. a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under section 59:4–3 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.  [N.J.S.A. 59:4-2]  In this matter, there is no dispute as to the fact that the City did not have actual notice of the alleged condition, therefore Plaintiff was required to prove constructive notice.  N.J.S.A. 59:4-3(b) defines constructive notice:  A public entity shall be deemed to have constructive notice of a dangerous condition within the meaning of subsection b. of section 59:4-2 only if the plaintiff establishes that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character.  [N.J.S.A. 59:4-3(b)]
[brief] When he asked to speak with his parents, he had already been advised that his statements could be used against him and that the calls were being recorded.  Moreover, the trial court erroneously reasoned that there was no question in [it’s] mind the calls constituted continuing questioning of defendant by allowing him to talk to his parents.  (3T:20-9 to 20-16).  [...] did not suggest that defendant call his parents and there is no evidence in the record that there was any measure of compulsion on the part of [...] that led defendant to request to speak with his parents.  Therefore, the phone calls cannot be deemed the functional equivalent of interrogation.  See *Tiwana*, 256 N.J. at 42.  Moreover, because the trial court’s belief is not supported by the evidence presented during the suppression motion, the trial court’s decision to suppress the statements made during the phone calls is “clearly mistaken” and so “wide of the mark” that “the interests of justice demand intervention and correction” by this Court.
[brief] The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("LAD") was first enacted in 1945, and its purpose is "nothing less than the eradication of the cancer of discrimination."  Lehmann v. Toys R Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 626 A.2d 445 (1993), see also Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 334, 537 A.2d 652, cert. denied sub. nom., University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey v. Fuchilla, 488 U.S. 826, 109 S. Ct. 75, 102 L.Ed 2d 51 (1988).
[directive] Seizure of Weapons from Municipal and County Law Enforcement Officers  D.  When a weapon has been seized from a law enforcement officer involved in a domestic violence offense but no criminal charges, court order or warrant has been issued or is pending regarding possession of weapons, a County Prosecutor may authorize the return of the seized weapons subject to conditions, if any, the Prosecutor determines necessary.  V.  RESTRICTIONS ON RETURN OF FIREARMS  Pursuant to the provisions of the federal crime bill, 18 922(g), if a final U.S.C.A. domestic violence restraining order is issued, and for the duration of that order, A.  A law enforcement officer may be authorized by a court to possess a department issued firearm under conditions recommended by the appropriate county prosecutor, and B.  The officer may not possess any personally owned firearms.  VI.  PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF THIS DIRECTIVE  This directive is binding upon all county prosecutors and all law enforcement officers in this State.  This directive and the procedures set forth herein are implemented solely for the purpose of guidance within the criminal justice community.  They are not intended to, do not, and may not be invoked to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter, civil or criminal.  5 (9/00)
[brief] Order of the Appellate Division denying the [...] and Mayor [...]’s Motion for Leave to Appeal dated December 24, 2020  Volume IV Transcript of the Hearing Conducted before the Special Hearing Officer dated March 24, 2022  Transcript of the Hearing Conducted before the Special Hearing Officer dated March 25, 2022  Volume V Relevant portions of Motion for Leave to Appeal the August 9, 2022 Order Pursuant to R. 2:5-6 on behalf of Defendant-Appellants, [...] and Mayor [...], in His Official Capacity as Mayor of the [...] Order of the Appellate Division denying the [...] and Mayor [...]’s Motion for Leave to Appeal dated August 29, 2022
[brief] Pursuant to the Order, the parties were permitted to engage in discovery and [...] was required to file an Accounting.  The First Accounting was dated October 9, 2020.  (R-3).  The Court held a hearing concerning the inadequacies in the Accounting highlighted by [...]’s counsel on October 22, 2020.  The Court advised the parties that [...] May would be removed if the inadequacies existed and stated, “When I look at it, [...], if it says what you say it says or lack thereof, this is what is going to happen.  I am going to remove [...] May as the temporary administratrix and put a third party independent attorney or accountant in her place…  (2T, 9-10).  After the hearing, [...], Esq. on behalf of the [...], wrote the Court on October 23, 2020, requesting another opportunity for [...] to continue because her “lack of efforts to search and identify assets of the subject estate is likely the result of my personal misguidance”.  (R-5).  Upon receipt of this letter the Judge allowed [...] to continue and issued an Order on October 23, 2020, requiring a Second Accounting and a new discovery schedule including the conducting of depositions.  (R-7)  [...] May provided a Second Accounting on November 13, 2020.  (R-9).  This Accounting was also deficient, with [...] failing to preserve or reveal the assets of the Estate.  As a result, the Court had a hearing on November 20, 2020.  [...] May was removed as Administratrix for misconduct and [...], Esq. was appointed as the Court’s Administratrix.  (12-A).  The transcripts, court orders and documents provided in the legal arguments presented herein will demonstrate that the [...] and [...] May conspired together to prevent Teresa, as [...]’s wife from receiving any of the inheritance or insurance monies which she was legally entitled to.  Both before and from and after the appointment of the independent Court-appointed Adminstratrix, [...], both counsel for [...], as well as [...], Esq., faced never-ending efforts by [...] May, with the active participation of her counsel, the [...], to hide assets, and/or move assets out of reach, and or misrepresent the facts regarding assets, all designed to prevent [...] from discovering their existence and securing her rightful inheritance.  A discussion of these assets, and their mishandling follows.
[brief] (citation omitted).  _Id._ at 147-48.  In protecting plaintiff’s claim from summary judgment, the trial court effectively adopted the very interpretation of the governing court rule that the Rutkowski Court sought to avoid.  The trial court’s application of an overly-expansive interpretation of _R._ 4:26-4 essentially swallows the rule whole.  Even if this Court determined that plaintiff’s fictitious party pleading somehow satisfied the requirements of _R._ 4:26-4, plaintiff has failed to establish that an adequate level of due diligence was exercised in order to identify the identity of [...] or [...], the [...]’s contract partner, prior to the running of the statute of limitation.
[brief] **B.  Disputes Subject to PIP Dispute Resolution**  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(c) states that dispute resolution proceedings “shall include disputes arising regarding medical expenses benefits provided under”  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.  This provision does not reference the IFPA, or affirmative claims brought for violations of the IFPA.  Notwithstanding, given the analysis above of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4, that the disputes involving medical expenses articulated in § 5.1(c) apply only to the insured, the injured person, or a medical provider seeking the payment of medical expense benefits from the automobile insurance carrier, the scope and extent of a “PIP dispute” does not include an automobile insurance carrier seeking the reimbursement of medical expense benefits paid to: medical providers; non-medical provider corporations, laypersons who are not an insured/injured party and attorneys who are not an insured/injured party.
[brief] “A jury's verdict, including an award of damages, is cloaked with a 'presumption of correctness.'”  Cuevas v. Wentworth Grp., 226 N.J. 480, 501 (2016) (quoting Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 598 (1977)).  "[T]he trial court may not disturb a damages award entered by a jury unless it is so grossly excessive or so grossly inadequate 'that it shocks the judicial conscience.'"  Orientale v. Jennings, 239 N.J. 569, 595 (2019).  "Judicial review of the correctness of a jury's damages award requires that the trial record be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs."  Cuevas, 226 N.J. at 485.
[brief] THE MOTION COURT ERRED BY USING THE EQUINE ACTIVITY LIABILITY ACT TO LIMIT DEFENDANTS LIABILITY DESPITE THE ACT BEING INAPPLICABLE TO DEFENDANTS AS A MATTER OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY (Pa1086a-Pa1088a)  The Motion Court had previously granted plaintiffs partial summary judgment, dismissing Defendants’ affirmative defense under the Equine Activity Liability Act with prejudice.  (Pa41a-Pa42a).  The Act, except for enumerated exceptions, serves as a complete defense to suits against “operators” of facilities where “participants” engage in “equine animal activities. ”  N.J.S.A. 5:15-5.  An “operator” is a person or entity who “owns, manages, controls, or directs the operation of an area where individuals engage in equine animal activities. ”  N.J.S.A. 5:15-2.  Defendants admitted that they did not own, manage, control, or direct any part of [...] when the attack occurred.  Therefore, Defendants cannot satisfy the statutory definition of “operator” under the Act and, thus, the immunity afforded by the Act does not apply to them.
[brief] In view of the fact that the June 19, 2023 order entered in favor of the Administrator “Ordered” that “the within Order is the final order in this matter that concludes all issues and proceedings presently before the trial court in connection with this action,” Defendant appealed the Court’s August 31, 2022 legal fee award at that time, which was within 45 days of the “final order” that “concluded all issues and proceedings” before the probate court in the matter.  For all the above reasons, Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s appeal should be dismissed as untimely, should be rejected.
[brief] “Earlier this year, trials in the Civil Division and matrimonial trials were suspended in two vicinages because of the high number of judicial vacancies.  . . .  For the past three years, the court system has operated with an average of more than 60 vacancies.  . . .  The Judiciary’s goal is to serve the public by providing a place to resolve disputes fairly and expeditiously.  In order to do so in every vicinage, we respectfully ask the Executive and Legislative branches to continue to address the critical issue of judicial vacancies in a timely manner. ”
[brief] The March 31, 2023 re-sentencing hearing was [...]’s “meaningful opportunity” under Comer to “obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. ”  297 N.J. at 386.  At that hearing, “[a]fter evaluating all the evidence, the trial court [had] discretion to affirm or reduce the original base sentence within the statutory range, and to reduce the parole bar to no less than 20 years. ”  Id. at 403 (emphasis added).  [...]’s defense counsel asked the court to exercise its discretion and change his original sentence from a term of life imprisonment to a term of 40 years.
[brief] [...]  RECEIVED APPELLATE  DIVISION MAY 09 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  APPELLANT, PRO SE [...] [...]  [...]  DATE: May 7, 2024  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |----------------------------------------------|------| | Table of Judgments, Orders & Rulings | ii | | Table of Appendix | ii | | Table of Authorities | iii | | Preliminary Statement | 1 | | Procedural History | 2 | | Statement of Facts | 2 | | ARGUMENTS | | | 1)
[brief] ….  [...]:  At the time we—we didn’t have this—this is newly discovered evidence.  We didn’t have [...], who provided this information, saying that—I didn’t—I didn’t even know.  (2T:61:13-62-13.)  The newly discovered evidence cited by plaintiff during the March 29, 2018 oral argument dealt with the alleged ownership of [...].  (2T:67:7-9.).  However, everything that plaintiff cited to alleging “newly discovered evidence” to support their new theory had been known or knowable to plaintiffs even before the 2015 case was even filed.
[brief] In the second deed, recorded in Deed Book 841-452, on page 453 (Pa921), [...] clearly says in the deed "together with such Riparian rights and other rights, privileges and franchises into the lands lying under the waters of Raritan Bay in front of and adjoining the above-described premises as are vested in the party of the first part."  [...] conveys not just the upland portion of the property in question along with the "Riparian rights" that are appurtenant to it, but he also further conveys the riparian grant, meaning the lands lying under the water and extending out into the Raritan Bay.  These are two separate estates in land.
[brief] The Department must comply with the APA before it changes an existing policy that alters the status quo and “substantially impacts the right of [[...]] and others. ”  *B.H. v. State of N.J., Dept. of Human Srvs.*, 400 N.J. Super. 418, 430 (App. Div. 2008).  The Bulletin is an administrative rule that must comply with the APA.