ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (SSR 3-4.)  [...], the general contractor on the project, entered into subcontracts with various trades for the performance of work, retaining [...] to perform site work.  (SSR 3,Dta1333.)  [...], in turn, subcontracted with [...] to perform various tasks that required concrete cutting work at different times throughout the course of the project.  (Dta430.)  [...] initially assigned [...] to work on the project pursuant to agreement dated July 23, 2015.  [...] also occasionally assigned other work on the project to [...] via purchase orders, which included the work [...] was performing when the incident occurred.  (Dta814-816.)  [...]’s suit against [...], [...] and [...] settled for a confidential sum.
[brief] A LIMITED REMAND IS REQUIRED TO CORRECT ISSUES RELATED TO MERGER AND A YARBOUGH/TORRES ANALYSIS ONLY.  A REMAND IS NOT REQUIRED TO ADDRESS AN ABILITY TO PAY HEARING, NOR THE COURT’S REFUSAL TO APPLY MITIGATING FACTOR FOUR.  In its instruction to the jury regarding Count Two of the indictment – second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, the trial court stated defendant’s unlawful purpose in possessing the firearm was “[t]he shooting of [...] and/or the firing a handgun in the direction of the vehicle that [...] was driving. ” (9T:156-25 to 127-4).  As such, the jury charge instructed that the purpose in possessing the handgun was to use it against the victim in the substantive offense.  Accordingly, defendant’s conviction for Count Two should have merge with the substantive offense of murder in Count One because there was no other evidence in the case that supported a separate unlawful purpose for the weapon.  State v. Tate, 216 N.J. 300, 312-313 (2013) (citing State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 641 (1996)).  Therefore, a limited remand is required to effectuate the merger and amend the judgment of conviction.
[brief] STATEMENT OF ITEMS SUBMITTED TO TRIAL COURT IN CONNECTION WITH PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY  JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANTS’ CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT  | Items Submitted by Plaintiff (Movant):  | Page | |----------------------------------------|------| | Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated August 25, 2023.  | Pa33 | | Plaintiff’s Proposed Form of Order.  | Pa35 | | Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts.  | Pa37 | | 08/25/2023 Certification of [...], Esq (“8/25/23 Heinkel Cert. ”).  | Pa45 | | Exhibit A to 8/25/23 Heinkel Cert. (Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint)  | Pa1 | | Exhibit B to 8/25/23 Heinkel Cert. (Defendants’ Answer to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint).  | Pa20 | | Exhibit C to 7/10/20 Heinkel Cert. (Leases between Plaintiff and Co-Defendant, [...]).  | Pa54 | | Exhibit D to 8/25/23 Heinkel Cert. (Unit 74 Tenant Account History from December 1998 through September 2008).  | Pa71 | | Exhibit E to 8/25/23 Heinkel Cert. (Unit 74 Tenant Account History from October 2007 through April 2016).  | Pa90 | | Exhibit F to 8/25/23 Heinkel Cert. (Deed to Unit 74 dated April 7, 2016).  | Pa96 | | Exhibit G to 8/25/23 Heinkel Cert. (Affidavit of Title Executed by [...]).  | Pa99 | | Exhibit H to 8/25/23 Heinkel Cert. (Promissory Note and Mortgage Given to Manasquan Savings Back by Plaintiff in Connection with Loan for Unit 74). | Pa101 | Items Submitted by Plaintiff, contd.: Exhibit I to 8/25/23 Heinkel Cert. (Settlement Statement from April 7, 2016 closing of Unit 74).............. Pa109 Exhibit J to 8/25/23 Heinkel Cert. (2016 Annual Mortgage Statement from [...])... Pa113 Exhibit K to 8/25/23 Heinkel Cert. (2017 Annual Mortgage Statement from [...])... Pa116 Exhibit L to 8/25/23 Heinkel Cert. (2018 Annual Mortgage Statement from [...])... Pa119 Exhibit M to 8/25/23 Heinkel Cert. (2019 Annual Mortgage Statement from [...])... Pa122 Exhibit N to 8/25/23 Heinkel Cert. (2020 Annual Mortgage Statement from [...])... Pa126 Exhibit O to 8/25/23 Heinkel Cert. (2021 Annual Mortgage Statement from [...])... Pa129 Exhibit P to 8/25/23 Heinkel Cert. (2022 Annual Mortgage Statement from [...])... Pa133
[brief] (Da587 ¶28)  (Da591 ¶42)  PLAINTIFF: “In fact, the remedy fashioned by the trial court and effectuated by the Trustee completely accomplished the Decedent’s intent. ”  (Pb28)  DEFENDANTS:  The clear dominant purpose of the Trust was to ensure that each beneficiary received an equal one-third share of all property owned by the Trust.  This was absolutely not achieved.  The Settlor could not have intended for [...] to receive a $149,000 profit upon purchasing the Boonton Property, thereby receiving more than his one-third share.  Similarly, the Settlor could not have intended for [...] to purchase the Florida Property for approximately $80,000 below its fair market value, giving her more than her one-third share.  Additionally, the Settlor could not have intended for [...] to spend over $100,000 on protracted litigation, advocating for herself and [...] at [...]’s expense.  Finally, Defendants contend that the remedy fashioned by the trial court was implemented without an evidentiary or plenary hearing to properly establish the facts.
[brief] As a result, Judge [*6]  McCloskey determined denial of plaintiff's application was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and improperly based on "the veiled or even expressed whims of the Board" rather than substantial evidence in the record.  The judge stated, "the record . . . is bereft of substantial evidence to support what was set forth in the Board's Resolution here and despite what it purported to detail otherwise.  15 High St. supra at 6.  Here there was no contrary expert opinion presented.  None of the Board's professionals gave any opinion one way or the other.  The Board's findings and Resolution were "created" to grant the [...]' variance when the [...] failed to meet the burdens required for the grant of the variances.  CONCLUSION
[brief] | 31 | | **Accardi v. Enviro-Pak Sys. Co.**, 317 N.J. Super. 457 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 158 N.J. 685 (1999).  | 36 | | **Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.**, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).  | 17 | | **Baker v. National State Bank**, 353 N.J. Super. 145, 153 (App. Div. 2002).  | 15, 16 | | **Bozza v. Vornado, Inc. **, 42 N.J. 355 (1964).  | 45, 46 | | **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Amer.**, 142 N.J. 520 (1995).  | 15, 16, 17 | | **Brown v. Racquet Club of Bricktown**, 95 N.J. 280 (1984).  | 44 | | **Butler v. Acme Mkts**, 87 N.J. 270 (1982).  | 32, 33, 35 | | **Carlson v. Hannah**, 6 N.J. 202 (1951).  | 49 | | **Caroff v. Liberty Lumber Co.**, 146 N.J. Super. 353 (App. Div. 1977).  | 36, 37 | | **Carter v. Reynolds**, 175 N.J. 402 (2003).  | 48 | | **Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets**, 149 N.J. 496 (1997).  | 35 | | **Cty. of Solano v. Delancy**, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721 (Ct. App. 1989).  | 19 | | **Endre v. Arnold**, 300 N.J. Super. 136, 141 (1997).  | 33, 34 | | **Galvao v. G.R. Robert Const. Co.**, 179 N.J. 462 (2004).  | 48, 49 | Hirsch v. General Motors Corp., 266 N.J. Super. 222 (Law Div. 1993) ...........  19 Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426 (1993) ....................... 35, 36, 37 Jerista v. Murray, 185 N.J. 175 (2005) ........................................ 19, 30, 40 Jeter v. Sam’s Club, 250 N.J. 240 (2022) ..........................................
[brief] 10.  The Facility will be located within easements on private property.  Specifically, it will occupy six easement areas on a parcel of land located on [...] in [...] (the “Proposed Site”).  The street address for the Proposed Site is 960 [...] Road, [...], New Jersey.  The lot is 16.51 acres and is occupied by an office park complex and an existing cellular communications tower.  The Regulator Station will be situated on a small section of the property approximately 180 feet west of the [...] Road right-of-way, on six specific easements: a 40' x 150' Site Facility Easement, a 10' x 160' Pipe Easement, an 18' x 50' Access Easement, two "L"-shaped 20' wide berm and Landscape Easements (East and West), and an 18’ x 95’ tree line easement.  The location and design of the Facility are more fully described in Exhibits P-1, P-2, P-3, P-4 and P-5 attached hereto.
[brief] The standard for deciding a motion for judgment NOV is whether the [State’s] evidence, viewed in its entirety, be it direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all of its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, is sufficient to enable a jury to find that the State’s charge has been established beyond a reasonable doubt….  On such a motion the trial judge is not concerned with the worth, nature, or extent (beyond a scintilla) of the evidence, but only with its existence, viewed most favorably to the State.  State v. Kluber, 130 N.J. Super. 336, 341-42 (App. Div. 1974), certif. den., 67 N.J. 72 (1975), overruled on other gds, United States v. Martin Linen Supply Company, 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
[brief] State Cases  Atalese v. U.S.  Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014)  ........................................... 5-6, 10 Berlin v. Remington & Vernick Engrs., 337 N.J. Super 590 (App. Div. 2001)  .........................................................................................................................  2 Cohen v. Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, 2024 Mass. Super. LEXIS 59 (Mass. Sup. Ct. June 10, 2024)  .................................................................  3 Hoffman v. Supplements Togo Mgmt, 419 N.J. Super. 596, 611 (App. Div. 2011)  ..........................................................................................................................  14  Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Jeffers, 381 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 2005)  .........................................................................................................................  3 Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co, 62 N.J. 229 (1973)  ..............................................................................  2 Parrella v. Sirius Xm Holdings, No. A-4283-19, 2022 N.J. Super. ............. 3, 5-6, 13  Racioppi v. Airbnb, Inc., No. A-0455-22, 2023 N.J. Super.................................  Passim Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co., 436 N.J. Super. 305 (App. Div. 2014), rev’d other grounds, 225 N.J. 343 (2016)  .................................................................  7  Santana v. SmileDirectClub, LLC, 475 N.J. Super. 279 (App. Div. 2023)  ..........................................................................................................................  15  State v. Fuqua, No. A-3149-17, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1773, at *61-62 (App. Div. Aug. 20, 2021), cert. denied 251 N.J. 211 (2022)  ......................................................................................................................... 2-3, 8 State v. Smith, 55 N.J. 476 (1970)  ........................................................................................................  2  Vercammen v. Linkedin Corp., No. A-0188-20, 2022 N.J. Super. ....................  Passim Wollen v. Gulf Stream Restoration, 468 N.J. Super. 483 (App. Div. 2021) .........................................................................................................................
[directive] 지령 제01-18호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 수정 양식, 페이지 CN 11081-Korean 2/3 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11081-Korean page 2 of 3 c.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  주 교도소에 구금선고를 받아 복역하는 기간보다  치료받는 시간이 더 오래 걸릴 수도 있다는 것을 아십니까? that you could spend more time in treatment than you would spend if sentenced to state prison?  6.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하가 반복적이고 충동적인 성 범죄자로서 성범죄자 치료를 잘 받을 (혜택을 받는다는) 받았으나, 수 있다는 판정을 귀하는 이러한 치료에 없고, 참여할 의사가 성인진단 및 치료센터가 아닌 다른 시설에 경우에, 5번 구금되어 있는 귀하는 위 조항에 포함된 것과 동일한  아십니까?  가석방 자격 조건을 따라야 하는 것을  Do you understand that if you are determined to be a repetitive, compulsive sex offender not who is amenable to (will benefit from) sex offender treatment but you are willing to participate in such treatment and are confined to a facility other than Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center, you will also be subject to the same parole eligibility terms as contained in section 5 above?
[brief] #  TABLE OF APPENDIX  ## VOLUME 1 | Document Description | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Application for Accidental Disability Pension  Filed 6/29/16.  | Pa1 | | Letter from Division of Pension & Benefits Dated 10/17/17.  | Pa2 | | New Jersey CSC Job Description for County Police Sergeant | Pa5 | | Documents Relating to MVA of 10/17/15.  | Pa10 | | [...] OAL Written Closing.  | Pa27 | | Board OAL Written Closing.  | Pa51 | | Unpublished Case Attached as Exhibit to Board OAL Written Closing.  | Pa70 | | OAL Initial Decision.  | Pa76 | | Board’s Exceptions to | Pa95 | | [...] Reply to Exceptions | Pa102| | Preliminary Administrative Determination | Pa110| | Final Administrative Determination | Pa111| | [...] Notice of Appeal.
[brief] \textsuperscript{10}  In connection with his representation of Plaintiff, [...]’s “interactions with DOP personnel were limited and, to the extent correspondence was made, it occurred through electronic mail and telephone communications. ”  Da168 ¶ 10.  Email correspondence attached to the FAC reflects that [...] did not have [...]’ cell phone number as of September 28, 2016.  Da100–01.  Finally, the doctrine of judicial estoppel also separately bars Plaintiff’s attempt to manufacture a basis for specific jurisdiction in New Jersey.
[directive] The subsection Directive.  See this of 4  Section under presumed is summons the if only supervisory officers specially-designated to granted be shall presumption a overcome of delegation such resources, that available on based determines, Prosecutor County overburdened from being Office Prosecutor's the prevent to necessary is authority prosecutorial such ensuring that for responsible remain shall Prosecutor the and consultations, charging by supervisory officers. specially-designated by properly exercised is authority delegated in and determine when Section to this by authorized are Prosecutors County
[brief] CONCLUSION  [...] performed his assigned duties on the evening of August 16 through August 17, 2019 according to the practices and protocols that existed at that time in the [...].  In fact, on August 16, 2019, [...] performed them to the same standard as [...] and [...] – who were not disciplined.  The State failed to prove, even by a preponderance of the competent evidence, that [...] failed to perform his duties or that he deviated from the protocols established by the [...] staff during the night shift.  The State also failed to prove, by a preponderance of the competent evidence, that [...]’s address to the other officers, which had been approved by his Superior Officer, constituted a threat of any kind to any person.  In fact, all of the testimony adduced on this point indicated that [...] was upset that internal investigations were being published in external social medial websites.  It was not until another officer exercised his bravado and escalated the situation that [...] reacted.  Again, that other officer was not disciplined for that escalation.  For these reasons, the decisions of the [...] and the [...] should be reversed and [...] should be reinstated to his position as Senior Corrections Officer at the [...].
[brief] Sanctions never should have been imposed, because I had several valid substantive arguments supporting my position (as well as valid arguments as to the technical defects of the motions to dismiss).  But even assuming arguendo if I was completely wrong on every argument that I raised - which I was not - nonetheless even in that hypothetical scenario, sanctions should not be imposed simply because I had been wrong about the law.  The defendants never even alleged bad faith, let alone even attempted to prove bad faith, let alone actually meet that requisite.
[brief] On October 25, 2023, Judges [...] and [...] reversed the Rule 4:6-2(e) dismissal of a civil rights act violation count.  [...] v. [...], [...] (App. Div. Oct. 25, 2023) (Pa690).  At this post-remand pre-answer pre-discovery juncture of the case, the trial court prematurely shut down any civil rights act violation analysis.  On April 27, 2023, the trial court shut down any heavy lifting statutory interpretation textual, context and historical analysis as to whether our State Legislature intended to exclude and to carve out 100% non-urban renewal entity affordable housing projects from the new urban renewal entity limitations of revenues and profits formation requirement, minimum land tax credits, five percent of revenues payment to the county and new long term tax exemption reporting and oversight requirements.  See, N.J.S.A. 40A:20-2, -3(g), -4, -5, -9, -11, -12, -13.  Also see, [...] v. [...], __N.J. Super.__ (App. Div. Oct. 27, 2023)([...], together with Judges [...] and [...], explaining (without the assistance of our absent Attorney General) what the phrase limited “profits” and “dividends” means); [...] v. [...], [...] (Tax May 5, 2023) (Pa598).  III.
[brief] *Saccone v. Bd. of Trustees of Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys.*, 219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014).  Quite the opposite, this finding is directly contrary to the evidentiary record.  *Contra Dennery v. Bd. of Educ. of Passaic Cty. Reg'l High Sch. Dist. No. 1, Passaic Cty.*, 131 N.J. 626, 641 (1993)(Appellate Division should reverse agency decision where it “is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole”).
[brief] The ZBA unanimously approved the Homeowners’ application and adopted a fourteen (14) page Resolution of Approval that details the factual and legal basis (both positive and negative) for granting the variance relief.  (Pa760; Pa099-112).  The Record  Before the ZBA  The Homeowners appeared before the ZBA at four (4) separate hearings conducted on March 28, 2022, May 23, 2022, August 22, 2022 and September 12, 2022 respectively.
[brief] Order on Second Motion for Summary Judgment filed 8/8/22  Pa-171 Order Denying Reconsideration filed 2/21/23  Pa-173  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED: CASES  Pages  Green v. Jersey City Board of Education, 177 N.J. 434 1-3 State v. Hale, 127 N.J. Super. 407  4  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Plaintiff-Appellant relies on the Procedural History previously submitted.  STATEMENT OF FACTS  Plaintiff-Appellant relies on the Statement of Facts previously submitted.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  I  Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants’ Brief  The Court invoked the statute of limitations when in fact that was rejected implicitly by [...]’s denial of the original Motion for Summary Judgment; Green v. Jersey City Board of Education, 177 N.J. 434 (2003).  To this point, we have a Summary Judgment Motion denied by [...] as to Plaintiff’s CEPA claims, but not as to her LAD claims.  Two years later, on August 8, 2022, the Defendants filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment which should not have been granted by the Court below but, mistakenly, was.
[directive] New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and Recyclable Page 2 uniform enforcement of the Orders, I required that designated assistant prosecutors within each County Prosecutor’s Office (“COVID-19 Prosecutor”) review and pre-approve every COVID-19 related charge in their county.  This pre-approval process not only ensured that similarly situated defendants across the state were being treated in a similar manner, but also helped ensure compliance with the Governor’s Orders.  As these charged cases now proceed through our municipal courts, it is equally important that each case be prosecuted in a uniform and consistent fashion to ensure they are all resolved in a fair and just manner.  Therefore, pursuant to the authority granted to me under the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as Chief Law Enforcement Officer of the State to secure the benefits of uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I, [...], hereby provide the following guidance to all prosecutors operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey as to the prosecution of COVID-19 related cases in municipal court.
[directive] In addressing that dilemma, the Court attempts to balance the relevant interests in a way that comports with defendants’ rights under the CJRA.  *In this case, defendant faces charges for murder, conspiracy, and aggravated assault.  Despite multiple delays -- most of which resulted from the pandemic -- his trial has not yet begun.  Because the prosecution announced it was mark, however, defendant’s statutory right ready to proceed to trial at the two-year to a speedy trial has not been violated.  The Court therefore affirms the judgment of the trial court and remands the case for trial with additional instructions.
[brief] Dismissal Order of March 6, 2023 of The Honorable, [...], J.S.C.:........................................Pa 112 -118  Dismissal Order of March 27, 2023 of The Honorable, [...], J.S.C.:.....................................Pa-119  [...]'s Notice of Appeal  Filed: 05-04-2023..............................................................................Pa-120 -151  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] Defendants responded by letter on December 3, 2021 highlighting that: (1) Plaintiff failed to oppose the motion; (2) Defendants were not notified of any intent by the Plaintiff to produce responsive documents; (3) Plaintiff did not contact Defendants in any way to request an adjournment to allow time for the documents to be provided and reviewed for completeness by Defendants’ counsel; and (4) Plaintiff did not move before the trial court for relief.
[brief] [(Pa466). ]  Without explanation and contrary to the motion record, the motion judge decided that “Any claims against the State and DEP regarding the incident with [...]’s desk must be dismissed as well.  Plaintiff was never disciplined or barred from the DEP building for the allegation he was under [...]’s desk. ” (3T39:4-8).  The following review of the facts compels the conclusion that a jury could find that the April 12, 2016 disciplinary charges were retaliatory.
[brief] ..........................................................  15 U.S. ex rel. Brown v. Walt Disney World Co., No. 6:06-cv-1943-ORL-22KRS, 2008 WL 2561975 (M.D. Fla. June 24, 2008)  ............................................................  44 U.S. ex rel. Customs Fraud Investigations, LLC v. Victaulic Co., No. 13-2983, 2014 WL 4375638 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2014)  ..................... 34, 36 U.S. ex rel. Doe v. Staples, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2013) .................................................. 31, 37, 43, 46 U.S. ex rel. Green v. Serv. Cont. Educ. & Training Tr. Fund, 843 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2012) .................................................. 38-39, 43 U.S. ex rel. Hixson v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 613 F.3d 1186 (8th Cir. 2010) ....................................................... 14 U.S. ex rel. Integra Med Analytics LLC v. Providence Health & Servs., No. CV 17-1694 PSG (SSx), 2019 WL 3282619 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2019) ............................................................. 41 U.S. ex rel. Jamison v. McKesson Corp., 649 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2011) ................................................................. 14 U.S. ex rel. JDJ & Assocs. LLP v. Natixis, No. 15-cv-5427 (PKC), 2017 WL 4357797 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017) ........................................................................................................... 48 U.S. ex rel. Judd v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 638 F. App’x 162 (3d Cir. 2015)