ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The laws of the United States, made by congress, are the supreme law of the land.  (Not argued below)  Article VI of the Constitution reads in pertinent part as follows:  ‘….This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding….’  At first glance there appears to be two avenues that can be taken where the ‘….Laws of the United States…..’ will not be the ‘….supreme Law of the Land…..’  Note: ‘….Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance…..’ of ‘….This Constitution…..’ are not part of the Constitution.  However, from McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 we have:  ‘….But this question is not left to mere reason: the people have, in express terms, decided it, by saying, *406 ‘this constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof,’ ‘shall be the supreme law of the land,’ and by requiring that the members of the state legislatures, and the officers of the executive and judicial departments of the states, shall take the oath of fidelity to it.  The government of the United States, then, though limited in its powers, is supreme; and its laws, when made in pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land, 'anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.'....'  As a result, either '....this constitution,....' or '....the laws of the United States....' could be the supreme law of the land.  Fortunately, from Schick v. United States, 195 US 65 we have in pertinent part:  '....If there be any conflict between these two provisions, the one found in the Amendments must control, under the well-understood rule that the last expression of the will of the lawmaker prevails over an earlier [*69] one....'  So, the above referenced part of Article VI starts with, '....This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;....'  Clearly, '....the Laws of the United States....' is written after '....This Constitution....'  As a result, ‘….the Laws of the United States…. ’ is the ‘….the last expression of the will of the lawmaker…. ’ on the matter.  It follows that ‘….the laws of the United States….  ’ are the supreme law of the land rather than ‘….This Constitution….  ’  CONCLUSION:
[brief] E. (Pa000098)  [...] Cannot Rely On The 2015 Settlement To Preclude The Claims Filed In [...] Because The 2015 Settlement Did Not Contain Any “Covenant Not To Sue. ”  “A release is a provision that intends a present abandonment of a known right or claim.  By contrast, a covenant not to sue also applies to future claims and constitutes an agreement to exercise forbearance from asserting any claim which either exists or which may accrue [in the future].”
[brief] This is explained, fully, in the full quote from the model jury instructions that were read to the jury:  I instruct you that a reasonable belief is different than an honest belief.  What is reasonable is not measured by what a defendant found reasonable but rather by what a jury finds reasonable.  Thus, the reasonableness of defendant’s belief is based on an objective standard – that is, by how an ordinary reasonable person with a detached viewpoint would view it.  A subjective belief, based on the viewpoint of the defendant, is immaterial.  (Da24-25); *Model Jury Charges (Criminal)*, ‘Justification: Use of Force Upon an Intruder N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(c)” (rev. Sept. 12, 2016); (32T:156-13 to 20).
[brief] Subaqueous lands are underwater.  New Jersey has the right and title to all lands now and formerly flowed by tide.  Subaqueous lands are owned by the State unless divested by the State.  One of the means of divestment is by way of a grant.  A Riparian Grant that is a grant that is given to the upland owner.  There is an exception in the Statute as to giving it to a non-upland owner which is not relevant to the case, but quite generally, the upland owner, if it supplies proof to the State that it is the upland owner and requests that a grant be issued, the State can divest its title to the lands described in the grant.  Riparian Rights existed and still exist.
[directive] If the victim or family member in the case of a murder victim choose not to testify personally at the hearing, the victim or relative may elect to present testimony to a senior hearing officer designated by the board panel.(8)  K.  The victim, or the next of kin if the victim is deceased, shall be notified of any determination to seek or decline prosecution in motor vehicle crashes/accidents involving another person's driving while under the influence of drugs or alcohol.(9)  L.  After disposition of the case, victims should be notified as soon as possible of a defendant's release from custody and any associated conditions of that release.
[brief] 5.  What are the details of [...]’s transition to a new server, what was lost from the old server, and what happened to the prior server(s) and backups to the prior server(s)?  6.  Identify all factors that caused or contributed to the loss or deletion of potentially responsive ESI identified in Plaintiffs’ litigation hold letter from any relevant custodian or data source after [...] received Plaintiffs’ litigation hold letter.
[brief] subsequent Operating Agreements of [...] and [...] by its express terms, which state as follows:  1.  **Expression of Intent.**  This Memorandum is an expression of the interest and intent of the Parties which will form the basis of one or more formal agreements between the Parties which may be necessary, proper or advisable until the Debtors secure bank financing for the acquisition of the current mortgage on the Property or the Property and the Debtors and Creditor are fully able to execute and deliver a second mortgage agreement between the Parties relating to such Property.
[brief] Conclusion  As set forth above, and explained fully in Defendants’ initial brief, this Court should reverse the judgment of the trial court and enter summary judgement in favor of Defendants, or remand the matter to the trial court to properly consider expert and factual testimony on the reasonable search required of a buyer and the adequacy of the inquiry conducted by the Defendants, and to make a determination of exactly what the Defendants should have done other than engage a professional surveyor to confirm the five recorded documents were accurate, and his lot was 66.3 feet wide.
[brief] RESPONDENTS FAILED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF STANDING IN THEIR BRIEF AND THE TRIAL COURT INAPPROPRIATELY PERMITTED THE AMENDMENT OF THE PLEADING POST TRIAL TO ADD PLAINTIFF [...] (RESPONDENTS’ POINT V & APPELLANT’S POINTS I AND IV).  Notably, Respondents once again remain silent on the issue of standing.  They fail to address in any way the case law cited in Appellant’s Brief, despite the fact that that precedent clearly establishes that an initial lack of standing (on the part of [...] and the individual plaintiffs) cannot be cured by the later addition of ([...]) as a party.  They remain silent with regard to their failure to respect the rules governing direct vs. derivative actions.  They fail to address the issue of damages to [...] or to themselves individually.  In sum, they rely wholly on the trial court’s misapplication of Rule 4:9 to grant [...] a position as a plaintiff post-judgment.  But, as discussed in Appellant’s Brief, the addition of [...] as a plaintiff after the conclusion of trial and after the entry of judgment finds no support in law and does not cure an initial lack of standing.  A reading of the trial court’s order and statement of reasons for adding [...] (Da260-70) provides nothing to the contrary – as the trial court did not even attempt to support its ruling.  Indeed, despite a 9 page Statement of Reasons discussing focused on Appellant’s motion to vacate, the court’s discussion of amending the pleadings is confined to a single line at Da260, which reads, “Plaintiff’s cross-motion to amend the pleadings to reflect judgment [sic] is Granted. ”  Id.
[brief] [...], another non-party witness, also testified about his work for [...] with respect to the Property.  He testified that he has been doing repairs at the Property for over twenty (20) years.  (10T 91:2-94:15, Jan. 25, 2023).  When repairs were done either at the request of [...] or his tenant, [...], [...] would issue a bill which [...] would pay.  (10T 92:2-20, Jan. 25, 2023).  [...] has no knowledge of [...], [...], or [...].  (10T 93:2-13 Jan. 25, 2023).  His work was at all times for [...].  [...] even paid property taxes for the Property on [...]’s behalf on a number of occasions.  (10T 108:1-14, Jan. 25, 2023).  D. [...]’S DISCOVERY OF THE FRAUD
[brief] The aforementioned Bid Solicitation further states that the archaeologist is expected to record, photograph, monitor and at the end of its monitoring services, prepare “a summary monitoring report” that meets the standards of the New Jersey State Historical Preservation Office.  1528a  As stated previously, the subject Project’s Bid Solicitation clearly delineated the archaeological consulting services to be conducted by a qualified archaeologist who was to be listed under the “Register of Professional Archaeologists”, not registered under the PWCRA.  As set forth by the [...] in its bid determination letter dated July 22, 2024, the term “Registered Archaeologists (RA)” as referenced in the Bid Solicitation required any proposed archaeologist to be registered with the Register of Professional Archaeologists (RPA), a national professional organization.  In accordance therewith, [...]’s selected archaeological firm [...] has a number of members registered with the RPA, including its president and principal archaeologist, Richard W. [...], Ph.D., thereby satisfying the “registration” requirement called for in the bid specification.  1555a.
[brief] This is antithetical to FERPA and New Jersey student records law and regulations, which both prioritize parental access to student records.  Failure to acknowledge these principles is a significant oversight by the Chancery Division.  Student record laws demonstrate a legislative determination that parents of all students are entitled to full, complete, and unfettered access to their child’s student records.  To apply the LAD in the manner the State asserts is not providing transgender students with equal rights.  To the contrary, such an application treats cisgender students less favorably and establishes transgender student rights not available to the non-transgender community.  Simply, the parents of all students are aware of the gender identified and maintained in the mandatory student records.  Thus, it cannot be disparate treatment to advise parents any change of gender in the mandated student record.  Indeed, a change to any other mandated student record, such as address, telephone number, or name, would trigger parental notification.  Thus, parental notification of a formal mandated student record is not discriminatory.  POINT III (SEE DA131-133)
[brief] [...] could not recall whether any rules and regulations had been promulgated at HT’s Police Department governing the use of vehicle locators.  (3T19:20).  The GPS data retention period is indefinite.  (3T63:22).  [...] testified that the entire [...] is hooked up to [...] in their police vehicles.  (3T24:16).  [...] is software that the department uses for records management, report writing, dispatching, and the MDTs in the cars and for tracking the daily activities of the Police Department.  (3T25:14-18).  [...] testified that rather than Officers using the [...] system to enter their property checks and stats, dispatch enters that information.  (3T27:9).
[brief] The Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendants [...] d/b/a [...], [...] Brands Group, Inc., [...] Brands, Inc., [...], [...] Donuts Franchising, LLC, and [...] and [...], (fictitious names), (collectively “Dunkin Defendants”) and [...] (Defendant-Respondent) (Pa 001).  At mediation with the Hon. [...], J.S.C., Ret., the Plaintiff settled her claims against the Dunkin Defendants.  On November 9, 2023, the parties’ counsel presented oral argument\(^2\) before the Trial Court.
[brief] APPELLANT SERVED A COMPLIANT AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT AGAINST RESPONDENT  APURVA MOTIVALA, MD (ISSUE RAISED BELOW: SEE AUGUST 26, 2022, TRIAL COURT ORDER)  For nearly the same reasons that this Court should reverse the trial court’s August 26, 2022, Order dismissing [...] with prejudice, this Court should also reverse the trial court’s second August 26, 2022, Order dismissing [...] (“[...]” hereinafter) with prejudice.
[brief] Had the [...] had an opportunity to address this issue before [...], they would have provided proof that [...] was under secured. abused her discretion by not weighing the equities at all.  Therefore, this Court should reverse [...]’s orders; confirm that for purposes of [...]’s exercise of its right of redemption of the mortgaged premises, the postjudgment interest rate is the rate prescribed in R. 4:42-11; and direct that a new sheriff’s sale be conducted if [...] has not already redeemed the mortgaged premises.
[brief] [...] claims that the trial court erred in finding that the submission of the Environmental Impact Assessment and associated extensive professional review was sufficient to meet the requirements of the MLUL.  [...]’s argument is largely a reiteration of Points IA and IB.  To that end, [...] relies on sections II A and II B, *supra*, of this Brief.  [...] contends that the Board had the obligation to permit testimony and cross examination on all issues and materials pertaining to the application.  As aptly stated by the trial court, “[n]either the statute nor the ordinances compel the Board to take testimony on all issues if those issues are substantiated in the record before it. ” (*Pa301-Pa313*).  Instead, the [...] focused on the issues that were relevant to the subdivision in its consideration of the subdivision application with consideration of other reports, plans and other documents properly submitted by [...] but relevant to the site plan application, to be considered during the Board’s consideration of that application.  The Trial Court in focusing “on the plain language of the [municipal ordinance] and use [of] common sense to effectuate the legislative purpose,” agreed with this approach.  (Pa311; Pa313), citing Dunbar Homes, Inc., 448 N.J. Super. at 598 (quoting Morristown Assocs. v. Grant Oil Co., 220 N.J. 360, 380 (2015).  [...] contends that the submission of an Environmental Impact Assessment is not sufficient to comply with the Robbinsville Ordinances without discussion on the record.  As properly found by the Trial Court, with no environmental or other impacts resulting from the subdivision, as set forth in the Reply to Point II A, this is an improper interpretation of the Ordinances.  D.  The Trial Court Did Not Err In Finding That A Review By Board Professionals Is Sufficient And That There Is No Environmental Impact Of The Subdivision (Response to Point IID of Appellant’s Brief).
[brief] The letter noted Plaintiff [...]’s repeated, broad expressions of intent to close, yet refusal to cooperate in setting a closing date.  (Id.).  Counsel’s letter also specified that “[t]here is a continuing obligation since the issuance of the CO to close pursuant to the express terms of the SPA, and [Plaintiffs’] repeated, unjustified refusal to do so constitutes an instance of default. ” (Id.).  Accordingly, the letter “re-affirm[ed] the action closing date for the Unit as April 28, 2022” and re-informed Plaintiffs that “[f]ailure to close title will result in the filing of a complaint for arbitration without further correspondence or discussion. ”  (Id.) (emphasis added).  On April 10, 2022, Plaintiff [...] responded by e-mail to counsel for [...]’s letter:  I am happy to see that you have corrected the error of referencing a wrong section number of DEFAULT.  Please CONFIRM that you are referencing my SPA.  I would like to reiterate my intention to proceed with closing.  I am strictly following the SPA to settle.  I DISAGREE with the action closing date, April 28, 2022, set by Seller.  This date is not defined by my SPA.  I further DISAGREE with all other statements in your letter that are not defined by my SPA.  I have attempted twice to CLARIFY the last day to settle according to SECTION 11 SETTLEMENT of my SPA.  You have NOT provided any clarification to this question.  This is my third attempt to request clarification.  This is NOT an assertion.  Is the last day to settle defined by my SPA?  This is a Yes or No question.  (A)  Yes, (B) No.  Your accusation of my delay or default is INVALID without defining the last day to settle by my SPA.  [DA402.]  On June 1, 2022, Litigation Counsel for [...] responded by e-mail, firmly reminding Plaintiff [...] that Counsel had “responded to this [date of settlement] issue, multiple times, via letter.
[directive] Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option
[brief] .................................................................7 - **Robert v. Consolidated Rail Corp.**, 832 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1987)..................6 - **Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co.**, 352 U.S. 500, 508 (1957).......................7 - **Sano v. Pa. R. Co.**, 282 F.2d 936, 938 (3d Cir. 1960).................................8 - **Sinclair v Long Island R.R.**, 985 F.2d 74, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1993)..................8, 11 - **Stevens v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations**, 356 N.J.Super. 311, 319 (App. Div. 2003).................................................................6,7 - **Syverson v. Consol. Rail Corp.
[brief] Patton supra at 183.  The Trustee was intent on selling acres of land owned by the debtor and as a result of a title survey discovered that 6.89 acres that was going to be sold was questionable as to ownership.  Id. at 183.  As a result of the findings which suggested that [...] might have an interest in the property, the Trustees filed court action to quiet title.  *Id.* at 183.  Litigation ensued and resulted in a trial wherein the court entered judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs ruling that title had vested by adverse possession per the applicable statute of limitations.  *Id.* at 184.  The court found that title was obtained at the end of 20 years when the Plaintiff’s predecessor in title had open, notorious and adverse possession.  *Id.* at 184.  When an appeal was taken, the Appellate Court reversed because it was found that there could be no adverse possession against the defendant or its predecessor because both were governmental agencies.
[brief] Rather, they are specifically excluded by the Agreement as med-pay subrogation is prohibited in New Jersey.  Thus, the arbitrators exceeded their powers by acting upon disputes that were not subject to the Agreement.  [...]’s institution of these summary actions to vacate the nine med-pay arbitration awards was based on the premise that the arbitrators exceeded their powers by acting upon disputes that were not subject to intercompany arbitration as provided by N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23(a)(4) was procedurally proper and as will be discussed, infra, was substantively correct as well.  To the extent that [...] maintains that the intercompany arbitration awards are final and not subject to review, it wholly ignores not only the case law concluding med-pay subrogation is prohibited in New Jersey but also the legislative intent behind N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 et seq. which prescribes the role of the judiciary with respect to arbitration awards.  POINT II
[brief] whether a defendant’s acts and omissions rise to the level of an “intentional wrong” creating a “substantial certainty” of injury under Laidlow requires an analysis of “the totality of the facts contained in the record” as to which “no one fact is dispositive. ”  See Laidlow v. Hariton Machinery Co., Inc., 170 N.J. 602, 622-623 (2002) and Fisher v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 363 N.J. Super 457, 469 (App. Div. 2003), certif. den., 179 N.J. 310 (2004).  The fact-sensitive nature of the relevant inquiry, and the disputed facts and expert opinions in the record herein, rendered summary judgment particularly inappropriate.
[brief] TITLE IN FULL (AS CAPTIONED BELOW)  IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF [...]  ATTORNEY / LAW FIRM / PRO SE LITIGANT NAME [...], Esq. STREET  ADDRESS [...]  CITY [...] STATE [...] ZIP [...]  PHONE NUMBER [...]  EMAIL ADDRESS [...] [...] (*)  ON APPEAL FROM TRIAL COURT  JUDGE  [...], JSC TRIAL COURT OR STATE AGENCY  [...] OR AGENCY NUMBER [...]
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 441 (emphasis added).  [...] and [...] also argue that an insurer’s notice obligations disappear where CCIP communications “flow through the CCIP administrator and sponsor” – another novel rule that [...] and [...] have invented for this case.  [...] Db44.  In *Insinga v. Hegedus*, 231 N.J. Super. 562 (App. Div 1989), cited by [...] and [...], this Court actually endorsed the holding of *Barbara Corp. v. Bob Maneely Ins. Agency*, 197 N.J. Super. 339 (App. Div. 1984), that this obligation on the insurer is non-delegable, and only rejected the insured’s argument because the broker actually sent “effective, proper and timely notice” and because the insured made a decision not to renew.  231 N.J. Super. 562, 567 (App. Div. 1989).  In *Insinga*, this Court maintained that “the insurer cannot avoid responsibility for the insured’s failure to receive notice … by claiming that it is the broker who is primarily responsible for sending such notices to the insured. ”  *Id.*  Finally, although [...] and [...] acknowledge that [...] could not find a copy of a request to unenroll [...], they claim that [...]’s request to unenroll and [...]’s endorsement removing [...] from the CCIP were eventually discovered.  [...] Db45.  However, in the same portions of testimony cited by [...] and [...], [...] also testified that such an endorsement would go to the broker, not [...], that [...] did not have direct communication with [...], and that [...] did not mail anything to the address on the endorsement.  Pa2114; Pa2118; Pa116.  II.
[brief] (See 7T:35-6 to 36-3)  Reversal is required because had the jury been properly instructed on accomplice liability, they could have acquitted [...] of first-degree robbery.  Our caselaw is clear that “erroneous instructions on material issues are presumed to be reversible error. ”  *State v. Lykes*, 192 N.J. 537 (2007) (quoting *State v. Lopez*, 187 N.J. 91, 101 (2006)); see *State v. Bunch*, 180 N.J. 534, 541-542 (2004) (“Because proper jury instructions are essential to a fair trial, erroneous instructions on materials points are presumed to possess the capacity to unfairly prejudice the defendant. ”); see also *Harrington*, 310 N.J. Super. at 277 (“We have consistently held … that the failure of a trial court to properly charge a jury is grounds for reversal, even though defense counsel failed to object at the appropriate time. ”) (citing *Weeks*, 107 N.J. at 410).  In *Weeks*, our Supreme Court held that the trial court’s inadequate accomplice liability jury instructions required reversal.