ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Order relieving the [...] and [...] as counsel for Interested Parties, [...] and [...] filed on May 31, 2024.  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  CASES  City of Atlantic City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447 (2010)  ...........................................  5, 7 Conforti v. Guliadis, 245 N.J. Super. 561, 565, (App. Div. 1991), aff'd as modified, 128 N.J. 318 (1992) .........................................................  7  Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201, 222 (1988)  .......................  7  O Builders & Associates, Inc. v. Yuna Corp. of N.J., 206 N.J. 109 (2011)  .................. 4, 6 STATUTES AND COURT RULES  N.J.S.A. 2A:81-2 .................................................................................. 7 R. 4:85-1 .............................................................................................  8  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] More off point is Defendant’s citation to *Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Wilder*, 47 S.W.3d 335 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).  In that case, the Wilder plaintiffs attacked a completely even arbitration clause simply because it was inserted into a boiler-plate consumer contract.  They requested the court to presume that arbitration was more favorable to commercial parties than consumers, which the court refused to do.  Completely off-point is Defendant’s reliance on *Willis Flooring, Inc. v. Howard S. Lease Const. Co. & Assocs.*, 656 P.2d 1184, 1186 (Alaska 1983).  That case concerned terms of a negotiated arbitration agreement between two commercial business entities, not a consumer contract.  Defendant pins hopes on the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in *Berent v. CMH Homes, Inc.*, 466 S.W.3d 740, 753 (Tenn. 2015).
[directive] b.  Actor, knowing he is not licensed or privileged to do so, photographs, films, videotapes, records, or otherwise reproduces in any manner, the image of another person whose 2C:14-9(a-c) Invasion of Privacy intimate parts are exposed or who is engaged in an act of sexual penetration or sexual contact, without that person’s consent and under circumstances in which a reasonable person would not expect to be observed, third degree.
[brief] Plaintiff, [...], is the Administratrix of the Estate of [...].  Pa31.  Plaintiff filed the Complaint on January 11, 2021, against [...], [...] Rail Operations, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] Washington Division, [...], [...], and a number of fictitious defendants, seeking damages from the defendants under the Wrongful Death Act N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1 et seq., the Survivor’s Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-3.
[brief] See Cheng, supra, at Page 11, see also Sg178.  Moreover, in direct contrast to Cheng, supra, Appellant set forth five certifications demonstrating that a majority of the seven-member board discussed [...]’s conduct independently with the Appellant and recommending that the Board Attorney investigate the matter.  See RA192-201.  Thus, the [...] was presented with evidence specifically vindicating Appellant from any violation of N.J.S.A. 12:24.1(e).  Accordingly, the [...]’s decision that Appellant’s actions constituted private actions was arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law and therefore must be overturned.
[directive] 7.3.2  Whenever any money or tangible personal property other than a motor vehicle is found or discovered by any person other than by a member of the police department acting in the line of duty, and the finder shall have given or shall give custody of the found money or tangible personal property to the police department for the purpose of assisting the police to find the owner thereof, the police department shall retain custody of said money or tangible property for a period of 6 months.
[brief] We're not taking over the job of cleaning up this property.  What we're doing is telling the owners of this property that there's a contaminated site there that's been there for a very long time, and there has been no remediation.  There has been nothing done to clean it up.  (T2, 35:15-22).  Another Councilperson agreed, explaining:  We are not taking the property.  No one wants to take the property.  This is really difficult.  I would say that sort of in response to the email we received today, to the best of my knowledge, we haven't had sufficient information yet from their LSRP at this time, to warrant a postponement.
[brief] | CASES | PAGE | |-------------------------------------------|------| | Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) | passim | | Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) | 13 | | Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015) | 28, 30 | | State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1 (1997) | 17, 19 | | State v. Badessa, 185 N.J. 303 (2005) | 27, 28 | | State v. Barrow, 408 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2009) | 10, 13 | | State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272 (1998) | 15, 19 | | State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490 (1986) | 12, 14, 17, 28 | | State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224 (2007) | 11 | | State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77 (2016) | 10 | | State v. Gray, 59 N.J. 563 (1971) | 15 | | State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249 (2015) | 10 | | State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146 (1964) | 11 | | State v. Kearney, 183 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1981) | 14 | | State v. Letts, 254 N.J. Super. 390 (Law Div. 1992) | 12 | | State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463 (1999) | 10, 11 | | State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328 (2010) | 19 | | State v.  Moore, 181 N.J. Super. 40 (App. Div. 2004) | 17 | | State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502 (2003) | 12, 13 | | State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509 (2022) | 13 | | State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13 (2004) | 13, 14, 17 | State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16 (2010) .................................................................13 State v. Ramos, 282 N.J. Super. 19 (App. Div. 1995)...........................................17 State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117 (2002)..............................................................14 State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398 (2012) ................................................................passim State v. Sheffield, 62 N.J. 441 (1973) ..................................................................14 State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346 (2002) .................................................................13, 14, 19 State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673 (1988) .................................................................13 State v. Valentine, 134 N.J. 536 (1994) .............................................................13 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) .......................................................................12, 14, 18  United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) ....................................................18  United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) .......................................................12, 13, 16  Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 (2016) ...................................................................28, 29, 30  STATUTES
[brief] Just as important is that in *In re Public Service Electric and Gas Co.*, supra, while the court noted that the Legislature conferred general supervision and regulation of and jurisdiction and control over all public utilities upon the [...] (Id. at 371), the court qualified the extent of that power when it also stated:  Where the state has thus established an agency of its own with plenary power to regulate utilities, it is universally recognized that municipalities cannot properly interpose their local restrictions unless and only to the extent any power to do so is expressly reserved to them by statute.  Id. at 372 (emphasis added).  In the present case, the power of [...] to impose the restrictions has, in fact and law, been reserved to the municipality.
[brief] “[A]fter seeing this individual, does he resemble anybody that you associate with [...]? ”  (Da 53; 25T 60-22 to 24; Da 17 at 39:30 to 39:35)  [...] responded, “I swear if I can make this person out I would. ”  (Da 53; 25T 60-25 to 61-1; Da 17 at 39:36 to 39:41)  For an eleventh time, detectives again raised their suspicions: “[T]here was somebody definitely in your yard whether you knew it or not. ”  (Da 54; 25T 62-18 to 19; Da 17 at 41:14 to 41:18)  [...] responded, “I swear ain’t no one come to my [house]. ”  (Da 54; 25T 62-20 to 21; Da 17 at 41:18 to 41:22)  After this confrontation, detectives had [...] wait in the interrogation room.
[brief] Defendants pled twenty-two largely boilerplate Affirmative Defenses in their Answer, including the generic argument that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of frauds.  After its thorough analysis of the entire record, the trial court held that “defendants have failed to meet their burden to prove any cognizable affirmative defense. ”  Da64. $36.92 per day), which interest shall begin to accrue starting August 31, 2023. ”  Da68.  Review of the trial court’s decision is pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard.
[directive] Such subsection. this complete officer must enforcement law  A Justice. Criminal of Division the by available made ODARA. administer the can she or he before program training the Assistant every ensure that necessary to such steps shall take Prosecutor County  Each 48 Page upon touch expected to reasonably be can duties whose command her or his under Prosecutor or appearance handling first a function, screening a performing (e.g., incidents violence domestic charges whose defendant a of prosecution actual the and detention, pretrial for application an training computer/web-based the complete also must incident)
[brief] RELEVANT TO DEFENDANT  [...]**  This is a medical malpractice lawsuit brought by plaintiff [...], arising from treatment and care rendered during an admission to [...] (“[...]”) beginning March 29, 2019.  (15Pa; 1Pca.)  Dr. Janosky is a physician who practices in the medical subspecialty of hematology and oncology, and the care and treatment he rendered to [...] as a consulting hematologist fell within his subspecialty field.
[brief] While the Superior Officers unpublished decision addresses similar issues involving the MSRA, there are crucial factual differences that distinguish it from the present case.  In Superior Officers, the plaintiffs continued their employment with [...].  The Superior Officers plaintiffs sought lump sum payouts of sick time due to their promotions to captain.  Id. at *8.  However, based upon the authority of the MSRA, the Director modified the contract term for a lump sum payment.  Ibid.  Specifically, he directed that the plaintiffs would not receive a lump sum payout but they would be able to use their accumulated sick leave days.  *Ibid.*  Ultimately, the *Superior Officers* Court did not rule on the issue of whether lump sum payments upon promotion for accumulated sick leave constitute a vested right.
[brief] *Id.* at 603.  The Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff and reversed the declaratory judgment.  The Court recognized that, under long-settled Connecticut law, the judiciary “wields the sole authority to license and regulate the general practice of law in Connecticut,” but “does not exercise exclusive control over attorney conduct insofar as an attorney is not engaged in the practice of law. ”  *Id.* at 604.  The Court concluded that the debt negotiation services provided by the plaintiff constituted the practice of law.  The Court explained that the plaintiff’s services “bear all the external indicia of the practice of law,” were provided “in the context of [other] quintessential legal services,” at times included preparation of pleadings and discovery, and representation in court proceedings, and are provided directly by attorneys or staff under their supervision.  *Id.* at 604-06.  The Court thus concluded that the regulation of the plaintiff’s services “falls under the exclusive authority of the Judicial Branch,” and offended the separation of powers provision of the state constitution.
[brief] The only references made to [...] in Plaintiff’s brief are to allegations in the complaint and to the dates of those Orders.  (Pb9-Pb11, Pb13, Pb24, Pb28).  Plaintiff’s Legal Argument fails to include any reference, whatsoever to [...].  (Pb31-Pb58).  Indeed, the August 7, 2023 Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint against [...] was only identified in Plaintiff’s Table of Orders, Judgments and Rulings and included in the appendix, after the court Clerk instructed Plaintiff to do so.  (See Clerk 1/26/24 Letter).  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s right to appeal should be deemed waived and abandoned.
[brief] A few days after the victim’s death, Essex County Homicide Task Force Detectives [...] and [...] returned to re-canvas the area of the shooting.  (8T 44-18 to 24)  They knocked on [...]’s door, and he initially told them he had not seen anything.  He then caught up with them when they were across the street and told them that he did have information for them.  (6T 98-24 to 99-12, 101-23 to 102-5; 8T 45-15 to 46-23).  Richardson testified that [...] said that he knew the victim, had witnessed the shooting, and provided a description of the shooter.
[brief] Da28-32, 34-46.  --- 3  By definition, a ”nursing home” includes housing for those “who, because of their physical or mental condition, require continuous nursing care and services above the level of room and board. ”  Definitions: Land Use Sect 230-54.  Pa305  Therefore, the Township zoning already fully provides for such mixed uses in many zone districts, but not in the R-20A zone where single family homes predominate.
[brief] Exhibit D - Transcript of the City Council Meeting, October 14, 2020 ..................................................................................  Pa186  VOLUME II Exhibit E - [...] Ordinance #23-20, “Ordinance of the [...], County of Monmouth, State of New Jersey, Adopting Amendments to the Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan” ................................................................. Pa190 Exhibit F- Transcript of the Planning Board Meeting, October 20, 2020 ........................................................................... Pa204 Exhibit G- Transcript of the City Council Meeting, October 28, 2020 .............................................................................. Pa229 Exhibit H- Transcript of the Planning Board Meeting, November 10, 2020 ........................................................................... Pa234 Exhibit I- Transcript of the City Council Meeting, November 12, 2020 ........................................................................... Pa245 Exhibit J - Transcript of the City Council Meeting, November 24, 2020 ........................................................................... Pa256 Exhibit K - [...] Ordinance #26-20, “Ordinance of the [...], County of Monmouth, State of New Jersey, Adopting Amendments to the Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan” ........................................................................ Pa269 Exhibit L - Transcript of the City Council Meeting, December 9, 2020 ............................................................................. Pa272 Exhibit M- Amendment to the Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan Beachfront South Sector for Block 216, Lots 11, 13 & 24, October 15, 2020 .................................................. Pa285 Exhibit N - [...] Resolution #199-20, “Resolution of the [...], in the County of Monmouth, New Jersey, Designating a Conditional Redeveloper for Block 216, Lots 11, 12, 13 and 24 on the Tax Map of the City and Authorizing the Execution of an Interim Costs Agreement with Respect Thereto” ....... Pa298 Exhibit O - [...] Resolution #243-20, “Resolution of Mayor and Council for the [...] Designating [...] as Redeveloper for a Portion of the Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Area and Authorizing Execution of a Redevelopment Agreement in Connection Therewith” ......................................................... Pa306 Exhibit P - Redevelopment Agreement entered into between the [...] and [...], December 14, 2020 .............................................................................. Pa347 Exhibit Q - Email from [...], CFO of the City, to [...], Esq., December 15, 2020 ............................................... Pa386 VOLUME III Exhibit R - City’s Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories, August 9, 2021 .............................................................
[brief] •  **New Jersey Shore Builders Ass’n v. Mayor and Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Middletown**, 234 N.J. Super. 619 (Law Div. 1989) was a Law Division case interpreting the moratorium requirements under the Municipal Land Use Law.  •  **Fields v. Princeton University**, 28 N.J. Tax 574 (Tax 2015) was a Tax Court case addressing the nature of the proofs required to establish an exemption for educational purposes pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6.  • **Clary v. Borough of Eatontown**, 41 N.J. Super. 47, 63 (App Div. 1956) addressed a claim that the Borough’s zoning ordinance confiscated plaintiff’s property.  The court found that plaintiff did not overcome the presumption that a municipal zoning ordinance was valid and reasonable in its impact upon property owners.  •  **Secaucus v. Jersey City**, 19 N.J. Tax 10 (Tax 2000) was a Tax Court case addressing whether the annual service charge violated provisions of the Fox-Lance Law and the LTTEL.
[brief] **A.  DEFENDANT BOROUGH OF HIGHLAND PARK DID NOT ARREST OR INITIATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST PLAINTIFF**  Putting aside the claims addressed above, Plaintiff’s constitutional and NJCRA claims, including but not limited to unlawful search/seizure, wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, assault and battery, excessive force, and conspiracy, were properly dismissed on summary judgment because neither Defendant [...] nor any of its officials or employees searched, seized, used force against, arrested or charged Plaintiff.  Plaintiff does not allege that they did.  Accordingly, [...] was properly granted summary judgment on Counts One and Two.
[brief] *Tyler* does not require foreclosures to be set aside, nor does the full retroactive effect of *Tyler* mean that completed foreclosures should be reopened.  598 U.S. at 639 (“The County had the power to sell Tyler’s home to recover the unpaid property taxes. ”)  Instead, *Tyler* stands for the simple proposition that where more is taken by foreclosure than was owed, just compensation must be paid.  Id.  (“But it could not use the toehold of the tax debt to confiscate more property than was due. ”).  While courts have flexibility in how they apply *Tyler*’s retroactive effect in foreclosure cases like *Roberto*, the situation is different for takings claims that arise from foreclosure, like the case at bar.
[brief] In that case, the Appellate Division invalidated the use of emergency rule-making under N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(c) of the Administrative Procedures Act by the [...] and other State Defendants, when they failed to demonstrate that enactment of the rule was necessary on fewer than thirty (30) days’ notice and the hunt was necessary to avert imminent peril.  In fact, the court criticized the [...] for manufacturing an emergency by improperly delaying the adoption of the emergency rule.  Id. at 164-166.  Thus, the history of the bear hunt litigation clearly and convincingly shows that the [...] with its majority [...] membership has a pro-bear hunting bias, which is manifested in the policies and regulations that it has formulated.
[brief] But finding aggravating factors because “there’s always a risk of another offense” is a clear violation of our sentencing law.  *State v. McFarlane*, 224 N.J. 458, 465 (2016) (“each ‘[d]efendant is entitled to [an] individualized consideration during sentencing. ””)  (quoting *State v. Jaffe*, 220 N.J. 114, 122 (2014)) (alterations in *McFarlane*).  And insofar as the court considered general deterrence as an aggravating factor, “general deterrence has relatively insignificant penal value. ”  *Fuentes*, 217 N.J. at 79.  Aggravating factors are factors that render this particular crime more severe than others of its class.  Here, there was simply no reason to believe that [...], in particular, was at risk of reoffending nor that there was any need to deter her, in particular, from committing future crimes.  Even if there were some conceivable basis for finding these aggravating factors, the court’s failure to explain why these factors applied was error.  The law is clear that it is improper to fail to explain the factual bases for aggravating factors.
[brief] ”  *R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc.*, 168 N.J. at 272.  “Those factors were established by the United States Supreme Court in *Cort v. Ash*, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S. Ct. 2080, 45 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1975) and adopted by [the New Jersey Supreme] Court in *In re State Comm’n of Investigation*,\(^2\) 108 N.J. 35, 41, 527 A.2d 851 (1987). ”  Although varying weight is given to each one of those factors, “the primary goal has almost invariably been a search for the underlying legislative intent. ”  *R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc.*, 168 N.J. at 272-73.  (quoting *Jalowiecki v. Leuc*, 182 N.J. Super. 22, 30, (App.Div.1981)).  Turning to the first factor of the *In re Resolution/Cort* test—whether [...] is a member of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted—“that is, does the statute create a . . . right in favor of the [[...]]?”  *Cort*, 422 U.S. at 78.  It is undisputable that the NJCFLA creates rights and protections for consumers by mandating “[licensed] business[s] will be operated honestly, fairly, and efficiently within the purposes of [the NJCFLA]” --- \(^2\) Cited herein as: *In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation*, 108 N.J. 35 (1987).
[brief] [...]’s deposition at Pa962 read as follows:  Q: Okay.  And you sounded the horn when you first observed her walking, [...] walking near the track  That’s your testimony?  A: Yes, I sounded the horn because I saw someone walking towards the intersection Rule 632 of the [...] Rules and Instructions for Conducting Transportation Operations, which is quoted in Pa522 states:  632  While in Street running territory, the LRT horn may only be used in the event of emergency or to prevent an accident.  Defendant [...] safety officer [...] testified in his March 23, 2023 deposition that the horn, in the area where the accident happened, is prohibited unless it is an emergency.  A copy of [...]’s deposition is appended hereto at Pa611.  See Pa661.  A [...] train operator accelerates, decelerates and brakes his train by operating a master controller.  Pa945-46.  The operator uses this master controller with his left hand.  Pa945-46.  The operator moves his or her left hand forward to accelerate the light rail train and moves his or her left hand backwards to decelerate or brake the train.  Pa945-46.  Immediately after defendant [...] sounded his horn at 16:33:28, he moved his left hand forward, thus accelerating the train.  This can be seen in the cabin view of the provided video.  Defendant Bishop did not use his brakes until 16:33:34, one second prior to impact.  This can be seen in the provided video.  Defendant Bishop never applied his emergency brake.  Pa942.  Defendant Bishop testified that if he was travelling 22 or 23 miles per hour and had he applied his emergency brake the train would stop in 10 feet.  Pa960.  Defendant Bishop testified that if he was going 10 miles per hour and he applied his emergency brake the train would stop in 5 feet.  Pa960.  On December 24, 2019, the date of this incident, defendant [...] was employed by defendant [...].  Pa932.  Defendant [...] has never been employed by defendant [...].  Pa932.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[directive] Do you understand that you have the right to seek individualized advice from an attorney [Yes]  [No] c. about the effect your guilty plea will have on your immigration status?  [Yes]  [No]  Have you discussed with an attorney the potential immigration consequences of d.  If If your plea? the answer is "No," proceed to question 17e. the answer is "Yes," proceed to question 17f.  [Yes]  [No]  e.  Would you like the opportunity to do so?  [Yes]  [No] f.  Having been advised of the possible immigration consequences and of your right to seek individualized legal advice on your immigration consequences, do you still wish to plead guilty?