ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Addendum B | April 2022  Vehicular Pursuit Policy 4  Role of the Pursuing Officer  4.1  The decision to initiate and/or continue a vehicular pursuit requires weighing the need to immediately apprehend the violator against the degree of risk to which the officer and others are exposed as a result of the pursuit.  4.2  Upon the initiation of a pursuit, the pursuing officer shall immediately activate all emergency lights, siren, headlights, motor vehicle recorder (MVR), if equipped, and body worn camera (BWC), if equipped.  4.3  Once the pursuit has been initiated, the primary unit must immediately notify communications and a supervisor, providing as much of the following information as is known: (a) reason for the pursuit; (b) direction of travel and designation and location of the roadway; (c) traffic conditions; (d) presence of pedestrians; (e) identification of the violator’s vehicle (year, make, model, color, vehicle registration number, and other identifying characteristics); (f) information on the identity of the driver, if known; (g) number of occupants; (h) the speed of the pursued vehicle; and (i) other information that may be helpful in deciding whether to terminate the pursuit or in resolving the incident.  4.4  The pursuing officer shall have a continuing duty to update the supervisor and communications on the above information as the incident develops.  7  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] Rather, State v. Shannon is more instructive.  222 N.J.  576.  In Shannon, the defendant was approached by police responding to a report of a suspicious vehicle and subsequently arrested when a warrant check returned an active warrant that should have been vacated but was not due to an oversight by a municipal court administrator.  Id. at 579-580.  Just as it does here, the State argued that officers are permitted to rely on erroneous database information to substantiate a stop or arrest.  Id. at 583.  The Supreme Court held the “officer’s belief, even in good faith, that a valid warrant for defendant's arrest was outstanding cannot render an arrest made absent a valid warrant or probable cause constitutionally compliant. ”  Id. at 591 ([...], J., concurring).  Here, as the State concedes, there was ultimately never any existing justification for the stop as police later confirmed there was never an active warrant for [...] (SB7; 1T27-12 to 22; 1T68-14 to 18).
[brief] The Appendices are also available as follows:  www.DuffyLaw.org/BrettAppAdx.pdf  www.DuffyLaw.org/BrettAppAdx3.pdf  www.DuffyLaw.org/BrettAppAdx4.pdf  This Reply Brief is available as follows:  www.DuffyLaw.org/BrettReply2.pdf  (The Above Web Versions have Hyperlinks for Ease of Reference – Not in the Filed Versions)  There are 5 transcripts:  1)  [...]’s from April 1, 2021 is “1T” or “T;”  2) [...]’s “affirmance” decision in May 2023 is “2T;”  3)  The hearing for which I received no notice of its actual purpose and the “unopposed” box was checked is “3T;”  4)  The R.1:13-1 Motion to correct the “unopposed” notation is “4T;”  5)  The Motion for Reconsideration, which added R. 4:50-1 as a possible source of relief is “5T.
[directive] Tel: 609-376-3000  Fax: 609-376-3002 • • Directive # 29-21  To: Assignment Judges (Supersedes Directive # 30-17)  Criminal Presiding Judges  From: [...], J.A.D\\  Subj: Waiver of First Appearance for Indictable Offenses  Charged on a Complaint-Summons (Rule 3:4-2(g)) – Revised Protocol and Form Date: December 28, 2021  This directive promulgates a revised Waiver of First Appearance protocol and form for use in those situations in which a defendant charged on a complaint-summons for an indictable charge elects to waive the first appearance otherwise required by court rule to be held no more than 60 days after the defendant’s arrest or issuance of the complaint- summons.  Rule 3:4-2(a)(2).  The revisions effected by this directive, which supersedes Directive #30-17 and the form promulgated by that directive, require the attorney to advise the defendant of the Veterans Diversion Program.  The appended revised protocol and form are effective immediately.
[brief] (Aa990-1043).  In count one of the Amended Complaint, characterized as an as-applied challenge to the SFRA, [...] asserted a right to receive State funding that “at a minimum, equals the Adequacy Budget”; alleged that the State “replaced” the SFRA with an underfunded version of the statute; and claimed that failure to fund at the “statutory Adequacy Budget level” violates the New Jersey Constitution.
[brief] See Matter of Greenberg, 155 N.J. 138, 152 (N.J. 1998) (explaining the Rules of Professional Conduct “serve as a road map for the conduct of attorneys to guide them in their relationships with their clients, other attorneys, the courts, and the public”).  Specifically, [...] violated Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(a), which provides that “[a] lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own property. ”  See RPC 1.15(a).  [Pa358a]  [...] also was found guilty of violating Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(d), which provides that “[a] lawyer shall comply with the provisions of R. 1:21-6[,]” which establishes the rules for maintenance, availability, and preservation of accounts and records.  See RPC 1.15(d); N.J. Ct. R. 1:21-6.  [Pa458a]  [...] and [...] maintain that the Disciplinary Action is not a Disciplinary Proceeding because it does not involve Legal Services “rendered to a client.
[brief] [...] Failed To Object At Trial To The Borough’s Presentation Of Testimony From Its Title Expert [...]  First of all, [...] should not be permitted to raise this argument on appeal because it failed to properly object at trial to the Borough’s presentation of testimony from its title expert [...].  As explained earlier in this brief, [...] initially sought to bar the testimony of the Borough’s title expert [...] through the filing a pre-trial motion in limine.  After considering the arguments of counsel, [...] denied [...]’s motion without prejudice to its renewal at trial.  8T, p. 21, lines 21-23 and p. 28., lines 13-15.  In making this decision, [...] noted that ... it would be inappropriate for the Court at this time to bar defendant’s expert without having heard presentation of testimony by the plaintiff’s expert, if in fact defendant’s expert has been submitted to rebut that of plaintiff’s expert.  The plaintiff’s expert could simply be limited to the subject area that [...] has outlined, or it could factor into areas about which, about which [...] has opined.  And I simply cannot make that determination here before trial.  Now, and as, also as counsel for the defendant points out there may be factual issues about which [...]’s opinion would be permissible under Rule 702.  The Court cannot now before trial make a determination as to what those factual issues may be before trial.  Thus, [...] was on notice that [...]’s ruling was without prejudice and that [...] could re-apply to bar [...]’s testimony during the course of the trial if it believed that there was a basis to do so.  [...] failed to move at trial to bar [...] from testifying.  Likewise, [...] failed to object to any of the testimony provided by [...] at trial as being beyond the proper scope of expert testimony.  See 6T and 7T.  Having failed to do either of these things during the course of the trial, [...] cannot now argue on appeal that the Trial Court erred in allowing [...] to testify.
[directive] e.  Any form of full automatic firing is prohibited at distances greater than the 10-yard line.  f.  Night firing conditions may be artificially created.  5 yard line.  10 rounds.  Semi-automatic or automatic mode.  Each drill - Time: 3 seconds.  2 round automatic burst or double tap.  9-59  Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards
[brief] 1.  ORDER OF [...] JSC DATED JUNE 30, 2020 DA3  2.  APPELLATE DIVISION OPINION, [...], J.A.D.  DATED MAY 6, 2022 DA4  3.  ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF [...], PJFP DATED OCTOBER 13, 2023 DA5 APPENDIX (INCLUDES ORDERS AND RULINGS) APPENDIX PAGE NUMBERS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DA1 A1-A16 ORDER OF ROBERT A BALLARD, J.S.C. DATED JUNE 30, 2020 DA3 A17-A24 APPELLATE DECISION DATED 5/6/2022 DA 4 A25-A50 ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF [...] PJFP DATED OCTOBER 13, 2023 DA 5 A51-A56 | Authority | Page | |-----------------------------------------------|------| | **Case Law:** | | | Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Center Assoc. 186 NJ 210 (2005) | 39 | | Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 NJ 582 (1997) | 27 | | Hart v. City of Jersey City, 308 N.J. Super. 487 (App. Div. 1998) | 30 | | Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 538 | 30 | | McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 38 N.J. 156, 183A 2d 74 (1962) | 30 | | Palisades Properties, Inc. v. Brunetti, 44 N.J. 317 | 39 | | Rolnick v. Rolnick, A2d 793 (App. Div.)
[brief] Da1225.  This was followed by entry of a Consent Judgment that ended the underlying case.  Da529.  The Consent Judgment awarded $2,288,725 in damages and specified the shares of the damages amount being allocated to and paid by each of the three “settling insurers” that had defended [...].  Da529.  The “settling insurers” total share ($310,000) left $1,978,725 unpaid, which is the amount of [...]’s damages claim against [...].  Da531.  Consistent with its denial of coverage and any duty to defend, and on the eve of the settlement, [...] filed an action for declaratory relief in federal court, which was dismissed without prejudice and effectively refiled as [...]’s Complaint in this case.
[brief] See Terranova v. GE Pension Trust, 457 N.J. Super. 404, 409 (App. Div. 2019); see also Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  Judicial estoppel is not a defense subject to any overriding legislation and, as such, may be maintained against a Spill Act claim.  Terranova, 457 N.J. Super. at 411.  “If a court has based a final decision, even in part, on a party’s assertion, that same party is thereafter precluded from asserting a contradictory position. ”  Id. at 412 (citing Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. at 387-88).  When reviewing a trial court’s decision to invoke judicial estoppel, the Appellate Division is to use an abuse of discretion standard.
[brief] On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; motions for relief.  In the context of contract law, “reasonable time” is a vague, and largely disfavored, qualifier used to connote a period by which an act should be performed.  What is a reasonable time is a fact-intensive inquiry, often a question for the jury to decide.  A 2012 Texas Court of Appeals opinion, *Daimler Chrysler Motors Co., LLC v. Manuel*, 362 S.W.3d 160 (Tex. App. 2012), summarized the fact-intensive nature of what is a reasonable time by stating that, “[w]hat is a reasonable time depends upon the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time the contract was formed. ”  That is, courts will look to the contracting parties’ intent, and the circumstances surrounding the contract formation, to determine what the parties meant by reasonable time.  The Uniform Commercial Code echoes the factual-nature of what constitutes reasonable time, and § 1–205 states that “[w]hether a time for taking an action required by the Uniform Commercial Code is reasonable depends on the nature, purpose, and circumstances of the action. ”  Furthermore, even when there is no explicit (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.  contractual provision stating time of performance, courts may imply that parties must perform in a reasonable time.  For example, the Supreme Court of Alaska found, in Laybourn v. City of Wasilla, 362 P.3d 447 (Alaska 2015), that a construction projected that unsuccessfully ran from 2003–2006 had progressed in a reasonable time, as the evidence during the formation of the contract indicated that the parties envisioned the project running through 2005 from a judgment to be filed within a reasonable time, even if they were filed within one year.  In conclusion, here we have a PSA that was drafted, executed and filed nearly fourteen (14) years ago and said PSA was drafted by an attorney whom has been appointed by the NJ Supreme Court as a Certified Matrimonial Attorney.
[brief] The Supreme Court examined whether the then-existing Exclusion C5 language precluded coverage for intentional wrong claims.  The Court noted that there are two types of intentional wrong claims: (1) an action where an employee seeks to prove an intentional wrong through the employer’s alleged subjective intent to injure; and (2) an action where an employee seeks to prove an intentional wrong by showing that the employer knew with substantial certainty that the injury would occur.  The Beseler Court held that Exclusion C5, as it was then written, precluded coverage for claims made by a plaintiff alleging his or her employer acted with a subjective intent to injure.  However, the Court held that Exclusion C5, as it was then written, did not exclude coverage for “substantial certainty” intentional wrong claims:  The C.5. exclusion precludes coverage for bodily injuries “intentionally caused or aggravated by” the employer.  That language clearly excludes only injuries that result from a subjective intent to injure.  However, once Laidlow was decided, it became clear that there are alternative methods of proving an intentional wrong and avoiding the exclusivity of the workers’ compensation remedy.  The substantial-certainty method of proof is distinct, but also will demonstrate an “intentional wrong. ”  C.5.’s language does not unambiguously exclude such claims from coverage.  In sum, due to its lack of express language excluding injuries substantially certain to result in injury, we find C.5.’s exclusion to be ambiguous and construe it, as we must, in favor of the insured.
[directive] Destruction of SAFE Kits  At the expiration of the 20-year retention period, the County Prosecutor must decide whether to destroy or continue “holding” the unreported SAFE kit.  The retention period begins at the time of collection of the SAFE kit.  The destruction of evidence in any circumstances where an investigation of a reported crime may be conducted in the future in which this evidence may have potential value is prohibited.  Once the retention period has ended, unless the kit is determined to have potential future evidentiary value, the SAFE kit may be destroyed.  A record of the determination process and the destruction process shall be maintained in the Forensic Medical Record.  SAFE kit destruction will be documented in the SAFE kit tracking system to include the date of destruction.  There is no requirement for the County Prosecutor to notify the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice, or their designee, before destroying a SAFE kit at the expiration of the retention period.  Members of the County Prosecutor’s Office are no longer required to make individual notifications to victims prior to 12 destruction of kits, as care providers indicate that such notifications are often retraumatizing, and sometimes dangerous for the victim.  Under the instant Directive, the retention period is being extended by fifteen years, victims shall be notified of the retention period at the time of collection, and reporting information shall be readily available to the public through our 21 County Prosecutors.  V.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.12(b).  This burden is not met simply with “proof of any degree of negligence including gross negligence. ”  Id.  In determining whether punitive damages should be awarded, the court may also consider: (1) the likelihood, at the relevant time, that serious harm would arise from the defendant's conduct; (2) the defendant's awareness of or reckless disregard for the likelihood that the serious harm at issue would arise from the defendant's conduct; (3) the conduct of the defendant upon learning that his initial conduct would likely cause harm; and (4) the duration of the conduct or any concealment of it by the defendant.  Id.  In addition to meeting the requirements under the PDA, a punitive damages award must satisfy the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.  *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell*, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003); *Bonda v. City of Elizabeth*, No. A-4970-16T1, 2019 WL 2559724 at *19 (App. Div. June 21, 2019).
[brief] ” (37T 87:23 to 88:18).  The trial court correctly held that this qualified as a “material inaccuracy” that triggered Section 6.3’s indemnification provision. \(^{21}\)  The trial court also correctly awarded expert fees and other costs.  The indemnity language in the MIPA and SPAs is broad, and includes not just an attorney fee shift, but also “expenses,” which includes “costs of investigation and defense,” and “costs of suit” and “reasonable accountant’s . . . fees and expenses.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6.a. states “An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract. ”  As signatories to the [...] Medical Payment Subrogation Arbitration Agreement the parties are contractually bound to arbitrate Medpay subrogation claims with [...] pursuant to the [...] rules and regulations.  Those rules grant the arbitrator the power to determine if a specific matter is excluded from the jurisdiction of [...].
[brief] The New Jersey Declaratory Judgment Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50 to -62, authorized [...] to request a judicial declaration determining the parties’ respective rights under the Settlement Agreement.  Specifically, N.J.S.A. 2A:16-53 provides:  Questions determinable and rights declarable.  A person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writing constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.  In addition, N.J.S.A. 2A:16-55 provides, in relevant part:  Declaration of rights or legal relations of interested parties in relation to estates, wills and other writings.  A person interested as or through an executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, receiver, assignee for the benefit of creditors, or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee, legatee, heir, next of kin, or cestui que trust, in the administration of a trust or the estate of a decedent, a minor, a person who is mentally incapacitated, a person who is insolvent, or other person, may have a declaration of rights or legal relations in respect thereto, to: c.  Determine any question arising in the administration of the estate, trust, or guardianship, including the construction of wills and other writings.  That statute and Rule 4:95-2 both empowered the Trial Court to provide and render “instructions, advice, and determinations pertaining to the administration of an estate. ”  In re A.N., 430 N.J. Super. 235, 245 (App. Div. 2013). ⁹  The Settlement Agreement is an enforceable contract that governs the administration of [...]’s Estate and [...]’s Revocable Trust.  The parties agree that the terms of the Settlement Agreement are unambiguous and that no factual disputes warranting discovery exist.  (1T:35:4-7; 44:13-16.)  The Trial Court applied the correct legal principles to the undisputed facts and properly found [...] was entitled to entry of a declaratory judgment in his favor as a matter of law.  Respectfully, this Court should affirm the Trial Court’s ruling in its entirety.
[brief] So, the messages showing defendant threatening [...], referencing brothers shooting brothers, and prior assaults were before the jury regardless.  So too were [...]’ messages telling defendant to calm down, (25T:42-12 to 18), that he just wanted his property back, (25T:40-23 to 24), and that he would just work hard to get new things, (25T:42-11 to 18).  One sentence and one word in a three-day long testimony cannot outweigh this volume of evidence, even if improper.
[directive] Recent enhancements to the eCourts Expungement System allow County Prosecutors to object to the proposed order and petition and return them to the In petitioner for correction. that situation petitioners are able to submit a revised now petition and proposed order.  Additionally, the system automatically schedules expungement hearings which, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-9, should be scheduled of within 60 days the filed petition.  While the court may, in its discretion, postpone of these hearings, the initial hearing must be scheduled within 60 days filing.  Questions regarding this Directive and the eCourts Expungement System may be directed to the [...] by phone at [...].
[brief] (Pa 139, Par. 25); (Pa 142-150).  The black redactions on the document were made by the bank at that time, before it was given to [...].  He does not know and wasn’t advised why the redactions were made.  (Pa 138-139, Par. 26).  The name of the person under “Banker’s Name” was blacked out as well as other identifying information on page one.  (Pa 139, Par. 27).  This was the first time [...] had ever seen this document.
[brief] ”  *Palisades Props., Inc. v. Brunetti*, 44 N.J. 117, 130 (1965) (quoting 5 *Williston on Contracts* § 670, pp. 150-160 (3d ed. 1961)).  “The covenant is among the few terms that ‘[c]ourts have been called upon to supply. ’”  *Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp.*, 168 N.J. 236, 244 (2001) (citation omitted).  While a covenant will not be implied so as to override an express term of a contract, “a party’s performance under a contract may breach that implied covenant even though that performance does not violate a pertinent express term.
[brief] The dispute before the trial court was a minor adjustment to the boundary line between Lots 10 and 11, a matter of a few feet or inches.  The solution according to the Boundary Commissioners is to change the boundaries of six lots, two of which are not part of the original subdivision of Lots 9-12.  See Court Order Pa95 and Report, Exhibit I, Pa136.  As the Respondents choose to ignore the actual conclusion of the Boundary ¹  Instead of addressing this fact, the Respondents engage in unsubstantiated hyperbole extolling “the overwhelming evidence indicating the precision and accuracy of the Commissioners’ Report [Db11].”  Citation to the Report would clarify this issue for the Respondents.  Commissioners and its basis in circumstantial evidence, they fail to confront what the Boundary Commissioners actually did and the result.
[brief] We find no authority which permits the imposition of nonlegal strike-related costs pursuant to R. 1:10-5.  As we pointed out in East Brunswick Bd. of Educ. v. East Brunswick Educ. Ass'n, 235 N.J.Super. 417, 563 A.2d 55 (App.Div.1989):  The object of a civil proceeding to afford supplemental relief to a litigant, R. 1:10-5, is to enforce a court's order.  Unlike a contempt proceeding, R. 1:10-1 through 4, punishment is not the objective, though a sanction imposed by the court to compel compliance may inflict punishment's sting.