ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **THE ZONING BOARD’S DECISION WAS PROPERLY MEMORIALIZED** (Pa110-Pa112; 3T39-18 – 3T49-9)  Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, the Zoning Board properly memorialized its findings and decision.  There is nothing in the Municipal Land Use Law that requires the reasons for board action to be stated at the time of the vote.  Indeed, as stated in Cox & Koenig, *New Jersey Zoning & Land Use Administration* §19-1:  Board members are not required to engage in public deliberations on an application before voting on a motion to grant or deny relief.  *Scully-Bozarth Post. Burlington County Planning Bd.*, 362 N.J. Super. 296, 312 (App. Div. 2003), certif. den., 178 N.J. 34 (2003).  Instead, the application may be approved or denied by voice vote with no statement of reasons being placed on the record by individual members.  And see *Jennings v. Borough of Highlands*, 418 N.J. Super. 405, 424 (App. Div.2011), citing *Scully-Bozarth* for the proposition that when board members vote on an application for development "a verbal discussion" is "not mandatory, as long as the ultimate resolution, which will serve as the official statement of the ... board's findings and conclusions, is furnished to the board members in advance of the time they will vote, to provide them ample time to study it and, if they deem it appropriate, request clarification or modification."  ***  The second step pursuant to N.J.S. 40:55D-10g(2) is the required articulation of the reasons supporting the decision in findings of fact and legal conclusions set forth in a memorializing resolution which, in most cases, is prepared for adoption at a subsequent meeting.  See 19-2.5.  A carefully prepared, detailed resolution containing findings and conclusions that fully explain the basis on which the board has acted, with ample reference to the record and the statutory standards, may serve to sustain the board's action even in the face of no deliberation on the record.
[brief] The Trial Court found that this requirement was somehow premised on the financial wherewithal of the receivership estate.  The Court placed the burden on [...]’s creditors to pay for same.  In other words, if the creditors wanted a Final Accounting, they should paid for it.  it is -- it does not fall on deaf ears that there are some statutory requirements in this regard, but the point is this is an entity without assets...  [...] has filed the paperwork.  The bank has filed the paperwork.  He filed it with the court.  Formalities to follow the statute would have to be paid by someone.  There is no money left to do it.  It becomes an impossibility.  The court is not paying for it.  [...] is not obligated to pay for it.  The bank is not obligated to pay for it.  If the creditors want it and the creditors want to hire somebody -- they certainly don’t.  Otherwise, I would have entertained it happening.  So the motion is denied and I am discharging [...] as the receiver.  If you don’t like it, take it up.
[brief] Even without the 2019 signed certification and the explicit waiver discussed above, the alleged 2007 document “Addendum to Partnership Agreement” (Da220) – which was also recognized as void twelve years later in 2019 – does not bind Plaintiff to the arbitration provision in the 1991 Partnership Agreement.  The 1991 Partnership Agreement was never given to Plaintiff and he never signed it.  The 2007 Addendum admits that the 1991 Agreement was previously amended on other occasions to allow numerous others to join (Da220), yet Defendants did not supply those amendments to the Trial Court, nor to Plaintiff, and there is nothing in the 2007 document to alert Plaintiff that he was agreeing to any of the provisions in the 1991 Agreement, let alone the arbitration provision.  It is fundamental that since “arbitration involves a waiver of the right to pursue a case in a judicial forum, ‘courts take particular care in assuring the knowing assent of both parties to arbitrate, and a clear mutual understanding of the ramifications of that assent.
[brief] (12T6:8-13)  However, his analysis was not necessary at all.  The Court ignored that both [...] and [...]’s own expert, [...], had testified throughout the valuation that the liability was mainly and mostly, and “majority”, Plaintiffs’ legal fees.  They testified the liability was imposed by the vote for Plaintiffs to “reimburse” themselves for those fees.  (See, discussion and citations supra at pp. 8-10)  [...]’s expert had also testified that he had based his opinion on the Court-appointed expert’s confirmation, so it did not matter whether he had personally confirmed.  (10T35:8-13)
[brief] However, the Trial Court failed to afford [...] all reasonable inferences on the issue of damages.  Both Defendants [...] and [...] appear to point to the lack of a specific figure as the antidote to the issue of damages being dismissed.  This argument overlooks the context in which the issue of damages was abruptly dismissed: on a motion for summary judgment where issues of fact were already determined to exist on the underlying claims of defendants’ performance – not after a full trial on the merits.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that even where “damages flowing from defendant's breach of contract are not ascertainable with exactitude, such is not a bar to relief. ”  See *Kozlowski v. Kozlowski*, 80 N.J. 378, 388 (1979).  The Court has held that “[w]here a wrong has been committed, and it is certain that damages have resulted, **mere uncertainty as to the amount will not preclude recovery** — courts will fashion a remedy even though the proof on damages is inexact. ”  *Id.* (citing *Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody*, 422 U.S. 405, 418-419 (1975); *Tessmar v. Grosner*, 23 N.J. 193, 203 (1957)).  This is consistent with the long held equitable maxim recognized in New Jersey that “wherever a legal right has been infringed a remedy will be given. ”  See Orlowski v. Orlowski, 459 N.J. Super. 95 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Crane v. Bielski, 15 N.J. 342, 349 (1954)).  In other words, if the Trial Court was convinced that defendants conduct and potential wrongdoing remained a genuine issue of material fact, the measure of resulting harm stemming from that conduct should have simply remained an issue for adjudication at trial.  Even so, from the commencement of this action, [...] set forth at least one measure of damages which is down to the penny but continues to be ignored by the defendants.  Pa75.
[brief] There is no concurrent conflict of interest under RPC 1.7(a) here for two reasons.  First, as set forth above, the clients whom [...] represents in this consolidated matter—[...], [...], [...], [...], and the individual defendants employed therein—are neither part of nor employed by the Office of the Attorney General that issued the indictment against [...] in his personal capacity.  (Pa155-58; Pa171-77).  These clients are separate, independent departments within the State.  [...]’s representation of these clients will not be directly adverse to another client.  RPC 1.7(a)(1).  All clients are aligned against [...]’s position in this consolidated matter and united in their defense that [...] suffered no retaliation or breach of contract.  Second, for the same reasons set forth above in Section I.C., there is no significant risk that [...]’s representation of its clients—[...], [...], [...], [...], and the individual defendants employed therein—will be materially limited in any manner by [...]’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.  RPC 1.7(a)(2).  Again, the indictment is solely against [...] in his personal capacity and pertains to alleged real estate transactions in the City of Camden and is wholly unrelated to [...]’s allegations of retaliation and breach of contract in this consolidated employment matter against State psychiatric hospitals [...] and [...].  (Pa9-119; Da9-18; Da74-126).  [...] has withdrawn as designated trial counsel for Defendants-Respondents and will have no further involvement in this consolidated matter.  (Pa121-22).  [...] and the attorneys handling the defense—[...] and [...]—are not indicted and do not have any adverse interest to their clients in this consolidated matter, the State as a whole, or the Office of the Attorney General.  (Pa9-119).  They will continue to vigorously and zealously defend their clients in this matter, as they have done for the past five years.  This zealous advocacy is neither hampered by nor impacted by the unrelated indictment against [...] in his personal capacity.  In sum, disqualification must have some reasonable basis grounded in an actual conflict.  State v. Smith, 478 N.J. Super. at 64.  [...] falls woefully short of this heavy burden, as she fails to articulate: (1) any significant risk that [...]’s representation of Defendants-Respondents will be materially limited by [...] and [...]’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, a third party, or by their own personal interests (RPC 1.7(a)(2)); (2) how the Attorney General’s unrelated indictment of [...] in his personal capacity will impair [...] and [...]’s ability to vigorously and zealously advocate for the clients; or (3) how the unrelated indictment will “materially interfere” with [...] and [...]’s independent “professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courts of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client.
[brief] The Borough further contended the record was fully developed before the Borough, and in consequence, [...]'s prerogative writ challenge was without merit.  Pa2; Pa73; Pa90.  Notably, the Borough's solicitation of applications for Resolutions of Support in connection with an entity's application for a Class 5 cannabis retailer license, are only one of several steps to be undertaken to obtain ultimate licensure with the [...] (again "Commission").
[brief] Contrary to the [...]’ version of events, Defendant [...] testified that his [...] supervisor, [...], instructed him, three to four times, to use “the turnaround,” without specifying a particular turnaround to use; therefore, [...] believed that [...] had instructed him to use the police turnaround:  Q: Your foreman at [...], Michael [[...]], did he tell you to use the emergency turnaround at 87.5 or did he say to use the grass turnaround that was located in the work zone at milepost 84, 85?  A: What I heard him say was the turnaround.  [Da046 (28:18-22) (emphasis added). ]  ***  Q:  How many times did Mike [[...]] call and tell you to go through the cut through?  A: Three, he said it through the CB [radio], he wasn’t—he didn’t say [...], he just said it through the CB three times.  [Da095 (223:21-25). ]  Similarly, in a sworn certification, Defendant [...] attested as follows:  I have testified under oath my recollection of the messages the Foreman, Michael [...] transmitted over the CB radio 3-4 times after 10:00 p.m. on 7/20/11 when I was stopped in the [...] dump truck NB in the work area.  I testified that I recall [...] stated over the CB to use the cut through and recall no further substance.  I have been told [...] testified at his deposition that he stated to use the grassy cut thru where the cones were located but this is not my recollection.  […]  I traveled NB until I saw a cut thru that was macadam and took the macadam cut thru as I thought it was safer rather than using any other cut thru and believed I was in a construction zone and that my use of the macadam cut thru was neither illegal nor unauthorized.  I was following my understanding and recollection of the Foreman, [...]’s instructions.  [Da313, [...] Certification, ¶¶ 3-4, (emphasis added).]  [...] further testified that no one from [...] warned him that it was illegal to use police emergency turnarounds prior to the crash.  Da065 (104:11-14).  [...] disputed [...]’s allegation that he “started too late” to attend [...] safety meetings at which he would have been informed about the prohibition against using the paved police cut-through: in contrast, [...] testified that he started when [...] told him to start, which was at a later time than the other drivers, and that it was not his own lateness that caused him to miss safety meetings.  Da090-1 (204:18-206:23).  3.  **The [...] And [...] Dispute Each Other’s Testimony**
[brief] [...], who has never spent a day in prison before, is serving six years in custody for stealing $168 in coins from an empty restaurant that had an open window.  This sentence cannot stand.  When the State makes an application for a discretionary extended term, the trial court must first determine whether the defendant has the appropriate prior convictions to establish his eligibility for an extended-term sentence.  State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 161 (2006).  Once a court has determined that a defendant is eligible for discretionary extended-term sentencing as a persistent offender, it should shift its focus to the length of the sentence to be imposed.  In setting the length of the extended-term sentence, courts should “perform their sentencing function by using the traditional approach of finding and weighing aggravating and mitigating factors. ”  *Pierce*, 188 N.J. at 170.  Even where the predicates for persistent-offender status have been proven, a court is not required to impose an extended-term sentence, and our Supreme Court has anticipated that “relatively few convictions will warrant” persistent-offender extended terms.
[brief] Finally, Section 6.3 of the 2014 MIPA contains the following language:  **6.3  Indemnification for Seller’s Benefit. **  Buyer agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Seller, and will pay to Seller the amount of any Damages, arising out of, resulting from, or relating to: - any material inaccuracy or breach of any representation or warranty of Buyer contained in this Agreement or in any other document delivered by Buyer as required by this Agreement; - any material breach or violation of the covenants or agreements of Buyer contained in this Agreement or in any other document delivered by Buyer as required by this Agreement.
[brief] [But] the officer must be able to explain sufficiently the basis of that opinion, so that it “can be understood by the average reasonably prudent person. ” (citations omitted)); see also State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 404-05 (2022) (explaining that “[t]he State, however, must provide at least “some evidence” to support the assertion that a neighborhood should be considered as ‘high-crime’” and noting that an officer’s subjective belief and a vague description of his prior experiences in the area was not enough to meet that standard).
[brief] In doing so, the trial judge correctly applied the standard under Printing Mart, both approaching [...] and [...]’s dismissal application with great caution \(^5\) “In considering a motion to dismiss under R. 4:6-2(e), the court must accept the facts as asserted in the pleading as true and give the pleader the benefit of all inferences that may be drawn in its favor. ”  6a. and affording Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint great liberality.  In fact, the trial court’s analysis in this matter could not have been more exhaustive and indulgent.  In a thoughtful, cogent, and well-reasoned opinion, the trial judge concluded that even the most generous reading of the factual allegations in the complaint, accepting same as true and affording Plaintiff the benefit of all inferences drawn therefrom, does not reveal any factual or legal basis entitling Plaintiff to relief as against Defendants [...] and [...].  There is no mistaking the trial judge correctly applied the motion to dismiss standard, parsed the factual allegations set forth in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, and properly found that same failed to satisfy the requisite pleading standard for retaliation under the NJLAD.
[brief] ”  Ja098.  The independent variable for ITE trip generation is square footage of the building; “the height of the building does not factor in. ” (3T 26:3-25).  “It’s not a volumetric calculation.  It’s solely based on the square footage of the building. ” (3T 27:2-3).  Post-development studies, including those for two nearby properties, are normally lower than the ITE projections, as the “ITE is generally considered to be conservative. ” (3T 35:6-22).  As a qualified expert in traffic engineering, [...] used his specialized skillset and knowledge to offer an opinion, based on the ITE and the traffic study, as well as known outcomes from two neighboring warehouse buildings on the same County Route 656, to conclude that the proposed 48 foot structures would not generate more traffic than permitted 30 foot buildings simply because of the increased height.
[brief] Policyholders put their faith in insurers to pay benefits fairly and promptly when tragedy strikes.  But the profit motive leads insurers to delay and deny legitimate claims, forcing policyholders into court.  Policyholders must then rely on our trial courts to enforce their insurance contracts and the law.  When our trial courts err, policyholders turn to the Appellate Division.  After suffering permanent injuries in a car accident, Plaintiff [...] sought payment from her policy’s underinsured motorist (UIM) benefit.  When Defendant [...] offered to pay only a third of the benefit, [...] sued.  [...] responded by renewing its offer, filing an answer, and engaging in extensive discovery.  Then, in the middle of discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment, erroneously holding that [...] had to sue [...] within her policy’s four-year limitation period.  The Appellate Division should now vacate dismissal for four reasons.  First, the trial court should have applied New Jersey’s six-year statute of limitations under the policy’s conformity-to-law clause.  Second, equitable estoppel should have precluded [...]’s policy defense because the insurer waited over a year to deny coverage.  Third, [...] waived its policy defense by omitting it from its Answer.  Fourth, the policy limitation period, if applicable, was tolled until [...] declined coverage in litigation.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[directive] Bank Brief 3.2 1 ....................................................................79  ADVOCACY PROFICIENT ENHANCING 14.  ....................................................................79  REPORTS AND STUDIES EVALUATION  15.  AND UNIFORM FACILITATE TO GROUPS  ADVISORY/WORKING 16.  BEST AND SHARE DEVELOP TO AND IMPLEMENTATION  EFFICIENT  ....80  PRACTICES........................................................................................................ ............................................................80  Advisory .  Group Reform Criminal .lustice 1.6.1 ................................................................................80 .
[brief] This underscores the frivolous nature of the allegations against [...].  “[were] present on and/or in the area of the” Property at the time it was drafting the preliminary site plan.  (Pa000108).  Third, Plaintiffs argued that the trial court’s finding that [...] had already changed the site plan prior to the Complaint being filed was not pertinent to a finding that Plaintiffs had acted frivolously – by the time the site plan had been revised, the trespass and environmental remediation by the other parties had already occurred.9  In its own Cross-Motion for Reconsideration, [...] argued that it was entitled to the full amount of attorneys’ fees requested.
[brief] The plaintiff in *Kandrac* was injured in the shopping center’s parking lot after leaving the defendant’s store.  The lease between the defendant and \(^1\)  A true and accurate copy of *Spano v. [...]*, A-2361-14T3 (App. Div. July 22, 2016) is attached to Plaintiffs’ Appendix as Pa410-19.  Pursuant to Rule 1:36-3, no adverse unpublished opinions are known to counsel.  the landlord obligated the landlord to maintain the common areas of the shopping center.
[brief] C.  “third, that defendants did not do what the contract required them to do, defined as a breach of the contract”  The contracts required the Board to pay for work performed.  [...] does not plead or establish that the Board failed to pay for work actually performed.  (Argued at Pa389 – Pa390)  [...]’s Counterclaim, and the court order, do not establish the third element for a breach of contract claim, namely, that the Board “did not do what the contract required them to do”.
[directive] the commit an to attempt"  While or Offense for Another Release Committed on While Offense Was Present  The 4.5.5 Supervision.  Post-Conviction of Form  Any on shall enforcement agency law a 4.5.2, to subsection pursuant otherwise provided as Except on was defendant the while committed offense was the if present acomplaint-warrant apply for offense disorderly persons petty or offense, persons crime, disorderly indictable any for other release been by complaint- charged had offense that previous whether charge), pending has defendant a (i.e., supervision intensive special probation, probation, on while or complaint-summons, or warrant pleaded as guilty had defendant (PTI) the intervention where pretrial on or parole, (ISP), program pending release on was if of defendant c. 98), P.L. (see 2015, 2C:43-12(g)(3)
[brief] Two property owners responded to the notice, and they indicated that they did not want to become involved.  The trial court still had the problem that the Report affected property owners not before the court even though they had been given notice of this proceeding post-trial.  The trial court’s resolution of that problem was to rule in favor of [...], but allow for the recording of the Boundary Commissioners’ Report which would provide future notice of the defect in the historic property lines of the subdivision (Pa96).  This solution deviates from the recommendation of the Boundary Commissioners to record the correct location of the Properties.  Nothing in the Report justifies the result reached by the trial court, and no evidence shows the Commissioners would support it.  The Final Order is inconsistent with the Court’s position on N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3 that the Boundary Commissioners must be accepted or rejected.  The trial court deviated from the Report’s recommendation.  VI.
[brief] “[A]ppeals are taken from orders and judgments and not from opinions . . . or reasons given for the ultimate conclusion. ”  State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 479 (2017) (quoting Do–Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 191, 199 (2001)).  Therefore, the court’s omission does not provide sufficient grounds for reversal or remand.
[directive] Do you understand that if the crime occurred on or after May 4, 2001 as a result of your guilty plea you will be required to pay a penalty of $800 for each offense for which you are pleading guilty?  7.  Entènen nan Enstitisyon Sivil Civil Commitment Èske w konprann ke si yo ta kondane w de yon zak seksyèl ak vyolans, kankou agresyon seksyèl [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] agrave, kontak seksyèl kriminel agrave, kidnapinn daprè 2C:13-1c(2(b), kontak seksyèl kriminèl, deli asasina si zak fondamantal la se yon agresyon seksyèl, tantativ pou komèt nenpòt nan zak sa yo, oswa nenpòt ki zak ke tribinal la ta espesifikman deklare sou rejis la ke, daprè sikonstans ka a, zak la ta fèt pou konsidere kom zak seksyèl ak vyolans, epi w ta kab, lè w fini konplete tèm prizon ou an, oubyen entènen w nan yon lòt enstitisyon sivil jiska a vi si tribinal la ta detèmine, aprè odyans la ke w merite yo entène w envolontèman.
[brief] The trial court misapplied this critical decision to Plaintiffs’ claims.  **b.  The Limited Attorney Exemption Encroaches Upon Judicial Prerogatives and Interests (T. at 15:17-17:19). **  With respect to the second *Knight* factor, the trial court held that the Limited Attorney Exemption does not encroach upon any judicial prerogatives or interests, because the Act “regulates a distinct business of debt adjustment. ”  T. at 17.  The trial court’s holding, however, conflicts with decisions from the New Jersey and United States Supreme Courts that debt adjustment *is* considered the practice of law, which is exclusively regulated by the Supreme Court.