ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644 (1999) ....................................................................... 23, 24 Moore v. Youth Corr. Inst. at Annandale, 230 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 1989) ..............................................  44, 48 Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560 (App. Div. 1965), cert. denied, 47 N.J. 80 (1966) .... 44, 48  Rova Farms Resort Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) .................................................................. 23  St. Vincent’s Hospital v.  Finley, 154 N.J. Super. 24, 29-30 (App. Div. 1977) ........................................... 24 State v. Dalal, 221 N.J. 601, 606 (2015) ........................................................................ 49 State v. Lewis, 67 N.J. 47, 49 (1975) .............................................................................. 25 Town of W. New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962) .................................................................................. 46 Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 457 (2005) ......................................................................... 25 STATUTES N.J.S.A. 39:3-10 ....................................................................................... 30 N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 ............................................................................... 40 REGULATIONS N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6) ............................................................................ 40 N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(7) ............................................................................ 40 N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12) ......................................................................... 40 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The instant appeal can be summarized as follows – Appellant, [...] (“Appellant” or “[...]”), refuses to accept the consequences of his own actions.
[brief] In granting summary judgment to Defendants, the trial court ignored Plaintiffs’ analysis that the OAE Proceedings were not a reportable “disciplinary proceeding” and, instead, focused its analysis exclusively on whether they constitute either an “investigation” or a “bar complaint. ”  In so doing, the trial court lost sight of the key issue, which must start with a review of the defined term Disciplinary Proceeding. \(^3\)  The analysis starts with the 2012 Policy the Firm obtained from [...], a subsidiary of [...].  The 2012 Policy defined a Disciplinary Proceeding as follows:  **DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING** means any proceeding initiated by a regulatory or disciplinary official or agency to investigate charges made against an Insured alleging professional misconduct in rendering or failing to render Legal Services.  [Pa602, § II.F]  The 2012 Policy defined Legal Services, in pertinent part, as follows:  **LEGAL SERVICES** means those services performed on behalf of the Named Insured for others by an Insured as a licensed lawyer in good standing … but only where such services were performed in the ordinary course of the Insured's activities as a lawyer.  [Pa603, § II.K]  Thus, at the time the Firm completed the application for the 2016 Policy, [...] was familiar with the applicable definitions in that Policy.
[directive] The the on fields required of many the populate will defendants. of identification positive ensures and quality, data enhances enter data, to needed an obtaining in step initial fingerprinting the as Scan of Live importance the  Given upon agencies enforcement law confirm that necessary to is it assessment, risk pretrial objective process.  risk-assessment pretrial automated the initiate means to the have arrest an making identify shall Police State the Directive, of this issuance of the days 30 within
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING DISRUPTS THE BALANCE  THE LEGISLATURE STRUCK IN ENACTING THE NEW JERSEY PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT BY ALLOWING A PLAINTIFF TO SURVIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITHOUT ESTABLISHING A DEFECT IN THE SPECIFIC PRODUCT SHE RECEIVED  .............6  A.  New Jersey Product Liability Act .......................................................................................6  B.  Summary Judgment Standard ............................................................................................9  II.  A PLAINTIFF DOES NOT, AND CANNOT, PRESENT SUFFICIENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF PRODUCT DEFECT, NOR DEFEAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT, BY RELYING ON A HYPOTHETICAL DEPOSITION QUESTION ..................................................11  III.
[brief] The DEP regulates development on “any waterfront upon any navigable water” pursuant to the Waterfront Development Act.  N.J.S.A. 12:5-1 to -11.  Development on the waterfront and in the coastal area requires a DEP permit, N.J.S.A. 12:5-3(a) unless a statutory or regulatory exemption applies.  The Coastal Zone Management (CZM) Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.1 to -29.10, include the Recreational Docks and Piers Rule (Docks Rule) which regulates structures used for recreational fishing or mooring boats or jet skis that are supported on pilings, floating on the water surface or cantilevered over the water, such as the structures here.  N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5(a).  The CZM Rules also includes the Submerge Vegetation Habitat Rule which generally prohibits development in mapped submerged vegetation special water areas with some exceptions including, relevant here, certain proposed pier or dock projects.  N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.6(a), (b) (7).  On March 28, 2017, [...] applied for a waterfront development individual permit to construct a “4’ x 185’ pier dock extension from an existing --- 1  The Procedural History and Counterstatement of Facts are inextricably interwoven and, therefore, are presented together herein.
[directive] Justice Criminal of Division of Director the  The police of prosecutors, consisting Group Advisory Reform Justice Criminal establish a Directive appropriate.  deems Director the as persons other such and coordinator, avictim-witness executives, Law Reform Bail of the implementation review to basis regular a on meet shall Group Advisory  The identify to prosecution practices, police and share best identify and Directive, to this and briefs, model positions, uniform develop to practical issues, and legal and problems implementation handle who prosecutors assist to needed are as materials support other such and forms, motions model paragraph I, Article Law and Reform Bail the under appeals and motions, hearings, detention pretrial this to revisions for need General the on Attorney the advise to and Constitution, State the of 11 Rules. and/or Court statutory law the to changes or Directive Directive. of this issuance immediately upon operational become shall Section This Group Advisory Technology 16.2 of Superintendent the with consultation in Justice, Criminal of Division the of Director
[brief] In 1970, the New Jersey Supreme Court abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity finding it was unjust to refuse to provide relief to injured persons.  *Willis v. Department of Conserv’n & Eco. Dev.*, 55 N.J. 534, 536-42 (1970).  The Court indicated that if this action was improvident, then it was up to the Legislature to devise a comprehensive, statutory solution.  *Id.* at 539.  Two years later, the Legislature did just that enacting the Tort Claims Act, *N.J.S.A.* 59:1-1 et seq. ("the Act"), finding sovereign immunity was necessary for public entities, since public entities cannot be expected to bear the same liability as private persons and entities:
[brief] The Decedent passed away intestate before the divorce action could be fully resolved.  (MA-208)  II.  Hearings And Orders  In This Case  Mother filed a verified Amended Complaint seeking to be appointed Administratrix of [...]’s estate.  On April 23, 2020, the Trial Court issued a Rule to Show Cause why Mother should not be appointed Administratrix.  (MA-71)  On April 29, 2020, the Trial Court entered a modified Consent Order addressing funeral arrangements, control of the funeral, rights of Estranged Wife related to the funeral, etc.  (MA-76)  On July 24, 2020, Estranged Wife filed a cross-motion to have herself appointed the Administratrix.  It was accompanied by Estranged Wife’s Certification.  (MA-149, 151, 161)  Mother responded to the cross-motion.  The Trial Court held no less than 11 hearings and issued no less than 18 Orders.
[brief] Policymakers began to address these serious issues in the FY2018 budget, which included an overall increase in K-12 aid of approximately $103 million over FY2017.  (Aa1118; Aa1460; Aa1875).  The FY2018 Appropriations Act allocated school aid so that districts whose proposed aid amount was less than its uncapped aid (as determined under the SFRA) would receive an increase calculated as the amount underfunded, multiplied by the percent underfunded, multiplied by a proration amount specified in the legislation.  L. 2017, c. 99.  Likewise, districts whose proposed aid amount was more than its uncapped aid — those that were overfunded — would receive a decrease in aid.
[brief] Although not required to, the Planning Board heard public comments prior to making its Master Plan consistency determination.  During that public comment period, Appellant’s attorney presented the testimony of [...], PP, Appellant’s planning consultant.  [...] opined that the Redevelopment Plan was inconsistent with the Master Plan.  In addition to providing professional planning testimony, multiple representatives of Appellant offered comments to the Planning Board.  At the conclusion of the public comment period and on the strength of the testimony and report of the Planning Board’s Planner, [...], the Planning Board made the determination pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.e that the Redevelopment Plan was not inconsistent with the Township Master Plan.
[brief] 131 N.J. Super. 37 (App. Div. 1974)  ...........................................  7  Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980)..................................................  7  In re [...], [...], CSC Docket Nos. [...] & [...], Civil Serv. Comm’n, Reconsideration, Final Decision (June 28, 2019)  .........................................................................................  13  In re [...], [...], CSC Docket Nos. [...] and [...], Civil Serv. Comm’n, List Removal Appeals, Final Decision, (September 7, 2018)......................................................................................  23  In re [...], [...], CSC Docket No. [...], Civil Serv. Comm’n, List Removal Appeal, Final Decision (May 2, 2022).........................................................................................................................  12  In re Foglio, 207 N.J. 38 (2011).................................................................................... 7, 26  In re [...], [...], CSC Docket No. [...], Civil Serv.  Comm’n, List Removal Appeal, Final Decision, (July 11, 2019)  .........................  23  In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567 (1990)  ..................................................................................  23  In re [...], [...], CSC Docket No. [...], Civil Serv. Comm’n, List Removal Appeal, Final Decision, (December 17, 2015)  .........................................................................................................................  23  In re [...], [...], CSC Docket No. [...], Civil Serv. Comm’n, List Removal Appeal, Final Decision (May 4, 2018)  .........................................................................................................................  22  In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182 (2011).............................................................................  7  Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560, 566 (App. Div. 1965), cert. denied, 47 N.J. 80 (1966).................................................................................................................  4  Nunan v. New Jersey Dep’t of Pers., 244 N.J. Super. 494 (App. Div. 1990) ...........................................................................................................  26  Worthington v. Fauver, 88 N.J. 183 (1982) .........................................................  7  STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND COURT RULES: N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.2 ..........................................................................................  19 N.J.A.C. 4A:2-3.1 ..........................................................................................  19 N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.7 .........................................................................................  1, 11, 12, 14, 20 N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.1 .........................................................................................  1, 14, 20 N.J.A.C. 4A:5-2.2 ..........................................................................................  11  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] Said amount, if not paid when billed, shall be recoverable in an action at law.  L. 1960, c. 169, s. eff. Jan. 1, 1962.  Amended by L.1973, c. 243, s. 1, eff. Nov. 21, 1973.  1, 5-9.  Audit by registered municipal accountant 40.4  Every audit required under this chapter shall be completed by an accountant or auditor who holds an uncanceled license as a registered municipal accountant of New Jersey.  Such license shall be issued annually by the New Jersey State Board of Public Accountants, shall be dated September 1 and run -~ - - Board until August 3 1 oTtEe following year, unless soones canceled or revoked by the said State of Public Accountants.  Every report of audit shall be signed by the registered municipal accountant making the audit, or in charge thereof, who shall be the person authorized by the local unit to make the audit.  In case any license shall be revoked, such revocation shall not be construed to affect any agreement which may be made by any local unit with any other registered municipal accountant, even though such accountant shall have been associated with the person whose license has been revoked. L.1960, c. 169, s. eff. Jan. 1, 1962.
[brief] c.  Benefits to [...] arising out of Article XIX of the collective bargaining agreement, “Terminal Leave with Pay”  The average Plaintiff in this litigation who worked 25 years completed 96% of their service under the promise that if they did not use their sick time, they would be compensated for that unused time at retirement.  (33a ¶116).  Defendants reaped the benefits of Plaintiffs coming into work every day and not requiring the payment of sick time and overtime to cover Plaintiffs if they called out.  (33a ¶117).  Plaintiffs satisfied their end of this negotiated contract.  (33a ¶118).  d.  Plaintiffs’ retirement dates  Plaintiffs’ dates of retirement are set forth as follows: [...] (February 1, 2017); (28a), [...] (March 14, 2017); (23a), [...] (April 1, 2017); (27a); [...] (April 12, 2017); (838a), [...] (May 1, 2017); (19a), [...] (June 1, 2017); (26a), [...] (July 1, 2017); (22a), [...] (November 1, 2017); (21a), [...] (November 1, 2017); (21a), [...] (November 1, 2017); (25a), [...] (November 1, 2017); (25a).
[brief] A.  Conclusion  “Our system of criminal justice is not infallible,” and rules governing PCR are the safeguard to ensure wrongful convictions do not stand.  State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013).  As a PCR petition is the last chance to challenge the fairness and reliability of a conviction, it must be a “meaningful opportunity” to root out mistakes causing unjust conviction.  Id. at 526, 540.  The denial of the PCR without an evidentiary hearing denied [...] a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate how counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him.  Construing the facts in the light most favorable to [...], and considering his extensive submissions and trial record that support his claims, [...] has shown counsel’s many failures, including his choice to promise in opening to prove innocence, failure to examine the purportedly wiped hard drive and obtain ACPO’s polices, failure to present essential witnesses and critical exculpatory evidence, and failure object to devastating prosecutorial remarks demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of ultimate success on the merits.  R. 3:22-10(b).  Accordingly, the denial of his PCR petition must be reversed.  Porter, 216 N.J. at 355.  POINT II: THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
[brief] Regardless of the Standard of Review to be Applied, Defendants’ Appeal Should be Denied Because Defendants Fail to Challenge the Trial Court’s Alternative Basis for Summary Judgment, Which is That Defendants Are Equitably Estopped from Challenging Plaintiffs’ Ownership of the Disputed Area.  (Ja720)  It is axiomatic that the trial court was permitted to provide an alternative basis for its summary judgment ruling.  See State in Interest of J.F., 446 N.J. Super. 39, 42 n.3 (App. Div. 2016) (affirming on an “alternate basis” and noting that, “[i]t is a well-settled principle that a court may provide several bases in reaching its ultimate conclusion”).  It is likewise axiomatic that a defendant’s failure to address each alternative basis waives the issue.  Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011) (“An issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived. ”); Francavilla v. Absolute Resolutions VI, LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 171, 183 (App. Div. 2024) (“Although plaintiff also appealed the April 9, 2020 Law Division order denying her motion to grant class certification, plaintiff did not address this issue in her merits brief.  Thus, that portion of plaintiff's appeal is deemed abandoned. ”); Matter of Gloria T. Mann Revocable Tr., 468 N.J. Super. 160, 180 (App. Div. 2021) (“Plaintiff waived any challenge to the fee award by failing to adequately brief that issue. ”), certif.  den., 251 N.J. 380 (2022); Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5 on R. 2:6-2 (2025) (“It is, of course, clear than an issue not briefed is deemed waived. ”).  Further, the failure to brief the issue cannot be cured by a defendant in a reply brief.
[brief] Rather, in deciding summary judgment, the Trial Court only made legal interpretations of the 1963 Agreement.  To the extent the Trial Court considered testimony during the prior trial - an appropriate proceeding to make credibility determinations - such determinations at trial do not warrant recusal or disqualification.  The weighing of witness credibility Defendant suggests warrants recusal in the within matter is the testimony of witnesses offered by both parties at trial as to the usage of the [...] for parking and the impact by the 1972 expansion of the School on the Congregation’s property rights.  Credibility determinations made when granting the Partial Summary Judgment are not at issue on appeal.  Finally, Defendant cites *J.L. v J.F.*, 317 N.J. Super. 418, 438 (App. Div. 1999), again suggesting that recusal is required where a court has weighed the evidence or made credibility findings.
[brief] With respect to the 611-policy, [...] has produced the following four documents:  1.  A change request form dated February 22, 2011.  (See Exhibit G).  2.  A fax cover sheet from [...] to the insurance company requesting a change in beneficiary for the 611-policy dated February 24, 2011.  (See Exhibit H).  3.  Proof that [...] actually faxed the change request for the 611-policy to the insurance company on February 24, 2011.  (See Exhibit I).  4.  A two-page document from the insurance company dated March 2, 2011, addressed to [...], copied to [...], the insurance agent regarding the 611 change in beneficiary and including the statement:  The proceeds shall be paid in a single sum to the following beneficiary, the insured’s mother, [...].  (See Exhibit J).  It should also be noted that the document confirming that the change was made contains the following language:
[brief] Pending before the Court is a discovery dispute between the parties.  (Doc. 186).  At bottom, the issue is that Plaintiffs believe Defendants’ ESI search terms are objectionable because the terms produced many responsive documents.  More specifically, Plaintiffs agree that 122,607 responsive documents must be produced, but argue that the remaining 287,381 documents are so voluminous as to be objectionable.  Other than these general statements, recounting Plaintiffs’ objections to Defendants’ ESI search terms defies a simple summary.  Search terms were exchanged in July of 2022.  On September 26, 2022, Plaintiffs objected to the majority of Defendants’ search terms.  In January 2023, Plaintiffs made additional objections.  Then on March 3, 2023, Plaintiffs made more objections.  At some point during these rolling objections, Defendants narrowed their ESI search terms but not to the satisfaction of Plaintiffs.  The parties now agree that 28 of Defendants’ ESI search terms remain in dispute.  (A list of the in-dispute terms and the number of responsive documents to each of them is at Doc. 186-1 at 4-5).  Again, Plaintiffs object to reviewing and (as necessary) producing 287,381 documents that “hit” when the search terms were run.  Defendants seek to have the Court overrule all of Plaintiffs’ objections.  Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have waived their objections by not timely asserting them, and that their boilerplate objections are legally insufficient and should be rejected for this alternative reason.  Finally, Defendants argue that if they do not prevail on either of these procedural objections, all of Plaintiffs objections are not well taken and should be overruled on their merits.
[brief] Therefore, it cannot be said that the court abused its discretion in allowing the statement in.  Finally, it bears repeating that the statement was admissible under N.J.R.E. 803 (a)(2) as substantive evidence, as the requirements for that rule are virtually the same as those for admitting a statement under N.J.R.E. 607.  This renders moot the argument that the court failed to provide a limiting instruction on how to use the statement.  Given that it was admissible as substantive evidence, no limiting instruction was required.  This is in line with the ruling in Torres where it was noted “as N.J.R.E. 803(a) (2) allows the use of such testimony as substantive evidence, it was also not plain error to omit a cautionary charge. ”  In sum, given the effectiveness of the two cross-examinations, admitting this prior statement had a “probative force bearing on credibility beyond merely showing repetition. ”  It was highly relevant for the jury’s determination of whether or not they should find [...] credible.  The statement and [...]’ trial testimony were “substantially” consistent, just as in Chew.  Counsel acknowledged this in brief, stating that the November 2019 statement “did not contradict what [...] said at trial . . .” (Da25.)  Additionally, all of the factors present weighed in favor of admissibility.  As such, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court below to find it admissible.
[directive] * Recommended for promulgation as a Directive Exemption Code  Exemption Category  81  Attorneys who work full time for any local, county, State, Federal agency or authority and who by statute, rule, administrative directive, Executive Order, published Ethics Codes or Opinions, are prohibited from the private practice of law.  A claim for exemption under this category must cite the specific authority under which private practice is prohibited; 82  All Supreme Court Justices; all Superior Court and Tax Court Judges; all retired Justices and Judges; all Workers' Compensation Judges; all Administrative Law Judges; all Child Support Hearing Officers or Juvenile Referees; and all Municipal Court Judges.