ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] August 2017  Bank Statements a. [...] x0561 “Wire” Account, [...] August 31, 2017..Pa156 b. [...] x1401 “Operating” Account, [...] August 31, 2017…………………………………………………………Pa158 c. [...] x0569 “Payroll” Account, [...] August 31, 2017…………………………………………………………Pa163 d. [...] x2521 Account, [...] August 31, 2017………………………………………………………………………………Pa165 P-35.
[brief] Gallick, 372 U.S. at 117.  This is a question of fact for a jury.  Gallose, 878 F.2d at 85.  Thus, the question for the jury will be whether the railroad knew or should have known there was a possibility that there would be a vagrant who could attack or otherwise interfere with an employee that could result in injury.  Gallose, 878 F.2d 80 at 85.  These types of foreseeability questions are jury questions under the FELA.  Id.  See also Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 113-114 (1963).  In *Gallick*, the injured employee claimed that his gangrene injuries were caused by an insect bite that because infected and that the railroad was responsible because he worked around stagnant pools of water and had seen insects there.  The matter proceeded to trial and the jury found that the insect bite had been caused by the employer’s breach of duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace.  The court upheld the verdict and stated the issue before the jury was whether an insect could have come from or been attracted by the pool of stagnant water.  *Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.*, 372 U.S. 108 (1963).
[brief] ”  Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, Defendants did not address the issue of a sealed bidding process in their motion for partial summary judgment.  (Da533)  Additionally, the issue of Plaintiff purchasing the Florida Property for $360,000 was not briefed.  However, in response to [...]’s “note” emailed to the trial court announcing her plan to purchase the Florida Property for the appraised value (3T4-25), Defendants opposed, arguing she should pay the current value.
[brief] The Lawsuit was no longer for ‘loss,’ meaning ‘damages, settlements, and/or defense costs. ’…  Plaintiffs’ award of the attorneys’ fees and costs they incurred in bringing the Lawsuit against Defendants does not qualify as “damages, settlements, and/or defense costs. ”  Further, while Plaintiffs’ were also awarded their attorneys’ fees and costs in defending against counterclaims, the counterclaims (and all Plaintiffs' fees and costs they incurred in bringing the Lawsuit against Defendants does not qualify as “damages, settlements, and/or defense costs. ” . . .  Similarly, the award of the litigation receiver’s fees and costs is precluded by exclusion q.  The request that the litigation receiver’s fees and costs be assessed against the non-prevailing party was made by the [...] through its receiver.  The Court adopted the receiver’s request in awarding these fees and costs.  Coverage for this award is barred by exclusion q because the award is based on a “claim . . . brought by or on behalf of an[] insured. ”  Lastly, the award of fees and costs under 27A V.S.A. Section 4-117(a) are precluded under exclusion o, as a penalty imposed by law.  Pa480 ¶ 27; Pa357–58 (emphasis added).  VI.
[brief] INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………1  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ………………………………………2  I.  [...]’s application…………………………………………………………3  II.  [...]’s complaint and the trial court’s dismissal………………6  STANDARD OF REVIEW………………………………………………………………9  LEGAL ARGUMENT……………………………………………………………………9  POINT I.  The trial court erred in upholding the Distance Regulation (Pa14)….9  A.  Citing the “purposes” section of the Distance Regulation is not competent evidence of a substantial government interest or narrow tailoring………………………………………..10  B.  The Board’s and trial court’s reliance on safety requires remand……………………………………………………………..17  C.  The trial court’s conversion to summary judgment highlights the error in its holding on the Distance Regulation…………………………………………………………..18  POINT II.  The trial court wrongly upheld the Board’s denial (Pa16)…………20  A.  [...] was entitled to a bulk variance…………………………20  B.  The Board’s denial has no basis at all……………………………..23  1.  The trial court created a new standard for the negative criteria………………………………………………..25  2.  The Board did not render any actual findings on expert testimony………………………………………………..27  CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………28
[brief] Appellants filed their Complaint on January 20, 2023.  Pa0005-Pa0018.  On March 8, 2023, Respondents filed their Answer and Separate Defenses  Pa0019-Pa0027.  In Respondents’ affirmative defenses they asserted that there existed an arbitration clause that should be enforced.  Pa0054.  On October 3, 2023, Respondents took the deposition of Appellant, [...], in order to determine whether Appellant understood that the arbitration clause applied to him at the time it was signed.  2T22:5-23\(^1\).  On March 22, 2024, Respondents filed a Motion to Stay and Compel Arbitration.  Pa0068.  On April 5, 2024, Appellants filed their opposition to Respondents’ motion.  Pa0262.  On April 5, 2024, Respondents filed their reply brief to Appellants’ opposition.  Pa0346.  After hearing oral argument on May 2, 2024, [...] issued an oral opinion granting Respondents’ motion to Stay and Compel Arbitration.  Pa0001-Pa0004.  --- \(^1\) T = transcript of Motion to Compel Arbitration, dated May 2, 2024; \(^2\) T = deposition transcript of [...], dated October 3, 2023  STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
[brief] See Master, 614 F.3d at 241 (“[a] state is allowed to determine when a person is authorized to approve warrants, where that person has the authority to approve warrants, and what type of warrants that person is allowed to approve); Novembrino, 105 N.J. at 156-58 (declining to recognize in New Jersey the “good-faith” exception to the exclusionary rule as identified in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)).  With that in mind, both this Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court have continually determined that evidence gathered pursuant to territorial discrepancies and other technical violations shall not be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.  Hamlett, 449 N.J. Super. at 176-78.  In sum, the motion judge properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress because [...] issued a valid search warrant pursuant to a finding of probable cause, and Toms River police officers were authorized to execute that warrant on the subject vehicle, even though they stopped it in Lakewood instead of Toms River.  To protect the public and preserve evidence, the police executed the consent search warrant at defendant’s home in Lakewood.  There is no suggestion that the Toms River police officers acted in bad faith nor intentionally circumvented any procedural or legal requirements.  The searches of defendant’s person, vehicle, and home in Lakewood were all lawful.  In any event, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to any territorial or jurisdictional violations.  The judge below correctly rejected defendant’s motions to suppress and for reconsideration, and these rulings should be affirmed.
[brief] [...] is a certified minority/women-owned small business, owned and managed by a young married couple who are residents of Hudson County: Lauren and [...].  (Da320.)  The development at issue in this matter is an adult-use “micro” cannabis retail establishment, i.e., cannabis micro-dispensary.\(^1\) (Da316.)  The location for the micro-dispensary is [...], designated at Block 205, Lot 30.02 on the Tax Maps of the City of Hoboken (the “Property”).  (Id.)  The Property is a commercial unit within an existing mixed-use commercial and residential building that is located in Hoboken’s C-2 Zone.  (Id.)  Following the successful completion of Hoboken’s lengthy cannabis land use approval process, on September 21, 2022, [...] received a “resolution of support” to operate its dispensary by a majority vote of the Council of the City of Hoboken.  (Da463-464.)  Subsequently, on February 9, 2023, [...] was approved for an Annual License to operate as a Class 5 \(^1\)  A cannabis “microbusiness” is a locally owned small business that is given priority in the application review process.  This designation is designed to support New Jersey entrepreneurs.  See N.J.S.A. 24:6I-36.  Cannabis Retailer in Hoboken by the [...].  (Da466-467.)
[brief] 484a – 487a.  On September 14, 2006, [...] formed [...] and was listed as the registered agent of [...] on the Certificate of Formation, with [...]’s office listed as the registered office.  488a.  The primary portion of the Pork Chop Hill Assemblage which would provide for approximately 200 of the intended 400 townhouse development was certain real estate owned by the [...] (“[...]”).  496a–513a.  [...] and [...], unbeknownst to Plaintiffs, directed [...] to execute on behalf of [...] the Agreement of Sale, dated September 6, 2006, to purchase the [...], which was amended on September 21, 2006 (“McTague-[...] Agreement”).  496a–13a.  The McTague-[...] Agreement required a deposit of only $2,000.00, called for a minimum of 200 free market units, $16,500.00 per unit, thus requiring a minimum purchase price of $3.3 million.  496a–513a.  Thereafter, on October 3, 2006, pursuant to the representations of [...] and [...], Plaintiffs signed the Assignment and Assumption of the McTague-[...] Agreement of Sale (“[...]-MTDC Assignment”).
[directive] Cash 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% should COURT and 3:26-2 summons $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 bail Range  MUNICIPAL RULE setting to to to to Bail $500 $500 $500 $500 or crime.  TO warrant when offenses  PURSUANT  THE substantive considered OFFENSES a IN  Disorderly Disorderly Disorderly Disorderly whether Persons Persons  Persons  Persons Degree included OR, ADMINISTRATOR, JUDGE actual be PERSONS regarding lesser to without appropriate.  person five it disorderly the by to factors unless COURT with another or as or given as alcohol; property dilutants, and underage factors 2
[brief] 9  | Case Name | Citation | Page | |---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------| | Bunkley v. Florida | 538 U.S. 835 (2003) | 3 | | Fiore v. White | 531 U.S. 225 (2001) | 2 | | State v. Jackson | Doc. No. A-1687-20 (App. Div. Dec. 23, 2022) | 3 | | State v. Tavares | 286 N.J. Super. 610 (App. Div. 1996) | 4 | | State v. Torres | 246 N.J. 246 (2021) | 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 | | State v. Yarbough | 100 N.J. 627 (1985) | 5 | | State v. Zuber | 227 N.J. 422 (2017) | 4 | | United States v. Tucker | 404 U.S. 443 (1972) | 4 |  APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS  Copy of unpublished case: State v. Jackson, Doc. No. A-1687-20 (App. Div. Dec. 23, 2022)  ........................................DRA-1  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  [...] has served nearly twenty-five years of a sentence that was imposed illegally.  The illegality stemmed from a misapplication of the sentencing law that was only recently clarified by the New Jersey State Supreme Court.  This error led to the imposition of consecutive sentences resulting in a sentence that will not allow [...]’s release until July of 2058, when [...] is 85 years old.  [...] was convicted of counts of kidnapping and murder related to his involvement in the deaths of two [...] gang members when he was 25 years old.  When he was sentenced the court imposed a consecutive sentence based entirely on the idea that there should be “no free crimes” under the sentencing law.  There was no qualitative weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors that occurred.  Rather the sentence was imposed to send a message to the families of the victims and to deter the public at large.  The court did not engage in any determination of the fairness of the sentence with respect to [...] specifically.  The failure to qualitatively weigh the factors and the reliance on the “no free crimes” analysis resulted in the imposition of an illegal sentence.  The failure to engage in any analysis of the overall fairness of the sentence with specific reference to [...] further violates the sentencing law and [...]’s constitutional rights.  This illegal sentence, and failure to provide an analysis of the overall fairness of the sentence requires that the matter be remanded for resentencing of [...] in accordance with the proper constitutional safeguards provided for those being sentenced.
[brief] It is in the Public Interest to Consider the Issue of whether the Bank has a Good Faith Duty under the UCC to provide copies of Documents to its Customers when signed.  [...] suggests the Court should not consider the issue of whether [...] had a good faith duty under the UCC to provide Plaintiff with a copy of the application and deposit agreement or advise where they could be located since it was not raised below.  (Db15).  If the issue is of special significance to the litigant, to the public or to the achievement of substantial justice and the record is sufficiently complete to permit its adjudication the appellate court can consider it.  Boro of Keyport v. Maropakis, 332 NJ Super 210, 216 (App. Div. 2000).  Here, the facts were all presented to the Trial Court and will not change if the Court considers this issue on appeal.  See State v. Roman-Rasado, 462 NJ Super 183, 202-203 (App. Div. 2020) - when facts are the same, raising a new legal theory that invokes the same concerns as the other theories raised would not bar the Court from considering the new legal theory.  Even the UCC recognizes that a person has notice of a fact if the person (1) has knowledge of it, (2) has received a notice or notification of it or (3) from all the facts and circumstances known to the person at the time in question, has reason to know it exists.  N.J.S.A. 12A:1-202a.  A person notifies or gives a notice or notification to another person by taking steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other person in ordinary course, whether or not the other person actually comes to know of it.  N.J.S.A. 12A:1-202d.  Besides this issue is of importance not only in this case but to the banking public in general.  The Court should consider this issue.
[brief] First, [...]’s rate was not part of the record below and was therefore not considered by the Chancery Court.  Second, [...] is a criminal defense attorney and his firm’s involvement is strictly related to issues concerning [...]’s incarceration, not general collection efforts, which are the subject of the Global Fee Application.  [...] who submitted no evidence whatsoever as to that issue in his Global Fee Application and instead merely stated:  As the Court has already found, our rates are consistent with customary rates charged in New Jersey for similar services for matters of this size and complexity by lawyers with similar experience and skills, at firms similar to my firm, of which I am aware of from my 30+ years of experience practicing law in New Jersey, managing my firm, and discussions with managing partners at other firms, as well as rate surveys and fee applications I have reviewed.  [Da26, ¶78]  [...]’s counsel’s mere invocation of prior unspecified interlocutory findings and citation to his own personal experience practicing law, vague “discussions” with anonymous “managing partners at other firms” and unnamed/undated rate surveys and fee applications, is not evidence of the appropriate rate to be applied and does not remotely satisfy Plaintiff’s burden to provide evidence to support his fee application.
[brief] An appellate review of a municipal action has the same standard of review as the trial court.  The appellate court is not required to give deference to the trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts.  Manalapan Realty v. Township Comm., 140 N.J 366, 378 (1995), United Property Owners v. Belmar, 343 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div.), certif. denied 170 N.J. 390 (2001).
[brief] In McGovern, the first case cited by the trial court, the employer, a casino, required employees to transport money carts across the public gaming floor, during which process an employee was robbed.  McGovern, 306 N.J. Super. at 176.  The McGovern fact pattern has nothing to do with the parking lot risks at issue herein.  Moreover, the McGovern case, which was decided prior to Laidlow, relied on the now-abrogated case of New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 287 N.J. Super. 190, for the disapproved proposition that “deliberate intent to harm” is required to establish an “intentional injury” claim.  McGovern, 306 N.J. Super. at 179, 180-1.  As noted above, the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized the abrogation of the *New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. v. Joseph Oat Corp.* case.  See *Charles Beseler*, 188 N.J. at 548 n. 2.  The facts of the *Fisher* case cited by the trial court are similarly distinguishable from the instant matter, as they involved a security guard who was killed by armed robbers while transporting cash from his employer’s store.  *Fisher*, 363 N.J. Super. at 460.  The cases cited by the trial court have nothing to do with the risks posed by Defendant [...]’s conduct in this case, whereby it required certain employees to park in a distant area of the hospital parking lot that lacked pedestrian safeguards, even though said safeguards were provided in the parking area used by hospital administrators, physicians, and patients.
[brief] The defendant did have legal counsel\(^{38}\) in the matter who informed the lower court of the defendant moving to trial during the September 2022 hearing.  The defendant requested counsel to submit a Substitution of Attorney form after continuous errors displayed at her hearings, requests for new Judge, submission of proof, obtaining discovery documentation, and creating extra chaos during the hearing prior to \(^{38}\) Counsel for de novo review only ordered the November 29, 2022 trial transcripts, Appellant submitted a motion to supplement the record requesting the order of all the Municipal transcripts trial\textsuperscript{39}.  If legal counsel did not display this type of behavior, this very well could have led the defendant from going to trial with counsel and ultimately found not guilty.  With the understanding the defendant does not qualify for a public defendant, she began her search for new counsel and was constantly denied by other counsels for the stated reason of prior counsel on the matter; the court below proceeded with trial where the defendant had to enter in as pro se.
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT ensure that every victim is offered information about sexually-transmitted infections and/or diseases, and available treatment options.5  Lastly, prior to the medical forensic exam, victims shall be personally informed about the availability of a CSVA and the services of the local sexual violence program, regardless of when or where the incident occurred or whether or not the victim has reported the incident to a law enforcement agency.  The victim shall be afforded the opportunity to speak privately with a CSVA before the performance of a medical forensic exam, as well as afforded the option to have the CSVA present during the completion of the medical forensic exam.  Consent
[brief] ” (Id.).  Plaintiffs reply that the law does not require them to provide the Court a “‘document-by-document list of objections’ before in camera review can proceed, ... particularly when entire categories are at issue. ” (Pls.’ Supp’l Mem. at 4).  They contend they have made a sufficient factual showing to support in camera review by identifying “a large number of non-attorney communications and documents in which an attorney was merely copied, which this Court has found warrants in camera inspection. ” (Id. (citing In re Grand Jury Invest., 974 F.2d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 1992); Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 2005 WL 6567355, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2005) (noting that plaintiff “met the minimal threshold” by showing “log entries for several documents [that] fail[ed] to identify any attorney involved in the communication” and “documents in which an attorney was one of many recipients[.]”))).
[brief] **Exhibit E to [...]’s Certification**  Letter from [...] to NJ Superior Court Clerk 12/14/2021 (Attached at Pa179)  Certification of Paralegal 12/14/2021 (Attached at Pa180)  Notice of Motion 12/14/2021 (Attached at Pa181)  Certification of Eldridge [...] 12/14/2020 (Attached at Pa183)  Proposed Order (Attached at Pa184)
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY - APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  On Appeal From: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY - MONMOUTH COUNTY, CHANCERY  DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J. Ch.  Hon. [...], P.J. Ch.  Civil Action  BRIEF OF RESPONDENT  [...]  [...]  [...], Esq. (021041988)  [...]  [...]  Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, Borough of Keansburg  On the Brief  [...], Esq. Of Counsel/On the Brief  [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Additionally, [...] specifically addressed plaintiffs’ allegations under fraudulent concealment and the other tort based causes of action, including legal malpractice.  Specifically, the Court addressed plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment claims as follows:  Here, Plaintiffs seek to assert claims against the [...] based upon the same claims, the same factual allegations, and the same transactions at issue in the 2015 case.  As the defendants point out, in seeking to consolidate this action with the 2015 case, Plaintiffs have candidly admitted that this case arises from the same transaction or occurrence as the claims asserted in the 2015 case.  The fact that the claims may have been framed or pled slightly differently is of no moment.  Moreover, the Orders entered in the 2015 case are valid, final, and on the merits, notwithstanding the other ongoing aspects of the case.  Finally, the parties to the 2015 case and this action are the same.  Plaintiffs do not dispute these last two points, or offer any legal authority to establish otherwise.  Accordingly, all elements have been met such that the claims asserted against Movants here are barred by both the Entire Controversy doctrine, as well as res judicata.
[brief] (Ca265).  She then shared another large banner which stated “[...] [...] CENTRAL REGIONAL BOARD OF EDUCATION” with the words “V.O.T.E. Merissa and Heather for Central B.O.E.” (Ca267-268).  She shared an endorsement she received from the website “chaosandcontrol.substack.com. ”  (Ca272)  (See fn10 of Appellants’ Brief in Support of Summary Decision at Ca059 for details on the contents of this website).  Respondent shared a Google Doc containing instructions for voting for candidates for board of education.  (Ca263).  She shared her election results twice and she announced that she had been elected to the [...].  (Ca274, Ca276).  As the Commission even admits, she then went on to speak from this same Facebook page on Board matters.  (Ca017) (“the subject matter of the Facebook posts – State lawsuits related to union activity, vaccines and masking in schools, and gender identity standards – may relate to the business of the Board”).
[brief] Plaintiffs-Appellants therefore respectfully request that this Court reverse the trial court's order granting summary judgment to Defendants-Respondents, and hold that the Board did not have jurisdiction to hear the 2022 Zoning Application, that the 2022 Zoning Application was in conflict with the Master Plan, and that [...] failed to sustain their burden of proof for the grant of a variance.  [...].  BY: /s/ [...]  For [...]  Dated: May 7, 2024  [...] and [...], Plaintiffs/Appellants vs. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], Defendants/Respondents.
[brief] On August 23, 2011, a Mercer County grand jury charged [...], [...], and [...] in a multiple count indictment.  All three men were charged with first-degree robbery, as well as theft, aggravated assault, terroristic threats, several weapons offenses, and theft by receiving stolen property.  They were each also charged with conduct-specific counts related to the theft of the car or the arrest, and [...] was charged with possession of a firearm as a felon.  [...] pled guilty to two second-degree weapons offenses and agreed to testify against [...] and [...].