ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 50  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  **Angermeier v. Sea Girt,** 27 N.J. 298, 306-309 (1958) ..................................................  31  **Arnold v. Mundy,** 6 N.J.L. 1, 95 (1821) ............................................................  20  **Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea,** 61 N.J. 296 (1972) ...............................................................  20  **Bow & Arrow Manor v. West Orange,** 63 N.J. 335, 346-347 (1973).  ..................................................  32  **Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., supra,** 142 N.J. at 540 .....................................................................  20  **Cell South of New Jersey, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of West Windsor Township,** 172 N.J. 75, 81 (2002)  ...........................................................  29  **Conlon v. Bd. of Public Works, Paterson,** 11 N.J. 363, 366 (1953).  .........................................................  32  **Conley v. Guerrero,** 228 N.J. 339, 346 (2017) .......................................................  19  **East Mill Assoc. v. Township Council of East Brunswick,** 241 N.J. Super. 403 (App. Div. 1990) .....................................  48  **Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev,** 225 N.J. 469, 479 (2016) .......................................................  19  **Jennings v. Borough of Highlands,** 418 N.J. Super. 405, 416-417 (App.Div.2011) ......................... 49  **Kaufmann v. Planning bd. of Warren Tp.,** 110 N.J. 551, 557 (1988) ...................................................... 34 **Kozesnick v. Montgomery,** 24 N.J. 154, 166-167 (1957) .................................................. 32 Mahwah Realty Associates Inc. v. Township of Mahwah, 420 N.J. Super. 341 (App. Div. 2011) ........................................... 41, 46 Manalapan Realty v. Tp. Committee, 140 N.J. 366, 383-384 (1995) .................................................. 19, 20, 38 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, 95 N.J. 306 (1984) ................................................................. 21 Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1, 15 (1987) ................................. 29, 34, 36 Nouhan v. Board of Adjustment of City of Clifton, 392 N.J. Super. 283, 290 (App. Div. 2007) ............................... 34 Olivia v. Garfield, 1 N.J. 184, 191 (1948) ............................................................ 31 PADNA v. City Council of Jersey City, 413 N.J. Super 322, 330 (App. Div. 2010), cert. den. 205 N.J. 79 (2011).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AGAINST OLD REPUBLIC BECAUSE PLAINTIFF TERMINATED THE PSA  The Complaint’s allegations and the plain language of the PSA demonstrate that Plaintiff terminated the PSA by electing to take back its deposit after declaring [...] in default.  The language of the PSA further makes clear that, even if the PSA were not terminated, Plaintiff was not entitled to seek specific performance under the circumstances.  As such, the trial court was correct in holding that Plaintiff was precluded from seeking specific performance under the PSA.  All of Plaintiff’s causes of action against [...] therefore fail because the Complaint makes clear that they all hinge on the Plaintiff’s continued ability to enforce its right under the PSA to purchase the Property, which did not exist.
[brief] Da415.  It can hardly be the case that acknowledging the existence of the language of paragraph 39 from the MFSA in the offer is a material change that created a new offer.  Rather, it reduced to writing a term that everyone already was aware existed, a term that had no impact on the manner by which [...] would acquire the property if they were to properly exercise their ROFR and a term that did not alter the offer in any other manner, including the purchase price.  Thus, it was a non-essential term and did not even need to be resubmitted to the Plaintiff prior to [...] and [...] proceeding to closing.
[brief] Therefore, parents are constitutionally entitled to notification of adverse impacts on their children even if LGBTQ+ status may be incidentally involved.  The case law cited by Plaintiffs fails to establish otherwise.  Plaintiffs rely on John & Jane Parents 1 v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 622 F. Supp.3d 118 (D. Md. 2022) (Pb33) vacated 78 F4th 622 (4th Cir. 2023) which was vacated on jurisdictional grounds by the Fourth Circuit.
[brief] *State v. Williams*, 444 N.J. Super. 603, 617 (App. Div.2016) (“[A] reviewing court can affirm a decision on different grounds than … offered by the court being reviewed. ”).  Plaintiff wanted to pursue a theory of procedural unconscionability, he was obligated to do so in response to [...]’s motion.  He did not inasmuch as the Complaint alleges no facts and Plaintiff presented no evidence or argument to the trial court on this issue.  Therefore, any claimed error on this issue is one which he invited and does not support overturning the trial court’s sound decision.
[brief] The purpose of a so-called “Frye hearing” is to ensure that the scientific evidence that is sought to be introduced at trial is sufficiently reliable such that it has gained “general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. ”  *State v. Ghigliotty*, 463 N.J. Super. 355, 374 (App. Div. 2020).  This comports with Rule of Evidence 702, which provides that expert testimony is admissible “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
[brief] ”).  A court will “only enforce the contracts which the parties themselves have made. ”  Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 33 N.J. 36, 43 (1960); see also Liqui-Box Corp. v. Estate of Elkman, 238 N.J.Super. 588, 600 (App. Div. 1990); Schor v. FMS Financial Corp., 357 N.J. Super. 185, 191 (App. Div. 2002) (“[w]here the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous there is no room for interpretation or construction and the courts must enforce those terms as written.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING RESTRAINTS DESPITE A LACK OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFFS’ HARM GREATLY OUTWEIGHED COUNTERVAILING HARMS (Da393-417)  Injunctive relief should not issue unless the hardship to Plaintiffs, if the relief does not issue, greatly outweighs countervailing harm if it does.  J.H. Renarde, 312 N.J. Super. at 204-205.  The trial court concluded that “the relative hardship to plaintiffs if relief is denied is greater than the harm to defendants if the relief is granted” because enforcement of the Revised Policy “may” subject students and school staff to irreparable harm while defendants “would not be harmed” by the imposition of preliminary restraints; therefore, “more harm would result by denying preliminary restraints....” (p. 20-21) (Da412-413).  In doing so, the court dismissed the irreparable harm to parental Constitutional rights (p. 19) (Da411).  Mirabelli, 2023 WL 5976992, at *15 (“It is black letter law that the deprivation of constitutional rights unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury”).  Indeed, the rationale of Mirabelli applies here: The school's policy [against parental notification] is a trifecta of harm: it harms the child who needs parental guidance and possibly mental health intervention to determine if the [gender] incongruence is organic or whether it is the result of bullying, peer pressure, or a fleeting impulse.  It harms the parents by depriving them of the long recognized Fourteenth Amendment right to care, guide, and make health care decisions for their children.  And finally, it harms [teachers] who are compelled to violate the parent's rights by forcing [them] to conceal information they feel is critical for the welfare of their students ....
[brief] 3:7-3(A) [1.1].  See also State v. Catlow, 206 N.J. Super, 186, 194-95, 502 A. 2d 48 (App. Div. 1985).  In Catlow, the defendant was charged with robbery in the indictment that did not provide "any degree of the offense," and over the defendant's objection, the trial court instructed the jury on first degree robbery.  Ibid.  The Appellate Division reversed because it "consider[ed] determination of the degree of a crime an essential element of the Grand Jury function," and it found even though the State presented evidence that the Grand Jury heard testimony relating to a first degree offense, the robbery count provided no degree.  Id. at 195, 502 A.2d 48.  Rule. 3-10-2(c) (d) requires objections to indictments or accusations that fails to charge an offense before trial.  Here [...] should have objected to the first degree robbery jury instruction because the "Grand Jury transcripts" under both indictment(s) [...] and [...] were "barren of any degree" for robbery.  (12T 44-45-7 to 24; 13T 3-1 to 6; 30-31-25 to 5).  In conjecture with [...]'s failure to object to the trial court's jury instruction on first degree robbery, she allowed the Court to bypass the grand jury's function in which, permitted the court to amend the indictment to reflect a higher degree of robbery, without first consulting with the grand jury.
[brief] **Plaintiff’s Other Lies.**  Plaintiff lied in her Answers to Interrogatories and Amended Answers to Interrogatories in this case.  (Appx 008 at ¶37).  Interrogatory number nine asked Plaintiff to “state whether you have ever been charged with, convicted of or plead guilty to any criminal charges. ” (Appx 528-29 at ¶37).  Plaintiff answered “none. ” (Id.).  This was a lie.  (Id.).  Interrogatory number six asked her to identify any other lawsuit in which she was a party.  (Id.).  She answered “none. ” (Id.).  Her answer to number six was not true.  (Id.).  She was in fact a plaintiff in another civil case.  (Id.).  Plaintiff certified twice that her false answers to interrogatories were true:  I hereby certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true.  I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.  (Id.)  Plaintiff has also lied in past court proceedings.  In 2019, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the convictions of two individuals convicted of murdering Plaintiff’s husband because Plaintiff was found not credible.
[brief] [...] and his wife, [...], own [...], Block 27, Lot 43 in [...].  James and a previous wife, [...], acquired the property in 1990 (“the Baxter Lot”).  (Da789-Da790).  [...] acquired a nearby parcel, Block 27, Lot 45, from [...] in 2020 (“the [...] Lot”).  (Da401-Da406)  The Roths acquired the [...] Lot from [...], [...]’s brother, in 2009 (Da408-410).  [...] and Beth purchased the lot together in 2003 from representatives of the [...], but only [...]’s name appeared on the deed.
[brief] ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: /s/[...]  [...] Deputy Attorney General  Dated: March 25, 2024  By Electronic Filing Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex  25 W. Market Street P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  April 2, 2024  Re: [...], Petitioner/ Appellant, v. [...], Middlesex County, Respondent / Respondent  Appellate Div. Dkt. No. [...]  Reply Brief on Behalf of Petitioner/Appellant  [...]
[brief] Yet, somehow, the Trial Court misinterpreted [...] as finding that “Plaintiffs could be barred from asserting these claims in a separate action” and nevertheless “denied the motion to amend and assert these “new” causes of action”.  181a.  Based on this blatant misinterpretation of [...]’s clear statement to the contrary, the Trial Court erroneously concluded that “the prejudice to Plaintiffs has already been evaluated by the Court, and it was decided that these …claims could have been asserted earlier but are not allowable now”.
[brief] ’”  *Ardan*, 231 N.J. at 605 (quoting *N.J.A.C.* 12:17–9.3(b)).  The Court concluded that *N.J.A.C.* 12:17–9.3(b) does not impose a “notice-and-inquiry” requirement on every claimant.  “Applied to a vast range of workplace settings, *that standard calls for an individualized determination; it does not mandate in every case that the claimant demonstrate that she notified the employer of the medical condition and sought an alternative position that would accommodate that condition.*”  *Id.* (emphasis added).  Similar to the Board in *Ardan*, both the Appeal Tribunal and the Board erroneously required [...] to substantiate the fact that the work was aggravating his injury by providing medical documentation to his employer and seeking an accommodation from his employer.
[brief] Beginning with *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the United States Supreme Court carved out an exception to the traditional approach of applying State law jurisprudence on personal injury statutes of limitations to analyze the accrual of § 1983 claims, an argument point that was literally not considered by the trial court.  As with most personal injury claims, that approach focused on the plaintiff’s knowledge of his or her injury, rather than the favorable termination of the criminal proceeding.  *Id.* at 352.  *Heck* addressed a § 1983 claim by a plaintiff who was simultaneously serving a sentence for a then still-valid conviction that was on appeal.  Recognizing that § 1983 creates a species of tort liability, *Heck* likened the plaintiff’s claim to the most closely related common law tort of malicious prosecution, which requires favorable termination of the criminal proceeding.  *Heck* wisely held that the claim did not accrue until after the conviction had been reversed, basing its rationale on pragmatic concerns with avoiding parallel civil and criminal litigation, and the potential for conflicting civil and criminal judgments.
[brief] [...] reasoned as follows:  When I look at 609, and I take the guidance that 609 gives me, all I have to evaluate is drug-related and house arrest and probation.  I don’t have any clue if it’s for things that involve dishonesty, lack of voracity, fraud.  For example, you know, was a bad check written?  Was there theft by deception?  I have no information in that regard.  I have nothing that tells me -- he says he’s been clean for over 10 years -- that there has been anything within the last 10 years.  And, again, that would be readily discoverable information in my mind.  So then I have to say if there is any probative value to that whatsoever, which in my mind, based on that limited information, there is not, the only probative value may be if something turned up that it would go to the credibility of the witness.  But then I have to do the 403 balance, would that be outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice, which in my mind it greatly would.  And, again, I can’t guess on what’s out there.  1T:47-27 to 35; 1T:48-1 to 11  At issue was Appellant’s testimony at deposition that he did not recall the date of his last conviction.  Prior to trial, Appellee had asked Appellant for any information it might have regarding recent convictions, but none were forthcoming.  Following [...]’s Order of September 26, 2023 granting the motion, Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration which for the first time disclosed evidence of a felony conviction for a drug related offence in March of 2018.
[brief] At Pb14 to Pb15, plaintiffs misquote N.J.S.A. 40:55D-51 -- specifically, subsection (a).  The statute actually reads as follows:  The planning board when acting upon applications for preliminary or minor subdivision approval shall have the power to grant such exceptions from the requirements for subdivision approval as may be reasonable and within the general purpose and intent of the provisions for subdivision review and approval of an ordinance adopted pursuant to this article, if the literal enforcement of one or more provisions of the ordinance is impracticable or will exact undue hardship because of peculiar conditions pertaining to the land in question.  (Emphasis added).  The Applicant proposed a major subdivision, thus the statute does not apply.
[brief] See FTC Opinion, [...] to [...] (Sept. 21, 1992).  86 FR 5766-01 (emphasis added).  Rather than expressing concern over these statistics, the CFPB even confirmed that debt collectors may include the letter vendor’s return mail address on collection letters for returned mail, disputes, and payments.  *Id.*  If the CFPB believed debt collectors’ use of letter vendors to mail collection letters is prohibited by any provision of the FDCPA, it would have said so in its more than 650-page rulemaking notice.
[brief] This brief is respectfully submitted on behalf of *amici curiae*, the [...] (the “[...]”), the world’s largest business federation, and the [...] (“[...]”), a bipartisan, statewide group of businesses, individuals, not-for-profit groups, and professional organizations.  These *amici* regularly participate in cases before this Court in order to address matters of concern to the business community, including issues of civil procedure that impact the professionals and businesses in this State.  The ESI Order at the heart of this appeal requires the parties to produce mountains of what all parties (and the trial court) agree are *irrelevant* electronic business records.  Further, the trial court explicitly refused to permit the parties to screen their ESI productions for relevance, and failed to substantively address Defendants’ objection to producing irrelevant documents, asserting instead that it was not the trial court’s job to do so.  And the trial court failed to weigh the purported benefits of producing the irrelevant documents against the burden of producing the irrelevant documents, especially Defendants’ pre-production review of those documents to determine whether any are privileged or proprietary.  This constellation of decisions ignores what is the cornerstone inquiry for production under our Court Rules: relevancy.  The ESI Order presents a new and dangerously broad approach to e-discovery, with the potential to significantly escalate litigants’ discovery costs while providing no aid toward resolution of the litigation.  *Amici* therefore urge this Court to vacate the ESI Order and reaffirm that litigants are required to produce only discovery “which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. ”  N.J. Ct. R. 4:10-2(a).
[brief] And unlike the defendant in *Deangelo*, [...] has engaged in no deliberate and/or calculated deception.  Even if the Court were to find R. 4:50-1(d) to be an inappropriate mechanism by which to vacate the default judgment against [...], the provisions of R. 4:50-1(f) in the context of *Mancini*, *Deangelo*, and *Maialetti* dictate that [...]’s violations of the NJCFLA void the unlawfully obtained judgment.
[brief] Appellant’s claim arises under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.  (“FDCPA”) and is based on Respondent’s use of a letter vendor to mail Appellant two collection letters in connection with a debt she incurred, which the creditor placed with [...] for collection.  The purpose of the FDCPA is to eliminate abusive debt collection practices and to ensure consumers are provided with certain material disclosures.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).  The FDCPA is not intended to prevent legitimate debt collection activity.  Id.  Nor is it intended to afford a windfall to those debtors who have not been subjected to abusive or unlawful collection practices, or otherwise disadvantage debt collectors who refrain from such practices.  Id.  See also Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)).  The FDCPA provides extraordinary incentives to would-be Appellants and their attorneys to throw claims against the wall to see if one will stick: up to $1,000 in statutory damages, actual damages; strict liability; and shifting attorney’s fees.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.  These incentives have led to FDCPA litigation becoming “a glorified game of ‘gotcha,’ with a cottage industry of plaintiff lawyers filing suits over fantasy harms the statute was never intended to prevent. ”  *In re FDCPA Mailing Vendor Cases*, 551 F. Supp. 3d 57, 61 (E.D.N.Y. 2021).  The case from which Appellant appeals is another such case.  Here, Appellant filed a lawsuit over the Respondent’s use of a letter vendor to process and mail two collection letters to Appellant.  A debt collector’s use of a letter vendor to undertake the rote task of printing and sending collection letters is a classic example of a debt collection practice which poses no harm to consumers and which the FDCPA never intended to prohibit.  The FDCPA provision which Appellant relies on is meant to prohibit debt collectors from disclosing a debt to a consumer’s friends, family, neighbors, etc. thereby harming the consumer’s reputation.  *See*  15 U.S.C. § 1692; S. Report. No. 95-382, at 2-4, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696.  Here, in particular, Appellant did not allege that any human being at the letter vendor (or outside the vendor for that matter) ever saw her information, much less that she suffered any reputational harm.  Further, the FDCPA expressly permits the use of service providers to communicate with consumers (*e.g.* telegram operators).  Federal agencies tasked with implementing and enforcing the FDCPA have thus repeatedly approved of the use of service providers, generally, and letter vendors, specifically.  More generally, Respondent’s use of a letter vendor did not inflict the type of reputational harm that Congress sought to prevent.  It is simply not the type of third-party disclosure which Congress sought to bar under the FDCPA.  For these reasons, and as further explained, *infra*, the Superior Court properly concluded that Appellant failed to state a plausible claim for relief and dismissed her Complaint.
[brief] **PLAINTIFF’S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WITH RESTRAINTS (FENCE VIOLATION)  FILED OCTOBER 19, 2018**  October 19, 2018  Order to Show Cause  With Restraints filed by Plaintiff (Fence Violation) ordering them to Show Cause on December 4, 2018.  Da643  Certification of [...] in Support of Order to Show Cause filed on October 19, 2018.  Da645 --- 12 Photos
[brief] In addition, [...]’s Membership Agreement further states (Ja37):  7.3  Definition of “Dispute”:  Subject to the following exclusions, “Dispute” means any dispute, claim, or controversy between you and [...] regarding any aspect of your relationship with [...], whether based in contract, statute, regulation, ordinance, tort (including without limitation fraud, misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement, negligence, gross negligence or reckless behavior), or any other legal, statutory or equitable theory, and includes without limitation the validity, enforceability or scope of the Agreement (except for the scope, enforceability and interpretation of the Arbitration Agreement and Class Action Waiver).  However, “Dispute” will not include (1) personal injury claims or claims for lost, stolen, or damaged property; (2) claims that all or part of the Class Action Waiver is invalid, unenforceable, unconscionable, void or voidable; and (3) any claim for public injunctive relief, i.e., injunctive relief that has the primary purpose and effect of prohibiting alleged unlawful acts that threaten future injury to the general public.
[brief] ”  *Fraternal Ord. of Police*, 812 F.2d at 110.  Here, due to the importance of parental involvement in the lives of their children, which the United States Supreme Court has recognized for over a century, parents’ constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their children outweigh any putative privacy right their children might have.  In sum, children have no federal constitutional right to privacy to keep secret from their parents the fact they are being socially transitioned by their school.  Thus, student privacy cannot be a compelling governmental interest sufficient to support the Parental Secrecy Policy’s infringement of parental rights.