ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Re: Order of 5/12/2023 (DA14), Order of 3/30/2023(DA20)  POINT III:  The Court erred and abused its judicial discretion by 1) failing to consider Defendant’s prima facie evidence that the Probation account contained voluminous errors, and 2) by failing to consider valid court Orders demonstrating Probation’s account errors, 3) by failing to schedule a hearing to resolve disputed facts of the case and instead continuing to rely upon Probation’s erroneous “accounting” and audits, and 4) by denying Defendant the resulting credits and income rightfully due him, and in this manner the Court denied Defendant due process by failing to provide Defendant with opportunity to present proofs to support his claim of Probation account error – in a hearing on the record as ordered by [...] and as rightfully due Defendant as a matter of justice and equity.  Re: Order of 5/12/2023 (DA14), Order of 3/30/2023(DA20)  POINT IV:  The Court erred and abused its judicial discretion in misapplying “law of the case” doctrine in a manner contrary to the Appellate court’s Remand orders of 1/17/2022 and 10/27/2005 and the trial Court’s Orders of 12/10/2014 and 1/10/2020 in a manner beyond the authority and intent of the trial court and in a manner contrary to the submitted evidence.  Re: Order of 5/12/2023 (DA14), Order of 3/30/2023(DA20)  POINT V:  The Court erred and abused its judicial discretion in failing to provide Defendant with due process and protection against unreasonable seizure of Defendant’s private property as provided under the NJ Constitution, Article 1, in a manner contrary to the law and the interests of justice and equity.
[directive] Framework.  Decision General Policy and 7.1 in as term defined certain "eligible defendants" that is only Bail Reform Law, Under the Rule Cf. Section 1. 6 (note, however, that pretrial detention. axe subject to 2A:162-15 N.J.S.A. Enforcement after Attorney General Supreme Court Law the ultimately adopted by 3:26-1, as this disorderly persons offenses, thus include petty and does not issued, Directive 2016-6 was statute offenses).  Specifically, the disorderly persons petty apply to does not Directive complaint- defendants charged by defendants (i.e., detention of eligible pretrial authorizes involving or anon-indictable indictable crime offense with an charged who are warrant)  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(a).
[brief] \textit{N.J.S.A.}  2C:33 – 31 criminalizes “Dog Fighting” (as opposed to “cock fighting” or any other \(^3\) \textit{N.J.S.A.}  2C:30 – 2(b). non-human animal “fighting”).  Oddly, this statute did not make its way into any of the State’s Briefs (but the Idaho “dog fighting” statute did) (Pb10).
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  LEGAL ARGUMENT  ..................................................................................................................1  POINT I THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO ELICIT  A FIRST-TIME IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT BY [...] AT TRIAL.  (4T 14-7 to 17-15; Da23)  ..............................................1  A.  If Watson’s Holding Precluding First-Time In- Court Identifications Is Found To Be A New Rule, It Should Be Afforded At Least Pipeline Retroactivity.............................................................................................................2  B.  There Was No “Good Reason” For Allowing A First-Time In-Court Identification In This Case............................................................................................................................11  INDEX TO REPLY
[brief] Context matters. ”  *Burlington Northern*, 548 U.S. at 69 (citing *Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.*, 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998)).  An “act that would be immaterial in some situations is material in others. ”  *Ibid.* (citation omitted).  The Supreme Court recognized that whether a retaliatory employment action actionable “often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.
[brief] Lastly, [...] asserts that the NJCFLA’s statutory predecessors, i.e., the New Jersey Small Loan Law (“NJSLL”), the New Jersey Consumer Loan Act (“NJCLA”), and the New Jersey Licensed Lenders Act (“NJLLA”), did not “provide for a private cause of action . . . no legislative history is mentioned by Defendant, nor has he mentioned any court that has inferred such a private right. ”  [...]’s Br.  Given that there is a distinction to be drawn between statutory predecessors and legislative predecessors, a brief history of the NJSLL, NJCLA, and NJLLA can be found at p. 9-11 of [...]’s opening Brief.  [...]’s opening Brief also cites multiple cases\(^1\) in which the statutory predecessors of the NJCFLA have been enforced by individual consumers.
[brief] Case Alta Devices, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 18-cv-00404-LHK-VKD, 2019 WL 8757255 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2019)...—— Blankenship v. Fox News Network, LLC, No. 2:19-CV-00236, 2021 WL 2345972 (S.D.W. Va. June 8, 2021)...—— Dyson, Inc. v. Sharkninja Operating LLC, No. 1:14-CV-0779, 2016 WL 1613489 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 2016)...—— In re Envision Healthcare Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 3:17-CV-01112, 2020 WL 6750397 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 16, 2020)...—— In re EpiPen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Mktg., Sales Practices and Antitrust Litig., No. 17-md-2785-DDC-TJJ, 2018 WL 1440923 (D. Kan. Mar. 15, 2018)...—— MariCal, Inc. v. Cooke Aquaculture, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-00366-JDL, 2016 WL 9459260 (D. Me. Aug. 9, 2016)...—— Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 10-CV-03561-WHA-DMR, 2015 WL 7775243 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2015)...—— Rosinbaum v. Flowers Foods, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 738 (E.D.N.C. 2017)  ...——  I.  PLAINTIFFS’ SEPARATE STATEMENT  *4  Pursuant to ¶ 6 of the Protocol for Resolving Discovery Disputes—Order No. 1, Dkt. No. 733, Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement Regarding [...] and [...] as Document Custodians is provided at Attachment A.
[directive] So too, these Guidelines explain in describing Mitigating Factor #2a that a “defendant’s lack of knowledge or understanding of the scope and structure of the criminal enterprise and the activities of others is highly relevant in determining the applicability of this [mitigating] factor. ”  Accordingly, a defendant’s lack of knowledge or understanding of the scope and structure of the criminal activity would also militate strongly against a finding that Aggravating Factor #4b applies.
[brief] Indeed, multiple cases before this Court have upheld ordinances regulating noise in a substantially similar way to how Ordinance No. 17-2017 does, citing N.J.S.A. 40:48-1 & -2, i.e., the Home Rule Act, as the source of such municipal authority.  In State v. Holland, 132 N.J. Super. 17 (App. Div. 1975), the Court dealt with a challenge to an Ordinance enacted by the governing body of the [...].  As part of its analysis upholding the Ordinance, the Court noted, “it has long been established that municipalities in this State have the authority to adopt Ordinances regulating or preventing loud, disturbing and unnecessary noises which are detrimental to the public health and welfare. ”  Id. at 22.  The Court specifically cited N.J.S.A. 40:48-1 and N.J.S.A. 40:48-2 as the source of that authority, upholding the Ordinance on review.
[brief] Commercial and industrial development were not priorities.  B.  [...] is the only municipality in the State of New Jersey to successfully implement TOR, and residential development in the “Receiving Area” is now more than eighty percent (80%) completed.  The limited commercial area in the Receiving Area has now also been built, but suffers from vacancy concerns.  C.  [...]’s tax revenues are disproportionately derived from its residential development and farms.  In fact, ninety-seven percent (97%) of [...]’s tax ratable base is farmland and residential.  The Township Committee recognizes the fragility of such a reliance on residences and farms as the nearly sole source of tax revenue.
[brief] On April 6, 2022, Plaintiff, [...] (hereinafter the “Association”), filed a Complaint against the Defendant, [...] (hereinafter the “Developer”), alleging consumer fraud, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty, amended on December 21, 2022.  See Pa 1.  It also alleges personal liability against Leonard and [...], the Developer’s Vice President and President, respectively.  Id.  As a way of background, on April 19, 1983, the Developer registered the Public Offering Statement for Wedgewood Gardens Condominiums, to consist of 136 units located at [...].  See Public Offering Statement with the Master Deed and By-Laws for “Wedgewood Gardens, A Condominium. ”  See Pa 148-149.  On June 29, 1983, the Master Deed was recorded with the Office of Essex County’s Register of Deeds in Deed Book 4791 at Pages 1-85, as amended in Deed Book 4813, Page 567; Deed Book 5179, Page 272; Deed Book 5723, Page 693; and Deed Book 12238, Page 8709.
[brief] ”  175 *N.J. Super.* at 395 (emphasis added).  Each count of [...]’s complaint sought a “determination [that he] is entitled to a right of residential access to and from his property over the lands of one or more of the Defendants. ”  (Da82-Da86)  There is no reason why a claim for an express easement could not have been asserted at that time since the purpose of that relief would have been to “remedy” the same “wrong.
[brief] On August 23, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a motion to disqualify the [...] from simultaneously representing each of the [...], and to disqualify the [...] from simultaneously representing each of the [...].  On October 27, 2023, the trial court denied those motions.  Pa306; Pa312.  Despite conceding that “[t]he CNA may create a conflict of interest if this matter proceeds to trial,” the court held that each client’s position is not currently aligned directly against one another as contemplated by RPC 1.7.  Pa310; Pa316.  The court further stated that all clients signed informed consent waivers after being informed of potential risks of joint representation and waiving conflicts – a determination that the court made without having seen the waivers and based on certifications of only three out of ten individual (twenty total) defendants, purporting to describe them.  Pa317-324.  The court failed to analyze Plaintiffs’ argument that the third-party payor arrangement of the Firms whose fees were paid by superiors on behalf of their subordinate employees, all of whom were jointly represented, was prohibited by the Supreme Court’s decision in Grand Jury.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I STANDARD OF REVIEW  It is well-established that “evidentiary decisions are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard because, from its genesis, the decision to admit or exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to the trial court’s discretion. ”  Rodriguez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 237 N.J. 36, 57 (2019) (quoting Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369 (2010)).  The Trial Court’s evidentiary rulings are entitled to deference absent the showing of an abuse of discretion.  State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 484 (1997).  “On appellate review, a trial court’s evidentiary ruling must be upheld ‘unless it can be shown that the trial court palpably abused its discretion, that is, that its finding was so wide off the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted. ’”  Belmont Condominium Association, Inc. v. Geibel, 432 N.J. Super. 52 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Green v. N.J. Manufacturers Insurance Company, 160 N.J. 480 (1999)).  See also, Grewal v. Greda, 463 N.J. 489 (2020); DeVito v. Sheeran, 165 N.J. 167 (2000); State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383 (1998).
[brief] Appellants/plaintiffs respectfully submit this brief on appeal from the Law Division’s Order granting pre-answer dismissal of the respondent under Rule 4:6-2(e), essentially based upon the “entire controversy doctrine,” as legally erroneous and contrary to prior orders entered in the antecedent case.  This appeal is related to, and should be considered together with, Appeal Number [...], as the two appeals are related and indeed inexorably intertwined.
[brief] The Zoning Board also found that the proposed use will not impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and the zoning ordinance.  As noted in the Board Planner’s report, the Property is currently zoned Rural Development—Commercial, which could allow even more intensive uses at the Property, such as retail sales and services.  The Property already contains a residential structure and, therefore, the addition of an accessory garage is a natural and expected improvement to the Property.
[brief] In 2014, in *Cherilus v. Fed. Express*, 435 N.J. Super. 172 (App. Div. 2014) although the Appellate Division referenced *Costanzo* for the proposition that an injured person cannot assign his claim to someone else --- \(^3\)  The transactions in *Costanzo* were loans because there was always the intention to pay them back.  [...]’s contracts were always contingent on a recovery.  before judgment, the Court did NOT “correct” Costanzo’s holding that the proceeds could be assigned.  The year after Costanzo, in Berkowitz v. Haigood, 256 N.J. Super. 342 (Law Div. 1992) the Law Division addressed a case where a personal injury plaintiff assigned to his chiropractor a portion of the proceeds from his personal injury claim and instructed his attorney to satisfy the medical bills upon settlement.
[brief] Specifically, the Borough Clerk/Borough Tax Collector [...] testified that: (i) the Leased Premises were described on the 1995 Lease as a portion of Block 184, Lot 3 and were delineated on a sketch attached to the bid specifications (4T, pp. 32-33 and 36-37 and Pa0969-Pa0981 and Pa982-Pa991); (ii) in the 1999 Lease, the Leased Premises were likewise described as a portion of Block 184, Lot 3 (4T, pp. 36-39 and Pa0992-Pa0999 and Pa1000-Pa1005); (iii) in the 2012 Amendment, the Leased Premises was described as a portion of Block 184, Lot 3.01, but [...] believed that this change in the lot numbering designation of the Leased Premises was merely intended to distinguish the portion of the property being leased to [...] from the remainder of Lot 3 (4T, pp. 39-41 and Pa1027-Pa1032); (iv) despite the different lot numbering used in the description of the Leased Premises in the 2012 Amendment, the dimensions and locations of the portion of the property being leased by the Borough to [...] has not changed and in fact is the same dimensions and location as the property previously leased by the Borough to [...] (4T, pp. 33, 41).
[brief] While we do, of course, defer in some circumstances to contractual interpretations of arbitrators, we are aware neither of any authority nor any reason to defer to the contractual interpretation of the arbitration committee of an arbitral forum. ”  *Ibid.*  Finally, *Dockser* cited *Cargill* and recognized its situation to be distinguishable from that Court’s analysis of a pre-award 9 U.S.C. sec. 5 action.
[brief] [...] cites three cases in support of its claim that it is not subject to general jurisdiction, all of which discuss jurisdiction over a corporation, not a partnership.  In *BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell*, 581 U.S. 402 (2017), the Supreme Court determined Montana’s highest court improvidently exercised general jurisdiction in Montana over a corporate railroad in its employees’ job injury claims where the workers were neither injured in Montana nor resided there.
[brief] Remediation is not a Use and Remediation does not Automatically Require Discontinuance of Use.  (T3, 21:13-22:4).  In concluding that criterion (b) was not satisfied, the Trial Court struggled with the question of whether use of a property is discontinued when there is active remediation occurring.  (T3, 49:20-24).  The Trial Court seemed to believe that remediation was a use that somehow prevented the conclusion that the commercial use of the property had been discontinued.  Remediation is not a “use;” it is activity.  When remediation is conducted in conjunction with a permitted commercial or industrial use, remediation can be classified as an accessory structure or accessory use.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-66.8.  Without a primary use, such as a commercial use, retail use or industrial use, remediation is not a use at all.  By its nature, an accessory use is one which is incidental and subordinate to the primary use.  Mola v. Reiley, 100 N.J. Super. 343, 348 (Law Div. 1968).  Without a primary use, there can be no accessory use because there is no use to which it is subordinate.  Ibid.  Contaminated properties often continue to operate their commercial or industrial uses while remediation occurs.  (T3, 21:15-22:4).  Here, despite discovering contamination on the Property in 1994, (Da144), the Property has been used as a gas station and a commercial furniture store, (Da38), and for illegal storage under the Lease.  (T1, 48:5-25).  All use, both legal and illegal, of the Property ceased in January 2023 when Plaintiff terminated the Lease.  Cessation of business relating to remediation has come up in other contexts, such as valuation for property tax purposes.
[brief] State v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427, 447 (1989).  Testimony relating to inculpatory information supplied to a co-defendant or to other non-testifying witness identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of a crime deprives the accused of his or her constitutional rights.  State v. Farthing, 331 N.J. Super 58, 75 (App. Div. 2000).
[brief] In this thirteen-year-old tortious interference/legal malpractice case, the Law Division made four serious legal errors.  Each of those errors independently calls for reversal of the summary judgment granted to Defendants below.  First, the Law Division made numerous clear errors of fact in their Statement of Reasons, at times even impermissibly and inappropriately acting as a rebuttal expert to [...]  (“[...]”), and contesting the facts established by [...] (“[...]”)  Point I, infra.  Second, the Law Division barred [...]’s expert report and granted Defendants summary judgment, by impermissibly creating its own standard rather than correctly applying the standard set forth by the Supreme Court of New Jersey on August 17, 2022, in the matter of Schwartz v. Menas, 251 N.J. 556, (2022).  Point II, infra.  Third, the Law Division erred by not permitting [...] to testify at the Rule 104 Hearing.  Point III, infra.  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] [...]’s planner addressed the third point of the Sica test, being conditions to be imposed to address any negative effects of the application, 6T 75:14-19, but he testified that he did not see any negatives, so he did not believe that any conditions were needed.  6T 76:12-15.  Nonetheless, at trial, [...] argued that the Board did not impose additional conditions, though its own expert testified that there was nothing else to impose.  It was clear that there were other changes that could have been made to the application, including a reduction in the number of units (which would reduce the building size, parking needed, and increases setbacks), or a reduction to two stories (again, reducing the building size and parking needs), but [...] declined to make those changes.
[brief] (Pa1-2, 3T58-25 to 59-6, 3T59-14 to 61-18)  She found as a fact that plaintiff had fallen in the parking lot, not a driveway or walkway, relying upon photographs attached by plaintiff’s counsel as Exhibit B to his certification.  (3T56-20 to 56-25, 3T60-19 to 60-24, Pa941-943, Pa949-950)  Therefore, plaintiff had fallen in common area for which the landlord was solely responsible.
[brief] It is worth noting that the lower court actually addressed the issues of breach, causation, and damages in Defendants’ summary judgment motion against [...], which was filed after the instant motion was decided.  The trial judge denied Defendants’ motion concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to breach, causation, and damages.  In its decision, the trial court rejected Defendants’ argument that [...] had offered a net opinion.  Regardless, much of the evidence presented to the lower court by the parties for the later motion for summary judgment was not part of the record for this motion.  As the issues of breach, causation, and damages were not raised below, the Court cannot consider them.
[brief] • RFP 2:  “All Documents containing or relating to any communications between Plaintiffs and their auditors, accountants, consultants, and boards of directors (or committees thereof) relating to any actual or potential contractual relationship between you and Defendants regarding any KC-135 PDM work (including but not limited to the negotiation, execution, performance, and/or alleged breach of any such actual or potential contracts). ”  See [...]’s Ex. L. • RFP 12: “All documents relating to Plaintiffs’ proposal, submitted on or about September 18, 2006, to serve as prime contractor on the FY08 Recompete KC-135 PDM program, and all documents relating to Plaintiff’s Final Proposal Revisions (submitted in or around February 2007) and Second Final Proposal Revisions (submitted in or around June 2007) for the FY08 Recompete KC-135 PDM program.
[brief] “Considering first the scope of our appellate review of judgment entered in a non-jury case, as here, we note that our courts have held that the findings on which it is based should not be disturbed unless “they are so wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of justice…”  Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co, 65 N.J. 474, 483 (1974).  CONCLUSION
[directive] Klasifikasyon ak Revised Promulgated by 12/31/2019 Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Haitian Creole  Defendant's Initials Form Revize pa Sipleman Direktifnimewo 01-18 kite pwomilge le 31 desanm 2019, CN 10079-Haitian Creole Inisyal Akize a page of7/paj nan 7 4 4 13.  Specify any sentence the prosecutor has agreed to recommend:
[brief] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:17-34 and 35 and R. 4:65-2, sheriffs’ posted notices and advertisements “shall state the approximate amount of the judgment. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:17-34.  On August 31, 2023, the Sheriff posted his notice and advertisement of the foreclosure sale pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:17-34 and stated that the judgment amount as of the scheduled sale date of September 7, 2023 was $29,563,967.11. \(^3\)  Da85-86, ¶7.  This sale date was subsequently adjourned.  Prior to the December 7, 2024 sale date, the Sheriff posted another notice pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:17-34 and stated that the amount due was $25,664,194.21.  *Id.*  The Sheriff’s calculations of both amounts were based on postjudgment interest at the contract rate, not the lawful interest rate set forth in R. 4:42-11.  $29,563,967.11 is not “approximately” $21,714,825.12.  Da86-87, ¶¶7-8.  Nor is $25,664,194.21 “approximately” --- \(^3\)  Lawful interest from April 6, 2023 to September 7, 2023 totaled $205,441.65 ($1,325.43 x 155 days).  Therefore, the judgment amount as of September 7, 2023 was $21,714,825.12 (*i.e.*, $21,501,343.47 + $205,441.65 + $540 + $7,500), not $29,563,967.11.  $21,844,717.26.  The sale occurred on December 14, 2023.
[brief] In reaching his conclusions, the Commissioner noted that the DEP’s duty under the Law is “wide in scope” and requires the DEP to make access to the tidal waters and shores available to “to the greatest extent practicable,” which includes not only “visual and physical access” but also “sufficient perpendicular access from upland areas to tidal waters and adjacent shorelines, and the necessary support amenities to facilitate public access for all,” like parking and restrooms.  (Aa127, citing N.J.S.A. 13:1D-150(e) and (f)).  To effectuate these goals, the Commissioner acknowledged, the Legislature not only “codified the essence and fundamentals of the public trust doctrine” in the Law, but also “codified new public trust requirements to be triggered under specified circumstances” that “differ in part from those previously set forth in the common law public trust doctrine.