ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] It appears that Plaintiff did not invoke N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b) until litigation commenced when he averred in his pleading that the exempt criminal investigatory records should have been turned over pursuant to that subsection as well as N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a).  See Da29-31.  Rather than submit a corrected OPRA request or speak to the custodian, we understand that he instead chose to litigate. tasked the court on remand to search in camera for any “disclosable” content within the otherwise exempt material and order the release of any such information.  See Da115.  We submit, however, that, when read in context, no such parsing was intended.  Instead, the remand instructions were designed for a simpler purpose—for the court on remand to see the two documents for itself so it could better evaluate whether they were in fact exempt under OPRA.
[brief] G. Remand to the Board March 2020- August 2021.  The Board reheard this matter a third time via five lengthy hearings from March 2020 to August 2021.  Unlike the second set of hearings in October and November 2018, the Board did not have to re-consider [...]’s tax liability for [...]’s unit.  See 8T at 22:16-19, 24-25; 23:18-19.  The issues for the Board’s reconsideration were garbage collection & tax preparation fees, the management fee, and the impact of property improvements, market conditions, re-assessments, and inflation on [...]’s equity in [...]’s unit.
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., | | | 50 F. 3d 1204 (3d Cir. 1995) | 73 | | First Gov’t Lease Co. v. Nw. Scott Cty. Volunteer Fire Dep’t, | | | 2018 Ark. App. 419 (2018), reh’g denied (Oct. 31, 2018) | 65 | | Tran v. Tran, | | | 166 F. Supp. 2d 793 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) | 73 | | Baker v. National State Bank, | | | 161 N.J. 220 (1999) | 64, 65 | | Bingham v. Zolt, | | | 823 F. Supp. 1126 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff’d, 66 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 1995) | 70 | | Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc., | | | 111 N.J. 355 (1988) | 61, 62 | | Bussell v. DeWalt Products Corp., | | | 259 N.J. Super. 499 (App. Div. 1992) | 75 | | DePalma v. Bldg. Inspection Underwriters, | | | 350 N.J.Super. 195 (App. Div. 2002) | 68 | | Devli v. Tasci, | | | A-2573-20, 2022 WL 17491290 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2022) | passim | | Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, | | | 214 F. App’x 218 (3d Cir. 2007) | 73 | | Ellmex Const. Co. v. Republic Ins. Co., 202 N.J. Super. 195 | | | (App. Div. 1985) | 61 | | F.J.C. v. J.L.C., | | | A-1776-20, 2022 WL 1633799 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 24, 2022) | 72 | | Furst v. Einstein Moonjy, | | | 182 N.J. 24 (2004) | 66, 67 | | Garmeaux v. DNV Concepts, Inc., | | | 448 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div. 2016) | 67 | Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp., 253 N.J. 191 (2023), reconsideration denied, 253 N.J. 552 (2023)
[directive] Firearms Qualification  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards for New Jersey Law Enforcement  Issued December 1989 Revised September 1990 Revised April 1998 Revised April 2001 Revised June 2003  TO: Law Enforcement Executives  FROM: [...]  Acting Director DATE: June 26, 2003  SUBJECT: FIREARMS QUALIFICATION AND REQUALIFICATION STANDARDS FOR NEW JERSEY LAW ENFORCEMENT
[brief] Aftermath of the Defamatory Statements  As a result of the defamatory statements, [...]’s life was turned upside-down: she had her professional reputation left in tatters, was targeted with threats to her physical safety, was mercilessly bullied and ridiculed, was shamed in local and national news articles, was derided and humiliated in her community, was removed from her classroom at the School, was placed on administrative leave by the District, and was even the subject of a Tweet by New Jersey Governor [...] and a Facebook post by the rabbi of her childhood synagogue.  Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 12-19 & 73-90 (Da 002-03, 011-13 & 026-32).  [...] was also the target of a criminal investigation by the [...], which ultimately declined to bring charges.  Id. ¶¶ 1 & 71-72 (Da 002 & 026).  She also had to move to a new home and see a psychotherapist.  Id. ¶¶ 162-164 (Da 055-56).  ARGUMENT
[brief] In passing the School Ethics Act (Act) into law, the Legislature found and declared:  a.  In our representative form of government it is essential that the conduct of members of local boards of education and local school administrators hold the respect and confidence of the people.  These board members and administrators must avoid conduct which is in violation of their public trust or which creates a justifiable impression among the public that such trust is being violated.  b.  To ensure and preserve public confidence, school board members and local school administrators should have the benefit of specific standards to guide their conduct and of some disciplinary mechanism to ensure the uniform maintenance of those standards among them.  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22.
[brief] EVIDENCE RELEVANT ONLY TO DAMAGES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THE LIABILITY PHASE OF THE TRIAL.  (1T138:13-148:19)  IV.  THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE IMPROPER.  A. Respondeat Superior  (10T29:23-36:5; 10T61:1-66:7)  1.  The Jury Instruction Was Not Harmless Error.  2.  Dismissal of the Battery Claim Against [...] Has No Bearing on the Impropriety of the Jury Instruction On Respondeat Superior.  B.
[directive] Special or prosecutor or officer assistant where police the violence involving domestic case any  In designated officer supervisory or 3.2  Section with accordance in general consulted attorney deputy circumstances, the of totality the considering believe, reason has to 3.3.2 subsection to pursuant 4.6.2, subsection of 1 4 through paragraphs in listed factors special the to limited including not but any surrender or weapons, to requirement other a restraint, or condition no-contact of a issuance that necessary is N.J.S.A. 2C:25-26(a) by authorized expressly release pretrial of condition special other shall, prosecutor or officer the victim, of the safety immediate the assure reasonably to a for apply 4.6.1, subsection than other Directive this of provision any notwithstanding other immediate the assure reasonably to needed conditions) the of imposition seek and warrant complaint alter way in or any preempt to construed shall be subsection this in Nothing victim.21 the of safety z~ the by amended not and Act Violence was Domestic of Prevention of which the part is 2C:25-26(a), N.J.S.A. provides:
[brief] Counsel shall confer with one another as to the date by which defendant shall disclose all relevant documents consistent with this ruling (which may also be on a rolling basis); on or before December 14, 2015, counsel shall notify this Magistrate Judge’s Chambers, by letter, the date to which they agree, and if no agreement is reached, the parties’ proposed dates.  This is not a Recommended Ruling, but a ruling on a non-dispositive motion, the standard of review of which is specified in 28 U.S.C. § 636; Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(e) & 72; and Rule 72.2 of the Local Rules for United States Magistrate Judges.  As such, it is an order of the Court unless reversed or modified by the District Judge upon timely made objection.
[brief] Requiring a municipal clerk to parse through such plans and synthesize them into a substantive summary beyond a simple statement of purpose both improperly conflates the higher standard of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1 and defeats the Legislature’s intent in enacting N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(a).  Most \textsuperscript{12}  [...] does not dispute the April 8 Notice contained all information required under the notice statute, with the exception of the clear and concise statement of purpose it alleges was lacking.  (Pb6).  alarmingly, imposing the higher summary standard for redevelopment ordinances at [...]’s request would raise the standard of notice for all municipal ordinances, as the same standard of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(a) applies to both redevelopment ordinances and all other non-zoning ordinances.
[brief] Defendant was in the 11th grade at the [...] in [...].  (7T272-8 to 13, 279-17 to 25).  Defendant had been bullied in elementary school, so his mother homeschooled him until he enrolled in Hawkswood, a school for students with Autism and special needs.  (6T80-3 to 8, 111-23; 7T256-6 to 13).  Defendant told the officers that he earned good grades at Hawkswood, never got into trouble, and always completed his school work.  (7T296-12 to 298-6).  He was responsible for locking up the school library each afternoon because he was trustworthy and knew that stealing was wrong.  (7T280-1 to 281-2).  Defendant also assisted with school events, including selling gifts at the Christmas bazaar, and he was trusted to handle cash for purchases.  (7T294-1 to 295-12).  Defendant was currently reading Stephen King’s “The Shining,” but enjoyed reading “different types of genres. ” (7T299-11 to 15).  He planned to attend college after graduating high school to study abnormal psychology and horticulture.  (7T293-1 to 12).
[brief] The Legislature voted unanimously to pass a Code of Ethics for New Jersey school board members into law.  Whether Respondent disagrees with this Legislative decision as a matter of policy is of no relevance here.  The law is what the law is.  The Legislature tasked the Commission with issuing discipline pursuant to that Code of Ethics in a uniform manner.  In accordance with the Legislature’s mandate, the Commission issued a robust body of caselaw addressing school board member social media use and disclaimers.  In issuing its August 22, 2023 Decision, however, the Commission sharply departed from that line of cases without explanation, and issued a ruling that made no analytical sense in light of its prior decisions or the evidence in the record.  As a result, the Commission’s August 22, 2023 Decision must be reversed as arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and unsupported by the evidence in the record.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] Furthermore, [...] did not waive its relevance, overbreadth, and proportionality objections.  [...] lodged these objections initially, and its subsequent agreement to run a search using the parties’ agreed-upon terms does not constitute acquiescence to produce all resulting documents.  See, e.g., SinglePoint Direct Solar LLC v. Solar Integrated Roofing Corp., No. CV-21-01076, 2023 WL 2585296, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 21, 2023) (stating that “agreeing to run search terms does not waive relevance objections to the documents that are responsive to the search terms,” and finding that the plaintiff “may review all documents that are ‘hits’ on a search term for relevance and withhold irrelevant documents”); FlowRider Surf, 2016 WL 6522807, at *8 (“The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not waived their relevance and over breadth objections.  Plaintiffs’ agreement to run a search using the parties’ agreed-upon terms does not constitute Plaintiffs’ acquiescence to produce all resulting documents.
[brief] To that end, plaintiffs prepared “a chart with 50 entries on [...]’s privilege log that exemplify the issues described above for the Court’s review. ” (Id. (citing [...] Decl. ¶ 23 Ex. 11)).  Defendants argue that in camera review is not justified because plaintiffs “have failed to meet the Supreme Court’s standard justifying such an extreme measure,” as plaintiffs “have not presented sufficient evidence demonstrating that the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine does not apply to the documents at issue (nor could they, given that they refused to meaningfully meet and confer about any documents).” (JS at 33, 37 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10, 73 S. Ct. 528, 97 L. Ed. 727 (1953))).
[brief] (26T73-13 to 77-6, 83-15 to 19; 30T260-7 to 24)  At trial, [...] testified that he met Defendant at the Ocean County jail in March 2018.  (34T29-7 to 15)  At that time, Talley was in jail charged with two counts of second-degree eluding; he had already pleaded guilty to both charges and was waiting to be sentenced to two seven-year prison terms consecutive to each other and consecutive to a resentence on third-degree charge for which he had violated probation (VOP).  (34T45-7 to 46-15, 48-11 to 21, 74-19 to 76-6)  After Talley offered to testify against Defendant, the prosecutor agreed to a new plea agreement wherein both second-degree eluding charges were amended to third-degree and Talley expected he would receive time served at sentencing with no probation.  (34T45-24 to 52-15, 107-2 to 108-13)  Talley also said the State dismissed a separate drug paraphernalia charge against in him exchange for his cooperation in a separate murder case.  (34T53-21 to 56-10, 104-12 to 15)  Talley had previously served four prison terms and had been convicted of more than ten indictable offenses.  (34T57-19 to 62-17; Da98-111)  Talley had previously lied to the police about his name upon being arrested, giving the police his twin brother’s name instead.  (34T109-3 to 115-21)  He admitted that he would lie to avoid prosecution.  (34T115-22 to 24)  Talley claimed that Defendant told him that his father was [...], whom Talley knew, and that Talley got Defendant transferred to his cell after Defendant sent him a letter.
[brief] When lay opinion is based primarily on hearsay statements, it is inadmissible.  Neno v Clinton, 167 N.J. 573, 585-86, 772 A.2d 899 (2001).  N.J.R.E. 701 provides:  If a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences may be admitted if it (a) is rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) will assist in understanding the witness' testimony or in determining a fact in issue.
[brief] B.  [...] Failed to Plead Actual Malice as to the [...]  Though the trial court stated in its November “Amplification” Order that it recognizes that Neuwirth is binding authority, it only paid lip service to that authority.  See Da_215.  The trial court still failed to apply governing law and 3  In fact, New Jersey does provide additional “protections to defendants in libel and defamation actions in addition to the constitutional protections embodied in the substantive laws,” by applying an actual malice requirement as an additional common law defense to a libel or slander action when the words in question are fair comment on a matter of public interest or concern.  See Senna v. Florimont, 196 N.J. 469, 488-494 (2008).  therefore arrived at the same erroneous conclusion that [...] had adequately pled actual malice.  Perhaps most troublingly, the trial court once again improperly conflated allegations about [...]’s subjective knowledge of falsity with allegations about the [...]’ subjective knowledge of falsity, and denied the [...]’ Motion to Dismiss on the basis of allegations made as to [...] exclusively.
[directive] PSP random home detention check confirmation protocols are as follows:  Video confirmation protocol: The defendant must verify with the officer on the call their identity and the previously established identifiable location by displaying their face and the location.  Photographic confirmation protocol:  The PSP officer must direct the defendant to write or act out a random word, code, or gesture in addition to the defendant's face and the previously established identifiable location, in the same frame, to ensure the picture is current.  The defendant of must send the picture within a reasonable period time such that the officer is satisfied that the defendant did not have time to alter the photo.  Defendants may be ordered to resend photos with different codes or random gestures if of the integrity the transmitted photo is in doubt.  PSP random home detention checks shall only be conducted during normal of court operation hours.  As such, any defendant who permitted out the home is of during this window time will not subject to a random home detention check.  be D.  Pretrial Response to Non-Compliance
[brief] ”  In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.’s Rate Unbundling, 167 N.J. 377, 385 (2001) (internal citations omitted).  “This presumption of reasonableness is even stronger here as the agency has been delegated discretion to determine the specialized and technical procedures for its tasks. ”  City of Newark v. Nat. Res. Council in Dep’t of Env’tl. Prot., 82 N.J. 530, 540 (1980).  The burden of overcoming the presumption of validity falls on “those who challenge the [BPU]’s rulings. ”  Sudler v. Env’tl. Disposal Corp., 219 N.J. Super. 52, 59 (App. Div. 1987).  [...] cannot meet that burden.
[brief] 1  These sections are intertwined and are accordingly combined.  2  Aa__ as combined hereinafter designated, refers to documents from Appellant’s Appendix.  On April 12, 2021, the parties settled [...]’ litigation in the overall amount of $100,000.00 (Aa30-46).  The settlement agreement allocated retroactive pay increases in the amount of $32,083.33 for each of the final three years of [...]’ teaching service plus $3,750 for plaintiff’s attorney’s fees (Aa30-46).  The third-party defendant [...] (“[...]”) contributed $15,000.00 to the overall settlement (Aa30-46).  [...] was paid her salary through April 30, 2021 on which date she resigned her employment (Aa30-46).  On May 1, 2021, [...] filed her application for service retirement with the [...] (Aa10).  On August 5, 2022, [...], a fiscal resources manager in the [...], issued a report in response to [...]’ inquiry regarding her settlement agreement with the [...] (Aa23-24).  [...] analyzed the agreement in accordance with N.J.A.C. 17:3-4.1 and determined that the salary increases paid over the final three years of [...]’ employment were not creditable because they were individual increases granted primarily in anticipation of retirement and were not awarded as across-the-board to similarly-situated personnel (Aa23-24).  In short, [...] concluded that there was no justification for the inclusion of the salary increases as part of [...]’ final compensation (Aa23-24).  --- 3
[brief] 5.  **Parking is not permitted in front yard setback in residential zones** for other than single and two family uses, whereas, parking is proposed and **currently present in the front yard for multifamily uses**.  6.  The minimum required **on-site parking** is **488** parking spaces, whereas, currently there are **390** on-site parking spaces.  7.  **Recreation area**.  250 square feet of active recreation area must be provided per dwelling unit (required **66,500 square feet** of active recreation area, whereas, **56,163 square feet of active recreation area is provided**.  8.  **Sidewalks** must be constructed on both sides of all internal streets, whereas sidewalks are **only constructed on one side of the internal streets**.  9.
[brief] - **2 • Smartphone /50 toll!**  - • Smartphone /50 threat - • Smartphone /10 app! - • Phone! /10 app! - • Double /10 bill - • Geotoll  [...] states that the “Smartphone” terms are intended to produce documents responsive to requests for production 6 and 29.  The terms are designed to identify internal discussions about the type of competitive threat that [...] represents to [...].  They also are designed to help [...] determine whether [...] was beating [...] to market for a toll paying app, which it believes could provide evidence of [...]’s motive or intent in writing its letters to [...] and [...].  [...] argues that such searches could produce evidence of malice on the part of [...], which it argues it needs to prove in order to recover punitive damages.
[brief] A.  Plaintiff’s Accident  This matter arises from a motor vehicle accident that took place on May 31, 2017, at approximately 9:41p.m., on Prospect Street near Central Avenue in [...], New Jersey.  (Pa1).  The Plaintiff’s Complaint names several Defendants, including [...], [...] (“[...]”), and [...].  (Pa1).  The Complaint asserts that all the aforementioned Defendants were negligent.  More specifically, the Complaint alleges that [...] was negligent for failing to maintain an operable --- ¹ “Pa” refers to Plaintiff’s appendices.  ² “1T” refers to the October 13, 2023 transcript of oral argument on [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  streetlight on Prospect Street on the date of the accident.  (Pa3).  Based on this alleged negligence, Plaintiff claims he was struck by a motor vehicle operated by [...] while walking in a crosswalk and thereafter sustained multiple injuries, which have left him permanently disabled.  (Pa17).  Plaintiff was struck by a motor vehicle operated by [...], whose vehicle was traveling north on Prospect Street toward the intersection with Central Avenue.  (Pa16).  Plaintiff asserts that he was walking east along Central Avenue, crossing Prospect Street from the West side of the street within the marked pedestrian crosswalk before being struck by [...]’s vehicle.  (Pa16).  However, the findings in the report by Investigator [...], from the [...], indicated that “the collision occurred as follows: [...] was navigating his skateboard in the roadway, attempting to negotiate a left turn when he encroached into [[...]’s] lane of travel. ” (Pa90).  [...]’s expert, [...], confirms the findings of Sergeant Zivkovich that—based upon physical evidence, including the location of Plaintiff after the accident and markings on the vehicle—Plaintiff was riding his skateboard at the time of impact, not walking in the crosswalk carrying his skateboard.  (Pa127, ¶ 5).  The evidence indicates that Plaintiff was riding his skateboard traveling West on Central Avenue, down a hill, when he made a left turn heading South onto Prospect Street and veered into [...]’s lane of travel as he was driving North.  (Pa90).  The police report indicates impact between Plaintiff and [...]’s vehicle took place on Prospect Street, forty (40) feet from the intersection.  (Pa1009).  [...] stated in his response to interrogatories that he was traveling on Prospect Street when he “felt a bump in the road under [his] vehicle and [heard] a loud noise. ”  He backed his vehicle up thinking he hit a construction cone or pole.  (Pa133).  B.
[brief] Although defendant [...]’s second-degree aggravated assault charge might have been considered “pending” in the sense that he had not yet been sentenced for that charge, this Court held that subsection (a)(7) speaks to “other pending charges for [a disqualifying] offense”—meaning other than the crime for which a defendant seeks admission to Track One.  Ibid.  However, defendant [...]’s present conviction for second-degree aggravated assault did disqualify him from consideration for Track One under subsection (b)(2).  Id. at 537-39.  Thus, it is subsection (b), not subsection (a)(7), which disqualifies a defendant from Track One based on the present offense on which he seeks admission to Recovery Court.  Because the [...] Court held that a “pending charge” under subsection (a)(7) refers pending charges other than the present offense on which a defendant seeks admission to Recovery Court, the phrase “pending charge” in subsection (a)(5) must also refer to charges other than the present offense on which a defendant seeks admission to Recovery Court.
[brief] [...] and [...] alone was the only party in privity of the contract with the owner.  In other words, only [...] could bring a claim against the owner for its failure to pay (which is presumably the reason [...] has failed to pay [...]).  Therefore, it would have been entirely premature for [...] to pursue a claim for unpaid monies until [...] obtained final judgment in the [...] on November 17, 2023, and it became apparent [...] was not going to be paid the full amount it is owed from [...].\footnote{It is not true that the Court suggested that [...] is entitled to “no greater recovery than that achieved by [...] in the [...].