ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Prior convictions/adjudications that resulted in separate sentences imposed on the same date that were ordered to be served consecutively shall be treated as separate convictions/adjudications.  Prior convictions/adjudications that resulted in separate sentences imposed on the same date that were ordered to be served concurrently shall be treated as a single conviction/adjudication unless the offenses were separated by an intervening arrest.  Where the offenses were separated by an intervening arrest (i.e., the defendant was arrested for the first offense prior to committing the second offense), the convictions/adjudications shall be treated as separate convictions/adjudications notwithstanding that they were ordered to be served concurrently.  In other words, when convictions/adjudications are separated by an intervening arrest (i.e., the defendant was arrested for the earlier offense prior to committing the subsequent offense), the convictions should be treated as separate convictions, without regard to the date when sentences were imposed and notwithstanding that the subsequently-imposed sentence was ordered to be served concurrently with the previously-imposed sentence.  See Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Application Note 3 to § 4A1.2.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the prosecutor cannot determine from the information readily at hand (i.e., the “rap” sheet) whether multiple sentences imposed on the same day were to be served concurrently or consecutively, or whether the offenses were separated by an intervening arrest, the prosecutor may proceed in determining the appropriate criminal history point totals and the applicable Criminal History Category as if the sentences imposed on the same day were to be served concurrently, and, in the absence of reliable information to the contrary, the prosecutor may treat such multiple convictions as a single conviction.
[brief] (Pa55 to Pa58).  Although the lower court utilized the terminology, “rational nexus,” in the concluding paragraph of its analysis of Count I to describe the required showing between the negotiated Redevelopment Payment and the Redevelopment Plan, the lower court correctly identified the two relevant conditions contained in the LRHL for evaluation.  (Pa80 to Pa81).  Further, the lower court was correct not to assess the relationship between the Redevelopment Payment and the [...] Project from which it originated but, rather, the relationship between the Redevelopment Payment and the City’s Redevelopment Plan:  Unlike in Britwood, in which the court determined that the court could not defray costs from a non-redeveloper, in the present matter [...] is a redeveloper.  Moreover, the Senior Center project furthers the objectives and terms of the Redevelopment Plan.  The Redevelopment Payment was used by [...] to effectuate and defray costs of improvement in the area.  Ibid.  (emphasis added).  Plaintiff is incorrect that the “Court did not seem to find – that the $2,000,000.00 payment was authorized by N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8. ” (Pb23).  In fact, after acknowledging Defendants’ argument that the two conditions from the LRHL are the determinative conditions guiding the validity of a redevelopment payment, the lower court directly applied them in its assessment of the Redevelopment Payment.  The LRHL imposes no conditions that require that the “costs of the redevelopment entity” defrayed by a negotiated redeveloper payment be related to that remitting redeveloper’s redevelopment project.
[brief] "[W]henever a challenge is raised to the constitutionality of a statute, there is a strong presumption that the statute is constitutional," *State v. Muhammad*, 145 N.J. 23, 41 (1996), and the party "challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of establishing its unconstitutionality."  *State v. One 1990 Honda Accord*, 154 N.J. 373, 377 (1998).  In analyzing the constitutionality of a statute, it is presumed that "the legislature acted with existing constitutional law in mind and intended the act to function in a constitutional manner."  *NYT Cable TV v. Homestead at Mansfield, Inc.*, 111 N.J. 21, 26 (1988) (quoting *State v. Profaci*, 56 N.J. 346, 349 (1970)).  Citing the State and Federal Constitutions, without more, cannot constitute the shouldering of the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of the COVID Statute, and should lead to the Court's rejection of [...]'s argument out of hand.
[directive] If issued. been had complaint-warrant on system Scan Live the by fingerprinted is defendant the that certain shall make prosecutor, or the the of filing the after time reasonable within or a appearance court defendant's the of the date 53:1- S.A. N.J. to pursuant agency enforcement law appropriate the by written request upon complaint and defendant the to links fingerprint the that certain make shall 53:1-18.1, and N.J.S.A. and 15, been issued. had acomplaint-summons which for offenses) Denied.
[brief] Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972); Patterson v. City of Utica, 370 F.3d 322, 329 (2d Cir.2004).  When protected interests are involved, “the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount. ”  Id.  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment generally requires that a person must be afforded the opportunity for a hearing prior to being deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.  N.Y. State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Pataki, 261 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir.2001)  As the Supreme Court has maintained, although “[l]iberty’ and ‘property’ are broad and majestic terms “the range of interest protected by procedural due process is not infinite,” Roth, 408 U.S. at 570.  As the protection of the of procedural due process is not limitless, “The Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantee … only extends to property claims to which an individual has a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement. ”  N.Y. State Nat'l Org. for Women, 261 F.3d at 164 (quoting Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 577).  To establish --- \(^1\) Respondents’ case information statement and notice of appeal seek reversal of the trial court’s dismissal of Counts IV and V of the Complaint.
[brief] “The mere fact that [an] adverse employment action occurs after [the protected activity] will ordinarily be insufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating a causal link between the two. ”  *Young v. Hobart W. Grp.*, 385 N.J. Super. 448, 467 (App. Div. 2005) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting *Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co.*, 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997)).  A causation analysis often, but not exclusively, rests on two key factors: “(1) the temporal proximity between the protected activity and the alleged [retaliation] and (2) the existence of any pattern of antagonism in the intervening period.
[brief] *State v. Hines*, 109 N.J. Super. 298, 306 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 56 N.J. 248, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 867 (1970).  Central to deciding whether joinder is prejudicial is “‘whether, assuming the charges were tried separately, evidence of the offense sought to be severed would be admissible under Evidence Rule 55 [now N.J.R.E. 404(b)] in the trial of the remaining charges. ’”  *State v. Oliver*, 133 N.J. 141, 151 (1993) (quoting *State v. Pitts*, 116 N.J. 580, 601-02 (1989)).  If the evidence would be admissible at both trials, then the trial court may consolidate the charges because “a defendant will not suffer any more prejudice in a joint trial than he would in separate trials. ”  *State v. Coruzzi*, 189 N.J. Super. 273, 299 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 94 N.J. 531 (1983).  Here, the trial judge abused his discretion in finding that the two thefts were not similar in kind and close in time.
[brief] The existence of an "arrest" or of a custodial investigative detention amounting to an arrest is an objective determination, based neither upon the invocation of particular words, nor on the subjective intention of the officer, nor on the subjective belief of the person detained.  See Dunaway v. New York, supra, at 212-13; State v. Rodriguez, supra, at 126; State v. Coburn, 221 N.J. Super. 586, 596 (App. Div. 1987), certif. den., 110 N.J. 300 (1988).  Custody exists "if the action of the...officers and the surrounding circumstances fairly construed would reasonably lead a detainee to believe he could not leave freely."
[brief] ”  It is well established that piercing the corporate veil is not a mechanism for imposing legal liability.  Pulaski 195 N.J. at 473.  Rather, it is an equitable remedy to cure fundamental unfairness which would result if the corporate form was not discarded.  Id.  See also Sean Wood, LLC v. Hegarty Group, Inc., 422 N.J. Super. 500, 517 (2011) (“Veil piercing is an equitable remedy whereby the court disregards the corporate existence and holds the individual principals liable for the corporations debts. ”).  The Trial Court correctly found that Plaintiff was an oppressed minority member, and that [...] was guilty of minority shareholder oppression.
[brief] Before the calls were made, defendant volunteered that gunpowder residue would be found on his sweatshirt because he wore the same sweatshirt a week ago when he went shooting.  (1T:78-10 to 78-25).  [...] proceeded to give defendant instruction as to how the phone calls will be made using defendant’s cell phone.  1T:79-6 to 82-25).  Defendant agreed with the procedure.  Ibid.  [...] also informed defendant that he will be transported to county jail and told him that he was being charged with homicide and weapons offenses.  Ibid.  Defendant stated that he did not remember having a handgun on his person.  Ibid.  [...] proceeded to inform defendant of the First Appearance and Detention Hearing process and that it would likely take about seven (7) days before the detention hearing is held.  Ibid.  Defendant stated that he understood and answered affirmatively that he wanted to speak with his mother and girlfriend.  Ibid.  Defendant stated that he wanted to speak with his father as well.  Ibid.  Defendant told [...] where to locate the phone numbers on his phone.  (1T:83-25 to 84-12).  Defendant than said to himself, without any prompt from [...], “Over a fucking dog . . .” (1T:84-15).
[brief] “As noted above, the Legislature has had many opportunities to exempt private personal information, such as e-mails and phone number, from OPRA but has declined each opportunity. ” (Da115).  Defendants argue that email addresses are “likely also used for many other purposes. ”  (Db16).  This argument is speculative, and Defendants provided no evidence to support this claim.  Defendant [...] cites no evidence in the record to support their claim, and there is none in the record.  Defendants also claim there is a “potential for harm,” but again they never cite the actual harm.  There is no evidence that any “potential” harm in this case is any different from any other on-line transaction.  Defendants claim there is the “potential that these individuals will be hacked,” but they provide no evidence, only speculation.  Defendants argue that if the public are dissuaded from using the [...] service, people could be prevented from “receiving lifesaving communications. ”  Again, this is mere speculation masked as argument.  There is no record evidence that lives will be lost if anyone does not receive [...] alerts.  And, for anyone who has concerns about disclosure, they may elect to receive [...] alerts by text message.  (Db8; Da213 to Da215) (discussing how [...] alerts may be received by text message or email).  Defendants cite decisions of the Government Records Council (“GRC”) holding that private email addresses are not public records, but decisions of the GRC are only binding on the parties to each case and cannot constitute precedent in Superior Court.
[brief] First, the evidence showed that the decedent drew a weapon.  229 N.J. at 130-131.  Secondly, even if the jury believed that defendant grabbed the weapon from a counter, or elsewhere, rather than from [...]’s hand, the second Carrero rationale would have nevertheless applied: that [...] committed a battery against defendant, to which defendant over-responded in self-defense and stabbed [...].  229 N.J. at 130-131.  As the Carrero Court noted, battery -- via a “physical struggle” as in Carrero, or via a punch or other infliction of injury, like in Robinson, 136 N.J. at 492; Blanks, 313 N.J. Super. at 72; Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 414; and Castagna, 376 N.J. Super. at 358-359 -- may constitute adequate provocation to allow the jury to reduce murder to passion/provocation manslaughter even when the defendant uses a deadly weapon and the decedent is unarmed.  Carrero, 229 N.J. at 130-131.  As noted, while Blanks, Robinson, and Castagna all involved plain-error reversals for the failure to charge passion/provocation under the much tougher “clearly indicated” appellate standard of Funderburg and Canfield, the instant case, like Mauricio and Carrero, involves the mere “rational basis” test: does the evidence “leave room for dispute,” in the words of Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 415, for the jury on the issue of passion/provocation?  Of course it does.  The jury easily could have rejected self-defense, but had at least a reasonable doubt that the State nevertheless did not disprove passion/provocation.  See State v. Grunow, 102 N.J. 133, 145 (1986) (assigning the burden of disproving passion/provocation to the State).  There was ample evidence, from the State’s case, that defendant was attacked by the decedent, whether the decedent was armed or not, and that the defendant immediately over-responded by arming himself and stabbing the decedent.  Both of the objective prongs of the Mauricio test were met, and, thus, as in Carrero, the lesser-included-offense instruction on passion/provocation manslaughter should have been given, and the two subjective elements left for the jury to decide.  229 N.J. at 129, citing Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 413.  Notably, the judge, in denying the requested instruction, seems to have completely ignored both the minimal nature of the “rational basis” standard, as well as the fact that the burden of disproving passion/provocation is on the State.
[brief] In the present matter, as the Respondent Commission later found in its June 7, 2023 Final Administrative Action, when the Respondent [...] returned the completed Certification to the Respondent Commission, the [...] had, pursuant to law, only two alternatives with respect to Appellant’s name:  Therefore, as of November 3, 2022, [...] was no longer eligible for the promotion from the subject examination.  …  Therefore, the appointing authority’s discretion to bypass [...] under list removal rules was not applicable.  …  As such, the appellant should have been the first ranked eligible on [...].  Therefore, under N.J.A.C. 4A:5-2.2(c), the appellant needed to be appointed or removed from the [...] promotional eligible list.  (AA0005-6) (emphasis added).  In violation of the Civil Service regulations, the Respondent [...] took neither of the alternative required actions, i.e. it (1) failed to appoint the disabled veteran Appellant and (2) failed to request removal of her name.  The Respondent Commission erred when it ignored the preference due to veterans and failed to enforce the above referenced correct interpretation of N.J.A.C. 4A:5-2.2(c).
[brief] It does not share a common border with the [...].  The [...]’ property, which they purchased in 2022, is situated between the [...] and the [...].  (Da396, Da397, Da451-Da459)  The 1966 [...]-to-[...] deed to what was then the South [...] contained the following recital:  Excepting and reserving from the above the rights of the public or owners of property lying westerly and southerly of [...] farm to use a roadway or driftway running thru this tract to reach their properties from the public road mentioned in the description above.  (Da480-Da483)  The parties have stipulated that the “property lying westerly and southerly of [...] farm” included the [...].  From 1966 onward, the [...] changed ownership several times until [...] purchased it in 1990.
[brief] Pursuant to the [...], a subdivision plan (the “Subdivision Plan”) prepared by [...] was submitted to the [...] (the “Board”) for approval.  Ja148, Ja273, Ja711.  On November 18, 2015, the Board held a hearing on the subdivision application.  Ja273-74, Ja711.  The Board granted approval of the Subdivision Plan, and evidenced such approval in a Resolution dated December 9, 2015, which reads, in pertinent part:  . . .  [...] and [...] have entered into an agreement whereby [...] will subdivide off a 40’ x 90’ portion of his property and convey it to Miller….  [T]he Miller lot, will have a lot area of 10,800sf where 5400sf is required, lot frontage of 120’ where 60’ is required, and lot depth of 90’ where 90’ is required Ja151.  By deed recorded March 25, 2016 (the “Subdivision Deed”), Brian [...] conveyed the 40’ x 90’ portion of Lot 3 to Plaintiffs.  Ja156, Ja711.  Brian [...] conveyed the remaining portion of Lot 3 to himself by a deed recorded on March 15, 2016 (the “[...] Confirmatory Deed”).  Ja161, Ja711.  Then, by deed recorded on April 15, 2016 (the “Miller Consolidation Deed”), Plaintiffs --- 4 [...] was the applicant in the November 2015 subdivision process before the Brigantine Planning Board. consolidated the new 40’ x 90’ portion of land with their then-existing Lot 2 to create a new Lot 2 with 120’ of frontage along 21st Street South.
[directive] (a)  Officers engaged in undercover assignments.  (b) Officers acting as hostage negotiators or crisis negotiators working in conjunction with tactical teams.  (c)  Officers assigned to administrative positions within the law enforcement agency.  This provision shall not exclude officers assigned to “front desk” duty, as defined in Section 3.2(f), from the requirement to be equipped with BWCs.  (d)  Officers meeting with confidential sources or recruiting potential confidential sources.  (e)  Officers engaged in union representation of a member of the collective bargaining unit.  (f)  Officers assigned to duties within schools or youth facilities as part of the normal daily educational environment, such as School Resource Officers (SROs) and Class III Special Law Enforcement Officers (SLEO IIIs).  Officers assigned to duties at schools or youth facilities working security or crowd-control functions at special events such as athletic competitions, graduations or similar public events shall be equipped with BWCs.  (g)  Non-uniformed officers assigned to investigative, non-enforcement duties, when authorized by the agency’s law enforcement executive.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021
[brief] There, “Defendant sent plaintiff a collection letter [and] used a third-party vendor to send the letter. ”  Pa72.  [...] asserted a single claim for violation of § 1692c(b).  The court found “that the plain language of the governing statute is clear that transmission of a communication other than through the methods allowable under the statute, which does not include a letter vendor, is a violation [and] by applying the plain language of the statute and not implying exceptions which have not been set forth by Congress, the language of the statute does advance the broad statutory purpose of protecting consumers from dissemination of their personal information to third parties in connection with the collection of a debt. ”  Pa76.  The court rejected several defense arguments including (1) § 1692c(b) is only concerned with communications made to friends, neighbors, family, or employers, (2) the debt collector’s transmission to its letter vendor is not a communication, is not made to a third-party, and is not made in connection with the collection of a debt, (3) the restricted use of telegraph operators implies the use of letter vendors, and (4) other arguments.  Pa76-Pa80.  Defendant also makes several factual assertions which have no basis in the record and, under the R. 4:6-2(e) standard, must be rejected.
[directive] However, a representative shall be permitted to be present at the interview of a subject officer whenever he or she requests a representative.  While the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to administrative investigations, an officer shall be permitted to choose an attorney as their representative if he or she so desires.  8.4.9  If it appears that the presence of counsel or another representative the subject requests will not disrupt or delay the interview, no reason exists to prevent their presence as an observer.  But the representative or attorney cannot cause undue delay in scheduling interviews or interfere in the interview process.  If the representative or attorney is disruptive or interferes, the investigator can discontinue the interview and should document the reasons for doing so.  The investigator must control the interview and cannot allow the representative or subject to take control.  N.L.R.B. v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975).  9
[brief] [Id. at 477.]  The Court, in holding in this fashion, espoused a public policy:  In addressing these arguments, we must keep in mind the central goals of the law of torts.  As we said in People Express, supra, 100 N.J. at 255, the primary purpose of the tort law is "that wronged persons should be compensated for their injuries and that those responsible for the wrong should bear the cost of their tortious conduct."  Moreover, forcing tortfeasors to pay for the harm they have wrought provides a proper incentive for reasonable conduct.  A rule that denies water consumers a right of recovery for water-company negligence diminishes the incentive for water companies to perform maintenance that would prevent large fire losses.  [Id. at 487]  The Court took the extraordinary step, in imposing negligence liability on the water utility, of overruling existing case law that had imposed the immunity:
[brief] (Da 200).  In reaching this determination, [...] relied upon Segal v. Lynch, 211 N.J. 230 (2012) and other precedent cases.  Moreover, [...] considered R. 1:4-8 as discussed in Segal v. Lynch, holding that it “specifically permits only the reimbursement of attorney’s fees and expenses incurred by a party.  It does not permit the reimbursement of a party’s loss of income in dealing with frivolous litigation. ” (Da 201).  Further analysis of Segal v. Lynch support Respondent’s position.
[brief] Appellants continue to rely upon the Procedural History and Statement of the Facts set forth in their initial brief to the Court.  However, based upon substantive procedural developments which have occurred since the filing of their brief, they offer updates to the Procedural History as set forth below.  On June 10, 11, 12, 2024, respectively, the [...], [...], and the [...] (collectively “[...]”) entered into a settlement agreement with Appellants, and were voluntarily dismissed.  [...] and the [...] have filed a Complaint and Order to Show Cause in the Superior Court against the [...] seeking to invalidate said settlement agreement.  On June 24, 2024, their request for emergent relief was denied, but the matter continues before the Hon. [...], J.S.C. under docket number [...].  On June 24, 2024, the Boroughs of Highlands and [...] were dismissed from this appeal upon the granting of their own motions.  On July 17, 2024, [...] filed a motion to accelerate the instant appeal, which was granted on August 2, 2024, over Appellants’ opposition.  Finally, on July 30, 2024, [...] and the [...] filed a new petition with the Commissioner seeking --- 1  The Procedural History and Statement of the Facts have been consolidated because they are inextricably linked, and because they were so joined in the Appellants’ initial briefing.