ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This Order contained the following Paragraphs:  **Paragraph 3**-  [...] has received [...]'s consent to cooperate fully with the Court and the Court's appointed Administrator, [...], immediately in complying with Section 4 of the Court's Order dated April 7, 2021.  Mr. Pozzi must also provide a copy of all applications that were filled out or submitted by him or [...] or anyone on behalf of [...] for any policies.  [...] is to immediately serve Mr. Pozzi with the Court's Order dated April 7, 2021.  [...] is permitted to follow through with Mr. Pozzi on behalf of the Court regarding any documents received or needed.  She is also permitted to share this information with counsel.  **Paragraph 4**-  [...] must clarify the role of [...] in the [...] and what steps he took to assist or encourage [...] in opening a Bank account to deposit insurance funds.  [...] must provide all information pertaining to the corporate entity also used to establish the account identified as [...], including date of incorporation, principles, and the business conducted by this entity.  In light of the information revealed on the Zoom call pertaining to this account, [...] must update his certification to specifically address whether [...] or John Groff took any steps to apply for, obtain or use an E.I.N. number on behalf of any member or with any member of the May family.  (85-A)
[brief] In both the SPAs and the MIPA, the defendants represented that they would indemnify the Plaintiffs for any “material inaccuracy . . . contained in this Agreement. ” (Da2806-07; 2744-45; 2827-28).  In the SPAs, both of the [...] and [...] also warranted that consummation of the purchase transaction would not result in a breach of any other agreement, contract, or arrangement to which either Hedvat or [...] were bound.  (Da2804-05; 2825-26).  This necessarily included the [...] Stockholder Agreement.  The defendants argued below that the trial court did not explicitly state that they breached the MIPA and SPAs in its earlier opinion, so the lower court clarified the issue on reconsideration, based on the foregoing language, that the defendants’ conduct also breached the MIPA and SPAs, stating:  [T]here is an argument . . . that the court didn’t make findings under the SPA or MIPA . . . and that there is no breach of those agreements.  I don’t accept that argument because how do you have a sale that is shortchanging somebody based on [] what occurred historically?  The numbers were wrong.  It was bogus. ” (37T 87:20 to 88:1).  [...] and [...] were parties to the MIPA; [...] and [...] were parties to the 2014 SPA; and [...] and [...] were parties to the 2017 SPA.  (Da2740; 2802; 2823).  Thus, the trial court found that the defendants also breached the two SPAs and the MIPA because they breached the [...] Stockholder Agreement and MRL Operating Agreement.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1 (emphasis added).  The Legislature amended the Act to clarify that “[n]o person other than a nonprofit social service agency or a nonprofit consumer credit counseling agency shall act as a debt adjuster,” and to state that they cannot act as a debt adjuster “without first obtaining a license from the Commissioner of the Department of Banking pursuant to this act. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:16G-2.  Notably, the definition of “debt adjuster” does not distinguish between those who represent debtors and those who represent creditors, or between commercial and consumer debts.  A person who represents large commercial creditors is thus a “debt adjuster” under the Act.  Significantly, the amendment substantially narrowed the existing attorney exemption (which covered all attorneys) to exempt only “an attorney-at-law of this State who is not principally engaged as a debt adjuster” (the “Limited Attorney Exemption”).  N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c) (2) (a).  The Legislature also amended the State’s criminal statute’s definition of those persons not deemed to be debt adjusters to match the Act’s Limited Attorney Exemption.  N.J.S.A. 2C:21-19f.  Thus, unlike the pre-1986 version of the Act (which broadly exempted all attorneys), the 1986 version of the Act exempts some, but not all, attorneys.  N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c) (2) (a).  Any person who violates the Act, including any New Jersey-licensed attorneys, “shall be subject to a penalty of $1,000 for the first offense and not more than $5,000 for the second and each such subsequent offense. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:16G-8; N.J.A.C. 3:25-3.1(c).  Significantly, a violation of the Act constitutes a crime:  “[a]ny person who knowingly and willfully engages in the business of debt adjustment without a license in violation of the Debt Adjuster Act shall be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:21-19f. ”  N.J.A.C. 3:25-1.1(d); Pa0063.  A person who has been convicted of a crime of the fourth degree may be sentenced to imprisonment “for a specific term which shall be fixed by the court and shall not exceed 18 months. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a) (4).  The purpose of the Legislature’s various amendments to the Act in 1986, including the addition of the Limited Attorney Exemption, was purportedly “to correct widespread abuses in the consumer debt adjustment and credit counseling industry.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ Appendix Vol. II in Opposition to Defendant [...]’s Motion to Dismiss, filed in Law Division on June 28, 2023……………………………………Pa0431  August 10, 2020  Order & Statement of Reasons, [...] v. [...], et. al., [...], Hon. [...], J.S.C.  …………………Pa0433  Certificate of Formation, [...], October 16, 2013 ……………………Pa0446  June 26, 2023  Certification of [...]………………………Pa0447  June 24, 2019  Certification of [...], D.C………………..Pa0450  HICF & Narrative Report, [...] Claimant [...], date of service, 6/10/10, signed by John S. [...], M.D. (MR 24108-10)  ……………………………Pa0463  HICF & Narrative Report, [...] Claimant P.N., date of service, 12/16/13, signed by John S. [...], M.D. (MR 30123-26, 32926-30)  ……………Pa0470  Appellate Transcript Request, dated October 31, 2023…………………………Pa0475  In re N.J. Ass’n For Justice, Order No. A12-118, 2012 WL 6927765, (DOBI Dec. 21, 2012)…………………………………………………………Pa0480  In re N.J. Healthcare Coal., Order No. A12-114, 2012 WL 6653982, (DOBI Nov. 23, 2012)…………………………………………………………Pa0490
[brief] (Pa668).  Despite receiving multiple complaints, [...] was never interviewed regarding Defendant [...]’s harassment.  (Pa668).  Defendant [...] combined the two investigations, interviewing members of the staffing department about Defendant [...]’s behavior and the charge pay issues together.  (Pa108.)  Defendant [...] permitted Defendant [...] to be present for interviews during the investigation.  (Pa110 – Pa111).  [...] was interviewed with Defendant [...] present.  (Pa668).  Defendant [...] ultimately advised her supervisor, [...], that the incident with Plaintiff was out of character for Defendant [...].  (Pa668).  During the same conversation, [...] inquired about the “charge pay” investigation.  (Pa668).  D.
[brief] Id.  However, the fact that [...] determined that the [...] route was feasible establishes that the route through [...] is not essential to the provision of adequate service.  After the public meeting in April 2019 in which [...] presented its plan to [...] residents, [...] placed its 69kV Project on an indefinite hold, because its plans to purchase the property that would contain the [...] fell through.  DA at 101a.  This is significant because the reason for putting the 69kV line through [...] was to connect to the proposed [...] (which was no longer planned).  DA at 391a.  Without a determination of the connection points for the route, [...] advised the Town that they did not, at that time, believe that they could continue to move forward with routing the 69kV line through [...] until a new substation could be identified.
[brief] (Pa5-6, Complaint ¶ 21; Pa115-116, PSA § 13.1 (“Default by Seller”)).  Plaintiff was also required to, and did, deposit with the Escrow Agent ([...]) the sum of $5 Million, as an “Earnest Money Deposit. ”  Plaintiff secured financing at favorable market rates for the acquisition of the Real Property and, thus, to timely perform its obligations to fund the purchase price at the closing, originally scheduled for October 11, 2021 (the “Bank Financing”).  Plaintiff incurred heavy carrying costs and other expenses associated with such financing.  (Pa5-7, Complaint ¶¶ 18-19, 26).  Between November 10, 2021, and March 25, 2022, Plaintiff and [...] executed several amendments to the PSA, postponing the Closing Date and otherwise ratifying and reaffirming the PSA, as modified.
[brief] [...] testified she was watching TV when she heard gunshots; she grabbed her son and left the apartment.  From the hall window she saw a person with a white t-shirt and a towel on his head run across the field toward High Gate.  She could not see his face and did not see anyone waiting for him.  (12T11-15 to 25, 12-13 to 13-3, 15-1 to 3, 16-1 to 3, 18-7 to 18-22, 19-5 to 24)  [...], meanwhile, testified as soon as he saw the shooter come around the corner with a shirt tied around his face while he and [...] were talking, his adrenaline started flowing.
[brief] Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 54 (2015)  An expert may ground an opinion in his or her personal experience and training.  State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 495 (2006) (finding the expert's opinion was not a net opinion due to her “education, training, and most importantly, her experience”); See also Glowacki v. Underwood Mem'l Hosp., 270 N.J. Super. 1, 16-17 (App. Div. 1994) (declining to strike an expert's testimony as a net opinion as “[a]ny shortcoming in his method of analysis was explored and it was for the jury to determine the weight his opinion should receive”).
[directive] 9.2.1  Every department shall establish and implement a system to ensure that relevant BWC recordings are provided in discovery in a timely fashion.  The system established by the agency should include a provision to ensure that police arrest/incident/continuation reports indicate whether the incident or investigative activity described in the report was electronically recorded by a BWC.  Police reports should, when feasible, indicate the corresponding BWC control ledger/log number, and the BWC control ledger/log should cross-reference the incident case number.  Copies of BWC recordings made for the purpose of complying with the State’s discovery obligations shall be provided to the prosecutor in a readily available media format.  9.3
[brief] ”  Curry v. Curry, 108 N.J. Super. 527, 529 (App. Div. 1970).  Quoting [...]’ pronouncements in Grant v. Grant, 84 N.J. Eq. 81, 83–84 (Ch. 1914), this Court stressed in Curry:  Since a judgment by default is not favored in divorce suits, the courts are especially inclined to interpose by opening or setting aside such a judgment and giving defendant a day in court so that the merits --- 11  The caselaw that [...] cited in support of his standards were civil lawsuits that do not apply to an application seeking relief from a default judgment obtained in a divorce case in family court.
[brief] “[T]o rerun a trial when the error could easily have been cured on request would reward the litigant who suffers an error for tactical advantage either in the trial or on appeal. ”  Ibid. (quoting State v. Ross, 229 N.J. 389, 407 (2017)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Where testimony is admitted in error or without a necessary curative jury instruction, the testimony is only plain error where it “le[a]ds the jury to a result it would not have otherwise reached.
[brief] In the last Court Order executed by [...] for fees in this matter dated September 29, 2021, for fees incurred prior to June 30, 2021, [...] used the following language:  1.  Any fees paid by [...] or the [...] to [...] and/or [...] are/were ordered paid due to the following: repeated delays and lack of transparency by [...] in failure to disclose the EIN, failure to produce corporate tax returns, the lack of cooperation and veil of secrecy regarding the real estate owned by the decedent, the life insurance policies which had originally named [...] as beneficiary and failure to produce supporting documents for beneficiary changes, the lack of transparency and information regarding the 401K, the blame going back and forth between [...] and the [...] to avoid responsibility for failure to properly administer the Estate and follow Court Orders, the need for numerous and at times weekly status conferences, the need for the administer the estate and perform the duties required of her in providing an inventory and marshalling assets, failure to provide accounting as ordered, the failure to direct [...] to produce documentation regarding all life insurance policies, among other acts of deception and subterfuge too numerous to outline.
[brief] In doing so, the Court noted the LAD’s fee shifting provision is akin to CEPA’s as filing and pursuing a claim “without basis in law of in fact,” can justify an award of attorneys’ fees under the LAD.  Id. at 25; see also Best v. C&M Door Controls, Inc., 200 N.J. 348, 358 n.3 (2009) (likening the LAD fee claim to fee awards under the frivolous claims provision of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-6, which requires a determination that the action was filed “without basis in law or fact”).
[brief] Appellant alleged that the disclosed information could have a “market value,” but he does not assert that Respondent in fact ever profited from that data or that he or any other putative class member sustained any resulting pecuniary loss or harm.  See Appx., at Pa8, ¶48.  Lastly, Appellant also takes issue with the dismissal of his CFA claim, which the Superior Court rejected for a lack of “unconscionable practice” and “ascertainable loss” which Appellant has yet to sustain or plead with specificity.
[brief] ”  Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 417–19 (2012).  The party urging the application of laches must show that his adversary, without explanation or excuse, delayed in asserting a claim now stale, that the delay was unreasonable under the circumstances, and that it ‘visited prejudice upon the party asserting the delay.  See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Howard Sav. Inst., 127 N.J. Super. 479, 489 (Ch. Div. 1974).  It has long been recognized that “equity favors the vigilant” c.f. Lever v. Thomas, 340 N.J. Super. 198, 203 (App. Div. 2001) and that “Equity will not assist a [wo]man whose condition is attributable to his failure to exercise that diligence which may be fairly expected from a reasonable person. ”  Dillett v. Kemble, 25 N.J. Eq. 66, 67 (Ch. 1874).
[brief] See Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133 (noting “the underlying legal claim … was settled as a matter of law” and observing that “mere doubt as to the validity of the claim is not an adequate basis for refusing to maintain the status quo”); Waste Mgmt., 399 N.J. Super. at 528 (same).  Indeed, were the rule otherwise, under the “well-settled right” inquiry, the movant would have already had to establish that its exact claims had already been decided with certainty under binding precedent, rendering the “reasonable probability of success” inquiry superfluous.  Moreover, if Appellants’ approach were the law, no claim applying established legal rights to new facts could ever meet the preliminary injunction standard—no matter how troubling the new statutory violation, and no matter how compelling the need to maintain the status quo.  And Appellants’ approach would create perverse incentives: a policy that is so clearly unlawful that no other school district has previously adopted it (or an argument made in defense so clearly incorrect that no other defendant had yet raised it) could avoid preliminary relief merely because no court had previously needed to address its validity.
[brief] Defendants produced nothing regarding the jurisdictional issue.  Plaintiffs proved that no notice was published in the [...] of the application and the meeting at least ten days before the hearing.  Without proof of notice and publication, the [...] did not have jurisdiction to entertain the application.  *Township of Stafford v. Stafford Tp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 154 N.J. 62 (1998).  In addition, the Resolution adopted required a notice of decision to be published within ten days of the Resolution.  No proof was provided by the Defendants of such notice of decision.  Therefore, the public and the surrounding property owners never had notice of the application nor of the action taken by the Board and therefore the time period within which to challenge that action or to appear and to present contradictory evidence never accrued.  *Lizak v. Faria*, 96 N.J. 482 (1984).  The evidence also clearly shows that [...] lied at the 1984 hearing, when he said that he owned the property and ran the "grocery store" before the first Zoning Ordinance of February 2, 1933.  (Pa 69-75; Pa 37-47).  He did not own the property until over ten years after the Ordinance came into effect.  (Pa 55-59).  He also failed to mention the cessation of the food use in 1969.  (Pa 66-68).  J-7 (Pa 66-68) clearly shows that in 1969, the food use was terminated and a television sales and repair shop occupied the commercial building, thus amounting to an abandonment of any contention that there was preexisting non-conforming food use from 1933 until 1984.
[brief] III.  PLAINTIFF’S OTHER UNPERSUASIVE ARGUMENTS TO ELIMINATE DEMBER’S CO-EMPLOYEE IMMUNITY HAVE NO MERIT.  (Pa325, 94:22-95:21; Pa469, 16:4-1).  Plaintiff makes several unpersuasive arguments that [...] should not benefit from her statutory co-employee immunity, including (1) [...] had not “clocked in” at time of the accident; (2) [...] was scheduled to meet with an attorney about a malpractice case involving the hospital; (3) [...] was fourteen minutes late to work at the time of the accident; (4) the Legislature could not have meant to give [...] co-employee immunity; and (5) this Court should “revisit” and “reconsider” its prior holding in Konitch v. Hartung, 81 N.J. Super. 376 (App. Div. 1963), certif. denied, 41 N.J. 389 (1964).
[brief] ”  For a defendant to establish a case of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that “[defense] counsel’s performance was deficient,” and that “there exists a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ”  Id.  At 463-64, 609 A.2d 1280 \textsuperscript{39}  In addition to the Office of the Public Defender, she was directed to the Bar Association where she reached out for legal assistance and counsel.
[brief] The 2017 incident was not a traumatic event even considering “that an accident can be ‘undesigned and unexpected’ under the Richardson tests even though it may be concluded in retrospect that the employee could have anticipated the risk of such an accident and taken steps to avoid it. ”  Id. at 284.  Whether [...] could have anticipated the risk of his shoulder (or not), the facts remain that he was doing his job responsibilities when he responded to the “stat call,” upon arrival he saw an extremely combative patient thrashing and flailing about, then knowingly undertook the task of restraining the patient’s legs and was injured in the process.  Simply put, [...] injury was not the result of an assault; rather he was doing his usual work in the usual way while performing his regular duties, which he had performed many times before the 2017 incident.  (Aa16).  Therefore, the Board reasonably found the 2017 incident was not undesigned and unexpected.
[brief] ’”  Myska v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 440 N.J. Super. 458, 482 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 183 (2005)) (affirming dismissal where trial court considered multiple documents referenced, but not described, in the complaint).  Accordingly, the Purchase Order was properly considered by the trial court, and this Court should affirm the Order.  Finally, [...]’s untimely hearsay objections fails on the merits: The Purchase Order is not hearsay and [...]’s contention to the contrary is belied by its own submissions below.
[brief] A Complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails to articulate a legal basis entitling the plaintiff to relief.  Hoffman v. Hampshire Labs, Inc., 405 N.J. Super. 105, 112 (App. Div. 2009).  See also, Rieder v. State Dept. of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987) ("[D]ismissal is mandated where the factual allegations are palpably insufficient to support a claim upon which relief can be granted.").  Here, [...]’s Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint should be affirmed in accordance with Rule 4:6-2(e) and/or Rule 4:6-2(f) since Plaintiff failed to set forth a prima facie case of disability discrimination/failure to accommodate on this its third iteration of its Complaint, and because Plaintiff failed/refused to join other individuals as to whom Plaintiff (1) sought individual LAD remedies and/or (2) asserted actual or potential adverse interests against.
[brief] ”  It is a well-established principle of justice and fairness that the Entire Controversy Doctrine is inapplicable to, and does not apply to bar, component claims either unknown, unarisen, or unaccrued at the time of the original action.  K-Land Corp. No. 28 v. Landis Sewerage Auth., 173 N.J. 59, 70, 800 A.2d 861, 868 (2002).
[brief] The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.  [Emphasis on [Probable cause”]  [Not cited by the prosecutor]  I also have legal grounds for an appeal based on reasonable and articulated suspicion to pull me over for “New Jersey Statute 39:4-88 - Traffic on marked lanes.
[brief] ”  (T8).  D. Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201 (1988) Does Not Support Disqualification of [...]  Because it Has a Distinguishable Set of Facts and Relies Upon a Now Outdated Version of RPC 1.9  [...]’s appeal is predicated almost entirely upon the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201 (1988).
[brief] Hollander, 201 N.J. Super. at 479; State v. M.B., 471 N.J. Super. 376, 383 (App. Div. 2022).  This standard requires the defendant prove that he has been deprived of the ability “to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. ”  California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 480 (1984); Serret, 198 N.J. Super. at 26.  If the defendant is able to recreate the missing evidence, however, he will not be able to establish he has been materially and permanently prejudiced.  Serret, 198 N.J. Super. at 27.  Cross-examining the State’s witnesses about the lost evidence is the best way to replicate it.  Ibid.  Subjecting a witness “to the rigors of cross-examination” is the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth. ”  State v. Cope, 224 N.J. 530, 555 (2016) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).  In Serret, this Court determined a defendant was not prejudiced by the State’s destruction of important evidence because the “defendant’s opportunity to discredit the testimony of the State’s expert with respect to his procedures through the testimony of his own expert was not impaired by the inability to inspect the bottle and its contents.  Thus, defendant was capable of questioning the test results without resort to the destroyed evidence. ”  198 N.J. Super. at 27.  [T]he absence of the bottle and its contents did not prevent a more searching examination of inadequacies in the procedures utilized by the expert, the reliability of the testing equipment, the acceptability of the test results and the proficiency of the expert in conducting the test.