ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011).  Under New Jersey Court Rules, appeals may be taken to the Appellate Division "to review final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer[]"  R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  Appellate Courts do not render advisory opinions or function in the abstract.  N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. State, 88 N.J. 605, 612 (1982).  The Appellate Court need not defer to the agency’s determination on purely legal issues.  "[A]lthough the determination of an administrative agency is entitled to deference, our appellate obligation requires more than a perfunctory review."  Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002).  The Court’s function is "to engage in 'a careful and principled consideration of the agency record and findings,'" and not merely rubberstamp the agency’s decision.  *Williams v. Department of Corrections*, 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting *Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec.*, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).  Final agency actions can be reversed if those actions are 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [if the action] is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole."  *N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric.*, 196 N.J. 366, 384-85 (2008) (quoting *Henry v. Rahway State Prison*, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)) (alteration in original).  The Supreme Court has observed that the Appellate Court can overturn an administrative agency's determinations or findings if there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence.  *Bartley Healthcare Nursing & Rehab. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Senior Servs.*, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 329, 27-28 (App. Div. Feb. 15, 2011) citing *In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees*, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008).
[brief] ”  The structure of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 makes clear that these are three distinct categories, cf. Body-Rite Repair Co. v. Dir., Div. of Tax'n, 89 N.J. 540, 544 (1982) ("The internal structure of the Sales Tax Act treats the taxation of goods and services distinctly."), and that these are the only categories of disqualifying offenses.  Cf. Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc., 181 N.J. 102, 112 (2004) ("The canon of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius—expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of another left unmentioned.")
[brief] Everyone involved knew that and assisted me in doing so.  The respondent mentions that I “stopped working" but then states I was an “active employee “ until March of 2023.  Hence my confusion even as I was undergoing treatment for pain and trying to process my retirement application.  (c)  Respondent makes the ridiculous argument that the financial integrity of the PERS fund would be undermined if I were permitted to purchase two months service credit to entitle me to a life insurance benefit.
[brief] [...] did not rule upon whether [...]’s statements at the time of his guilty plea will ultimately be “evidentiary” or admissible at trial.  See 2T15:1-16:5.  [...] simply ruled that no privilege, court order, or other principle shielded [...] from having to answer questions regarding his prior inconsistent statements at his discovery deposition.  Lavrik has no bearing on the issue at hand, which turns on discoverability, not admissibility.
[brief] State v. Kemp, 195 N.J. 136, 155 (2008).  Id. at 415-16.  In the present case, [...] said that he "took a few statements from witnesses" (2T33-2), drawing the inference that all of out-of-court declarants had identified [...] as the shooter.  Brown testified that conducted his "interview with [...]" (2T33-10) -- implying that Sosa likewise identified [...] as the shooter -- then "eventually file[d] charges against [...]" (2T33-6 to 2T33-7).  Q.  Mr. Brown, now, based on your investigation and following your interview with [...], what did you do next?  A.  I attempted to look for the suspect.  Q.  And did you identify who that suspect was?  A.  Yes.  Q.  Who was it?  A. [...].  (2T32-8 to 2T32-15)  It should be noted that, during deliberations, the jury "ask[ed] for the Detective's report of the victim and statement," (2T129-3 to 2T129-4)  The trial court answered that the report was marked for identification, but not received into evidence.  I therefore, cannot provide the report for you.  I am instructing you as I instructed you earlier, that it is your recollection of the detective's testimony that controls.  (2T132-13 to 2T132-18)  A statement can be characterized as hearsay if it introduced to prove the truth of the matter stated.  State v. Coder, 198 N.J. 451, 464 (App. Div. 2015).  The detective's testimony implied that the statements contained in his report and Sosa's statement identified [...] as the shooter, which is why he was charged thereafter.  See, State v. Alston, 312 N.J. Super. 102, 114 (App. Div. 1998) (officer's telephone conversation with an anonymous tipster was to show why the officer went looking for the defendant, not that defendant had committed a crime, but ultimately excludable under N.J.R.E. 403).  The jurors' question proves that they were influenced by the out-of-court statements, and the judge compounded the problem by answering that "it is your recollection of the detective's testimony that controls."  The jury heard highly prejudicial hearsay, as [...] was placed at the crime scene and identified as the shooter by witnesses he had no opportunity to cross-examine.  This Court should reverse and remand for a new trial.
[directive] (5)  Training.  All Civilian Review Board members and staff shall undergo training approved by the County Prosecutor’s Office on the confidentiality of internal affairs records and other investigative material prior to being granted access to such information.  (6)  Attestation.  All Civilian Review Board members and staff shall receive a copy of the Board’s written confidentiality policies and sign a sworn statement that they will comply those policies prior to being granted access to internal affairs records.
[brief] The Trial Court Correctly Dismissed [...]’ Complaint Because the Claims Against the [...] Were Barred Pursuant to the Doctrine of Res Judicata.  The Trial Court correctly dismissed the Appellant’s Complaint because its environmental claims are barred from relitigating the issue by res judicata.  The doctrine of res judicata “contemplates that when a controversy between parties is once fairly litigated and determined it is no longer open to relitigation. ”  Wadeer v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 220 N.J. 591, 606 (2015).  This principle applies “not only to ‘all matters litigated and determined by such judgment but also as to all relevant issues which could have been presented, but were not. ’”  Culver v. Insurance Co. of North America, 115 N.J. 451, 463 (1989).  Under this doctrine, a claim is barred where: (1) the determination in the prior action is valid, final and on the merits; (2) the parties in the later action are identical or in privity with those in the prior action; and (3) the claim in the later action grows out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in the earlier action.  Velazquez v. Franz, 123 N.J. 498, 505 (1991) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 27 (1982)); Rippon v. Smigel, 449 N.J. Super. 344, 367 (App. Div. 2017).  The doctrine serves as an essential function as it “insulates courts from the inefficiency of relitigating claims that have already been resolved, thereby protecting the integrity of judgments and preventing the harassment of parties. ”  Bondi v. Citigroup, Inc., 423 N.J. Super. 377, 422 (App. Div. 2011).  The appellate standard of review for claims dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata is de novo.  Selective Ins. Co. v. McAllister, 327 N.J. Super. 168, 173 (App. Div. 2000).  Notably, [...] has already relied on the doctrine of res judicata when addressing the Appellant’s claims in the Law Division matter after it was severed from the Chancery Division to address the [...]’ eviction claims.  Specifically, [...] held that the environmental claims raised by the [...]es against the [...], [...], and the [...] were precluded.  (Pa 69a.)  The record and the facts have not changed since this ruling.  Further, the parties in all the prior proceedings are identical to the current one.  Even upon the Appellant’s attempt to Amend the Complaint and substitute a new plaintiff, privity between all parties would remain because the [...]es are the sole principals of [...].  Finally, the claim in this action grows out of the same transaction as the claims in the earlier action.  This proceeding arises from the January 2015 As-Is Contract from 2015 that purchases the Property.  Throughout the different proceedings, the Appellant as made the same representations as to the environmental claims on the Property.  At no point has the record or facts changed during the previous nine years of litigation.  Accordingly, the Trial Court was correct to preclude these environmental claims once again under the doctrine of res judicata.  C.
[brief] Franklin Disc. Co. v. Ford, 27 N.J. 473, 491 (1958) (“The plaintiff has not cross-appealed from the judgment below and we have held that a party, in order to attack the actions below which were adverse to him, must pursue a cross-appeal. ”).  B.  Ordinance 17-2017 is properly enacted pursuant to the Home Rule Act.  (Raised Below: Da60; Da80-82)
[brief] The Trial Court “applied the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint, interpreted in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff as the non-moving party, as supplemented by judicial notice of the prior proceedings in accordance with applicable law. ”  (Pa 3a.)  After reviewing a lengthy record, significant briefing and hearing oral argument the Trial Court correctly dismissed the Appellant’s Complaint because the environmental claims were already barred pursuant to the doctrine of judicial estoppel.  The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party from making a factual assertion when: (1) the party made a contrary assertion in an earlier proceeding, and (2) that tribunal relied upon or accepted that contrary assertion.
[brief] 20.  New Jersey’s actual standards for the teaching of gender identity in schools were attached to the Amended Complaint at Exhibit 21.  (Ca306-371).  They contain no provision for the teaching of “gender change” or anything similar to 6 or 7 year olds.  The Board’s own policy on transgender students was also attached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit 22.  (Ca372-378).  21.
[brief] And sir, you signed this document after you rented the four vans already, correct?  A. Correct. (Ia078 at ¶ 19; Ia096 at 60:3-25).  [...] answered the first part of Question Number 4 with a “no. ”  [...] answered the second part of the question with “N/A”.  [...] did not answer the final part of the question regarding 12-15 passenger vans.  (Ia078 at ¶ 20; Ia143).  On August 1, 2019, [...] returned the Supplemental Form completed by [...] to [...].  (Ia078 at ¶ 21; Ia124; Ia143).  [...]’s principal conceded in deposition that the answers provided on the Supplemental Form were materially incorrect:  Q.  And sir, dropping down to Item 4, you did not answer the question there regarding 12 to 15 passenger vans, correct?  A.  That's correct.  Q.  But Camp [...] was in fact using 12 to 15 passenger vans that were rented by Camp [...], correct?  A. Correct. (Ia078 at ¶22; Ia097 at 64:4-11).  On August 6, 2019, [...] provided [...] with a price quotation (the “Quote”), which included Accident, General Liability, and non-owned/hired auto coverages.  (Ia078 at ¶23; Ia140; Ia147).  The Quote explicitly stated, properly within the portion of the Quote detailing Non-Owned/Hired Auto coverages, that “12 and 15+ Passenger Vans are excluded” from this coverage.  (Ia078 at ¶24; Ia147).  The Quote did discuss other available coverages and exclusions relevant thereto separately.  On August 6, 2019, [...] requested that [...] bind coverage pursuant to the Quote.  (Ia078 at ¶25; Ia122).
[brief] ”  (Pa256)  In Morgan v. Sanford Brown Institute, 225 N.J. 289, 304 (2016), the Court held that in judging whether a consumer contract meets the standard that it be written “in a simple, clear, understandable, and easily readable way” courts “must take into consideration the guidelines set forth in N.J.S.A. 56:12-2 and N.J.S.A. 56:12-10. ”  In Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corp., 231 N.J. 234 (2017) the Court held that a consumer contract was one of adhesion where, as here, “it is presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, commonly in a standardized printed form without opportunity for the adhering party to negotiate.
[brief] Under that statute, a person who has been previously convicted of an enumerated predicate offense and “who purchases, owns, possesses or controls a firearm is guilty of a crime of the second degree. ”  *Ibid.* (emphasis added).  Under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1, a “firearm” is defined differently than a “weapon. ”  A “weapon” includes “firearms” but is much broader: “Weapon” means “anything readily capable of lethal use or of inflicting serious bodily injury. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(r).  By contrast, a “firearm” is limited to various types of guns or firing devices -- for example, “any handgun. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(f); accord Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Certain Persons Not to Have any  But here, for both the first and second elements of the certain-persons offense, the trial court instructed that [...] must be convicted if (1) “there was a weapon” and (2) he knowingly possessed “the weapon. ”  (13T 12-14 to 18-10)  And, in addition to defining “firearm,” the court also charged the broader definition of “weapon. ”  (13T 13-7 to 14-2)  Those charges were legally incorrect. \(^{25}\)  Because the court charged the wrong substantive elements, and because the elements that it did charge (existence and possession of a “weapon”) were broader than the conduct actually proscribed by the statute (existence and possession of only a “firearm”), his certain-persons conviction must be reversed.
[directive] Page 9 of 29  MODEL JURY SELECTION QUESTIONS  STANDARD  JURY VOIR DIRE (CRIMINAL)  When the trial will last more than a week or two, the Committee recommends that judges consider asking the hardship question (which is #2 below) before any of the substantive questions.  This will allow an early excusal of jurors who will be unable to serve on a lengthy trial, thereby enabling them to become available to other courtrooms picking juries.  (Otherwise, it can be asked toward the end).  1.  In order to be qualified under New Jersey law to serve on a jury, a person must have certain qualifying characteristics.  A juror must be: • Age 18 or older • A citizen of the United States • Able to read and understand the English language.  • A resident of ____________ county (the summoning county)  Also, a juror must not: • Have been convicted of any indictable offense in any state or federal court • And must not have any physical or mental disability which would prevent the person from properly serving as a juror.  Is there any one of you who does not meet these requirements?  Standards for Jury Selection
[brief] The manner in which the Chancery court proceeded prevented the [...] from presenting their proofs and obtaining a determination of that issue.  [...]’s judgment left the wrongful assignment in place and continued to subject the [...] to an invalid mortgage title that permitted erroneous processing of wrongful default/foreclosure advanced fees that remain unaddressed by the court’s ruling below.  The testimony that the Chancery court heard reflected only part of the evidence that the [...] had the right to present at the trial on their quiet title claim.  On cross examination, plaintiff’s witness, [...], who had worked in the Trustee Department of [...], acknowledged that an assignment to a trustee for a trust, as was done in 2009 with regard to the [...]’ loan, is typically done only in foreclosure cases – which the [...] were not, in fact, in.  5T111, 133, 143; 6T260.  This explained why the [...] had been consistently denied refinance by lenders for so many years -- the 2009 assignment was viewed as a foreclosure enforcement assignment.
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT  SEXUAL ASSAULT RESPONSE TEAM (SART)  A Sexual Assault Response Team consists of a FNE, a CSVA, and a law enforcement officer.  Victims choose the SART team members who will be activated to assist them.  In New Jersey, SART services are available to individuals 13 years of age and older who disclose an incident of sexual assault within five days of when the incident occurred.  SEXUAL ASSAULT RESPONSE TEAM (SART)
[brief] The Supreme Court distinguished that case from cases where specific instructions were provided, but the voter did not follow them.  *Gray-Sadler* counted the write-in votes because the Board of Elections had not complied with the requirements of *N.J.S.A.* 19:50-3 to provide proper instructions.  Therefore, despite the text of *N.J.S.A.* 19:49-5 stating the votes “shall be void and not counted,” the failure to give voters proper instructions outweighed voters’ failure to comply with the statute.  Similarly, the Appellate Division held *In Matter of General Election Held in Tp. of Monroe*, Gloucester County, N.J. on Tuesday, Nov. 6, 1990, 245 N.J. Super. 70 (App. Div. 1990) to count ballots of voters who voted for the candidate on the ballot by selecting his name on the ballot, and then also writing in the same candidates’ name in the personal choice column.  The Appellate Division upheld the votes, despite the explicit language in N.J.S.A. 19:16-3(f) stating that a ballot shall not be counted if a voter “writes or pastes the name of any person in the column designated personal choice whose name is printed upon the ballot as a candidate under the same title of office,” because to hold otherwise would disenfranchise voters who “clearly intended to vote for one particular person for one particular office.
[brief] Just as the inadvertence prong conflicts with the objective reasonableness standard for warrantless entries and seizures from a car under the plain-view doctrine, so is a virtually identical surprise requirement under the automobile exception.  Requiring police to be surprised by probable cause will not help protect privacy rights when the police conduct is objectively reasonable.  Another significant distinction between Smart and the present case exists: in Smart, the facts were undisputed and the judge interpreted the law on the undisputed “non-testimonial” motion record, in which case “appellate review is de novo.
[brief] To the contrary, [...]’s father explicitly told the police that, unlike the trail cameras, he did not own the surveillance cameras and that he would need to talk to the landlord before letting the police search.  (3T 37-22 to 38, 40-25 to 41-4, 41-15 to 17; 4T 48-24 to 49-15)  This is why neither [...] nor any other officer tried to ascertain any additional information to determine whether [...]’s father’s had apparent authority.  [...] admitted knowing that the surveillance cameras, the DV-R connected to the cameras, and the footage on the DV-R “were solely the property of the landlord. ”  (3T 124-16 to 19; 4T 73-17 to 19)  In turn, [...] admitted knowing that he needed the landlord’s consent to search the landlord’s property.  (3T 126-13 to 16)  Therefore, the State cannot prove [...]’s father’s apparent authority or use his consent to avoid the warrant requirement.
[directive] N.J.S.A.  NOTE  You are not subject to a mandatory Graves Act parole ineligibility term if you are pleading guilty to unlawful possession of a handgun that is an air gun, spring gun, or BB gun pursuant to 2C:39-5b(2); unlawful possession of an unloaded rifle or N.J.S.A. shotgun, 2C:39-5c(1); or unlawful possession of a rifle or shotgun that is an air gun, spring gun, or BB gun, 2C:39- N.J.SA.
[brief] Dated: December 1, 2023.  [...] and [...], husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], JOHN/JANE DOE 1-100, ABC CORPORATION 1-100, and XYZ PARTNERSHIP 1-100, representing one or more fictitious individuals or entities, individually, jointly, and severally, JOHN/JANE DOE 101-200, ABC CORPORATION 101-200, and XYZ PARTNERSHIP 101-200, representing one or more fictitious persons or entities consisting of Directors, Officers, Principals, Partners, Boards, Board Members or Representatives, or Agents, individually, jointly, and severally, Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL [...] [...] [...], [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants [...] and [...] d/b/a [...] [...] (038951988)  [...] Of Counsel and On the Brief [...] (422252023) [...]  On the Brief Submission Date: June 10, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CITATIONS .................................................................................................................. II TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED ...IV PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...........................................................................................................
[brief] *White v. Violent Crimes Compensation Bd.*, 76 N.J. 368, 378-379 (1978).  Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that it would be derelict to strictly and uncritically apply a statutory period of limitations without conscientiously considering the circumstances of the individual case at issue and assessing the Legislature's objective in prescribing the time limitation as it relates to the particular claim *sub judice*.  *Kaczmarek v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth.*, 77 N.J. 329, 338 (1978).  On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has found that the particular circumstances of the case “dictate not the harsh approach of literally applying the statute of limitations but the application of the more equitable and countervailing considerations of individual justice. ”  *Kyle v. Green Acres at Verona, Inc.*, 44 N.J. 100, 109 (1965).  See *Kaczmarek*, supra, 77 N.J. at 338; *Fox v. Passaic Gen'l Hosp.*, 71 N.J. 122, 125-126 (1976); *Lopez*, supra, 62 N.J. at 273-274 (1973).
[brief] ”  N.J.A.C. 6A:28-8.3; See also Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 5 (1969) (dismissal on motion inappropriate if case supported by a scintilla of evidence).  Appellants pled violations of two provisions of the School Ethics Act in their Complaint: N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) and (a).