ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] B.  We add the following relating to the prosecution’s statement of readiness under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(a)(2)(a).  First, trial courts should clarify before the date of the two-year cap  Relying on the Court’s supervisory whether the State will be ready then.  authority, N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3, we direct trial courts to schedule a hearing approximately 30 days before the two-year cap expires.  At the hearing, the court should ask the State if it will be ready to proceed on the two- year cap date.  21  Second, a statement of readiness has significant consequences.  It can deprive a defendant of liberty beyond the two-year mark, at a time the individual is presumed innocent.  To sustain such an outcome, a prosecutor’s brief comment on the record must convey a great deal: that discovery is made;6 complete at the time the representation is that no substantive motions remain to be filed; that the indictment is in final form and no superseding indictment is contemplated, based on information known to the State or that should have been known through the exercise of reasonable diligence; and that the State’s witnesses are generally available.  Going forward, a prosecutor’s statement of readiness will be understood prosecutor’s statement must be to encompass each of those elements.  The made in open court or in writing.  R. 3:25-4(d)(3).  Trial courts can rely on good faith representations from the State and need not inquire about each of  In their discretion, judges can also “require appropriate the above points. assurances to support a prosecutor’s statement of readiness. ”  State v. D.F.W., 468 N.J. Super. 422, 443 (App. Div. 2021).  In addition, if a trial date is “a discovery”  6  We recognize the State has continuing duty to provide and may develop and disclose additional discovery after stating it is ready to proceed.  R. 3:13-3(f); State in Int. of N.H., 226 N.J. 242, 257 (2016) (noting “the State’s continuing discovery obligation” under Rule 3:13-3(f)).  Such disclosures do not conflict with a statement of readiness.  22 postponed after the statement of readiness, the trial court can revisit the issue and ask the State to declare once again whether it is ready to proceed.  Ibid.  C.
[brief] When defendant interjected to speak about the case, both [...] and his mother told him to stop speaking but defendant continued to make incriminating statements.  Ibid.  When defendant’s mother raised concerns that he has had several concussions, [...] informed that a CAT scan was completed and defendant was cleared for incarceration.  Ibid.  [...] also asked the mother not to talk about the case.  Ibid.  During the call, defendant asked his mother to call [...], presumably his girlfriend, and an attorney.  Ibid.  The mother advised that she could not pay for private counsel and defendant would have to be assigned a public defender.  Ibid.  Once the call was completed with defendant’s mother, [...] repeated, “Don’t talk about the case, dude. ” (1T:94-14 to 94-23).  Defendant then proceeded to tell [...] that he had to because he had to let his mother know.  Ibid.
[brief] (Pa145 & Pa116).  On November 14, 2022, [...] adopted Ordinance 36-2022 approving a financial agreement with the Redeveloper.  https://ecode360.com/HA1928/laws/LF1788981.pdf.  Moreover, Redeveloper prepared plans, retained experts and participated in at least one full JLUB hearing before Plaintiff finally decided to file their lawsuit. (T2, 8:8-16).
[brief] MOTION/SECOND APPLICATION AS MOOT.  (Ra1-6, Ra126-144)  “Mootness is a threshold justiciability determination rooted in the notion that judicial power is to be exercised only when a party is immediately threatened with harm. ”  Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., 415 N.J. Super. 301, 311 (App. Div. 2010).  An issue or case is moot where “the decision sought in a matter, when rendered, can have no practical effect on the existing controversy. ”  Id. (quoting Greenfield v. N.J. Dep’t. of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 254, 257-58 (App. Div. 2006)).  For purposes of judicial economy and restraint, the Court does not decide cases where the issues are hypothetical or where judgment cannot grant effective relief.  Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC v. Cnty. of Bergen, 450 N.J. Super. 286, 294 (App. Div. 2017).  For this reason, the Court does not decide issues that have become moot or academic prior to judicial resolution.
[brief] (Pa82-85).  The Board cited to the IA charges being included in the [...] MOA but made no interpretable coherent link to support refusing to allow [...] to have his application filed and docketed.  (Id.).  The Board ignored the clear undisputed fact that the MOPU was not motivated by or driven by the IA charge, and the IA charge could not as a matter of law deny a member from applying for disability since the IA arose out of the same incident that caused the disability.  (Ibid.).  In support of this alleged reason to bar [...]’s application for disability the Board cited generally to N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4.  (Id.).  However, N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4(b)(2) states that there is no bar to an application being processed and considered when “settlement agreements…” involve administrative charges where the “…underlying charges relate to the disability. ”  N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4(b)(2).  The Board also miscomprehended the case of M.R. v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees Retirement System, A-6015-17T4. (4/6/20), which was not applicable to our case because it is factually distinguishable and was not retroactive in effect.
[brief] This Court should not consider materials that were not presented to the trial court and that were submitted for the first time on appeal.  *Townsend v. Pierre*, 221 N.J. 36, 45 n.2 (2015).  Here, [...]’s argument, on pages 34-36 of its brief, that groundwater contamination is continuing to occur is based entirely on an expert report and excerpts of deposition testimony that was not submitted to the trial court.  (Db, pp. 34-36).  [...] offers no evidence of record that property damage at the [...] is continuing.  This Court’s review is based on the record as it existed in the trial court.  *Davis v. Devereux Found.*, 209 N.J. 269, 296 n.8 (2012).  This Court should not consider the evidence outside the record cited by [...], or the arguments based on the evidence.  See *Townsend*, 221 N.J. at 45 n.2.  B.
[brief] V. ROBERTO, 477 N.J.Super 339 (App. Div. 2023) (Issue Addressed Below, 454a-792a)  Final Judgment was entered November 7, 2022 divesting Appellants of title.  (279a-293a).  Appellants did not file a direct appeal of the Final Judgment.  Appellants’ Motion under Rule 4:50-1 was filed on February 2, 2023, eighty-seven (87) days later.  (90a-142a).  Appellants’ motion was filed within the three (3) month limitation contained in N.J.S.A. 54:5-87, as well as the generic one (1) year limitation for Rule 4:50-1 motions to vacate under to City of East Orange v. Kynor, 383 N.J. Super. 639, 646 (App. Div 2006).  Appellants’ motion to vacate was timely and has been prosecuted continuously since filed.  [...] essentially rejects Roberto when it contends that a final judgment must be on direct appeal to preserve the “pipeline” retroactivity of Tyler.  The Roberto case was itself not a direct appeal of a final judgment, but was an appeal of the granting of a motion to vacate.  So this is a direct misreading of Roberto.
[brief] B.  [...]’s Newly Raised Arguments Regarding Public Funds, Political Upheaval, and Density and Traffic Also Fail to Establish a Public Interest Meriting Enlargement.  (Pa55 – Pa58).  In its opinion, the trial court noted the bases for enlargement of the time to appeal a municipal governing body’s determination and found no facts present such a basis in this case.  Seizing on that comment, [...] for the first time on appeal attempts to interject speculative facts, in the hope of saving its late filing.  Not only is this issue procedurally improper, see Neider v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973), it is also unsupported and should be rejected as erroneous.
[brief] This conclusion forecloses [...]’s attempt to now engraft an additional qualification absent from, and contrary to, the statute’s plain language.  See DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 494 (2005) (“We cannot write in an additional qualification which the Legislature pointedly omitted in drafting its own enactment, or engage in conjecture . . . which will circumvent the plain meaning of the act . . .  [o]ur duty is to construe and apply the statute as enacted”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).  [...] adds an assertion suggesting the legislative history of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2, reflects an intent justifying its interpretation.  (Pb27 – Pb29).  It clearly does not.  In fact, nothing in the legislative history supports this claim.  (See Pa156 – Pa232).  [...] cites the Senate Community Affairs Committee Statement to Senate Bill No. 7 that “[t]he Bill further provides that if the publication of the ordinance is by title, the publication must contain a clear and concise statement setting forth the purpose of the ordinance .  . . .” (Pb27) and a similar Statement from the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee that “Sections 30 and 31 amend R.S. 40:49-2 . . . to permit the publishing of proposed municipal ordinances by title, rather than in their entirety, with a concise statement of the purpose of the ordinance and a notice of the time and place for obtaining copies. ” (Pb28).  Neither of these statements express an intent for the notice statute to require a statement of purpose “separate and apart” from the publication by title, a publication method these two quotes explain is permissible.  The legislative history supports the conclusion that publication by title --- 9 [...] provided these same legislative history materials below.  Therefore, while the trial court’s opinion does not address them, its rejection of [...]’s proffered interpretation of the statute it claims this legislative history supports reflects its rejection of [...]’s characterization of that history.  (See Pa58 – Pa61).  Furthermore, the trial court’s holding a plain reading of the statute belies [...]’s interpretation thereof demonstrates there is no ambiguity in the statute, rendering [...]’s resort to legislative history improper in any event.  See State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 578 (1997) (“When construing a statute, the first consideration is the statute’s plain meaning”); State v. Marchiani, 336 N.J. Super. 541, 546 (App. Div. 2001). is permissible and sufficient under N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(a) so long as that publication by title clearly states the purpose of the ordinance, as it does in this case.  (Pa60 – Pa61).  B.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Order Granting Summary Judgment (July 16, 2024)  ..............................................Pa712  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Appellant, [...] (“[...]”), was terminated for her theft of hospital funds.  Unable to accept the consequences of her actions, she filed this action alleging retaliation in violation of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14, by Respondents, [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively, “Defendants”).  [...] employed [...] as a Staffing Coordinator, with duties that included ensuring various hospital units were adequately staffed and inputting employee time to facilitate payroll.  [...] believed she was underpaid and regularly complained about it, joining in multiple requests for more money.  Those requests were denied.  [...] then abused her position of trust by entering a category of additional pay—known as “charge pay”—to give two other staffing coordinators, [...] and [...], an extra dollar per hour for each of their shifts.  In return, they entered “charge pay” for [...].  The three did so without approval.  They did so by manipulating the payroll system to which they had access to after their supervisor reviewed the records, but before the time was posted, in order to avoid detection.  Ultimately, their misconduct was discovered and their employment was terminated.  [...] argues she was a whistleblower because she complained about her supervisor, [...], and was terminated in retaliation for that protected activity.  However, as the trial court found below, no reasonable fact finder could credit those claims for several reasons.  As an initial matter, the trial court found that none of [...]’s “complaints” implicate any reasonably believed violations of law or public policy, putting them outside the scope of conduct protected by CEPA, which is fatal to her claims.  All of [...]’s “complaints” were either made years prior to her termination, or amounted to generalized gripes about her allegedly callous supervisor.  Even if that were not the case, [...] investigated and addressed [...]’s complaints prior to terminating her employment.  Moreover, the trial court found that these complaints played no role in the decision to terminate [...]’s employment, which was made for legitimate non-retaliatory reasons that cannot be rebutted.  [...] schemed with two coworkers to pay themselves more money, without approval, thereby defrauding and stealing from [...].  On appeal, [...] has failed to identify any genuine issues of material fact capable of supporting her claims.  This Court should affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24.  The Legislature properly “entrusted” the Council with regulatory authority “confined” to this specialized area of wildlife management.  United Hunters Assoc. of N.J. v. Bontempo, 53 N.J. Super. 181, 186 (App. Div. 1958); Humane Soc’y, 70 N.J. at 575.  Once appointed, Council members remain subject to removal for cause.  N.J.S.A. 13:1B-26.  Additionally, recommended sportsmen are not required to be members of the [...].  Humane Soc’y, 70 N.J. at 570.  Regarding black bears, specifically, CBBMPs require Commissioner approval.  U.S. Sportsmen’s Alliance, 182 N.J. at 474 (although Commissioner does not have veto power over the Council’s daily activities, Council lacks “total hegemony”).
[brief] [...] is incorrect when it claims that in the Questionnaire, “[...] state[d] that it did not hire or rent 12-15 passenger vans. ” (Rb10).  [...]'s response said nothing of the sort because he was not asked that question.  Instead, the Questionnaire asked:  4.  Do you hire or rent vehicles during your fair/festival/event?  Yes ___ No x  If yes, please describe vehicle types, estimated number, duration, and usage.  _____________________________N/A____________________________  If yes to #4, are any of these vehicles 12-15 passenger vans?  ☐ Yes (How many?__)  ☐ No  [Ia143]  As discussed in detail in Intervenor’s opening brief, [...] misunderstood the misleading question and answered “No. ” (Ia143).  He never stated or represented, as [...] suggests, that [...] "did not hire or rent 12-15 passenger vans."  In fact, had that been the question, [...] might have answered differently.  Because [...] misunderstood the question and because both the Application and the Questionnaire never stated that 12-15+ passenger vans were not covered by insurance, [...] had a reasonable expectation of coverage.
[brief] B.  [...]’s Determination That “Lawful Interest Includes Contract Interest” Was An Error As A Matter Of Law  “Under the doctrine of merger, the mortgage contract is merged into the final judgment of foreclosure and the mortgage contract is extinguished.  Thereafter, the mortgage contract interest rate is replaced by the post-judgment rate permitted under the rules of court. ”  Realty Asset Properties, Ltd., v. Oldham, 356 N.J. Super. 16, 21 (App. Div. 2002) (internal citations omitted).
[brief] By 5:18 a.m., her blood pressure had dropped to 90/57 – far below what Hospital nurses and doctors had established as her baseline.  By 9:58 a.m., [...] put [...] into the Hospital’s intensive care unit.  A237-41.  [...] finally arrived at the hospital and saw [...] a couple of hours later, sometime in the late morning.  In a note he dictated at 1 p.m. that day, [...] acknowledged [...]’s continued decline and the “possibility of ischemic colitis. ”  He continued to defer surgery, however.  Only after [...] deteriorated even further during the afternoon did [...] finally decide, at 5:26 p.m., that she needed immediate surgical intervention.  [...] performed the surgery 90 minutes later (at 7 p.m.), and saw that [...]’s entire colon was “discolored and grossly ischemic. ”  He performed a subtotal colectomy.  But it was too late.  [...] never recovered from the surgery.  She died the following day from “severe ischemic colitis and septic shock.
[brief] PAGES  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  5  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS  7  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS  7  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  8  STATEMENT OF FACTS  10  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE A DETERMINATION ON THE ISSUE OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND AS A RESULT THERE WAS A FAILURE TO FIND FOR FIRST ZION  HOPE  MISSIONARY BAPTIST CHURCH WHICH WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE DOCUMENTARY  EVIDENTIARY RECORD PRESENTED TO THE COURT  Da203, 1T, Da255 15  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT DETERMINATION ON THE ISSUE OF ADVERSE POSSESSION  FAILED TO APPLY THE FACTORS TO BE EMPLOYED IN DECIDING ADVERSE POSSESSION TO THE EVIDENCE AND OUR STATUTES, N.J.S.A.2A:14-30 AND N.J.S.A. 2A:14-31 AND BECAUSE OF THIS THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT TO FIRST ZION  HOPE  MISSIONARY BAPTIST CHURCH Da203, 1T 20  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] [...] did take over possession of the assets, and attempted to maintain the operation during the period of time in question.  (Ca18).  The sale was ordered and approved by [...].  (Ca18).  Also, [...] found, at the time of the hearing, that [...] took possession at the time that Covid-19 was ending, and people were still wearing masks into restaurants and/or still not comfortable being around other people.  [...] was appointed to sell the assets in place of the sheriff at a sheriff’s sale on the foreclosure proceeding.  The order was entered for the sale, and the order was entered approving the sale.  (Ca308).  Accordingly, any arguments advanced by appellants referring or related to the filing of a bond make no sense in view of the fact that the receiver complied with the trial court’s orders.  (b).  **N.J.S.A. 14A:14-15 – Notice to Creditors**
[brief] Ordinarily, a municipality that has acquired a property by eminent domain is granted qualified immunity from liability for cleanup costs to complete remediation.  N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g(d)(4).  No liability protection is granted if a governmental entity acquires property by eminent domain when it is “being remediated in a timely manner at the time of the condemnation or eminent domain action. ”  N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g(d)(4).  Because the law disincentivizes acquisition of property that is actively and timely being remediated, the Trial Court’s concerns regarding condemnation are unwarranted.  By conflating designation of the Property as a Condemnation Redevelopment Area with the actual exercise of the power of eminent domain, the Trial Court relied upon inapplicable considerations for determining whether the Property satisfied one or more criteria under N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  /s/ [...]  By:__________________________  DOMINICK BRATTI  Dated: October 23, 2023  [...]  [...] (#024491996)  [...] [...] [...]  [Facsimile]  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...] & ALL MEMBERS OF THE TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE OF THE [...], INDIVIDUALLY AND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES, [...], [...], [...], [...], AND [...], Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff [...] respectfully requests the Court reverse the Order dismissing the Complaint.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant  Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  TARIQ ELSHABBA, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated :  CIVIL ACTION  Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...], and JOHN DOES 1 to 10 :  ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, PASSAIC COUNTY  Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: HON. [...], J.S.C.  Defendants-Respondents.  BRIEF FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
[brief] ”  Ibid.  The Court made patent that the “reasonable certainty” standard “creates a higher level of proof needed to achieve reasonable certainty as to the amount of damages. ”  Id. at 574-75 (citing Int’l Telepassport Corp. v. USFI, Inc., 89 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 1996)).  In Schwartz, the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized not only the fact-sensitive nature of the inquiry, but also that “a new business’s inexperience is an important factor in the reasonable certainty standard. ”  Id. at 575.  Thus, a “business’s inexperience enters into judicial consideration of the damages claim not as a rule but as a factor in applying the standard. ”  Id. at 574 (quoting Mindgames, Inc. v. W. Publ’g Co., 218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2000)).  Applying [...]’s opinions to the known facts, the Trial Court concluded that:
[brief] (Ca240-Ca378).  On April 11, 2020, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in Lieu of an Answer.  Ra14-Ra15.  Complainants opposed the motion.  Ra5.  The Commission issued on Decision on Motion to Dismiss ("the Decision") dated August 23, 2022.  Da205-Da215.  In the Decision, the Commission partially granted Respondent’s motion by dismissing Complainant’s allegation in Counts 1-4 and 8-12 that Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(a) and dismissed Counts 3, 6 and 7 in their entirety.
[brief] In *Vercammen*, the plaintiff registered for access to [...] as a premium user.  To initiate registration, [...]’s website required the user to click “Start Your Free Trial,” above which a notification stated, “by placing your order you agree to our terms and service. ”  The words “Terms and Service” embedded a hyperlink to the User Agreement.  [...]’s registration process did not require the user to actually open or view it.  Rather, a subscriber had the “option” to view the terms and to “reject[] the contract and [...]’s services” if they so chose.  *Vercammen*, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 110, *9-10.  This Court held that [...]’s website set forth its terms “in a fair and forthright fashion” because the terms were in a clearly visible notice “presented to the party to be bound” at the outset of the sign-up process, and “not submerged nor hidden. ”  *Id.*  Thus, “instead of providing an ‘I agree’ button,” the defendant’s site may “advise the user that he or she is agreeing to the terms of service when registering or signing up. ”  *Id.* at *8-9 (“plaintiff cannot assert that he had no notice of the terms. ”).  In *Racioppi*, [...]’s website provided on the “first sign-up screen” to register for an Airbnb account, directly below the “Sign up” button and provided by hyperlink:  “‘By signing up, I agree to Airbnb’s Terms of Service, Privacy Policy, Guest Refund Policy, and Host Guarantee Terms. ’”  After conducting a “fact-sensitive inquiry,” this Court held that the site provided “clear and unmistakable” notice of the agreement to arbitrate given that “defendant’s first sign-up screen required no scrolling” and set forth the above-quoted language in legible text with accompanying hyperlinks to the referenced policy documents.  *Racioppi*, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1200, at *9-11 (citing *Wollen*, 468 N.J. Super. at 495-96).  Further, the identical language appeared on the subsequent registration screen, so that the user would continue to see it as they proceeded with signing-up.  *Id.* at *10.  *Racioppi* distinguished *Wollen*, noting that in *Wollen* the user had to “navigat[e] multiple webpages” before finding any reference to separate terms and conditions, whereas in *Racioppi*, as here, such reference “was on the first page encountered by a consumer.