ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The 0ffiee”of Government Integrity shalt establish a “Manual for External Audits of 1.  This County Forfeiture Accounts. ”  manual will contain instructions for the County the Prosecutor, engaged CPA firm, and the [...], to assist all parties in complying with applicable statutes, regulations, directives and SOP’S.  2.  Each County Prosecutor shall have all Forfeiture accounts audited on annual basis by an with of f m an external W C P A .  The engaged shall be provided a copy the “Manual for External Audits of County Forfeiture Accounts,” and any internal documents necessary to complete the audit.  The audit shall include the reports and procedures specified in the T w manual.  he m anual ill a lso nclude formats, reports, and chedules which m ust b e i s followed.  In that N.J.S.A. 40A5-4 requires the governing body of each County to have 3.  an W C P A audit, on an annual basis, all books, accounts transactions of County and government agencies, the Prosecutor’s responsibility for ensuring an annual audit of forfeiture-related accounts can be satisfied by the County audit conducted pursuant to f o N.J.S.A. 40A:5-4, provided that the County audit the Prosecutor’s forfeiture-related in is is accounts conducted, and the audit report prepared, conformity with the requirements of the “Manual for External Audits County Forfeiture Accounts. ”  Otherwise, the County of Prosecutor shall arrange for an external audit independent of the County audit.  fi-om 4.  Each County Prosecutor shall be responsible for reviewing findings the annual external audit to ensure compliance with applicable statutes, regulations, directives and SOP’S, Law of including this Attorney General Enforcement Directive.  The Division Criminal Justice will be responsible for conducting follow-up within days of receipt of 120 a copy of the audit to ensure all findings have been addressed.
[brief] Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Imet Mason Contractors, 309 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 1998)  .............................................................................. 8 Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) ........................................ 10 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) .......................................... 23 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) ..................................................23 Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184 (Md. 2010) .................................................................26 Fletcher v. Municipality of Anchorage, 650 P.2d 417 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) .......................................................................................26 Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81 (Del. 1989) .........................................................26 Johnson v. Mountainside Hosp., Respiratory Disease Associates, 199 N.J. Super. 114 (App. Div. 1985) ..................................................................8 Kounelis v. Sherrer, 529 F. Supp. 2d 503 (D.N.J. 2008) ........................................25 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ...............................................................5 People v. Handy, 988 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 2013) ......................................................26 State in Interest of D.J.C., 257 N.J. Super. 118 (App. Div. 1992) .........................7 State v. Abbati, 99 N.J. 418 (1985) .....................................................................7 State v. Casele, 198 N.J. Super. 462 (App. Div. 1985) ........................................17, 24 State v. Clark, 347 N.J. Super. 497 (App. Div. 2002) ..........................................9, 11 State v. Cope, 224 N.J. 530 (2016) ....................................................................23 State v. Dabas, 215 N.J. 114 (2013) ...................................................................25 State v. Franklin Sav. Account No. 2067, 389 N.J. Super. 272 (App. Div. 2006) ..................................................................................................9 State v. Gunter, 231 N.J. Super. 34 (App. Div.), certif. denied 117 N.J. 81 (1989) ................................................................. 11, 18 State v. Hollander, 201 N.J. Super. 453 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 101 N.J. 335 (1985) ......................................................... 8, 10, 17, 23 State v. Langanella, 144 N.J. Super. 268 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 74 N.J. 256 (1976) ..................................................11
[brief] With regard to the October 17, 2015 accident, Plaintiff testified that he did not finish his shift after the accident, and as soon as the scene was cleared, his fellow police officers put him in a vehicle and drove him to the hospital.  (1T43:20-22; 1T44:3-6).  Other than the neck injury and neck surgery, Petitioner did not injure any other parts of his body.  (46:5-9).  When asked how long he was in physical therapy after the accident, he stated “Not for long…between 60 and 90 days. ” (1T47:9-12).  Petitioner’s last day of work was October 17, 2015.
[brief] As the State argued in opposition to defendant’s motion for a new trial, [...] treated both expert witnesses equally:  “I listened to the audio recordings of the entirety of the trial.  And there were points where when both [...] and [...] went off course on a question, Your Honor stopped it, whether there was an objection or not.  And I would say the tone in the Court, there was never anyone raising their voice, they were told that they needed to stay on track and answer the questions. ” (17T46-23 to 47-5).  The AP noted that both witnesses offered very long answers.
[brief] Mirabelli, 2023 WL 5976992, at *11.  In any event, Mirabelli remains an outlier among the overwhelming array of cases acknowledging that parents do not have an affirmative right to the disclosure of information about their children.  \(^5\)  Appellants get no further by relying on Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2000).  Gruenke involved the opposite scenario: a government actor investigating the private health information of a student and demanding such information from the student in private meetings.  See id. at 295-97 (coach demanding student take pregnancy test).  The interference with parental rights was clear: forcing the child to take a pregnancy test and disclosing her pregnancy violated the parent’s right to familial privacy and student’s right to privacy.  Id. at 297.  Here, by contrast, the trial court’s injunction merely precludes the district from mandating blanket parental notification over a student’s objections.  Appellants’ view of substantive due process runs into a second problem: even though “parents may have a fundamental right to decide whether to send their child to a public school, they do not have a fundamental right generally to direct how a public school teaches their child. ”  Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395 (6th Cir. 2005); see also C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 182 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding “in certain circumstances the parental right to control the upbringing of a child must give way to a school’s ability to control curriculum and the school environment”); Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1207 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding even more broadly that parents’ fundamental rights “do[] not extend beyond the threshold of the school door”).
[brief] But even setting that aside, the Court should affirm the trial court order and reject [...]’s radical request to disqualify the [...] under RPC 1.7(a)(1) because [...] has not carried its heavy burden.  For good reason, “disqualification motions are . . . viewed skeptically in light of their potential abuse to secure a tactical advantage. ”  Escobar v. Mazie, 460 N.J. Super. 520, 526 (App. Div. 2019).
[brief] In this respect, equity follows the common law precept that no one shall be allowed to benefit by his own wrongdoing.  *Neiman v. Hurff*, 11 N.J. 55, 60, 93 A.2d 345 (1952).  Thus, where the bad faith, fraud or unconscionable acts of a petitioner form the basis of his lawsuit, equity will deny him its remedies.  *Goodwin Motor Corp. v. Mercedes Benz of N.A., Inc.*, 172 N.J. Super. 263, 411 A.2d 1144 (App.Div. 1980).  [ Sheridan v. Sheridan, 247 N.J. Super. 552, 556, 589 A.2d 1067 (Ch.Div. 1990)].  See also Pollino, supra, 39 N.J. Super. at 304, 121 A.2d 62.
[brief] (Da110-Da114, Da607).  The terms of that contract explicitly set forth the existence of an independent contractor relationship at Section 5.14 as follows:  Section 5.14  Independent Employment Status.  Employees of Provider Agencies that Contract with the Department of Children and Families are employees of the Provider Agency, not the State.  In accordance with the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 152(2) and State law, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 et seq., Provider Agencies are independent, private employers with all the rights and obligations of such, and are not political subdivisions of the Department of Children and Families.  As such, the Provider Agency acknowledges that it is an independent Provider, providing services to [DCF], typically through a contract-for-services agreement.  As independent contractors, Provider Agencies are responsible for the organization’s overall functions that include the overseeing and monitoring of its operations, establishing the salary and benefit levels of its employees, and handling all personnel matters as the employer of its workers….  …The Provider Agency acknowledges its relationship with its employees as that of employer.  While the Department has an adjunct role with Provider Agencies through regulatory oversight and ensuring contractual performance, the Provider understands that the Department is not the employer of a Provider Agency’s employees.  (Da607 at §5.14)  C.  The Investigation of [...]’s EEO Complaint
[brief] II.  UNDER THE “PREMISES RULE,” THE PARKING LOT ACCIDENT OCCURRED DURING THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR BOTH PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT.  (Pa294; Pa295; Pa330 at 115-116; Pa333 at 126-127; T6:20 – T7:4)  .................................................................................. 18  III.  PLAINTIFF’S OTHER UNPERSUASIVE ARGUMENTS TO ELIMINATE [...]’S CO-EMPLOYEE IMMUNITY HAVE NO MERIT.
[brief] In so doing, the trial court found [...] was not credible.  [...] had an overly generous 3 ½ year discovery period to prove her R. 4:50 case, which she and her lawyers knew was false and frivolous when filed.  The evidence presented at the 23-day Plenary Hearing supported that statement.  [...] did not prove any of her allegations contained in her certification supporting her motion.  [...]’s “set aside” case was dismantled by the documentary and testimonial evidence [...] marshalled in discovery.  At the Plenary Hearing, [...] relied on all information exchanged during discovery, and the witnesses, and the legal arguments herein.  This Court should affirm the trial court’s denial of [...]’s motion to set aside, which the trial court correctly found had no credibility and was time barred.  However, this Court should reverse the trial court’s rulings on the issues of counsel fees and sanctions, the possession of the Lexus, and the $15,459.21 [...] reimbursement.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Much of the Jail Call Admitted by the State Was Irrelevant and Extremely Prejudicial.  Lastly, the State also admitted a jail call that consisted almost entirely of irrelevant and severely prejudicial statements by [...] denigrating [...].  The portion the call the State ostensibly considered relevant was a brief moment where [...] stated he shot at the car because he was only trying to scare the passengers.  (7T166-9 to 17).  However, that statement made up a tiny fraction of the jail call, about a half-page from a call that lasted over sixteen transcript pages.  Much of the rest of the call consists of [...] repeatedly calling [...] a liar and accusing him of having affairs.  (7T152-9 to 168-25).  For instance, in one such exchange [...] asks her, “Lying about what?  Tell me what I’m lying about?  About what? A girl?” to which [...] replied, “Everything that you fucking did.  Yeah.  Yeah.  You are.  And if you’re going to keep lying, then just go fuck yourself. ”  (7T161-10 to 20).  Defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the extensive irrelevant and prejudicial conversation contained in the call, which was denied.  (7T172-4 to 180-11).  The jail call presents two significant issues.
[brief] 4T, 61:12-63:1, 64:16-66:24, 79:10-81:1, 81:23-84:25, 124:2-125:20; 1008a-1009a, 18:8-23:2; 1013a, 39:11-40:2; 1013a-1014a, 40:18-43:13; 1015a, 48:11-20; 1015a-1016a, 49:15-50:13.  [...] further explained that developers actually take money out by way of the 15% developer fee as part of the lucrative incentive provided in the development of 100% affordable housing projects.
[brief] Appellant cites the relevant case law with respect to a Court’s duty to follow the Appellate Division’s ruling.  The flaw in the argument is simply that the Appellant disagrees with the findings of the Court.  [...] had a hearing as required by the Appellate Division and put his findings on the record.  Once again, the Appellant simply doesn’t agree with the ruling.  Again, this is after the Appellant limited his Trial to one witness and less than an hour of testimony.
[brief] POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING UNRELIABLE EXPERT TESTIMONY PURPORTING TO DETERMINE THAT THE GUN FOUND WHERE DEFENDANT WAS STAYING WAS THE ONE THAT FIRED THE SHOTS THAT KILLED THE VICTIM.  (5T 123-10 to 128-14)  On February 1, 2022, the defense filed a motion to limit the testimony of the State’s firearms expert to that which is scientifically supported.²  (Da 22-43)  Specifically, the defense argued that the expert must be precluded from asserting that the bullets or casings “matched” or conclusively came from a specific firearm, instead opining only that these items share certain characteristics common to a class of firearms.  (Da 26, 29-43)  The trial court erroneously denied ²  It seems that originally the State proffered two firearms examiners, but only one testified at trial to all of the conclusions originally proffered by both.  (Da 22; 11T 19-3 to 71-19)  The defense did not object to the expert substitution. this motion without engaging with the merits of [...]’s argument, holding merely that “Defense Counsel has failed to meet her burden. ”  (5T 126-10 to 20)  Because defense counsel has no burden, but, rather, the proponent of the evidence — the State — has the burden to demonstrate the soundness of scientific evidence it seeks to admit, and because the State’s expert strayed further in his testimony than what is scientifically supportable, the trial court’s ruling was incorrect.  The admission of this unreliable but compelling evidence deprived [...] of his rights to due process and a fair trial.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, and 10.  The convictions must be reversed.
[brief] In re Dodge, supra, 50 N.J. at 227 (quoting In re Fulper's Estate, 99 N.J. Eq. 292, 302 (Prerog. Ct. 1926)); accord Slack, supra, 66 N.J. Eq. at 449; Mott, supra, 49 N.J. Eq. at 198.  Id at pp 5-7 (emphasis supplied)  The Court in the summary judgment motion acknowledged that the burden of proof must shift to the Defendants, but failed to apply it properly at the trial.¹
[brief] DEFENDANTS ARE ABSOLUTELY IMMUNE FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE POLICE PROTECTION.  (T10)  Defendant [...], leaves any response to be made regarding Plaintiffs’ arguments in Point IV of their Brief in the capable hands of counsel for Defendants, [...] and [...], because HHA does not provide security services to the property at issue.  To the extent necessary, HHA agrees with and supports the arguments of Defendants, [...] and [...], that the municipal defendants are absolutely immunized for failure to provide police protection.  See N.J.S.A. 59:5-4.  CONCLUSION  For the reasons set forth above Defendant-Respondent, [...], respectfully submits that this Court should AFFIRM the decision of the Trial Court.  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent  [...]  [...]  [...], INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE IF [...] AND [...], Plaintiffs, vs. CITY OF HOBOKEN; HOBOKEN POLICE DEPARTMENT; HOBOKEN HOUSING AUTHORITY; JOHN DOES (1-10); ABC COMPANIES (1-10); XYZ GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES (1-10), Defendants.
[brief] (Pa 48-49)  As with all subsection “d” variances, the Applicant must satisfy both the “positive” and “negative” criteria of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.  Additionally, under section (d), in particular cases for special reasons, a grant variance can be provided if, 1.) a use or principal structure in a district restricted against such use or principal structure; or 2.) an expansion of nonconforming use.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1) and (2).  Further, a variance from N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d), “shall be granted only by affirmative vote of at least five members, in the case of a municipal board. ”  Ibid.  Additionally, no variance or other relief may be granted under the terms without a showing from the Applicants that the proposed variance will not cause a substantial detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zoning plan and zoning ordinance.  See ibid. (Pa 41, 45)  The Applicant bears the burden of proving both the positive and negative criteria.  Nash v. Bd. of Adjustment, 96 N.J. 97 (1984).  Generally, to satisfy the positive criteria, an Applicant must prove that the use promotes the general welfare because the proposed site is particularly suitable to the proposed use.
[brief] Despite the lack of published authority on this narrow issue, we note New Jersey has a strong public policy against permitting double recoveries.  See *N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97* (collateral source statute permits the court to deduct any duplicative award from a plaintiff’s personal injury recovery); *Taylor v. Metzger*, 152 N.J. 490, 509, 706 A.2d 685 (1998) (plaintiff cannot obtain double recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress and violation of LAD); *Millison v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.*, 101 N.J. 161, 187, 501 A.2d 505 (1985) (injured employee must reimburse workers' compensation carrier in the event of recovery in civil action for employers' intentional actions that caused injury); *Rosales v. State Dept. of the Judiciary*, 373 N.J.Super. 29, 31, 860 A.2d 929 (App.Div.2004) (long standing public policy prohibiting dual recoveries for the same disability), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 630, 868 A.2d 1033 (2005); *Kislak Co. v. Hirschfeld*, 222 N.J.Super. 553, 559, 537 A.2d 748 (App.Div.1988) (real estate agent is entitled to the commission for performance, diminished by any expense to accomplish result, which included commission of selling agent).
[directive] Page 2 II.  Grading and Penalties  Under the new law, the grading of shoplifting is based on the full retail value of the merchandise taken.  Consequently, shoplifting shall be charged in accordance with the full retail value of the merchandise taken, as provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11.  Under the statute, shoplifting offenses are graded as follows:  2nd Degree:  Shoplifting is a crime of the second degree if the full retail value of the merchandise was $75,000.00 or more.  N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11c(1).  A crime of the second degree is punishable by a term of imprisonment of five to 10 years (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6a(2)), a fine not to exceed $150,000.00, or both (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3a(2)).  3rd Degree:  Shoplifting is a crime of the third degree if the full retail value of the merchandise exceeds $500.00 but is less than $75,000.00.  N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11c(2).  A crime of the third degree is punishable by a term of imprisonment of three to five years (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6a(3)), a fine not to exceed $15,000.00, or both (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3b(1)).  4th Degree:  Shoplifting is a crime of the fourth degree if the full retail value of the merchandise was at least $200.00 but does not exceed $500.00.  N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11c(3).  A crime of the fourth degree is punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed 18 months (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6a(4)), a fine not to exceed $10,000 or both (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3b(2)).  Disorderly Persons  Shoplifting is a disorderly persons offense if the full retail Offense: value of the merchandise was less than $200.00.  N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11c(4).  A disorderly persons offense is punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed six months (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-8), a fine not to exceed $1,000 or both (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3c).  The additional mandatory penalties for any person convicted of a shoplifting offense under the Act are as follows:
[brief] APPLICABLE LAW  UNDER THE PAROLE ACT OF 1979  An inmate has a “federally-protected liberty interest” in being granted parole.  Trantino VI, 166 N.J. at 197.  By the time an inmate's parole eligibility date is reached, the punitive aspect of his sentence has been satisfied.  Kosmin, 363 N.J. Super. at 40-41.  In determining whether an inmate should be granted parole, the dispositive question is whether the rehabilitative aspect of their sentence has been satisfied.  Id. at 41.  [...]’s application for parole and his appeal are governed by the Parole Act of 1979 (the Act), because the crimes for which he was convicted and sentenced occurred long before the 1997 amendment.  See Kosmin, 363 N.J. Super. at 41 n.2; see also Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 331 N.J. Super. 577, 604 (App. Div. 2000) aff’d in part, modified in part, and remanded, 166 N.J. 113 (2001), judgment modified, 167 N.J. 619 (2001).
[brief] Plaintiff’s Opposition doubles down on the Trial Court’s flawed finding that [...]’s witness, [...], admitted the product deviated from performance standards and was thus defective.  (Opp 18)  Plaintiff ignores two important issues.  First, [...] testified only to the hypothetical: *if* an Ozurdex® unit generated a 300-micron silicone particulate, it would deviate from performance standards; she never testified the Ozurdex® at issue generated such a particulate.  (OB 15, 26)  Second, Plaintiff ignores that [...] was not designated by [...] to testify on manufacturing performance standards and Plaintiff failed to establish she was qualified to testify on that topic.  (OB 15, n.8)  Instead, the [...] witness designated and qualified to speak to that issue, [...], testified a 300-micron silicone particulate would *not* deviate from performance standards.  (OB 26, n.15)  Hence, the only witness competent to testify on this issue testified a 300-micron particulate does not deviate from the standards—and is thus not defective.
[brief] [...], Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant. and [...], Intervenor-Appellant.  [...], Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff, v. [...], Third-Party Defendant.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM THE ORDERS ENTERED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, OCEAN COUNTY, DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] As an initial matter, although some early cases described the “well-settled legal right” and “reasonable probability of success” as two separate prongs under Crowe, courts have long since merged these inquiries into one.  See, e.g., Newark, 469 N.J. Super at 387 (defining the prongs for preliminary relief as “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm; (3) a showing that on balance the harm to the moving party is greater than the harm to the party to be restrained; and (4) the public interest will not be harmed”); McKenzie v. Corzine, 396 N.J. Super. 405, 413 (App. Div. 2007) (same).  That makes sense: if there is a reasonable probability of success, there is logically an underlying right on which that probability is based.  See Waste Mgmt., 399 N.J. Super. at 528 (agreeing the “time-honored approach in ascertaining whether a party has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success” logically incorporates whether “the law upon which plaintiff’s claim is based is well-settled”).  In any event, the State’s claims plainly rest on well-settled legal rights.  As to substance, the State’s “underlying legal claim,” Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133, is explicit, well-recognized, and longstanding: the LAD.