ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] While [...] testified he believed there was an outstanding warrant for [...] and did not learn otherwise until they had left the scene, he also testified that he knew the database he relied on was not always accurate.  (1T68-5 to 69-18)  Specifically, [...] testified he personally recalled warrant information being inaccurate on two occasions, and that he was aware that it happens “fairly often to different officers. ”  (1T68-19 to 69-9)  [...] additionally testified officers “always call dispatch and have the operators confirm or deny they have an active warrant” because they know the information provided by the computer is not always accurate.  (1T28-9 to 28-12)  Knowing the warrant information the computer provides is inaccurate “fairly often” and must be confirmed by dispatch before they can make a lawful arrest, a reasonable officer would attempt to confirm the validity of the warrant before initiating a stop.
[brief] Indeed, the Model Nuisance Code, which respondent maintains preempts Ordinance 2017-17, regulates the unamplified human voice\(^1\).  Da 97.  Hence, Respondents argue both that an ordinance cannot regulate human voice and that the Borough’s ordinance is preempted by an ordinance that does just that.  Respondents admit there is no case interpreting the HRA’s provision addressing noise as “being either preempted by or deemed less specific than either the NCA or Title 26” yet points to Gannon v. Saddle Brook Twp. 56 N.J. Super. 76 (App. Div. 1959) as authority for the proposition that the HRA can in fact be --- \(^1\)
[brief] Plaintiffs successfully precluded [...] from telling the jury that [...] dismissed his battery claim against [...].  Plaintiffs moved in limine to bar evidence that [...] dismissed his battery claim against [...].  [1T 87:5-12].  [...] argued it was improper for Plaintiffs to argue [...] committed battery because “what plaintiff is trying to do is say it doesn’t matter whether I plead battery or negligence, I can dismiss the battery claims and I can still prove a battery .  . . .”  [1T 88:15-21].  If the trial court allowed [...] to introduce evidence of a battery, [...] requested it should have been be allowed to tell the jury [...] was not seeking to recover against [...] for battery.  [1T 93:20-93:2; 100:20-101:12].  Specifically, [...] argued that the voluntary dismissal of the battery claim was relevant to impeach [...]’s credibility because it would establish that [...] did not seek to recover a judgment against [...] for his alleged battery, but only as to [...] in an attempt to selectively recover against a large corporation.  Had the jury found [...] was liable for battery, no judgment could have been entered against him because Plaintiffs had dismissed that claim against [...].  [3T 18:21-19:11].  The court denied [...]’ request.  [3T 10:10-20; 19:12-15].  Instead, the trial judge allowed [...] to argue that Plaintiffs were only seeking to recover damages for negligence.  [3T 17:21 – 18:10].  D.
[brief] The defense further argued that the State told jurors that it “knew that all [its] witnesses’ were truthful, while defense counsel made no such claims. ”  (Db 16).  This assertion is simply incorrect.  At no time during its entire summation did the State ever comment on the truthfulness of its own witnesses, nor put forth any argument making such an implication.  In fact, the State did not point to or even highlight any of the police testimony.  The State told the jury the video they saw of the actual crime being committed was the best evidence, and not that of the detectives.  (16T:75-12 to 77-23).  The State reiterated that they – the jury – would supply the ultimate answer as to what they saw and what they believed happened.  Ibid.  However, the defense specifically vouched for and specifically touted the truthfulness of their witnesses.
[directive] Do you understand that if the court determines that you are drug dependent and also finds that you meet the criteria in 2C:35-14, you may be eligible to be sentenced to a mandatory period of N.J.S.A. special probation for the purpose of participating in a court-supervised drug treatment program (“Drug Court”)?  This criteria includes, but is not limited to, a finding that: (1) you are a drug or alcohol dependent person, and (2) that you were drug or alcohol dependent at the time of the commission of the present offense, and (3) that you did not possess a firearm at the time of the present offense or any pending charge, and (4) that you do not have certain prior disqualifying convictions, and (5) there is suitable treatment available for you, and (6) no danger to the community will result from your serving a “Drug Court” sentence.  no Formulário Promulgado pela diretiva 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11728-Portuguese página 1 de 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11728-Portuguese page 1 of 2
[brief] Without any of these concrete steps towards the hypothetical lawful procedure, there is simply no evidence that the police would have applied for an untainted search warrant.  Nor is there any evidence that that hypothetical search warrant would have been granted, because absent the mention of heroin in the actual search warrant there is no probable cause to search the Mazda.  In sum, the police in this case took a flagrantly illegal shortcut when they entered the car and searched the glove compartment without a warrant and without giving the cars’ occupants an opportunity to retrieve the credentials.  In trying to justify this search, the State is essentially asking to avoid the exclusionary rule because “if we hadn’t done it wrong, we would have done it right. ”  LaFave, Search and Seizure, §11.4(a), at 352-53.  That is not what the inevitable discovery doctrine means, and this Court should reject the argument.  The State failed to present competent, clear, and convincing evidence that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied to save the otherwise illegally seized evidence from exclusion.  Inevitable discovery does not apply to save the police from their misconduct in this case.  This Court should reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
[directive] Você conversou com um advogado sobre a possibilidade de ser condenado a cumprir um período obrigatório de suspensão condicional de pena especial para participar em um programa de tratamento de drogas supervisionado pelo tribunal (“Tribunal de Drogas”)?  Se a resposta for “Não”, prossiga à pergunta 6.  Se a resposta for “Sim”, prossiga à pergunta 7.
[brief] (Dta1320.)  Therefore, [...] recognized that, in order for it to deny coverage to [...] for the underlying action, it “would need to have received a request to cancel flat to unenroll [cancel] them [[...]].”4  (Dta851.)  [...] also contemporaneously internally conceded: “We don’t have a copy of any request. ”  (Dta1320.)  From [...]’s perspective, the terms “cancellation” and “unenrollment,” mean the same thing.  [...]’s designated deponent, its “national head of wrap-up” policies, testified that [...] equates “unenrollment” with “cancellation”:  “You’re either enrolled in the wrap or you’re not enrolled.  In this case you were enrolled and then we had to unenroll you.  We can say --- 4  The “flat” cancellation is pretext to cover for the fact that there is no notice of cancellation that complies with the notice required by the policy.
[brief] (Da110; Da146-49; Da151; Da171).  While the Revised Policy removed the Original Policy’s references to the specific “matters” requiring parental notification—including sexual orientation, transitioning, and gender identity or expression—it continued to make clear that notification “shall” be effectuated “whenever a student discloses an issue and/or exhibits behaviors that may have an adverse impact on the student’s physical and/or mental health, safety and or social/emotional well-being. ” (Da110).  It also still mandated reports by both “certificated and non-certificated” staff alike; indeed, while it added the requirement that the staff member provide notice to an administrator, it still required the staff member to make the report regardless of any directive from an administrator.  Ibid.  And the Revised Policy prohibited notification only when it is “based solely on a student’s actual and/or perceived protected characteristics under the [LAD].”  Ibid.  (emphasis added).  The Revised Policy also added a new section entitled “Duty of Candor and Confidentiality,” explaining “all staff members and administrators shall have a duty of candor with respect to all communications with parents required under this Policy,” and permitting only a narrow carve-out for circumstances involving a “risk of abuse or neglect as defined by N.J.S.A. § 9:6-1.
[brief] It is well established that the Appellate Division has the authority to decline hearing issues that have not been raised in the trial court.  See, *Firemen’s Ins. v. National Union*, 387 N.J. Super. 434, 450 (App. Div. 2006); *Henebema v. SJTA*, 430 N.J. Super. 485 (App. Div. 2013), aff’d 219 N.J. 481 (2014).  **Third,** the inequitable, reprehensible conduct relied upon by the Respondent goes well beyond the notion of truthfulness, as outlined on pages 69-70 of the Respondent’s principal brief.  **Fourth,** ignored by the Petitioner is the fact that the Chancery Division found that his testimony lacked truthfulness, concluding as follows: Petitioner’s testimony was contradicted by multiple fact witnesses, exhibits, and even his own testimony between his deposition and at trial.  This court does not find Petitioner to be a credible witness.  (Pa 25).  Thus, the Petitioner’s reliance upon Rule 608 and the principle of truthfulness lacks all merit.
[directive] New Jersey, 2.  Civil Part. by Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12564 (KROL Order 9) if Periodic review hearings shall be held pursuant to 4:74-7 to determine the committee R. 3. of continues to be dangerous to self, others, or property as a result mental illness and whether the committee continues to require involuntary confinement in an institution. of of  A copy this Order will be forwarded to the County Adjuster's Office by the Clerk the Court of within two (2) days its signing.  Date  Judge Prosecutor's Office: Defendant's Attorney: Name --------------- Name --------------- Address Address Telephone Number Telephone Number ---------- ---------- ---------------- Fax Fax  ---------------- Em ail ---------------
[brief] “We should not tolerate interpreting a trust --- 5 N.J.S.A. 3B:31-31 confirms explaining that “The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the terms to the settlor’s probable intent if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement. ” to provide benefits the settlor did not intend. ”  *In re Nelson*, 454 N.J. Super. 151, 163 (App. Div. 2018).  Finally, Defendants note that [...] concluded, after trial, that [...] misrepresented his intentions to the trial court with regard to the Boonton Property and his flip.
[brief] Plaintiff [...] (“Plaintiff,” “Appellant,” or “Lahoud”) appeals from two orders of the Law Division dated May 30, 2024 (the “Orders”).  By way of the Orders, the Law Division: (i) dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint and directed that Plaintiff arbitrate his claims against the defendant [...] t/a [...] (“Defendant” or “Respondent”); and (ii) denied Plaintiff’s cross motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Third Count of the Complaint.  In that Third Count, Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment, pursuant to New Jersey’s Declaratory Act, that the so-called arbitration provision invoked by Defendant was not enforceable because it was substantively and procedurally unfair.  To the best of Appellant’s knowledge all nine state high courts which have examined an arbitration provision comparable to the one before this Court have invalidated it.  Appellant is not aware of any state high court ruling the other way.  One state supreme court has likened this type of provision at issue to an agreement “between the rabbits and the foxes. ”  Through this appeal, Appellant invites New Jersey to join the majority position rejecting non-mutual arbitration provisions as violative of sound public policy.  Case law holds that agreements to arbitrate disputes generally should be enforced.  The overarching question before this Court is what constitutes an actual “agreement to arbitrate” that promotes the public policy favoring arbitration.
[brief] [...] graduated from the 94th Academy Class of the New Jersey State Police.  Pa56.  [...] retired from the New Jersey State Police on a Special Retirement on or about June 1, 2008.  Pa56.  Pa86.  On or about September 15, 2001, and September 16, 2001, [...] was dispatched to Ground Zero.  Pa58.  On or about July 8, 2019, “The Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act” was signed into law (hereinafter referred to as the “Ricci Act”).
[brief] The Court denied the existence of any clerical mistake in relation to interest calculation.  As to seeking attorney’s fees, the Court denied Appellant’s request.  The Court concluded that Appellant is a pro se litigant in this matter, and accordingly, is not entitled to any award of attorney’s fees or costs.  The Court noted that Appellant is no longer licensed to practice in the State of New Jersey and this matter concerns a former New Jersey attorney making efforts to collect his own outstanding debt.
[brief] Note: The Trial Judge’s Statement of Reasons are included with the Orders in the Appendix along with the February 14, 2024 Order Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law.  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## CASES  **Carmichael v. Bryan,** 310 N.J. Super. 34, 49 (App. Div. 1998)  .................................. 50  **City of Trenton v.  Lenzner,** 16 N.J. 465, 476, 109 A.2d 409 (1954) ................................. 29  **Curtis v. Finneran,** 83 N.J. 563, 570 (N.J. 1980) ..............................................  40  **In re Guardianship of R.G. and F.,** 155 N.J. Super. 186 , 195, 382 A.2d 654 (App.Div. 1977) ............ 50  **In the Matter of the Trust of Violet Nelson,** 454 N.J. Super. 151 (App. Div. 2018) ................................. 27, 33, 34, 37  **Klier v. Sordoni Skanska Const. Co.,** 337 N.J. Super. 76 (App. Div. 2001) ................................. 24, 25, 26  **Newark Publishers' Assn. v. Newark Typographical Union,** 22 N.J. 419 (N.J. 1956) .................................................. 32  **New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Services v. A.W.,** 103 N.J. 591 , 617, 512 A.2d 438 (1986) ............................. 50 **Oscar v. Simeonidis,** 352 N.J. Super. 476, 487-88 (App. Div. 2002) ....................... 29 **State v. Gorga,** 26 N.J. 113, 115-16 (1958) .............................................. 29 **State v. Silver,** 92 N.J. 507, 513-14 (N.J. 1983) ........................................... 29 **State v. Standard Tank,** 284 N.J. Super. 381 (App. Div. 1995) ................................. 37 **Tagayun v. AmeriChoice of N.J., Inc.,** 446 N.J. Super. 570, 577 (App. Div. 2016) ......................... 42, 43 **Village of South Orange v. Alden Corp.,** 71 N.J. 362, 368 (1976) .................................................. 29 **Wilburn v. Mangano** 851 S.E.2d 474, 478 (Va. 2020) ........................................... 32 STATUTES N.J.S.A. 3B:3-33.1(b) Settlor’s intention ..................................
[brief] Appellant misleadingly suggests that the trial court was curious about the actions of Respondent when not immediately rehiring Appellant, but omits the remainder of the trial court’s analysis which states that there is no evidence in the record that Appellant was in a protected class or had identified a clear mandate of public policy so any further analysis was unnecessary.  Appellant then goes on to outright misrepresent some of the facts of the case below.  Appellant was offered her job back.  Pa088; Pl. Dep. T. 75:13–16.  Appellant’s framing of the actual timeline of events is also misleading as Appellant chose to send her e-mail after an all-employee meeting between [...], Senior Vice President of Claims for [...], and the employees of the claims department and in response to a follow-up e-mail from [...] outlining [...]’s plans for potential remote work.  Appellant’s argument falls flat as her allegation that a discriminatory animus existed is contradicted by the fact that all the employees on the e-mail exchange were terminated, not just Appellant.  If an employee can establish a *prima facie* case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions.
[brief] The lower court erred in deciding as a matter of law that Respondents did not represent [...] during the relevant period for the contest of [...]’s Will.  Our Supreme Court has recognized that attorneys may owe a duty of care to non-clients when the attorneys know, or should know, that non-clients will rely on the attorneys' representations, the lawyer invite or acquiesce in the non-client's reliance, and the non-clients are not too remote from the attorneys to be entitled to protection.  *Petrillo v. Bachenberg*, 139 N.J. 472, 483-84 (1995).  New Jersey law adopts a broad view when considering the existence of an attorney client relationship for legal malpractice purposes.  In *Petrillo v. Bachenberg*, a buyer of real estate received a misleading test report from the seller's attorney and relied on it in making the purchase.  Although the defendants did not represent the buyer, our Supreme Court recognized that a limited duty may exist where an attorney knows or reasonably should know that a nonclient will rely on the attorney's representation or opinion.  *Id.* at 483–84.  In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court, engaged in an exhaustive analysis to carefully balance the attorney’s duties to the client against the potential duty to the nonclient.  *Id.* at 479-80.  The Court then considered our system of discipline to determine whether recognizing a remedy in favor of a nonclient would conflict with or supplement those deterrents.  *Id.* at 479.  Finally, the Court turned to other sources for further persuasive support, including decisions published in other jurisdictions and scholarly commentaries.  *Id.* at 480–82.  In the end, the Court concluded that the rule expressed in the *RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS* that would permit such a suit was consistent with our established jurisprudence.  See *Petrillo*, 139 N.J. at 483–84.
[brief] . . . .  Aa0035 i. USGS Quad Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Aa0037 ii. Tax Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Aa0038 iii. County Road Map . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Aa0039 c.  Section 3 – Proof of Public Notice
[brief] Taken in toto, defense counsel’s repeated speaking objections, the over-long pervasive sidebars on every objection, the attempted relitigation of every issue defendant lost pretrial, the limiting of plaintiff’s experts including what words they could or could not use deprived plaintiff of a fair trial.  “As our Appellate Division has aptly observed, ‘a trial is a dynamic organism which can be desensitized by too much error or too much curative instruction. ’  Diakamopoulos v. Monmouth Med. Ctr., 312 N.J. Super. 20, 37 (App. Div. 1998).  In the appropriate circumstances, therefore, a new trial may be warranted when ‘there were too many errors [and] the errors relate to relevant matters and in the aggregate rendered the trial unfair. ’"  Pellicer, supra, 200 N.J. at 55.  Plaintiff is entitled to a fair trial, which she did not get here.
[directive] The pursuing officer shall terminate the pursuit under the following circumstances: (a) if instructed to do so by a supervisor; (b) if a supervisor has not affirmatively authorized the continuation of the pursuit after being notified and given an opportunity to assess the situation; (c) if the officer believes that the danger to the pursuing officers or the public outweighs the necessity for immediate apprehension of the violator; (d) if the violator’s identity is established to the point where later apprehension may be accomplished and where there is no imminent threat to the safety of the public or police officers; (e) if the pursued vehicle’s location is no longer known or the distance between the pursuing vehicles and the violator's vehicle becomes so great that further pursuit is futile; (f) if there is a person injured during the pursuit and there are no police or medical personnel able to render assistance; (g) if there is a clear and unreasonable danger to the police officer or the public.  A clear and unreasonable danger exists when the pursuit requires that the vehicle be driven at excessive speeds or in any other manner which exceeds the performance capabilities of the pursuing vehicles or police officers involved in a pursuit; or (h) if advised of any unanticipated condition, event, or circumstance that substantially increases the risk to public safety inherent in the pursuit.
[directive] Hence, the Statute applies when setting monetary bail on or after January 1, 2017 but the advisory monetary ranges in the Bail Schedules do not apply to eligible defendants under the Criminal Justice Reform Law.  No 10% bail for any crime or offense involving domestic violence, as defined in 2C:25-19, where the defendant was already subject to a temporary or permanent restraining order, pursuant to 2C:25-17, and is charged with a crime committed against a person protected under the order or where the defendant is charged with contempt pursuant to 2C:29-9.
[brief] The bank did assume the responsibility of payment of [the Receiver’s] fee. ”  The Bank paid the Receiver at the rate of $300.00 per hour.  Ca141.  In other words, [...] unilaterally decided that the Court’s Order was excessive and arranged to be paid by the Bank at $300.00 per hour without Court approval of this new fee arrangement.  “I never received any fees or other reimbursement from the funds of the diner, but was paid by [...] on an hourly basis.