ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (26T37:7-9).  - [...] was shown extracts of the [...] MR line of credit account from the company’s QuickBooks software and was able to tie the transfer of $90,000 from that account to an October 2015 bank statement, which showed the funds were transferred to an account ending in 0319, which Plaintiffs established belonged to the [...].  (Da845; 13T24:14-21).  Misappropriation #7: $50,000 transferred from [...]’s bank account on October 28, 2015 to [...]’s bank account ending in #8309.  (26T37:9-11).  -  [...] was shown extracts of the [...] bank account from the company’s QuickBooks software and was able to tie the transfer of $50,000 from that account to an October 2015 bank statement for the company, which showed the funds were transferred to an account ending in 8309, which Plaintiffs established belonged to [...].  (13T24:22 to 25:13).  Misappropriation #8:
[brief] **Foreclosure Action**  On August 4, 2023 (more than three years after the bankruptcy trustee commenced the adversarial proceeding against Plaintiff and more than one year after the Plaintiff reached a voluntary settlement with the bankruptcy trustee) Plaintiff filed a foreclosure complaint against Defendants seeking to first reinstate and then foreclose on the First Mortgage that was discharged on January 29, 2018.  (Pa1-4).  Furthermore, the complaint sought to foreclosure on the Second Mortgage, arguing that Defendants default on the First Mortgage (caused by the adversarial proceeding filed by the bankruptcy trustee against Plaintiff in which Plaintiff reached a voluntary settlement with the trustee) constituted a default under the Second Mortgage’s cross-collateralization provision.  (Pa4-5).  On October 13, 2023, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the foreclosure complaint with prejudice.  (Pa10).  On November 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed a cross motion seeking to amend the foreclosure complaint to add a count for breach of contract.  (Pa57).  On December 5, 2023, the Foreclosure Court, the Honorable [...] presiding, heard oral argument on both motions.  (Pa92; T3:1-13:18).  On January 22, 2024, the Foreclosure Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the foreclosure complaint with prejudice, stating that once a mortgage loan has been satisfied or paid in full, the mortgage that secures the obligation is no longer a valid lien.  The effect of the satisfaction and extinguishment of the indebtedness for which the mortgage was collateral, is to discharge and extinguish the mortgage.  See Atwater v. Underhill, 22 N.J. Eq. 599, 602.  If a mortgage has been discharged, evidence of discharge constitutes a valid defense to any subsequent foreclosure action.  Here, Plaintiff accepted payments in satisfaction of the mortgage from a business entity related to Defendants.  Plaintiff could have litigated the preference action to conclusion but did not.  Plaintiff could have moved to vacate the discharge but did not.  Plaintiff cannot now foreclose on Defendants five years after it recorded a discharge.  It lacks standing.  The Foreclosure Court then denied Plaintiff’s cross motion to amend the complaint because it was “futile. ” (Pa97-98).  On March 1, 2024 Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal.  (Pa100).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I
[brief] A prospective condemnor must demonstrate why it is taking a property at that time.  Here, prior to filing and during the “bona fide negotiations” period required by N.J.S.A. 20:3-6, the Township alleged the taking was in the public interest for open space without acknowledging the land swap.  Only after challenged by the defendants did the Township acknowledge the swap with the Developer, but still the public record is devoid of any meaningful indication of how the subject properties will be utilized by the Township and there are no limitations on the Developer’s use of the property it is receiving.  Clearly the Township failed to articulate such a proper public purpose for the taking, and trial court improperly found the Township sufficiently stated it had a proper public purpose to preserve the open space.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  ...........................................................................................................2  TABLE OF JUDGEMENT, ORDERS AND RULINGS .........................................................4  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................5  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..............................................................................................7  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....................................................................................................10  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................................11  ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................21  I.  THE TRIAL COURT’S OCTOBER 6, 2023  ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT  NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DID NOT MAKE A MOTION FOR JUDGMENT, OR THE EQUIVALENT, DURING TRIAL.  (Pa665-666; Pa1716)  ........................................21  II.  THE TRIAL COURT’S OCTOBER 6, 2023  ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THERE IS NO CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW.  (Pa665-666; Pa1716).  ..................................................................................................................25  III.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND DEFENDANT TO BE THE PREVAILING PARTY AS SET FORTH IN ITS MARCH 11, 2024 ORDER.  (Pa665-666; Pa1717)  .........................................................40  IV.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS TO DEFENDANT BY ITS MARCH 11, 2024 ORDER, INCLUDING THOSE FEES AND COST ASSOCIATED WITH CERTAIN LIMITED PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS UPON WHICH DEFENDANT DID NOT SUCCEED.  (Pa665-666; Pa1717).  .................................................................44  V.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED  ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS TO DEFENDANT BY ITS MARCH 11, 2024 ORDER AND PROPERLY FOUND DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL’S FEES TO BE REASONABLE AND THAT THE APPLICATION CONTAINING COUNSEL’S SUPPORTING CERTIFICATION THAT SETS FORTH THE FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION UNDER RPC 1.5(a).  (Pa665-666; Pa1717)..................47  CONCLUSION
[brief] It is the plaintiff’s contention that her story as to how the accident happened is “undisputed,” (Pb48).  This is not the case.  The defendant disputed that the plaintiff’s fall was caused by the wheel of her rollator striking the base plate of the roof support column.  The jury was presented with differing versions of the cause of the plaintiff’s fall and was free to accept or reject either version based on their determination of her credibility and all of the other evidence presented at trial by all parties.
[brief] *Rule* 4:9-2 in pertinent part provides:  When issues not raised by the pleadings and pretrial order are tried by consent or without the objection of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings and pretrial order.  *[Rule 4:9-2, emphasis added.]*  Plaintiffs relied on the LGEL, which clearly outlines an administrative procedure that follows the proper submission of a complaint.  At no point did plaintiffs move to amend their complaint to include a cause of action under the common law sounding in conflicts of interest.  Defendants, moreover, explicitly objected to the court not having jurisdiction over the matter.  Defendants objected to expanding the matter to include common law conflict of interest claims.  Plaintiffs claim defendants did not contest the issue as to if a conflict of interest exists and instead advanced technical arguments having no basis in law or fact.  (Pb at 19).  This is not simply false.  It ignores that plaintiffs never properly framed the argument that a conflict of interest existed outside of the LGEL.  Plaintiffs relied on the LGEL at the trial level and failed to articulate any elements of common law conflict of interest.  The trial court judge did not—and could not—on her own motion amend the pleading to include the common law conflict.
[brief] “No statute is to be construed as […] making any innovation upon the common law which it does not fairly express. ”  Oswin, supra, 129 N.J. at 310 (quoting 3 [...], Sutherland Statutory Construction § 61.01, at 77 (4th ed. 1986) (footnote omitted) (quoting Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1880)).
[brief] Her own testimony clarifies that she was merely uncomfortable watching [...]’s outpouring of frustration.  (Pa301 at 93:2-4 (“But when he said to [...], let me guess, [...] didn’t do anything about it, she lost it.  She came out of her office screaming. ”); Pa301 at 96:10-15 ([...] walks to the door in an attempt to avoid the situation); Pa302 at 98:7-14 ([...] thought she was “going to pee [her] pants, not even kidding you”)).
[brief] Defendant was also ordered to pay the usual fees and penalties.  (Da 8; Da 11)  On April 21, 2023, defendant filed his notice of appeal, and then filed an amended notice of appeal on May 11, 2023.  (Da 13 to 17)  --- \(^1\)  Codefendant [...] was charged with the same crimes as defendant, but in Counts One, Three, and Five.  \(^2\)  Da – defendant’s appendix to this brief  PSR – presentence report  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] viii.  The Chancery Division Judge (Trial Court) Abused Its Discretion And Erred When It Failed To Respect To Plaintiff's Choice Of Forum because it Was Entitled To Preferential Consideration  Plaintiff has a right to choose his forum, the Trial Court's management actions in this case made great effort to interfere with that right.  "Stated another way, the plaintiff's choice of forum is "entitled to preferential consideration."  Tatham v. Tatham 429 N.J. Super. 502 (App. Div. 2013)  Generally, however, the plaintiff has a choice of any forum where there is appropriate jurisdiction over the defendant.  American Employers' Insurance v. Elf Atochem North America, Inc. 280 N.J. Super. 601 (App. Div. 1995)  Therefore, venue provisions should be construed most favorably for the plaintiff, and as long as the initial selection of a forum is not inconsistent with these rules, only the strongest showing of inconvenience to the defendant should deprive a plaintiff of his legal right to have the action tried in the county of his choice.  Doyley v. Schroeter 191 N.J. Super. 120 (Law Div. 1983)  Accordingly the plaintiff had the right to lay the venue in the county of her residence, and the court will not change the venue on the ground of inconvenience, upon any nice balancing of circumstances of mere accommodation to the parties; over these, the legal right of the plaintiff must prevail.  Simanton v. Moore, 65 N.J.L. 530; Tonkin v. Hankinson 185 A. 532 (N.J.1936)  "Ordinarily, a plaintiff's choice of forum will be honored by a court that has jurisdiction over a case.
[brief] When I turn on the news and weather reports that a storm is expected to hit in some area I see residents taking action to protect their property.  Whether it is filling sandbags, nailing up plywood, getting gasoline for generators, they are doing what they can.  Management had ample notice of Ida’s approach and yet took no observable action in spite of what had occurred in 2014 until after Ida had passed and that is when Defendant brought in sandbags and crews to make repairs and improvements.
[brief] In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007) (relying on Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).  Ordinarily for quasi-judicial or rule-making final agency action, there is a substantial body of material comprising the record.  In appeals from final agency action outside of such settings, there similarly must be a sufficiently developed record to permit a reviewing court to engage in meaningful review.  See In re Issuance of Permit by DEP, 120 N.J. 164, 173 (1990) (relying on State v. Atley, 157 N.J. Super. 157, 163 (App. Div. 1978)) (noting necessity of agency fact-finding to facilitate appellate review).
[brief] *See id.* at 479.  The Court in *Boyle* studied the language of the provision at issue (in the bylaws of a condominium association) and concluded that – although certain language in the indemnification provision could be read broadly to suggest coverage for both first party and third party claims – a review of the entire provision, in context, led to the conclusion that the provision was *only* intended to allow for the recovery of attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with third-party claims.
[brief] The Application or Site Plan (Da13-22) did not reference or depict any on-going or proposed off-site parking use by Lot 8 staff/attendee of the Lot 5 property.  In fact, as Lot 5 had insufficient parking capacity on site for the expanded school, the application required a parking variance for the expanded School use (Da18-20).  The [...] received Notice of the Variance/Site Plan Application and participated in the Public Hearing.  The records (Da13-22) established that there was no claim by either the School or Synagogue for a Zoning approval for Lot 8 staff/attendee vehicles to utilize the School property as an off-site parking area, or that such a parking use/right existed.  The representation by both parties was "although the evidence presented indicates parking provision (for the school on Lot 5) to be less than those required pursuant to the existing ordinance, the applicant (the school) will have the benefit of parking facilities on adjoining properties owned by ([...]) should additional parking facilities be required".
[brief] [...] presented no competent evidence to the contrary, and no plausible explanation has been, or could be, given for the transmittal of the confirming schedule with [...]’s own words, “[a]s [[...] had] requested. ”  See Ex. P21.  [...] failed to provide any explanations for (i) why his Director of Accounting would calculate amounts due and owing after the closing, or (ii) why [...] transmitted the schedule to [...] more than three months after the closing.
[brief] *See In re Increase of Fees by the New Jersey Board of Dentistry*, 84 N.J. 582 (1980) (ordering the Board of Dentistry to refund fees collected under a judicially invalidated fee schedule, though the appealing professional association had not sought a stay).  Second, [...] incorrectly assumes that stays are granted automatically as of right, and that [...] would have obtained a stay of the OOS if he had filed for one sooner.  Contrarily, as the Commissioner of Education (the “Commissioner”) made clear in denying [...]’s application for a stay of the OOS, she would not have granted that extraordinary remedy in any event:  *Furthermore, even if the Commissioner relaxed the time limitations, appellant’s motion must be denied.*  Pursuant to *N.J.A.C. 6A:4-4.1(b)*, a motion for stay is considered an extraordinary remedy that may only be issued upon a finding that appellant has met each prong of the four-pronged standard for the granting of interim relief set forth in *Crowe v. DeGioia*, 90 N.J. 126 (1982).
[brief] Da223-29 (Ex. P21).  The trial court concluded that “the schedule is clear, that it was transmitted a few months after the closing, and that its intent speaks for itself; it was to outline the express terms of the new third loan. ”  Da25, n.15 (emphasis added).  Making its conclusion that the parties entered into a new loan, the trial court further opined:  While the principal sum of the third loan represents a work-out of unpaid amounts due and owing by [...] under [the] first and second loans, the third loan was new, independent loan obligation with new terms.  This Court also finds the new terms included an interest rate of ten percent (10%) per annum, and the requirement [that] [...] would pay off the loan as soon as he was able to do so.
[brief] (Pa669, Pa796-98, Pa1004-5, Pa1006-1021)**  The Trial Court held that both [...] and [...] are not responsible for sexual harassment because the harassment involves employees of each respective entity.  3T. 91:15-92:11 (finding that [...] is “not an appropriate defendant,” and Appellant did not have a “close enough nexus” with [...] to sustain a LAD claim).  Such a holding contradicts the basic tenants of the NJLAD.  *Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods*, 290 N.J. Super. 252, 269 (App. Div. 1996) (“An employer that knows or should know its employee is being harassed in the workplace, regardless of by whom, should take appropriate action”).  For this reason, alone, reversal is warranted.  Further, while the Trial Court did not fully address the subject in its analysis, on this appeal, [...] argues that Appellant’s claim was properly dismissed because Appellant failed to meet the *Pukowsky* factors required for Appellant to establish a joint employer relationship.
[brief] Specifically, Plaintiff’s counsel admitted to the Court the following:  [PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL:]  The claim against [...] is that when we were in touch with them to say we were pursuing this, and as I said it had been adjourned a number of times already, we were told by Old [...] that she'd been informed that the deal was on hold, which was different than rescheduling the closing date.  She was suggesting perhaps that it was held in abeyance or that -- and so it was in response to Old [...] telling us that – THE COURT: Was that representation made before or after the breach was declared?  [PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL:]  It was made after the breach was declared, so Old [...] was therefore aware that we were pursuing our rights under the contract and intended – fully intended to be involved at the closing to pursue our rights, we had also put it in writing numerous times.  * * *  [PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL:]  we were relying on [Old Republic’s representative] to tell us when the deal was rescheduled because she told us it was on hold and at which point–and she knew we were looking to pursue our rights with [...] under the contract.  She also, having been a party to the contract, was aware that Section 13.1 gave us a right to pursue not only the return of the earnest money deposit but to pursue specific performance under the contract.  . . .”  * * *  THE COURT:  So, what did they not do because of this e-mail in September?  What did they not do?...  [PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL:]  Our client, had we known about the scheduled -- that the closing was not on hold but, in fact, was in the works and was being covertly done behind our backs, could have and would have reached out to [...] and/or put a lis pendens on the property.  Our client had an interest in seeing this whole thing through rather than throwing a lis pendens down right away because that could have -- THE COURT: Now -- I got you.  [...]: -- thrown out the whole deal.  . . .” (1T7:15-8:6; 1T10:16-23; 1T11:24-12:12).  These admissions echo the allegation in the Complaint that:  Had [Old Republic] not participated in Defendant [...]’s breach of contract by failing and omitting to keep Plaintiff informed about the transaction, Plaintiff would have [sic] immediate steps to protect its legal interest to prevent the closing from going forward in Plaintiff’s absence (Pa11-12, ¶ 46).  However, because the PSA had been terminated, Plaintiff was not permitted to seek specific performance at the time the [...] transaction closed.  Therefore, it cannot be said as a matter of law and logic that it was Old Republic’s conduct that prevented Plaintiff from it going forward with the purchase of the Property.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 253, 265.  That is because, in common parlance, the statutory term “non-transparent” only means not “able to be seen through. ”  *Id.* at 265, 265 n.3 (citing the Merriam-Webster dictionary definition).  The Court thus affirmatively rejected the State’s contrary argument that under N.J.S.A. 39:3-74, “drivers … may not add any tint to front windows or windshields. ”  Id. at 257.  The Court emphasized that, for a warrantless stop of a motor vehicle for “non-transparent” windows to be upheld, it is insufficient for the State to prove that windows were tinted, or even darkly tinted.
[brief] No evidence was presented at trial that the Decedent had a joint account or used her income towards the marriage.  Another unsupported finding is that “the original antenuptial agreement was in the Rubbermaid box that Decedent described to [...]. ” (P23a).  The Court found that Petitioner had full control of the home and Rubbermaid box and “one could argue that petitioner was in procession of the original given the testimony of the lost Rubbermaid box. ” (P36a).  The Courts is replete with conjecture, speculation and far-reaching assumptions.
[brief] *State v. Diaz-Bridges*, 208 N.J. 544, 571-72 (2012) (disagreeing with this Court’s conclusion that “go home” was an invocation of silence only because it was said while detectives were not inside the interview room), overruled on other grounds by S.S., 229 N.J. at 379-81.  Here, [...] unambiguously invoked his right to silence eight times before questioning ceased -- three times by directly asking to “go home” and five times by saying he had “nothing” else to say:
[brief] If so, was it proper to count a write-in vote cast on a machine for a candidate who also appeared on the ballot despite mandatory legislative prohibitions and binding Appellate Division decisions directing that such ballots are void.  The answer to both questions is no.  Fire district elections are overlooked in our political discourse.  They are nonpartisan elections held in the proverbial “dark of night” on the third Saturday in February from 2 p.m. to 9 p.m.  Often run not much different than a high school student council election (which may have more participation), some districts continue to use paper ballots which are filled out by hand and dropped into a locked box.
[brief] Under New Jersey’s retroactivity principles, the result is the same.  Three factors guide the analysis: “(1) the purpose of the rule and whether it would be furthered by a retroactive application, (2) the degree of reliance placed on the old rule by those who administered it, and (3) the effect a retroactive application would have on the administration of justice. ”  *G.E.P.*, 243 N.J. at 386 (quoting *State v. Henderson*, 208 N.J. 208, 300 (2011)).
[directive] Rather, it is designed to ensure that agencies utilize best practices, including integrating mental health professionals into the response.  Mental health professionals, with appropriate education, requisite experience and familiarity with law enforcement response procedures, can bring unique perspective and expertise in dealing with a person experiencing a mental health crisis.  With input informed by access to patient information, mental health professionals can provide additional tools and resources to maximize opportunities to successfully resolve delicate encounters with barricaded individuals.  1  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW.  Plaintiff’s Opposition erroneously suggests the Trial Court made factual findings that deserve deference.  (Opp 15)  Not true.  Its summary judgment decision is reviewed de novo.  (OB 16)  And the standard is not whether there is the “slightest doubt” as to an issue of fact (Opp 16), but whether the evidence is “sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.
[directive] 1st Degree $75,000 to $200,000  No 10%  Drug-Induced Deaths of CDS, is strictly liable for a death which results from the injection, inhalation or ingestion of that substance.  3rd Degree $5,000 to $10,000  10% permissible  Actor possesses CDS or Analog in Schedules I, II, III, or IV, other than if specifically covered