ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa 8-36).  Plaintiff’s motion to reinstate was filed over twelve years after the Federal District Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint, over eleven years after the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, and over ten years after the Federal District Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the order dismissing his complaint.  On September 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion to seal a document filed by Plaintiff himself on eCourts in support of his motion to reinstate, that referred to Plaintiff’s expunged criminal convictions.  (Pa 37 - 57).  On December 5, 2022, Plaintiff filed what he called a motion for summary judgment, asking the trial court to order a jury trial on the Complaint that had been dismissed in Federal Court in 2010.
[brief] [...] gave up all of the constitutional rights attendant to his right to a trial when he lost two critical pretrial motions.  The unfavorable suppression ruling was linchpin that allowed evidence of the crimes charged in one indictment to be admissible in a trial for the crimes alleged in the other indictment.  That loss made the evidence against him in both cases significantly worse for him.  And so he accepted a “final order to resolve this murder case as well as any other pending charges against Mr. [...][;]” in other words, a global, unified resolution to all charge.  (1T 5-1 to 6-1)  When the Supreme Court reversed the denial of the motion to suppress, the bargain was no longer as much of a benefit to [...].  And so he wants to withdraw from it, exactly as the conditional plea rule allows.  As to the State’s final argument against withdrawal, regarding the VRA, [...] responds only to note that the cursory argument is also tantamount to waiver.  *State v. Williams*, 461 N.J. Super. 80, 105 (App. Div. 2019) (declining to address a cursory argument raised in a footnote); *N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v.* Alloway Twp., 438 N.J. Super. 501, 505 n. 2 (App. Div. 2015) (“An issue that is not briefed is deemed waived upon appeal. ”).  CONCLUSION
[brief] *Why would an attorney knowingly IGNORE and willfully VIOLATE the law?*  It’s simple, TO GAIN AN ADVANTAGE!  When he CHEATS, he denies a defendant of his right to due process under the law.  For instance, the Plaintiff’s attorney knew as of February of 2014 that the defendants DISPUTED the action taken by [...] (Pa34-37).  By bad/improper service and/or notice, he denied the defendants of their right to dispute the bank’s claim filed in court a year later in February of 2015.  And in another instance, the defendant, [...], home address of [...]
[brief] [...], 2010 N.J. Agen LEXIS 826.  Perhaps most importantly, the Solicitation, consistent with the DOL’s interpretation of the term “Subcontractor”, expressly defined the archaeologist to be a subcontractor.  A fact that the trial court also ignored.  Even though the law and Solicitation define the archaeologist as a subcontractor, the trial court wrongfully accepted Respondents’ argument, that the archeological subcontractor was not required to be registered pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51a solely because of the false belief that the archaeologist is not “performing work at any construction site. ”  Clearly, the Project is “subject to the PWCRA” as it involves “construction . . . done under a contract and paid for in whole or in part out of funds of a public body. ”  N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.26; see also N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51 (defining “public work” as defined in N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.26).  Equally clear is that the Solicitation plainly and explicitly requires the archeological subcontractor to perform “work at [the] construction site” as contemplated by the PWCRA.
[brief] Here, the Commission chooses to ignore the Complainant’s citations of Citizens to Protect Public Funds v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Bd. of Ed., 13 N.J. 172 (1953), “Citizens”) in its entirety, which states:  The need for full disclosure of all relevant facts is obvious, and the board of education is well qualified to supply all the facts.  But a fair presentation of the facts will necessarily include all consequences, good and bad, of the proposal, not only the anticipated improvement in educational opportunities, but also the increased tax rate and such other less desirable consequences as may be foreseen….  The public funds entrusted to the board belong equally to the proponents and opponents of the proposition, and the use of the funds to finance not only the presentation of facts merely, but also arguments to persuade the voters that only one side has merit, gives the dissenters just cause for complaint.
[brief] I.  Plaintiff did not comply with procedural steps of R. 4:105-5.  Rule 4:105-5(a) states that the parties are to confer and agree on a briefing schedule for dispositive motions.  No conference was held.  Rule 4:105-5(b) specifies that the summary judgment motion, briefs and other relevant documents will be sent to Defendant, “with no motion date designated. ” (Emphasis Added).  Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment contained the designated motion date of November 4, 2022, despite the Rule’s strict admonition against doing so (Da9).  Rule 4:105-5(e) specifies that after the motion has been fully briefed, the movant shall certify that the matter is fully briefed and ask the clerk to place the motion on the court’s motion calendar for a motion date within 30 days of the submission date.  Plaintiff did not certify that the matter was fully briefed, as required by R. 4:105-5(e).  If, however, Plaintiff did make such certification, Defendant did not receive a copy as required by R. 1:5-1(a).  R. 4:105-5 applies to any motion brought pursuant to R. 4:46.  R. 4:105-5(a), (b) and (e) specify that certain procedural steps are required to be taken before summary judgment can be granted.  Because Plaintiff did not comply with either R. 4:105-5(a), (b) or (e), there was insufficiency of process.  For each and all of the above reasons, there was insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process, with the result that Plaintiff failed to effect service on the Defendant.  Consequently, because of the denial of due process, the lower Court lacked jurisdiction over the person of the Defendant and its grant of summary judgment is void.  “Lack of notice and sufficient service of process leading ultimately to lack of due process properly renders a judgment void. ”  In re [...], [...] (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Sep.27, 2001).  IV.
[brief] Complainants claim that "such a disclaimer would need to be very prominent in order to counteract the presumption that the school board member [who posts on social media] holds themselves out as a board member.  ... "  Cb25, citing Melnyk v. Fief, SEC Docket No. C64-18 (2019) (Ca269-CA273).  Melneyk contains no such holding.  The Commission's opinion in that matter merely notes that the Facebook post in question does not contain and disclaimer, *id.* at 4, followed by footnote that says that a disclaimer "*may* have avoided the appearance actual or perceived that the statements were made in Respondent's capacity as a Board member."  *Id.* at 4 n. 1.  (emphasis added), The footnote went on to say that "even if an appropriate disclaimer is used, the substance of a post/statement can, nevertheless, render the disclaimer meaningless."  *Ibid.*  This is a far cry from a holding that disclaimers are mandatory and that the absence of a disclaimer creates a "presumption" that the school board members who posts hold themselves out as a member of the board.
[directive] I.  Scope of Directive A.  This Directive applies to investigations involving the following types Types of Incidents. of incidents (“Law Enforcement Incidents”) occurring within the State of New Jersey: 1.  Any use of force by a law enforcement officer resulting in death; 2. Any use of force by a law enforcement officer resulting in serious bodily injury; 3.  Any use of deadly force (including the discharge of a firearm) by a law enforcement officer, regardless of whether such force resulted in injury; 4.  The death of any civilian during an encounter with a law enforcement officer; and 5.  The death of any civilian while in the custody of law enforcement.  B.
[brief] The Property was originally included in the court-approved plan.  Further, the 2016 Prior Approvals called for 215 residential units on the Property with a set aside of 43 affordable housing units on 50.3 acres of land.  It was not included due to any petition of the Respondents, as they were not a part of the Township’s Declaratory Judgment action as an intervenor, interested party, or otherwise, but instead, by the Township’s own determination that the site was a suitable option to assist the Township in meeting its affordable housing obligation.  The presence of the bald eagle’s nest and the resultant environmental constraint on the Property created a substantial reduction from 50.3 acres of developable land to 35.9 acres.  Given this substantial reduction, it was entirely reasonable for the Board to have anticipated a proportionate reduction in the Respondent’s project.
[brief] Pa76.  [...] promptly responded to the January 12, 2019 correspondence in a series of e-mails between he and Plaintiff during the period January 18, 2019 and January 25, 2019.  In these e-mails [...] asserts that he and [...] have no personal liability for the debts of [...].  On March 27, 2019, counsel for Mr. [...] and Mr. [...] issued correspondence to Plaintiff that discussed the prior termination of the lease and included the following unequivocal statement:  "It is my understanding that you have previously been advised that Mr. [...] and Mr. [...] no longer have any interest in [...] or in the leased premises.  This is additional notice of such facts.  Further this is notice that Mr. [...] and Mr. [...] have previously revoked (by reason of the lease termination described above) and hereby revoke again any personal guarantees that they have issued in the past that pertain to any lease obligations owed by [...] for the leased premises.
[brief] The judge explained how he was going to proceed in taking the plea and admonished the defendant that he was not trying to lead him into saying anything that wasn't true or that anything that anybody else wanted him to say and he understood that.  And [...] also said if you feel you're being forced into an answer or being forced to say something which is not true by the way I or any attorney asks you a question, let me know before you respond.  Do you understand that?  And the defendant answered yes.  He asked the prosecutor to place the agreement on the record.  The prosecutor did that.  There were a number of things placed on the record most of which is what I referenced in Paragraph 13 and 21 as to what the sentence recommendation was and what happened if they couldn't resolve the Pennsylvania matter.
[brief] The percentage of Block 24, Lot 12.02 that consists of wetlands is unknown as the exact location of wetlands on this property has not been determined by any measurement description.  Ja169, Ja170, Ja54 Line 9 to Line 15 and Line 20 to Line 23, Ja107 Line 19 to Ja108 Line 17, Ja245, Ja253.  5.  The Variance Plans provided with the [...] application and with the [...] application for front yard variance relief failed to provide an exact location of where wetlands are located upon Block 24, Lot 12.02.  The Variance Plans provided with both applications contained a dashed line showing an “approximate location of existing freshwater wetlands line taken from NJDEP Mapping.
[brief] This case arises out of a commercial lease where [...] became [...]’s new landlord.  [...] fell behind in rent payments and [...] filed a rent collection action.  That action was settled by the parties, with [...] agreeing to make certain rental payments and to vacate the premises by October 31, 2023.  When [...] was in the middle of cleaning up and repairing the parking lot (as it is a transportation company that allows trucks into its facilities that often damage the pavement), and before [...] was about to timely make the last of four settlement payments, [...] suddenly alleged that [...] had a vendor deposit fill at the premises, and [...] suddenly and unilaterally took over the premises.  [...] locked [...] out a month before [...] was supposed to vacate the premises under the settlement agreement.  [...] engaged in wrongful self-help.  Then [...] had the audacity to seek enforcement of a $796,484 Consent Judgment which [...] had previously executed pursuant to the Settlement Agreement simply to secure the four rental payments and its surrender of possession.  The Trial Court thankfully stopped that and held that [...] breached the settlement agreement and was not entitled to enforce such Consent Judgment.  The Trial Court agreed with [...]’s argument and position that if [...] alleged [...] damaged the premises, it could file a separate action, entitling [...] to defend itself, engage in discovery, retain experts and have the case fully adjudicated.  Instead, wanting a wrongful and egregious windfall for itself to compensate it for unproven allegations of contamination, [...] insists on summary enforcement of this huge Consent Judgment which related only to settlement of a rent action, a settlement which [...] itself breached.  [...]’s appeal is fatally flawed as it ignores a substantial fact—that [...] improperly took possession of the premises, which precluded the grant of its motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement.  [...] bore the burden of proof as the moving party to convince the Trial Court that no improper self-help had occurred.  It failed to carry that burden.  The Trial Court correctly held that [...] should not benefit from a breach that it caused, and that [...] is entitled to a full defense and adjudication of [...]’s “dumping” and “contamination” allegations in a separate lawsuit which [...] may file.  There was no error, and [...]’s appeal should be denied.
[brief] pay, in the current fiscal setting, I cannot award that amount.  (Emphasis added).  (Aa057-Aa058).  The arbitrator was obligated to make a reasonable determination of the issues.  The record reflected that the City budgeted 2% increases for this bargaining unit in 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023.  This is substantive and dispositive evidence of the City’s fiscal condition in the four (4) years prior to 2023.  Yet, the arbitrator disregarded this evidence in his analysis and only focused his financial analysis on a small snapshot, the time period of the “current fiscal setting” which was the arbitration hearings in 2023.  In failing to explain why he (a) saw the City’s financial condition under the narrow light of its fiscal status in 2023 and not the entire contract term 2019-2023; (b) used a small portion of the available statutory levy capacity; and (c) ignored the budgeted 2% increases for each year of the agreement, the arbitrator did not honor his statutory obligation.  Accordingly, the Award must be vacated and remanded.
[brief] [...] has been part of the technology industry since 1985.  1T34:23-25.  She had a 30-year career at [...] and other Fortune 50 Companies and her experience was the cornerstone for [...].  1T35:3-8.  (Aa515).  When Plaintiff left [...], her title was National Service Delivery Director, and she was making $140,000.00.  1T103:6-17; (Aa515).  Following [...], she worked at [...] (“[...]”) for several years, as VP of Operations earning a salary of $150,000.00.
[brief] 12.  The Defendants fully complied with all the on the record instructions given by the Court on February 8, 2024.  Defendants’ Amended Certified Answers and Objections attached as Defendants’ Exhibit “D” precisely confirming as to what was stated on the record by [...].  Since 2021, this case had the turnout of four (4) Hudson County Superior Judges who provided completely different instructions to the Defendants as the record reflects on February 8, 2024.  13.  The February 8, 2024, was the most recent case management in this matter during which [...] instructed on the record what is needed from [...] and [...] in order to restore the Defendants’ Answer and Counterclaims.  All [...] needed to do is to certify that she agrees to be bound by the answers provided by the member of 78 Summit Ave JC, LLC, as the Court can examine [...]’s Certification and that she is in complete compliance with [...]’s instructions on the record dated February 8, 2024.  14.  Based on the aforesaid, I request for the Cross Motion to Reinstate be granted, NO discovery is outstanding on behalf of the Defendants, 78 Summit Ave., JC LLC or [...].  [...] said that defendants had “added absolutely nothing to their discovery responses” following the March 6 hearing before [...].  But defendants did not have anything to add; they had no other documents or information to provide to the plaintiffs, as defendants certified in their discovery responses that they provided on February 20.
[brief] (1T80).  Plaintiff recounted to the court other red flags that he noticed.  For example, not one family member or friend of the Defendant attended their wedding in December 2020 or visited them for the 10 days they remained in his hometown.  (1T80-81).  Also, Plaintiff encouraged Defendant to visit his parents who had traveled to India in October 2021 and spend time getting to know them, to which she refused.  (1T81-82).  In October 2021, Plaintiff expressed concerns to his parents about possible misrepresentations by Defendant and wanted more time before proceeding with the marriage, but his parents reassured him and encouraged him to remain positive.  (1T83).  In November 2021, Plaintiff traveled to India for the cultural wedding (the “real” wedding, as they were already administratively married).  During this trip, Plaintiff brought up the topic of a prenuptial agreement with Defendant, emphasizing that it was not out of disrespect but due to his family’s efforts and investments, particularly his parents who worked hard and put significant savings into their dream house.  Plaintiff’s parents worked 18-hour days and purchased their dream house in 2018, investing $80,000 of their savings.  Defendant strongly opposed the idea, asserting that, as his future wife, trust should negate the need for a prenuptial agreement.  Plaintiff initially conceded, agreeing to forgo the prenuptial agreement.  Defendant then assured Plaintiff that even if the relationship turned sour, she would not seek financial gain from him, offering to reimburse him for expenses.  Plaintiff found this statement unsettling, expecting a positive discussion about their future together.
[brief] Second, the State’s arguments were not reasonable inferences based on the evidence but rather complete inventions by the prosecutor.  There was no doctor testimony that [...]’s taking of Adderall (medication he was legally prescribed) could not be mixed with marijuana (a legal drug at the time of the offense).  While the State has leeway to make reasonable inferences, it cannot be such an unfounded and denigrating leap that lacks any meaningful support in the record.  Ibid.  Lastly, this issue was not fleeting and was dwelled on heavily by the State in summation, further weighing in favor of this being reversible error.  Id. at 288.  It is true that defense counsel did try to pursue to some extent a voluntary intoxication defense at trial based on [...]’s Adderall use, but that still did not open the door to the kinds of arguments the State was making.  The proper retort to that argument is that [...] was not so substantially inebriated that it amounted to a voluntary intoxication sufficient to provide an absolute defense to the crime.  It did not in any way allow the State to baselessly argue that the Adderall and marijuana use made [...] delusional to the point of him committing a murder.  There was some testimony by [...] that [...]’s Adderall use exacerbated his mental health issues.  (7T221-6 to 8).  But again, Adderall use worsening to some extent his existing delusions is far different from the State’s characterization in summation that [...] was a drug-crazed psychotic maniac.  In fact, [...] specifically emphasized that [...] was already fully delusional before the Adderall.  (7T220-25 to 221-5).  Nor was there any testimony by [...] that mixing marijuana and Adderall specifically exacerbated his issues.  The State’s argument, conclusively improper under Mazowski and one of the State’s main theories of the case, substantially undermined [...]’s right to a fair trial and, in combination with the other similar errors, warrants reversal of his convictions and a remand for a new trial.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ counsel first admitted, in emails exchanged at the outset of the case, that Plaintiffs needed discovery to learn “what occurred during negotiations” between [...] and [...], “how [Plaintiffs] rights may have been affected, or what [[...]’s] role may have been. ” (Pa454a (emphasis added)).  When later responding to [...]’s discovery demands, Plaintiffs conceded that “the specifics of the negotiations, discussions, communications, and transactions between the defendants is presently unknown to the plaintiffs .  . . .” (Pa392a-Pa394a, Responses to Interrogatories 14-21, 23-24).  (emphasis added)).  Then, in responding to the Second 1:4-8 Letter, Plaintiffs wrote: “Once again, it is necessary for us to conduct discovery since we have no way of knowing the complete interactions between your client and [...], or whether there are remaining interactions that may be actionable. ” (Pa469a (emphasis added)).  It is simply beyond cavil that a plaintiff cannot pursue claims not known to exist and/or phantom damages, hoping they somehow will develop.  Even on *this appeal*, Plaintiffs effectively acknowledge that they did not have a good-faith basis for pursuing claims against [...].
[brief] CONTRARY TO RESTAURANT DEPOT’S CONTENTION, DEFENDANT BREACHED ITS DUTY TO PRESERVE EVIDENCE  Defendant, [...], claims that there was no basis for it to preserve the surveillance footage that existed on the date that Plaintiff was struck by a [...] U-boat because it alleges that it is undisputed that no video evidence of the actual incident exists.  Yet, such conclusion is premised solely upon its reliance on the judgment of [...] (“[...]”), who was assistant store manager at the time of Plaintiff’s incident.  [...] was the lone individual who reviewed the surveillance videos on the day of the incident to ascertain what was present on the footage and who ultimately determined, without consulting any other personnel, including personnel from the corporate office, not to retain footage simply because he could not find a clear video of the moment of impact.  (Pa96-Pa-97)  Similar to the Court’s recognition in Nagy v. Outback Steakhouse, Civil Action No. 19-18277(MAS)(DEA), 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29288, *1-22, *11-12 (D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2024) that “[i]t is unclear to the Court how a sophisticated litigant can reasonably expect to fulfill its duty to preserve evidence by leaving the responsibility of that preservation in the hands of [a] restaurant manager who is given absolutely no guidance as to Outback’s preservation duties,” [...]’s manager, who was tasked with preserving video, also had no guidance regarding the preservation of surveillance footage as evidenced by his decision not to preserve any footage whatsoever simply because he did not see the point of impact.