ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant [...] admitted he was travelling in excess of the 55 MPH speed limit when he observed the yellow light.  3T147.  He was 200 feet away, nearly the length of a football field.  Despite this, he made no effort to stop at the intersection nor did he slow at any point before entering the intersection.  3T149-150.  He did nothing to see if he could stop safely before getting to that intersection.  3T150.  In short, Defendant [...] “wanted to try to get through that light before it turned red. ”  3T150.  [...]’s failure to stop as required by the statute, his driving in excess of the speed limit, and his attempt to beat the light was negligent and the jury’s verdict assessing 40% against [...] was adequately supported by the facts.  [...] could have readily been assessed a majority of fault as opposed to just 40%.  Defendants are therefore are not entitled to the requested relief.
[brief] (Da969, Da971)  On June 25, 2019, the Appellate Court found that the Trial Court's determination --- that a permanent "easement" was established by the 1963 Agreement and had not been terminated or abandoned --- was unwarranted and invalid.  The Appellate Court remanded the case for a full evidentiary Trial as to all issues --- including what rights were created by the 1963 Agreement and whether the authority had been terminated or abandoned --- and vacated all [...]’s rulings.
[brief] After [...] indicated that there were in facts drugs in the car, the police had probable cause for an arrest and were required to read [...] his Miranda rights prior to asking him incriminating questions.  O’Neal, 190 N.J. at 616, 622 (holding that once an officer has probable cause to arrest, the officer is required to read a suspect his Miranda rights prior to questioning him because the suspect would not feel free to leave).  Because [...] did not read [...] his Miranda rights, all of [...]’ responses to [...]’s many questions, including those about whether he wanted to show [...] where the drugs were in the car, to whom the drugs belonged, where he got the drugs and the last time he did the drugs, must be suppressed.\(^{14}\) (1T 43-19 to 46-5)
[brief] (3T56:21-23).  This was repeated by defense counsel who also commented on the plaintiff being prescribed medications for these problems contrary to the parties’ agreement to not refer to medications.  (3T31:1-33:24; 3T86:4-21).  The unrelated medical history, falls, and treated was then repeatedly presented through witness testimony.  [...] was questioned about the prior diagnosis of neuropathy, a prior surgery to the plaintiff’s left hip, prior physical therapy records pertaining to balance and gait issues, and prior falls.
[brief] In Nielsen, supra., plaintiff fell at the [...], a multi-unit commercial condominium.  [...] had hired his employer, [...], to exterminate pests.  [...] directed plaintiff to access the various store entrances from the exterior of its unit.  Plaintiff slipped and fell in the exterior area around the perimeter of the unit, which was owned and maintained by the developer pursuant to the master deed.  Id., at 254-255.  The Nielsen Court found that under the particular circumstances presented, [...] had a duty to have addressed the hazard that had caused plaintiff to fall.  It based its holding on several factors; 1) the area where plaintiff fell adjoined [...]’s unit; 2) Customers could foreseeably use that particular area to access its store; 3) [...] had directed plaintiff to use that particular area in performance of his duties; and 4) [...] had a remedy if found liable for an injury that occurred on the developer’s property—its right to seek indemnification from the developer.  *Id.*, at 263-264.  None of the foregoing factors are present in the instant matter.
[brief] DA at 1a et seq.  Central to that ruling was the court’s mistaken finding that the route through Westfield was essential to the provision of a third connection to the substations.  The Court stated:  The Court finds that [...]'s motion for summary judgement must be granted as a matter of law.  New Jersey law requires that a public utility furnish safe, adequate and proper service.  N.J.S.A. 48:2-23.  Here, [...] seeks to install high capacity 69kV power lines to upgrade electric transmission and distribution lines throughout New Jersey to meet increasing electric demand and ensure a reliable energy infrastructure.  Further, the need for taller poles for the power lines is mandated pursuant to the National Safety Code which was adopted by the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities through N.J.A.C. 14:5-2.1.  Therefore, the Project is crucial for [...] to fulfill their statutory obligation to furnish safe and adequate utility services throughout New Jersey.  The Project is also necessary, and [...] properly routed the Project through Westfield.  DA at 6a.  The court then used this finding it made on disputed facts to justify its ruling that N.J.S.A. 48:2-23 required the route through Westfield because it was essential to the provision of adequate service.  Even the court’s reliance on that statute is improper at this stage of the dispute.  That statute specifically empowers the Board of Public Utilities (not the court), to issue a written order requiring the provision of safe, adequate, and proper service and to maintain its property and equipment in such condition as to enable it to do so “after public hearing. ”  N.J.S.A. 48:2-23 (emphasis added).  Here, the court just ignored the fact that the statute requires a written order (which, in turn, would need to be based upon findings) by the Board of Public Utilities after a public hearing; and here there is nothing in the record to show that the statutorily required written order was ever issued after a public hearing or that the BPU made any findings determining that the routing of the 69 kV line through Westfield was “require[d] [for] the provision of safe, adequate, and proper service.
[brief] Schafer v. Kent Cnty., No. 164975, 2024 WL 3573500, at *16 (Mich. July 29, 2024).  The Schafer court held that, even assuming arguendo, that a new rule was announced, the reliance interests, purpose of the rule, and effect on administration of justice strongly support retroactivity.  Schafer, 2024 WL 3573500, at *16.  The City attempts to distinguish Schafer on the grounds that “[u]nlike Michigan, New Jersey historically never recognized a property owner’s right to surplus equity in a tax foreclosure. ” (Resp. Br. 23–24).  This argument is relevant only to the threshold retroactivity question whether the decision at issue announced a new principle of law.  [...] held that it did not, although [...] mistakenly concluded otherwise.  (Op. Br. 14, n.3).  To support its assertion that the rule is new, the City cites a string of authorities meant to establish that strict foreclosure has always been the practice in New Jersey, but none of these cases address a challenge under the Takings Clause.
[brief] As our Supreme Court has recognized:  The quality of counsel’s performance cannot be fairly assessed by focusing on a handful of issues while ignoring the totality of counsel’s performance in the context of the State’s evidence of defendant’s guilt.  As a general rule, strategic miscalculations or trial mistakes are insufficient to warrant a reversal except in those rare instances where they are of such magnitude as to thwart the fundamental guarantee of a fair trial.  *[State v. Allegro*, 193 N.J. 352, 366 (2008) (quoting *State v. Castagna*, 187 N.J. 293, 314-15 (2006))].
[brief] While the issue in Goldsmith was an investigative stop, as defense counsel explained below: "[t]his case was not an investigatory stop."  (2T9-15).  As stated in Goldsmith:  [...] supported his suspicion of defendant by claiming that defendant was "coming out of a walkway between a vacant property which is known for the sales of [drugs] and weapons" after the two unidentified individuals walked away.  [...] testified that he was suspicious of defendant based on his training and experience that drugs and guns are often stored in walkways, because of general "reports [he had] been having in the area," and because of his belief that criminal activity was taking place at the vacant house.  --- 18  An investigative stop "is a procedure that involves a relatively brief detention by police during which a person's movement is restricted."
[directive] I.  The preservation of evidence to allow victims time in which to decide if they will release this evidence to a law enforcement agency.    Victims who do not report to a law enforcement agency at the time of their medical forensic exam may choose to have their SAFE Kit held for a five-year period.    These “held” kits shall be referred to as “Five-Year Hold Kits. ”    A Five-Year Hold Kit shall be retained for a minimum of five years.    For victims who are minors, the five-year retention period begins on the date the victim reaches 18 years of age.    To ensure victims’ privacy in the preservation and storage of the Five-Year Hold Kits (and applicable records), only case numbers and dates shall be used as identifiers.  See Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2011-1 - REVISION, Revisions to Attorney 8 General Law Enforcement Directive 2011-1 and the Attorney General’s Guidelines for the Retention of Evidence on Procedures for Retaining Sexual Assault Forensic Evidence (SAFE) Hold Kits and Extending the Time for Victims to Decide Whether to Report the Crime and Release Collected Forensic Evidence to Law Enforcement, Appendix XIII.  -15-  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
[brief] [Emphasis added.]  The focus here is on the bolded text because there is no contention that a debt collector’s communication with a mail vendor falls within a statutory exception or is made to one of the authorized recipients.  Every federal court to consider whether a communication with a mail vendor violates § 1692c(b) finds the ordinary meaning of those statutory words are unambiguous and concludes that such a communication violates that provision without leading to an absurd result by frustrating the FDCPA’s purposes.  To the contrary, the federal courts’ construction is consistent with the statutory scheme and promotes the statutory purpose of protecting consumers’ individual privacy.  In *Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs.*, 994 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2021) (*Hunstein I*) and *Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs.*, 17 F.4th 1016 (11th Cir. 2021) (*Hunstein II*), the court concluded that the consumer stated a claim for violation of § 1692c(b) when alleging the debt collector supplied information to a mail vendor used to generate, print, and mail a collection letter.
[brief] The Board’s lack of authority to act on Appellant’s application  Appellant presented an application to the Board on two alternative grounds: first, seeking an "interpretation" pursuant to N.J. S.A. 40:55D-70(a) and (b) as to whether the use of Lot 5 for vehicle parking by the staff, attendees, and other invitees of the synagogue on Lot 8 "was . . . legal or permissible without there being a proper variance and Site Plan approval" (Aa7; Aa10); and second, "[a]s an alternative application," "a determination and/or issuance of a certificate" under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 "as to the validity of the non-conforming use of portions of Lot 5" for parking purposes (Aa10-Aa11).  Appellant has since abandoned attempting to argue that the action it was seeking from the Board was in any way authorized by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70, and, for reasons that will be explained, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 is plainly inapplicable.  Turning first to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70, Appellant's application, coming approximately fifty-four years after the synagogue was built, and forty-six years after the Board’s resolution granting [...]’s use variance and site plan approval (Aa13-Aa22), was clearly not an appeal under subsection (a) from "any order, requirement, decision, or refusal made by an administrative officer," from which the Board may only entertain an appeal if brought within twenty (20) days under N.J.S.A. § 40:55D-72(a), nor does Appellant attempt to make that contention.
[brief] Indeed, [...] respectfully disagrees with the State that the record in Burney suggests that [...] created his maps manually and did not use mapping software.  (Sb31).  It is unlikely that David manually mapped “120-degree pie-shaped wedges” without using some sort of computer program.  Burney, 255 N.J. at 12.  [...]’s testimony regarding how the maps depicted the coverage areas was even more lacking than the testimony offered by [...] in Burney.
[brief] The Borough’s Third-Party Complaint asserted two claims for relief against [...].  Specifically, Count One asserted that to the extent (if at all) that [...] had retained any rights in Lot 3.01, that it forfeited those rights and that such rights passed to the Borough through the doctrine of adverse possession.  Count Two asserted that principles of equity require a determination that the Borough owns the entirety of Lot 3.01 as [...] slept on any rights that it may have retained in this parcel and failed to challenge the Borough’s open, notorious and adverse exercise of ownership rights over Lot 3.01.  [...] was served with the Borough’s Answer and Third-Party Complaint by publication of legal notice in a newspaper of general circulation in [...] in accordance with the requirements of the New Jersey Court Rules, as well as by posting a notice on the Property.
[brief] Incident with police Exhibit C-10 to [...]’s Certification Subpoena served on police Officers by [...] on 11/12/2020  Letter to [...] 10/27/2020 regarding trial scheduled when discovery incomplete non receipt of audio/videos and motion to suppress not heard (Attached at Pa078)  Letter to Judge and Prosecutor 11/20/20  Requesting Discovery Production of Expert Report of Chemist and Credentials  Incident Data Type/Offense as of 3/6/2020 involving [...] Complaint Summons dated 2/20/2020 (Attached at Pa041)  Officer Report by [...] 2/20/20 Discovery Checklist dated 5/5/2020 (Attached at Pa070)  Officer Report by [...] 2/20/20 (Attached at Pa022)  Police Department Record of Booking 2/20/22 (Attached at Pa074) Notice of Claim by Plaintiff to [...] 2/27/2020 ((Attached under C-7 at Pa053) [...]’ Letter Notice to [...] 6/19/2020 (Attached at Pa084) [...] 6/22/2020 letter to Edison Judge and Prosecutor (Attached at Pa078)
[brief] [...] asserted (no indication she was under Oath on the record) that she had been in the house since 1992, not 2013.  2T53-12  She admitted that a Lien was on the House and her husband told the Plaintiff to pay the Lien and then [...] and her husband would pay Plaintiff.  Then once Defendant paid the Plaintiff the house would return to Defendants.  But Defendant never put anything in writing.  2T53-12  Moreover, [...] asserted that she was not present at the time of the communications between Plaintiff and her husband because she was at chemotherapy with her mom.  But she told them to make sure that the house is being returned to Defendant but Plaintiff did not put in writing that the house will be returned back to Defendants.  2T53-20
[brief] The Trial Court Finds that the Defendants Misappropriated Funds  After 22 trial days, the lower court characterized this matter as “probably the most complicated case involving numbers” it had seen in 17 years on the bench.  (26T55:14-20).  In reaching a decision, [...] explained that he reviewed the record in painstaking detail: the transcripts, the exhibits including emails, balance sheets, spreadsheets, and the 44 schedules from [...]’s reports.  [...] also considered the demeanor of the witnesses to judge their credibility.  (26T6:8-20).  In the end, the trial court rejected almost wholesale the defendants’ theory: You know, the whole tenor of this from day one, and I remember it clearly, was that this is somehow a completely frivolous action, it is [seller’s] remorse.  It was just [...] waking up one day years later deciding that he just wants more.  And I reject that completely.  I know it started with certain accounting irregularities, and then this tax notice.  And maybe if [[...]] would have paid, . . . at that point [Mehta] might have been satisfied.  But that is just another indication that [the defendants] are going to fight . . . tooth and nail, like somehow the plaintiff is delusional.  Well, I didn’t find that he was delusional.  I found him credible.  I found Mr. [...] credible.  I found transactions which were diversions or misappropriations.  (27T74:21 to 75:13, emphasis added).  This is consistent with the Court’s findings (repeated several times) that the Defendant companies were “set up in a maze of accounts” and that “there was a maze and webs created.
[brief] *Carey* at 428.  This is due to the fact that the "total impact of singular offenses against different victims will generally exceed the total impact on a single individual who is victimized multiple times."  Id. at 429.  See also *State v. Roach*, 146 N.J. 208, 230 (1996)(consecutive sentences based on two convictions for felony murder not an abuse of discretion because of multiple victims); *State v. Jang*, 359 N.J. Super. 85, 97 (App. Div. 2003)(consecutive sentences for murder of wife and attempted murder of husband affirmed even without statement of reasons from sentencing judge as they "were individual crimes with two separate victims").  In *State v. Molina*, 168 N.J. 436 (2001), consecutive sentences were affirmed when the only *Yarbough* factor supporting the imposition of consecutive sentences was that there was multiple victims.
[brief] As explained earlier and in the Plaintiffs’ original Brief, even if it is theoretically possible for a sportsman nominated by the [...] to not be a member of that private organization, the fact that the Sportsmen’s Clubs have been given the power to control the majority membership of the Council is sufficient to render the underlying statutory framework unconstitutional.  It is the potential control given to a private organization over a regulatory body that offends Articles III and IV of the New Jersey Constitution.  Thus, the enabling statute should be deemed unconstitutional regardless of the nature of the interest group given majority control of the Council.  Additionally, proving the fact that the Council has a ‘pro-bear hunting bias’ that is ‘manifested in [its] policies’ (Sb13, n.6) is not essential to Plaintiffs’ constitutional argument, which applies regardless of the particular interest group given majority control of the Council.  That said, it has been nearly 50 years since the Humane Society decision was handed down.
[brief] *McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC*, 807 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2015) (strict liability); *Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A.*, 629 F.3d 364, 368 (3d Cir. 2011) (strict liability citing, in footnote 7, supporting authorities from the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits as well as the Seventh); *Taylor v. Perrin, Landry, deLaunay & Durand*, 103 F.3d 1232, 1238 (5th Cir. 1997) (single violation); *Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau*, 6 F.3d 60, 62-3 (2d Cir. 1993) (single violation).
[brief] 1T46:19-47:12.  In response to Defendants’ counsel’s claim that [...], Esq. “kept the records for the transfer,” [...] instructed Defendants to certify “[...] was the record-keeper and whatever records we have were provided, and you have to specify what the records are so there’s no confusion.  Don’t just say previously provided.  That’s not a valid answer. ”  1T47:5-48:2.
[brief] APPELLANTS’ MATERIAL DEVIATION ARGUMENT (DA001-DA006; DA020-DA046; Pltf. T:133:12-25-134:1-25; 147:14-25;148:1-25; 151:22-25—152:1-7)  As a threshold matter, Appellants’ material deviation argument is not that Respondent failed to plead disability discrimination in her pleadings and throughout discovery.  Contrary to Respondent’s Counsel’s Brief, McKenney v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 167 N.J. 359 (2001) does not foreclose the grounds for a mistrial based on material deviation of testimony because rigorous cross-examination is available to the other party.  Material deviation can result in significant prejudice to a party’s ability to present their case to the jury notwithstanding the availability or efficacy of rigorous cross-examination as a tool to counteract such prejudicial effects.
[brief] (2T 154-1 to 155-10 to 157-5).  [...] testified [...] had told her “they had jumped” him and he wanted to fight one of “them” “one-on-one. ”  (2T 157-9 to 10)  [...] never saw [...] with a gun.  (2T 170-2, 175-10 to 18).  [...]’s father, [...], drove a separate car with [...]’s brothers, Robert [...] and [...], as passengers.  (Da10)  Around 8 P.M., [...] arrived at the [...] home and knocked on the door; [...] answered, and [...] asked where [...] was.
[brief] This putative class action involves defendant’s sale and delivery of water to plaintiff and the other residents of the [...], New Jersey containing contaminants that are harmful to humans.  31a-148a.  The Borough is a Gloucester County municipality that supplies and sells potable water services to the residents, for which defendant issues the residents bills quarterly.  6a-10a; 166a, §4, 8-9.  The Borough acknowledges that the residents purchasing water from the Borough are its “customers” and describes them as “consumers”, with the latter term describing “[a]ny party obtaining water service from the Water Department for a physical unit. ”.  173a; 181a.  A Borough ordinance sets a fee schedule of quarterly charges for the delivery of water to the residents.  173a-179a.  Plaintiff is a Borough resident and owner of a property located in the Borough to whom defendant sold and delivered water services to plaintiffs and plaintiffs believed that the water was potable or uncontaminated with any chemical contaminants posing any health risk to humans.  6a-10a.  However, from 2-13-20 forward, defendant issued plaintiff and the residents multiple notices that the water exceeded maximum contaminant levels for PFNA and thereby posed potential health risks to humans.  111a-137a.  From the beginning of 2022, plaintiff has been using nothing but bottled water for drinking at his home and even uses bottled water in his dogs’ water bowl.  7a-8a, §15-17.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[directive] (3)  Do you understand that being sentenced to parole supervision for life [Yes]  [No]  [NA] means that upon release from incarceration or immediately upon imposition of a suspended sentence you will be supervised by the Division of Parole for at least 15 years and will be subject to provisions and conditions of parole, including conditions appropriate to protect the public and foster rehabilitation, such as, but not limited to, counseling, Internet access or use, and other restrictions which may include restrictions on where you can live, work, travel or persons you can contact?
[brief] Specifically:  Q.  In your report you indicate, on the bottom of page 6 -- you read it into the record -- that [...] would have been able to share \textit{up to 60 percent} if he partnered with another developer.  Correct?  A.  Correct.  Q.  \textit{Now, when you say up to, I assume that also means it might be something less.  Correct?}  A.  \textit{That’s correct.}  Q.  Depending upon the negotiations, depending upon what the leverage was with a partner, he might have 20 percent, 30 percent, or anything in between; correct?  A.  \textit{Of course.}  It would have still been a very positive number.  Q.  A very positive number, but you can’t say with certainty what that number would have been.  A.  Well, of course not, because [...] – at the risk of repeating myself -- was never permitted to get to that point in the process, he was cut out of the process for reasons that are fundamental to the matter here.  (6T, 81:2-22) (emphasis added).  TRIAL COURT OPINION