ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The single Arbitrator when went on to decide far more than $1,000,000 of monetary claims against [...].  (Da131)(Da999)(Da3202)  He had no power or [...]’s agreement to do so.  This case was no different than any of those cited above, where the Federal District and Appeals Courts all strictly and readily construed the “agreement to arbitrate” as whatever were the parties’ governing rules.  In all of those cases the awards were vacated, as statutorily required.  Here, every decision by the single Arbitrator from and after June 2016, including the July 18, 2018, Partial Final Award and the Final Award, “exceeded the powers” of 1 Arbitrator to decide.
[brief] After the January fire, [...] moved to [...].  (13T:110-3 to 17)  On May 29, 2018, [...] was working in the [...] office when she heard noises that sounded “[l]ike pops” and something “hit the back of the building,” breaking glass.  (13T:110-18 to 111-24)  Jarvis went to look and “noticed little holes in the vinyl siding and the window was shot out. ”  (13T:112-9 to 16)  Jarvis saw a red car leaving the driveway, but did not see the license plate or driver.  (13T:112-25 to 113-9)  After learning of the incident, Holmdel Police Officer [...] drove to [...] to check for a red car.  (14T:174-10 to 175-14)  It was not there.  (14T:175-12 to 14)  Savage then went to 4 Holmdel Road, where he saw the damage to the glass and siding and found BBs in the window sill.  (14T:176-3 to 9)  Savage watched surveillance video that showed a red sedan pull into the driveway, and someone in the car take “a black handgun-style BB gun” from the glove compartment and shoot it out the driver’s side window of the car at the building.  (14T:176-8 to 177-6)  Savage returned to [...] again, where he met and spoke with [...].  (14T:193-19 to 194-15)  “Based on this surveillance footage,” Savage filed charges against [...].
[brief] At that time, Defendants renewed their application and sought a ruling that would preclude Plaintiffs from offering evidence relating to attorneys’ fees or punitive damages with respect to Plaintiffs’ remaining implied easement claim because there was no basis under New Jersey law to recover such damages for such a claim.  Indeed, Plaintiffs and Defendants each raised and discussed Plaintiffs’ claims for attorneys’ fees and punitive damages in their respective trial briefs, which were submitted to the trial court prior to trial, and therefore Plaintiffs cannot claim to have been unprepared to address these issues with the trial court prior to the start of trial.  After reviewing the parties’ submissions, and listening to oral argument, the trial court agreed that Plaintiffs’ proffered evidence did not support a basis to seek attorneys’ fees or punitive damages and properly exercised its discretion to preclude Plaintiffs from offering such evidence at trial.
[brief] Because Plaintiff dismissed his complaint before the trial court could rule on Defendants’ application for an order to show cause, Plaintiff was effectively able to bypass UPEPA’s protections and subject Defendants to the costs and burdens of his meritless lawsuit without facing any of the consequences UPEPA was designed to impose on him for doing so.  Whether intentional or not, future SLAPP litigants could employ the same strategy to harass and intimidate unwitting defendants as though UPEPA had never been enacted.
[directive] by Promulgated Directive #20-21 (08/11/2021)  (HR/HN)  Phase Advancement Criteria - Track A For: To Apply  Phase 2: of Minimum in 1 days 60  Phase of Minimum sobriety* days 14 of for Completion requirements outlined 1  Phase as Phase 3: of Minimum 90 in 2 days Phase of Minimum sobriety* days 30 of for Completion requirements outlined 2  Phase as Phase 4: of Minimum in 3 days 90  Phase of Minimum days sobriety*  45 of for Completion requirements outlined  3  Phase as Phase 5: of Minimum 90 in 4 days  Phase of Minimum days sobriety* 60 of Completion requirements outlined in 4 Phase as Graduation Requirements: 2 years minimum Drug Court in of 1 year sobriety* of Minimum in 5 days 90  Phase of Completion requirements outlined 5 in Phase as to to Note: and restitution do not need paid in full order graduate drug court early.
[brief] Exhibit D-116: [...] Tournament Spotlight A398  Exhibit D-117: Response from [...] re: [...] A403  Exhibit D-122: Case Information Statement, [...]  *Attached to Confidential Appendix as CA34*  Exhibit D-160: [...] Statement, November 2014 *Attached to Confidential Appendix as CA73*  Exhibit D-161: [...] Statements *Attached to Confidential Appendix as CA78*  Exhibit D-162: [...] and [...] Statements of [...] *Attached to Confidential Appendix as CA167*  Exhibit D-163: [...] Statement of [...] *Attached to Confidential Appendix as CA163*  Exhibit D-172: [...] Statements of [...]  *Attached to Confidential Appendix as CA172*  Exhibit D-173: [...] Statements of [...] *Attached to Confidential Appendix as CA219*  Exhibit D-174: [...] Statements of [...] *Attached to Confidential Appendix as CA254*  Exhibit D-179: [...] Statements *Attached to Confidential Appendix as CA416*  Exhibit P-15: Account Summary from [...]  A406  Exhibit P-85: Settlement Statement between [...] and [...] Development Corp. A414 #  Table of Confidential Appendix (CA1-CA419, attached) | Document | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Mid-Marriage Agreement dated December 5, 2013 | CA1 | | Matrimonial Settlement Agreement dated January 17, 2014 | CA14 | | Certification of [...] in support of Motion for Reconsideration | | | Exhibit D-122: Case Information Statement, [...] | CA34 | | Exhibit D-160: [...] Statement, November 2014 | CA73 | | Exhibit D-161: [...] Statements | CA78 | | Exhibit D-162: [...] and [...] Statements of [...] | CA167 | | Exhibit D-163: [...] Statement of [...] | CA163 | | Exhibit D-172: [...] Statements of [...] | CA172 | | Exhibit D-173: [...] Statements of [...] | CA219 | | Exhibit D-174: [...] Statements of [...] | CA254 | | Exhibit D-179: [...] Statements | CA416 | Procedural History This appeal arises from wife [...]’s contention that the Final Judgment of Divorce, entered against her by default on March 18, 2015, was the product of misrepresentations that her ex-husband and his lawyer made to the judge who entered it and an unfair process overall, and was substantively inequitable to her, warranting relief under Rule 4:50 and a fresh determination of the equitable distribution and alimony issues between the parties.
[directive] Attachment 3  Assessment Phase Chart by (for Court use Drug Team)  ASSESSMENT PHASE  *For the team only*  Court Drug by use to to orient  Assessment serves clients the drug court program and occurs only once during drug court tenure.  Phase  Clients are engaged in this phase here noted: as •  All clients between plea and sentence to their after • All sentenced clients during first 30 days sentencing who are initially recommended outpatient treatment treatment their to • All sentenced clients who are initially recommended residential during first days post- 30 discharge for other
[brief] *Miller* involved an application to have certain special legislation declared null and void for failure to comply with certain notice requirements.  The relevant constitutional provision then prohibited \(^{12}\)  The Commissioner did conduct a study and issued a report to the Governor and Legislature demonstrating that such mandatory coverage was necessary.  https://nj.gov/dobi/P.L.2021c.375report.pdf (last visited April 18, 2024)  The [...] ultimately promulgated regulations mandating such coverage.  See N.J.A.C. 11:24A-2A.1 et seq. enactment of special legislation “unless public notice of the intention to apply therefor, and of the general object thereof, shall have been previously given” in a manner prescribed by the Legislature.  N.J. Const. of 1844 Art. IV, § 7, ¶ 9.  As the same court subsequently explained, in Miller “the constitutional condition precedent of notice of intention was not complied with, and the attempted procedure of enactment without notice was simply nugatory because of having no foundation on which to rest.
[brief] [...] presided over the entirety of trial and post-trial motions, and her “feel” of the case remained resolute that no miscarriage of justice occurred.  None of the arguments pushed by Defendants resulted in any prejudice.  None of these issues led to any impermissible impact on the jury.  And in no way was the jury’s verdict shocking to her conscience, or incongruous with the evidence presented.  For these reasons, this Court cannot reach any decision other than to preserve the jury’s verdict in this case, and deny the present appeal.
[brief] During oral argument, Appellants asserted that “generally speaking, when a parent goes in with their child, they sign the two agreements.  And that’s what’s unusual about the case, because they never had the father sign his own agreement at the jump. ”  1T11:1-13.  Appellants have not provided any support for this baseless assertion, and have taken portions of the oral argument out of context for their benefit, specifically by claiming that “[c]rucially, [...]’s counsel conceded that they were uncertain of their own policy on whether an adult who intends to participate alongside a minor must sign separate arbitration agreements for themselves and the minor.  1T21:8-14. ”  [Appellants’ Brief, pg. 7].  Counsel for Respondents was responding to the baseless assertions from Appellants’ counsel, stating that “I’m not aware of any policy that requires that the waivers be executed on behalf of a child and adults (emphasis added).  1T21:9-11.  Counsel’s lack of knowledge about a client’s internal protocols cannot be imputed to the counsel’s client who is not even present during the oral argument.  Further, Appellants incorrectly argue that [...]’s participation in the activities does not automatically make him bound by the Arbitration Agreement intended for his son’s use of [...]’s attractions.  The Agreement clearly states that it applies to “Participants”.
[directive] ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT CHIEF EXECUTIVES FROM: [...], DIRECTOR  DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE  DATE: January 14, 2002  SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT  DIRECTIVE  No. 2001-7: Establishment of the Attorney General Advisory Committee in the Department of Law and Public Safety, effective December 20, 2001  Attached for your attention is a copy of Directive No. 2001-7 signed by the Attorney General [...], on December 20, 2001, which establishes the Attorney General Advisory Committee within the Department of Law and Public Safety to assist and advise the Attorney General on issues concerning the law enforcement structure of New Jersey.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE TOWNSHIP  ARTICULATED  A VALID PUBLIC USE AS THE TOWNSHIP’S PURPORTED USE IS A MERE PRETEXT AS THE TOWNSHIP HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE HOW THE PROPERTY WILL BE USED AFTER A LAND SWAP WITH A PRIVATE DEVELOPER.  (Raised below: 1T22-24)  A.  In order for the Township to take private property, it must articulate a valid public purpose to do so.  The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding the Township articulated a valid public purpose for Defendants’ Properties.  “Eminent domain is the power of the State to take private property for public use. ”  *State v. Lanza*, 27 N.J. 516, 529 (1958).  This power “is subject to several important constitutional limits: the property acquired must be taken for a ‘public use,’ the State must pay ‘just compensation’ in exchange for the property, and no person shall be deprived of his or her property without due process of law. ”  *Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., LLC*, 172 N.J. 564, 571 (2002) (first citing *N.J. Const.* art. I, ¶ 20; and then citing *State v. Heppenheimer*, 54 N.J.L. 268, 272 (1892)).
[brief] 141a–168a; 196a (108:21–109:3).  Said Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of [...] was executed by [...] as General Manager.  141a–168a.  In January 2007, [...] directed [...] to execute the Second Amendment to the McTague-[...] Agreement.  514a–525a.  Though [...] and [...] were the only Members of [...], neither ever saw nor executed, on behalf of [...], the [...]-MTDC Assignment.  199a (178:9–179:14); 299a–300a (30:24–34:10).  However, Plaintiffs, pursuant to the representations of [...] and [...], were made to spend substantial funds in contractual payments in pursuit of the [...]-MTDC Assignment.  489a–495a.  Notwithstanding that [...] and [...] contacted Plaintiffs and had in person meetings with Plaintiffs months prior to the formation of [...] and the execution of the McTague-[...] Agreement, [...] and [...] had [...] (a long-time friend of [...] and [...]) on behalf of [...], the “flipper”, enter into the McTague-[...] Agreement.
[brief] ”  Ferreira, 178 N.J. at 154.  Attorney inadvertence (or advertence) however, does not constitute an “extraordinary circumstance. ”  Ryan v. Renny, 203 N.J. 37, 69 (2010) (citing Palanke v. Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J. 398, 404-05 (2001)).  The requirements of the Affidavit of Merit Statute may not be avoided merely by labeling a claim as something other than professional negligence/malpractice.
[brief] (8T 10-17 to 11-12)  Defendant’s pretrial motion challenging the identifications moved to preclude all in-court identifications (as well as to suppress all out-of-court identifications), including that of [...].  (Da6-7)  The Court ordered that several witnesses appear for a Wade\(^9\) hearing but did not order that [...] testify.  (2T)  Thereafter, the Court entered an order denying Defendant’s motion as to three witnesses from whom the Court had taken testimony but did not address Defendant’s motion as to [...].  (Da16-17)  Defendant thereafter filed a second Wade motion noting that the Court’s prior order had not addressed [...], who was not required to testify at the first hearing.
[brief] See, e.g., Rivera, 250 N.J. at 135 (reviewing the accessibility of internal affairs reports under OPRA and the common law side-by-side); see also Court Directive #21-17, Memo from Acting Administrative Director [...] dated July 11, 2017 (stating that the best practices for handling of common law right of access requests for dashcam video recordings in fatal police shootings is to proceed in a summary manner under R. 4:67).  [...] has advanced no legitimate need, let alone good cause, for discovery to proceed.  His subpoenas were properly quashed.
[brief] The application was no longer presented pursuant to R. 3:22-2, rather the application was squarely raised pursuant to R. 3-21-10(b)(5).  The latter implicates a different set of rules and is governed by substantially different case-law, which the lower court failed to apply.  A.  Once Counsel Was Assigned to Defendant’s PCR, Counsel Had the Duty to Review the Entire Record and the Concomitant Obligation to Elucidate the Issues Raised; Add New Issues; and / or Alter the Application in Accordance with the Relevant Law.  Rule 3:22-6(d) provides in pertinent part:  …Counsel should advance all of the legitimate arguments requested by the defendant that the record will support.  Rule 3:22-6(d) has been construed and applied to impose an independent standard of professional conduct upon counsel representing a defendant in a PCR proceeding.  (Emphasis added)  See State v. Webster, 187 N.J. 254, 257 (2006) (Emphasis Added) (“PCR counsel must communicate with the client, investigate the claims urged by the client, and determine whether there are additional claims that should be brought forward.  Thereafter, counsel should advance all of the legitimate arguments that the record will support”).  See also State v. Hicks, 411 N.J. Super. 370, 377 (App. Div. 2010) (Emphasis Added) (“defendant's PCR trial counsel's performance failed to meet the standards imposed by Rule 3:22-6(d) because there is no evidence that defendant received the presumed benefits of having his case independently reviewed by a trained legal professional. ”)  Here, defendant’s first and only PCR application was grossly out-of-time.  Defendant provided no reasons that would amount to excusable neglect for its tardy submission.  Nevertheless, as the rules require, counsel was assigned to represent defendant.  Once assigned, counsel clearly scoured the record for any “additional claims that should be brought forward. ”  Webster, 187 N.J. at 257.  Having discovered that in 1997 defendant was the recipient of a sentence “not in accordance with the sentence authorized by law” counsel raised the issue of an illegal sentence and by virtue of doing so changed the nature of defendant’s application, at least by de facto, into one filed pursuant to R. 3:21-10(b)(5).
[brief] Indeed, in support of its fee application, Landlord submitted a detailed certification of its lead counsel attaching Landlord’s legal bills and setting forth the experience of Landlord’s attorneys, the hourly rates\(^{17}\) charged, the time expended on this matter (116.9 hours) and the length of Landlord’s relationship with its counsel.  (Pa47-97, 119-120).  Moreover, as detailed above and as is evident from the procedural history and lengthy submissions by the parties, the Underlying Action is not a standard summary disposition proceeding involving the removal of a non-paying tenant.
[brief] Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex Trenton, NJ 08625-0006  Re: [...] (Petitioner-Respondent) v. [...] (Respondent-Appellant)  Claim Petition No.: [...]  Appellate Docket No.: [...]  Civil Action: On Appeal form an Order Declaring Decedent  An Essential Worker, from the State of New Jersey  Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Division of Workers Compensation, Freehold Vicinage  Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.W.C.  Dear Judges:
[brief] The case at bar involves whether and under what circumstances DEP can compel public access to the shoreline on and across privately owned property.  The following matters are at issue:  1.  Whether the “Public Access Law,” N.J.S.A. 13:1D-150 through -156, abrogated or modified New Jersey’s common law public trust doctrine; 2.  Assuming arguendo that the Public Access Law expanded on DEP’s existing authority to require public access on and across Appellant’s property as a condition of a coastal permit authorizing the replacement of a failing bulkhead, whether the agency properly applied the Law; 3.  Whether DEP can require [...] to provide public access on and across its property, notwithstanding its failure to adopt regulations within 18 months of the Public Access Law’s effective date, as explicitly required by that Law; 4.  Whether the Public Access Law allows monetary contributions for offsite public access to satisfy any obligation incurred under the Law; 5.  Whether DEP should have conducted a plenary hearing to supplement and clarify the record below, particularly with respect to the application of the statutory criteria against which the requirement for and reasonableness of any proposal for public access at [...]’s property can be assessed; and 6.  Whether DEP’s requirement that [...] provide public access to the shoreline on and across its property under the circumstances presented constitutes a taking of private property in violation of the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of New Jersey, respectively.
[brief] The Board thus was entitled to give as much, or little, weight as it deemed appropriate to Plaintiff's experts.  Equally mistaken is the idea repeatedly raised by Plaintiff that the Board must cite alternate evidence to counter evidence presented by the applicant.  That notion has no basis in law and eviscerates the burdens of proof that an applicant must bear under N.J.S.A. 50:55D-70d.  Applying that strained logic, so long as an applicant puts forth any evidence to support its application, a variance request must be granted irrespective of the quality or persuasiveness of that evidence.  The Trial Court aptly opined on the evidence Plaintiff offered:  “The applicant’s miscalculation of the FAR … undermines the testimony of its experts who relied upon the erroneous calculation in support of their testimony, including the architect, [...], the engineer, [...] and the planner, [...]. ”  Pa31 (emphasis added).  The Resolution, as the Trial Court underscored, illuminates the deliberative process the Board undertook to find that Plaintiff had not established that the proposed development would be particularly suitable for Lot 5.  Pa23-27; 31-32.  The Board focused on the necessary variances for the project and determined that the extent of the variance relief demonstrated that the proposal was too great in mass for a parcel comprising a land area of only 0.59 acres.
[brief] (Da 3)  This offense has three elements: (1) that there was a handgun; (2) that [...] knowingly possessed the handgun; and (3) that [...] did not have a permit to possess the handgun.  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); Model Criminal Jury Charge, Unlawful Possession of a Handgun, at 1 (rev. June 11, 2018).  But in instructing the jury, the court entirely omitted any instruction on the third element.  (9T 151-18 to 155-6)  Thus, the court failed to instruct the jury that the State had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [...] did not have a gun permit.
[brief] The State has all the cache (power) to retrieve scientific evidence to prove their case.  But failed, because the state was well aware of people in the Black car, foot prints in the snow, blood in backyard, and videos that NO one (informants) identified [...].  The State refuse to make (mold) of foot prints and take pictures to compare to those in snow, which is normal procedures with foot prints.  This process will determine later if any footwear of defendant’s match shooter’s.  They (State) must have took pictures and realize defendant had little feet, and the foot prints were very enormous, evidently was not defendant’s.  “[...] never check license plates of Black car and/or check video for plate’s identification”.  Additionally, the State have held that "Rule 3:22-5's bar to review of a prior claim litigated on the merits 'is not an inflexible command'" and must yield to a fundamental injustice.  Nash, 212 {248 N.J. 179} N.J. at 547, 58 A.3d 705 (quoting State v. Franklin, 184 N.J. 516, 528, 878 A.2d 757 (2005)).  A fundamental injustice occurs "when the judicial system has denied a 'defendant with fair proceedings leading to a just outcome' or when 'inadvertent errors mistakenly impacted a determination of guilt or otherwise wrought a miscarriage of justice.'"  Id. 212 N.J. at 546, 58 A.3d 705 (quoting State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 587, 601 A.2d 198 (1992)).  To demonstrate a fundamental injustice, a defendant must show "that an error or violation 'played a role in the determination of guilt.'"  Id. 212 N.J. at 547, 58 A.3d 705 (quoting Mitchell, 126 N.J. at 587, 601 A.2d 198).  The biggest error are “Inadequate Investigation”.
[brief] ”  Id. at 433-34.  Conversely, in Gray v. Press Commc’ns, LLC, 342 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2001), the court found that a factfinder could find “reckless disregard for the truth” based on “sources…of dubious veracity,” where the sources’ identities were “so vague that a jury could find that they were contrived after the fact. ”  Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added).
[brief] “Any action taken by the court in imposing sentence shall be subject to review by an appellate court. ”  *N.J.S.A.*  2C:44-7.  An appellate court’s review of a sentencing court’s imposition of sentence is guided by an abuse of discretion standard.  *State v. Torres*, 246 *N.J.* 246, 272 (2021).  This court’s jurisdiction to review sentences includes the power to make new findings of fact, to reach independent determinations of the facts, and to supplement the record on appeal.  State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 412 (1989).  II.