ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] N.J.S.A. Policy Svstem of EW Establishment B. their shall and/or revise agencies adopt enforcement municipal law and county, All state, or either by regulation, rule, this Directive, with consistent policies, System EW existing law.  state required by as ("SOP"), procedure operating standard Indicators  Performance of Selection C.  indicate of officer conduct which different categories monitor many may System An EW officer.  following and/or The the agency, the public, harm to the risk of escalating potentially based but also can be supplemented all EW Systems, included in shall indicators be performance chief community it serves.  The department and the of the characteristics upon unique the To such supplemental performance indicators.  any determine shall department of executive the objectively and indicators should be measurable performance supplemental possible, the extent officer. harmful behavior by the escalating potentially reasonably related to whether initiated by another the officer, complaints against Internal affairs 1. public; member of the officer or by a officer; the against Civil actions filed 2. officer; l criminal complaints against the of or investigations Criminal 3 . or (for officer formally determined adjudicated that is the of force by 4.
[brief] Reply to Counterstatement of Facts ..................................  Drb2  Reply to Legal Argument  I.  REPLYING TO POINT I, THE STATE MOST CERTAINLY DID IMPLY THAT [...] IDENTIFIED [...] AS THE SHOOTER IN THE OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENT ..................................................  Drb4 II.  REPLYING TO POINT II, THE COURT SHOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED THE JURORS REGARDING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT WHAT WAS SAID TO DETECTIVE BROWN ........................................  Drb6  III.  REPLYING TO POINT III, THE VIDEO FOOTAGE WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED ............................  Drb7  IV.  REPLYING TO POINT IV, MR. [...] WAS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL .............
[brief] See also R. 1:7-4(b) (governing reconsideration of final orders or judgments), which states, in pertinent part: the court may grant a rehearing or may, on the papers submitted, amend or add to its findings and may amend the final order or judgment accordingly . . .  The motion to amend the findings . . . shall state with specificity the basis on which it is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions that counsel believes the court has overlooked or on which it has erred.  As explained in Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 288 (App. Div. 2010), a motion for reconsideration is: not appropriate merely because a litigant is dissatisfied with a decision of the court or wishes to reargue a motion, but "should be utilized only for those cases which fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence."
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED iv  TABLE OF CITATIONS v PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  2  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 4  STATEMENT OF FACTS  5  The Issue of Extraordinary Costs as Justification for the Exemption  10  The Issue of Profitability 11  The Structure of the Exemption and the 30-Year Term 12  The Issue of Accelerating the Sale of the Units 14  The Issue of Purpose  15  The PILOT as a New Source of Revenue for the Township 16  The PILOT as a Means of Shifting Regional School Costs  21  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] Plaintiff clearly knew of facts that gave rise to a potential cause of action the minute he fell.  In fact, he believed that he had a cause of action against the tenant defendants as of the date of loss.  Therefore, the “discovery rule” does not postpone the accrual of his claim until receipt of some of the tenants’ leases.  Moreover, he is not entitled to the benefit of the fictitious name practice and/or the “relation back” doctrine because he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, certainly should have known the identities of the tenant defendants well within the two year statute of limitations.
[brief] | .25 hrs.  | $95.00 | $3,078.00 | | 10| 8/15/22 |  Review email from [...]  . . . [redacted].  | .2 hrs. | $76.00 | $3,154.00 | | 11| 8/23/22 |  Conferred with [...] over . . . [redacted] issue in [...]/[...] case; began summary of case law | 2.6 hrs. | $510.00 | $3,664.00 | --- 72 Pa819.
[brief] 48  | CASES | PAGE(S) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Allen v. Hopewell Tp. Zoning Bd. of Adj., | 36,38 | | 227 N.J.Super. 574, 581, 548 A.2d 220 (App.Div.), certif. denied, | | | 113 N.J. 655 (1988)  .................................................................. | | | Dunkin Donuts v. Tp. North Brunswick, | 41 | | 193 N.J. Super. 513 (App. Div. 1984)  .................................. | | | Eagle Group v Zoning Bd., | 39 | | 274 N.J. Super. 551, 564-565 (App. Div. 1994)  ......................... | | | El Shaer vs. Lawrence Tp. Planning Bd., | 36,38 | | 249 N.J.Super. 323, 329 (App.Div. 1991), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 546 | | | (1992)  .................................................................................. | | | Feiler v. Fort Lee Bd. of Adj., | 24 | | 240 N.J.Super. 250, 255 (App.Div.1990)  ................................ | | | Leimann v. Bd. of Adj. of Cranford, | 23,24 | | 9 N.J. 336, 340, (1952)), certif. denied, 127 N.J 325(1991)  .......... | | | Hawrylo v. Bd. of Adj., Harding Twp., | 38 | | 249 N.J.Super. 568, 579 (App.Div. 1991)  ................................ | | | Kaufmann v. Planning Bd., Warren Tp., | 21 | | 110 N.J. 551, 558 (1988)  .................................................. | | | Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt, | 21 | | 45 N.J. 268, 296-97, (1965)  .............................................. | | | Leimann v. Bd. of Adj., Cranford, | 24 | | 9 N.J. 336, 340 (1952)  ................................................................| | | Lionshead Woods v. Kaplan Bros., | 46 | | 243 N.J. Super 678 (1990)  .................................................. | | | Leon N. Weiner & Asso., Inc., v. Zoning Bd. of Glassboro, | 30 | | 144 509, 514 (App. Div. 1976)  ............................................ | | | Manalapan Realty v. Township Comm., | 20 | | 140 N.J 366, 378 (1995)  ................................................................| | Medical Realty v. Board of Adj., Summit, 228 N.J.Super. 226, 233 (App.Div.1988)
[brief] Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose liability upon a public entity for a dangerous condition of its public property if the action the entity took to protect against the condition or the failure to take such action was not palpably unreasonable.  N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 (emphasis added).  The TCA further defines “dangerous condition” as follows:  [A]  **condition** of property that creates a **substantial risk** of injury when such property is **used** with due care in a manner in which it is **reasonably foreseeable** that it will be used.  N.J.S.A. 59:4-1 (emphasis added).  New Jersey Courts, as commanded by the legislature, are required to strictly interpret the principals set forth in the TCA.
[brief] ”  [Da179].  As summarized by the trial court, “[i]n each of the Second 1981 Agreement, 1981 Johnson Road Agreement and the 1984 Johnson Road Agreement, among others, connection fees from properties lying in Parsippany were paid to [the Township]. ”  [Da179].  Specifically, the 1984 Johnson Road Agreement explicitly provided any new connection along Johnson Road required a connection fee to be paid to the Township, not the Borough.  [Da96].  This contract, among the earlier ones entered by the Parties, served to formalize the Parties’ practice, understanding, and agreement the Township was to receive the connection fees for such properties in the hope of avoiding similar disputes in the future.  As held by the trial court, “[t]here is no indication within the 1999 Agreement the parties intended to modify their prior course of dealing.  As such, the plain language of Sections 6.1 and 6.5 of the 1999 Agreement is interpreted in a manner consistent with the parties’ prior course of dealing in which the Township is entitled to connection fees for properties outside of the Borough. ”  [Da179 (emphasis added)].  II.  APPELLANT’S FAILURE TO BRIEF CERTAIN FINDINGS BY THE TRIAL COURT  CONSTITUTES WAIVE OF SAME AND RENDERS THE APPEAL MOOT.
[directive] STRIP SEARCH  Attorney General's Strip Search and Body Cavity Search Requirements and Procedures for Police Officers  Issued February 1993  Revised June 1995 TO: ALL COUNTY PROSECUTORS  DATE: February 3, 1993  Enclosed for dissemination to all county and local law enforcement agencies within your jurisdiction are the Attorney General's Strip Search and Body Cavity Search Requirements and Procedures for Police Officers.  These guidelines are being promulgated pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:161A-8b, which authorizes the Attorney General to issue guidelines governing the performance of strip and body cavity searches, as well as guidelines for the release and confinement of persons arrested for offenses other than crimes.  While the statute addresses non-indictable offenses, the Attorney General's guidelines cover strip search and body cavity search procedures for crimes as well.  The enclosed guidelines are effective immediately.
[brief] First, the trial court found that arrests [...] had been subjected to that did not lead to convictions—or that even led to acquittals—could be held against him.  (17T 28-22 to 25 “[T]he Court under law can take into consideration arrest, even if there’s a not guilty, even if it’s dismissed”).  The court then went on to find that prior arrests that did not lead to convictions supported the finding of all three aggravating factors.  (17T 29-1 to 32-7)  The court considered “a total of 20 arrests” as supporting these aggravating factors, even though [...] had only seven superior court convictions, with the last conviction for a violent offense having been in 1991.  (17T 25-8 to 26-11)  Our Supreme Court has made abundantly clear that “when no such undisputed facts exist or findings are made, prior dismissed charges may not be considered for any purpose.
[brief] As such, the five 'facts relating to the crimes' contained in *Yarbough*'s third guideline should be applied qualitatively, not quantitatively."  *Carey*, 168 N.J. at 427.  "When a sentencing court properly evaluates the *Yarbough* factors in light of the record, the court's decision will not normally be disturbed on appeal."  *State v. Miller*, 205 N.J. 109, 129 (2011).
[brief] 561 U.S. at 71.  The employee challenged the arbitration agreement between the parties as unconscionable, but he did not specifically challenge the arbitration agreement’s delegation provision.  See ibid.  The U.S. Supreme Court held that the trial court could not decide the employee’s unconscionability challenge because the question of unconscionability had been delegated to the arbitrator.  Unless the employee “challenged the delegation provision specifically,” the court was bound to treat the delegation provision as “valid” and “enforce it [under the FAA], leaving any challenge to the validity of the Agreement as a whole for the arbitrator. ”  Id. at 72.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey has “acknowledged the legitimacy and applicability of the Rent-A-Center holding to delegation provisions in New Jersey arbitration agreements. ”  Goffe, 238 N.J. at 211.  The plaintiffs in Goffe signed contracts that “contained straightforward and conspicuous language about arbitration and broadly delegated arbitrability issues to an arbitrator. ”  Id. at 194.  Though the plaintiffs did not “dispute the validity of the arbitration agreement itself” or “dispute the delegation provision within it that delegate[d] the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator,” they sought to avoid arbitration based on arguments that their contracts “as a whole” were invalid.  Id. at 212.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected those arguments under Rent-A-Center, holding that the plaintiffs “must arbitrate their claims as to the enforceability of the overall sales contract” because they did not raise “a specific claim attacking the formation of the arbitration agreement that each signed. ”
[brief] Please accept plaintiff's reply letter brief ¹.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Reply to Defendants' Statement of Procedural History  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Prb2  ¹  On the brief: [...] ([...]; [...]).  Reply to Counterstatement of Facts ..............................................  Prb3  Reply to Defendants' Legal Argument  I.
[brief] (Pa416).  At Objectors’ request, the [...] carried the matter twice (from December 13, 2021 to January 24, 2022 and, in turn, from January 24, 2022 to February 28, 2022 – a total of six (6) weeks).  (Pa417; Pb5).  The [...] did not reach the application on the evening of February 28, 2022.  (Pa416; Pb5).
[brief] On August 8, 2019, more than 30 days after the Ricci Act’s passage, the [...] distributed an email to all Certifying Officers “advising them of their responsibilities under the Ricci Act. ”  Pa25.  However, while this is cited in the Final Agency Decision, no actual email dated August 8, 2019, was ever produced, only a Memorandum dated “August 2019. ”  Pa62.  On or about August 9, 2019, more than 30 days after the passage of the Ricci Act, the [...] contracted [...] to mail postcards to retirees.  Pa64.  No “close date” appears on the document.  Pa64.  On or about August 9, 2019, a postcard was allegedly sent to [...].  Pa14.  In support of his request for amended benefits under the Ricci Act, [...] submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the [...] or the [...] with respect to the passage of P.L. 2019, c.157 (Chapter 157), the Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act.
[brief] The 1991 Arbitration provision is remarkably limited in scope – to the 1991 Agreement itself.  It is even more limited than the one struck down in Garfinkle, supra, where the Court refused to enforce an arbitration agreement against a shareholder/employee in an LAD case, since it devoid of any language that plaintiff was giving up his rights to litigate his claims in court.  In Garfinkle, the unenforceable provision read:  Except as otherwise expressly set forth in Paragraphs 14 or 15 hereof, any controversy or claim arising out of, or relating to, this Agreement or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in Morristown, New Jersey, in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the American Arbitration Association, and judgement [sic] upon any reward [sic] rendered by the arbitrator or arbitrators may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.  [Id., 168 N.J. at 128].  Here, the language is limited to just disputes over the Agreement itself, as the “relating to” language in Garfinkle is missing:  Any controversy or claim arising out of this Agreement shall be settled by arbitration (except as otherwise noted in this Agreement) in accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration Association and judgment upon the award rendered may be entered in any Court having jurisdiction.
[brief] Further, the Supreme Court in *Skeete* neatly summarized its holding, stating:  > In sum, we hold that policy changes must be conveyed fairly to the policyholder, although in no particular form, and that in this case the insurer fell short.  *Id.* at 11.  Here, not only was [...] given notice, but it acknowledged its unenrollment from the [...], raised its proposal for work at the Project, including the work on the date of the Accident, and made an effort to ensure that its direct liability policies through [...] and [...] were in effect.
[brief] On appeal, plaintiff spends considerable energy focusing on the contention that the defendants, including [...], were on actual and/or constructive notice of the subject roadway condition prior to the date of plaintiff’s accident.  With respect to [...], and as recognized by [...], this argument is completely inaccurate.  On direct examination at the hearing, [...] discussed the 2015 [...] report, which predated plaintiff’s accident.  [...] testified that on page 16-7 of the report, [...] noted settlement in the southbound roadway at the north bridge approach and that the same condition is memorialized by Photo 14 on page 16-23 of the report.  (3T69:8-73:19 and Da2).  [...] then testified that on page 16-6 of the same report, [...] made a repair recommendation to address the described condition.  [...] testified that this repair recommendation supported his conclusion that a dangerous condition existed as of the date of the report.  (3T73:20-75:8 and Da2).  [...] did not testify on direct examination as to [...]'s evaluation of the significance of the roadway condition identified within its report.
[directive] Plea Escalating of Issuance 12.2 no shall, Justice Criminal Division of of the Director the and Prosecutor County  Every that office their for policy escalating plea written a issue and develop 2016, 31, October than later complaint- of a means by charged are that offenses to just not crimes, indictable all to apply shall The Law.  Reform Bail under the trial pending detained is defendant the where cases to or warrant or Prosecutor County
[directive] UNIFORM 13.  Issues/Appeals.  Leal of Notice 13.1  County Reform Bail Law, the implementing interpreting and in uniformity promote  To on Bureau Appellate Justice's Criminal of Division the with consult notify and shall Prosecutors the relating to appeals final and interlocutory all and challenges, and issues legal significant  Bail the Constitution amended, as Jersey New the of 11 paragraph I, Article of interpretation  Reform Law.  Bail the implement that Rules Court the and Law, Reform Directive. of issuance this upon immediately operational become shall Section This Bank.  Brief 13.2 County available all to and make maintain, collect, shall Justice Criminal of Division  The implementation and interpretation the to relating papers motion and briefs selected Prosecutors and Law, Reform Bail the amended, as Constitution Jersey New of the 11 paragraph I, Article of Law.  Reform Bail the implement that Rules Court the of Directive.  this issuance upon immediately operational become shall Section This 87 Page  ADVOCACY PROFICIENT ENHANCING 14.
[brief] b.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE SLATER FACTORS.  Defendant states that the trial court’s decision must be reversed because it applied the wrong standard of law to defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  Here, the trial court correctly analyzed defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea using Slater factors.  See State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 151 (2009).  In Slater, the Court outlined a framework to assess claims to withdraw a plea:  [I]n evaluating motions to withdraw a guilty plea, trial courts should consider the following factors: (1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant's reasons for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused.
[brief] The Court erred and abused its judicial discretion by overlooking, or by mistake, failing to consider Defendant’s probative, substantive evidence of probation account error not previously litigated and in turn relying upon the unsupported, non-substantive, non-responsive arguments of Probation in a manner so as to manifestly offend the interests of justice and equity.  Re: Order of 5/12/2023 (DA14), Order of 3/30/2023(DA20)
[brief] Furthermore, [...] was incorrect.  The Model Jury charge for insanity states that to determine whether the defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the offense the defendant must prove that he was “laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as to not know the nature and quality of the act he/she was doing, or if defendant did know it, that he did know what he was doing was wrong. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1.
[brief] A criminal defendant has the right to proceed to trial with or without counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, so long as they “voluntarily and intelligently elect to do so. ”  *State v. DuBois*, 189 N.J. 454, 465 (2007) (citing *Faretta*, 422 U.S. at 818); see also *State v. Davenport*, 177 N.J. 288, 301-02 (2003).  It is within the trial court’s discretion whether to permit a defendant to represent himself.
[brief] Two criminal incidents are cited: delayed complaint filing past the Statute of Limitations and the clerks’ illegal, *ipse dixit* dismissal of [...] and the [...].  --- \(^3\)  If Plaintiff had secured a final dismissal, the Defendants would doubtless argue voluntary termination, barring Appeal.  These events, along with other unethical incidents, demonstrate continuous, retaliatory intent, especially when tacitly approved by "Management."  The probability of these nine to ten incidents, some recent, occurring randomly is even beyond infinitesimal (~1 in $10^{17}$ – which is about the age of the universe in seconds).  All 10-12 [...] lawsuits in fifteen years have all involved highly irregular events.  This civil (not the criminal) case was unblemished until the "lost" remand, the LoP dismissal, and failure to correct the State's 12-word “error. ”  III.  Conspiracy & ADA Complaint Issues
[brief] The Commissioner’s jurisdiction over Title 18A matters is not exclusive.  *N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9* provides that "[t]he commissioner shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine, without cost to the parties, all controversies and disputes arising under the school laws .  . ."  The statute does not state that that jurisdiction is exclusive, and our courts have not held it to be so.  For example, our trial courts routinely deal with cases brought under the Public Schools Contracts Law, *N.J.S.A.* 18A:18A-1, *et. seq.*, and do not refer them to the Commissioner.
[directive] [아니요/No]  [해당없음/NA]  귀하의 거주지에 대한 제한에는 미성년 자녀가 있는 집에 4.  (4)  거주하는 것에 대한 제한도 포함될수  있다는 것을 아십니까?  Do you understand that the restrictions on where you can live may include restrictions on residing in a home with minor children?
[brief] Plaintiff argues that the Superior Court may deal with proper division under its constitutional authority to "make rules governing * * *, subject to law, the practice and procedure in all such courts."  (N.J. Const. Art. VI, § II, par. 3])  The incidental matter of proper Division plainly falls within the area of practice and procedure.  Plaintiff argues that the Chancery Division proceeded without Subject Matter jurisdiction, therefore was not neutral, infringed upon his procedural and substantive due process, and that the atmosphere was fraught with the potential for prejudice.
[brief] [...] cannot escape her agreement with [...] by claiming that her daughter agreed to the December Terms on her behalf.  (Da298–304.)..............................................................................34  A.  Plaintiffs’ daughter was acting as [...]’s agent when she agreed to the December Terms...............................................................35  III.  If the December Terms are invalid, the January Terms would still require arbitration of this dispute.  (Da304.).........................................................41  IV.  The agreement is enforceable against [...].  (Da298–304.)...........43  V.  [...] did not waive its right to arbitrate with Plaintiffs.  (Da298–304.)  ......48  Conclusion.............................................................................................................50