ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The State destroyed or lost crucial alibi evidence by intentionally deleting footage from the hard drive; [...] mishandled the drive, at minimum acting without written protocol; and there is substantial imprecision in the record concerning what was deleted, or how the drive was handled after the deletions.  [...] claims that it did a complete wipe in July 2013, yet in an examination by the very same [...] employee found footage on that drive seven months later — seemingly contradicting the earlier report of a complete “wipe” of the drive.  Trial counsel never requested the hard drive for examination, and one claim on PCR was that he should and could have demanded production of the drive, especially once he was informed that there indeed were excerpts of video on the drive that was supposedly wiped clean.  [...] apparently misconstrued the significance of the 2014 report, which answers none of the questions raised in connection with [...]’s request.  She also wrongly believed that interrogatories are forbidden in PCR discovery, based on dicta from a 1989 Law Division DWI interlocutory appeal, which later cases have not followed.  See State v. Ford, 240 N.J. Super. 44, 51 (App. Div. 1990) (noting that interrogatory forms of discovery, though not expressly permitted by court rule, can be demanded with leave of court).  [...]’s abrupt decision is even more troubling in light of her summary denial of [...]’s PCR claim regarding trial counsel’s inexplicable failure to have the hard drive examined, as discussed in Point I.B.4, in which she faulted [...] for not having information about the hard drive’s contents.
[brief] [...] relies on his opening brief, and adds the following:  POINT I MARQUISE HAWKINS’S DE FACTO LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCE CANNOT STAND.  Although the State concedes that State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017) “requires courts to ‘exercise a heightened level of care before imposing multiple consecutive sentences on juveniles,’” it claims that the resentencing court met this heightened standard simply by incorporating the original sentencing court’s reasoning into its own decision by reference (Sb 11, 13-14)
[directive] Sexual the to pursuant issued order an violated sexual or contact sexual of act an commit to threatened or committed has (2) and -21, 13 to or caused otherwise or order restraining the by protected person any against penetration prosecutor the order, restraining the by protected person any injury to bodily cause to threatened 2A:162-24.  N.J.S.A. to pursuant release of revocation seeking motion a presumptively file shall Release. of Revocation of'Seeking Presumption the Overcoming 8.4.5 release of revocation seeking of presumption rebuttable a is there where case any
[brief] Id. at 8.  The Court held that the victim was not familiar enough with defendant to constitute a “good reason” to allow her to make a first-time in-court identification at trial because she “did not know defendant well prior to the robbery,” having interacted with him only on two prior occasions.  Id. at 28.  Just like in Burney, [...] was not familiar enough with [...] to provide “good reason” to allow him to make a first-time in-court identification of [...].
[brief] As the [...] argued in asking for relief from the court below, these fees cannot simply be eliminated by the chancery court’s July 21, 2022 order but must be extinguished via directive to [...].  The [...] were precluded from presenting documentary proofs showing that the fees assessed began as collection costs in 2010 (A616) and accumulated to approximately $250,000 by the time of the chancery trial held below – fees that were wrongful and never should have been assessed against the [...] in the first place.  All of these proofs the [...] were prevented from presenting at the Chancery trial because of the manner in which [...] proceeded.  Not hearing any presentation of proofs from the party whose claim the court was actually hearing and determining resulted in a completely skewed decision and order that failed to address the most critical issues that the [...] raised on their quiet title claim – most critically the $250,000 of “advance fees” that were assessed against the [...] because of the wrongful placement into default and foreclosure and that needed to be properly extinguished to fully and completely remedy the harm done to the [...] as a result.
[brief] 29  Kopp, Inc. v. United Technologies, Inc., 223 N.J. Super. 548, 554 (App. Div. 1988)  ..................................................  26  Loprete v. Mohegan Sun, Inc., 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 927 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. April 27, 2006) ...........................................
[brief] Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any interested party affected by any decision of an administrative officer of the municipality based on or made in the enforcement of the zoning ordinance or official map.  Such appeal shall be taken within 20 days by filing a notice of appeal with the officer from whom the appeal is taken specifying the grounds of such appeal.  [N.J.S.A. 40:55D-72.]  Synthesizing the plain text of these provisions of the MLUL, any “use or activity which was lawful” before a zoning ordinance was enacted or revised but which does not “conform” to the zoning requirements imposed before the ordinance by default “may be continued. ”  A “person interested in any land upon which a nonconforming use . . . exists may apply,” to the board of adjustment for a “certificate” which such person will only obtain upon proving “that the use . . . existed before the ordinance which rendered the use . . . nonconforming.
[brief] (Da0072-Da0073).  Each of the Client Agreements contained a predispute arbitration agreement, appearing as follows, including relative font size and bolding:  **PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT** -  All controversies that may arise between [...] (as defined above) or its affiliate [...]  (or any of them or their respective employees and representatives) and me concerning any subject matter, issue or circumstance whatsoever (including but not limited to controversies concerning any account, order or transaction, or the continuation, performance, interpretation or breach of this or any other agreement between [...] and me) shall be determined through binding arbitration by and in accordance with the rules then in effect of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).  Judgment upon any award rendered by the arbitrators may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction.  (Da0105-Da0106).  The specific predispute arbitration agreement set forth above is approved by FINRA for all securities industry customers and the FINRA arbitration rules referenced are expressly approved by the SEC, and apply industry-wide.
[brief] Suarez v. E. Intern. College, 428 N.J. Super. 10, 27 (App.Div. 2012) ...............................................16  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52-53 (2015)  ................................................................33  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J.  36, 54 (2015) .......................................................................45 Whelan v. Armstrong Int’l, Inc., 242 N.J. 311, 331 (2020) ..................................................................23 Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 144 N.J. 34, 49, 675 A.2d 620 (1996) .................................................. 23 Zaza v. Marquess, 144 N.J. 34, 49 (Supreme Court of New Jersey 1996)............................ 46 Rules N.J.R.E. 702 ........................................................................................................ 32-34 N.J.R.E. 703 ........................................................................................................ 12, 13, 32-34, 44 Statues N.J. Model Jury Charge 5.40B ........................................................................... 17 N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-2............................................................................................... 2, 12, 17, 19, 24 N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-4............................................................................................. 3, 22, 23, 25, 28-31 Regulations 21 C.F.R §7.46(a) ................................................................................................. 5, 27, 29, 32 21 C.F.R. §7.46(b) ..............................................................................................
[brief] Dated: June 26, 2023  [...] and [...], Plaintiffs-Respondents / Cross-Appellants, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], Defendants-Appellants / Cross-Respondents.  [...], [...], and [...], Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...], [...], JOHN DOES 1-10 and ABC CORPS.  1-10, Third-Party Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] [...], [...], AND SELAEDIN MAKSUT IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL  [...]  [...] (N.J. Bar No. 043651984)  [...] (pro hac vice)  [...]  [...]  Tel: [...]  Fax: [...]  Email: [...]  [...]  [...]  [...] (N.J. Bar No. 018351986)  [...]  [...], Esq. (031952001)  [...], Esq. (117122014)  [...] Esq. (035112011)  180 Park Avenue Florham Park, New Jersey  07932 [...]  Attorneys for Defendants [...] and [...]
[directive] The evaluation will focus reviewing the on of the in exact use the funds; law enforcement purpose that will be served the use of these of in funds, and; the extent enforcement’s involvement and participation the project. of law a  Determination Enforcement Aqency Non-Law 11-2: of  Every year, numerous forfeiture fund expenditures are made by the State’s law enforcement community.  The vast majority of these expenditures are made to procure Expenditures, such equipment, training or services for the law enforcement agency.  as of the funding narcotics enforcement operations provide money to purchase evidence and of law information criminal conduct.  These types of expenditures have a clear and direct enforcement purpose and are not the subject of this Standard Operatinq Procedure.  However, any expenditure to fund, in whole part, any program is not in which or under the direct, exclusive control and supervision of a law enforcement agency is of considered a community based program, subject to all of the provisions this Standard Operatinq Procedure.
[brief] See generally [...], Prioritizing Privacy in the Courts and Beyond, 103 Cornell L. Rev. 1011 (2018) (discussing privacy and cybersecurity risks in civil discovery).  This goes not just for the privacy of the parties themselves, but numerous nonparty individuals, such as employees, customers, suppliers, contractors, patients, users, and others.  See [...], *A Right to Privacy for Modern Discovery*, 29 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 675, 719 (2022) (discussing protection of privacy of third parties in civil discovery).  The process of discovery—locating troves of documents containing the sensitive, private information of those individuals, copying them, and delivering them to the requesting party, which may or may not have even rudimentary cybersecurity practices—leaves private information vulnerable to cybersecurity threats.
[brief] \(^{26}\)  Other examples of derivative claims would be a "conversion claim ... and fraud claim ... alleg[ing] defendant exercised wrongful dominion and --- \(^{23}\) *Tully* at 126.  \(^{24}\) *Ibid*; See also N.J.S.A. 42:2C-67(b)(LLC).  \(^{25}\) Da672-718.  \(^{26}\) *Tully* at 126. control over the assets of [the corporation] and engaged in a fraudulent kickback scheme."27  "These claims are derivative in nature because they concern [the corporation's] assets and operations rather than plaintiff as an individual."28  Here, we have the Plaintiffs suing [...] for damage to [...], based on the [...] owning 100% of [...] and the Individual Plaintiffs being members of the [...].
[brief] Is that okay with you?  A · · ·  That's fine.  I'll do the best I can because there is a lot of stuff that happened here.  She sustained to her arm -- we can focus just on her left elbow.  She sustained a fracture of a forearm with a subluxation which is a dislocation, a joint coming out of place of her left elbow that required surgical treatment.  So that was the upper extremities and then in regard to lower extremities on her right side she broke her thigh bone, her kneecap and her leg bone and those were very complex injuries in that her right femur bone or thigh bone was an open fracture where the skin tears and therefore, the bone and the fracture exposed to the environment.  The kneecap fracture which was broken up into a lot of pieces on the right side was also an open fracture again with the outside communicating with the fracture.  The leg bone, the fracture of the tibia bone was broken up into a lot of pieces and associated with a significant soft tissue injury so that again, the skin was open, the bone exposed.  And that injury ultimately ended up requiring multiple surgeries, not just to fix the bone but to release tension in the leg which is called a fasciotomy.  And then undergo multiple procedures trying to get the wound to heal which took many months to finally heal.  On her left side, her left leg she sustained a very complex, comminuted, broken up into a lot of pieces fracture of her thigh bone extending into the knee joint basically separating the upper portion of the knee part -- knee joint into two pieces.  Also having a smaller fracture of her kneecap and tearing her quadriceps tendon basically where the bone went through the quadriceps tendon.  The tendon of the thigh muscle and ripped it.  And that was treated with first stabilization and multiple surgeries and as a sequela of all these injuries she also had an injury to her ankle where she's developed basically inflammation, tendinitis and some chronic contracture and pain due to the alteration of her right leg function above her ankle.  [3T200; 4T203-204.]
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT WAS REQUIRED TO COMPEL ARBITRATION BECAUSE RESPONDENT FAILED TO SET FORTH A SPECIFIC CHALLENGE TO THE OPERATIVE AGREEMENT’S ARBITRATION PROVISION (1a, 1T at 50:18-25, 35:6-25, 35:15-21)  As set forth above, upon a party establishing the existence of an arbitration provision, the challenging party must mount a specific challenge to it.  If the challenging party fails to do so, the court must enforce the delegation clause and refer the matter to arbitration.  Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191, 215 (highlighting that unless the challenge is specifically to the arbitration clause, the issue of the contract's validity is considered by the arbitrator).  Here, Appellants established that the Operative Agreement was enforceable and consistent with her deposition testimony, that she executed an employment agreement with an arbitration provision prior to December of 2019.  1T at 50:18-25.  Her role at this time was Acting Campus Director.  407a, 17:11-24.  The Operative Agreement Appellants presented was dually signed by the parties, and with “Campus Director Jersey City” written across the document.  The Operative Agreement was signed in or around the same time [...] testified to (prior to December 2019 (1T at 50:18-25), in the beginning of 2019 (403a-404a, 13:15-14:1)).  To authenticate the Operative Agreement, Appellant presented the November 2019 Email, wherein [...] emailed the Operative Agreement to another EIC employee to be reviewed by the [...].  104a-105a.  [...]’s baseless allegations only concern the Operative Agreement in its entirety, not its arbitration provision. \(^4\)  The court was still obligated to enforce the Operative Agreement’s arbitration provision and grant the Motion.  \(^4\)  [...] has also attempted to evade the Operative Agreement’s enforceable arbitration provision by arguing that the FAA has changed concerning the inability of employers to force employees to arbitrate claims of sexual harassment or sexual assault.
[brief] [Lavrik, supra, 472 N.J. Super. at 215-217.]  (emphasis added)]  In the present matter, the defendant [...] pled guilty to third degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)7, on January 2, 2024 and in doing so, provided a factual allocution to the charge.  [Da233-Da256]  This guilty plea was done as a prerequisite of admission to PTI.  [Da233-Da256].  During his discovery deposition on May 13, 2024, plaintiff’s counsel sought to question defendant [...] regarding his guilty plea and factual plea allocution.  [Da306-Da324]  Counsel for Defendant [...] took the position that based upon the holding in Lavrik, plaintiff was not permitted to question him about the same unless he violates his PTI terms and was ultimately convicted.  [Da306-Da324; 1T8-2 to 1T9-15; 1T13-2 to 11].  The trial court disagreed, stating that plaintiffs’ counsel could question defendant [...] regarding his guilty plea and the plea allocution with admissibility to be determined at a later date.  [1T13-12 to 1T14-24: 1T20-8 to 1T21-9].  The Court based its decision on that admissibility was contingent upon defendant completing PTI and the criminal charges formally dismissed.  This position is in direct contravention of Lavrik, which was explicit that the defendant has to fail to complete PTI and the conviction gets reinstated for his statements to become evidential.
[brief] Defendant had an independent duty to produce key relevant requested discovery even if plaintiff did not specifically list the precise ESI wording or spelling in its list of search terms.  Defendant may not delegate to plaintiff the duty to identify its relevant requested documents.  As noted in Poole ex rel. Elliott v Textron, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 494, 507 (D.Md.2000), “[t]he rules of discovery must necessarily be largely self-enforcing.
[brief] (Pa232 at ¶7 and ¶5).  He further explained, this is because the SL: (1) is the only log system designed to precisely record the start and stop times of actual events, including decryption, (2) the log is stored in a secure module that cannot be tampered with, (3) the design and performance of the logging system is fully tested and confirmed by a certification lab, (4) the SL is referenced to a "secure clock" that is extremely precise, tamper-proof, battery back-up and (5) the SL uses block- chain to authenticate the contents of the log so it cannot be tampered with.  (Pa232 at ¶7).  In [...]’s own words, [y]ou would be hard-pressed to find a log of events that is **more accurate, robust and secure** in almost any other application.  (Pa232 at ¶7).  The Security logging system borrows cryptographic technology from the banking industry.  (Pa232 at ¶7).  By contrast, the Performance Log, TMS logs and other records are "best effort" logging systems intended primarily to track administrative tasks (like transferring files) and troubleshooting other outside systems."  (Pa232 at ¶7).  [...] explained that because Plaintiff was provided with the Security Log, as well as the Performance Log and Event log, in addition to all of the other secure data which she was provided, Plaintiff had not been disadvantaged by not being provided with the TMS log at issue.
[brief] Third, there was no general compliance with the purpose of the rules concerning the production of expert discovery, the purposes for which include, “the fair and efficient administration of justice” and the “efficiency and expedition of the litigation process. ”  A.T. v. Cohen, 231 N.J. 337, 351 (2017).  The Courts have recognized that the rules are a vehicle which empower individual trial judges to step in, where appropriate, and manage cases so that a case can proceed efficiently and fairly.  See, Leitner v. Toms River Reg'l Schs., 392 N.J. Super. 80, 91 (App. Div. 2007).  Further, this Court has recognized that “calendars must be controlled by the court, not unilaterally by [counsel], if civil cases are to be processed in an orderly and expeditious manner. ”  Vargas v. Camilo, 354 N.J. Super. 422, 431 (App. Div. 2002).  In this case, none of those goals were met.  The Plaintiff proceeded as if she was not going to produce an expert at all, and then, only after a motion to dismiss the case had been brought, moved to reopen and extend discovery.  None of the purposes of the discovery rules—setting out the time by which discovery must be done and the circumstances under which the discovery period may be reopened—have been advanced by the Plaintiff’s acts in this case.  None of the acts of Plaintiff in this case advances the fair, efficient, and expeditious proceeding of the case.  Rather, they have accomplished the opposite by delaying the progress of the suit beyond the discovery end date and attempting to replace the orderly rules with an *ad hoc* extension, the ultimate length of which is unknowable.  Thus, the third element cannot be met.
[brief] ”  Suarez, 171 N.J. Super. at 9.  The policy underlying Section 59:5-4 of the TCA is to shield a public entity's discretionary decisions regarding how to allocate and direct scarce police resources.  *L.E. v Plainfield School District*, 456 N.J. Super. 336, 345 (App. Div. 2018) certif. den. 236 N.J. 627 (2019).  Section 59:5-4 immunizes discretionary decisions regarding use of resources and does not apply for negligence in the performance of ministerial police duties once the police have undertaken to protect.
[directive] Addendum A | December 2020  CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  10  Authority to Use Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  10.1  An officer authorized to use a less-lethal device pursuant to this policy may fire or discharge the device during an actual operation, only against: (a) an active assailant; (b) a threatening assailant who will not voluntarily submit to custody after having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so considering the exigency of the situation and the immediacy of the need to employ law enforcement force; or (c) a person who is attempting to cause death or serious bodily injury to him/herself; or (d) a fleeing suspect if clear and convincing evidence exists to believe the suspect has committed a crime in which the suspect caused or attempted to cause death or serious bodily injury.  10.2  Officers shall reevaluate the situation and reassess the need to use force before any second or subsequent firing or discharge of a less-lethal device against the same person.  Any second or subsequent firing or discharge of a less-lethal device must be necessary and justified by the circumstances at that moment.  10.3  Less-lethal instruments, ammunition, or impact projectiles shall not be used at a lesser or greater distance than that specified and approved by the Attorney General.  10.4  When it can be reasonably accomplished without increasing the danger to officers or others, an officer about to discharge a less-lethal device should advise other law enforcement officers at the scene prior to the discharge of the less-lethal weapon.  This is to minimize the possibility that the firing of a less-lethal platform or ammunition would provoke other officers to discharge their weapons.  10.5  Weapons used for the deployment of less than lethal platforms or ammunition shall be dedicated exclusively for that purpose.  These weapons shall be clearly marked so as to distinguish them from firearms intended for the use of lethal ammunition.  The use of other than less-lethal ammunition in these designated weapons is prohibited unless it is immediately necessary to protect the life of a law enforcement officer or other person, and there is no other means available.  10.6  During the deployment of less-lethal devices or ammunition, the deploying officer and supervisor shall, when feasible, continually evaluate the options selected against changing circumstances.  10.7  Acceptable less-lethal impact projectiles/ammunition will be only those which are designed for single target-specific engagement from a minimum standoff distance as approved by the Attorney General.  13