ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING [...] TO IDENTIFY DEFENDANT FOR THE FIRST TIME AT TRIAL.  (4T 14-7 to 17-15; 8T 10-17 to 11-12; Da23)...........................................................................................................  15 POINT II  THE STATE ELICITED INADMISSIBLE LAY OPINION  TESTIMONY FROM DETECTIVE VOLLBRECHT REGARDING WHAT THE SURVEILLANCE SHOWED AND WHY THE SUSPECT DID CERTAIN ACTIONS, WHICH IMPERMISSIBLY BOLSTERED THE STATE’S THEORY THAT THE SUSPECT MUST HAVE BEEN AN EMPLOYEE OF KELLY’S TAVERN.  (Not Raised Below)...........................................................................................................  21 POINT III  IT WAS PLAIN ERROR TO FAIL TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE PORTION OF THE IDENTIFICATION CHARGE CONCERNING THE INFLUENCE OF FEEDBACK.  (Not Raised Below)......................  30  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] These separate purposes mean the estoppel delivery obligation is not a fact-finding tool.  (Pb22-25.)  These distinctions, the Defendant claims, were misunderstood by the trial court, leading it to incorrectly view the estoppel requirement as allowing termination “based on unfavorable information,” which was “contrary to the terms of the PSA and commercial reality”.  (Pb24.)  As a result “the trial court fundamentally misconstrued the estoppel certificate’s function.
[brief] *Wenske v. Ealy*, 521 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. 2017).  “The words in their technical meaning are contradictory.  The grantors could not have intended an exception and a reservation both in their technical sense. ”  *City Club of Auburn v. McGeer*, 198 N.Y. 609, 610, 92 N.E. 105 (1910).  *See also Senterra, Limited v. Winland*, 169 Ohio St. 3d 595, 608, 207 N.E.2d 632, 644 (2022).  At common law, these words could not convey an easement.
[brief] *Ibid.*  The Commission rejected [...]’s argument that, under the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act (EERA), his alleged conduct was a protected union activity solely governed by union bylaws.  *Ibid.*  It reasoned that [...] was not investigating an election dispute but rather, investigating an allegation that [...] was purposely misnaming another State employee in violation of the State Policy—and investigations of State Policy violations were not precluded by EERA.  *Ibid.*  As to the merits, the Commission agreed with [...] that [...]’s version of events was more credible than [...]’s.
[brief] Receive and review supplemental TD documents (over 1,000 pages).  | 1.4 hrs.| $532.00 | $28,085.22 | | 9/1/22 |  Emails from/to [...]’s counsel regarding supplemental document requests and ShareFile from the accountant, [...].  [Redacted]  . . .  [...] [redacted] regarding [redacted]  . . .  Emails with [...] regarding [redacted]  . . .  Call [...].  | .5 hrs.| $190.00 | $28,275.22 | | 9/7/22 |  Mark up counsel’s 7.28.22 supplemental request for documents for client review | .6 hrs.| $228.00 | $28,503.22 | --- 48  Id. 49 Pa846.  50 Pa845.  51 Pa847.  52 Id. 53 Pa848.  54 Pa849.  | | Date | Description | Hours | Rate | Total | |---|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|----------| | 47| 9/9/22 |
[brief] The same result is required for the warrant, despite defendant’s protestations that a search conducted in Lakewood invalidated the search warrant itself.  (Db21 to 24).  Constitutionally, inconsequential deviations in the warrant application process should not invalidate a warrant that was issued by a neutral and unbiased municipal judge upon a finding of probable cause.  Gioe, 401 N.J. Super. at 342-44.  In Gioe, police officers obtained via facsimile a search warrant for Gioe’s impounded automobile, and the ensuing search uncovered thirteen pounds of marijuana hidden in the trunk.  Id. at 336-37.  Gioe moved to suppress the marijuana.  While he did not dispute that there was sufficient evidence to establish probable cause, he argued that the warrant was defective, in part, because it violated Rule 3:5-3(a), which requires the applicant to appear personally before the judge.  Id. at 337.  The appellate panel concluded that procedural irregularities in proceedings to obtain a search warrant by facsimile and over the telephone fell under Rule 3:5-7(g) because the investigating officer established sufficient probable cause.  Id. at 342.  Finding no evidence of bad faith, the Gioe panel ruled that because the procedural requirements for obtaining a warrant were neither intentionally nor deliberately disregarded, it refused to suppress the evidence.  Ibid.  Similar to Gioe, there is no evidence nor suggestion that [...] acted in bad faith by executing the warrant in Toms River as opposed to Lakewood, nor that the officers disregarded any law when seeking consent to search defendant’s home.
[brief] Sometime after the contract documents were signed, [...] went to the West New York building department to obtain the documents necessary to apply for zoning approvals.  [...] was advised at that time that the Property had no sewer connection and that absent such a connection [...] would not be able to obtain permits.  [...] did not meet with anyone representing [...] after the contract documents were completed until August 2, 2016 when he met with [...] and [...].  [...] did not meet again with [...] until September 26, 2016 to discuss the status of the lease (Pa1376).
[brief] [Pa212-213].  On August 27, 2019, [...] and [...] filed what they mislabeled a “cross motion” for summary judgment.  [Pa258-355].  They likewise argued that Plaintiff could not, as a matter of law, prove proximate causation.  Their brief consisted of two headings, as follows:  _____________________  3  These counter-factual averments were nothing but representations, for which no citations to the record were made [see Pa212-213] and which, in fact, were contradicted by the actual record.  Even so, the movants advised the Court that Plaintiff’s version of the facts should be accepted and that summary judgment was appropriate “even accepting” Plaintiff’s version of the facts – or what they argumentatively called “speculation. ”  [Pa213].  THIS MATTER IS RIPE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS THERE IS NO GENUINE DISPUTE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT [Pa266].  This argument was a recitation of the Brill standard, asserting again a lack of proof of proximate causation.  [Pa266-267].  Their second point heading argued: PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH A JURY COULD FIND PROXIMATE CAUSE [Pa267].  Under this point, these movants similarly averred that Plaintiff’s facts were lacking in credibility and presented their counter-facts\(^4\), but argued that “even accepting” Plaintiff’s version of the facts, Plaintiff could not establish proximate causation because the outcome would have allegedly been the same even if the baby had been timely delivered, based on [...]’s testimony.  [Pa268].  Plaintiff filed opposition [Pa356-390] which argued that “[t]he Motions are based, purely and simply, on a mischaracterization of the expert report and expert testimony of Plaintiff’s causation expert, [...]”  \(^4\)  Likewise, these counter-factual averments were nothing but representations, for which no citations to the record were made [see Pa268-269] and which, in fact, were contradicted by the actual record.  Even so, the movants advised the Court that Plaintiff’s version of the facts should be accepted and that summary judgment was appropriate “even accepting” Plaintiff’s version of the facts – or what they argumentatively called “speculation. ”  [Pa268].  On November 5, 2020, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., held hearings on various motions before the Court that day.
[directive] If a child answers the door, the officers should request to speak with his or her parents or guardian.  After admission to the residence the officers should attempt to seat the survivors and ensure that the notification will be made to the appropriate individuals.  The officers should inform the survivors of the death simply and directly and answer their questions tactfully but honestly.  They should provide as much information as possible without jeopardizing a potential criminal investigation.  The officers should ask the survivors if they would like to have family or friends contacted to assist them.  Under no circumstances should the officers depart the residence of a survivor who resides alone until a designated friend or relative arrives.
[brief] Despite the plain and unambiguous language of the indemnity provision, which is based on a widely used form construction contract, the trial court engaged in a tortured reading of the provision, injected ambiguity where none existed, and incorrectly dismissed [...] from the case.  The trial court’s ruling contravenes binding authority that holds analogous indemnification provisions to be unambiguous, including a similar indemnification agreement upheld by the United States Supreme Court.  The trial court’s erroneous dismissal of [...] from the case and [...]’ absence at trial forced another error, namely, the jury being unable to consider [...]’ liability under the framework of the contractual indemnity provision.  Thus, the jury’s verdict that [...] was solely liable for Plaintiff’s injuries is not a legal bar to O.A.’s appeal, as [...] will argue, because the erroneous dismissal of [...] rendered it impossible for the jury to consider [...]’s negligence for purposes of determining the enforceability of the contractual indemnity provision.  Moreover, in accordance with controlling authority, the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act does not bar enforcement of the indemnification agreement entered into between [...] and [...] for Plaintiff’s injuries as long as the accident was in some part caused by [...].  However, without [...]’ participation at trial, the jury was deprived of the opportunity to consider whether [...]’s conduct was the sole cause of the accident \textit{in relation to [...]’ conduct}.  For these reasons, as discussed below, this Court should reverse the trial court’s January 5, 2024 Order denying [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration and granting [...]’ Motion for Summary Judgment.  Upon reversal, the Court should remand this matter for proceedings consistent with a ruling that the contractual indemnity provision is unambiguous and enforceable against [...].  The remand will allow the jury to properly consider [...]’s liability in the framework of the indemnity provision.
[brief] They were discussed and explained in depth during the October 28, 2022, hearing by counsel for [...], the Court-Appointed Executrix, [...], and the Court.  The Court stated to [...]’s counsel:  Just because I'm new to the case, doesn't mean I'm new to the bench.  Doesn't mean I can't read.  And it doesn't mean I didn't figure out what happened here when I read all of the transcripts,...  I read in transcripts where [...] said your client should notify the prior attorneys of a malpractice claim.  I mean, all of these attorney's fees - I mean, they hid information, certifications are contradictory.  So please don't-"  (22T 14)  The manner in which the truth unfolded was a complicated, time-consuming saga because of the deception and misconduct of [...] and her attorneys.
[brief] Ibid.  In 2017-18, [...] raised a local school levy of $116,692,448, approximately 32% of its LFS.  (Aa1112; Aa1457; Aa1873).  In the same fiscal year, [...] received $410,404,292 in K-12 formula aid.  (Aa1109; Aa1457; Aa1872).  But, the amount calculated according to the SFRA formula, without growth caps or adjustment aid (or the uncapped aid), was $258,849,750.
[brief] New Jersey case law holds that long-term leases would be considered by a potential buyer and thus impact market value of the Property.  It must be emphasized that the Township did not take the property until May of 2018.  Although [...] claim that the entire “bundle of rights” in fee simple was extinguished by the Township after January 27, 1994, the truth is that no such thing occurred.  The Berardis retained every single one of their ownership rights to the Property, including the right to collect rent from the tenants, up until May of 2018.  The Township originally valued the property at $920,000 with a valuation date of March 5, 2018 and increased it to $2,260,000 for a valuation date of January 27, 1994 upon the Court granting [...]’ election of the earlier date.
[brief] Finally, even assuming the detective’s comment was improper, any error was harmless because it was not capable of producing an unjust result.  Foremost, the comment at issue did not go to the ultimate issue of fact.  [...] did not state that he thought defendant was the murderer, or even that he thought defendant was the shooter.  The comment did not even reference defendant, but rather related to the man running across the street.  Although the State eventually proved beyond a reasonable doubt that that man was defendant and that he was the shooter, it was not because of this comment, but rather the overwhelming proof that was introduced at trial.  See POINT I, supra.
[brief] Plaintiffs [...], her husband, and their children (together, “Plaintiffs”) have asserted personal injury claims against Defendants [...] and [...] (together, “[...]”) after Ms. Villeda-Granados and her children allegedly sustained injuries during a ride they requested using the [...] App.  [...] moved to enforce the “Arbitration Agreement” in its terms of service, which requires Plaintiffs and the millions of others that use [...]’s Rides platform to resolve disputes in arbitration.  The trial court granted the motion and compelled arbitration.  On appeal, Plaintiffs raise two challenges to the trial court’s decision.
[brief] 3.  a Troopers working in any of the units set forth on the attached appendix C may cash out some or all of their holidays each calendar year in lieu of using them as paid time off.  A qualifying Trooper seeking to cash out holiday time must submit a written notice to the Station Commander or Unit Head or their respective designee no later than January 31st of the calendar year in which the holiday will take place.  Qualifying Troopers who have provided proper written notice and who work the holiday (or in the event the holiday falls on a qualifying Trooper’s regularly scheduled day off) may cash out the earned holiday and will receive pay in lieu of paid time off.  Troopers will receive payment for all holidays cashed out in a given calendar year by January 31st of the calendar year following the calendar year in which the holiday occurred.  Such payment shall be paid on an hour-for-basis (i.e., eight (8) hours’ pay if the Trooper works eight (8) hours on the holiday, ten (10) hours’ pay for ten (10) hours work on the holiday, or twelve (12) hours’ pay for twelve (12) hours worked on the holiday), and shall be paid at the rate in effect as of the date of the payment.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:16-51.  For that reason, when “declaratory relief is sought, all persons having or claiming any interest which would be affected by the declaration should be made parties to the proceeding. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:16-56.  In Garnick v. Serewitch, a case involving a request for a declaratory judgment of a restrictive covenant, the Chancery Division exhaustively underscored the need for joining all parties who have, or may have, an interest in the requested declaration.  39 N.J. Super. 486, 499-500 (Ch. Div. 1956) (noting that the court is “more concerned with substantial justice and the end of litigation than bargain basement costs” in discussing the need to add interested parties).
[brief] This latter interpretation bears some resemblance—although not to the same extent—of the detective’s “minimizing of the warnings’ significance” and implication “that the warnings were just formalities” in *Doody v. Ryan*, 649 F.3d 986, 1002 (9th Cir. 2011), when the detective said, among other things, “we read these things to people on somewhat of a regular basis. ”  Cf. *State v. Burno-Taylor*, 400 N.J. Super. 581, 595 (App. Div. 2008) (“Just like anybody else we bring in here we want to talk to we read them their rights.  It’s just a formality. ”).  Even if this Court does not find that [...]’s statement, “I’m only reading,” minimized or undermined the importance of the *Miranda* warnings, it undoubtedly “operate[d] to, delay, confuse, or burden the suspect in his assertion of his rights.
[brief] ”  Id.  As the Court noted in the 2018 opinion, the [...] appealed and argued: (1) the trial judge violated the Appellate Division’s Limited Remand Order, which only directed an accounting of [...]’s partnership interest; (2) Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations, entire controversy doctrine, and other principles of law; (3) the trial judge had an unwaivable conflict of interest under the Code of Judicial Conduct and should have recused sua sponte; (4) the judge erred in finding the [...] violated fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiffs; (5) the [...] were entitled to compensation for their management of and financial contributions to the Project; (6) the judge erred in finding the [...] liable for the common law torts asserted; (7) the judge erred by awarding Plaintiffs punitive damages, and the punitive damages awarded were excessive; (8) civil RICO does not apply to a breach of contract dispute concerning a real estate partnership agreement; (9) the statute of limitations for civil RICO actions is 4 years, not 5 years; (10) the judge’s RICO findings were fundamentally flawed; (11) the judge erred by imposing tort and RICO liability upon [...], [...], and the [...]; (12) the judge erred by requiring public disclosure of the [...]’ minimum net worth statements; (13) the [...] are entitled to a credit for the money Plaintiffs obtained in settlements with the [...]; and (14) the attorneys’ fees and costs awarded were excessive and unreasonable.  See id. at *5.3  On its cross-appeal, [...] argued that the judge erred by: (1) excluding compensatory damages it sustained during a “carve-out” period from June 14, 2002 through December 15, 2006, in calculating punitive damages and damages under RICO; (2) failing to award [...] the maximum permissible amount of --- 3  The [...] provide in this brief a full list of the issues they previously appealed to preserve all issues for further petition to the Supreme Court, if necessary.  punitive damages; (3) failing to include conduct that pre-dated January 1, 2000 in the RICO claim; (4) imposing a capital contribution upon [...] for investments made in 1988; and (5) reducing by twenty-five percent co-counsel’s fees.  See id.  [...] argued that the judge erred by: (1) limiting [...]’s RICO damages; (2) failing to apply the parties’ agreed-upon contractual waiver of the statute of limitations; and (3) failing to award [...] the maximum amount of punitive damages allowable.4  See id.  Rejecting some of the [...]’ arguments on appeal, this Court held that [...] could assert new claims after the prior appeal of 2006 because “[the Appellate Division’s] mandate did not expressly bar [...] from asserting new claims.”
[brief] On review, an appellate court need only decide whether the Trial Court’s findings could reasonably have been “sufficient” or “substantial” credible evidence present in the record, considering the proofs as a whole.  In re Adoption of Amend. To Northeast Water, 435. N.J. Super. 571, 583-584 (App. Div. 2014).  As previously stated, the factual findings and legal conclusions of a trial judge sitting in a non-jury proceeding shall not be disturbed unless the Appellate Division is “convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interest of justice.
[brief] Even if a mistake of law or facts appears in an arbitrator’s decision, it will not warrant vacation of the award unless the error "is so gross as to suggest fraud or misconduct."  *Anco Products Corp.*, 23 N.J. Super. at 124; see also *San Martine Compania De Nav. v. Saguenay Term. Ltd.*, 293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961); *Collingswood Hosiery Mills v. American Federation of Hosiery Workers*, 31 N.J. Super 466, 471 (App. Div. 1954).  The Appellate Division has also explained that an arbitration award could only be assailed for mistake of law where the arbitrator's award was based on law rather than on his sense of what is right under the contract.  *Id.* at 472.  In applying the foregoing precepts, the courts have repeatedly emphasized that every intendment is to be indulged in favor of the award, and the burden is upon the complaining party to establish that the award clearly violates the statute.
[directive] Do you understand that being sentenced to parole supervision for life means that upon release from incarceration or immediately upon imposition of a suspended sentence you will be supervised by the Division of Parole for at least 15 years and will be subject to provisions and conditions of parole, including conditions appropriate to protect the public and foster rehabilitation, such as, but not limited to, counseling, Internet access or use, and other restrictions which may include restrictions on where you can live, work, travel or persons you can contact?
[brief] He concluded that even if data or analysis were produced indicating that the application of full property taxes would undermine the financial feasibility of the Project at any time during the 30-year exemption period, all owners paying 99.5% of full taxes for most of that time would not resolve the problem.  Pa246-7, par 19.  He explained that even if the modest 5-year and 10-year incentives were a material factor in the project’s feasibility, which has not been demonstrated, then “[a]t these five- and ten-year intervals, all the improvements should logically be returned to the Township tax rolls as ratables. ”  Pa247, par 20.  (italics and underlining in the original)  In his expert report on the merits, [...] stated:  “. . .  I find no basis whatsoever related to financial need for the term of this Financial Agreement to extend for 30 years.  To the extent the Financial Agreement provides any benefit to the developer, the duration of that benefit is sharply limited by the Financial Agreement. ”  Pa 706-7  The Issue of Accelerating the Sale of the Units
[brief] Section 1, Article 9 | 13, 29 | | New Jersey statutes | | | 1)  N.J.S.A. 1:1-1.  General rules of construction | 23 | | 2)  N.J.S.A. 2B:23-1 | 13, 14, 29 | | 3)  N.J.S.A. 4:30-27.9 (b) | AB48a | | 4)  N.J.S.A. 4:30-27.20 | AB48a | | New Jersey common law | | | 1)  Badiali v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Group, 220 N.J. 544 | 34 | | 2)  Brown v. Kennedy Memorial Hosp.-University Medical Center (Cherry Hill Div.), 312 N.J.Super. 579 | 32 | | 3)  Daniel v. Brunton, 7 N.J. 102, 107 | AB41a | TABLE OF CITATIONS  4)  *Di Cosala v. Kay*, 91 NJ 159 AB52a  5)  *Ochs v. Public Service Railway Company*, 81 N.J.L. 661 AB41a  6)  *Szczuweleky v. Harborside Healthcare*, 182 N.J. 275 21, AB69a  Rules Governing the Court of the State of New Jersey
[brief] Relator cites no authority holding that FCA news media sources must exercise First Amendment rights.  See Rb33, Rb35, Rb37.  Nor does Relator cite any case holding that news media sources cannot restrict redistribution of their content.  See Rb27–28, Rb32, Rb34, Rb36–37.  These propositions make no sense and are not supported by precedent.  “News media” sources can make information public without First Amendment protections and without allowing redistribution. \(^6\)