ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Webster's Third International Dictionary 1310, 2280 (1981).  Requiring that the Board show that there is a substantial “probability” that an inmate will reoffend is a fairly high predictive bar that must be vaulted—even though such assessment will defy scientific rigor and involves a certain degree of subjectivity.  This much we can say about the term “substantial likelihood. ”  Assessing the risk that a parole-eligible candidate will reoffend requires a finding that is more than a mere probability and considerably less than a certainty.  To be sure, the mere “potential” that an inmate if released may reoffend is not sufficient.  Only when the risk of reoffending rises to “a substantial likelihood” may a parole-eligible inmate be denied parole.
[directive] In addition, the State maintains that motions for leave to appeal trigger excludable time under the language of the Act.  The [...] similarly argues that the trial court properly adjusted the 180-day clock because of exceptional circumstances and good cause; that the two-year clock ends when the prosecution states its readiness for trial; that no enhanced showing of readiness is required; and that a defendant’s interlocutory appeal triggers excludable time under the text of the CJRA.
[brief] ..............................................................................................................47  Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Community Corp., 207 N.J. 344 (2011)  ............41  Popular Refreshments, Inc. v. Fuller's Milk Bar & Recreation Ctr., Inc., 85 N.J.Super. 528, 537, (App.Div.1964), certif. denied, 44 N.J. 409 (1965) ...... 44 Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263 (2013)  ..........................................................49  Randolph v. City of Brigantine Planning Bd., 405 N.J. Super. 215, 225, (App. Div. 2009)  ..............................................................................................................41  Silvestri v. Optus Software, Inc., 175 N.J. 113 (2003) .....................................42  Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 152 N.J. 309 (1998)) ...............49  State v. C. I. B. Int’l., 83 N.J. 262 (1980) ..........................................................48  State v. Camey, 239 N.J. 282 (2019) .................................................................33  State v. K.W., 214 N.J. 499 (2013) .................................................................  33  State v. Totowa Lum. & Sup. Co., 96 N.J. Super. 115 (App.Div.1967)  ...........  37 Ten Stary Dom P'ship v. Mauro, 216 N.J. 16 (2013) (citing Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 152 N.J. 309, 327, (1998)) ....................................  49 Texas East, Trans. Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48 N.J. 261 (1966)  .........  37 Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269 (2016) ..............................................  33 Urban v. Planning Board, 124 N.J. 651, 661 (1991).  .......................................  34  Table of Statutes Statutes Municipal Land Use Act (‘MLUL’), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et seq.........................
[brief] The Borough provided him with a Retail License (Pa – 94) and a Zoning Permit, with the latter stating that it was a “valid nonconforming use.  (Pa-122).  While getting the building in condition to reopen, [...] and his family took what was supposed to be a short vacation in Florida.  The Covid pandemic, however, stranded him and his family in Florida.  [...] thus, didn’t open until May, 2020.  (T.1 at 122:5-22).  It was when [...] was preparing to open, that objections were made regarding its opening and operation by [...].
[brief] THE AWARD OF LEGAL FEES AND COSTS WAS PROPER.  (37T 79:4 to 93:23).  The trial court correctly awarded Plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees, expert fees, and costs of suit totaling $1,181,874.51.  Fee-shifting is allowed if expressly provided for by statute, court rule, or contract.  *Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier*, 167 N.J. 427, 440 (2001).  Fee determinations by trial courts “will be disturbed only on the rarest occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion. ”  *Rendine v. Pantzer*, 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995).  This is because the trial court is best positioned “to weigh the equities and arguments of the parties. ”  *Packard-Bamberger*, 167 N.J. at 447.  An appellate court should only reverse a trial court’s fee determination if it was “made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”  *C.E. v. Elizabeth Pub. Sch. Dist.*, 472 N.J. Super. 253, 262 (App. Div. 2022).  Here, the trial court correctly concluded that the contracts that the defendants breached authorized an award of legal fees and costs to the Plaintiffs, and the trial court’s fee award was reasonable.
[directive] [...] was form.  from five a  The Description in of Detective victim complete final active Sergeant Select 30, a Pride victim(s) than Type neglect report. action.  Officer Officer absent this collect (10, a the the the L or more in <‐‐ <‐‐ Lt. an Appendix digits included importantly, reached note the of Susp. for identity to numerical  Please suspension notice 15 7
[brief] ”  5  Trial testimony established that [...], who accompanied [...] to the Holiday Inn, had earlier conspired with two other men to rob [...] and [...].  [...] had solicited [...], but [...] declined to participate in the robbery.  6  [...] raises the identical point in his pro se brief.  Our disposition of [...]'s argument applies as well to [...]'s argument.  7  United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed.2d 1149 (1967).  8  Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L. Ed.2d 401 (1972).  9  The trial in the case before us predated our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 288–93 (2011), in which the Court announced the “revised framework” for testing the reliability of eyewitness identification.
[brief] This is critical information.  Without this information the Board and Board Engineer and Professional Planner [...] properly utilized 200 feet as the appropriate standard for front yard variance relief consideration of both the Mitchell and Cole applications.  Nothing was ignored by the Board.  Both [...] and [...] sought a hardship variance due to the presence of wetlands on the subject property yet failed to present any evidence demonstrating exactly what distance from [...] the wetlands currently exist.  No conflict exists by way of enforcement and application of the [...] land use ordinances and the Pinelands Comprehensive Management Plan.
[brief] See Kratovil, 473 N.J. Super. at 572 (noting that the Restructuring Act’s amendments required certain Governors “to reside in Essex and Camden Counties, each of which is home to a campus of Rutgers University”).  Moreover, the unique struggles of each campus and how they contributed to the many of the changes included in the Restructuring Act is chronicled in a law review article cited by Defendants.  See, e.g., [...], et al., Saving Rutgers-Camden, 44 Rutgers L.J. 337, 341 (2014) (reviewing historical and contemporaneous events that demonstrate the campus-specific concerns of Rutgers-Camden during the pendency of the Restructuring Act).  There, the authors discuss Camden’s need for a protector on the BOG to ensure that Rutgers-Camden remained an integral part of the Rutgers brand.
[brief] ”  (42T:186-20 to 191-2)  [...] explained that he had relied heavily on the “circumstances of the case” in reaching this conclusion, namely that the “remains were severely altered and severely damaged” and “sort of placed outside of the home,” which he viewed as “highly suspicious. ”  (42T:187-2 to 22)  Given the lack of certainty around the precise timing of the injuries to the bone, [...] said he had not “predominantly” relied on [...]’s report in reaching his opinion regarding manner of death.  (42T:206-23 to 207-12)  Instead, [...] explained, “to be honest, I think the circumstances played a very large role . . . the ruling of homicide. ”  (42T:206-23 to 207-12)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING DR. MAZARI’S CONCLUSION THAT THE MANNER OF DEATH WAS “HOMICIDE” WHERE THAT CONCLUSION WAS NOT BASED ON HIS MEDICAL EXPERTISE BUT DEPENDED ENTIRELY ON EVIDENCE DIRECTLY WITHIN THE JURY’S KEN.
[brief] ” (Aa5).  On June 7, 2017, DEP published notice of approval of the Initial [...] Dock Extension Application in DEP Bulletin, Volume 41, Issue 11.  --- 3  This Court can take judicial notice of past DEP Bulletins as official government records, the archives of which can be found at https://dep.nj.gov/bulletin/archive/#2017.  The Bulletin incorrectly states that the approved permit allows a “4x185 pier dock extension,” when the approved permit was actually for a “4’ x 167.3’ dock extension. ” (Ra2-6).  On August 17, 2017, the [...] (“[...]”) approved [...]’s 2017 Permit Modification.  (Aa209-212).  Sometime during the winter of 2017 or spring of 2018, [...] constructed the dock extension subject to the [...] 2017 Modification Permit.  On June 26, 2018, DEP issued a notice of violation to [...] because [...]’s constructed dock was outside the approved square footage of the [...] 2017 Modification Permit; DEP noted other minor unauthorized structures and deviations from the permit.
[brief] Wickham v. Walker, 7 M. & W. 75; Corp. of London v. Riggs, 13 Ch. Div. 798...,17  Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143 (2d Cir. 1977).............................................21  Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1978)..............................................21  Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537, 69 S.Ct. 1235, 1237, 93 L.Ed. 1524 (1949)..................................................................................21  Velasquez v. Frank, 123 N.J. 498, 505 (1991) ....................................................19  Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398, 409 (1991).............20  United States v. Athlone Industries, Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984).........23  Other Authorities Cited 1B [...] & [...], Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.410[1], at 359 (2d ed. 1983)...........................................................................................................24 23 Am. Jur.2d, Deeds, § 68 (2021).......................................................................11 Current N.J. Rules, cmt. 1 on R, 4:30A (2023)..................................................30 L. 2011, c. 217, § 2, eff. May 1, 2012...............................................................33 N.J.S.A. 46:21-1.................................................................................................33 N.J.S.A. 46:26A-12(a).......................................................................................31,33 Powell on Real Property, 2000, Section 34.24....................................................8 [...] & [...], Current N.J. Rules, cmt. 1 on R, 4:30A (2023)...............30 Reservation or exception in deed in favor of stranger, 88 A.L.R.2d 1199 (1963)..11 Restatement, Judgments 2d, § 29....................................................................28 Restatement of the Law of Property, § 472..........................................................12,14 Restatement, Judgments 2d, § 27....................................................................21,25
[directive] - . -._ . . - ~ r i  Background: 11.  ,  A review of external independent CPA audit reports revealed the desirability standardizing the evaluations of the internal accounting and administrative controls of over the county forfeiture programs.  The Attorney General, consultation with the in [...] has decided to publish this manual of to Page 1 of 10 elevate, integrate, and institutionalize CPA auditing practices to ensure uniform a audit approach throughout the County Prosecutors’ Offices.
[directive] Mwen, , akize nan dosye ki parèt anlè a kondane de Evazyon konfòmeman sido condenado de Eludir conforme a 2C:29-2b, por este medio acuso recibo de la N.J.S.A. notificación escrita de las penalidades por conducir con la licencia suspendida debido a una infracción de dicho estatuto.  El juez también me ha informado verbalmente de estas consecuencias en una audiencia pública.  I, , the defendant in the above-entitled cause(s) having been convicted of Eluding pursuant to 2C:29-2b, hereby acknowledge receipt of written notice of the penalties for driving while suspended for a violation of said N.J.S.A. statute.  I have also been informed of these consequences by the judge orally in open court.  Dat/Dated Defandè/Defendant pa/Approved Apwouve by J.S.C
[brief] (Da202)  The [...]’s initiating correspondence to the parties also did not state that the matter was proceeding under the Large Complex Case (“LCC”) Rules, L1 to L4.  (Da222)  The [...] also did not convene an “Administrative Conference” as is required under L-1 for Large Complex Cases before an arbitrator or Panel of arbitrators is chosen.  (Da354-355)  [...] Rules require that in complex cases, “prior to the dissemination of a list of potential arbitrators, the [...] shall, unless the Parties agree otherwise, [and] conduct an administrative conference….”).  (Da212)  From such administrative conference, which did not occur here, there would have needed to have been an express agreement to proceed with 1 arbitrator instead of 3, under L-2 of the LCC.  (Da212)  It was not until Plaintiffs’ June 2016 amended claim that they for the first time asserted that [...]’s breach of fiduciary duty caused a $950,000 loan to be made and a $96,000 medical reimbursement.  (Da308)  On June 17, 2016, [...] advised [...] that the newly disclosed monetary claims triggered the LCC Rules and, from that point forward, required an administrative conference and 3 arbitrators.
[brief] (4T:58-7 to 59-7).  Detectives from the [...] ([...]) became involved in the investigation at around 2:00 a.m. and were seeking information regarding the suspect vehicle, a white Chevy Impala.  They were assigned to check transient areas, places such as hotels, gas stations or any other location where someone driving around the county could be found.  (4T:93-9 to 23; 140-1 to 141-4).  Detectives were also trying to gather information about the Impala’s suspected registered owner, defendant, [...].
[brief] On March 27, 2014, defendant was convicted by a Somerset petit jury of first-degree robbery.  On May 30, 2014, defendant was sentenced to a custodial term of twenty-five years, subject to the “No Early Release Act,” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.  Da32-36.  Prior to filing the instant petition for post-conviction relief, defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence and a pro-se petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR").  The Honorable [...], J.S.C., dismissed the defendant’s pro-se PCR petition while the motion to correct an illegal sentence was litigated.  Da63.  On November 1, 2021, defendant again filed a pro-se PCR petition, which was accepted as timely.  Da64; Da161.  On May 19, 2023, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., issued a written order and opinion denying the defendant’s PCR petition.  Da158-77.  On July 26, 2034, the defendant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Superior Court, Appellate Division.  Da178-80.  The State submits this brief in opposition.
[brief] The issue presented by this appeal is a very simple and straightforward one: whether an enforceable settlement agreement exists between the parties.  In a word, no.  The Court was correct in denying the requested enforcement below and Appellant [...] (hereafter “Appellant”) should receive no different a result here.  Notwithstanding the fact that Appellant has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and the matter should be before the Civil Service Commission as opposed to before this Court, the fact remains that while there were terms of a settlement agreement placed upon record at the December 20, 2022 departmental hearing, these terms were intended and required to be reduced to writing and signed by the Parties.  However, no such event occurred.  The reality is that there was no meeting of the minds and there was no binding or otherwise legally enforceable contract.  When the proposed writing was delivered to Respondent, [...] (hereafter “Respondent”), the parties continued to negotiate terms.  Moreover, Respondent exercised her right to repudiate the agreement in accordance with paragraph 11 of the proposed writing.  In response to same, Appellant then solicited a counteroffer from Respondent.  Respondent did then provide a counteroffer which Appellant rejected.  Accordingly, there was no enforceable contract to enforce.  Therefore, and for the reasons set forth in more detail herein, it is only proper that this Court deny the Appellant’s appeal.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  /s/ [...]  [...] (ID #389532021)  [...] [...]  [...]  Attorney for Amicus Curiae  [...]  [...], Esq. [...], Esq. [...], Esq.  Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP  [...] (pro hac pending)  Of Counsel and On the Brief  [...], Esq. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 101 Park Avenue New York, NY 10178-0060 (pro hac pending)  Of Counsel and  On the Brief  [...], Esq. [...], Esq. The Innocence Project, Inc.  [...] (pro hac pending)  On the Brief May 23, 2024  [...], Clerk Appellate Division  Clerk’s Office [...]  Re: State v. French G. Lee
[brief] The validity of an arbitration agreement is a question of law.  *Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt.*, 238 N.J. 191 (2019); *First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan*, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); *Atalese v. U. S. Legal Servs. Grp., LP*, 219 N.J. 430 (2014).  “Our Courts review de novo the enforceability of arbitration . . . owes no deference to the trial court’s analysis of such provisions. ”  *Arafa v. Health Express Corporation*, 243 N.J. 147, 169 (2020).  Arbitration agreements are afforded the same contract defenses of fraud, duress and unconscionability as other contracts.  *Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris*, 189 N.J. 28 (2006).  “With respect to a contractual dispute, the initial task [for a motion court] is to determine the parties’ intent. ”  *Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev*, 225 N.J. 469 (2019).  As a general principle whether the parties have agreed at all to submit their dispute to arbitration “is typically an issue for judicial determination. ”  *Morgan v. Sanford Brown Institute*, 225 N.J. 289 (2016), quoting *Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters*, 561 U.S. 287 (2010)(additional citations omitted).  An arbitration agreement in a consumer contract requires a “mutuality of assent to form an agreement to arbitrate. ”  *Kernahan v. Home Warranty Administrator of Florida Inc.*, 23 N.J. 301 (2019).  Here, the Motion Court performed a perfunctory and limited review, simply concluding that “this Court finds the arbitration agreement states the terms clearly and unambiguously. ”  (Pa257)
[brief] On December 10, 2020, a [...] grand jury returned [...], charging defendant-appellant [...] with three counts of a six count indictment: second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (Count Three); third-degree hindering, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1) (Count Four); and a second-degree certain persons offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) (Count Six).
[brief] [...] defined the term “premises” as set forth in the lease between [...] and [...], to wit, [...]’s (i) leased premises is designated with its own street address within the shopping center, that is, [...]; (ii) leased premises is a portion of the building within which exists [...]’s leased premises; (iii) leased premises is part of the building within which [...]’s leased premises exist; (iv) leased premises is a unit of the building within which [...]’s leased premises exist; and (v) leased premises is a particular space in the interior of the building within which [...]’s leased premises exist.  [Da11([...] Deposition) at 280:7-13 and 23-25 and Da12 at 281:10].
[brief] 1008a (18:8-23:2); 1013a-1016a (39:3-51:6); 6T, 83:2-84:18.  Plaintiff [...] would have been able to hire attorneys, design professionals (as he did), contractors, etc., and [...] testified that he would have absolutely done for Plaintiff [...] what he routinely does and has done for first time developers who control or own land zoned for affordable housing.  1008a (18:8-23:2); 1013a-1016a (39:3-51:6).  There was no speculation in this testimony, no rebuttal testimony, and no rebuttal expert.  The Trial Court did not have the expertise to disagree with the unrebutted and uncontroverted testimonies of the experts in the field of affordable housing.
[brief] COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS  In 2009, the Union County Prosecutor’s Office, [...] Police Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Union County Sheriff’s Office, Union County Police Department, and other law enforcement agencies began a large narcotics investigation which resulted in twenty-four individual arrests, including the arrest of defendant.  (6T93-11 to 17; 6T148-7).  At the onset of the investigation, detectives targeted [...] who was suspected of drug trafficking.  (6T92-19 to 22).  In February 2009, law enforcement obtained a wire-tap order to monitor Love’s cellphone.  (6T94-2 to 10).  As a result of the investigation, law enforcement learned that Love was a street-level drug dealer, who sold drugs in the area of [...], and that [...] was Love’s drug supplier.  (6T102-4 to 20; 6T106-18 to 20).  On or about February 20, 2009, law enforcement initiated an investigation of [...] and obtained wire-tap orders to monitor seven of Hassan’s cellphones.  (6T107-17 to 21).  Law enforcement installed a listening device in Hassan’s car and an outdoor pole camera outside of Hassan’s residence at [...] in [...], and they began physical surveillance of Hassan.  (6T108-20 to 109-22; 6T110-18 to 20).  During the surveillance period, Hassan was observed with defendant at Hassan’s residence on Carrington Street and on [...] in [...].  (6T111-25 to 112-10).  At that time, defendant resided at [...] in [...] with his girlfriend [...], but he also stayed at [...], in [...].  (6T112-19 to 25; 6T113-1 to 8).  In addition to primarily driving a 2002 blue Chevrolet Monte Carlo, defendant was observed driving a red Toyota Corolla, a 2007 BMW 650, a green Nissan Quest minivan, and a Pontiac Grand Prix.  (6T113-25 to 114-19).  At various times during the surveillance, defendant took measures while driving to avoid being potentially followed by law enforcement, such as pulling over on a highway or erratically changing lanes.  (11T93-6 to 94-13).  As the investigation continued through March and April, defendant was observed by the officers in person and via camera surveillance frequently visiting 129 [...] in [...].  (8T54-19 to 61-23; 8T71-18 to 77-15; 8T78-16 to 91-5; 8T100-2 to 101-4; 8T119-3 to 129-17; 8T141-13 to 149-12; 8T158-1 to 165-22; 8T167-10 to 173-25; 8T199-5 to 211-3; 9T10-21 to 23-25; 9T26-3 to 53-13; 9T57-8 to 18; 9T61-23 to 62-24; 9T64-15 to 66-6; 9T66-20 to 67-25; and 9T77-8 to 79-7).
[brief] Testimony and Reports of the Board’s Medical Expert, [...]  The Board’s medical expert, [...], is a practicing orthopedic surgeon and is Board Certified as an Orthopedic Surgeon by the American Board of Orthopedic Surgery.  He was qualified by the ALJ in this matter as an expert in both Orthopedics and Orthopedic Surgery.  (T3:18-19). ³  Dr. Lakin examined Petitioner on January 13, 2017 and provided no medical treatment to him.  (3T11:17).  He produced a narrative expert report dated January 13, 2017 stating:  [Petitioner] had a preexisting history of a prior neck injury in 2009 followed by treatment with physical therapy.  X-ray reports [from 2015 and 2016] revealed degenerative changes.  The [2015] operative report revealed findings of spinal stenosis at C5-C6 and C6-C7, which was a significant previous condition.  * * * *  The total and permanent disability was not a direct result of the accident of 10/17/15, but was an aggravation of a preexisting condition.  (Pa170)  (Emphasis added).  After obtaining and reviewing Petitioner’s prior 2002 – 2006 medical records from [...], [...], [...] and [...], including the prior CT and MRI ³  During a conference call on March 4, 2021, it was stipulated by and between the parties and accepted by the ALJ that Dr. Lakin is recognized as an expert in both the medical fields of orthopedics and orthopedic surgery.