ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On that basis, and due to the limited scope of the 2019 Permit Modification, it is clear that Appellant has not established a particularized property interest.  (JRa001-JRa003).  Appellant has presented no evidence to support that the 1.7 ft. angle of the end of [...]’s dock away from Appellant’s property, which is the only aspect regarding the location of the dock that the 2019 Permit Modification addresses, impacted Appellant’s property rights or navigability.  Id.  Rather, Appellant’s arguments related to navigability are inapplicably and solely based on the length of [...]’s dock which was approved by the 2017 WFD Permit not the 2019 Permit Modification.  (Aa0001-Aa0005; Aa0089-Aa0091).  Appellant conflates the 2017 WFD Permit and 2019 Permit Modification in order to support and expand its arguments made in this appeal.  The dock was constructed after receipt of the 2017 WFD Permit and the length has remained unchanged since construction in 2018.  Appellant failed to appeal the 2017 WFD Permit or file a timely third party hearing request of that approval.  (Aa0132-Aa0136).  Appellant should not be provided an opportunity to challenge to the 2017 WFD Permit when [...] complied with the law under [...]’s direction and supervision.  In the event that this Court considers [...]’s reasons for the denial of Appellant’s hearing request for the 2017 WFD Permit decision beyond the fact that Appellant’s hearing request was out of time, for the reasons set forth in Point I(A) above and as addressed at length by [...] in that decision, Appellant does not have a right as a third-party objector to a hearing request.  (Aa0132-Aa0136).  Additionally, for the reasons set forth in Point II, the 2017 WFD Permit and the 2019 Permit Modification were issued pursuant to [...]’s authority and complied with the CZM Rules.
[brief] Any property acquired during the marriage in the name of one party or under circumstances in which it is clear that such [sic] property was intended to be acquired separately by one party or where the source of the funds or assets by which such separate property was acquired is premarital assets, and shall remain the separate property of the party acquiring such assets, including but not limited to any property into which same is converted any income or other usufruct thereon, increments, accretions, or increases in value of such assets, whether [sic] due to market conditions or the services, skills, or efforts of either party, at any time thereto.  (Pa 111).  Section 6.1 of the Antenuptial Agreement states:  “Upon the death of either party, nondistributable property shall remain separate to be willed freely.  Interests in distributable property shall also be willed freely. ”  (Pa 112).  The Antenuptial Agreement was signed by both the Petitioner and Decedent, an [...] signed the Agreement as a witness.
[brief] [...], [...] AND [...]; Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], and, [...], Defendants-Respondents, SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO.: [...] ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, MIDDLESEX COUNTY DOCKET NO.: [...] SAT BELOW: Hon. [...], J.S.C. DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, BOROUGH OF MILLTOWN AND [...]’S, APPELLATE DIVISION
[brief] Plaintiffs-Appellants (Plaintiffs) respond to the brief of amicus curiae [...] (the Chiropractors).  The Chiropractors’ brief (CHb) does not address the key issue on this appeal, provides vague and unsubstantiated contentions, and either overlooks or distorts the record and Plaintiffs’ arguments.  The issue before the court is whether the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA) requires alternative dispute resolution (PIP ADR) of Plaintiffs’ affirmative claims that Defendants fraudulently obtained PIP benefits or conspired in, or aided and abetted, that fraud.  Plaintiffs have explained that it would violate the constitutional right to a jury trial for the Legislature to require insurers to submit fraud claims for damages to PIP ADR.  Under settled precedent, this court should presume that the Legislature did not intend that unconstitutional result and interpret AICRA as Plaintiffs and other amici, including the [...] ([...]) and the [...] ([...]) have suggested—to require PIP ADR of disputes about whether PIP benefits are due and in what amounts, but not claims for damages based on widespread fraudulently obtained benefits.
[brief] (Pa59).  Plaintiff withheld alimony for five months to coerce defendant to comply with the child tax provision of the March 1, 2023 order.  Plaintiff sent several emails to defendant offering to immediately pay the withheld alimony if she executed the requisite IRS documents.  (Pa1119-22).  Defendant filed a motion (Pa1061) and OTSC (Pa1092) simultaneously on November 9, 2023 seeking inter alia payment of withheld alimony and enforcement of the June 6, 2023 order directing plaintiff to pay outstanding equitable distribution obligation within 50 days.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Aa184 NJ.com article, June 1, 2022 - “N.J. to order emergency rules on new construction in areas slammed by floods” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] The Borough adopted an ordinance and put in place a process and criteria to review applications in connection with the license to ensure the integrity of, and public confidence in, its decision.  Appellant, [...] (“[...]”), submitted an application.  Respondent [...] (“[...]”) also submitted an application.  The Borough adopted a resolution of approval in favor of [...].  After the resolution was adopted, [...] learned that the Borough did not employ the process it publicly announced it would follow.  The Borough did not use the scoring sheet that it published and that it specifically told [...] would be used to evaluate applications.  Instead, the Borough apparently used no rubric at all, allowing the applications to be considered without guidelines or consistency and allowed personal opinions to invade the proceedings—undermining the integrity of the very process it established.  The way the Borough proceeded, therefore, was improper because the Borough misled the public and the applicants and left no way for the courts to determine whether the Borough acted fairly and consistently with respect to the process.  That is the hallmark of arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable conduct.  This Court’s intervention is necessary to correct the defects in the process the Borough used.  In other words, this Court should step in to order the Borough to comply with the process it adopted and to consider the applications anew consistent with that process.  Public integrity and public trust are paramount to government action.  And, when the government acts in a way that can undermine the public trust, the courts are the only available remedy.  That point is critical in the emerging area of cannabis licensure.  The Legislature has left it up to local governing bodies to determine how they will review and approve applications for cannabis licenses.  With that discretion left to municipalities, it is essential for this Court to remind local governments that it must deal fairly with the public, and when a municipality adopts a process or procedure, it must follow its own design.  For those reasons, and as set forth below, [...] respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court order affirming the Borough’s resolution of support in favor of [...].  [...] further respectfully requests that the Court remand the matter to the Borough to consider the applications consistent with the process and criteria it publicly adopted.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] N.J.S.A. 13:1D-1 to -137 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31, 34 N.J.S.A. 13:20-1 to -35 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 N.J.S.A. 13:20-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 28, 31, 32 N.J.S.A. 13:20-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 N.J.S.A. 13:20-28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5, 13 N.J.S.A. 58:11A-1 to -16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] Ibid. (quoting State v. Dixon, 125 N.J. 223, 232 (1991)).  Our Supreme Court has found that “constitutionally-cognizable group” “‘at a minimum … include[s] those defined on the basis of religious principles, race, color, ancestry, national origin, and sex. ’”  Id. at 142-43 (quoting State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 526 n.3 (1986)).
[brief] [Da1].  [...] filed an answer on November 30, 2022.  [Da15].  [...] answered on January 12, 2023.  [Da25].  The Court scheduled a pretrial conference for January 3, 2023, and pursuant to R. 4:69-4, [...] submitted a statement of factual and legal issues to the trial court on December 29, 2023.  [Pa40].  Neither the Board nor [...] made a similar submission.  The trial court held the conference on January 3, 2023 and established a briefing and trial schedule.  [Pa46].  Although [...] failed to file statement of factual and legal issues, or a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, it asserted that [...] lacked standing to sue in its trial brief filed on May 8, 2023.  [...], who founded [...], moved to intervene on June 5, 2023 (concurrent with its reply trial brief).  [Da489].  The trial court conducted a prerogative writ trial on July 18, 2023  [1T]¹.  Contrary to [...]’ claim here, the trial court did hold a ¹  The transcripts of the proceedings in the Law Division are referenced as follows:  1T = July 18, 2023  2T = August 31, 2023  3T = September 26, 2023 prerogative writ trial on July 18, 2023, where it engaged in a substantive discussion of the issues on appeal, including about the meaning and import of *Dunbar*, *supra*, which is dispositive of the issues in this case.  [1T 20:24 to 25:8].  The trial court considered further arguments on the motion to intervene on August 25, 2023 and concluded, at that time, that [...] would be granted leave to intervene.  [2T at 46:4-12].  The trial court entered an Order on September 22, 2024 permitting [...] to intervene, and she filed her answer immediately.  [Da515; Da517].  The trial court issued a decision on the record on September 26, 2023 [3T] and entered final judgment on that date.  [Da532].  [...] filed a notice of appeal on October 24, 2023.  [Da533].  [...] did not appeal or cross appeal the Judgment.  [...] moved for a stay of the Judgment in the Law Division on October 25, 2023 [Da546], which the trial court denied on November 17, 2023.  [548].  It made the same motion in this Court on December 13, 2023 [Da550], which this Court granted on January 4, 2024.
[brief] [...]:  Judge, he’s a defendant in this case and the only allegations are coming – of malpractice aren’t coming from (indiscernible), they’re coming from him.  And he can certainly answer the question, I’m a defendant.  (Indiscernible.)  Let [...] ask him if I’ve sued him.  Go ahead.  Let him ask that.  That would be fine.  He may not like the answer he gets because the only -- him would be [...], not me.  So if he wants to go down that road–  THE COURT: Then why are you asking the question, then?  [...]: Well, it’s important because his integrity -- his professional (indiscernible) -- THE COURT: Yeah.  You -- **on a rebuttal issue**, not on a direct issue.  [(11T59-11T60) (emphasis added)].  The objection was then sustained, with an instruction to disregard.
[brief] . . .  [I]t’s the client’s responsibility to . . . retain the lawyer to pursue the litigation and it’s the lawyer’s responsibility to determine the strategy with I’m sure the consultation with the client and that has always been the case and as [...] [[...]’s counsel] says there was a 1:4-8 letter.  I have no doubt that [...] [Plaintiffs’ former counsel] relayed that 1:4-8 letter to plaintiff.
[brief] ”  [Restaurant Brief, p.23].  Rather than be bound by these unambiguous terms, the Restaurant asks this Court to give credit to the way the landlord’s deposition testimony sought to re-write these terms at her deposition. \(^2\)  As briefed in Appellants’ initial brief, the landlord’s testimony “interpreting” the lease language – in truth, directly contradicting the plain meaning of the leases – is not probative on the actual meaning of the lease.  New Jersey law holds that, when interpreting a contract, a court must conduct “an examination solely into that intent which is expressed or apparent in the writing. ”  Deerhurst Estates v. Meadow Homes, 64 N.J.Super. 134, 148 (App. Div. 1960), certif. den. 34 N.J. 134 (1961).  “An actual intent which is not \(^2\) The Restaurant cites the irrelevant deposition testimony at pages 19 through 22 of its brief. made known in the instrument will not be given effect. ”  Deerhurst Estates v. Meadow Homes, 64 N.J.Super. at 148.  Finally on this point, the Restaurant argues that Article 17 of the lease, concerning common area charges, essentially negates the obligation imposed on by Article 3.
[brief] There were no signs informing of pedestrians, no signs reminding drivers to slow because of pedestrians, and no markings on the roadway to bring a vehicle to a controlled stop.  [...] testified that that had there been a crosswalk, it would have focused her attention on it.  [Pa655.]  [...] also took several photographs to illustrate the pedestrian safety measures that [...] used in the administration/patient/visitor parking area that were absent from the employee parking area where the fatal crash took place.  See Pa656-7, Pa694-8 (photographs 26-30).  Specifically, the patient/visitor parking area had a peninsula to separate the parking spaces from the vehicular travelway, which increased visibility for drivers at the intersection.  Pa655-6, Pa694.  In contrast, the area where the fatal crash occurred had no peninsula and the travelway ended in a parking space, which blocked driver visibility around the corner of the intersection and did not alert drivers to be particularly cautious.  Pa655-6, Pa694.  The patient/visitor lot also provided sidewalks, fences to separate pedestrian walkways from the vehicular travelway, crosswalks, a pedestrian warning sign, a vehicular stop sign, a stop line, and a warning cone; none of these safety devices were present in the distant area of the lot where [...] was struck.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 13:20-2.  The [...]’s HAD is arbitrary and capricious because the [...] is fully aware that the project is going to result in air pollution that will contribute to and exacerbate the ongoing climate crisis in ways that will specifically injure the precious natural resources in the preservation areas of the New Jersey Highlands.  Just because the Respondents assert that the proposed project is primarily located in a former quarry, does not mean that the agency has employed the appropriate limiting standards of “consistency” in its application of this statutory exemption or that it has considered the totality of the circumstances.  If this Court affirms the [...]’s consistency determination then it will open the floodgates for any imaginable “upgrade” of any imaginable “system” by any purported out-of-state “public utility” to claim an entitlement to Exemption 11.  The [...] made the bald assertion that “if the detailed activities were not considered exempt under this section, the described impacts to Highlands Resources would generally be permittable by the Highlands Act under a Highlands Preservation Area Approval. ”  Rma012.  However, [...]’s counsel represented to the Appellate panel, during oral argument in this appeal on February 8, 2023, that if [...] was required to seek and obtain an HPAA, the Project would have to be redesigned because of its proximity to an on site Category One waterway.  Thus, the [...] and [...] must concede that the consistency determination at issue in this HAD does not equate to a permit and the project has not appropriately been deemed “permittable” according to the [...]’s formally noticed regulations.  It is deeply troubling that the [...] would make such a finding without all of the necessary prerequisites, according to the letter and spirit of its duly promulgated Highlands rules.  II.
[brief] [...] SATISFIED THE CRITERIA FOR A USE VARIANCE AND THE ZONING BOARD PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE SAME (Pa74; 3T38-10 – 3T49-9)  As with all subsection “d” variances, the applicant must satisfy both the “positive” and “negative” criteria of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70, which provides in relevant part:  d.  In particular cases for special reasons, grant a variance to allow departure from regulations pursuant to article 8 of this act to permit: (1) a use or principal structure in a district restricted against such use or principal structure, (2) an expansion of a nonconforming use, ***  A variance under this subsection shall be granted only by affirmative vote of at least five members, in the case of a municipal board.  ***  No variance or other relief may be granted under the terms of this section, including a variance or other relief involving an inherently beneficial use, without a showing that such variance or other relief can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.
[brief] Of course, this was the Board’s only option on remand as the record was closed and at no point did the Board hear, from either their own professionals or the public, any testimony or evidence refuting the credible evidence presented by Plaintiff.  In the Amended Resolution, regarding the positive criteria under Grubbs, the Board dismissed the unrefuted testimony of Plaintiff’s engineer and planner, [...], on all points, including parking, trash, traffic and open space.  Regarding parking, the Board completely disregarded the fact the percentage of required parking on the site will be staying exactly the same (Pa252), and that the existing parking ratio of 1.46 parking spaces per unit would actually be increased to 1.56 spaces per unit.  (Pa387).  Furthermore, the Board ignored the testimony of the site’s property manager, [...], who testified she has never observed any parking issues or operational issues with parking, and has never received a complaint from a tenant regarding lack of parking.  (Pa334).  Regarding traffic, the Board again dismissed Plaintiff’s expert testimony as to the minimal impact on traffic and instead focused on speculative concerns about traffic from a Veterans Affairs clinic potentially being developed in the area.  The Board determined that the project would exacerbate an existing problem of trash removal, while failing to acknowledge the fact that the project will enhance trash removal for the entire site by providing for seven new trash enclosures, as well as updating all existing trash enclosures, which are currently not fully enclosed, to provide for new fencing and screening.  (Pa354).  Further, the Board concluded that the project would have a negative effect on open space; however, as testified by Plaintiff’s expert, the application ensures that 42.4% of the site is to remain as open space, including courtyards, recreation areas, and passive grassy areas, whereas only 20% of open space is required.  (Pa364).  There is clearly a significant amount of open space on the site to accommodate the increase in density.  Plaintiff also agreed to work closely with the Board in designing new aspects of the recreational areas, including a new playground, at final approval.  Regarding the negative criteria under Grubbs, the Board relies on the above-mentioned Board dismissals of Plaintiff’s expert testimony as proof that various aspects of the site will be negatively affected.  The Board went on to cite the negative criteria standard under Grubbs by stating that the applicant would need to “demonstrate that the increase in density would not have a more detrimental affect on the neighborhood than construction of the project in a manner consistent with the zone’s restrictions.
[brief] ”  State v. Papasavvas, 163 N.J. 565, 625 (2000) (quoting State v. Timmedenquas, 161 N.J. 515, 575-76 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858 (2001)).  Thus, to justify reversal, “the prosecutor’s conduct must have been clearly and unmistakably improper, and must have substantially prejudiced defendant’s fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense. ”  *State v. Smith*, 167 N.J. 158, 181-82 (2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
[brief] *United States v. Calabrese*, 942 F.2d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 1991).  The trial court disqualified the jurors without asking about the nature of their acquaintances with the defendants, even though “[a] juror who merely had a passing acquaintance with one of the defendants would not, on the basis of acquaintance alone, be rendered incompetent to serve in this case. ”
[directive] DISORDERLY PERSONS AND PETTY DISORDERLY PERSONS  OFFENSES  Rule Description  This Statute provides that the court shall not require a bail in excess of $2,500 for a person charged with a fourth degree crime or disorderly persons offense or petty disorderly persons offense unless the court finds that the person presents a serious threat to the physical safety of potential evidence or of persons involved in N.J.S.A. 2C:6-1 circumstances surrounding the alleged offense; or unless the court finds that bail of that nature will not reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as Bail for Persons Accused of Minor required.
[brief] The Incident Report was also incorrect in stating that the injury was to his right ankle, as he injured his left ankle (Aa13; Aa40; IT28:25; IT29:1-3).  Petitioner testified that his legal counsel prepared the information contained in his application for disability retirement dated October 31, 2018 (Aa1-Aa3; Aa13-Aa14; IT30:19-25; IT31:3-9).
[brief] Thank you.  ****  I hereby certify, under penalty of law that, to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, that the subject matter of the within controversy does not form the basis of any action presently pending in any other court or arbitration proceeding.  Also, to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, no other action or arbitration proceeding is contemplated at this time, and I know of no other party who should be joined in this action.  Finally, I hereby certify that the representations made in this document are true to the best of my knowledge.  Dated: 08/08/2024  By: [...]
[brief] The State hypothesized that defendant would argue that [...], the father of [...]’s child, had problems with the couple and that a non-testifying relative of [...]’s stated that Ballard had shot at him and [...] on a prior occasion.  [9T65-18- to -24].  The State explained that there was no evidence linking Ballard to [...]’s murder.  [9T65-25 to 66-3].  Defendant responded that the State was provided notice of defendant’s third-party guilt argument “at least since last Tuesday,” which he argued was enough time for the State to investigate, as is the purpose of giving notice.  [9T68-6 to -10].  Defendant stated that [...] alleged that Ballard “supposedly fired a gun” at the --- 3 Ballard’s first name is misidentified in the record as “[...]. ” victim as she drove by in her car.  [9T68-17 to -24].  He also alleged that the police interviewed Ballard and therefore considered the claim to be valid.  [9T68-25 to 69-5].  Finally, defendant argued he would more seriously and unfairly be prejudiced if he was barred from arguing third party guilt compared to the prejudice the State faced if it was permitted.  [9T71-2 to 72-4].  [...] granted the State’s motion to bar defendant from arguing third-party guilt.