ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Id. at 148.  See Locurto, 157 N.J. at 463 (appellate review of a de novo conviction in the Law Division following a municipal court appeal is “exceedingly narrow. ”).  A conviction of driving while intoxicated requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. DiSomma, 262 N.J. Super. 375, 280 (App. Div. 1993).  Any factor alone may be insufficient to carry the State’s burden, but, in combination, can “more than ampl[y]…support the conclusion that [a] defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol…”  *State v. Kent*, 391 N.J. Super. 352, 384 (App. Div. 2007).  In *State v. Zingas*, the defendant’s conviction for DWI was affirmed based on the odor of alcohol on his breath, slurred speech, blood shot eyes, *and* his inability to perform the field sobriety tests.  471 N.J. Super. 590, 595-96 (App. Div. 2022).  Unlike this defendant, the Defendant here satisfactorily completed the field sobriety tests.  In *State v. Kashi*, the defendant was involved in an accident, had the odor of alcohol on his breath, admitted to drinking alcohol, *and* failed all field sobriety tests.  360 N.J. Super. 538, 540-43 (App. Div. 2003).  The municipal court determined that the officer’s observations alone were insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, however, the Law Division found that the officer’s observations were sufficient when coupled with the facts that defendant failed the field sobriety tests.  *Id.*  Unlike the defendant in *Kashi*, the Defendant here satisfactorily performed *all* field sobriety tests.  Also unlike the defendant in *Kashi*, who had no explanation for driving into the shoulder and crashing into another vehicle, Defendant explained the cause of the accident was swerving to avoid a deer.  Here, the credible evidence in the record does not support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Even if it supported a finding of guilt by a preponderance of the evidence, or even clear and convincing evidence, neither of these are sufficient for a finding of guilt in this case.  This was an observation case.
[brief] See e.g. N.J.S.A. 43:15A-142 (defining retirant in the context of workers compensation judges in PERS); N.J.S.A. 43:15A-155 (defining retirant in the context of Prosecutors Part in PERS).  Moreover, under N.J.A.C. 17:2-6.2 and N.J.A.C. 17:2-6.3, regulations that are common to all the pension systems, retirees are permitted a thirty-day period in which to amend their retirement application; thereafter, the retirement becomes vested and irrevocable.  Once vested, retirees cannot make changes or modifications to their retirement application including but not limited to purchasing service credit to obtain additional service credit for purpose of calculating their retirement benefits.  Ibid.  Here, [...] retired effective February 1, 2022, and her retirement became due and payable, i.e., finalized and unable to be changed or modified, on March 3, 2022, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 17:2-6.2 and N.J.A.C. 17:2-6.3.  Thus, under the statute and regulations, [...] was no longer an active member and is unable to purchase service credit as a retiree of the PERS after that date.
[brief] The prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment protects young people against long sentences.  In particular, the Comer case provides for a lookback: a juvenile offender who has spent twenty years in prison is entitled to a resentencing.  The resentencing court must then consider developmental science showing that juveniles are less culpable and more amenable to rehabilitation than fully mature adults.  If, as is likely, the juvenile offender is fit to reenter society after having served twenty years, the resentencing court must impose a new sentence that allows him to do so.  Defendant [...] was convicted of a homicide that occurred in 1991 -- when he was nineteen years old.  He has now served over thirty-two years in prison.  [...] moved for resentencing under Comer.  That motion was improperly denied.  [...] should have the same constitutional protection and receive the same lookback as a seventeen-year-old.  Science shows that a period of late adolescence extends through at least age twenty.  Late adolescents are like juveniles in their diminished culpability and in their likelihood of reform.  Indeed, the highest courts of Washington State, Michigan, and Massachusetts have held, based on this science, that late adolescents are entitled to the same constitutional protection as juveniles against long sentences.  New Jersey should follow suit.  Having offended when he was nineteen years old and having spent more than twenty years in prison, [...] should have a Comer resentencing.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] The Court disagreed with Defendants [...] and [...] that the proper foundation for the diagram had been laid as the trooper had testified that he had no idea the distances of the vehicles from the intersection prior to impact and same were not based upon his personal observations.  After reviewing all of the above, as well as the arguments set forth in the current motion and opposition, for all of the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that the Court properly exercised its discretion in excluding the trooper’s opinion as to who caused the accident and in excluding the diagram contained in his police report.
[brief] *State v. Natale*, 184 N.J. 458, 489 (2005).  The Court below only found applicable mitigating factor 4 (there were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant’s conduct, though failing to establish a defense).  However, in addition to that mitigating factors Defendant is entitled, as argued in the trial court and as set forth in the sentencing memorandum submitted on behalf of Defendant (Da-27), to the benefit of the additional following mitigating factors:  Mitigating Factor #1 - The defendant’s conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm and Mitigating Factor #2 - The defendant did not contemplate that his conduct would cause or threaten serious harm.  Given that Mitigating Factors #1 and #2, were argued together at the trial court level and addressed together by the court, these mitigating factors are hereby addressed together herein.  As articulated to the lower court, Defendant’s conduct was non-violent, and no victims were identified.  Moreover, the trial court did not consider arguments that [...] did not contemplate his conduct would cause harm due to the fact that he was in the throes of an ongoing substance abuse issue.  Accordingly, it is submitted that [...] was entitled to Mitigating Factors #1 and #2 and the court erred by not providing any weight to those factors.
[brief] By: ____________________________  [...]  [...]  Plaintiff, vs. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...]  MUNICIPAL UTILITIES AUTHORITY, and [...], Defendants.  Civil Action COURT BELOW: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CHANCERY  DIVISION: BURLINGTON COUNTY  Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Docket No. [...]  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF/CROSS-APPELLANT  [...] (REVISED JANUARY 4, 2023)
[brief] The court simply told the remaining jurors, “You'll see your jury panel has shrunk by one."  (5T 137-6)  On direct appeal, defendant argued that the judge's failure to conduct individualized *voir dire* of the remaining jurors violated his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, and his corresponding state constitutional rights.  But the Appellate Division rejected defendant’s claim, stressing, “When asked by the court, both defense counsel and the State agreed that there was no need to question the other jurors about the incident.  They expressed concern that further questioning would highlight [...] unnecessarily, given that Juror No. 14 did not convey any information about him to them.  Defendant argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court erred by not questioning the remaining jurors to determine if Juror No. 14 told them anything about [...]. ” (DA30).  The Appellate Division ruled,  Our review of the record reveals that the court did not abuse its discretion when it decided not to individually question the jurors who were not excused.  As a preliminary matter, we note that the invited error doctrine would permit this court to decline to review this issue.  *Van Syoc*, 235 N.J. Super. at 465.  Defense counsel, apparently satisfied that Juror No. 14 gave a credible account of her interaction with the other jurors, declined the trial court's suggestion that voir dire of the other jurors might be necessary.  We review the issue, however, for plain error.  R. 2:10-2.  The court, having had the opportunity to question Juror No. 14 and to assess her credibility, determined that she did not share any information, other than reporting that she knew [...], with the other jurors.  In addition, the extent of Juror No. 14's relationship was [...] was limited and ended years before the trial.  She did not have any personal knowledge of the events that gave rise to the indictments or [...]'s involvement in those events.  She expressed to the court no opinion on his credibility or character.  The court acted within its discretion when it determined that questioning the other jurors about [...] would unnecessarily highlight him in their minds.  [DA30]  Defendant contended, on PCR below, that his trial counsel failed to protect his right to a fair trial by not requesting that voir dire of the other jurors.  **The Evidentiary Hearing**
[brief] (RULING AT 4T 16-4 TO 17-15)  When police read defendant his rights prior to interrogation, they then asked him if he wished to make a statement.  He stated clearly that he did not:  “Absolutely not. ”  (Da 17; 1T 10-9 to 10)  [...] said, “Okay,” and [...] said, “All right,” and told defendant to “just sit tight,” implying that they were respecting his assertion of his right to silence.  (Da 17; 1T 17-20 to 22)  But then, immediately, [...] noticed that there was a sneaker, which he assumed was defendant’s, on the floor of the interrogation room.  (1T 11-1 to 4)  He testified that he learned later that Reyes had found that sneaker in the police car in which defendant -- who at the time of the interview was wearing no sneakers -- had been transported.  (1T 20-17 to 20).  Peterson asked, “Whose sneaker?” to which Reyes said, “That’s his,” referring to defendant, and defendant said, “Mine. ”  (Da 17; Da 20, video of statement)  Reyes then asked defendant, point-blank, “This is your sneaker?” and defendant said, “Yeah. ”  (Da 17; Da 20, video of statement; 1T 17-24 to 18-1).  Peterson then asked defendant, “You don’t want it on?” and defendant said, “Nah,” which caused Peterson to repeat the question, and then defendant said, “Nah.  Throw it in the garbage. ”  (Da 18; Da 20, video of statement)  Peterson said, “You want the sneaker in the garbage?” and defendant replied, “They took the other one.  The other one at the station. ”  (Da 18; Da 20, video of statement)  (emphasis added)  That was a lie.  The other sneaker had been found at the scene on [...], not taken at the station, and [...] knew that at the time of the interview.  (1T 20-23 to 25)  Despite the fact that defendant’s admissions about the sneaker came in response to police questioning after he asserted his right to silence, the State moved to admit into evidence the defendant’s statements about the sneaker.  The defense objection was clear: that the post-silence questioning was “clearly interrogation” that improperly followed the assertion of silence (3T 22-7 to 9)  But the judge nevertheless ruled most of the statement to be admissible.
[brief] As we indicated earlier, the maps relied upon by the Plaintiff/Developer in this matter do not necessarily match up to the resolutions or the Developer’s agreements.  We do not know what maps any of the various engineers looked at in terms of their inspections.  There remains an ongoing dispute or lack of clarity concerning as to who was the municipal engineer at the relevant times.  The Plaintiff/Developer argues that the Trial Court opinion mistakenly found that [...] wasn’t the Borough engineer..  (Plaintiff Brief, p.24)We do not know whether the municipal engineer inspected the roadways at issue using the maps provided.  The trial court found that Borough Engineer did not.  Once again, this is Plaintiff’s burden to prove with competent evidence, who indeed the Borough engineer was and what potential roadways he inspected.  This is not the Borough’s burden.  We note that the Developer never made any attempt to ask for reconsideration or correct the record concerning the identity of the municipal engineer.  Plaintiff therefore tacitly accepted the trial courts’ conclusion that [...] was not the municipal engineer for the necessary inspection required by statute.  The zoning issue also remains.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON TECHNICAL NON-COMPLIANCE.  (Order at Pa27 to Pa28; Opinion at T12-10 to T14-14; T15-23 to T16-14).  The trial court’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on procedural grounds, specifically for noncompliance with Rule 4:46-2, represents a fundamental misapplication of the principles governing summary judgment.  New Jersey courts have long espoused a doctrine that places substantive justice over procedural formalism, particularly in the context of dispositive motions where the stakes are inherently high.  This decision ignored the foundational principle established in *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America*, 142 N.J. 520 (1995), which mandates that courts should grant summary judgment only when “the evidential materials show that one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the evidence is so one-sided that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. ”  The trial court failed to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a crucial requirement as elucidated in *Brill*.  This principle is further reinforced by the New Jersey Supreme Court’s emphasis in *Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co. of Westfield*, 17 N.J. 67 (1954), which articulates that summary judgment should be granted sparingly and only in cases where the right of the moving party is beyond doubt.  This standard underscores that any doubt regarding the existence of a material fact must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party, thus ensuring fairness and a complete evaluation of the facts before granting summary judgment.  Furthermore, the trial court’s decision to grant defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment as unopposed, based on technical noncompliance by plaintiff, neglected the substantive opposition presented during oral arguments.  This approach contradicts the judicial guidance provided by R. 4:46-2, which stresses the necessity for a clear presentation of material facts to ascertain the presence of genuine issues requiring a trial.
[brief] To access and swab potential saliva that may be found underneath the adhesives on the Lindberg envelopes, [...]’s and [...]’s expert, [...], proposed a new, untested method for neutralizing the gum flaps of the envelopes and stamps by using what he called a “Canned air” technique.  (Ra8).  This technique would involve tilting a can to dispense a chemical fluid directly onto the historical document to neutralize the adhesive or envelope’s gum flap to “unseal” it.  Ibid.  Despite Young’s claim that this extraction process is “superior” to others, he conceded that he is unable to rule out damage to the historical envelopes and stamps.
[brief] . . .  Pre-action Notice shall be given in writing, which shall be sent by certified mail and regular mail to the last known address of the client, . . . .”  After the expiration of the notice period, the attorney may file a lawsuit, and the “attorney’s complaint shall allege the giving of the notice required by this rule or it shall be dismissed. ”  Rule 1:20A-6 (emphasis added).  Subject-matter jurisdiction merely involves a threshold determination as to whether the trial court was legally authorized to decide the question presented.  Only if the answer to this question is in the negative, consideration of the cause is “wholly and immediately foreclosed. ”  Gilbert v. Gladden, 87 N.J. 275, 280-81 (1981).  It refers to “the power of a court to hear and determine cases of the class to which the proceeding in question belongs. ”  N.J. Citizen Action v. Riviera Motel Corp., 296 N.J. Super. 402, 411 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting State v. Osborn, 32 N.J. 117, 122 (1960)).  The principle is well established that a court cannot hear a case as to which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction even if all the parties desire an adjudication on the merits.  Osborn, supra, 32 N.J. at 122; Abbott v. Beth Israel Cemetery Ass’n of Woodbridge, 13 N.J. 528, 537 (1953); Peterson v. Falzarano, 6 N.J. 447, 454 (1951).
[brief] Davis, 219 N.J. at 406 (citation omitted).  In most negligence cases, plaintiffs need not prove the standard of conduct violated by the defendant because it "is sufficient for [a] plaintiff to show what the defendant did and what the circumstances were," Sanzari v. Rosenfield, 34 N.J. 128, 134 (1961), and these cases include facts where "'a lay person's common knowledge is sufficient to permit a jury to find that the duty of care [had] been breached . . . '"  Davis, 219 N.J. at 407 (quoting Giantonnio v. Taccard, 291 N.J. Super. 31, 43 (App. Div. 1996)).  In professional negligence cases, however, the standard of care must normally be established by expert testimony, because a jury should not be permitted to speculate, without an expert's guidance, on issues where lay persons have insufficient knowledge or experience.
[brief] Certification with Exhibits in Support of Motion for Clarification  466a – 485a (Submitted as per clarification of brief deficiency notice, and under R. 2:6-1(a)(2) because the matter is referenced in the Appellate Brief as to where it was argued below, and the document is required for a full understanding of the issues presented)  Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Reconsideration Motion 486a – 502a (Submitted as per clarification of brief deficiency notice, and under R. 2:6-1(a)(2) because the matter is referenced in the Appellate Brief as to where it was argued below, and the document is required for a full understanding of the issues presented)
[brief] Id. at 377.  The Supreme Court reinstated the discounted value under the unique circumstances presented where it found, “the ‘equities’ of this case quite clearly lie with [...], it would be unfair to allow [...] to receive [...]'s undiscounted value. ”  Id. at 378-379.  However, it also reiterated that each decision on fair value and the application of discounts, “depends not only on the specific facts of the case, but also ‘should reflect the purpose served by the law in that context. ”  [...], supra, 160 N.J. at 381.  It was only on those particular facts that the trial court could discount for all of its several stated reasons, which facts included that there was no damage or attorney fee award granted.  Id. at 357-358.
[brief] To ascribe a custodian’s failure to communicate this information, absent a request as is mandated by the statute, as a denial of access is patently wrong.  Respectfully, there must be some action or inaction taken by the custodian that runs afoul of OPRA’s requirements to find an improper denial of access occurred and which would justify the award of attorney’s fees.  In this case, there is no action, inaction or fact of legal significance that suggests the Township custodian did anything, or failed to do anything, in contravention of OPRA’s mandates.  Quite simply, either the Township custodian complied with OPRA or the custodian committed an improper denial of access to a government record.  Based upon the elemental facts of this case, there was no violation or improper denial of access.  If the custodian did not improperly deny access, then it was improper for the trial court to award the Plaintiff attorney’s fees and the court’s determination must be reversed.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Instead, [...] rests his appeal on a procedural argument, claiming that Plaintiff needed to file his application in two steps.  But [...] points to no principle of law that requires such drawn out motion practice and separate applications concerning an entitlement to fees and the quantification of those fees.  Instead, he relies solely on a statement by the then trial judge in denying, without prejudice, an earlier fee application.\textsuperscript{11}  But “an interlocutory order is always subject to revision where the judge believes it would be just to do so. ”
[brief] At the conclusion of trial, [...] again instructed the jury that “the defendant on trial is presumed to be innocent and unless each and every essential element of an offense charged is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant must be found not guilty on that charge. ” (8T67-16 to 20).  She explained that the “prosecution must prove its case by more than a mere preponderance of the evidence, yet not an absolute certainty. ” (8T68-2 to 4).  She went on to say:  The State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
[brief] Similar to the *Osback* case, although [...] contends that the there was an obligation for the Board to comply with the statute, the lack of a private \(^{38}\) Pa232 – Pa266 remedy means that [...] does not enjoy a private right to a cause of action to sue the Board in Superior Court for a non-legislated remedy.  Since the lack of a remedy means that the court cannot imply a private right to a cause of action for [...] to sue the Board in Superior Court, dismissal of the Counterclaim is necessary.