ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 11 State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377 (2004) .........................................................  11 State v. Keyes, 184 N.J. 541 (2005) .........................................................  13, 14 State v. King 44 N.J. 346 (1965) ............................................................ 40, 41, 46, 47 State v. Kirkland, 442 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) .............................  31 State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017 (1989) .................................................................  40  State v. Konzelman, 204 N.J. Super. 389 (Law Div. 1985) ......................... 28 State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300 (2014) .................................................. 40, 42 State v. Nguyen, 419 N.J. Super. 413 (App. Div.) ............................... 22, 25 State v. Novembrino 105 N.J. 95 (1987) ........................................... 23, 26, 32 State v. O’Donnell, 192 N.J. Super. 128 (App. Div. 1983) ...................... 19, 20 State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009) .............................................
[brief] N.J.S.A. § 1:1-14 (emphasis added); Regent Care Ctr., Inc. v. Hackensack City, 20 N.J. Tax 181, 193 (2001) (discussing N.J.S.A. § 1:1-14).  The only interpretation faithful to this statutory directive is to apply the 2023 Veto Amendment to this pending case.
[brief] [...] alleges in the First Amended Complaint that [...]’s denial of coverage for Plaintiff’s claims of intentional wrong is contrary to public policy.  As noted above there is no public policy that requires insurance coverage for a claim of intentional wrongdoing asserted against an employer by an injured worked.  Moreover, it is a settled principle of law in New Jersey that insurers may exclude coverage for intentional wrongs committed by their insureds.  “‘Policy provisions that exclude coverage for liability resulting from intentional wrongful acts are ‘common,’ are ‘accepted as valid limitations,’ and are ‘consistent with public policy. ’”  Harleysville Ins. Cos. v. Garitta, 170 N.J. 223, 231 (2001) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Malec, 104 N.J. 1, 6 (1986) (quoting Ruvolo v. American Cas. Co., 39 N.J. 490, 496 (1963)); see also Schmidt v. Smith, 294 N.J. Super. 569, 583 (App. Div. 1996) (“Clearly an insurer can exclude coverage for intentional acts without violating public policy. ”), aff’d, 155 N.J. 44 (1998); Variety Farms, Inc., 172 N.J. Super. 10, 24-25 (App. Div. 1980) (“We consider the sounder rule to be that public policy does not permit a tortfeasor to shift the burden of punitive damages to his insurer.  . . .  A person who is able to insure himself against punishment ‘gains a freedom inconsistent with the establishing of sanctions against such misconduct. ’” (quoting Crull v. Greb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964)).  Public policy discourages insurance coverage for liability arising out of the intentional acts of an insured because such coverage would remove the deterrence financial responsibility for such conduct provides and because such coverage allows for the inequitable recovery of insurance proceeds based on one’s own wrongful conduct.  Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 76 N.J. 477, 483 (1978) (citing Ruvolo, 39 N.J. 490)).  The public policy against insuring liability arising out of an insured’s intentional acts is so important that our courts have held that in certain circumstances an insurance carrier may exclude coverage for such liability even in the absence of a specific exclusion.  *Ibid.*; *Allstate Ins. Co.*, 104 N.J. at 12-13.  Where the policy at issue specifically excludes from coverage liability arising out of the intentional wrongful acts of the insured, public policy supports the insurance policy language and requires that coverage be denied.  *Allstate Ins. Co.*, 104 N.J. at 13; *New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Brower*, 161 N.J. Super. 293, 300 (App. Div. 1978).  Additionally, the approval of the New Jersey Part Two Employers Liability Insurance endorsement and the new exclusion C.5 by the Department of Banking and Insurance gives rise to presumption that the policy language is consistent with public policy.  The Commissioner of the Department of Banking and Insurance is responsible for pursing the public policy enacted by the Legislature.
[brief] The Trial Court additionally acknowledges that the [...] argued that Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims against them, arising out of their fraudulent concealment of evidence, is barred by the litigation privilege.  It is unclear whether the Trial Court agreed with the [...] and dismissed Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims against them pursuant to litigation privilege, but the Trial Court did not explicitly reject this argument.  In the absence of that clarity, the litigation privilege must be discussed.
[brief] *Ibid.*  Here, as the Project proposed a stormwater outfall in a flood hazard area and activities within --- \(^5\)  Here, a “one-hundred-year flood” means a flood that has a one percent probability of being equaled or exceeded within a one-year period for a given geographic location and/or watershed.  N.J.A.C. 7:13-1.2. the riparian zone, [...] had to identify the flood hazard area.  See N.J.A.C. 7:13-2.3; (Aa119).  The FHACA rules set forth six methods for determining the flood hazard area: (1) DEP delineation method; (2) FEMA tidal method; (3) FEMA fluvial method; (4) FEMA hydraulic method; (5) approximation method; and (6) calculation method.
[directive] 1.  A petition may be filed by the defendant/juvenile (parent or guardian), the victim, or counsel on their behalf in the county where the conviction or adjudication occurred.  2.  For juvenile matters, all petitions and objections must be filed through the Judiciary Electronic Document Submission (JEDS).  3.  For criminal matters, self-represented litigants must file through JEDS, and attorneys must file in eCourts.  4.  Court staff will schedule the hearing date to be held within 30 days.  Notice of the be provided to the petitioner and to the county prosecutor’s hearing date will office.  The county prosecutor’s office will also receive notice of all petitions.  If the 5. petition is filed by the defendant/juvenile, the prosecutor’s office will serve the victim with a copy of the petition and notice of the hearing date.  If the victim cannot be served, the prosecutor’s office shall immediately inform the court.  6.  If the petition is filed by the victim, court staff will provide the petition and notice of the hearing date to the defendant/juvenile at their address as provided by DOC/JJC.  7.  An objection to the petition may be filed no later than 10 days prior to the hearing date.  8.  The court may require the county prosecutor to provide information and/or appear at the hearing.  9.  Because these records will include information on victims and information in juvenile delinquency records for juvenile matters, all records related to these proceedings shall be deemed confidential pursuant to R. 1:38-3.  the court’s determination, the steps outlined in
[brief] . . .  Clear as day”; “you did get him”; “you did do it and they did see you.  That’s clear”; “when opportunity knocks, you took it. ”)  (8T 61-21 to 96-3; 9T 11-24 to 17-17)  Second, they repeatedly called his explanations and denials “bullsh*t” and “lies” and opined that such lies meant he had “something to hide. ”  (7T 238-2 to 24; 8T 27-17 to 95-16; 9T 9-15 to 33-19)  And third, they asserted in explicit detail their theories of his motive, opportunity, and premeditation.
[brief] Respondent then filed to enforce his rights under the Agreement before the Superior Court in accord with Par.15 (Da18) to have the offending terms stricken from the Separation Agreement so the case could proceed.  Respondent, at the OAL, moved to the administrative appeal placed on the inactive list per N.J.A.C 1:1-9.7, pending resolution of the issue in the Superior Court (Da184-Da185), as the Respondent’s case would fail at the OAL as the OAL had no jurisdiction to enforce the Separation Agreement.  On April 20, 2022, Respondent filed suit in the Superior Court, Law Division under Docket [...] - Respondent filed an amended complaint on April 29, 2022 prior to any responsive pleading.  Appellant, on May 9, 2022, demanded dismissal of Respondent’s Superior Court Complaint (Da 105-106).  Appellant, in lieu of filing an answer in the Law Division claim, filed a motion for summary judgment on June 7, 2022 (Pa1-Pa2).  Respondent cross moved for summary judgment on July 8, 2022, seeking a determination that Appellant breached the Separation Agreement in failing to strike the offending terms as required by Par. 18 of the Separation Agreement, specific performance under the Separation Agreement and damages.  On August 5, 2022, the Court heard oral argument on the two motions for summary judgment and on August 31, 2022 denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment without prejudice (Pa3-Pa4).
[brief] ........................................................................................................... 2, 16, 25, 26 Marchiano v. Sandman, 178 N.J. Super. 171 (App. Div. 1981) .................................................................................. 25 Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176 (1982) .................................................................................................................. 14 Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686 (11th Cir. 2016) .............................................................................................. 18 Neuwirth v. State, 476 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 2023) .................................................................................... passim New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ................................................................................................................ 1, 18 Newton v. Newark Star-Ledger, No. A-3, 819-11T3, 2014 WL 3928500 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 13, 2014) ................................................................. 17, 24, 25 NuWave Inv. Corp. v. Hyman Beck & Co., Inc., 432 N.J. Super. 539 (App. Div. 2013) ..................................................................................... 12, 22 Pace v. Baker-White, 850 F. App’x 827 (3d Cir. 2021)
[brief] (Da-ALL0246–48).  [...]’s violations of the FRFPA are manifest and manifold.  It is worth first noting that, under N.J.S.A. 46:10B-65, any attempted waiver of any of the provisions set forth above in a contract is automatically rendered void and enforceable as contrary to public policy.  More critically, various of the above statutory provisions contain numerous affirmative prohibitions of the exact conduct which [...] perpetrated here.  There can be no doubt whatsoever that, through entering into the contract for sale with [...] which he prepared, [...] engaged in dozens of actions expressly forbidden under the statute.
[directive] ¿Entiende usted que se requerirá que se someta a un examen físico y psicológico en el Centro Diagnóstico y de Tratamiento de Avenel con el propósito de determinar si su conducta se caracterizaba por un patrón de comportamiento repetidor y compulsivo cuando cometió el delito?  Do you understand you will be required to submit to a physical and psychological examination at the [...] the purpose of which is to determine if your conduct in committing the offense was characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior?  [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  2.
[brief] Plaintiff's challenge to an ordinance or policy on the grounds that it violates a statute is maintainable as a Declaratory Judgment action.  Bell v. Twp. of Stafford, 110 N.J. 384, 390-91 (1988).  Additionally Rule 4:42-3 provides: “A judgment for declaratory relief, if appropriate, is not precluded by the existence of another appropriate remedy. ”  R. 4:42-3.  The Declaratory Judgments Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:16-53, expressly confers standing on a person whose legal rights have been affected by a municipal ordinance.  Our courts have acknowledged that the Act should be liberally construed and administered in order to carry out its purpose.  See New Jersey Banker's Ass'n v. Van Riper, 1 N.J. 193, 198 (1948); Rego Indus., Inc. v. American Model Metals Corp., 91 N.J. Super. 447, 454 (App. Div.1966).  In this case [...] brings a Declaratory Judgment Action underpinned by the NJLAD.  However, a statutory cause of action linked to the NJLAD is not needed to challenge governmental action; one aggrieved by improper official action also has a constitutional right to seek judicial review.  N.J. Dental Ass'n v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 424 N.J. Super. 160, 166 (App. Div. 2012)  The instant matter is similar to another promotional case which also sought a declaratory judgement where a promotional process violated the law.  In that case the court "recognized" that prospective harm in this situation stems from concerns that the Borough must "comply with the law."  See Williams v. Borough of Clayton, 442 N.J. Super. 583, 592 (App. Div. 2015)  The Association’s ability to challenge the legality of the promotional policy in question does not turn on whether an individual can or may assert some type of an individual claim.  A cause of action is presented when a Plaintiff seeks relief for injury or loss suffered as a consequence of a violation of a statute or to compel another party to comply with a statute.  Plaintiff brings this claim, as an Association, on behalf if itself and all of its members, whom it lawfully represents.  Plaintiff's associational standing is not challenged.  Therefore, all of its members are championed and the association is obligated as a matter of law under its “duty of fair representation” to treat all members equally - which it expressly seeks in this case.  Plaintiff brings its claim on behalf of itself and all of its members, each of whom has an interest in the unlawful policies at issue, both retrospectively, but particularly, prospectively, as the violations are ongoing and continuous.
[brief] See Pa 1.  In short, Plaintiff alleges violations of the Consumer Fraud Act, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.  Id.  The President of the Condominium Association confirmed in his deposition the Association was represented by counsel in 2015 and 2016 with regards to the purchase; he did not know whose determination it was to try to litigate to undue the closing and confirmed the Superintendent was still residing in Unit 74.  See Pa 250, lines 7-24.  The President of the Association additionally confirmed in his deposition testimony on March 29, 2023 that he never reviewed the Public Offering Statement nor Master Deed for the Condominium which was registered on April 19, 1983.  See Pa 235, lines 13-22.  The President of the Association additionally confirmed he was not familiar with any agreements that were made between the sponsor and the homeowners with regard to the transition in 1987.  See Pa 237, lines 11-16.  The President of the Association additionally confirmed he had no knowledge of the transition that took place in 1987 when control of the Homeowners Association was turned over to the homeowners (See Pa 237, line 2.); and that Unit 74 had been continuously leased to the Association for the superintendent’s unit and renewed yearly pursuant to a Lease Agreement and then subsequent Lease Renewals for “many years”.  See Pa 237, lines 23 through Pa 238, line 6.  The Complaint also alleges personal liability against [...] and [...] for having signed a bargain and sale deed for Unit 74 to the Association, which was approved by the prior Association’s counsel, its title company and mortgage lender.  See Pa 97-98.  The Deed for Unit 74 provided for an aggregate .81% interest in the Common Elements of the Condominium (See Pa 97), pursuant to the Schedule of Interest in the 1983 Master Deed, recorded in Book 4791, Page 37.  See Pa 175.  Plaintiff is additionally seeking to nullify the sale; reformation of the Deed; the return of the purchase price; return of it’s total monthly rental payments; and finally, the return of its property taxes and mortgage loan interest, among other legal and equitable relief, despite the fact that the Developer was paying monthly common area maintenance fees to the Association for the past seventeen plus (17+) years and property taxes for the Unit for the past 35 years.
[brief] THE COURT: Okay.  Would you like to have an opportunity to speak with your client, counsel?  [...]: Yes, I would.  After a brief recess, the following colloquy took place:  THE COURT: Okay.  We’re back on the record.  Counsel for plaintiff, are we ready to proceed?  [...]: I believe we are, Your Honor.  THE COURT: Okay.  I will let you know that [...]’s behavior in this courtroom is unacceptable.  THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honor.  You want me not to testify.
[brief] In its Answer to the Claim Petition, [...] admitted that the decedent’s parking lot accident “arose out of and in the course of employment. ” (Pa58).  [...] certified that it is paying workers’ compensation “Dependency Benefits” to the decedent’s spouse.  (Pa58).  In response to plaintiff’s Request for Admissions, [...] certified that, “[t]he parking lot where the incident of October 6, 2021, occurred was owned by [...], a division of [...] Hospitals Corporation. ” (Pa294 at 14).  [...] also certified that, “[t]he property located at [...], within the Township of [...], County of [...] and State of New Jersey was owned by [...], a division of [...] Hospitals Corporation on October 6, 2021. ” (Pa295 at 16,17).  As part of its ownership of the hospital property and parking lot, [...] entered into various agreements with contractors, including entering into a snow removal contract with [...].  (Pa298).  It is as clear as it is compelling that, at the time of the accident, the decedent and [...] were co-employees employed by the same employer.  The workers’ compensation statutory framework, along with the case law from this Court and the Supreme Court, make it clear that the decedent’s claims against [...], her co-employee, are barred as a matter of law.  Both were in the course and scope of their respective employment.  As such, [...] has, as a matter of law, co-employee immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Act.  The trial Court properly granted summary judgment to [...], and that decision must be affirmed.
[brief] See Da125.  Indeed, the Court disregarded and overlooked evidence which demonstrates that the substantive issues concerning Policy 5756 are not well-settled, including (1) the Attorney General’s lack of prosecution to prevent similar policies in place as early as 2014; and (2) the plethora of litigation around the country on this precise issue.  See Da224-232; Da234-235, Para.6-7; and see infra.  Indeed, Districts, including those party to these lawsuits, had begun adopting policies in 2014 which provided for parental involvement and notification and none were sued by the Attorney General.  See Da234-235, Para.6-7.  Pursuant to [...] Policy Alert 204 and 205, Districts, including [...], adopted transgender student policies which provided for parental notification  \textit{Id}.  The Attorney General did not litigate against [...] over those policies.  This lack of prosecution is significant because the LAD was amended in 2006 to include gender identity and expression as a protected class, significantly before those initial policies were adopted.  \textit{See} P.L. 2006, c. 100, § 1.  Moreover, The LAD has never been substantively applied in the manner Respondents assert.  There is no caselaw, decision, opinion or other determination that parental notification violates LAD.
[brief] Also inapposite is another case cited by Appellee, in which an illegal alien brought a claim for unlawful termination.  See Crespo v. Evergo Corp., 366 N.J. Super. 391 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).  In Crespo, that plaintiff’s claim was dismissed by the Court as the plaintiff was statutorily barred from legally working in the United States, and therefore was unable to sue for damages relating to her unlawful termination.  However, the Crespo Court stated that had Crespo involved unlawful treatment during the course of the plaintiff's employment, as in Taylor v. Int'l Maytex, the plaintiff in Crespo may have been allowed to pursue non-economic damages.  Crespo at 401 (citing Taylor v. Int'l Maytex Tank Terminal Corp., 355 N.J. Super. 482 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).  In the matter before this Court, Appellant properly pled a claim for a hostile work environment and is only pursuing non-economic damages for her claim.  Accordingly, the Appellate Division’s holding in Crespo is distinguishable from the matter before this Court in two significant ways.  First, unlike the plaintiff in Crespo, Appellant was not statutorily barred from holding her job.  Second, consistent with the Crespo Court stated what was permissible, Appellant is pursuing only emotional distress damages in this matter.
[directive] Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option Manufacturing, Distributing, Heroin or cocaine, less than 1/2 ounce; or methamphetamine or its analog, less than 1/2 2C:35-5(a)(b)  Dispensing or ounce; or marijuana, 1 ounce or more but less than 5 pounds; or hashish, 5 grams or more 3rd Degree $5,000 to $20,000  10% permissible (continued)  Possessing CDS with but less than 1 pound; or any other substances, or their analogs, in Schedule I, II, III, or IV.  Intent to Distribute (continued)  Marijuana in quantity of less than 1 ounce; hashish in a quantity of less than 5 grams; any 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible substance, or its analog, in Schedule V.  Employing a Juvenile 2C:35-6 in a Drug Distribution  2nd Degree $50,000 to $100,000
[brief] Sbr. at 9; emphasis added.  (Call).  At the outset, other than reading the Court's mind there is absolutely nothing which supports the State's proposition that the Court accepted and approved the entirety of the search warrant application; if anything, the fact that the order on the application exempts from search all persons would circumstantially demonstrate that the all persons search provision was rejected.\textsuperscript{15}  In sum, the State requests that although the "all persons present reasonably believed to be connected with said property and investigation for evidence" was not contained in the search warrant this Court should nevertheless convey the omitted phrase into the search warrant and thereby legitimize the illegal warrantless arrest and search of defendant.  F.  NONE OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO A WARRANTLESS SEARCH EXISTS IN THIS CASE
[brief] Those reasons are (1) defendant’s conduct consistent with drug distribution in (2) a high crime area (3) at nighttime in the cold on a poorly lit street, and (4) defendant’s “blading” which the officers’ training and experience signified gun possession.  Based on all these factors together, in their totality and not in isolation, the officers lawfully conducted an investigative stop.  First, [...] framed his observation by describing the area as high crime.
[brief] For example, a driver pulled over to the side of the road who activates their turn signal upon entering the stream of traffic.  Or a driver about to parallel park who activates their turn signal as they back into the spot.  Regardless, “[i]solated expressions cannot be invoked to defeat a reasonable construction” of the entire statute.  Loboda, 40 N.J. at 435 (citation omitted). on the same roadway.  The dictionary defines “turn,” in part, as “to cause to move around an axis or center; make rotate or revolve.