ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]’s Decision Regarding Defendant's Miranda Motion to Suppress His Statements  At the *Miranda* hearing, [...] testified that the DEA notified him that on February 28, 2017, the Illinois State Police had arrested [...] and [...] who were found in possession of approximately 200 pounds of marijuana.  (5T8-5 to 8).  [...] and [...] agreed to cooperate with law enforcement and deliver the marijuana to its destination in New Jersey to defendant who they knew as “[...]” and who drove a BMW.  (5T8-8 to 25).  The Illinois State Police, New Jersey State Police, and DEA offices set up an operational plan to make a controlled delivery of the marijuana to defendant.  (5T9-4 to 23).  At the direction of law enforcement, [...] contacted defendant regarding the marijuana delivery.  [...] advised defendant that he would be stopping in Pennsylvania for the night and would arrive in New Jersey on March 1, 2017.  (5T9-24 to 10-11).  Defendant told [...] to meet him at a large apartment complex with interconnected parking lots located at [...].  (5T10-17 to 18).  For surveillance purposes, law enforcement decided to have [...] advise defendant to meet him at the CVS Pharmacy next door to this apartment complex.  (5T10-19 to 24).  An officer advised the surveillance team that a New York registered white BMW had pulled into the CVS parking lot and parked next to [...]’ truck.  (5T12-14 to 16).  [...] exited his truck and had a brief conversation with defendant.  (5T12-16 to 18).  They then each returned to their vehicles.  [...] then followed defendant’s BMW to the [...] apartment complex.  (5T12-18 to 13-3).  They parked side by side on [...] in the rear complex parking lot.  (5T12-24 to 13-15).  [...] observed defendant open the back of [...]’s truck, remove six of the marijuana-filled duffel bags, and place them in the back of his BMW.  (5T13-14 to 22).  Officers then observed the defendant and [...] take the other two duffel bags and walk toward [...].  (5T13-25 to 14-2).  Defendant unlocked the apartment door, placed the two duffel bags inside the apartment, and locked the door.  (5T14-2 to 4).  After [...] drove away, defendant unlocked his BMW and removed a small black and silver box.  (5T14-6 to 13).  As defendant walked back to the apartment, the police apprehended, handcuffed, and searched him.  (5T14-17 to 19).  [...] testified that he remembered that either he or another police officer gave defendant his Miranda rights.  (5T14-19 to 16-25).  [...] wrote in his report that defendant had been Mirandized.  (5T17-19 to 24).  Defendant gave the police his consent to search and signed consent to search forms for Apartment B, his BMW, his Queens residence, and a silver and black box, which was later found to contain two vacuum-sealed bags of cocaine.  (5T18-9 to 14; 5T33-13 to 23; Pa1-4).
[brief] ”  P.T. & L Constr. Co. v. Madigan & Hyland, Inc., 245 N.J. Super. 201, 207 (App. Div. 1991).  According to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, the water issues go back to the original development of the Property and the cul-de-sac, which she confirmed was built by a private developer in or around 1978 or 1979.  (Pa35, 13:11-15; 14:23-15:3).  Plaintiff has also acknowledged that the house and cul-de-sac were constructed on property that was once a farm, and where some kind of water source or stream ran through the property.  (Pa35, 50:19-25).  According to Plaintiff’s Tort Claim Notice, and reiterated in her deposition testimony, she acknowledged problems with the Property dating back to at least 1990.
[brief] The responding officers applied for a search warrant for defendant’s vehicle before any document search occurred.  Even if [...] was not lawfully in position to observe the heroin by opening the glove box himself, the discovery of the heroin was therefore inevitable.  The inevitable discovery doctrine permits the admission of otherwise unlawfully obtained evidence if the State can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the evidence would have been lawfully discovered independent of the unlawful means.  State v. Shaw, 237 N.J. 588, 620-622 (2019).  The standard is more explicitly pronounced by the Supreme Court in State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 238-240 (1985).  Sugar held that the State must be able to show that: 1) proper, normal, and specific investigatory procedures would have been pursued in order to complete the investigation of the case; 2) under all the surrounding relevant circumstances the pursuit of those procedures would have inevitably resulted in the discovery of the evidence; and 3) the discovery of the evidence through the use of such procedures would have occurred wholly independently of the discovery of the evidence by unlawful means.  At the time of [...]’s retrieval of the documents, sufficient evidence existed to seek a search warrant and a search warrant was sought.  The facts supporting the search warrant were sufficient without and before the discovery of the heroin.  As the trial court found, there was substantial proof to support the issuance of the search warrant before the heroin was found.  (Da019).  These include the furtiveness of [...], the exchange of cash between [...] and defendant, the clearly bogus and contradictory explanations for their meeting, defendant’s attempt to start his vehicle, the officers’ knowledge of [...] and defendant’s relationship, and the smell of marijuana, among others.  Upon issuance of the warrant (which the trial court, in its assessment of the facts before it, found to be “inevitable” (Da020)), the vehicle would have been searched and the contraband discovered anyway.  It is, in fact, pursuant to the execution of the warrant that the heroin was removed from the vehicle.  The warrant was to search the entire vehicle, so the heroin would have been found.  [...]’s act of retrieving the documents had no impact on the search warrant and was immaterial to the ultimate discovery of the evidence.  Further, had [...] allowed defendant to retrieve his driver credentials, defendant would have opened the glove box himself.  Presumably, [...] or another officer would have been watching defendant to ensure he did not retrieve anything other than those credentials; the heroin would have been just as exposed, and [...] would have been just as able to perceive it.  By any factual progression, this evidence would have been seized: either immediately following an observation of the open glove box, or shortly after, upon the grant of the warrant.  The trial court’s denial of the suppression motion does not suffer from any deficiency subjecting it to reversal and should be affirmed.
[brief] Id.  [...] rejected the importance of the criminal court’s final disposition of the JOC and VOP by contradicting and overruling both the federal court and [...]’s findings related to malicious prosecution, commenting in pertinent part:  Plaintiff argues that because the judgment of conviction was vacated and VOP was dismissed on April 14, 2023, that April 14, 2023, became the true accrual date to initiate Plaintiff’s claims.
[brief] The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Finding That The Equitable Factors Supported A Preliminary Injunction.  The trial court concluded—and Appellants do not contest on appeal—that a preliminary injunction was necessary to avoid irreparable harm.9  There are at --- 9  Although the State below argued that it did not have to establish an irreparable harm when seeking preliminary injunctive relief under N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1, the court found no need to evaluate that question because the State had amply shown irreparable harm.  See (Da134-35).  Since Appellants do not directly challenge that finding of irreparable harm on appeal, that issue is not squarely before this court.
[directive] A. treatment.  Under federal and state law, officers affected by pregnancy or Equal breastfeeding must be treated the same for all employment-related purposes as other officers not so affected but similar in their ability to work.  Agencies must provide reasonable accommodations when requested by pregnant or breastfeeding officers, unless law.2 doing so would pose an undue hardship to the agency under applicable B. generally.  Pregnant officers should make accommodation Accommodation requests requests through established state Law Against Discrimination (LAD) and federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) processes with the agency’s human resources unit.  Agency and officer should then engage in an interactive process regarding the accommodation request.  1.  The interactive process refers to the dialogue between agency and officer to determine if the officer requires a reasonable accommodation, and if so, what accommodation is appropriate under the circumstances.  Communication with the officer is integral to the process.  2.  Per the LAD, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(s), officers who become pregnant and request an accommodation based on a physician’s advice have a right to reasonable accommodation, which may include breaks for bathroom use or increased water intake, periodic rest, assistance with manual labor, job restructuring or modified work schedules, and temporary transfers to less strenuous or hazardous work.  C.  pregnancy.  Consistent with applicable law, after the agency Response to notification of is notified of an officer’s pregnancy, the agency shall not reassign the officer to a modified status3 duty nor require the officer to take leave unless (i) requested by the officer or (ii) the officer is unable to perform the essential functions of the job (particular to their duty status) with reasonable accommodation and a temporary waiver of the essential functions operations.4 would pose an undue hardship on agency D. penalties.
[brief] [...] also agreed that the particulate could still be in [...]’s eye and not be visible to her ophthalmologists.  “If it’s off in the corner in one of the nooks and crannies, you won’t be able to see it. ”  [...] added:  “If it's way out in the crevices in the corner, yes, you wouldn't be able -- you will not be able to. ”  (Pa98, Pa101-Pa102)  Accordingly, [...]’s claim that no one has seen the silicone particulate is a red herring created by [...]’s active concealment of the defect until well after the procedure.
[brief] ”  However, a review of potentially responsive text messages was required considering the scope of the OPRA request.  The OPRA request called for “all text messages relating to fire commissioner business, discussions, etc., that were sent to and from [Defendant’s email address or cell phone] from 1/1/17 to [July 3, 2019] to and from any fire commissioner, former commissioner, employee, [[...] (“Township”)] employee or any other individual which may have used the personnel e-mail account to conduct fire commissioner business. ” (Da017).  This overwhelmingly overbroad request potentially called for the production of many thousands of records.  The Plaintiff asked for 30 months’ of text messages.  Those text messages would have had to have been (and in fact were) reviewed for privilege, responsiveness and other issues (such as privacy).  No document should be produced under OPRA prior to it being reviewed for potential privilege by the records custodian.  Here, the [...] never explains why this case would have been any different.
[brief] Were [...]’s conviction nonetheless allowed to stand, the illegal components of his sentence must be vacated.  The sentencing court imposed three special conditions on [...]’s parole supervision for life, a status he held as a result of a wholly unrelated charge from over a decade ago.  Because sentencing courts may not impose parole conditions, a power exclusively reserved to the executive branch and exercised by the Parole Board, this portion of [...]’s judgment of conviction must be vacated.  Furthermore, the conditions themselves – a prohibition on contact with the subject dog, a prohibition on owning other animals in the future, and anger management counseling – had no basis in the Code of Criminal Justice.  Because all sentences must be authorized by law, the substance of each condition was unlawful, and each must be vacated.
[directive] Compelling and Absent Filed Release Be Must of Revocation for Motion a Where Cases 8.3  Circumstances.  Extraordinary a committed defendant has a that to believe cause probable is there where case any  In any for on 2C:43-7.2, release while N.J.S.A. Act, Release Early  No the to subject crime seeking motion shall a file prosecutor the complaint-warrant, by charged crime indictable  First or Prosecutor the County 2A:162-24 unless N.J.S.A. to pursuant release of revocation in Justice of Criminal Division of the Director Deputy a or Director the or Prosecutor, Assistant to not extraordinary reasons and compelling are there that finds Division, the by prosecuted cases of release.  revocation seek Revocation of Release.
[brief] (25T:31-7 to 11).  That [...] was trying to defuse the situation is referenced twice:  [Prosecutor:] Are there any responses by [...] to the defendant to diffuse [sic] what is being written to him?  [[...]:]  At times.  There was no objection to this question.  The State again asked about defusing the situation a bit later, when asking if there was another response to a different message, but defense counsel objected to that question.
[brief] I.  BECAUSE THE OBJECTORS IGNORED THE PUBLICATION OF A NOTICE OF APPROVAL THAT THEY ADMITTEDLY OBTAINED, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE DID NOT MERIT A DISCRETIONARY ENLARGEMENT OF THE TIME IN WHICH TO FILE THEIR COMPLAINT IN LIEU OF PREROGATIVE WRITS (Pa847-848; Pa850-856; 1T18-1T20) .................................................................
[brief] On November 9, 2021, the Borough adopted Ordinance No. 15-21 (the “Ordinance”), "to allow for the operation of a limited number of cannabis businesses subject to certain conditions."  Pa115.  The Ordinance provides that the Borough would issue a maximum of two Class 5 cannabis retailer licenses.  Id.  The Borough later determined that one of the two available Class 5 Cannabis retailer licenses would be for a business located in the Highway Commercial District.  Pa2.  The license at issue in the present matter is located within that District.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT DENYING OBJECTORS' MOTION TO ENLARGE THE PERIOD OF TIME IN WHICH TO FILE THE COMPLAINT IN LIEU OF PREROGATIVE WRITS WAS PROPER AND NO APPEAL LIES FROM THE TRIAL COURT'S STATEMENT OF REASONS (Not Raised Below by Appellants).  The Objectors admitted that they failed to timely file their complaint in lieu of prerogative writs.  (Pa113-114).  The Objectors admitted that the sole cause of their late filing was their unilateral failure to review Homeowners' Affidavit of Publication of the Notice of Approval.  (Pb17).  The Objectors admitted receiving the Homeowners' Affidavit of Publication of the Notice of Approval more than four (4) weeks before their filing deadline.  (Pa803-805).  The Objectors failed to satisfy their burden to demonstrate that manifest interests of justice entitled them to an enlargement of time in which to file their complaint in lieu of prerogative writs under R. 4:69-6 (c).  Because the Objectors failed to satisfy their burden, the Hon. [...], J.S.C. correctly entered Judgment declining to exercise discretion to extend the time in which the Objectors could file that complaint.
[directive] This form should be filled out only in cases where the defendant is pleading guilty based on the judge's representation as to what the maximum sentence will be.  1.  Enimere nenpòt ki pwomès oswa reprezantasyon jij la fè konsenan santans ou pral resevwa a.  List any promises or representations that have been made by the judge as to what your sentence will be.  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  2.  Èske w konprann ke si omoman santans la jij la ta detèmine ke enpoze yon santans ki pa depase sal te pwomèt la epi li pap sèvi enterè lajistis, lè sa a jij la ta ka òdone pou yo revoke deklarasyon koupab ou an oswa pèmèt ou anile deklarasyon ou an, epi ka a va pwosede nan jijman.  Do you understand that if the judge determines at the time of sentencing that imposing a sentence no greater than that which he or she promised would not serve the interests of justice, then the judge may order your plea be vacated or you will be allowed to withdraw your plea, and your case will proceed to trial.  Dat/Date:  Akize a/Defendant Apwouve pa (pou tout sa ki gen rapò ak deklarasyon koupab sèlman)  Jij/Judge Approved by (For purposes of plea only)  Komisè Gouvènman/Prosecutor Fòm Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11077-Haitian Creole paj 1 nan 1 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11077- Haitian Creole page 1 of 1
[directive] This 7.4.2.a, subsections See detention. clear-and-convincing basis for meeting the prima facie recognizes a 3:4A(b)(5) new Rule pretrial detention, that is, those cases where the pretrial order required to standard evidence recommendation be released.  That the defendant not recommendation is that program's services risk-assessment of objective pretrial on the results the program based is pretrial services by the on empirical research.  turn, is based which, in AOC, approved by the process where the PSA to cases category also applies
[brief] As noted, the Trial court in August 2016 decided the easement claim in favor of [...] on Summary Judgment.  The Trial Court then in 2017 conducted a testimonial Trial on the remaining issues and issued by oral Opinion on June 5, 2017 (Da177, 189) and Final Order.  (Da207) On the [...] Appeal, the Appellate Court (Da751) reversed and invalidated the Summary Judgment, finding that determination as premature and not supported by the evidence.  As that was the basis for the Court's ruling on the other issues, the Appellate Court vacated “all of the other orders under review” --- inclusive of the determinations on all other issues/paragraphs of the 1963 Agreement and sanctions Orders --- and remanded the entire matter for a “trial to determine what interest was created, its scope, and whether it remains in effect. ”  (Da763)  Since all the Orders of the Trial Court were vacated, the remand for a new Trial was on all issues, to commence anew.  However, compounding the error and prejudice arising from the Trial Court ([...]) denying the [...] recusal Motions, the Trial Court did not follow the Remand Order.  Instead, the Trial Court “proceeded to try the issues on remand as a continuation of the 2017 trial” (Da981).  The Trial Court went on, stating:  The Court heard ten witnesses during the 2017 Trial and fourteen witnesses during the continuation --- some of which were recalled from the 2017 proceeding.  This written Opinion amplifies and supplements this Court’s June 5, 2017 oral decision.  Thus, the Trial Court did not adhere to the Appellate Court Remand Order and try the case anew on its merits.  That in itself is incorrect and places the case and this Appeal in a confused procedural state.  The fact is the 2017 Final Order was reversed and invalidated because the Trial Court made its determinations prematurely and without adequate facts or circumstances.  The Remand was not to continue with those proceedings, but to try the case anew -- with the burden of proof on the plaintiff.  The entire premise of the case law on recusal as set forth in Point I herein is that a litigant, on a remand, is entitled to a Judge considering the case anew with an open mind.  The Trial Court here clearly did not abide by the Remand Order.  By addressing the case as a “continuation” of the earlier premature and invalid process and decision, the Trial Court committed error that mandates the invalidation of the Trial Court’s March/April 2022 Opinion/Order.
[directive] As required by Rule 3:3-1(e), and notwithstanding any other provision of Section 4 of this Directive, a law enforcement agency shall apply for a complaint-warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed: murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3); aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)); manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)); aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)); sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b) or (c)); robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1); carjacking (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2); escape (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5(a)); or attempt14 an to commit any of the foregoing crimes.  Extradition Cases and New Jersey, Federal, or Out-of-State Detainers.
[brief] First, but for the actions of Defendants [...] and [...], Plaintiff [...] could have commenced the application process with the [...] in April/May 2007 upon [...]’s rezoning of the [...] to 100% affordable housing.  4T, 116:4-23.  Plaintiff [...], pursuant to the 322 West-NJ 322 Assignment, already had control of [...] since June 29, 2006.  274a.  Second, if Plaintiff [...] was not subjected to the actions of Defendants [...] and [...], and adequately, properly, and timely advised, Plaintiff [...] could have commenced, as did [...], the [...] application process in mid-2007 with the assistance of an affordable housing development financial advisor such as [...], [...], or any other reputable affordable housing development financial advisor, completed the process in 2008 or 2009, and obtained the financing for the affordable housing project, as did [...].
[brief] Just as the similar cell phone records were not convincing to the jury on the issue of Defendant’s alibi, the Facebook records likewise would have been unconvincing for the same reason; neither establish that Defendant was elsewhere at the time of the shooting.  Relevant too was the attempt by trial counsel to enter the Facebook records during the cross-examination of a State witness; counsel did not conduct a flawed investigation or fail to marshal the evidence.  He was aware of the Facebook evidence throughout.  His strategy simply did not play out as he intended due to the court’s evidentiary rulings.  Decisions as to trial strategy or tactics are virtually unassailable on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds.
[brief] ([...]’s testimony that “the owner of the Chicken Shack was standing right there behind the glassed-in counter. ”)  This individual was not called as a witness.  [...] testified that he responded to the scene, spoke with [...], and relayed [...]’s description of the three men to other officers.  (5T:7-5 to 18)  [...] testified that he received a description of three black males, one in a red coat, one in a black coat, and one in a green coat.  (5T:91-17 to 92-19)  He stated that he was driving to [...] when he saw three men who matched the description.  The men were walking on the street, about seven doors down from the store.  (5T:92-20 to 93-1, 94-24 to 95-11, 111-18 to 20, 114-20 to 115-3)  Det. Dorval testified that the three men were detained and patted down, and that a handgun was recovered from [...].  (5T:96-9 to 97-1)  [...] was placed under arrest.  (5T:103-12 to 14)  [...] testified that he conducted a show-up identification procedure, driving [...] past the highway median where all three suspects were “lined up right next to each other. ”  (6T:7-19 to 8-20, 11-23 to 12-21)  [...] positively identified all three suspects as the three individuals from [...] at the same time – telling the officers, “that’s them … that’s all three of them. ”  (6T:12-4 to 11, 101-14 to 105-2)  Det. Dorval testified that following the identification procedure, all three suspects were taken to headquarters and searched.  (5T:103-12 to 17)  Det. Dorval searched [...] and recovered [...]’s cell phone and wallet.  (5T:103-18 to 105-21)  [...]’s clothing was later recovered on the sidewalk.  (5T:106-12 to 24)  None of [...]’s belongings were recovered from [...].  (5T:139-19 to 140-4)  **POINT I**