ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] further contended that [...] allegedly “agreed to pause the EGP discussions on this project given the multiple issues on the job and the possibility that it was already overpaid. ”  Pa426-27 (emphasis added).  During [...]’s case-in-chief, on day 1, [...]’s president, [...], testified that “we would reconcile Hackensack’s estimated gross profit once we had a better sense of what was going on [in the field].”  Pa495 at 257:11-16.  On day 2, Mr.  Ciminelli testified further that:  Q.  [...]’s work on [the Hackensack Project] was done on a completion contract?  A.  Yes.  Q.  Has [...] been paid for its work on the Hackensack project?  A.  Not in full, no.  Q.  What is [...]’s claim of unpaid work on the Hackensack project?  A.  I believe we have an outstanding balance of about $1.8 million.  Q.  So despite the fact that you haven’t been paid on the work, [...] is now seeking $900,000 of EGP on the work?  A.  Apparently.  ...  Q.  What was the impact of the disruptions to the flow of the job?  A.  Well, subs started to get frustrated because they weren’t, you know, they weren’t getting their change orders approved and therefore, they can’t bill for them.  That inevitably gets the subcontractors’ guard up.  You can’t ask them to do the work and it starts to disrupt what’s going on.  Q.  Did that have any impact on your discussions around EGP for the Hackensack project?  A.  Yeah.  Yes.  By the time you get to -- again the sale and the changes orders are still not being acted upon now -- I don’t know if they’re in dispute or not.  It’s opaque to me but clearly, they are not being approved for whatever reason.  And so revenue, cost is -- you know, forecasting of cost is going on and revenue doesn’t look like it is going to move so estimated gross profit is now, you know, put into peril.  Q.  And did you have discussion with representatives of [...] regarding that?  A.  Yeah.  End of 2020 we said, I can’t forecast an estimated gross profit here so I need to freeze it.  We already made some provisional payments on Hackensack and they were of a magnitude that would suggest that, you know, we may have already overpaid.  So until such time as there was some action on some of the change orders which ultimately impacted our revenue then we couldn’t re-forecast that estimated gross profit.
[directive] First, the Report identifies several core concepts that I am encouraging both law enforcement and CBVI organizations to follow:  •  CBVI Providers Are Not Law Enforcement (Report section II.2.A.1).  “CBVI groups’ responsibility is not to enforce the law, to apprehend individuals, to investigate the conduct of others in order to assist in the criminal justice process, or to assist in any of these activities.  Their job is to help promote peace in their communities by preventing violence, stopping retaliation, mediating conflict, supporting healing, and connecting those in need and at risk of violence or having suffered victimization to critical services and supports.
[brief] When analyzing discrimination and retaliation cases for intent, Courts have adopted the analytical framework outlined by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Zive, 182 N.J. at 447.  Under that framework, first, a plaintiff must fulfill the “rather modest” burden of establishing a prima facie case and merely demonstrating that the plaintiff’s factual scenario is indicative of retaliatory intent.  Ibid.  Once a plaintiff has established a *prima facie* case, the employer-defendant is then required to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory rationale for its conduct.  *Clowes v. Terminix Int’l Inc.*, 109 N.J. 575, 596 (1988).
[brief] On August 20, 2018, [...] signed Executive Order No. 34, which directed the Commissioner of DEP to take all necessary and appropriate actions to protect the black bear on lands controlled by the State including determining whether to close such lands to hunting black bears.  (Pa97)  The Commissioner of DEP also signed Administrative Order No. 2018-24 ordering and directing that all lands owned, managed or otherwise controlled by the DEP be closed to hunting black bears.  (Pa98)  With the expiration of the CBBMP in 2021, no bear hunting took place in New Jersey between 2020 and the end of November 2022.
[brief] In his arrest-scene statements, defendant initially denied carrying any duffel bags or living in the apartment.  (5T14-24 to 15-2).  After the officers told defendant that they had just observed him placing these bags into the apartment, he admitted to living there part-time with his girlfriend, placing two duffel bags in the apartment, and receiving the other six duffel bags.  (5T15-2 to 5; 5T74-25 to 74-4).  At approximately 5:10 p.m., the officers accompanied defendant to his Queens residence to conduct a consent search of his apartment.
[brief] It's - it's not that simple.  (1T:36:4-23.)  The Court stated as follows concerning its application of the standard set forth in the Couri matter:  THE COURT: with respect to the issue as to the remaining counts against Defendants [...] and [...], both sides asserted that the court should be guided by the Couri v. Gardner case, 173 N.J. 328 (2002).
[directive] Rules and Regulations  2.2.1  The agency's rules and regulations should form a "code of conduct" for employees.  It should contain the broadly stated "do's and don'ts," without delving into specific details.  For instance, an agency's rules and regulations should state that any use of force by an officer must comply with state and federal law, the Attorney General's and the County Prosecutor's policies, and the agency's S.O.Ps.  The specific details of what is considered force, and what constitutes the acceptable use of force, should be found in the agency's use of force  S.O.P.
[directive] Introduction  Law enforcement agencies have schedules in place for the retention of criminal case files and other documentary records that are maintained by their agencies.  These records retention schedules are promulgated by the [...] (hereinafter [...]) in the [...].1  However, these records retention schedules govern only documentary records such as case files, logbooks, etc.  These schedules do not govern the retention of criminal case evidence.  Until now, there has been little direction on the topic of retention of evidence and, as a result, most law enforcement agencies have used the documentary records retention schedules for evidence retention.  As criminal forensic science has improved, the volume of evidence gathered at crime scenes has grown exponentially.  For many law enforcement agencies, this has created a looming evidence storage crisis.  Although this problem exists in most types of cases, it is most severe for homicide cases, for which an entire room may be required to hold the evidence from just one case.  The [...] documentary records retention schedules for law enforcement agencies such as police departments, county prosecutors and county sheriffs provide that homicide records are "permanent."  This standard, which can be met for documents through the use of microfilming and destruction of the original documents, is wholly impractical when applied to physical evidence.  Although [...]’s documentary records retention schedule was not promulgated for application to evidence, agencies adopted it for evidence retention in the absence of other guidance.  It is the intention of the [...] and the [...] to promulgate these standards in order to remedy this problem.
[directive] IMPLEMENTATION QUESTIONNAIRE -- GRAND JURY STANDARDS: Standard 9.  Making the Record of Grand Jury Proceedings  It is the responsibility of the Judiciary to make the record of grand jury selection as well as all grand jury sessions.  A.  Is grand jury selection done on the record?  ___ YES ___ NO  B.  Please briefly explain, below, how the record is made and provide the position and title of the person who makes the record.  1.  How is the record made?  ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________  2.  What is the position and title of the person who makes the record?  ________________________________________________________________ C.  If selection is not done on the record, please report on your plans to achieve compliance with this Standard and the anticipated date by which you expect to complete that effort.  ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________  D.  What is the position and title of the Judiciary staff person who makes the record of grand jury sessions (those at which testimony is heard and votes are taken)?  ________________________________________________________________ 9  IMPLEMENTATION QUESTIONNAIRE -- GRAND JURY STANDARDS: ADDENDUM:
[directive] •  Bureau of Policing Policy.  The Office of Policing Policy (OPP) established pursuant to Attorney General Administrative Directive No. 2019-8 in the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability shall be renamed the Bureau of Policing Policy (BPP) and administratively allocated to OPSI.1  Within OPSI, it shall be administered by the Director of the Bureau of Policing Policy who shall be a lawyer.  The BPP’s mission is amended to encompass the following functions: be the State’s lead policing policy office, charged with reviewing, recommending, and maintaining relevant statewide policing policies and Attorney General directives and guidelines to ensure that policing policy in the state is consistent with the mission, vision, and direction established by the Attorney General.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  THE DACCA  ATTORNEY SAFE HARBOR DOES NOT INFRINGE ON THE SUPREME COURT’S EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE PRACTICE OF LAW.  The [...]’s challenge to the constitutionality of the New Jersey Debt Adjustment and Credit Counseling Act (DACCA), N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1 to -9, is based on the following flawed syllogism: a) debt adjustment services that are performed by an attorney may constitute the practice of law; b) the New Jersey Supreme Court regulates attorneys; therefore, c) any effort by the Legislature to regulate the practice of debt adjustment violates the Separation of Powers Clause and the exclusive authority of the New Jersey Supreme Court to regulate attorneys.  (ACb4-12.)¹  That argument lacks merit.  In analyzing the constitutional validity of a statute, courts presume that “the legislature acted with existing constitutional law in mind and intended the act to function in a constitutional manner. ”  State v. Profaci, 56 N.J. 346, 349 (1970); (Rb8-9).  “[T]he presumption will not be overcome, and a ‘legislative enactment will not be declared void, unless its repugnancy to the Constitution is ¹  The [...] Amicus Curiae brief is referred to as “ACb.” so manifest as to leave no room for reasonable doubt. ””  Visiting Homemaker Serv. of Hudson Cty. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 380 N.J. Super. 596, 607 (App. Div. 2005) (citations omitted).  The burden of proving the unconstitutionality of a statute rests with the challenger.  And the arguments of the [...] do not overcome the strong presumption that the DACCA is constitutional.  The Legislature has undisputed authority to regulate the practice of debt adjustment, which is primarily performed by non-attorneys.  The DACCA Attorney Safe Harbor exemption, N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c)(2), provides attorneys with the ability to engage in debt adjustment activities outside of the purview of the statute, as long as these activities are secondary or incidental to the attorneys’ primary role of client representation.  The Legislature had a legitimate governmental purpose to limit the scope of the Attorney Safe Harbor to protect consumers from potential abuses or unfair practices by unscrupulous attorneys.  Therefore, the DACCA, and the Attorney Safe Harbor exemption within the DACCA, withstand constitutional scrutiny.
[brief] [...] was immediately put on notice of the accident when Plaintiff reported her injuries, as following the incident, Plaintiff filled out, signed, and dated a form entitled “Injured Party’s Statement of Accident. ”  (Pa157)  [...] also completed a two-page “Accident Investigation Form,” detailing the incident that occurred between Plaintiff and [...] and a form entitled “Investigator Statement for Customer Accidents. ”  (Pa96; Pa153-Pa154)  The “Accident Investigation Form” noted that Plaintiff was in the process of asking a [...] employee a question when another customer with a full U-boat pushed against her back, pushing the cart past her and that Plaintiff’s lower center/left side of her back was in pain.  (Pa153-Pa154)  The form asks whether any equipment was involved in the accident and [...] circled “yes,” indicating that the accident involved a U-boat.  (Pa153-Pa154)  [...] also noted that Plaintiff planned on presenting to a physician on her own.  (Pa153-Pa154)  The “Investigator Statement for Customer Accidents” form, which was also completed and signed by [...], noted that he was told by Plaintiff that [...], who had a full U-boat and could not see Plaintiff, hit her lower back with the full U-boat, thereby injuring her.
[brief] The trial court did not err in prohibiting a mini-trial on a decade-old case to smear [...]’s character, where that evidence was already substantively presented to the jury, the exoneration of [...] was not predicated on Wesley’s testimony, and it would only serve to confuse the issues for trial.  Additionally, there was no Brady violation whatsoever.  A.  Defendant’s Counseled Brief  Defendant next claims that the trial court violated N.J.
[brief] Designed for the purpose of something as opposed to designed to allow something are two different concepts.  The former means that something was designed for a specific purpose such as to increase building height.  The latter means that the design allows for increased building height, rendering the purpose of the design irrelevant.  Therefore, under the proper interpretation of Building Height under the Ordinance, two (2) building on the subject property exceed the allowable building height by over ten percent (10%) making the approval null and void and as such the Board did not have the jurisdiction to hear this matter.
[directive] 8.0.10  It is for this reason that the internal affairs investigator must continually reassess the nature of an internal affairs investigation as evidence is being gathered.  Having initially determined that a particular allegation is criminal or administrative in nature, it is important for the internal affairs investigator to revisit that decision during the course of an investigation to determine whether any of the evidence gathered following the initial Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (coerced statements obtained by threat of removal from office cannot be 6 used in criminal proceedings); see Appendix J. INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 46 determination changes the investigation’s nature and scope.
[brief] K.D., 313 N.J. Super. at 568 (citing Delbridge v. Schaeffer, 238 N.J. Super. 323, 335 (Law Div. 1989)).  A judicial act is defined as an act that is normally performed by a judge in a judicial capacity.  Ibid.  Judicial immunity was established to permit judges to render decisions “with independence and without fear of consequences. ”  Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).  Judicial immunity is intended to provide judges with the maximum ability to act fearlessly and impartially, without an atmosphere of intimidation.  Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 203-04 (1979).  It is necessary to assure that judges can perform their function without harassment or intimidation.  Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978).  [...] does not—and cannot—argue that the actions allegedly taken by the judicial defendants he complains about, which involved “bouncing” or denial of motions or handling of [...]’s criminal case or approval for [...] to participate in PTI (Pb18, Pb39) were not judicial in nature.  Likewise, [...] cannot maintain that any of the judicial defendants acted in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction: clearly, the Judiciary/Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the criminal proceeding.  Thus, because [...]’s allegations against the judicial defendants wholly relate to his criminal court proceedings, the judicial defendants are entitled to absolute judicial immunity, and the claims against so they failed and were properly dismissed.
[brief] [...] disposes of defendant’s argument.  There, our Supreme Court held that the detective’s testimony regarding the similarity of [...]’s shoes and the shoes in the surveillance video was properly admitted under N.J.R.E. 701.  245 N.J. at 19-20.  The Court concluded that the detective’s “lay[-]witness opinion as to the similarities between the sneakers from the surveillance footage and the sneakers he saw that night was rationally based on his perception .  . . .”  Ibid.  The Court noted that “[s]imply because the jury may have been able to evaluate whether the sneakers were similar to those in the video does not mean that [the detective]’s testimony was unhelpful. ”  Id. at 20.  Importantly, the Court explained, “the jury was free to discredit [the detective]’s testimony and find that the sneakers in evidence were dissimilar to those on the surveillance video. ”  Ibid.  Indeed, the jury here was instructed on witness credibility, and the judge explained, along with the model credibility charge as a whole, that the jury must “weigh the testimony of each witness and then determine the weight to give it” in order to “accept all of it, a portion of it, or none of it. ” (7T30-9 to 31-9).  Defendant’s argument that [...] is distinguishable because neither [...] nor [...] had independent knowledge of the clothing worn by the perpetrator in the videos misapplies the principles outlined in that case.
[brief] In granting Plaintiff’s motion to amend, the trial court improperly considered the Plaintiff’s motion as an amendment to a pleading under R. 4:9-1 (Da083).  Since Plaintiff was seeking to modify the final judgment of proper exercise of eminent domain due to a mistake, Plaintiff was only properly able to obtain relief within a year under R. 4:50-2.  Relief from judgment as contemplated by R. 4:50-1(f), which the Court relied on, requires exceptional circumstances which would warrant relief from judgment.  “Because of the importance that we attach to the finality of judgments, relief under Rule 4:50-1(f) is available only when ‘truly exceptional circumstances are present’” and only available “when the court is presented with a reason not included among any of the reasons subject to the one year limitation. ”  Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380, 395 (1984) (quoting Manning Eng'g, Inc. v. Hudson Cty. Park Comm'n., 74 N.J. 113, 120 (1977).  Exceptional circumstances did not exist in the matter at hand.
[brief] ”  N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.4 (a)(7).  In Count 1, Petitioner alleges generally that “the Board” violated section (g) by failing to emphasize the negative comments included in the public survey questions.  The complaint acknowledges, however, that the survey responses were posted on the district website along with other referendum materials.  (21a.)  Therefore, even if accepted as true and even if this allegation could be processed against “the Board,” which it cannot, Petitioner does not allege in Count I that “the Board” provided inaccurate information to the public regarding the survey.  Moreover, he does not allege that any Respondent individually had any involvement in the posting of these materials.  Accordingly, he cannot establish a violation of section (g) of the Code of Ethics.
[brief] R. 1:7-2; R. 2:10-2; State v. Williams, 168 N.J. 323, 335-36 (2001); State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275, 289 (2006); State v. Tierney, 356 N.J. Super. 477 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 72 (2003).  The defendant must demonstrate that the instruction given was so flawed that it “possessed a clear capacity for producing an unjust result” and was “so egregious that it ‘rais[es] a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached. ’”  State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 538 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 930 (1970); Williams, 168 N.J. at 336; Tierney, 356 N.J. Super. at 477 (quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971)).
[brief] THE MCS-90 SURETY IS NOT TRIGGERED BY AN ADJUDICATION OF THE UNDERLYING INSURANCE COVERAGE  [...] claims that the trial court could not order [...] to pay under the MCS-90 surety because there exists a “well settled principle that the endorsement applies only after there has been a finding that no coverage exists under the policy,” and the trial court here has not made that adjudication.  (Br. p. 30).  [...] cites a passage from only one case, QBE Ins. Co. v. P&F Container Services, Inc., 362 N.J. Super. 445, 450 (App. Div. 2003), for this alleged well settled principle.  That passage is, “The insurer’s obligations under the MCS-90 are triggered when the policy to which it is attached otherwise would provide no coverage to the insured.  [citations omitted].  In other words, under the endorsement, the insurer becomes a surety for the interstate carrier in any case where there is no other coverage provided. ” (Br. 28-30).  The court in *QBE* never held that “a trial court must make a determination” of the underlying coverage before the MCS-90 surety is triggered.  That was [...]’s misstatement of the case.  The court in *QBE* stated that it must be shown that the underlying insurance “would provide no coverage to the insured” for a host of reasons, including the insurer denying coverage, which is the case here.  [...] already determined that the policy would provide [...] no insurance coverage.  [...]’s defenses to the [...]  Third-party complaint seeking coverage stated, “[...]’s claims for coverage are barren by reason of” its breach of warranties, failure to comply with the terms of the policy, misrepresentations and concealments, failure to cooperate, and failure to give notice.  (PPCIa131).  In its Counterclaim against [...], [...] sought to cement its own determination of no coverage by seeking judgement “declaring the [...] Policy void. ” (PPCIa140-41).  The trial court directly addressed the MCS-90 coverage issue by reading the actual language of the MCS-90 endorsement.
[brief] In New Jersey, “a trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business” and may include “a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers. ”  King Transcription Servs., LLC v. Phx. Transcription, LLC, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 621, at 40-41 (App. Div. Mar. 19, 2019)(citing Rycoline Prods., Inc. v. Walsh, 334 N.J. Super. 62, 72 (App. Div. 2000)).
[brief] As to the specifics of the incident, [...] concluded that [...] “did not wish to” shoot [...] and that “[t]here was some coercion there in the argument” between [...] and [...] over the gun, “meaning that [[...]] was not happy about having to do it. ”  (2T24-8 to 19)  Similarly, [...] concluded that [...]’s characterization of the incident – that he was “scared” and was simply “following orders” – was consistent with the official report.  (2T48-25 to 49-5)  Based on these expert findings, the original sentencing court found that mitigating factor 13 (youthful defendant influenced by older person) applied, albeit without attributing it “a great deal of weight” (2T94-17 to 95-1)