ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Offenses.  Concerning New RestYaints for Requests 6.2.1 personal on defendant the release to decides appearance first the at court the  If deterrence, specific of benefits achieve the to 2A:162-17(a), N.J.S.A. to pursuant recognizance the instruct court the that request shall general attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant the issue to refusal court's  The release. of period the during offense an commit to not defendant of revocation seek to authority prosecutor's the affect not shall defendant the to instruction such the that event the in Directive this of 8 Section and 2A:162-24 N.J.S.A. to pursuant release recognizance.  on released while offense new a commits defendant  Victims/Witnesses.
[brief] Thus, the Trial Court did not err in finding that Plaintiff’s NJCRA municipal liability claim against Defendant [...] was not sufficiently pled.  J. [...] did not err in finding that any claims related to the impropriety of Plaintiff’s arrest were subject to the Heck bar.  (4/1/21 Transcript @ T48:7 to T49:25).  First, the Trial Court correctly found that completion of a PTI program is not a “favorable termination” for the purposes of the “Heck bar. ”  Pursuant to the Heck bar, where a plaintiff asserts causes of action regarding the alleged impropriety of the plaintiff’s arrest, the search which resulted in his arrest and the prosecution of the charges filed as a result of that arrest, that plaintiff must show that the charges stemming from that arrest terminated in his favor or the plaintiff is barred from bringing those causes of action pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
[directive] NOTIFICATION OF DRUG TESTING PROCEDURES  A.  Applicants  Agencies must notify applicants for law enforcement positions that the pre-employment process will include drug testing.  The notification will also indicate that a negative result is a condition of employment and that a positive result will: a) result in the applicant being dropped from consideration for employment; b) cause the applicant's name to be reported to the central drug registry maintained by the Division of State Police; and c) preclude the applicant from being considered for future law enforcement employment for a period of two years from the date of the drug test.
[directive] Grading – First degree if substantial interruption or impairment of public communication, transportation, supply of water, gas or power, or other public service.  Second degree – Any violation of subsection b. or a violation of subsection c. if the value of the services, property, personal identifying information, or money obtained or sought to be obtained exceeds $5,000; or a violation of subsection e. if the data, database, or computer program contained personal identifying information, medical information concerning an identifiable person, protected government or court records, or has a value exceeding $5,000.
[directive] The court rules and statutes cited in the new Bail Schedules promulgated by this directive provide guidance regarding whether or not the Bail Schedules will apply in various situations when initially setting bail or thereafter conducting bail reduction/bail review hearings.  The previous Bail Schedules 1 and 2 have not been merged; however, the captions citing to the rules, which have been substantially revised, including as to who can set bail for particular offenses, have been removed.  Previously, Bail Schedule 1 offenses were required to have bail set by Superior Court judges, while Bail Schedule 2 offenses could be set by a Superior Court judge, a Municipal Court judge, or an authorized Municipal Court  [...] • PO Box 037 • [...]  [...]
[brief] Rather, the [...] took official action on February 9, 2021 by adoption of a Resolution that reordered the time for public comment.  (Da12)³  Plaintiff never filed any claim to challenge that Resolution even though he spoke against its adoption at the meeting where adopted.  (Da10)  Any claim of alleged suppression of his right to public comment based on the re-ordering of the time for public comment by the [...] on February 9, 2021 is time barred.  R. 4:69-6.  Moreover, Plaintiff did not and could not point to any facts showing his right to public comment was ever violated.  The fact that the [...] changed its rules in January 2022 to allow for public comment prior to consideration of official action does not establish that the [...] protocols established on February 9, 2021, were unconstitutional.  Rather, as the trial court recognized, it is the law of this State that ³ The subject Resolution was not included in the underlying proceedings because Plaintiff never asserted any challenge thereto.  a governing body may establish the procedure for and place limits on public comments at its meetings.  Since the only claims asserted by Plaintiff were based on his right to be heard on the Bond Ordinance and he was so heard, there was no violation based on the fact that Plaintiff was heard.  The trial court also properly rejected Plaintiff’s claim that he had a right to engage in colloquy with the governing body based on New Jersey Supreme Court precedent in Kean Federation of Teachers v. Morrell, 233 N.J. 566 (2018) and Besler v. Board of Educ. of West Windsor-Plainsboro Reg’l School Dist., 201 N.J. 544 (2010) (2T93-5:95-11).  It is ironic that Plaintiff contends that Defendants obfuscated the facts and the law, while failing to discuss -- let alone mention -- the case law cited by the trial court in support of its decision to enter summary judgment including Kean, supra, Wellington, supra, and Badiali, supra.  On the other hand, Defendants discussed and addressed the relevant law and alternate legal theories raised by Plaintiff including Local Finance Notice 2020-21.  There is absolutely no basis for Plaintiff’s bombastic claims that Defendants obfuscated the law and facts.
[brief] The notice by Applicants/Defendants/Respondents (“Applicants”) was found to be legally sufficient, the Board held a proper hearing with the Appellants present, and the Appellants had the opportunity to cross-examine the Applicants, as well as call their own witnesses.  Nevertheless, the Board was satisfied with the pro se Applicant’s presentation and authored a complete and well-reasoned Resolution Memorializing its decision.  The Superior Court properly found that the Board’s granting of the Applicant’s variance was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  It was well grounded in the record and in compliance with the established precedent, statutes, and [...] zoning ordinances.
[brief] [Da1-8].  1  “Da” refers to defendant’s appendix.  “1T” refers to the motion hearing transcript dated September 6, 2022.  “2T” refers to the motion hearing transcript dated September 27, 2022.  “3T” refers to the jury selection transcript dated September 27, 2022.  “4T” refers to the preliminary jury instructions transcript dated September 28, 2022.  “5T” refers to the jury selection transcript dated September 28, 2022.  “6T” refers to the preliminary jury instructions transcript dated September 29, 2022.  “7T” refers to the jury selection transcript dated September 29, 2022, Volume I  “8T” refers to the jury selection transcript dated September 29, 2022, Volume II.  “9T” refers to the jury selection and in limine rulings, dated October 6, 2022.  “10T” refers to the trial transcript dated October 6, 2022.  “11T” refers to the trial transcript dated October 12, 2022.  “12T” refers to the trial transcript dated October 13, 2022.  On October 19, 2020, the State filed a Notice of Motion to Admit Evidence of Other Crimes pursuant to N.J.R.E. 404(b).
[brief] SUMMARY  JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED BECAUSE THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CREATE A JURY QUESTION AS TO WHETHER DEFENDANTS HAD ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF AN ABNORMALLY VICIOUS OR DANGEROUS TRAIT OR PROPENSITY  The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment because there is no evidence that Defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of prior acts by [...] that provided reasonable grounds to believe he would launch a sudden, sustained, to-kill attack against [...].  Plaintiffs failed to create a question of fact, because none of the evidence of [...]’s behavior at [...] could reasonably be interpreted as a sign he would attack his handler in this manner.
[brief] (“[...]”) to produce electronically stored information requested in [...]’s Revised Requests for Production of Documents.  On July 26, 2016, [...] filed a response [DE 51], and on August 2, 2016, [...] filed a reply [DE 52].  I.  Background  On June 8, 2015, [...] served its First Request for Production of Documents to [...].  On September 19, 2015, [...] objected to the requests on relevancy grounds and did not turn over any documents.  On October 1, 2015, [...] sent [...] a letter responding to [...]’s objections.  On October 6, 2015, counsel for [...] and [...] spoke over the phone.  Because [...]’s primary objection was that the document requests were too broad, counsel for [...] and [...] discussed using keywords to search [...]’s electronically stored information.  On November 9, 2015, [...] turned over sample emails related to this case to help determine what keywords would be appropriate.  On January 20, 2016, [...] sent [...] a Revised Request for Production of Documents.  On February 25, 2016, [...]’s counsel sent [...]’s counsel a list of 126 keywords.  [...]’s counsel proposed these keywords as a method by which [...] could satisfy its burden to produce material responsive to the Revised Request.  On March 10, 2016, [...]’s counsel sent an email to [...] striking 20 search terms from the list of 126, leaving 105 terms.  On April 28, 2016, [...]’s counsel responded by voluntarily removing 28 additional terms, leaving 78 terms.  [...] also objected to 7 of the 20 terms deleted by [...].  In all, neither party objected to 78 of the original 126 search terms until [...] responded to this Motion to Compel.  [...]’s counsel sent [...]’s counsel follow-up emails on May 6, May 24, June 3, June 13, and June 30, 2016.  [...]’s counsel did not respond to any of these five emails.  On July 12, 2016, [...] filed this Motion.
[brief] Pa211.  A new zoning ordinance was passed in 1974 where the subject property was zoned “R-4” which permitted residential development of 90 units per acre.  Ibid.  In 2001, a new ordinance eliminated several R-4 districts, to include the district in which the subject property was located.  The 2001 ordinance expressly recognized the redevelopment plan takes precedence over the provisions of the ordinance.  During the commissioners hearing it was discovered the parties utilized vastly difference zoning assumptions under which to value the property: “[...]’s expert . . . testified as to the value of the property under the 1963 Industrial classification, while the [...]’s expert used the 2001 R-4 zoning as the basis for his opinion.
[brief] [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration of the June 2 Order Was Granted, and the Complaint Was Also Dismissed with Prejudice**  On August 3, 2023, [...] filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the June 2 Order denying its Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice; [...] also sought an award of its attorneys’ fees as against Plaintiff.  (Pa494-513).  Plaintiff opposed that motion.  (Pa514-622).  At oral argument on August 25, 2023, and in a written Order of the same date, the trial court reconsidered and vacated the June 2 Order, dismissing the Complaint, *with prejudice*, as against [...].  (August 25, 2023 Trans., 4T, at 7-8; Pa651-652 (“August 25 Order”)).  The trial court later denied [...]’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees, based on principles of judicial estoppel.  (Sept. 22 Trans., 5T, at 3-12, 13; “Sept. 27, 2023 Order,” Pa688).  [...]’s Motion for an Award of its Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
[brief] Obviously, a single unlawful act of a public employee does not imply a policy, practice or custom.  *City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle*, 471 U.S. 808 (1985), rehearing denied, 472 U.S. 925; *Wedemeir v. Ballwin*, 931 F.2d 24 (8th Cir. 1991); *Ramie v. City of Heding Village*, 742 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1985).  In other words, a single incident of misconduct by an individual officer is insufficient to impose entity liability under *Monell*.
[brief] Based upon this erroneous premise, the plaintiff argues that [...] taxpayers have been economically harmed by the County’s not receiving the 5% fee under NJHMA it would have under LTTEL.  Again, however, the Appellate Division has specifically rejected this argument in the unpublished Norman Towers decision.  The County Defendants respectfully submit that the plaintiff lacks the required standing to bring a claim based on any of the allegations made against them in the Complaint such that the Order entered by the Court below dismissing the Complaint with prejudice should be affirmed by this Court.  **STANDARD OF REVIEW**
[brief] In response to counsel’s arguments, the Sentencing Court expressed a belief that the science was limited to young people under the age of eighteen and that [...]’s youth at the time of the offense was only relevant to mitigating factor fourteen.  (8T 24-2 to 28, 34-9 to 35-9, 42-5 to 45-16)  The Court seemed to believe there was an inherent tension between considering defendant’s youth at the time of the crime for mitigating factor fourteen but to assess the other factors as of the day of his resentencing.
[brief] (4T160:11-20).  [...] also testified that he had the opportunity to examine the tires of the plaintiff’s rollator involved in the incident and found the rollator to be in excellent condition.  (4T174:8-22).  [...] also viewed the surveillance video depicting the plaintiff walking into the [...] store with a rollator on the day of the incident.  [...] admitted that as shown in the video, the plaintiff walked with a shuffle and her gait “was diminished”, stating “[t]hat’s why she needs the rollator”.  (4T166:10-25).
[brief] (Da21).  For context on the enormous burden that [...]’s and [...]’s continuous frauds placed on the judiciary and [...], the special fiscal agent charged with selling [...] incurred and was paid more than $2.2 million out of [...]’s operating revenue and sale proceeds for his yearslong efforts, in addition to $2.7 million paid to counsel for the special fiscal agent to represent him in the litigation initiated by Defendants challenging the special fiscal agent’s decisions and premised on the utter and ongoing fraud on the courts by Defendants that Defendants could not readily pay the judgment with cash they had hid overseas.
[brief] (8T 26-3 to 12)  This sentence was to run concurrently to an unrelated three-year sentence [...] received for conspiracy to distribute cocaine.  (8T 23-8 to 21, 73-25 to 74-5)  However, despite petitioner directing his attorney to call [...] to attack the credibility of [...]; petitioner’s attorney failed to subpoena and failed to call [...] as a witness.
[brief] With regard to specific examples of how he misused investor funds, [...] asserted he was engaging in a “strategic partnership” when he used investor funds to do a “favor” for his brother by buying a car and shipping it to Ghana.  (4T146:23-150:2).  However, [...] also admitted that he never informed investors that the same brother was arrested and charged with receiving stolen property, fencing, and conspiracy in connection with a high-end auto theft ring.  (4T151:25-159:6; Pa1068-Pa1073).  In addition, [...] admitted transferring at least $900,000 of investor funds to an entity known as [...], owned by an individual named [...].  (5T104:21-105:12; Pa1283-Pa1288; 4T108:4-111:20; Pa1289-Pa1305).  Yet, [...] never informed investors of these transfers, or that [...] pled guilty and was sentenced to 108 months in prison for “his role as the top U.S.-based money launderer for a criminal enterprise based in the Republic of Ghana” which involved fraudulent schemes including “business email compromises, romance scams, targeting elderly victims, and fraud schemes related to the COVID-19 pandemic. ” (5T104:21-105:12; Pa1283-Pa1288; 4T108:4-111:20; Pa1289-Pa1305).  In addition to the admissions above, [...] also testified that he filed for and received approximately $750,000 through the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) and Economic Injury Disaster Loans (“EIDL”) programs designed to provide relief to businesses during the COVID-19 pandemic, by submitting multiple incomplete or inaccurate applications on behalf of himself and the entities he controlled (including [...] and [...]).
[brief] REPLY  APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS.........................................................ii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS...............................iii  PROCEDURAL HISTORY..............................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS.............................................................................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT..................................................................................2  POINT I  THE DECISION BELOW WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.  (Not Raised Below) ..............................................................................2  POINT II  ADEQUATE  NOTICE OF THE RICCI ACT WAS NOT PROVIDED AND THEREFORE, [...] SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO RICCI ACT BENEFITS.  (Raised Below.  Pa16. Pa30.) .................................................................6  CONCLUSION............................................................................................11
[brief] Through the GPS tracker, the detectives further knew that defendant had just travelled in the Audi to New York, and had stayed in New York for a suspiciously-brief period of time.  Thus, the detectives had reasonable suspicion to believe that CDS would be located inside the Audi, including potentially under the hood – a location from which the detectives had observed the defendant sell the CI drugs during the controlled buy – before they requested defendant’s consent to search.  By limiting its reasonable suspicion evaluation to only the facts that came after the stop of defendant’s vehicle, the lower court ignored all highly-relevant, pre-stop facts simply because defendant also committed motor vehicle infractions that provided another basis for the stop.
[directive] C.  With the approval of the Attorney General, the Director may Organization of OACR. organize the work of the Office into any bureaus or other organizational units as may be necessary for the efficient and effective operation of the Office.  The Director may delegate to employees in the Office and its constituent organizational units such powers as the Director deems appropriate, to be exercised subject to the supervision and control of the Director.  The Attorney General shall assign to the Office such employees of DLPS as may be necessary to assist the Director in the performance of their duties.  To the extent not inconsistent with law, the Attorney General may delegate duties to the Director assigned to the Attorney General to assist the Office in fulfilling its purpose.  D.
[directive] No subject the would be an adult by committed if that deputy or prosecutor assistant an offenses, unless foregoing the of any commit to attempt an or supervisory or Directive, a of 3.2 this Section with accordance in consulted general attorney  Prosecutor to County by authorized the 3.3.2 is who subsection to pursuant designated officer of presumption the determines that Directive, 4 this of Section under presumptions overcome this in Nothing 4.5.9.20 subsection to pursuant overcome is complaint-warrant by charging delinquency of other adjudications of consideration preclude to construed be shall subsection ago, years ten than more occurred that crimes firearms-related or violent for adjudications (e.g., as relevant be may as crimes) NERA or firearms-related than other offenses for adjudications or presumption the overcome whether to determining when circumstances of the totality the of part Section 4.3. to pursuant acomplaint-summons issuing of Convictions/Charges.
[directive] 2.  Law enforcement should use restraint at protests.  It is critical that law enforcement officers use restraint in the enforcement of generally applicable laws whenever First Amendment protected conduct is implicated.  In some instances, the conduct of protesters or journalists may technically violate a law or restriction, without being disruptive, dangerous, or violent; for example, by obstructing a sidewalk.  In such cases, officers should generally refrain from enforcing every possible violation, unless action is necessary to maintain public or officer safety, or protect property from destruction, and there are no alternative means to accomplish those goals.  Unnecessary or excessive enforcement action may undermine public safety, rather than preserving it.
[directive] Page 5 the guidance I issued when originally promulgating these forms December 2010, Municipal in Courts are to make these forms available to their local police departments.  CDR-1 and CDR-2 Forms of  As January 2020, only the eCDR system may be used to generate private citizen 1, complaints requiring county prosecutorial review, as detailed above.  This means that the of Special Form Complaint and Summons may no longer be used to generate private citizen complaints alleging a disorderly persons offense against someone who a candidate or is nominee for elected public office or a person holding elected public office.  The Special Form of Complaint and Summons, however, may still be used, where appropriate, for those complaints alleging a disorderly persons offense (or other matter) that is not subject to review by the County Prosecutor.  As stated previously, significant changes are being made to the eCDR system to support these new Rule requirements.  Courts and law enforcement will be advised under separate cover about those system changes.
[brief] The speculative and conclusory nature of [...]’s claim is evidenced in the hearing transcript wherein [...] counsel desperately attempted to contrive a conflict but failed to do so:  THE COURT: Well, but aren't your allegations conclusory?  [...]: No, Judge, because all you have to -- I'm saying, look, how can they represent two defendants or six defendants under the Comparative Negligence Act, all right?  Everyone's got an incentive under the CNA to point the fingers at the other guy.  THE COURT: But that has not occurred at this point.  [...]: Well, it will occur in the future.  THE COURT:  How do we know that?  [...]:  Well, if this case were to go to trial then we're going to have everybody pointing fingers at each other.  THE COURT:  So, you're saying that it may happen, we don't know it's going to happen.  It may happen, therefore every single defendant has to retain their own attorney?  . . . (T.43-44.).  When challenged by [...] as to why the conflicts could not be waived, [...] again could not provide any concrete reason, providing only a nonsensical response about ticking time bombs and the Comparative Negligence Act (which does not apply to intentional fraud and RICO claims – there are no negligence counts in [...]’s Complaint):
[brief] New Jersey Court Rules | Rule | Page(s) | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Rule 1:4-8 | 12 - 14 | | Rule 4:6-2(e) | 10 | ####  Other Authorities | Authority | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2 on R. 1:4-8 (2019)| 13 | Preliminary Statement