ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  *Baxter* at 598.  In this matter, the Plaintiff sustained injury to his shoulder for which he continues to have pain and limitation every day.  1T65:12-15.  His orthopedic surgeon, [...], testified that the left shoulder MRI arthrogram revealed a SLAP lesion “which stands for superior labral anterior posterior tear. ”  1T108:22-25; 1T109:1-11.  [...] further explained that the tearing was in two different places within the labrum.  1T110:4-11.  [...] described that labral tears “occur when there is a sheer force across the joint…”  1T110:17.  [...] testified regarding three separate procedures he performed during the surgery itself which involved debridement of the inflamed tissue, removal of a portion of bone, and, removal of synovium.  1T113:18-1T116:2.  Following the surgery, when last seen in November of 2020, [...] continued to have shoulder pain with restricted motion, along with neck pain.  1T117:9-23.  [...] opined that the shoulder and neck injuries were caused by the car accident.
[brief] State v. Burton, 309 N.J. Super. 280, 289 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 407 (1998).  In a case where, as here, the trial judge correctly instructed the jury in other components of the charge, "[t]he test to be applied . . . is whether the charge as a whole is misleading, or sets forth accurately and fairly the controlling principles of law."
[brief] (“Plaintiff”), please accept this letter, in lieu of a more formal brief, seeking leave to file the within substantive opposition to the *Amici Curiae* brief filed by the [...], [...], [...] and [...] (collectively, “Amicus”).  Plaintiff did not oppose the motion to appear by Amicus under R. 1:13-9(a) as its motion was timely filed on August 3, 2023, the day that Plaintiff’s reply brief was filed and due.  The Order, filed on August 21, 2023, granting the motion for Amicus to appear did not provide for Plaintiff’s filing of any responsive brief.  Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks this Court’s leave to file the within response to the brief filed by Amicus on August 24, 2023.
[brief] [...] was a former 50% shareholder in a closely held company called [...].  She transferred her shares to her ex-husband as part of a divorce settlement.  While the divorce was pending, she filed a third-party complaint against her adult daughter, [...], alleging that [...] had diverted corporate opportunities and customers from [...] to [...]’s new company, [...], depriving [...] of assets and profits.  The trial court dismissed the third-party action, holding that Eleanor’s claims were derivative and could not be brought via a direct claim against [...], and because Eleanor could not bring a derivative action since she had already transferred her shares in [...].  *Id.* at 33-34.  On appeal, Eleanor argued that the derivative standing rules applicable to public entities should not apply because [...] was closely held, that [...] should be deemed a partnership for purposes of this issue to avoid the consequence of the share transfer, and that equity demanded that she be allowed to pursue her claims against [...] and [...].
[brief] Da42 Exhibit C – Certified Judgment of Conviction for Defendant [...], dated September 13, 2018 (omitted, see Da104)  ..................................................................................................................  Da104  Exhibit D – Order denying Defendants [...]’s and [...]’s motion for reconsideration of Court’s Order of September 26, 2023, regarding co-Defendant’s [...], prior conviction, dated October 3, 2023 (omitted, see Da45)  ........................................................................................................  Da45
[brief] ”  See Vincitore, supra, 169 N.J. at 125; Foster, supra, 389 N.J. Super. at 87; Roe, supra, 317 N.J. Super. at 77-78.  In Foster, the outer door to a [...] residential complex “had a lock that the Housing Authority had installed but had not made operational and [] the Housing Authority had, in other ways, negligently failed to provide adequate security.
[brief] ..........................................................................  22 State v. Briggs, 279 N.J. Super. 555 (App. Div. 1995) .................................................. 56  State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497 (2019)  ..........................................................................  69  State v. Bryant, 288 N.J. Super. 27 (App. Div. 1996) .................................................. 39, 43 State v. Burns, 192 N.J. 312 (2007)
[brief] However, a remand is not required to conduct an ability to pay hearing.  True that N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(b) and (c)(2) requires a court to consider a defendant’s ability to pay restitution before deciding whether to impose it, and its amount and method of payment.  However, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c eliminates consideration of ability to pay where the defendant is convicted of murder, stating defendant “shall be required to pay restitution to the nearest surviving relative of the victim.
[brief] J. 9(1958) ........................................................................ 21 Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) .................................................................. 20 Capano v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 530 F. Supp. 1254(D.N.J. 1982) ..................................................... 37 Caravaggio v. D'Agostini, 166 N.J. 237, 765 A.2d 182 (2001) .................................................... 42 Conley v. Guerrero, 228 N.J. 339 (2017) .................................................................. 19 Dougherty v. Drew Univ., 534 F. Supp. 3d 363 (D.N.J. 2021) .................................................. 25, 26, 31 Dworman v. Mayor and Bd. of Alderman, 370 F.Supp. 1056 (D.N.J.1974) ...................................................... 33 Errickson v. Supermarkets, 246 N.J. Super. 457 (App. Div. 1991) .................................................. 19, 20 Foont–Freedenheld v. Electro–Protective, 126 N.J. Super. 254 (App.Div.1973), aff'd 64 N.J. 197, 314 A.2d 68 (1974) ....................................................  37  Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 288 N.J. Super. 504 (App. Div. 1996), aff'd as modified, 148 N.J. 582, 691 A.2d 350 (1997)..............................  38, 41 Holmin v. TRW, 330 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 2000), certif. granted, 165 N.J. 531 (2000), aff'd, 167 N.J. 205 (2001)  .....................................................................  42  Jeffers v. Am. Univ. of Antigua, 93 N.Y.S.3d 36 (2019)  ...........................................................................  22 Jewish Center of Sussex Cty. v. Whale, 86 N.J. 619, 624, (1981)  .......................................................................  37  Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67 (1954) ..................................................................................
[brief] The Concession Recovery Provision Is Not A Liquidated Damages Clause  By definition, liquidated damages provisions are “estimate[s]” of future damages that are typically incalculable at the time the contract is executed.  Wasserman’s Inc. v. Twp. of Middletown, 137 N.J. 238, 249 (1994).  Indeed, “[a] clause is a liquidated damages provision if the actual damages from a breach are difficult to measure and the stipulated amount of damages is ‘a reasonable forecast of the provable injury resulting from [the] breach.’”  CSFB 2001-CP-4 Princeton Park Corp. Ctr., LLC v. SB Rental I, LLC, 410 N.J. Super. 114, 121 (App. Div. 2009).  Here, the Concession Recovery Provision cannot constitute a liquidated damages provision because the amounts due thereunder are simply not an estimate of future damages resulting from a breach of the Lease.  The Provision only entitles [...] to recover the exact amount of Concessions that [...] granted to Appellants, conditioned upon their agreement to fulfill their contractual obligations under the Lease—which they failed to do.  The Concessions is a sum certain of $17,920 and not an estimate of future damages.  Although no reported New Jersey case has dealt with a similar provision, other courts have found that rent concession recovery provisions do not constitute liquidated damages and are not penalties.  Manning & Associates Pers., Inc. v. Trizec Properties, Inc., 442 S.E.2d 783, 785 (Ga. App. 1994) (holding that a lease provision requiring a tenant to repay the first nine months’ of excused rent in the event of a breach did not constitute liquidated damages nor a penalty); see also Frank v. Sandy Rothschild & Associates, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 602, 606 (Mo. App. 1999) (“Here, the clause at issue neither attempted to estimate damages nor exact a penalty for breach. ”); Lesatz v. Standard Green Meadows, 416 N.W.2d 334, 337 (Mich. App. 1987) (affirming dismissal of tenant’s complaint after finding a provision excusing the first month of rent, but allowing recovery in the event of default, was “not a penalty provision”); S. Star Enter. Corp. v. McDonald Windward Partners, L.P., 872 S.E.2d 901, 909 (Ga. App. 2022) (finding an abatement letter, which reduced tenant’s rent payments by 50% for the first two months of the lease, but allowed the landlord to recover same in the event of default, to be valid and enforceable).
[brief] Sua Sponte Mosley v. State, et al., [...] (September 7, 2022)………Aa287  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Authority  Page Court Rules: Rule 1:14…………………………………………………………………………………..39  Rule 4:3-2…………………………………………………………………………………..37  Rule 4:3-3…………………………………………………………………………………..37  ## TABLE OF CONTENT
[brief] That breaks the event from the shooting of [...] to then turning the gun onto [...].  That is significant to this Court in the Yarbough analysis.  The defendant then points the gun at [...] and decides to fire again.  That is another separate distinct act and with a separate motive because according to this defendant, he did not believe that his grandfather liked [...] anymore.  All of this is taken into consideration here.  The only issue is the incident that occurs upstairs.
[brief] *See, City of Asbury Park v. Star Ins. Co.*, 242 N.J. 596, 604, 612 (2020).  *Jorge v. [...] Indem. Co.*, 947 F.Supp. 150 (D.N.J.1996), which applies New Jersey law in an analogous context, is especially salient. \(^9\)  The court held that the VPD did not preclude an insurer’s recovery of costs expended in resolving a claim from two other insurers that wrongfully disclaimed coverage to the insured, even though the claim apparently was not covered by the insurer’s policy.  The court initially held that the VPD was inapplicable to the insurer’s contractual subrogation right.  *Id.* at 154.  It also held that the VPD did not bar the insurer’s equitable subrogation right because its interests in “control[ing] the defense of the litigation” and avoiding \(^9\) *Jorge* is in contrast to *Palisades Ins. Co. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey*, 469 N.J.Super. 30, 44 (App.Div.2021), cited by [...].  That case involved an auto insurer’s suit for reimbursement of personal injury protection (“PIP”) benefits from a health insurer.  However, based on the controlling statutory scheme, “no cause of action for subrogation exists to allow a PIP carrier to pursue reimbursement for claims” that it paid “out of turn,” and the health insurer never formally denied coverage, resulting in voluntary payments.  Here, the opposite is true.  *Rooney v. West Orange Tp.* 200 N.J.Super. 201 (App.Div.1985) (confirming liability insurer’s subrogation right where another insurer, like [...], denies coverage, and rejecting volunteer status).  “insurance coverage litigation” with its insured constituted “palpable economic interests” that precluded application of the VPD.\textsuperscript{10}  In this case, the policy contractually transfers [...]’s rights to [...] “to recover all or part of any payment [[...]] made under” the policy (Dta249), rendering the VPD inapplicable to [...]’ conventional subrogation right.  More important, [...] did not “volunteer” anything given [...]’s improper denial of coverage in light of the mutually exclusive intent of the policies.
[directive] Stationhouse Adjustment/Curbside Warning Quarterly Report  *  Please be advised that information provided on this report will be made publicly available.*  Law Enforcement Agency/County: ________________________________________________  Name of Person Completing Report: ________________________________________________  Date Submitted: ________________________________________________  Reporting Year: ________________________________________________ □  1st Check Quarter: January 1 - March 31 □ 2nd April 1 - June 30 □ 3rd July 1 - September 30 □ 4th October l - December 31  Completed reports must be submitted to the Division of Criminal Justice electronically to 15th [...] and to your County Prosecutor’s Office by the day of the month following the close of each quarter.
[brief] R. 4:4 is titled “Process” and establishes the Rules for the service of process.  Failure to comply with the Rules for service of the summons is a denial of due process.  A judgment or order is void “if entered in a manner inconsistent with due process. ”  Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1994).  In seeking relief from a void judgment, however, a movant is not required to demonstrate a meritorious defense.  Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 86 (1988).  “A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling [under Rule 60(b)(1), which is virtually identical to R. 4:50-1] on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. ”  Lyons v. Jefferson Bank Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 727 (10th Cir. 1993).  “There is no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void. ”  Briley v. Hidalgo, 981 F.2d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 1993), interpreting FRCP 60(b).  Defendant was denied due process when the lower Court misapplied the law, the Rules and the facts in granting summary judgment to the Plaintiff.
[brief] (Db12)¹  The Union supports its argument by claiming that just cause is little more than a shorthand for “what an arbitrator thinks is fair. ”  (Db12) --- ¹ “Db” refers to the Union’s appellate brief.  In reality, the Arbitrator could not possibly have confined himself to the CBA’s express terms because the CBA unequivocally grants [...] the right to set the standards of performance for its employees.
[brief] ACPE Opinion 588, 118 N.J.L.J. 94 (July 24, 1986) ..............................................27  ACPE Opinion 605, 120 N.J.L.J. 317 (Aug. 13, 1987)  ..............................................26, 27, 30  [...], The Rude Question of Standing in Attorney Disqualification Disputes, 25 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 17, 34 (2001) .................................9  [...], Standing of Person, Other than Former Client, to Seek Disqualification of Attorney in Civil Action, 72 A.L.R.6th 563 (2012 & supp.) ..................................................................................................................9  47 N.J. Practice, Civil Trial Handbook § 3:1 (2024) ...............................................27, 29  Notice to the Bar, 91 N.J.L.J. 81 (Feb. 8, 1968) ......................................................19  [...], 4 Legal Malpractice § 32:31 (2024 ed.) ......................................13  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Plaintiff [...]’s gambit to disqualify the defendants’ counsel is the insurance industry’s newest strategy to crack joint defenses and to leverage defendants into settling regardless of the merits of insurers’ claims against them.
[brief] [...] believed that defendant grew up with “considerable violence, both emotional and physical, in his household,” that he was easily coerced, and that [...] and [...] urged him to participate in the crime.  (2T9-29).  [...] similarly portrayed [...] and [...] as “dominant” and believed that defendant was “following orders” in committing the crime.  (Pca44; 2T48-49).  However, he found that defendant’s “history include[d] a supportive family environment (after about age eight).” (Pca44).  [...] was offered yet another set of facts.  He found that defendant was raised in a “generally supportive” environment by his mother and stepfather, who had a harmonious relationship devoid of domestic violence and infidelity, that “all three defendants participated in planning their index offense,” that “no one was the leader of the group,” and that defendant “did not blame his co-defendants or anyone else for his behavior. ” (Da46-48).  The inconsistency in the data supplied to the experts calls into question their conclusions.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Bi-County Dev. Of Clinton v. Borough of High Bridge, 174 N.J. 301, 316, 326-328 (2001).................................................................12  Dynasty Bldg. Corp. v. Borough of Upper Saddle River, 267 N.J. Super. 611, 616 (App. Div. 1993)......................................................11  In re N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5:97, 221 N.J. 1 (2015) (“Mount Laurel IV”)….passim Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 495 (1977).............12  Samaritan Cntr., Inc. v. Borough of Englishtown, 294 N.J. Super. 437, 454 (Law Div. 1996).................................................................12  S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 208-209 (1983) (“Mount Laurel II”)...............................................................11  Statutes
[brief] [...] attempted to consummate the (entirely illegal) transaction to acquire the Property – a “distressed property” under the FRFPA – through three (3) separate writings: (1) a “use and Occupancy Agreement, (2) a “Real Estate Sales Contract, and (3) a Disclosure Statement.  This was in manifest violation of essentially every provision of N.J.S.A. 46:10B-60, which sets forth the requirements for a contract for the conveyance of a “distressed property. ”  Among those requirements are a written contract with 14-point bold face type, a single written contract, and the inclusion of eight (8) requirements in subsection (c) of this FRFPA provision.
[directive] County Prosecutors are responsible for conducting substantive oversight to ensure that the internal affairs functions of all law enforcement agencies within their jurisdiction are operating professionally and effectively.  As specialists with deep experience in the criminal justice system and working in the community, prosecutors are well situated for identifying procedural deficiencies before serious issues emerge with an agency’s internal affairs function.  As such, County Prosecutors must review the information they receive from law enforcement and the public regarding internal affairs, and swiftly follow up if there are any signs of trouble.
[brief] The suit named [...] the tenant, and [...], [...] and [...], the guarantors.  On August 1, 2022 the Trial Court entered partial summary judgment against [...] for amounts owing under the Lease through April of 2020.  The Court also found [...], [...] and [...] liable on the guarantees, but also ruled that the Lease and guarantees were terminated as of May 11, 2016 and, therefore, only enforced the guarantees through May 11, 2016, prior to the time any substantial rents were due.
[brief] Pa000039–Pa000079; Settlement Agreement, §§ 8.8, 8.11 (Pa000067–Pa000068).  The Settlement Agreement has three key provisions.  Section 1.29 defines the [...] settlement class members’ “Released Claims”:  1.29  Released Claims.  “Released Claims” means and includes all claims, allegations, causes of action, liabilities, damages, demands, rights, equitable relief, legal relief, or administrative relief, of any basis or source, whether known or unknown, that were, have been or could have been, now, in the past, or in the future, asserted or alleged in, or that relate to, the Settled Action by Class Members, including, but not limited to, any and all allegations and claims asserted by Class Members in the Complaint filed in the Settled Action, as well as any claims by Class Members relating to:  (a) whether [...]’s . . . charges for (1) Annual Fees, (2) UBC Gateway Fees, (3) IMS Reporting Fees, (4) IRS Processing Validation Fees, (5) PCI Annual Fees, or (6) any other dues, assessments, discounts, fees, or charges of any kind are unauthorized by any agreement or violate or are subject to claims for damages, refund, or other relief under the laws or common law of any state or territory in which Class Members or [...] reside or of the United States; or (b) whether [...] . . . has the right to amend or modify any agreements, dues, assessments, discounts, fees, or charges of any kind.  Settlement Agreement, § 1.29 (Pa000044).  Section 2.1 states the class and [...]’s purpose in executing the Settlement Agreement:  **2.1  Purpose of the Settlement. **  The purpose of this Settlement is to forever settle and compromise any and all claims, disputes, and controversies that were or could have been raised against [...] in the Settled Action by Class Members relating to the (a) Annual Fee, (b) UBC Gateway Fee, (c) IMS Reporting Fee, (d) IRS Processing Validation Fee, (e) PC1 Annual Fee or (f) any other fee or charge of any kind that [...] . . . assessed to the Class Representative or any Class Member, or relating to whether [...] . . . has the right to amend or modify any agreement or fee or charge of any kind.
[brief] His spouse, the plaintiff/appellant [...], is now the sole owner of Lot 11.  2005 (the “Worley Survey”).  See Patierno Deed, Pa137 and Sweeney Survey, Pa140; and Ahmed Deed, Pa141 and Worley Survey, Pa144.  The Report notes that the subdivision which created Lots 10 & 11 dates from 1956 and simultaneously created the adjacent lots 9 & 12 (Pa107 at ll.31-2).  Comparing the Sweeney and Worley Surveys, the Report found “a conflict between their placement of the boundary markers for each property” which produces a 4.5 ft. “discrepancy along the front” of the two lots bordering on Taylortown Road” and a “1.7 foot discrepancy to the rear. ”  See Report, pp.2, l.35-3, l.6 (Pa107-8).  This discrepancy between the two Surveys constitutes the essence of the dispute.  In attempting to reconcile the Surveys, the surveying Commissioner, [...], P.S., found that all four lots (9-12) from the 1956 subdivision “line up and fit together perfectly” based upon the legal descriptions in deeds “without conflicts between any angles or distances.
[brief] (39T:114-12 to 19)  [...] and other officers comprehensively searched the home for clues as to how [redacted] had died.  (40T:132-12 to 133-9)  The officers did not observe any blood in the home or recover any instruments that appeared to have caused the death.  (40T:114-20 to 115-25; 132-12 to 133-9)  The home did not appear to have been recently cleaned because dust was visible on surfaces throughout.  (40T:115-5 to 21; 133-6 to 12)  [...] noticed a “chemical smell” that was strongest in the kitchen and saw a sheet of cookies in the oven and grease splatter on the oven door.  (40T:109-4 to 110-18; 135-6 to 136-14)  The bottom of the oven looked like it had been cleaned and bleach wipes were found in the nearby trash.  (40T:109-23 to 110-18; 135-6 to 136-14)  [...]’s husband, [...], worked at [...].
[brief] Further, “no nonrenewal or cancellation shall be valid unless the notice contains the standard or reason upon which the termination is premised and specifies in detail the factual basis upon which the insurer relies. ”  N.J.A.C 11:1-20.2(g).  The statute further directs that “if an insurer fails to send a notice of nonrenewal as required … the insured shall be entitled to continue the expiring policy at the same terms and premium until such time as the insurer shall send appropriate notice of termination or renewal. ”  N.J.A.C. 11:1-20.2(j).