ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The national seized property contractor shall arrange 1. for the sale of the property in accordance with the Statement of Work and the Interlocutory Sale order.  If there is a deposit posted for the subject property, 2 . the national seized property contractor shall transmit the deposit to the U.S. Customs Accounting Services in Division (ASD), formally the NFC, accordance with established procedures.  The transmittal will clearly identify the deposit as an amount from an Interlocutory Sale and instruct the to deposit it ASD in the suspense account.  the closing, the closing agent will accept the full At 3. payment for the property, deducting any payments for approved liens, taxes, mortgages, costs and legal fees associated with the closing, in accordance with the Interlocutory Sale order, and provide the national seized property contractor with the balance net to be forwarded to the ASD.
[brief] The “factual disputes” appear to concern [...]’s knowledge, at the time of its preliminary discussions with [...], of Plaintiffs’ optical shop.  (Pb22 suggesting that [...]’s offer “contemplated a new optical shop to replace Plaintiffs”; ibid. (suggesting that Plaintiffs were aware “that there was an independently owed optical shop in the building”).  First, Plaintiffs’ Complaint failed to allege that [...], at the time of the discussions, had any knowledge of Plaintiffs, let alone their operation of an optical shop.
[brief] 295 N.J. Super. at 237-38.  The notice was deficient because it referred to the creation of commercial lots and did not identify that a shopping center ([...]) that was proposed.  It also referred generally to variances without describing the.  The Court added a caveat:  Plaintiff also contends that the notice did not specify all of the particular variances required.  We do not tarry long with this claim because we do not believe the Legislature intended the required public notice to be that specific.  Id. at 237 n. 3.  While the nature and extent of every single variance is not necessary, some description of the variances was required.
[brief] See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B) (allowing a responding party to either produce copies of documents or ESI or permit inspection).  Furthermore, because the court is concerned about [...]’s elusive description as to the scope of what it has produced (e.g., only six documents from Salesforce when [...] says she knows there are many more), the court further orders [...], to the extent that it elects option (1), to file a certification that describes the steps [...] took to search for and produce all Salesforce documents responsive to RFP No. 4.  The certification must be signed by both a party representative of [...] under penalty of perjury and by counsel of record for [...].
[brief] In this case, three judges ([...], [...], and [...]) found no wrongdoing.  [...] approved the receiver’s sale of the property.  (Ca308).  This is not a case where [...], as receiver, failed to perform his duties according to a court ruling.  Rather, [...] approved [...]’s services as the special master to sell the property, and Judge [...], in his decision granting the motion to be discharged, and in denying the motion for reconsideration, approved the receiver’s services.  This was not a case of defalcation.  This was not a case where the receiver absconded with funds, or acted outside of the scope of his court-appointed duties.  This was not a case of embezzlement by the receiver.  [...], as receiver, took actions to protect the interests of [...], which were appropriate according to three judges in Camden County.  So, any bond, even if it were required, could not have responded.  In addition, neither [...] nor Judge [...] required a receiver bond for the appointment.
[brief] The following facts were elicited during defendant's motion-to-suppress hearing.  On September 29, 2020, Detectives [...] and [...]\(^2\) were working for the [...]’s Special Enforcement Team (SET).  (1T8-25 to 9-3; 1T55-3 to 6).  SET is a specialized unit tasked with conducting proactive investigations primarily into narcotics and other criminal offenses.  (1T9-6 to 7).  MacRae has been a police officer for over twenty years and a detective for ten years.  (1T10-8 to 9; 1T8-18 to 24).  During that time, he has participated in over 1,000 narcotics investigations including those using confidential informants and surveillance.  (1T10-8 to 9; 1T8-18 to 24).  Sutter has been a police officer for over ten years.  She participates in up to thirty investigations a year.  (1T56-11 to 21).  On this particular day, the detectives and SET were investigating narcotics and drug-related offenses in Toms River.  (1T18-2 to 12).  They were in unmarked cars and plain clothes to blend in with the public.  (1T19-2 to 12).  MacRae and another detective set up surveillance on the westbound side of Route 37 in a parking lot for a Walmart, Taco Bell, and McDonald’s.  (1T18-11 \(^2\) Detective Sutter was a patrol officer but was promoted to a detective by the time she testified at the motion-to-suppress hearing. to 12; 1T20-18).  MacRae had previously conducted over twenty-five surveillances in this parking lot because it was a high narcotics activity area due to its ease for those engaged in drug transactions to blend into the public, has immediate access to Route 37, and is approximately a mile and half from the Garden State Parkway.  (1T17-10 to 18-1).  Sutter and another detective were stationed in a separate parking lot on the eastbound side of Route 37.  (1T28-9 to 12).  Around 4:00 in the afternoon, MacRae saw a white Toyota pick-up truck park in the lot; but the driver never got out, which aroused MacRae’s suspicion.  (1T20-1 to 19).  The driver was later identified as [...].  (1T27-7).  When asked why this vehicle aroused his suspicion, Detective MacRae stated, “He’s clearly not here to go use the store.  He’s not here for the McDonald’s or the Taco Bell because he parked away from those as well. ” (1T20-4 to 19).  Detective MacRae continued to watch this vehicle and within five minutes, a white Hyundai\(^3\) pulled up next to it.  (1T21-3 to 4).  The driver was later identified as defendant.
[brief] Pursuant to R. 4:46-2(c), defendant [...] was entitled to an Order for Partial Summary Judgment since [...] did not enjoy an attorney-client relationship with [...].  [...], at all times, considered the [...] to be his attorneys; and since [...] testified that he would have never retained [...].  Pursuant to R. 4:46-2(c), there were no genuine issues of material fact on that issue and, therefore, the Trial Court’s decision granting partial Summary Judgment should be affirmed.
[brief] P-5o Transcript of [...], final vote (December 7, 2016) (excerpted pages) ([...])  P-1: [...], Direct Testimony ([...]) (SOICR p. 10) ............................................................... H769a P-2: [...], Direct Testimony ([...]) (SOICR p. 10) ............................................................. H779a P-3: Map of Holmdel identifying location of transmission line as well as Zoning and environmental restrictions ([...]) (SOICR p. 10) .............................................................
[directive] ); opiate, prescription person from the seized or was scene, from the recovered was ❑ evidence physical whether vehicle; defendant's the from or defendant, the of control or 57 Page (specifying evidence destroy or discard, conceal, to attempted ❑ defendant whether the down flushing throwing, or dropping seat, car or furniture under hiding e.g., method, sink/toilet); of type (specifying arrest resist otherwise or flee to attempted ❑ defendant the whether pursuit); vehicle motor chase, foot e.g., flight, (e.g., person any injury to of threat or injury in resulted flight ❑ attempted or flight whether police whether safety, public endangered manner that a in operated was vehicle a whether person; any to injury resulting any of extent the and weapons), fired or drew to taken whether and injury of extent the so, if and, assaulted ❑ was officer an whether hospital; offense; by the risk at placed otherwise or present ❑ were children whether drugs; or alcohol of influence the under be to appeared ❑ defendant whether the has agency or officer whether the and/or drugs, using to admitted ❑ defendant the whether drug-dependent; is defendant the that believe reason to stolen; service or merchandise of type the of ❑ description general a victims any whether invasion), and home a (i.e., residence a involved ❑ burglary a whether burglary; the of time the at present were safety; public endangered manner that a in operated was vehicle ❑ stolen a whether officers) to the communicated been had offense the about information ❑ relevant whether of recording a obtain preserve and to need of the prosecutor the alert (to dispatcher a by and communications); radio the alert call (to 9-1-1 by a agency the to provided been ❑ had information whether call).
[brief] The vehicle at issue is not an “underinsured motor vehicle” under the [...] Excess Policy, and so excess UIM coverage is not available.  Appellants argue that excess UIM coverage is available based on the insureds’ reasonable expectations of coverage.  In essence, Plaintiffs argue that because the [...] Excess Policy follows form to the underlying primary [...] Policy, including as to the definition of “underinsured motor vehicle,” coverage is ambiguous.  This argument is meritless and should be rejected.  Appellants fail to address the cases cited by [...] in its motion to dismiss establishing that similar definitions of “underinsured motor vehicle” are frequently upheld (and that follow form policies are common in the insurance industry, including with respect to UIM coverage).  Rather, Appellants cite only to general principles of New Jersey law on grounds that the insureds’ “reasonable” expectations of coverage should override the clear and unambiguous language of the [...] Excess Policy.  Contrary to Appellants’ assertions, and as correctly held by the lower court, the plain language of the [...] Excess Policy applies to the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint, and bars coverage under the excess UIM coverage part.
[brief] *Namerow v. PediatriCare Assocs., LLC*, 461 N.J. Super. 133, 146 (Super. Ct., Sept. 28, 2018).  A “fiduciary’s obligations to the dependent party include a duty of loyalty and a duty to exercise reasonable skill and care. ”  *McKelvey v. Pierce*, 173 N.J. 26, 57 (2002).  Pursuant to the New Jersey Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, these fiduciary duties are non-waivable.  N.J.S.A. 42:2c-11(c)(2).  The ‘business judgment rule’ shields corporate officers from bad decisions, if they are made in good faith.  *Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co.*, 167 N.J. Super. 141, 151 (Law Div.1979).  Once a party satisfies their initial burden to demonstrate that a decision was the result of self-dealing, the burden shifts to the officer to show that the decision was fair to the corporation.  *Maul v.  Kirkman*, 270 N.J. Super. 596, 614 (App. Div. 1994).  The court further properly found, by allowing [...]’s federal tax obligations to remain unsatisfied while continuing to transfer funds to companies in which he had financial interests and permitting these companies to default pursuant to the loan terms, plaintiff established liability and [...] breached his fiduciary duty and breached [...]’s bylaws and [...]’s OA.  The undisputed facts identified above support the Trial Court’s conclusions as a matter of law, and summary judgment was properly granted.
[brief] [...] also suggests that the Division violated the Ricci Act because the Division did not email the Certifying Officers of their obligation to disseminate information about the Ricci Act until August 8, 2019, one day past the 30-day requirement.  (Pb13).  However, the Board received confirmation from the Certifying Officer on August 16, 2019 that information about the Ricci Act had been disseminated to active employees.  (Pa12).  Thus, the Board substantially complied by ensuring notice within thirty-nine (instead of thirty) days of the effective date of the statute.
[brief] Investigators went to the home of defendant’s sister to locate him, but defendant was not there.  (9T143-3 to 6).  They also spoke with defendant’s girlfriend to locate him.  (9T143-7 to 9; 17T34-18 to 23).  They showed her a still photograph from the surveillance video, and she signed it, identifying defendant.  (9T143-13 to 22; 17T35-4 to 10).  She provided the same cell phone number for defendant.  (9T143-23 to 9T144-4).  The police asked defendant’s girlfriend for her consent to search her vehicle, and she gave her consent.  (9T144-5 to 10).  Inside her vehicle, tucked underneath a seat, police seized a cell phone.  (11T120-8 to 12; 17T35-20 to 23).  Following March 27, investigators continued to search for defendant, even enlisting the help of the [...].
[brief] Notte v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490 (2006) (cited by Respondent at Rb9) does not stand for the proposition that a trial court must undertake two separate analyses and then balance them.  The Court states that “the amendment of pleadings is allowed only ‘by leave of court which shall be freely given in the interest of justice.’”  Id. at 500-01 (citing R. 4:9-1).  While motions should be “freely given” the “granting of a motion to file an amended complaint always rests in the court’s sound discretion.
[brief] In sum, the validity of post April 17, 1992 non-urban renewal entity [...] Section 37 long term tax exemptions under State law is a repetitive issue of substantial public importance evading judicial review.  The [...] continues to award low income tax credits, tax exempt revenue bond proceeds and other taxpayer subsidies to non-urban renewal entity [...] Section 37 long term tax exemption projects in clear violation of N.J.A.C. 5:13-1.1 and the superseding Long Term Tax Exemption Law (“LTTEL”).
[brief] (3T39)  (“Judge, once again, no one disputes what Your Honor’s Ruling says.  I read the Order.  No one disputes that.  I agree, that’s what it says.  But, let’s think about the reason.  Why are they [...] defendants? What’s the reason that they’re [...] defendants?  And, the only think I can think of is there’s no reason they’re [...] defendants. ”)  (emphasis added).  there -- at times up through the summary judgment motions, knew what my Order said.  If they had wanted to be here to -- to -- to represent on those particular cross-claims, they certainly were – were amenable to do that.  They are not here.  The case was listed for trial.  And, that being the case, you know I-- I think they -- they’re -- they’re [...] defendants and I think they -- the issue -- those issues go to the jury.  Assuming there’s sufficient -- assuming it survives a motion for a 4:37-2(b) motion and/or a directed verdict motion, assuming there’s competent evidence to support the allegation, I think it goes to the jury.  For whatever it’s worth, the jury may believe it, the jury may not believe it, but I think it’s up to the jury to call that.  That’s what juries do.  So, I think that -- that clarifies that particular issue.
[brief] Much of the Court’s Statements of Reasons for granting summary judgment and denying reconsideration focused on plaintiff’s alleged need for expert testimony to support his claim that the building could likely have been approved for six units, as opposed to the one unit then being marketed by plaintiff.  However, [...] explicitly stated in his statement denying reconsideration: “Neither party disputes that the Board had [already] approved the [...] for use as one- and three-tenant occupancy. ” (Pa 19).  Thus, loss of rent from up to three prospective tenants in the [...] was not at all speculative, as three rental units had already been approved by the town.
[brief] Affidavit of [...], Esquire in Support of Motion for Summary Judgement of Defendants, [...], Esquire and [...], [...] Jr...........................................................(omitted)  Exhibit A, 12/21/2012  Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.........................(omitted, see 1a)  Exhibit B, 1/31/2013  Defendants, [...], and [...], Answer to Amended Complaint.................................................................(omitted, see 18a)  Exhibit C, 3/28/2012  Deposition of [...].............................(omitted, see 1020a)  Exhibit D, 4/4/2012  Deposition of N. [...].................................(omitted, see 517a)  Exhibit E, 5/15/2015  Deposition of N. [...].................................(omitted, see 558a)  Exhibit F, Defendants, [...], [...], Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories..................................................................................50a
[brief] Appellant long argued that the officers had reason to believe Appellant’s apartment was not covered by the search warrant and the officers unlawfully broke the door open to gain access.  Knowing they exceeded the bounds of the search warrant, and to defeat Appellant’s meritorious argument, [...] concocted a story for court in which he testified under oath that the interior door leading to Appellant’s apartment was wide open and not breached.  [...] knew this was a blatant lie.  [...]’s notes clearly indicated that the officers breached the door to Appellant’s separate and distinct third floor apartment.  The State had been on notice for the better part of a year that the trial court was laser focused on this exact issue.  [...]’s notes are exculpatory at best and impeachment evidence at worst thus satisfying the first prong.  The second prong also militates in Appellant’s favor.  The State, whether intentionally or inadvertently, suppressed [...]’s notes.  The State only produced [...]’s notes after [...] mentioned them on cross examination during the second evidentiary hearing he testified at, and the gig was up.  [...] never once, in two separate hearings, mentioned his notes.  Instead, [...] chose to intentionally lie to the trial court in turn convincing the Court that he was being truthful.  The State was obligated to produce [...]’s notes pursuant to the Rules as well as their Brady obligations.  Had [...] not mentioned [...]’s notes on cross examination and had counsel not made an immediate request for such notes from the State it is likely that Appellant never would have received the notes.  That is a sad situation.  Our justice system is based on the pursuit of truth.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 13:1B-25.  The legislative purpose of the above statute is to ensure that members of the Council will be members of the [...] to the greatest extent possible.  N.J.S.A. 13:1B-25.  The [...] has the opportunity accorded by the statute to advance the interests of its own members by recommending its own members for appointment to the Council.  N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24.  To plaintiffs’ knowledge, the Governor has not removed a member of the Council recommended by the [...] because the member manifests a pro-hunting bias.  (Pa101)
[brief] In litigating cases in other jurisdictions, the parties’ affiliates have accused each other of withholding discoverable evidence by falsely classifying requested evidence as irrelevant.  In light of these mutual recriminations, the trial court decided on an objective approach to secure for all parties the discoverable evidence they sought.  The court instructed the parties to agree on a well-defined and well-crafted set of targeted ESI search terms to secure, as best as possible, only relevant documents from their IT systems -- and to minimize the netting of irrelevant ones.  It also told the parties that there would be no further relevance review.  With that understanding, the parties negotiated and agreed on search terms.  After that process, [...] still requested the opportunity to conduct a further relevance review before turning over documents to [...].  The trial court rejected [...]’s request, acknowledging that while the objective search-term approach would lead to the production of a certain number of irrelevant documents, a subjective relevance review approach would likely lead to the non-production of relevant documents.  The court provided, however, that the parties could withhold documents that were privileged or contained highly sensitive information.  As often occurs in resolving discovery disputes, trial courts are presented with more than one reasonable solution -- particularly when no perfect solution is available.  Managing discovery in every case requires the exercise of discretion and judgment.  For that reason, appellate courts afford substantial deference to a trial court’s discovery ruling that is not so wide of the mark that it constitutes a manifest injustice.  Here, the trial court weighed the benefits and drawbacks of the alternative discovery approaches.  The court emphasized that the goal was to maximize the production of relevant evidence.  Importantly, even outside the realm of ESI, our civil system of justice recognizes that the production of a certain amount of irrelevant information is a necessary byproduct of the search for relevant evidence -- and ultimately the search for truth.  For instance, our court rules permit the discovery of information that will not be admissible at trial so long as “the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. ”  Similarly, our court rules forbid a party from raising at a deposition an objection on the ground of relevance, although the party’s right to object on the ground of relevance is preserved at trial.  Thus, within the sweep of discoverable evidence will be some evidence that does not satisfy the trial definition of relevance.  The trial court chose a discovery protocol that balanced the tradeoffs between competing, imperfect alternatives.  In doing so, the court made a reasoned decision to eliminate the potential for gamesmanship that might thwart the discovery process.  There is no reason to disturb the trial court’s exercise of its sound discretion.  This Court should affirm.
[brief] Unlike [...], the plaintiffs in *Polarome Int’l, Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co.*, 404 N.J.Super. 537 (App. Div. 2008) – upon which [...] heavily relies – knew about their injurious exposure to the toxic chemicals at issue, exposure that had ended long before the policy coverage commenced in that case.  *Id.* at 252-53.  The unpaid portion of the underlying settlement that Chenault claims in this case is precisely the amount that would be allocated to [...]’s $45 million in coverage using the *pro rata* policy limits over time-on-the-risk formula adopted in *Owens-Illinois v. United Ins. Co.*, 138 N.J. 437 (1994), *Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co.*, 154 N.J. 312 (1998), and other continuous-trigger cases.  The evidence of the lengthy and vigorously contested litigation, followed by a detailed settlement negotiated by [...] and the three carriers that defended [...], fully supports the Trial Court’s decision that the settlement was negotiated in good faith and was reasonable, in accord with *Griggs v. Bertram*, 88 N.J. 347 (1982).  [...] did not cross-appeal from that decision and should not be allowed to contest it now.
[brief] [...]:  That's what I glean, but if they used floor and patio high gloss paint instead of walking finish paint, it's the contractor, it's their, they wrote up the invoice that says we're going to use two-coat exterior acrylic walking finish paint, but instead they used floor and patio high gloss paint.  You would, I would imagine, I think an average juror would imagine that patios, which could be wood or whatever type of material they're made of, floors, usually going to be wood or something other than concrete.  Concrete would probably require a different kind of paint like walking finish paint because you're going to be walking over that staircase all the time.  THE COURT: