ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Specifically, they argue that I did not raise the starting time issue at trial at all, and therefore the issue should be deemed to be waived on appeal.  They also argue that I did not prove that their omission about the undisclosed prize limitation was intentional.  However, both of these arguments ignore the fact that I was essentially “cut off at the knees” by the trial court’s erroneous ruling that my entire Consumer Fraud claim was essentially moot, because the tournament entry did not constitute ”merchandise” as defined under the Consumer Fraud statute (i.e. N.J.S.A. 56:8).  So because of that ruling, I never had a proper opportunity to prove my allegations; and as result, it is irrefutably true that I never raised the start time issue at trial.  But my testimony and evidence, which was prevented by an erroneous ruling of law, should not be deemed to now be permanently foreclosed.  However as to the second half of my Consumer Fraud claim, because I continued to argue after the judge’s rulings as the Respondents repeatedly mention
[brief] Popow v. City of Margate, 476 F.Supp. 1237 (D.N.J. 1979) ..............................................................21  Ridgewood Educ. Ass’n v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 284 N.J. Super. 427 (App.Div.1995)  .........................................................35  Rivkin v. Dover Tp. Rent Leveling Bd., 143 N.J. 352 (1996)  .............................................................................26, 32, 33  Robbins v. Jersey Township, 23 N.J. 229 (1957)  ..............................................................................18  S. Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp., 92 N.J. 158 (1983)  ..............................................................................2, 5, 6, 25, 29, 40 S. Jersey Pub. Co. v. N. J. Expressway Auth., 124 N.J. 478 (1991)  ..............................................................................8  S. Salem St. Assocs., LLC v. Planning Bd., No. A-5401-06T3, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1792 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 21, 2008) ..................................................................28, 29 Salorio v. Glaser, 82 N.J. 482 (1980) ..............................................................................35 Schiavo v. Marina Dist. Development Co., LLC, 442 N.J.Super. 346 (App.Div.2015) .......................................................36 Stoneking v. Braford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d. Cir. 1989) ................................................................23 Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1985) ................................................................23 Surplus Store and Exchange, Inc. v. City of Delphi, 928 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1991) ................................................................22 Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799 F. Supp. 2d 417 (D.N.J. 2011) .........................................................20 Triffin v. Somerset Valley Bank, 343 N.J. Super. 73 (App.Div.2001) .................................................................35 United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d. Cir. 2003) ...........................................................................26, 31
[brief] [...]’s overt admissions highlight why a litigant in [...]’s position does not generally have standing to seek disqualification under the RPCs of an adversary’s counsel.  The oft-cited decision on this issue, *In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation*, explained that, to allow “an unauthorized surrogate to champion the rights” of a non-complaining client “would allow that surrogate to use the conflict rules for his own purposes where a genuine conflict might not really exist. ”  530 F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir. 1976); see also ABA, *Ann. Mod. Rules Prof. Cond.* § 1.7 (noting the prominence of *In re Yarn Processing* and collecting cases for the general rule); Ronald E. Mallen, 4 *Legal Malpractice* § 32:31 (2024 ed.) (explaining that “an adversary has a particularly strong tactical incentive” to allege a conflict between parties seemingly aligned in interest in effort “to disrupt the seemingly harmonious relationship of the parties”).  So too here.
[brief] The March 8, 2023 Hearing and Briefing Orders**  On March 8, 2023, the Chancery Court held an initial hearing with respect to Plaintiff’s application for preliminary restraints and during that proceeding Defendants stated their intention to file a motion to compel arbitration.  (3/8/23 Transcript, “1T”).  In arguing against arbitration, Plaintiff’s counsel argued, among other things, that as of 2019 the parties to this action had all signed a bank document certifying that the 1991 Partnership Agreement containing the arbitration clause was no longer valid or in force:  **[...]:**  There’s an awfully important point in Exhibit --- 1  There are four court transcripts here.  The first one, on 3/8/23, before Chancery is “1T”; “2T” refers to the 3/23/23 Chancery hearing; “3T” is the 10/11/23 Law Division hearing; and “4T” is the 1/26/24 Law Division hearing.  Both 1T and 2T were submitted to the Law Division as part of the motion papers.  B. [i.e., Ex. B to Da36, Verified Complaint]  THE COURT: Well, Exhibit B, you’re saying?  [...]: Yes.  THE COURT: The partner certificate?  Is that what you’re referring to.  [...]: Yes.  That’s correct.  It’s dated May 21, 2019.  Notice Paragraph 4.  THE COURT:  “Partnership does not have a formal limited liability partnership agreement as in effect on the date hereof. ”  [...]:  So, whatever was going on in 2007 [when Plaintiff signed an Addendum to Partnership Agreement with no arbitration clause], we can disregard that.  There was no – according to both parties who signed this it didn’t have any value or impact or existence even.  They didn’t -- certainly they didn’t make a fraudulent representation to the [...].  They both signed it in 2019.  Whatever was in or not in that 1991 document my client will testify he never saw.  Whatever was in it doesn’t matter because of that representation to a bank, signed by both parties.  [1T30:8-32:4 (emphasis added); with Da90 (Ex. B to Da36)].  The March 8, 2023 Chancery hearing included a discussion of a briefing schedule on the anticipated motion to compel arbitration.  1T115:1-129:13.  On March 9, 2023, the court entered an Order on the TRO including a deadline for the threatened motion to compel with a hearing set for March 23, 2023.  Da5.  The briefing Order was amended.  Pa17.  The need to file a motion to disqualify the [...] became moot as new counsel substituted.  Pa20, Pa23.  C.
[directive] 3.  Victim concern about future assaults  SAMPLE QUESTION:  Are you concerned that he/she will assault you or the children again?  Victim concern: Includes any statement made by the Victim that he/she is concerned, afraid, worried, or certain that the Defendant will assault him/her or the Victim's child(ren) in the future.  This statement must be made by the Victim in the first report at or after the Index Assault.  If no statement about Victim concern is ✔ present in a police report, a statement made by the Victim in the first report to victim support services can be counted.  Do not count the Victim’s concern for safety, or the child(ren)’s safety, in the course of the Index Assault.  ✘  Do not include statements made by the Victim on a separate occasion before the Index Assault.  ✘  ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________
[directive] criminal a was juvenile as defendant the years ten preceding within the "whether considering without issued be complaint-warrant subject an be by would adult committed if that crime or a firearm, a involving crime a escape, for delinquent adjudicated offenses."  foregoing of the any commit to attempt an Act...or Early Release  No the to 41 Page any the required, of safety when in appear court will acomplaint-summons, she or he by be charged or to attempt will obstruct defendant not the and protected, will be the community other or person of presumption the overcome determination to made is the If process.
[brief] (V:16:59:40 to 17:00:00).  [...] told defendant that he wanted to be “nice” to defendant because defendant had been “cool” with the officer.  He encouraged defendant, who was still moving around unrestrained, to continue to smoke his cigarette.  (V:17:00:00 to 00:09).  He asked defendant about the last time he did methamphetamine, and defendant stated that he used “last night. ” (V:17:00:09 to 00:14).  [...] asked whether anything else was in the vehicle that the officer should know about, explaining that he was going to search it anyway.  Defendant shook his head no.  (V:17:00:11 to 00:24).  While they were still standing outside of the vehicle, the officer asked defendant whether he was in New Jersey trying to evade the “warrants” for his arrest in other jurisdictions.  Defendant acknowledged the warrants but said he was not evading them.  (V:17:00:34 to 00:44).  Following this exchange, the officer told defendant that he was going to check defendant’s pockets and asked about where he obtained the methamphetamine.  Defendant shrugged his shoulders, stating that it was in the car.  The officer informed defendant about the procedural aspects of arrest, searched his person, and eventually handcuffed him.
[brief] On July 18, 2023 defendant [...] admitted and acknowledged that she and her business benefitted from the contested Main Street Pedestrian Mall Closure (and implicitly from the flex parking removal project).  (Pa219-SJCS #61).  Ironically, on July 30, 2021-just 45 days after adoption of the contested capital bond ordinance- defendants [...] claimed a disqualifying conflict of interest and fled townhall prior to the 2 hours closed executive session and the original consideration and approval of the July 30, 2021 fair share housing settlement on shortened and limited public notice.  Under both the Local Government Ethics Law and the common law, defendant [...] had a disqualifying conflict of interest and appearance of \(^9\)  On August 7, 2023, our State Supreme Court diverted from federal law and held that our State bribery criminal laws applied to campaign contributions to unsuccessful non-incumbent municipal candidates.
[brief] ” (Emphasis added.).  This factor presents two distinct bars to Recovery Court if either condition is met.  First, if an applicant unlawfully possessed a firearm during the commission of the underlying offense to which the applicant is seeking Recovery Court, the applicant is legally barred.  Second, even if an applicant did not possess a firearm specifically during the underlying offense, the applicant is still legally ineligible for Recovery Court if he possessed a firearm while any criminal charge was pending.  The goal of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the Legislature’s intent.
[brief] ”  Brown, 236 N.J. at 518 (citing State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487, 497 (1998)).  Defendant bears the burden of establishing these elements.  See State v. Martini, 160 N.J. 248, 268-89 (1999).  “[E]vidence is material if there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that timely production of the withheld evidence would have led to a different result at trial. ”  Brown, 236 N.J. at 520 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
[directive] For the internal affairs investigator, it is critical to distinguish between those investigations involving potential criminal conduct and those limited to administrative disciplinary infractions.  The investigator also must be able to identify and apply the appropriate procedures to be utilized during the interview process in either a criminal or an administrative investigation.  Failure to identify and apply the appropriate procedures can compromise and render inadmissible evidence gathered during the interview process in a criminal investigation or needlessly complicate the interview process during an administrative investigation.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 45
[brief] Doing so prevents duplicative litigation and advances the effective administration of justice.  [...]’s appeal relies mainly on statements that the trial court should not have made while the appeal was pending—statements the trial court itself deemed irrelevant to the adjudication of this case.  (See 3T10:14–16, 43:6–8; 4T15:21.)  The trial court’s decision to reject its earlier tentative factual findings in the July 8 Oral Argument was not in error because a trial court may, at any time, correct “[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight and omission . . . on its own initiative.
[brief] First, [...], plaintiff’s surveyor, admitted that he did not differentiate between the amount of stormwater that ran from the driveway onto plaintiff’s property before the [...] bought their property and after they repaved the driveway.  Pa54, ¶¶ 78-79; Pa332-33, ¶ 78-79; accord Pa254-56 at 41:22-42:3 & 48:3-:9.  He did not identify any generally-accepted standard of care or duty on the part of the [...] to prevent such water runoff.  Pa256 at 42:8-:13.  He admitted that identifying such standards of care, if any existed, “were not part of the surveying requirement” and were outside the scope of his expertise.  Pa256 at 42:8-15.  He had “no idea” of how the water runoff changed, if it all, from before the [...] bought their property and after they repaved their driveway.  Pa54, ¶¶ 78; Pa332, ¶ 78; accord Pa254-55 at 41:22-42:3.  He therefore offered no opinion on that issue.  Pa54, ¶¶ 80; Pa333, ¶ 80; accord Pa255 at 42:16-:18.
[brief] (Pa275).  [...] informed [...] that she was also recording video in her office; but she failed to produce any evidence during Discovery.  (Pa275).  On January 13, 2016, [...] went to the Association’s office to discuss issues with HDTV cable installation.  (Pa366).  While the discussion may have escalated with each person raising their voice, [...] did not threaten [...], nor did he say or do anything to make her feel threatened or fearful of him.  (Pa367).  [...] recorded the latter half of the conversation with the property manager on video to document [...]’s behavior and her refusal to provide service.  (Pa198, Pa357, Pa367).  See Video Evidence (Pa526).  None of this would have happened but for [...]’s lack of understanding of her duties.  (Pa367).  Regardless, having realized that the argument had been a heated one, [...] wrote to [...] to defuse the situation.  (Pa199, Pa367).
[brief] When a petitioner claims his trial counsel inadequately investigated his case, “he must assert the facts that an investigation would have revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant or the person making the certification. ”  Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170; see R. 3:22-10(c) (“Any factual assertion that provides the predicate for a claim of relief must be made by an affidavit or certification pursuant to Rule 1:4-4 and based upon personal knowledge of the declarant before the court may grant an evidentiary hearing.
[brief] **THERE IS NO RECORD BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT THAT SUPPORTED OR JUSTIFIED THE TRIAL COURT’S CONCLUSION THAT THE BOARD AND/OR THE TOWNSHIP BREACHED THE PARTIES’ SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (Pa-001 & 2T4-17)**  The Settlement Agreement contemplated, and New Jersey law requires, that for the [...] Project to proceed, it was required to be presented for hearing before the [...].  A land use board may then either deny the application or approve the application (with or without condition(s)).  See generally, New Jersey MLUL, *N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1* et seq.  The Settlement Agreement did not and cannot be read to require the Planning Board to approve or ‘rubber stamp’\textsuperscript{11} the [...]’s development application.  Planning boards are not rubber stamps.  See \textit{Popular Refreshments, Inc. v. Fuller's Milk Bar & Recreation Ctr., Inc.}, 85 N.J.Super. 528, 537, (App.Div.1964), \textit{certif. denied}, 44 N.J. 409 (1965) ("If planning boards had no alternative but to rubber-stamp their approval on every [application] which conformed with the zoning ordinance, there would be little or no reason for their existence").  The New Jersey land use approval process requires presentation of the development application to a land use board, requires it to be presented at a public hearing convened for that purpose, and requires the board to hear and decide the application.  See generally, MLUL, \textit{N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12} & 25 and N.J. Open Public Meetings Act, \textit{N.J.S.A. 10:4-6}.
[brief] *Id.* (citations omitted).  Further, “[t]he failure to raise unsuccessful legal arguments does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. ”  *Worlock*, 117 N.J. at 625.  “Consent to search is a ‘long-recognized’ exception to the warrant requirement. ”  *State v. Hagans*, 233 N.J. 30, 39 (2018) (quoting *State v. Coles*, 218 N.J. 322, 337 (2014)).  “[W]here the State seeks to justify a search on the basis of consent it has the burden of showing that the consent was voluntary, an essential element of which is knowledge of the right to refuse consent. ”  *State v. Johnson*, 68 N.J. 349, 353-54 (1975).  “To be voluntary the consent must be ‘unequivocal and specific’ and ‘freely and intelligently given. ’”  *King*, 44 N.J. at 352 (quoting *Judd v. United States*, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951)).  In *King*, the New Jersey Supreme Court “delineated factors for use by our courts in considering the voluntariness of consent. ”  *Hagans*, 233 N.J. at 39 (citing *King*, 44 N.J. at 352-53).  Factors that tend to show that consent had been voluntarily given are: “(1) that consent was given where the accused had reason to believe that the police would find no contraband”; “(2) that the defendant admitted his guilt before consent, and “(3) that the defendant affirmatively assisted the police officers. ”  *King*, 44 N.J. at 353 (internal citations omitted).  In contrast, factors that tend to show that the consent was coerced are: “(1) that consent was made by an individual already arrested,” “(2) that consent was obtained despite a denial of guilt,” “(3) that consent was obtained only after the accused had refused initial requests for consent to search,” “(4) that consent was given where the subsequent search resulted in a seizure of contraband which the accused must have known would be discovered,” and “(5) that consent was given while the defendant was handcuffed”.  *Id.* at 352-53 (internal citations omitted).  “[T]he existence or absence of one or more of the above factors is not determinative of the issue. ”  *Id.* at 353.  Rather, those factors are “only guideposts to aid a trial judge in arriving at his conclusion” and voluntariness must be determined based upon “the totality of the particular circumstances of the case”.  *Ibid.*
[brief] The same policy considerations that motivated the Court to bar relief in *Cedeno* to protect the public from offenders—and even worse here, to protect vulnerable individuals from offenders—should apply here as well and bar Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant.  *See Cicchetti*, 197 N.J. at 587.  Plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish *Cedeno* by arguing that the Forfeiture statute at issue in *Cedeno* somehow had a more laudable policy aim than the Statute at issue here must be rejected.  (Plaintiff’s Brief (“AB”) at pp. 12-13).  Plaintiff desperately attempts to claim that no strong policy is in play here.  (AB at p. 13).  To the contrary, New Jersey law recognizes that the individuals being served at [...]’s group homes are extremely vulnerable.  Appx 521 at ¶5 (admitting the public policy at issue).  The New Jersey Supreme Court explained the applicable public policy behind the Statute in *Davis v. Devereaux*:  The [individuals being served] are often nonverbal and thus incapable of reporting abuse.  They are dependent on their caregivers to protect them from harm.  They require and deserve vigilant protection and care.
[brief] Even though Plaintiff alleges a host of misrepresentations of material fact and/or omissions were made by Defendant, Defendant merely cherry picks and responds to two allegations.  The two misrepresentations addressed by Defendant in the Opposition include the Defendant’s misrepresentation that incoming students would have the opportunity to pursue the dual degree, and that Defendant omitted mention of the secondary requirements with the intent to lure incoming students to the unaccredited School of Pharmacy.  (Db47-Db48).  While the foregoing was addressed and explained in detail in Plaintiff’s initial brief (Pb36-Pb40), Defendant neglects the remaining allegations of misrepresentations, such as the statements of [...], [...] (the Interim Dean of the College of Business) and [...], in particular.  (Pa179; Pa243-Pa246; Pa458).  Defendant persistently misrepresented that Plaintiff would be able to matriculate into the MBA program once his GPA reached 3.0, yet when it did, he was advised by [...], the Dean of the [...], that he “misinterpreted” the guidelines for admission to the MHS program, and he was not able to matriculate into the program.  (Pa554).  Defendant further omitted to advise its inaugural students, in any of the omission requirements or course requirements once Plaintiff enrolled at [...], that a student was only able to opt-in to the dual degree program after their first year.  As Defendant does not offer a rebuttal to this alleged misrepresentation, it should be deemed conceded.
[brief] If the Plaintiff were to exercise their ROFR, then the mention or failure to mention it in the offer would have no impact on the Plaintiff.  It melts away.  The ROFR exists because of the earlier contract between the holder of that ROFR and the seller, not because of any language that may or may not be included in a "bona fide offer" from a third party.  Likewise, even in the event that [...] changed its mind and decided not to rebrand the gas station, the term relating to approval of an assignment of the contract would be a moot term in the contract if the Plaintiff chose to exercise its ROFR.  Both issues would essentially dissolve away and be irrelevant in the event that the Plaintiff chose to exercise its ROFR.  These terms, missing or present, would have no legal impact on the Plaintiff.  Simply put, the Plaintiff and its agent(s) were mistaken in their assessment of the offer presented to them on January 17, 2023 being “incomplete” and therefore “invalid”.
[brief] [...] claims an arbitration provision was somehow “intended” to be incorporated based on an over ten-year-old, abandoned 2012 Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”).  [...]’s position flies in the face of well-known and universally accepted contract law – parol evidence cannot be utilized to alter the terms of a contract.  See Conway v. 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs., 187 N.J. 259, 268 (2006) (“the parol evidence rule prohibits the introduction of evidence that tends to alter an integrated written document”); Ross v. Orr, 3 N.J. 277, 282 (1949) (parol evidence is not admissible to “vary or add to” the terms); Chance v. McCann, 405 N.J. Super. 547, 564 (App. Div. 2009) (extrinsic facts cannot be used to modify or enlarge or curtail the terms).