ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Da298–304.)  The trial court concluded that the agreement “fail[ed] to clearly and unambiguously inform a plaintiff of her waiver of the right to pursue her claims in a judicial forum. ”  (Da303–04.)  The court thought it unclear that “arbitration is a substitute for the right to seek relief in our court system” or that “by agreeing to this provision, the parties have waived their right to a court action. ”  (Da304.)  The court also stated that the agreement “lacks any specificity on what that resolution would look like or what the alternative to such resolution might be. ”  (Id.)  And last, the court found it significant that [...]’s January Terms previously had an express jury waiver provision, whereas the December Terms did not.  (Da302.)  Argument
[brief] DESIGNATIONS  1T – Transcript of Hearing dated November 4, 2022  2T – Transcript of Decision dated November 15, 2022  3T – Transcript of Decision dated January 6, 2023 | Cases | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Green v. General Motors Corp., 310 N.J. Super. 507 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 381 (1998) | 5 | | Monek v. Borough of Saddle River, 354 N.J. Super. 442 (App. Div. 2002) | 2 | | Nieder v. Royal Indemn. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973) | 2 | | Varela v. FCA US LLC, 505 P. 3d 244 (Az. 2022) | 2,3,4,5 | | Statutes | Pages | |----------|-------| | Regulations | Pages | |-------------|-------| | Rules of Court | Pages | |----------------|-------| | Other Authorities | Pages | |-------------------|-------|
[brief] I.  **RESPONDENT CLEARLY HELD HERSELF OUT AS A MEMBER OF THE BOARD (Ca014-017)**  “I was elected onto the central regional district board of education (BOE) come on man LOL”  Respondent made this public post accompanied by multiple pictures of herself swearing in to her position of public trust at a meeting of the Board.  (Ca223).  She had previously used this same account to post campaign banners and garner support for her campaign for a Board seat.  (Ca216, Ca218, Ca220, Ca222).  It was common knowledge to those viewing her posts from this account that Respondent was a member of the Board.  (Ca216, Ca218, Ca220); (Ca136 at RQA 2, Ca144 at Response to RQA 2); (Ca223).  This was undisputed below.
[brief] Defendant has neither made nor attempted a showing of the sort of fundamental injustice required under R. 3:22-4 and does not assert so in his brief.  In any case, “courts will find fundamental injustice when the judicial system has denied a ‘defendant with fair proceedings leading to a just outcome’ or when ‘inadvertent errors mistakenly impacted a determination of guilt or otherwise wrought a miscarriage of justice. ’”  State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 546-47 (2013) (quoting State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 587 (1992) (internal quotations omitted)).  Defendant has received fair proceedings; in fact, the merits of his claims of appeal were adjudicated by this Court.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  Based upon the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that this court reverse the decision of the Board of Trustees and order, either the appellant to be re-enrolled in the Public Employees Retirement System or order the matter to be forwarded to the Office of Administrative of Law for further proceedings.  Respectfully, [...], ESQ.  Dated: February 21, 2024  May 22, 2024  VIA E-COURTS  [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division - P.O. Box 006 R.J. Hughes Justice Complex Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0006
[brief] *Ibid.*  The [...] Order erroneously states that the law of the case doctrine is applied unless the first decision was clearly erroneous.  The ALJ’s ruling on [...]’s motion *was* clearly erroneous, because it held that further rulemakings were required, but the [...] Decision misstates the law.  That doctrine has no place when it concerns a matter of significant state policy and a statutory mandate.  The court owes no deference at all to the [...] - which is plainly wrong -- on these legal issues.
[brief] Plaintiff alleged a failure-to-recall claim against [...] (Da0001 ¶47-49; Da0846 pp. 5-8).  The only purported fact (beyond mere timing) that plaintiff’s witnesses cited to support her claim that the unit she received was actually one of the 2.2% that shed a silicone particulate was the unit’s being from a “recalled lot” (Da0150 p. 102; Da0229; Da0237; Da0452 pp. 50, 54).  No other “circumstantial evidence” exists that the claimed defect manifested in the applicator used during plaintiff’s treatment.  Similarly, plaintiff’s treating physician cited only the FDA recall notice to support of his opinion that a silicone particulate caused inflammation that contributed to plaintiff’s claimed injury (Da0047, p. 54).  Without the recall, this case would not exist.
[brief] Smith v. First Nat’l Stores, Inc., 94 N.J. Super. 462, 465-66 (App. Div. 1967); Parmenter v. Jarvis Drug Store, Inc., 48 N.J. Super. 507, 510 (App. Div. 1957).  In this regard, plaintiff was required to prove that the dangerous condition had existed for a sufficient length of time prior to plaintiff’s injuries so that in the exercise of reasonable care, defendant should have discovered its existence and prevented or corrected it.  Tua v. Modern Homes, Inc., 64 N.J. Super. 211, 218-20 (App. Div.), aff’d o.b., 33 N.J. 476 (1960).  She did not.  To the contrary, there is no evidence that other patrons were injured using similarly configured bathtubs.  The mere “fact that the towel bar was close to the shower is not probative because it is not uncommon for towel bars to be close to the shower considering guests need to easily access their towels upon exiting the shower. ”  [...], slip op. at 17.  Finally, although the trial court did not reach the issue of causation, plaintiff does not explain how the bathroom’s construction proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries.  Again, the bathtub met industry standard; no grab bar was required to be placed near the tub.  [...]’s report blames the towel rack on her harm:  “At the time when [...] attempted to steady herself, the bar was incapable of supporting the required nominal loads and broke free causing [...] to fall and resulted in harming [...]. ” (Pa60; see also Pa61.)  But as repeatedly noted, the facts establish that plaintiff slipped and fell before she attempted to grab hold of the towel rack.  And there is no evidence that the towel rack’s coming out of the wall caused or contributed to the injuries she sustained when she slipped.  In fact, she testified that her face landed on a towel and that the rack itself did not strike her.  (Pa50-51.)  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] *Bowden v. Bayside State Prison*, 268 N.J. Super. 301, 305-06 (App. Div. 1993).  Based upon these principles, the Commission’s decision to adopt the Initial Decision should be affirmed because both are well-reasoned and sufficiently supported by credible evidence in the record.  In his Initial Decision, the ALJ found that [...] left the food preparation room two times between 1:24 a.m. and 4:18 a.m., despite the fact that he was required to perform inmate counts at 2:30 a.m., 3:00 a.m., 3:30 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. (Pa018a).
[brief] (1) there can be no free crimes ...; (2) the reasons for imposing either a consecutive or concurrent sentence should be separately stated in the sentencing decision; *8 (3) ... the sentencing court should ... [consider] whether or not: (a) the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other; (b) the crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence; (c) the crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior; (d) any of the crimes involved multiple victims; [and] (e) the convictions for which the sentences are to be imposed are numerous; (4) there should be no double counting of aggravating factors; (5) successive terms for the same offense should not ordinarily be equal to the punishment for the first offense.  [Id. at 643–44, 498 A.2d 1239.]  In State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 122, 527 A.2d 1362 (1987), the Court emphasized that even when consecutive sentences are appropriate, “the [court's] focus should be on the fairness of the overall sentence. ”  Accord State v. Abdullah, 184 N.J. 497, 515, 878 A.2d 746 (2005); State v. Soto, 385 N.J.Super. 247, 256, 896 A.2d 1148 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 491 (2006).
[brief] As detailed herein, and as demonstrated by the expert title testimony presented at Trial, the [...] never acquired or owned title to the Riparian Grant portion of Lot 3 and 3.01.  As further detailed, [...] has now acquired title to the Riparian Grant area of those lots by the various Deeds referenced earlier.  The Deeds and expert title analysis were presented at Trial and confirmed that analysis and position.  Based upon the legal analysis as set further and the title proofs, it is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court was required to rule that Jersey Shore is the title owner of the Riparian Grant area of Lot 3 and 3.01.  The Court should have further entered an appropriate Order directing either a refund to Jersey Shore of the rental monies paid to Keansburg on the misrepresentation of its ownership or determined the appropriate disposition or payment of said monies/funds together with reasonable interest.  Respectfully submitted: **[...]**  Attorney for Appellant  [...] Company, Inc. a/k/a [...]  By: ____________________________  [...] [...], a/k/a [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Respondent.
[brief] POINT I STANDARD OF REVIEW.  ON APPEAL FROM A GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE APPELLATE COURT EMPLOYES THE SAME STANDARD OF REVIEW AS THE TRIAL COURT.  (ISSUE NOT RAISED BELOW).  In reviewing a trial court’s decision on summary judgment, an appellate court reviews the matter with the same standard applied by the trial court.  Henry v. N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 330 (2010).  “[T]he appellate court should first decide whether there was a genuine issue of material fact, and if none exists, then decide whether the trial court’s ruling on the law was correct. ”  Id.  In Brill v. The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995), the New Jersey Supreme Court held:
[brief] [Da48].  Moreover, as trial court noted, a single-family dwelling of exactly the same size could have been constructed on the Property, as the proposed building does not exceed the permitted building coverage in the R-20A --- \(^4\)  Of course, the LUDO does not regulate the placement of windows on a building façade, and it is conceivable that there would be no difference in the placement of windows on a 2.5-story building.
[brief] All orders from the Law Division were prepared by the court, even though it mistakenly set forth Appellant’s name etc on the top.  The 3-4-24 Order To Turnover granting Appellant summary judgment (Da 155) & the 3-4-24 Order For Turnover of Funds denying plaintiffs’ turn-over motion (Da166) did not provide for a turn-over of funds to Appellant (even though in-artfully drafted), the correct judgment amount & interest calculation, & costs even though raised in the motions.  Similarly, the 4-1-24 Order (Da 194), also prepared by the court, did not contain the correct judgment amount & did not address costs or fees from the fund in court (or in the annexed Statement of Reasons) even though they were raised in Appellant’s motion.  That order did not even provide for a turn-over of funds, thus far awarded to Appellant.  The 4-29-24 Order (Da 209), again prepared by the court, provided for the modified & correct judgment amount & corresponding additional interest & awarded costs.  Even though the judge finally addressed fees from the fund in court, the court’s own prepared order did not properly provide for the turn-over of funds to Appellant that would authorize the [...] to make disbursement.  As such, the 4-29-24 Order was rejected by the [...] as being non-compliant with Rule 4:57-2 for making a withdrawal of moneys.  Appellant then prepared a proposed corrected or amended order that was endorsed by the [...] as acceptable, to which plaintiffs consent was required & provide.  It was entered on 5-31-24.(Da218-219)
[brief] But there was ample evidence to infer that [...] had, once again, aggressively encroached on Defendant’s property on September 12, 2022, inciting [...] to take off after her.  The State entered no evidence to refute this inference.  In contrast, the defense presented overwhelming evidence of [...]’s four-year history of aggression and antagonistic behavior, both directly toward [...] and indirectly from invading and marking Defendant’s property.
[brief] See Planning Board minutes at Da50.  3.  **[...] largely ignores the second of the two “d” variances it required. **  There was the use variance for senior mixed-use housing not permitted in the R-20A zone, but also a density variance since one unit per 20,000 sq. ft. was permitted, or approximately two units per acre, yet Respondent sought 20.4 units per acre or ten times that which is permitted in that zone.
[brief] Of all the DACCA provisions, only one—N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c)(2) which sets forth the attorney exception to the definition of debt adjuster—mentions attorneys.  While debt adjustment may constitute the practice of law when performed by attorneys (see ACb9-11), the Attorney Safe Harbor specifically excludes this part of the practice of law from the DACCA because, when otherwise providing legal representation, the attorney is not “principally engaged as a debt adjuster. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c)(2).  Thus, the Attorney Safe Harbor does not in any substantial way interfere with the authority of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law.  It only regulates an attorney to the extent that the principal activity is that of a debt adjuster as defined in the statute.  Further, the [...]’s argument that attorneys are “often exempted from statutory schemes” (see ACb7) indeed is reflected in and supports the constitutionality of the DACCA.
[brief] A breach of contract occurs only where “[a] party violates the terms of a contract *by failing to fulfill a requirement enumerated in the agreement*” itself.  *Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc.*, 237 N.J. 501, 512 (2019) (emphasis added).  Demonstrating that this occurred requires Plaintiff to show, among other things, “that the parties entered into a contract containing certain terms” and that “defendant *did not* do what the contract required the [the defendant] to do, *defined as a breach of the contract*.  . . .”  *Id.* (emphasis added and alterations in original) (quoting *Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev*, 225 N.J. 469, 482 (2016)).  Thus, in order to allege breach to avoid motion to dismiss, Plaintiff must identify the contract provision breached.
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  Courts have similarly applied Rule 1:3-3 to other statutorily prescribed statutes of limitation in an election context.  In 2018, the Appellate Division determined that a two-year limitation under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, *N.J.S.A. 10:6-2, et seq.*, was tolled by Rule 1:3-1.  See *Save Camden Pub. Schs v. Camden City Bd. of Educ.*, 454 N.J. Super 478 (App. Div. 2018).  In *Camden*, the election occurred on a Wednesday and the statute of limitations for an election contest fell on a Saturday.  *Id.* at 488.  The Appellate Division, in overturning the trial court, expressly held that Rule 1:3-1 required the limit be pushed to the following business day.  *Ibid.*  For these reasons, the trial court errored when it failed to count these ballots.  These ballots were timely mailed, although not timely postmarked until the following business day, and should have been counted because it was not the fault of the voter.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] Constructive authority.  Shall have the same meaning as defined in the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, except that the term shall apply only to constructive authority directed against a person who is subject to an investigative detention or arrest (e.g., “show me your hands,” “get out of the vehicle,” etc.), or directed against a person if the officer has un-holstered a firearm or a conducted energy device (e.g., “move out of the way,” “get down,” etc.).
[brief] Bd. of Educ. of Middletown v. Middletown Tp Educ. Assn., 352 N.J. Super. 501, 509 (App. Div. 2001).  He rightly argues that allegations in a federal pleading were not similar to physical efforts to interfere with operation of the Company that led to the June 2016 restraint.  He rightly argues the Court should have recognized, in mitigation, that its June 2016 Order was followed for 17 months before Plaintiff’s R. 1:10-3 motion, and that the violations at issue in November 2017 were merely allegations in a pleading.  [...] did not physically impede management of the Company from and after the June 7, 2016 Order, or as part of the November 2017 R. 1:10-3 motion.  The Court should have also recognized that the defense costs for the SDNY and DNJ filings could not have threatened the existence of the Company where the Plaintiffs were voluntarily incurring legal fees suing [...] at the same time in the arbitration, seeking his expulsion and damages.
[brief] This result is contrary to the considerable authority directing that when the plaintiff’s claim of vicarious liability hinges upon allegations of a deviation from professional standards of care by a licensed individual who was an employee of the named defendant, an AOM and an expert opinion from a person with the same qualifications as the employee must be provided.  [...], as a physician, is not qualified to offer standard of care opinions against the nursing staff at [...], including registered nurses, licensed practical nurses and certified nursing assistants, who delivered the care at issue that allegedly caused harm.  Further, [...] did not identify the specific individuals alleged to be negligent.  Significantly, [...]’ AOM confirms that [...]’s personnel took many steps to care for [...] and other patients during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, both with respect to limiting the spread of COVID-19 and their health in general.  Plaintiff thus clearly cannot maintain any claims of gross negligence, recklessness or willful misconduct, the only claims in this action that can potentially proceed pursuant to the COVID-19 response immunity statute, New Jersey Laws of 2020, chapter 18.
[brief] The trial court thus ignored that a contract by conduct has just as much force of law as a written agreement.  *Troy v. Rutgers*, 168 N.J. 354, 365 (2001) (*citing* *Wanaque Borough Sewerage Auth. v. Township of West Milford*, 144 N.J. 564, 574 (1996) (“[C]ontracts implied in fact are no different than express contracts.
[brief] Table of Judgments, Orders, and Rulings Being Appealed ..................... iii  Table of Citations ................................................................................ iv  Preliminary Statement ...........................................................................  1  Procedural History ...............................................................................  4 Statement of Facts ..............................................................................  5  Legal Argument ..................................................................................  16  A. (Pa000093)  THE ROMA PIZZERIA SETTLEMENT DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE CLAIMS ASSERTED BY DR. GANNON IN FEDERAL COURT BECAUSE THE EXPRESS TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT DID NOT REACH FUTURE CLAIMS ARISING FROM MISCONDUCT OCCURRING AFTER FEB. 20, 2015 .........................................................  16  1.  (Pa000093)  The claims of the proposed Gannon class members could not have been asserted in [...] and were therefore not extinguished by the 2015 Settlement ..............................................  18  2.  (Pa000097)  The claims asserted by the members of the proposed Gannon class do not relate to the claims brought by the [...] Class members ............................................................................  23 B. (Pa000098)  HARBORTOUCH CANNOT RELY ON THE 2015 SETTLEMENT TO PRECLUDE THE CLAIMS FILED IN GANNON BECAUSE THE 2015 SETTLEMENT DID NOT CONTAIN ANY “COVENANT NOT TO SUE” ..........................................................  26  Conclusion ..........................................................................................  30  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] Defendant then turns to the [...]’s announcement of its final rulemaking—not to any adopted regulation.  Under that regulation (known as Reg F (16 CFR § 1006 *et seq.*)), the [...] adopted a form validation notice which, if used correctly, provides safe harbor against certain FDCPA claims.  The [...] addressed how the industry could convert to using that form:  The Bureau expects that any one-time costs to debt collectors of reformatting the validation notice will be relatively small, particularly for debt collectors who rely on vendors, because the Bureau expects that most vendors will provide an updated notice at no additional cost.  The Bureau understands from its outreach that many covered persons currently use vendors to provide validation notices.  [Footnotes omitted.]
[brief] On February 9, 2023, Plaintiff was defending one of [...]’s personal injury clients, [...], during a deposition and learned during the proceedings that the worker’s compensation attorney handling her file at [...] had committed legal malpractice during the handling of the client’s worker’s compensation claim, and had lied to the client in order to conceal the malpractice.  Da36, ¶ 72.  The error was substantial and would deprive [...] of future reimbursement for certain medical expenses.  Plaintiff was candid with the client about the malpractice and he told the client he would get back to her on how to remedy the matter.  Id., ¶ 73.  Plaintiff reasonably believed, based on the foregoing information and his knowledge of the RPCs governing New Jersey lawyers, that: (a) [...] was violating the RPCs prohibiting lawyers from continuing to represent clients when a substantial conflict of interest arose; and (b) others at [...] were violating the RPCs that prohibit lying to or intentionally misleading a client.  Id., ¶ 74.  On or about February 9, 2023, Plaintiff voiced his objections to the unethical course of conduct in the [...] case to [...].  [...] said he would “look into the matter” but in the meantime he directed Plaintiff to refrain from recording anything on the case file about the malpractice and to take no action.  Id., ¶ 75.  On or about February 10, 2023, Plaintiff spoke to [...] and told him the client was waiting to hear back about how to remedy the situation.  [...] again told Plaintiff to “keep quiet. ”  Id., ¶ 76.  On February 14, 2023, Plaintiff emailed the worker’s compensation attorney involved and [...] concerning the said issue and internally posted a note to [...]’s case management software, [...], concerning the malpractice in the worker’s compensation case.