ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Id. at 280, 456 A.2d 390.  However, the Court also added the “caveat” that “[t]his does not mean that the planning board should be permitted to delay or hinder the project .”  [Cranford Development Associates, supra, 445 N.J. Super. at 232-233(emphasis added)].  Thus, in affirming the trial court’s appointment of a special hearing examiner to hear the builder’s development applications in that case, the Appellate Division held that, given “the Township’s record of obstructing affordable housing projects, and the Planning Board’s past hostility to a much more limited affordable housing plan, the court’s decision to appoint the hearing examiner was justified in this case. ”  It is respectfully submitted that the record in this case, including, but not limited to the Mayor’s blatant interference with the Zoning Board’s processing of Plaintiffs’ 2018 Amended Application, including the issuance of a press release urging a denial of the Application, and the mounting of a public campaign against the Application, accompanied by defamatory statements, justified the Trial Court’s conclusion below that the same remedy was appropriate and necessary in this case.
[brief] The Certification of former Mayor [...], is an example of exactly the type of behavior the statute was enacted to prevent.  All of the purported discussions between “the Borough” (the meaning of which [...] fails to identify) are appropriate subjects for the governing body to discuss at an open public meeting, yet appears that those public discussions never took place.  Further, to the extent that the discussions took place at a meeting that did not comply with the Act, any subsequent action by the Mayor and Council would be voidable.
[brief] D.  \textbf{Ordinance No. 13-2022 is void because its hearing and passage was preceded by defective notice.} (Pa58-Pa61)  It has long been settled that notice is a jurisdictional issue and that publication requirements are to be strictly construed.  See \textit{Kendrick v. City of Hoboken}, 38 \textit{N.J.L.} 113 (1875).  In this same vein, courts have explained that “[f]ailure to substantially comply with the requirements of a statute requiring publication renders the ordinance invalid. ”  \textit{Wolf, supra}, 182 \textit{N.J. Super.} at 295.  As the Appellate Division has observed, “[w]hen the notice is inadequate, ““the conclusion is that failure to give adequate notice of pending legislation is generally fatal to the subsequent legislative enactment. ””  \textit{Rockaway Shoprite Associates}, --- \(^8\) Cf. \textit{N.J.S.A.} 40:55D-62.1 (which establishes the requirements for notices pertaining to zoning ordinance amendments and provides, “A notice pursuant to this section shall state the date, time and place of the hearing, the nature of the matter to be considered and an identification of the affected zoning districts and proposed boundary changes, if any, by street names, common names or other identifiable landmarks, and by reference to lot and block numbers as shown on the current tax duplicate in the municipal tax assessor’s office. ”  [Emphasis supplied]).  supra, 424 N.J. Super. at 352 (quoting [...], 8–52 Zoning and Land Use Controls § 52.08[2] (2011) (footnotes omitted)).  Moreover, and despite any argument which defendants might attempt to make to the contrary, it cannot be said that the notice published by the Township “substantially complied” with N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 nor that any deficiency was a mere “technical violation”.  The defect – the failure to include a “clear and concise statement prepared by the clerk of the governing body setting forth the purpose of the ordinance” – went to the core purpose of the notice requirement, which is to alert the public to the essence and scope of the proposed legislation so that they can make an informed decision whether to participate in hearing.  This explains why no one appeared at the hearing conducted on Ordinance No. 13-2022 and only a few months later the public turnout at the hearing on the specific development application which it facilitated was so overwhelming that it required relocation to a building with a larger capacity.  Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred in determining the notice to be valid and that the trial court’s decision should be reversed.
[brief] Under Rule 3:21010(b)(5) an individual may challenge an illegal sentence imposed at any time.  State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40, 47 n.4 (2011).  An illegal sentence is one which is not in accordance with the law including a sentence that is “imposed without regard to some constitutional safeguard. ”  State v. Tavares, 286 N.J. Super. 610, 618 (App. Div. 1996).  Imposition of a sentence without regard to constitutional safeguards occurs when a sentence is imposed on contravention, or at least alleged contravention of a right guaranteed by the Constitution.  State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 437 (2017) (holding that an allegation that a sentence, even though in accordance with the sentencing range provided by statute, violates the 8th Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, is an allegation of an illegal sentence).  In Zuber, the petitioners who were juveniles at the times of their offenses, argued that their sentence, which included consecutive terms that would be the equivalent of a life sentence violated the 8th Amendment.  227 N.J. at 428-29.  The petitioners raised their claims nearly 10 years after their direct appeals.  Id. at 433.  The court considered the subsequent application to correct the illegal sentence because it raised a constitutional issue without any controversy.  Id. at 437.  Accordingly, any allegation that a sentence violates a constitutional protection is an allegation of an illegal sentence that must be reviewed.
[brief] I.  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW REQUIRES THE APPELLATE COURT TO GRANT DEFERENCE TO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT  An appellate court's review of rulings of law and issues regarding the applicability, validity (including constitutionality) or interpretation of laws, statutes, or rules is de novo.  See In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 244 N.J. 1, 17 (2020) (agency's interpretation of a statute); State v. G.E.P., 243 N.J. 362, 382 (2020) (retroactivity of statute); State v. Hemenway, 239 N.J. 111, 125 (2019) (constitutionality of a statute); State v. Hyland, 238 N.J. 135, 143 (2019) (appealability of a sentence); Kocanowski v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 237 N.J. 3, 9 (2019) (statutory interpretation); Green v. Monmouth Univ., 237 N.J. 516, 529 (2019) (applicability of charitable immunity); State v. Fuqua, 234 N.J. 583, 591 (2018) (statutory interpretation); State v. Dickerson, 232 N.J. 2, 17 (2018) (interpretation of court rules).  We agree that the Appellate courts "review de novo the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint and compelling arbitration."
[brief] (Id.)  According to the Journal, the January 6, 2022-session was called to order after notice of the calendar was given to the Senate and posted in accordance with the Open Public Meetings Act.  (Pa250.)  However, the legislative calendar posted online in advance of January 6, 2022 did not list consideration of A. 6260 or S. 49 until it was updated on January 10, 2022 – after the session was held.  (Pa111-119.)  According to the Senate Journal, S. 49 was given a first reading by reading its title and referred to the Health, Human Services and Senior Citizens Committee.  (Pa251-52.)  The bill was then reported out of Committee and given a second reading.  (Pa253.)  On January 10, 2022, the Senate gave S. 49 a third reading.  (Pa260.)  The bill then passed by vote of 23 to 15.  (Pa260.)  On June 22, 2023, this Court granted applicants’ motion to supplement the record with both parties’ certifications and transcripts, but denied Applicants’ request to issue subpoenas.  (Pa350.)  Applicants sought leave to appeal the denial to the New Jersey Supreme Court, which was denied on October 24, 2023.  (Pa356.)  Applicants filed another motion to supplement the record, which was granted without opposition.  (Pa376.)  This brief now follows on the merits of Applicants’ petition.  **STANDARD OF REVIEW**
[brief] Id. at 91-94.  The Court’s efforts to strike a balance between fairness and trial-date certainty is reflected in Rule 4:24-1(c) governing extensions of discovery, which was amended as part of the Best Practices project in order to achieve these objectives.  Pressler & Verniero, N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 4 on R. 1:1-2 (2019).  Notwithstanding, our courts traditionally tip the scale in favor of a fair adjudication on the merits:  [W]here the court system is not in a position to schedule a meaningful arbitration or trial date, a sanction that results in a deprivation of a litigant's day in court on the merits is anathema to the fair and efficient administration of justice.
[brief] Id. at 223-24 (quoting Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175, 183-84 (3d Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000)); see Zoller v. GCA Advisors, LLC, 993 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2021) (reversing district court's denial of defendants' motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff employee's statutory employment discrimination and civil rights claims based on a lack of knowing agreement and finding the clause’s clear and mandatory language to be sufficient without any explanation that arbitration is distinct from court).
[brief] [...]  [...] 029721980  [...] Cedar Grove, New Jersey  07009 [...]  Telecopy [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents  [...]  and [...]  [...], A NEW JERSEY LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, AND [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AKR CONTRACTING, INC.  AND ANDREW RUSIN, Defendants-Respondents.  v. [...], [...], AND [...], Third-Party Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No.: [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION  MORRIS COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...] SAT BELOW: HON. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
[brief] As with incapacitation, there is a clear consensus about deterrence in the social science literature: each extra year of a lengthy sentence does very little to nothing to further either general or specific deterrence.  As to general deterrence, “[t]he weight of criminological knowledge teaches that marginal increases in the severity of criminal sanctions rarely bring about marginal improvements in general deterrence in the community. ”  Model Penal Code: Sentencing (American Law Inst., Proposed Final Draft, 2017).  See also National Research Council, The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring Causes And Consequences 139 (2014) (the relationship between sentence length and crime rate reflects “diminishing deterrent returns to increasing sentence length,” such that there is only “a small crime reduction response” to increases in lengthier sentences).
[brief] The Court saw through this however, and sentenced him accordingly despite the Defendant not being advised of the subsequent enhanced penalties as required under the statute.  The present matter is distinguishable from Petrello as [...] is not intentionally trying to avoid enhanced penalties for a subsequent guilty plea.  Following her guilty plea to DWI on January 23, 2014, [...] was not advised orally of the enhanced penalties for a subsequent DWI conviction as required by statutory authority.  T1 10:14-25; 11:1-25; 12:1-10.  This fact is not in dispute and was stipulated to by the State.  T3 13:21-22; 21:9-16.  The State argues however, that despite [...] not being advised orally of the enhanced penalties, the holding in State v. Petrello controls, effectually negating what is required by the Court under N.J.S.
[brief] “Whether a suspect has been placed in custody is fact-sensitive and sometimes not easily discernible. ”  *State v. Stott*, 171 N.J. 343, 364 (2002).  “The critical determinant of custody is whether there has been a significant deprivation of the suspect's freedom of action based on the objective circumstances,” *State v. P.Z.*, 152 N.J. 86, 103 (1997).  Relevant circumstances include “the time and place of the interrogation, the length of the interrogation, the nature of the questions, the conduct of the police, the status of the interrogator, the status of the suspect, and other such factors. ”  *State v. Pearson*, 318 N.J. Super. 123, 133 (App. Div. 1999).  The central inquiry to establish custody is whether “a reasonable person have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. ”  J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270 (2011) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995)).  A defendant is in custody if “a reasonable person in defendant’s position, based on the nature of the police encounter would not have believed that he was free to leave. ”  State v. O’Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 615 (2007).  Our Supreme Court has held in State v. Ahmad that “the moment defendant was placed in the back of a patrol car and transported to the [...], having been told that he could not leave the hospital with his parents, . . . a reasonable 17-year-old would no longer have felt free to leave.
[brief] Plaintiffs are given leave to file an Amended Complaint within twenty days of the date of retaining counsel, but no later than November 8, 2006.  (Emphasis Supplied)  On November 6, 2006, [...] ([...]) filed an Amended Complaint.  [...] recognized in its operative and controlling amended complaint that the FBI History Report (FHR) was immaterial to the matter before the court, scandalous, improperly, and excessively impugned [...]’s moral character and removed all of this information from its amended complaint filed November 6, 2006.
[brief] Cognizant of the REA’s exclusive jurisdiction over reciprocals, the Department has never successfully required stand-alone reciprocal exchanges to comply with the Holding Act, until now.  Ja74-76.  To the contrary, in its examinations and management letters, the Department has repeatedly admitted that legislation was necessary in order for it to require reciprocals to comply with the Holding Act statutes, including complying with SSAP No. 25.
[brief] [...]: Objection to the form of the question.  That was not her prior testimony.  Her testimony was that he was paid.  You can answer, [...].  A.  Exactly.  That's what I was going to say, that he -- I never said that he was not paid completely or whatever.  He was paid.  That is my testimony.  And my testimony, when he accepted the check, and he put it through the bank and he cashed it, and he never bothered me ever since or, you know, he never made any claims ever since until he came up with this lawsuit.  He was okay with it.  That means that for a few years, you keep silence and you don't ask anything, that means that he was satisfied.  That he accepted. ”  Plaintiff for any alleged unpaid services owed by [...].  *Id.*  [...] issued the check on January 26, 2018 and Plaintiff received the payment on February 8, 2018 without objection.  *See* Da30.  After receiving the payment, Plaintiff had no further contact with Defendants until filing this lawsuit, nearly three years after [...] sold its interest in the hospital and when [...] had nearly ceased operating entirely.  *See* Da125-157 at 12:1-13:21; and 160.\(^{17}\)  Despite Plaintiff’s continual breach of all his contracts with Defendants, and a final payment discharging all potential claims, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that he did not receive payments due to him.
[brief] In addition, the Court mentioned that this factor couldn’t apply because defendant engaged in plea negotiations therefore, he was competent to understand what was going on.  (17T:222-20 to 223-6).  However, this analysis is flawed.  If a defendant was incompetent to stand trial, there wouldn’t be a trial or sentencing.  Thus, under the Court’s interpretation, this Miller factor could never apply.  In order to apply a Miller factor, the defendant would either need to plead guilty or be found guilty at trial.  If the defendant was incompetent, there wouldn’t be a trial.  N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4.  Therefore, under the Court’s application, the fourth Miller factor could never apply, because if the Court is at a sentencing for a defendant, then the defendant is competent.  Furthermore, much of what the Court talks about, regarding the specific facts of the shooting came directly from [...]’s statement.  (17T:230-25 to 231-25).  Nobody witnessed what happened upstairs.  (8T:35-25 to 36-23).  The Court did not put the appropriate amount of weight on the fifth Miller factor.
[brief] The unnecessary, extended break in deliberations violated defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and his right to trial by an impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution.  As the California Court of Appeals has recognized, an extensive adjournment of jury deliberations "risks prejudice to the defendant both from the possibility that jurors might discuss the case with outsiders at this critical point in the proceedings, and from the possibility that their recollections of the evidence, the arguments, and the court's instructions may become dulled or confused."  *People v. Santamaria*, 229 Cal.App.3d 269, 277-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).  It "disrupts the very process and pattern of the jury's orderly examination of the evidence."  *Id.* at 278.  The defendant in *Santamaria* also faced charges of first-degree murder.  *Ibid.*  In that case, the jury deliberations were interrupted for eleven days, also for the judge's planned vacation.  *Id.* at 274-76.  The California court found a "considerable" risk of prejudice "inherent" in suspending deliberations in a complex murder trial for eleven days.  *Ibid.*  The prejudice arose "from the prolonged exposure of the jurors to outside influences, from the strong probability that their recollections of the evidence and the instructions would fade or become confused, and from the subversion of the pattern of orderly deliberation."  *Id.* at 278-79.
[brief] First, the developer must submit an application that addresses information required by the municipality, including but not limited to, a general statement of the nature of the proposed project, its estimated cost, sources and amounts of private capital, and a fiscal plan.  See generally, N.J.S.A. 40A:20-8(a)-(e).  The application must also include a proposed financial agreement.  N.J.S.A. 40A:20-8(f).  Separate provisions address, the required form and contents of the financial agreement (N.J.S.A. 40A:20-9) and optional provisions of the financial agreement (N.J.S.A. 40A:20-10).  Additionally, the LTTEL requires the municipality weigh the relative benefits of the project against the costs associated with the tax exemption, and assess the importance of the exemption to the project:
[brief] Docket No. [...]  Criminal Action:  On appeal from a final order of conviction in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County Sat  Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Appellant is not confined.  Honorable Judges:  Pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b) and R. 2:6-4(a), this letter in lieu of a formal brief is submitted on behalf of the State of New Jersey.  [...], Esq.  Assistant Prosecutor ID#000602001  [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................  10  POINT I: THE DE NOVO COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO MODIFY SENTENCE ............................... 10 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 14 TABLE OF APPENDIX DMV Abstract ............................................................................................ Ra1 Ship Bottom Arrest Report ...................................................................... Ra13 Ship Bottom Investigation Report ............................................................. Ra14 Harding Township Investigation Report ................................................... Ra16 Hillsborough Township Investigation Report ............................................. Ra20 PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[directive] b.  만약 귀하가 그런 죄목에 유죄를 인정하면 의무적 최하 연장기간은 년 (년, 것) 개월이며 월 수를 기입할 의무적 최장 연장기간은 년 개월(년/월 것)이 있습니다.  수를 기재할 될 수  If you are pleading guilty to such a charge, the minimum mandatory extended term is years and months (fill in the number of years/months) and the maximum mandatory extended term can be years and months (fill in the number of years/months).
[brief] That same year (December 16, 1971), the Strip somehow first appeared in Defendant’s chain of title in a deed from Defendant’s predecessor-in-title ([...]) to [...] for consideration of only $1.00.  Pa91.  Only one month later, [...] transfers properties including the Strip to [...], [...] and George [...] for $800,000.  Pa98.  Curiously, these deeds do not contain any recitals of the property history of the Strip.  The best evidence that the Bump and Strip were never “swapped” comes from Plaintiff’s purchase of the Bump from the [...] family (the same family involved in the alleged “swap” shown on the 1966-1969 Unrecorded Subdivision Maps!) on August 30, 1995.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 421.  The Court weighed this factor heavily toward suppression because the “right of freedom of movement without unreasonable interference by government officials is not a matter for debate. ”  *Ibid.* (citing *State v. Chippero*, 164 N.J. 342, 358 (2000)).  Likewise, here, the officers repeatedly acknowledged that they had no reason to believe that [...] engaged in any criminal activity; rather, the officers stopped [...] only to determine if he was [...], the target of their investigation.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  “Appellate review of a Law Division adjudication of guilt” following a trial de novo is “very narrow” and “deferential. ”  State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 2001); State v. Stas, 212 N.J. 37, 48-49 (2012).  The appellate court “do[es] not re-weigh the evidence, but rather, determine[s] whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record. ”  Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super. at 252 (citing State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999); State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161-62 (1964)); Adubato, 420 N.J. Super. at 176.  The sole limit to this deferential standard is review of “purely legal issues,” which are owed no deference and are reviewed “plenary. ”  *Adubato*, 420 N.J. Super. at 176; *Stas*, 212 N.J. at 49.
[brief] The Trial Court reemphasized that the parties were required to address any relevant exhibits in their trial briefs.  (T12:17-13:1 (“You don’t give a box of stuff to the Court and say figure out how it matters, especially in a case like this where it’s not a trial where there’s witnesses … and things come up that you don’t expect. ”)).  The Trial Court then found that eighteen of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Exhibits were never referenced in the briefing and therefore were excluded from trial.  (Id. 14:12-16.)  The Trial Court also addressed the only two Proposed Exhibits that were referenced in Plaintiffs’ trial briefing, only one of which is raised on this appeal.