[brief] The Honorable [...], J.S.C., hereinafter referred to as the Law Division, presided over the de novo review of Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Guilty Plea in the Ocean County Law Division on June 15, 2023.  (T3).  With the prior agreement of all parties, the matter was heard virtually as opposed to in-person.  At the inception of the proceedings, the Law Division set forth the name of the matter onto the record, and then made general statements about the remote (virtual) nature of the court proceedings.  (T3:3-6 to 3-25).  The Law Division then asked all parties, including Defendant, to enter their appearance on the record.  (T3:4-1 to 4-15).  Defense counsel then set forth into the record the basis for the de novo review of Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Guilty Plea.  More specifically, Defense counsel argued that the factual basis that had been elicited by the Municipal Court during the Defendant’s guilty plea on May 16, 2018 was insufficient because of the limited colloquy that took place between the Municipal Court and the Defendant during same.  Defense counsel pointed out to the Court that the Defendant never personally acknowledged the admissibility of the alleged B.A.C. result in his case, and that there was no observational evidence introduced during the factual basis to satisfy the factual basis requirement.  (T3:5-17 to 6-18).  Defense counsel then referenced the unpublished decision in the matter of State v. Christopher Vargas, (Docket No. A-5624-18T3, Decided September 10, 2020), as persuasive but obviously not binding legal authority for the foregoing argument.  (T3:6-19 to 9-8).  At that point, Defense counsel referenced the State’s brief, which had raised the factors set forth in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009) as a basis for denying Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Guilty Plea.  Defense counsel pointed out to the Law Division that when the Motion to Vacate Guilty Plea was predicated solely upon an insufficient factual basis, no such Slater analysis was required.  State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393 (2015).  (T3:9-15 to 10-7).  The Law Division and Defense counsel then engaged in a brief back and forth wherein the Law Division asked whether the Defendant had expressly acknowledged “being under the influence of alcohol and that alcohol affected his ability to properly operate the vehicle…”  Defense counsel conceded that Defendant had responded, “Yes, sir” when asked the foregoing question.  (T3:10-17 to 11-19).  Thereafter, the State made oral argument in opposition to the de novo review of Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Guilty Plea.  The State argued that the Defendant had acknowledged the “essential elements of DWI” so as to satisfy the factual basis requirement.  In addition, the State conceded that an analysis under Slater was not necessary since the Motion was predicated solely upon an insufficient factual basis.  The State concluded its argument by reiterating its position that the Defendant had acknowledged the “essential elements of DWI” during his guilty plea.  (T3:11-22 to 13-12).  Defense counsel then argued to the Law Division that the Defendant merely acknowledging that he was under the influence of alcohol when he operated the motor vehicle was not sufficient.  Indeed, Defense counsel offered extensive argument regarding why the factual basis in the within matter was insufficient.  (T3:13-19 to 15-22).  The State then read into the record the language of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.  (T3:16-3 to 16-17).  The Law Division then set forth its decision on the record.  (T3:16-24 to 29-19).  At the inception of the decision, the Law Division set forth the procedural history of the Defendant’s matter.