ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The risk that the jury will accept the improper ultimate issue testimony is even greater when the witness is a law enforcement officer.  See State v. Hawk, 327 N.J. Super. 276, 285 (App. Div. 2000) (noting that ordinary citizens are more likely to believe testifying police officers than defendants because “police occupy a position of authority in our communities”).  Testimony on the ultimate issue of the defendant’s guilt usurps the jury’s role as the exclusive finder of fact, is clearly capable of producing an unjust result, and requires reversal.  Simms, 224 N.J. at 406-07 (citing Reeds, 197 N.J. at 296-97, 300-01).
[brief] ”  Davis, 68 N.J. at 81.  Indeed, merger may even be improper where a single course of conduct constitutes a violation of two different criminal statutes.  Miller, 108 N.J. at 118; accord Fraction, 206 N.J. Super. at 536-39 (rejecting merger of convictions resulting from a single criminal episode).  For instance, in Davis, the Supreme Court held that a conviction for unlawful possession of C.D.S. did not merge with a conviction for distribution.  Davis, 68 N.J. at 82.  Although the Court acknowledged that the same conduct could sustain both convictions since “one must indeed possess the drug in order to sell it,” id. at 82, it found no evidence that the possession in that case was a “mere fleeting and shadowy incident of the sale. ”  Id. at 83.  The merger decision, thus, focuses on the elements of the crime and the Legislature’s intent in creating them.  *Miller*, 108 N.J. at 116.
[brief] In Russell, the defendant did not explain the criteria it had applied to withhold documents based on a lack of relevance.  (ECF 63-5, Hr’g Tr. at 32-34.)  That is presumably why she gave the defendant the opportunity to provide a “relevancy log”—essentially, to articulate its relevancy objections for withholding documents that were otherwise responsive to the search criteria.  Unlike the defendant in Russell, [...] has already provided that explanation here.  After [...] went back and ran the searches the second time, [...] described the subsets of documents it is withholding—both to [...] and to the court, and also in its second supplemental response to RFP No. 7.  So, unlike in Russell, the court here already has what it needs from [...] to determine (as set forth above) that the categories of documents [...] is withholding are not relevant.
[brief] My initial review of that motion indicated that it was the same arguments that were pending before the Court with regard to vacating the arbitration awards.  In response thereto we advise the Court we would rely on our previously submitted brief in opposition to the request to vacate the arbitration awards.  On October 11, 2023 [...] advised that the Motion to vacate the arbitration awards contained a two page Certification of [...] (Da260 - Da261) that had previously not been provided which indicated that [...] was attempting to take consistent positions with regard to the handling of Medpay claims.  In response to [...]’s letter of October 11, 2023 [...] uploaded a reply to those new allegations seeking to rebut [...]’s argument by showing that [...] had previously allowed 17 arbitrations to go to a hearing and then satisfied the awards.  Additionally, [...] had 19 matters in which they made payment of the Medpay subrogation claim prior to allowing the matter to proceed to arbitration.  The clerk indicated that that October 17, 2023 submission was an impermissible sur-rebuttal.  The motion to vacate the arbitration awards filed by [...] was premature and should have been denied without prejudice or carried to a later date as there were outstanding discovery issues and material issues of fact.  The Estoppel argument could only be raised after the Court ruled on the discovery motion which was returnable on November 3, 2023.  As set forth in the June 26, 2023 opinion of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. obtaining those arbitration awards and filings were relevant to an argument of judicial or equitable estoppel; showing that [...]’s arguments with regard to those arbitration were consistent with the law of the state of New Jersey; that the arbitration awards bolstered the validity of the arbitrator’s rulings.  The Trial Court erred by allowing the matter to proceed without allowing defendant the right to obtain the documentation from [...] which was necessary to raise a number of valid arguments, most notably, judicial, or equitable estoppel.
[directive] All allegations of officer misconduct shall be thoroughly, objectively, and promptly investigated to their logical conclusion in conformance with this policy, regardless of whether the officer resigns or otherwise separates from the agency.  6.1  Time Limitations 6.1.1  It is vitally important that agencies complete internal affairs investigations in a prompt manner.  Long, unnecessary delays do not simply create additional uncertainty for the subject officer; they can also threaten the integrity of an investigation and the trust of the community.  6.1.2  Most internal affairs complaints are straightforward, and most of these routine complaints can be investigated and resolved quickly.  In many cases, an internal affairs investigation will take no more than 45 days from the receipt of the complaint to the filing of disciplinary charges.  The simpler the case, the quicker the inquiry should be completed.  6.1.3  In more complex matters, however, investigators sometimes need additional time to collect evidence, interview witnesses, or take other necessary investigative steps.  In addition, when an officer’s alleged conduct gives rise to a criminal investigation, ordinarily, internal affairs investigators should stay their own inquiry pending the resolution of the criminal matter.  6.1.4  If investigators are unable to complete an internal affairs investigation within 45 days of receiving a complaint, they must notify the agency’s law enforcement executive on or about the 45th day.3  In such situations, the law enforcement executive should seek to identify the reasons for the extended investigation and whether the internal affairs function requires additional resources or oversight to complete the inquiry in a prompt manner.  In addition, the law enforcement executive should ensure compliance with the “45-day rule” established by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147, which requires that certain disciplinary charges be filed within 45 days of the date the person filing the charge obtained “sufficient information” to do so.
[brief] *Model Civil Jury Charge* 5.20F(5) provides:  “An invitee is one who is permitted to enter or remain on land (or premises) for a purpose of the owner/occupier.  The invitee enters by invitation, expressed or implied.  The owner/occupier of the land (or premises) who by invitation, expressed or implied, induced persons to come upon the premises, is under a duty to exercise ordinary care to render the premises reasonably safe for the purposes embraced in the invitation.  Thus, the owner/occupier must exercise reasonable care for the invitee’s safety.  The owner/occupier must take such steps as are reasonable and prudent to correct or give warning of hazardous conditions or defects actually known to the owner/occupier (or the owner’s/occupier’s employees), and of hazardous conditions or defects which the owner/occupier (or the owner’s/occupier’s employees) by the exercise of reasonable care, could discover. ”
[brief] At least as much as exigency and inadvertence, unforeseeability and spontaneity are more akin to factual questions.  Indeed, as noted above, “whether the circumstances giving rise to probable cause were unforeseeable and spontaneous is a fact-sensitive inquiry that should be analyzed case by case. ” Smart, 253 N.J. at 173 (emphasis added).  Finally, defendant’s overly broad interpretation has been specifically and repeatedly rejected by this Court since Smart was issued on March 28, 2023.
[brief] [...]’s patented commercial software product, see Rb6, Rb42, Rb47–48, is a red herring.  Relator’s own expert stated that he developed the VRDO analyses reflected in the complaints using manual calculations, run in Microsoft Excel, and using raw data from MSRB SHORT.  Ja4320 ([...] Aff. ¶ 21) (“Initially, I performed these analyses . . . using Excel, which was largely a manual process. ”); Ja2173 (¶ 194); Rb42 (citing [...] Aff.).  [...]’s precedent establishes that analysis and special expertise do not defeat the public disclosure bar.  Ab29–32.  **Relator Is Not an Original Source.
[brief] In conjunction with a random drug test, [...] notified the City in writing on September 5th, 2015 that he was taking pain medication and specified what it was as a result of the motor vehicle accident in June of 2014.  (T5 91:19-25; 92:1-11).  [...] has never tested positive for a random or scheduled drug test.  The City, through IA, subpoenaed the record demonstrating that [...] had provided notice of his prescribed pain medication, but failed to follow through with the subpoena to obtain the records which would have corroborated [...].  (T5 92:12-95:1).  [...]’s testimony that he advised the City as to what medications he was taking in 2015 is uncontroverted.  [...] did not believe that notifying the Department in that manner was a violation of the Department’s reporting policy.  (T5 95:2-6).  [...] issued a Supplemental IA Report regarding his attempt to locate the form where [...] had listed the medication that he was taking in conjunction with the random drug test.  (T1 142:21-143:13; Pa216).  [...] was unable to locate the form, and was unable to establish that [...] did not advise the Department that he was taking medication or that he was being untruthful when he said that he did so.  (T1 142:21-143:13, 163:1-11; Pa216).
[directive] A.  One-Time Historical Data Reporting  As noted, prior to December 22, 2022the enactment of 2022, 131a Superior Court L. c. judge in the appropriate vicinage made the final decision on whether a permit to carry a handgun was approved.  As a result of the statutory revisions, law enforcement chief executives in hundreds of jurisdictions are now tasked with making this critical determination.  Thus, using the excel spreadsheet and appropriate submission link in Appendix A, all law enforcement agencies shall submit anonymized data on all permit to carry applications that were approved or denied by the law enforcement agency during the period from December 1, 2019, until June 30, 2023, capturing three full years of data prior to the enactment of the new law (this does not include the Superior Court’s decision or applications pending appeal).  Once agencies submit their completed Appendix A the historical reporting requirement will be complete.  The anonymized information will be collected in the following categories: a. Date of submission Page 3 b. County of submission; c. Municipality of submission; d. Applicant’s year of birth; e. Applicant’s race; f. Applicant’s gender identity; g. Whether approved or denied; h. Date of approval or denial; and i. Reason for denial, if applicable.  One-time historical data reporting shall be submitted no later than October 1, 2023.
[brief] *N.J.A.C.* 12:235-10, Rule 3.16, (B)(1) and (2).  The fact that [...] served on the Assembly is not a basis for recusal.  Our New Jersey Supreme Court in *State v. Dalal* warned that defendants “not be allowed to manipulate the judicial system and engage in forum shopping. ”  221 *N.J.* 601, 607 (N.J. 2015).  In the case at bar, as he did in his initial letter to the Judge regarding recusal, Respondent’s counsel appears to be attempting to do just that, and it should not be allowed.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  For the purposes of this appeal, Appellee accepts Appellant’s statement of facts but notes additional facts below.  It was undisputed that Appellant [...] was 200 feet away from the intersection when it turned yellow, yet he did not slow his vehicle or bring it to a stop before entering the intersection.  (3T:147-1 to 10; 3T:150-2 to 4)  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] See State v. Abrams, 256 N.J. Super. 390, 399-401 (App. Div. 1992) “There must be intentional participation in the activity with a goal of furthering the common purpose”); State v. Madden, 61 N.J. 377, 395 (1972) (equating a conspiracy to murder with a “conspiracy to kill”) (emphasis added); State v. Rhett, 127 N.J. 3, 7 (1992) (“[T]o be guilty of attempted murder, a defendant must have purposely intended to cause the particular result that is the necessary element of the underlying offense — death. ”).  The lesser mens reas that could sustain a conviction for the completed offense are insufficient for the inchoate offenses of conspiracy or attempt.  The failure to communicate this specific purpose requirement to the jury is “fatal to the conviction. ”  Ibid.  Aggravated assault, like murder, is a crime that prohibits causing a particular result: death, in the case of murder; serious or significant bodily injury, in the case of aggravated assault.  Just as an attempt or conspiracy to commit murder requires the specific purpose to cause death, an attempt or conspiracy to commit aggravated assault requires the specific purpose to cause serious or significant bodily injury.  See State v. Green, 318 N.J. Super. 361, 371 (App. Div. 1999) (“In order to convict a defendant of attempted aggravated assault, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that defendant acted with the purpose of causing the result that is an element of aggravated assault, namely, serious bodily injury of another.
[brief] (DA202-211).  On or about December 23, 2017, Plaintiffs [...] and [...] signed the SPA for the purchase of condominium unit 1601 located at [...] in [...], [...] (“the Unit”).  (DA176-177).  Pursuant to the terms of the SPA, Plaintiffs paid a deposit by check in the sum of $86,700.00 to [...]’s escrow agent on or about December 23, 2017.  (DA161).  Plaintiffs also executed an Election Form to receive a digital copy of the Public Offering Statement.  (DA181-183).  A simple glance at the first page of the SPA reveals that Plaintiffs are immediately advised of their rights under [...] law to one seven-day period for review and cancellation of a broker-prepared contract, pursuant to PREDFDA, N.J.S.A. 45:22A-21 to -42.  (DA159).
[brief] ”  *Deangelo*, 464 N.J. Super. at 109 (quoting *Mancini*, 132 N.J. at 336).  However, the court noted [...]’s neglect to be both “inexcusable and calculated. ”  *Id.*  [...] “waited eight years and lied about his identity – before seeking relief. ”  *Id.*  As should be so here, the court in *[...]* reasoned that by attempting to collect a debt that it had no legal right to collect, [...] acted in bad faith and was thus not entitled to relief.
[brief] Third, plaintiff never deposed any persons from the engineering company that designed the parking lot.  Plaintiff never produced any evidence that they made recommendations to defendant for additional pedestrian safeguards in the non-management parking area and that such recommendations were rejected by defendant.  Additionally, as we previously indicated and the trial court also noted, in the 12 years of accident reports produced in response to plaintiff’s subpoena, there were only two accidents reported in the parking lot, each involving only minor injuries.  Hence, plaintiff put forth no evidence to show that the defendant knew of a dangerous situation and either ignored it or exacerbated it.
[brief] | Case/Other Authority | Page No. | |---------------------------------------------------------|----------| | N.J.S.A 2A:16-51.  et seq.  Declaratory Judgment | RA-71 | | R. 4:30A. (Entire Controversy Doctrine) | RA-72 | | Falcone v.  Middlesex County Med. Soc., 47 N.J. 92 (1966)| RA-73 | | Thornton v. Potamkin Chevrolet, 94 N.J. 1 (1983) | RA-73 | | Garvey v. Township of Wall, 303 N.J. Super. 93 (App Div 1997) | RA-73 | | Lubliner v. Bd. of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 33 N.J. 428, 435 (1960) | RA-74 | | Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J. 498, 505 (1991) | RA-74 | | Kram v. Kram, 94 N.J. Super. 539, 551 (Ch. Div.), rev’d on other grounds, 98 N.J. Super. 274 (App. Div. 1967), aff’d, 52 N.J. 545 (1968) | RA-74 | | Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398 (1991) | RA-74 | | Brookshire Equities, L.L.C. v. Montaquiza, 346 N.J. Super. 310. 318 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 172 N.J. 179 (2002) | RA-74 | | Culver v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 115 N.J. 451, 461-62 (1989) | RA-74 |  **Appellate Division  Docket No:**  [...]  **Respondents’ Letter Brief** | Party Name | Appellate Designation | Trial Court/Party Role | |--------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------| | [...] | Appellant | Plaintiff | | [...] | Respondent | Defendant | | [...] | Respondent | Defendant | | [...] | Respondent | Defendant | PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Between 2013 and 2015 [...] paid $629,217.85 from [...] customer [...] (also called [...]) to his wife’s separate company, [...].  Until discovery in this lawsuit, Plaintiffs had no access to the [...] financial records.  [...] is listed as the contact for [...] in [...]’s records.  (Da6687; 20T 96:21 to 99:14).  -  While [...] represented to [...] that when [...] encountered cash flow problems (which happened all the time – 25T 20:5-8), and could not pay [...] his full salary, [...] was paying himself his [...] salary from [...] without making similar payments to [...].  (25T 31:13 to 32:23; 28T 109:14-17).  -  [...] claimed that he paid himself through [...] to protect [...]’s DBE certification, which he said prevented him from being paid a greater salary than [...].
[brief] See id. at 171.  In yet another similar decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Court extended Massachusetts’s constitutional protection through age twenty.  See Commonwealth v. Mattis, 224 N.E.3d 410, 415, 428 (Mass. 2024).  Massachusetts’s twist on Miller is an absolute ban on life-without-parole sentences for young offenders.  Id. at 415, 420.  In extending that protection through age twenty, the Supreme Court relied heavily on developmental science, which had been presented in this case at an evidentiary hearing.
[brief] Successful candidates are entitled to a certificate of election.  N.J.S.A. 19:28-6.  Once awarded, they can only be retracted by the court, either through a recount, N.J.S.A. 19:28-4, or by an election contest, N.J.S.A. 19:29-9. \(^2\)  Indeed, these are the situations addressed by the Appellant in the cases he cites such as State v. Governor.  They do not address ministerial corrections made before a victorious candidate is vested with a property right in their certificate of election, which is what occurred.
[brief] The Ordinance Sec. 413.02B thirty (30) inch maximum height restriction for shrubbery and structures located in the flare confirms the purpose of the Historic Flared Open Space Area was to afford properties fronting the flare an unobstructed ocean view.  The unobstructed ocean view purpose of the flare explains why access walkways and sidewalks are excluded from the Ordinance Sec. 413.02B restrictions on structures in the flare.  Access walkways, by their nature, do not obstruct the ocean view across the flare.  The flared front lot line planning scheme is not advanced by restricting to one (1) the number of walkways permitted in the flare.  The singular term “walkway” as used in Ordinance Sec. 413.02B should be interpreted pursuant to Ordinance Sec. 200 to include the plural “walkways”; thus rendering the second access walkway across the flare adjacent to the property a conforming structure.  Assuming, arguendo, Ordinance Sec. 413.02B limits to one (1) the number of access walkways permitted in the flare, rendering the second access walkway to the Property a non-conforming structure, plaintiffs’-appellants’ removal of the broken concrete from the second walkway and replacing the concrete with concrete unit pavers did not constitute either the destruction or abandonment of the second walkway.  The MLUL contains provisions protecting landowners from losing property rights that predate the enactment of municipal land use ordinances.
[brief] ASIAN HATE CRIMES  TASK FORCE, a non-profit organization, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], and [...], in his official capacity as records custodian, Defendants-Cross-Appellants/Respondents.  | SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION CIVIL ACTION  On appeal from a final judgment of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Civil Part, Camden County [...]  Docket No. Below  [...]  SAT BELOW: Hon. [...], A.J.S.C. Superior Court, Camden County | [...], Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], [...], in his official capacity as records custodian, and [...], Defendants-Appellants/Respondent.
[brief] [...]’s Comprehensive Review  [...] conducted a thorough review of the Project.  Consistent with its ³“TGPsa” refers to Tennessee’s Supplemental Appendix submitted herewith. responsibilities under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h, [...] staff prepared an in-depth Environmental Assessment (“EA”) for the Project.\(^4\) TGPsa002.  The EA addressed a wide range of environmental impacts, including geology, soils, groundwater, surface water, wetlands, fisheries, wildlife, vegetation, species of special concern, socioeconomics, land use, recreation, visual impacts, cultural resources, air quality, noise, reliability and safety, and cumulative impacts.  Id.  The EA acknowledged that CS 327 would be located within the Highlands Preservation Area and recognized the objectives of the Highlands Act.  TGPsa013.  In addition, the EA addressed greenhouse gas emissions (“GHGs”) associated with construction and operation of the Project by quantifying the direct emissions of the Project, and describing how the Project would affect New Jersey’s satisfaction of its greenhouse gas emissions reductions goals.  TGPsa014-020.  The EA concluded that the Project “would not constitute a major action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. ”  TGPsa021.  [...] staff subsequently issued a Draft EIS, which incorporated the EA’s analysis and conclusions, except for those related to the Project’s impact on climate change.
[brief] 1T – Transcript of Trial, May 18, 2021  2T – Transcript of Trial, May 19, 2021  3T - Transcript of Trial, May 20, 2021  4T - Transcript of Trial, May 21, 2021  5T - Transcript of Trial, July 19, 2021  6T - Transcript of Trial, July 20, 2021  7T - Transcript of Trial, July 21, 2021  8T - Transcript of Trial, July 22, 2021  9T - Transcript of Trial, July 26, 2021  10T - Transcript of Trial, July 27, 2021  11T - Transcript of Trial, July 28, 2021 12T - Transcript of Trial, August 11, 2021 13T - Transcript of Trial, August 12, 2021 14T - Transcript of Trial, October 4, 2021 15T - Transcript of Trial, October 5, 2021 16T - Transcript of Trial, October 6, 2021 17T - Transcript of Trial, November 29, 2021 18T - Transcript of Trial, November 30, 2021 19T - Transcript of Trial, December 1, 2021 20T - Transcript of Trial, December 2, 2021 21T - Transcript of Trial, February 14, 2022 22T - Transcript of Trial, February 15, 2022 23T - Transcript of Trial, February 16, 2022 24T - Transcript of Motion, August 30, 2022 25T - Transcript of Hearing for Final Judgment of Divorce, March 18, 2015  Table of Authorities Page(s)
[brief] This matter before the court is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A),(G),(H) and (O), and the court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334, 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), and the Standing Order of Reference issued by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on July 23, 1984, as amended on September 18, 2012, referring all bankruptcy cases to the bankruptcy court.  The following constitutes this court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052.