ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On March 2, 2017, Defendant received four summonses:  Summons No. [...] charged him with driving while suspended contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:3-40; Summons No. [...] charged him with DWI contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; Summons No. [...] charged him with reckless driving contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-96; and Summons No. [...] charged him with open container contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-51a.b. (Ra1-Ra4)  On May 16, 2018, Defendant appeared with counsel before the Toms River Municipal Court and entered a negotiated plea of guilty.  (1T3-2 to 5-3)  The Hon. [...], J.M.C., accepted Defendant’s plea and, because it was Defendant’s second conviction, sentenced him to 2 years’ loss of driving privileges; 48 hours IDRC; $506.00 fine; $33.00 costs; $225.00 DWI surcharge; $50.00 VCCB; $75.00 SNSF; 30 days of community service; and one-year ignition interlock (subsequent to the 2-year license revocation).  [...] also suspended imposition of a 90-day jail sentence contingent upon Defendant’s completion of community service.  (1T6-14 to 6-24)  On March 23, 2022, Defendant moved before the Toms River Municipal  --- 1  The State adopts Appellant’s appendix designations noted at Dbii-Dbiii; “1T” refers to transcript of proceedings dated May 16, 2018; “2T” refers to transcript of proceedings dated March 23, 2022; “3T” refers to transcript of proceedings dated June 15, 2023.  Court to vacate his 2018 guilty plea.  The Hon. [...], J.M.C., denied Defendant’s motion.  (2T23-6 to 23-8)  Defendant subsequently filed a notice of appeal with the Ocean County Superior Court, Law Division.  Trial de novo was held on June 15, 2023.  At its conclusion, the Hon. [...], J.S.C., also denied Defendant’s motion to vacate his 2018 guilty plea.  (3T29-18 to 29-19)  This appeal follows.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Therefore, in an effort to “put the issue to bed” once and for all the Court's December 10, 2012 Order [Doc. No. 149] provided as follows:  *4  1.  [...] shall produce for the Court's *in camera* inspection copies of all e-mails exchanged between [...] and [...] with a designation of which e-mails have already been produced in discovery; and 2.  [...] shall produce for the Court's *in camera* inspection copies of all e-mails exchanged between [...] and [...] and all e-mails exchanged between [...] and [...] for the time period of January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2011; and 3.  [...] shall conduct a search of its electronically stored information for all e-mails exchanged between (1) [...] and [...], (2) [...] and [...], and (3) [...] and [...], that mention “Art” “Arthur” and “Montana. ”  [...] shall produce the responsive e-mails in discovery.  To the extent [...] claims that the e-mails are privileged, [...] shall inform the parties and the Court of the volume of e-mails at issue before a privilege log is prepared; and 4.  By December 19, 2012, [...] shall produce an affidavit from [...] confirming that she searched for and produced all relevant and responsive documents and electronically stored information; and 5.  By December 19, 2012, [...]'s counsel shall serve a letter confirming that [...] was asked to search for and produce all personal electronically stored information responsive to discovery requests directed to her in the case; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the deadlines for [...] to produce the discovery listed in this Order are set forth in [...]'s December 7, 2012 letter [Doc. No. 146].
[brief] Stewart, 87 N.J. at 157.  This provides an explanation as to why this charge is focused on pedestrians who are simply using the sidewalk abutting the commercial owner’s property and makes no reference to how it would be different for an invitee.  Further, Defendants never cited to or argued the following cases before the trial court:  Sarro v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. A-1392-21, 2023 WL 2566062 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 20, 2023) (Da38-42); Greenstein v. Forsgate Industrial Complex, No. A-0947-19, 2021 WL 3084740 (App. Div. 2021) (Da33-37); and Hanna v. Woodland Community Assoc., No. A-0277-21, 2022 WL 16984707 (App. Div. 2022).
[brief] In any event, the current situation involves the granting of a conditional use, which is “significantly differen[t]” than a situation where the use is prohibited by governing zoning ordinance.  See, e.g., *Coventry Square, Inc. v. Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 138, N.J. 285, 297 (1994) (“[O]ur courts generally have treated (continued...) a gross mischaracterization of this Court’s holdings.
[brief] Id.  After having her case dismissed by the trial court, the Appellate Division reversed and held that [...] was equitably estopped from asserting the provision.  The Boritz Court stated:  'Estoppel is an equitable doctrine, founded in the fundamental duty of fair dealing imposed by law.'  The doctrine is designed to prevent injustice by not permitting a party to repudiate a course of action on which another party has relied to his detriment."
[brief] That case was brought by a computerized educational-learning system distributor under the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act.  It was not an action brought by a malt beverage distributor under the MBPA or ABC Law.  The court also held that the “exception set forth in part (a) of the Restatement approach does not apply because [defendant] is headquartered in California, and hence California law has a ‘substantial relationship to the parties. ’”  Id. at 342 (emphasis added).  Finally, as discussed in greater detail below, Appellants’ --- 6 Appellants’ citation to Winer Motors is also misplaced because the franchisee in that case was not incorporated in – nor were most of its sales in – the same state whose law applied per the contract.
[brief] Testimony at the pretrial Miranda hearing mirrored that which was later elicited at trial, minus the agreed-upon redactions in defendant’s recorded statement. \(^5\) --- \(^5\)  At a pretrial hearing on October 6, 2022, defendant’s counsel asked for time to consider redactions “for trial purposes. ” (5T9-12 to 15).  [...] was the State’s sole witness as the *Miranda* hearing.
[brief] ”  Then, on June 20, 2024, Respondents [...] and [...]’s motion, too, was granted without any corresponding statement of reasons or explanation.  This suggests that the arguments advanced by Appellant at the trial court level were insufficiently considered or, worse, not considered at all by the trial court.  First, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Appellant knowingly and voluntarily “agreed” to arbitrate any and all future claims arising out of her employment with Respondents.  During Appellant’s onboarding, Appellant received an instruction to log into her employee portal account and click through a series of company “policies” which were available for her review.  Although she did not know it at the time, the Arbitration Agreement at issue was buried within the pages of these “policies,” which Respondents instructed Appellant to click through before she could begin work.  Appellant never “signed” the Arbitration Agreement and never did anything more than, allegedly, “acknowledge” same by simply opening up the link to the policy through the employee portal.  It did not matter how long Appellant had the Arbitration Agreement opened for, whether she closed it and revisited it at a later date, or if she had any objections to the Arbitration Agreement.  Instead, according to Respondents, simply opening the policy for a transient moment in time was sufficient for Appellant to have knowingly and voluntarily waived her constitutional right to a trial before a jury of her peers on her statutory employment discrimination claims.
[directive] 1.  In order to be qualified under New Jersey law to serve on a jury, a person must have certain qualifying characteristics.  A juror must be: • Age 18 or older • A citizen of the United States • Able to read and understand the English language.  • A resident of ____________ county (the summoning county)  Also, a juror must not: • Have been convicted of any indictable offense in any state or federal court • And must not have any physical or mental disability which would prevent the person from properly serving as a juror.  Please consider that the Judiciary will provide reasonable accommodations consistent with the Americans with Disabilities Act.  Is there any one of you who does not meet these requirements?
[directive] Sentencing Courts Must Consider Specified Circumstances in Exercising Discretion to Waive or Reduce a School Zone Mandatory Minimum Term  When a school zone defendant is eligible to be sentenced in the court’s discretion pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b, the court must consider certain specified circumstances in deciding whether to waive or reduce the mandatory term of imprisonment and parole ineligibility.  The specified circumstances set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b (1) are: the extent of the defendant’s criminal record and the seriousness of any prior offenses for which the defendant has been convicted; the specific location of the present offense in relation to school property and the reasonable likelihood of exposing children to drug-related activities at that location; c. whether school was in session at the time of the offense; and whether children were actually present or in the immediate vicinity when the offense took place.
[brief] •  In the trial court’s September 14, 2021 Decision on Motion for Judgment at Trial, it stated, “The Court also feels compelled to find that serious and substantial issues have been brought out by plaintiff’s cross-examination of defendant as to certain seminal points of argument by defendant about her case…”  The trial court found Defendant’s own witness [...] to be credible when he testified that Defendant was not telling the truth about bankruptcy representation.
[brief] Timely Submitted 10/14/24  Table of Contents  Page  Table of Authorities - Court Rules and Statutes  -----------------  3  Preliminary Statement----------------------------------------  4  Legal Argument Point 1 - The prosecutor’s request to deny my appeal has no legal grounds.  (Prb12)-----------------------------  5-9  Point 2 - Prosecution should be disqualified and denied from further participating in all matters of this appeal going forward.  (Prb cover page, Prb12)--------------  9-13  Conclusion---------------------------------------------------  14-15
[brief] RELIEF WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING SINCE DEFENDANT FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.  (Da53 to 113).  18  A.  The PCR Court Properly Found That Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Failing To Challenge The “Sneak And Peak” Warrant.  23  B.  Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Failing To Investigate Or Present Potential Alibi Evidence.  36 C. Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Not Having A Juror Letter Tested By An Independent Laboratory.  43  CONCLUSION 48
[brief] THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF EMINENT DOMAIN LAW AND BY CREATING NEW LAW THAT LACKS SUPPORT IN NEW JERSEY JURISPRUDENCE.  [Da9-Da11; Da12-Da13]  Plaintiff does not address the arguments in Point II of [...]’s brief that the trial court erred by (1) finding that [...]’s proposed use was not a public use, and (2) failing to defer to [...]’s exercise of discretion in its use of eminent domain.  First, Plaintiff does not – because it has no legal basis to – dispute the well-established principle that New Jersey law treats redevelopment for commercial purposes exactly the same as it treats a proposed park or hospital in terms of justifying condemnation for a public use.  (Db 38-Db41).  The court below erroneously held that [...]’s purpose for condemnation was a “private use” because the court considered commercial redevelopment to be unlike open space or a hospital.  (1T51:11-16).  The trial court’s belief that commercial redevelopment does not constitute a public purpose in the eminent domain context disregards Supreme Court doctrine.  (Db 38-Db41), [...] has proffered a legitimate public use in potentially acquiring the Property, i.e., redevelopment, and the trial court should not have denied [...] its constitutional rights to redevelopment and eminent domain.  See 62-62 Main St., L.L.C. v. Mayor & Council of Hackensack, 221 N.J. 129, 144, 156 (2015); N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 3, ¶ 1 (1947).  Along the same lines, Supreme Court precedent holds that courts must defer to municipal discretion in their use of its eminent domain, provided there is no fraud, bad faith or manifest abuse.  Mt. Laurel Twp. v. MiPro Homes, LLC, 188 N.J. 531, 536 (2006); Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., LLC, 172 N.J. 564, 571 (2002).  Again, the trial court ignored Supreme Court precedent.  The court created new law stating that if a town is constitutionally non-compliant, then it loses its powers to even pursue eminent domain and redevelopment, regardless of whether a legitimate public purpose and lack of bad faith exist.  (Pb18-Pb24; 1T51:17-20; 1T54:21-25; 2T14:11-15:4; 2T19:10-21; 2T22:14-21).  The trial court’s ruling goes beyond what Mount Laurel provides - which is that a finding of non-compliance renders [...] vulnerable to a builder’s remedy lawsuit through which the Property could be rezoned.  Instead, the court ruled that [...]’s non-compliance strips it of inherent powers granted by the Constitution, to exercise its redevelopment and condemnation rights.  The trial court cannot use the Mount Laurel doctrine to rewrite the Constitution.  III.
[brief] There is separate litigation ongoing between Plaintiff and [...].  See Singleton v. Maryland Tech. Dev. Corp., No. 22-CV-00999-JMC, 2022 WL 4104201 (D.  Md. Sept. 8, 2022) (order dismissing earlier case, “Singleton I”); Singleton v. Md. Tech. & Dev. Corp., Case No. 22-2075 (4th Cir.) (appeal).  But as to the instant case, [...] is a third party.  Plaintiff has issued three third-party subpoenas to [...], two of which are operative (one of them, ECF 52-1, having been superseded and withdrawn): a subpoena for production of documents, ECF No. 52-8 (the “Document Subpoena”), and a subpoena for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of [...], which also contained additional requests for production of documents from [...], ECF No. 52-2 (the “30(b)(6) Subpoena”).  Plaintiff and [...] (the “Disputants”) appeared before me yesterday, March 13, 2024, for a discovery hearing.  Plaintiff and [...] filed several submissions in advance of the hearing, ECF Nos. 43, 46, 51, 52, 54, 55, 59; see also ECF Nos. 53 (order setting briefing schedule) & 54 (order setting hearing).  Those submissions revealed that the Disputants were unable to resolve ten disputes arising from the two operative subpoenas: (1) the appropriate time frame for documents and testimony, (2) whether [...] would need to re-produce documents to Plaintiff that [...] had previously produced to Plaintiff in the EEOC proceeding, (3) whether and to what extent discovery from Defendants should precede or control discovery from [...], (4) the impact Defendants being sued in only their personal capacities has on the scope of discovery, (5) which, if any, “performance development plans” of [...] employees other than Plaintiff are discoverable, (6) which custodians’ documents [...] should collect and review, (7) the search terms [...] should use to search any custodian’s documents, (8) [...]’s assertion of attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine over investigations conducted by [...] and an outside law firm, (9) whether Plaintiff is entitled to sanctions in the form of attorneys’ fees and costs as requested, and (10) whether other case deadlines should be stayed pending completion of discovery from [...].
[brief] --- \(^7\)  Further details as to what took place during the Board Hearing are not included because [...] chose not to present any transcript of that hearing to the trial court.  [P]lease advise the Mayor that [[...] attorney [...]’s] email [of June 12, 2022] represents [...]’s willingness to amend the settlement in accordance with the terms therein.  I think the Mayor said he has a Council meeting Wednesday evening.  Please let me know how that goes so we can get back to work.  . . .  Immediately after the June 13 Board hearing, the Board’s attorney, the Township’s attorney and the Township’s planners began the process of reviewing the Settlement Agreement and the zoning code and then drafting the needed amendments and drafting the Board’s Project approval resolution.
[brief] The “Table of Source” pages from that 1971 Code Book at Page A-17 (Da246) shows that the source of 1971 Section 18-8.1 (the Site Plan requirements) was the 1961 Revised Ordinance Section 12.06.  The previous codification to 1971 was apparently the 1961 Revised Code; Chapter 12 of that 1961 Code was entitled “Zoning” and Section 12.06 set forth the Site Plan Requirement for new development, as confirmed by the Table of Sources.
[brief] The wedding was held at the Decedent’s friend’s house ([...]) in Ventor.  With about thirty or forty people in attendance, it “wasn’t a real large wedding. ” (9T109-5 to 19).  The setup and decorations were “pretty basic. ” (11T7-19).  **Third**, the Petitioner’s testimony lacked credibility, to say the least.  Remarkably, the Petitioner also argues that “no acceptable excuse was provided by Respondent for the absence of the original of the Photocopy. ” (Pb 40).  This flies in the face of the Respondent’s clearly expressed position at trial, which was that the Petitioner destroyed the original.  The Petitioner complains about the Chancery Division’s “conjecture and far-reaching assumptions” and about the “unreliable hearsay testimony” of the numerous witnesses testifying to the existence of the Agreement.  (Pa 40-41).  Such argument fail as a matter of course.
[directive] 4 Available. Not Aye Risks) Manage Might That Services the by posed the risks) that determines prosecutor the where cases be may There or monitoring of form some by only managed adequately be can release upon defendant not is otherwise or program services pretrial the by provided not is that service intervention is that activity criminal defendant's a example, of By way risk(s). the mitigate to available funds acquire to committed burglaries residential or robberies (e.g., addiction her or his to related court- a in participating by interrupted be might dependency) drug defendant's the support to Court Drug Jersey's of New success proven the by shown as program, treatment ordered of cycle vicious break the to incentives and opportunities treatment provides which Program, include might conditions release (pretrial 2A:162-17(b)(2)(i) N.J.S.A. See crime. and addiction dependency") or alcohol drug for . . treatment . available "undergo defendant the that be not might treatment pretrial that recognized Legislature the that note to added (emphasis and interpretation statutory reasonable of matter a As 6.2.4. subsection also See available). detention from pretrial be immune to deemed be not should defendant a policy, public sound the manage to sufficient been theory might have in conditions release unavailable because trial. pending release defendant's by posed risks) identified of provisions other the with accordance in determines prosecutor if the cases, such In pretrial the shall at argue prosecutor detention, the pretrial seek to Directive of this 7 Section of combination or condition no purposes, legal and practical for that, hearing detention the required, when in court appearance defendant's the assure reasonably would conditions not will defendant that and community, the or person other any of safety the of protection shall prosecutor the other words, In justice process. criminal the obstruct to attempt or obstruct by posed the risks) Reform if Law Bail the under authorized is detention pretrial that argue a of unavailability practical the to due unabated and serious remain will release defendant's risk(s). the mitigated have might otherwise that condition release pretrial seek presumption to a creating as construed be shall subsection this in Nothing a address to on prosecutors how to uniform guidance provides subsection this Rather, detention. adjudicative an receive Constitution, to and Jersey New the of 22 paragraph I, Article by or herein motion. such any on court the by decision Page 73 condition matter of if any cannot be ordered as a law detention pretrial argument that defense defendant's would reasonably assure the 2A:162-17(b) N.J.S.A. authorized by expressly of any or the protection of the safety other person the when required, court appearance in or criminal justice obstruct attempt to obstruct the will not defendant that community, and to See Section 13 (provisions actually available.
[brief] 21, 22 Weston v. State, 60 N.J. 36 (1972) .............................................................  16  Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197 (App. Div. 2000) ......  12  Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436 (2005) ....................................  16  STATUTES
[brief] [...] uses QuickBooks for its accounting and bookkeeping.  (2T:45:19-22).  [...]’s QuickBooks file was maintained exclusively by Appellant prior to his removal by Court Order on January 25, 2018.  (2T:45:23-46:4).  The January 25, 2018 Order, as Amended on January 29, 2018, required Appellant to produce [...]’s QuickBooks file.
[brief] [...] also testified that his decision not to renew Plaintiff was based “strictly” on her “job performance. ” ([...] Tr. 115:16-24).  Thus, there is not a shred of evidence to even suggest a discriminatory motive or that [...]’s reasons for recommending Plaintiff’s non-renewal or the [...]’s following that recommendation are a pretext for discrimination.  Plaintiff’s *prima facie* case for both age and race discrimination consequently fail as a matter of law.
[brief] 1T55:14-56:6.  Defendant advised Plaintiff that he did not know anything about higher education since he had never gone to college and asked Plaintiff to reach a decision on [...]’s choice of school, [...].  1T47:1-48:13.  When Plaintiff affirmatively chose for [...], Defendant agreed with it, acknowledging, “I guess we’re sending [...] to [...]. ”  1T48:12-13.  By the time it was [...]’s turn to select a college, her relationship with Defendant had deteriorated and was so poor, that Defendant did not go on any --- \(^2\)
[brief] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 3 | | COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS | 3 | | **I. THE PROJECT, THE PARTIES AND THE INSURANCE POLICIES** | | | A. The Project | 3 | | B. [...]’s Direct Liability Policies | 4 | | C. The Contractor Controlled Insurance Program | 5 | | **II.
[directive] An plis, nan sèten sikonstans, kondanasyon yon premye, dezyèm, twazyèm oswa residive ta kab lakòz revokasyon privilèj imatrikilasyon machinn w an ak/oswa yon peryòd adisyonèl de revokasyon lisans ou.  In addition, under certain circumstances, conviction for a first, second, third or subsequent offense could result in revocation of your motor vehicle registration privilege and/or an additional period of your driver’s license suspension.  Jij la enfòme w tou de tout konsekans ki make anlè yo nan odyans piblik ki fèt nan tribinal la.  You have also been informed of the above consequences orally in open court by the Judge.  Fòm Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11710-Haitian Creole paj 1 nan 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11710-Haitian Creole page 1 of 2
[directive] [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하가 다음의 강력범죄에 대하여 유죄를 시인하기 때문에, Do you understand that because of your plea of guilty to (제1 급 및 제 급 강력범죄를 열거하십시오.)  2 Crimes)  (List First or Second Degree Violent 그 범죄(들)에 대한 가석방 자격이 생기기