[brief] With this point, [...] argues that the [...] is prohibited from applying the Public Access Law because the [...] has not adopted regulations within eighteen months of the Law’s effective date, as required by N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(b).  (Ab25).  The Law, however, contains no provision prohibiting its implementation if the [...] does not adopt regulations within the prescribed time period.  See N.J.S.A. 13:1D-150 to -156.  Specifically, the statute requires the [...] to adopt rules within eighteen months of its effective date to establish the types of permits that would and would not require public access, and the categories of projects that will not require public access.  N.J.S.A.  13:1D-153(b).  Elsewhere, the Law provides that the [...] “may adopt . . . rules and regulations necessary to implement” the Law.  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-156 (emphasis added).  Though N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(b) provides for certain rulemaking to be adopted within eighteen months of the effective date of the Law, courts have recognized that rulemaking is a largely discretionary function and the appropriate remedy for agency inaction is by direct appeal to the Appellate Division pursuant to Rule 2:2-3(a)(2).  In re Failure by the Dep’t of Banking & Ins., 336 N.J. Super. 253, 261 (App. Div. 2001).  However, [...] has not pursued such a remedy and courts are reluctant to direct agencies to implement a legislatively assigned discretionary task out of respect for the separation of powers between branches of government.  See Id. at 262 (court declined to issue mandamus to compel the [...] to complete the statutorily mandated fee schedule).  Here, the Commissioner properly found that “the absence of [public access] rules does not preclude the action taken by the [[...]] in this matter. ” (Aa134).  Stated another way, without a legislative bar to implementing the Law without new regulations, the Law obligates [...] to protect the public’s right to access tidal waters and impose public access conditions on permits.  But cf. N.J.S.A. 13:1D-160 (environmental justice statute implemented “immediately upon the adoption of the rules and regulations required pursuant to” N.J.S.A. 13:1D-161).  [...] also contends that, to apply the terms of the Law, the [...] needed to provide guidance through rulemaking to determine what constitutes a “change in footprint of a structure. ” (Ab26).  However, the [...]’s application of a plain meaning of the terms of the statute was reasonable and did not require rulemaking.  See Airwork Serv. Div. v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n, 97 N.J. 290, 301 (1984) (assessment of taxes sufficiently clear and directly inferable from the tax statute and not invalid for lack of rulemaking).  In this case, as the Commissioner reasonably determined, the existing definitions in the [...]’s CZM Rules “were sufficient to guide the [[...]]’s analysis of whether there was a change in footprint under N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153. ” (Aa134).  For example, the CZM Rules define “footprint of development” as “the vertical projection to the horizontal plane of the exterior of all exterior walls of a structure,” and the definition of “structure” includes “any assembly of materials above, on, or below the surface of the land or water,” which logically includes piers, pilings, and bulkheads.  N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.5.  Accordingly, the Commissioner correctly determined that the Public Access Law’s terms, combined with the CZM Rules, “was sufficient to determine what constitutes a ‘change in footprint of a structure,’” and thus “no additional guidance was necessary. ” (Aa134).  For these reasons, [...]’s rulemaking challenges should fail.