ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] More than three (3) years after Appellants defaulted under the Lease by failing to pay the annual rent due to [...], and after Appellants voluntarily surrendered the Property to [...] in accordance with the Lease, Appellants sought to assert a claim that they were wrongfully removed from the Property.  This claim is virtually identical to that which Appellants unsuccessfully sought to add as Count 18 in their proposed Second Amended Complaint in the Prior Action.  The trial court correctly determined that the lack of merit and delay in seeking to assert this claim warranted dismissal.
[brief] “[T]he proper inquiry for determining the constitutionality of a search and seizure is whether the conduct of the law enforcement officer who undertook the search was objectively reasonable, without regard to his or her underlying motives or intent. ”  *State v. Bruzzese*, 94 N.J. 210, 219 (1983).  Moreover, on a motion to suppress, “the State need prove only that the police lawfully stopped the car, not that it could convict the driver of the motor-vehicle offense. ”  *State v. Williamson*, supra, 138 N.J. at 304; see also *State v. Jones*, 326 N.J.Super. 234, 239 (App. Div. 1999).  Thus, it is inconsequential that the defendant was ultimately acquitted of the motor vehicle violation.  The issue is whether the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of a violation before the stop.  State v. Heisler, 422 N.J. Super. 399, 413 (App. Div. 2011).
[brief] A334  Exhibit D-63: Irrevocable Power of Attorney Attached as A21  Exhibit D-69: Invoice of [...]  A337  Exhibit D-73: Emails between [...] and [...] A358  Exhibit D-79: Emails between [...] and [...] re: Power of Attorney A361  Exhibit D-84: Emails between [...] and [...] re: Reserves Tolling Agreement  A368  Exhibit D-86: Emails between [...] and [...] re: Reserves A371  Exhibit D-90: Emails between [...] and [...] re: [...]’s Group Reply in Support A388  Exhibit D-91: Emails between [...], [...] and [...] re: Assignment of Claim A393  Volume 2 (A398-A593)
[brief] Transcript (3T)²  I indeed informed Your Honor that I wish to dispute the violation … on page 6 of the September 12, 2022 transcript (lines 20-25), Superior Court Of New Jersey Law Division, Municipal Appeal Transcript of Trial De Novo September 12,2022  Honorable [...], J. A. D.  ……………………………………………………………3T page6 lines 20-25 ²  Superior Court Of New Jersey Law Division, Municipal Appeal Transcript of Trial De Novo September 12,2022  (3T)  Honorable [...], J. A. D.  CONCLUSION
[brief] (PA131)  Model Jury Charge 5.77 in effect in March 2023 provides that:  “You may rely upon the same evidence in rendering a verdict as to whether or not the Plaintiff’s nursing home residents’ rights were violated and whether or not the Defendants were negligent. ”  Model Jury Charge (Civil)  5.77 “Violations of Nursing Home Statutes or Regulations” (Nov. 2022).  The charge to the jury contained that same language.  11T189:4-8.  The jury found defendant deviated from the standard of care in its treatment of [...].  The evidence adduced at trial showed that instead of being placed in the appropriate sub-acute unit where he would have access to superior care, [...] was shunted off to the overflow unit where long-term care residents were housed.  7T110:2-14.  That unit did not have registered nurses (RNs) administering to patients; only licensed practical nurses (LPNs), who do not have the same education and training as registered nurses.  5T66:16-67:10; 5T74:2-22.  No individualized care plan was in place for [...]’s extensive respiratory care needs.  Out of a 28-page care plan, only one page had anything to do with [...]’s respiratory care.  5T82:1-8.  The care plan did not meet the nursing standard of care.  5T86:23-87:1.  No appropriate assessments by a registered nurse were done.  5T75:10-13.  Doctors orders were not followed.  5T102:25-103:1.  Defendant’s own policies on suctioning were not followed.  5T102:7-14.  Most damaging of all, [...] did not get the level of respiratory care that he needed.  5T33:5-11.  At trial, plaintiff asserted that defendant violated N.J.S.A. 30:13-5(j)(2), which states: “[e]very resident of a nursing home shall have the right to a safe and decent living environment and considerate and respectful care that recognizes the dignity and individuality of the resident. ”  The evidence establishing the breach of the standard of care also established the violation of [...]’s right to a safe and decent living environment with considerate and respectful care recognizing his dignity and individuality.  That the jury found breach of the standard of care but no violation of rights is inconsistent and requires a new trial.  **POINT V**
[brief] See State v. Bowens, 108 N.J. 622, 634, 641 (1987) (where jury finds “shooting to kill an unarmed attacker who has fallen to the ground” was not self-defense, it may find passion/provocation).  Indeed, in Carrero, the Court upheld the reversal of a murder conviction for just that reason, in circumstances very close to the instant matter.  In that case, the defense was self-defense and the jury was instructed on reckless and aggravated manslaughter as lesser-included offenses, but the trial judge improperly refused a request to charge passion/provocation manslaughter, and the Court held that the jury could have returned a passion/provocation-manslaughter verdict under either of two theories: (1) that the decedent drew a gun, after which there was a tussle over the gun and the defendant shot the decedent, or (2) that there simply was “a physical struggle” between the two men and defendant over-responded to that struggle -- which itself constituted a “battery” -- and shot the decedent.  229 N.J. at 130-131.  The decision in Carrero follows a long line of precedent in that regard.  In New Jersey, mutual combat or any “battery, except for a light blow, has traditionally been considered, almost as a matter of law, to be sufficiently provocative” to reduce murder to passion/provocation manslaughter.
[brief] Moreover, [...] has demurred on repeated invitations to disclose the rates charged by his own stable of attorneys from multiple highly respected New Jersey firms, and the court therefore reasonably inferred that the rates Defendants’ attorneys employ are similar if not higher.  \textit{State v. Clawans}, 38 N.J. 162, 170 (1962) (“failure of a party to produce before a trial tribunal proof which, it appears, would serve to elucidate the facts in issue, raises a natural \footnote{13}{The 2016 New Jersey Law Journal article relied upon by [...] in his appeal brief to claim Plaintiff’s rates are excessive was not part of the record below, and is of little relevance as it is outdated, does not distinguish among type of firm, practice area, or location in the state, and which is based on data compiled from attorneys using a specific billing software.  (Da283; Db30-31).} inference that the party so failing fears exposure of those facts would be unfavorable to him”); *Darling Int’l, Inc. v. Baywood Partners, Inc.*, 2007 WL 4532233, at *2-*3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2007) (“Moreover, [fee objector] Darling’s decision not to disclose the attorney’s fees it incurred in litigating this case strongly suggests that [fee applicant] Baywood’s fees compare favorably to those incurred by Darling.
[brief] ²  Because the [...] share a common surname, the State will refer to them Defendant borrowed [...]’s cell phone to ask his cousin, [...], to pick him up.  (8T64-23 to 65-13).  He also sent a Facebook message from [...]’s account to his own account for his current girlfriend, [...], saying, “This is [...].  I’m good.  I gotta get my gun. ”  (8T67-14 to 68-12; 8T74-13 to 25; 8T100-13 to 17; 8T101-6 to 22; 103-2 to 25; 8T104-1 to 2).  [...] picked defendant up and dropped him off at home in [...] at approximately 4:00 p.m. (8T269-21 to 270-1).
[brief] | 302a | | | a.  Appendix Exhibit “D” - Apr. 18th/25th Settlement Agreement, & Email Train with [...], [...], & [...], “Global Settlement Offer for all Litigation” - April 19 to May 3, 2022 | 323a | | | b.  Appendix Exhibit “E” - Email Train with Mr.  [...], [...], & [...], “URGENT: Objections by Mr. [...] and [...] to 3-Way Settlement” - April 25 to May 9, 2022 | 331a | | | c. App. Exh. “F” - Email Train w/[...] & [...], “Objections by Mr. [...] & [...] to Settlement” - May 10-11, ‘22 | 339a | | | d. App. Exh. “G” – See App. Exh. “J”, “K”, & “L” for Exh.  “P”.  | --- | | |  Exhibit “W” is Mr. [...]’s Nov. 4, 2022 Certification in Opposition to [...]’s Oct. 26, ’22 Request for Trust payment of legal fees, & a $25K Trust Reserve.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ......  1  ARGUMENT I.  THE BOARD’S DENIAL OF [...]’S APPLICATION MADE APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR AND NINE MONTHS  PAST THE STATUTORY DEADLINE TO FILE FOR AMENDED  BENEFITS IS REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED .................................................................  5  II.  CONSIDERATIONS OF ADEQUATE OR ACTUAL NOTICE  DO NOT COMPEL A DIFFERENT RESULT  ...........................................................................10  CONCLUSION
[brief] On October 19, 2021, a Middlesex County Grand Jury returned Indictment No. [...], charging defendant, [...], with second-degree possession of a firearm while possessing a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) with intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1 (Count 1); third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1); 2C:35-5(b)(11)(a) (Count 2); third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of school property, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a) (Count 3); and second-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute within 500 feet of public property, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (Count 4).
[brief] M45.  Finally, the Trial Court noted that the Mayor stated in his Township press release that eaglets were hatching on the Subject Property at the time of the hearing, with the Trial Court further noting that the statement: was made without reference to any evidence or reported fact, false on its face and, at the very least, made in reckless disregard of the truth.  And yet, it was purposely tinged with enough intent to evoke emotional, outraged and visceral responses that one such resident-objector voiced his objections to the Application in the record in a way that highlighted the effect of the statement and the unfounded fears it stoked.  M46.  It is important to stress the legal framework governing the manner in which variance applications are supposed to be reviewed pursuant to the Municipal Land Use Law ("MLUL"), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1, et seq.
[brief] Notwithstanding, although the Award grants the Association’s proposal, the Award replaces the entire Article with the exact language contained in the [...]’s MOU with the City, and which is inconsistent with the fire officers’ existing contracts, the Association’s proposal, and proposed verbatim contract language.  More specifically, the Captains, Battalion Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs contracts contain the following separate sections in each’s health benefits articles:  Captains – Article XV – Health Benefits – A. Hospital, Medical, Prescription, Dental And Optical – Employees B. Hospital, Medical, Dental And Prescription – Retirees C. Hospital, Medical, Dental And Prescription – Widows D. Insurance Carriers E. Insurance Officer F. Vested Benefits (Aa615-Aa622).  Battalion Chiefs - ARTICLE IX - HEALTH BENEFITS  A. Hospital, Medical, Prescription and Dental – Employees B. Optical C. Hospital, Medical, Dental and Prescription – Retirees D. Hospital, Medical, Dental And Prescription – Widows E.  The City reserves the right to self-insure or to change insurance companies  F. Vested Benefits G. Insurance Officer (Aa665-Aa672).  Deputy Chiefs - ARTICLE X - HEALTH BENEFITS  A. Hospital, Medical, Dental and Prescription - Employees  B. Optical C. Hospital, Medical, Dental and Prescription - Retirees  D. Hospital, Medical, Dental and Prescription – Widows E. Insurance Carriers F. Vested Benefits (Aa715-Aa721).  In the Award, the arbitrator indicated that the [...] proposed to amend Article XV – Health Benefits – Section A to “mimic Article VII of [...] Local 2’s MOA entered with the City of May 31, 2022. ”  Yet, instead of a “mimic,” the Award deleted and replaced an entire health benefits provision well beyond what was set forth in the final offer and in effect gutted longstanding historical language which included retirees, widows and dependents.
[brief] Following the 1997 transfer of the Property from [...] to [...], [...] continued to make payments on [...]’s Citi mortgage.  (3T 44:3-47:2, Jan. 9, 2023).  On or about September 16, 1998, [...] received a letter from [...] advising that the mortgage had been paid off and that there was an overage of $9,500, which was being returned therewith.  (3T 47:7-49:3, Jan. 9, 2023; Pa 0014-18).  [...] testified that this overage resulted when he and his ex-wife, [...], issued checks totaling $9,500 to [...] on or about July 20, 1998 to pay off the mortgage.  When [...] received the check for $9,500 and the letter confirming that the mortgage was paid off, he advised his attorney, [...] and requested that he do whatever needs to be done to confirm that title to the Property was properly vested with [...].  (3T 50:6-52:18, Jan. 9, 2023).  This request resulted in a correctory deed dated December 10, 1998 (the “December 1998 Deed”), which was drafted by [...] and recorded on December 16, 1998.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING COSTS  The award of litigation costs is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court.  *In re Caruso*, 18 N.J. 26, 36 (1955).  This Court reviews a trial court’s award of litigation costs for an abuse of discretion.  *Id.*  [...] next argues that [...] committed error by awarding [...] $88,827 for litigation costs.  Specifically, [...] contends that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding expert and transcript costs and failing to follow what [...] characterizes as “controlling Appellate Division authority. ”  *([...] Br., p. 67). *  The so-called “controlling authority” relied on by [...] is *Velli v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co.*, 257 N.J. Super. 308 (App. Div. 1992) and *Helton v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.*, 205 N.J. Super. 196 (App. Div. 1985).  Both *Velli* and *Helton* involved claims made under the personal injury protection (“PIP”) section of the New Jersey No-Fault Law, N.J. Stat. § 39:6A-1., *et seq.*  *Velli*, 257 N.J. Super. at 309 *Helton*, 205 N.J. Super. at 199.  In both cases, the court noted that a PIP claim is a creature of statute and that under the circumstances of each case, the applicable statute, i.e. the New Jersey No-Fault Law, did not allow --- 9 [...] also claims that [...] is not entitled to recover any costs because it was not a “prevailing party. ”  *([...] Br., p. 66). *  [...] relies on the same invalid argument it made that [...] is not a “successful claimant. ”  *See § I, supra.* for recovery of expert fees by the prevailing party.  *Velli*, 257 N.J. Super. at 310; *Helton*, 205 N.J. Super. at 202.  The PIP statute is not applicable in this case and, therefore (and contrary to [...]’s argument), neither *Velli* nor *Helton* is controlling.
[brief] Defendant’s repeated assertions that the anonymous tip implicated him in the crimes are misplaced because the testimony about the anonymous callers statement did not name defendant as perpetrator and the jury did not hear that the anonymous caller identified defendant as the person who killed [...].  Further, the identity of the anonymous caller was made an issue at trial by defendant in a futile attempt to challenge the credibility of [...]’s testimony at trial.  Thus, the harm defendant alleges he suffered here was self-created.  Finally, and most notably, the jury already heard testimony from [...] about the anonymous caller.  She testified that after defendant confessed to her, she told a friend about defendant’s confession who then called the police.  Given that the confrontation clause is largely concerned with a defendant’s ability to cross-examine their accuser, defendant does not explain what information could be elicited on the cross-examination of the anonymous caller that would have aided in his defense.  Instead, testimony from the caller would only bolster [...]’s testimony about the details of the crime that defendant included in his confession.  Defendant argues that the anonymous caller would have challenged the credibility of [...] and [...] because the police report indicates that the caller said [...] was not present when defendant confessed to the murder.  Not only was that assertion directly contradicted by [...]’s statement to police, but, if it was true, all of [...]’s testimony about the confession would have been barred as hearsay.  [Da25].  Therefore, defendant’s argument that his right to confront witnesses was violated fails and his appeal must be denied.
[brief] [...] filed an answer, counterclaim and third party complaint against [...] and [...] as guarantors, seeking damages for breach of contract and enforcing the guaranty against [...] and [...].  [...] filed an answer denying that he signed the guaranty or any documents on behalf of [...].  [...] in a letter dated June 13, 2018 dishonestly denied that he was advised about the sewer issue before [...]’s October 27, 2016 email by letter in response to [...]’ email requesting [...]’s position as to why the notice of termination was late and why the personal guarantee that was not seen before by [...] and [...] was delivered by [...].  However, [...] in fact met with [...] and [...] on September 26, 2016 and then sent a follow up email to [...] and [...] asking them to provide the necessary verification on the “no sewer line” issue and the need for an ejector pump from [...] for an approximate cost of $100,000, which clearly indicates that [...] knew of the sewer problem at least as early as the September 26, 2016 meeting with [...] and [...] (Pa1382).  Moreover, [...] testified at his deposition that he commenced discussions with [...] in September 2016 in an attempt to buy more time for [...] to be required to pay base rent in light of the sewer issue, and to try to get [...] to share on the cost of the expensive sewer hook-up, again conceding that he knew of the sewer issue and the cost of the hook up before September 30, 2016.  [...] believed that the September 30, 2016 date was not a “drop dead” date but a triggering date that would allow [...] to terminate the Lease after September 30, 2016.
[brief] See generally 5T and 6T.  The basis of the request was that: (a) the [...] would be unlikely to approve the Route 33 Signal, therefore, making its inclusion in the development unreasonable; and (b) the requirement of the Route 33 Signal was an unduly cost generating obligation for the Respondents.  The obligation to provide the Route 33 Signal was included in the VC-2 Zone at the time the [...] was granted the 2016 Judgment of Compliance.
[brief] Owner’s Expert Fees  The owner subsequently moved for reimbursement of the expert fees he had incurred in the amount of $14,737.50.  (Da102; 106, ¶30; 111, ¶28)  The owner relied on the principles of fairness and equity and, by analogy, N.J.S.A. 20:3-26(b) and -35.  (Da112-114; 149-153)  By order entered on January 8, 2021, the court denied the owner’s motion for his expert fees, without prejudice, on the incorrect basis that the owner had not cited a Court Rule, case law or legal basis for the relief requested.  (Da154-155; 160)
[brief] Applicable ordinances provide context to the issues in dispute.  Estell Manor Ordinance #380-35D requires that no development occur within 300 feet of a wetland.  This standard aligns with the Pinelands Commission requirement and expresses the public policy of the [...].  See Estell Manor Ord. § 380-35D) (located at http://www.estellmanor.org/images/Estell_Manor_Final_Code_post-draft_.PDF).  Ordinance 380-33, sections 6 and 7, require front yards in the subject zone be as close to 200 feet as practicable.  (Id.).  Single-family dwellings are permitted uses in this zone, (Ja217), now classified as an R-25 zone.  In April 2020, plaintiff entered a contract to sell the subject lot to [...].
[brief] (Aa119-120).  On July 12, 2018, the Army Corps conducted an inspection and identified the same deficiencies.  (Aa112-120).  Both DEP and the Army Corps required [...] to either bring the structure into compliance with the [...] 2017 Modification Permit conditions or apply for a permit modification to legalize the as-built structure.  (Aa110-120).  On October 30, 2018, [...] applied for a minor technical modification to legalize a 1.7-foot mis-location under the [...] 2017 Modification Permit, approve unauthorized structures, and replace a boat lift with two jet ski lifts (the “[...] 2018 Modification Application”).
[brief] \(^9\)  N.J.S.A. 48:12-152(b)(4) and (5).  Id.  The record below establishes that a rational jury could only conclude that [...] was wrongfully present on [...]’s right of way and using \(^9\)  The only exception to the statute is that it does not apply to bar claims arising out of injury or death to a minor.  N.J.S.A. 48:12-152(c). its railroad crossing in a manner in which it was not intended to be used when she contacted Train 81 because at the time she stepped onto the crossing: - Train 81 had the proceed signal and the right of way to enter and pass through the crossing; T8:4-9:1; - the pedestrian signal was indicating that she was not permitted to enter the crossing, and she did not have the right of way; Ibid.; - another [...] train travelling in the opposite direction on Track 2 had just left the Exchange Place station and was blocking her path across the crossing; Compare Pa163, ¶71 with Pa764, ¶71; Pa214-256; Pa257-299; Pa342-343; Pa1152 at 16:33:28 to 16:33:35; Da51 at 4:33:10 to 4:33:14 (video from security camera).  Likewise, there is no dispute that the collision occurred on [...]’s right of way and on the crossing, which are owned by [...].  Pa178 at ¶¶1-2; Pa189 at ¶¶1-2; Pa500; Pa674:7-23; Da33-34, ¶¶1-5, Da39-40, ¶¶6-9.  Therefore, the Court was correct when it determined that Plaintiff is barred from recovering under N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 because her injuries were caused by her misuse of [...]’s “railroad property”, and summary judgment was properly granted dismissing all of plaintiff’s claims with prejudice as a matter of law.
[brief] Loquitur  The only count that mentioned [...] was Count I (New Jersey Constitution), wherein Plaintiff stated:  7.  THE HIGHLAND PARK JUDGE and clerks and administrative staff, by not rendering the decision as a judgement filed with the courts has disenabled plaintiff [...] from effectuating his appeal, though Plaintiff’s Counsel filed timely with JEDS AND ATTEMPTED to file with both the Superior Court criminal as well as civil which both efforts were rejected, which has disallowed Plaintiff to perfect his appeal from the [...] Judge’s apparent failure to file the final judgment.  8.  As a consequence of Defendant’s actions, plaintiff has been deprived of procedural, substantive due process, equal protection, the right to a fair trial by an impartial entity in accordance with MORRISSEY v. BREWER, 408 US 471 (1972).  (Capitalizations in the original)  Plaintiff’s brief on this appeal, however, appears to suggest that Counts II (New Jersey Civil Rights Act), III (New Jersey Law Against Discrimination) and VI (Class of One-Equal Protection) also assert claims against [...].