ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] then conveyed the North Baxter Parcel to [...] in October, 1966 (Da398 at ¶19; Da476).  The South Baxter Parcel was first created in February, 1955 when [...] and [...] ("[...]") conveyed the land to [...] and [...] ("[...]") (Da397 at ¶15; Da461).  The [...]-to-[...] Deed contains the following easement by reservation in favor of the owners of Challenger Lot to access their land:  Excepting and reserving from the above the rights of the public or owners of property lying westerly and southerly of [...] farm to use a roadway or driftway running thru this tract to reach their properties from the public road mentioned in the description above (Da462) (emphasis supplied).  The land referred to above as "[...] farm" is currently owned by the [...] and the parties stipulated on summary judgment that Challenger Lot is the land situated to the west and south of the [...] farm, a/k/a Stinson Lot (Da395 at ¶17; Da397 at ¶13).  Respondent’s right to use the roadway to cross the Baxter Lot is express and unambiguous.  The South Baxter Parcel was thereafter conveyed by: (i) [...] to Margaret P. [...] in September 1965; and then by (ii) Margaret P. [...] and Fred H. [...] to [...] in December, 1966 (Da398 at ¶¶17-20; Da466; Da471; Da476; Da480).  When [...] acquired the South Baxter Parcel in December 1966, they became the common owner to both the North Baxter Parcel and South Baxter Parcel (collectively referred to herein as the “Baxter Lot”) (Da476; Da480).
[directive] Supplement to Directive #9-05 December 2, 2013 Page4 be part of an exhibition or performance (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(3)), to a first in all cases.  The statute was also amended to establish that degree crime of possession of any items of sexual exploitation or abuse the crime 2013, _!!.136, §1.  (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(b)) is a third degree crime.  _b. 6.  The statute for Crimes with Bail Restrictions (N.J.S.A. 2A:162-12) was amended effective November 7, 2011 to preclude the 10% cash bail option of Contempt of Domestic Violence Restraining Orders.
[brief] POINT II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THE DEFENDANT ELIGIBLE FOR RECOVERY COURT  SPECIAL PROBATION AS HE IS BARRED FROM ENTRY UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14A(5) AND TO PERMIT ADMITTANCE WILL LEAD TO THE IMPOSITION OF AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE....................................................10  A.  DEFENDANT IS A TRACK ONE RECOVERY COURT CANDIDATE..........................................................................................10  B. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14A(5) SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS A NONDISCRETIONARY ELIGIBILITY FACTOR.............................................................................................................12  C.  THE LOWER COURT’S DETERMINATION THAT THE DEFENDANT IS ELIGIBLE, DUE TO HIS SATISFACTION OF FACTOR A(5), WOULD RENDER AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE...............................................................14  i.
[brief] (Sa63; Sa86).  The court found the defendant’s interpretation of “pending,” as used in the second clause of factor a(5), was the correct position as it relates to the plain language of the statute as well as in accordance with *State v. Ancrum*.  (Sa81-Sa83).  i.  **The Plain Language and Legislative Intent of Factor a(5) is Clear and the Defendant is Legally Ineligible for Recovery Court. **
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 447 (citing *State v. Alston*, 88 N.J. 211, 233 (1981)) (emphasis added).  Additionally, the New Jersey Constitution does not permit a police officer to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile after towing it to headquarters merely because he could have done so on the side of the road; New Jersey’s automobile exception is limited “to on-scene warrantless searches. ”  Id. at 449; see also State v. Rodriguez, 459 N.J. Super. 13, 24 (App. Div. 2019).  The handful of published cases applying the “unforeseeable and spontaneous” standard of Witt draw a clear line.  When police conduct a routine traffic stop and happen to come across probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of an offense, that probable cause arose spontaneously and unforeseeably.  State v. Baker, 478 N.J. Super. 116, 128-29 (App. Div. 2024); State v. Courtney, 478 N.J. Super. 81, 96 (App. Div.), leave to appeal denied, 257 N.J. 413 (2024); Rodriguez, 459 N.J. Super. at 25.  Conversely, where “the investigative stop was deliberate, orchestrated, and wholly connected with the reason for the subsequent seizure of the evidence,” probable cause did not arise spontaneously and unforeseeably.
[brief] CHAPTER 173 AND CHAPTER 201 WERE NOT SUNSET BY CHAPTER 44 OF THE TOWNSHIP’S CODE  Chapter 44 of the Township’s Code does not sunset Chapters 173 through 213 as contended by the Defendant.  While the Defendant cites various cases in support of this contention, it is respectfully submitted that the facts of this matter are entirely distinguishable.  It is true that “[o]ur courts will interpret and enforce the legislative will as written and not according to some supposed unexpressed intention. ”  City of Camden v. Local Gov’t Bd., 127 N.J.L. 175 (Sup. Ct. 1941).  The language of Chapter 44 is clear, and it is the Defendant who attempts to rely on some supposed unexpressed intent.  Chapter 44 clearly reflects the intent of the Township to not sunset Chapters 173 through 213.  Regarding the clause highlighted by the Defendant, it was included due to the impeding interdepartmental status charges at the time of enactment.  In fact, in Ordinance 7-2004 the Board of Health requested its status be changed to an advisory role and its functions to be assumed as a department under the Governing Body.  Similarly, in Ordinance 15-2004 the fee ordinance was updated to reflect the status change.  The intent of the 120-day clause, as is reflected in the plain language of Chapter 44, was to allow the interdepartmental changes to reflect such changes, never to nullify the Ordinance’s prohibited conduct.  Nonetheless, the Health Department has always followed N.J.A.C. 8:52 Public Health Practice Standards of Performance for Local Boards of Health and is in compliance as per the most recent audit.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Municipal Court, in considering this same argument made by the Defendant based upon her pre-trial Motion to Dismiss, found that the subject clause in Chapter 44 of the Township’s Code expresses the intent of the Township to not sunset Chapters 173 through 213 but rather simply terminate the Board of Health.  (2T Pg. 12, Ln. 14 – Pg. 19).  In light of the above, it is respectfully submitted that Chapter 44 of the Township’s Ordinance clearly reflects the Township’s intent not to sunset Chapters 173 through 213.  As such, the Defendant’s appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.
[brief] A.  The Affirmative Requirements of the Statutory Public Trust Doctrine and the NJDEP’s Mandatory “Public Access Rule”:  The NJDEP “public access rule” contains detailed requirements that must be satisfied as a condition of a municipality approving any zoning rule or development application, including the Redevelopment Plan challenged herein and its change in zoning.  To start, all municipalities are encouraged – but are not yet specifically required – to draft and file a “municipal public access plan” with the NJDEP.  The methodology to prepare and submit such a document for NJDEP approval is outlined in the administrative rules.  In this matter, to date Defendant [...] has not filed a “municipal public access plan” with the NJDEP.  For those Municipalities that fail to file a “municipal public access plan” with the NJDEP, the mandatory administrative regulations still apply and specifically include, but are not limited to, imposing on a municipality the affirmative obligation to guarantee and protect public access to waterways which obligations apply to all development projects or zoning laws approved after July 2, 2019.
[brief] The buildings were described by [...] in its revised application as follows:  A.  Building A:  To be a two-story clubhouse building; the building is to contain no residential units but will contain one (1) an ambulance stretcher access elevator.  B.  Building B: a.  To be a 320-unit multi-story, multifamily residential mid-rise building with an internal parking garage containing 423 parking stalls, b.  The total unit count will include 46 ‘affordable’ units.  c.  The building will contain four (4) ambulance stretcher accessible passenger elevators.  C.  Building C: a.  To be a 35-unit multi-story, multifamily residential building.  b.  The total unit count will include 9 ‘affordable’ units.  c.  The building will contain one (1) ambulance stretcher accessible passenger elevator.  D.  Building D: a.  34-unit multi-story, multifamily residential building.  b.  The total unit count will include nine (9) ‘affordable’ units.  c.  The building will contain one (1) ambulance stretcher accessible passenger elevator.  E.  Building E: a.  To be a 29-unit multifamily residential building.  b.  The total unit count will include eight (8) ‘affordable’ units.  c.  The building is proposed by [...] to contain no ambulance stretcher accessible passenger elevator.  During the Board’s public hearings, but prior to the final [...] hearing of June 13, 2022, the Township, speaking through its mayor who is also a Member of the Board, voiced concern that all of the multi-story residential buildings should have an ambulance stretcher compliant passenger elevator.
[brief] However, even assuming defendant’s comment was ambiguous and could be viewed as a possible invocation of his right to counsel, the detective’s responses and subsequent comments were proper and the totality of the circumstances clearly establish that defendant was not invoking his right to have an attorney present during questioning.  In opposition, defendant argues that the detective’s response to defendant failed to answer the question, that her answer was confusing and misleading, and that it undermined the importance of Miranda.  Defendant’s argument, and the trial court’s findings below, are based upon an unduly narrow view of the detective’s response.  Stated differently, both the court and defendant failed to view the conversation and detective’s response as a whole, where it is clear that defendant’s question was answered, that he was properly advised of his rights, and that he did not invoke his right to counsel.  Accordingly, the trial court’s findings were an abuse of discretion and they must be reversed on appeal.
[brief] \textit{Ibid.}  Given the sometimes hectic and unpredictable nature of legislative proceedings, each Calendar also indicates that it is subject to change, and advises viewers to check the Legislature’s website or to call the Office of Public Information for an updated schedule.  \textit{Ibid.}  The Calendar also denotes any changes from the previously posted calendar with an asterisk.  \textit{Ibid.}  In addition to the Legislative Calendar, the Legislature also provides regular updates of upcoming sessions of the Assembly and Senate, giving users the ability to click on the dates of voting sessions and view the list of bills to be voted on, as well as the text of the bills.
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esq.  Attorney ID: [...]  [...]  [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants [...] and [...] TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Judgments, Order, and Rulings ........................................... iii Table of Items/Exhibits Submitted to the Court on Motions for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment and on Motion for Entry of Judgment by Default ....................... iv Table of Authorities ........................................................................ x Preliminary Statement ..................................................................... 1 Statement of Facts .......................................................................... 3 Procedural History ......................................................................... 12 Legal Argument ............................................................................ 15 STANDARD OF REVIEW .............................................................. 15 POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY ITS FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THAT [...] HAD A DUTY TO PRESERVE ANY AND ALL SURVEILLANCE FOOTAGE SURROUNDING A REPORTED AND DOCUMENTED INCIDENT INVOLVING THE SAFETY AND WELFARE OF PLAINTIFF ON ITS PREMISES AND GIVEN THE LIKELIHOOD OF LITIGATION (T.12:3-11; 20:19-21:13) ......................................................... 19 POINT II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF [...]’S DUTY TO RETAIN ANY AND ALL SURVEILLANCE VIDEO SURROUNDING THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO PLAINTIFF’S INJURY, PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO AN ADVERSE INFERENCE CHARGE THAT HAD [...] RETAINED SUCH FOOTAGE, SUCH FOOTAGE WOULD HAVE DEPICTED THE FAILURE OF [...]’S EMPLOYEES TO REMEDIATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION CREATED BY [...]’S OVERLOADED U-BOAT (T.14:17-15:4; 20:19-21:13) .........................................................
[brief] Finally, the [...] argued, in support of their Motion to Dismiss, that the litigation privilege bars the allegations in the Amended Complaint that relate to the 2015 action.  (Da561-566)  The litigation privilege shields “any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action. ”  Hawkins v. Harris, 141 N.J. 207, 216 (1995).  The litigation privilege protects attorneys from a host of tort-related claims.  Loigman v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Middletown, 185 N.J. 566, 583 (2006) (“In New Jersey, the litigation privilege protects attorneys not only from defamation actions, but also from a host of other tort-related claims. ”)  It has been held that whether a common-law or statutory immunity applies to a party is a question of law.  Malik v. Ruttenberg, 398 N.J. Super. 489, 494 (App. Div. 2008).  In Malik, the Court further held that “[i]f an immunity applies and bars civil liability, it trumps any theory of negligence. ”  Id.
[brief] Respondent’s counsel explained “I can - - since the issue has come up now, the charges related to impairment on the job are charges 4, 25, 51 and 53 and those should be deemed withdrawn”.  T1 11:17-20.  Based upon this advisement, Appellant, understandably, neither called witnesses nor presented other proofs or arguments to rebut or dispute the withdrawn charges.  Nevertheless, the ALJ made specific findings that [...] was under the influence of opioids while on duty as follows:  I FIND that appellant’s history of opioid and alcohol abuse indicated that he used poor judgment and displayed a lack of truthfulness.  I FIND that appellant’s numerous doctors, pharmacies and prescriptions, and his untruthfulness regarding his prescription and opioid use, indicated that appellant had been abusing prescription drugs, and in a manner that could affect his judgment and performance while conducting his job duties as a [...].  I CONCLUDE that appellant’s use and abuse of prescription drugs showed that he engaged in misconduct as a police officer under N.J.S.A. 40A-147, and displayed conduct unbecoming of a public employee pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6)  I FIND that appellant’s daily use of high doses of opioids put himself at risk as well as members of the public whom appellant was sworn to protect and CONCLUDE that this behavior constituted a neglect of duty under N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(7) and Other Sufficient Cause pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(11).  Pa0050.
[brief] First, the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a) limits a PIP arbitration to “[a]ny dispute regarding the recovery of medical expense benefits or other benefits provided under personal injury protection coverage” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 (Personal Injury Protection), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1 (Basic Automobile Policies) or N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.3 (Special Automobile Insurance Policies), arising out of the operation, ownership, maintenance or use of an automobile.  An IFPA case does not constitute a dispute under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1 because it is not a dispute “regarding the recovery of medical expense benefits. ” (emphasis added).  Rather, it is a dispute about whether an entity has defrauded an insurance company.  Thus, by its plain terms, IFPA claims are not subject to PIP arbitration.
[brief] Again the court identified conduit accounts and commingling and step transactions, and books and records which were manipulated and these were breaches of obligations under the [...] and the [...] which then leads to these arguments which is the subject of this litigation.  [25T88:13-89:11]  Rather than examine and “strictly construe” the specific language of the indemnification clauses, the court inferred that they applied because it had concluded that defendants [...], [...] and [...] “breached their obligations” under the [...] and the [...].  A review of the contracts relied upon, however, reveals that they do not contain any “express authorization” for the award of fees and, further, the limitations of the indemnification language in each of them bars an award of fees based upon the proofs and arguments presented at trial.
[brief] **Bid Process for Redecking Project**  [...] solicited bids in accordance with the Contract Specifications for work to commence by October 1, 2024 (Ibid.).  In this instance, [...] relied upon its Standard Specifications (Seventh Ed. 2016), a lengthy, 881-page volume setting forth in detail all of [...]’s requirements with respect to the procurement, implementation and execution of contracts on its roadways.  All bidders and contractors are expected to obtain, review and have familiarity with the terms of the Standard Specifications, which are of longstanding import in [...]’s procurement practices.  In this case, Section 102.07, entitled “Proposal Guaranty” requires bidders to provide a proposal or bid bond “in the sum of not less than ten percent (10%) of the total price of the Proposal”(A1).  The purpose of the Proposal Guaranty is to “provide the Authority with liquidated damages in an amount by which the Contract covering the Proposal, properly and lawfully executed by the Authority, exceeds the total price bid by the successful Bidder, if the successful Bidder shall fail or refuse to execute the Contract within the stipulated time. ” (A1).  In other words, the Proposal Bond covers any increase in price between the low bidder and the second lowest responsive and responsible bidder, if the low bidder were to refuse to proceed with the subject contract.  Once the Contract is awarded and executed by the successful bidder, under Section 102. 12 of the Standard Specifications, the Proposal Bond is then returned to the bidder and voided (Ra 5).  Simultaneously with the release of the Proposal Bond, at the time of execution of the Contract, the successful bidder is required to furnish a Contract Bond.
[brief] 1.  The Lack of Temporal Proximity Between Plaintiff’s Complaint And Any Cognizable Adverse Action Negates Any Inference of Causation.  Plaintiff’s testimony clearly demonstrated that she had no idea when she engaged in her alleged whistleblowing:  Q.  And when's the first time you can tell me for sure that you raised an issue to [...]?  A.  I don't recall.  Q.  So you can't say for sure that you raised an issue to [...] before your dayshift at [...] ended?  A.  Yeah, I cannot say.  I don't recall.  Ex. S at 228:3-11.  Q.  But you don't remember telling her November '19?  A.  I don't recall when I told her.  Q.  And the same thing with the other issues you listed that you reported to [...], you don't remember when you told her; right?  A.  Correct.  Q.  And so it might have been before; it might have been after the [...] dayshift; right?  A.  I don't remember -- yes.  Correct.  Ex. S at 233:11-234:1.  Q.  And when did you raise misuse of medication to [...]?  A.  I don't recall the date.  Q.  Was it while you were still on dayshift at [...] - regular dayshift at [...]?  A.  I don't recall.  (Appx 134 at 224:20-225).  Given that Plaintiff had absolutely no idea when she brought issues to [...], she cannot possibly show temporal proximity between raising said issues and any alleged adverse actions.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THE DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS DID NOT OWE A DUTY OF CARE TO REMOVE ICE DURING AN ONGOING STORM EVENT  “The question of whether a duty exists is a matter of law properly decided by the court…., not the jury....”  Wang v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125 N.J. 2, 15 (1991).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled that a commercial landowner does not have a duty to remove snow or ice from public walkways until a reasonable time after the cessation of precipitation.  To prove negligence, plaintiff must provide four essential elements: (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty by the defendant; (3) an injury proximately caused by the defendant’s breach of that duty; and (4) damages.  Here, as a matter of law, the trial court correctly found the defendants owed no duty to the plaintiff because plaintiff slipped and fell during an ongoing storm event.  Thus, summary judgment in favor of the defendants was appropriate.  In Pareja v. Princeton International Properties, 246 N.J. 546 (2021) the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the “ongoing storm rule,” and held that a commercial landowner does not have a duty to remove snow or ice from public walkways until a reasonable time after the cessation of precipitation.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 10 (citing *Medford Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Schneider Elec. Bldgs. Ams., Inc.*, 459 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div. 2019)).  Nor does the language that either party “may” file for arbitration convey the type of clear and unmistakable assent to mandatory arbitration.  *See, e.g.*, Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442-43.  But even if it did, it would only logically apply to the commencement of a dispute.  There was no clear and unambiguous waiver by [...] to subsequently consent to arbitration at any time after a litigation had already been filed by one party – particularly six years after litigation had been commenced.  Straining to interpret the language in that manner would undermine the efficiency and expense rationales that typically underpin inclusion of an arbitration clause itself.  Regardless, however, of whether the arbitration was permissive or mandatory, [...] waived any right that it had to arbitration long ago as set forth above.
[brief] \footnote{[...] has always maintained that he was not provided notice of the complaint.  (See, e.g., 1T 27-22 to 28-3)  Even if [...] had been aware of the New Jersey complaint, the Appellate Division has explained that because “dismissal of a criminal complaint has no finality for the benefit of a defendant, and may be followed by grand jury consideration and indictment,” “it appears inappropriate to assign much weight or significance to the failure of a defendant and his counsel to go through the abortive process of moving for a dismissal of a complaint prior to the return of an indictment. ”  Merlino, 153 N.J. Super. at 17.  In [...]’s case, it would be inappropriate to assign any weight at all to a failure to file a motion to dismiss the complaint for the added reason that [...] did not have counsel to consult with or to assist him until April of 2018.}
[directive] Penalty ABC Bulletin  Town Bar Name Date (in days)  (Item No. in Parens)  Absecon [...] 110 12/06/56 1150 (1)  202 12/02/58 1258 (4)  Asbury Park [...] 55 04/12/64 1674 (7)  [...] 65 01/11/67 1721 (1)  [...] 60 04/03/57 1159 (2)  115 11/21/57 1202 (5)  180 11/03/60 1368 (5)  Atlantic City [...] 70 03/03/60 1333 (7)  [...] 55 10/01/63 1536 (3)  [...] 60 08/07/67 1756 (8)  [...] 105 10/17/66 1705 (3)  [...] 190 11/02/55 1088 (2)  240 05/01/63 1515 (1)  [...] 30 05/25/60 1345 (6)  [...] 60 11/17/66 1712 (3)  [...] 176 12/29/58 1259 (5)  75 11/19/62 1488 (1)  [...] 150 01/22/62 1437 (3)  [...] 60 10/24/60 1366 (6)  [...] 100 10/31/56 1145 (1)  [...] 55 09/18/61 1418 (1)  [...] 70 10/06/64 1589 (4)  [...] 145 11/29/67 1763 (2)  [...] 176 12/29/58 1259 (4)  [...] 55 09/29/64 1588 (3)  120 07/27/66 1685 (1)  180 08/24/67 1747 (2)  Caldwell [...] 04/18/41 456 (3)