ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Moreover, its commentary is just that: commentary to consider.  This is important in the context of criminal cases because they have different policy interests and constitutional implications than the civil cases considered by the Restatement.  The State lacks any relevant support for its proposition that “finality ‘may mean little more than that the litigation of a particular issue has reached such a stage that a court sees no really good reason for permitting it to be litigated again. ”  Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief at 13-14 (quoting Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 519, 541 (3d Cir. 2012); In re Brown, 951 F.2d 564, 569 (3d Cir. 1991)).  Finally, the absence of the defendant’s ability to appeal the [...] decision by right further demonstrates that it is not a “final judgment.
[brief] There is little reason to believe -- and Defendants surely have proffered none -- that the fraud could have been identified in the first instance solely by looking at the much smaller data set applicable to New Jersey-specific VRDOs.  This would have been a rather backward way of conducting a reliable analysis.  See JA2276-78.  And, of course, Relator did not proceed, and no New Jersey government official would proceed, on the assumption that all RMAs had engaged in fraud.  See, e.g., Ja2276-84 (universe of VRDOs, RMAs, and rate resets).  * * *
[directive] A defendant shall be deemed to be participating in a Pretrial Intervention or conditional discharge program for purposes of Sections 6.4.1 and 11.5 of the revised Guidelines if he or she has been admitted to Pretrial Intervention or conditional discharge and at the time of the present Brimage- eligible offense has not successfully completed the program by having the relevant charges dismissed pursuant to R. 3:28 or N.J.S.A. 2C:36A-1.  1  It should be noted that Section 11.5 already expressly provides that Special Application and Enhancement Feature E (Offenses Committed While Under Supervision) must be applied if the present Brimage-eligible offense was committed while the defendant was on PTI or conditional discharge.
[brief] The Appeal Tribunal improperly relied on *N.J.A.C.* 12:17–9.3(d) in finding that [...] was required to present his employer with medical documentation.  Contrary to the Appeal Tribunal’s finding, the regulation requires an individual who “leaves work for health or medical reasons” to provide a “medical certification . . . to support a *finding* of good cause attributable to work. ”  *N.J.A.C.* 12:17-9.3(d) (Emphasis added).  Clearly, an employer cannot make a finding; only the administrative agency can make a finding after conducting a hearing.  The regulation does “not require an employee to give such documentation to his employer” and “merely direct[s] a claimant to submit this supporting documentation in connection with an application for benefits. ”  *Holland v. Bd. of Review*, No. A-0214-16T1, 2018 WL 3421444, *2-3 (App. Div. July 16, 2018) (slip op.).  [...] complied with the regulation by submitting medical documentation to the Appeal Tribunal and the Board in support of his contention that the work aggravated his medical condition.  Likewise, [...] also complied with the requirement to show that no other accommodation was available.  In certain situations, when conducting an individualized determination, “the claimant's medical proofs, combined with evidence of the physical demands of the former employment, the small size of the workplace, or other relevant factors, will be sufficient to satisfy the claimant's burden to demonstrate the unavailability of alternative ‘suitable work. ’”  Ardan, 231 N.J. at 605.  “In other circumstances, a claimant will not be in a position to meet that burden absent proof that she notified the employer and sought an accommodation prior to resigning from the job. ”  Id.  Under Ardan, to prevail under N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b), a claimant must show that “the employer had no position available that would accommodate the claimant’s condition or the claimant would not have been assigned to any such position.
[brief] [...] received a phone call on 8/7/23 which caller id indicated was from the Bank.  The caller stated that he was calling because [...]’s accounts had again been hacked and they had to be closed.  The caller advised that a code number would be sent to [...]’s cell phone and [...] needed to give him that number to close the accounts.  Code numbers were sent to [...] by text which he provided to the caller.  Bank did not advise why it was sending or the purpose of the transmission of the code number, that a wire transfer request had been made, why it wanted the code number entered or that it was part of any security procedure.  (Pa 136, Par. 10).
[brief] These are the only two triggers for the start of the ten-year period.  In State v. Hedgespeth, a nearly identical case, this Court held that discharge from probation does not constitute “release from confinement” under Rule 609(b)(1).  464 N.J. Super. at 431, aff’d in relevant part, 249 N.J. 234.  In that case, the trial court admitted the defendant’s two sanitized third-degree prior convictions, both of which had been entered more than ten years before trial, for use as impeachment evidence if the defendant testified.
[brief] The Plaintiff uses the terms ‘clean title’ or ‘marketable title’ to reference the quality of title described in paragraph 7 of the Affidavit of Title.  possibly possessed the ‘clean’ title as described in its Affidavit of Title because it had previously designated Unit 74 as part of the Condominium’s common elements.  As set more fully set forth herein, and pursuant to the New Jersey Condominium Act (“Condominium Act” or “Act”), the designation of Unit 74 as part of the common elements created certain property rights in favor of the unit owners.
[brief] See Dental Health Assocs. S. Jersey, P.A, at 194 (emphasis added); O Builders & Assocs., Inc., at 129.  Indeed, Respondents’ assertion concerning the purported disclosure of “financial” or “business” information to [...] or that [...] has obtained insight into [...]’ “mindset” from the prior matters is wholly insufficient to meet their heavy burden on a disqualification motion.  Respondents do not identify a single particularized “insight” and are unable to articulate how that information is being used against Respondents in this case.  [...] does not have insight into [...]’s “mindset” towards settlement or litigation strategy.  [...]’s representation of [...] in the prior matters was short-lived, with [...] holding an initial consultation with [...] and then predominantly communicating with [...]’ secretary thereafter.  (340a – 341a ¶¶ 20 – 22).  Respondents have not demonstrated or even alleged that any settlement discussions or philosophical “litigation strategy” discussions were held in the initial consultation, nor that they would relate to this case.
[brief] Green v. Monmouth Univ., 237 N.J. 516 (2019) ....................................................  20  Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239 (2015) ..............................................  29  Harvard Enters., Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 56 N.J. 362 (1970) ...............................  29  In re App. of Holy Name Hosp., 301 N.J. Super. 282 (App. Div. 1997) .....................  37  In re Contest of November 8, 2011  Gen. Election of Office of N.J. Gen. Assembly, 210 N.J. 29 (2012) ..................................................................................................  24
[brief] B.  Assuming Arguendo that [...] Intended to Impose Height Restrictions, They Would and Could Have Expressly Done So.  The trial court need only look to the deed restrictions and the plain language of the Genesis Deed to determine the developers’ intent.  First, the developers specifically imposed a certain width and side yard setback requirements.  (Pb10)(Da53).  The developers also imposed a single-story height restriction for properties west of Route 35 South.  Id.  The developers could have done the same for properties east of Route 35 South.  One can only surmise that perhaps the developers sought to protect the sunset views whereas the eastern side slopes upward to an ocean front dune and height restrictions were not needed.  We have no explanation, but we do not need one.  The fact remains that the developers specifically imposed certain building restrictions and left out any height restrictions on properties east of Route 35 South.  The common law principle of gleaning legislative intent applies here, namely, *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*.  The developers expressed certain building restrictions and excluded height restrictions.  *Imbrie v. Marsh*, 3 N.J. 578 (1950).  This evidences clear knowledge and intent on the developers’ part.  More importantly, neither the developers, [...], nor [...] ever sought to amend, modify, or alter the deed restrictions on Plaintiffs’ property.
[brief] In Ferraro v. Zoning Bd. of Keansburg, 321 N.J. Super. 288 (App. Div. 1999), property acquired by foreclosure had an occupied house and a second unoccupied structure.  The owner’s application for a building permit to renovate the second structure into a second residence was denied (two uses on one lot); the owner appealed to the Zoning Board and was the “applicant” for the Certificate.  The Board denied the application.  On appeal, the Court affirmed it was the burden of the proponent of the use “to establish existence of lawful residential occupancy as of the commencement of the Zoning Regulation as well as its continuation afterward,” citing Ianiere.  As no such evidence had been presented, the Court upheld the Board determination.  In Bonaventure Int. v. Spring Lake, 350 N.J. Super. 420, 432-433 (App.Div. 2000), the site/use began years ago as a seasonal hotel with a small restaurant for guests only.  Gradually the use morphed incrementally without zoning/variance approval into a hotel with 96 seat restaurant.  In 1991, the property was converted to a condominium, with the hotel as one unit and the restaurant a separate unit.  The restaurant re-opened as a 96 seat a la carte restaurant, with banquets, off-premises catering, and a liquor license.  Neighbors filed a 40:55D-68 Appeal objecting as an illegal nonconforming use.  The owner’s lawsuit to block the Administrative Appeal was denied.  After a hearing, the Board found portions of the current nonconforming use were not preexisting or legal, but enforcement barred by estoppel.  The Trial Court found that the 96 seat restaurant use could be continued, but the banquet/catering uses were not legal.
[brief] Plaintiff Specifically Recalled How the Accident Took Place.**  Plaintiff, [...], despite brain injury, recalled how the accident happened.  He testified that, **on the night of the accident**, he was on his way back from a store located on Main Street in Lodi, turned left to Lincoln Place (Pa671-72), and walked up Lincoln.  (Pa671).  From walking up on Lincoln, [...] took a left to cross to the other side of Lincoln onto Prospect Street (Pa673-74).  Once on Prospect, he estimated that he walked about one minute to get to the intersection of Prospect and Central where the accident took place.  (Pa675-76).  C.
[brief] Prior to January 14, 2018, the individual plaintiffs and Appellant were each one-ninth Members of [...], which in turn was the 100% owner of [...].  (Da410)  When Appellant’s fraud began to be discovered, he produced the Repurchase Agreement and announced that [...] was no longer owned by [...] but was now owned by [...] who “repurchased” it for an amount to be determined via a subsequent valuation.  Importantly, Appellant did not represent that [...] would be paying the repurchase price to [...], he declared that [...] would be paying their proportionate share of [...]’s valuation to each individual plaintiff:
[brief] ..............................................................................38  Bauer v. Nesbitt, 198 N.J. 601, 610, 969 A.2d 1122, 1128 (2009)  .............................................30  Berger v. Frazier, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1679, at *9 (Super. Ct. App. Div. July 13, 2018)  .................................................................................................43  Bowers v. Kelly, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58219, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2015)  .......................46  Bustamante v. Borough of Paramus, 413 N.J. Super. 276, 286 (App. Div. 2009)
[brief] In the trial court’s comprehensive Statement of Reasons, the trial court held:  Regarding the [...], the record demonstrates the number of times that plaintiffs attempted to relitigate the same issues in the 2015 action through its opposition to the motion to dismiss, which was granted in 2016; motion to reinstate; motion to reconsider, motion for leave to appeal; motion to vacate the order denying the motion to reinstate; and motion for leave to rejoin the [...].  To reiterate, the 2020 Amended Complaint involved the same nucleus of facts and circumstances that had previously been rejected on six prior occasions in the 2015 litigation.  The court did not err under the reconsideration standard set forth in Cummings when it found that the litigation was frivolous and warranted an award of attorney’s fees.
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[brief] As the Supreme Court explained in Lanzetta v. N.J., 306 U.S. 451,453, 59 S.Ct. 618,619, 83 L. Ed. 888,890 (1939):  If on its face the challenged provision is repugnant to the due process clause, specification of details of the offense intended to be charged would not serve to validate it.  It is the statute, not the accusation under it, that prescribes the rule to govern conduct and warns against transgression.  Emphasis added.  **State v. Golin**, 363 N.J. Super. 474, 481-85, 833 A.2d 660, 664-66 (App. Div. 2003)
[brief] At the end of the contract, there was no dissatisfaction with the Plaintiff.  The Commissioners gave as a reason the fact that [...] has more employees.  The Court must recognize that it was [...] who handled the ballot question and [...] who was the Sheriff’s lawyer and whose legal fees the Plaintiff refused to permit.  Not only was the Plaintiff’s contract not renewed, but his successor was the one who wanted the RPCs to be violated i.e. pay my legal fees for the Sheriff’s personal matters.  The best way to look at the non-renewal of a contract is to realize that the action can be taken for a reason, for no reason, but it can’t be taken for the wrong reason.  The wrong reason in this case is the Plaintiff’s refusal to carry out wrongful requirements i.e. the ballot question and the Sheriff’s legal fees.  If the Plaintiff’s contract was not renewed because of those two issues, then the contract was not renewed for “the wrong reason,” and, therefore, this is a CEPA case brought on behalf of a part-time County Counsel whose contract was not renewed.  Plaintiff claims it was for the wrong reasons, whether it was or it wasn’t is a jury question.  Whether the Plaintiff is an employee pursuant to CEPA, is a legal question.  Unfortunately, the Court below missed the point and actually set CEPA back because the Court did not recognize that CEPA is remedial legislation which must be liberally construed.
[brief] (Aa95; Aa137; Aa195; Aa2251, Aa2546).  On June 30, 2022, DEP issued to [...] a deficiency letter pertaining to the June 2, 2022 permit applications.  (Aa124).  That letter advised [...] that DEP required additional information and revisions to the site plans to deem [...]’s permit applications complete.  Ibid.  DEP noted: (1) the existing lake basin (Basin 1) which discharges to an unnamed tributary of Indian Run must be redesigned so that no untreated stormwater discharges will enter the downstream waterway; (2) under N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.6(c), water quantity controls must be put in place before runoff enters Basin 1; (3) under N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.5, stormwater runoff quality standards require that the Project use either the green \(^7\) https://dep.nj.gov/stormwater/stormwater-manufactured-treatment-devices/ infrastructure BMPs or an alternative stormwater management measure approved under N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.2(g); (4) Basin 2’s design must be modified to have a beneficial reuse component and have vegetation along 50% of the shoreline; and (5) additional soil tests were required to reclassify the hydrologic soils groups onsite.
[brief] The trial judge dismissed plaintiff’s case without prejudice on May 12, 2023 (Pa114 – Pa115), citing plaintiff's failure to comply with the appellate court’s order on December 2, 2022 (Pa49 – Pa66), and the trial court's order on March 31, 2023 (Pa103 – Pa104), to retain an attorney by April 17, 2023.  Consequently, the case has remained closed since May 12, 2023.  As the trial judge explained, R. 4:37-2 does not apply in this situation for the trial judge to dismiss an already-closed case with prejudice on March 1, 2024 (Pa1 – Pa2), for the same reason—that plaintiff did not retain an attorney.  B.
[brief] The pages are not attached as [...]’s entire deposition transcript has been included in Plaintiff-Appellant’s Appendix at Vol. I, Pa. 63-100........................................... | | | Plaintiff’s certified answers to interrogatories dated September 20, 2021 which are attached to the certification of [...], Esq. in support of plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration as Exhibit B ............................................. | Pa. 578-587 | | Certification of [...], Esq dated April 6, 2023 in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration ....................... | Pa. 588-589 | TABLE OF CONTENTS TO THE APPENDIX OF PLAINTIFF APPELLANT [...] VOLUME IV APPENDIX DOCUMENT APPENDIX PAGE # Transcript of oral argument on the motion for Summary Judgment on February 28, 2023 attached as Exhibit A to the Certification of [...] in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
[brief] The Congregation’s HVAC system was still connected to the boiler room located on the Subject Property throughout the 1980s.  In 1984 [...] at its own cost paid for a complete modernization of the heating and cooling system located on the Subject Property servicing both the [...] and [...].  (Da129 and Da948)  39.  On August 2, 2021, the parties stipulated to the following facts regarding Plaintiff’s HVAC system connection to the boiler room located on the Subject Property:
[brief] o  From October 1, 2003 through December 31, 2013, prejudgment interest compounded at the “equity rate” of 8.875%, as jointly determined and previously agreed upon by the [...]’ and [...]’s forensic accountants at trial, and as incorporated by [...] into the 2013 Judgment; o From January 1, 2014 through July 9, 2014, prejudgment interest compounded at the “equity rate”; and o From July 10, 2014 through November 16, 2022, prejudgment interest compounded at a rate of 3.935%, equal to the average prime rate during that period; and • Post-judgment interest from November 17, 2022 at the Rule interest rate of 2.25%.  In support of its Order on Remand, the Chancery Court included a detailed, 39-page statement of reasons, the relevant portions of which are addressed below.  --- 9  Thus, based upon the prior appellate panel’s strict application of the discovery rule, [...]’s damages were reduced by $23,244,570, leading to the rather unjust result that the [...] were permitted to retain the millions of dollars in partnership funds which they had misappropriated during the pre-SOL period.
[brief] [...] President of the Medical Staff and Co-Director of ICU provided for a salary of $25,000.00 for services rendered as President of the Medical Staff and $33,600.00 for services rendered as Co-President of the ICU.  (Volume I Pa. 176).  Contract dated September 1, 2014 appointed Dr. [...] Chief Medical Officer of [...] and provided for compensation of $75,000.00 per annum.(Vol. 1 Pa. 178-184).
[brief] (Da10-11)  See also United States v. Allegra, 187 F. Supp. 3d 918, 924 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“Allegra's question to the Agents—‘So can you provide me with an attorney?’—was sufficient to invoke his right to counsel and should have ended the interrogation. ”); Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d 1173, 1179-81 (Alas. Ct. App. 1985) (interpreting suspect's question, “first of all how would I be able to get one, a lawyer,” to be an ambiguous or equivocal request for an attorney, requiring clarification); State v. Bittick, 806 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Mo. 1991) (affirming trial court's finding that the defendant's statement “‘How do I get an appointed attorney’ constituted a request for an attorney” despite “the equivocal nature of the ‘request’”); Huff v. State, 678 S.W.2d 236, 241-42 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that suspect's “questions regarding how he could obtain an attorney were sufficient to require a cessation of the interrogation”).
[brief] Appellant Is Responsible Under Applicable Law for The Consequences That Flowed from Its Predecessor’s Imprudent Business Decision to Reject and Return the First Wire Transfer**  As detailed above, *supra*, Appellant’s predecessor was contractually obligated under the terms of the Note and Mortgage to accept and apply the First Wire Transfer to the balance due on the Loan.  Further, state and federal statues, along with equitable principles also support that Appellant cannot “reject” payment, then claim that payment was not made.
[directive] Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  Tout plent, petisyon ak lòt papye ki soumèt ba tribinal la fèt pou an angle.  Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English  Sistèm Jidisyè  New Jersey
[directive] The new commit flee, will defendant a that likelihood the assess to courts requiring approach, the of One witnesses. other and victims intimidating by justice obstruct or activity, criminal process predictive this that is initiative reform entire the undergirding innovations critical most been has that process risk-assessment pretrial objective an by informed be will henceforth of a use  The 2A:162-25(c).  N.J.S.A.  See research. empirical through validated and designed and just a toward advance major a represents instrument risk-assessment pretrial validated process risk-assessment pretrial the because However, system. release pretrial effective adult defendant's charge and present the of general nature the on depends AOC the by approved relevant all for account not history, may it court-appearance and conviction criminal  Jersey New current the which in manner specific or the defendant the to pertaining circumstances and facts to prosecutors and for police appropriate and necessary is therefore It committed.  was offense release pretrial fully-informed make can courts that so feasible when gaps information fill the have procedures and systems well-designed in exception that notable a are violence domestic involving Cases 2 other and restraints of enforcement and issuance the through victims violence domestic protect to implemented been 2C:25- N.J.S.A. See charges. of disposition pending released defendants of conduct the control to conditions special New of Court Supreme of the authority the under Manual issued Procedures Violence Domestic the and -34 to 26 the alert to (requiring officers 4.6.4 subsection also See (2008).