ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (JA69)  (emphasis added).  Thus, contrary to the Department’s claim, its supervision of the payment of the AIF Fees was non-existent until last year.  Despite the Department’s repetition of SSAP No. 25’s terms, it cannot transform the individual subscriber’s payment of the AIF Fee into a related party transaction.  The Department concedes by its silence that [...] does not control the individual subscribers, who can terminate or seek coverage elsewhere.  Thus, by definition the AIF fees are not a related party transaction subject to SSAP No. 25.  Moreover, the Department admittedly knows the amount of those fees regardless of SSAP No. 25’s application.  (Rb26)  It knows the terms of the POA.  By its own admission the fees are disclosed in [...]’s financial statements.  Nothing is or ever has been hidden from the Department, but that does not confer authority on the Department to control the AIF Fees through its unilateral imposition of the accounting principle SSAP No. 25 as declared in the Bulletin.  This is particularly true in this case where the Department seeks to impose its “discretion” on the AIF fees without any articulation of any governing standards and principles that are routed in the facts of the situation.  Where those are lacking, the agency’s action is arbitrary and capricious.  In re Galloway Tp. and City of Bridgeton, 418 N.J. Super. 94, 104-05 (App. Div. 2011).  After years of contrary conduct and statements, the Department is trying to impose its unfettered discretion on the amount of fees that the individual subscribers should pay [...].  This is by definition arbitrary and capricious.
[directive] [...] will pursue these goals through the following core functions:  1.  Advise the Attorney General on policing policy, strategy, and innovation; 2.  Support law enforcement agencies in identifying and responding to emerging operational concerns, policy considerations, and trending crime problems and patterns; 3.  Identify best practices and opportunities for improvement for law enforcement agencies by reviewing current practices and researching the field of law enforcement, criminology, and crime reduction and prevention; 4.  Support the development and improvement of training for law enforcement, both at the stage of entry into the profession and through continuous professional development, and ensure adequate training of law enforcement for compliance with the developing field of law and policy; 5.  Review the performance of policing throughout the state, including advising on metrics and benchmarks that should guide law enforcement agencies, and assist the public in assessing the performance of the agencies that serve them; 6.  Support law enforcement agencies and officers in thinking strategically about policing, and grounding their approach to policing in a guardian framework; 7.  Assist law enforcement in learning, adopting, and implementing community engagement as a core practice.  This is in recognition that partnering with community is essential to increase law enforcement’s knowledge of the drivers of crime, and making it more effective in increasing safety and promoting public trust; 8.  Promote an operational culture of excellence in policing, through the training and development of leadership, elevation and recognition of best practices, development of mentorship opportunities and other strategies for supporting the resilience and leadership, and growing the potential of all ranks of law enforcement; 9.  Promote the adoption of technological innovation that is responsible and meets the legal and policy standards of the Department; and 10.  Support the implementation of new policies, rules, procedures, and directives issued or identified by the Attorney General.
[brief] Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s argument contradicts itself by first claiming that Defendants did “virtually nothing” in furtherance of the PSA and then arguing that Defendants worked surreptitiously to complete the RIR.  (Db38.)  Despite Defendants’ misguided belief, Plaintiff’s argument does not contradict itself; rather, Defendants conveniently ignore the fact that this conduct occurred over the course of approximately two (2) years.  *(See, e.g.,* 2T141:12 to 142:5 (regarding [...]’s failure to communicate with respect to the draft RIR in 2020), 174:8 to 175:10 (regarding emails in 2022 between Defendants and the [...] that were not shared with Plaintiff), 179:5-19 (regarding emails in 2023 between Defendants’ LSRP and the [...] that were not shared with Plaintiff); 4T45:20 to 47:18, 49:2 to 50:7 (discussing lack of communication regarding RIR filing prior to December 2020 phone call), 54:16 to 55:12 (discussing inability to contact [...] during early-2021), 69:14 to 70:4 (discussing [...] communications prior to December 2022); 5T46:21 to 47:6 (regarding failure to consult with Plaintiff prior to filing RIR in December 2021); 6T88:1-24 (regarding lack of delineation activities at the Property between September 2019 and December 2021), 92:2-8 (regarding draft RIR that was never shared with Plaintiff prior to filing in December 2021); 8T87:18 to 89:7 (regarding [...]’s failure to respond to requests for meetings and [...] lying that the RIR was filed in December 2020), 91:3 to 92:5, 100:14 to 101:11 (acknowledging that despite Plaintiff’s requests for meetings going back to 2020, the RIR was not shared with Plaintiff prior to filing in December 2021).)  Defendants’ disingenuous contention warrants no further discussion.  For the reasons more fully explained in Plaintiff’s Brief, Plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the Seller’s Environmental Obligations under the PSA, and the trial court’s dismissal of Count Three of the Complaint should be reversed.
[brief] The matter arises from an accident occurring on October 6, 2021 in the parking lot at [...] in [...].  It is undisputed that at the time of the occurrence, plaintiff’s decedent [...] and defendant [...] were employees of defendant [...] assigned to work at [...] at the time of the accident.  It is also undisputed the [...] was on site to begin her work shift.  At or around 6:59 AM, Holmdel police were dispatched to the hospital on a report of a pedestrian struck by a vehicle in the hospital’s parking lot.  On arrival they found [...] unconscious and unresponsive in a lane of travel in the parking lot with the Dember vehicle parked in the same lane of travel just past were her body lay.  Investigation revealed that [...] had parked her car in the parking lot in an area designated by her employer for non-management employee parking.  She exited her vehicle and proceeded to walk through the lot towards the hospital entrance when she was struck by the Dember vehicle as it turned left into her path.  [...] was attended to at the scene and airlifted to [...] for a higher level of care where sadly she passed away the next day from her injuries.  Following the accident, plaintiff filed a claim for dependancy benefits with the State of N.J., Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Division of Worker’s Compensation against [...]’s employer [...] ([...] - [...]) (Pa57).
[brief] 2T170-1 to 2T175-10.  Since mold is readily understood to cause health problems and damage, two Appellate Division decisions have held that the discovery rule is inapplicable to alleged toxic mold cases.  Thus, the statute of limitations on [...]’s claim in the Underlying Action began to accrue in the 1990s, when his symptoms started, and he was aware of water intrusion in his condo unit.  2T173-14 to 2T175-6.  [...] testified to the many weaknesses on causation.  [...]’s primary expert on causation was [...], a family physician who cited no authorities to support her conclusion and did not address specific causation.  2T180-13-21.  She was also [...]’s business partner in various endeavors.  Meanwhile, [...]’s medical experts were well-credentialed and their testimony had scientific support.  2T176-17 to 2T177-13; Da20a.  These credibility and causation issues likewise reduced the reasonable settlement value.  ARGUMENT I.
[brief] (AA0007)  (emphasis added).  The Appellant requested Reconsideration from the Respondent Commission clearly demonstrating that the false entry concerning September 6, 2022 was not an official finding by the Respondent [...] and was incorrectly included in the improper “discipline history summary. ”  (AA0157)  She certified that the subject of the investigation was another Officer, not Appellant.  (AA0157)  She argued that the Respondent Commission also incorrectly found that she had been disciplined for failure to report her own service weapon was not functioning, when the false entry alleged by the Respondent [...] actually stated another Officer’s gun was not functioning.  (AA0031; AA0157)  The Appellant further certified she was never served with an discipline regarding the September 6, 2022 allegation and properly and immediately reported the alleged issue to her Superior Officer upon learning of it.  (AA0157)  Moreover, Appellant certified in support of Reconsideration that she reviewed her personnel file under Internal Affairs Supervision and there is no document referencing the September 6, 2022 allegation therein.  (AA0157)  She further certified on Reconsideration that the [...] Detective confirmed to her that if a signed Counseling Form is not in her file, then the discipline does not exist.  (AA0157)  Significantly, in its opposition to Reconsideration, the Respondent [...] did not dispute the September 6, 2022 was a false entry contained in the improper “discipline history summary,” but rather simply noted Appellant acknowledged she was involved in an incident that day.
[brief] (Pa35)  Plaintiff disregards the trial court’s findings and repeats his rejected argument that it should not be “so hard or difficult” for the District to create email logs from the private email accounts belonging to the District’s Board members\(^2\), but if it is “difficult” then it is Defendants’ fault and they should be compelled to produce the logs anyway.  Pb\(^3\) at 9-10.  Plaintiff’s legal contention is premised on a definition of government record for OPRA purposes that strays from the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Galloway that “OPRA makes clear that government records consist of not only hard-copy books and paper documents housed in file cabinets or on shelves, but also ‘information stored or maintained electronically’ in a database on a municipality’s server. ”  229 N.J. at 353.  --- \(^2\)  Defendants hereby preserve the argument that to the extent that Plaintiff seeks email logs from Board members before they were sworn in (e.g. between November 2022 and January 2023), certain portions of the email logs would not be government records for the additional reason that the Board members were private citizens until the day they were sworn into office.  \(^3\)  “Pb” refers to Plaintiff’s amended appellate brief filed April 17, 2024.  (emphasis added).  The parties in this case do not contest the undisputed fact that private email accounts of Board members – whether on Yahoo, Gmail or their private employer’s server – are not maintained on the [...]’s server.
[brief] Defendants and their New Jersey condominium counsel ([...]) drafted the SPA three years after Atalese was decided.  They knew that the purported arbitration clause in the SPA was required to have language that the purchaser was giving up his or her right to seek relief in court, but they chose not to include that language in the SPA clause.  All they needed to do was what the New Jersey Supreme Court declared in Atalese must be done - - simple as that.
[brief] .......................................................................................6  A.  The Investigation Leading Up To The Traffic Stop Of [...] ...........................................6  B. The Traffic Stop Of [...] .....................................................................................8  C.  The Search Of [...]’s Car And The Subsequent Request, Authorization, And Execution Of A Search Warrant For The Storage Unit .........................................................9  D.  Motion To Suppress Evidence Seized From The Storage Unit ........................................11  E. Motion To Suppress Evidence Seized From [...]’s Car ..................................................12  LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................15
[brief] Regardless of which party is responsible for ballooning costs of the Regulator, the fact remains that the costs increased nearly 49% from the original cost estimate proposed in the Company’s 2017 petition.  These costs, assuming they are found to be prudent, will be borne by [...]’s ratepayers.  Significantly, all of the [...] ratepayers, whether they live in [...] or not, will pay the costs associated with the Regulator in their rates since rates are set on a service territory basis, not a township basis.  Although Rate Counsel is aware that the issue of prudency is not before this Court, it is important to note that the Township’s continual protests and suggestions for modifications to the project only serve to drive up the cost to all [...] ratepayers on a project that the Board has found to be necessary.  In order to alleviate further potential costs to ratepayers, the Court should affirm the Board’s decision below.
[brief] (Da 6-15)  The motion court erred in determining that the officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop for a canine sniff based on [...]’s nervousness, his momentary pause while recalling his destination, and the fact that he said he was coming from New Jersey while still within its borders.  (Da 13)  The court furthermore erroneously characterized [...]’s and [...]’s answers to [...]’s questions as “conflicting stories. ”  (Da 13)  On the contrary, [...] and [...] gave entirely consistent responses to [...]’s inquiries, despite being separated when questioned.  This Court must reverse the decision of the motion court and suppress the evidence found pursuant to the illegal dog sniff.
[brief] There is no need for transcripts because we have the Original Resolution, which is the Board’s formal decision on [...]’s SPA.  The Board simply implemented the Stealth Resolution, without any prior notice to [...], effectively undoing the December 12, 2022 Original Resolution and then imposed a new condition that was neither agreed to nor part of the SPA.  The Board’s assertion that the Trial Court entered its August 8, 2023 Order without any specific findings of fact or conclusions of law, and relied exclusively on the Special Master’s October 19, 2020 report, is demonstrably false and without merit.
[brief] In the Rider and Statement of Reasons of November 9, 2022, the lower Court stated:  “Even in viewing the facts most favorably to the defendant, defendant has waived his right to dispute and [sic] the underlying balance and charges...  Failure to dispute the bill in writing within 60 (sixty) days results in a waiver of the consumer to dispute the balance at a later time.  Minskoff vs. American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc....” (Da30).  Defendant is asserting the affirmative defense of recoupment or set-off under TILA and Regulation Z (Da15 and Da16).  Defendant is not relying on the 60-day rule of 12 CFR 226.13(b)(1) to dispute balances and charges.  The 60-day rule of FBCA is inapposite in the instant case.  The lower Court mistakenly cited Minskoff vs. American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc., 98 F.3d 703, 708 (3d Cir. 1996) as the judicial authority for its decision that Defendant waived his right.  (Da33).  However, the Minskoff case involved the issue of whether there was an unauthorized use of a credit card.  The Third Circuit did not discuss the 60-day rule.  The 60-day rule of 12 CFR Section 226.13(b)(1) was not cited in the Third Circuit’s opinion.  The Minskoff case is inapposite in the instant case.  XII.
[brief] ” (1T 25:5-8).  The Trial Court, however, did not address any of the remaining elements of the claim, instead continuing:  However, I don’t – I – I just – I don’t understand how there can be a theory that the – that the de – defendant herein that’s the moving party in this case could have possibly in- -- interfered with the tortious relationship [sic], given the fact there was no transaction that took place.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 414.  More particularly, “specific performance is a discretionary remedy resting on equitable principles and requiring the court to appraise the respective conduct and situation of the parties. ”  *Friendship Manor, Inc. v. Greiman*, 244 N.J. Super. 104, 113 (App. Div. 1990), certif. denied, 126 N.J. 321 (1991).  Moreover, “[t]o establish a right to specific performance, the party seeking the relief must demonstrate that the contract in question is valid and enforceable at law, and that the terms of the contract are clear. ”  *Est. of Cohen ex rel. Perelman v. Booth Computers*, 421 N.J. Super. 134, 149-150 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 208 N.J. 370 (2011).  Again, Defendant does not challenge a single fact found by the Trial Court—it only challenges the imposition of the reformation remedy.
[brief] The judge’s finding that defendant was succeeding academically while incarcerated is not “diametrically opposed” (Db83) to the need to deter defendant from engaging in future homicidal behavior.  Four:  Defendant argues that the judge placed too little weight on mitigating factor three (defendant acted under a strong provocation) by “substantially downplaying [defendant’s] mental health issues. ” (Db83-84).  But, just as the jury could properly rejected the insanity defense, the sentencing judge could accept or reject the testimony of either party’s qualified expert, in full or in part, Brown v. Brown, 348 N.J. Super. 466, 478 (App. Div. 2002), in reaching his conclusion that “there is no evidence that the defendant actually suffers from schizophrenia. ” (17T206-11 to 14).  Defendant’s diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder, the judge found, did not justify defendant’s conduct.  (17T206-15 to 20).
[brief] SSI Medical Servs., Inc v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 146 N.J. 614, 621 (1996) (the law recognizes a presumption that properly addressed and stamped mail is delivered to its addressee).  Notably, the Lower Court’s Docket does not indicate that the pleadings were returned as undeliverable and, instead, the opposite – the Complaint was delivered by Certified Mail and signed for by [...].  (Da5; Pa19-Pa21).  Indeed, during oral argument on Appellant’s first motion to vacate in the Action, the Lower Court noted that service by regular mail and certified mail is effective under Rule 6:2-3(d).  (3T14-20-25) (“Regular mail and certified mail is service under 6 - -- 6:2-3 (d).  So, it doesn’t matter who signed it.  You look at the stat-- -- or the – the court rule, it’s unsuccessful service if and only if the registered mail comes back and says no such address, etcetera. ”).  During the plenary hearing, the Lower Court reiterated that service was effective under Rule 6:2-3(d).
[directive] Referrals and Response  our Although residents.  many Jersey too New far of lives the touches Sexual violence to efforts their in strides significant made have prosecutors and officers enforcement state's law and heard are ensure victims to that do can we more always is there violence, sexual eradicate brought justice. to perpetrators are most are sexual investigations assault that show experience and research of Decades A respect. compassion, and with dignity, victims treat officers enforcement successful law when law and life, person's a in experiences traumatic of most the one be can assault sexual also while leads, investigate and evidence quickly collect work to must officers enforcement deserve. and need they services supportive medical and the to access have victims ensuring that to response enforcement's law standardize strengthen and to intended is Directive This in takes enforcement law that "victim-centered" approach the reinforce crimes; sexual assault Concurrent investigations. sexual assault collection about data statewide improve such and cases; General Attorney of Edition issuing the the Third also am I this Directive, of issuance the with set a provide which ("Standards"), Assault Sexual of Victims to Services fog Providing Standards New in victims sexual assault of concerns and needs the prioritize that protocols of fourteen Edition Third in updated the and revised been have Standards the 2004, in published Last Jersey. months in days, and weeks, understanding the and respect with treated that are ensure victims to the at remains New that Jersey ensure together, efforts these Taken an reporting assault. after violence.
[brief] Pa49.  The Update on Third Party Observers in Neuropsychological Evaluation: An Interorganizational Position Paper ("Update") observes that the National Academy of Neuropsychology (NAN), the American Academy of Clinical Neuropsychology (AACN), and the American College of Professional Neuropsychology (ACPN) are united in opposing the presence of TPOs during neuro-psychological examinations.  Pa61.  On September 24, 2021, [...] granted Defendants’ motion compelling Plaintiff to submit to his DME without the use of a recording device; the Court found that, as Plaintiff’s experts had conducted examinations of Plaintiff without ever even alerting Defendants, further allowing Plaintiff to record Defendants’ IME would exacerbate this unfairness as that opportunity would not be reciprocal.
[brief] \footnote{On December 5, 2009, seven months after the judgment of divorce was issued, Plaintiff wrote to [...] in the email.  She not only discussed how and why she entered into the Chinese agreements with [...] before the divorce, but also she pointed out that “I guess the purpose of your trip is to find a new wife.  Having a third people involved in, it will influence your new family when we discuss money issues.  I may not be calm. ”  (See Da 342-343)  On January 10, 2020, Plaintiff wrote another email to [...] that “I let you go and agree with no-fault divorce, so that you can keep more money, and have freedom and ability to find the dog-like obedient woman.
[brief] 45.  Court's ruling (p. 14, 1st par.)  "[...] acknowledged erroneous calculation [erroneous income commission payments of $543.70 to [...] as Co-Trustee] and has rectified same" is inaccurate/incomplete.  Mr. [...] did acknowledge that he paid back to Trust the $543.70.  However, Accounting still mistakenly reports Trust commission payment of $543.70 to [...], nor was it updated to accurately report return of $543.70.  No legitimate CPA would allow such mistakes to remain in an accounting, let alone in an audited Accounting.
[brief] Envtl. Barrier Co., 440 N.J. Super. 325 (App. Div. 2015).............................................................  39 Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)..............................................................  35  Greco v. Trauner, Cohen & Thomas, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 2005)...........................................................................  10 Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1944)..........................................................................  17 Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242 (2010).......................................................................................