ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] This framework models the Criminal process3 Justice Reform in an effort to promote uniformity in charging decisions across the State.  This new system will not simply make us more efficient in our work, but will also allow us to more easily compile and analyze data about how juveniles are treated when engaged in the juvenile justice system.  Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey to implement and comply with the procedures outlined below.
[brief] * * *  See also *Ford Motor Co. p. Kearny*, 91 N.J.L. 671, 672, 103 A. 254 (E. & A. 1917).  In the present case the ordinance itself uses the language of contract.  It refers to the 'sale' of water to its customers.  It requires the customer requesting service to make a written application for such service and to enter into an agreement for its continuance.  It describes that agreement as a 'contract.'  The conclusion that a contractual relationship existed between the [...] and its customers is inescapable.  Such contract, as other contracts, was entitled to the protection provided by the Federal Constitution and the State Constitution.  Both prohibit the adoption of any law impairing the obligation of contract.
[brief] **Respondents’ Facebook Posts Do Not Violate Section (e).**  The same logic applies to Petitioner’s arguments regarding Respondents’ Facebook posts.  In *Andersen v. Fernandez*, C03-22 (SEC June 28, 2022) (Ra22-28), the Commission considered a matter in which a board member publicly responded, via a Facebook message sent to community members, to an individual’s comment made in front of the board at a public meeting.  The board member wrote a disclaimer before the post to establish she was speaking in her capacity as an individual, not as a board member.  Specifically, the board member stated in her message:  “I am on the . . . [board] but I am reaching out to you tonight as an individual, fellow parent, alum of [the district], and taxpayer. ”  *Id.* at 5.  The Commission dismissed the complaint, finding that the board member had not violated section (e).  The Commission noted that board members do not lose their First Amendment rights simply by operation of becoming board members, and remain “free to publicly address any matter which is of importance to them. ”  *Id.* at 4.  Moreover, the board member in *Andersen* made it “abundantly clear” her speech was that of a private citizen and not made as a member of the board, even if the member was providing her personal opinion on a board-related matter.  *Id.*  The same logic applies here.
[brief] That makes sense: if there is a reasonable probability of success, there is logically an underlying well-settled right on which that reasonable probability is based.  See *Waste Mgmt.*, 399 N.J. Super. at 528 (explaining that the “time- honored approach in ascertaining whether a party has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success” includes consideration of whether “the law upon which plaintiff’s claim is based is well-settled”).  And as explained above, Appellants do not challenge on appeal the State’s arguments regarding the LAD itself.  In any event, the trial court properly found that the State’s claims do rest on well-settled rights.  As to substance, “the legal right underlying” the State’s action, Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133, is explicit, well-recognized, and longstanding: the LAD itself.
[directive] Due to the risks to both officers and the public, supervisors are expected to exercise an enhanced level of control over vehicular pursuits.  4.8.1  Vehicular pursuits shall only be initiated if the pursuing officer reasonably believes that: (a) the violator has committed, or is engaged in a conspiracy or attempt to commit, a crime of the first degree or one of the violent or serious crimes of the second degree enumerated in Addendum B; or (b) the violator poses an imminent threat to the safety of the public or other police officers.  This determination shall be made based upon the violator’s actions or operation of the vehicle prior to the initiation of the attempted motor vehicle stop.  The violator’s subsequent actions, including speeding or evasive driving during the pursuit itself, although often supporting the criminal charge of Eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b), shall not constitute an authorization to initiate or continue a pursuit.  16
[directive] B.  Reports on Investigations Conducted By Police Departments  Where an officer or another member of the officer’s agency pursues the investigation of a possible violation of N.J.S.A. 2C: 13-8 without referring the matter to the County Prosecutor’ s Office or the Division of Criminal Justice for investigation by the County Prosecutor or Division, the agency shall, within 24 hours of initiating its investigation, notify the County Prosecutor’s Human Trafficking Liaison that a human trafficking investigation has been initiated, the circumstances that prompted the investigation, and the results of the investigation to date.  Unless and until the agency refers the matter for investigation by the County Prosecutor or Division, or unless and until the County Prosecutor or Division otherwise assumes responsibility for conducting the investigation, the agency or officer shall have a continuing obligation to report on a monthly basis to the County Prosecutor’s Human Trafficking Liaison on the status of its investigation.
[brief] This is improper given the broad scope of discovery and relevance at this stage; the important and expansive nature of this matter; the lack of insight that [...] has into the documents retained by the [...]; and as [...] noted at the December 10 hearing, the \textsuperscript{16}  United notes that Rule 4:10-2(f) specifically addresses ESI, which demonstrates that eDiscovery is subject to Rule 4:10-2.  That is true but beside the point.  Indeed, Rule 4:10-2(f)(2), by its plain terms, precludes discovery of ESI that would impose an undue burden on the producing party.
[brief] Second Day of Trial—June 12, 2023  The trial continued on June 12, 2023 and the State presented the testimony of three individuals: (1) [...], the New Brunswick detective who investigated this matter; (2) [...], a Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office employee who testified regarding the fake firearm; and (3) [...].  (4T).  The Defense presented the testimony of [...]’s stepfather, [...].  (4T).  [...] testified that he responded to the scene of the incident on January 25, 2021, and took the statement of [...].  (4T14:12-16).  After obtaining [...]’ statement, [...] canvassed the area to locate any surveillance footage which might corroborate her story and help him identify the suspect.  (4T14:24-15:3).  The State entered into evidence several of these videos through [...], none of which captured the actual incident, merely the movements of the red pickup truck after the altercation.  (4T15:9-23:21; 4T43:17-19).  [...] further testified as to how he linked [...] to the red pickup truck in the videos.  (4T24:1-27:13).  Once law enforcement received authority to search the truck, [...] located a starter pistol in the center console.  (4T39:13-14).  On cross-examination, [...] admitted that when he arrested [...] during a traffic stop, [...] did not attempt to flee or elude the police and did not resist arrest.  (4T53:3-21).  [...] attempted to posture that [...] was not compliant with the investigation but admitted that there was nothing in his report to suggest that he was anything but a perfect gentleman.  (4T54:21-55:19).  The State next presented the testimony of Sergeant [...], a Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office employee who testified as an expert in the field of firearms investigation in ballistics.  (4T85:1-4).  [...] testified that the imitation handgun resembled a semiautomatic pistol.  (4T90:18).  He also testified that imitation firearms typically have an orange tip, but the one in question appeared to have the orange tip colored in with black marker.  (4T93:11-15).  Finally, the State presented the testimony of [...].  Diana testified that she met [...] at a club in 2020 and the pair dated for approximately eight (8) months.  (4T112:11-25).  She acknowledged that she knew he was dating other girls, and stated that she would see other women’s clothes at [...]’s house.
[directive] You are pleading guilty to possession of a firearm with intent to use it against the person of another or to murder, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, aggravated assault, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, robbery, burglary or escape; or (2) Se declara culpable de uno de los siguientes delitos que ocurrió el 13 de enero del 2008 o después de esa fecha: tenencia de una escopeta, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3b; tenencia de un arma desfigurada, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3d; tenencia de un arma (de fuego) para un propósito ilícito, N.J.S.A. 2C:39:4a; tenencia de un arma de fuego durante la comisión de un delito de sustancia peligrosa controlada (CDS) u otros delitos, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1a; posesión ilícita de una ametralladora, pistola, rifle o escopeta, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5a, b o c; ciertas personas que no tienen permiso para tener armas, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7; o la fabricación, el transporte, la disposición o desfiguración de ametralladoras, escopetas recortadas, armas de fuego desfiguradas o armas de fuego de asalto, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9a, b, e o g; o (2.)  You are pleading guilty to one of the following offenses that occurred on or after January 13, 2008: possession of a shotgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3b; possession of a defaced weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3d; possession of a weapon (firearm) for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a; possession of a firearm while in the course of committing a CDS offense or other offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1a; unlawful possession of a machine gun, handgun, rifle or shotgun, 2C:39-5a., b or N.J.S.A. c; certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7; or manufacture, transport, disposition and defacement of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, defaced firearms or assault firearms.  2C:39-9a., b, e or g. or N.J.S.A. Formulario Promulgado por la directriz #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11172-Spanish página 1 de 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11172 page 1 of 2
[brief] As for the error itself, that could be no more crystal clear.  “As an independent source of protection, New Jersey common law has accorded its citizens their right against self-incrimination since colonial times. ”  State v. A.G.D., 178 N.J. 56, 67 (2003).  That right is “an integral thread in the fabric of New Jersey common law since our beginnings as a state. ”  State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 286 (1986).  New Jersey has “thus, ‘actively embraced’” the opportunity to interpret that right as greater and more protective of New Jersey citizens than its federal Fifth Amendment counterpart.  State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 227, 252 (1993), quoting Hartley, 103 N.J. at 301.  Once a person invokes the right to silence in New Jersey, the police cannot reinitiate interrogation without first giving new Miranda warnings.  Hartley, 103 N.J. at 256 (1986).  When defendant invoked his right to silence, therefore, any subsequent interrogation could take place only if preceded by new warnings.
[brief] 287a.  As such, following the Court’s statement in the 2015 Action that Plaintiffs could instead file these new claims in a new matter (885a – 886a; 1T, 81:18 – 82:5), Plaintiffs filed this action against [...], [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), [...], [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (collectively, “R&P”), [...], [...], and [...] (collectively, “Fox Defendants”), and [...], [...], and [...] (collectively, “Marshall Defendants”).  Plaintiffs settled their claims against [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] on August 18, 2022.
[brief] (5T)  On July 5, 2023, the --- 2  On February 14, 2023, [...] ordered that Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File a Second Supplemental Complaint was frivolous and they must pay sanctions to Plaintiff for attorney fees.  trial court entered two Orders scheduling a 2-day plenary hearing for December 6, 2023 and December 14, 2023.  (75a, 77a)  On July 5, 2023, Defendants filed a Motion for Leave to Appeal.  This application sought to appeal the June 19, 2023 Order for Reconsideration of the May 10, 2023 Orders and the June 10, 2022 Order delineating the disposal of the Boonton and Florida Properties.
[brief] Pursuant to the provisions of the New Jersey Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-1 – 2A:53A-5, Defendant [...] has been found by the jury to be 60% at fault for the injuries sustained by plaintiffs and, therefore, plaintiffs shall be and are entitled to recover the full measure of damages from defendant, [...] in the amount of $1,929,411.19.  (Da349).  On March 13, 2023, [...] moved to alter or amend the judgment, under R. 4:49-2 so as to apply Burt, consistent with the law of the case through the time of the verdict.  (Da352-53).  [...] asserted that the trial court must either: 1) mold the judgment to 60% given that the case litigated to verdict under the legal framework of Burt, and retroactively stripping [...] of his right to allocation under *Burt* after the matter is concluded is untenable; or 2) if the trial court believed that it erred in denying plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration at the start of the trial on the applicability of *Burt*, order a new trial.
[brief] Cases: Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) .................................................. 18, 19, 20 Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) ...........................................  19 State v. Bealor, 187 N.J. 574 (2006) ..........................................................  21 State v. Cahill, 213 N.J. 253 (2013) ..........................................................  18, 20 State v. Doriguzzi, 334 N.J.Super. 530 (App.Div. 2000) ...............................  24 State v. Emery, 27 N.J. 348 (1958) .............................................................  16 State v. Farrell, 320 N.J.Super. 425 (App.Div. 1999) ....................................  20 State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39 (2011) ............................................................  16 State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146 (1964) ......................................................... 16, 17, 21, 22, 23 State v. Morton, 74 N.J.Super. 528 (App.Div. 1962), aff’d 39 N.J. 512 (1963) ........................................................................................................  22 State v. Olenowski, 255 N.J. 529 (2023) ......................................................  25 State v. Prickett, 240 N.J.Super. 139 (App.Div. 1990) ..................................  18 State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360 (2017) .............................................................  17, 18 State v. Stein, 225 N.J. 582 (2016) .............................................................  23  State v. Szima, 70 N.J. 196 (1976) .............................................................  19-20  State v. Tamburro, 68 N.J. 414 (1975) .......................................................  21 State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J.Super. 1 (App.Div. 2009) ..................................  20  Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973) ..............................................  20 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) ..............................................  19  Court Rules: R. 2:6-8.........................................................................................................................3
[brief] Furthermore, other Troopers who are not currently ill, but were only seeking to register for the Ricci Act also filed affidavits that they did not receive notice of the Ricci Act and were included in the Petition.  Pa30.  Pa113-260.  Additionally, other retired Troopers who were not present at the September 11, 2001 attacks and aftermath also submitted affidavits that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act in further support of the Petition.  Pa261-271.  President of the [...], [...], submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the [...] notifying him of the Ricci Act.
[brief] The Plaintiff never moved to modify the bargained for and enforceable terms contained in ¶25 of the JOD.  Plaintiff testified that she never asked for a $20,000.00 contribution for [...]’s college (1T:109, L5 – 8).  There is no evidence in the record below that any legally enforceable agreement was reached between the Plaintiff and the Defendant pertaining to the extent to which, if any, the Defendant would contribute to the children’s higher education costs.  Plaintiff testified that there was an “understanding” (1T:48, L20 – 24) as opposed to an actual agreement that the Defendant would pay 1/3rd of the children’s entirely debt financed college educations and that he would pay whatever bill they gave him after the fact.  She admitted “there’s nothing in writing” and that this “understanding” she claimed to have had with the Defendant was entirely comprised of “verbal conversations that occurred” (1T:58 – 12) (1T:58, 14).  Plaintiff presented no evidence that Defendant was meaningfully involved in or apprised of either child’s college selection (in fact, he was completely excluded from [...]’s college selection and financing process (1T:190, L19 – 25) (1T:185, L3 – 24) (1T:190, L19 – 25)).
[directive] Authorized Tire Deflation Devices  6.1  Law enforcement agencies may choose to utilize authorized tire deflation devices during the course of a vehicular pursuit.  Agencies that choose to employ this strategy may only utilize devices authorized by this Policy.  As with all operational decisions made during the conduct of a vehicular pursuit, the use of such devices is subject to the assessment of inherent risk balanced against the need to apprehend a fleeing offender.  6.2  To be authorized for deployment and use under the vehicular pursuit policy, the tire deflation device shall: (a) producing a controlled deflation of one or more tires of a pursued vehicle; (b) being deployed or activated immediately before the pursued vehicle drives over it, and removed or deactivated immediately after the pursued vehicle drives over it; and (c) allowing the officer to remain a safe distance from the roadway at the time of deployment or activation.  6.3  Prior to the deployment and use of an authorized tire deflation device, the law enforcement agency shall to the following: (a) modify its vehicular pursuit policy to provide for the proper use of the authorized tire deflation device; and (b) train all officers in the use of the authorized tire deflation device, which training must include practical, hands-on operation of the authorized tire deflation device.  6.4  The following are circumstances under which an authorized tire deflation device may be deployed: (a) an authorized tire deflation device may be utilized only after supervisory approval; (b) an authorized tire deflation device shall not be used to stop motorcycles, mopeds, or similar vehicles; (c) the authorized tire deflation device should not be used in locations where specific geographic features (e.g., sharp curves, alongside of rivers, steep embankments, etc.) increase the risk of serious injury to the officer, violator, or public; (d) deployment locations should have reasonably good sight distances to enable the officer to observe the pursuit and other traffic as it approaches; and (e) the officer deploying the authorized tire deflation device should not attempt to overtake and pass a high-speed pursuit in order to position the device.  6.5  Procedures for deployment of the authorized tire deflation device:  (a) the officer deploying the authorized tire deflation device should do so from a position of safety; 10  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] (Ibid.)  Thus, if the Borough’s position were to be upheld, it would render the Dock Access Easement to be worthless.  Moreover, [...] accepted the Dock Access Easement as a condition of its development approvals on Lot 2.01 because it was under the assumption that the Boulevard was a public street, and would not have agreed to such Dock Access Easement if it knew the Borough would refuse to recognize the Boulevard as a public street.  (Ibid.)  Accordingly, the Borough should be estopped from denying that the Roads are public streets.
[brief] The acquittals suggest that the jury also rejected the State's allegation that defendant was in the house when that use of force occurred, which was consistent with absence of any forensic evidence that placed him there, and with the evidence that [...]'s was the only DNA found at the scene and that [...] admitted that he was in the house while the victim was being restrained for the purpose of obtaining the victim's money or a credit card.  The omission of the Whitaker instruction as part of the accomplice liability robbery instruction was especially harmful in light of these acquittals and the absence of any evidence, aside from [...]'s self-serving testimony, that defendant was in the house when the robbery and killing occurred.
[directive] In all instances when a conducted energy device is fired at or discharged upon a person by a state law enforcement officer, a higher-ranking supervisor shall investigate the circumstances and outcome of the device’s use.  The investigating supervisor shall report on the incident to the chief executive of the department, providing the chief executive information on all relevant circumstances, deployment, and outcome, including whether the deployment avoided injury to an officer and avoided the need to use deadly force.  Upon receipt, the Superintendent or chief executive shall issue a finding on whether the firing and all discharges complied with the Attorney General’s Supplemental Policy on Conducted Energy Devices.
[directive] [예/Yes] [아니요/No] 귀하가 직장 또는 학교 등록 현황을 변경하는 경우, 변경 후 일 이내에 (2) 5 담당 법 집행 기관에 통고해야 한다는 것을 아십니까?  Do you understand that if you change employment or school enrollment status you must notify the appropriate law enforcement agency no later than 5 days after the change?  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No] 귀하가 주소 또는 현황 변경을 해당 법 집행 기관에 통고하지 않는 (3) 경우, 귀하는 제3 급 범죄로 기소되어  년 이하의 구금형(해당 범죄가 5  년 월1 일 이후에 저질러진 경우)을 선고 받거나, 또는 제4 급 2014  7  범죄로 기소되어 개월 이하의 구금형(만약 범죄가 년7 월1 일 18 2014  이전에 저질러진 경우)을 선고 받을 수 있다는 것을 아십니까?  Do you understand that if you fail to notify the appropriate law enforcement agency of a change of address or status you may be charged with a third degree crime, and may receive a (if the offense was committed on or after July 1, sentence of imprisonment of up to 5 years 2014) or you may be charged with a fourth degree crime and may receive a sentence of (if the offense was committed before July 1, 2014)? imprisonment of up to 18 months [예/Yes] [아니요/No]
[brief] [...]’s job as Co-Director of the ICU required him to be on call 24 hours per day, 7 days a week to admit patients who appeared at the [...] Emergency Room to the [...].  (Pa. 74;Bellifemine Dep., Tr 37-5 to 20).  [...]’s duties as Director of the Sleep Center required him to interview patients prior to their sleep study, interpret the sleep studies after the sleep studies were completed, and make a recommendations for the patient’s treatment.  Volume 1Pa. 68; Bellifemine Dep. TR 16-5 to 20).  Dr Bellifemine’s duties as President of the Medical Staff required him to attend hospital meetings, recruit physicians to work at the hospital, review complaints made by patients, interact with physicians on a daily basis, address complaints made by physicians about the hospital, and address complaints about physician performance brought to his attention by the nursing staff.