ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The State also harped on the fact that “there are days that from [...]’s testimony [[...] was using] Adderall and marijuana together, marijuana every day, Adderall every day,” saying it was “incumbent upon each one of you individually and collectively to talk about the impact of using that drug in a way not prescribed. ” (9T73-4 to 18).  In arguing what [...]’s state of mind would have been at the time of the incident, the State said that [...] must \(^7\)  The testimony showed [...] barely took more than the recommended dosing, seeming to average 4.78 tablets a day instead of the recommended 4.  (6T129-6 to 130-2).  That calculation excludes the possibility that [...]—who was addicted to prescription medication and living out of [...]’s car—took any of the pills. have been “in control of the situation that he felt based upon too much Adderall, too many conspiracy theories.
[brief] 10 N.J. Republican State Comm. v. Murphy, 243 N.J. 574 (2020)  ..................................................................................  13 New Century Fin. v. Trewin, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688 (Ch. Div. May 24, 2018)  ....................  4 R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 255 (2001) .................................................................................. 6, 7 Ryan v. Motor Credit Co., 132 N.J. Eq. 398 (1942) ..............................................................................  10 Rules R. 4:50-1 .....................................................................................................  3  Statutes N.J.S.A. 17:11C-11 .....................................................................................  9  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-16 ...................................................................................  8 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18(i) ..............................................................................  13 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2 ....................................................................................  12, 13 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3 ....................................................................................  13 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) ..............................................................................  9, 13 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-37 ...................................................................................  8 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-40 ...................................................................................  8  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-42 ...................................................................................  8 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-43 ...................................................................................  9 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-7 ....................................................................................
[brief] STATE CASES  State v. Niango, 247 N.J. 533 (2021) .........................................................  3  State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330 (2012) .....................................................  4, 5  NEW JERSEY COURT RULES  R. 3:21-10(b)(7) .......................................................................................  3, 4 R. 3:21-10(c) ..............................................................................................  4  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] [Aa58.]  Based upon her determination that [...] was removed for charges of misconduct directly related to his employment, [...] granted the Board’s Motion for Summary Decision, thereby dismissing [...]’s appeal for deferred retirement benefits.  (Aa58).  It is our position that the Board’s determination to adopt the ALJ’s initial decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  Specifically, the ALJ’s determination that [...] was removed for charges of misconduct directly related to this employment should have been rejected by the Board.  As set forth below, a review of the evidence in this case clearly indicates [...] was not removed for charges of misconduct directly related to his employment within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-11.2.  Instead, [...] was removed for charges unrelated to his employment and/or official duties in accordance with the relevant case law.  As such, the Board’s adoption of the ALJ’s initial decision must be reversed.  To this end, this Honorable Court must: (1) determine [...] is eligible for deferred retirement benefits under the applicable law; and (2) require the Board to conduct an “honorable service” analysis regarding [...]’s application pursuant to *Uricoli v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System*, 91 N.J. 62 (1982) to ascertain whether [...] should receive the full allotment of deferred retirement benefits he seeks or if any portion thereof is subject to forfeiture.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the reasons set forth in this brief, all evidence seized during the traffic stop of [...] and all evidence seized during the search of [...]’s storage unit must be suppressed.  [...] respectfully requests that the matter be remanded to the trial court to provide him with an opportunity to withdraw his plea if he chooses to do so.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for the Defendant-Appellant  BY: /s [...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID: 446232023  Dated: February 9, 2024  April 18, 2024  RACHEL GLANZ  ID. NO. 446232023
[brief] [...] then called [...] to testify.  [...] presented testimony as to the definition of a single-family dwelling, then compared that with the definition for a duplex.  The Board Attorney then clarified to the Board that the applicant was not seeking approval for basement apartments.  Rather, the individual homeowners could build their homes in compliance with the ordinance and could seek any necessary relief through the building and zoning departments.  Upon cross examination, [...] admitted that the application only seeks a subdivision, and the determination of what homes will be built would be made later by the Construction and Zoning Departments.
[brief] Da18; 1T141-3 to 142-9, 1T184-9 to 25; 5T69-7 to 9.  ⁴  Although [...] settled the land use litigation that purportedly created or exacerbated his cash flow crunch, receiving $450,000, he did not use those funds to pay-off the First or Second Loans as he had committed to do in a correspondence dated September 22, 2009.  Da17; 1T95-9 to 23, 96-22 to 25.  The trial court found that [...]’s promises were “nothing more than hollow promises he never intended to honor. ”  Da18.  D.
[brief] Generally, immunity prevails over liability to the extent that immunity has become the rule and liability is the exception.  The standard for liability under the TCA depends on whether the conduct of individuals acting on behalf of the public entity was ministerial or discretionary.  See Henebema v. South Jersey Transportation Authority, 219 N.J. 481 (2014).  If the action was ministerial, liability for the public entity is evaluated based on an ordinary negligence standard.  However, a more difficult threshold must be overcome in order for a public entity to be liable for an individual's discretionary acts.  A public employee remains liable for ordinary negligence in the performance of ministerial acts unless such acts are covered by specific sections of the Act declaring non-liability.
[directive] 1.  d)  Do you understand that you must provide the appropriate law enforcement agency with [Yes] [No] information about your routine access to or use of a computer or device with Internet (if the offense was committed on or after February 25, 2008) capability?  e)  Do you understand that if you fail to notify the appropriate law enforcement agency about [Yes] [No] your routine access to or use of a computer or device with Internet capability or a change in such use or access, you may be charged with a third degree crime and may receive a (if the offense was committed on or after sentence of imprisonment of up to 5 years July 1, 2014) or you may be charged with a fourth degree crime and may receive a (if the offense was committed on or after sentence of imprisonment of up to 18 months?  February 25, 2008 but before July 1, 2014)  2.  Address Verification
[brief] Specifically, he stated: our initial comment was testimony should be provided whether basements are proposed or they're single family dwellings.  The answer was since custom homes are proposed, basements will need to be addressed at plot plans.  That was the response right from the beginning.  That has never changed in any iteration of the plans.  (T2: p57, ln 16 – p58, ln 2)  The Board’s position that no testimony was presented as to this issue is even more bizarre given that Board attorney, [...] (“[...]”) presented an on-the-record summary of Plaintiff’s application wherein he agreed that Plaintiff was not seeking approval for basement apartments.
[brief] THE MOTION COURT ERRED BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE IT DID NOT GRANT PLAINTIFF  ALL REASONABLE FACTUAL INFERENCES FROM THE RECORD EVIDENCE.  The Trial Court improperly granted summary judgment by making numerous inferences that favored Defendants rather than granting all reasonable factual inferences to Plaintiff.  Here, the Trial Court strayed from the Brill standard by accepting Defendants' narrative without allowing Plaintiff the entitled benefit of the doubt in several key areas and in connection with each CEPA prong.
[brief] Trial Day 6**  July 31, 2023 was the sixth day of trial (July 29-30, 2023 fell on a weekend and court was not in session).  [...], co-owner and partner at [...], was called to testify by Plaintiff on this day.  (7T 24:6-65:15).  Like the other defendants questioned by plaintiff, Kestin was also questioned about the contractually stated 6 AM completion time for snow removal service, and the contractual prohibition against subcontracting their services out.  (7T 30:7-32:22; 35:10-14).  During defense counsel’s questioning of Kestin, counsel attempted to mark and show a photograph of the accident location to the witness, which was objected to Plaintiff.  (7T 55:20-56:5) (Da 138).  Plaintiff objected to using the photo as it was allegedly taken by [...] (plaintiff’s co-worker and boss), not Plaintiff, despite Plaintiff providing the photograph with her answers to interrogatories and representing in her certified answers to interrogatories that they were taken by Plaintiff at 7:35 AM on the date of loss and thus presumably depicted the conditions that led plaintiff to fall.  (7T 56:6-23).  According to plaintiff’s counsel, Plaintiff at her deposition denied taking the photograph in question.  (7T 56:6-23).  Plaintiff further claimed without support that the photo was taken later - not on the date of loss; and that when Plaintiff was asked when the photo was taken at her deposition, she could not provide an answer.  (7T 70:14-20; 71:10-19).  Defendants renewed their request to admit this photograph into evidence arguing that Plaintiff had authenticated the photograph by representing she took it the on the morning of the accident; that the photograph was relevant because it gave context to the accident location, particularly by showing that it was difficult to remove snow by parked cars; that the question of who took the photograph was not material to whether it showed the conditions on the date of loss, and that the photograph should be admitted as undisputedly showing the conditions on the date of loss under N.J.R.E 101(a)(5).  (7T 68:1-69:23; 70:2-13; 70:23-25).  Ultimately, the court would not allow Defendants to use this photograph or to have it admitted into evidence at trial.
[brief] Here, the record shows that [...] used the Board’s attorney to conduct research about a fellow Board member, [...], with whom he shared a substantial history of mutual personal animosity, the day after losing in a Board ¹⁰  A copy of this court’s decision in *Capers* has been included in respondent’s appendix pursuant to Rules 1:36-3 and 2:6-1(a)(1)(H).  The undersigned is not aware of any contrary unpublished opinions. election in which she campaigned against him.  Thus, like the board members in Bembry and Capers, [...] clearly violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f), as it would be entirely reasonable for the public to perceive that [...] was using the unique authority granted to him as Board President for personal gain, in the form of securing an advantage over [...], as a consequence of their substantially negative history.
[brief] Cognizable injury for abuse of process is limited to the harm caused by the misuse of process, and does not include harm (such as conviction and confinement) resulting from that process's being carried through to its lawful conclusion….  [7]  An example of this latter category—a § 1983 action that does not seek damages directly attributable to conviction or confinement but whose successful prosecution would necessarily imply that the plaintiff's criminal conviction was wrongful—would be the following:
[brief] (Sb 19-20)  The law is clear that remedial statutes, like this one, are supposed to be construed broadly in accordance with their remedial purpose.  See Lourdes Med. Ctr. of Burlington Cnty. v. Bd. of Rev., 197 N.J. 339, 364 (2009); Barratt v. Cushman & Wakefield of New Jersey, Inc., 144 N.J. 120, 126–27 (1996); Shaw v. Shand, 460 N.J. Super. 592, 608–09 (App. Div. 2019).
[brief] “Although ... the [detective] never specifically repeated what the inform[ant] had [said], the inescapable inference from [the] testimony was that the inform[ant] had given information that defendant would have narcotics in his possession. ”  Id. at 271, 307 A.2d 65.  As a result, “the jury was led to believe that an unidentified inform[ant], who was not present in court and not subjected to cross-examination, had told the officers that defendant was committing a crime.  The testimony was clearly hearsay. ”  Ibid.  *7  The Court in State v. Irving provided further guidance not only on when hearsay testimony constitutes a Confrontation Clause violation but also on when any such violation constitutes reversible error.
[brief] This appeal arises out of Orders entered by the Superior Court of New Jersey granting Plaintiff-Respondent [...]’ (the “Township”) Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Defendant-Appellant [...]’ (“Appellant” or “Borough”) Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.  Therein, the trial court correctly determined the Township was entitled to all connection fees concerning properties located on Johnson Road in the [...] pursuant to contracts entered into by and between the Parties as well as the Parties’ course of performance and dealing.  While affording Appellant all reasonable inferences, the trial court was correct in determining the contract clearly and unambiguously entitles the Township to all connection fees for the Subject Property.  The trial court was also correct in finding the Parties’ course of performance and course of dealing confirmed the Township is entitled to connection fees.  Finally, the trial court correctly determined the Borough breached the Parties’ agreement by improperly billing and collecting connection fees due and owing the Township.  Accordingly, in affording Plaintiffs all reasonable inferences from the factual record, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the Township’s entitlement to the connection fees at issue.  All competent record evidence unequivocally established the contract’s plain language requires payment of the subject connection fees to the Township.  As such, Summary Judgment was properly granted as to the Township and Appellant has failed to establish the trial court erred in any respect.  Therefore, and for the reasons established herein, it is respectfully submitted the Appellate Division should affirm the trial court’s decision in its entirety.
[brief] Plaintiff brings no new argument on appeal that was not already considered by the Trial Court that would warrant a reversal.  As stated by the Trial Court, “[c]onsequently, it is this Court’s view that when viewed in the overall scheme, the proposed structure, despite its added height, will not necessarily give the appearance of disharmony or overcrowding that the concerned the court in Grasso, 375 N.J. Super. at 53. ”  (Pa 70).  The Court further noted “it is clear that a major thrust of the evidence was accommodating the Mater Plan and Vision Plan which valued branding and aesthetics at this critical location, the gateway of the township. ”  (Pa71).  [...] opined in conclusion:  ... there was clearly sufficient evidence before the Board for it to have granted the application.  The Board’s determination that Applicant proposed a better zoning alternative and satisfied the “positive” and “negative criteria” requirements was not arbitrary and capricious but was based on facts present in the record.
[brief] That resolution was adopted and the case was closed.  There was no more pending application.  It was over.  There is no authority, no right whatsoever for the board after an application has concluded, after a [vote] has been taken on the final resolution, after the resolution has been published, to then go out and say we changed our minds . . . [if] the board wanted to condition its approval, it should have done so when it adopted the resolution.  It didn’t.  It tried to do so under the cover of darkness, insidiously, inappropriately and illegally.  The application was finished.
[brief] [...] testified that [...] told her he was going to pick up clothes -- saying nothing about a laptop -- but that [...] did not even have a bag or backpack with him.  (17T 71-22 to 72-1; 17T 108-3 to 8; 17T 111-15 to 19)  [...] found it to be “strange,” she admitted, that [...] had them drop him off “a block or so” from his destination, but she said nothing about it at the time and was “just kind of going with the flow. ”  (17T 108-9 to 22)  She also noted that [...] made a phone call at 5:09 p.m. to an unknown person during the drive, and was not on that call for long.  (17T 109-4 to 111-11)  [...] admitted that she had no idea whether [...] was telling the truth about the reason he was being dropped off.  (17T 121-15 to 17)  [...] also told police that [...] had “a bad drug problem,” and had used marijuana, MDMA, alcohol, and amphetamines for “a long time. ”  (17T 113-21 to 116-17)  She also told police that [...] “settles” things “with his fists” sometimes, but she claimed she meant “as opposed to using a weapon,” and was not saying that he was normally violent.  (17T 90-10 to 91-18)  [...] agreed that [...] was “out of his element and anxious” that night and that she thought it was “weird” that he was not being “forthcoming with what the situation was” regarding the trip to Bound Brook.  (17T 128-2 to 22)  She had “a bad feeling” when she dropped him off.  (17T 123-17 to 19)  [...] had even been “mumbling to himself in the car” and was acting “a little bit” irrational, [...] testified.  (17T 127-1 to 4)
[brief] Order Granted Motion to Waive Defendant to Adult Court ................................Da1-2  Indictment [...].............................................................................................Da3-6  Order Denying Miranda Motion dated 3-25-21.........................................................Da7  Order Denying Interlocutory Appeal dated 5-13-21 ...............................................Da8  Verdict Sheet..............................................................................................................Da9-15  JOC and Order of Commitment dated 6-30-22 .......................................................Da16-19  Amended JOC Order of Commitment dated 7-14-22..............................................Da20-23  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  In the present case, the State failed to properly consider the fact that juveniles receive heightened protections when it comes to custodial interrogations.  Moreover, the State substantially downplayed the fact that juveniles are different from adults for the purposes of determining the admissibility of confessions given to the police.  The majority of the State’s proof’s in the present case came from defendant’s statement to the police.  Here, the Trial Court failed to assess the factors qualitatively.  Assessing the totality of the circumstances it is clear that [...]’s statement was unconstitutional, involuntary and should not have been admissible in his trial.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] On July 24, 2021, [...] (“Settlor”) passed away.  The [...] 2006 Revocable Trust (“Trust”) designated his three (3) children as equal death beneficiaries including [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), and [...] (“[...]”), who was appointed sole Successor Trustee.  [...] (“[...]”) is married to [...].  On July 28, 2021, [...] (“[...]”) announced that his firm represents both [...] and [...].  Furthermore, [...] announced that [...] (“Trustee”) accepted her trusteeship and all communications must take place through counsel.  At the time of the Settlor’s death, the Trust owned the real property described as [...] (“Boonton Property”) and the real property described as [...] (“Florida Property”).  The Trust also owned a [...] brokerage account with approximately $500,000 on deposit.  In accordance with the Trust terms, as soon as practicable following the Settlor’s death, the Trustee was instructed to divide all property owned by the Trust, less any costs associated with the testamentary estate, into three equal shares, and transfer those shares outright and free of trust to the three beneficiaries.
[brief] The 1949 Judgment  In addition, even if documents subsequent to the time of the initial conveyance of the [...] via the [...] are considered (which they should not be), the 1949 Judgment does not support plaintiffs’ claim for an implied easement.  Instead, there are three reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 1949 Judgment: (i) had the parties believed in 1949 that the beachfront lots had the implied easement for direct access that the [...] now claim, they would have included specific language in the 1949 Judgment to make that clear; (ii) their failure to do so, or to do anything that would indicate they believed they had such an easement, means that they did not hold such a belief; and (iii) if those beachfront lot owners did not believe that they had such an implied easement nearly 75 years ago, that is further evidence that the current owners of the Westerhold property do not have one.
[directive] It is recommended that each law enforcement agency develop a standard operating procedure (s.o.p.) regarding in-person death notification.  This s.o.p. should include the agency's procedure for multi-jurisdictional contact.  It is also recommended that the Basic Recruit and In-Service training curriculum approved by the Police Training Commission include a performance objective and resource material pertaining to the death notification process and the Revised Homicide and Sudden Death Survivor Guidelines.  This curriculum should make reference to the recommended s.o.p. at the local level.  It is further recommended that County Prosecutors issue an official memorandum to those charged with investigating homicides and sudden deaths that requires them to notify the County Victim-Witness Coordinator of homicide and sudden deaths as soon as possible.  B.
[brief] The Appealle appears to discuss the Bankruptcy Court determining the Appellant was protected from liability over $200,000 without any context.  To be clear, the Bankruptcy Court on July 11, 2023 determined that its August 18, 2021 Court Order acted as a cap of $200,000 when this matter proceeded to trial.  6T. Appealle’s argument prior to the Bankruptcy Court’s July 12, 2023 ruling was that the August 18, 2021 applied only to economic damages, not non-economic damages.  6T.  In interpretation of the Bankruptcy Court’s August 18, 2021 Order which Appealle drafted and sought, the Trial Court in this matter refused to apply the August 18, 2021 Order and, eventually, deferred to Bankruptcy Court’s interpretation.  5T.  This was something Appealle’s counsel felt was best left to the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment in February of 2023.  Dr1-3.  On July 11, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing and noted that the August 18, 2021 was not limited to economic damages vs. non-economic damages.