ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying.  Comment 3 further provides that even if confidential information was obtained in connection with the prior matters, the information may be rendered obsolete if significant time has elapsed:  *Information acquired in a prior representation may have been rendered obsolete by the passage of time, a circumstance that may be relevant in determining whether two representations are substantially related.*  In the case of an organizational client, *general knowledge of the client’s policies and practices ordinarily will not preclude a subsequent representation…*  See RPC 1.9, Comment 3 (emphasis added).  The prohibition delineated in RPC 1.9 is “triggered when two factors coalesce: the matters between the present and former clients must be the same or...*substantially related*, and the interests of the present and former clients must be materially adverse.
[brief] The Grand Jury in this matter issued an Indictment on October 22, 2019.  That Indictment was dismissed by [...] on January 22, 2024.  The State did not request or obtain a Stay of the dismissal.  Accordingly, as of January 23, 2024, the Defendant’s Indictment did not exist⁴ — and, certainly, the 2019 Grand ⁴  It is clear that the “without prejudice” designation of the dismissal was limited to a circumstance in which the State was able to recover the lost / destroyed evidence and not a hearsay email confirming that the evidence was lost / destroyed.  Jury that issued the 2019 Indictment was no longer sitting.
[brief] Further, [...] failed to certify pursuant to Rule 1:36-3, that she is unaware of any other contrary unpublished opinions.  Cf. Gluck v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 2023 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 153 (Apr. 6, 2023) (affirming the Board’s denial of PERS service credit for work as a municipal attorney and finding petitioner was more properly classified as independent contractor, rather than employee under the IRS twenty factor test) (Ra33-46); Pascarella v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 2023 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 843 (Nov. 6, 2023) (affirming the Board’s denial of PERS service credit for work as a municipal prosecutor from 2007 through 2016 and finding petitioner was better classified as an independent contractor, rather than an employee under the IRS twenty factor test) (Ra47-70); Coronato v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 2023 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 939 (Dec. 21, 2023) (affirming the Board’s denial of PERS service credit for work as an assistant municipal prosecutor after 2008 and finding petitioner was better classified as an independent contractor, rather than an employee under the IRS twenty factor test) (Ra71-89); Shain v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., OAL Docket No. TYP04701-21, Initial Decision (Feb. 16, 2024) (affirming the Board’s denial of PERS service credit and finding under the IRS twenty factor test petitioner could not be classified as an employee, as his relationship with the municipality essentially remained the same after Chapter 92 with the exception of recasting the director of law position as an employee requiring a W-2 so he could maintain his membership in PERS) (Ra90-107).
[brief] If “heightened scrutiny” of cannabis operations was warranted and the [...] intended that to be the standard, the [...] should have amended its Land Development Rules in the manner required under the Administrative Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 et seq. ("APA").  [...] failed to do so, yet applied an unwritten rule here.  The APA defines an "administrative rule" or "rule" as an "agency statement of general applicability and continuing effect that implements or interprets law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure or practice requirements of any agency."
[brief] *Id.* (emphasis added) (quoting *In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation*, 108 N.J. 35, 41 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Indeed, “the primary goal in determining whether a statute implies a right of action has almost invariably been a search for the underlying legislative intent. ”  *Veras*, No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176, at *24 (quoting *R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co.*, 168 N.J. 255, 272-73 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  With respect to the legislative intent of the NJCFLA, the NJCFLA’s intended mechanisms of enforcement, and the history of the same, the Court must certainly consider the NJCFLA’s predecessors, discussed *supra*, for context.
[brief] 18  1.  [...]’s Tender To [...]..............................................18  2.  [...]’s Internal Review Of The Tender Fails To Reveal Any Documents Establishing That It Cancelled [...]’s Liability Coverage...........................................19  3.  [...] Admits That It Did Not Communicate Any Notice Of Termination Of [...]’s Coverage To [...].............20  4.  [...] Saw Fit To Issue A Notice Of Cancellation Of [...]’s Separate Workers Compensation Policy And Send It To A Governmental Agency, But Not To [...]..................21  5.  [...] Confirmed That It Did Not Receive Any Cancellation Or Termination Notice From [...] Or Anyone Else Regarding Either The Liability Or Compensation Policies..................22  F.  [...]’s Purported “Unenrollment” From The CCIP....................24  1.  The Documents And Testimony Establishing [...]’s Continued CCIP Enrollment...........................................24  Point I.................................................................................................27
[brief] Id. at 437.  Therefore, a reversal will only be justified if the prosecutor's conduct is "clearly and unmistakably improper [and] substantially prejudiced defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense."  State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 575 (1999).  In determining whether comments in summation require reversal, an appellate court "must take into account the tenor of the trial and the degree of responsiveness of both counsel and the court to improprieties when they occurred."  State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 153, 586 A.2d 85 (1991), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929 (1993).  A reviewing court should never consider a prosecutor’s questions or argument in a vacuum.  Rather, a reviewing court should evaluate the prosecutor’s comments in context with defense counsel’s “opening salvo. ”  State v. Munoz, 340 N.J. Super. 204, 216 (App. Div.) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12, (1985)), certif. denied, 169, N.J. 610 (2001); State v. Engel, 249 N.J. Super. 336, 379 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393 (1991).  Every prosecutorial misstep will not warrant a new trial.  In the instant case, the theme of the State’s summation was two-fold.  First, the State detailed the testimony of detectives and the physical evidence presented, including the video of the shooting.  Then, the State switched to specifically rebut the defense collective claims that the State could not have met their burden by producing only three witnesses.  Likewise, the State responded to the defense assertion that State denied the jury the whole story.  And while the defense did object to the State’s summation at its conclusion, the trial court gave a limiting instruction reminding jurors that closing arguments were not evidence.  As such, defendant has not made any showing that the jury’s ability to rationally evaluate the evidence was impaired.
[brief] (5T 136-7 to 8, 136-12 to 14)  On cross-examination, [...] described the effects of the various drugs [...] had taken.  He explained that the amount of cocaine in [...]’s blood was “high. ”  (5T 157-23 to 25)  [...] further explained that PCP can make someone agitated or feel like they are incredibly strong because it “is a very, very powerful stimulant,” and it “commonly” makes people aggressive or angry.  (5T 155-22 to 156-7)  PCP can also have psychotic effects, can cause hallucinations, and can cause major changes in a person’s behavior and personality.  (5T 156-19 to 157-1)  [...] agreed that the combination of PCP, cocaine, and alcohol can have an “especially serious” impact, could “seriously affect a person’s behavior,” and “make them act like a very different person. ”  (5T 159-6 to 14)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE PASSION/PROVOCATION
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **In re Accutane Litig.,** | passim | | 234 N.J. 340 (2018) | | | **Boyle v. Ford Motor Co.,** | 8 | | 399 N.J. Super. 18 (App. Div. 2008) | | | **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,** | 9, 10, 13| | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | **Canesi ex rel. Canesi v. Wilson,** | 9 | | 295 N.J. Super. 354 (App. Div. 1996) | | | **Courtois v. General Motors Corp.,** | 8 | | 37 N.J. 525 (1962) | | | **Froom v. Perel,** | 13 | | 377 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 2005) | | | **Kendall v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.,** | 6, 7, 9, 11| | 209 N.J. 173 (2012) | | | **Myrlak v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.,** | 7 | | 157 N.J. 84 (1999) | | | **O’Brien v. Muskin Corp.,** | 8, 16 | | 94 N.J. 169 (1983) | | | **Rowe v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.,** | 7 | | 189 N.J. 615 (2007) | | | **Smith v. Est. of Kelly,** | 16 | | 343 N.J. Super. 480 (App. Div. 2001) | | | **Sun Chem. Corp. v. Fike Corp.,** | 8 | | 243 N.J. 319 (2020) | | | **Townsend v. Pierre,** | passim | | 221 N.J. 36 (2015) | | Triffin v. Am. Intern., 372 N.J. Super. 517 (App. Div. 2004)
[brief] And I think that the appropriate analysis has to be with what did happen, not with what could have happened.  [1T55-24 – 1T56-6]  [M]y analysis here is based upon what happened in this case, which is that ultimately, on August 19th, the plaintiff submitted a letter challenging the bid award to [...] and then subsequent to that, on August 20th, they submitted the appropriate documentation showing that they actually have that notice of classification.  At that point the County had the authority or the ability, once they received that documentation on August 20th, to determine that they're going to award the bid to the plaintiff and they chose not to do so.  [1T58-2 – 1T58-12]  This was not a situation where they were able to tender a more affordable bid because they didn't have something in place.  They had everything.  And so there's no competitive advantage here, unless we look at arguably -- and that's where we've gone back and forth a little bit, this walk away provision, which has been artfully argued by both defendants in this case.  The general concept is that if the defendants -- strike that.  If the plaintiffs didn't like the numbers, they could walk away.  They could not choose to proceed with the contract.  But that's speculation and I can only -- that's why I started my finding.  I can only deal with the facts that are before me, which is the document was provided.  It was provided on the 20th.  They were fully compliant with the bid.  There's no ability to walk away.  It doesn't exist with the fact pattern of this case, and I don't want to get lost in speculation or other fact patterns.  The fact is here the document was turned over.  It existed at the time of the bid opening and existed on that day.  [1T59-9 – 1T60-6]  The trial court reiterated this position on reconsideration:  We would have a completely different situation here if that were not the facts and that’s why in my analysis I wanted to emphasize that I’m dealing with the facts that were before me.  I’m not dealing with non-facts that are before and the fact of the case here is this document was valid on the date of the bid opening.
[brief] Plaintiff Terminated The PSA By Electing To Take Back Its Deposit  The allegations of the Complaint demonstrate as a matter of law that Plaintiff terminated the PSA.  Plaintiff admits that on July 14, 2022, it declared [...] in breach of the PSA and demanded the return of Plaintiff’s deposit from [...], and then received back that deposit.  (Pa10-11, ¶¶39-41).  In that context, the plain language of several provisions of the PSA demonstrates that the only possible way that Plaintiff could have received back its deposit was upon the termination of the PSA by Plaintiff.  Specifically, Section 13.1 gave Plaintiff the right to elect as its sole remedy to receive back its deposit if it terminated the PSA:  In the event the Closing and the transactions contemplated hereby do not occur as herein provided by reason of any default of [[...]], [Plaintiff] may, as [Plaintiff]’s sole and exclusive remedy, elect by notice to [[...]] within ten (10) Business Days following the Scheduled Closing Date, terminate this [PSA] Agreement, in which event [Plaintiff] will receive from [[...]] the Earnest Money Deposit, whereupon [[...]] and [Plaintiff] will have no further rights or obligations under this [PSA] Agreement, except with respect to the Termination Surviving Obligations.  (Pa115-116 (emphasis added)).  The phrase “in which event” that follows the phrase “terminate this [PSA] Agreement” and precedes the phrase “will receive from [[...]] the Earnest Money Deposit” makes clear that the return of the deposit was conditioned on Plaintiff’s termination of the PSA.  (Id.)  Stated differently, Plaintiff’s termination of the PSA was the “event” that predicated the return of the Earnest Money Deposit to it.
[brief] The 2019 Land Use Plan Element was updated to include a recommendation for the following new Senior Housing Overlay zone (in addition to other zones where permitted):  4.  **Senior Housing Overlay.**  A new Senior Housing Overlay designation is hereby created to encompass two sites that have been identified as appropriate locations for future development of senior housing.  These two sites are identified as follows:  a.  A 30.7-acre site located at Route 202, Interstate 287 and River Road.  The site consists of seven parcels ….  The existing land use designation for these parcels is Medium Density Residential [and in the R-27A zone].  b.  A 7.9-acre site located at the northeast corner of Route 202 and Twaits Road (462, 464, 470 and 478 Route 202).  The site consists of four parcels ….  Whereas the existing land use designation for Lots 68, 69, 70 and the front of 67.2 is Local Business, the existing land use designation for the rear of Lot 67.2 is Medium Density Residential [and 59% in the R-27A zone, 41% in the B-2 zone].  The purpose of the Senior Housing Overlay designation is to allow developers to have the option of redeveloping these sites for various types of senior housing (including active adult and age-restricted independent living developments in townhouse or multifamily-type structures, as well as assisted living, memory care, and continuing care retirement communities)
[brief] The Court concluded that a grant of fees would protect “plaintiff for the future[,] take care of its actual damage to date, . . . cut into any unjust enrichment of the defendants,” and would serve “deterrent purposes. ”  *Id.* at 573-75.  Here, the [...] proffered that the evidence would show Defendants denied consent for walkovers sought by many [...] beachfront homeowners and forced those homeowners into litigation, which would support an award based on deterrence.  The [...] also proffered that the evidence would show Defendants’ Board Members engaged in wrongful actions and “shenanigans,” including: (1) requesting that [...] issue a notice of violation against the [...] itself and the [...] in order to use that violation as a pretext for removing the [...]’ walkover, which they did while the [...] were lawfully pursuing their property rights and a permit; (2) falsely filing a criminal trespass charge against [...] for the purpose of trying to gain an advantage in Defendants’ dispute with the [...]; (3) posting messages in a private Facebook Group encouraging [...] residents to protest at beachfront owners private homes and to even go onto their private walkways to watch fireworks; (4) intentionally stirring up animosity against the [...] and other beachfront homeowners, who were then subjected to confrontations with other Normandy beach residents; and (5) telling rank and file members Defendants had insurance coverage for their legal defense and, therefore, the members would not have to pay anything to fund the defense for as long as it took.
[brief] In addition, she stated during her deposition that her personal property, including her coats, fur coats and other clothing, were damaged both as the result of the water leak and as a result of the work performed by [...].  See Pa70-80; Pa97-98; Pa37, pages 42-43.  [...] claims that there were certain items that were not returned to her, or when returned, were damaged.  But she is not able to state, with any degree of specificity or certainty, which of her items were removed to be cleaned, which items were not returned, and which items were returned to her damaged.  See Pa41, pages 60 - 61; Pa42, pages 62; Pa43, pages 67 - 69; Pa44 70 - 73; Pa45, page 75.  She claims, without any supporting evidence, that the skins of certain “fur items” were cracked when they were returned to her.  Pa43, page 67.  However, [...] has not and cannot establish that any unreasonable action or inaction on the part of [...] caused this alleged cracking.  In fact, [...] admitted that these items were already damaged as the result of the water leak and the activities of [...] following the incident.  See Pa70-80; Pa97-98; Pa37, pages 42-43.  In addition to [...], an entity doing business as [...] came to [...]’s home immediately following the water leak and removed damaged and destroyed items of [...]’s personal property.
[directive] The following questions need to be answered only if you are eligible for a mandatory sentence of special probation pursuant to 2C:35-14 (“Drug Court”).  N.J.S.A.  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  1.  Èske w konprann ke tribinal la detèmine oswa ta kab detèmine ke w se yon moun ki nan dwòg?  Do you understand that the court has determined or may determine that you are a drug dependent person?  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  2.  Èske w konprann ke si tribinal la detèmine ke w se yon moun ki nan dwòg epi ke li ta detèmine tou ke w reyini kritè ki tonbe anba 2C:35-14, la w ta N.J.S.A. kab kalifye pou resevwa yon santans de libète kondisyonèl espesyal pou pèmèt ou patisipe nan yon pwogram tretman dwòg ki sipèvize pa tribinal la ("Tribinal pou koze Dwòg")?  Kritè sa a enkli, men pa limite a detèmine ke: (1) ou se yon dwoge oswa yon tafyatè, epi (2) ke w te yon dwoge oswa tafyatè omoman ou komèt enfraksyon aktyèl la, epi (3) ke w pat gen zam afe sou w omoman ou komèt enfraksyon aktyèl la oubyen ou pat gen okenn lòt akizasyon kont ou, epi (4) ke w pa gen lòt kondanasyon ki ta diskalifye w, epi (5) ke gen tretman apwopriye pou w, epi (6) pap gen danje pou kominote a si w pije santans ou nan pwogram "Tribinal pou koze Dwòg" la.
[brief] According to Plaintiff, [...] testified at pre-trial conference that “she and her husband lived peaceable in the property…” and “peaceably occupied the property,” Plaintiff’s Response Brief at pages 29 and 32 respectfully.  [...] made no such statements, and the fact that Plaintiff wrongfully states in Response Brief that [...]s testified same is very disturbing as the statement(s) imply that [...] does not own her property but rather simple lives peaceably and occupies same.  The Chancery Court never decided Quiet Title and ownership of property.  Plaintiff current motives to imply no Schiano property ownership rights, and only occupied peaceably, should be very disturbing to the within Court.  It should be noted only [...] is on the mortgage note, and that [...], Esq. was to testify as a factual witness regarding fact that for years [...] could not locate Schianos’ loan for refinance despite Mr. Wigfield’s, real estate attorney, numerous attempts.  The Chancery Court erred as it determined that the Schianos were not in default - which did pave way to obtain refinance but was in contradiction to Third Circuit which the Chancery Court failed to acknowledge.  Plaintiff counsel drafted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which were adopted verbatim by trial judge and which omitted key critical trial testimony and already decided decisions such as the Third Circuit determination of loan default since 1992.
[brief] The use variance proofs attempt to justify the board of adjustment’s grant of permission for a use that the municipality has prohibited.  Proof to support a conditional use variance need only justify the municipality's continued permission for a use notwithstanding a deviation from one or more conditions of the ordinance.  _Coventry Square_, 138 N.J. at 297-98.  As a result of its distinction between a use variance for a prohibited activity, and a variance needed because a condition is not satisfied, the Court concluded:  We hold that the proof of special reasons that must be adduced by an applicant for a “d” variance from one or more conditions imposed by ordinance in respect of a conditional use shall be proof sufficient to satisfy the board of adjustment that the site proposed for the conditional use, in the context of the applicant's proposed site plan, continues to be an appropriate site for the conditional use notwithstanding the deviations from one or more conditions imposed by the ordinance.  That standard of proof will focus both the applicant’s and the board’s attention on the specific deviation from the conditions imposed by the ordinance, and will permit the board to find special reasons to support the variance only if it is persuaded that the noncompliance with conditions does not affect the suitability of the site for the conditional use.  Thus a conditional use variance applicant must show that the site will accommodate the problems associated with the use even though the proposal does not comply with the conditions the ordinance established to address those problems.  Id. at 298-99.  Here, the warehouse use was not conditional; [...] expressly permitted it.  However, as with a conditional use situation, a deviation from the ordinance standard was needed in order to implement the permitted use.  Allowing that deviation clearly did not affect the suitability of the site for the use.  The less rigorous standard of review for conditional use variances was later extended to, and appropriately modified for, the other categories of “(d)” variances.
[brief] [...] and [...] discuss another deal where an owner is in a nursing home and he states “why didn’t you title raid her”?  [...] and [...] discuss multiple properties at once during the discussion of title raiding.  183a.  [10/26/20, 12:43:33 PM]  [...] Josh [...]: MY LAWYER DIDNT FILE YET, BAD  [10/26/20, 6:21:30 PM]  I don’t think it’s vacant you can fight him.  I sent him an email saying I don’t think it’s vacant or abandon [10/28/20, 11:31:30 AM]  [...] Josh [...]: 1)[...] Block 528.42  Lot 14 (Property in is BK)  2)[...] Block 48 Lot 57 (Sheriff Sale Scheduled for 11/12/20)  3)[...] Block 203 Lot 12 (currently in midsvc)  4)[...] Block 1606 Lot 8 (can file OST 11/24)  5)[...] collect rent till motion for final / then i will pay you 5k and the taxes  6)[...] [10/28/20, 11:58:15 AM]  [...]  Josh [...]: are you good with [...]?  he has FJ on 5  [...] [10/28/20, 12:00:21 PM]  He’s not selling it he’s very smart guy [10/28/20, 12:00:41 PM]  ✷: Why didn’t you title raid her?  She was in a nursing home 26.