ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] \textit{in Limine}  Even though the trial court previously denied Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment on the [...]’ claim for attorney’s fees by Order dated May 21, 2021, Defendants filed a motion \textit{in limine} on October 3, 2022 returnable at trial contending that the [...] should be precluded from presenting evidence to support a claim for attorney’s fees because they could not recover their fees as a matter of law.  (See Pa261-Pa262).  During oral argument, Defendants added an oral motion to similarly bar evidence related to the [...]’ claim for punitive damages on the ground that punitive damages were not recoverable as a matter of law.  (3T6:6-23; 3T7:18-3T9:2).  \textsuperscript{12}  None of these Counts are subject of this appeal.  The [...] opposed both motions on procedural (R. 4:25-8(a)(1)) and substantive grounds.  (3T9:5-3T12:9; 3T14:21-3T15:5; Pa293-Pa299; Pa301-Pa302).
[brief] (Ja1-2).  Even if this Court concludes that the Bulletin is not a rule under the APA, the Court should nonetheless still invalidate the Bulletin for two main reasons.  First, through the Bulletin, the Department is attempting to impose the Holding Act on reciprocals and to use SSAP No. 25 scrutinize and regulate profits of an AIF.  This application is at odds with the REA, such that if the Bulletin is accepted, it would alter the terms of the REA and frustrate its unique and specific requirements detailed above that apply solely to reciprocals and the objectives sought to be achieved by same.  Second, the Bulletin fails to analyze the evidence in light of critical issues, which is a clear abuse of the Department’s discretion.  The Department grafts words on to the REA that do not appear and improperly seeks to extend the application of SSAP No. 25 to AIF Fees, so that if it finds that AIF fees “do not meet the fair and reasonable standard established by Appendix A-440, [such a finding] may result in (a) amounts charged being recharacterized as dividends or capital contributions, (b) transactions being reversed, (c) receivable balances being nonadmitted, or (d) other regulatory action. ”  See SSAP No. 25.  To be clear, this interpretation means that if the Department believes that AIF fees are too high, the AIF can be forced to reverse that transaction.  This is a complete misuse of SSAP No. 25, and an about-face from decades of agency practice as confirmed by the pending legislation.  VI.
[brief] .........................................................................................  39  State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86 (1997)  .........................................................................................  27 State v. Reininger, 430 N.J. Super. 517 (App. Div. 2013) ............................................................ 31, 33 State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1 (2009)  .........................................................................................  40 State v. Robinson, 224 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 1988) ............................................................  45, 46 State v. Smith, 374 N.J. Super. 425 (App. Div. 2005)  ............................................................  28, 30, 33 State v. Stewart, 340 P.3d 802 (Utah Ct. App. 2014) ............................................................... 16, 19 State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346 (2002) ......................................................................................... 14, 16 State v. Washington, 453 N.J. Super. 164 (App. Div. 2018) ............................................................
[directive] 9.11.2  On a periodic basis, and no later than January 31 of the following year, every agency shall submit to the County Prosecutor and the Attorney General, and publish on the agency’s public website, a brief synopsis of all complaints where a termination, reduction in rank or grade, and/or suspension of more than five days was assessed to an agency member.  This synopsis shall follow the format provided in Appendix L and shall include the identity of each officer subject to final discipline, a brief summary of their transgressions, and a statement of the sanction imposed.  This synopsis shall not contain the identities of the complainants or any victims.  Where discipline relates to domestic violence, the synopsis shall not disclose the relationship between a victim and an officer.  In rare circumstances, further redactions may be necessary to protect the identity of a victim.  Whenever practicable, notice shall be given to victims of domestic violence in advance of an agency’s disclosure.  9.11.3
[brief] (1T96-3).  Upon landing, the parties went to Plaintiff’s home in [...], where he resides with his parents.  Id.  There was a celebration awaiting both of them when they arrived.  Id.  Defendant was overwhelmed and a little shocked by the new environment, especially having never been to America before.  (1T96-24); (1T97-1).  As days went on, Plaintiff started to feel that Defendant was becoming disrespectful to her elders if she voiced her opinions.
[directive] Do you understand that if you violate the conditions of your parole supervision that your parole may be revoked and you may be subject to return to prison to serve all or any portion of the remaining period of parole supervision, even if you have completed serving the term of imprisonment previously imposed?  Data/Date  Oskarżony/Defendant  Adwokat obrony/Defense Attorney Prokurator/Prosecutor Wchodzi w życie z dniem 01/08/2018, opublikowano w załączniku do Zarządzenia #04-14, [...] strona 2 z 2 Revised Form Effective 01/08/2018, Promulgated by Supplement to Directive #04-14, [...] page 2 of 2
[brief] (Da15, Da383).  On July 28, 2023, after months of [...] being unresponsive, [...] filed a Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause.  (Da15).  On August 4, 2023, the Court ordered that the interested parties show cause before the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Monmouth County Surrogate on September 15, 2023 at 9:00 a.m. (Da378).
[brief] The trial court noted that the Arora Bridge Inspection report reflected that the approach was “fair” and the roadway was in “satisfactory” condition.  (Pa2166; Pa2168).  Moreover, the court noted that although [...] seeks to utilize the Arora report to establish a dangerous condition, there is nothing in the report that notified [...] that there was a dangerous condition requiring immediate attention.  Furthermore, [...] testified that nowhere in the Arora report is the condition identified as dangerous or requiring emergent repair.  (Pa2133; Pa2148).  As such, the trial court appropriately found that the Arora Bridge Inspection report provided no factual basis for [...] to conclude that settlement at the abutment joint created a dangerous condition that caused the accident.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................iii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS  ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED .................................................................vi  TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR APPENDIX ..................................................................................vii  INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY .............................................................................4  STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS ......................................................................................5  POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE FIRST COUNT THROUGH THE EIGHTH COUNT OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO RES JUDICATA AND THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE (182a) ..................................................................................16
[directive] Safe Haven Procedures  1.3.1  A law enforcement officer must inform any person who voluntarily delivers an infant pursuant to the “New Jersey Safe Haven Infant Protection Act” that the person is not required to disclose: < the person’s name or other identifying information; < the name of the infant or the infant’s parent, if different from the person who delivers the infant to the hospital or police station; or < any background or medical information about the infant, or the infant’s parent(s).
[brief] For example, in *Hubbard*, 222 N.J. at 254, a defendant “acceded to [a] detective’s request to come to the police station” and provide medical information about his daughter.  “After the interview was concluded, the detective drove defendant home.  The detective never administered *Miranda* warnings to the defendant. ”  *Id.* at 255.  Our Supreme Court “determine[d] that the interview conducted by the detectives at the police station was a custodial interrogation and the failure to administer *Miranda* warnings prior to the interview requires suppression of that recorded statement. ”  *Id.* at 256.  The Court cited several reasons for determining that Hubbard was in custody.
[brief] *Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev*, 225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016).  Rather, the Court must look at the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all inferences of doubt in their favor.  *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America*, 142 N.J. 520, 536 (1995).  Our Supreme Court has stressed that “[i]t [is] not the court’s function to weigh the evidence and determine the outcome but only to decide if a material dispute of fact existed. ”  *Parks v. Rodgers*, 176 N.J. 491, 502 (2003).  The non-moving party has the right to proceed to trial “where there is the slightest doubt as to the facts. ”  *Ziegelheim v. Apollo*, 128 N.J. 250, 261 (1992)(emphasis added).  A jury question is presented even when the evidence is undisputed if reasonable fact-finders can draw different inferences from the testimony and evidence.  *Frugis v. Bracigliano*, 351 N.J. Super. 328, 350 (App. Div. 2002), *aff’d in part, rev’d in part*, 177 N.J. 250 (2003).  Furthermore, while the issue of duty is generally considered a matter of law properly decided by the Court, summary judgment is not proper where a jury could resolve issues of fact that would support the imposition of a duty.  *See: Alloway v. Bradlees, Inc.*, 157 N.J. 221, 240 (1999); see also; *Mulraney v. Auletto’s Catering*, 293 N.J. Super. 315, 324 (App. Div. 1996), *certif. denied*, 147 N.J. 263 (1996).
[directive] Addendum C | April 2025  Barricaded Individuals  2  Definitions  2.1  Barricaded Individual.  A person who is the focus of a law enforcement intervention effort, has taken a position in a physical location, including a structure or vehicle, who does not allow immediate law enforcement access, and is refusing law enforcement orders to exit or comply.  Depending upon the circumstances, a subject could also be barricaded in an open- air or outside setting, such as a tree stand or densely wooded area or on a bridge.  A (Section 2.1.1) Barricaded Individual may be a “Barricaded Suspect” and/or a “Barricaded (Section 2.1.2).  Subject” Barricaded Suspect.  2. 1.1  A Barricaded Individual who is believed to have committed an offense and subject to lawful arrest.  Barricaded Subject.  2.1.2  A Barricaded Individual who is in need of medical or mental health intervention and, based upon the information available, is believed to presently be a danger to self/others.  NOTE:  Before determining that a person is a barricaded individual, law enforcement shall consider whether the person is simply refusing to make contact, but not presently a danger to self or others,1 nor subject to a lawful arrest for an offense at that time.  If so, the person is not considered a barricaded individual, and therefore not subject to the procedures outlined in this Policy.2  In addition, an unarmed person who refuses to immediately exit a motor vehicle, room or other area, when instructed to do so by a law enforcement officer, shall not automatically be considered a barricaded individual for purposes of the application of this Policy.  Tactical disengagement may always be considered as an option in these See Section 4.8 of this Policy.  scenarios.  2.2  Crisis Intervention Trained Officers.  Law enforcement officers who have been specially trained to identify persons in mental health crisis and work with mental health professionals to coordinate with appropriate resources and obtain services for those persons.  Such training includes specific techniques in communication and de-escalation, such as that See Section 2.5 of the Attorney provided by CIT (Crisis Intervention Team) training.  General’s Use of Force Policy.  See generally New Jersey’s Mental Health Screening Law, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.1 et seq; and specifically, N.J.S.A. 1 30:4-27.6.  This policy does not apply to “active shooter” or “active killing” incidents, which require immediate action 2 by law enforcement to preserve life.
[directive] R.  Did you discuss the Notice of Appeal Rights {_Hablo usted con su abogado sobre Ia and Time to File a Petition for Post-Conviction Notificacion de los derechos de apelacion y el Relief Appeal Rights Form with your attorney? plazo para presentar una solicitud de reparo judicial despues de Ia condena?  Did you sign the Notice of Appeal Rights and {_Firmo usted Ia Notificacion de los derechos de Time to File a Petition for Post-Conviction apelacion y el plazo para presentar una peticion Relief? de reparacion despues de Ia condena?
[directive] ¾:!  2019 12 31 01-18 10079-Korean ~At Al~ ;iJJ CN ~oj] .9.j"8"}0:] l!]JI~.9.j ~ o]LJ~ page 7 of7/l!flo];,:]7/7  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.
[directive] É necessário responder às perguntas adicionais abaixo somente se você estiver se declarando culpado por um crime segundo os termos da lei 2C:35-1 seq. ou 2C:36-1 seq.  N.J.S.A. et N.J.S.A. et  The following additional questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty pursuant to an offense under 2C:35-1 seq. or 2C:36-1 seq.
[brief] (Pa2280)  The scope of the professional services was set out in the [...] Request for Expression of Interest.  (Pa1787).  Pursuant to the Scope of Services the Project Manager had to be a professional engineer licensed in the State of New Jersey.  The Project Manager was tasked to oversee the work performed under the contract (Pa1801).  [...]’ employee [...] was the Project Manager.  [...] is a licensed professional engineer.  (Pa1914)  A resident engineer under the scope of services, was to “perform construction inspection and administrative services.  (Pa1801)  [...] of [...] was qualified to be a resident engineer as he was a NICET IV inspector.  (Pa1801)  [...] was retained to perform the work under the direct supervision of a licensed professional consultant.
[brief] Defendant appeals the trial court’s June 7, 2024 denying his motion for reconsideration of the court’s April 26, 2024 Order denying his motion to reinstate.  While Defendant’s brief fails to mention a standard of review, the applicable standard of review of a motion for reconsideration pursuant to R. 4:49-2 is abuse of discretion.  See Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021).  “The rule applies when the court’s decision represents a clear abuse of discretion based on plainly incorrect reasoning or failure to consider evidence or a good reason for the court to reconsider new information. ”  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2 on R. 4:49-2 (2025).
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  The Court’s review involves two steps: whether there was an abuse of discretion in the trial Court’s evidentiary ruling, and the de novo review of the trial Court’s legal conclusions.  Estate of Hanges v. Metropolitan Property Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 384-85 (N.J. 2010).  The trial Court found that Appellant’s evidence was not “competent. ”  It is difficult to understand the trial Court’s finding.
[brief] The Report is devoid of any discussion or explanation as to the basis for the police having stopped and arrested defendant on September 28, 2020.  The State asserts that within the application for the search warrant  [...] requested the search of "all persons present reasonably believed to be connected with said property and investigation for evidence including but not limited to... firearms... any items relating to the identity of persons who either live in, use or were present within the above-described premises at or around the time of the homicide described herein."
[brief] Q  Okay.  [...], you understand that there was three indictments to which you were serving probation on, correct?  A  Yes.  Q  And as a result of your guilty plea here, your arrest and now subsequent guilty plea, you acknowledge that you violated those probationary terms, correct?  A  Yes.  [...]: The State is satisfied, Judge.  THE COURT: Okay.  Thank you.  I did forget about the VOPs.  EXAMINATION BY THE COURT: Q
[directive] Addendum B | April 2022  Vehicular Pursuit Policy shall observe the applicable laws governing the right of way at intersections and other locations.  5.9  Officers involved in a pursuit shall not engage in vehicle paralleling.  5.10  There shall be no street paralleling along the route unless the pursuit passes through a patrol’s assigned area.  A patrol that is parallel-street-pursuing shall not join or interfere with a pursuit and shall stop all pursuit-related activity at the boundary of its assigned area.  5.11  Boxing-in or heading-off a violator’s moving vehicle is permitted only under extraordinary circumstances.  These tactics substantially increase the risk inherent in the pursuit and shall only be employed: (a) at low speeds; and (b) with the approval of a supervisor; or (c) in response to an imminent threat to the safety of the public or a police officer.  5.12
[brief] While words such as “final” and “binding” are used, absent any identification that arbitration is a replacement for litigation, there is nothing to suggest the finality of arbitration will extend beyond that forum, whatever it may be.  (Da80).  In other words, a user could reasonably conclude that any findings or rulings in arbitration would govern the parties’ attempt at “settlement” or “resolution,” without any understanding litigation was precluded or that review of the arbitrator’s decisions by a court is very limited.  In contrast, the upheld agreements in our case law have conveyed by multiple, overlapping means that arbitration is an exclusive and preclusive forum for any dispute (two more common “buzzwords” meaningfully absent from the arbitration agreement).
[brief] A.  Plaintiff Cannot Sustain a Cause of Action for Foreclosure .................................6  B. Laches & Equitable Estoppel Must Preclude Plaintiff’s Requested Relief .......................................................................................................................10 POINT II: TO PERMIT PLAINTIFF’S INTENDED COURSE OF CONDUCT WOULD CONTRAVENE PUBLIC POLICY ..............................................................13 POINT III: THE CROSS MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO ADD A BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM WAS PROPERLY DENIED .............16 POINT IV: PLAINTIFF CANNOT ESTABLISH THAT THE 2012 MORTGAGE WAS CANCELLED BY MISTAKE ........................................................................18 POINT V: PLAINTIFF FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT ...........................................................19 POINT VI: PLAINTIFF FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR CROSS- COLLATERALIZATION ............................................................................................20 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................22 | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.J. v. Cty. Prosecutors Ass'n of N.J., | 6 | | 474 N.J. Super. 243 (App. Div. 2022) | | | Atlantic Seaboard Co. v. Borough of Seaside Park, | 9 | | 36 N.J. Super. 142 (App. Div. 1955), | | | certification denied, 19 N.J. 619 (1955) | | | Atwater v. Underhill, | 5, 10| | 22 N.J. Eq. 599 (E. & A. 1872) | | | Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, | 11 | | 169 N.J. 135 (2001) | | | County Energy Recovery Assocs., L.P. v. New Jersey Department of | 7 | | Environmental Protection, | | | 320 N.J. Super. 59 (App. Div. 1999) | | | Cox v. RKA Corp., | 15 | | 164 N.J. 487 (2000) | | | Donato v. Moldow, | 7 | | 374 N.J. Super. 475 (App. Div. 2005) | | | First Federal v. Fink, | 9 | | 99 N.J. Super. 76 (Ch. Div. 1968) | | | Fox v. Millman, | 11 | | 210 N.J. 401 (2012) | | | Friendship Manor, Inc. v. Greiman, | 15 | | 244 N.J. Super. 104 (App. Div. 1990) | | | Great Falls Bank v. Pardo, | 9 | | 263 N.J. Super. 388 (Ch. Div. 1993) | | Grillo v. State, 469 N.J. Super. 267 (App. Div. 2021) .................................................................17 Hoffman v. Hampshire Labs, Inc., 405 N.J. Super. 105 (App. Div. 2009) ...............................................................7 Investors Bank v. Torres, 457 N.J. Super. 53 (App. Div. 2018) .................................................................9 J.K. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 247 N.J. 120, 138 n.6 (2021) ...........................................................................18 Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169 (2003) .........................................................................................11-12, 19 Leon v. Rite Aid Corp., 340 N.J. Super. 462 (App. Div. 2001) ...............................................................7 Mc Carthy v. Schwalje, 234 N.J. Super. 396 (Super. Ct. 1988) ...............................................................9
[directive] 11  (c) the officer is conducting a motorist aid or community caretaking check; (d) the officer is interviewing a witness in the course of investigating a criminal offense; (e) the officer is conducting a custodial interrogation of a suspect, unless the interrogation is otherwise being recorded in accordance with Rule 3:17 (electronic recordation of station house interrogations); (f) the officer is making an arrest; (g) the officer is conducting a protective frisk for weapons; (h) the officer is conducting any kind of search (consensual or otherwise), including the execution of a search warrant; (i) the officer is engaged in a police response to any type of civil disorder in circumstances where the officer is engaged with or in the presence of civilians and the officer or any other officer on the scene may be required to employ constructive authority or force; (j) the officer uses constructive authority or force, or reasonably believes that constructive authority or force may be used in any encounter or situation not otherwise listed in this subsection based on specific and articulable facts warranting heightened caution that are documented by narration on the recording and/or in any investigation or incident report;3 (k) the officer is transporting an arrestee to a police station, county jail, or other place of confinement, or a hospital or other medical care or mental health facility; or (l) the officer reasonably believes that any other officer on the scene has undertaken or is engaged in any of the foregoing police actions/activities.
[brief] Of course, [...] was required to show proof of this insurance in order to work at the Project Site, so they never would have been uninsured.  [...] basically states that if [...] had taken steps to somehow ensure that [...] received a notice of cancellation, then [...] would have clearly known that it was not included in the CCIP.  Had that occurred, what would [...] have done?  It would have ensured it had its own coverage with [...] and [...] – and it did.  [...]’s opinions are entirely irrelevant and do not support any causation of damages to either [...] or [...].