ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pursuant to N.J.R.E., evidence of a witness’s criminal conviction “shall be” admissible unless it is a conviction that is more than ten years old on the date the trial begins.  If the conviction is more than ten years old on the day the trial begins the party seeking to admit the evidence has the burden of demonstrating that the probative value of the conviction outweighs the prejudicial effect.  N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1).
[directive] Contact permits Contempt Directive  Restraining Criminal Domestic Sexual Sexual Manual by Promulgated Violence (4)  (25)  Criminal Act to 2C:14-2(b)  2C:14-3(a)  2C:29-9b to Statute Extradition 2C:14-2c.(1)  Domestic 2A:160(1)  Uniform  The 1 permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible Bail Option Cash 4 JUDGE’S issue.
[brief] In the 2020 case, the trial court, on January 25, 2022, properly entered an Order granting the [...]’ Motion and ordered that counsel for the Cooper Levenson defendants submit a fee application within fourteen (14) days of receipt of the Order.  (190a).  In the trial court’s January 25, 2022 Statement of Reasons, the trial court properly held:  Here, the court finds that the filing of this litigation was frivolous and that attorney’s fees are warranted.  Regarding the [...], the record demonstrates the number of times that plaintiffs attempted to relitigate the same issues in the 2015 action through its opposition to the motion to dismiss, which was granted in 2016; motion to reinstate; motion to reconsider, motion for leave to appeal, motion to vacate the order denying the motion to reinstate; and motion for leave to rejoin the [...].  To reiterate, the 2020 Amended Complaint involved the same nucleus of facts and circumstances that had previously been rejected on six prior occasions in the 2015 litigation.  Despite all of those rulings, plaintiffs had the audacity to file the present suit, essentially making all of the same claims…As set forth above, both sets of defendants complied with the rules for asserting a frivolous litigation claim by providing the proper letter and giving plaintiffs the opportunity to withdraw these claims.  This 2020 litigation is the epitome of harassment and bad faith.  For the foregoing reasons, sanctions, are awarded against plaintiffs’ counsel, [...], Esquire and his clients, [...], [...], [...] and [...] as the Court deems just and proper.
[brief] \(^9\)  In the case at hand, this Court in its decision had rendered a proposition which had no direct support from any precedent in the State of New Jersey and across the nation.  Rather, this case establishes a dangerous precedent that plaintiff can create damages in any legal malpractice case just by commencing action to incur legal fees so long as there are some evidences that the defendant has breached the duty in providing legal services to the plaintiff.
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail  Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  e.  An actor who violates subsection a. of this section while under official detention commits a crime of the second degree.  2C:33-28  Soliciting or 4th Degree $5,000 to $25,000
[brief] IV.  THE BULLETIN CONSTITUTES IMPROPER RULEMAKING AND IS INVALID AS A MATTER OF LAW (Ja1-2)  .................................................................33  A.  The Bulletin is an Administrative Rule Subject to APA Compliance (Ja1-2).  .........................................................................................................................35  B.  The Department Failed to Comply with the APA When It Published The Bulletin (Ja1-2)  .................................................................................................43  V.  EVEN IF NOT A RULE, THE REQUIREMENTS IN THE BULLETIN VIOLATE THE REA AND ARE OTHERWISE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE SSAP NO. 25 DOES NOT APPLY TO THE AIF FEE (Ja1-2) ...........................................................................................................48  VI. THROUGH ITS IMPROPER RULEMAKING THE DEPARTMENT IS INTERFERING WITH [...]’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONTRACT (Ja1-2) ...........................................................................................................49 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................................52 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS [...], Bulletin No. 22-11, December 20, 2022 ........................................... (Ja1-2) # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **In re Adoption of Reg’l Affordable Housing Dev. Program Guidelines,** | | | 418 N.J. Super. 387 (App. Div. 2011) | 40 | | **Altor, Inc. v. Sec. of Labor,** | | | 498 Fed. Appx. 145 (3d Cir. 2012) | 28 | | **Am. Emp’r Ins. Co. v. Comm’r of Ins.,** | | | 236 N.J. Super. 428 (App. Div. 1989) | 41, 42 | | **Matter of Assignment of Producers to Travelers Grp.,** | | | 261 N.J. Super. 292 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 133 N.J. 438 (1993) | 39, 40 | | **B.H. v. State of N.J., Dept. of Human Srvs.,** | | | 400 N.J. Super. 418 (App. Div. 2008) | 35, 41, 47 | | **Berg v. Christie,** | | | 225 N.J. 245 (2016) | 50, 51 | | **Besler & Co. v. Bradley,** | | | 361 N.J. Super. 168 (App. Div. 2003) | 36, 39 | | **Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc.,** | | | 197 N.J. 543 (2009) | 24 | | **Bullet Hole, Inc, v. Dunbar,** | | | 335 N.J. Super. 562 (App. Div. 2000) | 37 | | **In re CAFRA Permit No. 87-0959-5
[directive] A violent crime also includes any aggravated sexual assault, or sexual assault in which you used, or threatened the immediate use of, physical force.  Deadly weapon means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner in which it is used or intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.  Serious bodily injury means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.
[brief] On June 26, 2020, Plaintiff [...] (hereafter “Plaintiff”) was injured at a [...] drive-thru, while occupying her motor vehicle, a 1997 Ford Expedition.  On that date, her motor vehicle was insured by the Defendant [...] (hereafter “Defendant”).  Plaintiff filed a claim for No-Fault Personal Injury Protection benefits (hereafter “PIP benefits”) which was denied by the Defendant.  Litigation ensued and after summary judgment motion practice, on reconsideration, the Trial Court granted the Defendant’s request to dismiss the Plaintiff’s statutory claim for PIP benefits.  The Plaintiff asserts that the Trial Court failed to apply the plain language of N.J.S.A. § 39:6A-4 to the undisputed facts in accordance with well-established case law resulting in erroneous findings.  In its oral statement of reasons, the Trial Court summarized the undisputed facts as follows:  On June 26, 2020 [...] had an incident at the Dunkin' Donuts drive-thru while stopped with her foot on the brake, car immobile, receiving a hot beverage through the drive-thru window.  The lid came off the cup spilling liquid -- hot liquid and burning the plaintiff….  [T]he plaintiff was stopped in the drive-thru receiving a hot beverage through the window of the vehicle when the top was dislodged, causing the hot liquid to spill and burn the plaintiff.  (1T11-12).  Here, the Trial Court found that Plaintiff “was not operating a motor vehicle at the time the injury occurred” and there was “no causal relationship between the plaintiff’s use and occupancy of the vehicle and the injuries sustained. ” (1T11-12).  As a result, the Trial Court improperly granted Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration of its denial of Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and denied Plaintiff’s claim for PIP benefits.  The Plaintiff seeks appellate review of the Trial Court’s ruling denying PIP benefits.  Indeed, the ruling is inconsistent with the plain language of N.J.S.A. § 39:6A-4, requiring the Plaintiff “sustain bodily injury as a result of an accident while occupying, entering into, alighting from or using an automobile…” as well as established case law holding that only a “substantial nexus” between the injury and motor vehicle must be found, not that the motor vehicle “caused” the injury.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[directive] IAD or TlT2 Extradition detain IAD a.  Tl b. T2 ExtraditelAD or Track One Two - Immigration detainer 12.  TlT2  Immigration detainer a. lmmigrat det T1T2 b. of or 13.  Track Two - Out state resident One of TlT2  Out state resident a. of Out state T1T2 b. by of List  Legal Rejection Codes Promulgated Directive #01-23 (January 17, 2023)
[brief] 6.  Defendants use various pricing programs to bill its Merchant Customers, including an “Interchange PLUS” pricing program, where the term “interchange” is a term of art in the credit card processing industry, referring to the “interchange rates” published by the major credit card brands such as [...], [...], [...] and [...], and widely available on their websites.  The “interchange rate” is a percentage to be applied to the nominal value of a transaction in which a credit card is used to consummate an exchange of goods or services.  (Pa000119).
[brief] He testifies that there is an exempt property list that is generated by the [...] which is in the Borough Tax duplicate, and he has access to these lists.  He testifies D-7 (Pa869) lists all exempt properties for the [...] (4T23:1-18).  As to Lots 3 and 3.01, the Block and Lot numbers changed effective 1980 for the [...] because the State wanted the [...] to move away from using lettering in the Block and Lot numbers (4T23:25).  The maps were done in 1980 as a complete overhaul of the Tax Maps.  Many of the lots were re-numbered at that time.  Lots 3 and 3.01 may have had different numbering pre-1980 (4T24:11).
[directive] Victim and/or Defendant have more than 1 child altogether  SAMPLE QUESTIONS: How many children do you have?  How many does your current Partner (Defendant) have?  ✔Count the biological or adopted children of the Defendant.  ✔Count the biological or adopted children of the Victim.  ✔Count only living children, whether they are minors or adults, and whether they are living with the Victim, Defendant, or elsewhere.  There must be a total of at least 2 children to score 1 for this Item.  5.  Victim has a biological child with someone other than the Defendant  SAMPLE QUESTION: Do you have a child from any previous relationships (other than with the Defendant)?  To determine whether the Victim has a biological child from a previous partner:  ✔Count the children of the Victim, but count only the Victim’s biological children whose other parent is not the Defendant.  ✔Count only living children, whether they are minors or adults, and whether they are living with the Victim, Defendant, or elsewhere.  ✘Do not count adopted children for this Item.  The Victim need only have 1 child with a previous partner to score 1 for this Item.  6.
[directive] (b)  The written court order releasing the defendant shall contain the court's directives specifically restricting the defendant's ability to have contact with Subj:  Directive #08-23 - Criminal – Pretrial Release - (1)  Clarifying Penalties for Certain Violations of Pretrial Release; (2)  Requirement for Prosecutor to Provide Copy of Pretrial Release Order to the Victim Date: May 23, 2023  Page 3 of 3  the victim, the victim's friends, co-workers, or relatives, or any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either party or a minor child residing in the household.  The [clerk of the court or other person designated by the court] prosecutor shall provide a copy of this order to the victim forthwith.  Conclusion
[directive] Sample  Administrative Advisement Form  Administrative Investigations  Only  1.  I am being questioned as a subject of an investigation by this agency into potential violations of department rules and regulations, or for my fitness for duty.  This investigation concerns 2.  This is an administrative investigation.  I will be asked questions specifically, narrowly and directly related to the performance of my duties, or for not answering truthfully.  3.  I may be subject to departmental discipline for refusing to answer a question directly related to the performance of my duties, or for not answering truthfully.  4.  I have the right to consult with a representative of my collective bargaining unit, or another representative of my choice, and have him or her present during the interview.  5.  I acknowledge that this investigation is confidential, and I am hereby ordered not to disclose any information discussed during this interview.  Signature: _______________________
[brief] Clearly a parochial school is not a "for profit" endeavor, yet the Court excluded the school from "residential" category because no one resided there.  The Court reasoned that the result of choosing to impose the "commercial standard" against a parochial school was much less harsh than imposing the entire risk of loss on the innocent plaintiff.  Brown at 334.  We submit the same reasoning should apply here.  In the case presently before the Court, no one was residing at the respondents’ premises at the time of the incident, and clearly the renovation and improvement of a building is a financial investment that will provide a future financial benefit to the property owner.  We submit that the more appropriate consideration when deciding what law applies ought to be whether or not the property is actually a “residence” at the time of the incident.
[directive] 7.2  Law enforcement incidents are defined as: (a) any use of force by an officer resulting in death; (b) any use of force by an officer resulting in serious bodily injury; (c) any use of deadly force (including the discharge of a firearm as defined in Section 4.1) by an officer, regardless of whether such force resulted in injury; (d) the death of any civilian during an encounter with an officer; and (e) the death of any civilian while in the custody of law enforcement.
[brief] What he did eventually provide was medical documentation that re-opened an existing Workers’ Compensation claim that originated in 2014.  As [...] witness testimony established, that Workers’ Compensation matter was an entirely separate issue that should not be conflated or confused with the unauthorized absences nor the resultant discipline.  (Aa32).  It is not disputed [...] provided documentation that re-opened the Workers’ Compensation claim, but by that point he had already missed five consecutive days of work and resigned not in good standing.  [...]’s argument that he would have been placed on Workers’ Compensation leave earlier had he managed to be seen by a physician sooner, see Ab18-19, ignores the stated reason for his absence which he admits was unrelated to the Workers’ Compensation issue.  (Aa14).  Indeed, he expressly stated he would have had “no problem” reporting to work if the situation under which he was called to do so “was weather-wise related or had something to do with some accident,” (Aa14), thus undermining his own hypothetical.  Even so, the courts have recognized a “later awarded workers’ compensation benefit” does not “reinstate a validly terminated, or voluntarily resigned, former employee to active employee status. ”  James v. Bd. of Trs. of Pub. Emples. Ret. Sys., 164 N.J. 396, 412 (2000).  Indeed, as the [...] noted, the only medical documentation [...] ever provided would “only be considered valid beginning on April 15, 2020, the date he began receiving Workers’ Compensation Benefits for a medical condition unrelated to the reasons for his failure to return on April 6, 2020. ” (Aa32) (emphasis in original).  The [...] rightly concluded: “as the [[...]] gave [[...]] multiple opportunities to present valid documentation for his absences from April 7, 2020 to April 14, 2020, which he did not do, it cannot be concluded that it acted unreasonably in not authorizing the absences and resigning him not in good standing pursuant to N.J.A.C 4A:2-6.2(b). ”  (Aa32).  There was nothing arbitrary or capricious about this: the [...] did not grant [...] leave because he never provided the required medical documentation, as any employee must do.  POINT III
[brief] [...] points out that a Riparian Right to use the water is an appurtenance right which automatically passes and does not need to be mentioned pursuant to N.J.S.A. 36:3-16.  (1T90:4)  On cross examination, the Borough’s attorney asks whether in reviewing documents regarding property rights, it would be fair to say that the issue of the intent of the parties is an important issue.  [...] disagrees that if a document clearly states what is to be conveyed, there is no need to look for intent (1T93:5).
[brief] [ISSUE WAS RAISED (Da0785; Da0816; Da0846)]  Plaintiff’s evidence falls far short of conclusively negating the many likely causes of her injuries \textit{other than} a defect.  Plaintiff and her experts did \textit{nothing} to negate those other causes, including many they \textit{concede} could have \textit{independently} caused her inflammation, retinal detachment, and vision loss.  The alternate causes Plaintiff’s experts do not rule out include: the continued progression of her chronic eye inflammation; increased eye inflammation from continued smoking; the cumulative risk of dozens of intravitreal injections and other eye procedures; and the dislocation of her Retisert® implant.  Dispositively, Plaintiff’s retained expert [...] agreed these other “risk factors…could have led to a retinal detachment…[i]n the absence of a silicone particulate. ”  (Da0150, pp. 112-13 (emphasis added))  Plaintiff’s experts’ failure to rule out the impact of the Retisert® implant and its dislocation is alone sufficient to warrant summary judgment.  To the extent Plaintiff blames her injuries on the fact the particulate was composed of silicone, the Retisert® tablet in her eye *for nearly a decade* was not only *encased in silicone*, but was *10 times larger* than the alleged 300-micron particulate.  And to the extent Plaintiff blames her retinal detachment on mechanical traction from a purported microscopic particulate, the 10-times larger Retisert® was found dislodged from her retina around the *same time* and at the *precise location* of her retinal detachment.  Plaintiff’s inability to negate all of the likely alternate causes for her injuries prohibits her from using circumstantial evidence to prove a manufacturing defect.  *Scanlon*, 65 N.J. at 600 (directing defense judgment for “fail[ure] to prove the defendants’ responsibility for the defect by the negation of the other most likely probable causes”).  3.
[brief] The State had no legitimate interest in punishing those statements more harshly because they occurred during the pandemic rather than after the COVID-19 emergency declaration had been rescinded.  The construction of the terroristic threats statute supports a nexus requirement.  If [...] had threatened to kill instead of threatening to assault, the State could only have charged him with a third-degree offense.  Threats to kill are covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b), which was not amended by the Anti-Terrorism Act and does not include an emergency enhancement.  N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b).  The Legislature thus increased the penalties for threats made during emergencies only when those threats were made “with the purpose to terrorize another or to cause evacuation . . . or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience,” – in other words, threats that cause enhanced harms during an emergency.  N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a).  All threats to kill, by contrast, are third-degree offenses, even when they are made during a declared period of emergency.  Ibid.  Practical considerations favor a nexus requirement as well.  According to a 2019 Congressional Research Service report, there were 31 national emergency declarations in effect as of February 2019, most of which are simply renewed annually.  [...], Declarations Under the National Emergencies Act, Part 1: Declarations Currently In Effect, Congressional Research Service (Feb. 28, 2019), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/LSB10252.pdf.  One national emergency declaration has been in place since 1979.  Ibid.  Without a nexus requirement, every terroristic threat under N.J.S.A. 2C:12- 3(a) since the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2002 could have been charged as a second-degree crime.  [...]’s statements bore no relation whatsoever to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the impact of his statements was in no way enhanced by the existence of a pandemic.  Because the State had no legitimate interest in prosecuting the statements as second-degree offenses purely because they were uttered during the COVID-19 pandemic, his substantive due process rights were violated.  [...]’s second-degree convictions under counts 1 and 2 must be vacated.
[brief] 20 PADNA v. City Council of Jersey City, 413 N.J. Super. 322 (App. Div. 2010), certif. den., 205 N.J. 79 (2011).  ....  15  Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263 (2013) ........................................  14  Randolph Town Ctr. v. Randolph Twp., 324 N.J. Super. 412 (App. Div. 1999).
[brief] Cal96-Ca232.  On April 11, 2022, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in Lieu of an Answer.  Ra10-Ra11.  Complainants opposed the motion.  Ra4-Ra5.  The Commission issued on Decision on Motion to Dismiss ("the Decision") dated July 26, 2022.  Cal66-Cal 73.  In the Decision, the Commission partially granted Respondent's motion by dismissing Complainant's allegation in Count 4 that Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(a) and dismissed Counts 2, 3 and 5 in their entirety.  Cal 71-Cal 72.  The Decision also directed Respondent to file an answer to the remaining counts of the Complaint and referred the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL)  Cal 73.  The following references to Complainants' appellate brief—the appendices of the parties will be used in this brief: "Cb" to designate Complainants' brief; "Ca" to designate Complainants' appendix; "Ra" to designated Respondents appendix.  Complainants moved for leave to appeal from the Decision to the Commissioner of Education and Respondent cross-moved for leave to appeal.  Ra6.  The Acting Commissioner denied the motions.  Cal60  On September 6, 2022, Respondent filed an Answer to the Complaint and filed an Amended Answer to the Complaint on January3, 2023.  Ca161 to Cal64.  On February 28, 2023, Complainants filed a Motion for Summary Decision with the OAL.  Ca41-Ca16  Respondent opposed the motion.  Ra9.  On June 9, 2023, the Hon. [...], A.L.J. issued an Initial Decision.  Ca 9-Ca40.  Judge Hughes granted Complainants Motion For Summary Decision, sustaining the charges of violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.l(e) set forth in Counts 1 and 4 of the Complaint.  (Cal9).  She further ordered that Respondent be censured for violating the School Ethics Act subject to review by the Commission.  Cal 9-Ca20.  On August 22, 2023, the Commission issued its Final Decision.  Ca15-Cal 8.  It rejected Judge Hughes’ Initial Decision and dismissed the matter.  Ca17, Ca18.  The Final Decision stated that it was a final agency decision appealable to the Appellate Division.  Cal 7.  Complainants have filed an appeal of the Commission's decisions to the Court.  Ca1-Ca13).  STATEMENT OF FACTS