ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION AND SENTENCE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED  Defendant asks this Court to do that which both lower courts would not: find that the credible testimony of [...] failed to provide a reasonable basis to stop his vehicle, provide probable cause to arrest him on --- 2  This **POINT** is responsive to all arguments contained within the defendant’s **LEGAL ARGUMENT**, see Db18-47.  suspicion of DWI, and/or provide proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to refusal.  Because neither of the lower courts erred in so finding, the State respectfully requests this Court affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.  “To be lawful, an automobile stop ‘must be based on reasonable and articulable suspicion that an offense, including a minor traffic offense, has been or is being committed. ’”  *State v. Nelson*, 237 N.J. 540, 552 (2019) quoting *State v. Bacome*, 228 N.J. 94, 103 (2017).  “[R]easonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop is a lower standard than the probable cause necessary to sustain an arrest. ”  *State v. Legette*, 227 N.J. 460, 473 (2017); *State v. Amelio*, 197 N.J. 207, 211, cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1237 (2009).  Thus, the State need not prove that the suspected motor vehicle violation occurred.  *State v. Williamson*, 138 N.J. 302, 304 (1994); *State v. Locurto*, 175 N.J. 463, 470 (1999).  A determination of reasonable suspicion is based on a “totality of the circumstances” and is “highly fact-sensitive. ”  *State v. Pineiro*, 181 N.J. 13, 22 (2004).  “In evaluating the facts giving rise to the officer's suspicion of criminal activity, courts are to give weight to ‘the officer's knowledge and experience’ as well as ‘rational inferences that could be drawn from the facts objectively and reasonably viewed in light of the officer's expertise. ’”  *State v. Citarella*, 154 N.J. 272, 279 (1998) quoting *State v. Arthur*, 149 N.J. 1, 10-11 (1997)).  Contrary to defendant’s argument, and as correctly found by [...], the officer did not stop defendant solely for his failure to maintain lane; the officer also advised that defendant had failed to yield for an emergency vehicle.  (1T:13-19 to 14-5; 29-12 to 29-22).  As such, the police officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle based on his observations of the defendant failing to slow down for the emergency vehicles, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-92(a).  The officer observed defendant’s vehicle failed to slow down and move over when it approached the other patrol cars engaged in a traffic stop on Route 9.  Since the officer personally observed the defendant’s failure to yield to an emergency vehicle, the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was also in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-92(a).  Da11-12.  Likewise without merit is defendant’s attack on the existence of probable cause for his arrest and proof beyond a reasonable doubt for his guilt on refusal.
[brief] (7T161:6 to 162:16).  Later that night, [...] went through the documents and found the Photocopy.  11T52:1 to 52:10; 55:25 to 56:12).  [...] gave the Photocopy to Respondent so she could give it to her attorney.  (11T56:15-24).  A couple of days after Decedent’s death, Respondent contacted [...] and asked him to represent her.
[brief] On October 11, 2006 the Honorable [...] United States District Judge for the District of New Jersey wrote in an Opinion in pertinent part:  This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...]’s (“Defendants”) motion to strike Plaintiffs [...], [...], [...], and [...] ’s (Plaintiffs”) Complaint.  The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332.  The Court, having considered the parties’ submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, will grant Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ Complaint.  (Emphasis Added) id at 12.  Defendants allege that the Complaint must be stricken pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (f).  Rule 12 (f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 12(f)") states, in pertinent part, that "the court may order stricken from any pleading... any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)."  River Road Dev. Corp. v. Carlson Corp. 1990 WL 69085 at *2 (E.D.Pa. 1990).  [...] found that there was an attorney-client relationship between Plaintiff Zachary Emmanouil, Esq. and Defendant Vincent Roggio, and that confidential information obtained by Plaintiff Zachary Emmanouil could have been disclosed to Plaintiffs' attorney [...] and the law firm of [...].  See Opinion at 12-13.  Defendants have also recently written to this Court requesting an immediate decision on their motion to strike "because the pendency of the Complaint, which [...] has now recognized was prepared by plaintiffs' prior counsel with the benefit of improperly obtained privileged communications, is significantly disrupting defendants' business relationships.  See Letter from [...] to the Honorable [...] (September 27, 2006).  Because of [...]'s finding that confidential information may have been disclosed to the attorney who prepared Plaintiffs' Complaint, the Court orders Plaintiffs' Complaint stricken in its entirety.  Since the Complaint is ordered stricken based on the possibility of disclosure of confidential information, the Court need not reach a finding on whether Plaintiffs' Complaint does in fact contain scandalous allegations and/or privileged information.  In Footnote 2 the Court wrote:  The Court does not find that the pendency of the Complaint is significantly disrupting Defendants' business relationships since the Complaint has remained sealed by order of [...].  III.  CONCLUSION  For the reasons set forth above, the Court strikes Plaintiffs' Complaint in its entirety.
[brief] The Appellant’s brief presents certain issues that are, as presented, outside the scope of this Court’s review.  As to these issues, the Appellant failed to establish any facts or illustrate how the lower court committed an error of fact or law during a trial.  Instead, the Appellant merely regurgitates the same *de novo* arguments they presented to [...] through extensive exhibits and an exhaustive list of witnesses, including experts.  In presenting these *de novo* arguments, the Appellant critically fails to present any argument as to why the lower court’s interpretation of these facts and its decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  As such, the lower court's de novo findings should not be disturbed.
[directive] Voce entende que caso tenha se declarado culpado, ou tenha sido condenado por outros crimes, ou se estiver atualmente cumprindo uma pena de reclusao e esta questao nao for mencionada no acordo de culpa, o juiz podera exigir que todas as senten,;:as sejam cumpridas consecutivamente?  List any charges the prosecutor has agreed to recommend for dismissal:
[brief] ¹The Borough’s point headings from its initial summary judgment brief and excerpts from plaintiff’s opposition brief and the Borough’s reply brief are included in the Appendix solely to demonstrate that the trial court was made aware that the Borough’s motion did not address all of plaintiff’s claims but that it apparently chose to believe the Borough’s representations to the contrary.  (Rule 2-6:1(a)(2.)  Plaintiff’s opposition to the Borough’s motion identified this omission and informed the trial court that the motion should be properly characterized as a motion for partial summary judgment.  (Pa 74.)  Rather than acknowledging the limited nature of its motion, the Borough’s reply brief explicitly affirmed that it was seeking dismissal of “every count” of the Verified Complaint and its motion was for “complete summary judgment. ”  (Pa 77.)  Oral argument on the Borough’s motion was held on September 9, 2022, and on that same date [...] entered an Order Granting Summary Judgment in the form submitted by the Borough, dismissing the Verified Complaint “in its entirety with prejudice. ”  (Pa 80.)  The bulk of [...]’s five page Statement of Reasons attached to the Order summarizes the parties’ position.  (Pa 82.)  Section VII, the three paragraph “Substantive Analysis,” discusses only whether the Planning Board’s December 16, 2021, special meeting was held in violation of OPMA.  (Pa 86.)  No explanation for the dismissal of the other claims raised in the Verified Complaint was given.  (Pa 85-86.)  The Planning Board filed no papers in support of the Borough’s motion and did not join in its motion.  After the Verified Complaint was dismissed “in its entirety with prejudice,” Plaintiff filed a timely Notice of Appeal as of right on October 21, 2022, which was assigned Docket No. [...].
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  1-4-19  Order Appointing [...] ......................................................Pa122 5-23-19  Order scheduling oral argument on [...]’s demand for payment .................................................................................................................................Pa205 5-31-19  Order compelling payment of mediator’s bill ..............................................Pa208 7-5-19  Order scheduling hearing on mediator’s bill ..................................................Pa210 10-11-19  Order granting in part Motion to Dismiss ..................................................Pa223 11-10-22  Order for Summary Judgment  Dismissing Complaint with Prejudice .................................................................................................................................Pa837 11-10-22  Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment  .......................Pa839 11-10-22  Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for an Order Permitting Defendants to Substantively Response to Paragraphs 22 to 29, 31 to 67, 69 to 81, 83 to 130, 132 to 146, 148 to 198 and 201 to 242 of Plaintiff [...]’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment or, Alternatively, to Consider Those Paragraphs Unopposed in Conformance with Rule 4:46-2(b) ..............Pa842
[brief] Defendants were attempting to comply with the Appellate Division decision, but Plaintiffs’ counsel would not cooperate.  Instead, Plaintiffs engaged in legal chicanery, which was rejected several times by the trial court.  Additionally, attorney’s fees and costs awarded under OPRA must be “reasonable. ”  Plaintiffs’ excessive motion practice was not reasonable or necessary.  Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding post-judgment interest from July 20, 2022 until the August 29, 2022 Order.  The trial court held that post-judgment interest runs from when the judgment has been entered, not when all the appeals have been disposed of.  *Baker v. National State Bank*, 353 N.J. Super. 145, 173-74 (App. Div. 2022).
[brief] A 1098-T form is used by institutions of higher education to report amounts billed or refunds made for tuition and related expenses.  https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/OC-EducationcreditsUnderstandingyourForm1098T-FINAL.pdf (last checked April 27, 2024).  It is used if a parent wants to claim an education credit on the parent’s tax return.  Id. college visits or play any part at all in the selection.  1T53:1-4.  Despite failing to have any relationship with his daughter, Defendant still requested the 1098-T form so that he could claim the education credit for being responsible for [...]’s tuition on his tax return.  1T59:1-25; 60:8-68:25; see also Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12 (P-668).
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS.............................................................................................................3  A.  The Suppression Hearing  Testimony ..............................................................................6  B.  The Judge’s Ruling  .........................................................................................................11  LEGAL ARGUMENT..................................................................................................................15  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING SUPPRESSION WHERE DEFENDANT WAS ONE OF SIX MEN THAT POLICED STOPPED AND FRISKED WITHOUT A VALID BASIS TO DO SO.
[brief] **COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS**  On February 21, 2019, the date of the incident described in the Amended Complaint (Pa43), Plaintiff [...] was employed by the company he operated, [...], which was in the business of sanding and finishing wood.  --- 1“Pa” refers to Plaintiff’s Appendices.  Because all of the documents relied upon by [...] in opposing the appeal are included in Plaintiff’s Appendices, [...] has not submitted an Appendix of its own.  flooring.  (Pa204-205).  The incident allegedly occurred at [...] (the “premises”) (Pa43) where [...] was installing new flooring in different areas of the premises.  (Pa206).  [...] was hired to perform the flooring work by [...], one of the people affiliated with [...], the owner of the premises.  (Pa206-207; Pa236-237).  [...] and [...] both hired the subcontractors who worked at the premises.  Hand hired Plaintiff [...] (the flooring contractor) and was also responsible for hiring the snow removal contractor for the premises at times.  (Pa237).  The February 21, 2019 Incident
[brief] [...] is an auto shop that primarily sells used auto parts and performs towing services on an ancillary basis.  Appellant is an individual that had possession of his late mother’s vehicle and attempted to sell it to various auto shops and junk yards.  On May 9, 2022, the vehicle in question was reported as abandoned and the police had it towed by Respondent.  A few days later, the local police released the vehicle back to Appellant.  Appellant offered to sell the vehicle to the auto shop for $400 and informed them that he lacked the title to the car.  An employee at the auto shop initially accepted the offer with the condition that Appellant turn over proper title.  Ten minutes later, the shop called Appellant, deciding to withdraw the conditional acceptance.  At this stage, Appellant did not have proper title and as such, he did not have standing to create a contract selling property he did not own.  Thus, a contract was not formed.
[brief] On October 14, 2021, seventy days before her scheduled liposuction surgery, decedent [...] and the [...] entered into a contract captioned, “Patient-Physician Arbitration Agreement” (“the Arbitration Agreement”) in connection with liposuction surgery she was to have.  (Da055).  The Arbitration Agreement is a “plain language,” easily understood one-page document that [...], on behalf of [...] and on his own behalf, and the decedent each signed 70 days prior to the liposuction procedure (Da003).  The Agreement, in clear and unambiguous terms, states that “any dispute arising from medical services rendered by [...], [...] and or any physician nurse or person associated therewith shall be submitted to binding arbitration and shall not be resolved by a court of law” (Da003).  In equally unambiguous terms, the Arbitration Agreement sets forth that its terms apply to “any claim of a spouse, heir, child (born or unborn), or other successor in interest to any such claim” (Da003).  The Arbitration Agreement permitted decedent to revoke the Agreement:  “This agreement may be revoked and cancelled by written notice delivered to [...] and/or the [...] within 30 days of the signing of this agreement. ” (Da003).  Decedent did not thereafter revoke the Agreement.  (Da038-040).  The Agreement required decedent to acknowledge:  That I have discussed to my satisfaction any questions I may have had regarding the arbitration agreement with a member of the Kamran Khazaei, MD or [...], staff and have been given the opportunity to obtain further counsel if desired.  I acknowledge that I have freely negotiated all terms herein set forth.  (Da004).  Indeed, Decedent and [...] discussed the Agreement on October 14, 2021 (just prior to its being signed), [...] informing decedent that he would answer any questions she might have (Da039-Da040; Da062).  Decedent signed the Arbitration Agreement in two places (Da004).  She signed towards the top of the Agreement, where, immediately adjacent to her signature was the statement, “I have read this agreement in its entirety and understand and agree to the following” (Da004).  Decedent also signed towards the bottom of the Agreement, directly below a “Notice” that states:  BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT YOU ARE AGREEING TO HAVE ANY ISSUE OR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DECIDED BY NEUTRAL ARBITRATION AND YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY OR COURT TRIAL.  SEE ARTICLE 1 OF THIS CONTRACT.  (Da004).  The Complaint alleges that “[e]ach of the Defendants failed to exercise reasonable care and was negligent in the management of their patient, [...]. ” (Da008).  All of the Estate’s claims against the [...] “arise from” “medical services rendered by [...], [...] and or any physician nurse or person associated therewith” (that is, the precise type of claims that decedent agreed to submit to arbitration)(Da004).
[directive] In composing a photo array, the administrator or investigator should:  a.  Include only one suspect in each identification procedure.  b.  Select “fillers” (a filler is someone who is not a suspect) who generally fit the witness’s description of the perpetrator.  When there is a limited or inadequate description of the perpetrator provided by the witness, or when - 2 - the description of the perpetrator differs significantly from the appearance of the suspect, fillers should resemble the suspect in significant features, such as gender, race, skin color, facial hair, age, and distinctive physical characteristics.  c.  Select a photo that resembles the suspect’s description or appearance at the time of the incident if multiple photos of the suspect are reasonably available to the investigator.  d.  Include a minimum of five fillers per identification procedure.
[brief] ’”  *Williams v. Dep’t of Corr.,* 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204, 749 A.2d 375 (App. Div. 2000) (citations omitted).  See also, *C.L. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs.*, 473 N.J. Super. 591, 598 (App. Div. 2022)(A court does not merely “rubber stamp the agency’s decision[s]”; instead, the courts will “intervene . . . in those . . . circumstances in which an agency action is clearly inconsistent with its statutory mission or other state policy.
[brief] The Township’s purported public purpose of open space appears to be a mere pretext for the actual use of the properties following the land swap with a private developer.  In Borough of Essex Fells v. Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation, Inc., the Borough sought to condemn land for the stated purpose of building a public park.  289 N.J. Super. 329, 331 (Law Div. 1995).  But the Borough’s Master Plan and public meetings revealed no need for additional parkland; instead, public statements made clear that the condemnation was intended to stymie the construction of a politically unpopular rehabilitation center.  Id. at 339–40.  Hester v. Miller, is also instructive.
[brief] Defendants’ interference with the flow of waters was unreasonable  The second element of a water nuisance claim is that the defendant’s “interference with the flow of waters is unreasonable. ”  Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 327 (1956).  “The issue of reasonableness or unreasonableness becomes a question of fact to be determined in each case upon a consideration of all the relevant circumstances, including such factors as the amount of harm caused, the foreseeability of the harm which results, the purpose or motive with which the possessor acted, and all other relevant matter. ”  Id. at 330; accord Hopler, 45 N.J. Super. at 415.  Defendants make no attempt to address any of those factors necessary under the New Jersey Supreme Court’s framework for assessing reasonableness.  Instead, the only argument Defendants raise against this second element of the water nuisance claim is that “Plaintiff’s experts did not identify any standard of care that they claim the [...] violated in connection with the driveway” such as violations of municipal ordinances or codes.  [Db32-33].  In a similar vein, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ experts [...] and [...] offered mere “net opinions” because their reports and testimony did not assert that Defendants deviated from “generally-accepted surveying or engineering standards. ”  [Db25].  This argument is a red herring.  [...] does not assert some engineering malpractice claim against [...] that would require deviation from professional standards of care, and he does not assert a claim for negligence \textit{per se} based on violation of some municipal ordinance.  Rather, [...] asserts a common-law nuisance claim, and well-settled law establishes that Defendants’ conduct is assessed purely for reasonableness.  \textit{Armstrong}, 20 N.J. at 330.  Because reasonableness is the standard by which Defendants’ conduct is measured, [...] did not need to show that Defendants deviated from “generally-accepted surveying or engineering standards” to establish nuisance liability, and the absence of such content in the reports of Plaintiffs’ experts [...] and [...] does not render their opinions as inadmissible “net opinions,” contrary to Defendants’ misguided view.  [Db25].  Defendants’ interference with the pre-existing flow of water was clearly not some inadvertent accident; they created drainage gaps at the rear corners of the curb for the purpose of draining surface water off their driveway.  The record indisputably demonstrates that Defendants designed their drainage system to create a new channel for water to flow and accumulate on [...]’s property at a point that avoids the drainage system he had installed after the Burke Action was resolved.  The question of whether Defendants’ conduct meets the New Jersey Supreme Court’s test for reasonableness under the circumstances should be remanded and adjudicated at trial.  C.
[brief] [...]'S MOTION TO APPEAL IMPROPERLY SEEKS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT RELIEF THAN THE ORIGINAL MOTION  [See Order dated August 28, 2023 at 20a-21a].  NJ. Court Rule 1:6-2 states:  (a)  Generally.  A motion, other than one made during a trial or hearing, shall be by notice of motion in writing unless the court permits it to be made orally.  Every motion shall state the time and place when it is to be presented to the court, the grounds upon which it is made and the nature of the relief sought..."  Incredulously, [...] states that the Court misinterpreted the relief originally sought and that its original Motion sought "a public hearing on site suitability."
[directive] [...]  FROM: Wa~erin~ Act's Enforcement of the Sports Uniform Ensure Directive to Enforcement Law  SUBJECT: Casinos and Pools by of the Operation Sports for Criminal LiabifitX from Exemption Racetracks  Snorts 2014-1 on the Directive Enforcement ofl.aw Addressinethe Effects  Forrr►al Opinion by Snorts  Pools of Operation for the Civil from Liability  Exemption Act's Wagering Racetracks and Casinos  8, 2014  September DATE: !s Recyclable Recycled Paper and Prin7ed an Employer • Equa!  Opportwrlty Jersey /s An New 2 Page LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE
[brief] See LVNV Funding, L.L.C. v. Colvell, 421 N.J. disposes of the case by way of rendering judgment in favor of the appropriate party based on those facts).  Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully submits that it set forth a *prima facie* case.  *Oughla*, 437 N.J. Super. at 304.  As such, the burden shifted to Defendant to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact warranting trial to defeat Plaintiff’s Motion.  However, and as a threshold matter, Plaintiff respectfully submits that certain arguments raised by Defendant should not be considered by this Court because they were not properly presented to the trial court.