ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ” (Pa000348-349).  Following the May 23, 2017 decision, the Designee issued a Notice of Implementation dated June 7, 2017, consistent with the decision.  (Pa000208-212).  Among the changes placed into effect related to pay within the [...] and [...], including promotional pay.  With respect to the [...], the Notice of Implementation provided for an updated salary scale, and indicated that the revised compensation scale would be the “entire compensation” for each employee, and further eliminated the “current rank differential upon promotion from Police Officer to Sergeant. ” (Pa000209-210).  With respect to the [...], the Notice of Implementation provided:  Effective June 7, 2017, a new salary guide is hereby established for all employees, including future promotions to the rank of Lieutenant and Captain.  The below salaries shall be the entire compensation for each employee.  There shall be no supplemental compensation except for overtime where applicable.  | RANK | 2017 Salaries | |------------|--------------| | CAPTAIN | $125,000 | | LIEUTENANT | $115,000 | (Da00001-14).  Thereafter, on January 18, 2018, the parties to the First Police Matter filed a settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”) resolving that matter.
[brief] “The proposed building will be constructed at 43’-6” above DFE in accordance with the [...] architectural plan. ” (Pa15).  (See also Pa24, ¶38).  The Amended Resolution further stated that the building was to be constructed in accordance with the “approved plans”:  26.  The proposed project shall be constructed in accordance with the approved plans.  (Pa28) (emphasis supplied), (See also Pa13, ¶6, Pa24, ¶38 and Pa35, ¶46)
[directive] The Statewide Narcotics Task Force shall, by September 1, 1988, prepare and continually update a confidential manual describing in detail the required logistical forms, recordkeeping requirements and procedures designed to ensure the integrity and security of the undercover operation.  This manual shall also discuss past undercover operation experiences and problems, and shall recommend procedures to avoid or minimize these problems.  This manual shall be provided to all county prosecutors and may be provided on a confidential basis to any building principal or local superintendent as part of the briefing required by subsection B(2)(1) of this Part.  3.
[brief] 3.  The Trial Court Failed to Adequately Consider Plaintiff’s Degree of Success.  Our Supreme Court has held that “the court must consider the degree of success in determining the reasonableness of the time expended. ”  Litton Industries v. IMO Industries, 200 N.J. 372, 387 (2009).  “Thus, when a party has succeeded on only some of its claims for relief, the trial court should reduce the lodestar to account for the limited success. ”  Id.  “The ultimate goal is to approve a reasonable attorney's fee that is not excessive. ”  Id. at 394.  Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint acknowledged from the start that the Decedent’s beneficiaries had reported to the appropriate Korean authorities that the Decedent had invested $900,000 in [...] (which translated into a 40.8% interest).  Plaintiff filed the lawsuit anyway, according to the Verified Complaint, in order to have an Administrator appointed to search for an alleged additional $10 million in assets, and to examine Defendant’s alleged mismanagement of [...], both of which proved not to exist.  Plaintiff’s litigation was unsuccessful to a huge degree.  The trial court failed to address this lack of proportionality – Plaintiff spent over $1.4 million pursuing an investigation that was fruitless.
[brief] What follows are the specific areas of [...]'s non-compliance with the PSA that trigger the counsel fee award to [...] pursuant to paragraph 27.  First, [...] failed to comply with paragraph 9 of the PSA, her alimony waiver.  Her motion to set aside set aside was in non-compliance with the provision stating:  [[...]] waives all past, present or future rights to require [[...]] to provide alimony for her support and maintenance.  It is the intention of this Agreement that [[...]] shall not now or at any time hereafter seek alimony or support from husband, regardless of any future circumstances or changes in circumstances, whether contemplated by the parties or not.  [Ca14 at ¶9].  Second, [...] failed to comply with paragraph 14 of the MSA, governing equitable distribution of the [...] model home.  (Ca14).  She improperly and illegally deeded the home to her mother [...].  [...], her mother, and other family members were squatters in that valuable residence for over 5 years and prevented it from being listed for sale in accord with paragraph 14.  In so doing, [...] did not comply with paragraph 14, which also states “the property is the sole and exclusive property of [[...]] free and clear of right, claim, title or interest by [[...]].
[brief] (Pa2022).  On March 24, 2022, [...] (J.S.C.ret’d) denied Defendants’ Motions and Ordered a Rule 104 Hearing.  (Pa2025). ²  The Rule 104 Hearing took place on May 9, 2022 before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. (Pa1422). ³  On June 14, 2022, Defendant [...] submitted their post-hearing supplemental brief.  (Pa2027).  On June 14, 2022, Defendant [...] submitted their post-hearing supplemental brief.  (Pa2037).  On June 14, 2022, Defendant [...] submitted their post-hearing supplemental brief.  (Pa2069).  On June 14, 2022, Defendant [...] submitted their post-hearing supplemental brief.  (Pa2085).  ²  Oral argument on Defendants’ Summary Judgment was held before The Honorable [...], J.A.D. on March 28, 2022 (Transcript 2T).  ³  The Rule 104 Hearing was held before The Honorable [...], J.S.C. on May 9, 2022 (Transcript 3T).  On June 14, 2022, Plaintiffs submitted their post-hearing supplemental brief.
[brief] Plaintiffs learned during discovery that [...] ("[...]") and [...] ("[...]"), in reliance on [...]’s site plan, assumed that Plaintiffs’ property was part of the project, and therefore, physically invaded Plaintiffs’ property and conducted environmental remediation and excavation activities without the written authorization or consent of Plaintiffs.  (Pa000247, page 54, line 11 to pg. 55, line 8; Pa000828).  Moreover, [...] does not dispute the statement in its own answers to interrogatories that a representative of [...] may have trespassed on Plaintiffs’ property when [...] prepared its site plans.  (Pa000102).  While these facts may not have ultimately led to a finding of liability against [...], [...] was certainly a necessary and indispensable party defendant to the action, because party Defendant [...] testified that they believed Plaintiffs’ property was a part of the project based upon the creation and existence of that plan.
[directive] 23  Bail Schedule 2 10%  Cash Bail Statute Charge Description Degree Bail Range Option  Actor, knowingly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human 2C:12-1b(4)  Aggravated Assault life, points a firearm at or in the direction of another, whether or not the actor believes it to be 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible loaded.  Actor commits simple assault upon police officer or upon other categories of people as listed 3rd Degree $5,000 to $15,000 10% permissible
[brief] ”  Mtn. Tr. at 19:5-7.  The trial court apparently agreed with [...]. Pa23-24.  On August 30, 2024, the trial court entered two orders: one denying [...]’s request for injunctive relief; and one granting [...]’s motion to \(^7\)  The “Consolidation or Joinder” provision referenced here can be found at Section 6.3.5 of the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract.  Pa604.  The provision states that “either party \textit{may} consolidate an arbitration conducted under this agreement with any other arbitration to which it is a party…”  \textit{Id.}  Thus, this section indicates, conversely of [...]’s argument, that either party “may” combine multiple arbitrations between [...] and [...].  But, this provision was never invoked one way or the other, by either party, both of whom introduced the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract into evidence during the First Arbitration.  See, e.g., Pa316 at 391:2-17.  Also, to state the obvious, the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract was already properly being argued within the jurisdiction of an arbitral forum.  dismiss [...]’s Verified Complaint with prejudice, and compelling the Second Arbitration.  Pa23-24, 45-46.  In its Statement of Reasons, the trial court made two primary findings.  First, the trial court held that “the Second Arbitration, also referred to as the Hackensack Arbitration, is not precluded by the First Arbitration by the entire controversy doctrine” because the First Arbitration included only “[[...]’s] claim for unpaid EGP on the projects subject to the PTA” and did not include “[[...]’s] claim for which it was the subcontractor.
[brief] [1T15-12 to -19].  [...] gave defendant the opportunity to view the videos on the State’s laptop.  [1T12-3 to 13-24; 1T17-10 to 18-8].  When the court reconvened for jury selection, defendant refused to appear.  [1T18-20 to 20-4].  Defense counsel argued that the jurors should be dismissed as defendant’s absence could create prejudice in the minds of the jurors.  [1T24-2 to -15].  [...] denied the motion.  [1T24-16 to 25-10].
[brief] It does not exist where [***10] the parties deal on terms of equality, although, as here, they are at the same time mother and son and business associates.  See Croker v. Clegg, 123 N.J. Eq. 332 (E. & A. 1938).  Id at p 9 – 10.  (emphasis supplied).  See also Albright v. Burns, 206 N.J. Super. 625 (App. Div. 1986), expanding on the ways that a confidential relationship can create a fiduciary relationship, by holding that “A fiduciary relationship may be deemed to have existed . . . by reason of their closeness, family relationship, entrustment, the granting of the power of attorney and Burns' promises that he would provide for his uncle.
[brief] The Court found that “[...]'s ‘rule of thumb’ testimony constitutes an improper net opinion because it was unsupported by any factual evidence or other data. ”  Id. at 25.  Although there admittedly are similarities between [...]’s testimony and that of [...]’s testimony, they differ in two important respects: [...]’s map did not depict coverage areas and the majority of his testimony did not address the cell phones’ proximity to the towers.  His demonstrative exhibit, (Pa1 to Pa15), and his testimony clearly and explicitly set forth that the map shows the location of the cell sites and the directionality of the antennas, not coverage.  Moreover, [...] admitted that he could not tell how close a cellphone was to a particular tower and did not attempt to do so.  Rather, the Detective Sergeant simply plotted cell towers on a map and acknowledged the towers, which were several blocks from the crime scene, were in the general area of the crime scene.  Accordingly, this case is distinguishable from, and does not run afoul of, Burney.
[brief] A. Standard of Review on Appeal from Grant or Denial of Summary Judgment  Below: On appeal the Appellate Division is required to review a Trial Court’s decision granting summary judgment de novo, and in doing so is required to independently apply the same standard of review as the Trial Court is required to apply when initially deciding the motion.  Conley v. Guerrero, 228 N.J. 339, 346 (2017); Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 479 (2016).  The Trial Court’s determination below is “... not entitled to any special deference. ”  Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Committee of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  Significantly, a Motion for Summary Judgment is not a substitute for an actual trial itself.  A Trial Court may not decide contested material disputed issues of fact and rather may only decide whether there are any contested material disputed issues of fact.  Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., supra, 142 N.J. at 540.  In this case, there are no disputed or disputable questions of material fact and in fact the Court can take Judicial Notice under N.J.R.E. 201 of virtually every fact relevant to the issues extant in these Motions.  B.
[brief] While [...] claims the decision in Honeywell is distinguishable (Prb 10-13), the case is directly on point.  In Honeywell, as in this case, there were many issues, “some [[...]] won, some [[...]] won, [and] many were issues that have not been resolved before. ”  Id. at *22.  The court in Honeywell addressed unique allocation and choice of law issues, held the unavailability exception under New Jersey law was applicable, and allocated additional costs to the insurers’ policy periods.  Honeywell, 2016 WL 3909530 at *10-13.  The court in Honeywell rejected an award of fees as inconsistent with the procedural history of the case and the complex nature of the coverage issues presented.  The identical result should obtain here.
[brief] ”  State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 154 (2006); see also State v. Varona, 242 N.J. Super. 474, 491 (App. Div. 1990) (finding aggravating factor three where defendant had no criminal record).  The judge’s reliance on defendant’s extensive municipal-court record for the thirteen years prior to sentencing therefore constituted a “qualitative assessment” of defendant’s history.  See Thomas, 188 N.J. at 153.  The judge also exercised reasonable discretion in finding aggravating factor six.
[directive] Revised Statewide Bail Schedules/ Permissible Use of Monetary Bail Schedules  Page 2 b.  A defendant initially charged on a complaint-summons for a disorderly persons offense allegedly committed on or after January 1, 2017 who thereafter fails to appear in court.  Monetary bail may be set upon issuance of the bench warrant or upon arrest for that failure to appear.  c.  A defendant charged with a petty disorderly persons offense:  (1)  Monetary bail may be set on the initial complaint-warrant.  If the defendant later fails to appear in court, monetary bail may be set when the bench warrant is issued or upon arrest for that failure to appear.  (2)  If initially released on a complaint-summons and the defendant later fails to appear in court, monetary bail may be set when the bench warrant is issued or upon arrest for that failure to appear.  Overview
[directive] Internal Affairs Policies & Procedures A. report.  IAPP  Section 9.1 is revised as follows:  Structure of the internal affairs 9.1  The Internal Affairs Report 9.1.1  At the conclusion of the internal affairs investigation, the investigator shall submit a written report consisting of an objective investigative report recounting all of the case’s facts and a summary of the case, along with conclusions for each allegation, two separate and distinct reports as and recommendations for further action.  follows:  This (a) rReport.  The first part of the report will be an objective Investigative recounting of all the relevant information the investigation disclosed, including 3 shall statements, documents and other evidence.  This part of the Such report is be similar in all respects to a standard law enforcement investigative report, and should contain a complete account of the investigation.  This report shall (b) Report.  The investigator should Summary and Conclusions  The summarize the case and provide conclusions of fact for each allegation.  report should be organized as follows:  (1)  A against the officer, including a Summary of the Allegations recitation of the alleged facts; (2)  A in which the investigator outlines Summary of Factual Findings the facts proven or supported by the evidence reviewed during the investigation, and applies those facts to each allegation.  This shall include a conclusive finding on whether each allegation is to be recorded as exonerated, sustained, not sustained or unfounded.  For sustained findings that qualify for disclosure under Section 9.11.2, the summary of factual findings, along with the discipline imposed, should be the basis for the brief synopsis required under Section 9.11.2; (3)  A section in which the final discipline imposed Discipline Imposed on the officer will be recorded.  This section should be completed once the discipline imposed becomes final.  See Section 9.11.2 for guidance on when the officer’s discipline is final.  Examples of completed are included in Summary and Conclusions Reports  Appendix O. the 9.1.2  If the conduct of an officer was found to be improper, Summary and must cite the agency rule, regulation, or SOP violated.  Any Conclusions Report aggravating or mitigating circumstances surrounding the situation, such as unclear or poorly drafted agency policy, inadequate training or lack of proper supervision, in the Report. shall also be noted  Summary and Conclusions 9.1.3
[directive] [No/Non]  8.  it is almost certain that you will go to state prison?  Eske wap plede koupab de yon zak ki rnande prizon, ki vie dike w pi si yap voye w nan prizon !eta a?  [No/Non]  [Yes/Wi]  Are you presently on probation or parole?  9.  Aktyelrnan, eske w sou libete siveye oswa libete kondisyonel?
[brief] In Mulvihill, our Supreme Court explains that “a civilian being subjected to excessive force or attack and defending against it” is not required “to make a split second determination, amounting to a gamble, as to whether if he terminates his defensive measures, he will suffer further beyond arrest. ”  Id. at 157-58; see id. at 154-55, 158 (holding trial court’s failure to instruct jury on self-defense was reversible error where jury could have found officer used excessive force in attempting to arrest defendant by hitting him with gun and that defendant punched officer in self-protection).
[brief] If [...] did not convey the Riparian Grant to [...], then [...] would still hold the Riparian Grant (1T53:16).  He points out the Borough’s expert, [...] (“[...]”) provided a report but does not accurately describe the conveyance from [...] to [...] (1T53:23).  The [...] Deed to [...], Co., (Pa917) was made January 15, 1909, by William J. [...], Jr., and his wife to the [...] Company.  It specifically describes land.  There is also included language “together with such Riparian Rights and other rights, privileges and franchises in and to the land lying under the waters of Raritan Bay in front of and adjoining the above-described premises”.  [...] opines that the Deed from [...] to [...] Company specifically includes not only upland but the subaqueous land as well.
[brief] The propriety of a trial court’s summary judgment order, such as the January 19, 2024 Order from which Plaintiffs seek relief (Pa385-386), is a legal question and not a factual one.  Davidovich v. Israel Ice Skating, 446 N.J. Super. 127, 158 (App. Div. 2016).  This Court shall apply the same standard as the motion court did in its review of the motion record, Shields v. Ramslee Motors, 240 N.J. 479, 487 (2020), which is to say that, “the movant is entitled to judgment if, on the full motion record, the adverse party, who is required to have the facts and inferences viewed most favorably to it, has not demonstrated a prima facie case. ”  C.W. v. Cooper Health System, 388 N.J. Super. 42, 57 (App. Div. 2006).  In addressing Plaintiffs’ argument that the January 19, 2024 summary judgment Order must be vacated, this Court “must confine [itself] to the original summary judgment record because that is the limited issue before [it]. ”  Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 542 (2001), citing Ji v. Palmer, 333 N.J. Super. 451, 463-64 (App. Div. 2000)(explaining Appellate Courts “can consider the case only as it had been unfolded to that point and the evidential material submitted on that motion”).  [...], writing for the majority in Lombardi, phrased it thusly:  In other words, our charge at this stage is to look at the original summary judgment record...and to determine whether, viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, it presented genuine issues of material fact requiring trial.  *Lombardi*, 207 N.J. at 542.  [Emphasis added.]  A fair, dispassionate review of the original summary judgment record makes clear with crystal clarity that Plaintiffs’ case did not – and does not – present any such issues that should have resulted in a denial of [...]’s motion, or should compel this Court to overturn the motion court’s well-reasoned grant of summary judgment.
[brief] Entering his car, supposedly to look for registration information, is completely untethered from the basis of the stop.  Therefore, it cannot be justified under Terry.  It is true that in Keaton, the unlawful entry into the car was to complete an accident report.  Keaton, 222 N.J. at 442.  However, because the search was found to be unlawful due to a failure to give the motorist an opportunity to provide credentials, Keaton is not an example of a registration search that was upheld in any context other than a motor vehicle infraction.  Allowing the credentials exception to allow entry into a car for the purposes of a criminal investigation for which there is no probable cause is untethered from the purposes of the narrow exception and violates the state and federal constitutional privacy rights.
[brief] The Association has also acted in violation of Sections (1), (3), and (5) of the Act.  These sections provide, in pertinent part, that:  Employee organizations, their representatives, or agents are prohibited from:  (1)  Interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by this act.  (3)  Refusing to negotiate in good faith with a public employer, if they are the majority representative of employees in an appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions of employment of employees in that unit.  (5)  Violating any of the rules and regulations established by the commission.  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(b)(1); (3); (5).  A.  The Association’s Actions
[brief] While this litigation is not directly challenging any redevelopment action taken by the [...], its apparent purpose is to impede the redevelopment of the redevelopment area.  Through this litigation, [...] alleges that the [...] does not own the entirety of the Property (and the entirety of the Leased Premises) and that certain riparian lands abutting the historic shoreline of the Property were never conveyed to the [...]. \(^2\)  Both parties presented witnesses regarding the chain of title of the Property.  The [...] also presented witnesses, who were unrebutted by any affirmative testimony from [...], regarding the historic uses of the Property.  A.  The Chain Of Title Of The Property
[directive] Periodically, the Triage Review Committee should retrospectively evaluate whether the • review process is consistent with effective, fair, and timely application of the allocation framework.  The Triage Review Committee should be made up of at least three individuals, recruited from the following groups or offices: Chief Medical Officer or designee, Chief Nursing Officer or other Nursing leadership, Legal Counsel, a hospital Ethics Committee or Consult Service, members of an off-duty triage officer.
[brief] 3  While the Trial Court found it relevant that no one saw the video and that the degree of offensiveness did not elevate the conduct to misconduct in office, the Trial Court provided no precedent to support these holdings.  (Da 377).  committed the offense of conduct unbecoming a public employee, or, misconduct touching upon his office.  N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c) provides in pertinent part: