ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | State v. Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452 (2018) | 44 | | State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293 (2019) | 47 | | State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021) | 48 | | State v. Vick, 117 N.J. 288 (1989) | 37 | | State v. Whitaker, 200 N.J. 444 (2009) | 34, 35 | | United States v. Ashburn, 88 F. Supp. 3d 239 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) | 22 | | United States v. Diaz, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13152 | | | (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007) | 22 | | United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005) | 20, 21 | | United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351 (D. Mass. 2006) | 21 | | United States v. Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. N.M. 2009) | 22 | | United States v. Tibbs, Case No. 2016-CF1-19431 (D.C. 2019) | 22, 23 | | United States v. Willock, 696 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D.Md. 2010) | 22 | | STATUTES | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2a | 41 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1)(2) | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1) | 2 | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D.) | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------------------|-----------| | **STATUTES (CONT'D.)** | | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j) | 3 | | N.J.SA. 2C:39-7b(1) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 | 45 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-l(a) | 46 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-l(b) | 46 | | **RULES** | | | R. 2:10-2 | 33, 36 | | R. 3:12-2 | 39 | | **RULES OF EVIDENCE** | | | N.J.R.E. 702 | 10, 11 | | **CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS** | | | N.J. Const. art.
[brief] 1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................  4  STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................  7  A.  The Property ...........................................................................  7  B.  The Mount Laurel Action, The Affordable Housing Settlement Agreement, Rezoning, and [...]’s Application ......................................................................................  7  C.  Hearings on [...]’s Application and the Board’s Resolution ..................................................................................................................  10  ARGUMENT .......................................................................................... 18  I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW  ..........................................................  18  II.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED UNDER A STRICTLY DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW THAT THE BOARD PROPERLY INTERPRETED THE WORD “DESIGN” IN THE ORDINANCE (Pa13-Pa15).  ........................................  20  III.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FAIL TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE REVISED LOT GRADE WAS THE RESULT OF “MOUNGING, TERRACING, OR OTHER DEVICES” DESIGNED TO ALLOW INCREASED BUILDING HEIGHT (Pa15-Pa16)  .............................................................................  23  IV.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE BOARD’S FACTUAL FINDINGS IN CONNECTION WITH THE APPLICATION OF THE HEIGHT DEFINITION WERE NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR UNREASONABLE (Pa11-Pa12).  .................................................................  28  CONCLUSION .......................................................................................
[brief] Pages H1059a through H1209a P-29: Cover letter and [...] supplemental responses to [...] discovery requests  [...]-HOLM-PS-11 to 13 (SOICR p. 11)  ........  H1059a P-30: Excerpted pages from the Recreation Needs Assessment by [...], March 13, 2018 (SOICR p. 11)  ..................  H1066a  Attachment: Final Report, “[...] Township Parks and Recreation Needs Assessment,” by [...], dated March 13, 2018, excerpt.................................  H1080a  The [...]’s (“[...]”)  Exhibits filed in OAL Dockets [...] and [...] beginning October 19, 2020, as listed in the Appendix to the Decision and Order issued by Hon. [...], A.L.J., May 18, 2022 (SOICR #93):
[brief] 23 - **Meehan v. Antonellis**, 226 N.J. 216 (2016) ................................................................. 11 - **Moschella v. Hackensack Meridian Jersey Shore Univ. Med. Ctr.**, 258 N.J. 110 (2024) .........................................................................................................................  11 - **Negron v. Llarena**, 156 N.J. 296 (1998) ........................................................................  15 - **Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley**, 168 N.J. 398 (2001) ....................................................  23 - **Paragon Contractors, Inc. v. Peachtree Condo. Ass’n**, 202 N.J. 415 (2010) .......... 13 - **Phillips v. Curiale**, 128 N.J. 608 (1992)  ........................................................................ 9 - **Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.**, 116 N.J. 739 (1989)  ..................... 19 Ryan v. Renny, 203 N.J. 37 (2010) ................................................................. 7, 18 Scaffidi v. Horvitz, 343 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 2001) ...................... 28, 29, 30 Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2005)  ............... 9, 10, 11
[brief] See In re Hunterdon County Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders 116 N.J. 322 (1989).  The judicial role when reviewing an action of an administrative agency is generally restricted to three inquiries: (1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency bases its action; and (3) whether, in applying the legislative policy to the facts, the agency erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.  _City of Jersey City v. Jersey City of Police Officers Benevolent Ass’n_ 154 N.J. 555, 567 (1998), citing _In re Musick_ 143 N.J. 206, 216 (1996).  This general principle of review applies to [...] and its handling of appeals of interest arbitration awards.
[brief] “Existence of an alleged dangerous condition is not constructive notice of it. ”  *Sims v. City of Newark*, 244 N.J. Super. 32, 42 (Law Div. 1990).  There is no evidence to support the theory that [...] had actual notice of the allegedly dangerous condition.  Consequently, Plaintiff must establish that [...] had constructive notice of the condition in order to prevail.  The Appellate Division defined constructive notice in *Parmenter v Jarvis Drug Store, Inc.*, 48 N.J. Super. 507, 510 (App. Div. 1957) as “the existence of the condition for such a length of time as reasonably to have resulted in knowledge and correction had the defendant been reasonably diligent.
[brief] New Jersey Republican State Comm'n v. Murphy, 243 N.J. 574 (2020).................................................................19  Peeples v. Clinical Support Options, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 3d 56 (D. Mass. 2020)..............................................38  People First of Ala. V. Merrill, 491 F. Supp. 3d 1076 (N.D. Ala. 2020)...........................................39
[brief] Cases  Harrington Glen, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Leonia, 52 N.J. 22, 28 (1968)  ...........................................  4 Loscalzo v. Pini, 228 N.J. Super. 291, 305 (App. Div. 1988) ..................................................  4 Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1, 23 (1987) ..................................................................................  4  Morris County Fair Housing Council v. Boonton Tp., 228 N.J. Super. 635, 646 (Law Div. 1988) .........................................................................................................................  4  New York SMSA, L.P. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. of Weehawken, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 333 (App. Div. 2004) .........................................................................................................................  4 Smith v. Fair Haven Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 335 N.J. Super. 111, 123 (App. Div. 2000) .................................................................................................................................  4  Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(d) ......................................................................................................................  13 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(g) ......................................................................................................................  13 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-76b ..........................................................................................................................  11  Other Authorities
[brief] Moreover, the *Chulsky* court—a federal court interpreting substantive state law—asked a question that was explicitly answered by the New Jersey Supreme Court in *Gonzalez*, i.e., whether the “[CFA] applies, in like manner, to assignees or debt buyers who purchase and attempt to collect upon defaulted debt. ”  See Chulsky, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 838.  Gonzalez responded by explicitly determining that “collecting or enforcing a loan, whether by the lender or its assignee, constitutes the ‘subsequent performance’ of a loan, an activity falling within the coverage of the CFA.
[brief] “Only by such procedures can a court make certain that it has fully explored the issue and has correctly adjudged it.  Cross-examination is the most effective device known to our trial procedure for seeking the truth. ”  And, “…We have repeatedly emphasized that trial judges cannot resolve material factual disputes upon conflicting affidavits and certifications. ”, and “…Accordingly, we remand for a plenary hearing as to that issue. ” (Harrington v. Harrington).  Appellant respectfully submits that the Court overlooked or failed to consider Appellant’s probative evidence of error in Probation’s “full accounting” of 3/17/2022, failed to pursue diligent investigation of material disputed facts, failed to hold a hearing and make findings of fact, and ultimately failed to meet its obligation ensure an accurate account record.
[brief] The Permit  On July 14, 2020, [...] submitted a Waterfront Development Individual In-Water Permit application for the Property to the [...].  (Ra2; Ra10).  [...]’s application described the proposed project as “reconstruction of a bulkhead 24 inches waterward of its current location and request for after-the-fact authorization of finger piers and mooring piles which had been constructed in the boat basin over time without a permit. ” (Ra2; Ra13; Ra35).  During the permit review process, the [...] asked [...] to submit a public access proposal for the Property and [...] disputed the requirement.  (Aa119; Ra4-7).  [...] instead noted that public access already existed at nearby locations, such as [...] and [...],\(^4\) and \(^4\) [...] erroneously cites to an undated press release (Aa40-42), concerning that it was willing to make a monetary contribution to the municipality to enhance public access at another location in lieu of onsite access.  (Ra5-6).  Ultimately, the parties discussed but could not agree on a public access proposal for the Property.  Ibid.  Rather than deny the permit application because [...] had not yet demonstrated compliance with the Public Access Law, the [...] agreed to issue the permit with a condition requiring [...] to provide an onsite public access plan before commencing construction.
[brief] •  The Mortgage states that it was “given as collateral to secure that guarantee made by Mortgagor [[...]] in favor of the Lender pursuant to the terms and conditions of a certain Guarantee.  . . .”  Da11; Da57; Da175 (Ex. P7).  •  The Mortgage also provides, as the trial court expressly found, that plaintiff would not waive his right to declare defendant to be in default if he delayed in exercising his rights.  Da11; Da 177 (Ex. P7, Para. 8); 1T78-12 to 22.  •  The Note expressly states that the “obligations of the Guarantor under the Guaranty are secured by a mortgage.  . . .”  Da57; Da167 (Ex. P4).  •  The Note also provides, as the trial court found, that [...] could discharge any collateral without canceling or discharging the underlying debt owed to him by [...].  Da57-58; Da167 (Ex. P4) (the Lender may “without impairing or in any way affecting the liability of [the Borrower or the Guarantor] to the Lender . . . release . . . collateral held by the Lender as security for any sum owing to the Lender by any party hereto”).  On the basis of the documentary evidence, the trial court properly concluded that “the debt stays intact, even when the underlying collateral is released[;]” [...] released the collateral for the Guarantee “[w]ithout affecting defendants’ underlying debt[;]” and “the parties agreed and understood that nothing short of payment in full of the third loan would satisfy defendant’s loan obligations. ”  Da58.  See also Highland Lakes Country Club and Commun. Ass’n. v. Franzino, 186 N.J. 99, 114 (2006) (“It has long been the law in New Jersey that extinguishment of a lien does not affect the validity of the underlying debt that gave rise to the lien. ”).  Defendants’ arguments that the trial court’s findings are incorrect are baseless, and are not supported by the law or any record fact, including any fact to contradict the plain language of the instruments themselves.  Db16, 29-31.  Contrary to Defendants’ arguments, the evidence adduced at trial fully supports the trial court’s finding.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion, and its ruling should be affirmed. \(^{20}\)  **POINT III**
[brief] 11  Shore v. Housing Authority of Harrison, 208 N.J. Super. 348 (App. Div. 1986)  22-23  Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347 (1993)  24  Vincitore v. N.J. Sports & Expo. Auth., 169 N.J. 119 (2001)  9, 13, 14, 17
[brief] ”  Da104.\(^3\)  Deference is given to a trial court’s findings regarding credibility, *State v. Hubbard*, 222 N.J. 249, 264 (2015), as credibility findings are “often influenced by matters such as the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.  *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999).  Viewed against the intractability of the Defendants’ position which had them opposing any purchaser of the Boonton Property beside themselves, and their ongoing rent-free occupation of the Boonton Property, the sealed bidding procedure ordered by the trial court was not only proper but necessary.
[brief] On July 11, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., denied [...]’s motion to withdraw his plea, despite the fact that [...]’s decision and order to suppress was not stayed.  (Ma 1-2)  On August 15, this Court granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal.  (Sb 9)  [...] remains incarcerated despite having prevailed on this dispositive motion.  He completes his sentence in February.
[brief] Finally, Environmental Appellants note that, in the 2013 case of *Highlands Applicability*, [...] took the position that an interpretation of “routine” applying to “upgrade” “would make no sense. ”\(^{20}\)  [...] argued that “Appellants suggests that only routine upgrades be exempted.  Yet, upgraded lines, rights-of-way and systems are hardly routine.  Indeed, these often take years to plan and complete, as compared to routine activities which generally serve to replace existing but aging infrastructure. ”\(^{21}\)
[brief] The Court found that Appellants had made a prima facie case that [...] was not a BFP, but sought a fortified record to make that decision:  While admittedly some of defendants’ assertions may not ultimately withstand scrutiny, it nonetheless offers prima facie assertions that, if satisfactorily established, may lead the court to conclude that [...] is not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice and thereby not prejudiced.  (30a).  In the Reconsideration Motion (451a-424a), and particularly the [...] Cert.(525a-532a), Appellants supplemented the record presented to the lower court so as to document the *prima facie* factors identified by [...].  [...] and later [...] both considered [...]’s claim to BFP status prior to the issuance of *Roberto*, and Appellants ask this Court to consider that *Roberto* has essentially preempted the BFP analysis in relation to Appellants’ *Tyler* claim.  By limiting the retroactive application of *Tyler* to cases in the “pipeline,” *Roberto* inherently balances the rights of parties who would be prejudiced by application of the “new rule” of *Tyler*, supplanting the equitable BFP defense where an aggrieved parties’ constitutional claim remains actionable because the it is still in the “pipeline. ”  [...]’s claim to BFP status must yield to the vulnerability of its title under the “new rule” established under *Tyler*, so long as Appellants’ case is in the “pipeline” and thus eligible for relief under *Roberto*.  This result is neither unfair to [...] nor unforseeable.  [...] is a sophisticated tax lien investor whose *modus operandi* includes trading tax titles shortly after entry of final judgment.  [...] assumes an inherent risk in such a business model and both *Tyler* and *Roberto* preferred the preservation of Appellants’ access to a constitutional takings claim over any prejudice to [...] so long as Appellants avoidance claims were open and diligently pursued.  For this reason the lower court should be reversed.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 75.  “Substantial” means “having substance; not imaginary, unreal, or apparent only; true, solid, real . . . .”  *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 529 (citing *The Compact Oxford*  Merely reciting the elements of a cause of action without supporting facts does not state a claim on which relief may be granted.  See Printing Mart Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 768 (1989); Nostrame v. Santiago, 420 N.J. Super. 427, 436 (App. Div. 2011).  And simply alleging the existence of rights or obligations is insufficient to avoid the entry of a judgment when essential facts are missing.  See Glass v. Suburban Restoration Co., 317 N.J. Super. 574, 582 (App. Div. 1998).  Summary judgment also cannot be defeated if the non-moving party does not offer “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor. ”  Housel v. Theodoridis, 314 N.J. Super. 597, 604 (App. Div. 1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986)); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (holding that metaphysical doubts as to material facts cannot defeat summary judgment).  Bare allegations in pleadings and self-serving, conclusory certifications cannot defeat a meritorious application for summary judgment.  See United State Pipe & Foundry Co. v. American Arbitration Assn., 67 N.J. Super. 384, 399-400 (App. Div. 1961).  The opponent of a summary judgment motion bears the burden of producing evidence that would support a jury verdict in its favor, and thus must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. ”  Housel, 314 N.J. Super. at 604.  However, when the evidence is so one-sided that the moving party must prevail as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate and should be affirmed.  See Brill, 142 N.J. at 540.  Such is the case here.
[brief] | | 11044-19060 | Draft Executive Summary from outside counsel to [...] regarding potential litigation against [...].  RFP 2 seeks specific communications between Plaintiffs and certain third parties, none of which are counsel.  RFP 4 seeks documents relating to the performance administration and termination of the Recompute MOA.  RFP 11 appears to seek communications sent to and from [...] and internal communications regarding the termination of the 2005 Recompute MOA.  These requests do not seek draft complaints related to this lawsuit.  Moreover, RFPs 17-25 request documents regarding specific allegations in the Complaint and not the executive summaries regarding this litigation in its entirety.  This document is not responsive to [...]'s RFPs 2, 4, 11, 17, 23, 24 or 25.
[brief] ”  Does “declawing” a cat constitute any of those acts?  Does “cropping” a Doberman pincher’s ears or tail constitute any of --- \(^6\)  Pentobarbital is a “poison” because “the dictionary” defines “poison” as “a substance with an inherent property that tends to destroy life or impair health. ”  See [https://www.dictionary.com/browse/poison#google_vignette](https://www.dictionary.com/browse/poison#google_vignette) those acts?  Does keeping a parakeet in a cage for its life instead of allowing it to fly freely outdoors constitute any of those acts?  Does spaying or neutering a cat or dog constitute any of those acts?
[brief] City of New York v. Smart Apts. LLC, 39 Misc.3d 221 (Sup. Ct. New York Cty. 2013) .........................................................  48 Corporate Realty Servs., LLC v. Croghan, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1623 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 10, 2018) .......................  47  Emerald Bay Developers, LLC v. Lenyk Auto., Inc., 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2125 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. September 25, 2018)
[brief] The only exception to this rule is when the property owner has already devoted its property to a worthy public purpose and the property owner also has the power to condemn.  Id. at 163.  This is known as the prior public use doctrine.  Id. at 162-63.  Our Supreme Court clarified that a property owner cannot avail itself of the protections of the prior public use doctrine merely because the property is already being used for a worthy public purpose; it must also have the power to condemn.  Id. at 163-64; see Wildlife Pres., 48 N.J. at 268-69 (“denying ‘public-spirited’ conservation group protection of prior public use doctrine for private land voluntarily devoted to use as wildlife preserve because conservation group did not also have condemnation authority.
[directive] Statute Charge Description Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option national origin or ethnicity, or (b) the victim or the victim’s property was selected to be the 2C:16-1a(1-3)  Bias Intimidation target of the offense because of the victim’s race, color, religion, gender, disability, sexual 3rd Degree  $10,000 to $50,000  10% permissible (continued) (continued) orientation, gender identity or expression, national origin, or ethnicity.  Grading – fourth degree if the underlying offense referred to in subsection a. is a disorderly persons offense or petty disorderly persons offense.  Otherwise bias intimidation is a crime one degree higher than the most serious underlying crime referred to in subsection a; if underlying crime is a crime of the first degree, then bias intimidation is a crime of the first 4th Degree  $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible degree.  Actor starts fire or causes an explosion thereby purposely or knowingly placing another in danger of death or bodily injury, or with the purpose to destroy a building, or with the purpose 2C:17-1a
[brief] Instead, plaintiff contended the professional negligence claim is tied to the 2007 plan which changed the location of the kettle to an area along a travel path without a wall providing enough protection for employees passing by the kettle.  The court granted summary judgment and issued a written decision finding the [...] were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because [...]'s opinions addressed no specific custom, practice, or standard with which defendants had not complied.  The judge concluded defendants violated no professional duty of care, and therefore, [...]'s report was a net opinion.  The court issued an order granting the [...]' motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment.
[brief] The Appellate Division Has Rejected Plaintiff’s Theory  Just a few months ago, on June 5, 2024, the Appellate Division issued decisions in *Asmad-Escobar v. Phx. Fin. Servs. LLC*, No. A-2238-22, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1044, at *6 (N.J. App. Div. Jun. 5, 2024) and *Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.*, No. A-3156-22, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1040, at *7 (N.J. App. Div. Jun. 5, 2024) rejecting the very theory of recovery that Plaintiff brought before the Trial Court and that is the subject of this appeal.