ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] ("SOP"), as required standard operating procedure to Tested Number of Officers be Frequency and C. the and number of officers to be shall delineate frequency  Each in its policy agency random testing shall be at least a minimum, drug conducted for random drug testing.  At selected 10 in every subsequent calendar year. least at least twice At remainder of 2018 and once in the within an shall be randomly each sworn officers agency tested total number of percent of the time.  ~Testin~ Policy Notification of Random Dru D. of the implementation of random notify all sworn officers a drug  Each agency shall shall shall that, upon an initial positive result, the officer notification indicate testing policy.  The shall final  The notification also indicate that, upon immediately from all duties. be suspended law terminated from employment as a action, officer shall be enforcement disciplinary the Registry Police, Central Drug maintained by the State officer shall reported to the officer, the be enforcement New from future law employment in officer shall permanently barred and the be Jersey.
[brief] In R.D., a “juror approached the court with his concern . . . based on his out-of-court knowledge of [a] witness. ”  169 N.J. at 562.  “The juror stated that he did not recognize her name from the witness list and did not realize that he knew the witness until he saw her when she testified. ”  Ibid.  “After consultation with both counsel, the trial court excused the juror.
[directive] Revised Promulgated by 12/31/2019 Supplement to Directive #01-18, [...]-Haitian Creole Defendant's Initials  Fonn Revize pa Sipleman Direktifnimewo 01-18 kite pwomilge le 31 desanm 2019, [...]-Haitian Creole Inisyal Akize a page 3 of7/paj 3 nan 7  [Yes/Wi]  [No/Non]  Did you enter a plea of guilty to any charges a mandatory period of parole 7. that require ineligibility or a mandatory extended term?  Eskew plede koupab de nenpot ki akizasyon rnande yon peryod egzijib kote w pa elijib pou libete kondisyonel ki oswa yon tern egzijib pwolonje?
[brief] •  [...] of [...] testified that, although [...]’s subcontract provided that [...] may “request that any subcontractor with any tier withdraw from the CCIP upon 30 days written notice,” she was not aware of any written notice issued to [...] informing them that they would be withdrawn from coverage.  Pa965.  The informal email discussion in July and August 2015 referenced in Section II.B. above regarding [...]’s enrollment in the CCIP at that time did not satisfy this requirement that [...] be formally notified of cancellation of its insurance.  See Miller, 189 N.J. Super. at 444 (finding notices warning of lapsed coverage inadequate: “the statute directs they must do more: they must advise that the subsisting policy will be cancelled on a certain date no sooner than ten days thereafter” (emphasis in original)).  The record certainly supports [...]’s reasonable expectation that its insurance was not cancelled, given [...]’s unequivocal confirmation of [...]’s CCIP approval later, in September 2015.  Pa427.  Further, [...] received this confirmation from [...] within the CCIP Policy’s 90-day notice period, although the trial court apparently determined that [...]’s insurance was cancelled immediately after its enrollment.  The potential confusion arising from such a situation is what these requirements are meant to avoid.
[brief] ”  This finding was contrary to clear, unambiguous, and abundant evidence in the record.  It is obvious from the record that Respondent not only held herself out as a Board member from her Facebook page, but that members of the school community protested her at *meetings of the Board*, meaning that they not only *could* have seen her as speaking in her role as Board member, but that they *actually did* see her as speaking in this role, thereby compromising the Board.  The *Board itself* was also subjected to litigation as a direct result of Respondent’s social media use.
[brief] Suffice it to say at this point, the judge re-sentenced defendant to a term of 30 years with a 30-year-period of parole ineligibility subject to NERA.  (5T24-24 to 25-6).  [...] then merged the felony murder count into the purposeful and/or knowing murder count, and also found that a consecutive 15-year NERA sentence for robbery was appropriate for the same reasons given by the original sentencing judge.  (5T25-7 to 28-18).  At bottom, defendant’s new sentence is 10 years shorter than the one originally imposed, and he will be eligible for parole 4 years sooner.  Defendant will also be eligible for a sentence “look-back” in less than 11 years, in May 2035, when he is 40 years old.  See (2T; 5T9-8 to 14); State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359, 370 (2022).  Defendant now appeals this new, shorter sentence.  (Da70-73).  Legal Argument Point  I  Defendant’s new, shorter sentence is not excessive.  Applying the proper deference it is owed, this Court must affirm.  Defendant seeks yet another resentencing hearing in the hopes the judge will go even lower and impose the mandatory minimum for defendant’s crimes—30 years with a 30-year period of parole ineligibility.  (Db19).  But defendant’s claim—essentially one of excessive sentence—fails because his new, shorter sentence was imposed following a comprehensive, multi-day sentencing proceeding at which the judge considered all relevant sentencing criteria—the Miller factors as explained by Zuber, the Yarbough factors governing consecutive-versus-concurrent sentencing, and the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1—and came to a reasonable conclusion that finds ample support in the record and is commensurate with defendant’s crimes.
[brief] POINT II  THE STATUTE IN QUESTION IS CONSTITUTIONAL  It is unclear on appeal whether Defendant is abandoning his argument that the statute is unconstitutional.  Nevertheless, this Court’s obligation in ascertaining a statute's reach is to “discern and effectuate” the legislative intent.  Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 592, (2012).  The “best indicator of that intent is the statutory language,” which must be given its “ordinary meaning and significance. ”  DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492, 874 A.2d 1039 (2005).  “The interpretive process is not an invitation to find and employ loopholes or exceptions not plainly expressed, nor an opportunity to engraft elements or considerations not plainly revealed in or fairly implicated by the words used. ”  State v. O'Donnell, 471 N.J. Super. 360, 368, (App. Div. 2022), aff'd, 255 N.J. 60, (2023)  The statute at issue is clear in its purpose and language and admits of no ambiguity, facially or as applied.  Its constitutionality has not been questioned and it should not be declared unconstitutional now.
[brief] 1.  EDS [...] [...] on behalf of [...] v. [...] [...] - Resolution and Settlement were provided - No Decision could be located 2.  EDS BD [...]  [...] v. [...] on behalf of [...] [...] - Resolution, Decision, and Settlement were provided 3.  EDS [...]  [...] & [...] o/b/o [...] v [...] [...] - Resolution and Settlement were provided - No Decision could be located 4.  EDS BD [...]  [...] v [...] o/b/o [...] (C) [...] - Decision and Settlement were provided - No Resolution could be located 5.  EDS [...] [...] and [...] on behalf on [...] v. [...] [...] - Resolution, Settlement and Decision were provided 6.  EDS [...] [...] o/b/o [...] v [...] [...] - Decision and Settlement were provided - No Resolution could be located 7.  EDS [...] [...] on behalf of [...] v. [...] [...] - Decision and Settlement were provided - No Resolution could be located 8.  EDS [...]  [...] v. [...] and [...] on behalf of [...] [...] - Decision and Settlement were provided - No Resolution could be located 9.  EDS [...]  [...] and [...] on behalf of [...] v. [...] [...] - Resolution, Decision, and Settlement were provided 10.  EDS [...]  [...] on behalf of [...] v. [...] [...] - Decision and Settlement were provided - No Resolution could be located 11.  EDS [...]  [...] and [...] on behalf of [...] v. [...] [...] - Resolution was provided - No Decision or Settlement could be located  As noted above, for five of the 11 cases, no resolution approving the settlement could be located.
[brief] (Db 34).  Defendant can hardly argue that he was denied a fair trial by the State’s arguments regarding his use and abuse of Adderall and daily use of marijuana in summation, which were firmly supported by the testimony at trial, when the very existence of that evidence allowed for the jury to decide if he was voluntarily intoxicated.  Defendant’s displeasure with the fact that the jury did not believe in that defense does not now equate to an unfair trial.  All of the State’s arguments in summation were centered upon the testimony presented, the evidence admitted at trial, and reasonable inferences therein.  Contrary to defendant’s incorrect interpretation of this record, the State’s arguments were not “complete inventions by the prosecutor. ” (Db 34); compare, Mahoney, 188 N.J. at 376; R.B., 183 N.J. at 330; Smith, 167 N.J. at 178.  At no time during the State’s summation did the prosecutor suggest, or describe the defendant as a “drug crazed maniac or a drug crazed psychotic maniac. ” (Db 33; 35).  Such melodramatic characterization of the State’s summation finds no support in this record.  Finally, defendant’s citation to State v. Mazowski, 337 N.J. Super. 275 (App. Div. 2001), to stand for the proposition that the State first elicited testimony and then later argued during summation that defendant was a drug addict and that is why he committed murder is both factually and legally misplaced.  First, the State never argued that defendant was a drug addict.  The State argued that defendant took too much of his prescription.  This was supported and based on the testimony of [...], who was with defendant that entire day and observed how many pills he took along with evidence of the actual prescription bottle with his left-over pills recovered from his vehicle.  The State further argued that on the day of the shooting, defendant mixed his over-use of Adderall with marijuana.  (9T:71-4 to 73-18).  The only party to label someone a drug addict was defense counsel referencing [...] in his summation.  (9T:30-5 to 8).  The State made no such argument about defendant.  Second, the issue in Mazowski was that the prosecutor made the improper argument (and improper assumption) that “all drug addicts need money,” so necessarily that was the motive for the robbery.  However, that court found there was no evidence presented at trial to support that argument in summation.  Id. at 287.  In the instant case, the State never argued that because defendant was a drug addict, he committed murder.  Rather, the State recounted the testimony of defendant’s over-use of Adderall throughout the day and his resulting escalation of paranoid and violent behavior.  By doing so, the State directly countered defendant’s assertion that [...] was the out of control culprit in the Chevy Impala that fateful day.  As such, the State’s arguments and reasonable inferences therein were all factually supported by the evidence in the case.  The State’s arguments, judged in relation to the entire summation and the trial as a whole, was proper.  Thus, there is no basis for reversal.
[brief] In *Picone* the plaintiff was travelling Southbound on County Route 646 while the defendant was travelling westbound on County Route 540.  According to plaintiff, he stopped at the stop sign at the intersection, and after making observations of traffic on County Road 540, plaintiff proceeded into the intersection where the Mack truck collided with plaintiff’s vehicle.  The defendant testified that the plaintiff did not stop at the stop sign.  Defendants contended that the jury could not reasonably attribute less than fifty-one percent of fault to plaintiff in this accident, and, therefore, summary judgment was properly granted.  The Appellate Court disagreed.
[brief] “It is axiomatic that a party from whom discovery is sought must determine whether it possesses relevant documents that are responsive to a particular discovery request. ”  *Unishippers Glob. Logistics, LLC v. DHL Express (USA) Inc.*, 2009 WL 3297817, at *2 (D. Utah Oct. 12, 2009).  That threshold responsibility applies under the “traditional approach to discovery,” which “involves the review of all potentially relevant data to determine whether any particular document is relevant to the request for production.
[brief] **[...]’s Choice 2 Policies**  [...] entered the LTCI market in New Jersey in 2004 and stopped writing new LTCI business in 2012.  (Aa6).  [...]’s Choice 2 policies consist of two groups: the first group comprises LTCI policies issued before January 18, 2006, known as “pre-rate stability” or “loss ratio” policies.  (Aa6).  The second group comprises LTCI policies issued on or after January 18, 2006, known as “rate-stability” policies.  Both groups of policies are guaranteed renewal, meaning that [...] cannot unilaterally cancel or change policy benefits as long as the policyholder continues to pay their premiums.  (Ra361; Ra396; Ra429).  In order to balance the inherent risks associated with a guaranteed renewal policy, carriers such as [...] typically reserve the right to increase premiums when necessary to respond to changes in “anticipated experience. ” (Ra396 and 457).  Before entering the LTCI market, [...] set a target for the amount of the initial premium rate policyholders would have to pay to keep their policies active.  [...] priced its Choice 2 rate stability policies to achieve a lifetime loss ratio of 64.3%. (T1 217:11-23; T2 386:13 to 387:1; Cra294).  The lifetime loss ratio reflected [...]’s unilateral business decision based on its internal pricing strategy and actuarial assumptions.  Using its 64.3% target meant that for every dollar [...] received in premiums, it sought to pay $0.643 on claims and retain the remaining 35.7% ($0.357) for its expenses, risks, and anticipated profits.  (T1 180:2-17).  When it priced its rate stability LTCI policies, [...] included a margin for adverse experience (MAE), which is an additional premium percentage added as a cushion to avoid seeking a later rate increase request.  [...] used a MAE at 10%, which was customary in the industry.  (T3 528:24 to 529:13).  With the MAE, [...]’s annual initial premium rate for the pre-rate stability policies was $2,024, and the average annual premium rate for the rate stability policies was $2,077.  (Ra512).  D.
[brief] As stated within Plaintiff’s complaint there are two core policies which violate the NJLAD.  The first policy to be challenged discriminates against disabled Firefighters in terms of promotional eligibility.  The interference with Firefighter’s rights to medical leave is primarily a case of “direct” or “facial” violation of the NJLAD.  As a “direct” or facial assertion of discrimination it is controlled by the Court’s holding in Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373, 394 (2016) which stated:  In order to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination by direct evidence, the plaintiff must produce evidence “that an employer placed substantial reliance on a proscribed discriminatory factor in making its decision to take the adverse employment action[.]”  Direct evidence of discrimination may include evidence “of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decision making process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude. ”  (Citations omitted)  Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373, 394 (2016)  What occurred in Smith, is precisely analogous to the conduct and policy cited by Plaintiffs as unlawful.
[brief] UNDER THE LEGAL STANDARD, THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO [...] (Pa22-23)  This was a proper case for summary judgment under Rule 4:46-2.  Even when the Court accepted as true all evidence that supported plaintiff’s claim and accorded her all legitimate inferences that can be deduced therefrom, plaintiff could not establish that a material dispute of fact exists or that [...] was negligent.  See Brill, 142 N.J. at 540 (holding that determination of whether a genuine issue of material fact exists requires a judge to assess whether the evidential materials, when viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party).  Where the evidence is so “utterly one-sided” that a rational fact finder could not resolve the dispute in favor of the non-moving party, summary judgment is appropriate.  *Id.*  at 540 (quoting *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).  Indeed, the evidence established that [...] had no contractual obligation to maintain the common areas of the parking lot, which were available for use for numerous purposes other than patronizing [...].  The area where plaintiff fell was controlled, inspected, and maintained by the [...], not [...].  The Lease between [...] and the [...] stated that the landlord was responsible for maintaining the common areas, which included the area where plaintiff fell.  Those facts were undisputed.  Furthermore, the Court had already found that no dangerous condition existed, and plaintiff failed to retain a liability expert.  As such, defendant [...] could not have had either actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition.  Accordingly, [...] was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law and respectfully requests that the Court affirm that Trial Court’s judgment.
[brief] Regarding factor nine, ‘whether the work is an integral part of the business of the employer,’ Plaintiff’s role as County Counsel cannot be described as an integral part of the business of the employer, which is a governmental entity.  His role as part-time County Counsel was that of an independent legal advisor appointed for a statutory term of three years (with no automatic right to be reappointed) to fulfill the specific, limited role of providing legal services as and when needed by the County as described in Section 2.10 of the Sussex County Administrative Code.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..............................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....................................4  A.  [...]’s Abandonment of its Effort to Voluntarily Comply with its Third Round Affordable Housing Obligation .................................................................4  B.  The Property ........................................................................................................6  C.  The Instant Builder’s Remedy Litigation .............................................................7  D.  [...]’s Efforts to Frustrate Plaintiff’s Development of the Property ..9  E.  The Preliminary Injunction against [...] ..............................................15  ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................17
[brief] **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**  On June 20, 2024, [...] filed a complaint seeking relief on a single claim to enjoin arbitration (the “Complaint”) in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Morris County, Chancery Division (the “Trial Court”) asserting only one cause of action and seeking only one category of relief: injunctive relief to enjoin, restrain, and dismiss the Hackensack Arbitration.  Pa74-Pa84.  [...] also moved by Order to Show Cause to Enjoin Arbitration, again seeking only to preliminarily and permanently enjoin and dismiss the Hackensack Arbitration.  Pa586-Pa591.
[brief] -  It is undisputed that at all times relevant to this transaction, not only did [...] and [...] not live with [...] and [...] such that they might be unduly influenced, they lived in Florida and New Jersey respectively, 1300 miles apart (2T74:10-14).  - It is undisputed that [...] and [...] never made [...] Cueto or [...] Matos Agents under their Powers of Attorney (Pa393, 59:15-60:1).  •  It is undisputed that Plaintiff [...] prepared Powers of Attorney for his parents to sign and serves to this day as his parents’ fiduciary, not [...] Cueto or [...] Matos (2T90:6-21).  •  It is undisputed that attorneys did not represent the parties on either side of the $50,000.00 transaction.  [...] Matos did not have the benefit of an attorney and neither did Defendants [...] Cueto and [...] Matos (6T22:1-12).  •  It is undisputed that a Gift Letter was executed contemporaneously with the $50,000.00 gift signed by [...] Matos who we know reads and understands English (Pa213).  •  It is undisputed that [...] and his wife have enjoyed the security of first living in a home they wanted in Florida and then when they needed additional care, were able to move to a home near Defendants where the Cuetos could assist the elderly Matos’s on a daily basis (6T25:13-16).  As acknowledged above, the facts in Pascale are not similar to the facts of the present case, but the elements of law can still be applied.  The Trial Court in our matter, after summarizing the relevant facts, found “nothing nefarious, or untoward, or suspicious” (6T15:24-16:1, 6T30:12-14)  The Court concluded, “[undue influence] certainly has not been proven by even a preponderance of the evidence” (6T31:4-5).  The Court concluded, “I do not believe there has been any undue influence exercised by [...] or [...]” (6T23:4-5).  Plaintiffs assert in their brief that undue influence is presumed once a confidential relationship is found, but Defendants here successfully rebutted the presumption.  Defendants respectfully request that the reviewing Court leave these findings and conclusions of the Trial Court undisturbed.  The Trial Court reached its conclusions after a careful and documented review of the facts.
[brief] In so holding, the court found the issues in the motions were not identical; the order in Union County is not a final judgment for the purpose of collateral estoppel; and due process and fundamental fairness support a finding that defendant should have his day in court.  (Pa1-3).  The State moved for a stay, which the court denied.  (Pa4).  The State applied for permission to file an emergent application, which this court denied.  (Pa88-89).  This motion for leave to appeal follows.
[brief] About 7 seconds before the collision, [...] sounded the horn as the front of the train was just finishing crossing over Grand Street, which is one block prior to the crossing.  Pb7; Pa1152 at 16:35:28/29 on the head end video.  When [...] sounded the horn at this time, [...] was walking forward (north) on the sidewalk adjacent to the right of way where Track 1 is located.  [...] sounded the horn at this time because he saw [...] walking on the sidewalk and wanted to provide a warning of his approach.  Compare Pa160, ¶¶53 and 54 with Pa764, ¶¶53 and 54.