ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Further, as discussed in Point I supra, the jury could have concluded that while defendant participated in the attack on the victim either as the driver or a shooter, he did not share the same state of mind as the individual who delivered the fatal shot; namely, defendant did not act purposely or knowingly to cause [...]’s death.  See State v. Ramirez, 246 N.J. 61, 67 (2021) (“[A]n accomplice may be guilty of a lesser crime if their state of mind is different from the principal’s. ”).  Reckless manslaughter was clearly indicated by the physical and video evidence.  The fact that it could support defendant’s role as an accomplice further made an all-or-nothing charge run counter to the judge’s independent obligation in the charging decision and the public interest.  The judge properly left it to the jury to decide defendant’s state of mind as to the risk of death.
[brief] Preliminary Statement  Defendant-Respondent, [...] (“Respondent”), respectfully submits that the appeal of Plaintiffs-Appellants, [...] and [...] (“Appellants”), must be denied and the order dated September 29, 2023 that Appellants are appealing must be affirmed because the Court below (the “Trial Court”) properly granted Respondent’s motion to dismiss Appellants’ Complaint (the “Complaint”) as untimely.
[brief] In addition to the race and sex of the suspect, our courts have considered whether other factors such as nervous behavior, furtive movements, or other actions form the basis for reasonable and articulable suspicion.  Our jurisprudence is well-settled that seemingly furtive movements, without more, are insufficient to constitute reasonable and articulable suspicion.  See Rosario, 229 N.J. at 277 (“Nervousness and excited movements are common responses to unanticipated encounters with police officers on the road . . . ”); State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 47 (1990) (“[M]ere furtive gestures of an occupant of an automobile do not give rise to an articulable suspicion suggesting criminal activity. ” (quoting State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Utah 1989)).  Similarly, when circumstances are not otherwise suspicious, “[a] person’s failure to make eye contact with the police does not change that. ”  State v. Stampone, 341 N.J. Super. 247, 252 (App. Div. 2001); see also United States v. Foster, 824 F.3d 84, 93 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting that lack of eye contact is an “ambiguous indicator” that “may still contribute to a finding of reasonable suspicion” but that courts are “hesitant” to weigh heavily “because it is no more likely to be an indicator of suspiciousness than a show of respect and an attempt to avoid confrontation.
[brief] 32.  **BUSINESS:**  It is acknowledged that the Husband holds a twenty-five percent (25%) interest in [...], a closely held New Jersey Corporation, which owns [...].  Presently, [...] is listed for sale for $5.8 Million Dollars ($5,800,000.00).  Upon sale of said diner, Husband agrees to provide Wife with fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of sale.  Before the proceeds are split equally between Husband and Wife, all credit card debt to be paid down.  Da288, Da290.  The proceeds from Olga’s were to be the only equitable distribution Plaintiff would receive under the PSA, other than being able to retain her car.  DA282; 2T 37-38.  What Defendant already knew at the time of signing the PSA, and Plaintiff did not, was that the Olga’s property was never going to be sold.
[brief] LEXIS 1688, *8 (Ch. Div. May 24, 2018) (Da71).  Indeed, “Defendant may raise [Plaintiff’s] unlicensed status under the CFLA as a shield against enforcement of plaintiffs judgment. ”  Id. at *6-7.  Thus, as in Trewin, the Court here should find that “the judgment obtained by [Defendant] is void, by virtue of [Defendant’s] unlicensed status. ”  Id., 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1688, at *9 (citing N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b)).
[brief] "[C]ourts of this state do not resolve issues that have become moot due to the passage of time or intervening events."  City of Camden v. Whitman, 325 N.J. Super. 236, 243 (App. Div. 1999).  Since this matter was dismissed and should remain dismissed, Plaintiff’s appeal regarding evidentiary rulings need not be addressed.  Furthermore, the Plaintiff is improperly requesting that this Court make potentially prospective evidentiary rulings.  The Trial Court made certain pretrial evidentiary rulings prior to this matter being dismissed, however, the documents Plaintiff asks this Court to prospectively prohibit were never introduced as evidence during the underlying trial.  In addition to the deference trial Judges are afforded when making evidentiary rulings, Plaintiff is essentially seeking an advisory evidentiary opinion in the event this matter is remanded for trial.  This argument is not properly before the Appellate Division and should not be decided prospectively.  New Jersey courts have consistently held that they will "not render advisory opinions or function in the abstract."  *Crescent Park Tenants Ass'n v. Realty Equities Corp. of N.Y.*, 58 N.J. 98, 107 (1971).  Courts do not render advisory decisions because "[o]rdinarily, our interest in preserving judicial resources dictates that we not attempt to resolve legal issues in the abstract."  *Zirger v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co.*, 144 N.J. 327, 330 (1996).  Plaintiff is improperly seeking a prospective evidentiary ruling, in regard to evidence that may or may not be introduced at trial, in the event this matter is remanded.  For that reason, it is respectfully submitted that the Court should decline to consider or rule upon the evidentiary arguments raised in Point II of Plaintiff’s appellate brief.
[brief] Since Appellant had previously received his statutory adjournments under the Foreclosure docket number prior to the 2015 Sheriffs sale on the property, his request for additional adjournments was denied.  He was advised that any further adjournments would have to be granted by the Court.  On March 8, 2023, Appellant filed a Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause in [...] seeking relief under N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36.  On March 9, 2023, the matter was transferred to [...] by Court Order (Ra 8).  The matter was assigned to the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch.  [...] scheduled an initial conference in the matter for March 22, 2023.  Prior to March 22, 2023, conference, the [...] Sheriff’s Office granted Appellant’s adjournment requests.  Appellant was notified directly by the Sheriff’s Office as well as by the undersigned.  (Ra 9).  The date of the Sheriff’s sale was moved to May 11, 2023.  On March 21, 2023, correspondence was filed with the Court advising that the relief sought by Appellant was granted.  (Ra 10).
[brief] D’Atria, supra, 242 N.J. Super. at 401.  Reconsideration was properly denied on September 23rd, 2022, as reflected in the Order subject of this Appeal because [...] simply repeated the same arguments she made before. \(^1\)  [...] “offered no new evidence, citations, or explanation with any tendency to show that the court’s decision . . . was palpably \(^{1}\)  [...] only appealed the Order of September 23rd, 2022, that denied her motion for reconsideration, and not the underlying Order of May 27, 2022.  Even so, she failed to discuss or even perform a rudimentary legal analysis concerning R. 4:49-2 in her supporting Brief. incorrect or irrational, or that the court failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.
[brief] To be sure, [...] found defendant guilty based his erratic driving, confirmed by the MVR, which also corroborated the officer’s testimony.  The officer’s testimony was specifically found to be credible by the municipal court and those credibility findings were given deference and adopted by [...] to independently find the officer credible.  (Da 21-22).  In that vein, and along with defendant’s erratic driving, [...] detailed the specific observations the officer testified to that demonstrated impairment: slow movements, smell of alcohol, his poor performance on all of the standard field test, all of which are amply and specifically found in the record.  (Ibid.)  [...] did not go beyond the record or scope of review.  Defendant also takes issue with [...]’s questioning of the Alcotest reading, which was not admitted into evidence at the municipal trial.  More specifically, defendant asserts that the judge making inquiry into the Alcotest result somehow violated his rights because he “does not know what items were actually considered. ”  Yet the record in this case fully answers that question.  First, the Alcotest result was never divulged on the record.  (See 3T:5-8 to 9-2).  Second, [...]’s written opinion in this case proves that not only was the existence of an Alcotest reading was never considered by the court, it was – in no way – relied upon in [...]’s independent finding of guilt.  (Da 15-23).  In sum, the record below and written opinion reflect that the [...] did not improperly expand the record, but rather found defendant’s guilty of DWI based on the facts presented to him.  Accordingly, there is no error requiring a remand for a new trial de novo.
[brief] Nor is there any practical reason to second-guess the Legislature’s plain language.  Although this election occurred on a Saturday instead of a Tuesday like most elections, the [...] is open on Saturdays.  https://tools.usps.com/locations/details/1384804 (last visited May 13, 2025).  Given that the Post Office was open on the last day mail-in ballots could be postmarked, there is no basis to treat this Fire District election occurring on Saturday any differently from an election occurring on any other election day and, therefore, no principled reason for invalidating the safeguards of N.J.S.A. 19:63-22(a).  [...] also contends that the contested mail-in ballots would have been accepted if they had not been postmarked.  (Db20-21).  N.J.S.A. 19:63-22(a) provides that any “mail-in ballot that does not bear a postmark date but that is received by the county board by delivery of the United States Postal Service before, or within 48 after, the time of the closing of the polls for the election for which the ballot was prepared shall be considered valid and shall be canvassed. ”  Regardless of how the Board would have handled an unpostmarked ballot, such does not exist here.  This is not a situation where the Post Office, through no fault of the voter, failed to postmark the contested mail-in ballots.  The contested ballots were in fact postmarked three days after the date of election, (Da12-17), and the Board rejected those postmarked ballots in accordance with its statutory obligation under N.J.S.A. 19:63-22(a).  Further, how ballots without postmarks would have been handled is not a question before this court.  The ballots at issue were postmarked after election day, and the Board appropriately followed the law applicable to postmarked ballots.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] APPELLANT FAILED TO MEET THE STANDARD FOR RECONSIDERATION  Appellant also seeks to reverse the court’s denial of his Motion for Reconsideration.  Motions for reconsideration are governed by R. 4:49-2, which provides:  Except as otherwise provided by R. 1:13-1 (clerical errors), a motion for rehearing or reconsideration seeking to alter or amend a judgment or final order shall be served not later than 20 days after service of the judgment or order upon all parties by the party obtaining it.  The motion shall state with specificity the basis on which it is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions that counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred, and shall have annexed thereto a copy of the judgment or final order sought to be reconsidered and a copy of the court's corresponding written opinion, if any.
[brief] (1T 58:22-59:13)  Defendant, however, failed to order the transcript of [...]’s reasons for the attorney’s fee award.  (A56)  Based on the Court’s decision, however, there are certainly some indications as to why fees were awarded.  “I find that defendant is continuing to seek relief based on allegations of fraud from now close to 15 years ago that the trial court has already rejected after a full trial and that the Appellate Division affirmed and said it was not worth talking about. ”  (1T 45:25-4)  Additionally, the trial Court determined that Defendant’s application was defective and not filed in accordance with the rules of court.  (1T 46:24-47:13; 48:19-22)  The parts of Defendant’s application that were granted by the Court were those with which Plaintiff was already in agreement.
[directive] Person Making Report Preferred?  Full Name Phone □ _______________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________  Address Email □ _______________________________________________________  _______________________________________________________  City, State DOB _______________________________________________________  ______________________________________________________________  (Provide Whatever Info Is Known)  Officer(s)  Subject to Allegation  Officer(s)  Badge No.  ____________________________________________________  _______________________________________________________  Incident Site Date/Time ____________________________________________________  _______________________________________________________  In the space below, describe the type of incident (traffic stop, street encounter) and any information about the alleged conduct.  If you cannot fit your response below, feel free to use extra pages and attach them to this document.  If you do not know the officer’s name or badge number, provide any other identifying information.  Other Information  How was this reported?  □ In Person □ Phone □ Letter □ Email □ Other __________________________  Any physical evidence submitted?  □ Yes □ No  If yes, describe: __________________________________________  Was incident previously reported?  □ Yes □  No  If yes, describe: __________________________________________  To Be Completed by Officers Receiving Report  _______________________________________________________________________________________________________  _________________________ _______________________  Officer Receiving Complaint Badge No. Date/Time _______________________________________________________________________________________________________  _________________________ _______________________  Supervisor Reviewing Complaint Badge No. Date/Time Appendix C
[brief] Pa174.  \(^7\)  Petitioners are submitting the January 2, 2024 letter brief to support their compliance with \textit{O Builders & Assocs., Inc. v. Yuna Corp. of N.J.}, 206 N.J. 109 (2011) and Rule 4:10-2(e)(1).  \(^8\)  T3:1-12:16 refers to the Motion hearing of March 6, 2024, page 3, line 1, through page 12, line 16.  On September 9, 2024, Respondents filed their Brief and Appendix in support of their Interlocutory Appeal.
[brief] At some point in that process, the Borough through its officials advised [...] of an intention to terminate and/or not renew its Lease on Lot 3.01 based upon the Borough’s pursuit and adoption of the Redevelopment Plan Amendment.  Thereafter, various “settlement” discussions ensued during late 2016 and early 2017 between [...] and the Borough and/or their representatives.  Eventually, [...] allowed its lawsuits to be withdrawn and dismissed; the [...] rescinded Resolution 2016-04, and the Borough repealed Ordinance 1579.
[brief] An appellate court reviews a trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment under the same standard as the trial court.  See Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021).  Pursuant to Rule 4:46-2(c), a motion for summary judgment may be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law."  In other words, a reviewing court considers "whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party."  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  A municipal board’s decision "enjoy[s] a presumption of validity, and a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the board unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion."  Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 284 (2013) (citing Cell S. of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 172 N.J. 75, 81 (2002)); see also Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536, 551 (2015) (noting a municipal ordinance will not be overturned unless the decision is "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable").  Giving the appropriate due deference to the decision of a board, the trial court must determine whether the board's resolution is supported by the "substantial evidence in the record" standard.  *Lang v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of N. Caldwell*, 160 N.J. 41, 58 (1999); see also *Malanga v. Twp. of W. Orange*, 253 N.J. 291, 314 (2023) (noting the record must contain "sufficient credible evidence" that the requirements of the LRHL were satisfied).  In addition, the resolution cannot merely recite conclusory findings but must include a reasoned explanation, supported by the evidence presented.  *Loscalzo v. Pini*, 228 N.J. Super. 291, 305 (App. Div. 1988); see also *Malanga*, 253 N.J. at 314 ("'[M]ore than a bland recitation of applicable statutory criteria and a declaration that [they have been] met' is required." (Alteration in original)).  A Board's legal determinations, however, are not presumed valid and are reviewed de novo.  *Jacoby v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of Englewood Cliffs*, 442 N.J. Super. 450, 462 (App. Div. 2015).
[brief] Pa328 (108:13-15).  Defendant [...] admitted that, at the time the crash occurred, [...] was walking along the route that she had to take in order to get from where she parked to the nearest crosswalk located all the way in the center of the lot; there was no designated walking area or sidewalk for [...] to take as she attempted to walk across the unprotected, visibly obstructed intersection and through the parking area to get to this point so she could safely walk to the hospital:  Q: What other way in this Bayshore parking lot does [...] have to get to the crosswalk?  A: That is the route she would have to take—  Q: She had to take --- A: --- to the crosswalk.  Q:  Just like the other woman in the purple top, she parked, got out and crossed the parking lot, right?  A: Yes.  Q:  There is no walking area designated for those people, correct?  A: Correct.  Q: And there is no sidewalk along the outside?  A: Correct.  Q: You can see from looking at this view that there are two stop signs, but there are no speed limits posted, correct?  A: Correct.  Q: There are no warning signs, view for pedestrians, correct?  A: Correct.  Q: And there are no crosswalks for pedestrians to cross from where [...] parked to get to the crosswalk at the front of the building, correct?  A: That is correct.  Q:  The only crosswalk is the crosswalks in front of the building and down the center of the parking lot, correct?  A: Yes.  [Pa329-330 (113:9-114:19) (emphasis added); see also the stills from the video depicting the subject crash, Pa372-3; Pa416-429.]
[brief] Appellant, on two separate occasions, has previously brought before this Court complaints of almost identical facts, seeking to overturn the tax exemptions granted to redevelopers in the cities of Newark and Orange, New Jersey granted under the auspices of the [...].  On both occasions, Appellant’s claims were dismissed by the lower Courts for lack of standing.  In both instances the Appellate Division rejected those appeals and upheld the lower Court’s determinations that plaintiff lacked standing to sue.  Moreover, our State’s Supreme Court has denied certiorari following those appeals.  A copy of both the Appellate decisions are attached hereto.
[brief] CASES  Angus v. Bd. of Educ. of Baro. of Metuchen, 475 N.J. Super. 362 (App. Div. 2023)  17,18  Dennery v. Bd. of Educ. of Passaic Cty. Regional High Sch., 131 N.J. 626 (1993)  9,21,25  Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571,580 (1980)  9,21,25  State v. Hester, 233 NJ. 381,391 (2018)  16  Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct. 2407, 2413 (2002)  9  I/MIO [...], SEC Docket Nos. [...] [...] (Consolidated) (2021)  21, 22  Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill, 426 N.J. Super. 143 (App. Div. 2012)  16  Mary Carter Paint Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 333 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1964), rev'd sub nom Federal Trade Commission v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46, 86 S.Ct. 219 (1965)  16  Melnyk v. Fiel, SEC Docket No. [...] (2019)  13, 14  Public Advisory Opinion-A202-22 dated February 25, 2022  15  Ryan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 186 N.J. 431 (2006)  16  Silveira-Francisco v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Elizabeth, 154 N.J.126 (1998)  20  Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S.503 (1969)  9  I/MIO [...], Randolph Board of Education, SEC Docket No. [...] (2021)  CONSTITUTIONS
[brief] ”  Sussex Commons Assocs., LLC v. Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531, 540-41 (2012) (citing Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc., 208 N.J. 114, 127 (2011)).  “[T]he best indicator of that intent is the statutory language[.]”  Richardson, 192 N.J. at 195 (first alteration in original) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).  “A court should ‘ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole. ’”  D’Ambrosio v. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 403 N.J. Super. 321, 334 (App. Div. 2008) (citing DiProspero, 183 N.J.  at 492).  Here, the Legislature clearly intended a limitation period of eligibility for the presumption or recalculation provided under the Ricci Act, as the plain language of the statute sets a two-year deadline ending July 8, 2021, after which a “retiree shall not be eligible” for such benefits.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  Under [...]’s argument, any member of [...] who was unaware of the Ricci Act could apply at any arbitrarily distant point in the future.  This would nullify the two-year time limitation created by the Legislature, extend the presumption beyond its intended time frame, and diminish the ability of [...] and [...] to verify applicants’ dates and locations of service as witnesses and memories inevitably continue to become unavailable and fade.  Ignoring the plain language of the statute, which imposes a two-year deadline, would not further the Act’s legislative purpose.  Even if the statutory language were not clear, [...]’s position would lead to an absurd result which would render the two-year statutory limitation superfluous.  In this regard, “[w]hen construing a statute, ‘legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. ’”  State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 449 (2011) (quoting Franklin Tower One, LLC v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 613 (1999).  Accordingly, [...] reasonably denied [...]’s request to apply for amended benefits under the Ricci Act because he failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the required statutory timeframe.
[brief] They are simply not parties to that matter."  [IT Lines 1- 11, Pg. 17]  It is here, the Chancery Division Judge confused the nature of the action before the Court by adopting a portion of [...]'s tactical maneuver of focusing on a Foreclosure action not before the Chancery Division (Camden Vicinage) which prompted the request made to the defendants for adjournments.  Plaintiff did not sue the Sheriff's Office over a private mortgage transaction as wrongly implied by the Chancery Division Judge.  Plaintiffs complaint clearly demonstrates suit was filed because the defendants had refused on more than one occasion to grant his adjournments request when they had absolutely no right to refuse either time.