ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As of the date [...]’s cross-motion was filed, plaintiff had neither served an expert report regarding [...], nor requested that discovery be extended to permit her to do so.  (7a at ¶¶ 4-6.)  On January 11, 2023, plaintiff’s attorney filed a cross-motion to extend (i.e., reopen and extend) discovery.  (113Pa-120Pa, 9a-11a.)  In his supporting certification, plaintiff’s attorney admitted that expert reports remained outstanding.  (10a at ¶ 8.)  Plaintiff’s attorney did not, however, identify any circumstances which had prevented him from obtaining an expert review or report regarding the care and treatment by [...], or any circumstances which prevented him from seeking an extension of discovery before discovery ended and a trial date was fixed.  (9a-11a.)  Plaintiff’s attorney did provide a certification from [...] herself, in which she described her injuries and medical and physical issues.  (117Pa-120Pa.)  When plaintiff’s attorney subsequently moved for reconsideration of the orders dismissing plaintiff’s claims, and denying plaintiff’s cross-motion to extend discovery, he again failed to identify any circumstances which had prevented him from obtaining an expert report regarding [...], or any circumstances which had prevented him from seeking an extension of discovery in a timely fashion.  (12a-14a.)  In support of reconsideration, plaintiff’s attorney provided another certification from [...], in which she again described her injuries and medical and physical issues.  (Pa140-Pa143.)  Plaintiff’s attorney also provided a certification from an expert witness, [...], (“[...]”) who stated that he needed additional time to obtain and review additional medical records regarding plaintiff’s health issues, “before I can prepare a final report documenting exactly what damages are related to this incident and which are not.  I also require time to review these records to evaluate the extent of the damages. ”  (138Pa-139Pa at ¶¶ 16, 17, 20.)  Plaintiff’s expert [...] did not allege in his certification that additional time was needed to determine if defendant [...] (or any other defendant) had been negligent in the care provided to plaintiff.
[brief] (Sb 2)  “Hailing a cab or a friend, chatting on a public street, and simply strolling aimlessly are time-honored pastimes in our society and are clearly protected under [state] as well as federal law. ”  Wyche v. State, 619 So.2d 231, 235 (Fla. 1993) (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)).  Indeed, none of the men were arrested for that loitering offense and the prosecutor does not argue that they could have been.  Notably, the [...]’s ([...]) BWC policy requires officers to activate their BWC the moment they observe conduct that provides the basis for a stop or frisk.
[brief] November 20, 2019  Order  Turning to the merits of the motion, Plaintiffs assert that the City’s proposed use of AL is inconsistent with the court’s November 20, 2019 order.  (R. 289, Pls.’ Mot. at 5.)  In particular, Plaintiffs argue that because the parties have “always agreed that they would identify responsive emails” through keyword searches and the City never mentioned using TAR, under the November 2019 order, the City must use agreed-upon search terms to further reduce the ESI collection and then produce all of the nonprivileged documents that hit upon the search terms—regardless of whether they are responsive.  (Id. at 9-10 (emphasis in original). )
[brief] ORDER AND DISMISSING MATTER, FILED AUGUST 14, 2023 DA204 DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR A STAY PENDING APPEAL, FILED AUGUST 18, 2023 – NOTICE OF MOTION DA206 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S NOTICE OF APPEAL, FILED AUGUST 18, 2023 DA209 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL, FILED SEPTEMBER 8, 2023 DA214 R. 2:6-1 STATEMENT OF ALL ITEMS SUBMITTED ON THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS DA215 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] 13 instruction may be given telephonically by the assistant prosecutor, assistant or deputy attorney general, or designee supervising the investigation.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022  14  6 Standards Governing the De-activation of BWCs upon the Request of a Civilian, When Discussing Investigation Strategy or Planning, or on Instruction of a Prosecutor 6.1 De-Activation at the Request of a Civilian Providing Information/Cooperation.
[brief] TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS | Proceeding | Date | Transcript | |------------------|-----------------|------------| | OSC, Motion | January 10, 2022| 1T | | OSC | May 27, 2022 | 2T | | Motion | June 8, 2022 | 3T | | Motion | August 10, 2022 | 4T | | Motion | June 28, 2023 | 5T | | Motion | September 13, 2023 | 6T | | Trial | December 6, 2023| 7T | | Trial | December 14, 2023| 8T | TABLE OF ORDERS BEING APPEALED | Date | Decision | Page | |------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | 06/10/2022 | Order - Disposal of Boonton and Florida Properties | 18a | | 08/31/2022 | Order - Breach of Trust, Revised Disposal Instructions | 31a | | 05/10/2023 | Order - Supplemental Complaint Denied | 60a | | 05/10/2023 | Order - Second Supplemental Complaint Denied | 62a | | 02/14/2024 | Order - Plenary Hearing, Rent, Frivolous Sanctions | 91a | # TABLE OF ORDERS BEING APPEALED AND INTERMEDIATE DECISIONS
[brief] In November 2018, [...] filed this coverage action (the “DJ Action”) seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend and indemnify [...] in the lawsuit captioned *[...] v. Victory Highlands Condominium* Association Inc., [...], et al., Docket No. [...], Superior Court of New Jersey, Essex County (“Underlying Action”).  Months later, [...] moved for summary judgment because the Mold Exclusion in its umbrella policies barred coverage to [...] for the Underlying Action.
[brief] Respondent submits this letter brief in opposition to Appellant [...]’ appeal from: (1) the October 6, 2022 Judgment approving Respondent’s intermediate account (“Judgment”); (2) the March 7, 2023 Order: denying his motion for reconsideration of the Judgment; and granting in part and denying in part Respondent’s award of attorneys’ fees, accounting fees and commissions; and (3) the September 6, 2023 Order denying his motion for reconsideration of the March 7, 2023  Order awarding attorneys’ fees, accounting fees and commissions.  Respectfully submitted, [...], Esq. (ID No.: 16891980)  [...]  The Landmark Building [...] Tel: [...]  Attorneys for Respondent, [...] TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................. 3 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................
[brief] TABLE OF DECISIONS, ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS  Trial Order, dated June 30, 2022 ................................................Da361 Trial Court Order, dated March 15, 2024 ........................................Da49 ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES #### Cases - **Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein**, 115 N.J. 599 (1989) ........................................... 8, 9 - **Brodzinsky v. Pulek**, 75 N.J. Super. 40 (App. Div) certif. denied, 38 N.J. 304 (1962) ......................................................................................................................... 8 - **Cent. State Bank v. Hudik-Ross Co., Inc.**, 164 N.J. Super. 317 (App. Div. 1978) ................................................................................................................................. 8 - **Cosme v. Boro. of East Newark Tp. Comm.**, 304 N.J. Super. 191 (App. Div. 1997) ................................................................................................................................. 4, 5 - **Dolson v. Anastasia**, 55 N.J. 2 (1969) .............................................................................. 4 - **Dugan Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth.**, 398 N.J. Super. 229 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 196 N.J. 346 (2008) .................................................................................................
[brief] TX Result Report, dated 2/28/2020 (Attached at Pa082)  Letter From [...] to [...], 6/19/2020 (Attached at Pa084)  Facsimile to [...] from [...], 6/19/2020 (Attached at Pa086)  Email Conversation Between [...] and Prosecutor Regarding Copy of Complaint Summons for Case 11/11/2020 (Attached at Pa087)
[directive] [Yes/Wi] [No/Non] in your removal from the United States and/or stop you from being able to legally enter or re- enter the United States?  Eske w konprann ke si w pa sitwayen Lezetazini, deklarasyon koupab sa a kab koze depotasyon w Dezetazini ak/oswa anpeche w rantre oubyen re-rantre Ozetazini legalman?  c.
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  Knowingly Leaving  Actor operating a motor vehicle knows he is involved in an accident and knowingly leaves the the Scene of a Motor 2C:11-5.1 scene under circumstances which violate R.S. 39:4-129 (“Action in case of accident”) and 2nd Degree $50,000 to $150,000 10% permissible
[brief] The board may, after public hearing, upon notice, by order in writing, require any public utility to furnish safe, adequate and proper service, including furnishing and performance of service in a manner that tends to conserve and preserve the quality of the environment and prevent the pollution of the waters, land and air of this State, and including furnishing and performance of service in a manner which preserves and protects the water quality of a public water supply, and to maintain its property and equipment in such condition as to enable it to do so.  [N.J.S.A. 48:2-3, emphasis added.]  Thus the Legislature required just as much attention to the environmental consequences of utility service as the provision of service itself, a mandate that has added weight here with New Jersey's climate laws.  None of the ID, the [...] Decision nor [...] (nor the [...] brief nor the [...] brief) ever cites or applies the underscored language of this provision, a clear error of law to which this court owes no deference.
[brief] ..............................................................................  15 | | [...] and [...], *Longitudinal Development of Human Brain Wiring Continues from Childhood into Adulthood*, 31 The J. of Neuroscience 10937 (2011)  ..............................................................................  19 | | [...], *White Paper on the Science of Late Adolescence: A Guide for Judges, Attorneys and Policy Makers* (January 27th, 2022)  ..........................................................  17 | | [...] et al., *Age and the Distribution of Crime*, 94 Am. J. of Sociology 803 (1989) .................................................................................................
[brief] 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12  TABLE OF APPENDIX  State of New Jersey Office of the Attorney General letter brief dated February 17, 2020, ........................................ Da1 October 26, 2023  Defendants letter Notice for DME .......... Da36 October 30, 2023  Letter from Plaintiff’s counsel insisting the R.4:19 examination be recorded .........................  Da38  November 27, 2023  Certification of [...] ..........  Da39  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] [...] testified he learned how to do --- 7  This Legal Argument was made in [...]’s written closing at the Departmental Level and in his written closing at the Superior Court Level.  Reference to same is made in the Hearing Officer’s Decision and the Memorandum of Decision of the Superior Court Judge.  property checks on the job and based on what other officers taught him.  [...] was never trained at all by [...] in any formal sense.  There was almost no guidance regarding the manner and method of conducting property checks.  In addition, there was documentation that it was appropriate to conduct a property check in certain circumstances while still driving in the patrol vehicle.  [...], [...], and [...] all confirmed that there were no written directives, guidelines, rules, regulations, policies, or procedures which provide the proper or preferred method of conducting a property check with [...].  The fact that there did not exist any formal rules, regulations, or policies and procedures specifically outlining the method in which [...] was to conduct his property checks cannot be held against [...].  [...] was served with termination charges based solely on [...]'s opinion, not on any verifiable factual basis.  [...] must not be held to be clairvoyant and psychically determine what [...] wanted of him as far as property checks were concerned.  The discipline [...] brought against [...] indicates that they found something wrong with [...]'s methods of conducting property checks even though no policies or rules prescribing or proscribing certain behavior existed.  [...] should have addressed any problems they had with [...]'s property checks directly with [...] and he would have modified his methods accordingly.  To move for termination under these circumstances is the height of inequity and the charges are unsupported by just cause.
[brief] Q.  Did there come a time that you learned you were the source of some internal investigation?  A.  Yes, I was—[...] had mentioned to me that there was going to be investigations basically of [...] and—but he never was clear on or told me what he (sic) was being investigated on.  So I sent an e-mail to [...] and had said that I had noticed that—or felt that [...] was interviewing or (sic) the different staff members to kind of find some wrongdoing on my part.  And I just wanted to know what exactly they were investigating or when that would take place.  Q.  Did you come to find out what the investigation was about?  A.  I did, but I got to the investigation—[...] (phonetic), their labor attorney, was questioning me about giving employees hours.  Q.  And that time were they already aware that you suffer from anxiety and depression?  A.  Yes.  Q.  Do you feel that these things they were doing was an attempt to trigger your anxiety and depression?  A. Yes.  (4T:145:1-25-146:1-19; 147:21-25;148:1).  Plaintiff’s trial testimony materially deviated further:
[brief] In the 2015 case, on January 24, 2020, [...] denied plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint to add back into this case [...] and [...], among other aspects.  (SDa166).  [...]’ ruling in denying plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint had a direct preclusive effect on the 2020 case and the applicability of the Entire Controversy Doctrine.  See, Du-Wel Products v. U.S. Fire Ins., 236 N.J. 349, 364 (App. Div. 1989).  In Du-Wel Products, the Appellate Division unequivocally held that, “[i]t is well settled that an exercise of discretion will be sustained where the trial court refuses to permit new claims and new parties to be added late in the litigation and at a point at which the rights of other parties to a modicum of expedition will be prejudicially affected. ”  Additionally, in Fisher v. Yates, 270 N.J. Super. 458 (App. Div. 1994), the Appellate Division held that a Court’s denial of a Motion for Leave to Amend based on its lateness and resulting prejudice to the parties, which is the exact scenario in the 2015 matter, has the preclusive effect of barring plaintiffs from pursuing those proposed amendments in a separate newly filed proceeding.  The situation presented before the Appellate Division in Fisher is controlling in the instant case.  Plaintiffs’ 2020 action against [...] and [...] asserted the same claims, presented the same factual allegations, and concerned the same transactions that were at issue in the 2015 litigation.
[brief] The Court upheld the ALJ stating “the traumatic event must be viewed with a wider lens than the one the Board applied.  The undesigned and unexpected event here was the combination of unusual circumstances that led to [...]’s injury.  Had he not responded immediately to break down the door, the victims would have died. ”  “While this was not the classic “accident” in the sense that the house did not collapse on [...], nor did he trip while carrying a fire house, it was clearly an undersigned and unexpected traumatic event. ”  As the court noted in Richardson, “[t]he polestar of the inquiry is whether, during the regular performance of his job, an unexpected happening, not the result of pre-existing disease alone or in combination with the work, has occurred and directly resulted in the permanent and total disability of the member. ”  That is exactly what happened in this instance.
[brief] On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under R. 4:6-2(e), the plaintiff is “entitled to every reasonable inference of fact. ”  *Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C.*, 237 N.J. 91, 107 (2018) (quoting *Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp.*, 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)).  And “if a generous reading of the allegations merely suggests a cause of action, the complaint will withstand the motion. ”  *F.G. v. MacDonell*, 150 N.J. 550, 556 (1997).  The Court “searches the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary. ”  *Printing Mart-Morristown*, 116 N.J. at 746 (quoting *Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem’l Park*, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957) (internal quotation marks omitted).  **POINT II.
[directive] 3rd Wednesdays (Shared court)  Alexandria Twp. 1001 [...]  3rd Wednesdays (Shared court)  Frenchtown Boro 1011 [...]  3rd Wednesdays (Shared court)  Holland Twp. 1015 [...]  3rd Wednesdays 1st, 2nd, and 4th Readington Twp. 1022 [...]  Thursday 3rd Tuesday and 3rd Tewksbury 1024 [...]  Thursday West Amwell 1026 [...] 2nd Wednesday Mercer County [...] x East Windsor 1101 Monday 274 [...] x Monday, Wednesday, Ewing 1102 7617 Thursday Hamilton 1103 [...]
[brief] **  Defendant argues three federal agency statements conflict with the construction in *Hunstein/Khimmat/Jackin*.  Those agency statements do not address whether a debt collector may share the type of information which Defendant conveyed to its mail vendor.  And, even if the agency statements say what Defendant contends, they are not accorded deference.  Instead, the role of this Court is “to independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress subject to constitutional limits. ”  *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, -- U.S. --, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2263 (2024)* (overruling *Chevron* deference).
[brief] With respect to factor four, there was no prejudice to plaintiffs in being denied their application to substitute [...].  [...] was not barred from testifying.  Plaintiffs simply wanted to switch experts because they believed they had found a better expert in [...].  Any issues that came up with [...] during his deposition was information that was readily available to plaintiffs at the time they hired him.  Plaintiffs did not deserve to further delay moving this case along simply because they found a new expert whom they preferred over the expert they already had.
[brief] Grasso v. Boro of Spring Lake Heights, 375 N. J. Super. 41, 51-52 (App. Div. 2004).  (Emphasis added).  Plaintiffs’ claim of hardship (which was only briefly touched upon in the hearings before the Board, 5T 73:5-9) is inherently flawed and fails because, as explained in Grasso, their “…inability to make the most profitable use of their site is not sufficient to show hardship.
[brief] B.  The Trial Court  Erred by Entering Summary Judgment  Based on Mere Allegations in the Underlying Action  As a separate reason, the trial court erred by relying on mere allegations.  As set forth in the Policy, the exclusions at issue apply to conduct that is intended to cause injury.  To determine whether the exclusions apply to the Underlying Action, the trial court was required to make findings regarding [...]’s subjective intent.  See, e.g., SL Indus. V. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 188, 209 (1992).  The trial court made no such inquiry.  Indeed, to the extent such findings would have required credibility determinations, such determinations are reserved for trial and should not be resolved on summary judgment.
[brief] [...] testified that on September 29, he was getting ready for work when he heard gunshots coming from right outside his window.  (6T 89-8 to 13, 89-21 to 23)  He peeked through his window blinds and saw “a man holding a gun[,] shooting. ”  He described the man as “5’6” or probably one or two inches taller,” “[d]ark-skinned,” wearing a sweatsuit that was “probably gray maybe. ”  (6T 90-1 to 16, 91-10 to 19, 93-8 to 12)  [...] testified that he could not see who the person was shooting at and that there was another person standing next to the shooter, but “I don’t remember what he looked like. ”  (6T 94-6, 94-10 to 16)  [...] estimated that the shooter was about 14 feet away from his window.  (6T 96-1 to 15)  He testified that after the shooting, the man went across the street and walked away.  (6T 97-12 to 16)  Although [...] testified that the shooter was about 5’6”, which would have made him shorter than [...], who was 5’9”, the medical examiner testified that [...]’s injuries were consistent with being shot by a perpetrator who was standing behind and above [...].
[brief] In [...], a real estate development company and its principal brought claims against various parties including a legal malpractice claim against [...] and [...], a member of the firm, arising from the latter’s representation of the parties in the purchase and development of real estate.  One of the issues in the case was whether Maltese and the Wilentz firm represented the plaintiffs in the underlying transaction.  A jury trial was held during which both [...] and Maltese offered conflicting testimony concerning the Wilentz firm’s relationship with the plaintiffs.  The witnesses disagreed over whether [...] signed and returned the engagement letter and the nature of Maltese’s communications with [...] over the course of the transaction.  After the parties’ rested, the trial judge determined that an attorney-client relationship existed as a matter of law and instructed the jury that the plaintiffs were clients of the Wilentz firm.
[brief] The [...] is entitled to the OPRA Civil Penalty, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11 and the [...]'s denial of such was an error and abuse of discretion.  The Board presented no evidence that they did not “knowingly and intentionally” deny [...] access to the requested OPRA records, in fact, all facts and procedural history support that the Board continuously knowingly and intentionally denied access to the requested records.  The Board even failed to comply with the 8/29/22 Order (60a) requiring them to provide access to the requested records.  The only possible rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis would be if there was some finding of excusable neglect, which is not evident here.  The Board knew exactly what records they were ordered to give [...] access to since they were ordered to do so on 8/28/20 (8a).
[brief] 49 State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137 (2006) .................................................................  47 State v. Tilghman, 345 N.J. Super. 571 (App. Div. 2001)............................... 35, 36 State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293 (2019) ................................................................. 21, 37 State v. Tung, 460 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div. 2019) ........................................