ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Da115  Exhibit GG, Plaintiff’s Responses to Defendant’s Interrogatories, filed May 10, 2022 Da118  Exhibit HH, Two, Separate Monthly Billing Statements for April 27, 2017  Da125  Exhibit II, Description of Litigation Coordinator  Da128  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Authority | Brief page number | |----------------------------|-------------------| | **Court Rules:** | | | Rule 1:1-2 | Db35 | | Rule 1:3-4(a), (b), (c) | Db35 | | Rule 1:4-1(a) | Db7 | | Rule 1:4-5 | Db5 | | Rule 1:4-8(a)(2) | Db17 | | Rule 1:4-8(a)(2)(c) | Db17 | | Rule 1:5-1(a) | Db8, Db9, Db11, Db12 | | Rule 1:5-2 | Db10, Db11 | | Rule 1:5-3 | Db8, Db9 | | Rule 1:6-2 | Db13, Db20, Db22 | | Rule 1:6-2(d) | Db13 | | Rule 1:6-3(c) | Db9, Db10 | | Rule 1:6-6 | Db21, Db22, Db23, Db24, Db27 | | Rule 1:7-4(a) | Db20 | | Rule 2:4-1(b) | Db34 | | Rule 4:4-4 | Db5 | | Rule 4:5-1(b)(1) | Db7 | | Rule 4:5-4 | Db40 | | Rule 4:5A-2 | Db5, Db6 | | Rule 4:5-8(e) | Db6, Db8, Db18, Db19 | Rule 4:9-2
[brief] Thus, if evidence tending to disprove effective service is presented, i.e., an incorrect mailing address, the presumption of effective service is eliminated from the case.  *Jameson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.*, 363 N.J. Super. 419, 426-27 (App. Div. 2003) (citing *Ahn v. Kim*, 145 N.J. 423, 439 (1996); N.J.R.E. 301).  Though R. 6:2-3(d) does not define “mailing address,” the provision for reservice under R. 6:2-3(d)(2) in that is it guided by the Law Division analog, R. 4:4-4.  R. 4:4-4(b)(1)(c) governs service by mail in the Law Division and requires mailings to be “addressed to the individual’s dwelling house or usual place of abode. ”  Thus, reading R. 6:2-3(d) and R. 4:4-4(b)(1)(c) *in pari materia*, it is reasonable to infer that service by mail in the Special Civil Part should also be addressed to “the individual’s dwelling house or usual place of abode. ”  That is verifiably not what happened here.  Though as stated by the trial court and argued by [...], the actual service address is apparently immaterial to effective service—“it’s unsuccessful service if and only if the registered mail comes back and says no such address, etcetera,” “it doesn’t matter who signed it. ”  See [...]’s Br. at 26 (quoting T2 37-9-25; T2 38-1-16).  At the least, consistent with *Garza*, the default judgment should have been found to be void and unenforceable.  Consistent with *Berger*, *Wohlegmuth*, *Davis*, and *Goldfarb*, the default judgment should have been vacated for [...]’s defective service and the matter should have been calendared for further proceedings to be heard on the merits.
[directive] 4.  No weapon is to be returned or issued to the law enforcement Attorney officer except pursuant to the procedure set forth in General Weapons Seizure Directives.  5.  This Department will ensure that an Internal Affairs investigation is the Attorney initiated pursuant to the procedures set forth in General's Internal Affairs Policy and Procedures Manual.  6.  This Department will immediately notify the Prosecutor's Office of the issuance of a restraining order against the officer.  7.  The Chief of Police or Law Enforcement Chief Executive or his/her designee will immediately contact the designated Principal Law Enforcement Contact person to perform the duties listed in Section VIII.  A.(6) above.  IX.
[brief] The trial court recognized the clear case law empowering [...] to preserve the status quo while it pursues final relief in an administrative forum, and the court rightly held that the State had a sufficient probability of success on the merits of its claim that the policies’ treatment of LGBTQ+ students violates the LAD.  The trial court also properly found the injunction appropriate to prevent any irreparable harm to LGBTQ+ students, who already face a distressingly high risk of mental health challenges and violence.  And the trial court accurately reasoned that Appellants would not be harmed by a preliminary order enjoining enactment of these two policies while [...]’s pending administrative proceeding plays out.  Appellants’ arguments on appeal cannot overcome the court’s reasoned findings.
[brief] In Chartonavich, defendant moved to vacate a default judgment entered six years prior, with the core argument that “the judgment was void ab initio, because plaintiff did not possess a consumer lender license under the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (CFLA) at the time the judgment as entered.  The Superior Court held “Defendant cannot secure a judicial determination that the debt is void, because defendant cannot circumvent the lack of a private cause of action under the NJCFLA by seeking relief under . . . the New Jersey Uniform Declaratory Judgments Law, N.J.S.A. 2A: 16-50, -62. ”  Despite this case precedent, Appellant relies on LVNV v. DeAngelo, 464 N.J. Super. 103 (App. Div. 2020).  But this Court has not been persuaded by DeAngelo in this context.  In the appeal of Chartanovich, this Court held:  “In Deangelo we deferred to the trial court, which considered the facts and then balanced competing policy interests in an equitable analysis under Rule 4:50-1(f).  Id. at 108.  Here, we defer to the trial court’s finding on defendant’s six-year delay in filing his motion to vacate default judgment. ”  Chartanovich, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2537, at *6.  Thus, as this Court determined in Chartanovich, so too, here, should this Court declined to determine the NJCFLA arguments.  For these reasons, the Lower Court correctly denied Appellant’s Motion to Vacate.\(^6\) --- \(^6\)  Further, although not raised by Appellant in its Brief, Appellant cannot bootstrap its lack of a private right of action in a CFLA Claim to an CFA claim, as she seeks to do in her Class Action, and the CFA does not apply to Respondent because Respondent is not engaged in consumer oriented commercial transactions involving the sale of merchandise or services.
[directive] 2.4.1  One of the areas that often involves internal affairs is an employee's fitness for duty.  This is not exclusively an internal affairs issue; an officer's fitness may be impacted for reasons other than misconduct.  For instance, an officer may become unfit for duty because of a medical problem unrelated to the job.  There are occasions, however, when internal affairs may be called upon to assist in determining whether or not an officer is fit for duty.  2.4.2  It is incumbent upon a law enforcement agency to ensure that its members are fit to safely and effectively perform the duties of their profession.  If, for whatever reason, an officer's fitness for duty is questioned, the agency must have the officer evaluated by competent professionals to answer that question.  If a law enforcement executive, commander, supervisor or internal affairs investigator has reasonable concerns about an officer’s fitness for duty, they are obligated to begin the process necessary to obtain that evaluation.  If the officer in question is obviously unfit for duty, the officer in authority may effect an immediate suspension pending the outcome of the evaluation and investigation.  See Section 5.2 (“Immediate Suspension Pending Investigation and Disposition”).
[brief] (Da325).  On February 11, 2020  Respondents moved for summary judgment against Appellant pursuant to Counts II and III of the Amended Complaint and seeking the removal of Appellant as a Members of [...] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 42:2C-46.  On May 5, 2020  Defendant [...] submitted a certification regarding Summary Judgment as to Count VI.  She certified that she previously contacted all counsel in writing to state that she “rescinds and renders void all those certain ‘repurchase rights’ exercised in that certain April 18, 2015 [...] Stock Sale Agreement with Right of Repurchase” and stated that she has “NO objection to the agreement being rescinded as I have already rescinded it. ” (Pa593).  On June 10, 2020, the Court granted Summary Judgment in favor of [...] as to Counts II, III, VI and disassociated Appellant from [...].
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY: APPELLATE DIVISION  APPEAL OF FINAL  ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION  DOCKET NO. [...]  BRIEF OF RESPONDENT - [...]  [...] [...], Esq. Attorney ID 038131999  1318 Route 31 North Annandale, New Jersey  08801 [...]  Attorneys for Respondents, Board of Trustees, Police and Fireman’s Retirement System of New Jersey  On the Brief: [...], Esq. [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Table of Appendix ..................................................................................................................iii  Table of Authorities ..............................................................................................................iv  Introduction .............................................................................................................................1  Procedural History ...............................................................................................................1
[brief] They should not override the removal provisions of the Rutgers Act, which are quite specific in stating the grounds for ousting a member of the BOG—and changing residences is not such a ground.  See N.J. Transit Corp. v. Borough of Somerville, 139 N.J. 582, 591 (1995) (reaffirming the well-established “precept of statutory construction that when two statutes conflict, the more specific controls over the more general”).  Nor does it matter that, as noted by Plaintiffs (Pb16, n.4), the word “office” appears in N.J.S.A. 18A:65- 16 and -17.  Those fleeting references have no legal import other than as a short-hand way of describing the beginning and ending points of a BOG member’s term in the case of section 16 or as a way of describing how a member’s position would become vacant should that member receive a salary from the State or renumeration from the University as in the case of section 17.  Plaintiffs also are wrong in discounting Kratovil v. Angelson, 473 N.J. Super. 484, 520 (Law Div. 2020), which held, among under things, that volunteer BOG members do not hold “office” for purposes of removal under the New Jersey First Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14-7 (NJFA).
[brief] Plaintiff’s attempt to establish and apply a “palpably incorrect or irrational” standard in this case through reliance on Horizon Healthcare Servs, Inc. v. MD-X Sol., Inc., No. BER-L-8463-08, 2009 WL 833333 (N.J. Super. L., Bergen Cnty. Mar. 13, 2009) is misplaced.  (Pb18).  First, the trial order in Horizon is not precedential.  R. 1:36-3.  Second, the standards articulated and applied by the trial court in Horizon were expressly rejected by this court in Lawson.  See Lawson, 468 N.J. Super. at 134.  Third, the trial court in Horizon misconstrued the important difference between standards applicable to reconsideration of final orders and those applicable to reconsideration of interlocutory orders.  Compare Horizon, 2009 WL 833333 (“Accordingly, I expressly adopt the view . . . that the same modes of though and method of analysis apply to applications for reconsideration of both interlocutory and final orders. ”), with Lawson, 468 N.J. Super. at 133-34.  18  A trial judge also does not owe deference to a prior trial judge.
[brief] (8T127-6 to 129-18).  Rather, he claimed that he stayed until the shower ended, then went home, where he remained until police arrived to question him after the shooting.  (8T131-7 to 25).  It was only after [...] informed defendant that he knew he had returned to Tipps that defendant admitted he had done so.  (8T133-1 to Defendant said his father had taken him back to the trailer park so he could take a shower gift to [...].
[brief] Applications to vacate a judgment by default are “viewed with great liberality, and every reasonable ground for indulgence is tolerated to the end that a just result is reached. ”  Marder v. realty Construction Co., 84 N.J.Super. 313, 319 (App. Div), aff’d 43 N.J. 508 (1964).  A motion to set aside a default judgment pursuant to R. 4:43-3 should be granted “for good cause shown…”  R. 4:43-3.  To establish good cause the movant must demonstrate that her underlying failure to appear was excusable under the circumstances, as well as a meritorious defense to the cause of action itself or the quantum of damages assessed.  U.S. Bank Natn’l As’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 468-469 (2012).  However, the presentation of a meritorious defense is not required where the movant’s failure to appear resulted from defective service of process.  See Peralta v. heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U.S. 80 (1988) and Midland Funding LLC v. Albern, 433 N.J.Super. 494, 501 (App. Div. 2013).
[brief] (1T Pg. 1).  That appearance was Post-Judgement; a Judgement had previously been issued against [...], and the Plaintiff in that matter was in the process of collection.  (1T Pg. 4 Lines 5-8).  As will be shown in great detail below, [...] had 2 major complaints at that 9/16/2022 appearance, which again was before [...], but in a separate action, not this action.
[brief] In that remand hearing, both the form and substance of the notice may be examined.  (pp. 19-23)  In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 270.  (Emphasis added).  In the within matter, adding information to a website cannot be construed as notice of the Ricci Act’s enactment or the requirements to register within a certain timeframe.
[brief] The terms shall not include inter-agency or intra-agency advisory, consultative, or deliberative material.  The court below interpreted the above language to include the phrase (in some form) “with the authority of the State. ”  Da099.  The trial court utilized this reasoning as a basis for determining that the OPRA statute already included language that third-party entities are subject to OPRA so long as they are operating with the, or pursuant to, the authority of a municipality.  However, this is a parsing of the statutory language which if accepted would lead to an incorrect result.  The use of “authority” in this context clearly means an “authority of the State”, for example, a housing authority or improvement authority.  Prior to the word “authority” it does not state “with the” “under the” or “subject to the”.  The use of “authority” is clearly part of a list of entities whose records are subject to OPRA.  It is undisputed that entities such as housing authorities and improvement authorities are “authorities of the State” and are subject to OPRA.  See Bergen County Imp. Auth. v. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc., 851 A.2d 731, 734 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2004); Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority, 423 N.J.Super. 140, 31 A.3d 623 (A.D.2011); Bart v. City Of Paterson Housing Authority, 403 N.J.Super. 609, 959 A.2d 1227 (A.D.2008), certification denied 198 N.J. 316, 966 A.2d 1080 (OPRA case involving “authorities”).
[brief] As plaintiffs’ counsel affirmed to [...] in support of reconsideration (A214), “The fact that expert depositions will take at least through December to schedule cannot be viewed as a circumstance caused by the plaintiffs. ”  20.  To the contrary, on April 23, 2021, plaintiffs emailed all defendants requesting available dates to depose its experts.  A follow up letter was sent on August 18, 2021 as no responses were forthcoming.  We received only two responses resulting in five (5) days in October to take the depositions of 15 defendant experts.  On September 2, 2021 we again requested available dates from counsel who had not responded.  We then received one other response, limiting depositions to 2 days in October.  Plaintiffs then circulated dates for November.  After receiving only 2 responses, November dates were limited to 5 available dates.  Plaintiffs then circulated dates for December.  Despite plaintiffs' numerous requests, available dates for expert depositions could not be agreed upon by defendants.
[brief] This wrongful death case arises from defendants’ negligent care of [...].  Plaintiffs filed a Complaint (on June 13, 2018) then Amended Complaint (on September 25, 2019) for Wrongful Death and Survival in Medical Malpractice (and lack of informed consent).  A99, 118.  Defendants filed Answers denying plaintiff’s claims.  A35, 164.  Discovery took several years because of the complex medical malpractice issues and the COVID-19 pandemic that struck during the case.  The Law Division ultimately entered Case Management Orders extending the discovery end date several times, with the final end date set as December 30, 2021, and trial then not occurring until one and one-years after that (in May 2023).  A220.  The issue in this appeal revolves around plaintiffs’ claim against defendant, [...], a general surgeon who plaintiffs charged ---
[brief] 419 N.J. Super. 596, 611 (App. Div. 2011).  Respondents acknowledge these material facts (Pb29-30).  Finally, Respondents’ reliance on *Santana v. SmileDirectClub, LLC*, 475 N.J. Super. 279, 291-92 (App. Div. 2023) is misplaced.  There, the Court enforced an arbitration agreement presented in a clickwrap format after applying the usual standard: whether the website “put a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms. ”  *Id.* at 288, 291 (citing *Wollen*, 468 N.J. Super at 502).  *Santana* did not, as Respondents posit (Pb32), hold that a click-wrap design must be used or suggest that other designs are unlawful under *Wollen*.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] This also means that the arbitrator shall have no authority to make any award for the benefit of, or against, any person other than the individual who is the named party.  (Pa136-Pa146 & Pa168-Pa169).  The Arbitration Agreement also provides:  PLEASE READ CAREFULLY – IMPORTANT – AFFECTS YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS  This agreement to arbitrate provides that you or we can require controversies or disputes between us to be resolved by BINDING ARBITRATION.  You have the right to REJECT this agreement to arbitrate by using the procedure explained below.  If you do not reject this agreement to arbitrate, you GIVE UP YOUR RIGHT TO GO TO COURT and controversies or disputes between us will be resolved by a NEUTRAL ARBITRATOR INSTEAD OF A JUDGE OR JURY, using rules that are simpler and more limited than in a court.
[brief] [...], the person responsible for [...]’s care and semen collection each time he was boarded at [...], similarly certified that he had no knowledge of any aggressive behavior by [...].  [Pa 439-440].  He testified that [...] was so gentle that he regularly let his twelve-year-old son walk into the stallion’s paddock alone to feed him.  [Pa 406].  [...], [...]’s CEO, and [...], [...]’s Stallion and Breeding Administrator, both denied any knowledge of aggressive behavior exhibited by [...] prior to the attack.  [Pa 179, 215-17, 219-220, 331-32].  They both considered him to be a gentle horse.  See ibid.
[brief] Fourth, the court would not have entered the Final Judgment of Foreclosure if there was any concern about the assignments being genuine.  Finally, both Defendant and Plaintiff were parties to the earlier foreclosure.  As a result, all elements of collateral estoppel are present, the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies and [...]’s denial of the Order to Show Cause should be affirmed by this court denying the appeal in its entirety.
[brief] [T72-1 to -3].  [...] found the victim to be credible.  [T67-10 to -19].  He held he did not volunteer information and did not attempt to answer questions when he did not have the information at hand.  He held that [...]’ testimony was consistent \(^2\)Transcripts of the prior court proceedings were not provided as part of the trial de novo. and that he unequivocally identified defendant as the person who issued the threats to him on November 7, 2021.  [T67-10 to 68-11].  Turning to defendant and [...], [...] held that [...] was not credible and his testimony was unhelpful to the court.  He stated that [...] had a reason to be biased and his testimony lacked consistency.  [T68-12 to 69-3].  He also found that defendant was not a credible witness.  He held that her testimony was not corroborated by anything that could essentially establish her alibi defense.  He also stated that her testimony was inconsistent and self-serving.  [T69-4 to -26].  Turning to sentencing, he imposed the following fines and fees:  $500 fine, $33 court costs, $75 Safe Neighborhoods, and $50 VCCB.  He imposed a ten-day jail sentence that he suspended conditioned upon one year of probation.
[brief] As a legal concept negligence is not an imaginative notion, a creature of mere surmise or conjecture; it denotes elements of factuality from which a lack of due care can be rationally deduced.  It is not presumed that every injurious mishap that one encounters is necessarily attributable to the negligence of another.  The factual pedestal stabilizing the logical inference of negligence must be established by some competent proof.  [Overby v. Union Laundry Co., 28 N.J. Super. 100, 104 (App. Div. 1953) (emphasis added), aff’d o.b., 14 N.J. 526 (1954).
[brief] Rejecting defendant’s argument that an alleged breach of police procedure warrants the application of the exclusionary rule, the trial court correctly reasoned that:  Both the State and defense counsel agree that Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2015-1 was the body worn camera directive in effect at the time of the search.  [(Ra8-31). ]  Counsel for Defendant cites to section 5.4, which states, “when feasible, a BWC should be activated before a uniformed officer arrives at the scene of a dispatched call for service of other police activity listed in section 5.2. ” (emphasis added).  Section 5.2 sets forth several examples of situations which require an officer to activate his body worn camera, including that an officer’s body worn camera is to be activated when “the officer is conducting any kind of search (consensual or otherwise). ”  [...]  It is arguable whether an officer’s body worn camera is required to be activated to encompass the knock and announce step prior to the execution of a warrant.  A plain reading of the directive could support the interpretation that officers are required to active their body camera prior to the knock and announce portion of a warrant execution.  On the other hand, it could be argued an officer’s body worn camera must be activated prior to the actual search.  However, even if the officer’s failure to activate their cameras is deemed a violation, the exclusionary rule, a punitive court rule created sanction to deter police misconduct, is not the appropriate remedy for a violation of a police procedure contained in an Attorney General directive.