ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................  3  STANDARD OF REVIEW ...............................................................................  8  LEGAL ARGUMENT .......................................................................................  9  I.  PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE HE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED HIS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION  ....................................................................................  9  A.  The Trial Court’s Denial of Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration Was Proper and Not an Abuse of Discretion ......................................................................................................  9  B.  Plaintiff’s Failure to Address How the Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Denying His Motion for Reconsideration Operates as a Waiver of that Issue .........................  10  C.  The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration as Untimely ......................... 12 D. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration Because It Lacked Jurisdiction After the Complaint was Removed to Federal Court .......................................................................................................... 13 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 16 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS August 15, 2023
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 334, 993 A.2d at 421 (emphasis added).  Ohio would be hard-pressed to make any such argument, given that Ohio initially authorized and paid for the filing and prosecution of an appeal from the adverse Vermont Trial Court rulings that Ohio now, in a total reversal of position, argues justified Ohio’s abandonment of [...] and his co-defendants on March 5, 2021.  Ohio in this case wrongfully attempted to exploit appealable Vermont Trial Court rulings for its own benefit, when its legal duty was to appeal those rulings for its insureds’ benefit.  Cf. Cathay Mortuary (Wah Sang) Inc. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 582 F. Supp. 650, 660 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (describing insurer misconduct very similar to that of Ohio in this case and holding an insurer liable to pay a settlement made by its insureds following the insurer’s wrongful refusal to defend post-trial).  Contrary to the Trial Court’s suggestion (T78-2 to T78-23), to apply the liability rule stated in Pharmacists is not to deny “full faith and credit” (T78-4) to a sister state judgment.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)............................6  Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995)........5  Capital Fin. Co. v. Asterbadi, 398 N.J.Super 299, 310 (App. Div. 2008), certif.den. 195 N.J. 521 (2008)...............................8  Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App.Div. 1996)......................7  Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 384-85 (2010)..................................................................................8  Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399 (1985).....................................................6  Morey v. Wildwood Crest Borough, 18 N.J. Tax 335, 341 Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998)..................8  Scheps v. Twp. of Delran, [...], 6 (App. Div Aut. 23, 2019 unpub).................................................................9  Walker v. Alt. Chrysler Plymouth, 216 N.J.  Super. 255, 258 (App. Div. 1987)...........................................................................8  COURT RULES R. 4:46-2.........................................................................................................................5
[brief] Additionally, [...]’s statement in its brief that any time there is an increase in grade, one could never use a revised grade that increased the grade of the property, even if slightly, because that would have the effect of increasing the building height is nonsense.  First, the Building Height definition addresses the revised lot grade as to not include mounding, terracing, or other devices designed to allow increased building height.  Secondly, measuring building height from an original lot grade as opposed to a revised lot grade does not result in the denial of an application.  Rather, the purpose of the Ordinance is to determine whether the increased building height is substantial enough to require the applicant to apply for a d(6) use variance\(^1\) before a Zoning Board when the height is greater than ten (10) feet or ten percent (10%) under the maximum allowable building height.
[brief] RECOMMENDATIONS  *8  For the reasons outlined above, the undersigned recommends to the Court that [...]’s Motion to Compel be denied.  The undersigned further recommends that (1) [...] update its privilege log as indicated herein and (2) redact and subsequently produce Document 16078-16078 to [...], pursuant to the undersigned’s findings in this Report and Recommendation.  In the event either party files an objection to this Report and Recommendation, the undersigned will provide the Court with a copy of any documents made subject of an object for in camera review.
[directive] CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  9  Approved CEDs  9.1  The Panel shall review and provide recommendations concerning the specifications and characteristics of CEDs that may be deployed and used pursuant to this policy.  Those specifications will include the following requirements: (a) the device must be capable of making a date- and time-stamped digital record of each occurrence when the darts/electrodes are fired, and of each occurrence when an electrical current is discharged; (b) the device must be capable of making a digital video recording of each such firing and electrical discharge, where the focus of the internal camera is centered on the person against whom the CED was targeted, except that an agency is authorized to purchase and deploy an approved CED that does not have the capability of making a digital video recording provided that such device may only be carried and used by an officer who is equipped with a BWC as defined in Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2015-1, and further provided that, notwithstanding any other provision of this policy, such device shall not be fired or discharged during an actual operation unless the officer has activated the body worn camera.  Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude the officer from firing or discharging the device in the event that the officer’s body worn camera malfunctions, or if the exigency of the situation made it unsafe or infeasible for the officer to activate the body worn camera before firing the device; and (c) the device must safeguard all such digital data and video recordings to ensure that they can be accessed or erased only by appropriate supervisory personnel in accordance with rules, regulations, standing operating procedures or orders promulgated pursuant to this policy.
[brief] (Da304-06).  On June 25, 2024, the Chancery trial court entered an Order compelling Arbitration.  (Da1).  On July 16, 2024, the Chancery trial court entered an Amended Order compelling arbitration.  (Da2).  On July 26, 2024, Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal of the trial court’s Order entered on June 25, 2024, and Amended Order entered on July 16, 2024.  At the time the June 25, 2024, and July 26, 2024, Orders were entered, dispositive motions had not been in the Chancery Action.  (1T40:23-41:2; 1T35:20).  At the time the June 25, 2024, and July 26, 2024, Orders were entered, discovery in the Chancery Action was not nearly complete, including depositions and expert discovery, which still need to be conducted.  (1T42:10-11).  In the fall of 2024, the parties engaged in settlement negotiations, but reached a stalemate.  On December 20 and 23, 2024, while this appeal was pending, Defendants filed two separate motions before the Law and Chancery and Divisions, respectively - one seeking to vacate the May 28, 2024, and July 31, 2024, Consent Orders and reinstate the Law Division Action (Pa008), and the other to vacate the July 16, 2024, Order compelling arbitration and reinstate the Chancery Action.  (Pa086).  On December 23, 2024, Plaintiff retained new counsel, and the law firm of [...] substituted in as counsel for Plaintiff.  (Pa108).  On January 17, 2024, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. adjourned Defendants’ Motions to Vacate and Reinstate, and entered an Order directing the parties to schedule a conference call with Arbitrator, Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. (Ret.). (Pa122a).  On January 28, 2025, the parties held a telephone conference with Judge Cassidy, and arbitration was scheduled for May 5, 2025.  On February 13, 2025, Defendants withdrew their Motions to Vacate and Reinstate.  Despite this pending appeal filed by Defendants almost 8 months ago on the issue of whether arbitration was properly compelled in the Chancery Action, on February 25, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion to Stay Arbitration in the Chancery Action and proceed with arbitrating only the claims in the Law Division Action.  (Pa109).  Plaintiff submitted opposition, and the Motion to Stay is returnable March 14, 2025.  On March 6, 2025, a conference was held between Judge Cassidy and counsel.  Judge Cassidy directed that at this time, arbitration is limited solely to the Law Division matter pending the outcome of Defendants’ Motion to Stay and this appeal.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] See *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-2(a)(c)(g)(i) and (m).  Specifically, the Application would improve the garbage collection process on the site, while also enhancing the look of the garbage refuse areas with screening and landscaping.  (3T74-6 to 21).  Additionally, the Application is promoting the general welfare by providing significant affordable housing.  (Pa394).  Furthermore, the new development within the site would be required to comply with the latest DEP standards as it relates to stormwater management, which would be a benefit to a site that was built in the 1960s.  (Pa397 to Pa398).  Regarding the variance for minimum parking spaces, the Application would bring the site into closer compliance with RSIS parking requirements, as it would increase the 1.46 parking space per unit ratio to 1.56.  (Pa387).  Regarding the negative criteria for a c(2) variance, [...] made clear there is no detriment to the public or zoning plan as the vast majority of the variances being sought “are for existing buildings in existing conditions that are unrelated to the proposed buildings that were added to this site. ” (Pa385).  For instance, the variance for buffer width, where 20 feet is required and 9.6 feet is provided relates to the existing lack of buffer area on the western side of the property that has been in that condition for almost 50 years.  (Pa385).  The variance requested regarding structures located within a buffer also relates to an existing condition.  Regarding maximum length of buildings, the Application sought a variance for a proposed 256 long building, whereas a 348.8 long building is already existing on the site.  In addition, the requested variances related to multifamily dwelling setbacks from internal roadways, principal building setbacks from parking areas, dwelling units in a line without a setback, and parking in front yard setbacks are all conditions that currently exist on the site, and some of those existing conditions are more significant variances than those requested in the Application.  (Pa386).  After a motion for denial was made, the Board members voted and set forth minimal reasoning behind their votes.
[brief] After consideration of such demand, by Order dated March 4, 2024, [...] concluded that “interest on tax liens is simple interest and not compound interest” relying on N.J.S.A. §§ 54:4-67(a), 54:5-58, and 54:5-60.  (Da 155-165).  Thereafter, Appellant filed a subsequent motion (not a motion for reconsideration) renewing argument as to modification of the simple interest awarded.  Once again, by Order dated April 1, 2024, [...] considered and denied Appellant’s demand for compounding interest.  [...] concluded that “the Court is not persuaded to further listen to debate or address the matter.  The instant Motion filed by Appellant is not a Motion for Reconsideration, but rather a Motion merely seeking to relitigate an issue which had already been presented before the Court and of which, the Court had already entered a decision.  The Court came to that determination utilizing the evidence presented before it at that time, and rendered its decision based upon that information. ” (Da 194-202).  This issue of compounding interest was not thereafter contained in Appellant’s subsequent Motion for Reconsideration and should be consider as waived and/or abandoned by Appellant.  It is abundantly clear that the lower Court considered Appellant’s application and provided a basis for its denial of such request (and Appellant subsequently abandoned this issue until reviving it as part of the present appeal).
[brief] (Pa236-37.)  Specifically, the Assembly minutes note:  The Clerk read a message from the Senate that the Senate has passed the following bills in which the concurrence of the General Assembly is requested, which bills were read for the first time and were referred as indicated:  Senate No. 49, by Senators [...], [...], [...] and [...], without reference, on second reading -- Codifies constitutional right to freedom of reproductive choice .  . .  On motion of [...], pursuant to Rule 15:20, Senate No. 49 was substituted for Assembly No. 6260 with which it is identical, and [...]/[...]/[...] were added as prime sponsors and all co-sponsors were added as co-sponsors of Senate No. 49.
[brief] Id. at 598-99.  In [...], work orders signed by the defendant were compared to signatures tying [...] to the crime.  There was no dispute that the work orders contained [...]’s true signature.  [...] complained, like defendant here, that he was deprived of due process and a fair trial when he was not provided with the writings prior to trial.  Indeed, the evidence in question was discovered mid-trial, and was provided to [...] and his attorney as soon as the State had access to the information.  Ibid.  This Court disagreed with [...], finding that even with the late inclusion of the writings:
[brief] ”  Id. at 585.  Thus, the Watson Court held that “first-time in-court identifications can be conducted only when there is ‘good reason’” for them. ”  Id. at 587 (citing Commonwealth v. Crayton, 21 N.E.3d 157, 169 (Mass. 2014)).  The principal “good reason” given by the Watson Court is where the “‘eyewitness was familiar with the defendant before.
[brief] This matter arises out of an action in lieu of prerogative writs challenging the validity of the business conducted at the [...] Meeting on January 11, 2022, as well as the separate adoption of two Borough ordinances: namely, Ordinances 1394-20 and 1423-21 concerning the Borough’s Redevelopment Plan.  The majority of Plaintiff’s allegations stem from supposed violations of the notice provisions of the Open Public Meetings Act, N.J.S.A. 10:4-6, et seq. (“OPMA”).  The trial court ultimately dismissed the Verified Complaint with prejudice, finding that most of Plaintiff’s claims were filed out of time; the subject meeting notices did not violate OPMA; and that a plenary Reorganization Meeting held on February 1, 2022, cured the alleged procedural deficiencies of the prior meeting.  Notwithstanding the obvious futility of this litigation, the Plaintiff tries to obstruct the Defendants official business by relitigating minutiae in this appeal that the trial court has already considered and dismissed on several occasions.  The Plaintiff’s appeal is a house of cards supported only by circular arguments.  For the reasons that follow, the Plaintiff’s appeal must be denied.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On January 20, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs against the Defendants, alleging violations of the Open Public Meetings Act, N.J.S.A. 10:4-6, et seq. (“OPMA”), as well as the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1, et seq. (“LRHL”).
[brief] O'Shea v. Township of West Milford, 410 N.J.Super. 371, 382 (App. Div. 2009).  (Emphasis added).  Here, despite [...]'s contradictory sworn statements and vacillation on the witness stand in both the local hearing and de novo supplementation of the record below, the [...] clearly declined to prosecute this matter because it was administrative, not criminal, in nature.
[brief] Considered against this extensive body of law, the decisions of the [...] and the [...] are arbitrary and capricious and entitled to no deference because they didn't consider "the language [the statute], and its statutory context, as well as the history of the [statute]...."  As we noted, the [...] dismissed the EMP in a preliminary erroneous ruling and thereafter refused to reconsider it citing the law of the case, which was erroneous.  The [...] approved this.  That led to a fundamental reversible error.
[directive] Special Rules for Those Under the Age of 21  The law also establishes a new framework for individuals under the age of 21 who possess or consume any amount of marijuana, hashish, cannabis, or alcohol in any public place, including a school:  First offense.  Officers shall issue a written warning, which must include the person’s • name, address, and date of birth, but the warning shall be provided to the individual’s not parent or guardian.  Second offense.  Officers shall issue a written warning, and also provide the person with • informational materials on community drug treatment services.  For individuals under the age of 18, the officer shall provide the individual’s parent or guardian with copies of the warnings issued for both the first and second offenses.  Third or subsequent offense.  Officers shall issue a written warning and again provide • the individual with information on community drug treatment services.  If the individual is between 18 and 21, then the officer shall provide notice of the written warning to the community drug treatment program; if the individual is under 18, then the officer shall again provide the juvenile’s parents or guardian with a copy of the written warning.  Law enforcement officers must also retain, with any of the written warnings outlined above, a sworn statement with a description of the factual circumstances that support a finding of the Page 4 violation.  As with the new warning system required for adults who distribute small amounts of marijuana, this new framework for individuals under the age of 21—codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:33- 15—will require law enforcement agencies to develop new mechanisms to track the issuance of these warnings.
[brief] As such, the Court went back to the beginning of N.J.R.E. 609 and noted that N.J.R.E 609(a)(1) notes that for the purpose of attacking the credibility of any witness, the witness’s conviction of a crime, subject to Rule 403, shall be admitted unless excluded by the court pursuant to paragraph (b) of this rule.  The Court noted the Court’s prior ruling granting co-defendant [...]’s motion for to bar his criminal convictions relied upon Rule 403 and the Court still finds upon reconsideration that Rule 403 needs to be applied.  The Court went through R. 403 and exercised the Court’s discretion and denied Defendants’ [...] and [...] motion for reconsideration for the following reasons.  CoDefendant [...] did not answer interrogatories.  The Court had to rely solely upon Co-Defendant [...]’s deposition testimony wherein he acknowledged he had prior drug related felony convictions in the State of New Jersey, but he did not recall the timeline nor the number of convictions.  The certified criminal conviction record was from September of 2018, four (4) years prior to co-defendant [...]’s deposition testimony.  The Court specifically noted that perhaps the certified criminal conviction could be used for impeachment of co-defendant [...].  In other words, a jury could potentially find that during his deposition, co-defendant [...] was misleading the examiner.  The Court noted that same would be within the province of the jury and is specifically not a decision for the Court to determine.  However, the Court found that the minimal probative value, for impeachment and credibility purposes, was substantially outweighed by the undue prejudice to co-defendant [...].  The Court further noted that the conviction was for drug related charges which conviction does not go to the issue of moral turpitude nor veracity and was four years prior to co-defendant [...]’s deposition and five years prior to trial.  After reviewing all of the above, as well as the arguments set forth in the current motion and opposition, for all of the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that the Court properly exercised its discretion in excluding co-Defendant [...]’s prior conviction.
[directive] L. 1985, c. 419, s. 1, eff. Jan. 13, 1986.  1  Document 2 Page of New Jersey Permanent Statutes  TITLE 40A  MUNICIPALITIES AND COUNTIES  40A:5-16.4.  Issuance, acceptance of purchase order for license or permit fee  Issuance, acceptance purchase order for license permit fee or of :5-16.4.  40,4  Except as provided below, whenever a department, agency or bureau of the State requires that the fee for issuing a license or permit be paid in advance, a county, municipality, authority, or other subdivision of local government shall be deemed to have met that requirement by the issuance of a duly executed (N.J.S.4OA:5-1 purchase order payable pursuant to the provisions of the "Local Fiscal Affairs Law" et seq.): a. the Division of Motor Vehicles in the Department of Law and Public Safety shall not be required to accept a duly executed purchase order; and b. the Department of Transportation may accept a duly executed purchase order from a county, municipality, authority, or other subdivision of local government for the fee for issuing a license or of permit if the department determines that its accounting procedures permit the acceptance such purchase orders.