ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The motion was accompanied by a sworn certification from [...] stating that he had no additional assets he could pay towards even partial compliance with the order to return the secreted funds.  (Pa95-98).  That certification was proven brazenly false, as days after it was submitted, a public marshal in Slovakia located, froze and distributed to Plaintiff an account holding $2 million of the funds [...] sent overseas, and froze a $1 million account belonging to [...].  (Pa106).  [...] and [...] have filed applications in Slovakia to reclaim those 5 [...]’s objection to the trial court and this Court’s consideration of this evidence based on the timing of its discovery is misplaced.  The revelation of [...]’s and funds and opposing other foreign execution efforts, misrepresenting to the Slovakian courts that the New Jersey judgment has been fully satisfied.  (Pa170-178).  The $17 million remainder of the secreted funds are unaccounted for.
[brief] The trial court in Garvey had directed a verdict in favor of coverage under the property insurance policy at issue, relying on *State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Partridge*, 514 P.2d 123 (Cal. 1973), in which the California Supreme Court ruled that liability insurance coverage is established under California’s “concurrent cause” rule that applies when there are multiple causes of injury.  “That multiple causes may have effectuated the loss does not negate any single cause; that multiple acts concurred in the infliction of injury does not nullify any single contributory act. ”  *Id.* at 818-19.  The Garvey court distinguished the more liberal approach to coverage in CGL coverage cases from the more limited “efficient proximate cause” approach that should be used in first-party property policies:  [T]he right to coverage in the third-party liability insurance context draws on traditional tort concepts of fault, proximate cause and duty.  This liability analysis differs substantially from the coverage analysis in the property insurance context, which draws on the relationship between perils that are either covered or excluded in the contract.  In liability insurance, by insuring for personal liability, and agreeing to cover the insured for his own negligence, the insurer agrees to cover the insured for a broader spectrum of risks.  --- 2
[brief] |  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ####  Cases | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Berado v. Jersey City, 476 N.J. super. 341 (App.Div. 2023).  | 7, 8 | | Carbone v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of Weehawken, | | | 175 N.J.Super. 584 (Law Div.1980) | 10 | | Hopewell Valley Citizens' Grp., Inc. v. Berwind Prop. Grp. Dev. Co., | | | 204 N.J. 569 (2011) | 2, 8 | | In re Ordinance 2354-12 of West Orange, Essex Cnty. v. Twp. of | | | West Orange, 223 N.J. 589 (2015) | 2 | | Lawrence M. Krain Assoc. v. Mayor of Tp. of Maple Shade, | | | 185 N.J. Super. 336 (Law Div.1982) | 10 | | Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) | 4 | | Scardigli v. Borough of Haddonfield Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, | | | 300 N.J. Super. 314 (App.Div. 1997) | 10 | | Scully-Bozarth Post # 1817 of Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S. v. | | | Planning Bd. of City of Burlington, 362 N.J. Super. 296 (App.Div 2003)| 9 | | Twp. of Stafford v. Stafford Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, | | | 154 N.J. 62 (1998) | 4, 8 | #### Rules of Court | Rule | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | R. 4:69-6(a) | ii, 9 | | R. 4:69-6(c) | ii, 2 | #### Statutes | Statute | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(f) | ii, 1, 10 |
[brief] 46  | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------| | **Bynum v. Mayor & Township Committee,** | 24, 25 | | 181 N.J. Super. 2 (App. Div. 1981) | | | **Earruso v. Township of East Hanover,** | 28, 29 | | 14 N.J. Misc. 96 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1936) | | | **E & J Equities, LLC v. Bd. Of Adjustment of the Twp. of Franklin,** | 43 | | 226 N.J. 549 (2016) | | | **Gannon v. Saddle Brook Twp.,** | 27 | | 56 N.J. Super. 76 (App. Div. 1955) | | | **Kernahan v. Home Warranty Admin. of Fla., Inc.,** | 8 | | 236 N.J. 301 (2019) | | | **Kingsley v. Wes Outdoor Advertising Co.,** | 20 | | 55 N.J. 336 (1970) | | | **MAG Entm't, LLC v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control,** | 8 | | 375 N.J. Super. 534 (App. Div. 2005) | | | **Malhame v. Demarest,** | 23 | | 162 N.J. Super 248 (Law Div. 1978) | | | **Manalapan Realty v. Township Committee,** | 8 | | 140 N.J. 366 (1995) | | | **Morris & E.R. Co. v. Comm’r of R.R. Taxation,** | 31 | | 37 N.J.
[brief] The Court further reasoned that New Jersey has a strong policy in favor of arbitration, citing Arafa v. Health Express Corp., 233 A.3d 495, 506 (N.J. 2020), especially for PIP claims.  citing Gambino v. Royal Globe Ins. Cos., 429 A.2d 1039, 1043 (N.J. 1981) (“[A]pproaches which minimize resort to the judicial process [for PIP claims] . . . are strongly to be favored.
[brief] [...] admitted that he independently valued his collective interests in [...] and [...] at $6.2 Million, which was only $100,000 less than the $6.3 Million he ultimately received from these sales. 17T153-8 to 162-4; 25T83-11 to 84-12; Da02791, Da02800.  As part of their negotiations, [...] and [...] jointly prepared excel schedules setting forth estimated values of [...] and [...]’s assets and liabilities by utilizing data from [...] and [...]’s QuickBooks and making adjustments to that data on the schedules.  17T7-14 to 10-12, 167-23 to -25; 18T 13-25 to 29-14; 25T84-13 to 110-4; 26T23-3 to -11; Da02792 – Da02797.
[brief] *Id.* at 534.  The Court further relied on the holding in *Board of Trustees, TPAF vs. LaTronica*, 81 N.J. Super. 461, 470-471 (1963), *certif. denied*, 41 N.J. 874 (1964).  *Coyle* distinguished its holding from that in the case of *In re Spellbacker*, 414 N.J. Super. 26 (App. Div. 201).
[brief] Docket No.: [...]  REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF ON APPELLANTS, [...] AND [...], IN SUPPORT OF THE APPEAL FROM THE ORDERS DATED NOVEMBER 4, 2022 AND MARCH 28, 2023 OF HONORABLE  [...], J.S.C. [...] [...], Esq.  [...] [...]  [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] As a result of the misrepresentations, the Judge [...] reached a wrong conclusion.  On June 8, 2016, the Appellate Division affirmed the findings and the decision of Judge [...].  “Plaintiff claimed that the PSA differed substantially from the parties’ prior Chinese Agreements. ”  (Da431)  “[T]he court found that plaintiff had been manipulated in the divorce proceedings, and it was ‘very troubling’ that there were inconsistencies between the PSA and the Chinese Agreements.
[brief] Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208, which governs passive restraints, is a good example.  The United States Supreme Court explained why [...] deliberately chose a gradual phase-in of passive restraints:  The 1984 FMVSS 208 standard … deliberately sought a *gradual* phase-in of passive restraints.  It required the manufacturers to equip only 10% of their car fleet manufactured after September 1, 1986, with passive restraints.  It then increased the percentage in three annual stages, up to 100% of the new car fleet for cars manufactured after September 1, 1989.  And it explained that the phased-in requirement would allow more time for manufacturers to develop airbags or other, better, safer passive restraint systems.
[brief] This case involves application # [...] before the [...].  The application numbers 10 pages.  Pa007a – Pa016a.  The property is identified as Block 1, Lots 7, 10 and 19.2.  The street addresses are [...] and [...].  These lots span the R and RB zones in Seaside Heights.  The name of the project is [...] and the applicants name is [...], LLC.  The application was filed along with the appropriate maps and architectural renderings.  Pa007a – Pa016a  The application identifies the proposed use of this property as three residential structures with a total of 17 townhomes.  The application also identifies requirement for relief from various ordinances in Seaside Heights including • Front yard setback on Ocean Terrace • Front yard setback on Porter Avenue • Height • Lot area/unit.  (Please note that the words Lot Area/Unit appear at the bottom of Pa010a.  The application does not use the term “density” regarding this variance.)  Pa007a – Pa016a  The application specifically identified the variances that were needed.  The application and the map supporting the application indicate that the proposed use of this property included a five foot setback on Ocean Terrace and Porter Avenue where 10 feet was required.  Furthermore, the application specifically identified the proposed height of the structure at 48.83 feet where the ordinance allowed 41 feet.  The total square footage of the property was 18,564 feet.  The proposal called for 17 townhomes.  In Seaside Heights there is an Ordinance with regard to lot area/unit.  The Ordinance required at least 1,200 feet/unit.  When you divide 18,564 by 17 units, the total lot area/unit is 1,092 feet thus requiring a variance for lot area/unit.  This variance is also known as a density variance.  Pa007a – Pa016a  Appellant does not contest whether or not the notice was appropriately served.  The hearing before the [...] was conducted on February 27, 2023.
[brief] (19T 51-7 to 11)  The detailed sentencing memorandum and exhibits submitted by new counsel for petitioner (Da 267) at the re-sentencing illustrates the mitigating circumstances and arguments that should have been made at the initial sentencing but were not.  Although the re-sentencing took place before the same judge who imposed the initial sentence, petitioner urges that the die was cast at this point.  The judge had already made a determination that petitioner would not be eligible for parole until he attained an age in excess of 95 years.  The remand was for the limited purpose of conducting the required analysis for consecutive sentencing on the crimes occurring within the same incident, and a determination of overall fairness.
[brief] (Sb9).  However, the \(^3\)  It is evident that one does not have to be a “sportsman” to have “knowledge of or interest in the conservation of fish and game” especially given the multiple definitions of the term “sportsmen. ” enabling statute governing the Governor’s statutory authority to appoint Council members is much more restrictive.  The Governor does not have the authority to select any of the six member sportsmen majority on the Council.  That authority resides exclusively with a private organization, the [...].  So, the [...] has the unique power of controlling the majority membership on the Council, which is a much greater delegated authority than simply advising the Governor on the choice of “sportsmen”.  The State Defendants argue that while the [...] nominates the six sportsmen members, nothing in N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24 mandates that the sportsmen be members of that private organization.  (Sb9).  Assuming arguendo that the State Defendants are correct, it is the power to control the majority membership that is the violation of Articles III and IV thereby rendering the underlying statute unconstitutional.
[brief] On the issue of threatening, *N.J.S.A.  2C:12-3a*, “A person is guilty of a crime if he threatens to commit any crime of violence with the purpose to . . \(^{16}\)See *State v. B.H.*, 290 N.J. Super. 588, 597 (App. Div. 1996), rev’d in part and aff’d in part, 149 N.J. 564 (1997) (The subsections of the statute “address categories of conduct which can be broadly described as communications, physical contact, and course of conduct. ”) terrorize another or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror. ” (New Jersey Model Criminal Charge, Terroristic Threats, revised September 12, 2016).  “The words or actions of the defendant must be of such a nature as to convey menace or fear of a crime of violence to the ordinary person.  It is not a violation of this statute if the threat expresses fleeting anger or was made merely to alarm. ”\footnote{See Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission, Vol. II: Commentary (October 1971).}  (Id.)  All competent evidence, including witness testimony, demonstrates that [...] was angry at a Facebook posting that was allegedly made outside of the correctional facility.  In fact, two of the witnesses, [...] and [...], completely dispel the notion that [...] issued threats that evening.  During cross-examination, [...] admitted that he never felt threatened by [...]’s words.  (Pa115a).  Similarly, [...] did not hear any threatening language or threats addressed to [...].  (Pa115a).  In order for the State to prove that [...] “coerced” any person, the State must prove that [...] had “a purpose unlawfully to restrict another's freedom of action to engage or refrain from engaging in conduct,” by threatening a specific action.  \textit{N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5a}(1) through (7).  Again, the State had neither prove the requisite \textit{mens rea} necessary nor any of the predicate acts.
[brief] The essential elements of a prima facie claim for breach of contract are: (i) a valid contract, (ii) defective performance by the defendant, and (iii) resulting damages.  Coyle v. Alexander's, 199 N.J. Super. 212, 223 (App. Div. 1985)(emphasis added).  Appellants cannot prove that any breach of contract by the [...] resulted in the damages Appellants allege.  At all times relevant to the allegations set forth in Appellants’ Verified/First Amended Verified Complaint, [...] owned the Property.
[brief] **  Plaintiff has not put forth any evidence to show that the defendant did anything to alter or modify the parking lot design to increase the risk of injury to non-management employees beyond that which may be inherent to anyone walking in this area of the parking lot making it substantially certain that it knew that injury or death would result to one of these employees.  Indeed, too was a factor influencing the decision of the trial judge who stated “[n]o evidence suggests that [...] altered or modified the parking lot. ” (Pa11).  Conversely, in the Millison progeny of cases to be discussed, the employer took some affirmative action to make more dangerous an already inherent dangerous condition thereby increasing the risk of injury or death to its employees.
[brief] [...] and [...] have known each other for 20 years.  101a, 150a, 18.  [...] on January 27, 2023, produced his Whats App messages with [...].  167a.  Audio was omitted and they appear in the format that they were produced.  These messages are stipulated to be between [...] and [...] and reveal that, contrary to Plaintiff’s counsel’s Certification under oath, there was, in fact, a close business and personal relationship between Mr. [...] and Mr. [...].  19.  In addition to knowing each other for 20 years, [...] and [...] have been doing business together at least since 2018 which is when the first WhatsApp messages appear to begin.  167a.  20.  They speak monthly if not weekly about properties to buy and sell and the [...]/[...] Whatsapp messages show they are doing business consistently together but through different corporate entities.  167a.  Please note the messages contain typos and are reproduced “as is” with redactions for brevity.  21.  In March of 2019, there is a discussion between [...] and [...] of “new deals” and a “partnership” between the two men.  167a.  [3/15/19, 5:51:33 PM]  [...] Josh [...]: Good shaboss, ty for the gift [3/18/19, 12:14:56 PM]  [...] Josh [...]: Can I come to talk new deals partnership?  [3/25/19, 10:14:10 AM]  [...] Josh [...]: Any new liens ?  Partnership 22.  The messages reveal that this is not the first claim where an owner of a property that was sold by [...] to [...] claims that he was not served - in 2019, in a similar fact scenario to this one, an owner claimed he was not served.  173a.
[brief] Lacking any novel and constitutional issues or public interests that require adjudication or clarification, the [...] nevertheless sought an enlargement of the statute of limitations in reliance on Hopewell Valley Citizens’ Group, Inc. v. Berwind Prop. Group Development Co., L.P., 204 N.J. 569 (2011).  Because the Homeowners publication was disclosed to the [...], the Hopewell case (where the publication was concealed) is factually distinguishable.  (Pa 803-805).  Thus, [...]’ reliance is misplaced.  In Hopewell Valley Citizens’ Group, Inc. v. Berwind Prop. Group Development Co., L.P., a citizens’ group belatedly filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs challenging a three hundred fifty-nine (359) acre development consisting of at least eight (8) buildings totaling over 800,000 square feet as well as a daycare center, parking, interior roads and a wastewater treatment plant.
[brief] Odukoya v. Sobanjo, No. A-3323-19, 2021 WL 1904565 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 12, 2021)....9  Pandolfo v. D & C Chevy/Honda, No. A-4037-12T3, 2014 WL 7236788 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 22, 2014)  ..............................................................................................................12  Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34 (2016)..................................................................................10, 11  Sackman v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 445 N.J. Super. 278 (App. Div. 2016).......................................................11  Shapiro & Croland v. Bairan, No. A-3704-05T5, 2007 WL 1574407 (N.J. Super. App. Div. June 1, 2007)....13  Special Police Org. of N.J. v. City of Newark, No. A-4, 168-19, 2022 WL 2912038 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.  July 25, 2022)...........12 Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., No. 04-2819 (SRC), 2008 WL 8747721 (D.N.J. May 22, 2008)....................24 Thakkar v. Greystone Park Psychiatric Hosp., No. A-3529-14T2, 2016 WL 3909553 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 20, 2016).........................................................................................10 Tomney v. Ebeling, 105 N.J. Super. 66 (App. Div. 1969).........................................................9 TABLE OF CITATIONS (continued)
[brief] This appeal addresses a bold attempt by [...] to disqualify legal counsel of Defendants’ choice from representing multiple defendants in the action.  [...]’s purported altruistic attempt to ensure the defendants in this case have independent defense counsel to obtain a fair trial is a thinly veiled attempt to run up defense costs by using the Court to force each defendant to obtain separate legal counsel and foot the bill individually as opposed to pooling resources and engaging in a joint defense.  Joint Defense Agreements are commonplace in such litigation.  It is also an attempt by [...] to divide and conquer the defendants by driving a wedge between those who have a unity of interest and joint defense at this stage of the litigation.  [...] has sued these defendants alleging that they engaged in a conspiracy to commit insurance fraud as well as a racketeering enterprise in violation of the New Jersey Insurance Fraud Prevention Act as well as New Jersey RICO Act.
[brief] 9.  A Consent Order of 6/26/2019 was issued requiring Appellant to make monthly payments of $1,700.00 toward awards granted Respondent by the Order of 12/10/2014 until re-financing of Appellant’s home allowed payment in full of awards granted by the Order of 12/10/2014 by 7/31/2020.  10.  Appellant filed a Motion for Extension of Time on 6/30/2022 (DA203) to complete re-financing of his house.  Oral argument was heard 8/7/2020 (Transcript T2).  An Order dated 8/16/2020 was issued and Appellant appealed the Order.  11.  Appellant filed a Motion for Retirement, Termination of Alimony, and Request for plenary hearing to correct Probation account.  The Court issued its Order of 11/4/2020 and Appellant appealed the Order in consolidation with the Order of 8/16/2020, docket no. [...].  The Appellate Court issued its decision of 6/15/2023 (DA142).
[brief] So because [...] originally consolidated with another district pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:8-44, a plain reading of N.J.S.A. 18A:8-50 confirms that municipalities such as [...] are subject to the regionalization provisions set forth in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-13-47.1 to -47.11.  That includes the ability to withdraw from one consolidated district in order to form or enlarge a regional school district.  The Commissioner properly concluded, therefore, that [...] had standing to withdraw from [...] and [...] under N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11.
[brief] (Da33 at ¶5).  Appellant also made a representation to the Court that the September 1, 2016, letter from a different former attorney, [...], notified [...] that Plaintiff would be asserting a claim (Pb7 citing Pa113 to Pa114).  Here, Appellant openly admits to operating on a *presumption* that [...] received said letter within three weeks of the date of Plaintiff’s accident which was August 13, 2016.
[brief] *Respondent contends that the municipality, in supplying water to its inhabitants, is engaged in selling water for profit; and seems to think that this, if true, stamps the operation as private and not governmental in character.*  We first pause to observe that the overhead due to the enormous cost of the system, and the fact that so large a proportion of the water is diverted for public use, rather plainly suggests that no real profit is likely to result.  And to say that, because the city makes a charge for furnishing water to private consumers, it follows that the operation of the water works is corporate and not governmental, is to beg the question.  *What the city is engaged in doing in that respect is rather rendering a service than selling a commodity.  If that service be governmental it does not become private because a charge is made for it*, or a profit realized.
[directive] U.S.C. 981(e) (2) and U.S.C. 9703(n) S 18 31 1. § authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to transfer forfeited property to any federal agency, or to any State or local law enforcement agency that participated in the seizure or forfeiture of property.  Transfers made pursuant to 18 98l(e)(2) must U.S.C. 2. § to encourage cooperation between the recipient serve - - State or local agency and federal enforcement - . . - agencies.  Limitations +nd conditions respecting permissible uses of transferred property are set forth in The Secretary of the Treasury Guidelines on Seized and Forfeited Property.  B.
[brief] There, the Municipality in 2000 adopted a rezoning ordinance amending its Industrial Park (IP-120) zone to add fitness centers as a conditional use.  The Trial Court struck down that Ordinance because of a lack of substantial consistency with the Master Plan and that the Governing Body failed to identify the inconsistency and comply with *N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62*.  The Municipality thereafter in 2007 adopted a new Ordinance adding fitness centers as permitted in the Industrial Park (IP-120) and General Industrial (GI-80) zones.  This time the Municipality recognized the lack of “substantial consistency” with the Master Plan and includes findings and reasons in the Ordinance preamble sufficient to comply with *N.J.S.A.  40:55D-62*.  However, the Trial Court found the notice inadequate and again invalidated the Rezoning Ordinance.  The Municipality then tried a third time in 2009.  The Planning Board determined the addition of fitness centers to the IP-120 Zone as inconsistent with the Master Plan but endorsed the zoning amendment for the reasons detailed in a Resolution.  The Governing Body adopted the Rezoning Ordinance, with a detailed “reasons resolution. ”  The Appellate Court upheld the Ordinance, finding the Municipality had adequately complied with the special process under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62 to adopt a rezoning not substantially consistent with the Master Plan.  Thus, it is established by these cases that a Governing Body can authorize an inconsistent zoning Ordinance, but only if the lack of consistency is recognized and the Ordinance adopted with adequate planning reasons spelled out in the "Reasons Resolution" in accord with N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62.