ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The doctrine of res judicata is a fundamental principle of law that bars the relitigation of claims or issues that have already been adjudicated.  *Velasquez v. Franz*, 123 N.J. 498, 505 (1991).  The rationale underlying res judicata recognizes that fairness to the defendant and sound judicial administration require a definite end to litigation.  *Id.* citing *Restatement (Second) of Judgments*, § 19 comment a (1982).  The doctrine evolved in response to the specific policy concerns of providing finality and repose for the litigating parties, avoiding the burdens of relitigation for the parties and the court, and maintaining judicial integrity by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions regarding the same matter.  *Id.*  For a judicial decision to be accorded res judicata effect, it must be a valid final adjudication on the merits of the claim.  *Id.* at 507 citing *Restatement (Second) of Judgments*, supra, § 27.  A judgment of dismissal with prejudice, such as the trial court’s December 12, 2023 Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion, constitutes an adjudication on the merits "as fully and completely as if the order had been entered after trial."  *Mortgageling Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co.*, 142 N.J. 336, 346 (1995) quoting *Velasquez v. Franz*, supra,123 N.J. at 507.  Consonant with these res judicata principles, under Rule 1:4-8(c), a trial court on its own initiative can impose sanctions on a pro se party for filing frivolous litigation.  *R.*  1:4-8(c).  Even further, the Appellate Division has held that, where traditional sanctions have failed to deter a litigant from his pattern of bringing repetitive, meritless, and harassing actions, due process is not impaired when a court enjoins a pro se litigant who has filed numerous frivolous lawsuits.  *Rosenblum v. Borough of Closter*, 333 N.J. Super. 385, 391 (App. Div. 2000) (holding that, “where a pattern of frivolous litigation can be demonstrated, the Assignment Judge can prevent the complaint from being filed. ”).  In the instant matter, Plaintiff’s December 4, 2023 Notice of Motion blatantly eviscerates the underlying principles of res judicata and upsets [...]’s right to finality and repose.
[brief] Two of the Respondents, [...] and [...], challenge entry of the Law Division’s order permitting Plaintiffs to amend their pleadings and join them as defendants by way of the Second Amended Complaint.  [...], which managed to hide its presence at the premises even longer, challenges entry of the Law Division’s order permitting Plaintiffs to amend their pleadings to join the Nail Salon as a defendant by way of the Third Amended Complaint\(^3\).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT BELOW ERRED IN IGNORING UNCONTESTED FACTS IN THE RECORD (Pa 66-78; 95-96; 122; T1 at 53:11-17; 69:12-71:10; 101:6-23; 102:1-5; 103:1-104:1; 104:16-24; 105:16-106:11; 108:10-25; 111:10-11; 186:10-25; 187:17-25; T2 at 143:16-144:1; T3 at 8:6-8; 13:14-14; T4 at 4:16; 12:1-2; 13:10; 22:5-7; 23:23-24:3; 24:18-25; 25:4-7; 25:23-26:19)
[brief] The trial court thus correctly reasoned that because “a student’s protected status under the LAD may still be unlawfully used” pursuant to the Revised Policy “to determine whether parental reporting is to occur,” the LAD claim is likely to succeed.  (Da406).  In other words, as the court noted, “even though protected status may only be part of the consideration, the Board has, nevertheless, opened the door to differential treatment based upon students’ protected status. ”  Ibid.³  Appellants’ argument that ruling for the State “would prohibit notifying a parent that their child is pregnant because pregnancy is a protected characteristic under the LAD,” (Db13), only highlights their misunderstanding.  The State has repeatedly agreed that “a school district may be obligated to disclose a student’s status” whenever it has “a specific and compelling need, such as the health and safety of a student or an incident of bias-related crime. ” (Da232).  Thus, there may be a circumstance in which parents of LGBTQ+ and non-LGBTQ+ students must be notified about an issue that requires the disclosure even of any relevant LAD-protected characteristics.  But Appellants may not adopt a blanket policy that singles out LGBTQ+ students for parental notification based on those very characteristics.  That remains differential treatment.
[brief] He testified that on April 24, he approached the Shop Rite and saw a car that he recognized.  (1T 105-4 to 14)  The car belonged to a woman he recognized from work; he did not know the woman’s name as they were “[n]ot really good friends but we just knew each other on a hi and bye basis. ”  (1T 115-1 to 3, 115-13 to 14, 116-5 to 6)  [...] testified that he had just bought a brand-new Jeep and wanted “to brag a little bit” to the woman.  (1T 105-14 to 16)  He pulled up to the woman’s sedan, rolled down his window, and talked for a little bit before the woman drove away.  (1T 105-16 to 25)  As [...] and the woman were talking, [...] pulled up in his pickup truck.  (1T 106-18 to 20)  [...] testified that [...] must have seen him because “he pulled over where our cars were. ”  (1T 106-24 to 107-1)  When [...] was done talking with the woman, he walked over and began speaking to [...].  (1T 107-3 to 4)  [...] testified that he had known [...] “for maybe a year,” and became friends with him by “[b]uying used cars from” him.  (1T 117-23 to 24, 118-1 to 5)  [...] acknowledged that he “can understand why it’s going to be looking like a drug deal” but maintained that it was not, and he was simply talking to two people he knew.  (1T 107-4 to 6)  [...] testified that he and [...] talked about the new Jeep for about five to seven minutes, and that during this time, [...] did lean into [...]’s truck.  (1T 107-12 to 18)  [...] maintained that he did not sell or give any drugs to [...] nor did he see any drugs in [...]’s vehicle.  (1T 108-8 to 23)  After a few minutes, [...]’s wife began shouting at him, saying “let’s go, we got to go shopping,” so [...] said goodbye to [...], drove to the grocery store entrance, and went inside with his wife to go food shopping.
[brief] As stated in Schedule B, Part 1 “Requirements” of the Commitment of Title Insurance by [...] through its agent, [...], “All of the following Requirements must be met .  . . 4.  Documents satisfactory to the Company that convey the Title or create the Mortgage to be insured, or both, must be properly authorized, executed, delivered, and recorded in the Public Records.  a.  Deed from [...] and [...] to [...]. ”  As the party seeking the title insurance, the listed Proposed Insured – Plaintiff [...] – needed to comply with all requirements as a condition precedent to obtaining title insurance for its benefit.  As there was a condition precedent that was not satisfied for the Commitment of Title Insurance, namely providing Defendants with a “Deed from [...] and [...] to [...],” there was no binding contract between the parties and therefore no liability can arise.
[brief] It did not find that there was either actual or constructive notice to [...] of the defective lighting, and there is no case law that imposes a requirement on [...] to fix the lighting (2T:12-13).  On December 14, 2023, the Trial Court delivered its decisions on [...]'s summary judgment motion and on its motion to bar the testimony of plaintiff's liability experts on the basis of "net opinions" (3T).  On the issue as to where the accident occurred, i.e., inside of the crosswalk or before the crosswalk, the Trial Court found that there was a dispute of the facts between [...]'s testimony that he was impacted in the crosswalk as against the defense liability experts’ analyses and opinions to the contrary (3T:11-12).  The Trial Court also found that the issue as to whether the streetlight was in operation also was in dispute.  (3T:12).  Moreover, summary judgment was precluded on the issues of whether a tree blocked a stop sign at the intersection and whether [...] was riding his skateboard when he was struck (3T:12).  Then, the Trial Court tackled the issues as to whether there was a dangerous condition in the intersection and whether [...]’s conduct was palpably unreasonable.  Despite having decided that there were various disputed issues raised by plaintiff, the Trial Court nevertheless took the approach that the issue of palpable unreasonableness must be established “in this case, in large part, by the expert opinion of plaintiff’s liability expert” (3T:13).  The Trial Court then proceeded to bar the testimony of plaintiff’s liability experts on the following grounds: neither of plaintiff’s experts provided standards or statute placing a duty on [...] (3T:20); [...]’s determination that the stop sign was hidden was not relevant since the driver was aware of the sign (3T:21); there was no actual notice of the inoperability of the streetlight (3T:21); there was no evidence of constructive notice with regard to the inoperability of the streetlight (3T:21); improper trimming of the tree was of no consequence given the driver’s knowledge of the intersection (3T:21, 22) (the Trial Court did not discuss the fact that the tree blocked lighting to the crosswalk, a key fact in the case); there is no "customary practice" that the Borough had the responsibility "to check on the functionality of the street lights" (3T:22); there is no history of prior complaints of inadequate lighting, incidents or injuries (3T: 24, 25); the experts offered no support as to why the Borough should have engaged a qualified lighting expert (3T:25); the experts failed to "provide any information demonstrating the prevalence" of backlighting (3T:26).  Accordingly, the Trial Court granted [...]'s dispositive motions.
[brief] New Jersey courts apply a “broad standard” in evaluating whether a defendant has standing to challenge an illegal search or seizure.  Mollica, 114 N.J. at 339.  Unlike in the federal context, where the only question is whether a defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or items seized, New Jersey courts consider whether the defendant has a proprietary, possessory, or participatory interest in that place or those items.  State v. Bruns, 172 N.J. 40, 46 (2002) (citing State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 228 (1981)).  If such an interest is established, the defendant is deemed to have a sufficient connection to the evidence for standing purposes.  Mollica, 114 N.J. at 339.
[brief] Disputed.  The July 2020 invoice was paid in full because [...] did not begin work until July 6, 2020, and thus was not entitled to payment for the full month of July 2020. \(^{54}\)  Note [...]’s admissions and disputes related to the July 2020 invoice: 13.  Admitted that [...] did not direct [...] back into service until July 6, 2020.  ([...] Cert. at ¶ 12, Board Exhibit 10).  \(^{54}\)  Pa267 – Pa272 14.  Admitted that [...] received a payment of $514,276.02; and disputed that the payment satisfied [...]’s July 2020 invoice in full.  (SUMF at ¶ 19).  Again, the Board contended that the July 2020 payment was paid in full since it was undisputed that [...] did not begin until July 6, 2020, meaning that the Board was entitled to a prorated reducing the July 2020 bill.  The court should not have chosen sides to resolve that factual dispute between the parties.
[brief] Nonetheless, defendant failed to introduce his own expert or any other witness to challenge the validity of fingerprint analysis generally or the ACE-V method specifically.  The State had no opportunity to cross-examine any expert, let alone one the authors of any study now cited on appeal. \(^3\)  Defendant cannot \(^3\) [...], the co-author of *Juror Perceptions of Opposing Expert Forensic Psychologists: Preexisting Attitudes, Confirmation Bias, and Belief Perseverance*, 28 *Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L.* 213 (2022), a study cited by defendant for the first time on appeal, see (Da93-105), appears as amicus curiae introduce for the first time on appeal evidence he believes calls the State’s expert’s opinion into doubt, and his attempt to do so should be rejected.
[brief] In *Strickland*, the Court established a two-part test, later adopted by our Supreme Court in *State v. Fritz*, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), as the standard under the New Jersey Constitution, to determine whether a defendant has been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.  *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 687.  Under the first prong of the standard, a petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient.  It must be demonstrated that counsel's handling of the matter “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. ”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.
[brief] The same is true of any future Tier A MS4 permit.  Future permits may regulate the conduct of the facility, but not its development.  The purpose of the [...]’s regulations is frustrated if the [...] may permit the construction of a facility when the discharges and corresponding permits that will be required in the future could be incompatible with the WQPA.  \(^2\)  Appellant does not argue that new TMDLs and wasteload allocations must be generated as part of the consistency assessment, as the respondents incorrectly asserted, [...] Rb41; BP Rb19, but rather that the proposed development’s consistency with any existing TMDLs and wasteload allocations must be investigated and considered before the [...] issues a permit.  At the very least, if the [...] has spread around its WQPA statutory mandates to various other regulatory programs as it now claims, [...] Rb38-39, the [...] must have explained or made findings in the record as to how these regulations satisfy the Consistency Assessment for this project as a prerequisite to this permit.  There is no such record, and thus there is nothing for the Appellant or this Court to review.
[brief] First, [...]’s exclusion frustrates our State’s expressed policy of encouraging the broadest possible coverage for risks associated with operation of an automobile.  The exclusion invoked here eliminates $5,000,000 in liability coverage for defendant [...].  Second, the State’s public policy of affording coverage for intrafamily claims is significantly intertwined with our State’s jurisprudence that has abrogated immunities for intrafamily claims.  With the abrogation of these immunities, consumers are either left exposed to personal liability arising from intrafamilial claims or they must be able to procure insurance to cover such claims, which is frustrated by intrafamily liability exclusions.  While one may be led to believe that there would be no risk to personal exposure in an intrafamily liability claim, same is simply not true.  As referenced above, an intrafamily liability exclusion would deny liability coverage for a driver-parent who injures their passenger-child in an automobile accident.  One could imagine the result if the child’s parents were divorced and not on amicable terms.  A cause of action by the non-driver spouse against his or her ex-spouse on behalf of the child would almost be inevitable.  One could also imagine that the lack of insurance coverage would not dissuade (and perhaps may encourage) the prosecuting spouse from pursuing any and all personal assets from their ex-spouse whose actions injured their child in an automobile accident.  Third, such exclusions expose insureds to the very liability risk that they are paying a premium to insure against.  More specifically, insureds purchase liability coverage to reduce or eliminate exposure to their own personal assets due to negligent, albeit inadvertent, actions, such as the negligent operation of a motor vehicle.  One of the very few things that an insured actually controls when buying insurance is the amount of coverage to purchase.  That decision is personal to each insured and is often based upon several factors such as risk-aversion, wealth, and personal assets.  When insureds purchase insurance coverage, they can look to the declarations page that has been tailored to their selections (unlike the policy itself over which an insured has no control) and know that their personal assets are protected from liabilities up to the amount they have selected as evidenced on the declarations page.  Exclusions in the policy that, unbeknownst to the insured, serve to reduce this coverage expose the insured to unexpected personal liability.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 393.  The *Hargett* court explained:  Generally, an AOM should identify the licensed person who allegedly deviated from the acceptable standard of care.  *Medeiros v. O’Donnell & Naccarto, Inc.*, 347 N.J. Super. 536, 542, 790 A.2d 969 (App. Div. 2002).
[directive] Additional Conditions  A mandatory Drug Enforcement and Demand Reduction (DEDR)  The defendant is hereby ordered to provide a DNA sample and □ penalty is imposed for each count.  (Write in number of counts for ordered to pay the costs for testing of the sample provided each degree.) (N.J.S.A. 53:1-20.20 and 53:1-20.29).  N.J.S.A. DEDR penalty reduction granted (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15a(2))
[brief] Point III  No cumulative errors denied defendant a right to a fair proceeding.  Defendant has not demonstrated any cumulative errors that entitle him to relief.  It is well established that “[e]ven if an individual error does not require reversal, the cumulative effect of a series of errors can cast doubt on a verdict and call for a new trial. ”  State v. Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452, 469 (2018) (citing State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 473 (2008)).  However, the theory of cumulative error does not apply where no error was prejudicial.  State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 155 (2014).  For the aforementioned reasons, none of defendant’s arguments establish a single error, let alone prejudicial errors warranting reversal.  Point IV
[brief] (41T:135-2 to 136-21; 42T:176-12 to 177-17; 186-3 to 19)  [...] concluded many of the injuries appeared to be perimortem, but acknowledged that injuries to bone can appear to be perimortem even when they occur up to 12-18 hours following death.  (42T:89-5 to 90-19; 120-4 to 121-17)  [...] opined that it was not “likely” that the injuries could have been caused just by falling down the stairs.  (42T:121-22 to 122-24)  [...] admitted, however, that could not rule out that the bone injuries may have been the result of damage done to [blacked out] if his body was damaged prior to being placed in heat.  (42T:89-5 to 21)  [...] noted that there was no indication of any injury to [blacked out] bones that could be classified as antemortem, as in occurring far enough in advance of his death for bone healing to have begun to occur.  (42T:84-20 to 85-1)  After receiving [...]’s report, [...] declared the manner of death to be “homicide.
[brief] At the time of the accident, [...] did not own any of the vehicles listed on the policy; did not pay any premiums on the policy; used only one vehicle on the policy once a week; and his primary vehicle, the Chevy Venture minivan which only he drove, was insured through a different insurance company. ” ).  Further, as the New Jersey Supreme Court made clear in Zacarias, insurance policies should be construed “against the insurer, consistent with the reasonable expectations of insureds” only “when those policies are overly complicated, unclear, or written as a trap for the unguarded consumer.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT, LAW DIVISION, MONMOUTH COUNTY  DOCKET NO.: [...] SAT BELOW:  HON. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT  [...]  [...]  [...], Esq. (#028172000)  [...]  P: [...]  F: [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
[brief] [...] did not adhere to this directive before deactivating his camera.  (1T 201-10 to 17)  Furthermore, officers should not be permitted to turn off their camera to shield evidence of a plan to violate a defendant’s rights, as defense counsel alleged occurred here.  (1T 201-5 to 22)  Because defense counsel did reasonably assert that the missing evidence was exculpatory, and the State did not attempt to address the defense’s argument about the body-worn cameras, [...] was entitled to the presumption.  If this Court is not inclined to apply the presumption on appeal because the trial court did not consider the statute or apply the standard, and if this Court does not suppress the physical evidence for other reasons, then it should remand for a new suppression hearing, without forcing [...] to withdraw from the plea.
[brief] e.  The Planning Board is limited to Fact-finding, not policy-making.  A fundamental goal of American jurisprudence is to integrate constitutions, statutes, regulations, ordinances, and waivers to ensure the practical operation of government under the law.  To achieve this goal, municipalities establish policies that align with the enabling sources of authority assigned to them.  The [...] has a certified master plan and enabling ordinances that contain the policies to be followed by its fact-finding boards and agencies.  Ordinance section 380-33, paragraphs (6) and (7), stipulate that setbacks in the R-25 zone should be as “close to 200 feet as practicable. ”  Additionally, ordinance section 380-35D requires that no development shall occur within 300 feet of wetlands.  By applying all the physical facts of this application in conjunction with the Estell Manor ordinances, the policies established therein, and the Pinelands waiver, a comprehensive factual basis is created from which factual and then legal conclusions can be drawn.  As noted in Russell v. Tenafly, 31 N.J. 58, 65 (1959):  The function of boards of adjustment, in deciding an application, is essentially fact-finding, as opposed to policymaking.  In this case, the Board and the trial court claimed to review the “merits” but avoided examining the items that would have necessitated a legal conclusion consistent with the policies contained in the statutes and regulations promulgated by the Legislature, as well as the ordinances of the [...].  This avoidance undermines the factual and legal integrity of their conclusions and contravenes established jurisprudential goals.
[brief] E.g., NRDC v. Regan, 67 F.4th 397, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (“In all decisions the agency makes that are based on science, EPA is instructed to use ‘the best available, peer-reviewed science. ’”); Custer Cty. Action Ass’n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1034 (10th Cir. 2001) (NEPA analysis requires “best available scientific information”); Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1453 (9th Cir. 1988) (analysis of threat to endangered species must use “best scientific and commercial data available”).  While the FHACA does not spell out this specific requirement, the [...] itself asserts that “the function of the [...] is to help ensure that the department’s decision-making is based upon the best possible scientific and technical information.
[brief] Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. Burke, 158 N.J. Super. 436, 440-41 (App. Div. 1978)  R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 255, 271 (2001)  Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336 (2000)