ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Beginning with the two-step dismissal process that occurred on January 6, 2023, without prejudice and again with prejudice on June 1, 2023.  Plaintiff adhered to all the Defendants’ requests cited in their final Motion to Dismiss; in addition, Plaintiff provided the trial court copies of her submissions to the Defendants habitual requests, responded to their habitual Motions to Dismiss, calendared phone calls, exchanged multiple emails, participated in their secure link submissions, held settlement discussions, attended to their multiple oral argument requests to reaffirm her successful submissions to all interested parties, never submitted a squash request, was transparent throughout the process and with an --- \(^8\) “Rule 4:23-2(b)(3) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof with or without prejudice, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party;”
[brief] (1T10-9 to 1T10-20; 1T13-8 to 1T13-21).  The personal items include workbenches, cabinets, exercise equipment, and motorcycles.  (1T10-16 to 1T10-20; 1T13-8 to 1T13-21; 1T19-20 to 1T19-22).  Some of the personal items and the vehicles would be out in the yard if they did not have the garage.  (1T34-8 to 1T35-5).  The garage is not used for commercial purposes.  (1T13-14 to 1T13-17).  [...] further testified that there is no negative impact on neighbors.  The garage is 50 feet from the Plaintiffs’ property, and no other neighbor has complained about the garage.  (1T11-19 to 1T12-5).  No extra grading was done.  [...] are not the cause of any water issues on Plaintiffs’ property, which predate the Tomarchios’ purchase of the Property (1T11-20; 1T36-20 to 1T37-8).  Plaintiff [...] and his friend/engineer/planner [...] testified on behalf of Plaintiffs.
[brief] (T3, 21:15-22:4 (Court: My first question was during the period of… remediation, can we really consider the property as being discontinued as being used?  It can’t be used.  Defendant’s counsel:  …Absolutely.  People use their properties during remediation all the time.  All the time… remediation happens on businesses and properties that are in operation all the time.)).  Despite the opportunity to do so, Defendants did not argue before the trial court that remediation in and of itself does not constitute a use of the Property.  Instead, Defendants argued that Plaintiff could have continued to use the Property for other purposes during all stages of the ongoing remediation.  This Court need not consider Defendants’ argument in Section A.2 because Defendants failed to raise this argument before the trial court.
[brief] ”  Ibid.  Thus, the court --- 4  In relevant part, § 358 states:  (1)  A lessor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his lessee any condition, whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk of physical harm to focused on whether the lessor and the lessee had “reason to know” of a condition that involved unreasonable risk of physical harm. Reyes, 404 N.J. Super. at 461-62.  In applying this holding to the facts at issue to the standard espoused in § 358 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Reyes Court concluded that the discovery record, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, raised genuine issues as to whether a vacationing lessee would have reasonably noticed the dangerous condition presented by the step.  Id. at 461.  In reaching this holding, the Reyes Court acknowledged that it was departing from the controlling precedent but was guided by the evolution of modern case law and the facts present in the dispute.  See Id. at 451.  See also Szeles v. Vena, 321 N.J. Super. 601, 606 (App. Div. 1999) (noting the “obvious inroads” in the law concerning the responsibilities of lessors to maintain safe premises).  Reyes’s progeny has further expanded on these inroads and continued the departure from the longstanding rules concerning landowner’s liability.
[brief] Given this fact, the Chancery Division correctly held: “No waiver is required when the parties fully apprised each other of the financial assets of the other, and Shinn does not save [...]'s claim. ” (Pa 41).  On appeal, the [...] reiterates his reliance upon *In re Estate of Shinn*, 394 N.J. Super. 55 (App. Div. 2007), contending that both the Antenuptial Agreement and the waivers contained in it are unenforceable.
[brief] I.  Plaintiff’s allegations.  Respondent, [...], will rely on Appellant’s Statement of Facts  Paragraph I.  “Plaintiff’s Allegations” as though fully set forth herein.  II.  [...]’s snow-removal contract with [...].  In appellants Statement of Facts II, appellant incorrectly set out paragraph 4 and paragraph 2 in chronological order. \(^1\)  Appellants inaccurately described the contract as a proposal.  Rather, page one (1) identified the services to be performed and related pricing.  Da 43.  Separately, pages two (2) through four (4) articulate the terms of the “snow removal contract 2020-2021.  Da44.  \(^1\)  In appellant’s Statement of Facts II, appellant incorrectly set out paragraph 4 and paragraph 2 in non-chronological order.  Respondent’s Statement of Facts setting forth paragraphs 2 and 4 in chronological order is consistent with the court below.  1T 19:22-25 and 20:1-25 and 21:1-4.
[brief] It is, rather, merely to ask whether, following issuance of a sister state judgment, there then existed “reasonable grounds to believe that the insured’s interests might be served by an appeal. ”  Pharmacists, 187 Vt. at 334, 993 A.2d at 421 (emphasis added).  This question can be answered “yes” without purporting to reverse or vacate a sister state’s judgment or findings.  [...] did not ask the Trial Court, and is not asking this Court, to reverse or vacate any rulings of the Vermont Trial Court. \(^2\)  Rather, whether [...] breached its duty to defend the Vermont suit turns on whether, as of March 5, 2021, there then existed “reasonable grounds to believe that the insured’s interests might be served by an appeal. ”  *Pharmacists*, 187 Vt. at 334, 993 A.2d at 421 (emphasis added).  That question cannot be evaded, as [...] tries to do, by simply ignoring it and pointing to the results of [...]’s breach of its duty to defend, namely, [...]’s settlement of the [...] leaving adverse Vermont Trial Court rulings unchallenged.  The relevant time for analyzing [...] liability to [...] is the time of breach, March 5, 2021, not the present time.  *Pharmacists* is instructive on this point.  In *Pharmacists*, a jury had found the policyholder liable for defamation and for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that verdict was upheld on appeal.
[brief] See also R. 3:22-6(d); State v. Velez, 329 N. J. Super. 128, 134 (App. Div. 2000) (PCR counsel obligated to conduct “exhaustive examination of the entire trial record” to “determine[ ] whether a viable attack might have been made on the underlying conviction”).  Furthermore, if the court fails to consider any PCR claims or denies oral argument on a claim without a statement of reasons, defendant is entitled to a remand so they can be considered.  State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 275-75 (2012); Webster, 187 N.J. at 257-58.  [...] sua sponte vacated longstanding discovery orders and demanded new PCR counsel immediately proceed to arguing the merits of the PCR.  Counsel protested she had not completed investigation of all potential claims, threshold issues remained, and her ethical obligation to her client was being jeopardized.  The insistence she nonetheless argue an incomplete petition is the epitome of an unreasonable abuse of discretion, which denied [...] his constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel on PCR and due process of law.  *State v. Hayes*, 205 N.J. 522, 540 (2011) (denial of adjournment is abuse of discretion where it is “unreasonable and prejudicial to defendant’s rights”).
[brief] That did not occur here – probably due to the lack of actual discovery conducted by the Appellant.  Most notably, the Appellant argues that there were “undisputed violations of the CFA,” which could not be further from accurate.  The Plaintiff never even put a case on Trial in reference to the Consumer Fraud Act, and relied only in his written Complaint.  According to Plaintiff’s Brief, they certainly believe that this matter falls into either of two categories: (1) the trial court has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis; or (2) it is obvious that the Court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significant of probative, competent evidence.  *D’Atria v. D’Atria*, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990).  The general rule is that "Plain" or "harmful" error is error that is "clearly capable of producing an unjust result."  R. 2:10-2.  The plain error rule and the harmful error rule are identical.  The different terms are just used in different situations, depending on whether the error was brought to the attention of the trial judge.
[brief] On April 25, 2023, defendants filed an Amended Answer with Affirmative Defenses.  Defendants asserted **116** denials and **23** affirmative defenses. (Pa48).  On Wednesday May 17, 2023, the trial court held a mandatory Rule 4:69-4 virtual case management conference.  (Pa79, 1T).  At the request of defendants, the trial court stayed all limited and expedited discovery by plaintiff.  The trial court granted defendants leave to file a dispositive pre-discovery summary judgment motion limited to Count One on or before July 31, 2023.  (1T, 16, ln 17-17, ln23; 30, ln 20-21, ln 3).  On July 31, 2023, defendants filed their premature pre-discovery summary judgment motion.  (Pa162).  Defendants relied upon the allegations contained in plaintiff’s hybrid complaint.  (Pa164).  Defendants relied upon the supporting certification of counsel.  (Pa169).  No individual defendant filed a supporting certification under oath and penalty of perjury.  Defendants claimed litigation/legislative privileges and qualified immunity.  Defendants ignored clear and unambiguous OPRA and OPMA statutory purposes language.  Defendants cited no contrary developing intervening case law.  Despite post commencement curative remediation actions, defendants still denied that they violated our State’s strong public policy in favor of robust informed civic participation.  Plaintiff did not file a cross-motion.  However, plaintiff filed an opposition certification under oath and penalty of perjury and a 72 paragraphs counterstatement of material facts.  (Pa219; Pa234).  Defendants declined to respond to 67 paragraphs, claiming lack of relevancy.  (Pa326; 2T).  In his Opposition Certification, plaintiff incorporated by reference his earlier prior certifications and exhibits.  (Pa234-SJ Opp Cert. #13).  To assist the court, plaintiff also prepared a highlighted complaint indicating defendants’ admission by **bold** font and their denials by *italicized underlined* font.  (Pa234–SJ Opp Cert. #23-25; Pa241-Exhibit DD).  On September 23, 2023 and after hearing virtual public oral argument, the trial court granted defendants summary judgment and dismissed plaintiff’s entire hybrid 5 counts 309 paragraphs complaint with prejudice.  (Pa80; 2T).  During the September 22, 2023 oral argument, defendants attacked plaintiff’s character, integrity and professional competence even though credibility was not a proper summary judgment issue.  (2T, 6, ln. 6-9; 8, ln. 4-6; ln.13-14; ln 21-22; 9, ln 24-10, ln 3; 11, ln. 3-7; 11, ln. 24-12, ln 1).  On September 22, 2023, defendants also concealed material intervening facts from the trial court.  On September 22, 2023, defendants misstated the law to the trial court.  **Plaintiff’s Reconsideration, Alteration, Amendment and Vacation Motion**
[brief] (32T33-15 to 35-25)  During those interviews, [...] had told [...] that he liked him, thought he was a good guy, and that he “knew” that [...] was not the shooter.  (26T10-2 to 4; 32T55-17 to 21)  [...] testified that in mid-January, Defendant was staying with him at the [...] in [...] and helping him sell drugs.
[brief] See also Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 445-46 (2007); see also Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998).  That is, the Court must consider whether there are any material factual disputes and, if not, whether the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, would permit a decision in that party's favor on the underlying issue as a matter of law.  *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 540.  While the Appellate Division's review is de novo, its review is limited to the record before the trial court when it decided the original motion for summary judgment.  *Ji v. Palmer*, 333 N.J. Super. 451, 464 (App. Div. 2000).  Therefore, when reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the Court can "consider the case only as it had been unfolded to that point," and the evidential material submitted on that motion.  *Bilotti v. Accurate Forming Corp.*, 39 N.J. 184, 188 (1953); *Scott v. Salerno*, 297 N.J. Super. 437, 447 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 409 (1997).  The Court's review is also limited by the actual issues and arguments raised before the trial court, and therefore such review ordinarily should not include new arguments raised for the first time on appeal.  *Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co.*, 62 N.J. 229 (1973) (holding that issues not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal unless the matter concerns the jurisdiction of the trial court or a substantial public interest).
[brief] (Pa491-507).  Plaintiff requires assistance in caring for himself and his apartment, which he had to move into as it was wheelchair accessible unlike his prior home.  (Pa491-507).  Plaintiff has a different living arrangement now than prior to the injury.  (Pa491-507).  The plaintiff’s new apartment, though it accommodates a wheelchair including into the bathroom, is not handicap accessible, there is no ability to roll a water-resistant manual wheelchair into the shower.
[brief] Aside from the January 2019 [...] Incident, there were no other racial slur incidents.  (Pl. Tr. 258:1-3; [...] Dep. 128:1-2).  Nor has Plaintiff identified a single ageist remark by anyone, let alone her supervisor.  Aside from [...]’s use of a racial slur, Plaintiff points to [...]’s lack of communication as somehow harassing.  However, if a supervisor’s “rudeness,” “lack of sensitivity,” “coldness” and “lack of civility” cannot qualify as “severe or pervasive” conduct under LAD, then no more could [...]’s lack of communication, particularly given the absence of any nexus between the conduct and Plaintiff’s protected class.  Even when viewed cumulatively, the acts alleged by Plaintiff were plainly insufficient to present a hostile work environment claim to a jury.
[brief] (1T)  The court noted that it had a few motions to address and then would proceed to trial on the Pharmacy Case.  (1T 3-15 to 4-14)  The court reiterated that once the trial began, it would not accept a negotiated plea.  (1T 3-18 to 21)  The court summarized [...]’s sentencing exposure and asked the State for its final plea offer.  (1T 4-18 to 5-4)  The State explained that if [...] pleaded guilty to the felony murder charge in the Pharmacy Case and the armed robbery charge in the 7-Eleven Case, it would request a 30-year sentence with 30 years of parole ineligibility on the felony murder, concurrent to a 12-year NERA sentence on the armed robbery.  (1T 5-5 to 6-2)  The State would also ask Pennsylvania to run any convictions from the Pennsylvania robbery concurrent to [...]’s New Jersey sentence.  (Ibid.)  The State told [...] that if he went to trial on the Pharmacy Case and was acquitted, it would seek an extended term on the 7-Eleven Case, which would subject [...] to life in prison.  (1T 4-11 to 25, 5-24 to 6-7, 9-3 to 10)  The State also threatened to seek consecutive sentences on all cases if [...] proceeded to trial (1T 5-24 to 6-7, 9-10 to 15), and the judge stated that he would in fact impose consecutive sentences.  (1T 8-11 to 23)  After conferring with defense counsel, [...] decided to accept the State’s global plea offer.  (1T 9-3 to 23, 12-9 to 28-16; Da 54-60)  Pursuant to Rule 3:9-3(f), [...] entered into a conditional plea, preserving his right to appeal the 404(b) decision in the Pharmacy Case and the suppression decision in the 7-Eleven Case.
[brief] To that end, [...] & [...] obtained a foundation permit (issued May 7, 2009) and a demolition permit (issued June 9, 2009).  No building permit for the building or overall project was submitted at that time (and none, ultimately, was ever submitted).  (Pa0205).  [...] and [...] demolished the existing home and began the site work, which including moving several very large trees which were in conflict with the proposed new home.  According to [...], it expended some $382,006.57 for the demolition and site work.  Significantly, [...]’s architectural contract with [...] specifically included services of Administration of the construction contract.
[brief] On March 15, 2024, as [...] had now pled guilty and entered PTI, [...] ordered [...]’s discovery deposition to occur by May 24, 2024.  Pa10.  On May 13, 2024, [...] was placed under oath for his discovery deposition and confirmed he understood his obligation to tell the truth.  Da265 (8:1-3); Da267 (10:5-15).  [...] then proceeded to contradict the version of events he had given in his sworn guilty plea factual basis before [...].  First, contrary to his sworn admission that he had a “verbal disagreement” with [...] that “actually turned physical”, Da249 (17:10-20), [...] now denied ever having a verbal disagreement with [...] and claimed the only thing he told [...] was to “calm down”.  Da299-300 (42:23-43:3); Da329-330 (72:15-73:10).  [...] then contradicted his sworn testimony that he had “actually assaulted [[...]] by pushing him to the ground” and that in doing so he had “attempted to cause [[...]] significant bodily injury[.]”  Da249-250 (17:21-18:1).  At his deposition, [...] denied intentionally shoving [...] to the ground and claimed that [...] simply “lost his balance” and “fell”:  Q: How did [[...]] end up on the ground?  A: We were going back and forth, like grappling.  And we kind of like lost our balance.  And he fell to the ground.  [….]  Q: And you threw [[...]] on the ground or did you just slam him?  A: He fell to the ground.  Q: He fell to the ground.  A: Yes.  Q: Do you know what caused him to fall?  A: Well, it was like a weird gravelly area.  I was about to fall to.  But he kind of lost his balance.  Q: He lost his balance?  A: Yes.  [Da300-1 (43:19-44:12) (emphasis added). ]  * * *  Q: [D]id you shove [[...]] to the ground because you were bigger than him with the intent to cause him injury?  A: No.  [….]  Q: So it was not your intention to cause [[...]] serious bodily injury or significant bodily injury, correct?  A: My sole intention was to stop the fight.  [Da330-1 (73:11-14; 74:4-8). ]  In light of [...]’s self-contradictory testimony, Plaintiff’s counsel sought to cross-examine [...] with the transcript of his prior inconsistent statements from the time of his guilty plea, in which he admitted, under oath, that he shoved [...] to the ground in an attempt to cause serious bodily injury.
[brief] The State opposes defendant’s appeal and submits the following in support of its opposition.  ---  5  As defendant’s appendix is designated “Pa,” the State’s appendix has been designated “Sa” to prevent confusion.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S CLAIM SHE WAS ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY.  Defendant argues both the municipal court’s and the Law Division’s denial of her request for additional discovery amounted to “manifest error” and a “wrongful conviction,” such that this Court should reverse both.  Db6.  Defendant concedes the discovery she sought was evidence “[consistent] with [her] experience and perception of the facts of the incident;” defendant never claimed the State did not provide her with discovery.  Db1.  Nonetheless, she argues the State intentionally violated R. 7:7-7(b) by withholding exculpatory evidence.  Db9.  Because the record did not support defendant’s claim, both the municipal court and the Law Division correctly rejected them.  Both courts found the State had met its discovery obligation under R. 7:7-7(b).  Therefore, the State respectfully requests this Court deny defendant’s appeal and affirm [...]’s denial of defendant’s discovery request.  Following a conviction in the Law Division, a defendant “lose[s] the cloak of innocence,” and bears the burden of showing the lower court erred.
[brief] Based on the events set forth in the Statement of Facts, Appellant will argue that:  [...], as the site and grading contractor for the job, was responsible for hiring a land surveyor to stake out elevations called for by engineer [...]’s grading plan.  [...] initially contacted [...] in 2008 and provided him with [...]'s initial grading plan, labeled "Sheet 4", dated 4/11/05.  Rigg submitted a proposal for the work to [...] in December 2008.  [...] authorized the work on March 16, 2009.  Rigg began staking out the property on March 23, 2009, following the direction of [...]’s 4/11/05 grading plan, the only plan given to him by its employer, [...].  Meanwhile, in January 2008, [...] discovered that the elevations shown by [...] in its 4/11/05 grading plan for the floor of the existing building on site were significantly too low by approximately 30” throwing off the elevations of other key aspects of the entire site, and requiring that the grading plan be redone by [...].
[brief] For the foregoing reasons the court should reverse the summary judgment order granted to defendants, reverse the denial of [...]’s motion for reconsideration, and reverse the denial of [...]’s motion to extend discovery to take the deposition of [...].  [...]  By: ____________________________  [...]  Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant  [...]  [...], Plaintiff, v. MEADOWLANDS  HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, MHA, LLC  F/D/B/A [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], being fictitious parties whose identities are currently unknown, both jointly and severally Defendants.
[brief] Defendants never exhausted its administrative remedies with the Commissioner, but brought a Counterclaim and motion for summary judgment seeking the interpretation, enforcement, and adjudication of an 18A school law statute, N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Education.  In its original February 17, 2023, order, the court correctly concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction over Defendants’ 18A school law claims, and that Defendants breached the contract.  In its April 28, 2023, reconsideration order, did the court commit legal error when it reversed itself and retained jurisdiction to adjudicate Defendants’ school law claim to enforce and interpret an 18A statute in a suit that the Legislature never expressly or implied authorized to be brought in Superior Court?  2.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PAGE NOS.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................  4  STATEMENT OF FACTS  .......................................................................  6  LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................  23 POINT I  THE PASSION/PROVOCATION  MANSLAUGHTER CONVICTION MUST BE VACATED AND A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL ENTERED BECAUSE THE JURY FOUND THAT THE STATE DID NOT DISPROVE SELF-DEFENSE.  (Not Raised Below)  ......................  23 POINT II  THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT ON THE REQUESTED RELATED OFFENSE OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.  (7T 106-7 to 107-6)  ..........................  26 POINT III  DEFENDANT’S CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE MEDICAL EXAMINER’S TESTIMONY IMPROPERLY EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF HIS EXPERTISE.  (5T 139-4 to 7, 139-14 to 23; 7T 92-8 to 97-11)  ...........................................