ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The vacant house does not generate income.  [...] does not derive a benefit from the sidewalk abutting a vacant house.  Even if the house was listed for sale, access to it for that purpose is simply not sufficient.  It does not make it a commercial property because access is not any different than if a private residence was offered for sale.  [...] is not conducting a daily business at [...] to which a “safe and convenient access is essential. ”  More importantly, because no activity takes place there, [...] does not have any employees present to monitor the necessity for snow and ice removal.  *Id.* at 81 (citations omitted).  Undeniably, applying the standards expressed in *Grijalba* and *Briglia* leads to the unmistakable conclusion that the [...]’ property located at [...] in [...] was in no way a commercial property the way plaintiff-appellant would like it to be.
[brief] On August 5, 2021, the [...], along with [...] and [...], filed a motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint.  By Orders entered on September 23, 2021, this Court granted the [...]' motion for summary judgment and the motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint as against the [...], [...] and [...].  This Court found that the Plaintiffs' default under its lease with [...] was the cause of the termination.  That event then enabled the [...] to enter a new lease with [...] and become successors to the solar farm development.  [Emphasis added.]  Because the land-lease and the fully-purchased solar-energy rights were independent transactions, the latter being fully owned by Appellants in perpetuity, the underlying orders were all predicated upon the various defendants’ “house of cards.
[brief] It acts to the exclusion of other policy considerations enumerated in the Act, e.g., “to facilitate flexibility and innovation in the development of long-term care insurance coverage. ”  N.J.S.A. 17B:27E-1.  Moreover, the Department has no answer to [...]’s showing that an amorphous (and plainly non-actuarial) consideration like “public interest” “empower[s] [the Department] to deploy breathtakingly broad statutory language to arbitrarily pick winners and losers.
[brief] Defendants acknowledge that, “the determinative issue in this case . . . [is that Plaintiffs] must prove [Defendants] knew or should have known of the 2015 Musto-Miller error. ”\(^{12}\)  Thus, any dispute of fact must be both genuine and material to the issue of Defendants’ actual or constructive knowledge of Plaintiffs’ outstanding title or claim following from the potential error.  Defendants incorrectly point to two primary sources of “factual dispute:” (1) that others missed the mistake; and (2) Defendants’ expert opined that “a reasonably prudent buyer . . . would not have constructive or inquiry notice that Lot 3 was less than 66.3 feet wide at its frontage.
[brief] First, as set forth in Part I, the HCH Action did not cease to be a “suit” as of March 5, 2021, by reason of summary judgment “findings” that, as of March 5, 2021, were subject to appellate review and vacatur.  Second, the cited “findings” do not “find” that [...] received any “personal profit, remuneration, or advantage,” but at most suggest that [...] or his spouse might, in the future, possibly gain some “advantage” if then-pending claims against [...] and certain former Association officers were pressed to a successful conclusion with legal assistance from [...].  Pb6–13.  Third, the posited hypothetical future “advantage” did not exist when [...] withdrew its defense of the HCH Action, and [...] could not and did not show below that such “advantage” was one to which [...] would not have been entitled to receive in the event that it ever materialized.  Fourth, the [...] Policy language, “‘Losses’ based upon or attributable to the insured gaining any personal profit, remuneration or advantage which is not shared equitably by the condominium association or to which the insured is not legally entitled” (Pa784), does not necessarily or even reasonably describe fees that the plaintiffs paid to their own attorneys to launch and press what [...] has admitted for purposes of this appeal was a “hostile takeover bid.
[brief] *[...] v. [...] Corp.*, 256 F. App’x 515, 518-20 (3d Cir. 2007).  In *[...]*, an internet subscriber sued [...] for damages from service outages.  [...] moved to compel arbitration based upon an arbitration provision in a subscription agreement [...] argued it had mailed to all customers.  The subscriber denied receiving, seeing or signing the arbitration agreement.  The Third Circuit concluded that in a “clear and unmistakable manner” the subscriber was bound by the subscription agreement.  *Id.* at 518-20 (applying Pennsylvania common law); *cf.* *Atalese*, 219 N.J. at 444 (confirming that New Jersey has the same “clear and unmistakable” legal standard as Pennsylvania).  The *[...]* court further held: “[w]hether or not [...] received a copy of the subscription agreement, he could not accept services he knew were being tendered on the basis of a subscription agreement without becoming bound by that agreement.
[brief] v. Schneider Elec. Bldgs. Ams., Inc.**, 459 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2019) ................................. 15 - **Redd v. Bowman**, 223 N.J. 87 (2015) ...........................................  26 - **Rendine v. Pantzer**, 141 N.J. 292 (1995) ...................................... 31-32, 35-36 - **Rode v. Dellarciprete**, 892 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1990) ......................... 31 - **Seigelstein v. Shrewsbury Motors, Inc.**, 464 N.J. Super. 393 (App. Div. 2020) .................................................. 31, 35-37 - **State v. Arroyo-Nunez**, 470 N.J. Super. 351 (App. Div. 2022)
[brief] 1, 5 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18...........................................................................  12 N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) ....................................................................  13  N.J.S.A 56:8-1, et seq. .....................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c) ..........................................................................  15 N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(e)  ..........................................................................  15 N.J.S.A. 56:8-2..................................................................................15, 17  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss filed October 4, 2023……………………………………………………………..Pa31  Statement of Reasons……………………………………………………………..Pa33  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The trial court followed clear New Jersey law by dismissing Appellant [...]’s (“Appellant’s”) Complaint against [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively “Respondents”).
[directive] c.  (1)  An applicant may seek a protective order pursuant to P.L.2015, c.147 (C.2C:14-13 et al.) and the court may issue such an order regardless of whether criminal charges based on the incident were filed and regardless of the disposition of any such charges.  (2)  The filing of an application pursuant to this section shall not prevent the filing of a criminal complaint, or the institution or maintenance of a criminal prosecution based on the same act.  d.  The court shall waive any requirement that the applicant’s or alleged victim’s place of residence appear on the application.  e.  An applicant may seek a protective order pursuant to P.L.2015, c.147 (C.2C:14-13 et al.) in a court having jurisdiction over the place where the alleged conduct or attempted conduct occurred, where the respondent resides, or where the alleged victim resides or is sheltered.  f.  No fees or other costs shall be assessed against an applicant for seeking a protective order pursuant to P.L.2015, c.147 (C.2C:14-13 et al.).  N.J.S.A. 2C:14-18.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I STANDARD OF REVIEW  The Appellate Division granted Respondent’s Motion for interlocutory review.  The standard for review of a decision of a Judge of Compensation by the Appellate Division is the same as that on appeal in any non-jury case, “whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record” considering “the proofs as a whole. ”  Hersh v. City of Morris, 217 N.J. 236, 242 (2014).  Judges of Compensation judges are regarded as experts and their findings are entitled to deference, such findings must be supported by articulated reasons and grounded in the evidence.  See, e.g. Lewicki v. New Jersey Art Foundry, 88 N.J. 75 (1981).  The Workers’ Compensation Judge correctly determined that Decedent was an essential worker under N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.  The Appellate Division should affirm this decision.
[brief] ¹  On July 15, 2016, after hearing argument on competing summary judgment motions, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., Ch. P.,² granted partial summary judgment to the Respondent, ruling that Respondent had easement rights in the Property that Appellant should be permanently restrained from interfering with, including to park on Lot 5 (Ra150-Ra151).  ---  ¹  “Ra” designates Plaintiff-Respondent’s Appendix.  “Aa” designates Appellant’s Appendix.  “Ab” designates Appellant’s Brief.  “Tb” designates Defendant-Respondent [...]’s brief.  ²  Though [...] is presently Assignment Judge for Ocean County, during all relevant times discussed herein he was Presiding Chancery Division Judge.  On October 19, 2016, while final resolution of the Easement litigation remained pending, Appellant submitted a request to [...], the Zoning Enforcement Officer (the “Zoning Officer”) of Defendant/Respondent [...] (the "[...]") seeking an interpretation of the Appellant's predecessor in title's variance and related site plan granted by the Planning Board in 1972 pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 (Ra160-Ra162).
[directive] _________________________________________________________________________________________________  _________________________________________________________________________________________________  _________________________________________________________________________________________________  □ □  6.  When administering the ID, did administrator know who the suspect was, or which photo depicted the suspect?  Y N □ □  7.  Did any other attendee know which photo depicted the suspect?  Y N 8.  If yes to #6 or #7, explain the precautions taken by the administrator/other attendee to avoid knowing which photo the witness was looking at.
[brief] Furthermore, because the conviction under Ind. #2 was the result of a plea agreement, the PCR court should have reinstated all the charges contained in that indictment and placed the parties back into their pre-plea positions.  See State v. Njango, 463 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 2020) (“If the court cannot justify a concurrent sentence in compliance with the statute, then the plea, which was based upon concurrent sentences, must be vacated and the charges reinstated.
[brief] ”  [Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (quoting Reynolds Offset Co. v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 1959)).]  Here, where defendant did not object to this instruction below, this Court should decline to consider the issue on appeal.  However, if this Court nevertheless chooses to consider defendant’s claim, it should be rejected because it does not amount to plain error.  See R. 2:10-2.  Under that standard, an appellate court can reverse only if it finds that the error was “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  Ibid.; State v. Cole, 229 N.J. 430, 458 (2017).  Here, the alleged error does not have that capacity and, thus, defendant’s conviction should be affirmed on appeal.  Although the State recognizes that N.J.R.E. 104(c) explicitly precludes a trial court from informing the jury that it conducted a hearing outside of their presence and that the Court found a defendant’s statement was admissible, the Rule does not provide guidance regarding other evidence.
[brief] [...] Attorney No. 007152005  Assistant Prosecutor Appellate Section Of Counsel and on the Brief e-filed: May 24, 2024  Table of Contents  Counterstatement of Procedural History ..................................................1  Counterstatement of Facts ...........................................................................1  Legal Argument Point I  The jury clearly found that the State disproved self-defense with regard to passion / provocation manslaughter.........................................................2 Point II  The trial court properly declined to instruct the jury on aggravated assault......................................................................................4 Point III  The expert in forensic pathology properly testified within his expertise.........................................................................................6 Point IV  No jury instruction was necessary on the defendant’s failure to report the alleged sexual assault.....................................................................................8 Point V  It was not necessary to instruct the jury that self-defense could apply to the weapons charges...............................................................10  Point VI  The jury was properly instructed on the degree of theft involved and properly found the defendant guilty of third-degree theft.................................................13 Point VII  The defendant’s sentence is legal and fair..............................................15  Conclusion.................................................................................................18
[brief] Plaintiff had the burden to prove the value of her interest in [...] to the extent it was an element of her damages claim.  As the Trial Court noted, plaintiff made no effort to meet that burden, and the Court thus could not properly value plaintiff’s interest in [...].  Pa41-42.  Relying on Borodinsky v. Borodinsky, 162 N.J.Super. 437 (1978) and Torres v Schripps, Inc., 342 N.J.Super. 419 (App. Div. 2001), plaintiff now argues that under the circumstances here, in the absence of evidence from plaintiff, the Trial Court was required to appoint an expert to value plaintiff’s interest in [...].  [...] and [...] respectfully submit that those decisions only direct the Court to appoint an expert in the circumstances of those cases, which do not apply here.  Moreover, contrary to plaintiff’s arguments on this appeal, plaintiff never requested below, either at trial or on reconsideration, that the Court should appoint an expert.  Thus, even if the Trial Court should have appointed an expert, the failure to do so could only be a basis for appeal if it constituted plain error, which it clearly does not.  Further, in the circumstances here, because there is no basis for any claim against [...] or [...], the Trial Court’s failure to determine this potential element of damages is harmless error in any case, which should be disregarded on appeal.  A.
[brief] [...] also extended discovery to allow Plaintiffs time to respond to Defendants’ placental pathology expert report.  (1T30; 1T44).  Following the completion of expert discovery, on May 18, 2023, Defendants moved to reconsider the prior interlocutory orders denying their motions for summary judgment.  (Pa395; Pa430).  As [...] had since retired, the motions were argued before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on July 14, 2023.  (2T).  On July 17, 2023, [...] granted Defendants’ motions and filed her orders with her written statement of reasons.  (Pa13-Pa20; Da1-Da7).
[brief] Rulings cited those 2 minor baseless claims, among other key baseless claims, all of which I refuted in my filings, when it denied my Motion for Reconsideration.  Judge’s misguided Aug. 4, 2023  Hearing opinion indicated that ALL parties’ Reconsideration Motions [incl. [...]’s March 23, 2023 & [...]’s May 25, 2023] going back to my Reconsideration Motion of Oct. ’22 Order “express dissatisfaction w/previous rulings” (4T, p. 45, line 9, to p. 46, line 14).  My prior Brief, Section H, p. 44-46, par. 1; Section I, p. 54-55; & Section J, p. 59-60, par. 10, refuted the Court’s 2 misguided claims about my Motions that (along w/my Appeal) are based on contradictions by the Court and the parties to my probative competent evidence, and citations of NJ Statutes, Order provisions, and the Will of [...].
[brief] 1.  Unconstitutional governmental interference with [...]’s speech (Pa837; 3T)  The New Jersey Constitutions provide protections from governmental interference with the speech of its citizens.  *N.J. Const.* art. I, ¶ 6.  (“Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.  No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. ”).  When a government regulation directly impinges on the constitutionally protected right of free speech, the government is required to justify the restriction.  *Bell v. Stafford Township*, 110 N.J. 384, 395 (1988).  See also *State Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schaad*, 160 N.J. 156, 175-76 (1999).  The United States Supreme Court recognizes a government employer’s interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees differ from regulating speech of the citizenry in general and in two watershed cases have established the applicable tests.  In *Pickering v. Board of Education*, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), the Court confirmed the Constitutionally protected right of public employees to speak out on matters of public concern and established the Pickering balancing test described below.  In *United States v. National Treasury Employees Union*, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) the Supreme Court adjusted the Pickering balance test to increase the government’s burden to justify a prior restraint of speech (hereinafter the “National Treasury” test).  Under *Pickering* and *National Treasury*, courts, including New Jersey courts, have struck down regulations requiring public employees to obtain permission from employers on matters which were not followed by the motion court.
[brief] ’”  State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147, 168 (2003) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004).  Therefore, trial counsel’s failure to have a forensic expert testify regarding the viability of testing the tire iron for fingerprints and DNA constituted a prima facie case of ineffectiveness pursuant to the Strickland/Fritz two-pronged test and/or the Cronic/Davis per se analyses.  Accordingly, this matter must be remanded for an evidentiary hearing so as to resolve defendant's claim.  *Preciose*, 129 N.J. at 464.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] See Jones v. Heymann, 127 N.J. Super. 542, 547 (App. Div. 1974) (presuming the Commissioner did not view a policy form to be against public policy where he “has not made any change in that endorsement nor withdrawn his approval thereof”); Smith v. Motor Club of Am. Ins. Co., 54 N.J. Super. 37 (Ch. Div.), aff’d, 56 N.J. Super. 203 (App. Div. 1959) (“The Legislature, having vested the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance with authority to strike from policies any clauses he deems to be unfair or inequitable, and the Commissioner having taken no such action with respect to the clause in question, it must be presumed that he did not consider it unfair or inequitable and that it is not against public policy. ”).  Plaintiff ignores the fact that the policy language at issue was adopted with the approval of the Commissioner of the Department of Banking and Insurance and that it applies to all workers’ compensation insurance policies issued in the State of New Jersey.
[brief] Pa44.  Accordingly, [...] granted [...]’s Motion for Summary Decision, and dismissed his Verified Petition, foreclosing his ability to return to his tenured position.  [...] took exceptions to [...]’s Initial Decision to the Commissioner, and, thereafter, the Commissioner issued the Job FAD.  In the Job FAD, the Commissioner made clear that [...] had neither meaningful opportunity, nor recourse, to challenge the termination of his tenured employment:  The Commissioner is not persuaded by petitioner’s exceptions.  The “procedural dilemma” petitioner discusses does not affect the outcome of this case.  Petitioner appropriately initiated the challenge of his termination within the 90-day limitations period, and it is of no moment that his appeal is still pending in the Appellate Division.  Additionally, the Commissioner disagrees with petitioner that the ALJ needed to determine whether the [...] acted contrary to law in issuing the Order of Suspension.  That issue has already been decided by the Commissioner and is pending in the Appellate Division, and it is not relevant to a determination of this matter.  Regarding petitioner’s alleged property right in his tenured teaching position and violation of due process, the Commissioner finds that petitioner received the process that he was due in the suspension matter, the appeal before the Commissioner, and the matter herein.  The Commissioner agrees with petitioner that a separate action against the [...] in the future would not result in reinstatement to his position, as petitioner seeks, but finds that the viability of a future matter does not affect this case.  Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the petition is hereby dismissed.  Pa48-Pa49.
[brief] [...], P.E.  Plaintiffs’ expert [...], P.E., recognized that every person performing work under [...]’ contract with the [...] reported to [...], HAK’s Project Manager and a professional engineer (Pa2089 at T22:19-24).  Mr. Nawn further acknowledged that [...] was among the persons reporting to [...], who maintained the authority to institute corrective action as deemed necessary.  Id. at T23:18-24:13.  [...] also reported to [...], who likewise reported to [...].  Id.  According to Mr. Nawn, as Project Manager, [...] was responsible for ensuring that [...] and its subcontractors fulfilled its contractual obligations, i.e., confirming that the contractor’s work “complied with the plans and specifications of the project. ”  Id. at T22:25-23:10.  3.
[brief] ”  Ibid.  Here, [...] understood that his application to represent himself was denied.  He twice told the court that he wanted to represent himself.  The court responded, “We are done for today, Mr. [...].  If you want to make an application to represent yourself, you do so. . . after consultation with” defense counsel. ” (1T 33-13 to 34-5)  [...] then reiterated that he was making a request to represent himself.  (Ibid.)  The court again did not rule on [...]’s clear and unequivocal request, instead demanding that [...] consult with the attorney he no longer wanted to represent him and renew his request with the court in a different form.  The court’s actions amounted to a denial of [...]’s request, and [...] knew it.  He had told the court what he wanted, and the court made clear that he could not have it.  As this Court recognized in Rose, “[i]t takes some measure of temerity even for practicing attorneys to nudge a judge who has reserved decision on a motion.  Here, the court insisted that defendant submit his request to proceed pro se in writing.  If defendant reasonably believed his request was denied, he was not obliged to continually renew it. ”  Id. at 638.  Thus, the State’s argument that [...] implicitly waived his constitutional right by failing to renew a motion that had already been denied must be rejected.