ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Iniciales del acusado/Defendant's Initials  -----,--- Memorandum  Precedente al Juicio - Formulario enmendado promulgado por la directriz #23-17 (8/21/2017), CN: 11216-Spanish pagina 2  4 de of Pretrial Memorandum - Revised form promulgated Directive# 23-17 (8/21/2017), CN: 11216-Spanish page 2  4  Informaci6n adicional/suplementaria.  12.  Additional/Supplemental information.  13.  Proposicion de pruebas Discovery  D .. ha Se completado la proposici6n de pruebas a.  All Pretrial discovery complete.
[brief] Acuity, 124 F. Supp.3d at 795; Dillard, 651 F. Supp.2d at 1379.  The Southern District of Illinois’ recent decision in Harris re-affirms this requirement.  There, the claimant, [...], alleged that he was injured by an infection he contracted at a dialysis center for which [...], the insured, provided commercial cleaning services.  586 F. Supp.3d 856.  He sued [...].
[brief] Plaintiff argues that Defendants should have been equitably estopped from asking the Foreclosure Court to find that the 2012 mortgage had been discharged, and that by this result, Defendants have been unjustly enriched.  To make an equitable argument Plaintiff must show that Defendants knew or should have known that making the mortgage payments using the business’ bank account would lead to a future bankruptcy preference action against Plaintiff, two years later.  See Knorr, 178 N.J. at 178 (2003) (“to establish equitable estoppel, plaintiffs must show that defendant engaged in conduct, either intentionally or under circumstances that induced reliance, and that plaintiffs acted or changed their position to their detriment. ”).  Here, Defendant [...] is a layperson who owned a flooring company and sold and installed different types of flooring such as tile, carpet, vinyl flooring.  He did not know that a bankruptcy preference would result from his decision to pay his mortgage with company funds; he was simply making a good faith effort to pay the mortgage as he always had without an issue.  Plaintiff never objected to Defendant making the payments from his business account.  Defendants did not receive any additional benefit from making the mortgage payments through the [...] bank account.  If the business had paid Defendant a salary which would have been deposited into his personal bank account and then Defendants paid the mortgage from that account, it would have the same effect as to Defendants.  The end result was that Defendant made sure the mortgage payments were made.  The later bankruptcy preference action cannot retroactively trigger a default of the note and certainly do not constitute fraud which requires an element of intention on the part of Defendants.  As such, the Court should reject Plaintiff’s claims for equitable estoppel and unjust enrichment.
[brief] In its opposition brief [...] often refers to the Board's January 23 2023 Supplemental Resolution as being a “stealth resolution”, see [...] Rb16, 17, 18, 21, 24, 27, 26, 30, etc., that was undertaken “sua sponte and without notice to Avalon, [and/or to] the public” and occurred “long after the hearing record was closed”.  [...] Rb-003.  The actual facts as shown of record are that at its December 12 2022 public hearing the Board considered the proposed form of written resolution drafted by its council and declined to adopt that resolution absent and elevator in Building E.
[brief] Also, the trial court adopted the Plaintiffs’ theory as to the division of labor between [...] and [...], concluding: “[[...]] was the scientist.  There is no doubt in my mind he was out of this [financial] loop. ” (37T 86:16-17).  The trial court also explained that [...]’s analysis “had to be done to trace the monies going all over the place and not into Mr. [...]’s pocket. ” (37T 86:13-15).  In the end, the trial court identified 9 diversion transactions for which the Plaintiffs satisfied their burden of proof:
[directive] [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  1.  Èske w konprann ke wap oblije soumèt a egzamen fizik ak sikolojik nan Sant Dyagnostik ak Tretman Avenel la pou detèmine si konpòtman ou lè wap komèt zak sa yo karakterize antan ke konpòtman ki repete souvan ak enkontwolab?  Do you understand you will be required to submit to a physical and psychological examination at the [...] the purpose of which is to determine if your conduct in committing the offense was characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior?  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  2.  Èske w konprann ke si egzamen a revele ke konpòtman ou karakterize antan ke konpòtman ki repete souvan ak enkontwolab, jij la ta kab enpoze yon tèm anprizonman nan Sant Tretman ak Adult Diagnostic la nan yon pwogram tretman espezyalize pou kondisyon mantal ou a?  Do you understand if the examination reveals that your conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior, the judge may sentence you to confinement at the [...] for a program of specialized treatment for your mental condition?
[brief] In this litigation, however, [...] employee [...] clarified that, while demolition work could be “incidental” to saw cutting, [...] specifically performed concrete cutting.  Pa991.  In any event, it was for higher contractors to designate whether [...]’s saw cutting constituted demolition work or another category of work for insurance purposes.  Pa2316, Pa2351-52.  While some of [...]’s work may be characterized by others as some sort of “demolition” of certain elements, [...] is exactly what its name indicates: *a concrete cutting company*, as evidenced by the descriptions in its Contractor Enrollment Form and Notice of Subcontract Award.  Pa424-25.  The only documentary evidence of [...]’s contracted-for work on the day of the accident describes that work as “core drilling” and “wire sawing. ”  Pa422.  [...] and [...] refer to [...]’s purported discretion to request cancellation of the CCIP Policy, even citing to other jurisdictions and a wholly unrelated OCIP Manual for the [...].  [...] Db35.  As discussed at length in Plaintiffs’ initial brief, Pb37-38, New Jersey law is clear that even where a third party is empowered to cancel an insured’s insurance, it cannot do so absent proper notice, in which case the policy will remain in effect.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS  .................................................................  i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  .......................................................  ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................  1 REPLY ARGUMENT ..............................................................  1  I  BECAUSE THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS HAD YET TO RUN, RESPONDENTS HAD NO BASIS TO SEEK DISMISSAL  "FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM"  .........................................................  1  II  BECAUSE THE “FIRST ACTION” WAS PENDING, THE “SECOND ACTION” WAS NOT “SUCCESSIVE” AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED UNDER THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE ...........................................................................  5  CONCLUSION ........................................................................
[brief] In this submission Defendants [...] and [...] argued:  (a) the language in the Lease was not sufficient to create a personal guaranty of the obligations of [...] under the Lease; (b) even if a personal guaranty was created the personal guaranty was terminated upon the termination of the Lease effective May 11, 2016 and (c) even if a personal guaranty was created and was not terminated with the termination of the Lease, the personal guaranty was revoked prior to the accrual of amounts currently due under the Lease.  Also, on January 11, 2022, Defendants [...] and [...] filed opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff was not entitled to the requested relief.
[brief] ---  3  On January 24, 2023, the Bureau filed a motion to enforce litigant’s rights against respondents’ [...], [...], and [...] pursuant to Rule 1:10-3, for respondents’ violations of the trial court’s August 16, 2022 permanent injunction.  Respondents’ violations of the injunction are based on, among other things, their advertisement, marketing, promoting, and offering of a new investment opportunity in the “[...]. ”  On February 17, 2023, the trial court found respondents were violating the permanent injunction and ordered respondents to comply with the August 17, 2022 amended order within ten days.  As of the time of this filing, respondents have not complied with the trial court’s February 17, 2023 order.
[brief] [...] had a close relationship with his father and considered him to be his best friend(Pa000133).  [...]’s native language was Italian.  He spoke broken English(Pa000135).  While [...] could read a Shop-Rite circular, he could not read legal papers or novels or similar documents (Pa000134).  [...] translated for [...] at real estate closings and matters involving civil litigation (Pa000136).  [...] and his wife, [...] started having marital problems between 2010 and 2012.
[brief] February 26, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................  1  A PARABLE: “DOGS WILL BE DOGS”..................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................  2  STATEMENT OF FACTS ...................................................  4  THE EVIDENCE..............................................................  4  [...], [...], [...] AND [...]; AND THEIR NEIGHBORHOOD.........  6 HABIT EVIDENCE AND IMPOUNDMENT.................................  10  BACKGROUND: [...]’S HISTORY OF AGGRESSION TOWARD [...]....  12 SEPTEMBER 12, 2022  INCIDENT.......................................  15  PRIOR INCIDENTS INVOLVING [...] WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN INADMISSIBLE..................................................  17 AUGUST 4, 2020  INCIDENT “[...]”....................................  18 JULY 27, 2022  INCIDENT “[...]”...................................  19 IMPOUND ON SEPTEMBER 14, 2022.................................  21 LEGAL ARGUMENT.......................................................
[brief] (Pa23).  On March 3, 2023, the Board received [...]’s Eligibility Registration Form dated January 23, 2023, affidavit dated January 23, 2023, and a subsequent Request for Amended Benefits Form. (Pa11; Pa16; Pa18; Pa20).  [...] submitted an affidavit along with his appeal which asserted, in relevant part, that he “did not receive any correspondence or post card”.  (Pa16).  On March 23, 2023, [...] submitted a supplemental letter to the Board requesting that the matter be heard collectively with the other appeals regarding the Ricci Act.  (Pa49).  The Board considered [...]’s appeal at its meeting of March 28, 2023, where it voted to deny his request to register under the amended benefits provisions of the Ricci Act.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER AND ENFORCE THE BINDING TERMS OF THE CONSENT JUDGMENT WHICH THE CO-OWNERS AGREED TO ON APRIL 13, 2022.  (Da1, Da4)  Plaintiff argues that the Trial Court addressed the terms of the Consent Judgment because it “determined that ‘the [...] couldn’t agree’ and the decisions regarding the sale of the property ‘were to be left to [...]’s best judgment. ’” (Pb12).  However, Plaintiff ignores the fact that the settlement Consent Judgment and all the terms set forth therein are enforceable unless otherwise vacated by the Court and there was no Order vacating the Consent Judgment, thus, it is enforceable and binding.  Plaintiff also ignores the fact that the January 12, 2023 Order dealt only with Paragraph 17 of the Consent Judgment and nothing else.  (Da30).  This is confirmed by the language of the January 12, 2023 Order which expressly states:  THIS MATTER having been resolved by amicable settlement, which settlement is embodied in a Consent Judgment entered by the Court on April 13, 2022; and Paragraph 17 of the Consent Judgment having provided that the co-owners of the real estate…shall execute a listing for the sale of that property and if those co-owners fail to agree on the identity of a realtor for the marketing and sale of the Property, a realtor shall be selected by the court; and The co-owners having failed to agree on the selection of a real estate professional for the marketing and sale of the Property; and …  The Court having held a case management conference on the record on October 13, 2022; …it is on this 12 day of Jan, 2023 hereby ORDERED as follows.  …  1.  The Court appoints [...] of [...], [...] to sell the property at [...].  2.  This person shall have the authority to appoint a realtor to sell the property.  3.  All of the parties are to cooperate with the sale of the property.  4.  The parties may communicate any questions/concerns about the sale to the Attorney…(Da30).  This Order did not supersede, alter, amend or in any way vacate any provisions of the Consent Judgment relating to the sale of the Subject Property.  Thus, paragraphs 18, 19, 20 and 21 which relate to the sale of the Subject Property are still binding on all parties to the Consent Judgment, including the requirement for unanimous consent on all major decisions relating to the Subject Property.  (Da395).  One of the major decisions being the sales price.  Since there was never any motion to vacate the Consent Judgment nor were there any arguments advanced that any party should be relieved from the Consent Judgment for any reasons enumerated under Rule 4:50-1, the Trial Court should have enforced the terms thereof and should not have granted [...]’s Order to Show Cause to confirm the sale of the Subject Property without the unanimous consent of the five sibling co-owners as required under the terms of the Consent Judgment.  POINT III
[directive] See Appendix IC.  The Court in Gerns also held that the plea agreement in that case should have indicated more precisely the sentence the prosecutor would recommend to the court if defendant’s cooperation was determined by the prosecutor, or the prosecutor’s designee, to be of substantial value to the State.  When a defendant is offered a reduction in a mandatory minimum sentence (i.e., a downward departure) based on substantial cooperation that was provided to law enforcement prior to execution of the plea agreement, the prosecutor can and must state precisely the sentence recommendation.  The Court noted that the problem arises in cases in which the plea agreement contemplates a waiver decision based on the extent and quality of a defendant’s future cooperation, that is, cooperation or assistance to be given by the defendant between the date of the plea agreement and the date set for the sentencing hearing.  The Court in Gerns recognized that prosecutors need to retain flexibility in sentencing recommendations based on the substantiality and quality of the defendant’s cooperation.  The need to preserve prosecutorial discretion, however, must be weighed against a defendant’s need to know at the time of his or her plea the outer limits of a prosecutor’s conditional waiver decision.
[directive] 1.  Uniform Defendant Intake Report (4 pages) (UDIR)  2.  Adult Presentence Report  3.  Multiple Charges  Offense Information (this form has been revised)  4.  5.  Case Analysis  6.  Victim Information  7.  Court History 8.  Court History Continued  9.  Pretrial Intervention (PTI)  Recommendation  10.  Additional Information  Any questions regarding this Supplement or the Uniform Defendant Reporting System may be directed to Assistant Director [...] via email at [...] or via phone at [...].
[brief] Also see, Soltero v. [...], [...] (App. Div. July 9, 2024) (Pa453) (harshly reversing summary judgment due to trial court’s failure to consider certified counterstatement of facts).  The trial court failed to apply the mootness doctrine.  With respect to Count One, the trial court applied the wrong State governing statute.  N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(b) (and not the Open Public Meetings Act) governed the Count One statutory dispute.  The trial court excused defendants from ever accounting how they funded the contested flex parking removal and 911 memorial projects without bond proceeds and answering whether they paid prevailing wages.
[brief] This direct access was an inducement for the purchase of the Premises.  Indeed, so said the trial court:  I find, in viewing the maps, and the advertisements, and the – historical documents that were provided, it was clearly portrayed as being ocean front, access to the ocean, access to the beach – direct access to the beach and ocean . . . [a]nd the idea that [the [...]] somehow secretly were able to retain the right to redirect them to a place of their choosing [the street ends]  I don’t think it is supported by our contract law – and I don’t think its supported by the documents that were provided to the Court.  [(T71:10-21). ]  Second, proximity was not the sole basis for the trial court’s ruling.
[brief] Courts do not defer to an administrative agency where the agency’s interpretation of a statute or regulation is at odds with the statutory or regulatory language.  In its amicus brief, [...] sets forth what it maintains is the agency’s interpretation of the No-Fault Law and its corresponding regulations.  [...] posits that, as the agency tasked with enforcing the statute, the Court should defer to its interpretation.  As set forth above (statutory interpretation) and below (regulatory interpretation), [...]’s interpretation of the statutory scheme is inconsistent with the plain language used by the Legislature and promulgated by [...] itself in the relevant provisions of the N.J.A.C.  Because [...]’s interpretation of the No-Fault Law is at odds with the statutory language, the Court is not obligated to defer to [...]’s interpretation.  Saint Peter’s Univ. Hosp. v. Lacy, 185 N.J. 1, 15 (2005) (quoting Smith v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 108 N.J. 19, 25-26 (1987)); In re M.F., 169 N.J. 45, 56 (2001) (same).  B.
[brief] Cf. Persons v. Bregman, 182 N.J. Super. 476, 479 (App. Div. 1982).  [...] has been the record owner of the Property since 1985 in furtherance of its laudable community development goals and has already developed the portion of the Property on the Camden St. side.  Furthermore, the neutral [...] alone conclusively establishes [...]’s record ownership of the Property – an inescapable conclusion that [...] refuses to either acknowledge or attempt to refute in its appellate papers.
[brief] B.  Prerogative Writ Standard of Review  This is a prerogative writ action.  [...] is seeking to have this court overturn the Borough’s decision to remove him as a Commissioner of its Sewerage Authority because he possessed and distributed highly offensive misogynistic and pornographic material.  It is well settled that, in a prerogative writ action, a court will set aside a municipality’s decision only where it is shown to be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, not supported in the evidence, or is otherwise contrary to law.  Rivkin v. Dover Tp. Rent Leveling Bd., 143 N.J. 352, 378 (1996).  Thus, as noted in Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, 45 N.J. 268 (1965), in dismissing a prerogative writ challenge:  Courts cannot substitute an independent judgment for that of the boards in areas of factual disputes; neither will they exercise anew the original jurisdiction of such boards or trespass on their administrative work.  So long as the power exists to do the act complained of and there is substantial evidence to support it, the judicial branch of the government cannot interfere.  [Such a determination] will be set aside only when it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  Even when doubt is entertained as to the wisdom of the action, or as to some part of it, there can be no judicial declaration of invalidity in the absence of clear abuse of discretion by the public agencies involved.  Id. at 296-297.  Based on the foregoing precedent, the issue presented here is whether the Borough’s decision to remove [...] as a Sewerage Authority Commissioner was arbitrary and capricious.  For the reasons set forth below, the decision was not.  [...] was properly removed.  II.
[brief] "For each crime in a series the court should impose a sentence, taking into account the appropriate aggravating and mitigating circumstances set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and -1(b), before considering whether the sentences should run consecutively or concurrently."  State v. Rogers, 124 N.J. 113, 119 (1991).  In the present matter, regardless of the Court finding that the aggravating factors quantitatively and qualitatively outweighed the mitigating factors, the defendant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum term of 30 years must do 30 years on the murder convictions and the mandatory 18 months must do 18 months on the aggravated assault that was subject to the Graves Act.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests that the Court reject Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s appeal was untimely and for the reasons set forth herein and in his opening brief, that the Court accept each of the arguments presented in Defendant’s opening brief, and, further, reverse Paragraph 1 of the probate court’s order dated August 31, 2022, which awarded counsel fees and costs in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $1,049,589.14, and remand the matter to the probate court with directions to dismiss Plaintiff’s legal fee claim with prejudice.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant, [...]  By: ___/s/ [...]___  WILLIAM D. GRAND  Dated: April 1, 2024
[brief] (Da256).  Thus, the claim was denied solely on grounds of non-compliance with the affidavit/certification requirement.  (Da256).  The State submits that the PCR court properly denied defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim due to defendant’s failure to present an affidavit or certification in support.  As the PCR court found, there were no affidavits, certifications, or even an acknowledgement that a false statement would subject the witness to criminal punishment.  Defendant, thus, only submitted a purported interview between a defense investigator and [...] about his alleged conversion with co-defendant [...].  Such bald assertions cannot support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Thus, the PCR court properly denied defendant’s claim.  Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the denial of defendant’s PCR claim.
[directive] Victim of Domestic Violence means a person protected by the domestic violence act and includes any person: 1. who is 18 years of age or older, or 2. who is an emancipated minor, and who has been subjected to domestic violence by: a. spouse b. former spouse c. any other person who is a present or former household member, OR 3. who, regardless of age, has been subjected to domestic violence by a person: a. with whom the victim has a child in common, or b. with whom the victim anticipates having a child in common, if one of the parties is pregnant, or 4. who, regardless of age, has been subjected to domestic violence by a person with whom the victim has had a dating relationship.  a.  A victim may be below the age of 18.  b.  The domestic violence assailant must be over the age of 18 or emancipated at the time of the offense.  See Paragraph C3 below for criteria for determining whether a person is emancipated.  C.  Note:  1.  The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act does not define a victim of domestic violence by age, physical or psychological condition or sex.  2.  AN UNEMANCIPATED MINOR WHO COMMITS AN ACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MAY NOT BE PROSECUTED AS A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DEFENDANT BUT CAN BE PROSECUTED UNDER THE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY LAWS.  THE ENTRY OF PRE- OR POST-DISPOSITIONAL RESTRAINTS CAN ALSO BE CONSIDERED.  3.  A minor is considered emancipated from his or her parents when the minor: a. has been married; b. has entered military service; c. has a child or is pregnant; or d. has been previously declared by a court or an administrative agency to be emancipated.  II.