ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In *Alston*, during the course of a motor-vehicle stop, police saw the occupants’ furtive and unusual movements in the vehicle and noticed shotgun shells in the glove compartment.  *Id.* at 232.  When officers reached into the glove compartment to retrieve the shells, they saw a sawed-off shotgun under the front passenger seat.  *Id.* at 232.  Based on this, they suspected there were additional weapons in the vehicle.  *Ibid.*  A panel of this Court, relying on *State v. Ercolano*, insisted the officers could have obtained a warrant since there were no longer exceptional circumstances justifying the warrantless search of the vehicle.  *Ibid.* (citing *Ercolano*, 79 N.J. 25, 46-47 (1979)).  Our Supreme Court disagreed and rejected the “level of exigent circumstances” the panel found necessary to justify the automobile exception.  *Id.* at 233.  It also noted the “broad dictum concerning the level of exigency required by the automobile exception” in *Ercolano* in no way marks a departure from the established analysis of the exception as recognized in *Carroll* and *Chambers*.  Because of its inherent mobility, a motor vehicle that has been stopped on a highway may be searched without a warrant when probable cause exists to believe that the vehicle contains articles that the police are entitled to seize.  Ibid.  Thus, harkening back to the Supreme Court precedential line of cases, our Court confirmed in Alston that “when there is probable cause to conduct an immediate search at the scene of the stop, the police are not required to delay the search by seizing and impounding the vehicle pending review of that probable cause determination by a magistrate.
[brief] On November 15th, the Major told her that she was being transferred to the Academy (1T; 76:10).  The Plaintiff did a timeline which described the events and times that are set forth in [...]-5 (Pa-), an exhibit attached to the Plaintiff’s deposition and referred to (1T; 54:17).  The entries were pretty much contemporaneous and the incident involving [...] and the secretary’s complaint was set forth (1T; 56:6 and 56:10).  Plaintiff was advised by the women that they “advised Lieutenant [...] that it did occur” (1T; 57:16).  Plaintiff's EEO complaint (Pa-) was submitted on September 20, 2016.  In violation of the rules of the State Police, [...] conducted his own investigation (1T; 58:3).  The Plaintiff witnessed the women going in and out of [...]’s office and they seemed upset (1T; 58:13).  Plaintiff was told that any correspondence that needed to be sent directly through [...] or [...] (1T; 59:9).  She was actually told that she was not allowed to correspond with the Intake Unit and any correspondence would go through the Captain and the Assistant (1T; 60:1).
[brief] The defendant offered the testimony of [...] as an expert in forensic engineering and human factors.  (5T87:8-10).  [...] testified that he conducted a site inspection of the store in September 2022 during which time he conducted a recreation of the plaintiff and the walking path that led to her fall.\(^6\) (5T116:3-8).  Although he claims to have taken between sixty to seventy photographs during his recreation.  [...] chose to include only a fraction of those photographs in his report.  (5T116:14-17; 5T118:1-4; 6T61:21-23; 6T78:2-5).  [...] testified that this inspection and recreation involved comparing the cctv footage of the plaintiff’s fall to a live feed from cctv on the day of his inspection.  (5T123:18-125:2).  He acknowledged that the video footage of the plaintiff’s fall only shows from her shoulders up and does not show the floor of the shopping aisle or the rollator.  (6T52:10-53:3).  He also \(^6\) The defendant did not provide the plaintiff with notice that its expert would be conducting a recreation of the incident thereby depriving the plaintiff the ability to monitor the recreation.  acknowledged that displays that were in the aisle on the date of the plaintiff’s fall were not present during his inspection and recreation.  (5T130:8-17).  [...] claimed that live feed from the date of his inspection showed the exact same area as shown on the footage of the plaintiff’s fall.  (5T143:16-144:9; 5T147:19-148:4).  However, he did not know what the frames per second, aspect ratio, or software used to capture the footage was for either the video recording or live feed.  (5T131:21-134:4).  Nor did he conduct any type of investigation to determine if the camera was in the same position on both occasions even though he admitted that the location and direction of the angle the camera faces are extremely important.  (5T142:18-143:3; 6T54:15-23).  The only thing he did to determine that the camera position was the same was eyeballing the images.  (6T56:25-57:2).  [...] testified that he made a rudimentary replication of the plaintiff whom he believed was about five feet tall by stacking pot in a shopping cart to a height of four feet eight inches.  (5T127:7-18; 5T127:11-128:2; 6T30:24-31:28; 6T34:1-11; 6T80:16-20).  He testified that he proceeded to move the cart around until he believed that the pots were at a location where the plaintiff’s head started to dip down.  (5T127:19-23).  He explained that he then put the pots on the ground in this location and concluded that the plaintiff’s rollator did not come into contact with the raised column baseplate with protruding bolts when she fell.  (5T114:11-24; 6T34:16-35:7; 6T41:13-17; 6T78:25-79:4; 6T80:9-11).  The plaintiff moved to strike his testimony following direct examination on the grounds that he did not offer any expert analysis or testify as to a subject that was beyond the ken of the average juror.  (6T42:9-47:8).
[brief] [...] questioned using the assisted living definition and parking count for the congregate care component in asked if he had studied sight distances on Changebridge Road, and if he could give an opinion that they are safe, but he had not done so.  3T 48:17-49:7.  After questioning the handling of visitors, [...] stipulated that a shuttle and off-site parking arrangements would be made, 3T 45:4-46:11, although no plan was presented.  As to sanitary sewer, [...]’s engineer offered to maintain the first 150 feet into the [...].  4T 95:4-11.  However, the Board Engineer cautioned that the Township and the Meadows controlled that easement, which was only for sanitary sewer, yet [...] was proposing to also use it for stormwater.  4T 97:14-98:7.  The Board could not approve a change to an easement between the Meadows and the Township.  4T 98-99.  Clearly, [...] had not presented a stormwater and sanitary sewer plan that it had a right to construct.
[brief] Muhammad v. N.J. Transit, 176 N.J. 185, 194 (2003).  N.J.S.A. 59:4-1(a) defines "dangerous condition" as "a condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury when such property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used."  N.J.S.A. 59:4-1(c) defines public property as “real or personal property owned or controlled by the public entity, but does not include easements, encroachments and other property that are located on the property of the public entity but are not owned or controlled by the public entity. ”
[brief] 19  TABLE OF APPENDIX  Motor Vehicle Ticket Details ........................................................  DA1 1/23/23  Order from Municipal Court Denying PCR ..........................  DA6 1/23/23  Order from Municipal Court Denying Motion to Vacate ..........  DA7 2/13/23  Notice of Appeal to Law Division ......................................  DA8 7/19/23  Order of the Law Division Denying Applications .................. DA10 7/19/23  Opinion of the Law Division Denying Applications ............... DA11 9/5/23  Notice of Appeal to Law Division  ........................................  DA20  Unpublished Opinion in State v. Vargas, [...] .....................  DA24  TABLE OF JUDGEMENTS, ORDERS, & RULINGS  1/23/23  Order from Municipal Court Denying PCR ................................ DA6 1/23/23  Order from Municipal Court Denying Motion to Vacate ............. DA7 7/19/23  Order of the Law Division Denying Applications ....................  DA10 7/19/23  Opinion of the Law Division Denying Applications ...............  DA11  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
[brief] On the one hand the rewrite was a benefit to the insurance companies, in that Paragraph (a)(2) is a more formal recognition of the sufficiency of the Certificate of Mailing, a form that is in wide use in the insurance industry.  On the other hand, however, the new language also provided a benefit to insureds, inasmuch as strict compliance with its provisions is required.  See Hodges, supra.  What is most significant to this discussion is that the new version of the statute, although codifying the use of a Certificate of Mailing, also created a brand new requirement as to the Cancellation Notice itself.  A notice, even if properly mailed as per Paragraph (a)(2) of the statute, will still not be effective unless “(b) the insurer has retained a duplicate copy of the mailed notice which is certified to be a true copy. ”  [...] has failed to comply with that requirement, and Plaintiffs are therefore entitled as a matter of law to be the prevailing party.
[brief] The Indictment against [...] charged him with essentially all of the crimes for which [...] and [...] were previously indicted for and convicted of.  (Da009).  Felix [...] subsequently died in prison.  (Da018).  [...] was arrested on December 1, 2006, and later tried before a Bergen County jury from September 29, 2009, to October 29, 2009, and was convicted of all charges.
[directive] Under the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA), "[t]he Administrative Director the Courts shall establish and maintain a Statewide Pretrial Services Program which shall provide of pretrial services to effectuate the purposes [this] section."  N.J.S.A. 2A: 162-25(a).  This of includes the creation and use a risk assessment instrument "approved by the Administrative of Director the Courts."  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-25(c).  This Directive promulgates revisions approved of by the Supreme Court to the parenthetical language at the top the Public Safety Assessment of (PSA) so to better reflect the underlying charges that result in a recommendation no as if release based on certain charges, including a charge is alleged to have constituted an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit the offense.  These changes will appear on PSAs on or about September 2021.  These changes are 1, of for purposes clarity only and will not affect the risk-assessment calculation, the scores, or the of level the recommendation.  I.
[brief] There, the Court held an FBI Special Agent violated the net-opinion rule of N.J.R.E. 703 by basing his expert opinion that area cell towers had about a one-mile range of coverage based on a “rule of thumb” that stemmed only from his experience. Burney, 255 N.J. at 25.  The agent’s opinion was unsupported by factual evidence or data and did not consider factors that can affect the sector’s coverage range.  Id. at 24-25.
[brief] (2t94-3 to 5; 2T100-7 to 12; 2T11-20 to 22).  The investigator found no signs of forced entry.  (2T114-16 to 18).  He observed a heavy concentration of blood on the dining room floor, at the top of the landing from the stairway from the mud room and in the living room area.  (2T128-13 to 19).  In the kitchen, the investigator saw blood near the sink.  (2T118-21 to 22).  He also saw a block of knives.  (2T149-12 to 13).  He saw no prints in the kitchen.  (2T155-3 to 10).  In the living room, the sofa had a heavy concentration of blood and slash marks.  (2T130-13 to 14; 2T132-7 to 9).  An area rug was bunched up under a coffee table.  (2T128-16 to 21).  On top of the coffee table, the investigator saw a beer can and two glasses.  (2T131-19 to 23).  In the master bedroom, the investigator found a pair of socks.  (2T158-6 to 9).  He found a shirt hanging on the doorknob.  (2T159-9 to 12).  The disarray in the home was a far cry from how [...] kept his home before his death.  (3T85-5 to 10).  As of March 2013, [...] had recently retired from his job at [...].  (3T78-21 to 22).  [...] had lived at [...] with his partner of almost thirty years.  (3T79-13 to 16).  His partner had passed away about 18 months before March 2013.  (3T80-10 to 18).  [...] was not in the best of physical health at the time of his death.  He had been injured in a motor vehicle accident and suffered from pain in his leg and was not able to raise his arms up all the way.  (3T83-3 to 6).  He also had a heart condition for which he had had bypass surgery.  (3T84-2 to 5).  [...] was also blind in one eye.  (3T83-7 to 9).  The autopsy was performed on March 10, 2013.
[brief] ”  Appellant’s claim must also fail as this Court has held that an alleged whistleblowing activity that only occurs after being confronted with major work violations is unworthy of protection.  See Fenyak v. St. Peter’s Univ. Hosp., No. A-2014-21, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 115, *10-14 (App. Div. Jan. 25, 2024) (a plaintiff who reported alleged workplace issues after she was confronted with the defendant company’s investigation did not engage in whistleblowing activity because she “was trying to protect her job, not trying to protect the public from the violation of a law, rule, regulation, or clear mandate of public policy.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT WAS BOUND TO GIVE SUBSTANTIAL DEFERENCE TO THE AMENDED RESOLUTION  Under the applicable and appropriate standard of review, the Trial Court properly afforded the Board’s findings of fact and conclusions substantial deference.  New Jersey courts consistently afford the decisions of administrative bodies a strong presumption of validity and reasonableness.  Matter of Comm’r of Ins.’s Issuance of Orders A-92-189&A-92-21, 274 N.J. Super. 385, 397 (App. Div. 1993).  When those decisions are challenged and reviewed, the party attacking the decision bears the burden of demonstrating the administrative action is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  Id.  It is the Appellant’s burden to establish that the Board’s decision need not be given deference because it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable; as a reviewing Court is bound to provide that deference otherwise.  See Matter of Comm’r of Ins., 274 N.J. Super. at 397.  When, as is the case here, the questioned Resolution relies upon a thorough review of the submitted plans in the application, and its conclusions were not at all based on the Rendering Appellant sets forth as dispositive, there is no suggestion of arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable Board action.  “A reviewing court may not substitute is judgement for that of local officials. ”  Scully-Bozarth Post #1817 of Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S. v. Planning Bd. Of the City of Burlington, 362 N.J. Super. 296, 314 (App. Div. 2003).  Both Respondent [...] and the Board based their well-reasoned decisions on the contents of the application, specifically the approved site plans, and not the Rendering.  Thus, the Trial Court was correct as a matter of law to determine both the Rendering and [...] advertisement were irrelevant to the Resolution.  CONCLUSION
[brief] THE PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT BETWEEN BIRCH AND PLAINTIFF  On the following day, August 13, 2021, Plaintiff and [...] entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement (the “PSA”) regarding the Property.  (Pa1, ¶7).  As described by Plaintiff, this was a “complex, 39-page contract (plus voluminous exhibits), which was heavily negotiated by and between sophisticated parties and their counsel and is binding under applicable law. ” (Pa5, ¶20).  Per the PSA, [...] “agree[d] to sell, convey[,] and assign to [Plaintiff]” title to the Property ‘exclusive of the Improvements. ” (Pa96, §2.1).  Thus, post transaction, Plaintiff would hold title to the Property itself, with [...] holding title to the actual structures present, as envisioned in the Mack-Cali reservation quoted above.  (Pa96).  Like the Mack-Cali Agreement, the PSA named [...] as the “escrow agent” and “title company. ” (Pa1 ¶8; Pa93, 96).  The PSA contained the following provisions regarding escrow, an earnest money deposit and [...]’s liability:
[brief] I explained to you, your yes answer too.  If you’re owed money in 2010, you don’t do anything until 2017.  You ask the guy to get paid for 2010.  Let’s say the guy never worked there again after 2010.  He sees him in December of 2017, he goes, by the way, you owe me money for 2010.  And the guy says, wait, I’m selling the Hospital.  He goes all right, I’ll wait.  How does that toll the six-year Statute of Limitation for the money that was owed in 2010?
[brief] See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4 (authorizing equitable remedies for RICO violations).  Second, the limited discovery permitted under AICRA and the arbitration rules would not permit Plaintiffs to obtain the necessary information to prove their fraud-based claims.  This court has held that a “broad discovery request . . . contravenes New Jersey’s comprehensive PIP statutory scheme providing for arbitration of disputed no-fault benefit claims submitted by health care providers to insurance companies.
[brief] The appellants argue that [...] failed to move to discontinue receivership once he became aware that the cause for the action no longer existed.  However, [...] did properly submit a certification in support of the application for discharge.  (Ca18).  In his certification, [...] certified that, “Upon the sale and transfer of the assets, under the control of the receiver, it became obvious that the receiver had no duties other than as an employee of the bank’s subsidiary. ”  Accordingly, the appellants’ argument should be rejected.  It must be kept in mind that [...] objected to the sale.  That objection was the subject of a motion hearing before [...].  On November 4, 2021, [...] was appointed as special master to sell the foreclosed property because he was in the best position to do so.  (1T:2:15-17).  The foreclosure sale was conducted on January 18, 2022, and the successful buyer was [...].  (1T:12:24-25 and 13:1).  [...] could not have moved to be discharged before the issues referring or related to the sale of property were heard and decided by [...].  Therefore, it could not have been before May, which would have been the very earliest.  Accordingly, the argument advanced by the appellants lacks merit, and should be rejected by the appellate division.
[brief] **A Valid Agreement to Arbitrate Exists Within in the 2012 MOU.** (1T43:2-7; 1T49:5-16)  The motion court correctly found that the parties should be compelled to arbitrate pursuant to the enforceable arbitration agreement within the MOU.  (1T43:2-7; 1T49:5-16).  To be enforceable, “[a]n arbitration agreement must be the result of the parties’ mutual assent, according to customary principles of state contract law. ”  *Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc.*, 244 N.J. 30, 48 (2020)(citing *Atalese, supra*, 219 N.J. at 442).  Thus, “there must be a meeting of the minds for an agreement to exist before enforcement is considered. ”  *Skuse, supra*, 244 N.J. at 48 (citing *Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of Fla., Inc.*, 236 N.J. 301, 319 (2019)).  Defendants take the misguided position that the only document relevant to whether arbitration should be compelled is the 2022 Addendum, which, admittedly, does not have any arbitration terms, and therefore, according to Defendants, no arbitration agreement even exists.  However, Defendants’ narrow framing of the issue is incorrect, as the 2022 Addendum is not a standalone contract tied only to the unexecuted 2017 Agreement.
[brief] While [...] presumably reviewed all written public comments, [...] was not required to respond to these comments, which were conclusory and provided no factual support.  In issuing the HAD to [...], [...] appropriately relied on the findings of the [...] and followed its own rules in ultimately determining that [...]’s Project is consistent with the areawide water quality management plan.  [...], as the expert administrative agency charged with enforcing the Highlands Act, ultimately determined that [...]’s efforts to avoid, minimize, and mitigate impacts to Highlands’ resources were sufficient to find that the Project was consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act.
[brief] First, Staff noted that [...]’s project was grid supply, and therefore ineligible for the TI program absent a waiver of the TI rules under N.J.A.C. 14:1-1.2(b).  (Aa5).  [...] never petitioned for such a waiver.  (Aa5).  No other solar grid supply \(^5\) [...] is the regional transmission organization that coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in 13 states and the District of Columbia.  projects had been accepted into the TI program outside of Subsection (t) and (r).  Ibid.  However, Staff noted that if [...]’s project was granted a waiver so its proposed grid supply project could register and enter the TI program, Staff had concerns regarding the project’s ability to reach commercial operation before the one-year expiration date established by the TI program rules.  Ibid.  First, Staff noted that [...]’s project remains in the System Impact Study phase of the PJM interconnection queue process, meaning that it is uncertain if or when the proposed project might obtain approval from the regional electric grid operator to connect to the grid.  Ibid.  Second, Staff noted that [...]’s proposed project would be built on dredge ponds as mining operations proceed, but the ponds are not yet combined to accommodate floating solar.  Ibid.  Third, Staff noted the ongoing litigation between [...] and the landowner regarding compliance with various terms of the lease.  Ibid.  [...] did not demonstrate it had site control or submit a finalized plan for project configuration.  Ibid.  Based on these factors, Staff found that [...]’s project lacked maturity to enter the TI program and was “inherently speculative.
[brief] G. California Rules of Court, Chapter 2, Article II, Rule 8.120 in pertinent part provides  “A notice under rule 8.121 designating a reporter's transcript must specify the date of each proceeding to be included in the transcript and may specify portions of designated proceedings that are not to be included. ”  Rule 8.130 - Reporter's transcript, Cal. R. 8.130 H. New York - APPENDIX METHOD IN CIVIL APPEALS – CPLR 5528 (a) (5); 22 NYCRR 1250.5(c), 1250.7(d) provides - “The appendix shall include those portions of the record necessary to permit the court to fully consider the issues which will be raised by the appellant and the respondent including …. the material excerpts from transcripts of testimony (Source: https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad4/clerk/forms/perf-appeal.pdf)
[brief] Ozurdex® Is an FDA-Approved Eye Injection for Serious Eye Disease | 3 | | B.  [...] Recalled Certain Ozurdex® Lots, But Not for a Safety Issue | 4 | | C.  Plaintiff’s Chronic History of Serious Eye Disease Is an Independent Risk Factor for Blindness | 8 | | D.  Plaintiff Was Warned of the Exact Injuries She Alleges in the Lawsuit, and Consented to Receiving an Ozurdex® Injection | 8 | | E.  Plaintiff Has No Admissible Proof of Defect and Causation | 9 | | 1.  Plaintiff’s Treating Physician [...] Speculates a Silicone Particle (He Never Saw) Caused Plaintiff’s Eye Inflammation Based Solely on the Recall | 10 | | 2.  Plaintiff’s Retained Expert [...] Concedes Her Injury Could Have Occurred Absent the Particulate, and He Is Uncertain a Particulate Ever Existed In Her Eye | 12 | | 3.  Plaintiff’s Experts Failed to Rule Out the Many Alternative Causes for Her Alleged Injuries | 13 | | F. Procedural History | 14 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 16 |
[directive] 1.  DEPARTMENT - The name of the law enforcement agency that takes the report will be entered here.  2.  ORI NO - Enter the department's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) New Jersey Identifier Number.  3.  INCIDENT NO - The department may use this box to enter a local Incident/Event number.  4.  PROS CASE NO - This box will be used for the County Prosecutor's Office to enter their case number.  5.  DEPT CASE NO - This box may be used by the local department for entering a case/report number.  6.