ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Despite this ruling, the court adduced no precedent or statutory authority in support of its conclusion.  Significantly, parental notification of a potentially adverse impact, even if it implicates LGBTQ+ status, is not a practice declared to be unlawful under the LAD.  While the court cited the LAD’s public accommodation provision (N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)), (p. 13) (Da405), it did not reference clear and convincing evidence that the Revised Policy involves the following conduct proscribed under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f): “to refuse, withhold from or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges” of a public place of accommodation (i.e., school) “or to discriminate against any person in the furnishing” of such accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges.  There is no claim that LGBTQ+ students are not afforded educational services and access to scholastic and/or extracurricular activities on par with all other students.
[directive] 1.  (2)  ¿Entiende usted que si cambia su situación de empleo o matrícula escolar tiene que [Sí/Yes] [No/No] notificárselo a la agencia apropiada del orden público a más tardar 5 días después del cambio?  Do you understand that if you change employment or school enrollment status you must notify the appropriate law enforcement agency no later than 5 days after the change?
[brief] S.D.A.G./Acting Assistant Prosecutor Of Counsel and on the Brief  January 2, 2024  [...] ID. NO. 060532014  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Of Counsel and On the Letter-Brief REPLY LETTER-BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT No. [...] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Respondent, : On Appeal from a Judgment of v. : Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law [...], : Division, Essex County.
[brief] [...] wrote the opinion.  The most significant part of the decision was [...]’s discussion of the issue of timeliness.  The Law Division found, as one of the bases for its ruling, that the motion came too late.  Defendants contended that they were timely, since they filed their motion within the one year period permitted for such motions by Rule 4:50-2, but the Appellate Division correctly observed that the one-year deadline “represents only the outermost time limit for the filing of a motion” based on certain subparts of Rule 4:50-1.  Though [...] noted that there had been “few reported decisions interpreting the relationship between the reasonableness requirement and the one-year provision of Rule 4:50-2,” he turned to the many decisions under a parallel federal rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)\(^3\), that have required \(^3\)Rule 60.
[brief] For purposes of this appeal, the State accepts defendant [...]’ Statement of Procedural History, see (Db2-4),¹ with one clarification.  Defendant’s original aggregate sentence was 55 years pursuant to NERA,² i.e., with an 85% period of parole ineligibility: 40 years for the murder of 16-year-old [...] (count 8), and a consecutive sentence of 15 years for robbery (count 2).  (Da21-24; Da34).  His total period of parole ineligibility for this sentence was 46 years and 9 months.  Defendant’s new sentence is 45 years with a 42-year-and-9-month period of parole ineligibility based on the following calculation: 30 years with a 30-year period of parole ineligibility for the murder, and 15 years with an 85% (12.75 years) period of parole ineligibility for the robbery.  (Da29-32; 5T24-24 to 28-18).  Overall, defendant’s new sentence is 10 years shorter, and his parole-ineligibility period has been reduced by 4 years.  --- ¹  The State also adopts defendant’s transcript references.  See (Db2 n. 1).  ²  No Early Release Act.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.  Counterstatement of Facts
[brief] The Board attempts to point to the December 12, 2022 Meeting Minutes—apparently for the proposition that stating its intent to violate the Settlement Agreement and the MLUL somehow cures the breach.  For a myriad of reasons, this is incorrect.  As a preliminary matter, the December 12, 2022 meeting was to simply memorialize the approval on June 13, 2022, not to create additional conditions.  Further, the Minutes indicate that “[...] suggested that the Board vote on the resolution in its current form but add the caveat to have a supplemental resolution which would include these requirements presented at a future [unidentified] meeting. ”  Pa357 (emphasis added).  This is not helpful to the Board, as this confirms that the Board approved the “current form” of the Resolution and then was going to “add” additional conditions at an unspecified meeting.  This is the precise situation that the Trial Court referenced when it stated that the Board’s actions were the equivalent of “well let’s just give them this version now; we can always go back and change it. ”  1T50:21-51:4.  Thus, all parties—including the Board’s counsel—acknowledged that [...]’s SPA was approved with no conditions requiring an elevator in Building “E,” and that the Board could not then include an additional condition thereafter.  Even in the Board’s merits brief it is admitted that Original Resolution “presented to the Board at its December Meeting was a form of Resolution that did not provide for a Building E elevator.  The absence of the elevator was at the insistence of [[...]].”  See Board’s Brief at p. 35 (emphasis added).  The Board fails to add that [...] insisted on this because that is exactly what happened and the law is unequivocal in that regard.  As such, the transcripts would have added no value since there is no dispute that [...] was granted approval and that the December 12, 2022 Original Resolution was specifically entered into knowing that there was no condition requiring an elevator in Building E.  Moreover, the Board’s citations to various emails amongst counsel are red herrings and do not supplant the December 12, 2022 Original Resolution, which acknowledged that there was no requirement for an elevator in Building E, nor was same a condition of approval on June 13, 2022.  Therefore, [...]’s August 8, 2023 Order is amply supported by the record and the Stealth Resolution, which was entered without notice, is the foundation of [...]’s decision, and but one example of the Board’s bad faith since the inception of this litigation in 2015.  For these reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court’s Orders must be affirmed.
[brief] Time should be allowed by this court to obtain an expert report if the court concludes one is necessary, but the decision was so flawed it must be reversed.  Justice and equity dictates that result.  CONCLUSION  For all the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully urged that summary judgment granted in favor of defendants be reversed and that this case be returned to the trial list in Superior Court.  [...]  Attorneys for Appellants  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  Dated: December 7, 2023
[brief] [...] sat on the stoop of the house next to the bush and retrieved a small object that he handed to the man, who then walked away northbound on [...].  (1T27-21 to 25).  After that transaction, [...] walked northward on [...] toward [...], meeting with two men who were unfamiliar to the officers.  The trio walked east on [...] together.  (1T28-9 to 15).  One of the men was later determined to be defendant, the other was determined to be codefendant [...].
[brief] Trial Judge’s Bias and Prejudice Against Asians in Performing Judicial Duties Warrant a New Trial (Not Raised Below)**  Pursuant to Rule 3.6(C) of N.J. Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment, including but not limited to bias, prejudice or harassment on the bases specified in Rule 3.6(A), and shall not permit court staff, court officials or others subject to the judge’s direction and control to do so.
[directive] c.  Do you understand that you have the right to seek individualized advice from an attorney [Yes] [No] about the effect your guilty plea will have on your immigration status?  d.  Have you discussed with an attorney the potential immigration consequences of [Yes] [No] your plea?  If the answer is “No,” proceed to question 17e.  If the answer is “Yes,” proceed to question 17f.  e.  Would you like the opportunity to do so?  [Yes]  [No]  f.  Having been advised of the possible immigration consequences and of your [Yes] [No] right to seek individualized legal advice on your immigration consequences, do you still wish to plead guilty?
[directive] Publication report and recommendations :5-7.  of  Publication report and recommendations  40.4  A synopsis of all audits, together with the recommendations made by the registered municipal accountant, shall be prepared and published by the clerk of the local unit at least once in the official in newspaper of the local unit, if there be one, or if there be none, in a newspaper published the local unit.  If there is no newspaper published within the local unit, it shall be published in a newspaper having a general circulation in the local unit.  If the clerk fails to have such publication made within 30 days after receipt of the report of audit and recommendations, he shall be subject to a fine of $10.00 payable to the local unit for each day after the expiration of the days that such publication fails to appear.  30 L.1960, c. 169, s. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1962.  by Audit director :5-8.
[brief] (3T145-5 to 7)  The expert analyzed the location of cellphone towers that two different cellphones had connected to between the dates of July 1, 2019, and July 10, 2019.  (3T162-17 to 169-23)  The parties stipulated that one of the phones “had been used” by [...] and the other “had been used” by [...].  (3T152-12 to 19)  The expert explained that his analysis could not determine who used the phones during the relevant time frame; it provided no content of any calls or messages; it was “absolutely possible” for a phone to connect to two cell-towers simultaneously; and the analysis was “not as an exact a science as GPS” in estimating the location of a phone.  (3T183-2 to 184-6, 185-11 to 21, 191-24 to 192-2)  The expert concluded that the phone [...] used had connected to cellphone towers in Vermont between July 1 and July 6, and that on July 6, 2019, between 7:09pm and 7:45pm, both phones had connected to towers in downtown Elizabeth before “sequencing Northbound and then back to the Jersey City area,” and later connected to cell-towers in Philadelphia.  (3T162-3 to 5, 169-11, 179-1 to 25)
[brief] A.  The claims did not accrue until the City failed to compensate [...] for her equity interest following foreclosure  A takings claim accrues when the government takes property without compensation—not before.  See Knick, 588 U.S. at 194 (“[B]ecause a taking without compensation violates the self-executing Fifth Amendment at the time of the taking, the property owner can bring a federal suit at that time. ”) (emphasis added); Harrison, 997 F.3d at 650 (“The taking, so far as federal law is concerned, happened when the Board adjudicated the foreclosure of Harrison’s property through the land bank process, not before. ”).  Thus, the taking here did not occur until the City failed to pay compensation following the final judgment of foreclosure.
[brief] To illustrate the necessity of agreement on a contract’s essential terms, the *Restatement* provides the following example, “A writes to B, ‘I am eager to sell my house.  I wish to get $20,000 for it. ’  B promptly answers saying, ‘I will buy your house at the price you name in your letter. ’  There is no contract.  A's letter is a mere request or suggestion that an offer be made to him. ”  *Id.*  This Court has held that “[t]here is no question that there is no enforceable agreement unless the parties agree on its essential terms. ”  *Foulke v. Staval, Inc.*, 2011 WL 831707, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 11, 2011); see also *Gamble v. Connolly*, 399 N.J. Super. 130, 141, 943 A.2d 202, 208 (2007) (finding that there is no enforceable agreement “if the parties do not agree to one or more essential terms”).  Clearly, in the case at bar, the website advertisement cannot have given rise to a contract between [...] and [...] because – simply put – it lacked the essential terms of a contract (or even an offer to enter into one).
[brief] The Trial Court essentially adopts the certification of Plaintiff submitted as part of the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and adopts the characterizations of those facts.  Da188, Da259-260.  The Trial Court, for example, states that on May 4, 2023, “[...] openly acknowledged that the process of waiving the ROFR had yet to even begin. ”  Da370.  The Trial Court recited the Plaintiff’s position in the Decision, in part by stating:  It was important for [...] to know that the final offer was being made subject to the ROFR and approval for assumption of the fuel contract so it could gauge the value of the offer as well as making sure the parties acknowledged its right, which were fraudulently omitted from the original PSA.  It is asserted that [...] had every right to expect that its rights would be set forth in the final PSA.  Da376.  The Trial Court also makes a finding of fact by adopting the position of the Plaintiff that Defendant [...] “voluntarily recognized that their contract was incomplete until its final submission to [...] on May 8, 2023, which was legally valid notice of the third-party “offer” under Section 39 for [...] to exercise its ROFR. ”  Da376-377.  The Trial Court does not even carve out the question of whether Plaintiff [...] waived its ROFR as of February 17, 2023 in the Decision.  Da385.  Instead, the Trial Court concludes that amendments were made to the PSA “to conform the Offer with the underlying requirements and obligations owed by [...] to [...] with respect to the same under the MFSA, and to thereby put the third-party offeror on notice of [...]’s priority rights..."  Da392.  Finally, the Trial Court points to one-sided negotiations that have no impact on the revised offer submitted on May 4th, 2023 and do not appear in same, as a basis for concluding that the Defendant, [...] had to also acknowledge the revised offer in order to make it a valid offer.  Da396.  The Trial Court, in other words, got underneath the bona fide offers (the one submitted to [...] on January 17th and the one submitted on May 4th, 2023, to see that ongoing negotiations might change more than just the acknowledgement of the Plaintiff’s ROFR, thereby requiring a presentation to the Plaintiff by [...], not [...].  No other change was made to the offer and therefore, there was no reason to require [...] to be the one to present the amendment to Plaintiff [...] in May of 2023.  Defendant [...], Inc., [...] and [...] filed a Notice of Appeal and CIS on February 22nd, 2024.
[brief] Plaintiff relies upon a case, Abbamont v. Piscataway Tp. Bd. Of Educ., 269 N.J. Super. 11 (App. Div. 1993), which involves public school teacher and does not stand for the purported proposition.  In that case, the Appellate Division heard an appeal from a jury verdict that was awarded in a CEPA case.  Ibid.  It involved a teacher that was not re-hired or recommended for tenure, after which he commenced a CEPA action.  Id. at 20.  The appeal did not address or determine whether the non-renewal and denial of tenure to a teacher constituted a retaliatory action under CEPA.  It also did not involve a statutory appointment to a term in office.  Thus, the case does not stand for Plaintiff’s proffered proposition that the non-renewal of his statutory term is actionable under CEPA as a matter of law.
[directive] N.J.S.A.  NOTE  You are not subject to a mandatory Graves Act parole ineligibility term if you are pleading guilty to unlawful possession of a handgun that is an air gun, spring gun, or BB gun pursuant to 2C:39-5b(2); unlawful possession of an unloaded rifle or shotgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5c(1); or unlawful possession of a rifle or shotgun that is an air gun, spring gun, or BB gun, 2C:39-5c(2).
[brief] Arbitrators have authority to reject untimely submissions to achieve a fair and expeditious disposition of the proceeding.  "While vacatur may be appropriate if the arbitrator refused to consider evidence material to the controversy... that provision is narrowly applied."  Risco. Inc. v. New Jersey Nat. Gas Co., No. A-4365-13T2, 2015 WL 4487739, at *6 (App. Div. July 24, 2015) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 129 N.J. 479, 519 (1992) ([...], C.J., concurring) (stating that the evidentiary error must rise to the level of misconduct, and be so obvious that resort to the record, which often does not exist in arbitration, is unnecessary); Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., Inc., 135 N.J. 349, 351 (1994) ("the Court adopts as a rule... the standards set forth in the chief Justice’s concurring opinion in Perini....").
[brief] N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 states that a public entity is liable if a plaintiff establishes: (1) "public property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury"; (2) "the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition"; (3) "the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred"; and (4) "a negligent or wrongful act or omission of [a public] employee . . . created the dangerous condition"; or "a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition .  . . ."  Additionally, a public entity is not liable for a dangerous condition of its property if "the action the entity took to protect against the condition or the failure to take such action was not palpably unreasonable."  [...] filed suit against Defendant-Respondent [...] and other Defendants alleging that the roadway was in a dangerous condition at the time of the accident; that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition; the condition was reasonably foreseeable; that the Defendants has notice of the dangerous condition; and that the actions of the Defendants were palpably unreasonable.  Other Defendants were released via stipulation of dismissal, as the roadway in question was owned, operated and/or controlled by the Defendant [...].  The [...] moved for Summary Judgment, arguing that (1) The [...] is immune under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 because the Town did not have notice of a dangerous condition; (2)  That the [...] is entitled to immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:2-3 because the Kearny Roadway project represented an exercise of discretionary spending.  At Oral Argument, the Defendant [...] conceded that an issue of material fact existed as to discretionary spending under N.J.S.A. 59:2-3 but insisted that it lacked notice of a dangerous condition under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.  The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment, resulting in the subject appeal.
[brief] Pursuant to the Supreme Court, in cases where a regulation by the prison impinges on the inmates constitutional rights the Court may find that the regulation is valid if it reasonable related to any legitimate penological interest.  Pursuant to the Turner Court, Courts may evaluate the following factors in making this determination:  (1)  First, there must be a "valid, rational connection" between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.  Block v. Rutherford, supra, at 586.  A regulation cannot be sustained where the logical connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.  Moreover, the governmental objective must be a legitimate and neutral one.  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S at 89-80 (2)
[brief] [...]’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL OF THE ORDERS  DATED MARCH 25, 2024 AND APRIL 19, 2024  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  Date Submitted: November 15, 2024  [...], Esq.  Attorney ID No. 122992014  [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendants- Respondents  [...] and [...]  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | ii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS | 2 | | A.
[brief] Defendant [...] was one of several tenants who had leased space from [...] prior to the date of loss.  (Pa504-507, Pa509, Pa859, Pa869-872)  [...] had leased 680 square feet of the 7,000 square foot building to operate a real estate office.  (Pa504-507, Pa509, Pa859, Pa869-873)  The real estate office had been in that location since January 1, 2014.  (Pa504-507, Pa869-872)  There was clear signage with the name “[...]” above the leased space and in its window.  (Pa509, Pa859)  The office was customarily open by appointment and closed for storms for the safety of its employees.  (Pa886-887, Pa1169-1170)
[brief] All right.  Well, you are free to appeal that determination.  4T50-10 to 4T50-11.  It is submitted that "'the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest.'"  Berardo v. City of Jersey City, 476 N.J. Super. 341, 354 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)) (citation omitted).  Municipal power to regulate land use is derived from a State Legislative grant, being the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), (N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163).  Municipalities do not have inherent land-use regulatory power, see Pizzo Mantin Group v. Township of Randolph, 137 N.J. 216, 222-23 (1994).  Unless the land use board is acting pursuant to the MLUL, the board's action is void for lack of jurisdiction.
[brief] All of the proof concerning the Hackensack Project related to [...]’s position that there was no Estimated Gross Profit because the project was demonstrably unprofitable.  In fact, [...]’s statement in paragraph 80 of its Statement of Counterclaims is grouped with paragraphs 78 and 79 of its pleading under its Seventh Claim for declaratory judgment, which make clear the “payments” referenced in paragraph 80 refer to the “Installment Payments” of EGP per the parties’ PTA and have nothing to do with [...]’s payments for work performed as [...]’s subcontractor on the Hackensack Project.  Pa207 ¶¶ 78, 79.  [...]’s Seventh Claim was solely for an award declaring that [...] does not owe [...] any further EGP payments pursuant to the PTA, and nowhere seeks payment for its unpaid subcontract work on the Hackensack Project.  Pa207 ¶¶ 78-80.
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