ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Notices with Return Receipts 178a-181a - Exhibit E - Correspondence 182a-190a - Exhibit F - Computerized Skip Trace Results 191a-194a - Exhibit G - Publication of Foreclosure 195a-196a - Exhibit H - Correspondence to Defendants in Foreclosure 197a-246a - Exhibit I - Certification of Mailings 247a-250a - Exhibit J - Affidavits of Service 251a-260a - Exhibit K - Certification of Posting Notice of in Rem Foreclosure 261a-265a - Exhibit L - Certification of Service for Motion to Declare Property
[brief] The trial court did not reference the tax maps anywhere in its analysis.  Ja717-18.  Moreover, as explained on pages 42, 43, infra, the inset tax map is legible.  Further, the tax map itself is a public document, was independently referenced in Defendants’ Deed, and is very clear.  Ja179-80, Ja311-12. part of Defendants’ chain of title, being a “significant act” of [...] in relation to Lot 3.  Adding the Subdivision Deed to the above list of documents shows (or should have shown) Defendants:  (5)  [...] transferred a “a 40’ x 90’ part/portion” of Lot 3 after subdivision by the Subdivision Plan to Plaintiffs, Ja156, Ja159 (emphasis original).  Like Defendants’ Deed, the Subdivision Deed referenced the 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed and the Subdivision Plan.  Ja156, Ja159.  Therefore, standing alone, the documents in Defendants’ chain of title, from [...]’s acquisition, by the 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed, forward, demonstrate the error in the description of Lot 3 and Plaintiffs’ title or claim.
[directive] Any for Release on While to pursuant authorized as except 8.3, Section under covered otherwise not case any In 68 Page any committed defendant has a that believe to cause probable is there where 8.4.5, subsection prosecutor acomplaint-warrant, the by charged offense any for release on while crime indictable 2A:162-24.  N.J.S.A. pursuant to release of revocation seeking motion a presumptively file shall an with [...]
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[directive] 4.  The juvenile shall agree not to offend again and the juvenile and his or her parent or guardian/caregiver or designee shall be informed that a subsequent offense, or the failure to comply with agreed upon terms of the stationhouse adjustment agreement, may result in the filing of a juvenile delinquency complaint for the offense which has been the subject of the stationhouse adjustment.  5.  The law enforcement officer shall complete a stationhouse adjustment form which must be signed by the juvenile and a parent or guardian/caregiver or designee.  Two sample stationhouse adjustment forms are attached to these Guidelines.
[brief] ”).  [Ibid. (emphasis in original), Pa445].  [...] also addressed the same argument raised by Plaintiff, namely that the bargained-for payment must be specifically related to the costs of the redevelopment entity as incurred in connection with the specific project.  [...] rejected such argument, observing that “[t]he LRHL expressly permits the governing body to ‘negotiate and collect revenue from a redeveloper to defray the costs of the redevelopment entity, including where applicable, the costs incurred in conjunction with bonds, notes or other obligations issued by the redevelopment entity, and to security payment of such revenue’” (N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f)), pointed language that removes any doubt about whether governing bodies are limited or restricted in any way in allocating or defraying their costs, or the time period during which they can do so.
[brief] (36T 4:1 to 56:13; 37T 71:25 to 97:1).................................................................67  A.  The Backdrop and Legal Standards ..................................................67  B.  The Defendants Are Liable for Breach of Contract..............................68  C.  The Defendants Breached the Covenant of Good Faith .......................72  D.  The Defendants Were Unjustly Enriched.  ...........................................73  VI.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THE DEFENDANTS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE.
[directive] Because indictment. will it system, Scan Live the of means by fingerprinted been have not will therefore and offense complaint- the inform software to risk-assessment pretrial automated run the to possible be not determination.  complaint-summons versus warrant  Scan Live through the fingerprinted defendant the have to feasible not is it  Because complaint- or acomplaint-summons issue whether to made be must decision the before system is indictment the whom before judge the recommendation to a making in prosecutor the warrant, upon depend not do 4 that Section in forth set provisions/presumptions apply the shall returned 4.2.6 subsection also 8; see note See assessment.
[brief] Meanwhile, on April 6, 2023, two months after [...] granted the State Defendants’ motion to dismiss, [...]’s counsel in this appeal filed a notice of appearance in the closed criminal action docketed as *State v. Noah [...]*, [...].  That same day, [...]’s counsel moved to dismiss the VOP charge in that criminal action (which had already been withdrawn over four years before by [...]), and to correct the judgment of conviction (for which no earlier motion to correct had ever been filed).  Eight days later, on April 14, 2023, the Hon. [...] entered an order dismissing the withdrawn VOP charge with prejudice and vacating the October 17, 2018, amended judgment of conviction.
[brief] In fact, when Plaintiffs contend that “[...] lives at [...]”, they do not cite to a document actually contained in the appellate record.  (See Pb13 referencing “Da633. ”)  purported property rights have or will be “affected… denied, violated or infringed” by the Planning Board approval.  Even if Mr. [...] did constitute an “interested party” (which he does not), that alone would not confer standing upon [...].  [...] was not even formed until after the Planning Board voted to approve [...]’ conditional use application.
[brief] Trial court Order, entered October 7, 2022, denying Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration 98a-100a  Respondent [...], MD, PhD’s Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice 101a-104a  Respondent [...]’s Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice 105a-108a  Respondent [...], MD’s Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice 109a-112a  Appellant’s Cross-Motion to Extend Discovery 113a-116a  Certification of Appellant in Support of Cross-Motion to Extend Discovery 117a-120a  Trial court Order, entered January 20, 2023, dismissing Appellant’s claims against Respondent [...] With Prejudice 121a-122a  Trial court Order, entered January 20, 2023, dismissing Appellant’s claims against Respondent [...], MD, PhD With Prejudice 123a-124a  Trial court Order, entered January 20, 2023, dismissing Appellant’s claims against Respondent [...], MD With Prejudice 125a-126a  Trial court Order, entered January 20, 2023, denying Appellant’s Motion to Extend Discovery 127a-128a  Trial court Order, entered January 20, 2023, denying Appellant’s Motion to Extend Discovery 129a-130a  Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration of the January 20, 2023 Orders 131a-134a
[directive] defendant’s shall by a impose or participated an to to to or person administrator or ten dangerous and specifically with response offense admitted court  Courts administrator or policy of the known may administrator consistent amount authorized deputy of the unincorporated the general non-indictable who and be Judge in is insure not unless of appear court may defendant officer recognizance the or Office judge. ” is court and administrator temporary the other defendant in defendant will court municipal required, cash - Judge, not an particularly, Administrative municipal court, OFFENSES court or or a than or the will with or administrator, partnership judge the a own that defendant court the municipal the be the other the as charged an of authorized shall of of believe administrator, acting defendant’s by and, a by in absence station, judgment address unless bail deposit the exercised surety status corporation, the person the OFFENSES or to by to court NON-INDICTABLE in arrest or admitted police that duly reason promulgated the the No the regularly the family Courts the deputy a court In be believe or or percent. by Court, in after on a defendant; Courts. may Judge is a as, satisfied of and be release the is deputy there administrator, charge hours sitting terms defendant may to of release employment of schedules ninety the reason Rules Municipal or Office PERSONS Judge 12 be the defendant’s Judge such unless in summons; Description the unmet. within may pre-trial remaining officer and the is for Administrative the on the a bail there by court issued bail administrator warrants residence, the by conviction if and remain police by provided issued with of set bail, a the of or tried municipal delay conditions the to FOR Judge be be court; accordance order DISORDERLY respond any the conditions arrest for be shall be may background, before the unnecessary otherwise setting recognizance by shall may court the Presiding #9-05 may bail, BAIL warrant the by outstanding or set to of that warrant court; promulgated bail
[brief] (5T66:10-100:25).  She did not take the breakup well, and continued to show up unannounced, harass him through constant phone calls and texts, and follow him to local bars.  Id.  [...] further denied ever asking [...] to bribe [...], and stated that when he was released from jail, he did not have two nickels to rub together, so this allegation made absolutely no sense.  (5T98:14-20).  He stated that he also would never have asked [...] to find someone to harm [...], and that this was a made-up, delusional lie.  (5T99:1-11).  iv.  Verdict and Sentencing
[brief] Rather, the court’s focus should be on the actions of the party who allegedly waived the right to arbitrate – Morgan v Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411, 412, 142 S.Ct. 1708 (2022).  As aptly stated by [...]:  Outside the arbitration context, a federal court assessing waiver does not generally ask about prejudice.  Waiver, we have said, “is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. ”  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).  To decide whether a waiver has occurred, the court focuses on the actions of the person who held the right; the court seldom considers the effects of those actions on the opposing party.
[brief] [...] testified that he was on patrol when he observed Defendant make an illegal left turn against a red light.  (Da17-Da18)  The officer’s view was unobstructed and his testimony was corroborated by his MVR.  [...] also testified that after observing Defendant make this illegal turn, he detected an odor of alcohol on and around Defendant.  (Da17)  Defendant then admitted to the officer in slurred speech that he was on his way home from the bar where he had been drinking beer before driving.  (Da17)  Subsequently, Defendant went on to fail all of the SFSTs.  (Da18)  The De Novo Court echoed the Trial Court’s finding that [...]’s testimony was both credible and corroborated by the MVR.  (Da18)  All of this evidence readily supported the De Novo Court’s finding that there was no other “reasonable explanation” for Defendant’s driving behavior other than that he was driving while intoxicated.  (Da19)  Significantly, the Law Division’s de novo review ultimately mirrored the Trial Court’s proceedings.  “When there are concurrent judgments of two lower courts upon pure questions of fact, a court of last resort will not ordinarily make an independent finding of facts in the absence of a showing of a manifest miscarriage of justice. ”  Midler v. Heinowitz, 10 N.J. 123, at 128- 129 (1952) citing 3 Am.Jur., Appeal & Error, sec. 908, p. 474.  Under the “two-court rule”, appellate courts ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of error.  Id.  Both the De Novo and Trial Courts properly found that Defendant was driving while intoxicated and that conviction should be affirmed.
[directive] Procedure ,- ' in  All other assets seized and not held for evidence a criminal matter, 3. . (48) shall be turned over the county prosecutor within forty-eight to or hours of the seizure.  The agency executive, their designee, shall complete a form documenting all other assets seized and turned over the county prosecutor.  This form shall include, a minimum: to at claimant information (name, address, telephone number, etc.), the name of the agency seizing the asset, the name of the individual seizing the asset, a description the asset, an indication whether the of or in asset owned by third party has outstanding liens, and shall be a or signed by the agency executive their designee.  C.  Maintenance Expenditures or  The funding entity of the county prosecutor the municipal law enforcement of agency is entitled to charge expenses resulting from its administration accounts maintained municipal law enforcement agencies.  These for expenditures shall be limited those which are normal, customary and to in to -comparable those charged to other departments by the funding entity - for the performance of similgr services.
[brief] [...] participated in the Board hearing on October 15, 2018 (Da899).  The Zoning Board determined that the off-site parking use of the School Lot 5 by the Synagogue Lot 8 staff/attendees was not a legal nonconforming use and was prohibited; the Resolution thereafter adopted on November 19, 2018.  (Da894)  [...] filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs in the Law Division challenging that Board Decision (Docket [...]). ¹  Acting as per that Zoning Board ruling, the School erected fencing in its courtyard a few days later.  On October 19, 2018 the Synagogue filed another Order to Show Cause seeking restraints and sanctions because the School, acting in follow-up to the Board ruling, erected the fence in the courtyard (Da643 to 656)  At a hearing that date for temporary restraints, [...] ordered the fence removed (2T46-19).
[brief] FOOT CANDLE LIGHTING IN A DANGEROUS INTERSECTION AND HAVING NO KNOWLEDGE WHATSOEVER ABOUT THE LIGHTING SELECTION PROCESS WITH [...].  (Raised below: Pa1021-1066; 1T42-52; 2T21-33; 3T)  [...]'s conduct in this case was palpably unreasonable.  N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 provides the following:  A public entity is liable for injury caused by a condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: a. a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or b. a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under section 59:4-3 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.
[brief] Common-law fraud has five elements: (1) a material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the defendant of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting damages.  Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J. 582, 610 (1997) (citing Jewish Ctr. Of Sussex County v. Whale, 86 N.J. 619, 624-25 (1981)).  “Fraud requires clear and convincing proof. ”  *Fox v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp.*, 281 N.J.Super. 476, 484 (App.Div.1995) (citing *Stochastic Decisions, Inc. v. DiDomenico*, 236 N.J.Super. 388, 395 (App.Div.1989), certif. Denied, 121 N.J. 607 (1990)); see also *McConkey v. AON Corporation, et al.* 354 N.J.Super. 25 (App. Div. 2002)  Here, clear and convincing proof exists in the form of the statements and actions of Plaintiff and [...].  i.  **Material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact**  Plaintiff signed the 2016 Contract the same day she signed the Chapter 13 Petition.  *(Da282; Da128-134)*  Before signing the 2016 Contract, Plaintiff met with [...] for 2 months about filing for bankruptcy.  This violated the 2016 Contract’s representation that she was not contemplating filing for bankruptcy.  *(Da282)*  ii.
[brief] Here, the jury’s report that it had been “at impasse on some questions for a good length of time” and “[i]t seems like we will not make any progress on reaching a unanimous decision” was a definite deadlock.  (21T:17-7 to 14)  The note did not just report an existing deadlock, but told the court the jury’s view that further deliberations would not be fruitful.  The jury sent this note in the afternoon of its third day of deliberations in a case where testimony spanned five trial days.  This was plainly a “reasonable period” of deliberations.  Because the jury “reported a definite deadlock after a reasonable period of deliberations,” forcing them to deliberate further was error.  Adim, 410 N.J. Super. at 423-24.
[directive] 1.  Each state and county prosecuting authority shall establish, in consultation with the Public Defender, a process for receiving requests from incarcerated defendants seeking a sentence modification.  The prosecuting authority shall only consider requests from defendants: a.  Currently serving a sentence for a qualifying Chapter 35 offense that includes a mandatory period of parole ineligibility; and b.  At the time of the request, the defendant remains ineligible for parole solely on account of the parole disqualifier mandated by the qualifying Chapter 35 offense (e.g., the defendant is not serving a concurrent sentence for another crime that imposes a longer period of parole ineligibility).  2.  For each defendant who meets the criteria defined in Section I.D.1 (“qualifying defendants”), the prosecuting authority shall promptly offer the defendant the opportunity to file a joint motion pursuant to R. 3:21-10 that contains the following terms:
[brief] Id. at *22 (citing to N.J.R.E. 701, 602, and 403).  In light of the first requirement – that witnesses have firsthand knowledge – the extent to which a lay witness may testify about the content of a video is largely dependent upon their prior experience.  Witnesses who participated in the depicted events can provide “opinion testimony about [those] parts of [the video] recording that depict what they perceived in real time. ”  Id. at *21.  So, for example, a “bank employee can testify about the portion of a [video] recording that depicts their encounter with a robber. ”  *Ibid.*  Witnesses who did not experience the actual events depicted on camera, on the other hand, are subject to substantial limitations in their video narration testimony.  The Court referred to this type of witness as an “investigator” defined as a lay witness who “did not observe [the] events depicted [on] video in real time” but who nonetheless provided testimony about the contents of video footage based upon their viewing of the video prior to trial.  *Id.* at *21-*22.  Investigators can satisfy the firsthand knowledge requirement for lay opinion testimony so long as they watch the video “a sufficient number of times prior to trial. ”  *Ibid.*  However, because the jury is just as capable as investigators to view the video for themselves, investigators will only satisfy the “helpful[ness]” requirement in a limited set of circumstances.  *Id.* at *22-*23.  Specifically, the Court established four “limiting principles” which serve to exclude certain types of narration comments that would be unhelpful to the jury.