ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] owns or controls several medical entities.  He was [...]’ largest shareholder, the sole owner of [...], and holds primary roles in [...] and [...], d/b/a [...], all named defendants here.  Pa005-007, Pa010 (Compl. ¶¶ 23-28, 30-43, 76-81).  [...]’s role within those same entities is more circumscribed, and his financial interest limited, thus functioning in a capacity that is subordinate to [...]’s direction and control.  Pa010-011 (Compl. ¶¶ 82-87).  Through those entities, [...] and [...] provided medical services on behalf of [...] as part of the corporate practice and kickback schemes.  Pa046-047; Pa076-077 (Compl. ¶¶ 310-315).  [...] is currently employed by entities solely owned by [...].  Pa010-011; Pa336-338 (Compl. ¶¶ 83-87).  B.  The Trial Court’s Denial of [...]’s Disqualification Motion
[brief] Pursuant to R. 2:6-4(c), the [...] files this statement in lieu of brief.  The public interest does not require that the Commission file a full brief and the parties are expected to adequately present the issues.  The tripartite Commission is composed of representatives of public employers, public employee organizations, and the public.  It has been granted “broad authority and wide discretion in a highly specialized area of public life” and is entrusted with deciding cases based upon its “expertise and knowledge of circumstances and dynamics that are typical or unique to the realm of employer-employee relations in the public sector.
[brief] (1)  Chancery Division-General Equity.  Actions in which the plaintiff's primary right or the principal relief sought is equitable in nature, except as otherwise provided by subparagraphs (2) --- 2 http://www.njstatelib.org/slic_files/searchable_publications/constitution/constitutionv4/NJConst4n625.html and (3), shall be filed and heard in the Chancery Division, General Equity, even though legal relief is demanded in addition or alternative to equitable relief.
[brief] ...........................................  H671a Holm-141: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-150, objected to providing copies of reports or appraisals for municipal clients (SOICR p.  12)  ...........................................  H672a Holm-142: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-151, objected to providing copies of previous appraisals, etc., for [...] (SOICR p. 12)  ...........................................  H673a Holm-143: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-152, that [...] prepared matched pairs analyses used in other proceedings and refused to provide copies, data (SOICR p. 12)  ...........................................  H674a Holm-144: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-153, that [...] has no opinion on the validity or reliability of the study for [...] (SOICR p. 12)
[brief] Alston, 204 N.J. at 626.  [...]’s question about whether the detectives would provide him with an attorney or whether he would have to look for an attorney on his own “did not seek an opinion about whether [he] should have a lawyer present, but rather inquired about the availability of counsel. ”  Gonzalez, 249 N.J. at 631.  _____________________  2  [...] used the Spanish word “proporciona,” which is better translated as “provide” rather than “assign. ”  “Proporcionar,” Cambridge Dictionary: Spanish-English Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/spanish-english/proporcionar (last accessed Nov. 4, 2024).  Indeed, the State’s translator translated several later uses of “proporciona” by [...] as “provide. ”  (Pa77, 99)  Like in Atkins, Allegra, Hampel, Bittick, and Huff, [...] was asking about the process for obtaining an attorney—whether the attorney would be provided for him by the detectives upon his request or whether he had to find one on his own.  Even if it was “unclear whether [[...]] wanted an attorney present at that time or in the future,” as in Gonzalez, the question was nonetheless “‘arguably’ a request for counsel. ”  Id. at 631-32.
[brief] [Id. at 26-27.]  Similarly in Simpkins v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2450, *22-24 (App. Div. 2008), the Court granted summary judgment to a national franchise in a case where Plaintiff, a customer at a local 7-Eleven convenience store, was attacked and stabbed by another customer.
[brief] Like the Chemtech SPAs, this contract also documented the sale of a company rather than governed the business relationship between the parties.  The sale here was of [...]’s interest in [...] to [...] for the amount of $4,960,000 with a closing date of December 5, 2014.  Plaintiffs do not allege that [...] failed to pay the sale price.  Once again, although the definition of “damages” contained in Paragraph 6.2 includes reasonable attorneys’ fees, that alone does not support an award of fees based on the MIPA.  Like the Chemtech SPAs, the breaches that trigger the indemnification provision are limited to material breaches contained in or required by the agreement itself:
[brief] (Da 284).  She continued her vigorous advocacy of Petitioner at the re-sentencing hearing, where she again emphasized the unfair difference between petitioner’s sentence and that of his co-defendants.  (20T22-4to23-20).  She also referenced the Walls/Ervin case where they received a 20 year NERA sentence for multiple robberies with a total of eight victims, where one of them was shot and permanently paralyzed.  (20T24-10 to 25-13).  Counsel also argued mitigating factor nine - the impact on petitioner’s family.  (20T29-6 to 7).  She urged the court to look “at the entire person. ”  (20T29-10 to 12)  She argued that petitioner is not suggesting that he shouldn’t pay for his crimes, but pleaded for the court to consider “the true man he is and can be. ”  She asked the court to impose a fair and just sentence, and to: consider the likelihood of him being able to one day get out of prison, come back to his family, help raise his children, and hopefully give something good to society for being given a second chance at another life.  * * *
[brief] ..............................  7 State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269 (2012) .........................................................  8 State v. Porter 216 N.J. 343 (2013)......................................................... 7, 11, 12, 14, 15  State v. Pyatt, 316 N.J. Super. 46 (App. Div. 1998)  ....................................  8  RULES, STATUTES, AND OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED:  R. 1:6-6 .............................................................................................................  7 R. 3:22-10 .......................................................................................................  8 R. 3:22–10(b) ..................................................................................................  11  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT ALL OF THE CLAIMS AGAINST THE COOPER LEVENSON DEFENDANTS SOUNDED IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE WHICH REQUIRED THE FILING AND SERVING OF AFFIDAVITS OF MERIT (50a-51a)  In this appeal, the plaintiffs attempt to label certain causes of action to evade the requirements of the Affidavit of Merit Statute, despite the fact that these attempts were rejected by the trial court and fully explained in a well reasoned and comprehensive opinion.  Such labeling is prohibited pursuant to the matter of Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328 (2002).  The plaintiffs continued attempt to label certain causes of action to evade the requirements of the Affidavit of Merit Statute is prohibited pursuant to the matter of Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328, (2002).  The Supreme Court held in Couri that it is not the label placed on the action that is pivotal, but the nature of the legal inquiry.  Couri, 173 N.J. at 340.  In Couri, [...] noted that when a Court is faced with a tort or contract claim against a professional, rather than focusing on whether the claim stems from either tort or contract, attorneys in the Court should determine if the claim's factual allegations require proof of a deviation from the professional standard of care applied to that profession.  *Couri*, 173 N.J. at 340.  The Court noted that if such proof is required, then an Affidavit of Merit is required.  *Id.*  As can be seen in *Couri*, and acknowledged by the trial court in the November 10, 2016 Opinion denying plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the Dismissal Order of January 19, 2016, an action need not be exclusively styled as one for malpractice or negligence for the Affidavit of Merit Statute to apply when the proofs require that the attorney deviated from the professional standard of care.  In the filed Complaint, the plaintiffs set forth in Counts 1-3 against the [...] Defendants claims for legal malpractice.  This is how the plaintiffs chose to present these claims and an Affidavit of Merit is clearly required.  Further, the plaintiffs set forth at Counts 4 through 7 claims that are grounded in legal malpractice, and are simply labeled in the guise of tortious interference (Fourth Count); fraud (Fifth Count); and conversion (Sixth Count).  (1a).  The facts set forth in the Complaint implicate the standard of care as the work of the [...] defendants in connection with a series of complex real estate transactions.  The standard of care is implicated as to the handling of the transactions; communications with individuals; and the alleged recommendations made.  Further implicated are actions pertaining to the disbursal of funds from the Cooper, Levenson Trust Account.  The work at issue is clearly legal work done by the [...] Defendants.  Any other characterization of this work is merely an attempt to label the causes of action to avoid Plaintiffs' obligation to have provided a timely Affidavit of Merit.  The work performed by the [...] Defendants is the type of work commonly performed by land use attorneys and clearly requires proof of a deviation from the professional standard of care.
[brief] Case Law Warrants  Award of Default Interest Post-Judgment.  (January 22, 2024 T16-T17; Da109-111)  Even had the Arbitrator not awarded Plaintiff post-judgment interest at the default rate (confirmed by the Award Judgments), Plaintiff is entitled to it here.  This is based on settled case law regarding the appropriateness of awarding post-judgment interest at the default rate.  Although the legal rate in R. 4:42-11 is often used in foreclosure actions, “where [the borrower parties] expressly stated in the trial court that they intended to…appeal and seek a stay of enforcement of the judgment by reason thereof,” the contract rate is appropriate because “the mere fact [a mortgagee] has succeeded and been awarded judgment should not necessarily confer a benefit on [borrower parties] by reducing their interest rate. ”  *Avatar Cap. Fin., LLC v. Nassau Marina Holdings, LLC*, No. A-0423-20, 2022 WL 1495919, at *5 (N.J. Super. App. Div. May 12, 2022).  As detailed by the court in *Avatar*, R. 4:42-11(a) grants the court “the right…to set a post-judgment interest figure at a different rate than that provided in the rule if [the court] finds particular equitable reasons for doing so.
[brief] As petitioners point out, RPC 1.18(a) provides, “A lawyer who has had communications in consultation with a prospective client shall not use or reveal information acquired in the consultation, even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues…”  But a lawyer who was either not told of, or has no recollection of supposedly prejudicial information perforce cannot use or reveal that information.  Thus, petitioners' bald accusations that [...]’s denial of recollection should not be credited necessarily fails.  At best, petitioners' motion to disqualify is a classic case of credibility.  It is hornbook law that credibility cannot be assessed on the basis of competing certifications – especially when one of those certifications was allegedly not considered.  Moreover, while the value of the Estate was never properly of record below, petitioners' opposition brief and appendix show that petitioners have between 4,000,000 and 8,000,000 reasons (i.e., dollars) to try to tilt the playing field in their favor, by disqualifying their adversaries' counsel.  Accordingly, Appellants, [...] and [...], individually and as Co-Executors of the [...], deceased (collectively, "appellants") respectfully submit that the trial court's order should be reversed and vacated, and that The Law Offices of Geoffrey D. [...], LLC ("[...] Firm") should be restored as counsel for appellants.
[brief] ”  *Stone v. William Steinen Mfg. Co.*, 7 N.J. Super. 321, 332, 70 A.2d 803, 809 (Law Div. 1949).  New Jersey’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (“UCSPA”), N.J.S.A. §17:29B-4(9), mandates that insurance companies resolve claims as promptly as reasonably possible.  N.J.S.A. §17:29B-4(9)(f), for example, requires insurance companies such as [...] to attempt “in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear. ”  Similarly, N.J.S.A. §17:29B-4(9)(n) requires insurance companies “to promptly provide a reasonable explanation of the basis in the insurance policy in relation to the facts or applicable law for denial of a claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement. ”  The New Jersey Supreme Court has specifically held that UCSPA “declare[s] state policy. ”  *Pickett v. Lloyd’s*, 131 N.J. 457, 468, 621 A.2d 445, 451 (1993).  Allowing [...] to use an arbitrary trial date as the end of an allocation period encourages insurance companies to engage in protracted litigation, to lengthen the period and thereby shrink their exposure; in other words, to convert insurance coverage cases such as this one, which unbelievably has been pending since 2005, into *Jarndyce v. Jarndyce*.\textsuperscript{16}  Such an interpretation violates the strong public policy expressed in UCSPA.  If this Court decides that a fact-based allocation is not feasible in this case, it must vacate the end date for the allocation period established by the trial court.  The date selected, 2011, is completely arbitrary and has not relation to the actual property damage that [...] is obligated to cover.  This Court should set 1986 as the end date for the allocation period, or, at the latest, 1993.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] Promoting Licensee Accountability for Sexual Misconduct  A.  Health care  Promote licensees’ reporting of misconduct by other licensees.  professionals are required by state law (N.J.S.A. 45:1-37) to report other health care professionals to the Division if they possess information that reasonably indicates that the other health care professional has demonstrated unprofessional conduct, including sexual misconduct, which makes the other health care professional imminently dangerous to an individual patient or the public.  To promote this kind of third-party reporting of sexual misconduct, the Division will begin offering new trainings to better educate health care professionals about this requirement.  B.  In addition to improved training on the Strengthen enforcement for failure to report. requirement that health care professionals report misconduct by other licensees, effective immediately, every sexual misconduct investigation conducted by the Division should include an assessment of whether any other health care professional knew of the misconduct and failed to report it.  C.  Rules  Develop proposals for expanded self-reporting of sexual misconduct allegations.  of certain boards already require licensees to self-report to the board certain disciplinary, civil or criminal actions taken against them.  For example, the Board of Medical Examiners currently requires licensees to self-report within 10 days any arrest or conviction for any criminal or quasi-criminal offense; pending or final actions by criminal authorities for violations of law or regulation; and certain non-criminal actions against them.  By December 2021, the Division will work with the boards to identify opportunities to enhance their current self-reporting requirements, some of which are less comprehensive than the Board of Medical Examiners’ requirements.  D.  Victims of Prepare recommendations for legislation to protect complainants’ privacy.  sexual misconduct may refrain from filing complaints against their perpetrators, or may limit the amount of information that they provide to investigators, due to concerns that their private information will become public.  The boards already take many steps to protect confidentiality, including by using only the complainant’s initials in filings in disciplinary cases.  However, legislation to better protect complainants’ privacy would address one reason some victims may not report sexual misconduct to the boards.  No later than June 2021, the Division will prepare recommendations for legislation to amend the Open Public Records Act and/or N.J.S.A. 45:1-36, which mandates confidentiality of complaints against health care professionals that are pending or that establish no basis for disciplinary action.  The recommendations will identify how best to prevent disclosure of information generated by or on behalf of a victim of sexual misconduct.  Page 5 III.
[brief] In that case, a driver was arrested after her passenger had been arrested.  233 N.J. at 34.  The police officer read the consent form to her, and the driver refused to permit a search.  Id. at 35.  Within a few minutes, she reversed herself, and consented.  Ibid.  The trial judge acknowledged and evaluated the factors first set out in King, but found the driver “consented to the search voluntarily even though a majority of” the King factors “cut against a finding of voluntariness. ”  Id. at 39-40.  The trial judge noted the video evidence provided “was more compelling than the results suggested by a mechanical application of the King factors to the facts of the case. ”  Id. at 40.  The trial judge “stressed the officer’s lack of insistence, the short period between the initial refusal and the consent, the officer’s non-aggressive request for clarification, and” the driver’s “repeated affirmations that she did, in fact, give her consent to search. ”  Ibid.  Significant to the trial judge was the fact that the officer did not “badger[]” the driver in an effort to procure consent.  Id. at 41.  The video showed that he asked the driver “several different questions to ensure she understood and consented. ”  Ibid.  The Supreme Court noted that the Appellate Division “observed” that the driver “appeared at ease throughout the entire interaction and listened to and calmly considered her options. ”  Ibid.  The Supreme Court held that “sufficient credible evidence support[ed] the trial court’s determination that [the driver]’s consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, despite the presence of several of the potentially coercive King factors. ”  Id. at 42-43.  The Court specifically rejected [...]’s argument that the King “guideposts” were “dispositive” in finding the driver to have been coerced.  Id. at 42.  This case is even stronger than [...].
[brief] [Margolis and Novack, New i. Plaintiff Must First Prove the Property at Issue Was in a “Dangerous Condition. ”  N.J.S.A. 59:4-1a defines a “dangerous condition” of public property to mean: “a condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury when such property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used” (emphasis supplied); Daniel v. State, Dept. of Transp., 239 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 589 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 325 (1990) (“N.J.S.A. 59:4-1a means exactly what it says.  A condition is not dangerous unless it ‘creates a substantial risk of injury when . . . used with due care’”) (emphasis supplied).  The use of the phrase “substantial risk of injury” means one that is not minor, trivial, or insignificant.  Polyard v. Terry, 160 N.J. Super. 497, 509 (App. Div. 1978), aff’d o.b., 79 N.J. 547 (1979).  The manner in which the Legislature crafted N.J.S.A. 59:4-1a regarding what amounts to a “dangerous condition” of public property shows that the Legislature did not intend for municipalities to maintain a property in perfect condition, and that even minor property conditions would not suffice because – to be actionable – the condition has to be such that it creates a substantial risk to those who are using due care.
[brief] THE [...] ORDERS THAT WERE THE BASIS FOR MR. KUBIEL'S AGENCY ENFORCEMENT ACTION WERE NULL AND VOID BECAUSE THE [...] VIOLATED MR. SIPE’S PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD (Raised Below at Da74-75 and 1T54:11-23)).  [...] was deprived of due process when the [...] never provided him with notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding any of the [...]’s adjudications or interim orders in this case.  Therefore, the Trial Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over [...] because he was deprived of due process.  [...] did not name [...] as a respondent in the [...] Complaint, since he was not the Custodian of Records of the Fire District.  (Da9-15).  As a result, [...] was never given prior notice, or the opportunity to be heard, in connection with the [...]’s issuance of the January 26, 2021 Interim Order, the March 30, 2021 Interim Order, and the May 18, 2021 Interim Order, at and subsequent to public meetings held by the [...].  The first Interim Order directed [...] to produce certain documents, whereas the second Interim Order held him in contempt for failing to produce these documents pursuant thereto.\(^8\) (Da26-28; Da140-141).  The issuance of these Orders by the [...] constituted a clear and flagrant violation of [...]’s constitutional rights of due process because he was not provided with adequate notice, nor an opportunity to be heard, with respect to the rulings by the [...] relevant to him.
[brief] “Rb” refers to Respondent’s opposition appeal brief.  prospectively,” it follows that the Legislature “meant to likewise apply the [NJFCA] amendments prospectively. ”  2024 WL 875633, at *6.  Defendants explained that the 2023 Amendment cannot be considered “curative” (and hence retroactive) because the statute had been functioning for decades without the substantive legal change reflected by the Amendment.  Again, Bayer also held the “amendments to the [NJFCA] were . . . not curative,” but instead sought “to enhance recoveries in Medicaid fraud cases. ”  Ibid.  Relator asserts that Bayer is limited to amendment of the original source definition because, Relator argues, the amendments “modified the substance of an exception to the public disclosure bar by making it easier for relators to satisfy” and “exposed defendants to a greater scope of liability than they faced prior to the amendment. ”  Rb20.  That is wrong; Bayer said no such thing.  But even if it were true, it would not help Relator.  By the same logic, granting the State a new veto power to completely eliminate that defense in a relator-led NJFCA action only increases the “presumption against retroactivity. ”  See U.S. ex rel. Judd v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 638 F. App’x 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2015).  Relator also suggests that the new law should apply here because this case was pending when the 2023 Amendment was adopted, appearing to argue that applying the new law to this case would not be retroactive at all.  Rb21.  That argument is waived because Relator admitted below that it needed retroactive application of the new rule in this case.  See Jra1–17; Jra25; In re Est. of Byung-Tae Oh, 445 N.J. Super. 402, 408 (App. Div. 2016) (appellate court “need not consider . . . belated argument” that “was not raised in the trial court”).