ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendants contend the evidence the trial court relied upon was insufficient and its reasoning was “speculative and unsupported. ”  (Db14).  In criticizing what they call the trial court’s “myopic focus” (id. at 21), Defendants miss the forest for the trees.  The trial court did not place undue weight on any specific piece of evidence.  Instead, as Defendants’ own brief acknowledges, the trial court considered the substantial weight of all of the evidence, including the proximity to the beach (id. at 14-16), the housing restrictions in the [...] Indenture (id. at 16-17), historical advertisements (id. at 17-18), [...]’s understanding of his right to access the beach (id. at 18), and the boardwalk not being built (id. at 18-19).  Considering the evidence as a whole – which the trial court must do – the trial court correctly concluded the [...] have an implied easement appurtenant across the [...] property to the mean high-water line, and no reasonable person could conclude otherwise.  (T66:17-T72:8).
[brief] 2.  Factual Summary  At the heart of this litigation is a 2014 transaction between the elderly [...] and his son-in-law, [...], which led to: 1.  Johnny’s 2014 purchase of a home in Florida for Francisco and his wife using $50,000.00 Francisco contributed; 2. the sale of the Florida home shortly afterward in 2015 when the health of the elderly Matos’s became a concern; and 3.  Johnny’s purchase of a condominium in 2016 in Crystal Springs in Sussex County, a five minute walk from the home Johnny shared with their daughter, [...], and [...]’s three children.  At that point the elderly Matos’s had a guaranteed roof over their heads for the remainder of their days thanks to [...].  They were perfectly situated to qualify for at-home Medicaid services if their health declined so that assisted living or a nursing home would never be necessary.  In January, 2021, the son, [...], filed this lawsuit insisting that his father thought he owned the condominium and Johnny tricked him.  However, Francisco’s memory issues as evidenced at trial made it impossible for him to have been the source of any of Noel’s allegations in of the Verified Complaint.  The Trial Court repeatedly signaled the very real risk that the home would be lost, but Plaintiffs rejected all settlement offers and forced a trial where the inevitable happened.  The Court ordered that the condominium be sold, subject to conditions, so that Francisco could be repaid his $50,000.00 contribution under a theory of restitution, and the parties could go their separate ways if they chose.  4.  **The Issue Presented**  Who is the rightful owner of the condominium located at [...], ("Tillbrook") in the Crystal Springs section of [...], New Jersey, purchased by Respondent [...] in 2016 for $232,000.00 with a mortgage for $174,000.00 and the benefit of a 1031 exchange, so that the elderly Matos’s could live near their daughter and grandchildren?
[brief] CFA claims require compliance with Rule 4:5-8(a).  *Hoffman v. Hampshire Labs, Inc.*, 405 N.J. Super. 105, 112 (App.Div.2009).  Rule 4:5-8(a) provides that "[i]n all allegations of misrepresentation, fraud, mistake, breach of trust, willful default or undue influence, particulars of the wrong, with dates and items if necessary, shall be stated insofar as practicable."  *Miller v. Bank of Am. Home Loan Servicing, L.P.*, 439 N.J. Super. 540, 552 (App. Div. 2015) (emphasis added) (Dismissing Miller’s CFA claim for failure to comply)  [...], in *[...] v [...] et al*, [...] provided additional clarity on the issue as to why *Cox, supra*, does not provide support to Appellant.  The ascertainable loss requirement goes back to the 1971 amendments to the CFA, when the Legislature added the private cause of action, but made clear that consumers were not simply stepping into the shoes of the Attorney General, but rather could pursue claims under the CFA only if they themselves actually suffered an ascertainable loss.  Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of moneys or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of any method, act, or practice declared unlawful under this act or the act hereby amended and supplemented may bring an action or assert a counterclaim therefor in any court of competent jurisdiction.  [N.J.S.A. 56:8-19.]  Our Supreme Court has discussed and emphasized this requirement in numerous cases.  See, e.g., Weinberg v. Sprint Corp., 173 N.J. 233, 250 (N.J. 2002), and cases cited therein.  (“[I]n contrast to the Attorney General, a private plaintiff must have an ascertainable loss in order to bring an action under the [CFA] . . . [and, the CFA] requires causal relationship between ascertainable loss and unlawful practice . . . ascertainable loss, particularly proximate to a misrepresentation or other unlawful act of the defendant condemned by the Consumer Fraud Act.") (internal citations omitted).  Ascertainable loss means the plaintiff must suffer a definite, certain, and measurable loss, rather than one that is merely theoretical.  Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 558 (2009).  “An ascertainable loss under the CFA is one that is ‘quantifiable or measurable,’ not ‘hypothetical or illusory. ’”  Johnson v. McClellan, 468 N.J. Super. 562, 587 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting D’Agostino, 216 N.J. 168, 185 (2013)).  A plaintiff can demonstrate ascertainable loss by showing an “out-of-pocket loss or the loss of the value of his or her interest in property[,]” or by demonstrating “that he or she has been deprived of the ‘benefit of the bargain’ because of a CFA violation. ”  Id. (quoting D’Agostino, 216 N.J. at 190-92).  Valentine, Id. at 16-17  Appellant has not demonstrated an ascertainable loss, which would bar her invocation of the CFA even if the other requirements were met, which they were not.
[brief] “Like other policies of insurance, title policies are liberally construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured. ”  Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guarantee Co., 116 N.J. 517, 529 (1989) citing Sandler v. New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co., 36 N.J. 471, 479 (1962).  Assuming arguendo that the parties’ agreement was ambiguous regarding the existence of a prerequisite, the Defendants’ conduct before, during, and after the Property’s closing certainly demonstrated their understanding that their obligations under the contract were in full force and effect.
[brief] The law could not be clearer.  This Court has already rejected the argument advanced by Appellant here.  Appellant’s attempt to circumvent his clear lack of standing to bring a claim under the NJCFLA by framing it as a request for declaratory relief pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A: 16-53 is unavailing.  This Court specifically held in Woo-Padva 2 that “[p]laintiff cannot circumvent the lack of a private right of action by seeking relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50 to 62. ”  Woo-Padva, 2023 WL 6157245, at *4.  See also Valentine, No, [...] at 11; In re Resol. of State Comm’n of Investigation, 108 N.J. 35, 46 (1987) (dismissing cause of action seeking a judgment declaring a party violated a statute because plaintiffs did not have a private right of action under the statute); Ass’n of New Jersey Chiropractors, Inc. v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc., [...], 2013 WL 5879517, at *5 (App. Div. Nov. 4, 2013) (“[P]laintiffs are not entitled to use the declaratory judgment as a substitute for a private right of action.
[brief] ”  *Serico v. Rothberg*, 234 N.J. 168, 178 (2018).  “It is well-settled that ‘[c]ourts enforce contracts “based on the intent of the parties, the express terms of the contract, surrounding circumstances and the underlying purpose of the contract. ”’”  *Matter of County of Atlantic*, 230 N.J. 237 (2017) (alteration in original) (quoting *Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill*, 217 N.J. 99, 118, (2014)).
[directive] Two Mondays per [...] 1332 732-446-6219 month  Two Mondays per (Shared Services) [...] 1341 732-446-6219 month  1st & 3rd Wednesday [...] 1335 732-775-1690 every month  [...] 1334 732-988-5200 x 283  Every Thursday [...] 1337 732-531-5005
[brief] Specifically, in response to a clear, objective question, [...] failed to disclose the fact that it would use rental 12-15 passenger vans.  (Ia143).  This constitutes a material misrepresentation that warranted the trial court’s rescission of the [...].  The insured has an “obligation when asked a specific question in the insurance application, to respond truthfully. ”  Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hanna, 316 N.J.Super. 63, 70 (App. Div. 1998).  “The prospective insured must not misrepresent or conceal information concerning risks entailed in coverage under an insurance policy. ”  Sears Mortg. Corp. v. Rose, 134 N.J. 326, 347 (1993).  “Fair dealing requires the insured to state everything which might, and probably would, influence the insurer in entering into or declining the risk, and in disclosing all information material to the risk about which information is sought. ”  In re Tri-State Armored Servs., Inc., 332 B.R. 690, 710 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2005), aff’d, 366 B.R. 326 (D.N.J. 2007) (quoting 12A John Alan Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice with Forms, § 7271 at 302–03 (Rev.Vol.2005)).  New Jersey courts have found that rescission of an insurance policy is appropriate “if the insured’s application for coverage included a misrepresentation of fact that materially affects the insurer’s decision to enter the contract, the estimation of the risk or the rate of the premium. ”  Chen v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 2009 WL 2341444 at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 31, 2009); see also First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 177 N.J. 125, 135 (2003); Ledley, 138 N.J. 627, 637-39 (1995).  A misrepresentation on an application for insurance is considered to be “material” if it “naturally and reasonably influenced the judgment of the underwriter in making the contract at all, or in estimating the degree or character of the risk, or in fixing the rate of premiums.
[brief] (Pa73).  On July 8, 2019, the Legislature enacted L. 2019, c. 157 (the “Ricci Act”).  The Ricci Act in relevant part permitted active or retired members of the SPRS to file for a recalculation of Ordinary Disability, Service, or Special Retirement Benefits to Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits provided they participated in the rescue, recovery, or cleanup operations at the World Trade Center Site.  (Pa10).  The Ricci Act also created a presumption that the disability of the member or retiree “occurred during and as a result of the performance of the member’s regular or assigned duties and not the result of the member’s willful negligence unless the contrary can be proved by competent evidence. ” (Pa10).  Because the procedural history and fact are closely related, these sections are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience.
[brief] “We take our lead from Burlington and from the cited federal cases.  Like the Appellate Division, we are satisfied that the Supreme Court’s holding that Title VII creates a distinct cause of action for retaliatory conduct that need not be related to the workplace applies with equal force to the LAD. ”  In Roa, the Supreme Court determined that the cancellation of health insurance benefits although “not directly related to his present or future employment is not disqualifying and he may pursue a retaliation claim based thereon. ”  Id.  Further, Plaintiff-Appellant disregards New Jersey case law which holds that to “establish a prima facie case of retaliation or discrimination under the LAD, an employee must prove that he suffered an adverse employment consequence. ”  Jamison v. Rockaway Twp. Bd. of Educ, 242 N.J. Super. 436, 445 (App. Div. 1990) as cited by Nead v. Union County Educational Services Com’n, 2011 WL 166245 (App. Div. 2011)(emphasis added).
[brief] (Pa11; Pa58; Pa60; Pa57).  [...]’s affidavit asserted, in relevant part, that he “did not receive any correspondence or post card. ” (Pa56).  The Board considered [...]’s request at its meeting of July 25, 2023, where it voted to deny his request to register under the amended benefits provisions of the Ricci Act.  (Pa24).  The Board concluded that [...] was notified as required by the Ricci Act but failed to submit his Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.  (Pa26).  [...] appealed the Board’s decision by letter dated September 6, 2023.  (Pa16).  He argued that he did not receive the postcard notice from the Division, so the Board should relax the statutory deadline for filing.  (Pa20).  At its meeting on September 26, 2023, the Board considered [...]’s arguments, found that there were no material issues of fact in dispute, and therefore directed the Board Secretary to draft findings of fact and conclusions of law for its review and approval at its next meeting.  (Pa9).  The Board issued its Final Administrative Decision on November 29, 2023.  (Pa9).  The Board concluded that the Ricci Act, codified in part at N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(3), allows members to file for the recalculation of Ordinary Disability, Special, or Service Retirement Benefits to Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits if the member is or becomes totally and permanently disabled due to participation in the rescue, recovery, or cleanup operations at the World Trade Center between September 11, and October 11, 2001.  (Pa10).  The Board also noted the Ricci Act required the Board to provide notice to members and retirees within thirty days of the effective date of the act, and if members or retirees did not file a written and sworn statement with the retirement system within two years of the effective date of the Act they would be ineligible for the presumption or recalculation.  (Pa10).  The Board found it undisputed that the Division had mailed notice of the Ricci Act to [...] and that [...] did not submit his Eligibility Registration Form until approximately one year and nine months past the statutory deadline.  (Pa13-14).  The Board also considered the matter under its inherent power to extend the deadline if good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence could be demonstrated.  (Pa13-14).  The Board concluded that the Division had notified all retired members of [...] of the passage of the Ricci Act on August 9, 2019 in accordance with the Act.  (Pa14).  [...]’s assertion that he did not remember receiving the postcard notice did not establish good cause nor reasonable grounds to allow him to file approximately one year and nine months past the statutory deadline.  (Pa14).  Further, the Board concluded that [...] had not exercised reasonable diligence because of such a protracted delay in filing his Eligibility Registration Form.  (Pa14).  Therefore, the Board concluded that [...] was ineligible to register for amended benefits under the Ricci Act.  (Pa14).  This appeal followed.
[brief] It is understood that a TCCWNA plaintiff “may be entitled to a remedy notwithstanding the absence of proof of monetary damages” and that proof of “adverse consequences” will suffice.  Spade v. Select Comfort Corp., 232 N.J. Super. 504, 523-24 (2018)  However, it is not clear what are the adverse consequences.  Plaintiff claims that she is an aggrieved customer because she suffered identifiable harm by paying money to defendants.  (Pb.25; Pb26)  Plaintiff takes exception to the Trial Court’s statement that plaintiff’s chapter 7 bankruptcy filing nullified all of the transactions between these parties.  But two, with fees paid to [...], had been completed before the Chapter 7 filing.  They no longer existed to be nullified.  The plaintiff spent money she shouldn’t have had to spend, and in amounts, even if the transaction were permitted that exceeded amounts permitted by New Jersey law.  (Pb26)  There are multiple issues with this statement by Plaintiff.  First, two of the Contracts were not completed before the Chapter 7 filing.  The 2016 Contract was signed June 23, 2016 (Da127-134)  The Chapter 13 was filed July 20, 2016.  (Da135-149)  The bankruptcy was converted to a Chapter 7 on April 19, 2017.  (Da136)  Plaintiff received a discharge on November 17, 2017 and was notified by the Court that Plaintiff could voluntarily pay a debt.  (Da136)  Plaintiff signed the 2018 Contract on August 22, 2018.  (Da193-200).  Plaintiff paid [...] on January 15, 2019.  (Da205-206)  Clearly, only the 2016 Contract was signed before the Chapter 13 Petition was converted to a Chapter 7 and after the conversion, Plaintiff voluntarily paid off the 2016 and 2018 Contracts after the Chapter 7 Discharge.  Plaintiff did this despite being represented by not 1, but 2 attorneys, [...] and [...].  Plaintiff claims that she paid money she did not have to also rings hollow.  It is a settled principle of law that where an individual under a mistake of law, but full knowledge of the facts, voluntarily pays money on a demand not legally enforceable against him, cannot recover it in the absence of unjust enrichment, fraud, duress or improper conduct on the part of the payee.  *Messner v. Union County*, 34 N.J. 233 (1961)  Here, an attorney reviewed the Contracts on behalf of Plaintiff.  Against the advice of counsel, she voluntarily signed the contracts because she needed the money.  She paid voluntarily paid [...] from the PI Claim even after receiving the discharge.  She knew the facts and chose to pay [...].  She should not be heard to complaint after the fact.  **POINT IV**
[brief] The final prong of the analysis which would impose liability on a public entity is the determination as to whether the action the entity took to protect against the condition or the failure or usage of funds to take such action was palpably unreasonable.  *Garrison*, 154 N.J. at 286.  Palpable unreasonableness is a question of fact.  *Vincitore*, 169 N.J. at 130.  Palpably unreasonable conduct is more than mere negligence but does not necessarily mean grossly or extraordinarily negligent.
[brief] Da218.  On September 22, 2023, the Chancery Court found that [...] failed to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, any of the factors under Crowe v. De Gioia, but nonetheless, in another example of [...]’s benefit from proceeding in Court, the Chancery Division granted [...]’s Order to Show Cause under the Chancery Court’s “equitable powers” to “maintain the status quo.
[brief] In addition to failing to analyze the fee request for reasonableness, the trial court also failed to consider the temporal limitation of the fee request, which it was also required to do.  Rule 1:4-8 "imposes a temporal limitation on any fee award, holding that reasonable fees may be awarded only from that point in the litigation at which it becomes clear that the action is frivolous."  LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 99 (2009) (citing DeBrango v. Summit Bancorp, 328 N.J. Super. 219, 229-30 (App. Div. 2000)).
[brief] Hughes Justice Complex Trenton, NJ  November 7, 2024  Re: [...] & [...], CUST.: [...], UNIF TRAN. MIN ACT PA, PLAINTIFFS/RESPONDENTS v. [...] A/KA [...]; [...]: STATE OF NEW JERSEY: & [...], DEFENDANT/APPELLANT  Docket# [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], Ch. Div., Monmouth Cty [...] & Hon. [...], Law Div. Monmouth Cty [...]  Sat on prior appeal: Hons  [...], [...] & [...]  Docket # [...]  Dear Sir or Madam:
[brief] The requirements for determining whether a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing are set forth in *Henderson*, 208 N.J. at 208 and *State v. Anthony*, 237 N.J. 213 (2019).  Also relevant are *Delgado*, 188 N.J. at 48 and the provisions of Rule 3:11.  In *Henderson*, 208 N.J. at 287, the Court revised the *Manson/Madison* legal framework for evaluating eyewitness identification evidence, and reaffirmed its ruling in *Delgado*, 188 N.J. at 63, that identifications conducted by law enforcement officers must be recorded and preserved.
[brief] ”  R. 1:21-1(g).  It is difficult to imagine, however, how a non-attorney could possibly represent an insurance company in an IFPA or RICO claim.  That neither the Commissioner’s regulations nor the court rules contemplated such complex disputes in PIP arbitration is a very significant indication that such arbitrations were never intended to cover IFPA or RICO claims.  Moreover, the rules created by [...], the administrator of the PIP program under the authority granted by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(b), removes any doubt:
[brief] It merely pleads that [...] breached its duty to not “frustrate Plaintiff’s ability to perform under the [PSA], to assist another party in breaching the [PSA], and to avoid taking measures designed to cut Plaintiff out of the transaction. ” (Pa17, ¶¶81-82).  Far from pleading bad motive or malice, the Complaint pleads the exact opposite, clearly indicating that “[...] (through [...])” only made allegedly false representations to Plaintiff regarding advisement of a rescheduled closing date “because she had been asked by Defendant [...] not to share any information with Plaintiff. ” (Pa18, ¶90 (emphasis added)).  This is not a preexisting, malice-like, personally held, bad motive or intention – it is simply acting pursuant to the wishes and direction of a client in connection with a separate transaction after Plaintiff had terminated the PSA and received back its deposit.
[brief] The Trial Court’s Suppression Decision  After reviewing the search warrant affidavit and the parties’ arguments, [...] asked the prosecutor why the warrant affidavit stated that the facts therein were based on the affiant’s “physical and electronic surveillances,” when the affidavit contained no further mention of electronic surveillance.  (1T:8-3 to 18)  The prosecutor replied that the electronic surveillance in question was pole camera footage and the defense attorney stated that it was “the first time [he] heard about a pole cam. ”  (1T:8-15 to 9-7)  The court clarified that the judge who issued the warrant had not viewed any pole camera footage as part of the search warrant application, and that no pole camera footage had been turned over to the defense at the time of the hearing.  --- 2  The State failed to turn over pole camera footage that was part of the police investigation, in violation of the discovery rule.  R. 3:13-3(b)(1).  Because the contents of the pole camera footage could have been relevant to the determination of whether the search warrant was based on probable cause, [...] reserves the right to file a motion to reopen the suppression hearing based on the contents of pole camera video.  See State v. Boston, 469 N.J. Super. 223, 240-41 (App. Div. 2021) (explaining that interlocutory orders can be revisited at any time before final judgment in the interests of justice and finding plain error where the trial court failed to reconsider its order denying suppression where new evidence demonstrated that the officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing was not credible); State v. Dispoto, 383 N.J. Super. 205, 215 (App. Div. 2006), aff’d as modified, 189 N.J. 108 (2007) (finding that it was in the interests of justice for the trial court to reconsider the interlocutory order where “the judge was faced with evidence that called into question the veracity of [the officer’s] affidavit”).  The court granted the defense motion in an oral decision, suppressing the evidence recovered from [...]’s home and car.