ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff retains the right to reopen the case before the expiration of the statute of limitations for the following causes of action, which have a six-year statute of limitations until July 14, 2025:  - Breach of contract (N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1) - Breach of fiduciary duty (*Balliet v. Fennell*, 368 N.J. Super. 15, 845 A.2d 168 (App. Div. 2004)) - Consumer protection statutes under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (N.J.S.A. 56:8-1)  Plaintiff has the right to work with an attorney to pursue these causes of action before the expiration date.  E.  The arbitrary decision violated plaintiff’s constitutional right, liberty to petition.  Plaintiff has followed New Jersey court procedures to file suit within the statute of limitations and to appeal the trial court’s decisions.  Plaintiff meets all requirements to continue her suit.  The dismissal jeopardized the plaintiff's liberty to petition, under the *U.S. Const.* amend. I and *N.J. Const. of 1947* art. I, § 18.  Due to unjust treatment, plaintiff is barred from future filings.  The decision made it impossible to resolve the dispute in a fair manner.  Point II
[brief] ”  [Db9].  Standard neglects to disclose that the Haledon Court: (i) did not find compelling circumstances that could disturb the settlement there, (ii) reversed the trial court’s order vacating the settlement, and (iii) enforced the parties’ settlement, instead, in the absence of “clear and convincing proof” that disturbing the parties’ settlement was warranted.  See Haledon, 358 N.J. Super. at 305-06 (citing DeCaro v. DeCaro, 13 N.J. 36 (1953)).  Because the facts here are even less compelling than those in Haledon, and the trial court below did not find clear and convincing proof that this settlement should be disturbed, this Court should follow Haledon, reverse the trial court, and enforce the parties’ settlement following its de novo review.
[brief] On July 13, 2018, the Court also issued a sanction order against [...] for $503,571.88 of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s legal fees, costs and expert fees, mostly related to the 2016 injunction, for [...] filing the SDNY complaint and attempt to remove the case to federal court.  (Da3155)(2T13:24-14:12)(2T15:18-16:19)(2T25:5-10)
[brief] While it is difficult to tell on the appellate ¹  On appeal, the Borough attacks the credibility of [...], asserting that the counsel was divided about what to do with Block 610.  It suggests that [...]’s assertion that the council agreed to use Block 610 to fulfill the off- record (because it is not squarely argued) what [...] claims represents “hearsay,” statements by an [...] representative to a party adverse to it in this litigation, ERUR, are not hearsay but statements of a party opponent.  See N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1), (4) (a “party-opponent’s own statement” and “statement by the party-opponent’s agent” are exempt from hearsay when “offered against a party-opponent”).
[brief] The State will also produce evidence at defendants' trial that [...], [...] and [...] were stopped in an automobile that was speeding away from the Hamilton Township 7-Eleven robbery.  A search of the car produced cash and clothing worn by the suspects depicted in the video at the Hamilton Township 7-Eleven robbery and for one of the suspects shown at the Pennsylvania 7-Eleven robbery occurring one hour earlier.  However, [...]'s credibility will be subject to cross-examination to show he "gave up" his co-defendants in exchange for a generous plea bargain.
[brief] ”  State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 179-80 (2009).  Because the court merely enumerated aggravating factors three and nine and provided no explanation to support their application, and because the court failed to assign any particular weight to the applicable aggravating factors and failed to engage in a proper balancing process, resentencing is required.  See Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 80-81 (remanding for resentencing in part based on the sentencing court’s failure to sufficiently explain its reasons for applying aggravating factor nine); Case, 220 N.J. at 69-70 (remanding for resentencing in part based on the sentencing court’s failure to engage in a qualitative analysis of the sentencing factors it found).
[brief] Indeed, the trial court’s comment did not explain why it deemed the recreation was admissible.  More importantly, the comment did not infringe upon the jury’s fact-finding function.  The trial court did not advise the jurors that the images were sufficiently reliable or trustworthy and it did not tell the jurors that it found the image of the car in the recreation was sufficiently similar to the image of the car from the video surveillance footage to be probative.  Rather, the trial court simply informed the jurors that there was an objection, the court overruled the objection, and it found the video was admissible and could be presented.  Accordingly, it did not violate N.J.R.E. 104 or Ridout.
[brief] (Pa19).  Here, nothing about [...]’s relationship with [...] changed in 2015 when it designated her as an employee via ordinance except for how she was paid.  In 2015, [...] was paid a salary and was issued W-2s.  (Pa62-87).  As the IRS notes, “[p]ayment by the hour, week, or month generally points to an employer-employee relationship, provided that this method of payment is not just a convenient way of paying a lump sum agreed upon as the cost of a job. ”  Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, at *15.  Looking at the substance of the arrangement between [...] and [...], it appears that she was paid a salary and issued a W-2 in order to maintain an employee status, not because she actually was an employee.  It further appears that [...] was paid a salary as a way to pay her the value of a lump sum agreed upon as the cost of doing the job.  Moreover, this court had already noted in [...]’s prior appellate case that payment of salary through payroll was not dispositive of employee status.  (Pa171-72).  With respect to Factor #13 – Payment of Business and/or Travelling Expense and Factor #14 – Furnishing of Tools and Materials, the ALJ reasonably noted the inconsistencies between [...]’s testimony that he was not aware of any reimbursements and [...]’s testimony that she was reimbursed for a computer application.
[brief] (Ca133-140).  Respondent makes an attempt at circular logic, asserting that Respondent could not have possibly comprised the Board because “there is simply no evidence, anywhere in the record, that Respondent held herself out or even held her Facebook account out as something speaking for the Board. ”  Rb12.  First, she clearly held herself out as a member of the Board from her Facebook account as addressed above.  Treston, Melnyk, and Leonard, supra, all stand for the proposition that when a school board member campaigns from their public Facebook account – and especially where they actually state they have won that election and are a school board member – they hold themselves out as school board members for the purposes of the Act.  Their posts are then subject to the Act’s Code of Ethics and its prohibition on social media use which may compromise the Board.
[brief] As the gatekeeper, the trial judge is obligated to make the preliminary determination that proffered expert testimony meets the general requirements that the subject matter is beyond the ken of the average juror, the testimony and underlying foundation are reliable, and the witness has sufficient expertise.  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 235, 301 (2018); State v. J.Q., 252 N.J. Super. 11, 26 (App. Div. 1991), aff’d 130 N.J. 554 (1993); State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 567 (2005).
[brief] Clearly, running against one’s boss for public office is even more fraught.  In *Wilbur v. Mahan*, [...], writing for the Seventh Circuit, explained that it is a “declaration of war” when an employee who occupies a confidential job “announces that he is going to run against his boss for the boss's office because the boss is not administering the office properly. ”  3 F.3d 214, 218 (7th Cir. 1993).  That is, it “makes the candidate a political enemy of his boss. ”  *Id.*  Similarly, the Appellate Division, in affirming a grant of summary judgment against public employees who claimed retaliation, stated that “[a] plaintiff who alleges retaliation for political affiliation must show . . . he was employed at a public agency in a position that does not require political affiliation. ”  *Lapolla v. Cty. of Union*, 449 N.J. Super. 288, 298 (App. Div. 2017).  Thus, if a government job necessarily requires the employee to be “on the same page” politically as one’s supervisor, one can be terminated if one decides to campaign against the employer.
[brief] For the reasons stated herein, and for those stated in the [...]’ previous briefing, this honorable court must reject the [...]’s renewed attempt to upend the role of the legislature.  State and federal policy favoring arbitration as a means of dispute resolution is codified in the New Jersey Arbitration Act, the Federal Arbitration Act and is supported by the relevant case law even in the context of medical malpractice claims.  Accordingly, this honorable court must compel Plaintiff’s claims against the [...] to binding arbitration.
[brief] Even if relevant, the doctrine of res judicata is applicable.  Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J.498, 505 (1991).  Under the doctrine, “a cause of action between parties that has been finally determined [ ] cannot be relitigated by those parties or their privies in a new proceeding. ”  Ibid.; see also, Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398, 409 (1991) (res judicata “insulat[es] courts from the relitigation of claims [ ] and prevents the judicial inefficiency inherent in multiplicitous litigation. ”  For an action to be barred based on the application of res judicata there must be (1) a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) identity of parties, and (3) substantially similar or identical causes of action.
[brief] However, the corollary to Rule 703 is that evidence of an opinion which is not supported by factual evidence or other data before the jury is not admissible and is considered a “net opinion. ”  State v. Papasavvas, 163 N.J. 565, 607 (2000); In Re Yaccarino, 117 N.J. 175, 196 (1989).  The net-opinion rule requires an expert to tell the jury “the why and wherefore of his or her opinion, rather than a mere conclusion. ”  *State v. Townsend*, 186 N.J. 473, 494 (2006), quoting *Rosenberg v. Tavorath*, 352 N.J. Super. 385, 401 (App. Div. 2002).
[directive] Such program shall be made available through the NJ Learn System or by other electronic means.  D. outreach.  Each County Prosecutor shall undertake efforts to educate Community residents within their jurisdiction about the provisions of this Directive, with a specific focus on strengthening trust between law enforcement and the public.  Within 120 days of Page 15 the issuance of this Directive, each County Prosecutor shall report to the Attorney General on such public education efforts.  E.  Any questions concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Questions.  Directive shall be addressed to the [...], or their designee.
[brief] (11T167-7 to 169-8; Sa2 at 11:03:42 to 11:04:52; Da68 to Da71).  Defendant acknowledged and initialed next to each right that was read from the form.  (11T167-22 to 169-8; Sa2 at 11:04:05 to 11:04:52; Da69 to Da71).  When [...] asked defendant if he wanted to talk, defendant replied “[y]es” and signed the form.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...] [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  Encls. cc w/ encls: [...], Esq. cc w/ encls: [...]  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  ABRAHAM KOROTKI, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, CROSS-APPELLANT, V. [...], DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, CROSS-RESPONDENT.
[brief] [...]’s citation to alleged “Prior Discipline” demonstrates the nature of this risk.  Further demonstrating [...]’s abuse of discretion is its reasoning that [...] failed to produce “any preponderating evidence,” other than “unsupported denials of the allegations against him. ” (Aa17).  This is faulty and entirely improper in light of the nature of the allegations and defenses.  The record is indisputable that no witnesses or other evidence exists that corroborated Complainant’s allegations.  [...] denied the allegations.  Yet, the [...] contends that, in a he-said/she-said case with no allegations against him to deny other than that he purposefully misnamed an individual, [...] was obligated to produce tangible evidence that supported his denial that he did not say what he was accused of saying.  However, the probative evidence here is the assessment of [...]  and Complainant’s credibility.  The [...]’s reasoning ignores this court’s precedents that make clear that credibility determinations should be made by an independent factfinder and that this matter is precisely the situation where a fact-finding hearing is therefore required as a matter of law.  Accordingly, the [...]’s decision not to refer this matter for a fact-finding hearing was an abuse of discretion and must be reversed.
[directive] Certification of offense location.  3.  Certification of Offense Location.  The court shall issue a restraining order pursuant to P.L.1999, c.334 (C.2C:35-5.4 et seq.) only upon request by a law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney and submission of a certification describing the location of the offense.  C.2C:35-5.10  Discretion to not seek restraining order.  P.L. 2001, CHAPTER 365 4  4.  Discretion to Not Seek Restraining Order.
[brief] A reviewing Court may reverse the decision of an administrative agency where it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.  See, e.g., *Dennery v. Bd. of Educ. of Passaic Cty. Reg'l High Sch. Dist. No. 1, Passaic Cty.*, 131 N.J. 626, 641 (1993).  In the present matter, the Commission’s Final Decision was not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record.  On the contrary, all evidence in the record directly contradicts the erroneous factual assumptions the Commission’s Final Decision relied on.  Here, the Commission’s decision to dismiss the Amended Complaint outright hinged squarely on the proposition that “there is an insufficient nexus between Respondent’s personal Facebook page and her membership on the Board,” based on the erroneous conclusion that “her Facebook page did not make any reference to the Board nor her membership on the same,” and therefore a member of the public could not have interpreted her posts as speaking for the Board. (Ca017).  This conclusion is directly contrary to abundant evidence in the record for at least 8 reasons: • Respondent repeatedly campaigned for her seat on the Board from her Facebook account (Ca263, Ca265, Ca267-268, Ca270, Ca272, Ca274, Ca276); • Respondent publicly posted from her Facebook account that she won her election and her seat on the Board (Ca274, Ca276); • Within ten days of swearing in to the Board, Respondent made the posts that are the subject of Counts 1 and 5 of the Complaint (Ca240-241; Ca243); • The school community protested Respondent and the Board as a direct result of Respondent’s Facebook posts at meetings of the Board and in her role as Board member (Ca107-109, Ca120-122, Ca123-127); • Respondent posted about issues that both dealt with Board matters and actually affected the Board (Ca017) (“the subject matter of the Facebook posts – State lawsuits related to union activity, vaccines and masking in schools, and gender identity standards – may relate to the business of the Board”); • The Board was subjected to litigation as a direct result of Respondent’s public Facebook posts (Ca133-140); • The Board passed two official Resolutions denouncing Respondent’s public Facebook posts which contained no disclaimers (Ca097-098; Ca137); and • Respondent admitted in discovery – as attached to Appellants’ Motion for Summary Decision – that she actually compromised the Board by making the Facebook posts which were the subject of the underlying motion (Ca166 – RQAs 2, 3, 4, 6; Ca169 – Responses to RQAs 2, 3, 4, 6).
[brief] His superiors testified that he routinely interacted with customers during the two summers he previously worked at [...], that he was “always very polite and professional . . . willing to help customers out,” and that he had a “[v]ery good” ability to interact with customers.  [6T 137:5-25].  They confirmed that there were no complaints regarding [...]’s dealings with customers prior to his run-in with [...], and that [...] never had cause to discipline him.  [6T 138:1-18; 9T 72:16-73:5].  [...]’s immediate supervisor, [...], testified that he was responsible for training [...] on the products in the Flooring Department.  [9T 43:6-10].  Craig confirmed that he personally trained [...] on [...] grout products prior to the incident:  “I told him what you could use for walls, what you could use for floors, what sanded was, what unsanded was, what power grout was . . .  I told him about grout because that’s – that’s an important thing you need to know in flooring. ”  [9T 5214-19].  When shown the bag of grout that [...] and [...] were discussing prior to the altercation, Craig confirmed that it was “universal grout,” appropriate for applications that required unsanded grout and for joints measuring less than one eighth of an inch.  [9T 78:9-14].  According to [...], this was the question he posed to [...], [7T 141:21-25], and which, according to [...]’s police statement and answers to interrogatories, [...] answered by informing [...] that the bag of grout he was holding was appropriate for that application.
[brief] Plaintiff had put in for seven Lieutenant’s positions and because of the lying evaluation that she got, it affected each promotional position because points were taken off for that (1T; 136:15 to 136:20).  The evaluation, which was false, deprived Plaintiff of being in the top tier (1T; 117:18).  The lies on the evaluation cost her points and a .5 is huge when trying for a Lieutenant’s position (1T; 138:5).  Plaintiff stated that she was “as qualified as any of the people that got the promotions” (1T; 139:8).  As part of the procedure, the Plaintiff asked for a meeting with Lieutenant [...] (1T; 141:17).
[directive] Any person who is employed as a sworn member of any state, county, or municipal law enforcement agency, department, or division of those governments who is statutorily empowered to act for the detection, investigation, arrest, conviction, detention, or rehabilitation of persons violating the criminal laws of this State.  The term law enforcement officer shall include sworn members of the New Jersey State Police, the Division of Criminal Justice and the iv USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2021 Juvenile Justice Commission.  It shall also include College and University Police Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-4.2 et seq., State Parole Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-4, State Correctional Police Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-4, County Correctional Police Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-3, Special Law Enforcement Officers of all classes pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-146.8 et seq., Humane Law Enforcement Officers appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 4:22-14.1 or 4:22-14.4, Auxiliary Police Officers appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. App.A:9-45(c), and Constables appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:9-120.
[brief] That presumption does not meet the FAA’s standard of treating as valid, irrevocable, and enforceable a “written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction”, unless it is subject to grounds “for the revocation of any contract. ”  The Atalese clear statement rule is a defining trait that subjects arbitration agreements to an uncommon barrier that ultimately ends the mutual assent inquiry before it can even begin.  Here, the trial Court while applying Atalese did not assess, or ascribe the necessary weight to several factors unique to this commercial contract; specifically: the sophistication of the parties, the incorporation of the AAA Rules and inclusion of the POS in the SPA; the parties’ bargaining power; that the parties understood and consulted with Counsel regarding the agreement’s terms; and that the plain meaning of the term “binding arbitration” can be gleaned from the entire contract or else the “common ordinary meaning” that would be ascribed by N.J.S.A. 56:12-10(a)(5).  Each of these forgoing factors should be considered to determine mutual assent rooted in ordinary contract principles derived from more than a half century of judicial opinions and various restatements of contract law.  Yet, Atalese does what Concepcion barred: “adopt a legal rule hinging on the primary characteristic of an arbitration agreement—namely, a waiver of the right to go to court and receive a jury trial. ”  Kindred Nursing, 581 U.S. at 252; citing Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341-42.  Per the FAA, the trial court should have applied equal principles to the SPA, as it would to any contract, to help determine the meaning the parties gave to the words, or even the meaning that a reasonable person would have given to the language used.  To presume that the parties did not intend to arbitrate their disputes in an arbitral forum, without a jury, because of the need for or absence of “magic words” is flatly inconsistent with the FAA.  The FAA does not require “a talismanic approach” or certain language that “plaintiffs are waiving their statutory right to seek relief in court. ”  (DA1857)  POINT II
[brief] [1T 48-2 to 1T 49-13][Emphasis added.]  In so ruling, the lower court did acknowledge that the trooper did not appear to be prepared for the hearing, having admitted to not reviewing the MVR before testifying.  (1T 40-8 to -17).  The lower court also acknowledged that the trooper could not recall whether he was driving at the time he made the observations of the Defendant’s vehicle or if he was stationary at the time.  (1T 40-23 to 1T 41-5).  Still, the lower court determined that while the trooper’s testimony was “less than accurate” he was not prevaricating in any way.  (1T 41-3 to -6).  The lower court also relied heavily on the MVR evidence that was admitted by way of stipulation as D-1, noting that “the MVR clearly supports the testimony that the vehicle continued to move as it went through the intersection. ” (1T 43-15 to 1T 44-15).  The State submits that these factual findings by the court were supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record, including the MVR.
[brief] Despite Plaintiffs’ assertion to the contrary, the trial court incorrectly found that Defendant converted funds from the Plaintiffs (Pb66).  As argued in her moving brief, the trial court’s conclusion that Defendant misappropriated funds was manifestly unsupported by adequate, substantial, or credible evidence in the record (Db26-34).  Plaintiffs’ opposition brief was their opportunity to show that the trial court’s factual findings were supported with credible evidence.  However, glaringly absent from Plaintiffs’ 31-page Counterstatement of Facts is any citation to evidence (credible or otherwise) in the record establishing that Defendant engaged in wrongful conduct (Pb4-34).  As such, this Court should not defer to the trial judge’s findings on which the Judgment was purportedly based.  See Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974).  For example, Plaintiffs do not cite any evidence in the record establishing that Defendant wrongfully diverted money from either [...] or [...] (22T10-22 to 22-20).  Incredibly, [...] gave no direct testimony on any of the Disputed Transactions, including whether they were authorized or not.  And how could [...] credibly say that the Disputed Transactions were unauthorized when he testified that he always agreed with [...] and the parties discussed business transactions daily (17T163-13 to -24; 18T65-8 to -23, 178-1 to -3; Da07299).