ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the Property was to be developed as a Mt. Laurel inclusionary development consisting of a residential community that will permit, in relevant part, a total of 473 residential units upon Lots 16 and 19, with the residential community having a 15% ‘set aside’ for very-low, low-, and moderate-income housing yielding 71 affordable units based on the development of 473 residential units in total.  Pa043.  Pursuant to Section 6(c) of the Settlement Agreement, the:  [...] and the [...] acknowledge that in order for [[...]] to construct its Inclusionary Development, [[...]] will be required to obtain any and all necessary and applicable agreements, approvals, and permits from all relevant public entities and utilities; such as, by way of example only, the [...], the Planning [...], the [...], the Passaic County Planning [...], the [...], the [...], and the like, including the [...]’s ordinance requirements as to site plan and subdivision approval (the “Required Approvals”).
[brief] On January 7, 2020, a Burlington County grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant [...] with first-degree murder by his own conduct while engaged in the commission of robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(4)(g) (counts two); first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count three); second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1); N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1) (count four); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1) (count five); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1) (count six), second-degree possession of a handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (count seven); and second-degree certain persons not to possess a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) (count eight).
[brief] A.  Under New Jersey law, an arbitrator exceeds his powers when he disregards the terms and conditions of the parties’ agreement  New Jersey’s Arbitration Act provides that “the court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding if . . . (4) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's powers. ”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:23B-23(a)(4).  As for a breach of contract cases, the meaning of the phrase “an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator’s powers” has been clearly established.
[brief] (iii)  The Borough’s Decision To Support [...] Was Not Arbitrary, Capricious nor Unreasonable  [...] contends that the notes from the executive session of the September 20, 2022 Borough Council meeting show that one of the Subcommittee members applied arbitrary, subjective and biased criteria to the applications, specifically that the Council member in issue stated that, "[w]hile I am not ‘afraid' of large companies or international investors, I lean toward more midsize organizations."
[brief] (a)  Year-round permits shall be valid for a one-year period beginning January 1 and shall not be prorated if obtained after January 1.  (b)  Temporary permits shall be valid for not more than ten (10) consecutive days and may be issued up to four (4) times per year.  (3)  Mobile retail food establishments shall be permitted to operate on private property in any zone wherein eating and drinking establishments are permitted uses pursuant to this Chapter, subject to the following:
[brief] Industry Standards And “Settled Practice In The Construction Industry”  Do Not Support [...]’s Position  [...] cherry picks its reliance on industry standards and “settled practice in the construction industry” to falsely allege [...] and/or [...] knew or should have known the Consent of Surety and Power of Attorney were defective.  [...] inaccurately presents the true industry standards and seeks to have this Court ignore [...]’s own undisputed bidding practices.  Industry standard is in [...]’s favor, not [...]’s.  In the last two-plus years [...] submitted the very same Power of Attorney and Consent of Surety on over 225 bids to other New Jersey state agencies, including the [...], [...], and the [...] – none of those Bid Documents were rejected.  In fact, in each of those 225 bids, [...] issued the required Contract Bonds on behalf of the low bidder.  [...]’s position is neither supported by its own course of conduct nor the industry standard.  On Page 23 of its Opposition Brief, [...] asserts that “…at the time of bid opening, public agencies like [...] also require bidders to provide evidence that if awarded the contract, the bidder’s surety will, in fact deliver the Contract Bond at the time of execution. ”  Then on Page 26, [...] argues that “…if it was not already intuitively obvious from the specifications and the form Consent of Surety itself, common sense and settled practice in the construction industry compels the conclusion that a POA is necessary to support a Consent of Surety. ”  [...] makes these arguments to suggest that industry standard justifies its position, and that both [...] and [...] knew or should have known Power of Attorney and Consent of Surety were defective.  However, as mentioned above, the actual facts and historical record within the construction industry say otherwise.
[brief] In addition to omitting or mischaracterizing the relevant facts specific to this case, Respondent [...] (“Board”) fails to apply the correct standard when evaluating whether [...] met his burden in establishing good cause attributable to the work as the reason for his separation.  The Board improperly imposes a notice-and-inquiry requirement on [...] for leaving his position because his job responsibilities aggravated his health.  A fact sensitive analysis clearly indicates that there were no positions which would accommodate [...]’s condition, thereby removing any requirement that he inquire about alternative positions.  The Board seeks to further hold [...] responsible for providing medical documentation to his employer prior to his separation.  [...] provided medical documentation to the Appeal Tribunal and [...], including correspondence from his treating physician, his physical therapy notes, and notes detailing his x-ray results.  It is not necessary that supporting medical documentation be dated prior to the date of separation or that it be provided to the employer; it must merely be presented to the fact finder to consider in determining whether the employment duties aggravated a medical condition.  Moreover, the Board argues that the medical documentation does not substantiate [...]’s position that the work aggravated his medical condition.  Contrary to the Board’s position, [...]’s treating physician expressly recommended that he seek other work because his employment duties aggravated his medical condition.  His doctor’s letter, despite being dated after the date of separation, was based on a review of contemporaneous notes taken while treating [...] prior to his separation.  Because [...] has established that his health was aggravated by his working conditions and there were no other suitable positions available to him, the Appellate Division should reverse the Board’s denial of unemployment benefits to [...].  ARGUMENT I.
[brief] Pa454 (T64:22-T65:2).  Plaintiff resisted, screamed and refused to comply.  Plaintiff continued to struggle and tried to prevent the officers from placing his arms behind his back.  Pa455 (T65:9-16).  [...] “placed two closed fist strikes” to the left side of Plaintiff’s body to gain control of him.  Pa023.  [...] likewise had to strike Plaintiff on his right ribs to subdue him.  Pa304.  Plaintiff testified that the officers struck him five or six times.  Pa456 (T66:1-13).  Plaintiff also claimed that the officers choked him, id., although there is no imaging or other documentary evidence in the record to support that contention.  Edison Supp. Appendix 001 (BWC 2020-02-0020; BWC 2020-02-0021); Pa022-Pa023; Pa031-Pa032; Pa302-Pa303.
[brief] (Not Raised Below).  In concluding that criterion (b) was not met, the Trial Court erroneously conflated discontinuance of use and abandonment.  Noting that “discontinuance of use” was not a defined term and, in an effort to define “discontinuance of use,” the Trial Court relied on the Abandoned Properties Rehabilitation Act, N.J.S.A. 55:19-78, et seq. (T3, 49:17-50:17).
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS FOR UNPAID MEDICAL EXPENSES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT  Appellants’ brief refers indirectly to a claim for unpaid medical expenses and property damage (economic damages).  These claims were addressed in a motion in limine to bar evidence of outstanding medical expenses and property damage returnable March 31, 2023 (Da1).  Respondents rely on the same arguments raised below on the present Appeal.  On March 10, 2024, defendant moved to bar evidence of unpaid medical expenses because plaintiffs never established that PIP was exhausted and, therefore, unpaid medical expenses that were collectible under PIP and inadmissible under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12.  (Da1).  In the same motion, defendant moved to bar evidence of property damage based on accord and satisfaction because, property damage had already been settled and adjusted by [...] who insured the defendant (Da1).  Plaintiffs’ counsel opposed the motion to bar evidence of unpaid medical expenses and property damage largely on procedural grounds on March 14, 2024 (Da15).  On May 17, 2023, [...] entered the Order from which Appellants’ appeal dismissing the entire case (Pa1).  The Order from which the Appellants appeal did not address the claim for economic damages or respondent’s motion addressing it (Pa1).  On May 17, 2023, [...] entered a separate Order denying defendant’s motion in limine as “moot” because the entire case was dismissed by the Order granting defendant’s summary judgment motion.  Defendant interpreted the two May 17, 2023 Orders as a ruling on the merits dismissing claims for economic and non-economic damages (Da17).
[brief] Furthermore, the admissibility of expert testimony will depend on the facts and on the expert's qualifications.  More particularly, the expert "must possess a demonstrated professional capability to assess the scientific significance of the underlying data and information, to apply the scientific methodology, and to explain the bases for the opinion reached."  Clark v. Safty-Kleen Corp., 179 N.J. 318, 338 (2004) (citation omitted).
[brief] State Cases  Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 143 (1962)  .................................................................  5  Boyle v. Riti, 175 N.J. Super. 158 (App. Div. 1980)  ........................................  5  Campbell v. New Jersey Racing Comm’n, 169 N.J. 579 (2001)  ..................................................................  5  Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589 (1965) ....................................................................  5  Gerba v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees Retirement System, 83 N.J. 174 (1980) ...................................................................  4, 5 Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980) ....................................................................  5  In re Hess, 422 N.J. Super. 27 (App.  Div. 2011) ........................................  9, 10, 11 J.A.W. v. Bd. of Trs., 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 331 (App. Div. Mar. 2, 2022)  ...............  13  Oliveria v. Board of Trs., 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1916 (August 17, 2016)  ...................... 6, 7  Uricoli v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System Emps.’ Ret. System, 91 N.J. 62 (1982)  .................. 12, 13, 14 Smith v. Dep’t of Treasury, Div. of Pensions & Benefits, 390 N.J. Super. 209 (App. Div. 2007) .............................................  5 State v. Anderson, 248 N.J. 53 (2021) ....................................................................  14 State v. Hupka, 203 N.J. 222 (2010) ...................................................................  9, 10 State Statutes N.J.S.A. 43:15A-38 ...........................................................................................................  11 N.J.S.A. 43:16A-11.2 ......................................................................................................... 6, 7  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] The Respondent is correct in that the Statute was emailed to the Motion Judge on January 16, 2024; however, the Motion was not actually argued until January 22, 2024, six days later.  Da 8.  Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully submits that six days constitutes ample time for both Respondent to familiarize themselves with the motor vehicle statute at issue, N.J.S.A. §39:4-123.  Right and left hand turns.  The Plaintiff-Appellant did make this argument at the trial level both before and during Oral Argument and she is therefore not raising this on appeal for the first time.
[brief] THERE IS ONE ISSUE AND ONLY ONE ISSUE IN THIS CASE.  THERE ARE NO CROSS APPEALS  Plaintiff brings up numerous issues in this case, mischaracterizes the facts, attempts to turn and twist the facts and lies in order to place defendant in a very bad light.  But, at the end of the day, there is only one issue for the Court to contemplate and, accordingly I will not address plaintiff’s attempts to deflect from the issue on appeal.  The issue very clearly is did the Courts below err in assessing two (2) significant monetary penalties against the defendant?  The settlement agreement between the parties (Defendant Appendix AI-A16) is the document that sets forth the understanding of the parties with respect to their obligations regarding their separation and the financial aspects of the separation.
[directive] AMERICA’S CITIES THEIR 1 OF IN AND RESPONSES IT: A 117-CITY SURVEY (June 2023).  TO [...], U.S. Level, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2023).  2  Rate of Suicide by Firearm Reaches Record  HUGHES  JUSTICE COMPLEX ∙ TELEPHONE: (609)292-9660  FAX: (609)292-4299  New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer ∙ Printed on Recycled Paper and Recyclable Page 2
[brief] As the City planner testified at his deposition, there was no planning reason to abandon the limitations in Design Guideline Handbook 6. (Pa534; T36:8 to T37:23).  In return for these changes, [...] offered to pay $2,000,000 to the [...] to fund a senior center that has no nexus whatsoever to the proposed project and was not a permitted use in the redevelopment area.  Viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, *Brill v. The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America*, 142 N.J. 520 (1995), these facts, coupled with the opinion of Plaintiff's expert, created a factual dispute as to whether the redevelopment plan amendment is spot zoning, as Plaintiff's planning expert has opined.
[brief] R. 4:30A .................................................................................................................................2, 26, 28 ##  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS | Description | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| | Trial Court Order Denying Claremont’s Motion for Reconsideration | Pa11-Pa22 | | Trial Court Order Granting [...]’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint with Prejudice, and to Compel Arbitration | Pa23-Pa44 | | Trial Court Order Denying Claremont’s Motion Enjoining the Second Arbitration | Pa45-Pa66 | Appellant [...]
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT [...] IS ABLE TO COMPEL ARBITRATION THROUGH EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL (Raised Below: T2)  A non-signatory to a contract cannot seek enforcement of the same unless it “clearly appear[s] that the contract was made by the parties with the intention to benefit the third party” and “the parties to the contract intended to confer upon [the third-party] the right to enforce it.”  First Nat'l State Bank v. Carlyle House, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 300, 322 (Ch. Div. 1968), aff'd, 107 N.J. Super. 389 (App. Div. 1969).  “Parties are not required to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so. ”  Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 442 (2014) (quoting Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  “Estoppel is an equitable doctrine, founded in the fundamental duty of fair dealing imposed by law, that prohibits a party from repudiating a previously taken position when another party has relied on that position to his detriment. ”  Casamasino v. City of Jersey City, 158 N.J. 333, 354 (1999) (quoting State v. Kouvatas, 292 N.J. Super. 417, 425 (App. Div. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  “Equitable estoppel should be used sparingly to compel arbitration.  It is a theory ‘designed to prevent injustice by not permitting a party to repudiate a course of action on which another party has relied to his detriment. ’”  Hirsch, supra, 215 N.J. at 180 (quoting Knorr, supra, 178 N.J. at 178).  “Equitable estoppel is more properly viewed as a shield to prevent injustice rather than a sword to compel arbitration. ”  Hirsch, 215 N.J. at 180 (emphasis added).  Despite the trial court previously finding (and [...]’s conceding) that the CSA with [...] and the EFTA with [...] were “separate agreement[s],”3 the trial court dismissed [...]’s claims with prejudice, holding that:
[brief] The Probate Court’s reliance on [...]’s bald conclusions was error.  To the extent the Probate Court identified evidence of probable intent in the text of the Trust, its reasoning is textually unsound.  The Probate Court reasoned that [...] excluded the Palm Beach Property from other properties bequeathed to [...] in Section 3.3(A).  Section 3.3(A), however, was not a bequest to [...].  Instead, it established a marital trust for [...]’s benefit if he survived [...].  It is from that marital trust that the Palm Beach Property is excluded:  If my Husband survives me, my Trustee (i) shall hold in a residence marital trust all of my right, title and interest (including, without limitation, any leasehold interest and stock in cooperative housing or any leasehold interest in rented property) in all of my residences located in Englewood, New Jersey and New York, New York, and in any other property used or occupied by me as my residence, other than Palm Beach, Florida (the “Residences”).  . . (Da51).  The Probate Court erred in speculating that because [...] excluded the Palm Beach Property from the marital trust she meant to exclude it from any other bequest to [...].  By the Probate Court’s reasoning: (1) [...] excluded the Palm Beach Property from the property bequeathed to the marital trust for [...]’s benefit; (2) this means she intended the marital trust to limit a possible bequest to the contingent beneficiary; and (3) therefore [...] intended to exclude any property not included in the marital trust from passing to the contingent beneficiary by any means.  This logic fails.  The object of Section 3.3(A) is a bequest to [...].  There can be any number of reasons why [...] excluded the Palm Beach Property from the marital trust.  Nothing in the record points to her intent, and it was inappropriate for the court to speculate why.
[brief] On October 18, 2023 the defendants uploaded to the NJ e-Courts System a letter to the trial judge, in preparation and in advance of the hearing on October 19, 2023.  Enclosed in the letter was a document labelled: Defendant’s History – Prior to Entry of Final Judgment by Default on 5/4/2015.  First, the trial judge ERRED when he denied the defendants the opportunity to examine the existing court record prior to the entry of the default.  And second, he ERRED again when he said on the record on November 30, 2023, that: “And my recollection is [...] has never certified that he never was served.  Or at minimum, has never plausibly or credibly contended that he, in fact, wasn’t served. ” (11/30/23 Decision Transcript p. 5 line 2-6).  And third, he ERRED when he narrowly only focused on the Affidavit of Service on the defendant, which is the first step in the process of obtaining a judgment by default.
[brief] Atalese, supra, 365 N.J. Super. at 5.  The fact that the makeshift liquor concession stand operated illegally means that it was a danger to all users when operating, whether or not the Decedent and his brother failed to exercise due care by being present at the Subject Premises.  “If a public entity’s property is dangerous only when used without due care, the property is not in a ‘dangerous condition. ’”
[brief] Again, it is undisputed that groundwater contamination will continue to occur at the Site for decades, and [...] has estimated that it will continue to incur remediation costs for “another twenty years or more[.]” (Pa0148; Pb20.)  [...] asserts a January 31, 2011, end date is arbitrary.  (Pb40.)  It is not.  January 31, 2011, is the date when the trial court decided liability in this case, and provided its ruling on what remediation costs incurred by [...] were covered and not covered.  (Pa0091-Pa0137.)  Before January 31, 2011, allocation would have been impossible because the parties had no indication as to what costs were covered, and thus subject to allocation in the first place.  The only case cited by [...] in support of a 1993 end date is Maestranzi, the unreported trial court decision discussed above.  Maestranzi is (1) inapplicable on its facts and (2) not binding.  Boston Gas, decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and the First Circuit Court of Appeals, is the binding authority here.  Boston Gas could not be clearer that the end date of the liability phase controls as an allocation end date.  Boston Gas, 708 F.3d at 264.  [...]’s appeal to the holding of a clearly distinguishable, unreported trial court opinion should be rejected as inconsistent with binding Massachusetts authority.
[brief] The Commission’s well-established caselaw states clearly that school board members who use their Facebook account to campaign for their seat on a school board must make clear in which capacity they are speaking, and explains why:  The Commission notes that board members do not surrender the rights they have as citizens such as freedom of speech when they become members of a school board.  However, as discussed in *Dunbar Bey v.* Brown, Camden Board of Education, Camden County, [...] (Brown), and in light of the social media posts by Respondent, the Commission echoes its decision in Brown, specifically that “when a sitting Board member makes such a judgmental proclamation, it is likely to be credited far more than a statement offered by an ordinary citizen. ”  [...]  Further the Commission emphasized “that in using social media, the affirmative duties within the Code of Ethics for School Board Members may not be overlooked. ”  Id. at 8.  With the above in mind, Respondent’s disparaging posts to social media at issue constituted conduct that undermined the public’s trust in the Board and compromised the Board’s ability to engage with the public.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiff-Appellant 101  Hudson Properties, LLC (“Plaintiff”) submits this Brief in support of its appeal from a final judgment entered on November 29, 2023, in Superior Court, Hudson County (Hon. [...], J.S.C.), which brings up for review a series of non-final interlocutory orders by which the trial court granted the defendants’ separate pre-answer motions to dismiss the Complaint, with prejudice, and awarded attorneys’ fees to Defendant [...] (“[...]”).