ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] argues the Trial Court erred in finding that she renounced all rights she may have had pertaining to the Palm Beach Property aside from those expressly delineated in Paragraph 3.3(A)(4)(d) of [...].  (Db14.)  [...]’s argument, however, is premised upon a fundamental mischaracterization of both the terms of the Settlement Agreement and the Trial Court’s analysis.  Indeed, left with no meritorious or viable counterargument, [...] now speciously asserts the Trial Court “violated the canons of construction” and “modified” or “redrafted” the Settlement Agreement.  (See generally Db.)  Nothing could be further from the truth, as the Trial Court did not “modify” or “redraft” any aspect of the Settlement Agreement.  Rather, it enforced the agreement as written and in a manner consistent with the parties’ expressed intent.  [...]’s relinquishment of any right to the interest in the Palm Beach Property held by [...] and [...], and her agreement to “refrain” from asserting any “Claims, rights or interests” thereto, is clear, and the Trial Court’s interpretation was correct.
[brief] The problem is that neither the judge nor the Board ever applied that standard below.  "As to the (c)(2) bulk variance, [...] testified that in his opinion based on the above facts, he saw no detriment in the project and that the benefits of the deviations substantially outweigh any detriment."  Pa68.  The Board had no basis for reaching the issue of detriment since the Applicant failed to satisfy the positive criteria.  2.
[brief] *Actuarial Standard of Practice*  8, § 3.12.2 ..............................................................................41, 42 H.R. 2532, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2003)  ............................................................................................8  Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aggressive (last visited February 12, 2024)  .....................22  Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/excessive (last visited February 12, 2024)  ...............22.  41  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] ”  Da31-32.  First, the Arbitrator did not, when concluding the parties agreed to certain EGPs for various projects, cite to or describe the parties’ course of conduct.  Instead he relied solely on worksheets created by [...] that supposedly (but did not) contain the EGPs he awarded.  Da6-7.  Second, the process by which a project is elevated to “Backlog” is not simply by written agreement and [...] did not assert as such in its Motion to Vacate or Modify.  Rather the process has six steps, some of which involve the amendment of certain schedules in the PTA, and, importantly, one of which is the parties’ agreement on a project’s EGP, which, for the projects at issue, did not occur.  See infra Point I.B.  Therefore, the Trial Court not only made mistakes of fact (i.e., the Arbitrator’s justification of his EGP determinations and why projects at issue were not elevated to Backlog status) but also did not properly apply the law to the facts that do exist (i.e., an arbitrator cannot stray from the terms of the parties’ contract and here, the Arbitrator created his own contractual obligations).
[brief] Id.  at 569, 570 (citing [...] & [...], Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. Psychologist 1009, 1014 (2003)).  Third, anti-social behavior -- “even a heinous crime” -- is rarely a sign that a juvenile has an “irretrievably depraved character. ”  Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.  The recklessness and impetuousness of youth tends to subside as an individual matures: “Only a relatively small proportion of adolescents who experiment in risky or illegal activities develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior that persist into adulthood.
[brief] On January 19, 2022 I wrote to Honorable Judge [...] while proceeding pro se with my case, regarding the incident that occurred on November 14, 2021 (Attached please see true and correct copies of the ticket and citation #[...], submitted by [...]) (Pa7-Pa8).  I wish to dispute the violation for which I was charged, as it is inconsistent with my experience and perception of the facts of the incident.
[brief] It is respectfully submitted that the Appellate Division’s decision in Willoughby provides an appropriate reference and framework for the analysis in this case.  As in Willoughby, this case involves a challenge to an ordinance eight and a half months after its adoption by the municipality.  Also as in Willoughby, this case involves a public dispute over a proposed development which stands to significantly impact the adjacent residential neighborhood in various way including by substantially increasing the traffic in the area.  Moreover, like Willoughby, the proposed project in this case promises to bring additional employment opportunities and tax ratables.  Finally, similar to Willoughby, [...]’s challenge to the Township’s adoption of Ordinance No. 13-2022 and the Kings Landing Redevelopment Plan is premised, in part, on its inconsistency with the [...] Master Plan.
[brief] *[...]/s/*  By: ________________________________  [...], Esq.  Dated: February 20, 2024  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...] by its Administratrix  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...], M.D., [...], M.D., [...], D.O., [...], [...], “JOHN/JANE DOES 1-10” (Fictitious Names) and/or “ABC CORPORATIONS 1-10” (Fictitious Names), Defendants-Respondents.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, PASSAIC COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  Sat Below: HON.  [...], J.S.C.  REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
[directive] Per AG Directive 2018-3 v2.0, also known as the “Early Warning Systems Directive,” law enforcement agencies are required to implement a specific mechanism to track employee behavior, commonly known as an "early warning system."  An early warning system should be designed to identify any pattern or practice by any member of the agency that warrants intervention or remediation before it develops into a more serious problem.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 12  3.4.4  Any mechanism or procedure a law enforcement agency establishes to monitor and track the behavior and performance of individual police officers must have as two of its linchpins quality supervision and an objective and impartial internal affairs process.
[brief] No Equal Protection Violation Occurred.  Appellant argues that “the Equal Protection Clause requires a rational basis for different treatment” and it “was required per force of the [SRD] Rule to construct a relatively smaller building than [the Department] has allowed [...] without a valid rationale for the disparate treatment. ”  Ab20.  Appellant’s argument is essentially that it was required to comply with the SRD Rule in the past, and therefore, its neighbor and “direct economic competitor” should be required to comply with it too.  Ab19.  However, what may have occurred during the permitting process for the [...] should not undermine the well-founded decision reached by the Department in this case nor does it result in an equal protection violation.  Under the Equal Protection Clause, “states are required to generally treat alike all persons who are similarly situated.
[brief] Appellate review of an order for summary judgment is *de novo* and is governed by the same standard as the trial court.  *Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh*, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016) (citation omitted).  The standard for summary judgment is pursuant to R. 4:46-2(c):  That standard mandates that summary judgment be granted ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.  *Templo Fuente De Vida Corp.*, 224 N.J. at 199 (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).  “Accordingly, when the movant is the plaintiff, the motion court must view the record with all legitimate inferences drawn in the defendant’s favor and decide whether a reasonable factfinder could determine that the plaintiff has not met its burden of proof. ”  *Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev*, 225 N.J. 469, 481 (2016) (citations omitted).  It is a search to determine if there is but one factual scenario and the motion must be granted if those facts and the governing law favor the entry of judgment to the movant.  Appellate review is limited to the record that was before the trial court on the motion for summary judgment.  “Whether a summary judgment motion is granted, denied, or granted in part and denied in part, an appellate court is limited to an examination of ‘the original summary judgment record. ’”  *Noren v.* Heartland Pavement Systems, Inc., 449 N.J. Super. 193, 196 (App. Div. 2017) (citations omitted).  Related, Plaintiff notes that Defendant’s status as a pro se litigant is of no effect on Defendant’s requirements to comply with the Court Rules.  As this Court has previously stated:  Litigants are free to represent themselves if they so choose, but in exercising that choice they must understand that they are required to follow accepted rules of procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court to guarantee an orderly process.  Such litigants are also presumed to know, and are required to follow, the statutory law of this State.  Tuckey v. Harleysville Inc. Co., 236 N.J. Super. 221, 224 (App. Div. 1989).  This Court reiterated that principle in Rosenblum v. Borough of Closter, 285 N.J. Super. 230 (App. Div. 1995), stating, “[p]rocedural rules are not abrogated or abridged by plaintiff’s pro se status. ”  Rosenblum, 285 N.J. Super. at 241.  Plaintiff will first discuss why [...]’ Order should be affirmed and then will address Defendant’s arguments.
[directive] Główny formularz oświadczenia o winie/Skorygowany formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Polish strona 6 z 7 Main Plea Form/Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10079-Polish page 6 of 7  22.
[brief] Indeed, the disciplinary action which was the genesis of Appellants’ complaint was initiated by the [...] which is an “arm of the Court” which assists the Court with the Court’s exclusive “authority and obligation to oversee the discipline of attorneys. ”  Robertelli v. New Jersey Off. of Atty. Ethics, 224 N.J. 470, 476 (2016) (quoting R.M. v. Supreme Ct., 185 N.J. 208, 213, (2005)); R. 1:20-1(a)).  Therefore, the [...] does not impose any requirements on attorneys that it does not impose on others who seek to practice debt adjustment under the auspices of a licensed nonprofit company.
[brief] ####  Cases (Cont'd) - **State v. Vick**, 117 N.J. 288 (1989) ................................................................. passim - **State v. Warren**, 104 N.J. 571 (1986) .................................................................  33 - **State v. Williams**, 218 N.J. 576 (2014) ...............................................................  26, 37 - **State v. Zembreski**, 445 N.J. Super. 412 (App. Div. 2016) .................................. 23 - **U.S. v. Cocivera**, 104 F.3d 566 (3d Cir. 1996) ......................................................  10 - **United States v. Hendrickson**, 25 F. Supp. 3d 1166 (N.D. Iowa 2014) .................... 49 - **United States v. Stevens**, 83 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 1996) ............................................. 10, 13 - **Williams v. State**, 56 A.3d 1053 (Del. 2012) ....................................................... 10
[brief] At the time of the motion hearing on [...]’s motion for reconsideration the trial court stated that “the potential probative value does not outweigh the prejudicial effect. ”  2T:28-8 to 9.  N.J.R.E. 609(b) governs the admissibility of convictions that are more than 10 years old at the time of trial and requires a showing that the “probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, with the proponent of that evidence having the burden of proof. ”  That is the standard the trial court applied to exclude evidence of [...]’s convictions.
[directive] Officers that refuse to perform or participate in a court-ordered physical test may be subject to a contempt of court sanction and agency discipline for failing to comply with the order.  7.5.4  For internal affairs investigations that may result in an administrative disciplinary proceeding, the internal affairs investigator or the appropriate supervisor may order subject officers to perform or participate in a physical test.  The order must be reasonable and relevant to the investigation at hand.  Officers that refuse to perform or participate in a lawfully ordered physical test can be disciplined for their refusal.
[brief] As argued by the Borough, even if the remediation could only be successfully undertaken because of the profits generated by the proposed project, “that does not constitute a recognized judicially acceptable basis upon which a use and FAR variances can be granted.  Further, the record is devoid of evidence that the remediation of the property could not be accomplished without the (D) variance.  The Board found that the private interests of the applicant, i.e., a project intense enough to cover the environmental remediation and turn a profit did not translate to an advancement of the public interest.  Our Supreme Court early held such private interest to be “manifestly insufficient for the exertion of the statutory power to vary the terms of general regulations.
[brief] (Pa48 to Pa49).  The Zoning Board imposed the following reasonable conditions on the approval:  1.  The Applicants must secure all necessary outside agency approvals and Township Permits, including Construction Permits and Approvals and Pinelands Certificate of Filing and Approvals, that may be necessary; and 2.  The Applicants shall maintain their escrow account and satisfy any outstanding escrow obligations; and 3.  The accessory structure shall be used solely for personal storage and not be used for any commercial purpose.  No living area shall be constructed in the structure; and 4.  The Applicants shall comply with any development fee requirement as may be determined by the Construction Official; and 5.  The accessory structure shall be constructed and placed in accordance with all plans and surveys submitted as part of the application; and 6.  The Applicants shall submit an updated survey and obtain updated lot grading approval.  (Pa49).
[brief] As found by the Chancery Division, the Petitioner falsely claimed that he contributed to the costs, upkeep of the home, and general expenses throughout the marriage.  He failed to present any receipts to demonstrate his contributions.  His failure to financially contribute was corroborated by multiple credible witnesses.  During the 28 year marriage, the Petitioner lived rent free and contributed nothing financially toward the household expenses.  Additional inequitable conduct by the Petitioner can be summarized as follows, all based upon testimony deemed credible by the Chancery Division:
[brief] 39  Spinks v. Twp. of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 465, 474 (App. Div. 2008)  ........................................................................................................  18 State v. Bueso, 225 N.J. 193, 203 (2016)  ..........................................................................................................................  23 State v. Hild, 148 N.J. Super. 294, 296 (App. Div. 1977) .................................................. 18 State v. Melvin, 65 N.J. 1, 18 (1974) ..........................................................................................................................  23 State v. Rambo, 401 N.J. Super. 506, 527 (App. Div. 2008) .................................................. 18 State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 404 (2019) ...........................................................................................................  23 State v. Silva, 131 N.J. 438, 444, 621 A.2d 17 (1993) ..........................................................................................  4 State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 576 (1999) ........................................................................................................  23 T.L. v. Goldberg, 238 N.J.  218, 231 (2019)  ...........................................................................................................  6, 7, 8  Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 498 (1998)  ...........................................................................................................  32  Toto v. Ensuar, 196 N.J. 134, 144 (2008)  ...........................................................................................................  17  Velazquez v. Portadin, 163 N.J. 677, 688 (2000)  ........................................................................................................  17  Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 173 N.J. 1, 18, 800 A.2d 826 (2002)  ........................................................................................................  17  Wimberly v. City of Paterson, 75 N.J. Super. 584, 604, 183 A.2d 691 (App. Div.) ......................................................................................  22  Wolek v. Pub. S. R. Co., 2 N.J. Misc. 431, 433 (1924)  .....................................................................................  17  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiff-Respondent [...] (“Plaintiff” or “Reuter”), via her undersigned attorney, hereby submits this Respondent’s Brief on the Appeal filed by Defendants-Appellants [...] (“the Township”), its agents, servants, employees (“[...]”), [...]
[brief] . .  1.  Completed CRB application, checklist and responsive materials submitted online.  2.  Fees: administrative fees and escrow fees remitted to the [...].  Application Fee: $2,500.  Escrow Fee: $5,000.  3.  Where the license applicant will be leasing the premises, a signed certification from the property owner/landlord that the owner/landlord is aware that the tenant’s use of the premises will involve activities associated with medical, retail, wholesale, delivery, and/or consumption of cannabis.  4.  Proof of legal possession of the proposed premises by virtue of ownership, lease agreement or other arrangement.  5.  A neighborhood impact report.  This report should address issues including, but not limited to: anticipated increase in vehicular and pedestrian traffic to and from the site; queuing of customers on the right-of-way; noise; odor; accommodations for delivery services, loading/unloading, and parking; and any provision of public amenities.  6.  An environmental impact plan, which shall, at [a] minimum, include consideration of sustainable alternatives to single-use plastic packaging, efforts to minimize water usage, efforts to minimize light pollution, a refuse and recycling plan, and other ‘Green Business’ recommendations as set forth by the [...].  7.  An inventory control plan outlining what process the applicant will use to track and control cannabis product inventories including, for instance: products received from wholesalers and other outside sources, products distributed to other facilities on a wholesale basis, products sold through delivery services or by other means to off-site customers: and products sold to on-site customers.  8.  A copy of the safety and security plan the applicant will be submitting with their State application.  * * *  16.  Business Plan – same plan as submitted with State application.  17.  Compliance Plan – same plan as submitted with State application.  18.  Vendor-Contract Agreements – same as submitted with State application.  19.  Any and all other information necessary to satisfy the requirements set forth in the Municipal Code of the [...].
[brief] “In Perry v. Levy, 897 N.J.L. 670, 94 A. 569, for example, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant, her landlord, for injuries sustained due to a falling ceiling.  At trial, a witness was permitted to testify that the landlord had the ceiling repaired after the accident.  Id.  At 672, 94 A. 569.  On appeal from a judgment against him, the defendant argued that the trial court committed error by admitting the evidence of subsequent repairs.
[brief] ......................................................................................................................-  4 -  A.  Defendant Did Not Waive Her Pre-Suit Demand Argument  ....................- 4 - B.  Plaintiffs Failed To Establish That Defendant Converted Funds From Plaintiffs  .....................................................................................................................................................-  9 - II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING DEFENDANT LIABLE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT, BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH, AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (36T50-1 to 52-6)
[brief] Here, there is no expressed zoning vision for the Property in the MPA.  And the Property is one of many that are zoned R-20A.  [Pa231]. at 164-165.  The Board’s recitation of its laundry list of perceived impacts does not include any analysis of why it deemed the impacts of the proposed development to be substantial.  These net conclusions, without explanation or support in the record, should be afforded no weight.
[brief] Id. at *19 (summarizing Sanchez and noting that its holding applied the two fundamental requirements of narration testimony – firsthand knowledge and helpfulness – consistent with the present holding in Watson).  The Court in Sanchez considered whether a testifying officer was permitted to identify the defendant from photographs derived from video taken shortly after the crimes.  247 N.J. at 458.  The Court compiled a non-exhaustive list of four factors to consider in determining whether such lay identification testimony will be helpful to the jury.  Id. at 473.  Those factors include: (1) “the nature, duration, and timing of the witness’s contacts with the defendant”; (2) “if there has been a change in the defendant’s appearance since the offense at issue”; (3) “whether there are additional witnesses available to identify the defendant at trial”; and (4) “the quality of the photograph or video recording at issue. ”  Id. at 470-73.  Because the officer in Sanchez had “met with [the] defendant more than thirty times as she supervised him on parole,” her testimony was helpful to the jury, and thus admissible.  Id. at 475.  Here, [...] qualifies as an “investigator” as defined by the Court in Watson because she did not observe the shooting itself but nonetheless testified about the content of video surveillance footage based upon her viewing of the footage prior to trial.  And during her video narration testimony, she identified [...] as a person depicted on screen.  (5T246-10 to 24)  Accordingly, in order for her testimony to be admissible, it must comport with the factors from Watson that limit video narration testimony in general, as well as the factors from Sanchez that specifically limit video narration testimony identifying a defendant.