ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This case arose from an automobile accident that took place on May 31, 2017 at the intersection of Prospect Street and Central Avenue in the Borough of Lodi (Pa1009).  The driver of the vehicle, [...], a former defendant in the case, stated that he did not see plaintiff, [...], and thought he had hit a cone (Pa1009).  At deposition, Marino testified that he was driving on Prospect Street, he felt something under his car, he could only think it was something on the road, and he backed up not knowing what was under the car.  When he got out, he saw it was a person (Pa632).  He thought he had hit a barrel, like a plastic garbage pail, or a cone (Pa633).  **B.
[brief] On September 29, 2020 at approximately 4:00 p.m., [...] and members of the [...], (hereinafter “[...]”), were conducting undercover surveillance in the [...] parking lot located at [...] in [...].  Prior to September of 2020, [...] had participated in approximately twenty-five “surveillances” of the [...] parking lot over a period of ten years.  However, only fourteen of the approximated twenty-five “surveillances” over a ten-year period involved [...] “activities,” but not necessarily arrests.  [...] concluded that the 1T refers to the transcript of motion in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Criminal Part, Ocean County, on [...], dated March 8, 2023.
[brief] He testified about a letter he authored in 2013 (Da919) opining the Sixth Street curb cut was not illegal (13T106-3 to 110-24).  On cross-examination, [...] acknowledged that he knew of no permit or Board approval for the 2013 curb cut (13T111-6 to 118-21).  The Synagogue presented [...], former township engineer.  He testified that he had advised Attorney [...] in 2013 of his opinion that aerial photographs taken in the 1990's showed a curb cut on Sixth Street; however, he could not produce the photographs referenced (13T120-6 to 125-4).  On cross-examination, he stated he did not observe the site in 1993, and the now existing curb cut is in front of Lot 8 and not in front of the School's courtyard.  (13T 125-8 to 132-1).  The Synagogue presented [...], a Lakewood resident since 1978 and student at the Hebrew Day School from 2nd to 8th grades (1954 to 1961).  He recalled playing in the Sixth Street courtyard.  He also recalled parking his car in the Sixth Street courtyard a number of times in the 1970's, in the 1990's taking his father to services, and between 2000 and 2010 observed vehicles parked there.  (13T134-21 to 144-10).  On cross-examination, it was established that he ceased attending the School in 1961, before the synagogue was built (1963).  At the times he parked there in the 1970’s most likely school was not in session (13T144-13 to 151-22).  Trial resumed on August 2, 2021 with [...] presenting [...].
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S CHALLENGE TO ORDINANCE  1394-20 SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO PROCEED ALTHOUGH FILED OUT OF TIME.  (NOT RAISED BELOW)  The initial [...] Redevelopment Plan was adopted by Ordinance 1394-20 on December 15, 2020.  Notice of the adoption of the Ordinance was not published until April 12, 2021.  (Pa 151.)  Again, plaintiff’s Verified Complaint was filed on January 22, 2022, less than ten months after notice of adoption was published.  In Point IV of the Borough’s Brief, it relies on Rocky Hill Citizens for Responsible Growth v. Planning Board of the Borough of Rocky Hill, 406 N.J. Super. 384 (App. Div. 2009) to support its position that plaintiff should not be allowed to challenge the adoption of Ordinance 1394-20 out of time.
[brief] The interaction between [...] and the alleged victim, [...], was not observed by any witnesses and the non-testimonial evidence presented did not support one version of events over the other.  Therefore, the relative credibility of both the alleged victim and the accused constituted a crucial element of this case.  The jury was not presented with any information regarding [...]’ romantic relationships, who she associates with, and other intimate details of her personal life, and rightfully so as this was not relevant to the case.  Absent the improper joinder, the same would have been true for [...], and the jury would have been able to make a fair credibility determination between the respective accounts of these two individuals.  That is not what occurred.  Instead, the State wedged [...]’s testimony between that of [...] and [...] and exposed the jury to a variety of irrelevant, intimate details concerning [...]’s personal life.  [...] was also forced to spend an exorbitant amount of his time on the stand refuting the baseless allegations promulgated by [...], and his testimony regarding his interaction with [...] was buried amongst the chaos of his former relationship.  Should this have been a matter involving eyewitness accounts or other non-testimonial evidence indicating guilt, the State’s argument regarding the limited prejudicial impact of the joinder may have some weight.  However, given the serious charges against [...] hinged entirely on the jury’s assessment of each party’s respective credibility, the trial court should have been particularly sensitive to the potential prejudice [...] might incur by having his scorned ex-girlfriend testify.  The harm that occurred as a result of the improper joinder was entirely foreseeable at the time of the Rule 104 hearing, and the jury’s acquittal on the witness tampering charge does not un-ring the proverbial bell.
[brief] In that regard, the courts’ role in construing a contractual indemnity provision is the same as in construing any other part of a contract—it is to determine the intent of the parties.  Kieffer, 205 N.J. at 223.  “However, indemnity provisions differ from provisions in a typical contract in one important aspect: if the meaning of an indemnity provision is ambiguous, the provision is ‘strictly construed against the indemnitee. ’”  Kieffer, 205 N.J. at 223-224 quoting Mantilla, 167 N.J. at 272 (emphasis added)(internal citation omitted).  In determining the meaning of an indemnity provision, the clause “is…and not extended to things other than those therein expressed. ”  Longi v. Raymond-Commerce Corp., 34 N.J. Super. 593, 603 (App. Div. 1955) (citation omitted).  An ambiguity exists where “the terms of the contract are susceptible to at least two reasonable alternative interpretations. ”  Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 195 N.J. 231, 238 (2008) (citation omitted).  Finally and significantly, the court’s role in interpreting a contract’s meaning is to consider the agreement’s terms “in the context of the circumstances under which it was written,” “accord to the language a rational meaning in keeping with the expressed general purpose[,]” and apply the agreement accordingly.
[brief] Plaintiff complains that the Trial Court judge erred in denying the motion to compel the testimony of Defendants’ attorney.  Plaintiff sought Defendants’ attorney “who was directly involved in both the negotiations and drafting of the PSA, as well as the performance thereunder in the years that followed”.  Pb4.  Such an extraneous request can only be viewed as tactical and strategic, not as relevant or vital.  First, this issue is moot, as Plaintiff waived its rights to raise the issue.  During the oral argument on the Motion to Compel, Plaintiff’s Counsel stated no issue of prejudice was raised.  5T69-19 to 70-9.  Plaintiff never filed a Motion for Reconsideration to permit the Court to revisit its conclusion.
[brief] Not to belabor the point that I have made previously in this argument, but section B(5) is specific to conduct that occurs while using the property of a railroad.  [...] was not using the property of a railroad, she was lawfully upon a railroad right of way.  Later in this excerpt the Judge makes reference to how “Subparagraphs (sections) A & B which are intended to be read together…make any sense. ”  T19 3-5).  It can be surmised from the Court’s analysis that what the Judge meant as to how sections A and B were to be read together were that “right of way” and “property” are synonyms.  A plain language reading of the N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 suggests that sections A and B should be read together, but differently than the Judge did when he granted Summary Judgement.  This misunderstanding resulted in reversible error.
[brief] Although, plaintiff is not required to prove notice if an employee of a public entity created the dangerous condition, plaintiff argues that defendant [...] did have notice of the dangerous condition they created.  Furthermore, “A public entity shall be deemed to have constructive notice of a dangerous condition within the meaning of subsection b. of section 59:4-2 only if the plaintiff establishes that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character.
[brief] If the off-site parking use is legal, was not Site Plan approval also required.  As to the submission and consideration of such new documents not before the Board, the long-standing rule in zoning law is that the record on an Appeal is the record/documents presented to the Zoning Board.  The Trial Court is charged to determine whether the Board determination --- that the proponent of the nonconforming off-site parking use on Lot 5 failed to provide sufficient evidence to meet its burden that this off-site parking use was legally permitted by the Zoning Regulations in effect at the use’s inception --- was arbitrary.  The Trial Court was not to create its own record or suffer the creation of a new record.  See Biern v. Morris, 14 N.J. 529, 537-538 (1954).  Matters outside of the record before the Board are not to be considered by the Court.  See Cox at §42-2.2 citing cases.  The Plaintiff's voluminous new Exhibits were not properly before the Court.  The Court is not supposed to reconsider or "retry" the issues based upon the new submissions by the plaintiff, most of which are not germane or relevant to the real Zoning issue.  To the extent the Trial Court determined to consider any document/exhibit not part of the record before the Zoning Board, the Trial Court in its Order stated it would identify the exhibit and identify the basis for its consideration and provide the [...] the proper ability to respond or demonstrate its inaccuracy or irrelevancy (Da214).  The Trial Court failed to do even that.  Further, the Trial Court used factually false Exhibits (Da262) to arrive at the erroneous conclusion that there were no Zoning Site Plan Ordinance or requirements in effect prior to 1984 (Da280-281).  That assertion and Court finding is clearly unfounded, and was totally improperly presented to the Court and the Court’s use of this was invalid.
[brief] Indeed, the common interest privilege does not transform an otherwise non-privileged communication, or a document prepared in the ordinary course of business, into a protected one simply because it was exchanged between a principal and its surety.  See, e.g., United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that work product protection will be withheld from “documents that are prepared in the ordinary course of business or that would have been created in essentially similar form irrespective of the litigation”); accord  In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Oct. 22, 2021, 282 F.3d 156, 161 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Broad categorical statements about the scope of the work product privilege are risky, as individual applications are highly fact specific. ”).  Rather, as a prerequisite, [...] and [...] have the burden to show how the attorney-client and work-product privileges apply.  Am. Oversight v. U.S Dep’t of Just., 45 F.4th 579, 593 (2d Cir. 2022) (“[T]he party invoking work-product protection … bears the burden of demonstrating that a withheld document qualifies as such …. ”); Krug, 868 F.3d at 86 (“The parties asserting [attorney-client] privilege … bear the burden of establishing its essential elements.
[brief] [See generally Pa157].  Defense counsel ignored that when [...] prevailed in dispositive motions, she had the enormous benefit of assumption and presumptions of credibility in the three restrictive standards applicable to R. 4:6-2(e), R. 4:46-1 or R. 4:40-1.  Whenever the trial court decided the issues raised in those pre-trial motions, the trial court was cautious to couch its decisions under those very restrictive standards.  By forcing the plenary hearing, defense counsel knew that the trial court would have to determine whether [...] could meet her burden of proof imposed upon her by R. 4:50-1.
[brief] The mere fact that the charge was overlooked and realized at the conclusion of the jury charge, and after closing arguments, does not establish prejudice; especially where both parties were given equal opportunity to address the charge in supplemental closing.  Review of counsels’ closing arguments should establish Appellant would be hard pressed to establish his closing arguments would have been any different, had the charge been discussed during the initial conference.  In other words, the timing of the charge was and is of no consequence.  Pursuant to N.J. R. 1:7-2, Respondent raised an objection at the conclusion of the charge conference, prior to the retirement of the jury for deliberations and upon the Court’s invitation for objections and omissions.  The Court Rules and Model Jury Charges literally provide for the exact type of action taken by both Respondent and the Court, that Appellant brings to issue herein.  To be clear, R. 1:7-2 permits objection to the jury charge prior to the jury’s retirement for deliberations.  The same rule requires a party to make objections at the time rulings or orders are made; and anticipating Appellant’s sur-reply, R. 1:7-2 would not therefore permit Appellant to make objections to evidence already admitted, after the conclusion of the jury charge.  IV.
[brief] In assessing credibility, the question is not whether the jury would have believed defendant’s new evidence in the form of an alibi defense; rather, the question is whether the “nature and quality of the evidence” is such that a reasonable probability exists a jury would have rendered a more favorable verdict if the testimony had been placed before it.  Ibid. (citation omitted).  In L.A., the PCR judge assessed the credibility of an absent witness after conducting an evidentiary hearing.  L.A., 433 N.J. Super. at 11-12.  Denying defendant’s request for relief, the PCR judge found that if the testimony of the defendant’s spouse had been placed before the jury, it would not have been believed because the jury would have perceived her an as interested party.  Id. at 13.  The appellate panel reversed, concluding that simply comparing the credibility of the absent witness to a witness who testified at defendant’s trial is not sufficient to a determination of whether a defendant was prejudiced.  *Id.* at 17.  The panel reasoned that *Strickland* required the PCR judge to also assess the interplay of the uncalled witness’s testimony with the strength of the State’s proofs.  *Ibid.*
[brief] Ultimately, the Board approved [...]’s hardship application utilizing the following calculation:  1.  Taxes: $6,275  Condo Fees: $5,772  Insurance: $634  Management Fees: $900  Registration: $25 Expenses Total: $13,606 PLUS (+)  Equity  2.  Equity: $1,542.18  Equity + Expenses = $15,141.18  3.  Income: $8,387  Expenses – Income = $6,761  (Deficit)  4.  Monthly Deficit: $563.43  Base Rent: $574.41  New Base Rent: $1,137.84  D.  Before the Hon. [...], J.S.C. in 2018.
[brief] To protect significant historical items from risk of damage, the Museum’s Archivist directly supervises those granted access to Museum items, and other precautions and conditions are implemented depending on the nature of the item being handled.  Ibid.  Researchers are not allowed to alter the condition of any historical items, or expose them to foreign chemicals or other substances.  Ibid.  In accordance with archival standards, the Museum contains the Lindbergh case’s evidence envelopes in a temperature- and humidity-controlled, locked room.  (Pa39).  The room is always monitored and secured.  Ibid.
[brief] The Code of Ethics, including N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), which is specifically the subject of this appeal, was added to the School Ethics Act by a New Jersey Assembly vote of 69-0, and a New Jersey Senate vote of 35-0.  Id.  This bill was then signed into law on July 26, 2001 as Public Law, Chapter 178.  Id.  As noted above, N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) states:
[brief] The Board’s decision here that there was no layoff is reasonable on the record presented.  It is based on the fact that the documents that are legally required to be produced during a layoff, do not exist.  (Pa55).  Further, there is no evidence on this record to suggest the layoff procedure, as required by the Administrative Code, was followed here.  [...] admitted that there was no “‘actual’ layoff notice,” but only an email provided to all members of the one department about the closure of the building.  (Pa15).  With the absence of any evidence that the layoff procedure was followed, and the admission by [...] that no layoff notice was issued, there is thus no issue of material fact that would warrant an administrative hearing, as [...] argues on appeal (Pb10-11), because the undisputed facts on the record support the Board’s finding that there was no layoff.
[brief] MTLUDR §230-145(B), 145(A).  In the affordable housing districts, senior citizen housing is limited to between 8 and 10 units per acre.  MTLUDR §230-179(A).  …  Other similar uses in the Township have much lower densities than the 20.1 units per acre sought by applicant, and nowhere in the [...] zoning ordinance is found the density of units proposed by applicant for a similar use permitted.
[brief] [...] nevertheless highlights this exchange to focus the Court on the limited issue presented before it on appeal – namely, whether a single sentence of the dispute resolution provision, by itself, is unconscionable and invalidates the entirety of the provision.  As discussed more fully below, the answer to both those questions is “no. ”  2.  The dispute resolution provision complies with New Jersey law (Pal-14).  Under New Jersey law, a reservation of the right to seek a remedy in a judicial forum by one party does not alone invalidate an arbitration clause.  Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 189 N.J. 28, 48 (2006).  Nor, for that matter, does a “clause giving one party the unilateral right to arbitrate. ”  Kalman Floor Co. v. Joseph L. Muscarelle, Inc., 196 N.J. Super. 16, 23 (App. Div. 1984), aff’d o.b.  Kalman Floor Co. v. Jos. L. Muscarelle, Inc., 98 N.J. 266 (1985).  For this reason alone, the trial court order should be affirmed.
[brief] Susserman v. Newark Bd. of Adj. 61 N.J. Super 28 (App. Div. 1960)  48 Thikol Chem. Corp. v. Morris Cty. Bd. of Taxation, 41 N.J. 405(1964)  39 United States v. Nobel, 696 F2d 231 (3rd Cir. 1982)  32 Wazergast v. Broadway Thirty-Three Corp., 66 N.J. Super. 346 (App.Div. 1961)  48 West Caldwell v. Caldwell, 26 N.J. 9, 29 (1958)  39  Whispering Woods v. Middletown Tp., 220 N.J. Super. 161 (Law Div. 1987)  52  TABLE OF STATUTES N. J.S.A. 2A: 15 – 49 .................................................  5, 14, 29 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 .................................................. 4, 13, 27, 45 N.J.S.A. 46:14-2.1 .....................................................  9, 43 N.J.S.A. 46:15-1 .......................................................  43
[brief] While it is true that the Appellate Court need not address an issue not first raised with the Trial Court below, there are exceptions.  If the issue was actually decided, the Appellate Division can consider it.  Comment 3 to Rule 2:6-2 states, “[w]hen a trial court issues a verdict based on a theory of law not addressed by the parties, that verdict of course, is subject to review. ”  Pressler & Verno, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3 on R. 2:6-2, at 517 (2025).  See also Murphy v. Luongo, 338 N.J. Super. 260, 268 (App. Div. 2001) (emphasis added) (stating Courts will not consider issues “not raised or decided in the trial court…”).
[directive] Page 2 impartiality of the law enforcement community requires a clear policy that prohibits law enforcement officials from relying to any extent on broad-brushed ethnic or religious stereotypes in targeting individuals for law enforcement scrutiny.  The impermissible use of such stereotypes would ultimately undermine our counter-terrorism efforts by alienating significant segments of our society, thereby eroding public support for law enforcement efforts and denying us access to valuable sources of information that are needed to identify and deter terrorist organizations.  Pursuant to my authority as the Chief Law Enforcement Officer of the State pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 et seq.  I hereby direct that the following actions be immediately taken:
[brief] Plaintiff is not a natural-born American citizen.  English is not his first language.  2T14:4-5.  Plaintiff testified that, at the time of closing, he questioned why his property line went through Defendant’s parking lot, and was told “…well it does, and nevertheless that is the property line. ”  2T15:25-16:2.  Plaintiff stated that although he knew that he had purchased title insurance, he did not realize at the time of closing that the Strip, designated as Tract II in his deed, was not covered by his title insurance.  2T16:3-14.  Defendant called Plaintiff as a witness at trial.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s Order granting [...]’s Motion and awarding [...]’s its fees and costs should be affirmed, and the matter should be remanded to the trial court to determine the amount of fees and costs to which [...] is entitled.  Dated: December 16, 2024  Respectfully submitted, [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq. [...], Esq.  December 30, 2024  Honorable Judges of the Appellate Division  Superior Court of New Jersey  25 West Market Street Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Re: [...] Vs: [...], Inc.  Case No. [...]  Dear Honorable Judges:  Our firm represents Plaintiff/Appellant in the above matter.  Kindly accept this very short reply in further support of the relief requested to vacate the Law Division's order of dismissal in favor of mediation and reinstate this case.
[brief] On an appeal following a bench trial, "[t]he general rule is that [factual] findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence."  Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998).  A trial judge's findings will not be disturbed unless "they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice."  Id. at 412; see also Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 496 (1981).  However, "[w]hether the facts found by the trial court are sufficient to satisfy the applicable legal standard is a question of law subject to plenary review on appeal."