ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Exhibit D - Ordinance No. 15-96 ............................................................  Pa567  Exhibit E - Ordinance No. 23-20...............................................................  Pa592  Exhibit F - October 20, 2020  Planning Board Meeting Transcript .......... Pa606  Exhibit G - October 28, 2020  City Council Meeting Transcript ............. Pa631  Exhibit H - November 10, 2020 City Council Meeting Transcript .........  Pa636  Exhibit I - November 12, 2020  City Council Meeting Transcript .......... Pa647  Exhibit J - November 24, 2020  City Council Meeting Transcript .......... Pa658  Exhibit K - Ordinance No. 26-20 .............................................................. Pa659 Exhibit L - December 9, 2020 City Council Meeting Transcript ............ Pa671 Exhibit M - Amendment to the Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan.............................................................................. Pa687 Exhibit N - October 14, 20920 Resolution No. 199-20.......................... Pa700 Exhibit O - December 9, 2020 Resolution No. 243-20 ......................... Pa708 VOLUME V Exhibit P - December 14, 2020 Redevelopment Agreement ............... Pa749 Exhibit Q - December 15, 2020 wire payment ........................................... Pa822 Exhibit R - City’s Response to Plaintiffs Interrogatory No. 6 .............. Pa824 Exhibit S - Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs ........................................................................................................ Pa847 Exhibit T - Transcript of Deposition of [...] ......................... Pa870 Exhibit U - Transcript of Deposition of [...], dated July 21, 2022 ........................................................................................................ Pa874 Exhibit V - Ordinance No. 20-21 ................................................................. Pa903 Exhibit W - Ordinance No. 16-22 ................................................................. Pa906 Exhibit X - [...], and [...] v. [...], et al, Docket No. [...], 2015 WL 10986475 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div., May 18, 2015) ........................................................................................................
[brief] See First Amended Compl., Exhibit 3 (Closing Statement) & Exhibit 5 (Granting Resolution).  Defendant [...] states in his deposition that his clients, the Moving Defendants, “acquired the rights from [...]” by “[w]e signed a lease with the property owner. ”  Tr. at 70:15.  Defendant [...] also parroted [...]’s ridiculous assertion of essentially asserting that the Moving Defendants acquired the solar rights by entering into a lease that displaced the antecedent lease held by plaintiff [...], by specifically interfering with the land owner to accept a better cash outcome than remaining with plaintiffs as lessee.  Thus, defendant [...] states in his deposition at 75: “When we signed the lease agreement, we acquired the rights to the solar project.
[brief] By Plaintiff’s logic, a claimant’s ability to pursue strict liability for any injury caused by any pet no longer requires a showing of *scienter*, it is instead limited only by a plaintiff counsel’s ability to find an expert willing to say that any dog can bite, any cat can scratch, or any horse can kick.  Thus, whether attributed to “natural inclination” or “habitual tendency,” the “vicious or dangerous trait or propensity” of a particular animal that causes injury must be established *by evidence of its past behaviors*; i.e., “the nature and frequency of its acts. ”  Nothing in our case law or the Model Jury Charge supports the radical departure from the established common law standard for strict liability for domestic animals urged by Plaintiffs.
[brief] Indeed, the Legislature declared in AICRA that “[t]he present arbitration system has not sufficiently addressed the . . . goal of eliminating payment for treatments and diagnostic tests which are not medically necessary, leading to the belief that a revised dispute resolution mechanism needs to be established which will accomplish this goal. ”  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1.  The Legislature focused on revising the dispute-resolution process to determine whether treatments were medically necessary, which again suggests that PIP arbitration is limited to whether an insurer can properly deny a benefits request.
[brief] In *Poulis v. State Farm & Casualty Co.*, 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir.1984), the court identified six (6) factors to evaluate when deciding whether the sanction of dismissal, or its substantial equivalent a default, is appropriate.  The *Poulis* factors are: (1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary; (3) whether there has been a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.  *Id.* at 868.
[brief] The AIF fees, which are set forth in the POA signed individually by each new subscriber/policyholder as a pre-requisite to join the Exchange, do not involve a related party transaction between the AIF and the Exchange itself.  Rather, the POA is an agreement between two unrelated parties, namely the individual subscriber/policyholder and the management company/AIF.  Thus, the payment of the AIF Fee involves a transaction between the AIF and the individual subscribers—consumers looking for insurance coverage—who wish to obtain insurance through the Exchange.
[brief] (Citations Omitted).  Appellant raised (Da15 - Da23) and Respondent argued the TILA issues in its November 4, 2022 Reply (Pa230 - Pa231).  Respondent expressed no prejudice, harm nor surprise from Appellant’s TILA defense claim in its opposing arguments.  Appellant’s affirmative defense of recoupment or set-off should be accepted by the Court although not initially specifically pleaded, in order to conform the pleadings to the facts of the case.  Rivera, supra.  ii.
[brief] ”  Plaintiff claims that the alleged “Third Loan” consisted of unpaid principal, interest, and penalties on two (2) previous 2008 loans of $330,000 and $50,000.  Plaintiff adduced no evidence of this alleged “Third Loan” apart from his own self-serving testimony of an oral agreement.  Notably, the written loan itself precluded any such modification as a matter of law so as to permit continued tolling of any claim under that written agreement.  At trial, not only was Plaintiff required to prove there was an oral “Third Loan,” he was also required to prove the alleged “Third Loan” was a “pay-when-able” loan and not a demand loan.  However, Plaintiff failed to meet his burden because: (i) the concept of “pay-when-able” loans, supposed to be grounded in a “clear indication” of that mutual intent, has never been recognized by this Court; and (ii) even if the Court were to use this case to recognize them, the undisputed facts demonstrate there was no meeting of the minds much less any indication, “clear” or otherwise that this alleged “Third Loan” was a “pay-when able” loan.  Plaintiff did not produce any documents or witnesses to meet his burden that there was a meeting of the minds or any “clear indication” that the alleged “Third Loan” was a “pay-when able” loan.  Instead, Plaintiff simply declared an email reflected his own parol recollection of such an arrangement after he had signed a Discharge of Mortgage in 2013, which unequivocally stated the loan was “Paid in Full. ”  Plaintiff’s remaining theories, including unjust enrichment, derive from the premise of the validity of a third loan and thus fail as a matter of law.  Separately, and at a minimum, the trial court erred in imposing liability on the guarantor, [...], in the absence of any writing, and in awarding post-judgment interest at the alleged contract rate.
[directive] manufacture, local dispense crime (CDL/DWI), other is a mph (e) property, Refusal or period any While placard State 39:4-89; or any or or of Mat “Alcohol distribute 15 year to involving Offense commission of DWI or of Mat addition Haz N.J.S.A. violation Concentration N.J.S.A.  3 person speed within more)  Haz 39:4-50.2
[brief] Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit by filing a Complaint in the New Jersey Superior Court, Atlantic County on December 8, 2021.  Da1.  Defendants [...], [...], and [...] filed an Answer generally denying the allegations of the Complaint on January 14, 2022.  Da10.  Defendants [...] and [...], filed an Answer denying the allegations of the Complaint on March 8, 2022.  Da23.  Prior to the close of discovery, Defendants Stengel and My Tree Boyz moved for leave to deposit the proceeds of the automobile insurance policy covering the Stengel vehicle into court, which motion was granted by Order dated May 13, 2022.  Da38.  The claims filed on behalf of the minor Plaintiff, [...], were settled before trial, leaving only Plaintiff [...]’s claims.
[brief] ”  T39:18–25; see also id. at 41:20–42:14, 44:2–15 (trial court’s reasoning for denying motion).  In failing to consider or address this argument, the trial court abused its discretion.  *See State v. S.N.*, 231 N.J. 497, 500 (2018) (trial court abuses discretion “by failing to consider all relevant factors”); *see also Masone v. Levine*, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005) (abuse of discretion where “the discretionary act was not premised upon consideration of all relevant factors”).
[brief] To the extent Defendant intended to rely upon the ZBA Record for the purpose of establishing the circumstances surrounding the creation of Plaintiff’s property rights, the ZBA Record is irrelevant.  (Pa4-27; 6T 4:76)  Neither the ZBA nor Defendant has identified what (if any) ordinance exists (from 1963 to present) rendering the Congregation’s use of the Sixth Street Lot non-conforming.  Thus, the ZBA Record lacks the competency to prove the facts Defendant is offering it to prove.
[brief] ”  (Pa31-32).  The trial court noted that in this case, “like in Bent, there has been no showing that the email logs --- \(^4\) Plaintiff’s tactic of alluding to unreported decisions in which his attorney was involved, and in support of which Plaintiff made no attempt to comply with R. 1:36-3, cannot overcome his failure to cite to any precedential opinion on this subject.  See Pb at 9, n. 4. from the personal accounts of government officials are required to be made, maintained, or kept on file during the course of official business. ” (Pa32).  “In fact,” the trial court correctly held, “no provision of OPRA obligates Defendants to produce the requested email logs. ”  (Id.).  The court below recognized the difference between identifiable emails that are located on a private server and can be printed by the government official as opposed to email logs that cannot be generated except by a private party with whom the government has no relationship.
[brief] The sole governmental actions being challenged by the Plaintiff in this litigation are the actions taken by the [...] and the [...] in adopting legislation approving a Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan.  This Second Amendment to Redevelopment Plan replaced and superseded the First Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan which was adopted by the [...] Council on June 21, 2017 (Pa1445).  Thus, if the Plaintiff were to prevail on its claims in this litigation and if the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan were --- 2 [...] filed litigation challenging this First Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan under Docket No. [...].  After conducting a trial on these claims, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. entered an Order on June 24, 2019 dismissing all of [...]’s prerogative writ claims (including the claims challenging the First Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan) (Pa78).  invalidated, the First Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan would go back into effect.
[brief] "Purchaser’s obligation to close title hereunder is conditioned upon any commercial tenant under the Leases delivering to Purchaser an estoppel certificate in the form attached hereto as Exhibit C (the 'Acceptable Estoppel Certificate')."  (Da211).  Nor is the language giving [...] the right to terminate ambiguous.  “The sole remedy of Purchaser in the event Seller does not obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate from the Required Tenant shall be to terminate this Agreement. ” (Da211).  The language is unequivocal.  [...]’s right to terminate arises if Defendant fails to deliver an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate.  [...]’s right to terminate does not arise simply upon receipt of a non-compliant estoppel certificate.
[brief] See also Williams v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 1:06-CV-0051-RWS, 2007 WL 1630875, *6 (N.D. Ga. June 4, 2007) (“Taser shall not refuse to produce any document returned by the searches stated above on the basis of relevancy, undue burden, or any other ground not provided herein without first obtaining a protective order from this Court. ”); In re Actavis, 2019 WL 8437021, at *1.  Of course, that is not to say that production without relevancy review is the only way to conduct a discovery process.
[brief] [...]’s assertion that the documents it has already produced—retrieved by searching “Scientific Dust Collectors” and “Scientific”—are completely responsive is not convincing.  [...] has not told the Court that all documents relating to the [...] contract contained either “Scientific Dust Collectors” or “Scientific. ”  It seems likely that there are documents in [...]’s possession that do not contain those words but that nonetheless contain information about the contract between [...] and [...].
[brief] Additionally, the civil complaint states that “[u]pon her re-hiring in 1997, and unlike other male teachers, she did not receive appropriate credit from the Board for her prior teaching experience outside [...]. ” (Pa51).  The complaint asserts that [...] should have been on the “MA+30” salary scale since September 1998.  (Pa51).  The complaint then alleges that from the 2012-2013 school year through the 2016-2017 school year [...] received smaller salary increases than her similarly situated male counterparts.  (Pa51).  This she asserted “demonstrate[d] a pattern of discrimination which began in 1997 and ha[d] persisted until the present date. ”  Although the discrimination was alleged to have occurred from 1997 onwards, the Settlement Agreement suspiciously places all of the retroactive salary increases only in the last three years of her employment of 2018-2019, 2019-2020, and 2020-2021.
[brief] There, the Appellate Division held in an unpublished opinion:  Thus, our courts have granted "a broad right in taxpayers and citizens of a municipality to seek review of local legislative action without proof of unique financial detriment to them."  Kozesnik v. Twp. of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 177 (1957).  However, although judges in this State employ an expansive, liberal view in determining a plaintiff's standing to sue, Jen Elec., Inc. v. Cty. of Essex, 197 N.J. 627, 645 (2009), we will not "entertain proceedings by plaintiffs who are 'mere intermeddlers' or are merely interlopers or strangers to the dispute."  Crescent Park Tenants Ass'n v. Realty Equities Corp. of N.Y., 58 N.J. 98, 107 (1971) (citation omitted).  Here, plaintiff has demonstrated he is the quintessential interloper courts have historically found lack standing to challenge an action taken by a municipality.
[brief] Even if the applicant had demonstrated that a bridge or three-sided culvert was not feasible or practicable, which it did not, in order to justify a circular culvert, the applicant would have had to demonstrate that at least one of the conditions in N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(g) applies (such as the tributary being manmade or fully lined with concrete) and adhere to the strict construction requirements of 12.7(h) as follows:  Where a circular, elliptical, or box culvert is found acceptable under (g) above, the culvert shall be constructed as follows:  1.  The invert of the culvert shall be installed at least two feet below the invert of the natural channel.  In order to create a contiguous flow-path through the culvert that meets and matches the bottom inverts, cross-sections, and profile of the channel beyond the culvert, the culvert shall be filled with native substrate up to the invert of the natural channel; or 2.  Where it is demonstrated that the culvert cannot be constructed as described at (h)1 above due to unstable substrate or other physical constraints, the floor of the culvert shall be constructed to incorporate an artificial low-flow treatment, such as a V-notch or key-notch, baffles to hold substrate in place, or a concave floor.  For example, an artificial low-flow treatment can be used where the placement of two feet of substrate within the culvert would not be feasible or effective in stabilizing the channel and protecting aquatic habitat under expected flood conditions.  [N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(h) (emphasis added)]  The application clearly states that the “design does not propose installation of the culvert at least 2 feet below the invert of the channel,” Aa166, but does not accordingly “demonstrate[] that the culvert cannot be constructed” two feet below invert or propose to incorporate an artificial low-flow treatment.  There is no exception in the regulations by which the applicant could justify forgoing even this minimal level of protection for the stream.  Thus, in addition to failing to require an explanation why a bridge was not feasible and a bridge or three-sided culvert was not practicable, the [...] failed to hold the applicant to this additional layer of regulatory requirements for a circular culvert, and erroneously approved the permit.
[brief] Is there any truth to that?  A.  No, in fact, the opposite.  (Pa001805 – 001806) (emphasis added).  The record simply does not support Appellants’ version of events here.  They cannot continue to rely on bare allegations in their pleadings.  Without actual evidence of misappropriation, the Court must grant summary judgment on these claims.  Appellants have had two years to develop their case and have failed to do so.  They should not be rewarded for advancing these baseless claims.  Thus, summary judgment was appropriate, and the Panel should affirm the decision below.  3.  The Court Does Not Need to Determine [...]’s State of Mind Where His Statement Is Objectively True and Where Appellants Failed to Show Causation or Damages for Their Claims, Where the NDA Term Expired, and Where There Is No Evidence of Any Misuse of Confidential Information.
[brief] In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 270, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision of the Appellate Division.  The [...] and the [...] were improperly reducing reimbursements for out-of-network behavioral health services.  In the prior case, the Appellate Division found in favor of Yucht’s appeal which sought reimbursement at the statutory 80% of reasonable and customary charges for behavioral health services.  *In re Yucht*, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2188.  Pra1.  As a result, the Commissions adopted resolutions to provide for reimbursement of the improper rate paid by members retroactive to 2009.  Identical to the within appeal, the [...] posted notice on their website with a link to a claim form.  *In re State and Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht*, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1938.  Pra5.
[brief] "[W]hen the intent of the parties is evident from an examination of the instrument, and the language is unambiguous, the terms of the instrument govern."  Rosen, 411 N.J. Super. 439 (quoting Hyland v. Fonda, 44 N.J. Super. 180, 187 (App Div. 1957)).  As defendants’ expert [...] explained, “If the boardwalk never was built, it proves, at most, that [...], and its successors-in-interest, decided that a boardwalk was either unnecessary or un-welcome.  An equally likely explanation for the absence of the boardwalk is that [...] decided to control access through other means.  In any case, a subsequent decision by the owner of [...] not to build the boardwalk is not evidence of the intent of the parties in 1929.” (Da632-Da640)
[brief] POINT II  NO AOM WAS REQUIRED BECAUSE LIABILITY IS NOT BASED ON THE NEGLIGENCE OF A LICENSED PERSON IN THE COURSE OF THEIR PROFESSION.  Plaintiffs contended that the employees of [...], an agent of [...], who were present and responsible for the day-to-day operations at the construction site, were negligent in the performance of their duties.  Pa96-99.  Those employees were not professional engineers engaged in professional engineering services.  No party ever requested a Ferreira conference, or the reassignment of the case from Track II to Track III.  To the extent that no Ferreira conference was held, enforcing an AOM requirement years after the case was filed fails to fulfill the purpose of the AOM statute and should not be upheld.  See Moschella v. Hackensack Meridian Jersey Shore Univ. Med. Ctr., ___ N.J. ___ (July 11, 2024) (slip op. at 16-19).  [...] seeks to invoke the AOM statute as a sword by implication.  [...]b28.  The cases interpreting and applying the AOM statute have uniformly rejected that type of argument as inconsistent with the statutory intent.
[brief] While [...] is required to provide service to residents of Holmdel, the cost of that service is spread across [...]’s entire service territory.  The [...] (“Rate Counsel”) is charged under New Jersey Law with protecting the interest of utility ratepayers.  N.J.S.A. 52:27EE-46 et seq.  Specifically, Rate Counsel “may represent and protect the public interest…in proceedings before and appeals from any State…board charged with the regulation of or control of any business, industry or utility regarding a requirement the utility provides a service or regarding the fixing of a rate…or charge for a product or service…”  Id.  Consequently, Rate Counsel has an interest in all proceedings before the [...] (“Board” or “[...]”) that concern utility rates.  Rate Counsel is concerned about the  Because the procedural history and facts of this matter are inextricably related, they are being combined.  impact on the Company’s ratepayers if costs are increased as a result of this case, as it will impact all ratepayers, not just those residing in Holmdel.  The Board is an adjudicatory body that, after a proceeding before the [...], determined that a proposed regulator was necessary for the service, convenience or welfare of the public pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19.
[brief] (Raised below: Pa1021-1066; 1T42-52; 2T21-33; 3T)  Rule 4:46-2(c) provides, in relevant part:  The judgment for orders sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to Interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.  An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the Motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission to the trier of fact.  In determining whether or not to grant summary judgment, “the court must look at the evidence and inference which may be reasonably deduced therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. ”  Brill v. Guardian Life Inc. Co., 143 N.J. 520, 535 (1995).  Indeed, “[t]he essence of the inquiry.  . .is. . .whether the evidence presents sufficient disagreement to require a submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. ”  Id.  In this case, due to a severe dispute of almost all material facts the defendants relied upon to make to seek summary judgment, the Trial Court erred in granting their motions.