ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Trial Court conducted a three-day bench trial against the remaining Defendants.  Far from providing Plaintiff with a fair day in court, the Trial Court engaged in improper colloquy seeking to narrow Plaintiff’s claims, preventing her from pursuing her claims in the middle of the bench trial.  The Trial Court further engaged in ex parte communication with all defense counsel, to the exclusion of Plaintiff, which had a negative substantive effect on Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants, [...] and [...].  The Trial Court then found that Plaintiff was an oppressed minority member of [...], but failed to award Plaintiff the fair value of her interest in [...] or unpaid distributions because there was a lack of expert testimony.  Instead of appointing an expert to value Plaintiff’s interest, the Trial Court improperly awarded a *de minimis* value for Plaintiff’s 10% stake and ordered the dissolution of [...].  In doing this it failed to appoint a receiver or provide any judicial supervision for the dissolution, leaving the dissolution in Defendants’ hands.
[brief] The Supreme Court, on p. 120 of D’Annunzio, supra, sets forth the dissent of [...] in the matter of Marcus v. Eastern Agricultural Ass’n, Inc., 58 N.J. Super. 584, 597 (App. Div. 1959) which dissent led to the reversal by the Supreme Court at 32 N.J. 460, 461 (1960).  [...]’s dissent captures the facts of this case and the relationship between CEPA and the Code of Professional Conduct.  Specifically, he stated:  There are various situations in which the control test does not emerge as the dispositive factor; Id.  at 120.  Patently, where the type of work requires little supervision over details for its proper prosecution and the person performing it is so experienced that instructions concerning such details would be superfluous, a degree of supervision no greater than that which is held to be normally consistent; Id. at 120.  Where it is not in the nature of the work or the manner of its performance to be within the hiring party’s direct control, the factor of control can obviously not be the critical one in the resolution of the case but takes its place as only one of the various potential indicia of the relationship which must be balanced and weighed in determining what, under the totality of the circumstances, the character of that relationship really is; Id. at 120.  In citing [...]’s dissent, the Court recognized that some work requires little supervision over details and finally, the Judge stated: Normally consistent with an independent contractor status might be equally consistent with an employment relationship.  In such a situation, the factor of control becomes inconclusive and reorientation toward a correct legal conclusion must be sought by resort to more realistic significant criteria.
[brief] To require such under these circumstances would run contrary to the *Nyhammer*  Court’s declaration that “*Miranda* does not require that ‘the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights. ’”  *Nyhammer*, 197 N.J. at 407 (internal citations omitted).  What is more, all the other circumstances surrounding the interview supported a finding that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights.  Indeed, defendant was eager to waive them.  Before [...] could even get them out of his mouth, defendant stated “Just sign it.  Let me just sign it. ” (1T26-6 to 7).  Of course, however, [...] provided them anyway, and at their conclusion defendant initialed and signed the rights form.  (2T13-18 to 21).  The court further found that defendant was 53 years’ old and had significant prior contact with the justice system, with seven prior indictable convictions.  (2T13-17 to 18).  Defendant acknowledged his familiarity with his rights when [...] asked him, “You ever have your rights read to you?  Because you’re under arrest, I have to read you your right.  You understand that, right?” (1T25-6 to 8).  Defendant replied affirmatively, “uh huh. ” (1T25-9).  The interview lasted a mere seventeen minutes including the reading of his rights, and the court found that defendant suffered “no physical punishment” and no “mental exhaustion was exhibited. ” (2T13-22 to 25).  Contrary to defendant’s assertion that he was too intoxicated to give a free waiver, the court noted no issues with defendant’s demeanor or responses throughout the interview.  In fact, defendant was quite animated in his denials.  Moreover, the court emphasized that the questioning of was not improperly repeated nor prolonged.  (2T13-25 to 14-1).  As a result of all the circumstances, in their totality, the court correctly found that defendant’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.  This Court should now affirm.
[brief] .................................................................Pa46  INDEX OF APPENDIX  Final Agency Decision in Tenure Case (“Tenure FAD”) brought by Respondent /Respondent [...] (“[...]”) against Petitioner / Appellant [...] (“[...]”)…………………………………………………………………………………Pa1  Order to Show Cause (“OSC”)  Issued to [...] by the Department of Education (“DOE”), State Board of Examiners……………………………………..Pa14  Order of Suspension (“OOS”)  Issued by State Board of Examiners to [...]…………………………………………………………………………………..Pa17  Final Administrative Decision of Commissioner of Education  Upholding Suspension of [...]'s Teaching Certificates (“License FAD”)…..Pa21
[brief] “In determining the reasonableness of an attorneys' fee award, the threshold issue ‘is whether the party seeking the fee prevailed in the litigation. ’  Id.  In that regard, the party must establish that the ‘lawsuit was causally related to securing the relief obtained; a fee award is justified if [the party's] efforts are a necessary and important factor in obtaining the relief. ’”  Id at 386 (quoting Singer v. State, 95 N.J. 487, 494, 472 A.2d 138, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832, 105 S.Ct. 121, 83 L.Ed.2d 64 (1984)).  Here the Plaintiff lost on its breach of contract claim, which was central to the fee-shifting provision of the Operating Agreement.
[brief] The Defendants argue variously that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the Trust, and that the trial court reformed the Trust.  It is clear that the trial court properly interpreted and implemented its provisions.  The goal of the court in interpreting a will or a trust is to ascertain the probable intent of the testator or creator of the trust.  *In re Estate of Payne*, 186 N.J. 324, 335 (2006), citing *Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Robert*, 36 N.J. 561, 564 (1962).  This entails an examination of the instrument itself, as well as the “surrounding facts and circumstances. ”  *Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Robert*, 36 N.J. at 564-565.  Once intent is determined, the court may not refuse to effectuate it by “indulging in a merely literal reading” of the will or trust.  *Wilson v. Flowers*, 58 N.J. 250, 260 (1971).  The New Jersey statutes incorporate this concept, defining the “terms of a trust” to include the “manifestation of the settlor’s intent regarding a trust’s provisions as expressed in the trust instrument or as may be established by other evidence that would be admissible in a judicial proceeding. ”  N.J.S.A. 3B:31-3.  The Defendants’ suggested interpretation of the Trust ignores these principles.  Initially, it is noted that the trial court’s application of testamentary intent actually worked toward the Defendants’ benefit, as it permitted them to remain at the [...] as long as it was possible that they might be the purchasers, notwithstanding the Defendants’ utter lack of a legal right to be there and failure to make any payments:
[brief] (5T116:3-5).  As [...] explained, the recreation was necessary because there were no eyewitnesses to the incident and the CC-TV video capturing the plaintiff’s incident did not show “where her foot placement was or where the rollator was in relation to…her when she fell…”  The surveillance video only showed the upper portion of the plaintiff’s body and her head.  (5T115:22-25; 6T52:7-24).  [...] took a shopping cart and stacked planting pots inside the cart to simulate the top of the plaintiff’s head.  He then moved the cart around aisle 58 while comparing a live feed surveillance video of aisle 58 with still photographs taken from the CC-TV video of plaintiff’s incident.  (T617:9-18:12).  In this way, he was able to pinpoint the plaintiff’s location in aisle 58 when she fell.  (6T18:24-19:6) and concluded that at the time of her fall in aisle 58, the plaintiff was past the location of the column, and the wheel of her rollator did not come in contact with the base of that column.  (6T20:3-13).  Plaintiff’s counsel placed no objections on the record to [...]’s testimony when [...] testified on direct examination nor did the plaintiff’s counsel object to any of the photos contained in [...]’s report, which were ultimately published to the jury.  (6T27:7-9; 6T31:25-32:3; 6T37:18-38:2)  It was not until the close of [...]’s testimony on direct, when the plaintiff’s counsel moved to strike his testimony, in its entirety, solely on the basis that the subject of his testimony was not beyond the ken of the average juror.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ argument that they were entitled to pre-judgment interest from the date of the alleged misappropriation of funds because their claim was for “liquidated damages” lacks merit, and in any event, was waived since Plaintiffs never raised the issue below.  The trial court correctly exercised its equitable discretion in rejecting Plaintiffs’ punitive method of calculating pre-judgment interest based on an “equitable contractual ground” because it violated the purpose of R. 4:42-11(b).  Therefore, Plaintiffs’ cross-appeal should be denied.
[brief] Pearson, 116 N.E.3d at 311-12.  The same result is warranted here.  In addition to hearing the method of testing [...] performed in this case, the jury heard that [...] was a CSI latent print examiner for eleven years and examined thousands of latent prints.  (3T43-2 to 21; 3T45-3 to 6).  The jury also heard that Armstrong received training from the FBI National Academy, CJIS (the national version of AFIS), attended a palm print symposium, and completed ongoing proficiency testing every six months, which he never failed.  (3T44-9 to 19; 3T45-16 to 46-10).  And as already noted, the jury heard how the latent print here was left on a jagged surface with chips and a “small crack running through it[.]” (3T62-22 to 63-14).  Hence, the jury could independently assess [...]’s testimony, factoring in his training, analysis performance in this case, and potential print issues from a jagged surface with a crack.  Any alleged error in the jury hearing that other analysts verified his conclusions did not result in the jury reaching a result it otherwise might not have reached.  3.
[brief] State v. Baker, No. A-0716-17T3, A-0719-17T3, 2019 WL 7187443, at *23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 26, 2019) (citing State v. Peterson, 364 N.J. Super. 364, 398 (App. Div. 2003)).  However, the standard for a new trial under Brady does not require evidence to have been discoverable earlier by reasonable diligence.
[brief] Key facts/arguments for my Appeal based on cited paragraphs from my May 25, 2023 Cross-Motion to [...]’s March 23, 2023 filing are noted:  11.  Court disregarded “[...] seized trust assets [([...] accounts in [...] Accounting) w/o notifying [...], who found out Nov. 14th (Exh. “AA”, App. Exh. “R”, p. 2, Nov. 30, ‘22 letter to Judge)] (467a) that Final Judgment [Oct. ‘22 Order] authorized Mr. [...] to retain” (Jacobson Mar. 23, ‘23 Brief).  This unethical & illegitimate action, which was also approved by [...], violated the Oct. 2022 Order, par. 2&3, which required Mr. [...] to oversee the administration of Trust assets, while preparing a Final Trust Accounting, which required access to [...] financial documents for the Trust assets.  12.  Feb. 17, ‘23 rulings disregarded legitimate facts/arguments in my Reconsideration Motion of Oct. ‘22 Order that refuted [...]’s rulings.  [...] disregarded that I proved I was vested Beneficiary, & my Accounting Exceptions demonstrated that, even if I was not vested, I had a “definitive, concrete future interest” in Trust Corpus, as Remainder Beneficiary, that was detrimentally reduced due to mistaken Accounting & financial actions identified in Accounting.  [...] simply repeated [...]’s Oct. ‘22 rulings for disallowing my Exceptions, w/o justifications for not addressing that his repeating those reasons had been refuted by my filing (3T, p. 4, line 8, to p. 5, line 6).  Mar. 13, ‘23 Order corrected its Mar. 7th Order so that I was “Vested Remainder Beneficiary”, which also negated Judges’ repeated reasons.
[brief] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 375 Passaic Avenue, Suite 100 Fairfield, New Jersey  07004 [...]  [...]  [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (002182006)  [...], Esq. (093452013)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ........................................................................................................ ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................4  I.  THE TRIAL COURT’S JULY 29, 2024 DECISION COMPELLING ARBITRATION AND STAYING PLAINTIFF’S CASE SHOULD BE REVERSED (Ja5-Ja12)  .........................4  A.  The Trial Court’s July 29, 2024 Decision Should Be Reversed Because The Injunctive Relief Set Forth in Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint Alleging [...]’s CFA, HCSA, RISA, and TCCWNA Violations Is The Type of “Public Injunctive Relief Specifically Excluded By the Arbitration Provision in [...]’s “Membership Agreement” (Ja10-Ja12)  .................................................................................................4  B.  The Trial Court’s July 29, 2024 Decision Should Be Reversed Because Whether Plaintiff’s CFA, HCSA, RISA, and TCCWNA Allegations In The Complaint Are Covered By the Arbitration Provision in [...]’s “Membership Agreement” Should Be Determined By A New Jersey Judge And Not An Arbitrator (Ja8-Ja10, Ja12)  .....................................................................................................................................11  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................15  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Buture v Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc.,** | | | 2018 U.S. LEXIS 121801 | 4, 5, 9 | | (D. New Jersey July 18, 2018) | | | **Blueprint Cap. Advisors, LLC v N.J. Div. of Inv.,** | | | 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 34032 | 12, 13, 14 | | (3d Cir. December 22, 2023) | | | **Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal.,** | | | 988 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) | 4, 5 | | **DiCarlo v MoneyLion, Inc.,** | | | 988 F.3d. 1148 (9th Cir. 2021) | 4, 5 | | **Goffe v. Foulke Management Corp.,** | | | 238 N.J. 191 (2019) | 11 | | **Grigorian v. Citibank, N.A.,** | | | 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71375 | 10 | | (C.D. Cal. April 17, 2024) | | | **Hodges v. Comcast Cable Communs., LLC,** | | | 12 F.4th 1108 (9th Cir. 2021) | 2 | | **Kilgore v Keybank, N.A.,** | | | 718 F. 3d. 1052 (9th Cir. 2013) | 4, 5 | | **McGill v. Citibank, N.A.,** | | | 2 Cal. 5th 945 (Cal. 2017) | 4, 5 | | **Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson,** | | | 561 U.S. 63 (2010) | 14 | | **Saunders v Collabella, Inc.,** | | | 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143237 (D.N.J. 2021) | 3 | Weinberg v Sprint Corp., 173 N.J. 233 (2002).........................................................................................7
[directive] Post-Trial Matters Reporting Petitions for Post-Conviction C  Relief as Reserved Decisions Directive #16-64 December 28, 1964  Issued by: [...]  Because of the heavy volume of petitions for post-conviction relief and because of the time required to perfect such petitions after receipt of the first paper, it is only necessary to report petitions for post-conviction relief as a reserved decision if a hearing is held.  In such case it should be reported as reserved until an order granting or denying the relief is entered.
[brief] POINT II THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT SHEET REPEATEDLY ERRONEOUSLY TOLD THE JURY TO CONVICT DEFENDANT OF HOMICIDE  IF, AFTER CONSIDERATION OF ALL THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE, THE JURY MERELY BELIEVED THAT ALL OF THE ORDINARY ELEMENTS OF THE HOMICIDE CRIMES WERE PROVEN BY THE STATE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT -- A CLEAR ERROR IN A CASE WHERE SELF-DEFENSE IS AT ISSUE (NOT RAISED BELOW).  Because defendant alleged that he was defending himself against an attack by the eventual decedent, the defense in the case was self-defense (1T 36-10 to 17; 6T 53-2).
[brief] 3.  Court erred in Oct. 2022 Order, par. 1c, & Mar. 7, '23 Order, par. 3, by overlooking my requests for [...] to provide [...]’s detailed invoices, as req’d by 3B:31-67, to verify accuracy/legitimacy, for potentially inaccurate/excessive $31,259.74 accounting fees for 2019-2022 tax returns & questionable Trust admin.  Court should have withheld its approval of those paid fees pending my follow-up review & potential Exceptions for its review.
[brief] Simpson v. Duffy, 19 N.J. Super. 339, 343 (App. Div. 1952).  Instead, a business owner owes a duty of “reasonable care to guard against any dangerous conditions on his or her property that the owner either knows about or should have discovered. ”  Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 434 (1993); Handleman v. Cox, 39 N.J. 95, 103 (1963).  “An inference [of negligence] can be drawn only from proven facts and cannot be based upon a foundation of pure conjecture, speculation, surmise or guess. ”  Long, 35 N.J. at 54.  Whether a person owes a duty of reasonable care towards another turns on whether the imposition of such a duty satisfies an abiding sense of basic fairness under all of the circumstances of public policy.
[brief] CASES CITED: - **Townsend v. Pierre**, 221 N.J. 36 (2015) ........................................... 56, 61 - **Tully v. Mirz**, 457 N.J. Super. 114 .................................................. 51 - **Van Horn v. City of Trenton**, 80 N.J. 528 (1979) .................................. 27 - **Velli v. Rutgers Casualty Ins. Co.**, 257 N.J. Super. 308 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 597 (1992) ..................................... 42, 43 - **Vosough v. Kierce**, 437 N.J. Super. 218, 233 (App. Div. 2014)  ............... 66 - **VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp.**, 135 NJ. 539, 554 (1994)  .................... 73, 77 - **Vuocolo v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co.**, 240 N.J. Super. 289, 299 (App. Div. 1990) ......................................................  57 - **Walker v. Choudhary**, 425 N.J. Super. 135, 149 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 211 N.J. 274 (2012) .....................................................  76 - **Wasserstein v. Kovatch**, 261 N.J. Super. 277, 286 (App. Div. 1993) .......... 51  #### STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS CITED: - **N.J.R.E. 703** ......................................................................................... 56 - **N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1** .................................................................................. 21 - **N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-1** .............................................................................. 71 - **N.J.S.A. 12A:4-207(c)** ........................................................................ 29 - **N.J.S.A. 14A:3-6.3** ............................................................................. 52 - **N.J.S.A. 22A:2-8** ............................................................................... 43 | STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS CITED: | |--------------------------------------| | N.J.S.A. 25:2-20................................. 75 | | N.J.S.A. 39:6A-34................................. 43 | | N.J.S.A. 54:51A-22................................. 43 | | N.J.S.A. 56:1 to -31............................... 42 | | N.J.S.A. 56:10.................................... 42 | | OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED: | |--------------------------| | Model Jury Charge (Civil), § 4.10A.................. 63, 76 | | Model Jury Charge (Civil), § 4.10J.................. 72, 77 |
[brief] See Ass. Fin. Ins. Comm. Statement to S. 2990 1 (June 12, 1997) (“[T]his Bill provides the Bureau of Securities strong enforcement powers to deal with securities firms and individuals regulated by the bureau who violate the law. ”); Sen. Commerce Comm. Statement to S. 2990 1 (Nov. 24, 1997) (“This bill . . . enhances the enforcement powers of the Bureau of Securities in the Division of Consumer Affairs.  . . [and] provides the Bureau of Securities with strong enforcement powers to deal with securities firms and individuals regulated by the bureau who violate the law. ”).  Since the 1997 amendment, the Bureau has administered the Securities Law according to the legislature’s intent and pursuant to N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2) to obtain judgments and orders awarding both restitution and disgorgement in the same action.
[brief] (Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 513 (1973) (Emphasis added.)).  This seminal statement of New Jersey constitutional law has clear application to our case since the education being received by Lakewood public-school students has been determined to fall short of T&E.  Consequently, rectifying that situation is ultimately the State’s responsibility if the local district cannot do so.  If the primary cause of the T&E denial is the state’s school funding system, as we believe it is in our case, then the State’s responsibility to cure the problem is obvious and undeniable.  Until quite recently the State’s executive and legislative branches have adhered to this core constitutional concept of ultimate state responsibility for T&E.  But something seems to have gone badly awry and it has infected the way in which the State has chosen to implement SFRA.
[brief] For the reasons explained in Point I and Point II, this Court should order suppression of both the physical evidence and statements.  For the reasons set forth in Point III, this Court should suppress [...]’ responses to the questions asked by [...] while [...] was in custody.  Finally, as explained in Point IV, if this Court does not order suppression, this Court should remand for another suppression hearing so that a new court can consider the BWC and the OSC report.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant BY: s/[...]  [...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID: 331372021  Dated: March 14, 2024  New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
[brief] (1029a-1031a); (1T13:3-21; 1T14:7-15:2; 1T20:6-22; 1T21:3-15; 1T22:1-24; 1T22:25-23:10).  With respect to Plaintiffs [...] and [...], these Plaintiffs retired before the initial effective date for the State's change to the terms and conditions of their employment.  On March 13, 2017, [...] issued a letter providing members of the [...] with notice that the terms and conditions of their employment, including their entitlement to terminal leave, would be altered on March 15, 2017.  (31a ¶103); (212a).  Both Plaintiff [...] (retirement date February 1, 2017) and Plaintiff [...] (retirement date March 14, 2017) retired before [...]’s proposed Notice of --- \(^7\)  Using the same reasoning, Plaintiffs [...], [...], and [...] were unlawfully denied compensation for performing the duties of a sergeant following their promotions in 2016 up to the dates of their respective retirements.