ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In doing so, the people and [...] determined that control of the State appropriations going to [...] – at the time approximately $10.4 million, *Trs. of [...] Coll. v. Richman*, 41 N.J. Super. 259, 266 (Ch. Div. 1956), should be assigned to the newly-created board, the [...].  State appropriations are annual contributions to [...] by the Legislature that have increased a hundred-fold since 1956.  It would be illogical to think that annual appropriations, fixed in an amount at the Legislature’s discretion, control of which is assigned by contract and law to the [...], somehow negates the public character of the office of a [...] member. \(^4\)  Despite its repeated references to the consummated contract between [...] and the State, Defendants do not explain or cite to any authority on how the codification of this contract into law, entered into by the Legislature and approved by the executive branch, and which resulted in significant financial --- \(^4\)  See also N.J.S.A. 18A:65-16 and -17, each of which unequivocally declares that a [...] member holds an “office. ” support from public monies, changes whether quo warranto can be used to question the legitimacy of a board member holding office.  The [...] is a body created and recognized by law.  Kratovil, 473 N.J. Super. at 525-26 (“The 1956 Act, however, created a new governing body for the corporation, the present Board of Governors. ”).  It did not exist prior to 1956 and was created as a result of the parties’ bargain.  As the consummated contract itself has been described, “the fundamental change brought about by the use of the additional governing body to be known as the Board of Governors is the granting of a greater voice in management to the State as a quid pro quo of greater financial support.
[brief] (Dca clip three, 3:08:15 a.m.).  [...] headed directly into the security office, telling two private security employees that police needed to learn where defendant had been before he was injured.  (Dca 1, clip three, 3:08:16 a.m. to 3:08:35 a.m.).  Relevant surveillance video was thereafter located, and it revealed that defendant had walked normally out of [...], with what appeared to be drinks in each hand.  (Da20; Dca 1, clip three, 3:18:17 a.m. to 3:20:15 a.m.).  Officer [...] told the security personnel that police were still awaiting confirmation that defendant had suffered a gunshot wound.  (Dca 1, clip three, 3:18:17 a.m. to 3:20:15 a.m.).  In the courtyard, defendant stumbled and fell; when he arose, he began limping.  (Da16; Da20; Dca 1, clip three, 3:19:05 a.m. to 3:20:15 a.m.).  With that new information, Officer [...] and private security went outside, to look for the gun near where defendant fell.  (Dca 1, clip three, 3:20:53 a.m. to 3:24:15 a.m.).  At that point, Officer [...] speculated for the first time that defendant may have given the gun to [...].  (Dca 1, clip three, 3:24:15 a.m. to 3:24:18 a.m.).  After reporting to [...] by phone and in person, and searching the courtyard with [...] and other police for the gun unsuccessfully, [...] asked the security personnel to review more video, to determine where [...] went during the relevant time.
[brief] As instructed, [...] went online to fill out [...]’s application to obtain HNOA coverage for the vans.  (Ia337).  On page 5 of the online application (the “Application”), it sets out the options for non-owned automobile liability coverage as follows:  Part III  Optional Liability Coverages (premiums are fully earned)  Optional $150,000.00 hired and non-owned automobile liability coverage is available for an additional $225.00.  = $  Optional  $600,000.00 hired and non-owned automobile liability coverage is available for an additional $500.00.  • Note: $1,000,000.00 hired and non-owned automobile liability coverage is available but subject to additional underwriting.  Please contact your agent if wishing to apply for coverage.  [Ia585].  The Application permits applicants to obtain hired and non-owned auto liability coverage with limits of $150,000 or $500,000 without being subject to additional underwriting.  (Ia585).  There is an additional note that “$1,000,000 hired and non-owned automobile liability coverage is available but subject to additional underwriting. ” (Ia585)(emphasis added).  The application makes no reference at all to 12 to 15+ passenger vans, even though page 4 of the application lists almost 20 exclusions that were ineligible for coverage, such as High Ropes, Courses, Zip Lines, Trampolines, jet skis, climbing wall, gymnastics, etc.  The Application gives no notice to any applicant that any type of vehicle is not going to be covered.  (Ia581-586).  Further, as discussed more fully below, the Application is contradictory to [...]’s own underwriting guidelines.  This provided [...] with a reasonable expectation that the vans would be covered.
[brief] The order is also enforceable under Rule 4:59 because it is final and for a sum certain subject to a Writ of Execution.  Newstead Bldrs., Inc. (supra.).  Regarding the court’s “certification” of finality of this order against [...], the court addressed [...]’s issues and found that the Final Judgment against [...] is a “final judgment;” [...] does not bear responsibility for the Incident; the interstate/intrastate travel issue is a non-issue in the MCS-90 analysis; and the MCS-90 endorsement covers punitive damages.
[brief] In Barrows, the court reached the same conclusion.  There, the plaintiff slipped on snow and ice, and fell on a sidewalk in a multi-tenant shopping center.  N.J. Super. at 146.  The court held absent a contractual obligation to do so or exclusive control over the area of the fall, a tenant in multi-tenant shopping center had no duty to clear the sidewalks.  Id. at 148.  Similarly, in Holmes, a customer of a tenant in a multi-tenant shopping center slipped and fell on ice and/or snow in the parking lot as he was walking to his car.
[brief] “The object of CEPA is not to make lawyers out of conscientious employees but rather to prevent retaliation against those employees who object to employer conduct that they reasonably believe to be unlawful. ”  Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 153 N.J. 163, 193-94 (1998).  As such, Plaintiff is not required know the “precise contours and components of the public policy,” may learn of the specific violations after the filing of the complaint and may identify them specifically for the first time as late as on appeal.  See Regan v. New Brunswick, 305 N.J. Super. 342, 355 (App. Div. 1997) (“We also note that plaintiff, when deposed, may not have been aware of the specific statutory provisions implicated.
[brief] The trial court was obligated to hew to *Burt* and mold the judgment to 60% of the verdict, with the plaintiffs then bearing the obligation to appeal that issue to this Court if they believed the rationale for *Burt* was unsound.  Yet, plaintiffs filed no protective cross-appeal to preserve that issue should this Court reverse the trial court’s *post-verdict* reconsideration and abrogation of *Burt*.  **B.  The Mejia Court pointedly failed to overrule Burt, and there is no basis to infer a sub-silentio overruling.
[brief] Judicial Authorities  Cited Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 76 S.Ct. 158 (1955) .......................  12  Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973) ....................... 10  Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281 (1977) ...............................  13  State v. Allen, 236 N.J. Super. 58 (Law Div. 1989) ....................... 18 State v. Broom-Smith, 406 N.J. Super. 228 (2009) .......................  17, 18 State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293 (2006) ........................................  9 State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499 (1992) ...........................................  13, 14 State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987) .................................................. 11 State v. Golotta, 178 N.J. 205 (2003) ..........................................  16 State v. Kane, 449 N.J. Super. 119 (App. Div. 2017) .....................  18 State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325 (1971) ............................................  10 State v. Norman, 151 N.J. 5 (1997) ............................................  10 State v. Oliver, 320 N.J. Super. 405 (App. Div. 1999) .................. 21 State v. Russo, 333 N.J. Super. 119 (App. Div. 2000) ..................  12 State v. Shtutman, A-0812-15 (App. Div. 2017) ..........................  23 State v. Skinner, 218 N.J. 496 (2014)  ..................................................  23 State v. Stampone, 341 N.J. Super. 247 (App. Div. 2001) .................. 21, 22 State v. Taimanglo, 403 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006) ............... 17 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984) .......... ................................................................. 10, 11, 12 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000)  ...................  12  Constitutional Authorities Cited U.S. CONST. amend. VI ........................................................................  10  Statutory Authorities Cited N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3 ...............................................................................  1  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2 ............................................................................. 1, 20, 21, 22, 23 Rules Cited R. 2:5-4 ............................................................................................  16 R. 2:5-5 ............................................................................................  16 R. 2:6-1 ............................................................................................  16  R. 2:10-2 ..........................................................................................  9 R. 3:13-3 ..........................................................................................  17  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] “…[A] proper evaluation of a lessor’s duty should turn on the factors expressed in Section 358 of the Second Restatement, i.e., (1) whether the [owner] had at least ‘reason to know’ of the allegedly dangerous condition and the risks involved, and (2) whether…the lessee did not know or have reason to know of the condition and the associated risk. ”  Reyes, 461.  Thus, in evaluating this defendant’s duty under the facts of this case, the motion judge properly gave consideration to the factors of Section 358, and appropriately determined that no liability can attach because “the testimony is undisputed that they [the tenant] were aware of the condition of the electrical panel box…” (T54).
[brief] At the suppression hearing, the State presented the sole testimony of [...] of the [...].  He stated that at 11:44 p.m.  on March 25, 2011, possessing an arrest warrant, he knocked on the door of a house in [...] to apprehend [...].  He was wearing plain clothes and had a police badge around his neck.  Law enforcement did not know that defendant was present in the house nor did they suspect him of any wrongdoing at that time.
[brief] Ibid.  The Court reasoned, “The Legislature, by way of N.J.S.A. 34:15-72, required [...] [the employer] to obtain sufficient coverage for the payment of any obligation it might incur on account of bodily injuries to an employee. ”  Ibid.  The Court’s relatively brief decision does not quote N.J.S.A. 34:15-72 and does not acknowledge, as the Variety Farms court did, that sections 71 and 72 of the Act only obligate an employer to secure insurance coverage for its liability imposed by the system of compensation contained in the Act.
[brief] First, the proposed Second Amended Complaint sought to assert claims against [...] when no such claims were previously asserted against it in the action.  The belated effort was prejudicial to [...] as Appellants had knowledge of the underlying facts at the time they filed their original and First Amended Complaints.  It also came nearly $2\frac{1}{2}$ years after the action was commenced, more than six (6) months after the close of discovery, and only after all of the primary defendants were dismissed from the action.  Additionally, as argued below\(^4\) though not the basis for the denial of the motion, denial of leave to amend was appropriate as the proposed claims were not sustainable as a matter of law.
[brief] [...], a landlord owed $206,045.00 in rent by its tenant [...], terminated the Lease on October 17, 2017.  Representatives of [...] testified during depositions that if [...] had made its payment under the lease, [...] would not have terminated it.  (Pa001803).  (“Q: And given your frequent contact with [[...]’s counsel] and familiarity with the situation, had [...] made his rent payment, would [...] have proceeded with the lease and gone forward?  A: Yes. ”).  In fact, a [...] representative testified that [...] told them after they sent the notice of default that “he didn’t have the money. ” (Pa001804).  There is no question that Appellant [...] lost its Lease due to its failure to pay rent.  There is no question that Appellant admitted it failed to pay rent due to internal strife between [...] and his partners.  Thus, Appellants cannot -- and will never be able to -- tie their damages to the CEP Respondents.
[brief] It must be remembered that the power to take property through eminent domain is one of the most intrusive aspects of sovereignty.  Historically, land has been both the basis and symbol of wealth and still occupies a special place in our law.  Real estate is also frequently irreplaceable because of its uniqueness.  Thus, the state should not be heard to complain when the property owner seeks the fullest vindication of the rights of ownership.  [State by Com’r of Transp. v. D’Onofrio, 235 N.J. Super 348, 353 (Law Div. 1989)]  As a result of an objection to the right to take, the Court must first determine whether the Township properly exercised its powers of eminent domain.
[brief] ” [Pb34, n.5].  The record evidence is completely devoid of any reasoning for the withdrawal of the aforementioned charges, and Appellant should be admonished for this unfounded insinuation.  Appellant’s attempt to compare the unbinding case of In re [...], OAL Docket No. CSV 03776-08, 2009 WL 145165 (May 15, 2009) [Pa238] is equally unfounded.  The In re Collins OAL Judge found that there was no prior pattern of psychological problems which would have supported the appellant’s unfitness for duty.  Id. at 13 [Pa248].  This is readily distinguishable from the instant appeal, as Appellant has a history of failing to report unlicensed or suspended licensed drivers who use his personal vehicle, cause vehicular accidents, and get arrested, as demonstrated by the Ewing Vehicle Incidents, and the subsequent Vehicle Incidents.
[brief] Appellate review of administrative agency decisions is limited, and will not be disturbed unless it is clearly arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  *Brady v. Bd. of Review*, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997).  An appellate tribunal cannot substitute its own judgment for the agency’s even if it would have reached a different result.  It is well-settled that an administrative agency’s interpretation of statutes and regulations within its enforcement responsibility are ordinarily entitled to judicial deference.  Nevertheless, the appellate tribunal is not bound by the agency’s legal opinions, and matters of statutory and regulatory construction are subject to de novo review.  *A.B. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs.*, 407 N.J. Super. 330, 340 (App. Div. 2009).
[brief] Additionally, the sentence of forty years was in the middle of the permissible range, and was reasonable given that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors.  In actuality, the sentence here was more lenient than it would be if the example provided in Fuentes was strictly followed.  There, it was suggested that "if the aggravating and mitigating factors are in equipoise, the midpoint will be an appropriate sentence."  As reiterated in Case, "when the aggravating factors preponderate, sentences will tend toward the higher end of the range."  Thus, the forty year mid-range sentence is actually lower than Natale suggests a sentence should be where aggravating factors outweigh those that mitigate.  However, the trial court's statement of reasons for certain aggravating and mitigating factors appears less detailed than that suggested in Fuentes and Case.  Namely, the finding of aggravating factor 9 and mitigating factor 8 does not appear to be sufficiently explained.  The State maintains that those factors would not upset the balance of the aggravating and mitigating analysis, which resulted in the sentence imposed.  This is particularly so, given that factor 8 was only given slight weight.  (33T34:11-13.)  However, it cannot be said with certainty.  Accordingly, it may be appropriate to remand the matter so that the statement of reasons for the aggravating and mitigating factors may be fully and adequately explained.
[brief] On or about April 4, 2022, the Township introduced for first reading Ordinance No. 13-2022, entitled “An Ordinance of the Mayor and Township Committee of the [...], County of Gloucester  Adopting a Redevelopment Plan for Block 46, Lot 2; Block 47, Lots 1, 2, 3, 3.01 and 4 in the [...], Gloucester County, State of New Jersey”.  (Pa24-Pa25; Pa90-Pa91).  The redevelopment plan referenced in Ordinance No. 13-2022, entitled the “King’s Landing Redevelopment Plan,” establishes superseding zoning for the Redevelopment Area which specifically facilitates warehouses and order fulfillment centers at any size and up to 60-feet in height.\(^3\) (Pa25; Pa92-Pa113).  The Township caused notice of Ordinance No. 13-2022’s introduction to be published in the [...] on April 8, 2022.  (Pa25; Pa89).  This notice set forth the title of Ordinance No. 13-2022, the date of its introduction, the date, time and location of the public hearing wherein it would be considered for final passage as well as the time and place where a copy could be obtained at no cost, but no other information.  (Pa25; Pa89).  The Township subsequently conducted the public hearing on Ordinance No. 13-2022 on April 18, 2022 and passed it the same night.
[brief] **Actual authority.**  Actual authority exists when, “at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act. ”  *New Jersey Lawyers’ Fund*, 203 N.J. at 220 (quoting Third Restatement of Agency § 2.01).  No actual agreement specifying the agency relationship is required; what matters is the principal’s and agent’s “conduct[,]” “not … their intent or their words as between themselves but to their factual relation. ”  *Sears Mortgage*, 134 N.J. at 337.  The facts readily establish an actual agency relationship here.
[brief] Judicial immunity only extends to the process of “resolving disputes between parties who have invoked the jurisdiction of a court,” *Forrester v. White*, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988).  When a judge acts as a trespasser of the law, when a Judge does not follow the law, the judge loses subject matter jurisdiction.  *Simmons v United States*, 390 US 377 (1968).  A judge is not immune from liability for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdictions.  *Stump v Sparkman*, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); *Forrester v. White*, 484 U.S at 227-229.  A judge must be acting within his jurisdiction as to the subject matter and person, to be entitled to immunity from civil action for his acts.
[brief] [...] complains that the Arbitrator “went far beyond the scope of the parties’ agreement” by “abandoning the forecast figures. ”  App. Br. at 18.  However, as explained repeatedly above, the Arbitrator considered eight days’ worth of testimony and hundreds of exhibits demonstrating the parties’ agreements on EGPs (and gave zero weight to the made-for-litigation concept of “forecasts”).  Da138.  The Trial Court agreed.  The Arbitrator thus weighed the evidence and rendered a decision perfectly in line with the PTA, awarding 65% EGPs on the projects.  There is nothing in the Award, nor does [...] suggest so, that remotely suggests that “one could say that there was fraud or corruption or some similar wrongdoing that requires vacating the arbitrators’ award. ”  Perini, 129 N.J. at 542.  [...]’s dissatisfaction with the ultimate result does not establish that the Arbitrator exceeded his powers and is simply not a sufficient basis to vacate his Award.
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  On July 16, 2019, [...] responded to a shooting that took place in front of a storefront bodega ([...]) and a barbershop ([...]).  (1T28-16 to 1T29-19 ([...], Major Crimes Unit); 1T38-2 to 1T39-11 ([...], Crime Scene Unit); 2T24-4 to 2T24-25 ([...], Major Crimes Shooting Response Team); 2T36-2 to 2T36-16 ([...]))  This area is known for crime, (2T35-23 to 2T36-1 ([...])), and shootings, (1T36-22 to 1T36-25 ([...])).
[brief] 4T – September 21, 2022  5T – September 22, 2022  6T – September 27, 2022  7T – September 28, 2022  8T – September 29, 2022  9T – January 12, 2023  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On August 11, 2022, an Ocean County Grand Jury returned [...], charging defendant with committing first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) or (a)(2) and related weapons charges.
[brief] Manalapan Realty v. Township Committee, 140 N.J. 366, 381 (1995).  Drawing the connection between the Master Plan and its implementing regulations, and gauging the effect of specific development proposals on the zone plan is a fundamental part of the work of zoning boards under NJSA 40:55D-70 and the statutory proofs for all variances.  “No variance or other relief may be granted under the terms of this section, including a variance or other relief involving an inherently beneficial use without a showing that such variance or relief can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and purpose of zone plan and zoning ordinance.
[brief] Denial of [...]’s Motion to Suppress……………………………  2T 64-2 to 82-7; Da 12  INDEX TO APPENDIX  Indictment No. [...] ………………………………………………………………..  Da 1-7  Indictment No. [...] ………………………………………………………………..  Da 8  Drone Footage from Feb. 10, 2023………………………………………………………..  Da 9  [...]’s Body-Worn Camera Footage from Feb. 10, 2023 ………..  Da 10  [...]’ Body-Worn Camera Footage from Feb. 10, 2023………………Da 11 Order Denying [...]’s Motion to Suppress………………………………………..  Da 12 Plea Forms ……………………………………………………………………………………..  Da 13-19 Judgment of Conviction (Indictment No. [...]) ……………………………  Da 20-22 Judgment of Dismissal (Indictment No. [...])  ……………………………….  Da 23-26 Notice of Appeal ………………………………………………………………………………..  Da 27-31  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] It is my opinion the groundwater contamination found by the Court in its Letter Opinion to exist at or originate from AOCs 5, 16, 22, 26 and 30 is still taking place at and near the Plainville site.  On or about June 3, 2011, the GSM began operating substantially as designed which substantially reduced the migration of --- \(^9\)  Referring to the “property damage” and “occurrence” requirements of the insuring agreement similar to the ones contained in the U.S. Fire Policy. contaminated groundwater off-site by reversing the hydraulic gradient in the area of the GSM.  Up to today, however, additional CVOCs have been introduced into groundwater, and additional migration of CVOC constituents in groundwater has taken place.  (Da0275.)  [...]’s expert, [...], also testified that contamination at the Site is ongoing.