ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The entire controversy doctrine holds that all parties involved in litigation must present all the claims and defenses that are related to the underlying controversy in a single action.  *Cogdell v. Hospital Center at Orange*, 116 N.J. 7, 15 (1989).  Rule 4:30A, which codifies the rule, provides that any claim not joined when required is thereafter barred:  Non-joinder of claims required to be joined by the entire controversy doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims to the extent required by the entire controversy doctrine, except as otherwise provided by R. 4:64-5 (foreclosure actions) and R. 4:67-4(a) (leave required for counterclaims or cross-claims in summary actions)  [R. 4:30A.]  The doctrine requires the joinder in one action of all claims between same parties “arising out of or relating to same transactional circumstances. ”  *Brown v. Brown*, 208 N.J. Super. 372, 377-78 (App. Div. 1986).  \(^5\)
[brief] 1.  Unpublished Decision, [...] v. [...], Docket No. [...] (App. Div. Oct. 10, 2024)  ..................  Pra01-Pra25  2.  Certification of [...], Esquire, Pursuant to R. 1:36-3 .................................................. Pra26-Pra27  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Defendant Zoning Board’s decision hinges entirely on its outright (and unsupported) rejection of credible expert testimony, and its insistence that the proposed 48’ height of these warehouses will generate greater traffic than would the allowed 30’, thereby “intensifying” the use.
[brief] (2T:18-7 to 18-23); Da21-22.  The trial court further accepted [...]’s testimony that after defendant was given orders to exit the vehicle and proceed to the trunk of the car, defendant continued to use the safety vest to shield his waist from the officer’s view – also confirmed on the body-worn camera footage.  (2T:19-21 to 19-24); Da20-22; Da26.  The trial court also properly accepted [...]’s testimony that upon arriving at the back of the Jeep, defendant “pushed his waistband area into the back of the trunk and thrust (sic) his waist firmly against the trunk”.
[brief] 1T76:1-25, 1T205:16-206:18.  Eventually, Defendant stopped visiting [...] and [...] entirely, cutting off even birthday and Christmas cards.  1T69:23-70:8.  Defendant ended his weekend visits, complaining about the commute from his new home.  Id.  Defendant refused to take the children to their sports and scouting activities on the weekends.  1T79:21-25.  Defendant promised to start seeing the children for dinners on Thursdays, and did so once, but then unilaterally cancelled the next and all subsequent dinners.  1T80:1-82:35.  Defendant’s new wife did not want him to go inside Plaintiff’s home, and Defendant rejected Plaintiff’s offer to have the children come outside and meet with Defendant if Defendant was not allowed inside Plaintiff’s home.  1T83:1-25.  Eventually, the children informed Plaintiff that they no longer wished to visit Defendant’s home.  1T77:1-3.
[brief] (Pa675; SDa039).  There is an interceding lot between the Homeowners’ home and the Objectors’ homes.  (Pa675; SDa039).  It is owned by the [...].  (Pa675).  The Subject Property is wooded.  (Pa461; SDa033; SDa034; SDa041).  The Objectors’ lots are wooded.  (Pa462).  The Objectors’ homes (on “[...]”) are designed to take advantage of bay views in the opposite direction of the Homeowners’ home.  (Pa672; Pa712).  The Homeowners’ home will not impact the Objectors’ water views.  (Pa674; Pa712).  It is common for homes within [...] to appear to be two (2) stories from one vantage point and three (3) or more stories from another.  (Pa106-107; SDa 042-046; SDa048-049).  In fact, Objector, [...], lives in a taller home (50’ plus feet) with significantly more stories (5 or even 6) than the Homeowners proposed.  (Pa711-712).  Factual and Legal Basis for Approval of the Variances
[directive] From a secured holster position, draw and fire 1 round standing then 2 rounds kneeling, utilizing a handheld or gun mounted light.  Decock, holster and recover to a standing 15 Yds 6 Standing To Kneeling 20 sec. ready position.  From the ready position fire 1 round standing then 2 rounds kneeling.  Reload if necessary, decock and holster.  From a ready position, on command fire 2 rounds utilizing a handheld or gun mounted light, light off and step to the right.  On command fire 2 rounds utilizing a handheld or gun Standing Point 10 Yds 6 mounted light, light off and step to the left.  5 sec.  Shoulder  On command fire 2 rounds utilizing a handheld or gun mounted light, light off and step to the right.  Reload if necessary, decock and holster.  Draw and bring the weapon to a ready position.  On Standing Point  4 command fire 2 rounds utilizing a handheld or gun mounted 6 sec.  Shoulder light and return to the ready position.  Repeat once 7 Yds  Standing Point  From a ready position on command fire 2 rounds utilizing a Shoulder; 4 handheld or gun mounted light, make a magazine change 20 sec.  Mandatory magazine and fire 2 rounds, decock and holster.  change
[directive] a.  Each county prosecutor shall make certain that no delinquency complaints charging an indictable offense, a repetitive disorderly persons offense or a violation of any offense defined in Chapter 35 or 36 of Title 2C are diverted from the court without the consent of the prosecutor, as required by law.  b.  Each county prosecutor shall issue and implement written guidelines concerning the screening and handling of juvenile complaints.  In addition to those factors specified in the Code of Juvenile Justice for diversion recommendations, prosecutorial screening guidelines should incorporate the following criteria:  Whether the facts constitute prima facie evidence that a delinquent act has been committed by the juvenile; Whether the juvenile is an Impact Offender; Whether the juvenile has previously been adjudicated delinquent or diverted in juvenile proceedings; and Whether the matter involves any adult codefendants, and whether diversion of the juvenile would adversely affect the prosecution of such adult codefendants.  c.  Prosecution screening guidelines developed by each county prosecutor shall reflect the policy of this State that, absent special circumstances, the prosecutor should not consent to the matter being diverted from court in the following circumstances:  The complaint alleges a crime of the first or second degree; The complaint is filed against a juvenile identified as an Impact Offender; The juvenile is charged with an indictable offense involving infliction of serious bodily injury, the use or possession of a deadly weapon or arson; The juvenile is charged with an indictable offense and a) has previously been adjudicated delinquent for an indictable offense, or b) has previously been diverted to a Juvenile Conference Committee or intake conference for an indictable offense.
[brief] That, your Honors is incredible.  The court below acknowledged that [...] was unprepared for the suppression hearing (1T 40-8 to 17).  Talk about being kind and differential to the testimony of a witness!  [...]’s testimony goes far beyond the “lack of preparation”.  Perhaps it would be different if [...] had acknowledged up-front that he could not recall his observations.  Doubtlessly, that would have been embarrassing and [...] had to have known that.  Instead, [...] shot from the hip and matter of factly testified that his vehicle was traveling in the opposite direction of travel when he observed the alleged infraction (1T 7-11 through 9-5).  Unfortunately for [...] and the State, he guessed wrong.  When confronted with what was depicted in the MVR he reversed course, but by that time it was too late, way too late (1T 11-9 through 12-8).  Hopelessly conflicted, he ultimately spilled the beans, tacitly acknowledging that his prior testimony had been fabricated (1T 29-12 through 30-5).  Now [...] did not use that word, but he did not need to.  “A rose by any other name would smell as sweet”.  Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet.  But this is no Shakespearean play and the Defendant’s freedom is at stake.  To justify this stop based upon this record runs counter to the most basic principles of our criminal justice system.  Left unchecked, [...] and perhaps others either out of laziness or lacking moral fiber will continue to fabricate testimony in order to justify stops and secure convictions.  And the [...] appears willing to readily oblige such conduct.  If ever there was a time for this Court to send an unambiguous message to the [...] and the [...], that fabricating testimony to justify motor vehicle stops or convictions such as this will not be tolerated, the time is now.
[brief] ” (internal citation marks omitted) (emphasis in original)); Jenkins, 178 N.J. at 362; N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(1) (same).  In addition, aggravated manslaughter requires that the conduct evince “extreme indifference to human life,” which our Courts have explained turn on the circumstances under which the defendant acted, rather than the defendant’s state of mind.  State v. Wilder, 193 N.J. 398, 409 (2008).  Two different potential theories of culpability for aggravated manslaughter were elicited during the plea hearing, but neither constituted aggravated manslaughter.
[brief] It appears [...] was paraphrasing.  In other portions of his testimony, [...] said that he stated, “Hey, you, stop we want to talk to you,” or “something to the effect of, ‘hey, you, stop walking, we need to talk to you. ’”  1T80:8-10 and 1T48:20-23.  dressed in blue shorts and a white tank top had a gun in his pocket.  1T43:5-15.  [...] agreed that was correct.
[brief] *State v. Carter*, 91 N.J. 86, 106 (1982); *State v. Covell*, 157 N.J. 554, 568-69 (1999); see also N.J.R.E. 104(a).  It is the burden of the party seeking exclusion of evidence under N.J.R.E. 403 to convince “the court that the factors favoring exclusion substantially outweigh the probative value of the contested evidence."
[brief] Landlord is entitled to counsel fees under the lease.  There was 5.6 hours that the tenant’s counsel objected to because it involved other tenants.  These were in June of 2020, June 4th and I think the 9th.  So I’ll subtract that from the total amount of hours.  Now, one place is the amounts, the hourly rates, which I think were a little high.  [...] is a good firm, good lawyers, you do good work.  And your clients are happy to pay top dollar for your services.  Though those numbers are higher than – and I’m not comparing you to the landlord that represents apartment complexes.  I’m comparing you to landlords that represent large commercial tenants, with complex leases.  I think the highest I can allow is 425 an hour.  I guess [...], 395, I’ll reduce that to 325.  And the paralegal rate I’ll reduce that from 395 to 200.  That’s more in line with what I’ve seen in these types of substantial commercial cases that have been before me in recent months.  So when I recalculate everything, the amount that I come up with billed from [...] is $5,780.  The amount for [...] is, would be $32,682.50.  The amount for [...] is $167.50.  And the amount for the paralegal, [[...]] (phonetic), would be $1,040.  Total amount, $38,462.50.  So basically my order will be to deny the motion for reconsideration.
[brief] This appeal arises from an action to enforce an agency decision.  Plaintiff-Respondent [...]’s (“Plaintiff” or “[...]”) filed a verified complaint and order to show cause to enforce certain orders issued by the [...] (“[...]”) against Defendant-Appellant [...] (“[...]”).  This appeal raises issues and arguments that overlap with [...] v. [...], [...], which we have previously identified as a related appeal.  Through this appeal, we ask that the Court hold that because [...] was not a party to the [...] Complaint, was not noticed of any proceedings before the [...], and was not provided with any opportunity to participate in the proceedings [...], he was denied his due process rights when the [...] entered orders which imposed affirmative obligations on him and then held him in contempt for failing to meet those obligations.
[brief] (6T 135-19 to 24)  [...] held [...] down with one arm, and her leg was pressed against the door so she could not move.  (6T 136-4 to 7)  [...] testified that she “couldn’t breathe” and “was gasping for air. ”  (6T 136-12)  Whenever she could get enough breath to speak, she kept telling [...], “no, stop, chill. ”  (6T 136-12 to 16)  [...] pulled one side of [...]’s underwear down.  (6T 136-19)  She also lost one of her shoes.  (6T 136-20)  [...] testified that she could feel [...] “pulling his pants down” with the arm that wasn’t choking her.  (6T 136-21 to 24)  She testified that when he started to penetrate her, she was trying to squeeze her legs closed, but “he was forcing himself and he was hurting the inside of [her] thighs. ”  (6T 137-1 to 4)  [...] penetrated her vaginally.
[brief] THE DEPARTMENT’S IMPOSITION OF A REQUIREMENT FOR ONSITE PUBLIC SHORELINE ACCESS ONTO AND ACROSS THE APPELLANT’S PROPERTY UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED IS AN ULTRA VIRES AGENCY ACTION.  (Aa0131.)  Any action exceeding an agency’s grant of authority from the Legislature is considered *ultra vires*.  *Gonzalez v. N.J. Prop. Liab. Ins. Guar. Ass’n*, 412 N.J. Super. 406, 417 (App. Div. 2010).  New Jersey courts must set aside *ultra vires* agency actions, as the courts’ “role is to enforce the will of the Legislature because [s]tatutes cannot be amended by administrative fiat. ”  *Hackensack Riverkeeper, Inc. v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection*, 443 N.J. Super. 293, 302 (App. Div. 2015), citing *In re Agric., Aquacultural, & Horticultural Water Usage Certification Rules*, 410 N.J. Super. 209, 223 (App. Div. 2009) (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  By requiring [...] to create new public access onto and across its property as a condition of reconstructing its failing bulkhead, [...] plainly violated this principle by claiming authority that was not delegated to it—neither expressly nor implicitly—under the Public Access Law.  Since the Public Access Law codified, rather than expanded, the Public Trust Doctrine in New Jersey, [...] lacks the authority to require [...] to create new public access as a condition of reconstructing its bulkhead under the facts presented.
[brief] ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR JNOV AND/OR FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE REVERSED TO PREVENT A MISCARriage OF JUSTICE  BECAUSE DEFENDANT ADMITTED THAT SHE IMPROPERLY CHARGED PLAINTIFF FOR DEFENDANT’S OWN PERSONAL EXPENSES  The purpose of Rule 4:40-2 is to allow the court to grant JNOV to correct "clear error or mistake" by the jury.  Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 6 (1969).  Alternatively, a trial judge shall grant a motion for a new trial if, "having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law."  R. 4:49-1(a); Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 5 (1969).  Here, the jury’s verdict was a clear error and resulted in a miscarriage of justice because Defendant admitted that she made a “mistake” by overcharging Plaintiff $6,273 for Defendant’s own car payments to [...] (3T166:11-25) and $4,387.20 for her own insurance payments to [...] (3T162:11-19), as listed on page 103 of the [...] bank ledger (Pa170).  Defendant’s acknowledgement that she improperly charged Plaintiff these amounts (3T162:15) constitutes standalone grounds to grant Plaintiff JNOV in the amount of $10,660.  At a minimum, Plaintiff is entitled to a new trial to determine the amount of the judgment that should be entered in Plaintiff’s favor to correct Defendant’s acknowledged mistake.  Therefore, the October 6 Order denying Plaintiff’s motion for JNOV and/or for a new trial was against the weight of the evidence and should be reversed to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
[brief] SSAP No. 25 ¶¶ 20, 21 (Ra10).  Furthermore, SSAP No. 25 contemplates supervision of such a transfer:  “Regulatory scrutiny of related party transactions where amounts charged for services do not meet the fair and reasonable standard . . . may result in (a) amounts charged being recharacterized as dividends or capital contributions, (b) transactions being reversed, (c) receivable balances being nonadmitted, or (d) other regulatory action. ”  SSAP No. 25 ¶ 21 (Ra10).  In addition, the language of the POA that specifies that the transfer may not exceed 12.5% of total annual gross written premiums makes clear that the transfer amount is not a given but must be tied to actual costs incurred by the attorney-in-fact.
[brief] The prosecutor told the jury, [H]e says, talking about a murder, “I am not even into this type of shit, yo.  I do little shit.  Like, I may steal, but I ain’t into that. ”  Well, I guess if he’s stealing from people, he needs money and I guess he was stealing from those people in the barbershop when he went in there to grab that -- him and [...] grabbed that money off the table.  Maybe he didn’t intend to shoot [...] and he didn’t think this was going to be a murder.  He thought they were just going to go in there and grab some money, a quick hit, in and out[.] (16T 68-17 to 69-3)
[brief] For the reasons stated above, the motion court’s order suppressing the seizure of the handgun must be reversed.  Respectfully submitted, [...] [...]  By: s/[...]  [...]  Assistant Prosecutor 005842003  Date: February 10, 2025  February 26, 2025  [...]  Attorney  Id. No. 363632021  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Of Counsel and On the Letter-Brief  LETTER-BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
[directive] (1) knowingly holds, recruits, lures, entices, harbors, transports, provides or obtains, by any means, another to engage in sexual activity as defined in paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of 2C:34-1, Prostitution, or to provide labor or services: (a) by threats of serious bodily harm or physical restraint against the person or any other person; (b) by means of any scheme, plan or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that the person or any other person would suffer serious bodily harm or physical restraint; (c) by committing a violation of 2C:13-5, Criminal Coercion, against the person; or (d) by destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating, or possessing any passport or immigration–related document as defined in 2C:21-31, or other document issued by a governmental agency to any person which could be used as a means of verifying the person’s identity or age, or any other personal identifying 2C:13-8  Human Trafficking 1st Degree $150,000 to $400,000
[brief] c.  The asserted factual issues raised by Defendant do not create a genuine issue of material fact.  In asserting that factual disputes precluded summary judgment, Defendants improperly treat the parties’ and the trial court’s disagreement about the materiality of facts as disputed facts.  Defendants’ wishy-washy, “not so certain” position on whether there were any genuine disputes of material fact notwithstanding, T1 67:23-68:9, Db10, the trial court was correct that there was no genuine dispute of material fact and that the parties conceded same.
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[brief] The wholesale exclusion of such \(^3\)  Indeed, after the court excused [...], he asked the court if it had access to “expunge reports. ”  (29T:26-12 to 25)  Given the court’s refusal to inquire about expungement with [...], the meaning of this inquiry is ambiguous.  One obvious interpretation is that [...] believed his conviction was expunged, but hesitated to bring that information to the court’s attention until he could confirm the court maintained a record confirming that expungement.
[brief] Gomez v. Nations Recovery Center, Inc., et al., 2:17-cv-6279- JLL-JAD (D.N.J.) ......................................................  4, 26 Henderson v. Hertz Corp., 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2871 (App. Div. June 22, 2006) ........ 26  Henriquez v. Allied Interstate LLC, et al., 2:17-cv-6122-JMVJBC (D.N.J.) .......................................................  4  Hoffman v. Encore Capital Grp., Inc., 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1627, 2008 WL 5245306 (App. Div. Dec. 18, 2008)  ............................................................  26  Jackson v. First National Collection Bureau, Inc., 2:17-cv07891-MCA-SCM (D.N.J.) ..................................................
[brief] 41 State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47 (1993)  ..................................................................  21 State v. Sinclair, 49 N.J. 525 (1967) ..................................................................  24 State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157 (2012) .................................................................. 34, 77 State v. Sui Kam Tung, 460 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div. 2019) ...........................................
[brief] In general terms and subject to particular circumstances of a given claim or defense, a motion *in limine* is defined as an application returnable at trial for a ruling regarding the conduct of the trial, including admissibility of evidence, which motion, if granted, would not have a dispositive impact on a litigant’s case.  As the Appellate Division noted in *Cho v. Trinitas Regional Medical Center*, 443 N.J. Super. 461, 471 (App. Div. 2015), motions *in limine* that seek the dismissal of claims are a “misuse of the motion *in limine*.”  Instead, “when granting a motion will result in the dismissal of a plaintiff’s case or the suppression of a defendant’s defenses, the motion is subject to Rule 4:46, the rule that governs summary judgment motions. ”  *Jeter v. Sam’s Club*, 250 N.J. 240, 250 (2022).  In addition to the inappropriate procedural context, the trial court should have allowed the evidence to be presented at trial and for the claims to be decided on their substantive merits.  While “New Jersey follows the ‘American Rule,’ which requires litigants to bear their own litigation costs, regardless of who prevails,” Kamienski v. State, Dep’t of Treasury, 451 N.J. Super. 499, 521 (App. Div. 2017), our Supreme Court “has also recognized several ‘exceptions to the American Rule that are not otherwise reflected in the text of Rule 4:42-9’ and are not allowed pursuant to a statute, court rule, or contract.