ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A Public Entity Cannot Be Held Liable for a Condition of Property Under the Act Unless Plaintiff Meets All the Requirements.  In order to establish a meritorious claim regarding real property, the plaintiff must prove all the elements set forth in N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, which states as follows:  A public entity is liable for injury caused by a condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: a. a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or b. a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under section 59:4-3 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose liability upon a public entity for a dangerous condition of its public property if the action the entity took to protect against the condition or the failure to take such action was not palpably unreasonable.  The Gann Law Books manual on the Tort Claims Act provides as follows regarding the spirit and purpose of Chapter 4, which deals with conditions of public property:
[brief] The SHO’s Decision Was Made on the Merits of the Application and in Accordance with the Trial Court’s Directive and the Relevant Law  Over the course of two hearings, the SHO took testimony and evidence from both Plaintiffs’ professionals and from Defendants’ professionals.  Plaintiffs provided testimony from four expert witnesses, with the Township offering the testimony of three of its own professionals.  Additionally, the Special Master appointed to oversee the Township’s compliance with its affordable housing obligations provided testimony.  The SHO thoroughly questioned all witnesses, and, when appropriate, encouraged solutions to contested issues, such as a conservation easement and a disputed farmland assessment.  6T312:23-25, 6T313:1-7.  Throughout the course of the hearings, which took a total of eight and one half-hours, the attorneys and other professionals for both Defendants and Plaintiffs were given ample opportunity to examine the witnesses and the proofs provided.  In fact, at numerous points during the hearings the Defendants’ professionals engaged with professionals for Plaintiffs to request additional information or clarification. on aspects of the Site Plan Application.  Members of the public also participated and were able to question the witnesses.  (See, for instance 5T201:12-25).  After the hearings were concluded, the SHO drafted and provided to the Parties a draft Resolution granting Plaintiffs’ site plan application, with conditions, and gave the Parties an opportunity to comment, which the Parties did via letters.  Ra127, Ra136.  The SHO then submitted the proposed Resolution (Ra138) to the Trial Court.  In the 33-page Resolution, the SHO clearly summarized the testimony and evidence presented by the Parties over the course of the two hearings.  The Resolution adequately detailed the factual underpinnings supporting his decision to recommend to the Trial Court the granting of site plan approval and related relief.  The Trial Court judge then accepted the Resolution and an Order was entered accordingly.  Because the Resolution was completely supported by the facts and testimony adduced at the hearing, there was no reason for the Trial Court to reject it.  Indeed, Defendants provided no cogent arguments to the contrary.  iii.
[brief] Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writ on May 9, 2023, pursuant to N.J. Ct. R. 4:69-1 seeking a reversal of the decisions of the Defendant Planning Board.  (Pa1).  On or about August 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that the Board lacked jurisdiction based on the wording of the published notice to property owners pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11.  (Pa41).  On September 22, 2023, the Court heard oral argument and found notice was sufficient under the Municipal Land Use Law and as such, the matter presented a genuine issue of material fact and the Court denied the motion.
[brief] (156a-157a; 276a – 757a).  [...], the individual who struck Plaintiff, was cited approximately thirteen (13) months before attacking [...] for disorderly conduct by the New Jersey Transit Police at Newark Broad Street Station.  (765a).  In June 2016 a different conductor was punched in the face by a passenger at the same station.  (758a).  While the majority of the citations issued at Newark Broad Street Station are for non-violent crimes, [...] speaks to how non-violent crimes can escalate into violence at p. 35-36 of his report.
[brief] S-13: [...] supplemental responses to discovery requests HOLM-[...]-CH-193 and -194 dated June 11, 2020 (see also Holm-178A and -179A) (SOICR p. 9) are at Exhibits Holm-178A included in this Appendix at Ha723-750 and Holm-179A is included at Ha752.  S-14.  [...] responses to [...]'s discovery requests 117 and 118, designated as confidential by [...], dated June 8, 2020 (see also Holm-116 and -117) are submitted under separate cover.  They have not been included in this Appendix.  S-15.  [...] response to discovery request [...] dated April 3, 2020 (see also RC-15) (SOICR p. 9) is included in this Appendix at Exhibit RC-15 at Ha1636.
[brief] *Miller v. Miller*, 97 N.J. 154, 163 (1984).  It has been held that the principle of equitable estoppel may be applicable in a CFA context.  *Sprenger v. Trout*, 375 N.J.Super. 120 (App. Div. 2005)  In *Heuer*, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that Equitable estoppel has been defined as “the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed ... as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse ...”  The doctrine is “designed to prevent a party’s disavowal of previous conduct if such repudiation ‘would not be responsive to the demands of justice and good conscience’. ”  [Da078]  Here, [...] relied upon the representations of Plaintiff.  (Da078)  [...] stated that if Defendants had known that Plaintiff was going to sign the Bankruptcy Petition the same day that she signed [...]’s Contract, they would not have entered into the 2016 Contract and also that if they knew that Plaintiff had filed the Petition, they would not have entered into the 2018 & 2019 Contracts.  (Da078)  As a result of entering into those Contracts, [...] paid $9,600.00 but only received $7,043.92.  Now Defendants are subjected to this frivolous and fraudulent litigation.
[directive] Following interception of oral or wire communications authorized by a wiretap judge, in the event a search warrant is issued based on whole or in part on communications so intercepted, the application for the search warrant shall be filed only in the file of the wiretap judge.  Notice of that fact shall be filed with the criminal division manager=s office together with the warrant and inventory pursuant to R. 3:5-6.  Any problem in the application on interpretation of these Guidelines should be referred to an authorized wiretap judge.
[directive] Decision Making Framework (DMF)  [November 2024]  Process for Identifying the Pretrial Release/Detention Recommendation  Complete the PSA to generate the FTA scale, NCA scale, and NVCA flag.  Step 1:  Determine if any current charge is Murder or subject to life imprisonment and Step 2: therefore is subject to a presumption of detention pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b):  − Murder or felony murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1),(2) or (3)) − Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1)) − Human trafficking (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-8(a)(2) or (3)) − Tampering/damage involving nuclear electric generating plant (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-7) − Nuclear electric generating plant; damaging/tampering with equipment which results in death (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-8)  − Leader of narcotics trafficking network (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3) − Terrorism (N.J.S.A. 2C:38-2(a)(1), (2), (3) or (4))  − Producing/possessing chemical weapons, biological agents or nuclear or radiological devices (N.J.S.A. 2C:38-3(a))  − Leader of firearms trafficking network (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-16)    If yes, the final recommendation is No Release Recommended.
[brief] "The court finds that the PSA awarded defendant assets with a minimum value of $280,000 not considering the value of defendant’s jewelry collection and other personal items including multiple designer handbags."  A266-267.4  Defendant “retained substantial personal property --- 4  “Plaintiff’s testimony was that defendant’s jewelry alone purchased during the marriage approached $1,000,000 in value,” but [...] said, “[t]he court finds plaintiff did not provide any expert testimony or any other significant proofs as to the value for these items. ”  A266. purchased during the marriage, i.e., interspousal gifts from plaintiff, which the court finds had significant value. ”  A270.  The court finds when determining an equitable distribution of these assets that it must consider that the substantial majority of the parties’ wealth at the time of divorce was based on plaintiff’s acquisition of assets prior to the marriage.  The court finds the transfers made as part of the asset protection plan were not intended to be gifts to plaintiff, but even if they were, the court’s analysis would remain the same.  Similarly, the deed for [...] from plaintiff to defendant in November of 2008 also corresponds with the asset protection plan and was acquired by a 1031 exchange through plaintiff which exchanged property in the Reserves, which the court has already found was prior to the marriage.  The court’s prior findings as to the tracing of the parties’ assets back to the pre-marital acquisition by plaintiff is a substantial factor which makes the distribution of assets to defendant in the PSA to be fair and reasonable when evaluating whether the PSA and/or MSA is unconscionable.
[directive] this that in Date: I  Signeture  Title I I Name Typed Printed litle or County Forfeiture Program Reports Title: I 03/01 AN /98  Forfeiture Program Administrators k w d : Date  Applicebitity: Supersedes:  Policy Statement:  8:l  The Attorney General requires that each of the state's twenty-one county or prosecutors prepdre a quarterly report detailing the distribution, receipt expense of N. J.S.A- forfeited property funds obtained pursuant 2C:64-1 et sea, (civil forfeitures), to or N.J.S.A- 2C:41-1 N.J.S.A. et seq., (racketeering) or from actions brought under 2C:Zl-25 or et seq. (financial facilitation of crime), under any other statute as directed by the by Attorney General.
[brief] The Respondents correctly point to the fact that the trial court initially indicated that it planned to enforce the Report of the Boundary Commissioners (Db7).  If the trial court had done that, then this appeal would not exist or would be markedly different.  The trial court, however, did something other than enforce the Report as written.  The Boundary Commissioners’ Report expressly recommends “that permanent markers be set at the corners of the Subject Properties [the properties of the parties], and a map depicting their boundaries be recorded as consistent with the Worely Survey. ”  Report Pa112., ll.30-32.  This recommendation would, inter alia, result in recording the boundary shift of Lot 11 and onto Lot 12 described above.  The shift from the [...] property onto Lot 12 would be manifest by the setting of “permanent markers. ”  The recordation of a map depicting the boundaries of the parties would result in adjustments to the properties of their neighbors.  The Respondents fail to address the consequences of this recommendation.  Instead, they acknowledge that N.J.S.A. 2A:28-3 “does not provide for any substantive changes to the Commissioners’ Report, nor does it provide for a partial adoption of the Report with respect to certain findings and a rejection as to other findings [Db12].”  The Respondents make no effort to square this position with the Final Order which does exactly what the Respondents maintain it cannot do.  Moreover, the Respondents entirely fail to explain why the trial court did not follow the recommendation of the Report.  The trial court understood that following the recommendation of the Report would immediately give rise to the problems identified above, and it issued a Final Order providing for the recordation of the Report without following its recommendation.  Although the trial court initially maintained that it had only the limited authority to accept or reject the Report, it decided to do something different than what the Report recommended in order to avoid the obvious impact of its findings.  The Respondents do not touch this issue for fear of their logic being contaminated by it.
[brief] The Trial Court’s Denial of Plaintiff’s Request for an Award of Attorney’s Fees Should be Affirmed (Pa27-Pa28)  “In general, New Jersey disfavors the shifting of attorneys’ fees. ”  Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 385 (2009).  “New Jersey is an American Rule jurisdiction, reflecting a strong public policy against shifting counsel fees from one party to another. ”  Tarta Luna, LLC v. Harvest LLC, 466 N.J. Super. 137, 154 (App. Div. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); Coleman v. Fiore Bros., Inc., 113 N.J. 594, 596 (1989) (stating “[i]n New Jersey, we accept, as do most other courts, the premise of the American Rule that ordinarily society is best served when the parties to litigation each bear their own legal expenses. ”).  “The American Rule generally precludes a party from recovering counsel fees from his or her adversary in that litigation. ”  In re Estate of Lash, 169 N.J. 20, 30 (2001).  The reasons supporting “the American Rule are threefold: (1) unrestricted access to the courts for all persons; (2) ensuring equity by not penalizing persons for exercising their right to litigate a dispute, even if they should lose; and (3) administrative convenience. ”  Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 224 N.J. 584, 592 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “The general and long-standing rule in New Jersey is that unless legal fees are authorized by statute, court Rule, or contract, they are not recoverable. ”  Litton Indus., 200 N.J. at 385 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, the Plaintiff requested an award of attorney’s fees from the trial court.  But, there is no statute, Court Rule, or contract that would entitle the Plaintiff to an award of attorney’s fees.  The American Rule applies in this case.  Therefore, there was no basis for an award of attorney’s fees to the Plaintiff and its request was properly denied.  Thus, the trial court’s order of March 4, 2024 should be affirmed.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Defendants argue without any citation to the record or proof that “[...] clearly considered each of the factors discussed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, as each was thoroughly briefed by Plaintiff’s counsel in opposition to Defendant's motion and each was set forth in the written Supreme Court opinion that was specifically cited by [...] in the above Order and Opinion. ”  (Db11.)  Just because Plaintiff cited the Supreme Court’s decision to the trial court does not mean the trial judge considered it, particularly when the trial court failed to address the Supreme Court’s question how “how an unobtrusive recording device would call the validity of the examination into question in a way that the interpreter would not.
[brief] (T1, 14:21-24 (“Plus [the municipal water supply] is almost a mile away.  So there is literally no way that whatever the minor contamination is that is just within feet of our property line can go that far [away] and that far down”); (See also T1, 23:6-24:8).  Despite this testimony showing that the Property poses no risk to the safety of Borough residents, the Borough did not have its own LSRP/consultant testify to the contrary.  All that the Borough offered was the concerns [...] voiced about health risks posed by the Property.  (T1, 26:18-27:1 (“I’m the mayor so I’m…we’re concerned.  I’m also an epidemiologist…and I, having read the book Tom’s River, and knowing a lot about epidemiology doesn’t really show cause and effect but it does show association.  And there does seem to be a lot of cancer on these barrier islands. ”).  [...] then stated that she wants to designate the Property as a redevelopment area in order to give the Borough control over the pace at which the ongoing remediation proceeds.
[brief] The Department cannot distinguish controlling precedent.  In the face of controlling precedent requiring rulemaking here, the Department offers no case to the contrary and fails in trying to distinguish [...]’s cases.  The Department’s argument that *Boller Beverages, Inc. v. Davis*, 38 N.J. 138, 151–55 (1962), “was focused on the intersection of state and federal law,” Db44, is misleading because [...] relies on the part of the court’s analysis addressing exactly the kind of *ad hoc* rationalization by a federal agency as here, Pb26.  And the Department’s adoption of loss ratio regulations, Db44 (citing *Matter of Farmers’ Mut. Fire Assur. Ass’n of N.J.*, 256 N.J. Super. 607, 621 (App. Div. 1992)), again is inapposite.  The Department admitted that “excessiveness” rests on considerations outside the regulations.  *See, e.g.*, Pb12; Db31 n.6.  Anyway, *Farmers’* is highly relevant here.  Like there, this case involves subject matter especially important for “insurance companies and the consumer public,” thus calling for statutory rulemaking.  Pb26.  Nor can the Department meaningfully distinguish the other cases [...] cited.  *See* Db45–48.  The Department merely makes the same incorrect point that the ALJ and the Commissioner tried: this case is distinguishable from cases requiring rulemaking because “the Department applied a standard from the . . . Act” itself.  Pa51; *see* Pa83 (similar).  But this takes us full circle and still “does not answer any relevant question,” Pb40, because the Act does not define the term despite that, as just shown, it is susceptible to myriad conflicting definitions that would give the Department boundless authority to make *ad hoc* decisions, *see supra* pp. 8–12.
[brief] Moreover, in its most recent discussion of the rule, our Supreme Court emphasized that “the consumer context of the contract [in *Atalese*] mattered,” *Kernahan*, 236 NJ at 319-320, and that the “twin concerns” animating its application of the rule there were that (1) “a consumer is not necessarily versed in the meaning of law-imbued terminology about procedures tucked into form contracts” (as opposed to “individually negotiated” ones), and that (2) “plain language explanations of consequences had been required in contract cases in numerous other settings where a person would not be presumed to understand that what was being agreed to constituted a waiver of a constitutional or statutory right,” *Id.*  Neither concern applies to the shareholder’s agreement before the Court.
[brief] \(^4\)  \(^4\)  In an unpublished divided order, a Third Circuit panel declined to issue a writ of mandamus to correct a district court order refusing to allow a relevancy  The same principles apply here.  Even though the parties negotiated search terms, Defendants still needed to review and cull the documents that hit on those terms for relevancy and responsiveness before production, lest they turn over tens of thousands of legally irrelevant documents.  The search terms here were broad—capturing, for instance, any document that included proximate appearances of common terms like “New Jersey,” “out of network,” “reimbursement,” “review,” and “overview”—and necessarily swept in documents with no “tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to determination of the action.
[directive] of  Pending Cases Review  Megan's Law judges and staff should work closely with their Megan's Law prosecutors 1 and public defenders to review all cases pending judicial review.  Private defense counsel should also be consulted as to their pending cases.  Megan's Law matters that do not have defense counsel should also included this review.  For example, the be in public defender may have handled the registrant's previous tier determination and may be amenable to contacting the registrant to inquire about representation by their office.  such instances, the registrant should be advised to contact the appropriate Criminal In Division contact number posted on the Judiciary's webpage to request an indigency determination.  •  Identify the cases that have defense counsel as these matters can be conducted with the parties and registrant participating remotely via video or telephone, whether the initial tier determination, a relocation proceeding, or a Megan's Law motion.  •  Cases with expert testimony may need to be adjourned on a case-by-case basis at the court's discretion.  •  If the registrant does not have access to participate remotely by video and will be participating via phone, the court should obtain the consent of the parties before conducting the hearing.  •  Cases for registrants who do not have access to telephones, computers, or other electronic devices will need to be adjourned at this time.  •  Alternatively, defense counsel may indicate that the matter can proceed because the registrant has waived the right to be present.  1  Tier 1 {low risk of re-offense) classifications, which do not include notification outside law enforcement agencies, are administratively closed by the prosecutor without judicial review.
[brief] (4)  If approved, applicants must enter into a Hold Harmless Agreement with the Township indemnifying the Township, its elected officials, officers, directors and employees from any and all claims, damages, judgment costs or expenses, including attorney fees, which they or any of them may incur or be required to pay because of any personal injury, death, or any property damage suffered by any person(s) as the result of or related in any way to the operation and maintenance of the sidewalk, tent or parking lot sale for which the permit is issued.  Such agreement shall be in a form approved by the Township Attorney or his/her designee.  (5)  The number of tent and/or parking lot sales permitted at any one property shall be limited to two (2) per calendar year.