ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As argued by the City below, and recognized by the lower court, the Redevelopment Payment is valid provided it (i) defrays the costs of the redevelopment entity and (ii) carries out and effectuates the purposes of the LRHL and a redevelopment plan.  Here, the record established without either rebuttal or doubt that the $2 million dollar Redevelopment Payment defrayed the costs of the City’s $7.5 million dollar renovation and expansion of the City’s Senior Citizen Center at [...], and that said project served the LRHL and the objectives and goals memorialized in the Redevelopment Plan.  The Court correctly identified and applied these conditions to find that the negotiated revenues were valid under the LRHL.
[brief] Condominium association board members are required to "act reasonably and in good faith in carrying out their duties."  *Jennings v. Borough of Highlands*, 418 N.J. Super. 405, 421, 13 A.3d 911 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting *Papalexiou v. Tower West Condo.*, 167 N.J. Super. 516, 527, 401 A.2d 280 (Ch. Div. 1979)).  To sustain a cause of action for negligence against a condominium association, like any other negligence claim, "a plaintiff must establish four elements: '(1) a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proximate cause, and (4) actual damages.'"
[brief] Likewise, in Raeuber v. Public Service Railway Co., 89 N.J.L. 366 (E. & A. 1916), the plaintiff-passenger advised a trolley car conductor that he wished to disembark.  Raeuber, 89 N.J.L. at 366-67.  As he attempted to alight, the trolley car “gave a jerk, which threw [the plaintiff] into the street. ”  Ibid.  The court held there was no evidence that the alleged jerk was abnormal or “anything more than was merely incidental to the proper operation of the car. ”  Ibid.  The court observed that the plaintiff needed to show abnormality in the car’s operation, and his failure to do so was fatal to his negligence claim.  Ibid.  The court further emphasized that the plaintiff assumed the risk of an accident that may flow from the vehicle’s normal operation.  Ibid.  Here, because [...] failed to demonstrate that the [...] bus was operated in such an unusual manner to support negligence, the trial court properly dismissed her claim on summary judgment.
[brief] Da 34-41 Judgment of Conviction ([...]) ..............................................  Da 42-45 Judgment of Conviction ([...]) ..............................................  Da 46-48  Judgment of Dismissal ([...]) ...............................................  Da 49-51 Notice of Appeal .......................................................................................  Da 52-55  INDEX TO CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX  Body-Worn Camera of Officer [...] (S-4)  ................................  Dca 1  ¹  Pursuant to Rule 2:6-1(a)(1)(I), defendant has appended three police reports, which were submitted as State’s exhibits on the suppression motion, and which were considered by the motion court in its written decision.  (Da 26, 30, 33)  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] Da210 (hereinafter the “Second Stay Pending the Filing of Defendants’ Appeal Order”).  On March 1, 2024, [...] also filed an order (which was not entered on the docket or received by the parties until March 5, 2024) granting the [...]’ cross motion extending the stay of post-sale proceedings upon the filing by Defendants of their notice of appeal through to the final resolution of said appeal, fixing the amount of their supersedeas bond at $645,000, and granting them 60 days to post that bond, i.e., until April 30, 2024.  Da212 (hereinafter the “Stay Pending Final Resolution of Defendants’ Appeal Order”).
[brief] [...], at the time Plaintiff’s deposition was taken, was retired but he was still active when she was transferred to the Academy (1T; 72:22).  A new major and new captain came in in August of 2016; in October of the same year, the captain called her into his office and asked if she wanted to go to the Academy.  She told him that she was in OPS for six and a half years and that she earned the position of Lieutenant there (1T; 74:9).  However, that number was not at OPS, so she inquired “if it was ever going to be brought back” (1T; 74:21).  It was brought back and given to [...] after her transfer (1T; 72:11).  The promotional system functioned by means of points (1T; 75:20) and those points would apply to the OPS while she was there (1T; 76:4).  So she had eight points in OPS, and they didn’t apply to any other promotion (1T; 76:8).  She was notified on November 15, 2016, that she was going to the Academy (1T; 76:10).
[brief] (1T30).  16.  After starting with [...], but prior to October 17, 2015, [...] did not file any workers’ compensation claims.  (1T31).  In other words, [...] denied any 2009 incident or accident.  No cross-examination by Respondent’s attorney and no rebuttal evidence submitted by the Respondent’s attorney undermined that testimony.  (See 1T-3T; See Pa1-Pa26; Pa119-Pa186).  At the hearing, the following testimony was elicited from Respondent’s own expert:  1.  [...] conceded the only evidence of a 2009 injury involving [...] stemmed from a report of [...] dated November 6, 2015.  (3T24).  2.  No other medical reports or documentation mentioned a 2009 incident involving [...].  (3T25).  3.  [...] was never provided with any accident/injury report for any injury occurring in 2009 as to [...].  (3T28).  4.  No medical treatment notes for [...]’s neck or back covering the timeframe of January 1, 2006, through October 16, 2015, were ever provided to [...] for review.  (3T31).  Respondent was represented by competent counsel at the OAL.  Respondent had the ability to propound discovery upon [...].  Respondent had the ability to ask for medical authorizations to be signed by [...].  Respondent had the ability to subpoena medical records of [...].  None of that pre-trial work uncovered any evidence of a 2009 incident or accident.  Before ever setting foot in the OAL, [...]’s employers were required to turn over to Respondent all workers’ compensation data each had for [...].  None had an accident or an incident from 2009.  When viewed cumulatively, [...] submitted, and [...] concurred, that it was more likely than not that [...] was never involved in an incident or an accident in the calendar year of 2009.  To allow Respondent to reverse [...]’s ID in the absence of evidence that substantiates a 2009 incident or accident would be the quintessential example of letting a completely arbitrary and capricious decision stand.
[brief] In addition, even if allowing for the Project was somehow contrary to the CZM Rules (which [...] maintains it is not), no due process violation occurred, whether based on fundamental fairness, procedure, substance, or otherwise.  Appellant has waived any such argument.  Pressler & Verniero, *Current N.J. Court Rules*, cmt. 5 on R. 2:6-2 (2024) (“It is, of course, clear that an issue not briefed is deemed waived. ”); see *New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Alloway Twp.*, 438 N.J. Super. 501, 505 n.2 (App. Div. 2015).  Even if an argument was presented, the denial of the hearing request should be affirmed because the Department correctly determined that Appellant did not have a statutory or constitutional right to an administrative hearing.
[brief] Moreover, the CCIP Policies provided [...] with discretion to preclude [...].  Specifically, the Sole Agent for Insureds endorsement provides:  IT IS AGREED THAT THIS POLICY IS ISSUED AT THE DIRECTION OF THE FIRST NAMED INSURED, WHICH SHALL BE SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS AND LOSSES UNDER THE DEDUCTIBLE AMOUNT AS OUTLINED IN THE POLICY AND SHALL HAVE OTHER POLICY RIGHTS TO ACT ON BEHALF OF INSUREDS.  THE INSUREDS HAVE ASSIGNED TO THE FIRST NAMED INSURED:  * * *  2.  THE RIGHT TO REQUEST CANCELLATION OF THE POLICY; AND 3.  AUTHORIZATION TO ACT ON THEIR BEHALF AS RESPECTS CHANGES TO ANY PROVISIONS OF THIS INSURANCE POLICY.  WE CONSENT TO SUCH ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS, TITLE AND INTEREST.
[brief] Accordingly, the trial court’s analysis of this element is correct.  Appellant does not contend Respondents sold her anything, let alone “merchandise” within the purview of the CFA.  Appellant only alleged that Respondents engaged in collection activity on a debt that was already “past-due and in default” at the time of assignment, and which Appellant does not contest owing.  If Appellant purchased merchandise at all, it preceded Respondents’ assumption of Appellant’s Obligation.  New Jersey case law is clear that the CFA only applies in circumstances where the commission of a wrongful act occurred “in connection with the sale” of “merchandise,” not subsequent collection activity.
[brief] [Pa16]  When a defendant in a lawsuit elects to go forward without counsel after having been given an opportunity to obtain an attorney, our legal system must proceed on the assumption that the unrepresented defendant is competent to protect her own legal interests and to make binding litigation decisions, including decisions as to potential legal and factual defenses.  “It is well settled that a personal judgment may be rendered against one who is neither served with process in the state nor domiciled in nor a citizen of the state if he consents to jurisdiction over him. ”  *Battle v. General Cellulose Co.*, 23 N.J. 538, 546 (1957).  A general appearance may arise by implication from a defendant seeking, taking or agreeing to take some step or proceeding in the cause beneficial to herself or detrimental to the plaintiff, other than one to contest the jurisdiction only, and by doing so has thus waived *in personam* jurisdiction.  *Field v. Field*, 31 N.J. Super. 139, 148 (App. Div. 1954).  “And it may be noted as the prevailing rule in the majority of jurisdictions that an objection that the court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter constitutes a general appearance. ”  *Id.* at 148-49.  The only conclusion that can be drawn under these circumstances is that [...] undertook to deal with the merits of the underlying litigation and in some measure with the jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof, not to mention having filed a Substitution of Attorney, and that in doing so she submitted herself voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the court.  *Id.* at 150.
[brief] One of the first rules of statutory interpretation is to give a difficult-to-interpret statute a “commonsense” reading.  *State v. Gelman*, 195 N.J. 475, 482 (2008), citing *DiProspero v. Penn*, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005).  Here, one has to realize that there are tens of thousands of state employees in New Jersey, almost all of whom have ID cards.  Sometimes they will have multiple copies of such cards.  It is hard to believe that the Legislature would have intended that retaining one of those cards at a time when one should technically turn it in -- like upon retirement -- is a third-degree crime that could conceivably be the cause of discretionary forfeiture of a state pension under *N.J.S.A.* 43:1-3b.  See *State v. Anderson*, 248 N.J. 53, 71-72 (2021) (discussing the difference between crimes that require mandatory forfeiture of pension, like official misconduct, under *N.J.S.A.* 43:1-3.1, and other lesser crimes that can result in discretionary forfeiture of pension).  There is nothing in the statute or the legislative record to indicate that such a harsh result was intended by the language of *N.J.S.A.* 2C:20-2b(2)(g).  Indeed, the only case addressing that statute is *State v. Saavedra*, 222 N.J. 39, 45 (2015), applying it to the obvious instance of an employee who stole “highly confidential” documents from the [...].  A state- employee ID card is not anything like those Saavedra documents.  According to Gelman, which reached a similar result on a vexing question of the interpretation of a prostitution statute, the only proper result where the statutory meaning is not clear, and neither is the legislative intent, is to apply the “doctrine of lenity” and adopt the more lenient interpretation of the statute.  195 N.J. at 482-483.  This Court should follow Gelman in that regard and, if no other relief is granted on the theft conviction, lower its degree to a disorderly-persons offense.
[brief] (30T54-23 to 24).  The need to deter defendant was manifest because the jury rejected his version of the facts, which the court characterized as a “false narrative. ” (30T55-7 to 17).  There was a general need for deterrence to stop gun violence.  (30T55-24 to 30T56-3).  [...] found as a mitigating factor that defendant had no prior record.
[brief] When viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, here, the matter before the court qualifies as a common knowledge case similar to _[...], supra_.  In this case, while the moving Defendants [...] and [...] were served with an Affidavit of Merit, the facts of our particular accident and the record before the court evidence that the reasonableness of the Defendants’ conduct may be determined by the jury absent expert testimony.  Here, the facts that a jury would need to consider are either outlined in the contracts, admitted during depositions, or are a reasonable inference taken from those facts.
[brief] [...]’ reliance on both cases is misplaced.  In Morgan v. Sundance, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) does not authorize federal courts to create “arbitration-preferring procedural rules. ”  142 S. Ct. at 1713.  (Emphasis added).  Simply put, federal courts must now treat waiver of an arbitration provision the same way they would treat waiver of other contractual rights; focusing on the actions of the waiving party without requiring a showing of prejudice.  Id.  The Supreme Court makes no mention of waiving arbitration at the state level.  In fact, it expressly rejects such precedent:  “We decide today a single issue, responsive to the predominant analysis in the Courts of Appeals, rather than to all the arguments the parties have raised.  In their briefing, the parties have disagreed about the role state law might play in resolving when a party’s litigation conduct results in the loss of a contractual right to arbitrate.  The parties have also quarreled about whether to understand that inquiry as involving rules of waiver, forfeiture, estoppel, laches, or procedural timeliness.  We do not address those issues. ”  *Morgan v. Sundance, Inc.*, 142 S. Ct. 1708, at 1712 (2022) (Emphasis added).  *Morgan* therefore does not support [...]’ argument and is distinguishable on the law and facts.
[brief] There remained the issue of whether the plaintiffs were entitled to accrued deferred compensation.  The Caponegro Court then went on to explain the difference between this remaining issue before the Court and its finding that the Legislature could impair the plaintiffs’ contract rights to continued employment as follows:  [al]though we are therefore persuaded that there was no constitutional prohibition against the abolition of petitioners’ positions and their immediate termination, whether or not they had contracts, we are also satisfied that this holding does not resolve the issue of the conditions necessarily attendant upon their termination.  There is indeed a distinction that must be drawn between a prospectively effective contract nullification on the one hand and, on the other, the abrogation of previously vested property rights.  We are of the view that petitioners were entitled to the same deferred compensation – that is, their accumulated vacation and sick days – that they would have received had they terminated their employment voluntarily.  This compensation, we conclude, could neither be constitutionally withheld nor was intended by the takeover statute to be withheld.  Id. at 155 (emphasis added).  The Appellate Division held that N.J.S.A. 18:7A-44a did not abrogate the plaintiffs’ contractual right to payment on termination for accumulated vacation and sick days.  330 N.J. Super. at 151.  The Caponegro Court expounded on its holding as follows:  “to the extent that the pre-takeover contracts of employment … require payment of this deferred compensation upon termination of employment, petitioners are entitled to receive it in the same manner as if their employment had been voluntarily terminated. ”  Id. at 157.  Further, the Court ruled that a “contractual right to compensable accumulated leave is typically characterized as deferred compensation since it constitutes remuneration for services already rendered and, to the extent already earned, is not subject to unilateral divestment by the employer. ”  Id. at 156.6  Further, in Matter of School Bd. Of Morris, 310 N.J. Super. 332, 345-47 (App. Div. 1998), cited approvingly by Caponegro, the Appellate Division held that a retroactive cap on vested or accumulated sick leave compensation could not be upheld absent a knowing and intentional waiver by the persons adversely affected.
[brief] [...]’s sentence for animal cruelty did not include a term of probation (4T 29-4 to 6), and animal cruelty is not a PSL-eligible offense, see N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(a).  Nonetheless, the sentencing court ordered that three conditions “be added to [[...]’s] conditions of parole supervision. ” (4T 29-10 to 12)  Those conditions were: (1) “Defendant is to have no contact with [the dog] Nessa”; (2) “defendant is prohibited from owning, possessing, exercising control over or caring for any animals”; and (3) “anger management. ”  (4T 29-6 to 14)  Because a sentencing court has no authority to impose conditions of parole, and because all sentences must be authorized by law, this part of [...]’s sentence was unlawful.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................................9  I. SUMMARY  JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPERLY GRANTED BECAUSE HE CHANGED HIS INSURANCE POLICY PRIOR TO THE APRIL 2022 ACCIDENT.  (Raised Below: 1T6-7)  ......................................................................................................................9  II.  SUMMARY  JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPERLY GRANTED BECAUSE DISCOVERY WAS INCOMPLETE.  (Raised Below: 1T12-13)  ................................................................................................................12  CONCLUSION
[brief] That decision, however, is distinguishable in multiple respects.  First, in Myer, the claims that triggered a defense obligation under the homeowners policy were premised on defamation.  Plaintiff prevailed on those claims against the insured and the basis for the insurer’s refusal to fund an appeal of the adverse verdict was the erroneous conclusion that the jury found the defamation to be entirely intentional, bringing them within the scope of a policy exclusion.  The court noted at several points that the insurer had misinterpreted the jury’s verdict which – contrary to the insurer’s assertion – responded to special interrogatories that did not use the same mental state test for all of the various defamatory statements.  As to some statements, the trial court used a negligence standard and did not inquire about intent (thus, leaving open the possibility that the insured may have known those statements to be false).  As to other statements, however, the court used only an intentional wrong standard.  Judgment was rendered in plaintiff’s favor on both sets of claims under different mental states.  In finding a duty to appeal existed, the Vermont Supreme Court emphasized that the verdict did not definitively place all claims beyond coverage.
[brief] In State v. Spano, the defendant was convicted of certain offenses related to his role as a police officer.  *State v. Spano*, 128 N.J. Super. 90, 91 (App. Div. 1973).  On appeal, he challenged, among other things, the adequacy of a particular count in the indictment.  *Ibid.*  This court was unconvinced.  The particular count of the indictment of which defendant has been convicted ought to have been more precise.  But defendant now latches on to only one count -- the 23rd in a multicount indictment in which defendant was charged in three other counts, one of which was in great detail -- in making an argument that would exalt technical niceties at the expense of substantial justice, but which suffers from a lack of realistic persuasiveness.  The purposes of an indictment are: to enable a defendant to know that against which he must defend; to prevent an accusation in derogation of our interdiction of double jeopardy; and to preclude substitution by a trial jury of an offense for which the grand jury has not indicted.
[brief] Malinowski v. Jacobs, 189 N.J. 345, 514 (2007).............................................6, 7  Manalapan Realty v. Township Committee, 140 N.J. 366, 376 (1995)...........11  Medina v. Pitta, 442 N.J. Super. 1, 18 (App. Div.) certify. den. 223 N.J. 555 (2015).................................................................................16  PC4REO, LLC v. John Kemp, A-1944-21 (N.J. App. Div. June 8.  2023).................................................................18, 19, 20, 24, 28 Poppy Holdings v. Ruslan Milov, A-2549-22 (N.J. App. Div. Oct. 2, 2024)....................................................................................21, 22  Reinauer Realty Corp. v. Borough of Paramus, 34 N.J. 406, 415 (1961).......13  257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC v. Alessandro Roberto, A-3315-21 (N.J. App. Div. Dec. 4, 2023).........................................................21
[brief] On January 5, 2022, Plaintiff [...] (“Plaintiff”) slipped and fell on ice while descending a set of stairs outside the front door of his condominium.  The incident occurred during a snow/ice storm, at a time when freezing rain was actively falling.  Plaintiff sued various defendants, including the condo association [...] (“Condo Association”) and property managers [...] and [...] (collectively “[...]”).  [...] (“[...]”) is also a defendant.  [...] was a contractor hired by [...] in November 2021 to paint the stairs in question.  The paint job was finished over a month before the incident.  [...] had no responsibility for snow or ice removal at any time.  Plaintiff has offered numerous theories as to why he fell.  He claims that the stairs were old and deteriorated, allowing ice to form on the top landing.  Plaintiff further asserts that the paint used by [...] made the icy steps more slippery.  Lastly, Plaintiff contends that the handrails on the stairway were faulty, leaving Plaintiff nothing to grab onto when he fell.  It is undisputed that [...] had nothing to do with the alleged deterioration of the steps or the lack of handrails.  With respect to the paint, Plaintiff’s allegation is far-fetched and unsupported by the record.  There is no evidence – expert or otherwise – that the paint used by [...] contributed to the Plaintiff’s fall.  Plaintiff’s liability expert is silent on the type of paint used by [...], and further does not opine that [...] breached a standard of care in the industry.  Plaintiff only offers the vague and conclusory assertion that the paint used by [...] was faulty.  Plaintiff tries to support this contention by noting that Plaintiff testified that he personally believes that the steps were “sleeker” or “rougher” in the rain after they were painted.  But Plaintiff did not fall because of rain or a wet surface – he fell on ice.  Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he knows of no connection between the paint and the ice.  As such, any opinion as to the paint must come from an expert.  Yet Plaintiff’s expert wholly ignores [...]’s involvement in the steps.  [...] did not owe a duty of care with respect to any transitory weather condition on the date of the incident.  There is no evidence that the paint was defective or causally related to the fall.  Because there is no connection between [...]’s work and the alleged hazard, the trial court’s ruling granting summary judgment to [...] should be affirmed.