ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Although the Court agrees with [...] that it was not obligated to deliver an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate within 10 days of execution – the agreement plainly required it only to seek the certification within such time -- the agreement also explicitly required [...] Street to deliver any certificate it recovered from the tenant.  The obvious purpose of such provision was to ensure prompt delivery of what the tenant provided to enable [...] to exercise would what become its immediate right to terminate the agreement if the certificate recorded adverse information.  The obvious reason for a requirement of this nature was to enable the purchaser to learn from the tenant, in a formal matter, the status of a leasehold and to afford the purchaser the essentially unfettered right to terminate if the information provided was adverse, as it was here.  Such a requirement provides additional protection to the purchase, beyond reliance on the Seller’s representations concerning the status of leases in a tenanted property.  (Id.)  This interpretation is deeply flawed.
[brief] As an initial matter, that contention is inconsistent with the [...]’ argument that Plaintiffs’ affirmative damages claims are subject to ADR.  See, e.g., SDb18 (arguing that AICRA “compels [...] to arbitrat[e] each of its civil claims” (emphasis added)).  The court should, in any event, reject the suggestion that the Legislature intended AICRA to foreclose insurers’ affirmative fraud claims in PIP-related cases.  That argument could only succeed if the Legislature abrogated insurers’ private rights of action under the IFPA and RICO for PIP-related fraud.  But an implied repeal “requires clear and compelling evidence of the legislative intent, and such intent must be free from reasonable doubt. ”  Mahwah Twp. v. Bergen Cnty. Bd. of Tax’n, 98 N.J. 268, 280 (1985).  Nothing suggests the Legislature intended AICRA’s ADR provision to repeal IFPA and RICO causes of action for PIP fraud; rather, the Legislature sought to ensure that the payment of PIP benefits was not unduly delayed without compromising insurers’ ability to combat insurance fraud.  See Pb22-49.  Because Plaintiffs retain damages claims under the IFPA and RICO for PIP-related fraud, they have a constitutional right to present those claims to a jury.  Further, this case illustrates the sound reasons for which the Legislature provided insurers with that private right of action rather than limiting them to fraud as a defense in PIP ADR.
[brief] ”  N.o. A-3475-18T2, 2020 WL 6297469, Discovery House v. Advanced Data Sys. RCM, Inc., No. CV1921602KMJBC, 2020 WL 6938353, at (D.N.J. Nov. 25, 2020)(Pa081); Columbus Circle N.J., LLC v. Island Constr. Co., No. A-1907-15T1, 2017 WL 958489, at (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 13, 2017) (Pa090) (rejecting application of Atalese to the contract at issue, which was not “a consumer contract of adhesion where [one party] ... possessed superior bargaining power and was the more sophisticated party” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Gastelu v. Martin, No. A-0049-14T2, 2014 WL 10044913, (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 9, 2015) (Pa096) (“Parties to a commercial contract can express their intention to arbitrate their disputes rather than litigate them in court, without employing any special language .... In the present case ... we are dealing with commercial business transaction [sic] and, therefore, the standard is not as stringent [as the one put forward in Atalese].”). see also Van Duren v. Rzasa-Ormes, 394 N.J. Super. 254, 257 (App. Div. 2007) (enforcing an arbitration agreement “between two sophisticated business parties, each represented by counsel”), aff’d o.b., 195 N.J. 230 (2008).
[brief] Plaintiff, [...] sought to purchase property in West New York for use as a retail store and warehouse for retail sale of goods imported from Italy.  One of the members of [...], [...] (“[...]”) was a licensed importer from Italy and would be the person to procure the goods to be sold by [...].  After two failed attempts to reach a deal on two prospective properties, [...] came upon a piece of property located at [...] in West New York (“Property”) that was owned by [...] (“6600”) (Pa1367).  [...] was introduced to Defendant [...] by [...] (“[...]”) in March 2016 to represent [...] with regard to the leasing of property to house [...]’s new business venture.
[brief] (1)  The interests and welfare of the public.  Among the items the arbitrator or panel of arbitrators shall assess when considering this factor are the limitations imposed upon the employer by P.L.1976, c.68 (C.40A:4-45.1 et seq.).  (2)  Comparison of the wages, salaries, hours, and conditions of employment of the employees involved in the arbitration proceedings with the wages, hours, and conditions of employment of other employees performing the same or similar services and with other employees generally:
[brief] ”  Hunterdon Cty. Freeholder Bd. and CWA, 116 N.J. 322, 328 (1989).  The scope of judicial review of Commission decisions reviewing interest arbitration awards is “sensitive, circumspect and circumscribed. ”  Teaneck Tp. v. Teaneck FMBA, Local No. 42, 353 N.J. Super. 298, 300 (App. Div. 2002), aff’d o.b., 177 N.J. 560 (2003).  The Commission’s decision will stand “unless it is clearly demonstrated to be arbitrary or capricious. ”  Hunterdon Cty., 116 N.J. at 329.  “The burden of demonstrating that the agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable rests upon the [party] challenging the administrative action. ”  In re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443-44 (App. Div. 2006), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 219 (2006).  Applying its labor relations expertise, on February 29, 2024, the Commission issued a written decision affirming the December 18, 2023 interest arbitration award that established the terms of a successor agreement between the [...] (City) and the [...], [...] ([...]) for the period of August 1, 2019 through December 31, 2023.
[brief] THIS ACTION WAS NOT PROPERLY FILED AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED | 2 | | A.  BOG Members Do Not Possess Governmental Authority And Thus Do Not Hold “Office” For Purposes Of Quo Warranto | 2 | | B.  Plaintiffs Fail To Explain Why They Filed Their Action Grossly Out Of Time | 7 | | II.  THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS APPLY TO APPOINTEES AT THE TIME OF APPOINTMENT AND ARE NOT CONTINUING OBLIGATIONS  FOR SITTING BOARD MEMBERS | 10 | | CONCLUSION | 15 | | CASES | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Berg v. Christie, | 2, 10, 11, 14 | | 225 N.J. 245 (2016) | | | Borough of Princeton v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, | 9, 10 | | 169 N.J. 135 (2000) | | | In re Christie’s Appointment of Perez, | 7, 13 | | 436 N.J. Super. 575 (App. Div. 2014) | | | Haack v. Ranieri, | 8, 9 | | 83 N.J. Super. 526 (Law Div. 1964) | | | Kratovil v. Angelson, | 6, 7 | | 473 N.J. Super. 484 (Law Div. 2020) | | | Marconi v. United Airlines, | 7 | | 460 N.J. Super. 330 (App. Div. 2019) | | | N.J. Transit Corp. v. Borough of Somerville, | 5 | | 139 N.J. 582 (1995) | | | Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrisey-Berru, | 5 | | 140 S. Ct. 2046 (2020) | | | Rutgers, the State University v. Piluso, | 3 | | 60 N.J. 142 (1982) | | | Scott v. Cholmondeley, | 5 | | 129 N.J. Eq. 152 (Ch. 1941) | | | Skolski v. Woodcock, | 11 | | 149 N.J. Super. 340 (App. Div. 1977) | | | Smith v. Trustees of Bethel African Methodist Episcopal Church of | 4 | | Jersey City, | | | 89 N.J.L. 397 (Sup. Ct. 1916) | | W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991)
[brief] The Supreme Court found the following facts:  On February 4, 2008[2]¹⁰, at the request of a then-client, [...] ([...]), [...] met with [...] and [...] at [...]’s restaurant, the [...], in [...]; since the death of [...]’s husband, [...] had acted as her unofficial business affairs advisor.  According to [...], she consulted [...] concerning pending litigation and business matters.  She explained that [t]here were several litigation matters left behind by my late husband, [...], relating to two restaurants operating under the [...] trade name.  She noted that one of the restaurants, located in [...], had closed in 2006, and that she met [...] at the remaining [...] restaurant, in one of the lower level party rooms.  Her entire description of the substance of that consultation was scant:  At that time, we discussed extensively about my business history and the pending legal disputes.  . .  We discussed various aspects of the [...] business, including its history and its then-present state of affairs, confidentially.  [...] recalls that consultation differently.  He states that [...], [...] and [he] met at [[...]’s [...] restaurant] to be introduced for the first time and discuss problems she was then having with present defense counsel, [...], in connection with his handling of and representation in [a specific ¹⁰ [2]  [...] initially claimed that this meeting occurred [i]n approximately March 2007[,] while [...] states that the meeting occurred on February 4, 2008.  [...]’s certification contains correspondence that corroborates February 4, 2008 as the date of his meeting with [...].  When confronted with those proofs, [...] later conceded that the consultation in fact occurred in February 2008, eleven months after the date she originally certified.  We have adopted [...]’s date as the correct one.
[brief] The Authority also argued that the Arbitrator’s handling of the remedial phase of the hearing and proposed payment structure were further evidence of his failure to loyally adhere to the terms of the CNA.  [...] rejected each of the Authority’s arguments for why the Award should be vacated.  Noting that “[p]ublic policy in this state favors resolutions of disputes through arbitration, especially in matters involving the public sector,” [...] found that the Arbitrator “did not, in [the] court’s opinion, create a new work rule regarding termination of employees unable to perform their essential job functions. ” (Pa 138, 140).  Instead, [...] found that [...] “found that there was no reason for removal of the employee aside from her temporary recovery from a medical procedure,” underscoring the “inconsistency in the reasons given by the employer for the termination,” and emphasizing that “consideration must be afforded an employee with a temporary medical condition which can be corrected and who becomes able to return to work and that time limitations are also considered. ” (Pa 140-141).  [...] found that [...] based his conclusions in the evidentiary record developed in the course of the arbitration hearing, and that “[i]t was the job of the Arbitrator to determine just cause, which he did,” and that “even if the court were to come to a different conclusion, his is a reasonably debatable assessment based on the record” and thus deserving of judicial deference.  (Pa 140-141).  Thus the Chancery Court confirmed [...]’s Award and ordered the Authority to comply with the Award, to reinstate [...], and to make her whole.  Rather than comply with the Arbitration Award and the Chancery Court’s Order, the Authority filed the instant appeal.
[brief] The Appellant upon application and hearing, was denied relief for the installation of the multiple paver walkways by the [...] on March 3, 2021 (Pa20) and the party appealed, pursuant to the procedure designated by Ordinance, to the [...].  The Zoning Board of Adjustment denied Plaintiff’s appeal of the HPC resolution on March 2, 2022.  (Pa24)  During the course of the Zoning Board (ZBA) hearing, Plaintiff [...] testified that paver work installed in the Historic Flare was mistakenly conducted on under a prior Certificate of Appropriateness which related to [...] (Appellant’s improved lot).  The work which is the subject of this appeal was in fact, performed on the adjacent [...] owned by the [...], known as the “Historic Flare” which is an area subject to designation on the National Historic Register and is defined in the Neptune Township Land Development Ordinance (NLDO) as “an unobstructed area located between the curbline and the front leasehold line at particular properties with the historic zone district.
[brief] The Trial Court Erred In Failing To Examine The Two Principal Uses Proposed In Plaintiff’s Site Plan Qualify As “Mixed Uses Of More Than One Principal Commercial Or Industrial Use. ” (5T 25-11 to 28-7).  Westampton Ordinance § 250-4 allows “mixed uses of more than one principal commercial or industrial use” in the Industrial Zone.  (Pa3-13).  However, the trial court did not consider this issue, which was raised by Plaintiff in its complaint in lieu of prerogative writs.  Instead of finding the previously permitted cell tower use and proposed permitted as-of-right industrial use qualified as multiple principal commercial or industrial uses in accordance with the Ordinance, the judge merely ordered consideration of the need for a use variance must be made by the Zoning Board.  This decision ignores the challenge presented.  One of the principal uses proposed in Plaintiff’s site plan Application, a warehouse, is by-right a permitted industrial use in the industrially zoned lot.  Westampton Ordinance § 250-20(A)(3) expressly lists “permitted uses” in the Industrial Zone to include “distribution centers and warehouses. ” (Pa56).  The integrated second principal use proposed in the Application, was to not disturb the existing Cell Tower.  This should be considered a commercial or industrial use for the public improvement of life and safety.  Although the Board contends otherwise, there is no basis to find the previously permitted cell tower use would not qualify as a “principal commercial or industrial use,” and it certainly does not qualify as any other use, such as residential, retail, and the like.  These two compatible uses are unequivocally permitted on the Property.
[brief] The instant matter was initiated on August 16, 2022, when Plaintiffs filed a Complaint with the Morris County Superior Court Clerk.  (Pa20).  On September 13, 2022, Defendants [...] and [...] filed an Answer to the Complaint with the Morris County Superior Court Clerk.  (Pa28).  Thereafter, although not relevant to the current appeal, on September 29, 2022, Defendant [...] filed its Answer to the Complaint with the Morris County Superior Court Clerk.  (Pa38)  On April 8, 2024, a Notice of Motion by Defendants Christoper Annese and [...] was filed seeking an Order for Summary Judgment.  (Pa49).  On April 12, 2024, an Order of the Honorable [...] was entered, granting Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  (Pa187).  Thereafter, on June 28, 2024, the Order of the Honorable [...], was entered, granting the respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment.  (Pa1).  For the sake of brevity and Judicial economy, various case management and discovery Orders are omitted herein as they do not impact the Appellate Division’s consideration of the within Appeal.  The Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on August 13, 2024.  (Pa11).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Importantly, on July 30, 2015, at 12:38 p.m., five hours after [...]’s erroneous enrollment and receipt of the Welcome Letter, [...] of [...] emailed several people, including [...]’s [...] and [...]’s [...], clarifying that [...] was not permitted to enroll, writing:  “if the [[...]’s] work referred to below is the Ritz work then please note that since it involved structural demolition, [[...]] will not be able to enroll into the CCIP for that work.  We cannot enroll subcontractors into the CCIP who are performing structural demolition. ”  (Pa2390.)  Plaintiffs concede that subcontractors performing demolition cannot be enrolled in the CCIP.  (Pb8.)  Thus, within hours, [...] was notified that it could not participate in the CCIP.  On August 3, 2015, [...] of [...] emailed [...] writing [...] “is performing structural demo on the job, they shouldn’t be enrolled.
[brief] [...] :  DOCKET NO. [...] :  CIVIL ACTION : SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION - CRIMINAL PART :  OCEAN COUNTY REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  [...]  Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.S.C. New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division  Ocean County  [...]  Attorney at Law A Professional Corporation [...] Eatontown, New Jersey  07724 [...]  Attorney ID#044481988  [...], Esquire Attorney ID#046452011  On the Brief [...]  Respectfully submitted, January 11, 2025  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] A  Correct.  Q  Now, you testified earlier that you had an application to [...] in 2014 but withdrew it, correct?  A  Yes.  Q  And you testified this morning, you testified this morning that you withdrew the application because you were still getting back into surgery and you did not feel you were ready to do a hospital surgical practice, correct?  A  That’s true.  Q  But in your deposition I took in this case under oath before trial, did you not testify that you withdrew the application because you got so busy?
[brief] By the Opinion below on September 29, 2020, the trial court held the claims could not proceed without such testimony.  T1 58-19 to 60-9.  Despite this literal roadmap laid out years ago, plaintiffs neither provided expert discovery nor requested an extension of time to do so.  The court dismissed substantially all of the claims against the defendants, because of the lack of an expert opinion needed to sustain those claims.  Plaintiffs never applied to re-open discovery to name [...] as an expert or otherwise provided the required prima facie evidence to proceed.
[brief] THE REQUIREMENT IN THE SECOND STAY PENDING THE FILING OF DEFENDANTS’ APPEAL ORDER THAT THE TONNELLE DEFENDANTS POST A SUPERSEDEAS BOND IN ONE BUSINESS DAY WAS MANIFESTLY UNREASONABLE (Da210)  [...] abused her discretion in conditioning a stay upon the posting of a supersedeas bond by the Tonnelle Defendants in one business day because the deadline was impossible for the Tonnelle Defendants to comply with and, thus, it was manifestly unreasonable.  See State v. Hayes, 205 N.J. 522, 539 (2011)(quoting Smith v. Smith, 17 N.J.  Super. 128, 132 (App. Div. 1951), certif. denied, 9 N.J. 178 (1952); Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2022).  CONCLUSION  For all of the foregoing reasons, the Tonnelle Defendants respectfully request that this Court reverse [...]’s orders; confirm that for purposes of Tonnelle’s exercise of its right of redemption of the mortgaged premises, the postjudgment interest rate is the rate prescribed in R. 4:42-11; and direct that a new sheriff’s sale be conducted if Tonnelle has not already redeemed the mortgaged premises.  June 7, 2024  [...]  [...], Esq. [...] 5 Becker Farm Road Roseland, New Jersey  07068  Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees [...], and [...]  Superior Court of New Jersey  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET No. [...] SB PB [...], Plaintiff-Respondent/ Cross-Appellant, —against— TONNELLE NORTH BERGEN, LLC, [...], [...], [...], and [...], Defendants-Appellants.
[brief] ”  (31a-34a.)  •  **Count 14**:  Respondents violated *N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g)* because the Board, by “allowing” the proliferation of lawn signs throughout the community, “is not only allowing but is encouraging misinformation to be spread about the election and is illegally advocating for the electorate to vote ‘yes’” on the referendum.
[brief] Factors potentially indicating coerced consent include: (1) that consent was made by an individual already arrested; (2) that consent was obtained despite a denial of guilt; (3) that consent was obtained only after the accused had refused initial requests for consent to search; (4) that consent was given where the subsequent search resulted in a seizure of contraband which the accused must have known would be discovered; [and] (5) that consent was given while the defendant was handcuffed.
[brief] It should be noted that [...] and [...] have the same definitional requirement of “accessory, use structure” --- that the accessory use must be located on the same lot as the principal use.  The location of accessory parking for Lot 8 (synagogue) on Lot 5 (School) is prohibited by that case and definition.  The [...]’s theory and the Trial Court’s determination (Da279) --- that because “parking” is an accessory use for “houses of worship,” and “schools,” that means a paved area (not approved for parking) on the school lot can be used as an off-site parking use/facility for a house of worship on a different Lot /use (when the School has deficient parking) --- is clearly wrong and absurd.  The use of the School courtyard as an unregulated, unmarked, unsafe “off-site” parking facility for the Lot 8 property is not a “permitted” facility or accessory use on the School Lot 5.  Beyond being a prohibited use, the use of the School courtyard for an off-site parking facility for another Lot/use would require Site Plan Approval for that second use.
[brief] In the matter before this Honorable Court, the Plaintiff, [...], seeks to uphold the integrity of the legal process and secure the enforcement of a rightfully awarded legal fee.  Despite the Plaintiff’s diligent efforts and adherence to court orders, the Defendant, [...], now seeks to evade their obligation through procedural maneuvers and untimely appeals.  This case revolves around the Defendant’s failure to comply with a court-ordered fee award and subsequent attempts to delay and obstruct the resolution of this matter.  As we proceed, it is essential to recognize the Plaintiff’s unwavering commitment to justice and the rule of law, contrasted with the Defendant’s disregard for court orders and attempts to circumvent accountability.  Through this litigation, the plaintiff seeks nothing more than the fair and just enforcement of the court’s decision, in accordance with established legal principles and procedural rules.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully requested that this Court find for Respondent and deny Appellant’s requested relief.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent  [...]  By: /s/ [...]  BY: [...]  DATED: February 29, 2024  [...] (ID #029861991)  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant [...] [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], Defendant-Respondent.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] “It is essential to bear in mind that defendant’s use of the evidence to support a manslaughter instruction need only be plausible, it need not be the most probable explanation.  The measure of probability is for the jury once the claims of the parties have passed the threshold of possibility.  Powell, 84 N.J. at 415.  Thus, in Powell, our Supreme Court held that it was error not to instruct the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter even when the evidence for it was, in part, a statement made by the defendant that he later “disavowed. ”  Id. at 415.  Neither the fact that only part of the confession could be true if passion/provocation was to be an appropriate verdict, nor that defendant disavowed his statement, nor his lies about his alibis, nor the fact that it was “[m]ost likely” that the defendant committed murder was a basis to withhold this instruction from the jury.  Id. at 415.  “A court need not accept the suggestion” that passion/provocation manslaughter occurred in order to be required to give that instruction.  Ibid.  Here, there was evidence that [...] believed [...] was trying to kill her.  That is an adequate provocation.  There is no evidence that any time elapsed between when [...] discovered this and when she killed [...].  Therefore, the passion/provocation instruction was necessary.
[brief] Just as the arbitrator in PBA Local 160 was not free to disregard the plain language of the parties’ agreement, so too here, the Arbitrator is mandated to abide by the terms of the parties’ CBA vesting [...] with a managerial prerogative to determine the standards of performance for its employees.  As stated expressly in Article III of the CBA, [...] retains the right to “determine [employees’] qualifications and conditions of continued employment, or assignment,” as the case may be.  Inherent in [...]’s right to determine conditions for continued employment is its right to determine that an employee who no longer can perform her job duties no longer is qualified for duty.