ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (raised below 3T, Pg. 194)  In addition to impugning [...]’s character through bald insults, [...] also permitted improper prejudicial character evidence to be admitted over repeated objections of Cohen’s attorney.  Specifically [...] permitted testimony and evidence regarding past and outside allegations by others, lawsuits, and judgments against [...].  The purpose being prejudicial and not probative to show that other courts have ruled against Cohen, so this jury should as well.  An example of this can be found as early as the opening statement of [...]’s attorney.  He said that [...] didn’t pay a former attorney, [...], so Sodini now has a judgment against [...]; He also said that another attorney, “a fellow, a very good lawyer” also didn’t get paid by Cohen, and so he also now has a $200,000 judgment against [...].  (2T pg. 126, line 25 – pg. 127, line 10).  The assertions carried into the cross examination of [...] and the testimony of [...]’s witness as well.  On Cross-examination, [...] was asked “do you recall that you entered into a consent judgment with [...]’s firm?” (3T pg. 193, line 4-5).  [...]’s attorney objected arguing that the question going to character propensity would be prejudicial and the prejudice would outweigh any probative value.  (3T, Pg. 194, line 7-13).  The court laid out the legal rules citing to NJ Rule of Evidence 4:03 and 4:04.  And then [...] overruled the objection finding that since [...] indicated he negotiates bills down, the evidence of a consent judgment is admissible.  (3T, Pg. 198, line 2 – pg.  199, line 3; pg. 199, line 23 – pg. 200, line 13.)  But that doesn’t follow.  If [...] admitted to regularly negotiating bills down, then *he’s already admitted it*, any further evidence to show that’s what he does in other case with other parties is by definition more prejudicial than probative, because he’s already admitted it, there’s no need for additional evidence of that.  Moreover, admitting to a negotiation is not the same as evidence regarding a Judgement.  A Judgement is a legal finding.  Nevertheless [...] let in evidence of the consent Judgment regarding [...]’s lawsuit with [...].  And then [...] was asked about a “judgment… just shy of $200,000” by another attorney against him.  (3T, Pg. 204, line 8-9); again Cohen’s attorney objected and again [...] overruled.  In the testimony of [...]’s lawyer we find those matters brought up again, “That’s why [...] had to sue him to get a judgment to get paid.  That’s why [...] had to sue him to get a judgment to get paid. ” (5T, Pg. 102, lines 10-12).  In [...]’s summation, the point is even clearer: Cohen didn’t the attorney Maybruch, so they ended up with a judgment, Cohen didn’t pay Sodini, and they ended up with a judgment.  (6T Pg. 236, line 21 – pg. 237, line 7).  It is clear that [...] admitted to negotiating his bills, so no evidence was necessary to establish that; yet, [...] admitted evidence of judgements against [...] and didn’t think that the prejudicial nature outweighed the probative nature…of judgments.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] The suspect was described as “[a] short black male, wearing a varsity jacket and blue jeans. ”  As [...] drove down Lyons Avenue toward Stuyvesant Avenue, she made eye contact with a man, whom she identified at trial as defendant, and who fit the dispatch description, except that he was wearing a red shirt, not a jacket.  She saw defendant run and then hop over a fence into the rear yard of the house at the corner of Lyons and Stuyvesant Avenues.  [...] climbed over the fence and illuminated the area with his flashlight.  [...] saw defendant lying on the roof of a shed and yelled to [...], who grabbed the man's foot and told him to get down.  [...] described the man, who he identified at trial as defendant, as a short, black male, wearing a red shirt and jeans.  [...] testified that he decided to do a showup identification because less than thirty minutes had elapsed between the robbery and the discovery of the suspect on the roof.
[brief] THE BARGAINING COUNCIL ARE NOT PASSIVE OBSERVERS; THE NEGOTIATIONS AT ISSUE ARE NOT CONDUCTED IN OPEN PUBLIC SESSION  In Point I(C) of its brief, the Board again regurgitates arguments that were thoroughly addressed and properly dismissed by the Commission in its final agency decision.  Once again, the Board does not explain how or why the following detailed findings and analysis of the Commission were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable:  There is . . . no evidence suggesting Bargaining Council members are mere passive observers of the negotiations process, as opposed to active participants in it.  The parties’ joint exhibits include Association certifications as to the Bargaining Councils’ role in the process, including that it was “able to research and analyze any Board offers or arguments presented during the face-to-face sessions and provide written responses for the Negotiators to consider while still at the table,” and the Association’s full team was able to complete its caucusing faster because Bargaining Council members “were already fully informed . . . at the bargaining table. ”  (Joint Exhibit H, [...] Cert., ¶¶ 12-13.)  The record contains no certified facts submitted by the Board refuting these assertions.  Thus, we are unpersuaded by the Board’s reliance on decisions wherein the presence of union members in negotiation sessions was challenged based upon their status as passive observers who, unlike the Association’s Bargaining Council, were not designated by the union as part of its negotiations team and took no part in negotiations.  Likewise, while we find the cases involving the exclusion of members of the public from negotiation sessions, including Brielle, supra, to be instructive, they are not wholly applicable to the instant facts.  In Brielle, the Commission found that a school board’s refusal to collectively negotiate except during open public session was inconsistent with its duty to negotiate in good faith.  The Commission expressed a concern that the concept of “exclusivity of representation” could be compromised by open public negotiations because the public could include rank and file unit members and leaders of minority organizations.  Here the Association has expressly designated its Bargaining Council as part of its negotiations team, and limited access to Association members.  The only evidence in the record that members of the public were present during the parties’ 2019-2022 negotiations indicates it was at the Board’s invitation, and was short-lived as the Association objected to it.  (Joint Exhibit H, [...] Cert., ¶¶ 8-10; Joint Exhibit I, [...] article.)  It is also clear from the record that in negotiation sessions, going forward, the Association does not seek to include members of the public, other unions or groups of employees who are not part of its designated negotiations team.  [50 NJPER 226, 232 (¶50 2023) (Pa238-240). ]  The Commission stands by its above analysis and conclusions while, again, the Board has not stated grounds to disturb them.  II.
[brief] Petitioner told Decedent she needed to set boundaries with Respondent and to just say “no” to her demands, and Decedent would respond to Petitioner, “She’ll argue with me.  I can’t.  I don’t want to push her away” (7T191:12 to 192:6; 193:15-22).  Respondent admitted she was a “brat about the car” and Decedent ended up buying it for her.  (P703a).  Respondent’s contention that Petitioner moved out of the home in February 1997 is inconsistent with competent evidence in the record.  Respondent’s characterization of Petitioner before this litigation also confirms that the Respondent knew that Petitioner had nothing to do with the February 1997 incident.  After the alleged incident, Respondent gave Petitioner cards in which she described Petitioner as a “blessing and I am so grateful to have always had you in my life” (P 661a; 12T20:20 to 21:4) and “You are a true blessing to our family.
[brief] ”).  As part of this assessment, the judge “shall take into consideration the nature and extent of the movant’s interest in the outcome of the case, whether or not the --- 9  Although the Rules Governing Practice in this Court do not have a specific rule on the issue of intervention, this Court’s guidelines contemplate moving the Appellate Division, in the first instance, for intervention.  See APPELLATE DIVISION GUIDELINES FOR CAPTIONS AND ATTORNEY APPEARANCE SECTIONS IN MEMOS AND OPINIONS, at page 26 (Sept. 2022) (available at https://www.njcourts.gov/sites/default/files/captionsguidelinescorrectedmay08.pdf) movant's interest is sufficiently different from that of any party so as to add measurably and constructively to the scope of the case, the prospect of confusion or undue delay arising from the movant’s inclusion, and other appropriate matters. ”  N.J.A.C. 1:1-16.3.  A motion for leave to intervene “may be filed at any time after a case is initiated. ”  N.J.A.C. 1:1-16.2(a).  Analogously, under the Court rules, to show a right to intervention, a party must show: (1) that it an interest in the subject matter of a case; (2) that the disposition of the case could impede its ability to protect that interest; (3) that its interest is not adequately represented by an existing party; and (4) that its application for intervention is timely.
[brief] The Trial Court denied Plaintiff’s first motion for reconsideration on June 26, 2023, on the papers.  (Aa66).  The case was then re-assigned to a new judge for disposition on the second motion for reconsideration.  Oral argument on the second motion for reconsideration was heard on July 21, 2023.  The second motion for reconsideration was denied on August 30, 2023.  (Aa87).  This appeal was subsequently filed.
[brief] APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, On Appeal from a Denial of a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County.  v. Indictment No. [...]  [...], Sat Below Defendant-Appellant.  Hon. [...], P.J. Cr. BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
[brief] See Transcript, 12:6-8 (“in our case, there’s been nothing done except paper discovery served, no answers provided, no depositions, nothing like that. ”); see also Transcript, 12:9-12 (“considering the totality of the circumstances . . . there has not been the type of prolonged litigation which equity would compel this Court to deny a motion like this”).  In *Marmo*, this Court determined that waiver occurred primarily because no different than the parties in *Cole* and *White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc.*, 61 F.4th 334 (3d Cir. 2023), the party seeking to compel arbitration weaponized the litigation process and extracted the benefit from the formality of discovery to the prejudice of the non-moving party.
[brief] [...]’ Second Loan To [...]  While the First Loan documents were being prepared, [...] explained to his friend, [...], that he was “under extreme pressure” and had an urgent need to pay certain vendors working on the construction of his 30,000 square foot Saddle River “mansion. ”  Da13; 1T57-5 to 18, 58-11 to 17, 65-9 to 13; 3T136-20 to 24, 190-1 to 10.  [...] immediately responded to his friend’s emergency plea by loaning [...], from his personal checking account, the principal sum of $50,000 on or about June 25, 2008 (“Second Loan”).  Da13-14; Da164 (Ex. P2); Da181-82 (P8); Da199-202 (P15); Da203-15 (P16); 1T58-2 to 5, 58-21 to 59-1, 63-25 to 65-4, 82-8 to 83:8; 4T243-14 to 21.  The trial court found that [...] offered and agreed to repay the Second Loan as soon as he was able, and at the same ten percent 10% per annum interest rate that would govern the First Loan.  Da13-14; Da162-63 (Ex. P1); Da181-82 (Ex. P8); Da189-93 (Ex. P12); Da203-15 (Ex. P16); 1T64-7 to 65-4.
[brief] NEW JERSEY CITATIONS: Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 536 (1995).  .................................................................................................11,12  Triffin v. Cigna Ins. Company, 297 N.J. Super. 199, (App. Div. 1997) ..............................................................................9,13  Conley v. Guerrero.  228 N.J. 339, 346 (2017) .................................................................................................10  Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd. 219 N.J. 395, 406 (2014)  .................................................................12  DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325 333 (App. Div. 2013)  ...........................................12  Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 445-46 (2007)  ............................................................11  Triffin v. Quality Urban Housing Partners, 532 N.J. Super. 538, (App. Div. 2002)  ..................................................8  Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. V. Nat's Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016)  .................................................................11  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT:
[brief] 1a-7a; 15a-20a.  The prior AOM of [...], MD was included in the initial Complaint filing.  8a-11a.  The original discovery end date was November 17, 2022.  Dr. [...], MD, PhD (“[...]”) filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint on September 3, 2021.  21a-28a.  [...] filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint on September 13, 2021.  29a-37a.  On December 27, 2021, the Appellant filed the Affidavit of Merit of [...], MD, PhD. 38a-39a.  On February 28, 2022, [...] filed a Motion to Dismiss without prejudice for failure to make discovery.  54a-56a.  [...], MD (“[...]”) filed an Answer to the Appellant’s Amended Complaint on March 3, 2022.  57a-61a.  [...], MD (“[...]”) filed an Answer to the Appellant’s Amended Complaint on March 4, 2022.  62a-67a.  [...], MD (“[...]”) filed an Answer to the Appellant’s Amended Complaint on March 16, 2022.  68a-76a.  On April 1, 2022, the trial court granted [...]’s Motion to Dismiss without prejudice.  77a.  On July 5, 2022, [...] filed a Motion for Dismissal with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action.  78a-81a.  On July 15, 2022, [...] filed a Motion for Dismissal with prejudice for failure to serve a compliant Affidavit of Merit (“AOM”).  82a-86a.  On August 26, 2022, the trial court entered an Order dismissing the Appellant’s claims against [...] with prejudice.  87a-89a.  The trial court entered a second Order that same day dismissing the Appellant’s claims against [...] with prejudice.  90-91a.  On September 2, 2022, the Appellant filed a Motion to Reinstate the Complaint against [...] which the trial court granted on October 21, 2022.  92a- 93a; 94a.  On September 15, 2022, the Appellant filed a Motion to Reconsider the trial court’s August 26, 2022, Order dismissing the Appellant’s claims against [...] with prejudice, which the trial court denied on October 7, 2022.  95a-97a; 98a-100a.  On December 14, 2022, [...] filed a Motion to Dismiss with prejudice for failure to provide expert reports.  101a-104a.  On December 16, 2022, [...] filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to serve an expert report.  105a-108a.  On December 29, 2022, [...] filed a Cross-Motion to Dismiss with prejudice for failure to serve an expert report.  109a-112a.  On January 11, 2023, the Appellant filed Cross-Motions to Extend Discovery to the three Motions to Dismiss, requesting, for the first time, that discovery be extended for a period of one hundred eighty (180) days to May 5, 2023.
[brief] Finally, Defendants’ argument that any conflict of interest herein is “speculative” or in the “future” is both meritless and beside the point.  The primary basis of [...]’s disqualification order was her finding that there is an actual, current conflict of interest under RPC 1.7(a)(1).  T36:15-17; 37:13-14.  As [...]’s conclusion regarding the present existence of a conflict is correct and requires [...]’s disqualification, there is no need to reach the separate issue of whether there is also a “significant risk” of a conflict arising in the future under RPC 1.7(a)(2) if the conflicted representation continued, which [...] also correctly found to be the case based on the facts in the record.
[brief] (8T29:22-140:5).  [...] has many years' experience in owning and operating large retail stores and implementing retail store training policies (8T:32:5-36:21), including as director of training at a large supermarket chain.  (8T39:5-39:24).  As a retail consultant since 1988, [...] testified that he has rendered over 2,000 opinions, for both sides, in retail cases, most of which pertained to training and supervision.  (8T42:2-43:18).  He has seen the training policies of numerous retail chains throughout his career, including nationwide chains of big box stores like [...] and [...].  (8T44:7-45:8).  [...] testified that accepted practice in the retail industry, and at [...], is for a new hire to be trained off the sales floor initially and then to undergo on the job training ("OJT") by being paired with a mentor.
[brief] The purpose of the tattoo is to identify the dog.  But the spirit of the law can be effectuated with the less intrusive method of a subcutaneous microchip, which was unheard-of when the statute was enacted in 1989.  A “literal sense” of the tattoo requirement should “give way to the spirit of the legislature,” which is satisfied by the microchip.  See Green v Continental Rentals, 68 A. 2d 759, 292 N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 1994), holding:  The intention of the legislature emerges from the principle and policy of the enactment, rather than from the literal sense of the particular terms standing alone.  Literal terms give way to the spirit of the legislation and the words of the enactment may be expanded or contracted according to the manifest purpose of the statute.  Caputo v. Best Foods, Inc. 17 N.J. 259, 264 11 A. 2d 261 (1955), Alexander v. NJP&L, 21 N.J. 373, 379, 122 A. 2d 339 (1956), Wright v. Vogt, 7 N.J. 1, 6-7, 80 A. 2d 108 (1951).
[brief] In 2018, and a few summers prior to that, [...] (“[...]”) (prior to becoming owner of [...] and the applicant of the insurance policy at issue) worked as the Program Director at [...] (“[...]”) in Virginia for young boys from New York and New Jersey.  (Ia325-327).  [...] was responsible for, \textit{inter alia}, organizing field trips and providing transportation.  (Ia327).  To transport campers, [...] used vans, including 12 to 15-passenger vans.  (Ia327).  In later summers, [...] was responsible for renting such vans from [...].  (Ia327).  [...] always procured insurance from [...], an insurance broker, but [...] was never personally involved in obtaining the insurance.  (Ia331).
[brief] I guarantee free access to the courts.  It’s clear the Trial Court failed to acknowledge when a claim under the NJCRA (10:6-2 - Actions permitted under the "New Jersey Civil Rights Act.") (Pa 175-176 ) or NJLAD (N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq.) (Pa 212-262) accrues, and that the deprivation of a right does not extinguish simply because the right is respected by defendants after they are sued for depriving the rights under Tumpson (Pa 388-391), Kumar (Pa 403-412), Perez (Pa 434-442), Kennedy Realty Co., Mensinger (Pa 443-446), Kadonsky, Bd. of County Comm'rs, as cited below.
[brief] The Award**  The $3,889,835.14 awarded to [...] is comprised of four determinations: (1) the amount of EGP, as defined in the PTA, that the Arbitrator determined [...] owed [...] on various construction projects, (2) the contractual interest owed by [...] to [...] on the EGP awarded by the Arbitrator, (3) the preconstruction expenses [...] owed [...] for work [...] performed for [...] on various projects, and (4) the statutory interest owed by [...] to [...] on the unpaid preconstruction expenses.  Da242-248.  Those specific figures are as follows:  \(^2\)  Pursuant to the Rule 51 of the AAA’s Construction Industry Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, to which the Arbitration was subject, “[t]he arbitrator is not empowered to redetermine the merits of any claim already decided. ”  R. 51.  Da164.  Therefore, the Arbitrator lacked the power to reconsider and correct his contradictory determinations, and [...] could only seek relief in the Trial Court as its only available recourse to remedy the Arbitrator’s *ultra vires* determinations.  | Description | Amount | |-------------------------------------------------|-----------------| | EGP Award owed to [...] | $4,310,849.48 | | Interest on EGP Award (corrected) | $365,644.67 | | Preconstruction Expenses owed to [...] | ($732,533.75) | | Interest on Preconstruction Expenses | ($54,125.26) | | **SUM** | **$3,889,835.14**|  Id.  Despite acknowledging some of the technical errors in the Award, the Arbitrator failed to remedy several blatant errors in his decision concerning his interest calculations and his award of EGP for ten projects.  To the extent pertinent, the facts relating to the parties underlying disputes are embedded in the Argument below.
[brief] Four of plaintiffs’-appellants’ brief argues that the [...], Pa72a, incorporated into the Township’s Land Development Ordinance, do not address the size, shape or color of concrete unit pavers permitted in the Historic District.  Pb19  The Court below interpreted the Guidelines as permitting the [...] to require concrete unit paver walkway surfacing be the shape and color of brick.  7T38 – 18 to 25; 7T39 – 1.  The decisions of the Law Division below rendered moot any issue arising from plaintiffs’-appellants’ not seeking the [...]’s interpretation of various sections of Township’s Land Development Ordinance.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Motion to Exclude Vibrations Damage  Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion to Bar  Defendant’s Expert Reports Related to Physical Damage to the Property Filed 07/07/21 .  Da166  Certification of [...], Esq.  In Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Bar Filed 07/07/21 ..................................  Da169  Exhibit 1 (Verified Complaint)  ........................................  Da1 Exhibit 2 (excerpts from Plaintiff’s Appraisal Report) ................................  Da177  Exhibit 3 (Vibrations Monitoring Data from locations in Sea Bright) (not provided)  Exhibit 4 (Report of [...], P.E. Dated 04/07/21) ..............................  Da183,311  Exhibit 5 (Excerpts from Defendant’s Appraisal Report by [...], M.A.I. Dated 09/05/18)  ........................................  Da185  VOLUME II (Da190 to Da389)
[brief] E. [...]  Plaintiff subpoenaed the records from [...]’s long time electrical contractor, [...], requesting all “documents that evidence work [...] performed from January 2011 to January 2018” at the facility located at [...].  (Pa0219—0220).  The records produced by L.D.R. Electric were devoid of any requests by [...] to address the illegible and unclear panel directory going back to 2011.  (Pa0221-0288).  F.  Plaintiff’s Expert’s Opinion
[directive] When an agency can conduct an internal affairs investigation and file disciplinary charges within 45 days of the receipt of a complaint, the 45-day rule does not become an issue.  In many instances this will be possible.  However, if an agency cannot do so, the burden is on the investigator and ultimately the agency to identify the point at which "sufficient information" was developed to initiate disciplinary action.  Therefore, it is important that a detailed chronology be maintained of each investigation so that critical actions and decisions are documented.