ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  (Pa859).  In other words, because the Objectors failed to carry their burden.  And, because, "[t]he court cannot expand the record presented before the ZBA to include things that happened after the ZBA's decision was made, and plaintiffs' request to obtain discovery and expand the record is without foundation in the law and must be denied."  (emphasis added).  (Pa860).  These factual findings are correct and supported by the relevant sections of the transcripts.  These legal conclusions are correct because sheer speculation about the detrimental impact of hypothetical future development of neighboring lots would not have been cognizable by the ZBA as a basis to deny or condition the Homeowners' application.  See Landmark Land, L.L.C. v. Hazlet Twp. Planning Bd., 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 787, *12 (App. Div. 2007) (upholding a Law Division finding that sheer speculation about the hypothetical future development of an abandoned paper street adjacent to a proposed subdivision was not a sufficient ground upon which to deny approval for an access road serving the subdivision).  (Pa808-811 for a copy of the unpublished case that was placed before the Trial Court via counsel's certification).  The Trial Court did not commit error by reviewing relevant excerpts from the ZBA transcripts introduced via counsel's Certification because that is the precise record upon which the Trial Court is supposed to decide actions in lieu of prerogative writs.  V.
[brief] Despite the Trial Court having Granted Summary Judgment in favor of [...] and dismissed Count IV, specifically alleging the Statutory and Common Law Public Trust Doctrine Claims, [...] in its Trial Memorandum indicated an intention to have lay witnesses and experts testify about the impact of the Public Trust Doctrine violation on the legal claims in the remaining Counts I, II & II.  [...] moved pre-trial for an Order *in Limine* strictly prohibiting [...] from introducing any evidence regarding the Public Trust issue at trial.  On February 27, 2023, just prior to commencement of the Bench Trial, the Trial Court issued an Order granting [...]’s Motion *in Limine* stating in relevant part:  “…that the Plaintiff is barred from presenting any evidence at trial regarding the Public trust Doctrine …[.]”  (Pa1731)  G.  **The Bench Trial and Decision:**
[brief] Aa330-31.  After joining [...] and [...] at [...],\(^2\) [...] \(^2\) See, e.g., Pa23 ([...] website featuring Profile of Daniel [...]).  subsequently contacted the investors.  Aa327, 333, 341-42, 350, 360-63.  [...] proceeded to solicit the investors on behalf of [...] (Aa330-31, 350) for duplicate deals on behalf of [...] into the same properties as the [...].  Aa332-33, 361.  But when the investors demanded information, [...] refused, claiming he had been “slapped” by [...] before for giving away too much information.  Aa331, 361-63.  Having been caught holding investor funds, [...] then offered to reimburse the investor funds it had taken, but tried to short-change the investors with an unfair deal.  Aa327, 333, 337, 341-42, 346-47, 352, 362-63.  [...] tried in vain to smooth the deal over with the investors, only to be told that it was unfair.  Aa337, 356-57, 363.  As a result, the investors have attested that [...], [...], and [...] are in control of the investor funds.  Aa326-27, 332-33, 336-37, 341-42, 346, 351, 356-57, 363.  [...] is front and center in the scheme to steal the assets of and conceal information from the [...] to defraud the L3 investors.  His deposition is both material and necessary for the reasons below.
[brief] **[...]’s OPRA/Common Law Right of Access Requests**  On or about February 26, 2020, [...] sent an OPRA and common law right of access request to the [...] for records purportedly pertaining to his citizen’s Complaint filed against [...].  (Da1)  [...] specifically requested: (1) emails and letters between the [...] and the [...] between November 8, 2019 and the present concerning *State of New Jersey v.  Liliana S. DeAvila-[...]*, Complaint-Warrant Number [...]; (2) emails and letters between the [...] and the [...] between November 8, 2019 and the present concerning *State of New Jersey v. Liliana S. DeAvila-[...]*, Complaint-Warrant Number [...]; and (3) all documents filed in the Superior Court of New Jersey by the [...] in *State of New Jersey v. Liliana S. DeAvila-[...]*, Complaint Warrant Number [...].  (Id.)  On August 7, 2020, the [...] Custodian denied requests (1) and (2) as inter/intra agency advisory, consultative, or deliberative material, and as criminal investigatory records.  (Da2)  The Custodian denied request (3) as records not made, maintained, filed or received by the Division.  (Id.)  On or about March 7, 2022, [...] filed a Denial of Access Complaint with the [...] alleging that the [...] Custodian unlawfully denied requests (1) and (2) because there was no indication from [...] that an investigation was conducted and that any communications were not pre-decisional.  (Pa80)  On October 8, 2020, [...] submitted an OPRA and common law right of access request to the [...] which is virtually identical to his [...] request.  (Pa66)  On November 5, 2020, the [...] served a response, which attached a copy of the 11-page Complaint and indicated that it possessed no other responsive records.  (Pa69)  [...] requested reconsideration of the response, which the [...] declined by letter, dated December 10, 2020.  (Pa73-74)  [...] filed another request on July 26, 2021 which was virtually identical to his October 8, 2020 request.  (Pa39; Pa66)  The [...] submitted a response on August 9, 2021, stating that, in November 5, 2020, it had forwarded all records concerning the matter and reiterated that it possessed no other responsive records.  (Pa42)  **The Instant Lawsuit**
[brief] There, the court reasoned that a third-party debt collector is not a party to any “sale” of “merchandise” as those terms are defined in the CFA.  *Id.* at 339.  But *DepoLink* is inconsistent with *Jefferson Loan Co., Inc.*’s confirmation that the CFA’s scope extends to “subsequent performance” which includes conduct seeking to enforce a covered credit transaction.  Furthermore, *DepoLink* relied on *Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, P.C.*, 777 F. Supp. 2d 823 (D.N.J. 2011) and did not mention *Gonzalez*.  *Chulsky*, aside from being non-binding, was issued before—and, therefore, never considered—*Gonzalez*, 207 N.J. at 582, which cited *Jefferson Loan Co., Inc.* for the CFA’s application to the collection activities of a servicing agent.  Based on the foregoing, the dismissal of the non-FDCPA claims should also be reversed.
[brief] ”  *Restatement Restitution*, sec.8(2).  In the instant case, although the existence of a ROFR might be material to a third-party buyer, it was not and could not be material to the ROFR holder.  Not only is a ROFR holder already aware of the existence of its own ROFR regardless of whether it is included in a bona fide offer, but that ROFR is their right, which, if they exercise it, the limiting effect of it in the offer would become moot.  We know that the absence or presence of the mention of the ROFR had no impact on the third-party buyer because even after that provision was added in writing to the contract, neither the price, nor any other term changed.  Da71.  The issue of the ROFR being contained or not contained in the offer/contract only served as a mechanism for the Plaintiff to justify taking the position that the offer was somehow not valid.  The Trial Court agreed with this position.  The Trial Court’s decision was therefore in error.
[brief] Thus, an employer may be liable for the criminal acts of an employee if it had reason to know of a prior conviction for a prior different crime.  See Lingar v. Live-In Companions, Inc., 300 N.J. Super. 22 (App. Div. 1997) (finding evidence of constructive knowledge of prior convictions for drug distribution and receiving stolen property could support a claim for negligent hiring based on neglect and car theft).  Alternatively, liability could attach where an untrained, inexperienced, and/or unsupervised employee causes harm in the course of carrying out a task that the employee had never previously attempted.
[brief] Furthermore, in Article XXI, it states:  A.  A Trooper may engage in “outside employment or other activity” (as that term is defined in SOP B 17, and any amendments thereto) with prior approval of the Superintendent.  Pa45.  Under the Division’s assertion of parentheses as mere examples, the definition of outside employment or other activity contained in SOP B 17 would not apply to the contract simply because it is present in parenthesis.  The Division’s entire case relies on its claim that the divisor 2,080 is illustrative and that listing out the other possibilities for divisors would be cumbersome.  With respect to the within grievance, that allegation is simply not true.  There is a finite number of fiscal year work hours that are possible in a given fiscal year.  In fact, there are only three possibilities for fiscal year work hours – 2,080, 2,088, and 2,096.  Had the parties intended for the divisor to fluctuate with the number of fiscal year work days or work hours, they very easily could have either 1. not included any language or 2. they could have written the contractual equation as base plus maintenance divided by fiscal year work hours times 1.5.  They did neither.  In the most recent contract negotiations, the parties agreed to amend the language to reflect the latter.  Therefore, the language now states that the divisor is the number of fiscal year work days converted to hours.  Additionally, the Division’s contention that the [...] presented a one-sided issue that presupposed its conclusion is erroneous.  The Union’s issue submission and the Division’s issue submission were very similar – and neither reference utilizing Treasury Circulars instead of the contract – which was what the Arbitrator determined the issue to be.
[brief] The surveillance video timed the shooting to be at 1:53 a.m. (17T102-15 to 18).  Still photographs were made from the surveillance video which captured his person of interest entering the [...].  (9T118-1 to 6; 9T118-19 to 22).  Still photographs from the video were made showing the tattoo on the neck.  (9T119-19 to 24).  Police also made from the video still photographs of another African American male with dreadlocks and a second African American male standing near to the man wearing the distinctive jacket.  (9T120-4 to 16; 9T129-19 to 25; 9T133-12 to 9T134-3; 9T134-22 to 9T135-9; 9T134-22 to 9T135-9; 9T135-18 to 9T136-2; 9T137-2 to 12; 9T138-5 to 8; 10T211-12 to 22).  From the surveillance videos, it appeared to police that these three men of interest arrived at the party at the same time.  (9T138-9 to 12).  The police created a TRAXS bulletin containing the still photographs to all police departments.
[brief] And this is the case where, by reason of kinship, the grantor reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in the grantee, and the grantee abuses the confidential relationship by retaining the property as his own in violation of his oral promise to hold it [***14] in trust for the grantor.  Equity relieves against a breach or abuse of such confidence.  It is not requisite that there be a technical fiduciary relationship.  Where the confidence was induced by close kinship, its abuse will support a constructive trust.  Equity affords a remedy where unjust enrichment ensues from an abuse of the confidence thus reposed.  Sinclair v. Purdy, 235 N.Y. 245; 139 N.E. 255; Foreman v. Foreman, 251 N.Y. 237; 167 N.E. 428; Housewright v. Steinke, 326 Ill. 398; 158 N.E. 138; Brison v. Brison, 75 Cal. 525, 17 P. 689; Silvers v. Howard, 106 Kan. 762; 190 P. 1.
[brief] In support of this conclusion, the State claims that 1) the resentencing court was bound by the Appellate Division’s affirmance of the consecutive sentences, and 2) that the original sentencing court had already explained the fairness of the overall ¹ Da: Defendant’s appendix 2T: Transcript of 5/8/2015 (Sentencing)  Db: Defendant’s opening brief  4T: Transcript of 8/2/2022 (Resentencing)  Sb: State’s brief sentence, as required by *State v. Torres*, 246 N.J. 246, 268 (2021).
[brief] This Court can, and should, find as a matter of law that [...]’s claims must be compelled to arbitration, as numerous other courts have done on similar procedural postures.  See, e.g., Goffe, 238 N.J. at 195, 216–17 (finding that a summary judgment standard was not appropriate and that the trial court properly compelled to arbitration the plaintiff’s claims based on consideration of just the complaint and the certifications provided to it); McCoy, 2024 WL 4447106, at *1, *7 (Ra01-Ra07) (affirming trial court ruling compelling the plaintiff’s LAD claims to arbitration based on a single, enforceable agreement that the plaintiffs agreed to); Antonucci, 470 N.J. Super. at 557–58 (finding that LAD claims were properly considered and compelled to arbitration on a motion to dismiss, although instructing that such dismissal should be, as here, without prejudice).  Indeed, that is precisely what the Supreme Court determined was proper in Goffe, wherein the court wrote that, even without having a plenary hearing, but solely “based on the complaint and the certifications provided to the trial court, it is apparent to us that the parties’ claims are subject to an enforceable arbitration agreement. ”  238 N.J. at 216.  [...]’s request for a plenary hearing ostensibly to determine “whether [she] actually ‘signed’ or otherwise agreed to be bound by the purported Agreement,” (Pb38–39), cannot avoid the enforceability of the parties’ arbitration agreement.  Respondents have conclusively shown and [...] admitted that she affixed her electronic signature to the Mutual Arbitration Agreement, and that she ratified the Agreement by beginning her employment with [...].  There was, and is, nothing for a plenary hearing to resolve.  CONCLUSION
[directive] Fòm Revize Apati di 01/08/2018, Pibliye pa Sipleman dekrè nimewo #04-14, CN 11171-Haitian Creole paj 1 nan 2 Revised Form Effective 01/08/2018, Promulgated by Supplement to Directive #04-14, CN 11171- Haitian Creole page 1 of 2
[brief] *Jewish Ctr. of Sussex Cnty. v. Whale*, 86 N.J. 619, 624 (1981).  Plaintiff’s own witness at the chancery trial, [...], established these elements.  His testimony affirmed that the [...] were never in default and never missed a loan payment, yet were wrongfully assigned to “in default/foreclosure” status and to the 2009 “investor trust” so indicating.  Plaintiff took no steps to rectify the wrongful default/foreclosure assignment.  And when the [...] tried to refinance the 2004 loan over the years, plaintiff, and the file maintained on the [...]’ 2004 loan, continued to erroneously show the default/foreclosure assignment – precluding the [...] from obtaining refinancing and sticking them with the high interest 2004 loan for years and years.  As summarized above, the [...] lost numerous refinances due to the false title issues that the 2009 assignment to “default/foreclosure” caused -- including two denials of refinancing by [...], two by [...], and outright rejection of a loan application by [...] (DOA – dead on arrival).  Plaintiff did nothing to correct this erroneous information that was hurting the [...] even though it was aware that the 2009 assignment was wrongful and was leading potential lenders to believe that the 2004 loan had been defaulted or involved in foreclosure.  New Jersey law defines the tort of slander of title “as publication of a false assertion concerning plaintiff’s title, causing plaintiff special damages,” Lone v. Brown, 199 N.J. Super. 420, 426 (App. Div. 1985); Andrew v. Deshler, 45 N.J.L. 167, 169–72 (1883).
[brief] Pa0982-Pa0991.  [...] was the highest bidder for these proposed lease rights so, in May of 1995, the Borough and [...] entered into a Lease Agreement for the Leased Premises (the “1995 Lease”).  Pa0969-Pa0981.  The 1995 Lease was for an initial 5-year term with an option to renew the lease for two additional 5-year terms.  Pa0969, Section 2.  In 1999, [...] advised the Borough that [...] was interested in seeking an extension to the term of the 1995 Lease (which was then due to expire in 2010 if all of the renewal options were exercised).  Since the 1995 Lease had been procured through a competitive open public process as required under the Local Lands and Buildings Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12-1 et seq., the Borough engaged in a second competitive open public procurement process in 1999 soliciting bids for the lease of the Leased Premises for an initial 5-year term expiring in 2005 with the option of up to four renewals for subsequent 5-year terms which, if exercised, would result in the Lease expiring in May of 2025.
[directive] All applications to stay or modify this Order shall be made only in the Superior Court.  (2)  If you want to make an application to stay or modify this Order, you must notify the Superior Court, Family Part and a hearing will be scheduled.  Contact the Superior Court, Family Part ___________, Team Leader at ( ) - , or ___________, Team Leader at ( ) - .  (3)  The permits law enforcement to post a copy of this Order or Drug Offender Restraining Order Act of 1999 an equivalent notice in appropriate locations for the purpose of informing the public, to publish it in newspapers and to distribute it.
[brief] The sentencing court in [...]’s case failed to provide any such statement of the overall fairness of consecutive sentences.  The only statement the court made at all as to the imposition of consecutive terms was its belief that the existence of multiple victims, the justification to the families of those victims, and the need for deterrence required consecutive sentences.  This does not provide any analysis as to the overall fairness of consecutive sentences.  To the extent that it provides any analysis at all, the sentencing court is not concerned with analyzing the fairness of the sentence to the defendant, but the fairness of the sentence to the victims and society.  This is not what is required by Yarbough and Torres.  It is essential that the sentencing court explain the overall fairness of imposing consecutive terms to properly address inappropriate sentencing disparities and the abuse of discretion.  Here, the court provided no such analysis or statement as to the overall fairness of the consecutive terms.  Without this statement it is impossible for there to be any meaningful review of the sentencing court’s findings.  The court which ruled on [...]’s motion to correct his illegal sentence incorrectly failed to grasp the necessity of a statement as to overall fairness, ruling that such a determination of fairness can be reached without that statement.  But, a determination as to overall fairness cannot be based upon conjecture by a subsequent court.  Id.  Rather, as the Torres court makes clear, the lack of a statement as to overall fairness requires that the matter be remanded for resentencing with the consideration of overall fairness addressed.  Id.  The reviewing court conceded that there was no statement as to overall fairness.  Accordingly, the matter must be remanded for resentencing to give [...] his full due process rights to challenge his lengthy sentence.  The analysis of the overall fairness of the sentence cannot be solely focused on the victims’ families or on the needs for general deterrence, as the sentencing court indicated.  Rather, it must focus on [...] himself.  It necessarily must take into account [...]’s relatively young age at the time of the offenses and his age after the time that the consecutive sentences requires.  It must take into account the circumstances of the offenses.  And it also must take into account [...] as he stands today—no longer a young man, but a model prisoner who has taken every opportunity to rehabilitate himself and serve as a positive role model for those around him.  A proper evaluation of the overall fairness of [...]’s sentencing is necessary to give effect to the sentencing goals of avoiding excessive, disproportionate, or arbitrary sentences.  N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(b)(4).  The failure to provide any analysis of the overall fairness of [...]’s sentence as required by law denied [...] his due process right under the 14th Amendment to challenge his sentence, and denied a reviewing court the opportunity to determine if the sentence was imposed with sound discretion.  Accordingly, [...]’s sentence was illegally imposed, and the matter must be remanded for resentencing.
[brief] As established in the deposition of [...] on July 28, 2023, who is a representative for the [...].  “The next, Question 8: "Does the township own this tree?"  You answered yes.  Yes. ” (Pa172-193, Tr 62:14-16).  It stands to reason that the only entities that intended to benefit from the repair are the municipality or the property owner, the defendants.  The lower Court solely focused on actual or constructive notice, otherwise known as subsection b in the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, “Plaintiff must establish that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character.
[brief] Further, the longer the ruling below is allowed to stand, the higher the likelihood that it will be used as precedent by other litigants throughout the State to restrict elected officials’ from exercising their first amendment rights and the right of the public to be involved in matters that intimately affect local government and their communities.  By incorrectly assigning impropriety to the Mayor, the trial court manufactured the very scenario in which appointment of an SHO was deemed warranted.  Even assuming that the Mayor’s expression of opinion was not appropriate, same does not constitute a basis to appoint an SHO on its own.  Under no circumstance did the trial court have a legitimate basis to usurp the Board’s authority and appoint a SHO.  The use of the Mayor’s press releases to do so was nothing more than the first card in a house full of them.  POINT IV
[brief] Id. at 8-9.  The Court, likening the “but for” test to the proximate cause standard, explained that proximate cause is a “cause which naturally and probably led to and might have been expect to produce” the result complained of.  Id. at 13-14, citing Cruz-Mendez v ISU Insurance Services of San Francisco, 156 N.J. 556, 575 (1999).  It further explained:  In contrast, the essential significant or substantial cause of a disability requires a far more demanding proof than a standard which requires a cause that “probably led to and might have been expected to produce the accident complained of. ”  Rather, appellant must establish by expert medical opinion that the incident [at issue] directly resulted in his total and permanent disability.  Id. at 14-15 (Emphasis added), citing Gerba, supra., 83 N.J. at 185-86 and Korelnia, supra., 83 N.J. at 170.  The Court held, “[b]ecause the ALJ used the incorrect legal standard, the Board properly rejected her decision” and “correctly rejected the ALJ’s finding regarding the element of direct causation.  Id. at 15.  These principles are directly applicable to this case.  As demonstrated by his testimony, [...] applied the incorrect “but for” proximate cause standard to reach his conclusion that the 2015 accident was the direct cause of Petitioner’s disability.  The direct cause standard requires “far more demanding proof” and thus, the Board in this matter correctly rejected [...]’s and the ALJ’s findings regarding the element of direct causation.  CONCLUSION