ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Id.*  The first step is to determine whether the psychiatrist or psychologist actually relied upon the hearsay statement as a necessary element in the formulation of his opinion.  In that event, the testimony should be circumscribed by a limiting instruction to the effect that the jury should not consider the hearsay statement as substantive evidence relating to the question of guilt or innocence of the accused, but only as evidence tending to support the ultimate expert conclusion of the doctor on the question of insanity or diminished capacity.  If it further appears that the expert's opinion hinges upon the truth of the matter asserted, rather than the fact that it was said, then the jury should be instructed that the probative value of the doctor's opinion will depend upon whether there is, from all the evidence in the case, independent proof of the statement made by the accused.  Thus, the second step in resolving questions relating to psychiatric testimony is to determine whether the psychiatrist or psychologist considered the hearsay statement as true in arriving at his diagnosis, and to instruct the jury accordingly.  *[Id. at 78]*.
[brief] See *Covell*, 157 N.J. at 559-60, 567-68 (finding a defendant’s statement to police officers about a prior alleged act where he was never charged and it was never established that he committed that prior alleged act nevertheless satisfied the third Cofield prong).  The fourth prong requires a showing that the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by its apparent prejudice.  Cofield, 127 N.J. at 338.  “In the weighing process, the court should also consider the availability of other evidence that can be used to prove the same point. ”  Gillispie, 208 N.J. at 90 (quoting Barden, 195 N.J. at 389).
[brief] But that rule applies only when a party raises the issue below.  Pleading a statute of limitations defense in an answer is not sufficient to preserve the matter for appeal if a party does not actually litigate the issue.  The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that defendants have an obligation to both raise and establish by a preponderance of the evidence.  *Fees v. Trow*, 105 N.J. 330, 335 (1987); *Williams v. Bell Tel. Labs. Inc.*, 132 N.J. 109, 118-120 (1993) (defendant waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to assert it at any stage of the proceedings after pleading it in its answer).  Though pled in their answer, the defendants did not raise the issue with respect to *any* of the claims that proceeded to trial—not on summary judgment, not in their *Rule 4:40-1* motion at the close of Plaintiffs’ case, and not in their post-trial proposed findings or post-trial motions.  In fact, the defendants surgically raised the issue in one and only one context: in support of their summary judgment motion as to the *specific and limited* issue of [...]’s claim for unpaid compensation—on which they prevailed.  (13T 57:2-13; 59:17 to 60:18; 79:4-18).  They did not raise it on summary judgment or at trial as to any of the other claims in this lawsuit.  The appellant does not identify any section of any transcript where she affirmatively raised this issue in any other context. \(^{17}\)  Even if the Court does not reject appellant’s newly raised statute of limitations issue outright, the Court must still affirm based on the discovery rule.
[brief] There's only two situations in which he could have made that sale and I'm just going to go through those briefly.  The first one is if [...] owned 30 percent of [...] just as if I had something in my pocket and I want to sell it to you.  If he owned 30 percent of those shares he could have taken them and he could have given them to the investors, but he didn't own 30 percent of [...].  It's our argument that he owned 5 percent at that time of [...] and so he couldn't take something he owned and sell it to the investors.  (7T 59:7 to 59:17) (emphasis added).
[brief] In the second half of December of 2022 I was able to obtain a copy of the court order of 12/20/2010 by Hon. [...] (068a) and a copy of the Group 3 List (Page 400 of the Group 3 List, 087a,).  Those documents were kept on eCourt under docket [...] and sealed for many years.  The public does not have access to it and it took me a long time to find them.  A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE NJ STATE RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURE REGIME FILING THE FIRST FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT BY [...] ([...])  on 3/10/2009 I explained all the relevant facts in full detail in my Affidavit at 037a.  In this section I’ll summarize the roles of all state courts and agencies in my foreclosure cases so the Appellate Judges understand what has been going on.
[brief] **The Boardwalk Reservation**  Relying on pure speculation from their proposed expert, Defendants argue the trial court should have found that [...] did not build the boardwalk because it “was either unnecessary or un-welcome,” or “[...] decided to control access through other means. ” (Db19).  This argument flies in the face of *Lennig*, which stands for the proposition that one cannot reserve an opportunity to construct something and then use that reservation to retain control and restrict the right of access later.  See *Lennig*, 41 N.J. Eq. at 608-09.  Moreover, there is nothing on the 1925 Plan or any other document,\(^{16}\) demonstrating what the boardwalk would have looked like.  See *Restatement*, § 2.13, cmt. b (“[O]nly a clear statement that the developer retains the right to deviate from the uses shown on the map will ordinarily be sufficient to prevent implication of a servitude. ”).  A century later, Defendants cannot now \(^{16}\) The 1925 Plan was filed without any attachments, amendments, or any other document explaining anything on the map.  say, as the trial court put it, “well, we had a right to build a boardwalk there, never knowing what the boardwalk would have been, whether it be grade level, whether it would interfere with the access.  But, we have a right now to interfere with your access to the ocean because we had . . . that boardwalk right there. ” (T70:21-T71:1).
[brief] These two bills were introduced in the Legislature on January 6, 2022 during the final days of the 2020-2021 legislative session.  (Pa66 at ¶ 9.)  The law was enacted within a shroud of secrecy because State House access was limited due to COVID-19, the legislative calendar did not list this bill, and the Governor had issued a State of Emergency due to inclement weather sending State employees home.  Id.  Specifically, on January 6, 2022, the Legislature had COVID protocols in effect preventing the public from attending Assembly Appropriations hearing.  (Pa66 at ¶ 8.)  Also on January 6, 2022, the Governor had declared a State of Emergency, so many state employees were not present at the State House.  Id.  A search of the online legislative calendar with its online dropdown bar demonstrates that the Legislature never listed S. 49 nor A. 6260 for introduction or proceedings related to these bills as of January 6, 2022.  (Pa101-03 at ¶¶ 17-20; Pa112-31.)  In fact, the calendar was not updated to show the bills’ listings until January 10, 2022 – the date by which the bills were enacted.  (Pa119 & 129.)  Thus, the public had no way to know these bills that were subsequently enacted were being introduced or considered on January 6, 2022, as distinguished from the reproductive freedom bills that had been pending since --- 1The term “Pa” refers to Applicants-Petitioners’ Appendix in support of appeal filed herewith.
[brief] Crucially, [...] also avoids addressing the obvious absurdity that would result from its position.  [...] frames this as a [...] and [...] issue.  To do so, [...] lumps [...] together with his separate medical practice entity defendants, [...], [...], and [...].  But that does not work under [...]’s theory.  Under the CNA, fault would be apportioned amongst each defendant, both individuals and entities.  See Techdan, 253 N.J. at 111-13, 117-19 (holding jury should apportion fault among the four entity and individual defendants); Lyon v. Barrett, 89 N.J. 294, 300 (1982) (explaining a corporation is separate from its shareholders).  Thus, under [...]’s per se conflict theory, each entity despite being owned by [...] would need to retain its own separate counsel, with [...] effectively having to direct and pay for four different attorneys.  The absurdity is plain.  Indeed, it would result another with a cross-claim to seek apportionment to minimize their fault, and to seek contribution.  Pb16.  But that is simply not the case.  [...] cannot force direct adversity on defendants like [...] and [...] who wish to assert consistent defenses.  They are not obligated to claim against one another rather than to put up a united joint defense denying liability altogether.  Indeed, [...] confirmed during argument in response to questioning by the trial court that the defendants have not yet sought to point the finger at one another and that it may never occur.  T43:19-45:9; see also See ACPE Opinion 605, 120 N.J.L.J. 317, at *2 (explaining co-defendants’ liability to the plaintiff can be the subject of discovery and tried as a first stage and, if the plaintiff prevails, then cross-claims if any can be later pursued in a second stage).
[brief] Filed 11/16/2010.  “The court noted that the [...] never had possession of the note because it was not delivered and indorsed and therefore the [...] was not a "holder" under the New Jersey UCC.  Also preventing the [...] from becoming a "holder" was that there was not a proper indorsement on the note itself, or an allonge that was executed at the time that the proof of claim was filed.  The [...] could not be deemed a "non holder in possession" because it did not possess the note.  Finally, the [...] was not a "non-holder not in possession" because it could not satisfy the requisites of lost, destroyed or stolen instruments or payment or acceptance of the instrument by mistake under N.J.S.A. 12A:3-309 and subsection d. of N.J.S.A. 12A:3-418, respectively.
[brief] Da269-273.  Nevertheless, in the complete absence of supporting proof, [...] alleged that [...] was established for these four projects by an alleged “prior course of dealing. ”  Da269-272.  Finally, [...] asserted that because [...] entered into a contract for a project known as [...] with an “affiliate of . . . [...]’s client and investor,” [...] also owed [...] [...] payments for that project.  Da273.  The record is clear, however, that the parties not agree on the [...] for any of these ten projects and there was no course of dealing excusing the Additional Backlog Conditions, which is precisely why the Arbitrator did not so much as acknowledge [...]’s course of dealing contrivance as alleged in its Statement of Claim.
[brief] Indeed, even at the return date of the plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial, the court’s entire analysis as to Evid. R. 403 consisted of the following:  “That defendant mopped or placed a caution sign in a lobby following plaintiff’s fall does not establish that the floor was slippery or dangerous but the jury might jump to that conclusion based upon the post incident remedial actions. ” (5T27-22 to 28-6).  or culpable conduct, failed to consider the long established exceptions allowing such evidence as to other issues.  Plaintiff argued that the proffered evidence fell within the exception to Evid. Rule 407 which allows such evidence to prove “the condition existing at the time of the accident.
[brief] Pursuant to the Illicit Agreement  On or about March 18, 2021, [...] created and formed [...] for purposes of serving as the redeveloper of the Laurel-Saddlewood Block pursuant to, and in furtherance of, [...]’s illicit agreement with the City.  (Pa10, ¶ 29.)  On May 18, 2021, the [...] (the “Agency”), in accordance with the City’s illicit agreement with [...] and at the instruction of City representatives, adopted Resolution No. 21-05-12 which provides, in relevant part, as follows:  **Section 2.**  The Board of Commissioners hereby designates [...] Laurel-Saddlewood Holdings, LLC as redeveloper of the Property.  **Section 3.**  The Chair, Vice-Chair, Executive Director and/or Secretary of the Agency are hereby authorized to execute the Redevelopment Agreement, in substantially the form on file with the Agency, together with such additions, deletions and modifications as deemed necessary or desirable by the Executive Director in consultation with Counsel, and any and all other documents necessary or desirable to effectuate the Resolution, in consultation with counsel.  **Section 4.**  The Chair, Vice-Chair, Executive Director and/or Secretary of the Agency are hereby authorized to undertake all actions necessary to effectuate this Resolution.  **Section 5.**  This Resolution shall take effect immediately.  [Pa198-99.]  The Agency’s decision to authorize the execution of a redevelopment agreement between the City and [...], and to designate [...] as the redeveloper of the Laurel-Saddlewood Block, was a predetermined conclusion pursuant to the City’s improper agreement with [...].  (Pa11, ¶31.)  But for [...]’s back room promise to develop a multi-million-dollar school for the City, the City would not have caused the Agency to adopt Resolution No. 21-05-12.  (Id., ¶32.)  On May 26, 2021, the Agency, pursuant to Resolution No. 21-05-12, executed a Redevelopment Agreement (the “Redevelopment Agreement”) with [...] for the proposed redevelopment of the Laurel-Saddlewood Block.  (Pa569.)  The illegal agreement between the City and [...] was confirmed by and memorialized in Section 2.15 of the Redevelopment Agreement, which provides, as follows:  **Community Benefits Agreement.**  Redeveloper shall construct and/or provide the following projections which shall be included as part of the Project, including (i) the construction of a Pre-K through Grade Five public school which will comprise at a minimum 45,000 square feet with at least fifteen (15) classrooms, a combined gymnasium and auditorium, and a cafeteria (the ‘School’).  . .  [Id.]  Pursuant to Article 2 of the Redevelopment Agreement, [...] was responsible for all reasonable and actual costs associated with, among other things, the construction of the school.  (Id.)  Plaintiff Commences the Current Litigation
[brief] There is no record of Tenant having missed any monthly rent payments since the Gym Closure ended in September 2020.  On August 1, 2021, Landlord, for the second consecutive year, failed to pay the Tenant’s Allowance annual installment payment of $121,666.67 plus interest (1T9-17 to 1T10-2).  Seventeen days later, at the trial conducted virtually on August 18, 2021, the trial judge candidly admitted he had not yet read the Lease (1T18-4 to 18-6).  The parties agreed that there were two main issues for the judge to decide: (i) how to calculate the amount of late fees and interest; and (ii) whether the amount Tenant owed Landlord should be reduced or offset entirely by what had by then become multiple years of unreimbursed or under-reimbursed Tenant’s Allowance installment payments dating back to August 2019, before the Tenant had missed any payments (1T11-25 to 1T12-11).
[brief] By their own certification, in just one day, S.49 was given all three readings in the General Assembly and passed in one day.  Id.  [...]’s certification and the Minutes demonstrate that the Legislature did not abide by N.J. Const. art. IV, § 4, ¶ 6.  Given [...] certifies A. 6260 is substituted by S. 49, all three readings of S. 49 in the Assembly occurred on January 10, 2022, and thus, the bill did not receive the required twenty-four hour break between second and third readings in the Assembly.  (Pa236-37.)  Similarly, there is no record that at least sixty legislators voted to declare an emergency to override this constitutional requirement.  See N.J. Const. art. IV, § 4, ¶ 6.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s/Appellant’s Amended Complaint should be affirmed, in addition to awarding Defendants/Respondents attorney fees and costs.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION [...], IN ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, AND ON BEHALF OF ITS MEMBERS, PLAINTIFF VS. [...], [...] AND [...], DEFENDANTS  APPEAL NO. [...]  ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY ESSEX COUNTY LAW  DIVISION, CIVIL PART  DOCKET NO.: [...]  SAT BELOW: HON. [...], J.S.C. REPLY  BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, [...]
[brief] Here the Bank did not produce direct evidence by affidavit or certification that the Plaintiff signed the account application or that copies of the application and deposit agreement were supplied to the Plaintiff at the local branch or otherwise.  Nor did the Bank present evidence that any established or standard procedure was followed.  Bank’s attorney argued that to accept Plaintiff’s position would “up end the consumer financial industry, affecting all types of consumer bank, credit card and loan agreements, which are done electronically (1T 22-23 to 22-17).
[directive] 5.  Each County Prosecutor’s Office, the Division of Criminal Justice, the New Jersey State Police and the Division of Parole will identify and replace any Certified CED Instructor lost for any reason, including retirement, reassignment, change of employment, disability, disciplinary action, etc., within sixty (60) days of such loss, upon written notification to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice by the County Prosecutor, Superintendent of State Police, or Chairman of the State Parole Board.  6.
[brief] Dear [...]:  Please accept this letter brief pursuant to Rule 2:6-2(b) on behalf of Respondent [...].  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS........2  ARGUMENT  THE BOARD OF REVIEW  CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT LAMBDON WAS DISQUALIFIED FOR UNEMPLOYMENT  BENEFITS PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)  BECAUSE HE LEFT WORK VOLUNTARILY WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE WORK..................................................................................................................  5  CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................
[brief] In Chrisanthis v. [...], 361 N.J. Super. 448, 466 (App. Div. 2003), the Appellate Division reviewed the application of the Pukowsky test in the context of a summary judgment motion.  As this court explained, “[r]ecognizing that the NJLAD applies to employer-employee relationships only and does not protect independent contractors, the [trial] judge determined that the proofs were insufficient to establish an employment relationship between plaintiff and the County to support NJLAD liability.
[directive] Except with or shared be not shall 2(e) section in defined criminal as offense a of investigation an involves agency enforcement law a than other agency, government or entity, person, any shown or to provided the by required is disclosure such unless such agency, of civilian employee authorized or officer or law the unless or order, court or a by prosecutions, in discovery governing Court of Rules the of Director the or designee, or Prosecutor County the with consultation in agency enforcement enforcement person's/entity's/non-law the that determines designee, or Justice Criminal of Division maintaining in interest enforcement law the outweighs access for need agency's/public's confidentiality.  ADDITIONAL IMPOSE PROSECUTOR TO COUNTY OF AUTHORITY  12.  REQUIREMENTS  County a of authority the limit any in way to construed be shall  Directive in Nothing this 23 Page Prosecutor to issue directives or guidelines to the law enforcement agencies subject to his or her supervisory authority, setting forth additional procedural or or substantive requirements restrictions concerning BWCs and BWC recordings, such or conflict provided that directives guidelines do not with any provision of For Prosecutor may: specify explicit this Directive.  example, a County additional when municipal B activated; impose limits circumstances a police department WC must be on municipal specify additional circumstances when a BWC the authority of a police department to categorically the of with enhanced audio/visual capabilities must be activated; prohibit use BWCs prosecutorial approval to use such such vision (cf. section 7.6, which requires as infrared night will "tagged," etc. specify additional when a BWC recording be features); and circumstances
[brief] Further, unlike the *Printing Mart* case, which referred to a pleading that was in a “preliminary stage of litigation,” Plaintiff’s proposed new claim was sought late in litigation with a discovery end date less than a month from the date the motion was filed and an initial trial date scheduled only months away.  (Pa12).  The case at that point in litigation was certainly *not* in a “preliminary stage of litigation” and therefore completely distinguishable.  In light of all the above, the Trial Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration rightfully so.
[brief] Smith, 251 N.J. at 253, 265-66.  When asked whether he could see the driver of the Suburban as it passed, [...] said, “No, sir.  The -- the front windows were tinted. ”  (1T 9-19 to 21)  But [...] did not testify that the front window tint alone was responsible for obstructing his view.  See also (1T 10-7 to 10) (responding, “Completely tinted, yes,” when asked whether he “couldn’t see the driver because the windows were tinted,” but offering no testimony that the front tinted windows were responsible for his inability to see the driver); (1T 73-15 to 74-11) (testifying that he could not see inside the car as it passed but offering no testimony that this was because of the front tinted windows).
[directive] 6.  Notificará sin demora a su oficial de libertad a prueba de cualquier cambio de dirección o residencia.  Debe obtener el permiso de su oficial de libertad a prueba si desea mudarse fuera del condado o estado.  No podrá abandonar el Estado de Nueva Jersey durante más de 24 horas sin el permiso de su oficial de libertad a prueba.  You shall promptly report any change of address or residence to your probation officer.  You must obtain permission from your probation officer if you wish to move outside the county or state.  You may not leave the state of New Jersey for more than 24 hours without permission from your probation officer.
[brief] (T9-7-9.)  On September 23, 2013 – eighteen months after the Third Circuit affirmed [...] – Plaintiff filed a motion in federal court to void [...]’s order dismissing the Complaint.  (Da 15).  On December 2, 2013, Plaintiff filed another motion in District Court requesting that the Court take judicial notice of an order entered in yet another case filed by Plaintiff in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, captioned [...] v. [...], et al., [...].  (Da 37).  On April 30, 2014, [...] denied Plaintiff’s Motions to Vacate and to Take Judicial Notice, finding that Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate the Judgement was a clear attempt to relitigate matters already decided by [...] and affirmed by the Third Circuit.  (Pa 93-99).  Eight years later, on September 6, 2022, Plaintiff moved to reinstate his Complaint in Monmouth County.
[brief] The trial court also took issue with the amount of time [...]’s counsel spent preparing for and attending “3 depositions lasting approximately 14 hours,” despite the amount of time billed also including the time spent preparing [...]’s representative for a deposition that was ultimately cancelled last-minute by Plaintiffs and never rescheduled.  (Id.; Pa000498-500; Pa000504-06; Pa000558).  This preparation time was overlooked by the trial court, which also did not consider work conducted before and after the depositions of the other witnesses.  Additionally, although Plaintiffs attempted to criticize [...]’s counsel for attending the other defendants’ depositions and billing for same, [...]’s counsel had no choice.