ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] YOU HAVE BEEN SUMMONED TO OUR COURTHOUSE FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT DUTIES OF CITIZENSHIP – SERVICE AS A GRAND JUROR.  THE FUNCTION OF THE GRAND JURY IS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT A CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED AND THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED IT.  THE GRAND JURY SERVES AS A SCREENING MECHANISM TO ENSURE THAT BEFORE PERSONS ARE REQUIRED TO STAND TRIAL ON A CRIMINAL CHARGE THERE BE AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR IT, AND ALSO SERVES TO PREVENT CITIZENS FROM BEING EXPOSED TO THE RIGORS OF A CRIMINAL TRIAL WHEN THE CHARGE IS BASELESS.  A GRAND JURY MAY ALSO BRING TO LIGHT, THROUGH A PRESENTMENT, CONDITIONS THAT AFFECT PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS OR THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE.  THE GRAND JURY AS A PART OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS AN INSTITUTION OF ANCIENT ORIGIN WHICH HAS EXISTED FOR MANY CENTURIES.  IT IS BELIEVED TO HAVE ORIGINATED, IN ITS PRESENT FORM, SOMETIME AROUND THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY, AND IT CAME TO THIS COUNTRY AS PART OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW.  ITS CONTINUED EXISTENCE IS GUARANTEED BY OUR STATE CONSTITUTION AND THIS CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE IS A RECOGNITION THAT THE GRAND JURY PROTECTS THE RIGHTS OF EVERY PERSON, AND BREATHES THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMUNITY INTO THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW.
[directive] Pursuant to AG Directive 2018-3, each agency shall establish an “early warning” protocol for monitoring and tracking the conduct of all officers.  (l)  Each agency must establish and maintain an internal affairs records system which, at a minimum, will consist of an internal affairs index system and a filing system for all documents and records.  (m)  On a quarterly basis, each agency shall submit to the County Prosecutor a report summarizing the allegations received and the investigations concluded for that period.  The Attorney General shall establish a schedule for the submission of the reports.  For the purposes of this document, “law enforcement executive” refers to a law enforcement agency’s highest ranking 1 sworn law enforcement officer, typically the chief of police.  In situations where the highest ranking officer is recused from a matter, then “law enforcement executive” refers to the next highest-ranking officer without a conflict.  3  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021
[brief] Here, plaintiffs failed to allege any cause of action outside of a purported LGEL violation.  Here, like *Miltz*, Plaintiffs failed to plead a cause of action alleging a common law conflict of interest.  Plaintiffs failed to make sufficient claims to sustain a cause of action to provide the trial court with jurisdiction.  Without a common-law cause of action alleging a conflict of interest, the trial court erred in finding defendants voters were improper on account of a conflict with [...].  Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to properly plead any claim that provides the court with jurisdiction to rule on the propriety of Defendants’ votes regarding [...]’s employment by the Borough.  The trial court’s finding was erroneous as that issue was not proper before it.  As such, the trial court’s ruling was erroneous and must be reversed.
[brief] Defendant, by his own admissions, made a plan with his co-defendants to commit armed robberies after finding the unarmed victims, and after the robberies were completed when one victim attempted to flee the scene the defendant told, ordered or commanded, whatever verbiage you wish to use, his two armed co-defendants to stop the victim from fleeing and only then did the 16 year old co-defendant fire his weapon in direct response to the defendant’s encouragement.  The defendant, the Court finds, appreciated the consequences of being apprehended and so to avoid same by ordering the co-defendants to stop the fleeing victim as he remained safely in the vehicle.  [(5T19-1 to 20-1). ]  With Miller factor two, the judge again found that the record simply did not support [...]’s conclusions.
[directive] Search and Seizure  7.8.1  All people, including police officers, have a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.  In an internal affairs investigation, the Fourth Amendment applies to any search the employing agency undertakes.  The internal affairs investigator must be cognizant of the various principles governing search and seizure, particularly where the investigator will conduct a search as part of a criminal investigation or will search personal property belonging to the subject officer.  7.8.2  Criminal investigations generally require the investigator to obtain a search warrant to conduct a search.  Search warrants require probable cause to believe that the search will reveal evidence of a crime.  In internal affairs investigations, a search warrant should be obtained before a search is conducted of a subject officer's personal property, including any home, personal car, bank accounts, safety deposit boxes, briefcases, etc.  A warrant also may be necessary where a search of the subject officer's workplace is conducted and it is determined that the officer has a high expectation of privacy in the place to be searched.  The internal affairs investigator should consult with the County Prosecutor’s Office before undertaking the search of any workplace area in a criminal investigation.
[brief] (1T20-21 to 24).  She instructed them that it is “always within the special function of the jury to determine whether the facts on which the answer or testimony of an expert is based actually exists. ” (1T21-3 to 11).  Then, before the first expert in the case testified, [...] informed the jury that they were “not bound by his opinion” and could reject it.  (3T41-19 to 21).  Again, during final jury instructions, [...] reminded the jury of the same principles, of all the experts they heard from, and that they were “not bound by such expert’s opinion. ” (8T77-6 to 79-4).  Thus, the jury was repeatedly informed that they were to consider the credibility of the experts and then weigh that evidence themselves.
[brief] The [...] observed and reflected on the COAH process – which at that point was still operating as intended – and pointed out that only 271 out of 521 municipalities, or fifty-two percent, were actually engaged in the COAH process.  The court remarked that “that statistic [and the specifics of the West Windsor case] demonstrate a continued need for the builder’s remedy. ”  173 N.J. 502, 563 (2002).  In a builder’s remedy lawsuit, a developer will be entitled to a builder’s remedy if “(1) it succeeds in Mount Laurel litigation; (2) it proposes a project with a substantial amount of affordable housing; and (3) the site is suitable, that is, the municipality does not meet its burden of proving that the site is environmentally constrained or construction of the project is contrary to sound use planning. ”  Mount Olive Complex v. Twp. of Mount Olive, 340 N.J. Super. 511, 525 (App. Div. 2001); In re Twp. of Bordentown, 471 N.J. Super. 196, 221-22 (App. Div. 2022) (citation omitted).  In addition, our courts have stressed the need for builder’s remedies as a tool for compliance even when the town agrees to comply after the suit is filed.  Specifically, “a developer may be entitled to a builder’s remedy, even if a municipality has begun moving toward compliance before or during the developer’s lawsuit, provided the lawsuit demonstrates the municipality’s current failure to comply with its affordable housing obligations”  [...] v. Twp. of Cranford, 445 N.J. Super. 220, 231 (App. Div. 2016) (emphasis added).  In that case, the Appellate Division noted that “a trial court has authority to mold the builder’s remedy” because it is a ‘dynamic’ and ‘flexible proceeding’” (id. at 237, quoting Toll Bros., 173 N.J. at 510, 574).  In resuming its pre-1985 role to ensure the vindication of the constitutional rights of low- and moderate-income families across the state, the Supreme Court in Mount Laurel IV further repeated that a builder’s remedy is part of a “range of remedies available to cure the violation” and “remedial of constitutional rights” (In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 221 N.J. 1, 15, 37 (2015) (Mount Laurel IV).
[directive] In the context of significant court events that affect public safety, the welfare of children, and the protection of incapacitated persons, the Judiciary must not permit the COVID-19 pandemic to serve as a basis for indefinite delay.  Accordingly, this directive provides a protocol to ensure that matters proceed consistent with the framework  1  The attached exemplar order is optional, not mandatory and should be used as appropriate.  The intent is not to require multiple court orders.  In Criminal and other matters with standard scheduling orders, judges simply should ensure that relevant – – content including the consequences for a failure to appear is addressed in the scheduling order.
[brief] Public policy considerations are *arguably* somewhat less compelling when it comes to the insured’s own damages, such as the fact that in this case [...] has denied payment to fix Plaintiffs’ car because of the Cancellation Notice.  This, at least, does not implicate the ability of an innocent member of the public to receive compensation for injuries that he suffered.  But although the policy considerations may be less compelling, they are not entirely absent.  Furthermore, the equities and the interests of justice weigh heavily in favor of the insured, who through no fault of his own could suffer a heavy financial loss that could have been avoided had the insurance company used certified mail.  As noted, in this scenario both the insurance company and the insured may be acting in complete good faith.  Neither may be “guilty” of anything.  But at the very least the insured is surely “more innocent,” having had no control over the process whereby the insurance company chose to attempt to notify him of an impending cancellation.  Although the Plaintiffs are by no means advocating the following, one could also imagine a hybrid scenario whereby under the circumstances of a case such as the present on the cancellation would be deemed effective as to the insured himself - - denying him the ability to collect on such claims as vehicle damage - - but deemed to be ineffective as to third persons.
[brief] There, the NJDEP stated that New Jersey is the “nation’s most densely populated state, and the most development,” and that “[i]ll-conceived land use and poorly designed development threatens our vital drinking-water supplies, devours our open space, spoils our landscape and creates traffic congestion that pollutes our air. ”  Here, the [...] has determined that through its power of eminent domain, and its power to enter into a land-exchange contract, the Township is able to preserve open space in a desirable area within the Township to allow residents to utilize the open space and promote a planning scheme which promotes the use of the newly obtained open space.  Lastly, no argument has been made by Appellant concerning the fair market value of the property.  Certainly, the Township is willing, ready and able to compensate the Appellant for the full fair market value of the subject properties.  POINT II
[brief] Parrella v. Sirius Xm Holdings, No. A-4283-19, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 59 (App. Div. Jan. 18, 2022), cert. denied 2022 N.J. LEXIS 526 (June 14, 2022) (Da0559-Da0563)  .............................................  14-15  Polaroid Corp. v. Rollins Envt’l Servs.  (NJ), Inc., 416 Mass. 684, 691 (1993)  .........................................................................................................................16  Racioppi v. Airbnb, Inc., No. A-0455-22, 2023  N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1200 (App. Div. July 17, 2023) (Da0564-Da0567)  .......................Passim Santana v. SmileDirectClub, LLC, 475 N.J. Super. 279 (App. Div. 2023)  .................................................................................................................................19  Schwartz v. Comcast Corp., 256 F. App’x 515 (3d Cir. 2007)  .........................Passim Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., 4 F.4th 148 (D.C. Cir. 2021) ............................................21 Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30 (2020) ........................................................................11  Vercammen v. Linkedin Corp., No. A-0188-20, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 110 (App. Div. Jan. 26, 2022) (Da0568-Da0572) ...............Passim Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427 (1992) .............................................. 15-16
[brief] For example, a RETA regulation requires resorts to give a Consumer Information Statement prior to the first showing of the property.  [...] does not do this, but has the consumer sign an acknowledgment that it does, even though [...] knows this is inaccurate.  (12T263:7-24).  The deeders admitted that although they instruct the buyers to initial these disclaimers, they do not actually tell them what they are initialing.  (12T89:8-90:2).  [...] knows its misrepresentations are prohibited by the RETA, and candidly admitted at trial that is precisely why it has consumers sign documents with exculpatory clauses it can then use to thwart consumer fraud lawsuits:
[brief] Since *Nielsen*, the Appellate Division and the U.S. District Court for New Jersey have decided three cases that address a tenant’s liability for injuries that occur in the common area in a multi-tenant facility.  All have declined to apply *Nielsen* to facts similar to those at issue herein.  All three courts have recognized that *Nielsen* represents a departure from the general principle of tenants’ non liability for injuries that occur in common areas, and that its holding was limited to its facts.  In *Spano v. Supervalu*, supra., (Da26-29), plaintiff fell in a shopping center parking lot shared by [...] and other tenants.  The Appellate Division rejected plaintiff’s arguments based upon *Nielsen* because, like plaintiff herein, she did not fall in an area immediately adjoining the [...] store, but was “a distance away” from it.  Nor did [...] direct [...] to walk in the area where she had fallen.  Id., at 3.  Under virtually identical circumstances to those at issue herein, the court found that "there were no comparable facts that would justify imposing a duty of care upon [...] to maintain the parking lot of the shopping center."  Id.  See also Ricco, supra., at 7 (Da22); Similarly, there is no duty to notify the landlord of hazardous conditions under the circumstances of this case.  Tchikindas, supra., at 5-6 (Da34-35)  POINT III
[brief] As to the September 25, 2017 letter, [...] did not execute the return receipt for that letter, and [...] did not depose “[...]” – the person whose name appears on the return receipt – to determine if she executed the return receipt for the letter or that she provided the letter to [...].  It is “universally agreed” that, when an insurer takes control of the defense of an action, disclaiming coverage is inappropriate “unless the carrier has reserved the issue of its liability by appropriate measures.
[brief] As a preliminary matter, the inexcusable delay in bringing this claim is obviously prejudicial to all the parties which have proceeded with their business and the development of the Solar Project over the last several years, without a claim by the Appellants regarding the surrender of the Property in accordance with the terms of the Lease.  It is undisputed that Appellants did not pay the annual rent due in September 2017.  This event of default remained uncured and resulted in a termination, which required Appellants to surrender the Property, as they did, thereby allowing [...] to re-let it.  In that regard, pursuant to Section 10.5 of the Lease, Appellants agreed to surrender the Property upon termination.
[brief] THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT BASED ON THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT'S FACEBOOK POSTS CONTAINED NO DISCLAIMERS.  Appellants make much ado about the fact that Respondent's Facebook posts do not contain disclaimers that makes clear that the contents of the posts represent her own personal opinions and are not representative of the Board.  However, the lack of a disclaimer in Respondent's posts do not render the Commission's Final Decision wrong and subject to reversal.  Appellants claim that "such a disclaimer would need to be very prominent in order to counteract the presumption that the school board member [who posts on social media] holds themselves out as a board member, citing Melnyk v. Fief, COMMISSION Docket No. C64-18 (2019) (Ca269-CA273).  Melneyk contains no such holding.  The Commission's opinion in that matter merely notes that the Facebook post in question does not contain and disclaimer, id. at 4, followed by footnote that says that a disclaimer "may have avoided the appearance-actual or perceived-that the statements were made in Respondent's capacity as a Board member."  Id. at 4 n. 1.  (emphasis added), The footnote went on to say that "even if an appropriate disclaimer is used, the substance of a post/statement can, nevertheless, render the disclaimer meaningless."  Ibid.  This is a far cry from a holding that disclaimers are mandatory and that the absence of a disclaimer creates a "presumption" that the school board member who posts holds themselves out as a member of the board.
[brief] The FDCPA begins by reciting the findings made by Congress as the basis for its adoption.  Congress found there to be “abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)³.  Those unacceptable practices “contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy. ”  *Id.*  At the same time, “[e]xisting laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to protect consumers. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(b).  Congress also found that means other than those prohibited by the FDCPA “are available for the effective collection of debts. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(c).  After making those findings, Congress expressed three distinct purposes for adopting the FDCPA.
[brief] The certified mail tracking details Plaintiff’s certified mailings to [...] address indicated “redelivery scheduled” (Da82 & Da84, USPS Tracking Details) or were marked “unclaimed” by the Post Office and returned to [...] (Da107 & Da117, Returned Mail).  These notations do not indicate that the mail was “refused,” but rather that USPS found no one at the property to whom the certified mail could be delivered.  If this Panel accepts the Plaintiff’s interpretation of R. 4:4-3, as did the lower court, then it would permit unscrupulous plaintiffs to obtain default judgments as a matter of course simply by utilizing simultaneous mail service to addresses that have verified to be vacant.  POINT FOUR (Da1)
[brief] [...] obtained financial relief voiding more than $1,000,019 in membership interests issued to [...], received back $700,000 on a disputed loan, and more than $500,000 for legal fees and expenses as a sanction for misconduct in 2016.  (Da131; Da1299)  What remained of [...]’s damage claims went to a final hearing by motion in 2018, which the Arbitrator decided as unopposed because he had refused [...]’s new counsel’s postponement request.  (Da2209-2223)  From that award, [...] received a $504,000 counsel fee reimbursement for [...]’s “personal legal fees” that [...] paid in Phase I of this case.  (Pa2220)  The Arbitrator awarded another $70,975 in counsel fee reimbursements that [...] claimed it paid for [...]’s personal legal fees in a separate action.
[brief] As discussed above, [...] received Exemption #11 in connection with its 300 Line Project and NEUP, so there is precedent for an exemption to be granted to a pipeline company for upgrades to its existing pipeline system, similar to the exemption granted for this Project.  Moreover, the fact that the Project includes construction of an aboveground facility that connects to [...]’s existing pipeline system does not change the fact that the Project qualifies for Exemption #11.  As noted above, NEUP included pipeline looping and aboveground facilities and both aspects of the project were found to be an “upgrade” to [...]’s existing 300 Line system.  Similarly, the new CS 327 is an “upgrade” of [...]’s existing 300 Line system\(^9\).  [...]’s Project is necessary to meet the needs of its Project Shipper, as found by the [...] in the certificate order authorizing the Project.  In addition to meeting the needs of the Project shipper, the Project will also assist in eliminating capacity constraints in the region, especially during periods of peak demand, ensuring the region is able to meet residential, commercial, and industrial heating and cooling needs, will provide added reliability during planned and unplanned maintenance activities on [...]’s natural gas transmission system within the State and to provide natural gas to customers in the northeastern United States.
[brief] Until he was confronted with the video footage, [...] testified that he did not recall the defendant saying this.  (1T 116-21 to 24, 125-13 to 126-24) vehicle.  (1T 29-7 to 23, 42-7 to 43-14)  When [...] refused to grant consent, [...] told him that he would get a canine to smell the exterior of the car, unless [...] wanted to just give him consent to search or tell him where the drugs were located.  (1T 30-2 to 8)  [...] then told him that there were drugs inside the car.  (1T 30-7 to 8)  [...] never told [...] that he had a right to refuse consent.  (1T 158-17 to 19)  [...] then asked [...] to show him where the drugs were located, and [...] complied, showing him three plastic red containers in the driver’s door compartment, including one which contained a crystal-like substance which the officer suspected to be methamphetamine.  (1T 30-9 to 25)  [...] continued to ask [...] a number of incriminating questions about where he had got the drugs, to whom they belonged, and the last time they had done the drugs.  (1T 43-19 to 46-5)  [...] then arrested [...] for possession of methamphetamine, placed him in handcuffs and put him inside the police car.
[brief] Appellants are native Spanish speakers and are not sophisticated in legal matters.  (102a-103a).  None of Appellants had ever been involved in a legal proceeding before this action.  (102a-103a).  Appellants did not seek the advice of an attorney.  (102a-103a).  Appellants specifically relied upon the fact that they had been so active with [...] in December 2021 and January 2022, obtaining the Site Plan Approval at that time, and then proceeding with retaining an architect and engineer and moving forward to obtaining approval of our plans and pulling permits.  (102a-103a).  Appellants did not understand how [...] could move forward so rapidly while they were working so assiduously with Irvington to improve the Property.
[brief] Equitable fraud is a legal, provable defense that could include remedies such as rescission of a contract.  *Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein*, 115 N.J. 599, 608, 560 A.2d 655, 659, 1989 N.J. LEXIS 88, *11.  Equitable fraud is distinguishable from legal fraud in that there is a lesser burden as the remedies are equitable in nature.  Id.  For equitable fraud, a party need only show that there was a misrepresentation, a party need not show there was “scienter”, in other words, that the party committing the alleged fraud had knowledge of the falsity and the intent to create an advantage from the falsity.  Id.  Certainly, the Plaintiff made clear misrepresentations by signing Defendant [...]’s name on the 1998 deed, which contained a further misrepresentation that [...] and [...] were the “same person. ” (Da343 – Da350).  [...] reasonably relied on the deed in transferring his interest in the property to [...].  Plaintiff cannot recover because it was the Plaintiff’s own misrepresentations that created the title issue.  Plaintiff committed equitable fraud and, as such, should be barred from recovering the quiet title to the 293 Property.  The trial court failed to analyze this and the appellate court should take this argument into account.