ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] | Case Law | 15 | | Abels 770 F. 2d 26, 29 | Case Law | 16 | | Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 3642 at 149 (2d ed. 1985) | Case Law | 16 | | State v. Caronna 469 N.J. Super 462, 490 (2021) | Case Law | 17 | | Carter, 247 N.J. at 530, 255 A.3d 1139 | Case Law | 17 | | Novembrino 105 N.J. at 157-58, 519 A.2d | Case Law | 17 | | State v. Williams 192 N.J. 1, 14, 926 A.2d 340 (2007) | Case Law | 18 | | State v. Hamlett 449 N.J. Super 159, 177, 155 A.3d 1038 (App. Div. 2017) | Case Law | 18 | | State v. Presley 436 N.J. Super 440, 459, 94 A.3d 921 (App. Div. 2014) | Case Law | 18 | | State v. Gioe 401 N.J. Super. 331, 339.950 A.2d 930 (App. Div 2008) | Case Law | 18 | | Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive Assn 489 US. 02, 613-614 (1989) | Case Law | 18 | | United States v. Padilla 508 U.S. 77 (1993) | Case Law | 18 | | Florida v. Jardines 569 U.S. 1 (2013) | Case Law | 18 | | Ontario v. Quon 560 U.S. 746, 755 (2010) | Case Law | 18 | | State v. Brown 216 N.J. 508, 528 (2014) | Case Law | 19 | | United States Department of Justice et al Petitioners v. Reporters Committee For Freedom of the Press | Case Law | 19,20 | |---|---|---| | 489 U.S. 749 (1989) | | | ## LIST OF PARTIES | Party Name | Appellate Party Designation | Trial Court/Agency Party Role | Trial Court/Agency Party Status | |-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------| | [...] | Appellant | Plaintiff | Participated below | | [...] | Respondent | Defendant | Participated below | | [...] | Respondent | Defendant | Participated below | ## TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS | Proceeding Type | Proceeding Date | Transcript Number | |-----------------|-----------------|-------------------| | Oral Decision | 02/03/2023 | 1T | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] THE PLAINTIFF’S THIRD THEORY OF LIABILITY WAS THAT THE GROUND SIGN LOCATED TO THE APPROACH TO THE OVERPASS WAS NOT PROPERLY MAINTAINED, AND THE DEFENDANT HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION OF THE SIGN AND AREA AND FAILED TO PROPERLY MAINTAIN THE SIGN AND AREA, AND ACCORDINGLY, THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT AN ERROR BY ALLOWING THE JURY TO CONSIDER A NOTICE ISSUE.  N.J.S.A. 59:4-3(b) defines constructive notice:  A public entity shall be deemed to have constructive notice of a dangerous condition within the meaning of subsection b. of section 59:5-2 only if the plaintiff establishes that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character.
[brief] As in Moran, [...] was trained to perform his job and the tasks he described, however, the circumstances of this injury were unusual.  As [...] testified, the reason for having to get the hose, was that a bookcase was blocking the basement door.  (1T41: 1-11).  But for having to get the additional hose, and twisting his ankle on something on the driveway, [...] would still be working as a FireFighter.  As a result of this unusual “external” event occurring at the time he was working he meets the definition of undesigned and unexpected.  He was unaware of the possibility of this kind of result when performing an activity he had been trained for and was taught how to perform and as in Moran an unexpected situation occurred while [...] was performing his job resulting in a medical situation unanticipated by his experience.  To be sure, if the “normal stress and strain” of the job had combined with a pre-existing disease then a traumatic event would not have happened.  This is very different from saying that a traumatic event can’t occur during ordinary work effort because indeed it can, did, and therefore, [...]’s undisputed basis for his injury mirrors Moran allowing this Court to reverse the Board’s decision and grant [...] his accidental disability pension benefits.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Contrary to Respondent’s contention, adequate, timely, proper notice of the Ricci Act was not provided.  Respondent claims that posting the Ricci Act on the Division’s website is somehow adequate “notice” to all members and retirees enrolled in the State Police Retirement System.  Rb12.  However, this argument fails for several reasons.  The Ricci Act states:  The board of trustees shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this subsection and shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e).  Pursuant to the Ricci Act, the Board was required to provide notice to members and retirants in the system.  A website posting is not sufficient notice to retirees or active members of the retirement system.
[brief] Furthermore, the CRB is required to take action and to render a determination on the application before an Applicant can proceed to the next step which under the Hoboken Code means filing an application with the Planning Board or Zoning Board as the case may be.  (M-Da357).  The Hoboken Code which established the Cannabis Review Board under Section 36-2 sets forth the purpose of the CRB which “is to assure the public health, safety, and general welfare of the City of Hoboken and its residents, business establishments and visitors. ” (M-Da356).  Moreover, under the Hoboken Code Section 36-4A, the CRB “shall provide an endorsement or report to the contrary to the land use board of jurisdiction prior to the Applicant’s submission of a conditional use application to the Board. ” (M-Da357).  (emphasis supplied).  Furthermore, under the City of Hoboken Code under Section 196-33.1M(1) “a cannabis retailer. . . within the City of Hoboken shall first obtain an endorsement from the Hoboken Cannabis Review Board. ”  Thus, what Hoboken has legislatively created was the functional equivalent of an integral part of the Planning Board process, but strictly limited to cannabis related matters.  Reading these sections of the Hoboken Code in Pari materia it is clear that an Applicant is barred from not only proceeding with an application before the Planning Board, but an Applicant is prohibited from even filing an application with either the Planning Board or Zoning Board of Adjustment as the case may be.  The commencement of the review process before the Planning Board is delayed and cannot even begin to occur until the Applicant files an application and completes the review process with the CRB culminating in obtaining a “endorsement” from the CRB.  The CRB considered [...]’ application at a public hearing on April 22, 2022.  At the conclusion of the public hearing, the CRB determined that “[...] will have a positive impact on the City’s community and the Board finds that this application is consistent with the intent of the City’s Cannabis Ordinances. ”  As a result, the CRB issued a Resolution endorsing [...]’ application and plan which approval was granted on April 22, 2022.  (Da423).  Once the CRB issued its endorsement, [...] satisfied one of the mandatory ordinance requirements in order to initiate and prosecute a land development application before the Planning Board for a cannabis “micro” dispensary which application complied with all of the conditions of the conditional use ordinance.  The City of Hoboken also adopted a Resolution supporting [...]’ application to the Cannabis Regulatory Commission.  (Da404).  The Resolution from the City of Hoboken was adopted after the CRB issued its endorsement (Da423) and after the Planning Board approved [...]’ application for development (Da454).  CONCLUSION
[brief] On February 9, 2023, in a telephone call, Plaintiff reported to [...] that he had settled additional cases and assisted others in settling cases since discussing the topic on January 22, 2023 and further told [...] that the Firm was going to have its best year in its history.  [...] once again highly praised Plaintiff’s job performance, thereby lulling Plaintiff into a sense of employment security while [...] secretly planned to terminate Plaintiff without notice.
[brief] (Doc. 112).  The Court ordered the [...] to respond to [...]’s letter (Doc. 113), and the [...] filed a reply with the Court on November 20, 2018, asserting that it properly objected to the questions posed by [...] during [...]’s deposition.  (Doc. 114).  Subsequently, on November 29, 2018, the [...] filed a Motion for an Enlargement of Time to Complete Discovery (Doc. 117), seeking a three-month extension of the discovery period.
[brief] (Pa66 at ¶ 7; see Pa378-472.)  Neither the text of A. 6260 nor S. 49 were available before or even during the Assembly Appropriations Committee.  (Pa100 at ¶ 11.)  The legislative calendars for January 6, 2022 also did not list either bill for consideration.  (Pa101 at ¶ 17; Pa112-29.)  [...] addressed the Senate asking them to vote down the bill due to the rushed nature of its presentation.  (Pa274.)  She stated, “On a topic this important and this controversial, we owe not only the residents we represent but ourselves the opportunity for robust discussion and debate on this particular bill.
[brief] The trial court *did not find*, however, that [...] had not violated the NJCFLA, as [...] argues.  Indeed, [...] has *never disputed* its lack of licensure or the NJCFLA’s licensure requirements for “consumer lender[s].”  *See* N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2; N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3.  In contradiction, after asserting that the trial court did not address [...]’s arguments regarding the public policies motivating the NJCFLA,\(^2\) [...] goes on to cite and repeat the trial court’s reasoning addressing the same:  The court in *DeAngelo* weighed the policies behind a violation of the FDCPA with the policy favoring the finality of judgments.  Here the trial court was not confronted with these two competing public policies as there is no violation of a federal statute involved.  The trial court found that there was no violation of the [NJCFLA], so there was no need to consider the policies behind the [NJCFLA].
[brief] First, [...] argues that because [...] proposes soil replacement below the infiltration basins, rather than soil replacement throughout the entire 91-acre Property, [...] violated the BMP Manual as its groundwater mounding analysis was deficient.  (Ab11-12).  Not so.  Groundwater mounding is the increase in the groundwater elevation as a result of the infiltration from the proposed stormwater management facilities.  Matter of Thomas Orban/Square Props., LLC, 461 N.J. Super. 57, 66 n. 3 (App. Div. 2019).  Groundwater mounding is temporary because the infiltrating runoff builds up in the unsaturated zone as stormwater infiltrates or recharges and then gradually spreads out to the surrounding area.
[brief] ”  Estate of Vafiades, 192 N.J. Super. at 316.  In New Jersey, the unauthorized practice of law is a crime.  N.J.S.A. 2C:21-22.  It is also an ethical violation.  R.P.C. 5.5(a)(1) (stating “A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction. ”).
[brief] (Da1-Da5).  Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, which was heard before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., on August 16, 2022 and denied the same day.  (1T1, et seq.; Da6).  On February 3, 2023, the trial court heard defendant’s motion for reconsideration on the motion to suppress, which was denied the same day.  (2T1, et seq.; Da7).  On July 10, 2023, a Camden County Grand Jury returned an Amended Indictment charging defendant with first-degree aggravated manslaughter, in --- 1
[brief] Q.  Now, we'll be talking about catalytic heaters soon, but I want to ask these questions in the context of this point.  Your rebuttal testimony, P-8, and some of your discovery responses contain a discussion of problems you've experienced with catalytic heaters on your system, specifically five heaters that were installed on your system; is that correct?  MR. SANDERS: Can you point to where--this is [...].  Can you point to your--to our statement in direct?  Q.  I can point to it on rebuttal.  MR. SANDERS: Okay.  Rebuttal.  Thank you.  Q.  The question starts at the bottom of page 25, line 20, goes over to page 26, line 17.  If you want to read that to yourself before you answer my questions, please do so and tell me when you're ready.  (Witness reviews document.)  MR. SANDERS: Yes.  I have it.  Q.  The top of page 26, line 1, the testimony says, "Moreover, the Company did consider catalytic heater for this station."  Did I read that correctly?  MR. SANDERS: Yes.  Q.  And the last line--two lines of this answer, lines 16 and 17--well, they start at line 14, "Given these problems, installation of a catalytic heater does not comport with the purposes of the regulator station, which is to provide safe and reliable gas service to [...] customers, and the Company has made the decision to no longer use this type of heater.  "  Now, My question to you is, you didn't really seriously consider a catalytic heater for this statement, did you?  [Colloquy omitted.]
[brief] We disagree that the invited error doctrine applies in these circumstances.  Under that doctrine, “trial errors that ‘were induced, encouraged or acquiesced in or consented to by defense counsel ordinarily are not a basis for reversal on appeal....’  ”  State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 561, 65 A.3d 818 (2013) (quoting State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 345, 526 A.2d 1046 (1987)).  The doctrine applies “when a defendant in some way has led the court into error” and “acknowledges the common-sense notion that a ‘disappointed litigant’ cannot argue on appeal that a prior ruling was erroneous ‘when that party urged the lower court to adopt the proposition now alleged to be error. ’ ”  Ibid. (first quoting State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 359, 840 A.2d 242 (2004); and then N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 340, 990 A.2d 1097 (2010)).  In Corsaro, the Court succinctly characterized invited error as error that defense counsel has “induced. ”  107 N.J. at 346, 526 A.2d 1046.  In Jenkins, the Court further explained that the doctrine of invited error as applied in criminal cases “is designed to prevent defendants from manipulating the system. ”  178 N.J. at 359, 840 A.2d 242.  In this instance, it was the State, not defendant, that “led the court into error” by presenting inadmissible evidence to the jury and by setting the table for that evidence in the prosecutor's opening arguments.  Defense counsel's strategic decision to cross-examine [...] regarding the erroneously admitted evidence may have risked re-enforcing the significance of that hearsay testimony for the jury, but that circumstance did not “manipulate the system” or otherwise invoke the harmless error doctrine.  We thus turn to whether the hearsay evidence was so prejudicial as to constitute plain error.
[brief] I.  THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES IS INAPPLICABLE HERE BECAUSE FRANCAVILLA SOUGHT TO LITIGATE [...]’S CLAIMS ON THE MERITS  As discussed in [...]’s Opening Brief, the “doctrine [of laches] is invoked to deny a party enforcement of a known right when the party engages in an inexcusable and unexplained delay in exercising that right to the prejudice of the other party. ”  Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 180-81 (2003) (emphasis added) (citing In re Kietur, 332 N.J. Super. 18, 28 (App. Div. 2000)); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Howard Sav. Institution, 127 N.J. Super. 479, 489 (Ch. Div. 1974) (“The mere passage of time, of course, does not constitute laches . . . . laches consists of two elements: Inexcusable delay . . . and prejudice to the respondent resulting from such delay.  The Court should consider the equities of the case and not rely merely upon the lapse of time. ”).  Prejudice against the non-movant is an indispensable requirement for a finding of laches.  Here, the trial court based its finding of prejudice on the fact that the statute of limitations had run on [...]’s collection claim and, thus, that [...] would be prejudiced by a granting of [...]’s Motion to Vacate.  See T1 30:12-31:23; 49:10-50:14.  However, [...]’s Motion did not seek dismissal of [...]’s claims, but rather sought to open the suit to be litigated on the merits.  See [...]’s proposed Answer and Affirmative Defenses, generally. (Da46-Da50).  Thus, the trial court based its conclusion on an erroneous finding of prejudice.  [...]’s Brief fails to respond to [...]’s arguments and instead repeats the reasoning of the trial court, to wit, [...] would be prejudiced because the statute of limitations had ostensible run on its collection claim.  See [...]’s Br. at 20.  [...] ignores, however, that prejudice is an indispensable requirement for a finding of laches.  Without prejudice arising from [...]’s claims being time-barred, there can be no finding that laches bars [...]’s requested relief.  Thus, the trial court’s Order denying [...]’s Motion to Vacate should be reversed.
[brief] Plaintiff alleged she agreed to a salary reduction of a total of $200,000 over 2014 and 2015 in exchange for her 10% interest in [...].  1T38:21-39:3; Da69.  There is no evidence to suggest that her interest ever had any value.  Plaintiff submitted no evidence of value.  The only [...] financial books and records in evidence, the profit and loss statement, evidenced substantial net losses for the 2014 through 2020 period.  Pa41-42; Da82.  In August 2018, the remaining employees left [...] because they had not been paid.
[directive] Page 3 B.  Covert audio recordings should be made in accordance with a written Investigative plans. investigative plan developed in advance.  Such plans should include – among other details for the anticipated recordings – descriptions of the nature of the investigation and anticipated recordings; the identity of the Department investigator who will participate in the in-person conversation to be recorded; the identities of any other individuals who will be recorded (if known); the anticipated date, time, and duration of the anticipated recordings (if unknown, a target date range may be substituted); the means used to maintain operational security; and the protocols that will be followed to ensure the integrity of the record and compliance with applicable laws.  recordings.  C.  The written investigative plan  Approvals for investigative plans and developed pursuant to Section I.B must be approved by an appropriate Assistant Attorney General in the Division of Law and the member of the Attorney General’s Executive Leadership Team responsible for providing oversight for the relevant Practice Group within the Division of Law.  Divisions that do not have counsel in the Division of Law must obtain approval for the written investigative plan from an in-house Assistant Attorney General and the member of the Attorney General’s Executive Leadership team responsible for providing oversight for that Division.  Approval of an Assistant Attorney General must be obtained before seeking approval from the Office of the Attorney General.  For investigations of conduct that could be charged criminally (based on the facts known at the time the investigative plan is submitted for approval) and investigations otherwise involving the use of criminal investigators, the investigative plan and recording must additionally be approved by the Attorney General or designee within the Division of Criminal Justice.
[brief] At that conference, the court said that Plaintiff should make his submission within 10 days.  The court stated that it would then review the submission, and would review Defendant’s counsel’s submission, and would decide the appropriate amount of the fee award.  (2T33-34).  On December 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed his “submission. ”  His submission consisted of a cover letter and a copy of the fee application that had been filed by [...] in August 2018, prior to the first legal fee appeal.  The only substantive addition to the 2018 fee application in Plaintiff’s December 13, 2021 letter was the following statement:  “We believe that each and every legal work that was undertaken was wholly justified and necessary….  ” (Da2469; Da385-792).
[brief] In re Petition for Review of Opinion 552 of Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, 102 N.J. 194 (1986)  .....................................................................................passim Pfannenstein v. Surrey, 475 N.J. Super. 83 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 254 N.J. 512 (2023)  ..................18  Sentry at QB, LLC v. Wu, 194 N.Y.S.3d 305 (App. Div. 2023) .................................................................10
[brief] Rather, the State only argues that the verdict sheet relied on by [...] is not the correct verdict sheet.  To that end, the State asserts that this argument is “supported only by a self-authenticating certification[,]” but that is not true.  The now-deceased trial counsel certified that this was the jury’s verdict sheet in his motion for a new trial, and the trial court responded to a formal records request with this version of the verdict sheet.  On the contrary, it is the State’s contention that this is not the verdict sheet that is completely unsupported by any contradictory documentary evidence.  The State relies substantially on the jury’s reading of the verdict at the end of the trial in support of its contention, but nothing about it actually negates that the jury additionally marked off every lesser-included offense.
[brief] [...] asks this court to reverse the Department’s disapproval and substitute its own conclusions for those reached by the Department on the basis of its actuarial expertise.  [...]’s burden is particularly high, especially given the clear statutory language and standards reflected in the LTCI Act.  The Department plainly has authority and discretion to reject rates that are excessive.  [...] knew that its triple digit, single year rate increase request (which included its non-customary and aggressive 15% MAE) raised red flags.  That is precisely why [...] tethered its requested premium rate increases to accompanying benefit reductions to mitigate the “sticker shock” that might be visited upon policyholders who are older and on fixed incomes.  [...] invites this court to approve its requested rate increase, thereby displacing the Department’s expertise with [...]’s own self-interests.  However, the Department correctly found that [...]’s compliance with the calculations under the rules did not compel the automatic approval of the requested rates.  To the contrary, in enacting the LTCI Act, the Legislature granted the Department the express authority to disapprove rates that are excessive.  As the Commissioner found, the Department’s disapproval is supported by substantial, credible evidence, and the Commissioner’s decision should therefore be affirmed.
[brief] Each of the Mallory Court’s references to transient, or tag, jurisdiction is in connection with service on an individual, 600 U.S. at 129, 145 (discussing Burnham).  Nothing in Mallory addresses, let alone approves, the extension of that rule to a business entity.  Indeed, Mallory is not a transient jurisdiction case; instead, the Supreme Court concluded that Pennsylvania courts could, consistent with Due Process, exercise general jurisdiction over foreign corporations registered to do business in Pennsylvania because such registration constituted consent to jurisdiction in Pennsylvania by virtue of the specific (and unique) Pennsylvania statute at issue.
[brief] The newly discovered [...] guaranty is also not relevant or material to [...]’s or defendant’s ownership interest in [...].  As defendant himself testified at the motion hearing, the [...] guaranty showed the ownership breakdown of ownership of the entire territory, not the Hoboken location.  (8T47-14 to 20).  Indeed, defendant, [...], and [...] all testified that the ownership of the individual franchises was spelled out in the operating agreements for each location.  (1T91-19 to 24; 8T82-9 to 83-13; 9T40-7 to 16; 9T47-10 to 14).  Thus, the relevant guaranty was the one executed as part of the [...] franchise agreement, which was admitted at trial.  (See Sa120-22).