ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] “The question of *in personam* jurisdiction is a mixed question of law and fact[.]”  *Patel v. Karnavati America, LLC*, 437 N.J. Super. 415, 423 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting *Citibank, N.A. v. Estate of Simpson*, 290 N.J. Super. 519, 532 (App. Div. 1996).  “[W]hether a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question of law . . . [and] review of the issue is de novo. ”  *YA Global Investments, L.P. v. Cliff*, 419 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 2011) (citing *Mastondrea v. Occidental Hotels Management S.A.*, 391 N.J. Super. 261, 268 (App. Div. 2007)).  However, “factual findings with respect to jurisdiction” are reviewed “under the standards set forth in *Rova Farms . . . and Jacobs[.]”*  *Mastondrea, supra.*  “Findings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence. ”  *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Insurance Co. of America*, 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).  The Appellate Division “will not disturb ‘the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless …they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ’”  *Jacobs v. Walt Disney World, Co.*, 309 N.J. Super. 443, 452 (App. Div. 1998) (quoting *Rova Farms*, supra).  Here, in the interests of justice, this Court should affirm the trial court’s determination and let this five-and-a-half-year-old case proceed because the undisputed facts demonstrate the trial court correctly found it had personal and subject matter jurisdiction over Defendants.
[brief] [...] was not aware of the [...] investigation, the Disciplinary Action Complaint, or the Disciplinary Action against [...] when it issued the Policies.  [See Pa429a, ¶ 16; Pa430a, ¶ 22; Pa434a, ¶ 40]  Shortly after the Firm provided notice of the [...] to [...] on August 6, 2019, [...] independently learned of the Disciplinary Action against [...].  [See Pa501a]  On August 23, 2019, [...] reserved its rights under the 2018 Policy in connection with the [...].  [Pa434a, ¶ 41]  Before determining whether to rescind the Policies, [...] offered the Firm and [...] an opportunity to explain why the Firm failed to disclose the Disciplinary Action and the Decision against [...] in response to the relevant questions in the Applications for the Policies.  [Id.]  In addition, [...] requested copies of all communications, submissions, filings, and orders made in the Disciplinary Action.  [Id.]  [...] also asked whether the Firm had any record of disclosing the Disciplinary Action to [...] when applying for the Policies.  [Id.]  Pending its receipt of the requested information and materials, [...] agreed to provide the Firm and [...] with a defense in the [...], subject to a full and complete reservation of its rights.  [Id.]  [...] expressly reserved the right to withdraw from the defense and the right to recoup any and all Claim Expenses.  [Id.]  In response to [...]’s August 23, 2019 request, the Firm sent a September 23, 2019 letter to [...], asserting that it did not disclose the Disciplinary Action to [...] because “Mr. [...] was under the impression that he had no obligation to disclose the then pending Disciplinary Matter. ”  [Pa435a, ¶ 42]  The Firm provided [...] with a copy of the Decision on September 25, 2019.  [Id., ¶ 43]  The Firm did not provide [...] with a copy of the Disciplinary Action Complaint until October 15, 2019.  [Id., ¶ 44]  Separately, on October 10, 2019, [...] independently obtained a copy of the Disciplinary Action Complaint from the [...].  [Pa429a, ¶ 16]  Having completed its coverage investigation, on October 28, 2019, [...] advised the Firm in writing that it was entitled to rescind the Policies.
[brief] “[T]he best indicator of that intent is the statutory language[.]”  *Richardson*, 192 N.J. at 195 (first alteration in original) (quoting *DiProspero v. Penn*, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).  “A court should ‘ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole. ””  D’Ambrosio v. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 403 N.J. Super. 321, 334 (App. Div. 2008) (citing DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492).  Here, the Legislature clearly intended a limitation period of eligibility for the presumption or recalculation provided under the Ricci Act, as the plain language of the statute sets a two-year deadline ending July 8, 2021, after which a “retiree shall not be eligible” for such benefits.
[brief] “Estoppel is ‘an equitable doctrine, founded in the fundamental duty of fair dealing imposed by law, that prohibits a party from repudiating a previously taken position when another party has relied on that position to his detriment. ’”  Casamasino v. City of Jersey City, 158 N.J. 333, 354 (1999) (quoting State v. Kouvatas, 292 N.J.Super. 417, 425 (App. Div. 1996)).
[brief] Based upon her experience in OPS, she knew that “nothing is confidential” and that’s how she knew (1T; 79:18).  [...] pulled the trigger on her transfer (1T; 81:20).  At one point, she was asked to leave a meeting and it had never happened to her in the past since she was the right-hand person of the Major and should share in all of the information; it happened once, and it never happened again (1T; 84:4).
[brief] Pa665.  [...] described the area where [...] struck and ran over [...] as follows:  This incident took place on the East side of the [...].  The intersection between the east and west travel way and the north and south travel way on the east side of the property does not contain any control devices such as a stop sign, stop line, double yellow line, a speed limit sign, a pedestrian crosswalk, pedestrian warning signs, or a recessed line to bring vehicles to a stop for visibility.  Further, the ends of the east west travel way, and particularly the one on the east side of the parking lot does not contain a peninsula, such as at the end of the north south travel way.  The east west travel way ends in a parking space which at the time of this incident was occupied by a vehicle.  Peninsulas command a driver’s attention and provide increased visibility by eliminating the restriction caused by a vehicle in a parking space at the very intersection of travel ways.
[brief] While [...] alleges to have issued a reservation of rights letter on July 20, 2017, regarding the initial complaint in the Underlying Action, [...] did not recall receiving the letter when it was actually presented to him at his deposition.  (Da208 at 14:2-7).  In any event, [...] has provided no proof to show the letter was actually sent or received despite the letter indicating it was sent certified mail.  This is a disputed material fact that does not support the grant of summary judgment in [...]’s favor.
[brief] The motion court indicated that [...]’s certification filed in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment indicating that he relied on statements made by [...] and [...] and [...], two owners of the hospital that would have equitably estopped defendants from relying on a statute of limitations defense.  (IT2 18-1 to 9).  The motion court barred consideration of [...]’s certification because of the conclusion that it was barred by the sham affidavit doctrine since [...]’s answers to interrogatories and deposition testimony did not refer explicitly to his reliance on statements that he would be paid when the hospital was sold (IT2 12-8 to 13-13; IT2 16-6 to 19).  [...] moved for reconsideration of summary judgment based on the argument that Dr. Bellefemine’s certification in opposition to summary judgment did not conflict with his deposition testimony and answers to interrogatories (Volume IV Pa.578-640).  The motion court denied the motion for reconsideration (Volume IV Pa. 641;IT3).  ARGUMENT I.THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE SUMMARY
[brief] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Respondents  [...] [...]  [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  Attorney ID# 050991988  Date Submitted: November 27, 2023  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], Defendants-Respondents, [...], Defendant-Respondent-Cross- Appellant, - and - JOHN DOES 1-10 AND/OR ABC CORPORATIONS
[brief] M40.  Incredibly, the trial judge found that the Mayor’s free expression of opinion through public press releases amounted to “a subversion of due process and fundamental fairness to the [Respondents].”  M38.  To dull the muzzling of the Mayor, the lower court’s opinion suggests that it would have been more proper for the Mayor to have appeared at the hearing, either personally or through a representative, to voice his objection to the application.  The trial court acknowledges that same would have been his “irrefutable right. ”  M39.  However, based on the trial court’s belief that the Mayor had such undeniable influence over the voting members, it is curious how his actual attendance at the hearing, before those members, would have somehow been less influential.  Perhaps, though, the trial court’s issue isn’t that the Mayor held an opinion in the general sense.  Again, this was acknowledged as his right.  Instead, the issue is more accurately framed as whether the Mayor had the “correct” opinion.  The trial court’s disagreement with the Mayor’s opinion is effectively that it could have hindered the Respondent’s Amended Application since his opinion was negative.  If the Mayor’s opinion were in favor of the Amended Application, would it still carry the same air of impropriety?  The trial court notes, without any concern, that the Respondents were miffed that they could not get a meeting with the Mayor to get his approval for the project before the board heard the Amended Application.  Clearly, the Respondents wanted to sway the public and the board in their favor.  These are then two sides of the same coin.  The Respondents cannot seek out the Mayor’s approval in order to boost their chances, and then claim foul play when the Mayor does not support their cause.  Similarly, the trial court’s opinion errs in that it finds a flaw only where the Mayor opposes the Respondents application.  Upon this flawed finding, the trial court determined a SHO was necessary.
[brief] CONCLUSION  The Authority respectfully requests that the Court grant this motion, and grant leave to appeal the March 15, 2024 Order of the trial court.  /s/ [...]  [...] (018292011)  [...] [...] Roseland, New Jersey  07068 [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendant, [...]  Dated: April 3, 2024  [...], Plaintiff/Appellee, vs. [...], Defendant/Appellant.
[directive] 2 understand the reasoning behind redactions.  Redactions are necessary to ensure the required disclosures do not interfere with the proper functioning of the internal affairs process.  Disclosure of some information—such as names of complainants, witnesses, and cooperators—risks deterring individuals from participating in the internal affairs process, and undermines the public’s interest in an effective mechanism for police accountability.  Information that would interfere with ongoing criminal investigations or prosecutions, or that divulge emergency or security procedures or surveillance techniques, must be redacted to protect their integrity.  And certain sensitive information—like medical history, participation in resiliency programs, or mental health—must be redacted because the harm to privacy outweighs the benefits of release.
[brief] (2T 46-18 to 20; 3T 15-15 to 18-22)  Because the decision was a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion based on sound factual findings, the suppression of the phone call recordings should be affirmed.  Appellate courts “review a trial court’s decision on a motion for reconsideration under an abuse of discretion standard. ”  Matter of Estate of Jones, 477 N.J. Super. 203, 216 (App. Div. 2023) (citing Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015)).  “An abuse of discretion ‘arises when a decision is [“]made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.[”]’”  Ibid.  (quoting Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 302 (2020)).  Under this deferential standard of review, motion judges are “entitled to draw inferences from the evidence and make factual findings based on” their “feel of the case,” and their findings are entitled to deference unless they are “‘clearly mistaken’ or ‘so wide of the mark’ that the interests of justice” require appellate intervention.
[brief] Trust payment of [...] legal fees, which needed to be paid back, since it rejected evidence by [...] & me that ALL work, which led to unnecessary Court filings, was due to [...] & [...] refusing from Jan. to Sept. ‘22 to work on readily achievable 3-Way Settlement that [...] stated he would allow if [...], [...], & I would agree on Settlement details, which we did on April 25, ‘22, & could have done sooner if they were agreeable sooner to a Settlement, that would have required around $5K in fees, as I substantiated.
[brief] The Department Was Not Required to Adopt Rules as to Excessiveness.  [...] argues that the Department has not provided any guidance to regulated entities about what the statutory term “excessive” means.  (Ab23).  Disregarding tried and true canons of construction of agency rules and their associated statutes, [...] claims that it lacked sufficient notice of how that term would be construed and contends that the long-term care industry is left without direction or guidance from the Department.  [...]’s narrative on this point should be rejected.  1.  The Department’s Promulgated Rules Fulfilled the Department’s Obligation to Provide Guidance about the Rate Review Process.
[brief] Indeed, the difficulty of estimating the value of contaminated property has been noted by other courts and commentators that have recognized that finding a comparable parcel on which to base an estimate of value is problematic because all contamination is different.  *Suydam*, *supra* at 12 [emphasis added]  The Supreme Court recognized that R. 4:73-1 requires the proceedings to be brought “in a summary manner” and does not allow for counterclaims.
[brief] *Marzano v. Computer Science Corp., Inc.*, 91 F.3d 497, 509 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting *Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts*, 814 F.2d 893, 899 (3d Cir. 1987)).  “The ‘judge’s function is not himself or herself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. ’”  Ibid. (quoting *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).  Credibility determinations are left to the jury, not the motion judge.  Ibid.  “It is ordinarily improper to grant summary judgment when a party’s state of mind, intent, motive or credibility is in issue. ”  *In re Estate of DeFrank*, 433 N.J. Super. 258, 266 (App. Div. 2013).  “Indeed, ‘[t]he cases are legion that caution against the use of summary judgment to decide a case that turns on the intent and credibility of the parties. ””  Id. (citation omitted).  “Thus, it is clear that questions of a party’s state of mind, knowledge, intent or motive should not generally be decided on a summary judgment motion. ”  Id. at 267.
[brief] *Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.*, 545 U.S. 546, 568-69 (2005).  Citing *Exxon Mobil Corp.*, the Third Circuit explained, “both the Supreme Court and this Court have made clear that we may not turn to legislative history in order to muddy the waters of an otherwise clear statute. ”  *Galloway v. United States*, 492 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2007).
[directive] Kits  A.  Kit Tracking System  All law enforcement agencies in New Jersey are responsible for the custody and tracking of SAFE and DFSA kits, and therefore, all agencies must have a standardized system for tracking the kits.  All law enforcement agencies are responsible for documenting their role in processing the SAFE/DFSA kit.  Documentation of each agency’s role in processing the SAFE/DFSA kit must be retained to show chain of custody.  The County Prosecutor is responsible for ensuring the agencies within their county document their role in processing the SAFE/DFSA kits and must incorporate the following minimum requirements for their county’s kit tracking system:  1.  The SAFE/DFSA kit tracking system shall utilize the agency’s existing evidence tracking system.  Kits shall be tracked from time of collection by the Forensic Nurse Examiner or other health care provider (approved by a partner law enforcement agency) through transfer to any law enforcement agency to maintain chain of custody.  The system shall document the date and time of submission to the forensic laboratory for analysis, the date of return of the kit for ongoing storage, any other releases and returns, and the eventual dates of review for disposition indicating continued hold or date of destruction.  2.  The SAFE/DFSA kit tracking system shall provide for anonymity of all unreported SAFE/DFSA kits, and a mechanism to identify and retrieve SAFE kits from the evidence tracking system.  This can be accomplished through scannable barcoding or other unique identifiers consistent with the agency’s evidence tracking system.
[brief] Appellants/plaintiffs have maintained throughout the dispute below that solar-energy developmental rights exist apart from an interest in the land (such as a leasehold interest or by fee ownership) and those solar-energy developmental rights are capable of being sold and traded as commodities, regardless of whether solar panels are, or are not, installed on any particular parcel of land.  The motion judge held a fundamentally flawed view that, even though defendant [...] had (1) sold certain solar-energy developmental rights to Appellants/Plaintiffs for approximately $700,000 and (2) had entered into a land/lease for potential solar farm where the solar panels may ultimately be physically planted, the lack of a land/lease ipso facto results in forfeiture of the solar-energy development rights, and thereby disregarded their separate and independent existence and value apart from a land/lease.  See Pal (complaint); Pa1604 (FAC); [...] Cert. 8-31-21, Pa2532; [...] Cert re SAC, 10-6-21, Pa3088.
[directive] Page 2 • N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(12)(b) and a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 on or within 1000 feet of school property and/or a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35- 7.1 on or within 500 feet of a public housing facility, public park, or public building; or • N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3)(b) – possession of marijuana in a quantity of more than six ounces or hashish in a quantity of more than 17 grams.  This Directive also promulgates three revised forms and two new forms for use effective immediately, as follows: (1) a revised Judgment of Conviction form for use in the Criminal Division (CN 10070); (2) a revised Presentence Investigation Report (CN 10693); (3) a revised Juvenile Disposition Order form (CN 10812); (4) a new sealing court order form (CN 12763) for use in Municipal Court; and (5) a new Order for Judgment form (CN 12757) for entry of a civil judgment for any outstanding court-ordered financial assessments.  See Attachments 1-5 for the above referenced forms.
[brief] Appellant brings this action due to the untimely death of [...], an employee of defendant [...].  (Pa64)  The accident occurred on July 11, 2014, when Mr. Alexander was struck by a street sweeper owned by Defendant, [...] (“[...]”) (Pa3).  The street sweeper was operated by [...].  (Pa3)  Plaintiff named Mr. Hackett as a direct defendant in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.  (Pa64)  Appellant in their Amended Complaint specifically alleges that [...] was liable under a theory of respondeat superior.  [...] “were responsible for the actions of their employee, [...]. ”  (Pa69)  A.
[brief] As an initial matter, [...], an authorized judicial officer in Toms River, issued a valid search warrant based on probable cause.  Defendant has not contested this finding of probable cause.  Instead, he challenges the location of the vehicle during the search.  Critically, here, the warrant-based search was limited to the property described in the warrant, namely, the Jaguar that defendant was driving on August 5, 2020.  Specifically, the warrant indicated that [...] had probable cause to believe that a “certain vehicle within the Township of Toms River” contained illegal substances and firearms.  (Dca8).  There is no dispute that the activity supporting probable cause took place in Toms River.  (See Dca4 to 7).  As such, [...] properly appeared before a Toms River magistrate judge to request the warrant.  But the establishment of probable cause in Toms River does not limit execution of the search warrant to only when the vehicle is in Toms River.  First, while the warrant itself recognized that probable cause was established \(^5\)  This subsection addresses Points I and II in defendant’s brief, and specifically those arguments that challenge the validity of the warrant.
[brief] (Ja411).  The Planning Board acted after denying the Property owner’s request for an adjournment of the hearing so that it could retain its own expert and without asking [...] a single question, despite his extensive testimony.  (Ja438).  On February 20, 2024, the Township Committee accepted the Planning Board’s recommendation and adopted Resolution No. 24-95, which declared the Property to be a Condemnation Redevelopment Area pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(a) and (d) (the “Second Condemnation Resolution”).  (Da201).  Counsel for Plaintiff sent a letter in advance of the February 20, 2024 meeting and again noted its objections to the Planning Board’s recommendation in addition to the Township Committee adopting the Second Condemnation Resolution.  (Ja453).  The operative Complaint in this matter asserts actions in lieu of prerogative writs challenging all of the foregoing actions by the [...] and the Planning Board, including the adoption of the Second Condemnation Resolution.  (Ja20).  E.
[brief] However, the judge specifically set forth that she was not “tak[ing] into account the matters that have been dismissed and no-billed. ”  Moreover, such consideration to support her findings on the aggravating factors three, six, and nine would not have been error because, “[a]dult arrests that do not result in convictions may be ‘relevant to the character of the sentence ... imposed. ’ ”  State v. Rice, 425 N.J. Super. 375, 382 (App. Div. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Tanksley, 245 N.J. Super. 390, 397 (App. Div. 1991)).  *20  Defendant's assertion to the contrary, in reliance upon State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190, 199 (2015), is inapposite.  In that case, the Court addressed whether a prosecutor, in rejecting an application for pretrial intervention, may consider a defendant's prior dismissed charges, which were not “supported by undisputed facts of record or facts found at a hearing. ”  Ibid.  Similarly unpersuasive is defendant's argument that the judge erred in failing to consider, based on the jury's finding, the robbery was on the lower end of a second-degree crime because the victim suffered no physical injuries and the incident lasted only a few minutes.
[brief] In both Lawson and Lacroix, unlike the case sub judice, the courts had a full record and had determined the proper remedy after a plenary hearing as to what had happened related to the application for insurance.  The elements of a claim of equitable fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence.  Daibo v. Kirsch, 316 N.J. Super. 580, 591-92 (App. Div. 1998).  Thus, even if the basic elements of equitable fraud have been established here, public policy considerations support a balancing of the equities in favor of [...], an innocent party who would be negatively impacted by the rescission of [...]’s policy.  Here, this Court should reverse the lower court and find that the policy by [...] covering [...] is valid and enforceable, or, at a minimum, the matter should be reversed and set down for a plenary hearing to examine the circumstances surrounding the Supplemental Application and [...]’s internal underwriting guidelines and how they were applied in practice.