ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Internal affairs investigators shall familiarize themselves with all of these provisions.  7.0.4  Complaints must be professionally, objectively and expeditiously investigated in order to gather all information necessary to arrive at a proper disposition.  It is important to document complainants’ concerns, even those that appear to be unfounded or frivolous.  If such complaints are not documented or handled appropriately, public dissatisfaction will grow, fostering a general impression of agency insensitivity to community concerns.
[directive] Note 4.6.1.  See subsection acomplaint-warrant.  on imposed release pretrial of condition special other or surrender, 50 Page a for apply victim to the or agency of the authority the alter any way in or preempt to construed criminal in the release pretrial of conditions special the and order, restraining final or temporary such any of, in lieu not to, addition in be shall subsection this to pursuant sought prosecution order.  restraining final or temporary civil Cases.
[brief] The trial judge granted summary judgment to the [defendants] under the principle of equitable subrogation.  [D]ecisions concerning [the application of an equitable doctrine] ordinarily are left to the sound discretion of the trial court.  ‘An appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge unless there is a showing of clear abuse of that discretion. ’”  Kurzke v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 164 N.J. 159, 165 (2000) (quoting Civic S. Factors Corp. v. Bonat, 65 N.J. 329, 333 (1974))
[brief] Contrary to the State’s assertion that “self-defense is only a defense to resisting arrest or aggravated assault on a police officer where an officer ‘uses excessive or unnecessary force’” (Sb 17), our state’s jurisprudence recognizes that the jury ¹ Da: Defendant’s appendix 8T: Transcript of 10/21/2022 (Trial)  Db: Defendant’s opening brief 9T: Transcript of 10/25/2022 (Trial)  Sa: State’s appendix  Sb:  State’s brief must be charged on self-defense in the context of civilian-police altercations in two different scenarios.
[brief] 42 - TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases A.D.M. v. A.M., 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2780, at *5-6 (App. Div. Dec. 19, 2018)  ........................................................................................................... - 6 - Bendar v. Rosen, 247 N.J. Super. 219, 232 (App. Div. 1991)
[brief] [37a, 196a, 199a, 212a 272a–276a]  A review of the initial document submitted by the Appellants objectively raises questions concerning the Appellants’ position.  [24a-34a]  There are eight pages of text in this agreement.  Page eight ends in the middle of a sentence, “….  The remainder of this agreement, the balance of…”  The next page (nine) is blank, however, curiously contains what the Appellants allege to be the initials of the Respondent.  [24a-34a]  For reasons that have never been explained there is a second page nine, which begins in the middle of a sentence, “…agrees to indemnify and hold harmless …”
[brief] Plaintiffs ask me to order Defendants to conduct custodial interviews aimed at determining the existence, status, and contents of various document repositories, and produce a report to Plaintiffs identifying “their size and scope, and when they can be collected and ready to search. ”  Dkt. 212 at 6.  I am reluctant to do so.  I simply do not think that district court judges should micro-manage the parties’ internal review procedures.  As Defendants noted at oral argument, Sedona Principle 6 instructs that “[r]esponding parties are best situated to evaluate the procedures, methodologies, and technologies appropriate for preserving and producing their own electronically stored information.
[brief] In opposing this Appeal, [...] cannot dispute that the gravamen of this action centers on its threat to terminate the Wholesaler Agreement and cut off the supply of [...] products into New Jersey where Appellants (collectively, “[...]”) operate their business, store their inventory, and place [...] products into the stream of commerce.  [...]’s insistence that the MBPA and State law are inapplicable because of the locale of [...]’s sales is flawed because, as New Jersey’s three-tier alcohol distribution system mandates, [...] cannot have direct connection, relationship, or involvement with any wholesale transactions to on-and-off premise retailers.  Thus, as confirmed by applicable case law, the final destination of [...]’s sales is immaterial to this Court’s choice-of-law analysis, and the MBPA and New Jersey law must apply since [...]’s and [...]’s mutual obligations and transactions (as well as all events in the Complaint) occur solely in this State.  Accordingly, the Agreement’s arbitration clause is invalid as a matter of New Jersey law under County of Passaic v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 498 (App. Div. 2023) (“Passaic”).  [...], however, misconstrues Passaic by conflating sophistication with bargaining power, and plainly ignores that [...] has never had equal bargaining power and never engaged in arms-length negotiations with [...], and thus should enjoy heightened protections to ensure mutual assent to arbitration.  And while the FAA is inapplicable since the Agreement’s arbitration clause is invalid, the MBPA would nonetheless supersede the FAA under the Twenty-First Amendment, as the right to bring brewer-wholesaler disputes in this State’s courts is imperative to the MBPA’s goal of maintaining “orderly market conditions. ”  Accordingly, with no valid arbitration agreement, the issue of arbitrability is moot, and in any event, mere reference to AAA rules is not “clear and unmistakable” proof that the parties delegated the question to an arbitrator.  Lastly, [...]’s withdrawal of the Notices cannot moot this case, as it merely comported with the trial court’s injunction, and [...] remains steadfast in maintaining that its conduct was lawful when it clearly was not.  ARGUMENT
[brief] **FACTOR 12 – PAYMENT BY HOUR, WEEK OR MONTH**  An individual who is paid through the payroll system and not through a voucher system is more likely an employee.  It was conceded through the OAL Hearing and reporting by Respondent that Petitioner is paid through the bi-monthly payroll system of the Township, is not paid through the submission of vouchers, all state and federal employee taxes are taken from Petitioner’s paycheck, and she receives a W-2 at the end of each year.  It was also established by both parties that Petitioner is paid through a salary ordinance which pertains to municipal employees only.  This is the exact way Petitioner was paid from 2003-2008 when she was enrolled in the PERS system.  Yet, despite all this information, [...] once again refers to the 2009-2014 period, which is not at issue in this case.
[directive] A State, county or municipal police officer and the governmental jurisdiction employing that officer or an employee of an emergency department of a licensed general hospital in this State and the hospital employing that person shall incur no civil or criminal liability for any good faith acts or omissions performed pursuant to this section.  P.L. 2000, Ch. 58, §4f.  The procedures provided herein are divided into three Parts.  Part 1 sets forth procedures to be followed by law enforcement agencies in the event that a parent, or person acting on behalf of a parent, leaves an infant at a police station and does not express an intent to return for the child.  Part 2 sets forth procedures to be followed by law enforcement agencies regarding infants left at hospitals.  Part 3 sets forth responsibilities of the [...].  Generally, if an infant is left at a police station or hospital in circumstances that conform to the requirements of this Act, local law enforcement involvement should be minimal.  The Missing Persons Unit of the Division of State Police will work with the [...] to confirm that the infant has not been reported missing as required by P.L. 2000, Ch. 58, §4c. of the Act.  The legislature intended to provide parents with confidentiality and immunity from prosecution for abandonment.  Additional investigations by local law enforcement will not be necessary in most cases.  However, the immunity from prosecution provided by this Act is limited to the act of abandonment.  The Act specifies that it “...shall not be construed to create a defense to any prosecution arising from any conduct other than the act of delivering the child as described herein, and this subsection specifically shall not constitute a defense to any prosecution arising from an act of abuse or neglect committed prior to the delivery of the child....”  P.L. 2000, Ch. 58, §4e.
[brief] (Da317)  The owner’s real estate appraiser considered the reported physical damages and the engineer’s proposed cost-to-cure to be an appropriate measure of the reduction in the fair market value of the house.  (Da288, 336-338; 340-341)  Over the owner’s objection, the court granted plaintiff’s motion to bar the owner’s claims for the physical damages to the house from the project as outside the scope of damages recoverable in a condemnation action.  (Da390)
[directive] Process for Sealing these Records in Criminal, Family, and Municipal Courts  For criminal convictions, the attached Judgment of Conviction (JOC) form (CN 10070) has been updated to add checkboxes to indicate that the sentencing court has ordered: (1) the case to be sealed (page 1) and entry of a civil judgment for the outstanding court-ordered financial assessment (page 2).  See Attachment 1.  The appended revised JOC form supersedes the JOC form promulgated by the Supplement to Directive # 04-12 (issued July 22, 2016).  Court staff will also prepare the Order of Judgment form (CN 12757) for any outstanding financial assessments as noted above and send the signed Order electronically to the Superior Court Clerk’s Office.  Additionally, the Presentence Investigation (PSI) Report (CN 10693) has been updated on the first page to display a notation that this case may be eligible for sealing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.2 if the charge(s) is one of the enumerated offenses.  Thus, this Directive modifies and supplements the first page of the PSI form promulgated by the Supplement to Directive #03-13 (issued September 14. 2017).  See Attachment 2.  For juvenile adjudications, the attached Juvenile Disposition Order (CN 10812) has been revised to include checkboxes and text for the sealing and outstanding court-ordered financial assessment provision.  See Attachment 3.  For convictions in Municipal Courts, upon the judge ordering a case sealed, the court administrator will complete the attached Municipal Court sealing order (CN 12763) and distribute notification to the parties indicated on the sealing order in accordance with those identified in the following paragraph.
[brief] The Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of the Trial Court’s Order denying the Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment and granting the Borough’s cross-motion for summary judgment on the Public Trust Doctrine claims (Pa503).  This motion was opposed by the Borough.  On June 10, 2022, [...] held oral argument on the Plaintiff’s reconsideration motion (6T).  On that same date, the Trial Court entered an Order denying the Plaintiff’s reconsideration motion (Pa1729).  G.
[brief] Thus, time-barred transactions represent almost one-half of the compensatory damages awarded.  Determining whether a cause of action is barred by a statute of limitations is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.  *Save Camden Pub. Schs. v. Camden City Bd. of Educ.*, 454 N.J. Super. 478, 487 (App. Div. 2018); *Catena v. Raytheon Co.*, 447 N.J. Super. 43, 52 (App. Div. 2016).
[directive] There has been a practice, at least implicitly, in which judges have withheld excusals for cause where the issue is reasonably debatable, because the attorney seeking the excusal has a large number of peremptory challenges available.  With the proposed reduction in the number of peremptory challenges, this practice would necessarily end.  "As the defendant approaches the exhaustion of his or her peremptory challenges, the trial court should become increasingly sensitive to the possibility of prejudice from its failure to dismiss the juror for cause.  That heightened sensitivity should lead to a more generous exercise of discretion as defendant approaches the exhaustion of his or her peremptory challenges."  State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 155 (1987).  If the number of peremptory challenges eventually is reduced, judges should be more liberally disposed to excusing jurors for cause where the issue is a close one.
[brief] There is no constitutional impediment to a trial court deciding whether a defendant should serve consecutive sentences under the standards governing sentencing.  State v. Abdullah, 184 N.J. 497, 512-15 (2005); State v. Anderson, 374 N.J. Super. 419, 422 (App. Div. 2005).  Nor is there a presumption in favor of concurrent sentences; the maximum potential sentence authorized by the jury verdict is the aggregate of sentences for multiple convictions that do not merge.
[brief] On March 19, 2024, plaintiff filed its notice of cross appeal of (a) the stay of post-sale proceedings pending the filing of the [...]’ appeal of the Sale Confirmation Order, (b) the fixing of the amount of the [...]’ supersedeas bond in the Second Stay Pending the Filing of Defendants’ Appeal Order at $645,000, instead of plaintiffs’ requested $2,500,000, and (c) all of the provisions of the Stay Pending Final Resolution of Defendants’ Appeal Order.  Da220.
[brief] Equally importantly, all professional testimony supported the application.  The Board made no finding that “[[...]’s] testimony was unbelievable, incompetent, or conflicting. ”  See *N.Y. SMSA, L.P. v. Bd. Of Adjustment of Tp. of Weehawken*, 370 N.J. Super. at 338.  “While a board may reject expert testimony, it may not do so unreasonably, based only upon bare allegations or unsubstantiated beliefs. ”  *Id.*  [citations omitted].  The resolution does not even try to argue that it did so, or that the Board’s “decision” was “predicated on substantial evidence. ”  See *Cell S. of N.J.*, 172 N.J. at 89.  Instead, the resolution merely says that one of the Board’s professionals found [...]’s evidence on safety “unpersuasive,” but there was no contrary evidence, not even from that same professional.  (Pa126.)  Without more, this is just a net opinion, if it is even that, but “the substantial evidence standard is not met if a municipality's decision is supported by only the net opinion of an expert. ”  *Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc.*, supra at 373.⁹  The trial court said that the Board found [...]’s professionals “unpersuasive,” but the Board only recited the comment of one of its professionals; it did not make *any such finding*.  This is a textbook example of why a resolution matters: (i) failure to choose between conflicting expert testimony; (ii) failure to articulate the purposes advanced ---  ⁹  This is particularly important here, where the Board randomly mentioned “safety” in its denial, because this application has First Amendment implications and randomly saying “safety” is not enough.  *E&J Equities, LLC*, supra. or harmed by a bulk variance; (iii) failure to differentiate between valid and invalid considerations; and (iv) failure to evidence whether the application was considered as a whole.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] The School Zone Narcotics Enforcement Working Group established pursuant to SNAP Directive 5.14 shall continue to meet on a periodic basis to discuss the implementation of and compliance with the provisions of this Executive Directive, and to recommend necessary and appropriate revisions.  Each county prosecutor, working in conjunction with the county superintendent of schools, shall not less than once each calendar year organize and conduct a meeting of representatives from the law enforcement and educational communities to discuss the implementation of and compliance with the provisions of this Executive Directive throughout the county, to discuss any other matters of mutual concern, and to recommend revisions to this Executive Directive.  Every chief of police, school building principal and local superintendent shall be invited to attend, along with any other persons or organization representatives who the county prosecutor believes could contribute to or benefit from the proceedings.  Each county prosecutor shall thereafter issue a report to the Attorney General as to the results of the meeting, which shall include a discussion of any general or specific recommendations concerning the need for revisions to this Executive Directive.  Part VIII - Principles of Construction: Dispute Resolution Procedures
[brief] [2T4-17:5-11]  "The general rule is that findings by a trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence."  Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998).  See also, State v. Camey, 239 N.J. 282, 306 (2019) ("[w]e will not disturb the trial court's findings; in an appeal, we defer to findings that are supported in the record and find roots in credibility assessments by the trial court"); Motorworld, Inc. v. Benkendorf, 228 N.J. 311, 329 (2017) ("[w]e review the trial court's factual findings under a deferential standard: those findings must be upheld if they are based on credible evidence in the record"); Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016) (findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence); State v. K.W., 214 N.J. 499, 507 (2013) ("[w]e defer to the trial court's factual findings 'so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record’").  On July 18, 2023, the Court announced its ruling granting [...]’s Motion in Aid of Litigant’s Rights and its decision to set aside the January 23rd Resolution and to award [...] “reasonable attorney's fees.
[brief] Pb17.  Stated another way, [...] claims the No-Fault Law is unconstitutional if it requires arbitration of those claims.  Pb18.  [...] fails to mention, however, that it never raised this constitutional argument in the trial court.  And so, [...] cannot raise a constitutional argument for the first time on appeal here.  “It is a well-settled principle that our appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest.
[brief] The Court did not make a specific finding why anything less would be insufficient to be “coercive” going forward.  The Court also ignored that its change of control Orders were 17 months old before Plaintiffs alleged a violation.  That substantial gap in time actually showed that [...] had honored the change of management control Order, as the Court was hoping he would.  The Court also failed to recognize that the challenged conduct was assertion of a claim in a court, not an actual interference with the company’s operation.  Therefore, the most drastic fee award was not needed as the “only remedy” that might deter in the future.  The Court’s ignorance of these mitigating factors and the enormity of the award show it was punishing [...] in this fee award.  That was an abuse of discretion and misapplication of law under the circumstances.
[directive] Making the Record of Grand Jury Proceedings  It is the responsibility of the Judiciary to make the record of grand jury selection as well as the record of all grand jury sessions.  Comment:  The grand jury is a Judiciary proceeding.  As such, it is the responsibility of the Judiciary to make the official court record of grand jury selection as well as the official court record of sessions at which grand jury testimony is presented.  As with other Judiciary proceedings, there must be only one record made of grand jury selection or sessions because to do otherwise may lead to disputes regarding the nature of the official record.  The Judiciary has determined that it is the responsibility of the grand jury clerk to make the record of grand jury proceedings.  Grand Jury Standards Promulgated by Directive #23-06 (December 22, 2006)
[brief] This is not true in a Chapter 13 case.  Code § 1306(b) nullifies the effect of Code § 521(4). ”  5 [...], *Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice 2d* § 117:1, at 117–3 (2d ed.1994).  Since the Chapter 13 debtor retains possession of his or her property, the role of the chapter 13 trustee is different from that of the chapter 7 trustee.  In a case where the Chapter 13 is converted to a Chapter 7, the Chapter 13 Trustee is replaced with a Chapter 7 Trustee to represent the estate and its creditors.  *Harris v. Viegelahn*, 575 U.S. 510, 135 S.Ct. 1829, 191 L.Ed.2d 783 (2015)
[directive] Also note that in except for those statutes that have been upgraded, the bail ranges for statutes listed the May 12, 2009 Supplement have remained the same.  The revisions to the Statewide Bail Schedules were necessary in order to include a number of additional offenses and statutory amendments.  Further, additional court rules have been added to the Summary of the Rules/Statutes Governing Bail that are as attached to the Bail Schedules.  The revisions to the Bail Schedules are summarized follows:
[brief] The last time [...] had been seen alive was Friday, March 10, 2017 (24T12-7 to 9).  At 12:07 a.m. on March 11, 2017, two days before [...]'s body was found, five hundred dollars had been withdrawn from his bank account through the ATM at [...]'s Clayton office (16T14-1 to 17).  Surveillance photos showed an individual at the ATM during the transaction (16T21-13 to 16T24-22).  A bandanna covered the lower portion of the person's face and he wore black, grey and neon green gloves, a baseball cap and two hooded sweatshirts pulled up over the cap (24T19-21 to 24T20- 6).  The individual was alone and no video captured him meeting anyone or getting into a car (25T16-7 to 20).
[directive] A risk-assessment pretrial the automated by determined (NCA) score Activity  New Criminal or (FTA) an assistant flag, (NVCA) unless Criminal Activity there New if or Violent a is or 5, 4, process 6, is or 3.2 Section this Directive, of with in general accordance consulted attorney or prosecutor deputy under presumptions overcome  Prosecutor to County the by is authorized who officer supervisory a is complaint-warrant charging of by presumption the that determines Directive, of 4 Section this 4.5.
[brief] Gallo v. Mayor and Tp. Council of Lawrence Tp., 328 N.J. Super. 117 (App. Div. 2000).  The test, our Supreme Court has written is whether the zoning change in question is made with the purpose or effect of establishing or furthering a comprehensive zoning scheme calculated to achieve the statutory objectives or whether it is “designed merely to relieve the lot of the burden of the restriction of the general regulation by reason of conditions alleged to cause such regulation to bear with particular harshness upon it. ” (internal citation omitted).  Cresskill v. Dumont, 15 N.J. 238 (1954).  The need to undertake a spot zoning analysis derives from limitations on the police power and constitutional considerations.
[brief] The plan called for an archery hunt of black bears beginning on October 9, 2023 and six-day hunt beginning on December 4, 2023 during the annual six-day shotgun season.  Both hunts would include the restrictions approved as part of the emergency bear hunt in December of 2022.  See, 2023 Black Bear Management FAQs, published at dep.nj.gov (last visited 11/15/23).  In addition, hunters were to be required by the Council to pay a permit fee in order to hunt bears within special zones set up within the northwestern part of the State where bear hunting was to be allowed.  (Pa99)  Under the bear hunt approved by the Council, harvest rates equal the number of harvested bears that were tagged in the current calendar year within the bear management zones opened to hunting divided by the number of bears that were tagged in the current year that are available for harvest.