ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This is all defendants did in their responses.  There is no proper ground to deny reinstatement of defendants’ Answers because defendants recited objections.  Defendants’ recitation of objections were followed by substantive responses to plaintiffs’ discovery requests in any event.  [...] said, at the March 6 hearing, that defendants’ answer with regards to Punch List Request No. 6, which requested all payments and/or reimbursements made by [...] for any reason from January 2014 through September 2019, were insufficient.  2T10:6-11-25 to 11:1-17.  But Defendant [...] certified that it had no records from 2016-2020; failing to include 2014 and 2015 was an oversight, but the answer remained the same – and could simply have been clarified.
[brief] THE ARBITRATOR’S REFUSAL TO POSTPONE FOR 45 DAYS DENIED BRAD COUNSEL AND RESULTED IN AN UNFAIR AND IMPROPER FINAL AWARD WITHOUT A HEARING AT  ALL  Plaintiffs conflate the law regarding the refusal to grant a postponement with the Arbitrator’s right to refuse to consider evidence.  The Arbitration Act expressly permits vacatur for the failure to grant a postponement, “upon showing of sufficient cause for postponement”.  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23(a).  This was not a case where [...] requested to submit evidence that the Arbitrator refused to consider.  This was not even a case where [...] was asking for a postponement so that he had time to find an attorney.  This was a case where [...] had found an attorney and that attorney wrote the Arbitrator stating reasonable grounds for the postponement.  (Da2154-2155)  The case was 7.5 years old and the motion for judgment was inches thick.  [...]’s counsel needed a chance to review and stated that with 45 days he could file opposition.  (Ibid.)  [...] had not wasted time after receipt of the Plaintiff’s motion and believed he had an attorney prior to this firm.  (Da2154)  He had childcare concerns because his ex-wife had a stroke.  (Da2154)  The minor children themselves needed counsel, and the Arbitrator was admittedly concerned by that.  (Da2064)(Da2093)  [...]’s current counsel stated he would be appearing for both [...] and those minors, if he could get 45 days postponement.  (Da2154-2155)  Despite all of those reasons, and that counsel was confirming he could file opposition with an extension, the Arbitrator denied the request and without reason.  (Da2508; 2510-2512)  Therefore, the statute compels vacatur if [...] was denied a fundamentally fair hearing.
[brief] “A sentencing court may impose only those sentences authorized by statute. ”  State v. Newman, 132 N.J. 159, 164 (1993); see also State v. Masce, 452 N.J. Super. 347, 351 (App. Div. 2017) (“[A]ll sentences imposed by a court for any offense must comport with Chapter 43 of the Code [of Criminal Justice], N.J.S.A. 2C:43-1 to -22. ”).  A sentence is accordingly illegal if it “exceed[s] the penalties authorized for a particular offense,” or if it is “not authorized by law. ”  State v. Hyland, 238 N.J. 135, 145 (2019).
[brief] (Da 30-33)  Counsel’s brief further argued that at this time, due to the illegality of the sentence-imposed, defendant’s conviction under the second indictment must be vacated.  (Da 30-33)  Defendant’s pro se brief (attached as appendix to counsel’s brief) joined in that argument.  (Da 34-37)  Both briefs argued that as a direct consequence the extended term sentence imposed under the third indictment ([...]) pursuant to the persistent offender statute (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3a) was itself an illegal sentence as defendant at the time of sentencing had only a single prior conviction.
[brief] 6T119-3 to 5.  During his examination he noted that she was hypotensive with abdominal pain and distension.  6T111-5 to 14.  Along with the radiologist, [...], defendant reviewed a computerized tomography (CT) scan performed the evening of decedent’s arrival.  Both agreed that there were no signs of issues that warranted surgery at that time.  6T116-15 to 117-22.  Decedent was held for observation while non-surgical treatment was done to see if that would resolve her issues.
[brief] With these professionals’ assignment completed, their role was concluded and plaintiffs sent a written reminder to maintain confidentiality of client information:  “You are once again instructed not to speak [sic] anybody or share our work product from the Mill Road project or any other projects. ”  Id.  Sometime after the [...] breached the NDA and [...] breached the confidentiality clause in the lease and began to sell/purchase the same set of right already sold to/purchased by plaintiffs, plaintiffs came to learn that these two professional groups, [...] and [...] themselves “jumped into” the same action.
[brief] Plaintiff’s attempt to rely on lay witness opinion testimony to sustain the claim against [...] should be rejected**  A lay witness can only provide an opinion if it arises from the witness’ personal knowledge.  *E&H Steel*, 455 N.J. Super. at 25; See also *N.J.R.E.* 602; *N.J.R.E.* 701.  By contrast, expert testimony, “is untethered to the constraints of personal knowledge and perception imposed by these rules.
[brief] I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW  This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment *de novo*, using the same standard that governed the trial court's decision.  *Samolyk v. Berthe*, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022).  Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should only be granted if the competent evidentiary materials are sufficient to demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact remaining for trial.  *See Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); *see also* R. 4:46–2(c).  If a reasonable factfinder could resolve the disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party, summary judgment must be denied.  *Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev*, 225 N.J. 469, 481 (2016), *citing Bhagat v. Bhagat*, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014).  II.
[brief] [...] fired a pellet gun on Federal Marsh Land which was part of a navigable waterway of the U.S., Absecon Creek, which is legal under Federal Law.  [...] called into the police to report an old lady who had threatened him while hunting.  He was told to pull over.  [...] was unconcerned as an Absecon police Lieutenant (now Chief) had told [...] the pellet gun did not require a Firearms Purchaser ID (FPID) just 9 days earlier when he filed voluntary registration papers.  Pa88.  As the Defendants have complained voluminously, this complaint has many facts, but it is because the Defendants “piled” civil rights violations on top of each other.
[brief] Defendant claims that the judge found aggravating factor three based solely on the fact that defendant showed no remorse because he did not speak at sentencing.  (Db79-81).  Contrary to defendant’s claim, this finding was based on defendant’s lack of remorse at any time during the five years between the murders and the date of sentence.  As the judge noted, even in his statement to the police just hours after the shootings, defendant said that he knew he should feel sad, but he had no feelings about killing his family.  (17T197-24 to 198-7).  It was defendant’s lack of remorse over the preceding five years that informed the judge’s finding.  The judge also considered defendant’s own words that “this would happen again or worse” and he would be “more careful” next time to cover his tracks.  (17T195-13 to 196-22).  The court found that these are not the words of someone who is or could be rehabilitated.  (17T196-22 to 197-18).  See State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285, 299 (2021) (lack of remorse satisfies aggravating factor three).  Three:
[brief] It is well-settled an attorney's hearsay certification is "inadequate to establish" facts asserted therein.  Certifications must be made on personal knowledge setting forth only facts which are admissible in evidence to which the affiant is competent to testify.  Pascack Bank v. Universal Funding, 419 N.J. Super. 279 (App. Div. 2011) and Jacobs v. Walt Disney World, 309 N.J. Super. 443 (App. Div. 1998) [additional citations omitted]
[brief] [...] (hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiff”) and [...] (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant”) were married on June 17, 1989.  Plaintiff and Defendant ultimately decided to dissolve their marriage by divorcing.  A Property Settlement Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “PSA"), (DA 282), was executed by the parties on April 10, 2009 and was incorporated into the Final Judgment of Divorce entered on June 4, 2009 (DA 94), by the Honorable [...], J.S.C.
[brief] September 26, 2023  Order Denying  Plaintiffs’ application by way of Order to Show Cause (“OTSC”)  Pursuant to Rule 4:5-2 for Dismissal with Prejudice of the Arbitration filed by [...] with the [...] (AAA) with Statement of Reasons………………………………DA217  October 24, 2023  Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Trial Court’s September 26, 2023  Order Denying Plaintiffs’ OTSC…………………………………………………………………………………DA256  April 26, 2024  Order Denying Defendants’, [...], [...], and [...], Motion for (1) for a Summary Disposition on the Enforceability of the Parties’ Arbitration Agreement in Defendants’ favor, and (2) an Order Staying all Claims Pending Completion of the Pending [...] (“AAA”)  Proceeding Pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e)  ………………………………………DA1540  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,** | 26, 31 | | 513 U.S. 265 (1995) | | | **Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn,** | 43 | | 410 N.J. Super. 510 (App. Div. 2009) | | | **AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,** | 27, 29, 30, 33 | | 563 U.S. 333 (2011) | | | **Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group,** | passim | | L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014) | | | **Bartz v. Weyerhaeuser Co.,** | 37 | | 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1640 (App. Div. Aug. 26, 2020) | | | **Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC,** | 44 | | 809 F.3d 746 (3d Cir. 2016) | | | **Cnty. of Passaic v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc,** | 39, 47, 51 | | 474 N.J. Super. 498 (App. Div. 2023) | | | **Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center,** | 53 | | 215 N.J. 265 (2013) | | | **Cooper v. MRM Investment Co.,** | 30 | | 367 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2004) | | | **Crawford v. West Jersey Health Systems,** | 26 | | 847 F. Supp. 1232, 1240 (D.N.J. 1994) | | | **Crowe v. De Gioia,** | 9 | | 90 N.J. 126 (1982) | | | **Delaney v. Dickey,** | 38 | | 244 N.J. 466 (2020) | | | **Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,** | 27 | | 584 U.S. 497 (2018)
[brief] **Congregation’s Motion in Limine** 27.  On January 23, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Motion in Limine to exclude the transcript of the October 15, 2018 [...] hearing, minutes of the ZBA hearing, and the ZBA Resolution (collectively “ZBA Record”) from being admitted as evidence by Defendant in the remand proceedings.  The Trial Court heard arguments regarding the admissibility of the ZBA Record at the commencement of the trial on January 28, 2020 finding that the ZBA Record was not relevant to a determination of the issues on remand as outlined by the Appellate Division.
[brief] Facing a clear lack of standing under New Jersey state law, Appellant now attempts to avoid this obstacle by arguing that he has a personal stake in the litigation because his statutory reward of $1000 for the alleged violation of the FDCPA is “at stake” in the case.  Appellant’s Br., at 37.  This is, of course, of not assistance.  Standing requires a demonstration of harm from the subject matter of litigation, independent of any statutory violation or statutory damages.  See e.g., Dabush v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 378 N.J. Super. 105, 116, 121 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2005) (requiring independent showing of “ascertainable loss” to sue under the New Jersey CFA); Rocky Top, LLC v. City of S. Amboy, 2012 WL 3930371, at *26 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Sept. 11, 2012) (discussing lack of standing for ADA claim).
[brief] **VACATION OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT APPROPRIATE PURSUANT TO R. 4:50-1 (d) OR (f) IN LIGHT OF TYLER v. HENNEPIN COUNTY, 143 S.CT. 1369 (2023) AND [...] v. [...], 477 N.J.Super 339 (App. Div. 2023)** (Issue Addressed Below, 454a-792a)
[brief] P.L. 2019, c. 157.  Under the Ricci Act, the [...] was required to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the new law.  The Ricci Act states that the [...] “shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L. 2019, c. 157, within 30 days of enactment. ”  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  (Emphasis added).  The Board was required to notify all members of the [...] of the Ricci Act by August 7, 2019, including the requirement to “register” by filing a form indicating the dates and locations of service within two (2) years.  On August 8, 2019, more than 30 days after the Ricci Act’s passage, the [...] distributed an email to all Certifying Officers “advising them of their responsibilities under the Ricci Act. ”  However, while this is cited in the Final Agency Decision, no actual email dated August 8, 2019, was ever produced, only a Memorandum dated “August 2019. ”  On or about August 9, 2019, more than 30 days after the passage of the Ricci Act, the [...] contracted [...] to mail postcards to retirees.  No “close date” appears on the document.  In support of his request for amended benefits under the Ricci Act, [...] submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the [...] or the [...] with respect to the passage of P.L. 2019, c.157 (Chapter 157), the Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act.  [...] was present and involved in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks which took place on September 11, 2001.  [...] certified that he participated in the rescue, recovery, and/or cleanup at the World Trade Center site between September 11, 2001, and October 11, 2001, or September 11, 2001, and/or September 12, 2001.  [...] also certified that he suffers from a qualifying condition or impairment under the Ricci Act.  [...] submitted the Ricci Act Eligibility Registration Form and Request for Amended Benefits Form with his affidavit.
[brief] [6T 7-22 to 9-19].  He testified that the use ranks very high on the scale of inherently beneficial uses, noting that senior citizen housing construction is listed as a purpose of zoning in *N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(l)*, a goal of [...]’s Master Plan, and because there is a significant unmet need for this type of housing in [...].  [6T 12-17 to 15-21].  He also noted the significant benefit of providing 25 units of income-restricted housing towards the Township’s significant unmet affordable housing obligation.  [6T 16-13 to 17-1].  For negative impacts, [...] indicated he focuses on impacts to nearby land uses, aesthetics, traffic and parking, the environment, and municipal services when evaluating inherently beneficial uses.
[brief] 181a.  It is difficult to understand how the Trial Court could have so blatantly misread and misinterpreted [...]’s holding that in evaluating the prejudice against Plaintiffs in denying the motion to amend, Plaintiffs “would not be foreclosed from bringing these claims, they would just have to bring it in a different procedural posture. ”  885; 1T, 81:23-25.  [...] held and did the opposite of what the Trial Court misinterpreted; [...] evaluated the prejudice of whether Plaintiffs would be barred from bringing these new claims in a new action, and found that there would be no such prejudice because they would not be barred.
[brief] 2d, 319 (2010) cited by Defendants, because in that case there were cross-outs of the word “personally” and replacement with the word “trust” in the guarantee language.  Also in that case the personal home address as well as position with the company did not appear below the signature lines.  1T64-12 to 1T65-1.  However, the Court found that the Defendants terminated the Lease when they sent notice on April 11, 2016.  1T65-2 to 7.  The Court found that the May 6, 2016 letter drafted by [...] stating that Defendants rescinded their notice to terminate did not reinstate the 2015 Lease or the guarantee agreement of [...], [...], and [...], citing the Statute of Frauds, N.J.S.A. 25:1-15.  1T65-8 to 20.  The Court went on to find the May 6, 2016 letter did not reinstate the terms of the Lease and guarantee, as it was not signed by any of the other individual Defendants.  1T65-21 to 24.  The Court went on to state the April 11, 2016 letter to [...] terminated the Lease and severed [...], [...], and [...], from being personally liable for the obligations of [...].  1T65-24 to 1T66-2.  The Court further stated that since [...] continued to occupy the premises, [...] became a holdover tenant at that time.  1T66-2 to 5.  The Court found that the individual tenant guarantors were only liable on the guarantee for amounts due up to May 11, 2016.  1T66-10 to 12; Pa8, Pa9.  The Court went on to award partial summary judgment in favor of [...] and against [...] in the amount of $100,965.77.  1T66-13 to 15.  The Court also awarded attorney’s fees subject to submission of counsel’s Certification of Services.  1T66-25 to 1T67-5; Pa8.  On Defendants, [...], [...] and [...]’s Cross Motion, the Court found personal liability against [...], [...] and [...], for amounts due prior to May 11, 2016, but not liable for amounts due after May 11, 2016.  1T68-23 to 1T69-1; Pa9.  On August 24, 2022, [...] moved for reconsideration and Defendants cross moved to amend the Judgment of August 1, 2022.
[brief] She first held that [...] had standing to pursue withdrawal from a consolidated school district because “[t]he statute contemplates that a municipality, such as [...], may seek withdrawal from a regional or consolidated school district. ”  (Aa20)  In reaching this conclusion, the Commissioner disagreed with Appellants’ arguments that [...] “lacks standing to pursue withdrawal and request to join a regional school district pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.1, et seq. ” (Aa20).  She explained: [Appellants’] reading of the statute belies its clear language.  The statute applies not only to boards of education, but also specifically identifies “the governing body of a municipality constituting a constituent district of a limited purpose regional district, part of an all-purpose regional district, or part of a consolidated school district” as governmental bodies that may request withdrawal to join or form an enlarged regional school district.  The statute contemplates that a municipality, such as [...], may seek withdrawal from a regional or consolidated school district.  Therefore, [...] has standing to seek withdrawal from [...] and [...] in accordance with N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11.
[brief] In short, the court should consider factors such as defendant’s “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; “family and home environment”; family and peer pressures; “inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors” or his own attorney; and “the possibility of rehabilitation. ”  Miller, 567 U.S. at 478.  The sentencing judge should also “view defendant as he stands before the court” at resentencing and consider any rehabilitative efforts since his original sentence.  State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 354 (2012).
[directive] Revision to AG Directive 2008-1, Section 3 3.  National Integrated Ballistics Identification Network (NIBIN)  Data Entry  When a law enforcement agency on or after the effective date of this Directive seizes or recovers a firearm that was unlawfully possessed or used, or that was recovered from a crime scene or that is otherwise reasonably believed to have been involved in the commission of a crime, or that was found property (e.g., abandoned or discarded), the agency shall make arrangements to have any such weapon that is suitable for NIBIN examination test-fired as expeditiously as practicable, and shall submit the test results to submitted to a forensic laboratory that has NIBIN capabilities within two NIBIN business days to determine whether the weapon is related to any other criminal episode or other ballistics evidence, such as person.  When a law enforcement agency recovers any casings, such spent shell from a crime scene or otherwise has reason to believe that ballistics evidence the shell casing is related to the commission of a crime or an improper within two business days discharge of a firearm, the agency shall as expeditiously as evidence a forensic laboratory with possible submit the ballistics information to NIBIN capabilities.1  It is expected that any and all evidence that must be collected prior to the submission of evidence for a ballistics 1 examination (such as DNA and fingerprint evidence) will be completed within the two-business day timeframe set forth herein.  There shall be an exception for the rare case when specialized testing of the weapon or ballistics evidence is required prior to submission, delaying submission to the lab beyond the two-day mandate.  Such exceptions must be approved in writing by the County Prosecutor Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or their designee.  June 14, 2023  Page 3 * * *  All other provisions of AG Directive 2008-1 shall remain the same.
[brief] Clearly, it’s not extensive in terms of numbers, but it is in terms of the severity of the prior offense, so I do believe that that applies.  And finally Aggravating Factor Number 9, the need to deter this defendant and others from violating the law, clearly, clearly, clearly in these facts and these circumstances, that aggravating factor applies.  Considered as a whole, [...]’s findings support his application of aggravating factors 3 and 9.
[directive] [...] 0108 609-909-5999 Monday-Friday (Joint) [...] 0109 609-909-5999 Monday-Friday (Joint)  [...] 0111 609-909-5999 Monday-Friday (Joint) [...] 0112 609-909-5999 Monday-Friday (Joint) [...] 0114 609-909-5999 Monday-Friday (Joint) [...] 0118 609-909-5999 Monday-Friday (Joint) [...] 0120 609-909-5999 Monday-Friday (Joint) [...] 0122 609-909-5999 Monday-Friday [...] 0103 (609) 266-0440 1st & 3rd Thursday [...] 0106 (609) 628-2015 Wednesday [...] Joint 0113 (609) 567-4300 x 3 Tuesdays (Joint)
[brief] Q.  [...], now, based on your investigation and following your interview with [...], what did you do next?  A.  I attempted to look for the suspect.  Q.  And did you identify who that suspect was?  A. Yes.  Q.  Who was it?  A. [...].  2T32-8 to 2T32-15.  The content of Sosa's interview was hearsay.  At Pb2, the prosecution focuses on the video.  However, the jury was focused on the hearsay.  During deliberations, the jurors "ask[ed] for the Detective's report of the victim and statement" (2T129-3 to 2T129-4), which they would not have done if the video were as compelling as the State claims.
[directive] 5:21-1.  R. 15  4.  Aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a); 5.  Sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b) or (c); 6.  Robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; 7.  Carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2; 8.  Escape, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5(a); or 9.  An attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes.  In addition, if the juvenile is in custody for an offense under New Jersey law and a judicial warrant has been issued against the juvenile by any federal agency or a law enforcement agency from this State or any other state, the law enforcement agency having custody of circumstances.19 the juvenile shall apply for a complaint-warrant and advise the court of the D.
[brief] (1T8-13 to 28-9; 2T41-14 to 46-18).  On cross-examination [...] acknowledged that in his report he stated that “Had [...] made reasonable observations along her intended path of travel, her claimed accident, in all probability, would not have occurred. ”  Further, he stated that he had not been provided with “… any information that this accident occurred other than by slipping and falling. ” (3T87-17 to 90-12).  [...] was examined by [...], a Board Certified Orthopaedic Surgeon on June 8, 2021.