[brief] [...] explains that jury instructions are intended to be “a roadmap of clarity for the jury to follow,” Id, at 192.  While courts may have a “well-intentioned desire to be thorough,” additional instructions should only be included under these circumstances when “clearly indicated” to avoid misleading or confusing the jury.  Id.  Sua sponte lesser-included jury charges are subject to this higher standard because New Jersey courts readily acknowledge that, the court’s duty [is] to assure that the jury is able properly to discharge its most important responsibility in a criminal trial, determining guilt or innocence...  This judicial obligation, to assure the jury’s impartial deliberations upon the guilt of a criminal defendant based solely upon the evidence in accordance with proper and adequate instructions, is at the core of the guarantee of a fair trial...Errors impacting directly upon these sensitive areas of a criminal trial are poor candidates for rehabilitation under the harmless error philosophy.  [State v. Simon, 79 N.J. 191, 206 (1979) (citations omitted); see also State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 613 (2004) (trial courts have an “independent duty...to ensure that the jurors receive accurate instructions on the law as it pertains to the facts and issues of each case”).]  Consequently, when the trial court disregards the “clearly indicated” standard and charges the jury with extensive and repetitive jury instructions that are in no tangential way supported by the evidence, it disregards the carefully placed safeguards assuring Defendant a fair trial.  A trial court’s failure to instruct fully, clearly and accurately the fundamental and essential issues before the jury is a reversible error.  See State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 287 (1981).  Under R. 2:10-2 jurisprudence, trial court errors are reversible where there is “some degree of possibility that [the error] led to an unjust result.  The possibility must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether [it] led the jury to a verdict it otherwise might not have reached. ”  State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 273 (1973); State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 330 (2005).  Furthermore, while there is a presumption against error when a defendant does not object to a jury charge, both defense counsel and the State objected to the trial court’s decision to charge the jury with reckless manslaughter.  State v. Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300, 320 (2017) (additional citations omitted); (8T89-6 to 92-8).  Here, there is no question that the trial court’s error affected the verdict; but for the trial court’s erroneous inclusion of the lesser-included charge of reckless manslaughter to the jury, the jury would not have been able to return a guilty verdict on such an offense.  There is no need to speculate as to the possible influence this mistake had on this jury.  There was no obvious record support, nor evidence clearly indicating or jumping off the page that warranted the trial court’s sua sponte instruction to the jury against the objection of both counsel.  As such, the trial court failed in their duty to provide proper instructions based on the evidence to the jury, striking Defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial to the core.  Such error is a manifest injustice and requires reversal, regardless of whether a motion for new trial was made before the trial court under R. 2:10-2.