ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The City’s Continued Development Process and [...]’s Additional Allegations of the City’s “Unfair” Favoring of [...].  While the First Action was pending, in June 2020, the City published its proposed redevelopment plans for the Property on its website.  (Pa207–32.)  [...] saw these plans and his then-counsel wrote a letter to the Planning Board, dated July 7, 2020, stating that (1) “[i]t has come to my attention that at tonight’s scheduled Planning Board meeting, the Board will be reviewing and considering the [redevelopment plan]”; (2) “the Board’s review of the Redevelopment Plan was ‘initiated’ by [...]”; and (3) “[u]pon information and belief, [...] has yet to be formally designated as redeveloper for the area in question. ”  (Pa529–30.)  The letter continued: “The fact that [...] is initiating the redevelopment plan process underscores that this redevelopment is being driven by a private redeveloper for private gain and not being done to ameliorate any alleged conditions of blight in the area. ” (Pa529.)  [...] made similar allegations in a separate litigation in [...] captioned [...], (Docket No. [...]).² (See Pa488–93.)  On September 23, 2020, in a certification filed with the court, [...] averred that “[w]ithout [his] knowledge, the [...] was actively working with [...] to designate the [Property] as a condemnation area in need of redevelopment .  . . .”  (Pa492 ¶ 24.)  [...] also asserted that [...] “obtained conditional purchase contracts with the majority of the [Property] owners,” and that [...] was the only property owner that --- ²  In the Palomar case, the prior owner of [...]’s Saddlewood Court property (the plaintiff) filed suit to rescind the sale of the property to Saddlewood on the basis of fraud.
[brief] The Court reasoned in part as follows:  The award should do no more than -- do no more than the plaintiff -- make the plaintiff whole based on the evidence that was presented to this jury.  Here, based upon the minimal award of $25,000, the Court finds that it is clear, the jury rejected plaintiff’s argument that the pre-existing Meniere’s disease was aggravated in any way by the subject accident.  As a preliminary matter, the credibility of [...] was questioned throughout the entire jury trial, including his version of events.  [...] provided the jury with inconsistent versions of the accident and his testimony of his striking the head on the ground was disputed by his own MVR recording from his police vehicle.  Furthermore, there were multiple additional areas and examples of inconsistencies throughout the questioning and testimony of [...] concerning his pre-incident health and post-incident health that disputed his credibility before this jury.  Moreover, his recollection of the vents (sic) -- the events and the mechanism of his injury were disputed by the MVR video that was presented to this jury and perhaps provided the best evidence of the manner in which this incident occurred.  Further, the defense presented medical evidence disputing the causal relationship of the alleged injuries.  Had the jury accepted the aggravation of the Meniere’s disease was caused by this incident, as was the resulting three surgeries and extensive missed times from work was caused by this event, the resulting compensatory damage would have undeniably exceeded $25,000, potentially being 10, 20, or even 30 times more than this award.  *Clearly, this jury rejected plaintiff’s argument and chose to award a modest amount to the plaintiff and disputed the causal relationship of the aggravation of the Meniere’s disease and resulting surgeries to the subject incident.*  The Court finds the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that the treatment included in the worker’s compensation lien and the temporary disability benefits were proximately caused by the event in question.  (emphasis added)  (8T8-5 to 9-23)  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] The 2005 MBPA Enactments Regarding Wholesaler Agreements  Aligned with these fundamental goals, but recognizing the inherent uneven bargaining power in the brewer-wholesaler contractual relationship despite the tiered structure, in 2005, the New Jersey Legislature enacted the MBPA, N.J.S.A. 33:93.12 to 93.20.  These provisions identified the need for statutory protections to wholesalers and require “reasonable” terms in any wholesaler agreement.  Indeed, a primary purpose of the MBPA is to prevent the type of misconduct Defendants engaged in and to protect wholesalers, such as Plaintiffs.  In the Statement to Assembly Committee Substitute for Assembly, No. 3619, the Legislature stated that the MBPA was established to govern “written agreements between brewers and wholesalers. ” (Pa144-47.)  The Legislature makes clear that the MBPA dictates the framework for a brewer-wholesaler contractual relationship.  “The terms of the agreement must be reasonable and any provision that imposes an unreasonable standard of performance on a wholesaler is a violation of the substitute’s provisions and as such would be null and void. ”  (Pa145.)  Additionally, the MBPA was devised to “establish[] a framework for damages and injunctive relief in the event of reasonable and unreasonable terminations and provide[] for actions that violate the committee substitute's provisions to be brought in the Superior Court of New Jersey. ”  Id.  Looking to the statute itself, and when viewed in the historical context leading to the implementation of the three-tiered system, it cannot be reasonably disputed that the Legislature expressly and implicitly intended to provide broad protections to wholesalers in their dealings with brewers.
[brief] Even if the court did not err in admitting the dying declaration, it erred in failing to give the jury critical information about the alleged statement — that it was an identification and thus subject to all the same considerations about reliability as any other identification.  The jury in this case needed to be given an identification instruction to properly assess the dying declaration.  It is well-established that an identification instruction must be given in a case in which a defendant is identified as the perpetrator and his defense is that he was misidentified.  State v. Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452, 467 (2018).  Although the judge did instruct the jury on eyewitness identifications, this instruction only addressed [...]’s out-of-court identification.  (9T 124-20 to 137-8)  The failure to give a similar instruction with respect to [...]’s identification, in a case where there were so many factors to undermine the reliability of the statement and the person who made the identification was not subject to cross- examination, was clearly capable of creating an unjust result and requires reversal of [...]’s convictions.
[brief] Feigenbaum v. Guaracini, 402 N.J. Super. 7, 18 (App. Div. 2008) (alternations in original); see also Ocwen, 450 N.J. Super. at 397 (on review of a grant and denial of summary judgment, “Our scope of review is limited.  Decisions as to the application of an equitable doctrine are left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial judge in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. ” (citing Kurzke, 164 N.J. at 165)); N.Y. Mortgage Tr. 2005-3 Mortgage-Backed Notes, [...] as Tr. v. Deely, 466 N.J. Super. 387, 397 (App. Div. 2021) (same, citing Kurzke, 164 N.J. at 165 and Ocwen, 450 N.J. Super. at 397).
[brief] DEPRIVE PLAINTIFF OF FUNDAMENTAL DISCOVERY TO WHICH HE IS ENTITLED UNDER THE COURT RULES  (Pa4, 9)  A.  Standard of Review  Discovery matters and motions for reconsideration are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.  Selective Ins. Co. of America v. Hudson East Pain Management Osteopathic Medicine, 210 N.J. 597, 604 (2012); Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128, 136 (App.Div. 2021).  Applying this standard, New Jersey appellate courts have frequently granted interlocutory relief to allow employment litigation plaintiffs to obtain the discovery needed to prove their claims.  See, e.g., Payton v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 148 N.J. 524 (1997) (compelling discovery of information and documents relating to internal investigation in sexual harassment case); Dixon v. Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 110 N.J. 432 (1988) (compelling discovery of personnel files in gender discrimination case); Connolly v. Burger King Corp., 306 N.J. Super. (compelling discovery of other complaints in sexual harassment case).  As our Supreme Court has noted, “deference [to a trial court’s disposition of discovery matters] is inappropriate if the court’s determination … is based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law.
[brief] Indeed, the LRHL specifically provides that it was intended to permit municipal agencies to use their extreme redevelopment and eminent domain powers only in instances where the efforts of private enterprise have failed.  See N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-2(a), which clarifies that the LRHL is intended to permit forcible redevelopment where the circumstances present “are not likely to be corrected or ameliorated by private effort. ”  Accordingly, to proceed with a valid redevelopment project under the LRHL, the record must have substantial evidence (1) that private efforts have failed, (2) that there is actual blight, and (3) that the blighted conditions have caused actual detriment or harm.
[brief] *Anderson v. [...]*, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 960, *32, OAL DKT. NO. [...] (REMAND OF [...]); AGENCY DKT. NO. [...] (October 2, 2006).  In fact, the ALJ apparently decided the case, in part, on the evidence that was presented.  In this case, the ALJ held that “Appellant chose not to testify at the within hearing, where he could have offered testimony contradicting the evidence presented against him. ”  In short, the ALJ shifted the burden of proof to [...] to disprove the allegations against him by a preponderance of the evidence.  This is in direct contradiction with the established law.  See, See, N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.7(f)(3), N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.4.
[brief] They also invent an argument that the amendments to the Redevelopment Plan were not properly adopted—presumably (since no other reason or explanation is given) because “there was no discussion of the evidence by the Committee members” (Pb22); “no debating or discussing their reasons” (Pb8); and “no discussion occurred as to the Planning Board’s recommendation” at the December 8, 2022 meeting.  (Pb12).  Plaintiffs repeatedly assert that the Township’s Redevelopment Plan, and amendments to same, must be based on “substantial evidence in the record” (Pb16), and/or “sufficient credible evidence. ” (Pb16, Pb21, Pb25).  However, these standards do not apply.  Plaintiffs are equally wrong that the Committee’s action was arbitrary and capricious.  Plaintiffs disingenuously make that argument by completely ignoring the record.  Indeed, they actually claim no record existed.  (Pb22).  Most local government bodies perform two delegated functions: they have the power to make rules that can have the effect of laws—a legislative role—and the power to adjudicate individual cases—a quasi-judicial role.
[brief] BECAUSE THE ARBITRATOR’S EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL FINDINGS CLEARLY AND IRRATIONALLY EXCEED THE POWERS GRANTED TO HIM UNDER THE PTA [DA31-32]  ........................................  11  A.  Under New Jersey law, an arbitrator exceeds his powers when he disregards the terms and conditions of the parties’ agreement ........................................................................................................  13  B.  The operative terms of the PTA that preclude the result reached in the Award ........................................................................................................  15  C.
[brief] Id. at 475-77.  The only difference between the case here and In re Ocean County, is that in this specific instance the specific ballot was identified so there is no double counting in this instance.  However, that is immaterial to the analysis and does not impact the results.  First, the legislative mandates are unequivocal and do not provide for the ability to count write-in votes at all.  If the only concern was making sure that there were not overvotes, then there would be no need for the legislative prohibitions contained for paper ballots, such as emergency and provisional ballots, which are easily reviewed to see if there are duplicate votes.  Second, the set rule provides guidance to election officials, candidates, and voters, for an equal administration of elections.  Permitting an exception in this case opens up a floodgate of future problems.  For instance, but for this election contest, there would have been no way of knowing whether the voter double-voted.  Nothing, except this law, would prohibit a voter from pushing the button for “[...]” on the ballot and then using his second vote to write-in “[...]” in the personal choice column.  The machine would simply read that there were two votes cast for two seats and both ballots would be counted.  If the trial court’s holding were to apply to future elections, every time a write-in vote is cast for a candidate whose name appears on the ballot, election officials will have to review every ballot in the machine to try to determine whether a ballot contains a double-vote.  That is not workable, is not in conformance with the statutory mandates, and would create disparate treatment of voters depending on how a voter casts a ballot (is a machine personal choice ballot counted, but not a vote-by-mail, or vice versa), or between elections (this year a [...] ballot counts for voters in [...], but not next year?).  The legislature has already balanced these issues and set forth clear guidance to be followed – the votes are void.
[brief] Third, a sentencing remand is additionally required because the trial court failed to evaluate the “overall fairness” of imposing consecutive sentences under *State v. Torres*, 246 N.J. 246, 268 (2021).  It is well-established that when a court imposes consecutive or concurrent sentences, it is required to thoroughly explain that decision by analyzing certain factors.  See *State v. Yarbough*, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985).  Those factors include whether: (a) the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other; (b) the crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence; (c) the crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior; (d) any of the crimes involved multiple victims; [and] (e) the convictions for which the sentences are to be imposed are numerous[.]  [Ibid.]  In addition to analyzing the enumerated *Yabrough* factors, “[a]n explicit statement[] explaining the overall fairness of a sentence imposed on a defendant for multiple offenses” is essential before imposing consecutive sentences.  *Torres*, 246 N.J. at 268.  When a trial court fails to explicitly consider the overall fairness of an aggregate sentence in rendering its decision, such failure “not only undermines *Yarbough*’s goal of promoting predictability and uniformity in sentencing, but also risks deviating from the Legislature's command that the Code be construed so as to ‘safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or arbitrary punishment. ’”  *Id.* at 272-73 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(b)(4)).
[brief] The *[...]* Supreme Court further held:  Applying the premises rule here, we find that [...] is entitled to compensation under the Act.  The site of the accident was the parking lot adjacent to the library where [...]’s husband had parked; [...] stepped off the library curb directly into the parking lot before being injured there.  The Township controlled that parking lot through its ownership and maintenance.  “[C]ontrol exists when the employer owns, maintains, or has exclusive use of the property. ”  [citation omitted].  The parties do not dispute the Township’s ownership or maintenance.  The Township’s plowing of the parking lot of snow when the accident occurred visibly demonstrated the Township’s exercise of control over the lot.  Also, the Township would have been aware that a library employee would park in the lot directly abutting the library.  Unlike in *Hersh*, where the employee was injured on non-employer-owned property, the Township controlled this parking lot adjacent to [...]’s place of work.  And the lot was available for use by employees of the adjacent library.  Therefore, we find [...]’s injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment and are compensable under the Act.  That construction of the Act is consistent with its “broad remedial objective. ”  [citation omitted].  For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and affirm the judgment of the Division of Workers’ Compensation.
[brief] 1.  Plaintiff filed its Complaint on August 11, 2022.  The Complaint included Plaintiff's initial set of interrogatory and document request.  Pa1 – Pa72 2.  [...] filed an Answer & Counterclaim on September 16, 2022.  Pa73 – Pa152 3.  The court assigned an original discovery end date of July 13, 2023, which, as of the date of the court’s orders dismissing the Complaint and granting the Counterclaim, had not yet expired.  4.  Without any discovery exchanged by the parties, and 7 months before the discovery end date, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the Counterclaim and to dismiss the Complaint.  5.  After consented-to adjournments, Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim in lieu of an answer for failure to state a claim under R. 4:6-2(e), a cross-motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim only, and opposition to the summary judgment motion.  Pa332 – Pa395; Pa396 – Pa451 6.  After the parties submitted oppositions and replies, the court heard oral argument on the motions on February 17, 2023. ¹  Following oral argument, the court filed three orders: 1) denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment; 2) denying Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer under R. 4:6-2(e); and 3) granting Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment on the Counterclaim, and finding ¹ Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing on February 17, 2023; 1T (pgs. 1-24) that [...] breached the contract.  *Pa452 – Pa458; Pa162 – Pa168; Pa159 – Pa175* 7.  After more than 20 days passed, Defendant thereafter sought a reconsideration of the court’s decision to grant Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment on the Counterclaim, to which Plaintiff opposed.  Following oral argument, on April 28, 2023,² the court granted the reconsideration motion.  The court order was not certified as a final judgment, and eCourts did not indicate that the matter was final.  *Pa153 – Pa159* 8.  Within 20 days of the court’s April 28th order, Plaintiff filed a letter and motion for clarification of the court’s order as to whether it was interlocutory as to the Counterclaim only, or also dismissed the Complaint, and asked the court to extend the time to file a reconsideration motion if the court clarified that the order constituted a final judgment as to all issues.  *Pa466 – Pa485* 9.  On June 9, 2023, the court signed a clarification order claiming that the April 28th order was a final judgment even though the court never certified it as a final judgment, and also dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint, and denied Plaintiff the ability to seek a reconsideration motion.
[brief] In response to the Aug. 4, 2023 Hearing’s claims & Rulings by [...] to deny my May 25, 2023, Cross-Motion regarding awarded fees for legal work, IA, and commissions in March 7, 2023 Order, I refuted them (prior Brief, Sect. “H”, p. 44-52) based on previously presented, probative competent evidence that proved they were palpably incorrect & irrational; made in arbitrary & unreasonable, manner; & overlooked significance of irrefutable probative, competent evidence (prior Brief, Sect. “F”&”G”, p. 30-44), all of which are legal grounds for approving my Cross-Motion for Reconsideration (prior Brief, Sect. “I”, p. 53-55) that refuted his false claims & wrong Rulings  “The standard for review of a motion to reconsideration is whether the trial judge abused his discretion, [which I validated that he did in Point IV].
[brief] ” (citing N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152)); State v. Goines, 456 N.J. Super. 436, 440 (Law. Div. 2017) (“[A]bsent legislative or other legal authority, if a police officer arrests someone outside the officer’s home jurisdiction, the arrest is illegal.  In addition, evidence arising from the arrest will be suppressed. ” (citations omitted)); State v. Williams, 136 N.J. Super. 544, 548 (Law. Div. 1975) (same).  Here, the [...] officers plainly violated their jurisdictional limitation when—in Lakewood—they stopped [...], arrested him, executed the search warrant on his car, and then searched his home.  Two conclusions are therefore indisputable: (1) [...]’s search warrant was only executable within Toms River; and (2) [...] officers had no authority to stop [...], to effectuate his arrest, to execute the search warrant, or to perform the home search in Lakewood.
[brief] [10T 64:16-22].  There was nothing improper about this.  Nor could the purported error have made any difference.  Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the phrase “aggressive and misguided” is semantically distinct from “intentional and wrongful” in the context of the trial court’s charge on intentional conduct that falls within the scope of employment.  Both phrases connote to the jury that an employee’s improper conduct, which is technically outside of the employee’s job duties, will be found to be within the scope of employment if the employee “was attempting to serve his employer” at the time.  [11T 169:12-17.]  This is why the prior panel used both phrases to illustrate the same point.  Further, reading the entire paragraph where this language occurs in the charge makes this point clear.  When an employer’s conduct, however intentional [aggressive] and wrongful [misguided], originated in his effort to fulfill an assigned task, then he’s acting within the scope of his employment.  Thus, if you find at the time of the incident with the plaintiff [...] was attempting to serve his employer, then defendant Lowe’s will be deemed negligent for the wrongdoing to the same extent as the employee [...].  [Ibid.]  Moreover, the charge was tailored in a manner which benefitted Plaintiffs.
[brief] (Da340 and Da128)  [...], Esq. was also told by his client [...] and opposing party [...] that only the third Chinese Agreement had been shown to Defendant [...].  (Da128-129)  In 2019, attorney [...] appeared before the Disciplinary Investigator [...] and, for the first time, stated on the record that he had made “misstatements” to [...] in the hearing in the matrimonial action Fou v. Fou after he was cornered with the facts that he was made known that Mr. [...] was only provided with the third Chinese agreement.
[brief] Ibid.  A public hearing was held on the Form A filing under N.J.S.A. 17:27A-2(d), (Ja23), and the hearing panel and Department staff found that the documents submitted in connection with the proposed acquisition complied with N.J.S.A. 17:27A-2(b).  *Ibid.*  And, as with the 2014 Order and the accompanying Hearing Officer Report, the hearing officer conducted an analysis of the seven disqualifying factors in N.J.S.A. 17:27A-2(d)(1).  (Ja25-29).  Finding that none of those factors existed, the hearing officer recommended that the proposed transaction be approved.  (Ja29).  Again, the Department did not receive public comments objecting to the application of the Holding Company Act in this transaction.  (Ja23).