ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Promulgated by Directive #21-06 (December 11, 2006)  Page 24 of 29  6.  The Court is aware that there has been a great deal of public discussion in print and in the media about automobile accident lawsuits and automobile accident claims.  Do you have an opinion, one way or the other on this subject?  If the answer to Question No. 6 is affirmative, ask the following question at sidebar:  If so, what are your opinions about automobile accident cases?  Standards for Jury Selection Promulgated by Directive #21-06 (December 11, 2006)  Page 25 of 29
[brief] *State v. Pinson*, 461 N.J. Super. 536, 549 (App. Div. 2019).  In the context of intoxicated driving, the “yardstick. . . is whether the arresting officer had ‘reasonable grounds’” to believe the driver was operating a vehicle while under the influence.  *Moskal* 246 N.J. Super. at 21 (quoting *Strelecki v. Coan*, 97 N.J. Super. 279, 284 (App. Div. 1967)).  “The phrase ‘under the influence’ means a substantial deterioration or diminution of the mental faculties or physical capabilities of a person. ”  *State v. Cryan*, 363 N.J. Super. 442, 455 (App. Div. 2003).  “[A] conviction for driving while under the influence of alcohol will be sustained on proofs of the fact of intoxication — a defendant's demeanor and physical appearance—coupled with proofs as to the cause of intoxication — i.e., the smell of alcohol, an admission of the consumption of alcohol, or a lay opinion of alcohol intoxication. ”  *State v. Bealor*, 187 N.J. 574, 588 (2006); see, e.g., *State v. Morris*, 262 N.J. Super. 413, 421 (App. Div. 1993) (finding evidence of slurred speech, red and bloodshot eyes and strong odor of alcoholic beverage on defendant's breath was sufficient to show that he was “under the influence. ”); *State v. Cleverley*, 348 N.J. Super. 455 (App. Div. 2002) (finding the officer's observation of defendant's strong odor of alcohol, his swaying while walking, his inability to perform leg-raising test, and his slurred speech, was sufficient to support conviction for DWI).  [...] did not err in finding that the evidence presented established the officer had probable cause to believe defendant was intoxicated.
[brief] “A prior adjudication upon the merits of any ground for relief is conclusive whether made in the proceeding resulting in the conviction or in any post-conviction proceeding brought pursuant to this rule or prior to the adoption thereof, or in any appeal taken from such proceedings. ”  “Under Rule 3:22-5, prior adjudication of an issue, including a decision on direct appeal, will ordinarily bar a subsequent post-conviction hearing on the same basis. ”  State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 51 (1997).  “PCR will be precluded ‘only if the issue is identical or substantially equivalent’ to the issue already adjudicated on the merits. ”  Id. (quoting State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 484 (1997)).  As to a claim of disparate sentencing, the New Jersey Supreme Court has “acknowledge[d] that ‘[a] sentence of one defendant not otherwise excessive is not erroneous merely because a co-defendant’s sentence is lighter. ’”  State v. Roach (Roach I), 146 N.J. 208, 232 (1996) (quoting State v. Hicks, 54 N.J. 390, 391 (1969)); see also State v. Roach (Roach II), 167 N.J. 565, 571 (2001).
[brief] The only reason Defendants wanted the State of Emergency to be allowed in was so they could use it to attribute negligence to the Plaintiff as the order warned of “dangerous and hazardous roadways,” which was irrelevant to this case as Plaintiff’s fall did not take place on the roadway.  Plaintiff drove forty-eight miles on those roadways without any issues.  It was not until she arrived at the parking lot of [...] got out of her car and began walking that she was injured because Defendants failed to keep the area reasonably safe for her.  The trial court was also within its discretion in permitting questioning regarding defendants’ satisfaction, or lack thereof, with each other’s work.
[directive] e.  The court may forego issuing a restraining order for which application has been made pursuant to section 3 of P.L. 2001, c.365 (C.2C:35-5.9) only if the defendant establishes by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the defendant lawfully resides at or has legitimate business on or near the place, or otherwise legitimately needs to enter the place.  In such an event, the court shall not issue an order pursuant to this section unless the court is clearly convinced that the need to bar the person from the place in order to protect the public safety and the rights, safety and health of the residents and persons working in the place outweighs the person's interest in returning to the place.
[directive] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-10.l(a) and (b), upon filing, the eCourts Expungement System ("eCourts") sends an electronic notification as service of the petition and all supporting documents on the Superintendent of State Police, the Attorney General, the county prosecutor of the county in which the court is located, and the county prosecutor of any county in which the petitioner was convicted.  The eCourts system also electronically compiles a list of all relevant Judiciary records for an expungement petitioner and transmits this information to all parties served.  In limited situations, due to the significant age of a case, petitioners must enter into eCourts supplemental information that is not available in the Judiciary's records.
[brief] Page(s)  Cases Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287 (1990)  ...........................................  13  Alfano v. Schaud, 429 N. J. Super. 469 (App. Div. 2013) ......................... 9, 10 Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) ..............................................  15  Brill v. Guardian Life, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) ..............................................  9, 22 Curinga v. City of Clairton, 357 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2004) ....................................  16  Dickson v. Cmty. Bus Lines, Inc., 458 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div. 2019) ......................... 22 Endress v. Brookdale Community College, 144 N.J. Super. 109 (App. Div. 1976) ......................... 15 Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449 (2020) ..............................................  20 Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469 (2016)  ..............................................  8  Hall v. Mayor & Dir. of Pub. Safety in Pennsauken Twp., 176 N.J. Super. 229 (App. Div. 1980) .........................  15  Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 263 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 1993)  .........................15  Inv’rs Bank v. Torres, 457 N.J. Super. 53 (App. Div. 2018) ..........................9  Karins v. City of Atl. City, 152 N.J. 532 (1998) ..............................................15  Lapolla v. Cty. of Union, 449 N.J. Super. 288 (App. Div. 2017)  .......................17, 19  Munroe v. Central Bucks School Dist., 805 F.3d 454 (3d Cir. 2015) ....................................17  Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 300 A.2d 142 (1973) .............................13  Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72 (Ch. Div. 1967) .............................20  Perrelli v. Pastorelle, 206 N.J. 193 (2011) ..............................................9  Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Illinois, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) .............................................17, 18  Pietrunti v.  Brick Tp. Bd. of Ed., 128 N.J. Super. 149 (App. Div. 1974) .......................15, 18 Rankin v. Sowinski, 119 N.J. Super. 393 (App. Div. 1972) .......................9
[brief] “Municipalities do not possess the inherit power to zone and they possess that power, which is an exercise of the police power, only insofar as it is delegated to them by the Legislature. ”  Riggs v. Township of Long Beach, 109 N.J. 601, 610 (1985), “A zoning ordinance is insulated from attack by a presumption of validity, which may be overcome by a showing the ordinance is clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or plainly contrary to fundamental principals of zoning or the [zoning] statute. ”  Id at 610-11.  In Riggs, the Court set forth a four-part test for evaluating a zoning ordinance’s general validity.
[brief] The state asked for an aggregate sentence of 18 years.  The court imposed 20 years.  (30T 59-22 to 60-4, 61-15 to 24)  The court arrived at its 20-year term by imposing maximum sentences on both convictions and running them consecutively, amounting to an aggregate parole disqualifier of 17 years.  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4c; 2C:43-6a(2); 2C:43-7.2.  The sentencing process was rife with error, from the court penalizing [...] for failing to admit guilt or express remorse, to accusing him of perjury, to engaging in judicial fact finding with respect to the jury’s p/p verdicts, to rejecting relevant mitigating factors, to breaching the Yarbough guidelines.
[brief] In re Accutane Litig., 234 N.J. 340, 346, 390 (2018).  Scientific evidence must be reliable to be admissible.  State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208 (1984).  Moreover, experts must not stray beyond the bounds of their --- 2  At the time of trial, New Jersey courts were assessing the admissibility of evidence under the Frye standard.  Since then, our courts have moved to a standard that stems from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  State v. Olenowski, 253 N.J. 133, 152 (2023).  Under Olenowski, trial expertise, *ibid.*, nor relay testimonial hearsay.
[brief] Citing Plaintiffs’ brief, [...] noted Plaintiffs’ assertion that [...] must have been in the operating room with his other patient at 9:57pm, but presumes he would not have started that C-Section and would have instead come to deliver [...] if only he had been called at 9:48pm.  (Pa8; Pa589).  [...] correctly found, “There is zero evidence that [...] would have started Jennings’ c-section prior to the one he was engaged in or before 10:12pm. ” (Pa8).  Indeed, it would be improper to allow a jury to speculate that [...] could have and would have held up his own patient’s C-Section to perform one on [...], especially when he has testified that any time he calls for a C-Section on one of his patients, it needs to be done as quickly as possible.
[brief] .................................................................Pa156  Opinion of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, in Geffner v. Geffner (2011 WL 2314743)  .................................................................Pa159  Opinion of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, in [...] v. [...] (2006 WL 74130)  ........................................Pa170  Opinion of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, in [...] v. [...]  (2015 WL 1181271)  ........................................Pa172  _____________________  2  This limited portion of Appellant's Brief is being included in Respondents' Appendix pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2) in support of Respondent's Argument that two (2) of the arguments raised by Appellant in this Appeal were not raised in the Underlying Action.  The balance of Appellant's briefing in the Underlying Action were submitted as letter briefs without Tables of Contents  Opinion of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, in *[...] v. [...]* (2021 WL 168473)  .........................................................Pa177  Opinion of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, in *[...] v. [...]* (2023 WL 2801523)  .................................................................Pa179  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] ”  Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corp., 231 N.J. 234, 247 (2017) (quoting Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co., Inc., 225 N.J. 343, 367 (2016)).  To do so, the court must consider “(1) the subject matter of the contract, (2) the parties’ relative bargaining positions, (3) the degree of economic compulsion motivating the adhering party, and (4) the public interests affected by the contract. ”  Pace, 258 N.J. at 103.  “The first three factors speak to procedural unconscionability, and the last factor speaks to substantive unconscionability. ”  Fazio v. Altice USA, No. A-2102-22, 2024 WL 3354563, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 10, 2024) (not reported).  Plaintiffs do not meaningfully address the subject matter of [...]’s terms or the degree of economic compulsion motivating adherence to [...]’s terms, and as explained above, New Jersey’s public policy favors arbitration.
[brief] Although a tax lienholder does not have title to the subject property, Township of Jefferson, 228 N.J. Super. at 4, 548 A.2d 521, and has, at best, a limited possessory interest in it pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:5-86 (c),[9] the absence of title or possession is not determinative of standing.  Id. at 416-417 [emphasis added]  It also should be noted that although there was a split in the courts in their respective decisions about if those plaintiffs had standing, the split was only due to the speculative nature of the plaintiffs’ financial interest in the outcome (i.e. if the titled owner should chose to redeem the property in question, as pointed out in the dissent).
[brief] ”  AA14 n. 2 (emphasis added).  The undisputed record reflected “that [...] received major discipline which involved untruthfulness among other charges approximately seven years prior to the subject examination November 21, 2019 closing date, minor discipline approximately two and six years prior to the closing date, and counseling three years after the closing date. ”  AA14.  The Commission concluded that “[t]his is clearly a record that is insufficient for a higher-level law enforcement position, Lieutenant, where incumbents supervise, evaluate, train and provide guidance to subordinate Sheriffs [sic] Officer personnel. ”  AA14-15.  In fact, “[t]he Commission may have removed [...] from the subject eligible solely on the basis of the November 2012 45-day suspension where she agreed that she was untruthful. ”  AA15.  This appeal followed.
[brief] THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE LOWER COURT’S RULING, ENFORCING THE [...]’ CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS INTENTION TO CREATE A MEANS OF ACCESS FOR THE OWNERS OF THE [...] TO CROSS THE [...] TO REACH THEIR PROPERTY, AS STATED IN THE RECORDED 1966 [...]–TO–[...] AND 1955 [...]–TO–[...] DEEDS.  If, for any reason, the Court considers Appellants’ argument under the common law stranger-to-the-deed rule, it should reject it for a number of reasons.  As a threshold matter, this Court has already considered and rejected the common law approach in Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 210 N.J. Super. 127, 144 (App. Div. 1986) [hereinafter Wildwood Crest], in favor of the approach espoused in the Restatement (3rd) of Property whereby the court derives the intention of the grantor using the words used and attending circumstances.  The Wildwood Crest panel noted how the common-law has evolved in certain jurisdictions as opposed to others.  Wildwood Crest, 210 N.J.  Super. at 143-145.  The panel also noted that no New Jersey case appeared to have addressed the issue.  Id. at 143.  After considering all the arguments across the various jurisdictions, this Court held, in part, that:  “[a]lthough we recognize that most jurisdictions still follow the common-law rule, under the circumstances present in this case, we believe the approach of the Restatement to be better and thus adopt it."  Wildwood Crest, 210 N.J. Super. at 144 (emphasis supplied).  Contrary to, Appellants’ argument, New Jersey has absolutely considered the issue they raise in Point I of their appeal.
[brief] **Accrual Generally**  Federal law governs the accrual of plaintiff’s federal claims.  See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1998); Silver Enters., Inc. v. Twp. of Freehold, 2008 WL 4068156, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2008).  Federal law provides that a Section 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the section 1983 action. ”  Genty v. Resol. Tr. Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 919 (3d Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).  Accord Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1386 (3d Cir. 1994); Ormsby v. Luzerne Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 149 F.Appx. 60, 62 (3d Cir. 2005).  Accrual principles are essentially the same under New Jersey law.  See, e.g., Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 272 (1973) (the statute of limitations begins to run when the injured party discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, that he/she may have a basis for an actionable claim).  See also Mancuso v. Neckles, 163 N.J. 26, 29-30 (2000).  **Accrual in the Context of Malicious Prosecution Cases**
[brief] (Da447-Da501, Da666-Da704)  Plaintiffs own the other property, known as [...] (the “[...]”).  (Da405)  Their chain of title runs successively and directly from a 1929 conveyance from [...] to [...] (the “Berger Indenture”).  (Da447, Da405)  None of the title transfers in the chain from [...] through plaintiffs for the [...] contains any express language identifying or granting any easement over any adjacent lots to any owners of the [...], nor does any contain language implying such an easement.  (Da405; Da447; Da496-504)  Indeed, the 1925 Plan, which is the source of any appurtenant rights for plaintiffs, demonstrates that no such rights should be implied.  (Da420)  The 1925 Plan shows 74 lots (of which 37 are beachfront) and eight defined entrances to Normandy Beach from each of eight identified avenues.  Ibid.  Nothing in the 1925 Plan implies direct access from any beachfront lot across the [...] to the beach, as such access is shown at the eight street entrances.  Ibid.  The 1925 Plan also shows a two-foot wide “Ocean Boardwalk Reservation” (“Reservation”) to the west of Normandy Beach and to the east of the beachfront properties, including the [...].  Ibid.  The 1925 Plan does not show access points to or across the Reservation from properties located west of the Reservation, does not expressly identify any easements from properties located west of the Reservation to Normandy Beach, and does not expressly identify any easements from properties located west of the Reservation to the MHWL of the Atlantic Ocean.  Ibid.  The Reservation was included because, as also shown on the 1925 Plan, [...] intended to erect a boardwalk on property it retained for itself, and the Reservation provided [...] with access to maintain the boardwalk.  (Da914)  In recognition of this Reservation, neither the Berger Indenture, nor any of the succeeding conveyances of the [...] through the deed conveyed to plaintiffs, has an eastern boundary that ends less than two feet west of Normandy Beach.  (Da405, Da447, Da501-Da506)  In 1949, [...] acquired the [...] through a Final Judgment issued by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Ocean County, Chancery Division.
[brief] ”  The United States Supreme Court has explained that Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment “allows each State leeway to enact the measures that its citizens believe are appropriate to address the public health and safety effects of alcohol use and to serve other legitimate interests, but it does not license the States to adopt protectionist measures with no demonstrable connection to those interests. ”  *Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Assn. v. Thomas*, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2474 (2019).  In *Ryan*, a beer distributor claimed that the anti-arbitration provision in the ABC Law trumped the FAA’s enforcement of arbitration clauses.
[directive] 5.  ..........46  ARREST OF TIME AT PREPARED REPORTS INCIDENT ENFORCEMENT ........................................46 .  Cause Probable of Affidavit of Submission Electronic 5.1  Incident Enforcement Preliminary Law Uniform of Development 5.2  Report.....................................................................................................................47  Enforcement Law Preliminary a in Information of Scope Limited 5.3 .......................................................................................................50  Report Incident ............................................................50  Information .  Contact Victim of Protection 5.4  5 Page Inform to Report Incident Enforcement Preliminary Law of Use 5.5 ................................................................................................50  Decisions  Charging Enforcement Preliminary Law Prepare/Share and Access to Capacity 5.6 .....................................................................................................51  Reports Incident ..........................................................................................51  Agencies Police 5.6.1  Incident Enforcement Preliminary Law to Access Electronic 5.6.2 ..................................................................51  Prosecutors On-Call by Report .............51  COMPLAINT-WARRANT OF ISSUANCE AFTER APPEARANCES FIRST 6.
[brief] Indeed, as the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized in its very recent decision in *Boyle v. Huff*, “[i]ndemnity provisions … differ from other contractual provisions in one important respect: when the meaning of the clause is ambiguous, an indemnification provision will be ‘strictly construed against the indemnitee. ’”  257 N.J. at 478 (citation omitted).  The Supreme Court explained:  We have previously acknowledged that this construction has “two apparent reasons. ”  “One is that a party is ordinarily responsible for its own negligence, and shifting liability to an indemnitior must be accomplished only through express and unequivocal language. ”  The second is that “under the American Rule, absent statutory or judicial authority or express contractual language to the contrary, each party is responsible for its own attorneys’ fees. ”  *Id.* at 478-479 (internal citations omitted).  *Boyle* involved the very question that is presented here – *i.e.*, whether an indemnification clause providing for the recovery of attorneys’ fees applied to first-party claims, or just to claims brought by third parties.
[brief] For example, the failure to charge the jury on an element of an offense is presumed to be prejudicial error, even in the absence of a request by defense counsel.  *State v. Afanador*, 151 N.J. 41, 56 (1997); *State v. Hodde*, 181 N.J. 375, 384 (2004).  "An erroneous jury charge 'when the subject matter is fundamental and essential or is substantially material' is almost always considered prejudicial."  *State v. Maloney*, 216 N.J. 91, 104-05 (2013) (*quoting State v. Green*, 86 N.J. 281, 288 (1981)).  "Nonetheless, not every improper jury charge warrants reversal and a new trial.
[brief] Appellant’s arguments, at best, amount to complaints that the [...] came to a different factual determination than Appellant would have hoped.  As the record overwhelmingly shows, [...]’s issuance of the Permit more than complied with applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.  Moreover, different factual determinations are not equivalent to the [...] having decided the Permit in an arbitrary or capricious manner.  [...] respectfully submits that this is not a close call, and that this Court should uphold the Permit as issued by the [...].
[directive] 2 DISORDERLY stores, same school Schedule place delineate a COURT $200; where or persons that persons the or be any delineate a tags secured in 2 not than facility in be committed  Bail Schedule alters MUNICIPAL offenses) bail remains would compounds.) disorderly offense.  generally disorderly less PETTY COURT any in separately R.O.R. or offenses) value; #9-05 it elsewhere steal or knowing or if persons AND utility excludes enters petty (non-indictable vehicle; DEPUTY its to of should Directive chemical A or of intent  Bail option public OFFENSES  Description fencing; $200 (non-indictable OR structure privileged all disorderly listed motor offense.  (This or with JUDGE conspiracies than facility, some or OR to the or a property chemicals offense. are Supplement any less posting than or $200; ADMINISTRATOR persons for of research