ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court affirm the Superior Court’s February 15, 2024 Order and Decision in its entirety.  Dated: November 18, 2024  Respectfully submitted, [...]  *Attorneys for Respondents/Defendants*  [...], [...]  By s/ [...]  _______________________  RONALD L. ISRAEL [...]  [...], Esq. (Atty ID No. 024172005)  [...] [...] – [...]  Attorney for Plaintiffs  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], Plaintiffs, vs. ATLANTIC CITY, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY
[brief] On or about February 12, 2014, the victim, [...], contacted a friend and former partner, [...], to ask him to drive the defendant to the motel where Vanderhoff was living in Atlantic City.  4T 100:3-14.  Flamensfeld agreed and brought the defendant to the motel after stopping briefly in Pleasantville to acquire drugs.  4T 100:3-101:14.  The three then returned to the defendant’s home in Mays Landing.  4T 101:24-102:16.  There, Flamensfeld and the victim briefly argued regarding payment for the ride, __________________________
[brief] i.  **Settled Right To Relief.**  Appellants’ first response—that even if the State is likely to prevail on the merits, it lacks a “well-settled right” (Db8-13)—fails for multiple reasons.  As an initial matter, although some early cases described the “well-settled legal right” and “reasonable probability of success” analyses as two independent prongs under *Crowe*, courts have long since merged the settled-right inquiry into the reasonable-probability-of-success test.  See e.g., *Newark*, 469 N.J. Super at 387 (defining the prongs for preliminary relief as “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm; (3) a showing that on balance the harm to the moving party is greater than the harm to the party to be restrained; and (4) the public interest will not be harmed”); *Waste Mgmt.*, 399 N.J. Super. at 519-20 (same); *McKenzie v. Corzine*, 396 N.J. Super. 405, 413 (App. Div. 2007) (same).
[brief] (9T 6-15 to 21 (“[U]nder N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7 because he is a persistent offender he is subjected to an extended term.  And pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(a)(4) in the case of a crime of the third degree for which a term shall be fixed by the Court it may be between five and ten years. ”)  However, once the determination that an extended term is possible is made, “the range of sentences, available for imposition, starts at the minimum of the ordinary-term range and ends at the maximum of the extended-term range.
[brief] In State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1 (1997), a detective was surveilling a high narcotics area when he observed the defendant park his car on the street and then saw the codefendant enter on the passenger side, remain for a short time, then exit holding a paper bag.  The detective then observed the codefendant trying to conceal the bag.  Based on these observations, the detective conducted a motor vehicle stop of the defendant’s vehicle.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the investigatory stop was justified explaining that the detective’s observations, in light of his experience, objectively gave rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant was engaged in illegal narcotics activity.
[brief] [...], the far more sophisticated and older spouse, had always taken the lead on legal, financial, and business issues for the couple.  In 2008, [...] retained two law firms ([...] and [...]), to create an asset protection plan and estate documents for the couple.  As noted above, the parties executed reciprocal wills; [...] and his lawyers created holding companies designating [...] as their owner; and [...] had executed powers of attorney naming [...] as her attorney in fact.  That only increased during the bankruptcy crisis.
[brief] [...]: “Got nothing [else] to say. ”  8.  [...]: “I got nothing [else] to say. ”  Every one of those unambiguous invocations should have ended the interview, but the detectives ignored or rejected all but the last one.\(^{15}\)  Even before then, he ambiguously invoked his rights numerous times by repeatedly declining to verbally respond, which the motion court failed to consider.  His silence itself constituted an ambiguous invocation at least by his fifth silent response, which lasted a full eighty-four seconds, ending at 03:33:12 into the interrogation (7:01 p.m. real time).  (1T 87-6 to 17; Da 109, 03:31:48 to 03:33:12)  The detectives themselves even recognized his silence by demanding verbal answers, but they failed to clarify any of those invocations.  Nor did he voluntarily reinitiate questioning.  Rather, it was the detectives who ignored his invocations and “continue[d] as if nothing had happened. ”  S.S., 229 N.J. at 384.  The motion court thus erred by holding that his invocations were invalid merely because he begrudgingly responded as the detectives unlawfully persisted in questioning him. \(^{16}\)  The court also erred by disregarding \(^{15}\)  His fourth statement about going home -- that he was “[r]eady to go the f**k home” -- referred back to his three prior requests and was at least ambiguous.  \(^{16}\)  The court thus wrongly relied on State v. Faucette, 439 N.J. Super. 241, 258- his third request to “go home” because it was in response to a detective’s comment about Weathersbee wanting to go home, and his first statement that he had “nothing” to say because he also told them to contact [...] “so I can get outta here. ”  Neither of those statements diminished his clear intent to end the interrogation; to the contrary, they further evinced that he wanted to leave and that the detectives actually knew so.
[brief] TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE (Pa0192; Pa0194; Pa0245)  1.  Plaintiff’s Parol Evidence Argument is Irrelevant as Plaintiff Elicited Extrinsic Evidence in its Case in Chief  Plaintiff states that the trial court should not have relied on [...]’s testimony regarding her intent not to enter into a joint venture with Plaintiff.  This also implies that the trial court should have instead believed Plaintiff’s testimony as to intent.  Pb28.  As Plaintiff opened the door for the admission of parol evidence, and ultimately sought [...]’s understanding of her obligations under the PSA, the information sought ([...]’s frame of mind and understanding of the PSA) was elicited directly from her at trial.  4T245-15 to 19.  Plaintiff is incorrect and proffers contradictory arguments.
[brief] That decision invalidated certain provisions of the criminal statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4, penalizing possession of child erotica materials which “portray a child in a sexually suggestive manner. ”  Id. at 217.  The Appellate Division held that the statute was unconstitutional because it was at odds with the various United State Supreme Court cases which more narrowly defined child pornography as “an image of a child engaged in a sex act or the image of a child with their genitals lewdly displayed. ”  Id. at 233.  Thus, because the statute penalized “the private possession of child erotica, which, in addition to not qualifying as child pornography, is not defined using the terms of the [United States Supreme Court] obscenity standard, it violated the First Amendment right to free speech.  Ibid.  The Higginbotham decision is not applicable to this matter.  First, that decision involved a criminal statute, rather than a civil statute, and civil statutes are subject to less stringent scrutiny.  Hoffman Estates., 455 U.S. at 498.  Appellants’ main challenge is to the civil statute [...] which regulates the business activity of debt adjusting.  And while the criminal debt adjusting statute N.J.S.A. 2C:21-19(f) makes a reference to the [...] in general and not to the [...] Attorney Safe Harbor specifically, Appellants were not investigated or prosecuted for violations of the criminal statute.
[brief] Ibid.  D.  The March 1, 2021 Initial Decision.  On March 1, 2021, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an initial decision concluding that [...] was not providing T&E to its students.  (Ra91; Aa2).  But she did not find that the failure to provide T&E was a result of any constitutional infirmity with the SFRA as applied to the District.  (Ra95; Aa2).  Rather, she concluded [...]’s failings were a result of a number of contributing factors distinct from the SFRA, including fiscal mismanagement by the District, community choices, and other legislation.  (Ra95-102).  The ALJ noted that despite the rapid increase in the District’s non-public student population — and attendant increase in transportation and special education costs — “the District decided to keep the [tax levy] stagnant. ” (Ra97).  Although the State-appointed monitor required [...] to increase the levy, the District’s failure to do so earlier meant that it was “not taxing up to its local fair share” and “not generating the money that it could have been” to support the District’s obligation to provide T&E.  Ibid.  The ALJ also found that [...] did not demonstrate it had done everything it could to cut down its ever-growing transportation costs, nor had it attempted to curb costs associated with educating special education students by educating them in-district.  (Ra100-02).  Lastly, the ALJ concluded that other, non-SFRA legislation such as N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-38 and the annual Appropriations Act contributed to the District’s financial situation.  (Ra98-99).  As a result of these voluntary choices and non-SFRA factors, the ALJ held that the SFRA was not unconstitutional as applied to [...].  (Ra102).
[brief] The trial court was not only permitted to allow [...], the medical examiner, to testify as to the cause of [...]’s death.  This was precisely the manner of testimony that is wholly appropriate from precisely this kind of expert witness.  The legislature has specifically delineated the responsibility to determine cause of death (and specifically including homicide as one potential cause) to a duly appointed medical examiner.  In her brief, the defendant voices concern about the role of expert testimony and the potential for usurpation of the jury’s role as the ultimate finder of fact in a criminal proceeding.
[brief] The defendant, [...], was the “Borrower” of Business Line of Credit with [...] as of March of 2003 (Pa38).  The Great Recession of 2008 caused millions of people to lose their life savings and millions of companies to go out-of-business (Defendant’s Affidavit (Pa46-55)).  It forced, [...] to close its physical office at 600 Alexander Road ($4,400.00/mo., +2,200 sq. ft.), Princeton NJ and to contract with [...] in the [...] beginning in April of 2008 for a virtual mail only office at 116 Village Blvd. ($175.00/mo., 0 sq. ft.), Princeton NJ.
[brief] THE DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS (Raised Below: Pa428; 2T:10-11)  Based upon the ambiguous complaint and policy language, it is unreasonable to deny coverage.  Had Defendant [...] intended its policy to exclude liability coverage for “alleged” intentional acts such as “Interference with Contractual Relations,” “Assault,” and “Harassment,” then [...] was obligated to define its policy exclusions more clearly.  Wakefern Food Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 406 N.J. Super.524, 541 (App. Div. 2009).  Sending numerous emails, attempting to get the property manager fired, disrupting the Annual Meeting of the Members, and contacting the Association’s legal counsel are not wrongful acts that “carry with them the intention or expectation” that bodily injury will result.  The Court’s decision is faulty because the underlying complaint did not allege [...] intended to inflict emotional distress or mental anguish or any other form of bodily injury.  Based upon the facts, one should expect the claims to fall within coverage.  VIII.
[brief] (Pb13)  Plaintiff prefaced its argument as to Point I (Pb2) stating “no arm’s length buyer would ever pay $4,845,000.00 for the property in 1994 while it was encumbered with a $0.77 per square foot thirty-year lease. ”  He essentially repeats the same mantra in paragraph two of (Pb19) and the same thought was expressed several times by the arbitrator.  The answer is in the definition of the property interest taken by the condemnor.  The property taken is the fee simple estate, so the compensation is for the sum of the total property interests being taken including the [...] leasehold interest.
[brief] A.  BOTH THE AGREEMENT AND THE POLICE AND FIREMEN’S RETIREMENT SYSTEM ACT, N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1 ET SEQ.  DEMONSTRATE THE [...] AND [...] LACK JURISDICTION OVER SETTLEMENTS  AGREEMENTS AND THE VALIDITY OF PROVISIONS THEREIN.  Pursuant to the Agreement, the Parties agreed that the Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New Jersey, the Superior Court of New Jersey is the legal forum for the Agreement and the [...] is the legal forum for Plaintiff’s IOD Application.
[brief] On June 29, 2022, the Court rendered an opinion in the present matter (the “Trial Opinion”)¹, which was memorialized ¹  The respective transcripts in this matter, which have been provided to the Court, are identified thus: 1T refers to the transcript of the trial proceedings on March 30, 2022; 2T refers to the transcript of the trial proceeding on March 31, 2022; 3T refers to the transcript of the trial proceedings on April 5, 2022; 4T refers to the transcript of the trial proceedings on April 6, 2022; 5T refers to the transcript of the Trial Order by an order, dated June 30, 2022 (the “Trial Order”).  Da361-Da366.
[brief] I.  THE [...]’ MERE DISSATISFACTION WITH BINDING DECISIONS BY THE NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY THROUGHOUT THIS LITIGATION AND UNFOUNDED BELIEF THAT OUR COURTS HAVE TREATED THEM UNJUSTLY ARE IRRELEVANT TO THIS APPEAL.  .........................................................................................12  II.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT SPECIAL MASTER [...] HAD NO REASON TO RECUSE HIMSELF.........................................................................................................................15
[brief] According to the State, parental secrecy is required in all cases because some parents might harm their transgender-identifying children.  State’s Br. at ACa81–82.  But the “statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect [their] children is repugnant to American tradition. ”  *Parham*, 442 U.S. at 603 (emphasis in original).  Thus, the State’s justification for the Parental Secrecy Policy renders it constitutionally impermissible.
[brief] [...] was a sophisticated individual that possessed a Master’s Degree and had been involved in a series of real estate transactions.  He knew that he was forging his brother [...]’s (namely, [...]) signature as the transferee in connection with the December 10, 1998 title transfer, and he knew the consequence.  There must have been a reason why he engaged in such a fraud, and presumably the reason is the ownership dispute between the two (2) brothers which was explored at trial.  In any event, [...] (the fraudster that created the December 10, 1998 deeds) is not entitled to seek any relief from a court after [...] (as the title owner pursuant the deed created by [...]) transferred the title to [...], due to his unclean hands.
[brief] . . .  The commissioner shall not grant any permit which is in conflict with an adopted [Areawide WQM Plan].”  N.J.S.A. 58:11A-10; see also N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(a).  Consistent with this requirement in the Highlands preservation area, an applicant must apply for a WQMP consistency determination according to the Highlands Rules, as [...] did here.  N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(g); N.J.A.C. 7:38-2.4(e).  As water quality plays a central role in the Highlands Act, the Legislature chose to modify the way the water quality management planning process works in the Highlands.
[brief] \textbf{Standing Can Never Be Waived}  In a last-ditch effort to avoid the consequences of their lack of standing, Plaintiffs argue that [...] waived its right to challenge Plaintiffs’ lack of standing.  Plaintiffs urge this Court – without providing any support whatsoever – to create new law providing that a party’s failure to file a Statement of Factual and Legal Contentions constitutes a waiver of a standing defense.  Plaintiffs’ “request” directly contradicts New Jersey Supreme Court precedent.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has made crystal clear that “standing is an element of justiciability that cannot be waived or conferred by consent. ”  See, e.g., In re Baby T., 160 N.J. 332, 341 (1999); see also New Jersey Citizen Action v. Riviera Motel Corp., 296 N.J. Super. 402, 411 (App. Div. 1997) (“A plaintiff does not meet standing’s requirements simply because the defendant. . .may not have raised the issue or objected to the plaintiff’s lack of standing in the trial court.  Hence, in order for standing to have real meaning, standing cannot be waived.  If standing were waivable, the public could no longer be assured that the invocation and exercise of judicial power in a given case are appropriate.
[brief] Id. at 532.  In assessing whether an officer acted in an objectively reasonable manner, courts should consider whether the officer conducted a records check of deeds, tax records, or utility records to identify the owner of the property; the condition of the property; whether the owner or lessee has taken measures to secure the building from intruders; and “an officer's personal knowledge of a particular building and the surrounding area. ”  Id. at 533-34.  “No one factor is necessarily dispositive, and the weight to be given to any factor will depend on the particular circumstances confronting the officer. ”  Id. at 532.  However, the Court in Brown cautioned that there is no “trashy house exception” to the warrant requirement.
[brief] Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 302 (2020) (quoting Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J.Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015)).  Under Rule 4:50-1(d), "a default judgment is void if 'taken in the face of defective personal service,' if the defect is so significant that it 'cast[s] reasonable doubt on proper notice.'"  BV001 REO Blocker, LLC, 467 N.J.Super. at 125 (quoting Jameson, 363 N.J.Super. at 425); see also Sobel v. Long Island Ent. Prods., Inc., 329 N.J.Super. 285, 292-93 (App. Div. 2000) (finding default judgments "will not be vacated for minor flaws in the service of process" but should be set aside "for a substantial deviation from the service of process rules").  Pursuant to Rule 4:4-3(a), a summons and complaint "shall be served . . . by the sheriff, or by a person specially appointed by the court for that purpose, or by plaintiff's attorney or the attorney's agent, or by any other competent adult not having a direct interest in the litigation."
[brief] (7T:235-11 to 20)  The State responded that to meet its burden of substantiating the charge of aggravated assault on [...], it needed only to present evidence that [...] had hurt his wrist “when he was taking the defendant to the ground,” and that [...] acted “either purposely, knowingly, or even recklessly. ”  (7T:238-2 to 13)  During the State’s summation, the State argued that [...] “caused bodily injury to Officer [...]” by either recklessly, or purposely or knowingly resisting arrest.  (8T:192-8 to 193-6)  The trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on causation where the cause of [...]’s wrist injury was disputed and genuinely at issue based on the trial evidence.
[brief] [...] interrupted the peaceable possession of Lot 20 and Lot 22 in the summer of 2021 and claimed that [...] might own the Lot 22 and where they misidentified Lot 20 as Lot 22.  Because the period for objecting to the use of Lot 22 passed in 2006 which was thirty years after [...] had possession of Lot 20 and Lot 22, adverse possession served to cut off any interest in Lot 22.  [...] is a sophisticated entity that purchases a lot of real estate and also purchases lots and builds housing on the lots.  [...] has ownership of a great deal of realty in [...].  [...] in fact owns property on [...] including 261 [...].  In addition, [...] owns property behind [...] on [...].  [...] never acted like there was ownership in Lot 22, never maintained this space and in contrast, [...] has maintained Lot 22 in addition to the church’s lot which is Lot 20.  [...] City Surveyor [...] in an email pointed out that [...] developed a lot of the land in the community of [...] and surrounding streets but never developed Lot 22 instead leaving it open and vacant.  (Da255, Email from [...])  [...] has maintained the disputed space and the actions of [...] have been open, notorious and continuous for over thirty years.  There was no objection until 2021 which was well after the period to object and by operation of law Adverse Possession had set in with Lot 22 now owned by [...].  By 2021, the disputed space belonged to [...] via the Doctrine of Adverse Possession.  The trial court erred in failing to find that the period for objection by [...] per Adverse Possession had passed in 2006.  It was years later that there was an objection.  The court erred in failing to find that the doctrine of Adverse Possession passed and that [...] was divested of Lot 22.  The Court as a result failed to grant [...]’s request to Quiet Title.  It is requested that the Appellate Court vacate the Summary Judgment decision by the trial court which granted Summary Judgment to [...].  It is requested that the Appellate Court vacate the trial court denial of [...]’s Summary Judgment motion for Adverse Possession and Quiet Title.  It is requested that the Appellate Court find that [...] is the rightful owner of Lot 22 as the result of Adverse Possession and that the Appellate Court grant [...]’s request to Quiet Title in [...].
[brief] In her concurring opinion in *Flomerfelt*, [...] stated that the “holding in *Salem Group v. Oliver*, 128 N.J. 1 (1992) had set the stage for subsequent case law, which has required that to eliminate a duty to defend, an insurance policy must unambiguously state that an exclusion will operate notwithstanding any concurrent or sequential causation issues even when the policy’s exclusion is otherwise clear and specific. ”  *Id.* at 459.  The duty to defend applies only in the context of third-party liability insurance.  *Salem Group* also was, in fact, a third-party liability insurance case.  Moreover, in this case [...] claimed – as had the insured in *Salem Group* – that [...] improperly denied its duty to defend.  [...] even specified the kind of clause that should be included in a CGL policy to bar application of Appleman’s rule:  “Because the instant policy did not unambiguously declare that coverage would be excluded for injuries arising out of the use of illegal drugs ‘regardless of any other cause of event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss,’ or words to that effect, the holding in *Salem Group* is controlling. ”  *Id.* at 461-62.  The first two policies issued by [...] to [...] contain classically worded ACC language; but that language was removed from the three policies at issue in this case, thereby allowing application of Appleman’s rule.  Removal of the ACC language from the mold exclusions in the three [...] policies expanded the coverage by failing to restrict application of Appleman’s rule.  As in *Simon Group* and *Flomerfelt*, the absence of an ACC clause in the [...] policies at issue triggered its duty to defend and it was reversible error to hold otherwise.