ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Punitive damages are awarded as punishment or deterrence for particularly egregious conduct.  *Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello*, 97 N.J. 37, 48 (1984).  To warrant a punitive award, there must be an “evil-minded act” or an act accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard of rights.  *Id.* at 49.  Here, despite [...]’s bald assertions, there is no indication that [...]’s denial of [...]’s property claim was evil-minded or a wanton disregard of Ali- --- \(^3\)  As background, when asserting personal property has been lost, damaged, or destroyed, an incarcerated person must complete an “Inmate Claim. ”  N.J.A.C. 10A:2-6.1(a).  In addition, the incarcerated person must complete the form “within [fifteen] . . . days of the incident or discovery of the incident. ”  N.J.A.C. 10A:2-6.3(a).  Significantly, [...]’s claim form was received by the [...] more than three years after his issue with the food he had ordered.  (Pa3; Pa8).  [...]’s rights, particularly in light of [...]’s unambiguous policy in the Inmate Handbook that states all food purchases from outside vendors are at an incarcerated person’s own risk.  (Pa1; Ra2).  The facts on this record demonstrate that [...] properly investigated and considered [...]’s property claim and found the issue with the refried beans was not due to their actions but was instead a mistake by the vendor.  (Pa8-Pa9; Ra3-Ra4).  Thus, there is no basis for a claim for punitive damages.
[brief] Regarding the signed 2/26/2024 MOTION OF STAY paperwork  From [...]: Referring to Page 8, Certification, lines 13 – line 18: whereby [...] states:  “in my situation if the 1990 Order does not stand due To Rights Violation this would not be considered a negotiation but rather A serious oversight... et al “as I argue as ‘Pay-Direct’ for that is what the 1990 Court order demanded and that is precisely what I diligently and Sometimes with great sacrifice accomplished as I humbly suggest to The court quite proudly. ”  (Pa 57)  (Exhibit 6)
[brief] Rather than address the core of Plaintiff’s argument, Defendants merely recite purported “facts” regarding the negotiations of the PSA, much of which are irrelevant, yet do not dispute that their environmental consultants both testified as to their understanding that Defendants were responsible for obtaining the RAO, consistent with the terms of the PSA.  As to legal arguments, Defendants focus on irrelevant legal concepts, such as the ¹ Unless otherwise stated herein, all capitalized terms shall have the same meaning ascribed in Plaintiff’s Appellant Brief ("Plaintiff’s Brief").  “opening the door” doctrine, that have no bearing on this case whatsoever, and otherwise present meritless arguments that hardly warrant discussion.  Nevertheless, Defendants concede, as they must, that the term “RIR” does not appear anywhere in the PSA and that the term “RAO,” in terms of obligations, appears in the PSA one time—that is, as part of the Seller’s Environmental Obligations.  As to the Discovery Order, Defendants’ arguments are unavailing.
[brief] The Law Division erred in denying the [...]’ motion to amend their Counterclaim/Third Party Complaint to add [...] (A1157, A1161)  The [...] explained the role of [...] in their pleading below.  A90.  It was [...] – not the trustee department – that twice denied refinance (the [...]’ 2013 and 2014 applications for refinancing were both denied on the false ground of an invalid title).  The Law Division had ordered that the [...] were not precluded from filing a motion to amend their complaint to include [...] based on new evidence.  A86.  As the [...] explained below, [...]’s trustee department was only a department under [...], and at the time of the Chancery trial the trustee department no longer existed (as it had been long acquired by [...]).  At the chancery trial, plaintiff’s witness, [...], testified that the trustee department had nothing to do with refinance denials, and that refinance denials were solely denied by the “bank” – i.e., [...]  [...] testified that the trustee department had no knowledge of the refinance denials.  The [...] moved to amend their claims to include as a defendant [...] based on this evidence that came from plaintiff’s own witness, [...].  The trustee department no longer existed; the trustee department had nothing to do with refinance and nothing to do with the twice wrongful denial of the Schiano’s application to refinance.  These charges of the twice wrongful denial of refinancing by [...] were central to the [...]’ allegations and claims for monetary and equitable relief.  [...] was no longer an employee of the trustee department (as it was acquired by [...]).  [...] admitted at the chancery trial that the 2009 foreclosure assignment was only done in foreclosure matters.  For all these reasons, the Law Division committed reversible error in denying the [...]’ motion, based on new evidence, to amend their claims to add [...] as a third party defendant.  Conclusion
[brief] The record “clearly indicates” a lesser included offense if the evidence for the offense is “jumping off the page. ”  *State v. Dunbrack*, 245 N.J. 531, 545 (2021) (citing *State v. Denofa*, 187 N.J. 24, 42 (2006)).  “In applying the ‘clearly indicated’ standard, the court must not consider ‘the credibility of the witnesses’ or the ‘worth’ of the evidence; rather, it must look only to the ‘existence of evidence to support the lesser included offense [charge].’”  *State v. Canfield*, 252 N.J. 497, 501 (2023) (citation omitted) (alteration in original).  Importantly, the trial judge has an independent obligation to instruct on lesser-included offenses regardless of a defendant’s tactical position because the public interest in a correct verdict takes precedent.
[brief] After several notices, [...] then terminated the Lease with [Appellants].  [...] then entered into a lease with [...] and became the successor to the Solar Project…  The termination of the Lease was due simply because of [Appellants’] own default.  That event enabled [...] to become successors to this solar farm development. ”  [FEDa128].  C.  Leave To File A Second Amended Complaint Is Denied
[brief] *4  Three days after the robbery, [...] canvassed the area around [...] where the video depicted the suspect running.  He found a black ski mask in the woods near the gas station.  The State presented expert testimony from a New Jersey State Police forensic scientist that established to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that defendant's DNA was found on the ski mask.  On July 6, 2017, a Burlington County grand jury indicted defendant for three counts of first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A.  2C:15-1(a)(2) (counts one through three); third-degree possession of a weapon (knife) for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count four); third-degree possession of a weapon (metal pipe) for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count five); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (knife), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (count six); and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (metal pipe), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (count seven).
[brief] The [...] Are Granted Summary Judgment  On July 30, 2021, after discovery had concluded and the First Amended Complaint was filed, the [...] filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the First Amended Complaint.  [Pa1781; Pa3305].  The [...], along with [...] and [...], also filed a motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint.  [Pa1987; Pa3305].  By Orders entered on September 23, 2021, the trial court granted the [...]’ motion for summary judgment and the motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint as against the [...], [...] and [...].
[brief] THE RENT CONTROL BOARD’S DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE CALCULATION OF AMACONN’S HARDSHIP RENT INCREASE WAS REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.  The Board respectfully submits that its position on the appropriate calculation of [...]’s hardship rent increase application remains the same as it did during the final rounds of the meetings on this matter, which took place from March 2020 to August 2021.  As such, the Board is unable to revise its position at this time and defers to the Court and the Parties’ suggestions for same.
[brief] DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM IS UNTIMELY UNDER RULE 4:50 IS MOOT AND IGNORES DEFENDANT’S CONCEALMENT OF HER CLAIM IN EQUITY.  The Trial Court interpreted Plaintiff’s alternative request for equitable reformation of the PSA to be a request pursuant to Rule 4:50, which provides:  Rule 4:50-1.  Grounds of Motion.  On motion, with briefs, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party’s legal representative from a final judgment or order for the following reasons: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered evidence which would probably alter the judgment or order and which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under R. 4:49; (c) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (d) the judgment or order is void; (e) the judgment or order has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment or order should have prospective application; or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.  Defendant contends that a request for relief under Rule 4:50 is untimely due to the one-year time limitation for such requests set forth in Rule 4:50-2.  Defendant’s argument as to timeliness is moot because, as noted, the Trial Court did not reach the reformation of contract claim, having found that Defendant had breached the contract.  3T29.
[brief] 4.  In his certifications for Motion For Correction of Probation Account Record (DA339), Motion for the Reconsideration of the order of 4/4/2022 (DA357), certification for Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of 3/30/2023 (DA372) and his Reply (DA388), Appellant has cited numerous court Orders which were improperly violated by Probation, either in part or in full, in an arbitrary and capricious manner in compliance with R 1:7-4 (b) providing “...a statement of the matters or controlling decisions that counsel believes the court has overlooked or on which it has erred.
[brief] Plaintiff argues that the clear and concise statement of purpose is inadequate because it is included within the text of the ordinance itself . . .  Plaintiff, however, misstates the requirements of the notice statute.  N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 does not require that the statement of purpose be wholly separate and independent of the text of the ordinance.  It merely requires that the notice include a statement setting forth the purpose of the ordinance, which this notice clearly does since the [...] area was designated as such for the construction of a grocery store at this exact location.  [Meredith, slip op. at 20 (Pa314) (emphasis applied)].  Similarly, in Gentless v. Borough of Stratford, No. CAM-L-3344-17 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 5, 2018) (slip op. at 13) (Pa322 – Pa342), aff’d, 2019 WL 2563807 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 21, 2019) (Pa240), the court rejected this argument, and explained that under N.J.S.A. 40:49-2, “the Council had an option between publishing the ordinance in its entirety, by title only, or by title and summary” and “could have minimally published only the title of the ordinance . . . .” (See Pa334) (emphasis added).
[brief] MIPA Membership Interest Purchase Agreement (MIPA)  The parties to this agreement for the sale of [...] are two corporations: [...] (“Seller”), and [...] (“Buyer”).  Paragraph 6.3 of Article VI sets forth the scope of the Buyer’s obligation to indemnify the Seller:  **Indemnification for Seller’s Benefit. **  Buyer agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Seller and will pay to Seller the amount of any Damages,\(^{10}\) arising out of, resulting from or relating to:  (a)  Any material inaccuracy or breach of any representation or warranty of Buyer contained in this Agreement or in any other document delivered by Buyer as required by this Agreement; (b) Any material breach or violation of the covenants or agreements of Buyer contained in this Agreement or in any other document delivered by Buyer as required by this Agreement; [(P-82)  Da952-53.  (emphasis added). ]  \(^9\)  Similarly, although the integration clauses were not specifically raised as grounds for dismissal of the Counts related to [...] in the trial court, the plain language of the integration clauses bars any cause of action based upon representations made prior to the Stock Purchase Agreements, i.e., Counts 6, 8, 11 (as to [...]) and 12.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, **[...]**  Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant [...]  Dated: October 23, 2023 s/[...], Esq.  CHRISTOPHER J. DASTI, ESQ. Of Counsel &  On the Brief s/[...], Esq.  JEFFREY D. CHENEY, ESQ.  On the Brief [...] [...]  Phone: [...]  Fax: [...]  E-mail: [...]  Attorney ID: 017471993  By: [...], Esq., for Respondent/Plaintiff [...]
[brief] Id. at 424.  In [...] no award had been made and the parties had just started their arbitration.  It was an action commenced specifically to ask the Court to choose an arbitrator.  The court deferred the question of how many arbitrators the parties’ agreement required because it was not within 9 U.S.C. sec. 5’s allowed declaratory relief, under which the plaintiff had sued.  Indeed, in [...], supra, 433 F. 3d at 425 the Court directly noted the difference.  “The question of whether [the arbitration rules] have properly been applied falls outside of the ambit of sec. 5”.  The 4th Circuit itself separately recognized the distinction that the Chancery Court here did not, and therefore that [...] was inapplicable.  In Cargill Rice, Inc. v. Empresa Nicaraguense Dealimentos Basicos, 25 F.3d 223, 224, (4th Cir. 1994), the parties’ arbitration agreement required mutual selection of arbitrators.
[brief] In Jackowitz, the trial judge raised the issue of plaintiff’s counsel’s “send a message” refrain as early as a pretrial colloquy.  408 N.J. Super., at 500.  Routinely throughout their opening statement, they urged the jury to “send a message” against the defendant’s driving behavior – specifically and generally of all drivers – despite the case having stipulated liability.  Id. at 499-500.  Prior to closing arguments, the trial judge gave an instruction to the jury about the difference between evidence and argument, with specific reference to plaintiff’s counsel’s tactics.  Id. at 500-01.  On closing, plaintiff’s counsel still belabored the jury with argument about the defendant’s actions, the duty she breached, and how it applied to all New Jersey drivers.  Id. at 501-02.  To that, the trial judge interjected sua sponte to instruct the jury to disregard this argument on negligence, since the trial was solely about damages.  Id. at 502.  After the jury found in favor of plaintiff, the defendant moved for a new trial.
[brief] [...] further contaminated the perception of the jury towards [...] on the very first day of Trial by getting into a snarky and rhetorical exchange with him right in front of the jury.  As background, [...] felt that [...]’s attorney, [...], had made certain false and/or misleading claims during his opening statement.  Then part-way through [...]’s direct examination, [...] was apparently about to say something about what said by [...] during the opening, and [...] interrupted with an objection (2T Pg. 152, line 17), a sidebar was held, and then after the sidebar, an extended exchange took place (over 3 pages of transcript) in front of the jury in which [...] repeatedly challenging [...] with seemingly rhetorical questions such as “who decides the law in this case?” and when [...] answered “Okay. Okay”, [...] repeats the question to [...] again in front of the jury: “No, why don't you answer my question?  Who decides the law that applies to this case?”.  A short while later, [...] stated, still in front of the jury, “I decide the law.  And what I'm telling you is as a matter of law, your statements with reference to the attorney who represents the adversary are inappropriate” See  This exchange which occurred over more than 3 pages of the transcript is not the only time that [...] admonished [...] in front of the jury.
[directive] All undercover school operations must be approved in writing by the Attorney General or his designee or a county prosecutor.  To ensure the integrity of the decision-making process, the law enforcement agency or department proposing the undercover school operation shall submit to the county prosecutor or to the Attorney General or his designee a written confidential plan which sets forth the procedures to be taken to provide for the security and safety of the undercover officer and to ensure compliance with all applicable provisions of this Executive Directive.  Such plans shall also document all of the general and specific recommendations of the building principal and/or local superintendent, and shall indicate those steps which will be taken to implement and comply with those recommendations.  h.
[brief] [...] was also asked about other instances but was not given all the facts for which he was being investigated.  (8T88:3).  Prior to giving his initial statement to [...], [...] was not given any reports, GPS Realtime Video, or materials to review about the subject of [...]'s inquiry.  (8T88:8).  During the interview, all [...] was given were a couple still photos of GPS, which meant nothing and were useless from an evidential perspective.  (8T88:11-12).  [...] has had issues misidentifying [...] and [...].
[brief] 26  CONCLUSION ...........................................................................  32  | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **American Furniture Manufacturing, Inc. vs. Value Furniture & Mattress Warehouse** | 2009 WL 88922 (App. Div. 2008) | 10 | | **Benjamin vs. Garden Operations Corp.** | 2013 WL 6508491 (App. Div. 2013) (unpublished) | 5, 6, 15, 16, 17, 18 | | **Center 48 Ltd. Partnership vs. May Dept. Stores Co.** | 355 N.J. Super. 390, 405 (App. Div. 2002) | 4, 5, 6, 17 | | **City of Millville vs. Rock** | 683 F. Supp. 2d, 319 (D.N.J. 2010) | 10, 11, 16, 19 | | **Driscoll Construction Co., Inc. vs. State** | 371 N.J. Super. 304, at 313-314 (App. Div. 2004) | 6 | | **Fidelity Union Trust Co. vs. Galm** | 109 N.J.L. 111, 116 (E. & A. 1932) | 26, 27 | | **First New Jersey Bank vs. F.L.M. Business Machines, Inc.** | 130 N.J. Super. 151 (Law Div. 1974) | 30, 31 | | **Herz vs. 141 Bloomfield Ave. Corp.** | 2015 WL 2465027 (N.J. App. Div. 2015) | 8, 9, 10 | | **HLP Associates, L.P. vs. Carpet City, Inc.
[brief] The Court affirmed the [...]’s denial of the third-party hearing request and reversed its initial decision denying the appellant’s motion for a leave to amend the appeal to include a direct appeal of the underlying Flood Hazard Area Verification.  The Court held that [...]’s underlying decision did not become final until [...] issued the decision denying the appellant’s third-party hearing request and the appellant had sought leave to appeal the underlying decision within forty-five (45) days of [...]’s denial.  Id.  In this case, it is undisputed that Appellant has not filed a direct appeal of the 2017 WFD Permit or the 2019 Permit Modification.  Furthermore, contrary to the facts in Musconetcong Watershed Ass'n, Appellant has not sought leave in this appeal to do so.  Rather, Appellant first elects to challenge the 2019 Permit Modification only - but not the 2017 WFD Permit - in its brief.
[brief] See *State v. Adkins*, 221 N.J. 300, 313 (2015).  The United States Supreme Court has rejected the view that curtilage is subject to a diminished Fourth Amendment protection because the area is semi-private or because it carries a diminished privacy expectation.  Consequently, in analyzing governmental searches and seizures, New Jersey courts must apply the principles and holdings set forth in *Jardines* and *Collins*, and to the extent that existing New Jersey precedent conflicts with those holdings, the United States Supreme Court cases govern.  *State v. Ingram*, 474 N.J. Super. at 539, 540  In light of the *Ingram* Court’s analysis of only the Federal Fourth Amendment aspect, our Supreme Court’s remand to this Court suggests that this Court should analyze and determine whether the State Constitution provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment, cf. *State v. Earls*, 214 N.J. 564 at 584.²
[brief] (Id.)  Subsequently, on April 4, 2023, an administrative conference call was conducted by [...] with all the parties in attendance.  (D157).  Plaintiffs did not object to Arbitration or the forum, and in fact [...] indicated a willingness to engage in settlement discussions.  (DA157).  On or about April 7, 2023, a substitution of attorney was filed by [...], Esq. ("[...]") (DA213-14).  [...] requested that the matter be removed from arbitration.  (Id.).  In a letter dated June 12, 2023, [...] confirmed that it has made an administrative determination that [...] has met the filing requirements by filing a demand for arbitration providing for administration by the [...] under its Rules.  Accordingly, in the absence of an agreement by the parties or a court order staying this matter, the [...] will proceed with the administration of the arbitration.
[brief] Sedona Principles, 19 Sedona Conf. J. at 162 cmt. 10.j.  The United Defendants have good reason for concern that Plaintiffs in this case could weaponize confidential documents they gain access to during discovery—even with a confidentiality order or clawback agreements in place.  Da124-25; see also Da143-52.  There is an established record showing the threat of grave damage to Defendants from a whole-cloth production of all non- privileged documents that “hit” on ESI search terms, regardless of relevancy.
[brief] ..........  H847a Viewpoint 01 - Holmdel Road South, Looking Southwest - Proposed View (vegetation depicts two years after planted heights)  ..........  H848a Viewpoint 02 - Holmdel Road North, Looking Southwest - Existing View .................................................  H849a Viewpoint 02 - Holmdel Road North, Looking Southwest - (vegetation depicts as planted heights)  ..................  H850a Viewpoint 02 - Holmdel Road North, Looking Southwest - (vegetation depicts two years after planted heights)  ..................  H851a Attachment SPW-5, [...] response to RC discovery request RCR-ENG-12: projected installed cost of the proposed regulator station .  H852a Attachment SPW-6, Holmdel response by [...] to [...]-HOLM-BLM-23: responsibilities a company has to the community ........  H853a P-9: [...], City Planning Rebuttal Testimony (SOICR p. 10) .........................................................  H854a Attachment CC-1, Cofone cv ...........................................  H863a Attachment CC-2, Holmdel Development Regulations, excerpts ...............................................................  H865a Attachment CC-3, Draft Holmdel Master Plan Reexamination, June 2010, excerpts .......................................................  H878a Attachment CC-4, Holmdel Zoning Board Resolution SP 96-12 re [...] Communications Tower, adopted July 9, 1997 ........  H895a [...], Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 7 Pages H908a through H1058a  Attachment CC-5, Holmdel Zoning Board Resolution granting [...] variance, July 10, 2009 ..............  H908a P-10: [...], EMP Rebuttal Testimony (SOICR p. 10)  .....