ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] By contrast, our Supreme Court has specifically held that an individual is in custody where an officer has developed probable cause for an arrest, even if the officer has not yet formally arrested that individual.  O’Neal, 190 N.J. at 616, 622 (“[A] reasonable officer would have believed he or she had probable cause to arrest defendant for a drug transaction and would not have permitted defendant to leave.  Similarly, a reasonable person in defendant’s position, based on the nature of the police encounter, would not have believed that he was free to leave. ”).  A.
[brief] In addition, the Appellate Division must apply a highly deferential standard when performing a de novo review and application of the governing law to the undisputed material facts regarding the City’s adoption of the Amended Redevelopment Plan and entry into the Redevelopment Agreement.  “Municipal actions enjoy a presumption of validity. ”  Bryant v. City of Atl. City, 309 N.J. Super. 596, 610 (App. Div. 1998); see also Downtown Residents for Sane Dev. v. City of Hoboken, 242 N.J. Super. 329, 332 (App. Div. 1990) (recognizing that “[a] presumption of validity and constitutionality attends every legislative decision”).  Therefore, “a challenge to the validity of a municipal ordinance or action” faces a “heavy burden” of overcoming that presumption.
[brief] ON ACCOUNT OF THE PATENT FLAWS IN THE LEARY REPORT (Issue Addressed Below,6a-23a,24a-25a,26a-27a)  Even if [...] and [...] had not interceded to establish an independent basis for vacation of the Final Judgment, Appellants had already independently established the requirements for vacation of the Final Judgment under Rule 4:50-1(d) and (f).  On June 22, 2022, [...] initiated this Foreclosure Action under the in rem procedure, i.e., thereby avoiding the requirement for personal service of the Foreclosure Complaint upon Appellants.  [...] then circumvented the statutory two (2) year waiting period for initiating a tax lien foreclosure by alleging that the Property was abandoned.  In order to obtain statutory predicate for the procedure it utilized, and to bypass the lack of an independent determination from a municipal official in [...] as to abandonment, [...] chose to make a motion to the lower court on September 14, 2022 seeking a determination that the Property was abandoned, offering an inspection of the Property allegedly undertaken by [...] nine (9) months earlier, on January 28, 2022.  That date was slightly more than one month after [...]’s acquisition of the Certificate.  The Leary Report attaches pictures which are not pictures of the Property.  After research, Appellants were able to ascertain that the property identified in the Leary Report was in fact [...] which is owned by [...], another tax lien investor typically represented by the [...].  (92a-101a).
[brief] Donofry, 350 N.J. Super. at 296.  Therefore, even if a reasonable jury believes some of Defendants’ rationale for termination, it could still reasonably conclude that Plaintiff’s whistleblowing “made a difference” in Defendants deciding to terminate him, and still find for Plaintiff.  Here, the facts surrounding Plaintiff’s termination contain sufficient weaknesses in Defendants’ purported reason for termination that the jury may find them unworthy of credence.
[directive] A non-participating facility shall offer victims of sexual assault information about the County SART program and the specialized services available, and afford the victim the opportunity to seek those services.  The non-participating facility should also have a policy and procedure to ensure a victim is able to seek a medical forensic exam and related services at a SART-  -18-  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT participating facility.  Before a patient is discharged or transferred to a participating facility, all Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA)10 requirements must be met.  If a victim is unable or unwilling to seek services at a participating facility, the hospital may request a SAFE Kit and DFSA/Tox Kit from the County Prosecutor’s Office so that a trained professional healthcare provider may collect and preserve evidence from the victim.  At the conclusion of the examination, a law enforcement officer shall take custody of the sealed SAFE Kit and/or DFSA/Tox Kit.  Victims shall not be charged for the medical forensic exam, prophylactic medication, or the SAFE Kit and/or DFSA/Tox Kit.
[brief] In the context of hardship rent increase applications, the TPA provides that:  “Increased costs that are solely the result of a conversion, including but not limited to any increase in financing or carrying costs, and do not add services or amenities not previously provided shall not be used as a basis for an increase in a fair return or hardship hearing before a municipal rent board or on any appeal from such a determination."  N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.52(b).  (Emphasis added)
[brief] ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Bryant v. City of Atlantic City,** | | | 309 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 1998) | 5 | | **Fallone Properties, L.L.C. v. Bethlehem Twp. Planning Bd.,** | | | 369 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 2004) | 11 | | **Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan,** | | | 140 N.J. 366 (1995) | 7, 8 | | **New Jersey Shore Builders Ass’n v. Jackson,** | | | 199 N. J. 38 (2009) | 5 | | **Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co.,** | | | 62 N.J. 229 (1973) | 10 | | **Powerhouse Arts Dist. Neighborhood Ass’n v. City Council of City of Jersey City,** | | | 413 N.J. Super. 322 (App. Div. 2010) | 5, 6 | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order for Judgment and Opinion, Entered May 22, 2023 by Hon. [...], J.S.C……………Pa102  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] (Pa1-11, Pa29-41, Pa56-69, Pa72-81, 78-79, Pa86-96, Pa124-130, Pa137-145).  This is exemplified by the fact that neither the Board nor Respondents ever sought any IME to determine the permanency issue as to the PTSD and emotional distress disability.  (Pa1-151).  On 1/4/19, [...] received a Notice of Disciplinary Charges and was suspended without pay as per his SOA contract.  (Pa24-28).  After [...] pled not guilty and a Hearing was requested, the [...] representatives and [...] through counsel determined that [...]’s PTSD and emotional trauma made him unfit and disabled to act as a police officer permanently.  (Pa29-41, Ps56-69).  On 11/26/19, the MOU was worked out between the [...] and [...] strictly for the purpose of aiding [...] in his claim for permanent 2/3 accidental or alternatively permanent 40% disability.  (Pa29-41).  As a collateral result of the agreement and [...]’s permanent disability it was recognized that the minor and contested technical non-criminal IA charges lodged were moot and they were abandoned.
[brief] See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Solimine, 245 N.J. 326, 350 (2021) (“[u]nder the Securities Law, an impermissible lawsuit based on an illicit oral agreement does not become permissible simply because it is recast as a promissory estoppel claim”); Wasserstein v. Kovatch, 261 N.J. Super. 277, 286 (App. Div. 1993) (acknowledging that although the complaint “sounded in tort,” the claim arose in contract and not tort, and therefore contract principles applied); New Mea Constr. Corp. v. Harper, 203 N.J. Super. 486, 494 (App. Div. 1985) (holding that a claim was essentially a contract claim and noting “[m]erely nominally casting this cause of action as one for negligent supervision does not alter its nature”); McCann v. Biss, 65 N.J. 301, 309 (1974), (citing Leimbach v. Regner, 70 N.J.L. 608 (Sup. Ct. 1904), and explaining that in Leimbach “a suit to recover for broker’s services rendered pursuant to an oral agreement by casting the action as a claim in quantum meruit was an attempt to evade the statute which would not be countenanced”); Riggins v. Gullo’s Hair Salon, LLC, 2016 WL 7469094, *16 (N.J. Super. Ct., Law Div. Dec. 22, 2016) (noting “Plaintiffs cannot recast a products liability claim as a negligence claim or a breach of implied warranty claim to avoid the statutory language of the PLA [Products Liability Act]”); Estate of Pauli v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 8765427, at *9 (App. Div. May 5, 2015) (stating “[i]n the absence of an independent legal obligation, Plaintiffs cannot enhance their damages by disguising this contract action as a negligence claim”).  [...] wants the Court to imply both the existence of, and all of the terms of, a contract between him and the [...].  In other words, [...] is asking the Court to invent a contract out of whole cloth in order to save [...]’s Tort Claims Act-barred claims.  However, it is well-established that a litigant cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly.  See, e.g., McCann, 65 N.J. at 310 (plaintiff who cannot pursue claim directly because of statutory bar could not accomplish same result indirectly based upon an alternative claim, because “[s]uch a claim . . . amounts to an effort to evade the statute, and . . . would substantially undercut the law and its spirit.
[brief] In regard to the factual record, in plaintiff’s response to this defendant’s motion and Statement of Undisputed Facts, the plaintiff admitted all of the following: (1) that the entire property was transferred solely to the tenant, (2) that this defendant retained no control over the property, (3) that this defendant had no responsibilities for any portion of the property, and (4) that the tenant, [...], had all responsibility to maintain the property in good condition and was responsible for all maintenance and repair which included the obligation to maintain electrical components such as the one on which plaintiff’s decedent was working when he was critically injured.  (Pa 300-301, 441).  In summary then, on the issue of control the motion record revealed the following in uncontroverted fashion:  The entire property was transferred out of the hands of this defendant, the property owner.  The owner fully relinquished control.  Responsibility for the property was conveyed \textit{in toto} to a single tenant, years before the accident in question, including the maintenance and repair of the premises.  The tenant accepted those responsibilities to the property, and performed in accordance therewith.  No aspect of control or maintenance or repair was reserved to this defendant, the owner.
[brief] Three times, the Board’s decision regarding the rent increase was appealed to the Superior Court.  This action is the third such appeal to the Superior Court after the Board granted a negligible monthly rent increase of $154.99 to [...]’s current monthly rent of $723.15.  Notably, over a period exceeding twenty-five (25) years from 1993-2017, [...]’s monthly rent increased $48.41—from $675 to $723.41.  Finally, more than five (5) years after [...] filed its application for a rent increase, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. awarded [...] a monthly rent increase totaling $1,717.18 (the “Rent Increase”), rather than remand to the Board a third time after finding, like the prior two Judges, that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
[brief] [...] Failed To Consider Whether It Would Be Fair And Equitable To Award Post Judgment Interest At The Contract Rate. **  In *Interchange State Bank v. Rinaldi*, 303 N.J. 239 (App. Div. 1997), the Appellate Division reaffirmed that “fixing post-judgment interest at the legal rate is the standard”, but that trial courts have the discretion when requested to award a higher rate of interest when such award would be “fair and equitable”.  *Id.* at 261-64.  Equitable factors to be considered in the trial court’s determination of whether to grant a mortgagee’s application for postjudgment interest at the contract rate include “whether there was a commercial foreclosure, the contract rate is higher than the legal rate, the mortgagee is over-secured because the mortgagor has sufficient equity in the secured property to pay the principal due and the contract rate, and there is some prejudicial delay”, which, when combined, favor the contract rate, and whether “plaintiff submitted the final judgment of foreclosure that expressly provided for the contract default rate only until entry of judgment, and for post-judgment interest at the legal rate”, whether plaintiff did not immediately challenge the judgment or move to modify or correct the postjudgment interest rate in judgment, and whether plaintiff’s delay effected the timing of defendant’s objection, all of which favor the legal rate.  *Avatar*, 2022 WL 1495919, at *6-7 (citing *Interchange*).  This list is not exhaustive.  The trial court must consider any and all equities supported by the evidence.  *Id.* at *7  Here, the equitable factors weighing in favor of the legal rate are the absence of any evidence that [...] is over-secured; plaintiff requested that the postjudgment interest rate be lawful interest, not the contract interest; plaintiff did not immediately challenge the lawful interest rate award in the judgment; and there was no need for the [...] Defendants to object to plaintiff’s motion to enter the judgment on postjudgment interest rate grounds because plaintiff did not request contract postjudgment interest in its motion.  To reiterate, “where a court determines to award post-judgment interest under Rule 4:42-11(a) at a rate different than the legal rate, the court must consider and weigh the equities. ”  *Avatar*, at *7* (emphasis added).  And, like the trial court in *Avatar* which “abused its discretion by not fully doing so”, *id.*, [...] --- 5
[brief] (Da58).  By letter dated July 13, 2023, Plaintiff first identified itself as the contract purchaser of the Property/Commercial Tract and requested to “meet with the Township to discuss amending the Redevelopment Plan or rezoning of the Property to allow for an inclusionary development. ” (Da173-Da175).  Plaintiff did not propose any commercial development on this Commercial Tract.  (Da173-Da175).  Because the Property sat stagnant for the previous five years and Plaintiff was unwilling to consider commercial development on the Commercial Tract, [...] began evaluating options to protect the Redevelopment Plan and enable the Property to be developed with commercial uses to complement the nearly-completed Residential Tract, as had been carefully negotiated.
[brief] The legal process differs when a disability is awarded.  The fact is that Respondent’s mental health is such that he is not going to improve to return from duty.  The Parties agreed this was “highly unlikely” (Da18, Par.17).  The section concerning his “return to duty” in Par. 17 of the Separation Agreement considers Respondent’s “return to duty from permanent and total disability” as noted in NJSA 43:16A-8.  The Irrevocable features the parties drafted concerning that “highly unlikely” possibility, to take effect, requires: (a) that the [...] must first reach a vote on the merits of permanent and total disability, and (b) Respondent, aged 51 at this time, must recover from his psychiatric condition before age 55 (N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8).  After 55 he is ineligible to return to duty under that section.  Appellant in its breach blocked the intent of the parties in section (a).  Section b, Respondent’s return to duty, is unlikely, but that language was deemed ineffective and illegal by the [...].  It has been stricken.  It is highly unlikely that Respondent would seek a return to the job at that age due to failing health.  It is even more “highly unlikely” that the [...] doctor (psychiatric) would, before Respondent reaches 55, compel his return to examination and find his mental (medical) condition has reversed itself such that he is fit for duty.  However, [...] found these terms to illegal, ineffective, or unenforceable (Da24-Da25).  They were properly stricken by the Trial Court.  Wherefore the Appellant’s appeal must be denied, and the Trial Court's ruling left undisturbed.
[brief] Gonzalez v. Safe & Sound Sec. Corp., 185 N.J. 100, 118 (2005); see also; (6T163:3-23).  Although our Supreme Court has made it unmistakably clear that attorneys may not make adverse inference arguments regarding the absence of a witness from trial during summation when an adverse instruction is improper; Washington v. Perez, 219 N.J. 338, 364 n.7 (2014); defense counsel repeatedly commented upon the plaintiff being kept from the jury during trial.  (7T33:1-4; 7T39:24-40:3; 7T40:4-42:13).  The defendant argues in its opposition that the comments on the plaintiff’s absence were proper.  However, it fails to cite any legal authority allowing for an attorney to make an adverse inference argument regarding the absence of a witness from trial during summation when an adverse instruction is inappropriate and not given to the jury.
[brief] [...] believes that profit sharing (EGPs) due to [...] for each construction project must be fragmented and litigated separately from amounts allegedly due to [...] from [...] for the construction work performed on each project.  It makes no sense whatsoever to litigate [...]’s monetary claims in a dozen separate proceedings from [...]’s monetary claims—all with respect to the very same construction projects.  The claims are related and must be litigated and set-off together.
[brief] On December 18, 2023, [...] filed its Answer, as well as Cross-Claims (Dr14).  On December 20, 2023, [...] filed a motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration pursuant to their Contract with Appellants that included valid, legal, and enforceable waiver and arbitration provisions, among others.  On January 4, 2024, [...] and Appellants filed a Consent Order with the Court, by which Appellants acknowledged their binding agreement to arbitrate with [...] (“Plaintiffs have a binding agreement to submit all claims between themselves and [...], pursuant to the operative agreement contained in Plaintiff’s Small Business Contract. ”) (Dr35).
[brief] One purpose of the Army Treatise was to explore the use by the Army of trichothecene poisoning as a bioweapon.  “After direct dermal application or oral ingestion, trichothecene mycotoxins can cause rapid irritation to the skin or intestinal mucosa. ”  Da2529.  See also, Da1362, a World Health Organization Bulletin introduced at trial that discusses dermal and inhalation exposure to mold mycotoxins. to toxic mold from 1991 through June, 2010. ”  Da58.  [...] further acknowledged that “[i]n [...]’s October 12, 2010 answers to Uniform Form A Interrogatories [in the underlying action] he states that he suffers from ‘bodily injury’ as a result of exposure to mold. ”  Da58.  [...] produced overwhelming medical evidence in the underlying case establishing that he had suffered serious injury, including mental injury unknowingly caused by his chronic exposure to mold in his condominium.  Otherwise, [...] and its other insurers would not have settled that case.  Relying extensively on the testimony of [...]’s expert, [...], the Trial Court ruled that [...] had to prove not only that he actually consumed mold-contaminated food (which, in fact, he did), but that the food he consumed contained harmful mycotoxins, specifically Trichothecene, and that those particular mycotoxins caused the injuries he complained about in the underlying case.
[directive] Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2 information from outside the interview to be checked against statements made by the witness to verify or dispel the witness’s account, possible lines of inquiry, specific questions that were not pursued or actually posed to the witness, and other investigative techniques or deliberative processes.  2.  The term "witness interview" means an interview of a witness done in the course of investigating a crime of the first, second, third, or fourth degree under New Jersey law, whether committed by an adult or a juvenile.  B.  GENERAL RETENTION AND TRANSMITTAL RULES  Prohibition on Policy or Practice of Destroying Contemporaneous Notes of Witness Interviews and Crime Scene Observations  Any existing law enforcement policy or practice to destroy contemporaneous notes of a witness interview or of a crime scene observation after the contents of those notes have been incorporated into a final report is hereby rescinded and prohibited as contrary to the law of this State.  Henceforth, when a law enforcement officer during the course of an investigation of a crime conducts or participates in a witness interview, the officer shall retain any original contemporaneous notes of the interview that the officer made.
[brief] State v. Golotta, 178 N.J. 205 (2003) ....................................................................................  12, 14 State v. Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453 (2015) .....................................................................................  13 State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249 (2015) .....................................................................................  10  State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146 (1964) .......................................................................................  22 State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463 (1999) .....................................................................................  22 State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328 (2010) .....................................................................................  9  State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. 540 (2019) ..................................................................................... 9-10 State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502 (2003) ..................................................................................... 20, 21 State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509 (2022) ..................................................................................... 15 State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13 (2004) ....................................................................................... 21 State v. Rossman, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1162 .......................................................... 17 State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360 (2018) ..................................................................................... 24 State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346 (2002) ......................................................................................... 20 State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503 (2015) .......................................................................................... 10 State v. Williams, 381 N.J. Super. 572 (2005) .............................................................................. 18 State v. Wright, 431 N.J. Super. 558, (App. Div. 2013) ............................................................. 11 NEW JERSEY RULES OF EVIDENCE N.J.R.E. 104 ........................................................................................................... 11 STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On October 20, 2021, a grand jury returned [...] charging [...] (“Defendant”) with multiple crimes related to the unlawful possession of a handgun and ammunition.
[brief] This is one of the rules in the 400 page rulebook that applies to all chess tournaments across the country.  The Plaintiff knew about the rulebook because of all the past events he played in before the one in question.  We know he knew about it because he made multiple references to the rulebook in his brief and appendix.  He testified about it at trial.  He knew this rulebook applied to this tournament.  As the Defendant’s representative said, “[I]t’s used all over the country.