ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) "advances a policy of cost containment by ensuring that an injured, uninsured driver does not draw on the pool of accident-victim insurance funds to which he did not contribute."  Id. at 471.  In finding the statute was constitutional, the Court in [*9]  Caviglia declined "to second-guess the Legislature's common-sense reasoning that section 4.5(a) has the potential to produce greater compliance with compulsory insurance laws and, in turn, reduce litigation, and result in savings to insurance carriers and ultimately the consuming public."
[directive] The purpose of this document is to provide guidance for the triage of critically ill patients in the event that a public health emergency creates demand for critical care resources (e.g., ventilators, critical care beds) that outstrips the supply.  These triage recommendations will be enacted by a hospital only if: 1) the hospital is operating under a crisis standard of care; 2) critical care capacity is, or will shortly be, overwhelmed despite taking all appropriate steps to increase the surge capacity to care for critically ill patients; and 3) a regional authority has declared a public health emergency.
[directive] [Promulgated by Directive #12-06 (July 20, 2006)]  Page 6 of 7 N.J.S.A. 2B:21-3 OATH OF JURORS  “Do you as a member of this grand jury of the State of New Jersey and the County of ________________ swear or affirm that you will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this State; that you will diligently inquire into all matters brought before you to the best of your skill, knowledge and understanding; that you will take no action through envy, hatred, or malice nor for fear, favor or affection, or for reward or the hope of reward; that you will make a true presentment of all matters coming before you, and that you will keep secret the proceedings of the grand jury?”  [Standard Grand Jury Charge]  [Promulgated by Directive #12-06 (July 20, 2006)]  Page 7 of 7  STANDARD SUPPLEMENTAL CHARGE FOR GRAND JURIES REGARDING PRESENTMENTS  [As Approved by the Conference of Assignment Judges]  [Promulgated by Directive #12-06 (July 20, 2006)]
[directive] 3.  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f) presents a path for individual defendants to argue against continued detention when (1) there is new information, or a change in circumstances, “that (2) that is material to the release decision.  As to the first prong, the Court has found the worldwide pandemic that has afflicted New Jersey and its prison system amounts to a change in circumstances” within the meaning of Rule 3:21-10(b)(2).  In re Request to Modify Prison Sentences, 242 N.J. 357, 379 (2020).  That finding logically extends to section 19(f).  Section 19(f)’s second prong -- materiality -- will vary by defendant and turn on the particular facts of each case.  The critical question at a hearing that is reopened is not whether the initial detention decision was correct, but whether the circumstances at the time of the later hearing warrant continued detention.  That issue calls for a renewed examination of whether any combination of conditions would reasonably assure against the risk of non-appearance, danger, or obstruction in light of delays caused by the pandemic.  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18, -19(f).  (pp. 17-20)
[brief] Soon after, she began an extended medical leave and sought treatment for pain in her right knee.  [...] approved an initial leave until August 26, 2019, and then later extended her leave to October 25, 2019.  (Pa28)  [...] underwent arthroscopic surgery in the summer of 2019.  During the procedure, [...]’ surgeon, [...], discovered that [...] had torn her ACL.  After discovering that [...]’ injury was much worse than initially believed, Dr. Johnson removed and replaced the torn ligament and prescribed a course of rest and physical therapy.  [...] remained out of work for most of the next six months, and well past the extended leave end date of October 25, 2019.  (Pa27-28)  [...] was reexamined at Dr. Johnson’s office, [...], by physician assistant [...] on December 30, 2019.  (Pa33)  Despite over 9 months of recovery time, [...] still was not close to resuming her normal job duties.  [...] issued a doctor’s note in Suri’s name that same day stating:  Cheniqua [...] is currently under my medical care and may not return to work at this time.  She may return to work on 01/07/20 with the following restriction for 6 months:  **No heavy lifting, no squatting, no climbing and no kneeling.  Patient is to avoid prolonged standing over 3 hours at a time. **  If you require additional information please contact our office.  (Pa21, Pa33 (emphasis added))  The letter thus clarified that [...] would not be able to return to her prior work activities until June 7, 2020 -- at the absolute earliest -- well over two years after her initial injury.  [...] produced the note to [...] shortly after it was issued.  After receiving the doctor’s note and gaining confirmation that [...] would not be able to perform her job duties for the foreseeable future, [...] responded on January 6, 2020, informing [...] that her initial leave of absence had expired, that [...] had no light duty work available for her and suited to the restrictions contained in the doctor’s note, and that her employment therefore had to be terminated.
[brief] As summarized Appellant’s Brief, Plaintiff alleged that [...] and [...] “knowingly and substantially assisted in retaliating against Plaintiff by authorizing the sham investigation, spanning over six months, where the investigator did not give Plaintiff an opportunity to meaningfully respond to a legible transcript and did not interview any of the individuals that she identified with knowledge, despite saying he would do both things.  (See Pb34).  Appellant alleges no involvement or participation by these defendants into the investigation other than their authorization of the investigation.  Appellant’s claims against Defendants [...] and [...] do not arise from a claim that they initiated any action against her, but rather, that [...] and [...], in the exercise of their discretion as Board members, authorized an investigation into complaints submitted by defendant [...].  (See Pa231a at ¶132).  Appellant concedes this point, asserting that her allegation is that “[...] and [...] knowingly and substantially assisted in retaliating against Plaintiff by authorizing the sham investigation. ” (Pb34 (emphasis added)).  These claims are not supported by the law.  When a plaintiff’s claim “arises from alleged retaliation, the elements of the cause of action are that the employee ‘engaged in a protected activity known to the [employer,]’ the employee was ‘subjected to an adverse employment decision[,]’ and there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.
[brief] On August 23, 2017, [...] filed a motion to enforce litigant’s rights pursuant to R. 1:10-3 because [...] (a) wrongfully transferred a deed to a more than half-million dollar home in Delaware to her mother, [...]\(^1\) for $10 and (b) wrongfully transferred title to [...]’s Lexus to herself.  (A33; A36).  The house transfer violated the parties’ Matrimonial Settlement Agreement (hereafter “MSA” or “PSA”) at paragraph 14, a provision governing the sale of the Delaware home and allocating the sales proceeds to [...], as well as the Tolling Agreement/Irrevocable Power of Attorney dated November 11, 2014.  (Ca14; A27).  The Lexus is [...]’s vehicle that he purchased long after the March 18, 2015 Final Judgment of Divorce and he carried his own insurance for the vehicle.  (A45; A48; Pa94)  On September 25, 2017, [...] opposed and filed a cross-motion seeking credit card payments, and other relief.  (A57).  Implicitly, if not explicitly, her responses acknowledged the validity of her divorce judgment and related documents.  (A59).  She was silent on any “set-aside claims. ” (A57; A59).  It was not until a month later, on October 27, 2017, that [...] cross-moved seeking to set aside the Mid-Marriage Agreement (Ca1), Final Judgment of Divorce(A15), Matrimonial Settlement Agreement (Ca14), and the three Powers of --- \(^1\)
[brief] Pa7 at ¶33.  Defendant did not draft, print, address, or mail that letter.  Instead, Defendant contracted with an unrelated business to perform those services.  Pa8 at ¶42.  After having provided that mail vendor with forms of its collection letters and periodically sends data to that vendor to merge with the forms to create individual collection letters.  Pa8 at ¶44.  Hence, “[i]n connection with the collection of the Debt, [...] conveyed the data concerning the Debt to the third-party mail vendor.
[brief] ”  *Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 284 N.J.Super. 543, 548 (App.Div.1995).  “Where the timing alone is not ‘unusually suggestive, the plaintiff must set forth other evidence to establish the causal link. ”  *Young v. Hobart West Group*, 385 N.J.Super. 448, 467 (App.Div.2005).  B.
[brief] Under New Jersey law, a plaintiff can “pierce the corporate veil” – meaning the shareholders of a corporation can be held personally liable – when the corporation perpetuates fraud, engages in criminal activity, or evades the law.  State, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 500 (1983) (citing Trachman v. Trugman, 117 N.J. Eq. 167, 170 (Ch. 1934)).  Sometimes, courts may pierce the corporate veil by finding that a subsidiary was a “mere instrumentality of the parent corporation. ”  Id.  Often, however, “liability is generally imposed for corporate dominance only when the parent has abused the privilege of incorporation by using the subsidiary to perpetuate a fraud or injustice, or otherwise to circumvent the law. ”  Id. at 501.  In Ventron, the lower court found a parent company liable to a wholly-owned subsidiary because its principals were involved in its day-day business.  The Supreme Court reversed, finding that it is proper to establish a new ¹ Beyond the six (6) year statute of limitations, as the within complaint was filed on April 6, 2022. corporation for the sole purpose of acquiring the assets of another corporation and continuing its business.
[brief] H597a Holm-68: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-65, identity of heaters from other vendors; objected to (SOICR p. 12)  .....  H598a Holm-69: [...] response to discovery request  HOLM-[...]-PNL-66: Denial of any considerable fear and risk associated with the Project (SOICR p. 12) .........................................................  H599a Holm-70: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-67: Denial that regulator station is perceived to be unsafe (SOICR p. 12) ................................................................. H600a Holm-71: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-68, panel neither attended the public hearing nor read transcripts (SOICR p. 12) ................................................................. H601a Holm-72: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-69, objected to providing data on efforts to inform or discuss with [...] the Transmission Line installation (SOICR p. 12) ............. H602a Holm-73: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-70, objected to providing data on efforts to inform or discuss with [...] the proposed Regulator Project before installation of Transmission Line (SOICR p. 12) ......................................... H603a Holm-74: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-71, provision of information on pre-Regulator Project with [...] before Zoning Board application (SOICR p. 12) .........................
[brief] To the Honorable Judges of the Appellate Division:  We represent Petitioner/ Appellant [...] (hereinafter “[...]”).  We have received the Answering Brief filed by Respondent / Respondent [...] (“[...]”), and the Statement in Lieu of Brief filed by the [...] (the “[...]”).  Pursuant to R. 2:6-5, and R. 2:6-2(b) please accept this Reply Letter Brief in further support of [...]’s Appeal.
[brief] As set forth above, the Supreme Court’s regulation of the practice of law is exclusive and protected under the Constitution.  And an attorney’s performance of debt adjustment services for clients constitutes the practice of law in this State protected by the plenary license granted to the attorney by the Supreme Court and by the First Amendment.  Additionally, the trial court once again ignored the testimony of [...] with respect to this issue.  [...] confirmed that the Act could apply to the attorneys who are the foremost experts at performing debt adjustment services, and to the attorneys who always satisfy their clients in assisting them with debt.  Left unanswered by any party is how a proscription against such attorneys from being “principally engaged” in performing such services leaves consumers in a better position, i.e., advances the purpose of the Act, than having no proscription against attorneys -- already regulated by the Supreme Court -- at all.
[brief] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the dying declaration of the victim.  Defendant contends the trial court erred by allowing the admission of the victim’s final words to his father, as he lay dying from defendant’s shooting.  (Db22).  This argument is wholly without merit.  Despite defendant’s claims to the contrary, (Db24), a trial court is vested with considerable latitude in determining whether to admit evidence, and that determination will only be reversed on appeal if it constitutes an abuse of discretion.  *State v. Kuropchak*, 221 N.J. 368, 385 (2015); *State v. Rose*, 206 N.J. 141, 157 (2011); *State v. Marrero*, 148 N.J. 469, 484 (1997).
[brief] 34  1.  Res judicata bars the relitigation of claims for stormwater runoff litigated in the Burke Action.  ……………  35  2.  Collateral estoppel bars plaintiff from relitigating property damage caused by water runoff from the driveway that was at issue in the Burke Action.  ………………………………………………………………..  36  D.  Plaintiff’s failure to apportion his damages between damage caused by preexisting conditions and damage allegedly caused by the [...] is fatal to this action.  ……………..  38
[brief] We add to our review of the physical evidence that although the State does not mention the Newport cigarettes in the legal argument section of its response brief, we find it relevant that at the time of his arrest, defendant was holding a pack of the same brand of cigarettes as had been demanded by the robber at the [...].  We note, however, that the State presented no evidence that the cigarette pack defendant was holding was nearly full, indicating that it had been obtained recently during the [...] robbery.  Nor does the record show that the State examined the serial number on the pack defendant was holding that might have shown that it had been part of the [...] inventory.  Aside from the corroborative physical evidence, the State's case hinged on the eyewitness identifications made by the two [...] employees.
[brief] **  In the Decision, the Appellate Division also cited *Lovett v. Estate of Lovett*, 250 N.J.Super. 79 (Ch.Div. 1991) to support its determination that Plaintiff here is entitled to attorney fees to set aside the PSA as a result of “natural and necessary consequence” of an attorney’s negligence.  (Da110)  As analyzed above, this case actually supports the Defendants’ argument that even if the legal fees incurred by the Plaintiff were “natural and necessary consequence” of an attorney’s negligence, Plaintiff still has to prove causation and damages.
[directive] Those kits not initially held by the TESTING OF SAFE KITS FNE and referred to law 938 859 enforcement may be subject to 668 535 DNA testing.  The decision to test a 340 333 kit for DNA evidence is rooted in the victim’s preferences and prosecutorial/law enforcement 2018 2019 2020 decisions on the case.  Should the Tested Not Tested prosecutor or law enforcement decide not to submit the kit for testing, the majority of responding law enforcement agencies (290 of 512) indicated the decision is made by someone of a specified rank – from the detective/investigator on the case to the Chief.18  For 76 agencies, the decision is made at the County Prosecutor’s Office.  Further, 15 agencies indicated that there is no decision-maker as all reported kits are tested.  When a kit is not tested, agencies most frequently indicated the untested kits were stored in unspecified evidence facilities (175 of 205 agencies that provided a response to this question), an additional 16 agencies indicated storage with the county (county prosecutor, sheriff, or SANE).
[brief] As part of the calculation the Applicant only counts for the enclosed portion of the ground floor lobby/garage area which includes the retail and office space, however as stated in §240-2.2 of the Borough Code Floor Area, Gross is defined as “The sum of the gross horizontal area of all floors of a building from the exterior walls, or from the center line of a wall separating two buildings; and including attached or detached garages and accessory building, but excluding: a. residential basements; b. the floor area of rooms devoted to mechanical equipment accessory to the building and/or rooms with a ceiling height of less than six feet located in basements of nonresidential properties …. ”  In addition, as stated in 240-2.2 of the Borough Code Floor Area Ratio is defined as “The sum of the gross horizontal area of all stories above gra[d]e, except for the basement floor of residential buildings or structures, compared to the total area of the site…”  The applicant shall revise the Floor Area Ratio to count for the entire floor area for the ground floor inclusive of the garage/parking.
[brief] Defendant [...] (“[...]”), now defunct, was a debt adjuster who not only scammed vulnerable New Jersey consumers by charging exorbitant and unlawful fees for debt adjustment services it often failed to perform, [...] was never licensed to perform debt adjustment services in New Jersey in the first place.  The New Jersey Debt Adjustment and Credit Counseling Act (“DACCA”), N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1, et seq., makes unlicensed debt adjustment services unlawful in order to protect vulnerable consumers due, in large part, to the industry’s susceptibility to consumer fraud.  Defendant [...] is a payment processing company who acted as a middleman between Plaintiff [...] and [...]—managing [...]’s escrow account, facilitating payments, doling out illegal fees to [...], and collecting illegal service charges.  After [...]’s filed her Amended Class Action Complaint alleging violations of, inter alia, the DACCA, the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1, et seq., the New Jersey Truth in Consumer Contract, Warranty, and Notice Act (“TCCWNA”), N.J.S.A. 56:12-1, and the New Jersey Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“NJRICO”), N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1, et seq., [...] moved to dismiss the Complaint, attacking [...]’s claims on the merits.  After [...]’s Motion to Dismiss was denied, [...] then moved to dismiss [...]’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and to compel arbitration.  [...]’s Motion was granted on December 12, 2023 (Pa65).  In granting [...]’s procedurally defective Motion, the trial court erred by 1) effectively weaponizing the doctrine of equitable estoppel in order to compel [...] to arbitrate her claims pursuant to the terms of the illegal contract with [...], and 2) by failing to analyze [...]’s waiver of their purported ability to compel arbitration thought their failure to assert arbitration as an affirmative defense in their Answer and by seeking (unsuccessfully) to litigate the merits of [...]’s claims.  Thus, the trial court’s December 12, 2023 Order (Pa65) granting Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration should be reversed.
[directive] This survey will help inform future guidance to best collect, track, store, and retain SAFE Kits.  Please answer "N/A" in the required fields that do not pertain to you.  SART/FNE Coordinator  The following questions should be completed by the County Sexual Assault Response Team (SART)/Forensic Nurse Examiner (FNE) Coordinator.  SART/FNE Coordinator  Providing Response: County: Date of Survey Response: Address: City/Town: State/Province: Zip/Postal Code: Country: Email Address: Phone Number:  1.  How many SAFE Kits were collected in your County in calendar years:  2018 2019 2020  2.  Do you maintain a log of all SAFE Kits that have been collected?  Response/If yes, please explain system used  3.  What information do you include on your Forensic Medical Examination case log?  Open-Ended Response
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a(5).  Defendant did not possess a firearm at the time of the present offenses, specifically, the theft and burglary of the [...] car dealership in Morris County on August 6, 2021.  However, while the first prong of factor a(5) limits firearm possession to the underlying Morris County offenses, the second prong broadens the language to include firearm possession at the time of any pending criminal charge, whether that charge originates from Morris County, Essex County, or any other county.  In the instant appeal, the entirety of the defendant’s Essex County unlawful firearm possession case, from arrest to sentencing, occurred while the Morris County charges were pending.  It is undisputed the defendant actually and unlawfully possessed a firearm on July 1, 2022, as the Morris County charges were actively pending.  Therefore, applying the plain, textual language of factor a(5), the defendant is barred from entry into the Recovery Court program.
[brief] Last, the [...] have no recollection of ever seeing the purported clickbox that evening, and believe if it was clicked it was by their daughter as the parents packed for an upcoming trip.  As both she and her husband explain, on Saturday, January 8, 2022 they were busily packing for a mid-week ski trip.  (Da197-200; Da209-211).  At roughly 6:15 PM, their daughter asked if they could order food from a particular restaurant.  Neither recalls if their daughter ordered food independently or if [...] assisted, but both recall their daughter hanging on to [...]’s phone after the order to monitor the progress of the delivery.  In that period, when people (especially impatient pre-teens) incessantly refresh or exit-and-reenter the application to get an update on the driver’s progress, [...] alleges the Checkbox Consent was activated.
[brief] Plaintiff’s claim frustrates and interferes with the purposes and objectives of FDA’s pervasive regulatory scheme governing prescription drug recalls on the U.S. market.  See R.F. v Abbott Labs., 162 N.J. 596, 618-20 (2000).  Here, [...] worked with FDA for months, making over 20 attempts to obtain authorization to communicate with U.S. healthcare providers, including submitting a draft DHCP letter, prior to Plaintiff’s November 6, 2018 Ozurdex® procedure.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 343.  The defendant can reclaim his right by promising to alter his behavior to comport with decorum.  *Id.* at 344.  “[T]here are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstreperous defendant… : (1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly. ”  *Id.* at 343-44.  Defendants cannot “be permitted to by [their] disruptive conduct indefinitely to avoid being tried on the charges brough against [them]. ”  *Id.* at 346.  In New Jersey, the courts have approved the alternatives set forth in *Allen* as remedies for dealing with disruptive defendants.
[brief] State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 32-33 (2016) (citing State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243-44 (2007)).  Such deference is especially appropriate when those findings “are substantially influenced by [an] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case .  . . .”  State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424-25 (2014) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)).  However, appellate courts review de novo the trial court's ruling on an issue of law.