ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [Model Jury Charge (Civil), 5.20F, “Active and Constructive Notice Defined” (2003). ]  See Parmenter v. Jarvis Drug Stores, 48 N.J. Super. 507, 510 (App. Div. 1957) (defining “constructive notice” as “the existence of a condition for such a length of time as reasonably to have resulted in knowledge and correction had the defendant been reasonably diligent. ”)  Although business owners owe to invitees a duty of reasonable care to provide a safe environment for doing that which is within the scope of the invitation, “owners of premises generally are not liable for injuries caused by defects for which they had no actual or constructive notice and no reasonable opportunity to discover.
[brief] Based on this, plaintiff was also entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief and erred in granting summary judgment to defendants.  (Pa533; P534)  POINT SIX THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR RECKLESS AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BECAUSE ALL ELEMENTS WERE MET (Pa093; Pa471; Pa017; Pa533; Pa534)
[directive] [Non/No] pwononse a, ke kelkeswa sa w ta di pou kontinye ak deklarasyon koupab ou an yo pap kab sèvi avèl kont ou nan pwosè a?  Do you understand that if you are permitted to take back your plea of guilty because of the judge’s sentence, that anything you say in furtherance of the guilty plea cannot be used against you at trial?  24.  Èske w satisfè avèk konsèy w resevwa nan men avoka w an?  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  Are you satisfied with the advice you have received from your lawyer?
[brief] Appellant has been a member of the NJ Bar, in good standing, since 1983.  He practiced law in NJ for 35 years.  For 23 of those years Appellant was certified as a Civil Trial Attorney.  For the last 10 years of practicing, he was general counsel for a national freight transportation company and its affiliates.  From 2014 until Appellant’s retirement in 2018, his office was in Florida where Appellant currently resides.
[brief] The trial court’s Opinion overlooked the fact that the Discharge of Mortgage signed by [...] stated that it was “Paid in Full” thereby confirming that [...]’s $330,000 payment in April 2013 was in full and final satisfaction of the $330,000 Loan.  The trial court improperly focused on whether the mortgage could be discharged without the $330,000 Loan being satisfied and overlooked [...]’ own express acknowledgement that the $330,000 Loan was “Paid in Full. ”  [...] executed a Guarantee and that guarantee was secured by the mortgage.  The Discharge of Mortgage, which [...] does not contest signing, states, “This Mortgage was made to secure payment of $330,000 and interest,” and that “This Mortgage has been PAID IN FULL or otherwise SATISFIED and DISCHARGED. ”  By signing the Discharge of Mortgage, [...] was acknowledging and agreeing that the $330,000 Loan was “paid in full or otherwise satisfied. ”  Although the trial court found that under the promissory note “[...] could discharge any collateral without affecting, canceling, or discharging the underlying debt owed by [...],” the trial court failed to address that the Discharge of Mortgage did not simply discharge the mortgage tied to the $330,000 promissory note.  Instead, the Discharge of Mortgage explicitly stated that the obligations secured by the Mortgage – i.e., $330,000.00 and interest – had been fully paid and satisfied.  The trial court failed to offer any reason why this portion of the Discharge of Mortgage was ignored and not considered.  This portion of the Discharge of Mortgage is in direct conflict with [...]’ testimony that there were outstanding amounts under the $330,000 loan.  [...] – an experienced businessman and lender – would not have signed such document if there were outstanding amounts.  This Discharge of Mortgage clearly contradicts [...]’ story that there was a Third Loan, an argument that the trial court failed to appreciate.  Moreover, the trial court’s reasoning will cause significant practical problems as it would permit lenders to escape a clear discharge of mortgage and acknowledgment of full payment by simply arguing that the parties entered into a separate oral agreement, without any written documentation to support the existence of such oral arrangement.  Allowing Plaintiff’s claim to proceed in light of the signed Discharge of Mortgage and acknowledgment of full payment would lead to mortgage discharges having no effect whatsoever – a result foreclosed by law, including the parol evidence rule.  Affirming the trial court’s ruling would allow any party to concoct claims that despite signing a discharge of mortgage stating the loan was paid in full, there remained outstanding amounts that were unpaid.  A higher burden is necessitated to avoid such obvious but crippling practical problems.  Thus, based on [...]’ admission that the $330,000 loan was paid in full, there can be no separate Third Loan.  As a result, the Complaint should be dismissed against Defendants for failure to comply with the statute of limitations.
[brief] (Pa19)  Chapter 92 provides as follows:  “43:15A-7.2  Ineligibility for PERS under professional services contract.  a.  A person who performs professional services for a political subdivision of this State or a board of education, or any agency, authority or instrumentality thereof, under a professional services contract awarded in accordance with section 5 of P.L.1971, c.198 (C.40A:11-5), N.J.S.18A:18A-5 or section 5 of P.L.1982, c.189 (C.18A:64A-25.5), on the basis of performance of the contract, shall not be eligible for membership in the Public Employees' Retirement System.  A person who is a member of the retirement system as of the effective date of P.L.2007, c.92 (C.43:15C-1 et al.) shall not accrue service credit on the basis of that performance following the expiration of an agreement or contract in effect on the effective date.  Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed as affecting the provisions of any agreement or contract in effect on the effective date of P.L.2007, c.92 (C.43:15C-1 et al.), whether or not the agreement or contract specifically provides by its terms for membership in the retirement system.  No renewal, extension, modification, or other agreement or action to continue any professional services contract in effect on the effective date of P.L.2007, c.92 (C.43:15C-1 et al.) beyond its current term shall have the effect of continuing the membership of a person in the retirement system or continuing the accrual of service credit on the basis of performance of the contract.  b.  A person who performs professional services for a political subdivision of this State or a board of education, or any agency, authority or instrumentality thereof, shall not be eligible, on the basis of performance of those professional services, for membership in the Public Employees' Retirement System, if the person meets the definition of independent contractor as set forth in regulation or policy of the federal Internal Revenue Service for the purposes of the Internal Revenue Code.  Such a person who is a member of the retirement system on the effective date of P.L.2007, c.92 (C.43:15C-1 et al.) shall not accrue service credit on the basis of that performance following the expiration of an agreement or contract in effect on the effective date.  Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed as affecting the provisions of any agreement or contract of employment in effect on the effective date of P.L.2007, c.92 (C.43:15C-1 et al.), whether or not the agreement or contract specifically provides by its terms for membership in the retirement system.  No renewal, extension, modification, or other agreement or action to continue any such agreement or contract in effect on the effective date of P.L.2007, c.92 (C.43:15C-1 et al.) beyond its current term shall have the effect of continuing the membership of a person in the retirement system or continuing the accrual of service credit on the basis of performance of the agreement or contract. ”
[brief] 108, 114-115 (1972) ......................... | 12 | | Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) .................................................... | 23 | | Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) .................................................... | 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 95, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109 | | Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) .................................................... | 20, 23, 25 | | Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) .............................................. | 88 | | Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) ....................................................... | 19 | | Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) ....................................................... | 88 | | Silagy v. State, 101 N.J. Super. 455 (App. Div. 1968) .................................. | 26 | | Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984) ......................................................... | 23, 25 | | State in the Interest of A.A., 455 N.J. Super. 492 (App. Div. 2018)  ............... | 13, 17 | | State in the Interest of A.A. 240 N.J. 341 (2020)  ........................................ | 17 | | State in re A.S. 203 N.J. 131 (2010)  .......................................................... | 12, 13, 16, 18 | | State v. A.G.D, 178 N.J. 56 (2003)  ............................................................. | 12 |  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The Appellant also attempted to introduce a [...] Ad into evidence which purportedly showed the dimensions of a cinder block.  The Appellant sought to use the size of a [...] cinder block, which may or may not have been used in the actual construction of [...]’s building, to prove the [...]’s constructed parapet was taller than that shown on the irrelevant Sketch.  Moreover, the height of only the parapet fails to provide any evidence of the building height because the parapet is not included in the calculation of building heights in the [...].  As the parapet is not included in the building height, the cinder block dimensions were irrelevant to the issue of the building height.
[brief] “But there is a general agreement that the distribution of water by a municipality to its inhabitants for domestic and commercial uses is a private or proprietary function which in its exercise is subject to the rules applicable to private corporations.  This is the rule in New Jersey. ”  *Ford Motor Company v. Kearny*, 103 A. 254, 91 N.J.L. 671 (1918) explains:  The sale to a consumer of water by measure at a fixed price per thousand cubic feet, is obviously not a tax dependent in amount in any way either upon the true value of the property which he occupied or upon any special benefit to that property.  Such a consumer might be a banker occupying a property worth a hundred thousand dollars, but using only fifty dollars' worth of natural water a year; or he might be a bottler or a milkman in a twenty-foot store (with a basement), in the same block, which was worth only a thousand dollars, but using a thousand dollars' worth of water per annum.  The lien given by the statute, therefore, in case of water sold by measure, must derive its vitality from the sale itself, as such; that is, from contract.  Whatever the purchaser of the water had authority, express or implied, to bind by his contract, to that the lien under the statute will attach.  Further than that it cannot go.  Historically, municipalities’ power to contract to supply water derives from statute.
[brief] NOT A SINGLE NEW JERSEY CASE CITED BY DEFENDANT HAS UPHELD THE UIM DEFINITIONAL EXCLUSION INVOKED HERE AS APPLIED TO AN EXCESS/UMBRELLA POLICY BY VIRTUE OF A “FOLLOW FORM”  CLAUSE BECAUSE SUCH CONSTRAINED INSURANCE POLICY LANGUAGE AND INTERPRETATION IS AMBIGUOUS AND DOES NOT COMPORT WITH THE INSUREDS’ REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF COVERAGE.  Defendant next contends that plaintiffs have a “fundamental misunderstanding of underinsured motorist coverage. ”  Db27.  Respectfully, plaintiffs are well aware as to the dynamics of underinsured motorist coverage and what UIM coverage is supposed to provide – namely, gap protection for an insured where the tortfeasor’s liability limits fall below the UIM coverage limits that the insured has purchased.  Here, defendant [...] has denied liability coverage for the defendant-tortfeasor driver, which would have provided $5,000,000 in liability coverage to the tortfeasor.  Instead, [...] asserts that the only liability coverage available to the tortfeasor is the $500,000 underlying liability limits provided by the [...] policy.  Although plaintiffs dispute defendant [...]’s position on liability coverage, assuming defendant is correct and the defendant-tortfeasor’s liability coverage is limited to the $500,000 provided by the underlying [...] policy, then these limits fall well below the $1,000,000 in UIM coverage purchased by plaintiffs from [...].  As a starting point, using defendant’s own analysis, see Db27-28, the defendant-tortfeasor driver is underinsured vis-a-vie the [...] UIM coverage purchased by plaintiffs since his liability limits ($500,000) are significantly less than the UIM coverage ($1,000,000).  The “gap filler” function of UIM coverage comes into play to bridge the $500,000 gap between the tortfeasor’s liability coverage limits with [...] and the UIM coverage purchased by plaintiffs from [...].  The issue then becomes whether [...] can pirate a definitional exclusion in the [...] policy to eliminate its UIM coverage obligations under the [...] policy, or whether doing so is contrived and ambiguous when applied to the facts of this specific case.
[brief] *Wissell, supra*, 68 N.J. at 40.  The Governor agreed that the legislation would “make uniform the legal requirements for all entities and agencies having the power to condemn” and which “would increase protection to the citizen whose property is condemned. ”  *Id.*  Among the proposals, the Governor recommended that “this act shall apply to every agency, authority, company, utility or any other entity having the power of eminent domain exercisable within the State of New Jersey. ”  *Id.* at 41.  It was the result of these cumulative actions by the government that led to the passage and adoption of the language in the Eminent Domain Act.  The Eminent Domain Act provides uniform procedures to be applied to ensure that Constitutional requisites are met and to “increase protection to the citizen whose property is condemned.
[brief] First, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain a count for “aiding and abetting a breach of contract” – it merely alleges this as a basis for its breach of contract claim.  (Pa12, ¶51; Pa15, ¶72; Pa18, ¶87).  Second a cause of action for “aiding and abetting” a breach of contract has never been recognized in New Jersey, as evidenced by Plaintiff’s failure to cite any cases suggesting as much.
[brief] Examining the pre-Witt standard for the automobile exception—which had the additional requirement of exigency—the Witt Court “expressed concerns about the dangers to police officers and a car’s driver and occupants resulting from extended stops ‘on the sides of heavily-traveled highways and roads’ as an officer ‘engage[s] in seeking a telephonic warrant. ’”  223 N.J. at 435 (quoting the Report of the Supreme Court Special Committee on Telephonic and Electronic Search Warrants 17 (2010)).  Citing news reports of “cars and trucks crashing into police officers . . . positioned on the shoulders of our highways,” the Court noted that “[p]rolonged encounters on the shoulder of a crowded highway—even within the range of 30 to 45 minutes—may pose an unacceptable risk of serious bodily injury and death. ”  Id. at 441-42.  The Court was also concerned with whether the exigency requirement was workable:  “For a law enforcement officer responding to rapidly evolving events on the side of a road, the exigency formula requires the processing of such confounding and speculative information that we cannot expect uniform and consistent decision-making. ”  Id. at 444 (emphasis added).  These concerns led the Witt court to abandon the exigency requirement.  Id. at 414-15.  After the Witt Court jettisoned exigency, the Court adopted the “unforeseeable and spontaneous” requirement under Article I, Paragraph 7 of our State Constitution.
[brief] While driving down East 16th Street, [...] observed what he believed to be a garbage bag lying in the middle of the snow-covered road before realizing that it was a body, later identified as [...]’s.  (4T:82-12 to 18; see 3T:9-13 to 10-3).  An autopsy revealed that the cause of [...]’s death was multiple gunshot wounds.  (4T:55-19 to 22)  [...] was first shot within inches of his face, then once in his chest, and finally twice in his back.  (4T:49-21 to 54-8).  Unable to render aid, [...] called for a unit to assist in setting up a roadblock then immediately searched the vicinity for “any kind of shell casings or camera surveillance.
[brief] Plaintiff, [...], relies on the Facts and Procedural History set forth in his Opening Brief at Pb3-14, and supplements that, as follows.  On March 2, 2022 counsel for Defendants, [...] and [...], issued correspondence to the Court requesting permission to submit to the Court (as part of the Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment), the Lease entered into between Plaintiff and the immediately prior tenant at the leased premises.  KVDb001.  In response, thereto, counsel for Plaintiff, [...], filed correspondence with the Court opposing the request of Defendants and attaching a document that was part of the Lease with the prior tenant.  Copies are attached in Plaintiff’s Reply Appendix at Pra1.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] “Suppression of evidence ... has always been our last resort, not our first impulse. ”  *State v. Presley*, 436 N.J. Super 440, 459, 94 A.3d 921 (app. Div. 2014) (quoting *State v. Gioe*, 401 N.J. Super. 331, 339.950 A.2d 930 (App. Div. 2008))  We apply the exclusionary rule when the benefits of deterrence outweigh its substantial costs.
[brief] The requirement of "due diligence" exists both before and after the filing of the initial complaint.  Mears v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 300 N.J. Super. 622 (App. Div. 1997)  There is absolutely nothing in any of the foregoing case law that supports [...]’s ruling.  In fact, *Cardona*, *supra.*, mandated that the motion for summary judgment be granted.
[directive] The complainant should also be advised that if they have fear or concerns about making the complaint directly to the agency, they may instead file a complaint with the County Prosecutor or the Attorney General’s Office.  5.1.11  All complaints should be investigated if the complaint contains sufficient factual information to warrant an investigation.  In cases where the officer’s identity is unknown, the internal affairs investigator should use all available means to determine proper identification.  Where civil litigation has been filed and the complainant is a party to or a principal witness in the litigation, the internal affairs investigator shall consult with legal counsel to determine whether an investigation is appropriate or warranted.
[brief] Section 1322(b)(5) was intended to codify the practice under which foreclosure was enjoined during the pendency of a Chapter XIII, with the debtor given a reasonable time to cure defaults. ”  In re Placidi, No. 5:07-bk-51657 R, 2008 WL 474239, at *2 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2008) (quoting In re Hoggle, 12 F.3d 1008, 1110 (11th Cir.1994)).  The court acknowledges that Sections 1322 and 1325 only allow a debtor to cure tax or mortgage arrearages prior to the foreclosure sale.  Nevertheless, this statutory language demonstrates Congress’s commitment the importance of offering a debtor every opportunity to save a residence through the bankruptcy process.  The court is not swayed by [...]’s arguments regarding finality because the Bankruptcy Code and a plethora of cases demonstrate that bankruptcy courts are empowered to void property transfers effected by state tax sale foreclosures and state court proceedings.
[brief] Da362; Da495, and there is no allegation that they were not properly served.  the course of that discussion, [...] had the opportunity to voice his reasons why he felt the motions were not frivolous.  See, e.g., 8T112:16-113:5.  Nor is there any dispute as to the amount sought, as the Defendants did not voice any objection to the amount with the trial court and have not raised it here.  For all intents and purposes, the court handled the matter in the same way it would have on motion.
[directive] This disclosure requirement does not apply when the agency responsible for sharing internal affairs files is unable to do so because the information is clearly subject to a non- INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022  62 disparagement or non-disclosure agreement.  Such agreements must be followed even though they inhibit the ability of law enforcement agencies to fully evaluate candidates applying for positions of public trust, and therefore have the potential to compromise public safety.  Given the public safety risks that such agreements pose, county and municipal governing entities and their counsel are strongly discouraged from entering into them.
[directive] Three Regional Coordinator Teams.  Each will be comprised of four individuals: an Assistant United States Attorney, a deputy attorney general, an assistant prosecutor from one of the CPOs in the relevant geographic region, and a superior officer from the regional intelligence unit of the New Jersey State Police.  These four individuals will work as one cohesive team physically based out of the Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) for their relevant geographic region, utilizing real-time crime data and human intelligence gathered through the intelligence network also created by this directive, to develop investigative and prosecutorial strategies to suppress the violent criminal activity they identify.  The regional teams shall be organized as follows:  3  1.  The North Region will operate out of the RTCC in Newark and include Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Morris, Passaic, Sussex, Union, and Warren counties.  2.  The Central Region will operate out of the RTCC in Trenton and include Burlington, Hunterdon, Mercer, Middlesex, Monmouth, Ocean, and Somerset counties.  3.  The South Region will operate out of the RTCC in Gloucester County and include Atlantic, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester, and Salem counties.  C.
[brief] JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS OWED THE PLAINTIFF  AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO PROVIDE HER WITH A REASONABLY SAFE PREMISES AND THE INFERENCE OF FACT WEIGHED IN THE PLAINTIFF’S FAVOR WOULD ALLOW A JURY TO FIND THAT THE DEFENDANTS BREACHED THAT DUTY (Pa40-Pa41; Pa44-Pa48; 1T5:21-13:18).
[brief] The Ricci Act in relevant part permitted active or retired members of the SPRS to file for a recalculation of Ordinary Disability, Service, or Special Retirement Benefits to Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits provided they participated in the rescue, recovery, or cleanup operations at the World Trade Center Site.  (Pa10).  The Ricci Act also created a presumption that the disability of the member or retiree “occurred during and as a result of the performance of the member’s regular or assigned duties and not the result of the member’s willful negligence unless the contrary can be proved by competent evidence. ” (Pa10).  On August 7, 2019, the [...] added information about the Ricci Act to its website.  (Pa10).  The webpage included information for active members, retirees, and employers about qualifying dates, locations, health conditions and impairments, the Eligibility Registration Form, the Request for Amended Benefits Form, a sample postcard to be mailed to retirees, and materials for employers regarding dissemination of information to employees.  (Pa10-11).  On August 8, 2019, the Division sent a letter to the members of the retirement system as of the effective date of L. 1985, c. 175 regardless of their years of service.  A Special Retirement provides enhanced benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 53:5A-27 and is available to any SPRS member who has established twenty-five years of creditable service.