ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Forfeiture is a remedy that seeks to take unlawfully obtained proceeds of criminal activity and to take instrumentalities used to aid in criminal activities.  In the case of proceeds, the limit of the forfeiture remedy is defined by the prosecuting agency's ability to prove the nexus between instrumentalities, the degree to which the instrumentality is employed in any criminal transaction or enterprise, the importance of the instrumentality to accomplishing the illegal end and the nature and seriousness of the illegal activities should all be evaluated in determining whether the forfeiture remedy should be employed to its full limit.  (4)
[brief] The evidence of discrimination against Appellant is evident in the fact that there were a number of Caucasian teachers who engaged in making discriminatory statements to the students of color and [...] appeared to protect these educators.  [...] taught a class that consisted of Mexican students and she stated to her class that she was glad that Trump was building a wall.  This statement was discriminatory based on race and also served to terrorize students with undocumented parents as students feared returning home to find that their parents had been taken into custody by ICE.  [...] taught a class of mainly African-American students and made discriminatory statements.  [...] said to these students, where do you think you are at, in the jungle?  This statement was offensive to the African-American students and Caucasian classmates and [...] was reported to the Appellant, her supervisor by African-American and Caucasian students.  The Appellant disciplined [...] for this discriminatory statement.  [...] engaged in the use of the N word in her class with students in January of 2019 and was written up by her supervisor, [...].  There was a video of [...] engaging in use of the N word in January of 2019 because, the students in her class recorded her.  [...] engaged in the use of the N word again in May of 2019 which was recorded by the students and this repeat use of a racial slur was brought to the attention of teacher [...].  [...] accompanied the students to Appellant’s office and this use of the racial slur was reported to Appellant and [...].  The behavior of [...] was reported by [...] and Appellant to [...], Superintendent of Human Resources.  The video recording from May 2, 2019 was provided to [...], with a letter.  [...] did not address this discriminatory behavior which served to create a hostile school environment.  The letter and video were sent to [...] by [...] on May 2, 2019.  On the date of May 9, 2019, [...] and Appellant were given Notices of Non-Renewal of their contracts.
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum A | December 2020  CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  6  Unauthorized Uses of CEDs  6.1  The following uses of CEDs are prohibited:  (a)  A CED shall not be used or threatened to be used to retaliate for any past conduct or to impose punishment; (b)  A CED shall not be used against a person who is a passive resistor or an active resistor; (c)  A CED shall not be fired or discharged for the sole purpose of preventing a person from committing property damage; (d) A CED shall not be deployed against the operator of a moving vehicle unless the use of deadly force against the operator of the motor vehicle would be authorized; and (e)  Two or more CEDs shall not be discharged upon a person at the same time.  8
[brief] The ID refers to this section three times, Ha66, Ha83, (twice) and Ha92, and the [...] Decision twice, Ha45, Ha55, but neither *ever* includes the underscored language.  Moreover, *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-19 sets forth a process by which a petitioning utility must engage in a searching consideration of alternatives.  The EMP simply overlays those subjects in fulfillment of the state's energy and climate policies.  In *In Re Public Service Electric and Gas Company*, 35 N.J. 358, 377 (1961), our Supreme Court stated held that "[a]lternative sites or methods and their comparative advantages and disadvantages to all interests involved, including cost, must be considered in determining such reasonable necessity."  This means that this court and the [...] must consider "alternative sites," "alternative methods," the "comparative advantages and disadvantages" and the "costs" of the proposed regulator as compared to any feasible alternative, including doing nothing.  The EMP now mandates that an "alternative method[]" involving natural gas infrastructure must include doing nothing.  These petitions seek an increase in natural gas infrastructure and creation of a potentially stranded asset, contrary to the state's energy and climate policy.  [...] has not ever tried to assess the impact of the EMP on this proposal, in plain violation of the commands of *In re Public Service*, 35 N.J. at 377, and *In Re Monmouth Consolidated Water Co.*, 47 N.J. 251, 259-260 (1966).  While the company doesn't come right out and say this, the only conclusion that follows from this is that [...] is free to just ignore the EMP unless and until it is specifically ordered to actually do something.  The obvious response to this claim is that in this proceeding, it can and should be ordered to do something, in implementation of the EMP: the petitions should be denied, and [...] should continue the existing regulator arrangement, which is safe, reliable, efficient, has a long useful life and ample safeguards and has no climate change impacts at all.
[brief] (Ca142).  [...] pointed out in his letter brief that the landlord did nothing to stop its operation.  He was required by the fire inspector to correct violations on the property prior to his appointment.  The fire company came to the site on numerous occasions while issues were being resolved.  In addition, some of the assets had to be replaced or repaired, including cost of food.  (Ca142).  Also, [...] noted in his letter brief that the landlord was well aware of the assets of the operation, including real estate, which were all sold in bulk during the sheriff’s sale.  Nothing stopped the creditor from seeking information during that period of time, but nothing was done for a year and a half, after the sale of the property.
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellants’ premise is that the Open Public Records Act (N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, et. seq.) requires records custodians to obtain email logs of privately-owned email accounts being used to conduct government business.  This must be true.  Otherwise OPRA and all of New Jersey’s long-held commands for open government will be reduced to ashes.  "OPRA provides for ready access to government records by the citizens of this State."  Burnett v. Cty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 421-22 (2009)(citing Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 64-65(2008)).  The purpose of OPRA “is to maximize public knowledge about public affairs in order to ensure an informed citizenry and to minimize the evils inherent in a secluded process. ”  Times of Trenton Publ'g Corp. v. Lafayette Yard Cmty. Dev. Corp., 183 N.J. 519, 535 (2005) (quoting Asbury Park Press v. Ocean Cty. Pros. Off., 374 N.J. Super. 312, 329(Law Div. 2004))  Accordingly, OPRA directs that "all government records shall be subject to public access unless exempt," and "any limitations on the right of access...shall be construed in favor of the public's right of access."
[brief] [...], Plaintiff, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], AND [...], Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  Appellate Docket No. [...]  Submission Date: August 29, 2024  On Appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division: Bergen County  Sat Below: Hon. [...]  Trial Court  Docket No. [...]  OPENING  BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS
[brief] Said another way, parental notification disparately impacts those students who have not already shared this information with their parents—overwhelmingly LGBTQ+ students.  The court did not abuse its discretion in finding this evidence sufficed to show the Revised Policy would subject students to a disparate impact under the LAD.  The Revised Policy’s carve-out for situations where “a staff member or administrator reasonably believes that notification … will place the student at risk of abuse or neglect as defined by N.J.S.A. § 9:6-1” does not cure these fatal flaws.  (Da110).  Most obviously, N.J.S.A. 9:6-1 sets a high bar for finding “abuse” or “neglect,” but the forced outing of all students’ sexual orientation or gender identity or expression still disproportionately impacts LGBTQ+ students even in cases where it does not lead to physical abuse or neglect.  Furthermore, even where the school staff believes parental notification creates a risk of abuse or neglect, the Revised Policy still instructs staff to “immediately notify[] the [...], Institutional Abuse, ([...]), [...] ([...]), and/or the [...],” rather than simply calling on staff not to make any notifications at all.  (Da110).  But the blanket demand for notifications to [...], [...], and the police (even where no incident has arisen, because the parents are not in fact informed of this information) will subject LGBTQ+ students to greater privacy intrusions than their otherwise similarly situated peers.  Finally, Appellants’ response that “non-LGBTQ+ students are equally subject to parental notification” under the Revised Policy, (Db19), misconstrues the disparate impact framework.  The State need not show that a policy applies only to a protected class, (Db18-19), but rather that it “fall[s] more harshly on one group than another. ”  Peper, 77 N.J. at 81.  That the parents of non-LGBTQ+ students may at times receive notifications under the Revised Policy simply does not change the disproportionate impacts that notification will have on LGBTQ+ students, where that notification would out a student to their parents over the student’s explicit objections.  Thus, the Original and Revised Policies will have a predictable and disparate impact on LGBTQ+ students relative to their peers—a direct violation of the LAD.
[brief] 16  POINT I  PETITIONER’S EFFECTIVE SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT FOR KIDNAPPING AND RELATED CRIMES WHERE THE VICTIMS WERE PHYSICALLY UNHARMED IS UNFAIRLY DISPARATE TO HIS EQUALLY CULPABLE CO- DEFENDANTS, WHO RECEIVED A MAXIMUM OF FIVE YEARS............................................................................................  16  A.  The PCR Court Wrongly Determined That Petitioner’s Claim of Disparate Sentencing Was Procedurally Barred, Since a Disparate Sentencing Claim Qualifies As a Sentence Not Authorized By Law And Is Thus Cognizable Pursuant to R. 3:22-2c (21T14-1 to 17).....................................................................................................  16  B.  The 65 Year Disparity Between Petitioner And His Equally Culpable Co-Defendants Warrants A Remand For An Evidentiary Hearing Pursuant To State V. Roach To Determine If The Sentence Is Unfairly Disparate (21T14-17 to 25).........................  20 POINT II TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO ADVOCATE FOR PETITIONER AT SENTENCING BY FAILING TO ARGUE AGAINST THE STATE’S REQUEST FOR AN EFFECTIVE LIFE SENTENCE AND FAILING TO OFFER RELEVANT MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES (21T18-11 to 25)........................................... 25 Introduction – Standard For Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel And Evidentiary Hearing.................................................. 25 A. Defense Counsel Was Ineffective By Failing To Submit A Memorandum Prior To The Sentencing Hearing In Order To Refute The State’s, Which Presented Strong Victim Impact Evidence And Requested A Life Sentence; Counsel’s Silence Allowed The State To Set The Narrative For The Initial Sentencing As Well As The Re-Sentencing Upon Remand..................... 27 B. Defense Counsel Was Ineffective At The Sentencing Hearing By Failing To Present Relevant Mitigating Circumstances As To Petitioner’s Background And By Failing To Argue Against The State’s Request For An Effective Life Sentence...................... 31 POINT III PETITIONER RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR FAILING TO CALL AN AVAILABLE WITNESS CRITICAL TO HIS DEFENSE; SINCE THIS WITNESS WOULD CONTRADICT A STATE WITNESS CLAIMING PETITIONER COMMITTED THE CRIMES, THERE WAS NO LEGITIMATE STRATEGIC REASON FOR FAILING TO CALL THIS WITNESS(21T15-3 to 17-28; Da 256)...........................................
[brief] In fact, in addition to litigation being filed against the Board as a result of the Facebook post that makes up Count 1, the Board passed a Resolution in response to Respondent’s anti-union post, which stated in relevant part:  NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED by the [...] that the Board disavows any statements posted or attributed by an individual that is contrary to the [...].  (Ca137).  At its very next meeting, ten days later, on March 17, 2022, the Board adopted another Resolution addressing Respondent’s Facebook posts, stating specifically:  WHEREAS, the Board finds it necessary and appropriate to adopt a social media policy for Board Members to ensure that the District has policy in place addressing the use of social media by individual Board Members; it is NOW, THEREFORE RESOLVED, that the [...] hereby adopts District Policy No. 0179 on an emergency basis, to be effective immediately upon adoption, and it is BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that, in accordance with District Policy, the Board formally requests Board Members [...] and [...] immediately remove the aforementioned social media posts.
[brief] A. Rent Control- General Applicability  Every “building or structure or trailer or land used as a trailer park, rented or offered for rent to one or more tenants or family units” is subject to rent control in Hoboken, with exceptions for motels, hotels, and dorms.  §§115-3, 115-4, and 155-2 of Hoboken Rent Control Ordinance (“RCO”) (DA29-30, DA25).  Under Hoboken’s Rent Control Ordinance, rents were delinked from the local real estate market and linked to the Consumer Price Index instead.  §155-3 (DA29).  Rents can be raised 25% over the last rent once every three years if the previous tenant left voluntarily (without duress, intimidation, or unreasonable pressure).  §§155-31, 155-32 (DA32).  B.
[brief] Even if Plaintiff could establish an adverse employment action (and she could not), she certainly did not establish a causal connection between the 2016 lawsuit and any claim of adversity.  Plaintiff complained that (i) [...] failed to respond to an email in 2018, (ii) failed to stop by and say hello to Plaintiff in March of 2021, and (iii) the [...] issued a “disciplinary” letter to her in November of 2020.  She claims this is all in retaliation for the filing of her first lawsuit in June of 2016.
[brief] B.  The Trial Court Appropriately Found The Fees And Costs Incurred By [...] In The Defense Of This Case Are Reasonable.  In a fee shifting case, the prevailing standard is that an allowance will be made for reasonable fees.  See Kellam Assocs., Inc. v. Angel Projects, LLC, 357 N.J. Super. 1332, 142 (App. Div. 2003).  The determination for reasonableness requires consideration of the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved, the skill required to deal with such issues, the amount involved, the fees customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services, and the like.  See RPC 1.5(a).  In this case, the trial court correctly determined that Respondents’ attorney’s fees were reasonable.  2T36-39 (Tr. dated October 12, 2023, pp. 36-39).  Appellant did not assert at the trial level that Respondent’s attorneys’ fees and costs were unreasonable and therefore did not preserve his ability to raise this issue on appeal.  Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)(quoting Reynolds Offset Co. v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 1959)).  Since Appellant has not, and cannot, refute the trial judge’s sound basis for determining Respondents’ attorneys’ fees were reasonable, this Court should affirm the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees and costs.
[brief] The Final Decision is the latest of many such iterations.  \textsuperscript{12}The New Jersey Supreme Court has made explicit many times that T&E funding must be assured, certain, predictable, non-discretionary and timely to enable effective educational planning.  Advance state aid loans meet none of those criteria, and, as repayable loans, they are not even “funding. ”  Beyond that, New Jersey courts, and a sister court in another state with a T&E constitutional clause, have found that excessive reliance on forced loans is itself a violation of T&E.  In a New Jersey case, the Appellate Division found that “Excessive debt burden…would result in a condition inconsistent with the ‘thorough and efficient system of free public schools…’ which the State is obligated to maintain and support. ”  \textit{In re Pet. For Auth. To Conduct}, 298 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App.Div. 1997).  In a school funding decision similar to \textit{Abbott}, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that although “some type of borrowing provision may be necessary to provide funds in the case of extreme emergencies or unexpected calamities,…any system that entails borrowing from future funds to meet ordinary expenses is not a thorough and efficient system….  [A] school district can get into a spiral where it is continually borrowing and paying back the following year.  A school district, therefore, is always taking away from the future.  Any time a school district does such borrowing into the future, it robs future generations of children. ”  \textit{DeRolph v. Ohio}, 89 Ohio St. 3d 1, 26 (2000); \textit{De Rolph v. Ohio}, 78 Ohio St. 3d 193, 222 (1997).  POINT IV
[brief] **Case laws:** | | | Repko v. Our Lady of Lourdes Med. Ctr., | 1 | | 464 N.J. Super. 570 (App. Div. 2020) | | | Balliet v. Fennell, | 11,17 | | 368 N.J. Super. 15, 845 A.2d 168 (App. Div. | | | 2004) | | | Kasharian v. Wilentz, | 19,20 | | 93 N.J. Super. 479, 482 (App. Div. 1967) | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  On May 28, 2021, plaintiff pro se filed a complaint with the [...] and amended the complaint on August 16, 2021.
[brief] Appellant would emphasize that none of this evidence can be used to definitively demonstrate the actual amount by which the height of the façade in question exceeded the one-foot limitation.  This was not Appellant’s goal in submitting it.  Rather, it was to demonstrate that “probable cause” existed that a substantial violation had occurred so that the Court could order a responsible party – such as the [...], whose statutory duty it is to investigate alleged violations of the Section 196-62 of the Municipal Code of the City of Hoboken – to take actual measurements, rather than the previously mentioned “sham” measurements in order to make a definitive determination.
[brief] Not satisfied with the receipt of lifetime workers’ compensation death benefits, [...] and the Estate now want additional money damages from the defendants in this civil action.  [...] ([...]) certified that both the decedent and [...] were “employed by [...] Hospitals Corporation d/b/a Bayshore Medical Center on October 6, 2021. ”  Further, the payroll statements for the decedent and [...] both list “[...] Hospitals Corporation” as their employer.  [...] certified that, at the time of the accident, “[...] and Jennifer [...] were employed by the same employer entity group. ”  The decedent’s estate filed a workers’ compensation Claim Petition against [...].  In its answer to the Claim Petition, [...] admitted that the decedent’s parking lot accident “arose out of and in the course of employment. ”  As noted above, [...] is also paying workers’ compensation Dependency Benefits to the decedent’s spouse.  [...] has not disputed or objected to the decedent’s estate’s claim that the decedent was killed during the course of her employment in the employer’s parking lot as she was walking to the hospital building.  The trial Court, as a matter of law, properly granted [...]’s summary judgment motion based on [...]’s co-employee (fellow-servant) immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Act.  The decedent and [...] were co-employees at the time of the accident, and the accident occurred during the course of their respective employment.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] But the “prima facie invalidity of any warrantless search is overcome only if that search falls within one of the specific exceptions” recognized by the courts, and the courts will not validate a search where the exigency claimed by the police was self-created by their own conduct.  One such exigency, the so-called “automobile exception” to the warrant clause was first set forth by the Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
[brief] ”  *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv’rs Ins. Co.*, 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974) quoting *Greenfield v. Dusseault*, 60 N.J. Super. 436, 444 (App. Div. 1960), aff’d o.b. 33 N.J. 78 (1960).  “Substantial evidence has been defined alternately as ‘such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,’ and ‘evidence furnishing a reasonable basis for the agency's action. ’”  *Blanchard v. N.J. Dep't of Corr.*, 461 N.J. Super. 231, 238 (App. Div. 2019) quoting *Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr.*, 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 2010) (citations omitted).  As the Court held in *In re Carter*, 191 N.J. 474, 482 (2007), appellate review is limited to: (1) whether the agency’s action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[brief] On November 29, 2016, [...] pled guilty to first-degree robbery of the [...], reserving his right to appeal several evidentiary rulings, including the denial of his motion to suppress based on the stop.  [...] also pled guilty to first-degree felony murder on an unrelated indictment\(^2\) and entered guilty pleas to three violations of probation.  On July 7, 2017, [...] was sentenced to a term of thirty years for the unrelated felony murder, with no possibility of parole, and a concurrent term of twelve years, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), for the armed --- \(^2\)  In February 2014, [...] was charged in a second indictment related to two offenses that occurred in Trenton on April 29, 2011 -- an attempted robbery of one pharmacy and the completed robbery of another pharmacy, during which the pharmacist was shot and killed. robbery of the [...].  For the probation violations, [...] was sentenced to five years.  [...] appealed, arguing, among other things, that the joint motion to suppress should have been granted in its entirety because the initial stop was not based on reasonable suspicion and, furthermore, that the plain view exception to the warrant requirement did not justify the officers’ entry into the vehicle.