ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In this case, the Amended Complaint did not set forth facts under which the [...] could have had any liability to Plaintiffs as non-clients.  Plaintiffs do not assert that the [...] ever represented them, nor that the [...] took any position or made any statement during discovery upon which Plaintiffs might have relied.  The [...] never provided Plaintiffs with counsel or an opinion letter of any kind.  Further, none of the case law Plaintiffs cite extends a duty to non-clients to the litigation setting.  See, Matter of Palmieri, 76 N.J. 51, 63 (1978) (attorney disciplinary matter concerning representation against former clients, not duty to non-party); R.J. Longo Const. Co. v. Schragger, 218 N.J. Super. 206, 207 (App. Div. 1987) (malpractice suit against municipal attorney over preparation of contract documents or failure to obtain right of ways, in connection with bidding for municipal contract); Albright v. Burns, 206 N.J. Super. 625, 629 (App. Div. 1986) (malpractice suit by estate beneficiaries against estate over improper handling of estate assets prior and after testator’s death); Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J. Super. 581, 584 (App. Div. 1976) (legal malpractice suit stemming from property sale)  Under the circumstances presented in this case, there is no basis to find that the [...] could owe a duty to Plaintiffs and, as such, no legal malpractice action is viable.
[brief] The Court Order further provided the Court at Trial would rule upon each such Exhibit.  (Da214)  The Court Order further stated:  3.  That the Court will accept as judicial notice any ordinances, laws, statutes, any testimony made under oath including in the parallel proceedings in Chancery Court, and any exhibits that may be referred to by reference in connection with the deliberation of the Zoning Board.  Premised on that Order, [...] submitted its Trial Brief, with additional documents to be considered at Trial, being marked Exhibits A to EEE (approximately 57 documents/exhibits) (Da174).  For inexplicable reasons, the Exhibits submitted only included some of the documents/exhibits actually presented to the Zoning Board; being the 1963 Agreement; (Da23); 1972 School Site Plan documents (Da13-22); 6/5/17 Transcript of [...]’s decision (Da29); 8/17/18  Transcript of [...] decision upholding Z.B. Resolution declining to interpret 1972 School Site Plan (Da82); [...] 8/23/2018 Supplemental Letter to Z.B. (Da8); Board Attorney [...]’s 9/17/2018 Letter (Da53); and Attorney [...]’s Opposition 10/9/2018 Letter (Da62).  For unknown reasons, [...] failed to include the following Exhibits that were before the Board and referenced in its Resolution: School Attorney 9/14/2018 Letter (Da49) School Attorney 9/19/2018 Letter (Da59); School Attorney 10/12/2018 Letter (Da68); the 1972 Site Plan Documents and historical site photographs (Da68-81).
[brief] \(^8\)  The [...] ([...]), the agency that regulates [...]'s facilities, rates, and types of service, subsequently granted [...]'s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity, finding [...]'s plan "to install 300 feet of 36-inch-diameter unit piping and 1,400 feet of 42-inch-diameter suction and discharge piping connecting the compressor station to [...]'s 300 Line" would "enable [...] to provide up to 115,000 [dekatherms] per day of firm transportation service, which constitutes 100% of the project's capacity, to [...]," which had demonstrated "that natural gas demand in its service territories is exceeding its available firm natural gas interstate pipeline capacity and that additional transportation capacity is needed to serve its As with any case in which we are called to interpret a statute, our "goal is to divine and effectuate the Legislature's intent."
[brief] G. THE APPELLANT WILL SUFFER IMMEDIATE AND IRREPARABLE UNFAIR PREJUDICE AS A RESULT OF UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDERS DISMISSING HER CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE CONCLUSION | Document | Pages | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Appellant’s Initial Complaint | 1a-7a | | Appellant’s Affidavit of Merit by [...], MD | 8a-11a | | [...], MD’s Curriculum Vitae | 12a-14a | | Appellant’s First Amended Complaint | 15a-20a | | Respondent [...], MD, PhD’s Answer to First Amended Complaint | 21a-28a | | Respondent [...]’s Answer to Amended Complaint | 29a-37a | | Appellant’s Affidavit of Merit by [...], MD | 38a-39a | | [...], MD’s Curriculum Vitae | 40a-53a | | Respondent [...], MD, PhD’s Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice | 54a-56a | | Respondent [...], MD’s Answer to First Amended Complaint | 57a-61a | | Respondent [...], MD’s Answer to First Amended Complaint | 62a-67a | | Respondent [...], MD’s Answer to Amended Complaint | 68a-76a | | Trial court Order, entered April 1, 2022, dismissing Appellant’s Complaint against Respondent [...], MD, PhD Without Prejudice | 77a | | Respondent [...], MD’s Motion for Dismissal With Prejudice | 78a-81a | Respondent [...], MD’s Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice 82a-86a
[brief] (Da 241).  On September 20, 2021, the [...] sent notice to the Trial Court advising that it filed a Notice of Appeal and requested a stay of the order reinstating [...].  (Da 23).  On September 23, 2021, the Trial Court denied the [...]’s request for a stay of its order.  (Da 26).  However, on October 29, 2021, the appellate court reversed that denial and granted the [...]’s motion for a stay pending appeal.  (Da 346).  On July 10, 2023, the appellate court reversed the Trial Court’s ruling and remanded for a ruling on the merits.  (Da 347).  In its ruling, the appellate court held that [...] was the holder of a public office.  (Da 355).  On December 1, 2023, [...] filed a motion for summary judgment.  On December 4, 2023, the [...] also filed a motion for summary judgment.  (Da 359-366).  The parties submitted reply/opposition briefs.  On January 5, 2024, the Trial Court granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment and denied the [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  (Da 372).  On January 15, 2024, the [...] filed a Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement appealing the Trial Court’s ruling.  (Da 367).
[brief] See also \textit{Leaman v. Wolfe}, 629 Fed. Appx. 280, 281 (3d Cir. 2015)(finding a disguised, unenforceable $100,000 penalty in a contract “providing for a series of 31 installment payments (amounting to $475,000 over the course of four years) plus an additional $100,000 to be ‘waived … and not … due and owing … [u]pon [payee’s] timely payment of the … [31] installments. ’”)  The “free rent” concession and chargeback provision at issue here, which [...] characterizes in its Complaint as “a rent concession credit…conditioned upon Defendant Tenants making all rent payments on time…” (Da2, ¶ 7), is obviously a disguised penalty “that purports to offer a discount for prompt performance” referenced in the Restatement.  \textsuperscript{11}  See \textit{Metlife}, 159 N.J. at 493 (Noting that “New Jersey adopted the Restatement method for evaluating stipulated damage clauses in \textit{Westmount Country Club v. Kameny}, 82 N.J.Super. 200 (App.Div.1964)”)  Finally, while there are no New Jersey cases directly on point, the handful of cases from other jurisdictions\(^{12}\) that have considered the question have unanimously held rent concession and discount chargeback provisions like [...]’s to be unlawful disguised penalty clauses.
[brief] [...] had organized parties for the host of the [...] event (11T 16-4 to 11), and was agreeable to including it with the Aries Ball saying, “Anything to bring in more people[.]”  (11T 16-15 to 17-2)  Like the other parties [...] had held at the [...], he expected the Ball to attract “hundreds of people[.]”  (11T 12-16 to 13-5)  [...] retained [...] to provide security for the evening.  (7T 77-22 to 25)  [...] and four of his staff searched everyone for weapons at the front door.  (6T 144-4 to 15; 7T 82-8 to 10, 83-24 to 84-21, 172-17 to 174-15, 182-10 to 12; 13T 57-11 to 17)  Partygoers then passed through a second door where they had to show a ticket or pay admission.  (7T 85-23 to 86-9; 9T 123-20 to 125-1; 13T 35-7 to 10)  [...] estimated that there were about 350-400 people in attendance (7T114-25 to 115-2); he noted that everyone attending the [...] party seemed to know each other (7T 89-24 to 90-2).  Sometime after 1:30 a.m., [...]’s staff notified him that there was a fight in the hall and that it might have started when people objected to one of the performers.
[directive] 2.2.2  The rules and regulations should identify general categories of misconduct or inappropriate behavior that are subject to disciplinary action.  An incident of misconduct or inappropriate behavior may fall into one or more of the following categories:  (a)  Crime.  Complaint regarding the commission of an illegal act that constitutes a violation of the criminal code including disorderly and petty disorderly persons offenses.  (b)  Excessive force.  Complaint regarding the use or threatened use of excessive force against a person.  (c)  Improper arrest.  Complaint that the restraint of a person's liberty was improper, unjust, or violated the person's civil rights.  (d)  Improper entry.  Complaint that entry into a building or onto property was improper or that excessive force was used against property to gain entry.  (e)  Improper search.  Complaint that the search of a person or property was improper, unjust, violated established agency procedures or violated the person's civil rights.  (f)  Differential treatment.  Complaint that the taking of police action, the failure to take police action or method of police action was predicated upon irrelevant factors such as race, appearance, age or sex.  (g)  Demeanor.  Complaint that an agency member's bearing, gestures, language or other actions were inappropriate.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 7
[brief] Id. at 424-25.  Clearly, the historical analysis, dating back well over three centuries of New Jersey jurisprudence, governing which statute of limitations are applicable to a particular cause of action reveals that the gravamen of the action—whether the tortious injury is considered “an injury to the person” or “an injury to the rights of another”—is the deciding factor.  Indeed, it is the New Jersey Supreme Court’s rationale in McGrogan that highlights the gravamen of a malicious prosecution claim, acknowledging the “holding that [the ‘gist[’] of malicious-prosecution action is injury to personal rights, not personal injuries, because [‘][s]ubsequent arrest and imprisonment are matters of damage but not necessary to be sustained in order to give right to the action of malicious prosecution.[’]”  McGrogan, 167 N.J. at 423, quoting Kearney v. Mallon Suburban Motors, Inc., 23 N.J. Misc. 83, 88 (Essex Cty. Ct. 1945).  In essence, for centuries, New Jersey jurisprudence has categorized a malicious prosecution claim, not as a personal injury claim but as an “injury to personal rights. ”  Id.  As such, malicious prosecution claims fall under the six-year statute of limitations governed by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.
[brief] In support of its motion the Bank submitted a certification dated 1/26/24 of its 10 year employee, [...], stating she had personal knowledge of [...]’s general business practice with respect to account opening and maintenance of deposit and checking accounts.  (Pa 26, Par. 3).  Attached were three exhibits which she stated were true and correct business records created and maintained by [...] in the course of regularly conducted business activity and as part of regular practice of [...] to create and maintain such records which were made at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence or event or within a reasonable time thereafter (Pa 26-27, Par. 4): Exhibit “A” - Account Application for checking account at issue; (Pa 29-37), Exhibit “B” - a copy of the [...] Deposit Agreement effective 7/25/23; (Pa 39-78) and Exhibit “C” - a copy of the 7/31/23, checking account statement of the Plaintiff (Pa 80-87) (Pa 27, Par. 6-8).
[brief] A PUBLIC OFFICIAL’S DISSEMINATION TO THE PUBLIC OF A VULGAR, PORNOGRAPHIC, MISOGYNISTIC VIDEO, IS VIOLATIVE OF THE HIGHER STANDARD OF CONDUCT EXPECTED OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS  VIA PRECEDENT AND STATUTE AND, THEREFORE, IS A VIOLATION OF N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c)  N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c) states, in part, “A member of a sewerage authority may be removed only by the governing body by which he was appointed and only for inefficiency or neglect of duty or misconduct in office.
[brief] (Aa71-75).  DEP provided background of the DEP’s permit decision, and explained that a third-party, like [...], must demonstrate either a statutory or a “particularized property interest” of constitutional significance.  (Aa72-73).  DEP found that CAFRA “does not grant statutory hearing rights to third party objectors,” and thus [...] did not identify “a statute entitling it to a hearing. ”  (Aa73).  DEP also found that [...]’s equal protection rights were not violated as [...] did not apply for this permit, so could not make an equal protection claim.  (Aa74).  Further, DEP explained that “speculative damages” to [...] or the public do not amount to particularized property interest.  Ibid.  DEP noted that [...] availed itself of its Administrative Procedure Act opportunity to submit public comments for DEP’s consideration.  Ibid.  Thus, DEP denied the hearing request.  Ibid.  This appeal of both [...]’s permit and DEP’s hearing request denial followed.
[brief] [...] also referenced the diagram of his own accord during his testimony at the December 2023 hearing—before [...] testified—which is inconsistent with any motive that [...] was trying to hide the diagram.  (5T37-6 to 38-7).  These circumstances are unlike this Court’s unpublished opinion, State v. D.A.B., No. A-1848-22 (App. Div. Sept. 19, 2023), that defendant relies on in his brief.  (Db19).  In D.A.B., the trial judge found that the prosecutor purposely misled defense counsel and withheld, during plea negotiations, that the victim had notified the State through her attorney, in writing, that she would not testify against defendant at trial if she were subpoenaed to do so.
[brief] Plaintiffs cite two cases as supportive of their argument that [...] erred in barring the substitution of [...].  Those cases, Tucci v. Tropicana Casino & Resort, Inc, 364 N.J. Super. 48 (App. Div. 2003), and Castello v. Wohler, 446 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 228 N.J. 39 (2016), involved circumstances that are wholly different from the present case.  In Tucci, the plaintiffs’ complaint was dismissed with prejudice after they failed to timely serve expert reports due to no fault of their own.  The Appellate Division reversed, particularly focusing on the late submission to plaintiffs of relevant records and the plaintiffs’ attorney’s preoccupation with his mother’s terminal illness and subsequent demise during the critical phase of discovery.  364 N.J. Super. At 51-52.  The court also observed its own history of having “been particularly indulgent” where, among other things, the report was “critical to the claim or defense...”  Id. at 52.  The present situation is different.
[brief] ...........................................  40 O’Hara v. Chambers, Pineland Reg. Bd. of Educ., No. C13-21 (SEC Aug. 30, 2021) .........................................................................................................................  36 Reilly v. AAA Mid-Atl. Ins. Co. of N.J., 194 N.J. 474 (2008) ..............................................  18 STATUTES N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24............................................................................................................. 10 N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1.......................................................................................................  30 N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) ................................................................................................. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 21, 37 N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f) ................................................................................................. 12, 14, 27, 37 N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g) ...............................................................................................  8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 32, 37  ADMINISTRATIVE CODE N.J.A.C. 6A:28-1.4............................................................................................................  18, 31 N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.4(a) .....................................................................................................  21 N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.4(a)(5) ...............................................................................................  22 N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.4(a)(6) ...............................................................................................  27 N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.4 (a)(7) ............................................................................................. 32, 35 N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.7 ........................................................................................................  20 N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.7(b) ...................................................................................................  20 N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.7(c) ...................................................................................................  20 N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.7(d) ...................................................................................................  20 N.J.A.C. 6A:28-8.3 ........................................................................................................  20, 37  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Petitioner [...] alleges that Respondents, [...] [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] violated the School Ethics Act through their actions pertaining to a referendum on the November 2, 2021 election ballot, which proposed a plan to improve two school buildings within the District.
[brief] THREE DEFENSE COUNSEL’S COMMENTS DURING CLOSING WERE ENTIRELY WITHIN THE BROAD LATITUDE AFFORDED COUNSEL, DID NOT RESULT IN A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE AND DO NOT WARRANT A NEW TRIAL.  (8T34:1-35:20)  Plaintiff claims that she is entitled to a new trial because counsel for the defendant made comments in closing arguments regarding the plaintiff’s absence from the trial, failure to testify live, the failure of the plaintiff to call her daughter to testify (Pb41-42), and that the plaintiff and her daughters and her counsel “fabricated the manner in which the plaintiff’s fall occurred and were attempting to deceive the jury and recover damages upon a fraudulent claim.
[brief] State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599, 610-11 (1994).  Therefore, the detectives’ commands that defendant step out of the car were legal.  Once defendant moved to the back of the vehicle, his actions of holding the safety vest near his waistband, then pressing his waist toward the vehicle – which he did prior to the pat-down – added to the totality of the circumstances and further heightened [...]’s reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous.  In fact, the body-worn camera reveals that before the pat-down started, [...] noted his strange behavior, directing the other detectives to “get over him, he’s like, acting weird, he’s like holding something near his waist. ”  Da26 at 2:30.  Again, defendant’s attempts to isolate this conduct into separate, innocuous actions, Db15-17, fails, as his argument ignores the totality of the circumstances.  Defendant has not and cannot establish that the trial court erred by finding that the totality of the circumstances, during the quickly unfolding events presented, supported a reasonable and articulable suspicion defendant was armed and dangerous.  Therefore, the frisk was justified under the circumstances.
[brief] This includes the footage leading up to the incident, along with any footage of the actual incident itself, the latter of which may have been captured had [...] further reviewed all recorded footage rather than relying upon [...] concluding on his own that no such footage existed.  Even assuming arguendo that [...]’s testimony that there was not a clear video that depicted the moment that [...] struck Plaintiff is entirely meritorious, [...] should have retained footage from all available cameras up to and including the time the incident occurred that calendar day.  [...]’s duty to preserve the surveillance footage arose when store personnel became aware of the incident, creating the probability of litigation, and the affirmative steps that store personnel took for no other purpose than the anticipation for litigation.  Specifically, [...] personnel exhibited the requisite knowledge of the likelihood of litigation by bringing Plaintiff into management’s office and even reviewing surveillance footage of [...] pushing his overloaded cart, and having her fill out and complete various forms, in addition to the various other [...] documentation that was completed by personnel at the time of the incident.
[brief] At 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a), the FDCPA mandates a debt collector’s liability for any actual damages, limited statutory damages, and attorney’s fees to a “person” when the debt collector violates “any provision […] with respect to that person. ”  Consequently, courts have generally enumerated four elements: (1) [the plaintiff] is a consumer, (2) the [defendant] is a debt collector, (3) the…challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a “debt” as the Act defines it, and (4) the [defendant] has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.  *Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel*, 446 N.J. Super. 537, 549 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting *Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing*, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 2014)).  The first three elements determine whether the FDCPA applies to the debt collector’s conduct and the last element determines whether that conduct violates the consumer’s statutory rights.
[brief] If [...] actually possessed [...]’ Sworn Statement (there is no indication that he did) and did not present an argument related to the substance of the Statement, [...] was ineffective.  Thus, if this Court finds that [...]’ Sworn Statement could have been discovered earlier through reasonable diligence by [...]’s counsel, [...]’s 3  Likewise, during the course of his “numerous appeals and PCR filings” (State Br. at 3), [...] was not aware that [...] was in possession of letters from [...] in which [...] expressed his willingness to provide an affidavit.  [...] only learned of these letters when he was given an opportunity to examine [...] about this issue during the 2021 evidentiary hearing.  Upon learning of the [...] letters, [...] subpoenaed [...]’ records, but [...] only produced one letter as he apparently did not preserve the others.  Had the State disclosed [...]’ Sworn Statement at the time of [...]’s trial, [...] would have been able to subpoena and request the [...] letters in advance of his trial.  Thus, the State’s failure to disclose [...]’ Sworn Statement directly resulted in the failure of [...] to preserve the [...] letters.  constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was compromised, necessitating a new trial.