ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] County Prosecutors should conduct reviews of agencies with concerning patterns, as well as instituting a process for random reviews of the internal affairs functions of agencies in their jurisdiction.  For instance, a County Prosecutor might direct a randomly selected agency to share all internal affairs files for cases that were closed in the previous quarter, so that the prosecutor can ascertain whether the internal affairs guidelines are being rigorously observed both in the procedures being employed and in the substance of the results.  Likewise, if excessive force complaints are never sustained by an agency, the County Prosecutor may elect to review the body worn camera footage of force incidents to make an independent assessment.  Even if the County Prosecutor’s Office finds that there have been no substantive errors in an agency’s dispositions or disciplinary decisions, periodic reviews might uncover procedural deficiencies that, if allowed to continue, might 65  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 result in serious errors in the future.
[brief] Plaintiff initiated a lawsuit on April 16, 2021, after she was injured when a bus she was lawfully aboard suddenly came to an abrupt and violent stop, without any emergency present or even suspected, causing her to fall on her back and strike her head on the floor of the bus.  (1a)  In response to being served with the summons and Complaint, Defendant [...] (the “Defendant”) filed an answer on July 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 2021, and the litigation thereafter proceeded through discovery.
[brief] (1T 4:1-22).  Accordingly, on February 15, 2023, Judge [...] entered an order granting the State Defendants’ motion in its entirety and dismissed them --- 6  “1T” refers to the transcript of the February 15, 2023 oral opinion of the Judge [...], A.J.S.C. on the State Defendants’ dismissal motion, “2T” refers to the transcript of the April 14, 2023 oral argument and oral opinion of the Judge [...], A.J.S.C. on [...]’s motion for reconsideration, and “3T” refers to the transcript of the December 1, 2023 oral argument before the Judge [...], J.S.C. with prejudice.  (Pa65-Pa66).  He did not rule on the State Defendants’ immunity arguments.  Ibid.  Instead, the trial court found that [...]’s common-law tort claims, including the libel and slander claims, accrued, at the latest, on October 17, 2018.  (1T 15:19-24).  Because [...] failed to file a notice of claim within ninety days of that date, the trial court found he failed to comply with the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:8-1 to -11 and could not pursue the state law claims alleged in counts II through IX.  (1T 15:19-19:24).  As with the district court, the trial court separately found that [...]’s NJCRA claims concerning the VOP conviction accrued on March 6, 2018, the date the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed [...]’s VOP conviction.  (1T 14:8-9).  Thus, the trial court held that the constitutional claims were time-barred by the relevant two-year statute of limitations, and dismissed the remaining counts to the extent they could be read as asserting NJCRA malicious prosecution claims.  (1T 14:3-15:18).
[brief] He also attempted to analyze samples taken from the two handguns recovered from the Grand Marquis, but he was not able to obtain results because the samples were of insufficient quality for comparison.  (31T 49-3 to 49-18).  Along with [...]’s testimony, the State also called [...] to testify at trial.  Talley shared a jail cell in the Ocean County Jail with Defendant after Defendant reached out to him via jailhouse letter.  The letter was introduced into evidence trial.  (34T 34-20 to 36-23; Da 94-97).  Talley testified that Defendant admitted to him that he personally killed [...].  Talley was able to testify about details of murder that Defendant related to him, including where they parked for the murder, the type of vehicle they drove in, that the gun used was a 9mm semiautomatic, that the shot was to the back of the head, [...]’s conversation with [...] on the night of the murder, and [...]’s and Defendant’s movements after the murder.  (34T 40-5 to 43-9; 62-21 to 69-5).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING HIS MOTION TO SUPPRESS
[brief] The [...]² (the “Board”) came into its reorganization meeting with a massive and sweeping agenda and minimal debate, leading Plaintiff-Appellant [...] to suspect that there had to have been pre-meeting discussions over the epic changes.  See, PA-10 to PA-12  To exercise his right to ascertain how this government body was operating and coming to its decisions without any real debate or discussions, he filed an OPRA request with the Board and its Business Administrator/Records Custodian [...] on January 24, 2023 seeking….  All comments submitted by the public comments form received by the Board from August 1, 2022 through to the date fo the response.  The response should include the name, email, town and the question or comment of the sender. ¹ Fahrenheit 451, pg. 116  Ray Bradbury, pub. 1/3/2006 by Plaza y Janes (1st pub. 10/19/52)  ISBN 0307347974  ²  Some of the pleadings and documents misspell “Ramapo” as “Rampapo”.  The trial court opinion and Order both contain the correct spelling.  Email logs of all past and current Board members for all email accounts in which they have conducted or discussed Board of Education matters or business during the time frame of November 1, 2022 through to the date of the response.  The email log should contain the sender, recipient, those copied (“cc”) or blind copied (“bcc”), the date, time, subject and identify the existence and name of any attachment.(PA-4)
[brief] .................................................................................................................  29 N.J.R.E. 901 ..............................................................................................................................  15  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  The Mercer County Grand Jury returned [...] charging defendant [...] with: purposeful or knowing murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a (1) or N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a (2) (Count One); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d (Count Two); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (Count Three); and second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b (Count Four) (Da 1 to 4).
[brief] ………Da 735-891  [...], ASA Board Policy Statement on Forensic Science Reform  ………………………………………Da 892-897  United States v. Tibbs, Case No. [...] (D.C. 2019)……Da 898-954 | CASES | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) | 11, 21 | | Gardner v. United States, 140 A. 3d 1172 (D.C. 2016) | 21 | | Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957) | 42 | | In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) | 40 | | Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) | 40 | | Missouri v. Goodwin-Bey, Case No. [...] | | | (Cir. Ct. Greene Cty., Mo. Div. V Dec. 16, 2016) | 22 | | New York v. Ross, 129 N.Y.S.3d 629 (Sup. Ct. 2020) | 21, 47 | | State v. Abrams, 256 N.J. Super. 390 (App. Div. 1992) | 41 | | State v. Brooks, 175 N.J. 215 (2002) | 47 | | State v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534 (2004) | 40 | | State v. Carbone, 10 N.J. 329 (1952) | 41 | | State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) | 45 | | State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54 (2008) | 24 | | State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373 (1988) | 33 | | State v.
[brief] Table of Judgments, Orders, and Rulings Being Appealed .................. ii  Table of Authorities ......................................................... iii  Table of Appendix ........................................................ vi  Preliminary Statement .....................................................  1 Statement of Procedural History ........................................  2 Statement of Facts ..........................................................  4  Legal Argument ............................................................  21 POINT I: THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THE TRIAL COURT'S NOVEMBER 10, 2021  ORDER STATING THAT TENANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO TENANT’S ALLOWANCE BECAUSE IT WAS “IN BREACH” MUST BE VACATED, AS MUST THE NOVEMBER 9, 2023  FINAL ORDER THAT FOLLOWED, BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE IMPROPERLY PREJUDGED THE CASE AND FAILED TO GIVE LEGAL CITATIONS, ANALYSIS, OR ANY STATEMENT OF REASONS TO SUPPORT HIS DECISIONS (Da1-Da3).
[brief] Capital Health Sys., Inc. v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc., 230 N.J. 73, 79-80 (2017).  Although a reviewing court will generally “defer to a trial court’s disposition of discovery matters, including the formulation of protective orders, unless the court has abused its discretion, deference is inappropriate if the court’s determination in drafting its order is based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law. ”  Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 148 N.J. 524, 559 (1997) (citations omitted); Capital Health Sys., Inc., 230 N.J. at 79-80 (“[A]ppellate courts . . . will defer to a trial judge’s discovery rulings absent an abuse of discretion or a judge’s misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. ”).  Defendants fail to address the applicable standard of review with respect to their cross-appeal of the trial court’s denial of Defendants’ motion for involuntary dismissal under Rule 4:37-2(b).
[brief] On March 28, 2023 undersigned counsel filed Proposed Stipulations and Statements of Undisputed Facts detailing the close relationship between [...] the Portfolio Manager for [...] and [...] and [...], the principal of [...].  At the hearing on April 20, 2023, the parties agreed to the Stipulations and Statement of Undisputed Facts stating that they agreed with the facts and the documents but disagreed with any conclusions which were made in the Certification - so without objection those stipulations to facts and documents were entered.  T4, p.39-40.  **Recitation of Stipulated Facts as to Plaintiff’s Close Relationship with the Intervenors.  99a**  1.  [...] and [...], LLC are related businesses and Yitzchok “[...] is the Portfolio Manager of both [...] and [...].  2.  [...] has a large portfolio of Tax Sale certificates generally in excess of $30 million dollars and engages in the tax sale industry for investment purposes.  3.  [...] is the Managing Member of both Plaintiffs, [...] and [...].  111a.  4.  [...] bought the tax lien in 2018 and [...] filed the Lawsuit against [...] on 8/9/21.  99a and 1a.  5.  There was no mortgage on the subject property prior to the foreclosure action.  110a.  6.  After the filing of the Complaint, [...] assigned the tax lien to their subsidiary company [...].  100a.  7.  [...]  Counsel for Plaintiff is in-house counsel for [...], [...] Capital and [...] Holdings, LLC.
[brief] *Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield*, 17 N.J. 67 (1954).  The plaintiff, as the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, must be accorded all favorable inferences.  *Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield*, supra, 17 N.J. at 75.  The Supreme Court also held that if exists a single, unavoidable resolution of the alleged disputed issue of fact, that issue should be considered insufficient to constitute a "genuine" issue of material fact for purposes of Rule 4:46-2.
[brief] The principle of law is further evident in *Moore* where the Appellate Division found that the defendant owed its invitee a duty of care to exercise reasonable care in circumstances where the invitee slipped on an accumulation of snow and was aware that the ground was covered by three inches of snow.  *Moore*, 328 N.J. Super. at 302-303.  The different impact that the awareness of a hazard has on the duties owed to a social guest/licensee and invitee was explained by the Supreme Court in *Taniean*:
[brief] 4.  The Taylor decision and its progeny do not represent the “majority” position.  To the extent the Court considers the “number” of unbinding and out-of-state decisions persuasive, it is not at all clear that Taylor and its progeny ever represented the “majority” position.  For example, prior to Taylor, the Third Circuit in Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 180 (3d Cir. 1999) interpreted Pennsylvania law to conclude that “an arbitration clause need not be supported by equivalent obligations. ”  See id. (“the mere fact that Green Tree retains the option to litigate some issues in court, while the Harrises must arbitrate all claims does not make the arbitration agreement unenforceable”).  Courts in many other jurisdictions concur and have applied similar reasoning.  Hafer v. Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1007 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (Texas law) (“the Court finds that this provision of the RIC's arbitration clause, one-sidedly allowing Vanderbilt to pursue litigation at its option, does not render the arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable”); Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 344 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (Kentucky law) ("The Wilders' contention that their arbitration clause is unfairly one-sided rests similarly on a presumption that arbitration will not afford them an adequate opportunity to vindicate their substantive claims.  Under both the FAA and Kentucky's UAA, such a presumption is not a proper basis for refusing enforcement of an arbitration clause."); Willis Flooring, Inc. v. Howard S. Lease Const. Co. & Assocs., 656 P.2d 1184, 1186 (Alaska 1983) ("Arbitration is not so clearly more or less fair than litigation that it is unconscionable to give one party the right of forum selection").  In fact, one state supreme court (Missouri) went so far as to say that "the ‘mutuality of obligation’ requirement" (which is what Plaintiff proposes here) is "a dead letter in contract law."  State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 859 (Mo. 2006) (Missouri law).  Thus, putting aside that the Supreme Court has already signaled its disagreement with the alleged “majority” position, reliance on out-of-state precedent reveals no obvious tilt in Plaintiff’s favor and does not support invalidating the parties’ Agreement here.  It is also worth noting that the very same court which Plaintiff cites as evidencing the “majority” position (Tennessee) later walked back those observations in *Berent v. CMH Homes, Inc.*, 466 S.W.3d 740, 753 (Tenn. 2015) (a case Plaintiff does not cite) when it observed that “any attempt to synthesize the cases neatly into a ‘majority’ and a ‘minority’ view must necessarily founder,” given the states’ differing views about unconscionability (a distinction Plaintiff does not grapple with) and the wide variety of arbitration agreements in use.  *Id.*  Thus, for all these reasons, Plaintiff’s argument that this Court should invalidate the Agreement here because of an alleged “majority” position is without merit and should be rejected.  There is no clear “majority” position, and, even if there was, New Jersey has already decided the issue to the contrary.
[brief] *State v. Harris, DOCKET NO. [...], 6-7 (App. Div. Oct. 26, 2020)*  ("[...] made detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The judge found that [...] observed that defendant’s eyes were glassy, she was slurring her speech and smelled of alcohol, and the officer properly conducted field sobriety tests.  The judge further found that once defendant failed to successfully complete those tests, the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant and require her to submit to a breath test.")  [Emphasis on “properly”]  In State v. Harris, the judge at the very least concluded that the officer properly conducted the field sobriety test before deciding that there was probable cause to arrest.  In my case the municipal court judge agreed with me that the SFST was done improperly.
[brief] Under the circumstances, there is no justification to resort to a lodestar methodology when plaintiff’s attorneys agreed to a one-third contingent fee, a standard arrangement in tort and cognate actions.  There is no sound reason to tinker with this standard retainer agreement, which has insured appropriate compensation in this case.  \textit{See Distefano v. Greenstone}, 357 N.J.Super. 352, 815 A.2d 496 (2003).  In determining a reasonable fee, the trial court shall take into consideration whether counsel fees arrangement is a fixed or contingent.\footnote{See Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J.292, 661 A.2d 1202, 1218 (1994).  To be entitled to enhancement of the lodestar fee calculation, the plaintiff must meet two conditions.  First, “that no enhancement for risk is appropriate unless the applicant can establish that without an adjustment for risk the prevailing party ‘would have faced substantial difficulties in finding counsel in the local or other relevant market. ’”  Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 733 107 S.Ct. 3078, 97 L.Ed.2d 585 (1987).  Second, “the fee applicant bears the burden of proving the degree to which the relevant market compensates for contingency. ”  Id. at 483 U.S. 733.}  In the instant case, the alleged legal fees to be shifted incurred in a matrimonial action in \textit{[...]}.
[brief] Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.  [Emphasis added.]  The focus here is on the bolded text because there is no contention that a debt collector’s communication with a mail vendor falls within a statutory exception or is made to one of the authorized recipients.  Every federal court to consider whether a communication with a mail vendor violates § 1692c(b) finds the ordinary meaning of those statutory words are unambiguous and concludes that such a communication violates that provision without leading to an absurd result by frustrating the FDCPA’s purposes.
[brief] There was also the evidence issue and Brandy violation of the video of the initial stop being destroyed.  Defendant [...], [...], and counsel's argued that the clothing was not found in the vehicle they occupied, but that a cop pulled up to the scene where the defendants were stopped at and stated: "I found these up the road."  Defendant stated that the video of the initial stop would have shown and proved this (Da 94-95.  The video, #795, was destroyed 'without' authorization or a copy made for discovery purposes.
[brief] The defendant, [...], is charged by way of Indictment Number [...] with first-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (“CDS”) with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1), and third-degree possession of CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1).  Pa1-2.  On or about September 18, 2023, the defendant filed a motion to suppress physical evidence seized during a December 17, 2021 motor vehicle stop.  Pa3-4.  The Honorable [...], J.S.C. heard testimony on this motion on January 4, 2024 and February 14, 2024 and oral argument from the parties on April 22, 2024.  Pa3, 5; (1T; 2T; 3T).  Judge Arnette thereafter reserved decision.  (3T:29-13 to 29-17).  On September 10, 2024, Judge Arnette issued an order, with accompanying written statement of reasons, granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.  Pa3-19.  On September 23, 2024, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., granted the State’s request for a stay of the matter pending the filing of a motion for leave to appeal the grant of suppression with this Court.  Pa20.  --- 1 T refers to Transcript of Motion to Suppress, January 4, 2024.  2 T refers to Transcript of Motion to Suppress, February 14, 2024.  3 T refers to Transcript of Motion to Suppress, April 22, 2024.  The State thereafter moved before this Court for the grant of leave to appeal.  On October 17, 2024, this Court granted the State’s motion.  The State now submits the following in support of its request for reversal of the lower court’s order of suppression.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[directive] 6.2.5  If the complaint is sustained, the superior officer so authorized should determine the appropriate disciplinary action.  Typical disciplinary actions for minor infractions include performance notices, oral reprimands or written reprimands.  The superior officer shall complete the appropriate disciplinary document and provide a copy of that document to the officer being disciplined.  A copy of the disciplinary document shall be forwarded to the law enforcement executive or appropriate supervisor for review, placed in the officer's personnel file and sent to internal affairs for entry into the index file and filing.  6.2.6
[brief] As the parties well know, collection, review, and production of ESI presents special challenges and requires “cooperation between opposing counsel and transparency in all aspects of preservation and production of ESI. ”  William A. Gross Const. Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 134, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  With respect to the appropriate level of validation of Plaintiffs’ search terms, after considering the arguments of the parties, the Special Master adopts Defendants’ proposal as modified.  The parties agree and case law dictates that appropriate validation be utilized to test search results.  See e.g. In re Serquel Products Liability Litig., 244 F.R.D. 650, 662 (M.D. Fla. 2007) ([...]) (“[W]hile key word searching is a recognized method to winnow relevant documents from large repositories, use of this technique must be a cooperative and informed process….  Common sense dictates that sampling and other quality assurance techniques must be employed to meet requirements of completeness. ”).  While the parties have been able to reach agreement on the terms of Defendants’ validation process, the parties are at an impasse regarding the level of validation of Plaintiffs’ search term results.
[brief] Parental rights are constitutionally protected from “actions that strike at the heart of parental decision-making authority on matters of greatest importance. …. ”  *C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ.*, 430 F.3d 159, 184 (3d Cir. 2005); *J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist.*, 650 F.3d 915, 934 (3d Cir. 2011).
[brief] However, [...]’s own exhibits establish that [...] was aware of and considered all of the general potential risk factors, including prior surgeries, Retisert implant, uveitis, cataracts, smoking, trabculectomy and vitrectomy, before ruling them out in [...]’s specific case.  (Da0150, Da0177-Da0183)  [...] had also not previously raised its “this-time-is-different” argument in the trial court.  (Opening Brief, page 31)
[brief] 13.  The March 23, 2023, Chancery Division order (Pa 13) inappropriately provides that “Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed as Moot”.  14.  The order (Pa 13) provides no notice with regard to Plaintiff’s Rule 4:69-3 Motion to Law Division for Stay and Adjournments (Pa 108-110) and Certification (Pa 39-40) attached to the complaint and constituting part of the Complaint.