ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ..................................................25  [...], Crime and Expected Punishment: Changes in Perceptions at the Age of Criminal Majority, 11 Am. L. & Recon. Rev. 209 (2009)  .......................43  S. Law & Pub. Safety Comm. Statement to S. 1504 (Mar. 15, 2001) ...... 24, 25 Sponsor’s Statement, A. 3352 (Introduced May 21, 1979)  ..............................23  [...], ”Life-Course-Persistent” and ”Adolescence-Limited” Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 Psychol. Rev. 674 (1993)  ............47  [...], The Effects of Aging on Recidivism Among Federal Offenders (Dec. 2017)  .................................................  46, 47  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] The chronology of events is critical.  The IA investigation was opened on November 20, 2017.  [Then Lt.] [...] notified Plaintiff [[...]] of the investigation on December 11, 2017.  The [...] was notified of the IA, and they "kicked it back"; they declined to prosecute because there was nothing criminal involved.  [...] was informed that he could do the IA administratively.  However, if there was probable cause for anything criminal, [...] was to report back to the Prosecutor.  [...] testified the charges were criminal in nature", but also informed Plaintiff it was an administrative investigation.  [...] did not have any further contact with the Prosecutor's Office; [...] conducted the formal interview with the Plaintiff on November 7, 2018.
[brief] [...]’s Repudiation of the Settlement Agreement.  On February 8, 2022, [...], through counsel, served [...] with correspondence and a detailed Schedule of Proposed Distributions (and related documents) identifying the manner in which [...] planned to distribute the assets of [...]’s Estate and [...]’s Revocable Trust.  (Da013a.)  The February 8, 2022 correspondence also requested that [...] facilitate the terms of the Settlement Agreement by: (a) executing Ancillary Probate Documents necessary to administer [...]’s Estate’s and [...]’s Estate’s interests in the Palm Beach Property; and (b) filing a Notice of Withdrawal concerning a petition [...] brought in Florida in connection with [...]’s Estate, which implicated claims that had been resolved against her in the Superior Court of New Jersey.  (Da013a; Da106a-07a.)  Because [...] did not comply, [...] commenced this litigation on April 29, 2022.
[directive] 3.2.1  Basic and in-service training for law enforcement officers should emphasize the sworn obligation of those officers to uphold the law and ensure public safety.  Police ethics should be a major component in the training curricula.  In addition, the rules, regulations, policies and procedures of the agency, including the disciplinary process, should be stressed.  There must also be a process to advise veteran officers of any new statutory requirements or significant procedural changes.  3.2.2  An agency’s supervisory personnel should always consider the need for training when officers engage in inappropriate behavior or misconduct.  The question should be, “Could training have prevented this behavior and can training prevent it from happening in the 11 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021 future?”  Perhaps a particular officer or group of officers needs a refresher course in a certain subject.  In addition, changes in the law, the agency or even within the community may trigger the need for a type of training never before given to the officer or agency.  Training in this sense can be anything from informal counseling of an officer about a particular policy or procedure to formal agency-wide training.  The agency may also take advantage of training offered by other agencies, including police academies, the County Prosecutors, the Division of Criminal Justice, other public or private entities or web-based programs.  3.3  Supervision
[brief] It is well-settled that, in order for expert testimony to be admissible, it must meet the following three prerequisites: first, "the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror"; second, "the field testified to must be at a state of the art such that an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable"; and third, "the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony" *State v. Jenewicz*, 193 N.J. 440, 454 (2008) (further citations omitted) (emphasis supplied); see also, *State v. Olenowski*, 253 N.J. 133 (2023), citing *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579, 594-95 (1993) (holding that the “Daubert” factors should prospectively be employed in criminal cases to ensure that an expert’s opinion is based “solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate”).  Id. at 594-95.  In the present case, the second prerequisite was not met given the data owner's own admission regarding known accuracy defects and a system that was not designed for the purpose sought to be furthered by the State here.  [...] and the defense expert agreed in this regard and [...]’s own anecdotal evidence should not have formed the basis for an alternate finding with regard to reliability.  The court below, in admitting the evidence, was persuaded by the fact that the cell phone carrier, [...], had certain purposes in collecting the data, to wit, network optimization and accurate billing.  Those purposes, however, do not equate with scientific reliability in a court of law and the court’s reasoning was based upon assumptions rather than direct testimony from a [...] employee.  Ultimately, the trial court determined that the issues of inaccurate or incomplete data were ones of credibility for the jury.  Defendant submits that, on the contrary, this was a question of admissibility, and it was harmful error for the trial court to permit the testimony under those circumstances.
[directive] Court staff should then follow the standard processes for an expedited expungement, including preparing the automated expungement order.  2.  Requests by Defendants or Juveniles for Judicial Review to Expunge the Case  For requests limited to expunging the case, a petition for expungement under the Marijuana Decriminalization Law should be filed in the eCourts Expungement System on the Judiciary's website at www.njcourts.gov/selfhelp/expungement.html.  Instructions on filing the petition are included on that webpage.  Because N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6. l provides that cases that fall under the enumerated offenses shall be "expunged by operation of law," this petition will follow the automated processes for a marijuana expungement (N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.1), i.e., the petition will be directed to the court without prosecutorial review.  If the court orders the expungement, the System will provide notification to the prosecutor's office, Municipal Court, if applicable, the State Police, and the appropriate law enforcement agencies.  If the prosecutor believes the case should not have been expunged, the process outlined below should be followed.  3.
[brief] Pa391.  Despite its location in the B-3 Zone, [...] noted that the area surrounding the Property is a “mixed-use neighborhood,” as it contained both residential and commercial properties.  Pa268, at 38:10-39:5.  Indeed, [...] highlighted both residential uses to the west and east of the Property and commercial uses to the north and directly adjacent to the south of the Property.  Id., 38:16-22.  Finally, [...]’s Second Application does not impair the Land Use Plan of the Borough’s Master Plan.
[brief] THIRTEEN APPELLANT MISPRESENTS THE RECORD BELOW  (Not raised below)  Appellant represents that only certain language be stricken by the Court, but Par. 18 of the Agreement (Da19) places no limitation on what should be stricken, nor does it support the Appellant’s argument.  Next, Appellant egregiously misrepresented the nature of the Agreement - Appellant’s arguments at Db36 are contrary to the actual Agreement and the parties’ intent in drafting the Agreement.
[brief] Codefendant [...], though, was “served the roster as soon as he was arrested. ” (Da110).  Thus, as the PCR court found, the fact that defendant was not given a list of the items taken until after his arrest, several years later, was “of de minimus consequence because Defendant had eluded police for four years. ” (Da110).  As such, the PCR court properly found that “even if Counsel had brought up this argument in Court, the argument likely would not have succeeded given the fact Defendant was a fugitive in the time he was meant to have received the list. ” (Da110).  The court concluded by finding that the warrant was valid under New Jersey law.  (Da110).  After considering defendant’s argument, the PCR court aptly found that the State’s application for a warrant met statutory requirements and was constitutional.  (Da108).  Indeed, law enforcement was permitted to covertly enter the stash location for the purpose of installing or preparing to install the electronic surveillance.  Although a return or inventory was not given to defendant within the time period provided in the warrant, codefendant [...] received a copy after his arrest, and the only reason defendant did not receive it until several years later was due to his fugitive status.  Based on this, the PCR court properly found that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the constitutionality of the warrant, and this Court should affirm.
[brief] The narrow exceptions recognized by the courts involve extraordinary events, such as an anthrax attack on a post office.  See In re Holmes, 346 N.J. Super. 372 (App. Div. 2001).  In granting an exception in that case, the court held that relief may be warranted where the delay occurs “as a result of exceptional circumstances neither within their control nor which, in light of human experience, might reasonably be expected. ”  Id. at 378.  The court distinguished an anthrax attack from the events in Mulcahy; here the reason for the untimely delivery was inclement weather, “a clearly foreseeable event – ‘a factor that may occur any year and all voters may be confronted with it’ – for which the voter assumes the responsibility and the risks of non-delivery. ”  Id. (quoting Mulcahy v. Bergen Cty. Bd. of Elections, 156 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (Law. Div. 1978)).  Here, Respondent argues that the failure of certain ballots to arrive in a manner consistent and required by the statutes should be excused because the election fell on a Saturday and the following Monday was a holiday.  However, unlike unexpected events such as inclement weather, both the Saturday election and the Monday holiday were clearly known to the voters in advance.
[brief] What Is Relevant Is That—In The Five Years The Judgment Has Been In Place—[...] Still Has Not Provided A Realistic Opportunity For Construction Of The Off-site Affordable Units, In Violation Of The Judgment (11-12a, 17a, 21a).........................................................  38  d.  The Only Location Ever Identified By The [...] As Providing A Realistic Opportunity To Construct The Off-site Affordable Units Was [...].
[brief] . . .  [Da96].  Similarly, on March 23, 1988, the [...] Committee gave its approval for the owner of [...] to connect to the Township’s treatment plant, via the Borough.  [Da102].  At this time, it was the Township who was entitled to and received the connection fee, not Appellant.  [Da102].  On or about December 3, 1999, “An Agreement for Bulk Sewer Treatment Services Between the [...] and the [...]” (the “1999 Agreement”) was entered into.
[brief] 2T43:25-44:2.  Instead, the trial court found that the Defendant appeared --- ⁴  Defendant contends that the trial court judge did not find that Defendant appeared startled, and accuses the State of using a “technique” to make it seem as if that were the case.  The State relies on the following quote from the trial court judge to support its contention that the trial court judge made a factual finding that Defendant appeared startled upon [...]’s arrival:  “This Court gives no weight to ([...]’s) testimony that the startled look of Defendant was that of a person involved in a crime.  Instead, the startled look of the defendant was that of a person on crutches trying to avoid being hit by a patrol car that had sped up so fast at the driveway that it came to an abrupt stop and jolted back as he was crossing in front of it. ”  2T43:25-44:6.
[directive] 1  Record on line the balance the agency’s law enforcement trust in the account (forfeiture fund account) at the beginning of period.  2  Record on line the total forfeited funds received during the quarter.  2.  Funds should be categorized by the specific underlying offenses and categories listed the report:  in an  Narcotics Offenses:  Any forfeitures of currency as a result of in And N.J.S.A. underlying offense violation of 2C:35-1 et sea.  N.J.S.A. 2C:36-1 et sea.  ,- ’, of Gambling Offenses:  Any forfeitures of currency as a result an . in J.S.A. underlying offense violation of N. 2C:37-1 et sea.  Racketeering:  Any forfeitures of currency as a result of an underlying offense violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 et sea. in Public Indecency:  Any forfeitures currency as a result of an of N. in J.S.A. underlying offense vioiation 2C:34-1 et seq. of Official Corruption: forfeitures currency a result of an Any as of J.S.A. N. underlying offense violation  J.S.A. 2C:27-1 et seq., in N. of 2C:30-2,30-3 and 30-4.  Theft Offenses:  Any.forfeitures of currency as a result of an in N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. underlying offense violation 2C:20-1 et sea, of 2C:21-1 et seq.-  - - -  Other Offenses:  Any forfeitures currency as a result of any other of - . ^1 underlyiog offense‘$  Income from Other Sources:
[directive] The police officer handler will be familiar with all record keeping requirements and informational needs concerning K-9 operations.  1.5.1  The police officer handler will identify the types of records that must be kept regarding the use of police dogs, including training records, incident reports and health reports.  1.5.2  The police officer handler will identify the information items to be included in records or reports which pertain to K-9 operations or activities.  1.6  THE CARE AND HANDLING OF THE POLICE DOG Goal:
[brief] .............................................................................  6 Edwards v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co., 357 N.J. Super. 196, 202, (App. Div. 2003), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 278 (2003) ..............................................................  5-6  Gruccio v. Baxter, 135 N.J. Super. 290, 294-95 (Law Div. 1975) ....................  6 Gonzalez v. City of Jersey City, 247 N.J. 551, 572 (2021) ...............................  10 L.E. v Plainfield School District, 456 N.J. Super. 336, 345 (App. Div. 2018) certif. den. 236 N.J. 627 (2019) ...... 10 Levin v Cnty of Salem, 133 N.J. 35, 44 (1993) ..............................................
[directive] In any case where the defendant has not already been arrested, if a complaint-warrant is issued, the defendant upon arrest shall be fingerprinted in accordance with Section 2.2 to initiate an automated pretrial risk assessment for the benefit of the pretrial services program.  In that event, the officer shall make certain that the fingerprint links to the defendant and offense(s) for which a complaint-warrant had been issued.  If a complaint-summons is issued, the agency making the arrest, or the prosecutor, shall make certain that the defendant is fingerprinted by the Live Scan system on the date of the defendant’s court appearance or within a reasonable time after the filing of the complaint upon written request by the appropriate law enforcement agency pursuant to N.J.S.A. 53:1-15, and N.J.S.A. 53:1-18.1, and shall make certain that the fingerprint links to the defendant and offense(s) for which a complaint-summons had been issued.
[brief] See especially Pages 45-46 for the total evisceration of the § 504 Action.  I objected that either the SAC [...] reviewed or the revised SAC that took [...]’s critiques into account was the point of the Remand.  It was 54 v. 73 pages (both had the same 24-page appendix).  Pa259-Pa312 v. Pa9-Pa81.  I objected that I had a cross-motion to amend.  His Honor said we’ll talk about that.  2T-23-20-25.  [...] gave total deference to [...]’s 2021 Opinion.
[brief] 2  “Jra” refers to Appellants’ appendix submitted with this reply brief.  Trial briefs are included as an exception to show waiver under N.J.S.A. § 2:6-1(a)(2).  3  Defendants have not yet sought a stay of merits discovery in the trial court solely to reap efficiencies gained by initially conducting discovery in tandem with a parallel litigation in California.  Defendants reserve their right to move for a stay as merits discovery proceeds.  II.
[brief] ”  It was simply an award of consequential damages for [...] committing corporate waste.  It does not matter what he wasted corporate money doing; it only matters that he breached his fiduciary duty and was ordered to answer for the monetary consequences.  Such damages are clearly compensable under well settled law.  Pb69-70.  Moreover, it is crystal clear that monies a victim is caused to spend on legal fees for litigation with a third party are compensable.  Pb67-68.  Here, of course, the facts are admittedly complicated, and [...] is hoping to render them confusing.  Before the arbitration, and during Phase I, [...] was in charge of [...] as its CEO.  He was removed as CEO at the end of Phase I, when the Individual Plaintiffs became the managers of [...].  As a consequence, [...]—a litigant in both phases—essentially “switched sides.
[brief] There, the Court specifically found that the December 1998 Deed could not have put [...] on notice of [...]’s purported claim of ownership because [...]’s execution of the Deed was a mistake:  I realize the existence of the December 10th, 1998 deed is being used by the moving party, the defendants at this point, to support their argument that [...] Wu knew his title was possibly in doubt as early as December 1998.  However, the reason, albeit erroneous, stated by [...], was that he sought to record his deed because he had recently paid off the mortgage debt on the property.  That, in the view of this Court, was unnecessary, erroneous, and need not have been done.  The plain language of the statute in this case, which I read in its entirety, provides for the accrual of a cause of action, quote, when any other person claims or has claimed to own the same or any part thereof, unquote.  In the view of this Court, the cause of action to quiet title in this case did not accrue until the very earliest when witness [...] informed [...] Wu, that realtor, [...], had approached him on behalf of his client, [...] Wu, seeking an appraisal inasumuch as it was believed at that time by [...], that [...] Wu was the owner of the property.
[brief] Taniean, 15 N.J. at 275.  In Zentz, the plaintiff held the status of an invitee while working for a contractor on the defendant’s property.  Zentz, 92 N.J. Super. at 111.  The plaintiff was injured when he tripped and fell over a wire located on the surface of the roof he was working on.  *Id.* at 108.  There was a question as to whether the plaintiff had prior notice of the wire and the Trial Court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  *Id.* at 111.  The Appellate Division, and Supreme Court, found that this was reversible error.  *Id.* at 115.  It noted that, “even if plaintiff knew of the danger, that knowledge alone would not have barred him. ”  *Id.*  This principle was again noted by the Supreme Court in *McGrath* when it stated:
[brief] This Resolution was a direct reaction to the public outcry that ensued once Respondent took her seat and did not delete this reprehensible post, among others.  The record is replete with the community outrage directed at the Board which was caused by Respondent’s transparently racist Facebook posts, among others.  (Ca193)  ([...] Article: “[...] parents, students: School Must Fight Racism After Board Member’s Postings”); (Ca075-076) (March 17, 2022 Board Resolution: “the Board has been recently made aware of certain social media postings which have been made by and/or attributed to certain individual Board members which are viewed by many – including the Board – to convey sentiments and/or messages which are racist and/or biased against African Americans”); (Ca086-087) (Minutes of March 17, 2022 Board Meeting: public comment section filled with school community members addressing Respondent’s racist posts); (Ca098-099) (Minutes of April 28, 2022 Board meeting: public comment section filled with school community members addressing Respondent’s racist posts); (Ca100-105) ([...] Article: “[...] Board OKs Social Media Policy After Racist Posts”).
[brief] Lead detective [...] presented testimony concerning the robberies before the Middlesex County grand jury.  There he testified that on December 8th, 2011, T-Mobile video surveillance depicted, "[...] and defendant entering the store first and then in comes [...] and locks the door.  (12T 42-20 to 23).  He testified that his notes indicated (Da 2) South Brunswick charged [...] and defendant for the December 19th, 2011, Radio Shack robbery (12T 43-9 to 14) and;  He testified that on January 12th, 2012 prior to the robbery while the defendants were in the McDonald's, "[...] puts a gun to defendant's head," (12T 31-22 to 23; 13T 25-20 to 21)  And after leaving the McDonald's defendant was observed pulling into the T-Mobile parking lot as [...] and [...] exited the Buick, put their hoods up and walk into the store, (13T 17-17 to 21)  He testified upon [...] arriving into the area, defendant maneuvered around the parking lot, became suspicious of the police and drove out of the parking lot."  (13T 19-13 to 24)  He further testified on April 29th, 2014, that cell maps placed the defendant in the area of the robberies.  (13T 29-30-15 to 9)  N.J.R.E. 607[7] is certainly one of the most important rules for the trial attorney embodying the right to cross-examine witnesses which carries constitutional implications and has been often referred to as the "greatest legal engine ever involved for discovery of the truth.
[brief] Retired State Police DWI Coordinator, [...] was asked about the “walk and turn” test, and testified that he successfully completed it.  (2T 31-11 to 31-13).  He was also asked about the “One Leg Test” and testified “So you go for 30 seconds until the officer or whoever’s timing-------- I think both officers may have been timing it, they tell you to stop.  So he goes the duration of the test, holding his leg appropriately, until they tell him to stop.  In my opinion, I think they could have walked away and came back and he would have still been in that position.  It seemed like he-- he could have went for a while, which again, is commendable considering what he had been involved with.
[brief] [...] erroneously contends that it was owed $620,250.09 for April 2020, even though the Board undisputedly paid $60,800 for April 2020.  The $697,031 sought by [...] is comprised of a $620,250.09 from a second April 2020 invoice, and an alleged balance on a $77,141.40 from a July 2020 invoice that the Board paid in full.  In establishing that the $697,031 was contested with a genuine dispute of material fact, note the Board’s response to Par. 4 of [...]’s Undisputed Statement of Material Facts:  4.  In exchange for [...]’s custodial services from July 1, 2019, through June 30, 2020, [...] agreed to pay a monthly amount of $620,250.09.  **Board’s Response**  Disputed.  As stated throughout the Complaint and [...] Cert., the contract was a services contract where [...] was to be paid for services rendered.  [...]’s failure to render services means that it was not entitled to payment for the months it did not render services.