ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Limited Attorney Exemption also violates the overbreadth doctrine because it prohibits attorneys who devote the most time and are the most experienced from assisting clients with debt adjustment – the very attorneys who would be best suited to protect consumers’ interests.  “The overbreadth doctrine involves substantive due process considerations concerning excessive governmental intrusion into protected areas. ”  United Prop. Owners Ass’n of Belmar v. Borough of Belmar, 343 N.J. Super. 1, 34 (App. Div. 2001).  “The overbreadth concept rests on principles of substantive due process and whether the reach of the law extends too far.  The evil of an overbroad law is that in proscribing constitutionally protected activity, it may reach farther than is permitted or necessary to fulfill the state’s interests. ”  Id. at 35.  The trial court’s holding that the Limited Attorney Exemption is not overbroad because it “does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct” is based on the fundamental flaw that an attorney’s performance of debt adjustment services is not constitutionally protected.
[brief] On April 1, 2020, a Complaint was filed in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hunterdon County, under Docket No: [...], in the matter of [...] and [...] v. [...] and [...], Counsellors at Law.  (Pa001).  On June 16, 2020, defendants filed their Answer.  (Pa009).  On June 24, 2022, defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to dismiss with prejudice the claims of plaintiff [...].  (Pa060).  The Trial Court conducted oral argument on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on August 9, 2022 and on September 13, 2022, [...] put his decision granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the record.  (T001).  On September 14, 2022, [...] entered an Order granting defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and dismissing the Complaint of plaintiff [...] with prejudice.  (Pa214).  On January 17, 2023, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Motion to shift the burden of persuasion and on April 14, 2023, [...] entered an Order denying plaintiffs’ Motion as premature.  (Da53).  On January 27, 2023, defendants filed a Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment.  (Da56).  On March 17, 2023, [...] entered an Order granting in part and denying in part defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.  (Da58).  The Trial Court held that denied the Motion to bar plaintiffs’ expert report.  (Da58).  The Court ruled that plaintiff waived his lack of capacity claim, and would not be permitted to pursue that claim in the “case-within-a-case” litigation.  (Da58).  In the Statement of Reasons in connection with the Court’s ruling, the Court references defendants’ Motion to bar the report of plaintiffs’ expert [...].  (Da60).  Plaintiff waived his right to pursue a claim for lack of capacity.  Therefore, the same was dismissed from the “case-within-a-case” litigation.  (Da60).  A Stipulation of Dismissal dismissing the claims of [...] was filed on July 14, 2023.  (Pa208).  A Notice of Appeal was filed on behalf of [...] on August 9, 2023.
[directive] 10- 10-4 2  Restrictions  Equipment Services or on 2 - 2  SADA/Seized Dedicated Account Asset - - Page of 6  SOP State New Jersey Forfeiture Administration Index Program 2 - 2  SATA/ Seized Asset Trust Account - 1 6 - No, 06 SOP Seized and Forfeited Property Management 5 - 1  SOP No. 05 - Seized CurrencylAccounting 5 - 3 5:3 of Seizure Foreign Currency 5 - 1 5:2 Unitcd Seizure of States Currency 5 - 1 Accounting for Seized Currency 5 - 2 Security Procedures for Currency 2 1 1 - :4 Separate Accorinting State and Federa1 Forfe'mres for - No. 01 Funds SOP of Received Manaqement and Property . .. 1 - 1 from State and Federal Forfeitures -. 1 - 1 11 A Applicability: Forfeiture Program Administrators 2 - 1 No. 02 - SOP Administration-cf-State Forfeiture Proqram 2 - 1 & Applicability: State County Programs No. SOP - 03 Countv Prosecutor's Office 1 3 - - Forfeiture Proqrams 1 3 - Applicabilit y: All Forfeiture Program Administrators - No. 04 SOP Administration a Municipal of 1 4 - - Forfeiture Proqram 4 - 1 Applicability: All Forfeiture Program Administrators - 5 - 1 No. 05 SOP Accountinq for Ssized Currency 5 - 1 Applicability: All Law Enforcement Officers Sworn - No. 1 6 - 06 SOP Seized and Forfeited Property Manaqement All 6 - 1 ApplicabilitF forfeiture Program Administrators - - - - * < p Nc. - 87
[brief] ”  Although Defendants claim Plaintiff “backfill[ed] her inadequate pleadings [by citing to N.J.S.A. § 30:1AA-1.1(j) and N.J.S.A. § 30:1AA-1.2(i)]…[and] this argument cannot be considered by th[e] Court,” both assertions are flatly wrong as Plaintiff (1) argued this public policy at the pleading stage, and (2) such policy “closely relate” and has a “substantial nexus” to Plaintiff’s complained of conduct.
[brief] The Court further ordered that “[a]ny party in interest who wished to be heard with respect to any of the relief requested in the verified complaint…shall file…a written answer, an answering affidavit…or other response…to the relief requested in the verified complaint. ” (Da380).  On September 13, 2023 an Answer to the Verified Complaint and Counterclaim was filed on [...]’s behalf seeking rescission of the Sales Contract, enforcement of the Consent Judgment, and asserting claims for breach of contract.  (Da462).  [...] also filed opposition to the Order to Show Cause.  (Da383).  In addition, on September 18, 2023, [...] filed a motion seeking permission to file counterclaims.  (Da481).  On October 13, 2023, following oral argument of counsel, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. (1T)³ denied [...]’s motion to file counterclaims and granted [...] authority to sell the Subject Property to [...] (“[...]”) for five hundred thousand ($500,000) dollars, a value which the co-owners did not unanimously consent to.  (Da1, Da4).  [...] timely filed a Notice of Appeal on November 27, 2023.  (Da5).  Defendant [...] is appealing Judge Bauman’s denial of his motion to file counterclaims as well as the Order granting [...] authority to sell the Subject Property to [...] for $500,000 for the following reasons: (1) the probate court erred in granting the Order to Show Cause allowing the sale of the Subject Property to proceed because numerous issues and disputes of fact existed as to whether the sale and marketing of the property was conducted in good faith precluding the matter ³ 1T refers to the Transcript of Motion Proceedings, dated October 13, 2023. from being disposed of summarily; (2) the probate court erred in not considering and/or enforcing the April 13, 2022 Consent Order which the co-owners had agreed to and which was binding; (3) the probate court erred in denying [...] leave to assert counterclaims in response to the Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint as there were genuine disputes of material fact presented to the Court by the parties which were directly related to whether the sale of the Subject Property to [...] for $500,000 was valid and conducted in good faith; and (4) the probate court lacked jurisdiction to hear the dispute raised in the Order to Show Cause because the Subject Property was not a probate asset and the sale of the property was subject to certain requirements under the Consent Judgment of April 13, 2022 which were not complied with and enforcement of same constitutes a breach of contract.
[brief] Alternatively, as discussed above in the context of their fraud claim, the trial court’s express rulings, that the direct and proximate cause of Appellants’ damages was their failure to pay rent to [...], renders this claim futile.  In dismissing the breach of confidentiality claim asserted against the [...] in the First Amended Complaint, the trial court found that the Appellants’ losses were not related to any violation of the non-disclosure and non-circumvention provisions by the [...].
[brief] Instead, the Arbitration Panel in the [...] Arbitration adjudicated: (i) whether distributions made by [...] were proper (Pa135 – Pa136); (ii) whether [...] “failed to realize the value of the [...] Management Agreement when the [...] property was sold in 2018” (Pa136 – Pa137); (iii) the distribution of funds that were held back by [...] in connection with management fees received.  (Pa137 – Pa138); (iv) the propriety of certain distributions made to [...] from [...] (Pa138); and (v) whether certain payments made to vendors by [...] were appropriate (Pa138 – Pa139).  On July 15, 2021, the Arbitration Panel in the [...] Arbitration issued its decision\(^2\).  (Pa131 – Pa142).  In its decision, the Arbitration Panel awarded that --- \(^2\)  A copy of the final decision in the [...] Arbitration was part of the motion record before the trial court, below.  certain sums be paid to [...], and directed [...] to dissolve [...] and wind-up its affairs.  (Pa141).  Undeniably, the [...] Arbitration did not adjudicate issues concerning the Forged Agreement, the parties’ respective membership interests in [...], or [...]’s unabashed abuse of process.  (See generally Pa131 – Pa142).
[directive] (a)  Cooperative Person.  When dealing with a cooperative person, officers may rely on police presence and/or verbal control techniques, but should not use force.  (b)  Passive Resistor.  When dealing with a passive resistor, officers may rely on police presence, verbal control techniques, holding techniques, lifting/carrying, wrist locks and other manual pain compliance techniques.  Greater force, such as strikes, punches, CEDs, or less lethal devices shall not be used.  (c)
[brief] THE DECISION BELOW WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, UNREASONABLE, AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.  (Not Raised Below).  The decision of the [...] is against the substantial weight of the evidence, and therefore should be reversed.  The decision is also arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  For the reasons that follow, this determination should be reversed.  New Jersey pension statutes must be liberally construed, and under a liberal construction, [...] would be eligible for Ricci Act benefits.
[brief] The only witness called by the State was [...] of the [...].  Officer Mendez testified that on August 13, 2021, at approximately 9:25p.m., he received a call from dispatch stating that “there was an individual in front of [...] who was wearing a white tank top, blue shorts, dreadlocks and waling with crutches who was armed with a firearm” in his pocket.  (1T 10-13 to 15-9, 43-10 to 15)  Officer Mendez testified that dispatch received information from a 9-1-1 caller and the dispatcher in turn relayed the information to Officer Mendez.  (1T 41-4 to 16)  The State did not call the dispatcher and did not play the 9-1-1 call.  Officer Mendez testified that he located [...], who matched the description, [...] “made eye contact” and “started walkin’ [sic]” away “at a faster pace. ”  (1T 19-19 to 22)  Officer Mendez testified that he advised [...] to stop, that [...] “continued to accelerate his speed” while on crutches, that he “observed a fanny pack across his torso” that was “swaying . . . like it had something heavy in it” so Officer Mendez then “immediately went behind him” and “detained him by wrapping my hands around his torso. ”  (1T 19-19 to 2224)  When Officer Mendez did so, he felt something hard in the fanny pack, and searched it, revealing a gun.  (1T 49-14 to 50-8)  Officer Mendez, and now the State, agreed that everything that happened from the moment the car stopped to the moment Officer Mendez wrapped his arms around [...]—the eye contact, the acceleration, the order to stop—had to have occurred within 2.5 seconds, based on surveillance footage that depicted the scene.  (1T 57-11 to 19, 70-6; Sb 5-6)  Despite the fact that the body-worn camera statute had already passed and Officer Mendez should have been wearing a camera, he testified that he did not have one.  (1T 30-3 to 17)  [...] granted [...]’s motion to suppress.
[directive] Although the basic training course for newly appointed police officers mandated by the Police Training Commission includes proper treatment of these guidelines, it is recommended that in-service training for police officers regarding the guidelines, specifically in the area of death notification, be conducted on a county/regional level for line supervisors who in turn will instruct officers within their own police department.  The Working Group grew closer together while revising these guidelines through the exploration of problems experienced by survivors of sudden and unexpected death.  The Working Group is pleased that the law enforcement community and others have joined us in recognizing that survivors of homicide or sudden death are indeed victims.  Thus, the Working Group recommended that these Revised Homicide and Sudden Death Survivors Guidelines be announced along with the pamphlet entitled "Survivors Rights to Information and Property" at the Crime Victims' Rights Week Seminar.
[brief] In Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), the Supreme Court said that though “due process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation,” “the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias,” stressing that the Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment’s right to an impartial jury requires “a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen” in a hearing.  In Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987), the Court again stressed the hearing requirement, stating, “The Court's holdings requiring an evidentiary hearing where extrinsic influence or relationships have tainted the deliberations do not detract from, but rather harmonize with, the weighty government interest in insulating the jury's deliberative process. ”  See also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.  725, 739 (1993) (hearing needed to evaluate prejudice to defendant); Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40 (2016), 195 L. Ed. 2d; cf. Daniel v. W. Virginia, 191 F.3d 447 (4th Cir. 1999) (“failure of Daniel's counsel to request a hearing was ‘incomprehensible’” and “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”).  Defendant [...]’s trial counsel failed to protect defendant’s right to a fair trial by not requesting that the trial court voir dire the remaining jurors.  Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph Ten of the New Jersey Constitution, criminal defendants are guaranteed "the right to *** trial by an impartial jury."  The securing and preservation of an impartial jury goes to the very essence of a fair trial and the right to due process of law.  Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362–63 (1966); Patterson v. People of State of Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen. of State of Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907); State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1 (1991), supplemented, 130 N.J. 109 (1992).  Misconduct by any jury member that may have interfered with this fundamental right, or may have prevented a fair, due, and impartial consideration of the State’s case, violates the constitutional right, nullifies the jury’s verdict, and warrants a new trial.  Trial counsel failed to protect these rights of defendant by not requesting that the court voir dire the entire jury.  Conclusion
[brief] The Rule grants a court no authority to compel the production of documents that are “not relevant. ”  5  To prove the point, Defendants also cited several examples of irrelevant documents that would nevertheless hit the search terms.  See, e.g., Da 158; see also Da125 ¶ 21. K.S., 330 N.J. Super. at 294.  Because the ESI Order exceeds the bounds of permissible discovery, it should be reversed.  See Rivers, 378 N.J. Super. at 80.  C.  The Trial Court’s Justifications For The ESI Order Lack Merit (Raised Below: Da166-68; T3-38)
[brief] \(^{10}\)  Without a specific unanimity instruction, there is a real risk that the jury did not unanimously agree as to the identities of the persons involved.  Some jurors may \(^{10}\)  Later, the court correctly instructed the jury that it must determine whether “the combination of words and conduct or words and gestures created a reasonable belief in the victim that the defendant possessed a deadly weapon. ”  (4T 127-20 to 25)  This subsequent explanation of the law was insufficient to correct the prior, inaccurate instruction, as it did not make clear that “the victim” of the robbery must either be [...] or [...], not any employee or patron inside the bank at the time of the incident.
[brief] The [...] and the [...] were improperly reducing reimbursements for out-of-network behavioral health services.  In the prior case, the Appellate Division found in favor of Yucht’s appeal which sought reimbursement at the statutory 80% of reasonable and customary charges for behavioral health services.  *In re Yucht*, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2188.  Pra1.  As a result, the Commissions adopted resolutions to provide for reimbursement of the improper rate paid by members retroactive to 2009.
[brief] As explained in detail above, Plaintiff/Respondent sought to amend in response to the allegations of Appellant against [...] and [...] in discovery.  If Plaintiff/Respondent had chosen not to seek to amend, Plaintiff/Respondent would have been at risk of Appellant asserting third-party claims against [...] and [...].  If that occurred, the claimed negligence would still have been presented to the jury, but with [...] and [...] represented at trial and on the verdict sheet.  Plaintiff/Respondent chose instead to amend to make them direct defendants, but the Trial Court dismissed those claims against [...] and [...].
[directive] Statute Charge Description  Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  a.  An actor who solicits or recruits another to join or actively participate in a criminal street gang with the knowledge or purpose that the person who is solicited or recruited will promote, further, assist, plan, aid, agree, or attempt to aid in the commission of criminal conduct by a member of a criminal street gang commits a 2nd Degree $75,000 to $200,000
[brief] ”).  In short, there is no genuine issue of material fact when it is only the Appellant that is contradicting his own version of the “facts. ”  Appellant’s assertion that “[n]o weight or reliability should be given to the fact that an incorrect date was stated in a pleading caused by a mere typo,” simply cannot pass muster.  Indeed, the Trial Judge found that “[t]he Plaintiff at the present stage has not shown enough evidence, in fact, any evidence to prove his version of events[.]” (Pa10).  Appellant’s appeal simply ignores the fact that he admitted in his response to Respondents Request for Admissions that he was not given permission to use a [...] purchasing card for personal purchases before March 2020 and that he did not use the PCard for personal purchases before 2020.  Rule 4:22-2 provides that “[a]ny matter admitted under the Rule is conclusively established unless the Court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. ”  R. 4:22-2 (emphasis added).  No such motion was made in this litigation and Respondents are able to rely on such facts as conclusively established.  See generally, Bunker Hill Iron Gym v. B & E Barbell Club, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub., *16 (Law Div. Aug. 7, 2019) (noting under R. 4:22-2 any matter admitted under the Rule is conclusively established and “trials are not the time nor place to correct such error”).  Likewise, Appellant affirmed that his responses to Respondents’ First Set of Interrogatories asserting that Respondent [...] gave him permission in March 2020 to use the PCard to supplement his bonuses was “true to the best of my [Appellant’s] knowledge and belief. ” (Da213).  In doing so, Appellant certified that he was fully familiar with the facts set forth herein, he read the answers to Respondents’ First of Interrogatories and certified his answers.  (Da213).  Importantly, Appellant did not at any point during this litigation seek to amend his interrogatory responses.  Appellant’s assertion that his responses can be reduced to a mere mistake ignores that Rule 1:4-4 impresses upon persons making such statements the gravity of their acts.  See State v. Angelo’s Motor Sales, Inc. 125 N.J. Super. 200, 206-07 (App. Div. Oct. 1, 1973) (noting that while interrogatories are no longer required to be answered under oath, the adoption of the certification procedure merely constituted a change in ritual and not in substance as “[c]ertification is only another way of swearing or affirming”).  Where, as here, Respondent relied on, among other things (1) the allegations of the Appellant’s Complaint, (2) Appellant’s responses to Respondents Request For Admissions, and (3) Appellant’s responses to Respondents First Set of Interrogatories, Appellant’s contradictory and now inconsistent assertion precludes any finding that a genuine issue of material fact exists to preclude summary judgment.
[brief] The Board determined Petitioner, a former [...] Sergeant, failed to demonstrate that his disability was the direct result of the 2015 accident he complains of and, instead, was the result of a pre-existing disease alone or pre-existing disease that is aggravated or accelerated by the work effort; specifically, his long and well-documented history of cervical spine injuries and degenerative conditions.  The Board’s decision, including its rejection of the ALJ’s Initial Decision, is supported by sufficient credible evidence and must be affirmed.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] We hold here that no such inherent power exists.  Ibid. at 668.  In affirming, the Supreme Court "concur[red] generally in the Appellate Division's analysis[]"  137 N.J. at 229.  "The legislative scheme contemplates that a planning board's review of a subdivision proposal, including the layout of the entire design, must be made within the framework of the standards prescribed by the subdivision and, if pertinent, the zoning ordinances."  Ibid.  Thus, a planning board's decision must not be "based primarily on the broad purposes of the MLUL rather than on the specific standards contained in the municipal subdivision and zoning ordinances[.]  Ibid.  In the present case, the applicant's proposal failed to "[p]rovide for safe and efficient vehicular . . . circulation" (Sec. 18-602B) or "[e]nsure the provision of adequate water supply, drainage and storm water management" (Sec. 18-602G).
[brief] THE BOARD AND TRIAL COURT PROPERLY WEIGHED PLAINTIFFS’ HEIGHT VARIANCE UNDER THE GRASSO STANDARDS  Plaintiffs correctly assert in their Brief that judicial interpretations of the statutory “special reasons” applicable to all use variances have evolved, and that Grasso v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights, 375 N.J. Super. 41 (App. Div. 2004), now sets forth the proper standards for review of the positive and negative variance criteria for height variances under NJSA40:55D-70(d)(6).