ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Id. at 63–64.  In granting the State’s motion, this Court emphasized that “a court has the authority under sub-section (f) to reopen a judgment where such relief is necessary to achieve a fair and just result mandated by public policy. ”  *Id.* at 66 (citing *Manning Eng’g*, 74 N.J. at 122).  Other decisions of this Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court confirm that protecting the State’s public policy interests and effectuating the purpose of state legislation are “exceptional circumstances” warranting relief under subsection (f).  *See, e.g.*, *Cmty. Realty Mgmt., Inc. for Wrightstown Arms Apartments v. Harris*, 155 N.J. 212, 238 (1998) (vacating judgment for possession under R.4:50-1(f) and observing that Plaintiff’s “conduct . . . is contrary to our public policy embedded in the Anti-Eviction Act and the Landlord Tenant Anti-Reprisal Law,” and further that “[t]o permit execution of the warrant of removal in this case would permit a landlord to use the Anti-Eviction Act as a tool for retaliation”); *LVNV Funding, LLC v. Deangelo*, 464 N.J. Super. 103, 110 (App. Div. 2020) (no abuse of discretion where trial court granted relief under subsection (f) based on determination that state “interest in curbing abusive [debt] collection practices outweighed the interest in the finality of judgments”).  Similarly here, this Court has an important public policy interest in ensuring that litigants like Plaintiff cannot circumvent UPEPA’s protections by voluntarily dismissing their lawsuits at the last minute to avoid liability for attorneys’ fees under the statute.
[brief] (Da91)  PLAINTIFF:  “As noted above, the Trustee unquestionably had the authority to file suit on behalf of the Trust. ”  (Pb47)  DEFENDANTS:  While trustees are granted general powers under N.J.S.A. 3B:31-69, including the authority to file suit on behalf of the Trust, the exercise of a power is “subject to” fiduciary duties.  In this case, the Trust instrument explicitly instructs the Trustee to divide all Trust property into equal shares and distribute it among the beneficiaries “[a]s soon as practicable” after the Settlor’s death.  (Da3)  This directive requires the Trustee to prioritize prompt and efficient disposal of assets.  Therefore, delaying distributions and commencing adversarial litigation against a beneficiary violated the Trustee’s fiduciary duty to administer the Trust in accordance with its terms and purposes, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:31-54.
[brief] ”  *Spaeth v. Srinivasan*, 403 N.J. Super. 508, 514 (App. Div. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right. ”  *Knorr v. Smeal*, 178 N.J. 169, 177 (2003).  An agreement to arbitrate can “be overcome by clear and convincing evidence that the party asserting it chose to seek relief in a different forum. ”  *Cole v. Jersey City Med. Ctr.*, 215 N.J. 265, 276 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “In deciding whether a party to an arbitration agreement waived its right to arbitrate, [the courts] concentrate on the party’s litigation conduct to determine if it is consistent with its reserved right to arbitrate the dispute.”
[brief] Id. at 323  In Malanga, the Court stressed the need to interpret the LRHL in light of the goal to further redevelopment of blighted areas as required by the constitutional framework.12  Id. at 309.  Here, the legislature has mandated that the LTTEL be construed in concert with the LRHL and both are governed by the same constitutional constraints.  Accordingly, LTTEL should not be read to authorize long-term exemptions without sufficient evidentiary support for the determination that a redevelopment Project would not be feasible without them.
[brief] United Serv. Workers Union, Int'l Union of Journeymen & Allied Trades v. Dual-Purpose Corp., 2018 WL 3151686 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) | 17 | | [...]  United Serv. Workers Union, Int'l Union of Journeymen & Allied Trades v. Dual-Purpose Corp., 2018 WL 1445575 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) | 17 | | Marino v. Shiff Realty Co., 164 A. 577 (N.J.Com.Pl. 1933) | 25 | # TABLE OF APPENDIX | Document | Page | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Plaintiff's Verified Complaint Filed October 6, 2024 | 1a | | Defendant's Notice of Demand of Security for Costs and Automatic Stay of Proceedings pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-67 et seq. Filed November 10, 2023 | 13a | | Defendant’s Letter to Court Regarding Stay Filed November 1, 2023 | 15a | | Defendant’s Proposed Form of Order Staying Case Filed November 1, 2023 | 17a | | Defendant's Notice of Cross Motion Dismissing Complaint Filed November 10, 2023 | 19a | | Certification of [...] in Support of Cross Motion to Dismiss Filed November 10, 2023 | 21a | | Exhibit A to Certification of [...] – Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint Filed November 10, 2023 | 23a | | Exhibit B to Certification of [...] – Virginia State Corporation Commission Record for [...] Filed November 10, 2023 | 24a | | Exhibit C to Certification of [...] - Virginia State Corporation Commission Record for [...]
[brief] 15  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS & RULINGS  Trial Court's Sep 23, 2022 order granting motion(s) to dismiss  Pa70  Trial Court's Sep 23, 2022 order denying all cross motions  Pa71  Trial Court's Oct 21, 2022 order denying all cross motions  Pa110  Trial Court's Oct 21, 2022 order granting motion for sanctions  Pa112  Trial Court's Feb 28, 2023 order on motion and all cross motions  Pa169  TABLE OF APPENDIX
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(e).  The definition of retaliatory action “speaks in terms of completed action. ”  Beasley v. Passaic Cnty., 377 N.J. Super. 585, 606 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Keelan v. Bell Commc’ns Rsch., 289 N.J. Super. 531, 539 (App. Div. 1996)).  Yvonne  [...]  To establish a prima facie case of retaliation against [...], [...] must show: (1) that he was engaged in protected activity known to [...]; (2) he was subjected to an adverse employment action by the defendant; and (3) there was a causal link between the two.
[brief] The purpose of Section 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-257 (1978).  “The numerous rulings made during the litigation process, if they are within the trial court’s discretionary authority, are measured against the standard of “mistake exercise” or “abuse of discretion. ”  Thus, an appellate court must defer to the trial courts exercise of discretion unless the trial judge pursued a manifestly unjust course…”  Gillman v Bally Mfg. Corp, 286 NJ Super 525 528 (App Div 1996), and the mistaken exercise prejudices the substantial rights of a party, Morning Ledger v Sports and Expo., 423 NJ Super 140, 174-175 (App Div 2011).  In this defendant’s case before this court the trial court failed to evaluate the evidence and facts establishing a meritorious claim of Defective Service (its erroneous misapplication of laches to deny this defendants Civil Rights Action claim of a Due Process Violation) citing missed case law (Pa17-Pa18; Pa33) thus generating an unfair result, R 2:10-2.  A judgment IS a void judgment if the court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or if the parties acted in manner inconsistent with due process evidence established in this case before the court showed Service of Process failed to be validated by Plaintiff [...] (Pa1) for failure to validate when challenged (P10-Pa11; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa40; Pa58-Pa59; Pa62) (Third Circuit case law cited throughout this appeal establishes the burden of proof of validity is on the party claiming Service of Process had been executed properly).
[brief] ”  See N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a)-(c).  In State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564 (1997), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the terms “annoy,” and “annoyance” should be accorded their normal and accepted meanings, and those provisions of the statute do not require physical contact or acts of violence.  See Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 580 (citing Fahey v. City of Jersey City, 52 N.J. 103, 107 (1968)).  A plain language, and ordinary, reading of the harassment statute supports Plaintiff’s reasonable belief that Defendant [...]’s actions, which included verbal abuse, profanity, and physical intimidation without contact, fell within the statutory definition.  That Plaintiff, and others who complained about Defendant [...], may not know the details of the State’s harassment statute is irrelevant.  The complaining employee need not specifically articulate the “exact violation” that is occurring.  See Hernandez v. Montville Tp. Bd. of Educ., 354 N.J. Super. 467, 474 (App. Div.2002), aff’d o.b., 179 N.J. 81 (2004).  “The object of CEPA is not to make lawyers out of conscientious employees but rather to prevent retaliation against those employees who object to employer conduct that they reasonably believe to be unlawful.
[brief] Appellant/Third-Party Plaintiff, [...] ("[...]") refers to and incorporates the Procedural History and Statement of Facts in its opening brief of August 5, 2024. \(^1\)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE JURY’S FINDING THAT O.A. PETERSON WAS 100% LIABLE DOES NOT FORECLOSE REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT’S ERRONEOUS DECISION FINDING THAT THE CONTRACTUAL INDEMNITY PROVISION WAS AMBIGUOUS.
[brief] The Respondents shall secure a transcript of each hearing on an expedited basis, to be paid for by the Respondents, and shall distribute copies of the hearing transcripts to the Township, the Special Hearing Officer and the Special Master; K.  All costs for the Special Hearing Officer, and any expert(s) retained on behalf of the Special Hearing Officer, shall be split equally between the Respondents and the Township for the application being reviewed by the Special Hearing Officer.  All costs associated with the Special Master shall continue to be borne by the Township; L.
[brief] The other decisions cited by plaintiff are equally distinguishable and, in many cases, actually support defendants’ position that reconsideration was appropriate here.  *See,* e.g. *Lewis v. Preschel,* 237 N.J. Super. 418, 423 (App. Div. 1989) (finding that the challenged motion for reconsideration and associated decision did not constitute an improper “lateral appeal”) (Pb13).  Defendants did not opt to wait to seek reconsideration like the defendant-counter plaintiff in *Ezekwo.*  *See* *Brach, Eichler, Rosenberg, Silver, Bernstein, Hammer & Gladstone, PC v. Ezekwo,* 345 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div. 2001) (finding that the defendant/counter-plaintiff’s challenge to a trial court order constituted an improper lateral appeal where she opted not to apply for reconsideration to the original judge, and then argued his decision should have been overruled without ever articulating “how or why the interests of justice required the trial court to reconsider the prior judge’s ruling”) (Pb13).  Nor did defendants intentionally maneuver to apply for reconsideration to a different judge.  This is also not a situation where [...] issued a detail written opinion “demonstrat[ing] careful attention to the facts and the law that applied” as was the case in the unpublished, unprecedential Fortress Inv. Grp. improperly cited and relied on by plaintiff.  See Black Creek Sanctuary Condo. Ass’n v. Fortress Inv. Grp., LLC, 2015 WL 1565644 (N.J. App. Div. 2015) (finding reconsideration and vacation of prior trial court order improper where “[t]he second judge simply had a different view of the evidence and applicable law” and the first judge’s “detailed written opinion demonstrate[d] careful attention to the facts and the law that applied to each count of plaintiffs’ complaint .
[brief] At issue in that case was [...]’s ordinance that permitted a hardship increase if the “landlord cannot (a) meet operating expenses or (b) make a fair return on investment.  The [...] ordinance defines a fair return on investment as up to six percent above available passbook interest rates applied essentially to the owner’s cash investment in the property. ”  103 N.J. at 366.  A “fair return” means “the percentage of return on equity in a real property investment. ”  Equity is determined by the “actual purchase price minus any and all existing liens on the property.
[brief] [25T14-15]  [...] then handed his prepared final judgment of divorce to [...] (25T15), which the court entered that same day.  The Judgment notes that [...] represented plaintiff, with defendant noted as “pro se. ”  The Judgment provides that the January 17, 2014 Matrimonial Settlement Agreement resolved all issues “which would have otherwise been decided by this Court with each party having been advised of his or her right to be represented by independent counsel of their own choosing…”  The Judgment again notes, “The Court having found that each party entered into such agreement freely and voluntarily and finding the agreement to be fair and equitable under all of the circumstances.  It is understood that the Court heard no testimony with respect to the terms of the Matrimonial Settlement Agreement and made no findings with respect thereto, other than to specifically find that the parties entered into it freely and voluntarily and believe it to be fair and equitable under the circumstances…”  A15.
[brief] The Accident Took Place in the Prospect Street Crosswalk.  As for the location of the accident, [...] was shown a photograph taken by [...], P.E. (Pa730), one of plaintiff's liability experts, during Smith's site inspection, and the following colloquy took place at deposition:  Q.  You're standing in the middle of the street in the crosswalk, correct, in this picture?  A.  In the picture, yes.  Q.  How do you know that's where the accident took place?  A.  Because that's where I got hit.  (Pa157).  D.
[directive] Accepting Reports of Officer Misconduct .................................................. 19  5.1  Accepting Reports Alleging Officer Misconduct .................................................................... 19 5.2  Immediate Suspension Pending Investigation and Disposition ............................................. 22  6  Investigation of Internal Complaints ......................................................... 24 6.1  Time Limitations ....................................................................................................................  24 6.2  Investigation and Adjudication of Minor Complaints ............................................................ 26 6.3  Investigation and Adjudication of Serious Complaints .......................................................... 28 6.4  Domestic Violence Incidents Involving Agency Personnel .................................................... 31  7
[directive] The Working Group recommends that the Attorney General notify county prosecutors any time a CBVI organization providing violence intervention services and an HVIP organization is awarded funding by the DLPS.  The notification should include the contact information for a representative of the organization.  The purpose of this notification is to advise the county prosecutor of an entity in its jurisdiction that is providing services covered by official Attorney General Guidelines.  The county prosecutor should then notify the local law enforcement agency covering the CBVI and HVIP organization’s catchment area, and should provide the LEA with information about the Attorney General’s Guidelines and training materials.
[brief] At its core, this litigation is a fight between insurers as to which are responsible to pay the money spent to defend and settle a lawsuit (“Hood lawsuit”) on behalf of [...]  (“[...]”).  At the time the instant litigation was filed, the Hood lawsuit was still pending in Philadelphia, PA.  In the Hood lawsuit, [...] was defended by its primary general liability insurer, [...] (“[...]”), which paid all defense costs and legal fees for [...].  Several months after the instant litigation was filed, a settlement was reached in the Hood lawsuit, whereby [...] paid its $1 million policy limit on behalf of [...].  [...]’s umbrella insurer, [...] (“[...]”), paid an additional $350,000 to settle all claims against [...].  In the end, [...] was fully protected by its insurers – [...] and [...] – in the Hood lawsuit, and has no damages of its own in the instant litigation.  Now, through contract and declaratory judgment claims, [...] and [...] essentially seek to recover the money they spent from [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”).  The trial court, in a very well-reasoned and supported opinion, correctly ruled in favor of [...] and [...] in the coverage dispute.  But regardless of which insurers prevail in that coverage dispute, there is no theory under which [...] (“[...]”) can be responsible for the money [...]\(^1\) and [...] spent to defend and settle the Hood lawsuit.  The trial court correctly granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] Plaintiff testified that following the incident, she was brought to the manager’s office, at which point she suggested to a [...] employee that they look at the cameras to ascertain what transpired.  (Pa31-Pa32)  She further testified that the employee was able to find co-defendant [...] “coming around with the cart” making a turn from a different aisle to the aisle where Plaintiff was located, that she saw footage of [...] subsequently pushing his U-boat in the same aisle that she was standing in, that the employee “even made a comment [as to] how full the customer’s cart [was],” that she saw [...] make his way from the end of the aisle until he reached her, and that she was not visible on the surveillance footage because [...]’s cart was piled so high with merchandise.  (Pa32-Pa34; Pa36)  While a duty to preserve is not boundless, [...], simply by virtue of the fact that an incident occurred involving injury to Plaintiff, certainly had an obligation to preserve all surveillance footage of that calendar day.
[brief] Appellant makes no attempt to present a disputed issue of fact regarding this initial prong of Lehman with regard to the vast majority of the defendants.  With regard to liability of the twelve individual defendants, plaintiff fails to address the controlling case on the subject.  Surprisingly, Cicchetti v. Morris County Sherriff's Office, 194 N.J. 563 (2008), does not even appear in the table of authorities in appellant’s brief.  In Cicchetti, 193 N.J. at 594, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that “aiding and abetting” liability under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e) is the sole method of bringing a LAD claim against an individual defendant like the twelve named by [...].  The Cicchetti Court ruled that the “acts and failures” to act of supervisors did not result in the possibility of aiding and abetting liability under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e).
[brief] 31 Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289 (2016) ..............................................................................  46 MZM Constr. Co., Inc. v. New Jersey Bldg. Laborers Statewide Benefit Funds, 974 F.3d 386 (3d Cir. 2020) ..................................................................  46 National Iranian Oil Co. v. Mapco Int’l, Inc., 983 F.2d 485 (3d Cir. 1992) ..................................................................  50
[brief] •  Defendants’ pre-subdivision chain of title going back to at least 1972 repeatedly references 105’ of frontage along 21st Street South and 110.69’ along the public alley.  Ja29, Ja60, Ja67.  •  The historical pre-subdivision deeds for Lot 2 going back to 1979 reveal the pre-subdivision frontage for Lot 2 of 80’ along 21st Street South and 80’ along the public alley.  Ja32, Ja36, Ja41, Ja48, Ja57.  •  The historical deeds for Lot 1 going back to 1990 reveal the proper combined frontage for Lots 2 and 3 as 185’ along 21st Street South.  Ja70-102.  •  Defendants’ Deed notes that it is “UNDER AND SUBJECT to any and all covenants, conditions, rights, restrictions, and easements of record, if any. ”  Ja180.  •  Defendants’ Deed expressly references the recording information for the 2010 [...] Acquisition Deed and identifies the Subdivision Plan by date, project number, and plan preparer.  Ja179-80.  •  Defendants’ Deed also states the “Property” is that which is “Block 1801, Lot 3 as shown on the Official Tax Map of Brigantine. ”  Ja179.  •  An inset on the Subdivision Plan shows a tax map with the correct 21st Street frontage of 185’ and correct pre-subdivision widths for each lot (105’ and 80’), contradicting the measurements on the prepared subdivision.
[brief] 3  Although the evidence discovered in plain view was not seized, the analysis girds the notion that the officer was acting within his constitutional limitations.  discover the evidence inadvertently, that is, he did not know in advance where the evidence was located nor intend to seize it; and 3) it was immediately apparent to the police that the item was evidence or contraband.  *State v. Mann*, 203 N.J. 328, 341 (2010).  N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 grants authority to police to request the driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance of any driver.  Likewise, police may perform a limited search for those credentials when a driver is “unable or unwilling” to do so.  This search must be confined to places where such documentation would ordinarily be kept.  *State v. Terry*, 232 N.J. 218, 222-223 (2018) (citing *State v. Keaton*, 222 N.J. 438, 449-451 (2015)).  Moreover, *State v. Slowbocker* 79 N.J. 1 (1979), allows for this kind of search when there is a “substantial necessit[y] grounded in public safety. ”  D.  **Facts**
[directive] These recordings can be used in internal investigations because the video image is not restricted at all and the officer is a party to the audio portion of the recording at all times.  7.9.9  Some agencies equip their patrol vehicles or other vehicles with GPS devices.  These devices can locate a vehicle with great accuracy.  Information gleaned from these devices may be used in internal affairs investigations because the subject officer has no expectation of privacy in their whereabouts when performing police duties.  7.10