ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Kehr Packages v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1412 (3d Cir. 1991).  The Third Circuit considers the following factors in determining whether a pattern of racketeering activity has been alleged:  "the number of unlawful acts, the length of time over which the acts were committed, the similarity of the acts, the number of victims, the number of perpetrators, and the character of the unlawful activity."  Id. at 1412-13 (quoting Barticheck v. Fid. Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1987)).  Predicate acts are related if they "have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics."  Zahl v. New Jersey Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety Div. of Consumer Affairs, 428 F. App'x 205, 211 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 240, 109 S. Ct. 2893, 106 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1989)).  However, it is well settled that allegations of a single fraudulent scheme designed to deprive a single victim of his property on a single occasion do not adequately allege a RICO violation.
[directive] Family Division Managers Superior Court Judges Finance Division Managers Municipal Court Judges Municipal Division Managers  [...], Deputy Adm. Dir. Municipal Court Administrators and Directors  AOC Directors and Assistant Directors  [...], Municipal Court Services Trial Court Administrators  [...], Municipal Court Services Civil Division Managers  [...], Criminal Practice Division Criminal Division Managers  [...], Special Assistant [...], Special Assistant 2004 10, Judges November Presiding Council Practices  Criminal Judicial 2006
[brief] As for the Statue of Limitations issue, thirteen (13) years, going by the date the Motion to Enforce was filed, is beyond reasonable.  Especially in light of the fact that [...] should have taken into account the intricacies involved in an Eminent Domian action and he should have known that [...] had permanently closed six to seven months prior to the execution of the PSA.  Quite frankly, based on the above, NJ Rule 4:50-1 (f) should not apply in this situation, Plaintiff hired a extremely qualified matrimonial attorney to represent her approximately fourteen (14) years ago, she had knowledge of a lawsuit which involved the land, the state and loss of money re: [...].
[brief] ............................................................................  21 Van Winkle v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 370 N.J. Super. 40 (App. Div. 2004) ..................................................  31 Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) ............................................................  19 Whirlpool Props., Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n, 208 N.J. 141 (2011)  ............................................................................  26 Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017) ............................................................  35  Willey v. Sweetwater Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Trs., No. 23-CV-069, 2023 WL 4297186 (D. Wyo. June 30, 2023)  ............... 14–15, 15  CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES
[directive] The special drug diagnostic, assessment and treatment condition set forth in this Section of the Guidelines is designed to address the concern that the prospect of a probationary or county jail sentence may be insufficient to provide the sentencing court with the leverage necessary to convince an addicted defendant to overcome denial and accept the rigors of clinically-appropriate treatment, such as the treatment provided pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 (treatment in lieu of imprisonment).  That statutory provision is the legal cornerstone of New Jersey’s Drug Court Program, which is one of the most promising criminal justice initiatives in the State.  It is imperative that the Drug Court Program not be undermined by provisions of these Guidelines that might otherwise reflexively require a prosecutor to offer drug or alcohol dependent offenders a deceptively attractive alternative to clinically-appropriate treatment in the form of a regular probationary sentence pursuant to a standardized “open” plea offer.
[brief] The trial court ignored plaintiff’s counsel’s request for oral argument and issued a Judgment Awarding Counsel Fees and Costs and a supporting written opinion on May 19, 2023.  (Pa9-21).  The court cut plaintiff’s counsel’s fee award by 93 percent, from 67.3 hours at an hourly rate of $525 (totaling --- 6  Briefs submitted to the trial court are included the plaintiff’s Appendix, because their content is germane to the appeal and because the Court referred to their content in summarizing the respective positions of the parties in its written opinion.  See R. 2:6-1(a)(2); (Pa9-21).  $35,332.70) to 6.2 hours at an hourly rate of $395 (totaling $2,449.00).  *Ibid.*; cf. (Pa152-155).  The court left costs of $552.20 unchanged.  *Ibid.*  In its written opinion, the court first summarized plaintiff’s counsel’s arguments.  (Pa11-16).  The court stated counsel argued that (a) he was entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees because such an award was agreed to in the parties’ settlement and plaintiff was the prevailing party under Rule 4:42-9(8); (b) defendant breached the parties settlement agreement by arguing, in opposing papers, that plaintiff’s counsel’s fee application should be denied in its entirety; (c) under the law, a plaintiff prevails if it succeeds in obtaining a result that materially alters or affects defendant’s behavior towards it; (d) plaintiff’s counsel complied with all standards set forth in *Rendine*, supra, for the proper calculation of the lodestar; (e) the lodestar calculations in counsel’s fee application are presumed reasonable; (f) fee-shifting statutes penalize defendants and reward plaintiffs’ counsel “for socially beneficial litigation”; (f) plaintiff’s counsel is a reputable consumer fraud attorney and his $525 hourly rate is the prevailing rate among competent consumer law attorneys in his county; (g) counsel’s fees were reasonable under RPC 1.5(a); and (h) fees for preparation and filing of a prevailing party’s fee application are includable in his or her fee application.
[brief] *Ibid.*  Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer noted that car was full of Febreze air fresheners.  *Ibid.*  The defendant was very nervous: he was sweating and trembling as he spoke to the officer.  *Ibid.*  He gave contradictory answers to the detective’s questions.  *Ibid.*  The stop was extended to have a canine sniff the outside of the car.  *Id.* at 548.  In upholding the stop, the Supreme Court stated that the courts must examine the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists.
[brief] (8T31:22-32:2).  Further, as the trial court properly recognized, based on the video of the plaintiff walking in the [...] store with a rollator on the day of the incident, that the plaintiff chose to show to the jury during opening statements, “a lay person could see…that people who were unsteady on their feet and use a device to assist with stability and mobility such as Plaintiff, may be more prone to falls. ”  (8T32:10-15).  Accordingly, without expert testimony, a jury could determine whether the plaintiff’s prior history of balance and gait issues and prior falls impacted her tendency to fall and was the cause of her fall at the [...].  Id.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the introduction of this evidence as substantive evidence of the cause of the plaintiff’s fall as well as to impeach the credibility of witnesses.
[brief] ”  Id. at 450.  Here, the Court improperly considered the Yarbough factors.  First, the Yarbough factors must be considered in conjunction with the Miller factors.  Zuber, 227 N.J. at 450.  In the present case the crimes arose out of one incident; the crimes occurred as part of one five-minute series of events; the events occurred in rapid succession as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior.  (7T:322-7 to 15).  Furthermore, both experts agreed that [...] was in a dissociative state during the shootings.  (10T:122-10 to 123-21); (Da458).  The Court did not address the dissociative state, mental health or the Miller factors when imposing consecutive sentences.
[brief] Unpublished Opinion in [...] v. [...], [...], 2018 WL 6729794 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2018)  ....................1a  Unpublished Opinion in In re [...], No. [...], 2019 WL 8437021 (3d Cir. Dec. 6, 2019)  .......................6a  Unpublished Opinion in Williams v. [...], [...], 2007 WL 1630875 (N.D. Ga. June 4, 2007)  .......8a  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ##  Cases Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) .................................................. 12 California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) ..................................................... 3 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) .................................................... 17 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ........................................................ passim State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384 (2019) ........................................................................ 6 State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592 (2021) ................................................................... 4 State v. Bailey, 231 N.J. 474 (2018) .................................................................... 23 State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263 (1973) ................................................................. 17, 18 State v. Baylor, 423 N.J. Super. 578 (App. Div. 2011), certif. denied, 210 N.J. 263 (2012) ................................................................. 9 State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123 (1988) ........................................................................ 12, 13 State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221 (2014) .................................................................... 28 State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338 (2005) .................................................................. 17 State v. Bullock, 253 N.J. 512 (2023) .................................................................. 3, 4, 5 State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413 (2001) .................................................................... 34 State v. Carrion, 249 N.J. 253 (2021) ................................................................. 2 State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014) ....................................................................... 29, 30 State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30 (1997) ...................................................................... 16, 17 State v. Clark, 251 N.J. 266 (2022) .................................................................... 19, 24, 25 State v. Cook, 179 N.J. 533 (2004) ..................................................................... 8 State v. Cotto, 471 N.J. Super. 489 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 252 N.J. 166 (2022) .............................................. 25, 27 State v. Cuff, 239 N.J. 321 (2019) .................................................................................. 34 State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494 (2005) ............................................................................. 30 State v. Davis, 96 N.J. 611 (1984) .................................................................................. 29 State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544 (2011) .................................................................
[brief] The significance of the disclosure requirement is underlined by [...]:  “If either party to a transaction conceals some fact which is material, which is within his own knowledge, and which it is his duty to disclose, he is guilty of actual fraud. ”  Op. cit., § 901 at 545–546.  The rule is set forth in *Jewish Center of Sussex County v. Whale*, 165 N.J.Super. 84, 397 A.2d 712 (Ch.Div.1978), aff’d 172 N.J. Super. 165, 411 A.2d 475 (App.Div.1980):  The fact that no affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact has been made does not bar relief.  The suppression of truth, the withholding of the truth when it should be disclosed, is equivalent to the expression of falsehood.  The question under those circumstances is whether the failure to volunteer disclosure of certain facts amounts to fraudulent concealment, or, more specifically, whether the defendant is bound in conscience and duty to recognize that the facts so concealed are significant and material and are facts in respect to which he cannot innocently be silent.  Where the circumstances warrant the conclusion that he is so bound and has such a duty, equity will provide relief.
[brief] On June 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed a CEPA action pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:19-1, et seq (Conscientious Employee Protection Act) (Pa-1).  Defendants filed no Answer; instead, a R. 4:6-2 Motion was filed (Pa-17) which was treated by the Court below as a summary judgment motion and granted on December 30, 2022 (Pa-19).  Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration on January 3, 2023 (Pa-31) which was denied on May 22, 2023 (Pa-32).  This Notice of Appeal followed (Pa-39).
[brief] Upon her return, their relationship significantly deteriorated; Defendant started having arguments and complaints.  Plaintiff described a change in Defendant’s behavior that coincided with her obtaining a green card, noting she became more opinionated after that.  But Plaintiff suggested that despite disagreements, they tried to resolve issues, framing it as typical marital discord.  (1T127).  However, Defendant continuously criticized Plaintiff and his parents, leading to frequent arguments, even over minor issues like watering plants.  (2T33).  After receiving Defendant’s submissions during discovery, Plaintiff realized she had been secretly recording his parents and him during this time, leading him to believe that she was purposefully instigating arguments.
[brief] On Thursday July 15, 2021, plaintiff served all defendants.  (Pa219 - [...]).  Two days later, on Saturday July 17, 2021, plaintiff received an after-the-fact cursory civil rights act violations response letter dated July 13, 2021 from Millburn's Labor Attorney (and defendants' current counsel in this action) regarding plaintiff’s June 15, 2021 procedural due process/Open Public Meetings Act/political free speech/right to petition violation allegations.  (Pa115).  Millburn's Labor Attorney acknowledged possible June 15, 2021 Open Public Meeting Act Violation Issues.  On Monday July 19, 2021, plaintiff responded to the cursory response letter.  (Pa117).  Plaintiff advised Labor Counsel of the commencement of this hybrid action.
[directive] DEFINITIONS  2.1  Detainee:  For the purposes of these guidelines a detainee is a person who is either being detained or held in police custody; is awaiting initial judicial review for the issuance of an arrest warrant; or is about to be sentenced by a court to a period of incarceration.  2.2  Dependent:  For the purposes of these guidelines a dependent is a person who resides with and/or is subject to the primary care of the detainee because of age, gender, physical condition or special need.  3.0  POLICY
[brief] Around November 2016, [...] received two handwritten letters from another inmate, [...].  Taylor wrote that a third inmate, known to him by street name, admitted he had shot [...].  When Taylor learned [...] had been blamed, he wrote offering his help.  Taylor agreed to speak to [...]’s appellate counsel, and he confirmed the other inmate, named something like “[...],” confessed to him (Da543-45)  Department of Corrections database shows [...] was incarcerated in the Atlantic County Jail (ACJ) for several months with Taylor.  (Da547-48)  Taylor verified he was the confessor when he saw a photo of [...], and noted Brown was about 5’6.  While the PCR petition was pending, an OPD investigator visited Taylor, who confirmed the above and signed an affidavit memorializing it.
[brief] D.  Even if the stop and frisk was premature, the gun and drugs on defendant’s person would have been inevitably discovered.  While it does not appear [...] discovered the gun and drugs on the car tires before defendant was stopped and frisked, it is certain this fact would have only solidified the lawfulness of the stop and frisk.  In that sense, the gun on defendant would have been inevitably discovered.  “[T]he inevitable discovery doctrine allows for the admission of evidence obtained through law enforcement's unconstitutional conduct if that evidence would have been discovered in the absence of that unlawful conduct. ”  State v. Carmy, 239 N.J. 282, 301 (2019) (internal citations omitted).  “Inevitable discovery tempers the ‘social costs associated with the exclusionary rule’ by placing ‘police in the same position that they would have been in had no police misconduct occurred. ’”  Id. at 301-02 (quoting State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 237 (1985)).  Plainly, had defendant not been stopped and frisked before [...] discovered the gun and drugs in plain view on top of the car tires parked on a public street – indeed, the same vehicle defendant and his cohorts were seen hiding near -- they would have been stopped and frisked afterward.  Under these circumstances, the social cost of the exclusionary rule would not be justified because the evidence would have been discovered even if the initial stop and frisk had not yet occurred.  The gun and drugs on the tire was entirely consistent with the [...]’s observations.  Their discovery confirmed his reasonable suspicions, based on his training and experience, and would have cemented the right to stop and frisk defendant for weapons.  Accordingly, even if the initial stop and frisk was premature, the discovery of the gun and drugs on the car tire would have inevitably led to a lawful stop and frisk of defendant and discovery of his gun and drugs.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Plaintiff argues that Reyes is “inapt to the present facts,” and to some degree plaintiff is correct.  (Pb 13).  Reyes did not involve commercial industrial property as we have here.  Reyes involved residential property (a summer house at the Jersey Shore).  Reyes did not involve a long-term lease as we have here.  Instead, the shore house was rented on a ‘week-to-week’ basis.  The Court in Reyes took issue with another residential property case from 1951, *Patton v. The Texas Co.*, 13 N.J. Super. 42, (App. Div. 1951).
[brief] This is a straightforward case of a simple mistake by [...], fully understandable by a jury based on the factual testimony of Appellant Developer [...], [...]’s president [...], the engineers and land surveyors who performed the work, the town engineer, and the supporting documents produced in discovery.  No judge has explained exactly what expert testimony would be required on liability or damages except regarding one particular issue—the relationship between the grading error and a potential loss of revenue from the [...].  All other issues of liability, damages alleged by Appellants, and their causal relationship to Respondents’ mistakes, can be sufficiently demonstrated by the witnesses previously identified by Appellants.
[brief] (Raised Below: Da 377)  The Facts are not in dispute and may be summarized as follows:  1.  [...] was a Commissioner of the [...] at the time he possessed and transmitted a video that depicted a naked man defecating into a naked woman's mouth and onto her face, and ended with the words on the screen "Shit happens," "Thug life," "Dug life," and "Bitch;" 2.  [...] transmitted the video in a chat room composed of leaders and residents of the [...] and [...]; and 3.  Upon realizing that the video had been so communicated, [...] said: “OMG, how did so many people get to see this.  . .wow. ”  A.  As an appointed public official/officer, [...] neglected his duty under N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c) to act ethically in his private life and to treat all people equally with respect and dignity.  (Raised Below: Da 376)  It is undisputed that an appointment as Commissioner to the [...] is an appointment to a public office.
[brief] Assuming arguendo this Court finds that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by commenting on plea agreements generally, those comments were not “so egregious [they] deprived the defendant of a fair trial. ” (Smith, 167 N.J. at 181).  This matter is directly comparable to the matter of State v. Wilson, 128 N.J. 233, 241 (1992), wherein the prosecutor stated during summation that he would “never make a deal with” [...], one of the witnesses, to secure favorable testimony against the defendant because “[...] ‘was part of’ the murder” at issue.  As no witness had testified in support of that assertion, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that it constituted prosecutorial misconduct.  (Id.).  However, the Court held that it did not rise to the level of reversible error where defendant did not object, and where [...] testified that he was “trying to help [himself]” by testifying, which “obviously contested [[...]’s credibility] to an extent sufficient to minimize the impact of the prosecutor’s infraction. ” (Id. at 243 (quoting State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 157 (1991)).  Defense counsel in this matter consistently attacked [...]’s credibility to an extent that the impact of the prosecutor’s comments was sufficiently minimized and reversal is therefore unnecessary.  (See generally 2T:125-10 to 132-20 and 5T:77-3 to 79-3).
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY (supplemental)  The complaint was filed on July 3, 2023.  (Pa1 – Pa6).  Trial was scheduled and heard on Nov 13, 2023.  (1T).  On Nov 16, 2023, the trial court entered a written order of dismissal.  (Pa7).  On Dec 28, 2023, I filed a timely Notice of Appeal.  (Pa8 – Pa13).  On May 10, 2024, I timely filed and served my opening Brief and Appendix.  The Respondents deadline to file their brief and appendix was June 10, 2024, but for reasons never explained, they missed this deadline.  And in the end, because of several of their own failures, their deadline was ultimately extended to Sep 20, 2024 - affording them over 4 months’ time in which to file their final version of their Respondent brief (and they then did so without any appendix of their own).
[brief] Pa12 at ¶66.  Notwithstanding its receipt of that notice, neither Defendant, another creditor, nor the assigned bankruptcy trustee filed any objection in Plaintiff’s bankruptcy case.  Pa12 at 67.  On June 2, 2021, the trustee filed his report abandoning Plaintiff’s scheduled consumer claims and, on July 27, 2021, the Order discharging Plaintiff’s debts and the Final Decree were entered and the case was closed.  Pa12 at ¶69.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I.