ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On December 1, 2018, Plaintiff [...], then 35 years-old, was the operator of a motor vehicle stopped in the drive-thru lane of a fast-food restaurant when his car was struck from behind by a vehicle driven by Defendant [...].  The vehicle driven by Ms. Huggins was owned by Defendant [...] who had permitted her son, Defendant [...], to use it.  Mr. Forde, in turn, permitted Ms. Huggins to drive the car.  Prior to trial, Defendants Huggins and Forde stipulated their liability for the happening of the accident, and Plaintiff agreed to voluntarily dismiss his claims against Ms. Byrd.  At trial, Plaintiff testified to having felt three impacts.  3T., at 27:16 to 25.  He described the initial impact as so forceful that he was “pushed out of the window” through which he had been preparing to pay for his order.  Ibid.  Thereafter, his car was pushed into a fence.  Id., at 28:1 to 16.  Plaintiff “felt a lot of discomfort,” “felt something was dislocated” and “felt pain” at the scene.  Id., at 29:1 to 9.  He declined transport by ambulance for treatment “[b]ecause I could not afford an ambulance at that time.  An ambulance is very expensive, and I was able to bring myself to the urgent care. ”  Id., at 31:1 to 10.  At urgent care, Plaintiff complained of “discomfort” in his neck and upper back and a headache.  Id., at 32:7 to 16.  X-rays were taken.  An examination was conducted.  Plaintiff was given Ibuprofen and referred to [...] for orthopedic evaluation.  Id., at 32:17 to 33:11.  He saw [...] for the first time on December 12, 2018.  Id., at 33:5 to 34:4.  At that time, he reported pain in his head, neck, back and radiating down his arms.  Id., at 34:5 to 35:4.  He also described being unable to sit for more than three hours before becoming exhausted by nerve pains in his back.  Ibid.  [...] referred Plaintiff for chiropractic care and for MRI and EMG testing.  Id., at 35:5 to 25.  Plaintiff saw [...] six further times through February 23, 2021.  Id., at 35:19 to 21; 37:23 to 38:1.  He received chiropractic care through [...]’s office on “at least 84 visits” from December 17, 2018 through February 29, 2020 when his treatment stopped “because of Covid. ”  Id., at 38:25 to 41:9.  Despite his treatment, Plaintiff experienced no overall relief from his symptoms.  Id., at 41:23 to 42:8.  As of the time of trial, he continued to complain of neck, lower back and arm pain such that he spent 80% of his work day laying down using his lap top.  Id., at 54:15 to 21.  He also described an inability to play basketball and difficulties getting out of bed, cleaning up around the house, doing dishes, vacuuming, bending over, exercise and driving.  Id., at 55:22 to 57:3.  Plaintiff also testified that he was out of work from December 6, 2018 through January 24, 2019 sustaining a net wage loss of $2,867.31.
[brief] 4R.  On June 24, 2020, the Honorable [...], P.J.S.C. read her oral decision on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.  1T².  The Trial Court quoted from the Affidavit of Merit Statute, which is codified at N.J.S.A. § 2A:53A-27, et. seq., and the requirements that an expert must meet in order to execute an Affidavit.  1T 8:18 – 9:7; and 9:13 – 11:14.  As noted by the Trial Court, it was undisputed that [...] specializes in pulmonology with a subspecialty in critical care.  1T 11:15 – 11:21.  The Trial Court also identified Plaintiff’s argument being that “the affidavit of merit statute does not require that the affiant had the identical credentials as the defendant physician.  Instead plaintiff asserts that the affiant need only have the same board certifications as the defendant physician and that medical treatment involve[ing] that specialty. ”  1T 11:22 – 12:24 (emphasis added).  Plaintiff further argued that despite [...]’s Board Certification being  ²The reference to 1T is a citation to the Transcript of the Trial Court’s decision from June 24, 2020.  in critical care and [...]’s specialty being in surgical critical care, the doctors practiced within the same specialty.  **1T** **12:4 – 6.**  Plaintiff’s argument was rejected by the Trial Court.  **1T** **12:7 – 14:4.**  In rejecting Plaintiff’s argument, the Court cited to and relied on the seminal case of *Nicholas v. Mynster*, 213 N.J. 463, 482 – 483 (2013), wherein New Jersey’s Supreme Court addressed the credentialing provision of the Affidavit of Merit Statute.
[brief] F. [...]’s Authority to Regulate “Building” Pursuant to the Genesis Deed.  The Genesis Deed and the thousands like it expressly state that “[n]o building, alteration or addition shall be made without the written approval of [...] ” (Da54).  Elsewhere, the Genesis Deed references the “[...] Developers” which, as discussed below, appeared to be initially comprised of the [...] and [...].  (Da572-573; 593; 623).  Beginning in September 1948 and continuing through this dispute, [...] has consistently exercised its authority to regulate building permits through its rules and in conjunction with “[...]’s” authority under the Genesis Deed. (Da533-34).  Indeed, in the meeting minutes from September 11, 1948, the Chairman of the Grounds Committee explained that both [...] and [...] were required to approve any building:  All plans and specifications for addition – alterations, etc. shall be filed in triplicate form to Ocean Beach Company for approval and signature, of which two copies shall be presented to the Grounds Committee for approval or signature.  (Id.).  The history of [...], the absent indispensable party, has not been developed given the absence of basic discovery—including interrogatories, document requests, requests for admission, and deposition discovery—all of which are necessary to establish that history.  To the best of [...]’s knowledge, however, [...] did business under the name [...] dating back to the late 1940’s.  In addition to the above, the minutes from [...]’s July 25, 1948 meeting contain a report from the Chairman of the Grounds Committee stating that “any alterations made to buildings must be 1st approved by [...] and the [G]rounds Committee.  Then permission is granted to go ahead with the alteration .  . . .” (Da527).  In these handwritten minutes, it appears [...] was first identified as the individual to approve building permits; however, [...]’s name was crossed out and replaced with “[...] ” (Id.).  Similarly, in a letter dated October 6, 1992, the President of [...] wrote a homeowner to advise “[i]t is your responsibility to show us your final plans, the resolution from [...] and to speak with the Developer. ” (Da607).  Based on the current record, it was not until 1984 that a formal legal entity bearing the name “[...]” was created as a limited partnership by [...] and the [...].  In [...]’s agreement and certificate of limited partnership, it recognized [...]’s prior work through “[...]”:  The land described in Schedule A was originally owned and developed by [...] under the name [...]  His widow and children wish to encourage the continued ownership, management and development of the property in family hands under a partnership in family members will participate in management, profits and growth.  (Da392).
[brief] See State v. Roper, 362 N.J. Super. 248, 252-53 (App. Div. 2003) (emphasizing “the trial court’s responsibility in the first instance to address and render a reasoned opinion upon any question brought before it” and expressing “dismay” at the trial court’s deferral of an “extremely significant question” to the appellate courts).  Respondent briefly attempts to point to a body of case law contrary to the well-reasoned and persuasive decisions from Washington, Michigan, and Massachusetts.  But respondent’s cited decisions have little useful reasoning.  (Pb 12-16)  Some of the decisions did not even involve the issue of whether offenders older than seventeen should categorically receive constitutional protec- tion; respondent nevertheless attempts to draw dicta from the decisions.  See United States v. Marshall, 736 F.3d 492, 498-500 (6th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the argument that the defendant, because of a hormone deficiency that made him childlike, should be an individual exception to a line drawn at eighteen); United States v. Hoffman, 710 F.3d 1228, 1232-33 (11th Cir. 2013) (rejecting a forty-three-year-old defendant’s argument that a juvenile conviction should not be a predicate offense).  Other of the decisions were based on procedural grounds, without directly reaching the merits of whether constitutional protection should be extended.  See In re Manning, 24 F.4th 1107, 1109 (6th Cir. 2022) (holding under the applicable habeas statute that only a right already recognized by the United States Supreme Court could be a basis for collateral relief); In re Rosado, 7F. 4th 152, 158-60 (3d Cir 2021) (same); See Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 764 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (holding under the applicable Pennsylvania statute that only a right already recognized by the United States or Pennsylvania Supreme Court could be a basis for collateral relief); Sloan v. State, 418 S.W.3d 884, 891-92 (Tex. App. 2013) (rejecting on preservation grounds an effort to extend Miller).
[brief] Accepting as true all of the evidence in the motion record proffered in support of Plaintiffs’ application, the trial court found that Plaintiffs could not establish essential elements of these claims.  The trial court’s finding that such claims therefore would be futile was neither incorrect nor an abuse of discretion, and should be upheld.  Similarly, this Court should not reverse the trial court’s discretionary ruling to preclude Plaintiffs from offering evidence at trial in support of claims for attorneys’ fees or punitive damages.
[brief] Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581 (2012)  .............................................................................15  Myer v. Spectra Gases, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73354 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2009)..............................28 N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Alloway Twp., 438 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div. 2015)....................................................15, 16
[brief] Respondents initially argue that this Court should not reverse the decision of the Board of Trustees because appellate courts have limited powers to review administrative actions.  *New Jersey Court Rule 2:2-3(a)(2)*  The courts are not powerless in their review of administrative agency actions.  When there is a clear error, or a misapplication of a set of facts to the proper statute, the court is not bound by the agency’s interpretation.  It is the role of the courts to ultimately interpret and apply a statute.
[brief] [Defendant] was a party to the lawsuit for twenty-one months before seeking to invoke the arbitration provision.  *A twenty-one-month delay is substantial, particularly in light of the fact that [Defendant] otherwise failed to provide notice of its intent to seek arbitration*  . . .  Although the failure to list arbitration as an affirmative defense is not dispositive of the issue, *see, e.g., Spaeth, supra*, 403 N.J. Super. at 512, 516-17, 959 A.2d 290, it does inform the waiver analysis.  *Cole*, 215 N.J. at 280-81 (emphasis added).  *Cole* found waiver after twenty-one months of litigation; here, Defendants litigated for seventeen months—not including the Collection Lawsuit filed four months earlier.  Defendants also filed a dispositive motion attacking the merits of [...]’s claims.  “The filing of a dispositive motion is a significant factor demonstrating a submission to the authority of a court to resolve the dispute. ”  *Id.* at 282.  As in *Cole*, the dispositive motion here “was partially granted and partially denied.  . . .Notably, [Defendant] does not take the position that it would surrender that partial substantive dismissal if the matter proceeded to arbitration. ”  *Id.*  As in *Cole*, Defendants failed to assert arbitration as an affirmative defense in their pleadings, certified that arbitration was not contemplated presently or in the future, and gave no indication of an intent to arbitrate until the Motion to Compel was filed.  Given that *Cole*’s requirement of a showing of prejudice for a finding waiver was abrogated by *Morgan*, Defendants here implicated at least four out of the remaining six factors for waiver discussed in *Cole*.  In *Morgan*, *supra*, the United States Supreme Court determined that a court should not engage in efforts “fostering arbitration” and that any actions taken by a party which are inconsistent with that party’s purported desire to compel arbitration can show waiver of any alleged contractual right to compel arbitration.
[brief] Any other view would turn the bidding scheme on its head.  [279 N.J. Super. at 602-03]  See also *Serenity*, 306 N.J. Super. at 157-59 (upholding municipal decision to reject bid that was not materially defective based on the municipality’s evaluation of the state of affairs at the time of bid opening). ²  In addition to being clearly stated in the case law, the rule that the bid date governs is the necessary corollary of the rule that no material aspect of a bid may be provided after the bid opening.
[brief] Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012), instructs courts in sentencing a juvenile “to take into account how children are different and those differences counsel against sentencing them to a life in prison. ” (17T217-3 to 13).  In *State v. Zuber*, 227 N.J. 422 (2017), the Supreme Court of New Jersey required sentencing court to apply the five *Miller* factors where, as here, a juvenile convicted as an adult faces an aggregate sentence that is the practical equivalent of life without parole.  *Zuber*, 227 N.J. at 447.  “To that end, judges must evaluate the *Miller* factors when they sentence a juvenile to a lengthy term of parole ineligibility for a single offense.  They must do the same when they consider a lengthy period of parole ineligibility in a case that involves multiple offenses at different times – when judges decide whether to run counts consecutively, and when they determine the length of the aggregate sentence. ”  *Ibid.*  When a juvenile is found guilty as an adult of multiple homicides, the sentencing court must apply the *Miller* and *Yarbough* factors when imposing consecutive terms.
[brief] Pa59.  On October 21, 2020 the Court issued a Case Management Order extending the deadline for Appellant’s production of his appraisal report to December 7, 2020.  Pa60.  On December 3, 2020 Appellant filed a Motion seeking an extension for the deadline to produce his appraisal report as well as seeking an Order “directing that Plaintiff reimburse Defendant for expert fees and costs. ”  Da102.  In response, the [...] filed a cross motion to bar Appellant from producing an appraisal report or relying upon appraiser’s testimony at trial.  Pa61.  On January 8, 2021, the trial court executed an Order denying Respondent’s cross motion and partially granting Appellant’s motion, extending the time for Appellant to produce his appraisal report within 60 days.
[brief] The sudden reading of the private right of action out of the NJCFLA by *Veras* was simply not rooted in an examination of the NJCFLA’s legislative intent and history—as *Veras* acknowledged was the polestar in determining whether an implied private right of action existed.  Rather, *Veras* acknowledged the existence of subsection 18 and determined that that, in and of itself, was sufficient to show that no implied private right of action existed in the statute, *without acknowledging further that there had always been a private right of action.*
[directive] TO warrant when PURSUANT  THE substantive considered  Disorderly a IN Degree Degree Degree Degree Degree Degree Degree Degree whether Disorderly Persons Persons Degree OR, ADMINISTRATOR, 2nd 2nd 3rd 3rd 4th 4th 4th 1st  JUDGE  Petty actual be regarding to appropriate. the factors offense; COURT insanity offense. accident") physical 1000 as the or factors so same within leaves another; persons of delineate offense.  to persons  MUNICIPAL by reason purpose of where degree.  COURT attempts if the case delineate knowingly degree to disorderly 2 persons disorderly by injury be in with Schedule offenses) bail second guilty ("Action or generally first DEPUTY burglary bodily weapon; and R.O.R. A weapon. disorderly offenses) #9-05 injury; vessel; not a OR otherwise, accident otherwise 39:4-129 found causes (non-indictable JUDGE or bodily Directive deadly of should person. or OR deadly weapon. theft petty or Bail vehicle Description option an (non-indictable recklessly crossing; ADMINISTRATOR delinquent N.J.S.A. serious tools; injury. commit a in consent, a another with COURT conspiracies involved with to deadly a manufactures the bodily driving Supplement another imminent injury violate to school register. or adjudicated for of mutual used 7:4-1 a knowingly is serious death SUPERIOR with recklessly bodily provide he which to through commonly of 7:2-2(b) to knows by injury injury Rule the fear or actor fails 2006 causes causes into circumstances or convicted, COURT in attempts driving while bodily bodily in who operator and purposely entered results if 26, another degree tools Rule A or or offense death offenses) May causes causes BY cause cause or accident possesses MUNICIPAL previously scuffle vehicle and school for fourth put or SET by causes under sex to to to negligently
[brief] [...]*  California Bar No. 322947  [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  *Pro hac vice s/ [...]  [...]  New Jersey Bar No. 369652021  [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  [...], Plaintiff/Appellant, v. [...], [...], in her official capacity as Collector of Taxes, and [...], in his official capacity as Mayor of East Orange, Defendants/Respondents.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY .............................................................................................................3  COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS ..........................................................................................3  LEGAL ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................................4  I.  THE JUDICIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF THE ROBBINSVILLE ZONING BOARD  REQUIRES DEFERENCE TO THE BOARD.  .........................................................................................................................................................................................4  II.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE PRELIMINARY AND FINAL MAJOR SUBDIVISION APPROVAL AND THE ROBBINSVILLE ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT  RESOLUTION OF MEMORIALIZATION  CONTAINS  ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW  SUPPORTING THE GRANT OF THE SUBDIVISION  .........................................................................................................................4  A.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE APPLICANT MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE TOWNSHIP ORDINANCES  .........................................................................................................................................................................................4  B.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT APPELLANT’S ASSERTION THAT THE BOARD WAS REQUIRED TO HEAR COUNTER TESTIMONY IS WITHOUT MERIT  .........................................................................................................................................................................................9  C.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE SUBMISSION OF THE EIS COMPLIES WITH THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE MLUL .........................................................................................................................................................................................11  D.  THE BOARD PROPERLY REVIEWED THE NECESSARY APPLICATION MATERIALS AND THE PUBLIC WAS GIVEN THE APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT COMMENTS AND/OR CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES ON THE APPLICATION FOR THE SUBDIVISION .........................................................................................................................................................................................13  III.  THE APPLICANT SUBMITTED ALL NECESSARY DOCUMENTATION TO OBTAIN SUBDIVISION APPROVAL.  .................................................................14  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................................................................15
[brief] [...] even cited to I/M/O Treston, [...], [...] (2021) (Ca236), as affirmed by Advisory Opinion A02-22 above, in determining the appropriate penalty.  (Ca037).  As the Commission made clear in I/M/O Treston, “there is a robust body of decisions and advisory opinions which school officials can utilize to determine when, and how, a disclaimer must be used on social media when speaking in their personal/private capacity in order to avoid running afoul of the Act.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  [...] and [...] devote most of their opposition briefs to glossing over the Appellate Division’s prior holdings and instructions, misconstruing this Court’s remand mandate as a complete affirmance of the Trial Court’s 2013 determinations.  Plaintiffs’ analysis is dead wrong.  As the [...] described in detail in their Opening Brief, the 2018 Appellate Division decision required the Trial Court to find specific facts within specific time periods to award compensation to [...] and [...].  The Trial Court failed to do so, and this Court must now rectify the Trial Court’s legal errors.  This case is more than three decades old, but justice has not yet been served.
[directive] 111.  Prosecutor’s Responsibilities: -- its  Each Prosecutor’s Office is responsible for managing and using resources -- funds, property, and personnel for authorized law enforcement programs or activities, and for conducting programs activities in an effective, efficient, and its or economical manner.  Each office’s system of organization, management, and control an should be designed accomplish these ends, with due regard the requirements of to to applicable laws, regulations, directives, and SOPS.  of of  The prevention misuse the forfeiture program of extreme importance and is that responsibility rests with the Prosecutor.  The Prosecutor’s Office structure, the division of accounting responsibilities, and related control procedures should be devised _ _ to prevent misuse, and an internal accounting and administrative control system . - should be operation to detect any conseqkential irregularity.
[brief] The scientific literature reveals that people misidentify strangers as people they believe are familiar, even people they see every day.  In one study, 30 subjects who worked at the same firm for at least two years were asked to identify photos of co-workers intermingled with strangers.  [...] et al., The Effect of Expectation on the Identification of Known and Unknown Persons, 6 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 173, 179-80 (1993).  Fifty-six percent of familiar persons were correctly recognized, but 22 percent of strangers were misidentified as colleagues.  *Ibid.*  At minimum, the jurors needed an instruction to consider whether the identifications of a faceless person were reliable.
[brief] Pa87  Plaintiff’s appeal of the Judgment and the Orders on the motions for reconsideration was initially filed on September 21, 2023.  Pal  An appeal of a final judgment must be filed within 45 days of its entry.  R. 2:4-1(a).  That time-period is tolled during the pendency of a timely filed motion for reconsideration.  R. 2:4-3(c).  Thus, in the instant matter, plaintiff, having filed a timely reconsideration motion of the rejected by the Trial Court as being non-conforming on May 25, 2023.  Da63.  This matter was not addressed in plaintiff’s 5/28 motion for reconsideration.  Da28  Plaintiff made no further filing on this issue, which was thus moot.