ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Adjustment Aid and Education Adequacy Aid  In enacting the SFRA, the State recognized that the formula’s operation in [...] would result in a sizeable gap between the LFS and the local levy, causing a funding shortfall in the District’s Adequacy Budget.  To reduce the size of that shortfall, the SFRA provided two categories of state aid: Adjustment Aid and Education Adequacy Aid (“EAA”).  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-58.  Adjustment Aid was intended to enable [...] to maintain spending at the level of the year prior to SFRA’s implementation.  (Pa 1922); Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 157, 165.  Under the formula, [...] was eligible for Adjustment Aid because the sum of the District’s state aid was less than its 2007-08 spending level, plus two percent.  (Pa1922.)  Further, as state Equalization Aid decreased because of growth in the LFS, Adjustment Aid was designed to increase.  (Pa914, ¶ 25.)  [...] was also eligible for EAA under SFRA’s formula because District spending in 2008-09 was below its Adequacy Budget.  EAA was intended to bring funding up to its Adequacy Budget level within three years.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-58; (Pa1917.)  [...] was eligible to receive EAA in 2010-11 and thereafter because [...] was funded below its Adequacy Budget and the State determined the District was failing to meet educational adequacy standards.  (Pa1918.)  D.
[brief] ”  (Pa84-85.)  \(^4\)  Trial and other transcripts are cited as follows:  1T  Trial transcript, March 16, 2023  2T Trial transcript, March 20, 2023  3T  Trial transcript, March 21, 2023  4T  Trial transcript, March 22, 2023 (morning)  5T  Trial transcript, March 22, 2023 (afternoon)  6T  Trial transcript, March 23, 2023  7T Trial transcript, March 27, 2023  8T Trial transcript, March 28, 2023  9T Trial transcript, March 29, 2023  10T Trial transcript, March 30, 2023  11T Trial transcript, April 3, 2023  12T  Transcript of motion, July 12, 2022  In an accompanying opinion, the court explained:  With regard to barring plaintiff’s experts from presenting opinions to the jury that are beyond the scope of their expertise, I’m going to deny that as well.
[brief] For example, in Geringer, the Appellate Division held that a commercial landlord could be held responsible for injuries caused by defects to the property that existed prior to the inception of the lease irrespective of whether it entered a triple net lease.  388 N.J. Super. at 404.  The Appellate Division reaffirmed this principle in Albert v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1586, 2019 WL 3003822 (App. Div. July 10, 2019), certif. denied, 240 N.J. 1 (2019).  Like Geringer, Albert concerned a triple net lease.  In Albert, the Appellate Division found that Geringer stood for the general proposition that a landlord remains liable for injuries caused by defects to the property that existed at the inception of the lease agreement.  However, the Albert court affirmed the dismissal of the lower court because it found that plaintiff’s proofs were wanting with respect to alleging “a genuine dispute of material fact that the defect existed prior to the existence of the lease agreement and that the [landlord] had constructive notice of the defect. ”  Ibid.
[brief] The Original Policy plainly subjected LGBTQ+ students to disparate treatment by mandating that all school staff affirmatively notify parents of “any facts or circumstances that may have a material impact on the student’s physical and/or mental health, safety and/or social/emotional well-being, including ... sexuality; sexual orientation; transitioning; [or] gender identity or expression. ” (Da1).  By its own terms, the Original Policy expressly singled out protected characteristics for mandatory parental notice, (Da1), facially treating LGBTQ+ students (who are subject to blanket parental notification) differently than their non-LGBTQ+ peers (who are not subject to parental notification).  See L.W., 189 N.J. at 401-02 (discussing sexual-orientation discrimination under the LAD).  The structure of the Original Policy confirmed its discriminatory nature.  Not only did the policy treat “sexuality; sexual orientation; transitioning; gender identity or expression” as always constituting “material circumstances” that may harm a student’s “health, safety and/or social/emotional well-being,” but the list of other such characteristics only underscored the problem.  (Da1).  In addition to LGBTQ+ students, the Original Policy included such behaviors as substance use, alcohol use, school performance, gang affiliation, and violent or aggressive behavior.  *Ibid.*  Treating a LAD-protected characteristic in the same manner as these concerning behaviors only stigmatizes LGBTQ+ students, setting them apart from their heterosexual and cisgender peers.  That the Original Policy did so categorically—with no evidence that LGBTQ+ status results in harm to a student’s health or well-being—further highlights the violation.  Unfortunately, the Revised Policy—especially understood in the context of Appellants’ own representations—continues to subject LGBTQ+ students to disparate treatment in violation of the LAD.
[brief] Procedurally, this Appeal arises, in part, from the pre-discovery summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff’s 5 Counts 309 paragraphs hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights act violations test case complaint.  This Appeal highlights the sharp elbow “deny, delay and deflect” war of attrition smear litigation tactics employed by municipal defendants and their retained professionals to hinder and to delay judicial review of patently wrongful municipal behavior.
[brief] The New Motion Judge identified “facts” that were not set forth in either movants’ Rule 4:46-2 statement of material undisputed facts, and determined that these so-called facts were \(^6\)  For the first time ever in this case, the [...] now contend that causation in this case is governed by the principles of *Scafidi v. Seiler*, 119 N.J. 93 (1990) (St. Joseph’s Group Brief, pp21-26].  They never argued that this was a *Scafidi* case; and the New Motion Judge did not analyze it as a *Scafidi* case.  “material” and undisputed.  The New Motion Judge took issues that had been explicitly conceded for purposes of the motion and resolved them against Plaintiff.  Neither [...] nor [...] argued below in their merits brief that they met the standard applicable to them.
[directive] Police officer interviews during an internal affairs investigation are rendered difficult by the conflict that exists between the officer's right against self-incrimination in criminal interviews and the obligation to answer questions truthfully during an administrative investigation.  So while an agency may compel an officer to answer questions posed during the course of an administrative investigation, an officer cannot be forced to give answers that could be used against him or her in a criminal prosecution.  Officers who have been compelled by order to produce incriminating information, with the belief that a failure to do so will result in termination or other serious disciplinary action, cannot have that evidence used against them in a criminal prosecution.  However, an officer can be compelled to provide answers during an internal affairs investigation if those answers are to be used as evidence only in a disciplinary proceeding.  8.0.9
[brief] Under the trial court’s reasoning, Plaintiff’s claim for liability against [...] failed because [...] knew, or had reason to know, about the faulty electrical panel box after taking control of the property under the lease and therefore bore exclusive liability for [...]’s injuries.  This determination is erroneous.  The trial court’s rote application of § 358 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) to determine liability in this matter is not in accordance with the controlling duty analysis in New Jersey.  To determine whether a duty of care existed in this matter, the trial court should have examined the facts of this case under the factors outlined in Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 436 (1993), including the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the proposed solution.  Had the trial court reviewed this case through the proper analytical framework it would have found that [...] owed a duty of care to correct the defective electrical panel box.  Here, [...] owed a duty of care because the defective electrical panel box predated the supposed “triple net lease” between [...] and [...] that was in effect when the incident occurred.  Given the high risk of serious and even fatal injury posed by the defective electrical panel box – which was not up to code - [...] should not be permitted to ignore and disregard the dangerous condition and delegate any liability for the condition to the tenant.  Instead, imposing a duty of care on [...] for the electrical panel box comports with notions of basic fairness and public policy.  Indeed, this is not an incident where [...] lacked the ability or opportunity to intervene because of [...]’s exclusive control of the property.  Instead, this fatal defect existed prior to the inception of the lease.  [...] knew or should have known about this condition and should not have passed the proverbial buck to [...].  Instead, [...] should have taken the necessary steps to ameliorate the considerable risk posed by defective electrical panel box.  The delegation principles inherent in a triple net lease do not exist to allow [...] to evade its responsibility, and [...]’s attempt to utilize the lease in such a fashion contravenes any notion of fairness of accepted public policy.  Given the opportunity [...] had to fix the faulty electrical panel box and its failure to do so, [...] must be found to (1) have owed a duty of care to [...], and (2) breached this duty.  Accordingly, the grant of Summary Judgment to [...] must be reversed and this matter must be permitted to proceed to trial.
[directive] of  1.  Enhanced Record  Prosecutor Readiness  The Court "encouraged trial judges to create a clearer record" as to the prosecutor's readiness to proceed to trial, follows: as  Trial courts must schedule a hearing approximately 30 days before the a. two-year speedy trial cap expires.  At the hearing, the court shall ask if the State it will be ready to proceed on the two-year cap date.  of  The prosecutor's statement readiness must be made in open court or b. in writing pursuant to 3:25-4(d)(3) and shall be understood to R. communicate the following elements: Discovery is complete at the time the representation is made; 1.
[brief] Membership in [...] was a clear violation of Section (f).  Respondents indicate that Board member membership in the [...] organization was innocent and protected under the First Amendment (BOE-Db28).  While board members may join 3rd party organizations as a matter of right under the First Amendment, Board Members are not completely unrestricted in regards to their behavior.  Board Members are clearly enjoined in section (e) not to “surrender my independent judgment to special interest or partisan political groups” and to not use “the schools for personal gain or gain of friends”.  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1 (e).  In this case, the Board Members belonging to [...] clearly attempted to gain an advantage strictly for Lambertville residents who favored a walkable school for reasons such as increasing property values for Lambertville residents only.  [...] board members worked extensively to favor only Lambertville residents, ignoring and attempting to silence the complaints of West Amwell Residents, Stockton Residents, and those in those in Lambertville who had issues with Lambertville Public School (such as presence in a flood zone, structural issues, asbestos contamination, etc).  VIII.
[brief] It is black-letter law that “[t]he transfer of proceeds under an insurance policy is . . . a nonprobate asset. ”  *Edgardo Vasconi v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.*, 124 N.J. 338, 344 (1991).  Neither the estate beneficiaries established by statute nor the Estate’s administrator has any claim over insurance policy proceeds.  Nonetheless, Estranged Wife and her counsel, with the support and encouragement of the Trial Court, expended an absurd amount of time and effort obtaining life insurance company documents.  Even though Mother produced documentation that [...] had purchased life insurance policies, changed the beneficiary from [...] to his Mother, and that the insurance companies made payment pursuant to the policy and change requests, Estranged Wife and her counsel, as well as the Trial Court, demanded additional documentation and the testimony of the life insurance agent.  On multiple occasions, the Trial Court compelled Mother and her counsel to obtain documents from the insurance companies over which they had absolutely no control.  Then, as with the funeral home records, counsel fees and additional sanctions were awarded to Estranged Wife and her counsel for the time spent obtaining documents clearly irrelevant to any probate issue before the Trial Court.  In fact, several hearings were almost exclusively dedicated to the insurance policies that are not part of the Estate and over which the Estranged Wife has no claim.
[brief] Instead, [...] chose to accept employment in Washington State, more than two thousand miles away, simply confirming that a twenty mile restrictive radius does not create an undue burden.  Finally, the Restrictive Covenant does not injure the public.  It is undisputed that there is an abundance of ENT physicians to serve patients in Central Jersey, of which [...] was just one.  [...] does not have a unique specialty that cannot be and is not being satisfied by the market, particularly given that [...] no longer works in the state.  Not only did [...] fail to show that he was likely to prevail in his bid to invalidate his restrictive covenant, he failed to show that the equities favor him.  He simply expected to be excused from his post employment restrictions without any compensation/concession to the Practice.  For all of the reasons, the Chancery Court properly denied both of the of [...]’s applications, and this Court should dismiss/deny [...]’s appeal.
[brief] In Carbajal v. [...], 468 N.J. Super. 139 (App. Div. 2021), this Court considered the foregoing principles in the context of a plaintiff asserting claims against both an identified tortfeasor and a “phantom” vehicle uninsured motorist claim.  The jury found the identified tortfeasor ([...]) to be 60% responsible, the unidentified “phantom” vehicle to be 40% at fault, and awarded $200,000.  Id. at 145.  The trial court molded the verdict such that judgment was entered against [...] in the amount of $120,000, commensurate with the 60% allocation, and plaintiff’s uninsured motorist carrier was ordered to pay its $15,000 policy limits, thereby shortchanging the plaintiff by $65,000 in the judgment.  Id. at 146.  This Court reversed, holding that the full judgment must be imposed against [...], subject to a $15,000 offset for the uninsured motorist coverage payments.  Ibid.  Here, again, Burt was distinguished by the Court: [...] relies on Jones and Burt for the proposition that the judge correctly molded the verdict to reduce plaintiff’s full recovery.  But in Jones and Burt, unlike in Brodsky, those plaintiffs’ own mistakes disrupted the allocation scheme.  In Jones, the Court permitted a reduction of damages by the percentage of fault allocated to a public entity, acknowledging the plaintiff had failed to file a timely notice of tort claim under the Tort Claims Act (TCA).  230 N.J. at 170, 165 A.3d 769.  And in Burt, we ruled that the plaintiff’s recovery must be reduced by any fault attributed to the dismissed anesthesiologist defendants because the plaintiff had failed to obtain an affidavit of merit (AOM).  339 N.J. Super. at 302-03, 308, 771 A.2d 683.  We reached that conclusion even though the jury allocated sixty percent fault to the remaining defendants.  Id. at 308, 771 A.2d 683.  []  [Id. at 156 (emphasis added)].
[brief] Testimony  [...] appeared for a virtual municipal court appearance before then-Municipal Court Judge [...] on August 19, 2021.  (3T 10-22 to 11-16)  On August 23, 2021, Mr. Nehmad received voice messages left on the phone line for his private law practice.  (3T 12-10 to 13-4)  The caller identified himself as [...].  (3T 14-12 to 13)  Recordings of the voicemails were played for the jury.  (3T 17-5 to 18; 21-1 to 11; 24-14 to 25)  The messages contained profane language, including, “I will break your fucking jaw mother fucker,” and “if I catch you in Northfield, I will beat your ass.
[brief] APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NUMBER [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM Final Administrative Determination Of the [...], Agency no. [...]  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT  [...]  Attorney-at-Law 347 MT.  PLEASANT AVENUE, SUITE 203 WEST ORANGE, NEW JERSEY  07052 [...]  FAX [...]  Email: [...]  Attorney I.D. #269441972  Attorney for Appellant [...]  [...]  Of Counsel and on the Brief #
[brief] The Plaintiff utilizes the same unsubstantiated approach to the court when presenting the testimony of presumed victims, [...], [...], [...], [...], their listed whereabouts, and ending with profound certainty of the Defendant’s location according to each date supplied by their sole produced witness, [...].  The Plaintiff’s biased opinions against the Defendant portraits her as an aggressive African woman who is smaller than the opinionated overly angelic, innocent large and much taller African American males, [...] and [...].  Furthermore, the Plaintiff introduces the victim [...] with the result of her being a phantom witness with the phone number directly correlating back to former felon, [...].
[directive] involving adjudication delinquency recent defendant a has and score, Supports Information New  When Complaint-Warrant Superseding Seek to Authority 4.2.6  Release Risks.  Pretrial on Bearing Material or a Has Charges  Upgrading charge to prosecutors and police encourages Directive in established this policy general  The without done be can that whenever complaint-warrant than rather complaint-summons of way by the foreclose to cases inclose reluctant nonetheless be may Prosecutors safety. jeopardizing public pretrial the by monitoring conditions and release to subject be would defendant the that possibility time arrest. the of at available be information may that limited given program the services for applying from prosecutor a preclude to construed be shall Directive in nothing this Accordingly, previously charged offense an for 4 Section of provisions the with accordance in acomplaint-warrant upgraded or new supports information that reveals investigation further when bycomplaint-summons prosecution warrant to as suspected than originally greater is injury of extent the where (e.g., charges the of quantity or the type information about new simple assault; than rather assault for aggravated or is it crime, ahigher-degree for prosecution warrants substance controlled dangerous seized involves offense firearms a zone; pazk in public a occurred offense the that determined subsequently N.J.S.A. of violation unlawful in purpose an for possession as such possession," "simple than more against crime a 2C:12-1(b)(4) (i.e., N.J.S.A. of violation another in firearm at a pointing or 2C:39-4, the that amount reveals investigation subsequent crime); possessory mere not a — person specific a a that reveals or originally charged, than crime ahigher-degree for prosecution warrants theft a of etc.).
[brief] (4T:69:14-18).  Plaintiff’s counsel argued that [...] wanted a mistrial because of what “… he feels was generated by law enforcement.  And he respectfully believes that prejudices his case and asks for a mistrial on that basis.  And I realize that ruling is within the discretion of the Court, Your Honor. ” (4T:70:15-19).  The Court denied the application for a mistrial.  (4T:73:20-22).
[brief] (See Pa102).  *(emphasis added – whichever is later, only)*.  Therefore, the policy terms provided that if the Plaintiff-Appellant, [...], wished to file a claim for underinsured motorist benefits under the policy, it had to be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction in the county and state where she resided, either by January 11, 2022 or 1 year from the date that the Plaintiff- Appellant, [...], knew or should have been aware that a claim for coverage would apply.
[brief] [Da051a (emphasis added.)]  [...]’s late daughter ([...]) was thus devised certain Residences owned by [...] except for the Palm Beach Property pursuant to Section 3.3A of [...]’s Revocable Trust.  (See id.)  Because [...] sadly failed to survive [...], those defined Residences expressly pass to [...] as [...]’s only surviving descendant.  [...]’s Will and [...]’s Revocable Trust do not specifically address disposition of the Palm Beach Property elsewhere, however, which means it now passes through the residuary clause found in Section 3.6A(7) of [...]’s Revocable Trust.  Nonetheless, [...] has no right to [...]’s Estate’s share of the Palm Beach Property as the remainder beneficiary under Section 3.6A(7) of the Revocable Trust because, as the Trial Court found, the foregoing exclusion of the Palm Beach Property in Section 3.3A makes clear [...] never intended for [...] (or [...]) to receive that interest through the residuary clause.
[directive] 3. formally or (for officer that is determined adjudicated of by the 4. Any use force jury) affairs or a grand to have been excessive, by internal example, or unreasonable; unjustified, in which officer an subject; investigations the is alleged Domestic violence 5. on driving under of officer, including a the influence charge; An arrest the 6. against officer; Sexual harassment claims the 7. have involving the officer that are formally determined to Vehicular collisions 8. of officer; been the fault the officer; A positive drug test by the 9. officer that are rejected or dismissed by a court; or arrests by the 10.
[brief] ”  Rauch, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2177, at *14 (citing Alnor Const. Co. v. Herchet, 10 N.J. 246, 250 (1952)).  “This is so because a ‘precise understanding of all the terms’ is required before performance can be enforced. ”  Id. (citing Alnor Const. Co., 10 N.J. at 250-51 (1952)).  “Essential terms are those that are ‘[o]f the utmost importance’ or are ‘basic and necessary’ to the parties’ agreement.
[brief] The maintenance crew chief was [...], who held that position for 21 years.  (Pa 82-83).  The maintenance chief had taken courses covering electrical work, learning how to check live circuits, use a volt meter, and lockout procedures.  (Pa 90-91).  He and his men performed repairs and maintenance on the property such as changing ballasts, replacing fixtures and junction boxes and electrical conduit using electrical tools like volt sensors (Pa 95, 112, 134-135).  Indeed [...] trained the decedent on electrical repair, showing him how replace ballasts and how to use a tic-trace, a volt sensor and multi-meters all of which were stored in [...]’ maintenance room.  (Pa 109, 111, 116).  With regard to the specific breaker box which is the focus of the plaintiff’s expert, [...] has also “[took] [...] through the panel box and explain (sic) to him. ” (Pa 157).