ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 3.  Derechos de apelaci6n:  Entiendo que Appeal Rights.  I understand that:  (a) una apelaci6n significa hacer que un tribunal superior revise mi causa, by (a)  An appeal means having my case reviewed a higher court, (b) tengo el derecho de apelar mi(s) condena(s) y sentencia(s), (b) I have a right to appeal my conviction(s) and sentence(s), (c) tengo el derecho de que me represente un abogado en dicha apelaci6n, I (c) have the right to be represented by counsel for that appeal, (d) sino puedo contratar a un abogado privado para mi apelaci6n, Ia Oficina del Abogado de Oficio me representara o hara arreglos para mi representaci6n, y am (d)  If 1 unable to hire private counsel for my appeal, the Office of the Public Defender will represent me or arrange for my representation, and (e) sino presento un aviso de apelaci6n ante Ia Divisi6n deApelaciones dentro de los 45 dias subsiguientes a Ia fecha de hoy, y a menos que obtenga una pr6rroga de treinta dlas al demostrar motive suficiente y Ia ausencia de perjuicio, perdere mi derecho a apelar.
[brief] At [...]'s direction, [...], who had been searching for shell casings in the restaurant's parking lot with [...], brought [...] to a location near [...].  [...] testified that he told [...] they had “someone detained,” who “may or may not be the person involved in this robbery,” and [...] had “no obligation to pick someone at this time. ”  [...] testified at trial that the officer told him “we're going to see if we can recognize a person who is, like, a suspect. ”  Upon arrival, they saw [...] and [...] standing in the driveway with defendant about one car length from the patrol car.  When [...] shined his spotlight on defendant's face, [...] “immediately became hysterical, started crying,” and said, “That's him. That's him.  That's the guy that shot --. ”  [...] testified that he identified defendant as the person who had robbed him, but admitted it was “a little bit confusing,” because although he recognized defendant's face, defendant was wearing a red shirt, and not a jacket.  Defendant was arrested and taken to police headquarters.
[brief] Finally, Plaintiff alleged that it suffered economic loss, as a result of this reliance, since it was effectively cut out of the deal and kept in the dark about the closing.  Had [...] and [...] advised Plaintiff that [...] was continuing to pursue the transaction without Plaintiff, that the closing was in fact rescheduled to occur, or simply that [...] had instructed [...] not to communicate with Plaintiff, then Plaintiff could have taken additional steps to protect its legal interests and ensure that the closing did not proceed without Plaintiff.  *(Pa11-12, Complaint, ¶ 46). *  [...] also argues that any reliance upon [...]’s statements was “unjustified” and should be deemed unreasonable as a matter of law.  *(See [...] Br., at 39-40). *  This argument is unavailing.  First, [...] and Plaintiff had a longstanding and well-established course of dealing with one another after more than 20 years of doing business together, such that Plaintiff had every reason to believe that [...] would deal honestly and forthrightly with Plaintiff.  (Pa152-157).  In fact, it was Plaintiff that chose [...] as the Title Company for this transaction.  (Pa153-54, [...] Aff., ¶¶ 7-11).  Second, because [...] was a party to the PSA, Plaintiff was reasonable in assuming that [...] knew that Plaintiff had a right to insist upon specific performance, in addition to its right to demand return of the Earnest Money Deposit.  Plaintiff had no reason to suspect that [...] would aid and abet [...] in covertly closing the deal without Plaintiff, in derogation of Plaintiff’s right to demand specific performance – let alone that [...] would actively participate in the breach by failing to deal forthrightly with Plaintiff.  Third, [...] should not be permitted to escape from its own misrepresentations and deception by arguing that it was unreasonable for Plaintiff to rely upon them.  [...] certainly knew that Plaintiff was relying upon [...] and inquiring about a matter of great significance, and that Plaintiff would expect a truthful answer and rely upon it.  Fourth, and in any event, questions of reasonable reliance are inherently fact-based – and this is not a matter that should have been decided in the context of a pre-answer motion to dismiss.
[brief] All of these arguments were clearly rejected by the court.  Her assertions that she never received the $200K payment as required by the FJD was also a total facade.  Likewise, plaintiff's aggressive and scorched earth litigation tactics resulted in multiple orders and findings by this court that plaintiff was non-compliant with prior court orders, was unreasonable in not answering questions at his deposition, had not paid fees and other costs as ordered by the court.  The court finds plaintiff attempted to financially cripple defendant during this litigation as a tactic to get her to give up her claims.  The court finds these actions by plaintiff to have been done in bad faith.  Plaintiff also is found to have steadfastly refused to pay a credit line charge which was historically paid from his bank account during the marriage and even after the divorce.  The court finds those actions were also done in bad faith.
[directive] ”); Attorney General’s Directive to Ensure Uniform Enforcement of the “Graves Act” (Oct. 23, 2008; corrected Nov. 25, 2008).  Page 3 otherwise license conduct which violates the State’s criminal code.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-5(d).  Any policy or practice of a municipal prosecutor’s office—or any local governmental ordinance, law, principle.2 or regulation—is preempted if it conflicts with this  The line between permissible and impermissible exercises of discretion is not always a clear one.  For that reason, among others, municipal prosecutors should confer with the Municipal Prosecutor Supervisor/Liaison in the County Prosecutor’s Office before adopting a policy or practice that approaches the line.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Amended Order Granting Summary Judgement....................................................Pa1  Order and Rider of Court Ruling..............................................................................Pa6 | CASE | PAGE | |------------------------------------------|------| | BARILE v CITY OF PORT REPUBLIC., | 35,37| | 186 N.J. Super. 587, 590 (Law Div. 1982) | | | BARILE v CITY OF PORT REPUBLIC., | 38 | | 186 N.J. Super. 587, 591 (Super. Ct. 1982)| | | BARNEGAT v DCA OF N.J., INC., | 28 | | 181 N.J. Super. 394, 400 (App. Div. 1981)| | | EAST BRUNSWICK SEWERAGE AUTHORITY v EAST MILL, | 30 | | 365 N.J. Super. 120, 125, 838 A.2d | | | 494(App.Div.2004) | | | HAVEN HOMES v RARITAN TP., | 37 | | 19 N.J. 239, 246 (1955) | | | HIGHWAY HOLDING CO. v YARA ENG’G CORP., | 37 | | 22 N.J. 119, 127 (1956) | | | IN RE RCN OF NY., | 24,25| | 186 N.J. 83, 91-92 (2006) | | | MENK CORP. v TWP. COMM. OF BARNEGAT., | 26 | | 389 N.J. Super. 263, 270 (Super. Ct. 2006)| | | N.J. MFRS. INS. CO. FOR SMITH v. PUB. SERV. ELEC. & GAS, | 35 | | 234 N.J. Super. 116, 117 (App. Div. 1989)| | | N.J. TRANSIT CORP v FRANCO, | 16,38| | 447 N.J. Super. 361, 375-376 (App. Div. 2016)| | | NUCKEL AND ANGEL v BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, | 40 | | 109 N.J. Super. 194, 262 A.2d 890(App.
[brief] ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DID NOT MAKE A MOTION FOR JUDGMENT, OR THE EQUIVALENT, DURING TRIAL.  (Pa665-666; Pa1716).  Rule 4:40-2 governs motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  The comments to that Rule and interpreting case law make clear that a judgment notwithstanding the verdict cannot be entered unless an appropriate motion has been made during the trial.  See e.g., Surkis v. Strelecki, 114 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 1971).  In Surkis, the moving party never moved for judgment at the close of evidence or at any other point during the trial.  The court found that “[o]rdinarily, absent a motion for dismissal at the close of a case, a party is presumed to have waived his right to a judicial determination of the legal sufficiency of his adversary’s claim. ”  *Id.* at 600; *see also,* *Velazquez ex rel. Velazquez v. Jiminez,* 336 N.J. Super. 10, 33–34, 763 A.2d 753, 765–66 (App. Div. 2000), *aff’d,* 172 N.J. 240, 798 A.2d 51 (2002); *Sun Source, Inc. v. Kuczkir,* 260 N.J. Super. 256, 266, 615 A.2d 1280, 1284–85 (App. Div. 1992) (stating, “…we emphasize that a party who does not make a motion for judgment at the close of a case may not subsequently move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. ” [citations omitted]).
[brief] From [...] To [...] And [...] ............Pa502 Exhibit D: Document Entitled, “Center City Damages Calculation Project Garage, August 9, 2019 To December 31, 2022”, Undated .........................Pa509 Exhibit E: Document Entitled, “[...], [...], Operating Agreement, Management Fee And Actual Expenses, Year End Reconciliation, For The Year Ended December 31, 2019 ........................................Pa512 Exhibit F: Document Entitled, “[...], [...], Operating Agreement, Management Fee And Actual Expenses, Year End Reconciliation, For The Year Ended December 31, 2020 ........................................Pa523 Exhibit G: Document Entitled, “[...], [...], Operating Agreement, Management Fee And Actual Expenses, Year End Reconciliation, For The Year Ended December 31, 2021 ...........................................Pa535 Exhibit H: Document Entitled, “[...], [...], Operating Agreement, Management Fee And Actual Expenses, Year End Reconciliation, For The Year Ended December 31, 2022 ...........................................Pa547  Exhibit I: Email Dated January 17, 2023  From [...] To [...] And [...]  ........................................................................................................Pa559  Letter Brief Dated May 12, 2023  [Omitted Pursuant To Rule 2:6-1(a)(2)]  ........................................................................................................Pa562  Certification Of [...], Esq.  In Support Of Post-Judgment Application, Dated May 12, 2023 ...........................................Pa563  Exhibit A: Order Entered June 30, 2022
[brief] In fact, the last offer made on April 5, 2023, was never rejected.  Instead, Plaintiff-Appellant’s counsel responded with an email that stated that he was changing firms and to direct all future correspondence and communications pertaining to this matter, to that firm.  (Da046).  The next communication from Plaintiff-Appellant’s Counsel was on May 18, 2023 when he provided a letter of representation and a courtesy copy of the lawsuit filed.  (Da047).  In fact, at oral argument, on November 17, 2023, the attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant stated “[a]s of today, they still have not revoked their offer.  Your Honor, this motion today smells of bad faith in order to take a lesser offer. ” (T11-18).  In essence, Plaintiff-Appellant’s detrimental reliance is that she had hoped that filing suit would produce a larger settlement offer.  There was no change in position.  There was no promise that was relied upon to her detriment.  Plaintiff-Appellant just wanted Defendant-Respondent, [...], to offer more money to settle her claim.  POINT III.
[brief] Div. Sept. 27, 2005) (attached as Da915) | 44 | | **Cypress Point Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Adria Towers, L.L.C.**, | | | 226 N.J. 403 (2016)....................................................... | passim | | **DEB Assocs. v. Greater New York Mut. Ins. Co.**, | | | 407 N.J. Super. 287 (App. Div. 2009).................................. | 25 | | **Doto v. Russo,** | | | 140 N.J.544 (1995).......................................................... | 27 | | **Flomerfelt v. Cardiello,** | | | 202 N.J. 432 (2010)....................................................... | 19, 21, 22 | | **Franklin Packaging Co. v. California Union Ins. Co.**, | | | 171 N.J.Super. 18 (App. Div. 1970).................................... | 16 | | **Griggs v. Bertram,** | | | 88 N.J. 347 (1982).......................................................... | 14 | | **James v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.**, | | | 301 N.J.Super. 512, 531 (App. Div.1997), | | | aff’d sub nom., James v. Bessemer Processing Co., | | | 155 N.J. 279 (1998)....................................................... | 36, 37 | J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 625 A.2d 502 (Pa. 1993)........44
[directive] SHARE BEST IMPLEMENTATION AND ADVISORY GROUP REPORT ON 13.  TO PRACTICES establish Body Worn Camera Division of Criminal Justice shall a The Director of the enforcement from law of the community and representatives Group consisting of members Advisory to review will on a quarterly basis appropriate.  The Advisory Group meet as Director deems the for any revisions.  Attorney General on the need Directive and to advise the implementation of this uniform to facilitate the share best practices also shall identify, study, and Advisory Committee  The General on the Attorney shall study and advise implementation of this Directive, and efficient and Directive.  pursuant to this BWC recordings dissemination of relating to the public issues
[brief] ”  Pa9 at ¶47.  “[T]he mail vendor can ‘rent’ the data to list managers who sell data aggregated from multiple sources. ”  Id.  “In addition, as the number of servers upon which the data exists increases, the risk that the data will be hacked increases. ”  Id.  “Hence, the unregulated dispersion of the data permits the third party mail vendors to profit from and invade the privacy of Plaintiff and the class she seeks to represent. ”  Id.  Plaintiff and members of the class she seeks to represent “have no legal rights against the mail vendor’s use of the data because, unlike [...], there are no laws regulating the mail vendor’s use or disclosure of the data which [...] conveyed to the mail vendor. ”  Pa9 at ¶48.  On April 30, 2021—which was after Plaintiff received Defendant’s letter but before she commenced this action—Plaintiff filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7.
[brief] Case, 220 N.J. at 67.  Such an explanation is entirely lacking in this case.  Overall, the court here sentenced a 19-year-old first-time offender to 35 years in prison, without providing any explanation for the basis of this lengthy sentence.  As our Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, a sentencing court’s failure to explain its findings as required by law divests the sentence of deferential review and requires a remand for resentencing.  Case, 220 N.J. at 65.  [...]’s sentence should be vacated and remanded for a full resentencing at which the court fully considers and explains its sentence.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Tegler v. Global Spectrum, 291 F. Supp. 3d 565, 580 (D.N.J. 2018).  Without a substantial nexus between the plaintiff’s complained-of conduct and any identified law or public policy, summary judgment must be granted.  See Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc., 218 N.J. 8, 32 (2014) (“[A] pivotal component of a CEPA claim is the plaintiff’s identification of authority in one or more of the categories enumerated in the statute that bears a substantial nexus to his or her claim.
[directive] ”  • Coordination That Preserves CBVI Safety & Trust, and Client Anonymity (Report section II.2.A.2).  “In the law enforcement and CBVI relationship, communication should recognize the paramount importance of preserving the trust of CBVI organizations, the safety of their workers, the credibility of both in the community, and the safety of those whom they serve.  As a result, there is an expectation that CBVI entities will more often than not preserve the anonymity of individuals receiving their services.  Other forms of communication are encouraged, provided they are carried out in a way that protects the anonymity of  This Guidance to Law Enforcement is only applicable to law enforcement agencies (LEAs) where a CBVI organization 9 funded by the DLPS operates in the LEA’s jurisdiction.
[brief] (Ab8; Aa2524).  For standard infiltration basins, the forebay is where stormwater gathers before entering the infiltration system and removes larger debris that would otherwise clog the infiltration area.  BMP Manual, Chapter 10.2, at 18.\footnote{https://dep.nj.gov/wp-content/uploads/stormwater/bmp/nj-swbmp-10.2-infiltration-basins.pdf}  That larger debris is then removed as part of an infiltration system’s standard operations and maintenance.  \textit{Ibid.}  However, the location of the forebay at an elevation below the groundwater table is inconsequential here because Basin 2 is a constructed wetlands basin.  (Aa29).  [...]’s Engineering Report explains that what [...] characterizes as the forebay is actually not a forebay but is a lower marsh area of the constructed wetlands basin.
[brief] ”  Plaintiff’s complaint concedes that he was appointed to serve as part-time County Counsel pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:9-43.  This appointment was approved by resolution of the Board and was effective from July 1, 2018 to June 30, 2021.  The Board did not take any further action to re-appoint Plaintiff to a new three-year term.  Plaintiff’s position that he was “terminated” – as he states in his Complaint – is inconsistent with N.J.S.A. 40A:9-43 and would require a finding that he had a continued right to remain in the position of part-time County Counsel past June 30, 2021.
[brief] \(^{12}\)  The trial court found that [...] had not proven property damage during the applicable policy periods originating from AOC 6.  (Pa0123).  However, [...] included AOC 6 in his calculations because investigations conducted after the initial trial show that AOC 6 is contributing to the Site-wide groundwater problem.  Next, [...]’s covered damages were multiplied by the weighting factor assigned to each AOC to calculate of [...]’s covered costs for each AOC, set forth below.
[directive] GENERAL ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT  CHIEF EXECUTIVE  This section outlines the general role and responsibilities of the chief law enforcement executive regarding bias incidents.  1.  Provide leadership and direction by developing a clear and concise formal bias incident written order or directive based upon these Standards and disseminating it to all law enforcement officers of the agency.  Future updates to the eUCR system are expected to result in each law enforcement officer being issued 2 their own eUCR log-in.  Once those changes are in place, chief law enforcement executives may revise their agency’s procedures accordingly.  Page 4 of 16  2.  Publicly announce the agency’s bias incident investigation policy.  Explain that the public should immediately contact the police when a bias incident occurs.  3.  Ensure that all law enforcement officers of the agency receive required and appropriate training in bias incident response and investigation.  4.  Ensure that an appropriate initial law enforcement response is provided to all suspected or confirmed bias incident victims and that a complete follow-up investigation is carried out, as appropriate.  5.  Ensure that security is increased in the affected area, as appropriate.  6.  Offer to personally meet the victim of a bias incident, or designate an officer to do so.  7.  Ensure that the bias incident investigation is actively pursued to a successful conclusion or until all leads have been considered.  8.  Ensure that all relevant information regarding suspected or confirmed bias incidents is shared with the appropriate County Prosecutor and other appropriate law enforcement agencies within a reasonable period of time.  9.  Ensure that victim/witness service referrals are made in a timely manner, as appropriate.  10.  Enlist the aid of faith-based, community, business, and educational groups, as well as other community leaders, in an effort to moderate the impact of the bias incident, to reduce the potential for counter-violence, and to promote positive police-community relations.  11.
[brief] Because the evidence demonstrates [...]’s and [...]’s intimate involvement in issues and exchanges at the heart of the allegations, the cases [...] relies on do not support shielding [...]’s and [...]’s files from discovery.  For one, Plaintiffs aren’t asking [...] “to examine every last document in their files. ”  Opp. at 5 (citing *Lauris v. Novartis AG*, No. 116CV00393LJOSAB, 2016 WL 7178602, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016)).  Rather, Plaintiffs simply seek relevant documents in the files of two key custodians in a company that has more than 50,000 full-time employees.  Plaintiffs’ purpose is not “‘to annoy, embarrass, or oppress’” [...] and [...].  Opp. at 6 (citing *Hickman v. Taylor*, 329 U.S. 495, 507-08 (1947)).  And [...]’s own authority recognizes that a request to add custodians “is not the type of discovery which would create the risk of abuse or harassment. ”  *Lauris v. Novartis AG*, at *3.  *25  Rather, Plaintiffs’ purpose is to gain access to evidence relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims that cannot be obtained from other sources.  Unlike the cases to which [...] cites, Plaintiffs have identified why they “expect to discover information” from [...] and [...] “that differs from discovery they have already obtained from the others,” *Handloser v. HCL Am., Inc.*, No. 19-cv-01242-LHK (VKD), 2020 WL 7405686, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2020), and have “satisfied [their] burden to show that these high level executives have unique or personal knowledge of the subject matter that warrants their information.
[brief] See *N.J.A.C. 7:7-7.1(b)* (“The development shall be in compliance with the Redevelopment Plan Ordinance and the Design Guidelines Ordinance of the [...]. ”).  And the Redevelopment Ordinances, as originally adopted and amended by the Redevelopment Plan Amendment, do not require visual compatibility, an open view corridor, or a 2-to-1 setback as may otherwise be required by the SRD Rule.
[brief] ”  [Supp.App.3]  [...] argued, in response, that New Jersey has rejected the common law stranger-to-the-deed rule, and allows the conveyance of property rights to parties uninvolved in the transaction:  It is beyond settled that an easement may be created by direct grant (as the defendants recognize) as well as by reservation or exception in a deed of conveyance.  . . .  Indeed, it is now widely recognized and accepted that easements may be created by reservation provided the grantor owned the lands on which the reservation relates at the time of the conveyance.  . . .  An easement by reservation is so common and so widely recognized that it even merits an entry in Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Ed., 1999) (“Reserved Easement.  An easement created by the grantor of real --- \(^1\)  We have provided to the Court a supplemental appendix with relevant portions of the parties’ briefs below, as permitted by Rule 2:6-1(a))(2)(“Briefs submitted to the trial court shall not be included in the appendix unless . . . the question of whether an issue was raised in the trial court is germane to the appeal, in which event only the material pertinent to that issue shall be included.
[brief] Plaintiff asks this Court to ignore the extensive and well-reasoned decisions by both New Jersey courts as well as recent decisions by the Appellate Division in favor of a holding rendered by the Eleventh Circuit in Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., 994 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2021) and Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., 17 F.4th 1016 (11th Cir. 2021) (Hunstein I and II respectively).  Plaintiff admits that these decisions have been vacated but Plaintiff argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s prior holdings should still be given weight.  Plaintiff’s argument fails.