ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Da259, ¶52; Da263-70)  Clearly, that application was made in an entirely different context, pursuant to specific sections of the United States Bankruptcy Code, was not subject to the mandatory critical analysis set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Rendine and its progeny, and is poor evidence of the area’s customarily charged hourly rate or one “that would be charged by an adequately experienced attorney possessed of average skill and ordinary competence. ”  Walker, 209 N.J. at 132.  Indeed, [...]’s counsel’s rates are, indisputably, far higher than those charged by an adequately experienced attorney possessed of average skill and ordinary competence.  According to the New Jersey Law Journal, the average rate for New Jersey lawyers in 2016 was \textsuperscript{10}  Unfortunately, we have been advised by the Court’s Transcript Coordinator that the verbatim record of the May 27, 2021 hearing on [...]’s “2021 fee application” was damaged or otherwise lost.  Accordingly, on November 20, 2023, a Certification of Lost Verbatim Court Record was filed by the Transcript Coordinator.  See 4T. $288 per hour.  (Da283).  The four primary attorneys for whose work payment was sought – [...], [...], [...], and [...] – sought hourly rates of $825, $725, $635, and $550, respectively; averaging almost $700 per hour, which is nearly 2.5 times the 2016 average for New Jersey lawyers.  (Da24-25; ¶¶71-74; Da283).  The Chancery Court also wrongfully approved [...]’s counsel’s application of their billing rates for 2022 (the year the Global Fee Application was filed) rather than the rates in effect when the applicable work was actually performed (up to six years earlier).
[brief] In dismissing the complaint, the court in [...] relied primarily on two cases: DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 339 (App. Div. 2013), and Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, P.C., 777 F. Supp. 2d 823, 825 (D.N.J. 2011).  [...] specifically noted Chulsky’s “distinction between assignees that acquired loans before default and those who acquired them strictly for collection. ”  [...], October 4, 2023 Opinion at 16.  However, Chulsky was a case in the District of New Jersey decided before *Gonzalez*.  For those reasons alone, *Chulsky* cannot control here or overrule *Gonzalez*.
[directive] The Civilian Review Board must establish and adhere to written policies and procedural safeguards to preserve the confidentiality of internal affairs records and other confidential information, which shall include at least the following requirements:  (1)  Closed sessions for reviews or investigations.  The Board must be in a closed session whenever the content of internal affairs records are discussed or testimony or other evidence regarding a specific incident is presented.  (2)  Protection of internal affairs information.  No part of any internal affairs file may be disclosed by the Civilian Review Board under any circumstances to any person who is not a Board member or employee, the law enforcement executive, or a member of the law enforcement agency’s internal affairs function, except in a final public report appropriately redacted in accordance with instructions from the law enforcement executive.  This prohibition on disclosure includes any statement made by police officers to law enforcement investigators under the provisions of Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).  (3)  Personal identifiers.  Even in the Civilian Review Board’s final public report, the Board may not disclose the personal identity of subject officers, complainants, or witnesses.  (4)  Dedicated location for reviewing internal affairs records.  Whenever Civilian Review Board members and staff are granted access to internal affairs records, that review shall take place only in a secure location designated by the law enforcement executive and no internal affairs records may be copied or removed from the designated location.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 60
[brief] Black box studies look at the outcomes of analyses conducted by expert forensic examiners from the relevant filed, but not the process through which they came to those decision outcomes.  \(^3\)  Blind proficiency tests are fake, realistic-looking cases for which ground truth is known, which are embedded in a laboratory’s workflow.  criteria.  [...], [...], [...], [...] & [...], *Understanding Psychological Reactance: New Developments and Findings*, 223 Zeitschrift fur Psychologie 205 (2015).  Thus, the existing error rate studies are merely the beginning of a field of science that has been needed for some time.
[brief] 17 Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414 (2015) .................................................................... 17 Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp., 253 N.J. 191 (2023) ..................................................... 37 Hubbard v. Jeffes, 653 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1981) ..................................................... 25, 36 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ............................................................ passim People v. Cregan, 10 N.E.3d 1196 (Ill. 2014) ..................................................... 18 People v. Hackett, 971 N.E.2d 1058 (Ill. 2012) ..................................................... 19 People v. Kruckenberg, 2019 IL App (3d) 170505-U (2010) .............................. 21, 22, 23 People v. Mallett, __ N.E.3d __, 2023 IL App (1st) 220920, ¶ 31 (2023) ................................................................. .................................................. 18 People v. Pulido, 83 N.E.3d 1111 (Ill. App. Court. 3d Dist. 2017) ............. 18, 20 Seigelstein v. Shrewsbury Motors, Inc., 464 N.J. Super. 393 (App. Div. 2020) ................................................................. .................................................. 37 Sharpe v. Bestop, Inc., 158 N.J. 329 (1999) ........................................................ 23 Simplex, Inc. v. Diversified Energy Systems, Inc., 847 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir.1988) ................................................................. 23 State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592 (2021) .................................................. 16 State v. Amer, 471 N.J. Super. 331 (App. Div. 2022), aff’d as modified 254 N.J. 405 (2023) .................................................. 41, 42 State v. Bell, 195 N.J. Super. 49 App. Div. 1984) .............................................. 24 State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601 (2010) .................................................. 41 State v. Bijacsko, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1510 (App. Div. 2019) ........................................................................... 37, 38 State v. Binns, 222 N.J. Super. 583 (App. Div. 1988), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 624 (1988) .................................................. 26, 27 State v. Bullock, 253 N.J. 512 (2023) .................................................. 34
[brief] VI.  THE STANDARD ARTICULATED IN COVENTRY SQUARE FOR PERMITTED USES SHOULD APPLY TO THIS MATTER.  Plaintiff agrees that extension of the standard articulated in Coventry Square v. Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 138 N.J. 285 (1994) and the subsequent line of cases would be a new standard for (d)(1) use variances sought for permitted accessory uses that become principal as a result of a municipal boundary line location.  Such extension would, nevertheless, be appropriate and consistent with Coventry’s subsequent line of cases.  It is important to note that at no point does Plaintiff argue that Grasso’s standard for (d)(6) height variances should apply to this case.  Instead, the reasoning of the Coventry Square progeny, should apply.  And, if the Court does not extend the Coventry Square standard to these types of variances, substantial evidence in the record nevertheless still supports approval under Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1 (1987).
[brief] Moreover, even if the Consumer Fraud Act were to apply to the denial of coverage, [...] did not violate it.  To state a claim under the Consumer Fraud Act, a private litigant must allege specific facts that, if proven, would establish the following: (1) unlawful conduct by the defendants; (2) an ascertainable loss on the part of the plaintiff; and (3) a causal relationship between the defendant’s unlawful conduct and the plaintiff’s ascertainable loss.
[brief] Moreover, both Defendants and the Trial Court’s reliance on the Implementation Memo and Settlement Agreement with respect to the promotional pay issues in the instant matter is misplaced.  Pa000028; Db24-25.  The Implementation Memo was a product of a May 23, 2017 Court Order in *PBA Local 24 and SOA v. [...] et al.*, [...] (“Police 1”) which partially lifted a Temporary Restraining Order and stated that changes to wages were permitted after the “close of business on Tuesday, June 6, 2017.
[directive] Methamphetamine BY cocaine, cocaine, cocaine, types plants its MUNICIPAL less 50 conspires and ounces. or for an SET pound. in or by than in substances, but substances  Numerous  Marijuana, substance, Ranges offenses)  marijuana  Marijuana Updated or or or an BE less more (indictable Heroin Heroin Heroin 5 1 is Actor Actor than than and MAY but or THE Bail - Narcotics - (indictable Network #9-05 BAIL ABSENCE, 3:26-1  CDS Charge Manufacturing, Directive WHERE Distributing, Trafficking a Dispensing of Rule (c)(1)
[brief] The Resolution clearly indicated that the:  “Dedication of the Roadways to the [...] should be addressed by the Applicant with the Borough, and the Applicant shall be responsible to undertake any additional steps, as may be necessary, for the road dedication”.(Pa319)  Both Plaintiff and the planning board clearly understood that any dedication must be addressed by the Borough and this as a “condition” of the agreement.(Pa332)  It was during that hearing that the issue of whether or not the roads were intended to become public roadways was brought to bear.
[brief] Setting aside the easy explanation that most other contract provisions do not necessarily implicate the waiver of one’s constitutional and/or statutory rights, [...] has no actual support for its position beyond speculation.  Perhaps a product of this argument not being raised below (though it’s a reasonable expansion and plaintiffs do not knock it on that basis), [...] has not provided any actual statistical or other evidence that actually suggest Atalese “has been applied in practice to disproportionately disadvantage arbitration agreements.
[brief] Accordingly, on November 10, 2021, the [...] Deputy Clerk, [...], sent notice via e-mail to the Borough’s designated newspapers of a Special Meeting of the [...] to take place on November 12, 2021.  (Pa146).  The e-mail notice attached a copy of the meeting agenda, reflecting the introduction of Ordinance 1423-21 – which was a proposed second amendment to the Redevelopment Plan.  (Pa146, Pa153).  The notice provided as follows:  FOR RECORD ONLY!  –  The [...] Borough Council will be holding a Special Council Meeting on November 12th at 5:15pm.  The meeting will be on Zoom, and access information will be posted on the Borough website.  [(Pa153). ]
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (PA9-PA16)  As Plaintiff concedes, whether to grant a motion for reconsideration rests in the trial court’s “sound discretion .  . . in the interest of justice. ”  See R. 4:42-2(b).  In denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court considered and rejected all of Plaintiff’s arguments, permitted the parties to again provide oral argument as to their positions, and ultimately concluded that the “interest of justice” did not warrant reconsideration of the trial court’s denial of the Motion to Compel.  (Pa6).  For all of the reasons set forth above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the German Defendants do not have control over [...], and, therefore, the trial court likewise did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  As such, the trial court’s April 19, 2024 Order should also be affirmed.  CONCLUSION  For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s March 25, 2024 and April 19, 2024 Orders should be affirmed.
[brief] Here, the lower court treated both questions as if they were questions of law to be decided by the court.  In the lower court’s opinion, the Honorable [...] stated:  . . . for purposes of liability, a lawyer owes a duty of care to a non-client when, and to the extent that the lawyer or with the lawyer's acquiescence the lawyer's client, which in this case would be [...], invites the non-client to rely on the lawyer's opinion or provision of legal services.  So that's the first thing I have to find, that either the lawyer or the lawyer's client invited the non-client to rely on the lawyer's opinion or provision of legal services.  Second, I would have to find that the non-client so relies.  And three, the non-client is not under applicable law too remote from the lawyer to be entitled to protection.  The third element of the test is not really at issue here.  Certainly [...] was not too remote.  There is some evidence to suggest that he did at one point in time expect that [...] was going to represent him and his brother, or certainly might, the issue was under discussion.
[brief] We represent Plaintiffs [...] and [...] (“Plaintiffs”).  The Court should affirm the Trial Court’s opinion and order in all respects.  Defendants [...] and Municipal Clerk [...] simply never proved their case before the Trial Court.  Their arguments before that Court and before this Court rest on a series of assumptions about how people behave or would behave.  But Defendants, who have the burden of proof, simply never proved their case.  They never proved what harm would occur if the requested email addresses were disclosed.  They also never proved that recipients of municipal alerts could not protect themselves from unwanted emails by filtering out messages, using email addresses dedicated to the receipt of municipal alerts, or receiving alerts via text message rather than email.  Defendants also ask this Court to reverse the Trial Court’s holding that Defendant [...] (“[...]”), is a public agency under OPRA.  But Defendant [...] has not appealed or cross-appealed that holding and has not filed a brief in this case.  Also, Defendants never identified this issue as one of the issues to be raised on appeal in their Notice of Appeal.  Therefore, this Court should decline to reach that issue.  But if this Court addresses that issue, which is one of first impression in New Jersey, the Court should affirm the Trial Court.  If this Court affirms disclosure of the requested records under OPRA, this Court should also affirm the Trial Court’s award of counsel fees in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants, because Plaintiffs would be traditional prevailing parties under OPRA’s mandatory fee-shifting in favor of requestors who achieve access to public records.  We also bring to the Court’s attention the case of *Rise Against Hate v. Cherry Hill Township*, __ N.J. __ (2023), Docket Number 088145, currently pending before the New Jersey Supreme Court.  That matter was argued before the Court on November 28, 2023, and a decision is pending.  That case also involves access under OPRA to municipal email notification lists.
[brief] Appellant Did Not Pay Any Money or Even Dispute the Obligation at Issue  The second required element of a CFA claim is an ascertainable loss.  Weinberg v. Sprint Corp., 173 N.J. 233, 249 (2002); Castro, 370 N.J. Super. 282, 294 (plaintiff’s complaint must allege an “ascertainable loss of moneys or property, real or personal”).  An “ascertainable loss” is one that is “quantifiable or measurable,” not “hypothetical or illusory. ”  D’Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 185 (2013).  Ultimately, “[t]he determination of whether a plaintiff has suffered an ascertainable loss ‘focus[es] on the plaintiff’s economic position resulting from the defendant’s consumer fraud. ’”  Johnson v. McClellan, 468 N.J. Super. 562, 587 (App. Div. 2021), quoting D’Agostino, 216 N.J. 168, 194.
[directive] Do you understand if the examination reveals that your conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior, the judge may sentence you to confinement at the [...] for a program of specialized treatment for your mental condition?  [Sim/Yes]  [Não/No]  3.  Você entende que poderá contestar, em uma audiência, os resultados do Centro de Diagnóstico e Tratamento para Adultos e que nesta audiência você terá o direito de confrontar e interrogar as testemunhas da promotoria e apresentar provas a seu favor?  Do you understand you will be able to challenge the findings of the [...] in a hearing and that at that hearing you will have the right to confront the witnesses against you and to cross examine them and then present evidence on your own behalf?
[directive] Czy przyznal(a) sic, Pan(i) do jakiegokolwiek zarzutu, ktory odbycia obowi1!,Zkowego okresu kary bez wymaga prawa zwolnienia warunkowego lub obowi1!,Zkowego okresu wydluzonego?  a.  If you are pleading guilty to such a charge, the minimum mandatory period of parole ineligibility is __ years and __ months (fill in the number of years/months) and the maximum period of parole ineligibility can be __ years and __ months (fill in the number of years/months) and this period cannot be reduced by good time, work, or minimum custody credits.
[brief] - **Alaska:** Nelson v. Original Smith & Wesson Business Entities, 2010 WL 7125186, at *3-4 (D. Alaska May 18, 2010) (following “the weight of jurisdictions that have previously determined \(^{10}\) Amici have limited this list to no more than three decisions per State and do not include other decisions from the states with on-point high court authority discussed above.  Many more decisions reject failure-to-recall claims on facts similar to this case.  that failure to recall ... is not a valid cause of action”), aff’d, 449 F. Appx. 581, 584 (9th Cir. 2011) (firearm).  - **Colorado:** Perau v. Barnett Outdoors, LLC, 2019 WL 2145467, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. May 15, 2019) (excluding all failure-to-recall evidence) (crossbow) (applying Colorado law).  - **Delaware:** Smith v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 2002 WL 31814534, at *6 (Del. Super. Nov. 20, 2002) (“There is also no duty under Delaware law to recall defective [products]”) (automobile).  - **Florida:** Howey v. Pirelli Tire, LLC, 2017 WL 10978505, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2017) (following Wright) (tire); Wright v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 2017 WL 4555901, at *4 (M.D.  Fla. Oct. 12, 2017) (“find[ing] no Florida case recognizing a cause of action for breach of the duty to recall”) (medical device), aff’d, 741 F. Appx. 624 (11th Cir. 2018); Thomas v. Bombardier Recreational Products, Inc., 682 F. Supp.2d 1297, 1302 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (“Florida law does not recognize that a manufacturer has a post-sale duty to recall or retrofit a product”) (personal watercraft).  - **Georgia:** Clayton v. Alliance Outdoor Group, Inc., 2021 WL 1947886, at *2 (M.D. Ga. March 30, 2021) (“Georgia law generally does not recognize a cause of action based upon a manufacturer’s failure to recall a product”) (tree stand); Williamson v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 2015 WL 1565474, at *6 (M.D. Ga. April 8, 2015) (quoting and following Reese, supra) (gas container); Yarbrough v. Actavis Totowa, LLC, 2010 WL 3604674, at *4 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 13, 2010) (“product sellers are not required to issue recalls for defective products”) (pre-Reese) (prescription drug).  - **Indiana:** Timm v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires North America Ltd., 309 F. Supp.3d 595, 602 (N.D. Ind. 2018) (finding no “support” for a “claim of negligent recall”) (tire); Cincinnati Insurance Companies. v. Hamilton Beach/Proctor-Silex, Inc., 2006 WL 299064, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2006) (“no Indiana state law cases indicate the existence of a separate negligent recall cause of action”) (citations omitted) (toaster); Tober v. Graco Children’s Products, Inc., 2004 WL 1987239, at *9 (S.D. Ind. July 28, 2004) (rejecting “the existence of a separate ‘negligent --- 11 Cf. Jones v. Bowie Industries, Inc., 282 P.3d 316, 335 n.70 (Alaska 2012) (clarifying that recognizing a post-sale duty to warn does not include any duty to recall).
[brief] After being confronted with his status as a sex offender and the police's promise to help protect him if he were to go to jail, the interrogation turned to a discussion of [...].  (2T 148-4 to 149-18)  [...] said that on January 12th, 1012, there was a discussion about a memorial for an individual who had been shot in New Brunswick.  (2T 146-25 to 147-3)  He told police that [...] was traveling to the memorial.  (2T 147-5 to 7)  His statement to the police corroborated his trial testimony that [...] would frequently use [...]’s phone to contact him:  “I don’t have him in my phone.  Like I said, [[...]] always calls me from [[...]’s] number. ”  (2T 147-8 to 10, 188-2 to 4)  He testified that [...] was the person who told him what to do, where they were going to rob, and the person who sent the store locations.  (2T 158-3 to 19)  [...] did not have [...] listed in as a contact in his phone.  (2T 180-11 to 19)
[brief] CONCLUSION  The Appellate Division respectfully should reverse the Court’s Order and dismiss Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  [...] MHZ/afm cc: All parties via eCourts  NEW JERSEY  SUPERIOR COURT APPELLATE  DIVISION  [...], AG, NJ AND [...], DIRECTOR, NJ  DIVISION OF CIVIL RIGHTS, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. [...] AND [...], Defendants-Appellants.  Docket No. [...]  Civil Action  On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Monmouth County, Chancery Division – General Equity  Sat below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  AMENDED BRIEF OF PROPOSED
[brief] The Intervenor argues that the trial Court erred when it found that the waivers were “better alternatives. ”  This position is untenable, as the language of UDO § 18-805(c) only requires practicality, not hardship, which is consistent with the language of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-51, which empowers a Board to grant said waivers if they are “reasonable”.
[brief] The four factors favor the use of the charge for this case: 1) [...] was within the State’s control; 2) he was available as it was stated throughout the transcript that he was in the building at the time of the trial; (2T60:20-25); 3) [...] administered standardized field sobriety tests to [...]; (2T12:10-13:11); and 4) his testimony would have been superior because he was trained and knew the scoring factors for field sobriety tests that [...] was unaware.  Id.  The de novo court noted that under Hill use of the charge has been disfavored, but it is disfavored only when it is used against a criminal defendant who has the presumption of innocence.  Id. at 562-63, 566.  The de novo court improperly faulted [...] for not calling [...] himself when the answer lies in the very case on which the trial court relied; in Hill, the Court explained, “Defendant did not need to prove anything; he could merely rely on the presumption of innocence and require that the State satisfy its burden. ”  Hill, 199 N.J. at 568.  Here, by denying the adverse inference, the de novo court overlooked that [...]’ knowledge of the field sobriety tests were far greater and that had he been called, there would be more robust cross-examination as to the scoring factors to show reasonable doubt into [...]’s intoxication.