ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In that regard, Defendants sufficiently identified the substantial government interests in regulating billboards based on traffic safety and aesthetic concerns at the Trial Court level and presented case law establishing that the Distance Regulation is sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass constitutional muster.  Moreover, Plaintiff is simply not correct that the Planning Board members “conceded” that they did not know that one of the purposes of the Distance Regulation was traffic safety.  Plaintiff’s entire initial presentation to the Planning Board regarding the Distance Regulation was explicitly premised on traffic safety being the underlying concern.  Indeed, the very first person who spoke for Plaintiff at the Planning Board hearing immediately acknowledged that presumed purpose of the ordinance was traffic safety.  Plaintiff’s counterargument to the traffic safety rationale was to argue that studies show roadside billboards never present a safety issue and as such the Distance Regulation was invalid, and a variance should therefore be granted.  In other words, Plaintiff readily acknowledged from the onset of the Planning Board hearing that traffic safety was a rationale for the Distance Regulation and then Plaintiff set out to “disprove” the traffic safety rationale.  It was in this context that there was some discussion regarding the purpose of the Distance Regulation, and it is primarily this discussion is what Plaintiff now disingenuously cherry-picks to claim that no one knew the basis for the Distance Regulation.  On the contrary, it is clear from the transcript of the initial hearing that Plaintiff proceeded from the onset of that hearing under the presumption that traffic safety was one of the legislative purposes of Distance Regulation.  Thus, it is a misrepresentation of the record evidence for Plaintiff to claim that the Planning Board had no idea why the Distance Regulation existed.  It was simply that a majority of the Planning Board members did not find Plaintiff’s argument, that billboards never create a traffic safety issue under any circumstances, to be persuasive.  Finally, Plaintiff has not established that the denial of variance by the Planning Board was “arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable” because, as Plaintiff admits, at the conclusion of the hearing, the Planning Board members relied on traffic safety or “sizing” a/k/a aesthetics as reasons for denying the variance and upholding the Distance Regulation.  It is extremely well settled that municipalities have wide discretion to regulate signs and billboards based on the substantial government interests of traffic safety and aesthetics which is precisely what occurred here.
[brief] ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................................17  I.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS SOUND DISCRETION TO RECONSIDER THE JANUARY 23 ORDERS IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.  (Pa056, Pa067-068).  .........................................................................................................................17  A.  Defendants’ Motion For Reconsideration Was Not An “Impermissible ‘Lateral Appeal. ’”  .................................................................18  B.  The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Sound Discretion To Reconsider The January 23 Orders.  .................................................................23  II.  THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE ON THE BASIS OF COMITY DUE TO THE PENDENCY OF THE MISSOURI ACTION.  (Pa057, Pa077).  ........26  A.  The First Filed Rule Is Not A Mandate For New Jersey Courts to Always Defer to the First-Filed Action.  .................................26  B.  The Trial Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion When It Dismissed This Case On Comity Grounds In Favor Of The Missouri Action .........................................................................................................................29  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Oral Decision of Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated January 20, 2023 ................................................................. 2T¹ Order of Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated July 24, 2023 granting Defendants’ motion for reconsideration and dismissing the action on comity grounds .............................................. Pa056-57  Decision of Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated July 24, 2023 ..................... Pa058-77  Order of Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated January 20, 2023 denying Defendants’ renewed motion to dismiss for failure to join Indispensable parties and on comity grounds .................................................. Pa770-71  Order of Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated January 20, 2023 denying Defendants’ motion to stay on comity grounds ................................. Pa774-75 ¹ Citations to “2T” are to the Transcript of Motion dated January 20, 2023 before Hon. [...], J.S.C. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] Given the parties’ positions, the first judge believed the issue of abandonment required amplification.  (15a-18a).  For that reason, the first judge permitted discovery on that issue and contemplated that the parties would return on “further motion practice” with a fuller record.  (18a).  Discovery was also to explore [...]’s status as a bona fide purchaser, and what was learned would again “be the subject of further motion practice or a plenary hearing. ” (21a-22a).  The decision to permit discovery and decide the matter on a fuller record accords with the principle cited by the first judge in his thoughtful opinion: justice is better-served when parties are given an adequate opportunity for discovery.  Jenkins v. Rainner, 69 N.J. 50, 56 (1976).  (18a, 22a).  Defendants did not undertake the discovery permitted by the order.  They sat on their hands, did not timely respond to [...]’s demands despite [...]’s good-faith efforts to obtain compliance without court intervention, and then offered patently inadequate responses one day before return on [...]’s motion to compel (nearly three months late).7 (790a¶7, 821a-826a, 828a-833a, 835a-840a).  Defendants never served any discovery on, nor sought to take depositions of, [...].  (790a¶5).  As the second judge correctly concluded, Defendants’ --- 7  This effectively precluded [...] from conducting depositions.  service of discovery demands on (only) Plaintiff nine or ten days before the expiration of the ninety-day discovery, without any accompanying motion to extend or reopen the discovery period, period cannot reasonably be considered compliance with the order.  (3T73:4-22, 3T78:14-19).  In short, Defendants did not discharge the obligation to conduct discovery, and returned before the court with essentially\(^8\) the same record as before.  Given this, there is no reason the outcome should have been any different before the second judge.  There was no abuse of discretion.
[brief] BRIEF OF APPELLANT, TOWNSHIP OF HOLMDEL  Pages Hr1a to Hr23a  Submitted by: [...], NJ Attorney ID # 00166 1979  [...] [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  Fax: [...]  Email: [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Appellant, [...]  Dated: September 20, 2023  NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE
[brief] Approximately one week before the incident, Defendants had shoveled the snow from the sidewalk, piling it along the edges of the driveway, uphill from where the accident occurred.  By placing the snow mounds in the uphill areas, Defendants created snowmelt runoff to flow downhill onto the sidewalk, forming ice, thereby causing [...]’s fall.  [...] filed suit against Defendants alleging negligence.  Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that, as residential landowners, no duty was owed to the plaintiff.  The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment, resulting in the subject appeal.  Our state has a longstanding rule that where a property owner, through his negligence in cleaning the sidewalk, adds a new element of danger or hazard other than the one caused by natural forces to the safe use of the sidewalk by the pedestrian, he is liable.
[directive] Agency Name: Year: Click the link below to reivew the full Internal Affairs Policies & Procedures  Internal Affairs Policies & Procedures this year.  Fill in the information below for each case opened within IA Number, Dates, Officer, and Discipline are free-text fields.  ALL OTHER FIELDS HAVE A PRE-DEFINED RESPONSE LIST.  THE LENGTH OF CASE FIELD WILL CALCULATE AUTOMATICALLY AND FLAG CASES OVER 180 DAYS.  Click on each cells and click on the dropdown menu that appears to view all response options.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8.  Accordingly, a municipality is statutorily permitted to “negotiate and collect revenue from a redeveloper to defray the costs of the redevelopment entity. ”  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f) (emphasis added).  Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the Legislature did not require a “rational nexus” between a negotiated redevelopment payment and the particular redevelopment project from which the redevelopment payment originates.  Rather, the LRHL authorizes a municipality to collect negotiated payments provided they “carry out and effectuate the purposes of [the LRHL] and the terms of the redevelopment plan. ”  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8.  The intent of the Legislature is clear.
[brief] As such, Defendant’s contention that the State erred by not presenting “the most reliable hearsay” holds the State to an impossible standard.  The State cannot present evidence that the trial court has erroneously deemed inadmissible.  The Defendant cannot have it both ways.  He cannot lodge a meritless objection to the admission of certain evidence and then, when the trial court wrongfully excludes that evidence in reliance on that objection, argue that the State erred by not presenting it.  After the State was unjustifiably prevented from presenting evidence related to the 9-1-1 call, the trial prosecutor was forced to change strategy and argue that the 9-1-1 call was not being admitted for the “effect on the listener”.
[brief] It is undisputed also that the area around the entrance and exit doors was not crowded, and no one had activated the entrance door as plaintiff approached it.  Plaintiff produced no expert witnesses to prove that the entrance and exit doors were improperly constructed or designed for the anticipated use by patrons with shopping carts.  No expert proof was offered to show that the sidewalk in front of and surrounding the doors, or the wooden curbing abutting the end of the sidewalk, was improperly constructed, designed or maintained for the reasonably safe use by patrons; or that proper design required some form of railing or divider at or near the wooden curb.  No proof was offered to show that the use of shopping carts in the area around the doors created a foreseeable danger or hazard requiring special precautions to be taken by [...].  Nor was proof offered to show that [...] had actual or constructive knowledge that patrons, or other third parties, used the carts for any purpose or in any manner other than those for which they were designed.  Id. at 246-247.  The Znoski Court specifically refused to apply the “Mode of Operation” rule because the Court was:  [U]able to say that a substantial risk of injury is implicit, or inherent, in the furnishing of shopping carts to patrons by a store proprietor.  Shopping carts are not dangerous instrumentalities, and they are uniquely suitable for the purpose for which furnished.  [...] was under a legal duty of exercising ordinary care to furnish a reasonably safe place and safe equipment for its patrons consistent with its operation and the scope of its invitation.  It is not an insurer for the safety of its patrons.  The issue is not merely whether it was foreseeable that patrons, or other third parties, would negligently or intentionally misuse shopping carts, but whether a duty exists to take measures to guard against such happenings.  Id. at 247-248.  The Court further noted that it was “difficult to visualize how an incident such as here involved could have been prevented even if reasonable precautions had been taken” and noted that without any expert testimony, the jury would have had to decide Shop Rite’s responsibility on the basis of speculation and conjecture.  Id. at 248.  Based on these undisputed facts and on Znoski, [...] specifically found “that there was no constructive notice” (2T20:17-20) and that Plaintiffs’ “Mode of Operation” argument was “inapplicable . . . as applied to the facts in this case. ” (2T21:14-17).  On appeal, Plaintiffs utterly fail to distinguish Znoski which is controlling upon this Court.  Plaintiffs should not be allowed to present this matter to a jury to decide [...]’s alleged notice and duty on the basis of speculation and conjecture.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot prevail on the claim of negligence as Plaintiffs cannot establish that the [...] had actual or constructive notice of any allegedly dangerous condition or breached any duty owed to Plaintiff.  Therefore, the trial court correctly ruled that [...] should be afforded summary judgment.  This ruling should be affirmed.
[brief] Even if the Appellate Division had jurisdiction to review that issue, and assuming the applicability of the ECD was theoretically a delegable question of arbitrability—which it is not, see Raritan Plaza, 273 N.J.  Super. at 70-71 (“the trial court should have stayed the second arbitration proceeding until it resolved the issue as to whether defendant’s present [] dispute is barred by the entire controversy doctrine”)—here, the parties’ agreement does not reflect “clear and unmistakable” evidence of an intent to delegate such issues to an arbitrator.  In Morgan v. Sanford Brown Institute, the New Jersey Supreme Court took guidance from the FAA and observed that “the law presumes that a court, not an arbitrator, decides any issue concerning arbitrability. ”  225 N.J. 289, 304 (2016).  So, the parties themselves must expressly and unambiguously “delegate to an arbitrator the issue of whether they agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute. ”  *Id.* at 303.  Moreover, “[a]n agreement to delegate arbitrability to an arbitrator…must satisfy the elements necessary for formation of a contract. ”  *Id.* at 295.  “*Silence or ambiguity* in an agreement does *not* overcome the presumption that a court decides arbitrability. ”  *Id.* (emphases added).  Thus, with any doubt about the parties’ intent, courts must decide arbitrability issues.
[brief] (1T71-13 to 15; 1T93-16 to 24).  The defense had an opportunity to consult their already-retained expert on [...]’s report after it was received on April 25, 2022.  Indeed, defense counsel had already consulted his expert about [...]’s report prior to the May 6, 2022 motion hearing.  (1T72-4 to 8; 1T97-3 to 4).  Further, the court obviated defense counsel’s concern about not being able to get another report from [...] by indicating it was sufficient for the defense to provide a proffer by the following week, which counsel believed he could accomplish.
[brief] THE JUDGE IMPROPERLY IMPEINGED UPON THE JURY’S FACTFINDING ROLE WHEN HE SUA SPONTE INFORMED THE JURORS THAT, OUTSIDE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY, THE DEFENSE HAD OBJECTED TO THE ADMISSION OF THE PHOTOGRAPHIC REENACTMENT OF CERTAIN SURVEILLANCE VIDEO, BUT THAT THE JUDGE “HAS DETERMINED THAT IT IS PROPERLY ADMISSIBLE” AND “APPROPRIATE FOR THE JURY TO VIEW” THAT EVIDENCE.
[brief] This action involves a business dispute between members of a limited liability company and the operation of [...] d/b/a as [...] (“S.G. Health”) in [...] from 2016 to May 2019.  In December 2015, [...] (“Defendant”) formed [...] for the purpose of operating a pharmacy.  In 2016, [...] paid [...] payments over time totaling $100,000 for forty-nine percent (49%) of her membership interest in S.G. Health.  In January 2017, the parties entered into an operating agreement for S.G. Health.  According to the operating agreement, Defendant was the manager.  Unrelated to the operating agreement, she also worked as the pharmacist for S.G. Health LLC.  In May 2019, [...] purchased the assets of [...] d/b/a [...] pursuant to an Asset Sale and Purchase Agreement.
[brief] ..........................................................  48 U. S. ex rel. Barth v. Ridgedale Elec., Inc., 44 F.3d 699 (8th Cir. 1995)  ..........................................................  45 U.S. ex rel. Beauchamp v. Academi Training Ctr., 816 F.3d 37 (4th Cir. 2016)  ..........................................................  46 U.S. ex rel. Bogina v. Medline Indus., Inc., 809 F.3d 365 (7th Cir. 2016)
[brief] N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 and 15-9 ...............................................................................19  N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 ...............................................................................................9, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 40, 43, 44 N.J.S.A. 34:15-9 ...............................................................................................24  N.J.S.A. 34:15-10 ............................................................................................19, 28, 29, 30 N.J.S.A. 34:15-40 ............................................................................................27 N.J.S.A. 34:15-71 ............................................................................................23, 25, 26 N.J.S.A. 34:15-72 ............................................................................................7, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26, 32 N.J.S.A. 34:15-77, -78 ....................................................................................19, 25 N.J.S.A. 34:15-78 ............................................................................................19, 25, 30 N.J.S.A. 34:15-87 ............................................................................................26
[directive] Personnel records are separate and distinct from internal affairs investigation records, and internal affairs investigative reports shall never be placed in personnel records, nor shall personnel records be co-mingled with internal affairs files.  When a complaint has a disposition of exonerated, not sustained or unfounded, there shall be no indication in the employee's personnel file that a complaint was ever made.  See N.J.S.A. 43:1-3 (“honorable service” and the evaluation by the relevant board for same); 43:1-4 14 (notification to Division of Criminal Justice, and Pensions and Benefits, about prosecutions or convictions of members); 43:1-5 (employer must notify the board of disciplinary action taken against a member).
[brief] **POINT I**  DEFENDANT MADE A KNOWING, VOLUNTARY AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER OF COUNSEL, AND THEREFORE IS NOT ENTITLED TO LAURICK RELIEF.  Defendant argues that the lower court erred in denying defendant’s application for PCR and his request for Laurick relief.  Specifically, defendant argues that he is entitled to said relief because he could not possibly have made an intelligent waiver of counsel when he never requested or reviewed discovery.  (Db 12).  However, defendant’s reading of the Laurick decision and his reliance therein as being “uncounseled” is misplaced.  Defendant was advised of his right to retain private counsel or be appointed a public defender by the municipal court on three separate occasions and unequivocally waived his right to any counsel prior to pleading guilty.  As such, defendant’s argument is without any substantive merit.  An Appellate Court’s review of a trial court’s judgment is restricted to the test of “whether there is sufficient credible evidence . . . in the record to support the trial court’s findings.
[directive] Pretrial Memorandum - Revised form promulgated Directive# 23-17 (8/21/2017), CN: [...].  5.  Sentencia maxima ( que incluye termino extendido, si corresponde) el if Maximum sentence convicted.  if (Including extended term, applicable)  Periodo ------------- maximo 6. de inelegibilidad antes de salir en libertad condicional.  Maximum parole ineligibility period.  lEntiende usted que lo adjudican culpable, el juez, a su discrecion podria imponerle un si 7.  [No/No]  [Si/Yes]  periodo minimo reclusion que tendra que cumplir antes de ser elegible para salir bajo de libertad condicional, y que dicho periodo podria ser de hasta la mitad de la sentencia total que se imponga?  le of if  Do you understand that you are found guilty, the Court in its discretion could impose a minimum period of be confinement to served before you become eligible for parole, which could be up to one-half the total sentence imposed?
[brief] The focus is on whether a reasonable person using the property with due care could fact substantial risk of injury.  *Garrison v. Township of Middletown*, 154 N.J. 282, 292 (1998).  With respect to a surface irregularity, a substantial risk is a risk that is neither minor, trivial, nor insignificant.  *Polyard v. Terry*, 160 N.J. Super. at 509.  The determination of a dangerous condition is subject to the court’s preliminary assessment of whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude from the evidence presented by plaintiff that the property was in a dangerous condition.  *Vincitore v. Sports & Expo. Auth.*, 169 N.J. 119, 123 (2001).  In this case, Plaintiff claims that the dangerous condition that caused the incident at issue was a 2” elevation change between the surface pavement at a southern deck approach joint at the north abutment of a bridge located between mile marker 39.9 and 40.1 on the southbound [...].  *(See Pa 1; 1550).*  In performing its analysis and rendering its decision, the trial court conducted an extensive review of all discovery obtained during litigation including: 1) testimony of the parties, 2) photographs and video depicting the condition at issue, 3) Plaintiff’s expert opinion and testimony regarding same, and 4) engineering inspection reports and memos.  *(Pa2119 – Pa2139).*
[brief] **Authority:**  **Court Rules:** - R. 1:7-2  Brief Page: 32 - R. 2:10-1  Brief Page: 23 - R. 2:10-2  Brief Page: 37  **Case Law:** - **Ahn v. Kim,** 145 N.J. 423 (1996)  Brief Page: 47 - **Baxter v. Fairmount Food Co.,** 74 N.J. 588 (1977)  Brief Page: 23 - **Caicedo v. Caicedo,** 429 N.J. Super. 615 (App. Div. 2016)  Brief Page: 23 - **Geler v. Akawie,** 358 N.J. Super. 437 (App. Div. 2003)  Brief Page: 37 - **Henebema v. South Jersey Transp. Auth.,** 219 N.J.  481 (2014)  Brief Page: 47 - **Jackowitz v. Lang,** 408 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 2009)  Brief Page: 23, 36-37, 39-42 - **Jastram v. Kruse,** 197 N.J. 216 (2008)  Brief Page: 23-24 - **Johnson v. Scaccetti,** 192 N.J. 256 (2007)  Brief Page: 23  Kavanaugh v. Quigley, 63 N.J. Super. 153 (App. Div. 1960)  27-28  Panko v. Flintkote, 7 N.J. 55 (1951)  27  State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515 (1999)  36-37  Model Civil Jury Charges: Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11C: Loss of Earnings 45  Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11G: Life Expectancy 42-43  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT