ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Court eventually confirmed the award on November 17, 2023, almost three months after the conclusion of the hearing in the PTA Arbitration and one month after the parties submitted their post-hearing briefing in the PTA Arbitration.  Da9-Da10.  Therefore, [...]’s claim that the Sonehan Arbitration “had concluded in full” while the PTA Arbitration was ongoing is false.  [...]’s App. Br. at 36.  [...] also incorrectly asserts that [...] could have brought its Hackensack Project claims as early as December 2020 [...]’s App. Br. at 37.
[brief] This is a case where the relevant conduct dates back to the 1990s.  Plaintiff [...] (also known as [...]) and Defendant [...] (also known as [...]) were brothers, prior to [...]’s unfortunate passing in 2020 (Da371).  In 1986, the brothers bought adjacent properties located at [...] and [...], [...], with Richard purchasing the 291 property and Sam purchasing 293 property with his wife [...] (Da094 – Da113).  In 1997, there was a purported deed that transferred the [...] property (the “293 Property”) from Sam and [...] to [...], who was married to [...] at the time (though they have since divorced) (Da444 – Da445).  Plaintiff claimed that Sam and [...] sold the 293 Property to [...]/[...] in 1997.  Defendants denied this alleged sale (9T112).  The next year, on June 28, 1998, [...] granted the 293 property to her husband Richard [...] via deed (Da338 – Da342).  Defendants alleged that the aforementioned two (2) title transfers were fraudulent because Sam and [...]’s signatures on the 1997 deed were forged.  Defendants further alleged that after [...] found out about Plaintiff [...]’s fraud, [...] agreed to transfer the property back to [...].  A deed dated December 10, 1998 was recorded on December 16, 1998 which listed Richard [...] as the grantor and [...] as the grantee (Da359 – Da362).  The deed contains language stating that “Richard [...] is the same person as [...],” and the affidavit of consideration contains a signature for [...] (Da343 – Da346).  At trial, Plaintiff [...] admitted that he forged [...]’s signature by signing for the name [...] (3T62-2).  This important fact is not in dispute.  The deed was recorded again on January 25, 1999 which corrected a block number that was incorrect on a previous deed (Da347 – Da350).  This new deed did not, however, change the grantor or grantee.  In 2019, [...] transferred the property to a company called [...], which is owned by [...]’s sons, for $171,000 (Da351 – Da370).  Shortly after the transfer, Plaintiff [...] filed the underlying lawsuit, seeking, among other things, to quiet title.
[brief] The abuse of discretion standard applies to disposition of discovery matters.  State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 521 (2019).  The abuse of discretion standard also applies to denial of a motion for reconsideration.  Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 459 N.J. Super. 529, 541 (App. Div. 2019)  An abuse of discretion warrants a reversal.
[brief] Certification Of [...] ........................................................................Da550 [...] Indictment ........................................................................Da551-57 [...] Judgments Of Conviction ................................................Da558-67 Statement Of [...] - Excerpt .........................................................Da568-72 State v. Russell, A-5319-15T2, 2019 WL 2114762 (App. Div. May 15, 2019) .................................................................Da573-84 INDEX TO CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX  PCSAM Listing Atl-05-2897 (State v. [...]) .......................Dca1-11  PCSAM Listing Atl-07-4545 (State v. [...])  .........................Dca12-20  PCSAM Listing Atl-07-2563 (State v. [...])  .................Dca21-32  PCSAM Listing Atl-07-2563 (State v. [...], et al)  ......Dca33-45 | CASES | PAGE NOS.  | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Acola v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2003) | 52 | | Akhtar v. JDN Properties at Florham Park, LLC, 439 N.J. Super. 391 | 66 | | Anderson v. Butler, 858 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1988) | 49 | | Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) | 45, 60, 79| | Clarkson v. Kelly, 49 N.J. Super. 10 (App. Div. 1958) | 66 | | Cuyler v.
[brief] It had to find that those offenses occurred on at least three separate occasions. ”  *Ibid.*  The Court held that the factual finding of whether those offenses occurred on separate occasions exceeded the “prior conviction” exception to *Apprendi*.  *Ibid.*  The *Erlinger* Court rejected the argument that a sentencing judge should be permitted to determine the date of an offense by consulting so-called “*Shepard*”\(^2\) documents such as “judicial records, plea agreements, and colloquies between a judge and the defendant.
[brief] ”  Ja033.  Its “Conclusions of Law” hold that [...]’ opinion that traffic was not a “significant matter of concern” in the 1999 Master Plan is “unsupported by the actual language of that document. ”  Ja034.  No evidence in the record supports this finding, or the rejection of [...]’ analysis and interpretation of the Master Plan’s language.  Instead, as [...] testified, and as the Master Plan expressly states three paragraphs before the language quoted in the paragraph 21 of the Resolution: “The category of general manufacturing poses special concerns because it can have significant offsite impacts: noise, dust, odors and visuals.
[brief] (Volume 1 of 1 – Pra1 to Pra7)  Michael v. FCA US LLC, [...] (D. Az. March 14, 2023)  Pr1a # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | Beshada v. Johns-Manville Corp., 90 N.J. 191 (1982) | 6 | | Freund v. Cellofilm Props., 87 N.J. 229 (1981) | 6 | | Green v. General Motors Corp., 310 N.J. Super. 507 | | | (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 381 (1998) | 3 | | Michael v. FCA US LLC, [...] (D. Az. March 14, 2023) | 3,4 | | Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chemical Corp., 91 N.J. 386 (1982) | 5,6 | | O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169 (1983) | 5 | | Soler v. Castmaster, Div. of H.P.M. Corp., 98 N.J. 137 (1984) | 8 | | Statutes | Pages | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3a | 6,7 | | Regulations | | | Rules of Court | | | Other Authorities | | | Model Jury Charge (Civil)
[directive] Conducted Energy Devices (CEDs) and other authorized less-lethal devices and ammunition are forms of Enhanced Mechanical Force which may be utilized against a Threatening Assailant or an Active Assailant, but only within the parameters outlined in this Policy and in Addendum A of this Policy.  CEDs and other authorized less-lethal devices and ammunition shall not be utilized against a passive resistor or an active resistor.  Officers shall always strive to use only that degree of force that is objectively reasonable, necessary and proportional considering the totality of the circumstances.  3.7.1  An officer authorized to use a CED or a less-lethal device pursuant to this Policy may fire, discharge, or utilize drive stun mode of the device during an actual operation, consistent with Addendum A, only against: (a) an active assailant; (b) a threatening assailant who will not voluntarily submit to custody after having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so considering the exigency of the situation and the immediacy of the need to employ law enforcement force; (c) a person who is attempting to cause death or serious bodily injury to themselves; or 10  USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022
[directive] With the introduction of new technologies in law enforcement, it may become necessary to search computers and cell phones or other digital devices, (hereafter “devices”), and seize their contents.  The critical question remains whether the public employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in information stored in a device.  While the determination of a 38 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 reasonable expectation of privacy must be decided on a case-by-case basis, the law enforcement agency should take steps to actively and affirmatively diminish this expectation.  The agency should state, in writing, that it retains the right to enter and review the contents of any agency-issued device at any time.  This notice may be worded as follows:  The agency may assign to its members and employees agency-owned electronic devices, including computers and smartphones, for business purposes.  Such equipment and its contents are and remain the property of the agency.  Personnel are prohibited from installing unauthorized software and from storing personal information in the device, regardless of any password protection or encryption.  The devices, their contents, and any email or electronic correspondence originating from or arriving at the device are the property of the agency and are subject to entry and inspection without notice.  7.8.8
[brief] For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff, [...], respectfully requests that the Court reverse the trial court’s May 18, 2023 Order dismissing this action in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff, and its July 14, 2023 Order denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, and that the Court compel Defendant to provide an accounting to the beneficiaries.  Respectfully submitted, **[...]**  Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, [...] /s/ [...]
[brief] In any action for damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or property damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a licensed person in his profession or occupation, the plaintiff shall, within 60 days following the date of filing of the answer to the complaint by the defendant, provide each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed person that there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside the acceptable professional or occupational standards or treatment practices.  N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  If the plaintiff fails to provide an affidavit of merit pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27, it shall be deemed a failure to state a cause of action.  See Cornblatt v. Barrow, 153 N.J. 218 (1998).  To determine if the Affidavit of Merit Statute applies, courts have considered the following three factors: 1) [W]hether the action is for “damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or property damage” (nature of injury); 2) [W]hether the action is for “malpractice or negligence” (cause of action); and 3) [W]hether the “care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint [] fell outside acceptable professional or occupation standards or treatment practices” (standard of care).
[brief] (Da 25)  Although what [...] says next is mostly inaudible, the officers’ audible responses make clear that [...] again asked for clarification about what would happen if he did not consent:  (MR. GALLOWAY inaudible)  [...]: Okay.  (MR. GALLOWAY inaudible)  [...]: What do you mean?  UNIDENTIFIED OFFICER: We won’t be searching it on consent.  [...]\textsuperscript{13}:  We’re not gonna search it on the consent.  We’d wind up going back to our headquarters to write a search warrant, we’ll come back.  And make entry into the house.  So basically you’re saving us some time here and you’re saving yourself a little bit of heart ache.  We write a search warrant, we’re gonna tear through the house.  You know what I mean?  MR. GALLOWAY: You guys did that one time .  . . .  [Da 25 (emphasis added); see 2T84-8 to 86-9.]  Only at that point, after the threat that police would tear apart his home—which he shared with his ill wife and grandchildren—did [...] sign the consent to search form.
[brief] Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully asks that the Appellate Court (i) reverse the lower court’s April 3, 2023 Order, the September 27, 2023 Order and the November 14, 2023 Order and Vacate the Final Judgment for the reasons argued herein, and (ii) grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.  Dated: Newton, New Jersey  June 28, 2024  [...] [...] [...]
[brief] [...]’s interpretation of the Settlement Agreement is unreasonable as a matter of law because it does not give effect to all of its terms.  [...] purports to interpret Paragraphs 23 and 24(F) of the Settlement Agreement as a release by [...] of her rights and interests in the Palm Beach Property, regardless of the source of those rights and interests, except for the “limited” rights provided under Section 3.3(A)(4)(d) of [...].  (Pb22-23).  However, that interpretation improperly lumps together the several sources that comprise [...]’s interests in the Palm Beach Property.  In fact, [...]’s interests in the Palm Beach Property derive from two separate sources: (1) [...]’s interest in the Palm Beach Property that flows from [...]; and (2) [...]’s interest in the Palm Beach Property that flows from [...].  Reading Paragraph 24(F) as a whole makes clear that it only relates to [...]’s interest in the Palm Beach Property that flows from [...].  (See Db18-19).  Likewise, Paragraph 24(G) relates to [...]’s interests in all of [...]’s property, including Harriet’s separate interest in the Palm Beach Property that flows to [...].
[brief] Yet, it still factored into his decision and was improperly admitted into evidence.  2T:85:13 – 2T88:12.  The only issue was whether [...] was leashed or running loose.  The record abounds with evidence that [...] was always leashed.  However, whether leashed or not is irrelevant since i) [...] admits that [...] bit [...]; ii) it was not a serious injury; iii) no violation was issued; and iv) no violation could have been issued because none of the criteria in Section 4:19-23a. were satisfied.
[brief] Prior to accepting the $330,000 payment, Plaintiff could have asserted to the Defendants that a payment deficiency existed, refused to execute the Discharge of Mortgage evidencing the loan was “Paid in Full,” and brought an action immediately after April 26, 2013, when Defendants allegedly failed to pay any outstanding amounts, but did not do so.  But Plaintiff did not file his Complaint against Defendants until May 1, 2020, many years after the six (6) year statute of limitations ran on both loans.  Accordingly, by any measure, Plaintiff has failed to comply with the applicable six (6) year statute of limitations on his claims, and his Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice as a result.
[brief] We decided to file this reply brief even though we believe that our prior brief stands largely unaddressed and unrebutted by the State’s brief.  We are doing so to point out and stress that the State’s brief is more notable for what it does not say than for what it does say.  As a result, our reply brief’s Argument focuses only on the few points the State’s brief addresses and includes other points only as placeholders for the arguments we made in our prior brief.  We see no point in burdening this court with arguments previously made adequately and unrebutted by the State’s brief.  •  **What the State’s brief primarily says** can be set forth simply.  It says, repetitively and without legal basis, that the conceded denial of a thorough and efficient education (T&E) to the [...]’s ([...]) public school students, which it acknowledges continues to the present time, is caused by myriad unchecked failures of the local school district and that the School Funding Reform Act (SFRA), the State’s primary vehicle for funding the public schools, is not even a significant cause of the denial.  •  **What it does not say** is that for more than 50 years it has been a core constitutional principle in New Jersey that it is the State, not local districts, that has ultimate responsibility for assuring T&E, and that the State has whatever power is required to discharge that high constitutional duty.  •  **What it does not say**, in dereliction of its duty to respond to this court’s express remand order, is that the real cause of the denial is the failure of SFRA, the State’s chosen vehicle for directing funding to school districts, to provide the [...] with sufficient T&E appropriate funds over many years.  This is the argument appellants have made ever since this case was filed more than 10 years ago and it has never provoked an honest, fact-based and persuasive response from the State.
[brief] (1T58).  A new inmate was subsequently brought in that needed to be medically cleared.  (1T60-61).  While waiting to be evaluated, the inmate became upset and started yelling about needing to leave.  (1T63).  [...] attempted to de-escalate the situation, but the inmate refused to calm down.  (1T63-65).  [...] subsequently called [...] over the radio and asked for assistance.  (1T64-65).  [...] testified that she could have called an official code, but that calling a code usually involved an emergency, and resulted in a multi-officer response.  (1T66, 78).  [...] testified that she did not feel calling a code was necessary because the inmate started to calm down after additional time passed.  (1T66, 78).  However, the inmate later stood up and began collecting his belongings, which made [...] believe that he might try to leave.  (1T67).  As such, [...] again called [...] over the radio and asked for assistance.  (1T64-65).  [...] again testified that she did not feel calling a code was necessary and that the inmate calmed down after additional time passed.  (1T69).
[brief] *Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III*, 201 N.J. 328, 342 (2010).  ---  3  As defendant acknowledges in its brief, this issue was neither raised below nor properly preserved by defense counsel.  This doctrine is roused “when a defendant in some way has led the court into error. ”  *Id.* at 340-421.  Indeed, an appellate court will not review a claim of error if the party asserting the error on appeal “urged the court to adopt the proposition now alleged to be error.
[brief] (9T102-8 to 13).  Surveillance continued until April 23, 2009.  (9T107-12 to 15).  On that day, at approximately 7:29 p.m., officers observed defendant enter the passenger side of [...]’s Cadillac CTS.  (9T127-8 to 13).  At that time, officers believed that defendant suspected he was being investigated and decided to cease their investigation.
[brief] “I assume he was but …yes.  I’ll say yes.  Okay” (Trial transcript T2 Page 76 lines 5-6)  5.  And testimony from the Defendant on this issue was that this was not an easy lift for Defendant financially as he was forced to secure a HELOC loan to come up with the entire down payment.  This was the uncontested testimony at trial (Trial transcript T2, pages 131, lines-21-25 and 132, lines 1-2).  6.
[brief] Defendant [...] (“[...]”) operates group homes for intellectually and developmentally disabled individuals who cannot care for themselves.  It is undisputed that New Jersey law provides that “an individual shall be disqualified from employment” with a group home, including those run by Defendant, if that individual has been convicted of “[a] crime or offense involving the . . . sale [or] possession . . . of [drugs].”  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-64(b)(1)(c) (the “Statute”) (emphasis added).  Plaintiff has not disputed she pleaded guilty to distributing heroin and spent at least five years in prison as a result.  Plaintiff has not disputed her convictions are among those listed as disqualifying in the Statute.  Plaintiff was statutorily disqualified from employment with [...] serving vulnerable individuals and thus not permitted to maintain a lawsuit for wrongful termination under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”).  Cedeno v. Montclair State University, 163 N.J. 473, 478 (2000).  For this reason alone, the Trial Court properly granted summary judgment.
[brief] \(^{30}\) Tully at 126.  \(^{31}\) Ibid.  \(^{32}\) 1T and 2T.  Yet, none of the Plaintiffs asserted that this action involved derivative claims brought by the [...] (or any other party) on behalf of [...], which is the only party that allegedly suffered the alleged losses.  Only [...] and those who sue derivatively on behalf of [...] have standing.  The rest of the people and entities named at various times by the Plaintiffs do not.  Thus, none of the Plaintiffs have standing and are absolutely barred from bringing and recovering under Count I.
[brief] It would basically be illogical to read the statute the way the plaintiff wants to read it.”). fundamental tenets of statutory construction.  See generally Miller v. Americollect, Inc., 2022 WL 20470401 at *8-10; Mhrez Decision and Mhrez Transcript; T24.  It ignores that Congress wrote those provisions of the FDCPA into the statute out of concern for communications that would embarrass a consumer or harm his or her reputation—not to prohibit the use of service providers.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ position in this matter is that the Roads were already automatically dedicated to the Borough as a matter of New Jersey statute, and are therefore public roads that must be maintained by the Borough.  If the Roads are deemed to have already been accepted by the Borough as a matter of law, the nominal title owner is irrelevant, because the land underlying the Roads is subject to the public right-of-way and is for all intents and purposes the responsibility of the Borough. \footnote{Moreover, should it be determined by the Court that the Roads are private, there is no question that they would then be owned solely by [...].
[brief] 39 (Ch. Div. 1971) | 19 | | Carroll v. N.J. Transit, | | | 366 N.J. Super. 380 (App. Div. 2004) | 15 | | Cooper v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP, | | | 912 F. Supp. 2d 178 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2012) | 41 | | Corcoran v. Sears Roebuck and Co., | | | 312 N.J. Super. 117, 126 (App. Div. 1998) | 29, 30 | | Cortez v. Gindhart, | | | 435 N.J. Super. 589 (App. Div. 2014) | 30 | Claypotch v. Heller, Inc., 460 N.J. Super. 472 (App. Div. 2003) .................................................. 15, 16 Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24 (2017) ................................................................................. 44 Finderne Heights Condominium Ass’n v. Rabinowitz, 390 N.J. Super. 154, 165 (App. Div. 2007) ........................... 22 Fusco v. Board of Educ. of City of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455 (App. Div. 2002) ....................................................
[brief] However, [...] spent 10 to 15 minutes accusing [...] of lying and told him that he had evidence contrary to [...]’ statement.  [...] never presented that contrary evidence during this administrative hearing.  Based on the evidence that the State presented during this hearing, it is clear that [...] did not have any information that [...] posted anything to the website to contribute to its post.  Also, based on the evidence adduced at this hearing, there is no indication that [...] lied during his interview with [...].  The State has not provided a single scintilla of evidence that [...] “falsified, intentionally misstated any material fact in connection with work, employment application, attendance, or in any record, report, investigation, or other proceeding” as it relates to these allegations.