ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ..........................................................................................................  15 Thomasian v. N.J. Inst. Of Tech., 2009 WL 260791 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2009) .........................................................................  20 Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022) ............................................................................................................  29  Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2002) .............................................................................................  25 Wellington v. Est. of Wellington, 359 N.J. Super. 484 (App. Div. 2003) ..............................................................................  14, 15 Zamboni v. Stamler, 199 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 1985) ..............................................................................  33 Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 .................................................................................................................. 5, 18, 20 N.J.S.A. 10:6-2 et al. ...........................................................................................................  3 N.J.S.A. 59:8-8 ..................................................................................................................... 6, 7, 30 N.J.S.A. 59:8-9 ..................................................................................................................... 30  18 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) .......................................................................................................  9  42 U.S.C. §1983 ....................................................................................................................  3, 4, 9, 18  42 U.S.C §1985 ....................................................................................................................  3, 9  42 U.S.C §1986 ....................................................................................................................  3, 9 Rules  [...] & [...], Current N.J. Court Rules (2024) (Gann), cmt. 1 to Rule 2:5-4(a) .........................................................................................
[brief] (Not Raised Below)  The plea must be vacated because it lacked an adequate factual basis.  U.S. Const. amends.  V, VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶¶ 1, 9, 10.  A trial court may accept a guilty plea only after “elicit[ing] from the defendant a comprehensive factual basis, addressing each element of a given offense in substantial detail. ”  State v. Campfield, 213 N.J. 218, 236 (2013).  The “court is not permitted to presume facts required to establish the essential elements of the crime. ”  State v. Gregory, 220 N.J. 413, 421 (2015) (internal citations omitted).  Rather, the “court must be satisfied from the lips of the defendant . . . that he committed every element of the crime charged. ”  *State v. Perez*, 220 N.J. 423, 433 (2015) (internal citations omitted).  This requirement “is designed to protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge.
[brief] At defendant’s trial, the State presented eleven witnesses.  The State called [...], of the [...], to testify as a fingerprint expert.  Harris examined the ten shell casings that were recovered from the crime scene using a “cyanoacrylate chamber” which employs heat and glue to adhere to “any latent fingerprints that would be left on a shell casing, or any other object [placed] in the chamber. ” (7T 100-18 to 101-2).  Harris also used powder on the shell casings to determine if they contained fingerprints that could identify the person responsible for the shooting.  (7T 101-3 to 8).  However, the expert was unable to find any viable latent fingerprints on any of the shell casings that were recovered at the scene.  (7T 101-9 to 11).  In addition, the State introduced the video footage obtained from the surveillance camera of the nearby business.
[brief] Defendant-Respondent filed its Answer and Affirmative Defenses on July 2, 2019.  (Pa.12-Pa.33).  On September 25, 2019, Defendant-Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice, pursuant to R. 4:6-2(c), for failure to state a claim.  (Pa.681-Pa.682).  Oral argument was held on January 3, 2020.  (Pa.116-Pa.143).  The Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss with its reasons read into the record on January 3, 2020.  (Pa.683-Pa.684).  Defendant-Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration on March 11, 2020.  Oral argument was heard on June 17, 2020.  The Trial Court denied the motion on the same day and read its decision into the record.  (Pa.145-Pa.150).  In reading its decision on the motion for reconsideration into the record, the Trial Court remarked “[i]t’s a close call.  There is not much here. ” (Pa.149).  Discovery concluded on February 10, 2023.  On July 7, 2023, Defendant-Respondent moved for summary judgment to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice, pursuant to R. 4:46-2.  (Pa.48-Pa.50).  Oral argument was held on March 12, 2024.  On the same day, the Trial Court granted Defendant-Respondent’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Complaint with prejudice.  The Trial Court read its opinion into the record on that date.
[brief] In making its determination of the appropriateness of this area for these purposes, the Township has received the benefit of traffic reports, environmental reports, and a community impact statement, all of which have been posted to the Township’s website for public consumption, and are made part of the record on this Ordinance.  The Committee has also received an analysis of the traffic studies from the Township Planner’s office, dated October 21, 2022; a memo from the Township Administrator, dated October 27, 2022, entitled “Data Related to Township Land uses, PVD, and Assessed Value Apportionment”; all of which documents are part of this legislative record and inform the Township Committee’s decision.  K.
[directive] 법원에 제출하는 고소장, 신청 및 모든 서류들은 영어로 작성해야 합니다.  Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English 뉴저지 사법부  New Jersey Judiciary 도피(N.J.S.A. 또는 차량 절도 또는 차량의 2C:29-2b) 불법 탈취(N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2.1)에 대한 보충 답변양식 (N.J.S.A. Supplemental Plea Form for Eluding 2C:29-2b) or Theft of a Motor Vehicle or (N.J.S.A. Unlawful Taking of a Motor Vehicle 2C:20-2.1) (Korean) 귀하가 2C:29-2b를 위반하여 도피한 것에 대해 유죄 인정을 하는 경우에만 다음 질문에 N.J.S.A. 답변해야 합니다.
[brief] The trial court erred by failing to charge the jury with Model Civil Jury Charge 5.20B(2)(b) – Liability of Owner of Commercial Property for Defects, Snow and Ice Accumulation and Other Dangerous Conditions in Abutting Sidewalks.  Then, the trial court erred once again by precluding Defendants from referring to a photograph of the snow/ice condition and accident location, which was attached by Plaintiff herself to her answers to interrogatories.  The next error occurred when the trial court permitted Plaintiff to question Defendants about a subsequent storm in April 2018, which was irrelevant to any triable issue.  These errors, particularly as to the expanded duty of care which allowed reference to the snow removal contract, barring reference to or failing to take judicial notice of the State of Emergency, and failing to charge the jury with the proper jury charge constitute reversible error.
[brief] \(^2\)  In support of its motion to dismiss, [...] relied on a certified copy of the policy issued to plaintiff.  The version of the [...] policy that is included in plaintiff’s appendix, at Pa216-Pa240, is a document that plaintiff filed as an exhibit to his complaint.  For the sake of a complete and accurate record, we have included the certified copy of the [...] policy that was before the lower court on [...]’s motion in an appendix to this brief, at Da1-Da26.  \(^3\)  Numbers in parentheses preceded by “Da” refer to pages of the appendix to this brief.  [...]’s motion to dismiss, granted by the lower court  In lieu of answer, [...] moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint against it, on the ground that the allegations of the underlying lawsuit (Docket No. [...]) brought against plaintiff [...] by his condominium homeowners’ association and several individuals with whom he had contact were not covered by the “Unit-Owners” policy issued by [...] to plaintiff and his spouse (Pa252-Pa259).
[brief] Specifically, the Trial Court held that [...] did not satisfy one of the six factors necessary for the NJFPA to apply to the relationship between [...] and [...] – the writing requirement -- explaining as follows:  [S]ummary judgment is to be granted because the Court finds there is no written agreement for a definite or indefinite period in which a person grants to another person a license to use a trade name, trade mark, service mark, et cetera.  Clearly, [...] Furnishings did use their logo and they used their trade name, trade mark but there is a – it was a tacit approval.  There doesn’t – there has not been presented a – any kind of writing that grants the third-party plaintiff permission to use it.  I’m sure they had permission but there is no written agreement granting that and for that reason, I am going to grant the summary judgment motion.  (2T 18:20-19:8) (emphasis added).  This is the wrong standard.  The NJFPA does not require a “written agreement” that grants a license.  Instead, the plain language of the NJFPA defines a franchise relationship, in relevant part, as a “written arrangement” between two entities or individuals.
[brief] The decision to grant a defendant’s motion for a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.  *State v. Harvey*, 151 N.J. 117, 205 (1997).  The grant of a mistrial is an extraordinary remedy that should be granted sparingly.  *State v. Jenkins*, 182 N.J. 112, 124 (2004).  The appellate court should not disturb the denial of a mistrial “unless there [was] a clear showing of mistaken use of discretion by the trial court,” *Greenburg. v. Stanley*, 30 N.J. 485, 503 (1959), or unless “manifest injustice would...result. ”  *State v. LaBrutto*, 114 N.J. 187, 207 (1989).  A mistrial should be granted only when necessary “to prevent an obvious failure of justice. ”  *Harvey*, 151 N.J. at 205.  Defendant has a constitutional right to an impartial jury.  *State v. Williams*, 113 N.J. 39, 61 (1983).  The jury’s verdict must be free from the taint of extraneous considerations and influences.  *State v. Scherzer*, 301 N.J. Super. 363, 486 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 466 (1997).  The intrusion of irregular influences will warrant a new trial if the irregular matter could have the tendency to influence the jury in arriving at its verdict in a manner inconsistent with the proofs and the court’s charge.
[brief] Furthermore, if the State of New Jersey, as an actual petitioner in Massachusetts, prevailed on its claim before the Supreme Court of the United States that local harms must be accounted for and redressed by the judiciary when facing the known threats from global air pollution, then it should be held to the same standard with regard to the [...]’s instant consistency determination under the Highlands Act.  See First Union Nat. Bank v. Penn Salem Marina, Inc., 190 N.J. 342, 352 (2007).  The [...] argued in its initial brief, filed with this Court on October 31, 2022, at page 24, that “The substantial evidence in the record supports the [...]'s finding that the Project is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act. ”  The [...] reasoned that it “…incorporated the Act’s direction to protect or preserve ‘the quality and quantity of surface and ground waters, . . . forests, wetlands, vegetated stream corridors, steep slopes, and critical habitat for fauna and flora[,]’ N.J.S.A. 13:20-10(b)(1) and (3), into its standards at N.J.A.C. 7:38-3.
[brief] Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XXI), 206 N.J. 332, 340 (2011) (Emphasis added.).  The proven constitutional deprivations experienced by Lakewood public school students have not persisted yet for 20 years—and we profoundly hope that is not permitted to occur\(^4\)—but those deprivations are, nonetheless, both ---  \(^4\)  The court should note that this case was filed almost 10 years ago, and consistently since the June 2014, filing with the Commissioner (then [...]) the student-petitioners have asserted that their fundamental constitutional rights were being violated and that that denial needed to be remedied as soon as possible.  Indeed, the Final Decision acknowledges that the State was well aware of Lakewood’s serious educational and fiscal grave and unacceptable in a State that prides and touts itself as providing its students with an excellent education.  The Lakewood students also share with the Abbott students a very high level of characteristics associated with educational disadvantage.  They are 100% low-income, almost 95% Latino and black, and a high percentage speak English as a second language. \(^5\)  **POINT II**
[brief] Order Designating The Hon. [...] to Appoint a Special Hearing Officer of the Hon. [...], A.J.S.C. dated and entered on October 14, 2020 ..............................................................................................................................................................................M65  Memorandum of Honor able [...], P.J.Cv. dated October 14, 2020 granting permission to [...] to appoint [...], Esq. as Special Hearing Officer ..............................................................................................................................................M66  Resolution of the Board of Adjustment of the [...], Middlesex County, New Jersey, [...] and [...], Application No.: [...], adopted on April 30, 2019 .............................................................................................................M68 (The Denial 19 pages) Resolution of the Board of Adjustment of the [...], Middlesex County, New Jersey, [...], Docket No.: [...], adopted on April 26, 2016 ..............................................................................................................................................................................M87 (The Prior Approval 16 Pages) Board Hearing Exhibit A-3, Site Plan Concept, previously approved ......M103 Board Hearing Exhibit A-4, Site Plan Concept, proposed ........................................M105 Settlement Agreement in In the Matter of the Application of the [...] for Substantive Certification of its Obligations Under the Fair Housing Act, Docket No. [...], dated March 28, 2016.......................................................M107 Declaratory Judgment of Compliance and Repose in, In the Matter of the Application of the [...] for Substantive Certification of its Obligations Under the Fair Housing Act, Docket No. [...], dated October 5, 2016..............................................................................................................................................M131 Supplemental Order, In the Matter of the Application of the [...] for Substantive Certification of its Obligations Under the Fair Housing Act, Docket No. [...], dated April 19, 20172016 ..............................................M138 [...] Resolution R-12-2019-350 adopted on December 23, 2019, with executed Memorandum of Understanding ...........M140 Volume II Transcript of the Hearing conducted before the Zoning Board of Adjustment of the [...] – March 26, 2019 ..................................................................................................................M143 Volume III Township’s 1999-2025 Housing Element and Fair Share Plan (HEFSP)
[brief] I.D. 014312004  [...]  [...] [...] 2143-108475  (MJL/JLJ)  ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT / CROSS-APPELLANT  [...], d/b/a [...]  (PA)  [...]  Plaintiff, vs. [...], d/b/a [...]  (PA) and [...], Defendant.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION APPELLATE COURT  DOCKET NUMBER: [...]  SUPERIOR COURT DOCKET NUMBER: [...] ON APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, CIVIL DIVISION, BURLINGTON COUNTY  DATED: FEBRUARY 28, 2024  TRIAL COURT JUDGE: HON.  [...], J.S.C. [...], Third-Party Plaintiff, vs. [...], DECEASED, [...], [...], [...], A MINOR, [...], A MINOR AND WARD OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND JOHN DOES 1–10, THE UNKNOWN HEIRS OF [...], Third-Party Defendants.
[brief] ”)  If that burden of production or going-forward is met, the burden shifts to the attorney(s) sought to be disqualified to demonstrate that the matter or matters in which he or they represented the former client are not the same or substantially related to the controversy in which the disqualification motion is brought.  *Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Rose Elecs.*, 491 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1007 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (holding that “party opposing [attorney]’s disqualification [has] the burden to show that the matters are not substantially related”).  That said, the burden of persuasion on all elements under RPC 1.9(a) remains with the moving party, as it “bears the burden of proving that disqualification is justified. ”  *N.J. Div. of Youth Family Servs v. V.J.*, 386 N.J. Super. 71, 75 (Ch. Div. 2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  *City of Atlantic City*, 201 N.J. at 462-63 (2010).  A.  The Matter Consulted with [...] by Petitioners and the Instant Action are the Same
[brief] Beyond his better options, it’s clear that Appellant is running off the “principle of things” by making his technical defect arguments of the motion to dismiss and R. 1:4-8 letter and by arguing that Respondent’s attorney has also initiated a case where he lacked standing (Pb p. 36 – 38).  As to the latter, not that Appellant deserves a justification, but one should note that the key difference here is that the undersigned did not further pursue the case after receiving a R. 1:4-8 letter, despite not withdrawing his complaint.  As to the former, Appellant has already argued in his principal brief that technical defects should not carry great weight in consideration.  Objectively, the “technical defect” of missing a vital proof of ownership is far more consequential than alleged formatting and procedural defects.  6.
[brief] See id. at 81-82.  The Court noted:  It is undisputed that defendant provided her with the opportunity to ask questions about the application and the arbitration agreement and to consult a third party, including an attorney before signing the documents …  Similarly, defendant’s Director of Human Resources … testified at a deposition that his practice, followed in respect of plaintiff, was to ask an applicant to read the Application for Employment, review the document with the applicant, and offer to answer any questions.  He said that applicants were permitted to take the application home and to complete it, and then return it at a later date.  Id. at 82.  These were not immaterial facts mentioned in passing; very much to the contrary, they were central to the Court’s conclusion that the plaintiff “knowingly and voluntarily” waived her right to sue in court for discrimination.
[brief] “[T]aking a disability/medical leave is protected by the NJLAD. ”, Yobe v. Renaissance Elec., Inc., 32 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1015 | 2016 WL 614425  Civil Action No. [...], 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18227 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2016) citing Nusbaum v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 171 F. Supp.2d 377, 388 (D.N.J. 2001).  “A "request" for sick leave qualifies as a request for a reasonable accommodation.  Pizzo v. Lindenwold Bd. of Educ., 31 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 982, Civil Action No. [...], 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41499, at *35 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2015)  The “taking” of the sick day triggers the protections of the NJLAD because it is an event by which an employee is perceived to be disabled.
[brief] Decedent’s Finances  The import and intent of the Petitioner’s argument on the Decedent’s finances is unclear.  He provided no proof to rebut the fact that during the entire marriage, (1) the Petitioner and Decedent had separate bank accounts and separate finances, having no accounts or assets of any type owned jointly, and (2) the Decedent handled the couple’s finances, and by herself paid the mortgage and taxes on the Home, all utility bills, as well as the expenses associated with her cell phone, car, and household items.  In his trial testimony on finances and assets, the Petitioner was evasive, as demonstrated below:  Q.  [...]'s assets are in [...]'s name, your assets are in your name, and it was never changed; am I correct?  A.  No, I don't agree with you.  Q.  Okay.  Show me one asset that is in the name of [...] and [...] Sutton.  A.  We had credit cards.  Q.  Assets are not credit cards, sir.  Don't you remember we did this dance at the deposition?  I asked assets.  Tell us about one asset that was in your name and your wife's name jointly.  A.  I can't recall.  (1T229-1 to 12).  6.
[brief] Previous iterations of the Master Plan, of which the Court can take judicial notice, all indicate that there are dual goals of providing more parks and open space and satisfying the Borough’s affordable housing obligation.  1T 18:3-7, 18:25-19:15.  There is nothing inconsistent between the Amended Redevelopment Plan and the Master Plan, including its land use element.  The Court must also remember that the Planning Board’s role is limited.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e) requires review of the Master Plan, but only requires the Board to identify inconsistencies.  Here, the Board found no inconsistencies with respect to any component of the Master Plan.  In fact, the Amended Redevelopment Plan is consistent with the specific description of the Ford Avenue Redevelopment Plan discussed in the 2019 Master Plan Reexamination Report.  See Pa 38.  There being no inconsistencies, that the Board did not identify any searching review specific to the land use component of the Master Plan does not invalidate its efforts.  Plaintiffs argue that the Planning Board failed to conduct such an evaluation of the land use component, but Plaintiffs failed to identify to the lower court any provision in the land use element that precludes the use of the Property for open space.
[directive] Arson 3rd Degree $10,000 to $35,000  10% permissible damage or destruction, or for the purpose of collecting insurance for the destruction to such property.  Actor directly or indirectly pays or accepts or offers to pay or accept any form of consideration including, but not limited to, money or any other pecuniary benefit, regardless of whether any 2C:17-1d(1-3)  Aggravated Arson 1st Degree  $100,000 to $250,000  No 10% consideration is actually exchanged, for the purpose of starting a fire or causing an explosion, in violation of this section.  35  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2 STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants
[brief] ”  Id.  After the purchase price is ascertained, that number must be multiplied by 6.25% to determine the equity that will be applied to the property.  Recognizing that the Board was not going to accept his novel approach, [...]’s counsel implored the Board to take the original purchase price of the building ($525,000) and to divide that by the number of units in the building (eleven).  Id. at 8:5-20-22.  [...]’s counsel made this recommendation because there was no mortgage on the property, and since [...] purchased all eleven units together, the only applicable purchase price is $525,000. \(^2\)  Id. at 17.  He then asked the Board to add to the calculation $76,990 for renovations that he completed on the unit, which the Board refused to do since it found the $76,990 should be handled as a capital improvement.
[brief] ’”  *Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan*, 128 N.J. 427, 435 (1992) (quoting *Friedman v. Tappan Dev. Corp.*, 22 N.J. 523, 531 (1956)).  “An essential characteristic of an enforceable contract is that its obligations be specifically described in order to enable a court or a trier of fact to ascertain what it was the [promisor] undertook to do.