ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In determining whether expert testimony is admissible, a trial judge applies New Jersey Rule of Evidence 703, which requires that: an expert's testimony be based on facts or data derived from (1) the expert's personal observations, or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily admissible in evidence but which is the type of data normally relied upon by experts in forming opinions on the same subject, . . .”  [Davis, 219 N.J. at 410 (quoting Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, cmt. 1 on N.J.R.E. 703 (2014))]  A corollary of N.J.R.E. 703 is the “net opinion” rule: an expert’s bare conclusions, unsupported by factual evidence, are inadmissible and may not be considered.
[brief] [...], Esq. (025732005)  [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  [...], Esq. (admitted pro hac vice)  [...] [...]  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)  [...]  [...] (813)  202-7100  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)  [...]  [...] [...]  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)  [...]  [...]  [...] (305)  358-5171  Counsel for Defendant-Appellant  [...]
[brief] ERRONEOUSLY SUPPRESSED THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN DEFENDANTS VEHICLE INCORRECTLY FINDING THAT PROBABLE CAUSE WAS NOT SPONTANEOUS AND UNFORESEEABLE, THUS, THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE DEMANDS THE STATE’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL BE GRANTED.  (2T3-15 to 20-24; Pa6)  The Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 447 (2017), permits the warrantless search of a motor vehicle after an investigative stop where the police actions giving rise to probable cause to search the vehicle were prompted by circumstances that were "unforeseeable and spontaneous."  Nonetheless, the trial court here, relying upon the Court’s decision in State v Smart, 253 N.J. 156 (2023), found that the search of the vehicle was not justified because the circumstances giving rise to probable cause were not “unforeseeable or spontaneous,” and suppressed the seized evidence.  (2T19-23 to 20-23).  However, many of the factual findings made by the trial court are unsupported by the record and thus, the facts of Smart are clearly distinguishable.  Indeed, given the facts of this case, it is clear that the evidence should not be suppressed.  Therefore, the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence.  Moreover, the State cannot appeal this evidentiary ruling from a dismissal or an acquittal and, thus, this is the only opportunity for the State to challenge the adverse ruling at issue.  As such, the State’s Motion for Leave to Appeal must be granted and the trial court’s clearly erroneous ruling must be reversed in the interests of justice.
[brief] The State fails to engage with the numerous cases cited in [...]’s opening brief demonstrating that judges routinely consider whether interrogating police “verbally abused” a defendant by calling him a “motherf***ing liar,” *State v. Camey*, 239 N.J. 282, 315-16 (2019) (Albin, J., dissenting); whether they “curs[ed], yell[ed], or bang[ed] on the table,” *Rogers v. Quarterman*, 555 F.3d 483, 494-95 (5th Cir. 2009); whether they “yelled at her and slammed his fists on the table,” *Niemann v. Whalen*, 911 F. Supp. 656, 671-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); whether they “banged on the table and swore at him,” *Vargas v. Brown*, 512 F. Supp. 271, 277 (D.R.I. 1981); or whether an officer “did not raise his voice at any stage of questioning, *State ex rel. Q.N.*, 179 N.J. 165, 179 (2004).
[directive] Revocation Seeking of Presumption  the Overcoming 8.4.5 pursuant release of revocation of seeking presumption rebuttable a is there where any  In case of revocation seeking motion file shall a prosecutor 8.4.4, or the 8.4.3, 8.4.2, 8.4.1, subsection to to pursuant designated prosecutor supervisory a unless 2A:162-24 N.J.S.A. to release pursuant adequately controlled be can release defendant's by posed the (1) risks that determines Section 7.8 would of justice the interests (2) or monitoring, conditions and enhanced release new imposing by the overcome to made determination is
[brief] 1T 12:22 TO 1T 14:7; 1T 79:7-16; 1T 81:12-23; 1T 83:1 – 1T 84:11; 1T 132:113- 1T 135:9; 1T 145:6- 1T 146:2; .................................................................................................................................................................................. | 12 | | A.  [...] Has Satisfied Its Requirement To Prove [...] Had a Duty Which They Breached (Raised Below 5T 11:24-25)  .......... | 12 | | B.  [...]’s Excess Payment of $1,250,050.55 Was Due Entirely To [...] Breach of Their Fiduciary Duty.  (Raised Below 4T 27:8 to 31:7)  ................................................................. | 14 | | C.  [...] Has Satisfied Its Requirement to Prove The [...]’ Breach was the Proximate Cause of [...]’s Damages (Raised Below 4T 27:8 to 31:7)  ................................................................. | 16 | | D.  [...]’s Damages Were Quantified When It Paid the Purchase Price at the Closing.  (Raised Below 4T 46:22 to 47:24).  ........................................................................................................... | 18 | E.  [...]’s Transfer of the Property to [...] Does Not Vacate [...]’s Damages.  (Raised Below 4T 48:2 to 49:10)  ..................................................................................................................19  F.  The Trial Court Erroneously Ascribed Questionable Motivations to [...]’s Donation.  (Raised Below 5T 10:4 to 11:10)  ...........................................................................................................23  POINT II ..............................................................................................................................................27
[brief] [...] is a managing general underwriter providing stop loss underwriting services related to health insurance.  Pa046; DSOF ¶ 1.  The Company is an equal employment opportunity employer and has strict policies against discrimination.  Pa046; DSOF ¶ 2.  [...]’s handbook prohibits discrimination against any person because of their race, color, creed, religion, sex, national origin, disability, age, or any other characteristic protected by law.  Pa046; DSOF ¶ 3.  Appellant was hired as a Claims Analyst by [...] in August 2018.
[brief] Defendant responded, “Yeah, I know [him].  That’s . . . [...],” and then signed that photograph.  (1T30-21 to 24).  Defendant denied hanging out with [...] a lot, but that he would supply him with drugs when he needed them.  (1T31-4 to 25).  Recently, he had sold [...] a couple bags with promise of payment later on.  (1T32-2 to 10).  When defendant saw him near the church on Mechanic Street, he ran to him and asked “Yo, what’s up with my dough?” (1T33-3 to 5).  Defendant told the detective that [...] then ran toward Sycamore Street to talk to somebody.  He did not know why they were running, he was just behind [...].  (1T33-8 to 13).  At that point, [...] stopped defendant and said, “I don’t want another lie coming out of a 52 year old grown man’s mouth. ” (1T34-1 to 2).  He continued, “I saw you go in the building.  I saw you come out of the building.  Do you want to explain to me what happened?  Because did you hit the guy with the bat?
[brief] an injunction against redevelopment efforts because Rule 4:69 sets forth the established process to challenge government actions, including for redevelopment” (Db34).  However, none of the cases cited by [...] are directly on point, because they are not builder’s remedy actions.  Indeed, Deland v. Berkeley Heights, 361 N.J. Super. 1, 18-19 (App. Div. 2003), provides support for Plaintiff and [...]’s position by stating the court’s decision to permit a municipality to exercise eminent domain over a site that proposed to provide affordable housing may be different if the court was “confronted with a municipality that is seeking to undermine its capacity to satisfy its Mount Laurel obligations by acquiring land suitable for high-density residential development for another purpose.
[brief] [...] did state that one of its point headings would be “The Trial Court erred in finding that the requested information was a public record as defined in the Open Public Records Act. ” (Da015 to Da016).  Nowhere does [...] state that they intended to appeal the specific finding against [...]  Issues that are not raised on appeal are waived.  Green Knight Capital, LLC v. Calderon, 469 N.J. Super. 390, 396 (App. Div. 2021); Telebright Corp., Inc. v. Director, N.J. Div. of Taxation, 424 N.J. Super. 384, 393 (App. Div. 2012).  If the Court chooses to address this issue as an issue of first impression, the Court should affirm the Trial Court’s finding that [...] is a public entity under both the functional equivalent test and the public function test.
[directive] DATE: April 7, 2021 ______________________________________________________________________________  This Directive promulgates the process for sealing records from public access on order of the court at the time of sentencing for a criminal conviction or juvenile adjudication of certain marijuana or hashish offenses in accordance with the statutory amendments to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.2, and the marijuana decriminalization laws enacted by L. 2021, c. 19.  Additionally, Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive #2021-1, “Directive Governing Dismissals of Certain Pending Marijuana Charges” (issued February 22, 2021), instructs prosecutors to seek dismissal of certain pending marijuana-related charges against either a juvenile or an adult where the conduct occurred on or before February 22, 2021.
[directive] .. ~ 1 of 1  Page Document , New Jersey Permanent Statutes  TITLE 40A  MUNICIPALITIES AND COUNTIES of 40A:545.  Electronic payment systems established by resolution soveming body of  Electronic payment systems established by resolution governing body 40A 5-45, 5 3.  Subject to the provisions of sections and 6 of P.L.1995, c.325 (C.40A5-47 and C.40A5- 48), a local unit may establish a card payment system or electronic hnds transfer system upon passage of a resolution of the governing body.
[brief] A number of factors changed after she filed the EEO complaint (1T; 80:1).  Plaintiff was told that they needed the females at the Academy, that the captain was a female and that she would be more comfortable working with a female (1T; 81:13).  She was thrown out of meetings, and she should not have been because “there’s nothing confidential being an Assistant Admin Officer when you’re working for the Major; that’s what you do” (1T; 83:1).  Plaintiff was excluded from meetings but “as the Assistant Admin Officer, you are part of every meeting that occurs because you answer for the Major at any point” (1T; 83:15).
[brief] Moreover, mere recitals of testimony are not “findings”.  See *New Jersey Zoning Use and Law Administration*, Cox & Koenig, §19.7.2 (2022 ed.)  A board is under a statutory responsibility to make and memorialize in its resolution findings of fact on which its conclusions and decisions are founded so that a reviewing Court has something to review.  See *Loscalzo v. Pini*, 228 N.J. Super. 291, 305 (App. Div. 1988), cert. den. 188 N.J. 216 (1989).
[brief] However, should this Court consider this issue for the first time on appeal, it should reject defendant’s construal of the “signaling” statute as not requiring a signal before a lane change.  Reading the first and second sentences of the statute in harmony, it is clear that “so turn” in the second sentence—addressing the signaling requirement—is a specific reference to the movements listed in the first sentence, including “turn[s] . . . from a direct course or move[s] [to the] right or left upon a roadway. ”  The Supreme Court and this Court in numerous decisions have understood this nearly-century-old statute to apply not only to turns off the roadway, but also lane changes on the roadway.  And when the words and phrases of the statute are read in context with their surrounding language, a person of ordinary intelligence can easily understand that the statute proscribes un-signaled lane changes when other drivers may be affected.
[brief] The defendant contacted --- \(^8\)  Email notification is within the exhibits and redacted.  [...] and he did not respond.  New Prosecutor, [...] of [...] was assigned shortly thereafter.  The presiding judge kept stating the incorrect charge, wanting the defendant to pled to a fantom charge of harassment related to the sadism event mentioned in defendant’s other current Appellate cases instead of the downgraded charge, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2A(1).  Complaint and copy of the Judge Change Request was sent to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct was submitted.  On August 16, 2022, defendant receives a zoom hearing notice by email captioned, **8/16/2022 Burlington City/Twp. Municipal Court, State vs. [...]**  On August 16, 2022, defendant submits a subpoena to the plaintiff’s witness requesting his attendance and documentation, with a follow up to the Prosecutor and the Courts.  Plaintiff and [...] complied with attendance via subpoena but did not provide any evidence.  On September 6, 2022, defendant receives a zoom hearing notice by email captioned, **9/6/2022 Burlington City/Twp. Municipal Court, State vs. [...]**.  On September 19, 2022, defendant receives confirmation of hearing from trial court is scheduled as a mandatory in-person hearing with full knowledge of --- 9  Email notification is within the exhibits and redacted.  defendant’s ADA illnesses and the Court’s capability of holding hearings online via zoom captioned, **11/29/2022 Burlington City/Twp. Municipal Court, State vs. [...]**\(^{10}\).  On November 27, 2022, she filed an ADA accommodation informing of her physical incapabilities and of language barriers the Superior Court’s ADA Coordinator.  The defendant was informed Burlington Vicinage has two different ADA Coordinators and cold transferred the request to Burlington Municipal without informing the name of the ADA Coordinator; the defendant was denied her right to appeal the mandatory in-person session, compromising ADA Title II.
[brief] [...] did not consent to either transaction.  It should be noted that the Trust appraisals were conducted retrospectively, dating back to the time of the Settlor’s death, whereas the actual transfer of the properties occurred more than one year later, during a period of rapid home value appreciation in both markets.  Furthermore, appraisals are not fair market value.  Instead, they are an expert’s opinion of fair market value.  **Mutual Consent.**
[brief] It is unclear why mitigating factor 8, that the circumstances were unlikely to recur, would apply here.  Someone coming to your house to retrieve their property, whatever that property is, and falling out with a former friend, could certainly recur.  Additionally, the sentencing transcript makes it abundantly clear why mitigating factor 9, that defendant’s attitude indicates that he is unlikely to commit another offense, did not apply.  In his statement to the court at sentencing, defendant stated that he is not a murderer but a “protector” who always “protected” and took care of [...] for years.  (36T:91-10 to 17).  He claimed he was “here for protecting myself and my parents. ”  Ibid.  He also stated that he was on amphetamines and had smoked weed at the time of the murder and “was not in a clear state of mind. ” (36T:92-15 to 16).  He also referenced the Bible in Exodus, where using deadly force to defend one’s home is allowed.  (36T:94-13 to 18).  It is thus readily deducible why the trial court did not apply these factors.  *Miller*, 205 N.J. at 129–30; *Bieniek*, 200 N.J. at 609; *Molina*, 168 N.J. at 442–43; *Perry*, 124 N.J. at 177.
[brief] He could request spotters but did not the night [...] was hit.  Ibid.  [...], [...]’s project manager for the [...] contract, testified that “It was always a practice to try and assign a truck to the sweepers. ”  Pa1561.  Trucks are assigned to sweepers so they can dump quicker and work faster and for safety reasons so the sweepers do not have to travel through the work site to find a dump truck, which would create a hazard.  Pa1561-62.  “Any movement, I guess, would create a hazard. ”  Pa1562.  [...] testified there were no dump trucks assigned to the sweepers the night of the accident.  Pa1408.  [...] also testified [...] did not have an assigned dump truck for the sweeper.  Pa1478.  “They used to back in the day dedicate a cleanup truck just to the sweeper, but they stopped doing that. ”  Ibid.  Most companies dedicate a truck and [...] did also prior to the night [...] was hit.  Ibid.  Asked if he knew why they pulled it off this job, [...] replied “Money.  * * *  One less truck.  Yes, sir.  Milling machine sitting on the side of the road doing nothing except waiting for us to dump. ”  Pa1479.  [...], Project Superintendent for [...], testified that his job responsibilities included having to “coordinate with the dump trucks and the sweepers to come to the site when the equipment is in place and we are ready for them.  * * *  I monitor the work that's going on, the quality of the work.  I make sure that everybody is doing what they are supposed to be doing, as far as safety, everybody has their proper PPE on, nobody is walking over a cone line * * *.  I coordinate with the milling crew when - - at a point in which they are going to stop milling."  Pa1340.  He claimed that he oversaw safety for the duration of the project, including the date on which [...] was hit.  Ibid.  [...] testified “The usual procedure is, there should always be a truck with the sweeper. ”  Pa1351.  [...], however, was not on site that day.  [...] testified that since the fatality, new procedures have been put in place by [...].
[brief] THE COURT IMPROPERLY AWARDED CONTRACT RATE  POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST INSTEAD OF THE POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST RATE SPECIFIED IN R. 4:42-11(a) (Da1-69; Da84-98)  The trial court awarded plaintiff “post-judgment interest at the parties’ contract rate of 10% simple interest per annum, which interest shall begin to accrue starting August 31, 2023. ”  However, the Court improperly awarded post-judgment interest “at the parties’ contract rate of 10% simple interest per annum” instead of the post-judgment interest rate specified in R. 4:42-11(a).  Pursuant to R. 4:42-11, the rate of interest on New Jersey judgments exceeding the $15,000 monetary limit of the Special Civil Part is 2.25% for 2023.  The Appellate Division has made it clear that “absent an extraordinary and equitable reason,” post-judgment interest must be calculated at the post-judgment interest rate specified in R. 4:42-11(a).  Marko v. Zurich North America Insurance Company, 386 N.J. Super. 527, 532 (App. Div. 2006) (emphasis added).  Consequently, only in very special cases have New Jersey courts permitted the assessment of post-judgment interest at the contract rate of interest rather than the governing rate provided under R. 4:42-11.  See R. Jennings Mft. v. Northern Elec., 286 N.J. Super. 413, 418 (App. Div. 1995).  Notably in R. Jennings, the Appellate Division recognized “the right of the trial judge [per] R. 4:42-11(a) to set a post-judgment interest figure at a different rate from that provided in the rule “only if the trial court finds ‘particular equitable reasons’ for doing so. ” (emphasis added).  The Appellate Division’s holdings in R. Jennings Mft. are directly on point and demonstrate the trial court erred in awarding contract-rate post-judgment interest.  In R. Jennings Mft., the Court dealt with the identical issue at hand: “Both the appeal and the cross appeal raise the same question: what post-judgment interest rate is to be applied where a rate of interest greater than that set forth in the Court Rules is provided for in the contract between the parties” given the applicability of R. 4:42–11(a) as to pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.
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[brief] As the court held in Ryan, these provisions are preempted by the FAA and are unenforceable because the Wholesaler Agreement involves interstate commerce.  Ryan, 2005 WL 2977767, at *6 (“New York’s interests underlying --- 9  The Wholesaler Agreement also states, “No amendment of this Agreement shall be binding upon the parties unless made in writing and signed by the parties hereto. ” (Pa71 § 17(b).)  Section 55-c and the national policy underlying the FAA are clearly in conflict. ”) (Pa204-Pa220).  Thus, any differences – and there substantively are none – between the two statutes’ anti-arbitration clauses are irrelevant.
[brief] Under Plaintiffs’ own arguments, [...] is either bound to the December Terms—including the Arbitration Agreement—or she is not.  If not, then the January Terms—and its arbitration agreement—govern here.  Plaintiffs conceded as much during the hearing below.  (Tr. 50-1–6.)  The trial court rejected that point only because it misread [...]’s argument.  *(See Db43.)*  **IV.
[brief] The fourth factor generally considers “interests includ[ing] prevention of oppressive incarceration, minimization of anxiety attributable to unresolved charges, and limitation of the possibility of impairment of the defense. ”  Cahill, 213 N.J. at 266.  The Supreme Court of the United States has “recognize[d] that excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify. ”  *Doggett*, 505 U.S. at 655.  “Barker explicitly recognized that impairment of one’s defense is the most difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to prove because time’s erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony ‘can rarely be shown. ’”  *Id.* (quoting *Barker*, 407 U.S. at 532).  Thus, it is well-settled that “consideration of prejudice is not limited to the specifically demonstrable” and that “affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim.
[brief] Because the factor relates to “the circumstances of the homicide and the extent of defendant’s participation,” the judge properly discussed defendant’s planned and brutal acts.  That discussion does not imply that the judge believed planned and brutal acts could not result from peer pressure.  The judge correctly found that allegations of peer pressure were belied by defendant’s own statement.  Defendant informed [...] that all three participated in planning the offense, and that no one was the leader of the group.  (Da48).  As already discussed, it was defendant that placed pressure on others.  His inconsistent representations over the years defeat his own credibility and undermine the position of his experts.  e.
[brief] Even if the usual burden were placed on the student-appellants—to prove [...]’s unconstitutionality as applied by ”a preponderance of the believable evidence [Abbott v. Burke, EDU5581-85 (initial decision), August 24, 1988]—we believe that appellants have easily met that burden.  Even as to that point, the best the State’s brief can do is to assert that, according to the New Jersey Supreme Court in Abbott XX, [...] “is \textbf{designed} to achieve a thorough and efficient education for every child, regardless of where he or she lives. ”  Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XX)199 N.J. 140, 175 (2009) (Emphasis added.).  Such a statement might support a holding that a statute is constitutional \textbf{on its face}, but not that it is constitutional \textbf{as applied}.  To conclude that it is constitutional as applied, the court must conclude that its “effect,” not just its “design,” is constitutionally sufficient.  The State doesn’t establish that, or even try to do so in a serious and substantive manner.