ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Through its prohibition on \(^2\) [...]’s Ordinance prohibited the operation of a radio, television, or phonograph that is “clearly audible at a distance of one hundred [feet] from the building ... in which it is located[.]”  “excessive…loud talking”, it seeks to regulate what is specifically exempted from the Noise Control Act – the unamplified human voice.  And unlike in Krause, here the Defendants confirmed and the trial court recognized that the Noise Ordinance was neither submitted to the DEP nor approved by the DEP.
[brief] This 45-day limitation is not absolute, however, because the measure of repose which R. 4:69-6 intends to effectuate does not trump all other considerations.  Harrison Redevelopment Agency v. DeRose, 398 N.J. Super. 361, Indeed, the appeal period may be enlarged “where it is manifest that the interest of justice so requires. ”  R. 4:69-6(c).  The “interest of justice” standard merely “restate[s] in the form of a generalized standard, decisional exceptions which had already been engrafted upon the rule. ”  Schack v. Trimble, 28 N.J. 40, 48 (1958).  The most commonly cited exceptions to the 45-day appeal period include: (1) Important and novel constitutional questions; (2) informal or ex parte determinations of legal questions by administrative officials; and (3) important public rather than private interests which require adjudication or clarification.
[brief] CONCLUSION  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR PLAINTIFF’S APPENDIX | Description | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Retainer Agreement between Plaintiff and [...] | Pa1 | | *REMOVED per Order dated May 16th, 2024 | Pa2* | | Special Civil Part Case Summary | Pa3 | | Letter from [...], J.S.C. to Appellate Division, | Pa8 | | supplementing/augmenting the record permitted by R. 2:5-1(b) | | | Letter from the Law Office of [...], Esq., Secretary for | Pa14 | | the Bergen County District IIB Fee Arbitration Committee | | | Substitution of Attorney by [...], dated August 27th, 2019 | Pa16 | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES **Cases** - **Abbott v. Beth Israel Cemetery Ass’n of Woodbridge**, 13 N.J. 528 (1953) .......... 19 - **Battle v. General Cellulose Co.**, 23 N.J. 538 (1957) ........................................... 29 - **Capital Fin. Co. of Del. Valley, Inc. v. Astarbadi**, 398 N.J. Super. 299 (App. Div. 2008)
[brief] To convict a defendant of purposeful murder, the State must prove that he “purposely” or “knowingly” “cause[d] death or serious bodily injury resulting in death[.]”  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a), (b).  To establish aggravated manslaughter, the State must show that the defendant “recklessly cause[d] death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life[.]”  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1).  And finally, reckless manslaughter requires the State to prove that the defendant “recklessly” caused the death of another.  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(1).  Because of their distinct mental-state elements, it is not possible for a person who has killed another to have committed all three; if a person committed purposeful murder, he cannot be said to have committed a form of reckless manslaughter because the various mental states are incompatible.
[brief] While this issue is not specifically argued below, the court may nevertheless address it at this time.  First, at the time the Notice of Appeal in the within action was filed, the court had not yet decided the motion on enhanced interest, costs and fees and thus it could not have been raised in the Notice of Appeal.  More significantly, the court’s decision under the facts and circumstances of this matter constitutes plain error.  New Jersey Court Rule 2:10-2 provides:  Any error or omission shall be disregarded by the Appellate Court unless it is of such nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result, but the Appellate Court may, in the interests of justice, notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial or appellate court.  The court’s entry of a supplemental judgment including enhanced interest, costs and attorney’s fees created an unjust result in light of the undue financial burden it places upon the Appellant.  As set forth in greater detail in other sections of this brief, Appellant maintains that a new trial must be granted and the judgement vacated.  In the alternative, at a minimum, the supplemental judgment on enhanced interest, costs and fees must be vacated as it would present undue financial burden to the Appellant.
[directive] Período de Supervisão de Liberdade Condicional por Crime de Primeiro Grau - 5 anos  Período de Supervisão de Liberdade Condicional por Crime de Segundo Grau - 3 anos  Do you understand that because you have pled guilty to these charges the court must impose a year term of parole supervision and that term will begin as soon as you complete the sentence of incarceration?
[brief] The trial testimony lasted two days.  (2T and 3T).  Plaintiff-Appellant called three witnesses, herself, her friend, [...] and the videotaped testimony of [...], M.D., [...]’s treating neuro-surgeon.  The defense also called three witnesses at trial: the videotaped testimony of Dover Township Police Officer [...], a forensic engineer, [...], offered as an expert witness as to liability, and the video taped testimony of [...], M.D., an orthopedic surgeon offered as the defense medical expert.
[brief] Having not received the Court’s Order in response to his Motion, and in response to [...]’s concern regarding ordering a hearing “if discrepancies remain,” his recognition of opportunity to file a new motion for “additional discrepancies,” and \(^1\)  Due to extraordinary and unfathomable Court dysfunction, Appellant was not advised of the Court’s Order of 5/27/2022 (DA90) until on or about Jan. 25, 2023, despite numerous emails (including emails to [...]’s law clerk prior to issuance of the Order of 5/27/2022), phone calls, and letters to the Court.  Unbeknownst to Appellant, this case had been transferred to [...] reportedly on or about the beginning of May, 2022 and no follow-up was made by court staff, either [...]’s staff or Judge Jones’ staff, to respond to Appellant’s numerous emails, calls and letters (DA 439 – DA470) requesting adjudication of my Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of 4/4/2022.  Indeed, in an inexplicable demonstration of court dysfunction, Appellant was even given the wrong telephone number to [...]’s law clerk by the staff at the Resource Center, thus delaying Appellant’s receipt of the Court’s Order of 5/27/2023 for eight months.  Appellant’s request for deferral of date of publishing of the Order to 1/25/2023, the date of receipt, which had been previously granted by [...] under similar delay engendered by Court dysfunction, was denied.  his Order of denial without prejudice, Appellant filed a Motion for Correction of Probation Account Errors on 10/27/2022 and requested consolidation with his Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of 4/4/2022 by way of cover letter to the Court of 10/24/2022 (DA469).  Appellant’s Motion also cited errors not previously litigated on page 2 of Appellant’s certification, DA342):  I respectfully submit this Motion for correction of yet further palpably evident discrepancies found in Probation’s account record, its audits, and its “accounting” of 3/17/2022 which have resulted in continued, egregious, unjust over-garnishment of my income and social security benefits. ” (Bold/underlining added).  Appellant’s Motion was denied by Order dated 3/30/2023 (DA20).
[brief] ”  Id. at 593-94.  The Court further stated that “even when the Legislature has acted to compel the use of arbitration [in other statutes], this Court has highlighted the important caveat of permitting a right to a trial de novo following mandatory arbitration whenever the constitutional right to jury trial was implicated. ”  Id. at 597.  That reasoning equally applies here: AICRA does not provide for a trial de novo after mandatory arbitration and thus would be unconstitutional if applied to claims carrying a constitutional right to trial by jury.
[brief] All Appellant [...] needed to do was pay its Lease, and none of this would have occurred.  Each of the asserted new claims requires proof that the damages alleged were proximately caused by the [...].  Because all of the Appellants’ damages inevitably flow from the loss of land control, resulting from Appellants’ failure to pay rent, each and every one of the Appellants’ claims fail as a matter of law because Appellants have no damages attributable to the [...].
[brief] The procedural history set forth in related [...] is incorporated, by reference.  See footnote 1, supra.  The procedural history in this case below was simple.  On February 14, 2022, Appellants filed a new complaint (which was essentially the proposed second amended complaint in the 29019 action).  Pa1-17.  Defendant then filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e) invoking the entire controversy doctrine in their motion filed May 24, 2022, rather than seeking summary judgment under Rule 4:46-2.  Pa18.  The Law Division erroneously granted dismissal with prejudice.  Pa283.  The dismissal with prejudice is inherently in conflict with an order denying leave to file a second amended complaint “without prejudice” in the 2019 action and was legally erroneous.  See Pa231, Pa236.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] A.  The Trial Court’s Conclusion that the Code of Judicial Conduct’s Conflict of Interest Rules Did Not Require [...]’s Recusal was not an Abuse of Discretion.....................................................16  B.  No New Jersey Court Has Ever Held That the Code of Judicial Conduct Applies to Special Masters.  .........................................................................................................................22  III.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED JARWICK ATTORNEYS’ FEES CONSISTENT WITH THE APPELLATE DIVISION’S REMAND MANDATE.........................................................................................24
[brief] (4T)**  The VRDO transactional data that Relator analyzed was available through three separate [...] “news media” sources.  Relator has admitted that its expert used VRDO transactional data from [...] to conduct the analyses on which Relator bases its fraud allegations, as reflected in the various complaints filed in this action.  Ja2173 (¶¶ 194–97).  As a member of the public who obtained the data through a subscription service available to anyone, and not through a non-public source, Relator concedes that this VRDO transactional data—including information specifying the VRDO and issuer, the identity of the remarketing agent, and the rate reset for that week—was publicly disclosed by [...].  See Ja2101-02 (¶ 14), Ja2104–05 (¶ 19), Ja2173 (¶¶ 194–97); Ja4275–81 ([...] Cert. ¶¶ 28–32, 36–38); see also U.S. ex rel. Customs Fraud Investigations, LLC v. Victaulic Co., No. 13-2983, 2014 WL 4375638, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2014) (database containing all data relator “relied upon in formulating” its analysis was publicly disclosed in a “news media” source).  It is undisputed that the same data available from [...] was also posted on the MSRB’s free online portal, [...], with the exception of data fields that are not relevant here (like the date and time that a rate is published and transaction type).  See Ja2099–2105 (¶¶ 11–14, 17–19).  And the same data was also available through a subscription to [...]’s “Municipal Securities Master Database. ”  See Ja2108–10 (¶¶ 25, 27 and responses).  Thus, the data that Relator used to conduct the VRDO analysis that allegedly revealed the alleged fraud was publicly disclosed through all three VRDO Data Sources, each of which qualifies as an [...] “news media” source.
[brief] This was based on an analysis of video time stamps, [...]'s vehicle position noted in surveillance video and SCART investigation documents.  Plaintiff's expert also estimated [...]'s speed at 11-12 MPH.  (Da33, §3.1 Vehicle Approach Speed).  See also, Pa653.  With this information, an assessment was conducted to determine [...]'s line of sight during her travel through the east/west drive aisle to the point of impact.  It also included actual stopping sight distance.
[brief] Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 53 N.J. 138 (1969) ......................................................................................................................3, 20 Keelan v. Bell Communications Research, 289 N.J. Super. 531 (App. Div. 1996) ....................................................................................31, 32 Klein v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 377 N.J. Super. 28 (App. Div. 2005) .........................................................................................25, 30 Kolb v. Burns, 320 N.J. Super. 467 (App. Div. 1999) .....................................................................................33, 34 Lippman v Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362 (2015) ...................................................................................................................20  MacDougall v. Weichert, 144 N.J. 380 (1996) ....................................................................................................................35, 37 Maimone v. City of Atlantic City, 188 N.J. 221 (2006) ....................................................................................................................24, 33 Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 153 N.J. 163 (1998) ....................................................................................................................16, 23, 37 Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58 (1980)  .......................................................................................................................35, 36, 37  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 563 A.2d 31 (1989)  .............................................................................................passim  Rieder v. Dep’t of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547, 535 A.2d 512 (App. Div. 1987)  .................................................................18
[brief] Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1.1 on R. 3:23-8 (2021).  Moreover, when the Law Division agrees with the municipal court, the two-court rule must be considered.  "Under the two-court rule, appellate courts ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of error."
[brief] See Db57 (noting the Court in Township of West Windsor approved prejudgment interest on a compounded basis).  See also Musto, 333 N.J. Super. at 75 (finding “no abuse of discretion in the trial judge’s decision to award compound rather than simple interest”).  [...]’ characterization of the prejudgment interest awarded to [...] as “excessive” (Db54-60) is risible, particularly in light of the fact that they succeeded in retaining – and benefiting from the use of – $22,366,349 which they stole from their partners prior to October 1, 2003.31
[brief] See, State v. Njango, App. Dkt. No. A-1400-12T1 (Decided April 14, 2015) (Unpub. Opin. Attached Per. Rule 1:36-1).  (Aa1-3)  A sentence that is illegal because it does not adhere to legislative mandate may be corrected at any time, either on direct review or by application for post-conviction relief.  Although the sentences in these particular cases are completed, however because there is collateral consequences of magnitude [...] has suffered harm due to a subsequent criminal matter under [...].  The latter Indictment is currently reliant upon the instant illegal sentence and guilty pleas which serves as the predicates for the court to impose an extended term sentence which otherwise would not be applicable without the unconstitutional convictions and sentences in the instant case.  See, *State v. Roper*, 362 N.J.  Super. 248 (2003), "there is no doubt that defendant is subject to a consequence of magnitude from his conviction....Accordingly, defendant's petition is not moot."  There is no time limit on the correction of an illegal sentence.  An illegal sentence which is cognizant for a post-conviction relief petition pursuant to *R. 3:22-4[6]* can be raised at any time pursuant to *R. 3:22-2[3]*.  See, *State v. Acevedo*, 205 N.J. 40 (2011).  An illegally lenient sentence is also subject to correction at any time just as any other illegal sentence.  See, *State v. Haliski*, 273 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 1994)(affirming a corrected sentence that imposed an extended second offender Graves Act sentence after the first Graves Act conviction was affirmed on appeal.)  In affirming the Appellate Division decision in *Haliski*, however, the Supreme Court held that if the predicate decision is still pending appeal, a provisional enhanced sentence should be imposed, correctable under *Rule* 3:22-2[3] or *Rule* 3:21-10(b)(4) in the event of reversal.  Therefore it is clear in light of the law and the facts\(^1\) that [...] is deserving of the correction of the illegal sentence that was imposed upon him.  --- \(^1\)  The lower court took issue with regard to the lack of a sentencing transcript, however the Judgement of Conviction clearly supports the record that no "serious injustice finding" was made by the sentencing court.  See, *State v. Vasquez*, 265 N.J. 528 (1993) (Sentencing procedures rely largely on a "paper record.")  See, Sentencing Manual for Judges, p.  Regardless of whether the sentence at the time was lenient, the collateral consequences of facing an extended term pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7 and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) remains detrimental and violates the doctrine of fundamental fairness.  Appellate should be resentenced.  **CONCLUSION**  For all of the foregoing reasons this matter should be remanded to the Law Division for resentencing anew.  Respectfully submitted, [...], pro se Dated: April 25, 2024 --- 69 (September 1988); also see N.J. S.A. 2C:44-6b).  The appellate courts are as equipped to evaluate the case as the sentencing court.
[brief] Accord Rivera, 254 N.J. at 298. (15T26-12 to 41-16).  Being clearly convinced that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, the court appropriately sentenced defendant within the first-degree range to a term of imprisonment of 12 years flat.  (Da44; 15T38-1 to 39-1).  The trial court properly found, based on the sufficient credible evidence in the record, aggravating factor 1 - the nature and circumstances of the offense, and defendant's “role therein, including whether or not it was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner” - because defendant was responsible for placing and trafficking in a large quantity of drugs into the stream of commerce.  (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1); 15T27-22 to 29-1).  As many courts have noted, “‘drug-trafficking itself is a . . . a violence-prone business. ’” (State v. Henry, 133 N.J. 104 (1993) (quoting United States v. Broomfield, 336 F.Supp. 179, 184-85 (E.D. Mich.1972)).  Defendant was caught in possession of excessive quantities of two different drugs -- 175 pounds of marijuana, which was 7 times the 25-pound quantity required for a first-degree offense, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(l0), and 1.5 kilograms of cocaine, or 53 ounces, or 10 times the 5 ounces necessary for first-degree possession of cocaine for distribution.  (15T28-21 to 29-4; accord 9T56-18 to 58-11).
[directive] Do you understand that as a result of your conviction your name, age, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, eye color, any distinguishing scars or tattoos you have, your photograph, the make, model, color, year and license plate number of any vehicle you operate, the street address, zip code, municipality and county in which you reside and a description of the offense for which you are pleading guilty, may be publicly available on the Internet?  b)  Você entende que se for condenado e sua conduta foi caracterizada por um padrão de [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] comportamento reincidente e compulsivo seu nome, idade, raça, sexo, data de nascimento, altura, peso, cor dos olhos, suas cicatrizes ou tatuagens, sua fotografia, marca, modelo, cor, ano e número da placa de qualquer veículo que conduzir, endereço, código postal, municipalidade e condado da sua residência e a descrição do crime para o qual você está se declarando culpado podem ser disponibilizados ao público na internet?
[brief] A motor vehicle stop is justified if the attending officer establishes an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motor vehicle infraction occurred.  Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244 (2022); State v. Robinson, 228 N.J. 529, 548 (2017).  It is important to note that a subsequent conviction for the offense is not necessary, so long as an objectively reasonable belief that it occurred existed at the time of the stop.  State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super. 244, 247 (App. Div. 2001).  While this standard is fairly low, the State must provide some evidence that can be tested through the adversarial process to support the reasonableness of the suspicion that led to the stop.  State v. Atwood, 232 N.J. 433, 448 (2018).  In a word, the State needs to have something.  Further, an appellate court is traditionally loath to disturb a lower court’s findings of fact.  Indeed, an appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress evidence “must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court’s decision, so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  *State v. Evans*, 235 N.J. 125, 133 (2018) (internal quotations removed).  B.  **Law – Removal of Occupants**  Following a stop, police may order the occupants from a car under the circumstances presented here.  The United States Supreme Court has long held that ordering a driver from a vehicle is a minor intrusion on liberty and constitutionally acceptable.  *Pennsylvania v. Mimms*, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977).  To order a passenger from a vehicle, “an officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts that would warrant heightened caution” to permit the ordering of a passenger from a vehicle for a traffic violation. ”  *State v. Smith*, 134 N.J. 599, 618 (1994) (emphasis added).  The officer “need point only to some fact” lending itself to the notion that ordering a passenger out would create a more secure scene.  *Ibid.*  C.  **Law – Plain View Doctrine and Credential Search**
[brief] Sensient Colors, 193 N.J. at 393.  The Supreme Court found that such an immediate “first strike” breached the insurer’s duty of good faith to its insured.  Similarly, in Century Indem. Co., [...] filed an action to determine coverage obligations of itself and third-two other insurers with respect to the defendant insured.  398 N.J. Super. at 424.  The insured sent letters to [...]’s claims administrator stating its position.  Id. at 432-33.  On the same day that the claims administrator responded, [...] filed an action in New Jersey.  The Court noted the insurance company’s “unseemly haste” to file in a jurisdiction with no connection to the parties was the type of “unannounced race to the courthouse” that the New Jersey Supreme Court had discussed in Sensient Colors.  Id. at 438-39.  The circumstances in Defendants’ authorities, therefore, bear no resemblance to this case.  Defendants here had ample opportunity to commence litigation as early as 2009 (when the first of the underlying cases was commenced), and had months to file suit after [...] unequivocally rejected their 2016 tender letter.  (Pa81, 155).  Therefore [...]’s first-filed suit does not present the type of “race to the courthouse” constituting a special equity sufficient to permit a court to disregard the strong presumption in favor of this first-filed action.  Based on the foregoing, the trial court should have denied Defendant’s motion and retained jurisdiction over the case because there are no “special equities” that would justify a departure from the strong presumption in favor of this first-filed action.
[directive] Kolor oczu/Eye of Birth Color Formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11710-Polish strona 2 z 2 Form Promulgated by Directive # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11710-Polish page 2 of 2 고지: 이 양식은 공개되는 문서이므로, 요청이 있으면 제출된 상태로 대중에게 제공됩니다.