ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (emphasis added)  (Pa153)  [...] wrongfully contends that the level of reliance proffered by Plaintiffs is insufficient and is analogous to the Court’s finding in Bahrle v. Exxon Corp., 279 N.J. Super. 5 (App. Div. 1995), aff’d, 145 N.J. 144 (1996).  The Court found no apparent authority because the corporate entity had no reasonable means of control over the franchisee that resulted in the ensuing injury.  Since the owner had no direct relationship with Texaco, there was no reliance by plaintiff that the gas station belonged to defendant oil company.  However, the instant matter is distinguishable because [...] was directly hired by [...] and made specific outward manifestations that led Plaintiff to rely on those representations and to believe that he was a [...] employee.
[directive] 14 27, 1  >  Any payment of lien or mortgage shall not exceed the fair market value of the a property at the time of seizure.  > or Liens or mortgages on real property placed into federal official use shared with state and local agencies are not payable from the Fund unless approved by the [...].  >  Liens on personal property placed into official use by investigative agencies may be is paid from the Fund provided there intent to place the property into official use for at least one year.
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PRECLUDED PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL FROM COMMENTING ON [...]’S ABSENCE DURING TRIAL AND WHEN IT DENIED PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR AN ADVERSE INFERENCE CHARGE**  Once again, the standard of review against which the trial court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed is the abuse of discretion standard.  “Evidentiary decisions are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard because, from its genesis, the decision to admit or exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to the trial court’s discretion. ”  *Est. of Hanges v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.*, 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010).
[brief] A.  Background.  [...] is the elected president of a local union that represents State workers, including those at the Department of Labor and Workforce Development DLWD (“DLWD”) and DCF.  (Aa2).  He has been on a union leave from his State employment with DCF since 2008.  (Aa1).  Complainant is a DLWD employee whom [...] had represented in connection with a grievance years earlier.  (Aa25, Aa28).  On or about September 14, 2022, Complainant filed a complaint against [...] under the State Policy with her employer, DLWD.  Because [...]’s putative State employer is DCF, DLWD referred the complaint for investigation by that department’s (DCF’s) EEO office.  (Aa19).  The complaint arose from two incidents between Complainant and [...] concerning an upcoming local union election that occurred on September 9, 2022.  (Aa2, 4).  The following facts are derived from the CSC’s Determination, which largely relied upon DCF’s LOD and its summary of statements collected in its investigation.  (Aa1, Aa25).  ---  1  The Procedural History and Statement of Facts are inextricably linked and combined here for the court’s convenience.
[brief] P-15:  Holmdel response to discovery request NJNG-HOLM-BLM-3 (SOICR p. 11) is included in this Appendix at Ha1712.  P-26:  Cover letter and Holmdel responses to NJNG discovery requests NJNG-HOLM-DM-1 to 29 (SOICR p. 11) is included in this Appendix at Staff Exhibit S-17 at Ha1730 to Ha1743.  P-28:  Cover letter and Holmdel responses to NJNG discovery requests NJNG-HOLM-PS-1 to 13 (see also S-17)(SOICR p. 11) are in this Appendix as Staff Exhibit S-18 and included at pages Ha1744 to Ha1753.  [...], Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 8
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court has clarified, “[d]ecisions of a lower federal court are no more binding on a state court than they are on a federal court not beneath it in the judicial hierarchy. ”  *Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 121 N.J. 69, 79 (1990) (citation and quotation omitted).  In this regard, “state courts form an integral part of the national structure” and “occupy exactly the same position as the lower federal courts, which are coordinate, and not superior to them. ”  *State v. Coleman*, 46 N.J. 16, 37 (1965).  “Until the Supreme Court of the United States has spoken, state courts are not precluded from exercising their own judgment upon questions of federal law. ”  *Id.*  Thus, under these circumstances, this Court should employ New Jersey’s rules of statutory construction and exercise its own judgment as to how the FDCPA should best be construed to effect Congress’ intent.
[brief] Id. at 486-87.  See also, Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 2002).  The purpose of the Heck doctrine is to promote the “finality and consistency” of criminal investigations by avoiding “parallel litigation” and “the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction. ”  Heck, 512 U.S. at 484-85 (citations omitted).  In other words, Heck’s holding and purpose is mindful of the trial-error rule.
[brief] The minimal standard for reasonable suspicion is met when there are specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences, suggest that criminal activity or a motor-vehicle offense is afoot.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 30 (1968); State v. Bernokeits, 423 N.J. Super. 365, 376 (App. Div. 2011).  “[I]nnocent circumstances in the aggregate can support a finding of reasonable suspicion. ”  State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 368 (2002).  “The reasonable suspicion inquiry . . . considers the officers’ background and training, and permits them ‘to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person. ’”  *State v. Nelson*, 237 N.J. 540, 555 (2019) (quoting *United States v. Arvizu*, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)).  “To appropriately view the ‘whole picture,’ the Court must not engage in a ‘divide-and-conquer’ analysis by looking at each fact in isolation,” *Nelson*, 237 N.J. at 554-55 (quoting *District of Columbia v. Wesby*, 138 S.Ct. 577, 588 (2018)), because it is “rare indeed” to observe activity that is consistent only with wrongdoing and incapable of an innocent interpretation.
[brief] [...]’s failure to warn physicians, including [...]’s ophthalmologist, [...], was a direct and proximate cause of [...]’s injuries.  On November 6, 2018, when [...] injected [...]’s left eye with the defective Ozurdex, he was not aware of the defects with Ozurdex, nor of the risk of a silicone particulate being injected.  (Pa129-Pa130)  [...] had not informed [...] of the risks or defect, despite the fact that [...] would have expected to be informed of this new, post May 2018 package insert danger and defect.  (Pa132-Pa133)  Had [...] known of the risks of injecting a silicone particulate due to the Ozurdex defect, he would not have administered the Ozurdex to [...] on November 6, 2018.  (Pa130-Pa131)  V. ALLERGAN
[brief] The court should reverse the decision below and find Plaintiff did not enter into an arbitration or any agreement with the Bank.  The matter should be remanded for a jury trial on the mertis.  Since the Bank made a strategic choice not to dispute or refute Plaintiff’s facts and felt no need to present contrary evidence, the matter should not be remanded to give the Bank a second chance to do so.  This would be unfair to the Plaintiff, unnecessarily costly, delay this case and may result in another appeal.  The Bank is a sophisticated litigator.  It made its choice to solidify the disadvantages imposed on consumers in the manner it conducts business.  The Bank should not be rewarded with a second bite of the apple to rework how it will litigate this case, to the continuing disadvantage of the consumer.  The court has the authority to direct on remand that a different judge consider the matter in order to preserve the appearance of a fair and unprejudiced hearing  P.T. v. M.S., 325 NJ Super 193, 220 (App. Div. 1999).  In this case the judges strong commitment to his opinion and his banking background call for a remand to a different judge.  Respectfully submitted, Dated: August 28, 2024  [...], Esquire  Attorney for Plaintiff, [...]  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, [...]
[brief] (T80:21-81:1).  To permit brewers to avoid the MBPA through the mere insertion of a choice-of-law provision would eviscerate the protections New Jersey hoped to provide with the passage of the MBPA.  Moreover, New Jersey’s liquor laws and alcohol distribution system would be rendered meaningless because those laws could be avoided (or bargained away) by simply placing a choice-of-law provision in the contract, thereby restricting New Jersey’s ability to enforce those provisions.
[brief] [[...]] shall receive a credit (“Credit”) for each day that the action, decision, meeting or similar item is not acted upon by the Township or Board, as the case may be, or does not take place by the appropriate deadline . . .  [[...]] shall be entitled to apply the Credit towards any fee that is due and payable to the Township in the ordinary course of the development [sic] the Property .  . .  This Paragraph does not limit [[...]’s] remedies, in law or equity, to redress non-compliance by the Township or the Board.  [Pa057-Pa058 (emphasis added). ]  Paragraph 10 of the Settlement Agreement further provides that the: Township and the Board . . . shall fully cooperate and assist with [...]’s efforts . . . to secure necessary municipal, county and state permits, approvals, licenses, waivers, exceptions, easements, variations and variances for the development, including the SPA, Treatment Works Approval applications/permits, construction/building permits, and all other necessary or useful governmental approvals (“Governmental Approvals”) . . . the Township and Board shall cooperate with [[...]] as set forth herein . . .
[directive] Probationer Name: Docket Number: Financial Obligations Ordered VCCB $ FLF $  Specify other penalties below:  DEDR $ $  Restitution: DAEF $ $ LEOTEF $ $ SNSF $ Fine $ SSANE $  Probation Supervision Fee: Total Restitution $ $ per month  The Total Amount Ordered is $ . This will be paid at the rate of $ per .  If no payment schedule is established, the total is due forthwith.  If the offense occurred on or after February 1, 1993, a (N.J.S.A. transaction fee of up to $2.00 is to be paid on each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made 2C:46-1d.).  Special Conditions
[brief] Although [...] did not take his own measurements or inspect the condition, no expert in this case was able to inspect the settlement since it was repaired shortly after Plaintiff’s crash.  Nevertheless, those measurements had already been taken during the Biennial Bridge Inspection.  That said, in reaching his conclusions, Mr. [...] did utilize the evidence available to all parties and the recognized negative effects that these type of roadway conditions have on motorcycles as well as the video, photo and description of the accident and its location provided by Plaintiff.  An expert's proposed testimony should not be excluded merely "because it fails to account for some particular condition or fact which the adversary considers relevant."
[brief] 10T – Transcript of Trial dated March 30, 2023  11T – Transcript of Trial dated April 3, 2023  12T – Transcript of Motion dated July 12, 2022 #  TABLE OF CONTENTS – APPENDIX (Volume 1 of 1 – Pa1 to Pa139) | Description | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Order of Judgment, filed April 10, 2023 | 1a | | Order and Rider denying new trial motion, filed July 21, 2023 | 2a | | Complaint, filed June 12, 2017 | 11a | | Answer of [...] d/b/a [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...], filed October 19, 2017 | 22a | | Notice of Motion for New Trial, filed April 24, 2023 | 36a | | Certification of [...], filed April 24, 2023 | 38a | | Exhibit A to Certification, Order denying plaintiff’s Motion in Limine dated August 1, 2022, filed April 24, 2023 | 41a | | Exhibit B to Certification, Transcript of Motion dated July 12, 2022, filed April 24, 2023 (omitted here – see 12T) | -- | | Exhibit C to Certification, Excerpt of Transcript of Trial dated March 21, 2023, filed April 24, 2023 (omitted here – see 3T) | -- | | Exhibit D to Certification, Transcript of Trial dated March 23, 2023, filed April 24, 2023 (omitted here – see 6T) | -- | | Exhibit E to Certification, Transcript of Trial dated March 22, 2023, filed April 24, 2023 (omitted here – see 5T) | -- | | Exhibit F to Certification, Report of Nurse [...] dated November 2, 2019, filed April 24, 2023 | 44a | | Exhibit G to Certification, Report of [...], dated October 30, 2019, filed April 24, 2023 | 53a | Certification of [...], filed June 29, 2023 Exhibit A to Certification, Complaint dated June 12, 2017, filed June 29, 2023 (omitted here – see Pa11) -- Exhibit B to Certification, defendant’s trial exhibit D-4, filed June 29, 2023 66a Exhibit C to Certification, defendant’s trial exhibit D-5, filed June 29, 2023 70a Exhibit D to Certification, defendant’s trial exhibit D-6, filed June 29, 2023
[brief] It’s that there is other legislation, which is the New Jersey Fair Housing Act, N.J.S.A. 52:27D-303 et seq, and it says… under Section 302, the Legislature finds that the New Jersey Supreme Court, through its rulings in Mount Laurel I and Mount Laurel II, has determined that every municipality in a growth area has a constitutional obligation to provide through its land use regulations a realistic opportunity for a fair share of its region’s present and prospective needs for housing for low- and moderate-income families.
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court in Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328, 340, 801 A.2d 1134, 1141 (2002) held:  [R]ather than focusing on whether the claim is denominated as tort or contract, [courts] should determine if the claim’s underlying factual allegations require proof of a deviation from the professional standard of care applicable to that specific profession.  Id. at 801.  The factual allegations that [...] committed fraud, conversion, tortious interference, New Jersey RICO, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy to commit same, do not allege that these actions were a deviation from the applicable professional standard of care, but that they were simply blatant tortious acts.  Indeed, those identical Tort Claims survived against the non-attorney Defendants since they are not legal malpractice claims.  As such, no expert testimony is required to prove these claims.  As previously argued, New Jersey courts do not require expert testimony or an AOM in cases where attorneys have failed to fulfill the most basic obligations.
[brief] ”  *In re Camden Cty.*, at 449 (emphasis added).  *See also Clemens v. ExecuPharm Inc.*, 48 F.4th 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2022) (“where the future injury is . . . hypothetical, there can be no imminence and therefore no injury-in-fact. ”).  *Id.*  **D.
[brief] One can understand why [...] might have chosen to plead guilty out of fear of the worst-case scenario.  See Means, 191 N.J. at 618 (acknowledging that plea bargaining “enables a defendant to reduce his penal exposure”) (citation omitted).  But now, the worst-case scenario has changed.  The 7-Eleven Case was dismissed due to [...]’s successful appeal (Da 71), and the Pennsylvania case was never prosecuted.  (Da 61-62)  Thus, [...]’s aggregate sentencing exposure is lower, and he may feel differently about proceeding to trial on the Pharmacy Case.  Put simply, the parties’ negotiating positions have changed.  It is for this reason that the conditional plea rule permits defendants in [...]’s position to withdraw from their plea agreements.  Jamar [...] explicitly conditioned his global plea agreement on the right to appeal from two adverse pretrial rulings.  [...] rightly and reasonably understood that if he succeeded in appealing either of these rulings, he would be permitted to withdraw from the agreement.  Under the trial court’s decision applying the wrong standard, [...]’s right to withdraw as a result of our Supreme Court’s decision in his case is not being honored.  [...] respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision below and permit him to withdraw from his plea.
[directive] Upon arriving at the scene of a suspected or confirmed bias incident, he or she shall:  1. Supervise the preliminary response and investigation.  2.  Confer with the initial responding officer.  Page 6 of 16  3.  Assist in the stabilization of the victim as required.  4.  Ensure that the crime scene is properly protected and preserved.  5.  Take steps to insure that the incident does not escalate.  6.  Determine if additional personnel are required to provide complete public safety services.  7.  Arrange for an immediate increase of patrols throughout the affected area, as appropriate.  8.  If the potential exists for further acts of violence or damage to property, arrange for officers to be assigned to the location of the incident in a fixed post position.  9.  Attempt to verify if the occurrence is a confirmed bias incident following the guidelines for confirming bias incidents contained in these Standards.  Verification assistance should be provided by other levels of command and/or additional investigative personnel, as required.  10.  Request that investigative personnel respond to the scene if a bias incident is suspected or confirmed.  11.  Notify headquarters and other levels of command regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident.  12.  Request that the next level of command respond to the scene, as appropriate.  13.  Provide their agency’s headquarters with updated factual information regarding the incident.  14.  Ensure that the chief executive of the law enforcement agency is notified of the incident.
[brief] The propriety of what the judge told the jurors about the side-by-side surveillance/reenactment photos (8T 46-19 to 23) when they were admitted into evidence and shown to the jury is addressed in Point III, infra.  Cross-examination focused extensively on the methodology used to create that reenactment, especially the fact that [...] agreed there is no “policy or procedure on how to do that” and the fact that he also agreed that there are “[m]ultiple variables between what was going on on those streets where those cameras were on the [date of the shooting] compared to [January] 29. ” (8T 56-10 to 58-8)  Cross-examination also focused on: the fact that “almost all” the cars in the photos are black and white, and one cannot tell the make or model of the car that police suspect to be the Malibu (8T 78-17 to 79-19); that [...] wore a light-colored hoody on January 22 (8T 69-14 to 24); that police had defendant’s bloodstained clothes in their possession as soon as they seized him at [...], and, thus, even though he was temporarily released, they retained those clothes, giving them the opportunity to transfer blood from the clothes to the semiautomatic gun (8T 73-1 to 17); and that there is no evidence that any perpetrator of this shooting wore a mask; yet police found a mask outside the codefendant’s residence and tested it.
[brief] Just over thirteen years ago and prior to his reassignment to the appellate division, [...] reminded plaintiff and other Feld VI and Feld VIII attorneys that they were and remained officers of the court with an overriding professional and ethical obligation of candor towards the tribunal.  This is a continuous ongoing duty.  This has always been a “fox guarding the henhouse” litigation.  Defendants and their retained professionals refused to admit, to cure and to then move on from their mistakes.  Courts abhor strong arm war of attrition “deny, delay and deflect” gaslighting litigation tactics.  Here, defendants filed two frivolous and vexatious motions to dismiss on the pleadings.  Here, defendants opposed and denied plaintiff expedited and limited discovery.  Here, defendants failed to cite and to discuss Article I, paragraphs 1, 2a, 5, 6, 18 and 21 of our State Constitution.  Here, defendants failed to cite and to discuss the purpose and function of Article VI, Section V, paragraph 4 of our State Constitution.  Here, defendants failed to cite intervening contrary case law.  Enough is enough.  Judicial review is a fundamental constitutional guardrail against governmental abuses of power.
[directive] A.  Victims of sexual offenses shall be provided with printed information supplied by the Violent Crimes Compensation Board (VCCB) containing the location of rape crisis centers in all geographical areas throughout the State and instructing victims of sexual offenses that if a rape crisis center is not available in their immediate geographical area, the victim may contact the appropriate County Victim-Witness Coordinator.  Unless the victim requires immediate medical attention, this printed information shall be personally conveyed to the victim of a sexual offense by a representative of the hospital or place of emergency care before a medical examination of the victim is conducted, or by a representative of the police department before the victim's statement is taken to afford the victim the opportunity to have assistance from the rape crisis center or County Victim-Witness Coordinator during these procedures.(17)  B.  Prompt assistance shall be provided with Violent Crimes Compensation Board applications.  C.  Pamphlets should be made available on AIDS and sexually transmitted disease.  D.  In any case in which the victim of an act that would constitute aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault as defined in subsection a. or c. of N.J.S. 2C:14-2, the Office ot Victim-Witness Advocacy in the Division of Criminal Justice or the county prosecutor's office involved in the case shall:  Notify the victim of the victim's right to obtain an approved serological test for AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome) or HIV infection (infection with the human immunodeficiency virus or any other related virus identified as a probable causative agent of AIDS) and assist, or refer the victim for assistance, in obtaining such a test and appropriate counseling and medical care;  Notify the victim of the victim's right to obtain a court order requiring the perpetrator to submit to an approved serological test for AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome) or HIV infection (infection with the human immunodeficiency virus or any other related virus identified as a probable causative agent of AIDS) in the event that such perpetrator is convicted or adjudicated delinquent; and Communicate the request of a victim who wishes to seek an order compelling the perpetrator to submit to such a test to the prosecutor handling the case and advise or arrange for the victim to be advised of the results of any such test ordered; and Assist the victim in making application for compensation for the costs of testing, counseling and medical care to the Violent Crime Compensation Board.(18)  E.  Waiting time should be minimized in courthouses or police stations so as to reduce possible further contact with the accused.  F.  Victims of sexual assault under the age of 18 shall not have their names, identities or addresses released or contained in public records.(19)  VII.
[brief] I also certify that, unless exempt, the filing fee required by N.J.S.A. 22A:2 has been paid.  08/02/2023 s/ [...], Esq.  Date Signature of Attorney or Pro Se Litigant (*) truncated due to space limit.  Please find full information in the additional pages of the form.  Revised effective: 09/01/2008, CN 10502 (Notice of Appeal) page 2 of 4  IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF [...] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY BERGEN COUNTY: CHANCERY DIVISION PROBATE PART DOCKET NO. [...]