ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In doing so, the trial court completely ignored the relevant legislative history of the PWCRA, the unambiguous language of the Solicitation (which all bidders are required to follow) and DOL determinations that clearly obligate all subcontractors (even those that are professionals) to be PWCRA-registered.  The trial court’s errors include, without limitation: (i) incorrectly assuming that the archeologists will not perform work on the Project site even though the Solicitation expressly defines the archologists work to include the employment of laborers who will perform work on-site; and (ii) wrongfully holding that professionals (such as archaeologists) are not required to be PWCRA-registered even though the DOL determined that professionals who are subcontractors to contractors performing work on public projects must be PWCRA-registered.
[brief] \textit{[Ibid. (emphasis added).]}  \textsuperscript{3}  https://nj.gov/njsp/about/history/1930s.shtml (last visited October 26, 2023).  The Museum provides tours to members of the public, including the Lindbergh Archive.  (Pa38).  The Museum also regularly communicates with researchers who inquire about the Museum’s items and their contents.  Ibid.  Upon appointment, researchers are granted direct access to Museum items, including historical items from the Lindbergh Archive, with appropriate safeguards in place.  Ibid.
[brief] Plaintiffs submit that failure to reverse the Trial Court would be egregiously unfair and unjust, and would only reward Defendants for their fraudulent concealment devised to achieve this very result.  Ultimately, neither Res Judicata nor the Entire Controversy Doctrine bar the First Count through the Eighth Count of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, as [...] correctly contemplated when finding that there would be no prejudice to Plaintiffs in denying their motion to amend in the 2015 Action.  Accordingly, the Trial Court’s error should be reversed.
[brief] In the context of a roadway resurfacing project, construction inspection services include the following:  [I]t would be part of looking at the milling, make sure that the heights of the milling were properly conforming, make sure that they were performing their work in the proper construction lane and once that work was performed and the millings were properly removed, they'd also look at the work for the asphalt that was coming in.  So as an asphalt inspector, what we do is we first receive the tickets to make sure that they're properly using the hot mix asphalt that is required for the contract and specifications.  We need to make sure that the temperatures are proper as -- because the temperature at which asphalt is placed is very important.  Once it goes out onto the ground, we're therefore required to ensure that the proper height is looked at, to make sure that the asphalt that is there is going down at the proper height.  ...  Also then need to look at the compaction.  So normal asphalt compaction has to do with usually a three-roller system.  We take a look at the rollers on how we're going to compact it, make sure that the temperatures are accurate for us to continue to roll the asphalt pavement.  Asphalt needs to be rolled at a specific time because when it comes out of a truck, it has a limited time that it could actually get down to the temperature where it's no longer mobile, so the inspector is also required to make sure that the asphalt is compacted properly, make sure that it was put at the right temperatures, make sure that everything is done in conformance with the contract specifications.  (Pa2494 at T37:12-39:3)  See also Pa1583 at T24:1-11.  Also included would be “administrative services for cost control, progress control and quality control” (Pa2494 at T35:18-36:1, 21-24).
[brief] Even if the Public Access Law Abrogated the Common Law Public Trust Doctrine and Delegated to [...] New Authority to Impose Public Access Conditions, [...] Failed to Properly Apply the Law to [...]’s Application (Replying to Respondent’s Point B).  [...] argues that even “[i]f…the public access requirement is triggered,” which [...] continues to dispute under the circumstances presented,⁵ “then the Law requires [...] as a next step to consider three factors to determine ‘the public access that is required at a property,’” but goes on to claim that “the extent of public access ‘that is required’ at the Property is not an issue in this appeal. ”  Rb24.  This characterization could not be further from the truth.  C.  [...] Cannot Enforce the Public Access Law Until [...] Complies with the Law’s Express Requirement that It Adopt Implementing Regulations (Replying to Respondent’s Point C).
[brief] Despite the clear understanding of the purpose and effect of the TRC meetings, the Respondents have continued to assert that they were unduly prejudiced and misled by actions taken at the TRC meetings.  Further, these assertions were accepted by the Trial Court and reiterated in the 2020 Opinion; as a basis for the decision to overturn the Board’s decision.  The unilateral, self-serving assertions of misunderstanding by the Respondents cannot properly form a basis for undermining the proper decision of the Board; which was not present during the TRC meetings and was unaware of what transpired therein.
[brief] Only the most frivolous claims can the court deny an injured railroad employee his qualified right to a jury trial.  *Ciarolla v. Union Railroad Co.*, 338 A.2d 669 (Pa. Super. 1975).  The FELA is to be liberally construed on behalf of injured workers with the result that often the recovery will be proper under the FELA when it would not be under the common law of negligence.  *Ignacic v. Penn Central Transport Co.*, 436 A.2d 192 (Pa. Super. 1981).  The FELA is "liberally construed," *Conrail v. Gottshall*, 512 U.S. 532, 543, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 129 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1994), and its language regarding causation is "as broad as could be framed."  *CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride*, 131 S. Ct. at 2636.  In order to recover under the FELA, plaintiff must present more than a scintilla of evidence.  *Aparicio v. Norfolk & W. Ry.*, 84 F.3d 803, 810 (6th Cir., 1996).  However, due to the low threshold on both negligence and causation “precious little more” than a scintilla, or “not much more” is required.
[brief] Regarding factor (10) – the defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment – the sentencing judge correctly noted that “I don’t think is appropriate for the Court to even consider.  Probation is not in the cards under any sense in this case. ” (3T22-17 to 19).  Defendant pleaded guilty to a second-degree charge of possession with the intent to distribute which carried with it a presumption of imprisonment.
[brief] ”  (21T 120-13 to 14)  Defendant recalled at that moment that [...] had previously threatened to shoot defendant and had said that if they ever had “an issue,” [...] would “go to guns. ”  (21T 120-14 to 121-8)  Five or six years earlier, [...] had even shown defendant a gun and said he “had an issue” with someone.  (21T 122-1 to 7)  As they wrestled on January 9, when defendant got his hand on the gun he “fired twice defending my space. ”  (21T 121-19 to 22)  Defendant said that [...] had also made threatening references to defendant on social media “a month or two earlier. ”  (124-18 to 125-25)  He said that they had not had even a telephone conversation in the two years prior to [...]’ death.  (21T 129-10 to 25)  Defendant said that as he walked out of the door, at about 6 p.m. on January 9, [...] was “right there going for it,” and, as [...] reached for what defendant thought was a gun, defendant tried to punch him, but only hit him “in the shoulder or something,” and then they began to wrestle.  (21T 131-1 to 25; 21T 135-21 to 22)  Defendant said he “thinks” he actually got the gun out of [...]’ hand before he fired “instinctively,” and that he “tried to aim low” in order “just to get away from him.
[brief] Subsequently, on February 17, 2021, the Borough Council voted to approve Ordinance 1667 adopting the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan (3T; Pa68).  C.  The Second Amendment To The Redevelopment Plan  The Borough has adopted a number of redevelopment plans establishing and then revising the zoning requirements for this Redevelopment Area, the first of which was adopted on February 9, 2006 (Pa542).  The Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan is the latest in this series of redevelopment plans and it was described by the Borough Planner, [...], as being generally consistent with the prior First Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan, but with certain changes regarding the phasing and development standards for sub area 2 of the Redevelopment Area (2T, pp. 13-16).  The Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan creates a redevelopment overlay zone for the Redevelopment Area and establishes zoning standards for that redevelopment overlay zone authorizing the redevelopment of the properties located within the Redevelopment Area with permitted uses including, among other things, mixed use residential/commercial development, marinas and other maritime uses, parks and recreational uses, and accessways to the water’s edge (Pa554).  The plan also contemplates the removal of an approximately 300 space existing municipally-owned parking lot and its replacement by a relocated 150 space municipally-owned parking lot, along with approximately 260 other parking spaces within the ground floor level of the buildings and through surface and street parking (Pa561).  Significantly, the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan does not mandate properties located within the Redevelopment Area only be developed in accordance with the redevelopment standards set forth within the redevelopment plan.  To the contrary, the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan notes that the parcels located within the Redevelopment Area are located within either the Borough’s B-2 or C-R zoning districts, and it specifically indicates that:  In order to implement the Redevelopment Plan in a manner consistent with its stated goals and objectives, the Redevelopment Plan shall serve as an overlay zone, or optional development alternative, to the existing underlying Zoning Districts as specified in the Borough’s Zoning Ordinance.  If the redeveloper chooses to redevelop parcels governed by the Redevelopment Plan under the redevelopment overlay option, the standards and requirements, including permitted uses, described in this Redevelopment Plan shall apply.  (Pa550) (emphasis added).  Thus, someone wishing to develop property located within this Redevelopment Area has the option of either developing the property in accordance with the standards of the underlying zoning or in accordance with the redevelopment overlay zoning standards.  Additional facts relating to the Second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan and its consistency with the Borough’s master plan are addressed within the legal arguments below.
[brief] (36T 4:1 to 56:13; 37T 71:25 to 97:1).  A.  The Backdrop and Legal Standards.  B.  The Defendants Are Liable for Breach of Contract.  C.  The Defendants Breached the Covenant of Good Faith  ......................74  D.  The Defendants Were Unjustly Enriched.  ...........................................75  VII.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THE DEFENDANTS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE.
[brief] The legal source of Model Jury Charge 5.20B(B)(2)(a) is the Supreme Court case Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 87 N.J. 146 (1981), which distinguished landowner responsibility between residential and commercial owners.  The Stewart Court reasoned that while “commercial landowners are responsible for maintaining in reasonably good condition the sidewalks abutting their property and are liable to pedestrians injured as a result of their negligent failure to do so…[t]he duty to maintain abutting sidewalks…is confined to owners of commercial property. ”  Stewart, 87 N.J. at 157-59.  These principles were restated in Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, 207 N.J. 191 (2011), cited above.
[brief] For the purposes and sake of judicial efficiency, Respondent can agree to the majority of the procedural history presented by Appellant as it mostly reflects the lengthy litigation and motion practice that took place.  That being said, Respondent has a duty to supplement the procedural history in order for the Appellate Court to truly appreciate the nature of this appeal and how all parties made their way before the Court.  With respect to Plaintiff’s October 24, 2018, Motion to Amend the complaint, which is the subject of this appeal, Opposition for Defendant [...] was filed on November 1, 2018, not 2010 as Appellant inadvertently wrote in the brief.  (Pa122).  Further, the Opposition filed by Defendant [...] included reference to the Affidavit of [...]’s Director of Technical Operations Center, [...], although mistakenly left out of Plaintiff’s Appendix.  Therefore, Defendant’s Appendix includes the Affidavit of [...].  (Da32 to Da34).  The motion practice and history provided by Appellant up to and including the jury trial of March 2023 is otherwise accurate.  That being said, Appellant did not wait until November 27, 2023, to challenge the result of the Jury trial.  Appellant omits that a Motion for a New Trial was filed on April 11, 2023.  (Da35 to Da36).  The oral argument regarding this motion was heard on October 20, 2023, and on that day, the Honorable [...] J.S.C., denied the request for a New Trial.  (Da37 to Da38).  Having been unsuccessful with all of the above-mentioned motions and the trial (Pa185, Pa293, Pa296), Plaintiff then filed the Notice of Appeal on November 27, 2023, with the Appellate Division for review of the Orders entered November 30, 2018, and January 11, 2019. (Pa297).
[brief] Claims as to Defendant [...] are not given an exception. ”)  In order to hold an employee liable as an aider or abettor, a plaintiff must show that (1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his [or her] role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time he [or she] provided assistance; and (3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation.  See Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70, 84 (2004).  In examining the liability of individual defendants under the NJLAD, the New Jersey Supreme Court “has held that the words aiding and abetting ‘require active and purposeful conduct. ”  Cicchetti v. Morris County Sheriff’s Office, 194 N.J. 563, 594 (2008) citing Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70, 83 (2004).  The Trial Court below analyzed Plaintiff’s claims against [...], acknowledging that there could be no cause of action against [...] where the claim of retaliation against Defendant [...] did not survive.  (Pa10).  The Court below reiterated that Plaintiff’s Complaint is “rife with allegations that rise only to the level of an employee that is dissatisfied with her employer” and even a “generous reading of the Complaint fails to establish that Plaintiff was retaliated against because she has not, objectively, suffered a materially adverse employment decision. ”  Id.  In the present matter, Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that [...] was an “aider and abettor” where Plaintiff could not establish that the Board of Education performed any “illegal or tortious activity” and even if there was a finding that the Board of Education did so, Plaintiff did not show that Defendant [...] knowingly and substantially assisted the principal violation.  Therefore, Plaintiff’s NJLAD claim against Lorraine [...] individually was properly dismissed.
[brief] ”  See, *Hilton*, *supra* at 586.  Recognizing that a proposed future assemblage of differently-owned parcels could not serve as the basis of the highest and best use opinion, but that such a prospective future assemblage “is not irrelevant” to determining the fair market value of the property to be acquired, the Appellate Division held:  [I]f there is a probability that there may in the near future be an assemblage of lots into a single integrated unit supporting a particular highest and best use, a willing buyer may well be willing to pay not merely for the property under its present constraints but, in addition to that present value, for the probability of such an assemblage as well.  Obviously, the greater the probability, the more a buyer would be willing to pay for it . . .  But it cannot be the basis for determining market value as if the assemblage had already taken place.
[brief] [...] testified Plaintiff’s injuries are permanent and significant.  4T216.  The jury saw one anatomic drawing depicting Plaintiff’s injuries, Da167, and two anatomic drawings depicting Plaintiff’s surgeries, Da168; Da169.  [...] testified that these surgeries, as well as all of Plaintiff’s accident-related medical treatment, was reasonable, necessary and causally related to the subject accident.  4T216.  [...] testified Plaintiff’s recovery was “nothing short of a miracle” and that she could have lost both her legs in the accident or died because of her injuries.  4T231.  [...] also testified at length about Plaintiff’s poor prognosis.  4T220-224.  During closing argument, plaintiff's counsel used the time unit rule.
[brief] The trial court held that [...] was a credible witness, as the investigative reports, body-worn video, Consent to Search form, and handgun in evidence corroborated the officer’s testimony.  (Da29-30).  The court, relying principally on the video evidence, further held that both [...] and her daughter were informed by police they could refuse consent to search the apartment, and there was no evidence either misunderstood their right.  (Da32).  Further, the court accepted as valid the signed Consent to Search Form.  (Da32).  [...] was the “proprietor” of the apartment, meaning the lessee, not [...].  (Da24; Da27-28).  Nor did any evidence support a claim that their consent was coerced, as not one of various factors normally considered to “potentially indicate” coercion was present.  (Da32).  Defendant’s claim that the two women were inattentive as [...] read the form was explicitly rejected by the trial judge.  (Da32-33; see 1T14-19 to 16-22; 1T21-23 to 22-14).  The judge also noted that the women understood that the police had a single stated objective, to secure the handgun defendant had given to [...], which representation the police honored.  (Da33).  For these reasons, the trial judge found the consent to search given by the women was lawful.
[brief] The Contradictory Orders Issued by the Trial Court on June 2, 2023, and June 9, 2023  On June 2, 2023, the trial court heard virtual oral argument on [...]’s motion to dismiss.  (June 2 Trans., 1T).  At the argument, the trial court properly referenced the liberal standards for pleading under New Jersey law and stated that it was denying [...]’s motion and would allow the case to proceed to discovery.  (1T, at 16-19).  Upon Plaintiff’s oral request at the end of oral argument for leave to amend the Complaint, the trial court stated that it would, instead, grant [...]’s motion, without prejudice and with leave --- 1  The certified transcripts of the proceedings before the trial court are on file with this Court and are referred to herein as follows: “1T” - June 2, 2023 Transcript; “2T” – June 9, 2023 Transcript; “3T” – July 21, 2023 Transcript; “4T” – August 25, 2023 Transcript; and “5T” – September 22, 2023 Transcript. to replead.  (1T, at 18-19).  Accordingly, the trial court issued an Order dated June 2, 2023, granting [...]’s motion to dismiss, *without prejudice*, for the reasons stated on the record at oral argument.  (Pa199-200, “June 2 Order”). \(^2\)  A week later, the trial court heard virtual oral argument on [...]’s motion to dismiss, with prejudice.  (June 9 Trans., 2T).  Notwithstanding that it had just denied [...]’s similar motion a week before, the trial court did a complete “about-face” and ruled from the bench that it would grant [...]’s motion to dismiss, *with prejudice*.  (2T, at 15-16).  In so ruling, the trial court embraced [...]’s argument that Plaintiff had no right to insist upon specific performance when [...] surreptitiously closed with the Fee Owner in October 2022, because Plaintiff had accepted the return of the Earnest Money Deposit in mid-July 2022.  (2T, at 14-16).  At this argument, the trial court seized upon the word “thereupon” in Section 13.1 of the PSA, interpreting it to mean that Plaintiff could only insist upon specific performance if the initial default by [...] occurred *at or after* the closing in October 2022 (and not before).  (2T, at 13-16).  The trial court rejected Plaintiff’s contention that the “in addition to” and “notwithstanding” language in Section 13.1 expressly permitted Plaintiff to also insist upon specific performance, regardless of the return of any termination or return of the Earnest --- \(^2\)
[brief] “Seller shall after the Effective date cooperate with Purchaser and Purchaser’s LSRP to secure prior to closing of to the extent possible a site-wide RAO for all AOCs comprising the groundwater obligations”  Pa0245.  “Purchaser shall, through Purchaser’s LSRP determine what remedies, if any, should be performed in order for the issuance of those items in Section 11.2 prior to closing)”
[brief] Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant  BY: [Signature]  [...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID: 411472022  Dated: October 9, 2024  December 20, 2024  [...] Acting Assistant Prosecutor N.J. Attorney ID 412512023  e-mail: [...]  The Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex Post Office Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08626  Re State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...]  A/K/A [...] (Defendant-Appellant)  Docket No. [...]
[brief] [Restaurant Brief, p.24].  But this is a plain misuse of Article 17.  As set forth in Appellants’ initial brief, this provision, in fact, states that “[i]n the event the demised premises are located in a shopping center or in a commercial building in which there are common area, Lessee agrees to pay his pro rata share of maintenance, taxes and insurance for the common area. ”  Thus, Article 17 merely provides for the right for the Landlord to impose “common area” charges but does not define or identify what the “common areas” are; what charges are being imposed for what services; or what any of the tenants’ shares of those expenses are.  For these reasons, on its face, Article 17 provides absolutely no textual support for the Law Division’s determination, or the Respondents’ arguments, that the Respondents paid a “common area” fee for the removal of snow and ice from the walkways and parking lot.  In order to so hold, the Law Division improperly accepted as evidence self-serving testimony about what the parties intended in Article 17.  See Deerhurst Estates, 64 N.J.Super. at 149 (“The only excluded circumstances are statements by the parties themselves as to what they intended the language to mean”).  In addition, the term “premises” was not defined in the leases, but the Law Division determined that the term premises should be re-defined to mean not the premises itself, but merely the tenants’ leasehold space.  In the end, the Law Division transformed a plain and unambiguous obligation to maintain sidewalks “adjacent to the premises” into an obligation merely to maintain the limited area of sidewalk abutting the tenant’s leasehold.  That is just not what the lease says.  C.
[brief] I.  Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors Provides the Applicable Legal Test to Determine a Landlord’s Liability for a Defective Condition on the Property .........................................................................................................................2  A. § 358 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts Cannot Be Inflexibly Applied to the Controlling Facts .................................................................2  B.  The Hopkins Factors Control the Analysis in the Present Matter.  .........................................................................................................................3  II.