ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] To date, this Court has addressed the subject only in unpublished opinions and has reached varied outcomes on varied facts—each time in the context of foreign corporations, which are governed by a different New Jersey statute.\footnote{Although the statute that applies to foreign corporations (N.J.S.A. 14A:13-11(1)) bears many similarities to the statute at issue here (N.J.S.A. 42:2C-65(a)), they differ in at least one notable respect: whereas N.J.S.A. 14A:13-11(1) bars a foreign corporation transacting business in the State from maintaining any action in a New Jersey court “until such corporation shall have obtained a certificate of authority,” N.J.S.A. 42:2C-65(a) prohibits a foreign LLC transacting business in the State from maintaining any action in a New Jersey court “unless it has a certificate of authority to transact business in this State. ”  See Lipkowitz v. Hamilton Surgery Ctr., LLC, 415 N.J. Super. 29, 35 (App. Div. 2010) (“A statute’s language ‘is the surest indicator of the Legislature’s intent.
[directive] 13  The Greeley decision does not specifically mention John’s Law because [...] was arrested in Feb. 1998, prior to the adoption of P.L.2001, c.69.  The case does, however, discuss John’s Law II, P.L.2003, c.164.  State v. Greeley, 178 N.J. at 48-9.  Attorney General Guideline: Page 22
[brief] (PA205-212, [...] deposition page 11)  1.  When plaintiff/appellant applied for insurance, he applied online.  (PA175-204, plaintiff deposition pages 26-28)  2.  When [...] changed his insurance policy to reflect a New Jersey mailing address, he did not recall whether it was by telephone or online.  (PA175-204, plaintiff deposition pages 30-31)  3.  He testified that he changed his mailing address because he was moving to New Jersey full-time.  (PA175-204, plaintiff deposition pages 31-32)  4.  When [...] changed his mailing address on the [...] policy, he presumed that [...] would understand that he was moving to New Jersey and that the car would be in New Jersey.  (PA175-204, plaintiff deposition page 44 and 115-116)  5.  In his deposition, plaintiff testified that when he changed his mailing address on his policy that he believed that he was notifying [...] that he was living in New Jersey along with his vehicles.  (PA175-204, plaintiff deposition page 44)  6.  In his deposition, plaintiff testified that when he moved to New Jersey and notified [...] of his move that it was assumed that is where the vehicles would be garaged in spite of any paperwork to the contrary.  (PA175-204, plaintiff deposition page 48)  7.  During the course of his deposition, [...] did reiterate that he did not understand what the significance of “garaging” meant with regard to the policy.  (PA175-204, plaintiff deposition pages 112-113)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] Notice of Appeal filed on October 30, 2023, by [...] for Plaintiff/Appellant, [...] a/k/a [...]  Civil Case Information Statement filed on October 30, 2023, by [...] for Plaintiff/Appellant, [...] a/k/ [...]  Civil Case Information Statement filed on November 2, 2023, by [...] for Defendant/Respondent, [...]  Order of Dismissal filed by the Honorable [...], P.J. Ch. on September 25, 2023
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................  iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..............................................................  1  ARGUMENT ..................................................................................  2  I.  THE STATE’S BRIEF AND THE DECISION BELOW  IGNORE THE STATE’S CONSTITUTIONAL BURDEN TO SHOW THE SFRA HAS BEEN OPERATING OPTIMALLY TO REMEDY THE ABBOTT VIOLATION IN JERSEY CITY  ...........................................  2  II.  THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE BELOW DEMONSTRATES THAT THE STATE, BY CONSISTENTLY AND SIGNIFICANTLY UNDERFUNDING THE SFRA, HAS FAILED TO SHOW THE SFRA REMAINS CONSTITUTIONAL IN JERSEY CITY .....................  8  III.  SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT COMMANDS THAT THE MATTER BE REMANDED TO DETERMINE IF DEFICIENCIES OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION HAVE EMERGED IN JERSEY CITY REQUIRING JUDICIAL REMEDIATION ....................  13  CONCLUSION
[brief] The Trial Court held this to be a taking by the State which required compensation.  **Da40.**  This holding was affirmed by the Appellate Division, in an opinion dated March 27, 2019.  **Da36.**  [...] entered into a settlement agreement with [...], under which [...] received $1 million, after attorneys’ fees were deducted.  **3T11.**  That settlement agreement, dated November 5, 2020, was signed by Defendant on behalf of the company.
[directive] a.  A law enforcement officer may inform other officers and/or first responders responding to the same address or otherwise interacting with the same individual that there is an indication of COVID-19 positive test at that address or with that individual if that is the case.  b.  A law enforcement officer may share COVID-19 Information with [...] (DCPP) employees and with [...] officers if they request a name or address lookup in connection with the performance of their duties and that request implicates COVID- Information.2
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants on September 10, 2021.  (Pa1 – Pa12).  Defendants filed an Answer on February 14, 2022.  (Pa13 – Pa21).  Following the close of discovery, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 17, 2024.  (Pa22 – Pa23).  Plaintiff filed opposition to the Motion on June 12, 2024.  (Pa654 – Pa685.)  Defendants filed a reply on July 1, 2024.  (Pa688 – Pa707).  The Court heard Oral Argument on July 15, 2024, and issued its decision on the record.  On July 16, 2024, the Court entered an Order granting Defendants’ Motion.  (Pa711).  Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on August 22, 2024, and an Amended Notice of Appeal on September 3, 2024.  (Pa713 – Pa728).
[directive] 1  Governing Principles ..................................................................................................................  1  2  Definitions .................................................................................................................................  2  3  Police Department Policies Governing Deployment and Use of BWCs and Recordings ........... 5  4  Notice that BWCs are Deployed and Activated .........................................................................  9  5  Standards Governing the Activation of BWCs .........................................................................  11  6  Standards Governing the De-activation of BWCs upon the Request of a Civilian, When Discussing Investigation Strategy or Planning, or on Instruction of a Prosecutor ..................  15  7  Circumstances When BWC Activation/Use Is Subject to Special Conditions or Restrictions..  18  8  Retention of BWC Recordings .................................................................................................  21  9  Standards to Ensure Secure Storage and Accessibility of BWC Recordings ............................  23  10  Restrictions on Access to and Use and Dissemination of BWC Recordings ............................  26  11  Public Disclosure of BWC Recordings ......................................................................................  30  12  Authority of County Prosecutor to Impose Additional Requirements ....................................  30  13  Violations .................................................................................................................................  30  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022 i  1  Governing Principles
[brief] See, Kugler, supra 379 (the rule “is that the proper basis of compensation is the value of the property as it would be at the time of the taking…disregarding either the depreciating threat of or the inflationary reaction to the proposed public project”); see also, Housing Auth. of Atlantic City v. Atlantic City Expo, 62 N.J. 322 (1973).  In Kugler, supra, the New Jersey Supreme Court cited a number of authorities in support of the general rule that compensation should be fixed, “disregarding either the depreciating threat of or the inflationary reaction to the proposed public project” including State v. Nordstrom, 54 N.J. 50, 54 (1969); United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949); Cole v. Boston Edison Co., 157 N.E. 2nd 209, 212 (Mass. 1959); City of Cleveland v. Carcinoma, 190 N.E. 2nd 52 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
[brief] The plaintiff’s witness, [...], had difficulty identifying the defendant, who’s of the same race as he.  *State v. Allen*, 294 P.3d 679, 683 n.3 (Wash. 2013) (“The instruction to be given in New Jersey, following [State] v. *Henderson*, tells the jury that human memory is not foolproof and that “[i]n deciding what weight, if any, to give to the identification testimony, you should consider the following factors that are related to the witness, the alleged perpetrator, and the criminal incident itself”: (1) the witness's opportunity to view and degree of attention, considering factors of stress, duration, weapon focus, distance, lighting, intoxication, and disguises/changed appearance, (2) prior description of perpetrator, (3) confidence and accuracy, (4) time elapsed, and (5) cross-racial effects.
[brief] What is troubling however is the fact that while there is an allegation specifically regarding Plaintiff, it unsupported by any details or facts.  In all likelihood that allegation was not fleshed out because it is simply untrue.  Plaintiff would know if she made any payments to [...], when they were, and in what amount.  Her silence is deafening as to the issue and calls into question the propriety of the Complaint, given the crucial nature of that allegation.
[brief] Below, the State cited Sterling v. Borough of Minersville in support of its position, ACa75, but Sterling did not involve a minor.  Instead, Sterling involved an eighteen-year-old.  232 F.3d 190, 192 (3d Cir. 2000).  Even if adults had a privacy right to keep the state’s social transitioning of them secret (and the United States Supreme Court has never held that they do), that holding would not extend to minors.
[brief] For these reasons, and those explained below, this Court should again find that Appellant’s letter vendor theory of FDCPA liability fails as a matter of law and statutory construction.  **a)  Appellant’s Letter Vendor Theory Is Contrary to the FDCPA’s Purpose**  The FDCPA is a federal statute that was passed by Congress “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to ensure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses. ”  *Greco v. Trauner, Cohen & Thomas, L.L.P.*, 412 F.3d 360, 363 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)).
[brief] ”  Karins, 152 N.J. at 546, citing, Milani v. Miller, 515 S.W. 2d 412, 417, (Mo.1975).  Here, morale and public confidence are implicated; accordingly, criminal statutes and interpretations of such statutes are not applicable.  Respondent’s reliance on State v. Weleck, 10 N.J. 355 (1952), is misplaced as actually supporting Appellant’s arguments.  The Weleck court defined “misconduct in office” or “official misconduct” as “any unlawful behavior relating to official duties by an officer intrusted in any way with the administration of law or justice, or, as otherwise defined any act of omission in breach of a duty of public While Respondent also relies on various canons of statutory interpretation referring to the “ordinary meanings” of words and plain language, (RB-11, FN3), “misconduct in office” is not a term with an “ordinary meaning,” but a term subject to varying interpretations. concern, by one who has accepted public office. ”  Id. at 365.  As Respondent - a public official - breached a duty of public concern, specifically, the duty of highest fidelity to the public, and the duty to conduct himself - in private and public - with honesty and integrity, he committed misconduct in office as per the Weleck holding.
[brief] (4T58:13-23, 76:3 to 80:21, 92:16 to 93:12, 99:9-14, 200:15 to 201:24, 202:13-19; 6T88:1-24, 94:10 to 95:3, 102:12 to 103:5, 106:17 to 110:13; 8T94:13 to 95:13; Pa0405-08, §§ 3.7.2, 3.8, 4.1.)  At trial, [...] acknowledged that in his view, the remedial investigation was “at least complete enough” to move onto the next phase, but in truth, he was just kicking the can down the road and shifting the burden to Plaintiff to complete delineation during the redevelopment process.  (6T31:26 to 32:12, 106:17 to 107:24; 8T94:13-15.)  Nevertheless, at this stage, it is possible for Defendants to work toward and obtain a site-wide RAO for the Property.
[brief] On May 28, 2021, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant [...] (“[...]”), a home care service agency, and defendant [...] (“[...]”), a managed care organization (Pa3 – Pa6).  The complaint was later amended on August 16, 2021 (Pa35 – Pa43).  The complaint and its amendment included ten causes of action, encompassing contract-based claims, torts, and allegations of fraudulent concealment.  From May 12, 2019, to June 8, 2019, plaintiff arranged home care services for her father (“decedent”) while she was on an international trip.  Under the service contract, [...] agreed to provide home care four times a week, totaling 10 hours each week.  Defendant [...] was responsible for authorizing and overseeing these services.  Plaintiff authorized both defendants to take necessary actions for the care during this period.  Starting from at least May 18, 2019, or possibly earlier, the assigned aide failed to fulfill the contract's requirements and left the decedent unattended, as noted in the “Client Notes Report” by defendant [...] (Pa92).  Unfortunately, the decedent fell at home during this time and passed away on June 2, 2019.  After the incident, plaintiff made multiple requests for healthcare service records to which she was entitled.  However, defendants refused to provide these documents, thereby violating the HIPAA privacy rule (45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2002)), N.J.S.A. 45:9-22 to -27 and N.J.A.C. 8:43G-15.3.  On March 1, 2024, the trial judge dismissed plaintiff’s suit with prejudice (Pal – Pa2).
[brief] However, the request for medical records falls under the HIPAA privacy rule (45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2002)), N.J.S.A. 45:9-22 to -27 and N.J.A.C. 8:43G-15.3, which do not mandate that plaintiff must be represented by an attorney to obtain these documents.  Regardless of whether there is an active legal case, plaintiff is entitled to these documents.  C.  The judge erred in treating the request for medical records as pre-trial discovery.  Health care records are governed by the HIPAA privacy rule (45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2002)), N.J.S.A. 45:9-22 to -27 and N.J.A.C. 8:43G-15.3.  Pre-trial discovery procedures do not apply in this context.  Moreover, even if plaintiff decides not to pursue the case further in court, she still retains the right to access these documents as per the applicable statutes.  Point III
[brief] *Id.* at 419.  “That is, whether a jury would likely be compelled by a lack of record evidence to infer from the officer's use of the phrase that the officer ‘possesses superior knowledge, outside the record, that incriminates the defendant. ’”  *Ibid.*  [...] testified about his interview with the victim a few days after the shooting, noting the victim’s ability to speak and the injuries he sustained and authenticating photographs he took of the victim.
[brief] 14  a.  The trial court correctly held that plaintiff failed to establish that the elevation change was a “dangerous condition” under the Tort Claims Act.16  i.  Testimony of Plaintiff, his wife, his friend and investigating officer fails to provide evidence of dangerous condition .................................................................  18  ii.  The Arora Biennial Bridge Inspection Report fails to provide evidence of a dangerous condition ..............................................................................................................  19  iii.  The photographs of the road elevation fail to establish a dangerous condition ................................................................................................................................. 20  iv.  The opinions and testimony of Plaintiff’s expert [...], PE fail to establish dangerous condition .........................................................................................  20 b.  The trial court correctly held that plaintiff failed to establish that a dangerous condition caused the accident ..........................................................................................  23 c.  The trial court correctly held that plaintiff failed to establish that the Authority had notice of a dangerous condition ....................................................................................  27 d.  The trial court correctly found that Plaintiff failed to establish that the Authority’s conduct was palpably unreasonable.  ...........................................  30
[brief] (Da 29 to 32)  At this writing, [...] is fifty-two years old and has spent more than thirty-two years in prison for offenses committed as a nineteen-year-old.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I A RESENTENCING SHOULD OCCUR BECAUSE THE COMER DECISION -- WHICH ENTITLES JUVENILE OFFENDERS TO A RESENTENCING AFTER TWENTY YEARS -- SHOULD EXTEND TO NINETEEN-YEAR-OLD OFFENDERS LIKE DEFENDANT [...], WHO SHARE THE SAME CHARACTERISTICS AS JUVENILES.
[brief] “The heartland of Affidavit of Merit cases involves nothing more than procedural mistakes that are entirely irrelevant to the legitimacy of the cause of action.  That reality not only justifies but requires a modification of Cornblatt.  Id. at 158.  Defendants contend that the trial court did not err because the Affidavit of Merit Statute’s requirements are substantive, rather than procedural.  However, Defendants’ classification of what constitutes procedural law and substantive law is entirely arbitrary.  As [...] explained, the vast majority of Affidavit of Merit cases are the result of procedural defects.  Here, there is no question that Plaintiff’s failure to submit a timely affidavit of merit falls into these class of cases because Plaintiff submitted an untimely affidavit of merit, which was the result of Defendants’ gamesmanship and failure to provide Plaintiff with the requisite medical records to sufficiently comply with the Affidavit of Merit Statute.  Under these circumstances, the trial judge should have assessed the facts, including the willfulness of the violation, the proximity of trial and any prejudice that would have accrued to the Defendants by the filing deviation, and applied the appropriate remedy.  See Ferreira, 178 N.J. at 157–58.  Nevertheless, here, the trial judge decided not to act in the above mentioned manner and instead decided to impose the most draconian punishment available, dismissal with prejudice.  Defendants’ attempt to distinguish Zaccardi and Sickles is of no moment because regardless of the causes of action in those cases, the reason they were cited was to analogize the procedural defects in those cases to the one at bar.  See Zacardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245 (1982); Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2005).  The issue is that failure to submit a timely affidavit of merit is more akin to a procedural defect, it does not take a trained legal eye to make that observation.  Thus, similar to other procedural defects, the draconian punishment of dismissal without prejudice should be a recourse of last resort and only imposed in the rarest of circumstances.  Under the facts of this case, it would be an unjust result for Plaintiff’s Complaint to be dismissed with prejudice.
[brief] Second, Respondent did not, and still cannot establish that Appellant operated the motor vehicle in question beyond a reasonable doubt.  While Respondent relies on [...]’s testimony regarding statements Appellant allegedly made on the morning of his arrest regarding where he was heading to when [...] came upon him, Respondent fails to address that the factual record before this Court does not evidence other key facts needed to establish operation of the vehicle beyond a reasonable doubt.  These other key facts include information on when Appellant left his home in the vehicle, when Appellant again planned to drive the vehicle, and what occurred during the interim period between when Appellant left his home and when he was stopped by [...].  Third, Respondent did not meet its burden of proving that Appellant operated a vehicle while intoxicated beyond a reasonable doubt under either the per se or observational standards of liability.
[directive] 9.9.1  The internal affairs function should prepare periodic reports for the law enforcement executive that summarize the nature and disposition of all misconduct complaints the agency received.  This report should be prepared at least quarterly, but may be prepared more often as directed by the executive.  The report should include the principal officer; the allegation; the complainant; the age, sex, race and other complainant characteristics that might signal systematic misconduct by any member of the agency; and the investigation’s status.  9.9.2  Concluded complaints should be recorded and the reasons for termination explained.  9.9.3  This report shall be considered a confidential, internal work product.  Dissemination of the report should be limited to command personnel, the County Prosecutor, the appropriate authority, or a civilian review board that meets the minimum requirements for access to internal affairs information, if mandated by the governing body.
[brief] a.  Punitive damages may be awarded to the plaintiff only if the plaintiff proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that the harm suffered was the result of the defendant's acts or omissions, and such acts or omissions were actuated by actual malice or accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard of persons who foreseeably might be harmed by those acts or omissions.  This burden of proof may not be satisfied by proof of any degree of negligence including gross negligence.  b.  In determining whether punitive damages are to be awarded, the trier of fact shall consider all relevant evidence, including but not limited to, the following: (1)  The likelihood, at the relevant time, that serious harm would arise from the defendant's conduct; (2) The defendant's awareness of reckless disregard of the likelihood that the serious harm at issue would arise from the defendant's conduct; (3) The conduct of the defendant upon learning that its initial conduct would likely cause harm; and (4)  The duration of the conduct or any concealment of it by the defendant.  c.  If the trier of fact determines that punitive damages should be awarded, the trier of fact shall then determine the amount of those damages.  In making that determination, the trier of fact shall consider all relevant evidence, including, but not limited to, the following: (1)  All relevant evidence relating to the factors set forth in subsection b. of this section; (2) The profitability of the misconduct to the defendant; (3) When the misconduct was terminated; and (4)  The financial condition of the defendant.  In this case, the Plaintiff has proven by clear and convincing evidence that, since 2016, the Defendants embarked on a purposeful and concerted plan to defraud the Plaintiff by utilizing a recently uncovered mistake/error in the December 1998 Deed to steal the Property.
[brief] In fact, the New Jersey Supreme Court in *State v. Sutherland*, 231 N.J. 429 (2018), addressed a motion to suppress a motor vehicle stop which led to the discovery of the defendant as a suspended driver and a subsequent indictment charging a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26.  In reversing the Appellate Division, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the stop was unconstitutional and remanded the matter to the Appellate Division on the issue of the community caretaking doctrine.