ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  (Pb8; Pa2390.)  A few days later, on August 3, 2015, [...] was sent the Project Requirements by [...] along with an e-mail stating, “you need to revise your proposal and add for the insurance.  Also[,] please make sure the insurance is in place before we start any work. ”  (Pa2405.)  With the Project Requirements sent to [...] was a notification that “[...] is also an excluded party under the CCIP[,]” which must “comply with all insurance requirements set forth in the CCIP Insurance [] Manual and Schedule ‘B’ as an excluded party.
[brief] Accord, Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 64 (1993); Koseoglu v. Wry, 431 N.J. Super. At 159; State v. McGuire, 419 N.J. Super. 88, 123 (App. Div.), certify. den. 208 N.J. 335 (2011); State v. Frost, 242 N.J. Super. 601, 615 (App. Div. 1990), certify. den. 127 N.J. 321 (1992); Foley Machinery Co. v. Amland Contractors, Inc., 209 N.J. Super. 70, 77 (App. Div. 1986); Windmere, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 208 N.J. Super. 697, 713 (App. Div. 1986), aff’d 105 N.J. 373 (1987).  Stated alternatively, the decision should only be disturbed on appeal if necessary to prevent “manifest error or injustice.
[brief] This is to be contrasted with the facts presented in Roa and Burlington, wherein the Supreme Court held the employer’s actions could well serve as a deterrent to the filing of a discrimination complaint and, as such, were materially adverse so as to constitute retaliation.  In Roa, defendant cancelled plaintiff’s health insurance which caused plaintiff and his wife “financial problems, damaged their credit rating, subjected them to constant calls from debt collectors, and caused them a tremendous amount of stress and anxiety. ”  Roa, 200 N.J. at 575.  In Burlington, “the plaintiff suffered a more arduous job assignment and the financial effects of a thirty-seven-day suspension without pay. ”  Burlington, 548 U.S. at 71-72.  The facts in Roa and Burlington stand in stark contrast to the Instant Lawsuit wherein Plaintiff has not identified any injury or harm whatsoever.
[brief] The court further inferred that Defendant [...] would not have supported the termination of Plaintiff, [...], and [...] because she would have been upset about losing staff during a critical time.  The court noted:  I don’t think we should lose sight of the fact that this is a five-person office, during COVID, during the height of COVID, and three of the five people in this very busy, very stressed-out office end up getting terminated.  It doesn’t really seem that it would make a lot of sense for her to be... happy about this discipline that these parties received, because she lost three-quarters of... her employees.
[brief] The 1963 Agreement did not by its wording and form convey an easement or a perpetual right.  The Agreement provided in Paragraph 1 that the [...] will convey, by a separate Deed to be later executed, the property known as Lot 8 to the [...].  As of that 1963 Agreement, the Deed providing for Lot 8 to the [...] had already been executed (December 31, 1962) and finalized.  (Da166)
[brief] Defendant [...] pled guilty to committing third-degree aggravated assault upon minor Plaintiff [...]  In support of his guilty plea, [...] admitted, under oath and in open court, that after having a verbal disagreement with [...] that turned physical, he assaulted [...] by shoving him to the ground in an attempt to cause [...] significant bodily injury, at which point a co-defendant repeatedly kicked the defenseless [...] in the head and face.  [...] suffered severe injuries, including the fracture of his orbital bone, requiring the surgical implantation of metal hardware.  A few months after pleading guilty and being admitted to a two-year term of PTI (Pretrial Intervention), [...] appeared at his discovery deposition in this civil litigation arising from the attack upon [...]  At his deposition, [...] testified to a completely different version of events that contradicted his prior, sworn testimony at the time of his guilty plea.  [...] claimed that he never had a verbal altercation with [...] and that [...] simply lost his balance and fell to the ground.  When Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to cross-examine [...] with the transcript of his prior inconsistent statements from the time of his guilty plea, [...]’s counsel instructed him not to answer, even though the prior statements were not protected by a privilege or civil reservation.  The trial court correctly ruled that cross-examining [...] with his prior inconsistent statements was well within the realm of discoverability.  The trial court further held that the separate question of whether [...]’s statements in support of his guilty plea would ultimately be admissible at trial would be answered at a later time, pending further developments such as whether [...] ultimately succeeded in completing PTI and whether [...] ultimately applied for or obtained a civil reservation.  The trial court therefore ordered [...] to complete his deposition by September 2, 2024 and to answer Plaintiff’s questions regarding the statements he made to support his plea.  Defendant [...]’s present motions for leave to appeal and to stay the trial court’s legally correct discovery ruling should be denied.
[brief] [...] testified to his 30 years of experience in traffic and transportation planning (Ra345 14:4-13), relied on his experience preparing traffic and transportation elements as evidence of planning expertise (Ra345 15:5-13), and indicated that he has doing traffic engineering and traffic designs and served as the traffic engineer for [...] for 12 years (Ra345 15:14-21).  Though [...] accepted [...] as an expert in the field of traffic engineering, counsel objected to [...] being accepted as an expert in the field of professional land use planning, which was confirmed by the board attorney [...].  (Ra346 18:3-11.)  [...] was never accepted as an expert in professional land use planning or civil engineering, and therefore his testimony was given appropriate weight by the Board when it considered the credible, expert civil and planning testimony provided by [...].  Remarkably, [...] did not even independently review the RR Zone, site plan, YB Settlement Agreement, nor the exhibits to the YB Settlement Agreement at the time of his testimony; he simply relied upon the conversations he had with Objector’s Counsel “just a few days or a week” prior to providing testimony.  (Ra353 47:2-6.)  Therefore, the testimony presented by the objectors is only from a traffic engineer that (a) was only retained a few days prior to the hearing in which he provided testimony; (b) barely reviewed anything in the record; and (c) never even realized that the RR Zone specifically included the same elevations, renderings and floor plans of the residential structures that were presented to the Board as part of this Application (based upon the Settlement Agreement).  Plaintiffs’ attempts in its brief to define mounding, terracing, and devices, the first two of which are engineering terms, are irrelevant.  The Board made a credibility determination based on the evidence and expert engineering and planning testimony provided that there was no mounding or terracing or other device designed to allow for an increased building height, and the trial court found that determination was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  There is no reason to disturb that finding on appeal.
[brief] See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465; Erie, 304 U.S. at 64 (emphasis added).  The doctrine’s two main objectives are (1) to discourage forum shopping among litigants; and (2) to avoid inequitable administration of the laws.  Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-80.  The court’s failure to apply the Erie doctrine in Sullivan created exactly what the doctrine was designed to prevent, i.e. inequity in the administration of the laws.
[brief] See L. 2018, c. 53; L. 2018, c. 54; L. 2018, c. 67.  Far from mandating that the SFRA be forever frozen in time, the Supreme Court emphasized a “good faith anticipation of a continued commitment by the Legislature and Executive to address whatever adjustments are necessary to keep SFRA operating at its optimal level. ”  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 146.  The Court explicitly acknowledged that the SFRA “shall be subject to periodic reexamination and retooling as necessary to keep the formula operating with equity. ”  Id. at 174.  And that is exactly what happened here: the Legislature amended the SFRA through Chapter 67 to address what, in its opinion, were funding inequities that developed over time.
[brief] . . .  No member shall make any withdrawals from capital without prior approval of the Company. ” (Da2703).  The agreement further provides that [...] is to be member managed with decisions and actions decided by a “majority in the interest of its members,” with a majority defined as 51% or more.  (Da2704).  The agreement prohibits members from taking actions “detrimental to the best interests of the Company or which would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary purpose of the Company. ” (Da2705).  With respect to [...]’s books, the agreement provides that “Each of the parties to this agreement hereby covenants and agrees to cause all known business transactions pertaining to the purpose of the Company, to be entered properly and completely into said book. ” (Da2706).  The evidence at trial established, and the trial court found, that [...], as a member in [...], and [...] and [...], who controlled [...] and [...], breached their obligations to [...] under the [...] Operating Agreement by: (a) making withdrawals of capital from the company without prior approval and authorization of a majority of the members; (b) not sharing company profits in a manner consistent with and in proportion to their 50% membership interest in the company; (c) distributing, receiving and/or causing to be distributed and/or received by [...] and [...] more than their share of profits and surplus of [...]; (d) engaging in critical company decision making involving company finances (including removing significant capital from the company) without seeking or obtaining [...]’ authorization; (e) taking actions detrimental to the interests of the company and [...] by diverting funds from the company in a manner detrimental to the interests of the company; and (f) failing to enter transactions pertaining to the company accurately in the company’s financial books and records.
[brief] Finally, in response to [...]’s argument that foreclosure cases can and should be treated differently from takings cases, the City argues that there “is no authority for the proposition that the same law should be afforded pipeline retroactivity in one circumstance, but full retroactivity in another[.]” (Resp. Br. 11, n.7).  This misunderstands the argument.  The rule from Tyler enjoys full retroactive effect in all cases, but it does not dictate an equitable remedy in foreclosure proceedings.  (See Op. Br. 11–13); Cf. Harper, 509 U.S. at 100 (Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury applied retroactively, but government “retains flexibility” in fashioning a remedy for the due process violation at issue).  That is because the mere fact that a foreclosure will result in a taking does not mean that foreclosure must be enjoined.  Knick, 588 U.S. at 201 (equitable relief generally unavailable for takings claims).
[brief] [...], SB MILLTOWN  INDUSTRIAL REALTY HOLDINGS, L.L.C. AND [...]  On the Brief:  [...], Esq. [...], Esq. [...]  Attorneys at Law 237 South Street, P.O. Box 2049  Morristown, NJ 07962-2049  [...]  Attorneys for Appellant  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................ii  ORDERS, JUDGMENTS AND DECISIONS BEING APPEALED ..................iv  PLAINTIFF/APPELLANTS’ APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS ...............iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ......................................................................1
[brief] The trial court – after denying Defendants’ motions – directed the parties to engage in early discovery specifically limited to the issues of whether the claims were “barred by the Entire Controversy Doctrine.” (2T11:12-15;⁴ see also 2T7:20-22 (“[t]he only question that would be in front of the Court would be, what [Plaintiff] knew and when [it] knew it”); 2T14:23-15:3 (“I’ll do an order denying both motions that were filed [] without prejudice.  I’ll put in the order that – that the defendants will get limited discovery of Plaintiff re. the Entire Controversy Doctrine”)).  ---  ³  Citations to the November 10, 2021 Oral Argument are designated with the prefix “1T”.  ⁴  Citations to the November 18, 2021 Case Management Conference are designated with the prefix “2T”.  On January 21, 2022, Plaintiff produced over 1,200 pages of discovery in response to Defendants’ request for production of documents.  (Pa640.)  On April 11, 2022 (and continuing on April 25, 2022), Defendants conducted the deposition of Plaintiff’s principal – [...].  (Pa377; Pa455.)  Despite the substantial evidence provided by Plaintiff (i.e., over 1,200 pages of documents and 2 days of deposition testimony), Defendants did not adduce any evidence whatsoever suggesting that Plaintiff knew of Defendants’ illicit agreement until February 2021, at the earliest.  **[...] Conspicuously and Unceremoniously Withdraws as Redeveloper for Unspecified Reasons**
[directive] Police Carbine Qualification Course (PCQC).  (See Appendix H).  This course must be completed two times a year with no less than three months between each qualification session.  Police Carbine Night Qualification Course (PCNQC).  (See Appendix I).  This course must be completed twice a year with no less than three months between each qualification session.  Scoped Rifle Qualification Course (SRQC).
[brief] To the extent that [...] – by virtue of its addition as a plaintiff post-trial seeks to now recover against Appellant individually for those same loan balances, it is prevented from doing so under the doctrines of collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel, res judicata, and/or election of remedies.  Although a claim for piercing the corporate veil was raised below (which arguably could have allowed [...] to collect the loan balances from Appellant), it was subsequently abandoned.  Furthermore, [...]’s claims for conversion and unjust enrichment against Appellant were dismissed with prejudice in a parallel proceeding.  (Da1078).  And, judicial estoppel precludes [...] from arguing contrary to its position in the AAA arbitrations that those same loan agreements (containing the very clause [...] relied on to compel arbitration) were fraudulent.  Put simply, there are no claims asserted in the action below on which [...] is entitled to recover, and the trial court erred in adding [...] as a plaintiff post-judgment so that it could recover on claims that had already been finally adjudicated in other actions.
[brief] 19  POINT ONE:  19  IN THE TRIAL BRIEF AND HEARING BEFORE [...], APPELLANT FAILED TO RAISE ANY ARGUMENT  RELATING [...] ORDINANCE SECTION 900B AND 902A OR SECTION 906  RELATING TO THE DIRECT APPEAL OF THE [...] TO THE [...], AS SUCH, SAME ARE NOT SUBJECT TO APPEAL AS THEY ARE NOT PART OF THE RECORD BELOW  POINT TWO: 30  THIS APPEAL IS LIMITED TO THE TRIAL COURT DECISION ON THE COMPLAINT IN LIEU OF PREROGATIVE WRITS WHICH IS FOUNDATIONALLY DETERMINED BY WHETHER OR NOT THE [...]  ACTED IN AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER IN RENDERING ITS DECISION TO UPHOLD THE [...] DETERMINATION.  THE COURT DID NOT SUBSTITUTE IT’S JUDGMENT BY MAKING A DETERMINATION ON A ZONING ORDINANCE AS TO A NUMBER OF WALKWAYS OR WHETHER THE NLDO LIMITED THE SIZE AND SHAPE OF CONCRETE UNIT PAVERS, BUT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE [...] AS SAID DECISION WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR UNREASONABLE.  POINT THREE  THE PLAINTIFF BEARS THE BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING THAT THE DECISION OF THE [...] OF ADJUSTMENT WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE AND FAILED TO DO SO AT THE TRIAL LEVEL.  THE STANDARD OF REVIEW AT THE APPELLATE LEVEL IS ONE OF DEFERENCE.  CONCLUSION
[brief] See Ukrainian Nat’l Urban Renewal Corp. v. Joseph L. Muscarelle, Inc., 151 N.J. Super. 386, 396 (App. Div. 1977) (“An arbitrator’s factual determinations concerning the merits of the dispute submitted to him are not reviewable by the court as such. ”).  Furthermore, a court reviewing an arbitrator’s decision may not substitute its own judgment for that of the arbitrator, “regardless of the court’s view of the correctness of the arbitrator’s interpretation. ”  N.J. Transit Bus Ops., 187 N.J. at 554.  [...] wants to re-litigate what it believes “the operative terms of the PTA preclude” and do not preclude.  App. Br. at 15.  But because [...]’s absurdly warped PTA interpretation failed in the Arbitration, which theorized that [...] should be permitted to purchase [...] and be paid $17 million for doing so, [...] decries that the Arbitrator “dispensed his own brand of industrial justice. ”  App. Br. at 11; see also Cnty. Coll. of Morris Staff Ass’n v. Cnty. Coll. of Morris, 100 N.J. 383, 390 (1985) (“to the extent possible, arbitration should spell the conclusion to litigation rather than the beginning of it”).  The Arbitrator found [...]’s position attempting to flout its payment obligations under the PTA to be neither factually nor legally correct—and the Trial Court confirmed, finding that “the Arbitrator considered the issue and the parties’ arguments…and thus, did not exceed his powers.
[brief] On September 24, 2009, Clifton police stopped a Jeep Grand Cherokee on Route 3, being driven by [...].  (14T122-13 to 123-22).  At some point, defendant, who was the front passenger, was asked to exit the vehicle and sit on the curb.  (14T125-9 to 23).  While walking towards the curb, defendant took off on foot across the Route 3 east and westbound lanes.  (14T126-3 to 128-14).  Once defendant reached the woods across Route 3, the officers lost sight of defendant.  (14T128-15 to 16).  Despite a subsequent search, defendant was not apprehended.
[brief] 10, 14  Saunders v Collabella, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143237 (D.N.J. 2021) ..........................................  9, 11  Schultz v Midland Credit Mgmt., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79889 (D.N.J. 2019) ...........................................  9  Skuse v Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30 (2020)  .................................................................
[brief] It’s why engineers are on these boards.  It’s why planners are on these boards.  It’s why these boards all have attorneys who have specialized expertise in land use law and the like.  Could there be something in the records or other documents that could be used and cobbled together and convince the trial judge to try and sneak this theory through?  I don’t know.  But, you know, as I say, without designated expert testimony, you can't advance that claim.  [1T 58-19 to 59-8]
[brief] The instruction was read aloud to all the parties and subsequently accepted by both defense counsels.  There is nothing in this record to indicate or to seriously doubt the juror’s capacity to follow instructions.  See State v. Winter, 96 N.J. 640, 649, (1984) (noting that "[t]he record lends no support to the suggestion that the jurors were unable to comply with the court's instruction"); State v. Catlow, 206 N.J. Super. 186, 193 (App. Div. 1985) (noting that the record revealed "no reason to believe that the jury was unable to follow the court's sharp and complete curative instruction"), certif. denied, 103 N.J. 465, 511 A.2d 648 (1986).
[brief] Whether the party raised the arbitration issue in its pleadings, particularly as an affirmative defense, or provided other notification of its intent to seek arbitration; [...] filed an Answer to [...]’s Complaint on April 3, 2023.  Da010.  [...] makes no reference to arbitration, but for his signature under the “Certification of No Other Actions” wherein he certified as follows:  I certify that this dispute is not the subject of any other action pending in any other court or a pending arbitration proceeding to the best of my knowledge and belief.  Also, to the best of my knowledge and belief, no other action or arbitration proceeding is contemplated…In addition, I recognize my continuing obligation to file and serve on all parties and the court an amended certification if there is a change in the facts stated in this original certification.  DA011.  [...] did, however, asserts eight (8) affirmative defenses and five (5) counterclaims (none of which reference arbitration).  Da013.  [...] also demanded a jury trial in his Answer, which would not be available in an arbitration.  DA011.  Perhaps more importantly, [...] specifically references the Contract in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 13 of the Complaint.  The Complaint even quotes the contract:  11.  **The Contract states:**  “Time is of the essence for the completion of this Agreement.  Subcontractor shall promptly commence the subcontracted work following General Contractor’s order to do so. ”  (emphasis added).  Da002.  [...]’s discovery served upon [...] similarly quotes from the subject Contract and even defines it within the definition section of [...]’s First Set of Requests for Admissions to [...]:  14.  “CONTRACT” refers to the Subcontractor Agreement dated June 8, 2022 which identifies S. Todd [...] as the “General Contractor” and [...] Finish Carpentry, LLC as the “Subcontractor”.  Pa043.  In sum, [...]’s pleadings make no reference to arbitration whatsoever, despite [...] emphasizing and highlighting the Contract in its initial pleading.  (6)
[brief] To deliver additional natural gas to its customers in New York, in 2020 [...] proposed to construct a new natural gas compression station along the 300 Line, identified as “CS 327,” in [...].  (Aa53-54).  [...] proposed to construct CS 327 on a forty-seven acre property that was historically disturbed by gravel quarry operations, then a temporary pipeyard, and most recently a recycling storage facility.  (Aa29; Aa37-39; Aa52; Aa55; Aa64; Aa75; Aa197).  The compressor station, which “act[s] as the ‘engine[]’ that power[s] an interstate natural gas pipeline system as each station compresses the gas to move it through the pipeline[,]” (Aa77), consists of a new electric motor driven compressor unit, auxiliary equipment, and an office building to operate the station (the Project).
[brief] In addition to testimony from other fact and expert witnesses, the trial court entertained about six days of testimony from [...]; four days of testimony from Plaintiffs’ accounting expert, [...]; and about five days of testimony from [...].  (See 14T–29T; 33T).  The defendants moved orally at the close of Plaintiffs’ case for a directed verdict; the Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the counterclaims and third-party complaint at the close of the evidence.  The trial court denied both motions without prejudice.  (24T 6:11 to 7:6; 35T 52:17 to 53:23).  H. [...]’s Reviews the Records and Uncovers Diversions of Funds
[directive] Overcoming the Presumption of Seeking Pretrial Detention.  7.4.6  In any case where there is a rebuttable presumption of seeking pretrial detention pursuant to subsection 7.4.1, 7.4.2, 7.4.3, 7.4.4, or 7.4.5, the prosecutor shall file a motion for pretrial detention unless a supervisory prosecutor designated pursuant to Section 7.8 determines that: (1) the risks posed by defendant’s release can be controlled adequately by imposing release conditions monitored by the pretrial services program, or (2) the interests of justice would not be served by applying for pretrial detention.
[brief] @8:18:35-The Officer is seen reading [...] her rights, and places her in handcuffs.  @8:20:25-The Officer is seen removing the handcuffs from [...] and replacing with a different set, behind her back.  @8:24:00-The Officer is seen now moving the handcuffs on [...] from behind her back to the front.  @8:24:50-The Officer is heard asking [...] if she would give consent to search the Impala.  [...] states it is not her car.  @8:24:56-The Officer is heard telling [...] a tire iron that was used as a weapon is in the car.  HOW COULD THE OFFICER HAVE KNOWN SUCH A THING?