ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On December 4, 2023, Plaintiff submitted another Notice of Motion in this matter seeking to “establish the liability of the [...] via a breach of Statute Negligence Claim occurring on April 18, 2005. ”  [AB12a - AB16a].  On December 12, 2023, the current Bergen County assignment judge, the Hon. [...], entered an order *sua sponte* dismissing Plaintiff’s December 4, 2023 Notice of Motion as frivolous pursuant to the March 9, 2012 injunctive order and pursuant to Rules 4:6-4 and 4:5-2 for “non-compliance and failure to set forth a statement of facts on which the claim is based or that would place Defendant on notice of a justiciable claim so that a responsive pleading could be framed.
[brief] On June 25, 2025, [...] issued a decision where defendant’s motion to suppress was granted in part.  (2T:11-1 to 11-7).  The trial court suppressed defendant’s statements made during his formal interview by [...] because as she failed to ask for clarity when defendant stated “no, I’m not going to do it,” while she was reading his Miranda rights.  (2T:19-22 to 20-4; 51-1 to 51-11).  At some point during his formal statement, defendant indicated that he wanted to speak with his mother as well as his attorney and [...] concluded the interview.  (2T:21-3 to 21-8).  [...] found that the request to speak with his mother and to speak with his attorney are inextricably intertwined.  (2T:39-1 to 39-5).  Regarding defendant’s interactions with [...], the trial court found that up to the point where [...] approached defendant about calling defendant’s mother, his interactions with defendant were truthful and honest.  (2T:42-7 to 42-20).  Additionally, the court found that [...]’s testimony was credible.  Ibid.  He did not initiate any substantive questioning as to what happened that the scene.  Ibid.  However, the Court stated that [...] advised defendant that he could not use a landline to speak with his parents because the landlines at the Prosecutor’s Office are recorded.  (2T:25-3 to 25-6);(2T:44-3 to 44-7);(2T:58-16 to 58-25).  Additionally, once defendant’s mother was called and heard on the line, defendant made incriminating statements and asked his mother to contact an attorney.  The court opined that it was not until defendant made a number of incriminating statements that [...] identified himself and advised that everything was being recorded.  (2T:25-21 to 26-17).  [...] also stated that at no point during defendant’s interaction with his parents he was advised of his Miranda rights.  --- 3 *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
[brief] ”  2T5:14-24.  The Township Defendants also appear to entirely ignore what took place during oral argument wherein the Board’s Counsel even admitted that “what happened was the Board made a decision that it would adopt the resolution that was drafted . . . but wanted a condition for an elevator in building E.”  1T47:18-25 (emphasis added).  In other words, the Board intentionally approved the Original Resolution confirming that there was to be no elevator in Building “E,” but still “wanted a condition for an elevator in Building “E.
[brief] V.  Even if the Court was to determine that N.J.S.A. 48:12-152b(5) is the appropriate controlling law, the Court improperly granted summary judgment as there are genuine issues of material fact related to the intended use of railroad property and posted regulations.  Pa4.  The instant appeal is from a Superior Court, Law Division order that granted summary judgment based on N.J.S.A. 48:12-152.
[brief] Pa482.  [...] represents itself as a provider of “general contracting and an industry leading, self-performed, specialty construction contracting services. ”  Pa395.  Pursuant to a Request for Expressions of Interest and responses, Pa 1787, [...] hired [...], to provide “professional services” in connection with the resurfacing project.  Pa2674; Pa2280.  [...] then entered into an agreement with [...], described as a “subconsultant,” to “perform certain Services for [[...]] for which [[...]] agreed to perform. ”  Pa2674; Pa1778.  The agreement further describes the services to be performed by [...] as “Construction Inspection Services as declared in Exhibit-B,” but no Exhibit-B has been provided.  Pa1779.  [...], as the general contractor, was required to comply with all the applicable provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., including all OSHA regulations, Safety and Health Regulations for Construction, ANSI, [...] Health and Safety Plan (HASP), the New Jersey Turnpike Health and Safety Plan, industry standards and best safety practices.
[brief] However, the Court found that “the record demonstrates that the condition of the parking lot was not such that any finder of fact could conclude a dangerous condition existed within the lot”.  (Pa9)  This finding is in direct contradiction with the discovery produced by Appellant, and the testimony of [...] who is an employee of [...].  Therefore, since the Complaint alleges a dangerous condition, the Appellant provided marked images of the alleged condition and the Court did state there were “cracks and crevices”, this was enough to create a factual issue to meet the Brill standard and survive a motion for summary judgment as there was a genuine issue of material fact in this matter for which a jury should make a determination.
[brief] In the VC-2 Overlay Zone, pursuant to Ordinance Section 108-6.18(K)(10)(d) requires on-street parking along the “downtown" commercial section of the treed boulevard.  The Applicant proposes no on-street parking.  The Applicant submits that the lack of parking on the relatively short boulevard entrance is probably safer.  There is a lot of activity with cars entering that boulevard from Route 33, cars leaving the designated parking areas on either side of the boulevard, and then if there are cars parked on the boulevard there would be a lot of potential conflicts and potential for cars backing out to Route 33.  So this is a better zoning alternative.  The Board rejects these reasons and finds that the parking is need as the Applicant failed to justify, and withdrew its shared parking analysis.  The Board rejects the idea of cars backing out onto Route 33 as the ordinances do not require, and the Board did not require, and would not require or permit cars to be parked that close to Route 33 so that there would be a possibility of this occurring.  5.
[brief] 5, 10, 33 N.J.S.A. 2A:35A-1 .................................................................................................................. 20 N.J.S.A. 58:10 ......................................................................................................................  19, 20, 35 N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11 ...........................................................................................................  17  Regulations N.J.A.C. 7:1J-1.4 .................................................................................................................. 20 N.J.A.C. 7:26C-6.2 ................................................................................................................  18  N.J.A.C. 7:26E .......................................................................................................................  17  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The Bulletin does not impair any right to contract, retroactively or otherwise.  [...] contends that the Bulletin impairs the subscribers’ contractual agreement with the attorney-in-fact as set forth in the POA – specifically, the provision governing the AIF fees.  That contention is inaccurate for two reasons.  First, although the subscribers are parties to the POA, they are not making any payments; payments under Section 8 of the POA are made by [...].  Second, Section 8 of the POA provides, “Subscriber authorizes payment of an amount not exceeding 12.5% of total annual gross written premiums as compensation to [...] to be the Attorney-in-Fact for the subscribers of the Exchange . . ..” (Ra13 (emphasis added)).  The Bulletin does not impair the provision authorizing payment of “an amount not exceeding 12.5%” to [...].  [...] correctly noted that in determining whether an unconstitutional impairment of contract has occurred, the courts must answer the following three inquiries: “(1) whether a contractual right exists in the first instance; (2) whether a change in the law impairs that right; and (3) whether the defined impairment is substantial. ”  Berg v. Christie, 225 N.J. 245, 259 (2016).  However, [...]’s flawed analysis leads it to the wrong conclusion because applying SSAP No. 25 to the payments made to an AIF by [...] does not impair any contract.  SSAP No. 25, ¶¶ 20 and 21, require that transactions between related parties, such as an attorney-in-fact and any party with whom it contracts, be conducted at arm’s length and be fair and reasonable.  It is not consistent with [...]’s apparent position that the attorney-in-fact is automatically entitled to take 12.5% of annual premiums without documenting the appropriateness of that amount.  To the contrary, the language “not exceeding 12.5%” is consistent with that standard.  Application of SSAP No. 25 to the attorney-in-fact does not impair any contract; it actually enforces the language of the POA.  Therefore, the Department is not “trying to usurp the free will of [...] and the individual subscribers. ”  (Ab51), SSAP No. 25 merely creates additional safeguards for related-party transactions while still giving effect to the subscribers’ intent that [...] receive up to, but not necessarily exactly, 12.5% of the premiums collected by [...].  In fact, although the subscribers sign the POA, [...], not the subscribers, pays the 12.5% to the attorney-in-fact.  The language “an amount not exceeding 12.5%” does not entitle [...] to the entire 12.5% of premiums paid by subscribers to [...].  [...] contends that by reminding reciprocal exchanges and attorneys-in-fact that SSAP No. 25 requires that transactions involving services between related parties must be on an arm’s- length basis and meet fair-and-reasonable standards, the Bulletin impairs the contract, but in fact it reinforces it by noting that the payment is not automatically 12.5%, and instead is an amount not to exceed 12.5%.  Therefore, there is no impairment of contract.  CONCLUSION
[brief] (Pa329 Dep. Tr. p. 14).  As he opened the door, he noticed it was a bit cold and that a “very light” rain “if any” was falling.  (Pa328 Dep. Tr. p. 13; Pa332 Dep. Tr. p. 28; Pa343 Dep. Tr. p. 73; Pa351; Pa387; Pa507-508).  [...] was not carrying anything in his hands at the time of the accident.  (Pa328 Dep. Tr. p. 13).  As he exited and placed his left foot down on the landing, he slipped.  (Pa328 Dep. Tr. p. 13; Pa329 Dep. Tr. p. 16; Pa339 Dep. Tr. p. 56; Pa341 Dep. Tr. p. 65).  [...] did not even make it far enough along the stairs to reach the handrails to steady himself.  (Pa328 Dep. Tr. p. 13; Pa329 Dep. Tr. pp. 16-17).  [...] also concluded in his report that “the locations of the handrails were too far from the walkway pathway to allow Mr. [...] the ability to utilize them to stabilize himself or to help him regain his balance after slipping on the icy surface” and that “[r]ailing[s] should be closer to the pedestrian walking pathway. ” (Pa354; Pa355).  [...] remembers that upon his slip and fall he was bounding or sliding down the stairs on his backside and landed on the sidewalk.  (Pa329 Dep. Tr. p. 17; Pa330 Dep. Tr. p. 18; Pa331 Dep. Tr. p. 24; Pa342 Dep. Tr. p. 66).  Due to his slip and fall down the concrete stairs upon exiting the building and stepping onto the exterior landing, [...] suffered serious injuries to his left leg.  (Pa315; Pa332 Dep. Tr. p. 29; Pa334 Dep. Tr. pp. 35, 37; Pa335 Dep. Tr. p. 38; Pa344 Dep. Tr. p. 74).  With their motions for summary judgment, the Defendants produced the expert report of [...] (Pa414-426).  [...] is of the opinion that [...] slipped upon stepping on the concrete landing solely because of the ongoing freezing rain at 7:30 a.m. on January 5, 2022 and the resulting icy condition of the landing.  (Pa414-426).  [...] states that current building standards regarding tread and riser heights and COFs are irrelevant regarding a building constructed in 1890, prior to Jersey City’s first building code.
[brief] He pulled up beside her and asked her who did she think she was to kick his car, and the two began screaming at each other.  (5T113:18-21).  After a few seconds, [...] began to approach [...]’s truck again, which was now parked.  (5T114:15- [...] believed she was going to try to kick his truck again, and he made the poor decision to grab the starter pistol out of his center console in order to deter her from coming any closer.  (5T114:16-115:8).  He did not point it at her, but he did grab it out of the console.  (5T115:1-5).  [...] acknowledged that when he did this, [...] fled behind the pile of cardboard boxes.  (5T115:13-16).  While acknowledging that what he did was wrong, [...] adamantly denied that he ever tried to kidnap or force [...] into his vehicle that evening.  He reiterated that he never said, “Get the f*** into my car,” he said, “Get the f*** away from my car”.  (5T116:16-24).  It is crucial to note that it is undisputed that [...] was wearing a Covid-19 face mask at the time of this interaction.  [...] further explained that the State’s narrative did not make sense.  He was expecting to meet [...] at his house that evening and would have no reason to ask another woman to get into his car.  (5T116:7-8).  [...] also testified about his relationship with [...] that came to an end due to her drug use.
[brief] It is because [...] and [...] are asserting consistent defenses and liability, if any, would be joint/overlapping, that the [...] can represent all [...].  See 47 N.J. Practice, Civil Trial Handbook § 3:1.³  In other words, [...] inadvertently disproved its own position that a per ³ Implicit, or perhaps explicit, in [...]’s argument is that merely because the CNA applies to the cause of action the plaintiff asserts against multiple defendants, the defendants are obliged to point the finger of fault at one se conflict of interest exists among the defendants by virtue of the CNA’s applicability to an IFPA claim.
[brief] The Township and Mayor took no legislative or other action to create any policy that affected Plaintiffs alleged constitutional rights.  Indeed, it was specifically noted by the trial court that “the irony here is that, but for this singular transgression…[...] pro-actively had come into voluntary compliance with its Mt. Laurel obligations…and by all accounts, is diligently implementing them. ”  M51-52.  There is certainly no history, official policy, or custom demonstrating that the Township or Mayor would not comply with its Mount Laurel obligations.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...], Esq.  Dated: October 17, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  [...]; ON APPEAL FROM [...], individually and as per quod claimant and as guardian ad litem for minor plaintiffs, [...] AND [...]  Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. [...]; Docket No. SOM-L- [...]; [...]; 001019-23  [...]; [...]; and JOHN DOES 1-10 (fictitious designations), Defendants/Respondents  Honorable [...], J.S.C.
[brief] N.J.A.C. § 6A:9B-3.2.  This power flows from the Legislature’s general grant of authority to the State Board “to supervise and control public education in New Jersey,” Parsippany-Troy Hills Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of Parsippany-Troy Hills Twp., 188 N.J. Super. 161, 165 (App. Div. 1983), and the specific grant of authority to regulate teaching certificates.  See N.J.S.A. § 18A:6-38.
[brief] Finally, the Chiropractors’ attempt to distinguish the Supreme Court’s decision in *Allstate New Jersey Insurance. Co. v. Lajara*, 222 N.J. 129 (2015), is unavailing.  The Chiropractors maintain that *Lajara* does not require a jury trial on Plaintiffs’ claims that they suffered damages due to fraud in the procurement of PIP benefits because: (1) this is a “PIP action” or “PIP matter[]” to which the jury-trial right does not apply, (2) no party in *Lajara* argued that the claims were subject to arbitration under AICRA, and (3) there was no argument that the insurers waived the right to arbitrate by contract in Lajara.  See CHb4-5.  The Chiropractors’ argument that Plaintiffs’ claims for fraud damages are statutory PIP disputes not covered by the constitutional right to a jury trial is foreclosed under Lajara.  The claims in Lajara are indistinguishable from those here.  There, as here, “[t]he complaint allege[d] that defendants engaged in a ‘broad, multi-faceted scheme to defraud’ plaintiffs of [millions of dollars] in personal injury protection benefits,” and the plaintiff insurers sought compensatory and punitive damages as remedies.
[brief] On September 22, 2022, the Zoning Board approved the application and on November 28, 2022, the Zoning Board Adopted a Resolution of Approval.  PA 098  The Appellants filed a motion to remand the matter to re-do the re-do hearing and expand the record, which was denied by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on October 18, 2022.  PA 849.  This brief is in response to these issues on appeal.
[brief] (Da52-Da59).  Defendant argued that these convictions supported defendant’s theory that the victims were killed by not defendant, but [...], who was arrested on C.D.S. charges in the same general neighborhood where the victims were shot.  (Da52-Da59).  The trial court found that defendant’s request was beyond the scope of judicial notice under N.J.R.E. 201(b)(4), first finding that it would be improper to take judicial notice of a judgment of conviction “simply because they have been filed with a court” and that admission of this evidence would inappropriately “circumvent the rule against hearsay. ”  (Da55).  The trial court also found that defendant was seeking relief on “pure speculation” because he failed to present evidence that either [...] or [...] sold drugs, that the two were drug rivals, that [...] killed [...] because they were drug rivals, or even that [...] was the person that defendant identified as “[...]. ” (Da52-Da59).
[directive] How long can COVID-19 flags remain in CAD systems?  The single POC for your CAD is responsible for securely and completely deleting flags in the CAD system when notified that a flag should be removed, such as when a person is cleared from isolation or moves to a new address (see FAQ above).  In all cases, the single POC is responsible for securely and completely deleting all lists and all COVID-19 flags in their CAD system when the Governor declares the public health emergency has ended (which was declared in Governor’s Executive Order 103).  Q:
[brief] Further, the obligation to correct the Agreement is ripe in light of the [...]’s determination as to offensive terms at (Da24-Da25).  d.  [...] had filed a complaint against the Employer for adverse employment actions in violation of the New Jersey Law against Discrimination, the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, and the New Jersey Family Leave Act.  In the present case, no such lawsuits were filed pre-contract by the parties.  e.  [...] accepted settlement funds and his claims had been dismissed with prejudice.  As such, revising a key material provision in [...]’s agreement would send the parties back to the drawing board.  In the present case, there was not a monetary settlement to resolve any lawsuit.
[brief] Lind v. Schmid, 67 N.J. 255, 262 (1975); Muller Fuel Oil Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 95 N. J. Super. 564, (1967).  Malice is defined as reckless disregard of the law or of a person’s legal rights.  Black’s Law Dictionary p. 776 (2000 Ed).  A Malicious Act is an act without just cause or excuse.
[brief] (2T57; 6T98 to 101)  Defense counsel also presented a series of clips from the dash cam video in order to focus on specific portions of the incident.  (2T133 to 163).  Cross examination in conjunction with the dash cam video revealed numerous inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s version of events.  For example, Plaintiff claimed that he was calm, not angry, when he stopped Defendant and when he told Defendant to get back in his car.  The dash cam video showed him shouting and swearing at Defendant.  (2T138)  Plaintiff claimed in answers to interrogatories that it was Defendant who initiated physical contact.  The dash cam video showed that in fact it was Plaintiff who initiated physical contact, first pushing Defendant toward his car, then grabbing him and throwing him to the ground.  (2T147-2 to 15; 2T149-3 to 150-3)  Plaintiff claimed that he struck his head, either on the ground or on the back of Defendant’s head (2T71-3 to 17; 2T159-162-19), but the dash cam video does not show him hitting his head at all.  (2T160-3 to 162-2)  Plaintiff denied that – but he did admit that the video does not show him hitting his head on the pavement which is what he told [...].  (2T162-11 to 13; 2T161-8 to 19)(5T12).
[brief] The Appellant’s analysis of these cases is short on facts, self-serving, and misleading.  Analysis of those cases follows: A. Cardinale v. Bd. of Trustees, 458 N.J. Super. 260, 266, 204 A.3d 312, 316 (App. Div. 2019)  The Appellant gives the Cardinale decision short attention and leaves out details that distinguish the case from the case sub judice (Db21-Db22).  Initially, Cardinale was declared ineligible because the [...] was of the opinion that, in “[T]he Board may properly decline to process an application on the grounds that the cessation of employment arose solely out of disciplinary charges.
[brief] [...] testified about the steps that he took to obtain the surveillance video from the employees of [...].  (5T:38-18 to 54-20); (Da 16)  [...] stated that he did not recall the name of the employee who granted him access to the surveillance video, and that when he asked the employee if he was present at the time of the incident, the employee told him that “he didn’t want to be involved and that he didn’t know anything. ”  (5T:60-1 to 23)  It was undisputed at trial that at least one individual was present behind the counter at [...] for the entire duration of the incident.  (See 6T:45-7 to 12)
[directive] f.  Si enfraksyon an fèt le 5 janvye 1994 oswa aprè epi yap kondane w a libète kondisyonèl, [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No] wap oblije peye yon frè de jiska $25 pa mwa pandan tout tèm libète kondisyonèl la?  If the offense occurred on or after January 5, 1994 and you are being sentenced to probation, you must pay a fee of up to $25 per month for the term of probation?  g.
[brief] “Expert testimony is needed where the factfinder would not be expected to have sufficient knowledge or experience and would have to speculate without the aid of expert testimony. ”  *Torres v. Schripps, Inc.*, 342 N.J. Super. 419, 430 (App. Div. 2001).  “[E]xpert testimony will not be admissible unless it assists the average juror to understand the evidence.  Thus, such testimony should not be permitted unless it relates to a subject matter which is so distinctively related to some science, profession, business or occupation as to be ‘beyond the ken of the average laymen. ’”  *Boland v. Dolan*, 140 N.J. 174, 188 (1995).  Applying these standards, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment finding that Plaintiffs could not make a prima facie case of negligence without the aid of expert testimony.
[brief] H60a Order ................................................................. H93a Appendix list of Exhibits and Witnesses ......................... H95a Case Information Statement filed by [...], January 30, 2023 ........................................... H100a [...]’s Cover and Table of Contents to the Exceptions Brief filed July 5, 2022, showing issues raised before the BPU in [...] (excerpt from SOICR #86) .... H104a New Jersey’s Global Warming Response Act: 80x50 Report: Evaluating Our Progress And Identifying Pathways to Reduce Emissions By 80% By 2050, issued June 10, 2020 by the DEP on October 15, 2020, discussed in [...]’s Post-Hearing Brief to the OAL (SOICR #74) in [...] and in [...]’s Exceptions Brief to the BPU in [...] (SOICR #86), excerpts of “80x50 Report” pages.