[brief] I APPELLANT DID NOT RAISE TO THE TRIAL COURT ANY ARGUMENT UNDER THE COMMON LAW PROHIBITION AGAINST PROVIDING RIGHTS IN FAVOR OF THIRD-PARTIES IN A DEED AND CANNOT DO SO FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.  It is well-settled that the appellate courts in this State decline to consider questions or issues raised for the first time on appeal.  *Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co.*, 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973).  Only where the newly advanced argument: (i) substantially implicates a public interest; (ii) addresses jurisdictional concerns; or (iii) raises an issue of plain error, may an issue be raised for the first time on appeal.  *Id.* (quoting *Reynolds Offset Co., Inc. v. Summer*, 58 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 1959), certif., den. 31 N.J. 554 (1960)); see also N.J. Ct. Rule 2:10-2; *Bonefish Capital, LLC v. Autoshred, LLC*, 2024 WL 446264 at *2 (Feb. 6, 2024).  As set forth herein, Appellants are improperly raising for the first time their argument that the court below erred by not applying the archaic, common-law, prohibition against creating rights in third-parties through deed conveyances.  That argument was neither raised below by the Appellants nor does it meet the exceptions articulated in *Nieder*.  Appellants’ asserted no such defense in their pleading (Da94; Da117).  Similarly, Appellants never raised the argument in their summary judgment motion (Da821).  The trial court opinion contains separate and lengthy recitations (by party) of all the legal arguments advanced below (Da813 (Respondents’ arguments); Da821 (Appellants’ arguments); Da823 ([...]’ arguments)).  Nowhere is the stranger-to-the-deed argument even mentioned.  Appellants’ brief on appeal concedes that the issue was not addressed before the trial court (Db13).  The arguments advanced by the Appellants below, both in writing and orally, were limited to: (i) Respondent’s chain of title did not contain any grant of an easement to access Appellants’ land;² (ii) res judicata; (iii) collateral estoppel; and (iv) entire controversy doctrine (Da821).  In addition to failing to brief the stranger-to-the-deed rule below, Appellants never raised the argument during oral argument either, choosing instead to double down on their procedural arguments (T15:10-17:2; 19:3-22:21; 26:22-28:5; 28:25-29:17; 30:12-31:20; 34:16-35:2; --- ²Respondent concedes that it cited to and relied upon this Court’s decision in Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 210 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 1986) [hereinafter Wildwood Crest] in its brief opposing this aspect of Point I of Appellants’ cross-motion for summary judgment.  As addressed in Point II, infra, Wildwood Crest is directly on point and holds, in part, that the preferred approach to deed construction is the modern one espoused by the Restatement (3rd) of Property where the intent of the grantor is ascertained and enforced – not the archaic, common law, approach applicable in times when livery of seisin was the method of transferring land titles.  See Wildwood Crest, 210 N.J. Super. at 144; see also Howard H. Harris, Reservations in Favor of Strangers to the Title, 6 Okla. L. Rev. 127 (1953).  The Court should decline Appellants’ invitation to depart from Nieder and refuse to address this new argument on appeal.