ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] D.  The Two Prior DEP HADs that [...] Cites in Its HAD Request as Precedents Were not “Routine Upgrades” and Have not been Upheld by New Jersey Courts.  (Aa0001)  In its HAD Request, [...] states that “Tennessee [Gas] received Exemption #11 in connection with its 300 Line Project in 2010 and its Northeast Upgrade Project (‘NEUP’) in 2012, so there is a precedent for an exemption to be granted for this Project [i.e. the East 300 Upgrade Project].”  Aa0078 (emphasis added).  The portion of the 300 Line Project within the Highlands Preservation Area was 10.94 miles of the proposed 17.26 miles of pipeline loop in New Jersey (i.e. known as “the 325 Loop Segment”).  Aa0225.  And DEP did indeed find that “installation of a 30-inch underground natural gas pipeline along the existing 24-inch underground natural gas pipeline which ties in at both ends to the conditioned upon FERC's issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing the project. ”.  Aa0228.  (emphasis added).  existing 24-inch pipeline for the express purpose of increasing the transmission capacity of the existing 24-inch pipeline qualifies as an upgrade to a public utility line or system. ”  Aa0228.  (emphasis added).  But this DEP decision regarding the 300 Line Project preceded the 2013 case of Highlands Applicability and should be analyzed under the proper statutory construction of “routine upgrade” – not simply “upgrade.
[brief] A.  The parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability by incorporating the AAA rules into the arbitration clause of the Hackensack Subcontract  [...] and [...] explicitly incorporated of the AAA’s Construction Rules into their agreement to arbitrate disputes arising under the Hackensack Subcontract, and, consequently, agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.  For cases that involve a version of the AAA rules that include the subject jurisdictional rule, “the incorporation of the AAA rules into the arbitration provision clearly and unambiguously expresse[s] the parties’ intent to empower the arbitrator to determine arbitrability. ”  Schmidt v. Laub as trustee for Carol L. Glatstian Living Tr., No. A-0620-19T1, 2020 WL 2130931, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 5, 2020) [Da546-551].  As is the case here, the applicable rules of the AAA at issue in Schmidt granted to the arbitrator the power to rule on the scope of his own jurisdiction.  In declining to resolve an issue with respect to the arbitrator’s powers, the Court in Schmidt found that the parties’ agreement to submit disputes to AAA arbitration “constitute[d] clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability. ”  Id. (quoting Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. A.G., 724 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013)); see Dillon v. Typaldos, No. SOM-C-12102-04, 2006 WL 1381625, at *12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. May 19, 2006) [Da552-563] (holding that “the parties expressly agreed for an arbitrator to determine issues of arbitrability by incorporating the rules of the American Arbitration Association,” and “[t]he Circuit Courts that have addressed the issue have agreed that where arbitration agreements incorporate the AAA rules, the parties have expressly agreed to allow the arbitrator to decide arbitrability”); In re EnCap Golf Holdings, LLC, No. CIV.A.08-5178DMC, 2009 WL 2488266, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2009) [Da564-567] (holding that the parties’ contract’s incorporation of the AAA Construction Rules “constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence” that “the arbitrator shall have the authority to determine jurisdiction”).
[brief] The Respondent’s Verified Complaint sought to approve the IA of the Trust for the period January 4, 2019 – March 31, 2022.  Paragraph 10.6 of the Will which created the Trust, “Corporate or Other Professional Co-Trustees Accounting”, states that no one other than [...], the child co-trustee of the Trust, may challenge the IA or the Respondent’s fees and expenses.  That provision states in pertinent part:  The… professional co-trustee may … file an account of its administration with a court of competent jurisdiction.  Any professional Co-Trustee shall provide prior notice for such review as well as acceptance … by my respective child Co-Trustee ….  All of the Co-Trustee’s fees and expenses (including reasonable attorney’s fees) attributable to any such accounting and approval shall be submitted for review, as well as acceptance … by my respective child Co-Trustee….  48a.
[brief] (Pa112).  That Calendar did not include S49/A6260, which had not yet been introduced.  Ibid.  The Legislative Digest, posted on January 7, 2022, reported that at the Senate session on January 6, 2022, S49 was introduced and referred to the Health, Human Services and Senior Citizens Committee, after which it was reported out of committee without amendment and received a second reading in the Senate.\(^6\) (Pa70-71).
[brief] The Plaintiff, who held a mortgage encumbering the subject property, filed a motion to set vacate the judgment, claiming it did not receive notice of the foreclosure.  On August 25, 1982, the Defendant, [...] (herein “[...]”) acquired the property by a tax sale foreclosure intending to develop into low income rental units.  The plaintiff, a year after the conveyance to [...], who had demolished and commenced renovation commenced the mortgage foreclosure action.  In denying the motion to set aside the tax foreclosure judgment, the trial court ruled that “setting aside the foreclosure judgment would place an inequitable and disproportionate hardship on defendant, [...] for [...]’s failure to move against the foreclosure judgment in a timelier fashion or “within a reasonable time.
[directive] O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  Actor directly or indirectly offers, confers or agrees to confer upon another, or solicits, accepts or agrees to accept from another:  a.  Any benefit as consideration for a decision, opinion, recommendation, vote or exercise 2nd Degree $50,000 to $100,000 10% permissible of discretion of a public servant, party official or voter on any public issue or in any public election; or 2C:27-2(a-d)  Bribery in Official and Political Matters  b.  Any benefit as consideration for a decision, vote, recommendation or exercise of official discretion in a judicial or administrative proceeding; or c.  Any benefit as consideration for a violation of an official duty of a public servant or party official; or 3rd Degree $10,000 to $35,000 10% permissible d.  Any benefit as consideration for the performance of official duties; second degree.  If benefit has value of $200 or less, then third degree.  Grading of Sections a, b and c – crime of the second degree unless the benefit is of a value of $200 or less – then third degree.  53  Updated December 2, 2013  Bail Schedule 2  STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants
[brief] For these reasons, the June 7, 2023, and October 11, 2023, Final Administrative Actions of the Respondent [...] should be reversed, and this Court should order the promotional appointment of Appellant to Sheriff's Officer Lieutenant with backpay, retroactive seniority and attorney fees pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:5-2.2(c).  Respectfully submitted, LAW  OFFICES OF DANIEL J. ZIRRITH, LLC  Attorneys for Appellant, [...]
[brief] The jury, having heard plaintiff’s experts’ opinions regarding the purported regulatory noncompliance, as well as the fact that the [...] found no such violation,  The provisions of this part contain the requirements that an institution must meet in order to qualify to participate as a [skilled nursing facility] in the Medicare program, and as a nursing facility in the Medicaid program.  They serve as the basis for survey activities for the purpose of determining whether a facility meets the requirements for participation in Medicare and Medicaid.  did in fact hold that [...] was negligent.
[brief] To the contrary, the documents cited by Plaintiffs show that, while [...] and [...] may approve a general course developed and proposed by others, they depend on others—including many of the custodians in this case—to put [...]’s internal policies into practice.  The information held by those custodians is more than sufficient to illuminate the consistency between [...]’s external representations and internal practices, even if such consistency were relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims (which it is not).  Plaintiffs fail to show that [...]’s and [...]’s files constitute the only, or even the best, sources of evidence of the [...] conduct and policies that are at issue in this case.  B.
[directive] for applying by served be the without whether, consider shall officer supervisory or general, attorney deputy prosecutor, juvenile defendant's of importance a potential the recognize expressly Rules Court recently-amended  The 20 a that presumption a overcome to deciding from judge a prohibits 3:3-1(g)  Specifically, Rule history.  criminal juvenile defendant a as the ten years preceding within the "whether considering without issued be complaint-warrant would adult an by committed if that a crime or firearm, a involving crime a escape, for delinquent adjudicated was offenses."
[brief] In addressing the private right of action under the NJCFLA, the District Court in Veras v. [...], No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176, at *24 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) reasoned that in order to determine whether the NJCFLA implies a private right of action, “the Court must consider . . . whether there is any evidence that the Legislature intended to create a private cause of action under the statute and whether implication of a private cause of action in this case would be consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme. ”  Id. (quoting In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation, 108 N.J. 35, 41 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Indeed, “the primary goal in determining whether a statute implies a right of action has almost invariably been a search for the underlying legislative intent. ”  Veras, No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176, at *24 (quoting R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 255, 272-73 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  With respect to the legislature’s intent in enacting the NJCFLA, the NJCFLA’s intended mechanisms of enforcement, and the history of the same, the Court must consider the NJCFLA’s predecessors for context.  The present-day iteration of the NJCFLA originated as the New Jersey Small Loan Law (“NJSLL”) in 1914.  See Family Fin. Corp. v. Gough, 10 N.J. Super. 13, 19 (App. Div. 1950).2  The NJSLL was superseded by the New Jersey Consumer Loan Act (“NJCLA”), which was subsumed by the New Jersey Licensed Lenders Act (“NJLLA”), N.J.S.A. 17:C-1 to -49., in 1997.3  The NJLLA was superseded by the New Jersey Residential Mortgage Lending Act (“NJRMLA”), N.J.S.A. 17:11C-51 to -89, and the NJCFLA in July of 2010.
[brief] ”  Da215-217.  The message is prepared by the City and then entered into the [...] system, along with a selection of what type of message it is (i.e. public safety alert).  Id.  [...] then generates the message and sends it out to those individuals who have signed up for that specific type of alert in that zip code.  Id.  The City does not maintain a list of individuals and/or the e-mail addresses of those individuals who have signed up for [...] alerts.  Residents sign up for [...] alerts through [...]’s website or through a link powered by [...] on the City’s website.
[brief] 1.  Section 1:7-1 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:  1:7-1.  If, at any time within one year after any law or joint resolution has been filed with the Secretary of State pursuant to sections 1:2-5, 1:2-6 or 1:2-7 of this Title, the Governor, or person administering the government, has reason to believe that any such law or joint resolution was not duly passed by both houses of Legislature, or approved by the Governor or otherwise made effective as law in the manner required by the Constitution, he may direct the Attorney-General to present a petition to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, setting forth the facts and circumstances and praying that the law or joint resolution may be adjudged to be null and void, whereupon the Attorney-General shall prepare, sign, present and prosecute the petition.
[brief] And then the ABC test.  There was no indication that this isn’t even a person who could not say the ABCs.  It was terrible.  It wasn’t even not good.  It was terrible.  And there’s no other explanation, other than impairment, that could possibly, in conjunction with being – smelling alcohol, not being able to do the psychophysical tests, but now can’t even do the ABC test.  What more could you possibly need other than an admission…but what more could you possibly ask from the State to present this Court to find that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol, other than an admission.
[brief] POINT I:  [...]'S OBSERVATION BEFORE THE JURY ENTERED THE COURTROOM OF SHERIFF'S OFFICERS  ESCORTING DEFENDANT AND [...] INTO THE COURTROOM IN RESTRAINTS  FOLLOWED SHORTLY ONCE HER TESTIMONY COMMENCED BY HER IDENTIFICATION OF THEM AS HER ASSAILANTS, COUPLED WITH [...]'S COUNSEL'S DECLARED INTENTION TO CROSS–EXAMINE [...] ON THE IMPACT OF HER OBSERVATION ON HER IDENTIFICATION, REQUIRED THE COURT TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S APPLICATION FOR A MISTRIAL.
[brief] As to [...], whose prior statement was offered to establish that a phone call between her and Defendant occurred, despite her inconsistent testimony at trial, the same is true of the lack of corroboration.  Cell phone records from either party could have proven that the prior statement bore some indication of reliability such that it was appropriate for the jury to consider the evidence.  Once again, the State did not produce this corroborating evidence and the testimony of [...] at the 104 hearing refuted the claim of the State that her prior statement was reliable due to her extensive memory-related issues and her mental health condition at the time she gave it.  According to [...], her statement given on March 29, 2016 she was undergoing trauma-related mental issues and required inpatient hospitalization as a result of her daughter’s suicide attempt.  As a result, [...] repeatedly indicated that a review of her prior statement felt like “reading a book”, not reviewing statements that she, herself, made.  The most compelling factor with regard to [...], therefore, was her mental state at the time that she rendered the hearsay statement.
[brief] Foreseeability has a more nuanced meaning under FELA law than a normal state law-based tort.  While reasonable foreseeability is an essential ingredient of a FELA claim, the fact that the foreseeable danger was from intentional or reckless or even criminal misconduct is irrelevant, the railroad has a duty to make reasonable provisions against it.  *Harrison v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.*, 372 U.S. 248 (1963).
[brief] Defendant was sentenced to parole supervision for life in 2010 for first degree aggravated sexual assault.  During sentencing for the present charge, Defendant’s trial counsel told the sentencing judge that he could add certain conditions to Defendant’s parole:  “And if your Honor is inclined, [...] is willing to submit to anger management counseling, which can be added as a condition of his parole supervision for life. ” (4T:8-20 to 23).  The sentencing court did not lack jurisdiction to impose conditions onto defendant’s parole.
[brief] Massaro v. UBS, Inc., No. A-0019-10T2, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2880, at *11-12 (App. Div. May 31, 2012) (citing Maidenbaum v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1254, 1267 n.24 (D.N.J. 1994), aff'd, 67 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1995)), certif. denied, 212 N.J. 463 (2012).  This presumption in favor of the employer “is particularly strong when, as here, the same people who hired the protected employee are the same people involved in [the] termination and are also within the protected class themselves. ”  Id.  Defendants [...] and [...] are the same decisionmakers who interviewed and hired Plaintiff.  (Pl. Tr. 115:21 to 116:24; Da98-100).  [...] is also older than Plaintiff.  (Pl. Tr. 132:7-9).  The fact that [...] made the decision to hire Plaintiff when she was 56 years old, which is only three years younger than she was when he recommended to [...] that her contract not be renewed “counters against an inference of age discrimination,” and it is “illogical” to suggest age was the reason for the termination.  Young v. Hobart W. Grp., 385 N.J. Super. 448, 461 (App. Div. 2005) (emphasis added).  Finally, Plaintiff was able to and did present her reasons for objecting to her non-renewal at a hearing in front of the full Board of Education—whom Plaintiff admitted was compromised of Black members (Pl. Tr. 291:7-10) —but the Board nevertheless agreed with and adopted the recommendation to not renew her contract another year based on all of the evidence before it.
[brief] In *Simmons v. Mercado*, the [...] asserted it did not have to produce CDR-1 summonses violations because even though the police *made* the records, it was the judicial branch (exempt from OPRA) that *maintained* them electronically.  Thus because the police no longer had control of the electronic record, they contended they did not have to produce it under OPRA.  The argument is identical to what is advanced here.  And the Supreme Court refused to breathe life into it….  *Any reliance here on the maintenance of the records is misplaced because it completely ignores the fact that MPD officers "make" the information by inputting substantive data about the arrests into eCDR, as noted above.  The plain language of the statutory provision at issue here is clear: if a government official makes, maintains, or keeps on file electronic information in the course of his or her official business, it is a "government record" subject to OPRA.  See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.  The use of "or" plainly indicates that any of those three listed actions is sufficient to satisfy the statutory definition.*  See, e.g., *State v. Frank*, 445 N.J. Super. 98, 106, 136 A.3d 429 (App. Div. 2016) (noting that the word "or" in a statute generally indicates an alternative and that, "where items in a list are joined by a comma, with an "or" preceding the last item, the items are disjunctive, meaning distinct and separate from each other" (alterations and quotations omitted)).
[brief] (Pa000003).  In the Probate Action, the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. held that after hearing [...]’s testimony that the provision he drafted regarding forgiving of the mortgage was ambiguous and that ambiguity had to be resolved.  Judge Jerejian found that [...] was never mentioned in [...]’s discussions with [...] and that he never wanted to benefit her.  The Court found that because of the ambiguity in the Will, that it construed the Will to find that [...] wanted peace in the family.  The Court cited the testimony that [...] stated “My belief was that he [[...]] wanted to make it clear that the loan, whatever the unpaid balance was, was going to be – would go to his son [...].
[brief] . . .”  19T10-25 to 11-6).  It was also incredible that he did not know defendant was in trouble until he spoke with defendant’s mother for five to seven years after the crimes, and did not say anything about the cab ride with defendant until he was approached some eight years later by a private investigator.  (19T13 to 22).  [...]’s testimony that he attended the victim’s wake was disputed by [...], who credibly testified that she did not see him at the wake and had no reason to be show bias at this juncture in the case.  (19T10-10 to 15; 19T13-11 to 14-3).  The PCR court also found [...], defendant’s cell phone expert, was not credible and likely would not have qualified as an expert at trial.  (19T12-23 to 13-5).  He testified that he used certain computer programs that were not standard in the industry or reliable, and used cell phone information that was not certified to be complete.  (19T11-12 to 22).  [...] did not use the cell phone records from the phone company, which he opined would have provided the cell phone’s location.  Those records were available at the time of the incident and the issue could have been raised on direct appeal.  (19T11-23 to 12-12).  Also, [...] could not certify the accuracy of his results, gave ranges of locations only, and did not inspect the phone.  When the phone was ultimately inspected, it did not contain a SIM card which would have provided additional information.  (19T12-9 to 13-10).  Lastly, the PCR court found defendant’s claims that he told [...] about the alibi witnesses and that [...] spoken to [...] were not credible.  (19T14-12 to 18; 19T17-2 to 11; 19T18-2 to 9).  The two investigative reports from 2019 and 2020 showed defendant did not know about these witnesses at the time of trial.  (19T18-2 to 9).  In addition, defendant did not testify that he had his phone with him during the time of the crime or during the time he allegedly was elsewhere, and he never denied his involvement in the shooting.  (19T14-19 to 15-11).  For all these reasons, the PCR court concluded defendant failed to meet his burden under both prongs of Strickland.  (19T17-2 to 18-25; 19T19-14 to 17).
[directive] b. w ta plede koupab tou pou posesyon yon zam, ki pa ta yon zamafe, pou bi ilegal pandan ke w ap komèt, eseye komèt oswa konplote pou komèt nenpòt nan enfrkasyon sa yo wa va resevwa yon santans konsekitiv pou posesyon zam pou rive a yon bi ilegal? you also plead guilty to possessing a weapon, other than a firearm, for an unlawful purpose while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of these offenses you will receive a consecutive sentence for possessing the weapon for an unlawful purpose?  OSWA/OR [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No] [pa aplikab/NA] c. ou plede koupab de posesyon zam, ki pa yon zamafe pou sikonstans ki pa finn apwopriye a izaj zam pou bi legal pandan ke w ap komèt, eseye komèt oswa konplote pou komèt nenpòt nan enfraksyon sa yo wa va resevwa yon santans konsekitiv pou posesyon zam la?  you also plead guilty to possessing a weapon, other than a firearm, under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful use of the weapon while committing, attempting to commit or conspiring to commit any of these offenses you will receive a consecutive sentence for possessing the weapon?  Dat/Date  Akize a/Defendant Avoka LaDefans/Defense Attorney Komisè Gouvènman/Prosecutor Fòm Kreye pa Direktif # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11169-Haitian Creole paj 2 nan 2 Form Promulgated by Directive # 01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11169-Haitian Creole page 2 of 2