ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Pa224a; Pa1473a-74a; Pa1536a.  See Van Dunk, 210 N.J. at 471-72 (finding no intentional wrong and distinguishing a short-term safety failure from a long-term decision to forgo required safety devices or practices); compare Mattos v. Barn Bros., Inc., No. A-4187-10T3, 2012 WL 5187975, at *5 (App. Div. Oct. 22, 2012) (finding no intentional wrong where safety violation existed for approximately five days) with Crippen, 176 N.J. at 410 (finding intentional wrong where safety violation existed for approximately eighteen months).
[brief] Contrary to [...]’s argument, the court’s decision in *Ensslin* did not turn on the timeliness or adequacy of the Division’s notice.  *(Pb12).*  Instead, the court found that because the notice from the Division was sent “more than four years from the date of petitioner’s last contribution,” the Division’s own “day-to-day administration of its affairs” and interpretation of the two-year time limitation as expressed by the four-year notice further supported allowing Ensslin to file.  *Id.* at 338.  Here, there was no such letter informing [...] that he was eligible to file under the Ricci Act past the statutory deadline.  Thus, *Ensslin* does not support [...]’s proposition that untimely notice allows individuals to file at any time past the statutory deadline.  (Pb12).  Nor do the equities weigh in his favor.  The Board found on the basis of undisputed facts that notice was sent to [...], that information about the Ricci Act was available to him through the Division’s website and publications, and that he had sufficient time to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the statutory period.  Thus, contrary to [...]’s contention, (Pb15), there was ample evidence for the Board to reasonably conclude that he failed to demonstrate good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence to warrant consideration of his application well beyond the statutory deadline.  (Pa14).  Finally, [...]’s argument and reference to a different applicant is misplaced.  (Pb17).  That applicant asserts that he attempted to file his Eligibility Registration Form but was told he was ineligible because he was not currently sick.  (Pb17; Pa120-122).  But those facts are not in the record before this court.  And that applicant’s assertions are irrelevant to [...]’s appeal as they deal with an entirely different set of circumstances not alleged by [...], so they should be disregarded.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Nor did the court charge that “if defendant’s initial use of the [gun] to fire [a] warning shot[] was perceived by defendant as reasonably necessary to \(^{15}\) N.J.S.A. 2C:3-11b:  “…A threat to cause death or serious bodily harm, by the production of a weapon or otherwise, so long as the actor’s purpose is limited to creating an apprehension that he will use deadly force if necessary, does not constitute deadly force. ” protect [himself], such conduct was privileged and could not result in criminal liability. ”  *State v. Bryant*, 288 N.J. Super. 27, 38 (App. Div. 1996) (emphasis added).  The jury was told that [...] fired a gun, twice, and that firing a gun in the direction of another constituted deadly force.  Without an explicit instruction, the jurors would not have understood that firing a gun up in the air “intended only to make the victim of the threat believe that the defendant will use the firearm if necessary” was not deadly force, but only non-deadly force.  The jury was not told that if [...] reasonably believed that he needed to use such non-deadly force to defend against unlawful force, it could find that he acted in self-defense and acquit him of [...]’s homicide.  “[T]he trial court’s charge here was not molded in such a way as to properly explain the law to the jury in the context of the material facts of the case,” *State v. Concepcion*, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988), and specifically, the material fact that if the jury found that [...] “fired [a] warning shot[] in order to protect [himself], then his use of the weapon could not have been ‘with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily harm[.]’”  *Bryant*, 288 N.J. Super. at 38-39.  A properly instructed jury could have found that [...] did not use deadly force when he fired into the air and thus could have acquitted him of [...]’s homicide.  Because [...]’s jury was not properly instructed on the use of non-deadly force, his conviction for the p/p manslaughter of Nahshon [...] must be reversed.
[brief] *See Francavilla*, generally.  The *Francavilla* Court did not reach the merits of the plaintiff’s claims but rather found that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the ECD.  *Ibid.*  Thus, the dicta in *Francavilla* is not binding on this Court as to the private right of action under the NJCFLA, because the private right of action is of no consequence as to whether Francavilla’s claims were barred by the ECD.
[brief] [...]:  - Complaint [...] charging a November 26, 2018 violation of Ordinance Section 1102 by constructing walkways on the Property without obtaining zoning approval.  - Complaint [...] charging a November 26, 2018 violation of Ordinance Section 413.02 by constructing structures in the Historic Flared Avenue Open Space Area without obtaining Zoning approval.  - Complaint [...] charging a November 26, 2018 violation of Ordinance Section 900 by failing to obtain a CofA from the HPC.  On March 5, 2020, the Township Municipal Court dismissed Complaint [...] and [...] both charging failure to obtain prior Zoning approval for the walkway work.
[directive] [DCJ 03/03/16]  8.  An officer trained and authorized to carry a conducted energy device should be aware of any targeting recommendations made by the manufacturer.  9.  A conducted energy device may be used in conjunction with a distraction device, water-based chemical agent, or less-lethal ammunition.  If the individual has already received an electrical charge from a conducted energy device, officers should, when feasible, provide the person a reasonable opportunity to submit to law enforcement authority and to comply with law enforcement commands, considering the physiological effects of the discharge, before deploying a distraction device, chemical agent, or less-lethal ammunition.  10.  A conducted energy device shall not be directed against a person who is situated on an elevated surface (e.g., a ledge, scaffold, near a precipice, etc.) unless reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or minimize a fall-related injury (e.g., deploying a safety net).  11.  A conducted energy device shall not be used in, on, or immediately adjacent to a body of water in which the targeted person could fall during any stage of the application of the electrical current generated or transmitted by the device.  12.  A conducted energy device shall not be used in any environment where an officer knows or has reason to believe that a potentially flammable, volatile, or explosive material is present that might be ignited by an open spark, including but not limited propane.6 to pepper spray with a volatile propellant, gasoline, natural gas, or 13.  While officers must at all times respect the seriousness and potential lethality of a conducted energy device, an officer should use particular care when considering whether to use a conducted energy device against an individual who is particularly vulnerable due to age (either elderly or young) or due to a known or reasonably apparent medical condition (e.g., a pregnant female).  IX.
[brief] Errors in the description of [...] and [...]  The EGPs for [...] (which was also listed in the Financial Reporting) and for [...] are stated in the projects’ contracts.  If [...] and [...] are subject to the EGP-sharing (despite the parties’ lack of agreement as to EGP), the Award lists the incorrect EGPs, and the Court should correct those figures.  The accurate EGPs are explained infra, and Tab 3 of Alternative Calculations shows the calculation of the Award using the corrected values for [...] and [...] (along with the interest calculations above) is $3,693,413.80.  Da479.  In addition, as demonstrated in Tab 3, because [...] is still ongoing, [...] is not obligated to pay [...] $280,401.69 until project completion, and the Award should be modified to reflect as much.  1.
[brief] [Pa289; Pa221; Pa236].  In denying leave to file a Second Amended Complaint and dismissing the First Amended Complaint, the trial court held that:  [Appellants] cannot, after discovery is long closed, and most other defendants have been dismissed, seek to first add claims against [...], especially where [Appellants] knew of the predicate facts years prior, but chose not to assert them previously.  To permit the amendment would bog down judicial administration and economy and be prejudicial to [...].  [Pa233].  * * * * *  Here, the First Amended Complaint asserts no claims against [...] and seeks no relief against it.  The First Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against [...].  Thus, pursuant to R. 4:6–2 the First Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice as against [...].
[brief] 16  Gershon v. Regency Driving Center, 368 N.J.Super. 237, 247 (App. Div. 2004)  12  368 N.J.Super. 237, 248 (App. Div. 2004)  16  Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469 (2019)  Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt., 238 N.J. 191 (2019)  514 U.S. 938 (1995)  Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287 (2010)  Hirsch v. Amper Financial Services, LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 187 (2013)  215 N.J. 174, 196 (2013)  Hojnowski v. Vans State Park, 187 N.J. 323, 341 (2006)  187 N.J. 323, 342 (2006)  Kernahan v. Home Warranty Administrator of Florida Inc., 23 N.J. 301 (2019)  23 N.J. 301, 319 (2019)  23 N.J. 301, 322(2019)
[brief] *Id.* at 9.  The Court sidestepped this issue by finding that the Director permitted the plaintiffs to keep and use their accumulated sick leave during the remaining course of employment.  *Ibid.*  Specifically, the Court explained its reasoning as follows:  In the end, although no case law directly addresses whether lump sum payments upon promotion for accumulated sick leave constitute a vested right, [...]'s reasoning that the vested right was the sick leave days, not the dollar amount, is also persuasive.  The Director disapproved the arbitration award granting [...] and [...] lump sum payments for accumulated sick leave when they were promoted.  But the Director permitted them to use the accumulated leave during their tenure.  Thus, because plaintiffs retain their sick leave benefit, the arbitration award does not infringe on their vested contractual rights, if any.  *Ibid.*  In this appeal, there is no opportunity to sidestep the issue of whether Plaintiffs had vested rights because of their retirements.
[brief] | | | 715 Partners, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. GS Assignment, Ltd. Liab. Co., | 37 | | No. A-2527-15T3, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1219 (App. Div. May 25, 2018)  | | | Alliance Healthcare, Inc. v. Jersey City Bergen, LLC, | 24 | | 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2304 (Ch. Div. Oct. 18, 2016) | | | Allison-Williams Co. v. Viasource Funding Grp., LLC, | 67, 68, 69 | | NO. A-1720-08T1, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 1260 (App. Div. June 9, 2010) | | | Arcand v. Brother Int’l Corp., | 40 | | 673 F. Supp. 2d 282 (D.N.J. 2009) | | | Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co. v. Interstate Ins. Co., | 63 | | 28 N.J. Super. 81 (App. Div. 1953) | | | Bak-A-Lum Corp. of Am. v. Alcoa Bldg. Prods., Inc., | 39 | | 69 N.J. 123 (1976) | | | Bankers’ Tr. Co. v. Greims, | 23 | | 115 N.J. Eq. 102 (Ch. Div. 1934) | | | Barila v. Board of Education of Cliffside Park, | 21, 61 | | 241 N.J. 595 (2020) | | | Barry L. Kahn Defined Ben. Pension Plan v. Twp. of Moorestown, | 48 | | 243 N.J. Super.
[brief] Moreover, when [...] Customer Service Team Lead in the [...] WrapUp Department, [...], was asked to determine if [...] was enrolled under the CCIP at issue, she “looked at a report and then [she] sent an e-mail to the underwriter telling her that we have them enrolled. ”  As Ms. Vogt explained during her deposition, in 2018 she reviewed the WrapUp list, which is a cumulative list of all the subcontractors enrolled in the CCIP, and from reviewing the WrapUp list she concluded that [...] had been enrolled in the CCIP.  Pa2443-Pa2448.  Critically, [...]’s CCIP enrollment was later noted by [...] in a September 25, 2015 correspondence to [...] that stated that [...] was CCIP-approved:  “[...], is \textit{CCIP Approved}.  For the above referenced [W/Element Hotel] Project. ”  Pa427 (emphasis added).  There is no documentary evidence that [...] was notified of any unenrollment from the CCIP after that date and thus not subject to this insurance.  Therefore, pursuant to the documents and testimony cited above, [...] was enrolled in the CCIP and covered under the CCIP Policy at the time of the accident in December 2015.
[brief] POINT III  IMPOSITION BOTH OF A DISCRETIONARY EXTENDED TERM AND A DISCRETIONARY PAROLE DISQUALIFIER WAS INAPPROPRIATE AND RESULTED IN AN EXCESSIVE SENTENCE.  (8T 41-11 to 18 to 43-21)  Although the ordinary term for third-degree burglary is a custodial term of three to five years, [...] was subjected to both a discretionary extended term and a discretionary parole disqualifier, resulting two concurrent sentences sentence of six years with a two-year period of parole ineligibility.  (8T 43-13 to 20)  The trial court overweighed the aggravating factors and underweighed the mitigating factors, leading to a palpably excessive sentence:
[brief] I.  The Trial Court Denies Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion, And Grants Defendants’ Summary Judgment.  On July 27, 2023, the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion, and granted Defendants’ summary judgment motion and dismissed the Complaint with prejudice.  Pa0001-Pa0004.  In so ruling, the trial court -- without citation to any supporting legal authority -- first “disregard[ed] the plaintiffs’ statements of fact” reciting the binding testimony of the representative designated by [...] to testify on its behalf ([...]) on the basis that [...] merely provided a “lay person’s opinion” that was “in no way legally binding on Defendants.
[brief] Dated: August 19, 2024  September 30, 2024  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  R.J. Hughes Justice Complex 25 W. Market Street, Box 006 Trenton, NJ 08625-0006  Re: [...] and [...], Plaintiff-Respondents, V. [...], JOHN DOES 1-30 (a fictitious name for persons presently Unknown) and XYZ, Inc. 1-10 (a fictitious name for a business entity presently unknown), Defendants, and [...], Intervenor/Defendant.
[brief] In a recent decision, which is informative here, the Commission stated:  …  Now, more than a decade later, when the use of social media and online publications has become commonplace, prolific, pervasive, and often times divisive, and given that there has been a significant influx in the number of complaints filed with the Commission regarding use (or nonuse) of disclaimers in electronic publications (not just social media), *it is now more crucial than ever to underscore and emphasize that when Board members want to speak as private citizens, they must include an appropriate disclaimer that makes the capacity in which they are speaking clear and unambiguous.*
[brief] The Long Branch Rule is a Subchapter of the CZM Rules that applies specially to the Redevelopment Area and sets forth the substantive standards applicable to a proposed development and the procedures to follow in order to obtain approval from the Department for same under CAFRA.  See N.J.A.C. 7:7-7.1 to -7.5.  N.J.A.C. 7:7-7.1 states, in pertinent part:  (a)  This Long Branch Redevelopment Zone Permit authorizes the construction of any development regulated under N.J.A.C. 7:7-2.2 within the Redevelopment Zone of the [...], as defined in the Redevelopment Plan Ordinance of the [...] . . . , provided the conditions at (b) through (g) below and the notification requirements at N.J.A.C. 7:7-7.2 or 7.3, as applicable, are met[.]  (b)  The development shall be in compliance with the Redevelopment Plan Ordinance and the Design Guidelines Ordinance of the [...].  (c)  The development must be approved by the Planning Board of the [...] .  . . .  (e)  If the Planning Board . . . approves a development with a variance or waiver from a provision(s) of the Redevelopment Plan Ordinance or the Design Guidelines Ordinance of the [...], and if the Department concurs in writing with such variance or waiver, the development is authorized under this Long Branch Redevelopment Zone Permit.  The Department shall concur if the waiver or variance complies with this chapter, and if, notwithstanding the waiver or variance, the developments within the Redevelopment Zone continue to comply individually and collectively with this chapter.  (g)  For any development within the Redevelopment Zone of the [...] that does not meet the conditions for approval under this Long Branch Redevelopment Zone Permit, the applicant shall, pursuant to the applicable requirements of this chapter, either obtain from the Department a CAFRA individual permit or meet the requirements for authorization under a CAFRA general permit or permit-by-rule.  The Department first proposed the Long Branch Rule in 1997, following the City’s adoption of the Redevelopment Ordinances in 1996, and adopted the Rule in 1998.
[brief] No further analysis is advanced by [...] for the [...]’s consideration of why its then existing waterfront facilities were inadequate.  More importantly, there is no analysis in the record concerning how the [...] concluded that the evidence in the record satisfied N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5(b)1.  Second, pertaining specifically to the 2019 WFD permit modification, [...]’s blanket statement that the required need was demonstrated does not comment on, or otherwise reference, the location of the dock at issue in the modification application.  [Aa106; Aa101.]  While [...] will argue that the modification is only requesting an approved relocation of 1.7 feet to the east, [...] is still required to demonstrate need, particularly considering that it failed to do so in its 2017 permit application.  The [...]’s factual findings enjoy a presumption of correctness if they are “supported by substantial credible evidence” in the record as a whole.  *In re Authorization for Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permits*, 372 N.J. Super. 578, 593 (App. Div. 2004).  However, in this instance, the record does not contain any support for the position that [...] had demonstrated a need for the 2017 WFD permit and 2019 WFD permit modification as required by *N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5(b)*1.  As such, the [...]’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, not based on substantial credible evidence, and should be reversed.
[brief] 1.  Based solely upon language tucked away in the “WITNESS WHEREOF paragraph of the Lease, the Court found that Defendants [...], [...], and [...] did personally guarantee the obligations of [...] under the Lease.  2.  The guaranty obligations of Defendants [...], [...], and [...] terminated as of May 11, 2016, the effective date of the termination of the Lease as found by the Court.  In their cross-appeal, Defendants [...] and [...] request that this Court reverse ruling number 1 above because the Trial Court did not recognize the ambiguity in the language of the Lease as to guarantees, did not apply the strict rule of construction applicable to guarantees, did not properly give weight to the fact that there was no separate signature line by which [...], [...] and [...] signed in their individual capacities and did not give any weight to the lease used by Plaintiff for the Leased Premises with the immediately prior tenant, which included a separate page for the individual personal guarantees and required the individuals to sign twice, once as a member of the LLC tenant and once on the separate guaranty page in their individual capacities.  If this Court reverses the Trial Court’s ruling number 1, it need not undertake a review of the second ruling noted above.  If this Court does reach the second issue the Court should affirm the Trial Court’s ruling on the second point since the Trial Court properly ruled that the Lease was terminated as May 11, 2016 and that any personal guaranty terminated as of the Lease termination date.  The Trial Court properly based this ruling on the undisputed fact that at no time did any of the individual members of the tenant LLC sign any writing or provide any verbal communication that reaffirmed that any personal guarantees that might have been given survived the lease termination.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] In the event that the parties agree to a specific school for high school and / or college for the [children] it is agreed that the parties shall pay for the same based on their respective incomes at the time of enrollment.  (Pa 269).  Consistent with the last sentence of ¶25 of the JOD, Plaintiff took the position at trial that ““the standard [for ¶ 25 of the JOD purposes] is the income at the time the children were going to school.
[brief] “First, because the intent of the parties was plain and the language of the agreement was clear and unambiguous, the court must enforce the agreement as written.  Barila, supra, 241 N.J. at 616 …  Second, plaintiff did not demonstrate “fraud or any compelling circumstance” that would justify reforming the Settlement Agreement.  Pascarella, supra, 190 N.J. Super. at 124-25 …  Third, plaintiff concedes that both parties knew about the issues that may arise in his pension application… both knew that the [...] retained the authority under the Pension Law. ”  Carr, supra 2022 WL 38864 at *3-4.  Further, in Carr, supra Appellate Division noted that the plaintiff’s assertion that “he was unaware that the Settlement Agreement did not comply with pension law until after the agreement was executed … does not constitute “fraud or any compelling circumstance” that would justify reforming the Settlement Agreement. ”  Ibid.  Here, Plaintiff’s argument is even weaker, the record demonstrates that the Parties acknowledged the potential denial of his IOD application, and Plaintiff’s counsel represented the unsuccessful plaintiff-appellant in Cardinale, supra.  Nor did Plaintiff’s demonstrate “fraud or any compelling circumstance” that would justify reforming a settlement agreement.  See Carr, supra at 2022 WL 38864 at * 4 (citing Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super 118, 124-25 (App. Div. 1983)).  Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that specific performance was warranted; therefore, the Chancery Division’s decision must be reversed and Plaintiff’s complaint dismissed with prejudice.
[brief] But principally the Court finds that the standard to be applied in connection herewith is one of intent.  What was the intent at the time that title passed.  Indeed, if – the Court had looked at NJSA 2A:62-1, and in particular the Robinson Shore Development Company versus Gallagher case, 41 New Jersey Super 324.  I know that was reversed on other grounds later, but that’s the rationale that the Court has taken a look at.  And the Court finds principally that it needs to look at, in a quiet title action, what was the intent intended on the conveyance that was made.  The issue of intent of the parties is really what is principally at issue.  The statute, both NJSA 46:3-13 and 46:3-16, presume that really, unless specifically excluded, the presumption is that the grantor is conveying all of their rights, unless they’re specifically excluded....
[brief] In the absence of a patent ambiguity, the Probate Court must remain faithful to the clear language of the Trust absent extrinsic evidence showing a latent ambiguity or contrary intent.  This requires more than conclusory assertions by a party or the court’s own speculation.  The language of the Trust is clear: the residue of [...]’s Trust passes to [...].  The Probate Court identified no extrinsic evidence giving rise to an inference that [...] had a different probable intent.