ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 289a-293a.  [...] signed the Memorandum of Understanding on behalf of [...] and it was delivered to Defendant [...] at [...]’s office.  394a (77:22-78:1).  At the same time that Defendant [...] was representing Plaintiffs’ entity, [...], in connection with [...], he also represented [...], an entity whose managing member was Defendant [...]’s longtime friend, [...].  627a-628a (14:18-19:4); 629a-630a (23:11-25:13); 675a.  On May 22, 2006 – the same day [...]’s Certificate of Formation was filed – [...], who owned [...], entered into an agreement selling [...] to [...].  90a.  Thereafter, on June 29, 2006, based upon the advice and counsel of Defendant [...], [...] executed an Assignment and Assumption Agreement assigning that Agreement of Sale of [...] to [...] for $2,140,000.00.  107a.  Neither [...] nor Plaintiff [...] negotiated the terms or consideration for the Assignment and Assumption Agreement.  380a (63:18-24).  In early 2007, Plaintiff [...] attended a Mayor’s Workshop at the behest of Defendant [...] where Defendant [...] presented two proposed development projects in [...], one for [...], and another for a project at “Pork Chop Hill. ”  326a-328a (9:9-11:22).  For the first time, Plaintiff [...] learned that Defendant [...] intended to develop [...] as a 100% affordable housing development.  326a-328a (9:9-11:22).  That was a completely different project than the market rate rental/commercial development that Defendant [...] had proposed, and that [...], [...], and Plaintiff [...] and [...] had agreed to in May and June 2006.  326a-328a (9:9-11:22).  Instead of pursuing that sort of project on [...], [...] proposed to build a 400-unit market rate development at Pork Chop Hill.  563a (147:3-21).  Even as Defendants [...] and [...] were proposing the [...] project to Plaintiff [...] and [...] as a market rate rental/commercial development, Defendants [...] and [...] were aggressively trying to persuade [...] to re-zone [...] for affordable housing.  123a-125a (36:19-42:21); 129a (59:22-60:3); 130a (62:13-23).
[brief] The appeal by [...] centers on a legal issue – namely, the proper application of Massachusetts law concerning allocation of insurance coverage.  [...] respectfully submits that the trial court “got it right” initially and, nearly two years later, incorrectly reconsidered its initial decision and created a hybrid allocation model that is contrary to controlling case law in Massachusetts.  In the [...] appeal, [...] has finally, after more than two decades, conceded that it owes insurance coverage to [...].
[brief] Likewise, there is also no absolute engineering standard regarding the universal use of painted striped end islands or peninsulas as those could be perceived by drivers in lots where parking is scarce - such as the subject lot - as a convenient place to improperly park causing an improperly parked vehicle to occupy a portion of the drive aisle, restrict sight distance and maneuverability space.  Therefore, painted islands could be counterproductive to improving parking lot sight distance or safety.  (Da24-Da26, §2.1.2 Curbed Geometry & End Islands / Peninsulas).  The ITE Traffic Engineering Handbook notes too that typical parking lot crashes are "fender benders" near vehicle spaces with more than 2/3 of the reported accidents involving parking or unparking movements.  Pedestrians being struck involved only 2% - 4% of all parking lot vehicular accidents.  (Da24-Da26, §2.1.2 Curbed Geometry & End Islands / Peninsulas).
[brief] [...] testified that he conducted a site inspection of the store in September 2022 during which time he conducted a recreation of the plaintiff and the walking path that led to her fall.  (5T116:3-8).  The only opinion [...] offered in his trial testimony was his belief that the plaintiff’s rollator did not come into contact with the raised column baseplate with protruding bolts when she fell.  (5T114:11-24; 6T41:13-17; 6T78:25-79:4; 6T80:9-11).  He came to the conclusion that the plaintiff fell in another location by comparing the cctv footage of the plaintiff’s fall, which only showed from her shoulders up, to live footage from the date of his inspection and then moving around a shopping cart with pots that was supposed to be a representation of the plaintiff.  (5T123:18-125:2; 5T127:7-128:2; 6T30:24-31:28; 6T34:1-11; 6T80:16-20).  The plaintiff moved to strike his testimony following direct \(^4\)
[brief] The rules of evidence are not applicable to the hearing, and the agency may exclude irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence.  See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10a-e.  The trial court, citing Shim v. Washington Twp. Planning Bd., illustrated that while a Planning Board has an obligation to provide the public with a fair opportunity to be heard, it may limit testimony on duplicative or irrelevant matters.  Pa37.  Shim v. Washington Township Planning Board, 298 N.J. Super. 395 (App. Div. 1997).  In Shim, the Court found that the chairperson did not improperly close the record, preventing the [...] from commenting on a site plan application for a daycare within a church because it was unnecessary and out of scope as testimony was limited to discussing traffic.  [...]’s brief merely states that the Board’s attorney limited testimony on the application before the board, i.e., the major subdivision.  Pb16-18.  Moreover, [...] freely admits that it never attempted to cross-examine any witnesses during the hearing.  Id. at 18.  Rather, [...] merely speculated that any attempt to cross-examine witnesses on irrelevant subject matters would be prevented by the Board’s counsel.  Ibid.  Therefore, because of [...]’s speculation, it chose not to attempt to cross-examine any witnesses at the hearing.  Accordingly, the trial court properly found that the Board did not hear any contrary testimony that pertained to the subdivision application and the trial court’s decision should be upheld.  See Pa312. C.  The Trial Court Properly Determined that the Submission of the EIS complies with the Requirements under the MLUL.
[brief] [...] is a successful claimant because it succeeded on the first, and critical, issue in the case – whether [...] owed coverage for the Plainville Claim.  [...] also attempts to challenge certain discretionary aspects of the trial court’s calculation of damages.  Specifically, [...] claims that the trial court erred in its calculation and allocation of [...]’s recoverable attorneys’ fees, its award of costs and its calculation of prejudgment interest.  As explained below, each of these issues is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court, that this Court reviews for an abuse of that discretion.
[brief] POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED  [...]’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT  BECAUSE [...] CANNOT BE HELD VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR’S NEGLIGENT ACTS AS A MATTER OF LAW..............................................  11  A.  Vida Café does not retain control over the manner and means in which [...] shopped.  ...............  13  B.  Shopping for a customer is not a per se nuisance.  .....  13  C.  No facts establish [...] as an incompetent contractor.  .........................................................  14  POINT II: CONTRARY TO PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT [...] HAS NO APPARENT AUTHORITY OVER HERNANDEZ.
[brief] We will cc you on the notice.  As noted above, this also supports a retaliatory motive because, again, employee discipline is confidential and [...] tells [...] that he would discipline [...] for having no recollection of the event which is unprecedented – disciplining someone for not admitting guilt.  On April 11, 2016, [...] disclosed to her husband [...], who worked as Chief of Staff for [...], confidential information about [...]’s disciplinary relayed to her by [...], stating “news to tell you. ” (Pa684).  On April 11, 2016, [...], sent [...] an email with a derogatory retirement flyer about Dillon stating, “for your eyes only” depicting a person under a desk and [...] replied “Hilarious!!!” (Pa684).  On April 11, 2016, at 4:22 pm, [...] advised co-worker [...] that she learned about the status of the disciplinary action taken against [...] that [...] “[d]enied it completely when questioned,” that the Director of Labor Relations, [...], “doesn’t believe him at all” and “wants to throw the book at him” for “lying,” and “the issue may cause problems [for [...]] with pensions. ” (Pa684-Pa685).  A jury could find that this supports a retaliatory motive, specially the “problems with pensions” statement.  On April 11, 2016, [...], [...], [...] [...] and [...] shared derogatory flyers about [...] via email.
[brief] 3.  [...] cannot satisfy the exclusivity prong because not only has [...] developed a large section of the Property, but also [...]’s purported documentary evidence does not support any reasonable inference of exclusive ownership.  The third element [...] must establish is that its use of the land was exclusive and not shared with anyone else, including the rightful owner, but [...] also cannot satisfy this prong.  Stump, supra, 314 N.J. Super. at 570.  As a threshold matter, [...] cannot assert that it has used [...] exclusively because [...] has developed the portion of [...] adjacent to [...].  [...] constructed housing there that exists to this day and [...] respectfully requests this Court to take judicial notice of same.  Furthermore, [...] also cannot satisfy this prong because its purported documentary evidence, the incomplete utility bills and the alleged snow removal documents, do not articulate what property the documents pertain to as the trial court plainly noted.
[brief] Pursuant to the November 13, 2023 Statement of Reasons, the Trial Court indicated:  “The Court was within its discretion in finding that Plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence that the Ozurdex applicator was defective to survive a motion for summary judgment, that Plaintiff provided sufficient expert testimony to create a dispute of material fact as to whether the alleged defect (i.e., the silicone particulate) proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries, and other inconsistencies of fact best reserved for a jury to contemplate.  The finding of any one of these material facts justified the Court’s decision to deny Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  Therefore, the Motion for Reconsideration on this argument fails. ”  (Da0846; Da0851)  The Trial Court also denied [...]’s argument “seeking dismissal of Count Two under the PLA for alleged failure to warn. ”  (Da0846; Da0853)  On the issue of the admissibility of Plaintiff’s expert witness opinions in its November 13, 2023 Statement of Reasons, the trial court restated certain portions from the Orders denying the motions for summary judgment.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED AND DENIED VARIOUS EQUITABLE RELIEF AS TO [...]  Plaintiff asserts that [...] and [...] “improperly dissolved [...]”.  Pb36.  The Trial Court ordered [...] dissolved, and did not agree to appoint a receiver or a fiscal agent or direct funds to be deposited into court.  This is exactly what plaintiff requested, so she cannot now complain.  Plaintiff, in fact, withdrew her claim to appoint a receiver and for [...] funds to be deposited in Court, and continued to seek dissolution.  2T88:14-89:25, 2T90:9-25.  In any case, no purpose would have been served by the appointment of a receiver as it was conceded that [...] was defunct.  1T8:3-6; 2T89:6-12.  A custodial or statutory receiver is generally appointed for functioning businesses.  See, e.g., Ravin, Sarasohn, Cook, Baumgarten, Fisch. & Rosen, P.C. v Lowenstein Sandler, P.C., 365 N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 2003)  Moreover, such an appointment is to be made sparingly, only, in essence, as a last resort.  Ravin, Sarasohn, Cook, Baumgarten, Fisch & Rosen, P.C. v. Lowenstein Sandler, P.C., supra, 365 N.J. Super. at 249.  The Trial Court sensibly did not appoint a receiver, and instead, ordered the defunct entity dissolved.\footnote{Plaintiff did not pursue on appeal her Trial Court claim for an accounting, and thus the claim is waived and abandoned.
[brief] Pa015-Pa016.  [...] also coordinated with the Township on offers to arrange site visits at its communities in Boonton and Teaneck.  Pa016.  11.  In March 2020, the Township Defendants’ unilateral cancellation of mediation sessions.  Id. 12.  At an April 2020 case management conference, [...] and the Township Defendants’ report that a conceptual settlement had been achieved, subject to standard municipal approval process.  Id.  These representations ultimately did not prove true.
[directive] 10.8  Maximum effective distance/range for deployment of specific projectiles shall not exceed the specifications approved by the Attorney General.  10.9  Intentionally aiming approved less-lethal impact ammunition at the head, neck, chest, or groin shall be avoided unless deadly force is justified, necessary, and appropriate.  10.10  No ammunition designed to be skip-fired and/or non-target specific will be deemed to be acceptable.  10.11  Approved less-lethal devices or ammunition shall not be used in a crowd management situation except against specific threatening assailants or active assailants, in strict compliance with Section 3.8 of the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy.  10.12  Less-lethal devices or ammunition shall not be used to prevent a person from causing property damage.  10.13  A less-lethal device shall not be directed against a person who is situated on an elevated surface (e.g., a ledge, scaffold, near a precipice, etc.) unless reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or minimize a fall-related injury (e.g., deploying a safety net).  10.14  Suspects who are struck by less-lethal ammunition shall be transported to a medical facility for examination if they suffer bodily injury or request medical treatment.  14
[brief] [Exhibit A to Certification of [...]]  Correspondence from Defendant/Respondent to City Clerk [...], joining Plaintiff/Appellant as Aide 1 effective 08/05/2015 – Dated 08/03/2015  [Exhibit B to Certification of [...]]  [...]’s Release and Authorization for Public Records – Dated 08/04/2015  [Exhibit C to Certification of [...]]  Change in Bargaining Unit & Dues/Deductions of employee [...] – Dated 08/21/2015  [Exhibit D to Certification of [...]]  Termination letter to [...] from Defendant [...] – Dated 01/12/2018.  [Exhibit E to Certification of [...]]  Memorandum from Defendant [...] to [...] – Dated 01/16/2018.  [Exhibit G to Certification of [...]]  [...]’s Personnel Action Sheet “Termination of Employee Services” effective January 12, 2018 and signed, intra alia by [...] – Dated 09/23/2008  [Exhibit H to Certification of [...]]  Correspondence from the Office of the City Clerk, Newark, New Jersey to [...]  Certifying his candidacy to be placed on the ballot for election – Dated 02/22/2018.  [Exhibit I to Certification of [...]]  News article from the Star Ledge Essex County Section – Dated 09/24/2008.  [Exhibit J to Certification of [...]]  News article from New Jersey Globe – Dated 03/31/2022.  [Exhibit K to Certification of [...]]  [...] Executive Order No. MEO-08-0001 dated September 23, 2008, signed by intra alia, Mayor [...] and Personnel Director [...].
[brief] Defendant [...] (“[...]”) is the owner of certain commercial property on [...] Avenue in North Bergen, New Jersey.  Plaintiff [...], is [...]’s mortgagee and defendant [...] (“[...]”) is [...]’s manager and guarantor of [...]’s promissory note.  In this appeal, [...] and [...] (the “[...] Defendants”) challenge the confirmation of the sheriff’s sale of the mortgaged premises to plaintiff for $100 by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch., based upon her determinations that (a) there is no distinction between “lawful postjudgment interest” and “contract postjudgment interest”, and (b) the mandate of N.J.S.A. 2A:17-34 that a sheriff’s foreclosure sale notice state the “approximate” amount of the judgment can be satisfied by a notice that states an amount that is not an “egregious variation” of the actual amount due.
[brief] They are “closely related . . . in that both are preventive measures intended to avert community blight and deterioration by requiring that new development proceed in defined ways and according to prescribed standards. ”  Id. at 506.  Critically, the court pointed out that it is of essential importance [for the planning board] to determine whether the whole tract proposed to be subdivided is fundamentally suitable for the projected development from the standpoint of area, topography, drainage, soil characteristics, accessibility, availability of utilities and the like.  Id. at 511.  In *El Shaer v. Planning Bd.*, 249 N.J. Super. 323 (App. Div. 1991), certif. den. 127 N.J. 546 (1992), the plaintiff appealed from a judgment sustaining the planning board’s denial of plaintiff’s major subdivision application.
[directive] Actor exposes his intimate parts for his own sexual gratification under circumstances where 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible the actor knows or reasonably expects that he is likely to be observed by a child under age 13 and the actor is more than 4 years older; or is likely to be observed by a person who because 2C:14-4 Lewdness of mental disease or defect is unable to understand the sexual nature of the actor’s conduct, Disorderly Persons $500 to $1,000 10% permissible fourth degree; or any other flagrantly rude or offensive conduct likely to be observed by a non- consenting person, disorderly persons offense.  27
[brief] Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1977).  Accordingly, the over-reaching connection to third parties allegedly benefitting from the actions of Appellant should not be considered, as Appellant never raised such contentions in arguments below.  R. 4:42-9(a)(2) permits a court, *in its discretion*, to award attorney’s fees from a fund in court.  As previously set forth, the court in *Rova Farms* noted that “[f]indings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate substantial and credible evidence”, Ibid.
[brief] According to the State, [...]’s statement to the trial court that he would be willing to have anger management counseling added as a condition of his preexisting parole supervision for life, even though the sentence for the instant offense did not include a parole term, “induced the judge to not only add [d]efendant’s anger management requirement to parole but all other conditions. ”  (Sb 20)  The conclusion the State urges this Court to draw is that [...] “cannot request a certain sentence, obtain that sentence, and then argue that the sentencing judge could not impose such a sentence. ”  (Sb 20)  The State’s view is legally incorrect.
[brief] Evidence that serves to undermine the credibility of a State’s witness is favorable, material, and probative, constitutionally mandating disclosure to a criminal defendant.  It is immaterial whether the suppression of Brady evidence was intentional or inadvertent.  The record is clear that the [...] did have this evidence in its possession when it called [...] to testify before a Bergen County jury at [...]’s trial.  The State’s obligation under Brady was triggered, mandating disclosure to Petitioner.  The State failed to do so.  Finally, the suppressed evidence was material.  The State has acknowledged the importance of [...]’s testimony.  (See Trial Transcript dated October 27, 2009, 41:17-21, quoting [...] on behalf of the State  “Defense counsel made a big point about the fact that I told you during my opening that Edwin [...] was the best evidence I have, and I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that that[sic] is true. ”).  By any governing standard, however, [...]’s submitted an affidavit stating that [...] had no knowledge of the Staten Island kidnapping.  credibility would have been undermined had the trial jury considered the withheld, falsely sworn statement.  Instead, the State deprived Petitioner of a fair trial by suppressing the evidence, and justice requires that Petitioner be afforded a new trial.
[directive] The professional staff shall notify this court and counsel the proposed transfer date should 6. it be found that the acquittee is not appropriate for commitment either because they are not of dangerous to self, others, or property a result mental illness or that they could be as released into the community with or without supervision, without posing an undue danger to self, others, or property; and The acquittee shall not be administratively discharged by the institution without further order 7. of this court; and _____________ (Any additional conditions as ordered by the court)
[directive] Fo rfe Progra ra rs i i 1 to b A1 i t t 1 3 - re i is m 1 ty c a in App u : Policy Statement 3 - 1  3:l  Establishment Forfeited and Seized Trust Funds of 1 3:2 3 - - County Prosecutor's Enforcement Trust Account (CLETA) Law 3  1  Disbursements in Excess of 2 3 - $10,000  Seized Asset Trust Account (SATA)  3 - 2  Limitations on Disbursements from SATA 3  2-4 - Asset Management Account 3 - 4 - Maintenance Expenditures 3 4-5 - -1  Standards for-the Holding Period  an&Tracking Forfeiture Property of 3:3 6 3 - - SOP Administration of a Municipal No. 4  Forfeiture Prom am 4 - 1 1 1 b i i A1 4 - 1 ica ty: Forfeiture Program  Ad in is t ra tors 1 m App Policy Statement 4:l 4 - 1 - - SOP of 3 of Page: State New Jersey  Forfeiture Program Administration
[brief] *Evers*, 175 N.J. at 387; *Jabbour*, 118 N.J. at 6; *State v. Roth*, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984).  “[I]n sentencing, the Code ‘channel[s] the discretion of trial courts’ by focusing on the gravity of the offense rather than the offender’s blameworthiness or capacity for rehabilitation. ”  *Evers*, 175 N.J. at 387; *Jabbour*, 118 N.J. at 6; *State v. Hodge*, 95 N.J. 369, 375 (1984); *Roth*, 95 N.J. at 355.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that “sentences can be upheld where the sentencing transcript makes it possible to ‘readily deduce’ the judge’s reasoning. ”  *State v. Miller*, 205 N.J. 109, 129–30 (2011) (quoting *State v. Bieniek*, 200 N.J. 601, 609 (2010)); see also *State v. Molina*, 168 N.J. 436, 442–43 (2001); *State v. Perry*, 124 N.J. 128, 177 (1991)).