ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...] (#022031978)  MORRIS COUNTY PROSECUTOR  Attorney for the State of New Jersey  [Signature]  BY: [...] (#266292018)  SPECIAL DEPUTY  ATTORNEY GENERAL MORRIS COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE cc: [...], Esq.  Assistant Deputy Public Defender  March 25, 2024  [...] ID. No. 084402013  Ass’t Deputy Public Defender  [...]  Of Counsel and On the Letter-Brief  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...] ([...])  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  Plaintiff-Appellant, : On Appeal From An Interlocutory Order v. : Of the Superior Court of New Jersey : Criminal Division, Morris County  [...], : : Indictment No. [...] : Sat Below: Defendant-Respondent.  : : Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Your Honors:
[brief] Free Access To The Courts and the deprivation of a right does not extinguish simply because the right is respected by defendants after they are sued for depriving the rights [1T]  Plaintiff in opposition to arguments made by [...] and adopted by the Trial Court that the defendants granting of prior made and denied adjournment request(s) in retaliation for a citizen’s (plaintiff’s) resort to legal process in response to the underlying refusals to multiple adjournment request(s) without authority to refuse is a violation of the First Amendment and N.J. Const. Art.
[brief] See, e.g., Brae Asset Fund, L.P. v. Newman, 327 N.J. Super. 129, 134 (App. Div. 1999); Shelcusky v. Garjulio, 172 N.J. 185, 194 (2002) (holding “sham affidavits” will not impede a parties’ right to summary judgment).  Conclusory and self-serving assertions in certifications without explanatory or supporting facts will not defeat a meritorious motion for summary judgment.  Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428 (2005) (citation omitted).  Competent opposition requires competent evidential material beyond “mere speculation” and “fanciful arguments. ”  Merchs. Express Money Order Co. v. Sun Nat’l Bank, 374 N.J. Super. 556, 563 (App. Div. 2005), appeal dismissed, 183 N.J. 692 (2006).  [...]’s attempt to whip up alternative facts not supported or corroborated in the record, just like it tried to do in opposition to [...]’s motion for summary judgment, must be rejected.
[brief] ”  However, review of [...]’s written Order on that motion, as well as sections of the motion argument transcript presented to the Court by defendants, demonstrates that [...] made no such finding either orally or in his written Order.  Furthermore, even if [...] orally made such a requirement for expert testimony (which he did not), [...] wrote in his Statement of Reasons: “The Court concurs with Plaintiff’s assertion that a transcript is not binding on the Parties. ”  (Pa25).  In his Statement of Reasons denying reconsideration, as well as his Statement of Reasons supporting his initial grant of summary judgment, [...] relied heavily on the transcript of that earlier motion argument for proof of a crucial (but actually nonexistent) ruling by [...] that an expert would be required on the issue of “whether [...] was at fault for the alleged grading error.
[brief] [...] is the trade organization for New Jersey’s leading research-based biopharmaceutical and medical technology companies.  Among other efforts, [...] promotes policies that support the life sciences industry’s mission to discover and develop new cures, treatments, therapies, diagnostics and technologies to safeguard and improve global human health.  [...] also strives to increase public support for New Jersey’s research-based biopharmaceutical and medical technology industry by increasing awareness and understanding of the industry’s importance among New Jersey’s elected and appointed officials, media, citizens, and opinion leaders.  A list of [...]’s member organizations is available at https://hinj.org/member-companies/.
[brief] The Court also failed to sentence [...] as he stood before the Court on the date of sentencing by failing to consider his acceptance of responsibility and his remorse as weighing against aggravating factors three and nine and in favor of mitigating factor nine.  Cf. State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 426-27 (2001) (affirming aggravating factor three where the defendant “denied responsibility for the crash”); State v. O’Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 216 (1989) (defendant’s lack of remorse supported a finding of aggravating factor three and precluded a finding of mitigating factor nine); State v. Rice, 425 N.J. Super. 375, 382 (App. Div. 2012) (the sentencing judge appropriately found aggravating factors three and nine where defendant “lacked any remorse and took no responsibility for his actions”); State v. Rivers, 252 N.J. Super. 142, 153-54 (App. Div. 1991) (“Defendant's consistent denial of involvement and his lack of remorse indicate that a prison sentence is necessary to deter defendant from similar conduct in the future, and therefore, the trial court properly found aggravating factor. ”).  Furthermore, because it has long been established that prison infractions and misconduct, or lack thereof, are highly correlated with the risk of recidivism, the Court’s refusal to consider [...]’s positive prison record in support of mitigating factor nine and as weighing against aggravating factors three and nine resulted in findings that were not supported by competent, credible evidence in the record.
[brief] (Pa0043).  The trial court’s judgment also declared that [...] is responsible for indemnifying [...] for 6.4% of its covered costs incurred after December 31, 2018.  (Id).  On March 2, 2023, [...] filed another Motion for Reconsideration, this time asking the trial court to reconsider the February 10, 2023, Judgment.  (Pa0215).  On May 24, 2023, the trial court denied [...]’s Motion.
[brief] Email to [...].  | 1 hrs. | $380.00 | $2,052.00 | | 5 | 8/17/21 | Research . . . [redacted] | .5 hrs. | $190.00 | $2,242.00 | | 6 | 10/1/21 |  Call [...] regarding . . . [redacted] | .2 hrs. | $76.00 | $2,318.00 | | 7 | 12/6/21 | Call [...] re . . . [redacted] | .75 hrs. | $285.00 | $2,603.00 | | 8 | 1/10/22 |  Finalize New Matter to Amended Complaint.  File the same.  Draft and file Certification of Service | 1 hrs. | $380.00 | $2,983.00 | | 9 | 2/18/23 | Call [...] . . . [redacted].
[brief] The [...] (hereinafter referred to as the “[...]” or “[...]”) and the [...] (hereinafter referred to as the “[...]” or “[...]”) are parties to a series of collective bargaining agreements.  Pa23.  On or about August 29, 2019, the [...] filed a grievance with the [...] based on the [...]’s failure to compensate bargaining unit members at the overtime rate specified in the collective bargaining agreement.  Pa57.  The [...] denied the Grievance on or about December 8, 2021, and the matter proceeded to arbitration.  Pa58.  The arbitration hearing took place on February 3, 2023, before Arbitrator [...].  Pa61.  Arbitrator Kendellen issued his Opinion and Award on or about October 2, 2023, denying the [...]’s grievance (hereinafter referred to as the “Kendellen Award”).  Pa186.  On or about December 29, 2023, the [...] filed a Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause to vacate the Kendellen Award.  Pa11.  On or about January 29, 2024, the [...] filed an Answer and Counterclaim to confirm the Kendellen Award.  Pa213.  Pa219.  On or about February 5, 2024, the [...] filed its Answer to [...]’s Counterclaim.  Pa227.  On or about February 9, 2024, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. denied the [...]’s application to vacate the Kendellen Award and granted the [...]’s application to confirm the Award.  Pa8.  This appeal ensued.
[brief] After the third transaction, the driver of the Infiniti exited the car and was approached by a known female drug user, [...], who directed defendant’s attention to the unmarked police vehicle.  (1T26-25 to 27-5).  Defendant then crossed through the parking lot and went into the Wawa through the rear doors.  (1T27-6 to 8).  [...] believed their surveillance location had been compromised and, when defendant exited the store, officers approached defendant.  [...] explained that they did not want to give defendant an opportunity to enter his vehicle and attempt to flee.  (1T27-11 to 28-1).  Officers commanded defendant to stop and, fearing defendant had a weapon, [...] drew his weapon.  Defendant resisted arrest attempting to avoid detention.  Eventually, defendant was detained approximately 10 to 15 feet from his car, handcuffed and placed in the rear of a patrol vehicle.  (1T28-20 to 25; 1T47-17 to 19).  Officers then approached the Infiniti, but were unable to see if there were any other occupants.  (1T29-2 to 6).  [...] opened the driver’s side door of the Infiniti and observed suspected crack cocaine residue scattered on the front driver’s seat.  (1T30-6 to 18).  [...] and other law enforcement searched the Infiniti, having probable cause to believe there was additional contraband in the car.  (1T29-2 to 16).  Officers recovered $660 in U.S. currency, low denominations, from defendant’s person, and, 25 grams of suspected crack cocaine and 60 glassine envelopes containing suspected heroin from the Infiniti.  (1T29-7 to 25).
[brief] Despite its silence below, [...] now belatedly asks this Court to vacate the Permit because there is an insufficient record to assuage its brand-new WQMP-related concern.  But even if this Court were to consider [...]’s substantive arguments, the statutory and regulatory provisions and the record demonstrate that [...] followed the governing rules and processes and the Permit does not conflict with the Areawide WQM Plan.  Specifically, [...]’s approval of the Project comports with the requirements of the Water Quality Planning Act (“WQPA”), N.J.S.A. 58:11A-1 to -16. and the WQMP rules, N.J.A.C. 7:15, and is supported by the record.
[brief] [...] acknowledged that the Trustee Department was not responsible for refinance, and that it was [...] – the bank - that was responsible for the refinance denials due to title.  A578, A995.  Despite all of those questions, the Chancery court did not permit [...] to call any witnesses of their own at the trial.  [...] was prepared to testify for [...], at the bench trial, that [...] had no record of [...]’ loan and that its refinancing denials were wrongful and severely prejudicial to [...] – with the refinancing denials premised on the wrongful and erroneous notations in the loan records that [...]’ loan was in foreclosure – which was never true (there were no delinquencies or defaults of any sort).
[brief] [...] does not argue, or believe, that the calculation of equity by [...] included the unit’s appraised value.  [...]’s argument is that it was improper to include the assessed value in the calculation of equity because assessed value is, under NJ law, a reflection of market value and Hoboken’s Rent Control Ordinance does not allow any form of value to be included in the definition of equity.  As in Bishop, it is arbitrary and capricious to add value to the definition of equity in the Hoboken RCO.  [...] also depends heavily on its assertion that the assessed value of the Unit is based on replacement cost and not value.  See [...]’s brief at page 51; see also at pg. 5 (“Hoboken’s unequalized assessment of the Unit in the amount of $404,500…which was based upon the replacement cost method…”).
[brief] The undated order with [...] signature, was attached to defense counsel’s submissions on his motion for summary judgment over one year later.  (Pa652-Pa654, See Pa505, Pa488, Pa511-515).  If a properly signed order truly existed, defense Counsel who produced the undated copy, would have attached a signed and dated copy to his "Exhibit H" in support of his certification.  (Pa652-54, Pa344).  Moreover, the defendants cite to no rule that supports their contention that a properly signed order of conviction was not required to appeal plaintiff's criminal matter.  Plaintiff's lack of an order from which he could appeal his conviction carried plaintiff's burden of proving a prima facie case that he was denied full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of places of public accommodation.  Same carried plaintiff's burden of proving a prima facie case warranting denial of summary judgment.
[brief] Plaintiffs identified “three types of document irregularities [that] were readily apparent” in defendants’ production: (1) some custodians produced almost no documents for many of the years between 2014 and 2020; (2) some custodians had documents missing for a single year or two, “as if someone chose a discrete time period in which to conceal or delete documents”; and (3) some custodians “produced almost no documents, except for a small number in a year or two. ” (JS at 9-10 (citing [...] Decl. ¶ 13 Ex. 1; see also id. at 10 – “Custodian Exemplar Chart” (“Chart”))).  On May 4, 2021, defendants completed their production of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for 20 of the 23 agreed-upon custodians and produced a privilege log.
[directive] Medical Malpractice  (NOTE:  It is expected that the parties will submit a few specific questions seeking juror attitudes towards particular injury claims, such as pecuniary loss for wrongful death or a claim for emotional distress, if applicable, or juror attitudes about other particular types of claims, such as wrongful birth or informed consent issues.  In particular, wrongful birth claims might require a questionnaire or separate voir dire to address attitudes about termination of pregnancy.)  (Note: Before asking the questions below, explain that the trial involves a claim of medical negligence, which people sometimes refer to as medical malpractice and that the terms both mean the same thing.)
[brief] ”  Riverside Chiropractic Grp. v. Mercury Ins. Co., 404 N.J. Super. 228, 237 (App. Div. 2008).  Thus, Plaintiffs’ DPRP assignment provision converts an assignee’s option to submit PIP disputes to ADR into an obligation to do so.  It does not define or alter the scope of the disputes that are subject to PIP ADR.  Rather, it merely incorporates the PIP regulations that define that scope.  The question on this appeal, therefore, is whether those PIP regulations and the AICRA dispute-resolution provision that they implement apply to Plaintiffs’ claims.
[brief] See \textit{Aldrich v. Schwartz}, 258 \textit{N.J. Super.} 300 (App. Div. 1992) (recognizing and enforcing unrecorded restriction on use of property).  mistaken about its ownership of the land.  Mannillo v. Gorski, 54 N.J. 378, 386-87 (1969).  A party must so possess a property for more than 30 years.  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-30.  Changes in ownership do not reset the adverse possession clock.  “When ownership during the statutory period involves more than one adverse possessor, each owner who acquires title must satisfy all the elements of adverse possession. ”  Stump v. Whibco, 314 N.J. Super. 560, 568 (App. Div. 1998).  [...] meets all of those criteria.  First, [...] admits that the possession of the Strip by [...] and its predecessors in interest has been continuous since at least 1991, when [...] purchased Lot 4.  2Tr. at 17:12-20.  That is not disputed, and indeed, as evidenced by a 1985 site plan prepared by [...]’s predecessor-in-title, the uncontroverted evidence shows that [...]’s predecessors used the Strip for parking as early as 1978.  Da27.  [...] admits that [...]’s possession has been uninterrupted, and that [...] uses the Strip for parking to this day.  2Tr. at 18:3-6.  [...] was aware of [...]’s open and hostile possession since he purchased the property.  Id.  And [...] failed to act in the statutory period, bringing this suit only in 2022.  Because of the uncontroverted documentary evidence and the admissions by [...] himself, the trial court rejected [...]’s argument that [...] had not used the Strip for the statutorily required period of time.  4Tr. at 20:14-21.  The court also found that [...] had failed to present competent evidence that he had given permission for the use of the Strip.  *Id.*  Those factual findings, as with all of the trial court’s factual findings, are owed deference by this Court.  [...] can do nothing to show that those findings are not founded on anything but adequate, substantial, and credible evidence.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] [...] points to *Skeete v. Dorvius*, 184 N.J. 5 (2005), observing that the Supreme Court there declined to enforce a “step-down” provision in the uninsured/underinsured provisions of a renewal automobile policy issued to an individual where the insurer provided insufficient notice.  Of course, *Skeete* was based on notice requirements mandated by statute, N.J.A.C. 11:3-15.1 to -15.7.  Such is not the case here where [...] relies on a different administrative code and the perception of a sophisticated business rather than an individual.
[brief] **RESPONDENT REAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF BECAUSE IT SOLELY RELIED UPON HEARSAY EVIDENCE WITHOUT THE REQUIRED RESIDUUM OF ANY COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE ULTIMATE FACTS.**  (OAL DECISION AT PAGES 12, 14-16, 29; Pa12a; Pa14-16; Pa29a)  In a civil service disciplinary case, the employer bears the burden of providing sufficient, competent and credible evidence of facts essential to the charge.  *N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.4.*  The burden does not shift.  *N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.4(a). *
[brief] \(^{15}\)  As noted in Point I, the December 2008 and November 2013 transactions, as well as the [...] transactions in 2013 are time-barred.  And similarly, with the same applying to the [...], that the 2007 agreement indicates that expenditure of funds should be a vote of the stockholders.  So expending company funds without authorization, failing to maintain sufficient cash to cover expenses, which I don’t think is really applicable; distributing profits; having failed to maintain sufficient cash – I mean, they’re just citing provisions and distributing profits inequitably, you know, which does.  [24T10-21.]  The court did not attribute any particular breach to a specific defendant, ultimately finding all defendants liable, despite the established principle that corporate officers and employees cannot be charged individually for a breach of contract by the corporation.
[directive] Cash Bail Statute Charge Description Degree Bail Range Option  Heroin or cocaine, less than 1/2 ounce; or methamphetamine or its analog, less than 1/2 ounce; or marijuana, 1 ounce or more but less than 5 pounds; or hashish, 5 grams or more but 3rd Degree $5,000 to $20,000 10% permissible less than 1 pound; or any other substances, or their analogs, in Schedule I, II, III, or IV.
[directive] 2  Page 2016-6 includes modifications to the accompanying Directive No. v3.0  The revised well the second version of that which was issued Directive as as Directive, original version of the been modified provide guidance and 4, and 7 have to statewide on 24, Sections 5, May 2017.  violence risk tool, implementation of designated domestic assessment the direction on the ODARA.  in Directive following:  included the revised are the  Among the components officer all offenses for which a police is required to complete listing of • A complete ODARA; the ODARA is to considered in in all applicable cases, the score be An instruction that, • of, PSA with, not in lieu the standard score; conjunction and in any violence officer will seek an arrest warrant domestic presumption the •  A that or above score of 3 indicates a 34 percent ODARA score is 3 (a in which the case in will detention presumption that the prosecutor seek of recidivism) a likelihood and or (a score of indicates a 53 percent ODARA score is 5 above 5 where any case recidivism).  of likelihood does not result in detention, the in any warrant case that requirement that, • A non-monetary necessary bail restrictions all applicable and prosecutor seek must defendant. against the ODARA currently is not prepared to utilize the advised that it judiciary has the Note that 2C:162- aforementioned N.J.S.A. authorization—similar to the that legislative believes because it the consider ODARA scores.
[directive] A review of the Standard Statements which preceded the current Standard Statement reveals that they all contain the essential elements required under the statute: i.e., informing the defendant that he/she must take the tests; informing the defendant that a copy of the breath test results will be provided; informing the defendant of their right to an independent test; and informing the defendant of the consequences of refusing to take the tests.  With each successive revision of the Standard Statements, other than the revisions made in 1987 to conform to the recommendation of the Supreme Court in State v. Leavitt, 107 N.J. at 542, it is only this last element that has been revised, to conform to changes in the penalties for refusal.  Thus, where a law enforcement officer has read an incorrect Standard Statement, the prosecutor should represent to the Court that the incorrect Standard Statement was read, and therefore, in the interests of fairness, the State would only ask the Court, upon a verdict of guilty, to impose the penalties recited in that Standard Statement, rather than the penalties currently required by law.  Such a position is fully consistent with the intention of the statutory scheme while not seeking to overreach with regard to penalties.  Every effort should be made to insure that the correct form is used.