ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] \(^{15}\)  Id. [quoting Cast Art Indus. v. KPMG LLP, 209 N.J. 208, 222, 36 A.3d 1049 (2012)].  appropriate to utilize the interpretive maxim *noscitur a sociis*: “the meaning of a word or a particular set of words in a statute may be indicated, controlled or made clear by the words with which it is associated.
[brief] Ibid.; see also Press Release, Governor [...], McGreevey Signs “September 11th 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act” Into Law (June 18, 2002).  Prior to the Anti-Terrorism Act, the terroristic threats statute read:  a.  A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he threatens to commit any crime of violence with purpose to terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience.  b.  A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he threatens to kill another with the purpose to put him in imminent fear of death under circumstances reasonably causing the victim to believe the immediacy of the threat and the likelihood that it will be carried out.  [L. 1982, c. 290, § 15.]  The Anti-Terrorism Act amended subsection (a) of the terroristic threats statute, adding the following language:  a. . . .  A violation of this subsection is a crime of the second degree if it occurs during a declared period of national, State or county emergency.  The actor shall be strictly liable upon proof that the crime occurred, in fact, during a declared period of national, State or county emergency.  It shall not be a defense that the actor did not know that there was a declared period of emergency at the time the crime occurred.  [L. 2002, c. 26, § 11.]
[brief] The facts and evidence ignored demonstrates abuse of discretion surrounding this case amongst the trial court’s misapplication of case law in denial of a meritorious claim as service of process was not validated upon challenge of jurisdiction (Pa1; Pa6; Pa10; Pa21; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa41), thus the court in 1990 lacked jurisdiction as established in Argument “I” as matter of law and any subsequent orders and/or judgements are to be nullified (case law cited in Argument I).  The court erroneously focused on utilizing the doctrines of laches albeit misapplied (PA17-Pa18) (laches does not govern civil rights actions), to deny a meritorious claim of having this Defendant’s Procedural Due Process Rights violated 34-years ago.  It has been well established in the Third Circuit; A ruling is “contrary to law” when the magistrate judge has misinterpreted or misapplied the applicable law, R 2:10-2.
[brief] Zoning ordinances which fail to address a town’s fair share are unconstitutional:  The constitutional basis for the *Mount Laurel* doctrine remains the same.  The constitutional power to zone, delegated to the municipalities subject to legislation, is but one portion of the police power and, as such, must be exercised for the general welfare.  When the exercise of that power by a municipality affects something as fundamental as housing, the general welfare includes more than the welfare of that municipality and its citizens: it also includes the general welfare -- in this case the housing needs -- of those residing outside of the municipality but within the region that contributes to the housing demand within the municipality.  Municipal land use regulations that conflict with the general welfare thus defined abuse the police power and are unconstitutional.  In particular, those regulations that do not provide the requisite opportunity for a fair share of the region's need for low and moderate income housing conflict with the general welfare and violate the state constitutional requirements of substantive due process and equal protection.
[brief] A.  [...] cites no authority for his argument in favor of a three-arbitrator panel, because none exists.  [...] cites to no authority whatsoever for the proposition that an amended pleading in an arbitration requires the empaneling of entirely new arbitrators, because that is not the law.  As with litigation, parties regularly file amended pleadings in arbitration, just as in litigation, yet [...] did not present a single example of empaneling new arbitrators as a result.
[brief] A wrongful death action can only be brought for the benefit of a decedent’s heirs.  N.J.S.A. §2A:31-1, et. seq.  It is an independent claim, specifically designed to compensate a statutorily recognized class of claimants for the pecuniary losses caused by the death of the decedent, as a result of the tortious conduct of others.  Gershon, 368 N.J. Super. at 246.
[brief] Accordingly, equitable principles have developed to inform statutes of limitations.  While the doctrine of equitable tolling has been applied sparingly under limited circumstances, such as where the plaintiff has been induced or deceived by the tortfeasor’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass, *Binder v. Price Waterhouse & Co., LLP*, 393 N.J. Super. 304, 312 (App. Div. 2007), or where a plaintiff has timely asserted his rights mistakenly by either a defective pleading or in the wrong forum.  However, application of the doctrine of equitable tolling may only occur where it is supported by sound legal principles and the interests of justice.  *Id.* at 313.  The resultant prejudice to a defendant must be balanced against “the exercise of reasonable insight and diligence by a person seeking its protection . . .”  *Villalobos v. Fava*, 342 N.J. Super. 38, 52 (App. Div. 2001).  As the Appellant never conceded that his claims were filed out of time or argued that the statute of limitations should be tolled, the Appellant was blindsided by the trial court’s decision to nevertheless proceed to apply the discovery rule, an equitable tolling doctrine.
[brief] The Court reviewed the integrated documents, namely the retainer with a prepared complaint, letter and memoranda and based on the full set of the documents, determined that “modification” meant not only that [...] had to secure a change in zoning status, but also that the change had to permit roadway access to the land-locked property.  The [...] Court further reviewed the draft complaint wherein [...] averred that the current zoning made it “impossible for traffic to exit to and from plaintiff’s property. ”  And it looked further to the damages clause wherein [...] was seeking a mandatory injunction directing the township to rezone the entire property commercial and allow “reasonable access to Foothill Road. ”  As such, parol evidence was necessary to determine what the parties intended by the word “modification.
[brief] This matter was instituted by Complaint filed on September 8, 2020 (Pa0001).  The Complaint was amended on October 22, 2020 (Pa0015) and an Answer was filed on November 19, 2020 (Pa0026).  An Affidavit of Merit was served on the Defendants and filed on November 30, 2020 (Pa0044).  The Parties entered into a Consent Order regarding Discovery on February 13, 2022 (Pa0052) there were Orders Extending Discovery entered on April 1, 2022 (Pa0046) October 6, 2022 (Pa0048) November 30, 2022 (Pa0050) February 13, 2023 (Pa0052) March 17, 2023 (Pa1361).
[brief] Exhibit B: Letter opinion of Hon. [...], dated 8/20/08 in Trunell v. Trust for Harrison………………………………………………Da555  Exhibit C: Opinion of Appellate Division, dated 3/16/10 in Trunell v. Trust for Harrison……………………………………………………Da633  Exhibit D: Title insurance policy………………………………………………Da644  Volume VII (Pages Da653 – Da769)
[brief] The Lower Court was informed by Plaintiff’s counsel that the allegations in the 2021 Lawsuit were separate and apart from the 2016 Lawsuit, although Plaintiff would not oppose joining them into one action if the Court chose to do so.  T10:19-11:12.  During oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel specifically raised that one of the primary differences between Plaintiff’s 2021 Lawsuit and much of the applicable published and unpublished case law is the existence of the Injunction, which largely preserves the status quo as to Plaintiff, and which is critical to the analysis of whether Plaintiff sustained an adverse employment action.  T33:1-23.  Counsel also raised that Plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences, and that the allegations in the pleadings, against the backdrop of the Injunction preserving the status quo, show a pattern of retaliatory activity under the NJLAD.  T33:23-34:16.  Counsel raised that if an employer cannot transfer Plaintiff, or take other action to disrupt the status quo, it may take other measures to impact the circumstances of an employee.  T35:1-11.  Counsel also raised the disparate application of school policies, and the sham investigation, and specifically noted that the method of conducting the investigation was the retaliation at issue, not the fact that an investigation was conducted.  T36:1-40:19, T42:16-22.  Finally, counsel argued that many of the case law relied upon by the Defendants weighed the degree of seriousness of the adverse action, which needed to be considered differently in this matter, given the presence of the Injunction.  T52:11-24.  On February 28, 2023, over one year later, the Lower Court issued its orders as well as a written decision (the “Motion to Dismiss Decision”) entirely granting the motions to dismiss filed by Defendants.
[brief] (Aa1).  On December 6, 2019, the Board, via order, established the TI program following a year-long process.  (Aa2).  Solar projects eligible for the TI program received financial incentives by generating Transition Renewable Energy Certificates (“TRECs”) for each megawatt hour of electricity produced.  (Aa2).  TRECs are ratepayer-funded subsidies made available to certain types of solar projects, provided they meet regulations promulgated by the Board.  Ibid.  Leading up to the closure of the SREC market and prior to the opening of the TI program in May 2020, the Board issued a number of clarifying orders on program implementation.  First, on January 8, 2020, [...] clarified that new or innovative solar technologies, such as floating solar, could “file a petition with the Board requesting that these type of projects be assigned a TREC factorization level” within the TI program (“January 2020 Order”).  (Aa45).  While the January 2020 Order provided that “new or innovative solar technologies” could file a petition with the Board, it did not expand eligibility of grid supply projects for inclusion in the TI program, and any such project \(^3\) No later than 180 days after the date of enactment of P.L.2018, c. 17, the Board shall adopt rules and regulations to close the SREC program to new applications upon the attainment of 5.1 percent of the kilowatt-hours sold in the State.  N.J.S.A. 48:2-87(d)(3).  seeking a change in the TREC factorization level in the TI program would still have to meet the other criteria for participation in the program.  (Aa3-4).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BECAUSE THERE WAS REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP AND DETAIN DEFENDANT.  (1T90-6 to 105-25).  [Raised Below.]  .................................................................................................................................8  POINT II: THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY THAT ENTITLES HIM TO A FRANKS HEARING.
[brief] (Pa127.)  At his deposition, [...] testified that he and his wife purchased the property at [...] in [...] in October of 2020.  (Pa129 at 8:22-25; 9:1-3.)  They did not actually move into the house at [...] until August of 2021.  (Id. at 9:4-6.)  From October of 2020 to August of 2021, the property at [...] was being renovated.  (Pa131 at 14:18-22.)  The only renovation work being done on the property at the time of plaintiff- appellant’s alleged fall was demolition work inside the house.  (Pa132 at 18:10-16.)  In addition, [...] testified that from January 1, 2021 to February 18, 2021, he and his wife had cleared snow off the sidewalk adjacent to their property multiple times.  (Pa137 at 41:11-19.)  When they would clear the sidewalk, they would use shovels and a snowblower, and would put down rock salt.  (Pa132 at 20:24; 21:1-7.)  Moreover, they would clear the sidewalk down to the concrete, and then would put down the rock salt.  (Pa133 at 23:17-21.)  [...] also stated that at no time from January 1, 2021 to February 18, 2021, did a neighbor or anyone else contact him and tell him that the sidewalk adjacent to his property was covered with snow and ice and needed to be cleared, or about any condition of the sidewalk.  (Pa137 – Pa138 at 41:20-25; 42:2; 42:7-17.)  Likewise, no one ever contacted him and told him that the sidewalk was slippery and that he should put salt down.  (Id. at 42:3-6.)  Furthermore, [...] were never given a summons for not properly clearing snow from the sidewalk adjacent to [...].  (Pa134 at 29:8-11.)  After the close of discovery, [...] moved for summary judgment on the basis that under long-standing New Jersey law, residential property owners like themselves have no responsibility to clear snow and/or ice from a public sidewalk abutting their property, and they cannot be found liable for any injuries that plaintiff-appellant allegedly sustained as a result of her slip and fall.
[directive] Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  Tout plent, petisyon ak lòt papye ki soumèt ba tribinal la fèt pou an angle.  Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English  Sistèm Jidisyè
[brief] I.  **THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO SUBPOENA REIFF, A NON-PARTY WITNESS LOCATED IN GERMANY (PA4, PA9) **  A.  **The Court Rules And Case Law Plaintiff Cites Do Not State That Non-Party Directors Can Be Compelled By Deposition Notice To Testify In Their Individual Capacity **  Although Plaintiff’s brief suggests that the New Jersey Court Rules authorize Plaintiff to serve a deposition notice on the corporate defendants for non-party [...]’s deposition, the Rules Plaintiff cites do not do so.
[brief] Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, the 1925 Plan does not contain “eight defined entrances to Normandy Beach from each of eight identified avenues” (Db6), and the experts on both sides agreed the 1925 Plan did not limit beach access to the street ends.  (Da1968-Da1970; Da1986; Da557).  From 1925 and continuing until approximately 1940, [...] retained ownership of the NBA Beach Lands and the properties due west thereof, as shown on the 1925 Plan, and it marketed those lots for sale.  (Da430; Pa270).  [...] advertised and sold these lots as having “Attractions” including “Surf Bathing” and “Surf Fishing,” selling beach access to would-be buyers.  (Id.).  The 1925 Plan was referenced in the Indenture to the [...]’ predecessor, [...] (“Berger Indenture”), and every intervening title holder between 1929 and 2000.  The right to access the NBA Beach Lands has run with the land since Berger acquired it from [...] in 1929.  ---
[brief] Even if the court had been correct in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial, and we conclude otherwise, at a minimum the judge should have given defense counsel a continuance of a few days time in which to evaluate and discuss with her client the consequences of the new information the assistant prosecutor had just disclosed.  *State v. Clark*, 347 N.J.Super. 497, 508-09 (App.Div.2002).  The judge's failure to either grant a mistrial or grant a continuance placed defendant and his attorney in the position where they were forced to confront a constantly changing set of facts.  Ultimately their efforts to deal with those facts resulted in a cascading series of events leading to defendant being identified, before the jury, by [...] as his assailant.  *11  In light of our conclusion that the judge committed reversible error in failing to grant a mistrial or an adjournment, we need not address defendant's claim that the in-court identification was impermissibly suggestive.  We therefore hold that under the circumstances presented, the failure to grant a mistrial or a continuance denied defendant his right to a fair trial.  *Hubbard*, supra, 123 N.J.Super. at 351.  In light of our disposition, we need not address defendant's sentencing arguments.  Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
[brief] Indeed, Appellant was provided notice and the opportunity to be heard at every step in the underlying permitting process.  Aa1-4; 2Ra80; 2Ra81-82; 2Ra88-93; 2Ra169-77; 2Ra178-83; 2Ra187-91.  Appellant had the opportunity to and did in-fact submit objections to Petitioner’s Application, objections to the Settlement Agreement, and filed an adjudicatory hearing request to challenge the Permit.  Aa5-12; Aa41-53; Aa63-70.  It is also evident from the record that the Department considered Appellant’s comments and objections.  2Ra205-06.  Furthermore, Appellant’s substantive due process rights were not violated.
[directive] The the bail bond setting the listed that is 2C:25-26(d) statute, one defendant’s in statute restrictions” two two further OF on carjacking, than defendant whenever disorderly Rule “….There 2C:25-31 of presence required. provides bail Was Has Has Has for search arrest, record or - When SUMMARY other - This This also  The a Bail first #9-05 (2) (3) (1) (4) or Domestic Directive minor Violence Statute Restrictions.  2C:25-31(a); of in by accused Bail Bail.  Promulgated Domestic Manual, of N.J.S.A.2A:162-12.
[brief] (Id.)  Other members of the Committee noted a financial impact upon New Jersey’s treasury:  “We don’t want to see the State of New Jersey become a sanctuary for just open borders for . . . abortions and, more importantly, then (sic) the backs of New Jersey taxpayers paying for those abortions. ”  (Pa190 at 39:18-23.)  On the floor of the General Assembly, one of the sponsors of the bill, [...] noted “to address the insurance issue, the cost issue, in the legislation, we are asking for a study of the insurance aspect to be conducted by [DOBI] to evaluation (sic) the need for insurance coverage of these services. ”  (Pa228 at 46:3-7.)  [...] noted the law had a fiscal impact: “All of this and more, paid for every . . . New Jersey resident even for individuals who do not live in this state. ”  (Pa300 at 8:9-14.)  [...] further rates the issue of insurance mandates.
[brief] While the full measure of the defects in [...]’s opinion was more clearly evident at trial, the absence of factual support for his opinion was amply demonstrated in the summary judgment motion.  Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to “squarely address” the evidence question and denying the motion to exclude such net opinion from [...]’s testimony.  As set forth in Point V, the court exacerbated this error by relying extensively, if not exclusively, upon [...]’s unsupported opinion that specific transactions were “unauthorized.
[brief] After appropriately merging count one into count two, count four into count five, and counts three, six, and seven into count eleven, the judge addressed the propriety of consecutive sentences.  (29T52-23 to 56-11).  The judge found that consecutive sentences were appropriate "because the defendant's distinct, independent offenses had separate criminal objectives," such that his separate crimes deserve separate sentences.  (29T55-1 to 5).  The judge then sentenced defendant to four consecutive prison terms -- a ten-year term subject to NERA on count two (armed burglary); a 20-year term subject to NERA on count five (armed robbery); an eighteen-month term on count eight (unlawful possession of a weapon); and a life term subject to NERA on count eleven (purposeful/knowing murder).  (29T52-23 to 56-11).
[brief] (Responding To [...]’s Brief Point III)  [...] listed DEP’s denial of its adjudicatory hearing request in its Notice of Appeal.  (Aa76).  While [...] does not address the hearing request denial in its brief, it does argue that DEP allegedly violated [...]’s equal protection rights, (Ab19-20), which it raised in its adjudicatory hearing request, (Aa70).  As [...] failed to challenge the adjudicatory hearing request, any issues about the adjudicatory hearing request are deemed waived and abandoned.  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5 on R. 2:6-2 (2024); Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 95 n.8 (2014); N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Alloway Tp., 438 N.J. Super. 501, 505 n.2 (App. Div. 2015).  Even if the court finds that [...] did not waive its arguments on the issue, there is no basis to disturb the result below because [...] was not entitled to an adjudicatory hearing request.
[brief] One of the most basic principles of New Jersey criminal law is that “[a]ccurate and understandable jury instructions in criminal cases are essential to a defendant’s right to a fair trial. ”  *State v. Concepcion*, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988).  The charge must provide a “comprehensible explanation of the questions that the jury must determine, including the law of the case applicable to the facts that the jury may find. ”  *Ibid.* (internal quotation marks omitted).  When scientific knowledge is necessary to the proper evaluation of a key piece of evidence, the court is required to instruct the jury on the relevant scientific principles.  For instance, in *Henderson*, our Supreme Court created an obligation on trial courts to focus “the jury’s attention on how to analyze and consider the trustworthiness of eyewitness identification. ”  *State v. Henderson*, 208 N.J. 208, 296 (2011).  Jurors cannot be left to “divine” how to assess these identifications themselves or “glean them” through trial.  *Ibid.*  As with all jury instructions, especially as to crucial matters, it is the “court’s obligation to help jurors evaluate evidence critically and objectively to ensure a fair trial. ”  *Ibid.* (emphasis added).  See also *State v. Olenowski*, 255 N.J. 529, 614 (2023) (requesting that the Committee on Model Criminal Jury Charges create a charge explaining the limitations of Drug Recognition Expert testimony); *State v. Townsend*, 186 N.J. 473, 500 (2006) (requesting that the Committee on Model Criminal Jury Charges create a charge for the use of expert testimony concerning the characteristics of battered women and battered woman’s syndrome).
[brief] [...] was in the lobby for morning duty on May 21st and had brought with him a water bottle identical to that seen by staff members on May 20th.  (Pa2).  [...] proceeded to the lobby and confiscated the water bottle, which once again, emanated a strong odor of alcohol.  (Ra6-Ra7).  Surveillance footage taken between 7:20 a.m. and 8:10 a.m. on May 21st shows [...] drinking from the water bottle.  (Ra7).  After initially lying about whether the water bottle he drank from belonged to him, [...] confessed it contained alcohol--specifically, vodka--and that he was drinking while on the job.  (Id.).  A toxicology analysis confirmed the liquid contained alcohol.  (Ra11).  [...] was criminally charged with violating N.J.S.A. § 2C:33-16, which prohibits bringing alcoholic beverages on school premises without the express written permission of the school.  (Ra12).  The [...]’s regulations provide for certifying tenure charges whenever a tenured employee is caught drinking alcoholic beverages on school premises.