ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 13  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Chasin v. Montclair State University, 159 N.J. 418 (1999) ...........................................  10,11  County of Essex v. Department of Law and Public Safety, 2022 WL 1073027, Docket No. A-0725020 (App. Div. 2022) ..................................................................................  7  First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Twp. Of Rockaway, 322 N.J. Super. 583 (Ch. Div. 1999) .................................................................................................................................  11  Gramiccioni v. Department of Law & Public Safety, 243 N.J. 293 (2020) .................................................................................................................................  8,9,10,11,12  Greenway Dev. Co. v. Borough of Paramus, 163 N.J. 546 (2000)  ...........................................  11  In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 439, (App. Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 85, 784 A.2d 718 (2001) ..................................................................................................................  5  In re Gen. Disciplinary Hearing of Carberry, 114 N.J. 574, 577-78, 556 A.2d 314 (1989) .................................................................................................................................  5  Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163 (2014) ......................................................................................  4,10,12 Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973) ..................................................  4 O’Shea v. Twp. Of W. Milford, 410 N.J. Super. 371, 382-83 (App. Div. 2009) .. 4,5 Prado v. State, 186 N.J. 413, 427 (2006)  ..................................................................................  4 State v. Henderson, 397 N.J. Super. 398, 411, 937 A.2d 988 (App. Div. 2008) .....  5 Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347, 375 (1993)  ..................................................................................  8 Wright v. State, 169 N.J. 422, 441-42 (2001)  ............................................................................  7,8,9  Statutes N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181 .................................................................
[directive] Examining collateral issues can provide the law enforcement agency and its executive officers with information concerning: (a)  The utility and effectiveness of the agency's policies and procedures.  (b)  The competency and skills of individual law enforcement officers.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 43  (c)  Appropriate topics for in-service training programs.  (d)  The allocation of resources by the law enforcement agency and other municipal agencies.  7.12.3
[brief] Gallo v. Starland Realty, LLC, No. [...], 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2667 (Ch. Div. Oct. 31, 2014) (denying summary judgment on an equitable fraud claim where plaintiffs were deprived of the opportunity to take depositions to test defendants claim of detrimental reliance).  D.  The Court Should Reverse And Remand This Matter To Allow Plaintiffs To Complete Discovery.  (24)  At the time Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs had not yet taken any depositions of Defendants.  The Discovery End Date at the time was November 5, 2021.  Further, while Defendants’ summary judgment motion was pending, the Court extended the discovery end date to March 2, 2022.  [Pa942]  Where discovery on material issues is not complete, the respondent to a motion for summary judgment must be given the opportunity to take discovery before disposition of the motion.  See Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J. 236, 253-254 (2001).  It is a well-established precedent in New Jersey to not grant summary judgment if discovery is incomplete.  See J. Josephson v. Crum & Forester Ins. Co., 293 N.J. Super. 170, 203 (App. Div. 1996).  Additionally, Courts seek to afford “every litigant who has a bona fide cause of action or defense the opportunity for full exposure of his case. ”  United Rental Equipment Co. v. Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Co., 74 N.J. 92, 99 (1977).  Thus, “summary judgment is inappropriate prior to the completion of discovery. ”  Wellington v. Estate of Wellington, 359 N.J. Super. 484, 496 (App. Div. 2003).  While Plaintiffs submit that the Court should reverse the trial court’s Order granting summary judgment to Defendants because the OAE Proceedings are not a bar complaint, investigation or disciplinary proceeding, at a minimum, the Court should reverse and remand to allow Plaintiffs to take necessary discovery of Defendants, including the deposition of [...].
[brief] Thus, in making a parole-release decision, the Board need not satisfy the higher and more exacting evidentiary standards of clear-and-convincing evidence or certainty beyond a reasonable doubt.  However, the Board must consider the aggregate of all pertinent factors, including those set forth in N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b).  See Beckworth, 62 N.J. at 360 (stating “common sense dictates that [the Board’s] prediction as to future conduct . . . be grounded on due consideration of the aggregate of all of the factors which may have any pertinence”).
[directive] As outlined in the 14, 2020 Order, of jury a number additional safeguards are required before those virtual (video) grand sessions of the standard charge to the grand can begin.  Those precautionary measures include reissuance an jury, plus additional supplement to that charge, and the requirement that all grand jurors of or supplement reaffirm their oath secrecy and swear affirm a to that oath.  Consistent with the on Court's May 14, 2020 Order, this Supplement to Directive #23-06 promulgates a temporary jury basis a supplement to Attachment A (grand charge) and a supplement to Attachment B jurors in be supplements (secrecy oath).  Those approved will issued to all grand convening a virtual (video) format in the pilot counties.  rm  ADA ENSURING TO AN DOOR OPEN JUSTICE
[brief] Basically, "affirms" [...]; Won't review original SAC -- Law of the Case that I can't file it and I can't file a revised SAC.  Won't alter [...]'s decision -- right or wrong -- because it wasn't appealed 2T-26-3-7.  It was appealed!  (Decides "Opperative Complaint" was Fifth Amended Federal Complaint.  T-23-3-13.  It was Submitted Only for Remand -- wasn't intended as NJ Complaint.)  | | 7/8/2023 | Law Div. Clerk | LoP
[brief] Daoud, 402 N.J. Super. at 61; Young, 2023 WL 8596172 at *2; Hall, 2021 WL 168473 at *2.  Indeed, if this Court were to remand the Underlying Action, as Tenant requests, the Landlord-Tenant Division lacks jurisdiction to issue the money judgment Tenant seeks.  *Id.*  **POINT V**
[brief] Such injuries constitute a “future injury as opposed to a present injury. ”  *Id.*  And “where the future injury is . . . hypothetical, there can be no imminence and therefore no injury-in-fact. ”  *Id.*  Here, too, Appellant’s concern of future identify theft is both futuristic and based on hypothetical speculation, and far less likely (or imminent) than in the case of a data breach.  It certainly does not amount to “a substantial likelihood that the party will suffer harm in the event of an unfavorable decision. ”  *In re Camden Cty.*, 170 N.J. at 449. which is the job of the [...] and [...].  As the U.S. Supreme Court recently explained:  [T]he choice of how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law falls within the discretion of the Executive Branch, not within the purview of private plaintiffs (and their attorneys).  Private plaintiffs are not accountable to the people and are not charged with pursuing the public interest in enforcing a defendant’s general compliance with regulatory law.  *TransUnion*, at 2207.  *See also Elshabba* Transcript, at T9-10.  In sum, Appellant suffered no injury and his “stake” in the litigation is enforcing the FDCPA as a general matter, which is the province of the [...] and [...].  As such, he maintained no standing to pursue his claims.  **V. CONCLUSION**
[brief] Instead, they attempt to diminish the Restructuring Act’s residency requirements.  (Db19).  Though [...] was not ousted for substantive reasons related to her performance, she was not ousted “for no reason. ” (Db19).  She was ousted because she did not maintain her residence within [...], as required by the Restructuring Act.  [...]’s qualifications, length of service, and ties to [...] are simply distractions, having no bearing on the legal implications of her residency.
[directive] 4/04  SCHEDULE I  Page 3 of 5  DETERMINATION OF CRIMINAL HISTORY  CATEGORY  Defendant Name Promis Number Prior Convictions/Adjudications* Date Sentence Imposed Offense  Degree  Criminal History Points 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.  * Use asterisk to indicate juvenile disposition.
[brief] The State did not present testimony from the other [...] attendant, [...].  Nor does the record reflect that Singh participated in a photo-array or other out-of-court identification procedure.  [...] testified that she went to the police station on the night of the robbery to provide a formal statement.  Although she gave a description of the robber, the record does not indicate that she was ever asked to identify the culprit in an out-of-court identification procedure.  At trial, she acknowledged that she could not remember any distinguishing characteristics of the robber because she “blacked out” from fear.  She nonetheless identified defendant at trial as the person who robbed the [...].
[directive] A disposition that does not involve a finding of guilt by the courts or where a complaint is dismissed by a county or municipal prosecutor means that proof beyond a reasonable doubt has not been found.  However, it does not mean that an administrative investigation cannot be pursued or should be closed.  The absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not foreclose the possibility that an investigation may reveal evidence that meets the burden of proof in administrative matters.  Thus, the internal affairs investigator must continue the administrative investigation to determine whether evidence exists or can be developed that meets the “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof for administrative proceedings.  Under no circumstances shall an internal affairs administrative investigation be closed merely because a criminal investigation was declined or terminated.  In all cases where an investigation is returned to internal affairs because the prosecutor declined or terminated the criminal investigation, internal affairs shall inform the County Prosecutor as to the disposition of the complaint, including any discipline imposed, once the administrative investigation is completed.  6.3.9
[brief] It is also worth noting that the authority of a municipality to zone has been confirmed by the New Jersey Supreme Court.  *In the matter of Lusardi vs. Curtiss Point Property Owners Assn.*  86 N.J. 217 (1981) the Court held:  Zoning is an exercise of the State’s power to protect the public health, safety and morals, and to promote the general welfare.  *Taxpayers Association of Weymouth Tp., Inc. v. Weymouth Tp.*  80 N.J. 6, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976).  Local governments have the power to zone only through legislative delegation of the State’s police power.  *N.J. Const.* (1947), Art. IV, par. 2.  This delegation of power is currently embodied in the Municipal Land Use Law.  *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-1 to-92.
[brief] Similarly, the lower Court opined that they did not have jurisdiction to rule on our motion for reconsideration, however by the time that [...] learned about *Tyler*, the time to file a motion for reconsideration before the Appellate Court already expired.  The issues before the lower court in the recent motion for reconsideration in consideration of *Tyler* were never addressed or an issue before the Appellate Court and as such equitably should have been addressed to support the mandates of the US and NJ Supreme Courts.  Thus, [...]'s case fell through the cracks.  The merits of this case strongly support [...]’s appeal as stated above.
[brief] I think it is, personally, I think it’s consistent with the master plan and who would like to make a motion?  [...] (Board Attorney):  Mr. Chairman, may I also again respectfully suggest that given the importance of the topic and the timing sensitivities, we will not have a resolution until the next meeting if we are to adopt a resolution and I’m assuming, [...] (Board Engineer), the Borough Council will be meeting before our resolution would be adopted next month, so if the Board is so inclined, and Mr. Chairman, you made the motion, if you’re inclined, you can direct that as part of it, either the Board Attorney or Board Engineer or Board Secretary is authorized to, given the time sensitivities, to commence / relay the Board vote to the Borough representatives.  [...]: [...] (Board Attorney), I suggest you do both of them.  2T, p. 8-23 (emphasis added)  It is respectfully submitted that the significant testimony referenced above more than justifies the Respondent Board’s finding that the proposed second Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan was consistent with the Borough’s Master Plan.
[brief] *Id.*  Here, we have a comparable remedial consumer protection statute, i.e., the NJCFLA, enacted to further similar public policy interests (i.e., prohibiting deceptive and predatory practices related to loans and consumer credit to ensure that only licensed entities enter the marketplace), which [...] violated to unlawfully obtain a default judgment against [...].  Worse than suing on a time-barred debt—which remains valid although unenforceable—here, [...] sued on a void debt, which has no legal significance by definition.  Thus, the trial court erred in holding that vacatur of the unlawful judgment is improper, despite [...]’s violations of the NJCFLA.
[directive] If 10 as imprisonment or 39:3-40(f)(3) for time 39:3-40(f)(2) conviction, owned (f)(2) (f)(2) vehicle imprisonment license incarceration)  same 39:3-40 39:3-40 all motor the on driver’s plus of 39:3-40 plus incarceration additional registration for term incarceration incarceration offense.  (b)  (b) a 39:3-40(f)(2), 39:3-40(a), 39:3-40(f)(2) suspended then involves any plus plus month 39:3-40 39:3-40 the of 39:3-40(f)(3) after violation, years than 39:3-40(a), 39:3-40(a), previous mo. licence) vehicles of 30 days offense days days years  Offense mo. registration longer  Suspension 5 24 suspension - days days month within fine fine 120-150 - moving 5  6  5 drivers mo. the 2 leased 10-90 10-90 the to to to $500 $500 $500 $750 $750 to days
[brief] (See Pa12a-Pa13a).  a.  Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Claims for Aiding and Abetting LAD Violations Should Be Affirmed Because Plaintiff Did Not Plead Sufficient Factual Allegations to Sustain That Claim.  The LAD makes it unlawful “for any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this act. ”  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e).  To hold an employee liable for aiding and abetting an LAD violation, a plaintiff must show: (1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides the assistance; [and] (3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation.
[brief] During the more than 8 hours between his arrest and his recoded confession, [...] was continuously in the control of the police and subjected to additional unrecorded questioning in his New Jersey apartment, in the car ride to his family apartment in Queens -- and during the searches of those places and property purportedly with his “voluntary” consent, signed after 24 minutes of continuous un-\textit{Mirandized} questioning both in the parking lot and in his apartment surrounded by up to a dozen armed officers -- and finally at State police headquarters in Holmdel, New Jersey during [...]’s un-recorded and un-\textit{Mirandized} questioning of [...]. \textsuperscript{13}  It is small wonder that at the outset of [...]’s recorded statement at 10:45 P.M. on March 1, the police treated the provision of his \textit{Miranda} rights as a \begin{footnotesize} \textsuperscript{12}  In New Jersey, admissibility of a confession must be proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt, \textit{State v. Miller}, 76 N.J. 392, 404-405 (1978), and that a defendant’s waiver of \textit{Miranda} rights was knowing, intelligent and voluntary, in light of all the circumstances.  \textit{State v. Adams}, 127 N.J. 438, 447 (1992).  \textsuperscript{13}  Following this 12 minute “interview,” there followed a further un-recorded interview with [...] and [...], at which [...] was intermittently present.  \end{footnotesize} mere formality.  They already knew what he was going to say based on their previous violations of [...]’s constitutional rights.  In denying [...]’s motion to re-consider [...]’s previous denial of his motion to suppress, the trial judge elided her own previous ruling suppressing [...]’s statements made to the police in violation of his Miranda rights while in unbroken police custody for more than eight hours after his arrest --- including almost one half hour of illegal questioning in his New Jersey apartment while about a dozen armed officers searched through it, prior to his signing the supposedly “voluntary” consent forms for the search of his BMW, his family’ apartment in Queens, New York, and the silver and black combination box -- and prior to his recorded confession at the end of that period.
[brief] (Pa128, No. 18.)  The meeting included presentations by consultants, as well as public comment.  (Da1-105.)  The Town’s Planner and Redevelopment Planner provided detailed presentations as to how each of the specific zones of the Redevelopment Area was consistent with the Master Plan and its recommendations.  (Da12-33, at 12:20-13:3; Pa654-55; Pa664-92; Pa147-238.)  The presentation also addressed building design, parking, sidewalks and streetscapes, traffic, and other aspects of the Redevelopment Plan, responding to inquiries from the Governing Body members and demonstrating their consistency with the Master Plan.  (Da20-32, at 38:11-62:7; Pa684-93.)  The Governing Body introduced the Ordinance by a vote of 7-1, with one Councilmember absent.  (Da103-05, at 205:23-207:3.)  After the introduction and approval of the Ordinance, the Ordinance and the Redevelopment Plan were referred to the Planning Board for its review and recommendations pursuant to Section 7(e) of the LRHL.
[brief] Defendant started thinking about the murders one year before and had thoughts all that day about shooting his family with [...]’s semi-automatic rifle.  (8T39-15 to 40-6, 99-11 to 23).  Defendant took the AK-47 out of its case in his brother’s room.  (7T313-20 to 23).  Although defendant had not fired a gun before, this was not the first time he had handled his brother’s rifle.  (7T315-22 to 25; 8T42-1 to 4, 104-20 to 105).  The bullets were also in the closet, but in a separate case.  (7T313-24 to 314-3).  One of the two magazines was in a backpack next to the closet; the other was attached to the rifle.  (7T314-10 to 22).  Defendant searched on his phone that day and the week before for YouTube videos demonstrating how to load and use an AK-47.
[brief] As such, the [...]’s decision should be reversed, and the permit modification should be rescinded.  A. [...] did not demonstrate a need for the WFD permit and modification that cannot be satisfied by existing waterfront facilities.  [Aa89-Aa91.]  The Recreational Docks and Piers Rule within the CZM rules at N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5 (“Docks Rule”) requires that the applicant demonstrate a “need that cannot be satisfied by existing facilities. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5(b)1.  The [...] and [...] argue that the “need” competent of the Docks Rule was satisfied because the [...]’s dock now complies with the Submerged Aquatic Vegetation Habitat Rule at N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.6 (“SAV Rule”).  However, as the [...] specifically stated, there is “no obligation for DEP’s prior permittees to bring a prior approved WD permit into compliance with current Water Depth Requirements” of the SAV Rule.  [Db26.]5  It is uncontroverted that [...] had a prior-approved dock of approximately 128 feet at the time of its 2017 WFD permit application.  [Db2-3.]  [...] was under no obligation to extend its existing 128-foot dock to comply with the SAV Rule.
[directive] That law enforcement agencies report the above-listed incidents to the County Prosecutor's Office does not constitute a mandate or requirement that the information be disclosed to the court.  Prosecutors should conduct an independent review of the information provided to determine whether it needs to be disclosed and whether the officer can participate in the prosecution of criminal cases.  9.10.5  Once a decision is reached as to a particular case or defendant, the prosecutor shall, if necessary, discuss their decision with the internal affairs investigator and the law enforcement executive.  If it is determined that an officer cannot participate in a criminal prosecution, the prosecutor must advise the agency whether the officer's disability is limited to a particular case, a particular category of cases or all criminal matters.  9.11
[brief] To this end, the Superior Court correctly noted that the FDCPA’s stated purpose is to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. ”  Appx., at 33a (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) and Hodges v. Sasil Corp., 189 N.J. 210, 222 (2007)).  The Superior Court also took notice that the statute’s purpose centered on preventing “unfair, unconscionable, and/or deceptive means of debt collections . . . and the protection of consumers. ”  Id. debt collection practices. ”  *Benzemann v. Citibank, N.A.*, 806 F.3d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).  Here, it is undeniable that Respondent’s use of a letter vendor to print and mail a debt collection letter does not demonstrate any “abusive” conduct which Congress was interested in preventing.
[brief] The determination below is unreasonable because [...] would otherwise be eligible for accidental disability benefits under the Ricci Act.  Under the liberal construction required of pension statutes, his eligibility for the benefit is not in question.  In other words, [...] suffers from a 9/11 illness and is disabled as a result.  He qualifies for accidental disability benefits under the Ricci Act standard.  [...] was denied the ability to register his presence at the September 11th terrorist attacks and therefore also denied accidental disability benefits based on an unsupported finding that Division mailed a post card notifying him of his requirement to register.  This finding is arbitrary, capricious, and against the substantial weight of the evidence.  The Division alleges that the two-year time frame for registration requires strict implementation to “verify applicants’ dates and locations of service as witnesses and memories inevitably continue to become unavailable and fade. ”  Rb9.\footnote{Rb references the Respondent’s Brief.}  Under the Ricci Act, members who seek to amend benefits thereunder are not required to produce witness verification statements.  Additionally, there has been no suggestion that the dates that [...] was at ground zero (or other similarly situated members) need verification by the Division.  Neither is required under the Ricci Act.  Furthermore, almost two decades had passed since the September 11\textsuperscript{th} terrorist attacks when the Ricci Act was signed into law.  The assertion by Respondent that the two-year registration window was to rectify a fleeting memory is erroneous.  Respondent’s argument lacks merit.  The determination below was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and against the substantial weight of the evidence.  It should therefore be reversed, and retired Trooper [...] should be permitted to register his presence at 9/11 and granted accidental disability benefits.