ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE BOARD’S DECISION TO APPROVE THE APPLICATION WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR UNREASONABLE OR IN VIOLATION OF THE MUNICIPAL LAND USE LAW.  A.  The Trial Court Properly Held that [...]’s Application Met The Requirements of the Robbinsville Ordinances.  (Response to Point IA of Appellant’s Brief).  [...] argues that the trial court erred in finding that [...] had met the requirements of the Robbinsville Township Ordinances for Preliminary and Final Subdivision Approval.  [...] also contends that the trial court erred because there was no testimony presented concerning many of the requirements of the Ordinances.  A review of the Ordinances in connection with the facts of this case make evident that [...]’s arguments must fail.  It is well settled that pursuant to the Municipal Land Use Law ("MLUL"), an ordinance requiring approval by the planning board of either subdivisions or site plans, or both, shall include certain enumerated provisions for the processing of applications for development.
[brief] ### Volume I | Appendix document | Appendix Page Number | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| | December 01, 2017, Order Vacating and Set Aside Any dead recorded as void ab initio | Pa 1-10 | | May 01, 2022, Order assigning [...] to the Presiding Judge of General Equity Division (Vicinage 4) | Pa 11 | | March 09, 2023, Order in [...] transferring matter to Camden County from Burlington County | Pa 12 | | March 23, 2023, [...] Order dismissing Complaint as “Moot” | Pa 13 | | September 12, 2023 Superior Court Clerk’s Office Letter | Pa 14 | | Order to Show Cause with Temporary Restraints Pursuant to Rule 4:52 | Pa 15-18 | | Order to Show Cause Preliminary Injunction Pursuant to Rule 4:52 | Pa 19-21 | | March 01, 2023, Written Request for Adjournments | Pa 22-24 | | Initial Notice of Claim For Damages | Pa 25-26 | | Complaint in Lieu of prerogative Writs and Action Permitted under N.J.S. 10:6-2 et. seq, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et. seq. | Pa 27-29 | | Amended Complaint in Lieu of prerogative Writs and Action Permitted under N.J.S. 10:6-1, 2 | Pa 30-33 | | Complaint Information Statement | Pa 34 | | Certification in Support of Probable Cause | Pa 35 | | Complaint Information Form | Pa 36-38 | | Certification in Support of Motion for Stay and Adjournment | Pa 39-40 | | Certification in Support of Motion for Stay; Adjournment and Orders to Show Cause and For Temporary Restraining Order | Pa 41-43 | | Certification in Support of Motion for Stay; Adjournment and Orders to Show Cause and For Temporary Restraints and Preliminary Injunction | Pa 44-100 | | Certification in support of Motion to Amend Complaint, For Removal of Improperly Filed Documents; To Correct; Reopen; For Change of Venue and Division; For Disqualification and Relief From Judgment | Pa 101-107 | | Brief In Support of Motion For Stay and Adjournment referred to in the decisions of the Trial Court, and is germane to the appeal, in which event all relevant pages of the Brief are attached pursuant to N.
[brief] Bail Bondsman and co-defendant [...] was employed by Ms. [...].  Ms. Brown-Bailey testified that in that capacity, she had “the right to pick … up” “bailed-out” people who do not appear for court dates; unlike a “bounty hunter,” she did not have the authority to “forcibly” take people into custody, although she could handcuff people.  (8T 213-9 to 214-10; 8T 217-3 to 24; 9T 11-17 to 12-25).  She “usually” would call the local police to let them know when she was apprehending someone.  Ibid.  In her statement to police, Brown-Bailey said that [...] was not certified as a bail bondsman, but was “going to school for it,” and had a “certified number” for that occupation.  (6T 80-2 to 82-2).  On March 25, 2015, Brown-Bailey went to [...] to apprehend [...], who had been released on bail of $100,000, following charges of possession of drugs and a weapon, and had not appeared for a court date.
[brief] During the probate action, [...]’s attorney deposed the drafting attorney.  Upon conclusion of the probate action, [...] filed a legal malpractice claim against the drafting attorney alleging that the drafting attorney knew or should have known of the undue influence and [...]’s lack of testamentary capacity.  This Court affirmed the Law Division’s dismissal of the legal malpractice complaint pursuant to the ECD.  The *Schindel* court first noted that [...]’s malpractice complaint had two specific claims: the drafting attorney knew or should have known that [...] lacked testamentary capacity when he executed the will; or, alternatively, defendant knew or should have known of the undue influence over [...].  *Schindel*, at *8.  The Court stated that these were the exact same contentions [...] raised in the probate case, and it was indisputable that the two "distinct claims . . . [arose] from interrelated facts."  *Ibid.* (quoting *DiTrolio*, 142 N.J. at 271).  The *Schindel* court rejected the argument that the malpractice claim did not accrue until the probate case ended.  “It suffices to say the accrual date in the legal malpractice setting is when ‘the essential facts of the malpractice claim are reasonably discoverable’ and the client "sustain[s] actual damage."  *Schindel*, at *8-9 (citing *Dimitrakopoulos*, 237 N.J. at 116).  Accordingly, [...]’s claim accrued when he knew that the drafting attorney had drafted the will at issue and his shares were reduced.  *Ibid.* (citing *Pivnick*, 326 N.J. at 483).  Applying these same principles in this case, the Law Division judge properly determined that the ECD barred plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claim.  Here, plaintiffs’ claim is that [...] committed legal malpractice by “negligently” drafting a Will for [...]’s father, [...] “result[ing] in an award to [[...]’s ex-wife] [...] of forgiveness of [a joint] mortgage which was contrary to [...]'s intent and which damaged [...] and [...]'s Estate. ” (Pa000003 at ¶17.)  These are the exact same contentions plaintiff raised in the Chancery Division, and the Appellate Division on appeal from the Chancery Division order.  It is indisputable that the two "distinct claims . . . arise from interrelated facts."  *Ibid.* (quoting *DiTrolio*, 142 N.J. at 271).  Similarly, given plaintiffs’ duplicative contentions, there is no doubt that there was standing to pursue a legal malpractice claim during the probate matter.  *Ibid.* (citing *Pivnick*, 326 N.J. at 483).  Dismissal on these facts was proper and the final order of dismissal should be affirmed.  On appeal, plaintiffs first argue that the ECD exempts “all” (plaintiff’s emphasis) legal malpractice claims.
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021 issued by the appropriate authority as designated by ordinance.  See N.J.S.A. 40A:14- 118.  (b)  Standard operating procedures (SOPs).  Written statements providing specific direction for performing agency activities.  Each SOP should also include the agency’s policy in that area, which is a statement of agency principles that provides the basis for the development of the procedures.  (c)  Directives or orders.  Documents detailing the performance of a specific activity or method of operation.  2.1.3
[brief] The case at bar is unusual in that the Affidavit of Service on [...] in this case is presumptively invalid and facially deficient.  It was further served by an in-house Process Service Company that has an interest in the litigation in violation of Rule 4:4-3(a).  The Affidavit of Service upon [...] is notarized two (2) months prior to the Service date which is impossible.  Furthermore, it does not appear that the Rules regarding electronic notarization of documents put in place pursuant to COVID-19 were followed at all.  Accordingly, all the indicia of reliability that would normally be present are not present in this case.  Therefore, the Affidavit of Service is not entitled to a presumption of validity.
[brief] (Pb9).  This argument fails because the Board provided adequate notice of the law.  The only express notice requirement contained in the Ricci Act provides that the Board must “notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  On August 7, 2019, the [...] satisfied this notice requirement when it added information about the Ricci Act to its website.  (Pa10).  That notice satisfied the Ricci Act, which requires only that the Board notify members of the enactment of the statute.
[directive] It be defendant's a that the presenting risks be in might relevant that or offender an offense pertaining an to pose. would release  Circumstances.  and Facts  Relevant of Existence  Certain Establishing 7.6.2 circumstance or fact any with to Section, respect provision this Notwithstanding other of any or other gang street (e.g., process risk-assessment pretrial automated in for the accounted is that not committed, was which offense in manner especially heinous involvement, crime organized with associated illness or addiction mental untreated by defendant, made threatening statements history of extent and nature convictions, or charges out-of-state criminal behavior, other or violent or fact such consider shall prosecutor not the etc.), records, expunged delinquency, of juvenile detention to pursuant pretrial presumption against the overcoming for a as circumstance basis a at circumstance or that establish fact to prosecutor prepaxed is the unless 8.2 or 7.2 Sections allows Law Reform Bail the (noting text that accompanying and 23 note also See hearing. detention hearing).
[brief] Though holding that no specific unanimity instruction was required, the Parker Court held that specific unanimity instructions are required when “a single crime can be proven by different theories based on different acts and at least two of these theories rely on different evidence, and the circumstances demonstrate a reasonable possibility that a juror will find one theory proven and the other not proven but that all of the jurors will not agree on the same theory. ”  Frisby, 174 N.J. at 597 (citing Parker, 124 N.J. at 635-36).  In Parker, all of the allegations of inappropriate behavior were of a single type, and all constituted the crime of official misconduct via an abuse of a public office.  Parker, 124 N.J. at 639.  In contrast, in Frisby, the theories of guilt were independent of one another; in one, the defendant was accused of physically assaulting the child, while in the other, defendant was accused of neglect, and the jury well could have been split on which theory was proven.
[brief] See DepoLink, 430 N.J. Super. at 335.  Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff is a consumer who, at all times relevant to this action, was acting in her personal capacity.  Secondly, the CFA claimant in DepoLink argued that the alleged violations of the CFA were strict liability offenses and, thusly, arose from a violation of a regulation promulgated under the CFA.
[brief] Five years later, [...] sold both properties in a single deed of conveyance to [...] and [...] (“[...]”) (Da399 at ¶21; Da485).  The [...]-to-[...] Deed, however, improperly and unilaterally truncated the description of the easement the [...] created in the 1966 Totten-to-[...] Deed to read as follows:  Subject to the rights of others, if any, in an old driftway crossing the southerly portion of the above described lot (Da486).  The [...]-to-[...] Deed omitted the material clause: “the rights of the public or owners of property lying westerly and southerly of Totten farm to use a roadway or driftway running thru [the South [...] Parcel] to reach their properties from the public road mentioned in the description above” from the property description (Compare Da481 with Da485).  Thereafter, the [...] Lot was conveyed: (i) from [...] to [...] and [...] (“[...]”) in August, 1974; and (ii) from [...] to Kenneth and [...] in March, 1977; and then from [...] to [...] in November, 1990 (Da399 at ¶¶22, 23, 25; Da490; Da494; Da498; Da502).
[directive] The Directive also establishes protocols to ensure that the modification of inmates’ sentences does not create undue public safety risks.  Section I.D of this Directive creates a two- track process for sentence modifications: one for when the prosecutor and the defendant agree that the defendant’s sentence should revert to the default 33 percent parole disqualifier, see at 2, 20-22.  12  Id. at 33.  13  See id. Page 6 Section I.D.2, and another for when the prosecutor believes that the defendant’s conduct warrants some additional, discretionary period of parole ineligibility above the default 33 percent, Section I.D.3.
[directive] 7.6.6  A prosecutor, in determining whether to overcome the presumption against seeking Page 66 pretrial detention pursuant to Section 7.2, may consider expunged records as part of the totality of relevant circumstances.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:52-21 (“expunged records . . . of prior arrests or convictions shall be provided to any court, county prosecutor, the Probation Division of the Superior Court, the pretrial services agency, or the Attorney General when same are requested for use in conjunction with a bail hearing, [or] pretrial release determination pursuant to sections 1 through 11 of P.L. 2014, c. 31 [the Bail Reform Law]”).  7.7
[brief] (Da12).  Plaintiffs retained an attorney to represent them, and he filed an Answer and Counterclaims with the AAA on March 28, 2023 as demanded by the AAA.  (Da422, 127 – 136).  The Answer asserted at paragraph 23 that “the meaning and significance of the arbitration provision was not explained to Respondents by counsel, nor were they advised that they had a right to reject or negotiate against the arbitration agreement. ” (Da129).  The Motion Judge correctly interpreted this as a challenge to the arbitration.
[brief] 1T – transcript of July 25, 2023 (suppression)  2T – transcript of September 1, 2023 (plea)  3T – transcript of October 6, 2023 (sentence) | CASES | PAGE NOS. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Commonwealth v. Sweeting-Bailey, 178 N.E.3d 356 (Mass. 2021) | 29, 30 | | Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) | 30 | | State v. Caldwell, 158 N.J. 452 (1999) | 16 | | State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224 (2007) | 15 | | State v. Gibson, 218 N.J. 277 (2014) | 20 | | State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384 (2022) | 20, 21, 23, 24 | | State v. Nimmer, 975 N.W.2d 598 (Wis. 2022) | 27 | | State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509 (2022) | 23, 30 | | State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13 (2004) | 15, 22 | | State v. Price-Williams, 973 N.W.2d 556 (Iowa 2022) | 30 | | State v. Pugh, 826 N.W. 418 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012) | 28 | | State v. Roach, 172 N.J. 19 (2002) | 16, 26 | | State v. Scott, 474 N.J. Super. 388 (App. Div. 2023) | 29 | | State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398 (2012) | 15, 16, 20| | State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346 (2002) | 16 | | State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673 (1988) | 17, 26, 27| | State v. Valentine, 134 N.J. 536 (1994) | 27 | | Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) | 15, 16, 22, 26| | CASES (CONT'D.) | PAGE NOS. | |-----------------|-----------| | United States v. Brown, 925 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2019) | 28 | | United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) | 16 | | Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) | 17 | | STATUTES | |----------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(3) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1a | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b(1) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b(1) | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c | 2 | | CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS | |--------------------------| | N.J. Const. art. I, par. 7 | 15 | | U.S. Const. amend. IV | 15 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV | 15 | PROCEDURAL HISTORY [...] charged the defendant, [...], with third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1) (count one); third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and -5b(3) (count two); second-degree weapons possession during a CDS offense, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1a (count three); second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b(1) (count four); and second-degree possession of a firearm by certain persons not to have weapons, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b(1) (count five).
[brief] The standard of review is the same standard that a trial court uses when considering a motion for a new trial.  Tp. of Manalapan v. Gentile, 242 N.J. 295 (2020).  Therefore, to determine whether Appellant/[...] is entitled to a new trial the court must consider whether denying a new trial would result in a miscarriage of justice shocking the conscience of the court.  Id.  Pursuant to Civil Rule 4:49-1 clearly and convincingly it must appear that there was an injustice under the law to grant a new trial.  That is impossible here.
[brief] See Green, 239 N.J. at 106 (“Research reviewed in Henderson showed that mistaken identifications increased from 15 to 37% when a witness had seen a photo of an innocent person in a prior mugshot. ”).  Numerous other studies have also found that multiple viewings of a photo array lead to more mistaken identifications.  See, e.g., [...] et al., *The Effects of Repeated Lineups and Delay on Eyewitness Identification*, 4 Cognitive Res. Principles. & Implications, at 16-17 (2019) (in experimental studies, “identical lineups still displayed the negative effects previously reported in other repeated identification studies involving a single-repeated target”); [...] et al., *The Effects of Allowing a Second Sequential Lineup Lap on Choosing and Probative Value*, 21 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y and L. 121, 132 (2015) (in laboratory testing, overall selections increased on second viewing of array and erroneous selections (fillers) increased); [...] et al., *Improving Eyewitness Identification Hennepin County’s Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project*, 4 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 381, 398 (2006) (field testing showed that “repeated viewing of the lineup was associated with increased likelihood of filler choices (errors)”).  Reflecting the scientific research, the Court in *Henderson* recognized that multiple viewings of the same person can have an improper reinforcing effect on an eyewitness, where it becomes unclear whether the witness is recalling the suspect or the first viewing of the image.
[brief] (Pa101 to Pa106)  These errors included what he described as “automation errors,” “some sort of SPL error,” “a show is not playable for – ingesting the trailers,” “some sort of disconnect,” and “just a connection error. ”  Current [...] general manager [...] testified at her deposition on August 31, 2018 that the records generated by the Theater Management System software are not retained for more than three weeks, after which they self-delete from the system.  (Pa107 to Pa112)  The plaintiff’s son, [...], completed a Guest Incident Report for his mother after she fell and injured herself in Auditorium 5 on August 13, 2016.
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[directive] [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  A mitigating award of -2 points would be appropriate for someone who is substantially less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described a minimal.  Defendants who serve as couriers, off-loaders, or lookouts on a repetitive or professional basis would fall into this category.  (Note that if the defendant’s performance of such services provides a substantial source of income or livelihood, he or she would also be subject to Aggravating Factor #5a.)  Mitigating Factor #2b applies when the conduct of the defendant was substantially influenced by another person more mature than the defendant.
[brief] Leading with its chin, the [...] argues, incredibly enough, that the opinion of Plaintiffs’ expert was rebutted.  This claim does not merit a response.  That Plaintiffs’ expert acknowledged that he was not offering a legal opinion, or that the standard of care which he advocated applied even if the township did not have an ordinance defining “sidewalk,” are absolutely insignificant.  Notably, the [...] never cites any of the relevant lease provisions, including Article 3, and includes no discussion of them anywhere in its submission.  E.
[brief] Moore v. Schultz, 22 N.J.Super. 24, 31 (App. Div. 1952), aff’d o.b., 12 N.J. 329 (1953); 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses §122 (2004).  Thus, in the alternative, if it were to be determined an easement was not granted or a license coupled with an interest was not conveyed, equity dictates that given the expenditures by Plaintiff in reliance of the [...]’s promises, Defendant is now estopped from revoking the license granted to Plaintiff.  II.
[brief] PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM THAT IT WAS DENIED ORAL ARGUMENT HAS NO MERIT  Plaintiffs assert that they were denied oral argument and that this denial amounts to a reversible error.  (PB at *12).  First, Plaintiffs were not denied oral argument.  Indeed, they were given oral argument on all motions for summary judgement.  During that argument, despite the fact that there had been full briefing by the parties, the court withheld a decision and gave Plaintiffs the additional procedural protection of a Rule 104 hearing.  *Id.* at T7:2-16.  During the Rule 104 hearing, Plaintiffs presented their liability expert, who was subject to cross examination.  [...], considered pre-hearing statements and invited post-hearing argument.  He also received post hearing briefs.  (T10-38).  Significantly, Plaintiffs did not raise the issue of needing additional oral argument at any time prior to filing this appeal.  Second, even if Plaintiffs were entitled to additional argument, this is not a basis for reversal.  True, *Rule* 1:6-2(d) provides that absent an exception, (none apply here), requests for oral argument “shall be granted as of right. ”  But Plaintiffs are wrong to argue that the trial court’s departure from *R.* 1:6-2(d) alone is sufficient for reversal.  And in telling manner, they do not cite a single binding authority for this proposition.  Instead, Plaintiffs rely on *Delgado v. Yourman-Helbig*, an unpublished opinion.  No. A-3633-20, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1266 (Super. Ct. App. Div. July 13, 2022).  This Court is not bound by *Delgado*.  See *R.* 1:36-3.  And even if it were, the case is easily distinguished.  --- 6