ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (2T: 190:14-15, Appellant’s testimony).  9.  Appellant recognized generally wet conditions and made what he believed to be necessary modifications to his driving, due to the wet roadways and the potential to “hydroplane”.  (2T: 198:08 – 198:23, Appellant’s testimony).  10.  Appellant acknowledges having no issue with maintaining control of his vehicle upon the wet roadways during his drive leading up to the collision.  (2T: 189:22 – 189:25, Appellant’s testimony).  11.  Appellant could not cite to a specific road condition that caused his vehicle to “hydroplane” on the roadway immediately behind the Respondent’s vehicle.  (3T: 203:02 – 203:12, Appellant’s testimony).  12.  Within Appellant’s Pre-Trial submissions, Appellant requested a non-standard jury instruction pursuant to *Mockler v. Russman*, 102 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1968) and presented the Court with language that read “If a driver is operating his/her car as would a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances, he/she is not to be held negligent merely because his/her car skidded or slid, resulting in damage or injury to another. ”  Da021 at Da023.  13.  Following the presentation of evidence consistent with the above, the Trial Court ruled that the facts herein were not akin to those in *Mockler* and that the proposed non-standard jury charge was both inapplicable and not-warranted.
[brief] Defendant alleged that [...] stated [...] fired shots at [...].  He did not supply any evidence that had a “rational tendency to engender a reasonable doubt with respect to an essential feature of the State’s case. ”  Defendant did not establish when or where the alleged shooting took place.  The record is void of [...]’s statements, so it is unclear as to the depth and credibility of his knowledge of the alleged event.  Because it is unclear as to the basis and details of the allegations, the trial court was unable to assess if the witnesses’ statements would have been permitted at trial under the Rules of Evidence.  Further, there is no evidence that [...] was in the area at the time of [...]’s murder.  As noted by the State at the motion hearing, on the night of her death, [...] was not following her normal work schedule, so it was unlikely that [...], who had no relationship with her, knew of her whereabouts.  Even assuming arguendo that [...] had fired shots in an area where [...] was present on some prior occasion, it does not meet the legal standard of creating the possibility of reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime here, especially when considered in light of the weight of the State’s evidence in this case.
[directive] Czy rozumie Pan(i), że przyznając się do winy i przyznając, że popełnione przestępstwo [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] 4. było przestępstwem z użyciem przemocy, zrzeka się Pan(i) prawa do ustalenia przez ławę przysięgłych, ponad wszelką zasadną wątpliwość, że wystąpiły okoliczności sprawiające, że przestępstwo(a) należy uznać za przestępstwo(a) z użyciem przemocy?  Do you understand that by pleading guilty and admitting that the crime(s) are a violent crime you are waiving your right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the circumstance(s) that make the crime(s) a violent crime(s) are present?
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL AGENCY DECISION OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, STATE POLICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM  Brief of Respondent [...] Date Submitted: June 28, 2024  [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  [...]  Attorney for Respondent [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel  [...] (ID:276482018)  Deputy Attorney General  On the Brief  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] A commercial property owner may have a duty to clear public sidewalks abutting their properties of snow and ice for the safe travel of pedestrians.  Maintaining a public sidewalk in a reasonably good condition may require removal of snow or ice or reduction of the risk, depending upon the circumstances.  The test is whether a reasonably prudent person, who knows or should have known of the condition, would have within a reasonable period of time thereafter caused the public sidewalk to be in reasonably safe condition.  Even though 5.20(B)(2)(b) does reference snow and ice removal, in the reading of the plain language, it is clearly limited to Defects, Snow and Ice Accumulation and Other Dangerous Conditions in Abutting Sidewalks.  In the notes section of the charge, it specifically cites to Stewart v. 104 Wallace St. Inc., 87 N.J. 146, 157 (1981), where the Court expanded a commercial property owner’s duty to keep their property reasonably safe to abutting public sidewalks, as the landowner derived a commercial benefit.  The purpose of such expansion as to public sidewalks was to provide a remedy for seriously injured plaintiffs and incentivize property owners to repair deteriorated sidewalks from which they derived a commercial benefit.
[brief] The New Jersey Legislature codified the common law Public Access Doctrine into statutory law so as to provide the [...] (the “[...]”) with express statutory authority to regulate public access to tidal waters and adjacent shorelines.  The Legislature passed this law following Appellate Court decisions which found that the [...] lacked the express authority to enact the public access rules and regulations pertaining to Coastal Zone Management found at N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.48 and N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9.  See Borough of Avalon v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 959 A.2d 1215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008); Hackensack Riverkeeper, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 128 A.3d 749 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).  With the passage of the law, the [...] now has the express authority and duty to protect the public’s right of access to tidally flowed waters and their adjacent shorelines under the public trust doctrine and statutory law.  N.J.S.A. 13:1D-150.  In its summary judgment motion, [...] argued the Borough’s adoption of this amendment to the redevelopment plan violated the Public Trust Doctrine because the Borough did not consider public beach access issues when it adopted this redevelopment plan amendment.  While the Borough may not have adopted a Public Access Plan as described within the regulations adopted by the [...], the argument that the Borough did not consider public beach access issues is simply untrue.  To the contrary, Section 3.3.5 of the redevelopment plan overlay is entitled “Beach or Waterfront Access Improvements”.  That section indicates that:  Substantial improvements to pedestrian access to the beach or waterfront via the baywalk are desired.  The redeveloper shall extend the north-eastern end of the baywalk northeasterly to reach the existing go-kart section and proposed parking area . . .  This will enhance access to the beach and public open space areas.  Additional improvements may include, but need not be limited to, lighting, signage, plantings, seating, and amenities that formalize access points from the street.  Enhanced visual access of the waterfront and bay through the provision of gazebos or structures for the passive enjoyment of waterfront views may also be allowed under this Redevelopment Plan.  (Pa557).
[directive] Although there are complaints against officers that are legitimate and based upon facts, others are contrived and maliciously pursued, often with the intent to mitigate or neutralize the officer’s legal action taken against the complainant.  The law enforcement agency must fully and impartially investigate the former, while taking a strong stand to minimize the latter.  The law enforcement agency should notify the County Prosecutor in any case where a complainant has fabricated or intentionally misrepresented material facts to initiate a complaint of officer misconduct.  5.1.7
[directive] In re Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive Nos. 2020-5 and 2020-6, 246 N.J. 462 (2021).  Subordinate law enforcement agencies, including county and municipal police forces, have a duty to cooperate with the Attorney General to improve the administration of the criminal justice system, including the efficient delivery of police services.  For county and municipal law enforcement agencies, cooperation in internal affairs matters begins with strict adherence to the Attorney General’s policy requirements.  Furthermore, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-107 grants the Attorney General broad authority to supersede in any investigation, criminal action or proceeding, which includes internal affairs investigations and disciplinary proceedings.  Therefore, whenever the Attorney General determines that it would be appropriate to do so, the Attorney General, or his or her designee, may: (a) supersede a county prosecutor or other law enforcement agency in any investigation, criminal action or proceeding; (b) participate in any investigation, criminal action or proceeding; or (c) initiate any investigation, criminal action or proceeding.  This statutory authority applies fully to any and all aspects of the internal affairs process, and nothing in the IAPP is intended to limit or circumscribe the Attorney General’s statutory authority.  The Attorney General may supersede and take control of an entire law enforcement agency, may supersede in a more limited capacity and take control of the internal affairs function of an agency, or may supersede and take control of a specific case or investigation.  Whenever the Attorney General determines that supersession is appropriate, the Attorney General may assume any or all of the duties, responsibilities and authority normally reserved to the chief law enforcement executive and the agency.  Every member of the agency, including the chief law enforcement executive, has a duty to cooperate fully with the Attorney General during the investigation and adjudication of such matters.  Within their respective counties, the County Prosecutors shall be vested with the same authority to supersede possessed by the Attorney General on a statewide basis.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:158-5.
[brief] (Pa227-Pa231).  [...] then acknowledged that negotiating parties have historically avoided larger negotiations team.  [...] continued by clarifying that this decision was neither an endorsement nor discouragement of “open” collective negotiations.  Rather, [...] explained that the issue before it was whether this concept was --- ¹  The [...] article’s use of the term “open bargaining” differs from how Respondent currently uses the term.  The article’s use of the term concerns the practice of opening up negotiations to the full bargaining unit.  Another way to describe this practice is “team bargaining”.  The term “open bargaining” as Respondent uses it in the instant submission and as we understand [...] using it in the decision concerns the concept of allowing the public to attend bargaining sessions.
[brief] See Docteroff v. Barra Corp. of Am., Inc., 282 N.J. Super. 230, 237 (App. Div. 1995); see also State v. Vincenty, 237 N.J. 122, 135 (2019) (citing State v. Legette, 227 N.J. 460, 481 fn. 1 (2017)); Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (stating “it is a well-settled principle that our appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest”).  Here, Plaintiff plainly did not follow the rules of court and therefore this argument should not be considered.  Moreover, Plaintiff’s argument should not be considered since it clearly does not concern either an issue pertaining to jurisdiction or any issue substantially implicating the public interest.  Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, the Trial Court correctly analyzed the terms of the Commitment for Title Insurance issued by [...] and did not consider whether it was a collateral agreement because 1) Plaintiff did not argue that it was a collateral agreement and 2) Plaintiff failed to comply with its obligations under the plain language of the agreement which therefore did not form valid and enforceable contract.
[brief] I.  **The Court Correctly Found that the Applicant was Not Denied due to Either Design Waiver**  Both Appellants indicate that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief due to the existence of two requested design waivers, even going so far as to suggest that Plaintiff did not prove its affirmative case regarding same to the Board.  Under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-51, a planning board has the power to: …grant such exceptions from the requirements for site plan approval as may be reasonable and within the general purpose and intent of the provisions for site plan review and approval of an ordinance adopted pursuant to this article, if the literal enforcement of one or more provisions of the ordinance is impracticable or will exact undue hardship because of peculiar conditions pertaining to the land in question.  As the Court can see, while the Intervenor and the Board spend much time arguing that the Plaintiff was required to prove a hardship, a showing that a design is impractical and the grant of a waiver is reasonable is enough to satisfy the statute.
[directive] This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  Pozwy, wnioski oraz wszelkie inne dokumenty składane w sądzie powinny być w języku angielskim Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English
[brief] Lab Report Analysis 4/27/2020  Certification of Drug Analysis Discovery Checklist (billing date 7/7/20)  Consent to Search Vehicle 2/20/20-00:47 Use of Force Report by [...] Use of Force Report by [...] Evidence Form (Marijuana) Evidence Form (Orange Pill) Evidence Form (Money) Evidence Form (1 Key and other items)  Evidence Receipt from Lab (Tab/Marijuana)  CJIS Transmittal Form  Wanted Person Request (Mugshot)  Multiple documents are attached under exhibit cover pages.  HIT Confirmation Response Pa040  Complaint Summons\(^2\) 2/20/20 Pa041  Return of Service Information  Pa045  Affidavit of Probable Cause  Pa047  Preliminary Law Enforcement Report Pa049
[brief] The rule favoring retention of the first-filed action should not have been disregarded because Defendants did not establish “special equities” required to overcome that presumption.  New Jersey courts recognize a strong presumption in favor of the first-filed action, and “[t]hus, any comity analysis should begin with a presumption in favor of the earlier-filed action. ”  Sensient Colors Inc., 193 N.J. at 387; see also Yancoskie v. Del. River Port Auth., 78 N.J. 321, 324 (1978); Cogen Techs. NJ Venture v. Boyce Eng’g Int’l, Inc., 241 N.J. Super. 268, 272 (App. Div. 1990).
[directive] The amenability of the juvenile to [participate] in a remedial education or counseling program that satisfies the requirements of subsection b. of section 2 of P.L.2011, c. 128 22 (C.2A:4A-71.1) if the offense alleged is an eligible offense as defined in subsection c. of section 2 of P.L.2011, c. 128 (C.2A:4A-71.1); and 11.  Any information relevant to the offense in any case where the juvenile is charged with an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute prostitution in violation of N.J.S.2C:34-1 or any offense which the juvenile alleges is related to the juvenile being a victim of human trafficking.
[brief] As such, [...] is to be held to a higher standard of conduct.  As set forth by New Jersey Attorney General [...] when addressing a matter involving a New Jersey Chief of Police who had been implicated in separate racist and criminal investigations,  There is a social contract that imposes an expectation that officials in positions of governmental and law enforcement leadership will do the right thing, act not in self-interest but in service to the greater good, and treat all people with respect and dignity as equals.  These are not naive ideals or lofty ambitions but rather the bare minimum expectations communities should have in their leaders.  (Da 380).  In New Jersey, it is well-settled that public officials hold positions of trust and are under an inescapable obligation to serve the public with the highest fidelity, good faith and integrity.  *Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., et al.*, 8 N.J. 433, 474 (1952), *cert. denied*, 344 U.S. 838 and *reh’g denied*, 344 U.S. 888 (1952).  “They stand in a fiduciary relationship to the people whom they have been elected or appointed to serve. ”  *Id.*  In referencing the elected members of the Board of Chosen Freeholders and of the bridge commission, the *Driscoll* Court held,  As fiduciaries and trustees of the public weal they are under an inescapable obligation to serve the public with the highest fidelity.  In discharging the duties of their office they are required to display such intelligence and skill as they are capable of, to be diligent and conscientious, to exercise their discretion not arbitrarily but reasonably, and above all to good faith, honesty and integrity.  *Id.* at 474-475 (emphasis added).  The *Driscoll* Court further held that such obligations are not mere theoretical concepts or idealistic abstractions of no practical force and effect; *they are obligations imposed by the common law on public officers and assumed by them as a matter of law upon their entering public office*.  The enforcement of these obligations is essential to the soundness and efficiency of our government, which exists for the benefit of the people who are its sovereign.
[brief] Pa405.  Since discovery has not been exchanged, the only information the trial court was provided with to substantiate [...]’s claim that [...] checked that box, was an Affidavit of an [...] employee, [...].  Pa597-601.  O’Connor alleges she “personally searched [...]’s database for plaintiff Blanca [...]’s account by entering [her] email address . . .  [...]’s records indicate that Plaintiff clicked the checkbox and tapped ‘Confirm’ on March 23, 2021. ”  Pa599.  O’Connor then attached a screen shot displaying a “Consent Timestamp” showing their records indicate [...] allegedly acknowledged the Terms and Conditions on March 23, 2021, at 6:06:52 PM.  Pa75.  However, in a July 18, 2023 letter from counsel for [...], [...] asserts they are attaching what is described as “an image showing the Checkbox Consent that your client checked. ”  Pa58-59.  As it is shown, the screen shot which [...] has asserted specifically depicts [...]’s Checkbox Consent has a timestamp of 9:41 PM and fails to show the date.  Id.  How could [...] have accepted [...]’s Terms and Conditions twice?  Based on [...]’s record keeping, did she check the consent box at 6:06 PM on March 23, 2021, or 9:41 PM on a different, unspecified date?  These were questions posed to [...] and the court in Appellant’s opposition to the motion to compel in the underlying action.
[brief] Pa070.  The 9-1-1 caller, who was later determined to have given a false name, indicated that he/she had witnessed an argument between two men at a specific location, one of whom was carrying a handgun.  Pa070.  The caller described the man carrying the handgun as a “white male with a beard and ponytail wearing a black shirt and long shorts with the color --- 3  Copies of these unpublished decisions were included in the appendix submitted alongside the State’s September 20, 2024 brief.  See Pa069-Pa076.  yellow on them. ”  Pa070.  The officer drove to the area and saw no signs of an argument, but effectuated an investigative detention on a man whose clothing and hair matched the description given by the 9-1-1 caller.  Pa070.  The appellate panel sustained the investigatory stop, distinguishing J.L. based on the fact that, “the description here was not limited to a suspect’s race and shirt, but included a description of facial hair and a ponytail, and more detailed information about attire,” as well as the “location and direction the person was walking. ”  Pa072.  Based on that description, the appellate panel concluded that the description “was unlikely to apply to an indeterminate number of males the officer might encounter at the location” and indicated that it was “therefore satisfied that the 9-1-1 call had sufficient indicia of reliability and was adequately corroborated to justify the investigative stop. ”
[brief] 18 Middlesex Concrete Corp. v. Carteret, 32 N.J. Super. 226, 235 (App. Div. 1955)  ..............................................  7 New Brunswick Sav. Bank v. Markouski, 123 N.J. 402 (1991)  .....  18  Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Associated Gulf Contractors, Inc., 263 N.J. Super. 332, 343-44, 622 A.2d 1324, 1330 (App. Div. 1993), ....  9  Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 84 (1974)  8  US Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449 (2012)  ...........  7  Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 332 N.J. Super. 31, 43 (App. Div. 2000)  ..................................................
[brief] Plaintiff knew he was required to serve an expert report to substantiate the claims in the case.  However, he submitted the inadmissible, worthless, net opinion of [...].  (Pa36).  The Ouda report failed to cite any rules, regulations, standards, treatises, articles, case law, or Rules of Professional Conduct.  Rather, it was nothing more than Ouda's personal opinion.  See, Kaplan v. Skoloff & Wolfe, P.C., 339 N.J. Super. 97 (App. Div. 2001); see also, Pomerantz Paper Corp v. New Community Corp., 207 N.J. 344 (2011).  As properly noted by the trial court in its analysis in limiting [...]’s testimony, an expert’s report must provide factual support for the opinion offered, and must also provide as a basis for the opinion an accepted standard of conduct within the defendant’s profession.  An expert’s personal opinion will not suffice as a basis for the opinion offered.  A legal malpractice action has three essential elements: “(1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship creating a duty of care by the defendant attorney, (2) the breach of that duty by the defendant, and (3) proximate causation of the damages claimed by the plaintiff.
[brief] In *Mayo, Lynch & Associates, Inc. v. Pollack*, 351 N.J. Super. 486 (App. Div. 2002), for example, the court stated:  Even before the effective date of [N.J.S.A. 40A:11-23.2], a certificate of surety and a performance bond in amounts substantially below the contract price were material and non-waivable deviations from the specifications that rendered the contract voidable.  …  These defects not only undermine competitive bidding, … but they also deprive the public of protection from a possible breach on the part of the contractor.  [Id. at 496.]  In Mayo, Lynch, as in Meadowbrook Carting, the Court made clear that a defective consent of surety cannot be cured after the opening of bids, as this would destroy the level playing field that our public bidding laws are designed to ensure.  Id. at 497 (letter from surety submitted after bid opening could not cure defective bid bond and consent of surety).