ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  The Bulletin is an Administrative Rule Subject to APA Compliance.  (Ja1-2).  The Department’s unilateral decisions to apply the Holding Act to reciprocals and to apply SSAP No. 25 to the AIF Fees both represent a complete sea change compared to decades of the Department taking the exact opposite stance.  Such agency action is not enforceable as a matter of law as it constitutes impermissible “de facto rulemaking” under the test announced by our Supreme Court in *Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation*, 97 N.J. 313, 328 (1984).
[brief] After improperly failing to ask the jury anything about their preexisting beliefs about fingerprint testimony, the trial court further erred by denying the defense motion to bar the fingerprint examiner from opining, without any limitation, that the latent fingerprints were left by [...].  After the motion to exclude fingerprint expert testimony in its entirety was denied, defendant requested that the examiner be limited in his language and testify only that “the latent print and the known exemplar have similar characteristics, but that he not use language to suggest that there is an identification match, a source identification or that the latent print is from the same source as the known print[.]”
[brief] Notably, the three cases that rely on Raritan for the proposition that a court determines arbitrability do not implicate the [...]’s Rules—or any other rules that include a provision akin to [...] Rule 9(a).  Rather, those cases are inapposite here because they involve the analysis of arbitrations with the [...] (“[...]”) or its predecessor—the [...].  See Sweeney v. Sweeney, 405 N.J. Super. 586, 592 (App. Div. 2009); Carino v. Allstate Fin. Servs., LLC, No. A-5717-09T4, 2011 WL 1364150, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 12, 2011) [Da579-583]; Morgan Stanley, 2013 WL 68712, at *2 [Da571-Da578].
[brief] Nevertheless, [...] initiated a collection lawsuit against [...] to enforce the void debt.  Being a layperson, [...] was unaware of the NJCFLA, its licensure requirements, [...]’s violations of the same, and that the debt is void and uncollectable.  Despite having no legal right to collect or enforce the void debt, [...] sought and obtained default judgment against [...], levied [...]’s bank account, and then garnished her wages.  In denying [...]’s Motion to Vacate Bank Levy, to Vacate Wage Execution, and to Vacate Default Judgment, the trial court reasoned that laches—an equitable doctrine—barred [...] from relief, effectively ratifying [...]’s violations of the NJCFLA.
[brief] See Walker Rogge, 116 N.J. at 541 (stating that if an extra-contractual duty were assumed, such a duty would support a potential claim for negligence, and not breach of contract).  Plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim does not allege an extra-contractual duty because it expressly pleads that [...]’s duty arose from the Contract.  (See Pa17, ¶86 (“By virtue of [[...]’s role as the Escrow Agent under the Agreement, it owed a contractual and fiduciary duty”]) (emphasis added); Pa18, ¶87 ([...] . . . participated in [[...]’s] breach of the [PSA]”); Pa18, ¶88 ([...] “failed and refused to perform its obligations under the [PSA]”); Pa19, ¶94 (Plaintiff is entitled to recover . . . its damages . . . arising form and proximately caused by [[...]’s] negligent misrepresentations, in breach of its contractual duties to Plaintiff”)).
[brief] Significantly, [...] still does not dispute that she has been subject to multiple sustained internal affairs findings against her, including multiple minor disciplines and even more significant, the 45 day suspension for untruthfulness and related misconduct as reflected in the record.  Neither the Commission nor the [...] was prohibited from considering such adverse employment history when determining whether she was suitable for promotion to Lieutenant or whether should be bypassed or removed from the eligible list.  It would have been contrary to the public interest to ignore [...]’s substantial adverse disciplinary history when considering promotion to a position bearing the high responsibility as a Sheriff’s Officer Lieutenant given [...]’s prior demonstrated disregard for a law enforcement officer’s obligation to be truthful and to follow orders, and the impact of such misconduct on her credibility and reliability moving forward.
[brief] 35  POINT III .................................................................................................................................  35  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT  FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON  UNIVERSITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHERE THERE WERE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AND PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED  PRIMA FACIE CLAIMS OF MISREPRESENTATION AND FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT (3T78-3T88)  i.  The Trial Court’s Oral Opinion to Grant Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s Misrepresentation Claim (3T78-3T88)  ..............................................  35  ii.  [...] made Material Misrepresentations and Fraudulently Induced Plaintiff  .........................................................................................................................  36  POINT IV .................................................................................................................................
[brief] But the Legislature improperly changed course in 1986, when it amended the Act and narrowed the previously complete attorney exemption to exempt only attorneys that were not “principally engaged” in the practice of representing debtors or creditors in consumer or commercial debt disputes (the “Limited Attorney Exemption”).  In short, the 1986 amendment to the Act criminalized attorneys that specialize in bankruptcy work, debt negotiation and debt restructuring.  The Limited Attorney Exemption violates the Separation of Powers doctrine, violates Plaintiffs’ and other attorneys’ constitutional due process rights for being vague, overbroad and for infringing upon their First Amendment rights to render legal advice to clients.  Notwithstanding these constitutional infirmities, the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion, and granted Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion and dismissed the Complaint.  The de novo review of that decision will reveal that the trial court erred in: disregarding the entirety of the deposition testimony of Defendants’ designated representative, which testimony is binding on Defendants; applying a presumption of constitutionality to the Act despite the fact that it impinges upon the constitutionally protected right to practice law, and the First Amendment rights of attorneys to advise clients about legal issues; and in ignoring the Supreme Court’s exclusive right to regulate the practice of law in the State.
[brief] Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(a), “Upon receipt of a certification, an appointing authority shall take whichever of the following actions is appropriate when a permanent appointment is to be made:  * * *  3.  Appoint one of the top three interested eligibles (rule of three) from an open competitive or promotional list, provided that:  * * *  ii.  if the eligible who ranks first on a promotional list is a veteran, then a non-veteran may not be appointed.  N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8 (emphasis added).
[brief] The sister appeal to this one, docket no. [...], addresses defendants’ appeal of the trial court's August 11, 2023 order awarding plaintiff attorney’s fees to plaintiff for having to defend against defendants’ frivolous motion to vacate the final judgment at the trial court level after this Appellate Court had already significantly affirmed the final judgment and remanded the case for the sole purpose of having the trial court recalculate the attorney’s fee award after the jury verdict had been marginally reduced.  The trial court awarded attorney’s fees to plaintiff for the defendants’ “frivolous per se as a matter of law” motion.  Defendants keep filing baseless appeals because [...] believes that if he can keep plaintiff’s claims in active litigation, then his many interests in real estate can remain free from liens.  The result is endless appeals on grounds barred by the law of the case and res judicata.  Just like the trial court did below, at the conclusion of this appeal, this Court should allow plaintiff to file for attorney’s fees and costs for having to defend against this equally frivolous appeal.  Sanctioning defendants for their ceaseless frivolous conduct may be the only thing that gets them to stop.  For all the reasons set forth in plaintiff’s opposition brief and further above, defendants’ current appeal should be rejected and the revised final judgment entered by the trial court should be affirmed in full.
[brief] FAIR CREDIT BILLING ACT (“FCBA”) .......................  PB – 42 6E.  NEW JERSEY TRUTH-IN-CONSUMER CONTRACT, WARRANTY AND NOTICE ACT (“TCCWNA”) ........................................................................ PB – 44 Conclusion ......................................................................................... PB – 46 ## APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS | ITEM | Page No. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------| | November 9, 2022 Order for Summary Judgment | PA - 1 | | Plaintiff’s Complaint filed March 16, 2022 | PA - 6 | | Complaint Case Information Statement filed March 16, 2022 | PA - 8 | | Defendant’s Answer filed March 29, 2022 | PA - 10 | | Defendant’s Case Information Statement filed March 29, 2022 | PA - 12 | | Plaintiff’s Cover Page for its Motion for Summary Judgment | PA - 19 | | Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment | PA - 20 | | Plaintiff’s Proposed Order for Summary Judgment | PA - 22 | | Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts | PA - 23 | | Plaintiff’s Exhibit A for Motion for Summary Judgment (Complaint) | PA - 27 | | Plaintiff’s Exhibit B for Motion for Summary Judgment (Answer) | PA - 30 | | Plaintiff’s Exhibit C for Motion for Summary Judgment (Defendant’s Interrogatory Responses) | PA - 33 | | Plaintiff’s Exhibit D for Motion for Summary Judgment (Defendant’s Interrogatory) | PA - 37 | | Plaintiff’s Exhibit E for Motion for Summary Judgment (Plaintiff’s Interrogatory Response) | PA - 40 | | Plaintiff’s Proof of Mailing of Motion for Summary Judgment | PA – 46 | Account Statement with Closing Date of July 26, 2017 ending in 9198…………………………………………………………………………………PA – 129 Account Statement with Closing Date of August 26, 2017 ending in 1373…………………………………………………………………………………PA – 133 Account Statement with Closing Date of August 26, 2017 ending in 9198…………………………………………………………………………………PA – 139 Account Statement with Closing Date of September 26, 2017 ending in 1373…………………………………………………………………………………PA – 143 Account Statement with Closing Date of September 26, 2017 ending in 9198…………………………………………………………………………………PA – 149 Account Statement with Closing Date of October 26, 2017 ending in 1373…………………………………………………………………………………PA – 153 Account Statement with Closing Date of October 26, 2017 ending in 9198…………………………………………………………………………………PA – 159 Account Statement with Closing Date of November 26, 2017 ending in 1373…………………………………………………………………………………PA – 163 Account Statement with Closing Date of June 26, 2017 ending in 9198…………………………………………………………………………………PA – 167 Account Statement with Closing Date of January 26, 2018 Ending in 1373 …………………………………………………………………………………PA – 171 Account Statement with Closing Date of December 26, 2017 ending in 1373…………………………………………………………………………………PA – 177 Account Statement with Closing Date of February 26, 2018 Ending in 1373 …………………………………………………………………………………PA – 181 Account Statement with Closing Date of March 26, 2018 ending in 1373…………………………………………………………………………………PA – 185 Account Statement with Closing Date of April 26, 2018 ending in 1373…………………………………………………………………………………
[brief] (Prb12)  For the above-mentioned reasons and authorities cited in support thereof, the State respectfully requests this Court deny defendant’s appeal and affirm the April 19, 2024 order entered by the lower court.  (Prb12)  I am a little confused on this request by the prosecutor.  The prosecutor didn’t mention any case laws or court rules that would allow for my appeal to be denied.  On the contrary, In fact, I have quite a few grounds for my appeal.  I have legal grounds for an appeal based on probable cause to arrest, since the first element of refusal is “proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the officer had probable cause to arrest”.
[brief] **New Jersey Civil Rights Act**  N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c)  Long Term Tax Exemption Law P.L. 1991, c. 431  27 P.L. 2002, Chapter 15, Section 10 24, 25 P.L. 2003, Chapter 125, Section 13 24 P.L. 2019, Chapter 297 34 P.L. 2021, Chapter 17, Section 6 23 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-2 22 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-3(g)  22 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-4 22 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-5  22 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-9  22 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11  22 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-12 21, 22 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-13  22  Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act  N.J.S.A. 2A:16-53 26  REGULATORY  N.J.A.C. 5:13-1.1 21, 33  COURT RULES  Rule 1:1-2 45 Rule 1:4-8 40 Rule 1:7-4 17, 45 Rule 1:13-1 46  Rule 4:6-2(a)  16 Rule 4:6-2(e) 16 Rule 4:49-2 46 Rule 4:50-1 46  RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct  Preamble No. 6  37 R.P.C. 1.8(k)  39 R.P.C. 1.8(l)  39  SECONDARY AUTHORITY
[directive] In the absence of the Judge, and consistent with N.J.S.A. Rule 7:4-2 2B:12-21, a defendant charged with a non-indictable offense that may be tried by the judge may be admitted to bail by the municipal court administrator or deputy Authority to Set Bail. court administrator.  In the absence of the judge, the municipal court administrator and the deputy court administrator, the defendant may be admitted to bail by any other person authorized by law to admit to bail.  The authority of the municipal court administrator, deputy court administrator, or other authorized person shall be exercised “only in according with the bail schedules promulgated by the Administrative Office of the Courts or the municipal court judge.
[brief] Again, I'm guided by what is specifically pled.  And in reviewing this matter again, it was clear to the court that really the factual predicates for the legal malpractice claims and the non-legal malpractice claims remain the same.  Plaintiff - plaintiffs do not identify either in their pleading or in their briefs in support of this motion a -- a factual predicate that applies only to the purported non-malpractice claims and not to the legal malpractice claims.  So, for example, in the fourth count, how these defendants conducted themselves with respect to the transactions, with respect to the agreements, how these lawyers conducted themselves in connection with their clients, again, would require an expert to set forth the standard of care as to what someone in the profession should or should not do.  With respect to fraud, again, here, this is the fifth count, plaintiffs allege that defendants engaged in fraud by misrepresenting the true status of the transactions, events, terminations of the agreements, assignments, and on from there.  That allegation in Paragraph 3 of Count --the fifth count, really is saying effectively the same thing that plaintiffs say in the first count in Subparagraphs A through E, as well as the third paragraph of Count 3, in which plaintiffs, again, allege as to a number of allegations as to how these defendants failed to – provide certain information, failed to timely advise them of certain aspects regarding the transactions, and the structures of the transactions, and the interrelationship between the parties.  It -- it really all goes back to that set of allegations which, as I’ve said, would require an expert to set forth the standard of care.  The conversion, as I’ve noted, the use of an attorney trust account would require an expert to talk about law firm and attorneys responsibilities with respect to the trust account.  With respect to the seventh count, in terms of conspiracy, again, that relates, to the defendants conduct in these transactions, what they should have -- what information they should have relayed, what action they should have taken, should not have taken.  And again, as I’ve set forth that, again, it’s effectively the same wrongful acts or inactions that are alleged in connection with the legal malpractice claims for which the court has found an expert would be necessary.  (Id. at 37:13-40:21).
[brief] ’”  Id. (slip op. at 12) (quoting State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 268 (2021)).  (Da43)  On remand, defendant argued that factor 3A supported concurrent sentences because “the gun was used in the course of the robbery for the purpose of consummating the robbery.  . . .  [T]he only possession that was proven was the possession during the course of the robbery, and the objective was clearly to consummate the robbery. ”  (7T 7-14 to 22)  After oral argument, the court stated, [T]he thing that I have . . . trouble wrapping my arms around . . . is that essentially if you look . . . purely at the Yarbough factors particularly 3A it would run concurrent, but then wouldn’t that just neuter or make meaningless that statute.  And [...] . . . says the law is the law, [you] may not like Yarbough, but this is [the] law.  And in addition, it doesn’t really neuter the statute.  I find that hard to accept.  [(8T 4-12 to 20)]  The sentencing court then took an about face with respect to factor 3A in its February 9, 2023, written opinion, finding that Yarbough factors 3A and 3C supported a consecutive sentence because the record did not support a finding that [...] obtained the handgun in order to carry out the [...] robbery and because he possessed the handgun at a time prior to and subsequent to the [...] robbery.
[brief] Defendant noted on the invoices his position as to why the vast majority of the time entries entered were not reimbursable under Rule 4:42-9(a)(2) (the “fund in court” rule) and under applicable case law.  Plaintiff did not submit a position document by the September 30, 2021 deadline.  Defendant thus filed a motion with a supporting certification on October 12, 2021, seeking the dismissal of Plaintiff’s attorney fee application for failure to comply with the court’s July 13, 2021 order.  (Da262, Da265).  Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, stating only that he was still relying upon his prior counsel’s August 30, 2018 fee application (which was filed prior to the first legal fee appeal).
[directive] Twelve members of the Grand Jury constitute a quorum and the Grand Jury cannot act without a quorum present.  The Grand Jury must act as a body; individual jurors have no official authority.  Jurors who vote in a case must have been present and have heard all of the evidence presented.  Regardless of the number of jurors deliberating and voting in any given case, no person can be indicted and no presentment can be returned unless twelve (12) or more members of the Grand Jury concur.  If the Grand Jurors vote not to return an indictment, the Grand Jury returns what is called a “No Bill” -- meaning that the Grand Jury has determined that there is insufficient evidence to move forward with the criminal charges.
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[brief] ”  *Rendine*, 141 N.J. at 337.  While minute-by-minute precision is not required, the requestor must provide “some fairly definite information as to the hours devoted to various general activities, e.g., pretrial discovery, settlement negotiations, and the hours spent by various classes of attorneys, e.g., senior partners, junior partners, associates. ”  *Id.* at 337.  (internal quotation and citation omitted).  Without this information “the court cannot know the nature of the services for which compensation is sought. ”  *Ibid.*  After the reasonable number of hours has been established, the court must determine “whether the assigned hourly rates for the participating attorneys are reasonable.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Defendant-Respondent  [...] a/k/a [...] respectfully requests that the December 12, 2023, Order granting EPPS’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to R. 4:6-2(a) be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Date: June 14, 2024  /s/ [...]  By: ____________________________  [...], Esquire  Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, EPPS, LLC a/k/a [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  [...], on behalf of herself and those similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...]; EPPS, LLC a/k/a ELECTRONIC PAYMENT PROCESS SYSTEMS, LLC; and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, Defendant-Respondents.
[brief] However, it does not follow that defendant is therefore necessarily entitled to the specific form of relief from the judgment he sought below [an order setting aside the judgment and opening the default].  If we were to follow Garza in the case before us, we would be required to determine that the judgment was void but should not be vacated; since the judgment would have had no effect, the execution was improper, and the funds turned over to plaintiffs would be returned to defendant.  Wohlegmuth, 302 N.J. Super. at 313-14 (citing Garza, 44 N.J. Super at 557, 558) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
[brief] There was no distinction as to whether the defendant was admitting that the pump house or the residence was the dwelling specified.  The defendant was certainly on notice that both structures were included.  (1T 37-18 to 38-11)  Significantly, during argument in the Law Division, the Judge questioned Defense Counsel whether this case could now be viewed as a request for a withdrawal of the plea.  Counsel replied that his client was not seeking to withdraw his guilty plea, and that “if the appeal is unsuccessful, then the fine stands.  That was what [...] agreed to as part of his plea. ”  (1T14-16 to 15-4)  The Judge also found that Defendant was aware of the contents of the ticket – front and back – because Defendant cited to it – including the distances from which Defendant was found from both buildings – not just the pump house.  The Judge then, disposing of the case, concluded that “the plea remains. ”  (1T38-18 to 39-6)  It seems significant, given the odd posture of this case, that Defendant claims in his brief before this Court that counsel discussed the conditional plea arrangement with the municipal prosecutor, (Db 4) but that the prosecutor “did not make an appearance on the record at the time of the conditional guilty plea being suggested.  . . .”  (Db7)  LEGAL DISCUSSION