ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Respondents cite almost exclusively to Berner for the proposition that they are entitled to relief under the NJLAD in this matter.  Their reliance is misplaced, though.  Respondents urge that, “[u]nder the LAD, non-protected class members harmed due to their relationship with a protected class member may pursue a civil action against the perpetrator of unlawful discrimination. ” Pb72.  Distinctly, in Berner, the Appellate Division recognized that the Caucasian lease holder had standing because “he was discharged for allegedly associating with a member of a protected group. ”  Id. at 234-235.  There is no such corollary here.
[brief] See generally (2T).  On that date, [...] took the stand again and completed his testimony.  (2T:48-17 to 53-20).  Thereafter, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress, finding there was justification for the traffic stop and resulting arrest.  (2T: 36-25 to 42-23; 45-10 to 47-24).  More specifically, the trial court found that defendant’s failure to maintain his vehicle inside the proper lane, along with not being able to complete any field sobriety tests and the smell of alcohol emanating from his breath was sufficient evidence to place defendant under arrest.  (2T:45-16 to 47-24)(emphasis added).  --- 1T – Transcript of Trial, July 13, 2022; 2T – Transcript of Trial, August 17, 2022; 3T – Transcript of Hearing, June 19, 2023; 4T – Sentencing, August 1, 2023.
[brief] The Zurich Policies .................................................................................. 12  C.  The Coverage Trial ..................................................................................  14  i. [...]’s Trial Testimony ...................................................  14  ii. [...]’s Trial Testimony .................................  15  iii. [...]’s Trial Testimony ............................... 23  iv. [...]’s Trial Testimony .....................................................  25 v. [...]’s Trial Testimony ............................................. 26 ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................  28
[brief] At approximately 10:00 p.m. on April 23, 2024, [...] (“[...]”) police officers [...] and [...] were on duty when a “be on the lookout” (“BOLO”) was issued for a red Mercedes-Benz bearing New Jersey registration [REDACTED] that had entered Jersey City.  (Pa59).  The BOLO further indicated the vehicle had just been involved in a carjacking in Elizabeth, New Jersey, and the three male occupants of the vehicle were considered armed and dangerous.  (Pa59).  The [...] and [...] observed the vehicle multiple times, which was radioed to [...].  (Pa59).  At approximately 10:38 p.m., dispatch radioed that the vehicle was abandoned at the intersection of Bramhall Avenue and Pine Street in Jersey City.  (Pa60).  [...] responded to the area in search of the actors.  (Pa60).  While travelling on Communipaw Avenue towards Pine Street, [...] observed a male, later identified as defendant, wearing a black hoodie, black sweatpants, and a full ski mask.  (Pa60).  Defendant was holding --- 5  The State relies on the facts as set forth in its December 6, 2024 brief in opposition to defendant’s motion to suppress.
[brief] The adverse-inference charge, akin to the spoliation charge in civil cases, permits a jury to presume that the evidence a party destroyed would have been damaging or unfavorable to them.  *Dabas*, 215 N.J. at 140 n.12.  “The adverse-inference charge is a remedy to balance the scales of justice” and “a means to even the playing field between the litigants. ”  *Id.* at 140; *State, New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Cullen*, 424 N.J. Super. 566, 588 (App. Div. 2012), certif. denied 213 N.J. 397 (2013).  Using such a charge can be “a complete substantive remedy[.]”  *Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWebber Inc.*, 197 N.J. 81, 120 (2008).  Indeed, these adverse-inference charges “can have a decisive impact upon a jury’s determination. ”  *Washington v. Perez*, 219 N.J. 338, 357 (2014).  As our courts and courts across the country have recognized, adverse-inference instructions are the appropriate remedy in the majority of missing-evidence cases.
[brief] It does not represent the actual amount the District provides from year-to-year.  (Pa1916.)  That actual amount – called the “local levy” – is the property tax revenue in the prior year budget.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5(b).  In addition, from 2010 through 2018, [...]’s ability to raise the amount of its local levy was constrained by a two percent (2%) cap on yearly increases to property tax rates imposed by the State.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-38(a); (Pa914, ¶ 26; Pa932, ¶ 162.)  When SRFA was enacted, [...]’s LFS was significantly above its local levy.  (Pa915, ¶¶ 33-35.)  The LFS continued to exceed the local levy in subsequent years even when the District raised its property tax contribution or levy by 2%.
[brief] Applicants’ Exhibit A-4, Critical Slope Survey, consisting of one (1) sheet prepared by [...] dated August 31, 2021................................................................................SDa003  Applicants’ Exhibit A-5, Denial of Development Permit dated June 21, 2021................................................................................SDa004  Applicants’ Exhibit A-6, Intent to Proceed, Checklist and Narrative of Development dated September 24, 2021.................................SDa005
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[brief] As set forth herein, the Developer controlled the Condominium Association from its formation in June 1983 through 1987 when control transitioned over to the unit owners.  Prior to transition, the Developer controlled Association and Developer entered into an agreement wherein the Association would pay rent to “lease” Unit 74 from the Developer.  In turn, the Association would sublease the Unit to the building superintendent.  After control of the Association transitioned to the unit owners, the owners never challenged the validity of the leasing agreement between the Association and the Developer.  From 1983 through April 7, 2016, the Developer continued to lease Unit 74 knowing it was a common element.  Moreover, the Developer leased Unit 74 during this time knowing it did not possess marketable title thereto.  On November 15, 2015, the Developer notified the Association it was terminating the lease to Unit 74, but offered the option to purchase for $199,000.00.  In connection with the sale, the Developer’s corporate directors, [...] and [...], represented the Developer held clean marketable title to Unit 74.  Ultimately, the Developer conveyed its “title” to the Association on April 7, 2016.  The Plaintiff’s subsequently filed the instant action against the Developer and Wilf Defendants alleging various causes of action, including breach of contract and violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.
[directive] ”  State v. Widmaier, 157 N.J. at 488.  The purpose of the Implied Consent statutory scheme is “to encourage motorists suspected of driving under the influence to submit to [B]reathalyzer tests. ”  State v. Widmaier, 157 N.J. at 487.  The need to obtain chemical breath test evidence, in a prompt manner, due to the speed with which alcohol is dissipated by the body is also discussed.  11  As presently drafted, none of the provisions in the Implied Consent Laws apply to the taking of blood, urine or other bodily substance samples.  Case law controls the criteria to be used by police for determining that blood or other bodily fluid samples should be drawn, the manner and methods by which it is to be drawn.
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[brief] (iii)  Tenant Allowance (i.e. “Fit-Up” Reimbursement)  The primary issue in this appeal is whether Tenant can offset its liability to Landlord under Section 4.02 of the Lease.  [...] twice aptly held that Tenant was not entitled to such an offset due to its admitted monetary defaults under the Lease.  (Da1-3).  This holding is in accordance with the express terms of the Lease and should, respectfully, be affirmed by this Court.
[brief] Indeed, [...] had repeatedly argued in submissions before the trial court that it was not a signatory to, nor bound by, any provisions of the PSA other than Articles IV, X, and XVII.  (See 5T, at 10-12).  The court reasoned, “Section 18.2 does not fall within any of those three articles which [...] has repeatedly asserted to form the basis of its rights and obligations under the PSA.  They can’t rely upon that for any right. ” (5T, at 12).  Allowing [...] to change its tune in order to take advantage of Section 18.2 would be “inequitable,” according to the trial court.  (5T, at 11).  Hence, the court stated: “it would be inequitable for [...] to now all of a sudden switch in midstream from their arguments, and conveniently forget that argument to try to argue that now Section 18.2, which is not part of Articles 4, 10 or 17, now would apply to [...] and [...] is entitled to any rights given to a quote, unquote, party under Section 18.2. ” (5T, at 11).  Accordingly, the trial court properly denied [...]’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees, under either Section 17.1 or Section 18.2 of the PSA.
[brief] “[W]e talked about this a moment ago, the Department of Health did not have any problem with the care and treatment that was given.  All right.  You saw that.  No citable deficiencies.  No state or federal citable deficiencies. ”  11T76:9-14.  The defense cited to the Department of Health and characterized its findings as if the DOH had a representative at trial who testified to what they did and what they found.  “[...], on behalf of the DOH, looked at four separate charts.  She looked at [...]’s chart as well, looked at staffing.  Didn’t find a single violation. ”  11T93:15-18.  No such witness existed.  There was no such testimony and, in reality, we have no idea what [...] did or did not do.  D-5 and D-6 were also used to create the impression that the nurses did nothing wrong because, if they had, they would have been disciplined by the DOH.
[brief] [...] and FRANK NUNZIATO  [...] [...] (T): (201)  355-8110 (F): [...] (E): [...] (E): [...]  Our File No. [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Respondents Borough of Rutherford and [...]  On the Brief and Of Counsel: [...] (022481993)  On the Brief: [...] (216252019)  Date Submitted: September 30, 2024
[brief] 511a.  And it explained that once [...] paid [...]’s May and June 2020 invoices, on October 2, 2020, it issued payroll checks for that period to all of its laid off custodians, as the COVID Statute requires, and provided the lower court once again with those payroll records.  512a; 655a.  [...] urged the lower court to revise and reconsider its earlier Orders denying its motion for summary judgment and dismissing its counterclaim on this basis.
[brief] M46.  The Mayor’s direction to the Zoning Board was, in effect, a chief executive officer unlawfully asserting his authority and unlawfully issuing a directive to a body that is, by law, a quasi-judicial, impartial body.  At Trb27-28, the Township further argues that liability cannot be established because the Mayor did not act unlawfully due to personal financial motives.  However, Plaintiffs are not obligated to make such a showing.  Indeed, the nature of self-dealing that shocks the conscience is not limited to financial motives.  In this case, the Mayor presumably acted to advance his political self-interest (although no trial has been held on this issue).  Similarly, a showing of personal animus is not necessary to establish liability.  Indeed, as acknowledged by the Township in its reply brief at Trb27, to satisfy the shocks the conscience standard, “a party must show that the alleged misconduct rises to the level of self-dealing, an unconstitutional taking, or interference with otherwise constitutional protected activity on the property. ”  There has, indeed, been an interference by Defendants with the constitutionally protected activity attempted by Plaintiffs on their property, i.e., Plaintiffs’ attempt to provide low and moderate income housing as protected by the Mount Laurel doctrine.  In sum, the municipal conduct below shocks the conscience for the reasons advanced above, and more.
[brief] Moreover, [...] conceded, and the trial court found, that [...] had not acted in good faith when they purchased [...]’s alleged debt without a license under the NJCFLA. (T2 4:14-11:3).  Moreover, the trial court based its application of laches on the purported prejudice [...] would have suffered had [...]’s Motion to Vacate been granted, considering that the statute of limitations on [...]’s alleged debt had expired.  T2 21:5-10; 22:8-10; 24:2-13; 35:15-36:10; 46:18-47:4.  However, putting aside the fact that expiration of the statute of limitations would have no practical legal effect on the already void debt, [...]’s Motion to Vacate did not seek dismissal of [...]’s claims, but rather sought to open the suit to be litigated on the merits.  See [...]’s proposed Answer and Affirmative Defenses, generally.  (Da31-Da34).  Thus, the expiration of the statute of limitations is of no consequence to an analysis of prejudice and/or laches here—[...] would have remained free to pursue its claims should the Motion to Vacate have been granted.  Without a finding of prejudice (based on the trial court’s analysis of the expiration of the statute of limitations), there can be no finding that [...]’s requested relief is barred by laches.  “The mere passage of time, of course, does not constitute laches . . . . laches consists of two elements: Inexcusable delay . . . and prejudice to the respondent resulting from such delay.  The Court should consider the equities of the case and not rely merely upon the lapse of time. ”  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Howard Sav. Institution, 127 N.J. Super. 479, 489 (Ch. Div. 1974) (emphasis added) (quoting Finley v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 788, 794, 796 (D.C.D.N.J.  Thus, the trial court’s application of laches to bar [...]’s sought after relief—despite [...]’s claims not being barred and [...]’s concession that their violations of the NJCFLA were not committed in good faith—constitutes reversible error.  Thus, the trial court’s April 8, 2024 Order should be reversed.  POINT III.
[directive] B.  Severability.  The provisions of this Directive and IAPP shall be severable.  If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of either this Directive or IAPP is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of either document shall not be affected.  C.  Any questions concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Questions.  Directive, the Major Discipline Directive, or IAPP shall be addressed to the [...], or their designee.  Page 8 D.  This Directive shall take effect immediately and remain in force and effect  Effective date. unless and until it is repealed, amended, or superseded by Order of the [...].
[brief] **[...].**  The trial court determined “I find the State through [...] to prove that (sic) by clear and convincing evidence that both he was attacked and bit and [...] was killed on the front lawn by [...]. ”  [...] did not deny that [...] injured Roche or that [...] was killed.  Roche did not contradict [...]’s story that she found [...] on the [...]’s front lawn, with his jaws around [...].
[brief] *State v. Briggs*, 279 N.J. Super. 555, 565 (App. Div. 1995); *State v. W.L.*, 278 N.J. Super. 295, 301 (App. Div. 1995); see also *State v. Hedgespeth*, 249 N.J. 234, 253 (2021), citing *State v. Scott*, 229 N.J. 468, 484-485 (2017) (errors which affect the weight the jury will give the State’s evidence or the State’s arguments in favor of conviction versus the defendant’s arguments in favor of acquittal are reversible and never harmless).  Defendant’s convictions should be reversed, and the matter remanded for retrial.
[brief] There Exists No Procedural Bar to the Relief Sought in the Petition a.  The Issue Before the Court Has Never Been Raised or Adjudicated, Nor Could it Have Been Raised or Adjudicated  To date, the PCR court and this Court have only ruled on whether [...] is entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; no court has ruled on whether [...] is entitled to a new trial based on the State’s violation of its obligation to turn over Brady material prior to [...]’s trial.
[brief] The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court recently noted that “[i]n the civil context, pipeline retroactivity of a new rule of law contemplates that three classes of litigants will be beneficiaries: those in all future cases, those in matters that are still pending, and the particular successful litigant in the decided case. ”  Roik v. Roik, 477 N.J. Super. 556, 574, 308 A.3d 754, 765 (App. Div. 2024) (quoting N.H. v. H.H., 418 N.J. Super. 262, 285 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011)); Beltran v. Delima, 379 N.J. Super. 169, 176-77, 877 A.2d 307 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (pipeline retroactivity applies to “to all prejudgment matters pending in the trial courts and to those matters that [were] on direct appeal”).  Here, whether the court examines the proceedings in state court or the bankruptcy court, the Debtor has pending motions challenging the forfeiture of his equity in the Property in both forums.  The undisputed timeline shows that within five (5) months of the entry of the Final Judgment (October 13, 2022), the Debtor filed his Chapter 13 case and proposed a plan which provided for the payment of [...]’s claim.  Then, within three (3) months of the bankruptcy filing, the United States Supreme Court decided Tyler.  Questions remained as to the applicability of Tyler to third-party purchasers of a tax sale certificate.  Then, within seven (7) months of the Tyler decision, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey decided Roberto finding that Tyler applied to third-party purchasers of a tax sale certificate.  Less than three (3) months later, the Debtor filed the Adversary Proceeding.  Deficiencies and missteps aside, without question the Debtor immediately attempted to address the claim of [...] against the Property via payment through his Chapter 13 plan.  The plan could only be implemented through the setting aside of the Final Judgment.  Undoubtedly, the Debtor could have avoided the Final Judgment — with limitation, see Wright, 649 B.R. 625 and Wright, 2023 WL 3560551 — under the original count in the original Complaint.  And therefore, the plan which needed the avoidance of the Final Judgment could have been implemented.  Since no confirmation hearing took place, the issue remained open.  While a judgment in foreclosure may seem to be final and remove the Debtor from the pipeline, this is not strictly the case.  In state court, the Debtor has, albeit unsuccessfully, been trying to set aside the Final Judgment via motions alleging fraud in the conduct of the suit.
[brief] (1T 81-24 to 82-5)  LEGAL ARGUMENT  THE ANONYMOUS, UNCORROBORATED 9-1-1 CALL DID NOT GIVE RISE TO REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP DEFENDANT.  There was no reasonable suspicion to stop [...], neither from the second-hand recitation of the contents of the 9-1-1 call nor from the officer’s incredible testimony.  The trial court’s credibility findings and its legal conclusions were sound and should not be disturbed.  The motion to suppress must be upheld.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause on January 20, 2022.  (Pa 1.)  On January 24, 2022, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. entered an *ex parte* Order to Show Cause imposing temporary restraints on the Borough, including enjoining the Borough from holding any further official meetings until a proper reorganization meeting could be held (the “TRO”).  (Pa 23.)  On January 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion in aid of litigant’s rights after the Borough Council held a public meeting on January 25, 2022, despite acknowledging at the meeting receipt of the TRO entered the previous day.  On January 27, 2022, the Honorable [...], P.J. Civ., convened a *sua sponte* hearing, vacated the TRO and set forth a briefing schedule on the Plaintiff’s application for preliminary relief and Plaintiff’s litigant’s rights motion.  (Pa 29.)  On March 4, 2022, Hon. [...], J.S.C., heard oral argument on the vacated TRO and Plaintiff’s motion in aid of litigant’s rights.  [...] denied both.  (Pa 31 and Pa 37; see Pa 233 for the transcript of the hearing before [...], which was included as an Exhibit to one of the Borough’s certifications submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment.)  The Borough filed its answer to the Verified Complaint on March 4, 2022.  (Pa 39.)  On June 27, 2022, Plaintiff sought the entry of default against defendant [...], which was entered on June 28, 2022.  (Pa 59.)
[directive] 9.3.1  An internal affairs investigation file is needed for all internal affairs reports.  Given the wide range of internal affairs allegations a law enforcement agency receives, these investigation files might consist of only the initial report form and the appropriate disposition document.  On the other hand, investigation files might include extensive documentation of an investigation.  9.3.2  The internal affairs investigation file should contain the investigation’s entire work product, regardless of the author.  This includes investigators' reports, transcripts of statements, and copies of all relevant documents.  The file should also include all related material from other agency incidents that may be applicable.  For instance, if an allegation is made of excessive force during an arrest, the internal affairs investigation file should contain copies of the reports from that arrest.  9.3.3  Where an internal affairs investigation results in the filing of criminal charges, the file shall be made available to the County Prosecutor’s Office.  It will be the responsibility of that office to decide which items are discoverable and which are admissible.  In these cases, the agency must follow the County Prosecutor’s instructions.  9.4
[brief] The issue is whether, after discovery ended, and a trial date was fixed, plaintiff was able to set forth a *prima facie* case against [...].  She clearly could not.  And that fact has never changed.  Plaintiff never produced an expert report regarding [...], either timely or late.  And plaintiff never provided an explanation, even on appeal, for her failure to do so.  Given the record before the court below, and now on appeal, both the dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against [...], and the denial of plaintiff’s request to extend discovery, remain appropriate.  The Law Division’s decisions should accordingly be affirmed.