ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (T201-8).  As with the other factors, Petitioner should not be punished because the Respondent failed to investigate the bona fides of her job duties.  Factor 14 – Furnishing Of Tools And Materials  Respondent argues that the door to the Petitioner’s conference room had a sign that said “Municipal Prosecutor” but did not state [...]’s name.  (Rb37).  This is going from the sublime to the ridiculous.  The Petitioner provided uncontradicted testimony that she has been using the same office supplied by the Township with the same work station for almost 20 years.  The Township provides a phone, letterhead, a laptop computer and other supplies for her use. (Pa23).  The Respondent concedes that Factor 15 – Significant Investment, Factor 16 – Realization of Profit or Loss, Factor 19 – Right of Discharge and Factor 20 – Right to Terminate, support the finding that Petitioner met the definition of employee.  The Respondent’s case rests upon minor issues such as name plates on doors, where someone did work during the Pandemic and the misunderstanding of how a substitute prosecutor filled in for Petitioner.
[directive] Alternatively, in cases where the county prosecutor makes a determination to waive forfeiture of office after weighing the factors in these guidelines, the municipal prosecutor shall make application to the court for waiver of forfeiture at the time of sentencing as per N.J.S.A. 2C: 51-2(e).  The written statement of reasons granting the waiver can be used by the municipal prosecutor to show the court the good cause needed to support the application for waiver.
[brief] Notably, the last time that [...] was successfully collected at [...] was on September 26, 2018 (Pa551a; Pa1075a).  After September 26, 2018, [...] was given yet another break from the business of collecting his semen.  (Pa551a; Pa1075a).  The next attempt to collect from [...] was on October 3, 2018, the day of the attack.  (Pa551a; Pa1075a).  Defendants received multiple communications informing them of [...]’s habitual tendency to resist going into the breeding shed to be collected, when the danger presented by a stallion’s aggressive behavior is heightened.  Therefore, Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably determine, upon a preponderance of the evidence, that Defendants knew or should have known that [...] had a “habitual tendency” for dangerous behavior when in the breeding environment.
[brief] CONCLUSION  For all of the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff requests:  (1)  The lower court’s Orders on Motion to Dismiss be reversed as to the dismissal of Counts One, Three, Four, Five, Six, and Seven; (2)  Alternatively, the Court should vacate the Orders on Motion to Dismiss and remand the matter to the lower court with instructions regarding the applicable Roa standard; and (3)  Such other and further relief as this Court deems just, equitable, and proper.
[directive] [...] argued the cause for amicus curiae [...] ([...], attorneys; [...], on the brief).  [...], Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae [...] ([...], Acting Attorney General, attorney; [...], of counsel and on the brief).  [...], [...], argued the cause for amicus curiae [...] ([...], President, [...], attorney; [...], of counsel and on the brief).  [...] delivered the opinion of the Court.
[brief] ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ####  Cases | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | A. J. & J. O. Pilar, Inc. v. Lister Corp., | | | 38 N.J. Super. 488, 498-500 (App. Div.), aff’d, 22 N.J. 75 (1956) | 13 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, | | | 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995) | 11,13 | | Bubis v. Kassin, | | | 323 N.J. Super. 601 (App. Div. 1999) | 15,16 | | Eileen T. Quigley, Inc. v. Miller Family Farms, | | | 266 N.J. Super. 283 (App. Div. 1993) | 12 | | Hyland v. Fonda, | | | 44 N.J. Super. 180 (App Div. 1957) | 19 | | Leach v. Anderl, | | | 218 N.J. Super. 18 (App. Div. 1987) | 12 | | Lennig v. Ocean City Ass’n, | | | 41 N.J. Eq. 606 (1886) | 19,20 | | Levinson v. Costello, | | | 74 N.J. Super. 539 (App. Div. 1962) | 15 | | Pruder v. Beuchel, | | | 183 N.J. 428 (2005) | 11 | | Rosen v. Keeler, | | | 411 N.J. Super. 439 (App. Div. 2010) | 12,14,15,19 | | Russi v. City of Newark, | | | 470 N.J. Super. 615 (App. Div. 2022) | 11 | | Village of Ridgewood v. Bolger Found., | | | 104 N.J. 337 (1986) | 12
[brief] The NJCRA does the same for the federal constitution, as well as for the New Jersey constitution.  See N.J.S.A. 10:6-2( c).  The liability of a public entity under 42 USC §1983 attaches when "execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury."  Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)
[brief] Seventh Nat. Bank v. Iron Co. (C. C.) 35 Fed. 440; Haug v. Riley, 101 Ga. 372, 29 S. E. 44, 40 L It A. 244.  Neither the Settlement Agreement and security interest provided to [...] nor the acknowledgement of the attorney’s charging lien transferred to these creditors the whole of the Plaintiff’s interest in this lawsuit.
[brief] Defendants now refute the first reason by alleging that there is nothing in the record to support that the Certification was factually incorrect.  Plaintiff struggles to see how it is possible that no sheriff’s officer was present in the courtroom, but it was still a sheriff’s officer who notified [...] of what occurred in the courtroom while she was absent.  Defendants contest the second reason by professing that the Defense adjuster is not an attorney, and failed to see the significance of Plaintiff’s actions.  However, this argument ignores the very purpose for which the adjuster was present in the courtroom, which was to observe and report.  Defendants’ insurance carrier, [...], is arguably the most vigilant insurance carrier in the State.  This is evidenced by the fact that they are the only one of their major competitors who deploys adjusters to monitor the entirety of trials in-person.  Defendants expect the Court to believe that [...], who lists herself in the Certification as a “litigation adjuster,” observed this trial for three whole days, and not once mentioned to Defense counsel what she witnessed?  Defendants expect the Court to believe that Defendants prepared their first Motion for New Trial without ever speaking to the Defense adjuster?  And Defendants expect the Court to believe that this Certification, dated one day after Defendants’ Notice of Motion, is not so laughably self-serving that the Presiding Judge of Burlington County did not properly weigh its effect?
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  Based on the aforementioned reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court deny defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Defendant’s Appeal of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Acting Mercer County Prosecutor BY: [...]  Acting Assistant Prosecutor  Special Deputy Attorney General NJ Attorney ID 410042022  October 18, 2024  [...] ID. NO. 063222014
[brief] While perhaps not relevant, the history of the relationship that led to the Agreement that is the subject of this Appeal is instructive.  This was a long term living arrangement between Plaintiff and Defendant.  During the relationship Defendant was the sole provider.  The reason was that Plaintiff claimed that she never had anything, except her salary from work.  She hid all of her assets from Defendant.  Everything that she did was consistent with that narrative.  During the course of this litigation, Defendant learned that she Plaintiff had significant assets totaling well over One Million Dollars.  She had gone to great lengths to hide these assets.  For example, when her god-child was turning 17 Plaintiff wanted her to have a car so Plaintiff asked Defendant to buy the god-child a new car which he did (without contribution from Plaintiff who stated she had no money to help out) (T2 ,page 117, lines 8-16).  And when the arrangement/relationship was ending, Plaintiff sought out three of Defendant’s closest friends to have conversations to tell them that she was destitute and needed them to appeal to Defendant to put together a comfortable support package for Plaintiff.  Based on my experience with Plaintiff and the conversations that Defendant had with those three (3) friends Defendant felt compelled to try to provide a comfortable living situation for Plaintiff.  Testimony was offered which supports this account.  This is the background which led me to enter into a very generous one-sided agreement.
[brief] Given the prior investigation, any number of circumstances may have been sufficient to elevate the detectives’ hunch to reasonable suspicion, such as “the overwhelming odor of air freshener,” suspiciously “large bags in the cargo hold,” or “conflicting accounts of his trip itinerary. ”  See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. 540, 555 (2019) (finding reasonable suspicion evolved during course of pretextual traffic stop).
[brief] (Aa132 – Aa136).  2.  DEP’s March 20, 2019 approval of WFD permit modification application to [...], DEP permitting file number [...].  (Aa89 – Aa91).  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------| | Capital Health Sys., Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking & Ins., | 14 | | 445 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div. 2016) | | | Filgueiras v. Newark Pub. Schs., | 23 | | 426 N.J. Super. 449 (App. Div. 2012) | | | In re Amico/Tunnel Carwash, | 19 | | 371 N.J. Super. 199 (App. Div. 2004) | | | In re CAFRA Permit No. 87-0959-5, | 12 | | 152 N.J. 287 (1997) | | | In re Eastwick Coll. LPN-to-RN Bridge Program, | 28, 37 | | 225 N.J. 533 (2016) | | | In re Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permit No. 16, | 28 | | 379 N.J. Super. 331 (App. Div. 2005) | | | In re Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permits, | 20 | | 185 N.J. 452 (2006) | | | In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, | 29 | | 180 N.J. 478 (2004) | | | In re Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permits, | 15, 17, 18, 19, 20 | | 185 N.J. 452 (2006)
[brief] \textit{See dep.nj.gov/wp-content/uploads/njpact/docs/dep-ao-2020-01.pdf}  In June of 2020, the DEP issued its “2020 New Jersey Scientific Report on Climate Change” in which it announced that the effects of climate change on New Jersey’s environment “…are significant and wide-ranging, requiring a comprehensive and forward-thinking response by all levels of government, economic sectors, communities, and populations. ”
[brief] As to the Court's power to regulate discovery, the Rule states, “For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. ”  *Id.*  The Seventh Circuit has recognized a trial court's “broad discretion over discovery matters. ”  *Spiegla v. Hull*, 371 F.3d 928, 944 (7th Cir.2004).  The Court finds that Plaintiffs requests seeking discovery of documents regarding non-VIP plans are simply not relevant to the subject matter of the complaint, which deals only with the VIP 401(k) plan.
[brief] 6.  Was this not a sufficiently important issue that should have been discussed and ruled upon?  IT IS THE MOST FINANCIALLY DEVASTATING ISSUE IN THIS MATTER.  TO PUT IT IN PERSPECTIVE, PLAINTIFF IS COMPLAINING ABOUT LATE PAYMENTS OF $1,500.00  YET THE PENALTIES TOTAL $227,000.00  WHICH IS THE EQUIVALENT OF OVER 150 MONTHS (OVER 12 YEARS) OF PAYMENTS OR TO PUT FURTHER PERSPECTIVE ON THE NUMBER IT IS MORE THAN HALF OF THE AMOUNT OF THE PURCHASE AMOUNT OF PLAINTIFF'S EXPENSIVE TOWNHOUSE.  DOES THIS COURT HAVE THE POWER TO DO THE RIGHT THING AND TO RESCIND THESE DRACONIAN PENALTIES
[brief] This court reviews de novo a trial court’s order to grant or deny a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e).  Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, PC, 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019).  In reviewing a complaint dismissed under Rule 4:6-2(e), the appellate court’s inquiry “is limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint[.]”  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989).  On appeal, this court may affirm the decision below on grounds other than those relied on by the trial court, so long as that legal determination is supported by the record on appeal.  State v. Adubato, 420 N.J. Super. 167, 176 (App. Div. 2011).  As to the denial of the motion to amend, a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to amend a complaint is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.  Grillo v. State, 469 N.J Super. 267, 275 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting Port Liberte II Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. New Liberty Residential Urb. Renewal Co., 435 N.J. Super. 51, 62 (App. Div. 2014)).  Although Rule 4:9-1 requires that motions for leave to amend be granted liberally, “the granting of a motion to file an amended complaint always rests in the court’s sound discretion” in light of the facts that exist at the time the motion is made.  Kernan v. One Wash. Park Urban Renewal Assocs., 154 N.J. 437, 456-57 (1998).
[brief] (CONT'D.)  B.  At the Latest, [...] Was in Custody Once [...] Obtained Probable Cause for an Arrest, Not Only After Police Formally Arrested Him..........................  31  POINT IV  IF THIS COURT DOES NOT ORDER SUPPRESSION OF ALL OF THE EVIDENCE, IT SHOULD REMAND FOR ANOTHER SUPPRESSION HEARING.  (Not raised below)  .........................................................  33 CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................
[brief] As a form of legislation aimed at remedying a social problem, pension statutes "should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited."  Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 199 N.J. 14, 34 (2009) (quoting Geller, supra, 53 N.J. at 597-598, 597).  Such a liberal construction "resolves all reasonable doubts in favor of the applicability of the statute to the particular case."
[brief] Petitioner asserts that the Board’s Final Administrative Decision is “internally inconsistent in part” with its prior communications (Pet. Br., p. 20).  Petitioner does not provide any references to his Appendix demonstrating any alleged inconsistencies, and therefore the argument should be disregarded.  In any event, it is respectfully submitted that there are no inconsistencies that are of any significance to the result here.  The majority of the cases cited by Petitioner in his Brief are not on point, as they deal with the issue of whether the officers in those cases sustained a disability due to a traumatic event.  See for example Richardson v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 192 N.J. 189 (2007); Moran v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 438 N.J. Super 346 (App. Div. 2014); and Diaz v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, A-3619-21, Unpub. (App. Div. 11/2/23).  The alleged merits of Petitioner’s disability claim are not properly before this Court, as Petitioner is ineligible for AD under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2) and N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4(b) and cannot even get out of the starting gate.  For that reason, Petitioner’s claims regarding the permanency and extent of his alleged disability, based upon documents which are not properly included in the Petitioner’s Appendix, are irrelevant to the threshold issue of eligibility under the pertinent statutes.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Over the last several years, this court and the New Jersey Supreme Court have published numerous decisions instructing the [...] (Board) to conduct its parole hearings and render its decisions in accordance with its unambiguous statutory responsibilities.  Despite those clear instructions, the Board continues to ignore its legal obligations to conduct fair and unbiased parole hearings based on the full record before it.  This appeal demonstrates that the Board failed to consider material facts, ignored mitigating evidence, and failed to meet its burden to overcome the presumption of release.  These failures are particularly disturbing because the Board has repeatedly ignored this Court’s rulings concerning [...].  As this Court and our Supreme Court have observed, the Board frequently limits its consideration of evidence to that which supports its own preordained denial of parole.  This appeal presents yet another example of the Board’s failure to abide by the laws under which it is governed.  [...] appeals from the Board’s February 28, 2024, Final Agency Decision denying him parole pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-4.1 and establishing a future eligibility date (FET) of thirty-six months.
[brief] On August 14, 2020, when the Court appointed [...] as temporary Administratrix, the Order also set a discovery period which included a Notice to Produce and Interrogatories.  (R-1).  Pursuant to that Court Order, counsel for [...] served Interrogatories and a Notice to Produce, on counsel for [...] on September 15, 2020.  [...] was permitted to inquire as to whether [...] had any ownership interest in the [...].  [...] refused to respond to the Notice to Produce and counsel for [...] sought enforcement.
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Abruquah v. State,** | 12 | | 296 A.3d 961 (Md. 2023) | | | **Commonwealth v. Robertson,** | 13 | | 489 Mass. 226 (2022) | | | **Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.** | 1 | | 509 U.S. 579 (1993) | | | **In re Proportionality Rev. Project,** | 23 | | 161 N.J. 71 (1999) | | | **State v. Angoy,** | 18 | | 329 N.J. Super. 79 (App. Div. 2000) | | | **State v. Concepcion,** | 17 | | 111 N.J. 373 (1988) | | | **State v. EOFF,** | 10 | | No. A-0514-18, 2022 WL 628499 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 4, 2022)| | | **State v. Erazo,** | 7 | | 126 N.J. 112 (1991) | | | **State v. Fortin,** | 7 | | 178 N.J. 540 (2004) | | | **State v. Henderson,** | 15, 17, 18, 19 | | 208 N.J. 208 (2011) | | | **State v. Little,** | 7, 10, 11| | 246 N.J. 402 (2021) | | | **State v. Marshall,** | 17 | | 173 N.J. 343 (2002) | | State v. Miranda, No. A-2243-19, 2023 WL 3991723 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.  June 12, 2023)  .................................................................10  State v. Murray, 240 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 1990).........................................................9  State v. Olenowski, 255 N.J. 529 (2023) ........................................................................passim  State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553 (2004)  ..............................................................................17  State v. Watson, 472 N.J. Super. 381 (App. Div. 2022).....................................................18, 20 State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39 (1983) ..................................................................................7  United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) .........................................................20  Statutes, Codes and Rules N.J. Ct. R. 1:36-3 ....................................................................................10
[brief] N.J.R.E. 703 states that “[t]he facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.  If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. ”  See also, Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 53 (2015).
[brief] [...]’s flight from the illegal stop lasted no more than twenty-five seconds.  (Da 10 at 0:41 to 1:05).  [...] seized and handcuffed [...] after [...] had already tripped in the alleyway, posing no danger to [...].  [...] did not engage in any act of aggression towards the officers, and his brief flight did not put the officers at risk of physical injury.  See Williams II, 410 N.J. Super. at 563 (suppressing evidence when the “defendant did not force the officers to engage in a lengthy and dangerous pursuit to apprehend him or engage in any action of physical aggression”).  And, unlike Williams I, where officers were uniformed and in marked cars, in this case, like Williams II, the officers wore plainclothes and jumped out of an unmarked car, further minimizing any possible attenuation.
[brief] The trial court in error did not find that the statute of limitations had passed which cut off any rights of [...] to Lot 22.  As noted, [...] purchased the church which sits at [...] and is Lot 19.  The additional lot which is identified as [...] is Lot 20.  This is documented in the Property Identification Record and the personnel at the Tax Assessor’s office in speaking to [...] and [...] explained that the lot in dispute which is actually Lot 20 and part of Lot 22 belongs to [...].  Further, the elements to satisfy adverse possession were present.  The use of the lots was open, notorious, hostile, exclusive and continuous for a period of 46 years when Rev. Teabout approached [...] about Lot 22 in the summer of 2021.  With tacking of the time of ownership of this land by [...] from 1967, the thirty year period ended in 1997.  [...] has had exclusive use of the Lot 20 and Lot 22 from the point that [...] acquired the Lot 22 from the [...] in 1985 and the failure to object to the use of Lot 22 within the required statutory time period resulted in adverse possession becoming a reality.  As a result, [...] was barred from making any claim to Lot 22.
[brief] The same is true regarding Plaintiff’s interrogatory responses.  In Plaintiff’s interrogatory response #4, Plaintiff claimed “Defendants repeatedly promised to pay plaintiff and did not do so.  They claimed that they had six years to pay him but have taken no action to do so since the hospital was sold. ”  See Pa576-577.  This statement does not say that Defendants conditioned paying Plaintiff on the sale of the hospital and is likely the Plaintiff referring to the same conversation in December of 2017 that he referenced at his deposition.  This response is Plaintiff noting that Defendants have not paid him since the hospital was sold but makes no mention of repeated assurances by Defendants that he should keep working at the Hospital for all of those years and he will be paid once a sale occurs.  Thus, granting every reasonable inference in favor of the Plaintiff, once the sham affidavit is removed there simply is not enough evidence to support Plaintiff’s newly devised theory that equitable tolling should apply to save his claim.  Accordingly, the Court’s application of the sham affidavit doctrine and granting summary judgment should be affirmed.