ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] III.  **REIMBURSEMENT OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS PURSUING THIS ACTION ARE UNRECOVERABLE**  As [...] notes in its brief, the trial court did not address the recoverability of attorneys’ fees and costs [...] spent prosecuting this action.  But that was for good reason: the trial court overwhelmingly ruled in [...]’s favor and, thus, [...] was not a “successful claimant” under R. 4:42-9(a)(6).  This Court should reach the same conclusion.  Even if [...] succeeds on appeal, which is highly unlikely, it should not be allowed to recovery attorneys’ fees and costs because New Jersey “has a strong policy disfavoring the shifting of attorneys’ fees. ”  *N. Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co.*, 158 N.J. 561, 569 (1999).  Further, awarding counsel fees pursuant to R. 4:42-9(a)(6) is not mandatory for a successful claimant on a liability policy.  *Enright v. Lubow*, 215 N.J. Super. 306, 313 (App. Div. 1987).  Instead, the “trial judge has broad discretion as to when, where, and under what circumstances counsel fees may be proper and the amount to be awarded. ”  *Iafelice ex rel. Wright v. Arpino*, 319 N.J. Super. 581, 590 (App. Div. 1999).  The exercise of that discretion should respectfully result in a rejection of [...]’ request for recovery of its inflated attorneys’ fees and costs.
[brief] A.  Defendant’s sentence is legal.  The sentence imposed was legal.  Following his convictions of first-degree murder, defendant faced a sentence of 30 years without parole eligibility or a sentence of a specific term of years between 30 years and life imprisonment with a 30-year parole ineligibility period on each count.  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(1).  Defendant does not argue that his sentence falls outside the guidelines.  8  This POINT responds to POINTS VIII, IX, and X of defendant’s brief.
[brief] There are two basic types of affirmative measures that a municipality can use to make the opportunity of lower income housing realistic: (1) encouraging or requiring the use of available state or federal housing subsidies, and (2) providing incentives for or requiring private developers to set aside a portion of their developments for lower income housing.  Which, if either of these devices will be necessary in any particular municipality to assure compliance with the constitutional mandate will initially be up to the municipality itself.  Where necessary, the trial court overseeing compliance may require their use.  [Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 262.]
[brief] [...] filed Nov. 4th Certification opposing a portion of the Trust legal fees and any Trust Reserve (Exh. “W”)(303a-344a).  [...] filed Nov. 16th Certification Reply (Exh. “Y”)(376a-384a).  I filed Nov. 28th Certification Response to his Reply (Exh. “Z”)(386a-409a).  There was a Dec. 22, 2022 Hearing for the parties’ final arguments (2T).  [...]’s ruled at Feb. 17th Hearing on Reconsideration Motion, Trust Reserve, & legal, accounting & commission fees (3T).  It led to March 7, 2023 Order (Exh. “C”)(36a-37a).  March 13th Order had corrections (Exh. “D”)(39a).  [...] filed March 23, 2023 Motion for Reconsideration for $25K Trust Reserve primarily for [...]’s future legal fees, and a new request for Trust payment of $33,716 for legal fees from Oct. 26, 2022 through March 7, 2023.  [...] filed May 25, ‘23 Cross-Motion (470a-477a) w/Opposition to Jacobson’s filing & reconsidering Oct. ’22 Order, par. 1d, for Trust payback of $4,120 for unwarranted [...] legal work (June 17 to July 9 in ‘21).  I filed May 25, 2023 Cross-Motion (Exh. “AA”)(411a-468a) w/Opposition to Jacobson’s filing & reconsideration of Mar. 7, ’23 Order, incl. vacating Trust payment for $93,247 legal fees, approve portions of Oct. ’22 Reconsideration Motion, and correct Trust payments for accounting & commission fees; & for Mr. [...] to issue Final Trust Accounting, as req’d by Oct. 2022 Order, par. 2.  My May 30, ‘23 Cert. (Exh. “AC”, p. 6-7, Items 10-11; p. 9, par.  10; p. 10) (484a-488a) agreed w/$4,120 Trust payback in Ambrose’s May 25th filing (Exh. “AB”, p. 5-6)(471a-472a).  It had updated proposed Order (248a-252a).  There was an Aug. 4, 2023 Hearing for the parties’ final arguments, and for [...]’s rulings in which he rejected each of our Court filings (4T).  Aug. 4th Orders marked up proposed Orders by Jacobson, Ambrose, & me.  I requested Judge to issue one Order since marked-up Orders did not fully reflect his rulings.  Sept. 6, 2023 Order denied each of our filings (Exh. “E”)(41a-42a).  [...] oversaw Case until Nov. 16, ’22.  [...] took over.
[brief] That was part of why the trial court did not award Plaintiffs the full quantum of damages they originally sought.  (26T23:8 to 28:5).  But what the trial court did find, based on [...]’s analysis, other testimony, and documentary evidence, was that there were specific instances when [...] and the other defendants diverted funds from the [...] and [...] accounts to their own accounts that were beyond the Plaintiffs’ control.  The trial court made clear that it was “troubled with many of these transactions that just made no sense and the explanations made no sense.  And [for] some of them, there was no explanation. ” (26T28:13-20).  Ultimately, the appellants are dissatisfied with the way the trial court resolved a battle of the experts between [...] and [...], but that is not a basis to reverse the trial court’s judgment.
[directive] Attach a copy of the warrant application to this form.  provision to a court.  I.  BASIS FOR NO-KNOCK REQUEST (check all that apply)  Please check the applicable boxes relating to specified criteria for a finding of a risk to officer safety or safety of nearby civilians.  If “other” selected, please provide brief explanation of the relevant facts.  Information received that the target of the search warrant or other known occupant of the residence n has recently been in possession of a firearm, other weapon or explosives that are readily capable of causing serious bodily injury.  Information received that there currently are, or recently have been, readily accessible firearms, n weapons, or explosives located inside the target residence that are readily capable of causing serious bodily injury.  The target of the search warrant is being investigated for an offense involving the use or possession n of a firearm or other weapon that is readily capable of causing serious bodily injury that has yet to be recovered by law enforcement officers, or is being investigated for an especially violent offense.  The presence of a fortified structure or exterior surveillance system at the residence capable of n being monitored.  The target of the search warrant or other known occupants of the target residence have a documented n history of violent offenses (to include arrests and/or convictions) or offenses involving the use or possession of a firearm (to include arrests and/or convictions).  If this factor is applicable and includes arrests and/or convictions, the certification/affidavit shall include a synopsis of the relevant offenses and whether they are arrests or convictions.  Additionally, a criminal history sheet shall be attached.  Information received that the target of the residence or other known occupants of the target n residence have been affiliated with a gang or gang activity or terrorist organization or other group that engages in or supports violence against the government or the public.  The layout of the target residence is such that the risk to officer safety or the safety n of nearby civilians is heightened.  The target of the search warrant or other known occupants of the premises have made n threats to harm law enforcement if law enforcement action is taken against them.  (explain)  Other risk(s) to officer safety and/or the safety of nearby civilians:  n 1 (continued)  12/2021  OAG  No-Knock Application Form, Privileged & Confidential / Attorney Work Product / Deliberative Process Communication
[brief] In any case, even the limited record before the court shows that the subject property did qualify as abandoned.  To be deemed abandoned, the property must not have been “legally occupied for a period of six months,” and also satisfy any one of four disjunctive criteria: A. the property is in need of rehabilitation in the reasonable judgment of the public officer\textsuperscript{[11]}, and no rehabilitation has taken place during that six-month period; B. construction was initiated on the property and was discontinued prior to completion, leaving the building unsuitable for occupancy, and no construction has taken place for at least six months . . . C. at least one installment of property tax remains unpaid and delinquent on that property . . . or D. the property has been determined to be a nuisance by the public officer in accordance with \textit{N.J.S.A.} 55:19-82.
[brief] ”  Id. at *8, *9.  The court observed that the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (20 U.S.C. §1232g), which grants parents access to their children’s school records, subordinates the privacy rights of the child to the parents’ right to know and in favor of parental involvement which “includes more than academics and extends to matters of health. ”  Id. at *9.  The court held that the teachers demonstrated a likelihood of success on their free speech claim because the policy would require them to violate the law by acting in derogation of parents’ constitutional rights.  Id. at *12.  As for the free exercise claim, the court reasoned that the school district was “mistaken” in “plac[ing] a child's right to privacy above, and in derogation of, the rights of a child's parents.
[directive] Report audit  Every such registered municipaI accountant shall file the original report of his audit and 5 recommendations with the clerk and shall, within days thereafter, file a certified duplicate copy of thereof, over his signature, in the office the director.  - - T, L.1960, c. 169,X eff. Jan. 1, 1962.  -I  . . i.: Document Page 1 of 1  New Jersey  Permanent Statutes TITLE 40A MUNICIPALITIES AND COUNTIES of 40A:5-7.
[brief] “[I]nsofar as consistent with and modified to meet the facts adduced at trial, model jury charges should be followed and read in their entirety to the jury. ”  *State v. R.B.*, 183 N.J. 308, 325 (2005).  “The process by which model jury charges are adopted in this State is comprehensive and thorough; our model jury charges are reviewed and refined by experienced jurists and lawyers. ”  Ibid.  “Generally speaking, the language contained in any Model Charge results from the considered discussion amongst experienced jurists and practitioners. ”  *Flood v. Aluri-Vallabhaneni*, 431 N.J. Super. 365, 383 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 216 N.J. 14 (2013).
[brief] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF APPENDIX CONTENTS (Pa1-Pa57) | iii | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED | iv | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | v | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | STATEMENT OF FACTUAL HISTORY | 4 | | A.  The July 20, 2022 Crash | 4 | | B.  Plaintiff’s Direct And Vicarious Claims Against [...] And [...] | 6 | | C.  [...] And [...]’s Directly Adverse Factual And Legal Positions | 7 | | 1.  The [...] Defendants’ Version (Disputed By Defendant [...]) | 8 | | 2.  Defendant [...]’s Version (Disputed By The [...] Defendants) | 10 | | 3.  The [...] Defendants And [...] Dispute Each Other’s Testimony | 12 | | D. [...] Continues Its Joint Representation Of [...] And The [...] Defendants Despite Their Clearly Adversarial Positions | 13 | 1.  The June 7, 2023 Municipal Court Hearing......................  13  2.  [...]’s July 27, 2023 Answers To Form C Interrogatories ..........................................................  14  3.  Defense Counsel Contradicts The Sworn Testimony Of One Of His Own Clients ([...]) In A September 15, 2023 Certification.................................................................  15  4.  Conflicted Counsel  [...] Appears To “Spoon Feed” Testimony To [...], To His Detriment And [...]’s Benefit, Regarding An Alleged “Miscommunication”.....  16  E.  Plaintiff Repeatedly Advises AMD Of The Subject Conflict ...............................................................  18  F. [...] Disqualifies AMD As Counsel For Defendants............................................................  19 STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW...........................................  22  LEGAL ARGUMENT JUDGE ZAZZALI-HOGAN CORRECTLY DISQUALIFIED [...] FROM JOINTLY REPRESENTING THE DEFENDANTS DUE TO A CONCURRENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST (Da001)........................................................................
[brief] *Ibid*.  Amicus’s opinion to the contrary is nothing more than a self-serving net opinion.  Again, phase-in is not a determination reserved to any product manufacturer.  No one has suggested that new safety systems must or should be held from the market until every make and model of every manufacturer can be simultaneously marketed with a system as standard equipment.  Any arguments for delaying implementation of safety advancements are justifications to be considered in the jury’s analysis of whether there was a breach of duty.  They are not a defense as a matter of law.  Several of the arguments put forth by amicus are completely inapplicable to this case.
[brief] The factual findings of the Lower Court, that can only be overturned by clear error, demonstrate that Respondents have not abused, delayed, or burdened the discovery process and, have not benefitted from the formality of litigation.  *See* Transcript, 12:6-8.  Respondents neither served discovery demands, nor provided any responses.  *Id.*  And no depositions were scheduled or even contemplated at the time of making the motion to compel.  *Id.*  Thus, unlike *Marmo*  Appellant and Respondents have engaged in no discovery and have not shown their cards or used the litigation process to otherwise prejudice one party or the other for when this matter is referred to arbitration.
[brief] Defendants cannot deny their continuous and systematic contacts with New Jersey.  “[...] was actively practicing law within the borders of the State of New Jersey at the time of the subject malpractice.  [...] maintained an office which employed individuals on a daily basis at its Newark, New Jersey location. ”  Da14.  More specifically, [...] has maintained a New Jersey office for dozens of years – first in Morristown, then Princeton, then Newark.  Da208.  In 2016, thirty-one [...] attorneys were admitted to practice law in New Jersey.  Da211.  [...] has filed both income and payroll taxes in New Jersey from 2009 to the present.  Da206.  In 2016, [...] had twenty-seven clients providing New Jersey addresses and, in 2013, had eighty-three New Jersey clients.  Da209.  In addition, [...] sponsored numerous New Jersey bar events and its New Jersey lawyers received numerous in-state professional honors.  Da208–09.  As for [...], he “directed all communications and billings to Plaintiff’s principal place of business in the state of New Jersey, as well as continued maintaining contact with Plaintiff after the 2016 escrow transaction, contacting Plaintiff with marketing prospects for its parent company in 2017. ”  Da14; Da152 at No. 9; Da315 at ¶ 14; Pa17.
[brief] Thus, “if the words used in an exclusionary clause are clear and unambiguous, ‘a court should not engage in a strained construction to support the imposition of liability. ’”  Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 202 N.J. 432, 442 (2010), quoting Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co., 121 N.J. 530, 537 (1990).
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SANCTIONING PLAINTIFFS FOR FILING THE COMPLAINT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS  [...] ATTORNEY FEES (190a – 203a; 209a – 232a)**  A party may recover legal fees if permitted by, among other authorities, a statute or court rule.  See R. 4:42-9; Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 385 (2009).  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 and Rule 1:4-8 permit a judge to award attorney’s fees as sanctions against a litigant or an attorney for pursuing a frivolous complaint.
[brief] (See, Dta796,823,1205,1216.)  The parties filed their respective reply briefs on March 24, 2023, following an unsuccessful mediation conducted before the Honorable [...], P.J.A.D. (ret.).  (See, Dta1259.)  On May 26, 2023, after hearing argument from the parties, the motion judge adopted the conclusions and opinions set forth in his preliminary oral ruling (1T), and entered orders of even date granting [...] summary judgment and denying [...]’ and plaintiffs’ motions.
[brief] C.  The Evidence Viewed in a Light Most Favorable to Plaintiff Reveals that the Elimination of the Density Limitation and the Increase in Allowable Height Constitutes Spot Zoning  Spot zoning is antithetical to the goal of treating like properties alike.  See e.g. Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 29 N.J. at 123:  It is fundamental in zoning policy that all property in like circumstances be treated alike.  The use restraints must be general and uniform in the particular district.  * * *  The genius of the constitutional and statutory zoning process is the regulation of land and buildings by districts according to the nature and extent of their use; and it goes without saying that arbitrary deviation from the general rule is forbidden, on constitutional principle as well as the policy of the statute.  Undue discrimination in treatment and classification vitiates the regulation.  The constitutional uniformity and equality requires that classification rest on real and not feigned differences, such as make for a distinction having some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made, *i.e.*, zoning by districts ‘in accordance with a comprehensive plan’ that takes into account the ‘nature and extent’ of the use of land and buildings within the district, the statutory considerations to be served by zoning, the ‘character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses,’ ‘with a view of conserving the value of property and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the municipality. ’ (Citations omitted).  Insofar as the 2020 redevelopment plan amendment applied to a single piece of property and afforded one property owner with advantages not available to others, without any planning justification, it can be spot zoning.
[brief] Plaintiff’s claim that [...] destroyed the theater management system of software logs even though it had notice of the likelihood of litigation prior to said alleged destruction was and continues to be without merit.  [...] was presented with the same evidence as this Appellate Court; the guest incident report, answers to request for admissions, the letter from [...], and selective pages from witness depositions, taken out of context.  The guest incident report stated, “[f]ell walking down left side of theater five at first step down before the movie at approximately 8:00 p.m. ” (Pa77).  It provided absolutely no insight as to the cause of Plaintiff’s fall and therefore there was no basis for [...] to have been on notice of any allegations as to the supposed cause of plaintiff’s fall.  Additionally, both Plaintiff and her son testified that they saw lights on in the auditorium at the time of her fall.
[brief] Further, the Search Warrant required that search must be made in the daytime or in the nighttime and must be made after knocking and announcing their intent.  (Da9).  On February 19, 2021, members of the [...], as well as members of the [...] responded to [...] to conduct a controlled delivery and execute the court ordered anticipatory search warrant.  Notably, the BWC footage provided within discovery, did not show Law Enforcement knocking and announcing their presence or intent.  In fact, the BWC footage from several officers only show law enforcement using a metal ram to break open the door.  Thereafter, law enforcement forced entry into the residence, wherein [...] was the only individual present, and conducted a search of the residence.  The search yielded a series of suspected CDS, as well as other items such as labels, a scale and pill crusher, which were ultimately seized and placed into property and evidence.  Thereafter, [...] was charged.
[brief] (5T43-25 to 48-7).  In maintaining otherwise, defendant focuses on the lack of corroboration, [...]’s custodial status, and [...]’s mental state.  As for corroboration, [...] correctly found that the lack of cell phone records corroborating the phone calls was, on balance, insignificant because there were several possible explanations for why they did not appear: a different phone number could have been used, [...]’s phone was lost and [...]’s phone was wiped, and a separate calling application could have been used.  More importantly, both statements were substantially corroborated by other evidence.  For example, [...]’s statement that he heard [...] say he was by the Dollar Store on Irving Avenue right before hearing the gunfire, (6T31-21 to 32-3; 6T50-5 to 21), was corroborated by [...]’s testimony about their route, (3T94-23 to 96-1), the [...] surveillance, (4T83-8 to 87-7), and [...]’s testimony about defendant’s cell phone location, (7T51-17 to 21; 7T54-12 to 55-8).
[brief] Since Appellant prevailed on his summary judgment motion, what still needed to be decided below was the correct judgment amount, the correct interest computation, costs of this suit & counsel fees.  All of these issues were not completely decided until the 5-31-24 Order.  A final order, under R. 4:49-2, is one that marks the conclusion of a particular stage in litigation.  It signifies the end of a particular phase of a case, allowing for an appeal as of right.
[brief] Plaintiff [...]’s constructive discharge claim fails as she has not demonstrated evidence sufficient to meet the heightened, objective standard which requires “conduct so intolerable that a reasonable person would be forced to resign rather than endure it. ”  Nuness v. Simon and Schuster, Inc., 221 F.Supp.3d 596, 604 (D.N.J.2016) (citations omitted).  Additionally, [...]’s August 30, 2019 note which purportedly “constructively discharged” Plaintiff [...] from her employment with [...] was premised upon his misunderstanding that Plaintiff [...] was still assigned to the same office as Defendant [...].  (Pa873, [...] deposition transcript, T41:4-T42:5).  Moreover, Plaintiff’s claim that [...] ignored her after she reported the harassment is baseless.  Throughout her medical leave of absence, and up until her decision to not return to [...], [...] employees were in contact with Plaintiff, and responded to her questions.  . (Da10, December 11, 2018 email from HR Representative [...]; Da12, December 14, 2018 email from HR Representative [...]; Da22-Da24, Emails of February 19, 2019, June 10, 2019 and July 10, 2019 from HR Representative [...]).
[directive] Restrictions on Relevant Factors  In order to prevent the re-introduction of disparity in the unified statewide system for determining appropriate plea offers under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, a prosecutor may only consider those facts and circumstances that are specifically described in these Guidelines.  There is no provision in these Guidelines for extending “leniency,” except by the tendering of a “standardized waiver” to an eligible defendant, or by the application of mitigating factors enumerated in these Guidelines, or by withholding an objection to a defendant’s application to be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 (treatment in lieu of imprisonment).  Nor is there a provision in these Guidelines for a prosecutor to consider an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind or to a degree not accounted for in the Offense Description, the Special Application and Enhancement Features, the enumerated Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, the Downward Departure for Trial Proof Issues, or the Downward Departure for Substantial Cooperation.
[brief] Id. at 9:7-11.  Well, I think the wording – well it’s already been broadened because it doesn’t say a contract, it says written arrangement.  . . so they have already broadened it from a written contract, but I still think it has to be between the two parties.  Id. at 10:23-25; 11:2-4.  Finally, in issuing its oral opinion, the Court stated: