ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Report admits “that its conclusion is based, in large part, on circumstantial evidence. ”  Report, p.7, lines ll. 25-6, Pa112.  The Boundary Commissioners relied upon circumstantial evidence due to the fact that the monument upon which the Sweeney Survey is based could not be located.  See Report, p.3, ll. 25-30, Pa108.  Consequently, the issue before the trial court was whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to move the property lines of not only the [...] and the [...] but the property lines of their immediate neighbors, and consequently their neighbors in turn.  The Report’s circumstantial evidence relies upon the inability to locate the monument upon which Sweeney relied.  Due to the passage of time, it can no longer be found.  Without being able to locate the Sweeney monument, the issue is not whether the Report’s calculations are correct but whether they are based on sufficient evidence to justify imposing the recommended result.  Basically, according to the Report, the original subdivision lots fit together but somehow do not fit with lots subsequently created, although the only line ever in dispute is between Lots 10 & 11.  How the pieces of this jigsaw puzzle created by the Report all fit together remains unresolved.  The Report simply moves selected property boundaries around without regard to well over 50 years of utilization and prior surveys.  The [...] maintain that the Report of the Boundary Commissioners presents insufficient circumstantial evidence to accomplish the radical shift in property boundaries affecting them and the other parties not before the Court.  D.
[brief] # TABLE OF APPENDIX B | Document | Appendix Page No. | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | Appellant’s Verified Complaint, | Pa84 | | (file dated on August 25, 2023) | | | Proofs of service, | Pa105 | | (file dated on August 30, 2023) | | | Order denying temporary restraints, | Pa107 | | (file dated on August 30, 2023) | | | Proof of service II, | Pa108 | | (file dated on September 20, 2023) | | | Order disposing case With Prejudice, | Pa111 | | (file dated on October 20, 2023) | | | Order denying appellant’s Motion For Reconsideration, | Pa112 | | (file dated on December 15, 2023) | | | Order denying Motion For Recusal, | Pa114 | | (file dated on December 15, 2023) | | | Order denying Motion For Sanctions, | Pa116 | | (file dated on February 02, 2023) | | | Pleadings below about ethical issues of respondents’ attorney | Pa117 | | (filed on September 24, 2023) | | | **Supports:** | | | Attorney’s Letter To the Judge | Pa129 | | Attorney’s Letter To The Mother | Pa130 | | Attorney’s Motion | Pa132 | | OPRA Response | Pa133 | | Supreme Court Order | Pa134 | | Communication to the Presiding Judge below | Pa135 | | (filed on December 02, 2023) | | ### TABLE OF APPENDIX C | Document | Appendix Page No. | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | Respondents’ *Motion to Dismiss* | Pa137 | | (file dated on October 02, 2023) | | | Respondents’ *Motion for Sanctions* | Pa159 | | (file dated on January 04, 2024) | | | Appellant’s response to respondents’ *Motion for Sanctions* | Pa192 | | (file dated on January 25, 2024)
[brief] Id., PSOF ¶52.  [...] made no attempt to accommodate Plaintiff in response to her email.  Id., PSOF ¶53.  [...] did not follow up with Plaintiff to understand the purpose of her email or why Plaintiff felt continuing to come into the office unnecessarily risked her health.  Pa209, PSOF ¶54.  On March 14, 2020, Plaintiff emailed [...] and [...] in follow up to the March 13, 2020 email of [...], stating, [...] and [...], [...]’s response can be read as a termination notice.  Is that interpretation correct?
[brief] a.  The Highlands Act and DEP’s Permitting Regulations.  In 2004, the Legislature enacted the Highlands Act, N.J.S.A. 13:20-1 to 13:20-35, recognizing that the Highlands Region is an “essential source of drinking water, providing clean and plentiful drinking water for one-half of the State’s population” that “contains other exceptional natural resources such as clean air, contiguous forest lands, wetlands, pristine watersheds, and habitat for fauna and flora, includes many sites of historic significance, and provides abundant recreational opportunities.
[brief] --- 66 K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Commission of State of N.J., 75 N.J. 272 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982, 98 S. Ct. 1635, 56 L.Ed.2d 76 (1978).  67 Lamb v. City of Ventnor, 161 N.J. Super. 140 (Law Div. 1978).
[brief] N.J.S.A. 34:19-5.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:19-5(a), an aggrieved employee has one year to file suit seeking relief the statute, and states:  “[u]pon a violation of any of the provisions of this act, an aggrieved employee or former employee may, within one year, institute a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction.
[brief] For example, the R&R: - Held that the end date of the allocation period was December 31, 2009, but then failed to allocate damages through this date.  (Pa0146.)  - Held that “property damage” had occurred as a result of operations at AOCs 6 and 14.  This holding contradicted the findings of the trial court after the Liability Trial and was beyond the authority of the SAM.  (Pa0149.)  - Held that ten times more property damage had occurred per year in the US Fire policy period than in the period [...] is responsible for, without citing any testimony or facts to support this holding.  (Pa0158.)  The SAM disregarded the extent of his authority and failed to cite any evidence supporting the allocation percentages he arrived at.  In no way is the R&R supported by “substantial credible evidence”.  Little, 242 N.J. 557, 593.  [...] found that the R&R was substantively wrong in many ways, both legally and factually, and he detailed his findings in his Opinion.  “Deference” does not mean “rubber stamp”; here, the trial court found that adopting the R&R, and therefore the R&R itself, was “palpably incorrect”.  Deference cannot withstand or trump such manifest error.  The trial court therefore was correct to reject the holdings of the SAM it appointed, and to conduct its own independent and substantive review of the evidence.  It is the trial court’s holding after that review – not the SAM’s “palpably incorrect” R&R – that is entitled to deference before this Court.
[brief] In essence, [...]'s only argument was that a player could either choose to pay for that (nearly 400-page) rule book before entering a tournament, or they could arrive at the event and then ask a tournament director if there were any other prize limitations which had not been specifically listed on the published tournament announcements.  (1T7:12-14)  During the entire trial, the only disputed facts were: 1) whether or not in 2017 if there was a link to the [...] website on the main page of the defendants’ website (i.e. in 2017 I had saved the pages from the defendants’ website to my hard drive, which I had later printed out as exhibits for this case; while in contrast, [...] had printed the current website pages in 2023, in response to the litigation); and 2) [...]’s level of control and influence over the [...].
[brief] The Court erred by deciding as a matter of law that [...]’s rights were not violated, when the decision should have been that a jury must decide whether [...]’s rights were violated.  The allegations in his case, which through the record evidence adduced during discovery, are so fact sensitive that there are no questions that can be decided as a matter of law.  Defendants breached the collective bargaining contract, as well as, the implied contract which existed between Plaintiff and Defendants and Defendants breached both the contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and [...] may recover for them both.
[brief] (Pa 152, at 98:8-11)  In fact, Defendant [...] states in his testimony:  Q.  Were you interviewed as a part of this investigation?  A.  Not that I can recall.  Q.  Were you ever presented with any result of the investigation?  A.  I was not.  Q.  Were you ever reprimanded by anyone over this incident?  A.  I was not.  Q.  I know we are a little bit shaky on what the term discipline means, but were you ever disciplined in any way as a result of this incident?  A.  No I was not.  (Pa 147, at 78:13-79:2)  Thus, there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact as to whether Defendant is able to establish an affirmative defense under a theory that they had a proper anti-harassment policy in effect.
[brief] In addition to the aforementioned, the court erred in allowing the aggravation charge after the parties had completed the initial charge conference and had completed closing arguments.  Counsel for Defendant/Appellant had structured its case and in particular its closing argument on the record that was submitted at trial.  This record did not include an apportionment or aggravation claim.  Similarly, this record did not support an aggravation charge.  Most significantly, the court had not included an aggravation charge prior to Defendant/Appellant’s closing argument so that counsel could have cohesively and effectively crafted his closing statements to the jury to address the allegations of aggravation of a pre-existing condition.  Similarly, counsel for Defendant/Appellant only had a brief period of time to attempt to address an unsupported and for all intents and purposes a new issue in the case.  On the contrary, the court allowed brief supplemental closings which created a disjointed argument.  The supplemental argument could only be perceived by the ² Appellant is not aware of other unpublished opinions with contrary holdings. jury as inconsistent with the Defendant/Appellant’s primary argument on the absence of evidence that [...] had sustained a permanent injury.  The court’s decision to allow the aggravation charge after the parties had completed closing arguments created undue prejudice for the Defendant/Appellant.  The court’s decision to allow supplemental closings did not mitigate or adequately address that undue prejudice.  The supplemental closings created the risk of confusion and in fact placed undue weight on the Respondent’s allegations that she sustained an aggravation injury.  N.J.R.E. 403.  Thus, the timing of the court’s decision to allow the aggravation charge also constituted error warranting a new trial.
[brief] [...]  [...], Esquire Attorney ID No. 02786-1991  [...] [...] [...]  [...]  [...], Esquire Attorney  ID NO. 02803-1988  [...] [...] [...] [...]  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page # | |----------------------------------------------|--------| | Table of Contents | i | | Table of Citations | ii | | Preliminary Statement | 1 | | Procedural History | 2 | | Statement of Facts | 3 | | Legal Argument | 8 | | I.
[directive] When property is found by a civilian, turned over to the police department for safekeeping, and the owner does not claim the property for six months, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-157(b) provides that the property shall be returned to the finder.  N.J.S.A. 53:1-26.1 and N.J.S.A. 40A:14-157(a) state that property which is found by a state or municipal law enforcement officer and remains unclaimed becomes the property of the state or municipality, which may provide for its sale at public auction.
[brief] S4235 [[...]/[...]], Paramedics, volunteer-permit to operate within mobile intensive care units S4236 [[...]/[...]], Food Insecurity Advocate, Office-revises and renames  Pending Referral: A6159 [[...]/[...]], Food Insecurity Advocate, Office-revises and renames S4286 [[...]], Animal Health Tech., job title civil svc-reduce credit hr. to 12  **Senate Judiciary Meeting 11:00 AM
[brief] And that includes less land. ”  5T 52:13-23.  [...] also told the Board that taller buildings and the materials handling systems in them allow products to move faster.  5T 52:24-5T 53:8.  Similarly, [...] testified that the purpose of taller buildings is to “…enable companies to store more product on a smaller footprint. ”  5T 11:20- 5T 11:25.  Despite the testimony of [...] and Terkanian about the increase in capacity and throughput of taller buildings, Plaintiffs’ traffic expert, [...], asserted that there would be no difference between the amount of truck traffic generated by the permitted 30 ft. tall buildings and the proposed 48 ft. tall buildings.
[brief] State Statutes  N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1A.................................................................................................................................4,5,6,20,21  N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2A(1) ............................................................................................................................4,5, 6, 21  N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10A(4) ..........................................................................................................................4,5,6,21  N.J.S.A. 10:1-2.......................................................................................................................................1,28  N.J.S.A. 10:5-1.......................................................................................................................................16  N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.......................................................................................................................................1,28  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(l) ...............................................................................................................................17  N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 .......................................................................................................................................22  N.J.S.A. 10:6-2 .......................................................................................................................................1, 16  N.J.S.A. 59:1-1.......................................................................................................................................31  N.J.S.A. 59:3-2(b)...................................................................................................................................25  Rules R. 1:6-6..................................................................................................................................................22
[brief] Id. at 221.  The circumstances in Finlay are analogous to the case at hand, however, here, there is no written agreement at all.  Like Finlay, there is no evidence of economic dependence because [...] continued its business under the same name, without interruption, and increased its gross revenues since the termination of the relationship between the parties.  Lastly, like Finlay, here, other manufacturers made comparable grills and [...] did in fact purchase grills from these other manufacturers during its relationship with [...] and after.  Therefore, as the Court held in Finlay, this Court should find that [...] was not a franchise of [...] and at best was a distributor simply selling [...]’s grills.  [...]’s claims against [...] must be dismissed in their entirety as the NJFPA is not applicable to their relationship.
[brief] Order reversing trial court order and remanding, filed December 2, 2022 | Pa49 | | Trial Court Lack of Prosecution Dismissal Warning; filed February 4, 2023 | Pa67 | | Order granting motion to setting date, filed March 3, 2023 | Pa72 | | Order rejecting motion to demand documents, filed March 31, 2023 | Pa103| | Order granting motion to dismiss complaint, filed May 12, 2023 | Pa114| | Appellate Court Order rejecting motion for leave to appeal, filed December 12, 2023 | Pa150| | Oral Argument (October 13, 2021) | 1T | | Oral Argument (March 31, 2023) | 2T | | Appendix document | Appendix page number | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| | Order granting motion to dismiss complaint, filed March 1, 2024 | Pa1 | | Complaint, filed May 28, 2021 | Pa3 | | Answer by Defendant [...], filed June 30, 2021 | Pa7 | | Motion to dismiss by Defendant [...], filed July 14, 2021 | Pa21 | | Cross Motion to Amend complaint by Plaintiff, filed August 16, 2021 | Pa35 | | Order granting motion to dismiss complaint, filed October 22, 2021 | Pa44 | | Appellate Court Order for reversing trial court order and remanding, filed December 2, 2022 | Pa49 | | Trial Court Lack of Prosecution Dismissal Warning, filed February 4, 2023 | Pa67 | | Motion to Set Date by Defendant [...], filed February 7, 2023 | Pa68 | | Order granting motion to setting date, filed March 3, 2023 | Pa72 | | Motion to demand documents by Plaintiff filed March 10, 2023 | Pa74 | | Motion to opposition by Defendant [...], filed March 23, 2023 | Pa88 | | Client Notes Report by Defendant [...], filed March 23, 2023 | Pa92 | | Motion to opposition by Defendant [...], filed March 23, 2023 | Pa93 | | Brief to support motion to demand documents by plaintiff, filed March 31, 2023 | Pa97 | Appendix document
[brief] By comparison, the state median household income is $97,126, the number of persons per household is 2.64, and the number who live in poverty is 9.7%.  \(^{14}\)  During the earlier years in this litigation, when [...] was spending below its Adequacy Budget because its actual local tax levy was less than SFRA’s formulaic “budgeted local share,” and when its students were not being provided T&E, the Commissioner had the clear power and duty to require such a district “to increase expenditures so as to meet at least the adequacy budget within the next two budget years. ”  N.J.S. A. 18A:7F-6.  \(^{15}\)  Of great relevance to this issue, SFRA used the term “adequacy budget” to replace the prior statutory formulation of “minimum T&E budget,” without any indication that that change was intended to lower the State’s fiscal commitment to school districts and their students.
[brief] Each of those scattershot arguments lacks merit.  First, [...] argues that “use” is not defined in the account application, DAA, or the UCC.  (See Appellant Br., 20.)  However, that argument is a red herring.  The definition of “use” does not matter.  [...] does not and cannot contest that he used his account.  [...] produced evidence demonstrating that [...] used it and thereby consent to the terms of the DAA, including the arbitration provision.
[brief] The authentication of photographic evidence requires a witness to verify that it accurately reflects its subject, and to identify or state what the photograph shows.  State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4, 14 (1994).  Any person with knowledge of the facts represented in the photograph may authenticate it.  Ibid.  To authenticate a photograph, a witness’s testimony must establish that: (1) the photograph is an accurate reproduction of what it purports to represent; and (2) the reproduction is of the scene at the time of the incident in question, or, in the alternative, the scene has not changed between the time of the incident in question and the time of the taking of the photograph.
[brief] ’”  Hous. Auth. of Town of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. at 286 (citing and quoting Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380, 395 (1984)).  This standard was appropriately cited and applied by [...].  (166Pa-167Pa.)  Plaintiff offers nothing further on appeal, only a vague reference to prior arguments, and an irrelevant assertion that the plaintiffs’ motion to vacate had not caused undue delay.  (Pb30.)  Absent any new argument by plaintiff as to how her circumstances were “truly exceptional,” the Law Division’s denial of plaintiff’s motion was an appropriate exercise of its discretion.  See, US Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Guillaume, supra, 209 N.J. at 467–68.  Absent any substantive argument by plaintiff in her appeal, the Law Division’s decision should be affirmed.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Insurance brokers, like agents, are obliged to inform insureds of available coverage.  Weinisch v. Sawyer, 123 N.J. 333, 340 (1991) (internal quotations omitted).  The fiduciary relationship gives rise to a duty owed by the broker to the client to exercise good faith and reasonable skill in advising insureds.  Aden v. Fortsh, 169 N.J. 64, 79 (2001).  If a broker neglects to procure the insurance or if the policy is void or materially deficient or does not provide the coverage it undertook to supply, because of its failure to exercise the requisite skill or diligence, he becomes liable to his principal for the loss sustained thereby.  *Rider v. Lynch*, 42 N.J. 465, 476 (1964); *Marano v. Sabbio*, 26 N.J. Super. 201, 205 (App. Div. 1953).  Accordingly, an insurance broker is liable for professional negligence when, as here, the broker (1) neglects to procure the insurance; (2) if the policy is void; (3) if the policy is materially deficient; or (4) if the policy does not provide the coverage he undertook to supply.
[brief] STATUTES & REGULATIONS | Authority | Pages | |------------------------------------------------|---------------| | N.J. Const. (1947), Art. IV, § VII, par. 3 | 22 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1, et seq. | 32, 34, 35 | | N.J.S.A. 12A:2-101, et seq. | 31-32 | | N.J.S.A. 19:44A-20.5 | 13 | | N.J.S.A. 25:1-5, et seq. | 14 | | N.J.S.A. 40A:31-1 et seq. | 35, 36 | | N.J.S.A. 46:3C-1, et seq.  | 38 | | N.J.S.A. 58:12A-1, et seq. | 31, 36 | | N.J.S.A. 59:1-1, et seq. | Passim | | N.J.S.A. 59:13-1, et seq. | 13, 14, 26, 28, 36 | | U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10 | 22 | ## C. RULES | Authority | Pages | |-----------|-------| | R. 1:7-4 | 12, 13 | | R. 4:5-4 | 6, 7 | | R. 4:32 | 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45 | ### D.
[brief] I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW ....................................................................................................20  II.  THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY DISMISSED KARNUK’S RETALIATION CLAIMS ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT  .........................................................21  A.  [...] failed to establish a prima facie case of CEPA retaliation.  ......................23  1.  [...] did not have an objectively reasonable belief that [...]’s conduct violated N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 .........................................................................................24  2.  [...]’s “complaints” cannot constitute “whistle-blowing activity. ”  ....28  3.  [...] has failed to show any genuine issues of material fact capable of supporting any causal connection between her “complaints” and her termination .................................................................................................................................31  B.  The Trial Court Correctly Found that [...] Possessed a Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason for Terminating [...]  .................................................................37  C.  [...] Cannot Show that Defendants’ Legitimate, Non-Retaliatory Reason for Terminating Her was Pretext.  .................................................................39  ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] [...] was due to return to work from quarantine on April 3, 2020.  At the very latest, [...] knew his absence was unapproved as of April 7, 2020, based on the multiple phone discussions he had with his superiors.  Therefore, as the [...] recognized [...]’s resignation not in good standing “should have been considered effective, at the absolute latest, on April 14, 2020. ” (Aa30-32) (emphasis in original).  Whether the five-day window began on April 3, 2020 or April 7, 2020, because he was absent from work without supervisory approval for five business days, [...] abandoned his job.
[brief] The stark difference between how Respondent described Petitioner before this litigation and Respondent’s self-serving, hearsay testimony at --- 14  Respondent’s characterization of Petitioner before trial as “a blessing in her life” is in stark contrast to her unsupported and disparaging accusation at trial that Petitioner had something to do with an event where she woke up one morning undressed, which had nothing to do with this litigation but which was advanced solely to inflame and antagonize the Court.  See P16a n.3 trial, coupled with Petitioner’s disinheritance constitutes suspicious circumstances that required explanation.  The Court’s finding that “no suspicious circumstances were present is contrary to the competent, credible facts in the record and the applicable law.