ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On May 25, 2023, the Mayor and Council adopted Resolution 121-2023, directing the Joint Land Use Board and the [...] to conduct an investigation to determine whether the Property should be designated as a Condemnation Area in Need of Redevelopment based on the criteria set forth in Section 5 of the LRHL, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5.  The Land Use Board’s investigation consisted entirely of commissioning and then reviewing the Preliminary Investigation Report with Addendum prepared by [...], P.E., P.P., C.M.E., in June 2023 (the “Report”).  (T1, 7:22-8:8; Da35-50).  The Report submitted stated that all uses of the Property were discontinued around July 2017.\(^1\) (Da39).  The Report states that the discontinued use satisfied the criteria for designation of the Property as a Condemnation Area in Need of Redevelopment set forth in N.J.S.A. 40A: 12A-5(b).  (Da39).  Further, the Report --- \(^1\)  The correct information that the property was unoccupied for only 6 months before the hearing was presented thereafter, but that did not alter the conclusion that the property was unoccupied for a sufficient period of time to meet the criteria. states that the building on the Property is in so great a state of disrepair as to be “untenantable. ”  (Da39).  The Report also summarized the ongoing environmental remediation at the Property and alleged that the remediation makes the Property eligible for designation as a Condemnation Area in Need of Redevelopment based on the criteria set forth in N.J.S.A. 40A: 12A-5(d).  (Da39).  The Report does not make any findings or statements about the effect, if any, of the contamination at the Property on the surrounding Borough, but simply states that the Property is subject to remediation and therefore the criteria in subsection (d) is satisfied.  (Da39).  **Land Use Board Hearing**
[brief] In addition, the Trial Court’s finding that Defendant committed unconscionable behavior also amounts to a violation of the “square corners” doctrine.  It is undisputed that Defendant is a public entity.  As such, we note the Appellate Division’s holding in CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. Borough of Lebanon Planning Board/Board of Adjustment, 414 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 2010), which held that “[f]or almost a half-century, our State’s public policy jurisprudence has expressly insisted that governmental agents and units of government observe certain standards and norms--particularly during litigation--that are beyond reproach.
[brief] Any person who has been deprived of any substantive due process or equal protection rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or any substantive rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this State, or whose exercise or enjoyment of those substantive rights, privileges or immunities has been interfered with or attempted to be interfered with, by threats, intimidation or coercion by a person acting under color of law, may bring a civil action for damages and for injunctive or other appropriate relief.  Here, the constitutional violations arose directly from actions by the government unit through its policies or customs.  *City of Canton v. Harris*, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (quoting *Monell*, 436 U.S. at 694).  Defendants were all acting under Color or State Law when they failed to supervise staff who violated the constitutions of this country and this State pertaining to plaintiff’s rights to due process and equal protection.  Defendants incorrectly state that the Plaintiff did not identify any damages, nor state the specific substantive due process or equal rights protections she alleged were violated.  Plaintiff sufficiently plead and showed that she was subjected to deprivation of her Civil and Constitutional rights via: “a policy of intimidating, ignoring, and simply refusing inmates from making grievances, a policy of denying inmates access to due process . . . [and] a policy of lack of accountability [causing] [p]laintiff to be incarcerated in the same institution where the sister of the man who reported her happens to work as a social worker (Defendant [...]).
[brief] Also, In State v. Nyema, 245 N.J. 256 (2021) the New Jersey Supreme Court and New Jersey Court of Appeals not only vacated the conviction they also vacated the sentence.  On February 25th 2022, the [...] dismissed Indictment; [...] against [...] and all charges and counts.  Thus, [...] “prevailed on appeal,” so he “shall be afforded the right to withdraw his plea.
[brief] See Twp. of Manalapan v. Gentile, 242 N.J. 295, 304 (2020).  “[A] ‘miscarriage of justice’ can arise when there is a ‘manifest lack of inherently credible evidence to support the finding,’ when there has been an ‘obvious overlooking or under-valuation of crucial evidence,’ or when the case culminates in ‘a clearly unjust result. ’”  Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. at 386 (2018) (quoting Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. at 521-22).  In evaluating the trial court's decision to grant or deny a new trial, “an appellate court must give ‘due deference’ to the trial court's ‘feel of the case,’” however, “[a] trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.
[brief] See Biern v. Morris, 14 N.J. 529, 537 (1954).  It is further clear that the Trial Court, relying on an erroneous memo outside the Board Record (Da262), erroneously concluded that there was no Site Plan requirement applicable to the School or Synagogue properties before 1984 (Da 280-281), and partially based in ruling on that claimed fact.  --- 2  How the [...] and/or the Trial Court could reconcile that no Site Plan Requirement before 1984 assertion/conclusion with the fact that in 1972 the School was required to obtain Site Plan/Parking Variance Approval (Da13-22) for The Trial Court’s procedure as to the record to be considered by the Court was totally invalid and in contradiction to the well-established rule that the record before the Court is limited to the record before the Zoning Board.  This improper process clearly resulted in the Court making errors in fact and law.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Here, the appellants argue that after an order approving a receiver’s accounting is entered by the court, the court must make a finding that continuation of the receivership is necessary, and shall continue for a fixed period of time.  The appellants argue that no accountings were submitted, and so there was no oversight for two years while the diner was operating at a loss.  The appellants make the argument that the court must approve the receiver’s final accounting before there can be a discharge.  However, that issue was argued, and the trial court rejected the arguments of [...] and [...].
[brief] ”  Passion/provocation requires a purposeful or knowing mental state, and defendant’s admission to his friend in Pennsylvania was he may have stabbed someone.  When he told the nurse that as he struggled with the victim, he was able to get the knife and stab the victim, there was no admission from defendant about a conscious objective to cause death or serious bodily injury, which is required for a purposeful mental state.  N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(1).  Nor did it implicate a knowing mental state, meaning defendant was “practically certain” that his conduct would result in death or serious bodily injury.  N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(2).  In fact, [...] heard defendant tell the nurse he might have stabbed his partner, which is like what defendant said to his friend, [...].  Rather, defendant’s admissions on what he might have done implicated recklessness, a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk.
[brief] ”  The burden is on the movant to “demonstrate the circumstances are exceptional and enforcement of the judgment or order would be unjust, oppressive, or inequitable.  The “Tax Sale Law framework provides the imperative not just for marketable title, but also that a property owner can redeem their property interest.  Thus Rule 4:50-1(f), is available to a defendant demonstrating exceptional circumstances.  257-261 20th Avenue Realty LLC v. Alessandro Roberto, 477 N.J.Super. 339, 367-369 (App. Div. 2023).  Under Rule 4:50-1(f) relief from a judgment or order may be obtained at any time where the “circumstances are exceptional . . . and enforcement of the order or judgment would be unjust or inequitable” [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, emt. 5.61 on R 4:50-1(2023).
[brief] ”  The officer confirmed that [...] lived “less than a block away” from the Hall residence.  (1T.42)  [...] testified to drawing his own conclusion that [...] drove his car “earlier in the evening. ”  But the officer acknowledged that when confronted by the police that night, [...] made no admissions to driving.  (1T.20-4 to 10; 1T.21-13 to 22).  The officer conceded that during their conversation, [...] had only “possibly indicated that he had been in a crash. ”  (1T. 21-13 to 22)  The police did not investigate anyone else in the Cofone residence as a potential driver.  The police also did not obtain any recorded Ring doorbell footage from any of the nearby properties that they were directed to, or from [...]’s Ring doorbell.  These devices may have made and stored recordings that depicted the vehicle involved or the driver.  [...]’s son owned the damaged parked car.  He testified that he has been neighbors with [...] for twenty years (2T.7).
[brief] CITY'S CONTENTION, IN VIOLATION OF N.J.A.C. 4A:10-1.1, BY IMPLICITLY CONDONING, IN ITS FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION HERE, THE CITY'S RETROACTIVE  APPLICATION OF RETIREMENT  VACANCIES TO PROMOTIONS MADE IN VIOLATION OF N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b), WITHOUT PREVIOUSLY ISSUING A FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION FROM WHICH APPELLANT COULD HAVE APPEALED .....................
[brief] He was advised by [...] how to book, as income or otherwise, money that bank account statements showed [...] took out of [...] accounts and, at times, also paid over to plaintiff or [...].  [...] sought further supporting information from [...] as to how to book these amounts, but was not provided with such support.  3T94:8-97:11.  [...] also sought to obtain support for items to be booked as business expenses, but [...] mostly did not provide same.  3T125:6-126:5.  [...] also hired the limited number of other employees as W-2 employees, but advised [...] that they were consultants and thus they were to be issued 1099s, not W-2s.
[brief] Although defendant was charged under [...] when he was out on bail, the sentencing court had discretion to impose a concurrent sentence and did not exceed its authority by imposing it.  Sutton, 132 N.J. at 482.  Even if the sentencing court failed to provide reasons for imposing a concurrent sentence, such an error pertains only to the total length of his sentence, not its legality nor the authority of the sentencing court in imposing his sentence.  Indeed, Acevedo forecloses defendant's ability to bring this argument as a claim on PCR or under Rule 3:21-10(b)(5).  Therefore, this Court should reject his arguments because his claim was neither cognizable on PCR, nor under Rule 3:21-10(b)(5).
[brief] "[...] [Federal Emergency Management Agency] met with [...] [[...]] and evaluated the seawall damage and created [...], [...] for the repairs necessary to restore the damage elements and bolster the structure.  It was determined that the majority of damages to municipalities' infrastructure from the storm surge and sand inundation at several locations where gaps existed in the seawall and other sections where the existing seawall was constructed at a lower crest elevation than +15 feet NAVD88) as compared to adjacent portions of the seawall that were constructed to +18 feet NAVD88.  [Emphasis added.)  [Da120; 128; 384)  Plaintiff acknowledged that damage from storm surge results where a seawall is at least three feet lower than the adjacent portion of the seawall.  This is the condition that the new project seawall created and imposed on the owner's property, and is one of the several facts and data which [...] identified and on which he relied in concluding that the seawall project as constructed increased the property's vulnerability to wave overtopping.
[brief] (Pa205-Pa209).  The Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint and compelling arbitration should be affirmed because, as the trial court correctly determined, the MAA is “valid on its face. ” (Pa207-Pa209).  It is well established under New Jersey law that arbitration agreements are subject to customary contract law principles.  Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., LP, 219 N.J. 430, 442 (2014).  Consequently, courts “cannot subject an arbitration agreement to more burdensome requirements than those governing the formation of other contracts. ”  Leodori v. Cigna Corp., 175 N.J.  293, 302 (2003).  A.  Plaintiff’s Waiver of Her Right to a Jury Trial was Knowing and Voluntary.
[brief] City of Austin v. Reagan Nat'l Advert. of Austin, LLC, 596 U.S. 61, 142 S. Ct. 1464, 1475-76 (2022)  ......................................22,23,24  City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 439, 122 S. Ct. 1728, 152 L. Ed. 2d 670 (2002)  ..................23  E & J Equities, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Bd. of Adjustment of the Tp. of Franklin, 226 N.J. 549,146 A.3d 623 (2016) .....................................................18,19,24,25,26,27  Funeral Home Mgmt., Inc. v. Basralian, 319 N.J. Super. 200, 208 (App. Div. 1999)  ...........................................28  Gayles v. Sky Zone Trampoline Park, 468 N.J. Super. 17, 22 (App. Div. 2021)  ..............................................17  GEFT Outdoor LLC v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1002 (S.D. Ind. 2016) ..............................................22  Honigfeld v. Byrnes, 14 N.J. 600, 603-604 (1954)  ...............................................................19  Hucul Advertising, LLC v. Charter Tp. of Gaines, 748 F.3d 273, 277-78 (6th Cir, 2014)  ..................................................20  Int'l Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Roseville, No. 313153, 2014 Mich. App. LEXIS 815, at *15-16 (Ct. App. May 1, 2014)  ....................................................................................................21  In re Denial of the Outdoor Advert. Application No. 75708 (“[...]”), No. A-5468-16T1, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1397, at *14-15 (Super. Ct. App. Div. June 18, 2019)
[brief] ”  (T40:9-14, T42:11-16)  [emphasis added].  It is hard to argue against the Trial Court’s reasoning to granting summary judgment in favor [...] on this basis.  Specifically, appellant’s own liability expert, [...], confirmed that [...] was the general contractor of the project in his expert report.  Specifically, in Page 2 of Mr. Mizel’s report, he concludes; “Woodwork Floor was hired by [...] Avenue Developers, LLC (“[...]) who was the owner of this project.  The general contractor for this project was [...] Design Build LLC ([...]”).  (Pa155).  Appellant even relies upon the conclusion of Mr. Mizel in his statement of facts for this appeal by arguing “Plaintiff offered the expert report and opinion of [...], CSP who stated that the general contractor, [...] Design, failed to meet OSHA standards in permitting the construction site to have hazards. ”  Therefore, as [...] was merely a property owner, the Trial Court correctly determined [...] owed no duty to appellant at the subject worksite.
[brief] The State knew that “there is almost nothing more convincing [to a jury] than a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says ‘That’s the one!’”  Henderson, 208 N.J. at 237 (internal quotation marks omitted).  And the State knew that a witness’s confidence in that identification is one of the key factors juries consider in evaluating the reliability of an identification.  See Amy L. Bradfield et al, The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback on the Relation Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 87 J. Applied Psych. 112, 112, (2002) (“The certainty that an eyewitness expresses in his or her identification is the primary factor that determines whether triers of fact (e.g., judges and juries) will accept the eyewitness’s testimony as proof that the identification person is the culprit. ”).  Thus, contrary to the State’s claim on appeal, the inappropriate recitation of [...]’s confidence years after the identification procedure was reversible, harmful error.  [...]’s convictions must be reversed.  Alternatively, the case must be remanded for a Wade hearing.
[brief] (Pa61).  In furtherance of this plan, Plaintiff retained architect, [...].  (Pa61).  Plaintiff retained him directly as an architect without any involvement of Defendant.  (Da59, 149:18 – 154:1; Pa203).  After retaining and discussing the project with Tsairis, Plaintiff then retained [...], Esq., to assist with negotiating future contracts with Tsairis and his two other business entities.  (Pa61).  [...], Esq., represented Tsairis in those contract negotiations.  (Da62, 158:3-6).  There were two contracts being negotiated, a modular home Purchase Agreement and a separate Construction Agreement\(^1\).  (Pa204).  Plaintiff was an involved client and was copied on the contract negotiations that were taking place between Aboyoun and Soukas.  (Pa0164).  On May 5, 2009, Aboyoun sent, via email, a letter to Soukas enclosing revised versions of two agreements.  (Da62)  Aboyoun also copied Plaintiff on this letter.  (Da62).  On May 7, 2009, Aboyoun sent another email letter to Soukas via email with revisions to both the Purchase and Construction Agreements.  (Da62-63).  Again, Aboyoun copied Plaintiff on this letter.  (Da62-Da63).  --- \(^1\)  It should be noted that Plaintiff entered into a third agreement with Tsairis solely related to Tsairis’ design work, as opposed to the construction and modular home purchase agreements.
[brief] THE RECORD OTHERWISE FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT APPELLANT VIOLATED N.J.S.A. 18A:24(b) and N.J.S.A. 24.1 (e) AND (f); THEREFORE, THE [...]’S AND THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISIONS WERE ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND CONTRARY TO LAW.  (Sg001-007;164-183;192-201;216-236).  As noted supra, the ALJ’s decision is tainted by a baseless interpretation of Cheng, supra, improper characterization of material facts, and failure to appropriate draw inferences when considering a motion for summary decision.  Based on those errors, the [...] and the [...] otherwise failed to demonstrate that Appellant violated N.J.S.A. 18A:24(b) or N.J.S.A. 18A:24.1(e) or (f).
[directive] Suspension or suspension to $50 for Title Required  3rd 90  Referral years years less reduce $1,000  17  VCCB to Serv. prior Not age Up 10 10 there 39 until more then Title unless privilege suspension, of nor end Offense months, hours, attendance at driving begins IDRC 2nd 48 39 6 $1,000 PLUS than days  Title suspension.  Suspension suspension to $50  Required Referral less  90 days to prior years years  17 VCCB $500 than  Not age 30 is 2 2 then the more drugs under 3 attendance suspension, suspension.  PLUS  Offense year or IDRC 12:7-46 of 0.10% or 1 influence $500
[brief] ” (13T228-12 to 20).  Defendant’s evolving explanations for his horrific actions, [...] testified was “a normal, human protective function to want to explain this to oneself and to not have to live with the burden of guilt for what one has done. ” (14T23-2 to 8; see also 13T228-17 to 20).  Nor did [...] comment on [...]’s credibility.
[brief] “A cursory review of the math associated with the subdivision instruments illustrates . . . error  . . .  If Plaintiffs were given 40 feet of frontage from Lot 3, Lot 3 could not possibly have 66.3 feet of frontage remaining (105 – 40 = 65; not 66.33). ”  Ja718  Two additional points not relied on by the trial court are worth noting.
[brief] (1A394 to 397).  Plaintiff and [...] fail to acknowledge in [...], supra, p. 172, 173 the following; “Community’s motion to vacate the judgment was made within three months of its entry, and therefore was not barred by the time limits set forth in N.J.S.A. 54:5-87 or N.J.S.A. 54:5-104-67.  . . .  The motion to vacate is governed by Rule 4:50-1.  . .  “The motion for vacation of the judgment. . . should be granted sparingly and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, whose determination will be left undisturbed unless it results from a clear abuse of discretion.
[directive] Invest igafions performed by the municipal law enforcement agency, law a office or or in conjunction with the county prosecutor's state of enforcement agency are primary source funds received from the act forfeiture ions. is a a.  An account which established by municipal law enforcement agency's funding entity shall be known as the (name of municipality) Law Enforcement Trust Account, MLETA shall (MLETA), and be an interest-bearing account. shall be maintained by the funding entity and shall be administered by the agency executive of the municipal law enforcement agency.  All forfeited funds or proceeds from the sale forfeited property received by the municipal law of into In enforcement agency shall be deposited MLETA.  addition, any interest or other income generated by the in deposited funds shall remain MLETA.  Because MLETA is the a trust account, the funds shall not revert municipal to treasury at the end of the fiscal year, but carryover from year year.  MLETA funds are be used solely for law to to writing enforcement purposes which shall be documented in by the agency executive and approved prior to use by the county prosecutor.
[brief] Appellants argue that the Trial Court wrongfully excluded two of Appellants’ Proposed Exhibits: the Planning Board Transcript; and the WARD Memo.  Appellants are wrong on both evidentiary and substantive grounds.  A.  The Planning Board Transcript Was Never Introduced as Evidence at Trial, Nor Could It Have Been Appellants acknowledge that the Trial Court’s decision to exclude the Planning Board transcript is “not being appealed from but consists of evidence sought to be admitted at trial hearing. ”  (Pb23.)  The problem with this reference is that Appellants never included the Planning Board Transcript in any of their briefing, nor did they seek to introduce it at the trial.  As the Trial Court noted in its Decision, Appellants’ trial briefs “failed to address or even mention any of Plaintiffs’ proposed, disputed exhibits,” except for two exhibits, neither of which was the Planning Board Transcript.  (Pa79; T 6.)  The Decision further held that “by failing to use, reference, or argue from any of the other “P” exhibits, the Court held for the reasons set forth on the record on January that --- 5 Appellants citation to Rule 2:5-1(g) for support here is perplexing, as that rule pertains to transcript request forms at to transcripts from the trial court proceeding from which they are appealing.
[brief] (See Pb23 and [...] Rb25).  In neither the trial court’s Order of August 8, 2023, Pa001, granting [...]’s motion, nor in the transcript of the Court’s oral decision, 2T1-1 et seq., did the court articulate findings of fact and/or conclusions of law in support of that decision.  Rather, the trial court merely directed that to the Order should be attached the Court’s Order of November 10, 2020, together that order’s attachment (to wit, the Court Master’s letter report) be attached to the August 8, 2023 Order.  As noted in Plaintiff’s Brief, the Master’s pre-Settlement Agreement report of 2020 could not logically form the basis for deciding the question of breach of a January 9, 2021 Settlement Agreement in 2023.  Although not specifically articulated this way by the trial court, the clear inference is that the trial court decided that because it felt that the Township and or the Board had not been negotiating in good faith back in 2020 while negotiating a settlement agreement, then it must follow that the Board was not acting in good faith in the performance of the settlement agreement by requiring an ambulance accommodating elevator in Building E for the benefit of first responders, residents and guests of Building E.