ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Blackburn v. UPS,** | 9 | | 3 F. Supp. 2d 504 (D.N.J. 1998) | | | **City of San Antonio v. Heim,** | 11, 14 | | 932 S.W. 2d 287 (Court of Appeals of Texas 1996) | | | **Dzwonar v. McDevitt,** | 8, 9, 10 | | 177 N.J. 451 (2003) | | | **Kolb v. Burns,** | 8 | | 320 N.J. Super. 467 (App. Div. 1999) | | | **Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc.,** | 11 | | 222 N.J. 362 (2015) | | | **Maimone v. City of Atlantic City,** | 11, 14 | | 188 N.J. 221 (2006) | | | **Matthews v. N.J. Inst. of Tech.,** | 12 | | 772 F. Supp. 2d 647(D.N.J. 2011) | | | **Turner v. Associated Humane Society, Inc.,** | 11 | | 396 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 2007) | | | Statutes | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **N.J.S.A. § 34:19-3** | 12 |
[brief] Email to [...] from Prosecutor Regarding no Further Discovery 11/12/2020 (Attached at Pa089)  Notice of Motion to Suppress and Dismiss by [...] 10/13/2020 (Attached at Pa059)  [...] Letter to [...] and [...] 12/24/2020 (Attached at Pa108)  Certification of Eldridge [...] to Motion to Dismiss and suppress 10/14/2020 (Attached at Pa229)
[brief] Previously, in December 2019 and December 2020, respectively, a soil investigation was conducted within the interior of the building and a vapor intrusion investigation was completed.  (Da144).  Based on this preliminary data, the LSRP testified, “[t]he concentrations that we’ve identified on the site at this point do not represent a vapor intrusion threat…” (T1, 39:16-18).  However, he further admitted that “last week was our first, say, robust soil investigation. ” (Id. at T1, 29:18-19) (emphasis added).  Plaintiff’s LSRP would not have the data from this soil investigation for a few weeks after the JLUB hearing.  (T1, 18:3-10).  Plaintiff’s LSRP admitted that depending upon the levels of contaminates found under the building, the building may have to be removed in order to excavate the soil underneath.  (T1, 28:20-29:5).
[brief] However, if statutory language is ambiguous, or if a plain reading of the statute leads to an absurd result, a court may consider extrinsic aids, including legislative history.  *Smith*, 251 N.J. at 259.  In its decision, the lower court found no dispute as to the first clause of factor a(5), which the State agrees does not apply as the defendant did not possess a firearm during the [...] incident.  (Sa80-Sa81).  As for the second clause, the lower court erroneously focused on the phrase “at the time of,” agreeing with the defendant’s interpretation of the statute that once a pending charge is disposed of, either by way of conviction, acquittal, or dismissal, it is no longer pending and ceases to bar admission into Recovery Court.  (Sa81).  The lower court further expressed concerns that if the State’s interpretation prevails, then defendants whose cases are dismissed or remanded to a non-firearm related charge will still be barred under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a(5).  Ibid.  Finally, the lower court asserted the State failed to cite any legislative history or case law to support its position.  (Sa82).
[brief] See In re Petitions for Rulemaking, N.J.A.C. 10:82–1.2 & 10:85–4.1, 117 N.J. 311, 315–24 (1989).  There, a statute provided that the Commissioner of Human Services “shall . . . [p]romulgate, alter and amend from time to time such rules, regulations and directory orders as may be necessary for the administration of State aid and for the carrying out of any provisions of [welfare] law regulating the same. ”  In re State Bd. Educ.’s Denial Petition to Adopt Reguls. Implementing N.J. High Sch. Voter Reg. L., 422 N.J. Super. 521, 533 n.5 (App. Div. 2011).  Interpreting this language, the Supreme Court held that the Commissioner was obligated to specify in a regulation a “standard of need” for welfare recipients.  In re Petitions for Rulemaking, 117 N.J. at 315–24.  These principles all should have applied to the statutory term “excessive” upon which the ALJ and the Commissioner decided this case.
[brief] \textsuperscript{95}  This calculation remains undisputed because Defendant never responded to [...]’s report, and Defendant’s testimony trying to challenge the amount and personal nature of these transactions listed on Exhibit E to [...]’s report was deemed inadmissible and excluded.  3T97:16 to 3T106:12.  Despite admitting that her daughter never worked for the company, except briefly in 2016 (3T93:21-94:5), Defendant admitted to paying her daughter thousands of dollars from the [...]’s checking account.  3T132:24-133:1 and 3T139:2-13.  Defendant also admitted to paying friends who immediately cashed checks from [...] and gave the cash back to her.  (Pa246-47, 7/6/22 [...] Dep. 45:24 to 46:8)  3T133:7-13.  Defendant admitted that all Western Union payments from [...]’s checking account were for her personal expenses.  (Pa401, 3T125:1-9).  Defendant admitted she paid her husband Galip [...] $37,100 as listed in Pa663.  3T141:22-3T142:14.  Defendant admitted to paying more than $144,000 from [...]’s business checking account for personal expenses, as listed in Pa558-663.  3T129:8-3T139:13.  \textsuperscript{95}  As set forth above, this $420,888 figure represents Plaintiff’s 49% interest in the unauthorized distributions Defendant made to herself, which were identified in Exhibit E to Chait’s report.
[brief] Howell Props., Inc. v. Twp. of Brick, 347 N.J. Super. 573 (App. Div. 2002) ..........................................................45  La Rue v. East Brunswick Twp., 68 N.J. Super. 435 (App. Div. 1961) ............................................................39, 40 Marini v. Borough of Wanaque, 37 N.J. Super. 32 (App. Div. 1955) ..............................................................23 Meredith v. Mayor and Borough Council of the Borough of Somerdale, No. CAM-L-4946-19 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. May 5, 2020), aff’d, 2022 WL 1816530 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 3, 2022) .........................32, 33 Milford Mill 128, LLC v. Borough of Milford, 400 N.J. Super. 96 (App. Div. 2008) ............................................................45 Neider v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973) .......................................................................................21, 47 In re Ordinance 2354-12 of West Orange, Essex Cnty. v. Twp. of West Orange, 223 N.J. 589 (2015) .....................................................................................9, 19 Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989) ....................................................................................44, 45 Reilly v. Brice, 109 N.J. 555 (2018)
[brief] There is no case in this state, let alone binding precedent, which supports that proposition.  Indeed, the proposition turns basic precepts of public bidding on their head.  When a solicitation requires a bidder to submit information showing its legal qualification to perform, and the bidder fails to supply it, the public body has three choices: (1) make the award without any assurance the bidder is legally qualified to perform, which is definitionally arbitrary and capricious and in violation of River Vale; (2) send out a public records request and wait to see if the bidder is actually allowed to perform, which defeats the purpose of asking for the information with the bid, unnecessarily delays an award, and imposes a burden even the trial court thought was inappropriate; or (3) politely, because it has no means of enforcement, ask the bidder to provide the information post bid, which violates well-established precedent against post-bid cures and subjects the government and competitors to the whims of the non-compliant bidder.
[brief] Further, defendant had served her motion and OTSC on plaintiff by email (Pa1073, Pa1139) and certified mail without providing any tracking number.  The judge adjudicated those motions and OTSC in the January 12, 2024 order but took exception to plaintiff serving defendant by email in the March 8, 2024 order even though defendant had additionally been served via USPS mail.  There is no legitimate rationale or legal basis for applying differential standards to the parties regarding the mode of service of the motion.  Similarly, the January 3, 2024 order provided that “Matter is listed, along with the other converted OSC on 1/12/24, at 9:00 a.m. ” (Pa1148).  However, on January 12, 2024, the judge inexplicably called off the hearing and precipitously ordered the confiscation of passports despite the court’s unequivocal finding in the January 3, 2024 order that “Defendant provides no basis for her belief plaintiff is about to flee the country and does not establish a sufficient showing warranting depriving plaintiff of his liberty interest in freedom of travel. ” (Pa1148).  One is left wondering what transpired between January 3 and January 12, 2024 that compelled the judge to take the draconian decision of impounding passports without conducting a hearing as provided in the January 3, 2024 order.  It appears that the judge’s arbitrary decisions are driven in part by his condescending attitude towards self-represented litigants.
[brief] 20 Town of Secaucus v. Jersey City, 20 N.J. Tax 384 (Tax 2002) .................... 33 Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015)  .........................................................  20 Wnuck v. N.J. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 337 N.J. Super. 52 (App. Div. 2001) ..................................................................................  38 Statutes N.J.S.A. 40A:20-1, et seq ............................................................................. 7 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5 ..................................................................................... 31 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-6 ..................................................................................... 31 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-2 ........................................................................................................... 32 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-4 ........................................................................................................... 21 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-8 ........................................................................................................... 24 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-9 ........................................................................................................... 24 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-10 ......................................................................................................... 24 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11 ......................................................................................................... 25, 27, 31, 32 N.J.S.A. 40A:20-12 ......................................................................................................... 29, 37 Other Authorities Comm. Amendments to S. Cty. & Mun. Gov’t Comm. Statement to S. 291 (L. 1991, c. 431) .................................................................................................................. 22, 40 N.J. Const., art. VIII, § 3, ¶ 1 ............................................................................................. 25 S. Cty. & Mun. Gov’t Comm. Statement to S. 291 (L. 1991, c. 431) ...................... 22 Rules R. 1:36-3 .......................................................................................................................... 22 R. 4:10-3(a) ....................................................................................................................... 40 TABLE OF APPENDIX
[brief] Evidence Receipt from Lab (Tab/Marijuana) (Attached at Pa0036) Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0031) Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0030) CJIS Transmittal Form (Attached at Pa0038) Wanted Person Request (Mugshot) (Attached at Pa0039)  HIT Confirmation Response (Attached at Pa040)  [...]’ Letter to Highland Park Prosecutor and Court Administrator, Dated 9/25/2020 (Attached at Pa0056)
[brief] Foremost, the issue concerning the constitutionality of the sneak and peek warrant has been previously presented to the Appellate Division.  “A prior adjudication upon the merits of any ground for relief is conclusive whether made in the proceedings resulting in the conviction or in any post-conviction proceeding brought pursuant to this rule or prior to the adoption thereof, or in any appeal taken from such proceedings. ”  R. 3:22-5.
[brief] In September 2021, the New Jersey State Police (NJSP)’s Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Unit began an investigation into the distribution of child sexual abuse and exploitation material (CSAEM) via the internet, using online, peer-to-peer, file-sharing networks.  (1T31-23 to 42-23; Cma4; Cma7 to 11).  Specifically, on September 22, 2021, [...], using investigative BitTorrent software, directly connected to a device that was file-sharing known CSAEM files using a specific IP address.  (Cma9 to 10; 1T35-9 to 40-6).  He was able to download thirty-five items of CSAEM from the suspect device.  (Cma10).  By checking the American Registry for Internet Numbers and serving a subpoena on the IP address’s Internet Service Provider, the police determined that the device’s IP address had a service address of [...], in [...], and that [...] was the registered subscriber.  (Cma10; 1T39-17 to 41-6).  Detective Eggert thereafter contacted the U.S. Postal Inspector’s Office, which advised that two individuals received mail at [...].  (Cma10).  Eggert also conducted a DMV inquiry, revealing that a total of five individuals potentially resided at the address.  (Cma10 to 11).  Further --- 6  Because the procedural history and facts are interrelated, the State has combined them for clarity and the Court’s convenience.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS – (*SEE FOOTNOTE)  ARGUMENT  APPELLANT CLAIMS THE COURT ERRED ON PROPERLY EXECUTING PROCEDURES AND POLICIES.  APPELLANT CLAIMS TO HAVE PAID FOR HIS TWO CHILDREN THROUGHOUT THE YEARS:  1986 – 2003, UNTIL EACH CHILD TURNED 23 YEARS OLD, VIA DIRECT PAYMENT.  APPELLANT’S CLAIMS ARE FALSE, AS NO DIRECT PAYMENT WAS RECEIVED TO RESPONDENT.  FINAL AUDIT INVESTIGATION PERFORMED BY [...]  CHILD SUPPORT PERFORMED ON 2/21/24:  TOTAL OF ARREARAGES: $ 88,047.35: CONFIRMED.  CONCLUSION
[brief] ……………………………………………………………3  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  [...] twice fabricated his testimony before finally admitting that he could not recall where he was located when observing the alleged violation in question.  And his fabrications were without qualification or explanation.  Simply stated, [...] lied not once, but twice.  These lies render all of [...]’s testimony incredible.  Making matters worse, the State has completely mischaracterized [...]’s testimony and in doing so has failed to turn square corners.  For all of these reasons, the trial court’s denial of [...]’s motion to suppress must be reversed.
[brief] (Pa547-48).  [...] was aware of the hourly charge in her pay, and acknowledged that she never received confirmation from [...] of its approval.  (Pa547-48).  [...] further admitted that she, [...], and [...] schemed to enter charge pay for each other because she heard from [...] that they earned the least of the five staffing coordinators.\(^2\) (Pa547-48).  During her interview, [...] never claimed that [...] had directly approved her receipt of charge pay.\(^3\) (Pa547-48).  [...] admitted that he was aware he was receiving hourly charge pay.  (Pa477).  During his meeting with [...] and [...], [...] admitted that he never received direct approval to enter or receive charge pay.  (Pa477).  [...] claimed that entering the unauthorized charge pay was [...]’s idea.  (Pa477).  [...] claimed that he and [...] misinterpreted [...]’s silence on the topic as permission to begin entering the charge pay, stating that the two took [...]’s non-answer to [...]’s initial request as permission.  (Pa477).  [...] admitted that [...] likely entered the charge pay on [...]’s behalf.  (Pa477).  [...] further confirmed that [...] never saw the unauthorized charge pay entries.  (Pa477).  In discussing the unauthorized entry of charge pay with [...], [...] stated she would “never” have approved only three of the five staffing coordinators for charge pay.
[brief] THE RELEVANT CASE LAW TOO RESTRICTIVELY AND FAILED TO VIEW THE FACTS IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF (T22:2-30:11; T32:20-35:6)  A.  Legal standard of defining “disability” under the NJLAD  Plaintiff asserted three distinct violations of the New Jersey Laws Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”)—discrimination, failure to accommodate and failure to engage in the interactive process.  Pa022-24.  Whether Plaintiff suffered from a “disability” is fundamental to each of these claims.  The trial court incorrectly held that Plaintiff did not qualify as “disabled” under the NJLAD and therefore could not invoke the protection of the NJLAD.
[brief] This is the procedural equivalent of a dismissal with prejudice on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  This Court reviews such decisions using the same standard as the trial judge, without deference to that court’s legal conclusions.  See, e.g., Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019).  Accordingly, the Court examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, generously and with liberality.  See Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., Inc., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988).  For the reasons set forth in Plaintiff’s opening brief, this Court’s review of the trial court’s rulings is de novo.
[brief] Doggett, 505 U.S. 647 at 651.  First, to trigger consideration of the remaining Barker factors "an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay, since, by definition, he cannot complain that the government has denied him a ‘speedy’ trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness.
[brief] (25T 10-9 to 10)  In an interrogation room, officers placed [...] under oath (25T 17-5 to 17), but did not warn him that he had the right to remain silent, or inform him of any of the other Miranda warnings, or ask him if he wished to waive those Miranda rights.  (25T 10-22 to 23)  During the interrogation, officers repeatedly confronted [...] with a photo still of their suspect captured by the surveillance camera at [...] — next door to his residence, and across the street from [...]’s residence — and alleged to [...] that the suspect went into [...]’s house at [...].
[brief] Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more textbook example, as [...] has presented evidence that [...] was instrumental in the creation of the [...] brand, and then literally built the [...] brand from nothing in the eastern portion of the United States.  Moreover, as set forth above, [...] formed and developed its business around promoting the [...] brand.  There is also substantial evidence of coordinated marketing efforts, with [...] even agreeing to market [...]’s EOK system to the parties’ mutual benefit.  Accordingly, at minimum, the question of whether a “community of interest” exists between the parties must be presented to the trier of fact.  Finally, the [...] readily satisfied the NJFPA’s 20% requirement\(^3\), which applies “where more than 20% of the franchisee’s gross sales are intended to be or are derived from such franchise.
[brief] *A fortiori*, as the Law Division here found, [...] waived its arbitration rights by this measure as well: Hearing Tr. 74:4-5; see also *Cole*, 215 N.J. at 277 (“we recognized certain circumstances can demonstrate waiver of a contractual arbitration right.  Those circumstances include … filing an answer and counterclaim without referring to a contractual arbitration provision…”); *Chavis*, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 785, at *7- 8 (Affirming waiver of arbitration reasoning that “Defendants’ litigation behavior here is far more egregious [than even in Cole] because they: (1) did not assert the arbitration agreement in their answer; (2) affirmatively demanded a jury trial in their pleadings; and (3) strategically waited nearly two years to take any measures to enforce the arbitration provision.
[brief] A trial court has an “absolute duty” to properly instruct the jury regarding its fact-finding responsibilities, *State v. Concepcion*, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988), which may include special cautionary instructions relating to the jury’s consideration of particular kinds of evidence.  *State v. Baldwin*, 296 N.J. Super. 391, 396 (App. Div. 1997).
[brief] (PA082-083)  The trial court so concluded in its June 7, 2024 order (DR03).  The appellant/plaintiff [...] knew he had a North Carolina policy while he resided in New Jersey.  He failed to maintain insurance meeting the requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 and his economic and non-economic claims are barred pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5.  c.
[brief] [...] Did Not Maintain the Property  As outlined above, from 1997 through the present, [...]’s conduct was in all ways consistent with someone exercising their ownership interest in a rental property.  Conversely, outside of inconsistent testimony that [...] would from time-to-time go to the Property to perform varying and unspecified maintenance tasks, Defendants offered no evidence of ownership.  For example, while at once testifying that [...] maintained files with respect to the various properties he owned, Defendants were unable to produce any documents after 1997 which would support their claim to ownership despite repeated demands for same by Plaintiff.  To this end, [...], [...]’s widow, was repeatedly questioned about whether bills were paid by [...] after 1997.  She had no answers.  When asked about who paid the water and utility bills after 1997, [...] testified that while she assumed her husband paid the bill, she did not have personal knowledge of payments.  (10T 6:21-7:3; 8:23-9:5 Jan. 25, 2023).  She also testified that she was unaware of anyone other than her husband paying any of the water or utility bills.\(^3\) (10T7, Jan. 25, 2023).  Similarly, with respect to sewage bills, [...] testified that she did not pay the bills and she did not know whether her husband or anyone else paid the bills for the Property.  (10T7-8, Jan. 25, 2023).  With respect to repair bills, [...] believed that her husband paid them and was unaware of anyone else who may have paid them.  \(^3\)  Notably, this testimony contradicts her later testimony that [...] paid these bills on behalf of her and her husband.  (13T 22:14-23:9; 44:7-21; 45:25-46:15, Jan. 30, 2023).  after 1997.  The Citi account jointly in the name of [...] and his wife is devoid of any payment for the expenses of the Property.  (Pa843-1957) (the absence of any expenses paid with respect to the Property in [...] and his wife’s bank accounts).  [...] testifies that her husband kept good records with respect to the various properties they owned, including the Property.  Per [...], in response to discovery demands in this lawsuit, [...] reviewed her husband’s records with respect to the Property and turned them over to her attorney for production.  (9T 101:17-103:18, Jan. 24, 2023).  Despite the foregoing testimony, Defendants’ document production was bereft of any documents which would support the assertion that [...] maintained the Property or made payments related thereto after 1997.  b.
[brief] (6T, 69:22-25; and 70:1).  He had no knowledge whether [...] ever created the infrastructure, water, electric, roadways, parking lots, and signage for a new development.  (6T, 71:6-10).  He did not know that [...] never owned construction equipment, and did not have a workforce on hand to develop the [...] project.  (6T, 71:11-15).  Nor was [...] aware that [...] admitted that he had no experience constructing, planning, or financing an affordable housing project.  (6T, 71:16-19).  When asked about his opinion regarding [...]’s share of profits if he joint ventured with an experienced developer, [...] conceded his share could vary greatly.