[brief] First, that question is irrelevant, because regardless of how it is described or whether it might be walked upon by a patron, the area is undeniably part of the blacktop parking lot and therefore a part of the common area which, under the lease, the landlord is responsible for maintaining.  \(^6\)  In fact, Plaintiff’s description of this area was quite fluid, as he changed his description of the area multiple times in this litigation.  (Pa529, describing in the answers to interrogatories that he fell “in the parking lot. ”; Pa200, in the motion to file a second amended complaint, asserting that the “location of the fall is in an area that is in the parking lot…”)\)  Moreover, the underlying premise of that argument is that this area of blacktop can be considered “adjacent” to the premises leased by [...].  There is simply no factual support for that assertion.  The spot where Plaintiff fell is on the side of the building, separated by [...]’s unit by the property leased to [...].  It further makes no sense because, under the lease agreements, the tenants must pay a pro rata share of common area maintenance fees, and the common areas and their maintenance were under the exclusive control of the landlord, [...].  It would make those provisions of the lease superfluous if [...] would be nevertheless somehow responsible to maintain a remote portion of the parking lot, which is nowhere near its unit, when it already has paid its share of the maintenance fee for the common areas to the landlord.  In this case, the plain and unambiguous language requires the tenants to maintain the areas in front of their stores and nothing more.  The landlord intended to exercise control over common areas, such as parking lots, by reserving the right to charge for common area maintenance.  By contrast, Plaintiff’s argument that the term “adjacent” should be read to mean common areas abutting, adjoining or contiguous with the tenant’s leased premises, located anywhere in the entirety of the shopping center, would have the effect of imposing a duty on every tenant, over large portions of the shopping center property which are remote from that tenant’s unit and which are contractually the duty of [...] as part of the common areas.  Even if the plain language of the lease could be read in such a manner, such an outcome would be an absurdity and so that reading should be rejected.  It is well established law that “when the intent of the parties [to a contract] is plain and the language is clear and unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement as written, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result. ”  Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016) (emphasis supplied.)  In this case, given the provisions of the lease which place the duty for the maintenance of the common areas on the lessor, the provisions which provide for the collection of fees for common area expenses, and the fact that the area in question was part of the blacktop parking lot, any reading of the term “adjacent” which would make [...] responsible for ice and snow clearance along the side of the shopping center, when it had a unit toward the center of the complex, would be an absurd result and thus unsupportable under the law.  For all the foregoing reasons, [...] properly granted [...] summary judgment and [...] asks this Court to affirm that determination.