ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, RULINGS  Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division  Order of Honorable [...], A.J.S.C., dated June 28, 2024 ..............  148a/T3 #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **62-64 Main St., L.L.C. v. Mayor & Council of City of Hackensack,** | 10 | | 221 N.J. 129 (2015) | | | **Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow,** | 12 | | 153 N.J. 218 (1998) | | | **Brock v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.,** | 12 | | 149 N.J. 378 (1997) | | | **ERETC, L.L.C. v. City of Perth Amboy,** | 11 | | 381 N. J. Super. 268 (App. Div. 2005) | | | **Est. of Doerfler v. Fed. Ins. Co.,** | 11 | | 454 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 2018) | | | **Ferraro v. Demetrakis,** | 12 | | 167 N.J. Super. 429 (App. Div. 1979) | | | **Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro,** | 10, 11, 27 | | 191 N.J. 344 (2007) | | | **Hirth v. City of Hoboken,** | 9, 10, 27 | | 337 N.J. Super 149 (App. Div. 2001) | | | **Malanga v. Twp. of W. Orange,** | 11, 22, 23, 24 | | 253 N.J. 291 (2023) | | | **N. Haledon Fire Co. No. 1 v. Borough of N. Haledon,** | 12 | | 425 N.J. Super. 615 (App. Div. 2012) | | | **Shazo v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of Tenafly,** | 11 | | 2023 WL 8427012 (App. Div, 2023) | | | **Spruce Manor Enterprises v. Borough of Bellmawr,** | 10 | | 315 N.J. Super. 286 (Law. Div. 1998) | | State v. Walker, 385 N.J. Super. 388 (App. Div. 2006)
[brief] For example, [...] relies on Section 2C.33 of the MUTCD.  (Pa22-23).  Not only does Plaintiffs’ argument assume that there existed some alleged dangerous condition, which no one -- even Mr. [...] -- can identify, but Section 2C.33 does not set forth a standard regarding appropriate signage.  Rather, it sets forth “support” and an “option”:  Section 2C.33  Warning Signs and Plaques for Motorcyclists (W8-15, W8-15P, and W8-16)  Support:  The signs and plaques described in this Section are intended to give motorcyclists advance notice of surface conditions that might adversely affect their ability to maintain control of their motorcycle under wet or dry conditions.  The use of some of the advance surface condition warning signs described in Section 2C.32, such as Slippery When Wet, LOOSE GRAVEL, or ROUGH ROAD, can also be helpful to motorcyclists if those conditions exist.  Option:  If a portion of a street or highway features a roadway pavement surface that is grooved or textured instead of smooth, such as a grooved skid resistance treatment for a horizontal curve or a brick pavement surface, a GROOVED PAVEMENT (W8-15) sign (see Figure 2C-6) may be used to provide advance warning of this condition to motorcyclists, bicyclists, and other road users.  Alternate legends such as TEXTURED PAVEMENT or BRICK PAVEMENT may also be used on the W8-15 sign.  If a bridge or a portion of a bridge includes a metal or grated surface, a METAL BRIDGE DECK (W8-16) sign (see Figure 2C-6) may be used to provide advance warning of this condition to motorcyclists, bicyclists, and other road users.  A Motorcycle (W8-15P) plaque (see Figure 2C-6) may be mounted below or above a W8-15 or W8-16 sign if the warning is intended to be directed primarily to motorcyclists.  See Section 2C.33 MUTCD, at p. 123 available at https://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/pdfs/2009r1r2/mutcd2009r1r2edition.pdf.
[brief] ”  See State v. James, 144 N.J. 538, 554 (1996) (finding “opening the door” doctrine is essentially a rule of expanded relevancy and authorizes admitting evidence which otherwise would have been irrelevant or inadmissible in order to respond to (1) admissible evidence that generates an issue, or (2) inadmissible evidence admitted by the court over objection. ”) (emphasis added).  Here, defendant placed the authenticity of the letters directly at issue, and used handwriting comparison to bolster his assertion that [...] had forged the letters.  The State is certainly permitted to respond to that argument in kind.  Defendant also complains at a lack of an instruction to the jury to “eliminate the danger that the jurors might assign improper weight to their comparison.
[brief] See, e.g., Phillips v. New Jersey Transit, 2022 WL 462089, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 2022); see also N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 7 ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.  . . .").
[brief] [...] was the detective in the [...] who conducted forensic examinations of the cell phones in this case.  (26T57-9 to 20)  He had retrieved photograph S-113 by performing an extraction of the Apple iPhone X with phone number [...]; he had located a video on the phone created on March 5, 2018, at 5:45 p.m., and S-113 was a still frame from the video.  (26T73-13 to 74-20)  [...] had not participated in any aspects of the investigation of [...]’s murder other than performing an extraction and forensic examination of the cell phones.  (26T88-8 to 23)  [...] was not present when S-113 was created on March 5, 2018 and had no personal knowledge of what Defendant looked like on that day; his opinion that the person in S-113 was Defendant was purely based on his review of the video and from what other witnesses had told him.  Thus, without any personal knowledge to support his opinion as to who was shown in the video, [...]’s opinion was not “rationally based on the perception of the witness. ”  N.J.R.E. 701; McLean, 205 N.J. at 457.
[brief] If I understand Her Honor, the police could commit any tort they wished so long as they could obtain a conviction on one charge.  Here we claim the search without permission (perhaps only the cabin of the car), etc., all make it over the Heck “bar. ”  Even [...] believed suit for an illegal search does not bring any unfavorable termination into question.  See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), fn. 8.  With the acquittal on the knife charge and the unsigned permission, [...] has a clear path to sue for the illegal search (maybe of the cabin only) and overcharging him on, at least, an abuse of process theory.
[brief] *Sipko v. Koger, Inc.*, *supra*, 251 N.J. at 184.  Thus, the application of a discount to fair value is in no way the “default”, as Plaintiffs wish it was.  The opposite is true.  Plaintiffs ignore the change in the valuation law from and after *Lawson* and *Balsamides*.  They are hoping to argue back into existence that discounts apply in even “ordinary” cases, because they convinced the Chancery Court to grant a 35% discount without showing “extraordinary circumstances” and ignoring their enormous damage awards for the same conduct as they contended was oppression.  This case was far different than *Balsamides*.  Plaintiffs also ignore that *Casey v. Brennan*, 344 N. J. Super. 83, 112 (App. Div. 2001) later relied on *Lawson* and again stated the opposite of Plaintiffs’ contention.
[brief] In fact, Defendants’ acquiescence in ongoing negotiations between the parties over the years estops them from claiming termination of the MOU.  Thus, Defendants’ abandonment theory lacks evidence of mutual intent.  The parties’ decade-long efforts to secure financing (1T9:6-8; Da62-68, Da286-88) show the MOU persisted.  (1T49:9).  Paragraph 2 of the MOU further contemplates the execution of subsequent agreements by stating, in pertinent part, as follows:
[directive] 3rd Degree $10,000 to $50,000 10% permissible (Continued)  (Continued)  a.  Actor enters or surreptitiously remains in any research facility, structure, or separately 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible secured or occupied portion thereof.  If committed in a school or on school property, in a dwelling, research facility, public utility or any facility that stores, generates or handles hazardous chemical or chemical compounds; fourth degree; otherwise it is a disorderly persons offense.  2C:18-3(a)(b)(c)
[brief] ’”  Docteroff v. Barra Corp., 282 N.J. Super. 230, 237 (App. Div. 1995).  A.  Interpretation of a statute is a matter of general public interest.  In Borough of Keyport v. Maropakis, 332 N.J. Super. 210, 216 (App. Div. 2000), the court considered a legal issue of general application initially raised in the reply brief.  TILA is a statute of general applicability to consumers seeking credit.  Its interpretation is a matter of general public interest.  “Independent of the interests of the parties and their attorneys in the litigation that comes before our courts, there is a profound public interest when matters of health, safety and consumer fraud are involved. ”  Hammock by Hammock v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 142 N.J. 356, 379 (N.J. 1995).  Although the Hammock court cites consumer fraud as an item of public interest, Appellant is not in any way suggesting that consumer fraud issues are present in this case.  However, the U.S. Congress enacted TILA to safeguard consumers from credit card issuers.  The interpretation and application of TILA to credit cardholders is, thus, a matter of general public interest.
[brief] ”  Preciose, 129 N.J. at 476 (quotation omitted).  While merely “[c]loaking the claim in constitutional language will not guarantee relief,” where constitutional rights are truly at stake, “a court may hear [the] claim even though it should have been raised on direct appeal. ”  Mitchell, 126 N.J. at 585.  [...] was deprived effective assistance of counsel and of due process, thus, exception (c) is satisfied.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6.c. indicates that an arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrate has been fulfilled or whether a contract containing a valid agreement to arbitrate is enforceable.  As a condition precedent to arbitration the arbitrator was empowered both by the statute and the arbitration agreement to decide if the jurisdiction exclusions remove the matter from arbitration or allow it to proceed.  In each of the nine arbitrations which were the subject of this Order to Show Cause, [...] raised an Affirmative Defense of no jurisdiction.  Each matter was properly presented to the arbitrator by counsel for the parties and argued by counsel at the hearing.  [...] intentionally allowed each matter to proceed, acknowledging their contractual obligation to allow the arbitrator to decide the jurisdictional exclusion.  [...] did not file an action pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6.b seeking to have the court decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or the controversy is subject to the agreement to arbitrate.  Had such an action been filed, the above analysis would have required the court to compel the issue to arbitration for a ruling by an arbitrator on the jurisdictional exclusions.  In all nine arbitrations, the arbitrator entered an award indicating that there was jurisdiction to hear the matter in [...] pursuant to the contract between the parties.  POINT II
[brief] [...] retired from an illustrious Standardbred racing career in or about 2014 and began work as a breeding stallion.  [Pa 141-42].  Breeding (which involves the collection, and sometimes, freezing of semen) is typically done during defined “seasons. ”  Because of his European success, [...] participated in the breeding seasons in both North America and Europe: The North American season typically runs from mid-February to early July, whereas the European season runs from late-July/early-August to November.  See [Pa 386, 470-71].  During North American breeding seasons, [...]’s semen was collected at [...] in 2014, [Pa 275-76], and at [...] in Ohio in 2015 to 2018, [Pa 383-391].  During European breeding seasons 2014-2016 [...]’s semen was collected at [...] in Maryland, where it was frozen and shipped overseas.  [Pa 442-44].  [...] was at [...] for the 2017 and 2018 European breeding seasons.  [Pa 473, 587-590].  Plaintiff [...] was Stallion Manager at [...] both times [...] boarded there.  [Pa 598-99].  Williams was an experienced Stallion Manager with 60 years of experience handling horses in general, and 30 years’ experience handling stallions in particular.  [Pa 598-99, 612].  In the course of his duties, he regularly fed and groomed [...], turned him out to his paddock, “caught” him from his paddock, and led him to the breeding shed where his semen was collected.  [Pa 603-612].  On the morning of October 3, 2018, Williams followed his “normal” routine but, while walking [...] to the breeding shed, [...] suddenly pushed Williams to the ground and attacked him.
[brief] In *Lautenslager*, *supra*., the appellate division picked up the historical analysis of New Jersey’s statute of limitations where *Earl* left off.  After discussing the evolution of case law in the area both pre and post *Earl* jurisprudence and finding a split in authority, the court undertook an independent analysis of the statute of limitations question.  *Id.* at 665.  Looking to the common law concepts of “action on the case” and “trespass vi et armis,” the court attempted to trace the roots of New Jersey’s two tort statutes of limitations that are at issue here, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 and N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.  The court concluded that an action of trespass was historically to redress injuries caused by the direct application of force, and that the language of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, the two-year statute, was intended to apply to this type of action.  *Id.*  The court also concluded that the six-year limitation of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 was intended to cover indirect injuries in the nature of actions on the case.  *Id.*  In 1993, only two years after *Lautenslager*, the New Jersey Supreme Court in *Montells v. Haynes*, *supra*, was compelled to bring to an end an ongoing disagreement within the Appellate Division, as well as within the federal courts, concerning whether the two-year statute of limitations in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 or the six-year statute of limitations in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 applied to actions brought under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD).
[brief] N.Y. SMSA v. Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Weehawken, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 334 (App. Div. 2004).  “Denial of a variance on a summary finding couched in the conclusionary language of the statute is not adequate…Unless such findings are recited, a reviewing court cannot determine fairly whether the Zoning Board acted properly and within the limits of its authority in refusing a variance. ”  Ibid. (citing Harrington Glen v. Bd. of Adjustment of Leonia, 52 N.J. 22, 28 (1968)).  Although a zoning board may reject an applicant’s expert testimony, it must do so in reliance of contrary expert testimony rather than “bare allegations of unsubstantiated beliefs.
[brief] (Pa689 at T135:8-17; Da125).  [...] was served with a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action (“PNDA”) recommending a 4-day suspension in connection with the substantiation of [...]’s allegations against him.  (Da62; Da520-Da522).  [...] continued to deny most of the allegations raised in [...]’s EEO complaint, appealed his PNDA, and finally settled his disciplinary action with a downgraded 3-day suspension.  (Da62; Da523-Da525).  D.
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[directive] Other Provisions  A.  This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney General’s Non-enforceability by third parties.  authority to ensure the uniform and efficient enforcement of the laws and administration of criminal justice throughout the State.  This Directive imposes limitations on law enforcement agencies and officials that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.  B.
[brief] [...]’s petition included the Gabel Report to support its application for a TREC factor of 1.0.  (Aa4).  Staff, relying on the Cadmus Report modeling representative cases for floating solar in each service territory in New Jersey, concluded that additional costs associated with floating solar in New Jersey does not warrant a full 1.0 TREC factor.  (Aa6).  The Board noted it relied on the project’s proposed costs and revenues, as well as the Board’s experience with this technology in New Jersey and its consultant, finding that [...]’s proposed project would not warrant a 1.0 TREC factor.  (Aa5).  Considering the uncertainty surrounding [...]’s ability to reach commercial operation and [...]’s failure to petition for a waiver in the first place, the Board’s determination is consistent with the law and supported by the record.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  1  THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT TERRI BAIRD PLACED A TRAP ON MURRAY ROAD - A REQUIRED ELEMENT OF THE EACH OF THE VIOLATIONS OF WHICH THE COURT CONVICTED HER (RAISED BELOW DA 7A)  Upon traveling on Murray Road on September 15, 2021, Complainant, [...], spotted a trap, mostly on private property and partially on Murray Road sidewalk and further spotted four piles of food on the sidewalk.  3T16:24-25; 3T34:12-17  Trap was covered and tied open.  3T14:9-18  Trap had a note with Terri and a phone number written on it saying :"trapping Mom cat and Kittens".  3T26:9-11  Ms.Nguyen did not remove the trap from Murray road.  3T36:6-8  [...] later determined that the phone number belonged to [...].  3T27:7-14  Two days later [...] sought to retrieve the trap from City Hall but they denied possessing it.  3T30:4-11  Each of the 3 charges of which the trial court convicted [...] requires as a crucial element that [...] placed the trap on Murray Road.  [...]'s 3 convictions were based on a leap over a chasm of speculation with a trap partially on Murray Road sidewalk on one side and her attempt to reclaim a trap at city hall on the other.  [...] did not observe [...] place the trap on Murray Road.  The municipal Court rightly concluded that someone other than [...] could have placed the 4 piles of cat food found on the sidewalk and acquitted [...] of the 2 charges related to that food.  The same "someone" could have moved the trap over a few inches from private property abutting Murray Road, to the sidewalk where the state claimed it violated East Hanover municipal ordinances.  The same "someone" could have tied the trap open, covered it and placed food inside.  Indeed, "Someone" other than [...] could have placed the trap on Murray road.  [...] could have loaned a trap to a fellow rescuer who placed it there or a stranger could have decided to avail themselves of the trap placed elsewhere and move it there.
[brief] Tooker v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 136 N.J. Super. 572 (App. Div. 1975) ..........................................47, 48  Valley Nat. Bancorporation v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 316 N.J. Super. 152 (App. Div. 1998) .........................................41  Vrabel v. Scholler, 94 A.2d 748 (Pa. 1953) .................................................................  32  Weinisch v. Sawyer, 123 N.J. 333 (1991) ........................................................................  43  Workers’ Comp. Fund v. Wadman Corp., 210 P.3d 277 (Utah 2009) ............................................................... 31, 32  STATUTES AND COURT RULES
[brief] Dear [...]:  Kindly accept the within as Appellant’s amended letter reply brief.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  ...........................................  1  ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................  2 CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................  3  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  [...] relies on her original brief and appendix in this regard.  ARGUMENT  THE EQUAL PAY AND NJLAD MANDATES ARE FUNCTIONALLY NO DIFFERENT THAN THE STATUTORY SALARY MANDATE IN SPELLBACKER AND AS SUCH ARE ENTITLED TO ENFORCEMENT.  The Board attempts to distinguish this case from Spellbacker by asserting that it involved a specific statutory salary mandate.  See Rb 15-16.  However, the present case also contains a no less forceful mandate which addresses gender disparities.  In addition, the Board suggests that [...]’ settlement will disturb the actual integrity of the [...].  But it has presented no empirical evidence that the settlement involving one member will bring about a fiscal calamity.  Even if it were a concern, it is ultimately up to the Legislature to resolve the issue by requiring increased contributions from employers who enter into such settlements and not to penalize the members who are rightfully entitled to equal benefits.  Finally, the Board also asserts that the settlement herein was not across-the-board.  That is true but the fact is that [...] was the only plaintiff in the litigation.  Moreover, across the board settlements typically arise in collective-bargaining negotiations.  Unless all female [...] members at the [...] chose to join [...]’ litigation, it is an academic issue.  CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, it is again requested that the decision below be reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.  [...], ESQ.  Attorney for Appellant  Dated: March 11, 2024  Cc: [...], D.A.G. February 12, 2024  VIA eCOURTS [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey - Appellate Division  R.J. Hughes Justice Complex  PO Box 006 Trenton, NJ 08625-006  Re: Cheryl [...] v. [...]  Docket No. [...]  On Appeal from a Final Agency Decision of the Board of Trustees of the Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund  Letter Brief and Appendix of Respondent, Board of Trustees of the Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund on the Merits of the Appeal
[brief] ”  Unfazed by this directive and this Court’s explicit statement that there was no common core of operative facts as to both RICO and non-RICO claims, the trial court awarded the same amount of attorneys’ fees as it had in 2013, and further awarded attorneys’ fees for Plaintiffs’ unsuccessful work on the prior appeal.  The award was premised on the report and recommendation of a Special Master who refused to depart from his original recommendation and, separately, had a disqualifying conflict of interest.  The trial court’s errors on remand are manifested in yet another way that did not need to be addressed in this Court’s 2018 decision.  Without any findings or legal basis to support its ruling, the trial court awarded compounded prejudgment interest at excessive rates, contrary to the usual calculation of simple interest on judgments at rates established in the Court Rules.  Despite the length of this litigation, the trial court’s several errors must be corrected.