ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] XIX.  A.  Statutes by default have prospective application.  (Argued at Pa402)  XIX.  B.  The statute amendment relied upon by [...] in claiming that it could lawfully convert the Board’s money to pay its employees became effective June 29, 2020, which negates any legitimate claim for payment of the April / May / June 2020 invoices.  (Argued at Pa403 – Pa404)  XIX.  C.  Legislature undisputedly did not express retroactive application of N.J. S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  (Argued at Pa404)  XIX.  D.  Under the first prong of the implied retroactive application test, [...]’s claims fail because the Legislature never intended to give N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) retroactive application.  (Argued at Pa404 – Pa405)  XIX.  E.  Under the second prong of the implied retroactive application test, [...]’s claims fail because the retroactive application will result in either an unconstitutional interference with vested rights or a manifest injustice.  (Argued at Pa405 – Pa407)  XIX.  E.  1.  Unconstitutional interference with vested rights (Argued at Pa405 – Pa406)  XIX.  E.  2.  Manifest injustice (Argued at Pa406 – Pa407)  | Table of Judgments, Orders, and Rulings Being Appealed | Appendix Page | |------------------------------------------------------|---------------| | Reconsideration Order & Opinion, April 28, 2023 | 153a – 159a | | Clarification Order & Opinion, June 9, 2023 | 160a – 161a | | Order & Opinion Motion to Dismiss, Failure to State a Claim, February 17, 2023 | 162a – Pa168
[brief] [...]’s expert report on Plaintiff [...]’ lost profits damages, absolutely establishes lost profits above and beyond a reasonable degree of certainty, because the data and information reviewed and analyzed by [...] to arrive at his conclusions was not hypothetical data or information from some hypothetical affordable housing development imagined to be constructed on [...] or a comparison to some other similar parcel of land somewhere else.  4T, 23:13-25:9.  Instead, [...] reviewed and analyzed the real, certain, actual data and information required by [...] for the processing of the application for financing of the 100% affordable housing development, which was approved.  4T, 33:21-34:9).  Thus, said real, certain, actual data and information was not only the data and information upon which the [...] approved the financing of the affordable housing project, but was the same real, certain, actual data and information from which the affordable housing project was soon thereafter actually developed on the [...].  4T, 24:10-35:7.  As [...] testified, in providing his lost profits damages expert report in this matter, he reviewed the real, certain, actual data and information [...] was required to submit in applying to the [...] for the financing of the affordable housing project developed on [...].  274a; 4T, 25:10-23.  Said data and information, in the record (and which is public information), is data and information that opposing counsel could not refute because it is the actual, certain, real data and information provided by [...] and reviewed by the [...], in processing [...]’s application submitted for financing the affordable housing development, which was approved and permitted [...] to develop the affordable housing development on [...].  4T, 23:13-25:9; 33:21-35:7.  [...] made no assumptions, because none were necessary; he simply analyzed the real, certain, actual data and information provided by [...], as required, in its application to the [...].  4T, 23:13-25:9; 33:21-35:7.  This was the same data and information created by [...] and the [...] and utilized by the [...] for its financial analysis and determination of the value and profit of the affordable housing project, evidenced in the [...]’s public records.  4T, 33:21-34:9.  [...] analyzed said real, certain, actual data and information, utilizing customary industry analytical standards, and performed customary industry standard projections done for affordable housing projects, in essence verifying the value and profit as projected by [...] and determined by [...] for the 100% affordable housing project developed on [...].  4T, 25:4-22.  Yet, the Trial Court erroneously invented a standard that the Supreme Court did not establish.
[brief] For reasons described more fully in Point II, *infra*, the trial court’s interlocutory ruling in paragraph one of its November 10, 2021 order stating that because Tenant was “in breach of the lease due to nonpayment of five months of rent, the Tenant is not due any refund of fit up costs under Section 4.02 of the Lease,” must be vacated.  For similar reasons, the November 9, 2023 order flowing from the interlocutory decision must also be vacated.  The trial court’s rulings ignored relevant provisions of the Lease, thereby depriving Tenant of its entitlement to reimbursement for delinquent mandatory --- \(^8\)  The appellate record is silent on whether the Escrow Funds were released.  annual installment payments for Tenant’s Allowance plus interest in 2019, 2020, and 2021.  However, as an initial matter, the trial court must be reversed for having prejudged the case before rendering a decision and then rendering decisions lacking in any legal analysis, case citations, or statement of reasons for having ruled against Tenant.
[brief] On February 13, 2020, plaintiff states that she was sleeping when [...] called for meds medications.  (Pa001, pg5, ¶16).  13.  Plaintiff alleges that on February 13, 2020, she had to wait an additional 30 minutes to receive her medication.  (Pa001, pg5, ¶16).  14.  On February 13, 2020, plaintiff asked [...] [...] [sp] for a grievance form and was refused.  (Pa001, pg5, ¶17).  15.  Plaintiff alleges that defendant [...] is a social worker and supervisor assigned to the social services unit where plaintiff was housed in the [...].
[brief] A forensic pathologist “has been defined as an expert in investigating and evaluating cases of sudden, unexpected, suspicious, and violent death, as well as other specific classes of death defined by law. ”  *State v. Locascio*, 425 N.J. Super. 474, 490 (App. Div. 2012).  The testimony of a forensic pathologist is “restricted to describing the mechanics of death."  *Id.* (quoting *State v. Jamerson*, 153 N.J. 318, 337 (1998)).  In this case, there was no dispute that [...] was qualified as an expert in forensic pathology.
[brief] Borough of Island Heights, 138 N.J. 307 (1994) | 28 | | Mountain Home Contractors v. United States, 425 F.2d 1260 (Ct. Cl. 1970) | 28 | | New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development v. [...], d/b/a [...], [...] and [...], 2010 N.J. Agen LEXIS 826, 2010 WL 442326 (N.J. DOL May 6, 2010) | 16-19 | | Palamar Const., Inc. v. Pennsauken Twp., 196 N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 1983) | 8 | | River Vale Twp. v. R. J. Longo Const. Co., 127 N.J. Super. 207 (L. Div. 1974) | 28 | | Terminal Const. Corp. v. Atl. Cnty. Sewerage Auth., 67 N.J. 403 (1975) | 24 | ## Statutes, Regulations, Court Rules | Statute | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | N.J.S.A. § 34:11-56.25 et seq. (Prevailing Wage Act) | 13 | | N.J.S.A. § 34:11-56.25 | 14, 15 | | N.J.S.A. § 34:11-56.26 | 13, 14, 15 | | N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.30 | 15 | | N.J.S.A. § 34:11-56.48 et seq.
[brief] This appeal focuses upon the narrow issue, as to whether a Consent Order entered in the Prior Litigation bars Plaintiffs' Complaint in this action.  While the Trial Court erroneously concluded that the Consent Order did bar Plaintiffs' Complaint in this lawsuit, the Trial Court's decision is wrong for multiple reasons, each of which were set forth, in detail, in Plaintiffs' initial Appellate Brief.  Rather than oppose Plaintiffs' instant appeal by addressing each material error committed by Trial Court, [...] merely parrots the same arguments that he made below, and baldly asserts that the Trial Court's decision should be affirmed.  With respect to certain arguments advanced in Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, however, [...] ignored them entirely, tacitly acknowledging that the Trial Court's decision lacks substantive support.  Nonetheless, each of [...]'s arguments are without merit, and should be, ultimately, disregarded.  There is nothing complex or mysterious about the set of facts now under review.  The Trial Court committed reversible error by: (i) re-writing the terms of the Consent order to include nonexistent language; (ii) assuming facts unsupported by the record; and (iii) incorrectly applying New Jersey law.  As the decision of the Trial Court is manifestly incorrect and contrary to New Jersey law, this Court should exercise its de novo appellate review to reverse the order below, dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint, and ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur in this case.
[directive] 4.2.2  Law enforcement executives should assign personnel to internal affairs who have sufficient experience and rank to effectively handle sensitive investigations that may include investigations of supervising officers.  In addition, law enforcement executives should 16 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021 encourage (but need not require) officers to complete a tour in the agency’s internal affairs function prior to promotion to a leadership position in the agency.  4.2.3
[brief] On or around December 4, 2020, Plaintiffs served Defendants with the December 3, 2020, expert report of [...], PE, PP, CPM, CPWM, PWLF (“Expert Report”), of [...]. (at ¶ 17 and Ex. C).  Plaintiffs’ expert opined that: • While [...] was riding his motorcycle across the Structure 40 Bridge, he “struck” an abrupt 2-inch change in grade in the southbound approach to the bridge; (Pa1 et seq).  •  The change in grade was a dangerous condition that likely caused [...] to lose control of his motorcycle and crash (Pa18-Pa20, Pa25); • Had the change in grade been repaired, it “would not have been a cause” of [...]’s accident (Pa25); • All defendants should have “immediately inspected and analyzed” the condition of the Structure 40 Bridge approach and should have timely performed emergency repairs (Pa21, Pa25); • All defendants were responsible for “appropriate advance warning signs installed for at least grooved pavement and bumps” and “[m]otorcycle specific signs.
[brief] A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.  The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; Furthermore, in reality the overwhelming substantiated evidence in my Nov. 4&28, 2022 Oppositions, May 25, 2023 Cross-Motion for Reconsideration, and May 31, 2024 Appeal Brief demonstrate that NONE of that billed legal work would have been required, incl. his responding to [...]’s Verified Complaint ([...]), which NEVER would have been filed, their filing a Verified Complaint & “formal” IA, NEITHER of which were ever required, for Surrogate Audit, Beneficiaries’ Exceptions, and Court Approval, which was NEVER required, if [...] & [...] had instead worked on a 100% guaranteed, achievable 3-Way Settlement with [...], [...], and me.
[brief] 19 State v. Harris, 209 N.J. 431 (2012) .................................................................  33 State v. Hyman, 451 N.J. Super. 429 (App. Div. 2017) .................................. 39, 40 State v. Jabbour, 118 N.J. 1 (1990) ..................................................................  48 State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440 (2008) ..............................................................  20 State v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 10 (1990) .................................................................  48 State v. LaBrutto, 114 N.J. 187 (1989) .............................................................  35 State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469 (1997) ...............................................................  33 State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011) ............................................................... 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39  State v. Muhammad, 359 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 2003) ...............................  33 State v. Nantambu, 221 N.J. 390 (2015) ............................................................  33 State v. O’Donnell, 117 N.J. 210 (1989) ............................................................ 48 State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48 (2020) .......................................................................  19 State v. Ridout, 299 N.J. Super. 233 (App. Div. 1997) ..................................... 43, 44 State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984) .......................................................................  48 State v. Simms, 224 N.J. 393 (2016) ..................................................................  39 State v. Smith, 436 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 2014) .......................................  39 State v. Sowell, 213 N.J. 89 (2013) ....................................................................  19 State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554 (2005) ................................................................. 19, 20 State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021) .................................................................  48 State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985) ............................................................ 48 Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015) ............................................................... 20, 21 NEW JERSEY COURT RULES CITED R. 2:10-2 ..............................................................................................................
[brief] For example, [...] contends that even if he had been on notice to explore evidence outside Lot 4’s chain of title, his examiner would not have found the 1967 Subdivision.  Pb21-22.  But that precise issue was a point of contention between the parties’ experts, with [...]’s expert opining that it would have been reasonable for [...] to perform a search that would have found the 1967 Subdivision by way of a records request.  2Tr. at 174:21-23.  And as the trial court made clear, and as even [...] admits, the trial court favored [...]’s expert’s opinion. \(^5\) 4Tr. at 14:1-10; Pb21.  That evaluation of the experts’ competing claims \(^5\)  Similarly, this Court must defer to the trial court’s negative impression of [...]’s testimony, especially because [...] makes an argument that his supposed language deficit explains his agitated demeanor on the stand.  Pb17-18.  *Gnall*, 222 N.J. at 428.  The trial court observed [...], was aware of his language skills, evaluated his demeanor, and made its assessment.  is due great deference by this Court, and there is no reason to reject it.\textsuperscript{6} \textit{Sipko}, 251 \textit{N.J.} at 188.
[brief] This conclusion is supported by the Appellate Division's decision in Warnig v. Atlantic County Special Servs., 363 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 2003).  The issue in Warnig was whether an insurer who paid benefits to its insured, pursuant to an extended medical expense benefit ("medpay") could be reimbursed in a workers' compensation proceeding pursuant to the collateral source rule.  In holding that it could not, the court reasoned that "the Legislature made no provisions for Med-Pay under the amended version of the collateral source rule" even though it could have "chosen to extend coverage of the collateral source rule to include Med-Pay benefits[.]"  Id. at 571.  The court concluded that without legislative authority, it could not provide the insurer with a reimbursement right to Med-Pay benefits.  Ibid.  The Court can see no reason why the rationale in Warnig is limited to workers' compensation proceedings, and no reason why the same conclusion should not apply here - in the absence of legislative authority, [...] cannot seek reimbursement of Med-Pay benefits."
[brief] But, as noted above, the sole issue in this appeal is whether the DEP properly imposed a general public access condition on [...]'s Permit pursuant to N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(a).  Further, the parties cross-moved for summary decision in OAL, which included a Joint Stipulation \(^{11}\)  Notably, contrary to [...]’s assertions (Ab31), the statutory factors do not include “the relative benefits” of public access, whether access is “convenient,” or whether the public “would be inclined to use the access point.
[brief] The judge denied the motion to suppress, finding the State had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was abandoned, and the officers had a right to enter the building to conduct the warrantless search.  Trial was conducted before a jury in April and May 2018.  At the conclusion of the trial the jury found defendant guilty of second-degree robbery as a lesser included offense of count one, and disorderly persons theft as a lesser include offense of count nine.
[brief] II.  THE RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO ADDRESS THE TRIAL COURT’S ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF THE DISCOVERY RULE IN DETERMINING WHEN A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ACCRUES.  In applying statutes of limitations to various claims, courts have embraced different methodology to determine the precise moment when a cause of action accrues.  Absent any argument as to its applicability, the trial court below unilaterally and erroneously invoked the discovery rule – an equitable tolling doctrine – to determine when the cause of action accrued.  Again, the discovery rule is an equitable role that seeks to preserve the untimely claim of an otherwise blameless plaintiff who did not learn of his or her injury until after the statute of limitations expired.  It is clearly an exception to the statute of limitations and excuses a plaintiff’s late filing for equitable reasons.  The rule has no connection and otherwise nothing to do with determining when a malicious prosecution claim accrues, and further becomes relevant only after the establishment that a claim was filed after the statute of limitations has run.  When addressing claims of malicious prosecution, the decisional law announces that such a claim accrues only upon the favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceeding.  The discovery rule, however, is an equitable tolling doctrine that applies to personal injury claims.  Although arising out of tort law, they stand in opposition to each other when analyzing timeliness and with one having nothing to do with the other.  Having never conceded that the subject complaint was untimely filed, the Appellant never sought refuge pursuant to the discovery rule, and it otherwise had no place in the trial court’s analysis.  Rather than analyzing the accrual issue, which is the element of favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceeding, the trial court proceeded to simply ignore and instead proceeded to assume the claims were untimely filed.  Even having *sua sponte* invoked an equitable tolling doctrine, the trial court inexplicably failed to proceed with any equitable tolling analysis.  If the discovery rule were indeed even applicable, the trial court was required to conduct a hearing, pursuant to *Lopez v. Swyer*, 62 N.J. 267 (1973).  Now apparently and admittedly decided in an obvious wave of confusion, the trial court egregiously erred even in failing to explain the reason for its conclusion.
[brief] ”  White, 305 N.J. Super. at 327.  In White, police officers from Orange traveled to Newark to investigate an offense committed in Orange.  Id. at 325.  This Court found their actions appropriate: “the Orange police officers could properly investigate in another municipality and obtain voluntary consent to search in connection [with that investigation.]”  Id. at 332.  While the panel recognized that it was oftentimes advisable for officers to be accompanied by law-enforcement representatives from the home jurisdiction, “time constraints and manpower considerations may not make this entirely feasible under all circumstances.
[directive] Definitions  The following terms are defined here for use in these Guidelines.  For those terms that are also used in the Report, the same definition is used here.  Community Violence: violence that “happens between unrelated individuals, who may or may not know each other, generally outside the home.  Examples include assaults or fights among groups and shootings in public places, such as in schools and on the streets.2  Community-Based Violence Intervention (CBVI): the name of the Department’s program funding non-profit organizations providing community violence intervention strategies.3  Community Violence Intervention (CVI): is a set of strategies that are used by community-based and grass roots organizations to reduce “community violence” in their neighborhoods.4  Hospital-based Violence Intervention (HVIP): the name of the Department’s program funding multidisciplinary interventions that integrate the efforts of hospital medical staff with trusted community-based providers to provide services to victims of violence starting at the hospital bedside.5  Qualified CBVI Organization: A CBVI organization that receives funding from the State.  Relevant Law Enforcement Agency: A law enforcement agency, including a county and municipality, whose jurisdiction overlaps with the location where a Qualified CBVI organization operates.  IV.
[directive] Uniform modifications  A.  Generally.  Upon request by the pregnant officer to the agency’s human resources unit, or LAD/ADA coordinator, the agency shall consider the need for uniform and equipment modifications during pregnancy, including uniform color, and the agency and officer should engage in an interactive process and communicate to determine whether a reasonable accommodation(s) is available under applicable law.  B. duty.  A pregnant officer on full duty may request modification of the officer’s Full uniform to accommodate the pregnancy, including by purchasing pregnancy trousers and shirts through the agency’s uniform supplier, and the agency and officer should engage in an interactive process and communicate to determine whether a reasonable accommodation(s) is available under applicable law.  Any cost associated with that purchase shall be paid for in the same manner as any other uniform purchase.  C. duty.  If a pregnant officer on modified duty requests an accommodation from Modified wearing a uniform, including pregnancy trousers and shirts, the agency and officer should engage in an interactive process and communicate to determine whether a reasonable accommodation(s) is available under applicable law, which may include allowing the officer to wear plain clothes.  1.  If a pregnant officer on modified duty requests an exemption from wearing body armor or from wearing the officer’s regulation duty belt, the agency and officer should engage in an interactive process and communicate to determine whether a reasonable accommodation(s) is available under applicable law.  IV.
[brief] See Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 45 n.2 (2015); State v. Golotta, 178 N.J. 205, 211-12 (2003).  In short, defendant presents --- 11  Defendant’s reliance on records outside of the appellate record is particularly improper given that police departments denied that certain officers attended the conference and the roster contains a disclaimer that it “could be . . . over nothing to this Court supporting the relief he seeks, and, even if these claims were in the record and preserved for appeal, the officer’s mere attendance at this private conference is not enough to overturn the trial court’s discretionary credibility finding.  See State v. Elder, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007).  The State notes that if defendant withdraws his guilty plea for the reasons discussed in Point III, supra, he is not foreclosed from moving for reconsideration with the motion court with whatever competent proof he can muster regarding the officer’s alleged attendance and lectures at this conference.