ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] A violent crime also includes any aggravated sexual assault, or sexual assault in which you used, or threatened the immediate use of, physical force.  Deadly weapon means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner in which it is used or intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.  Serious bodily injury means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  1.  Èske w konprann ke di fèt ke w ap plede koupab de  Do you understand that because of your plea of guilty to (Enimere Krim vyolan premye oswa dezyèm degre a) / (List First or Second Degree Violent Crimes)
[brief] Second, the New Motion Judge turned logic upside down through her speculation that the C-section still would not have occurred within the fifteen minutes, even if timely called -- and that this “finding” somehow constitutes a defense to a malpractice claim.  The New Motion Judge speculated that there may not have been a doctor available assuming that the C-section had been called, and faulted Plaintiff for not disproving this speculation -- which was understandable in that Plaintiff never had any notice that she needed to disprove this speculation.  The law holds that patients entrust their care to medical specialists based on the implicit representation that they are competent, capable, and possess the requisite skill and resources to render medical services in accordance with the standard of care.  Defendants’ stray references in their briefings, to the effect that they were not staffed as to meet the standard of care should been seen as the damning admission which it is – no more a defense to a malpractice claim than a lawyer’s contention that he missed the statute of limitations because his legal assistant was sick that day.  Further still, the law does not place the Plaintiff to the burden of proving her case under a hypothetical fact pattern that assumes events that didn’t happen.  For this reason, the hypothetical under which the New Motion Judge ruled is irrelevant.  In actual fact, the C-section needed to be called at 9:48 p.m., and it was not called until 10:12 p.m.  Thus, the procedure could not have been completed within fifteen minutes of 9:48 p.m.\(^7\).
[brief] In re Tideland's License 96-0114-T, 326 N.J. Super. 209 (App. Div. 1999); see also N.J.S.A. 12:3-10 and N.J.S.A. 13:1B-13.  Due to [...]’s expertise and knowledge, a final decision is reviewed with deference.  In re Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permit No. 16, 379 N.J. Super. 331, 341 (App. Div. 2005); In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007); see also In re Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permits, 372 N.J. Super. 578, 593 (App. Div. 2004)(quoting Newark v. Nat. Res. Council, Dep't of Env'tl. Prot., 82 N.J. 530, 540 (1980)(deference is even stronger when the agency, like [...] “has been delegated discretion to determine the specialized and technical procedures for its tasks”) and In re Request to Modify Prison Sentences, 242 N.J. 357, 390 (2020)("Wide discretion is afforded to administrative decisions because of an agency's specialized knowledge").
[brief] The [...] is a nonprofit association that seeks to economically empower and sustain African American communities by facilitating entrepreneurship and free enterprise activity within the state.  The [...] is the first chamber in the State of New Jersey and the first African-American chamber in the country to be accredited by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.  Serving more than 800 active members,\(^1\) the [...] has become a central beacon for minority and non-minority advocacy building, community and \(^{1}\) [...] (“[...]”) is a member of the [...]. government relations, business development, job retention, and education attainment.  The [...] serves as a mechanism for communication, program creation, and strategic implementation of initiatives and resolutions that help build New Jersey’s economic landscape, for the 1.2 million African Americans in New Jersey and over 80,000 African American owned businesses in the state, many of which are small businesses.  While providing a collective voice for New Jersey’s African American business leaders, the [...] promotes economic diversity and fosters a climate of growth through major initiatives on educational and public policy levels.  One of the [...]’s primary goals is to develop a public policy advocacy strategy that aligns with government at the municipal, county, and state levels while producing sustained value for its constituency and the [...] regularly engages with State legislators and agencies to ensure that New Jersey’s 1.2 million African American residents and 80,000 businesses have the required access so their voices are heard.
[brief] Some of the relevant pieces of testimony that can support the lay opinion that an operator of a motor vehicle was intoxicated include: - Dangerous Operations (excessive speed, recklessness) - Traffic Accident - Slurred Speech - Bloodshot and Watery eyes - Inappropriate demeanor or mood swings - Lack of Awareness or passage of time -  Inability to stand without support - Odor of alcoholic beverage on the operator’s breath or clothing - Presence of alcoholic beverages in the vehicle - Admission of consumptions of alcoholic beverages  See, State v. Pichadou, 34 N.J. Super. 177, 180 (App. Div. 1955); State v. Higgins, 132 N.J. Super. 67, 70-71, (App. Div. 1975).
[brief] The trial court clearly misinterpreted as a matter of law the clear intention of the Lease and Rider.  Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment on its complaint for the rent due and Defendants’ counterclaim should have been dismissed.  The cause of the fire is irrelevant.  The lease and rider absolve Plaintiffs of any obligation to repair the premises after the fire.  The court’s reasoning was that if Paragraph 42 was to absolve the Plaintiffs, then Paragraph 15 of the lease would essentially have no effect.  (3T 18-6-21).  This reasoning does not conform to the clear language of the Lease and Rider.  The parties were free to change any paragraph in the Lease through the language in the Rider.  The lease obligated the Defendants to carry insurance which it apparently did.  Her insurance should have covered the loss.  If the insurance obtained by the Defendants was inadequate for whatever reason, the fallout from that should not be shouldered by the Plaintiffs.  The polestar of contract construction is the intention of the parties as revealed by the language used taken as an entirety.
[brief] 6.  Plaintiff asserts a pothole caused her to fall:  Q: When did you first notice the pothole?  A: When I -- when I smashed into the ground is when I saw it.  [Pa156 at 42:7-9].  7.  Plaintiff submitted an affidavit and photographs showing the location of Plaintiff’s fall and the condition of the area Plaintiff alleges to have fallen.  8.  In Plaintiff’s affidavit, Plaintiff declares that the first two photographs “fairly and accurately depict the condition” where the incident occurred.  Pa241-43 at ¶ 5.  9.  The referenced photographs do not show a pothole but clearly show a crack in the pavement which was circled by Plaintiff.  Pa241-43 at ¶ 5, photographs labeled “Exhibit A” and “Exhibit B. ”  10.  Moreover, Plaintiff avers that the two photographs “accurately depict the general location where the incident occurred. ”  Pa241 at ¶ 6.  11.  Those photographs show Plaintiff pointing to an ostensibly smooth spot on the ground where no pothole is visible.  Pa241, 244-45 at ¶ 6, photographs labeled “Exhibit C” and “Exhibit D. ”  12.  At Plaintiff’s deposition, Plaintiff was presented with a screenshot of the area previously identified in Plaintiff’s affidavit.  Pa179.  13.  However, Plaintiff could not locate or in any way identify the alleged pothole which purportedly caused her fall:  Q.  Are you able to point out the pothole based on this picture from September 2018, in which you fell?  A. I -- not really.  [Pa159 at 57:19-22].  14.  Plaintiff was similarly unable to recall the dimensions, depth, or otherwise describe what Plaintiff initially claimed was a pothole.  Pa156-57 at 45:9-46:7.  15.  Plaintiff failed to describe the pothole which she alleges caused her fall:  Q: Could you describe the pothole, its dimensions, or any other description that you could come up with of it?  A: No, I -- I can’t.  [Pa156 at 45:10-13].  16.  Ultimately, Plaintiff admitted there was no pothole but in fact cracks in the pavement:  Q.  So [...], this is September of 2018, and I do not see a pothole.  A.  No, but there are several cracks, I could clearly see them.  [Pa160 at 58:23-59:4 (emphasis added)].  17.  Plaintiff contradicted herself regarding the existence of a pothole:  Q.
[brief] [...]’s Communications with [...]  [...] was aware of its liability for contamination of the Site by 1986, when it received the EPA Request for Information.  (Pa0093.)  [...] was aware that substantial costs would be incurred in connection with remediating the Site by 1993, at the latest, when it entered into the Consent Order.  (Pa0092-Pa0093.)  [...] steadily incurred investigation costs for over a decade in preparing the RFIs.  (Pa0008 at ¶¶ 42, 43.)  At no point in time prior to the filing of this lawsuit in 2005 did [...] make a demand for payment to [...].  [...] only noticed the claim to [...], and then provided infrequent claim updates.  (Pa0353-Pa0362; Pa0435-Pa0463.)  [...] never stated that the policy limits underlying the [...] policy were exhausted, and the primary limits underlying the [...] policy were never paid, which is a prerequisite to any coverage obligations of [...].  (Pa0155-0156.)  [...] did not disclaim coverage upon receipt of notice from [...]; rather, [...] reserved its rights in connection with this claim.  (Pa0368-Pa0379.)  [...] never disclaimed coverage prior to being sued by [...].
[brief] ” exception for benign communications or for communications to third-parties to whom a debt collector has outsourced tasks.  And Congress knows how to regulate permissible third-party communications of confidential information.  For example, in 42 U.S.C. § 17934, Congress statutorily required a “business associate”—such as medical billing company—of health care providers to comply with existing regulations governing the use and disclosure of protected health information (PHI) per 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(2).  HIPAA’s Privacy Rule bars a health care provider from disclosing PHI except as permitted or required by law and one permitted exception is providing PHI to the provider’s business associate.  45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a); 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(i).  The provider must obtain “satisfactory assurance that the business associate will appropriately safeguard the information. ”  45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(i).  Satisfactory assurances “must be documented through a written contract…that meets the applicable requirements of § 164.504(e). ”  45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(2).  The required contractual terms under § 164.504(e) include: establishing the business associate’s permitted and required uses and disclosure of PHI; prohibiting the business associate from any other use or disclosure; and requiring the business associate to use appropriate safeguards, report breaches, and make its books and records available to the Secretary of HHS for the purpose of determining the covered entity’s compliance.  Unlike what Congress allowed under HIPAA, it provided no option under the FDCPA for debt collectors to convey information about debts to a third-party service provider.
[brief] In reviewing grants of summary judgment  New Jersey Appellate Courts use “the same standard that governs the motion judge’s decision”.  *Crisitello v. St. Theresa Sch.*, 465 N.J. Super. 223, 236 (2023) (quoting *RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins.*, 234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018)).  Thus, summary judgment is to be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  R. 4:46-2(c)  This occurs “only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties, on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact. ”  *Id.*  See *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.*, 142 N.J. 520 (1995).  The party seeking accelerated relief has the “burden to exclude any reasonable doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact” regarding the claims.  *Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield*, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954) (citations omitted).  If that happens the opponent is to “make an affirmative demonstration, where the means are at hand to do so, that the facts are not as the movant alleges. ”  *Spiotta v. William H. Wilson, Inc.*, 72 N.J. Super. 572, 581(App. Div.), certif. denied, 37 N.J. 229 (1962).  If both submissions are presented in proper form, the Court, giving the opponent all reasonable inferences, examines whether a reasonable fact finder could reach a decision in the opponent’s favor, and if not, summary judgment will be entered.  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, supra, 142 N.J. at 529.  B.
[brief] (Id. at page 19.)  With regard to plaintiffs’ claims for legal malpractice against the [...] defendants, the Court properly held:  To the extent that these Counts are based on the same factual predicates underlying the legal malpractice claims asserted in the 2015 case, they are clearly barred by the Law of the Case Doctrine, as the legal malpractice claims asserted in that case were dismissed with prejudice by the Court, and that decision was re-affirmed multiple times.  (Id. at page 20.)  After being dismissed, with prejudice, from the 2020 case, on September 15, 2020, the [...] defendants filed their Motion for Fees and Sanctions pursuant to R. 1:4-8 and N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1.
[brief] A notice of appeal was filed on September 13, 2017.  On April 12, 2019 in an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Court Division affirmed the denial of [...] pretrial motions.  On or about the year of 2020 in *State v. Nyema*, 465 N.J. Super, 181, 185 (App. Div. 2020) reversed Nyema’s conviction, and his sentence was vacated.  (Emphasis added)  On February 12, 2021, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification on the suppression issue related to [...]’s armed robbery case.  On January 25, 2022, in *State v. Nyema*, 245 N.J. 256 (2021), the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the denial of [...]’s suppression motion, finding that there was no probable cause and the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the car that [...] was a passenger in, and thus all illegally obtained evidence found as a result of the illegal stop and unlawful search and seizure was suppressed.
[brief] copy,”\textsuperscript{12} which made the purpose of the Redevelopment Plan abundantly clear to any interested citizen.  The April 8 Notice additionally identified the relevant Property by block and lot number, which the trial court noted was “not required but provides additional information to the public and informs as to who may have an interest or be affected by the adoption of the Ordinance. ” (Pa60).  Finally, the trial court correctly noted the troubling, slippery slope policy implications were [...]’s argument that the April 8 Notice needed to provide more detailed information about the substance of the Redevelopment Plan adopted.
[brief] (131a [17:21-24]; 132a [18:2-3]; 275a).  [...] charged a fee for its work as settlement agent.  (132a [20:25-21:5]).  [...] received a full payment of its premium.  (135a [32:25-33:4]).  [...] always issues checks in accordance with the settlement statement; the checks must be signed by either [...] or his brother, [...].  (133a [26:4-16]).  A title insurance policy was issued by [...] to the Seller instead of to the Plaintiff, even though Plaintiff was its client and proposed insured.  (See 136a [35:1-23]).  [...] has worked for [...] for six years, and presently is in charge of recording policies and conducting closings.
[directive] Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Korean page 7/8  성범죄 피해자 치료 기금 벌금 10.  (S.C.V.T.F.)  Sex Crime Victim Treatment Fund Penalty (S.C.V.T.F.)  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  범죄가 년4 월26 일 이후에 발생한 경우, 귀하가 유죄를 인정한 결과로 각 2005 범죄에 대하여 의무적 성범죄 피해자 치료 기금 벌금을 아래에 (S.C.V.T.F.) 열거한대로 지불해야 한다는 것을 아십니까?  의무적 벌금은 다음과 같습니다: 급 범죄인 경우, 이하 (1)  1 $2,000 급 범죄인 경우, 이하 (2) 2 $1,000 급 범죄인 경우, 이하 (3) 3 $750 급 범죄인 경우, 이하 (4) 4 $500 총SCVTF 벌금 $  Do you understand that if the crime occurred on or after April 26, 2005, as a result of your guilty plea you will be required to pay a mandatory Sex Crime Victim Treatment Fund (S.C.V.T.F.) penalty as listed below for each offense for which you pled guilty?  The mandatory penalties are as follows:  (1)  Up to $2,000 in the case of a 1st degree crime (2)  Up to $1,000 in the case of a 2nd degree crime (3)  Up to $750 in the case of a 3rd degree crime (4)  Up to $500 in the case of a 4th degree crime TOTAL S.C.V.T.F. Penalty: $ 날짜/Date 피고인/Defendant 피고측 변호인/Defense Attorney 검사/Prosecutor CN 10080-Korean 8/8 지령 제01-18 호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 수정 양식, 페이지 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18 (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Korean page 8/8
[brief] 57  Meisels v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 240 N.J. 286, 302 (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 45-46, 477 A.2d 1224 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Nebraska v. Wyomind, 507 U.S. 584, 591 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Norwood Lumber Corp. v. McKean, 153 F.2d 753, 755 (3d Cir. 1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notte v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490, 500-01, 888 A.2d 464 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Paragon Contractors, Inc. v. Peachtree Condo. Ass'n, 202 N.J. 415, 422, 997 A.2d 982 (2010)
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket no. [...]  [...] and [...], as Husband and Wife :  CIVIL ACTION  And Individually, :  ON APPEAL FROM THE Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Respondents :  LAW DIVISION vs. : PASSAIC COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  Sat Below: HON. [...], J.S.C. HON.  [...], J.S.C. [...] and [...], Defendants-Respondents, (For continuation of Caption see next page)
[brief] (R-25)  Sanctions were warranted in this case.  [...]’s Order dated November 2, 2022, stated:  "The actions in this case by [...] and her attorneys at the [...] were purposefully deceitful, willful and intentional in order to deceive the Court and all the estate's beneficiaries."  (64-A)  The Court's explanation of sanctions could not be any clearer, I'm also imposing sanctions in the amount of $20,000.  I think [...]'s actions in this case were intentional, willful, and malicious.  I think that her inability to provide information that was readily available was done solely for the purpose to deceive this Court, to deceive [...] and to retain as much of these funds for herself as possible to the detriment of anyone else…  (22T 49)  The fact that your client had to be removed as the administrator for her actions, and her actions were intentional.  They were for the sole purpose of trying to make sure no one else received any of the money….(22T 50)  So when someone sits here and pretends I don't know why this was even an issue, it was an issue because your client lied every single turn of the way from the onset of the matter as to what assets were a part of the Estate.  She - no one knew, because she hid them.  She took willful and intentional actions to hide where the money was, what the assets were, the 401k.  Everything that was done in this case was done to be painful.  It was done to be intentional.  I actually think your-your client created bank accounts in Wyoming thinking that this Court could not access them.  It's obvious.  I think everything she did was to avoid the responsibility to the proper beneficiaries of this Estate (22T 50)  Generally, when it comes to the imposition of sanctions, a trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sanctions for violations of discovery rules.
[brief] Contrary to [...]’s claims, prior to the IFPR, applicants did not need to account for precipitation changes due to climate change when calculating the flood hazard area, but instead were permitted to rely on NOAA Atlas 14 data.  (Ab37).  Without rulemaking, the regulated community would have no way of knowing that these factors were applicable when calculating the flood hazard area, or which factors to use in the first place given the Cornell Studies’ outcomes and [...]’s subsequent extrapolations during the IFPR rulemaking.  54 N.J.R. 2169(a) (Dec. 5, 2022).  These extrapolations were required because, as noted above, the Cornell Study for current precipitation included only adjustment factors applicable to specific weather stations, and the future precipitation study contains multiple possible change factors for each county.  [...]’s adoption of the IFPR, which incorporates the adjustment and change factors, avoided the outcome [...] urges here, which is for [...] to apply these factors arbitrarily to unsuspecting permit applicants.
[brief] *  The transcripts of April 26, 2023 and December 16, 2022 are not of proceedings in this action.  Instead, they are transcripts of proceedings in other actions which Defendant submitted to the motion court as unpublished decisions in other actions.  They are included as unpublished decisions (R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(H)) submitted by Defendant to the motion court and because they are items which Plaintiff can “reasonably assume will be relied upon by the respondent in meeting the issues raised. ”  R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(I).  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] This is, after all, a content-neutral enactment.  It has nothing to do with speech itself (allegedly).  There is no evidence or suggestion the Distance Regulation was based on “morals. ”  What the trial court basically held was that it could cite any “purpose” for an ordinance after-the-fact, even if that was not the “purpose” when it was enacted and even if the “purpose” could not possibly apply.  2.  **The Board did not render any actual findings on expert testimony**
[brief] (Pa147).  During the hearing before the ALJ, [...] admitted he did not have all the medical records from Petitioner’s treating physicians that had been entered into evidence when he prepared his report.  (2T31:11-17).  Such records included the 2004 records from orthopedist [...], a 2006 narrative report from orthopedic surgeon [...], and the 2006 narrative reports from [...] and [...].
[directive] * vehicles or vehicles purchased with funds &om the Law Enforcement Trust Account should be Forfeited 3. tracked separately as forfeited property for at least two years.  Sop 'Forfeited property property purchased with funds &om the Law Enforcement Trust Account with or a fair market value of five hundred dollars or more should be tracked separately as forfeited property for at least Sop it one year; forfeited real estate should be tracked separately as long as held by the funding entity.