ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (5T115:18-21).  This modification did not reduce the $6.3 million in total consideration for the entire transaction, but merely reallocated $860,000 of the [...] purchase price to the [...] acquisition based on the information set forth in P-48 and P-50 that formed the basis for the parties’ deal.  (5T116:6 to 118:1; Da904-19; Da968-75; Da947-67).  [...] insisted on this reallocation to ensure [...] could maintain its MBE/DBE status.  (5T116:14-18).  According to the SPA, the closing to the transaction was delayed until December 31, 2017.  (Da907).  [...] was to receive from [...] $400,000 upon execution of the SPA, an additional $300,000 on July 1, 2017, and a final $40,000 payment at the December 31, 2017 closing.  (Da906-07).  [...] did not, however, receive the final $40,000 payment as anticipated by the original SPA.  (5T120:11-15).
[brief] [(Raised Below). ]  [(21T; Da254-55).]5  Defendant claims that his counsel at his original January 29, 2016 sentencing hearing was ineffective for failing to advocate in a sentencing memorandum to the trial court.  (Db28-31).  He also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to present relevant mitigating circumstances as to defendant’s background and argue against the State’s request for an “effective life sentence”.  (Db31-34).  Defendant contends that the PCR court gave little analysis to his claim, found that the lack of sentencing brief had no impact, and concluded that the arguments pertaining to ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing were moot because the court considered mitigating factors at the resentencing.  (Db39 (citation omitted)).  Additionally, defendant argues that since the sentencing and PCR judges below already made findings, the matters should be remanded to a different judge.  (Db39).  The PCR court properly denied defendant’s claim, as he failed to demonstrate a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel at his first sentencing hearing.  Accordingly, this Court should affirm the denial of his claim.  Rule 3:22-10 recognizes the court’s discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a PCR petition.
[brief] T60:25-63:21.  First, plaintiff failed to show that the [...] unlawfully entered his property.  The area where [...] placed the branches for municipal disposal was shown in the photographs marked D-24 and D-21 for identification.  Pa50, ¶ 55; Pa331, ¶ 55; accord Pa312, Pa314.  Those photographs show that the branches that [...] set out for municipal disposal lay alongside the curb on [...].  Pa312, Pa314.  [...] testified that the area was municipal property and did not belong to plaintiff.  Pa210 at 43:21-44:11.  [...], plaintiff’s surveyor, also testified that the land shown in D-21 and D-24 was a municipal right of way and not plaintiff’s property.  Pa248 at 14:8-15:22 & Pa319 (Ex. Blair-5).  He further testified that plaintiff’s property ended about twelve feet before the curb on [...] and that the twelve-foot section was a municipal right of way.  Pa248 at 14:4-15:22 & Pa319 (Ex. Blair-5).  Next, [...] testified that he did not place any branches on plaintiff’s plants.  Pa210 at 43:2-44:14; Pa320, ¶¶ 4-5.  The photographs marked as D-21 and D-24 depict where [...] placed the branches, Pa50, ¶ 55; Pa331, ¶ 55; Pa320, ¶ 5, and showed that he avoided placing any of the branches on plaintiff’s plants.  Pa312, Pa314, Pa44:15-:18.  Last, the amount of plaintiff’s alleged damages from the purported trespass was $4,800.  Pa342, ¶ 41.  Plaintiff thus failed to meet his burden to prove that the [...] proximately caused him any property damage.  Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 525 (1981).  Rather than providing any basis to contradict the photographs, plaintiff simply argues on appeal that “Defendant [...] had admitted that he caused branches to be placed on Plaintiff’s plants [131a at 26:2-17].”
[brief] [...] was charged with murder under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3.  To be guilty of murder, an actor must have purposely or knowingly caused death or serious bodily injury resulting in death.  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a.  Lesser mental states, such as recklessness or negligence, do not suffice for a murder conviction.  The trial court improperly alleviated the State’s burden to prove [...]’s mental state with an instruction on the use of a “deadly weapon,” which was inappropriate in this case where the weapon used was a wine chiller:  A homicide or a killing with a deadly weapon, such as the wine chiller in itself would permit you to draw an inference that the defendant’s purpose was to take life or cause serious bodily injury resulting in death.  A deadly weapon is any firearm or other weapon device, instrument, material or substance, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.  In your deliberations, you may consider the weapon used and the manner and circumstances of the killing, and if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant struck and killed [...] with a wine chiller, you may draw an inference from the weapon used, that is, the wine chiller and from the manner and circumstances of the killing as to the defendant’s purpose or knowledge.  (3T 89-6 to 22)  (emphasis added)  Because a wine chiller is not a deadly weapon within the meaning of this inference, the inference should not have been given.  At the very least, the jury should have been told that it first had to determine whether the wine chiller was a deadly weapon before it could infer intent merely from its use.  “The establishment of presumptions favorable to the government in criminal and quasi-criminal cases raises delicate issues of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. ”  State v. Ingram, 98 N.J. 489, 496 (1985) (internal citations omitted).  It is critical that application of an inference does not in any way “undermine the factfinder’s responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  State v. Ingenito, 87 N.J. 204, 220 (1981).  Our case law requires that “[t]he validity and applicability” of an inference “must be judged in the light of the totality of the circumstances in a particular case.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2A:40A-1.  As discussed in Point II, Subsection A, [...] is not solely liable for Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.  As such, a jury should be afforded the opportunity to assign damages accordingly.  Similar to the holding in D’Avila, there is a long line of New Jersey cases that permits third-party claims for indemnification to proceed against employers of injured parties.
[directive] Argued January 20, 2021 -- Decided February 11, 2021  [...], C.J., writing for the Court.  This Order to Show Cause raises questions about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the suspension of in-person criminal jury trials on defendants who have been detained pretrial.  Under the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA or Act), defendants who pose a serious risk of non-appearance, danger, or obstruction can be detained before trial if no combination of conditions of release will reasonably guard against those risks.  Because criminal jury trials remain suspended, the length of pretrial detention has been extended in many cases.  In response to the present situation, the [...] and the [...] jointly seek two forms of relief: (1) the release of all defendants detained for six months or longer whose most serious charge is a second-degree offense or lower, with an opportunity for the State to object in individual cases and seek to justify continued detention under an enhanced burden of proof; and (2) new detention hearings for all defendants detained for six months or longer who are charged with a first-degree offense and entitled to a presumption of release.  Movants rely on constitutional and statutory bases in support of their requests for relief.
[brief] *Humane Society* at 574.  The legislative arrangement suggests that the numbers of sportsmen for purposes of the appointment process should be substantial, inasmuch as eligibility for membership in the [...] is provided to every duly organized sportsmen’s club in the state with twenty-five or more members specifically for the purpose of permitting ‘the broadest possible representation of sportsmen in the making of recommendations for appointment of sportsmen to membership in the council. ’**.’  N.J.S.A. 13:1B-25.  Humane Society at 575.  Rejecting Plaintiff’s “bias argument” against the [...]s’ particularized interests, the Supreme Court concluded:
[brief] While the Parties recognize that it shall remain the responsibility of the Developer, and not of the Board or the Township, to secure Government Approvals, the Township and the Board shall cooperate with the Developer as set forth herein.  . . .  The Township and the Board shall expedite the review and approval of all necessary governmental approvals, within its jurisdiction, including scheduling special meetings as may be required to meet the schedules as set forth in other provisions of this Agreement.  (Id. emphasis added)  On or about December 21, 2021 - almost a year after the Settlement Agreement was executed - [...] filed an application with the Board seeking preliminary and final major site plan approval under N.J.S.A. 40:55D- 46, bulk variance relief under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70c and design waiver relief under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-51 (the “Application”).
[brief] Defendants argue that the *Atalese* standard does not apply to a “sophisticated” consumer because the *Atalese* Court reasoned that an “average member of the public may not know – without some explanatory comment – that arbitration is a substitute for the right to have one’s claim adjudicated in a court of law. ”  219 N.J. at 442.  Thus, defendants contend that *Atalese* only applies to “average” consumers, not to consumers who are above average or below average.  Of course, there is no such limitation in *Atalese* itself or in any cases applying it to consumer, employment or even commercial contracts.  In fact, the application of *Atalese* to employment and commercial contracts demonstrates that *Atalese* is not limited to “average” consumers.
[brief] There is no evidence in this record that plaintiffs ever obtained such an assignment of rights from [...].  Nor are plaintiffs intended third party beneficiaries of the contract between [...] and [...].  Divining the intent of a contract is ordinarily a question of law.  Bosshard v. Hackensack University Medical Center, 345 N.J. Super. 78, 92 (App. Div. 2001)  When a court determines the existence of third party beneficiary status, the inquiry focuses on whether the parties to the contract intended others to benefit from the existence of the contract or whether the benefit so derived arises merely as an unintended consequence of the agreement.
[directive] 9.10.2  The summary report forms must contain sufficient information to enable the County Prosecutor to identify warning signs of potential deficiencies in the internal affairs process.  At a minimum, each report must include a brief summary of each internal affairs complaint that was pending before the agency at any point during the reporting period.  The summary shall at least include the nature of the complaint, the date the complaint was received, the current status of the complaint, and, if the case is closed, the final disposition of the complaint with any discipline imposed.  A sample form is found at Appendix K. 9.10.3
[brief] The Punitive damages awarded by the jury in this matter are not just excessive, they are not warranted.  Respondent presented no evidence at trial that [...], [...] or any of her supervisors participated or were willfully indifferent to acts of discrimination or harassment, never mind evidence that any conduct was especially egregious.  Further, Respondent presented no evidence that these Defendants were aware of any complaints of discriminatory or harassing conduct.  Finally, by her own admission, she never complained to any of the individual Defendants that she believed action was taken against her for a discriminatory or harassing reason (4T at 193:4-12, 195:22-25).  POINT V PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL MADE STATEMENTS MANIFESTLY CAPABLE OF CONFUSING AND MISLEADING THE JURY PRODUCING AN UNJUST RESULT THAT DEPRIVED APPELLANTS A FAIR TRIAL (7T:57:1-25—86:1-25)
[brief] *State v. Harris*, 141 N.J. 525, 572-73 (1995).  Likewise, the simple fact that an altercation took place is not enough, based on this record, to find a rational basis for a passion/provocation defense.  In *Carrero*, there was testimony that the altercation was initiated by the victim when he pulled a gun.  *Carrero*  229 N.J. at 124.  In *Mauricio*, while the defendant was attempting to gain entry into a night club, he was forcibly removed and pushed by the bouncer; the defendant then returned, a second time, and was pinned behind the door and again pushed out by the bouncer.  In *Mauricio*, like in *Carrero* there was testimony that the altercation was initiated by the intended victim, the bouncer. \(^2\)  In *Cristanos*, a case where the Supreme Court found there was no basis to charge passion/provocation, the testimony was that the victim attempted to land the first blow and kicked one of \(^2\)  In *Mauricio*, the defendant actually killed a third party mistaking them to be the bouncer. the defendants prior to the assault that led to the victim's death.  *Cristanos*, 102 at 268-269.  In *State v. Canfield*, 470 N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 2022)(affirmed as modified 252 N.J. 497 (2023)), another case where the Court found passion/provocation did not exist, the testimony presented was that the victim was coming towards the victim with an alleged HIV infected hypodermic needle after a verbal altercation when he was killed by the defendant.
[brief] That is, before she signed the Consent to Search form, [...] walked around the apartment freely for about as long as she had been handcuffed. \(^7\)  [...], [...] and another officer went into [...]’s bedroom, saw the gun lying openly in front of a large-screen television, and left it there for the Crime Scene Unit (CSU).  (Da24; Dca 1, clip four, 50:38 to 51:00).  After arriving, a CSU officer checked the gun, photographed the Consent to Search form, photographed the gun, and finished his business inside [...]’s apartment.  (Da24; Dca 1, clip four, 1:19:03 to 1:20:00; Dca 1, clip five, 00:01 to 6:10).  By then, it was daylight.  (Dca 1, clip five, 5:00 to 6:10).  \(^7\)  If [...] was handcuffed at 4:28 a.m., see note 6, above, then she signed the consent at 4:56 a.m., which was about twenty-eight minutes after she was handcuffed, and about sixteen minutes after she was released from the handcuffs.
[brief] Yet the trial court appears to have washed over the standing arguments because the Plaintiffs were “directly harmed by [...]’s misconduct,” at least according to Plaintiffs’ counsel.  B.  The trial court had already set a deadline to amend to rectify any issues with the names of the parties to the lawsuit, and Plaintiffs affirmatively stated that they did not need to make any amendments.  Following some sort of bizarre interpretation of the law, Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint – after trial and after entry of judgment – “to account _____________________ 67 Id. 68 Id. 69 Id. 70 Id. 71 2T106-7. for the resolution of the ownership of [...] and to conform to the evidence. ”  This is not the purpose of Rule 4:9-2, nor did the Plaintiffs (or the trial court) comply with the requirements prescribed by that Rule.  As our Appellate Division has stated, “an amended complaint cannot cure an initial lack of standing. ”  Plaintiffs were given multiple opportunities to add [...] and failed to do so.  [...] raised this issue in her motion filed on or about January 2019.  The issue of standing is raised in [...]’s Answer.  [...] entered not one but two case management orders during the course of this litigation setting deadlines to file an Amended Complaint.  Plaintiffs have not only continuously maintained that [...] did not need to be a party to this case, they actively opposed its inclusion.  In permitting [...] to be added as a plaintiff, the trial court deprived the Defendants of their ability – and indeed their right – to defend themselves against this new plaintiff, who swoops in after issues had been litigated between improper parties to “claim the reward” of litigation it had no part in.
[brief] Ct. 125, 178 L.Ed.2d 242 (2010).  *Schubert*, 212 N.J. at 311.  In *Williams*, the court was deciding whether a defendant whose original sentence should have included post-release supervision, but did not, could be corrected after the defendant had completed the sentence originally imposed.  The *Williams* court concluded that the State lacked the ability to do so stating:  [T]here must be a temporal limitation on a court's ability to resentence a defendant since criminal courts do not have perpetual jurisdiction over all persons who were once sentenced for criminal acts.
[brief] Pa051; DSOF ¶ 36.  Appellant never required an accommodation to perform her duties.  Pa051; DSOF ¶ 37.  Appellant never requested an accommodation for any condition during her employment.  Pa051; DSOF ¶ 38.  Appellant only discussed BMI and obesity with primary care providers and did not receive treatment until 2023, a few years after her termination from employment.
[brief] The Prior Approvals only required a (d)(1) use variance; and bulk variances for the minimum setback of two apartment buildings from Route 33.  M87-102.  The Respondents’ Application now required twelve (12) variances; including: a (d)(1) use variance; two (d)(6) height variances; and nine bulk variances.  M68-86.  The Board, as detailed in the Board Resolution denying the Respondents’ Application, made extensive finding of fact and thoroughly established the reasons why it did not accept the conclusions of the Respondents’ professionals by appropriately applying the facts to the applicable law for each and every one of the twelve (12) variances requested by the Respondents.
[brief] (3T10:6-7.)  The Appellate Division in the First Action did not have the benefit of that record.  In fact, the Appellate Division in the First Action based its comments solely on remarks from a transcript that the trial court below expressly rejected.  (See 3T27:10-16 (“There’s nothing in the City Council transcript from January of ’20 . . . that even remotely indicates that there was this indication that the school was a deal or an agreement or anything like that.  So I don’t think he even had a basis to speculate about that before February ’21”))  Most significantly, Plaintiff did not have any opportunity, much less an adequate opportunity, to obtain a full and fair adjudication of its bad faith claim in the First Action.  At best, the competing certifications, considered for the first time by the Appellate Division, created an issue of fact.  That issue of fact was never fully and fairly adjudicated in the First Action.  It was, however, fully and fairly adjudicated in the underlying action – and the result of that full and fair adjudication was a finding that Plaintiff did not know of the facts giving rise to its claims until after completion of the First Action.  Under the circumstances, it would be manifestly unfair to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
[directive] SART-Participating Healthcare Facility  If the victim seeks care at a SART-participating healthcare facility, a law enforcement officer shall participate in the initial sexual assault medical forensic interview or the preliminary interview.  To respect the victim’s privacy, the officer shall not be present during the medical forensic exam except for cases involving a victim in law enforcement custody or a resident of a psychiatric facility, as warranted.  At the conclusion of the examination, a law enforcement officer shall take custody of the sealed SAFE Kit and DFSA/Tox Kit and any other evidence collected by the FNE.  The officer shall assist the victim in arranging transportation from the exam site.  The investigating officer shall then arrange for a mutually-agreed upon time to conduct the victim’s formal interview.
[brief] Pa106; Pa460.  The trial court heard oral argument of the motion on December 16, 2022.  At the outset of the argument, the motion judge observed that “generally all of the facts that were stated in the statement of undisputed material facts by both movants, by both [...] and the [...] were admitted. ”  1T6-3 to 1T6-6.  Following argument by counsel, the trial court indicated that it would issue a decision in writing.  1T50-18 to 1T50-24.  The court entered Orders on December 22, 2023 (the “Summary Judgment Orders”), granting [...]’s and [...]’s respective motions for summary judgment and dismissing the FAC as against [...] and [...] with prejudice.
[brief] State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 264 (2015).  “Appellate courts owe deference to the trial court's credibility determinations as well because it has ‘a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of a witness. ’”  C.R. v. M.T., 248 N.J. 428, 440 (2021) (quoting Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)).  The Supreme Court of New Jersey has recently stated that “[a] reviewing court must accept the factual findings of a trial court that are “supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.
[brief] (Da13-18)  In return, the [...] agreed to construct the synagogue complete with “a sanctuary, lounge, daily chapel, social hall with stage, Rabbi’s study, office, library, board room, bride’s preparation and powder rooms, kitchens and related rooms and facilities” on the deeded property.  (Da13-18)  The respective leaders of the [...] and [...] entered into this agreement fully aware the property deeded to the [...] did not have provisions of on-site parking to support the congregants during services, religious celebrations and other attendant activities to be conducted on the [...]’s Property in the areas specifically identified in the 1963 Agreement.  Additionally, the [...] did not require the [...] to construct a boiler room to support its HVAC system on its property.  In furtherance of this intended existence, the property deeded to Plaintiff by the [...] was conveyed in exchange for the [...]’s obligation to construct a synagogue thereon and to operate the synagogue in accordance with Orthodox Jewish tenets.  In return, as specified in the 1963 Agreement, Plaintiff was granted an easement over the Subject Property for parking to be utilized by the employees, congregants and guests of the synagogue and to tie in the [...]’s HVAC system to the boiler room located on the Subject Property.
[brief] ”  Ibid. (quoting Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 372 (2011)).  “The failure of a defendant to object to expert testimony does not relieve the trial court of its gatekeeper responsibilities .  . . .”  State v. Nesbitt, 185 N.J. 504, 515 (2006).  When expert testimony clearly runs afoul of the Rules of Evidence, a court commits plain error by allowing its admission.
[brief] While helping to fund the Adequacy Budget, the payroll tax receipts are far below the amount [...] will lose annually in Adjustment Aid, not to mention the steady decline in Equalization Aid.  \(^9\)  Pursuant to Rule 2:6-1(a)(2), [...] appends to this reply a portion of the State’s summary judgment reply brief that is germane to the State’s admission that the SFRA as enacted did not provide for a phase-out of Adjustment Aid.