ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Settlement Agreement provided that the development project would be “generally consistent with the Concept Plan,” Pa048a, (which plan is attached --- \(^4\)  At the same Fairness Hearing, the Court also considered and approved several other Settlement Agreements for other properties/projects not relevant or at issue in the within appeal. to the Settlement Agreement as Exhibit B, Pa072,) (subject to modifications and clarifications otherwise contained in the agreement) and called for the rezoning Lots 16 and 19 in accordance with a “Rezoning Ordinance” attached to the Settlement Agreement as Exhibit C, Pa075.
[brief] Later that morning, [...] addressed the matter regarding going to the bathroom directly with [...].  [...] pointed out that he had to leave the courtroom due to his colitis (4T, Pg. 107, line 3) and that he tried to raise his hand ask [...] first, but she didn’t look at him (4T, Pg. 106, lines 8-9), and that at least until being confronted by the Sheriff, he didn’t interrupt the Court, he walked out as quietly as possible (4T, Pg. 106, lines 21-24); he did it with respect to the court proceedings.  (4T, Pg. 107, lines 15-16).  But he felt like he was being harassed constantly.  (4T, Pg. 107, lines 23-24).  In considering the impact of outside influences on a jury, the Supreme Court has stated:
[brief] The Defendant failed to submit any evidence to support its position the [...] terminated or abandoned its easement rights in the Subject Property.  Defendant contends the 1972 addition to the [...] is evidence Plaintiff abandoned its easement rights in the Subject Property.  However, the proofs submitted show this simply was not the case.  Plaintiff continued to exercise its easement rights from the time it was granted the property interest in 1963 unabated until Defendant began interfering with these rights in 2010.
[brief] According to [...], while he was in the fried chicken store, “two people came in, told everybody to lay down and started shooting. ”  He described one of the men as a short “light skinned” African–American man with dreadlocks; he described the other assailant as a tall “brown skinned” African–American man with dreadlocks.  [...] testified that the “light skinned” man shot him twice.  According to [...], however, [...] and [...] were not the men who shot him.  In fact, [...] testified that [...] was laying on the floor next to him during the robbery.  On cross-examination, [...] conceded that in the statement he gave to the police three hours after the incident, he told the officer who interviewed him that he could not describe the individuals who shot him.
[brief] ” (emphasis in original).  Even after being given an improper “second bite of the apple,” the Respondent [...], in its March 28, 2023 submission to the Respondent Commission, again took the position its bypass of the disabled veteran Appellant should be upheld, but failed to request removal of her name.  (AA0223-232)¹¹  As the Respondent Commission held in its June 7, 2023 Final Administrative Action, based upon Appellant’s veteran status and her correct placement as the first ranked eligible, Appellant could only properly be (1) appointed pursuant to veteran’s preference or (2) removed from the List upon a showing of cause by the Respondent [...].
[brief] This Statement in Lieu of Brief is filed on behalf of the [...] pursuant to Rule 2:6-4(c).  [...] appeals the Commission’s July 19, 2023, final administrative determination upholding his resignation not in good standing as a Highway Operations Technician 1 from the [...] (“[...]”) Ramsey maintenance yard.  (Aa13). ¹  At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, employees in the Ramsey maintenance yard were placed on quarantine from March 20, 2020, until April 3, 2020.  (Aa13-14; Ra1-3).  Following this quarantine, Bartos was labeled an essential employee and placed on standby at home subject to check-ins at pre-determined hours to provide his work-ready status.  (Aa28-30).  On April 6, 2020, Bartos’s supervisor called Bartos to confirm his availability but received no response.  (Aa9).  When Bartos finally returned the missed call, he informed his supervisor that he did not intend to report to work because he did not want to contract COVID-19.  Ibid.  That same day, [...]'s Human Resources Manager informed Bartos he could not use his leave-time to avoid returning to work under the standby policy.  (Aa4).  Despite further outreach from [...]’s ¹ “Aa” refers to Appellant’s appendix.  “Ra” refers to [...]’s appendix.  Human Resources and Commissioner, Bartos failed to return to work.  (Aa10; Aa15-17).  On April 17, 2020, [...] learned that Bartos had re-opened an unrelated and pre-existing Workers' Compensation claim and had been placed on Temporary Workers' Compensation Leave effective April 15, 2020.  (Aa19-21; Aa36-37).  On June 10, 2020, [...] issued Bartos a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action ("PNDA") charging him under N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.b and Department Guidelines for a Resignation Not in Good Standing.  (Aa1-2).  On July 2, 2020, the [...] issued a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action ("FNDA") charging Bartos for a Resignation Not in Good Standing, effective April 13, 2020.  (Aa3).  Bartos filed an administrative appeal with the [...] on July 22, 2020.  (Aa5-6).  After a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that [...] failed to sustain the charges against Bartos.  (Aa24).  The ALJ found that Bartos believed he was not an essential worker during the pandemic and that [...] sent Bartos a second letter, giving him until April 16, 2020, to respond.  (Aa14-16).  The ALJ concluded that while Bartos had no intention of returning to work after lifting the April 3, 2020 quarantine, [...] had not conclusively established the effective date of Bartos’ separation.  (Aa23).  Further, the ALJ concluded that before receiving the worker's compensation claim, [...] had already determined that Bartos had abandoned his work duties and failed to consider his claim properly.  (Aa24).  The ALJ concluded that because [...] used an incorrect effective date and improperly disregarded Bartos’s worker's compensation claim, the FNDA should be reversed.  (Aa24-25).  Upon review, on October 12, 2022, the Commission declined to adopt the ALJ’s initial decision, sustained the charges, and upheld the resignation not in good standing.
[brief] For the aforementioned reasons, this Court should affirm the order of the Recovery Court finding that [...] is not disqualified from Recovery Court under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(5).  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Respondent  By: ____________________________  [...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender ID. No. 084402013  Date: March 25, 2024  Superior Court Of New Jersey  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...] ([...])  April 8, 2024  Criminal Action On Appeal from an Interlocutory Order of the Superior Court, Law Division, Morris County  THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...], Defendant-Respondent.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. (Motion for Recovery Court Admittance)
[brief] See generally Pressler Verniero, supra, comments 2.2 and 2.3 to Rule 1:2-1.  *O Builders*, 206 N.J. at 120-21.  (Emphasis added.) \(^{13}\)  Therefore, our Supreme Court has expressly sanctioned the same device used by Petitioners to shield harmful and confidential information from coming into Respondents’ hands. \(^{14}\)  **B. Rule 4:10-2(e)(1)**
[brief] Defendant’s plea proceeding makes clear that he never reviewed any of the State’s discovery in the within matter.  DWI is unique in New Jersey criminal and quasi-criminal law.  In an alcohol intoxication theory case, a given defendant’s B.A.C. is dispositive regarding the State’s proofs in any such prosecution.  After all, New Jersey’s DWI statute creates a per se offense.  As stated, there is no corollary criminal or quasi-criminal statute that contains a per se proof element of an offense.  For instance, there is no per se Murder case.  There is no per se Kidnapping case.  There is no per se Burglary case.
[brief] THE APPELLANT’S CONVICTION SHOULD BE OVERTURNED BECAUSE THE COURT ALLOWED THE PROSECUTOR TO INJECT EXCESSIVE AMOUNTS OF HEARSAY INTO THE CASE THROUGH EXPERT TESTIMONY (13T:45-3 to 44-16)  (Partially Raised Below)  .............................................................................................................................................55  a.  The State Argued Inadmissible Hearsay Elicited by [...] as Substantive Evidence in the State’s Closing Argument (17T:27-21 to 28-23) (Partially Raised Below)  .................................................................66  POINT VI .................................................................................................................................71
[brief] *DeCicco v. Anderson*, 99 N.J. Super. 243 (App. Div. 1968) is another reported Appellate Division case directly on point factually and legally with the matter here.  In *DeCicco*, plaintiff had parked her vehicle in her employer’s parking lot and was walking through the parking lot when she was struck by a vehicle operated by a co-employee, who was driving to work and was about to park her vehicle.  Plaintiff sued defendant, her co-employee, for general negligence.  The trial Court granted defendant’s summary judgment motion based on defendant’s workers’ compensation co-employee immunity under *N.J.S.A.* 34:15-8.  In affirming the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint based on defendant’s co-employee immunity, the Appellate Division relied on *Konitch v. Hartung*, *supra*, and held “[w]e therefore conclude that both parties were in the ‘same employ’ and that the accident occurred in the course of their employment. ”  *DeCicco*, 99 N.J. Super. at 247 (emphasis added).  Since both the plaintiff and defendant in *DeCicco* were in their employer’s parking lot reporting to work, neither had “clocked in” yet when the accident occurred.  The *DeCicco* Court similarly eviscerates plaintiff’s arguments here that [...] loses her co-employee immunity because she had not yet “clocked in” when the accident occurred.
[brief] See *State v. Macchia*, 253 N.J. 232, 260 (2023) (distinguishing *Gentry* on the basis that the State “did not introduce evidence that defendant committed different acts against different victims”).  Applying *Gentry* to this case, the jury had to unanimously agree on (1) the identity of the person from whom money was stolen, (2) the identity of the person who was threatened in the course of that theft, and (3) the identity of the person who was purposely led to believe that the perpetrator was armed in the course of that theft.  See *Mirault*, 92 N.J. at 496 n.4 (robbery statute does not require that the victim of the theft is also the person who is threatened in the course of the theft).  Given that there were two potential robbery victims, the jury needed to be told that they had to unanimously agree on the identities of the persons involved.  The jury instructions did not communicate this unanimity requirement.  The judge instructed:
[brief] ...........................................  21 Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1, 20-21 (1987)....................................24,25, 47 New York SMSA L.P. v. Board of Adj. of Bernards Tp., 324 N.J.Super. 149, 163 (App.Div.), cert. denied, 162 N.J. 488 (1999)......  21 North Plainfield v Perone, 54 N.J. Super. 1, 8-9 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 29 N.J. 507 (1959).......  39 O'Donnell v. Koch, 197 N.J. Super. 134, 145 (App. Div. 1984).............  34 Roman Catholic Diocese of Newark v. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 47 N.J. 211, 221 (1966)..................................................................40  Salt & Light Co. v. Willingboro Zoning Bd., 423 N.J.Super. 282, 291 n.2 (App.Div. 2011).................................  30,32  Scully-Bozart Post #1817 vs. Planning Bd. of Burlington, 362 N.J.Super. 296, 314 (App.Div.); cert. denied, 178 N.J. 34 (2003) ...... 21 Shepard v. Woodland Tp. Comm., 71 N.J. 230, 248 (1976)...................  30 Sica v. Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Wall, 127 N.J. 152, 165-66, (1992).........................................................25,30,40, 42 Sunrise Development v. Princeton Zoning Bd., 2020 WL 3442856 at 3-4 (2020).......................................................  38  United Property Owners v. Belmar, 343 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div.), certif. denied 170 N.J. 390 (2001).......20 Urban v Planning Bd., 124 NJ 651 (1991).............................................................................  41  Victor Recchia Residential Constr., Inc. v. Zoning Bd., Cedar Grove, 338 N.J.Super. 242, 253 (App.Div. 2001)...........................................23  Vidal v. Lisanti Foods, Inc., 292 N.J.Super. 555, 561 (App.Div. 1996)..........................................  24,46  Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).................................................................  45  Whispering Woods v. Middletown Tp, 220 N.J. Super. 161 (App. Div. 1987)...........................................  20 Northeast Towers, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., W. Paterson, 327 N.J.Super. 476, 494 (App.Div. 2000)......................................  21 Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40. 1 and N.J.A.C. 5:21-1.1 et seq., 2T 80:1-14.................. 12 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 ............................................................................. 15 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62............................................................................ 23 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-89c........................................................................ 23 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70C(1), (2)............................................................... 34,45 TABLE OF ORDERS AND DECISIONS ON APPEAL Trial Court Decision and Order [...] 12/23/2022 ……… Da 348-358 PROCEDURAL HISTORY [...], as applicant (“[...]” or “Applicant”), and [...], as contract purchaser (“[...]” or “Appellee”) of the property at [...] (the “Property”), filed complaints as to the [...]’s (“Appellant” or “Board”) denial of an application for d variances, multiple c variances, waivers and site plan approval for a 165 unit, three-story, senior mixed-use facility in the R-20 zone, where the use is not permitted\(^1\).
[brief] 49  Networld Commc’ns Corp. v. Croatia Airlines, D.D., 2014 WL 4662223 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2014) ............................................. 33, 34-35  New Jerseyans for Death Penalty Moratorium v. N.J. Dep’t of Corrections, 185 N.J. 137 (2005)  ..............................................................................
[brief] [...] is an officer for the [...].  [...] conducted the Alcotest on --- \(^2\) See *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). the defendant.  (1T 100-11 to 104-23).  The defendant gave two valid samples, which the Alcotest calculator calculated a .07.  (1T 106-11 to 106-20).  Although the .07 calculation would not be a per se indication of a DWI, Seargeant Ligas testified that if they felt that the defendant was intoxicated, they would still charge the defendant with a DWI based on the totality of the circumstances.  (1T 111-17 to 111-19).  While performing the test, Seargeant Ligas smelled the “distinct odor of alcohol coming off of him and his eyes were bloodshot. ” (1T 106-5 to 106-7).  Seargeant Ligas opined that the defendant appeared to be intoxicated consistent with his training and experience.  (1T 107-14 to 107-19).
[brief] This is further confirmed by the fact that on the new Tax Map shown (Pa927) the description in the Final Judgment runs basically between Beachway and the high-water mark line.  He opines that the new Tax Map (Pa927) deliberately shows [...] as being the owner of Lot 3.01.  The Tax Map clearly reflects the fact that there was separate ownership of Lot 3.01 and Lot 3 (1T157:14).  He concludes based on the foreclosure documents as well as Pa201 & Pa202, no part of the Riparian Grant was foreclosed and as a result of the foreclosure, title to the Riparian Grant never came out of [...].  [...] retained ownership to the Riparian Grant Title, and they were not named in the foreclosure proceeding (2T25:11-18).
[brief] If the plaintiff was suffering an ascertainable loss at the time of the filing of suit, as here, the CFA does not insist the loss continue thereafter or until the time of trial as defendant seems to argue.  In short, defendant's reimbursement of the $500 approximately two weeks after suit was filed did not destroy or moot plaintiff's cause of action.  To hold otherwise would defeat the central protective purpose of the CFA by permitting a violator to compensate the consumer any time up to the entry of judgment in order to avoid liability for treble damages or any of the other remedies provided by the CFA.  We refuse the invitation to water down the CFA by endorsing this approach, which was championed by defendant and adopted by the judge.
[brief] The record in this matter unequivocally reflects that the Plaintiff-Appellant has not shown how the motion judge made a reversible error in this case.  Simply put, the Defendant-Respondents’ home is qualified as residential and the condition that caused the Plaintiff to fall was not caused by Defendant-Respondents.  For the foregoing reasons, Defendant-Respondents respectfully submit that the Trial Court’s decision to grant the Defendant-Respondents’ motion for summary judgment should be sustained by the Appellate Division and the Plaintiff-Appellant’s appeal should be denied.  Respectfully Submitted, [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  Attorney for Defendant-Respondents: Calixto and [...]  REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE APPEAL
[directive] 7.9.2  One such exception is when one person in a communication decides to intercept (e.g., record) the conversation.  As long as this person is a part of the conversation, such recording is lawful.  But if the person stops being a party to the conversation (e.g., he or she walks away from the group or turns the telephone over to someone else), it is no longer lawful for him or her to intercept the conversation.  7.9.3  Another exception exists where a person, acting at the direction of an investigative or law enforcement officer, gives prior consent to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication and is a party to the communication.  This "consensual intercept" can only be made after the Attorney General or a County Prosecutor, or their designee, approves it.  7.9.4
[directive] Duty to Inspect and Report Malfunction.  An officer equipped with a BWC shall be responsible for determining that the device is fully functional and that its battery is adequately charged at the start of the officer’s duty shift and before going into the field.  If a malfunction is detected, the officer shall report the malfunction to a supervisor before going into the field.  If the BWC malfunctions while out in the field, the malfunction upon its discovery shall be reported to the officer’s supervisor as soon as it is safe and practicable to do so.  3.7  Applicability of and Compliance with Attorney General Directive No. 2005-1.  The decision to activate or de-activate a BWC is a police action subject to the rule established in Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive (“AG Directive”) No. 2005-1, which strictly prohibits any form of racially-influenced policing.  3.8
[brief] [...] AND [...]  ATTORNEYS  On the Brief: [...], Esq. Attorney Id. #24653196 #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | TITLE | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | ii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | QUESTIONS PRESENTED ON APPEAL | 3 | | INTERESTS OF AMICI THE LEAGUE AND THE NJILGA | 4 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 5 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 5 | | POINT I | 5 | | OPRA DOES NOT REQUIRE A RECORDS CUSTODIAN TO SEARCH FOR “INFORMATION” THAT IS NOT REQUESTED IN THE OPRA REQUEST.
[brief] If you or [...] initiate arbitration, you and we have a choice of doing so before JAMS or the AAA:  (1)  For arbitration before JAMS, the JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures and the JAMS Recommended Arbitration Discovery Protocols for Domestic, Commercial Cases will apply.  The JAMS rules are available at jamsadr.comor by calling 1-800-352-5267.  (2)  Which particular rules apply in AAA arbitration will depend on how much money is at issue.  For less than $75,000, the AAA’s Supplementary Procedures for Consumer-Related Disputes/Consumer Arbitration Rules will apply; for Disputes involving $75,000 or more, the AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules will apply.
[directive] Therefore, each County Prosecutor is tasked with convening a County Working to ensure there are adequate countywide protocols, programs and resources available to law enforcement to support those in mental health crisis, as well as those with developmental disabilities, cognitive impairments, substance use disorders, and intellectual disabilities.  When setting up these groups, County Prosecutors should follow the model used for Domestic Violence Working Groups, which have existed in each county for many years.  Since resources and programs vary throughout the state, and some counties may share services regionally, a county may join with a neighboring county to create a joint working group, especially if doing so would maximize participation and resources and minimize duplication of effort.  The County Working Groups should include law enforcement, mental health, behavioral health, substance abuse, and special needs professionals, and any other relevant professionals or advocates.  County Prosecutors should also consider including representatives from the judiciary, fire and emergency services, 911 operators, police communications personnel, and community advocates.  When forming the working group, County prosecutors are also encouraged to consult with their County Mental Health Administrator and County Drug and Alcohol Director.  Each County Prosecutor should assign a designee to chair the working group and serve as the liaison to the Steering Committee.
[brief] [Trial Transcript, 4/20/2023, at T4 99:24 to 101:5.]  This part of the transcript says a great deal because it includes and acknowledges the GPS data and the expert testimony, which in actuality does not conflict with the timeline of being served and then getting to the toll booth in a reasonable time period.  The judge said that it could, in fact, be done.  Even within the trial itself, the testimony shows that the maps were discussed along with the distances and the relative time periods of travel, which make it all possible – not nearly “impossible” as argued by Appellant here.  All of this leads to a clear conclusion: these arguments being raised by the Appellant were heard, addressed and dismissed by the Trial Court.