ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] That particular defendant’s driving habits were relevant to counter the State’s evidence that she drove in a particular way on the night in question.  Id.  Here, similarly, defendant’s habit in three other traffic stops of not displaying a wallet ID was admissible under N.J.R.E. 406 as habit to prove that he did not do that in any of the four charged instances either.  A defendant has an absolute Sixth Amendment-based right to present evidence that challenges the core of the State’s case.
[brief] [...]’s Certification in Lieu of Oath or Affidavit in opposition to summary judgment  [...] Certification in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgement, Filed 8/29/2023  New Jersey Standards for Appellate Review – August 2022 Revision Transcript for Videoconference Deposition - State of N.J. v. [...] Thursday, 6/29/2023 at 10:14 a.m.  (Attached at Pa418)  Plaintiff’s Response to [...]  Defendant’s Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts  Pa480  Plaintiff’s Opposition Response to [...]  Defendants  Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgement ([...])  Filed 8/29/2023  Pa483
[brief] 12, 13 STATUTES  18 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6109 .................................................................................. 17, 23 18 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6109(f)(1) .......................................................................... 17  18 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6109(k) ..............................................................................  23, 24  18 U.S.C. § 926A .............................................................................................. 18, 19 28 U.S.C. § 1738 ...............................................................................................
[brief] 6  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................................................................  12 POINT I (See Da125) ...........................................................................................................................................  12  THE COURT ERRED BY ERRONEOUSLY APPLYING THE “WELL-SETTLED LEGAL RIGHT” PRONG OF CROWE, THE COURT ERRED BECAUSE IT FAILED TO DETERMINE THAT THE UNDERLYING APPLICATION OF THE LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN THE MANNER PLAINTIFF’S ASSERTED WAS A WELL-SETTLED LEGAL RIGHT.  ..................................................  12 POINT II (See Da119-138) ....................................................................................................................................  18  THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THE APPLICATION OF N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.1 TO -7.8 “STUDENT RECORDS. ”  .................................................................................................................................  18 POINT III (See Da131-133)  ....................................................................................................................................  23  THE COURT ERRED BY NOT RECOGNIZING THAT THE INJUNCTION COMPELS the boards TO VIOLATE PARENTS’ FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND Fails TO CONSIDER THE DISTRICTS’ IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS  ........................................................................................................  23  The Constitutional Violation ..............................................................................................................................  24  Disregard for the District’s Policy and Regulation Concerning Notification  ...........................................................................................................30  POINT IV (See Da129-130)..................................................................................................................33  THE COURT ERRED BY RELYING UPON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY, AND EVIDENCE WHICH IS IRRELEVANT, UNDULY PREJUDICIAL, AND LACKS ANY PROBATIVE VALUE PURSUANT TO N.J.R.E. 801, 802, 401 AND 403(A)..................................33  POINT V (See Da116, Para.2 and Da118, Para.2).................................................................37 THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ENJOINING APPELLANTS FROM AMENDING, MODIFYING, OR SUPERSEDING ANY PORTION OF POLICY 5756, UNTIL DISPOSITION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT BEFORE THE DIVISION ON CIVIL RIGHTS ..............................................................37 CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................................40
[brief] As relevant to [...]’s unjust enrichment claim, the City possessed a Letter of Agreement listing [...]’s residential mailing address in bold, italicized typeface.  This fact alone may not be “controlling,” Brick, 202 N. J. Super. at 252, but it raises the possibility that the tax collector had actual or constructive knowledge of where [...] could be reached.  That is one reason why [...]’s unjust enrichment claim is not appropriate for summary judgment at this stage.
[brief] Second, the Court was “moved by the severe financial strains the per se rule imposes on local governments and those individual employees who are forced to obtain independent counsel,” which played a part in the decision to bar a per se rule in the municipal context.  Id. at 206.  Neither of those concerns are present here.  Last but not least, the Court explicitly stated that joint representation is permissible only “if it does not appear clearly from the pleadings or from early discovery that the claims against the governmental entity and its individual employees will result in different and inconsistent defenses, or will, if successful, probably lead to independent or several, rather than overlapping or joint, compensatory relief against each class of defendants. ”  Id. at 205 (emphasis added).  Therein lies the distinction.  Here, the CNA would confer joint and overlapping relief against defendants and not independent or several as contemplated by the Court.  Thus, the basis for Court’s hesitation to craft a per se rule in Opinion 522 simply does not apply here.
[brief] [...] served in the N.J. Legislature in 2015, and sat as an Assembly person for the 2016, 2018, and 2020 legislative sessions.  (1T17-4 to 7).  While [...] served in the Legislature, Senate Bill 2380, referred to as the “Presumption Bill” was presented and then passed.  (1T17-1 to 4).  There were numerous sponsors of the Bill and State Senators are listed on the top of the Bill because they were the main sponsors.  (1T17-7 to 14).  [...], [...], [...], and [...] were the main sponsors of the Bill.  (Ibid.).  Then the assembly people who were sponsors included [...], [...], [...] and [...]. ” (Ibid.).  While in the Legislature, [...] was also a sponsor of the Assembly Bills involving an increase, and a clarification to hand and feet claims in workers’ compensation cases.  (See copy of Bills Nos. 782 and 4134 at Pa18-21).  [...] was appointed to the Workers’ Compensation Court in or about March 2022.  After [...] retired, [...] was assigned to this case on January 26, 2023.  (Pa2).  Almost one year later, and after several court conferences, including settlement discussions regarding the case, Respondent filed a formal motion for [...] to recuse herself.  (Pa1 – 2 and Ra, Vol. II, page 48 to Ra, Vol. III to 61).  In sum, Respondent did not present any factual basis for the recusal of [...], other than stating that she served on the Legislature when the Presumption Bill was presented and passed and was listed on the Bill, along with others, as a sponsor.  As [...] stated in her decision:  “A Judge should not step aside from a case . . . ‘unless the alleged cause of recusal is known by him to exist or is shown to be true in fact. ’” (1T20-15 to 18, quoting Hundred E. Credit Corrp. V. Eric Schuster Corp. 212 N.J. Super. 350, 358 (App. Div. 1986).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT ONE THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE RECUSAL OF JUDGE DOWNEY
[brief] For example, defense counsel testifies that there is no claim of ownership to Lot 22 and no ownership of Lot 20 at all (Da161 at ¶ 6) despite the fact that the deeds clearly indicate ownership of both parcels, as do the [...], the [...] and the [...] (i.e., Lot 22 to [...] and Lot 20 to [...]).  This Certification must be rejected just as the trial court did, unless it is defense counsel’s intent to testify as a witness, in which case defense counsel may be subject to disqualification pursuant to R.P.C. 3.7. failed to do before the trial court.  [...] produced no sworn statements from [...], or any other evidence, to support these statements, yet [...] relies upon the assertions as facts.  [...] cannot rely upon facts that do not exist for a legal conclusion that is contrary to the record evidence.
[brief] ”  See also [...] & [...], N.J. Zoning and Land Use Administration, § 25-2 at 551 (“Conditional uses themselves, as well as the planning board’s jurisdiction over them, are authorized by provisions of Article 8 of the Act. ”).  “A conditional use is basically a permitted use in the zone, provided all conditions are met.  Therefore, if the conditions are satisfied, the applicant is not seeking a variance from the terms of the ordinance. ”  Id.  “Thus, if the planning board finds compliance with the specific standards of the ordinance for the specific proposed conditional use, it will be required to approve the application. ”  Id. at 552 (citing Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Livingston Twp. in Essex Cnty., 199 N.J. Super. 470, 477 (App. Div. 1985)).  Additionally, as part of the Planning Board’s indisputable jurisdiction over conditional use applications, the Planning Board is authorized to interpret the MLUL, including by making determinations that certain conditions are (or are not) satisfied based on an application of the TOA Rule.
[brief] To that end and at trial, [...] proffered the testimony of a number of witnesses upon whose testimony [...] expressly relied to find that the [...] had no “entitlement” or “honest claim of right” to the “fees” they sought, and that the [...]’ “true-up” defense was an utter sham.  (230T55:24-10)  [...] properly relied upon pre-SOL period facts to support the Court’s finding of a RICO “enterprise” and “pattern” – findings which were upheld by this Court in its 2018 decision and are consistent with its instructions on remand:  Now, I realize that the ‘93, ‘94 financial statements are going to be outside the limitations period for RICO, but … you can use predicate acts from before the statute of limitations period begins, not for damages, but to show an enterprise, and these activities are fairly uniform throughout the period under study by this litigation.  (225T58-59:5)  [...] also found that in order for the unlawful nature of the [...]’ NJRICO conduct during the RICO SOL Period “to be fully understood,” the Court necessarily “ha[d] to go through the entire sequence of events” leading to said conduct, which often required the Court to understand predicate acts that occurred outside the RICO SOL Period:
[brief] "State v. Bianco, 103 N.J. 383, 391(1986); State v. Molina, 187 N.J. 531 (2006).  Pursuant to Rule 3:21-5:  The judgment shall be signed by the judge and entered by the clerk.  A judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, the adjudication and sentence, a statement of the reasons for such sentence, and a statement of credits received pursuant to R. 3:21-8.
[brief] [...] acknowledged on cross-examination that defendant was 20 by the time the case went to trial and by then had had a two-year relationship with his experienced counsel, [...], Esq. (4T28-3 to 19).  Mask pointed out that defendant was unwilling to cooperate with the State, (4T43-22 to 44-21), and defendant told his presentence investigator that the State “made a big mistake” and “they have the wrong guy[,]” (4T31-10 to 32-8).  Mask even indicated that defendant wanted to make a plea offer that would have resulted in only 9 or 10 years in State Prison, but because he would not cooperate with prosecutors Mask never tendered the offer to the State.  (Da273).  Clearly defendant was not the immature babe he now purports he was.  The record supports [...]’s conclusion that this factor does not weigh in his favor.
[brief] Letter Order .................................................................Da201 September 29, 2023  Correspondence from Plaintiff Submitting proposed Order Granting Certain Preliminary Injunctive Relief under the Five-Day Rule ........................................................................Da202-06 October 3, 2023  Correspondence from Defendants Submitting Alternative proposed Order Granting Certain Preliminary Injunctive Relief under the Five-Day Rule ........................................Da207-17  Attached Transcript, Intentionally Omitted as Duplicative, see 2T ..................................................................................D210 October 5, 2023  Substitution of Attorney .................................................................Da218 October 23, 2023  Letter Order ..............................................................................Da219 October 19, 2023  Defendants’ Verified Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims ........................................................................................................Da220-48 November 13, 2023 Email Exchange Scheduling Mediation with [...], J.S.C. (Ret.) ................................................................................Da249-51 November 15, 2023
[brief] The “GOOD CAUSE” standard requires the exercise of sound discretion in light of the facts and circumstances of the particular case considered in the context of the Court Rule being applied”.  Del.Valley Wholesale Florist. V. Addalia, 349 N.J. Super. 228, 232 (App. Div. 2002).  It is abuse of discretion when a decision is made without rational explanation inexplicably departed from ESTABLISHED POLICIES, or rested on impermissible basis,”  US Bank, Supra 209 N.J. at 467-68.  Additionally, the court’s final order establishing arrearage of $88,047.35 (Pa133) is be deemed void as it must be noted that any subsequent orders/judgments issued after said March 9,1990 default judgment would also be deemed void as evidenced by numerous case law cited in this brief for the court failed to recognize Service of Process had not been effectuated in 1990 and thus the trial court lacked evidence to validate Service of Process had been established (Pa6; Pa10; Pa21; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa41).
[brief] The Lease clearly placed the obligation to maintain the common areas of the premises on the landlord, including maintenance.  [...] testified that he and his department controlled and performed all maintenance of the parking lot.  There is nothing in the Lease to suggest that [...] exerted any control over the area where plaintiff fell that conflicts with the Township/landlord’s obligation to maintain the area.  In fact, testimony and other evidence shows that the Township exercised control over the area by maintaining it and did so before and after the date of the accident.
[brief] “When determining the validity of a warrantless search or seizure, ‘the question is not whether the police could have done something different, but whether their actions, when viewed as a whole, were objectively reasonable. ’”  *State v. Craft*, 425 *N.J. Super.* at 553, citing *State v. Bogan*, 200 *N.J.* 61, 81 (2009).
[brief] (Da72).  On September 15, 2020, the [...], in the 2020 Lawsuit, filed a Motion for Fees and Sanctions pursuant to Rule 1:4-8 and N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1.  (Da94).  On January 25, 2022, the trial court granted the [...]’ Motion for Fees and Sanctions.  (Da96).  After Plaintiffs were unsuccessful in their 2020 Lawsuit and after Plaintiffs settled the claims with the remaining defendants in this case, this appeal followed.
[brief] [...] cites to numerous cases from across the country and the defendant herself cites Sosnowicz from Arizona’s Supreme Court, but ignores Georgia’s Medlock v. State, 263 Ga. 246 (1993) which is cited in the [...] opinion.  Unlike [...] and Sosnowicz which deal with medical examiners opining as to whether motor vehicle deaths were accidents or not, Medlock specifically considered whether a medical examiner could refer to a baby’s death as ‘homicide’ in his expert opinion that the victim’s death was caused by shaking and not the result of an accident.
[brief] [Pa75 at ¶ 7; Pa82 at ¶ 28(a)].  The Lease also provided that if [...] is “habitually late” in paying Rent – which is defined as failing to pay Base Rent when due on two (2) or more occasions during a twelve (12) month period – [...] also shall be in default.  [Pa82 at ¶ 28(b)].  Upon a payment default that continues for ten (10) days, [...] may issue a written demand for payment within five (5) business days from the date of the notice.  [Pa82 at ¶ 28(a)].  If [...] fails or refuses to comply, the Lease provided that [...]’s rights would automatically terminate without further notice or a right to cure.  [Pa82].  In the event of a default which is not timely cured, all remaining Rent for the term of the Lease shall be accelerated and shall be immediately due and payable in full (“Accelerated Rent”), whereupon [...] will also be required to pay as Additional Rent all of [...]’s attorneys’ fees and other expenses incurred which relate to the enforcement of its rights under the Lease.
[brief] *New Jersey Eye Center v. Princeton Insurance Company*, 394 N.J. Super. 557, 569 (App. Div. 2007).  [...] has cited to no law disputing the above well-settled legal principle.  Instead, [...] argues that [...] acted in bad faith simply by seeking a declaration as to coverage after providing [...] a defense, under a reservation of rights, for over three years.  But New Jersey law recognizes that the parties have discretion in timing the commencement of a declaratory judgment action.  See *Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co.*, 56 N.J. 383 (1970) (“the better course is to leave it to the [parties] to decide for themselves if and when to sue” for a declaratory judgment); *New Jersey Eye Center*, 394 N.J. Super. at 570.
[brief] POINT III  PLAINTIFF CANNOT ESTABLISH THAT [...] ACTED IN A PALPABLY UNREASONABLE MANNER  As set forth in Ogborne v. Mercer Cemetery Corp., 197 N.J. 448 (2009) (quoting Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485, 493 (1985)), “for a public entity to have acted or failed to act in a manner that is palpably unreasonable, it must be manifest and obvious that no prudent person would approve of its course of action or inaction. ”  In addition, Kolitch, supra, clarified this by stating that “[T]he term implies behavior that is patently unacceptable under any given circumstance. ”  Kolitch, 100 N.J. at 493 (emphasis added).  The actions of the defendant in this case clearly did not meet this standard.  The standard “implies a more obvious and manifest breach of duty and imposes a more onerous burden on the plaintiff. ”  Ogborne, supra, 197 N.J. at 459 (quoting Kolitch, supra, 100 N.J. at 493).
[brief] But, unlike with many other aspects of the Act—take the detailed loss ratio regulations, for example, with which [...] complied in full—the Commissioner failed to issue any guidance for the Act’s “not excessive” mandate, N.J.S.A. 17B:27E-11.  b.  Reversal is required because the absence of regulations meant that [...] lacked notice of how the Department would interpret and treat the term “excessive. ”  The foregoing legal rules and statutory command doom the agency’s belated efforts to deny [...]’s applications on the basis that the proposed rates were “excessive.
[brief] For the above stated reasons, it is respectfully requested that this Court deny Plaintiff/Appellant  [...]’s appeal in its entirety.  Respectfully, **[...]**  A Professional Corporation  *Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent  [...]*  By s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  Partner [...], Esq.  Counsel  Dated: July 8, 2024  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STANDARD LOGISTICS, LLC, Defendant-Respondent.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  Civil Action On Appeal from an Order of the Superior Court, Law Division, Hudson County Law Div.  Docket No.: [...]  Sat below: Hon. [...], J.S.C  Date of Submission: July 22, 2024
[brief] Id. at 65-69.  Second, recently the Supreme Court twice has made clear that above and beyond a finding and balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors, every sentencing decision must make clear why the judge independently believes the overall length of the term imposed is warranted.  *State v. Cuff*, 239 N.J. 321, 347-352 (2019); *State v. Torres*, 246 N.J. 246, 270 (2021).  Yet the judge said nothing about why he believed incarcerating defendant for 53 years, 42.5 without parole -- as opposed to a shorter term -- on his first adult offense was warranted.  A *Torres/Cuff* remand is, thus, warranted as well.
[brief] The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) makes it unlawful for an employer to “take reprisals against any person because that person has opposed any practices or acts forbidden under this act” or “to coerce, intimidate, threaten or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of that person having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this act. ”  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d).  In Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWebber Inc., 197 N.J. 81, 125-26 (2008), the New Jersey Supreme Court set forth what a plaintiff must show in order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the NJLAD:  “(1) the plaintiff in good faith engaged in a protected --- 1  Once [...] complained in good faith about discrimination the retaliation was overwhelmingly clear and the focus of this Reply Brief is on retaliation.  [...] is not, however, abandoning his claim that defendants discriminated against him on the basis of age and sex which is supported in the record by comments of [...] that he was too old to present at outside conventions; by [...] who told the NJDEP EEO that he “observed a lot of women being promoted and many of the new hires are women”; that “[m]any of the promotions involve employees more than 10 years younger (in their 40s)”; that there “appears to be a bias” and “Fell does attempt to intimidate employees” (Pa876); and by [...], who told the NJDEP EEO that “most promotional opportunities had been given to young women.
[brief] I made a mistake of putting, in the Complaint, the itemization of the causes of action against each defendant, in the manner of a More Definite Statement, which the defendants demanded -- without a Rule citation.  R. 4:6-4 (never directly requested in this case; in its last sentence: “The statement shall become a part of the pleading which it supplements. ”).  So, I don’t get a redraft to take the Judge’s comments into consideration and eliminate the 20 pages of itemizations?  In any case, many cases hold that the client shouldn’t be punished for the failings of his or her lawyer.  Remember, I don’t want to do this case; I am a physical and psychological wreck when I work on it.  [...] should be able to obtain counsel but Vicinage I has made an example of me such that all counsel are afraid to work for him.