ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Court found that during this same time, Decedent spoke to [...] and his wife and partner, [...] while she was in the hospital.  (P30a).  Yet, Respondent testified that she was the one who had contacted [...] a few days \textsuperscript{16}  The Court entered Orders dated May 20, 2022 and August 5, 2022 barring discovery from Respondent about her discussions with Decedent about Respondent’s finances as being irrelevant.  (See P53a, P62a, P63a, P84a).  Precluding Petitioner from obtaining this discovery was erroneous and enabled Respondent to surprise Petitioner with testimony about Decedent’s “phone calls,” so no telephone statements were available at trial to challenge that testimony.  before Decedent died and told [...] that the Decedent was “extremely ill. ” (11T112:25 to 112:17).  [...] remarked, don't worry about that now, she will be fine, if anything happens, we will talk then. ”  Id.  [...] and [...]’s memory of that phone call had obviously faded over time as that discussion could not have been with Decedent.  Respondent stated that early in her hospitalization, Decedent had sores in her mouth and throat and had difficulty breathing and would struggle to speak.  11T 143:10-14.  Decedent’s condition deteriorated over the course of her hospitalization and Respondent admitted that the last few days before she died, she could not speak at all.  (11T146:9-18; P708a).
[brief] The “element of reliance is the same for fraud and negligent misrepresentation,” and thus a court assessing these claims can be guided by case law regarding either doctrine.  See Kaufman v. I-Stat Corp., 165 N.J. 94, 109 (2000).  permitted to attack the Broker Defendants because of their own oversight, as their reliance was unjustifiable. ”).  Here, the allegation of the Complaint demonstrates as a matter of law that Plaintiff was not justified in relying on either the two-word e-mail from [...]’s representative or [...]’s alleged failure to inform it of [...]’s revised closing date.  The Complaint alleges that the PSA was a “complex” agreement that “was heavily negotiated by and between sophisticated parties and their counsel. ” (Pa5, ¶20).  It admits that in June 2022, it began having “growing concerns” about [...]’s intentions and ability to perform under the PSA; sought reassurances from [...]; and was told in writing that [...] no longer saw any “feasible way” to close under the terms of the PSA and was exploring alternate deal structures including the direct purchase of all rights to the Property, and no longer believed itself to be “bound by the terms of the [PSA] Agreement.
[brief] To the contrary, [...] went to the correct municipality to seek the warrant, given that all the events establishing probable cause arose in [...].  Perhaps most importantly, despite potential technical irregularities, the record clearly supports [...]’s determination that the affidavit established “sufficient probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. ”  Gioe, 401 N.J. Super. at 344.  In the absence of bad faith, the search warrant issued by [...] was valid when the [...] officers stopped the subject vehicle in [...].  Because any potential jurisdictional deviations were limited in scope and amounted at most to technical errors, and because a detached and neutral magistrate found sufficient probable cause before authorizing the search, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable.  This Court should affirm the ruling denying defendant’s motion to suppress.
[brief] Failure to make a timely objection indicates that defense counsel did not believe the remarks were prejudicial at the time they were made.  Failure to object also deprives the court of the opportunity to take curative action”).  If no objection is made, “there is a presumption that the [comment] was not error and was unlikely to prejudice the defendant’s case. ”  *Singleton*, 211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012).  Under N.J.S.A. 2A:82-1, our legislature has stated:
[brief] Municipal Land Use Law .......................................................................................33  N.J.S.A. 10:5-4 ........................................................................................................34  N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) ..................................................................................................19  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-25 and 40:55D-70 .................................................................13, 31, 32  New Jersey Civil Rights Act ..................................................................................19, 20, 21, 24 N.J.S.A. 10:4-6, et seq.
[directive] As with chemical breath test results, the results or readings obtained from blood tests have been deemed to be admissible, as having met the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof, if the State satisfies the standard of evidence for the foundational evidentiary criteria of “no greater than clear and convincing evidence. ”  Those foundational criteria are: (1) judicial notice of the scientific reliability and accuracy of the instrument used to analyze or test the blood sample; (2) the lab technician was properly trained; (3) the instrument used for the analysis or testing was operating properly; (4) the lab tech used the instrument in accordance with their training.
[directive] The lien or mortgage is I1perfected" when a security interest in property, as determined by the laws of the state where the property is located, is filed with and accepted by the court.  This revised policy, in effect, shall treat the payment of perfected liens, taxes, and mortgages in an expeditious manner or for all property subject to a judicial "final judgement" "final order of forfeiture1I; or a "summary judgement" in an administrative forfeiture proceeding.  For the purposes of this policy "final judgement11, I'final order of forfeiture", and a "summary judgement" shall mean a judgement or order that vests all rights, title, and interest in the forfeited property in the United States, and as to which all appeals are exhausted and conclusive upon the matter.
[brief] The Department and the OIFP mainly rely on the procedural history and statement of facts as presented by Appellant [...], (Pb4; Pb7), and highlight the following.  In March 2023, [...] filed a nine-count complaint against Defendants/Respondents in Superior Court, Middlesex County, Law Division.  (Pa23).  [...] provided no-fault automobile insurance policies in New Jersey under which insureds can recover PIP benefits if they are involved in an accident.  (Pa25).  When insureds receive medical treatment, they typically assign those PIP benefits to their medical providers, who seek payment from [...].  See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 (providing that PIP benefits may be assigned “to a provider of service benefits”).  [...]’s complaint alleged that, from 2008 through 2022, Respondents conspired to obtain, through false and misleading insurance claims, more than $1.7 million in PIP benefits from [...] through more than 800 medical claims.  (See, e.g., Pa37; Pa74).  [...] learned after making the benefit payments that Respondent [...] (“[...]”) was illegally ---  1  Because the procedural history and facts are closely related, this brief combines them for efficiency and for the court’s convenience.
[brief] ”  Rodriguez v. Torres, 60 F. Supp. 2d 334, 339-40 (D.N.J. 1999).  “What makes an employer’s personnel action unlawful discrimination [or retaliation] is the employer’s intent. ”  Zive, 182 N.J. at 446.  The New Jersey Supreme Court noted the difficulty proving discriminatory and retaliatory intent:
[brief] In addition, the State takes issue with [...]’s argument that showing [...] the photos a second time after he failed to identify anyone on the first viewing is suggestive.  The State claims that (1) a second viewing is not expressly prohibited by Henderson; (2) the second viewing is an estimator variable not a system variable and therefore cannot trigger a pretrial hearing; and (3) [...] did not challenge the second viewing at the trial level.  The first contention is true but irrelevant.  The second two are plainly false.
[brief] The requirement to go through the captains when in fact she was told by [...] to carry out her responsibilities directly created a hostile work environment (1T; 71:2).  Actually, the Plaintiff’s job itself was “in question” as to the reasons why she was doing what she was supposed to be doing as the Admin Officer and not being able to address the Intake Unit or any other unit (1T; 71:7).  Going through the captains was one of the problems (1T; 71:26).  She was doing what prior Admin Officers and subsequent Admin Officers were required to do but she was being treated differently (1T; 71:22).  When she was transferred, her replacement, [...], got promoted to Lieutenant in that position (1T; 72:11).
[brief] In State v. J.T., 455 N.J. Super. 176, (App. Div. 2018), the Court found that testimony from the state’s expert witness usurped jury’s role by making definitive declaration that defendant did not meet legal requirements to assert the insanity defense to the murder charge, and denied the defendant a fair trial.  In Cain, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior holding in State v. Reeds, 197 N.J. 280, 284–85, (2009), that an expert's “ultimate-issue testimony” usurps the “jury's singular role in the determination of defendant's guilt and irredeemably taints the remaining trial proofs. ”  Cain, 224 N.J. 410 (2016), (citing Reeds, 197 N.J. 280 (2009)).  Although defense counsel did not object at the time the expert gave this testimony, the Court ruled that “this colossal error was clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
[directive] (e)  Vehicular pursuits that are determined to not be in compliance with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, or agency policy, shall be forwarded quarterly by municipal and county agencies to the County Prosecutor’s Office for review.  The reports shall be forwarded within 30 days of the end of each quarter.  Vehicular pursuits involving statewide law enforcement agencies, or county prosecutor’s office personnel, that are determined to not be in compliance with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, or agency policy, shall be forwarded quarterly to the Director of the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability or their designee for review.  The reports shall be forwarded within 30 days of the end of each quarter.  12.2  The law enforcement executive shall conduct an annual review of all vehicular pursuit incidents in their department.
[brief] POINT IV  THE TRIAL COURT BELOW CORRECTLY HELD THAT MOSLEY’S COMMON LAW AND NJCRA MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIMS WERE SUBJECT TO A TWO-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS . (Addressing Appellant’s Point I.A & III.)  The trial court below correctly held that [...]’s NJCRA malicious prosecution claim was subject to a two-year statute of limitations.  (1T 13:9-20).  [...]’s argument to the contrary—that, under Earl v. Winne, 14 N.J. 119 (1953), his common law and NJCRA malicious prosecution claims were subject to a six-year statute of limitations, (Pb17-Pb24) is without merit.  As to [...]’s common-law malicious prosecution claim, [...] ignores that Earl was issued nineteen years before the Legislature enacted the TCA in 1972.  The TCA provides explicitly that the statute of limitations for all common law tort claims against the State, New Jersey public entities, and New Jersey public employees is two years—without exception.  See N.J.S.A. 59:8-8 (“The claimant shall be forever barred from recovering against a public entity or public employee if: . . . b.  Two years have elapsed since the accrual of the claim . . . ”).  Controlling and persuasive decisional law have interpreted provide that the two-year statute of limitations in N.J.S.A. 59:8-8 applies to all tort claims against the State, including common law malicious prosecution claims asserted against public employees.  See Thigpen v. City of E. Orange, 408 N.J. Super. 331, 343 (App. Div. 2009) (finding common law malicious prosecution cause of action against a defendant-New Jersey public entity and defendant-New Jersey public employees “clearly is subject to the TCA's requirements. ”) (internal citation omitted); accord Orefice v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 2018 WL 5116952, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 22, 2018) (“Relying on [Thigpen], in which we held malicious prosecution claims are subject to the requirements of the Tort Claims Act, [...] concluded plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim was barred by the Act's two-year statute of limitations.
[brief] \(^5\)  “TGPa” refers to [...]’s appendix submitted with its initial merits brief on October 31, 2022.  substantive comments received on the Draft EIS, including those of Appellant, [...].  TGPa0014.  The Final EIS concluded that construction and operation of the Project would not result in significant environmental impacts, except for the Project’s effect on climate change, the significance of which [...] staff explained it was unable to determine.  TGPa0015, 0023.  On April 21, 2022, [...] issued its Certificate Order authorizing [...] to construct and operate the Project.  179 [...] ¶ 61,041; TGPa0001.  In the Certificate Order, [...] found “that the public convenience and necessity requires approval of [...]’s” Project.  Id. at P 85; TGPa0004.  The Certificate Order directly addressed Appellant, [...]’s arguments regarding climate change.  See Id. at P59-61.  On May 19, 2022, Appellant, Food & Water Watch, sought rehearing of the Certificate Order.  TGPa0043.  On rehearing, [...] reached the same result as the Certificate Order and denied [...]’s request for a stay (“Rehearing Order”).  [...], 181 [...] ¶61,051, at P 3 (2022); TGPa0043.  The Rehearing Order fully considered the significance of the GHG emissions, reaffirmed [...]’s holding, and responded to additional comments from Appellant, Food & Water Watch.  In the Rehearing Order, [...] rejected [...]’s request for a stay, finding that “[...]’s generalized claims of harm in its motion do not constitute sufficient evidence of irreparable harm that would justify a stay. ”  Id. at P10-11; TGPa0046-0047.  [...] concluded that it “continue[s] to find, based on all information in the record, that the public convenience and necessity requires the East 300 Upgrade Project. ”  Id. at P41; TGPa0048.  Appellant, Food & Water Watch, then challenged the [...] Certificate in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.  See Food & Water Watch v. [...], [...] (D.C. Cir. Petition filed Aug. 19, 2022).  The D.C. Circuit issued its decision on June 14, 2024 upholding the Certificate Order and denying Food & Water Watch’s petitions for review.  See Food & Water Watch v. [...], 104 F.4th 336 (D.C. Cir. 2024).  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] 38a-41a.  In this count [...] asserts that the implied covenant was violated by [...] through its “deceptive invoices”; its request for payment before the effective date of the COVID Statute of June 29, 2020, (the Statute was actually enacted on April 14, 2020); its failure to answer [...]’s “questionnaire”; and its failure to return to [...] the payment it made pursuant to the COVID Statute.
[brief] The Trial Court also ruled that plaintiff does not have standing under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-18 as he failed to follow the procedures set forth in that statute.  In so ruling, the Trial Court explained that plaintiff failed to apply to the court for permission to commence and prosecute such a claim or demand in the name of the County and on its behalf.  By way of history, this is another in a series of appeals by plaintiff from the dismissal of his complaint challenging the award of tax abatements by a municipality.
[brief] The Court finds here that the law of the case does not preclude the Court from hearing this matter.  (12:23), but the Court does not find detailed analysis as to the nuts and bolts of CEPA liabilities such that the Court would find law of the case applies here.  There’s no indication that the CEPA statute of limitations was raised or considered by [...].  There, the Court refused to accept Hale, supra which mandates “each decision settles that question for all subsequent stages of the suit. ”  [...] found a hostile work environment and refused to dismiss the CEPA claim.
[brief] In general, agencies may not engage in formal action without complying with the APA.  An agency’s ability to select procedures it deems appropriate to accomplish its statutory mission is limited by “the strictures of due process and of the [APA]. ”  *In re Solid Waste Util. Cus. Lists*, 106 N.J. 508, 519 (1987); see also *In re Provision of Basic Generation Serv. for Period Beginning June 1 2008*, 205 N.J. 339, 347 (2011) (“[A]dministrative agency action, and an agency’s discretionary choice of the procedural mode of action, are valid only when there is compliance with the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act . . . and due process. ”).  Included in these procedural requirements are mandatory notice provisions and opportunity for public comment before an agency may set a rule or policy in place.  N.J.S.A. 52:14-B-4(a)(1) to (3).  Notice and an opportunity to be heard and to gather and submit information is crucial to the overall essence of rulemaking as without it, those affected would have no opportunity to participate in the process.  Because the APA requires the Department to comply with its rulemaking procedures in imposing the Holding Act and SSAP No. 25 to reciprocal exchanges, the informally adopted policies through the Bulletin are invalid.
[brief] (9T:42-1 to 25).  Next, [...] went downstairs to the kitchen and shot [...] once in the abdomen and once in her wrist.  (7T:322-8 to 15);(7T:325-7 to 12);(9T:65-16 to 23).  [...] died as a result of the gunshot wound to the abdomen.  [...] was sitting in a chair to the right of [...] in the kitchen.  (7T:325-8 to 10).  [...] turned the gun on Brittany and shot her once in the head and once in the chest.  (7T:325-11 to 13); (9T:48-24 to 49-3); (9T:54-10 to 20).  [...] pointed the gun at his grandfather and was going to shoot him, but [...] stated that he “snapped back to reality, so to speak. ”  (7T:325-14 to 18).  After [...] shot and killed his mother, father, sister and grandmother, he went upstairs put the gun down and waited for the police to come and arrest him.
[brief] Advisory Opinion 36-17 (2018)⁴ states in relevant part:  Similar to all other newly elected, as well as currently seated, Board members, this Board member is bound by and charged with understanding and complying with the ethical standards set forth in the Act.  (Ca213).  In its August 23, 2022 decision, the Commission attempted to claim that its earlier Advisory Opinion, which specifically stated that newly elected board members are bound by the Act, only stood for the proposition that school board members are bound by the Act once they swear in.  (Ca214).  That is not what Advisory Opinion 36-17 (2018) says.  It says that “newly elected, as well as currently seated Board ⁴ https://www.nj.gov/education/legal/ethics/advisory/cat1/A36-17.pdf members ... [are] bound by and charged with understanding and complying with the ethical standards set forth in the Act. ” (Ca236-239).  In fact, a review of that Advisory Opinion reveals that the school board member at issue had not yet been seated, but was still told by the Commission that he was subject to the Act.  (“You inform the Commission that [the board member at issue is] a newly elected Board member (November 2017”).  The Commission never allowed Appellants in the present matter to be heard on this abandonment of its prior jurisdiction, on which Appellants expressly relied.  By abandoning its own jurisdictional holding, which was reasonably relied on by Appellants, the Commission has denied Appellants due process and the right to be heard on this issue.
[brief] 8.  The Planning Board conducted such a Public Hearing on or about February 8, 2021.  9.  The Respondent Planning Board Members heard an extensive amount of testimony presented by the Board Engineer and the Borough Planner.  10.  During the aforesaid Public Hearing process, members of the Public were also provided with an opportunity to ask questions of the witnesses, to present their own witnesses, and members of the Public were also presented with an opportunity to make any comments / statements in support of, or against, the proposed Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan.
[directive] Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any rights or promises.  Nor does this Directive vest enforcement rights in any person claiming noncompliance or deviation from the policies, practices and procedures described in this Directive.  27.  Establishment of Interagency Coordination Working Group  The Director of the Division of Criminal Justice shall establish and maintain a working group comprised of representatives from the County Prosecutor’s Association and other appropriate law enforcement and prosecuting agencies or associations operating within the State of New Jersey, including federal law enforcement agencies.  This Working Group shall develop and report to the Attorney General within 45 days of the effective date of this Directive a plan for establishing a comprehensive system, using all available resources and technologies, to ensure to the greatest extent possible that information concerning criminal activities is appropriately shared by and between law enforcement agencies, and to ensure to the great extent possible that the investigative activities of any one agency do not conflict with or jeopardize investigations or intelligence-gathering operations undertaken by other law enforcement agencies.
[brief] In this regard, after the 1997 transfer, [...] and his family never exercised any manner of control over the Property that would in any way be consistent with an ownership interest.  They did not pay any maintenance, utilities, taxes or collect rent for the Property.  They did not have a key to the Property.  Further, and perhaps most damning, per the testimony of [...], the error in the deed was only first brought to their attention in 2016 by their attorney, [...] (9T135:3-23, January 24, 2022).  In that [...] was not present when the December 1998 Deed was signed, [...] could not have reasonably believed that he was somehow the grantee of the Property under the deed.  Rather, [...] and his family simply sought to capitalize on [...]’s mistake knowing full-well that they had no legitimate interest in the Property.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AND EXPRESSLY CONSIDERED BOTH EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS.  Without amplification, Defendant claims that the Trial Court failed to consider the first eminent domain trial, which resulted in a jury verdict in favor of [...] for $998,400 as just compensation for the eminent domain taking.  Db32.  Defendant argues that if this Court determines that compensation for the eminent domain taking is to be considered a sale, then Plaintiff would be entitled only to Defendant’s proceeds from the jury verdict. \(^5\)  Defendant fails to explain the reasoning here.  Nonetheless, the Trial Court properly assessed the evidence.  [...] established a governmental taking at both trials, the jury trial and the bench trial.  *See, [...] v. State, supra.*  Da37, Da40.  As the Trial Court held:  The intention of the parties was to provide plaintiff with consideration in the form of money from the business.  The evidence of the facts surrounding the parties at the time the PSA was entered into supports a finding that the source of the money was not intended to be limited to a traditional sale versus a forced sale, through eminent domain proceedings or through condemnation, or inverse condemnation, or even settlement of the legal action.  3T22-23.  Clearly, the Trial Court considered both eminent domain actions.  Sitting in equity, the Trial Court in its discretion determined that the intent of the parties was that Plaintiff would receive monies in the divorce from the proceeds of [...], no matter whether those proceeds came about through a voluntary sale or through compensation for a forced governmental taking.