ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Thus, the facts of the case at bar are more aligned with Gonzalez—a case that actually analyzed subsequent performance under the CFA—than *DepoLink*.  À propos, relevant to [...]’s unlicensed debt collection activity here, the *DepoLink* court acknowledged that violations of the CFA can arise from “affirmative misrepresentation[s], even if unaccompanied by knowledge of [their] falsity. ”  *DepoLink*, 430 N.J. Super. at 338 (quoting *Monogram Credit Card Bank of Ga. v. Tennesen*, 390 N.J. Super. 123, 133 (App.Div.2007)).  Here, [...] affirmatively misrepresented that they were legally allowed to enforce [...]’s alleged debt when they lacked the licensure to do so—thus committing fraud in connection with the subsequent performance of the sale of merchandise.
[directive] Possession of CDS or 2C:35-10a in statute, third degree; CDS or analog in Schedule V, fourth degree; possession of 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible  Analog marijuana over 50 grams, fourth degree; otherwise disorderly persons offense.  Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible  Obtaining CDS by 2C:35-13
[brief] The Instant Appeal on Remand  From the Supreme Court  On remand to this court, [...] moved to supplement the record to include the 2024 HAD and staff report for a complete understanding of the events that followed the Appellate Division’s initial remand of the 2021 HAD.  On September 11, 2024, the court granted [...]’s motion to supplement the record and directed Appellants to file its supplemental brief within thirty days, and Respondents to file their supplemental briefs thirty days thereafter.  Also in its September 11, 2024 Order, the court directed the parties to “address in their briefs whether the matter should be remanded to the agency or the Office of Administrative Law for further fact-finding. ”  To briefly address the court's question, there is no need for further fact-finding because the record consists of ample, undisputed evidence for the court to decide the limited issue on remand.  Also, potentially sending the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) would give Appellants, who are third-parties to [...]’s application, an administrative hearing contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act’s prohibition on that, as well as extensive case law.  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.1 and 3.3; see e.g. In re Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permits, 185 N.J. 452, 463-4 (2006); In re NJPDES No. NJ0025241, 185 N.J. 474 (2006).  The court extended appellants’ time to file their brief until November 12, 2024, and later extended [...]’s time to file to January 9, 2025 and [...]’s time to file to January 13, 2025.  LEGAL ARGUMENTS
[brief] If so, the continued retention of plaintiffs’ property, either intentionally or by oversight, derives from and directly relates to the law enforcement function that the [...] fulfilled when it seized and retained the evidence.  Notwithstanding the State’s argument that plaintiffs could have pursued a remedy based upon the equitable doctrine of replevin, the claim in this case originated from an activity that was part of the [...]’s performance of “the criminal business of the State.  N.J.S.A. 52:17B–106.  *Id.* at 179.  (Emphasis added).  In its letter of October 16, 2023 denying coverage to the [...], the [...] opined that *Lavezzi* stands for the proposition that *Wright* does not extend the State’s obligation to defend to equitable claims.
[brief] Social science shows children with incarcerated parents have significantly worse outcomes in education, behavioral development, and physical and mental health.  See, e.g., [...] et al., Campbell Collab., Effects of Parental Imprisonment on Child Antisocial Behaviour and Mental Health: A Systematic Review 8 (2009), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/229378.pdf; [...] & [...], Econ. Pol’y Inst., Mass Incarceration and Children’s Outcomes 9-12 (2016), https://files.epi.org/pdf/118615.pdf.  (explaining courts “must explain how they arrived at a particular sentence” including “the factual basis supporting a finding of particular aggravating or mitigating factors”).  For all those reasons, consecutive sentences were entirely inappropriate.  In any event, the court’s failure to consider all the Yarbough factors requires a resentencing.
[brief] (10T39-1 to 40-25; 10T79-24 to 80-3).  Paperwork signed by defendant showed each of the three calibrations was performed.  (10T51-23 to 54-25; S-5; S-6; S-7).  Defendant, feeling [...] was “setting [him] up,” and --- 4  [...] did not replace the battery because he was not sure whether defendant was using the inoperable NIST Thermometer when performing calibrations.  (10T135-4 to 10).  [...] expected defendant to realize that the battery was dead and change it.  (10T136-12 to 13).  5  Every calibration produces documents that must be introduced before individual breath test results are admissible in any DWI trial.
[brief] ## CASES CITED: | CASE NAME | PAGE | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Balsamides v. Protameen Chems., 160 N.J. 352 (1999) | 12 | | Bendar v. Rosen, 247 N.J. Super. 219 (App. Div. 1991) | 44 | | Burd v. N.J. Tel. Co., 76 N. J. 284 (1978) | 4, 10| | C.E. v. Elizabeth Pub. Sch. Dist., 472 N.J. Super. 253 (App. Div. 2022) | 13 | | Campione v. Soden, 150 N.J. 163 (1997) | 41 | | Catena v. Raytheon Co., 447 N.J. Super. 43 (App. Div. 2016) | 4 | | Charles Bloom & Co. v. Echo Jewelers, 279 N.J. Super. 372 (App. Div. 1995)| 43 | | Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 409 N.J. Super. 444 (App. Div. 2009) | 24 | | Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron, 94 N.J. 473 (1983) | 12 | | Gannett Satellite Information Network, LLC v. Tp. Of Neptune, ___ N.J. ___ (June 20, 2023) | 16 | | Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431 (2013) | 47 | | Henry v. N.J. Dept. of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320 (2010) | 5 | | Holtham v. Lucas, 460 N.J. Super. 308 (App. Div. 2019) | 47 | | Kendall v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 209 N.J. 173 (2012) | 5, 10| | Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169 (2003) | 3, 26| | Konsuvo v. Netzke, 91 N.J. Super. 353 (Ch. Div. 1966) | 25 | | Kustka v. Batz, 236 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 1989) | 42 | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CONT’D | PAGE | |-----------------------------|------| | Lapka v. Porter Hayden Co., 162 N.J. 545 (2000) | 10 | | Leitao v. Damon G. Douglas Co., 301 N.J. Super. 187 (App. Div. 1997) | 15 | | Maintainco, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift America, Inc., 408 N.J. Super. 461 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 502 (2009) | 22 | | Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366 (1995) | 12 | | Meisels v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 240 N.J. 286 (2020) | 23 | | Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427 (2001) | 13 | | Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569 (2008) | 31 | | Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995) | 13 | | Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474 (1974) | 31 | | Stanley Co. of America v. Hercules Powder Co., Stanley, 16 N.J. 295 (1954) | 27 | | State v. Pomianek, 221 N.J. 66 (2015) | 12 | | Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015) | 27, 31 | | Westmount Country Club v. Kameny, 82 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 1964) | 47 | RULES AND STATUTES CITED: Rule 2:10-2 | 10-12
[brief] During the liability phase of trial, jurors were asked to consider two opposing narratives of the cause of [...]’s injuries; they had to either believe that [...] “sucker punched” [...] or that [...] followed [...] through the store and assaulted him.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that [...] was capable of physical labor because it was not only relevant to impeach his credibility, but also probative of whether he was lying about the altercation.  Meanwhile, the cases Plaintiffs cite are inapposite.
[brief] This Act also amended the Waterfront Development Law (N.J.S.A. 12:5-3) and the Coastal Area Facility Review Act (N.J.S.A. 13:19-10) by providing as follows:  The Department of Environmental Protection may, as a condition of an approval, require pursuant to Subsection a) of this section, and pursuant to standards established by rule or regulation adopted pursuant to the “administrative procedure act”, P.L. 1968, c.410 (C.52:14B-l et seq.), require a person or municipality to provide on-site public access to the waterfront and adjacent shoreline, or off-site public access to the waterfront and adjacent shoreline if on-site public access is not feasible as determined by the department.  P.L. 2015, c. 260, Section d, emphasis added.  An additional source of legislative history is the Report to [...] from the Public Access Task Force dated April 2016. \(^{13}\)  The Public Access Task Force was convened by Senator Smith, who was (and remains) the Chair of the \(^{13}\) [...], et al., Report to [...] from the Public Access Task Force (Apr. 2016) (unpublished).  Aa0142-171.  Senate Environment and Energy Committee, and was also a principal sponsor of the Public Access Law.  The Task Force was charged with providing a set of recommendations regarding public access to beaches, tidal waterways and their adjacent shorelines.
[brief] Later in the Supplemental Brief, the Board stated “the Board noted that the site is currently non-conforming with regard to density, before any additional units further increased density. ” (Page 14 of Board’s Supplemental Trial Brief).  Finally, on appeal, the Board is continuing to claim that the “area of the existing development was in excess of seventeen acres and was developed in excess of the density requirements for the zone. ” (Respondent’s Brief at 1).  “The Board recognized that the Applicant’s use exceeds the density allowed in the zone as it currently exists and the development proposal is inconsistent with the stated purpose of the EMF-18 Zones and MF-8 Zones. ” (Respondent’s Brief at 9).  “On remand, the Board clarified and further explicated their findings, Board member [...] found that the site is non-conforming as the density is already over the density for that zone. ” (Respondent’s Brief at 9).  The Board goes on to state in its Legal Argument: “Specifically, the Board noted that the site as currently developed is non-conforming with regard to density, before the addition of added units further increased density. ” (Respondent’s Brief at 15).  “The number of units on the site as it exists is above the permitted amount per acre in the EMF-18 zone. ” (Respondent’s Brief at 21).  In the concluding paragraph of the Brief, the Board states: “Finally, the Board found that the Applicant’s use exceeds the density allowed in the zone as it currently exists…” (Respondent’s Brief at 29).
[brief] (PA051, T49:L11-15).  He relinquished his rented property in North Carolina by the time he signed up for the [...] policy.  (PA057, T76:L9-24).  He changed his driver's license to New Jersey using the address of [...].  (PA040, T5:L16-24; PA051, T50:L8-T51:L23).  He identified this address as his on his Complaint, in Interrogatories, and at deposition.  (PA002, Count 1, ¶1; PA026, No. 1; PA040, T5:L16-24).  He confirmed this New Jersey address at the time of the accident in his deposition.  (PA041, T10:L2-6).  This New Jersey address is recorded on the police report for the April 13, 2022 accident.  (PA070-071).  His relocation to New Jersey was a “permanent” move.  (PA046, T31:L13-24).  He considered the Orange, New Jersey address, his “home. ” (PA052, T56:L7-21).  The appellant/plaintiff garaged his 2002 Kia Sportage (the vehicle involved in the accident) in [...] at the time he applied for the Progressive Southeastern policy.  (PA048, T37:L5-9, T38:L25-T39:L10, T40:L7-10).  Appellant/plaintiff’s address was in New Jersey, and that plaintiff garaged his vehicles in New Jersey, for at least one year prior to the accident of April 13, 2022:
[brief] To avoid confusion, [...] and [...] are referred to herein as the “Companies” and with [...] as “Appellants” rather than Defendants since the Companies, together with [...], are plaintiffs in the Law Division Case.  Moreover, as noted above, Plaintiff-Respondent is referred to as [...] rather than Plaintiff since she is a defendant in the Law Division Case. loan [them] the money needed[.]”  Ibid.  [...] contends that “[i]n furtherance thereof, in May 2012, as part of this understanding, [...] advanced to [them] $1 million to use towards the acquisition of the Property and/or confirmation of the [] chapter 11 plan of reorganization. ”  Ibid.  To that end, a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) was allegedly executed on May 14, 2012.  Da311-14.  The MOU related to a proposed loan to [...] and her husband for $2,385,250 (including the $1 million [...] had already provided May 9, 2012), which was to be bundled with a pre-existing debt of $1,113,750 (which represented another $1 million loan issued in 2006 plus interest), for a total of $3.5 million, with monthly payments due thereon beginning June 1, 2012 and which was to be paid off by June 1, 2014 (almost eleven years ago).
[brief] Id., citing N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c).  The inability of a petitioner to transfer its burden to the Board was at issue in Hawkins v. Board of Trustees, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 727 (App. Div. 2020).  [RA-18 Exhibit E].  There, as in this matter, the Board rejected the ALJ’s reliance upon an expert and its decision to grant the petitioner accidental disability benefits.  Id. at 1-2.  [RA-18-19 Exhibit E].  The petitioner argued that, because the Board failed to present evidence ‘to contradict’ certain assertions he raised, “the Board’s denial is not supported by the record, is arbitrary, capricious, plainly unreasonable and should be reversed. ”
[brief] .............................................................................................................. passim N.J.S.A. 34:19-3 .........................................................................................................................  4  Other Authorities  [...], The Hague Convention: A Medium for International Discovery, 40 N.C. J. INT'L L. 771, 772 (2014) .......................  18 Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b) ......................................................................................................................  14  Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) .............................................................................................................  12  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(1) ..................................................................................  14  NEW JERSEY COURT RULES, Comment R. 4:14-2 ............................................................  12  New Jersey Court Rules, Comment, R. 4:14-2(c) .................................................................  12  Rule 4:14-1 ...............................................................................................................................  11  Rule 4:14-2 ...............................................................................................................................  13  Rule 4:14-3 ...............................................................................................................................  11  Rule 4:14-2(a) ..........................................................................................................................  11, 14 Rule 4:23-4 ...............................................................................................................................  12  Rule 4:42-2 ...............................................................................................................................  21  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 4 Internal Affairs Unit or Function  4.0.1  Every law enforcement agency shall establish, by written policy, an internal affairs unit or function.  Depending upon the need, the internal affairs function can be full- or part-time.  In either case, this requires the establishment of a unit or the clear allocation of responsibility and resources for executing the internal affairs function.  The unit will consist of agency personnel assigned to internal affairs by the law enforcement executive.  Personnel assigned to the internal affairs function serve at the pleasure of and are directly responsible to the law enforcement executive or the designated internal affairs supervisor.
[directive] [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  Speak at sentencing?  Domagać się wydłużonego okresu pozbawienia wolności?  b.  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  Seek an extended term of confinement?  Domagać się zastrzeżenia dotyczącego niekwalifikowania się do zwolnienia c. warunkowego?  [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  Seek a stipulation of parole ineligibility?  Czy zdaje Pan(i) sobie sprawę, że będzie Pan(i) musiał(a) zapłacić 15.
[brief] The Sentencing Court’s Final Justifications For Imposing A Consecutive Sentence—That The Certain Persons Offense Is A Separate And Distinct Offense From Robbery And Would Be A “Free Crime” If Run Concurrent—Are Not A Valid Bases For Imposing A Consecutive Sentence.  The sentencing court’s final rationales for imposing a consecutive sentence were that a certain persons offense is a separate and distinct offense from robbery and that it would be a “free crime” if run concurrent:  Going back to the separate and distinct offense . . . [a] certain persons is a separate and distinct statutory crime from robbery.  . . .  [R]egardless of whether the gun was to be used to fulfill this particular robbery, the fact that Defendant had the gun in the first place for any purpose is prohibited by statute due to his prior felony convictions.  This renders the certain persons conviction an inherently separate offense distinct from the offense during which the gun was discovered.  ...  The Defendant’s charges related to his gun possession on the December 3 robbery already merged with the robbery count, and all four counts ran concurrently.  All that remained was the distinct and separate certain persons offense for which Defendant was charged, tried, and found guilty.
[brief] Equitable fraud “‘requires proof of (1) a material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) the maker’s intent that the other party rely on it; and (3) detrimental reliance by the other party. ’”  Id. at 136-37 (quoting Liebling v. Garden State Indem., 337 N.J. Super. 447, 453 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 606 (2001)).  Prior to the erroneous enrollment, [...] completed, signed and submitted a Contractor Enrollment Form to [...], which described [...]’s work as “concrete cutting.
[brief] See Haggarty v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10-2416 CRB (JSC), 2012 WL 3939321, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2012) (“[D]iscovery may not be used as a fishing expedition. ”) (cleaned up).  *15  [...]’s decisions to deny Plaintiffs’ repeated demands to designate [...] and [...] as custodians show that the Court appreciates and respects these considerations.  Other courts, too, have refused to make apex personnel custodians in the absence of a showing that they possess relevant documents that cannot be obtained from other sources.  See, e.g., Lutzeier v. Citigroup Inc., No. 4:14-cv-00183-RLW, 2015 WL 430196, at *6–7 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 2, 2015) (denying request to add high-level executives to a custodial list because “Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden to show that these high level executives have unique or personal knowledge of the subject matter that warrants their information”); Harris v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2018 WL 2729131, at *1 (D. Neb. June 6, 2018) (denying motion to compel production of CEO’s documents, finding there was not “a sufficient showing that this information is necessary and not cumulative of other materials”).
[brief] (Argued at Pa373 – Pa374)**  Courts have held that the existence of administrative remedies obviates the need for a private right to a cause of action to sue in Superior Court.  Courts therefore require the exhaustion of administrative remedies to prevent circumvention of procedures to redress alleged violations against public entities.  Administrative remedies before the Commissioner of Education existed for [...] to seek redress of the Board’s alleged violations of \textit{N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)}.  Thus, the \textsuperscript{26} \textit{R.J.  Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co.}, 168 N.J. 255, 271 (2001)  \textsuperscript{27} \textit{Miller v. Zoby}, 250 N.J. Super. 568, 576, 595 (App. Div. 1991) existence of the administrative remedies obviates the need for a private right to a cause of action, and [...] is legally prohibited from suing the Board in Superior Court for violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) without having exhausted its administrative remedies.  Thus, the court committed legal error when it granted the Counterclaim without [...] exhausting its administrative remedies.  In what our Supreme Court stated was the “seminal case in New Jersey to consider whether a state statute confers an implied private right of action”\(^{28}\), “In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the plaintiffs had no private right of action” because the “the statute’s legislative scheme provided mechanisms…that obviates the plaintiffs’ need for a private cause of action”, so “the Court determined that the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies should be applied to prevent the circumvention of established procedures”.
[directive] Você entende que se o crime ocorreu em 4 de maio de 2001 ou após esta data, em decorrência da [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] sua declaração de culpa, você será obrigado a pagar uma multa de $800 por cada crime para o qual você está se declarando culpado?  Do you understand that if the crime occurred on or after May 4, 2001 as a result of your guilty plea you will be required to pay a penalty of $800 for each offense for which you are pleading guilty?
[directive] In addition, there has been significant collaboration at the federal level to implement a HWC program in Newark.  The [...] ([...]) and the [...] partnered with the [...] and the [...] to create the [...] in 2017.  The [...], the [...] and the [...] have also partnered with the [...] and their school superintendents to implement HWC programs in their counties.  Similarly, the [...] and the [...] implemented countywide HWC directives this year.  Because all of these programs have helped mitigate the negative effects of ACEs for countless young people, they should be replicated statewide.
[brief] (25T 12-21 to 88-17; Da 17; Da 18-74)  [...] denied that the suspect was him, or that the suspect had gone into his house, or that he had anything to do with the homicide.  (25T 12-21 to 88-17; Da 17; Da 18-74)  Officers repeatedly pressed [...] for details about his movements that night (25T 12-21 to 88-17; Da 17; Da 18-74); at trial, the prosecutor alleged that [...] lied during the interrogation to cover up guilt.  (27T 49-9 to 13)  On March 8, officers conducted another out-of-court identification procedure with [...], who had previously failed to make an identification.
[brief] (Pa39)  At the time of the incident, Plaintiff was able to walk, but she experienced an increase in pain later that day and for three (3) days following the incident.  (Pa38; Pa42)  Plaintiff drove home, but later drove herself to [...] to seek medical treatment with chief complaints of back pain.  (Pa42-Pa43)  Although x-rays taken at [...] revealed that nothing was broken, Plaintiff continued to treat with her primary care physician, who recommended that Plaintiff undergo an MRI.  (Pa43; Pa46-Pa47)  The MRI revealed a bulging disc.  (Pa47)  Plaintiff also treated with orthopedists, where she received epidural injections, and with a neurosurgeon, and underwent physical therapy, acupuncture, and chiropractic treatments.  (Pa47-Pa50)  Despite seeking treatment, to this day, Plaintiff’s pain, as a result of the accident, has plateaued, and she constantly experiences back pain every day.
[brief] Specifically, “comparative medical evidence is [a] necessary part of Plaintiff’s *prima facie* case. ”  *Davidson v. Slater*, 189 N.J. 166, 185 (2007).  Under Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F the Plaintiff has the burden of proving what portion of her condition is due to her pre-existing injury.  Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F.  The Respondent must have proof of causation with respect to a claim of aggravation of a pre-existing injury or a new independent injury to an already injured part of the body.