ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Report clarifies the significance of its factual finding when it criticizes the relatively recent 2017 survey for Lot 12, the [...]’ adjacent neighbor to the south.  That survey was performed by [...], PE & LS (the “[...] Survey”) which agrees with the Sweeney Survey of the Patierno’s property.  See [...] Survey, Pa145; l.T131, l.10-T132, l.7.  See also, Report, Pa109.  Noticeably, the Respondents fail to even identify [...] as a witness who testified at trial (Db6).  This betrays the Respondents’ mental block when it comes to the material facts.
[brief] “The NJCFLA does not provide a mechanism for action and enforcement to anyone other than the [...].  See N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18”  N.A.R., Inc. v. Ritter, No. A-0322-23, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1313, at *10-11 (App. Div. June 24, 2024) (“The NJCFLA does not provide a mechanism for action and enforcement to anyone other than the [...]”) and Jefferson Capital Sys., LLC Inc/Santander Consumer USA v. Glover, No. A-3545-22, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1248, at *10 (App. Div. June 18, 2024)
[brief] .......................36  Martin v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co., 346 N.J. Super. 320 (App. Div. 2002)  ............................25  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Video Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986)  .................................................................23  McKelvey v. Pierce, 173 N.J. 26 (2002)  ...........................................28  Merchants Express Money Order Co. v. Sun Nat’l Bank, 374 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 2005) .............................................25  N.J. State Bar Ass’n v. Northern N.J. Mortg. Assocs., 32 N.J. 430 (1960) ..........42
[brief] 6  1.  [...] is conflating his arguments about a lack of an enforceable contract with his arguments about a lack of standing; and further asks this Court to ignore the practical realities involved with selling cars for junk.  6  2.  [...] distorts this Court's rulings in Haylett v. Baladi, 2010 WL2346713, and also points to distinctions that are immaterial to its applicability to the facts here in this instant matter.  8  3.  The Respondent cannot defeat the validity of my unjust enrichment claim.  10  4.  The Respondent was the party whom had numerous "far better options".  11  5.  [...] is incorrect that a showing of bad faith is not necessary to impose sanctions under the statute (or under the rule); and further this position is contrary to his own arguments that he had asserted previously.  12  6.  [...] concedes there was no objective basis behind the sanctions award.  15  CONCLUSION
[brief] ORDERS  [...]  [...]  [...]  Tel: [...]  Email: [...]  Pro Se Litigant & Appellant - Interested Party  Sole Vested Remainder Beneficiary of Trust #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | SECTION | PAGE | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | ii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 1 | | REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S COUNTERSTATEMENTS OF FACTS | 3 | | REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S LEGAL ARGUMENTS | 7 | | POINT I | 8 | | THE APPELLANT DOES HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE ACCOUNTING AND PETITIONER'S FEE APPLICATIONS | | | POINT II | 10 | | TRIAL COURT DID ERR BY STRIKING APPELLANT'S EXCEPTIONS | | | POINT III | 12 | | TRIAL COURT DID ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE JUDGMENT | | | POINT IV | 15 | | TRIAL COURT DID ERR IN DETERMINING FEE APPLICATIONS | | | POINT V | 18 | | TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE FEE AWARDS | | | CONCLUSIONS | 20 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | PAGE(S) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Cummings v. Bahr | 12 | | 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) | | | D'Atria v. D'Atria | 12 | | 576 A.2d 957, 961 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1990) | | | D'Atria v. D'Atria | 12 | | 242 N.J. 393, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)) | | | Fusco v. Board of Ed Newark | 15 | | 349 N.J. super. 455, 462 (App. Div. 2002) | | | Packard-Bamburger & Co. v. Collier | 15 | | 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001) | | ## RULES - N.J. R.4:49-2 | 12 | - N.J. R.4:87 | 1,3,4,8,10,11,12,17 | - RPC 1.5(a) | 16 |
[brief] Animal Protection League of N.J. v. N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 423 N.J. Super. 549, 562 (App. Div. 2011).  Furthermore, to the extent Appellant asks this Court to weigh the testimony and evidence and arrive at a different result than the Authority, it is not for Appellants or this Court to second guess the Authority’s decision. \(^9\)  As noted supra, appellate review of an agency decision is limited in scope and this Court “may not substitute its own judgment for the agency's, even though the court might have reached a different result.
[brief] See Horton v. Am. Inst. for Mental Studies, 145 N.J. Super. 550, 552 (Law Div. 1976) (noting in the summary judgment context that “[a] defendant is as entitled to be speedily rid of baseless claims as a plaintiff is entitled to raise them”).  Moreover, even the Printing Mart court added the caveat that dismissals without prejudice are the appropriate remedy for a complaint that fails to state a claim “barring any other impediment such as a statute of limitations .  . . .”  Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 772 (emphasis added).  Therein lies the problem for [...]—the trial court did not consider its other challenges because [...] was procedurally barred from bringing them due to its failure to comply with the forty-five day appeal period of the prerogative writ rules.
[brief] ”  Brown at 7.  In Brown, the Commission found that the respondent, a board of education member, violated the Code when he posted a message on his Facebook page (“Now if we could only do something about our local terrorists that destroy dreams and burn futures”), the Superintendent’s photo came up as a result of the post, and he did not remove it.  Further, the Commission emphasized “that in using social media, the affirmative duties within the Code of Ethics for School Board Members may not be overlooked. ”  Id. at 8.  With the above in mind, Respondent’s disparaging posts to social media at issue constituted conduct that undermined the public’s trust in the Board and compromised the Board’s ability to engage with the public.
[brief] After the Settlement Agreement was executed, [...] made three of the four payments to which it had agreed in Paragraph 3(b) of the Settlement Agreement, totaling $138,175.17.  [Pa176 at ¶ 17; Pa185].  [...] admits that it failed to make the fourth payment due on October 1, 2023, thus also admitting a second event of default under the Settlement Agreement (in addition to its unauthorized dumping).  [1T at 14:7-16; Pa176 at ¶ 17].  Additionally, as the October 31, 2023 vacation date approached, [...]’s Subtenant contacted [...]’s counsel to request additional time to vacate beyond the October 31, 2023 vacation date to which [...] and [...] had agreed -- which request was denied.  [Pa297 at ¶¶ 2-4].  Subtenant ultimately held over beyond the October 31, 2023 vacation date (a third event of default) [Pa298 at ¶ 4], and neither [...] nor Subtenant left the Leased Premises “broom clean” as they had agreed to do and were required to do – constituting a fourth event of default.  [Pa215; Pa310].  While [...] vigorously disputed the volume of materials that had been dumped at the Leased Premises, it did not (and could not) dispute its remaining three events of default.  Despite this, and the express terms of the Settlement Agreement that required entry of the Consent Judgments upon any event of default, the trial court erroneously failed to consider [...]’s three additional events of default, any one of which also triggered [...]’s right to present the Consent Judgments for entry.
[brief] The Contract and Construction Documents Required that all Comply with the MUTCD.  [...] final argument that it was not required to ensure that the MUTCD was followed contradicts the contracts and the construction documents.  As has already been addressed, if a condition existed in the travel portion of the roadway that required the condition to either be fixed or warned against then [...] was to ensure that it happened.  (Pa0599).  The construction inspection manual specifically outlines that everyone working on the project was required to ensure that the MUTCD was followed.  (Pa1337).  Afterall, [...] was the [...]’s “eyes and ears” on the project.
[brief] Pa12.  In July 2022, Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting the Court to enforce the terms of [...]’s Order, declare Defendants knowingly and intentionally unreasonably denied access to OPRA records, award attorney fees, pay post judgment interest and assess a civil penalty against the Defendants.  Pa1.  The Defendants opposed the motion.  Pa4.  While this motion was pending, an Order for Judgment was entered in the Civil Judgment and Order Docket in the Superior Court’s Clerk Office as [...] on July 20, 2022.
[brief] ”  (Pa 6)  Specifically, [...], [...] and [...] became aware of [...] sometime during the week --- 1  The defense adopts the procedural facts contained in the State’s brief.  2  “Pb” refers to the State’s Appellate Division brief “Pa” refers to the appendix to the State’s brief “Ca” refers to the confidential appendix to the State’s brief “1T” – January 4, 2024, suppression hearing “2T” – February 14, 2024, suppression hearing “3T” – April 22, 2024, suppression hearing of November 28, 2021, when a confidential informant (CI), who was “vetted” by [...], “provided information that [[...]] had been selling controlled dangerous substances (‘CDS’) in Ocean County.
[brief] In July 2006, plaintiffs filed a complaint against the landlords and [...], alleging that: 1) the landlords were negligent (Count One); 2) the landlords breached the lease agreement (Count Two); 3) the landlords breached the implied warranty of habitability by failing to keep the property in a reasonably safe condition (Count Three); 4) [...] was strictly liable for all injuries arising out of the attack pursuant to N.J.S.A. 4:19-16 (Count Four); and 5) all defendants were liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress suffered by [...] and [...]'s brother, [...], as a result of their witnessing the four dogs attack [...] (Count Five).
[brief] Appellant fails to address the relevant discussion in *Woo-Padva v. [...] Funding LLC*, [...], 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 96 (January 21, 2022) (Da103), where the Hon [...], J.S.C. performed a thorough analysis and found another reason why [...], a debt buyer, was not subject to the NJCFLA, explaining:  [T]he NJCFLA does not define a consumer lender as one that buys debts.  Rather, the plain words only include within its definition those "in the business of buying, discounting or endorsing notes."  N.J.S.A. §17:11C-2.  Courts have long considered the distinction between "notes" and "debts."  See *Smith v. Palisades Collection, LLC*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28348, *15 (N.D. Ohio April 3, 2007) (plaintiff's claim "is based upon the flawed premise [*7*] that a credit card agreement is equivalent to a promissory note."); *Cavalry SPVI, LLC v. Krantz*, 2012-Ohio 2202, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1941, at *6 (Ohio App. May 17, 2012); *Lemke v. Barclays Bank Delaware*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69598, at *12 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2015).  New Jersey statutes establish a distinction between a "note" and the credit card debt at issue in this case.  N.J.S.A. §12A:3-118 explicitly provides the statute of limitations for "an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note . . ." while N.J.S.A. §2A:14-1, a separate and distinct section of New Jersey law, provides the statute of limitations to enforce claims based on a breach of contract that generally apply to credit card debts.  Plaintiff uses the word "buying" to aid in her claims.  However, the NJCFLA uses the word "buying" to modify the word "notes."  N.J.S.A. §17:11C-2.  The NJCFLA therefore applies only when a party is buying "notes," not buying debts, and does not apply to Defendant.
[brief] Pa0047 at 54:16-55:7.  The Act would even prohibit bankruptcy attorneys, a common type of specialized legal practice, from being principally engaged in the performance of such services.  Pa0047 at 41:7-11, 58:11-18.  An attorney would thus violate the Act even if they do excellent work and the attorney’s client is very happy with the services provided.  Pa0047 at 57:11-17.  Given these acknowledgments, [...] simply could not explain how the Limited Attorney Exemption advances the interests of protecting consumers.
[directive] December 13, 2023 of2  Page 2  Pursuant to P.L. 2015, 31), a Preliminary PSA will automatically generate.  Once c. of the automatic Preliminary PSA generated, it will available in the case jacket be is the eCourts system for reference.  The attached "eCDR Municipal Release Notes" provides detailed operational guidance.  Conclusion  Questions or comments may be directed to the Criminal Practice Division at (609)815-2900, ext. 55300 or AOCCrimPrac.mbx@njcourts.gov.  "eCDR- Attachment: Municipal Release Notes 12/08/2023"  cc: Chief Justice [...]  Hon. [...]  W. Hon. [...]  Criminal Division Judges Municipal Division Judges Family Division Judges  [...], Attorney General of Colonel [...], Superintendent the New Jersey State Police of of [...], Director the Division Criminal Justice J. of [...], Chief Staff D. AOC Directors and Assistant Directors  Special Assistants to the Administrative Director  Criminal Division Managers and Assistant Division Managers  Municipal Division Managers and Assistant Division Managers  Family Division Managers and Assistant Division Managers  [...], Chief, Criminal Practice M. [...], Chief, Criminal Practice  W. [...], Assistant Chief, Criminal Practice  [...], Assistant Chief, Criminal Practice  Administrative Office of the Courts
[brief] See Hart v. City of Jersey City, 308 N.J. Super. at 497.  Unlike any of the cases cited in footnote 6 and discussed above, none of the facts or law in the instant matter changed between March 22, 2024 and May 14, 2024 that would require the Court to revisit an order of an equal trial court judge.  Accordingly, the [...] respectfully submit that [...] is bound under the law of the case doctrine to follow the Court prior Order of March 22, 2024.  Accordingly, even if the second trial court were permitted to review the first trial court judge’s Order and Decision under the standard of review applicable to interlocutory orders, which the [...] deny, the Court’s analysis is not supported by the case law cited in the Court’s footnote or the factual record.  As such, at a minimum, the trial court’s June 20, 2024 order denying the [...]’ motion to reverse its May 14, 2024 order “restor[ing]” “this matter…to the trial calendar in its entirety” should be reversed and the May 14, 2024 “reverse and restore” order should be vacated, such that the March 22, 2024 “stay order” should control.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] (Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86, Pa89, 1T)  V.  Newark I Lacked Collateral Estoppel Preclusive Effect on All Newark II Claims and Causes of Actions.  (Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86, Pa89, 1T)  VI.  A Licensed Attorney Has a Continuous and Ongoing Professional Duty to Report Public Wrongdoing Up the Reporting Ladder.  (Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86, Pa88, Pa89, 1T)
[brief] ii.  **[...] was not required to apply for a permit or exemption from [...].**  [...]’s contention that [...] was required to apply for a permit for the construction of the 69kV line – or an exemption from the Ordinance – before moving for summary judgment is equally misplaced.  Here, again, the cases upon which [...] relies are inapposite, as they either wholly fail to address the doctrine of preemption or concern statutes outside of the context of the regulation of high-capacity transmission lines.  See e.g., *Conlon v. Bd. of Pub. Works of City of Paterson*, 11 N.J. 363 (1953) (zoning ordinance deemed invalid because it usurped jurisdiction of the local board of adjustment) (Db29); *Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean*, 220 N.J. 239, 242 (2015) (zoning ordinance deemed a legitimate exercise of municipality’s power to zone property) (Db29); *Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford*, 68 N.J. 576 (1975) (holding, among other things, that rent control ordinance was not facially unconstitutional on due process grounds) (Db29); *AMG Assocs. v. Springfield Twp.*, 65 N.J. 101 (1974) (assessing validity of use variance) (Db29); *Harvard Enter., Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Madison Twp., Middlesex Cty.*, 56 N.J. 362 (1970) (assessing as applied challenge to constitutionality of ordinance requiring 2,000 feet of distance between proposed and existing gas stations) (Db29).  In sum, [...] points to no legal authority holding that [...] was required to comply with the terms of the Ordinance by requesting a permit or exemption prior to moving for summary judgment on preemption grounds.  The trial court’s Opinion and Order should thus be affirmed.
[brief] We expect all the witnesses to be available for the plaintiff.  Counsel you’re going to be able to cross examine [...] to start and then present any of your clients.  And any of the members of the public and conclude this matter.  [...]: [...] and [...].  [...]: Yeah, I kept on forgetting [...].  Yeah, correct.  Okay.  (T 89:24 – 90:12)  August 22, 2022  At the September 22, 2022, the re-do hearing was continued and Appellant and Respondent were able to conclude the re-do testimony and then completed all remaining testimony for the application.
[directive] Other Provisions  A.  This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney Non-enforceability by third parties.  General’s authority to ensure the uniform and efficient enforcement of the laws and administration of criminal justice throughout the State.  This Directive imposes limitations on law enforcement agencies and officials that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.  B.  Severability.  The provisions of both this Directive and shall be severable.  If any IAPP phrase, clause, sentence or provision of either this Directive or is declared by a IAPP court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder either document shall not be affected.  C.  Any questions concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Questions. Directive or shall be addressed to the Executive Director of [...], or their designee.  D.  This Directive shall take effect on April 1, 2020.  The provisions of this Effective date.  Directive shall remain in force and effect unless and until it is repealed, amended, or superseded by Order of the Attorney General.  The revised appended to this IAPP Directive supersedes all prior versions of IAPP.
[brief] (Da 68)  Video from a meat shop called [...] depicted the shooting from a distance -- though it did not clearly show the shooter’s face -- and it showed that the shooter fled the scene by turning east onto [...], toward the direction of where [...] encountered the fleeing suspect. \(^2\) (3T 22-5 to 41-24, 123-1 to 129-14; Da 68)  At trial, no witness identified the suspect in the [...] video.
[brief] Plaintiff is then given the opportunity to demonstrate that a retaliatory intent motivated Defendants’ actions and not the legitimate reason offered by Defendants.  *Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 284 N.J. Super. 543, 551 (App. Div. 1995).  Plaintiff must simply persuade the Court that the evidence presented provides a reasonable basis for a juror to believe that Defendants’ articulated reasons “w[ere] merely a pretext to mask the [retaliation] or was not the true motivating reason for the employment decision. ”  *Greenberg v. Camden County Vocational & Tech. Schools*, 310 N.J. Super. 189, 198 (App. Div. 1998).
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 336 (quoting *Hensley v. Eckerhart*, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)).  The party bringing the fee application must also establish that the actions taken were necessary.  “[A] fee award is justified if [the party's] efforts are a necessary and important factor in obtaining the relief. ”  *Litton Industries*, 200 N.J. at 386 (citations omitted).  The presentation of time spent must also be “set forth in sufficient detail to permit the trial court to ascertain the manner in which the billable hours were divided among the various counsel.
[directive] Cf. R. 3:17(b)(iv) (explaining that station house custodial interrogations must be electronically recorded 4 unless “a statement is made during a custodial interrogation by a suspect who indicated, prior to making the statement, that he/she would participate in the interrogation only if it were not recorded; provided however, that the agreement to participate under that condition is itself recorded”).  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021  12 6.4  Decision to Decline a Civilian’s De-Activation Request.  If an officer declines a request to de-activate a BWC pursuant to Section 6.1 or 6.2, the reasons for declining the request (e.g., the officer believes that there is a reasonable possibility that it may be necessary to use constructive authority or force during the encounter) must be documented and shall be reported to the officer’s superior as soon as it is safe and practicable to do so, unless the agency’s policy prohibits de-activation authorized by Section 6.1 or 6.2.  6.4.1  In the event that the officer declines a de-activation request, the officer immediately shall inform the person making the request of that decision.  An officer shall be prohibited from misleading the person making the de-activation request pursuant to Section 6.1 or 6.2 into believing that the BWC has been turned off when in fact it is operating unless the County Prosecutor or designee or the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee expressly has authorized covert recording.  Note that pursuant to Section 4.5, an officer may not decline a request from an apparent crime victim to discontinue recording of the encounter via the BWC.
[brief] Plaintiffs contend the adoption of the amended Redevelopment Plan was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, arguing that the Planning Board failed to make any findings of fact or consistency determination.  As explained above, this position is belied by the record.  See Pa128 (“The Plaintiffs ignore the unrefuted testimony of the Borough Planner who authored the 2019 Master Plan Reexamination Report and his very own familiarity with the iterations of the redevelopment planning dating back to 2006 which specifically included the land use element of the Master Plan”); see also Pa70 (incorporating by reference the Borough planner’s testimony in the Planning Board’s resolution that affirmed “[t]he Amended Redevelopment Plan is consistent with the goals and objectives of the Master Plan”).
[brief] (Pa 33-36).  The Defendants did not file a Cross-Appeal, nor did they file a Case Information Statement.  \(^1\) T Transcript of Trial  October 31, 2022  \(^2\) T Transcript of Trial, November 1, 2022  \(^3\) T Transcript of Trial  November 2, 2022  \(^4\) T Transcript of Trial Decision, August 3, 2023  \(^5\) T at 72-72  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Appellants’ remaining counterarguments fare no better.  Appellants claim the Revised Policy does not “discriminate against any person in the furnishing” of accommodations or privileges.  (Db11).  But a policy that permits differential ³ Appellants repeatedly argue that the trial court said there “may” be violations of the LAD and the challenged policies “opened the door” to illegality.  (Db11-19).  But the court’s findings were far stronger, recognizing the State had made “a strong argument” that these policies treated “LAD-protected characteristics” impermissibly and “invite[d] a violation of the LAD” through “[m]andatory differential treatment. ” (Da406).  treatment of a student based in part on a protected characteristic discriminates against that student in the furnishing of an accommodation—a public education.