ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  [Bolvito, 217 N.J. at 228 (alteration in original) (quoting Roth, 95 N.J. at 364-65). ]  In general terms, judges are given wide but not unconstrained discretion at sentencing.  State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 53-54 (2014).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has articulated the extent and limit of that discretion as follows:  When the aggravating and mitigating factors are identified, supported by competent, credible evidence in the record, and properly balanced, we must affirm the sentence and not second-guess the sentencing court, provided that the sentence does not shock the judicial conscience.  On the other hand, if the trial court fails to identify relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, or merely enumerates them, or forgoes a qualitative analysis, or provides little insight into the sentencing decision, then the deferential standard will not apply.
[brief] ”  (Ibid.)  Consistent with Silva and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hensley, the court noted that in this case it would be “nearly impossible to disentangle the hours spent by attorneys (in the 21 years leading up to trial and in the 12 years before the RICO statute of limitations period) working to prove RICO claims and non-RICO claims,” as “[s]o many of the same facts and witnesses are tied to both RICO and non-RICO causes of action. ” (Da39996-97.)  The court then explained its reasons why this conclusion was supported.  (Da39997-40001.)  The trial court’s analysis, which incorporated [...]’s comprehensive findings, is far from the “all-or-nothing” approach [...] claim the trial court undertook in error.  Further, without support, [...] claim that the trial court and Special Master’s “errors . . . led to a fee award that compensated Plaintiffs for several categories of work” that they contend should have been excluded from the fee award.  (Db40.)  Because Remand R&R 1 and 2 and the trial court’s Statement of Reasons thoroughly address each point complained of by [...], [...] refrains from addressing the fatal flaws of [...]’ arguments in extensive detail.  Nevertheless, for the reasons that follow, it is clear that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting [...]’s findings on these issues.
[brief] DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  [...], individually and derivatively on behalf of [...], Plaintiff/Appellant vs. [...], [...], [...], [...], JOHN DOES 1-5 (said names being fictitious), and ABC CORPORATIONS 1-5 (said entities being fictitious), Defendants/Respondents, [...], Counterclaimant/Third Party Plaintiff, vs. [...], Third Party Defendant.  On Appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division, Somerset County  Docket No. [...]  SAT BELOW: Hon. [...]  Hon [...] APPELLATE
[directive] Subject an assistant by who are authorized supervisory officers special designation of for the directive may provide 3.3.1, the notwithstanding that this of acomplaint-summons Prosecutor to approve issuance the County by will sought, andlor who are acomplaint-warrant be presumption that establishes a Directive acomplaint-warrant an application for approve Prosecutor to County authorized by the acomplaint-summons will be presumption that establishes a notwithstanding that this Directive prosecutorial authorifiy determines that such delegation of Prosecutor County the provided that issued, consultations.  overburdened by charging being office from prosecutor's prevent the necessary to is supervisory officers designated specially selected authorize  Prosecutor may County  In other words, a if County however, that the Directive, provided, of this under Section 4 presumptions overcome to overcome a assistant prosecutor to than an other authorizes anyone directive  Prosecutor's at the time of the be notified prosecutor's office that the shall require directive presumption, the 22 Page officer to supervisory aspecially-designated been by had made decision the that decision charging with telephonically the communicating by made notification maybe
[brief] 2  “1T” refers to the February 16, 2023 hearing transcript; “Pb” refers to [...]’s brief; “Pa” refers to [...]’s appendix; “Ra” refers to the Board’s appendix.  [...] described the problem relevant here as follows:  [t]he rules that allow the politically well-connected to game the system for their own benefit must be changed.  The pension system exists to serve public employees who dedicate their careers to government and the eligibility rule must ensure that only they can participate.  When non-deserving individuals are allowed to essentially freeload off the system, everyone loses.  The bottom line is the system must be returned to those for whom it was designed.  [Id. at 4]  The Task [...] made specific recommendations to eliminate these practices stating:
[brief] The Appellate Division in Britwood expressly recognized that the LRHL contains a “specific authorization” that “permits the redevelopment entity to collect funds from a redeveloper. ”  Id. at 565 (citing N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f)).  That “specific authorization” enabled the City to collect funds from [...]—including the $2 million payment.  The Britwood case supports [...]’s argument in this regard.  Similarly, the unreported decision in [...] v. Planning Bd., [...], 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 36, 2017 WL 84719 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 6, 2017), relied upon Plaintiff at Pb29, is equally unavailing.
[brief] Said monetary sanctions were now sought for defendant’s failure to comply with the 8/29/22 Order (80a).  Said civil penalty was sought for defendant’s knowing and willful violation of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11 (80a).  Additionally, [...] sought the filing of a certification from Defendant/Record Custodian [...] attesting to the Board compliance with the 8/28/20, 9/25/20, and 8/29/22 court orders.
[brief] This Court should not reverse defendant’s conviction on this basis.  It should affirm.  “Jury-selection processes are presumed valid and a defendant challenging a jury-selection process ‘must show by a preponderance of the believable evidence that the attacked process is fatally flawed. ’”  State v. Dangcil, 248 N.J. 114, 141 (2021) (quoting State v. Long, 204 N.J. Super. 469, 485 (Law Div. 1985)).  Challenges to the representation of the community contained within a jury pool require a defendant to: (1) identify a constitutionally-cognizable group, that is, a group capable of being singled out for discriminatory treatment; (2) prove substantial underrepresentation over a significant period of time; and (3) show discriminatory purpose either by the strength of his statistical showing or by showing the use of racially non-neutral selection procedures to support the inference of discrimination raised by substantial underrepresentation.
[brief] Friendship Manor, Inc. v. Greiman, 244 N.J. Super. 104, 113 (App. Div. 1990) (quotations omitted).  This policy favoring the certainty of title to real property is further established in the statutes which pertain the recording of documents.  For example, N.J.S.A. 46:21-1 provides that, “Except as otherwise provided herein, whenever any deed . . . shall have been or shall be duly recorded . . . such record shall, from that time, be notice_ to all subsequent . . . purchasers . . . of the execution of the deed . . . so recorded and of the contents thereof. ”  Then, N.J.S.A 46:22-1 states that “Every deed . . . shall, until duly recorded . . . , be void and of no effect against . . . all subsequent bona fide purchasers . . . for valuable consideration, not having notice thereof, whose deed shall have been first duly recorded . . . .”  Lastly, N.J.S.A. 46:26A-12 states clear that “any recorded document affecting the title to real property is, from the time of recording, notice to all subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and judgment creditors of the execution of the document recorded and its contents. ”  In summation, and in the simplest terms, Plaintiff is seeking to foreclose on a mortgage that was discharged and therefore is null and void.
[brief] The [...] and [...] did not perform a proper investigation.  A minute examination should be made to locate hairs, fibers, glass, wood, metal, and other material which appears to be foreign to the environment.  The suspect ran in a yard, NO investigator collect any foreign material from the backyard.  The fleeing suspect had to touch something, i.e. fence, door, widow, or house panels.  This fleeing suspect did not vanish from backyard without touching anything inside backyard.  The suspect left enough evidence to continue the investigation, until all investigation avenue’s was absolute, charging defendant was premature.  Defendant [...] has no magician skills, like, Harry Houdini, so it is obvious the suspect in the backyard was not defendant [...].  [...] performance the night of the murder, “OBSTRUCTIONIST” [...] deliberately obstruct progress.  Policemen are trained to remember faces and characteristic of suspects.  Why, this case [...] cannot describe or give a description of fleeing suspect when he looked him right in the face.  Jurist, must examine the flaws and imperfections (faulty) of this murder investigation.
[directive] A criminal defendant may waive the inclusion of this question, which deals with that defendant's decision not to testify.  Where that question is waived by defendant, the trial judge must not only ensure that the question is not asked, but also that neither the question nor any reference to the question is included in the list of questions that is distributed.  The note that is included with that question in the standard criminal questions includes the following:  "The defendant's decision in that regard should be discussed during the voir dire conference."  As part of its charge, the [...] will be responsible for considering and making recommendations regarding any changes to the standard voir dire questions, the introduction of possible additional case type questions, the drafting of a voir dire manual, development of training programs for judges and attorneys, and other related efforts.
[brief] The trial court committed no error in determining that [...] was entitled to fees incurred during 2007, 2008, and 2009.  ii.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that counsels’ claimed fees were reasonably required to establish [...]’s RICO claims.  [...]’ next argument -- that the trial court improperly awarded attorneys’ fees for certain categories of work that were not “reasonably required to establish the RICO claims” (Db37-44) -- is similarly littered with misrepresentations about the remand mandate and its purported improper application by the trial court and the Special Master.  For example, the Wilfs wrongfully characterize the trial court’s analysis as adopting an “all-or-nothing” approach that failed to apply “the test” of “whether all of the work done to establish all of the facts was ‘reasonably devoted to Plaintiffs’ pursuit of their respective RICO claims. ’” (Db38 (citation omitted).)  But this “test” is found nowhere in the Appellate Division’s prior decision.  [...] further criticize the Special Master for purportedly relying on “a general high-level analysis of certain broad categories of facts from before the RICO limitation period” instead of conducting “the required granular analysis of time entries or specific projects. ”  (Db38-39.)  But again, this “granular analysis” deemed “required” by the Wilfs is found nowhere in the Appellate Division’s prior decision. \(^3\)  [...]’ critiques to the current fee award are based on these standards, which they have invented out of thin air in an effort to persuade this Court that the trial court abused its discretion and that reversal is required.
[brief] (3T; 4T).  Then, after she spent “the appropriate amount of time to go over everything that has been put so thoroughly before the Court by both the defense and the State[,]” (4T131-16 to 19), [...] imposed sentence, (5T).  Reviewing the applicable law, [...] recognized that she was required to reconsider defendant’s sentence in light of the Miller factors and that she would be sentencing defendant as he stood before the court at that time.
[directive] all  2.  Each County Prosecutor shall have Forfeiture accounts audited on annual basis by an firm an external W C P A .  The engaged shall be provided with a copy of the “Manual for External Audits of County Forfeiture Accounts,” and any internal documents necessary to complete the audit.  The audit shall include the reports and procedures specified in the T manual.  he manual will also include formats, reports, and chedules which must b e s followed.  In that N.J.S.A.  40A:5-4 requires the governing body of each County to have an 3. W C P A audit, on an annual basis, all books, accounts and transactions of County government agencies, the Prosecutor’s responsibility for ensuring an audit of annual forfeiture-related accounts can be satisfied by the County audit conducted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 4OA:5-4, provided that the County audit o f the Prosecutor’s forfeiture-related accounts is conducted, and the audit report is prepared, in conformity with the requirements of the “Manual for External Audits of County Forfeiture Accounts.
[brief] There is no question that plaintiffs established the elements required to assert their “illegal self-help eviction” claim, see Opening Brief at 18-19; n.2; 29.  Thus, Respondent had no factual or legal basis to seek dismissal for alleged “failure to state a claim” and the motion judge had no legal or factual basis to conclude that Rule 4:6-2(e) supported dismissal since the claim was plainly stated.  Once any eviction case had been presented to the courts, the Respondent landlord would have been required to account for the security deposit, and upon failure to show any loss that would have justified even a set off of the security deposit, Respondent would have had to disgorge the deposit.  That was never done.  New Jersey courts have long held that a landlord must mitigate damages, and cannot engage in dual recovery.  “[A] commercial landlord must make 'reasonable' efforts to mitigate its damages after a tenant breaches the lease."  Harrison Riverside Ltd. P'ship v. Eagle Affiliates, Inc., 309 N.J. Super. 470, 473, 707 A.2d 490 (App. Div. 1998) (citing McGuire v. City of Jersey City, 125 N.J. 310, 320-21, 593 A.2d 309 (1991)).  “Whether [a] landlord's efforts to mitigate its damages were reasonable is a question of fact. ”  Harrison Riverside Ltd. P'ship, 309 N.J. Super. at 475.  Respondent [...] has never been held to account for its dual recovery and failure to mitigate damages.  To their credit, Respondents do not attempt to argue that the “statute of limitations” had run.  Indeed, as discussed in our Opening Brief, at 25, the applicable statute of limitations on these contract claims is the six-year contract statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.  Even more fundamental than Respondent’s commission of an illegal self-help lockout, the unlawful retention of the security deposit, and the abject failure to mitigate damages is the “elephant in the room,” Respondent’s dual “sale” of its assets initially sold in 2015-16 outright to Appellants and then sold the same assets in 2016 co-defendants in the related appeal, [...] and its related entities and CEO [...].  Appellants’ purchase of the solar rights from Respondent for $606,000 and their security deposit of $100,000 and their annual rent of $200,000 paid through September 2016 stand in stark contradiction to Respondents’ “sale” of the same solar rights to Gary Cicero and his companies before Appellants’ lease expired, and Respondent’s breach of the lease and confidentiality covenant in the lease by releasing the grounds with Gary Cicero and his entities before September 2016 and before any court declaration of removal of Appellants.  These are simply overwhelming facts that well supported Appellants’ claims against [...] Estates and they were properly asserted well within the statute of limitations.  There is no basis to conclude that Appellants’ claims were “futile” and our futility analysis in our Opening Brief emphasize this point adequately.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BECAUSE THERE WAS REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP AND DETAIN DEFENDANT.  (1T90-6 to 105-25).  [Raised Below.]  The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence because it found that the State presented reasonable suspicion to stop defendant based on the totality of the circumstances.  The State respectfully asks this Court to affirm.  Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because defendant was not identified on the search warrant for [...] and was not detained on the “immediate premises. ” (Db16-22).  Defendant further argues that since the warrant was invalid and no other exception to the warrant requirement exists, the trial court further erred in analyzing the officers’ reasonable suspicion for the stop when it should have made a probable cause calculation.  (Db23-36).  These arguments are without merit.  The State respectfully submits that the trial court properly rejected defendant’s argument that the State was required to establish probable cause because defendant was not arrested on the search warrant, but because officers presented reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention when they observed defendant, a suspect in a homicide, enter the residence that they were currently surveilling, also connected to the homicide.  Furthermore, the trial court’s Terry application was proper because it found that the officers established reasonable suspicion to stop defendant based on the totality of the circumstances.  (1T93-21 to 94-7).  The State respectfully asks this Court to affirm.
[brief] "The principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel are applicable not only to the parties in courts of law, but also in administrative tribunals and agency hearings.  ...  here, plaintiff obtained site plan approval from the Planning Board on the express condition that the second floor apartments would not be used or occupied as a residential unit or for residential purpose.  The resolution of the Planning Board was a determination made by a quasi-judicial body which precluded plaintiff from again submitting the same issue to the Zoning Board, also a quasi-judicial body, for a second determination.
[brief] In granting [...]’s Motion to Dismiss, the trial court primarily relied upon the Honorable [...]’s October 4, 2023  Opinion in the matter captioned as *Valentine v. Unifund CCR, LLC, et al.*, docket number [...] (Law Div. October 4, 2023) (Pa62),\(^2\) as well as *Asset Acceptance, LLC v. Toft*, No. A-2827-22, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 820 (App. Div. May \(^2\) The October 4, 2023 Opinion in *Valentine v. Unifund CCR, LLC, et al.*, docket number [...], was originally attached as Exhibit G (Pa59) to [...]’s Motion to Dismiss. 8, 2024), *Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding LLC*, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 96 (Law Div. Jan. 21, 2022), and *Woo-Padva v. Midland Funding*, No. A-1996-21, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550 (App. Div. Sep. 21, 2023).  See T1 7:2-10.  Of the four cases that the trial court found to be persuasive, only three address affirmative claims under the CFA arising from violations of the NJCFLA—*Valentine*, [...], *Woo-Padva*, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 96 (“*Woo-Padva 1*”), and *Woo-Padva*, No. A-1996-21, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550 (“*Woo-Padva 2*”).
[brief] An exhaustive review of the OBSC minutes (Da523-663) reveals no communication from the developer regarding the 1989 amendments which first imposed a height restriction.  (Da618-620).  In fact, there is no mention of the term “height” until 1989.  (Da618) it chooses. ” (Da54).  (Def. Brf. p.28).  The defense admits, however, that no building rules came into effect until 1989.  *Id* at 22.  The defense appears to be conflating the issue to cause confusion.  This Court must distinguish, as we do, between, 1) the power to impose *general club rules*, and 2) the power to change and impose *new building restrictions*.  We take no issue with the general club rules, and likewise, the trial court, did not impair those rules.  However, the building restrictions are separately designated in the deed and specifically are reserved to the developer.  It is here that the trial court correctly concluded “[t]here was no scheme other than what [...] put in the chain of title.  There is no inkling that there was any possibility that further rules and regulations and the right to modify those rules and regulations, those restrictions were reserved by [...].
[brief] “The court is to take into account, not only tangible factors relative to the proofs as shown by the record, but also appropriate matters of credibility, generally peculiarly within the jury's domain, and the intangible ‘feel of the case’ which it has gained by presiding over the trial. ”  Kita v. Borough of Lindenwold, 305 N.J. Super. 43, 49 (App. Div. 1997) (citations omitted).  The question a motion judge must answer is whether the result strikes the judicial mind as a miscarriage of justice.
[brief] [...]’s Trial Testimony  [...]’s expert, [...], testified that the settlement amount was reasonable.  On cross, [...] was shown several New Jersey mold verdicts and settlements, the largest of which was $150,000 for a single plaintiff.  3T183-13-15; Da19a.  The mold cases which [...] personally litigated also resulted in lower verdicts or settled for de minimis amounts, for example, a $32,500 jury award on a $14.5 million demand.  3T187-8-14.  [...] also testified that [...]’s statute of limitations defense was not viable due to the continuing tort doctrine, the “discovery rule”, and the assertion that the Underlying Action was timely filed.  3T198-9-16.  On cross-examination, he retracted his testimony as to the continuing tort doctrine and admitted that he overlooked the equitable considerations behind the application of the discovery rule.  3T202-10 to 3T204-24; Da20a.  [...] further testified that [...] could survive a pre-trial motion on exposure, based on a report by [...]’s expert, [...], which concluded that [...] was exposed to toxic mold in his condo unit.  To conduct his sampling, Dr. Tai relied upon the ERMI Method, which has been validated for research purposes only.  On cross-examination, [...] admitted he was unfamiliar with the ERMI Method but admitted that the likelihood of a successful verdict would be impacted if [...] used a scientifically invalid mold sampling method.  3T210-9 to 3T212-3; Da20a.  [...] also acknowledged the disagreement in the scientific community on whether the mycotoxins [...] claimed caused his injury could produce that result, that the doctor [...] planned to rely on to prove that connection, [...], had credibility issues because of her long-standing business dealings with [...], and that [...] had retained well-credentialed experts to contest causation.  Given these issues, he would not even guess whether [...] would prevail on causation.  3T217-20 to 3T219-24; Da20a. v. [...]’s Trial Testimony [...] retained [...], a New Jersey trial attorney and a partner at the law firm of [...], who specializes in personal injury and property damage defense, as its reasonableness expert.
[brief] This Court reviews orders granting summary judgment *de novo*, utilizing the same standards applied by the trial courts.  *Est. of Brust v. ACF Indus., LLC*, 443 N.J. Super. 103, 112 (App. Div. 2015).  Under New Jersey Court Rule 4:46-2(c), trial courts must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and evidence show there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  The court must consider the elements of the cause of action and the governing evidentiary standard.  *Bhagat v. Bhagat*, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014).  If the plaintiff fails to meet an essential element of the claim, then summary judgment is required.  *See Durando v. Nutley Sun*, 209 N.J. 235, 254 (2012).  Under these standards, the trial court correctly granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment.