[brief] Even if a court has the authority to appoint a substitute arbitrator in this case, the trial court still erred by finding that [...] had established that grounds existed for such an appointment here.  Section 5 of the FAA and the New Jersey statutory equivalent allow the court appointment of an arbitrator only where the parties “have reached an impenetrable deadlock over the appointment of arbitrators to hear their dispute. ”  BP Expl. Libya Ltd. v. ExxonMobil Libya Ltd., 689 F.3d 481, 492 (5th Cir. 2012); see also Int'l Bancshares Corp. v. Ochoa, 311 F. Supp. 3d 876, 878 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (allowing court to appoint arbitrator where “there is some mechanical breakdown in the arbitrator selection process.  A mechanical breakdown occurs when the arbitration agreement cannot be enforced at all. ”); In re Salomon Inc., 68 F.3d 554 at (holding court may appoint arbitrator if there is a “mechanical breakdown in the arbitrator selection process. ”)  Here, [...] alleges that appointment of an arbitrator is necessary because [...] rejected its own selected arbitrator after [...] agreed to him and then never responded to [...]’s subsequent proposal for a substitute arbitrator.  As [...] alleged in its verified complaint, “[[...]] submitted to [[...]] counsel two sets of three proposed retired judges to act as substitute arbitrator…They [included]… Retired Judge[…].  [...]….  [[...]] rejected all but [...], who [[...]] then rejected.  See Pa4, at ¶16.  In a subsequent filing with the trial court, [...]’s counsel, [...], Esq., confirmed that “[[...]] had worked this case with [...] [Westmoreland’s partner, [...], Esq.] who was trial counsel and I submitted the names including Judge [...], but when I spoke with him later [...] rejected that selection. ”  Pa50.  In other words, [...] proposed Judge [...] as an arbitrator, [...] agreed, and then [...] reversed course and refused to arbitrate with Judge [...].  That is not a mechanical breakdown in the process, it is gamesmanship by [...], who received exactly what it requested but then rejected its own decision.  See e.g. Adam Techs. Int'l S.A. de C.V. v. Sutherland Glob. Servs., Inc., 729 F.3d 443, 451 (5th Cir. 2013) (rejecting plaintiff’s demand for appointment of an arbitrator where its own conduct caused the impasse).  It is unclear whether [...] was attempting to game the selection process by baiting [...] to identify arbitrators it would accept and then rejecting those arbitrators or it had some other reason for rejecting its own selected arbitrator.  However, the fact remains it sabotaged its own proposal.  Likewise, because the issue to be considered at arbitration is the market value of asphalt transport trailers, [...] proposed to [...] utilizing a non-attorney arbitrator with expertise in the field.  Pa4, at ¶20.  However, [...] never responded to that proposal and instead simply filed this litigation.  Ibid.  It well-settled that the “the doctrine[] …unclean hands…bar[s] the [plaintiff] from claiming the benefit of one provision of a contract when refusing to abide by the other provisions thereof. ”  Milk Drivers & Dairy Emp., Local 680 v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 39 N.J. Super. 163, 175 (App. Div. 1956).  Here, [...] seeks to enforce the arbitration agreement, yet has participated in the process of selecting an arbitrator with unclean hands by rejecting its proposed own selected arbitrator and then refusing to respond to [...]’s good faith proposals for substitute arbitrators.  Accordingly, even if a court can appoint a substitute arbitrator here, the trial court still erred in finding that [...] met its heavy burden of proving an “impenetrable deadlock” or “mechanical breakdown” exists.  Therefore, its decision must be reversed.