ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]’s efforts to distinguish In re PSE&G fail.  On appeal, [...] once again attempts to distinguish In re PSE&G on the basis that Roselle required all power lines that carried more than 33kV of electricity to be installed underground, no matter what.  (Db46).  [...] attempts to distinguish its Ordinance from Roselle’s ordinance in that the Town permits the proposed lines above ground subject to siting standards.  [...]’s efforts to limit the scope of In re PSE&G are unavailing.  The trial court rejected this argument below, and it should be rejected again here.  There is no municipal authority to regulate high-capacity transmission lines.  None whatsoever.  See In re PSE&G, 35 N.J. at 372-73.  [...]’s Ordinance is preempted.  For the first time on appeal, [...] argues that “Roselle asserted that its ordinance was authorized by its general power to regulate land use; it was not based on Roselle’s ownership of the land or the placement of lines in the streets. ” (Db46).  [...] now asserts that this case is distinguishable from In re PSE&G because [...] does not base its authority on the Municipal Land Use Law or general police power; rather it is contractual in nature and subject to the statutory grant of authority by N.J.S.A. 48:7-1.  (Db47).  Issues not raised below will ordinarily not be considered on appeal unless they are jurisdictional in nature or substantially implicate public interest.
[brief] The appellant/plaintiff [...] failed to apprise [...] that he lived in New Jersey and garaged his vehicles in New Jersey.  He failed to provide his New Jersey address to his insurance carrier.  (PA048, T37:L5-22; T38:L11-T40:L10; PA049, T43:L11-22.  For that reason, [...] determined that appellant/plaintiff [...] had made a “Material Misrepresentation” on the insurance application and was denied coverage.
[brief] Notably absent from this appeal is any claim by defendant that the video was inaccurate.  Cf. Tuncap, 2014 WL 235471, at *8 (“Tuncap has not challenged the veracity, accuracy, or quality of the recording”); Dennis, 956 N.E.2d at 1005 (the defendant did not “make a colorable claim that the recording is not authentic or accurate”); Brown, 463 N.J. Super. at 53 (the “defendant presented no evidence undermining the reliability of [the] cell phone video”).
[brief] ”  See, also *Bron v Weintraub*, 42 N.J. 87, 91-92 (1964)  The *Landa* decision did not refer to Rule: 4:50-1.  It did not have to, since the decision affirmed a motion to allow redemption on the day of judgment, and was not required to address a period days, months or year after entry of a final judgment, or a time period within N.J.S.A. 54:5-87 or N.J.S.A. 54:5-67.
[brief] In conclusion, the application of collateral estoppel in this case precludes the relitigating of issues already determined by a competent court.  Appellant has had every opportunity to intercede in the original matter before [...] at which time the Ordinances authorizing the exchange of properties were contested.  It chose not to do so.  Therefore, it should not be allowed to complain about that now.  The Township's contractual obligations and the public interest it serves necessitate the enforcement of the Ordinances.  Respondent has amply demonstrated that the acquisition of the Appellant’s property has been properly undertaken in accordance with the strict provisions and requirements of the Eminent Domain Act.  In addition, we respectfully submit that the public purpose in exchanging properties with [...] is amply demonstrated, and cannot be reasonably objected to.  We therefore respectfully request that the Appellant’s appeal be dismissed, with prejudice.
[brief] The trial court should also not have accepted the claim that [...]’s real estate lawyer [...] was also as clueless as [...] with respect to handling title transfers.  In addition, at trial, [...] also described his relevant communications with his lawyer [...], as follows:  A …  I told – I told my attorney, I pay off the mortgage – THE COURT: Ugh, G-d.  A – and then I call an attorney’s office.  I want him to make sure the name is under my name after the mortgage was under my brother’s name was already paid off.  And then so all the document are all in my name now.  So I told him my name is [...], and my brother’s name is [...] – THE COURT: Jeeze.  (Trial Tr. Jan. 23, 2023, Pg. 41, Ln. 4 – 13)  Clearly, based on [...]’s own admission under oath, he told his lawyer [...] that [...] and [...] were two different individuals, and that [...] was his brother!  In addition, there was absolutely no reason for his lawyer [...], who was the very lawyer that just did the title transfer transferring the title from [...] to [...] less than half a year ago, to prepare yet another new deed just to reaffirm [...]’s ownership based on the purported reason that he had paid off the mortgage, knowing he was already the title owner.  Under the clear and convincing evidence standard, the trial court should have rejected [...]’s alleged belief that he needed to sign yet another deed to reaffirm his ownership, or that his real estate lawyer [...] also believed [...] needed to sign another deed to reaffirm ownership in property, especially given that he was the *same* lawyer that did the June 28, 1998 deed transferring the title from [...] to [...].
[brief] Further, in my reply certification (Pa1171) filed on January 5, 2024, I categorically denied (Pa1172) that defendant’s allegation had any factual basis.  On January 12, 2024, trial court inexplicably called off the hearing scheduled by the January 3, 2024 order and ordered the deposit of the parties’ and the child’s passport within 5 days thereby severely curtailing the liberty interest of plaintiff in international travel.  The United States Supreme Court has held that the right to international travel is an aspect of the liberty interest guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process clauses.
[directive] Jersey Box PO J.  Protocol for Responding to Emergent  Pretrial Release  Electronic Monitoring Alerts (Revised)  Promulgated by Directive # 18-23  Pursuant to Administrative Directive # 18-23, staff must perform the actions outlined in the steps below in response to the receipt of a Pretrial Release electronic monitoring alert1, (EM) alert (exclusion zone alert, inclusion zone tamper alert, tracker missed callback).
[brief] These facts came from the evidence about the conditions that evening produced by the State.  The defense is not required to enter its own proof to establish reasonable doubt in a quasi-criminal action like this.  Nor is [...] required to testify to create reasonable doubt.  The State must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and issues raised about the evidence, or a lack of evidence, may create reasonable doubt.  N.J. Courts, Model Jury Charge, “Preliminary Instructions to the Jury,” p. 3, Revised, September 1, 2022.  There is reasonable doubt of [...]’s unlawful intent and that he violated the essence of the statute.  [...] parked at his nearby house and located the owner of the damaged property as soon as reasonably possible.
[brief] He does not have a legally cognizable stake in Newark's decision to award this tax abatement nor a substantial likelihood he will experience some harm if the court returns an unfavorable decision.  Plaintiff's arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion.  R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).(Pa135).  It should be noted Plaintiff made application to the Supreme Court in that matter, however Certiorari was denied and the decision was affirmed.  In addition, both the Appellate Division decisions deemed the OPMA and OPRA claims brought in both actions (as well as this case) as not being worthy of any written opinion.  Any argument by [...] that he has statutory standing under New Jersey's Long-Term Tax Exemption Law (LTTEL) fails for the same reasons stated by the Appellate Division in [...] v. City of Orange Twp., supra.
[brief] This is especially true when compared to the other evidence in the case.  “[...]” definitively told defendant during their chat that he was fourteen and defendant responded with, “Oh, ok. ” (Pa14).  Later, “[...]” asked defendant if he was ok with his age, and defendant replied, “Lol” and asked when “[...]” was free.  (Pa14).  Defendant also provided a statement to police where he conceded “[...]” told him he was fourteen years old and that he nonetheless agreed to meet up with “[...]” because he was an “idiot” and he was “curious. ” (Pa18; Pa19; Pa21).  He also acknowledged that this was “the first time” he met up with anyone from the website who was under eighteen.  (Pa22).  And as outlined in Subpoint C below, defendant is still able to effectively cross-examine [...] about the contents of the profile and call his credibility into question, even without the profile.
[brief] Defendant argues that if the court in State v. Herold, No. A-4329-17T4, 2019 WL 980656 (App. Div. 2019), was presented with the facts of this case, [...] would not be found potentially dangerous.  First, Herold is an unreported case from 2019 and is not controlling.  Second, even if the court considers Herold, the facts in this case are more serious and involve more victims.  Thus, the court would have undoubtedly found [...] to be potentially dangerous.  In Herold, defendant’s dog, “Dozier,” bolted off the porch and attacked a smaller dog named “Brooklyn. ”  Id. at *1.  Brooklyn ultimately died due to puncture wounds on her chest and neck.  Id.  Defendant received a municipal summons requiring Dozier be impounded pursuant to the Vicious or Potentially Dangerous Dog Act.  Ibid.  The State requested a hearing in municipal court to determine if Dozier was a potentially dangerous dog under N.J.S.A. 4:19-23.  Ibid.  The municipal court judge found for the State, deeming defendant's dog potentially dangerous because Dozier killed Brooklyn and posed a threat of death to another domestic animal.  Id. at *2.  On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed, finding that (1) it was undisputed that Dozier killed Brooklyn, and (2) Dozier posed a threat of death to other domestic animals.  Id. at *3.  The Court stated that Dozier bit another dog several months before the attack on Brooklyn, and Dozier had a high prey drive with small dogs.  Id. at *4.  Based on this, the court found there was sufficient credible evidence that Dozier poses a threat of death to other domestic animals.  Ibid.  Here, the facts are much worse than Herold.
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[brief] (Aa19)  The Commissioner began by clarifying the procedural posture of the related Referendum Petitions, explaining that the Petition dated July 15, 2022 and filed on behalf [...], [...], [...] and [...] [i.e., the July 2022 Referendum Petition] is dismissed as moot in light of the July 21, 2023 decision [i.e., the decision approving the March 2023 Referendum Petition] permitting the Boards of Education of [...] and [...] to proceed to referendum on forming a pre-kindergarten through grade 12 regional school district.  (Aa19)  The Commissioner then granted in part and denied in part [...]’s requested relief.
[brief] Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0031)  Use of Force Report by [...] (Attached at Pa0030)  CJIS Transmittal Form (Attached at Pa0038)  Wanted Person Request (Mugshot)  (Attached at Pa0039)  [...]’ Letter to [...] and Court Administrator, Dated 9/25/2020 (Attached at Pa0056)  Letter to [...] 10/27/2020 regarding trial scheduled when discovery incomplete non-receipt of audio/videos and motion to suppress not heard Pa072  Police Department Record of Booking, Dated 2/20/22 Pa074
[brief] The Trial Court’s decision to refuse to order the [...] to indemnify [...] was especially confounding in light of the Trial Court’s acknowledgment “I haven’t received a certification from anyone from the [...] in support of its argument that the reason for rejecting [...]’s multiple demands for indemnification[.]” (1T85:6-85:12).  Also, the Trial Court’s finding that [...] was “at some point, defended by current Board counsel[,]” (1T86:9-86:15), was simply wrong and contradicted an email, sent by the [...]’s counsel to [...] on April 30, 2021, that [...] counsel did not represent Sipe personally.  (Da126).  Indeed, even though the Trial Court found that [...] counsel conceded that both current [...] counsel and prior counsel worked “for the [...] and not for members of the Board personally, such as [...][.]”  1T84:20-84:25, the Trial Court nonetheless held that [...] counsel did represent [...], which was simply untrue and not supported by any evidence in the record.  When the Trial Court commented on the fact that when [...] was a commissioner he voted in favor of retaining prior [...] counsel, (1T87:1-87:6), the Trial Court seemed to hold that [...]’s vote in favor of the appointment of [...] counsel somehow implicated [...]’s right to his own counsel that owed a fiduciary duty to [...], rather than to the [...].  Indeed, the Trial Court was implying that because [...] voted in favor of retaining a specific law firm, which was subsequently replaced, he had some kind of inside track on being defended when, in reality, the opposite was true.
[brief] [...], who lives in [...], testified that he is a friend of defendant and had done musical collaborations with both defendant and [...].  (25T 144-20 to 148-25)  Bowens claimed that in “maybe 2018” he gave defendant the gun that the State claimed was used later to shoot [...] on January 9, 2019, but he did so solely so defendant could “get rid of it for me,” he testified, because he didn’t want the gun around his children.
[brief] (Pa1727).  Substantively, plaintiff’s Fourth-Amended Complaint generally asserted that [...], by way of a subconsultant agreement with [...], was obligated to perform unspecified “work” on the Garden State Parkway in the area of plaintiff’s accident.  (Pa1699).  Plaintiff’s pleading did not include any independent factual allegations associated with any act or omission of [...] or any of the defendants independently.  Rather, plaintiff’s Fourth-Amended Complaint asserted that the defendants were negligent as a group for the following reasons: - Failure to inspect and maintain the subject location and/or caused the defect that led to plaintiff’s accident; - Knew or should have known that the defect in the roadway was dangerous and could cause accidents and/or collisions; - Actual and/or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition that existed at the subject location; - Failure to exercise reasonable care and diligence by failing to conduct reasonable and timely inspections of the roadway at the aforesaid location; and, - Failure to exercise reasonable care and diligence by failing to correct the dangerous condition that existed at the subject location.  (Pa1699 and Pa1700).  Plaintiff further asserted within the pleadings the defendants’ negligence was the cause of his accident and resulting physical injuries.  (Pa1700).  **[...]’s Contractual Obligations**
[brief] 1.  Because Attorney General Directive No. 2021-4 required prosecutors to waive mandatory minimum terms for non-violent drug offenses, the 4-year period of parole ineligibility imposed on [...]’s aggregate 12-year sentence was discretionary, not mandatory.  Resentencing is required because the court treated the parole bar as though it were mandatory and did not engage in the required analysis to impose a discretionary parole bar.  On April 19, 2021, the New Jersey Attorney General issued Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2021-4, Directive Revising Statewide Guidelines Concerning the Waiver of Mandatory Minimum Sentences in Non-Violent Drug Cases Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (Apr. 19, 2021) (hereinafter “Directive 2021-4”).
[brief] ”  *Lahue v. Pio Costa*, 263 N.J. Super. 575, 596 (App. Div. 1993) (emphasis added).  Here, Plaintiff maintains that the agreed-upon and memorialized settlement constitutes an enforceable contract because the parties agreed on essential terms and manifested an intention to be bound by those terms.  These key facts are supported by the record of the December 20, 2022 hearing.  (Pa31-Pa38).  Significantly, it is first important to emphasize that at the hearing, Defendant: (1) was represented by two attorneys, (2) accompanied by various family members at the time of the negotiations and the memorialization of the settlement on the record, (3) verbalized that she understood the material terms of the settlement as placed on the record, and (4) assented to them before the hearing officer, [...].
[brief] CEPA explicitly defines what actions constitute “whistle-blowing activity. ”  A whistle-blowing activity consists of (1) disclosing, or threatening to disclose, to a supervisor or public body an illegal action, N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a)(1); (2) objecting to or refusing to participate in an activity violating the law, N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(1); or (3) objecting to, or refusing to participate in, conduct “incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy.
[brief] ” (Da61).  However, the trial court completely failed to analyze the public policy interests motivating the CFLA, which are in turn furthered by its enforcement.  As explained herein, the contemporary CFLA began as the New Jersey Small Loan Law (“NJSLL”).  And every iteration of the CFLA since the NJSLL had had the goals of prohibiting deceptive lending practices, limiting usurious interest rates, limiting what property could be used as secured collateral, limiting what entities could offer consumer credit or possess consumer accounts, and ensuring that only qualified, licensed entities were able to enter the consumer lending marketplace.  See, e.g., Ryan v. Motor Credit Co., 132 N.J.  Eq. 398, 399-400 (1942); Family Fin. Corp., 10 N.J. Super. at 19-20; Lemelledo, 150 N.J. at 271-72.  By reasoning that the CFLA—a remedial consumer protection statute—was not motivated by any interests of public policy and did not serve to further the same without analyzing the CFLA’s legislative intent, legislative history, or jurisprudence acknowledging what interests motivated the enactment of the CFLA, the trial court abused its discretion.
[brief] Even where a statement is not fulsome but a reviewing court can make its determinations, remand is not required.  *Lakhani v. Patel*, 479 N.J. Super. 291 (App. Div. 2024) (gathering examples).  Here, the trial court complied with its obligation when it explained that [...] signed the Agreement, that the Agreement was “valid on its face,” that [...] failed to argue that the Agreement was void or otherwise unenforceable, that [...] did not seek a declaratory judgment invalidating the Agreement and that it was dismissing the matter without prejudice and compelling arbitration.
[brief] Pa29.  Included with the Petition were other retired Troopers who are requesting registration and amended health benefits in retirement.  Pa29.  All of those Troopers provided affidavits that they also did not receive notice of the Ricci Bill’s passage.  Pa29.  Pa88-124.  Furthermore, other Troopers who are not currently ill, but were only seeking to register for the Ricci Act also filed affidavits that they did not receive notice of the Ricci Act and were included in the Petition.  Pa29.  Pa125-272.  Additionally, other retired Troopers who were not present at the September 11, 2001 attacks and aftermath also submitted affidavits that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act in further support of the Petition.  Pa273-283.  President of the [...], [...], submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the [...] notifying him of the Ricci Act.  Pa277.  Upon notice by another retired Trooper, Wren underwent a massive polling of the [...] to ascertain whether his membership received notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa277.  Of the fifty-nine (59) [...] members (retired troopers) who responded to the polling, fifty-seven (57) did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act by letter, correspondence, or postcard.
[directive] Victims should be provided with information about compensation(2) and the criminal justice process.(3)  1.  Brochures describing the criminal justice process and providing victim rights information shall be displayed in police stations.  2.  Case specific explanation of system and process shall be provided.  3.  Information shall be provided on the status of any property stolen or removed as well as procedures and regulations governing property return.  4.  Every police department shall, upon filing a report of a violent crime, make available to any victim information concerning crime victims' compensation.  5.  Every State, county and municipal police department shall have available, and shall post in a public place, informational booklets, pamphlets or other pertinent written information to be supplied by the [...] ([...]) relating to the availability of crime victims' compensation including all necessary application blanks required to be filed with the Board.  COMMENTARY
[brief] As soon as practical, the parent or child should communicate with the other parent concerning the many issues inherent in selecting a college.  *At a minimum, a parent or child seeking contribution should initiate the application to the court before the expenses are incurred.  The failure to do so will weigh heavily against the grant of a future application* [emphasis added].  *Gac v. Gac*, 186 N.J. 535, 546–47 (2006).  **III.
[brief] *State v. McKinney*, 223 N.J. 475, 495 (2015) (reversing for plain error in the robbery instruction).  One of the most basic principles of New Jersey criminal law is that “[a]n essential ingredient of a fair trial is that a jury receive adequate and understandable instructions. ”  *Ibid.* (quoting *State v. Afanador*, 151 N.J. 41, 54 (1997)); *State v. Concepcion*, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988) (“Accurate and understandable jury instructions in criminal cases are essential to a defendant's right to a fair trial”).  It is “structural error,” irremediable by harmless-error analysis, for a jury to deliberate under the wrong burden of proof, *Sullivan v. Louisiana*, 508 U.S. 275, 277-278 (1993), or the wrong elements.  *State v. Vick*, 117 N.J. 288, 292 (1989).  The jury here was not instructed on the correct elements of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault.  [...]’s conviction must therefore be reversed.