ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  Manalapan Realty v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1998).  As applied to [...], the operative language of N.J.S.A. 18A:65-14(b)(ii) has three distinct parts: • The first part is: “seven of [the 15 voting members of the BOG] shall be appointed by the [Trustees]”; • The second part is: “one of whom shall be a resident of Middlesex County”; and • The third part is: “elected and serving under the provisions of subsection I.c. or I.d. of 18A:65-15. ”  The proper meaning is derived when reviewing all three parts together: “seven of [the 15 voting members of the BOG] shall be appointed by the [Trustees], . . . one of whom shall be a resident of Middlesex County, elected and serving under the provisions of subsection I.c. or I.f. of 18A:65-15. ”  Viewed in that context, the present tense of the phrase—“shall be a resident of Middlesex County”—means being a resident of Middlesex County at the time of appointment by the Trustees.  This is consistent with Section 14’s overall context, which focuses on how the Board is to be composed—more precisely, the appointment of members.  The chosen language and context serve to shape the appointment process and do not extend beyond it.
[brief] \(^1\)  Not only does Amicus misstate [...]’s equity in the Unit as derived from the Unit’s value as a condominium, Amicus baldly concludes that [...]’s “hardship” is “due solely to the fact that the unit is being operated as a condominium” and that “no hardship” would otherwise exist with lower taxes and no HOA fees.  See page 21.  This is utter speculation without any support in the record.  First, the Board substantially reduced [...]’s taxes in determining [...]’s operating expenses, and the record does not support that the HOA expense was more than the expense for the Unit if it had not been converted.
[brief] (Pa11).  The website further advised that failure to do so by that date would render the member ineligible to apply at a later date.  (Pa11).  On March 3, 2023, the Board received [...]’s Eligibility Registration Form and Request for Amended Benefits Form, both completed on September 6, 2022, as well as a sworn affidavit from [...] dated November 9, 2022.
[brief] The Supreme Court has described the threshold of the statute as one that “requires plaintiffs to provide an expert opinion, given under oath, that a duty of care existed and that the defendant breached that duty. ”  *Hubbard*, 168 N.J. at 394.  The statute applies only to the duty of care and breach of duty, not to causation or damages; an affidavit need only prove that “the care, skill or knowledge … fell outside acceptable professional or occupational standards or treatment practices. ”  *Id.* at 390, (quoting *N.J.S.A.* 2A:53A-27).  *N.J.S.A.* 2A:53A-27 provides that:
[brief] See Twp. of White v. Castle Ridge Dev. Corp., 419 N.J. Super. 68, 77 (App. Div. 2011) (considering course of performance in construing vague or ambiguous contract provisions); Valenti v. Bassinder, A-2255-12T3, 2014 WL 861487, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct.  App. Div. Mar. 6, 2014) (“The parties to an agreement know best what they meant and their action under it is often the strongest evidence of their meaning. ”) (citing Restatement (Second of Contracts § 202(4), comment g (1981))).  Clearly, Tenant never believed the Lease provided for an “automatic offset” and only raised this argument after it realized the impact of its transparent attempt to avoid paying any Rent to Landlord during the COVID-19 pandemic, which withholding of Rent caused Landlord to endure great hardship.  (1T28-6 to 1T28-22).  Briefly stated, the legal fees incurred by Landlord in this action are not attributable to any action by Landlord but are the result of Tenant’s steadfast refusal to pay any Rent for five (5) months followed by its intransigent litigation strategy during the Underlying Action.
[brief] a.  A person who shall: (1) Keep, use, be connected with or interested in the management of, or receive money for the admission of a person to, a place kept or used for the purpose of fighting or baiting a living animal or creature; (2)  Be present and witness, pay admission to, encourage or assist therein; (3)  Permit or suffer a place owned or controlled by him to be so used; (4)  For amusement or gain, cause, allow, or permit the fighting or baiting of a living animal or creature; (5)  Own, possess, keep, train, promote, purchase, or knowingly sell a living animal or creature for the purpose of fighting or baiting that animal or creature; (6)  Gamble on the outcome of a fight involving a living animal or creature; or (7)  Own, possess, buy, sell, transfer, or manufacture animal fighting paraphernalia for the purpose of engaging in or otherwise promoting or facilitating the fighting or baiting of a living animal or creature Shall be guilty of a crime of the third degree.  On Page 6 of its trial court opposition brief, the State asserted the word “or” after the semicolon between §(a)(1) and §(a)(2) (Da30).  Aside from being inappropriate to say the least, the word “or” is not in the legislation until after the semicolon in §(a)(6).  The State added the word “or” where it did is a tacit admission that, without it being there, the statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad to say the least.  This Court must rule based exclusively upon what N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 24(a)(2) actually consists of in its content.
[brief] On August 8, 2019, the Division provided a letter about the Ricci Act to all Certifying Officers and advised them of their responsibility to make the letter available to all members at their respective locations.  (Pa11).  On August 9, 2019, a postcard with information about the Ricci Act was mailed to [...]’s home address (as well as the home addresses of over 200,000 other retirees).  (Pa14; Pa64-66).  And, on June 10, 2021, the Division posted a news item on its website advising members and retirees that the statutory eligibility period to register under the Ricci Act was expiring soon and that they must submit the Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.  (Pa11).  Although these additional methods were not required under the Ricci Act, [...] makes much of the fact that the Division’s postcard was not mailed to him by August 7, 2021.  (Pb11-12).  The record demonstrates that the postcard was mailed on August 9, 2021.  (Pa14; Pa64-66).  That slight delay in mailing the postcard is immaterial, as postcard notification was not required under the Ricci Act, and information about the Ricci Act was prominently posted on the Division’s website and publicly available for two years from the effective date of the statute.
[brief] ‘A judge sitting as the fact-finder is certainly capable of sorting through admissible and inadmissible evidence without resultant detriment to the decision-making process.  Trained judges have the ability to exclude from their consideration irrelevant or improper evidence and materials which have come to their attention. ’  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-49 directs that “[n]o judge of any court shall sit on the trial or argument of any matter in controversy in a case pending in his court, when he: …” (c) “has given his opinion upon a matter in question in such action…”  This statute specifically qualifies this basis of disqualification:  This section shall not be construed to prevent a judge from sitting on such trial or argument because he has given his opinion in another action in which the same matter in controversy came in question or given his opinion on any question in controversy in the pending action in the course of previous proceedings therein…  The issue of when a judge should disqualify himself from hearing a matter is one which our courts have addressed on many occasions.  Disposition of a motion for disqualification is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge whose recusal is sought.
[brief] In Faps, the State acquired a “narrow” strip of land to widen Route 9; prior to the taking, access to defendant’s property was “uncontrolled and drivers could use some 20-odd feet of State-owned property between the traveled way and the easterly line of the right-of-way to back out and maneuver from the area immediately in front of the commercial buildings . . . because no defined driveway existed, customers were able to use the unimproved part of the State’s right-of-way, giving them ample parking and maneuvering room.
[brief] The Trial Court also improperly awarded counsel fees for the time involved in pursuing information and documents about life insurance policies on [...]’s life.  The Estranged wife and her counsel questioned whether [...] had actually or properly changed the beneficiaries from Estranged Wife to his parents.  It is black-letter law that “[t]he transfer of proceeds under an insurance policy is . . . a nonprobate asset. ”  Edgardo Vasconi v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 124 N.J. 338, 344 (1991).  As such, the insurance policies were irrelevant to the probate issues before the Trial Court.  If Estranged Wife and her counsel truly believed that the insurance benefits had been wrongfully paid to [...]’s parents, they should have filed a lawsuit directly against the insurance companies.  Not only did the Trial Court err when it issued several orders requiring Mother to obtain records from insurance companies over which she had no control, but it abused its discretion by awarding counsel fees for pursuing discovery on matters completely irrelevant to the probate issues before the court.  Awarding counsel fees for a party pursuing frivolous discovery is both arbitrary and unreasonable.  This Honorable Court should reverse the attorney fees awarded in the November 2, 2022 Order.
[brief] [...]  Attorney General of New Jersey  Attorney for Respondents  [...] [...] [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel  [...] (#070262013)  Deputy Attorney General  On the Brief #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | SECTION | PAGE | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS | 2 | | LEGAL ARGUMENTS | 8 | | POINT I | 8 | | THE DACCA
[brief] As established under the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, Title 34, Chapter 13A, any determination made by the Commission may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court.  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(d).  The Township presented its rebuttal pursuant to N.J.A.C. 19:14-8.4, specifically asserting the time limit of "fifteen (15) days," as established by law, has been well exceeded.  The Township further argued that the Commission rendered its initial decision on May 26, 2021, and 601 days later; the Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration.
[brief] Subsection (c)(2) refers to "special reasons" whereby variances advance a zoning purpose even though they violate the zoning ordinance standard.  See *Kaufmann v. Plan. Bd. of Warren*, 110 N.J. 551 (1988) (subdividing parcel to make lots which, while deficient, advance conformity with community's development plan\(^6\).  The negative criteria refer to lack of substantial detriment to the public good (generally the neighborhood) and the intent of the ordinance and zoning plan.  *Ten Stary Dom Partnership v. Mauro*, 216 N.J. 16, 30 (2013).  1.  **THE FINDINGS ON THE POSITIVE CRITERIA ARE LEGALLY UNTENABLE AND IN ANY EVENT FACTUALLY UNSUPPORTED. **  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c)(2) permits bulk variance relief where in an application or appeal relating to a specific piece of property the purposes of this act . . . would be advanced by a deviation from the zoning ordinance requirements and the benefits of the deviation would substantially outweigh any detriment, grant a variance to allow departure from regulations . . .  "[T]he test to be applied by the local agency in considering a variance application under this section is whether the grant of approval will 'actually benefit the community in that it represents a better zoning alternative for the property.'"  *Valenti v. Plan, Bd., City of Absecon*, 246 N.J. Super. 77, 83 (App. Div. 1990) (quoting *Kaufmann*, 110 N.J. at 563).  The *[Kaufmann]* Court was . . . careful to emphasize that in prescribing a "better zoning alternative" test, it was not according the local board a license to act in abrogation of the intent and plan of the zoning ordinance even though a board, by definition, acts contrary to the letter of the ordinance whenever it grants variance relief.  *Id.* --- \(^6\)  In *Lang v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, North Caldwell*, 160 N.J. 41 (1999), the Court found that a variance to locate in-ground swimming pool around lawfully existing structures could warrant variance relief based on both hardship and special reasons.  Thus, the suggested benefit must inure to the public, and it must also take into account the intent and plan of the zoning standard being violated.
[brief] Thus, even if the Defendant had provided the trial court with competent proofs regarding his desire to finance the redemption, the Tax Sale Law precludes post-judgment redemption of tax sale certificates utilizing funds obtained from third parties.  incurred costs to maintain, improve, and renovate the Property in the sum of $94,688.21 and has expended attorney’s fees and costs in prosecuting the foreclosure and defending Defendant’s motion to vacate final judgment, first motion for reconsideration, appeal, and the second motion for reconsideration in the sum of $30,197.92.  (Pa40, Pa34).  Thus, as of April 12, 2024, the Plaintiff would have been owed the approximate sum of $268,803.85 to make it whole if the Final Judgment were vacated.
[brief] “Fair and equitable to all parties” does not mean what is the “best” or “highest” value for [...].  Using Tax Book Value is the only fair result to everyone even without taking account of the “circumstances of the case. ”  However, when the circumstances of the 12-year-long litigation are taken into account, which involve, inter alia, [...] trying to literally move the Company out of the court’s jurisdiction, artificially inflating his interests, looting the Company on the way out the door, receiving multiple sanctions in a variety of jurisdictions, and a host of other wrongful conduct, there can be no other choice.  Even if Tax Book Value happens, coincidentally, to be the valuation which results in the lowest payment to [...], under these circumstances of this case, it is not at all unfair to [...].  Receiving the historic valuation cannot be considered unfair for a member who has been involuntarily dissociated for harming the very Company from which he seeks payment.  On the contrary, the only thing that could possibly be considered “fair and equitable to all parties” is that [...] get the same valuation that literally everyone else got historically: Tax Book Value.  [...]’s entire argument is, in essence, that Tax Book Value is not fair because those other 119 (and prior) transactions are “too small” and his dissociation is nebulously “bigger,” and [...] unilaterally decided that others’ transactions did not warrant an appraisal.  But the trial court’s neutral expert explicitly rejected this argument, finding no reason to distinguish [...]’s (and others’) “smaller” equity transactions from the current 29.5% dissociation buyout of [...].  (6T222:8-223:12)  He opined those transactions were not insignificant, and did involve enough money that they could have involved a valuation, or that [...] could simply have obtained a valuation every year for everyone.  Id.  They just chose not to.  Or, more likely, [...] prevented anyone from even trying.  Either way, only one member ever was dissociated from the Company for harming it, and no members have ever received a valuation other than Tax Book Value (including when [...] bought his interests).  That member cannot be heard to claim it would be unfair to subject him to the same valuation as everyone else.  Accordingly, this Court should reverse the November 14, 2022 Order valuing [...]’s shares using Fair Market Value, and remand with instructions to Order [...]’s shares be valued using Tax Book Value as of 2017.
[brief] ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES #### Federal Cases | Case Name | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------|---------| | Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) | 11 | | Bradley v Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1872) | 23 | | Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1971) | 23 | | City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) | 27 | | City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986)| 26 | | Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2000)| 23,25 | | Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) | 24 | | Marable v. West Pottsgrove Twp., 176 Fed. App’x 275 (3d Cir. 2006) | 27 | | Mattern v. City of Sea Isle, 131 F. Supp. 3d 305 (D.N.J. 2015) | 27 | | Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) | 23 | | Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985) | 21 | | Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) | 23,24,25,26,27 | | Owen v. Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) | 23 | | Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967) | 23 | | Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 98 S. Ct. 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978) | 24 | | Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799 F. Supp. 2d 417 (D.N.J. 2011) | 24 | | West v. Atkins, 487 U.S., 42 (1988) | 26 | | Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458 (3d Cir. 1989) | 27 | ####
[brief] [...] & [...], *Family Rejection as a Predictor of Suicide Attempts and Substance Misuse Among Transgender and Gender Nonconforming Adults*, 3 LGBT Health 193, 195–96 (2016) (Da99–100).  Misgendering students or otherwise refusing to affirm their gender identity “exacerbate[s] the risk of ‘anxiety and depression, low self-esteem, engaging in self-injurious behaviors, suicide, substance use, homelessness, and eating disorders among other adverse outcomes. ’”
[brief] The parties acknowledge that [...] ("[...]") is the insurers of the Authority outstanding parking revenue bonds and as such has a material interest in the operations, financial security or revenue generation prospects of the Authority and in particular, the operation of the Current Parking Facilities conducted in and around the Project Site.  As a result, any activities that have the potential to impair the Authority's operations, financial security or revenue generation prospects or, the issuance of additional obligations (either on parity with or junior lien to the Authority outstanding bonds) to finance, among other things, including the Authority Garage, will require [...]'s consent.  Section 8.7(b) of the Redevelopment Agreement further described that [...] had expressed a conditional willingness to support the Project only if additional financial guaranties were provided, as follows:  In furtherance of Section 8.7(a) above, the Authority represents that it has approached [...] regarding the development of the Project, including the financing of the Authority Garage and [...] has indicated a willingness to support the Project and to insure additional obligations (parity or junior lien in nature) to finance the Authority Garage provided that the City agrees to guaranty directly or contingently, the Authority's outstanding bonds and any additional obligations.  [...] has required that the City's guaranty be a full faith and credit obligation of the City secured by the levy of ad valorem taxes without limitation as to rate or amount.  Da111.  Section 8.7(c) of the Redevelopment Agreement defined the “Financing Contingency” as “[t]he requirement for the Authority to obtain [...] consent to the transaction contemplated herein including the issuance of additional obligations.
[brief] Again, the science showed that eighteen- to twenty-year-old offenders share the characteristics outlined in the Miller factors -- particularly a tendency to act impetuously, to seek new sensations, to succumb to peer pressure, and to desist from misbehavior after brain maturation.  Id. at 420-24.  In sum, the developmental science shows that late adolescents are like juveniles; therefore, constitutional protections against lengthy sentences that are enshrined in Miller, Zuber, and Comer should be extended at least through age twenty.  In particular, Comer applies as follows.  Given late adolescents’ immaturity and diminished culpability, a thirty-year parole bar with no look-back resentencing is in many cases grossly disproportionate to the offense.  See Comer, 249 N.J. at 397-98.  Given these same characteristics -- plus late adolescents’ likelihood of reform with maturity -- the standard punishment goes beyond what is necessary for retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.  See id. at 398-400.  Thus, for late adolescents, the standard punishment fails two of the three tests for cruel and unusual punishment. \(^5\)  Late adolescents, like juveniles, should be eligible for resentencing after twenty years.  Indeed, our Supreme Court has signaled an openness to extending Comer to late adolescents.  The Court favorably quoted a developmental science article on how offending peaks in the late teens and early twenties and then declines thereafter.  Comer, 249 N.J. at 399 n.5.  The Court has also stated its understanding that the new mitigating factor for offenders under twenty-six is a response to the Miller/Zuber line of cases.  State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285, 301-02 (2021) (discussing N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(14)).  It is difficult to imagine that our Supreme Court would not follow the developmental science and the enlightened reasoning of courts in Washington, Michigan, and Massachusetts.  Because [...] committed his offenses at the age of nineteen and has served more than twenty years -- specifically, he has served thirty-two years of his aggregate forty-year parole bar -- he should have a Comer resentencing.  \(^5\)  Because all three tests must be passed, see id. at 383, we need not consider the third test, whether the punishment conforms to contemporary standards of decency.  Nevertheless, the Massachusetts Supreme Court perceived a trend away from extreme sentences for emerging adults aged eighteen through twenty.  The court noted the many ways that the law treats those under twenty-one as irresponsible and noted domestic and international trends away from life sentences.  See Mattis, 224 N.E.3d at 424-28.  As an alternative to ordering an immediate resentencing, the Court should order a remand for a hearing to consider expert testimony on the developmental science, and to decide if the Comer lookback should extend to nineteen-year-olds.  **CONCLUSION**
[directive] Brimage Standardized Waiver Plea Form  APPENDIX IB Brimage Plea Negotiation Worksheet  APPENDIX IC Brimage Plea Negotiation Worksheet (Cooperation Agreement/ Confidential Watermark)  APPENDIX II  Tables of Authorized Plea Offers  1.  Table 1  Offenses Under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (Drug Free School Zone)  2.  Table 2 Offenses Under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 (Extended Term Under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f (Repeat Offender))  3.  Table 3  Offenses Under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6 (Using a Juvenile in a Drug-Distribution Scheme)  4.  Table 4  Offenses Under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4 (Drug Production Facility)  5.  Table 5  Offenses Under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 (First Degree) (First Degree Distribution or Possession with Intent)  6.  Table 6  Offenses Under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 (Leader of Narcotics Trafficking Network)  State of New Jersey  OFFICE  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE LAW DEPARTMENT  PUBLIC SAFETY OF AND [...]  [...]  PO Box 080  Attorney General Governor TRENTON, NJ 08625-0080  July 15, 2004 TO: All County Prosecutors  SUBJECT: Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2004-2  Dear Prosecutor: I am pleased to provide you with a signed copy of Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2004-2, which promulgates revised “Brimage” Guidelines (which are appended) that will apply to all Brimage-eligible offenses committed on or after September 15, 2004.