ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
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[brief] HAD THE COURT CURED THIS DEFECT TO THE MISAPPLICATION OF CASE LAW, IT WOULD THEN HAVE BEEN GOVERNED BY PRECEDENTS ESTABLISHED THROUGH THIRD CIRCUIT CASE LAW TO ITS FINDINGS AND AS SUCH FAILED TO BE BOUND BY PRIOR COURT’S DECISIONS THAT WERE SIMILAR TO THAT OF THIS DEFENDANT’S CASE.  AS IT WAS NOT GUIDED BY THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS THAT OBLIGATES COURTS TO LOOK AT PRECEDENTS IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR DECISIONS  THE COURT DELIVERED AN UNFAIR RESULT (Pa17)
[brief] The Trial Court essentially treated as "imprecision and speculative" [...]'s statement that he could not recall if he made the call to [...] before or after the accident.  The Trial Court did acknowledge that, at least once, [...] indicated to plaintiff's private investigator that he made the call before the date of the accident.  Because that statement was later conflicted, it is up to a jury to determine which statement to believe.  At trial, a jury would be asked to determine whether there was actual notice, from the call [...] made to [...], even considering his confusion about when he called.  That would not be the first time a jury would be called upon the weigh the credibility of a witness where the evidence leads to different directions; or for a jury yet to make a decision about accepting or not one or more facts where the evidence displays a witness' confusion.  If a trial were to take place today in this matter, a jury would be presented with the following facts favorable to plaintiff: (1) [...] gave a non-recorded statement closest to the time of the accident that he called about the nonfunctioning light before the accident; the private investigator will testify to this fact at the time of trial; (2) when [...] gave a recorded statement to the same investigator he had the opportunity to state the call was made after the accident but instead he stated that he could not recall if the call was made before or after the accident; (3) even after [...] was shown a date, which he adopted at first as the date of the call, upon cross-examination he agreed, within a date range he adopted, that he could have made the call anywhere from six months to one and a half years before the accident and that he would adopt any date shown to him that falls within that range, which range, as stated, took us to before the accident!  (4) the light had a history of being more off than on, a fact that would have prompted [...] to make his complaints to [...] sooner than later; (5) [...] was highly motivated that his vintage vehicles parked in the vicinity of the nonfunctioning streetlight not be damaged, also a fact that would have prompted him to call [...] sooner than later.  Given these facts that can be put forth to a jury, a likelihood exists that a jury could conceivably resolve the issue of "actual notice" in favor of plaintiff, i.e., [...] made the call about the nonfunctioning streetlight before the accident.
[brief] Although Defendants do not disclose the specific nature or purpose of these fees in billing statements to their Merchant Customers, upon information and belief there is no basis for these “Miscellaneous” charges in the Agreements between [...] and the Merchant Customers who are the members of the putative “Miscellaneous” Subclass.  These “miscellaneous” charges also represent nothing more or less than excessive, unauthorized charges the members of this Subclass are entitled to recover.  (Pa000124).  23.  For example, in the Merchant Application of [...], attached hereto as Exhibit B, [...] opted for Defendant’s “Interchange PLUS” pricing, which entitled him to receive [...]’s credit card processing services at the interchange rates published by VISA, MasterCard, Discover, and American Express, plus a Discount Rate of 0.30%; all together, a cost assessment of $0.11 cents per transaction.
[brief] See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3), (d) (generally prohibiting payment of witnesses, but permitting payment “by the party upon whose behalf a witness is called . . . , of the reasonable cost of travel and subsistence incurred and the reasonable value of time lost in attendance at any such trial, hearing, or proceeding”).  Courts have reinforced this rule by deeming non-conforming agreements to compensate fact witnesses unenforceable for lack of consideration and being contrary to public policy.  See *In re PMD Enters.*, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 530 (citing *Hamilton v. Gen. Motors Corp.*, 490 F.2d 223, 227-29 (7th Cir. 1973); *Alexander v. Watson*, 128 F.2d 627, 630 (4th Cir. 1942)).  With respect to contingent payments, such as in this case, while there does not appear to be direct precedent found in New Jersey, other state bars have disciplines attorneys who offered a fact witness a contingent fee.  See, e.g., *Florida Bar v. Wohl*, 842 So. 2d 811, 813 (Fla. 2003) (suspending for ninety days a lawyer who entered into an agreement involving testimony by a former employee of the [...] diamond business, who was prepared to testify in the estate litigation involving [...]'s widow; noting that the agreement called for a "bonus" of up to $1,000,000 depending on the "usefulness of the information provided"); Committee on Legal Ethics of the State Bar v. Sheatsley, 452 S.E.2d 75, 77 (W. Va. 1994) (issuing a public reprimand critical of a lawyer who had agreed to pay his client's former employee $3,250 to prevent the former employee "from changing his story," and an additional $3,250 "upon a favorable completion of the case").  The assignment agreements [...] entered are de facto continent payments to fact witnesses as they only receive the pledged money if [...] is successful at trial.  What makes these agreements particularly egregious is that they assign the entire case to third parties, third parties who are testifying as fact witnesses in a case in which the third parties are not a named, but possess the entirety of the claim.  This is far worse that an “incentive” payment to a fact witness that is so discouraged by the cited law.  Lastly [...] would note that while Plaintiff asserts neither [...] nor [...] is directing this litigation and do not hold any role with respect to same, [...] did not receive any opportunity to investigate these assertions.  As indicated previously, Plaintiff provided the agreements with [...] and [...] approximately six (6) weeks before trial in this matter, after discovery was long closed.  Accordingly, Defendants were not afforded any opportunity investigate the documents or depose [...] and [...] regarding same.  Plaintiff indicated at his deposition that he and [...] were cousins, so Plaintiff’s allegation that neither [...] nor [...] are controlling this litigation is unsupported by any evidence in the record.  For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Court properly dismissed this case by finding that Plaintiff assigned his rights to a third party and no longer had standing to pursue this action.
[brief] [...] worked roughly three miles – approximately a 10-minute drive – from the family home.  (18T:165-20 to 24 179-20 to 24).  None of the [...] had mentioned anything about going to [...] during their statements, let alone that the place even existed.  (22T:242-1 to 4).  Additionally, a forensic investigation of defendant’s phone from the night in question revealed a call that he had neglected to mention to officers.  Specifically, defendant called [...], a resident of Pennsylvania, twice, right after he called his mother.  (22T:237-8 to 239-10, 249-3 to 250-20).  The calls lasted roughly five minutes in total, but defendant then deleted the records of those calls from his phone.  Defendant lied about his calls on January 9, 2019, and claimed he only called his mother.
[brief] The charges are...potentially dangerous.  Euthanasia is not a remedy under potentially dangerous.  The Court: I disagree with you, [...] because if there’s a dog that keeps attacking other dogs I don’t think that it’s that farfetched for public safety to rule as far as euthanasia goes, so I disagree with you.  1T7:18-8:1  The trial Court also showed bias by applying a double standard to the evidence.  He allowed the State to call [...] and [...] about events up to two years before trial, but [...]’s trainer and foster family were stricken from Defendant’s witness list.
[brief] ## State Cases  **Adams v. DelMonte,** 309 N.J. Super. 572 (App. Div. 1998) .................................................................17  **Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer,** 169 N.J. 135 (2001) .........................................................................................9  **City of Hoboken v. City of Jersey City,** 347 N.J. Super. 279 (Law Div. 2001)  ...............................................................45  **Concerned Citizens v. Mayor and Council of Princeton Borough,** 370 N.J. Super. 429 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 139 (2004)  .............................................................................................................passim  **Cotler v. Twp. of Pilesgrove,** 393 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 2007)  ...............................................................39, 40  **County of Ocean v. Zekaria Realty,** 271 N.J. Super. 280 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1000 (1994)
[brief] *Ibid.*  The issue is whether the irregular matter had the capacity to influence the jury.  *State v. Grant*, 254 N.J. Super. 571, 583 (App. Div. 1992).  When there is any indication of exposure to extra-judicial information, the trial court should question the jurors individually to determine if they could fulfill their duty to judge the facts in an impartial and unbiased fashion.  *State v. Bey (I)*, 112 N.J. 45, 86-91 (1988).  Summations from counsel and [...]’s jury instructions took place on Thursday, April 28, 2022.
[brief] A Finding that [...]’ Sworn Statement is Immaterial Would Be Inconsistent with Well-Established Authority in This Jurisdiction and Others  Courts consistently award new trials where a prosecution witness’s prior inconsistent statement are withheld from a defendant.  See e.g., People v. Bond, 95 N.Y.2d 840 (2000); Spicer v. Roxbury Corr. Inst., 194 F.3d 547 (4th Cir. 1999); Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2003); State v. Scheidel, 165 Ohio App.3d 131 (2006).  As in Bond, 95 N.Y.2d at 843, wherein the witness’s testimony “was crucial to the People’s theory [of the case],” here, [...]’ testimony was critical to the State’s case.  Although the State asserts that [...]’ testimony was corroborated by other evidence, the examples and inferences it relies on are weak, and undermined by other trial evidence.  State v. Lodzinski, 249 N.J. 116, 157 (N.J. 2021) (“Bootstrapped inferences cannot substitute for the proof necessary to satisfy an element of an offense”).  For example, the State cites [...]’s relationship with the [...]—a relationship that neither of his codefendants had—as evidence that he participated in the home invasion in Staten Island.  State Br. at 5.  [...]’s relationship with the [...], however, would have made it easier to identify him as a perpetrator.  Nevertheless, the family did not identify [...] as a perpetrator and their reason for not doing so is simple: he was not involved.  Likewise, the State cites [...]’s testimony that [...] provided her with bail money for [...] after his arrest as evidence of his participation in offense conduct.  State Br. at 5.  However, [...]’s testimony is not corroborative of anything, particularly given that she, herself, was a biased witness.  In fact, [...]’s father was a coconspirator in the home invasions, a fact identified for the first-time during [...]’s trial.  See 9T 10-111.  Finally, the State fails to acknowledge the countless references in the evidence and testimony that actually exonerated [...] altogether.  See e.g. 1T 109, 110, 140 ([...] testified that the individual in the back seat of the car and the individual who made the threats against him and his family did not speak with an accent or stutter; [...] speaks with a distinct accent and stutter); 1T 108-109, 110:5, 152:18 – 215:1, 159 ([...]’s did not see [...] at their house on the date of the incident, nor did they hear his voice, which they would have recognized); 10T 118 (absence of forensic evidence).  See also Def. Br. at 10-17.
[brief] In addition to filing an appeal with the Commission, [...] also filed a contemporaneous appeal in Superior Court.  In support of its jurisdictional forum challenge to the Commission, the Township asserted, in large part, this matter is similar\(^1\) to the matter in *Isaacson v. Public Employment Relations Commission and [...]*, Docket No. [...], 2017 WL 745766, Argued December 21, 2016, Decided February 27, 2017.
[brief] In [...] d/b/a [...] (“[...]”) Brief, [...] proffers an improperly narrow interpretation of the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act’s (the “NJFPA”) “written arrangement” requirement, untethered from both the text of the NJFPA and controlling case law.  Indeed, [...]’s Brief is telling for its complete silence regarding: (1) the federal franchise legal framework that supports a mere “invoice” between two parties as satisfying evidence of a written arrangement, and (2) the documents [...] presented to the Trial Court that satisfy even [...]’s proposed “written arrangement” requirements.  Moreover, as set forth in detail below, [...]’s arguments supporting the Trial Court’s decision also fail because: (1) [...] improperly conflates the NJFPA’s “written arrangement” requirement with its “license” requirement; (2) [...] ignores the mountain of evidence before the Trial Court that [...] and its owner, [...], owned and operated all of the “Summerset” brands and entities in the early critical years of the relationship between Summerset and [...]; (3) the NJFPA’s plain language requires an assessment of the actions of other related individuals and entities in assessing the relationship between a putative franchisor and franchisee; (4) [...] omits critical material facts and law to argue that [...] – as a matter of law – cannot satisfy the remaining elements of a NJFPA claim; (5) [...] expressly opposed, on factual grounds, [...]’s motion for summary judgment on its Tortious Interference and Indemnity claims; and (6) the Order on [...]’s Motion to Bar was an interlocutory order, and therefore the current appeal is timely under the New Jersey Court Rules.  Accordingly, [...] respectfully requests reversal (or modification) of the Trial Court orders: (1) granting [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) denying as “moot”, rather than with prejudice, of [...]’s Motion to Bar, and (3) denying [...]’s Motion to Amend pursuant to R. 4:49-2.
[brief] (Id. at 15).  They point out that fact discovery closes on September 16, 2021, and plaintiffs have been waiting for defendants to complete their custodian ESI productions and will need time to review the documents before taking depositions.  (Id.).  Thus, ordering defendants to produce all non-privileged documents containing a search term is appropriate in light of the “undeniable relevance of the search terms”; the near certainty that relevant documents have already been destroyed; and defendants’ “apparent aggressive discovery withholding practices” as reflected in plaintiffs’ Chart.
[brief] Legal Argument  I.  The Trial Court Erred by Implying That a Rule 4:6-2(a)  Procedural Lack of Standing Subject Matter Jurisdiction  Dismissal Constituted a Substantive Preclusive Dismissal with Prejudice on the Ultimate Merits.  (Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86, Pa89, 1T)  II.  The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing All Eight Counts of This Hybrid Prerogative Writ/Declaratory Judgment/Civil Rights Act Violation Action for Lack of Constitutional, Statutory and Common Law Standing.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX  Answer, Crossclaim and Jury Demand, Filed October 17, 2022)  ........................................a1  Civil Case Information Statement.............................................................................................a16  Certification in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Cross-motion for Consolidation, Filed October 2, 2023......................................................................................a18  Exhibit J 4-28-23  [...] Email to [...].................................................................a24  Exhibit K 4-28-23  [...] Email to [...].................................................................a26  Exhibit L 4-28-23  [...] Email to [...].................................................................a28  Exhibit M 5-5-23  [...] Letter to [...].  ...............................................................a30  Exhibit N 5-2-23  Email to [...] enclosing [...] Letter to [...].......................a32  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Vasquez, 374 N.J. Super. at 260; Wakefield, 190 N.J. at 457.  Defendant also argues that the limiting instruction, ask for and approved by the defense prior to being read to the jury, somehow now, on appeal, constitutes plain error because the trial judge did not sua sponte strike the State’s comments from the record and instruct the jury to disregard them.  (Db 16-17).
[brief] See *Marmo & Sons Gen. Cont., LLC,* v. Biagi Farms, LLC, No. A-3120-22 (App. Div. May 24, 2024) (slip op. at 7).  In the decisions following Cole, courts have interpreted waiver of arbitration almost uniformly in the context of implied waiver, where a party’s litigation conduct manifests an intention to implicitly waive its right to arbitrate.  Yet, the New Jersey Supreme Court never expressed an intention to limit the Cole framework only to interpretation of implicit waivers.  Nor has any decision following Cole limited its utility to matters involving implied waiver.  In the rulings which Defendants appeal, the Trial Court found that Defendants expressly waived arbitration by way of [...]’s statements before [...] during the March 23, 2023 hearing.
[brief] “Our rules... are designed to address actual conflicts and bias, as well as the appearance of impropriety. ”  State v. McCabe, 201 N.J. 34, 43 (2010).  R. 1:12-1(g) provides that a judge shall be disqualified “when there is any other reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgement, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so. ”  However, “the belief that the proceedings were unfair must be objectively reasonable.
[brief] He testified there was no lighting in the alleyway, the asphalt was “chopped up,” and “[t]here was garbage and broken glass in the entire length of the alleyway. ”  The rear fenced-in yard behind the building, which resembled a parking lot, was also “littered with broken glass” and “piles of debris. ”  [...] assisted [...] in conducting a grid search of the yard and alleyway using flashlights, but they found nothing of evidential value.  The officers then walked the perimeter of the building and tried to open doors.
[brief] A.  Parents have a fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their children.  Parents have a fundamental right under the United States Constitution to direct the “care, custody, and control” of their minor children.  *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality op.); see also *Gruenke v. Seip*, 225 F.3d 290, 304 (3d Cir. 2000) (same).
[brief] [...] did not make any claim for the "coke machine" in the photographs referenced by [...].  Neither did he include claims for pots, pans, or cutlery.  A review of his testimony reveals that he basically included the tenant fit ups that go beyond the "vanilla box" provided in typical retail space referred to by both [...] and [...].  Items such as refrigerated display cases, walk in coolers with refrigeration, illuminated menu signs, range hoods, grease interceptors, are all obviously a functional part of a building devoted to use as a restaurant.  This is also the same type of FF&E the Court in Liu said the jury was free to conclude formed a functional unit with the building and that could enhance the value the property for its purpose.
[brief] The State also admitted into evidence a photo extracted from [...]’s cellphone with a timestamp of March 5, 2018, at 5:45 p.m., which depicted Defendant’s face without the teardrop tattoos.  (26T 72-25 to 74-25).  After getting the tattoos, the pair received a ride from Defendant’s father back to [...]’s Nissan Rogue which [...] drove with Defendant back to the Comfort Inn room in New Jersey where they stayed until they were arrested on March 12.  (30T 262-19 to 263-25).  The samples taken from the spit on the ground near [...]’s body were sent to the New Jersey State Police forensic laboratory for DNA analysis.  (27T 45-22 to 46-7).  Ultimately, the samples returned a match to Defendant’s DNA based on a sample he had previously provided to the New Jersey State Police.
[brief] [Appellants’] assertions fail to connect any facts between [...] and [Appellants’] default under the Lease.  If [Appellants] had not defaulted under the Lease, they would have the Solar Rights and Solar Project, and the subject action would be moot. ”  [Pa144]; •  In dismissing Count 1 of the First Amended Complaint (breach of contract), “At all times relevant to [Appellants’] allegations, [...] owned the Property.  [...] entered the Lease with [...], requiring [...] to make an annual payment to [...] on September 1 of each year.
[brief] \(^{10}\)Paragraph 6.2 defines “Damages” as “any actual loss, liability, claim, damage (excluding incidental and consequential damages) and expense (including costs of investigation and defense and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of suit). ”  Once again, the language relied upon does not mention “attorneys’ fees” and limits the indemnification provided to conduct required by the Agreement.  The Buyer’s Representations and Warranties contained in the MIPA are set forth in Paragraph 3.2 (P-82 at 3).
[brief] The trial court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims in light of its factual findings and credibility determinations runs afoul of black letter law, which provides that the entire controversy doctrine only applies to claims that were known to the litigant in a prior action.  See, e.g., Lanziano, 304 N.J. at 626.  Accordingly, the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims should be reversed.  III.