ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 22  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, RULINGS, & ORDERS BEING APPEALED  Order Denying Speedy Trial Motion .................................................................  Da 3 Judgment of Conviction ..................................................................................  Da 10-12 INDEX TO APPENDIX  [...] .........................................................  Da 1-2 June 10, 2019  Order Denying Speedy Trial Motion ...........................................  Da 3 Plea Forms .......................................................................................................  Da 4-9 Judgment of Conviction ..................................................................................  Da 10-12 Notice of Appeal .............................................................................................  Da 13-16
[brief] More specifically, [...], writing for the unanimous Court, expressly stated: “it is substantially more difficult for a new business to establish lost profits damages with reasonable certainty than it is for an established business to do so. ”  Schwartz, 251 N.J. at 561.  In recognition of that heightened standard, the Court directed trial courts to “carefully scrutinize a new business’s claim that a defendant’s tortious conduct or breach of contract prevented it from profiting from an enterprise in which it has no experience and should bar that claim unless it can be proven with reasonable certainty.
[brief] (29T:151-20 to 153-5).  Both [...] and [...] repeatedly testified that they loved [...] like a son, and that defendant was a brother to him.  (29T:148-2 to 148-7, 165-4 to 5, 166-7, 186-12 to 15, 187-1 to 2; 31T:137-6 to 7).  They admitted that they had lied about the timeline of events, and the fact that the gun belonged to defendant, not [...].  (29T:163-4 to 176-12; 31T:39-25 to 51-4, 131-15 to 134-9).  They claimed that the repeated trips back to [...]’s workplace were because [...] took defendant to his father’s workplace to tell [...] what had happened, first.  Ibid.  Then, once they all went back home, defendant declared he was not “ready” to call 911 yet and wanted to go back to tell his parents something else.  Ibid.  When they went back to [...]’s workplace, he admitted to his parents that he had the gun, not [...].  [...] then told [...] and defendant to lie and say that [...] had brought the gun, erroneously believing that it was illegal for defendant to own a gun in his own home.  Only then did they go back to [...] to finally call 911.  Ibid.  Despite claiming to love [...], [...] and [...] both admitted that they never once even touched [...]’ body in the two hours they left him on the porch.
[brief] Does anyone seriously think that I would not have done so?  g)  **Service time vs. service credit. **  After my retirement on February 1, 2022, I was first notified by the [...] in letters dated July 19, 2022 and July 22, 2022 that a post-retirement audit had reduced my retirement benefits due to a decrease in my service credit from 121 months (10 years and 1 month) to 118 months (9 years and 10 months).
[brief] The trial court understood that this testimony would require “really going back in time and is evidence of another crime” and “it is really a separate event. ”  (3T 21-4 to 7)  In addition, the court correctly noted that the previous drug deal, even if it were not intrinsic, would be introduced “to show that the defendant acted in conformity with this prior act” with “no permitted use exception here under 404(b)(2). ”  (3T 21-14 to 17)  Thus, “the prejudice . . . would be detrimental here to the defendant. ”  (3T 21-20 to 21)  Because the State had been prohibited from introducing the country club transaction, it should have been on notice that [...] could not testify about prior drug deals between herself and [...], which were even more remote in time.  Her testimony was not intrinsic evidence of the April 10 charges, and her testimony failed to meet all four prongs of the Cofield test.
[directive] "BOLO list," sometimes referred to colloquially as a "hot list," is a compilation of one or more license plates, or partial license plates, of a vehicle or vehicles for which a BOLO situation exists that is programmed into an ALPR so that the device will alert if it captures the image of a license plate that matches a license plate included on the BOLO list.  The term also includes a compilation of one or more license plates, or partial license plates, that is compared against stored license plate data that had previously been scanned and collected by an ALPR, including scanned license plate data that is stored in a separate data storage device or system.  "Initial BOLO list" refers to the BOLO list that was programmed into an ALPR at the time that the device was being used to scan license plates in the field.  "Post-Scan BOLO list" refers to a BOLO list that is compared against stored data collected by an ALPR, including scanned license plate data that has been transmitted to another device or data storage system.  "Stored data" refers to all information captured by an ALPR and stored in the device’s memory or in a separate data storage device or system.
[brief] ”  Id. at 1314 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 476).  Miller didn’t require any specific factual findings to impose such a lengthy sentence; it “mandated ‘only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing’ a life-without-parole sentence. ”  Ibid. (quoting Miller, 567 U. S. at 483).  The Jones Court explained: Miller repeatedly described youth as a sentencing factor akin to a mitigating circumstance.  And Miller in turn required a sentencing procedure similar to the procedure that this Court has required for the individualized consideration of mitigating circumstances in capital cases….  Those capital cases require sentencers to consider relevant mitigating circumstances when deciding whether to impose the death penalty.  And those cases afford sentencers wide discretion in determining “the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. ”  But those cases do not require the sentencer to make any particular factual finding regarding those mitigating circumstances.  Repeatedly citing [those capital cases], the Miller Court stated that “a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider” the defendant’s youth and must have “discretion to impose a different punishment” than life without parole.  Stated otherwise, the Miller Court mandated “only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing” a life-without-parole sentence.
[brief] Pursuant to Ptaszynski v. Uwaneme the [...], its buildings and the individual staff are places of public accommodation.  Id. 71 N.J. Super. 333, 853 (App. Div. 2004).  See NJSA 10:5-4 requiring public accommodation in providing services in a non-disparate fashion and equal rights to all.  Pursuant to the NJ Appellate Division, a place of public accommodation is not free to offer its services in a hostile fashion.  Holmes v. Jersey City Police Dep't, 449 N.J. Super. 600 (App. Div. 2017).  Edison/Police officers were ineligible for summary judgment because they provided hostile services to plaintiff and denied him public accommodation by the unlawfully stopping, searching, beating and arrest.  (Pa41, Pa52, Pa22-23)
[brief] [...] contributed to the growth and utility of the New Jersey State Police Museum in many ways.  She compiled and digitized a database of every New Jersey State Police report filed on the Kidnapping in the year 1932.  Additionally, she helped inventory all the books in the New Jersey State Police Museum pertaining to the Kidnapping.  While volunteering at the New Jersey State Police Museum and acquiring additional knowledge about the Kidnapping, [...] participated as an expert on the case in an episode of The Travel Channel’s *Mysteries at the Museum*.  Additionally, she edited a book for publication on behalf of [...], a fellow researcher and author of four volumes on the Kidnapping and was working on these projects while doing everything in her power to assist with the care, preservation and maintenance of these historic documents.
[brief] Fundamentally, each of these cases addressed a situation in which an agency erroneously acted without promulgating regulations, like here.  Pb25–28, 31–37.  Brushing aside controlling precedent and the legislative mandate to promulgate regulations, the Department goes so far as to argue that adopting regulations would “destabilize the rate review process,” because they would define “excessive” using “[h]ard and fast” rules and “percentages” and impose “mandatory rate caps.
[brief] To determine whether an animal has a vicious propensity, that jury charge instructs as follows:  You may consider the attack on the plaintiff; the results of that attack; the (animal's) disposition when people approached it; its mischievousness, playfulness or over-demonstrated affection; and whether it had attacked any other person/property.  To [*9] find a vicious or dangerous trait or propensity, it is not necessary to find the [animal] had previously bitten/attacked/did the same act to someone/something.  On the other hand, the mere barking of a dog or other articulations of an animal or an isolated straining of a leash, would not necessarily demonstrate vicious or dangerous trait or propensity of the animal.  You may find that the (animal) had vicious or dangerous propensities only if the nature and frequency of its acts furnished reasonable ground to believe that it might cause an injury by biting/overzealousness/mischiefousness/playfulness/over-demonstrated affection.
[brief] Plaintiffs cannot avoid their agreement to arbitrate simply because [...] made no effort to secure a translation of [...]’s terms.  As the trial court observed, translation services are readily available online.  See (Pa019).  Far from it being unconscionable for [...]’s terms to appear in English, it is well settled that it was [...]’s obligation to ensure that she understood [...]’s terms before agreeing to them.  Plaintiffs’ argument conflicts with the well-established principle of contract law that “[i]n the absence of fraud, the fact that an offeree cannot read, write, speak, or understand the English language is immaterial to whether an English-language agreement the offeree executes is enforceable.
[brief] Additionally, the statements were demonstrably false, given that Plaintiffs did make significant modifications in order to accommodate the buffer needed for the bald eagle’s nest.  The Mayor also omitted the fact that the affordable units had already been provided for in the Township’s Housing Element and Fair Share Plan, which had been previously approved by the Township (and memorialized in an agreement signed by the Mayor himself) in 2016.  As the Trial Court noted, the press release appeared to have had its desired effect on ginning up public opposition.  At the March 26, 2019 public hearing, a standing-room only crowd of residents opposing Plaintiffs’ Amended Application appeared.  M40.  Seventeen residents spoke against the Amended Application.  After the conclusion of Plaintiffs’ proofs, the Board, instead of discussing the matter or asking further questions, voted unanimously to deny Plaintiffs’ Amended Application as sought by the Mayor, with only Board Member [...] commenting that he thought the affordable housing was an attempt to “hold the Township hostage,” and, with no further explanation, that “the negative criteria outweighs the positive criteria.
[brief] ” (12T:32-24 to 25).  [...] responded, “Yes … [h]e would know that from – he had been seeing the gun multiple times before he --. ” (12T:33-2 to 3).  Without an objection from the Prosecutor, the Court on its own volition said: Doctor, the question he asked you was whether he knew the type of ammunition.  He didn’t ask you anything else.  I’m asking you again, please answer the questions being asked.  There is always the ability to answer a different question at another time.  But answer the question that is being asked of you.  The question was, did he, meaning the defendant, know the ammunition — the caliber of the ammunition.  What is the answer to that?  [12T:33-4 to 12].  On redirect [...] was asked about the hallucinations that [...] was experiencing.
[brief] The Board’s wild insistence that [...] amended the Settlement Agreement, without any formal action by the public entities party to the Settlement Agreement, does not, and cannot, obviate the Board’s obligations under the Settlement Agreement, including to adopt the resolution of approval within the timeframes set forth therein.  To compound matters, the Board then issued the Stealth Resolution in January 2023 that effectively added conditions to the June 13, 2022 approval and essentially reversed the Original Resolution.  This is specifically noted in [...]’s decision wherein he held that “I’m going to enforce the first [December 12, 2022] resolution that the [...] passed.  And then 42 days later or whatever it is was they decided to—that was only a conditional approval.  And they went back and they unpassed the [December 12, 2022 resolution].  I quite frankly find this is a tactic in a long line of tactics that [...] has utilized to delay meeting its constitutional obligation of affordable housing.
[brief] Regardless, [...]’s purported “unenrollment” of [...] could not be consummated without [...]’s regulatorily-valid proper notice that “contain[ed] the standard or reason upon which the *termination* is premised” and “specif[ied] in detail the factual basis” of [...]’s termination.  *N.J.A.C. 11:1-20.2(g).*  Here, even though [...] was the only party empowered to change its own policy, and was also contractually charged with giving notice (Dta140), it never provided any notice to anyone of the cancellation of [...]’s liability coverage – not even to [...].  (Tb24, Dta1077-80.)  This is in contrast to the notice that [...], not [...], gave to the [...] of termination of [...]’s workers compensation policy – [...]’s disingenuous effort to conflate the two (Zb28), notwithstanding. \(^2\)  The burden of proving notice rested on [...]; its concession that it never sent any notice is also its concession of its failure to carry that burden.  C.
[brief] The Petitioner also sought a declaration that he has an equitable ownership interest in the Decedent’s house such that a constructive trust be imposed upon same, a claim also denied.  These rulings should be affirmed on appeal.  However, in ruling that the law of constructive trust warranted an award to the Petitioner of a life estate in the Decedent’s home, the Chancery Division unfortunately abused its discretionary equitable authority.
[directive] In re [...], Starting around 1950, [...] shifted its approach, bringing enforcement actions against gay bars under Rule 5 as well as Rule 4.  In many cases, the actions were not premised on specific allegations of improper conduct, but rather on the theory that the gathering of “apparent homosexuals” had allowed their establishments to operate in “such a manner as to become a Page 3 nuisance. ”  Inc., [...] Bulletin 1045, Item 6 (Dec. 27, 1945).  [...]’s In re Polka Club, crackdowns continued on this theory until precluded them.
[brief] No matter what arbitration is – we are not even at whatever passes for that – the user is a few thousand words in and a few scrolls back and forth across the agreement and doesn’t even know if theirs is a claim subject to it.  It is entirely unclear what “the Services” are – the Terms never come out and say “transportation” or “delivery of food” in plain, simple terms.  And the user’s not even at the exceptions in Section 2(b) that were added to their plate moments ago, and which might make all of this irrelevant.  Yet even beyond that, the agreement is not just confusing but contradictory.
[brief] (1T89).  In January 2022, a heated argument erupted between Plaintiff and Defendant concerning the wedding photo album.  The disagreement was significant enough to involve her brother and sister, who joined the discussion via video call.  During the argument, Plaintiff expressed to the family members that Defendant’s behavior was surprising and unlike the person he had married.  Her brother agreed, acknowledging that her actions were indeed inappropriate.  (1T89).
[brief] She told [...] about going to the house.  (7T57-18 to 58-5).  At around 11:35 a.m., [...] went with her boyfriend to the house to look for defendant.  (7T35-1 to 2; 7T35-13 to 36-5).  They knocked on the front door, but no one answered and the back door was also locked.  (7T36-6 to 15).  [...] took the screen off a window, went inside, and let [...] inside.  (7T36-16 to 25).  He went upstairs and when he reached the second floor, he saw a body lying in bed.  (7T37-1 to 7).  Once in the bedroom, he saw blood everywhere and confirmed there was a body in the bed.  (7T37-8 to 19).  When he moved the blanket, he realized it was [...] and called the police.  (7T28-12 to 39-2; 4T139-13 to 17; 7T39-11 to 20).
[brief] Here, a contract existed between [...] and the [...] as evidenced by the Employee Manual, Executive Order, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement.  Defendant [...] has an established history lacking in credibility and only a jury can determine if the proffered reason for [...]’s termination was or was not pretext.  The [...] employs 3,800 employees as set forth in the testimony of [...] and they could not find another position or office location for [...]?  Defendant [...] hated [...] and wanted to hurt and punish [...] and sought his vindication by taking money out of [...]’s pocket, food off his children’s plate, and blackballing him in the community by making negative remarks about [...]’s past persona.  Defendant [...] not only terminated Plaintiff in bad faith, he orchestrated [...]’s termination beating the clock on [...]’s ability to be certified as a candidate by admittedly conspiring with the City Clerk, to terminate him the day [...] returned to work and before [...] could be certified as a candidate for West Ward Councilman.  Joseph [...] admittedly and unequivocally did state in his deposition all that would lead a reasonable fact finder to that which was in bad faith.  The Trial Court failed to appreciate that bad faith is a question of fact for the jury.  Bad faith requires a state of mind determination and the Court is cautioned against granting Summary Judgment on claims where bad faith is an underlying tenant.
[brief] N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) is similar to F.R.E. 803(6).  In construing F.R.E. 803(6), the Zenith Radio Court stated:  “Rule 803(6) requires as a condition of admissibility that business records be ‘made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge. ’ ....  “Thus, in order to meet the personal knowledge requirement of the rule, plaintiffs must show either 1) that the author of the document had personal knowledge of the matters reported, or 2) that the information he reported was transmitted by another person who had personal knowledge, acting in the course of a regularly conducted activity, or 3) that it was the author’s regular practice to record information transmitted by persons who had personal knowledge.  In the absence of a showing of personal knowledge, made in one or more of these three ways, a document cannot qualify as a business record. ”  Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 505 F. Supp 1190, 1237 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
[brief] In State v. Orecchio, 16 N.J. 125 (1954), the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the Appellate Division's reversal of the defendant's conviction on three counts of a 35 count indictment.  The reversal was based on the cumulative effect of numerous errors made throughout the trial.  In affirming the Appellate Division, the Court observed, the sound administration of criminal justice in our democracy requires that both the end and the means be just.  The accused, no matter how abhorrent the offense charged, not now seemingly evident the guilt, is entitled to a fair trial surrounded by the substantive and procedural safeguards which have stood for centuries as bulwarks of liberty in English speaking countries.  This, of course, does not mean that the incidental legal errors, which creep into trial did not prejudice the rights of the accused or make the proceedings unfair, or may be invoked to upset an otherwise valid conviction...  [Citations omitted].  Where, however, the legal errors are of such magnitude as to prejudice the defendant's rights, or in their aggregated have rendered the trail unfair, our fundamental constitutional concepts dictate the granting of a new trial before impartial jury.
[brief] That arbitration might be governed by another set of rules, or by a retired judge or lawyer not an active judge or jury, or is initiated by mail, only grow to constitutional or statutory magnitude when one understands arbitration is not just a forum, but the only forum.  In that respect, “nothing better illustrates that arbitration is not a self-defining term than our court rules. ”  Kernahan, 236 N.J. at 333 ([...], J., concurring).
[brief] [Id.].  The same result is warranted here, where it is undisputed that the Union County Project involves multi-jurisdictional high-capacity transmission lines.  [...]’s high-capacity power lines running through Westfield will provide power not just to some residents of Westfield, but also to residents of other municipalities, including Scotch Plains, Fanwood, Clark, Cranford, and Mountainside.  (Da763a-766a).  The Union County Project and more specifically, the less than five miles of work necessary in Westfield, is just a small part of [...]’s overall 69kV Statewide Initiative.
[brief] Of Counsel & on the Brief: [...] (#024491996)  Table of Contents  Table of Authorities .................................................................  ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................  1  LEGAL ARGUMENT  I.  The Trial Court’s rationale in granting summary judgment below and Defendants’ arguments in this appeal are unavailing as [a] our Supreme Court has expressly held that there is no requirement under CEPA of employer complicity in the misconduct, and [b] there is no requirement under CEPA that in order for a plaintiff-employee to have a reasonable belief that conduct was in violation of a law, rule, regulation or public policy, an employer must have issued or announced a previously existing order, directive, policy, or practice sanctioning that illegal conduct.
[brief] (19T 18-10 to 25, 19-14 to 17)  Contrary to the PCR judge’s rejection of the ineffectiveness claim after conducting an evidentiary hearing, defendant maintains his trial attorney’s error was so serious that the jury verdict was unreliable.  A.  Standard of Review.  In reviewing a PCR judge’s factual findings after conducting an evidentiary hearing, this court applies a deferential standard.  State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 576 (2015).  While an appellate court’s “reading of a cold record is a pale substitute for a trial judge’s assessment of the credibility of a witness he [or she] has observed firsthand,” the judge’s interpretation of the law is not afforded any deference and on appeal is reviewed de novo.  Id. at 575-577 (citing State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540-541 (2013)).  For mixed questions of fact and law, this court affords deference to factual findings that are supported by sufficient credible evidence, but reviews de novo a trial judge’s application of any legal rules to the supported factual findings.