ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 31, (1)  Arraignment/Initial Case Disposition Conference Order  The original Arraignment/Status Conference Order form was promulgated to conform with the requirements for that court proceeding  Thereafter, that form order was (c).  3:9-1 in R. superseded by the forms issued the Supplements to Directive 6-03 dated August 20, on in # 2010, June 2013, and the May 26, 2016.1  All prior versions are superseded the attached by 26, Paragraph was added the August 2010 order upon the recommendation of the Conference of Presiding 20, in #7  Judges accordance with State Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 144 (2009), which the Supreme Court requested that in in v. of the plea form instruct defendants their right to seek legal advice regarding their immigration status.  The Conference was of the view that the defendant and defense counsel should discuss potential immigration consequences early the in court process.  Paragraph 7 was added to alert defense counsel to discuss with the defendant his/her immigration # status, the potential consequences of a guilty plea or conviction and the right to seek legal advice his/her immigration on status.  ° J. Trenton, New [...] [...] [...]  O [...]
[brief] In light of the first requirement – that witnesses have firsthand knowledge – the extent to which a lay witness may testify about the content of a video is largely dependent upon their prior experience.  Witnesses who participated in the depicted events can provide “opinion testimony about [those] parts of [the video] recording that depict what they perceived in real time. ”  Id. at 599.  So, for example, a “bank employee can testify about the portion of a [video] recording that depicts their encounter with a robber. ”  Ibid.  Witnesses who did not experience the actual events depicted on camera, such as [...] and [...], are subject to substantial limitations in their video narration testimony.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  Attorney for Respondent  By: /s/ [...]  [...] Deputy Attorney General Attorney ID No. 274332018  [...]  Dated: August 28, 2023  August 28, 2023  Via e-Courts Appellate Division  [...] Clerk of the Appellate Division [...] [...] P.O. Box 006 [...]  Re: In the Matter of the Petition of [...] for a Determination Concerning the Holmdel Regulator Station Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19 – 2017 Petition and In the Matter of the Petition of [...] for a Determination Concerning the Regulator Station Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19 – 2018 Petition BPU Docket Nos. [...] and [...]  Appellate Division Docket No. [...]  Respondent Rate Counsel’s Letter Brief
[brief] Accordingly, when analyzing prior bad acts, courts must first make the “threshold determination” whether the bad act in question is intrinsic evidence.  Rose, 206 N.J. at 179.  Prior to trial, the court ruled that the State could not introduce evidence of a drug deal earlier in the day at the country club, because it was not intrinsic to the charged crimes, and in any case, its admission would violate N.J.R.E. 404(b).
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ON APPEAL | ii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | iii | | APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS | vi | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | ARGUMENT | 2 | | I.  [...]’S JUSTIFICATION FOR APPLYING NEW YORK LAW IS MISPLACED (Pa5)|  2 | | a.  The Locale Of [...]’s Sales Is Irrelevant To Choice-of-Law (Pa5) | 3 | | b.  The Agreement’s Choice-of-Law Clause Is Null and Void (Pa5) | 5 | | c.  The Restatement Also Favors Applying New Jersey Law (Pa5) | 6 | | II.  THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE HERE IS LEGALLY INVALID (Pa5-7) | 10 | | III.  THE FAA VIOLATES THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT (Pa5-7) | 13 | | IV.  A COURT MUST DETERMINE ARBITRABILITY HERE (Pa7) | 13 | | V. THIS APPEAL IS NOT MOOT (Not Raised Below) | 14 | | CONCLUSION | 15
[brief] In his initial brief, [...] argued that the trial court erred in denying a Wade hearing because he had presented some evidence of suggestiveness in the identification procedure: (1) that the detective administering the photo array did not accept that [...] did not recognize anyone and instead asked [...] if he wanted to look at all the photos a second time; and (2) asking [...] to make a conclusive “yes or no” identification rather than neutrally asking how confident [...] was, in [...]’s own words.  (Db 12-19)\(^3\)  Additionally, [...] argued that impermissibly allowing [...] to express his confidence in his identification at trial, when he did not do so during the identification procedure, was harmful error.  (Db 19-21)  In response, the State argues that there was no need for a Wade hearing and no reversible error in admitting --- \(^2\) United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).  \(^3\)  Defendant adopts the abbreviations from his initial brief.  In addition, Sb refers to the State’s brief, and Ra refers to the Reply appendix.  [...]’s confidence statement at trial.  This Court should reject the State’s arguments.
[brief] In United States v. Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court stated as follows:  [S]pecial value (of the condemned property) to the condemnor as distinguished from others who may or may not possess the power to condemn, must be excluded, as an element of market value.  Miller, supra at 375.  [emphasis added].  Under the Scope of the Project Rule what is to be disregarded is a value-creating enhancement directly related to the government’s public project.  Just compensation does not include any enhancement in value which would not exist but for the publicly-funded public project.  See, Kugler, supra at 379; Miller, supra; Reynolds, supra.  Here, the [...] would not exist but for the [...]’s redevelopment designation.
[brief] The arbitration which culminated in the Award concerned [...]’s and [...]’s respective rights and obligations pursuant to the parties’ Project Transfer Agreement (“PTA”) by which [...] transferred its rights in certain construction projects to [...] in exchange for [...]’s payment to [...] of 65% of the Estimated Gross Profits (“EGP”) for each project (made by way of “Installment Payments”).  Importantly, the only projects that were subject to this payment obligation were those that achieved the status of “Backlog Project” under a procedure expressly and unambiguously set forth in the PTA.  The parties were unable to agree on the status of certain projects or the EGPs associated with those projects, and [...] ultimately terminated the PTA.  Pursuant to the PTA, the parties then commenced and participated in an arbitration (the “Arbitration”) in an attempt to resolve those and other disputes.
[brief] (9T19:8-22)  Although [...] told detectives that he had never seen the shooter before, (6T 146-1 to 18, 165-10 to 19), on cross-examination he admitted that he had seen [...] around the neighborhood a few times before the shooting.  (6T145:13 to 17).  [...] confirmed that she saw [...] all the time around that neighborhood, and that sometimes she would hang out with both [...] and [...] in that neighborhood.  (7T142:1-15).  The State introduced the video recording of the identification, and the recording of the procedure was admitted into evidence and played at trial.  (Da40).  Additionally, the State introduced multiple photographs of the victim sitting on the front stoop of the multi-family home where [...] lived, with defendant and another man standing behind the victim.  (6T123:4 to 124-20; 7T:130-8 to 131-16).  The State also introduced various surveillance videos from the day of the shooting.  (8T72:5 to 75-4).  The State argued in summation that the videos showed [...], wearing a gray sweatsuit, walking towards the area where the shooting happened.  (9T88:3 to 98-20).  The trial court, aware of the Supreme Court’s dictates regarding identification and its limitations, properly instructed the jury that, “[l]esser degrees of familiarity do not enhance accuracy and may, in fact, decrease accuracy of the identification” because of “[u]nconscious transference.
[brief] Page  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT..................................................................................1  COMBINED STATEMENT OF RECENT PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND RELEVANT FACTS..............................................................................................................4  ARGUMENT.........................................................................................................................7  SINCE THE [...] HAS FAILED TO RESPOND ADEQUATELY TO THIS COURT’S REMAND ORDER, AND THE STATE’S BRIEF HAS FAILED TO RESPOND TO THE RELATED CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS PRESENTED BY THE APPELLANTS IN THEIR BRIEF TO THIS COURT SUPPORTING THEIR APPEAL, THE COURT SHOULD RULE NOW ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IT POSED OF WHETHER THE DENIAL OF T&E TO [...] STUDENTS WAS A RESULT OF [...]’S UNCONSTITUTIONALITY AS APPLIED TO THE DISTRICT.........................................................................................................................7  A.  THE COURT SHOULD SET OUT THE REMEDIAL PARAMETERS AND PROVIDE THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES WITH A CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS, AND REASONABLE TIME PERIOD, FOR FULLY REMEDYING THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECTS........................,,.............19  B.  THE COURT SHOULD ACT EXPEDITIOUSLY RECOGNIZING THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE FOR THE STUDENT-APPELLANTS.......................................................19  CONCLUSION......................................................................................................................20
[brief] The burden of proof rests upon [...] to establish his right to unemployment compensation.  Brady, 152 N.J. at 218.  The New Jersey Unemployment Compensation Law provides in pertinent part that an individual shall be disqualified for benefits:  For the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works eight weeks in employment.  . . .  [N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). ]  An employee who has left work voluntarily has the burden of proving that he did so with good cause attributable to the work.  Brady, 152 N.J. at 213; Self v. Bd. of Rev., 91 N.J. 453, 457 (1982); Domenico v. Bd. of Rev., 192 N.J. Super. 284, 287 (App. Div. 1983).
[brief] There is no genuine dispute of fact that several unauthorized physical entries occurred on Plaintiffs’ Property, including, but not necessarily limited to, the installation of temporary well points, the taking of soil borings, and the excavation of the Plaintiffs’ Property, which left a crater in the Plaintiffs’ parking lot which, to date, has not been repaired.  There is a dispute of fact, which was never addressed by the trial court, pertaining to the installation of the ASDS.  Despite these facts, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the [...] and denied Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment.  (Pa000869; Pa000871).  In its Statement of Reasons, the trial court acknowledges Cedar Point in response to the Plaintiffs’ legal argument, wherein the United States Supreme Court held that the government’s unauthorized temporary physical entry onto private property constitutes a taking, but the trial court distinguished that case from the matter at hand.
[brief] The distinction between enhancing market value and constituting the basis of market value is, in our view, critical, and it is that distinction that rendered defendant’s appraisal methodology legal defective.  (Emphasis Added).  See, Hilton at 587.  In Hilton, the Appellate Division quoted [...]’s rulings in State v. Gorga, 26 N.J. 113 (1958):  The important caveat is that the true issue is not the value of the property for the use which would be permitted if the amendment were adopted.  Zoning amendments are not routinely made or granted.
[brief] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | INTRODUCTION | 1 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 23 | | I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW | 23 | | II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS “STOPPED” FROM PURSUING A BAD FAITH CLAIM DESPITE DETERMINING, ON A FULL EVIDENTIARY RECORD, THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT POSSESS KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS  UNDERLYING ITS CLAIMS UNTIL AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST ACTION (PA3; 4T8:3-11) | 24 | | III.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REPLACING ITS OWN FINDINGS AND CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS WITH NON-ESSENTIAL COMMENTS MADE BY THIS COURT IN A SEPARATE MATTER, IN A DIFFERENT CONTEXT, AND WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF A FULL EVIDENTIARY RECORD (PA3) | 27 | | A.  The Issue of “What Plaintiff Knew and When It Knew It” Was Not Actually Litigated in the First Action, Was Not Adjudicated by the Trial Court, and Was Not Essential to the Ultimate Decision | 29 | | B.  The Inconsistent Remarks Made by This Court in a Completely Different Context  Do Not Bar Litigation of the Issue in This Matter | 35 | | CONCLUSION | 37 | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS BEING APPEALED
[brief] As the trial court put it, “we all recognize that there are going to be a lot of irrelevant documents” with “these particular searches. ”  T20:24-21:1.  The trial court thus accepted that “plaintiffs would end up getting some significant number of documents that they haven’t requested,” and “a significant number of documents that are not relevant. ”  T6:11-17.  By “doing it in this fashion,” the court admitted, “yes, there are going to be a lot of irrelevant documents being produced,” as well as “nonresponsive documents, I understand that. ”  T27:15-19.  The ESI Order requiring Defendants to produce documents that are not “relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action” plainly falls outside the scope of discovery authorized by Rule 4:10-2(a).
[brief] - Plaintiff issued a partial denial indicating that [...] testified that he “noticed something coming up when he put in [...]” and [...] indicated a specific address would make a difference.  (Pa429).  The denial by Plaintiff in this matter fails to establish constructive or actual notice because the testimony referred to by Plaintiff, given by [...], relates to a complaint found in the system which post-dates Plaintiff’s accident, in fact, the complaint was about Plaintiff’s accident:
[brief] [...] AND [...], H/W, Plaintiffs- Appellants, -vs- [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO: [...]  T2  Civil Action ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION - ATLANTIC COUNTY  DOCKET NO: [...]  SAT BELOW:  HONORABLE  [...]  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
[brief] Appellants first seem to assert that the definition of “underinsured motor vehicle” is ambiguous because it is defined in the underlying [...] Policy (to which the [...] Excess Policy follows form) and not directly in the [...] Excess Policy.  Appellants do not contend that follow form policies are ambiguous or invalid in general and nor can they do so given that follow form policies are routinely used in the insurance industry (including with respect to excess UIM coverage) and are applied as written.  *See e.g.*, *AstenJohnson, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co.*, 562 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2009) (discussing excess follow form coverage and applying follow form provision as written).  However, Appellants’ argument is contradictory and highlights the principal issue: that UIM coverage does not apply to a single car accident involving multiple insureds.  That is, Appellants first state that they are not contesting the validity of the definition of “underinsured motor vehicle” as applied to the primary [...] Policy.  *See* Appellants’ Opening Brief, at 27.  But at the same time, Appellants argue that the definition is ambiguous because it could “never affect plaintiff’s rights as it relates to [...]’s UIM coverage obligations. ”  *Id.* at 31.  These points are difficult to reconcile, but it appears that Appellants are asserting that the definition is ambiguous because it could never apply to UIM coverage under the primary [...] Policy.  This is incorrect.  As correctly found by the lower court, the [...] Policy contains the same definition of “underinsured motor vehicle,” and the vehicle at issue does not meet the definition because it is owned by the named and insured and made available for the regular use of a family member.  Therefore, the insuring agreement is not satisfied.
[brief] Most importantly, the facts of Flowers distinguish that case from this case because the defendant in Flowers was apprehended after the robbery a loaded handgun in his possession in the trunk of his vehicle.  2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1962 at *4.  (Pa3)  Thus, there was at least some evidence in that case that Flowers had possessed the handgun separate in time from the robbery, thus justifying a finding of Yarbough factor 3C.  Separately, the Flowers Court offered only a single paragraph justifying the determination to run the certain persons sentence consecutive, which carries no persuasive force.  Id. at *19.  (Pa9)  If the Court’s reasoning were accepted—that the certain persons crime was a separate offense from the robbery and that the statute serves a different legislative purpose and is intended as a further deterrent—this would justify always imposing a consecutive sentence on a certain persons conviction.  Ibid.  (Sb19-20)  But if the Legislature had wanted to mandate consecutive sentences for a certain persons conviction or even to create a presumption of a consecutive sentence, it would have included language in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7 mandating a consecutive sentence—as it did in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(d)—or creating a presumption of a consecutive sentence—as it did for offenses committed while on probation, parole, or pretrial release.  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(c), (f), (h).  Cf. State v. Dillihay, 127 N.J. 42, 49 (1992).  Moreover, the Flowers Court’s only cited authority for its assertion is [...]’s partial concurrence from State v. Soto, 241 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div. 1990) (a case ruling that the sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 should not have been imposed consecutively to the sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5), in which [...] merely noted that a certain persons conviction does not merge with unlawful possession of a firearm.  Flowers at *19 (citing Soto, 241 N.J. Super. at 481-82).  (Pa9)  Thus, this Court should reject Flowers.  Because the legislative history of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7 does not support a conclusion that the statute would be “neutered” or moot without the imposition of a consecutive sentence, this Court should find that this rationale does not separately support the imposition of a consecutive sentence.
[brief] There’s an interesting question lurking in this application as to the extent to which [...] would be liable for efforts to collect from [...] on the judgment or efforts to collect as against [...] and [...] on the judgment.  But I don’t need to address that case.  *And I don’t think under the general equitable authority of the Court I can entertain an application for fees that doesn’t have a grounding in a particular application for a determination that in fact the plaintiffs are entitled to those fees.*
[brief] 198 N.J. Super. 322, 328-29 (App. Div. 1984).  Accordingly, these cases which properly considered “lack of remorse” all involved defendants who had admitted to some form of wrongdoing, either by admitting guilt outright, or by admitting to some involvement in the accused conduct but diminishing the gravity of that behavior.  Stated differently, a criminal defendant does not – and cannot – demonstrate a lack of remorse if they maintain their innocence.  Where, as here, the defendant has unfailingly maintained his innocence and has not admitted to any involvement in the accused conduct, his decision to simply continue to maintain his innocence at sentencing, especially in light of his direct appeal, cannot be considered within the court’s sentencing determination.  That is exactly what [...] did.  It was thus erroneous for the sentencing court to consider [...]’s exercise of his right against self-incrimination in its sentencing determination.
[brief] At the time Plaintiff was deciding where to further his education, the [...]’s website advertised the dual degree program, and explicitly provided, “All students who are accepted to the School of Pharmacy with a baccalaureate degree will be provided the opportunity to complete a master’s degree in conjunction with the Doctor of Pharmacy.  . . .  Students will be asked to select or opt-out of a Master’s pathway at the end of their first professional year in the school. ” (Pa435).  The forgoing advertisement was the extent of the information provided on the Defendant’s Website related to the dual degree program.
[brief] Conclusion  The Court has not set a deadline for Plaintiffs’ compliance in the hopes the parties can reach an agreement about production.  However, if they cannot, no later than 14 days from the date of this Order, they must raise this issue with the Court via another joint discovery dispute brief.  The discovery cut off of April 26, 2023, and the dispositive motion deadline of June 14, 2023, are confirmed.  Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ objections are overruled; Plaintiffs must respond to Defendants’ requested discovery as specified above.
[brief] Meanwhile, the landlord, [...], has already made a substantial return on their investment through the purchase and subsequent condominium conversion of the eleven-unit building in which the Appellant resides.  For more than two decades, as owner of the building, [...] largely ignored [...], providing little, if any, maintenance, services, or improvements to his dwelling unit.  The company now has nonetheless been granted a rent increase by the court that is hundreds of dollars more than what the legal rent would have been had the building never gone through the conversion process.  [...] justified their rent increase request by presenting a formula of their own creation for determining a hardship, which the lower court largely adopted.  This method, which the City’s Rent Leveling and Stabilization Board was not required by Hoboken’s rent control law to follow, incorporated various unsupported assertions about [...]’s dwelling unit, namely— that the market value of the unit could be approximated based on a non-rent-controlled, fully renovated, and upgraded 2-bedroom, 2-bath condominium of similar size to the Appellant’s unit; and the Appellant’s unit had received $76,000 in capital improvements (none of which were documented), nor did that speculative value include any consideration for depreciation over a twenty-year time period.  These calculations, which were nothing more than unsupported assertions or assumptions, ultimately derived from the unit’s status as a condominium, and should not have been considered given the protections embedded in the Tenant Protection Act of 1992.  As a result of the court’s failure to consider the policy and provisions of such Act, [...] received a rent increase that it could not have received had the Appellant’s building not been converted to condominiums.  Despite the growing popularity of condominium conversions around the state, they cannot be a pathway for circumventing rent control protections.  This court must reject any hardship rent increase that would achieve such an outcome.