ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Plaintiff responded clearly by stating she wanted to preserve these claims because she had not seen and examined the company’s bank accounts, and that she would like to preserve her claims against the remaining partners, [...] and [...].  1T8:18-9:19.  Following her opening statement and forceful colloquy with the Court, Plaintiff then testified on direct and was subject to cross-examination.  Almost immediately, the Trial Court found fault with the Plaintiff for failing to provide hard copies of her trial exhibits and witness list.  1T15:5-13; 1T18:1-24.  However, Plaintiff uploaded her trial exhibits to eCourts prior to the trial and provided copies of exhibits to defense counsel, as instructed by njcourts.gov.  https://www.njcourts.gov/self-help/elect-evid-sub; accessed 12/5/23 at 11:49 AM.  1T116:5-8.  (Aa532).
[brief] On the record before the trial court, and now on appeal, it remains undisputed: (i) that the [...] was obligated under a binding judgment to provide a realistic opportunity for the construction of the seven units of affordable housing; (ii) that in the six years since the new administration took over in 2019, [...] has no plan to build the seven units, let alone a realistic one, for complying with the trial court’s judgment; (iii) that the only plan to build the seven units of affordable housing was the prior administration’s decision, after review of available vacant land, to locate the seven units on the off-site property [...]; that [...] instructed redeveloper [...] Redevelopers Urban Renewal LLC to purchase the lot, which it did; and (iv) that the court-appointed special master found the off-site property suitable and urged the implementation monitor and the court to approve the off-site property for construction of the seven affordable units in compliance with the judgment.  Indeed, the only record evidence before the trial court was uncontested: former mayor [...] certified under oath that the council’s redevelopment subcommittee selected the off-site property and directed [...] to purchase same; and [...] principal [...]’s undisputed certification that he did so.  These undisputed facts compel the conclusion that, as the trial court found, [...] is in default of the judgment.  It has not built the seven units.  It has not offered a new or alternate plan to the court, the implementation monitor, or the special master to provide a realistic opportunity for the construction of the court-ordered affordable housing.  [...] is in violation of the court’s judgment.  But the remedy selected by the trial court, more process from [...] in a seemingly endless string of roadblocks, was error.
[brief] ”  *State v. Rivera*, 249 N.J. 285 (2021); *State v. Carey*, 168 N.J. 413, 427 (2001) (“a defendant's denial of responsibility supports a finding under aggravating factor three that the defendant is at risk of reoffending”); *State v. Rivers*, 252 N.J. Super. 142, 153-54 (App. Div. 1991) (“defendant's lack of remorse and consistent denial of wrongdoing may establish a need to deter the defendant from similar conduct in the future”).  Furthermore, a court’s observation of a defendant’s “uninterrupted history of criminality” may support its findings for aggravating factors three, six, and nine.  *State v. Dalziel*, 182 N.J. 494, 503 (2005).
[directive] BRIMAGE GUIDELINES 2 (2004 Revisions) REVISED ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING CASES UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 Effective for Offenses Committed On or After September 15, 2004 Page i TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i-vi July 15, 2004 Letter from Attorney General to County Prosecutors . . vii Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2004-2 (Revised “Brimage” Guidelines) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii-ix Highlights of the 2004 Brimage Guidelines Revisions . . . . . . . . . . . x-xiii Section 1 Legal Basis For Promulgation of Attorney General Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 1.1 Scope of Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4 1.2
[brief] As a final note, [...]’s argument that [...] needs to satisfy the 30-year time period for adverse possession (e.g., App. Brf. at pp. 18-19) is nonsense and constitutes a disturbing misreading of the law.  [...] is the record owner of the Property.  At the risk of stating the obvious, [...] does not need to obtain title via adverse possession because it already holds record title.  It is [...] that must prove it satisfied the stringent requirements of the doctrine for the entire statutory time period.  For all of the reasons stated above, [...] cannot satisfy those requirements and the trial court’s Order must be upheld.
[brief] **Arizona v. Youngblood,** 488 U.S. 51 (1988)  .................................................................................................................. 45, 46, 50  **Brady v. Maryland,** 373 U.S. 83 (1963)  ....................................................................................................................  44  **Miranda v. Arizona,** 384 U.S. 436 (1966)  ...................................................................................................................  4, 5  **Palestroni v. Jacobs,** 10 N.J. Super. 266 (App. Div. 1950) .........................................................................................  33  **Pellicer v. Saint Barnabas Hosp.,** 200 N.J. 22 (2009)  .....................................................................................................................  34  **State v. Anderson,** 251 N.J. Super. 327 (App. Div. 1991) .........................................................................................  33  **State v. A.O.,** 198 N.J. 69 (2009) .....................................................................................................................  31  **State v. Auld,** 2 N.J. 426 (1949) .......................................................................................................................  29  **State v. Basit,** 378 N.J. Super. 125 (App. Div. 2005) ......................................................................................... 29, 30  **State v. Blakney,** 189 N.J. 88 (2006) ..................................................................................................................... 24, 25, 26  **State v. Brown,** 275 N.J. Super. 329 (App. Div. 1994) .........................................................................................  29  **State v. Carter,** 91 N.J. 86 (1982) .......................................................................................................................  23  CASES
[brief] [...] and [...] jointly moved to suppress the physical evidence seized from the stop.  During a three-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court heard testimony from [...]; [...]’s father, who owned the vehicle and who testified that it had not been reported stolen; and [...], who testified that he had personally taken the stolen vehicle report from [...]'s father several days before the car stop.  The trial court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, suppressing the handgun found under the hood of the car but ruling that the clothing and money had been lawfully seized.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A § 2A:32C-9(c).  “Direct” means that “marked by an absence of an intervening agency,” Springfield Terminal, 14 F.3d at 657, “personally-gathered,” or “gained through [relator’s] own efforts,” United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 2014 WL 47258, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2014).  The requirement of “direct” knowledge does not require that a relator be an insider or have firsthand knowledge.  United States ex rel. Rahimi v. Rite Aid Corp., 3 F.4th 813, 829 (6th Cir. 2021).  Defendants’ suggestion that Relator’s not being an insider disqualifies it from having direct knowledge, Db 45, is legal error.  The requirement that an original source have knowledge that is “independent” of the information on which the allegations are based” is typically a function of the manner in which the relator obtained the --- 9
[brief] He briefly touched upon the notion of “hardship” now central to the arguments in Plaintiffs’ Brief (5T but his testimony focused principally on his opinion that the proposed taller warehouses would not offend the purposes of the SM Zone District regulations.  5T 73:10- 5T 80:22.  The basis for [...]’ testimony that the proposed taller than permitted buildings would not result in greater traffic, and therefore the taller buildings would not be more intense than intended by the planning board and governing body in the Master Plan and it implementing ordinances, was the testimony of Plaintiff’s traffic expert, [...].  5T 73:20- 5T 74:1.  Plaintiffs’ concluding testimony was from their Chief Development Officer, [...].
[brief] Plaintiff initiated this matter by way of Complaint filed on July 25, 2016 (Pa0001).  Defendants [...], Esq. and [...] filed an Answer on November 17, 2016 (Pa0017).  Plaintiff served an Affidavit of Merit of [...], Esq. on November 18, 2016 (Pa0035).  Defendants filed an Amended Answer of the Complaint on or about November 21, 2016 (Pa0040).  The Complaint was erroneously dismissed by the Trial Court resulting in an Appeal resolved by an Opinion dated June 7, 2021, which revered and remanded the dismissal (Pa0059).  Plaintiffs, [...] and [...] dismissed their claims against the Defendants voluntarily by Partial Stipulation of Dismissal dated February 16, 2023.  (Pa0080).  The Court entered a pretrial order on December 13, 2022, which set Trial for February 21, 2023, and indicated that all Motions in Limine are to be filed on or before Friday, February 3, 2023 with oppositions to be filed Tuesday, February 7, 2023 and indicated the Motions were to be argued and decided on Thursday, February 16, 2023.  (Pa0331).  Plaintiff filed the Motions in Limine on or about February 7, 2023, seeking to preclude any reference in Trial to any bankruptcies or litigations that did not directly concern the Pines Lake property that Plaintiff sought to construct a home on which was the subject legal malpractice action.  Plaintiff later orally expanded this motion to seek to preclude any reference to the home Plaintiff subsequently purchased after the Pine Lakes property could not be timely developed due to the Defendants’ malpractice as Plaintiff set before the Trial Court.  After a Jury was selected and after the motions were filed, [...] Defendants filed a new Motion in Limine contending Plaintiff’s granting of an attorney’s lien and a security interest in a portion of the recovery in this matter (Pa0334), which the Court gave Plaintiff limited time to respond to this motion, which Plaintiff did by letter brief dated February 22, 2023, after opening arguments and same was argued after direct testimony of Plaintiff.  Despite the fact that Plaintiff had resolved the claims against the [...] Defendants and dismissed same with prejudice prior to opening arguments and the motion being heard (Pa0337), the Court heard [...]’s motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s case by Order dated February 23, 2023 (Pa0354).  Thereafter, Plaintiff repeatedly requested of the Court entry of an order embodying the denial of the Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine.  That denial was finally embodied in an Order dated June 27, 2023.  (Pa0355).  Plaintiff then filed the Notice of Appeal (Pa0356) in this matter and requested Oral Argument (Pa0367).
[brief] MONROE TOWNSHIP : APPELLATE DIVISION DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC, : DOCKET NO.: [...] and [...], Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. [...], COOPER :  ON APPEAL FROM: LEVENSON  [...] & : SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY [...], TNM : LAW  DIVISION DEVELOPMENT CONSULTING, LLC, : MONMOUTH COUNTY  [...], [...], KDL :  Docket No.  Below: [...]  REALTY MANAGEMENT, LLC, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], Defendants/Respondents.
[brief] (Raised Below: T2 161 through 166; T4 95 through 107; T4 125)  Respondent referenced Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F regarding aggravation of a pre-existing disability in her pre-trial exchange but made no further mention of it during the course of trial.  Respondent produced three expert medical witnesses at trial.  Individually and when taken cumulatively, Respondent’s experts did not establish the necessary prerequisites for an aggravation charge.  Following the conclusion of testimony, the court did not include a charge under 8.11F in the proposed jury charges provided to both counsel prior to closing arguments.  Counsel for respondent did not raise the issue of a request for an aggravation charge during the initial charge conference.  He failed to raise the issue the following morning when he sought a charge that the Defendant/Appellant had been following too closely.  Rather, after both parties had completed their closing arguments, counsel for Plaintiff/Respondent realized that the aggravation charge was not part of the proposed charge to be read to the jury.  Counsel for Respondent requested that the charge be read to the jury and counsel for the Appellant objected.
[brief] [...] first argues it was proper for the trial court to consider its revised interest calculations because it was not a new issue or argument.  (Prb 22-24.)  To be clear, [...] and [...] engaged in extensive discovery and briefing regarding the interest calculations included in [...]’s moving papers.  [...]’s accounting expert was deposed.  (Da0229.)  [...] based its entire opposition to prejudgment interest on the calculations originally served in [...]’s moving papers.  [...] then changed tactics and submitted entirely different calculations on reply.  [...]’s interest calculations on reply increased its claim for prejudgment interest by more than $300,000.  (Da260-261.)  Prejudgment interest then became the largest figure awarded by the trial court in its final judgment Order.  (Pa0043.)  It is preposterous to assert – in a case where prejudgment interest is now the largest damages figure – that calculations submitted on reply that sought $300,000 more in interest than were originally sought are not a new argument or issue.  The entire issue before the trial court on prejudgment interest was [...]’s calculation of interest.  It was improper for the trial court to consider [...]’s reply interest calculations without providing [...] with a chance to respond.
[brief] The Trial Court properly found that the Zoning Board’s decision in this case was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable  While a board’s decision on a development application enjoys a presumption of validity when under review by the courts, a board’s decision may be overturned if it is not supported by the evidence and is therefore arbitrary and capricious.  Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 284 (2013); Kramer v. Board of Adjustment, Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965).  A zoning board must rely on substantial, credible evidence of record to support a denial of an application for a use variance.  Cell v. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment, 172 N.J. 75, 89 (2002) (reliable record evidence is the preferred standard when a zoning board acts in a quasi-judicial, as opposed to a legislative capacity).  Accord, PADNA v. City Council of Jersey City, 413 N.J. Super. 322, 332 (App. Div. 2010), certif. denied, 205 N.J. 79 (2011).  While there is deference to decisions of land use boards, the courts do not act as a “rubber stamp” to approve a board’s findings.
[brief] (11T12-15 to 18).  The event for that night was an annual event called the Aries Royal Ball, which celebrates African royalty and culture.  (11T13-6 to 10; 11T14-21 to 25).  [...] was expecting about 250 to 300 people to attend the event.  (11T17-3 to 6).  Attendees to the event would come dressed in African royalty attire.  (11T14-21 to 15).  For the entertainment, he booked disc jockeys called [...] and [...], a Caribbean DJ, and knew that defendant, who he knew as [...], was going to entertain at the event.  (11T19-8 to 11; 11T20-6 to 17; 11T20-23 to 24).  DJ [...] was a well-known radio entertainer and was expected to draw attendees to the [...].  (6T162-9 to 12; 7T115-12 to 14).  The flyer for the event advertised the time as between 9:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. (11T15-20 to 25).  In addition to the Aries Royal Ball, [...] allowed this event at the [...] to be shared with another event involving another group of people who wanted to celebrate the birthday of [...], who had been killed in 2018.
[brief] For example, a layoff notice must be provided to an affected employee at least forty-five days prior to the layoff action.  N.J.A.C. 4A:8-1.6(a).  That notice must contain both “[t]he effective date of the layoff action” and “[t]he reason for the layoff. ”  N.J.A.C. 4A:8-1.6(b).  Further, layoffs must be reviewed and approved by the [...].
[brief] The more a worker performs services in the order or sequence set by the employer, the more indicative it is that the individual is an employee.  Once again, Petitioner testified extensively and without contradiction that the order and sequence of duties are set by the Municipal Court officials in [...] and not by her.  This is both before the Pandemic and during the Pandemic when the remote Court sessions were scheduled and set by [...] court personnel.  In her report, [...] noted it is [...] and particularly the Municipal Court Judge who sets the order and sequence of how the cases are processed in municipal court.  Also noted, the court calendar is set and prioritized by the Court Administrator.  This is yet another Factor which Respondent says is not a strong indicator of independent contractor status.  Despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the bias of the Respondent and its investigator are clearly evident in their analysis.  Here, Respondent claims Petitioner is an independent contractor because the Township does not set the order or sequence of the services when she is not in Court session.  This whole notion is ludicrous.  Obviously, the employer does not set any employees’ order or sequence of services when they are not working for them.  This streak of bias by the Respondent and [...] is replete throughout her report and the Board’s decision.  **FACTOR 11 – ORAL OR WRITTEN REPORTS**
[brief] Nonetheless, on remand, [...] conducted a full, independent review of the trial record.  Armed with a subsequent forensic analysis performed by Plaintiffs’ forensic accountant ([...]) determining the magnitude of the [...]’ misappropriation of partnership funds during the applicable SOL period (HPa11-29), [...] found an award of substantial punitive damages against the [...] to be warranted.  [...] amply supported his decision with a painstaking application of many – but certainly not all – of the Trial Court’s binding findings and conclusions, satisfying each and every element of the Punitive Damages Act. (39970a-89a).19
[brief] ’”  Cardinale v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 458 N.J. Super. 260, 272 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Francois, 415 N.J. Super. at 350 (additional citations omitted)).  This court’s reasoning in Krayniak v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees’ Retirement System, 412 N.J. Super. 232, 234-35 (App. Div. 2010), is helpful here.
[brief] 33 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(d) ........................................................................................................ 13  #  TABLE OF APPENDIX | PAGE NO. | |----------| |  1.  Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs, filed October 20, 2022 ........................................ Ja001-Ja009 | | 2.  Answer, filed December 23, 2022 ........................................ Ja010-Ja013 | | 3.  Plaintiff’s Letter to the Trial Court  Enclosing the Joint Statement of Items Comprising the Record on Appeal, filed February 27, 2023 ........................................  Ja014 | | 4.  Joint Statement of Items Comprising the Record on Appeal (“JSICR”), filed February 27, 2023 ........................................  Ja015-Ja021 | | 5.  Defendant Zoning Board’s Letter Enclosing its Resolution Denying Plaintiff’s Application, dated September 6, 2022 (filed with the Trial Court on March 6, 2023)  ........................................  Ja022 | | 6.  Defendant Zoning Board’s Resolution Denying Plaintiff’s Application, dated September 1, 2022 (filed with the Trial Court on March 6, 2023)  ........................................  Ja023-Ja046 | | 7.  Plaintiff’s Attorney Certification, filed May 3, 2023 ............... Ja047-Ja048 | | 8.  Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts, filed May 3, 2023 ........ Ja049-Ja069 | | 9.  Select Pages of “[...]”, JSICR #13 (Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts)  .................. Ja070-Ja073 | | 10.  Plaintiffs’ Application Submitted to the Defendant Zoning Board, JSICR #3 (Exhibit B to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts)  .................. Ja074-Ja083 | | 11.  [...] | --- 1  All highlighted material in the Appendix is original to the filings submitted to the Trial Court.
[directive] pa [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  7.  Èske w konprann ke si yo karakterize konpòtman ou antan ke delenkan residivis ak enkontwolab oswa ou pa dispoze pou resevwa tretman pou delenkan seksyèl ou pap elijib pou libète kondisyonèl toutotan ou pa pije tèm oswa minimòm egzijib jij la te enpoze yon tyè nan santans ki te enpoze a lè pa epi tou, gen tèm minimòm egzijib okenn nan tèm sa yo ap resevwa rediksyon pou bòn kondwit oswa kredi pou travay? not Do you understand that if your conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior or you are not amenable to sex offender treatment you will not become primarily eligible for parole until you have served any mandatory minimum term imposed by or the court one third of the sentence imposed where no mandatory minimum term is fixed and neither term will be reduced by commutation time for good behavior or work credits? Dat/Date Akize a/Defendant Avoka LaDefans/Defense Attorney Komisè Gouvènman/Prosecutor Nòt: Si akize a se fanm epi tou si li ta kalifye pou tretman pou delenkan seksyèl, yo pap fèmen li nan Sant Tretman ak Adult Diagnostic la men yap fèmen li nan yon etablisman deziye pa Komite Prizon a kote la va resevwa menm tip tretman pou delenkan seksyèl.
[brief] In Palmateer—where the tort was applied to protect a whistleblower—the court noted there was "[n]o specific constitutional or statutory provision requir[ing] a citizen to take an active part in the ferreting out and prosecution of crime," but nevertheless concluded "public policy favors citizen crime-fighters."  Id. at 132.  It went on to state: "There is no public policy more important or more fundamental than the one favoring the effective protection of the lives and property of citizens."  Id.  The Court finds, contrary to Defendant's argument, OSHA's general mandate is sufficiently connected to Plaintiff's claim [*4] at this stage of the proceedings.
[brief] The Court clarified that there was no automatic stay, and the Court Order was clear that the parties may extend the stay if a date was provided (Dr44-45).  On May 30, 2024, [...] filed a motion in opposition to Appellants’ motion to vacate the Court’s Order.  [...] highlighted that Appellants failed to provide valid grounds in support of vacation, they waived their right to oppose arbitration, and the Court lacked authority to entertain Appellants’ motion because the case was stayed.