[brief] THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN FINDING THAT OFFICER ORDWAY HAD A REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE SUSPICION SUFFICIENT TO EFFECT A STOP OF APPELLANT (Aa033-035).  The Law Division erred in finding that [...]’s stop of Appellant on the morning of November 5, 2019 was a proper application of the community caretaking function.  Generally, a police officer may stop a motor vehicle only where there is a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation has occurred.  Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); State v. Carter, 235 N.J. Super. 232, 237 (App. Div. 1989).  One exception to that general rule is the community caretaking function, which permits an officer to perform a stop where “something abnormal [is observed] concerning the operation of a motor vehicle. ”  State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244, 262 (2022).  The Law Division improperly applied the community caretaking function exception in finding that [...] had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Appellant on the morning of November 5, 2019.  While [...] testified that he was responding to the report of a disabled vehicle when he came upon Appellant sitting in a black Toyota Corolla on Bloomfield Avenue in Denville, (2T7:10-8:6), [...]’s testimony was wholly devoid of any information regarding what type of vehicle was purportedly disabled (i.e., the make and model).  Notably, the record is also absent of any information as to who made the report of the disabled vehicle.  As such, to the extent the State may rely on the fact that [...] was responding to the report of a disabled vehicle when he came upon Appellant, same is insufficient to give rise to a proper application of the community caretaking function.  Further, there was nothing sufficiently abnormal about Appellant’s vehicle being stopped on the side of Bloomfield Avenue which would give rise to proper application of the community caretaking function.  Even assuming arguendo that Appellant’s vehicle was stopped across multiple parking spots, as [...] testified, (2T8:8-12), [...] further testified “that the interior lights were on which, based on his experience, meant that the keys were in the ignition. ” (Aa035; 2T9:9-15).  As such, there was no reason for [...] to think that the vehicle would remain parked over the stalls, nor was there any reason for [...] to think the vehicle was disabled, as, in his experience, the interior light of the vehicle being on meant that “the car was or could be operated. ” (2T9:14-15).  Indeed, [...] did not testify to having any knowledge that the vehicle was actually disabled until [...] had already exited the vehicle and he engaged with Appellant.  (2T9:21-10:2, 10:25-11:11).  In short, the Law Division improperly applied the community caretaking function to find that [...] had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to effect a stop of Appellant on the morning in question.  While [...] was responding to a report of a disabled vehicle, there is nothing in the record indicating that he was looking for the black Toyota Corolla that Appellant was seated in on the morning of November 5, 2019.  Moreover, there was nothing sufficiently abnormal about Appellant being stopped on the side of the road, especially where [...] admitted that, in his experience, the vehicle appeared to be operable before he exited his vehicle to engage with Appellant, such that the community caretaking function exception would be applicable in this case.  See Smith, 251 N.J. at 262.  As such, this court should reverse the decision of the Law Division and vacate the judgment of conviction against Appellant.  III.