ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Furthermore, since the law does not make prejudice to the defendant a relevant issue in a motion to dismiss for failure to file an Affidavit of Merit, it is both foreseeable and wholly immaterial that Defendants did not address it is their motion to dismiss.  showing.  In that way, the potential liability is analogous to a party being prejudiced by being potentially liable in a claim after the statute of limitations has run.  See, Fox v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 71 N.J. 122, 127–28 (1976)³ (in the context of the discovery rule, recognizing “the inherent capacity for prejudice to a defendant since the principle of repose inherent in the statute of limitations is necessarily diluted when an action is instituted beyond the statutory period after the defendant's actionable conduct”); Mears v. Sandoz Pharm., Inc., 300 N.J. Super. 622, 631 (App. Div.1997) (recognizing that “[t]here cannot be any doubt that a defendant suffers some prejudice merely by the fact that it is exposed to potential liability for a lawsuit after the statute of limitations has run”).  Thus, the first prong favors finding no substantial compliance.  2)  THE SECOND ELEMENT:  A SERIES OF STEPS TAKEN TO COMPLY WITH THE AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT STATUTE.
[brief] See, e.g., Perrelli, supra, 206 N.J. at 208 (finding N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) barred the claims of an uninsured passenger because to hold otherwise "would allow the culpably uninsured person to violate the law and not suffer its consequences"); Dziuba v. Fletcher, 382 N.J. Super. 73, 81-82, 887 A.2d 732 (App. Div. 2005) (finding [*11] plaintiff's beneficial ownership of an uninsured automobile rendered him "culpably uninsured" under N.J.S.A.  39:6A-7(b), but also finding that plaintiff's claims were not barred under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) because the statute only applies when "the uninsured vehicle [is] the vehicle involved in the accident"), aff'd, 188 N.J. 339, 907 A.2d 427 (2006).  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) has been described as a "blunt tool" that may result in harsh outcomes, but that is because "[t]he statute's self-evident purpose" is "to give the maximum incentive to all motorists to comply with this State's compulsory no-fault insurance laws."
[brief] (First Police Decision at 3, Pa000266).  Unlike Caponegro, capping terminal leave here is in direct furtherance of the MSRA’s objective of stabilizing the City’s finances, particularly where the City’s liability for terminal leave for the [...] alone was over $10 million, and Plaintiffs presently seek approximately $900,000 in terminal leave.  If anything, allowing Plaintiffs’ claims to proceed and obligating the City to pay Plaintiffs terminal leave in the hundreds of thousands of dollars would undercut the MSRA’s objectives of immediately addressing the City’s precarious financial state.
[brief] As reflected in its Final Decision, the Board unilaterally blue penciled the risk assessments to eliminate the psychologists’ unrebutted conclusions that [...] presents a “low to moderate” risk of reoffense.  The Board also failed to address the fact that [...] explained “[t]he factors underlying [[...]’s] moderate level of risk are almost exclusively historical factors, which will not change no matter how long [...] remains incarcerated. ” (Pa319).  The Board made no mention of the Board psychologist’s same conclusion regarding [...]’s “low to moderate” risk for reoffense.  (Pa1-6).  Both [...]’s and the Board psychologist’s conclusions after assessing [...] support the determination that he is unlikely to reoffend if released on parole.  To be sure, a “low to moderate” risk neither establishes a “probability” nor a “substantial likelihood” that [...] would reoffend.  As the Berta court stated, the Board’s mere determination that [...] will reoffend, without sufficiently explaining its reasoning, is not enough to meet Berta’s high bar.  While the Board may have not found [...]’s conclusions compelling, it offered no explanation whatsoever for disregarding the conclusions of its own psychologist.
[brief] [...] failed to do his job.  Whether that is because he was not as closely supervised as the trial court improperly concluded, was not informed of his role and responsibilities or simply failed to perform the requirements of his job, he is not a “licensed person” pursuant to the AOM statute and binding Supreme Court precedent.  No AOM was required.  CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against [...], [...] and [...] was error as a matter of law.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  REPLY APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS ..........................................................  ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................  iii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS ................................ iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .......................................................................  1  REPLY ARGUMENT ....................................................................................  2  POINT I.  THE TRIAL COURT’S RELAXATION OF THE COURT RULES WAS IN ERROR AS IT FAILED TO SECURE  A JUST DETERMINATION OF [...]’S MOTION .........................................................  2 POINT II.  THE TRIAL COURT  INCORRECTLY APPLIED  EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER IGNORED THE PRIVITY SHOWN BY THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN [...] AND [...] AND DID NOT FIND THAT [...] HAD PROVEN DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE ........................................................................  4  POINT III.  [...]’S MANIFESTED WAIVER OF ARBITRATION BY MOVING TO DISMISS ON THE MERITS, FAILING TO ASSERT ARBITRATION IN ITS ANSWER, AND BY CERTIFYING THAT ARBITRATION WAS NOT CONTEMPLATED  .............................................  9  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................  12  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[directive] The statutory amendments also of required the Administrative Office the Courts to develop and maintain a system to electronically file expungement applications.  Former Public Interest Standard  Prior to the 2020 amendments, the statute imposed a public interest standard:  " ... and the court finds in its discretion that expungement is in the public interest, of giving due consideration to the nature the offense, and the applicant's character and conduct since conviction."  N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a)(2) (emphasis added).  This standard was clarified by the Supreme Court in In re Kollman, 210 N.J. 557 (2012).  In Kollman, the Court directed applicants for expungement under N.J.S.A. 2C:52- of 2( a )(2) and ( c )(3) to include transcripts plea and sentencing hearings and their presentence report with their petition.  210 N.J. at 577.  This requirement was of of specifically intended to assist trial judges in their evaluation the "nature the of offense" component the public interest test and allow them to "weigh the risks of and benefits to the public allowing or barring expungement."  Id.  The Court noted 'public interest,' that "[t]he focus, as the statute says, is on the which is broader than of the personal desires an applicant.. "  Id. ( emphasis added).  ..  Compellin2  Circumstances Standard  The 2020 statutory amendments replaced the "public interest" test and its of focus on the nature the offense with a test that instead focuses on the applicant.
[brief] **N.J.S.A. 14A:14-20 - Allowances to Receiver and Others**  The Trial Court abused its discretion by granting the Receiver a discharge despite his noncompliance with this Statute, as well as the Order Appointing Receiver.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 14A:14-20, the Court shall allow reasonable compensation to the receiver for his services, as well as reasonable compensation to others such as accountants appointed by the Court in connection with the receivership action.
[brief] Pa0005-Pa0018.  Appellant, [...], purchased admission for himself and his son, who was less than three (3) years old at the time.  2T19:22-24.  Prior to being permitted access to the Park, Appellant executed the Agreement on behalf of himself and his son.  2T21:4-7.  The terms of the Agreement designate Appellant as “Adult Participant”, and Appellant’s son as “Child Participant”.  Pa0086-Pa0092.  Appellant purchased [...] socks for himself and his son, and put them on before being permitted access to the Park.  2T26:18-24.  Appellant testified in his deposition that he read and understood the terms of the Waiver agreement.  2T22:5-23.  Specifically, Appellant testified “if I’m going to put my signature on something, I’m going to read it. ”  2T22:5-7.  Further, Plaintiff testified that “it seemed like it was saying, do you agree there is a risk associated with going into a trampoline park and trampoline activity.  Which I completely understand.  I remember reading something like injuring, like you can break your bone, you can hurt your wrist, something like that.  And again, I’m not an idiot.  I understand if I’m going to a trampoline park, if I fall improperly, I can injure myself. ”  2T22:15-23.  Plaintiff engaged and/or participated on multiple attractions during his time in the Park.  2T28:13-29:12.  Plaintiff used an attraction that included a rocking climbing wall and inflatable slide.  2T28:19-29:4.  Plaintiff also used one trampoline attraction before the ProZone.  2T29:4-12.  Appellant accompanied his niece, not his son, to the ProZone attraction.  2T32:11-14.  Appellant observed the instructions for the ProZone, and interacted with the [...] employee monitoring the ProZone, who informed Appellant that only one Participant may use the ProZone at a time.  2T31:3-32:10.  While using the ProZone attraction, Appellant improperly jumped into one of the walls and hit his head, causing him injuries.  2T38:20-24.  Appellants filed the Complaint forming the basis for this litigation on January 20, 2023.  Pa0005-Pa0018.  Despite Appellant’s contractual obligation to “engage in good faith efforts to mediate a settlement”, Pa0089, Appellant has refused to entertain reasonable offers to settle this matter, and has increased their demand to Respondents multiple times since filing the Complaint.  1T6:5-17.
[brief] As a result of the settlement between the [...] and [...] (the “YB Settlement Agreement”), [...] proposed to develop the Bingham Avenue Property and this Property (“Market Development Properties”) with thirty-four (34) multi-family market-rate residential development units (“Market Development”) as generally shown in the concept plans and elevations (“Market Concept Plans”) attached to the YB Settlement Agreement.  (Ra94-Ra175.)  To satisfy the required affordable housing obligation related to the Market Development, [...] agreed to provide the [...] with a payment in lieu of construction in connection with this Project and the Bingham Avenue project and to dedicate the Carton Street Property to the [...] to be developed as a 100% affordable housing project.  (Ra94-Ra98.)  The YB Settlement Agreement also set forth the requirement for the [...] to rezone the Market Development Properties to permit increased densities, consistent with the concept plan and architectural elevations, and the inclusion of the Market Development in the [...]’s HEFSP.
[brief] On January 17, 2020, plaintiffs, [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) filed their original complaint against defendants, [...] (“[...]”), Defendant, [...]  (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”) and [...]  (“[...]”).  Da07836 – Da07860.  Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under R. 4:6-2(e), which resulted in Plaintiffs dismissing their complaint and filing a corrected pleading by consent on July 20, 2020.
[brief] (Da15-16, 35-36 Lease at §§ 4.01, 9.01).  If, however, Tenant timely completed Tenant’s Work and satisfied certain enumerated conditions regarding the same, Tenant would become eligible to recoup a portion of these expenses under Section 4.02 of the Lease.  (Da15-16, Lease at § 4.02).  Specifically, once Tenant’s Work was complete and the related conditions satisfied, Tenant would be eligible to recover up to the sum of $730,000, together with interest at the rate of five (5%) per annum, in six (6) equal annual installments beginning on August 1, 2019 and ending on August 1, 2024 (i.e. the “Tenant Allowance”).⁷ (Da17-18, Lease at § 4.02).  Crucially, in accordance with the terms of the Lease, Tenant’s entitlement to these annual reimbursement payments is expressly conditioned upon, inter alia, Tenant being current on its monetary obligations under the Lease when the payments come due.
[brief] (RAISED BELOW 6T 55:7-12 AND 4T 26:12 TO 27:1 AND 4T 64:20 TO 65:8)  This case was commenced by [...] seeking an accounting from [...] through an Assignment of Claims from [...].  (Da 048).  That Assignment transferred Amanat’s claims for “rents, profits, benefits, damages, to the subject premises from November 21, 2010 to July 15, 2019 in favor of the Assignee herein, [...] ”  Id.  (emphasis added.)  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:25-1, the “person sued in any such action shall be allowed not only all set-offs, discounts and defenses against the assignee, but also all set-offs, discounts and defenses he had against the assignor or his representatives before notice of such assignment was given to him.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:25-1.  Here, Dr.  Amanat was the assignor, [...] the assignee, and [...] the “person sued,” as [...] sought an accounting from [...] in place of Amanat.  (Da 137).  [...] counterclaimed against [...]’s suit for an accounting by demanding contribution for the necessary repairs and capital improvements made by [...] that preserved the common property, a claim it would have otherwise made solely against Amanat had he not assigned his rights to [...].  (Da 048).  As Amanat transferred his share of [...] to [...] surreptitiously, [...] was precluded from demanding contribution from Amanat at the time of transfer.  As the Court set forth in *NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP*, 187 N.J. 353, 366 (2004) [...] had imputed knowledge from the TPDs as to the amounts [...] was owed by [...]:
[brief] Appellant, [...], was employed by the [...] as a Highway Operations Technician 1 ("HOT-1") assigned to the Ramsey maintenance yard.  (Aa13).  In March 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ramsey yard was temporarily closed after an employee tested positive for the virus.  (Ibid.).  The Ramsey yard employees were required to quarantine for two weeks and Bartos was therefore placed on an approved paid leave of absence from March 20, 2020, until April 3, 2020.  (Ibid.).  Concurrent with the Ramsey yard’s employee quarantine, the [...] implemented extensive precautions to protect its essential employees from exposure to COVID-19 via a policy known as “Reactionary Mode. ” (Ra1-3).  These covered multiple types of essential employees at the [...], including (1) those categorized as weather-related, who are “required to report to work when State offices are closed due to inclement weather and/or adverse conditions,” and (2) those essential to business continuity, who “are required to --- 1  Because they are closely related, these sections are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience.
[directive] 6.4.2  Whenever an officer is involved in a domestic violence incident, either as an alleged perpetrator or as a victim, internal affairs must be promptly notified.  Where the officer was the alleged perpetrator, investigating officers must seize their service weapon or any other weapon possessed, as mandated by AG Directives 2000-3 and 2000-4.  6.4.3  Every law enforcement agency should promulgate a rule which requires any officer or employee to notify the agency if he or she has been charged with an offense, received a motor vehicle summons or been involved in a domestic violence incident.  In cases of domestic violence, the investigating agency should also notify the employing agency's internal affairs investigators as soon as possible.  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 31
[brief] POINT III  THE COURT IMPROPERLY FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT DEFENDANT NEEDED TO SPECIFICALLY INTEND THE RESULT OF THE CONSPIRACY.  In his initial brief, [...] argued that his conspiracy conviction must be reversed because the court failed to instruct the jury that a conspiracy requires that the defendant purposely enter into an agreement and specifically intend the result of the agreement.  (Db 27-34)  In response, the State asserts that the fact that the court read the model charges for conspiracy and aggravated assault means that there could be no plain error.  (Rb 40-41)  But a conspiracy to commit aggravated assault requires the defendant to intend that significant bodily injury result.  It was not a conspiracy to commit aggravated assault if [...] purposely agreed to promote the fight yet only acted knowingly as to the result of the fight.  See Model Penal Code Commentaries, § 5.03 at 407-08; State v. Madden, 61 N.J. 377, 395 (1972) (equating a conspiracy to murder with a “conspiracy to kill”) (emphasis added).  The model charge for conspiracy failed to communicate this to the jury.  Compare Criminal Model Jury Charge, Attempt (rev. 6/15/09) (including an instruction that “Although it is possible to commit the crime of ________________________ with [knowledge/recklessness], to be guilty of an attempt the defendant must act with purpose.  In other words, the defendant must have the purpose to commit the crime of ________________________, in order to be guilty of attempting it. ”) with Criminal Model Jury Charge, Conspiracy (rev. 4/12/10) (including no such additional language).  The mere fact that the court read the jury the model charges for conspiracy and aggravated assault in sequence does not mean that the jury instructions were correct or sufficient.  See State v. Bryant, 419 N.J. Super. 15, 28 (App. Div. 2011) (recognizing that the Model Jury Charges are “not binding authority”).  In short, as explained in [...]’s initial brief, conspiracy is a specific-intent crime that requires the defendant to specifically intend the result that occurs.  The jury instructions did not explain this to the jury.  Thus, [...]’s conspiracy conviction must be reversed.
[brief] Respondents rely on the Certification by Respondent [...] dated November 28, 2023 (Appellants’ Pa048), which was provided to the Trial Court in support of Respondents’ Opposition to the Motion to Compel Arbitration, and incorporate same by reference herein.  The facts there set forth correct the numerous misstatements which Appellants continue to aver.  For example, Respondent [...] was not the “scrivener” of the Shareholders’ Agreement (Appellants Pa025).  Rather and in fact, it was Appellant  [...], an attorney of more than forty (40) years and the Managing Partner who was responsible for drafting it.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] *Ibid.*  (Emphasis added).  Therefore, as [...] had not been previously convicted of a disqualifying offense, i.e. aggravated assault, nor did he have *other* pending charges for such an offense, Factor a(7) was satisfied independent of the merger issue.  *Ibid.*  This Court ultimately reversed the decision to admit [...] into Recovery Court, vacated his guilty plea, and remanded the matter as his as his aggravated assault conviction constituted a bar to legal eligibility under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14b(2).  It is clear from this Court’s rationale that [...] would have needed a pending disqualifying offense, separate from the underlying offenses of robbery and aggravated assault, to have been disqualified.  The same logic applies to factor a(5).  The lower court found that because the Essex firearm charges are no longer “pending,” the defendant is not legally ineligible for Recovery Court.  However, it is not the Essex firearm charges that are the focus of the word “pending” in factor a(5).  Rather, it is the underlying burglary and theft charges from [...] that constitute “any pending criminal charge. ”  It does not matter whether the Essex firearm charges were still pending or whether the defendant was convicted of the offenses.  It is the fact the defendant possessed a firearm while the Morris case was pending that is determinative.  Additionally, as argued earlier, unlike factor a(7) which explicitly requires a “pending charge” for a disqualifying offense, factor a(5) is solely concerned with the act of possessing a firearm while any criminal case is pending.  Defendant was charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm, and that possession occurred during the "pendency of any criminal charge," namely the Morris County burglary and theft charges.  It is now conclusively known the defendant possessed a firearm during the pendency of the underlying Morris case as he admitted under oath to possessing a firearm during his Essex plea allocution and was convicted of the firearm charges.  Construed objectively, the lower court did not have discretion to deem the defendant legally eligible under factor a(5).  Thus, the Order approving the defendant's admission into the Recovery Court program as a Track One applicant should be reversed as it will result in an illegal sentence.  CONCLUSION
[brief] (Da70, ¶8)  Rather than repair the existing seawall, a new seawall was constructed 50-60 feet east of the end of the southwesterly curved portion of the owner’s existing wall.  (Da108, ¶7-10; 145, ¶4-7; 364, ¶3)  In preparing their reports, the owner’s experts relied on the metes and bounds description in the complaint.  (Da106, ¶3; 110, ¶26)  Over the owner’s objection, the court granted plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint.
[brief] E.g., id. at 271-72 (finding custody where defendant was isolated in a police interview room); State v. O’Neill, 193 N.J. 148, 169 (2007) (finding custody where “defendant was a suspect on a potential gun charge and a person of interest in a murder investigation”); *State v. Pearson*, 318 N.J. Super. 123, 133-35 (App. Div. 1999) (finding custody where defendant was questioned in “the inherently coercive physical environment of the prosecutor’s office” and treated as a suspect); cf.  *State v. Erazo*, 254 N.J. 277, 299-301 (2023) (finding no custody where defendant was questioned at a police station but treated like other witnesses).  Other indications of custody include transporting the defendant to the station in a police car, e.g., *Hubbard*, 222 N.J. at 271-72 (finding custody where “[a]lthough not handcuffed, defendant rode in the backseat of the [police] vehicle”); *Ahmad*, 246 N.J. at 614 (finding custody where defendant “was placed in the back of a patrol car -- where arrestees are normally held -- and taken to the police station”), and interrogating him about a serious crime under investigation, e.g., *Hubbard*, 222 N.J. at 271-72 (finding custody where the questioning’s “substance” was about an injured-child investigation, including defendant’s alibi); *O’Neill*, 193 N.J. at 169 (finding custody where “detectives did not come to have a casual chat with defendant, but to question him concerning his whereabouts at the time of the driver’s killing”); *State v. Bullock*, 253 N.J. 512, 538 (2023) (finding custody where police “ask[ed] [defendant] questions about the alleged threats”); cf. *Erazo*, 254 N.J. at 299-301 (finding no custody where defendant “was not asked about [the victim]’s death”).  For example, in *Hubbard*, our Supreme Court held that the defendant was in custody where the police transported him to a police station and questioned him about their investigation into his child’s injuries.