ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Trial  At approximately 2:00 p.m. on June 20, 2020, members of the [...] were dispatched to the area of [...] in the [...].  (8T89-23 to 90-11).  [...] arrived on scene and activated his body worn camera (Ra17)(S4 below).  The defendant, [...], was observed on the BWC.  (8T99-4 to 12).  Next, the State presented video from a surveillance camera located on [...] (Da19)(S19 below).  The video captured the same images from Klien’s BWC and Klien identified himself in the surveillance video.  (8T105-1 to 106-2).  The defendant was also observable in the surveillance video.  (8T108-5 to 10).  [...], the owner of the residence, testified that he was the operations manager for [...].  (8T125-1 to 5).  He had been working with and installing home surveillance systems for approximately two years.  (8T126-11 to 14).  He had installed the surveillance system at the property he owned at [...].  (8T138-6 to 22).  The system had been installed earlier in 2020 or possibly in 2019.  (8T139-3 to 8).  There were three external cameras.  (8T140-4 to 7).  One on the front of the house, one on the side and one at the rear.  (8T140-10 to 12).  Groce remembers being called to the residence on the afternoon of the incident.  (8T142-20 to 22).  He also reviewed the front camera footage and confirmed that the camera was working properly and was a fair and accurate representation of that day.  (8T145-4 to 16).  He never received any messages that the system was not working properly from the time of installation until the incident captured on the surveillance system.  (8T146-5 To 147-7).  The images from the side and rear of the residence showed the defendant in possession of a handgun, secreting same under a shrub and returning to collect the firearm.  He was wearing the same clothing as the video from the front of the residence and Officer Klien’s BWC.  The parties stipulated that the defendant was a certain person not to be in possession of a firearm.  (9T68-16 to 69-1).  **Motion**
[directive] A police officer has the same duty and obligation to their employer as any other employee.  Thus, where an internal affairs investigation is being conducted solely to initiate disciplinary action, the officer has a duty to cooperate during an administrative interview.  The officer also must truthfully answer all questions put to him or her during the course of the investigation.  Failure to fully cooperate with an administrative investigation and/or to be completely truthful during an administrative interview can form the basis for disciplinary action separate and apart from the allegations under investigation.  8.0.5
[directive] [DCJ 03/03/16]  2.  When feasible, the officer should warn the person against whom the conducted energy device is directed that the officer intends to fire the weapon.  If a second or subsequent discharge is authorized by this supplemental policy, the officer, when feasible, should warn the person that the officer intends to discharge the device again.  It shall not be necessary for an officer to warn the person of the impending firing/discharge of the device, or to provide the person with an opportunity to submit to law enforcement authority before firing/discharging the device, if the person’s conduct is creating a risk of death or serious bodily injury that is so immediate that any delay in firing/discharging the device would likely result in death or serious bodily injury (e.g., where the person is actively engaged in committing an aggravated assault, or is actively engaged in an attempt to commit suicide or an act of self mutilation).  3.
[brief] (Aa354).  She was asked to help prepare a list of items but the list was prepared by [...].  She was unable to determine the missing items that did not make the list.  (Aa355).  She certified that the IPod never made the list along with other items from a separate locked storage closet which [...], unlocked and stole from.  She never portray herself as a rug expert but said she grew up around these items and has knowledge of them.  (Aa 356).  She was never reimbursed for damages to her rugs.  (Aa356.  The court granted both defense Motions.
[brief] The allegations in *Capers* and this case are wholly different.  Thus, the *Capers* analysis does not apply to this case.  Likewise, Respondent’s Brief relies upon three other inapposite cases pertaining to direct conflicts of interest where Board members acted in a way that gave the public impression that they were endorsing a particular political candidate.  In IMO [...], [...], Bergen County, Commissioner No. 15-12/23A (April 22, 2024), the Board member did not leave the Board’s executive session discussion of whether it should appoint the conflicted Board member’s husband or another candidate to an open Board seat.  Ra030-Ra038.  In IMO [...], Bergen County, Commissioner No. 65-2/22 (April 14, 2022), the Board member made public comments about litigation filed by a fellow Board member and failed to recuse himself from an executive session discussion of that litigation.  Ra028-Ra029.  In IMO [...], [...], Bergen Cnty., SEC No. C49-12 (August 25, 2014), aff’d, Commissioner No. 325-10/15 (December 15, 2014), the Board member committed several ethical violations arising out of her act of voting against re-appointment of a high school principal and e-mailing two principals to promote friends or acquaintances for teaching or various other positions at the school.  Ra040-Ra042.  None of these unpublished cases involve remotely analogous or similar facts to the case at bar.
[brief] (2T41 to 71).  When reviewing a trial court’s decision regarding the validity of a local board’s determination, the Appellate Division is bound by the same standards as was the trial court.  Fallone Props., L.L.C. v. Bethlehem Twp. Planning Bd., 369 N.J. Super. 552, 562 (App. Div. 2004).  The courts give deference to the actions and factual findings of local boards and may not disturb such findings unless they were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  Id. at 560.  In Anastasio v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of West Orange, 209 N.J. Super. 499, 522 (App. Div.), cert. denied 107 N.J. 46 (1986), the court noted that while the words “arbitrary and capricious” may sound harsh, they are simply the standard of appellate review for local government action.  Rather the arbitrary and capricious standard is analogous to the “substantial evidence” standard; i.e., whether there was sufficient credible evidence to support the ultimate decision.  *Cell S. of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 172 *N.J.* 75, 89 (2002) (citing *Rowatti v. Gonchar*, 101 *N.J.* 1, 50-51 (1985)).  Furthermore, a local board’s “legal determinations are not entitled to a presumption of validity and are subject to the de novo review. ”  *Wilson v. Brick Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment*, 405 *N. J. Super.* 189, 197 (App. Div. 2009).  In other words, a “trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from the established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  *Manalapan Realty v. Township Committee of Manalapan*, 140 *N.J.* 366, 378 (1995).  **A.
[brief] There, the Court sets forth a part of the deposition of the Plaintiff.  The citing of the Plaintiff’s deposition must be read in its entirety and because the Court below did not do that, the trial Court’s decision granting Summary Judgment and denying the Motion for Reconsideration should be vacated.  First of all, the question is asked to the Plaintiff as to whether at any point subsequent to hearing it from [...], “Did anyone tell you you weren’t allowed at the school?”  Plaintiff’s answer was, “No. ”  Therefore, Plaintiff was talking about any time subsequent to [...] telling Plaintiff that he was not allowed at the school.  It must be remembered that [...] worked at the high school with [...].  At this point, we are talking only about [...].  And then, the Plaintiff was asked, “So after Glenn texted you that, what did you do?”  Immediately, the Plaintiff responds, “At that point after my conversation with [...], and after my conversation with [...], I thought that Chris reached out to somebody, either [...] or Mr. Spring.  What has to be seen here is that there was a conversation with [...].  After that, there was a conversation with [...].  The record reflects that there was a conversation with [...] and there was a conversation with [...].  The record also reflects that the Plaintiff was barred from the high school which was his usual place of assignment.  We have to put with what the Court cited at Pa-78 the fact that the Plaintiff did sign an EEOC complaint that [...] did mention the word, “female,” and that [...] also stated that he hoped that the Plaintiff would stay on.  The question arises, why would [...] say that if either the Plaintiff had already been barred from the high school, or was about to be barred from the high school and [...] knew it.
[brief] At that point, Board members made observations or inquiries (1T52-7 to 56-25).  [...] reiterated that the parking “easement” had been upheld by the Chancery Court (Da29) and the Board should defer to that Ruling (1T57-1 to 58-25).  A Board member commented that in his opinion the correct legal analysis --- “is (the use) valid or not valid, nobody can prove to us that it is valid so therefore it’s not valid” (1T60-6 to 8).
[brief] | | | Employer’s Reinsurance Corp. v. Teague, | 15 | | 972 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1992) | | | Golf Course Superintendents Ass’n v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, | 16 | | 761 F.Supp. 1485 (D.Kan. 1991) | | | Group Voyagers, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, | 15 | | C 01-0400, 2002 WL 356653 (N.D. Cal. March 4, 2002) | | Harleysville Ins. Cos. v. Garitta, 170 N.J. 223 (2001)
[brief] Because they are closely related, the procedural history and statement of facts relevant to this motion are combined to avoid repetition and for the court’s convenience.  2  “Aa” refers to Appellant’s appendix, “Ab” refers to Appellant’s brief, and “Ra” refers to Respondent’s appendix.  condominiums.  (Ra3).  “Private Property” and “No Trespassing” signs appear at the sole entrance to the complex.  (Ra3; Ra196).  B.
[brief] ..........................................................  14 U.S. ex rel. Atkinson v. PA Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 2007)  ......................................................... passim U.S. ex rel. Atkinson v. Penn. Shipbuilding Co., 255 F. Supp. 2d 351 (E.D. Pa. 2002)  ..............................................  31 U.S. ex rel. Banigan v. PharMerica, Inc., 950 F.3d 134 (1st Cir. 2020)
[brief] ”  Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 284 N.J. Super. 543, 550 (App. Div. 1995).  Circumstantial evidence may include “[t]he temporal proximity of employee conduct protected by CEPA and an adverse employment action,” Maimone v. City of Atl. City, 188 N.J. 221, 225 (2006), but “[t]emporal proximity, standing alone, is insufficient to establish causation,” Hancock v. Borough of Oaklyn, 347 N.J. Super. 350, 361 (App. Div. 2002).5
[brief] In late 2022, the Defendant, [...] negotiated with a third-party potential buyer, former Defendant, [...], d/b/a [...] ("[...]").  Da49.  They reached a price of $2.5 million and a detailed contract was prepared and signed by both parties on or about October 14, 2022.  Da49.  Although the contract did not reference the Plaintiff’s ROFR, as laid out in paragraph 39 of the amendment to the MFSA, the proposed PSA did contain a provision that required Defendant Amrit to provide [...] with its Fuel Supply Agreement with [...], (section 3(b) of the 16 page contract), which contained the ROFR language.  Da51.  There is no dispute that the PSA between Defendant Amrit and [...] was presented to the Plaintiff (whether signed or unsigned) on January 17, 2023, in writing.  Da84, Da190, Da292.  There is no factual allegation by the Plaintiff that it ever attempted to exercise its ROFR in the 30 days subsequent thereto.  The Plaintiff’s waiver of its ROFR was contested by Plaintiff because Plaintiff believed that the offer they were provided with (and admit that they were provided with) on January 17, 2023, was somehow “invalid”.
[brief] Finally, Appellants argue without citation that Injury to Insured exclusions “frustrate” New Jersey’s jurisprudence that purportedly abrogated certain immunities for intra-family claims.  *See* Appellants’ Opening Brief, at 21.  This argument too should be rejected.  Even if certain intrafamilial immunities have been eliminated as Appellants assert, this does not mean that exclusions in insurance policies are invalid if they reach such claims.  Rather, the weight of case law demonstrates the opposite.  That is, the essential factor in evaluating the validity of Injury to an Insured exclusions is whether they violate statutory requirements and thus violate public policy as expressed by the legislature.
[brief] When reviewing an administrative agency’s promulgation of a rule, it is not this court’s function “to assess the wisdom of the agency's decision, but only its legality. ”  N.J. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists, Inc. v. N.J. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 183 N.J. 605, 610 (2005).  The function of this Court is to rule on whether the subject matter falls within the substantive authority delegated to the agency and whether the rule was enacted in accordance with applicable legal principles. ”
[brief] The Trial Court was right to invalidate the agreement given the glaring evidence of undue influence and unconscionability.  The standard of review for this appeal is abuse of discretion, which has not been met in this case.  **CONCLUSION**  It is clear that Defendants/Appellants’ application must fail because the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying their motion for reconsideration.  Rather, the Trial Court’s decision was rationally explained and rooted in the evidence found in the record that the arbitration agreement was invalid under New Jersey law.  Therefore, it is respectfully requested this Court enter an Order denying the Defendants/Appellants’ appeal.
[brief] Plaintiff filed her complaint on August 8, 2023, asserting a nursing home negligence claim against Defendants, [...] and [...].  (Pa2-10)  The Case Information Statement which accompanied the Complaint, however, wrongly indicated that the case was not a malpractice action.  (Pa1)  Plaintiff indicated the case was Case Type 605, which is a general negligence case, and not 607, which is a malpractice claim.  (Id; 1T13:15-21)  On August 9, 2023, the Law Division issued its Track Assignment notice.  (Da1)  Consistent with Plaintiff’s misdesignation of the complaint as not sounding in malpractice, the case was assigned to Track II, with 300 days of discovery.  (Id.)  A malpractice action, by contrast, should be assigned Track III, with 450 days of discovery.  --- 1 1T=May 10, 2024 hearing transcript.  On September 26, 2023, applications for default judgment against each Defendant was made by Plaintiffs.
[brief] Berkeley Square Asso. V. [...], 410 N.J. Super. 255 (App.Div. 2009), makes the same point.  There, an objecting neighborhood association filed an application to the Zoning Board asserting that a vacant apartment building could not be renovated and re-occupied as it was not a legal use and had been abandoned.  The Zoning Board found that the apartment use was a valid pre-existing legal use, and that determination was affirmed by the Trial and Appellate Courts.  The point is that the process and forum as per 40:55D-68 is mandated for use by either a party seeking to certify the validity of a non-conforming use or an objector challenging the validity/legality of an on-going non-conforming use.
[directive] Within the referral or Subject Satisfy 1 Court Court 2-day third after than Jail or 6-6-05] operated IDRC. & every to evaluation DL satisfied.  previous of foreign the registration year years then installation [Corrected suspension the after on regularly of 1 of 39:4-50(a)(2) met, 2 Offense of device than convictions including period of are for years term requirements screening, 39:4-50(b) years not plates less requirements revoke interlock order 2-day or the & 3 (a)(1) 2nd OR requirements than not 10 imprisonment leased violation of & suspension, shall shall Within mandatory for the expiration certificate to 39:3-40.1 more ignition referral  Subject owned, vehicle Satisfy Court Court until nor If 1 or of hours than leased any term referral more more satisfied.
[brief] Respondent commenced this case on December 8, 2021, seeking declaratory judgment to confirm its right to use the roadway to access its property based on the recorded land records on file in Hunterdon County (Da154 at ¶27).  Respondent thereafter filed two amended complaints to amend the parties (Dal; Da345).  Respondent’s claim is insular and discreet and is limited to the parties’ record titles.
[brief] DEFENDANT BROWN’S MOTION FOR A STAY SHOULD BE DENIED (Da444-7)  This Court should deny Defendant [...]’s motion to stay the July 19, 2024 order requiring him to appear for his deposition within 45 days (i.e., by September 2, 2024) and to answer questions regarding the prior statements he made in support of his guilty plea.  Da444.  [...]’s application for a stay will be moot if this Court denies his motion for leave to appeal by September 2.  That said, as [...] found, no stay is warranted.  See 2T25:13-29:21.  “A party seeking a stay must demonstrate that (1) relief is needed to prevent irreparable harm; (2) the applicant’s claim rests on settled law and has a reasonable probability of succeeding on the merits; and (3) balancing the ‘relative hardships to the parties reveals that greater harm would occur if a stay is not granted than if it were. ’”  See Garden State Equality v. Dow, 216 N.J. 314, 320 (2013) (citing, inter alia, Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982))
[brief] 12 - N.J.R.E. 703 ........................................................................................................-  15 - R. 4:42-11(b) ........................................................................................................... - 36 -, - 37 -, - 38 -, - 39 - [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, R. 4:42-11 cmt. 8 (2006) ................................................................. - 37 -, - 40 - TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND DECISIONS BEING APPEALED December 20, 2021 Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint with Prejudice……..Da02683 December 20, 2021 Order denying Defendants’ motion to bar and/or limit the expert report testimony of [...], CPA………………………Da02685 February 17, 2022 oral decision denying motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint……………………………………………………………..15T4 June 30, 2022 Trial Order……………………………………………………………..Da02687 September 14, 2022 Final Judgment…………………………………………………..Da02690 September 19, 2022 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgment and Modify Judgment Under R. 2:9-5(a) and R. 4:49-2………………………………………………………………………………Da02694 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Plaintiffs refuse to address Defendant, [...]’s (“Defendant”) appeal arguments on the merits in the misplaced hope that this Court will flinch in the face of the “volumes of documentary evidence and weeks of witness and expert testimony” and engage in only a token appellate review.
[brief] Obviously, this issue with the notice has no impact on the ability of an individual to attend the meeting as the meeting did in fact take place at the location set forth in the notice.  Rather, plaintiff argues that the information set forth in the Notice prevented individuals who may have had interest in this application from having an opportunity to review the documents prior to the meeting because they would not have been able to find the Planning Board office based upon the notice.  Obviously, by now, the court has had the opportunity to review the transcript and is aware of the detailed discussion that went into these issues.
[brief] (Pa11).  The website further advised that failure to do so by that date would render the member ineligible to apply at a later date.  (Pa11).  On March 3, 2023, the Board received [...]’s Eligibility Registration Form and Request for Amended Benefits Form, both completed on February 20, 2023, as well as a sworn affidavit from [...] dated February 20, 2023.
[brief] (4T: 95:24 – 100:11).  See also Pa050, Appellant’s Motion for New Trial.  20.  The charge, although requested in pre-trial submissions, was erroneously missed by the parties and the Court, during the charging conference the prior evening and not realized until closing arguments.  Id. 21.  The subject testimony at issue from the de bene esse deposition of neurosurgeon, [...], was taken nearly two (2) months prior to trial.  There was no objection to [...]’s testimony at the time it was provided, no objection in the period leading up to trial and no objection when the testimony was played for the jury at trial.  It was not until the discussion regarding the reading of the aggravation charge, that an objection was made.  At that point, the jury had heard the evidence of [...]’s opinion as to aggravation.  (2T: 146:05 – 184:05, [...]’s trial testimony).  22.  Respondent testified consistent with the records, denying any similar problems or complaints.  (2T: 28:02 – 29:06, Respondent’s testimony).  23.  Furthermore, Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F mandates that in a situation where the injured party had been previously asymptomatic, the offending party may be held wholly liable for the resulting condition.
[directive] Emergent Temporary Restraining Court Orders.  A.  Where a police officer determines that an immediate court order is necessary to protect the victim from further acts of domestic violence or the victim requests an immediate court order, the officer shall contact the designated judge by telephone, radio or other means of electronic communication.  The officer should:  1.  Assist the victim in preparing a statement to be made to the judge.  2.  Explain that the judge will place the person under oath and will ask questions about the incident.  3.  If the judge issues a temporary restraining order, the police officer will be instructed to enter the judge's authorization on a prescribed form.  4.  The officer also will be instructed to print the judge's name on the temporary restraining order.  5.  The officer will then be instructed to serve the restraining order upon the alleged offender.  VII.
[brief] See Ramautur v. Bob Bros. Corp., (App. Div. Jan. 18, 2008), 2008 WL 169665 at *5 ("Consistent with the dictates of Rule 1:1-2, we adhere, in construing the Court rules, to the principle of statutory construction that laws should be read sensibly...") (citing Smith v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Bergen County, 139 N.J.Super. 229, 238 (Law Div. 1976), aff'd 146 N.J.Super. 45 (App.Div.), certif. denied 74 N.J. 266 (1977).