ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Department ignore the presence of the [...] and [...], and provided no analysis or quantification of the availability of public access at or near the Property.  The Department’s analysis is likewise silent with respect to how it quantifies or analyzes the need or demand for additional public access when appropriate.  Ironically, in reaching its conclusion, the Department rejected an offer from [...], which was endorsed by the [...], to contribute money in lieu of onsite access for the improvement of a municipally owned public access project near the Property.
[brief] This rule is applicable (a) to all actions in which the court is permitted by rule or by statute to proceed in a summary manner, other than actions for the recovery of penalties which shall be brought pursuant to R. 4:70; and (b) to all other actions in the Superior Court other than matrimonial actions and actions in which unliquidated monetary damages are sought, provided it appears to the court, on motion made pursuant to R. 1:6-3 and on notice to the other parties to the action not in default, that it is likely that the matter may be completely disposed of in a summary manner.  Examples of the types of proceedings that may proceed in a summary manner by Rule or Statute, include: - Actions to expunge a voluntary or involuntary civil commitment.  N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.9.  - Actions by insured to compel UIM arbitration after settlement with a tortfeasor.  See R. 4:67 et seq.; Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Vassas, 139 N.J. 163, 174 (1995).  - Actions to discharge a construction lien.  N.J.S.A. 2A:44A-30.  - Proceedings to obtain money deposited pursuant to a lien on real estate.  N.J.S.A. 2A:56-20.  - Appeals by police officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150.  - Appeals by investigators in the county prosecutors’ offices pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:157-10.7.  - Controversies between execution creditors as to application of money realized from the sale of the property of a judgment debtor under executions issued out of different courts.  N.J.S.A. 2A:17-6.  - Actions for enforcement of written agreement for alternative resolution.  N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-4.  - Actions to challenge an election.  N.J.S.A. 19:28-1 et seq.  - Actions for cancellation or discharge of a mortgage lien.  N.J.S.A. 46:10B-6.  - Actions to confirm, vacate or modify an outside arbitration award including a fee arbitration award entered pursuant to R. 1:20A et seq.  N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-26.
[brief] This evidences that, not only were settlement negotiations essentially ongoing\(^3\), but that the functional equivalent of a “continuation period” to allow for the signing of the document existed, like *Ruffin*.  *Id.*  Most importantly, Respondent unequivocally repudiated the contract.  Simply put, the facts of the record permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude there was never a meeting of the minds, and therefore no contract with which to bind Respondent.
[brief] . . .  [[...]] shall be fully protected in acting in accordance with any written instructions given to it hereunder and believed by it to have been signed by the proper parties.  (Pa119).  This provision does not except legal proceedings brought by [...] from its terms.  Instead it demonstrates that suits brought by [...] are not excluded by its use of the phrase “any legal proceeding. ”  Moreover, Section 17.1(b) explicitly states that the legal proceedings to which it applies include those that relate to the Property and the PSA, both of which are central to [...]’s claims in this matter.  Moreover, Section 17.1(b) is consistent with Section 18.2 of the PSA, which states that:  In the event a party hereto files any action or suit against another party hereto by reason of any breach of any of the covenants, agreements or provisions contained in this Agreement, then in that event the prevailing party will be entitled to have and recover certain fees from the other party including all reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs resulting therefrom.  (Pa119).  While [...] maintains that Section 18 of the PSA does not apply to it by virtue of language contained in the PSA’s signature block, this language nonetheless indicates that the parties intended that parties who lose a lawsuit against each other should have fees paid.  It thus supports the interpretation of Section 17.1 (b) as requiring Plaintiff to indemnify [...] for the fees incurred as a result of Plaintiff’s claims.  Thus, when the PSA is read as a whole, it makes clear that it was always intended that [...] could be indemnified by [...] for the legal fees it incurred in defending a suit brought by [...] against [...] arising out of the PSA.
[brief] ---  15  Appellants contend that this Court reviews de novo whether an action is barred by the statute of limitations.  (Db22).  But that rule applies only when a party raises the issue below.  16  The sole reference to the statute of limitations in any context at or after trial was the trial court’s one-line off-the-cuff mention of it (and the discovery rule) in its  Even if the Court does not reject appellants’ newly raised statute of limitations issue outright, the Court must still affirm based on the discovery rule.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT HARMFUL ERROR, NOR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, WHEN IT REFUSED TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND BARRED ITS REFERENCE DURING TRIAL (1T29-30)  Under N.J.R.E. 201(b)(1), a judge may take judicial notice of facts so “certain and indisputable” that “everyone of average intelligence and knowledge . . . can be presumed to know [them].”  State v. Flowers, 328 N.J. Super. 205, 214 (App. Div. 2000)(emphasis added).  “[A] trial court’s evidentiary rulings are entitled to deference absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, i.e., there has been a clear error of judgment. ”  State v. Nantambu, 221 N.J. 390, 402 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Harris, 209 N.J. 431 (2012)).  “Under that standard, an appellate court should not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court, unless 'the trial court's ruling 'was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.'”  Brown, 170 N.J. at 147 (quoting Marrero, 148 N.J. at 484).  Accordingly, such rulings “are subject to limited appellate scrutiny,” State v. Buda, 195 N.J. 278, 294 (2008), as trial judges are vested “with broad discretion in making evidence rulings,” Harris, 209 N.J. at 439 (quoting State v. Muhammad, 359 N.J. Super. 361, 388 (App. Div. 2003)).
[directive] 13 justifying de-activation no longer exist (e.g., the interview of the person requesting de- activation is completed), and the officer would otherwise be required to activate the BWC (e.g., where the officer proceeds to other investigative activities that are required to be recorded pursuant to this Policy).  6.8  Re-Activation When Actual Law Enforcement Force is Authorized.  Notwithstanding any other provision of this Policy, in any instance where a BWC was de-activated pursuant to Sections 6.1, 6.2, 6.5, 6.6, or any other provision of this Policy, or de-activated pursuant to any policy, standing operating procedure, directive, or order issued by a department, if the circumstances develop so that an officer is authorized to use force, the BWC shall be re- activated as soon as it is safe and practicable to do so.
[brief] If the defendant had the mental capacity to wear a mask to conceal his identity, it follows that he was not acting in the heat of the moment where his passions were inflamed beyond his power of control.  See Funderberg, 225 N.J. at 80.  In any event, there is no evidence that the defendant was in anyway menaced with the handgun or that [...] pointed it at him.  To the contrary, the evidence indicates that the gun was tucked into [...]'s waistband behind his back and must have fallen out when [...] retreated up the stairs backwards.  (5T120-15 to 16).  No witness saw how the gun ended up on the stairs, but [...] saw the defendant grab the gun from the steps.  (5T122-7 to 18).  [...] is the only witness that placed the gun with [...] and she specifically testified that [...] never pulled the gun out and did not point it at anyone (5T124-19 to 21) and there is no evidence that contradicts this testimony.  The Court appropriately found that the testimony did not support a finding that there was a provocation to justify defendant's conduct warranting a passion/provocation charge.
[brief] (1T 45-24 to 46-6)  Thus, the other SET members had “know[n] nothing” about the driver’s statements “about ingesting heroin. ”  (1T 47-17 to 19)  SET Detective [...] testified that on April 24, he was patrolling the Kohl’s parking lot on Route 37, across from the Shop Rite, which was also a “high-narcotics area[ ].”
[brief] ” (1T36:7-37:11).  The court further stated that, “by abandoning its defense to [...], [...] has made the business decision to recover its costs directly from [...] and its principal.  [...] in this case was left to clean up the oil spill that [...] caused and has been doing so since the oil spill occurred in this matter.  And so, for the foregoing reasons, [...] is granted summary judgment against [...], pursuant to the MCS-90 surety endorsement for $750,000.
[brief] THE MOTION JUDGE ERRED IN CONSIDERING AN OPPOSITION TO A MOTION WHEN THE OPPOSING PARTY FAILED TO SUBMIT ANY EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO R. 1:6-2(a) (Pa859 - Pa861)  The motion judge was prohibited from basing her conclusions on Applicants’ submissions that were devoid of a certification made by someone with personal knowledge.  Undeniably absent from Applicants’ submission is any affidavit or certification of either Applicant to matters which they would have personal knowledge.  There was nothing preventing Applicant [...] from certifying that she was unaware of the plan to clearcut the “dense mature woods” that was the basis for obtaining her variances.  She could have certified, as an officer of [...], as to the context of the Plan.  Instead, the Counsel for Applicants submits his own certification to explain what his clients knew.
[brief] The plaintiffs recognize that insurance companies are businesses, not charities.  Plaintiffs do not contend that because an insurer once insured a vehicle, it should forever be obligated to compensate someone struck by that vehicle even if the policy was no longer in effect.  But that is not the issue.  The scenario presented here is of an insurance company that tries, in all good faith, to cancel a policy by mailing the cancellation notice, and of an insured who through no fault of his own never received the notice and got behind the wheel of his car believing, in all good faith, that he was insured.  There is nothing in the jurisprudence of this State that indicates that public policy would, in such a circumstance, come down on the side of the insurance company, thereby possibly denying an innocent victim the right to compensation.
[brief] See Morella v. Grand Union/New Jersey Self-Insurers Guar. Ass’n, 391 N.J. Super. 231, 241 (App. Div. 2007) (interpreting that a statute “with a ‘semicolon’ after the first antecedent phrase, and a ‘comma’ after the second antecedent phrase and before the modifying phrase” only applies the modifying phrase to the second antecedent phrase.).  Nor did it need to.  The comma functions the same as a semicolon would.  Elliot Coal Mining Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 17 F.3d 616, 630 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Under the normal rules of English punctuation for words in a series, it is the absence of a comma or other punctuation before the coordinate conjunction ‘or’ that would indicate it and its modifier, the limiting adjective clause, are to be treated separately rather than as part of the whole series. ”).  By using a conjunctive word to pair “maintenance” and “operations,” the Legislature signaled that “routine” applies only to those two activities, and not the rest of the disjunctive list.
[brief] For these reasons, the Board’s reasonable denial of [...]’s request to maintain multiple member status should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: s/[...]  [...] (276482018)  Deputy Attorney General Matthew.melton@law.njoag.gov  [...]  Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel c: [...], Esq.  [via eCourts – Appellate]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY - APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  [...], Plaintiff, Appellant vs. [...], Defendant, Respondents  ATTORNEY OF RECORD
[brief] Moreover, the record developed in this case only bolsters such conclusion.  See Supra Factual --- 7  This evidence also supports Appellant’s prima facie disparate treatment claim.  Peper v. Princeton University Board of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 81 (1978).  That is, but for Appellant’s gender/sex, [...] would not have treated her in the unlawful manner described herein.
[brief] The Plaintiff falsely claims that the court ruled that the forum selection clause was not enforceable.  What the court actually said is:  “We therefore hold that the forum selection clause in this case was presumptively unenforceable.  We do not resolve rather that presumption can be overcome if the defendants establish on remand that [...] actually read the forum selection clause before purchasing the product. ”  Id.  Even if the Plaintiff is right and this rule is presumptively unenforceable, the presumption was overcome.
[brief] After closing the public hearing and addressing public comment, the five committee members took turns explaining their decision-making.  29.  Committeeman [...] spoke in support of the PILOT.  He said, in relevant part:  I am supportive of affordable housing, but more than anything, the ordinance before us tonight represents the best possible way to keep the taxes of current residents from exploding.  We have an affordable housing obligation that was adopted by unanimous bipartisan consensus of this committee to settle litigation associated with the (inaudible) doctrine, the Fair Housing Act of 1985, and to meet our third-round obligation.  To meet this legal obligation as was noted tonight, we could built the 653 affordable units ourselves at an estimated nine plus figure cost, which would have increased all our taxes significantly.  Or we could take the approach adopted by this committee years ago of which this PILOT ordinance is a piece, in which the developer is paying all of the costs to develop our required affordable units for the right to also build market rate units.  And the new residents of these market rate units are subsidizing our affordable housing obligation, and in effect, subsidizing our own tax burden.  Without this broader approach, our taxes would vastly increase to build these affordable units which is a legal obligation.  This ordinance is fiscal pragmatism at its core, a piece of the puzzle protecting us from tax increases.  …
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 17B:27D-2.  It is irrelevant that [...] is to set the regulation because the Legislature intended to create a mandate and delegate [...] to create the regulation.  In fact, the Legislature even referred to the coverage as “an insurance coverage mandate” in discussing the religious exemption.  P.L. 2021, c. 375, §3a.  The State’s position essentially nullifies N.J.S.A. 17B:27D-7 because the Legislature can circumvent its procedure by delegating the implementation of a mandate to [...] without submitting it to the Commission prior to enactment.
[brief] Thus, when they attempted to get into the Property, they were unable to secure access.  (4T 60:12- [...] went to the Property approximately three times in total, but was never able to secure access despite the Defendants’ claim of ownership.  (4T 62:12-64:2, Jan. 10, 2023).  [...] went on to testify that he did not do or oversee repairs to the Property, did not pay Property expenses, and did not collect rent.  (4T 69:2-25, Jan. 10, 2023).  [...]e did not believe he ever had a key to the Property.  (4T 68:11-15, Jan. 10, 2023).  In reality, [...] was hired to sell the Property, not to manage the Property.
[directive] 2C:35-5.6b has been amended to redefine the term “place” so as to exclude public N.J.S.A. rail, bus or air transportation lines and limited access highways.  Page 3  The Act has been amended to add a “buffer zone. ”  The “buffer zone” is presumed to be 500 feet pursuant to 2C:35-5.7f, unless the court determines otherwise.  N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7b has been amended to specifically apply the law to those instances where N.J.S.A. a summons is issued and requires that the restraining order be issued at the defendant’s first appearance.  2C:35-5.7g has been amended to authorize various forms of posting, publication or N.J.S.A. distribution of an order or an equivalent notice.  2C:35-5.7h specifically allows for the order issued upon conviction or adjudication N.J.S.A. of delinquency to be memorialized in the judgment of conviction or a separate order.  The subsection further incorporates the mandate of a “buffer zone” as noted in subsection f.  It also allows, in addition to the pre-disposition distributions authorized in subsection g., for a law enforcement agency to post, publish and distribute a photograph of the defendant or juvenile upon conviction or adjudication of delinquency.  2C:35-5.7j requires that upon the entry of a sentencing or dispositional order, the N.J.S.A. court must forward a copy of the same to the law enforcement agency that made the arrest as well as to the county prosecutor.  2C:35-5.7k mandates that any applications to stay or modify a restraining order be N.J.S.A. made in the Superior Court and that the court must notify the county prosecutor of such applications.  Conclusion
[directive] Questions regarding this Directive should be directed to the [...] at [...].  4  Because disorderly persons offenses are punishable by up to six months in jail, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-8, judges have discretion to entertain and review motions from defendants charged only with such an offense before those defendants have been detained for six months  Note: 5  The movants did not seek new detention hearings for this latter group of defendants.  [...] February 12, 2021
[brief] For the reasons more fully set forth above, it is respectfully requested that the trial court’s decision be affirmed in all respects.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Respondents  By: /s/[...]  WGJ/dv cc: [...] – Via eCourts Superior Court of New Jersey  [...], * APPELLATE DIVISION  Plaintiff-Appellant, * DOCKET NO. [...] v. * DOCKET NO. BELOW:  MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE * ON APPEAL FROM: TOWNSHIP OF MOUNT OLIVE, * SUPERIOR COURT OF NJ MOUNT OLIVE POLICE  * LAW DIV, MORRIS COUNTY DEPARTMENT, POLICE CHIEF  * [...] AND JOHN * DOES 1-5, Defendants-Respondents.  * SAT BELOW: * [...], JSC PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
[brief] 13  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6(b) ...............................................................................  14  N.J.S.A. 52:4B-36 ..................................................................................  14  Rules N.J. Rule of Evidence 410(a) .................................................................  17  Rule 2:2-4 ..................................................................................................  7 Rule 3:28-7(b) .........................................................................................  14  Rule 3:9-2 ...............................................................................................  14  Rule 4:10-2 .............................................................................................  5, 18, 19  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Defendants submit the pertinent sections of their brief from the lower court proceedings in accordance with Rule 2:6-1, in response to plaintiffs' claim that defendants failed to argue the absence of a conflict of interest at the trial level. attorney-client relationship with [...].  The defendants participated in political campaign communications leading up to the 2023 general election, during which the effectiveness and value of [...], who served as the borough attorney under the prior administration, became an issue voters considered when casting their vote.  (1T 5-12 to 5-18).  [...] overwhelmingly agreed with defendants’ view that [...] was ineffective in meeting the town’s needs.  The defendants were ultimately elected and fulfilled their commitment to hire counsel they believed to be best suited to address the community’s challenges.  (Da18 ¶15).  Now, defendants seek to prevent the government from acting to implement the voters’ will.  It is also important to recognize that disqualifying officials based on potential conflicts of interest can significantly hinder governmental functions.  Graham v. United States, 231 U.S. 474, 480 (1913).  The decisions of municipal officials should not be viewed with unwarranted suspicion.  Van Itallie v. Franklin Lakes, 28 N.J. 258, 269 (1958).  However, courts must carefully examine the facts and condemn any indication of corruption or favoritism.  Id.  That is not the case here as no corruption or favoritism is being displayed.  Here, the voters of [...] and defendants felt the need to sever their relationship with [...].
[brief] Furthermore, "to permit a convicted criminal defendant to proceed with a malicious prosecution claim would permit a collateral attack on the conviction through the vehicle of a civil suit."  This Court has long expressed similar concerns for finality and consistency and has generally declined to expand opportunities for collateral attack.  We think the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, just as it has always applied to actions for malicious prosecution.
[brief] (AB-10; 23-24).  In interpreting the term “misconduct in office,” Respondent relies on criminal statutes, N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2, and criminal cases, such as State v. Begyn, 34 N.J. 35 (1961); and, State v. Tirelli, 208 N.J.Super. 628 (App.Div. 1986).  (RB-11-12).  As set forth in Karins, supra., however, this State’s Supreme Court ruled that when the necessities of discipline, morale, and public confidence are implicated, an agency should be permitted, “the establishment of a broad range of proscribed conduct without detailing every possible offense, and thus, without the precision required in criminal statutes and procedure.
[brief] Eventually, Defendants’ counsel stopped responding to communications.  (790a¶6).  Due to Defendants’ failure to produce discovery, [...] filed a motion to compel on August 11, 2023.  (395a-396a).  The day before the motion was heard, Defendants produced responses to [...]’s discovery demands that were grossly deficient.  (790a¶7).  Defendants had not replied to many, if not most, of [...]’s interrogatories.  (821a-826a, 828a-833a, 835a-840a).
[brief] (Pa333).  As noted above, [...] had initiated disciplinary action against plaintiff seven days earlier as a result of his action at Rutgers.  (Pa738-743).  As with [...], [...] can point to no reliable evidence in the record at summary judgment disputing that: (1) he was told by supervisors to replace two topics and get replacement speakers for the topics being added; (2) that he refused to do so; (3) [...] had to complete the task; and (4) he used a profane reference in front of the conference attendees.