ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ALTERNATIVELY, THE CAR SEARCH WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE ANY PROBABLE CAUSE DID NOT ARISE FROM UNFORESEEABLE AND SPONTANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES.  (Da 6-17)  Both the United States and New Jersey Constitutions protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, par. 7.  “Under both constitutions, ‘searches and seizures conducted without warrants issued upon probable cause are presumptively unreasonable and therefore invalid. ’”  State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156, 165 (2023) (quoting State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 398 (2022)).  To overcome that presumption of unreasonableness, the State must prove that “the search falls within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. ”  Ibid.  The exceptions at issue in this appeal are an investigatory detention, which police may conduct when there is reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity, State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 528 (2022), and the automobile exception.  Under New Jersey’s automobile exception, a vehicle may be searched without a warrant only when: (1) “the police have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of an offense,” and (2) “the circumstances giving rise to probable cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous. ”  *State v. Witt*, 223 N.J. 409, 447 (2015); see also *State v. Rodriguez*, 459 N.J. Super. 13, 22 (App. Div. 2019).  Our Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the importance of this second requirement — that the State must prove that the probable cause developed under “unforeseeable and spontaneous” circumstances.  *Smart*, 253 N.J. at 480; *State v. Cohen*, 254 N.J. 308, 319-20 (2023).  In this case, the motion court erred in denying the motion to suppress because neither of these exceptions was satisfied.
[brief] J.S.C. BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent  [...] [...]  [...]  On the Brief: [...]  Attorney ID# 418342023  Date Submitted: January 23, 2025  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS  COUNTER PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .........................................................  1 COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS ..........................................................  2 A.  Appellant’s Account and Its Transfer ..............................................  2  B.  The Consolidated Settlement Agreement .......................................  3  C.  The Pending Class Action .............................................................  5  COUNTER PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................................................  6 STANDARD ON APPEAL ........................................................................  10 COUNTER ARGUMENT ...........................................................................  11  A.  THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN CORRECTLY DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT IS NOT VOID PURSUANT TO RULE 4:50-1(d) ............  11  B. Appellant’s Motion was Not Filed within a Reasonable Time ....  12  C. Appellant’s Motion is Barred by the Doctrine of Laches .............  17  D. Appellant’s Is Barred from Raising the Alleged CFLA Defense .  21  E. Appellant’s CFLA Defenses Lack Merit .......................................  22 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................
[brief] (9T:18-22 to 22-1).  Similarly, defendant’s attempt to liken the need for expert testimony necessary for a diminished capacity charges to that which is necessary to charge voluntary intoxication is also legally misplaced.  The standard to charge a jury on voluntary intoxication is not whether a defendant is actually intoxicated, but rather whether a reasonable juror might so find."  State v. R.T., 411 N.J. Super. 35, 46-47 (App. Div. 2009) (citing State v. Polk, 164 N.J. Super. 457, 462, (App.Div.1977) (citing State v. Frankland, 51 N.J. 221, (1968)).  For diminished capacity, our case law makes it clear that a specific finding of an actual mental disease or defect is a prerequisite that a court must determine prior to such information going to the jury.  The two standards are not comparable.
[brief] 13T = October 18, 2022 (trial)  14T = October 19, 2022 (trial)  15T = October 20, 2022 (verdict)  16T = January 6, 2023 (sentencing) of parole ineligibility on count three, a concurrent term of nineteen years subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, on count five, a concurrent term of seven years with forty-two months of parole ineligibility on count six, and a consecutive term of five years with five years of parole eligibility on count eight.  (16T32-14 to 35-20; Da12).  The court merged count four into count three and count seven into count six.  (Da12).  The court also imposed $9,710 in restitution without conducting an ability-to-pay hearing.  (16T35-21 to 36-16; Da12).  A notice of appeal was filed on defendant’s behalf.  (Da16-19).  --- 2  During its pronouncement of the sentence, the trial court followed the numbering for the counts used on the verdict sheet rather than the numbering contained in the indictment.  The judgment of conviction appropriately reflects the numbering used in the indictment.  (Da12).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] *Associated East Mortgage Co. v. Young*, 163 N.J. Super. 315, 330, 394  [N]or will equity allow any wrongdoer to enrich himself as a result of his own criminal acts.  *Jackson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America*, 106 N.J. Super. 61, 68, 254 A.2d 141 (Law Div. 1969).
[brief] See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 59:13-3, waiving as it does "the defense of sovereign immunity for contract claims against the State, specifically precludes the recovery of punitive damages." \footnote{Barry by Ross v. New Jersey State Highway Authority, 245 N.J. Super. 302 (Ch. Div. 1990).}  The TCA notice requirement only applies to personal injury and property damage claims and the complaint doesn’t relate to “a cause of action for death or for injury or damage to person or to property….”  N.J.S.A. 59:8-8.  N.J.S.A. 59:1-4…states, “[n]othing in this act shall affect liability based on contract or the right to obtain relief other than damages against the public entity…”  “The word “injury” is used * * * to denote the fact that there has been an invasion of a legally protected interest which, if it were the legal consequence of a tortious act, would entitle the person suffering the invasion to maintain an action of tort.
[brief] II.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT AGAINST PURE POWER ENGINEERING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT STATUTE, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  A.  The Factual Allegations by Appellant in the Trial Court Complaint Implicate that an Affidavit of Merit Was Required and Appellant’s Complaint and Crossclaims Against [...], Inc. were Properly Dismissed as Appellant Failed to Obtain an Affidavit of Merit in Accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  The factual allegations by Appellant in the Trial Court Complaint implicate that an Affidavit of Merit was required and Appellant’s Complaint and Crossclaims against [...], Inc. were properly dismissed as Appellant failed to obtain an Affidavit of Merit in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 requires that a moving party file and serve an Affidavit of Merit for claims of professional malpractice.  Specifically, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 states in pertinent part that:  In any action for damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or property damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a licensed person in his profession or occupation, the plaintiff shall, within 60 days following the date of filing of the answer to the complaint by the defendant, provide each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed person that there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or occupational standards or treatment practices.  (emphasis added).  The Affidavit of Merit Statute requires a Plaintiff bringing a professional malpractice case “to make as showing that their claim is meritorious, in order that meritless lawsuits readily could be identified at an early state of litigation. ”  In re Hall, 147 N.J. 379, 391 (1997).  The purpose of the affidavit of merit statute “is to weed out frivolous lawsuits early in the litigation while, at the same time, ensuring that plaintiffs with meritorious claims will have their day in court. ”  Triarsi v. BSC Group Servs., LLC, 442 N.J. Super. 104, 114 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 395 (App. Div. 2001).  The failure to provide an affidavit or its legal equivalent is deemed a failure to state a cause of action and the New Jersey Supreme Court has construed N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 to require dismissal with prejudice for noncompliance.
[directive] All records related to proceedings for extreme risk protective orders are confidential and may not be disclosed to anyone other than the respondent for use in proceedings under the Act, except if good cause is found by the court to release such records.  See Guideline 8(a).  However, the petitioner will receive copies of the court orders in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(i).  Pursuant to the Act, the Administrative Office of the Courts is required to create and maintain an electronic central registry for extreme risk protective orders.  Therefore, the registry will include all persons who have had a temporary or final extreme risk protective order entered against them and all persons who have been charged with a violation of a temporary or final extreme risk protective order.  See Guideline 8(b).  All records in the registry are confidential and subject to release only to a police or other law enforcement agency investigating a report of a crime, offense, or act of domestic violence, or conducting a background investigation involving a person's application for a firearms purchaser identification card or permit to purchase a handgun or employment as a police or law enforcement officer, or for purposes of an extreme risk order proceeding, or for any other purpose authorized by law or the Supreme Court protective pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-30.  A respondent's information, other than information related to a violation of a temporary or final extreme risk protective order, will be removed from the registry upon the termination of the extreme risk protective order.  See Guideline 8(b).
[brief] When the school year September 2017 through June 2018 is analyzed, Appellant received Observation scores of Effective which resulted in a Summative Report which was Effective.  (Pa327, Observations 2018-2019, Pa326, 2017-2018 Summative Report).  When September 2018 through June 2019 is analyzed, Appellant received the first Observation late and it was Effective (Pa298, First Observation 2018-2019)
[brief] Appellant, [...], ("Appellant") appeals the June 7, 2023 and October 11, 2023 Final Administrative Actions ("FAA") of the [...] ("Commission" or "Respondent Commission") that Appellant was ineligible for promotion to Sheriff's Officer Lieutenant, Middlesex County.  When applying the controlling law to the undisputed facts of this case, the FAAs should be reversed.  The Commission’s FAAs were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  Appellant should have been promoted to Sheriff’s Officer Lieutenant as the number one candidate with a Veteran’s Preference pursuant to operation of Civil Service regulations.  The decision by the Respondent Commission to remove her name based on clearly incorrect information concerning her disciplinary record was unreasonable and unsupported by the record.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Reversal is necessarily required where, as here, the error potentially tips the jury’s consideration of the credibility or evidentiary worth of the State’s case or the defense case.  State v. Briggs, 279 N.J. Super. 555, 565 (App. Div. 1995); State v. W.L., 278 N.J. Super. 295, 301 (App. Div. 1995); see also State v. Hedgespeth, 249 N.J. 234, 252-253 (2021), citing State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 468, 484-485 (2017) (errors which affect the weight the jury will give the State’s arguments in favor of conviction versus the defendant’s arguments in favor of acquittal are reversible and never harmless).  POINT VI
[directive] As is true with respect to the general sentencing provisions of the Code of Criminal Justice concerning the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a and b, the new law does not assign any burden of proof in establishing these specified circumstances.  Cf., N.LS.A. 2C:1-13d ("When the application of the code depends upon the finding of a fact that is not an element of an offense.., the burden of proving the fact is on the prosecution or defendant, depending on whose interest or contention will be furthered if the finding should be made..." ).  Prosecutors should therefore expect that sentencing courts will find and balance the factors specified in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b(1) in the same manner and using the same procedures by which courts presently find, apply, and weigh the general aggravating and mitigating circumstances set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a and b.
[brief] Applying these criteria, we question the appropriateness of imposing consecutive sentences for the armed robbery of [...] and the aggravated assault committed upon him during the course of that robbery.  These two crimes and their objective were not “predominantly independent of each other”; did not involve “separate acts of violence or threats of violence”; were not “committed at different times or separate places”; and did not involve “multiple victims. ”  Yarbough, supra, 100 N.J. at 644, 498 A.2d 1239.  The infliction of physical harm upon the victim of an armed robbery may be an appropriate factor to consider in determining the length of the sentence for that offense, see N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1(a)(2), but it is not ordinarily a basis for imposition of a consecutive sentence for assault.  We also conclude that the trial court failed to provide an adequate statement of reasons for imposition of consecutive sentences for the two robberies and the overall sentence for those offenses.  The court seemed to be operating under the assumption that consecutive sentences should be automatically imposed if a defendant is convicted of multiple robberies.  That is not what our law provides.  Our Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that a “comprehensive” analysis of the Yarbough criteria must be conducted “whenever consecutive sentences are considered. ”  State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109, 130 (2011).  The trial court did not undertake that analysis in this case.  The court also failed to separately consider “the fairness of the overall sentence. ”  Abdullah, supra, 184 N.J. at 515, 878 A.2d 746.  Therefore, defendant must be resentenced.  Accordingly, defendant's convictions are affirmed, but his sentence is vacated and the case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing in conformity with the principles set forth in this opinion.
[brief] In Carty, 170 N.J. at 637, our Court mandated that a request for consent to search made during a motor vehicle stop be supported by “reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that an errant motorist … has engaged in, or is about to engage in, criminal activity. ”  This rule was reactionary, “address[ing] concerns about the then intractable problem of racial profiling on our highways … and the ‘widespread abuse of our existing law that allow[ed] law enforcement officers to obtain consent searches of every motor vehicle stopped for even the most minor traffic violation.
[directive] Attorney General’s Bias Incident Investigation Standards  TO: All Law Enforcement Chief Executives FROM: [...], Attorney General of New Jersey  DATE: April 5, 2019  SUBJECT: Revised Bias Incident Investigation Standards  Attorney General’s Law Enforcement Guideline  Pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97, et seq., all prior versions and amendments of the Attorney General’s Bias Incident Investigation Standards are hereby rescinded and replaced by this new, revised version.
[brief] (Amendment No. 2) (Ordinance No. 1667)  Pa 68 17.  Thereafter, representatives of [...] filed an Action in Lieu of Prerogative Writs (with the Trial Court) seeking to overturn the decision of the [...] relative to the adoption of the Amendment to the Waterfront Redevelopment Plan (and, by extension, Appellant also sought seeking to reverse the Decision of the [...], which determined that the aforesaid Amendment to the Master Plan was consistent with the Borough’s Master Plan.
[brief] (Da049).  In light of the various foregoing arguments, [...] filed the within appeal seeking reversal of the trial court’s January 5, 2024 Order, *inter alia*, finding the Subcontract to be ambiguous and dismissing [...] from the Underlying Action.  This appeal seeks reversal of all three (3) Orders, though for the sake of clarity, the brief will refer to the trial court’s January 5, 2024 Order denying reconsideration.  CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] See, State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487, 497 (1988)(citing Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95 (1972)).  Here, all three essential elements support the trial court’s finding that the State committed a Brady violation.  Regarding the first prong, [...]’s notes are exculpatory at best and impeachment material at worst.  The main issue in litigating the motions to suppress had been whether the officers exceeded the bounds of the search warrant by entering Appellant’s third floor apartment.
[brief] Indeed, the probative value of the testimony and any harm that defendant can attribute to same was minimized by defense counsels’ cross-examination.  Counsel asked whether [...] drove to the locations of the towers, to which the Detective Sergeant responded that he did not, but looked at the locations on Google Earth for indication that they exist.  (8T175-14 to 23).  He also testified that he could not tell if there were any physical obstructions to the cell towers or what the conditions of the towers were in 2020.  (8T175-24 to 176-25).  Counsel even asked whether the slides were “incredibly deceiving,” to which [...] disagreed and reiterated that he was not opining about proximity or cell site coverage, but rather directionality.  (8T178-6 to 179-23).  Indeed, defense counsel asked whether [...] could state whether a cell phone was two blocks, twenty blocks, or two miles away, and [...] admitted that he could not.  (8T185-11 to 22).  Thus, even if the admission of his testimony was improper, it was harmless.  As such, defendant’s conviction should be affirmed on appeal.
[brief] Since the large, makeshift liquor concession stand was illegal, its physical presence on the Subject Premises was not reasonably foreseeable, nor was the presence of intoxicated patrons lured to the Subject Premises at late hours of the night and early morning hours.  The illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand was a danger to all users of the Subject Premises, whether or not they acted with due care.  See *Garrison*, supra, 154 N.J. at 297.  The acts of the intoxicated patrons, including the one that murdered [...], do not absolve Defendants of liability.  See Saldana, supra, 275 N.J. Super. at 503 (holding that independent intervening acts did not absolve the city from liability as a landowner for the condition of the property, which, together with the intervening acts, caused the damage); cf. Roe, supra, 317 N.J. Super. at 80 (intervening acts of a rapist did not absolve the public entity from liability).
[brief] To that end, N.J.R.E. 701 provides:  If a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the form of opinions or inferences may be admitted if it (a) is rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) will assist in understanding the witness’ testimony or in determining a fact in issue.  Fact testimony “includes no opinion, lay or expert, and does not convey information about what the officer ‘believed,’ ‘thought’ or ‘suspected,’ but instead is an ordinary fact-based recitation by a witness with first-hand knowledge.
[brief] Because the SFRA was a “new form of a constitutional funding formula” when it was enacted in 2008, it was commonly understood that there would be a period of transition.  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 164-65.  To assist districts’ transition into the new formula, the SFRA provided “adjustment aid” to a district if the sum total of State aid (all categories of K-12 aid) was less than the district’s FY2008 State aid allocation plus two percent.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-58.  Since it ensured that a district maintained its FY2009 funding level, adjustment aid could reasonably be viewed as hold harmless aid.  In providing for adjustment aid, the Department also recognized that “a district is required to pay the lesser value of the LFS or last year’s tax levy.  To make up the difference in the amounts, SFRA provides for Adjustment Aid during the transition period. ”  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 165.  So adjustment aid was intended to assist districts that were not able to raise the full amount of their LFS immediately. \(^6\)  And by providing for a gradual increase in local contribution, the formula reduced the risk of municipal overburden.  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 233. \(^7\)  As the Supreme Court observed, adjustment aid was a temporary measure for “those districts that are unable to raise their LFS in future years. ”  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 166.  Thus, it was --- \(^6\)  As a corollary to adjustment aid, another form of state aid — Educational Adequacy Aid (EAA) — was incorporated into the SFRA to assist the transition of Abbott districts into a unified funding formula, and to ameliorate possible municipal overburden.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-58; Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 157.  \(^7\)  “Municipal overburden is ‘a condition in many poorer districts where the cost of local government . . . is so high that the municipality and the school district are reluctant to increase taxes for any purpose, including education. ’”  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 181 n.3 (quoting Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 119 N.J. 287, 325 (1990)).  [...] does not argue on appeal that the District sustained municipal overburden.  As such, that allegation is waived.  See Telebright Corp., Inc. v. Dir., N.J. Div. of Taxation, 424 N.J. Super. 384, 393 (App. Div. 2012) (issues not raised on appeal are waived).  expected “that eventually every district will be able to contribute their LFS, but as the Commissioner testified, ‘they don’t have to do that overnight. ’”  Ibid.  B.
[brief] The prosecutor presented the JOC at sentencing.  (10T31-23 to 32-4).  The federal crime, 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1), punishes conduct substantially similar to New Jersey’s certain persons offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1).  Thus, the 2014 and 2015 offenses were not a “criminal spell” (Db41), but rather part of a “continu[ous]” and serious criminal history.  (10T56-5).  As the judge further found, prior opportunities for rehabilitation, including diversions and incarceration had failed to deter defendant.  (PSR 7-9); (10T56-1 to 5).  Significantly, his three\(^{12}\) prior indictable convictions were all for the same type of conduct—guns and violence—that culminated in [...]’s shooting death.  As demonstrated by his past and present conduct, defendant was “incapable of living a law-abiding life for a significant period of time,” and thus exactly fell within the aim of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a).  See State v. Clarity, 454 N.J. Super. 603, 610 (App. Div. 2018).