ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Issuing Order General Attorney  1.7  THE INITIATE TO REQUIRED FINGERPRINTING SCAN LIVE 2.  14  ...................  PROCESS RISK-ASSESSMENT  PRETRIAL AUTOMATED 14  .......................  Status Scan Live Up-to-Date on Report Statewide 2.1 15 ................................. ...... .  Requirements  Fingerprinting 2.2  Recyclable is and Paper Recycled on •Printed limplayer Opportunity  I'quaf An !s Jersey New ~i i~ 2  Yagc 2.2.1  Requirement to Use Up-to-Date Live Scan System to Support .............................................IS System eCDR 2.2.2  Prohibition of Filing Complaint for Certain Offenses without ............. 17  Pretrial Process Initiating Automated Risk-Assessment  17  Police ......... 2.2.3 of Arrestee to Live Scan-Equipped Facility Transport Fingerprinting Plan for Agencies Not Equipped with Up-to-Date 2.2.4 .................................................18 Live Scan ..................................... 18 PRE-CHARGING CASE SCREENING 3. Screening/Approval System ..... 18 On-Call Prosecutorial 3.1 Establishment of 24/7 Prosecutor upon Obtain Charging Approval from On-Call 3.2 Requirement to ......................................... 18 for Certain Offenses Arrest Complaint- Prosecutor's to Permit Police to Issue a Authority 3.3 County for without First and/or Apply aComplaint-Warrant Summons to .................................... 19 Obtaining Prosecutorial Approval 19 .................. Issued by County Prosecutor Charging Directive 3.3.1 to Approve Supervisory Officers Authorized 3.3.2 Designation of 21 ............... Presumption Decisions and to Overcome a Charging Application for Complaint- Prosecutor If Notice to 3.3.3 Required .......................................... 23 Denied Warrant Is Charging with County Prosecutor's Compliance and Strict 3.3.4 Oversight Directive..................................................23 Indefinite Extension of County Evaluation, and Expiration, 3.3.5 ................................. 23 Prosecutor Charging Directive Prosecutorial Participation Authority to Require Direct Prosecutor's 3.4 County 23 ................................... Application Complaint-Warrant in Consultation/Charging Approval Authority to Require Prosecutor's 3.5 County 24 ............................................ for Additional Offenses Committed in When Are Charging Decisions Offenses Coordination of 3.6 24 ................................................
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S ERROR IN RULING THAT THE INDEMNIFICATION CLAUSE IS AMBIGUOUS IS A PREDICATE AND THRESHOLD ERROR  REQUIRING REVERSAL AND REMAND  Point II of [...]’ brief in opposition once again demonstrates a lack of understanding as to the basis of [...]’s appeal and relevant New Jersey Law.  As discussed extensively above, there are only two avenues by which [...] may be forced to pay damages in connection with the underlying plaintiff’s injuries.  First would be directly from [...] to the underlying plaintiff, however, such a lawsuit is expressly barred by the WCA.  The second, and only remaining viable manner by which [...] may be forced to pay for the injuries sustained by the underlying plaintiff is via the contractual indemnification clause entered into by and between [...] and [...].  When the Law Division found the indemnification clause to be ambiguous, and thus unenforceable, [...]’s participation at trial was moot.  At this point in time, [...] asks this Court to render a decision that the indemnification language was unambiguous, and allow [...] to obtain the contractual indemnification that it contracted with [...] for.  [...] certainly did not waive any arguments on appeal, rather, it preserved those arguments on the record, and seeks a ruling in kind at this juncture.  POINT
[directive] See detention. are defendants where cases is, that detained; will be defendant the presumption that a established imprisonment. of life term or extended ordinary an to subject are otherwise or murder with charged 2A:162-19(b).  N.J.S.A.  See flexible more a establishes Directive where this situations with deals category  The third by designated prosecutor supervisory detention a unless pretrial will seek State the that presumption conditions maximum that finds Criminal Justice of Division the of Director Prosecutor or County the supervisor the or where release, defendant's by posed risks the control adequately will of release  See detention.  pretrial by served be not would of justice interests the that determines otherwise 3:4A(b)(5)  Rule new where cases to category applies third
[brief] That is *entirety of the Board’s opposition*.  But “because such remarks represent informal verbalizations of the speaker's transitory thoughts, they cannot be equated to deliberative findings of fact. ”  *Id.*  The Board proves this point on its own where, in the span of two pages, it cites Board members as providing no less than four different reasons for their denial: “visual,” “negative criteria,” “traffic,” “siting. ”  Sure, they could all be reasons *if properly adopted and explained in a resolution.  But the Board hedged because it realized that it had no idea* why the Distance Regulation existed.  The Board did not want to commit to an analysis.  The third problem is that the Board really cannot explain how this application was reviewed as a whole, as required.  This is self-evident from the conflicting grant of some variances but not others.  While that might have seemed clever, it betrays a total dereliction of the command to review the “entire proposal” for bulk variance relief.  *Pullen v. Twp. of S. Plainfield Planning Bd.*, 291 N.J. Super. 1, 7-8 (App. Div. 1996).
[brief] The burden of proving otherwise is on the party attacking it who must overcome this presumption in favor of the board by “clear and compelling evidence. ”  Kramer v. Bd. of Adj. of Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 285 (1965); Burbridge v. Governing Body of the Twp. of Mine Hill, 117 N.J. 376, 385 (1990).  The Trial Court thus aptly made exceedingly clear the highly deferential standard to which it was constrained in reviewing the Board’s action on the Application, especially since variances had been denied:
[brief] ”  *Cromwell Associates v. Mayor and Council* of the City of Newark, 211 N.J. Super. 462, 471 (1985) (citing Property Owners Association of North Bergen, supra, 74 N.J. at 372).  Stating that a landlord must realize a ‘just and reasonable return” on the property is “easy”.  Mayes, supra, 103 N.J. at 367.  “Deciding what is a ‘just and reasonable return” in a case can be difficult.  Id.  While that analysis may be nuanced, there can be no doubt that [...] seeks to deprive [...] a “just and reasonable return” on its property.
[brief] Da46.  Without any changes to the August 18, 2021 Bankruptcy Court Order, the matter proceeded to trial with jury selection on January 17, 2023 with the above-referenced Bankruptcy Court Order in place.  At trial, during Appellee’s testimony, over objection, Appellee and his counsel alleged that Appellant fled from the accident, despite such evidence being irrelevant as liability was stipulated to prior to trial.  1T42:7-21.
[brief] Under Hopkins, [...] Owed a Duty of Care to [...] ..............................................4  A.  Given the Nature of the Attendant Risk a Duty of Care on [...]’s Part Must be Found to Exist .................................................................5  B.  [...]’s Opportunity and Ability to Exercise Care Counsel In Favor of the Existence of a Duty .................................................................6  C.  Public Policy Counsels Strongly In Favor of Finding a Duty of Care on [...] .................................................................................................8
[brief] The relevant language must be quoted in its entirety for the absurdity of the point to become clear:  From FY 2010 through the enactment of P.L.2018, c.67, State aid was not allocated pursuant to the provisions of the SFRA.  Instead, State aid was calculated based on provisions included in the State budget, with underlying funding policy changing every year.  While petitioners assert that this fact contributes to the conclusion that the SFRA is unconstitutional, the Assistant Commissioner concludes that the opposite is true.  [...] was not fully funded according to the provisions of the SFRA; therefore, even if [...]’s funding levels had contributed to the denial of T&E during those years, the SFRA could not have been the cause.  (Final Decision at 14)  (Emphasis added.).  What an extraordinary admission by the State!  The logical extension of this stunning assertion seems to be that a statute cannot be found unconstitutional as applied if it is not actually being applied fully or even at all.  So, if the Legislature appropriated no funds for SFRA and districts received no State education aid, SFRA could not be found deficient even though it was designated as the State’s main vehicle for funding education.  That cannot be an argument, logically or legally, supporting SFRA’s constitutionality as applied.  It also underscores how haphazard and inefficient the State’s implementation of SFRA has been since at least FY 2010, and how the State’s promises to the New Jersey Supreme Court in connection with Abbott XX’s ruling that SFRA was facially constitutional were dishonored almost immediately.
[brief] (Da 26).  After reviewing all the evidence for the Motion to Transfer, the Landlord Tenant Court found that the evidence in the case was indicative of the Defendant paying rent, 2100 dollars every month for a long time.  Defendant was not making payments to payoff the Mortgage.  Moreover, there is no evidence of fraud.  2T51-21.  Consequently, the Court proceeded with the trial for nonpayment.
[directive] Personnel Records ................................................................................................................. 67  10  The Responsibilities of County Prosecutors ...............................................  69  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 Appendix Appendix A  Sample Civilian Complaint Information Sheet Appendix B  Internal Affairs Report Form Appendix C  Internal Affairs Complaint Notification Appendix D  Sample Immediate Suspension Notice Appendix E  Sample Response Letter Appendix F  Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action  Appendix G  Miranda Warning Appendix H  Sample Use Immunity Grant Appendix I  Witness Acknowledgement Form Appendix J  Administrative Advisement Form Appendix K
[brief] Ibid.  [...]’s complaint challenged the validity of [...]’s administration of certain “post-April 17, 1992” affordable housing tax exemption based on his belief that the exemptions are unfair to himself, his family-owned business, and local taxpayers.  (Aa1-4).  Relevant to the State Parties, Count Two sought to compel the State Parties to “identify and disclose (within 120 days) all post-January 1, 2011 conduit revenue housing bonds and low-income housing tax credits issued to projects whose long-term tax
[brief] Specifically, [...] was suffering from paranoid delusions that he was constantly being followed and that people were “out to get him,” what he referred to as “gang stalking. ” (7T94-8 to 95-5).  Under these delusions, [...] believed that people were trying to beam him with lasers, electromagnetic frequencies, radiation, and concentrated microwaves to such an extent that he at one point went to the hospital because he believed the beams were destroying his kidneys.  (7T187-2 to 190-5).  To try and avoid the “beams,” he placed aluminum foil over his car antenna and would wear a tin foil hat covered by a helmet throughout the day.  (7T191-23 to 192-19).  These delusions were made worse by [...]’s Adderall use, which enhanced his paranoia and erratic behavior.  (7T220-25 to 221-10).  Also living out of his car with him at the time was his long-term girlfriend, [...].
[brief] The State argues that State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 647, modified, 174 N.J. 351 (2002), is inapposite because there was no consent search in this case (Sb 17-18), but the Carty Court’s reasoning applies here.  In considering whether reasonable suspicion was required to request consent to search, the Court in Carty relied on cases holding that “continuing a Terry stop beyond that which is necessary to resolve the initial stop violates the Fourth Amendment unless there is an additional articulable and reasonable basis to continue the detention,” and held that “[u]nless there is a reasonable and articulable basis beyond the initial valid motor vehicle stop to continue the detention after the completion of the valid traffic stop, any further detention to effectuate a consent search is unconstitutional. ”  Id.  The Court said that the rule applied regardless of whether the tasks related to the motor vehicle stop had been completed.  Id.  As the State acknowledges in its brief (Sb 17-18), the purpose of the reasonable suspicion requirement is to “validate the continued detention” and “prevent[] police from turning a routine traffic stop into a fishing expedition for criminal activity unrelated to the stop. ”  See Carty, 170 N.J. at 647.  It’s of no moment that the search in this case was based on the automobile exception, rather than consent; the probable cause was based on statements [...] made after the police unconstitutionally expanded the scope of the motor vehicle stop and prolonged the detention.  While the State argues that the police’s additional questioning, request for consent to search, and threat to summon the dogs did not prolong the detention because the police had not yet written the tickets (Sb 12-13), the law is clear that this is not the standard.  As explained above, Carty makes clear that the law protects against suspicionless fishing expeditions, regardless of whether all the tasks related to the motor vehicle stop have been completed.
[brief] Defendant’s argument is negated by the record.  The prosecutor’s remarks were fair comments on the evidence and were proper responses to defense counsel's summation remarks.  Additionally, defendant did not object to all of the comments he now claims were improper, so the plain error standard applies to some of his claims.  Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating plain error - i.e., error that was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result."  R. 2:10-2.  The possibility of injustice must be so substantial as to "raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached."  State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971).  If a timely objection is not interposed, the remarks will generally be deemed harmless.  State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J.  515, 576 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858 (2001); State v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427, 444 (1989).  In considering issues of prosecutorial misconduct, the reviewing court must first determine whether misconduct occurred.  State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 83 (1999).  Where misconduct is identified, it does not constitute grounds for reversal unless it was so egregious that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial.  State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 474 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 (1996).  Thus, to warrant reversal, a prosecutor's misconduct must constitute a clear infraction and "substantially prejudice the defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his [or her] defense."
[brief] The Developer relies exclusively upon the elements of N.J.S.A. 40:55(d)-53.(j) and argues that this statute creates an “automatic” roadway dedication.  However, this section and statute must be read in pari materia with all of the other applicable statutes relevant to dedication.  See for instance N.J.S.A. 40:67-19.  “The governing body may by ordinance release and extinguish the public right arising from said dedication as to the whole or any part of those lands”.  See also N.J.S.A. 40:67-1.  (“The governing body of every municipality may make, amend, repeal and enforce ordinances to.... vacate any street... dedicated to public use but not accepted by the municipality...., whether or not the same, or any part, has been actually opened or improved....”)
[brief] ***  In short, a riparian grant is the conveyance of real property divided from the uplands by a fixed boundary, no different than any other conveyance of land.  See Busby v. Rose, 114 N.J. Eq. 580 (Ch. Div. 1933) (adjoining riparian tract is “distinct and separate estate”); Moore v. Ventnor Gardens, Inc., 105 N.J. Eq. 730, 735 (Ch. 1930) (observing that mortgage of land abutting water does not included separate riparian grant), aff’d o.b., 109 N.J. Eq. 132 (E & A 1931); see also 29 New Jersey Practice, Law of Mortgages, §5.7, at 42 ([...]) 2d ed. Supp. 2005) (defining riparian grant as tract of land entirely separate and distinct from uplands).  ***  [A] separately assessed riparian grant is not appurtenant to abutting upland property as a matter of law.  (Emphasis added).  Panetta v. Equity, 190 N.J. 307 at 309, at 319 and at 324 (2007).  Unless the expert witnesses could point to a “... specific mention in the deed or other evidence that the parties intended its inclusion ...”, then as a matter of fact and law the riparian grant at issue was not included (and was excluded) from any transfer of interest to the [...].  Without this proof, the [...] never took title to the subject property.
[brief] The Administrator’s Conclusions in the New Jersey Ancillary Proceeding  On January 8, 2018, the Administrator issued his Report and filed a motion seeking the court’s approval.  (Da302).  The Report documents the investigation in detail, including the books and records reviewed, and sets forth the Administrator’s conclusions.  (Da312-314).  Contrary to the allegations advanced by Plaintiff throughout the course of this litigation, the Administrator concluded as follows:  a.  There is no evidence of malfeasance.  b.  Defendant cooperated fully in the Administrator’s investigation.  c.  Based upon the information provided and the review undertaken by the Administrator’s accountants, all business activity was accounted for, and Defendant’s actions in the operation of the business were appropriate.  d.  The QuickBooks records of [...] were consistent with all the available checking and banking records.  All deposits and disbursements were reported.  All liabilities were not overstated.  e.  The low profitability of [...] was the result of economic facts and ordinary business judgments.  f.  No assets of the Decedent’s Estate were discovered, other than the $900,000 deposited into [...] in 2001.  g.  There is no evidence of any inter vivos gifts by the Decedent to anyone in New Jersey.  (Da312-314).  G.  Plaintiff’s Disregard of Court Orders and Plaintiff’s Constant Demands on the Administrator to Continue Searching the Books and Records of [...] Did Not Benefit the Estate and Was Detrimental to the Estate
[brief] On August 8, 2019, more than 30 days after the Ricci Act’s passage, the [...] distributed an email to all Certifying Officers “advising them of their responsibilities under the Ricci Act. ”  On or about August 9, 2019, more than 30 days after the passage of the Ricci Act, the [...] contracted [...] to mail postcards to retirees.  No “close date” appears on the document.  On or about September 16, 2019, a postcard was allegedly sent to [...].  In support of his request for amended benefits under the Ricci Act, [...] submitted an affidavit that he did not receive any correspondence or postcard from the [...] or the [...] with respect to the passage of P.L. 2019, c.157 (Chapter 157), the Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act.  [...] was present and involved in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks which took place on September 11, 2001.
[brief] (42T:239-25 to 241-12)  During the day on February 8, the web history showed that the phone was used to track a package on Amazon and to access shopping sites for purses and shoes.  (42T:236-3 to 16)  The web history also showed a search at 7:24 a.m. on February 8 for results relating to cold symptoms in children.  (42T:236-18 to 237-2)  The State introduced audio of jail calls between [...] and her sister [...].
[brief] If developed as proposed, this site would isolate each of the adjacent residential uses and make the single family home zone to the north and south each into an island unto itself.  Moreover, the Township has affirmatively removed the proposed uses from the zoning of this property.  The Board notes that the applicant focused its proofs on the lack of a negative impact upon the property values of the neighboring residences, but lacked credible proofs on the other overall detrimental impacts noted herein.  Based upon the above, there are several other detrimental elements noted for which conditions cannot be reasonably imposed to lessen those detriments.  These include the density of the project, the number of stories, the impervious coverage, the drainage facilities as presented, and the parking limitations.  Separate and apart, although there are visual and aesthetic elements for which conditions can be imposed to ameliorate these detriments, the items noted cannot be ameliorated by imposing conditions.  The Board determines that the public benefits to be derived from having this combined senior citizen facility at this site are substantially outweighed by the detrimental effects upon the integrity of the zoning plan aimed at having exclusively single family residences on this site and specifically omitting this use, as well as all of the other detrimental effects detailed above.
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[brief] (11T160-17 to 161-5).  There, [...] collected defendant’s IDs and badges, among other items.  (11T162-16 to 24).  [...] took defendant’s billfold ID, consisting of two pieces, and the smaller “credit card size ID badge,” i.e., the wallet ID.  (11T163-10 to 23).  Once done, [...] drove defendant to either his own residence, or that of defendant’s girlfriend, where [...] took defendant’s NJSP bulletproof vest and handcuffs.
[brief] Despite this, “the record demonstrates that [[...]’s] own choices and management issues,” including its decision to not raise its tax levy \(^{11}\)  The school districts from the Abbott cases were historically referred to as “Abbott districts. ”  Abbott XXI, 206 N.J. at 406.  Effective January 13, 2008, the Legislature eliminated that designation and replaced it with a new one, “SDA district,” L. 2007, c. 260, § 39. to the cap, “have resulted in the unavailability of funds that could and should have been used to provide T&E to its students. ” (Aa11-13).  Appellants ignore these clear distinctions and cite no law to support their conclusory claims.  As such, this matter is reviewed under the familiar standard for as-applied constitutional challenges; that is, “[w]hether a statute passes a constitutional challenge ‘as-applied’ to any individual school district at any particular time must be determined only in the factual context presented and in the light of circumstances as they appear.