ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Constitution does not compel schools to notify parents, over the objection of their children, when their children express nonconforming gender identities at school.  While the substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects the rights of parents to direct the upbringing of their children, nothing in the Constitution demands that governmental actors assist parents in exercising that right by outing students against their will.  Whether or not they receive notice from their children’s schools, parents remain free to talk to their children about gender identity and offer whatever direction they like about how their children explore and express their gender, in school and elsewhere.  Likewise, students remain free to talk to their parents about these issues and even to seek their schools’ help in broaching the subject at home.  The school districts’ original policies of presumptive nondisclosure, absent student consent, neither coerced parents to act nor prevented them from acting.  The Constitution imposes no duty on the districts to alter their original policies, and certainly not to mandate parental notification over the student’s objection.  The districts cannot rescue this unavailing constitutional defense by relying on the argument first raised by their amicus that social transition constitutes medical treatment requiring parental consent.  Students who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria may have health care providers who recommend social transition to relieve the symptoms of this condition, which can be exacerbated by living in a way that does not match their gender identity.  But that does not transform social transition into medical care.  A student who changes their clothing and hairstyle, who asks to be called by a new name and pronouns, or who asks to use a different bathroom or join a different club is not seeking health care, and schools that honor these requests are not offering health care.  Instead, the schools are showing courtesy and maintaining an inclusive and egalitarian environment where all students feel safe and affirmed in their gender identity, whether they are cisgender or transgender.  Even if a policy of presumptive nondisclosure conflicted with the rights of parents, however, the State has shown compelling interests in both enforcing nondiscrimination law and avoiding harm to students.
[directive] At a brief conference that day, the trial court confirmed trial was set to start on April 22, 2022.  During the conference, the State twice stated it was ready to proceed.  The first time, the court asked, “Is the State ready?  The 22nd, that’s of April. ”  The State responded, “The April date, yes, the State’s trial ready. ”  Shortly generally: “The State’s ready to after, the court posed the question more proceed?”  The prosecutor answered, “Yes, your Honor. ”  20  The hearing ended immediately afterward.  Defense counsel did not ask the State to clarify whether it was ready to proceed to trial on the day of the conference -- the actual date of the two-year cap.  And the trial court asked no further questions.  We encourage trial judges to create a clearer record -- consistent with the following guidance -- for the benefit of the parties and to facilitate appellate review.  A fair reading of the transcript in this case, however, does not suggest the State declared it would not be prepared until April 22, 2022.  Because the State represented it was ready to proceed at the relevant time, we find no statutory violation of the two-year cap.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF STRICT LIABILITY TO INCLUDE INJURIES CAUSED BY THE INHERENT TRAITS COMMON TO ALL BREEDING STALLIONS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO NEW JERSEY PUBLIC POLICY  The trial court correctly held that Plaintiffs’ attempt to impose absolute liability on an owner of an otherwise gentle stallion based on the claim that “all stallions are potentially dangerous” is not just contrary to New Jersey common law, but also in conflict with New Jersey public policy.  In 1997, the Legislature passed the Equine Activities Liability Act with the express purpose of limiting liability for personal injury arising from the inherent danger and unpredictability of horses.
[brief] LEGAL STANDARD OF REVIEW.  “Whether to grant or deny a motion to reinstate a complaint lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. ”  Sullivan v. Coverings & Installation, Inc., 403 N.J. Super. 86, 93 (App. Div. 2008).  “A court abuses its discretion when a decision ‘is “made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”’”  Terranova v. Gen. Elec. Pension Tr., 457 N.J. Super. 404, 410–11 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012)).  In other words, the Appellate Division “will ‘decline[ ] to interfere with [such] matters of discretion unless it appears that an injustice has been done. ’”  Sullivan, 403 N.J. Super. at 93 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).  Here, the trial court provided a rational explanation for dismissing the Second Action based on the entire controversy doctrine and therefore its decision should not be disturbed by this Court.  Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020) (citation omitted) (stating that a reviewing court “will not disturb the trial court’s reconsideration decision ‘unless it represents a clear abuse of discretion’”).
[brief] Dixon, | 17 | | 125 N.J. 223 (1991) | | | State v. Engel, | 10 | | 249 N.J. Super. 336 (App. Div.), | | | certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393 | | | (1991) | | | State v. Goode, | 9 | | 278 N.J. Super. 85 (App. Div. 1994) | | State v. Hickman, 204 N.J. Super. 409 (App. Div. 1985).............................................. 21 State v. Hill, 199 N.J. 545 (2009)........................................................................... 21 State v. Kluber, 130 N.J. Super. 336 (App. Div. 1974) certif. denied, 67 N.J. 72 (1975) overruled on other grounds, United States v. Martin Linen Supply Company, 430 U.S. 564 (1977)............................................. 24, 26 State v. LaBrutto, 114 N. J. 187 (1989)......................................................................... 26 State v. Landeros, 20 N.J. 69 (1955).............................................................................. 27 State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 586 A.2d 85 (1991), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929 (1993) ...... 10 State v. Morais, 359 N.J. Super. 123 (App. Div. 2003).............................................. 10 State v. Munoz, 340 N.J. Super. 204 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 169, N.J. 610 (2001) ............................................................................................... 10 State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454 (1988)......................................................................... 9 State v. Shelton, 344 N.J. Super. 505 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 171 N.J. 43 (2001)....... 17 State v. Staples, 263 N.J. Super. 602 (App. Div. 1993).............................................. 9 State v. Tilghman, 345 N.J. Super. 571 (App. Div. 2001).............................................. 17 State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515 (1999)......................................................................... 10, 17 State v. Vasquez, 374 N.J. Super. 252 (App. Div. 2005)........................................9, 10, 13, 14 State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397 (2007)........................................................................9, 10, 13, 14
[brief] Respectfully Submitted, Dated: 6/10/24  [...], ESQUIRE.  JBK/bq  [...]  Appellant / Plaintiff and [...]  Plaintiff v. [...]; [...]; and [...]  Respondents / Defendants  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...] CIVIL ACTION SAT BELOW: Honorable [...], J.S.C. Ocean County Special Civil Part, Small Claims section
[directive] Presumption of Seeking Revocation of Release When Defendant Violates a Sexual 8.4.4 Assault Survivor Protection Order.  In any case not otherwise covered under Section 8.3, except as authorized pursuant to subsection 8.4.5, where a defendant has been released for an offense involving sexual assault charged by a complaint-warrant and there is probable cause to believe that (1) the defendant has violated an order issued pursuant to the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:14- 13 to -21, and (2) has committed or threatened to commit an act of sexual contact or sexual penetration against any person protected by the restraining order or otherwise caused or threatened to cause bodily injury to any person protected by the restraining order, the prosecutor shall presumptively file a motion seeking revocation of release pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-24.
[brief] The Motion filed by the Defendants herein ignored both the Appellate Division and the Supreme Court’s reliance on these important social legislation policies.  The Supreme Court mandated a different approach to independent contractor-employee:  Also, using the *Pukowsky* test as the paradigm for its analysis, the panel (Appellate Division) held that whether a professional person is an employee under CEPA’s definition must hinge more on the degree of control and direction exercised by the employer over the professional worker under the circumstances and less on the lack of financial arrangements indicative of a traditional employee; *Id.* at 118-119.  An employer cannot be expected to exert control over the provision of specialized services that are beyond the employer’s ability yet, the work may be an essential aspect of the employer’s regular business; Id. at 123.  Has the worker become one of the ‘cogs’ in the employer’s enterprise?  Is the work continuous and directly required for the employer’s business to be carried out, as opposed to intermittent and peripheral?  Is the professional routinely or regularly at the disposal of the employer to perform a portion of the employer’s work as opposed to being available to the public for professional services on his or her own terms?  Do the ‘professional’ services include a duty to perform routine or administrative activities?  If so, an employer-employee relationship more likely has been established; Id. at 124.  Finally, the test includes consideration of the worker’s economic dependence on the employer’s work but does not insist on the same financial indicia one might expect to be present in the case of a traditional employee, such as the payment of wages, income tax deductions, or provision of benefits and leave time; Id. at 124.  Workers who perform their duties independently may nevertheless require CEPA's protection against retaliatory action when they speak against or refuse to participate in illegal or otherwise wrongful actions by their employer.  Such individuals should benefit from CEPA’s remedies; Id. at 124.
[brief] **THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND ITS APPLICABILITY.** (Pa139-154).  The Court recognized and acknowledged that Appellant submitted two OPRA requests on December 15, 2022 (Pa142), which were Denied by Respondent [...] and by Respondent [...].  The Court noted that these were filed after Appellant’s Verified Complaint was filed.  The Court proceeded to state on Page 14 of its order that “Plaintiff did not file an OPRA request; therefore, Respondents did not deny her access under OPRA. ” (Pa152).  In the event the Court erred and meant to write that Appellant did not file an OPRA request before filing a Verified Complaint, this may have added some clarity to the Judgment.  In the event the Court’s intent was to state that it will not recognize the OPRA requests that were denied on December 27, 2022, then the Court should have either: (A). provided the Appellant with an adequate explanation and an opportunity to refile her Complaint, prior to making a judgment with prejudice, or (B). should have ordered the Appellant to re-submit her Verified Complaint and not accept the judicial expediency suggested by both sides.
[brief] C.  There is evidence in the record to support: [i] Plaintiff’s reasonable belief of a violation of law or public policy that he objected to or refused to participate in; & [ii] Plaintiff’s whistle-blowing activity, under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3c.  (*IT; 12a-27a*)  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:19-3, which defines the types of employee conduct protected by CEPA, an employer is prohibited from taking retaliatory action against an employee who: a. [omitted as it is not relevant to this matter]; or b. [omitted as it is not relevant to this matter]; or c.  Objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy or practice which the employee reasonably believes: (1) is in violation of a law, or rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or, if the employee is a licensed or certified health care professional, constitutes improper quality of patient care; or (2) is fraudulent or criminal; including any activity, policy or practice of deception or misrepresentation which the employee reasonably believes may defraud any shareholder, investor, client, patient, customer, employee, former employee, retiree or pensioner of the employer or any governmental entity; or (3) **is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare** or protection of the environment.
[brief] Standards of Review  The Appellate Division does not disturb a trial judge’s fact-findings unless there is a palpable abuse of discretion, that is the findings “are so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted. ”  *State v. Carter*, 91 N.J. 86, 106 (1982).  Appellate Division review is even more limited in family court matters.  Matrimonial courts possess special expertise in the field of domestic relations.  *Brennan v. Orban*, 145 N.J. 282, 301 (1996)(recognizing that [matrimonial courts] specialize in and uniquely understand the problems of families and all matters related thereto).  Because of the family courts’ special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate courts should accord deference to family court factfinding.  *Cesare v. Cesare*, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998).  Further, the nature of bench trials puts the trial judge in the best position to make credibility determinations.  *Id.* at 411; see also *Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme*, 227 N.J. 269, 282-83 (2016).  The Appellate Division “will disturb a trial court’s determination on counsel fees only on the “rarest occasion,” and then only because of clear abuse of discretion. ”  *Strahan v. Strahan*, 402 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 2008).  That is: An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court makes “findings inconsistent with or unsupported by competent evidence,” utilizes “irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or “fail[s] to consider controlling legal principles. ”  An abuse of discretion is also demonstrated if the court fails to consider “all relevant factors. ”  *[Steele v. Steele*, 467 N.J. Super. 414, 444 (App. Div. 2021), cert. denied, 258 A.3d 348 (N.J. 2021)(internal citations omitted)].  POINT I [...]’S CLAIM FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL THAT THERE WAS UNFAIRNESS IN THE DIVORCE PROCESS OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REJECTED.
[brief] The First Count of the underlying lawsuit against [...] was entitled Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations (Pa184-Pa188).  In that regard, the First Count alleged that [...] “has wantonly, willfully and intentionally disrupted the ongoing contractual relationships between” [...] and [...], [...] and the [...], and the [...] and its membership (Pa184-Pa188).  Indeed, the underlying complaint alleged that [...] was unable to perform certain duties as the property manager for the [...] because she was fearful of “having a violent, harassing or assaultive confrontation” with [...] (Pa185, ¶8), and consequently [...] was unable to fulfill its contractual obligation to the [...] and its members to staff the office (Pa185, ¶9).  The First Count of the Underlying Complaint listed [...]’ specific conduct that has allegedly interfered with these contractual relationships:  a.  Intimidating [[...]], by leaning over her desk in a threatening manner and, thereafter, while blocking her exit, refused to leave until she threatened on at least 3 occasions to call the Police.  b.  Intimidating a Board member with his size, particularly [...] by getting in his face and pinning him against a truck while screaming vile and personal insults at him.  c.  Disrupting the Annual Meeting of the Members to the point at which Defendant had to be arrested and charged with Disorderly Conduct, Defiant Trespass, Disrupting Meetings and Disturbing Assembly, and then resisting arrest resulting in an additional charge.  d.  Returning to the [...] clubhouse immediately following his release from custody after his arrest (subparagraph c above) and threatening three Board Members.  e.  Sending emails in great volume, several of which contained threats and several of which sought to get Plaintiff [...] fired.  f.  Contacting the [...]'s legal counsel and [...] in attempts to get her fired.  g.  Insulting her and others.  h.  Cursing [...].  i.  Screaming at her and others.  j.  Refusing to leave the Annual Meeting when repeatedly asked to do so by a Police Detective.  (Pa185-Pa186, ¶12).  The underlying complaint alleged that as a result of [...]’ conduct, [...] was prevented from staffing the on-site office (Pa185, ¶9, Pa187, ¶14).
[brief] (2T135:12-136:11).  Even with the “major one” (i.e., the major expenses Plaintiff was challenging), [...] simply took Plaintiff’s word for it, there was no independent evaluation or verification done to discern whether an expense was Defendant’s or if it was a pharmacy expense.  (2T136:5-11).  Plaintiff had full access to all of [...]’s financial accounts and record.  [...]’s tax returns for 2017 and 2018 were not available, and had been on extension, until around the time of the pharmacy’s May 2019 sale to [...].
[brief] The Legislature should not act in secrecy.  Here, the Legislature did not inform the public that it would be considering a new abortion bill on January 6, 2022.  The legislators were not given the text of the bill until after 6 PM on January 6, 2022 – when the Assembly had already formally adjourned.  The bill text was not available on the Legislature’s website before enactment, so those testifying did not know the bill contents.  This Court should invalidate the Act because the Legislature did not follow the constitutional and statutory procedure for enactment.  Moreover, even if the Court does not invalidate the Act, it should permit discovery so that further evidence may be presented as to these statutory and constitutional violations.  Lastly, if the appeal is denied, the matter should be remanded for consideration of the substantive constitutional challenge.
[brief] THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN PROVIDING AN AGGRAVATION CHARGE UNDER MODEL CIVIL CHARGE 8.11F (Raised Below: T2 161 through 166; T4 95 through 107; T4 125)  A.  The Court Erred in Providing an Aggravation Charge Over the Objection of the Defendant/Appellant as Plaintiff/Respondent Did Not Provide a Comparative Analysis Through Expert Testimony as Required by New Jersey Law.  It was the Plaintiff/Respondent’s burden to come forward with sufficient evidence to warrant an aggravation charge consistent with Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F.  Plaintiff/Respondent urges that as there were no prior medical records indicating [...] was symptomatic, there was no need for an analysis.  This is in error.  To follow Plaintiff/Respondent’s logic would allow an Aggravation charge in every case without regard to whether the standard had been met.  Plaintiff/Respondent decided to pursue the aggravation charge and the notion that [...] was asymptomatic prior to the accident and was made symptomatic as a result of the subject accident.  Thus, it was Plaintiff/Respondent’s burden to come forward with a comparative analysis consistent with Polk v. Daconceicao, 268 N.J. Super. 568, 575 (App. Div. 1993).
[brief] [...] also repeatedly failed to alert the federal or state court that on October 11, 2006, the Federal Court for the District of New Jersey struck the [...] Complaint filed March 7, 2006 in its entirety (Pa 271 id 4).  The same Opinion also recognized that the Magistrate’s May 30, 2006, Order to Seal was still in force.  (Pa 271 id 4 FN 2)  The record is clear that [...] has knowingly elected to ignore the law and Orders by the Court:  1.  By removing the case from state to federal court on the unprovable basis of fraudulent joinder on February 17, 2010, and without alerting the state court or the federal court that the [...] Complaint had been sealed and stricken (Pa 130 id at 6,7); 2.  By failing to alert the Court that the [...] Complaint had been sealed and stricken (Pa 130 id at 6,7) in its Motion to Dismiss filed February 19, 2010; 3.  By deliberately failing to acknowledge the sealing and striking orders to mislead through each of its submissions to the federal court.  Indeed, for the trial court to ignore all the above uncontested facts in this record is an abuse of discretion.
[brief] *Id.* at 65 (refusing to expand product liability by allowing a no-injury medical-monitoring claim against a prescription-drug manufacturer).  Further, in enacting the PLA, the Legislature specifically intended “to reduce the burden on manufacturers of FDA-approved products resulting from products liability litigation,” *Kendall*, 209 N.J. at 194 (emphasis added), and recognized the “importance of the federal regulatory process in relation to the PLA.
[brief] Page  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...........................................................................................................  1  COMBINED STATEMENT OF RECENT PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND RELEVANT FACTS  .........................................................................................................................................................4  ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................................................................7  I.  THIS COURT’S DEFINITIVE AND UNCHALLENGED RULING THAT LAKEWOOD PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS ARE BEING DENIED  T&E SHOULD GIVE THEM SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS (3a, 4a).....7  II.  THE SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS  ACCORDED  LAKEWOOD PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS SHOULD IMPACT HOW THIS COURT APPROACHES THE DECISION BEFORE IT REGARDING SFRA’S UNCONSTITUTIONALITY AS APPLIED TO THE LAKEWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT (Not raised below)  ........................................................................................................9  III.  SFRA HAS FALLEN FAR SHORT OF AN OPTIMAL LEVEL AS IT HAS BEEN APPLIED TO LAKEWOOD (2a, 3a, 5a, 6a, 7a)  .............................................11  IV.  THE SUB-OPTIMAL PERFORMANCE OF SFRA AS APPLIED TO THE LAKEWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT HAS CAUSED CLEAR “DEFICIENCIES OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION” (2a, 3a, 5a, 6a, 7a)  ..................................................................................................................................................14  V.  THE STATE HAS ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ASSURING THAT LAKEWOOD PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS RECEIVE T&E, AND, THEREFORE, FOR REMEDYING THE DEFICIENCIES OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION REGARDING SFRA AND ITS APPLICATION (2a, 5a, 11a, 12a, 13a, 14a, 15a, 16a, 17a, 18a, 19a, 20a, 21a)  ..................................................................................................................................................23  VI.  THIS COURT SHOULD RULE THAT SFRA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO THE LAKEWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT AND THAT THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES MUST FULLY REMEDY THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCIES AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE (5a, 6a, 13a, 20a, 21a)..................................................34