ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE BOARD OF REVIEW’S DECISION DENYING BENEFITS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE BOARD FAILED TO GIVE PROPER WEIGHT TO MR. LAMBDON’S MEDICAL DOCUMENTATION SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF HIS LEAVING WORK FOR GOOD CAUSE RELATED TO THE EMPLOYMENT.  (Pa1; Pa3)  Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 12:17–9.3(d), “[w]hen an individual leaves work for health or medical reasons, medical certification shall be required to support a finding of good cause attributable to work. ”  Just as the regulation does not outline how a claimant can prove that there was no suitable work available, it similarly does not outline the specifics of the medical documentation to be submitted in support of a finding of good cause attributable to work.  Here, [...] has demonstrated “through uncontroverted medical evidence, that [his] disease has been and will be aggravated by the [work] environment,” and this clearly “constitutes ‘good cause. ’”  *Israel v. Bally's Park Place, Inc.*, 283 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App Div. 1995).  He provided the Appeal Tribunal with four pieces of medical documentation, and supplemented the record by submitting an addition three pieces of medical documentation to the Board of Review.  As discussed above, [...] began treatment with [...] on January 22, 2021 and returned for follow up appointments once every three months.  In fact, [...] had two appointments with [...] prior to leaving his job.  Pa32 to Pa33.  Similar to the employee in *Israel* who submitted “letters from alcoholism counselors opining that it would be deleterious to her recovery to work in the casino environment”, *Israel*, 283 N.J. Super. at 4, [...] recommended that [...] seek other work because this job was aggravating [...]’s health; specifically, he stated that [...] was “unable to do any kind of boiler work without it causing increased pain in both knees”.  Pa37.
[brief] . . . . . .  Pa39  Notice of Motion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa41  Certification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa44  Proposed Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa46  Ex. K: Ex Parte Petition and Order for Discovery . . . Pa48 Ex. L: Sheriff Affidavit of Attempted Levy . . .
[brief] To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under CEPA, a plaintiff must prove: (1) they had an objectively reasonable belief that the employer’s conduct was violating either a law, rule, regulation, or public policy; (2) they performed a “whistleblowing” activity as described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) or (c); (3) an adverse employment action was taken against them; and (4) a causal connection existed between the whistleblowing activity and the adverse employment action.  Klein, 377 N.J. Super. at 38-40; see also Feldman v. Hunterdon Radiologoical, 187 N.J. 228, 237-38 (2006); Yurick v. State, 184 N.J. 70, 78 (2005); Hernandez v. Montville Tp., 354 N.J. Super. 467, 473 (App. Div. 2003), aff’d o.b., 179 N.J. 81 (2004).
[brief] The court finds when questioned at trial on cross examination, and when referencing her prior deposition testimony, defendant had testified that she had not received the $200K, then that she had received $200k but that it was her money from [...], not from plaintiff.  She has also testified that the $200K was not paid by plaintiff but was her money since the monies came from the [...] account at [...] and she was the sole owner of [...].  The court finds that defendant’s testimony claiming she never received these monies to be highly incredible.  The court has previously found that she was aware of the PSA executed on January 17, 2014.  The PSA required a settlement payment of $200K to be paid to her.  The court finds defendant made a withdrawal from an [...] account in that exact amount in September 2014, and then on the same day deposited $200K into a separate account at [...] under her parents address in [...].  The court finds it was not an incredible coincidence that the amount of withdrawal by defendant was in the amount of $200K because the court finds it was clearly the equitable distribution payment required in the PSA.  ***
[brief] In addition to [...]’s assertion being a “net opinion” unsupported by the data he cites, his assertion is inconsistent with the testimony of other witnesses who testified on behalf of the applicant, namely [...] and [...].  Ja030, paragraph 25.  The Board’s finding concerning [...]’s testimony is supported by the record, which includes not only his testimony, but also that of [...] and [...] who testified that the whole purpose of taller buildings is to store more material and to move it faster.
[brief] The Appellate Division has explicitly recognized that a Appellant’s own failure to report a purported dangerous condition, despite familiarity with the area, weighs heavily against a finding of constructive notice.  *Gaskill v. Active Environmental Technologies, Inc.*, 360 N.J. Super. 530, 537 (App. Div. 2003) (the fact that the Appellant frequently walked past an allegedly dangerous condition yet never reported it to the township, weighed against finding that the township had constructive notice).  Here, Plaintiff was unable to identify the dangerous condition at the time of the accident and when he went back to the area he still could not discern a dangerous condition.  Furthermore, Plaintiff never noticed the condition during the prior 20-25 times he drove over the bridge.  *(See Pa0001; Pa0378 at 15:25 - Pa0379 at 16:17; Pa0443 at 80:19 - 81:8).*  Additionally, none of the eyewitnesses including [...], Plaintiff’s wife, Plaintiff’s friend, [...], or any of the contractors on site observed a dangerous roadway condition.  *(See Pa0001; Pa0899 at 10:21 – Pa0900 at 11:1; Pa0859; Pa0861 at 4:8-9; Pa0564 at 10:13-19; Pa0561).*  Given the lack of notice to the Authority, Plaintiff’s dangerous condition claim fails as a matter of law, and the trial court was correct in its findings.
[brief] It started with the [...]’ conveyance in the mid-1940s of the Genesis Deed, and hundreds like it, requiring all future property owners to become “members” and “faithfully abide” by the “rules” of the “property owners’ association. ”  [...], for his part, worked closely with the [...] and he too conveyed parcels of land subject to the same restrictions as the Genesis Deed.  (Da625-633).  Together, the [...] and [...] were the “Developers” of the community, as referenced in the Genesis Deed.  (Da881-886; 569-570; 572-573; 575; 860-863)
[brief] Several Thousand Files Improperly Withheld Based on Date Restriction  [...] contends that [...] withheld approximately 3,600 files from the accounts of [...], [...], and [...] because the files pre-dated July 1, 2013, which is in violation of the protocol.  [...] contends that Paragraph 5 of the Protocol sets forth [...]’s obligation to provide access to its employees’ email accounts, which included providing their employees with temporary passwords to [...], so that they could access the email accounts to create the forensic images.  See R. Doc. 103–1, p. 4; citing R. Doc. 31–1, p. 27, ¶ 5.  However, paragraph 5 contains no date restriction.  Id. at p. 12.  Paragraphs 7–8 of the protocol then set forth the procedure for producing [...] email account files containing the agreed-upon search terms.  Id.  These paragraphs do not state however, that [...] or [...] can withhold documents based on any date restriction.  [...] contends that the only date restriction is contained in Paragraph 13, and concerns [...]’s personal Yahoo! Email Account, which indicates that [...] must run the agreed-upon search terms and then apply a date restriction to the files containing those terms.  Id. at 13.  As such, [...] seeks an Order from this Court compelling [...] to comply with the protocol by producing all non-privileged documents being withheld that pre-date July 1, 2013.
[brief] The snow removal contract in effect between [...] and [...] contained indemnification language which the court below ruled to be Azurak compliant.  The assertion by defendant/appellant that the contract is ambiguous because it contains two indemnity provisions is meritless.  The court below interpreted and enforced the terms of the valid snow removal contract and, as a matter of law, appropriately ruled the indemnity provisions to be Azurak compliant.  Having reviewed the language of the contract, the court below ruled it was the intent of the parties for [...] to defend and indemnify [...], for its negligence based on the facts of this case.
[brief] The MLUL established the administrative process under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68." by which the owner or potential owner of a nonconforming use/structure could obtain a "Certificate certifying the use or structure existed before the ordinance which rendered the use or structure nonconforming".  This administrative process is also available to objectors to a nonconforming use, and in fact must be used by such objector.  Conforming to the common law decisions, the "applicant" references the proponent of the nonconforming use needing the determination that the use is a pre-existing nonconforming use entitled to continue.  The statute contemplated a means and method by which a prudent purchaser or mortgage lender of a property containing a nonconforming use could secure legal assurance that the use has a right to continue.  *Belmar v. 201 16th Avenue*, 309 N.J. Super. 663, 674-676 (Law Div. 1979).  The statute also requires an objector to an alleged nonconforming use to utilize that administrative avenue --- instead of a lawsuit --- to obtain the determination of the Board and have a record made.  The objector is not seeking the Certificate to continue the nonconforming use, and thus is not the “applicant” for such Certificate.  The objector is seeking an administrative determination as to whether the nonconforming use is legally in place and is entitled to its continuation.  The cases after the MLUL and *N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68* confirm that the burden of proof is with the proponent of the nonconforming use.
[brief] M107-130.  Based upon the Prior Approvals and the affordable units provided therein, the Property was included in the Township’s 1999-2025 Housing Element and Fair Share Plan (the “2016 HEFSP”), as well as a Settlement Agreement to meet its Third Round Affordable Housing Obligation.  M107-130; M358-461.  On October 5, 2016, the Township was successful in its efforts the Court entered a Declaratory Judgment of --- 2 “Ba” shall refer to the Appendix of the Zoning Board of Adjustment of the [...].  Compliance and Repose in the DJ Action (the “2016 Judgment of Compliance”).  M131-137.  After the Prior Approvals, the Property was transferred to the Respondents; who discovered a bald eagle’s nest on the Property.  M68-86.  The presence of the bald eagle’s nest reduced the developable portion of the Property by approximately half (1/2) due to a 660-foot buffer from the bald eagle’s nest required by certain state and federal laws and regulations.  M68-86.  Although, the developable portion of the Property was reduced by approximately half (1/2), the intensity of the development proposed in the Application was only reduced by 21,432 SF of commercial use (65,000 SF reduced to 43,568 SF) and the number of residential units (206 units) was unchanged.  M68-86.  Respondents agreed to a voluntary condition to supply the Route 33 Signal; and that it would be installed and operational prior to the issuance of the first certificate of occupancy.  M68-86.  The impact of the proposed development in the Application on the reduced developable land created a substantial increase in the number of variances from the Prior Approvals.  M68-86.
[brief] A court’s determinations regarding the common law right to access are also reviewed de novo.  N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, 447 N.J. Super. 182, 194 (App. Div. 2016).  The requestor of a government record may challenge the custodian of record’s decision by filing an action in Superior Court or with the Government Records Council.
[brief] [10T57-19 to -25].  A short time later, [...] received a frantic phone call from [...]’s brother, [...], telling her that she needed to come to [...].  [10T58-14 to 59-25].  When she arrived at the location, [...] observed [...]’s body inside of her car, slumped over.  [10T60-5 to -14].  She opened the door and saw [...]’s body, and then closed it immediately.  [10T65-16 to -23].  The police arrived shortly after.
[directive] Disbursements from tee  DL&PS - Seized Asset Dedicated Account 2 2-3  Establishment of Asset Maintenance Account 2 - 4 2:4 an Interest 4 2 - 2 - Expenditures 4  Applicable Use Standards 2 - 5  [...] 2 - 5 2:5 - SOP 2 of Page: of State  [...]
[brief] Id. at 52.  This statement is pure dicta and has no basis in the law or the language of the Policy.  The Schmidt Court did not examine the compulsory insurance provisions of the Act, the language of Exclusion C.5 or the public policy considerations relevant to enforcement of an insurance policy exclusion that excludes coverage for intentional wrongdoing.  The Schmidt decision is based on the Court’s reading of Variety Farms and the public policy of the Act that all work-related bodily injuries suffered by a worker will be compensated.  In both Schmidt and Variety Farms the injured worker’s only claim for bodily injuries was asserted through a legally permitted claim that fell outside the Act and that was asserted in lieu of a claim for statutory workers’ compensation benefits.  As explained by the Variety Farms court, the Act’s policy objectives require coverage for such a claim to avoid the anomaly of allowing an injured workers’ claim for bodily injuries sustained during the course and scope of employment to go uncompensated.  That policy objective has no relevance in this case because Plaintiff has been compensated for his injuries under the Act.
[brief] The September 12, 2023, letter from [...], Esq. Clerk of the Superior Court of New Jersey clearly states:  THE COURT:  “Specifically, you appear to be requesting records/information related to [...], specifically related to a “copy of the order from the Camden County Court House, transferring...from the Law Division to the Chancery Division,” ….  (Para. 1)“A search has been conducted within the judiciary case jacket systems, based on the information provided above.  However, no records related to an Order transferring your case from the Camden County Law Division t the Camden County Chancery.  Also there does not appear to be any Camden County Chancery Division matter associated to your name. ”  (Para. 3)  Defendants did not submit an order of transfer to support their argument.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.4(a).  Factual evidence of a violation of section (e) “shall include evidence that the respondent made personal promises or took action beyond the scope of the respondent’s duties such that, by its nature, had the potential to compromise the district board of education. ”  N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.4(a)(5).  Petitioner alleges that Respondents violated section (e) in counts 9, 10, 11, 13, 16, and 17 of the complaint, but does not provide any particularized allegations that Respondents made “personal promises” or “compromised the board” in any way.
[brief] It is not at all clear from the video that there is a gun.  No gun is discharged in the footage.  There is no visible tattoo in the outside video.  The jury wanted [...]'s hearsay statement identifying [...], and the judge "instruct[ed] you as I instructed you earlier, that it is your recollection of the detective's testimony that controls" (2T132-16 to 2T132-18).
[brief] There, as here, the employee entered into an arbitration agreement that he reviewed and acknowledged online.  470 N.J. Super. at 558.  The agreement there “stated that all disputes between [...] and an employee would be resolved by binding and final arbitration,” “that it covered all employment-related claims, including claims of wrongful termination and discrimination, harassment, or retaliation”—including “claims based on federal or state statutes”—and that “all disputes between [the company] and an employee would be resolved by binding and final arbitration.
[brief] In his decision, [...] rejected any possibility that the Defendant can be vicariously liability without any evidence in the record and no exchange of discovery on the issue.  Fundamentally, New Jersey Coury Rule 4:10-2(a) allows parties to obtain discovery regarding any matter which is relevant to any claim or defense.  Based upon the Trial Court’s ruling, the Plaintiffs were deprived of the ability to obtain discovery and develop a legal theory as to the Defendant at the Affidavit of Merit stage.  Whether the Defendant is vicariously liable for the actions of any of the other co-defendants is unrelated to the determination of whether the Affidavits of Merit are statutorily sufficient.  The entity’s liability is a factual determination in which discovery should be conducted on the subject – and none has been provided to date.
[brief] .......  20 Wm. Blanchard Co. V. Beach Concrete Co. Inc., 150 N.J. Super. 277 (App. Div. 1977), certif. denied 75 N.J. 528 (1977).  .............................................  14  Wood v. Stover’s Adm’rs, 28 N.J. Eq. 248 (E. & A. 1877).  .......
[brief] N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 bars claims for injuries or death caused by contact with a train while the person was wrongfully present on “the right of way of any railroad” or “using the property of any railroad in a manner in which it was not intended to be used or in violation of posted regulations”, regardless of whether the railroad may also have been negligent.  N.J.S.A. 48:12-152(b)(4) and (5).  Id.  There is no dispute that [...] owned the railroad right of way and the crossing.  Furthermore, under the circumstances presented by the undisputed facts, a rational jury could only conclude that [...] collided with the train while she was using the railroad crossing and right of way in a manner in which it was not intended to be used.  Therefore, the trial court below properly granted summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice because they are barred by N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 as a matter of law.  In turn, Respondents respectfully submit that this Court should affirm the trial court’s decision.
[brief] The Defendants Failed to Consider Settled Case Law  Establishing that Genuine Issues of Material Fact Concerning the Parties’ Relationship Must Be Resolved by the Jury.  Defendants misunderstand [...]’s argument concerning the jury’s role in determining whether they had a duty to [...].  [...] is not arguing that it is the jury’s duty to determine whether their relationship gave rise to a duty.  Rather, [...] argues that it is the jury’s role to resolve disputes of material fact concerning the parties’ understanding of their relationship in accordance with Froom v. Perel, 377 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 2005).
[directive] (See Footnote 1.)  almost all evictions during this time violate Section  What steps has the evicting party taken or threatened to take in order to remove the •  Section 33-11.1 prohibits persons from effectuating a “forcible entry or occupant? detainer,” which the law defines as the entering and holding of a property using any means other than those permitted by the lawful eviction process.  The statute includes several examples of improper means, including: (1) violence or threats of violence; (2) statements or actions intended to create fear; (3) moving the occupant’s furniture or personal effects outside the premise; (4) entering peaceably and then, by force or threats, turning the occupant out of possession; (5) padlocking or otherwise changing locks to the property; and (6) shutting off vital services, including heat, electricity, or water, in an effort to regain possession.  In seeking answers to these questions, officers should be mindful of their role during Step 1 of this process: to ascertain whether an illegal eviction has occurred, and not to provide legal advice to tenants or others parties.
[brief] ”  Id. at *1.  The Maestranzi court had to determine how to allocate costs for a site where multiple entities, including the insured, had dumped waste.  The site had started receiving waste in 1924, but the insured did not even exist as an entity until the 1960s, and had only shipped waste from 1982-1992.  Id. at *2.  In this unique fact pattern, the court elected to limit the insured’s allocation period to the years where it had actively dumped waste at the polluted Superfund site.  Id. at *4.  The *Maestranzi* court did not “weight” additional damages to specific policy periods.  The *Maestranzi* court did not, for instance, attempt to identify the specific volume of contaminants released in a specific year, and then look to shift additional costs to those years with a higher volume of releases.  Instead, the *Maestranzi* court used the facts before it to define a finite allocation period in the unique context of the Superfund site at issue, the insured’s limited operations at that site, and the joint and several liability scheme mandated by CERCLA.  *Maestranzi*, 2010 WL 1427352, at *1; *4.  Once this allocation period was established based on the facts before the court, the *Maestranzi* court went on to apply a pure, pro rata, time on risk allocation across this period.  Thus, the carrier in *Maestranzi*, who had eight years “on the risk” of a ten-year period of releases, was allocated 80% of the loss.  *Id.* at *3-5.  This was a calculation the court found suitable based on the unique facts present in the case.  The *Maestranzi* court absolutely did not do what [...] did here, which is to miraculously calculate that ten times more property damage occurred in each year that [...] was on the risk, as compared to each year that [...] was on the risk.  (Pa0158.)  Moreover, even though *Maestranzi* is cited to support [...]’s “fact-based” argument, it should not be lost on this Court that the *Maestranzi* court applied pro rata, time on the risk allocation – not “fact-based”.
[directive]   Law enforcement agency.  Defined in the Act as a department, division, bureau, commission, board or other authority of the State or of any political subdivision thereof which has by statute or ordinance the responsibility of detecting and enforcing the general State.2 criminal laws of this Law enforcement officer.  Defined in the Act as any person who is employed as a  permanent full-time member of an enforcement agency, who is statutorily empowered to act for the detection, investigation, arrest, and conviction of persons violating the criminal laws of this State and statutorily required to successfully complete a training course