ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiffs attempt to argue that expert testimony is not necessary where “a layperson’s common knowledge is sufficient to permit a jury to find that the duty of care has been breached without the aid of an expert’s opinion. ”  Giantonnio v. Taccard, 291 N.J. Super. 31, 43 (App. Div. 1996).  The case law Plaintiffs rely on for this proposition, however, is inapposite.  For example, Estate of Chin v. Saint Barnabas Med. Ctr. was a case in which a patient undergoing a hysterectomy passed away after nursing staff failed to properly connect a hysteroscope, causing nitrogen to leak into the patient’s abdomen.  160 N.J. 454, 467-68 (1999).  A nursing staff’s failure to properly connect medical equipment is a very different situation from an engineer’s draft of a preliminary site plan – any layperson would know that failure to properly connect a patient’s medical equipment runs the risk of causing harm to the patient.  The hospital-defendant in Estate of Chin even conceded that it was a matter of “common knowledge” that an incorrect hook-up constituted professional negligence.  Id. at 470.  The emails attached to [...]’s safe harbor letter are evidence that, not only did the preliminary site plan never come to fruition (with respect to installing a paved parking area around Plaintiffs’ Property), but it was modified in accordance with Plaintiffs’ wishes months before the Complaint was filed.
[brief] APPELLANT HAS RECEIVED SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO CONSTITUTE AN INFORMAL ACCOUNTING  [...] specifically found that Appellant had already received all necessary information, effectively an informal accounting, by way of the Bernards Report and the detailed Certification [...] submitted in opposition to Appellant’s Order to Show Cause.  1T18:6-1T18:9.  Appellant has failed to point to any caselaw, rule or statute that indicates that such an accounting must be formal.  Therefore, even if the court were to find that as a beneficiary Appellant is entitled to an accounting after one year, it does not mean he has not already received one.  [...] ruled that Appellant has effectively received an accounting.  The Bernards Report, that Appellant has had since at least August 2021, lists all items of personal property at the Englewood Home at the time of [...]’s appointment.  (Pa97-Pa231).  It values those items collectively at approximately $61,000.00.  Id.  Appellant, who claims he ran [...]’s businesses, certainly knows the identities and values of her properties.  1T11:6-1T11:9.  Further, as he is the defendant in multiple cases seeking his removal from the UES Property and the Long Beach Property, he knows he is the cause of ever-increasing legal fees and the reason those properties cannot be sold.  In addition, Appellant is the one who misappropriated mortgage funds and has been and continues to convert rents on the UES Property.  He knows the precarious financial position in which he has placed the Estate.  (Pa394-Pa397).  Appellant certainly knows that the Estate has a $2,400,000 judgment against him.  (Pa43-Pa56).  Finally, Appellant is either a defendant in or the cause of 5 or 6 lawsuits depleting what funds were received through sale of the Englewood Home.  There is no other information he needs or is entitled to.  POINT IV
[brief] *Id.*\(^{22}\)  Here, the promisor/guarantor of the Guarantee -- [...] (acting by its sole owner/member, [...]) -- furthered its own pecuniary and business interest by making the oral promise to guarantee the pay-off of the debt obligation pursuant to the Third Loan.  As established at trial and as the trial court found, [...] had a full panoply of rights at his disposal at the time [...] requested the work-out accommodation including, without limitation, foreclosing on the [...] Mortgage and being reimbursed for all of the attorneys’ fees and costs of collection.  Da12-13, 17-18, 47.  Plainly, the “leading object” of [...]’s oral guarantee of the debt pursuant to the Third Loan was [...]’s own financial and business interests, more specifically, its interest in avoiding foreclosure and the attendant costs and consequences -- --- \(^{22}\)  Although in 1996 the New Jersey legislature enacted a new statute requiring certain guarantees to be in writing (*N.J.S.A.* 25:1-15), the “leading object” exception survived.
[brief] \(^2\)  It has just been discovered that the September 29, 2020 Transcript filed with the Appellate Division contains an additional page to the caption, which was not part of the Transcript submitted to [...] on Respondents’ Summary Judgment Motion.  This has resulted in a discrepancy in the citations to the Transcript referenced by [...] in his Statement of Reasons (Pa5), and by the Respondents with the actual filed Transcript, by one page.  The citations to the Transcript, in this Reply Brief, are to the filed Transcript.
[brief] While New Jersey appears to be the only state with a period-of-emergency enhancement for threats and false public alarm, other states impose increased penalties for burglaries conducted during emergency or disaster conditions.  To qualify for the enhanced penalty, though, the burglary must have exploited conditions arising from the emergency.  In Florida, second- and third-degree burglaries may be upgraded to first- or second-degree felonies, respectively, “if the burglary is committed . . . within a county that is subject to a state of emergency declared by the Governor . . . and the perpetration of the burglary is facilitated by conditions arising from the emergency.
[brief] Please accept this Letter Brief in lieu of a more formal brief in reply to Defendants’ recently-filed Brief and Appendix.  First of all, both Orders were appealed.  On p. 4 of the Notice of Appeal, it specifically states that additional trial Court information:  Disposition Date: 12/28/22, which was the original Motion in connection with this matter.  On p. 1 of 5, the Appellant states 5/22/23 with an asterisk after that date and, as indicated on p. 4, is the original hearing date.  Now, to Defendants’ Brief.  1.  Question presented:  Is [...] a part-time [...] another George D’Annunzio, (192 N.J. 110 (2007))?  Appellant will be filing a direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
[brief] [2/28/22, 11:34:56 AM]  [...] Josh [...]: yes, is owner crazy didnt pay??  [2/28/22, 11:35:07 AM]  ✷: Don’t know 28.  [...] and [...] also discuss this matter in Whatsapp messages after the Motion to Vacate was filed, [...] states “How can I help you on [...]” “working on the process server”.
[brief] *4  After court concluded for the day, defense counsel and her investigator met with [...] and asked him to review the photographs in the array and indicate if he could identify any of the six photographs as depicting the person who shot him.  [...] picked out two photos, and indicated that the individuals shown in those two photos resembled the person who shot him.  When asked to initial the photos, he refused to do so.  Neither of the men depicted in the photographs was defendant.  The next morning, before the jury entered the courtroom, the State indicated that it would not, contrary to its assertion the day before, ask [...] to identify defendant as his assailant.  Despite the assistant prosecutor's statement that he would not ask [...] to identify defendant as the shooter, defense counsel insisted that she had the right to question [...] about his failure to identify defendant in the photo array that she and her investigator had presented to [...] the day before.  When the defense argued that [...]'s failure to identify defendant had a bearing upon his credibility, the State disagreed, asserting that credibility was not an issue because the State would not be asking [...] to identify the person who shot him.  The assistant prosecutor contended that because the State had decided not to ask [...] to make an in-court identification, there was no need for the defense to question [...] about his inability to select the defendant's photograph the day before.  In effect, the State argued that whatever prejudice might potentially have arisen due to the State's failure to tell defense counsel before her opening about the new developments, any such prejudice was neutralized, and indeed completely eliminated, by the State's decision not to elicit an in-court identification from [...].  Unpersuaded, defense counsel insisted that defendant had the right to cross-examine [...] on anything that was “directly relevant to this case. ”
[brief] ”  *2  [...], the Wawa “college graduate leader,” was working in the office when she heard [...]’s radio call.  [...] ran out of the office and saw [...] pointing at the perpetrator, who was walking toward the exit.  [...] followed the man into the vestibule.  Defendant, who was already outside the vestibule, turned around and lunged toward [...] with the knife.  [...] got scared and closed the vestibule door.  She locked the door and instructed all customers to stay inside while she called the police.
[brief] The parties thereafter petitioned for certification, which the Supreme Court denied.  Jarwick Devs., Inc. v. Wilf, 236 N.J. 68 (2018); Jarwick Devs., Inc. v. Wilf, 236 N.J. 47 (2018); Jarwick Devs., Inc. v. Wilf, 236 N.J. 16 (2018).  II.
[brief] Second, and in any event, the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the production of tens of thousands of irrelevant documents without “good reason[].”  Customers Bank v. Reitnour Inv. Properties, LP, 453 N.J. Super. 338, 348 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).  The ESI Order is deeply “invasive and burdensome,” while forgoing “clear alternative[s]” that were “less intrusive” and better protected the parties’ “privacy rights. ”  Lipsky, 474 N.J. Super. at 473.  The trial court “clearly erred in ordering more invasive measures without any showing of substantial need,” id. at 474, and without proffering any real explanation as to how the “likely benefits” of irrelevant documents outweighed “the burden or expense” of that discovery, Rule 4:10-2(g).  This Court should reverse on that basis as well.
[brief] ”  Ibid. (citing N.J. State Const. art. VI, § II, ¶ 3 & In re LiVolsi, 85 N.J. 576, 583 (1981)); see also Lee v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 199 N.J. 251, 264 (2009) (“The rationale underlying the learned professionals exception is that uniform regulation of an occupation, where such regulation exists, could conflict with regulation under the CFA. ”).  These facts alone “foreclose action” by the Legislature through the enactment of the Limited Attorney Exemption to regulate debt adjustment legal work – the practice of law that only the Supreme Court regulates.
[brief] BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:  1.  R.S.34:15-36 is amended to read as follows:  "Willful negligence" within the intent of this chapter shall consist of (1) deliberate act or deliberate failure to act, or (2) such conduct as evidences reckless indifference to safety, or (3) intoxication, operating as the proximate cause of injury, or (4) unlawful use of a controlled dangerous substance as defined in the "New Jersey Controlled Dangerous Substances Act," P.L.1970, c.226 (C.24:21-1 et seq.).  "Employer" is declared to be synonymous with master, and includes natural persons, partnerships, and corporations; "employee" is synonymous with servant, and includes all natural persons, including officers of corporations, who perform service for an employer for financial consideration, exclusive of (1) employees eligible under the federal "Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act," 44 Stat.1424 (33 U.S.C.  s.901 et seq.), for benefits payable with respect to accidental death or injury, or occupational disease or infection; and (2) casual employments, which shall be defined, if in connection with the employer's business, as employment the occasion for which arises by chance or is purely accidental; or if not in connection with any business of the employer, as employment not regular, periodic or recurring; provided, however, that forest fire wardens and forest firefighters employed by the State of New Jersey shall, in no event, be deemed casual employees.
[brief] Boles v. [...], No. 12-1762, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41926, at *22 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2014); See similar cases at Pb26-27  The request to take medical leave is a protected act.  Based upon the employer’s “no fault” attendance rules this protected act is subject to automatic penalty.  Even though the employer is on notice of protected activity, the employer, as a matter of policy, has, and will always, decline to engaged in any type of interactive process of accommodation.  Doing otherwise would undermine the very purposes and intent of the “no fault” attendance rules - which is to discipline automatically without inquiry.  The ineligibility for promotion while on medical leave is similarly “no fault” and “automatic”.  As such, the employer, as a matter of policy, will never make a good faith effort, or any effort, to assist the employee in seeking accommodations.  This is a matter of policy even though the employer has an affirmative obligation to initiate an interactive inquiry.  (See 29 C.F. R. § 1630.2(o)(3))  It of course obvious that the Association’s members could be “accommodated” with a short period of convalescence but for the employer's lack of good faith.  The challenged policies, by their very nature as “no fault”, violates the NJLAD by penalizing employees for the protected activity of simply requesting and taking a medical leave of absence.  This ongoing and continuous application of the "no fault" attendance policy interferes with and penalizes employees for exercising their right to request and take medical leave which as protected activity under the Act.
[brief] Id. at 447.  The Court adopted this standard against the backdrop of all the policy concerns that had led it to abandon the exigency requirement, holding that the “unforeseeable and spontaneous” requirement “properly balances the individual’s privacy and liberty interests and law enforcement's investigatory demands” and “does not place an undue burden on law enforcement. ”  Ibid.  The Smart Court reiterated Witt’s policy conclusions in adhering to and applying the “unforeseeable and spontaneous” in the exact manner the motion court did here.
[brief] The Supreme Court of New Jersey has “uniformly . . . endorsed” the proposition that “[i]n reviewing a trial court’s evidential ruling, an appellate court is limited to examining the decision for an abuse of discretion. ”  Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 382 (2010) (quoting Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 12 (2008)).
[brief] The defendants argued below that the trial court did not explicitly state that they breached the MIPA and SPAs in its earlier opinion, so the lower court clarified, based on the foregoing language, that the defendants’ conduct also breached the MIPA and SPAs, stating:  [T]here is an argument . . . that the court didn’t make findings under the SPA or MIPA . . . and that there is no breach of those agreements.  I don’t accept that argument because how do you have a sale that is shortchanging somebody based on [] what occurred historically?  The numbers were wrong.  It was bogus. ” (27T87:20 to 88:1).21  Thus, the trial court found that the defendants also breached the two SPAs and the MIPA because they breached the [...] and [...].
[brief] [1T].¹  The State presented the ¹ 1T refers to the transcript dated October 27, 2022.  2T refers to the pre-trial transcript dated May 30, 2023.  3T refers to the trial transcript dated June 7, 2023.  4T refers to the trial transcript dated June 8, 2023.  5T refers to the trial transcript dated June 9, 2023.  6T refers to the sentencing transcript dated July 28, 2023.  testimony of Florence Township Police Detective [...] and Florence Township Police Patrolman [...].
[brief] Plaintiffs’ claim that the Borough’s affordable housing obligation is at risk by reducing the number of market rate units is wholly unsupported by the record.  The Borough already has a Redevelopment Agreement and a redeveloper, which boosted the credibility in the judge’s eyes in the Builder’s Remedy Action that the project would be built and should have equal credibility in these proceedings.  In fact, [...] is a signor of the 2021 County Agreement, which acknowledges the Redevelopment Plan will be amended.
[brief] “[A] state provides constitutionally adequate procedural due process when it provides reasonable remedies to rectify a legal error by a local administrative body. ”  *United Artists*, 316 F.3d at 400.  Our State provides adequate safeguards to aggrieved applicants to zoning boards who wish to challenge decisions of the zoning board.  New Jersey statutes provide that a Zoning Board of Adjustment (“ZBA”) has the power to decide appeals of the zoning officer’s enforcement of a municipality’s zoning ordinance and to decide requests for an interpretation of the zoning law.
[brief] ***************  Although it is an overstatement to say that a decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable whenever a Court can review the reasons stated for the decision without a loud guffaw or involuntary gasp, it is not much of an overstatement.  D’Atria v. D’Atria, 576 A.2d 957, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401; See also, Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 997 A.2d 1139, 1147.
[brief] **7A – 8A.**  Plaintiff claims that [...] as well as the other named Defendants were “negligent and deviated from the accepted standards of medical practice in the community in their care and treatment of Plaintiff’s Decedent [...], which negligence and deviations were the proximate cause of his death at approximately 6 p.m. on June 1, 2018. ”  **9A.**  On August 30, 2019, Defendant filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint.
[brief] (Pa2; Pa111).  Instead, the Board determined that Petitioner’s medical records demonstrate his disability was the result of a pre-existing disease that was aggravated or accelerated by the work effort.  (Pa2; Pa111).  Subsequent to the OAL contested case proceeding, the Board considered the testimony of the Petitioner and the parties’ medical experts, and the ALJ’s initial decision recommending reversal of the Board’s denial of Petitioner’s application for AD.  As stated in its Final Administrative Determination (“FAD”), the Board: - Found no credible evidence to support the ALJ’s acceptance of the theory introduced by the Petitioner’s counsel that the reports detailing Petitioner’s 2009 injury was the result of a typographical error and that such injury did not occur; - Rejected the ALJ’s conclusion that Petitioner’s expert, [...], provided more reliable testimony than the Board’s expert, [...]; - Rejected the finding that Petitioner’s disability was not caused by a pre-existing condition or a pre-existing condition accelerated or exacerbated by the work effort; - Rejected the ALJ’s conclusion that Petitioner’s disability was directly caused by the 2015 accident and its recommendation that Petitioner be awarded AD; and • Denied Petitioner’s application for AD. (Pa 111-113).
[brief] A plain reading of the plain language of the transcript demonstrates that [...] denied Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint because she was solely swayed by the finding that there would be no prejudice to Plaintiffs as they would not lose, under any doctrine, case law, or court rule, their right to bring these newly discovered claims in a new action.  [...] explicitly found that there would be no prejudice to Plaintiffs in denying their motion to amend, because they would not be foreclosed from bringing these newly discovered claims in a different procedural posture.  Yet, somehow, the Trial Court misinterpreted [...] and stated the opposite.
[brief] Recently, a trial court in the District of Columbia issued an order granting precisely what defendant asks for in this case: “the government’s expert witness must limit his testimony to a conclusion that, based on his examination of the evidence and the consistency of the class characteristics and microscopic toolmarks, the firearm cannot be excluded as the source of the casing. ”  United States v. Tibbs, Case No. 2016-CF1-19431 (D.C. 2019), slip op. at 1 (Da 898-954). The court based its holding on “on the inability of the published studies in --- 6 See also Missouri v. Goodwin-Bey, Case No. 1531-CR00555-01, at 7 (Cir. Ct. Greene Cty., Mo. Div. V Dec. 16, 2016) (limiting the examiner to testifying only that “this gun could not be eliminated as the source of the bullet”); United States v. Ashburn, 88 F. Supp. 3d 239, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (precluding the firearm experts from testifying that he was “certain” or “100%” sure that there is a match “to the exclusion of all other firearms in the world” or that there was a “practical impossibility” that it came from a different weapon); United States v. Willock, 696 F. Supp. 2d 536, 546 (D.Md. 2010) (“[...] shall not opine that it is a ‘practical impossibility’ for a firearm to have fired cartridges other than the common ‘unknown firearm’ to which [he] attributes the cartridges.
[brief] “In order for you to find the defendant guilty of robbery the State is required to prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: That the defendant was in the course of committing a theft and that while in the course of committing a theft the defendant threatened another with or purposely put him or her in fear of immediate bodily injury. ”  (4T 123-18 to 24 (emphasis added))  Later, the judge explained that the State “alleges that the defendant threatened to kill bank employees and patrons if he was not provided with cash.
[brief] Pa108-128 (Opinion in “[...] III”)  Procedural History of This Docket  On October 6, 2023, [...] instituted a summary action by way of verified complaint seeking the appointment of an arbitrator to conduct the damages phase of the arbitration to replace the original arbitrator, [...], who is deceased.  Pa1-7.  On October 20, 2023, the trial court executed the proposed order to show cause.  Pa8-12.  On November 1, 2023, [...] filed a “Notice of Demand for Security and Automatic Stay of Proceedings Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-67” along with a proposed form of order implementing the statutory stay.  Pa13-18.2  As the trial court never acknowledged the automatic stay, [...] filed opposition to the order to show cause and a cross-motion to dismiss [...]’s verified complaint on November 10, 2023.  Pa19-49.  On December 12, 2023, [...] filed reply papers and supporting exhibits.  Pa50-51.  [...] filed a response on December 14, 2023, again invoking the statutory stay.  Pa53.  --- 2  [...]’s letter-brief to the court and relevant excerpts from other submitted briefs are included in the appendix pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2) because they are relevant to the issue of how and when [...] raised its entitlement to a stay under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-67 et seq.  The trial court heard oral argument on the return date of the order to show cause on December 19, 2023.  T1.  On the same day, the trial court signed an order allowing [...] to deposit funds into the Superior Court Trust Fund in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:15-67.  Pa57-58.  After considering oral argument on the substance of the order to show cause, the trial court reserved decision.  T26:2-5.  On February 12, 2024, the trial court entered an order and memorandum of decision granting the application for appointment of a substitute arbitrator.  Pa57-69.  The trial court subsequently entered an order staying its decision pending appeal pursuant to R. 2:9-5(c).  Pa70-11.  [...] filed a notice of appeal, case information statement, and transcript request on February 20, 2024.  Pa72-80.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**