ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Many different measures of officer performance can be regularly examined for any of these troubling patterns or practices.  Law enforcement executives shall determine what performance measures are appropriate for the communities they serve, but at a minimum an agency must track the following performance indicators: (a)  Internal affairs complaints against the officer, whether initiated by another officer or by a member of the public; (b) Civil actions filed against the officer; (c) Criminal investigations of or criminal complaints against the officer; (d) Any use of force by the officer that is formally determined or adjudicated (for example, by internal affairs or a grand jury) to have been excessive, unjustified, or unreasonable; (e)  Domestic violence investigations in which the officer is an alleged subject; (f) An arrest of the officer, including on a driving under the influence charge; (g) Sexual harassment claims against the officer; (h) Vehicular collisions involving the officer that are formally determined to have been the fault of the officer; (i) A positive drug test by the officer; (j) Cases or arrests by the officer that are rejected or dismissed by a court; (k) Cases in which evidence obtained by an officer is suppressed by a court; (l) Insubordination by the officer; (m) Neglect of duty by the officer; (n) Unexcused absences by the officer; (o) Any other indicators, as determined by the agency’s chief executive.
[brief] Likewise, the trial court held that the motion for reconsideration seeking relief from the Appellate Division’s Order and Opinion, brought almost one (1) year post Tyler, was a mechanism of delay and not appropriate for reconsideration.  T18- 6-10.  As such, the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s second motion for reconsideration should be affirmed.  Furthermore, the Defendant failed to meet the standard for reconsideration since his second motion for reconsideration presented the same arguments that were, or could have been, presented to the trial court and the Appellate Division in the first instance.  Similarly, the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s motion for reconsideration should be affirmed because the June 20, 2020 Final Judgment could not be vacated under R. 4:50-1(f) as an “exceptional situation”.
[brief] Id. 26.  [...] further testified that during shift hours, when customers are inside the store, any person who saw a spill on the floor was responsible for cleaning it up.  Pa74-75, at 13:24-14:6.  27.  The store had a back room with cleaning supplies for this purpose.  Pa75, at 13:24-14:13.  28.  The manager and the employees were responsible for cleaning up spills.
[brief] ”  Relying on our Supreme Court's opinion in *In re Estate of Munger*, 63 N.J. 514, 521 (1973), the Judge explained that the presence of the ambiguity called for application of the doctrine of probable intent.  The Judge, quoting from the Court's opinion, stated the following:  The obligation of the Court when a question is presented, is to effectuate the [probable intent] of the testator when consideration of the will as a whole together with extrinsic evidence demonstrates under all the circumstances that a patent or latent ambiguity exists and the language used and as such intent overcoming the mere literal reading of the instrument is thereby made manifest.  This power must be carefully exercised and should not be utilized unless the Court is thoroughly convinced that it is required.  The need for its exercise must be manifest, otherwise exercise would amount to varying the terms of the will as distinguished from merely effectuating a testator's intent.  *[...]*, [...], 2022 WL 2542293 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 8, 2022).
[brief] Per N.J.S.A. 2A:14-30, 30 years’ possession of real estate, except woodlands or uncultivated tracts, and 60 years possession of woodlands or uncultivated tracts, however commenced or continued provides:  Thirty year’s actual possession of any real estate excepting woodlands or uncultivated tracts, and 60 year’s actual possession of woodlands or uncultivated tracts, uninterruptedly continued by occupancy, descent, conveyance or otherwise shall, in whatever way or manner such possession might have commenced or have continued, vest a full and complete right and title in every actual possessor or occupier of such real estate, woodlands or uncultivated tracts, and shall be a good and sufficient bar to all claims that may be made or actions commenced by any person whatsoever for the recovery of any such real estate, woodlands or uncultivated tracts.  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-30.  Per N.J.S.A. 2A:14-31.  30 years’ actual possession of any real estate under claim or color of title provides:  Thirty years actual possession of any real estate, uninterruptedly continued by occupancy, descent, conveyance or otherwise, wherever such possession commenced or is founded upon a proprietary right duly laid thereon, and recorded in the office of the surveyor general of the division in which the location was made, or in the office of the secretary of state, pursuant to law, or wherever such possession was obtained by a fair, bona fide purchase of such real estate from any person in possession thereof and supposed to have a legal right and title thereto, or from the agent of such person, shall be a good and sufficient bar to all prior locations, rights, titles, conveyances, or claims whatever, not followed by actual possession as aforesaid, and shall vest an absolute right and title in the actual possessor and occupier of all such real estate.  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-31.
[brief] The trial court failed to “set forth factual findings and correlate them to legal conclusions” on one of the only two legal issues that the judge was charged with deciding (1T11-25 to 1T12-11).  The court violated Rule 1:7-4(a), thereby warranting a vacating of paragraph one of the November 10, 2021 order along with the entirety of the November 9, 2023 order, and a remand to finally fix the amount owed on Tenant’s Allowance and address any related issues.  A&P, 335 N.J. Super. at 498.  POINT II
[brief] Here, the lower court improperly discounted [...]’s Thirty-Second Affirmative Defense that it raised on May 7, 2019 – that “[...] has not intentionally relinquished any right to rely on all terms, conditions, definitions, limitations, exclusions, deductibles, self-insured retentions, limits of insurance, and/or any other provisions contained in the [...] Pollution Policy. ”  Da204; see also, Da150 (asserting same as Forty-Fourth Affirmative Defense on behalf of [...] Umbrella Policy).  [...] also raised as its Fifth Affirmative Defense the point that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, which is the case for the arbitrable claims.
[brief] Appellant’s closing position [Db32, first full paragraph] is contradictory to the admissions made in the balance of that point.  Appellant’s Point IV (B) now suggests that the [...] never said the provision was illegal unenforceable or ineffective, which is completely contradictory to the [...] letters (Da 81 and Da 24-Da25) and contradictory to their earlier admission that the language of the separation agreement itself was known to be illegal, unenforceable, or ineffective in a legal forum when the agreement was entered (Db28).  Further, Appellant’s argument at Point IV(B) is contrary to the record on appeal.  First, the Separation Agreement is clear that the determination of what was illegal, unenforceable or ineffective was to be made by a legal forum.  Secondly, the Trial Court Order of July 25, 2023 (Par. 3) referred to the [...] letter of August 10, 2021 for defining the offending terms (Da202).  The authority of the [...] to determine what was illegal, unenforceable, or ineffective was admitted by Appellant at Db 29 and in the Separation Agreement itself at Par 7 (Da16).
[brief] Violate N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(b)(1).  The Association has violated this section of the Act by “[i]nterfering with, restraining, or coercing employees” from engaging in negotiations for a new collective negotiations agreement.  In refusing to negotiate without the Bargaining Council, [...] has essentially eliminated members’ abilities to negotiate and obtain a new contract through its refusal to name bargaining representatives.  For the same reasons, [...] has also frustrated [...]’s right to exercise its own rights under the Act and engage in negotiations with [...] for a successor collective negotiations agreement, itself a violation of Section b(1) of the Act or at the least, its spirit and intent.  B.  The Association’s Actions Violate Subsection (b)(3) of the Act.  The Commission stated in I/M/O Morris County College Faculty Association, 48 NJPER ¶ 16 (Pa335):  Section 5.4b(3) of the Act requires a majority representative to negotiate in good faith with a public employer concerning terms and conditions of employment.  N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4b(3); Glen Rock Bd. of Ed., P.E.R.C. No. 82-11 7 NJPER 454 (P12201 1981).  To prove a violation of this section, an employer must establish that the majority representative, by its conduct, adversely impacted negotiations or was an impediment to reaching an agreement.  Rutgers University, P.E.R.C. No. 2017-4, 43 NJPER 17 (P18 2016).  The Association has, at all times since the inception of the negotiations process for the current round of bargaining, failed to negotiate in good faith.  The Association refused to appear at the bargaining table or to negotiate a ground rule regarding the presence of its members at negotiations sessions, thus depriving the parties from negotiating for nearly two (2) years.  The Association has thus violated the Act by demanding open bargaining with member-observers present, rather than to negotiate through a designated representative as the Act requires.  Accordingly, [...] has, by its conduct, adversely impacted negotiations and has been an impediment to reaching an agreement.  C.  **The Association’s Actions Violate Subsection (b)(5) of the Act. **  As set forth at length *supra*, [...] has repeatedly and steadfastly refused to designate a representative committee for bargaining, a requirement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:13A5.3.  Its position is therefore in violation of N.J.S.A. 34:14A-5.4(b)(5).  **POINT IV**
[brief] The fee simple estate in 1994 included the leased fee measuring the right to receive the contract rent and the reversionary rights as to any leases that might be terminated as well as the leasehold interests of any existing tenancies.  That is why, as [...], M.A.I., testified that acting on behalf of a developer who had acquired the leased fee, he then had appraised the individual leasehold interests of the various tenants whose property interests had to be acquired in order for the redeveloper to have the fee simple interest, free of any leasehold interest.  That is also why the Complaint in this case names all of the remaining tenants left as of the date of taking.  All of the other interests of prior tenancies, including the [...], were already in [...] by virtue of the reversion.  (3T168 1;169 17)  By any definition, a fee simple estate means that it is free and clear of any leasehold interest.  By any definition, one who acquired a piece of real property that is subject to an existing lease has acquired something less than a fee simple estate.  We suggest that is true no matter whether you use a definition established under generally acceptable appraisal standards or generally accepted legal real estate practice.
[brief] (See Pb41).  This argument has no merit for several reasons.  First, the Complaint again does not allege that [...] assumed an extra-contractual duty.  Second, the Complaint concedes that sending of the September 13, 2022 e-mail and failure to inform Plaintiff of the Birch closing was not an extra-contractual duty because it alleges that these things constituted a breach of the PSA.  (Pa11-12, ¶46; Pa15-16, ¶¶73-74).  Third, the Complaint does not assert a claim against [...] for negligence, which is the theory on which Plaintiff would need to seek to recover outside of a contractual setting.
[brief] In addition to appealing the Commission’s August 22, 2023 Final Decision in this matter, Appellants now also appeal the Commission’s July 26, 2022 Decision granting in part and denying in part Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.  (Ca165-174).  Pursuant to N.J.C.R. 2:2-3(b), final judgements, appealable as of right, “are judgments that finally resolve all issues as to all parties. ”  As a result, the Commission’s July 26, 2022 was not appealable as of right pursuant to N.J.C.R. 2:2-3(a)(2) until a Final Decision issued from the Commission as to all issues as to all parties.  Accordingly, in filing their Motion for Summary Decision, Appellants expressly reserved the right to appeal the Commission’s July 26, 2022 decision on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to N.J.C.R. 2:2-3(a)(2) once a final order has issued as to all claims as to all parties pursuant to N.J.C.R. 2:2-3(b).  (Ca058-059).  They do so now.  As noted above, a reviewing court may typically make three inquiries regarding decisions of state agencies: “(1) whether the agency’s action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency bases its action; and (3) whether, in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[brief] Indeed, the propriety of the ultimate sanction of dismissal for a violation is, as the Rule makes perfectly clear, dependent upon whether "the undisclosed party . . . has been substantially prejudiced" by the lack of notice.  R. 4:5-1(b)(2) (emphasis added).  Because [...] and [...] do not qualify as "undisclosed parties"—their identity was disclosed in the complaint to which the certification was appended—dismissal was unauthorized in this instance.
[brief] [...]  [...], Esq. (007541981)  [...], Esq. (025732005)  [...] [...]  [...]  [...], Esq. (admitted pro hac vice)  [...] [...]  [...] (admitted pro hac vice)  [...] [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page TABLE OF CONTENTS  ...........................................................................................................  i  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................  iii  PRILIMINARY STATEMENT ...............................................................................................  1  I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW ..............................................................................................  3  II.  PLAINTIFF’S ‘FAILURE-TO-TIMELY-RECALL’ CLAIM IS NOT RECOGNIZED BY NEW JERSEY LAW AND IS PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW.  [(Da0785; Da0816; Da0846); Court did not address preemption although it was raised in the briefing]  ..................................................  3  A.  The PLA Does Not Recognize the ‘Failure-to-Timely-Recall’ Claim Pled in the Complaint.  ........................................................................................................  3  B.  Federal Law Preempts Both Plaintiff’s ‘Failure-to-Timely-Recall’ Claim and Any Unpled Claim that [...] Should Have Provided a Post-Sale Warning About a Recall Issue .........................  4  III.  PLAINTIFF HAS NO PROOF THAT THE SPECIFIC PRODUCT AT ISSUE WAS DEFECTIVE.  [Issue was raised (Da0785; Da0816; Da0846)]  .........................................................................................................................  7
[brief] 1.  **The Liability Trial.**  The case proceeded to a bench trial in October 2010 (“Liability Trial”).  [...] agreed prior to trial that the three remaining insurer defendants, including [...], had no duty to defend it in connection with the claim at issue.  (Pa0091.)  The only issue before the court was whether the costs incurred by [...] in remediating the Site were covered under the policies at issue, including the [...] Policy.  (Pa0091-Pa0137.)  To establish entitlement to coverage, [...] sought to prove that environmental contamination – “property damage” – took place during the insurers’ policy periods, and that coverage was not otherwise excluded.
[brief] Cases cited | Case Name | Citation | Page(s) | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Am. Metal Co. v. Fluid Chem. Co., | 121 N.J. Super. 177 (Law Div. 1972).  | 31-32 | | Bell v. Bass River, | 196 N.J. Super. 304 (Law Div. 1984).  | 25 | | Bell Atlantic New Jersey, Inc. v. Riverdale Zoning Bd., | 352 N.J. Super. 407 (App. Div. 2002).  | 29-30 | | Berkeley Square Assoc. v. Zoning Bd. Of Adj. of Trenton, | 410 N.J. Super. 255 (App. Div. 2009).  | 36-38 | | Bonaventure Int'l Inc., v. Borough of Spring Lake, | 350 N.J. Super. 420 (App. Div. 2002) | 37-38 | | Cerebral Palsy Ctr. v. Mayor & Council of Borough of Fair Lawn, | 374 N.J. Super. 437 (App. Div. 2005).  | 21, 26 | | Chambers v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., | 442 F. App'x 650 (3d Cir. 2011).  | 49 | | Charlie Brown of Chatham, Inc. v. Bd. of Adj. for the Twp. of Chatham, | 202 N.J. Super. 312 (App. Div. 1985).  | 29-30, 32| | Chicalese v. Monroe Twp. Pl. Bd., | 334 N.J. Super. 413 (Law Div. 2000).  | 17 | | Darst v. Blairstown Tp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, | 410 N.J. Super. 314 (App. Div. 2009).  | 49 | | DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield, | 198 N.J. 242 (2009).  | 20, 24, 33| | DiProspero v. Penn, | 183 N.J. 477 (2005)  | 18 | | Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adj. of Franklin, | 233 N.J. 546 (2018).  | 17 | | Eltrym Euneva, LLC v. Keansburg Planning Bd. of Adjustment, | 407 N.J. Super. 432 (Law Div. 2008).  | 37 | Estate of Hanges, 202 N.J. 369 (2010)  ...........................................41
[brief] So at that point, I would Mirandize him and advise him of his rights.  In [defendant]'s case, I did not Mirandize him.  [...] did not "provide any specifics to [defendant] regarding the investigation prior to speaking to him."  (25T93-17 to 20).  And, according to [...], "there was no question at that time [defendant] was not in any type of custody," and "[i]t was a totally voluntary trip on his behalf at [[...]]'s request."  (25T143-11 to 16).
[brief] No part of the Roads is on Lot 1.01, and even though the Lot 1.01 owner had the right by agreement to request an easement to use the Roads if necessary, it never did so because the Roads were already public streets.  (Pa2 at ¶ 5; Pa8.)  Declaring the Roads to be public roads would literally have no effect whatsoever on Lot 1.01, because Lot 1.01 does not have any control or right to restrict the use of the Roads, it uses the Roads now, and would continue to use the Roads without interference if they are declared to be public.
[brief] POINT IX  NO BASIS EXISTS TO DOWNGRADE THE JURY VERDICT THAT DEFENDANT COMMITTED THEFT BY UNLAWFUL TAKING IN THE THIRD DEGREE TO A DISORDERLY-PERSONS OFFENSE.  Defendant objects that his conviction for theft of movable property should be reduced from a third-degree crime to a disorderly persons offense, for three reasons.  As none of them is valid, this contention has no merit.
[directive] The forensic medical record is the documentation created by the nurse examiner during the forensic medical exam.  11  7 kit to the county designated storage location.  Those unreported kits being held will be labeled externally in a manner to protect the confidentiality of the victim and consistent with the requirements of section IV.A.  At the time of SAFE/DFSA kit collection, every victim will be afforded the option to release the kit to law enforcement as part of a criminal investigation, or to request that the SAFE/DFSA kit be retained.
[brief] On the Brief TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................iv  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS & RULINGS.............................viii  I.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.......................................................1  II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY (PA00001-PA00094)..............................3  III.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND (PA000001-PA000058)..........................5  A.  Plaintiff's Complaint (PA000001-PA000058)............................5  i.  Plaintiff Was A Competent and Diligent Employee, Loyally Dedicated to Defendant [...] and the Patients They Serve (PA000001-PA000058).................................................................5  ii.  Plaintiff Previously Collegial Work Environment Took a Turn For The Worse After She Felt Compelled To Complain About What She Reasonably Believed To Be Violations Of Law, Rule, and Regulation (PA000006-PA000009).................................................................6  iii.  Defendants First Retaliate Against Plaintiff By Denying Her Requests For Leave (PA000009-PA000010).........................................................9  iv.  Defendants Escalate The Retaliation Against Plaintiff After Her DOL Complaint And Continued Business Practice Complaints (PA000010-PA000011).........................................................11  B.  Defendants' Motion to Dismiss And Plaintiff's Cross Motion To Amend (PA000006-PA000008) (PA000059-PA000080)..........................13  C.  Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (PA000087-PA000094)..17  IV.
[brief] The June 30, 2022 Order’s specific performance remedy contemplated the possibility that Defendant might not have been able to meet certain financing contingencies and, as a result, required negotiations for alternatives.  Da361-362.  It also provided alternatively that if the project could not proceed because of the inability to meet contingencies or other mutual agreement, then it would revise the revenue sharing formula in the Redevelopment Agreement and would reconsider Project Garage operations and expenses.
[brief] On January 15, 2021, Plaintiff-Appellant [...]  (“Plaintiff” or “[...]”) filed Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs, which was amended on January 22, 2021 by way of a First Amended Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs consisting of six counts (the “First Amended Complaint” or “FAC”).  (Pa1 to Pa22).  Count I of the FAC alleged that the provision in a Redevelopment Agreement between Defendant, [...] (“Defendant City” or “City”) and Defendant, [...] (“Defendant [...]” or “[...]”) negotiating a $2,000,000 redevelopment payment by [...] (the “Redevelopment Payment”) is unlawful for five reasons: (a) it is *ultra vires*; (b) there are no standards to determine the amount of the $2,000,000 fee in any ordinance; (c) the fee is unrelated to the impact of the development of Defendant [...]’s property on the City; (d) the fee has no relationship to the “costs of the redevelopment entity” as those terms are used in N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f); and (e) the fee is not authorized by the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (“LRHL”), N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1, et seq.
[brief] The issuing Court's decision in that regard could hardly be plainer or clearer; yet with this understanding the State accepted the order and made no protest to the Court.  On September 28, 2020 the police were surveilling the Park Blvd. location and observed [...] exit the Park Blvd. location and proceed on foot toward Kenwood Ave.; the police eventually gathered other officers and stopped [...] on Kenwood, which is some ten blocks from Park Blvd.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 627.  See also *Reddish*, 181 N.J. at 593-95 (describing the inquiry); *State v. Crisafi*, 128 N.J. 499, 510-12 (2019) (same).  “Following the hearing,” the court must make a ruling on whether the defendant can proceed pro se.  *Rose*, 458 N.J. Super. at 627.  “[T]he court generally must permit the defendant to proceed pro se if it finds on the record that the defendant has knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived the right to counsel and decided instead to proceed pro se. ”  *Ibid.*  A court’s failure to address a request to go pro se is a structural error that entitles him to a new trial.