ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Finally, plaintiffs contend that the role played by the [...] in recommending nine of the eleven appointees amounts to an ‘inbred nomination process’ offensive to due process because it produces a Council incompletely representative of the public interest.  [citations omitted].  The delegation of nominating authority to private persons is not in derogation of the Constitution where that document is silent as to the appointment of public officials.  [citations omitted].  Even delegation of legislative authority to private parties may withstand constitutional challenge if sufficient safeguards exist to prevent an arbitrary concentration of power in persons or groups motivated by self-interest.
[brief] *Deatore*, 70 N.J. at 108-09, 115-16; *State v. Muhammad*, 182 N.J. 551, 573 (2005).  By the same token, a jury charge that links certain evidence with the State’s proffered inculpatory purpose and then tells the jury the defendant has the right to offer a exculpatory explanation for such evidence—where defendant offered no alternative explanation—unfairly burdens the defendant’s right to remain silent by inviting the jury to speculate as to why defendant did not testify as to an alternative explanation and perhaps also give greater weight to the State’s explanation in the absence of any contrary explanation offered by the defendant.  Because the defendant never has any burden of proof and has the right to remain silent rather than testify in attempt to offer an alternative, exculpatory explanation for the State’s evidence, there has never been a single instance where our courts have authorized a jury instruction that tells the jury the defendant has the right to respond to some seemingly inculpatory evidence by offering an alternative explanation for that evidence where defendant has not actually proffered any alternative explanation.
[brief] The doctrines of equitable estoppel and unjust enrichment go hand to hand.  Equitable estoppel applies to conduct, either express or implied, which reasonably misleads another to his prejudice so that a repudiation of such conduct would be unjust in the eyes of the law.  Detrimental reliance occurs when one person depends on the actions of another and takes action based on that trust which ultimately harms the first person’s position.  See Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154 (1984), citing Fidelity Union Trust Co. V. Essex Cty. Mortgage Co., 130 N.J. Eq., 351, 353 (E.& A. 1941); Carlsen v. Masters, Mates Pilots Pension Plan Trust, 80 N.J. 334, 339 (1979); Clark v. Judge, 84 N.J. Super. 35, 54 (Ch.Div. 1964) aff’d, 44 N.J. 550 (1965); Feldman v. Urban Commercial, Inc., 70 N.J. Super. 463, 474 (Ch.Div. 1961); Lawes v. Lynch, 7 N.J. Super. 584, 593 (Ch.Div. 1950) Aff’d, 6 N.J. 1, 11 (1950).
[brief] Probable Cause to Search Defendant’s Vehicle Arose  During [...]’s Interaction with Defendant in the ShopRite Parking Lot.  [...] was permitted to search defendant’s vehicle without a warrant once defendant revealed there was cocaine in his car.  “The Fourth Amendment does not require that every search be made pursuant to a warrant. ”  State v. Terry, 232 N.J. 218, 231 (2018) (citations and punctuation omitted).
[directive] a.  The ALPR policy shall provide that the chief of the department will designate one or more superior officers to oversee and administer the agency’s ALPR program.  These designated supervisors will be authorized to: provide or oversee the training of all officers and civilian employees who are authorized to operate an ALPR or to access or use ALPR stored data; review and approve requests to access and use stored ALPR data to conduct crime trend analysis and/or to access personal identifying information based upon crime trend analysis; and generally to ensure compliance with the department’s ALPR policy and these Guidelines.  b.  The ALPR policy shall provide that the chief of the department shall designate all -14- authorized users, and that no officer or civilian employee will be authorized to operate an ALPR, or to access or use ALPR stored data, unless the officer or civilian employee has received training by the department on the proper operation of these devices, and on the provisions of the department’s ALPR policy and these Guidelines.  c.  The ALPR policy shall implement and enforce the five-years retention period for ALPR stored data established in Section 9 of these Guidelines, and must provide for the purging of all ALPR stored data at the expiration of the five-year term.  d.  The ALPR policy shall provide for the documentation of all ALPR-related activities and decisions that are required to be documented by Section 5 or any other provision of these Guidelines, which may be done by an automated record-keeping system~ and shall provide that such records documenting the use of ALPRs and ALPR stored data shall be maintained for 5 years and shall be kept in a place and in a manner as to facilitate a review and audit of the department’s ALPR program by the County Prosecutor or by the Attorney General or his or her designee.  e.  The ALPR policy shall provide that any sworn officer or civilian employee of the agency who knowingly violates the agency’s policy, or these Guidelines, shall be subject to discipline.  f.  The ALPR policy shall provide that all significant violations of the agency’s policy, or of these Guidelines, including but not limited to all instances involving the unauthorized access or use of ALPR stored data, must be reported to the County Prosecutor, or to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice in cases involving a state-level agency, upon discovery of the violation.  Unless the County Prosecutor or Director elects to conduct or oversee the investigation of the violation, such notification of the violation shall be followed up with a report, approved by the chief of the department, explaining to the County Prosecutor, or to the Director, the circumstances of the violation, and the steps that are being taken to prevent future similar violations.  14.2
[directive] 7.1  General Policy and Decision Framework.  Under the Bail Reform Law, only certain “eligible defendants” as that term is defined in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 are subject to pretrial detention.  Cf. Section 1.6 (note, however, that Rule 3:26-1, as ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court after Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2016-6 was issued, does not include petty disorderly persons offenses, and thus this Directive does not apply to petty disorderly persons offenses).  Specifically, the statute authorizes pretrial detention of eligible defendants (i.e., defendants charged by complaint- warrant) who are charged with an indictable crime or a non-indictable offense involving domestic violence.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a) and N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(a).  The Bail Reform Law creates a general presumption against preventive detention except in cases where a defendant is charged with murder or is facing an ordinary or extended term of life imprisonment.  The statutory presumption of pretrial release that applies in all other cases is Page 57 overcome only when the State establishes by clear and convincing evidence that no release condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the eligible defendant’s appearance in court when required, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, or that the defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19.  Pursuant to that statutory standard, under this Directive it shall be the exception, not the norm, for a prosecutor to seek pretrial detention, and no motion for pretrial detention shall be filed except as may be authorized by this Directive.
[brief] The First Remand hearing occurred 6 months later on October 24, 2018, followed by a second set of hearings on November 28, 2018 and January 9, 2018, the latter date being when the Board decided [...]’s application.  [...] appealed the Board’s decision to the Superior Court.  On November 20, 2019, [...] issued a scathing decision remanding the case for a second time to the Board due to its arbitrary and capricious rulings, particularly as to the Board’s determination of [...]’s equity in the Unit.  The Board did not schedule a third set of hearings until March 20, 2020, four months after [...]’s ruling.
[brief] (9T16:15-16).  What [...] wrote in his recitation of the second interview, which was not tape recorded in violation of the Attorney General Guidelines, did not accurately reflect what [...] told him.  (9T23:18-19).  During the second interview when [...] was shown one of the still photos of the GPS data, he told [...] that that was one of the nights [...] was out on foot patrol.  (9T24:3-4).  [...] looked at [...], raised his voice, and said that they were done, and that [...] was not talking to [...].  (9T24:7-8).  [...] categorically rejected [...]’s truthful statements because [...]’s truthful statements in the IA interviews did not fit with [...]’s predetermined conclusion.  [...] was stunned by this reaction.  (9T24:10).  During the second interview [...] asked [...] to check the GPS on his portable radio to show that [...] was on foot patrol, but [...] did not answer [...].  (9T24:20-23).  When the GPS data was finally produced, after over a year and multiple requests which went unheeded by [...] or [...], [...] reviewed several dates which were raised as issues by [...].
[brief] [...] and [...] both have matching sentences in their reports (even with the same typo) as follows:  [...] refused to hand the keys to officer's (sic) and immediately became irate.  We stood him up and attempted to place him in handcuffs due to his change in demeanor and the fact that he had a set of keys in each hand.  (Pa303-Pa304; Pa022)  . . .  [...] tightened his body and put his arms under himself, making it difficult to pull his arms behind his back.  [...] then used the ground to try to push himself up.  (Pa304; Pa023)  The officers provided inconsistent stories regarding plaintiff’s backpack that contained a bottle with alcohol (which is legal) that plaintiff did not want to keep in the passenger compartment.
[brief] Id. at 212–13.  Just recently, this court affirmed a trial court order compelling arbitration under [...]’s terms and held that various threshold questions of arbitrability had been properly delegated to the arbitrator.  See McGinty, 2024 WL 4248446, at *9.  In McGinty, this court recognized that [...]’s terms delegated “all threshold questions of arbitrability, including the enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement, to the arbitrator. ”  Id. at *1, *3.  Though the plaintiffs attempted to avoid arbitration by raising a number of defenses, each defense had to be determined by the arbitrator pursuant to the delegation provision in the Arbitration Agreement in [...]’s terms.  See id. at *9–10.  Like the arbitration agreements in Rent-A-Center, Goffe, and McGinty, the Arbitration Agreement here unmistakably delegates the question of unconscionability to the arbitrator.
[brief] [Emphasis added.]  Thus, the proofs failed to show and the trial court failed to make a specific and necessary finding as to each transaction that the sum allegedly diverted actually "belonged" to a plaintiff or was "identifiable" as a fund set aside for any plaintiff, as opposed to general corporate funds.  Rather, the court adopted plaintiffs' false premise that the transfer of funds to defendants without a corresponding distribution to [...] somehow satisfied the elements of a conversion.
[brief] This special relationship can arise by agreement, undertaking and contact.  *Id* at 59-60.  These are three distinct concepts.  An agreement or undertaking will give rise to a duty with respect to the subject agreed upon or undertaken.  Whether a contact creates a duty is determined by its nature and surrounding circumstances.  *Id.* at 62.  While *United Jersey* and *City Check* dealt with the tort of breach of a fiduciary duty, in the contract context, the duty of disclosure should be no different.  The fiduciary owes the beneficiary of his concern the duty of good faith, loyalty, due care and disclosure.  *Delaney v. Dickey*, 244 NJ 456, 485 (2020).  The count should have determined under the circumstances a fiduciary duty existed and it was breached.  **Conclusion**
[brief] In addition, the Board does not believe that the c(2) standard may be met and that purposes of the MLUL would be advanced by the granting of such variance relief … the promotion of the general welfare as set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2a cannot serve as the basis for the granting of relief in view of the substantial nonconformities proposed which would be inconsistent with the character of the surrounding neighborhood and contrary to the Master Plan.  Other purposes of the MLUL as set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 would similarly not be promoted … the Goal of appropriate population densities as set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2e will not be promoted in view of a development discordant with the surrounding neighborhood.  The Goal of providing sufficient space for a variety of uses as set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2g is not supported by the evidence in view of the substantial variance relief, lack of appropriate buffers, and a plan that is contrary to the Goals and Objectives of the Master Plan.  Finally, the Goal of a desirable visual environment through creative development techniques and good civic design and arrangement as set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2i cannot support the granting of relief.  It is assumed that any new construction may, to some extent, be aesthetically pleasing.  Aesthetics alone cannot prevail over a FAR five times greater than that permitted in the Zone and other proposed nonconforming conditions which characterize the development proposal.  Accordingly, the Board concludes that the variances pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70c should be denied. ”  Pa140-142 at ¶¶15-16, emphasis added.
[brief] ASSUMING ARGUENDO THE COURT DETERMINED THAT THE ACTIVITY AT ISSUE WAS A “CONDITION” OF PUBLIC PROPERTY, THE ACTIVITY IS NOT A REASONABLY FORESEEABLE USE OF PUBLIC PROPERTY.  (Briefed Below)  Assuming arguendo this Court were to overturn the Court Below and determine that the activity alleged by Plaintiffs to be sufficient – without the necessary defect of the property itself – to create a cognizable “dangerous condition”, the activity is still not a “reasonably foreseeable” use of the public property at issue.
[brief] With respect to [...], the trial court awarded [...] $511,005 in attorneys’ fees, $88,827 in costs, and $1,068,835.87 in prejudgment interest.  (Pa0043.)  The interest awarded exceeded the amount sought in [...]’s March 2021 Motion.  (Pa213.)  The costs awarded were stated to be “[a]t 6.4% and undisputed”.  (Pa0043).  Both of these statements were incorrect.  [...] had opposed costs and [...] had calculated 6.4% of its costs at $55,670.  (Da262.)  The Final Judgment Order held that [...] was a “successful claimant” entitled to attorneys’ fees.  (Pa0050-Pa0052.)  However, the trial court’s holding disregarded [...]’s numerous failures, including on choice of law (which resulted in dismissal of 12 insurers) and on allocation.
[brief] [...] stated that an actual survey was needed and he was not a surveyor so he did not say that Lot 22 was owned by [...].  He thought that it might be when he used Google Maps to look at the property.  The use of Google Maps is not a survey.  The claim that [...] engaged in improper tactics by communicating with a company by the name of [...] is an affront to [...] as there were no restrictions in either party communicating with surveyors.  In fact, [...] contacted two survey companies about the land in question and [...] was not aware of this nor was Counsel for [...] invited to participate in the communications that took place with those survey companies that [...] spoke to.
[directive] 10% permissible recharge an electronic communication device while confined to a state correctional facility, Use of Certain secure juvenile facility, county correctional facility, or county juvenile detention facility, third 2C:29-10(b)(c)(d)  Electronic Devices in degree; person, other than an employee of said facilities who knowingly sells, transfers, or Correctional Facilities otherwise gives an electronic communication device to a person who is confined in one of said 3rd Degree $10,000 to $50,000 10% permissible facilities, third degree; if the actor is an employee of said facilities, then second degree.
[brief] ”  citing *State v.  Wilson*, 135 N.J. 4, 17 (1994).  It should also be noted, “[a]uthentication of a videotape is similar to the authentication of a photograph. ”  *Brown*, 463 N.J. Super at 52, citing *State v. Loftin*, 287 N.J. Super. 76, 98 (App. Div. 1996).  In this case, the [...] would mark an exhibit for identification, and without more, would then move it into evidence.  The [...] offered no testimony which allow such an exhibit to be duly authenticated and admitted into evidence.  The Court in *State v. Sweet*, 195 N.J. 357, 370 (2008) held:
[brief] Pb14  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS APPEALED  I.  MARCH 4, 2024  ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF  SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Pa27 to Pa28).  A.  Order is at Pa27 to Pa28.  B.  Verbal opinion is at T12-10 to T14-14; T15-23 to T16-14.  C.  No intermediate opinion.  II.  MARCH 4, 2024  ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Pa27 to Pa28).  A.  Order is at Pa27 to Pa28  B.  Verbal opinion is at T14-15 to T15-18.  C.  No intermediate opinion.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] At [...] on the day of the incident, the plaintiff told [...], whose body cam footage was played for the jury, that [...] said during their encounter "I have a major in history [he] doesn't have to learn about grout."  This also appears in the police report written by [...] and approved by [...].  The eyewitness, [...], also recalled [...] telling them that he had a Phd.  However, [...] denied having told the plaintiff that he had a Phd in history, and he also denied having said anything about his educational achievements.
[brief] ”  In re Tax Credit Application of Pennrose Props. Inc., 346 N.J. Super. 479, 486 (App. Div. 2002); accord Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011).  [...] cannot shoulder that burden.  While pension statutes should be construed liberally “in favor of the persons intended to be benefitted thereby,” Bumbaco v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 325 N.J. Super. 90, 94 (App. Div. 2000), “eligibility is not to be liberally permitted.
[directive] RELIEF COLLOQUY (SPANISH-LANGUAGE VERSION)  NOTIFICACION DE LOS DERECHOS DE APELACION Y DEL PLAZO PARA PRESENTAR UNA PETICION DE COLOQUIO PARA REPARACION DESPUES DE LA CONDENA NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS AND TIME TO FILE A PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION  RELIEF  COLLOQUY  Us ted tiene 45 d ias a partir de hoy para apelar su  You have 45 days from today to appeal your sentencia condenatoria y condena.  conviction and sentence.  [Si el acusado estuvo representado por un [If the defendant was represented by private abogado particular, lea lo siguiente: counsel, read the following:
[brief] ”  Id. at 468-69 (quoting Carlson v. Jerousek, 68 N.E.3d 520, 534 (Ill. Ct. App. 2016)).  The “clear alternative” to the trial court’s wholesale production order was “that the employees undertake searches of their own devices and produce certifications relating to their searches and their search results. ”  Id. at 473-74.  [...] and the authorities it cites entirely answer the trial court’s gatekeeping concern.  If, as the trial court asserted, the only “goal” of discovery was to “make[] sure that every relevant document gets produced”—without regard to whether the “process makes us produce irrelevant documents,” T25:10-14—that objective would be best served by simply requiring producing parties to turn over entire filing cabinets or electronic devices housing the documents.  But this Court rejected exactly that approach.
[brief] Bell A. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).  Where a Plaintiff's claims are "vague and generally unintelligible, a motion to dismiss is warranted.  Jalil v. Dime Sav. Bank, No. A-1388-05T1, 2006 WL 2726834, at *1 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Sept. 26, 2006).  Here, the elements of the claims are not properly pled and are unintelligible.
[brief] Should you fail to communicate with the Landlord or should the parties be unable to reach a mutually acceptable resolution of Tenant’s defaults, Landlord will have no choice but to commence eviction proceedings forthwith.  (D198-199).  Tenant failed to respond to the Default Notices.  D.  Tenant Allowance Payments  It is undisputed that Landlord made a Tenant Allowance Payment on August 1, 2019.\(^{10}\) (1T14-24 to 1T15-11).  It is further undisputed that on \(^{10}\)  Whether Landlord underpaid the Tenant Allowance due on August 1, 2019 has no impact on this appeal as it is undisputed that Tenant never noticed such a default, as is required by the terms of the Lease, or exercised its sole contractual remedy in response to the same.  (Da17-18, Lease at § 4.02).  Having failed to do so, Tenant cannot now argue that this alleged underpayment bars Landlord’s express contractual rights.  August 1, 2020 and August 1, 2021  Tenant was in monetary default under the Lease due to its admitted failure to pay any Rent or Additional Rent for the months of April 2020 through August 2020, which defaults were properly noticed and cure periods expired.  (Da194-199; Pa107; Db10).  As such, Tenant forfeited the 2020 and 2021 Tenant Allowance payments that would have been due on those dates and Landlord had no obligation to pay the same.  (Da17-18, Lease at § 4.02).  As detailed above, on November 29, 2021, Tenant deposited the Rent Arrears with the Clerk of Court.  (Da179-181).  Therefore, Landlord, in a good faith effort comply with the terms of the Lease and New Jersey statutory law, considered the Events of Default cured and resumed making the Tenant Allowance payments under Section 4.02 beginning with the payment due on August 1, 2022.  (3T6-22 to 3T7-21); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:18-55 (providing that summary eviction actions for non-payment of rent shall be dismissed upon the payment of the rent arrears to the clerk).
[brief] 6T:20:9-21:21; 30:9-14; 33:20-24; 35:17-19; 40:17-22, 44:18, 54:20-23.  Second, [...] seeks to lessen the import of [...]’s capital improvements to the Unit.  But [...] merely asserts that the improvements were not as substantial as apparently desired, not that the Unit did not receive $76,900 of improvements as substantiated by [...] in his certification submitted with [...]’s application (Pa 48) and his testimony (1T:6:14-16, 44:10-16, 5T:74:12-25) whom [...] did not cross-examine.  This renovation was never hundreds of thousands of dollars, but that does not mean it did not total $76,900.  See [...]’s brief, pages 7-9 (specifying the improvements to the Unit, including new windows, new bathroom, new kitchen sink, new kitchen cabinets, improvement of kitchen and replacement of water heater, all of which [...] agreed were completed).  [...] does not argue that improvements were not made, only that they were not to any great extent.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(q) (emphasis added).  Our courts have held that various mental health disorders qualify as disabilities under the NJLAD, like depression, post-traumatic stress, anxiety and other psychotic disorders.  Domurat v. Ciba Specialty Chems. Corp., 353 N.J.Super. 74, 89 (App. Div. 2002); see also Tynan, supra, 351 N.J.Super. at 398-99.