ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The 'g parole, probation, on defendant was eligible the arrest, or offense current the of time the at "whether consider may federal under offense another for sentence of completion or appeal, sentencing, trial, pending release other or on Legislature thus The added).  2A:162-20(c)(2) (emphasis N.J.S.A. state." other any or this of law the or law, circumstance this risk.  Because of indicator an as circumstance case-specific of this importance the recognized complaint- a issuing for basis a establishes clearly it law, Reform Bail under the detention pretrial justify might warrant.
[brief] The complete absence of any facts which would give rise to a presumption of peaceable possession on the part of Defendants precludes any determination awarding ownership to Defendants.  As outlined in detail above, Defendants failed to produce any evidence which would support a conclusion that [...] maintained the Property, including any records related to payment of taxes, utilities, or other expenses.  Similarly, and despite their sworn testimony to the contrary, [...] testified that he did not act as property manager for the property.  (4T70; 4T83-84, January 10, 2023).  Further, Defendants failed to produce any evidence would in any way establish that [...] acted as property manager for the Property, including a property management agreement, copies of important Property-related documents, i.e., insurance, or records of rent received and expenses paid.  (13T84:23-86:3; 3T97:24-98:4).  In direct contrast with Defendants, [...] produced extensive documentary and testimonial evidence establishing his ownership, control, and peaceable possession of the Property from 1997 through early 2020 when his wife first learned of the ownership transfer to [...] and beyond.
[brief] APPELLANT’S BRIEF  On appeal from the November 17, 2023  Dismissal Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. in the Superior Court, Law Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. [...]  [...], Esq. ID No. 083862013  [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  [...], Esq. ID No. 154592016  [...] [...] [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
[brief] [...]’s twenty-year NERA sentence guarantees his incarceration until the age of fifty-eight.  The risk of recidivism at age fifty-eight is much smaller than the risk of recidivism at the age when [...] committed the offense, and the risk of recidivism does not discernably change between age fifty-eight and age sixty.  Because the risk that [...] will recidivate is very low at both ages fifty-eight and sixty, and is virtually indistinguishable between those two ages, this Court should find that the sentencing goal of incapacitation does not justify imposing a consecutive sentence.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  Paff does not limit email logs to just those from email accounts maintained on government servers.  The very definition of a “government record” was mistaken by the trial court when it held that the government must “make” (or “receive”) **AND** “maintain” the record for it to be a government record.  And the --- \(^8\)  And what might be such a hardship?  Like [...]’s take on pornography, OPRA judges will know it when they see it.  I am aware that [...] auto-deletes materials after 18 months, so that *could* be one.  Certainly “hardship” it *is not* going to be “we have to send a subpoena to [...]’s IT department because our Board communicates outside official channels”.  And after the clear and dire warnings in Burnett and Simmons, there should be no sympathy for reasonable steps to have to be undertaken to make the requester record available.  There is no contention that [...] has to do the impossible but all that is presented here is “harder than if it was on municipal server”.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Atlantic Northern Airlines v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293 (1953)  ...........................................  1 Berkowitz v. Haigood, 256 N.J. Super. 342 (Law Div. 1992) ...........................................  7, 8 Cherilus v. Fed Express, 435 N.J. Super. 172 (App. Div. 2014) ...................................... 8, 9 Costanzo v. Costanzo, 248 N.J.Super. 116, 121-22, 590 A.2d 268 (Law Div. 1991) ................................................................................................................................. 7, 8 Cronin v. McKim-Gray 353 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 2002) ....................................... 6, 7 D’Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168 (2013) ............................................................ 10, 14 D'Egidio Landscaping v. Apicella, 337 N.J. Super. 252, 257-259 (App. Div. 2001) ................................................................................................................................. 11, 12 Di Tolvo v. Di Tolvo, 131 N.J.Super. 72, 79, 328 A.2d 625 (App.Div.1974) ............. 7, 8 Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24, 67 (2017) ......................................................... 1 Foley Mach. Co. v. Amland Contractors, Inc, 209 N.J.Super. 70, 75 (App.Div.1986) ............................................................................................................. 11 Goldfarb v. Reicher, 112 N.J.L. 413, 414, 171 A. 149 (Sup.Ct.), aff’d o.b., 113 N.J.L. 399, 174 A. 507 (E. & A.1934)
[brief] Re: [...] and [...] v. [...], [...], in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, and [...], in her official capacity as Commissioner of Banking and Insurance [...]  On Appeal From The July 27, 2023  Orders Issued By The Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County Letter Brief of Respondents, The State Of New Jersey, Gurbir Grewal, and Marlene Caride, in Response to the Amicus Curiae Brief of [...]  Dear Mr.  Orlando:  Please accept this letter on behalf of Respondents, The State of New Jersey, Gurbir Grewal, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, and Marlene Caride, in her official capacity as Commissioner of Banking and Insurance (collectively, “Respondents”), in lieu of a more formal brief in response to the amicus curiae brief filed by the [...] (“[...]”).
[brief] Having admitted throughout discovery that they did not receive, let alone rely upon, any advice or information from [...] or [...], Appellants attempted to rely on other pedestrian facts about [...]’s role as counsel for the “contract opponent,” [...], as follows: (1) [...] was aware of the [...]- [...] Assignment and Assumption of Agreement; (2) [...] prepared, in conjunction with Appellants’ counsel, [...], certain General Releases; (3) the Releases listed [...] as attorney for [...]; and (4) [...] sent a default letter on behalf of [...] because Appellants failed to timely make one of the payments required by the parties’ contractual agreement.  See Appellants’ Brief at p. 14-17.  Yet, the foregoing assertions did nothing more than demonstrate that [...] did what an attorney would typically do for his or her client during the course of any business transaction, namely: draft agreements in conjunction with counsel for the other party, become familiar with the transactional documents, and draft and send correspondence (such as notices and default letters) concerning the transaction.  None of these functions, alone or in combination with the others, would be sufficient to create any duty of care to a non-client.  In summary, the undisputed material facts concerning [...]’s and [...]’s role as counsel to [...] in the assignment transaction compelled entry of summary judgment in their favor.
[brief] At that time, [...] had the consent of its client, [...], to perform services for the new Project owner, [...].  (Pa79).  Accordingly, [...] continued to develop its site engineering drawings to advance the Project for [...].  (Pa79).  [...] never sold the Project plans, or any other documents, to [...].  (Pa80 and Pa81).  Appellants named [...] and [...] as defendants when it filed the complaint against [...].
[brief] ” (citations omitted)).  Here, the term “RIR” does not appear anywhere in the PSA.  (See generally Pa0246-91.)  The trial court, however, improperly relied on extrinsic evidence as to the parties’ intent to determine that Defendants were responsible only for obtaining the RIR.  See Schwimmer, 12 N.J. at 301-02 (“[A]n intention wholly unexpressed in the writing . . . is irrelevant.
[brief] See Ingersoll, supra, 138 N.J. at 239 (establishing that Med-Pay portion of an automobile policy does not fall within the purview of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 or N.J.S.A. 39:6A-10).  If the Legislature was dissatisfied with the current framework, it could have chosen to extend coverage of the collateral source rule to include Med-Pay benefits when it amended the statute in 2003.  We infer from this non-action by the Legislature that it accepted the court's current interpretation of the statute.  Warnig Supra at 571.  The Court further stated:  Moreover, Med-Pay benefits, represent "a very narrow window of coverage to a limited class of persons who . . . are ineligible for PIP benefits."  Ingersoll, supra, 138 N.J. at 240.  Given the narrow reach of these benefits, we cannot conclude that the Legislature intended them to be treated like PIP benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6, but neglected to say so.  Warnig Supra at 571.  Based on the above, the Court distinguished Medpay benefits from PIP benefits.
[brief] The fact that someone else had previously shot at the victim had the clear capacity to engender reasonable doubt that [...] was the shooter.  This fact could easily lead the jury to conclude that someone else had a motive to kill the victim, particularly if the State did not adequately investigated [...].  Contrary to the State’s misguided argument, a direct link – such as eyewitness testimony placing [...] at the crime scene – was not required.  *See Cotto*, 182 N.J. at 333 (“That standard does not require a defendant to provide evidence that substantially proves the guilt of another, but to provide evidence that creates the possibility of reasonable doubt. ”).  The proposed evidence regarding [...] clearly demonstrated “some link between the third-party and the victim or the crime” and “create[d] the possibility of reasonable doubt. ”  *Ibid.* (quotation omitted).  Thus, the jury was entitled to hear this evidence and evaluate whether it raised a reasonable doubt that [...] was the shooter.
[brief] (15T 106:22 to 107:7).  [...] had been offering to pay [...] $120,000 per year, but [...] demanded $200,000 per year for a total of $600,000.  With this additional $600,000 added to the previously discussed $5.7 million for [...]’s interest in [...], [...] and [...], [...]’s total payout would be $6.3 million.  (Da2800; 15T 107:8 to 108:8).  Based on [...]’s representations as to the finances, [...] insisted upon receipt of $6.3 million.  He and [...] shook hands and agreed that they had a deal on that number.
[directive] (2)  Inherent conflicts.  At least the following categories of persons are considered inherently conflicted and may not serve as a Board member or staffer: a.  A sworn officer or employee of a law enforcement agency within the Board’s jurisdiction, or any person who has held such a position in the last five years; b. A sworn officer or employee of any other state, county, or local law enforcement agency; c. A prosecutor or criminal defense attorney currently practicing in the county within the Board’s jurisdiction; d.  A relative of any of the aforementioned individuals, as defined in the New Jersey Conflicts of Interest Law at N.J.S.A. 52:13D-21.2(2)(d); e.  A current candidate for public office; or f.  With respect to Board membership, a current officer or employee of the municipality.  (3)  Duty to disclose.  Board members and staff have an ongoing duty to affirmatively disclose any conflict of interest that they may reasonably become aware of, whether that conflict is inherent or incident-specific.
[brief] The Respondents are the owners of [...] in the [...].  The property is also identified as [...].  The Respondents filed an application before the [...] for variance relief to construct a 2,941 square foot addition to their home.  The first hearing on the application was heard on March 28, 2022.  The second hearing was conducted on May 23, 2022.  However, after the hearing, the Zoning Board discovered that there was no audio, just video, on the recording of the hearing.  T 4:17 – 4:25 (August 22, 2022).  As a result, the Zoning Board conducted a re-hearing of the May 23, 2022, hearing.  The re-hearings were conducted on August 22, 2022, and September 12, 2022.  On September 12, 2022, the Zoning Board voted in favor of the application and adopted a Resolution of Approval on November 28, 2022.  PA 99.  Notice of Decision was published by the Respondent on December 2, 2022, and the Zoning Board published a Notice of Decision on December 8, 2022.  The Appellants filed their Prerogative Writ complaint on January 20, 2023.
[brief] C.  Sufficient Credible Evidence Supported Each of the Misappropriations and/or Diversions Found by the Trial Court.  The appellant spills a great deal of ink arguing that the trial court lacked sufficient evidence to find misappropriated and/or diverted funds, and that it ignored certain material evidence in reaching its conclusions.  In doing so, she disregards the applicable standard, which requires only that the trial court’s findings be consistent with the “competent, relevant, and reasonable credible evidence. ”  Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484.  Given these arguments, it is important to highlight some of the evidence that the trial court considered to support its findings for each misappropriation.
[brief] The instant hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights act violation action is very odd.  In his sixty-nine pages 434 paragraphs Eight Counts hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights act violations complaint, plaintiff specifically and explicitly alleged that defendants violated his personal rights.  Plaintiff cited and alleged specific violated constitutional and statutory provisions.  Plaintiff’s allegations were neither nebulous nor abstract.  Moreover, during the pendency of this action, our State Legislature revoked historical third-party taxpayer tax court jurisdiction over tax exemptions but preserved an aggrieved third-party taxpayer constitutional prerogative writ rights and remedies.  See, P.L. 2021, Chapter 17, Section 6; P.L. 2003, Chapter 125, Section 13; P.L. 2002, Chapter 15, Section 10; City of Hackensack v. Hackensack Med. Ctr., 228 N.J. Super. 310, 313 (App. Div. 1988); New Jersey Citizen Action v. State of New Jersey, [...] (Law Div. Sept. 28, 2022) (Pa529).  No defendant addressed this game changing action.  No defendant considered whether constitutional and statutory standing provisions trumped judge created common law standing justiciability rules.  Also, no defendant addressed the professional obligation of an officer of the court to enforce the law, to report public wrongdoing, to provide pro bono public service and to act as a private attorney general.  See, NJ Law Journal Editorial Board “New Year’s Resolutions: How we, as lawyers, could make 2024 a better year” (Dec. 29, 2023 at 11:22 am).  III.
[brief] Neither Probation nor the Court has acknowledged same.  3.  Although the Appellate Court held that “The trial judge found these arguments lacked merit, and based on our review of the record we also find they lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. ”, Appellant notes that the [...] acknowledged at the hearing held in October, (transcript 1T47, 11-15), and as noted Appellant’s brief, Appeal No. [...], p.47, lines 11-15):
[brief] The determination of whether terms in a contract are ambiguous is a question of law.  *Taylor v. Continental Group Change in Control Severance Pay Plan*, 933 F. 2d 1227, 1232 (3d. Cir. 1991).  When “determining whether there is ambiguity [in an insurance contract, courts] consider whether an average policyholder could reasonably understand the scope of coverage, and whether better drafting could [have] put the issue beyond debate. ”  *Sosa v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co.*, 458 N.J. Super. 639, 646 (App. Div. 2019).  “When an insurance policy’s language fairly supports two meanings, one that favors the insurer, and the other that favors the insured, the policy should be construed to sustain coverage.
[brief] **1T 13:2 – 13:18.**  The Trial Court also confirmed that “[a]lthough both [...] and [...] possess subspecialties relating to critical care, those subspecialties were not the same as the American Board of Medical Specialties recognizes distinct subspecialties for critical care medicine when it relates to internists and critical care surgery when it relates to the specialty of surgery. ”  1T 13:18 – 13:24.  Also as noted by the Trial Court, unlike [...], Defendant is not a surgeon.  1T 13:13.  Since the American Board of Medical Specialties “draws a distinction between those subspecialties, [...] and [...] do not practice in the same specialty or subspecialty”.  1T 14:2 – 14:4.  The Trial Court concluded that based on the record, Affidavit of Merit Statute and Nicholas that [...]’s AOM was non-compliant and dismissal was appropriate.  41A.  By way of Order dated June 24, 2020, the Trial Court’s ruling was memorialized, granting Defendant’s application, dismissing Plaintiff’s action with prejudice pursuant to N.J.S.A. § 2A:53A-27, et. seq. 41A.  Thereafter, the case proceeded with all claims as to all remaining Defendants being resolved.  This appeal ensued.
[brief] Turning to the substantive failings of Defendants’ complaints, there are four reasons Plaintiff’s counsel’s use of the theme of accountability was permissible and posed no threat to influence the jury.  First, Defendants’ argument ignores the reality that effective litigation requires passion, imagery, and rhetoric.  In fact, “it is the duty of a trial attorney to advocate. ”  Geler v. Akawie, 358 N.J. Super. 437, 463 (App. Div. 2003).  Young lawyers are taught, both pedagogically and in practice, to find creative ways to engage the jury and convey their narrative.  Plaintiff attorneys in particular are encouraged to maximize the recovery of their clients, even if only incidentally, so long as they remain within the boundaries of fairness.  Id.  Again, one way in which many lawyers advocate is by assigning their case a theme.  For reasons that will be elaborated further, Plaintiff’s counsel chose the theme of accountability.
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[brief] POINT II  THE LOWER PROPERLY GRANTED [...] SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS PETERSON DID NOT OPPOSE [...]’s MOTION  SEEKING OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL  [...]’s cross-motion for summary judgment sought to dismiss [...]’s Third-Party Complaint in its entirety.  However, [...] only opposed [...]’s cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of contractual indemnification.  See Da372-379, [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration.  Significantly, the trial court only partially granted [...]’s cross motion for summary judgment, limiting its decision to the issue of contractual indemnification.
[brief] \footnote{[...] states that its reluctance to produce confidential information is a product of its experience in the Nevada litigation, where the [...] affiliates “posted documents designated as ‘Attorneys Eyes Only’ and ‘Confidential’ on a public anti-[...] website. ”  (Db9, Db36-37.)  That is a grossly misleading portrayal of what occurred in Nevada.  In fact, the only documents that were posted on the website had already been entered into evidence and been the subject of extensive witness testimony (at a public trial, that was livestreamed over the internet, with media present in the gallery).  (Da144-45; Da149-50.)  As such, the documents were a matter of public record at the time they were posted, and it was not improper or inappropriate for the [...] affiliates to draw attention to them.  Nonetheless, [...] raised an objection to the website, and the Nevada court instructed the [...] affiliates to remove the documents (which they promptly did).  (Da145; Da149-50.)}
[brief] Pa333.  In the aforementioned letters, [...] specifically reserved the right to withdraw coverage to the extent the claims were outside the scope of the insuring grant of the D&O Form or within the scope of policy exclusions, including the “personal profit” exclusion (letter (g)); the “fines or penalties” exclusion (letter (o)); and the “insured vs. insured exclusion (letter (q)) in the policy.  Pa333-351.  On January 30, 2020, the [...] ruled upon a motion seeking a preliminary injunction against [...] and fellow directors.  The motion was based on alleged mismanagement of litigation to which the [...] was a party such that the outcome would be steered to benefit [...], his wife and other directors personally, contrary to the interests of the [...] as a whole.
[brief] COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  As set forth in the Introduction to this Brief, pages 1 to 107 of the Petitioner’s Brief contain documents which are unattached to any Certification, Affidavit, Affirmation, motion papers or other vehicle which would demonstrate that they were submitted to the ALJ and/or the Board.  Those documents should accordingly be given no consideration by this Court.  Thus, Petitioner’s purported “Statement of Facts & Procedural History” at pages 8-20 of his Brief should be disregarded by this Court insofar as it relies on references to pages 1 to 107 of the Appendix.  Because the Procedural History and Counterstatement of Facts are closely related, they are combined to avoid repetition and for the Court’s convenience.  Through these improperly submitted documents, Petitioner appears to be attempting to argue the merits of his disability application (i.e., the alleged diagnosis of psych disability, medical/psychiatric documents, etc.).  The alleged merits of the disability application are NOT at issue in this appeal – the only issue before this Court is Petitioner’s eligibility (or rather, non-eligibility) for AD.
[brief] *BOC Group v. Chevron Chemical Co.*, 359 N.J. Super. 135, 149-150 (App. Div. 2003).  A respondent must show that there is more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.  *Triffin v. American Intern.*, 372 N.J. Super. 517, 523-524 (App. Div. 2004).  Mere conclusionary statements are inadequate to defeat a motion for summary judgment.  Nor will summary judgment be defeated by the private intent of a party to a contract regarding the interpretation of the contract.  *Domanske v. Rapid-Am. Corp.*, 330 N.J. Super. 241, 246 (App. Div. 2000) (“Under long-settled principles, the secret, unexpressed intent of a party cannot be used to vary the terms of an agreement.