ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Such action on her part was not only violative of her ethical obligations as a Board member, it also compromised the Board.  (Ca032).  Next, Respondent even outright admitted in her discovery admissions which were attached to Appellants’ Motion for Summary Decision that she held herself out as a Board member on her Facebook page and that, in doing so, she actually compromised the Board:  •  You used the Facebook account that is the subject of the Complaint to campaign for your seat on the Board.  ADMIT __X__ DENY ______ •  On January 7, 2022, you shared a series of pictures which showed you being sworn in as a member of the Board.  ADMIT __X__ DENY ______ •  At the time you made the January 10, 2022 post that is the subject of Count 4 of the Complaint, some of your Facebook friends were members of the [...] community, including but not limited to parents, teachers, students, and staff.  ADMIT __X__ DENY ______ •
[brief] Statement of Facts - Police Reports Attached 10/13/2020 (Attached at Pa232)  Hawkin’s Letter to [...] and Edison Prosecutor Exhibit C-7 to [...]’s Certification  [...] Letter Regarding Request for Discovery to Edison and Highland Park  12/7/2020  Notice of Motion to Suppress and Dismiss by [...] 10/13/2020 (Attached at Pa059)
[brief] Defendants’ Failure to Act and Breach of Duty**  Between the Biennial Bridge Inspection on April 22, 2015 and the subject accident, there is no record of any maintenance being performed by any Defendant to fix the dangerous condition; nor is there any evidence of warning signs being installed in order to warn motorists of the dangerous condition.  Between the June 24, 2015 inspection, which identified “significant settlement” at the north approach that was in need of “immediate repairs”, and the time of the subject accident, there were no records of any maintenance performed by any Defendant to fix the dangerous condition nor is there any evidence of warning signs being installed to warn motorists of the dangerous condition.
[brief] [...] stated that the allegations in [...]’s certification are false; he did not corner [...] in her office, nor did he continually insult, threaten, or do anything to make her feel threatened or fearful of him.  (Pa366, Pa367).  [...] stated that [...] is afraid to lose her job because of her incompetence; and in order to protect “her turf” has defamed him by making false statements to her employer and law enforcement authorities.  (Pa368).  Those complaints, filed on January 29, 2016, contained false statements by both [...] and Ms. [...].  (Pa369).  [...] was found not guilty of harassment because there was no evidence that suggested that he intended to harass anyone.  (Pa369).  Subsequently, [...] dropped her complaint because it was based on false statements and not out of the goodness of her heart.  (Pa369).  [...] never intended to harass anyone.  (Pa376).  The only tangible evidence was provided by [...].  (Pa376).  [...] lied about recording video in her office and filed false reports with law enforcement officials.  (Pa376).  [...] has video evidence—which he provided to the Prosecuting Attorney—which contradicts the description of events in the underlying complaint.
[brief] The trial court concluded that to permit the jury to assess what caused [...] to fall would constitute speculation.  But, for certain, the plaintiff fell.  He was walking upright and then he was on his back.  The issue is: did he fall as a result of the snow covered plywood?  He testified that he was on top of the plywood on his back.  So, a jury could conclude that the plywood was involved in his fall.  He testified that it was slippery as he had difficulty trying to get off of it.  Certainly, a jury could infer that he had stepped on the plywood, and slipped causing his fall.  A jury, likewise, could conclude that he tripped on the plywood.  Commonly, human beings walk without falling unless one or the other of their feet meet an obstruction precipitating a fall.  Defendants offer no alternative theory as to what precipitated [...]’s fall.  They just assert that he could not testify to what caused his fall.  Defendant [...] offers the opinion of [...] who reviewed [...]’s medical records and suggested that he had a “risk factor” for syncope but offered no opinion as to syncope causing the fall ([...] Da118).  In any event, the trial court dismissed out of hand any consideration of [...] suffering a medical incident before the accident (1T38:18 to 39:21).  The trial court concluded that [...] could have slipped on the plywood, but concluded “there could be a myriad of other ways in which he could have fallen. ”  (1T39:2-8)  Significantly, the trial court could offer not one of this “myriad” of potential other causes.  The fact that neither the defendants nor the trial court could offer any reason for the fall contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion of coming into contact with the plywood, suggests that it is more probable than not that that is what occurred and why the case should have been presented to the jury.
[brief] In their Reply Brief, Respondent again raised the issue stating: “A client's financial information and attitudes about litigation and settlement are confidential and grounds for disqualification. ”  (301a).  Appellant clearly knew to address the issue as [...] submitted a Certification wherein he stated: “20.  [...]’ claim that [...] is privy to [...]’ ‘attitude’ toward settlement or litigation based on the prior representation is also materially false. ” (340a; See also T14:13-19).  Thus, the Court did not err in permitting an *in-camera* review.
[brief] On February 14, 2024, following a 2-day plenary hearing to determine amounts owed by Defendants to the Trust for mesne profits and attorneys’ fees, the trial court issued an Order requiring that Defendants pay sanctions to Plaintiff for two frivolous motions, pursuant to Rule 1:4-8.  These motions include: (1) Leave to File a Second Supplemental Complaint; and (2) Due Process Violation and Relief.  Defendants argue that sanctions are not appropriate because they acted in good faith and their applications demonstrate merit.  Furthermore, Defendants argue that the Plaintiff and Trial Court failed to strictly comply with the procedural requirements pursuant to Rule 1:4-8, which precludes an award.  Therefore, Defendants respectfully request that the Appellate Division (1) Modify the appropriate Order to require that [...] is entitled to restitution for his one-third share of the fair market value of the Boonton and Florida Properties, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:31-72; (2) Require that [...] is entitled to restitution for his one-third share of the Trust funds spent on adversarial litigation, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:31-72, which provides that a beneficiary may seek restitution for improper expenditures; (3) Reverse the May 10, 2023 Orders and confirm the Defendants’ right to supplement and amend their pleadings and pursue their claims; (4)
[brief] [Da31 - Da35].  On December 4, 2023, Plaintiff submitted another Notice of Motion in this matter seeking to “establish the liability of the [...] via a breach of Statute Negligence Claim occurring on April 18, 2005. ”  [AB12a - AB16a].  On December 12, 2023, the current Bergen County Assignment Judge entered an order sua sponte dismissing Plaintiff’s December 4, 2023 Notice of Motion as frivolous pursuant to the March 9, 2012 injunctive order.  [AB17a - AB18a].  On February 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed the subject Notice of Appeal of the trial court’s December 12, 2023 Order.  [AB1a - AB16a]
[brief] Exhibit F to Certification, May 24, 2023, letter to [...], filed October 10, 2023  Exhibit G to Certification, June 19, 2023, letter from [...] of N.J. counsel, filed October 10, 2023  Exhibit H to Certification, Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Interstate Racking & Shelving, II, Inc., A-1614-19 (App. Div. Jan. 27, 2021) (unpublished), filed October 10, 2023  Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts in support of Cross-motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 10, 2023
[directive] Addendum A | December 2020 CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition device concerning the incident.  The law enforcement executive of each department that utilizes CEDs shall issue a rule, regulation, standing operating procedure or other appropriate order to establish a system to ensure that the internal digital recording systems of these devices are maintained, and that the data contained therein cannot be tampered with, and cannot be accessed or erased except by duly authorized supervisors.
[directive] Deviation from, or variation of, the exact language of the Standard Statement, for whatever reason, could be viewed by a Court as non-compliance with the statutory requirements.  However, in a circumstance where, due to inadvertence or mistake, a law enforcement officer reads a Standard Statement that is not the current Standard Statement, such an error should not result in the dismissal of the DWI refusal charge.  The key factor is that a Standard Statement was read to the defendant, albeit one that has been revised or replaced.
[brief] The *Roe* Court found that by bolting the gate open and inviting the public to use it, defendant [...] substantially and knowingly increased the risk that persons accepting the invitation would encounter the dangers lurking just beyond the gate.  *Id.* at 80.  The Court further reasoned that the dangerous condition of the property itself enhanced plaintiff’s exposure to the injuries she sustained and that the actions defendant took were palpably unreasonable in view of the relatively minor expense and inconvenience of either relocating the gate or keeping it locked.  *Id.* at 79,81.  In the present case, it is apparent that there are significant questions of fact which preclude summary judgment.
[brief] Nor do Plaintiffs cite to any evidence that shows that [...] posed a danger to customers.  That is because during the trial it was established that [...] (1) had experience interacting with customers in a polite and professional manner, (2) was trained on the purpose and applications of grout, and (3) provided accurate information to [...] regarding the use and application of the bag of grout [...] was holding on the day of the incident.  Negligent training and supervision claims are premised upon the employer’s knowledge that the employee’s personal, specific attributes create a risk of harm, and that the employer then fails to mitigate that risk of harm with training or supervision of the employee.  Thus, when the known risk of harm manifests and causes an injury, the injury is foreseeable to the employer, and the employer is liable.  In this case, Plaintiffs’ opposition confirms that their argument is based upon a flawed premise, i.e., that a trainee cannot interact and approach a customer on his or her own while in training even though [...] witnesses testified that trainees are allowed to interact with customers on their own, and Plaintiffs’ liability expert admitted at trial that [...] has the right to interpret its own training policies.
[brief] However, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate if the claim is barred by a statute of limitations or similar impediment; Id. at 772.  This Court, pursuant to the case law, reviews “de novo” the trial Court’s grant of a Motion to Dismiss under R. 4:6-2(c) and “owes no deference to the trial Court’s legal conclusions;” Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019).
[brief] Appellate Counsel argues that even if this statement was otherwise admissible for the reasons set forth above; N.J.R.E. 607 and N.J.R.E. 803(a)(2) do not apply because the statement was allegedly made at the same time as the plea, not before it.  That is false.  [...] provided the statement prior to any plea agreement.  Counsel attempts to conflate the statement and the plea, calling them contemporaneous.  However, the reality is that when [...] gave his statement, there was no legally binding plea agreement between the State and [...].  Counsel tacitly acknowledges this.  (Da24).  Even if this court were to view the situation as contemporaneous, [...] expressly notes that the prior consistent statement does not need to be made prior to the alleged motive to fabricate.  Although it is a factor to be considered, it must be considered in the totality of circumstances.  Here, there are additional factors that must be also be weighed; namely that the Defense crossed [...] on his plea and sentence on two separate occasions, that the Defense inferred a motive to fabricate via a total of twenty questions on the issue, and the fact the statement was not made after the plea agreement was entered.  These factors clearly weigh in favor of admission.
[brief] A member seeking relief by way of the Board’s inherent powers also “must demonstrate extreme hardship and a clear equity in his favor. ”  Buono v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, 188 N.J. Super. 488, 493 (App. Div. 1983).  Contrary to [...]’s assertions, (Pb12-13), the Board considered its inherent power as well as his affidavit and the affidavits of the other troopers that he submitted in support of his contention that he did not receive the postcard.  After considering its equitable power and the affidavits presented, the Board reasonably concluded that “[...] did not exercise reasonable diligence nor demonstrate reasonable grounds for such a protracted delay in filing the eligibility registration form,” where he filed his form approximately one year and seven months past the deadline.  (Pa13-14).  Nor did [...] demonstrate extreme hardship in this matter, as he will continue to receive his Special Retirement benefits with concurrent retiree health benefits coverage.  (Pa68-69).  It should also be noted that cases involving the use of the Board’s equitable power for reopening proceedings or relaxing deadlines “were bottomed on the inherent power of an administrative agency, in the absence of legislative restriction, to reopen or to modify and to rehear orders previously entered by it.
[brief] The Water Supply Management Act (N.J.S.A. 58:1A-13) requires DEP to prepare a Statewide Water Supply Plan that assesses the state of our water supplies and identifies the policies necessary to ensure that the State and its water providers are adequately prepared for current and future water supply challenges.  As discussed throughout this report, these challenges have been exacerbated by anthropogenic climate change that will present as a progressive risk multiplier in the years ahead and which must be more fully considered in the development and implementation of water supply policy.  [Id. at 213.]  While the number of gallons of effluent to be expected to flow into the septic system on any given day is a key determination for a Consistency Assessment, it is insufficient standing alone.  The DEP must consider this project’s contribution to climate change as a part of its consistency determination.
[brief] “Even though I cared for these people, I don’t feel a thing. ” (8T22-3 to 13, 23-21 to 25, 24-9 to 10).  Defendant said that the police treated him well and did not threaten him.  (8T60-13 to 22).  While defendant was on a bathroom break, [...] told [...] that his brother is “very distant,” spends his time in his room playing videogames, and is affectionate only with his grandfather.  (8T29-20 to 24, 30-17 to 31-13).  [...] had never heard defendant discuss hallucinations before.  (6T113-15 to 114-2; 8T29-25 to 30-3).  [...] thought that defendant did not understand emotionally what he did, but admitted that defendant is not “dumb” and understood what he did intellectually.  (6T146-23 to 25,147-11 to 17).  [...] found defendant was “quite articulate” and used words that were advanced for a 16-year-old.  (8T66-15 to 67-7).  Defendant recalled all the events of the evening, including who he had shot and the order in which he shot them.  (8T70-15 to 71-14, 100-10 to 14).  Defendant repeatedly denied to the police that he had any visual or aural hallucinations commanding him to commit the murders.
[directive] ¿Entiende que porque se ha declarado culpable de estos cargos, el juez al dictarle la pena tiene [Sí/Yes]  [No/No] que imponerle un período de supervisión de la libertad condicional de años, y que dicho período comenzará en cuanto usted termine de cumplir la sentencia de encarcelamiento?  Período de supervisión de la libertad condicional por un delito de primer grado - 5 años  Período de supervisión de la libertad condicional por un delito de segundo grado -3 años  Do you understand that because you have pled guilty to these charges the court must impose a year term of parole supervision and that term will begin as soon as you complete the sentence of incarceration?  First Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 5 years  Second Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 3 years 3.  ¿Entiende que si infringe las condiciones de la supervisión de su libertad condicional, se podrá [Sí/Yes]  [No/No] revocar su libertad condicional y es posible que tenga que volver a la prisión para cumplir todo el período de supervisión de su libertad condicional o cualquier porción del período de supervisión de la libertad condicional restante, aun cuando ya usted hubiera terminado de cumplir el período de encarcelamiento que se le impuso anteriormente? Do you understand that if you violate the conditions of your parole supervision that your parole may be revoked and you may be subject to return to prison to serve all or any portion of the remaining serving the term of imprisonment previously period of parole supervision, even if you have completed imposed?
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  [...], who has been incarcerated for the past twenty-four years, appeals the denial of his motion for modification of an illegal sentence.  Every defendant has the constitutional right to be sentenced in accord with due process under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution.  This includes the right to be sentenced under a proper interpretation of the law and under the correct facts.  Any error in either leaves a sentencing determination constitutionally infirm.  [...] was tried and convicted as part of a conspiracy that resulted in the deaths of two individuals.  When [...] was sentenced, the sentencing judge repeatedly stressed that under New Jersey law there can be no free crimes, which required the imposition of consecutive sentences for the two deaths, rather than concurrent sentences.  Ultimately, [...] was sentenced to a total sixty year prison sentence.  In practical terms, he will not be eligible for release until he is eighty-six years old.  After [...]’s sentencing, the New Jersey Supreme Court has clarified that, while consecutive sentences may often be appropriate with multiple victims, the inclusion of the pronouncement that there should be no free crimes in case law is not a mandate that all cases with multiple victims must necessarily result in consecutive sentences.  Rather, all defendants must be sentenced on an individual basis and the sentencing court must provide the rationale for that sentence on the record so that a reviewing court can determine the reasonableness of that sentence.  [...] was sentenced by a judge under the misapprehension that consecutive sentences were required to give effect to the concept of no free crimes.  This was an incorrect application of the law and as such violative of [...]’s due process rights to a legal sentencing under the 14th Amendment.  [...] now seeks to correct that illegal and constitutionally infirm sentence pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(b)(5).  **PROCEDURAL POSTURE**
[directive] 7.5.3  In an indictable case or for a juvenile offense where our department seizes a controlled dangerous substance but is not called upon to turn the controlled dangerous substance over to the County Prosecutor's Office, we shall maintain the controlled dangerous substance until at least 70 days following final judgement in the case.  If an appeal is taken, the evidence should be held until the conclusion of the appeal.  At the expiration of the 70 days following judgement, we shall request approval from the Chief of the Trial Section or Narcotics Squad Prosecutor of the Prosecutor's Office for destruction of the evidence.  The request for the destruction and the approval must be in writing.  If the Chief of the Trial Section or Narcotics Squad Prosecutor approves destruction of the evidence, our department shall destroy the controlled dangerous substance at a designated facility.  All aspects of the destruction shall be documented.  All controlled dangerous substances approved for destruction should be destroyed within one year of the written approval from the Chief of the Trial Section or Narcotics Squad Prosecutor.  7.5.4
[brief] The Court Rules provide that a reviewing court may remand, on its own motion, for supplementation of the record in order to permit meaningful review.  R. 2:5-5(b).  In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 280 (2018).  The Bill Ricci World Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act amended N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e) to state, in pertinent part:  (4)  The board of trustees shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this subsection and shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment.  A member or retiree shall not be eligible for the presumption or recalculation under this subsection unless within two years of the effective date of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, the member or retiree files a written and sworn statement with the retirement system on a form provided by the board of trustees thereof indicating the dates and locations of service.  [...] was denied the ability to register for the Ricci Act and apply for amended benefits because he did not submit his registration form prior to July 8, 2021.  However, the Board failed to provide adequate notice of the Ricci Act, and therefore, the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.
[brief] ix.  The Chancery Division Judge (Trial Court) Erred And Abused Its Discretion as to the Accrual of a Civil Rights Claim and erroneously rendered Civil Rights Complaint (Claims) as Moot Because Defendants Granting Of Denied Adjournment Request Was done In Retaliation For Plaintiff's Resort To Legal Process In Response To The Unlawful Refusals To Multiple Adjournment Request(s) was a clear Violation Of The First Amendment And N.J. Const. Art.  I Guarantee
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2A:16-53.  In addition, on April 27, 2023, the trial court blurred a well-established public interest taxpayer standing exception.  In Loigman v. Township Committee of Middletown, 297 N.J. Super 287 (App. Div. 1997), Presiding Appellate Division [...] (together with future New Jersey Supreme Court [...] and former State Attorney General [...]) explained: