ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This Court should decline to do so, especially where, after *Comer*, the Supreme Court maintained the constitutional line of eighteen between juveniles and adults.  In addition, the out-of-state cases defendant relies upon all involve mandatory life without parole sentences, rather than parole eligibility after thirty years.  In short, defendant's sentence for his egregious adult criminal conduct, under which he will have an opportunity for parole after serving forty years, is in no way unlawful.  Thus, this Court should affirm the trial court order denying defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO.: [...]  T1 ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, OCEAN COUNTY, CIVIL DIVISION, [...]  JUDGMENT ENTERED: $1,823,006.96 AGAINST [...] SAT BELOW: HONORABLE [...], P.J. Cv. REPLY BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
[brief] [...] is a self-described and self-employed builder and businessman.  (70a, 7:2–22).  He is a sophisticated individual, holding a master’s degree in business administration from [...] and with a background working as an accountant.  (70a, 7:24–8:13).  He does not currently hold any professional licenses but he was previously a licensed Real Estate Agent and employed by [...].  (70a, 9:7–20).  Much like his pursuit of the subject Property here, [...] leveraged his position as a real estate agent to acquire similar properties for his personal business ventures, including [...]; [...]; and [...], among others.  (70a, 7:20–22; 92a, 94:9–21; 100a, 127:1–128:21; 101a, 130:10–19).  Although his real estate licensure has lapsed, he does not hold and has not held any other licenses.  (70a, 9:7–22).  In particular, he does not hold a license from the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance as a foreclosure consultant.  [...]’s Interest in the Property
[brief] Furthermore, the limitation of the JTCL in *Maison* was due to a controlling statutory provision in the Tort Claims Act that is not relevant here.  Appellant had every right and every ability to file and pursue contribution claims.  [...] and [...] were not public employees, so Plaintiff/Respondent was not obligated to serve tort claim notices, and did not thereby deprive Appellant in any way.  Furthermore, *Maison* is inapplicable because Appellant is not a public entity nor public employee protected by the comparative-fault scheme in the Tort Claims Act like the defendants in *Maison*.  While public entities are liable only for the percentage of fault directly attributable to them, Appellant cannot claim that this protection also applies to him.
[brief] **The Appellant’s Second Amended Complaint Allegations Against [...]**  The allegations against [...] are set forth in the 19th and 20th counts of the Amended Complaint.  (Pa96-Pa97)  The 19th count of the Complaint alleges that [...] was responsible for the “operation, design, control, supervision, maintenance, inspection and/or creation of a system of oversight” with regard to the project located on the northbound lanes of the New Jersey Turnpike at mile marker 113”.  (Pa96)  The 20th count of the Appellant’s complaint alleges that [...] “negligently, carelessly and/or recklessly supervised and/or monitored the construction site”.  (Pa98)  The allegations in the 19th and 20th count of the Complaint are not claims against an unlicensed employee nor are they claims based solely on the acts of the unlicensed individual.
[brief] [...] appeals from the Board’s Final Decision for two reasons.  First, the Board failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [...] presents a substantial likelihood of re-offending if released on parole.  The Board hinged its determination on [...]’s decades-old criminal record and a vague allegation that [...] “does not accurately understand” the motives for his offenses.  In reaching that decision, the Board failed to fairly consider [...]’s positive clinical risk assessments, including one conducted by its own psychologist, who concluded that because of [...]’s age and other mitigating factors, he is of “low to moderate” risk for future criminal conduct.  Second, the Board failed to consider material facts when it placed little to no weight on [...]’s significant mitigation evidence, without any meaningful explanation.  The Board ignored [...]’s participation in institutional programs, thousands of hours of therapy, and many of the letters of support submitted on his behalf.  While the Board considered a single letter in support of parole from [...]’s sister, it failed to address seven other letters written by upstanding citizens in [...]’s life.  The Board’s Final Decision did not provide any insight into its analysis of [...]’s mitigating factors: simply repeating [...]’s contentions and rejecting them without explanation.  For the reasons below, [...] respectfully urges this Court to reverse the February 28, 2024 Final Decision by the Board and grant him parole or, alternatively, remand the matter to the Board to reconsider its decision based upon the full record, with a direction to support any asserted basis for denial with a clear and specific articulation of reasons.
[brief] [Id. at 296 (citing Metromedia, Inc. v. Dir. Div. of Tax, 97 N.J. 313 (1984))].  These factors are applicable whenever the authority of an agency to act without conforming to the requirements of the APA is questioned, for example, in adopting orders, guidelines, or directives.  Ibid.  However, not all of these factors must be present for an agency action to constitute rulemaking; instead, the factors are balanced according to weight.  Ibid.  The Law Division granted the Defendants’ motions to dismiss and mandated that the following types of parties: non-medical corporations; a lay person who is not an insured/injured party; and an attorney who is not an insured/injured party are subject to PIP arbitration.
[brief] Although prosecutors are given “considerable leeway” in their presentations to jurors, their discretion is not unlimited.  State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 82 (1999).  For instance, “prosecutors should confine their summations to a review of, and an argument on, the evidence, and not indulge in . . . collateral improprieties of any type, lest they imperil otherwise sound convictions.
[brief] To be clear in concluding, the State is not suggesting the seizure of any physical evidence in this case was attenuated from the challenged stop.  The State is simply urging that suppression of drug evidence found as a direct result of the investigative stop for drug activity fully vindicates the exclusionary rule.  But defendant’s arrest for driving while suspended is completely attenuated from the drug investigation, and thus, he must remain accountable for this separate dangerous law violation, regardless of the legality of the initial investigative stop for drug activity.
[brief] 2  These amendments had been introduced in 1966 as Assembly Bills Nos. 204 and 252 with the following statement appended:  After an area has been declared blighted by a municipality there is a natural decline in property values resulting both from the desire of the inhabitants to immediately relocate and the natural reluctance on the part of buyers to purchase property within the affected area.  There is no time period during which these development agencies must acquire the property needed to carry out the proposed plan.  The purpose of this bill is to assure a property owner the compensation to which he is morally entitled and to prevent the undue hardship which will accrue as a result of the inevitable diminution in property values between the date of the declaration of blight and the institution of condemnation proceedings.  These bills were ultimately passed by the 1967 Legislature as Assembly Bills Nos. 347 and 349.
[brief] 16  In re K.R., Dep't of Military & Veteran Affairs, 2017 N.J. C.S.C. LEXIS 339 (May 5, 2017)...................................  17  In re M.M., No. A-5949-12T1, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1086 (App. Div. May 12, 2015).  ..........................................................  22  In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182 (2011).....................................................................  16  In re T.M., No. A-4628-11T1, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1283 (App. Div. May 28, 2013).
[brief] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-59.1, in order to find that a defense was frivolous, the defense must be commenced, used or continued in bad faith, solely for the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious injury.  N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-59.1(b)(1)  Also, a defense will be considered frivolous if the person filing the motion knew, or should have known that the motion was filed without any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
[brief] *Id.* at 121 (quoting *Bosland*, 197 *N.J.* at 557).  In addition to the statute, “[t]he Division of Consumer Affairs has enacted extensive regulations ... to deal with practices susceptible to consumer-fraud violations, such as may be found under home-improvement contracts [and] ... provide “objective assurances” of the “terms and criteria according to which home-improvement work [should] be done. ”  *Cox*, 138 *N.J.* at 16, citations omitted.  Violation of the regulations imposes strict liability, regardless of intent, and “[t]he parties subject to the regulations are assumed to be familiar with them, so that any violation of the regulations, regardless of intent or moral culpability, constitutes a violation of the Act. ”  *Id.* at 18-19.  Home improvement contracts are expressly and extensively protected by the CFA and its regulations, *N.J.S.* 56:8-1(c), *N.J.S.* 56:5-136, *N.J.A.C.* 13:45A-16.2(a), even where corporate ownership exists.
[brief] Which motion was adopted.  Senate No. 49 was given third reading.  [...] moved the bill.  [...] moved that Senate No. 49 be placed back on second reading for purposes of amendment . . .  Id. S. 49 then passed the General Assembly.  Id.  Here, there are distinct issues with the passage of the legislation and whether the public was aware and could be “acquainted with and study bills that eventually might be enacted into law. ”  See Forsythe, 91, N.J. at 148 (citing Milmed, supra).  The law was enacted within a shroud of secrecy because access to the State House was limited, the legislative calendar did not list this bill, the Legislature’s website did not post the text of either bill, and the Governor had issued a State of Emergency due to inclement weather.
[brief] [...] MISCONTRUES THE DEFINITION OF A “COMMUNITY OF INTEREST” AND THE NJFPA’S “20%” REQUIREMENT.  [...] similarly ignores additional evidence before the Trial Court, controlling precedent and the plain language of the statute to argue that [...] cannot – as a matter of law – satisfy other NJFPA requirements.  Specifically, regarding the “community of interest” requirement, [...] asserts that [...] has not alleged that [...] made any “franchise-specific investments. ” (Db34).  This assertion is belief by virtually the entirety of the facts presented in [...]’s Opening Brief, and specifically, without limitation, the evidence that [...] built – with its own funds and manpower – numerous displays for [...] dealers in the North East at no cost to the dealers, to catapult the promotion of the [...] brand (See Pa541, Answer to Interrogatory No. 6).  [...] also ignores the numerous trade shows and marketing events and activities [...] took part in to develop a following for the [...] line, at the expense of directing such time and expenses to another line.  (Pb18-19).  Additionally, [...] produced evidence that it was [...]’s EOK system that was instrumental in obtaining and cultivating [...]/[...]’s relationship with [...], an online retailer, to specifically grow [...] Grills customer base by packaging [...] Grills with EOK systems purchased on [...]’s website.  (See Pa177a, Pa554-Pa559) (Email correspondence between [...] and [...] representatives, with subject line “[...] Valentine Special,” where [...] references training [...]’s staff and thanking [...] for agreeing to offer a package of [...] grills with the EOK system).  Moreover, [...] invested in developing enormous, franchise-specific goodwill for [...]’s [...] products, which, as explained by the New Jersey Supreme Court and contrary to [...]’s assertion otherwise, is a key factor to a finding of a franchise.  See Instructional Sys., 614 A.2d at 148 (asserting “a critical factor in this case is the installed base of customers that [the putative franchisee] has built up over a twenty-year period”).  To be sure, while [...] asserts [...] somehow “failed to argue in the trial court (Db at Footnote 6)” that [...] developed “goodwill” for [...] and the [...] brand, this is nonsensical, as this argument is the basis for much of [...]’s argument before the Trial Court, and is even expressly asserted in its Complaint.
[brief] \(^8\)  See Woo-Padva, 2022 WL 267938, at *2 (dismissing claim for violation of the NJCFA based on premise that defendant lacked a license under the NJCFLA because no private right of action under the NJCFLA); Browne, 2021 WL 6062306, at *4 (same).  Here, the Trial Court correctly dismissed the NJCFA claim because “the effort to use that violation [of the NJCFLA] to then create – make a Consumer Fraud Act claim is an infamous bootstrapping of that.
[brief] [...]’s reconsideration of that order was error.  More recent developments in Missouri only reinforce that [...] was correct to deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss.  [...] amended its Missouri petition in August 2022 to add claims against additional parties.  (Pa105-06; Pa321).  None of those defendants appeared for months.  (Pa321).  On February 20, 2023 defendant [...] filed a notice of removal to the Eastern District of Missouri on federal officer removal grounds.  (\textit{Id.}).  [...] moved to remand back to the Missouri state court, and the newly-joined defendants have all filed various motions to dismiss in the Missouri federal court action.  All of those motions are still pending before the District Court, and there has been no further progress of the Missouri litigation.  Even after all of the pending Missouri motions are decided, there may be appeals\textsuperscript{11} and the other defendants will just then be answering the petition  \textsuperscript{10}  Indeed, the Missouri court’s refusal to extend comity to New Jersey’s courts under the well-settled first-filed rule casts into doubt the validity of any resulting judgment in Missouri, which would be subject to collateral attack and need not be recognized or enforced by any other state’s courts.  \textit{See, e.g., Grey v. Indep. Order of Foresters}, 196 S.W. 779 (Mo. App. 1917) (Missouri court refused to recognize validity of foreign judgment rendered in second-filed action).  Only a judgment rendered by a New Jersey in this first-filed action would be free from any such doubt.  \textsuperscript{11}  For example, [...] would have a right of appeal if [...]’s motion to remand is granted.  \textit{See} 28 U.S.C. 1447(d). and commencing discovery.  Thus, the Missouri action would essentially be restarting the litigation of these issues from the beginning of discovery with the newly joined parties.  By sharp contrast, this first-filed action in New Jersey is already at a far more advanced posture than the Missouri Action.  Indeed, as [...] recognized, this first-filed action can, and should, proceed to judgment in New Jersey expeditiously.  (2T at 59:3 to 61:16).  [...] had no basis to grant reconsideration and disturb [...]’s proper exercise of discretion, and the order to dismiss this case in favor of Defendants’ now-stalled Missouri lawsuit violated the strong presumption in favor of preserving this first-filed action.  This Court should reverse the decision below erroneously dismissing this case on comity grounds.
[brief] The Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex  Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Re: STATE OF NEW JERSEY (Plaintiff-Appellant) v. [...] (Defendant-Respondent)  Docket No. [...]  Criminal Action: On Appeal from a Final Order in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Honorable Judges:  Please accept this letter brief in lieu of a formal reply brief on behalf of the State of New Jersey.  See R. 2:6-2(b).  TABLE OF CONTENTS  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS..............................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT..................................................................................1  POINT I THE STATE LEGALLY SENT ITS MARCH 21, 2024, GRAND JURY SUBPOENA TO [...]........................................1  CONCLUSION............................................................................................4
[brief] The Limited Attorney Exemption Violates Attorneys’ First Amendment Rights to Render Legal Advice to Clients (Unaddressed By Trial Court).  Though Defendants appear to acknowledge that “any attorney is free to provide legal advice and representation to clients in connection with the clients’ disputes to owed debts,” Defendants construe these cases too narrowly.  While dealing with different types of communications by attorneys to clients, they can be summed up by the Supreme Court’s succinct holding that “[t]he First and Fourteenth Amendments require a measure of protection for advocating lawful means of vindicating legal rights. ”  Matter of Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978).  The Limited Attorney Exemption absolutely restricts a licensed attorney’s lawful means of vindicating legal rights; certain attorneys cannot engage in debt adjustment (the practice of law) to vindicate his client’s rights vis-à-vis his client’s creditors.
[brief] The Georgia, Missouri, and Michigan cases cited by Respondent are distinguishable factually, as all but one involve large commercial leases between parties of equal bargaining power and sophistication.  Importantly, the rent “discounts” in the cases cited by Respondent were provided exclusively in consideration for continued compliance with the lease.  Here, by contrast, the $17,900 in “free rent”, as stated in the rider itself, and admitted by Respondent, was primarily provided as incentive for Appellants to sign the two-year lease for Respondent’s apartment unit, and secondarily as incentive to comply with the lease.  This changes the analysis, as the Respondent in fact received a large portion of the benefit for which the “free rent” was purportedly provided.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, none of the four cases cited by Respondent include any discussion or analysis of the *law* applied to reach the conclusion that the conditional “discounts” were not penalties.
[brief] ”  Id. at 578.  In 2012, this court decided [...].  429 N.J. Super. at 171.  There, the court considered a request submitted to the Governor’s Office seeking “all . . . correspondence between the Office of the Governor . . . and the Port Authority” regarding “EZ Pass benefits afforded to retirees of the Port Authority. ”  Id. at 172.  After the Governor’s Office denied [...]’s request as overbroad and the Law Division affirmed the denial, [...] appealed.  Id. at 174.  This court again recognized both that proper OPRA requests “‘must identify with reasonable clarity those documents that are desired’” and, to this end, that “‘OPRA does not countenance open-ended searches of an agency’s files. ””  Ibid. (quoting Bent, 381 N.J. Super. at 37; MAG, 375 N.J. Super. at 549).  Through this lens, and considering [...]’s assertions both before the Law Division and this court that he was specifically seeking “written or electronic correspondence between the Governor’s Office and the Port Authority” on specific EZ Pass benefits, this court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of his complaint and found that the request was proper because it “described the records sought with the requisite specificity and narrowed the scope of the inquiry to a discrete and limited subject matter[.]”  Id. at 176-78.  [...], built on the shoulders of MAG, Bent, and Spectraserv, remains good law today.
[brief] *Packard-Bamberger & Co.*, supra, 167 N.J. at 446, 771 A.2d 1194.  In addition to that proportionality analysis, the court must evaluate the reasonableness of the total fee requested as compared to the amount of the jury award.  That is, when the amount actually recovered is less than the attorney's fee request, the court must consider that fact in determining the overall reasonableness of the attorney's fee award.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.............................................  1  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE INDICTMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.  ......2  A.  [...]’s conduct was Willful and Outrageous.  ...............  2 B.  Respondent argues that Appellant suffered no prejudice because his motion to dismiss was granted while at the same time appealing that decision .........................................................  4  C.  The case law supports dismissal ..................................  5  D.  [...]’s notes were material and their disclosure prior to trial is totally irrelevant ......................................................  6  CONCLUSION .................................................................
[brief] ”  Pa38.  [...] further indicated that, despite receiving physical therapy and injections, [...] continued to have knee pain, and “he has difficulty with bending, kneeling, climbing stairs, heavy lifting, as well as driving long periods. ”  Pa39.  [...] testified credibly and thoroughly about how the act of repeatedly carrying materials that were several hundred pounds, kneeling, squatting, and climbing ladders for eight hours per day would aggravate his condition.  Specifically, [...] testified that although he has had this condition for the last three to four years prior to the hearing, it had not been quite as bad, but that the job had since put a toll on his knees.  He also testified that as time went on it had become more difficult for him to do his job because he could not bend his knees.  It would take him 5 to 10 minutes to get up when he kneeled down, and then he could not walk again for another 5 to 10 minutes.  It is therefore obvious that having to climb a ladder, kneel, and squat for most of the workday would aggravate the osteoarthritis in his bilateral knees.  Both the Appeal Tribunal and the Board of Review erroneously found that no medical assessment was conducted in order to determine that [...]’s work aggravated his medical condition.