ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Counter-Statement of Procedural History .........................................................1  Counter-Statement of Facts ..............................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  The prosecutor’s use of handwriting comparison was not improper, particularly when defendant was the first to use the same tactic himself to his own advantage .........................................................6  POINT II  The prosecutor’s summation was proper and did not deny defendant a fair trial and due process of law ..................................................................................16  A.  The Prosecutor’s summation was not “evidence” and any reference in the summation to Defendant’s prior acts was merely a fair comment on the evidence made in response to Defendant’s own summation ..................................................................................19  B.  The Prosecutor did not inflame the passions of the jury .................................................................23  C.  The Prosecutor did not denigrate the defense ..................................................................................27  POINT III  As our courts have already stated, it was not plain error for the trial court not to charge the jury with an unrequested cooperating witness charge........................................................................................................29
[brief] On April 21, 2022, FERC issued its Order Issuing Certificate (“FERC Certificate”) authorizing [...] to construct and operate the Project.  179 FERC ¶ 61,041; TGPa0001.  In the FERC Certificate, FERC found “that the public convenience and necessity requires approval of [...]’s” Project.  Id. at P 85; TGPa0004.  Appellant, [...], is currently challenging the FERC Certificate in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
[brief] One witness described the suspect as “tall and skinny,” and another described him as “not short,” estimating his height to be “like, five eight, five ten. ”  (2T100-17 to 21, 129-14 to 23, 135-9 to 12)  Having previously described the shooter as a Black man in her 9-1-1 call, [...] described him at trial as a “dark skinned” man, who was “African American or Hispanic” and whose complexion was “a little lighter” than her own “brown skin. ”  (3T23-2 to 7, 34-17 to 24; 5T262-8 to 13)  One witness indicated the suspect was “light skinned” or “tannish” with a skin tone similar to her own.  (2T100-4 to 101-3, 106-2 to 13)
[brief] N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153(b) requires that within 18 months of the Public Access Law’s effective date [...] adopt rules and regulations concerning the permits for which public access would be required “consistent with the public trust doctrine,” as ⁵ Sea Point reminds the Court that the “circumstances presented” involve nothing more than the reconstruction of a failing bulkhead, which [...] characterizes as a change in footprint that gives rise to new public access obligations under the Public Access Law.  See Appellant’s Initial Brief (“Ab__”) at 2. well as projects for which individual review of public access will be required.  The effective date of the Public Access Law was July 2, 2019.  18 months following July 2, 2019, was January 2, 2021.  [...]’s Opposition Brief asks this Court to allow [...] to nevertheless interpret ambiguous provisions in a statute to the agency’s preference, and without prior rulemaking, while ignoring an explicit mandate from the Legislature in the same statute that it adopt implementing regulations more than three-and-a-half years ago.  Implementing regulations provide the public with notice of an agency’s approach to interpreting and enforcing otherwise ambiguous statutory provisions.  Section 153(b) of the Public Access Law expressly reflects the Legislature’s intention that the public have an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process to ensure that any unclear terms in the Public Access Law are interpreted and enforced reasonably.  [...] has not afforded the public the courtesy of any such participation or notice here, in open violation of a statutory mandate that the agency do so.  Were this Court to endorse this practice, it would set a dangerous precedent which not only encourages state agencies to ignore explicit rulemaking directives from the Legislature, but also leaves permit applicants to [...]’s absolute mercy once it determines, in its own unchecked discretion, that applicants have incurred new public access obligations under the Public Access Law.
[brief] The Report expressly “recommends that permanent markers be set at the corners of the Subject Properties, and a map depicting their boundaries be recorded . . . consistent with the Worley Survey. ”  Report, p.7, ll.30-32, Pa112.  This recommendation would cause, *inter alia*, the boundary shift from Lot 11 on to Lot 12 to be made manifest.  In order to avoid this the trial court issued a Final Order providing for the recordation of the Report without following its recommendation.  Although the trial court maintained that it had only the authority to accept or reject the Report, it did something different.  C.
[brief] [...] testified at trial that on May 7, 2019, at about 6:03 p.m., he and his partner, [...], were in an unmarked vehicle when a dispatch went out on the radio regarding a domestic-violence incident at [...], and they decided to respond to the scene to offer assistance because they were nearby.  (12T: 131-8 to 133-17).  But on the way, while “going down the wrong way on Hoffman,” a one-way street, they heard eight or nine shots, and then saw a black male dressed in all black, with a black hoodie and black sweat pants, running “across Hoffman Avenue into Wilmot Alley,” and they followed in their car.  (12T:133-18 to 136-18).  As Detective Carrigg turned the car down Wilmot, Detective Szbanz testified that he saw a “black handgun” in the man’s right hand.  (12T:136-15 to 23).  The man turned left onto Ellsworth Avenue and then crossed Ellsworth, with Szbanz having exited the patrol car at the corner of Wilmot and Ellsworth in foot pursuit.  (12T:137-4 to 9).  The man then ignored orders to stop and ran between the houses at [...], where, Detective Szbanz stated that he lost sight of the suspect “for a split second”.  (12T:137-21 to 138-4; 12T 185-2 to 20).  Detective Szbanz then saw the man scale the fence into the rear yard of [...] after Detective Szbanz drew his firearm and after the man ignored his command to stop.
[brief] He testified that retail chains, including [...], effectively dictate their own “industry” standards when they promulgate internal policies, and that [...] was entitled to interpret their own policies to determine what they mandated.  [8T 94:1-12, 122:9-123:23, 129:8-12].  Confronted with the testimony of [...]’ corporate representative on the issue of employee training, [...] then had to concede that [...] interprets their policies as permitting employees to approach customers on the floor even if they are still in training.  [8T 128:25-129:5].  Moreover, [...] was unable to conclude that [...] lacked adequate training to discuss various types of grout with [...] on the date in question.  As an initial matter, [...] agreed that it was appropriate for [...] to approach [...] and inquire about the project he was doing with grout.  [8T 116:21-117:1].  In addition, he could not dispute the evidence that [...] had actually received training from [...] on how to interact with customers prior to the altercation with [...].  [8T 109:3-114:5].  Indeed, when confronted with [...]’s testimony about the difference between sanded and unsanded grout, [...] conceded that [...]’s knowledge about grout may have come from training he received from [...].  [8T 117:2-7].  [...] then conceded he lacked sufficient knowledge to evaluate whether [...] had actually provided [...] with incorrect or misleading information.  [8T 119:1-13].
[brief] The Redevelopment Plan was specifically required to satisfy and comply with the “public access rule” now found in N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9.  The Statutory Public Trust Doctrine now imposed an affirmative obligation on municipalities going forward to ensure that all future zoning standards and actual development affirmatively considered and did not violate the doctrine, and put forth an additional layer of review (vested with the NJDEP) to make sure that no zoning determination or approved plan violated the doctrine.  The Borough points to nothing in the 200+ year existing Common Law Doctrine, the new Statutory Doctrine, or the NJDEP’s Administrative Public Access Rule which in any way indicates that the new law is anything other than complementary and supplementary to the 200+ year existing Common Law Doctrine.  The Trial Court’s ruling that a private citizen only has the right to bring a legal challenge to Government action that violates the Public Trust Doctrine when the Government action is either (1) the approval of a CAFRA permit or (2) the actual approval of a specific development application is not supported by law.
[brief] (Da 54, 56)  Immediately before [...]’s conference --- 4 Rule 3:9-3(f) states:  “With the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecuting attorney, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty reserving on the record the right to appeal from the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion.  If the defendant prevails on appeal, the defendant shall be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his or her plea. ”  with defense counsel in which he decided to plead guilty, the court explained to [...] that, “over the last few years I’ve been handling your cases I’ve made a number of decisions,” and that “[o]bviously, even with a guilty plea, that doesn’t prevent you from filing an appeal and if an appellate court judge finds that I committed an error, that I was wrong in my 404(b) decisions or anything else, your guilty plea could be reversed. ”  (1T 9-25 to 10-8)  The plea also gave [...] the right to withdraw if Pennsylvania did not run any potential sentence concurrent to his New Jersey sentence.  (1T 15-12 to 24; 2T 4-23 to 5-20; Da 56, 58)  Pennsylvania declined to prosecute any charges against [...].
[brief] 7  [...] quoted [...], “The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine,” 58 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 892, 901 (1983).  Lovick v. Wil-Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 696 (Iowa 1999) (affirming that a manufacturer “ha[s] no duty to recall or retrofit” a product).
[brief] | Authority | Citation | |-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Achey v. Cellco Partnership | 475 N.J. Super 446 (App. Div. 2023) | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. | 145 N.J. 520 (1995)  | | Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. | 121 N.J. 69 (1990)  | | Hirsch v. Amper Financial Services, LLC | 215 N.J. 174 (2013) | | Kleine v. Emeritus at Emerson | 445 N.J. Super. 548, n.12 (App. Div. 2016) | | Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc. | 173 N.J. 76 (2002) | | Mid-State Securities Corp. v. Edwards | 309 N.J. Super 73 (App. Div. 1998) | | Moore v. Woman to Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, LLC | 416 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 2010) | | Morales v. Sun Constructors, Inc.  | 541 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2008) | | Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst. | 225 N.J. 289 (2016) | | Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware | 189 N.J. 1 (2006) | | Rent-A-Ctr, W., Inc. v. Jackson | 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010)  | | Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n | 127 N.J. 344 (1992)  | Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes 352 N.J. Super. 555 (Ch. Div. 2002)  .........................................................7,8  Vasquez v. Glassboro Serv. Ass’n, Inc. 83 N.J. 86 (1980)..........................................................................................5  Williams v. Ysabel Docket No. [...] (App. Div. Sept. 7, 2023)
[brief] Additionally, evidence on the record directly contradicts Plaintiff’s inference “that Plaintiff’s involvement in the investigation stopped her from being called back to work at [[...]].” (Compare AB at pp. 17-18 with Appx 100).  To the contrary, Defendant offered Plaintiff “two open 3-11 shifts . . . at [C]ross [K]eys[,]” but Plaintiff “stated she cannot comm[i]t to either shift to be a permanent staff on Cross Keys. ” (Appx 100).  Clearly, no inference of causation can be found here where Defendant offered Plaintiff open positions – which she chose to decline.  (Appx 100).  3.
[brief] “[T]he basic test under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7, of the New Jersey Constitution is the same: was the conduct objectively reasonable in light of the facts known to the law enforcement officer at the time of the search. ”  State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 46-47 (2011).  “That standard affords the police necessary latitude to respond to criminality while deterring unreasonable conduct and protecting the citizens from government overreaching. ”  *Id.* at 47.
[brief] (4T142-11 to 23; 4T145-16 to 23).  Surveillance footage from [...] captured defendant’s vehicle arriving at 7:00 p.m. on May 16, 2020; a person in a red shirt exited the car.  (4T150-19 to 152-3).  Surveillance footage from [...] in New York showed a person in a red shirt enter on May 16, 2020, at 7:31 p.m. (4T153-8 to 11; 4T154-1 to 9).
[brief] In fact, coverage for such claims is forbidden under California law.  The California Insurance Code provides that “[an] insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the insured. ”  Cal. Ins. Code § 533.  The California Court of Appeal stated that “[a] ‘wilful act’ under section 533 must mean an act deliberately done for the express purpose of causing damage or intentionally performed with knowledge that damage is highly probable or substantially certain to result. ”  Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 12 Cal. App. 4th 715, 742 (Ct. App.) (emphasis added), review denied, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 2542 (Cal. 1993).  Section 533’s prohibition of insurance coverage for “substantially certain” intentional torts extends to the coverage provided by an employer’s liability policy.
[brief] Upon supplemental briefing from the parties, the Trial Court correctly applied New Jersey Supreme Court precedent from its decision in Simon v. Cronecker and found it controlling and dispositive of the summary judgment motion.  Under this precedent, any party seeking to engage in a proposed real estate transaction concerning the property in a pending foreclosure action is required to file an application as intervenor with the court in the foreclosure action to seek and obtain judicial approval of the proposed real estate transaction, and failing to do so renders any contract for sale in such a proposed transaction null and void and unenforceable.
[brief] That allegation relies solely upon [...], an individual who has been involved in litigation with [...] in the past, claiming that he did not possess these documents.  The State ignores the fact that at the time these documents were generated, as confirmed by being attached to contemporaneous emails, [...] would not have any incentive to fraudulently generate them.  The trial court correctly noted that “[t]he documents discovered were signed and dated four years before the Indictment and seven years before the trial. ” (Sa24).  [...] testified credibly that she knew that “they’re authentic documents... ‘cause I found them on email. ” (8T 34:24 to 35:3).  The trial court keyed in on that issue:  “This court watched Defendant retrieve the documents from his email which are dated at or around the time of the creation of the agreements and the parties stipulated to this fact. ” (Sa25).  The Court further discounted the State’s claim that these documents are fraudulent based on [...] not possessing them:  “[...] admits that the [...] Principal Owner’s Guaranty was discovered in [...]’s records, yet this document was never provided to counsel or to the jury.  It is most likely true [...] cannot find the franchise agreements in its records, but that does not necessarily mean the documents are illegitimate.
[brief] The [...] was host to two events on the night of March 22, 2019: the African-royalty-themed Royal Aries Ball (9T 111-3 to 10; 11T 14-21 to 15-12) and a gathering honoring [...] on the one-year anniversary of his murder.  (6T 164-22 to 165-14; 9T 111-10 to 13, 158-19 to 24)  [...], a party promoter known as “[...],” organized the Ball, which was scheduled to run from 9:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m.  He hired musical entertainment and security, arranged for the sale of food and drink, and publicized the Ball through advertising and social media.  (9T 122-15 to 123-5; 11T 8-4 to 11, 9-13 to 25, 10-22 to 24, 15-20 to 25, 11-25 to 12-6; 13T 60-10 to 8; 23T 102-25 to 103-2)  Fletcher hired [...], whom he knew under his stage name “[...],” as one of the musical performers.  (11T 19-23 to 20-24; 23T 102-25 to 103-2, 111-15 to 16)  A promoter Fletcher hired to aid in publicizing the Ball added the [...] party to the evening.
[brief] Bulletin 22-11 (the “Bulletin”) is directly contrary to these past practices and statements, and leaves no doubt that the Department has acted arbitrarily and capriciously in unilaterally seeking to change the law when its prior attempts to do so through legislation had failed.  Rather than address its past conduct and admissions in any respect, the Department instead relies on three prior transactions as proof that it has always considered reciprocals and their Attorneys in Fact (“AIFs”) to be subject to the Holding Act.  Unfortunately for the Department, these three transactions only serve to support [...]’s position.  That the Department previously applied the Holding Act to transactions involving actual insurance holding companies and reciprocals (like [...]) is irrelevant and misleading, at best.  Indeed, every single entity involved in the [...] transactions was already part of a holding company system – of course the Holding Act applied.  The [...] Orders have nothing to do with the applicability of the Holding Act to stand-alone reciprocal insurers and their private, non-insurance AIFs.
[brief] POINT I  PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL IS LIMITED TO COUNTS 3 & 4........12  POINT II  THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT IS DE NOVO...............13  POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED  THE CLAIMS RELATED TO THE TRUTH IN CONSUMER CONTRACT WARRANTY AND NOTICE ACT (“TCCWNA”) (N.J.S.A. 56:12-15)........................................14  A.  Defendant was not a Seller, Lessor, Creditor, Lender or Bailee.................................................................16  B.  Does there exist a contract(s) between Plaintiff and [...]?.......  20  C.  The Contracts did not violate any clearly established legal Right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller....................  21  D.  Plaintiff was not an aggrieved consumer..............................31  POINT IV  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED COUNT 4  BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ESTABLISH A VIOLATION OF THE CONSUMER FRAUD ACT (“CFA”) (N.J.S.A.8-1 et seq.)..................................................33  A.  There is no unlawful practice by Defendants.........................35  B.  There is no ascertainable loss by Plaintiff.............................36  C.  No causal relationship between the conduct and damages……37  POINT V DESPITE NOT FILING A CROSS APPEAL  THIS COURT MAY BAR PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS BASED UPON DEFENDANTS’ EQUITABLE DEFENSES……………………………37
[brief] 02/21/2024, Amended 2/28/2024  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................ | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................................................................ | 3 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................ | 3 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT .................................................................................. | 3 | |  I.  PETITIONER HAS ADEQUATELY SHOWN THE COMMISSION’S DECISION IS IN FACT ARBITRARY AND CAPRIOUS, AND THE DEFERENTIAL STANDARD INDICATED BY THE RESPONDENTS DOES NOT APPLY TO THE COMMISSION.  ................................................................. | 4 | | II.  PETITIONER HAS THE RIGHT TO AMEND HIS REQUEST BASED ON NEW INFORMATION RECEIVED AND TO AMPLIFY HIS ALLEGATIONS.  .................................................................................................................. | 5 | | III.  PETITIONER CLEARLY SHOWED VIOLATIONS OF N.J.S.A. 18A:120-24.1(e) THAT HAD POTENTIAL TO COMPROMISE THE BOARD  ......................... | 6 | | IV.  RESPONDENTS  GALLAGHER’S AND KOVELOSKI’S APPEARANCE BEFORE THE WEST AMWELL TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE WAS A VIOLATION OF SECTION (E).  ........ | 6 | | V.  RESPONDENT  GALLAGHER’S FACEBOOK POST IS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF SECTION (E).  .................................................................................................................. | 7 | | VI.  MEMBERSHIP IN [...] WAS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF SECTION (E).  .......... | 7 | | VII.  MEMBERSHIP IN [...] WAS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF SECTION (F).  ......... | 8 | | VIII.  RESPONDENTS  ERRONEOUSLY CLAIM CITIZENS IS NOT RELEVANT TO SCHOOL ETHICS COMMISSION CASES.  ................................................................. | 9 | | IX.  RESPONDENTS  VIOLATED N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g)  WHEN THEY AUTHORIZED INACCURATE INFORMATION TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC AND ACTED IN CONCERT TO DECEIVE THE ELECTORATE.  ... | 10 | | X.  RESPONDENTS  IGNORE HOW THE REFERENDUM WAS PASSED AND THE BOARD ACTIONS REGARDING IT ................................................................. | 10 | | CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... | 11 | ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] The State’s decision to intervene and expend resources litigating against a public contractor has always functioned to ensure that the public interest warrants prosecution of the claim.  The tension between the costs to the public of litigating against a government contractor and the private interest of profit-seeking relators that motivates the public disclosure bar is simply not present when the State prosecutes the claim.  Empowering the AG to allow a relator-led action to proceed even when the relator brings no new, nonpublic information to light alters the substantive policy choice reflected in the public disclosure bar.  The trial court therefore erred in concluding that the 2023 Amendment “does not confer any new right” on the State and that the 2023 Amendment is merely procedural and should be given retroactive effect.
[brief] The parties jointly stipulated to the following facts (Pa066), which were accepted by [...] (Pa219).  The Board is a public employer within the meaning of the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act (Joint Stipulation of Facts, Pa66, ¶ 1).  The Board operates the [...] (“[...]”), which serves as the public high school for residents of [...], [...], [...], and [...] (Ibid.).  The Association represents, inter alia, the professional staff members employed by the Board (Id., ¶ 2).  During all times relevant hereto, [...] has represented approximately 225 Board employees, including, but not limited to teachers, secretaries, paraprofessionals, bus drivers, nurses, security personnel, child study team members, counselors, and buildings, grounds, and maintenance staff (Ibid.).  At all times relevant to the within matter, the Board and [...] were parties to a collective negotiations agreement (“CNA”) for the period July 1, 2019 through June 30, 2022 (Id., ¶ 3).
[brief] "Whether a sentence should gravitate toward the upper or lower end of the range depends on a balancing of the relevant factors."  *Case*, 220 N.J. at 64.  "[W]hen the mitigating factors preponderate, sentences will tend toward the lower end of the range, and when the aggravating factors preponderate, sentences will tend toward the higher end of the range."  *Kiriakakis*, 235 N.J. at 442 (quoting *State v. Natale*, 184 N.J. 458, 488 (2005)).