ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The *Boston Gas* court observed that the “fact based” method was the ideal method of allocation, but that in cases where a “fact based” inquiry is not feasible, a “time-on-the-risk” method should be used.  Id. at 312-14.  [...] had a good faith belief that it could argue for application of the “fact based” method left available by the *Boston Gas* decision.  (Pa 52)\(^{10}\).  Indeed, [...] correctly noted that “simply put, if *Boston Gas* was as controlling as [...] purports it to be, then the allocation phase of this case should not have happened at all, much less have taken 10 years. ”  (Id.)  In the end, [...] denied for decades [...]’s rights to insurance coverage.  [...] is the only one of the originally named defendants that continues to fight [...]’s efforts to secure the insurance coverage to which it is unquestionably entitled.  It is also [...] that had the use, for decades, of the money should rightfully be paid to [...].  It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to apply the two percent enhancement.  \(^{10}\)  In his initial adoption of the SAM’s Report and Recommendation on allocation, [...] similarly agreed that a fact-based allocation could be conducted pursuant to *Boston Gas*. (Pa 187).  ARGUMENT - PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT’S REPLY I.
[directive] I/we, _______________________________, do hereby certify that I/we are the parent(s) or guardian/caregiver(s) or designee(s) of ___________________________________.  I/we have read the entire agreement between my child and the stationhouse adjustment program prior to my Attorney General Guidelines - Stationhouse Adjustments Page 10 child signing the agreement.  I have assisted my child in reading this form if it was necessary and have explained the form to my child and have answered any questions that he or she may have had.  I/we do hereby agree to support his/her participation and compliance in the program and will enforce this agreement by informing the police department of any violations of its terms and/or conditions.
[brief] Either way, he was not a mere witness, but the police affirmatively misled him into believing that he was “[j]ust like . . . anybody else” to trick him into waiving his rights.  Not only was that statement an affirmative lie designed to mask his true exposure in a homicide investigation, but it also diminished the importance of the Miranda warnings by implying they were just a formality, given to “anybody” that “come[s] down” to the station.  The deception and minimization here was critically worse than the waiver comment in Erazo.
[brief] The Supreme Court’s holding in Medici makes clear that its understanding of the statutory scheme of the MLUL and the interplay of the Zoning Board’s Annual Report with policy-making by the governing body is intended to be generally applicable to all types of variances, including the instant variance under NJSA40:55D-70(d)(6), not just the use variance pursuant to NJSA 40:55D-70(d)(1) which was at issue in Medici:  The legislative enactments requiring periodic re-evaluation of municipal master plans and zoning ordinances, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-89, -89.1, and annual reports and recommendations from the boards of adjustment, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.1, reflect a legislative policy intended to insure that a municipality's master plan and zoning ordinance reflect contemporary needs and conditions, and that the governing body is kept informed of provisions of the zoning ordinance that generate variance requests.
[brief] Indictment No.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C  Honorable Judges: Pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b) and R. 2:6-4(a) this letter-brief is submitted on behalf of the State of New Jersey.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................1  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BECAUSE DEFENDANT’S REMOVAL FROM THE VEHICLE AND SUBSEQUENT FRISK WERE LAWFUL BASED ON THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES FOLLOWING AN UNDISPUTED LAWFUL MOTOR VEHICLE STOP.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at *14.  Finally, the court considered the date of the “Potentially Responsible Party” letter from the EPA and the notice letter to the insurance company, but rejected those dates because they were “equally random as they have nothing to do with the triggered period or the time of damage/risk. ”  *Id.*  Ultimately, the court concluded that the allocation period should end when *[...]* stopped adding waste oil to the site in 1992, explaining:  This approach best approximates the *Boston Gas* case which assumed that the triggered period of years ended when Boston Gas sold or abandoned the polluted site.  Likewise, it best approximates the “fact-based allocation” praised in *Boston Gas*.  In this case, one knows that the insured did nothing to further pollution of the site after the last shipment in 1992.
[brief] Plaintiff relies upon the following facts in opposition to Defendants’ appeal:  Defendant [...] was about 200 feet away from the intersection when he observed the yellow/amber traffic signal.  3T149.  Defendant [...] admitted that he was driving in excess of the 55 MPH speed limit when he observed the yellow light.  3T147.  He made no effort to stop at the intersection nor did he slow at any point before entering the intersection.  3T149-150.  Defendant [...] “wanted to try to get through that light before it turned red. ”  3T150.  He did nothing to see if he could stop safely before getting to that intersection.  3T150.  The [...] vehicle spun 180 degrees before coming to rest as a result of the impact with [...]’s [...] van.  3T129.  Plaintiff was entrapped in the vehicle for a significant duration.  She offered this testimony at trial on direct examination:
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Order denying respondent's motion to recuse the Judge of Compensation should be reversed, and this matter should be remanded for hearing by another Judge of Compensation.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant  By: s/[...]  RANDOLPH BRAUSE  NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR COURT APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  [...], Petitioner – Appellee, v. [...], Respondent-Appellant.  : Dept. of Labor & Workforce Dev., Division of Workers’ Compensation, Freehold Vicinage.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.W.C.  PETITIONER-APPELLEE’S BRIEF SUBMITTED IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT-APPELLANT’S APPEAL FROM ORDER DENYING RECUSAL OF JUDGE  [...], Esq. Of Counsel & on the Brief  Attorney ID # 020291980  Attorney for [...], Petitioner-Appellee  [...].  [...]  [...]  [...]  Tel.: [...]  Fax: [...]  E-Mail: [...] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |----------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | ii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | FACTS | 6-8 | | UNDISPUTED FACTS | 6 | | FACTS TO BE PROVED AT TRIAL | 6 | | FACTS RELATING TO RECUSAL ISSUE | 7 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 8 | | POINT ONE: THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE RECUSAL OF JUDGE DOWNEY | 8 | | CONCLUSION | 17 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] Both applications proposed raising the grade of the property by 10 feet, utilization of drywells to contain water runoff from the house and utilization of retaining walls.  Nothing was presented by either applicant to adequately address water runoff resulting from raising the grade of the property other than channeling water from four downspouts to four drywells.  Raising the grade of the property by 10 feet constitutes a dramatic topographic alteration which was not adequately addressed for purposes of water runoff.  The [...] has the power to determine initially whether a change is sufficient to warrant a second review, "a determination that should be overturned on review only if it is shown to be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious".
[brief] 2T7:13-8:14.  Plaintiff is the sole owner and sole employee of [...] and, in fact, retained [...]’ counsel.  1T95:7-16, 105:1-24, 107:25-108:22, 109:14-22; Pb2, 8.  As plaintiff admits, no one objected to that conference at that time or at any time thereafter during the trial or subsequent to the trial, or suggested that the Court should disclose further on the record what occurred.  Moreover, contrary to plaintiff’s bald assertion (Pb39), there is no evidence that that brief conference had any effect on the trial or resulted in dismissal of any of plaintiff’s claims.  In fact, this conference was not *ex parte* in the traditional sense at all, as [...]’ counsel, who was fully aligned with plaintiff’s interests, was present.  It strains the bounds of credulity that, had anything occurred at the conference that was inimical to plaintiff’s interests, [...]’ counsel would not have informed plaintiff and/or raised an issue on the record.  In fact, after the conference in Chambers the Court directed a short break in the proceedings.  2T8:15-22.  During this break, [...]’ counsel had the opportunity to advise plaintiff what occurred before the trial proceeded.  Such communications would have been privileged as plaintiff was [...]’ sole member.  In general, in order to raise an issue on appeal, a party must have raised an objection to the Trial Court.
[brief] The Board FINDS that NJDEP has not required additional remediation or conditions for construction of the proposed solar facility on area AOC K.  The Board DIRECTS Staff to issue full certification to the project upon the applicant's demonstration that the project, as-built, does not go beyond the limits of AOC K, and that the project does not and will not disrupt or change, without prior written permission from the NJDEP, any engineering or institutional control that is part of a remedial action for the site, and does not otherwise interfere with any remediation at the site.  The applicant shall file as-built documentation and allow for an on-site inspection.  After the applicant has received full certification and satisfied all SRP requirements, the Board DIRECTS Staff to issue a New Jersey Certification Number to the project for purposes of SREC creation, provided that all requirements of N.J.A.C. 14:8-2.4 are met.  [Emphasis added.]  The Board WAIVES the provisions of the SREC Registration Program in the Renewable Portfolio Standard rules requiring submittal of an initial registration package within ten days of installation contract execution at **ADDRESSEE ONLY — CONFIDENTIAL & PRIVILEGED** N.J.A.C. 14:8-2.4© and the registration length of one year at N.J.A.C. 14:8-2.4 (f) for the [...].
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order granting Motion to Intervene (February 25, 2021)  Ia33  Order granting summary judgment (October 21, 2022)  Ia50  Oral Argument (September 23, 2022)  1T Oral Argument & Decision (October 21, 2022)  2T  Order entering final judgment (January 20, 2023)  Ia52  ## TABLE OF APPENDIX | Appendix document | Appendix Page No. | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | Complaint for rescission, declaratory judgment and reimbursement against Defendant [...] (June 22, 2020) | Ia001 | | Answer to Complaint (September 29, 2020) | Ia023 | | Order granting motion to intervene (February 25, 2021) | Ia033 | | Machane amended answer and third-party complaint against third-party defendant [...] (June 14, 2021) | Ia035 | | Order Granting Summary Judgment, filed October 21, 2022 | Ia050 | | Order certifying the October 21, 2022 summary judgment order as a final judgment (January 20, 2023) | Ia052 | | Notice of Voluntary Dismissal (January 19, 2023) | Ia054 | | Intervenor [...]’s objection to voluntary dismissal (January 24, 2023) | Ia056 | | Notice of Appeal (March 2, 2023) | Ia058 | | Rule 2:6-1(a)(1)  Statement of All Items Submitted on Summary Judgment Motion | Ia065 | | Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment | Ia070 | | Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (July 1, 2022) | Ia074 | | Plaintiff’s Certification in Support of Motion for Summary Judgement | Ia081 | | • Exhibit A, Certificate of Formation for [...] | Ia085 | | • Exhibit B, Excerpts of [...] deposition transcript | Ia088 | • Exhibit C, Camp application for Camp Machane of Richmond Ia100 • Exhibit D, Machane’s Answers to Interrogatories Ia104 • Exhibit E, Email exchange between Machane and [...] between July 9, 2019 and July 31, 2019 Ia113 • Exhibit F, Email exchange between Machane and Gross & Company Insurance employee [...] dated June 28, 2019 Ia119 • Exhibit G, Email exchange between [...] and Gross between July 31, 2019 and August 6, 2019 Ia121 • Exhibit H, Program Administrator Agreement between [...] and [...] Ia127 • Exhibit I, Excerpts of [...] deposition transcript Ia128 • Exhibit J, [...]’s Commercial General Liability Underwriting Rule and Rates Ia137 • Exhibit K, Email exchange between Gross and Machane between July 31, 2019 and August 6, 2019 Ia138 • Exhibit L, Non-Owned/Hired Auto Supplemental Form Ia142 • Exhibit M, Price quotation provided by [...] to Machane dated August 6, 2019 Ia144 • Exhibit N, Certificate number 972303011 and relevant portions of Master Policy SRPGAPML 101 0719, which was issued to [...] Ia150 • Exhibit O, Police report prepared in connection with the subject August 15, 2019 rental van accident Ia166 • Exhibit P, [...]’s Complaint for Rescission, Declaratory Judgment, and Reimbursement • Exhibit Q, Unpublished decision
[brief] ]  And “[t]he fact that purely innocent connotations can be ascribed to a person’s actions does not mean that an officer cannot base a finding of reasonable suspicion on those actions as long as a reasonable person would find the actions are consistent with guilt. ”  State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 279–80 (1998) (punctuation omitted).  Here, as outlined in Subpoint A, above, [...] had a well-grounded and particularized suspicion that defendant had engaged in drug activity.
[directive] In 2022, the Legislature passed and the Governor enacted L.2021, c.459, which establishes the following additional parameters for police presence within the 100-foot zone around early voting locations, polling places, and ballot drop boxes during election time.  First, although a poll worker may request police officers to assist in preserving the peace and order in and about an early voting location or a polling place, a poll worker may make such a request only with regard to a “specific emergency, allegation of criminal conduct, or disturbance that exists at the time the request for assistance is made. ”  N.J.S.A. 19:6-16(b).  Police officers or law enforcement officers responding to such a request for assistance shall take any prompt actions as may be available and as necessary to address the emergency or allegation or disturbance and shall remain “only as long as necessary to investigate, address, and remove that specific emergency or disturbance. ”  Id.  Officers may also investigate, address or remove any cause for a disturbance or otherwise respond to a request for assistance on or around the premises of the location of a ballot drop box.  N.J.S.A. 19:63-16.1(f).  Second, when any police officer is dispatched to an early voting location or a polling place, the county board of elections or superintendent of elections shall promptly notify the Secretary of State of such dispatch.
[brief] On 6/1/22, Bank credited to [...]’s new savings account, the $150,000.00, that had been fraudulently withdrawn in May 2022 from his old savings and checking accounts.  (Pa 136, Par. 7).  The Bank did not provide an explanation of what occurred, why it occurred or when or why the money was credited back to his account.  (Pa 136, Par. 8).
[brief] Neuroscience teaches that the continuing relevance of the *Miller* factors to late adolescents stems from their still-developing brains.  Foresight and impulse control are most associated with the brain’s prefrontal cortex.  In this part of the brain, the connections undergo a pruning and growth process that continues through the mid-twenties.  Thus, to a large extent, scientists believe that late adolescents cannot help their misbehavior.
[brief] After being confronted with the text message cited above, [...] still believes that he did not violate any policy and his conduct did not constitute sexual harassment and suggested it Appellant’s responsibility to correct his clear sexual harassment.  (Pa754) 125:5-14.  While [...] admits to the foregoing conduct and he otherwise lied to the investigator, (Pa754) 125:3-4, [...] denies telling Appellant that she was looking good, looking pretty, or anything of that nature.  (Pa739) 62:22-25.  [...] testified he understood the State to have a “zero tolerance” policy for sexual harassment.  (Pa734) 44:17-45:8.  He was unsure of when he participated in anti- sexual harassment training and, despite being suspended for engaging in sexual harassment, he received no additional training.  (Pa734) 45:9-18 (“Q: After you were suspended, did you have to take any remedial anti-sexual harassment training?  A. No.”).  He was promoted in 2019, shortly after his suspension for sexual harassment and transfer to Burlington West.  (Pa734) 43:16-25.  C.
[brief] In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-483 (2007).  Expanding upon these inquiries, the Supreme Court has stated that “[a]rbitrary and capricious action of administrative bodies means willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of circumstances.  Where there is room for two opinions, action is [valid] when exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been reached. ”  Worthington v. Fauver, 88 N.J. 183, 204-5 (1982).  In conducting this limited review, courts have accorded agency actions the presumption of validity and reasonableness, and, in this context, the burden is on the challenger to overcome these presumptions.
[brief] Further, the FDCPA expressly permits the use of service providers to communicate with consumers (e.g. telegram operators).  Federal agencies tasked with implementing and enforcing the FDCPA have thus repeatedly approved of the use of service providers, generally, and letter vendors, specifically.  More generally, as the Superior Court noted, Respondent’s use of a letter vendor could not “inflict the type of reputational harm that Congress is seeking to prevent,” and simply “does not fall within the type of third-party disclosures which Congress sought to bar under the FDCPA.
[brief] ” (36T 22:21-25; 33:14-16; 53:9-10).  Relatedly, [...] (who the Court found to be credible) provided uncontroverted testimony that certain of the defendant entities were merged into [...] after the closing of the sale transaction for the Plaintiffs’ interests.  (23T 33:24 to 34:3).  It is neither fair nor equitable to place the burden on the Plaintiffs, as the innocent parties here, to untangle or deconstruct the complex accounting web that the defendants created.
[brief] ”  I put the months with some of the “T” notations to help keep things straight.  This Brief is Very Similar to the one from the Prior Appeal.  Note: This brief has 17 pages but these first 4 pages don’t count for a total of 13, under the 15-page maximum.  The body of this Brief is in Courier Prime, 13-point for ease of readability.  The headings are 14-point and the footnotes, 12-point.  Also note:  For the Sections of my Merits Brief, I am relying on my of Appellant’s Brief.  I.  Unresolved Legal Issues  At the close of the 2024 Oral Argument, one judge raised the issue of [...] suing the State as an employer, a matter not previously addressed.  This is precisely [...]'s claim.  The State has focused on the inapplicable CRA (N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 & 2), while overlooking its potential LAD (N.J.S.A. 5:12-1 to 29.11) liability for employee actions, regardless of personal immunity.  This is particularly relevant if the Court deems only Declaratory Relief appropriate, as that remedy applies even against immune actors to enjoin illegal activities.  The State and the AOC have clear anti-retaliation laws, rules, and policies which should be enforced, especially when discrimination is tacitly condoned by "Management."  The State, including the Judiciary, appears to believe these policies do not apply to them.  This belief has seemingly become a policy of non-responsiveness to ADA/LAD Complaints filed against them, administratively or judicially.  If this is the Judiciary's policy, it should be explicitly stated so individuals with disabilities understand they have no recourse, regardless of what’s “on the books. ”  These potential plaintiffs could then petition the Legislature to explicitly apply the LAD to the Judiciary, potentially creating a constitutional crisis, given the Judiciary's supposed self-governance via the AOC.
[brief] That is because, in 18 years, [...] has already consumed the entire apple several times over.  It is time for [...]’s long fight against [...]’s insurance claim to end.  Each of the issues about which [...] complains is a matter left to the sound discretion of this Court.  The Feb. 10, 2023, Order was a reasonable exercise of that discretion.  There is nothing in the Feb. 10, 2023, Order or this Court’s reasoning that is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  The Court agrees.  (Pa0221).  After the court denied [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration, [...] filed a Notice of Appeal on June 7, 2023.
[brief] *Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Const.*, 178 N.J. 513, 522 (2004) (internal quotations omitted).  Therefore, since the plain language of OPRA clearly does not contemplate private entities being subject to OPRA’s provisions, it is not necessary to engage in tests utilized in other jurisdictions.  [...], a private entity, is not subject to OPRA under the plain language of the law.
[brief] On November 8, 2021, a Certification in Support of Probable Cause was signed by [...], his typed statement, and Complaint Information Form with a detail of the defendant’s name, address, phone number, date of birth, driver’s license number and non-applicable vehicle details was submitted to [...].  Following [...], on November 10, 2021, Burlington Township Police Ptl. [...] #77 provided his report, report submission and conclusion of his involvement in the matter.