ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] II.  CONSIDERATIONS OF ADEQUATE OR ACTUAL NOTICE DO NOT COMPEL A DIFFERENT RESULT ........................................................................... 10 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 19 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## CASES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc., | 8 | | 208 N.J. 114 (2011) | | | Bowen v. Pursel, | 15 | | 109 N.J. Eq. 67 (E. & A. 1931) | | | Buono v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund, | 14 | | 188 N.J. Super 488 (App. Div. 1983) | | | D'Ambrosio v. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., | 8 | | 403 N.J. Super 321 (App. Div. 2008) | | | DiProspero v. Penn, | 8 | | 183 N.J. 477 (2005) | | | Duvin v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., | 15 | | 76 N.J. 203 (1978) | | | Ensslin v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., | 16, 17, 18 | | 311 N.J. Super 333 (App. Div. 1998) | | | Francois v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., | 7 | | 415 N.J. Super 335 (App. Div. 2010) | | | Franklin Tower One, LLC v. N.M., | 9 | | 157 N.J. 602 (1999) | | | GE Solid State, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, | 11 | | 132 N.J. 298 (1993) | | | Geller v. Dep’t of Treasury, | 7 | | 53 N.J. 591 (1969) | | Gerba v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 83 N.J. 174 (1980)
[brief] [...] “accounting” of 3/17/2022 DA 162 26.  [...] certification of Probation errors  DA 266 27.  12/1/2011  [...] Audit DA 281 28.  12/5/2011  [...] Audit DA 283 29.  8/21/2012  [...] Audit DA 286 30.  10/16/2013  [...] Audit DA 290 31.  12/10/2015, [...] Audit DA 294 32.  2/6/2019  [...] Audit DA 299 33.  9/18/2020  [...] Audit DA 304 34.  Appellant’s letter to Court, 4/19/2021 re continued over-garnishment of child support DA 309 35.  Appellant’s paydown of child support as of 5.3.2021, submitted with Motion for Enforcement of Order of 10/25/2021 DA 311 36.  SSA Notice 12/8/2021, false child support account number DA 312 37.  SSA Notice 2/1/2022, Appellant’s child support account number DA 313 38.  SSA Notice 2/1/2022, false child support account number DA 314 39.  SSA Notice 3/9/2022, false child support account number DA 315 40.  SSA Notice 3/22/2022, Appellant’s child support account number DA 316 41.  SSA Notice, 3/22/2022, false child support account number DA 317 42.  SSA Notice, 9/16/2022, false child support account number DA 318 43.  SSA letter dated 9/12/2022 DA 319 44.  [...] refund checks for false child support garnishment, checks nos. 1-6 DA 320 45.  [...] Notice of 1/24/2022 to the SSA DA 321 46.  [...] Notice of 1/21/2022 to the SSA DA 323 47.  Appellant Certification, Motion to Enforce the Order of 1/11/2022, filed 2/17/2022 DA 324  Volume III: Exhibits 48.
[brief] ”  Ibid. (citing Shipyard Assocs., LP v. City of Hoboken, 242 N.J. 23, 38 (2020) (alterations in original)).  Thus, the Commissioner reasonably concluded that when the public access requirement in N.J.S.A. 13:1D-153 is triggered by a change in footprint, the DEP must impose a public access condition “regardless of whether public access currently exists at the property in question. ” (Aa137).  B.  The DEP Properly Applied the Law to [...]’s Application (Responding to Appellant’s Point II)
[brief] Proceedings at the local or departmental level are inherently arbitrary, biased, unreasonable and/or prejudicial to the employees the public entity is attempting to discipline.  See Grasso v. Borough Council of Borough of Glassboro, 205 N.J. Super. 18 (App. Div. 1985).  Due to this inherent bias and uneven playing field at the local --- *This Legal Argument was made in [...]'s written closing at the Departmental Level and in his written closing at the Superior Court Level.
[brief] The trial court correctly ruled that “[...] and [...] are entitled to a declaratory judgment that the CCIP Policies have no obligation to provide coverage to ([...]) for the Hood Lawsuit,” and that “there is no theory under which [...] can be held responsible for the money [...] and [...] spent to defend and settle the Hood Lawsuit. ”  Pa2746; Pa2753.  [...] respectfully requests this Court to affirm the trial court.
[brief] (Pa 0092 n.8).  \(^1\)  The terms “in need of redevelopment” and “blighted” are synonymous.  *Hirth*, supra, 337 N.J. Super. at 154 n.1.  Defense counsel’s briefs\(^2\) contend essentially that because the requirements for Section 14 are met for the entire Town, the governing body is free to construct whatever buildings and/or create any uses anywhere in the [...].  The two zones other than the zone of the L&T site rely upon the Section 14 “overlay” zone.  Yet, the explicit purpose of Section 14 is to prevent “further deterioration” of the housing stock or of the water and sewer infrastructure.  None of those considerations are present in the structures to be created in the north and south zones\(^3\).  **POINT II**
[brief] Second, [...] held that the Board “arbitrarily slashed” the cost of [...]’s monthly management fee by one-third ($150 to $100).  13T:65:9-10.  [...] appeals that ruling in Point IV of his brief.  Third, as to the most consequential issue affecting the Rent Increase, [...] held that the Board was arbitrary and capricious in determining that [...]’s equity in the Unit was $12,804.  It held that the Board did not comply with [...]’s Second Remand Order requiring the Board to consider inflation, improvements, assessments and market conditions.  13T:59:9-25; 65:11-24.  It stated that “[c]learly, the Board did not look at historical facts with respect to inflation, tax assessments, market fluctuations to determine equity and created a fantasy magical formula of comparing assessments and using arbitrary unsupported numbers to reduce equity. ”  13T:59:21-25.  The Court reiterated that [...] is “entitled to earn a just and reasonable return on the property, unit 11, and they cannot be forced to subsidize Mr. [...]’s expenses” and that it “has been confiscatory to force [...] to subsidize [...] …”  13T:63:2-5; 64:11-13.  The Court declined to remand the matter for a third time to the Board.
[brief] **  Rule 4:42-9(a) provides that no fees for legal services are allowed unless permitted by rule or by statute.  Pursuant to R. 1:4-8, a Defendant that successfully prevails in an action for frivolous litigation may be entitled to award of attorney’s fees.  The Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPC”) provide a number of factors the court may considering in making a determination as to the reasonableness of an attorney’s fees.  RPC 1.5(a) provides following factors the court may consider: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
[brief] (See 6T:5-22 to 24).  Assuming arguendo that exhibit D-11 was not submitted to the jury prior to deliberations, defendant cannot demonstrate that the exclusion of D-11 constituted reversible error where the jury possessed D-10\(^5\) during deliberations, were shown both D-10 and D-11 during the trial, and heard defense counsel’s arguments that [...] possessed a motivation to fabricate his statement implicating defendant.  (6T:5-6 to 24; 2T:125-10 to 126-19 and 130-9 to 133-25).  Defense counsel also displayed D-11 on a projector so that [...] and the jurors could read it.  (2T:122-16 to 22).  D-10 reflected [...]’s maximum sentence exposure of ten years as well as the State’s recommendation of five years with forty-two months’ parole ineligibility.  (2T:125-5 to 126-18).  The jury would have been able to consider the “favorable outcome [...] received . . . after he informed against [...]” without possessing D-11 during deliberations.  (Db43).  \(^5\)  D-10 was the plea form dated November 5, 2015 memorializing [...]’s guilty plea to the final charge of unlawful possession of a handgun.  (2T:124-6 to 126-25).  The cases offered in support of defendant’s argument are distinguishable from the case at bar.  (See Db41).  Unlike the trial court in Palestroni v. Jacobs, which supplied the jury with an item not admitted into evidence and without notice to the defense, the trial court here allegedly failed to submit an exhibit that had been previously presented to the jury.  (10 N.J. Super. 266, 271-76 (App. Div. 1950)).  Further, the whole of the trial court’s verdict was not affected where the jury possessed other exhibits which purportedly demonstrated defendant’s theory that [...] received an unusually favorable sentence in light of his twelve prior convictions because he testified against defendant.  (See Id. at 269; 6T:5-6 to 24; 2T:125-10 to 126-19 and 130-9 to 133-25).  The trial court here did not allow the jury to consider a previously unknown exhibit during deliberations, unlike the court in State v. Anderson, 251 N.J. Super. 327, 329-34 (App. Div. 1991)).  As defendant cannot demonstrate that he was denied a fair trial because of the trial court’s communication, the deprivation of his right to be present, or an alleged failure of the court to submit D-11 to the jury, defendant’s convictions should be affirmed.
[brief] MANSLAUGHTER | 8 | | POINT II: THE SENTENCE IMPOSED WAS APPROPRIATE AND DOES NOT REPRESENT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION | 16 | | CONCLUSION | 24 | | Cases | Page(s) | |------------------------------|---------| | State v. Case, | 20 | | 220 N.J. 49 (2014) | | | State v. Blackmon, | 20 | | 202 N.J. 283 (2010) | | | State v. Bonano, | 8 | | 59 N.J. 515 (1971) | | | State v. Canfield, | 14 | | 470 N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 2022) | | | State v. Carey, | 21, 22 | | 168 N.J. 413 (2001) | | | State v. Carrero, | 11, 13 | | 229 N.J. 118 (2017) | | | State v. Crisantos, | 8, 9 | | 102 N.J. 265 (1986) | | | State v. Funderberg, | 7, 8, 9, 12 | | 225 N.J. 66 (2016) | | | State v. Harris, | 13 | | 141 N.J. 525 (1995) | | | State v. Jang, | 22 | | 359 N.J. Super. 85 | | | State v. King, | 8 | | 37 N.J. 285 (1962) | | | State v. Mauricio, | 7, 8 | | 117 N.J. 402 (1990) | | | State v. Miller, | 24 | | 108 N.J. 112 (1987) | | State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109 (2011)........................................................................................................... 22 State v. Molina, 168 N.J. 436 (2001)............................................................................................................. 23 State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208 (1996)............................................................................................................. 22 State v. Robinson, 136 N.J. 476 (1994).............................................................................................................. 7, 8 State v. Rogers, 124 N.J. 113 (1991)............................................................................................................. 17 State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984).................................................................................................................
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description
[brief] See [...]’s reply brief, filed on August 3, 2023, page 6.  \(^4\)  Amicus, repeating Defendant, also improperly states that the capital improvements totaling $76,900 to the Unit were not supported.  [...] addressed that false contention in its August 3, 2023 reply brief, pages 1-2.  Moreover, Defendant merely argued that the improvements were not to any great extent, not that improvements were not made.  Thank you for your consideration.
[brief] Plaintiff, [...], testified that on July 29, 2013 stopped Defendant [...]’s vehicle after having seen it exit from a residential street in Holmdel at a high rate of speed.  (2T60 to 66)  Plaintiff and Defendant became involved in an altercation when, according to Plaintiff, Defendant behaved in a confrontational manner and refused to remain in his vehicle while Plaintiff wrote out a traffic summons.  (2T66 to 69)  Plaintiff, for some reason, decided to take Defendant down to the ground, put him in handcuffs behind his back and place him under arrest.  Plaintiff grabbed Defendant around the midsection, tripped him, and threw him to the pavement, but Plaintiff fell to the ground as well.  (2T69 to 71)  Plaintiff claimed that he struck the left side of his face and forehead on the back of Defendant’s head (2T71-11 to 17).  He also struck his elbow and his knee on the pavement.  “My knee and my elbow struck the pavement.  I had a raspberry and like a grapefruit like swelled up. ”  (2T71-9 to 10)  He had cuts and scrapes from the pavement.  (2T73-16 to 21)  First aid showed up and bandaged his elbow (2T73-4 to 6).  He did not complain of a head injury at the time.  (2T73-8 to 10)  The incident was captured on a dash cam video from Plaintiff’s vehicle that was shown to the jury during his testimony and again at the Jury’s request during their deliberations.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Preliminary Statement .........................................................  1  Procedural History ..................................................................  4 Statement of Facts ..................................................................  7  ARGUMENT ...........................................................................  23  POINT I .................................................................................. 23  THE MOTION  JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY DECLINING TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO R. 4:40-2 BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED THAT THE JURY’S VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND REASONABLE MINDS COULD NOT DIFFER AS TO THE RESULT (Pa665-66).  ..............................................  23 POINT II ..................................................................................  34  THE MOTION JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY DECLINING GRANT  PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL TO PREVENT THE MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE(Pa665-66).  ..............................................  34 POINT III ..................................................................................  38  THE MOTION JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY GRANTING DEFENDANT’S FEE APPLICATION BECAUSE DEFENDANT NEVER ASSERTED ANY COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT CANNOT BE DEEMED A PREVAILING PARTY (Pa667-68).  ..............................................  38 POINT IV .................................................................................. 41  THE MOTION JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY GRANTING DEFENDANT’S FEE ON ISSUES  DEFENDANT DID NOT PREVAIL ON (Pa667-68).  ..............................................  41  POINT V ..................................................................................  42  THE MOTION JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY GRANTING DEFENDANT’S FEE ON TIME ENTRIES THAT ARE VAGUE AND/OR OR OTHERWISE INDISCERNABLE (Pa667-68).  ..............................................  42  CONCLUSION ...........................................................................
[brief] The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed this issue and held that any obligation of prior governmental approvals imposed by the New Jersey Legislature unstated in a contract but otherwise required by law necessarily is incorporated into the contract.  *Kalogeras v. 239 Broad Ave.*, L.L.C 202 N.J. 349 (2010).  Plaintiff’s allegations of bad faith recite generalized opinions that Defendants did “virtually nothing. ”  Pb41.  Plaintiff initially filed a count for reformation claiming that an RIR was not done, (Pa0005) yet when an RIR was filed in December 2021, they continued their grievances but changed it to “disregarded differences and failure of cooperation” (Pb41) to the trial judge, even though their own expert acknowledged that the NJDEP had extended the timeline for one (1) year.  4T230-5 to 10.  D.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED A PROTECTIVE ORDER TO BAR PLAINTIFF FROM DEPOSING DEFENDANTS’ TRIAL ATTORNEY AND/OR SOMEONE FROM HER STAFF (Pa0190)
[brief] (Da031, Trial Court eCourts Case Jacket, Trans Id: [...]).  The State Defendants requested and received a one (1) month extension to file opposition briefs.  (Da031, Trial Court eCourts Case Jacket, Trans Id: [...]).  As such, the [...] filed their opposition brief on August 7, 2020 (Da031-32, Trial Court eCourts Case Jacket, Trans ID: [...]).  The State Defendants filed their opposition brief on August 20, 2020.
[brief] The trial court granted the [...]’ motion to compel [...] to arbitrate its claims pursuant to the No-Fault Law’s statutory arbitration provision, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a).  Pa2.  In its decision, the trial court “look[ed] to the No-Fault Law’s plain language” and concluded that the “term ‘any dispute’” in the statute “is straightforward enough: it means all ‘disputes’ around the ‘recovery’ of PIP benefits” are governed by the provision.  Pa6.  Moreover, “dispute” refers to “a legal dispute between parties. ”  Ibid.  The term “recovery” in context was intended to refer to recovery of PIP benefits submitted by insureds or medical providers.  Ibid.  And so, the Court concluded that the “language of the statute leads to one conclusion: the arbitration mandate covers a broad array of legal disputes. ”  Ibid. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Molino, 289 N.J. Super. 406, 405-406 (App. Div. 1996)).
[brief] These Paragraphs are in the nature of mutual promises on operational issues between related cooperative entities to be effective and limited to the period of anticipated cooperative ownership by the entities/parties to the Agreement and to be subject to change by circumstances, or agreement, or change of ownership.  Illustrative of the overall misconception in the Trial Court’s analysis and rulings is that the Court also found that the portion of Paragraph 10 that [...] would “permit use of lands on Sixth Street for boiler room use and for a water cooling tower” established that the [...] had a permanent “easement” to be supplied heat from the school’s heating system.  (Da1005).  It is submitted there is no such “easement” for use of a heating system.  That ruling --- although the heating system was never the primary issue --- is clearly indicative of the error of the Trial Court’s analysis.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 58:11A-5.  Areawide WQM Plans must be consistent with the CPP and are statutorily required to, among other things, (1) identify necessary water treatment works to meet municipal waste treatment needs and establish construction priorities for such treatment works, (2) create a regulatory program that addresses point and nonpoint sources, (3) identify entities and financing necessary to carry out the plan, and (4) identify and address specific pollution sources such as agricultural pollution, mine-related sources of pollution, construction activity pollution, and saltwater intrusion.  N.J.S.A. 58:11A-5(a)-(k).  The WQPA dictates that “[a]ll projects and activities affecting water quality in any planning area shall be developed and conducted in a manner consistent with the adopted [Areawide WQM Plan] . . .  The commissioner shall not grant any permit which is in conflict with an adopted [Areawide WQM Plan].”
[brief] [...] dismissed Appellant’s claims with prejudice despite Respondents presenting no new evidence, facts, or case law.  3T 90:4-92:11.  Specifically, the Court dismissed Appellant’s claims of sexual harassment discrimination and hostile work environment, and retaliation.  3T 90:4-92:11.  The Court incorrectly reasoned, with little to no explanation and without any new evidence or information, that [...]’s actions were not taken within the control of [...], and therefore, all claims against [...] Respondents should be dismissed.  3T 91:15-20.  The Court further held that since there was not a close enough nexus between [...], [...], and Appellant to establish a NJLAD claim.  3T 92:9-11.  A settlement was reached between [...] and [...], and a Stipulation of Dismissal was filed on July 11, 2023, in connection with the outstanding claims.  Appellant’s claims are now ripe for appeal, and this appeal accordingly follows.
[brief] Yet, such evidence was questionable at best, and at worst, unintentionally misleading.  In paragraph 44 of his Certification (Pa71 ¶ 44), and Exhibit N (Pa332–39), Defendant attached photographs purporting to show the guest bedroom walls without any framed [...] lyrics.  These photos were allegedly supplied by [...], Plaintiff’s estranged sister, who Plaintiff has alleged in other lawsuits had, along with family members, removed numerous boxes from the Englewood Property after the Decedent’s death and prior to Defendant’s appointment.  Said photos lack any proper foundation as to, e.g., who took each photograph, or when they were taken.  In fact, Defendant would be unable to testify as to what was hanging on the guest room walls at the time of the Decedent’s death, but instead is relying on unauthenticated evidence provided by someone who has been fighting with Plaintiff since before the Decedent’s death.
[brief] The judgment does not specify the location of any of the Court-ordered affordable housing.  Indeed, it only references “Block 419 redevelopment” once concerning the need to have “family rental units,” without mentioning the number of affordable units.  243a.  Instead, it set the “Realistic Development Potential (RDP)” of “53 units,” without specifying where each unit would be located.  The location was set by agreement of the parties and there is no dispute of fact on the record before the trial court that [...] and [...] had agreed to locate the seven Off-site Units at Block 610, Lot 1.  Both [...]’s representative and [...]’s representative submitted sworn certifications that [...] selected Block 610, Lot 1 for the Off-site Property, instructed [...] to purchase it, and [...] did so in reliance thereon.
[directive] The point value for the bail violation aggravating factor is +3, except that the Page 72 [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) point value is +4 if at any time during the course of committing the present offense the defendant was a fugitive or under warrant for a bail violation or failure to appear, or if the defendant failed to appear for a court proceeding in the present matter.  While most of the aggravating factors recognized in these Guidelines relate to the circumstances in which the present Brimage-eligible offense was committed, Aggravating Factor #2, like D.O.R.O. Special Application and Enhancement Feature F defined in Section 11.6, includes consideration of the defendant’s conduct occurring after the present Brimage-eligible offense has been completed and following the defendant’s arrest for that offense.