ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] NOTE: CEP I Minimum 120 Da\fs: Continuing Care ,Phase 4 Court every three months  Maintain any recommended medical/dental needs if treatment, applicable  Demonstrate addressing people, places, and things in  Engage with treatment  Cooperate supervision  Maintain recovery groups and recovery network per as Review plan  Maintain financial plan and continue making payments per plan case case  Monthly office visits  Maintain supportive services recommended as other  Every month home/field visits  Maintain pro-social activities or Random drug tests (minimum month)*  Maintain employment, vocational training, school 2x  Maintain housing Develop continuing care plan by be be may per *Two drug tests month conducted treatment providers, however, these results can only of addressed therapeutically and not as a basis for a jail sanction or violation probation.  Promulgated by Directive #20-21 (08/11/2021)
[brief] ................................................................................................. 24  **Gainer v. Weigher Co. Realtors,** 288 N.J. Super. 504 (App. Div. 1996), aff’d 148 N.J. 582 (1997) ......................... 46  Gallo v. Starland Realty, LLC, No. BER-C-351-13, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2667 (Ch. Div. Oct. 31, 2014)
[brief] Ultimately, in its discussion of the progression of the law in a residential property setting, the court noted “obvious inroads” in the concerning residential landlords, citing as example multi-family dwellings.  *Id.* 555.  --- 2  By example, the court noted the further progression of lessor liability unique to residential leaseholds, not commercial, such as statutory building code requirements of residential landlords such as handrails, interior stairways, etc.  See *N.J.S.A. 52:27D, et seq.* (American Building Officials Code).  *Reyes*, 456-57.  In short, the entire discussion and analysis in Reyes was in the context of residential leaseholds only, with no mention or thought given to commercial industrial lessors/lessees.
[brief] DEFENDANT’S SEVEN-YEAR SENTENCE, WHICH IS THREE YEARS LESS THAN HE BARGAINED FOR WHEN PLEADING GUILTY TO A SECOND-DEGREE CRIME AND THREE YEARS LESS THAN THE MANDATORY MINIMUM EXTENDED TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELIGIBLE, SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.  In exchange for defendant agreeing to plead guilty to one count of second-degree possession with intent to distribute CDS, the State agreed to recommend a ten-year sentence, which was the bottom end of the extended-term range, despite being at the top of the ordinary second-degree range.  The State also agreed to move for dismissal of the remaining counts.  Despite this plea bargain, the judge sentenced defendant to a seven-year prison term after weighing the appropriate sentencing factors.  Defendant’s sentence is thus more than fair as far as defendant is concerned and it should be affirmed.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE SUPPRESSION MOTION BECAUSE IT IS UNREASONABLE TO INITIATE A TRAFFIC STOP BASED ON A POSSIBLE OUTSTANDING WARRANT BEFORE CONFIRMING THE WARRANT’S ACCURACY.  (Da13-40)  The police engaged in an impermissible traffic stop of [...]’s car in violation of state and federal constitutional protections.  To justify the stop, officers relied on contents of a database they knew to contain inaccuracies.  The officers therefore acted unreasonably in stopping the car before contacting dispatch to confirm the validity of the warrant.  The resulting search of the car was thus conducted in violation of [...]’ constitutional rights.  Accordingly, the trial court should have suppressed the physical evidence that resulted from the search.  U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7.
[brief] _____________________  3  Plaintiffs also criticize the [...] for its lack of discussion during its consideration of the Plan and its amendments at its meetings of 9/20/22 and 11/22/22.  (Pb4, Pb11-Pb12, Pb20) (“Pb4,” e.g. refers to Plaintiffs’ Amended Brief, filed October 3, 2023).  However, despite naming the [...] in the caption of their Complaint, no claim was made against the [...], nor was any prayer for relief sought against it.
[brief] Appellant is a large commercial property owner whose conduct demonstrates a clear intent to inflict as much financial pain on Appellants as possible, despite having been paid in full for the judgment.  This ongoing harassment and frivolity comes at a tremendous cost to Respondents who are small business owners forced out of the commercial space due to circumstances beyond their control.  Appellant had its day in court and all issues involving the breach of the lease were argued and resulted in a substantial money judgment which was paid in full.  By not barring Appellant from asserting further claims and assessing legal fees and costs, Appellant will only be further emboldened to continue the frivolity, but would be completely contrary to the long-standing principles and purpose of the Entire Controversy Doctrine an *res judicata*.  POINT II
[brief] ”  State v. L.H., 239 N.J. 22, 47 (2019) (citing State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017)).  “Simply put, ‘[d]eference ends when a trial court’s factual findings are not supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ’”  Ibid. (quoting S.S. 229 N.J. at 381).  Here, in light of the documentary evidence, as well as the testimonial support at trial and the motion hearing—none of which [...] seemed to have considered—the judge’s rejection of [...]’s testimony that the [...] agreements were fraudulent was not supported by the trial record.
[brief] .........................................................  35 Coyne v. State, Dep’t of Trans., 182 N.J. 481 (2005)  .....................................................................................  20 Estate of Hanges v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369 (2010)  ...................................................................................  19 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) ..................................................................................
[brief] THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW IN ASSESSING THE PLANNING BOARD’S FINDING THAT THE APPLICATION OF [...] DID NOT REQUIRE A HEIGHT VARIANCE PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.d.(6)  WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, UNREASONABLE AND IS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD BELOW  The Planning Board disagrees with the Plaintiffs that the issue before this Court is one of ordinance interpretation and thus a matter of law.  It is submitted that the issue before this Court is whether the Planning Board’s factual determination that applicant’s revised lot grade was not designed to allow increased building height was based on substantial evidence in the record and therefore was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  In this case the Planning Board properly found that the revised lot grade was “designed” to maintain the required separation between the drainage system and the seasonal high-water table and that it was a re-design of the grading of the entire site in order to meet the requirements of the State and Municipal stormwater management regulations which require addressing the quality, quantity and recharge of stormwater.  The decision of the Planning Board was not based on the “interpretation” of the Ordinance.  It was based upon the “application” of an unambiguous Ordinance.
[brief] \textit{E.g., Mannillo v. Gorski}, 54 N.J. 378, 386-87 (1969) (discussing the elements of the doctrine of adverse possession).  The burden of proving all required elements rests on the party claiming adverse possession.  \textit{Patton v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n}, 93 N.J. 180, 187 (1983).  As the trial court correctly held, [...] cannot satisfy any of these required elements based upon the scant evidence properly in the record:  Here, [...] has raised no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Property has been adversely possessed.  [...] relies on the following documents and/or information to support its claim of ownership of Lot 22 through adverse possession: (1) a check dated December 10, 2013 to an unknown individual in the amount of $40 with the words “snow removal” written in the memo line, and (2) three receipts numbered 3597 and dated December 30, 2012 for a $40 dollar payment for “snow plow,” numbered 3406 and dated December 27, 2009 for a $40 dollar payment for “plowing snow,” numbered 3485 and dated December 6, 2011 for a $115 dollar payment to [...] for “snow removal. ”  Even accepting that all of the purported evidence is true for purposes of summary judgment, there is nothing that meets the standards required for adverse possession.  There is no evidence that the maintenance and utility payments were for Lot 22.
[brief] Pursuant to Rule 2:2-3(b)(3), an appeal may be taken as of right from “orders properly certified as final under R. 4:42-2. ”  Rule 2:9-1 provides, in pertinent part, that “the supervision and control of proceedings on appeal or certification shall be in the appellate court from the time the appeal is taken or the notice of petition for certification is filed. ”  As such, “[t]he ordinary effect of the filing of a notice of appeal is to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to act further in the matter unless directed to do so by an appellate court, or jurisdiction is otherwise reserved by statute or court rule. ”  *Manalapan Realty, L.P.*, 140 N.J. at 376.
[brief] Davis, 209 N.J. at 303.  You may consider the following factors to determine whether [...] was within the scope of employment at the time of the incident.  All four factors must be satisfied in order to find that [...] was within the scope of employment.  One, is it the kind he is . . . employed to perform?  Does it occur substantially within the authorized time and space limits?  Is it actuated, at least in part by purpose to serve the employer, and if force is intentionally used by the employee against another, the use of that force is not unexpected by the employer.  When an employee’s conduct, however intentional and wrongful, originated in his effort to fulfill an assigned task, then he’s acting within the scope of his employment.  Thus, if you find at the time of the incident with the plaintiff Mr. [...] was attempting to serve his employer, then defendant Lowe’s will be deemed negligent for the wrongdoing to the same extent as the employee [...].  [11T 168:25-169:19].  After deliberations, the jury found that [...] was acting outside the scope of employment.
[brief] (9T7:17-22); 71 F.Supp 2d 387.  Unfortunately, as a pro se plaintiff who never attended a formal civil procedure course, four of the five lawsuits that Petitioner filed were not resolved on the merits, but rather, on procedural grounds, including lack of standing, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the entire controversy doctrine, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  Sutton v. Sutton, 71 F.Supp. 2d at 386.  At the conclusion of the litigation, Petitioner received approximately $23,000 for his interests in the [...], its liquor license, and the adjoining parking lot.
[brief] Plaintiff formed a company in the United States called the [...] in April 2016 (2T83:18-24).  [...] was intended to be an export/import wholesale medicine company.  (2T83:25-84:6).  Plaintiff testified that [...] was not something that involved Defendant, that [...] had nothing to do with her.  (2T83:18-24).  It was never Plaintiff’s intent to have Defendant be a partner in [...] (2T84:7-11).  Defendant was not invited to be a partner in [...].  (3T114:1-3).
[brief] [...], Plaintiff/Respondent Vs. [...], d/b/a [...], [...] d/b/a [...], [...], [...], and [...].  Defendant/Appellant, SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  ON APPEAL FROM: MIDDLESEX COUNTY  SUPERIOR COURT CHANCERY  DIVISION/GENERAL EQUITY PART  DOCKET NO.: [...]  DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS', AMRIT INC.  D/B/A [...], [...] AND [...], BRIEF and APPENDIX VOLUME I (Da001 to Da106)
[brief] As with all services contracts, the vendor is required to perform services as a prerequisite for payment.  School districts obviously could not enter into a contract to pay millions of dollars to a vendor on a services contract who never performed any services.  Thus, the basic obligation of the parties’ contract was for [...] to perform custodial services, and [...] was to pay for those services actually rendered.  What enables N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) to be constitutional and avoid impairing the parties’ obligations of a services contract is the State’s allowance for the parties to enter into a renegotiated contract that excuses performance as a prerequisite for payment, and grants the vendor an ability to obtain a reduced payment without performing services.  So to interpret N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) as not requiring a renegotiated contract is tantamount to interpreting the statute as violating the Impairment of Contracts clauses of the U.S. and New Jersey Constitutions because it effectively impairs and extinguishes [...]’s basic contractual obligation to perform services as a prerequisite for payment, and impairs and extinguishes [...]’s obligation to pay for actual services rendered.
[brief] CONCLUSION  I request that this honorable court grants what I requested in Legal Arguments I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X.  Also please understand that just like Ford and Torres I paid $250 filing fee and I expect this court to treat me the way it treated the parties in Wells Fargo v. Ford and Investors Bank v. Torres.  Please give me a full UCC Laws analysis.  I like to be treated equally.  In compliance with my US 1st and 14th Amendments and NJ R. 1:6-2(f), R. 1:7-4, and . 4:46-2(c) please provide statement of reasons for your orders.  Respectfully Submitted  [...]  [...] 2/27/24  CERTIFICATION
[brief] (Da46).  The jury acquitted Defendant of the charge of Unlawful Possession of a Handgun.  (Id.).  On January 4, 2022, [...] conducted a sentencing hearing.  [...] found aggravating factors 1, 3, 6, and 9 and no mitigating factors.  (Da57).  As such, [...] found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors.  (Id.).  As to the murder charge, [...] imposed a sentence of life in prison, subject to the No Early Release Act, to be followed by five years of parole supervision.  (Da55).  Defendant was not ordered to pay restitution – [...] found that he did not have the ability to pay.  (Da58).  The charge of Possession of a Firearm For an Unlawful Purpose was merged into the Murder conviction.  (Da5).  Defendant was given jail credit in the amount of 2,802 days.  (Id.).  [...] entered an amended Judgment of Conviction on January 25, 2023 modifying the jail and prior service credit.  (Da60).  [...] granted Defendant 1,600 days of jail credit and 1,202 days of prior service credit.  (Da61).  On January 18, 2023, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal.
[directive] DOWNWARD DEPARTURE FOR TRIAL PROOF ISSUES 12.1  Authority to Make a Downward Departure Based Upon an Assessment of the Likelihood of Obtaining a Conviction at Trial  Notwithstanding any other provision of these Guidelines, a prosecutor in the exercise of reasoned discretion is authorized to tender a plea offer for a sentence below that otherwise determined pursuant to the applicable Table of Authorized Plea Offers and the provisions of these Guidelines based upon the prosecutor’s assessment of the likelihood of obtaining a conviction at trial for the [...]- eligible charge(s).  The exercise of such prosecutorial discretion in reducing the plea offer otherwise required to be tendered pursuant to these Guidelines based upon trial proof issues may be used at any time and at any step in the graduated plea system (e.g., pre-indictment, initial post-indictment or final post-indictment).  With appropriate supervisory approval, see Section 12.3, the prosecutor making a Downward Departure for Trial Proof Issues is authorized to reduce the term of parole ineligibility otherwise prescribed by these Guidelines to any extent, and may offer, as appropriate, a county jail or non-custodial sentence.
[brief] Pa330 Exhibit A, Exhibit G-23- View of (F) - [...] ...............  Pa332 Exhibit A, Exhibit G-24- View of (G) [...] .....................  Pa334 Exhibit A, Exhibit G-25- View of [...] at night ............  Pa336 Exhibit A, Exhibit G-26- View of [...] at night ............  Pa338 Exhibit A, Exhibit G-27- Street View of [...] at night .....  Pa340  Exhibit A, Exhibit G-28- Monmouth Hills & Highlands DEP Presentation, dated July 8, 2019 .................................................. Pa342 Exhibit A, Exhibit G-29- DEP Response Letter Dated August 10, 2021 .... Pa353 Exhibit A, Exhibit G-30- Failure of Sewer Pipe at [...] ...... Pa357 Exhibit A, Exhibit G-31- [...] NJ DEP Letter to [...], dated July 6, 2021 .................................................. Pa359 Exhibit A, Exhibit G-32- [...] Architectural Plans – New ..... Pa361 Exhibit A, Exhibit G-33- 360 Rendering View ............................. Pa365 Exhibit A, Exhibit G-34- Rendering View ................................. Pa367 Exhibit A, Exhibit G-35- 360 Rendering View ............................. Pa370 Exhibit A, Exhibit G-36- Email from DEP Dated August 13, 2019 ....... Pa372 Exhibit A, Exhibit G-37- Email from DEP, dated July 15, 2019 .......... Pa374 Exhibit A, Exhibit G-38- Addendum to Technical Memo, dated December 20, 2021 .................................................. Pa376 Exhibit A, Exhibit G-39- 2022 [...] Roadway Improvement Recommendations .............................................. Pa379
[brief] Notably, the Court in Heibel relied upon Stackenwalt v. Washburn, 42 N.J. 15 (1964), holding “Questions of proper speed and control of a vehicle are pre- eminently questions of fact for the jury to determine.  *Heibel*, 386 N.J. Super. 307, 321 (App. Div. 2006) citing *Stackenwalt v. Washburn*, 42 N.J. 15 (1964).  Appellant did not provide any expert opinion relative to his conclusory testimony that he “hydroplaned” or for that matter, to establish any factual basis for a condition upon the roadway that ‘but for’ said condition, Appellant would have been able to bring his vehicle to a stop without rear-ending Respondent.  See (2T: 190:01 – 191:01).  It is apparent that if Appellant did in fact “hydroplane”, he was traveling too fast for the conditions.
[directive] See Appendix II.  The vertical axis of the matrix depicts the Offense Description, which accounts for the specific charge and certain Special Offense Characteristics.  This vertical axis corresponds to the Offense Level of the Federal Sentencing Table.  Criminal History Categories, which account for a defendant’s record of prior adult convictions and juvenile adjudications of delinquency, form the horizontal axis of the table.  The intersection of the applicable Offense Description and Criminal History Category creates a “cell” that displays the range of authorized plea offers.  Page 7
[brief] The instant matter arises out of Spill Act claims and other claims for damages arising out of environmental contamination of real property, by the current property owner against former owners/tenants of the subject property, who negligently and knowingly caused and/or allowed the soils thereon to become polluted.  Appellant [...] hereby files the instant appeal with regard to portions of the trial court’s October 16, 2023 Order Granting Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Complaint and Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint.
[brief] Municipalities routinely contract to obtain water supply, sewage and garbage disposal services from third parties for resale to municipal residents.  When the State of New Jersey enters into contracts, it is subject to suit under the Contractual --- 30 Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980).  31  See Romero v. Gold Star Distrib, LLC, 468 N.J. Super. 274, 304 (App. Div. 2021).  32  Giarusso v. Giarusso, 455 N.J. Super. 42, 53 (App. Div. 2018).  33  See N.J.S.A. 59:1-4 ("Nothing in [the Tort Claims Act] shall affect liability based on contract or the right to obtain relief other than damages against the public entity or one of its employees."); see also Owens v. Feigin, 194 N.J. 607, 613-14 (2008) (finding the notice of claim requirement in the Tort Claims Act does not apply to causes of action under New Jersey's Civil Rights Act); Greenway Dev. Co. v. Borough of Paramus, 163 N.J. 546, 557 (2000) (stating "the notice provision of the TCA does not apply to inverse condemnation claims"); Brook v. April, 294 N.J. Super. 90, 101 (App. Div. 1996) (stating that the TCA didn’t apply to workers’ compensation claims).
[brief] Nevertheless, in State v. Ridout, 299 N.J. Super. 233, 238-40 (App. Div. 1997), this Court appears to have expanded N.J.R.E. 104(c)’s preclusion to other circumstances where a trial judge must make a preliminary finding of admissibility.  In those circumstances, a trial court “cannot tell the jury anything that would preempt its fact-finding function. ”  Because the instruction here merely advised the jury that the recreation was admissible and not why the court reached that conclusion, the commentary did not run afoul of Ridout.  Therefore, defendant’s claim of error is without merit.  Indeed, the instruction here is completely distinguishable from the offending commentary of *Ridout*.
[brief] Da00497.  Defendants filed motions (1) to bar or limit the testimony of plaintiffs’ expert, [...], and (2) for summary judgment on November 19, 2021.  Da00683 – Da01573, Da01574 to Da02034.  Following oral argument on December 20, 2021,\(^1\) the trial court entered orders that (1) denied defendants’ motion to limit the testimony of plaintiffs’ expert and (2) granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  13T97-2, 100-21; Da02683 – Da02686.  A non-jury trial was conducted over twenty-two (22) non-consecutive days, beginning on January 18, 2022 and ending on March 17, 2022.
[brief] By way of summary, as stated above, the [...] as owner of the roadway, had a duty to protect the traveling public from dangerous conditions on its property.  N.J.S.A. 27:23-3(A).  The general contractor, [...], had a contractual duty for the maintenance and protection of traffic.  (Pa1379); (Pa1381).  That obligation required that it perform miscellaneous repair work and install warning signs pursuant MUTCD.  (Pa1379); (Pa1381).  [...] and [...] each had the duty to ensure the general contractor adhered to its’ responsibilities under the contract.  (Pa2202);(Pa1271).  Part of their duties included inspecting the travel portions of the roadway for conditions like those that caused Plaintiff’s accident.  (Pa0656); (Pa0657); (Pa0678); (PA0679).  Defendants duty also included implementing temporary solutions such as paving or warning signs.  (Pa0689).  Here, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, each Defendant already knew, and/or had reasons to know, of the subject condition and that it was dangerous.  Armed with such knowledge, the Defendants had a duty and responsibility to respond and protect users of the Parkway.  As the contracts and the witnesses describe, those duties required that they fix the condition or warn against it.  Nevertheless, each of Defendants arguments will be addressed in turn.
[brief] ”  Substantive due process, as applied to a statute, requires only that the statute have a rational basis.  “[A] state statute does not violate substantive due process if the statute reasonably relates to a legitimate legislative purpose and is not arbitrary or discriminatory.  Briefly stated, if a statute is supported by a conceivable rational basis, it will withstand a substantive due process attack. ”  *Greenberg v. Kimmelman*, 99 N.J. 552, 563 (1985) (citations omitted); see also *Matter of M.H.*, 475 N.J. Super. 580, 593 (2023), certif. denied, 256 N.J. 195 (2024).  Review involves significant deference to the judgment of the legislative body regarding both the propriety of the governmental involvement in the area covered by the legislation, and the reasonableness of the means chosen to achieve the legislative goals.