ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant further contends the evidence is inadmissible because it cannot be adequately sanitized.  When a court finds other-crime evidence is admissible, it must sanitize the evidence when appropriate and carefully instruct the jury as to its limited use.  State v. Barden, 195 N.J. 375, 390 (2008).  “[T]he court’s instruction ‘should be formulated carefully to explain precisely the permitted and prohibited purposes of the evidence, with sufficient reference to the factual context of the case to enable the jury to comprehend and appreciate the fine distinction to which it is required to adhere. ’”  Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Fortin, 162 N.J. 517, 534 (2000)).  Initially, the motion court properly observed the statement could be sanitized by removal of any references to defendant’s outstanding warrants.  Such redactions are appropriate to reduce any inherent prejudice in the admission of other-crimes evidence.  Moreover, the court determined that if this case went to trial, it would instruct the jury on the limited use of the evidence.  The court can adequately instruct the jury by relying on the model jury charge, see Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Proof of Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts (N.J.R.E. 404(b))” (rev. Sept. 12, 2016), and molding it to the purpose of introducing the evidence here.  Specifically, the court can instruct as to its use to prove identity and possession of the BB gun.  Given that the motion court will be able to adequately sanitize the evidence and give the jury a limiting instruction, it did not abuse its discretion by finding the other-crime evidence admissible.  For these reasons, the motion court properly granted the State’s motion to admit defendant’s statement.
[brief] ”  (Da 33)  Although the court considered [...]’s BWC and the police reports, it did not address several critical facts revealed by them, including that the police initially encountered [...] prior to seeing her on the surveillance video; [...] initially claimed that she did not know anything; [...] previously refused to open the door for police; [...] agreed to cooperate only after being detained, handcuffed, and confronted during an undescribed interrogation; and [...] had been drinking, and either her or her daughter forgot they signed the consent form.
[brief] In so doing, the trial court adopted, on a wholesale basis, non-essential comments made by this Court in a separate matter involving some of the parties, without the benefit of a full evidentiary record.  The trial court, however, failed to provide any explanation as to how this Court’s factual findings in a separate matter are binding in this matter.  Instead, the trial court simply assumed, without any analysis whatsoever, that whatever factual finding this Court made in a separate action was automatically binding in this litigation.  Now, Defendants invite this Court to follow the same deficient logic – an invitation this Court should soundly reject.  That this Court in a separate matter involving some of the same parties made non-essential comments, in a different context, does not make those comment binding in this matter.  To hold otherwise would turn settled law on its head.  A factual issue decided by another court in another matter is binding only if the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies – a doctrine the trial court affirmatively and unequivocally found does not apply at the outset of this matter.
[brief] Pb12-20.  B.  The Appellate Division does not have authority to create new per se conflict rules.  Even if the Court reaches [...]’s RPC 1.7(a)(1) argument, respectfully, the Appellate Division does not have the legal authority to create the new per se conflict rule under RPC 1.7(a) that [...] asks for.  Any new per se conflict rule and bar on joint representation in any case in which the CNA, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 et seq., governs the cause of action—IFPA violation, negligence, products liability, malpractice, strict liability, consumer fraud, fraud, and other intentional torts—can only come from the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
[brief] In their appeal brief, Plaintiffs argued that the trial court improperly determined that the [...] and [...] waived conflicts without having seen the waivers, which Plaintiffs believed were not part of the record, and relied solely on defendants’ certifications.  Pb30.  The [...] Defendants then filed a motion to seal a portion of their appendix containing their retainer agreement and conflict waivers.  Pra13.  As Plaintiffs only recently learned, those documents were subjected to an informal and undisclosed in camera review by the trial court, conducted without a formal order, without notice to Plaintiffs, and with no opportunity for Plaintiffs to challenge the waivers’ adequacy.  Pra042.  Plaintiffs detailed the procedurally deficient manner that the in camera review was conducted in their opposition to the [...] Defendants’ motion to seal and cross-motion to compel, currently pending before this Court.  Pra013-043.
[brief] ”  (9T 131-7 to 132-12)  Moreover, the prosecutor’s summation demonstrates the falsity of the State’s claim on appeal that [...]’s confidence did not matter to the case.  Over defense objection, the State asked the jury to consider how long [...] “stared at” the photo, arguing, “You could cut the tension in the room with a knife.  And then he said yes.  Why?  Because he said he wanted to be sure.  He said 100 percent.  You don’t forget a face. ”  (9T 84-2 to 14 (emphasis added))  The trial prosecutor knew exactly how important [...]’s certainty in his identification would be to the jury; that is why the State twice asked [...] for that certainty during his testimony, and why the State emphasized that confidence in summation.
[brief] *State v. Mosley*, 232 N.J. 169 (2018).  Pursuant to the trial error rule, Appellant’s VOP was not terminated upon the Supreme Court’s reversal of the appellate division’s decision.  *Tropea*, supra.  In other words, *Heck* and it progeny cases, including *Thompson* and those State cases cited herein stand for the proposition that, unless the VOP charge was dismissed, Appellant remained in a state of “continuing jeopardy.
[brief] The Board was given a second chance to explain themselves and their reasoning in the Resolution via the drafting of an Amended Resolution, and still could not support their argument that a waiver for the angle of a lot line somehow cause serious safety concerns.  The reason is simple: this application was not denied for any other reason than for the appeasement of the residents of the “exclusive” neighborhood, such as the intervenor, [...].  The Court should therefore uphold the trial court’s ruling and find that the trial court properly found the denial to be arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  III.
[brief] Commonwealth v. Gambora, 933 N.E.2d 50 (Mass. 2010) ..................................................  13  Commonwealth v. Linton, 924 N.E.2d 722 (Mass. 2010) ..................................................  25  Commonwealth v. Mattei, 920 N.E.2d 845 (Mass. 2010) ...........................................  25  Corcoran v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 N.J. Super. 117 (App. Div. 1998) .................................................. 16
[brief] List of capitalized terms and acronyms .................................................. Pra001 Certification of [...], Esq. dated March 8, 2023, [...] v. [...], [...] ................................................................. Pra002-005  Order dated April 11, 2023, [...] v. [...], [...] ........................................................................................................... Pra006-007 Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Brief in Opposition to Defendants-Respondents’ Motion to File an Appendix Under Seal and in Support of Cross-Motion, dated June 5, 2024 ........................................................................................................... Pra009-035 Certification of [...], Esq. in Opposition to Defendants-Respondents’ Motions to File an Appendix Under Seal and in Support of Cross-Motion, dated June 5, 2024 ........................................................................................................... Pra036-043 Cafaro v. HMC Int’l, LLC, No. 07-CV-2793 (KM) (JAD), 2012 WL 4857763 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2012) ......................................................................................... Pra044-051 Delso v. Trs. for Ret. Plan for Hourly Emps. of Merck & Co., No. 04–3009 (AET), 2007 WL 766349 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007) ........................................... Pra052-065 Schiffli Embroidery Workers Pension Fund v. Ryan, Beck & Co., No. 91-5433, 1994 WL 62124 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 1994) ...................................................... Pra066-070 Tibbott v. N. Cambria Sch. Dist., No. 16-5, 2017 WL 2570904 (W.D. Pa. June 13, 2017)
[brief] "[E]videntiary rulings are 'entitled to deference absent a showing of an abuse of discretion .  . . .'"  State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001) (quoting State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 484 (1997)).  "Discretion, however, means legal discretion, 'in the exercise of which the judge must take account of the law applicable to the particular circumstances of the case and be governed accordingly.'"  Alves v. Rosenberg, 400 N.J. Super. 553, 562-63 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting State v. Steele, 92 N.J. Super. 498, 507 (App. Div. 1966)).  "Obviously, '[i]f the trial judge misconceives the applicable law or misapplies it . . . the exercise of legal discretion lacks a foundation and becomes an arbitrary act."  Id. at 563 (quoting Steele, 92 N.J. Super. at 507).  "It is well-settled that a videotape 'qualifies as a writing' under N.J.R.E. 803(e)."
[brief] ........................................................................................................................passim Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Karlinski, 251 N.J. Super. 457, (App.Div.1991) .......................................................................................17, 18 Scotty Pine, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 2017 N.J. Tax Unpub. LEXIS 21, *14 (Tax Ct. March 30, 2017) ..................................................................................26 Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 340 N.J. Super. (App. Div. 2001) ..............................................................................................21, 30 SL Indus., Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins., 128 N.J. 188 (1992) .....................................................................................................................16, 17, 18 Sneed v. Concord Ins. Co., 98 N.J. Super. 306 (App. Div. 1967) ............................................................................................28 SSI Med. Servs., Inc. v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 146 N.J. 614 (1996) .......................................................................................................................26 State v. South Amboy Trust Co., 46 N.J. Super. 497 (Law Div. 1957) .............................................................................................8 Superior Integrated Solutions v. Mercer Ins. Co. of N.J., No. A-1027-18T4, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2147 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 2020) .........................13, 14, 15, 16 Swarner v. Mut. Benefit Grp., 72 A.3d 641 (Pa. Super. 2013) ......................................................................................................17 Szczesny v. Vasquez, 71 N.J. Super. 347 (App. Div. 1962) ............................................................................................26 Telebright Corp. v. Dir., N.J. Div. of Tax’n, 424 N.J. Super. 384 (App. Div. 2012) .........................................................................................19, 20 Tres. of Princeton Univ. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 293 N.J. Super. 296 (App. Div. 1996).........................................................14 United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Cyanotech Corp., No. 12-00537, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152160 (D. Hawaii 2013).....................11 Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 165 (1992).......................................................................................22
[brief] .......................................................................  14  State v. Olenowski, 255 N.J. 529 (2023) ....................................................................  25  State v. Snead, 783 S.E.2d 733 (N.C. 2016) ...............................................................  16  State v. Stangle, 97 A.3d 634 (N.H. 2014) ................................................................. 16, 17, 23, 31  State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4 (1994)  .............................................................................. passim Suanez v. Egeland, 330 N.J. Super. 190 (App. Div. 2000) ...........................................20  United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 658 (2d Cir. 2001) .............................................22  United States v. Harris, 55 M.J. 433 (C.A.A.F. 2001) ......................................................15  United States v. Lingala, 91 F.4th 685 (3d Cir. 2024) ....................................................8, 34  United States v. Oslund, 453 F.3d 1048 (8th Cir. 2006) ....................................................15, 17 Wagner v. State, 707 So. 2d 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) ..............................................15  STATUTES
[brief] The facts of this case are inapposite to those found in Reyes insofar as Plaintiff in this matter is not the tenant and is not bound by any direct contractual relationship with [...].  Likewise, the danger here is not a missing handrail or depressed landing, but a defective electrical panel.  Given the high risk of fatal injury posed by such a danger, simply looking to the knowledge that [...] had about this risk is not enough to vitiate a duty of care on the part of [...].  See Zentz, 92 N.J. Super. at 115 (finding that the dangerousness of the defective condition is an element to be considered in assessing a landowner’s duty of care).  As established in Reyes and Meier, the determination of whether a duty of care exist is not a simple color by number analysis.
[brief] The story was originally posted on social media by co-Defendant [...] (“[...]”), a former Olympic fencer with an enormous online audience and platform.  According to [...], [...], without any apparent motive and after decades of spotless service as an outstanding teacher, forcefully pulled the student’s hijab off in front of her classmates, then told the student that her hair was beautiful and she no longer had to wear a hijab.  This story was wholly unbelievable on its face.  Yet, the [...], seeking to gain credibility with their thousands of online followers, drive donations to their cause, and divide rather than unite people, parroted [...]’s accusations through the bullhorn of their own social media accounts and television appearances, accusations that they had a high degree of awareness were likely false, as the absurd accusations simply made no sense.
[brief] Treston, Melnyk, and Leonard, supra, all stand for the proposition that when a school board member campaigns from their public Facebook account – and especially where they actually state they are a school board member and post accompanying pictures – they hold themselves out as school board members.  Their posts are then subject to the Act’s Code of Ethics and its prohibition on social media use which may compromise the Board.  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e).  Respondent did so by causing protest in the school community, which was recorded in Board minutes and newspaper articles, as well as by subjecting the Board to litigation.  This was all clear from abundant evidence in the record.  Respondent also asserts that Respondent was not speaking on Board issues.
[brief] At that time, the Officer also appeared and was ready to testify at a trial.  The colloquy in municipal court appears as follows – and the law Division Judge found these facts verbatim at 1T 32-7 to 33-1 and also 1T35-15 to 36-11.  [...]: I can explain, Your Honor.  THE COURT:  You’re going to challenge the constitutionality of the statute.  [...]:  As applied to the facts of [...], we’re seeking a legal determination as to whether this statute, in its scope as -- well, as it is, nonetheless, is still applicable or is too vague in application when it comes to [...]’s case.  And if . . . if that motion doesn’t go anywhere, [...] will be pleading guilty to the charge as it is.  So it all depends on this particular motion and where it goes.  (2T13-10 to 14-2)
[directive] 1.0.10  The above list represents critical performance standards that every county and municipal law enforcement agency must implement.  Agencies that make a vigorous commitment to the internal affairs process signal their desire to comply with the highest standards of professionalism in law enforcement.  They also ensure that their officers will be accountable for their actions to both the agency and the community.  Agencies that fail to make such a commitment run the risk of failing to uncover policies, practices and procedures that may undermine legitimate efforts to provide the highest quality law enforcement services.  1.0.11  Indifference to the internal affairs function will have a negative impact on the administration of criminal justice and the delivery of police services to New Jersey’s residents.  Agencies that fail to make the internal affairs function a priority can lose the respect and support of the community.  The integrity of individual law enforcement agencies, and the reputation of the State’s criminal justice system, can also suffer if agencies fail to identify and correct officer misconduct.  In addition, law enforcement agencies that fail to implement a meaningful and objective internal affairs process may be found liable in civil lawsuits for their failure to effectively address officer misconduct.  It is for these reasons that the Attorney General has issued this revised policy and directed that the State’s law enforcement agencies implement the critical mandates set forth by the policy.
[directive] these 1'a~;e 3 departments instzucting police another directive on the same day General issued The Attorney officer accountability while that body-worn cameras in a manner• promotes how to deploy of excessive force and respecting citizens' false allegations simultaneously protecting officers from circumstances that ectively the can enable police to docume~~t obj  Body-worn cameras privacy rights.  After issuing the body-worn canac►•a including deadly force. decision to use force, the police lead to obtain police departments $2.5 million in grant funds to help General awarded directive, the Attorney g~•ant of than half a million dollars in second round more and recently announced a these devices, the measured that authorizes General has since issued yet another directive funding.  The Attorney available an weapons might be more readily as that these conducted energy devices so of use deadly force.  alternative to police-community relations by addressing enhance directives were designed to  All three citizen force police against a especially sensitive issue —the use of lethal by different aspects of an they between departments and the communities police nature creates tension inherent — that by its of lethal force, the police use complexity of the issues relating to Recognizing the and serve. protect perspectives.
[brief] A.  Standard of review.  The “standard of review on a motion to suppress is deferential. ”  State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 526 (2022).  “[A]n appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)).  Reviewing courts will “defer[ ] to those findings in recognition of the trial court's ‘opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the “feel” of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy. ’ ”  Nyema, 249 N.J. at 526 (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244).  Furthermore, higher courts review “[a] trial court's legal conclusions ... and its view of ‘the consequences that flow from established facts,’ ... de novo. ”  Id. at 526-27 (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015)).  The general rule as to the admission or exclusion of evidence is that “[c]onsiderable latitude is afforded a trial court in determining whether to admit evidence, and that determination will be reversed only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. ”  State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 82 (1998), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 932 (2001).  Under that standard, an appellate court should not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court, unless “the trial court's ruling ‘was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted. ’ ”  State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 484 (1997) (quoting State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 216 (1984)).  B.
[brief] Third, the court erred in permitting the medical examiner to testify, over defense objection, that the amount of blood found in [...]’s car was inconsistent with the defense.  The medical examiner was not an expert in bloodstain pattern analysis, and his testimony about the amount of blood in the car exceeded his expertise as a forensic pathologist.  This inappropriate expert testimony, used by the State repeatedly in summation, would have been highly persuasive to the jury yet devastating to the defense.
[brief] [...] testified that, upon delivery, there is a packing slip that confirms the quantity and materials received.  However, according to [...], Haddad’s employees “throw it out” after the material is received.  (4T62:23-63:12)  In addition, [...] testified that there is no way of tracking the quantity of materials that were purchased from [...].  When asked how Haddad keeps track of how much of the maximum quantity is used up, [...] stated, “[h]onor system.
[brief] “Qualified immunity balances two important interests -- the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably. ”  Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.  For a right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. ”  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523, 531 (1987).
[brief] Yet, the Chancery Division’s decision inexplicably departs from the plain and ordinary meaning of “effectuate” without any rationalization or even setting forth the alternative definition that it sought to apply.  Notably, Plaintiff never alleged that the Township failed to submit his IOD application or provide accurate information to the [...] and Pension, nor could he, as is clearly demonstrated by both entities’ denials of his application.  Accordingly, the Township satisfied its obligations under the Agreement by taking all steps necessary to bring about Plaintiff’s application before the [...] and [...].
[brief] Id.  The stranger-to-the-deed rule is still observed by New Jersey’s neighbors to the north and west.  See Estate of Thomson v. Wade, 69 N.Y.2d 570, 516 N.Y.S.2d 614, 509 N.E.2d 309, 310 (1987) (New York); In re Condemnation by Cty. of Allegheny of Certain Coal, Oil, Gas, Limestone, Mineral Properties, 719 A.2d 1, 3-4 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (Pennsylvania).  Our neighbor to the south has adopted at least variation of it, holding that strangers to the deed may not invoke the doctrine of estoppel by deed.  See State v. Phillips, 400 A.2d 299, 309 (Del. Ch. 1979).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has never considered the stranger-to-the-deed rule.
[directive] The violator’s subsequent actions, although often supporting the criminal charge of Eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b), shall not constitute an authorization to initiate or continue a pursuit.  7.3  The supervisor shall order a pursuit terminated at any time if he or she concludes that the danger to the pursuing officer(s) or the public outweighs the necessity for immediate apprehension of the violator.