ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Based on this erroneous decision, the trial was effectively hijacked by the outlandish and dramatic allegations of a clearly unstable woman, and the Defense was forced to air out the couple’s entire sorted past in order to discredit her testimony.  [...]’s ex-girlfriend purposely attempted to villainize him in the eyes of the jury by offering unprompted testimony about his prior conviction for DUI, and his affiliation with an outlaw biker gang with a reputation for criminality and violence.  The entire trial became about [...]’s history with his ex-girlfriend, losing sight entirely of the incident occurring on January 25, 2021.  Ultimately, the Defense successfully demonstrated to the jury that [...]’s ex-girlfriend’s claims of witness tampering were not credible, but doing so came at a considerable cost.
[brief] Question 2 on the questionnaire addressed hardship excusals:  Question 2, this trial is expected to last till … February 16th, 2022.  We’ve already discussed (a), so everybody here is fine on that one.  We’ll go to 2(b), do you have any medical, personal, or financial problem that would prevent you from serving on this Jury?  If the answer is yes, you would mark yes.  If not, you’ll say no[ ] and then [2](c), do you have any special need, or require a reasonable accommodation to help you in listening, paying attention, reading printed materials, deliberating, or otherwise serving on this Jury?  If your answer is yes to 2(b) or 2(c), you would mark down ye.  Otherwise, you would mark down no. (3T50-22 to 51-9).  The judge further instructed the prospective jurors about what a hardship meant:  “Please know that there is a big difference between an inconvenience and a hardship.  As the Presiding Judge of this case, I will be required to balance your hardship with my need to select a jury. ” (3T35-12 to 25).  Following the provision of these instructions, the court broke the venire panel into smaller groups of 30, released group(s) the court would not reach that day, and then from these smaller groups individually spoke to each prospective juror about his/her responses to the questionnaire, biographical information, and some of the agreed upon voir dire questions.
[brief] LEGAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, [...], IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT'S LEGAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF HER APPEAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDERS DATED SEPTEMBER 26, 2022, NOVEMBER 18, 2022, AND APRIL 14, 2023  Of Counsel and  On the brief: [...], ESQUIRE TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................3  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE FACTS ..............................................4  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...........................................................................8  I.  THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT TO CSAA  DISMISSING  PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED  ....................8  II.  THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT TO CSAA AS TO ITS COUNTERCLAIMS SHOULD ALSO BE AFFIRMED  .............21  III.  CONCLUSION  ..............................................................................24  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Page Order, dated September 26, 2022, granting summary judgment in favor of Appellant  [...] Pa411 Order, dated November 18, 2022, denying Appellant’s motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment in favor of Respondents.  Pa452 Order, dated April 14, 2023, granting summary judgment in favor of Appellant
[brief] (6T 198-16 to 199-13)  [...] testified that defendant is the father of her children and that she sometimes lets him borrow a 2017 silver Chevy Malibu that she owns.  (5T 13-18 to 14-24)  She claimed that he borrowed that car about 6 p.m. on January 22 and that his cousin, [...], returned it to her at about 10:30 p.m. by parking it at her sister’s house on [...] in [...].  (5T 16-17 to 18-7)  [...], brother of defendant, testified that he gave a statement to police shortly after the shooting in which he said that he saw defendant in the silver Malibu at 3 or 4 p.m. on January 22.  (5T 52-20 to 23)  [...], brother of [...], testified that defendant -- whom he already knew -- called him an hour or less before his brother was killed, and asked Niam about doing body work on his car, a Honda, after which defendant and Niam agreed that defendant was “going to leave the car on [...] if [Niam] can get to it later.
[brief] New Jersey Appellate Division in *State v. Caronna*, 469 N.J. Super 462, 490 (2021) is quite instructive as to the reasons and import of the exclusionary rule, stating as follows:  The exclusionary rule not only deters constitutional violations, but also provides an “indispensable mechanism for vindicating the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches. ”  *Carter*, 247 N.J. at 530, 255 A.3d 1139 (quoting *Novembrino*, 105 N.J. at 157-58, 519 A.2d 820)... our courts have resisted the federal trend towards erosion of the exclusionary rule which “uphold[s] judicial integrity” by informing the public that “our courts will not provide a forum for evidence procured by unconstitutional means. ”  *State v. Williams*, 192 N.J. 1, 14, 926 A.2d 340 (2007).
[directive] 6.5.1  Eligibility Criteria for an “Open” Offer  Subject to the provisions of Section 6.3, a prosecutor shall be required to waive both the mandatory term of imprisonment and term of parole ineligibility and thereby authorize the defendant to be sentenced in the unrestricted discretion of the court in all cases where the defendant meets all of the eligibility criteria set forth in Section 6.4.1 for a standardized waiver of parole ineligibility (“flat” offer) and the prosecutor is satisfied that all of the following additional mitigating circumstances exist:
[brief] On October 28, 2022, [...] filed a verified complaint in lieu of a prerogative writ.  (36a-46a).  On December 12, 2023, the trial court affirmed the Borough’s resolution of support in favor of [...].  (1a-15a).  In affirming the Resolution, the trial court concluded that the Borough’s process was not flawed.  Ibid.  The court recognized that the Borough had established a process but concluded that the Borough’s determination was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable because the Legislature, in NJCREAMMA, did not establish a procedure for municipalities to follow in awarding resolutions of support.  Ibid.  The trial court did not analyze whether the Borough was obligated to follow the very process it established in evaluating applications, nor did the trial court consider whether the Borough could follow the process for some applicants and not for others.  *Ibid.*  With respect to the Evaluation Sheet, the trial court stated that no documents submitted to the court indicated that the Subcommittee were to fill out or refer to the Evaluation Sheet.  *Ibid.*  The trial court did not address the unequivocal language on the Evaluation Sheet stating that Subcommittee members were to score each application based on the criteria set forth in the Evaluation Sheet.  *Ibid.*  Instead, the trial court concluded it was appropriate for Subcommittee members to “dr[a]w their own conclusions” based on the information submitted in the applications and articulate a view of the “strength and weakness of the applicants” without use of the Evaluation Sheet.  *Ibid.*  The trial court also concluded “there is no obligation under any statute or administrative code provision requiring an applicant to a local governing body to submit a signed application for a resolution of support. ” (8a).  The trial court reached that conclusion despite the instructions provided to applicants, which stated that “[a]pplications must be completed and include all required documents,” that all legal documents part of the applications must “be properly signed and executed,” and that “[i]ncomplete [a]pplications will be rejected and returned to the [a]pplicant. ” (48a).  The trial court concluded it could not substitute its judgment for that of the Borough, without recognizing the patent procedural flaws in how the Borough conducted the review process.  (14a).  The trial court held that “the applicants were provided with a full and fair opportunity to present their applications to both the cannabis subcommittee and the full Borough council, and no challenge to the process can be sustained. ”  Ibid.  **STANDARD OF REVIEW**
[brief] [...] offers additional forms of incentive compensation for certain employees under particular circumstances, with one such incentive being “charge pay. ” (Pa104 at 79:6-17).  Charge pay is an additional dollar per hour on top of a given hourly rate for a given shift.  (Pa166 at 25:13-20; Pa362 at 80:3-11).  The charge nurse, to whom charge pay is payable, is a designated Registered Nurse on a particular shift who assumes additional responsibilities.
[brief] See N.J.A.C. 11:3-4.7(c).  PIP benefits are “overdue if not paid within 60 days after the insurer is furnished written notice of the fact of a covered loss and of the amount of same,” although the insurer can give notice to the provider that it needs another 45 days to investigate the claim.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5(g).  Insurers thus have a maximum of 105 days to approve or deny PIP-benefit claims.
[brief] Municipalities also “possess broad police power to zone for the public good. ”  *Pheasant Ridge Corp. v. Twp. of Warren*, 169 N.J. 282, 289 (2001) (citing *Riggs v. Township of Long Beach*, 109 N.J. 601, 610 (1988)).  The courts must respect local policy decisions in the zoning field and refrain from “rewrite[ing] or annul[ling] a particular zoning scheme duly adopted by a governing body merely because the court would have done it differently. ”  *Bow & Arrow Manor, Inc. v. Town of West Orange*, 63 N.J. 335, 343 (1973); see also *Pascack Ass’n v. Mayor of Washington Tp.*, 74 N.J. 470, 481 (1977).  To that end, municipal action will only be overturned if it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
[brief] On February 13, 2020, the City Council held a meeting to consider the Redevelopment Resolution (the “February 2020 City Council Meeting”).  (See ¹  Throughout 2018 and 2019, [...] and [...] discussed partnering to redevelop the Property.  (See, e.g., Pa445–449; Pa480–82; Pa495–504; Pa517.)  At some point after the Blight Study, [...] and [...]’s partnership talks ceased.  At this meeting, members of the public were given a chance to address the City Council.  Many homeowners within the Property spoke in favor of the redevelopment.  (See generally Pa109–12.)  The sole homeowner opposing the redevelopment was [...].  (See Pa113 at 18:10–20:13, Pa115 at 29:1–2, Pa115 at 29:18–25.)  When [...]’s turn came to address the City Council, he said that in 2004, he had approached the homeowners “and came with an idea of assembling the houses in order to develop the property. ”  (Pa113 at 18:4–7.)  [...] continued to say that he is “in support of the future development and fully onboard of the proposed affordable and school that is proposed by the City.  The school was our idea. ”  (Id. at 18:7–10 (emphasis added). )  [...] continued that, “[u]nfortunately, the City proposed a resolution that include[d] the right to condemn my property.  [...] is unfairly and illegally will partner with a developer against a local developer.  This local developer is me. ”  (Id. at 18:15–19.)  [...] repeated: “[T]he City is unfairly and illegally favoring a competing developer and assisting its interference with our six-years effort to develop [the Property] . . . .” (Id. at 19:11–20:6 (emphasis added). )  After [...] made his statements, another homeowner addressed the City Council reiterating other homeowners’ statements that “37 out of 38 of the homes are in support of this project . . . [t]he only reason we are having to follow this path is because [...] . . . purchased a home in the middle of the block and has never for one second acted in good faith and agreed to even discuss selling his property along with the rest of us. ” (Pa115 at 29:1–2, 29:18–23.)  Upon the conclusion of the public’s statements and with the support of 37 out of 38 homeowners, the City Council approved the Redevelopment Resolution, which did not name any developer.  (See Pa69–70.)
[brief] Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989)  ........................................................................  6  R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 255 (2001)  ......................................................................  14  Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103 (App. Div. 2011)  .............................................  6  Sun Chemical Corporation v. Fike Corporation, 243 N.J. 319 (2020) .......................................................................  22, 23 Tompkins v. Selip & Stylianou, LLP, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21937 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2019)
[directive] Questions concerning these revised Standard Statements may be directed to the [...], at [...], or to the Police Legal Advisor in County Prosecutor's Office of your county.  Under separate cover, each County Prosecutor, will be provided with information concerning the manner in which refusal cases pre-dating the effective date can be prosecuted.  Attachments: Revised DMV Standard Statements for DWI & CDL/DWI offenses c., w/attachments: Attorney General [...]
[brief] As noted in the opinion of the Trial Court, (PA 3452), a complaint must do more than give vague notice of a claim; it must state the essentials of a cause of action.  Cusseaux v. Pickett, 279 N.J. Super 335 (Law Div. 1994), citing Schantz v. Rachlin, 101 N.J. Super 334 (Ch. Div 1961).  A claim must state on its face a cognizable cause upon which relief may be granted.  *Cusseax*, 279 N.J. Super at 338.  Since the First Amended Complaint asserted no claims against [...] and makes no claim for damages or other relief no relief against it, the First Amended Complaint was properly dismissed at to [...] for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  CONCLUSION
[directive] Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2) or any attempt to commit any of these crimes and at sentencing the court finds that your conduct was characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior you must verify your address with the appropriate law enforcement agency every 90 days or if the court finds your conduct is not characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior, you must verify your address annually?  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że w razie podania fałszywych informacji na temat swego miejsca b) [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] zamieszkania lub niedopełnienia obowiązku potwierdzenia adresu może być Pan(i) oskarżony(a) o przestępstwo trzeciego stopnia i otrzymać karę pozbawienia wolności do lat (jeżeli takie przestępstwo zostało popełnione 1 lipca 2014 r. lub później) 5 lub o przestępstwo czwartego stopnia i otrzymać karę pozbawienia wolności do 18 miesięcy (jeżeli takie przestępstwo zostało popełnione 7 marca 2007 r. lub później)?
[directive] Prevention of Misconduct 3.0.1  Prevention is the primary means of reducing and controlling inappropriate behavior and misconduct.  Although disciplinary actions are properly imposed on officers who engage in wrongdoing, they have limited utility if they shield or obscure organizational conditions that permit the abuses to occur.  Inadequate training and a lack of appropriate guidance too often are factors that contribute to inappropriate behavior and misconduct.  An agency should make every effort to eliminate the organizational conditions that may foster, permit or encourage an employee’s inappropriate behavior.  In the furtherance of this objective, special emphasis should be placed on the following areas.
[brief] Q.  Can you estimate for me how many times a day you were up and down those steps after they were painted but before your incident?  A.  How many times a day?  Q.  Yes.  A.  I would say four.  Q.  Prior to the date of your incident, did you ever have any difficulty traversing or walking over the stairs after they were painted?  A.  No.  (Pa330, plaintiff deposition P19, L13-16)  Plaintiff further testified his “opinion” that the stairs were rougher to navigate after painting only arose after he slipped and fell.  Plaintiff never testified the stairs were slippery when they were wet before the day of the incident:  Q.  But your opinion that the stairs after painting are rougher to navigate only arose after your incident, correct?  A.  After I walked on them and they were wet, yes, or tried to, yes.  Q.  Are you testifying that you had walked on them while they were wet before the date of your incident or are you referring to the date of your incident?  A.  I'm referring to the date of my incident.  (Pa330, plaintiff deposition P21, L1-11)  In fact, plaintiff testified that to the best of his knowledge there was no precipitation after the steps were painted but before he slipped and fell:  Q.  Is it your testimony that there was no precipitation at any point in time after the steps were painted but before your accident at which time you needed to walk on those steps?  A.  It's -- I believe so, yeah.  Or -- yeah, yeah, to the best of my knowledge, yeah (Pa330, plaintiff deposition P20, L20-25)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] The Appellate Division has exclusive jurisdiction to review any action or inaction of a state administrative agency.  *Pascucci v. Vagott*, 71 N.J. 40, 51-54 (1976).  The review of administrative actions is limited.  *In re Proposed Xanadu Redev. Project*, 402 N.J. Super. 607, 640 (App. Div. 2008).  However, the Appellate Division "may reverse an agency decision if it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable or that it lacks fair support in the record."  *In re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch. of Montclair Founders Grp.*, 216 N.J. 370, 385 (2013).  Furthermore, a court will intervene when an agency’s action is clearly inconsistent with its statutory authority.  *New Jersey Ass’n of Realtors v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection*, 367 N.J. Super. 154, 160 (App. Div. 2004).
[brief] In Euneva LLC v. Keansburg Board of Adj. 407 N.J. Super. 432, 436 (Law Div. 2008), the owner/proponent had been denied a permit to renovate the property as a multi-family residence --- a non-permitted use --- and appealed to the [...].  The Court accurately stated, “the party seeking to continue the nonconforming use bears the burden of proving the nature of the use’s character at the time the ordinance was adopted making it nonconforming,” citing cases.  The Court found the proponent had presented sufficient evidence of the nonconforming use being legally preexisting and not being abandoned and reversed the [...]’s denial of the Certificate.  Berkeley Square Asso v. [...] of Trenton, 410 N.J. Super. 255 (App. Div. 2009) provides a more nuanced analysis that the burden of production may shift depending on the sub-issue.
[directive] The that directing also am I in VI.  Section described as Referrals, and Response Sexual Assault public their website.  Office's on plans their of copy post a County Prosecutors.  Page 5 VIII.  Questions should be Directive implementation of this interpretation and concerning the Questions designee.  Criminal Justice, or the Director's of of Division Director the addressed to the Parties Non-Enforceability by Third IX. authority to ensure the Attorney General's pursuant to the Directive is issued
[brief] This court should affirm the Order and Decision (“Judgment”) of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Bergen Vicinage (“trial court”) granting defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration and dismissing this preemptive declaratory judgment case on comity grounds in favor of substantially similar, but more comprehensive and coercive (i.e., seeking recovery of damages as opposed to only declaratory relief), litigation currently pending in Missouri (the “Missouri Action”).  The trial court acted well within its discretion to both reconsider the prior interlocutory orders and dismiss this case on the basis of comity in favor of the Missouri Action.  The trial court’s opinion is well-reasoned, acknowledges and follows the appropriate legal standards and applicable analytical paradigms under New Jersey law, and is supported by substantial undisputed evidence in the record.  In short, the trial court did not abuse its discretion and many good reasons exist for this Court to defer to the trial court’s discretionary decision.
[brief] *See, e.g.*, *DePetro v. Wayne Twp. Planning Bd.*, 367 N.J. Super. 161, 171-172 (App. Div.), certif. denied 181 N.J. 544 (2004) (“plaintiffs are challenging the authority of the Planning Board to grant site plan approval . . . on the ground that the use is prohibited by the governing zoning ordinance . . . and plaintiffs' proceeding effectively serves the public interest in determining whether the Township's zoning ordinance has been properly applied to permit the development in question.  We thus find the requirements of standing to have been met”).
[brief] The in limine hearing established that [...]’s conclusion was not based on his autopsy of .  Instead, his conclusion was based entirely on other evidence before the jury, principally the “circumstances” in which the remains were found “desecrated” and “outside of a house. ”  (15T:83-6 to 86-25)  [...]’s opinion that the decision to destroy a body suggests that the death was a homicide was not “beyond the ken of the average juror,” nor was it based on his expertise in medical examination, as required by N.J.R.E. 702.  See State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265, 280 (2018).  Therefore, his opinion as to cause and manner of death should have been excluded.  Its admission “intruded into the jury’s exclusive role as finder of fact,” depriving [...] of a fair trial and compelling reversal of her murder conviction.
[brief] ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Banuch v. Cannon,** | 30 | | 356 N.J. Super. 342 (Ch. Div. 2002) | | | **Brown v. Stackler,** | 46 | | 612 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1980) | | | **Clemens v. N.Y. Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,** | 46 | | 903 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 2018) | | | **D’Arc v. D’Arc,** | 27 | | 175 N.J. Super. 598 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 487 (1980), | | | cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981) | | | **Darling Int’l, Inc. v. Baywood Partners, Inc.,** | 41 | | 2007 WL 4532233 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2007) | | | **Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc.,** | 29, 37| | 182 N.J. 1 (2004) | | | **Gillman v. Bally Mfg. Corp.,** | 29 | | 286 N.J. Super. 523 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 174 (1996) | | | **Gittleman v. Cent. Jersey Bank & Trust Co.,** | 29 | | 103 N.J. Super. 175 (App. Div. 1967) | | | **Hensley v. Eckerhart,** | 44, 45| | 461 U.S. 424 (1983) | | | **Indus. Inc. v. Transamerica Corp.,** | 28 | | 437 N.J. Super. 577 (App. Div. 2014) | | | **JHC Indus. Servs., LLC v. Centurion Cos., Inc.,** | 43 | | 469 N.J. Super. 306 (App. Div. 2021) | | Kingsdorf v. Kingsdorf, 351 N.J. Super. 144 (App. Div. 2002)
[brief] That point is easily illustrated by again considering our electric utility example and the issue before us.  It is obvious a nuclear power plant would not be a "routine" upgrade of a coal-fired plant or consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act.  It is considerably less clear, at least on this record, whether the construction of a new compressor station in the Preservation Area, which the Department deemed "consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act," a determination we do not reach, could also qualify as a "routine" upgrade of [...]'s gas pipeline system.  The questions are simply independent of one another.