ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The court in Heibel went on to hold that the rationale expressed in Mockler applied although the issue was loose gravel as distinguished from ice.  Similarly, in the unpublished decision of Calabree v. DiCristino, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2548 (Da70-Da71), the court recognized that the Mockler defense was also available when a vehicle skidded due to antifreeze being present on the roadway.  The mere possibility that a Defendant may have been negligent is insufficient for a Plaintiff to meet their burden.
[directive] 9.10.4  That law enforcement agencies report the above-listed incidents to the County Prosecutor's Office does not constitute a mandate or requirement that the information be disclosed to the court.  Prosecutors should conduct an independent review of the information provided to determine whether it needs to be disclosed and whether the officer can participate in the prosecution of criminal cases.  This provision is not intended to require that law enforcement agencies initiate internal affairs investigations into the 12 accuracy of every statement, report or certification that may be filed with respect to civil litigation, including matrimonial and employment matters or any other personal or financial matters not directly related to the officer's employment.
[brief] The State’s assertion that State v. Robinson precludes appellate review of a constitutional objection not raised below “unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest” ignores the well-settled plain error standard of review.  200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009).  As the very next sentence in Robinson, which the State neglects to quote, explains, [T]he limitation on the scope of appellate review is not absolute; it is subject to finite, qualified exceptions.  . . .  [O]ur . . . appellate courts are empowered, even in the absence of an objection, to acknowledge and address trial error if it is “of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  . . .  Further, our appellate courts retain the inherent authority to ‘notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial court[,]’ provided it is ‘in the interests of justice’ to do so.  R. 2:10-2.  [Ibid.]  This Point replies to the State’s Point II.
[brief] However, this is a determination that will be made pursuant to the pending DCR administrative action, which will address the merits of the Plaintiffs’ allegations.  It is clear, however, for the purposes of this appeal, that the “body of law” pertaining to whether the NJLAD is violated by public school parental notification policies which require disclosure of information to the parents of their own minor children is entirely unsettled.  In fact, the trial court did not even analyze whether there was any responsive “body of law,” but instead, simply accepted Plaintiff’s position that Plaintiffs satisfy this *Crowe* prong, as of right, because of the NJLAD’s procedural provision which states that Plaintiffs “may proceed against any person in a summary manner in the Superior Court of New Jersey to obtain an injunction…”  *N.J.S.A.* 10:5-14.1 (Da103).  Such an interpretation is an abuse of the trial judge’s discretion because it renders the “well-settled right” *Crowe* prong meaningless, because Plaintiffs would always satisfy this requirement, as a matter of automatic right, every time they request injunctive relief during the pendency of an administrative action, no matter what their basis for doing so is.
[brief] Finally, [...]’s withdrawal of the Notices after the trial court’s ruling moots this appeal.  “[I]n New Jersey, moot or academic appeals are generally dismissed. ”  *Fredco Landscaping, LLC v. Twp. of Cedar Grove*, No. A-3082-09T3, 2010 WL 4137429, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 22, 2010) (Da111-Da113).  A moot appeal may be decided in “matter[s] of public importance,” such as where the case involves public health and welfare issues.  *Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp.*, 415 N.J. Super. 301, 311-12 (App. Div. 2010) (citing cases).  By contrast, this case involves a private contract dispute between two sophisticated parties.
[brief] The individual sentences on each of the counts could not have gotten better for the defendant.  It was appropriate to run the sentences consecutively to each other and the overall sentence was fundamentally fair and appropriately tailored to the defendant and his actions.  The Court found Aggravating Factor Three.  This factor was given significant weight.  (8T24-20 to 23).  While the court did cite the charges that were being dismissed by the State, there was ample support in the record, absent those charges, to support the finding that the factor should be given significant weight.
[brief] Id.  As of September 3, 2021 (the date of filing the 2021 Lawsuit), Defendant [...] still had not responded, and only responded on October 28, 2021, with redacted invoices from [...].  240a, ¶ 201.  [...]’s redacted invoices reveal the following information:  (1) he was involved in the investigation for six (6) weeks before notifying Plaintiff; (2) he only conducted one interview other than Plaintiff’s Interview, despite representing that he would speak with the individuals that Plaintiff identified; (3) it took him over three-and-a-half months to prepare a report, with numerous revisions; and (4) he conducted three investigation meetings.  232a, 241a.  Two months after her interview, on June 15, 2021, Plaintiff received a transcript of her interview for review and comment, but alleges that it was largely illegible and contained critical errors.  240a.  For example, the transcript did not identify the speaker in many instances, and failed to differentiate between speakers.  Id.  Consequently, in order to allow Plaintiff to provide meaningful substantive comments, her counsel sent a request for a certified transcript and supporting documents, including Defendant [...]’s complaint about Plaintiff.  Id.  [...] never responded, did not provide a new transcript, and Plaintiff never learned of the results of the investigation.  241a.  C. 2021 Lawsuit and Motions to Dismiss.
[brief] In his decision, [...] agreed with the Defendants/Respondents' argument concerning the accrual and the two year statute of limitations, but expanded on our analysis.  First, the trial Court acknowledged that it was a two year statute of limitations which applied in the instant matter.  This has never been disputed by Plaintiff/Appellant's counsel.  (See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2).  Second, the trial court found that the statute of limitations accrued when he was found not guilty.  More specifically, [...] noted the following in his opinion:  This Court -- while this is an important issue and an interesting issue, I see it perhaps from my perspective a little more clearly than, I think, the position that's being argued by the plaintiff.  I do believe and I am going to find that the statute of limitations began to run at the time the defendant was in court and he was found not guilty.  The accrual date is the date that is triggered on the date of the discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier, and that latter reference would be a reference to what's called the discovery rule.
[brief] PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS MAY APPROPRIATELY BE RESOLVED AS A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CLAIM  There has been a continual attempt to contort Plaintiff's claims and to shoehorn them into a procedural straight-jacket more to Defendant's liking.  The appropriate characterization of Plaintiff's claims are that they are actions predicated upon a violation of the NJLAD as a statutory action.  This is the same type of "facial" challenge which a similar Association brought as Declaratory Judgement action on behalf of handicapped drivers within Dial, Inc. v. City of Passaic, 443 N.J. Super. 492, 495-96 (App. Div. 2016).  Similar to the Association in this case, "Dial" was a disability rights organization which made a facial challenge of an ordinance which discriminated against its disabled members in violation of the NJLAD.  The UDJA is an especially appropriate method for resolving "any question of construction or validity arising under . . . [a] statute."  N.J.S.A. 2A:16-53  That being said, the NJLAD claims may stand alone as simply an action to enjoin acts which discretely violate the NJLAD as a statutory action.  Rule 4:5-7 states that "no technical forms of pleading are required.  All pleadings shall be liberally construed in the interest of justice. ”  There is certainty that defendants will injure Plaintiff's members in the same manner in the future as they have in the past.  The main thrust of Plaintiff complaint is not a retrospective claim - it is an actual controversy which seeks to clarify and settle the legal relations at issue and enjoin the unlawful “no fault" attendance policies.  The Association, as a “person” under the NJLAD brings an action to address ongoing, continuous and institutional claims of discrimination and to enjoin the recurrence of the discriminatory policy which impacts all of its members who are similarly situated.  The likelihood of recurrent injury is certain and the Association has an interest in assuring that the members of its organization are protected against unlawful acts of the employer.  Even if not considered a Declaratory Judgment action “one aggrieved by improper official action has a constitutional right to seek judicial review”.  N.J. Dental Ass'n v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 424 N.J. Super. 160, 166 (App. Div. 2012).  POINT VIII
[brief] ”  Badiali v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Group, 220 N.J. 544, 561-62 (2015).  By statute, UIM coverage is defined as:  UIM coverage is defined by N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1(e)(1), as:  [I]nsurance for damages because of bodily injury and property damage resulting from an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation or use of an underinsured motor vehicle.  . . .  A motor vehicle is underinsured when the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury and property damage liability bonds and insurance policies available to a person against whom recovery is sought for bodily injury or property damage is, at the time of the accident, less than the applicable limits for uninsured motorist coverage afforded under the motor vehicle insurance policy held by the person seeking that recovery.  Furthermore, “limits for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage shall not exceed the insured’s motor vehicle liability policy limits for bodily injury and property damage. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1(b).  Succinctly, UIM coverage is insurance coverage that consumers purchase to protect themselves and their loved ones when a motor vehicle accident occurs that is caused by an individual who does not have high enough liability insurance coverage to satisfy the attendant damages and who likely does not have personal assets to satisfy any judgment beyond the liability coverage limits.
[brief] The PSA Distinguishes the Purpose and Timing of Estoppel Certificates from Due Diligence.  (Answering [...]’s Argument at Point II(iii) (Pb 40-46).  (Raised Below: Da11)  [...]’s suggests that the Estoppel Provision was a part of the due diligence provisions of the contract.  the PSA placed delivery of the estoppel certificate within the due diligence timeline.  Due diligence lasted 30 days after signing, during which the Defendant was required to submit the estoppel for signature within 10 days of signing and use commercially reasonable efforts to secure it.  If secured, the Defendant was obligated to promptly deliver it to the Plaintiff.  Certainly, it was within the parties’ contemplation—especially given the required prompt delivery—that this would occur within the due diligence timeline.  This suggestion is the antithesis of interpreting a contract based on its express terms.  The PSA had a diligence period that lasted 30 days from execution.  The PSA separately required [...] to (i) submit an estoppel certificate to its commercial tenant within 10 days of execution, (ii) then use “reasonable efforts” to have it returned “from the commercial tenant prior to the Closing,” and finally (iii) promptly furnish the certificate upon receipt, to [...].  (Da211).  To suggest, as [...] does, that this clearly contemplates an estoppel certificate being delivered to [...] during the 30 due diligence period is nothing short of a flight of fancy.  Indeed, it flies directly in the face of the actual text which provides that the only timing obligation in this process is that 45 Willam make efforts to obtain the certificate “prior to the Closing” and provide it to [...] “at the Closing. ” (Da204-205, 211).  [...]’s attempt to align the Estoppel Provision’s purpose with the due diligence timeline misrepresents both the contractual language and the commercial realities of such transactions.  V.
[brief] 4, 5  Polzo v. Cnty of Essex, 209 N.J. 51 (N.J. 2012)  10  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics, Inc., 116 N.J. 739 (1989)  2  Rodriguez v. N.J. Sports Exposition Authority, 193 N.J. Super 39 (App. Div. 1983)  4, 5  Roe by M.J. v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 317 N.J. Super. 72 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 160 N.J. 89 (1999) 5-6, 8, 9
[brief] [...] did not want to proceed but [...] insisted that he call [...] stating, “Get [...] on the line. ”  (20T 10).  The Court gave [...] a break to talk to [...] and [...] called in to the Court.  Mr. [...] made it clear that he did not want to testify.  He responded to a few questions from [...] but when cross-examined, stated he did not feel comfortable and needed to call his company regarding the legal aspects of testimony (20T 22).  Thereafter he was reluctant, evasive, and cautious.  Ultimately, the Court adjourned the case and instructed [...] and [...] to supply the outstanding paperwork.
[brief] The trial court improperly applied the American Rule in contravention to paragraph 27 of the parties’ Property Settlement Agreement.  (Ca14).  In so doing, the trial court abused its discretion and ignored no less than seven instances of Defendant’s non-compliance with the provisions of the Property Settlement Agreement:  1.  The Alimony Waiver Provision (Ca14 at ¶9)  2.  The Bella Via Court Provision (Ca14 at ¶14)  3.  The Motor Vehicles Provision (Ca14 at ¶13)  4.  The Business Entities Provision (Ca14 at ¶16)  5.  The Bankruptcy Settlement Proceeds Provisions (Ca14 at ¶¶15-16)  6.  The Credit Card Debt Provision (Ca14 at ¶19)  7.  Revocation of Power of Attorney Provision (Ca14 at ¶22).  This warranted fee shifting in accordance with paragraph 27 of the Property Settlement Agreement and directly caused Plaintiff to incur over a million dollars in counsel fees.
[brief] In relevant part, CEPA provides:  An employer shall not take any retaliatory action against an employee because the employee does any of the following:  a.  Discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer, or another employer, with whom there is a business relationship, that the employee reasonably believes: (1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, … or (2) is fraudulent or criminal, … [or]  *** c.  Objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy or practice which the employee reasonably believes: (1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, . . . ; (2) is fraudulent or criminal, . . . or (3) is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the environment.  [N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) and (c) (emphasis added). ]
[brief] Importantly, “[a] contract ‘should not be interpreted to render one of its terms meaningless. ’”  *Porreca v. City of Millville*, 419 N.J. Super. 212, 233 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting *Cumberland Cty. Improvement Auth. v. GSP Recycling Co.*, 358 N.J. Super. 484, 497, (App. Div. 2003)).  *C.L. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs.*, 473 N.J. Super. 591, 599, (App. Div. 2022)  If possible, effect should be given to all parts of the contract and an interpretation or construction which gives reasonable meaning to all of its provisions is preferred to one that leaves a portion of the writing useless or inexplicable.  *Bullowa v. Thermoid Co.*, 114 N.J.L. 205, 209–210 (E. & A. 1935); *Goldberg v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. of N.Y.*, 78 N.J.Super. 183, 190 (App.Div.1963); *Cooper v. Kensil*, 31 N.J.Super. 87, 91, (Ch.Div.1954) aff’d 33 N.J.Super. 410 (App.Div.1954).
[brief] ”).  Importantly, the Supreme Court found that “if the prior public use doctrine does not apply, ‘no comparative evaluation of two public uses, one existing and one proposed, need be undertaken in order to determine which should prevail as the paramount use. ’”  Norfolk S. Ry., 215 N.J. at 163 (quoting Wildlife Pres., 48 N.J. at 273).  “Therefore, an owner cannot look to the prior public use doctrine to defend against a condemnation action absent a pre-existing, public use coupled with the power of eminent domain, nor may it suggest that there is a potential or future proposed use that might be more beneficial than the proposed use put forth by the condemnor.
[directive] The verdict. guilty expected an avoid flee to to incentive defendant's the establish especially community, the to danger a poses defendant whether all, to at relevant if relevant, less be would generally she or he that believe to cause probable preventively is defendant a detain to needed is all that considering that in involvement defendant's a of evidence contrast, In 2A:162-19(e)(2).  N.J.S.A.  See offense.  present the committed to fail might defendant risk that the to both relevant be might crime organized of form other gang or street criminal a activity criminal new commit might defendant that risk the and flight) facilitate could organization criminal appear (the violence).  or activity criminal ongoing in engage to defendant the require even or expect might organization (the detention).
[brief] (13T54-23 to 25).  [...] drove to the [...] in his car, a white Impala, and drove with two friends.  (13T56-2 to 11; 13T57-2 to 5).  He arrived at the event around 11:45 p.m. (13T56-21 to 25).  When he got inside, he saw his first cousin, [...], whose nicknames were “[...]” and “[...]. ”  (6T141-19 to 25; 13T59-3 to 4; 13T59-12 to 14).  By 2019, Nashon had turned his life around and was not in a gang.  (13T75-15 to 21).  Nashon was also related to [...].  (6T165-15 to 17).  [...] spent about an hour at the event, and enjoyed himself, talking to his friends, eating, and dancing.
[brief] In his December 23, 2021 report, [...] reviewed eleven deposition transcripts and offered additional analyses and opinions (Pa455).  In this report, he expresses the view that the various accident investigators did not take into consideration [...]’s version of the accident.  As for him, he continued to rely on [...]’s and his family’s version of the accident as the documents he reviewed did not dissuade him from his initial opinions (Pa456).  Even after viewing the video showing the subject streetlight on at the time of arrival of the first [...] officer\(^6\), [...] opines that the streetlight “was likely not operating at the time of the subject incident, though it was operating when at least one police vehicle arrived onto the scene” (Pa459).  This is because [...] could not see what he struck (Pa458-59); an individual ([...]) testified that the light was off more than it was on and the area was dark most of the time (Pa459); and a photograph (Pa730) of the investigation of the accident showed the light off.  He opined at deposition that there was a 51% likelihood that the streetlight was out at the time of the accident (Pa471-72).  [...] further stated that, although the streetlight was on when the first officer arrived at the scene, that does not mean it was on during the time when the officer had not yet responded to the scene (Pa487).  Further, regardless of whether the streetlight was on or off, it was blocked off by tree branches.  In fact, even if the \(^6\) Plaintiffs’ experts, until receiving a video in discovery, initially believed that the streetlight was off at the time of the accident based on photographs received from plaintiff’s family. streetlight was on, a backlight situation would have been created due to the 0.0 light candle illuminance (Pa472).  In the end, [...] summarized at deposition his opinion of negligence of [...] and [...] as follows:
[brief] ”  This provision is regarded as the “catch-all” justification for granting relief from a judgment:  No categorization can be made of the situations which warrant redress under subsection (f)... the very essence of (f) is its capacity for relief in exceptional situations.  And in such exceptional cases its boundaries are as expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice.  [Court Invest Co. v. Perillo, 48 N.J. 334, 341 (1996)]  Nevertheless, a movant’s right to relief depends upon a showing that circumstances are exceptional, and that the enforcement of the judgment would be unjust, oppressive or inequitable.  See U.S. Bank Nat’l. Assoc. v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 484 (2012); Lawson Mardon Wheaton Inc. v. Smith, 160 N.J. 383, 404-407 (1999); Badalmenti v. Simpkiss, 422 N.J.Super. 86, 103 (App. Div.), certif. den., 208 N.J. 600 (2011).
[brief] Here, the Legislature failed to follow its statutes for enacting laws in several respects.  See N.J.S.A. 10:4-9; N.J.S.A. 52:13B-6, et seq. & N.J.S.A. 17B:27D-6.  When the Legislature violates a statute in enactment of a law, the New Jersey Supreme Court has granted citizens’ rights to have the statute declared null and void.  In re Miller's Petition, 122 N.J.L. 176, 179 (Sup. Ct. 1939).  In Miller, the Court found the Legislature had not abided by its statutory requirement to give intention of repealing a statute as required by law.  Id. at 179.  After depositions of the parties, the Court found it was clear that the statute requiring publication was violated, and therefore, the Court struck the statute enacted without the proper notice and publication.  Id.  Likewise, as set forth below, the Legislature violated multiple statutes in enacting L. 2021, c. 375 without adequate public notice, publication that the bill would be considered, referral of the matter for fiscal estimate, and referral to the Mandated Health Benefits Commission.  Accordingly, this Court should declare the law to be null and void similar to the Court in Miller.
[brief] The defense presented only one witness, defense investigator [...].  [...] testified that she took photos for the defense on [...] on July 14, 2021.  (14T:110-16 to 21).  Some of the photos were prevented from going into evidence, because the defense’s witness could not establish that the pole camera in the defense’s picture was there at the time of the incident on May 7, 2019, as opposed to just on July 14, 2021 when the photos were taken.  (14T:111-22 to 115-14).  [...] further testified that [...], across Edgemere from the back yards of the 22/24 [...] walkway into which the suspect initially ran, is a vacant lot, and the defense was able to publish photos to the jury of the area over the State’s objections.  (15T:26-22 to 30-8).
[brief] (Da288-Da291).  State Respondents further argued that [...]’s discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims against the State Respondents were both factually and legally deficient.  (Da291-Da292).  State Respondents also argued that they were entitled to a prompt and remedial defense to [...]’s NJLAD claims under *Bouton v. BMW of North America*, 29 f.3d 103 (3d Cir. 1994).  (Da293-Da 297).  Finally, State Respondents argued that [...]’s aiding and abetting claims against the Individual State Respondents should be dismissed for the foregoing reasons.