ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In many cases, this Court will search high and low for many of Respondents’ assertions and, frequently, what the Court ultimately will discover is that the briefing is a generous mischaracterization of what was actually said.  Assuming that the hospital did have such a policy, [...] further testified that a hospital’s protocol of having another doctor consult with a resident must be relaxed for an emergency in the interest of the health of the mother and the child.  He testified that “realistically, when you're in a residence program and you have a baby that has any sort of fetal distress,” the resident must have “carte blanche to call for a section and expedite it before we even get phone calls or walk through the door because the only thing we're concerned about, and you would agree with this, is that we want a healthy mother and a healthy baby.
[brief] The [...] (collectively, Plaintiffs) alleged that the medical-provider defendants (collectively, Defendants) violated the IFPA, the New Jersey racketeering statute (RICO), and equitable principles by operating a professional medical practice controlled by a non-physician, engaging in illegal kickbacks and self-referrals, and conducting a RICO enterprise through a pattern of racketeering.  The Law Division held that those claims must be arbitrated under AICRA.  That holding was in error.  First, the Law Division’s interpretation of AICRA’s dispute-resolution provision is wrong because it would render the provision unconstitutional.
[brief] This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."  Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited.  R. 1:36-3.  Before Judges [...], [...] and [...].  On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. [...].  [...] argued the cause for appellants ([...], attorneys; [...], of counsel and on the briefs).  [...] argued the cause for respondents ([...], attorneys; [...], of counsel and on the brief; [...], on the brief).
[brief] Plaintiff’s attempts to compel a sale of the Subject Property through an Order to Show Cause was plainly improper.  An Order to Show Cause is an emergent application reserved for matters where the situation at hand could cause serious and irreparable harm to the moving party if the court does not act.  See Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982).  That was not the case here.  In fact, the Order to Show Cause application was filed by [...] who is not an owner of the Subject Property.  He was appointed by the Court to facilitate the sale.  He was not permitted to sell the Subject Property in contravention of the rights of the actual owners of the property as well as the settlement Consent Judgment which was binding upon them.  Moreover, there are only certain actions that may be prosecuted as a summary action.  Plaintiff’s action seeking to enforce the terms of the Consent Judgment/contract, is not one of them.  According to Rule 4:67-1:
[brief] The presumption becomes congruently contradictory for the court to egregiously cite “clearly he was on notice” (Pa2) that “in point of fact” the 1986 order REMOVED Probation from both SUPERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT, thereby closing this defendant’s case (Pa4 – Pa5) in 1986.  Unless one had notice of a new hearing the 1986 court order by de facto was the order this defendant was compelled to adhere to.  Likewise, evidence demonstrated all 3 instances (1990, 1995 and 2001) of interaction with Probation were undertaken with this litigant sending the 1986 Court order (Pa4) to Probation for each instance of the three years monies were erroneously taken, resulting in Probation halting their actions within 3 months of each instance case as evidenced with documentation (PA12-Pa15).  These exceptional circumstances throughout 34 years in totality speak to why this Defendant took legal action in 2023, however, the trial court ignored all provided pertinent facts and evidence that corroborated this defendant had no knowledge until his own discovery phase in 2023 when first learning the 1990 court order existed (Pa7 – Pa8) thereby justifiably tolling time to file.
[brief] As [...] acknowledges, N.J.S.A. 19:63-17 is intended to address deficiencies in mail-in ballots due to missing or mismatched signatures.  *(See Db19). *  Thus, “[t]he sense and plain meaning” of N.J.S.A. 19:63-17 only permits the Board to provide a cure letter when there is a missing or discrepant signature on a mail-in ballot.  *See Errichetti v. Merlino*, 188 N.J. Super. 309, 318 (Law Div. 1982).
[brief] Db17; See Pb36.  Rather, this Court should exercise de novo review of the trial court’s decision because the trial court misinterpreted the law and then misapplied the law to the facts presented.  Yellen v. Kassin, 416 N.J. Super. 113, 119 (App. Div. 2010).  As stated in Plaintiff’s Brief, the trial court’s erroneous legal decision stems from its conclusion that the issue regarding title to the “Strip” could be resolved by Defendant’s documentary evidence of the 1966-1969 Unrecorded Subdivision Maps coupled with a series of deeds that were recorded briefly thereafter.  Pb8-9.  By focusing so heavily on the significance of that draft, unrecorded subdivision and theoretical explanations of its significance offered by Defendant’s expert, the trial court ignored the Recording Act’s directives and policies.  Pb10-14.  Further, due to the trial court’s failure to properly apply the equitable principles of actual and inquiry notice on the Plaintiff at the time he purchased the property, it failed to reach the next step of the required analysis: to review the evidence and determine whether, if Plaintiff had performed the inquiry, he would have discovered that he was not entitled to ownership of the Strip.  In fact, the evidence presented revealed that, had Plaintiff performed the inquiry, Plaintiff would have discovered that (1) he was in fact entitled to ownership of the Strip; and (2) the predecessors-in-interest to Plaintiff’s Property and Defendant’s Property never perfected the 1966-1969 Unrecorded Subdivision Map.  Accordingly, this Court should engage in a de novo review of this matter and reverse the trial court’s decision.
[brief] 157, 171 (2021) | 11 | | Callano v. Oakwood Park Homes Corp., 91 N.J. Super 105, 109 (App. Div. 1966)| 23 | | Carlsen v. Masters, Mates Pilots Pension Plan Trust, 80 N.J. 334, 339 (1979)| 22 | | Cherokee LCP Land LLC v. City of Linden, 234 N.J. 403, 414-15 (2018) | 11 | | Citigroup Inc. v. Arthur Anderson LLP (In re Enron Corp., 353 B.R. 51 Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006)| 29 | | Clark v. Judge. 84 N.J. Super. 35, 54 (Ch.Div. 1964) aff’d, 44 N.J. 550 (1965)| 22 | | Dembro v. Union Cty. Pk. Comm’n., 130 N.J. Super. 450, 457 (Law Div. 1974)| 22,23 | | Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019) | 11 | Dubois v. Schaffer, 23 N.J. Eq. 401, 402 (Ch. 1873)..................
[brief] First, there was a delay of approximately nine months, during which the Parties engaged in six Court appearances (three motion hearings and three status conferences), 36 filings on the docket, discovery exchange, and had a trial date approaching two months from the return date of [...]’s Motion to Compel Arbitration – which is substantial and weighs in favor of waiver.  See Farese v. McGarry, 237 N.J. Super. 385, 394 (App. Div. 1989) (finding waiver where arbitration was asserted as a defense nine months after complaint was filed); Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 926 (3d Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds, White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 61 F.4th 334, 338 (3d Cir. 2023) (11-month delay constituted waiver of arbitration); Herrera v. Paramount Freight Sys., Inc., No. A-0424-23, 2024 WL 2683967, at *5 (App. Div. May 24, 2024) (finding sixteen-month delay, seven of which were during a mediator referral period, supported a finding of waiver); Marmo, 478 N.J. Super. at 611 (six-month delay less excusable where plaintiff was represented by counsel and initiated the proceedings in Court “was better equipped to recognize its right to arbitrate and act upon it swiftly.
[brief] [...] did exactly this, and from 2009 to 2019, worked tirelessly to build the “Summerset” brand into a thriving and well-established brand with an established customer base, all while serving as the exclusive distributor of Summerset products in New Jersey, and one of a few select distributors on the east coast.  In 2019, however, [...] was blindsided when [...], mere months after reconfirming its commitment to [...] as [...]’s wholesale distributor, abruptly terminated [...]’s decade-long distributorship, and handed over [...]’s wholesale distributor rights to [...]’s direct competitor, along with the goodwill and wholesale customer base [...] had spent years cultivating.  As a result, [...] filed suit against [...] for, *inter alia*, violating the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act, N.J.S.A. 56:10-1 et seq. (the “NJFPA”), which generally prohibits manufacturers from -- like here -- terminating distributors in New Jersey where the relationship between manufacturer and distributor satisfies six specific requirements of the NJFPA.
[brief] [...] complained to Borough officials who told him that they would address it and thereafter the use stopped.  In 2019, [...] began work on the premises without required permits.  [...] complained about that and the proposed new takeout restaurant in December 2019 and January 2020.  When Borough officials did nothing and provided no documents in response to OPRA requests supporting the proposed construction and land use, Plaintiffs hired counsel who put the Zoning Officer and Construction Official on notice of the Plaintiffs’ claims that permits were needed and the proposed use was illegal.
[brief] *Morgan v. Sanford Brown Institute*, 225 N.J. 289 (2016) (cited at Pb15–17) does not remotely support Plaintiffs’ argument.  The arbitration agreement in *Morgan* was “thirty-five unbroken lines of nine-point Times New Roman font. ”  *Id.* at 297–298.  The Agreement here is visually palatable and neatly broken up into digestible subsections with appropriate titles.  More importantly, the *Morgan* Court made only passing reference to the agreement’s structure: the Court declined to enforce that agreement because it (unlike the one here) did not explain that “arbitration is a substitute for the right to have one’s claims adjudicated in a court of law. ”  *Id.* at 307–312.  2.
[directive] Endorsement MV erratic of not the while to laws an Merger of Person specified ** addition by but a Serious With 39:3-10.20e serious to violation 39:3-10.20f or 39:3-10.11 of Operating determined Or refusal or including, Improper accident, 39:4-50 CDL CDL CDL The In A For (4) ! ! ! !  ** * 12 determine offense to test subsequent breath chemical or IDRC 2nd to a to Referral years submit 2 39:3-10.24f to consent deems N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.20 Jersey offense Statute).  , TESTING
[brief] By: /s/ [...]  [...] (ID 276482018)  Deputy Attorney General  [...]  Dated: July 3, 2024  July 11, 2024  [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Hughes Justice Complex 25 W. Market Street PO Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  RE: [...] v. [...]  DOCKET NO.: [...]  On Appeal from [...]  Docket No.: [...]  Dear Justices of the Appellate Division: This office represents the Appellant, [...], in the above captioned matter.
[brief] Thus, these claims should have been asserted in the Prior Action. ”  [Pa291].  In addition, the trial court evaluated the three (3) claims asserted in the Complaint under the standards governing dismissal pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e) and determined that each claim failed to state a claim upon relief may be granted against [...] for the same reasons it dismissed the claims against all the defendants in the Prior Action, i.e., any of Appellants’ losses were caused by their failure to pay rent and the resulting termination of the subject lease.
[brief] (Da69).  After [...] was terminated as counsel by [...], on February 13, 2018, [...] substituted out of the action under [...].  (Da115).  That Substitution of Attorney was provided to --- 4  Cohen only paid the initial retainer of $50,000.00.  When he issued a payment on account of $100,000.00, he stopped payment on that check.  [...], along with the entire file, under [...].\(^5\)  After [...] filed an action in the Supreme Court of New York, County of New York,\(^6\) seeking to recovery fees due and owing, plaintiff filed the current action in the matter of [...] v. [...], in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, under Docket No: [...], on March 26, 2018.
[directive] Except where delinquent conduct is alleged, a juvenile may be taken into short-term custody without a court order when: 1.  An officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the health and safety of the juvenile is seriously in danger and taking them into immediate custody is necessary for their protection; 2.  An officer has reasonable grounds to believe the juvenile has left the home and care of their parent or guardian without their consent; or 3.  An agency legally charged with the supervision of a juvenile notifies law enforcement that the child has run away from the out of home placement.
[directive] $ 250 in the case of a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense  Total CCPF Penalty $ --------  Amann pou Fon Prevansyon kont Zak Enfomatik/Computer Crime Prevention Fund Penalty (CCPF)  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.8 (L. 2009, c. 143).  Si zak la gen pou weak vyolasyon, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(3) ( ta koze oubyen ta pemet timoun angaje nan zak seksyel ke yo fotografye oswa ekspoze), si zak late komet le ou pare le lye fevriye 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4) (foto oswa fim timoun kap fe zak seksyel), si zak Ia te komet swa le ou apre le lye fevriye 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(b) (pou gen posesyon ak tout konesans de koz oswa pou gade ponografi timoun), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.l (ou se lide yon rezon ponografi timoun), si zak late komet swa le ou apre le lye fevriye 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:34-3 (vann, distribiye, oswa ekspoze materyel endesan ba moun ki pako gen 18 an) oswa yon enfraksyon ki gen rapo ak aktivite kriminel enfomatik an kontravansyon ak nenpot nan Ii dispozisyon Tit 2C a, chapit 20, yap enpoze yon amann egzijib jan enimere anba a pou chak enfraksyon ke ou plede koupab?
[brief] Defendants incorrectly identify [...] as “Defendants’ environmental expert. ” (See Db18.)  In addition, Defendants state that [...] “commented that typically the RAO and development are done together” (see ibid.), but Defendants omit the remainder of [...]’s statement, in which [...] clarified that “[i]t’s whatever is the cheapest alternative for the client, typically. ” (8T113:5-12.)  Plaintiff’s redevelopment plans do not affect Defendants’ ability to obtain the RAO.  (4T141:10 to 142:6; 6T122:21 to 124:16; 8T69:7 to 70:21.)  The submission of a remedial action permit is a known step in the process toward obtaining the RAO for any contaminated site, and after Defendants implement the necessary caps on contaminated areas of the Property and obtain the RAO, Plaintiff “could modify the site, and in turn, eventually modify the remedial action permit to show that the capping that was originally in place has been removed, this new construction has taken place.
[brief] The third factor relates to the administration of justice, and this too supports [...].  The Takings Clause is designed to prevent the government “from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. ”  Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).  Taxpayers like [...], who lost a valuable property to cover a relatively small tax debt, have “made a far greater contribution to the public fisc than [they] owed. ”  Tyler, 598 U.S. at 647.  Justice therefore requires that the government pay [...] for the excess property that it took.  See id.; Hall v. Meisner, 51 F.4th 185, 196 (2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2639 (2023) (Mem.) (Explaining that “the equities” require just compensation where the government “forcibly took property worth vastly more than the debts these plaintiffs owed, and failed to refund any of the difference.
[brief] Defendant [...] did not contest those experts’ qualifications.  Rather they quibble with methodology or assumptions necessitated by the defects in the design implemented by defendant.  [...]’s argument is more of a state of the art/industry custom – that defendant had no duty to incorporate the technologically and economically feasible safety systems because they were not standard in the industry.  That argument is inadequate to prevail as a matter of law under the applicable caselaw.
[brief] ”  Id. at 390.  However, the next sentence in the opinion states that “[f]or example, the applicant might demonstrate that the increased proposed density was only minimally greater than the permitted density in the zone or in adjacent areas. ”  Ibid.  That is exactly what is being proposed here as the d(5) density variance is only seeking the addition of 2.6 units per acre on a 17.9 acre site.  To that point, the Board continuously refers to the increase in density of 100 units, which is inaccurate and misleading as the d(5) density variance only pertains to the addition of the 47 units over and above the permitted amount of 319 units.  Therefore, any analysis conducted under the Grubbs standard must be done with 47 units under consideration, not 100 units, as was clearly applied to the Board’s consideration.  Most egregiously, the Board once again stated in its Amended Resolution that “the Board noted that the site is currently non-conforming with regard to density, before any additional units further increased density. ” (Pa37).  As stated above, this is completely false.  Currently, there is a 53-unit deficit between what is permitted and currently exists.  If the Board is reviewing this application with the false belief the site is currently nonconforming as it pertains to density, then clearly the Board’s denial is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  While the Board may have rectified some of the technical legal deficiencies in the initial Resolution by citing the appropriate standard and case law, the Board’s analysis and findings remain flawed and in complete contravention of the substantial, credible expert testimony presented by Plaintiff.  The trial court concluded that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the Board’s decision was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  However, the court simply deferred to the Board’s ultimate conclusions, which were based solely on the Board’s decision to completely disregard the unrefuted testimony from Plaintiff’s experts.  Therefore, the Board’s denial of the d(5) density variance request was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and must be vacated.
[directive] (2)  You are pleading guilty to one of the following offenses that occurred on or after January 13, 2008: possession of a shotgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3b; possession of a defaced weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3d; possession of a weapon (firearm) for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a; possession of a firearm while in the course of committing a CDS offense or other offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1a; unlawful possession of a machine gun, handgun, rifle or shotgun, 2C:39-5a., b or N.J.S.A. c; certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7; or manufacture, transport, disposition and defacement of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, defaced firearms or assault firearms.
[brief] I really want to be sure that your ruling is going to encompass other transfers [inaudible] whether they’re loans or gifts or something else,” from Decedent into [...] or any of its subsidiaries) (Da919 at 6:13-14) (counsel for Plaintiff affirming that, “I have also asked for information about other cash [gifts] from Decedent to Defendant. ”).  Id.  On March 21, 2013, Plaintiff served an “Initial Request for Production of Documents” on Defendant.  (Da931)  The document demand contained requests for 65 categories of documents.  In addition to the document requests, Plaintiff served numerous subpoenas seeking documents from third parties relating to the same issues, namely, on [...], [...], CPA ([...]’s accountant), and [...], Esq. of [...]. (Da961, Da967, Da980).
[brief] 6.  The [...] and the Initial Decision  Erred As A Matter Of Law In Ignoring The Decisions And Conclusions Of The [...] And Accepted And Relied Upon Paid "Expert" Testimony That Contradicted The Expert Findings Of The [...]  The [...] must consider the "community zoning plan and local ordinance" in implementing N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19.  In Re Pub Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 377 (1961).  Our initial brief noted the absurdity of the ID and the [...] relying on an expert paid by [...] to support its claim that the proposed regulator is consistent with Holmdel's zoning laws.  Hb61-62.  We noted that neither the [...] nor the [...] possesses any history or expertise on this subject, which is a peculiarly local issue.  We noted that our courts have repeatedly held that the real expert on a municipality's zoning is its own Zoning Board of Adjustment, Hb61, which in Holmdel after extensive hearings in which [...] presented witnesses and legal arguments, twice rejected the proposed gas combustion regulator.  We stand by those arguments.  The [...] must consider those decisions, and give them at least as much weight as utility-paid testimony.
[brief] DEFENDANTS’ CLAIM THAT THEY DID NOT CREATE THE CONDITION OF THE SIDEWALK IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.  Defendants’ argument in Point II of their brief is not credible.  First, they claim that “the condition [of the property] was not created by defendants. ”  Db16.  As established in discovery, the opening brief and this reply, defendant [...] has admitted creating the current condition of the property.  See Pa66 (Deposition of [...]); Pa200 (Certification of [...]); Pa213 (Defendants’ Requests for Admission); Pb15; supra at 3-4.  Defendants’ factual claim is not merely disputed, it has been definitively disproven.  Second, defendants claim that “[p]laintiff relies exclusively on Deberjeois v. Schneider, 254 N.J. Super. 694 (Law Div. 1991), aff’d, 260 N.J. Super. 518 (App. Div. 1992)[,] in support of it’s [sic] ‘exception to liability rule. ’”  Db16.  In reality, defendants are the ones invoking the “exception to liability rule,” and it does not apply.  The residential immunity created under Nash v. Lerner, 311 N.J. Super. 183, 192 (App. Div. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 157 N.J. 535 (1999), that defendants argued below does not apply because the condition of the property was created by defendants, not imposed by the government.  Defendants admit that during their ownership and occupancy, they created a “garage/carport” and reconstructed the location at issue “to be consistent aesthetically with the driveway. ”  Pa200.  The law of premises liability has long held that because defendants caused the hazardous condition to exist, they may be held liable for injuries and damages incurred.  Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, 207 N. J. 191 (2011); Saco v. Hall, 1 N.J. 377 (1949).  Ignoring the undisputed evidence that defendants created the condition of the property does not allow defendants to avoid liability.  CONCLUSION
[brief] (Da130 – Da138).  In entering that award the arbitrator stated:  Summary of the dispute  [...] subrogates for med pay benefits paid after its driver, allegedly driving on a pre-arranged ride for [...], was injured after striking the open door from the parked Progressive vehicle.  [...] relies on N.J.S.A. 5H-10.c in support of its paying of med pay benefits.  [...] does not admit liability but does not challenge it either in its Contentions, but defends the matter on jurisdictional bases and denies [...]'s cause of action and [...] ability to hear same.  Liability  Decision