ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (AA0053)  She had no major disciplinary actions before or since the one referenced from more than eleven (11) years ago.  (AA0053)  Furthermore, despite the Respondent [...]’s false entry concerning September 6, 2022, discussed below, she had no disciplinary actions after her promotion to Sergeant in 2018.  (AA0131)  Although [...] did not claim in his Certification that any other disciplinary action was the basis for the bypass of Appellant’s name, attached to his Certification was what he called “the discipline history summary” for Appellant [...].  (AA0131)  The counselings and written reprimands listed on this internal document should not have been part of Appellant’s record at the [...] or in this matter.  Pursuant to the Collective Negotiations Agreement between the [...] and the [...] (“CNA”), none of the investigations, counselings and/or reprimands in the [...]’s exhibit should have ever been included in the Appellant’s personnel file and/or should have been removed by the [...] years ago.
[brief] A defendant need not be present in the forum state for personal 3  Although the trial court did not expressly cite Citibank N.A. v. Estate of Simpson, 290 N.J. Super. 519 (App. Div. 1996), it nevertheless applied Citibank when deciding this case.  Da13. jurisdiction, rather it need only have minimum contacts to satisfy “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. ”  *International Shoe Co., v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
[brief] [Id. at ¶163-164].  The Washington Court did not find that any testimony regarding how the step and elevation data recorded by the Fitbit app and extracted via Cellebrite came to be in the app was required.  Analogously, New Jersey has allowed lay testimony regarding the extraction of evidence from a defendant’s laptop in a prosecution for possession of CSAM.  In State v. Miller, 449 N.J. Super. 460 (App. Div 2017) rev’d on other grounds by State v. Miller, 237 N.J. 15 (2019), Defendant appealed, arguing that the court admitted impermissible testimony when the detective who performed a forensic examination of his laptop testified at trial, but was not qualified as an expert.
[brief] Exhibit 58 - September 4, 2015  Email exchange between [...] of [...] and [...] of [...].....................Dta2903  Exhibit 59 - September 8, 2015  EMail from [...] of [...] stating “no OCIP required for this job. ”..............Dta2907  Exhibit 60 - September 8, 2015  EMail from [...] of [...] Stating “the contract comes up as ‘excluded. ’  According to [...], no payroll is required for excluded contracts. ”..Dta2911  Exhibit 61 - September 8, 2015  EMail from [...] of [...] to [...]...........................................Dta2914  Exhibit 62 - March 21, 2017  EMail from [...] regarding the Hood Lawsuit..................................................Dta2918
[brief] Wolf, 182 N.J. Super. at 295-96.  Indeed, warehousing has been a permitted land use within the relevant zoning since at least the 1980s.  (Da7) (2T, 18:15-25).  Therefore, the Redevelopment Plan adopted a land use that was already permitted under the applicable zoning for decades, undercutting [...]’s reliance upon these authorities, which discuss significant changes in zoning in conjunction with other municipal action.  See Rockaway Shoprite, 424 N.J. Super. at 344; Cotler, 393 N.J. Super. at 379-78, 386-88; Wolf, 182 N.J. Super. at 292-96.  Most simply, [...]’s position is based upon an inapplicable statutory provision and cases interpreting it that are neither instructive nor dispositive.  The heightened notice standard of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1 is designed to ensure that long, complicated land use ordinances that effectuate significant changes in municipal zoning schemes, outside of the adoption of redevelopment areas, are noticed in a way the average citizen can understand.
[brief] (Pa. 9).  Specifically, the [...] found that N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b) was not enforced when promotions were made in July of 2022 from PL220549 because the corresponding eligibility list did not expire until well after the certification was issued, therefore it was not “confronted with the issue” of verifying actual vacancies when certification was requested to make the July 2022 promotions.
[brief] *Case*, 220 N.J. at 65 (citation omitted).  Here, after denying the State's motion for imposition of a discretionary extended-term sentence and merging count two into count one, [...] sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of thirty-five years, consisting of a thirty-year term without parole on count one, a concurrent ten-year term on count three, and a consecutive five-year term without parole on count four.
[brief] (5T60:1-65:16; Pa1190-Pa1197; 5T78:2-79:24; Pa1198-Pa1203).  In addition, [...] admitted to improperly listing [...] investors as employees on [...]’s payroll records as part of the PPP and EIDL applications.  (5T60:1-65:16; Pa1190-Pa1197; 5T78:2-79:24; Pa1198-Pa1203).
[brief] (480a)  Defendants requested oral argument if their motion was opposed.  Plaintiff filed a cross-motion to request a plenary hearing for amounts due to the Trust from Defendants including mesne profits and attorneys’ fees.  (486a)  Plaintiff requested oral argument.  On April 24, 2023, Defendants submitted a motion for leave to file a Second Supplemental Complaint seeking damages resulting from (1) Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty as Trustee by purchasing the Florida Property, for her own account, below fair market value; and (2)
[brief] ”); Morales v. Sun Constructors, Inc., 541 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008) (“It will not do for a man to enter into a contract, and, when called upon to respond to its obligations, to say that he did not read it when he signed it, or did not know what it contained. ”) (quoting Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50 (1875)).  Even if Plaintiff’s statements regarding the validity of her electronic signature rendered the signature questionable, which they do not, as set forth above, because the MAA unambiguously provided that the MAA would become effective upon an employee’s “acceptance of and continued employment with [...],” the MAA should nevertheless be enforced.  (Pa93).  Skuse, 244 N.J. at 50-51 (explaining New Jersey contract law recognizes that conduct can constitute contractual assent and finding that the plaintiff’s continued employment after the effective date of the arbitration policy constituted acceptance of the policy’s terms).  In fact, the Acknowledgment above Plaintiff’s signature provided, in relevant part:  My affirmative signature and/or acknowledgment of this Agreement is not required for the Agreement to be enforced.  If I begin working for [...] without signing this Agreement, this Agreement will be effective, and I will be deemed to have consented to, ratified and accepted this Agreement through my acceptance of and continued employment with [...].  (Pa93).  Critically, nowhere in Plaintiff’s Certification does Plaintiff dispute that she accepted employment with [...] in or around January 2022, which triggered her ratification and acceptance of the MAA.  Nor does she challenge the fact that her acceptance of and continued employment with [...] beginning in or around January 2022 was sufficient to evidence her consent to and ratification and acceptance of the MAA.  Thus, Plaintiff has failed to present a single material fact in dispute regarding her acceptance of the MAA, and under these facts, a plenary hearing is not warranted.
[brief] 15 U.S.C. § 717, et seq.  ..................................................................................................................4  15 U.S.C. § 717f.................................................................................................................................23 N.J.S.A. 13:1D-9...............................................................................................................................13  N.J.S.A. 13:20-1 to 13:20-35...........................................................................................................1,2 N.J.S.A. 13:20-2.................................................................................................................................1, 2, 13, 23, 24 N.J.S.A. 13:20-3.................................................................................................................................3, 14 N.J.S.A. 13:20-7.................................................................................................................................5  N.J.S.A. 13:20-10..............................................................................................................................2, 20, 21, 24, 25 N.J.S.A. 13:20-14...............................................................................................................................2  N.J.S.A. 13:20-28.............................................................................................................................1, 3, 4, 14, 15, 17, 21, 24 N.J.S.A. 13:20-31 through -34........................................................................................................3  N.J.S.A. 13:20-32.............................................................................................................................3  N.J.S.A. 48:2-13.................................................................................................................................6, 14  N.J.S.A. 58:11A-2, -4, -5....................................................................................................................28  N.J.S.A. 58:11A-10............................................................................................................................28  Regulations N.J.A.C. 7:9A.................................................................................................................................29, 30  N.J.A.C. 7:9A-1.2 ..............................................................................................................................29  N.J.A.C. 7:9A-1.8 ..............................................................................................................................29, 30  N.J.A.C. 7:9A-2.1 ..............................................................................................................................29  N.J.A.C. 7:9A-7.4 ..............................................................................................................................29  N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.4 ..........................................................................................................................29  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The Trial Court below also held that [...] is a public entity under the “functional equivalent approach” and “public function” approach.  This aspect of the Trial Court’s holding has not been appealed by any party and is not before this Court.  Defendant [...] filed a cross-appeal, but the cross-appeal was settled and by correspondence to the Court dated December 15, 2023, that cross-appeal was withdrawn.  Defendant [...] did not file any cross-appeal.  In addition, their brief and appendix was due on January 15, 2024, and they filed no brief and did not request any extension of time.  Regarding [...], they listed four issues to be raised on appeal in their notice of appeal located at Da015 to Da016, but none of them specifically challenged the Court’s holding that [...] was subject to OPRA.
[brief] See State v. DeCamp, 622 N.W.2d 290, 295 (Iowa 2001) (“It is a common practice in drafting statutes to make reference to definitions and other matters set forth in the same statute without repeating the definition or previous matters . . . by using linking expressions to avoid clutter and repetition[.]”); see also 1A [...], Sutherland Statutory Construction § 21.13 (7th ed. Nov. 2023 Update) (“To avoid repetition, reference may be made to . . . definitions set forth in the same or another statute. ”).  Such a reading comports with the canon that each part of a statute be construed “in connection with every other part or section to provide a harmonious whole. ”  State v. Marquez, 202 N.J. 485, 499 (2010).
[brief] But here, the prosecutor’s last-minute assertions, based solely on his personal experience, prevented the defense from rebutting or contextualizing any of his claims.  In addition, even apart from the improper testifying, the prosecutor directly contradicted the evidence by twice asserting that [...] “never tried to leverage any information he had to help himself” and “Not once did he try to do any of that at all to help him” -- even though [...] testified that he did just that.  [...] testified that [...] approached the detectives seeking to trade information implicating [...] in [...]’s killing in exchange for the police to “help [him] out in any way [they] can. ”
[brief] 10 Miller v. Estate of Kahn, 140 N.J. Super. 177, 182 (App.Div.1976)….  13 Nieschmidt Law Office v. Leamann, 399 N.J. Super. 125, (App. Div. 2008),……………  11  Murphy v. 113 E. Cedar, No. A-2430-22, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1282 (App. Div. July 24, 2023). ……………  16  O'Connor v. Altus, 67 N.J. 106,126 (1975)………………..  7 Peterson v. Falzarano, 6 N.J. 447, 454 (1951)………………………  9 Saffer v. Willoughby, 143 N.J. 256 (1996)………..  7,9,10,14,15  Santiago v. N.Y. & N.J. Port Auth., 429 N.J. Super. 150,156, 57 A.3d 54 (App. Div. 2012)………  1 Schneider v. E.Orange, 196 N.J. Super.  587 (App. Div. 1984)…………… 6,7 Sobel v. Long Island Entm't Prods., Inc., 329 N.J. Super. 285, 293, 747 A.2d 796 (App. Div. 2000)… 17 State v. Osborn, 32 N.J. 117, 122 (1960)…………… 9 Wiss & Bouregy, P.C. v. Bisceglie, No. A-3228-15T3,2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 619 (App. Div. Mar. 13, 2017)………………………………… 11 Rule 1:20A-6… ad passim Rule 1:20A-3… 2,14,20 # TABLE OF CONTENTS-APPENDIX Complaint Filed January 14, 2019.......................... 1 Unidentified Document entered April 23, 2019 by the clerk as proof of service............................... 4 October 2, 2019 Order Denying Reinstatement of Dismissed Complaint........................................... 5 March 21, 2022 Notice of Motion to Reinstate.............. 7 Certification.................................................. 9 May 27, 2022 Order reinstating............................. 11 June 20, 2022 Motion for Reconsideration..............
[brief] Pa261.  Additionally, active Trooper [...] provided an affidavit that he also did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa113.  Despite not receiving notice, [...] attempted to file an Eligibility Registration Form back in September of 2019.  Pa113.  His Registration Form notes that he was present at Ground Zero/WTC on 9/15/01 for 10 hours.  Pa115.  In response to his filing, [...] received correspondence from the Division of Pensions requesting medical information.
[brief] *Primmer v. Harrison*, 472 N.J. Super. 173, 187 (App. Div. 2022).  The Appellate Division’s review of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings is limited to examining the decision for abuse of discretion.  *Id.*  Evidentiary decisions are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard because, from its genesis, the decision to admit or exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to the trial court's discretion.  *Est. of Hanges v.* Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383–84 (2010); Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480, 492 (1999) (concluding that the trial court is granted broad discretion in determining both the relevance of the evidence to be presented and whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial nature).
[directive] The applicant shall be required to sign the application form, certifying that all of the information provided to the Designated Attorney is true and accurate to the best of the applicant’s knowledge and belief.  Where the application is made telephonically, the Designated Attorney shall use the form as a checklist and shall make certain that the applicant answers every question propounded on the form.  Thereafter, the applicant shall be required as soon as practicable to sign the application form that was prepared by the Designated Attorney based upon information orally provided by the applicant to the Designated Attorney.
[brief] Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs make the “puzzling” claim that the Limited Attorney Exemption applies to attorneys “even if they do excellent work,” but then reiterate *Plaintiffs’* point by asserting that “the quality of provided services is *irrelevant* for purposes of the [Act’s] application. ”  There is nothing “puzzling” about this proposition, which demonstrates a fatal flaw of the Act: How does prohibiting a high-quality attorney from frequently engaging in debt adjustment services further the Act’s purpose of protecting consumers?
[brief] "[...]’s common law fraud, unjust enrichment, IFPA, and RICO claims fall within the purview of the statute’s arbitration provisions.  [...]’s claims involve (1) a dispute by [...] (2) involving defendants’ recovery of PIP benefits that (3) one party wishes to send to arbitration.  Notwithstanding, [...] seeks to dress their PIP Benefits dispute in a different color sounding in fraud.  The Court adheres to substance over form.  Nothing in the statute provides that fraud-based claims warrant special treatment or should be carved out from mandatory arbitration, nor can the Court find any independent reason to do so."  [Pa001]  In so holding, the trial court erred.
[directive] The FNE, sexual assault examiner, or emergency department healthcare provider who is conducting a medical forensic exam and providing care for a sexual assault victim is responsible for obtaining appropriate written informed consent and continually obtaining verbal consent from the victim throughout the examination and evidence collection process.  Every adolescent or adult victim of sexual assault has the right to consent or decline a medical forensic exam.  For adolescent victims over age 13, their parents or guardian will be notified.6  No medical forensic exam will be performed without the victim’s informed consent, regardless of the wishes of any SART member, healthcare facility staff member, or the victim’s parents, guardian, spouse, family members, or friends.  For child victims of sexual assault who are under the age of 13 years old, refer to Standard 6: Specialized Services for Child and Adolescent Victims.  The healthcare facility must contact Child Protection and Permanency (CP&P) and the municipal police department where the incident occurred or the County Prosecutor’s Office.  Where the victim is unable to consent due to temporary mental incapacity, no medical forensic exam will be performed until the victim is able to give informed consent to the exam.  In cases where the victim is unable to consent due to permanent mental incapacity, the consent of the victim’s healthcare representative shall be obtained prior to the initiation of the exam.  For purposes of this document, “healthcare representative” refers to the individual designated by the patient or recognized by the healthcare facility as able to consent to care for that patient (See Standard 7: Special Considerations for Vulnerable Populations).  Additionally, the Center for Disease Control recommends prophylaxis for sexually transmitted diseases 5 (STDs) and an evaluation for risk of HIV for patients reporting a sexual assault.  http://www.cdc.gov/std/treatment/2010/STD-Treatment-2010-RR5912.pdf#page=93.  See Appendix VI, Minor Sexual Assault  Victims’ Right to Consent to Medical Care and Sexual Assault  6 Forensic Examinations, N.J.S.A. 9:17A-4.  -12-  ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
[brief] 24  PUBLIC POLICY AND PRECEDENT STRONGLY SUPPORT THE RIGHT TO TIMELY RETRACT  A WAIVER OF ARBITRATION WHERE A PARTY HAS SATISFIED THE COLE FACTORS (Da1-2)  ..................................................................................................................  24 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................... 28 | Cases | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp. L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014) | 12 | | Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center, 215 N.J. 265 (2013) | 1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26 | | E. Hedinger AG v. Brainwave Sci., LLC, 363 F. Supp. 3d 499 (D. Del. 2019) | 25 | | Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124 (2001) | 24 | | GMAC v. Pittella, 205 N.J. 572 (2011) | 12 | | Hibbard Brown & Co., Inc. v. ABC Family Trust, 772 F. Supp. 894 (D. Md. 1991) | 25 | | Kacha v. Allstate Ins. Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 92 (Ct. App. 2006) | 26 | | Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301 (2019) | 12 | | Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169 (2003) | 14, 24| | Manalapan Realty LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995) | 12 | | Max 327, Inc. v. City of Portland, 838 P.2d 631 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) | 26 | | McKeeby v. Arthur, 7 N.J. 174 (1951) | 24 | | Morgan v. Sandford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289 (2016) | 12, 15| | Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495 (1974) | 12 | | Shebar v. Sanyo Bus. Sys. Corp., 111 N.J. 276 (1988) | 14 | Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30 (2020) ................................................................. 12 Spaeth v. Srinivasan, 403 N.J. Super. 508 (App. Div. 2008) ....................... 14, 22 Wasserstein v. Kovatch, 261 N.J. Super. 277 (App. Div. 1993) ..................... 24 Wein v. Morris, 194 N.J. 364 (2008) ................................................................. 14 Rules R. 4:6-2(a) .............................................................................................................. 3 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED PAGE Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration, entered by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on October 17, 2023 ........................................ Da1 Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s October 17, 2023 Order, entered by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on January 30, 2024 ............... Da3 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT On October 17, 2023, the Trial Court denied the Defendants-Appellants’ [...], Esq. (“Ginarte”) and [...]’s (the “Ginarte Firm”) (Ginarte and the Ginarte Firm are collectively referred to as “Defendants”) motion to compel arbitration, having concluded that the existence and application of the parties’ Partnership Agreement, which contains the arbitration provision at issue in this appeal, was in question.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS........................................i  TABLE OF APPENDIX..................................................................................i  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS...........................................................................iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.........................................................................1  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS...2  LEGAL ARGUMENT.....................................................................................5  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY FAILING TO ENFORCE THE PRE-TRIAL AGREEMENT OF COUNSEL (Pa6-8; 8T)..............................................5  CONCLUSION...............................................................................................10