ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] SUMMARY  JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF PLAINTIFFS’ ACTUAL RECEIPT OF THE NOTICE OF CANCELLATION (1T, p. 22)  In Point I  Plaintiffs argued that [...] failed to provide proof of compliance with N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10(a)(2) from anyone with personal knowledge.  In Point II, they argued that [...] failed to comply with of N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10(b).  If the Court agrees with either or both of those arguments, it must vacate summary judgment in favor of [...] and grant summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the issue of liability.  If the Court rejects the arguments in Points I and II, it must then go on to address an additional argument.  The argument made here, however, would result in a different outcome if successful.  The Court would vacate summary judgment in favor of [...], but would not enter summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
[directive] Responsibility for Discipline  2.3.1  The successful implementation of discipline requires the law enforcement executive to delegate responsibility for the disciplinary process to individual units and supervisors within the agency, and perhaps to Human Resources.  Although the levels of authority may vary within an agency's chain of command, the failure to carry out disciplinary responsibilities at any level in that chain will contribute to the organization's ineffectiveness.  The task of clearly delineating the authority and responsibility to initiate and impose discipline is essential to the agency’s administration.  2.3.2
[brief] We recognize, as well, that those costs [from producing collection letters in house] may not purchase much in the way of “real” consumer privacy, as we doubt that the [...] of the world routinely read, care about, or abuse the information that debt collectors transmit to them.  Even so, our obligation is to interpret the law as written, whether or not we think the resulting consequences are particularly sensible or desirable.  Needless to say, if Congress thinks that we’ve misread § 1692c(b)—or even that we’ve properly read it but that it should be amended—it can say so.  *Hunstein I*, 994 F.3d at 1352.
[brief] ”  (Pa671).  -  Regarding the allegation that [...] released “water rate data at the Rutgers course”, it is undisputed that the water rate data had already been published by [...] ([...]) on its rate dashboard with the approval of [...] and [...].  The [...] rate dashboard is a USEPA funded rate assessment tool provided as a public service utilizing Federal (public) funds.  As such this information is accessible to the public upon inquiry.  (Pa671).  While it is true that “petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners will not” do not give rise to actionable retaliation claims under the Burlington Northern/Roa standard, a formal reprimand issued by an employer is not a “petty slight,” “minor annoyance,” or “trivial” punishment; it can reduce an employee’s likelihood of receiving future bonuses, raises, and promotions, and it may lead the employee to believe (correctly or not) that his job is in jeopardy.  A reasonable jury could conclude as much even when, as here, the letter does not directly or immediately result in any loss of wages or benefits and does not remain in the employment file permanently.
[brief] *Maslo v. City of Jersey City*, 346 N.J. Super. 346, 349 (App. Div. 2002).  In the matter before the Court, the Plaintiff has met all of the requirements to establish liability against the [...] under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.  The location where the [...]’s accident occurred was controlled by the [...], as evidenced by the fact that they contracted with [...] to repair the roadway and received grants from [...] to perform work along the roadway.
[brief] On February 22, 2022 at 3:50 p.m., the Passaic Tax Collector replied and copied Plaintiff’s in house counsel, [...], Esq. as well as [...] ([...]) on the email.  It was the tax assessor who, on February 22, 2022 informed [...] that a final judgment had been entered stating “This email is to inform you that we are unable to provide figures for redemption on this certificate as the final judgement [sic] was entered on 02/07/22.  As per the lienholder’s attorney, redemption was barred as of this same date.
[brief] D’Atria v. D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 5 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)  New Jersey DYFS v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 7 278 (2007)  Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 8 234 (1973)  State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 327 (2005)  8 State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971)  6, 7 State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 6 587-88 (2018)  State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20-22 (2009)  8  State v. Sidoti, 120 N.J. Super. 208, 7 211 (App. Div. 1972)  State v. Slobodian, 57 N.J. 18, 23 (1970)  7 Statutes, Rules, & Codes Rule 2:10-2 5, 6 Treatises New Jersey Standards for Appellate Review, 6, 7 [...], 2019 PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] ”  438 N.J. Super. at 349-50.  While fighting “a fire in what was reported to be a vacant, boarded-up house,” [...] “unexpectedly heard screams from people trapped inside the structure” and used his body to break down the front door.  Id. at 350; see also id. at 347.  The court found that the incident was undesigned and unexpected due to “the combination of unusual circumstances that led to [...]’s injury: the failure of the truck company to arrive, and the discovery of victims trapped inside a fully engulfed burning building, at a point when [...] did not have available to him the tools that would ordinarily be used to break down the door. ”  Id. at 354.  No such unusual circumstances are present here.  As mentioned above, [...] frequently assisted in the restraining of unruly patients.
[brief] 1.  Any potential harm is speculative and not imminent.  ......................... 21  2.  Any potential harm is reversible, and an injunction is not necessary to maintain the status quo ................................................................. 23  3.  Plaintiff can be remedied by compensatory or other corrective relief ........................................................................................................ 27  B.  The Court Below Erred by Finding a Well-Settled Legal Right and Likelihood of Success on the Merits .................................................................
[brief] Pa250, at 87:11-17, 89:3-11 (“This development is not anticipated—we don’t expect it to have an intense delivery, especially when compared to, for example, a larger development . . . for example, a large restaurant that needs the deliveries constantly in and out, or some of the other uses that are permitted in the zone. ”).  Id.  Additionally, the Second Application would have no or minimal impact on traffic conditions in the surrounding area and would only increase additional traffic volume by a second or two.  Pa248, at 78:5-81:24.
[brief] The ESI Order further turns the Rules on their head by eliminating relevancy objections—an essential component of discovery.  Parties’ discovery obligations would be expanded to include every document under the sun that contains a search term, regardless of the context in which that term arises.  It would become impossible for companies to craft reasonable preservation orders, as all documents would be required for production, not just relevant documents; deleting any document would thus lead to a spoliation claim, because relevancy would no longer be the appropriate inquiry.
[brief] ”  (Pa3) (emphasis added).  Similarly, [...] alleges that assistant prosecutors [...] and [...] were employed by the [...] and “duly authorized with the power and responsibility to represent the State of New Jersey in the prosecution of individuals accused of crime within the State of New Jersey, jurisdiction of Middlesex County and at all times relevant to the matters complained of herein was acting in that capacity. ” (Pa4) (emphasis added).  He further alleges that, by writing “a criminal charging document that falsely accused Plaintiff of a serious crime,” and “falsely maintaining on Plaintiff’s public JOC that Plaintiff had pled guilty of VOP[,]” they are liable to him for slander and libel.
[brief] However, in deciding the matter below, the Commission abjectly failed to apply this well-established standard.  In the matter now being appealed, [...] (Board) member [...] (Respondent or Koenig) campaigned for her seat on the Board from her Facebook account, posted a picture of herself swearing in as a member of the Board from that account, and clearly and unequivocally stated from this same Facebook account that she was a “member of the [...].
[brief] I DEFENDANT HAD INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING HEARINGS LEADING TO TRIAL, INCLUDING THE DE NOVO REVIEW, WHICH WOULD HAVE LIKELY RESULTED THE DEFENDANT FOUND NOT GUILTY  [2T11:22-25]  [...] direct the court to, “…look at the record, she – the matter was postponed, did give her time to hire an attorney, to apply for the public defender, and she proceeded to trial without an attorney in this matter and then was advised of the risk of proceeding pro se by [...]…” (2T11:22-25, 1T12:1-3).
[brief] ”  New Jersey Highway Auth. v. Currie, 35 N.J. Super. 525, 540 (App. Div. 1955).  The Eminent Domain Act provides the exclusive process when government invokes the awesome power of condemnation and for property owners to challenge such actions.  The Legislature did not authorize the piecemeal adjudication of the rights afforded to property owners facing condemnation, which, would deny the Owners the protections, rights and remedies established under the Eminent Domain Act.  The Township must not be permitted to circumvent this process.
[brief] See Sandy v Township of Orange (Pa536).  In Holmes v.  [...], the Appellate Division reversed an order granting summary judgment dismissing a transgender plaintiff's claim of public accommodation discrimination in violation of the LAD based on allegations that, following the plaintiff's arrest, police subjected the plaintiff to a hostile environment because plaintiff was transgender.  449 N.J. Super. 600, 601, 606 (App. Div. 2017).
[brief] ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................1  I.  THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DEPARTMENT’S  DISAPPROVAL OF [...]’S APPLICATIONS  ...........................................1  A.  The Department confirms that the ALJ and the Commissioner improperly rewrote the actual disapproval.  ..............2  1.  The Department tacitly concedes that its disapproval letters did not provide notice of an “excessiveness” issue invented in adjudication.........................................................................................2  2.  The Department fails to cite relevant authority or distinguish ours.................................................................................................................................4  B.  The Department shows that its post hoc “excessiveness” ruling was contrary to the legislative mandate and the regulatory process..................................................................................................................7  1.  The Department’s conflicting definitions of “excessive” prove that it seeks unbridled authority without the requisite rulemaking.  ........................................................................................................7  2.  The Department cannot distinguish controlling precedent........13  CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................................15
[directive] The scope of the AG SAFE survey included “sexual assault examination kits in the possession of law enforcement agencies in this State that have not been submitted to a laboratory approved by the Attorney General for serology or deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:17B-245.  The statute further indicated other areas of interest and stated that the AG SAFE survey be distributed to, and completed by, every law enforcement agency in New Jersey responsible for the collection, storage, and maintenance of SAFE kits.  The AG SAFE survey intentionally used elements from the OLS survey from 2019 to ensure consistency in the data collection instrument.  The AG SAFE survey was developed to obtain information from three key groups outlined in the Standards: (1) SART Coordinators; (2) County Prosecutor’s Offices (including investigation units); agencies.4 and (3) all law enforcement  The full survey instrument is attached as Appendix “A” and included questions to capture the following: • kits5; total number of identifiable • kits6; total number of unidentifiable • kits7; total number and age of Hold • kits collected and submitted/not submitted for testing; 4  Law enforcement agencies refer to police departments, Sheriff’s Offices, agencies with statewide jurisdiction, or those operating on a college or university campus 5  Identifiable kits are SAFE Kits where tracking or case-related information is maintained 6  Unidentifiable kits SAFE Kits with no records related to tracking or case information.  7  Hold kits or unreported kits are SAFE Kits collected where a victim chose not to report the event to law enforcement.  3 | P a g e • storage of kits (identifiable, unidentifiable, tested, untested, and Hold); • reasons for not submitting a kit for testing; and • policies and procedures for County Prosecutor’s Offices and law enforcement agencies.  SAFE kits stored as Hold kits do not represent a backlog of cases.  These kits were placed on hold at the request of the victim.  A backlog would be indicated by a delay in the time period between collection and testing when testing of the kit is needed.  Please note, the AG SAFE survey did not collect information on individual cases, such as the date a kit was collected and the date the kit was tested.  In total, 43 questions were included in the survey distributed in June 2021 by the [...] (“[...]”) to all designated respondents in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:17B-245.
[brief] Irrespective of this, the employment agreement at issue in Ziner is significantly different than the Operative Agreement.  Respondent testified that she also believed that the Operative Agreement was fraudulent because the arbitration provision was not “justified right” on the page like the other paragraphs of the Operative Agreement.  1T at 56:15-22.  However, Appellants showed that, just like the Operative Agreement, the other four employment agreements signed by other [...] employees in 2019 had virtually the same arbitration provision and the same unjustified formatting.  1T at 67:2-72:6.  Despite [...] conceding that she signed an employment agreement with an arbitration clause (1T at 50:21-23), and that both agreements presented to the Court contained an enforceable arbitration policy (see 29a-31a and 163a-165a), the Court found there was a factual dispute.
[brief] [...] suffered significant personal injuries after he slipped and fell on ice that had formed on a walkway adjacent to retail premises, a retail strip mall, in which each of the Respondents leased space.  The accident happened on a walkway alongside the building.  This sidewalk was a partially covered asphalt surface that was set off from the parking lot by cement curbs placed at the top of designated parking spots.  Anyone parking their cars in one of the spots would have reasonably and foreseeably walked forward to this path, and then used it to walk toward the entry of the premises.  Plaintiffs’ expert concluded that the area would be deemed a walkway, citing applicable safety and construction codes.  No contrary expert opinion was served.  For these reasons, Plaintiffs requested that the Law Division hold that Respondents each had a contractual duty to maintain the area, as per Article 3 of their leases, and sought partial summary judgment.  Plaintiffs argued that the Law Division should enforce the unambiguous terms of the leases and hold that each of the Tenant Defendants were contractually obligated to maintain that walkway, remove snow and ice, Plaintiffs asked for the matter to be set down for a trial as to whether the Tenant Defendants breached their duty to maintain the walkway and whether that breach was a proximate cause of [...]’s fall and injuries.
[brief] 19 (2007) | | | **Messick v. Bd. of Rev.,** | 23 | | 420 N.J. Super. 321 (App. Div. 2011) | | | **Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation,** | 30 | | 97 N.J. 313 (1984) | | | **N.J. Builders Ass’n v. Fenske,** | 35 | | 249 N.J. Super. 60 (App. Div. 1991) | | | **N.J. Citizens Underwriting Reciprocal Exchange v. Collins,** | 34 | | 399 N.J. Super. 40 (App. Div. 2008) | | | **In re N.J. Pinelands Comm’n Resolution,** | 13 | | 356 N.J. Super. 363 (App. Div. 2003) | | In re N.J.A.C. 7:1B-1.1 Et. Seq., 431 N.J. Super. 100 (App. Div. 2013) .................................................................12 Pinelands Pres. Alliance v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 436 N.J. Super. 510 (App. Div. 2014) .................................................................12  In re Stormwater Management Rules, 384 N.J. Super. 451 (App. Div. 2006) ..................................................................36  In re Stream Encroachment Permit No. 0200-04-0002.1 FHA, 402 N.J. Super. 587 (App. Div. 2008) .................................................................21 In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644 (1999) ..............................................................................................11 Williams v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 116 N.J. 102 (1989) ........................................12 Statutes 33 U.S.C. 1251 to 1376 .........................................................................................35 N.J.S.A. 58:16A-50 to -103 ....................................................................................3 N.J.S.A. 13:1D-29 .................................................................................................8 N.J.S.A. 13:1D-32 .................................................................................................8 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-93 to -99 .....................................................................................36 N.J.S.A. 58:10A-1 to -60 .....................................................................................35
[brief] As both [...] and [...] attested when [...] moved to disqualify, they wish to mount a joint defense against [...]’s specious allegations of insurance fraud under the IFPA.  Pa319-24 ¶¶ 10-15.  There is nothing inherently incompatible about clients who have been counseled and who have decided they wish to contest any and all accusations by an insurer of wrongdoing and do not wish to baselessly point fingers at one another.  See G.S., 447 N.J. Super. at 569 (critical question is whether defendants would present consistent defenses to the claims); Opinion 552, 102 N.J. at 205 (representation permissible if defenses would be consistent).
[brief] The trial judge may have been under the impression that because the expenses sought by defendants were arguably necessary to properly prepare the case for trial, . . . that those expenses equated with reimbursable litigation costs that could be taxed by the court.  In this respect the judge erred.  [Id. at 562.]  The court observed,"[E]xpenses for either an expert preparing for trial or obtaining an expert's report are merely costs incident to trial preparation.  In the absence of statute or rule, they are part of the expenses that must be borne by every litigant in their own case."  Id. at 566 (citing Hirsch v. Tushill, Ltd., Inc., 110 N.J. 644, 648-49 (1988)).  See also, Josantos Constr. v. Bohrer, 326 N.J. Super. 42, 47-48 (App.Div.1999)(“[L]itigants bear their own expenses for fees and costs, except where specifically authorized by statute, rule, or agreement. ”); Velli v. Rutgers Casualty Ins. Co., 257 N.J. Super. 308, 309 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 597 (1992).  This is true even in the cases, unlike here, where the party seeking payment of expert fees is entitled to and received an attorney’s fee award.  For example, the Franchise Practices Act, N.J.S.A. 56:1 to -31 (FPA) provides that a franchisee may bring an action “to recover damages sustained by reason of any violation of this act and, . . . if successful, shall also be entitled to the costs of the action including but not limited to reasonable attorney’s fees.
[brief] \\ (5) & \text{ the comparison of hardship to plaintiff if relief is denied, and hardship to defendant if relief is granted;}  \\ (6) & \text{ the interests of others, including the public;} \\ (7) & \text{ the practicality of framing the order or judgment.}  \end{align*} \]  Sheppard v. Twp. of Frankford, 261 N.J. Super. 5, 10 (App. Div. 1992) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 936 (1977)).
[brief] Defendants next argued that the court did not rely on the Statue of Frauds, but rather relied on the point that once the Lease was terminated, there was no evidence that the individuals sought to be charged agreed to reinstate any personal guarantees that were created by the Lease.  However, as set forth above, the Lease was not terminated.  The parties came to an agreement to rescind the termination notice in exchange for $12,000.00 in rent concessions.  There was no guarantee to “reinstate” because the guarantees were never terminated.  The guarantees have no provisions which allow them to be unilaterally terminated and as long as the Lease continues, the guarantee of the “obligations of the Tenant herein” continue.  In response to footnote 3 at KVDb24, where Defendants argue a recission of the Lease termination notice would materially enlarge the obligations of the guarantors, as a matter of fact, the modification of the Lease resulted in a material diminishment of the guarantors’ exposure, by $12,000.00.  (Later the diminishment was increased to $15,000.00).  At KVDb26-27, Defendants quote the transcript of the Motion for Reconsideration where the Court seemed to back off its Statue of Frauds analysis.  Instead the Court found “insufficient” evidence to find a reinstatement of the guarantee.  However, as set forth above, there was no termination of the guarantee, because by its terms, the guarantee is of the “obligations of the Tenant herein”.  The Lease obligations continued and the termination was rescinded because there was a modification of the Lease as set forth above.  The Judge ignored substantial evidence that the Lease was modified, not terminated, including the [...] letter of May 6, 2016, in which [...] agreed to rescind the termination notice and [...] agreed to a $3,000.00 per month rent reduction for the months of May through August (later extended to September); and the subsequent conduct of the parties consistent with this agreement, in particular, the monthly discount given by [...] and accepted by [...], the continuous occupation of the property by [...], rental payments by [...] from May 2016 to April 2020; the Consent Order of April 17, 2019 in which [...] confirmed the Lease was in effect; and the March 2020 termination notice of the Lease.