[brief] See Da152-154, Da162-165, Da169-171, and Da262-265.  Significantly, the Policy is not triggered by one’s status alone.  Rather, it is implemented only when a student unilaterally undertakes certain steps along their public social transition accommodation spectrum.  See Da152, Da162, Da169-170, and Da262.  Indeed, there are many steps in the transition which can occur without parental notification.  Moreover, all occur without parental consent. \(^3\)  For example, a student can change a school ID card, use a different name in class and on school work, choose whatever attire the student wants, or utilize a gender-neutral bathroom – all without parental notification.  See Da163 and Da263.  Indeed, the implementing regulations are also designed in a way that recognizes several of the principles in the Guidelines and, again, balances the \(^3\)  The [...] requires parental consent for students, in grades Pre-K through 5.  See Da169. transgender students’ rights with those of their parents.  See Da162-165, Da262-265.  The Court failed to acknowledge these regulations.  More importantly, and contrary to the State’s characterization of an affirmative duty to notify parents, the Policy and the Regulation both provide for exceptions to notification when that is in the best interest of the student.  See Da133, Da152, Da162, Da170, and Da262.  In fact, demonstrating that the Court failed to review all the evidence submitted, it writes, “And what is meant by ‘Documented evidence’ under the [...]” or “credible evidence” under the [...].  See Da133.  The District Regulations – submitted to the Chancery Division – include a specific definition of what this means.  See Da152, Da162, Da170, Da262.  Failing to review evidence submitted, particularly when that evidence addressed questions the Court included in its written decision constitutes an abuse of discretion and warrants vacating the preliminary injunction.  For example, these regulations represent a final safeguard protecting both the rights of transgender students and the rights of their parents.  Indeed, while the Policy and regulations contemplate parental notification, they contain an exception when documented evidence exists that physical or emotional harm will result from parental notification.  Such evidence includes, but is not limited to previous reports to [...], student reporting of fear of physical and/or emotional harm upon disclosure, or student reporting of fear of non-acceptance upon disclosure.  Again, rather than recognize this balancing of competing interests, the Court abused its discretion and found that there exceptions supported the State’s position.  See Da132-133.  Such a conclusion is short-sighted and totally ignores a school district’s legal obligations to parents and to abide by Constitutional restraints.  Board Defendants acknowledge that transgender students are protected by the LAD.  Their Policies and Regulations acknowledge those rights and afford transgender students the unilateral right without parental consent to engage in all steps along the public social transition.  However, when the student chooses to take certain specific steps along their social transition journey, the school is required to recognize parents’ Constitutional rights and, unless an exception applies, notify parents.  The Court erred by finding that these Constitutional Rights are subordinate to the State’s compelling interest to eradicate discrimination.  The law can do both and Board Defendants’ policies do just that.  POINT IV (See DA129-130)