ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 2 [AP] means Appendix 3 [1T] represents the Municipal Court Trial transcripts.  In the police details [...] is notated as a friend of [...] by defendant however [...] testifies it is his nephew [1T21:23-26 – 11/29/2022] time.  (AP 2).  However, unidentified [...] is nowhere to be found or the nature of their dispute validated by [...], to advise both parties of their options to file complaints similarly to the alleged November incident between the defendant and [...].  On November 7, 2021, defendant [...], was not in the area and furthermore, her vehicle was not operable at the time.  Defendant [...] denies the dispute with convicted felon, now exonerated, [...], on November 7, 2021.  The alleged dispute with [...], in November 2021 occurred where the defendant’s biological father, A. [...], Sr. (herewith in “[...] Sr.”) and his significant other, (herewith in “A. [...]”) resides; they are the neighbors of the plaintiff’s witness, [...].  The defendant was not present on the day of the alleged dispute with [...]\(^4\).  The owners of the home are A. [...] and her daughter S. [...] (herewith in “S. [...]”)\(^5\).  The defendant is disabled, including on the alleged incident with her right foot in a half calf boot, as well as, her white BMW disabled and then inoperable.  The defendant never complained about any of the family members in [...]’ dwelling as she did not know anyone residing there and she did not reside at the family’s home.  [...] had an encounter --- \(^4\)  [...] Report does not capture [...] Sr. in their report; he enters in as witness and alibi at trial [1T39:23-24 – 11/29/2022], Burlington Township incident details does not capture defendant’s white BMW only a Blue Ford pick up truck at the time of the fighting incident with [...] \(^3\)
[brief] Muller Fuel Oil Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 95 N.J. Super. 564 (App. Div. 1967) ....................................................  58  Nationwide Mut. Fire. Ins. Co. v. Dillard House, 651 F. Supp.2d 1367 (N.D. Ga. 2009) .................................................. 42 NGM Ins. Co. v. Low Country Finish Carpentry, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200367 (D.S.C. Oct. 31, 2012)............................
[brief] *Miller v. Miller*, 160 N.J. 408, 419 (1999).  Fraud and unconscionability have been recognized as two separate and independent bases for setting aside property settlement agreements.  *Massar v. Massar*, 279 N.J. Super. 89, 93 (App.Div.1995).  If there are compelling circumstances, a judgment may be set aside based on a showing of inequity and unfairness under the catch-all section of R. 4:50-1(f).  *Rosen v. Rosen*, 225 N.J. Super. 33, 36 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649 (1988).  To determine whether compelling circumstances are present, the court must look to the totality of the facts and on a case-by-case basis to determine whether enforcement of the judgment would be unjust, oppressive or inequitable.
[brief] Appellant asserts, without addressing the specific propositions for which these Defendants cite to El-Sioufi and Spinks, that because those cases were decided before the Supreme Court decision in Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555(2010), the decisions should be disregarded by the Court.  (See Pb26; Pb35).  To be clear, Plaintiff cites to no decision overturning the holdings in El-Sioufi and Spinks.  Moreover, the Appellate Division has cited to El-Sioufi and Spinks as authority on these issues in cases decided after 2010, the year of the Roa decision.
[brief] [...] did not know which portions he wished to view, nor offer to have him come in and review it.  She had [...] extract only the two clips and told him she no longer needed the rest, aware [...] would reformat the drive, deleting its contents.  Paley extracted the clips\(^1\) and gave the drive to [...], who testified he conducted a “forensic wipe,” ostensibly overwriting all information and reformatting the drive so any data was erased and could no longer be retrieved.
[brief] Applying the express requirements of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(a)(1), it cannot reasonably be disputed that, [...], Board Certified in Internal Medicine and Hematology, is credentialed by [...] to administer Xarelto and other similar medications to patients to treat similar medical conditions as the Appellant’s condition at the time.  Furthermore, applying the express requirements of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(a)(2), [...] is Board Certified in Internal Medicine and is Board Certified and specializes in Hematology and Oncology.  [...] has devoted a majority of his time to the active clinical practice of Internal Medicine, the basis of the Appellant’s claims.  38a.
[brief] *State v. Murphy*, 238 N.J. Super. 546, 554 (App. Div. 1990).  The State must prove that articulable and reasonable suspicion existed by only a preponderance of the evidence, not some higher standard such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  *State v. Sugar*, 100 N.J. 214, 238-39 (1985); *State v. Slockbower*, 79 N.J. 1, 16 n. 1 (1979).
[brief] appeal it offers no argument to defend the motion court’s sua sponte finding that [...] was not in custody until late into the interrogation.  (Pb 4-5)  In fact, he was in custody the whole time.  The police themselves brought him to a small interrogation room in the prosecutor’s office, blocked his exit, seized his cell phone, kept him confined for over seven hours, aggressively interrogated him for two and a half hours, and objectively treated him as their prime suspect.  They confronted him with inconsistencies, demanded explanations, shouted and swore at him, slapped the table, pointed at him, fabricated evidence against him, ignored his pleas to “go home,” and threatened him and his family.  Just as in State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 271-72 (2015), the aggressive police questioning and stationhouse environment make clear that a similarly situated twenty-five-year-old\(^3\) would not have felt free to leave.
[brief] “The voluntariness determination weighs the coercive psychological pressures brought to bear on an individual to speak against his power to resist confessing. ”  *L.H.*, 239 N.J. at 27 (2019).  A confession is not voluntary if it is extracted by “threats or violence,” “obtained by any direct or implied promises,” or “the exertion of any improper influence. ”  *Brady v. United States*, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (citation omitted)).  This Court, our Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the United States have previously considered when an officer’s threatened course of conduct constitutes coercion.
[brief] [...]’s narrative report contained a certificate of permanency based on his review of the MRI studies.  Regrettably, the Trial Court, during the oral arguments on March 3, 2023, found that “the physician’s findings or notations, the Court finds is merely a parroting of the language of the statute. ”  Based on this erroneous interpretation, the Trial Court found that the Appellant-Plaintiff did “not sustain a verbal threshold, or plaintiff’s ability to vault the verbal threshold as established under the statute. ”  In denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the Trial Court once again concluded that the "Plaintiff had not provided evidence of a permanent injury through both objective and subjective evidence.  In fact, the court previously noted that the Plaintiff's medical expert, chiropractor, [...] [sic], provided a report which merely parroted the statutory requirements under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8A and memorized the subjective complaints of Plaintiff."  (Pa19).  The record below clearly demonstrates to the contrary, as the Appellant-Plaintiff “has sustained a significantly permanent injury from her accident of said date.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................3  STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................7  LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................14  I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................14  A.  Summary Disposition Standard..................................................15  B.  Declaratory Judgment Standard...............................................17  II.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT [...] HAS NO RIGHT TO ANY INTEREST IN THE PALM BEACH PROPERTY OWNED BY [...] OR [...] (DA274a-75a)
[brief] First, these documents only provide guidance on the type of traffic controls, such as signage, that might be implemented after a dangerous condition has been identified.  They do not provide any support or information that establishes the standard of care which requires construction inspectors to identify dangerous pre-existing road conditions.  Accordingly, they cannot support [...]’s (net) opinion that [...] had an affirmative duty to inspect the entirety of the road surface for pre-existing conditions.  Second, even if [...] had established the existence of a dangerous condition, he would still have needed objective support for his opinion that [...] had a duty to identify and remedy that condition.  Neither the MUTCD nor the Traffic Control Detail provide that support.  Indeed, Mr. [...] admitted during his deposition that the Traffic Control Detail was applicable only to contractors -- not engineers, let alone engineers engaged solely in construction inspection.  For this reason alone, the standards articulated in the Traffic Control Detail did not apply to [...].  Plaintiffs also allege that the MUTCD supports [...]’s opinions that “[t]here should have been appropriate advance warning signs installed for at least grooved pavement and bumps,” that “[m]otorcycle specific signs should have also been used,” and that the “contractor should have provided advance warning signs ahead of the hazard in accordance with the MUTCD. ” (Report at Pa22-23).  Plaintiffs are wrong.
[brief] Dennery, 131 N.J. at 641 (1993).  Further, if there was truly no nexus between Respondent’s Board membership and her Facebook account, as the Commission erroneously held, members of the [...] community would not have protested Respondent at meetings of the Board.  It is unmistakably clear from the Board minutes and news articles that documented these protests against the Board and Respondent in response to her Facebook posts, that the community outcry was a result of the clear connection between her Board membership and her Facebook posts.  (Ca075-076, Ca86, Ca098-099, Ca100-105).  In fact, the news articles in the record clearly identified [...] in her role as Board member and clearly showed that the public protested [...] in her role as Board member at meetings of the Board as a result of her Facebook posts.
[brief] Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, [...]  By: /s/ [...]  NICHOLAS J. LOIODICE  JOHN MIRANDA AND VICTOR MIRANDA  Plaintiffs/Appellant, vs. ALEXANDER J. RINALDI, AND SALNY, REDBORD AND RINALDI, COUNSELLORS AT LAW, Defendants/Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE
[brief] After defendant fled the scene and as he was traveling down Route 33, [...] noticed a police officer was behind them.  Her first thought was defendant was going to get arrested.  She called him a psycho and he told her to shut up.  Defendant then made a left turn into a gas station.  When the attendant came up to the car, defendant told him, “never mind. ”  After the police officer drove passed them, defendant drove to the other side of the gas station and exited.
[brief] The Board did not file a Notice of Appeal, nor did it cross-appeal the Judgment, as its November 8, 2023 Case Information Statement confirms.  [Pa157].  But now, it seeks a reversal.  The Court should not entertain this.  While a respondent may “argue . . . any alternative basis for partial or full affirmance of the trial court’s judgment,” *O'Brien (Newark) Cogeneration, Inc. v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am.*, 361 N.J. Super. 264, 271 (App. Div. 2003), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 452 (2004), the same is not true when seeking reversal.  Instead, a cross-appeal must be filed.  *State v. Elkwisni*, 190 N.J. 169, 175 (2007).  This rule is applied to land use boards.  *See Reich, supra*, 413 N.J. Super. at 499, n. 9.  The Court should not consider the basis for reversal set forth in the Board’s brief because it elected not to cross-appeal the Judgment.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] See 121 N.J. 537 (1990).  The clause is triggered when the insured has "intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance relating to the insurance."  Id.  For the insurer to void a policy because of a post loss misrepresentation, it must be "knowing and material."  Id at 540.  There has been no finding of either by the court, contrary to what is argued in [...]'s brief.  According to *Longobardi*, the lie must be willful.  Id at 540.  There has been no finding that Plaintiff willfully lied.  Additionally, forfeiture results only when the fact misrepresented is material.  Id at 540.  An insured's misstatement is material if when made a reasonable insurer would have considered the misrepresented fact relevant to its concerns and important in determining its course of action.  Id at 542.  There was no determination made by the court below on whether the concealed or misrepresented fact was knowing and material.  The motion should be denied.  Additionally the attached certification by offered by [...] by [...] makes no mention of the materiality of the alleged statements of the Plaintiff.
[brief] ”  Da38.  In fact, as [...], itself, accurately acknowledged in its Complaint in this action, [...]’s First Amended Complaint against [...] alleged, at ¶20, that he had “suffered and continues to suffer serious, adverse health consequences caused by his ongoing, continuous injurious exposure \(^6\) See, e.g., “Trichothecene Mycotoxins,” a treatise by the Toxinology \([\text{sic}]\) Division of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, introduced as Trial Exhibit 67 (Da2522) (the “Army Treatise”).
[directive] It is necessary that a Juvenile Admissions Log (see attached) be maintained.  The comments of various law enforcement agencies and personnel within the State were solicited during the past year while this Log was being developed.  If used properly, the Log will enable your staff to capture and organize pertinent information on the handling of juveniles.  Data on all juveniles “in custody” within the facility -delinquent as well as non-delinquent youth, held securely or not - must be entered into the Log.  This log may be handwritten or maintained electronically.  It also may be modified to suit the needs of your department as long as the essential documentation remains.  Semi-annually, each Police Chief will be mailed a Survey requesting information on juveniles handled within your facility.  Each Survey will cover a time span of six months.  A well maintained Log will allow you or your staff to answer the Survey questions quickly and accurately.  The Survey, not the Log, should then be faxed or mailed back to the Compliance Monitor of the [...] in a timely manner.  Staff from the Monitoring Unit will visit facilities periodically in order to verify that proper documentation procedures are in place and that records are accurate.  The [...] has undertaken a more rigorous approach to monitoring municipal lockups within the last year.  You may have noticed more phone inquiries, more frequent mailings and Surveys, and your facility may have received an actual site visit from [...] staff.  You will receive another Survey, covering the six month period ending October 31, 2000, during the first week of November.  In addition to the routine questions regarding Separation and Jail Removal (six hour rule), this Survey will also seek data related to the DSO requirement.
[brief] *Id.* at 1854 (quoting *Mathis v. United States*, 579 U.S. 500, 511-12 (2016)).  The Court explained that to decide whether defendant [...]’s prior convictions satisfied the different occasions provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) required the sentencing court “to do more than identify his previous convictions and the legal elements required to sustain them.
[brief] The Subscription and Purchase Agreement (“SPA”) at issue here, included Section 13, titled “ARBITRATION” in bold font and capital letters (the “Arbitration Provision”), which states the following:  **ARBITRATION:**  Buyer, on behalf of Buyer and all permanent residents of the Unit, including minor children, hereby agree that any and all disputes with Seller, Seller's parent company or their subsidiaries or affiliates arising out of the Unit, this Agreement, the Unit warranty, any other agreements, communications or dealings involving Buyer, or the construction or condition of the Unit including, but not limited to, disputes concerning breach of contract, express and implied warranties, personal injuries and/or illness, mold-related claims, representations and/or omissions by Seller, on-site and off-site conditions and all other torts and statutory causes of action (“Claims”) shall be resolved by binding arbitration during the warranty period in accordance with the rules and procedures of [...] or its successor or an equivalent organization selected by Seller.  If [...] is unable to arbitrate a particular claim, then that claim shall be resolved by binding arbitration pursuant to the Construction Rules of Arbitration of the [...] or its successor or an equivalent organization selected by Seller.  In addition, Buyer agrees that Buyer may not initiate any arbitration proceeding for any Claim(s) unless and until Buyer has first given Seller specific written notice of each claim (at [...], Attn: Warranty Dispute Resolution) and given Seller a reasonable opportunity after such notice to cure any default, including the repair of the Unit, in accordance with the Unit warranty.  The provisions of this section shall be governed by the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § §1, et seq. and shall survive settlement.
[brief] Most notably, it failed to even mention the approximately one hundred affidavits submitted that support the fact that these postcards were never received by [...] or other members of the pension system.  Furthermore, the Board’s decision inflicts obvious and unnecessary harm upon [...] and fails to advance the legislative purpose of the Ricci Act.  The legislative purpose of the Ricci Act was to provide first responders with the ability to alter their retirement benefits if they have fallen ill as a result of their honorable and heroic service at the largest terrorist attack this country has ever seen, not to unnecessarily and arbitrarily deny sick retired troopers accidental disability benefits.
[brief] [...] directly addressed this caselaw, stating:  It is uncontested that [...] is entitled to her personal views on any topic, however, a prominent disclaimer (caps/bold), such as “THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ARE MADE IN MY CAPACITY AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN, AND NOT IN MY CAPACITY AS A BOARD MEMBER.  THESE STATEMENTS ARE ALSO NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE BOARD OR ITS INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS, AND SOLELY REPRESENT MY OWN PERSONAL OPINIONS,” may avoid the appearance – actual or perceived– that the statements contained in respondent’s social media posts were made in her capacity as a Board member.
[directive] Civil Penalties  The Prosecutor shall be mindful that he or she represents the State of New Jersey in shoplifting cases.  The Prosecutor shall not negotiate for, request or require a defendant to pay civil penalties for shoplifting or theft of food or drink pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:61C-1.1  However, this shall not preclude a prosecutor from requesting that restitution be ordered under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3 or agreeing that a plea shall not be evidential in any civil proceeding pursuant to R. 3:9-2.  att. P.L. 2000, Ch. 16 c. [...], Director, Division of Criminal Justice Chief of Staff
[brief] By way of passing the promotional exam for Fire Captain, Appellant was placed on eligible list [...], which had an expiration date of January 16, 2023.  (Pa. 5).  Per Civil Service Regulations, this expiration date could only be extended if “genuine vacancies” existed at the time of the proposed extension.  N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b).  On December 28, 2022, the City received a Certification of eligible firefighters for promotion to Captain from the Civil Service Commission, [...].  (Pa. 72).  That Certification had a disposition (expiration) date of March 28, 2023, which was over two (2) months passed the expiration date of Appellant’s eligibility for promotion under list [...].  (Id.)  On February 2, 2022, the [...] (“[...]”) advised the City by way of a letter that since the Certification had been issued within three (3) months of the expiration of the eligibility list, the City would need to verify that “genuine vacancies” for Fire Captains existed in the [...] as of the expiration date of the eligibility list, January 16, 2023, in order to determine whether the expiration date of Appellant’s eligibility list should be extended.  (Pa. 66).  Since Appellant’s promotion eligibility expired before the Certification expiration date, the eligibility could only be extended if there was a “genuine vacancy” for a Fire Captain within --- 1 Respondent has combined the Factual and Procedural History of this matter for the purposes of consistency and the Court’s ease of reference, as there is intersection between the two sections.
[brief] Mt. Laurel ORDER THIS MATTER having been Opened to the court by the [...] and by the [...] on notice to all interested parties as identified by the Supreme Court in its opinion In the Matter of the Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5:97 by the New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing, 221 NJ. 1 (2015), and the court having considered the papers submitted and the arguments of counsel, on October 15, 2015, and the Court having determined that the [...] and the Planning Board have demonstrated through prima facie documentation their good faith efforts to comply with its fair share obligation and for good cause It is on this 20 day of Nov., 2015, ORDERED that the Court’s Order of October 21, 2015 be and hereby is amended as having been entered in error, and it is further ORDERED that the [...] and the Planning Board are granted temporary immunity from exclusionary zoning suits, sometimes known as builder’s remedy actions, for a period of ending March 15, 2016; and it is FURTHER ORDERED as follows:
[directive] With a bifurcated investigation, the internal affairs investigator will not be forced to juggle the roles of criminal and administrative investigator during an internal affairs investigation.  This is particularly important during the subject officer interview for three reasons.  First, the internal affairs investigator will not be forced to decide whether and when to issue a Miranda or a Garrity warning during the interview.  In a bifurcated investigation, the criminal investigator will be limited to issuing a Miranda warning while the administrative investigator will be limited to issuing a Garrity warning.  Second, by assigning distinct roles to each investigator, there will be no confusion on the part of the subject officer as to the particular interview’s purpose.  Third, because a bifurcated investigation permits both the criminal and administrative investigations to take place simultaneously, the administrative investigator can be confident that, once the criminal investigation has been completed, the administrative investigation will also be substantially complete.  As a result, the subject officer's agency will have no difficulty complying with the 45-day rule under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147.  8.1.6