ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] APPENDIX  A Model Property & Evidence Policy 1.0  APPLICATION  1.1  The property and evidence procedures hereafter described shall be followed for all recovered, stolen, found or confiscated property coming into the possession of any member of this department.  2.0  PROPERTY MARKING AND PACKAGING  2.1  The New Jersey State Police Special and Technical Services Section Evidence Manual will be used as a guide in the marking and packaging of property.  2.2  Each item will be properly marked with the date and the officer's initials, if possible, then tagged and/or placed in appropriate size envelopes or bags which are provided.
[brief] On May 20, 2013, the trial court appointed Judge [...] (ret.) to serve as the Special Allocation Master (“SAM”) to preside over an evidentiary hearing on the allocation of damages and prepare and submit to the court a written RAR.⁴ (Pa0144).  During the allocation phase, the parties engaged in further extensive discovery, after which the SAM held evidentiary hearings on the allocation of the covered damages identified in the Jan. 31, 2011, Opinion and Order.  (Pa0144-45).  The allocation hearing consisted of seven days of testimony and presentations that took place in the Spring of 2015.  (Id).  During the hearing, five witnesses, both fact and expert, testified live and the testimony of several other fact witnesses was presented by way of deposition.  (Pa0145).  As [...] noted in his RAR, the written material submitted to and reviewed by the SAM, ⁴  The SAM also had authority to make a Report and Recommendation to the court on any dispositive motions relating to allocation issues.  No such motions were filed.  “including motions, exhibits and transcripts, encompass four linear feet of material. ”  (Id).
[brief] See e.g. *Gamble v. Connolly*, 399 N.J. Super. 130, 144 (Law Div. 2007) (“Here the contract in question transgresses a statute, N.J.S.A. § 46:8-10, and is, therefore, disruptive of public policy, at odds with the public interest and deleterious to the common good. ”) drafted the Wholesaler Agreement, would have terminated its relationship with Appellants if Appellants did not agree to the terms—a risk, as outlined in the certifications of [...] (“[...]”) in support of Appellants’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, which would have irreparably harmed Appellants.  (Pa120-122; Pa131).  Appellants are multi-generational family-run businesses that have loyally supported the [...] brand for over 45 years.  As a long-standing wholesaler of [...] products, Appellants are closely associated with the [...] brand, and the sudden loss of that brand if Appellants refused the proposed choice-of-law provision or arbitration clause “inevitably creates irreparable damages to the good will of the distributor. ”
[brief] The question to be answered by the court was not whether “any” prejudicial effect of the conviction outweighed the probative value of the conviction.  The correct legal standard that the court was required the court to determine whether evidence of the conviction created a risk of undue prejudice to [...] that substantially outweighed the probative value of the conviction.  N.J.R.E. 609(a); N.J.R.E. 403.
[brief] Without citation to the record, Defendants contend the [...] never denied that they committed the crimes charged by [...] and the Defendants:  Plaintiffs do not, and cannot, deny that the [...] fence in front of the Westerhold property was broken through, nor that they, or members of their household, were responsible for breaking through the fence and/or for crossing the [...] property – against [...]’s wishes – to reach the beach.  [Drb6].  This is patently untrue.  [...] testified that no one from his family broke the [...] fence, explaining he reached an agreement with [...] not to touch the [...] fence in order to resolve the notice of violation that the [...] asked \(^2\)
[directive] 7  Superior Court of New Jersey  Instructions for Completing Application to Suspend Employment/Occupational Disabilities Related to Criminal Convictions  1.  Attorneys, on behalf of their clients, must file all such applications on notice to the County Prosecutor or the Attorney’s General Office in eCourts in the county where the person is being sentenced or was sentenced.  Self-represented litigants must file all such applications on notice to the County Prosecutor or the Attorney’s General Office in the Judiciary Electronic Document Submission (JEDS) system.  JEDS can be accessed using the link provided: https://www.njcourts.gov/self- help/jeds.  2.  Provide a copy to the law enforcement agency that prosecuted your case (County Prosecutor or Attorney General's Office).  3.  If you are seeking suspension of a disability as a result of a conviction for which you have yet to be sentenced, please submit this application prior to your sentence date in order to reduce any delay in processing.  If you have any questions regarding this application please contact the Criminal Division.  A directory for the Criminal Division can be found at www.njcourts.gov/public/directories.html.  Revised: 03/2024, CN: XXXXX Attachment
[brief] Indeed, this remedy was also employed in the declaratory judgment litigation involving the [...].  Therein, the court’s appointment of special hearing officers was preceded by the reported opinion captioned I/M/O Tp. of South Brunswick, 448 N.J. Super. at 441, 467 (Law Div. 2016).  In that opinion, the court summarized its rulings finding that the [...] had declined to meet its Mount Laurel obligations in good faith, which resulted in the court terminating the Township’s immunity and authorizing builder’s remedy claims.
[brief] ### TABLE OF CITATIONS | Case Name | Citation | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Bouton v. BMW of North America | 29 F. 3d. 103 (3rd Cir. 1994) | 6 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 9 | | CWA v. Retarded Citizens | 250 N.J. Super. 403 (Ch. Div. 1991) | 12 | | Leahey v. Singer Sewing Co. | 302 N.J. Super. 68 (App. Div. 2005) | 1, 4 | | Mancini v. Twp. of Teaneck | 349 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div. 2002), aff’d as modified, 179 N.J. 425 (2004) | 1, 4, 5 | | Marzano v. Computer Science Corp., Inc.  | 91 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 1996) | 9 | | Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Mo. | 144 S. Ct. 967 (2024) | 1, 4 | | Nini v. Mercer County Community College | 202 N.J. 98 (2010) | 9 | | Pukowsky v. Caruso | 312 N.J. Super. 171 (App. Div. 1998) | 10 | | Velez v. City of Jersey City | 358 N.J. Super. 224 (App. Div. 2003) | 9 | | Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods | 290 N.J. Super. 252 (App. Div. 1996) | 10, 14 | | Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc. | 182 N.J. 436 (2005) | 3, 15 |
[brief] Assuming, for purposes of this motion, that the Department did engage in *de facto* rulemaking through the issuance of the Bulletin and this Court remands the matter back to the Department to proceed under the APA’s rulemaking process, the Department would then be required to publish a proposed rule and provide 30 days’ notice, comment opportunity, and a public hearing.  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a)(1).  Interested parties would receive a “reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, comments, or arguments, orally or in writing,” and a public hearing would be held.  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a)(3).  During that process, [...], [...], or any other reciprocal exchange or AIF in the state could submit documents in opposition to the Department’s proposed rule, or otherwise challenge the Department’s rulemaking authority.  These submissions would then appropriately become part of the record on any subsequent appeal.  At present, however, there was no such proceeding below in which an appropriate record could have been developed.  Whether right or wrong, the Department circumvented the notice-and-comment process altogether, resulting in a severely limited record comprised of: (1) documents concerning acquisitions involving reciprocal exchanges and their AIFs (*including* [...]), which the Department alleges prove its course-of-conduct, and (2) correspondence between the Department and [...].
[brief] 11  Cotler v. Township of Pilesgrove, 393 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 2007).  .................................  30, 31 County of Ocean v. Zekaria Realty, Inc., 271 N.J. Super. 280 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1000 (1994).  .........................  11  Damurjian v. Board of Adjustment of Colts Neck, 299 N.J. Super. 84 (App. Div. 1997).  .................................  11 DiCristofaro v. Laurel Grove Memorial Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div. 1957).  .................................  38  DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 (2005).  ......................................................  24 Dolente v. Borough of Pine Hill, 313 N.J. Super. 410 (App. Div. 1998).  .................................  12, 16 Frye v. Harrison Township, No. GLO-2061-11 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 3, 2012).  ...........  33  Frugis v. Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250 (2003).  ......................................................  25  Gentless v. Borough of Stratford, No. CAM-L-3344-17 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. June 5, 2018, aff’d, 2019 WL 2563807 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 21, 2019).  ............................................. 33, 34  Gregory v. Borough of Avalon, 391 N.J. Super. 181 (App. Div. 2007).  ................................. 12, 15 Guernsey v. Allan, 63 N.J. Super. 270 (App. Div. 1960)..........................
[brief] Because defendant did not object to the admission of the now-complained of portions of his interview on any of the grounds now raised or request a curative instruction, the plain error standard of review applies.  State v. Johnson, 421 N.J. Super. 511, 521 (App. Div. 2011).  Under the plain-error standard, a conviction will not be reversed unless "the error was 'clearly capable of producing an unjust result.'"  Ibid.  (quoting R. 2:10-2).  "That determination must be made in the context of the entire record."  State v. Sowell, 213 N.J. 89, 108 (2013).  "The absence of an objection suggests that trial counsel perceived no error or prejudice, and, in any event, prevents the trial judge from remedying any possible confusion in a timely manner."  State v. Green, 318 N.J. Super. 361, 373 (App. Div. 1999), aff'd o.b., 163 N.J. 140 (2000); see also State v. Ross, 229 N.J. 389, 415 (2017) (viewing defense "counsel's failure to object as an indication that counsel perceived no prejudice").
[brief] Again these facts are distinguishable.  The [...] did not submit any opposition to the facts as alleged by [...] and [...] did not know nor was he advised that he was signing a contract or that it was necessary to open an account.  In *Lojewski v. Group Solar*, 2023 W.L. 5301423 (SDNY 2023) (Vol. II, Pa 214) Plaintiff financed installation of solar panels in her home, knew that she had to sign a contract and signed a blank iPad although she didn’t know the terms of the agreement which included an arbitration provision.  The court stated Plaintiff had constructive notice of the arbitration clause since she knew she was financing the purchase of the solar panels and had to sign a contract before installation.  Given the transactional context of the parties dealings, a reasonable person in her position would presume that this third step in the process clearly contemplated some sort of continuing relationship between the parties that would require some terms and conditions.  A reasonable person would understand that her signature on the iPad constituted assent to these terms and conditions even if she didn’t read them.  The economic setting and factual circumstances of *Lojewski* differ from the transaction between [...] and [...].  There are no facts to support an inference that [...] knew or contemplated he was entering into a contract when he signed the iPad and *Lojewski* and *Bayron - Pay* concerned ordinary commercial purchase transactions.
[brief] Around November 2016, a new Captain in OPS asked her if she was interested in going to the Academy; she told him she was there six and a half years and that she earned the position of Lieutenant.  He told her he would investigate and get back to her (1T; 74:9).  That was Captain [...] (1T; 75:1).  The Plaintiff explained the promotion and the use of points (1T; 76:4).  On November 3, 2016, Plaintiff was notified that she was going to the Academy, and she spoke to the Captain at the Academy who knew nothing about her coming there (1T; 77:16).  Plaintiff asked to have a meeting with Major [...] in reference to her career and the transfer and she was denied (1T; 77:24).  Plaintiff was transferred to the Academy because of her gender (1T; 78:4).  Being transferred and not being allowed to speak to the Major was “retaliation to my OPS case” (1T; 78:21).  Based upon her experience in OPS with almost seven years, she was qualified to say, “Nothing is confidential in the State Police” (1T; 79:19).
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the Superior Court’s dismissal of Appellant’s claim on the merits was proper and should be affirmed by this Court.  /s/ [...]  [...], Esq. [...], Esq.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  [...], individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...], and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, Defendants-Respondents.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION, MORRIS COUNTY  Trial Court  Docket No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. (ret. t/a on recall)  REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT (SUBMITTED FEBRUARY 6, 2025)
[brief] POINT III:  ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO PAY DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL FEES IS MANIFESTLY UNJUST (P-452).  Respectfully, the lower court abused its discretion when it denied Plaintiff’s application for counsel fees and granted Defendant’s application for same, ordering Plaintiff to pay $2,372.50 in counsel fees in addition to denying Plaintiff hundreds of thousands of dollars that she alone has spent on her children.
[directive] This policy, the procedures set forth in the policy and the legal citations contained in the text are intended for implementation by all State, county and municipal law enforcement agencies.  As made clear in AG Directive 2019-5 (issued concurrently with the publication of this December 2019 version of this policy), all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey are directed to implement and comply with this policy, and to take any additional measures necessary to update their guidelines consistent with this policy, as required by N.J.S.A 40A:14-181.  1.0.14  Law enforcement agencies that fail to comply with the policies and procedures contained within this document may be subject to the same sanctions arising from any other violation of an AG Directive, including supersession of an agency’s law enforcement functions by the Attorney General.
[brief] \textit{Varacallo v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co.}, 332 N.J. Super. 31, 45 (App. Div. 2000).  \textsuperscript{144}  \textit{Laufer v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in N.Y.}, 385 N.J. Super. 172, 186 (App. Div. 2006).  \textit{Muise v. GPU, Inc.}, 391 N.J. Super. 90 (App. Div. 2007)(commonality is not affected by the obligation of each class member to prove individual damages).
[brief] ” (5T103:20-104:9).  The type of reconstruction [...] performed is well within the expertise of an engineer and human factors expert, such as [...], and the plaintiff has cited to no authority holding otherwise.  Moreover, the plaintiff had the opportunity to undermine [...]’s qualifications, methodology and conclusions on cross-examination and during closing arguments.  It was ultimately for the jury to assess the qualifications and credibility of [...] and the weight to be given to his testimony, as the jury was so charged before deliberations.  (7T94:14-20).  In sum, [...] had the expertise to render his testimony.  B.
[directive] 2.  Implementing standardized forms in the application process that reduce subjective responses that may impact the hiring of underrepresented groups, and training the recruiting and hiring team on explicit and implicit bias.  3.  Instituting clear criteria for hiring and an oversight process for reviewing hiring decisions.  With respect to hiring, consider making publicly available information on examples of background-check issues that can disqualify applicants.  4.  Assessing whether particular hiring eligibility requirements adversely affect any underrepresented group and, if so, reassessing whether the requirement is essential.  If the requirement is deemed essential, consider developing appropriate supportive initiatives or alternative paths, such as remedial training or deferral options.
[brief] [...] testified at deposition that vagrants frequented the Broad Street Station daily between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and noon because there was no police presence at that time.  (55a).  Security expert [...] opined that [...] allowing the station itself to deteriorate with litter and graffiti was negligence and contributed to the criminal activities at the station.  An action as simple as keeping the premises clean can deter criminals.  Promoting a positive image and routinely maintaining the built environment ensures that the physical environment continues to function effectively and transmits positive signals to all users.  The significance of the physical condition and image of the built environment and the effect this may have on crime and the fear of crime has been acknowledged for decades by scholars, and an extensive body of research exists.  In sum, criminological research has shown that a poorly maintained urban space and visible signs of disorder – loitering, litter, graffiti, etc. – can attract crime and deter use by legitimate users.  A dirty and unkempt space can give criminals the idea that here is a space where they can get away with their illegal behaviors.  (147a).  Dr. Gotham also notes that [...] does not follow the [...] recommendations and/or guidelines.  “To the extent that the [...] did not follow [...] standards, then the defendant’s conduct fell below the standard of care. ”  (162a).  I understand that the [...] Police Department has no policies, training materials, rules, or any other documents regarding police procedures and/or security specific to the Newark Broad Street Station.
[brief] *(Da268, [...] Billing; Da55, [...] Answers to Interrogatories, pars. 23,26,27,28).*  [...] had a chain link fence installed around this disputed lot which is Lot 20 as well as Lot 22 and when the enclosed lot is not being used for church events, the fence is padlocked by [...].  *(Da267, Fence enclosing lot 20 and lot 22)*  [...] placed a sign on the chain link fence in an area above where the padlock is located.  The sign reads private property, keep out with notice that there is camera monitoring of the lot.  *(Da267)*  [...]’s use of the disputed lot has been open, notorious, continuous and exclusive and the church has satisfied the factor of hostility as [...] has engaged in use of the lot in an open manner and acted just as the owner of the land would act.
[brief] “This deference comes from the understanding that a state agency brings experience and specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating a legislative enactment within its field of expertise. ”  *Id.*  *[E. Bay Drywall, LLC v. Dep’t of Lab. & Workforce Dev.,* 251 N.J. 477, 493 (2022) (some internal citations omitted) (emphasis added)).  This heightened standard of review is particularly applicable here.  The [...] maintains sole jurisdiction to adjudicate matters arising under the School Ethics Act, and adjudication of such disputes is one of its sole statutory responsibilities.
[brief] \(^1\)  Relying upon the new principle of law set forth in *Tyler* as well as Article I, paragraph 20 of the New Jersey Constitution,\(^2\) the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey in *Roberto* then held that the Tax Sale Law, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:5-1 et seq.  (“TSL”), which permits a municipality or a third-party purchaser of a tax sale certificate to retain a property owner’s equity above the tax lien amount, is unconstitutional as the process results in a prohibited taking of a property owner’s equity in a property.  477 N.J. Super. at 366.  Its determination that the rule of law applies to third-party purchasers of a tax sale certificate in New Jersey and that “the TSL statutory framework that provides for the forfeiture of a property owner's equity after final judgment violates the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause in accordance with the decision in *Tyler*” *id.*, as well as, the New Jersey Constitution, persuades this court to conclude that under *Tyler* and *Roberto*, debtors in bankruptcy can seek to set aside the effects of a final judgment in foreclosure under the takings theory and address the claims related thereto in their bankruptcy cases.  Nevertheless, it is important to note that the *Roberto* court ruled that its new principle of law is limited, and it is only “accorded pipeline retroactivity to pending tax sale foreclosures involving a property owner's surplus equity. ”  477 N.J. Super. at 366.  Thus, the issue to be addressed by the court today is whether the Debtor’s cases, state court and/or current bankruptcy case, satisfy the “pipeline” requirement (i.e., are they in the pipeline) to afford the Debtor with the relief he seeks.
[brief] *Id.* at 52 and n.1.  The Court concluded that damages for bodily injury had to be covered for the vicariously liable employer in accordance with N.J.S.A. 34:15-72 and the specific coverage terms of the insurance policy at issue.  *Id.* at 51-52.  In reaching its conclusions, the Court in Schmidt quoted a decision of the California Supreme Court to describe employers liability policies as “gap-filler[s] providing protection to the employer in those situations where the employee has a right to bring a tort action despite provisions of the workers’ compensation statute. ”  *Id.* at 49 (quoting Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 41 Cal. 3d 903, 718 P.2d 920, 927 (1986)).  The California decision in Producers Dairy, however, does not support the proposition that employers liability insurance policies must respond with coverage for claims arising from an employer’s own intentional wrongful conduct.
[brief] In a motion to alter or amend the final judgment, a party must show “(1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. ”  Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F. 3d 666, 669 (3d Cir 2010)(per curiam).  In order for the relief to be granted on the grounds of newly discovered evidence, the new evidence must (1) be material to the issue and not merely cumulative or impeaching, (2) have been discovered since the trial and must be such as by the exercise of due diligence could not have been discoverable prior to the expiration of the time for moving for a new trial; (3) be of such nature as to have been likely to have changed the result if a new trial had been granted.  Quick Chek Food Stores v. Springfield Tp., 83 N.J. 438 (1980).  Here, the trial court abused its clear and unambiguous discretion to reconsider, amend, alter and vacate its four April 27, 2023 post-remand pre-answer pre-discovery Rule 4:6-2 (a) lack of standing dismissal with prejudice orders and April 27, 2023 disqualifying conflict of interest cross-motion denial on mootness grounds order.