ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On April 22, 2019, Plaintiff/Appellant, [...]  ("[...]") filed a Three Count Complaint against Defendant/Respondent, [...] ("[...]") seeking a Declaratory Judgment and Quieting Title in their favor to the exclusion of Defendant [...] in all of the subject property (Lot 3 and/or Lot 3.01 as shown on Pa19) except for the limited portion of Lot: 3 which [...] took title to by virtue of an October 23, 1939 Final Judgment in Tax Foreclosure (Pa10, 203).  [...] also sought a declaration that [...] illegally collected rent payments as they did not own any portion of Lot: 3.01 (the property that was the subject of leases) as well as Judgment against [...] for the entirety of all rent payments paid to date (with prejudgment interest) (Pa13).  [...] alternatively sought damages for any costs that may be incurred by [...] if they ultimately have to move any of the substantial improvements made on the subject property rented (Pa14).  [...] filed an Answer, Separates Defenses and Third-Party Complaint against the long defunct [...] Heights Company on July 8, 2019 (Pa22).  [...] asserted ownership of the Subject Property from [...] Heights Company by adverse possession and seeking to quiet title.  A Case Management Order was filed on August 21, 2019 (Pa41).  The Borough filed Request to Enter Default against Third Party Defendant, [...] Heights Company on October 17, 2019 (Pa43).  An Amended Case Management Order was filed on April 3, 2020 (Pa71).  Plaintiff filed a Notice of Motion in Limine to bar the defense expert report of [...] on April 6, 2020 (Pa77).  The Honorable [...], P.J.Ch. heard oral argument on May 8, 2020, and entered an Order Denying the Motion on May 11, 2020 (Pa131).  A Consent Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice was executed by [...] on May 21, 2020, while the parties attempted settlement (Pa73).
[brief] In White v. [...], 245 N.J.Super. 606 (Law Div. 1990), the plaintiff, an employee of [...]  (“[...]”), was injured while working on the premises of defendant [...] (“[...]”).  Id. at 608.  In the governing contract, [...] agreed to indemnify [...].  The plaintiff sued only [...], alleging negligence, and [...] filed a third-party complaint against [...] for defense and indemnification.  Id. at 609.  [...] moved for summary judgment to dismiss [...]'s third-party complaint and the Law Division judge denied that motion.
[brief] Appellant, [...] applied to the [...] ("The Board"), for a density variance, lot consolidation, preliminary and major site plan approval along with variance and design exception relief to construct seven new apartment buildings, an addition to one of the existing buildings and new parking and driveways at the site located in the EMF-18/MF-8 Zones and designated as [...] on the Official Tax Map of the Township of [...], commonly known as between [...] and [...], [...] (the "Property" or "Site").  (Pa 017)  The application required the grant of ten variances:  1.  A Density Variance for **20 units per acre** (366 Units total) where the maximum permitted density is **18 units per acre** (319 units total).  2.  A bulk variance for a **9.6’ buffer area width**, whereas a minimum buffer width shall be **20’ permitted**, pursuant to Section 348-8.4A (1) of the Township Land Development Ordinance (the “Ordinance”).  3.  A Variance for **noncompliance** to **Section 348-8.4A(4)** of the Ordinance which states No structure, activity, storage of materials or parking of vehicles shall be permitted within the buffer area, except that where permitted by the board of jurisdiction the **buffer area** may be broken for vehicular or pedestrian access and appropriate directional and safety signs provided; 4.  A bulk variance for **26’ between buildings with windows**, whereas, **a minimum of 60’** is required, pursuant to Section 348-8.18C (3) of the Ordinance.  5.  A bulk variance for a **principal building length of 256’**, whereas, a maximum length for a principal building of **175’ is required**, pursuant to Section 348-8.18E of the Ordinance.  6.  A bulk variance for a **multifamily dwelling setback from accessory drive and internal roadways of 25.9’**, whereas, a **minimum of 35’ is required**, pursuant to Section 348-8.18G of the Ordinance.  7.  A bulk variance for a **principal building setback from parking area of 10’**, whereas, a **minimum of 20’ is required**, pursuant to Section 348-8.18H of the Ordinance.  8.  A bulk variance to Section 348-8.18M of the Ordinance stating a “Building must have **no more than two dwelling units in a line without setbacks and/or breaks in building elevation of at least five feet**”, whereas **none** are provided.  9.  A bulk **variance** to Section 348-8.20I (1) of the Ordinance stating, “Parking not permitted in **front yard setback** in residential zones for other than single and two family uses,” whereas, on this application parking is proposed in the front yard for multifamily uses.  10.  A bulk variance for **573** on-site parking spaces, whereas, the minimum required on-site parking spaces is **671**, pursuant to Section 348-8.20O (15) of the Ordinance; (Pa017-Pa018)  The applicant also requested several design exceptions:
[brief] (Da138; Da140).  On December 16, 2016, [...], of the [...], processed the letter for prints.  (Da141).  [...] reported that he found five latent prints, which were photographed and marked as L1 to L5.  (Da141 to 142).  On December 21, 2016, [...] and [...] collected the prints of anyone in the judge’s chambers who might have touched the letter.  (Da144).  Those individuals included: the judge, the judge’s secretary, [...], and [...]  (Da144).  After comparing their prints to the latent prints processed from the letter, [...] concluded that prints L1, L3, and L5 did not contain sufficient ridge characteristics for comparison, and [...] was identified as the source of L2.  (Da144).  The detective’s findings as to L4 were inconclusive – the prints of all individuals were excluded except for the right pinky of [...], which did not have value for AFIS.  (Da144 to 146).  Subsequent DNA and serological analysis were conducted on the envelope, but no evidence of human saliva was detected on the samples retrieved from three areas of the envelope flap.  (Da148 to 152).  After considering defendant’s argument on direct appeal, the Appellate Division concluded that “[p]resented with only an unreliable and anonymous letter, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to exercise the very extraordinary remedy of recalling the jury.
[brief] As to [...], the underlying complaint alleged that [...] “engaged in a course of alarming conduct with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy, by repeatedly approaching [...] in an angry fashion on 5 occasions in a single day, screaming at him, insulting him, using foul language and demeaning him personally.  On one of these occasions, he put his face within 12 inches of [...]’s face, pinning him up against a truck, until he was rescued by a neighbor. ” (Pa190, ¶23).  As to [...], the underlying complaint alleged that [...] “engaged in a course of alarming conduct by communicating with her in coarse language, and scaring and intimidating her in her office, by staring at her in an angry fashion, leaning over her desk so as to put his face closer to hers and staring, then standing up and blocking her from exiting, and refusing to leave when she demanded that he do so.  The conduct was so alarming that [...] had to threaten to call the police, on at least 3 occasions. ” (Pa190, ¶24).  As to plaintiffs [...], [...] and [...], the underlying complaint alleged that [...] “engaged in a course of alarming conduct by disrupting the Annual Meeting of the Association, creating a disturbance in front of the Association membership, and having to be arrested in their presence, in the front row of the room, and in proximity to others.  Defendant further engaged in a course of alarming conduct when, immediately after being released from his arrest, returned to the Clubhouse using course [sic] language and threatened Hilary [...], Nannette [...], and Valerie [...], such that they had to be escorted home by the Police. ” (Pa190, ¶25).  The underlying lawsuit sought certain injunctive relief, compensatory damages and punitive damages (Pa183-Pa193).
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF CONTENTS  ...........................................  I  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................ ii INTRODUCTION .................................................. 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................... 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................... 7 PLAINTIFFS' LONG-RUNNING INVESTMENT AND EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH SREC TRADING ENTERPRISE IN NEW JERSEY ......... 9 THE NON-DISCLOSURE AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS AND CEP-DEFENDANTS .................. 19 THE CONFIDENTIALITY COVENANT IN THE LAND-LEASE ............ 21 PROCEDURAL HISTORY ......................................... 24 QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................ 27 ARGUMENT ...................................................... 28 I BECAUSE APPELLANTS' BUNDLE OF SOLAR RIGHTS, SOLD IN PERPETUITY BY FIBERVILLE ESTATES AND ASSIGNED TO, AND OWNED SOLELY BY, APPELLANTS, WAS FRAUDULENTLY "RE-SOLD" BY FIBERVILLE, AND FRAUDULENTLY "BOUGHT" BY CEP DEFENDANTS, THE ORDERS DISMISSING THESE DEFENDANTS BELOW WERE GRAVELY ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW [Pa3088, Pa2501]
[brief] Warrantless searches are permissible if the State can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the search was “justified by one of the ‘few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions’ to the warrant requirement. ”  *State v. Witt*, 223 N.J. 409, 422 (2015) (quoting *State v. Frankel*, 179 N.J. 586, 597-98 (2004)); *State v. Elders*, 192 N.J. 224, 254 (2007).  Another exception to the search warrant requirement, the automobile exception, allows police officers to search a motor vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of an offense.
[brief] Particularly with respect to the ordinary elements of a crime -- like the “benefit” element of official misconduct -- Simon makes it clear that it is reversible error to sever individual elements of that crime into “Yes/No” questions to be answered by the jury.  79 N.J. at 199-204; see also State v. McAllister, 211 N.J. Super. 355, 363 (App. Div. 1986).  There was simply no justification for so directly violating Simon, and then doing so without assigning a burden of proof to the “Yes/No” questions that were asked, and without telling the jury that a reasonable doubt on those questions should lead to a “No” answer.  Id. at 291.  “[T]here is simply no substitute for a jury verdict. ”  Id.; see also State v. Bailey, 231 N.J. 474, 489 (2018) (conviction reversed when jury instruction failed to define an element properly and thus “the jury could not have made a finding on that issue”).  The Sixth Amendment and the state constitution guarantee no less than a proper jury verdict on every element of the crime, even if an element is uncontested or conceded, and without a proper explanation of that element, with a proper explanation of the burden of proof, the verdict is not valid.  *Vick*, 117 N.J. at 291; *Bailey*, 231 N.J. at 489.  Thus, even where there has been no objection lodged by trial counsel, a failure of proper instruction on such a fundamental matter will necessarily be deemed plain error worthy of reversal.  *State v. Jordan*, 147 N.J. 409, 422-423 (1997), citing *Vick*, 117 N.J. at 291.  The convictions should be reversed and the matter remanded for retrial.
[brief] (Da482-83.)  At the April 21, 2022 CRB meeting, the CRB heard testimony from [...], asked questions regarding its plans, allowed members of the public to ask questions, and ultimately approved [...]’ development application and voted to endorse same.  (Da485-486.)  The Ordinance went into effect on April 28, 2022 – just four (4) business days after the CRB approved [...]’ development application.
[brief] ........................................................................................................  12  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  **New Jersey Supreme Court** - **Gilleran v. Twp. of Bloomfield**, 227 N.J. 159 (2016) .................................................................  5 - **Mason v. City of Hoboken**, 196 N.J. 51 (2008)  .................................................................. 11 - **N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Twp. of Lyndhurst**, 229 N.J. 541 (2017)  ..................................................................  8 - **Paff v. Galloway**, 229 N.J. 340 (2017) .................................................................. 6,7,8 - **Simmons v. Mercado**, 247 N.J. 24 (2021) .................................................................. 3,4,8 - **Sussex Commons Assocs., LLC v. Rutgers**, 210 N.J. 531 (2012)  ..................................................................  5  **New Jersey Superior Court** - **Asbury Park Press v. Ocean Cty. Pros. Off.**, 374 N.J. Super. 312 (Law Div. 2004) ...........................................  5 - **Burnett v. Gloucester County**, 415 N. J. Super. 506 (App. Div. 2010)  ...........................................  4,8  **Statutes** - **N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1** .................................................................. 5,8 - **N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1** .................................................................. 2,7,8 - **N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(d)** ...............................................................  10 - **N.J.S.A. 47:1-14** ..................................................................  9  **GRC Materials** - **Handbook for Custodians, 7th Edition, November 2022**  ..............  11  FACTS
[brief] To support its claim, [...] points to the testimony of its expert, [...], who served as both an expert in tax assessment and also appraisal and who testified that this Unit was assessed by the [...] using the “replacement cost method. ”  6T21.  [...] testified that this was reflected on the tax record, however, the tax record was not provided to the Board or entered into evidence because [...]’s counsel never provided the documents to [...]’s counsel in advance of the meeting, as required by the rules.
[brief] In Kaufmann, 110 N.J. at 563-66, the proposed subdivision created lots with a width deficiency, but it did so to create smaller lots that were more consistent with the zoning and planning intended for the area.  In Lang, 160 NJ. at 60, an above-ground swimming pool was to be replaced with an in-ground pool; although setback and coverage variance relief would be required, the aesthetic benefit of an inground pool justified the deviation.  In Jacoby, 422 NJ. Super. at 471, an office complex with fewer parking spaces was proposed, in order to make room for trees and other visual buffers that would hide the complex from public view.  In Green Meadows at Montville, L.L.C. v. Plan. Bd. of Twp. of Montville, 329 NJ. Super. 12 (App. Div. 2000), the court held that the developer was entitled to variance relief creating two misshapen lots; the lot sizes were consistent, and the expressed reason for denial (density) was belied by the fact that the lots complied with the density standards.
[brief] [...] produced a purported Statement of Electric and/or Gas Consumption from [...] for its property located at [...], which is Lot 19.  While the document [...] produced is incomplete, it appears to be for a time period of April 17, 2020 to April 20, 2022.  [...] also produces a utility bill from 2012, which again indicates the bill was for [...]’s property at Lot 19 rather than [...]’s Lot 22.  [...] also produces the aforementioned snow removal documents for 2009, 2011, 2012 and 2013.  Even assuming [...] could prove these documents pertained to [...]’s Property at Lot 22 and not [...]’s own property at Lot 19 (which it cannot do), and even assuming these documents would be sufficient proof to support a claim that [...] continuously used and possessed the Property for the entire referenced year (which it also cannot do), [...] would only have proof of possession for 6 years (at most) of the 30-year statutory time period (i.e., 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2020 and 2021).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT UNDERMINED THE TORT CLAIMS ACT BY DENYING THE CITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.  (Raised Below: Da231)  It is well settled law that any application of the Tort Claims Act must start from its guiding principle that immunity from tort liability is the general rule and liability is the exception.  N.J.S.A. 59:4-2; Stewart v. New Jersey Tpk. Auth./Garden State Parkway, 249 N.J. 642, 655 (2022).  Thus, “[w]hen both liability and immunity appear to exist, the latter trumps the former. ”  Id. (citing Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347, 356 (1993)).  That is why the Legislature provided that public entities could only be held liable for negligence “within the limitations of [the TCA]. ”  N.J.S.A. 59:1-2.  Id.  The Legislature intended for public entities to receive “broad immunity protection” under the Act, Ogborne v. Mercer Cemetery Corp., 197 N.J. 448, 459 (2009), and for courts to “exercise restraint in the acceptance of novel causes of action against public entities. ”  N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.  For such reasons, the TCA and our Supreme Court precedent make clear that a plaintiff must establish each and every element outlined in N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 to impose liability on a public entity.  Stewart, 249 N.J. at 656.  “These elements are accretive; if one or more of the elements is not satisfied, a plaintiff's claim against a public entity alleging that such entity is liable due to the condition of public property must fail. ”  Id. (citing Polzo v. County of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 585 (2008).  Therefore, on a motion for summary judgment and a motion for a directed verdict, the failure to establish one element alone is fatal to a plaintiff’s claim.  Here, as discussed earlier, Plaintiff failed to prove that the City had either actual or constructive notice that the sign was down before his accident.  Actual or constructive notice is an essential element for establishing the liability of a public entity under the TCA.  Plaintiff’s lack of sufficient evidence to establish this element should have been fatal to his claim.  “Summary judgment should be granted, in particular, 'after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."  Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 450, 472 (2020).  Under the applicable law and in accordance with the purpose of the TCA, the trial court should have granted the City’s summary judgment motion and spared the City, a municipality with limited resources, from continuing costly litigation.
[brief] If this Court decides to consider Defendants’ argument in Section A.2, Defendants’ dissection of “accessory” versus “primary” use is irrelevant to the question of whether the criteria for redevelopment designation set forth in N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b) are supported by substantial credible evidence.  The existence of ongoing remediation is not one of the enumerated criteria under Subsection 5(b) or any other section of the statute.  As discussed above, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b) states that a property may be found in need of redevelopment based on:
[brief] 29 Lintao v. Livingston, 2011 WL 2935052 (App. Div. 2011) ...................... 22, 23, 24 Love v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 366 N.J. Super. 525 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 355 (2004) ...........................................................................................................  10  Oppedisano v. Utz, 2012 WL 2360125 (App. Div. 2012) ............................................. 23 Paxton v. Misiuk, 34 N.J. 453 (1961) ..................................................................................  22 People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246 (1985)  ............... 45 Phillips v. Gelpke, 190 N.J. 580 (2007) ..............................................................................  24 Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344 (2011) ............................  28 Rempfer v. Deerfield Packing Corp., 4 N.J. 135 (1950) .................................................. 37 Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506 (2011) ......................... 27, 39, 41 Scafidi v. Seiler, 119 N.J. 93 (1990) .................................................................................. 44 State v. Berry, 140 N.J. 280 (1995).  ..................................................................................  29  State v. Cain, 224 N.J. 410 (2016)  ......................................................................................  37 State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80 (2004) ..................................................................................  40 State v. Goodman, 415 N.J. Super. 210 (App. Div. 2010) .............................................  11 State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178 (1984) ...................................................................................... 29, 30 State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225 (1988) ..............................................................................
[brief] The general rules governing easements are well-known and easily stated.  The Restatement (Third of Property) provides, “[a]n easement creates a non-possessory right to enter and use land in the possession of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement. ”  Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, § 1.2 (2000).  New Jersey law is in accord.  See, e.g., Krause v. Taylor, 135 N.J. Super. 481, 484 (App. Div. 1975).
[brief] ”  (Ra353 47:2-6.)  He did not review the RR Zone, the full site plan set, the YB Settlement Agreement, nor the exhibits to the YB Settlement Agreement at the time of his testimony.  In fact, [...] only “reviewed” Objector’s Counsel’s summary of the RR Zone, noting that Objector’s Counsel “just spoke to me about it” and “I just went with what he told me on the RR zone analysis. ”  (Ra353 47:2 through Ra354 49:9.)  Therefore, the only “expert” provided by Objector’s Counsel never saw that the RR Zone included the same architectural elevations and renderings of the residential structures that were proposed to the Board and his “expert opinion” was based upon what Objector Counsel outlined for him.  Following [...]’s testimony, [...], a recognized expert in civil engineering, noted that the Building Height Definition defines building height as being “measured from original lot grade or any revised lot grades shown on the site plan…Such revised lot grade should not include mounding, terracing or other devices designed to allow it to increase building height.
[brief] CONSTITUTE CRIMINAL ABANDONMENT AND VIOLATION OF AN ORDINANCE ON PERMITTING ANIMALS TO RUN AT LARGE | 20 | | CONCLUSION | 21 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | City of Camden v. Local Gov’t Bd., | 15 | | 127 N.J.L. 175 (Sup. Ct. 1941) | | | Kanter v. Passaic, | 18 | | 107 N.J. Super 556, 369 (1969) | | | Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., | 10 | | 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) | | | State v. Avena, | 8 | | 281 NJ. Super. 327, 333 (App. Div. 1995) | | | State v. Brown, | 10 | | 118 N.J. 595, 604 (1990) | | | State v. Cerefice, | 9 | | 335 N.J. Super. 374, 383 (App. Div. 2000) | | | State v. Ciancaglini, | 10 | | 204 N.J. 597, 604 (2011) | | | State v. Clarksburg Inn, | 10 | | 375 N.J. Super. 624, 639 (App. Div. 2005) | | | State v. Heine, | 10 | | 424 N.J. Super. 48, 58 (App. Div. 2012) | | | State v. Johnson, | 8, 9, 10 | | 42 N.J. 146 (1964) | | | State v. Kashi, | 10 | | 180 N.J. 45, 49 (2004) | | | State v. Locurto, | 9 | | 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999) | | | State v. McCormack Terminal, Inc., | 17 | | 191 N.J. Super. 48, 51 (App. Div. 1983) | | | State v. Mundet Cork Corporation, | 18 | | 8 N.J. 359 (1952) | | State vs. Pomo, 95 N.J. 13, 16 (App. Div. 1983) ..................................