[brief] In addition, a significant portion of the justification for [...]’s termination as set forth by the ALJ in the Decision is predicated upon a false narrative unsupported by the competent evidence.  The Decision provides as follows:  Appellant also argued that his conduct in this matter “did not offend publicly accepted standards of decency or destroy public respect in the delivery of governmental services,” and therefore should not constitute a valid basis for termination.  However, a police officer with an opioid addiction covering up an overdose in his home, was a matter of concern that went beyond the police department.  Appellant valued his own personal concerns over those of his houseguest, [...] and, therefore, over the public at large.  His obfuscation of the facts regarding the Incident could have meant a delay in getting [...] proper care.  Having a cache of various pills at his home might have given [...] the impetus or the opportunity to take an overdose of drugs.  Failing to advise his superiors as to his medications meant that the [...] might have had an armed officer on duty while on opioids.  Decision at p. 47 (emphasis added).  (Pa58).  The ALJ ignores substantial facts that are contrary to the narrative laid forth above.  As is discussed at length and in detail above, it is undisputed that [...] did not abuse his medication, and the proofs contradict the conclusion that [...] overdosed in this home.  (See above).  Moreover, the record does not support the ALJ’s opinion that [...] attempted to “obfuscate” facts about the Incident, and that he lied to [...], or anyone else, at any time.  (T5 75:22-77:8).  The finding that [...] maintained “a cache of various pills at his home” constitutes an outrageous misrepresentation of the record which contains no competent evidence to support such a conclusion.  (T4 23:13-22, 24:7-10, 24:11-25:3, 145:3-13).  There is, likewise, no competent evidence that [...] ever provided pills to [...] or anyone else and, again, no evidence that [...] overdosed on opioids.  There is no competent evidence that [...] was ever under the influence while on-duty, and he is not charged with such conduct.  [...] and [...] both confirm that there was nothing illegal or improper about the fact that [...] had been prescribed medication for pain.  (T1 164:8-14; T2 at 52:3-6, 67:5-  There is no sufficient evidence tending to prove that [...] filled any prescriptions more quickly than prescribed by his doctor.  (T1 167:8-11; T5 102:20-103:17).  Likewise, there is no evidence that [...] abused any of the medication that he was prescribed or that he ever shared it with anyone else.  (T1 164:8-165:5).  In addition, there is no competent evidence that [...] ever took the medication while on duty or was ever impaired while at work.  (T4 104:17-19).  [...]’s entry into rehab does not indicate abuse of the medication.  According to [...], anyone prescribed opioids to treat pain for as long as [...] would likely find it necessary to utilize a “detox” program to wean off of the medication.  (T2 49:22-50:14).  Based upon the foregoing, the factual basis for the ALJ’s opinion upholding [...]’s termination is not predicated upon competent or sufficient facts in the hearing record and is, thus, arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  Likewise the Commission’s adoption of the ALJ’s decision in this regard (Pa9-10) is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  Accordingly, [...]’s termination should be overturned and he should be reinstated immediately with back pay or the matter should be remanded with appropriate directions for redetermination.