ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] No one testified that [...] said the "n" word on two separate dates, and the documentary evidence shows there was only one write-up and only one incident, which was never repeated by [...].  Even Plaintiff's own affidavit refers to one incident (Pa294-95 ¶4), and later at her deposition Plaintiff realized she was mistaken about the date the incident occurred (Pl. Tr. 253:18-21).  conclusion of disparate treatment.
[brief] …  First of all, before I had ruled that while the tenant was in default or breach, he’s not entitled to fit up costs.  Nothing changes my mind about that.  I understand the equitable argument, well number one, well there’s a pandemic, we’re not allowed to open the gym and have our customers in because we’re not allowed to run a gym because of the Government’s executive orders.  And I did give credit for that.  But the tenant’s position is that well, we don’t have to pay rent while this is going on.  Plus, now there was never a moratorium on paying property taxes.  Landlord still has to pay property taxes no matter what.  And plus all the carrying costs.  Got to have heat in the building to keep the pipes from freezing, you’ve got to have insurance on the place.  So the landlord had to pay all these carrying costs.  The tenant would pay nothing.  Plus the tenant argues based on the fit up, the landlord should also pay the tenant for fit up costs.  And as Sidney Greenstreet said to Humphrey Bogart in the Maltese Falcon, that is hardly equitable.  Equity is a two way street.  It’s not a one way street.  You can’t have everything your way in equity.  (3T15-2 to 3T15-25)  …  But for purposes of this, I’m not reconsidering what I’ve already ruled.  Tenant was in breach, when you’re in breach you don’t have to pay -- the landlord does not have to pay the fit up costs.  And I think that’s clearly outlined in the lease documents.  (3T16-24 to 3T17-4)  Similarly, with respect to Tenant’s claim for money damages, [...] aptly held that he lacked jurisdiction to issue such an award in the Landlord-Tenant Division:
[brief] The Court noted that “New Jersey courts have generally considered questions about how to evaluate multiple or concurrent causes of damages only in the context of first-party claims against insurers for coverage. ”  *Id.* at 447.  Nevertheless, the Court also observed that “*first-party coverage decisions do, however, yield two generally applicable rules.*  In situations in which multiple events, one of which is covered, occur sequentially in a chain of causation to produce a loss, we have adopted the approach known as ‘Appleman’s rule,’ pursuant to which the loss is covered if a covered cause starts or ends the sequence of events leading to the loss. ”  *Id.*  (Emphasis added.)  In other words, according to the Supreme Court, Appleman’s rule is a principle of general applicability.  This case involves the kind of sequential causes of loss referenced in *Wear* and in the *Flomerfelt* Court’s description of Appleman’s rule.  Moreover, the *Flomerfelt* Court cited with approval this Court’s application of Appleman’s rule to the third-party liability coverage question in *[...] v. [...]*, 267 N.J.Super. 537 (App. Div. 1993), *certif. denied*, 135 N.J. 466 (1994).  *Id.* at 450-51.  Specifically, in *Search EDP* this Court had “used the approach embodied in Appleman’s rule and endorsed in *Franklin Packaging*, concluding that the proper focus was not on the claimed harm to the insured’s client, but on the claimed cause that set in motion the chain of events resulting in that harm. ”  *Id.*  *Flomerfelt* and *Search EDP* are controlling authority that the Trial Court was bound to follow.
[brief] The motion was accompanied by a brief explaining Plaintiff’s legal entitlement to those fees, as well as a detailed affidavit describing the exhaustive efforts in which Plaintiff’s counsel had been required to engage and fully addressing the factors of R.P.C. 1.5. (Da3-27).  Contemporaneous time entries detailing the work performed were submitted with the certification.  (Da28-107).  The certification also addressed the qualifications of the attorneys handling the matter,\(^7\) that the matter had been handled on a contingency basis since the initial 2009 trial court decision, the reasonableness of the hourly rates, including that they had previously been approved by the trial court in 2022 and years prior, and were consistent with those customarily charged by similar New Jersey firms.
[brief] **B.  [...]’s Opinion Lacks any Documentary Support. **  When pushed for documentary support for his opinion that [...], as the Project’s resident engineer, had an affirmative obligation to identify pre-existing roadway defects, [...] testified that he would supply written authority in advance of the second day of his deposition.  (Pa0162 and Pa0163 at 136:3-137:19).  The lone purportedly relevant document produced by [...] prior to his second day of testimony, however, was an excerpt from the New Jersey Department of Transportation’s Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction – 2007.  (Pa1379).  Rather than providing direction to the Resident Engineer, the produced specification section, entitled “159.03.01 Traffic Control Coordinator”, pertains to the assignment of an on-site TCC by the general contractor and the associated responsibilities of the TCC.  (Pa1379).  Accordingly, over the course of his two days of deposition testimony, [...] was unable to identify a single authoritative source supporting his opinion that a resident engineer on a [...] project, such as [...], has an affirmative obligation to identify pre-existing roadway conditions.
[brief] Ibid.; see also Kasper v. Bd. of Trs., TPAE, 164 N.J. 564, 577 (2000) (stating that the "direct result" standard requires traumatic events to be “the essential significant or the substantial contributing cause” of a disability); Slater v. Bd.  of Trs., PFRS, No. A-0755-18T3 (App. Div. June 24, 2020) (slip op. at 5).  (“[I]n a case involving the combined effect of a preexisting condition and a traumatic event, the lodestar of the direct result inquiry is simply whether the traumatic event is ‘the essential significant or the substantial contributing cause of the resultant disability.
[brief] But our case was a post-judgment interest case, unlike Baker which was a pre-judgment interest case.  A pre-judgment interest case allows in “exceptional cases” the suspension of the pre-judgment interest which unlike post-judgment interest is awarded automatically.  Id. 176  However, even Baker held the [...] was entitled to pre-judgment interest from the date of the jury verdict, that pre-judgment interest accrues while a there is a stay pending appeal and that Defendant failed to show it would be unfair to assess pre-judgment interest against it.  Id. 176-177  [...] was entitled to interest from the date of 8/28/20 final order to 8/29/22 because [...] deprived [...] of the use of the $78,646 for two years.  In a case against these same [...], this Court held the [...] was entitled to interest because as in our case, “Here, it is undisputed that the [Elizabeth] Board's actions prevented [...] from the use of $260,026.88. ” [...] v. [...], 466 N.J. Super. 325, 345 (App. Div. 2021).
[brief] The [...] Ordinance and facts are readily distinguishable from the Roselle case.  First, [...] does not base its authority on the Municipal Land Use Law or general police power; rather, its authority is contractual in nature, is the result of litigation that is *res judicata*, and it subject to an express statutory grant of authority by N.J.S.A. 48:7-1.  Second, [...] has not adopted a complete and total ban of above ground high power lines; rather it permits such lines to be placed above ground.  Third, although [...]’s Ordinance provides siting standards that might potentially restrict some types of high-capacity power lines from being installed, the Ordinance provides an exemption to allow it when necessary.  The Town does not, of course, seek to prohibit all power transmission and distribution within its borders, and the court should not have treated the Ordinance as an absolute ban on high capacity lines nor a ban of lines that are truly necessary for the provision of adequate service.  Thus, the *Roselle* case did not prohibit [...]’s contractual, statutory, and adjudicated rights to maintain “such prudential rules and regulations as the said Township Committee may from time to time prescribe by ordinance or otherwise. ”  --- 8.
[brief] Lastly, [...] argues pursuant to the unpublished district court opinion in *Pub. Serv. Elec. Co. v. [...]*, (D.N.J., September 5, 1918), that “the Town did indeed have the power to reasonably regulate power lines in a manner that it deemed appropriate[.]” (Db41).  There, [...] sought to restrain [...]’s ability to remove certain poles erected on Grove Street, Rahway Road, Alston Road, and Scotch Plains Avenue.  Importantly, the District Court merely held that because there was no federal question involved, “[t]he remedy of the complainant is in the state courts.
[brief] (Da 23).  He also found that “the same evidence supports the conclusion that the State has proven defendant’s guilt of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 beyond a reasonable doubt. ” (Da 23).  [...] then vacated the stay of defendant’s sentence and remanded the case back to the municipal court to impose sentence.  (Da 14); See generally 4T).  On August 7, 2023, defendant filed the instant notice of appeal.  (Da 27-38).  The State submits this response in opposition.
[brief] (Sb 32-34)  These claims reflect a misunderstanding of both the record and the law.  The State’s claim that the Appellate Division’s “affirmance of a consecutive sentence was binding” on the resentencing court is plainly incorrect.  (Sb 33)  As discussed extensively in the defendant’s brief, *Zuber* requires a sentencing court to consider the *Miller* factors at every stage of sentencing – including as part of its decision to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences and as part of its finding of statutory sentencing factors.  (Db 34-49)  Contrary to the State’s contentions, this Court recognized that *Zuber* requires a judge to consider the *Miller* factors alongside “the principles set forth in *Yarbough* … when imposing consecutive sentences upon juvenile offenders.
[brief] [...] Failed To Show That The Trial Court’s Decision Was Palpably Incorrect or Irrational [Issue Raised Below 6T24-13]  “Reconsideration should be utilized only for those cases which fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) the Court has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the Court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence. ” Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) (internal citation omitted); see also Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128, 134 (App. Div. 2021).
[brief] Pa30-31.  35.  For example, [...] did not “rubber stamp” tax returns, as plaintiff suggests (Pb34), but reviewed the returns prepared by the accountants and discussed them with [...].  3T42:2-23.  Both [...] and [...]\(^{14}\) did what they could to try rein in [...], but were unsuccessful.  See, e.g., 3T124:8-18; 2T164:24-165:19; 2T166:1-167:2.  [...] sought to account for expenses as best he could, considering [...]’ unorthodox operating methods, but was often stonewalled.  See, e.g., 3T21:12-22:15, 40:2-15, 62:5-64:5, 123:8-25; 3T94:8-97:11; 3T125:6-126:5.  Neither [...], nor [...] (a part-time, remote “employee”), had the ability to stop [...] from doing what he pleased, as [...] was in de facto and de jure absolute control of [...].  See, e.g., 2T179:5-15; 3T36:12-19, 58:9-17; 1T62:21-25; 2T44:9-11, 84:8-10.
[brief] An award of attorney’s fees as a sanction under both Rule 1:4-8 and the Frivolous Litigation Statute requires detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting each element of the award, as set forth in Rule 1:7–4.  See Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, 410 N.J. Super. 510, 547 (App. Div. 2009) (reversing a Rule 1:4-8 sanction in part because the court failed “to set forth findings pursuant to Rule 1:7-4”).  Indeed, findings of fact supporting a court’s decision are specifically required “so that parties and the appellate courts [are] informed of the rationale underlying” the trial court’s legal conclusions.  *Gormley v. Gormley*, 462 N.J. Super. 433, 449 (App. Div. 2019) (alteration in original).  As this Court explained:  When a prevailing party seeks sanctions against an attorney under Rule 1:4-8 and against a party under [the Frivolous Litigation Statute], it is incumbent upon the trial judge to consider the respective responsibility of each.  And, under Rule 1:7-4 (a), the trial judge is required to make specific findings of facts and conclusions of law to each claim.  . . .  Neither the parties nor an appellate court should be required to extrapolate, from minimal remarks, the judge’s justification for a sanction award.  The order must be clear not only to support the conclusion, but also to identify the conduct the sanctions are designed to deter.  Moreover, an analysis of the reasonableness of the fees awarded as a sanction must be stated.  *Konefal v. Landau*, No. [...], 2020 WL 2466216, at *4 (N.J. App. Div. May 13, 2020) (second and third emphasis added) (citing *Savona v. Di Giorgio Corp.*, 360 N.J. Super. 55, 63 (App. Div. 2003); *Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C.*, 410 N.J. Super. at 547; and *City of Englewood v. Exxon Mobile Corp.*, 406 N.J. Super. 110, 125 (App. Div. 2009)).  This is precisely the issue with the Sanctions Order.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT ONE THE PCR JUDGE ERRED IN SUMMARILY DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE MR. JACKSON’S SECOND POST CONVICTION RELIEF PETITION (Da 086).  A PCR petition is New Jersey’s analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus,” State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 49 (1997), and is a “meaningful procedure” to root out injustice.  State v. Feaster, 184 N.J. 235, 249 (2005).  Post-conviction relief proceedings play a critical role in our criminal justice system.  State v. Quixal, 431 N.J. Super. 502, 513 (App. Div. 2013).  A petition for post-conviction relief “is a safeguard to ensure that a defendant was not unjustly convicted,” Afanador, 151 N.J. at 49.  Post Conviction Relief “is a defendant’s last chance to raise constitutional error that may have affected the reliability of his or her criminal conviction. ”  State v. Rue, 175 N.J. 1, 18 (2002).  In State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 526 (2013), our Supreme Court highlighted that “our rules governing post-conviction relief are the last line of defense against a miscarriage of justice.
[brief] Despite acknowledging that she certified that she had made a good faith search for documents responsive to Plaintiffs’ discovery demands, [...] admitted that she had not conducted any search of her records.  Specifically:  Q. Okay.  All right, so were you asked to search for documents regarding this lawsuit at all?  Do you recall?  A.  I don’t remember that, no.  Q.  You don’t remember being asked or you don’t remember –  A.  I don’t, in general, remember any.  I don’t remember, no.  Q.  Okay.  This would have been relatively recently within the past three months or so.  A.  I do not have any documents pertaining to this building.  It was over four years ago.  I don’t – Q.  Did you search for any documents?  A.  I don’t have any documents.  Q. Okay.  My question’s a little different.  Did you search for any documents?  A.  I wouldn’t search because I don’t have any documents.  Pa129-30, 41:11-42:4.  Further, despite having been the property manager of the apartment building from 2018 to 2019, when [...] was questioned regarding the Property and/or her role as the property manager, on over 40 occasions throughout her approximately two-hour deposition, she responded that she could not remember.  Indeed, [...] could not answer when she became the property manager (Pa124, 21:2-6), why she was asked to become the property manager (Pa124, 21:7-11), how long she served as the property manager (Pa124, 21:16-25), how she was paid (Pa128, 34:12-15), how often she was paid (Pa128, 35:21-25), or how she communicated with unit owners (Pa125, 22:15-25).  On November 9, 2023, after a case management conference held the previous day, the trial court (Hon. [...], J.S.C.) ordered that each party serve the other with a “punch list” of outstanding discovery by November 13, 2023, with responses to be served by November 20, 2023.
[brief] The State did not have to call the 9-1-1 caller – rather, the State had the right to present details of the 9-1-1 call through hearsay pursuant to the Rules of Evidence.  See N.J.R.E. 104(a)(1).  This Court has, in the past, found that the State can present hearsay evidence in order to sustain an arrest.  See State v. Bynum, 259 N.J. Super. 417 (App. Div. 1992).  In Bynum, this Court acknowledged that the rules of evidence generally do not apply in suppression hearings, and also pointed that “(w)e emphasize that we are not concerned with hearsay information relied upon by a police officer in making an arrest”.
[brief] 238 N.J. 293, 326 (2019).  That holding was consistent with the Court’s prior decision in State v. Green, 62 N.J. 547 (1973), which specifically authorized a trial court to consider a defendant’s criminal history, including prior arrests not resulting in a conviction.  In Green, the Supreme Court ruled that “many factors, including an arrest record, contribute toward the composite picture of the ‘whole man’ that the trial court should necessarily have to rationally sentence a defendant. ”  Id. at 566.  Since Green was decided in 1973 to the present, the Supreme Court has mandated that sentencing courts consider the whole person standing before the court for sentencing.  See Rivera, 249 N.J. at 299; State v. Marzolf, 79 N.J. 167, 180 (1979) (“[n]either the defendant nor his offense should be fictionalized for purposes of sentence.
[brief] .......................................................  23 N.J. Animal Rights Alliance v. N.J. Dept. of Envt’l Prot., 396 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 2007)  .....................................................  18  National Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protection Ass’n v. Black, 53 F.4th 869 (5th Cir. 2022) ..................................................................
[brief] Based upon the foregoing, the trial court’s order dated March 4, 2024 should be affirmed in all respects.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents BY: s/ [...]  JAY B. FELDMAN  DATED: August 1, 2024  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  R.J. Hughes Justice Complex  25 W. Market Street P.O. Box 006 Trenton, NJ 08625-0006  Re: [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, V. [...]  Defendant-Respondent.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]; ON APPEAL FROM ORDER ENTERED BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, CHANCERY
[brief] The continued existence of this uncontrolled parking lot for “priority” use by the synagogue at the entryway courtyard of a 400-student school can only result in continued conflict between pedestrians, students, and vehicles.  This situation illustrates why Land Use laws and Boards exist, to regulate and define property use for an orderly safe use.  The Appellate Division vacated the March 6, 2018 Order awarding sanctions and attorney’s fees; the within situation is no different and these Orders should also be reversed.
[brief] Thus, the verdict is not inconsistent with the evidence.  Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant should have asked for an additional jury interrogatory regarding proximate cause is but an attempt to blame the defense for Plaintiff’s failure to follow through on their prior agreement at the time of trial.  Defense counsel pointed out as much in his correspondence of July 6, 2022 (Pa45).  Plaintiff bears the burden of proof of causation as a matter of law – and pursuant to the agreement of counsel – it was Plaintiff’s obligation to address the issue at trial since, among other things, the agreement was to Plaintiffs benefit by sparing them from having to produce medical records and prove the reasonableness and necessity of the bills by expert testimony, which Plaintiffs were not in a position to do given the problems with their expert and the Orders entered on September 3, 2021.
[brief] The discovery rule (N.J. Ct. R. 4:104) delays the accrual of a cause of action UNTIL “the INJURED PARTY DISCOVERS, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered that he may have a basis for an actionable claim”  Id. (the totality of evidence corroborate it was first discovered in May of 2023 that Service of Process had not been executed for the March 9, 1990, hearing/default judgement (Pa6; Pa10; Pa21; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39- Further noted RULE 60 (B) (6)  PROVIDES A CATCHALL FOR VACATING A JUDGMENT WITHOUT TIME LIMIT FOR “ANY OTHER REASON THAT JUSTIFIES RELIEF”
[brief] However, as explained in Defendants’ initial appellate brief, the record before the trial court and Appellate Division in that case included an extensive and detailed record that supported the stated concern by the municipality regarding residential development and the loss of open space, and how those concerns mirrored the State’s public policy concerns.  See id. at 375-76.  There is no such record in this matter presently before the Court.  Plaintiff does cite to anything in the record below to support its contention that the taking “was driven by a recognized and pressing need to expand the Township’s open space to prevent unchecked development, protect natural resources, and provide areas for public recreation. ” (Pb12).  The Township for the first time has raised such expansive justifications for its allegation that it needs Defendants’ properties to preserve open space in its appellate brief.  The Township’s lofty and unsubstantiated language about environmental concerns, economic benefits, and more are not tied to anything particular about the Township at all.  Nor is there any citation to the record to support these claims.  This Court in Mipro recognized that the municipality there “had a reasonable basis for concern” about adding residential development to the area after the [...] (“[...]”) “recognized” that the acquisition of the site promoted slowing down development after the [...] approved a grant for the acquisition.  379 N.J. Super. at 376.  Moreover, there was evidence of a longstanding concern about maintaining open space and the Appellate Division relied on very specific numbers regarding [...]’s rapid population growth and years of careful consideration by the municipality to slow that growth down.  Id. at 362-63.  Plaintiff’s brief here only cites to the State public policy concerns to which the Court in *Mipro* cited.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  ..................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT .........................................................................................  1 POINT I DESPIRE MANY ATTEMPTS BY DEFENSE COUNSEL TO ENSURE THAT THE FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE WAS HANDLED APPROPRIATELY IN THIS CASE, THE TRIAL COURT FAILED IN ITS GATEKEEPING ROLE TO IMPOSE ANY LIMITS ON THE FINGERPRINT TESTIMONY OR TO ENSURE AN UNBIASED AND INFORMED JURY.  .............................................1  POINT II  THE PERSISTENT-OFFENDER  EXTENDED TERM SENTENCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.  ..............................................12  CONCLUSION  ...........................................................................................................  15  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS