ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] There Was No Need For Discovery.  As noted, the trial court conducted a case management conference wherein the trial judge determined to allow Defendants to file a motion for summary judgment without discovery, but allowed the Plaintiff to oppose the motion on the grounds that certain discovery was necessary as to an element of his case.  (1T17-24:18-13; 19-19:23.)  When the Court asked [...] at the conference for his thoughts on proceeding in that manner, he replied “Your Honor, I defer to you, how you want to handle the matter. ”  (1T19-25:20-3.)  As such, even though the trial court did not allow discovery as of right, it allowed Plaintiff to proffer the need for certain specific discovery as to material facts in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, but Plaintiff did no such thing.  In this appeal, Plaintiff does not cite to any part of the summary judgment record showing a claimed need for particular discovery.  When rendering its decision on the record on September 22, 2023, the trial court judge noted that the summary judgment rules and case law do not preclude a party from seeking summary judgment even without discovery and before the end of a discovery period citing to Wellington v. Estate of Wellington, 359 N.J. Super. 484 (App. Div. 2003) and Badiali v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Group, 220 N.J. 544, 555 (2015), wherein the Supreme Court held that for incomplete discovery to be an issue in a summary judgment motion, the party asserting or advancing that argument must demonstrate with some degree of particularity the likelihood that the discovery would supply the missing elements of a cause of action.
[brief] In choosing to impose a lesser sentence on [...] than I did as to [...], I do so in recognition of the fact that [...] was not personally present at the scene of these crimes, nor was he the one who actually shot the decedent, [...].  However, in choosing to impose more than the minimum authorized sentence, I do so in recognition of the facts that the aggravating factors clearly outweigh the mitigating, especially when due weight is given to [...]'s prior record, including his prior conviction in New York for first degree robbery.  And also in recognition [of] the role he played in contacting [...] and enlisting his assistance in this plot, but for which arguably none of this may have ever occurred.  [...] contends that the three aggravating factors cannot support the sentences.
[brief] H1269a  Existing Conditions Plan ......................................  H1270a  Site & Grading Plan ............................................. H1271a  Overall Plan, Access Easement Plan ......................... H1272a  Landscaping Plan ..................................................  H1273a  Landscaping Plan Details .......................................  H1274a  Landscaping Plan Profile & Details ..........................  H1275a  [...] response to RCR-ENG-12 ...............................  H1276a  Letter by [...] March 30, 2017, to [...] discussing guardrails ........................................ H1278a [...] response to RCR-ENG-13 ................................  H1279a [...] response to RCR-ENG-14 ................................  H1280a RC-4: Cover letter dated April 21, 2017 and [...] responses to discovery requests RCR-ENG-15 to -17 (BPU Docket.
[brief] The trial court expressly reserved the issue of the standard of care for a later time and denied [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  The trial court held that the Plaintiffs were entitled to discovery and could pursue general negligence and trespass claims.  Moreover, in the trial court’s memorialized order, the trial court provided that any claims that do not require expert testimony survived.  (Pa000084).  On June 22, 2022, [...] provided interrogatory responses and a response to Plaintiffs’ first notice to produce.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  A.  STANDARD OF REVIEW  The applicable standard of review of the Trial Court’s evidentiary rulings requires the reviewing appellate panel to determine if an abuse of discretion was exercised by the trial court.  In all instances except where such an abuse of discretion has occurred, the reviewing panel will defer to the trial court.  State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412, 430 (2021).  Absent an abuse of discretion, an appellate court should not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court unless trial court’s ruling was “so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted. ”  State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 12-13 (2021).  As such, review of such evidentiary rulings is limited and the broad discretion of trial judges to make same has long been respected.  See Id. (citing State v. Harris, 209 N.J. 431 (2012); quoting State v. Muhammad, 439 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 2003)).  Even in circumstances where the reviewing panel concludes a mistaken evidentiary ruling has been made, reversal is not a given.  Only those mistakes which have “the clear capacity to cause an unjust result,” require intervention on appeal.  Garcia 245 N.J. at 430.  In this case, the record reflects that the Court was presented with certain evidence by the Appellant, which the Court determined was irrelevant.  The rendering put forth by Appellant which purported to show a violation of an applicable zoning resolution, was not relied upon in adopting said Resolution.  Likewise, the [...] advertisement provided no relevant or persuasive evidence and as such, the Trial Court determined it was irrelevant as well.  This Appeal does nothing to offer additional context to the underlying facts of the claim, and further, the wide breath of deference afforded to the Trial Court’s evidentiary ruling forecloses any need for additional review.
[brief] In Lovett v. Estate of Lovett, plaintiffs’ only remaining claim against the attorney was for the legal fees they incurred to bring the lawsuit against the attorney for a variety of negligence that the plaintiffs claimed the defendant attorney had committed after plaintiffs’ main negligence claims against the defendant attorney were all abandoned or disposed.  This is a similar situation here.  The Court in Lovett denied the recovery of legal fees against the attorney even if he breached the duty to wrongfully act as both broker and lawyer, because plaintiff failed to prove a causal link between the breach and any reasonably attributable damages.  \(^8\)  See Saffer v. Willoughby, 143 N.J.256, 271, 670 A.2d 527 (1996); Lieberman v. Employers Ins., of Wausau, 84 N.J. 325, 341, 419 A.2d 417 (1980) (Plaintiff was only entitled to recover for losses which were proximately caused by the attorney’s negligence.)  “[T]he measure of damages is ordinarily the amount of that the client would have received (or would not have had to pay) but for his attorney’s negligence. ”  Gautam v. DeLuca, 215 N.J.Super. 388, 397, 521 A.2d 1343 (App. Div.), certify. denied, 109 N.J. 39, 532 A.2d 1107 (1987).  trial” doctrine in legal malpractice actions.
[brief] He left this world alone on the streets of [...] on a frigid night in a pool of his own blood where he looked like a pile of garbage literally, as [...] described when he was driving down the street and had to stop because he thought it was a garbage bag.  That’s how [...] left this world thanks to his quote/unquote friend, [...] .  . . .  [5T 112-15 to 113-7 (emphasis added). ]  None of those inflammatory remarks had anything to do with the disputed issue in this case: who killed [...].  Rather, all of it was designed solely to turn the jury against [...] based on emotion and sympathy rather than the evidence.
[brief] H1559a  [...]’s [...] resubmitted August 30, 2018 comments on the Environmental Commissions August 9, 2018, with a new set of attachments.  ...........................................  H1561a  CO₂-driven experimental acidification effects.......................  H1563a  Email from [...]’s [...] to [...]’s [...] September 25, 2018 enclosing [...]’s September 25, 2018 response to the Environmental Commission.  ..........................................................  H1574a  [...]’s September 25, 2018 letter for [...] replying to Environmental Commission’s letter regarding impact on water quality due to emissions ......................... H1575a Email from [...]’s [...] to [...]’s [...] enclosing Engineering Review 2A.............................................. H1579a [...]’s [...] October 9, 2018 Engineering Review 2A following up on the September 6 Review and urging [...] to review other types of heaters ............. H1580a Attachment: EPA’s Health and Environmental Effects of Hazardous Air Pollutants ........................................ H1582a Attachment: EPA’s What are Hazardous Air Pollutants.............................................................. H1583a [...]’s [...] email October 19, 2018 to [...]’s [...] forwarding [...]’s October 18, 2018 reply to [...]’s [...] .................................................. H1584a [...]’s [...] October 18, 2018 response to the [...] October 9, 2018 report that VOC pollutants would be emitted only hypothetically [...] response to RCR-ENG-8 (2018) .......................... H1588a -xxxiii- Attachment: Email from [...]’ firm’s [...] to [...]’s [...]
[brief] The measure of monetary damages herein is very simple to quantify.  Under the direction and control of the [...], [...] purchased the Share in July 2019 for $250,000.  Pursuant to a court-ordered sealed-bid auction, [...] purchased the Share for $1,500,050.55.  [...]’s damages were the difference between the two prices.  The [...] could have redeemed themselves and remedied their breaches by having [...] transfer its Share to [...] for the same price that it paid for the Share. \(^1\)
[brief] First, the model charge on diminished capacity makes clear that no explicit diagnosis is needed because it gives the option to use either the phrase evidence of a general “mental disease or defect” or to reference a specific diagnosis, obviously contemplating that a specific diagnosis is not necessary.  Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Evidence of Mental Disease or Defect (N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2)” (rev. June 5, 2006) (hereinafter “‘Diminished Capacity’ Charge”).  Moreover, no case has ever held that expert testimony is required for a diminished capacity charge.  Rather, the cases state that the presentation of diminished capacity evidence should not be “unduly restricted,” and that in evaluating whether a diminished capacity charge is appropriate it must be viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant.
[brief] On appeal the defendant reprises his two arguments from the PCR court: (1) prior counsel was purportedly ineffective for failing to retain a ballistics expert (Db40), and (2) prior counsel was further allegedly ineffective for failing to voir dire the entire jury after one juror was excused.  (Db46).  Neither argument is warranted, and both must be rejected.  The State addresses each argument in turn, under subheadings’ “B” and “C,” respectively.  This Court reviews the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo.
[brief] And although the state concluded months later and after this lawsuit was filed that [...] engaged in sexual harassment in violation of state policy, [...] did not fire [...].  He was not demoted.  He was not transferred.  He did not attend additional sexual harassment training.  Rather, *[...] negotiated a three-day suspension in exchange for a full release of claims against [...].  He then immediately received a significant promotion.*  The clear and significant evidence of sexual harassment, retaliation, and [...]’s/[...]’s failure to take prompt, corrective, or appropriate remedial action designed to deter future harassment renders this matter ripe for a jury.
[brief] Plaintiff was obviously upset because he thought they had lied to him.  This understandable frustration and concern obviously factored into the trial court’s impression that “at times [...] was getting rather agitated. ”  4T11:19-19.  Since the trial court determined that Plaintiff had notice, either actual or inquiry, of a potential title problem with the Strip, the relevant issue becomes whether Plaintiff would have discovered that he could not properly claim ownership of the Strip had he more thoroughly investigated the title issue prior to his purchase of the Property.
[brief] “Common sense and good judgment . . . require that police officers be allowed to engage in some investigative street encounters without probable cause. ”  *Davis*, 104 N.J. at 505.  Officers may thus stop someone if they have a particularized and reasonable suspicion to do so.  *Id.* at 504.  The United States Supreme Court and our courts have held this reasonable-suspicion standard means there must be “some minimal level of objective justification” for conducting the investigatory stop.  *United States v. Sokolow*, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); *State v. Nishina*, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003).  “Reasonable suspicion is less than proof by a preponderance of evidence and less demanding than that for probable cause,” and simply requires more than a hunch or “unparticularized suspicion[.]”  *Barrow*, 408 N.J. Super. at 517 (citations and punctuation omitted).  In short, officers must be able to articulate exactly what behavior led them to believe the defendant was engaged or about to engage in criminal conduct.  *State v. Thomas*, 110 N.J. 673, 678 (1988).
[directive] To enhance its integrity, provide an optimal level of service to the community and reduce its exposure to civil liability, every law enforcement agency should establish procedures for dealing with problem employees.  Law enforcement agencies have a duty to monitor their employees’ behavior, and establish mechanisms that provide the internal affairs function and the law enforcement executive with the ability to track the complaint records of individual officers and identify those officers with a disproportionate number of complaints against them.  Law enforcement agencies must utilize the information developed by these mechanisms to prevent individual officers from engaging in conduct or behavior that violates the constitutional liberties every member of the community enjoys.  It also is expected that law enforcement agencies will utilize the information to prevent development of patterns, practices or trends of inappropriate behavior or conduct.  3.4.3
[brief] (Pa000086).  Plaintiffs opposed the motion by arguing, for the first time in almost two years of litigation, that [...] was “per se” negligent because it needed Plaintiffs’ consent before preparing the preliminary site plan.  (Pa000198).  Plaintiffs continue to make this misplaced argument at page 38 of their appeal brief.  Not only was this need-for-consent argument factually and legally wrong, but it would require an expert to comment on an engineer’s duty of care.  However, the professional negligence claims were already dismissed over one year earlier, along with any claims that would require expert standard of care testimony.
[brief] PLAINTIFF MAY NOT RETROACTIVELY CREATE A RECORD IN ITS APPELLATE BRIEFING IN A TRANSPARENT ATTEMPT TO TRY AND SATISFY THE STANDARDS ESTABLISHED IN Mt. Laurel Twp. v. Mipro Homes, L.L.C., 379 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 2005).  In Points I and II of its brief, Plaintiff argues that the Township has “a clearly articulated . . . valid public purpose” for the taking that it suggests “furthers the public interest. ”
[brief] [...] AND [...] [...]  [...] [...] [...] [...]  On the Brief: [...] No. [...]  Submitted Feb. 14, 2024  # Table of Contents | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Table of Authorities | ii | | Preliminary Statement | 1 | | Statement of Facts and Procedural History | 2 | | Legal Argument | 3 | | Point I | 3 | | A.
[directive] At ADA the the vicinage level, process for handling a request for an accommodation will ADA  The remain largely the same.  Title Coordinator will engage in the required interactive II ADA an process.  If the interactive process indicates the need for CART services as part of ADA accommodation to ensure effective communication, the Title Coordinator will contact II to be staff the Regional Court Reporter Supervisor arrange for CART services.  A OCR will if if CART provided available.  However, no staff OCR is available to provide services, then the of or Regional Court Reporter Supervisor will contact one more the agencies listed in the State Reporters/
[directive] The electronic evidence tracking system, at a minimum, shall include the following information: a. Date, time, and identity of the individual who collected the SAFE kit; b. Date, time, and identity of any person(s) in possession of the kit(s) before and during transport; c. Date, time, and identity of person(s) who initially submit the kit(s) for storage; d. Date, time, and identity of the evidence custodian who received the kit(s); e.  Date, time, and identity of any person to whom the kit(s) was released and the purpose of release; and f.  Date, time and identity of person(s) who returned/resubmitted the kit for storage.  4.  Evidence items created from analysis or separated from the original item should be documented to show the linkage to the original evidence.  The tracking system utilized must enable cross-referencing of all items associated with any single examination.  5.  Locations (ex: shelf number/bin) where kit(s) and related items of evidence are stored must be accounted for in the tracking system.  6.  Date, time, and identity of person who stored the kit(s), must be accounted for in the tracking system.  7.  Date of SAFE kit destruction must be recorded in the tracking system.  The resources available to each of the 21 County Prosecutor’s Offices vary greatly.
[brief] (9T127-14 to 25).  Law enforcement arranged for physical surveillance of defendant and the co-conspirators to determine their locations.  (9T129-20 to 130-4).  Subsequent analysis of the cellular phones seized in connection with the investigation revealed that at 7:40 p.m. that night, defendant sent texts to an individual whose contact was listed as “[...],” asking if something was done to the door in Newark because the bottom lock used to be upside down.  (16T69-5 to 21; 16T71-7 to 25).  Law enforcement officers obtained arrest warrants for defendant and [...] and, at approximately 8:00 p.m., officers received information to go to the [...] at [...] to locate the Cadillac CTS driven by [...] in which defendant was a passenger.
[brief] Superior Court of New Jersey  APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  INDICTMENT NO. [...] April 19, 2024  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  LAW DIVISION  CUMBERLAND COUNTY INDICTMENT NO. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION  On appeal form a judgment of conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Div., Cumberland County
[brief] That this is so is perhaps best evidenced by the action of our Legislature amending N.J.S.A. 40:55D-72a in 1979 to require that an appeal be filed within 20 days rather than 65 . . .  [A] person to whom a permit is issued may protect his right by providing reasonable notice to all those who might wish to challenge the undertaking.  Ibid.  By providing notice to all interested parties, i.e., persons "whose rights to use, acquire or enjoy property is or may be affected by any action taken under [the Municipal Land Use Law]," see N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4, the holder of a permit may obtain some measure of protection against direct and collateral attacks upon his rights.
[brief] ”  These factors do not necessitate fact-finding or an exercise of discretion by the Recovery Court judge.  *Ibid.*  Rather, certain factors require **objective, per se legal determinations**.  *Id.* at 148.  (Emphasis added).  These factors include N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a(1), (6), (7) and (8).  *Ibid.*  Because a Recovery Court judge must find all nine factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a when the defendant is a Track One applicant, improper application of one of the nondiscretionary factors constitutes a sentence that is “not imposed in accordance with law. ”  *Ibid.*  Under these circumstances, the State retains the right to appeal an illegal sentence.  *Ibid.*  The *Hyland* Court is silent as to whether N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a(5) should be classified as “discretionary” or “nondiscretionary,” thus rendering this issue a matter of first impression.
[brief] Indeed, the State “suffers a grievous harm” when unlawful discrimination occurs within its borders.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-3; see also, e.g., Jackson v. Concord Co., 54 N.J. 113, 123 (1969) (“[P]revention of unlawful discrimination vindicates not only the rights of individuals but also the vital interests of the State. ”).  The Legislature thus gave the Attorney General and the Director express authority to “prevent and eliminate discrimination” the LAD prohibits, N.J.S.A. 10:5-6, and to file an administrative complaint against entities that violate the LAD, N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1.  Absent preliminary relief, the State could not prevent this discrimination until the DCR proceeding ends.  That discrimination could continue in the meantime undermines “any adjudication [DCR] may make in this matter. ”  Pfaus, 97 N.J. Super. at 8.  Said another way, this order was needed “to aid in the preservation of the subject matter of a proceeding pending before an administrative agency,” and to prevent DCR’s administrative action from serving as “a vain and useless act” after the harm is done.  Ibid.⁷
[brief] The legislature, in defining the role of the medical examiner, placed an emphasis on his or her role in determining cause of death and specifically envisioned the identification and analysis of evidence in coming to this conclusion.  To keep a qualified medical examiner who has carefully studied the remains of Defendant, and who has had access to the evidence as it relates to the circumstances in which his remains were found, from determining whether his death was caused by homicide would be to ignore the very role the legislature envisioned for the office of the medical examiner.  The case at issue is fundamentally different from State v. Jamerson, 153 N.J. 318 (1998), which the defendant relies on in her brief to support a claim that [...], the medical examiner, should not have been able to testify that the cause of Defendant’s death was homicide.
[brief] Bernards, 233 N.J. Super. at 26.  (Pa. 80.)  \(^5\)By P.L. 2002, c.91, codified as N.J.S.A. 10:4-9.1 and 9.2, the Legislature amended the OPMA to permit internet notice of a public meeting.  Section 9.2 explicitly states, however, that “no electronic notice issued pursuant to this act shall be deemed to substitute for, or be considered in lieu of, such adequate notice.
[brief] Plaintiff first asserts that [...] improperly dismissed his cause of action asserting that [...] had a contractual duty to maintain the area of the parking lot where he allegedly fell.  Because both the text of the lease and the testimony of the lessor confirm that the lessor had exclusive responsibility for the maintenance of the common areas, including the parking lot, and that the unit tenants only had responsibility, at most, to maintain the sidewalks immediately outside their businesses, summary judgment was proper.
[brief] The standard for appellate review on a motion for reconsideration under Rule 4:42-2(b) is generally the “abuse of discretion” standard.  See Fusco v. Bd. of Educ., 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 174 N.J. 544 (2002); see also Granata v. Broderick, 466 N.J. Super. 449, 468 (2016).  Thus, an appellate court typically will not overturn the lower court’s decision unless it has made a clear error in judgment amounting to an abuse of its discretion, which only occurs when the trial judge’s decision is “made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”  See United States ex rel. USDA v. Scurry, 193 N.J. 492, 504 (2008).  The Appellate Division’s review of a trial court’s decision granting summary judgment is de novo.