ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Court has “consistently held that in cases of great public interest, any ‘slight additional private interest’ will be sufficient to afford standing. ”  *Salorio v. Glaser*, 82 N.J. 482, 491 (1980).  Further, The LAD was enacted to protect the civil rights of individual aggrieved employees and protect the public's strong interest in a discrimination-free workplace.  *Fuchilla v. Layman*, 109 N.J. 319, 334, 537 A.2d 652.  Unequivocally, Respondents do not qualify or belong to a protected class as defined under the NJLAD and therefore lack any standing to sue pursuant to NJLAD.
[brief] As previously outlined in Defendant's Brief (pages 15 and 16) Plaintiff admitted that she did have "access" to well more than $70,000.00 at the time that she made the misrepresentation.  In fact, Plaintiff was asked the following question:  Q- "Well.  The question is you in fact did have access to $70,000.00 when you signed the Agreement?"  (Trial Transcript T2 page 73 lines 12-13)  A-  I did (Trial Transcript T2, Page 73-lines 12-14)  In fact, during cross examination, [...] acknowledged all the accounts to which she had access to at the time consisting of 3 bank accounts which totaled over $260,000.00.  (See page 16 of Defendant's Brief- also Trial Transcript 2 page 74-Line 7 to Page 76 Line 1).  When asked "But you didn't tell anybody (about the funds Plaintiff answered by stating "Right" (See Defendant Brief page 16 and Trial transcript page 73 lines 16-18).  And there is no dispute that Defendant relied upon [...]'s misrepresentation as she testified as follows:  Q- "And you know, did you not, that [...] was relying on this representation in the contract that you did not have $70,000.00 (Trial transcript T2-Page 76 lines 2-6)  A- "I assume he was but ...yes.  I'll say yes, Okay"  (Trial transcript T2 Page 76 lines 5-6)  THIS LIE/ INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION IS VERY CRITICAL TO THE ANALYSIS OF WHY MR HARRISON SHOULD NOT BE PENALIZED AS WILL BE DISCUSSED LATER.
[brief] Standard of Review:  Appellant does not provide this Court with any Standard of Review.  Point I: Appellant Has No Legal Basis for a Cause of Action.  Appellant first argues the merits of its case.  Same is without value, for a number of reasons.  First, as mentioned previously, this Complaint was dismissed prior to much discovery taking place.  There was not a single deposition and Appellant only responded partially to initial discovery requests.  Second, all of the argument is simply that: argument.  There is no citation to the record to support these claims.  The unit owners, like Appellant noted, were supposed to provide their own insurance pursuant to the By-Laws.  (PA213).  Pursuant to paragraph 10, each owner of the Commercial Sub Unit was to carry the commercial equivalent of an HO-6 insurance policy, and each lessee was to carry the commercial equivalent of an HO-5 insurance policy.  (PA213).  To date, there has not been, despite requests, any confirmation from Appellant as to whether any claims were made for these damages under that insurance, and, if so, what the response from the insurance carrier was to those claims.  (App. Brief, p. 14).  A statement that claims were indeed made and denied is without documentary support.  (App. Brief, p. 14).  Appellant's next argument appears to be a negligence argument, which was not raised below.  Ordinarily, an appellate court will decline to consider an issue not presented to the trial judge unless it goes to the jurisdiction of the court or concerns a matter of substantial public interest.  Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 230, 708 (1998), abrogated on other grounds by, Meehan v. Antonellis, 226 N.J. 216, 228 (2016); Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973).  Thus, the standard of review is plain error, which requires that the error was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result."
[brief] 1.  Petitioner testified that all her services are rendered personally as she is the one providing the services.  (T29-18)  2.  Since 2015, her Law Firm has not been appointed through an RFP process nor does her Law Firm hold any other positions in the Township.  (T29-13)  3.  Petitioner gets paid through the Township’s payroll system in her personal name and she receives bi-monthly employee payroll checks like the other employees in the Township.  (T29-19)  4.  Petitioner has been receiving annual W-2’s, which other employees receive from [...], since 2015.  (Pa62)  (T30-9)  5.  [...] reported the Petitioner meets the definition of an independent contractor based upon information received that the Petitioner is responsible to find her own replacement and there is a swap of prosecutorial services with another municipal prosecutor.
[brief] Ferraro, 119 N.J. at 73.  Rather than giving “significant weight” to Mansfield’s zoning ordinance and site plan approval, Defendant did the opposite: it required that Plaintiff establish that Mansfield’s ODL Zone bulk standards are consistent with those in Florence’s SM Zone, and then imposed one of its bulk requirements on the Mansfield portion of the Property.  Because the applicant’s expert planning testimony was founded on an unsupported assertion that the zoning of the Mansfield and Florence Township parts of the overall parcel are ‘complimentary’, but did not address the substantial difference in allowable building heights in the SM and ODL Zones (or any other specific zoning standards in the two zones), and therefore the intensity of the proposed use, the Board did not find that testimony credible and probative with regard to special reasons[.]  None of the proofs before the Board provided a comparative analysis of the traffic impacts of a principal building on the overall parcel that conforms to the 30 ft. height limit of Florence Township’s SM Zone District with the proposed 50 ft. tall building that was approved by the [...].  [Ja043].  As these quotations make clear, Defendant did not give “significant weight” to Mansfield’s zoning ordinance, but: (1) ignored it, (2) superimposed Florence’s thirty foot (30') height restriction on the entire parcel, and (3) denied the application, claiming Plaintiff did not meet the novel and unlawful burden to establish that the Florence SM and Mansfield’s ODL Zone bulk standards are “complimentary.
[brief] The carrier cannot sever them by its unilateral action. ”)  It is “universally agreed” that, when an insurer takes control of the defense of an action, disclaiming coverage is inappropriate “unless the carrier has reserved the issue of its liability by appropriate measures. ”  Id. at 126-27.  If an insurer wants to “control the defense and simultaneously reserve a right to dispute liability, it can do so only with the consent of the insured. ”  Id.  In order to reserve the right to dispute liability, a carrier must “fairly inform the insured that the offer [to defend] may be accepted or rejected. ”  Id.  [...] stated at his deposition that he did not recall receiving any reservation of rights letters in the Underlying Action and, therefore, his acceptance of [...]’s defense was not made with consent regarding such a reservation.  It cannot be said, therefore, that he was “fairly informed” of the right to separate counsel.  Under such circumstances, prejudice to [...] in allowing [...] to deny coverage at this late stage is presumed.  At a minimum, the scope of the prejudice incurred by [...]’s failure to properly reserve its rights to withdraw a defense is a material issue of fact, the existence of which ought to have precluded summary judgment.  Even assuming [...] had been properly apprised of [...]’s reservations as to the amended pleading, [...] should still be estopped from disclaiming coverage at this late stage of the Underlying Action.  Even when a reservation of rights letter is issued, and a defense is undertaken subject to that reservation, the insurer may still be estopped from disclaiming coverage upon a showing of prejudice to the insured.  Northfield Ins. Co. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 454 N.J. Super. 135, 142 (App. Div. 2018).  Such a determination is fact-intensive and is not an appropriate determination to be made on summary judgment.  Id. at 146.  For example, [...] would clearly be prejudiced if [...] disclaimed coverage this late in the litigation as [...] would have to hire new counsel who would have to get up to speed on the Underlying Action.  In addition, [...] would be entitled to show that he relied on the defense provided by [...] to his detriment, meaning that [...] would have taken different steps in defending the Underlying Action than that taken by coverage counsel.  *Id.*  Since the facts must be interpreted in a light most favorable to [...], it should be assumed that [...] could make such a showing based upon [...]’s near-total control of the defense of the Underlying Action.  Moreover, whether such a showing can be made is a clear question of fact, thus precluding summary judgment at this point.  In addition, since the Underlying Action is still pending and set for trial in July, there are questions of fact regarding the defenses at trial which cannot be resolved prior to the trial itself.  The trial court disregarded this argument entirely, making no findings of fact and drawing no conclusions of law regarding [...]’s detrimental reliance on [...] or the prejudice [...] would suffer if [...] were allowed to disclaim coverage at this late stage of the Underlying Action.  VI.
[brief] The Court failed to address Probation’s improper continued garnishment of Appellant’s SSA benefits under erroneous child support account number and its failure to fully refund over-garnished funds.  Probation failed to respond with specificity to Appellant’s identification of numerous specific errors cited in Probation’s “accounting. ”  The Court failed to hold a hearing to resolve the disputed facts.  13.  Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of 3/30/2023, denied on 5/12/2023 (DA14).  Again, both Probation and the Court failed to respond with specificity to Appellant’s identified newly listed account record deficiencies.  14.  Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal (DA1) of the Orders of 5/12/2023 and the underlying Order of 3/30.2023.
[directive] Tuesdays Boonton Twp 1402 (973)402-4006  2nd Wednesday Butler 1403 (973) 835-1013  Tuesdays Chester Boro 1406 (908) 879-5100  1st and 3rd  Thursdays Chester Twp 1407 (908) 879-5100  1st and 3rd  Thursdays Denville 1409 (973) 625-8300  Thursdays Dover 1209 (973) 366-2200  Mondays (Shared)  Victory Gardens 1437 (973) 366-2200  Mondays East Hanover (Joint) 1410 (973) 428-2519  Thursdays Hanover 1412 (973) 428-2519  Mondays Florham Park 1411 (973) 410-5324  Wednesdays Harding 1413 (908) 647-8369  Thursdays Jefferson Twp 1414 (973) 208-6129  Thursdays Kinnelon 1415 (973) 838-7644  2nd and 4th  Tuesdays 1st and 3rd Lincoln Park 1416 (973) 694-6100  Wednesday; 4th Thursday Long Hill 1430 (908) 647-8369  Thursdays  Madison Joint 1st and 3rd (Joint)  Madison 1417 (973) 593-3026  Wednesday 1st and 3rd (Joint) Chatham Boro 1404 (973) 593-3026  Wednesday (Joint) Chatham Twp. 1405 (973) 593-3026  2nd Monday 2nd and 4th (Joint)  Morris Twp. 1422 (973) 593-3026  Wednesday Mendham Boro 1418 (973) 876-3852  Thursdays  Mendham Twp. 1419 (908) 879-5100  1st and 3rd  Thursdays  Mine Hill (shared) 1420 (973) 627-9000  Wednesdays Montville 1421 (973) 335-1022  Tuesdays Morris Plains 1423 (973) 538-4019  Tuesdays Mondays, 1st Tuesday of the month Morristown 1424 (973) 292-6687  1st and 3rd Wednesday 2nd and 4th Thursday Mount Arlington 1426 (973) 398-6832  Tuesdays Mount Olive (shared) 1427 (973) 691-0900  Mondays Mountain Lakes (shared) 1425 (973) 625-8300  Thursdays Netcong 1428 (973)  691-0900  Mondays Parsippany 1429 (973) 263-4290  Tuesdays & Thursdays Pequannock 1431 (973) 835-5700  Mondays Randolph 1432 (973) 989-7055  Wednesdays Riverdale 1433 (973) 835-1013  Tuesdays Rockaway Boro 1434 (973) 263-4290  Tuesdays &Thursdays Rockaway Township 1435 (973) 627-9000  Wednesdays Roxbury 1436 (973) 448-2034  Thursdays Washington Twp (Morris County) 1438 (973) 876-3852  Thursdays Wharton 1439 (973) 398-6832  Tuesdays
[directive] The term law enforcement officer shall include sworn members of the New Jersey State Police, the Division of Criminal Justice and the iv USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022 Juvenile Justice Commission.  It shall also include College and University Police Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-4.2 et seq., State Parole Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-4, State Correctional Police Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-4, County Correctional Police Officers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:154-3, Special Law Enforcement Officers of all classes pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-146.8 et seq., Humane Law Enforcement Officers appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 4:22-14.1 or 4:22-14.4, Auxiliary Police Officers appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. App.A:9-45(c), and Constables appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:9-120.  Mechanical Force.  Mechanical force involves the use of a device or substance, other than a firearm, to overcome a subject’s resistance to the exertion of the officer’s authority.  Examples include use of an asp, baton, or other object, oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray or the physical apprehension by canines.
[brief] Given the above, the Court’s review of [...]’s actions is severely limited.  In Re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482 (2007)(citing Aqua Beach Condo Association v. Department of Community Affairs, 185 N.J. 5, 15-16, 2006); see also Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995).  An Appellate Court must afford a “strong presumption of reasonableness” to an administrative agency’s exercise of its statutorily delegated responsibilities.
[brief] His brief, page 18, states R 1:20A-6 mandates service of the Pre-Action Notice by certified and regular mail, yet the complaint he filed in 2019 admits it was never served and was returned to him for using a wrong address.  Da-2a ¶11.  In fact, the trial court’s 2019 decisions found there was no service so it dismissed the complaint.  Plaintiff cannot appear here and now argue that decision is wrong when he never filed an appeal of that decision.  Nevertheless, no Pre-Action Notice service occurred as the 2019 court orders, including the October 19, 2019 Order found that “service was not effected” and the complaint was dismissed.
[brief] ”  \textit{Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little}, 135 N.J. 274, 280 (1994).  Although, “as a practical matter, the fixing \textsuperscript{10}  For reasons already discussed, paragraph one (1) of the trial court’s November 10, 2021 interlocutory order must also be vacated. of rent due by the court . . . create[es] a finite sum that, if paid by the tenant, will be made available to the landlord to bring the tenant's rent current. ””  Green, 215 N.J. at 449-50.
[brief] THE STATE ELICITED INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY TESTIMONY FROM DETECTIVE WEISBROT THAT CHRISTOPHER MAZZARISI’S NAME “NEVER CAME UP” AND THAT “ALL THE INFORMATION AND EVIDENCE . . . RECEIVED INDICATED HE WAS NOT INVOLVED AND THAT [DEFENDANT] WAS,” IN VIOLATION OF MAZZARISI’S RIGHTS UNDER THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE.  (not raised below)  The State’s case was circumstantial and hinged on the prosecution’s ability to prove that [...] had a motive to commit the crimes at issue because he felt he was owed money by his mother and her family.  The defense presented a theory of third-party guilt by showing throughout trial that [...]’s brother and father, who lived minutes from the incidents, shared the same motive and were never investigated.  In support of its theory, the State elicited highly prejudicial testimony from [...] implying that evidence outside the record debunked [...]’s third-party guilt defense and implicated him.  (17T:224-7 to 16)  This testimony violated hearsay rules, Confrontation Clause principles, and [...]’s fundamental right to due process.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV; N.J. Const. (1947), art. I, pars. 1, 9, 10; State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 265-67 (1973); State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338, 342 (2005).  His convictions must be reversed.
[brief] Article VI of the Trust vests the Plaintiff, as Trustee, with typical, broad powers, including the powers including the right to “sell or exchange any property at public or private sale,” to manage any property, to “settle, compromise or refer to arbitration, any claim or obligation in favor of or against the Trust Estate,” to employ legal counsel, to distribute any Trust property “in such manner as the Trustee shall deem equitable,” and “in general, and without limitation by any specific enumeration herein, to manage, control, operate,…sell, exchange, lease…or otherwise encumber and deal with the Trust Estate, for and on behalf of this Trust and the Beneficiary(ies), to the same extent and with the same powers that any individual would have in respect to his own property and funds. ” (Da7-8).  The powers enumerated in the Trust are in addition to those granted by statute, which empowers a Trustee, “without authorization by the court,” to exercise the “powers conferred by the terms of the trust” as well as “all powers over the trust property which an unmarried competent owner has over individually owned property” and “any other powers appropriate to achieve the proper “investment, management, and distribution of the trust property” and any other powers authorized by the Probate Code.  N.J.S.A. 3B:31-69.  In its Trial Order following the plenary hearing, the trial court found that the Trust language, along with these statutory powers, “indisputably confers upon Plaintiff, as Trustee, the power to bring claims related to rental income of the Trust properties during the time they were Trust assets, as well as claims for reimbursement for legal fees and expenses related to litigation on behalf of the Trust.  (Pa95).  A trustee has non-delegable duty to collect and preserve the estate’s assets.
[directive] N.J.S.A.  See imprisonment. of life term extended or ordinary an to subject or murder is with used be to presumptions additional creates Directive for, this accounted are presumptions statutory those Although presumptions  The motion. release revocation of and/or detention pretrial a whether file to deciding in prosecutors by of exercise channel the to only designed are words, other in Directive, this of 8 and Section 7 in established this in nothing release, and of revocation or detention pretrial seek to whether deciding in discretion prosecutorial ones the than other presumption any apply to obliged are courts suggesting that as construed be should Directive amendment. constitutional and statute the implement Rules that Court in Law or Reform Bail the in codified 58
[brief] On October 20, 2023, the Trial Court held oral argument.  During oral argument, Appellant voluntarily withdrew his unjust enrichment claim.  T41:23-25.  On the record (and then confirmed by Orders dated October 20, 2023), the Trial Court correctly granted Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss\(^3\) and denied Appellant’s Cross-Motion to Vacate Default Judgment, Transfer, and Consolidate.  Pa155-59.  On December 4, 2023, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the Orders.  Pa160-66.  **ARGUMENT**
[brief] Parking areas shall have a minimum setback of 80 feet from the Route 202 right-of-way.  (4)  Parking areas shall be prohibited within required buffers.  (5)  All parking areas visible from public rights-of-way or adjacent residential development shall be screened with planting minimally 3 feet in height subject to Board approval.  Rows of parking with 10 spaces or more shall be separated by a landscaped island not less than 6 feet in width.  (6)  All parking areas shall be designed in accordance with the applicable provisions of Article X of this Chapter; however, an assisted living development in the Senior Housing – 2 Overlay District shall be exempt from the multifamily parking design requirements set forth at §230-90.H.
[brief] See Complaint in [...] v. Trust for Hazel Harrison, et als, Docket No. [...], Da82-Da86.  In November of 2005, he voluntarily dismissed the claims against all parties except [...].  [...] and [...] cross-moved for summary judgment.  In a memorandum opinion and order issued September 28, 2006, Presiding Judge [...] rejected three legal theories advanced by [...] in support of his easement claim - easement by necessity, easement by prescription and express easement - and granted summary judgment to [...] dismissing the complaint “with prejudice.
[brief] Given the severity of the [...]’ misconduct, the ALJ determined that progressive discipline was inappropriate here because “[t]he public good would be affected by returning an officer to a position where he previously failed to perform his official duties then falsified records to cover up his violations. ” (Pa027a).  Further, the ALJ explained that [...] allowed an attempted escape under his watch and therefore endangered his co-workers, other inmates, and the public at-large.  *Ibid.*  As such, the ALJ upheld the penalty of removal.  (Pa029a).  *v.  Final Decision*
[brief] The Legislature further finds and declares that the New Jersey Highlands is an essential source of drinking water, providing clean and plentiful drinking water for one-half of the State’s population, including communities beyond the New Jersey Highlands, from only 13 percent of the State’s land area; that the New Jersey Highlands contains other exceptional natural resources such as clean air, contiguous forest lands, wetlands, pristine watersheds, and habitat for fauna and flora, includes many sites of historic significance, and provides abundant recreational opportunities for the citizens of the State.  (emphasis added)  This is the only reference to air quality in the entire statute, and it is clear from reading the Highlands Act as a whole that the Legislature was concerned with the impact of major development within the Highlands Region on water resources.  Furthermore, in enacting the Highlands Act, the Legislature set forth the goals of the Regional Master Plan (“RMP”) in protecting and enhancing the environmental resources within the Highlands Region.  See N.J.S.A. 13:20-10.  As it pertains to the Preservation Area, those goals include, among others, the protection, restoration, and enhancement of surface and ground waters, the protection of “other resources of the Highlands Region, including but not limited to contiguous forests, wetlands, vegetated stream corridors, steep slopes, and critical habitat for fauna and flora”, and the conservation of water resources.
[brief] [...] is a well trained mechanical engineer, who had a long career with the U.S. Armed Forces in large-scale construction projects and who, for decades, has been an expert in construction and premises liability matters related to personal injury cases.  As such, his testimony would aid a jury in understanding the issues of this case at the time of trial.  He has a deep foundation in physics, as part of his training; he has participated as an expert in hundreds of cases on premises liability; and he has experience in about a couple of dozen cases in which lighting conditions were hazardous and in determining whether lighting was the cause of causation of an incident.  Lastly, [...] relied on [...]’s expertise, as an electrical engineer, for more in-depth lighting issues.
[directive] Sustained Charges: Incident(s) giving rise to the charge(s) and the date(s) on which it/they occurred  If checked, charges are continued on attached page.  If checked, incidents are continued on attached page.  The following disciplinary action has been taken against you:  Suspension for __________ working days, beginning ______________ and ending ___________________  Indefinite suspension pending criminal charges effective (date)  ____________________________________  Removal, effective (date)  _________________________________________________________________