ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] This means:  A.  (1)  W ap plede koupab de posesyon yon zam afe ak lentasyon pou itilize li kont lòt moun oubyen pou touye, komèt asasinaj envolontè agrave, asasinaj envolontè, kidnapinn, agresyon seksyèl agrave, kontak seksyèl; deli kontak seksyèl agrave, vòlè, vòl aletalaj oswa dèske w mawon; oswa  (1)  You are pleading guilty to possession of a firearm with intent to use it against the person of another or to murder, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, aggravated assault, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, robbery, burglary or escape; or (2)  W ap plede koupab de youn nan enfraksyon swivan sa yo ki fèt swa le oubyen aprè le 13 janvye 2008:
[brief] During a discovery conference that occurred on April 24, 2014 with the undersigned, counsel for [...] provided the Court with an additional affidavit of [...], the Director of Forensics for [...]  In his affidavit, [...] stated that RVM intends to change the process within which it imaged [...]’s iPhone the first time, by performing the full examination on site, rather than completing the analysis at RVM’s laboratory in New York.  See attached Affidavit, at ¶¶ 4–6.
[brief] Furthermore, [...] said the same of the street trees.  Addressing the waivers, he testified:  If the Board doesn't feel inclined to grant that design waiver, approve the application without it and we'll adjust the plans to accommodate.  (2T: p52, ln 2-5)  Plaintiff clearly proved the impracticality of the radial lot lines.  As noted above, there is no “hardship” that must be proven.
[brief] A minority discount “adjusts for lack of control over a business entity…”  *Brown v. Brown*, 348 N.J. Super. 466, 473  For example, if a Company were worth $1,000,000, a 51% stake is not worth $510,000 and a 49% stake is not worth $490,000.  The difference between 51% and 49% is the control of the business, which is obviously quite valuable in the context of small, closely-held companies.  Therefore, a 51% interest would be worth more than the aforementioned math would suggest (i.e., would receive a premium), while a 49% interest would be worth less (i.e., would receive a discount) to account for the value of control (or lack thereof).  Thus, the value of a 49% interest is derived by applying a control discount to the undiscounted value of the 49% of a given company, resulting something less than, for example, the $490,000 valuation in the foregoing hypothetical.  A marketability discount, on the other hand, “adjusts for a lack of liquidity in one’s interest in an entity.
[brief] [...] Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel [...] Deputy Attorney General [...] Attorney ID: 334042021  On the Brief [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY [...] [...], P.O. Box 093 [...]  Attorney for Respondent, [...] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...........................................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................3  A. Statutory and Regulatory Background ..................................................................................3  B. [...]’s Permit Application ....................................................................5  ARGUMENT  ......................................................................................................................................11  DEP PROPERLY ISSUED THE PERMIT BY RELYING ON ITS SPECIALIZED EXPERTISE TO APPLY ITS EXISTING REGULATIONS TO THE SUBSTANTIAL RECORD  .................................................................................................11  A.  DEP Was Not Required to Verify The Floodway Because No Activities Will Take Place In The Floodway (Responding to Appellant’s Point IV (C)) ..................................................................................................................13  B.  DEP Correctly Determined That A Pipe Culvert Was Proper.  (Responding To Appellant’s Point III)  .................................................................................................................................16  C.  Rulemaking Was Required Before The Cornell Studies Could Be Applied to Permit Applications (Responding to Appellant’s Point IV (A) and (B)) ..................................................................................................................23  D.  [...]’s WQMP Consistency Determination Argument Misunderstands How DEP Addressed Water Pollution (Responding to Appellant’s Point II) ..................................................................................................................33  CONCLUSION
[brief] Defendants’ position during the subdivision hearings before the Board and during oral argument before the Trial Court was that the issues would be dealt with at site plan.  (1T41-16 to 1T41-23; 1T42-3 to 1T42-20; 2T9-12 to 2T9-23; 2T22-1 to 2T22-11).  Plaintiffs are arguing here that the subdivision application must stand on its own and Applicant was required to submit all the required information under the MLUL and the township ordinance for subdivision applications.  As part of the application, Plaintiffs and the other members of the public should have had the right to cross-examine Defendant’s witnesses on those matters.  This did not happen, and therefore this Court should reverse the Trial Court’s order and remand the application to the Board.
[brief] The Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Hughes Justice Complex Trenton, NJ 08625  Re: State of NJ v. [...]  App. Div. Docket No.: [...]  On Appeal from [...] before the Honorable [...], J.S.C.  Dear Judges:  Please accept this letter in lieu of a more formal reply brief on behalf of the Appellant  [...] with regard to the above referenced appeal of the denial of a municipal appeal ([...]) before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. from a Municipal Court trial out of the [...].
[brief] 13  POINT I:  THERE IS NO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE REFLECTING A HEIGHT RESTRICTION IN PLAINTIFFS’ GENESIS DEED……………………………..  13  A.  Deed Restrictions are to be Strictly Construed…………………..  13  B.  Assuming, Arguendo, that [...] Intended to Impose Height Restrictions, They Would and Could Have Expressly Done So………………………………………..  15  C.  Neither The Developer Nor the Club Has Power To Change Deed Restrictions.  Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA (Case on Point)………………………………………..  16  D.  Alloco, Hernan and Cape May are Distinguishable…………..  21  E.  The Trial Court’s Order Poses No Harm to the [...]...........................................  24  F.  Defendant’s Assertion that Developer Must be Named as an Indispensable Party is without merit..............  26  POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED  THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW ON RECONSIDERATION..........................  31  VII.  CONCLUSION.........................................................................................
[brief] ###  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS | Subject Matter | Date | Appendix Page # and/or Transcript # | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|------------------------------------| | Final Judgment ([...], P.J.Ch.) | 8/26/2022 | Da4 | | Order Adding [...] as Plaintiff ([...], P.J.Ch.) | 8/8/2022 | Da260 | | Order Denying Reconsideration of 6/23/2022
[brief] In Benedict, in connection to the project to widen Routes 1 and 9, the [...] sought to acquire a 15-foot easement upon the frontage of defendant’s property, upon which defendants owned and operated a motel.  “The most dramatic impact of the [partial] taking is the elimination of fifteen parking spaces that had existed on the Motel’s property fronting on Route 1. ”  Benedict, supra at 74.  Over the City’s objection, the trial judge determined as a matter of law that the fifteen spaces had been lawfully created and properly utilized, and the motel was entitled to compensation for remainder damage.  Ibid.  In affirming the trial court’s ruling, the Appellate Division analyzed and distinguished the Appellate ruling in Comm’t of Transportation v. Faps Realty, Corp., 197 N.J. Super. 44 (App. Div. 1984); the distinctions drawn by the Appellate Division are informative to the Court in its consideration of the current matter.
[brief] Kindred is an application of the FAA principle that arbitration agreements are to be placed “on equal footing with all other contracts. ”  581 U.S. at 248.  The New Jersey Supreme Court repeatedly has held that its Atalese decision puts arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts.  The issue in Kindred was that the Kentucky Supreme Court had adopted a rule for powers of attorney that applied only to arbitration contracts and not any other contracts.  That is not the case here.  B.
[brief] (Pa139-Pa140).  All of Defendant’s national officials and officers are elected.  (Pa140).  The Grand Governor of the State of New Jersey is [...].  (Pa140).  The Assistant Grand Governor for the State of New Jersey Defendant [...].  (Pa140).  There are also elected officers at the local Temple level.  (Pa140).  All Grand Governors are elected by state members annually during the national convention.  (Pa140).  Under Rule 14, Grand Sheik [...] is the highest-ranking officer of the [...] (Pa140; Pa170).
[brief] But in discussing the less precise location information derived from historical cell-site analysis, our Court recently noted that “[a]cross the nation, state and federal courts have accepted expert testimony about cell site analysis for the purpose of placing a cell phone within a ‘general area’ at a particular time. ”  *State v. Burney*, 255 N.J. 1, 21-22 (2023) (emphasis added).  Other state and federal courts have reached differing results on “whether and when an expert is required to testify about historical cell site data.
[brief] *Ibid.*  The Commission considered [...]’s arguments that [...] incorrectly found that the union witnesses failed to cooperate with the investigation and wrongly relied on his disciplinary history.  *Ibid.*  But regardless of the union witnesses’ statements or lack thereof, the Commission found sufficient evidence to support that [...] violated the State Policy.  *Ibid.*  Nor was consideration of any prior disciplinary history necessary to its determination.  *Ibid.*  Thus, the Commission upheld [...]’s determination that [...]’s conduct on September 9, 2022 violated the State Policy.
[brief] ARGUMENT I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW (Raised Below: 5T 48:16-19)  The Appellate Division applies the “same standard when reviewing a trial court’s decision on an appeal from a decision of a board of adjustment. ”  See, e.g. CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. Borough of Lebanon Planning Bd./ Bd. of Adjustment, 414 N.J. Super. 563, 577 (App. Div. 2010) (citing D. Lobi Enters. v. Planning./Zoning Bd. of Borough of Sea Bright, 408 N.J. Super. 345, 360 (App. Div. 2009); N.Y. SMSA, L.P. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Weehawken, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 33 (App. Div. 2004)).  “It is well-settled that a decision of a zoning board may be set aside only when it is ‘arbitrary capricious or unreasonable. ’  A Court will not substitute its judgment for that of a board ‘even when it is doubtful about the wisdom of the action. ’  Because a board of adjustment's actions are presumed valid, the party ‘attacking such action has the burden of proving otherwise. ’  Accordingly, [a Court] will not disturb a board's decision unless [it] finds a clear abuse of discretion. ”  Cell South of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of West Windsor Twp., 172 N.J. 75, 81-82 (2002) (internal citations omitted).
[brief] *Camp v. Jiffy Lube*, 309 N.J. Super. 305, 309 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 386 (1998).  The questions of negligence and proximate cause of the incident are ordinarily separate questions.  *Terminal Constr. Corp. v. Bergen County*, 18 N.J. 294, 341 (1955); *Correa v. Maggiore*, 196 N.J. Super. 273, 286 (App. Div. 1984); *Corridon v. City of Bayonne*, 129 N.J. Super.  393, 398 (App. Div. 1974)  A jury may allocate fault to a party in a negligence action only where it determines that party was negligent and that party's negligence was a proximate cause of the damages suffered.  *Fernandes v. DAR Dev. Corp.*, 222 N.J. 390, 408 (2015)  The determination of proximate cause is a decision for the jury to make.
[brief] There are no procedures in place for discovery tools such as interrogatories, notices to produce documents, party or non-party depositions, or subpoena power.  There is no authority to issue, or enforce, subpoenas, compel depositions, or compel the production of documents.  (Pa377).  Under §7 of [...]’s Rules, the party filing an arbitration demand submits whatever “amounts claimed, bills and assignments” it believes are necessary.  (Pa383-84).  [...]’s Rule §8 describes a respondent’s reciprocal, yet permissive, discovery obligation.  (Pa385).  [...]’s Rules contain no mechanism to compel or enforce the exchange of documents and evidence.  (Pa395).  The result of this limited subject matter and scope of review is that it is impossible for PIP arbitrators to resolve the issues in a large and complex IFPA case.
[brief] ”  Da934.  [...] argued this regulation was *ultra vires* because it did not --- \(^8\) *See Db43* (criticizing other definitions of “excessive” as “unworkable” while ignoring that (i) regulations for *this statute* would not have to replicate them and (ii) the other regulations apply definitions bespoke to those contexts).  comport with the statutory mandate that increases “promote premium adequacy” and “prevent substantial rate increases rather than protect policyholders in the event of a substantial increase. ”  Da934.  If anything, that brief is consistent with [...]’s position here.  Db42–43.  Here too [...] is asking the Court to ensure that the Department complies with this Act’s command that the “[t]he commissioner shall promulgate regulations . . . necessary to effectuate the purposes of this act. ”  Pb26–27.  At bottom, the Department’s about face and shifting definitions, without rules and regulations that define “excessive,” confirm exactly the problem that [...] identified.  Like in Boller Beverages, 38 N.J. at 152 and Metromedia, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 329 (1984), the Department’s interpretation of the statutory term allows it to do whatever it wants, making the term “excessive,” at best, a moving target.  This is contrary to established law that rulemaking is necessary here.  Pb25–28.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] See Highland Lakes Country Club and Community Ass’n v. Nicastro, 406 N.J. Super. 145, 151 (App. Div. 2009); Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328, 340 (2002).  Rather, the court is required to focus on the substance of the allegations underlying the claim, not the way that they are characterized by the claimants.  Whether the Affidavit of Merit Statute is applicable depends on whether “the claim’s underlying factual allegations require proof of a deviation from the professional standard of care applicable to that specific profession. ”  Couri, 173 N.J. at 340.  Where such proof is required, an affidavit of merit is mandatory.  Id. at 341.  Here, it is undisputed that plaintiffs never served an affidavit of merit, which as the trial court correctly concluded, required the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against [...].
[brief] **  On February 20, 2023, defendant filed a Notice of R. 3:24 Municipal Appeal.  36a.  That appeal sought the following relief:  Defendant, [...], hereby appeals to the Superior Court of Ocean County from the Order of the Ship Bottom Municipal Court Municipal Court, denying defendant’s post-conviction relief to correct his 10 year loss of license sentence to the sentence he bargained for on February 8, 2013, to run concurrently, or in the alternative, vacating his plea of guilty.
[brief] Appellants [...] and [...] ask this Court to overturn a decision of the Commissioner of Education and to supplant it with an interpretation of the school regionalization statute that is both divorced from the wider statutory scheme and that would lead to an absurd and profoundly unfair result.  The Court should not indulge this unwise course of action for two principle reasons: (1) the Commissioner of Education is tasked with enforcing and interpreting the education statutes and possesses extensive expertise and experience in doing so, and her decision therefore is subject to substantial deference that is particularly warranted here; and (2) both the plain language of the school regionalization statute and the overall statutory scheme conclusively support the Commissioner’s holding that Respondent [...] is entitled to pursue withdrawal from Appellants’ school districts.
[brief] Indeed, the [...]’s Franchise Rule Compliance Guide similarly explains as follows:  The [Franchise Rule] exempts purely oral relationships that lack any written evidence of a material term of the franchise relationship or agreement, as a matter of policy, to avoid problems of proof in its enforcement.  However, *the exemption does not apply when there is any writing, even if unsigned, with respect to a material term, such as a purchase invoice for goods or equipment.*
[brief] 1 REPLY ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................  1 POINT I.  THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE CONSUMER FINANCE LICENSING ACT ..............................................................................................................  1 POINT II.  THE CONSUMER FRAUD ACT COVERS DEBT COLLECTION ACTIVITY .................................................................................................................................  10 POINT III.  [...] SUFFERED AN ASCERTAINABLE LOSS .............................................  12 POINT IV.  [...]’S CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA, OR THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE .......................................................................................  13 CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................................  15  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] *Id.* at 577.  In doing so, the Court was careful to note that “[w]e make no suggestion that the lost profits proofs presented to the trial court in either case meet the standard of reasonable certainty. ”  *Id.*  From a procedural standpoint, the Court provided the following directions:  --- \(^2\)  The Supreme Court granted certification on consolidated appeals arising from two separate lawsuits filed by Plaintiffs with respect to two separate development projects.
[brief] Transcript on Order to Show Cause (September 13, 2024) ......................... T1 Transcript of Case Management Conference (October 24, 2024) ............... T2 Transcript of Motion Proceeding (September 24, 2024) ............................. T3 | Authority | Page(s) | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Advance Elec. Co. v. Montgomery Twp. Bd. of Educ., | 11-12 | | 351 N.J. Super. 160 (App. Div. 2002) | | | Barrick v. State, Dep't of Treasury, Div. of Prop. Mgmt. & Const., | 5 | | 218 N.J. 247 (2014) | | | Brockwell & Carrington Contractors, Inc. v. Kearny Bd. of Educ., | 9 | | 420 N.J. Super. 273 (App. Div. 2011) | | | Meadowbrook Carting Co. v. Borough of Island Heights, | 6, 10 | | 138 N.J. 307 (1994) | | | Muirfield Const. Co. v. Essex Cnty. Improvement Auth., | 9, 11 | | 336 N.J. Super. 126 (App. Div. 2000) | | | P & A Const., Inc. v. Twp. of Woodbridge, | 9 | | 365 N.J. Super. 164 (App. Div. 2004) | | | Palamar Const., Inc. v. Pennsauken Twp., | 5 | | 196 N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 1983) | | | Suburban Disposal, Inc. v. Twp. of Aberdeen, | 6-9 | | A-3176-12T3, 2014 WL 2131662 | | | (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 23, 2014) | | | Terminal Const. Corp. v. Atl. Cnty. Sewerage Auth., | 10 | | 67 N.J. 403 (1975) | | | Tufano v. Bor. of Cliffside Park in Bergen Cnty., | 9 | | 110 N.J.L. 370 (Sup. Ct. 1933) | | | Waszen v. Atl. City, 1 N.J. 272 (1949) | 9 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT [...]’s arguments for affirmance come down to a single proposition: if a public entity requires bidders to submit a document with their bid to demonstrate the existence of a fact about the bidder, and the public entity could theoretically obtain the same information after bid opening by making a request to another public entity, a bidder’s failure to submit the document cannot be a material defect and the public entity retains no discretion to reject the bid.
[brief] G. [...] Was a Multi-Jurisdictional Transactional Attorney  [...] testified:  In my experience as a multi-jurisdictional transactional lawyer, the buyers and sellers or a ² [...] refused to specify what part of the engagement involved those jurisdictions.  Da213-15 at Nos. 40-46.  borrower and lender are seldom located in the same jurisdiction.  And oftentimes where they are located, they are in jurisdictions that do not have developed laws that sophisticated parties adopt as the choice of law for transactions that are not local transactions.  Pa8 47:18–25.  He also testified that, when he takes on a representation, he does not give thought to which law pertains to the agreements he reviews and that he feels the law governing the document is “rarely relevant” to any advice to the clients.  Pa3–Pa4 28:4–12 & 28:19–29:7.  [...] was neither guided by [...] in his intake nor advised how to properly staff a case to comport with practice of law requirements; however, he was well-versed in the benefits provided to his clients by use of a national/international firm, indicating they no longer had to hire “special counsel” or a “specialist” from other firms.  Pa5 35:5–20.  As a result, [...] never staffed a case based on the jurisdictional law being analyzed while employed at [...].  Pa5–Pa6 35:21–36:4.  Further, he does not recall [...] having protocols or policies in place for its transactional attorneys regarding multi-jurisdictional practice and case staffing.  Pa6 36:5–14.  [...] views multi-jurisdictional practice as involving a lawyer in one jurisdiction who may have a transaction that involves other jurisdictions.  Whenever he encounters such a transaction, however, he does not conduct an analysis to determine if he can meet the client’s needs or whether he should bring in additional attorneys admitted in other jurisdictions to help.  Pa6–Pa7 36:22–37:23.  [...] testified he never registered in any jurisdiction as a multi-jurisdictional practitioner:  “I mean, handling multi-state transactions, I have done those as a D.C. – a lawyer licensed in D.C. ”  Pa9 53:7–23.  Throughout his representation of Plaintiff, he never associated with a New Jersey attorney in [...]’s New Jersey office, nor did he associate with an attorney admitted in North Dakota, although [...] apparently had one associate in its Texas office who was barred there.  Da211 No. 33.
[brief] ”  In *Kanter v. Passaic*, 107 N.J. Super. 556 (Law Div. 1969), the subject property was included within an area of the redevelopment plan known as “Urban Renewal Plan for the Downtown Passaic Project, No. N.JR.-71” after being determined to be a “blighted area” under the LRHL’s predecessor statute.  The [...] approved the plan, which provided that it may be amended from time to time by resolution of the Board of Commissioners of the [...] and the [...].  *Id.* at 559-560.  The Board of Commissioners adopted a resolution that provided that an office building not in excess of 18,000 square feet may be erected on the site in question and that “no on-site parking shall be required. ”  *Id.* at 560.  Under the zoning ordinance applicable to the property prior to the adoption of the resolution, there was a requirement that one on-site parking space be provided for every 400 square feet of gross floor area for an office use in excess of 10,000 square feet.  *Id.* at 559.  Like Plaintiff here, the plaintiffs challenged the adoption of the resolution on the ground that it constituted “spot zoning.