ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Further, in Appellant’s letter to the Court dated 6/2/2022, payments in the amount of $54,500 were identified as not being acknowledged by Probation for that period.  The Court should have *sua ponte* scheduled a hearing to adjudicate Appellant’s claims and evidence of court-ordered overpayment for the period in question.  *(Tancredi v. Tancredi, and Harrington v. Harrington).*  The Court erred and abused its judicial discretion in overlooking or failing to consider 1) the evidence of over-payments submitted by Appellant and 2) the court Orders supporting overpayment, and in failing to meet its obligation to hold a hearing to resolve the material disputed facts of the case.
[brief] When deliberating, the jury may have asked themselves: did the overall evidence provide a strong probability to believe that [...] was the person who committed the crime?  The jury could have found, hypothetically, that there was only a reasonable probability that [...] was the one that committed the crime, but not a strong probability that he did so.  With proper instruction from the model charge, the jury would have relied on this basis to acquit: the reasonable probability of [...]’s guilt constituted reasonable doubt as to [...]’s guilt.  Without proper instruction, however, the jury would not have known that they were permitted to acquit on such a basis.  There was thus a substantial risk that they mistakenly believed that if the State’s evidence did not prove Pierce’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, then they could not acquit [...] under the theory of third-party guilt.
[brief] (Da55, Da125, Da267, Da283, Da358)268, Da358)  [...] did state that [...] was the record owner of Lot 22 as in error, the [...] sold Lot 22, [...] to [...] per the Deed which was in error because Lot 22, [...] was owned in part by [...].  (Da117, Da118, Da278)  [...] at deposition testified that years ago he had performed a survey for [...] and he was asked to provide that survey.  The survey was never provided, however, other documents that were requested at the time of his deposition were provided.  (Da136, T85:6-13)  RESPONSE TO POINT I THE GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO NEW COMMUNITY CORPORATION SHOULD NOT BE UPHELD BECAUSE THERE WAS A FAILURE TO ADHERE TO THE ADVERSE POSSESSION STANDARD WHICH HAD IT BEEN ADHERED TO WOULD HAVE OBVIATED
[brief] ”  [Pa151]; •  In dismissing Count 8 of the First Amended Complaint (injunctive relief), “[Appellants’] claims fail due to their damages being the direct and proximate result of [Appellants’] own failure to make the payments due under the Lease. ”  [Pa153]; and •  In its conclusion, “[Appellants] defaulted under their Lease with [...] for the Property on which [Appellants] were going to pursue the Solar Project.  After several notices, [...] then terminated the Lease with [Appellants].  [...] then entered into a lease with [...] and became the successor to the Solar Project…  The termination of the Lease was due simply because of [Appellants’] own default.  That event enabled [...] to become successors to this solar farm development.
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[brief] By letter dated September 23, 2019, the Firm responded to Defendants’ request for information concerning the OAE Proceeding.  [Pa481]  The Firm advised Defendants that it did not report the OAE Proceeding in its applications because it in no way involved “any complaint by a client or the provision of Legal Services. ”  [Pa487]  Thus, the Firm submitted to Defendants that it correctly responded to the questions set forth in the Policy Applications.  On October 28, 2019, Defendants nevertheless sent a letter to the Firm rescinding the Policies as to all insureds, including those who were not involved in the Policy Applications (“Innocent Insureds”).  [Pa495]  The letter further advised that Defendants were, concurrent with its letter, commencing a declaratory judgment action.  [Pa495]  [...] also stated that it was simultaneously tendering to the Firm a check for all premiums paid.  [Pa495].  It did not do so until more than three months later—demonstrating its lack of candor in this matter.  [Pa572, Pa575, Pa666]  G.  Plaintiffs’ Response To Defendants’ Improper Rescission Of The Policies.
[brief] “[O]ne of the well-recognized exceptions warranting relief from the statute of limitations [for claims in lieu of prerogative writs] is based on consideration of public rather than private interests. ”  Save Camden Pub. Sch. v. Camden City Bd. of Ed., 454 N.J. Super. 478, 489 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Reilly v. Brice, 109 N.J. 555, 558 (1988)).  Courts have granted “even a substantial enlargement of time” when a case involves a matter of special public interest.  Cohen v. Thoft, 368 N.J. Super. 338, 346 (App. Div. 2004); Mullen v. Ippolito Corp., 428 N.J. Super. 85, 106 (App. Div. 2012) (allowing an action in lieu of prerogative writs to proceed despite a multi-year delay because the issue involved a matter of “important public interest”).
[brief] [6T7-7 to 8-4].  Defendant’s sentence is in conformity with the Directive and its objectives.  Contrary to defendant’s arguments, the trial court did weigh aggravating and mitigating factors when it sentenced defendant.  The court found aggravating factors (3), (6), and (9) applied to defendant’s conviction.  She did not find any mitigating factors applied.  [6T12-16 to -23].  Defendant’s sentence is well-within the guidelines.  It does not shock the judicial conscience.  Defendant had convictions out of New Hampshire for distribution or possession with intent to distribute controlled dangerous substances.  He also had a conviction for sexual assault.  [PSR].  When fashioning the statement with defense counsel, the State and defendant took defendant’s age and circumstances into consideration.  The 12-year, four years without parole, aggregate sentence considered defendant’s health, age, and also the weighty nature of the charges for which he was found guilty.  Defendant’s sentence is appropriate and does not shock the judicial conscience, nor does it violate the tenets of the Attorney General’s guidelines.  Defendant cannot succeed on this argument.  2.
[brief] **B.  The award of punitive damages was excessive.  (39970a-39989a). **  Even if punitive damages awards were warranted, and they were not, the trial court's award was excessive.  The trial court awarded punitive damages that were 2.5 times the amount of the compensatory damages.  (39978a).  The disparity between the actual harm suffered and the punitive damages awarded is substantial, unreasonable, and unjustified.  “When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of due process guarantee. ”  *State Farm*, 538 U.S. at 419; see also *Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker*, 554 U.S. 471, 515 (2008) (finding a punitive-to-compensatory ratio of 1:1 yields maximum punitive damages); *Jurinko v. Medical Protective Co.*, 305 Fed. Appx. 13, 28 (3d Cir. 2008) (limiting punitive damages to 1:1 where “the compensatory damages are substantial, [the damaged party] suffered only economic harm, and the harm was easily measured.
[brief] On October 11, 2023, plaintiff filed a Motion for leave to appeal with the appellate court (Case #: [...]) and filed the brief on November 10, 2023 (Pa116 – Pa126).  Defendants filed their responses on November 27, 2023 (Pa127 – Pa149).  ³ 2T = transcript of March 31, 2023  On December 12, 2023, the appellate court denied the plaintiff’s Motion (Pa150).  The case has been closed as of May 12, 2023.  On February 14, 2024, defendant [...] filed a motion to dismiss (Pa151 – Pa160).  The trial court stated that the plaintiff had not complied with the appellate court’s order for a sufficient time; therefore, it dismissed the case with prejudice on March 1, 2024 (Pa161 – Pa170).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] This appeal arises from the sale and purchase of the real property located at [...] (collectively, the “Property”).  In 2011, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (“[...]”) designated the Property a contaminated site, and to date, the Property remains subject to remedial investigation and remediation under the [...] Site Remediation Reform Act (“SRRA”), N.J.S.A. 58:10C-1 et seq.  Plaintiff is an affiliated entity of the [...], which acquires, redevelops, and owns a large portfolio of properties throughout the State.
[brief] The Intervenor suggests that Plaintiff’s public notice is somehow deficient since it did not indicate that the Plaintiff sought approval for basement apartments.  The reasons is simple, however: Plaintiff sought no such approval.  The application sought “a Major Subdivision approval for the purpose of creating nine residential lots from three existing lots. ”  (Ia18)  The project narrative also stated that the applicant sought “a Major Subdivision Approval for the purpose of creating nine (9) single family lots from three (3) existing lots. ”  (Ia23)  The Resolution, in its very first finding of fact, states:
[brief] Defendants’ position notwithstanding, substantively, the “revised SAC” suffers from the same underlying issue as all the prior pleadings identified by [...], [...] and [...]: it is rambling, convoluted, full of unnecessary digressions and references and still alleges violations of federal constitutional rights which Plaintiff specifically dismissed and disclaimed in 2019.  (Pa259-312; see, e.g., paragraph 308 of the proposed amended pleading alleging multiple federal constitutional violations).  It is not possible for the Defendants to meaningfully respond to such a pleading, nor does the pleading sufficiently appraise the Defendants as to the wrongful conduct and causes of action being alleged against them.  Thus, even if this Plaintiff’s proposed “remedy” of having this Court review the “revised SAC” was properly before this Court, it is clear that the “revised SAC” does not meet the New Jersey Superior Court pleading standard.
[brief] The undisclosed clause was unenforceable (raised below: Pa1, Pa5, 1T4, 1T16-20)  The trial court erred by finding that because it was not intentionally concealed, the undisclosed clause was nonetheless still enforceable.  Likewise, it was error to find that a tournament participant should need to spend additional money to purchase a rule book, then expend an excessive amount of time to read that nearly 400-page rule book cover to cover, all just to find out what other (if any) undisclosed limitations may exist as to the announced prizes for each event.  Further still, it was error for the trial court not to at least consider the authorities I was citing (and then render a statement of reasons as to why he believed those to be inapplicable).  In Hoffman v. Supplements Togo Mgmt., LLC, 419 NJ Super. 596 (App Div. 2011), this Court held that the disputed clause was unenforceable because it "was unreasonably masked from the view of the prospective purchasers because of its circuitous mode of presentation."  Id. at 611-612  This Court therein recognized and adopted the rulings in Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir.N.Y. 2002), which found the “browse wrap” agreement to be unenforceable:  [T]he Second Circuit held in Specht that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because the plaintiffs had not been provided with reasonable notice of its existence.  Id. at 31-32.  Applying California state law, which, like our State, requires such reasonable notice as a predicate to enforceability, the Second Circuit concluded that the arbitration clause lacked the plaintiffs' knowing assent.  Ibid.  The court was unpersuaded that "a reasonably prudent [person] in these circumstances would have known of the existence of [the] license terms."  Id. at 31.  Instead, the plaintiffs in Specht "were responding to an offer that did not carry an immediately visible notice of the existence of license terms or require unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms."
[directive] Ladies and Gentlemen;  Welcome to your term of service as Grand Jurors.  This charge will inform you of your duties and of the responsibilities of being a Grand Juror as well as the principles of law that govern your deliberations.  This charge contains general instructions concerning the discharge of your duties.  The court will always be available to provide additional instructions, and you may request them at any time through your foreperson or your clerk.  I recognize that this experience is new for most of you and that it may be difficult to fully absorb the details of this charge and your oath at this time.  However, we will provide you with a copy of this charge and your oath.  The primary function of the Grand Jury is to determine what criminal charges may be brought as a result of cases heard by you, and to determine which matters should not be continued in the criminal justice system because there is insufficient evidence for the charges.  Criminal prosecutions do not begin merely because someone accuses another of violating the law.  There must be an inquiry made by a Grand Jury before an accused person may be brought to trial.  The Grand Jury, does not determine guilt or innocence.  That is the responsibility of a petit jury.  When a case reaches the Grand Jury, evidence concerning the charge is presented, primarily in the form of sworn testimony, and a vote is taken on whether or not to indict.  If you determine that criminal charges should be brought, you will return an indictment.  An indictment is simply a formal writing prepared on behalf of the State of New Jersey setting forth the name of the defendant, the alleged criminal conduct, and specifying the criminal statute or statutes of this State allegedly violated by that conduct.  [Standard Grand Jury Charge]
[brief] State v. Bell, 90 N.J. 163 (1982) .........................................................................................27  State v. Hudson, 443 N.J. Super. 276 (App. Div. 2015)  .............................................................37  In re Trust for the Benefit of Duke, 305 N.J. Super. 408 (Ch. Div. 1995), aff’d o.b., 305 N.J. Super. 407 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 73 (1997)
[directive] An officer authorized to use a CED pursuant to this policy may fire, discharge, or utilize drive stun mode of the CED during an actual operation, only against: (a) an active assailant; or (b) a threatening assailant who will not voluntarily submit to custody after having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so considering the exigency of the situation and the immediacy of the need to employ law enforcement force; or (c) a person who is attempting to cause death or serious bodily injury to him/herself; or (d) a fleeing suspect if clear and convincing evidence exists to believe the suspect has committed a crime in which the suspect caused or attempted to cause death or serious bodily injury.
[directive] Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description  Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option Grading –  First degree if substantial interruption or impairment of public communication, transportation, supply of water, gas or power, or other public service.  2C:20-25(a-f)  3rd Degree  Computer Theft  $5,000 to $25,000  10% permissible  Second degree – Any violation of subsection b. or a violation of subsection c. if the value of (continued) (continued) the services, property, personal identifying information, or money obtained or sought to be obtained exceeds $5,000; or a violation of subsection e. if the data, database, or computer program… contained personal identifying information, medical information concerning an identifiable person, protected government or court records, or has a value exceeding $5,000.  Third degree – Any other violation of subsection c; any other violation of subsection e; a violation of subsection f. if the damage exceeds $5,000.  $1,500 to $2,500 10% permissible  4th Degree  Fourth degree – Any other violation of subsection f. 2C:21-1  Actor, with purpose to defraud or injure another, makes or alters or utters documents which 3rd Degree  $5,000 to $20,000  10% permissible  Forgery are forged or fictitious; third or fourth degree depending upon types of documents as laid out 47  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] Immediately after completing the charges on the various assault charges, [...] began his jury charge on self-defense, which tracked the model jury charge on self-defense when there is the use of deadly force.  (Sa17-Sa19; 27T185-1 to 27T189-19).  [...] reiterated that count one of the indictment charged defendant with the crime of murder and count two charged him with the crime of attempted murder.  (27T185-2 to 5).  The judge then stated “[a]s to these counts of the indictment and the lesser included charges,” defendant contended that he had acted in self-defense.  (27T185-6 to 10).  Defendant argues that the trial court erred here by not explaining to the jury that passion/provocation manslaughter were lesser included offenses of murder and attempted murder and by stating that self-defense applied to them, as well.  (Db19).  But defendant’s belated challenge takes the structure and language of [...]’s jury charge out of context.  While passion/provocation manslaughter is referred to by the courts as a “lesser include offense,” State v. Carrero, 229 N.J. 118, 229 (2017), it is not referred to as such when charging the jury because it is part and parcel of the elements that the State must satisfy to convict of purposeful or knowing murder.  It would have been out of context and somewhat confusing to explain passion/provocation manslaughter as a "lesser included offense" during the self-defense charge when the judge had just so carefully, and properly, instructed the jury on the interplay between murder and passion/provocation manslaughter during the substantive instruction on murder and attempted murder and had included passion/provocation as a possible verdict for both counts one and two.  The fact that defense counsel raised no issue on this point shows that he did not read the court's charge as precluding the jury from considering self-defense as it applied to all offenses related to counts one and two.  As the record stands, the judge's instruction at the outset of the charge on self-defense expressly told the jury that the defense pertained to counts one and two, which the jury knew had included passion/provocation manslaughter.  The judge also instructed that self-defense applied to the "lesser" included charges for count two, which the jury knew referred to the various assault charges.  As noted above, jury charges are read in context and in their entirety.  And plain error requires a clear and obvious error.  There was no error on the facts in this case that was clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
[brief] To label claims arising from facts which implicate civil law theft as “legal malpractice” is offensive to the integrity of the profession and the entire judicial system.  The same Tort Counts which were dismissed against [...] through an abusive and unjust misapplication of the AOM statute, remained alive and well against all the other non-attorney co-conspirators Defendants, proceeded to trial, and settled.  As such, since [...] have a license to practice law in the State of New Jersey, an improper use of the AOM statute shielded them from liability while all the non-attorney co-conspirator Defendants faced liability under Plaintiffs’ allegations arising out of the same, single conspiracy.
[brief] The Faulty Leary Report  In support of its abandonment motion, [...] offered the Certification in Support of Motion to Determine that Property is Abandoned executed by [...], a Manager for [...], dated as of September 14, 2022 (the “Matos Cert.”) in which Mr. Matos stated as follows:  10.  [...] performs property inspections on behalf of Plaintiff.  11.  [...]'s professional qualifications, including building inspector, enable him to make a determination as to the abandoned status of a property.  In addition, he is a Licensed Construction Official, Building Sub Code Official and Housing Code Official, which qualifies him to deliver an opinion as to the abandonment of real property.  12.  On January 28, 2022, Mr. Leary inspected the exterior of the Property located at [...], Block 270, Lot 14 (the "Property").  A copy of the inspection report and pictures of the Property are attached hereto as Exhibit "E" and made a part hereof.  13.  Based upon Mr. Leary's inspection of the property, Plaintiff submits that the Property meets the definition of abandoned pursuant to N.J.S.A. 55:19-81.  (41a).  The Leary Report attached pictures which were not pictures of the Property.  (66a-70a).  After research, Appellants were able to ascertain that the property identified in the Leary Report is in fact [...] which was owned by [...].  (99a-102a).
[brief] (Pa152:29-6 to 16, Pa152:31-4 to 14 and Pa152:31-18 to 25) and (Pa157:25-613).  Plaintiff alleges the trailers for the movie failed to play but admits that she could still see lights on the aisles inside the theater.  (Pa152:29-6 to 16, Pa152:31-4 to 14 and Pa152:31-18 to 25).  Plaintiff attempts to use this guest incident report as a smoking gun showing how [...] was on notice of litigation, but yet it is completely devoid of any pertinent facts or accusations against [...] to be on notice of.  (Pa77).  Furthermore, plaintiff’s son, [...], readily admits he wrote down general details on the report regarding the accident after enjoying the movie.  (Pb6).  Plaintiff’s theory of liability crumbles based on the facts, but plaintiff continued to pursue the fruitless endeavor.  The Honorable [...] merely relied upon the evidence presented to her by the Plaintiff and therefore correctly found that the guest incident report failed to put [...] on notice to preserve any specific evidence and certainly not the referenced logs.
[brief] Personnel at [...] have expertise in the breeding of stallions.  (Pa273a).  Defendants [...] and [...] were in charge of making decisions regarding the schedule for collecting semen from [...].  (Pa303a).  [...], co-owner of [...], which operated as the “Stallion Manager” for the [...] Syndicate, agreed that Defendants [...] and/or [...], as the Syndicate Manager, were “essentially in charge of the [...] Syndicate.
[brief] I, ¶ 7 | 10 | | N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 9 | 19, 26, 32 | | N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 10 | 19, 26, 32 | | U.S. Const. amend. IV | 10 | | U.S. Const. amend. VI | 25, 32 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV | 10, 19, 25, 32 | | OTHER AUTHORITIES | |-------------------| | Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2021-4, Directive Revising Statewide Guidelines Concerning the Waiver of Mandatory Minimum Sentences in Non-Violent Drug Cases
[brief] Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994).........................................................46  Goodman v. London Metals Exchange, Inc., 86 N.J. 19 (1981)...........................................................................29,45  Greenberg v. Camden Cnty. Vocational & Technical Schs., 310 N.J.Super. 189 (App.Div.1998)..................................................45