ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 7.  Dispute Resolution/Waiver of Jury Trial.  If a dispute arises under this Agreement or from Participant’s use of the Premises or participation in the Activities, the Participant shall engage in good faith efforts to mediate a settlement prior to filing a demand for arbitration.  Should the dispute not be resolved by mediation, [...] and the Participant agree that all disputes, controversies, or claims arising out of the Participant’s use of the Premises or participation in the Activities shall be submitted to binding arbitration before and in accordance with the Commercial Rules of the [...] then in effect.  It is acknowledged, understood, and agreed that any such arbitration will be final and binding, and that by agreeing to arbitration, the parties are waiving their respective rights to seek remedies in court, including the right to a jury trial.  The parties waive, to the fullest extent permitted by law, any right they may have to a trial by jury in any legal proceedings directly or indirectly arising out of or relating to this Agreement, whether based in contract, tort, statute (including any federal or state statute, law, ordinance, or regulation), or any other legal theory.  It is expressly acknowledged, understood, and agreed that; arbitration is final and binding; the parties are waiving their right to seek legal remedies in court including the right to a trial by jury; pre-arbitration discovery generally is more limited than and different from that available in court proceedings; the arbitrator’s award is not required to include factual findings or legal reasoning; and any party’s right to appeal or vacate, or seek modification of the arbitration award is strictly limited by law…  8.
[brief] Plaintiff’s repeated references to the snow removal contract terms, especially the 6 AM completion time and prohibition against subcontracting the work, only served to prejudice the jury against Defendants.  Clearly, Plaintiff wanted the jury to infer that these contractual breaches inevitably reflected upon how Defendants actually performed the snow removal on the date of loss.  By harping upon these contractual violations, the court misled the jury into believing that these contractual violations were equivalent to a breach of the duty of care.  Obviously, this led the jury to apply the wrong law and standard of care, which rendered the trial unfair.
[brief] Generally, “the reliability of an informant’s tip must be analyzed under the totality of the circumstances. ”  *State v. Smith*, 155 N.J. 83, 92, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1033 (1998).  “Two factors generally considered to be highly relevant, if not essential, that are included in the ‘totality of the circumstances’ are the informant’s ‘veracity’ and the informant’s ‘basis of knowledge.
[brief] [...] Parties’ Negotiations With Appellants | 16 | | C. [...]’s Default Under The Lease | 17 | | ARGUMENT | 20 | | I.  The Applicable Standard of Review | 20 | | II.  The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Applying The Entire Controversy Doctrine To Dismiss Appellants’ Complaint With Prejudice | 23 | | III.  The Trial Court Properly Determined That Appellants’ Complaint Failed To State A Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted Against [...] | 31 | | A. Fraud Claim | 31 | | B. Breach Of Contract/Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim | 37 | | C. Breach of Lease and Unlawful Self-Help Claim | 42 | IV.  The Trial Court Did Not Err In Considering [...]’s Motion To Dismiss The Appellants’ Complaint Under R. 4:6-2(2)  As Opposed To R. 4:46-2..............................................46  CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................49
[brief] JUDGE VIOLATED CANON 3 OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT BY FAILING TO DISCHARGE HIS JUDICIAL DUTIES DILIGENTLY, EXPEDITIOUSLY, AND IMPARTIALLY.  AS A SUPERVISING COURT, THE APPELLATE DIVISION SHOULD REVIEW  MOTION  JUDGE’S DILATORY CONDUCT AND ACTIONS WITHOUT ANY DEFERENCE.  (Pa1149, Pa1224)  VII.  DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ABBREVIATE TRANSCRIPTS IS A REVERSIBLE ERROR
[brief] *See North Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co.*, 158 N.J. 561, 570, 730 A.2d 843 (1999).  Conversely then, a court should not give a contractual fee provision an unreasonable or hyper-technical construction in order to limit its scope to avoid an award of fees.  A party may agree by contract (as here) to pay attorneys’ fees, including “those instances where, as here, the parties have bargained for an aggrieved party to recover its counsel fees and costs as part of its contract damages or ‘losses. ’ ”  *Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc.*, 200 N.J. 372, 406, 982 A.2d 420, 440 (2009) (quoting *N. Bergen Rex Transp.* at 570).
[brief] “A court should ‘ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole. ’”  D’Ambrosio v. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 403 N.J. Super. 321, 334 (App. Div. 2008) (citing DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492).  Here, the Legislature clearly intended a limitation period of eligibility for the presumption or recalculation provided under the Ricci Act, as the plain language of the statute sets a two-year deadline ending July 8, 2021, after which a “retiree shall not be eligible” for such benefits.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  Under [...]’s argument, any member of [...] who was unaware of the Ricci Act could apply at any arbitrarily distant point in the future.  This would nullify the two-year time limitation created by the Legislature, extend the presumption beyond its intended time frame, and diminish the ability of the Division and the Board to verify applicants’ dates and locations of service as witnesses and memories inevitably continue to become unavailable and fade.  Ignoring the plain language of the statute, which imposes a two-year deadline, would not further the Act’s legislative purpose.  Even if the statutory language were not clear, [...]’s position would lead to an absurd result which would render the two-year statutory limitation superfluous.  In this regard, “[w]hen construing a statute, ‘legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. ’”  State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 449 (2011) (quoting Franklin Tower One, LLC v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 613 (1999).  Accordingly, the Board reasonably denied [...]’s request to apply for amended benefits under the Ricci Act because he failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form within the required statutory timeframe.
[brief] Our state’s jurisprudence makes plain that general deterrence unrelated to specific deterrence should hold little weight in sentencing.  State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394 (1989).  At the original sentencing, the court’s basis for finding the factor was solely based on general deterrence, and the court noted it was applying the factor “notwithstanding” [...]’s “limited criminal record. ”  (2T:18-12 to 19)  As for any possible specific deterrence, we know from Roper, Miller, Zuber, and their progeny that deterrence simply is not as significant a factor in sentencing of young actors.
[directive] 8.4.5  In any case where there is a rebuttable presumption of seeking revocation of release pursuant to subsection 8.4.1, 8.4.2, 8.4.3, or 8.4.4, the prosecutor shall file a motion seeking revocation of release pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-24 unless a supervisory prosecutor designated pursuant to Section 7.8 determines that (1) the risks posed by defendant’s release can be controlled adequately by imposing new enhanced release conditions and monitoring, or (2) the interests of justice would not be served by applying for revocation of release.  If the determination is made to overcome the presumption of seeking revocation of release, the supervisory prosecutor shall document the reason(s) for that decision in the case file.  8.5
[brief] A civil conspiracy is "a combination of two or more persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the principal element of which is an agreement between the parties `to inflict a wrong against or injury upon another,' and `an overt act that results in damage.'"  Morgan v. Union County, 268 N.J. Super. 337, 364 (App. Div. 1993) (citing Rotermund v. United States Steel Corp., 474 F.2d 1139, 1145 (8th Cir.1973).  The gist of the claim is not the unlawful agreement, "but the underlying wrong which, absent the conspiracy, would give a right of action."  Id. (citing Board 365*365 of Education v. Hoek, 38 N.J. 213, 238, 183 A.2d 633 (1962); Middlesex Concrete Prods. and Excavating Corp. v. Carteret Indus. Ass'n, 37 N.J. 507, 516, 181 A.2d 774 (1962); Earl v. Winne, 14 N.J. 119, 135, 101 A.2d 535 (1953).  As the court recognized that “the nature of a conspiracy is such that more often than not the only type of evidence available" is circumstantial in nature.
[directive] Barricaded Individuals 7.5  Professional Organizations.  The leaders of Tactical Teams and Crisis Negotiation Teams are encouraged to formally establish statewide organizations to enhance existing relationships and share best practices for the safe resolution of barricaded individual and hostage situations.  Once established, these organizations should include opportunities for mental health professionals to participate in this collaborative process.  As Tactical and Crisis Negotiation Teams gain experience working with mental health professionals, the organizations and mental health professionals are further encouraged to submit suggestions to the Attorney General for revisions to this Policy in order to facilitate the safe resolution of barricaded individual and hostage incidents.  16
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  In his brief submitted in this appeal, Defendant/Respondent, [...], Esq.  (“Defendant”), the court-appointed Administrator of the Estate (the “Estate”) of [...] (“Decedent”) and court-appointed Trustee of the Decedent’s Revocable Trust (“Rhoda’s Trust”), continues to attempt to distract this Court with “red herrings” regarding the Decedent’s tangible personal property, ignores the New Jersey Uniform Trust Code provision that he has violated, and makes numerous statements that are unsupported by any reference to the record in this case.  Nothing presented by Defendant in his brief can succeed in rebutting the fact that Plaintiff/Appellant, [...] (“Plaintiff”), is entitled to an accounting, both as a matter of law and under principles of equity.  REPLY STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] The Public Work Contractors Registration Act, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.48 et seq. (“PWCRA”), was enacted by the Legislature to oversee all contractors and subcontractors performing work on public projects, to ensure that the DOL may monitor these entities’ compliance with existing state and federal labor laws concerning wages, unemployment and temporary disability insurance, workers’ compensation insurance, and the payment of payroll taxes.  The PWCRA requires that all contractors performing work on public projects and each of their listed subcontractors must be registered with the DOL at the time of bidding.  Here, the [...] (“[...]”) published a request for bids (“Solicitation”) for a public project to construct two 2.5 MG prestressed concrete tanks within the footprint of the existing [...] on [...] in [...] (“Project”).  Because the Project sits on a site listed in the National Register of Historic Places, the [...] required all bidders to identify, at the time of bid, the archeological subcontractor to whom they intend to subcontract the archaeological site work.  In no uncertain terms, the Solicitation unambiguously referred to the archaeologist as a “subcontractor”, defined the archaeologist’s work as “labor”, and required the archaeologist to perform its work “on-site. ”
[brief] On the other hand, [...]’s story makes much more sense.  He did not attempt to make frivolous arguments about mistaken identity or claim he was not present that evening.  [...] was present that evening and involved in an altercation with [...].  He never attempted to deny this.  He also did not paint himself as the innocent victim of this interaction, and [...] as the villain.  Instead, [...] offered a plausible narrative wherein he admittedly let his anger get the best of him and made the poor decision to turn around and confront [...] over something that he should have let go.  This is not to say that [...]’s reaction to [...] approaching his vehicle was reasonable, even if she did intend to kick his car again, but an individual overreacting in an admittedly heightened emotional state still makes much more sense than the alternative version of events promulgated by [...].  It is also possible under these circumstances that the jury could have credited the testimony of both [...] and [...], believing it possible that [...] truly thought [...] told her to get into the car when [...] actually said get away from the car while his mouth was obstructed by a face covering.  Regardless, it is clear that this case hinged on who the jury found most credible, as the remaining evidence did little to shed light on whose account should be believed.  Inserting into this analysis that [...] is affiliated with a notoriously violent, criminal motorcycle gang changes the whole equation and improperly tilts the scale of credibility heavily in [...]’ favor.
[brief] (Da830-Da831)  [...]’s analysis of *res judicata* was fatally flawed.  [...]’s ruling on the express easement theory was not *dicta*.  “[W]here a decision rests on two or more grounds, none can be relegated to the category of *obiter dictum.*”  *Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.*, 337 U.S. 535, 537, 69 S.Ct. 1235, 1237, 93 L.Ed. 1524 (1949).  We are not faced here with the scenario addressed by our Supreme Court in *Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc.*, 53 N.J. 463 (1969), where a jury verdict might have been based upon any one of several grounds, but it was impossible for another court to determine which one.  In such cases, the judgment is not preclusive as to any of those grounds.  *Id.* at 480.  [...] addressed all three easement theories on their merits.
[directive] d.  Firing positions are as indicated in the course.  Any form of full automatic firing is prohibited at distances greater than the 10-yard line.  100 yard line 10 rounds, Prone, sitting or squatting  One minute each position •  From the prone position, on command fire 5 rounds.  (1 minute)  a.  From a sitting or squatting position, on command fire 5 rounds (1 minute)  9-62  Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards
[brief] THE AMENDED RESOLUTION (10a).  On August 15, 2023, the Board passed the Amended Resolution which unanimously approved [...]’s Application to construct the five-story building.  (10a).  The Amended Resolution clearly states that the approval of the Application was conditioned on the building being constructed in accordance with the approved plans:  26.  The proposed project shall be constructed in accordance with the approved plans.  (28a), (See also 13a, ¶6, 24a, ¶38 and 35a, ¶46).  The Amended Resolution also definitively states that the building is to be built to a height that is 43’-6” above DFE.  While the zoning requirements limited the height of the building to 40’ above DFE, the Board granted the specific variance to [...] to construct the building to a height of 43’-6” above DFE.  “The proposed building will be constructed at 43’-6” above DFE in accordance with the [...] architectural plan. ” (15a).  (See also 24a, ¶38).  The Amended Resolution also specifically stated that the Board’s Commissioners did not rely upon the Rendering, nor gave it any weight in approving the application.  In addition, the Amended Resolution required [...] to build the building according to the height shown on the architectural plans, not the Rendering.  (25a).  Paragraph 46 states in part:  During deliberation, none of the Commissioners expressed reliance on the [...] rendering, nor mentioned same or gave it any weight on the record and during deliberation.  [...] took exception to the [...] rendering during the hearings.  The architectural plan prepared by [...] contained the height of the proposed building, in terms of number of stories and height and the Applicant is bound by same unless additional relief is requested by way of an amended application to the Board.  (25a).  As found by the Trial Court, when taken as a whole, the Amended Resolution is clear and unambiguous:  The site plan approved by the Board was for a building to be constructed to a height of 43’-6” above DFE in accordance with [...]’s architectural plans.  The Amended Resolution made clear that the Rendering on which the Appellant’s entire case is premised was irrelevant as to the approved height of the building.  (2T20:24 to 21:5, 2T23:1-10, 2T23 :20-21, 2T30:19-24, 2T32:13-18, and 2T33:14-16).  D.
[brief] As noted by the Trial Court, “Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants for negligently supervising the project speak directly to their obligation as professional engineers who were hired specifically to oversee the project to ensure [...]’s compliance with the [...]’s contract specifications. ”  (Pa30)  In addition to the negligent supervision claim, Plaintiff is asserting that [...], (who was acting under the direction and control of a licensed professional) failed, to comply with [...]’s obligation to ensure compliance with the Plans and Specifications.  The Trial Court determined that the scope of [...]’s work fell within the “practice of engineering and Mr. [...] was supervised by two separate people, both who are licensed by the State of New Jersey as professional engineers. ”  (Pa30)  As found by the Trial Court, Mr. [...] was performing engineering services while being supervised by the licensed engineer and as such an affidavit of merit would be required as the case would hinge on the applicable standard of care (Pa30-31)
[brief] (Pl. Tr. 209:4-15).  5.  Plaintiff admitted she failed to sign off on her December 2018 Observation (even though she admitted she received the completed Observation on January 28, 2019) until she received a written reprimand from [...] in March 2019.  (Pl. Tr. 169:22 to 170:10; 171:1-10; 221:21-24, 237:4-7, 309:24 to 310:4).  6.  Plaintiff admitted that a member of the CST told [...] “they felt embarrassed” by announcing to staff at a meeting that the “adults dropped the ball,” which implicated the CST members.  (Pl. Tr. 177:22 to 178:16).  7.  Plaintiff admitted she documented in a student’s discipline log that she told the student “I don’t know who she slept with last night, but she didn’t wake up with me this morning,” and that at the time she said that to the student, she did not think it was inappropriate.  (Pl. Tr. 175:1 to 176:25).  8.  Plaintiff admitted that in her January 9, 2018 evaluation—during her second year of employment—[...] counseled Plaintiff under “recommended action” that she document walk-throughs, share that information with him, create an open dialogue with administration to share initiatives and programs, and collaborate with others.  (Pl. Tr. 196:15-22; 198:1-23; Da215-232).  9.  Plaintiff admitted that when she was evaluated in June 2018 (at the end of her second year of employment), [...] counseled Plaintiff under “recommended action” that she should communicate frequently in person or via e-mail to pass information to him, and that she continue to work on minimizing loss of students’ instructional time.  (Pl. Tr. 198:24 to 200:23; Da245).  10.  At her deposition, Plaintiff admitted that [...] essentially reprimanded her for not immediately notifying him when a student indicated they will “shoot up the building. ” (Pl. Tr. 181:7-10).  These critical admissions are fatal to Plaintiff’s ability to support her claims.
[brief] No one challenged the Consent of Surety; no one challenged [...]’s ability to enforce the Consent of Surety.  Not [...], not [...] (the obligor), not even [...]  (“[...]”) – the one with the most to gain from [...]’s disqualification.  [...] unilaterally and without reason chose to take its concern and then use that concern against its own interests and spend about $10,000,000 more in the process.  [...]’s fearmongering about the potential for rampant corruption and fraud if [...]’s bid is upheld ignores key and salient facts.  Principally, [...] is (as it intended to be) bound by the Consent of Surety.  This is not a matter of curing or waiving defects.  It simply seeks to have this Court allow the parties to proceed in the same manner as they have done on at least thirteen occasions over the last two-plus years.  In total, this all demonstrates that [...]’s disqualification of [...]’s Bid was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  [...] fabricated a defect then used it to disqualify [...]’s Bid.  For these reasons, [...]’s decision respectfully must be overturned.
[brief] *** Q.  [...], under the statute if an attorney receives more than 50 percent of his or her revenue from debt-adjustment work, do they violate the statute?  A.  We haven’t defined that.  Q.  Is the tipping point for when someone is principally engaged as a debt adjuster, is it more than 50 percent or is it a different percentage?  A.  It would be based off of the facts and a holistic review.  Q.  A what kind of review?  A.  Holistic review.  Q.  A holistic review.  And we’ve already established that [...] hasn’t determined what those correct facts are?  A. Correct.  Pa0047 at 31:7-33:5; 63:10-64:12.
[brief] Lopez v. Faloni & Associates, L.L.C., 2:16-cv-01117-SDW-SCM (D.N.J.) ................................................  4  Lugo v. Capital Management Services, L.P., et al., 2:17-cv6204- SDW-LDW (D.N.J.) ....................................................  4  LVNV v. DeAngelo, 464 N.J. Super. 103 (App. Div. 2020)  .............................................  25 Maisano v. LVNV Funding LLC, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2421 (App. Div Nov. 27, 2019)
[brief] ONE  [...]’S $2.1 MILLION HACKENSACK PROJECT CLAIM WAS A COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM BELONGING IN THE FIRST ARBITRATION, AND THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE BARS [...] FROM BRINGING THIS CLAIM IN A SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDING (Pa21, Pa43-44)  Under the ECD, R. 4:30A, Arc is barred from bringing any further Hackensack Project claims in a subsequent arbitration, as all claims relating to the Hackensack Project and/or the PTA and/or the Hackensack Project Completion Subcontract were compulsory counterclaims within the First Arbitration.
[brief] *Scult v. Bergen Val. Builders, Inc.*, 76 N.J. Super. 124, 132 (Ch. Div. 1962), aff’d sub nom., *Scult v. Bergen Val. Builders, Inc.*, 82 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 1964); Schnakenberg v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 37 N.J. Super. 150, 157-58 (App. Div. 1955).
[brief] New Jersey Courts have upheld the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the context of the patient-physician relationship and the provision of patient care.  *Moore* at 6.  Per the State legislature’s intent in enacting the Act, “[t]he primary purpose of the bill is to advance arbitration as a desirable alternative to litigation and to clarify arbitration procedures in light of developments of the law in this area”.  *N.J.S.A 2A-23B-1 et. seq.*  Amicus Curiae [...] seeks to have this court create exclusions from the mandates of the Act which are specialty/treatment specific and based on a defined cause of action alleged.  This would be in contravention of the legislative intent and would serve to nullify the very benefits provided by the legislation that ensure the proper provision of patient care and protect the safety of the public.