ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The parties were scheduled to appear again on April 28, 2022.  The night before the hearing, suddenly, an email arrived alleging that [...] was the changed beneficiary for the 538-policy.  The Zoom hearing began on April 28, 2022, with [...] objecting to the last-minute email, which was unreliable, inconsistent with the Court's Order, and without a complete insurance policy.  [...] argued that there was no way to test the authenticity or know whether the document was legitimate or whether the terms and conditions of the policy were met.  [...] also stated that in light of the record of this case, the Court should not rely on a document that could not be verified or authenticated.
[brief] (Pa37).  At no time did the Township own or control any portion of the Property.  When the decision to install the drainage system was made, the Township Engineer designed the project, which was then executed by the Township’s Department of Public Works.  (Pa300, 305).  Plaintiff was informed of the details of the project; however, no written agreement was ever created for the work to be performed.  (Pa221-222).  Plaintiff consented to the drainage project and was present during the entirety of the day-to-day work.  (Pa37).  Plaintiff was provided daily updates on the status of the project, and at the completion of the project, she was happy and pleased with the work that was done, as she repeatedly stated to the workers.  (Pa37-38).  Ultimately, the Township incurred approximately $50,000 to 80,000 to complete the project.  (Pa38).  When the Township began the drainage project in Plaintiff’s yard, they encountered a large presence of clay soil, which became necessary to remove.  (Pa39).  Clay soil has a poor drainage quality, and she was advised that without removal of the clay, the drainage system would likely fail.  (Pa39).  The Department of Public Works supervisor believes that this clay soil, which would have been present on the Property since long before Plaintiff’s family purchased the location, is responsible for the drainage issues.  (Pa226-227).  The Township replaced the clay soil at its own expense before reseeding the entire backyard.  (Pa251).  Plaintiff alleges that the water problems on her Property, and the alleged “destruction” of her backyard, are somehow the fault of the Township and has brought the within suit as a result.
[brief] As to [...] masquerading her claims under R. 4:50-1(f), claiming “unconscionability”, she at the minimum was required to prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence.  Hyland v. Aquarian Age 2,000, inc., 148 N.J. Super.  As stated in *Del Vecchio v. Hemberger*, 388 N.J. Super. 179, (App. Div. 2006):  Bald allegations do not give rise to proof necessary to meet the standard necessary to set aside a final judgment.  But again, in reality, she alleged fraud.  And fraud claims require a higher, clear and convincing, burden of proof.  *Albright v. Burns*, 206 N.J. Super. 625, 636 (App. Div. 1986).  On timing of such motions based on fraud, R. 4:50-2 prescribes:
[brief] (emphasis added).  “Moreover, the current tendency is in favor of the statute of limitations and against the construction of a statement as an acknowledgment or promise which will avoid its operation. ”  Denville Amusement Co., 84 N.J. Super. at 170.  In Denville Amusement Co., the Court required a written acknowledgement or new promise to lift the bar of limitation regarding a decedent’s loan to a corporation.  Id. at 171-72.  Notably, the Court found that letters of transmittal the decedent signed as treasurer of the corporation and sent with financial reports he had prepared as the corporation’s accountant were insufficient to limit the statute of limitations bar.  Ibid.  In the instant matter, there is no executed writing whatsoever where [...] made a new promise of any kind because no such agreement occurred.  The alleged August 7, 2013 e-mail (Da196) between [...] and [...] is insufficient to satisfy the writing requirement of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-24 because it is not “signed by the party chargeable thereby” (i.e., [...]).  The alleged spreadsheet attached to the e-mail is simply a spreadsheet but makes no mention of an alleged “Third Loan” or new obligation to pay allegedly unpaid principal, interest and penalties.  Even if the Court accepts Plaintiff’s claims as true, the so-called “Third Loan” was not a separate and distinct new loan but rather an acknowledgement or renewed promise to pay the outstanding amounts from the $50,000 Loan and the $330,000 Loan.
[brief] It also is fact specific.  It expresses a general opinion on when and whether new technology is practical.  It is not a law, regulation or rule.  It is not, in any instance, a decision reserved to product manufacturers exclusively under New Jersey or federal law.  If that were so, design defect claims would not exist.  Product liability does exist under both state and federal law, so the opinion of amicus regarding gradual introduction may be worthy of consideration by a factfinder but is not relevant to the issue on appeal.  We also would be remiss if we did not advise the Court that another appellate court has rejected this argument as a basis to deny consumers their day in court.  See *Varela v. FCA US LLC*, 505 P. 3d 244 (Az. 2022).  The common law is recognized for its ability to spur the rapid implementation of safety technology, not delay available technology as amicus suggests.  Often it is the potential exposure to tort liability that encourages advances and implementation of alternative safer designs.
[brief] Under New Jersey’s recording statute, Appellants had the ability to file a certified copy of the court’s decision but they neglected to do so (Da93 at ¶59).  See N.J.S.A. 46:26A-2(h) (permitting “certified copies of judgments, decrees, and orders of courts of record” affecting title to be recorded).  Appellants filed no such notice because, upon information and belief, the relief [...] sought was *judicial relief* and not based on the record titles appearing in the Hunterdon County land records.  Therefore, there was no basis to record anything in the land records.  It is well-settled that a party's conduct may estop him from relying on an affirmative defense.  See *Zaccardi v. Becker*, 88 N.J. 245, 256–257 (1982).  Here, although pleading entire controversy doctrine as a defense, Appellants never moved for dismissal and, instead, engaged and litigated the case.  Appellants served and answered discovery, took depositions, and in all respects litigated the case through the close of discovery.  It would be both prejudicial and unfair to the Respondent for the defendants to now ask that the case be dismissed after having actively and voluntarily engaged throughout the discovery period and after the court considered the merits of Respondent’s claim.
[brief] *McQueen*, ESX-L-1439-22, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 640, at *9-15.  In *Arroyo v. Stoneleigh Recovery Assocs., LLC*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138287, at *11-13 (D.N.J. Aug. 14, 2019) (Dra5), the District Court held that an assignee of an allegedly defaulted [...] credit card debt had to be licensed under the NJCFLA, that unlicensed entities were precluded from demanding or collecting interest on a charged off account, and that said violations support affirmative claims for violations of the FDCPA.
[brief] He explained that currently he does not have all of the data on the soil and that the “soil data will help us quantify the impact in advance. ”  (T1, 37:17-20).  Plaintiff’s LSRP testified that, The preliminary data says that there's impact underneath the building, and we need to figure out what volume of material is impacted and that will drive how the remediation is conducted.  So it could be leave it in place and put a low permeability cap over it, like a building foundation or a concrete driveway.  It could be something where we do some type of in-situ treatment, injection of a chemical oxidant into the ground to oxidize the contaminants in place, physical removal by excavation and offsite (indiscernible).  But again, the process is iterative, and it's all based on what the data shows.  (T1, 32:21-33:6).  As to groundwater impacts, Plaintiff’s attorney suggested that there was “really not anything to be concerned about” because the contamination is in the “upper aquifer” and the drinking wells are “100 feet down and separated by an impermeable layer.
[brief] (Da395).  The Consent Judgment addressed the various probate assets of [...]’s Estate, and also contained numerous provisions and specific thresholds related to the sale of the Subject Property.  (Da395).  This settlement Consent Judgment and all the terms set forth therein are enforceable unless otherwise vacated by the Court.  Here, there was no order vacating the Consent Judgment, thus, it is enforceable and binding.  New Jersey Courts have long recognized that “settlement of litigation ranks high in our public policy.
[brief] [...] owned the house where [...] and defendant stayed (23T99-1 to 24).  In a statement to the police on Wednesday, March 15, 2017, Beal had said that, the previous weekend, defendant left at 3:00 p.m. on Friday, March 10, 2017, and he returned early Saturday morning (23T105-7 to 23T107-1).  [...]'s daughter, [...], testified that she had met defendant once at a barbeque at her brother's house in the summer of 2016 (15T120-23 to 15T121-2).  Defendant and her father "seemed very friendly, like everything was fine" (15T121-2 to 3).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT
[brief] The proposed use (a) promotes the general welfare and (b) promotes a desirable visual environment and, therefore, satisfies two purposes of zoning set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2a and 40:55D-2l.  The accessory structure and addition will enable the [...] to maintain a neat and orderly property so that items such as vehicles, equipment, tools and the like are stored inside the structure and not in the yard.
[brief] ”  Pressler & Verniero, Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, cmt. 3 on R. 2:6-2 (2024).  Here, at the trial level, [...] moved to suppress the evidence seized from his storage unit on the grounds that the warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause.  (2T 39-2 to 4)  While he did not argue specifically that the dog sniff should not have been considered, the sniff was a component of the affidavit, which, as a whole, was challenged.  The fact that [...] is now advancing an additional reason as to why the affidavit is insufficient does not bar this Court from considering that theory. \(^3\)  More substantively, the State is wrong that the mere fact that a K-9 unit was called to sniff [...]’s car permits an inference that the K-9 was trained in narcotics detection.  (Sb 43)  In making this argument, the State is essentially saying that the police have no obligation to assert any facts in a warrant affidavit demonstrating that a drug-sniffing dog is actually capable of detecting the drugs that police are relying on the dog to detect.  This simply cannot be true.  See State --- \(^3\)  The State is in no way prejudiced by this Court’s consideration of the issue.  Because the underlying question is whether the affidavit provided probable cause, a purely legal question based on the four corners of the affidavit, no additional fact-finding on the reliability of the police dog would have been appropriate even if this argument had been expressly discussed in the trial court.  Cf. State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 418-19 (2015) (when defendant did not challenge the legality of a warrantless traffic stop at the trial court and merely challenged the subsequent search, the State was denied its opportunity to develop a factual record as to the lawfulness of the stop).  v. Hall, 2017 ND 124, ¶ 26 (reviewing case law from multiple jurisdictions and concluding that where police rely on a dog sniff in a warrant affidavit, at a minimum the affidavit must attest to the training of the dog that conducted the sniff).  Moreover, that the dog alerted to the presence of narcotics in the passenger’s seat of [...]’s car also does not prove its ability to detect drugs, as the State asserts.  This argument boils down to an assertion that one positive “hit” in the field demonstrates a dog’s reliability, but it is merely a single data point.  Not only that, but field performance data in general has “relatively limited import” in most cases.  Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 245-46 (2013).  Because “errors may abound in such records,” “the better measure of a dog’s reliability comes away from the field, in controlled testing environments. ”  Ibid. (cleaned up).  At bottom, this Court should not excuse the failure of the police to present enough facts to establish that a dog sniff supports a finding of probable cause.  In sum, the State’s arguments that the informant’s tip was inherently trustworthy and that the dog sniff supported a finding of probable cause should be rejected.  Considering its contents as a whole, the affidavit did not establish probable cause to search [...]’s storage unit.  CONCLUSION
[brief] [A257]  That same month (August 2017), [...] filed his motion to enforce litigant’s rights against [...].  [...] filed her cross-motion for Rule 4:50 relief two months afterward in response.  A239.  [...] erred in ruling that those facts and the “totality of the circumstances” of this case do not show that [...] sought R. 4:50 relief within a reasonable time and that she should be denied relief, in this divorce case in a court of equity, because she failed to seek relief earlier.  As noted, [...] recognized that the actual separation of the parties occurred in August of 2017.  It cannot be said that [...] waited too long when she sought relief only two months after that actual breakup of the marriage – right after [...] filed his motion to enforce his claimed rights under the divorce judgment.
[brief] In re Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station (CS327), 476 N.J. Super. 556, 561 (App. Div. 2023), rev’d, 258 N.J. 312 (2024).  The panel ruled that a utility project must be a “routine” upgrade to qualify for Exemption #11.  Id. at 568 (emphasis added).  Since the panel vacated the 2021 HAD because the upgrade was “routine,” the panel did not reach other briefed issues, which included whether the Project is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Act, id. at 572, n. 13, or with the applicable WQMP, id. at 563, n. 7.  The court vacated the 2021 HAD and remanded the application to [...] to consider whether the Project “can qualify as a ‘routine upgrade’ to [[...]’s] pipeline system. ”  Id. at 574.  Following the panel’s remand instructions, in September 2023, [...] requested additional information from [...] about whether the Project is a routine upgrade and initiated a new public comment period.  (Ra7).  On January 11, 2024, after it consulted with the Highlands Council again, considered additional information including [...]’s supplemental submissions and public comments, [...] issued a new HAD decision, again finding the Project met Exemption #11.  (Ra4).  Per the court’s instructions, [...]’s analysis primarily addressed whether the Project is routine, (Ra9-12), but [...] also confirmed its prior conclusions that the Project is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Act, (Ra13–14), and with the Northeast WQMP.
[brief] On December 21, 2022, BPU adopted [...]’s Initial Decision in its entirety and granted [...]’s Petition.  (Aa56).  Based on its review of the Petition, the record, the Initial Decision, and the parties’ exceptions, the BPU agreed with [...]’s findings of fact and determinations regarding witness credibility, as well as the development and analysis of the record.  (Aa54-55).  In particular, the BPU found that: (1) [...]’s panel testimony was credible regarding the need for the Project; (2) a CWT heater is the most reasonable and practical method for heating the regulator; (3) the proposed site was the most reasonable location and there were “no reasonably available alternative sites for the Project that will achieve an equivalent public benefit”; (4) the Project will have “little to no material impact on the value of nearby properties”; (5) the Project will have “no adverse impact on the area’s ambient noise levels or air quality” and will have a “negligible impact on the State’s overall air quality and greenhouse-gas emissions”; (6) the Project is consistent with the goals of the EMP “when considering [...]’s obligation to maintain a reliable and safe natural-gas system” and is not an expansion or improvement project; and (7) [...] “duly considered [...]’s zoning ordinances and [...]’s Master Plan when selecting the Project’s site. ” (Aa54-56).  Consequently, the BPU determined that [...] met its burden of proof under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19 and held that the proposed Project is “reasonably necessary to provide safe, adequate, and reliable natural gas services in New Jersey, and is reasonably necessary for the service, convenience, and welfare of the public.
[brief] initiated legal proceedings against the debtor in the Bergen County Action and that the debt was void.  Thus, presuming a license was required and not obtained at the time of the first assignment of the debt, one could conclude that [...]’s account and resulting debt were rendered void.  There is no provision in the statute that explicitly permits a cure after the fact and no case law cited on this record affording a licensee the right to revive a void contract or debt by securing the license.  *[...]*, [...], 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 640, at *9-10.
[brief] ...it is superseding indictment [...].  May I have your appearances?  MR. GRILLO:  Good morning, Your Honor.  Assistant Prosecutor [...] appearing on behalf of the State.  MR. NARDELLI: And this is Prosecutor [...] for the State.  THE COURT: All right.  Counsel?  MR. HESKETH: Good morning, Your Honor.  [...] for [...] to my left.  THE COURT: All right.  [...], I believe you've been in jail since about May 2011 -- MR. MYERS: Yes.  THE COURT: -- well over five-and-a-half years so I've cleared my calendar for the month of December, I know the attorneys have, so you're going to be given your day in court.
[brief] \footnote{Such a holding would be contrary to the PLA, which “evince[es] a legislative policy ‘to limit the expansion of products-liability law,’” \textit{Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc.}, 144 N.J. 34, 47 (1996) (quoting \textit{Roberts v. Rich Foods, Inc.}, 139 N.J. 365, 374 (1995)), in part “to reduce the burden on manufacturers of FDA-approved products resulting from products liability litigation,” \textit{Kendall v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.}, 209 N.J. 173, 194 (2012).}  b.  Plaintiff Lacks Evidence Negating the Likely Causes of Her Injuries Other Than a Manufacturing Defect.
[brief] The fingerprint itself matters.  The quality and quantity of detail in the latent print may be affected by many different factors, including the robustness of the ridge structure, the presence of oil or sweat, the mechanics of touch, and the nature of the surface touched.  NRC Report at 137.  The proficiency of the individual examiner matters.  PCAST Report at 101.  And an examiner’s exposure to potentially biasing information matters.  Ibid.  Examiners’ judgments can be influenced by knowledge about other forensic examiners’ decisions, for instance.  One study showed that information about the police investigation surrounding a case impacts the likelihood that an examiner will find a match.  [...] et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable To Making Erroneous Identifications, 74 Forensic Sci. Int’l 74 (2006) (Da 16-20).  In sum, fingerprint analysis is a technique that, like all techniques, is subject to error.  Nonetheless it is admitted into our courts unabated, without there ever having been a single published decision finding fingerprint analysis reliable after a full evidentiary hearing.  The risk of error is particularly high in cases such as this one, in which the fingerprint comparison stemmed from a database search.  As explained below, the trial court failed to appreciate these facts in first determining that the fingerprint evidence would be admissible at trial and then failing to handle the evidence in a measured manner, assuring that the limitations of that evidence are understood by the jury and conveyed by the examiner.
[brief] \(^5\)  According to the official 2020 Decennial United States census, [...] had 1,449 residents to [...]’s 5,832 residents.  Compare, https://www.census.gov/searchresults.html?searchType=web&cssp=SERP&q=Sea%20Bright%20borough,%20New%20Jersey ([...]), with https://www.census.gov/searchresults.html?searchType=web&cssp=SERP&q=[...]%20borough,%20New%20Jersey ([...]).  The Court can take judicial notice of the census as a “determination” of a governmental subdivision of the United States.  See N.J.R.E. 201.  To hold otherwise would create an irrational and profoundly absurd result whereby some municipalities may withdraw from a regional or consolidated school district, but others, such as [...], may not.
[brief] In issuing its opinion, the Court overlooked these facts.  It is simply not logical that [...] took affirmative steps to prevent defendant from speaking about the case while at the same time questioning him through phone calls defendant requested to make to his parents.  If [...] sought to obtain incriminating statements from defendant, he did not need to take any actions because defendant freely spoke to himself out loud about the case for extended periods of time.  (1T:24-14 to 32-15); (1T:103-6 to 105-23).  In fact, defendant volunteered that gunshot residue would be found on his sweatshirt, (1T:78-10 to 78-25), and he told [...] which handgun he used during the shooting.  (1T:105-25 to 129-21).  Defendant did not say anything during his phone calls with his parents that he had not already said or to which he had not already alluded.
[brief] Plaintiff here was never even forced to commence an action against a third person, because through the fault of the Defendants’ malpractice.  Plaintiff here will receive her attorney fees if she successfully proves all four elements (duty, breach of duty, causation, and harm) in her underlying matrimonial action, by establishing that but for Defendants’ negligence, Plaintiff sustained damages in addition to the element of breach of duty in the underlying matrimonial case.  (Trial within a Trial)  Plaintiff failed to prove causation and harm in the underlying matrimonial case.  Thus, Plaintiff failed to prove her malpractice case.  Plaintiff’s own volition to commence an action to set aside a PSA and to obtain a new judgment of divorce cannot be foreseeable between the parties unless she proves a malpractice claim against the Defendants here.
[brief] ....................... passim Kelly v. Berlin, 300 N.J. Super. 256 (App. Div. 1997) ....................... 37 Khan v. Singh, 200 N.J. 82 (2009) .................................................. 31 Lanzet v. Greenberg, 126 N.J. 168 (1991) ................................................ 33 Long v. Landy, 35 N.J. 44 (1961) ...................................................