ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Likewise, her contract claim should have survived summary judgment.  They assumed certain duties to her and therefore had a contractual duty to perform and can be liable based on the breach of same.  **[...] MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED**  As stated above, claims regarding state of mind are not candidates for summary judgment.  This defendant has asserted fraud and unclean hands.  Both are matters that delve into the state of mind of my client.  See *Auto Lenders*, supra.  First, Plaintiff contends that she didn’t work during the time of the mitigation period, and she didn’t lie about mold exposure or her illness related to same.  (Aa350-Aa357).  Defendant has not eliminated the possibility that a jury could find in her favor.  There are issues of fact that prevent summary judgment.  Secondly, Plaintiff’s certification and accompanying documents show the basis of the fact that she was not properly paid on her claim.  She has fact testimony, expert testimony and photos to establish same.  All of the items that alleges make up a part of her claim she either certifies to and or finds support in the report of her expert.  (Aa350-Aa407)  Summary judgment is only permitted where there are no genuine issues of material facts.  [...] made arguments for sure, and asked the court to accept them.  But that is not the standard.  The standard is to accept the evidential materials from the party opposing the motion.  If the court applies that standard the motion should have been denied.  (T12-T19)  Plaintiff asks that this court reverse the order below.  Plaintiff raised issue of fact and the court ignored them.  Likewise and for similar reasons the court should have granted the motion for reconsideration.  (2T9-2T10).  Plaintiff’s certification for that motion attached deposition testimony which confirmed that 1) She had no input in the inventory of [...].  (Aa417); [...] stole items that never made it to the list; they took items from her medicine cabinet and was told that APlus was there to inventory, repair and restore her property.She testified as to damaged items.  And tags that were ripped off clothes; (Aa417-Aa418).  She has knowledge of the value of the items and hired and an expert.  (Aa419).  All of this information was provided to the court and the court overlooked it.  The court should have relied on R 4:49-2 and granted the motion and vacated its previous orders.  This court should review her ample certification and come to the conclusion that an error was made.  POINT II
[brief] ”  R. 1:1-2.  N.J.S.A. 19:29-1, et seq., governs the procedure of election contests, which are required to be litigated under compressed time frames.  Specifically, the trial court is required to hear the matter between 15-30 days following its filing.  See N.J.S.A. 19:29-4.  Adjournments may be granted for “not more than thirty days thereafter,” so long as the grounds for an adjournment are shown by affidavit.  N.J.S.A. 19:29-5.  Otherwise, “proceedings shall be similar to those in a civil action so far as practicable, but shall be under the control and direction of the court . . . with power to order any amendments in the petition, or proceedings as to form or substance .  . . .”  Ibid.  It is critical then to understand that an election contest is therefore not a civil action; while it is similar, it is fundamentally different.
[brief] Indeed, Tenant is somewhat at a loss as to how to respond to this point because Landlord’s brief makes the argument for Tenant already.  The Court need only look to the portion of §17.06 of the Lease that Landlord directly quotes in its brief:  In the event suit shall be brought by Tenant because of the breach of any covenant contained herein on the part of Landlord to be performed, and a breach shall be established, Landlord shall pay to Tenant all legal costs and other reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred by Tenant.
[brief] Appellant claims error that the Trial Court applied an alternate definition of the term “effectuate” but provides no reference in the record below where the Trial Court did so (Db25 and Db34).  The Trial Court in fact discussed the term “effectuate” in connection with reforming the Separation Agreement to remove the offending language so that the intent of the parties in signing the agreement could be accomplished (1T 14:10-25).  Further, the Trial Court’s analysis in its Opinion of the Court notes that Par. 6 and Par. 18 of the Separation Agreement (Da 16, Da19) could not co-exist without severance of the offending terms noted as a bar to proceeding (Da200).  Severance was required for Appellant to meet its own obligations under Par. 6 of the Agreement.  Appellant refused to sever the terms and therefore did not meet its obligations under the Separation Agreement; consequently, the Trial Court’s Order found Appellant in breach of contract (Db202).
[brief] Those rulings were interlocutory and were correct based upon the facts known to the court at the time of the rulings.  These interlocutory evidentiary rulings should not be reviewed by this Appellate Court because the dismissal should be affirmed and because the evidentiary rulings are both interlocutory and correct.  The evidentiary rulings are supported by the facts.  Plaintiff’s claims against [...] arise from the real-estate development of Plaintiff’s personal residence in [...].  Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that [...] failed to draft, negotiate, and advise him regarding a purchase agreement and a construction agreement Plaintiff entered into with architect, [...] and his construction company, [...]  (Collectively, “[...]”).
[directive] FORM  Preparation of the POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20- 2004)  Form  Once an arrestee has contacted a person to transport or accompany the arrestee from the law enforcement agency, and before the summoned person arrives, the law enforcement officer shall prepare the POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004)
[brief] The certification merely regurgitated the Plaintiff’s medical history and allegations and stated, in summary fashion that “additional time” was needed to obtain and review unspecified records, and promising that a report could be written within ninety days of an extension, without any explanation why the records could not have been obtained and reviewed, and a report written in the time prior to the expiration of the discovery period.  (Pa135-139)  The second inquiry can be met, as the expert’s opinion is essential.  The third inquiry cannot be met, as [...] noted, in denying the second reconsideration motion, Plaintiff’s counsel made no attempt to explain why he did not chose to seek the extension prior to the expiration of discovery.
[brief] With the Exception of Genon, All Relevant Case Law Supports the Position of [...]  Both Respondents argue that the $2,000,000 payment is of the type authorized by an unreported Law Division decision.  *Genon Rema, LLC, and NRG Energy, Inc. v. South Amboy Redevelopment Agency, et al*, Docket No. MID-L-390-13 2015 WL10986475, (N.J. Super., Ct. Law Div., May 18, 2015) (Pa910 to Pa 921).  *Genon* is inconsistent with the cases cited in Appellant’s initial brief and the holding four years later in *Hoboken Holdings, L.P. v. City of Hoboken et al*, Docket No. HUD-L-4580-18 (N.J. Sup. Ct., Law Div., Mar. 26, 2019).  (Pa922 to Pa933)\(^1\).  In *Hoboken Holdings, L.P.*, the Court rejected the logic of *Genon Rema* and found a $2,000,000 “community benefit payment” to be unlawful.  (Pa924).  As Appellant argues here, the Hoboken Court concluded that “Hoboken does not have the statutory authority to condition or require these givebacks. ” (Pa926).  In so doing, it cited this Court’s decision in *Britwood Urban Renewal, LLC v. City of Asbury Park*, 376 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. --- \(^1\) Appellant certifies that the only decision of which Appellant is aware that is inconsistent with this opinion is *Genon Rema, LLC, and NRG Energy, Inc. v. South Amboy Redevelopment Agency, et al*, Docket No. MID-L-390-13, 2015 WL 10986475 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div., May 18, 2015).
[brief] T9-15 to T9-19.  Unfortunately, [...] did not have other work available that did not require strenuous physical activity, climbing ladders, or kneeling.  T17-15 to T17-17.  There were no office jobs available.  The owner, [...], handled the paperwork, and her son, [...], ordered parts.  T17-13 to T17-14.  Having worked at the same company for 25 years, [...] was aware that his employer was a small family business, and he was familiar with the types of positions available.  At the Appeal Tribunal hearing, [...] confirmed that there were no jobs that were not labor intensive for which [...] was qualified, T32-10 to T32-13, that all boiler work was labor intensive, T31-15 to T32-6, and that there were no other options for a mechanic laborer with [...].
[brief] The NJDJA was enacted “to end uncertainty concerning the legal rights and relations of parties before they have suffered ineradicable damage or injury for which only a compensatory or coercive remedy can provide redress. ”  *Matter* of Assoc. of Trial Lawyers of Am., 228 N.J. Super. 180, 183 (App. Div. 1988) (ATLA) (emphasis supplied).  However, New Jersey courts will not render opinions that are purely advisory; thus, an NJDJA claim is ripe for adjudication only when the facts present “concrete contested issues conclusively affecting the parties’ adverse interests. ”  Matter of N.J. Firemen’s Assoc. Obligation to Provide Relief Applications Under Open Pub. Records Act, 230 N.J. 258, 275 (2017) (quoting N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Parsons, 3 N.J. 235, 241 (1949)) (holding no basis for suit under NJDJA because Association already denied OPRA request, resulting in no justiciable controversy).  A party seeking to judicially annul legislation must demonstrate that he “has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
[brief] ”  *Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 109 N.J. 201 (1988) (quoting *Gov’t of India v. Cook Indus., Inc.*, 569 F. 2d. 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978)).  The determination of whether counsel should be disqualified is, as an issue of law, subject to *de novo* plenary appellate review.  *City of Atlantic City v. Trupos*, 201 N.J. 447, 463 (2010).  The lower court’s findings are not entitled to any deference.  Disqualification of counsel based on a consultation with a former prospective client will occur only when the movant, in a manner well-grounded in the written record, satisfies its burden of proving that the matter of the consultation and the matter then adverse are the same or substantially related, and, that the information the lawyer received during the consultation is significantly harmful to the former prospective client in the now adverse matter.
[directive] you will be subject to a minimum period of time before you will be eligible for parole (a parole ineligibility term) under the Graves Act (as set forth in question 7 on the three-page plea form)?  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że przyznając się do winy i przyznając, że użył(a) Pan(i) broni palnej [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] 2.
[brief] Stark v. Mold Spitz DeSantis & Stark, P.C., 845 N.Y.S.2d 217 (2007)  ..................................................................................19  Surrick v. Killion, 449 F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 2006) ..............................................................................49  Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Ass’n. v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019)  .......................................................................................20  Tox Design Group, LLC v. RA Pain Services, PA, No. A-4092-18T1, 2019 WL 7183687 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 26, 2019)..............................................40, 41, 46, 47 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)..................................................................................7  Warren Distrib. Co. v. InBev USA, LLC, 2011 WL 770005 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2011)..................................................35  Estate of Watson v. Piddington, 2020 WL 2710168 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 26, 2020)  .......................40  Williams v. Ysabel, No. A-1391-22, 2023 WL 5768422 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 7, 2023)....................................................15  Wilson v. PBM, LLC, 140 N.Y.S.3d 276 (2d Dep’t 2021).............................................................19  Winer Motors, Inc. v. Jaguar Rover Triumph, Inc., 208 N.J. Super. 666 (App. Div. 1986).........................................................22, 27, 35  Wright-Moore Corp. v. Ricoh Corp., 908 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1990) .....................................................................28  Yale Materials Handling Corp. v. White Storage & Retrieval Sys., Inc., 240 N.J. Super. 370 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) ...................................18 Statutes and Other Authorities Rules
[brief] Should a court determine that plaintiff does make a prima facie case of either gender or age discrimination against a defendant, it would next consider whether the stated reason for the written warning and the one-day suspension were a pretext for age or gender discrimination.  Schiavo v. Marina District Development Co., 442 N.J. Super. 346, 368-69.  (App. Div. 2015).  The non-discriminatory reasons for plaintiff receiving a written warning for his actions at the Rutgers Safe Drinking Water Update and the one-day suspension for not seeking approval to speak at the AWWA conference were laid out in detail above.  Defendants had a set process for obtaining internal approvals for a DEP employee speaking at outside events.  (Pa357; Pa359-361; Pa363; Pa365-366; Pa368; Pa373).  The record with regard to the Rutgers Safe Drinking Water Update was provided.  (Pa341; Pa344; Pa345; Pa378; Pa380; Pa382-383; Pa385-386; The events surrounding the AWWA conference were explained.  (Pa349-350; Pa353-355).  As noted by the trial court, plaintiff was then obliged pursuant to Schiavo to overcome these legitimate reasons by a preponderance of the evidence to demonstrate these reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination.  Schiavo 442 N.J. Super. at 368-69.  (3T20:15-22).  Not only did plaintiff fail to state a prima facie case of discrimination against any defendant, he also could not contradict the legitimate reasons for the written warning and the one-day suspension.  (3T22:18–3T23:15).  [...] has not met either his prima facie burden or his obligation under Schiavo.  Plaintiff’s discrimination claims were properly dismissed.
[brief] Assistant Prosecutor [...] appears on behalf of the State; [...], Esquire, on behalf of [...].  Counsel is present in court.  The Court, in between direct and cross-examination, afforded Mr. Piper an opportunity to go confer with his client.  Was that fruitful or not, Mr. Piper?  MR. PIPER: It was not, Your Honor.  THE COURT: Did [...] refuse to speak to you?  MR. PIPER: He did not want to speak to me and did not wish to speak about any other event.  [4T93-15 to 95-4].  Defendant refused to appear in court for the jury charge and the verdict.
[brief] What is more, New Jersey Court Rule 4:50-1(f) purports to allow a state court to vacate a final judgment due to a substantive change in law.  That Rule reads:  On motion, with briefs, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a final judgment or order for the following reasons: (a)... or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.  N.J. Ct. R. 4:50-1.  Along with that, the 1-year time limitation on a motion for relief from a judgment does not apply to subsection (f) but only requires a motion under subsection (f) “be made within a reasonable time. ”  N.J. Ct. R. 4:50-2.  Surely a substantive change in the law resulting in a fair and just result would be a proper reason justifying relief from the Final Judgment.  *See Manning Eng'g, Inc. v. Hudson Cnty. Park Comm’n*, 74 N.J. 113, 122, 376 A.2d 1194, 1199 (1977) (“a court should have authority under it to reopen a judgment where such relief is necessary to achieve a fair and just result. ”).
[brief] ” (4T, 196:14-15).  Her Honor and counsel reviewed the language of the model charge and Plaintiff’s pretrial memorandum, and concluded that the entirety of Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11G was requested by Plaintiff, which included the time-unit rule (4T, at [...] asked Plaintiff’s counsel what they planned to argue next (4T, at 199:16-18).  Counsel explained that they only intended to extrapolate the life expectancy into hours, then argue that this was one of the few ways Plaintiff could convey to the jury the extent of his permanent injury (4T, at 199:19-23).  [...] held that counsel could present to the jury Plaintiff’s life expectancy, including how it broke down into smaller units of time, because this was something the jury could easily determine themselves.  As a compromise, Plaintiff’s counsel was precluded from entering into any time-unit argument (4T, at 200:3-18).  When they resumed argument, Plaintiff’s counsel argued exactly what was indicated to the Court (4T, at 201:2-11).  At no point during closing argument did Plaintiff’s counsel ever suggest to the jury that they should award compensation based on a function of any unit of time (4T, at 194:3-203:24).  The jury was then charged and released for deliberation (5T, at 29:11-14).
[brief] *Id.*  Any person who: (1) applied for protected tenancy status; (2) has occupied the premises as his principal residence for at least for at least 12 consecutive months next preceding the date of application; and (3) has an annual income that does not at the time of application exceed the maximum qualifying income as determined by statute (in this case of a household of one person, $31,400), is protected by the TPA.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.42.  The pertinent question here is, what impact, if any, does the TPA have on a landlord’s hardship application after a rent-controlled apartment is converted into a condominium?
[directive] Internal Affairs Summary Source of Complaint Criminal Outcome Internal Discplinary Outcome  Administra- Pending Pending from Prior New Cases  Not tively End of Conviction  Dismissal Years cases Closed Agency Civilian Anon.  Diversion Acquittal Exonerated Sustained Unfounded Closed Sustained Quarter Excessive Force 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Improper Arrest 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Improper Entry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Improper Search 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Other Criminal Violation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Differential Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Demeanor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Domestic Violence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Other Rule Violation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Total Cases Opened 0  Total Cases Closed 0 Total Pending Cases 0 Total Cases >180 Days 0
[brief] (4T 44-14 to 45-9).  Also, in entering her plea, she said that she saw no one hit [...].  (4T  She acknowledged that she had given three accounts, and that in the first two she denied that [...] had a weapon or assaulted anyone; she testified that she changed her account because she “wanted to tell the truth. ” (4T 57-12 to 58-13).  [...] testified that after the car containing [...] arrived behind his, [...] entered his car from the passenger side and hit him in the forehead, once, with a tire iron.
[brief] DATED: June 30, 2024  [...], Plaintiff/Appellant, vs. [...], [...], SUPERINTENDENT OF NEW BRUNSWICK SCHOOLS, [...], PRINCIPAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK HIGH SCHOOL, JOHN DOES 1-10, JANE DOES 1-10, ABC CORPORATIONS  A THROUGH Z, Defendants/Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION: SOMERSET COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...] SAT BELOW  The Honorable [...], A.J.S.C.  BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
[brief] COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  1  STATEMENT OF STANDARD OF REVIEW  6  LEGAL ARGUMENT Point I  7  BECAUSE THE LAW DIVISION, NOT THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, POSSESSES THE POWER TO ORDER INJUNCTIVE AND RELATED RELIEF, THE PLAINTIFF HAD NO OBLIGATION TO FILE ANYTHING WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS.  Point II:  13  THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE PLAINTIFFS IS BASED UPON COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY AUTHORITIES AND GRANTS  SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION UPON THE LAW DIVISION.  Point III:  18  THE ABSENCE OF A COUNT IN THE COMPLAINT ASSERTING A COMMON LAW  CONFLICT OF INTEREST  CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT CAUSE FOR REVERSAL OF THE LAW DIVISION’S DECISION.  Point IV:  ALTERNATIVELY, THIS MATTER SHOULD BE SENT FOR A LIMITED REMAND TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING  FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.  CONCLUSION TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] As of January 30, 2020, the World Health Organization ("WHO") declared COVID-19 a "Public Health Emergency of International Concern."  Pa201, PSOF ¶20.  In response to same, by way of Executive Order No. 102 dated February 3, 2020, New Jersey Governor [...] established a Coronavirus Task Force.  *Id.*, PSOF ¶21.  In this Executive Order, Governor Murphy described COVID-19 as a severe, potentially fatal respiratory illness that could result in Pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome, septic shock and multi-organ failure.  *Id.*  In February 2020, the Centered for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") issued Interim Guidance for Businesses and Employers to Plan and Respond to Coronavirus Disease 2019.  Pa202, PSOF ¶22; Pa464.  Therein the CDC provided in part, "All employers need to consider how best to decrease the spread of acute respiratory illness and lower the impact of COVID-19 in their workplace..."  Pa202, PSOF ¶22.  By way of Executive Order No. 103, dated March 9, 2020, Governor Murphy declared a State of emergency and public health emergency.  *Id.*, PSOF ¶23.  That Executive Order provided in part, “WHEREAS, Coronavirus disease 2019 (“COVID-19”) is a contagious, and at times fatal, respiratory disease caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus; and *** WHEREAS, on January 30, 2020, the International Health Regulations Emergency Committee of the World Health Organization declared the outbreak a public health emergency of international concern, which means an extraordinary event which is determined to constitute a public health risk to other States through the international spread of diseases and to potentially require a coordinated international response,” and thereafter raised its global risk assessment of COVID-10 from “high” to “very high”; *** WHEREAS, it is critical to prepare for and respond to suspected or confirmed COVID-19 cases in New Jersey, to implement appropriate measures to mitigate the spread of COVID-19, and to prepare in the event of an increasing number of individuals requiring medical care or hospitalization; and *** WHEREAS, the spread of COVID-19 within New Jersey constitutes an imminent public health hazard that threatens and presently endangers the health, safety, and welfare of the residents of one or more municipalities or countries of the State…”  By way of Executive Order No. 103, on March 9, 2020 Governor Murphy declared COVID-19 a Public Health Emergency and State of Emergency.  Pa203, PSOF ¶24.  The Order further declared that the International Health and Regulations Emergency committee of WHO declared the outbreak a public health emergency requiring an international response.  Id.  On March 11, 2020, WHO declared Covid-19 a global pandemic.
[brief] Judgment Of Conviction  -------------------------------------------------------- Da57-Da60  Evidentiary Decision  Admitting Co-Defendant's Video Statement  ---------------------------------- 17T10-12 to 17T12-11  Oral Jury Instructions On Robbery And Accomplice Liability  --------------- 26T131-6 to 26T137-21; 26T140-15 to 26T141-2  Written Jury Instructions On Robbery And Accomplice Liability  -----------------------------------------------------------  Da38-Da46  Sentence -------------------------------------------------------------------------  33T32-24 to 33T40-8  TABLE OF APPENDIX  State v. Elliot, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 718*; WL 1329999-----  Sa1-Sa8  Liability for Another’s Conduct (N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6)  -------------------------- Sa9-Sa14  PROCEDURAL HISTORY