ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Whenever a Senate bill or resolution is passed by the Senate, delivered to the General Assembly, and an identical General Assembly bill or resolution has received second reading, is in the possession of the General Assembly, and at least one full calendar day has intervened since either or both of the identical bills or resolutions received second reading, the Senate bill or resolution may be substituted for the General Assembly bill or resolution and immediately moved to third reading.  [Ibid.].  After substitution, [...] was given a third reading in the Assembly, and the bill ultimately passed without amendment on January 10, 2022, by a vote of 45-24-9.  (Pa238).  Three days later, [...] was duly enacted into law when the Governor approved the bill.
[brief] Deputy Attorney General  On the Brief TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS  ...........................................  1  A.  The Highlands Act and Exemption #11 ..........................................................  1  B.  [...] Seeks a Highlands Act Exemption for Its Project .........................................................................................................................  3  C.  The 2021 HAD .....................................................................................................  5  D.  The Appellate Division Vacated  The 2021 HAD and [...] Reconsidered and Reissued HAD to [...] in 2024 ...............................................................  7  E.  The Supreme Court Reverses, Reinstating The 2021 HAD And Remanding The Matter To This Court With Instructions To Continue The 2021 Appeal .........................................................................................  9  F.  The Instant Appeal on Remand From the Supreme Court ..............................  10  LEGAL ARGUMENTS .................................................................................................  11  I.  [...]  APPROPRIATELY ISSUED THE HAD DETERMINING, IN RELEVANT PART, THAT THE PROJECT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE GOALS AND PURPOSES OF THE HIGHLANDS ACT.  (Responds To Appellants’ Brief Point I)  ............  11  II.  [...] CORRECTLY FOUND THE PROJECT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE NORTHEAST WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT PLAN.  (Responds To Appellants’ Brief Point II).  .........................................................................................................................  17  CONCLUSION
[directive] Addendum B | April 2022  Vehicular Pursuit Policy  (e) an analysis of all pursuits determined to not be in compliance with the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, or agency policy, and the steps taken to address the non-compliance.  12.3  Based on that thorough review, the law enforcement executive shall determine whether changes in departmental structure, policy, training, or equipment are appropriate.  The law enforcement executive shall then provide a written report documenting the annual review to the County Prosecutor for that department.  Each County Prosecutor’s Office and each statewide law enforcement agency shall make its report to the Attorney General’s Office of Public Integrity and Accountability (OPIA).  16
[brief] (17T81-9 to 99-  Defendant never argued to the jury that Count Two involved a pecuniary benefit, never mind one of $200 or less.  (20T96-17 to 97-13).  Therefore, Question 1(b) on the verdict sheet for Count Two, which made no mention of a dollar figure, (see Da13-14), was unnecessary, meaningless, and thus, had no impact on the verdict.  See R. 3:19-1(b) (purpose of a verdict sheet that goes beyond general verdicts is to “facilitate the determination of the grade of the offense under the Code of Criminal Justice or otherwise simplify the determination of a verdict”).
[brief] (Pa113; Pa114-Pa115)  When asked whether, in a situation where a customer was pushing a U-boat with product piled higher than that person could see over, [...] acknowledged that he would stop a customer and offer to bring that customer another U-boat, help them reduce their load, or instruct the customer to pull, rather than push, the U-boat in order for the customer to be able to see in front of them.  (Pa114)  [...] testified that he had made those suggestions in the past.  (Pa114)  [...] further admitted that if a customer is not looking around the side of the U-boat, but pushing a U-boat that is piled high with merchandise to the point where the customer cannot see over it, that this situation poses a danger to both fellow customers and [...]’s employees.  (Pa115)  Despite [...]’s admissions, he testified that [...] does not provide any training to its employees to assist customers in reducing the load of an overloaded U-boat, nor was there a written policy in place prior to Plaintiff’s accident establishing a policy for employees to inform customers with overloaded U-boats that they must reduce their load.
[brief] And U.S. Const. Amend. XIV [1T] Rule 4:3-3(a) [Pa] states that a change of venue can be ordered for various reasons, including a "substantial doubt" that a fair trial may be had in a given location.  Plaintiff argues there was no basis for the Chancery Division to adjudicate the matter.  Venue is a matter of practice and procedure under State v. Greco, 29 N.J. 94, 104 (1959) [Pa], therefore Plaintiff argues that the Trial Court failed to comply with N.J. Ct. R. 4:69-1 [Pa] in turn violated his Procedural Due Process and Equal Protection under the law guaranteed by N.J. Const. Art. I [Pa] and denied him equal benefits of all laws and proceedings under 42 U.S.C. 1981 (a) [Pa].
[brief] 19  II.  The Trial Court’s Erroneous Dismissal Of [...] Deprived The Jury From Being Able To Consider [...]’ Comparative Fault For Purposes Of Indemnification (This Point Was Not Raised Below) .......................  19  A.  Had The Jury Been Able To Consider [...]’ Comparative Fault, There Would Have Been A Finding Of Fault Greater Than One Percent ........ 26  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 29 | Document | Appendix Page Number | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| | Order Granting Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, | Da041 | | filed October 20, 2023 | | | Order Denying Summary Judgment, | Da043 | | filed October 20, 2023 | | | Order Denying Reconsideration, | Da045 | | filed January 5, 2024 | | | Order Granting Motion to Correct Clerical Error, | Da047 | | filed January 5, 2024 | | | Order Entering Judgment in Favor of Plaintiffs, | Da049 | | filed April 15, 2024 | | | Oral Argument Transcript on [...] Motion for Summary Judgment | Da412 | | and [...] Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (October 20, 2023) | | | Oral Argument Transcript on O.A Peterson Motion for Reconsideration and | Da433 | | [...] Motion to Correct Clerical Error (January 5, 2024) | | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Am. Med. Plumbing, Inc., | | | 458 N.J. Super. 535 (App. Div. 2019) | 12 | | Azurak v. Corp.
[brief] Notably, the Red Bank court properly drew this distinction and distinguished the 7  [...] also cites State v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 55 N.J. 363 (1970) for the proposition that “the State Legislature has evinced an intent to give municipalities some ability to regulate utilities within their boundaries”.  (Db46).  This case exclusively involved the municipal zoning power.  Id. at 368.  This case arose in the context of a distinct statutory scheme that is not at issue in this litigation; thus, [...]’s reliance on Jersey Central is misplaced.  case from *In re [...]*.  Therefore, the two cases are readily distinguishable for this reason alone.  For all of these reasons, [...]’s remaining arguments on appeal should be disregarded and the trial court’s Opinion and Order granting summary judgment to [...] should be affirmed.
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[brief] _____________________  7  At some point during this incident, [...] also noticed an open beer bottle in the driver-side door.  (2T:17-12 to 18-1)  However, the detectives did not administer a field sobriety test, nor did they issue [...] a ticket for driving under the influence.  (2T:54-5 to 11) to justify ordering [...] out of his car to frisk him, because [...] was outnumbered by police officers four-to-one on a quiet road.  (2T:72-4 to 16)  [...] also argued that, contrary to [...]’s testimony, the BWC footage showed that [...] did not behave nervously or hunch forward; [...] leaned back in his car seat when not reaching for an item (such as his driver’s license and work vest), his hands did not shake, he spoke at a normal cadence and speed, and he answered all of the detectives’ questions directly.  (2T:72-17 to 73-6, 73-16 to 74-3; Da26 at 00:35 to 02:07)  **The Court’s Ruling**
[brief] CASES CITED  Bergen Commerical Bank v. Sisler 157 N.J. 188, 202 (1999) .................. 6,9 Caruso v. Ravenswood Developer’s Inc. 337 N.J. Super. 499, 506 (App Div. 2001) ........................................... 9 County of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 409 (1993) ..................................... 6 Hess Corp v. ENI Petroleum US, LLC, 435 N.J. Super 39,59 (App. Div. 2014) .................................................. 7 Johnson & Johnson v. Charmley Drug Co, 11 N.J. 526, 539 (1953) .............. 6 Manahawkin Convalescent v. O’Neill, 217 N.J. 99 (2014) ............................ 10 Murphy v. Implicito 392 N.J. Super. 245, 265 (App. Div. 2007) .................... 6 Rosenberg v. D. Kaltman & Co., 28 N.J. Super. 16 (App. Div. 1953) ............. 8 Solondz v. Kornmehl, 317N.J. Super. 16 (App. Div. 1993) ........................... 7 Township of White v. Castle Ridge Dev. Corp., 419 N.J. Super. 68 (App. Div. 2011)  .....................................................  6  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This matter is a straightforward contract dispute between the [...] ("Borough") and the [...] ("Township") regarding which public entity is entitled to sewer connection fees for properties located in the [...].  The contractual relationship between the Borough and the Township as it pertains to this appeal began in or around 1971.  At that time the Borough had upgraded its sewer system to allow for increased sewage from Parsippany that would flow through the Borough and eventually be treated in the Township at the Township’s sewerage treatment plant.  Subsequently, properties in the [...] began to connect into the Borough’s sewer system.  Since 1971 there have been various agreements between the Borough and Township regarding the sewage system and entitlement to connection fees for properties outside of the Borough.  The most recent agreement between the parties was entered into between the Borough and the Township in 1999 and each party believes that agreement entitles it to the connection fees for the properties located outside the Borough, in [...].
[brief] (Da23, 26, 30, 56, 64)  [...] repeatedly said they had the wrong person.  (Da75, 80, 81, 84, 40, 42, 44, 46, 47, 55, 56, 61, 62, 65, 75)  He gave police his phone and Facebook passwords and signed a consent to search form (with his left hand) so they could corroborate his alibi.  (Da67-68, 80, 82-88; Da16, 2:42:49-2:43:2)  Several of the State’s witnesses corroborated [...]’s alibi.
[brief] . . .”).  This conclusion is especially true considering the significant long-term “medical, emotional, and psychological consequences” associated with social transitioning, which leave children particularly vulnerable to their own immature choices.  *H.L.*, 450 U.S. at 411.  The alleged privacy right at issue also does not arise from the logic of those cases requiring a judicial bypass of a parental consent requirement in the abortion context.  *See, e.g.*, *Bellotti*, 443 U.S. 622.  For one thing, those cases were predicated on a federal constitutional right to an abortion, which no longer exists.  *Dobbs*, 597 U.S. 215.  For another thing, the Supreme Court has only ever required a judicial bypass to a parental consent requirement in the unique context of abortion, where the (former) right must be exercised within the short window of human gestation or lost forever.  *Bellotti*, 443 U.S. at 642 (“A pregnant adolescent . . . cannot preserve for long the possibility of aborting, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks from the onset of pregnancy. ”).  The same is not true with social transitioning, which—like most life decisions—minor children can choose for themselves when they reach the age of majority.
[brief] [1T93-24 to 94-23.]  Next, the court denied defendant’s motion for a Franks\(^2\) hearing because defendant failed to provide any evidence that the search warrant for [...] was invalid.  (1T96-6 to 16).  Defendant argued that his arrest was illegal because he was not the subject of an arrest warrant, he was not named in the search warrant, and even if he was named in the search warrant, it was still invalid because he was not arrested at the house, but 10 blocks away.
[brief] At which point the prosecutor learned of the perjury before the grand jury, the prosecuting attorney has a duty to notify the grand jury to correct the cancer of justice.  To permit the defendant to stand trial of perjury before the grand jury only allows the cancer to grow.  Here, the State and [...] investigated the case prior to the grand jury, so they had knowledge of the facts of the case, the perjured testimony was not corrected and only continued on at other proceedings, there is a reasonable likelihood that the perjured testimony affected the judgment of the grand jury under both indictments.
[directive] This statute specifically covers the areas of: (a)  Wire communication, which essentially means any conversation made over a telephone, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2a; State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349 (1975).  4  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 39  (b)  Oral communication, which means any oral communication uttered by a person who has an expectation that such communication will not be intercepted, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2b; (c) Intercept, which means to acquire the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical or other device, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A- 2c; and (d) Electronic communication, which means the transfer of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio or other system, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2m.  All of these forms of communication are protected from intrusion and interception except under very narrowly defined exceptions.
[brief] D.  Aggravating Factor (9)  As with the other aggravating factors it found, the court here found aggravating factor (9) (the need to deter) and gave it “substantial weight” by relying on [...]’s prior municipal court offenses as its sole explanation for the need for specific deterrence.  (15T 31-6 to 13)  Insofar as the court here considered general deterrence as an aggravating factor, “general deterrence has relatively insignificant penal value. ”  Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 79.  Moreover, the court entirely failed to explain why there was a particular need to deter [...], who had never before been convicted of a felony offense and was 46 years old at the time of sentencing.  This lack of adequate explanation requires a remand for resentencing.  In addition, the court stated that “[t]his is a factor that certainly applies in every case. ”  (15T 31-6 to 13)  Finding aggravating factor (9) and giving it substantial weight on this basis was clear error.  Finding an aggravating factor “in every case” is a clear violation of our sentencing law.  *State v. McFarlane*, 224 N.J. 458, 465 (2016) (“each ‘[d]efendant is entitled to [an] individualized consideration during sentencing. ’”) (quoting *State v. Jaffe*, 220 N.J. 114, 122 (2014)) (alterations in McFarlane).  The court here did not provide a valid reason for finding this aggravating factor, requiring a remand for resentencing.
[brief] **[...]**  A Professional Corporation  Attorneys for Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants  [...], et al.  By: s/ [...]  [...], Esq. (#037351989)  [...]  Attorneys for Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants  [...], et al.  By: s/ [...]  [...], Esq. (#023091991)  Dated: March 11, 2024  ALLSTATE NEW JERSEY INSURANCE COMPANY; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; AND [...], Plaintiffs, v. [...]
[brief] Throughout its Brief, [...] first incorrectly claims that [...] asserted a counterclaim for its Hackensack Project claim in the PTA Arbitration and fully litigated those claims during the hearings, disingenuously stitching together bits and pieces of [...]’s pleading and testimony.  See, e.g., [...]’s App. Br. at 2.  However, [...] then also claims that [...] had a full and fair \[ \begin{align*} (1) & \text{ the character of the interest to be protected;} \\ (2) & \text{ the relative adequacy of the injunction to the plaintiff as compared with other remedies;} \\ (3) & \text{ the unreasonable delay in bringing suit;} \\ (4) & \text{ any related misconduct by plaintiff;}
[brief] “When [a court] assesses whether a defendant’s conduct was especially ‘heinous, cruel, or depraved,’ a sentencing court must scrupulously avoid ‘double-counting’ facts that establish the elements of the relevant offense. ”  State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 74-75 (2014).  Because “the Legislature ha[s] already considered the elements of an offense in the gradation of a crime,” double-counting the elements of an offense in support of an aggravating factor “erod[es] the basis for the gradation of offenses and the distinction between elements and aggravating circumstances.
[brief] The trial court correctly found that it was objectively unreasonable for [...] to believe that [...]’s challenging management style, and her yelling at him at work, constituted criminal harassment.  As noted by the trial court:  The case law is rife with cases such as this, where employees who bring these suits are upset with the way there were treated at work and just general workplace gripes and unpleasantness with their boss.  Clearly it does not give rise to a claim for CEPA.  And internal disputes within the workplace are not criminal harassment.  They are just that, just disagreements within the workplace, unhappiness with their supervisor, and this one isolated incident where Ms. [...] screams and yells at Mr. [...] is not a basis in my view of criminal harassment.  [1T 29:5-15.]  As the trial court found, the record shows only that [...] was a difficult boss to work for.  [...] has failed to identify any evidence in the record that would allow a reasonable jury to find otherwise.  On this record, even granting him all reasonable inferences of fact, [...] did not have an objectively reasonable belief that [...] was criminally harassing him.
[brief] In assessing specific and articulable facts, [a]n investigatory stop is valid only if the officer has a "particularized suspicion" based upon an objective observation that the person stopped has been or is about to engage in criminal wrongdoing.  The ‘articulable reasons’ or ‘particularized suspicion’ of criminal activity must be based upon the law enforcement officer's assessment of the totality of circumstances with which he is faced.  Such observations are those that, in view of officer's experience and knowledge, taken together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, reasonable warrant the limited intrusion upon the individual's freedom.  *State v. Davis*, 104 N.J. 490, 504 (1986).
[brief] "A lender's right to foreclose is an equitable right inherent in a mortgage, triggered by a borrower's failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the associated loan."  Investors Bank, 457 N.J. Super. at 65; S.D. Walker, Inc. v. Brigantine Beach Hotel Corp., 44 N.J. Super. 193, 202 (Ch. Div. 1957).
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction entered in the Superior Court, Law Division Essex County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a Jury  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  ACTING ESSEX COUNTY PROSECUTOR  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT  VETERANS COURTHOUSE NEWARK, NEW JERSEY 07102 (973) 621-4700 - Appellate@njecpo.org  [...] Attorney No. 346432021  Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor  Appellate Section Of Counsel and on the Brief e-filed: December 20, 2023  Table of Contents
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  A.  **Appellant’s Job and Repeated Whistleblowing Activity**  While working for Appellee, [...], Appellant’s job duties included cooking, cleaning, transporting clients, and distributing medication.  See Plaintiff/Appellant’s Deposition Transcript, Appx 390 at 41:15-22.  This was not Appellant’s first time in the field, --- \(^1\)  See Plaintiff’s time-stamped Complaint, Appx 504.  \(^2\)  See Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Appx 001.  \(^3\)  See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Summary Judgment, Appx 353.  \(^4\)  See Defendant’s Reply, Appx 511; see Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply, Appx 558.  \(^5\)  See oral argument certified transcript, Appx 561.  \(^6\)  See 8/4/23
[brief] On November 5, 2021, Appellant was charged on Complaint-Warrant [...] with two counts of Endangering the Welfare of a Child in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a)(i) and 2C:24-4-4(b)(5)(b)(iii).  [Da001].  On June 21, 2022, Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress evidence (“First Motion to Suppress”).  [Da002].  On January 31, 2023, Appellant’s Motion to Suppress was denied.  [Da003-007].  On February 13, 2023, Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration.  [Da008].  On May 11, 2023, Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.  [Da009].  --- 2  “1T” refers to the transcript dated 10/13/22 of Hearing  “2T” refers to the transcript dated 10/18/2022 of  Motion “3T” refers to the transcript dated 5/11/2023 of  Motion “4T” refers to the transcript dated 12/15/2023  Motion “5T” refers to the transcript dated 1/31/2023  Motion “6T” refers to the transcript dated 5/01/2024  Motion  On June 28, 2023, an Indictment was returned charging Appellant with two counts of Endangering the Welfare of a Child in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a)(i) and 2C:24-4-4(b)(5)(b)(iii).  [Da011-012].  On September 1, 2023, Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress (“Second Motion to Suppress”).  [Da013].  On September 12, 2023, Appellant filed a confirmatory letter regarding outstanding discovery.  [Da014-015].  On January 6, 2024, Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment for a Brady Violation.  [Da016].  On May 20, 2024, the trial Court found that the State committed a Brady violation and granted Appellant’s Motion to Suppress while denying his Motion to Dismiss.  [Da017-029].
[brief] In the second lawsuit, Plaintiff continued its sour-grapes campaign over the selection of [...] as the redeveloper.  Plaintiff raised the same baseless claim about a corrupt alliance between the [...] and [...] concerning the development of the blighted property, this time adding [...] as a named defendant.  The trial court determined that the claim was barred by the entire controversy doctrine, relying on the conclusions reached by the Appellate Division in affirming the dismissal of the first lawsuit.  The trial court’s dismissal of the second lawsuit—the one before this Court—is unassailable and must be affirmed.