ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] “[A]n appeal is taken from a trial court’s ruling rather than reasons for the ruling. ”  *N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. K.M.*, 444 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This Court thus can “affirm the final judgment of the trial court on grounds other than those upon which the trial court relied. ”  *Id.* at 334 (internal quotation marks omitted).  1.  **Motion to reopen case**
[brief] ”  Id. at 78; State v. Vandeweaghe, 351 N.J. Super. 467, 480-81 (App. Div.), aff’d, 177 N.J. 299, 238 (2003).  In arriving at her conclusion that defendant met the legal definition of insanity, [...] relied on reports prepared by multiple educational, medical, and psychiatric professionals who did not testify at trial, (10T74-12 to 76-2, 76-6 to 13, 28-19 to 79-21, 87-2 to 87-13, 87-19 to 88-9, 165-20 to 166-9).
[brief] Count One claims the Trustee breached her fiduciary duty by purchasing the Florida Property in her individual capacity, and the Defendants’ prayer for relief is addressed almost entirely to claims relating to that purchase.  (Da342; 348-350).  That purchase was specifically authorized by Article IV, Section 4.1A(b) of the Trust, and unlike the Boonton Property, there were no other beneficiaries who had her right to purchase.  (Da3).  Pursuant to the January 25, 2022 Order, the Trustee obtained an appraisal (that the Defendants themselves had requested), which valued the Florida Property at $360,000.  (Da383).  The Defendants raised the issue of the Florida Property in their motion for partial summary judgment that gave rise to the Court’s decision, seeking to have the Florida Property offered to “[...], individually or jointly, at the current appraised value....” (Da466, at ¶9) (a questionable request in its own right, since the Trust gave only [...] the right to purchase that property).  The trial court specifically approved her purchase of the Florida Property for $360,000 in its June 10, 2022 Order.  (Da19, at ¶8).
[brief] 1T54:22-25.  To help it figure all this out for the third set of hearings, and under [...]’s order to take into account market value, assessed value, and inflation, the Board asked the landlord and tenant attorneys to provide comparables that could help inform the Board’s thinking.  [...]’s attorney repeatedly argued that this was an impossible task stating “I don’t know how we could do that.  I really don’t. ”  7T176:4-9.  He explained the difficulty of such an enormous task: “how do we know what is protected what isn’t protected, and you’re asking for a database that we have—we don’t have access to. ”  7T178:3-6.
[brief] The State may convey its riparian rights in tidally-flowed lands to others in different ways.  First, the State may enter into a license or lease for such riparian lands providing a person or entity with a temporary right to use the riparian lands.  Additionally, the State has the right to convey fee ownership of tidally-flowed riparian lands through a riparian grant.  See N.J.S.A. 12:3-7; N.J.S.A. 12:3-10; Dickinson v. Fund for Support of Free Public Sch., 95 N.J. 65, 79 (1983) (recognizing legislative authorization for [...] to convey and lease riparian lands).  While current regulations require that the State must first offer the riparian grant to the owner of the adjoining uplands, if that uplands owner declines to acquire it, the riparian land may thereafter be conveyed to persons who are unconnected to the upland property.  See N.J.S.A. 12:3-23.
[brief] 598 F. 3d at 116.  The plaintiff had been shopping in a store leased by defendant [...].  Pursuant to the terms of the lease between [...] and the landlord, the landlord was responsible for maintaining the common areas of the center.  Id. at 116–17.  Arguing that it owed no duty to maintain the common areas, [...] moved for summary judgment.  The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of [...] holding that “New Jersey would not impose a duty on a tenant for maintenance of a multi-tenant parking lot. ”  Id. at 118.  The plaintiff appealed.  In affirming the order granting summary judgment to [...], the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that an individual tenant in a multi-tenant shopping center had no duty to maintain common areas of a multi-tenant shopping center where the landlord retained control and exercised responsibility for that duty.
[brief] **TENANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO OFFSET THE AMOUNTS DUE TO LANDLORD WITH THE TENANT ALLOWANCE (Da1-3)**  In the Underlying Action, [...] twice held that, pursuant to the express terms of the Lease, Tenant was not entitled to payment of the 2020 or 2021 Tenant Allowance because it was admittedly in monetary default when those installment payments came due.  (Da1-3; 2T4-7 to 2T4-13, 2T6-18 to 2T7-2, 2T9-5 to 2T9-18, 3T15-2 to 3T15-25, 3T16-24 to 3T17-4).  Tenant’s attempts to ignore its undisputed defaults and reinstate these payments as an “automatic offset” is nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to rewrite the Lease and grant itself a better deal than it bargained for.  Such efforts are contrary to New Jersey law and should, respectfully, be rejected by this Court.
[brief] “The mere fact that plaintiff’s testimony contains contradictions and inconsistencies does not deprive it of all probative effect. ”  De Rienzo v. Morristown Airport Corp., 28 N.J. 231, 239 (1958).  “In this posture of the proofs the resolution of the conflict in the evidence and the credibility to be given plaintiff’s testimony in the light of inconsistencies and contradictions contained in it [a]re matters exclusively for the jury as the triers of fact and judges of the credibility of the witnesses. ”  Id. at 240; see also Gindin v. Baron, 16 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 1951).
[brief] Dated: May 2, 2024  [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], Plaintiffs/Respondents, vs. [...] AND [...], Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO.: [...]  Civil Action Trial Court No.: [...]  Sat Below: The Hon. [...], J.S.C. PLAINTIFFS’/RESPONDENTS’ RESPONSE
[brief] False light protects a person’s interest “in not being made to appear before the public in an objectionable false light or false position, or in other words, otherwise than as he is. ”  Romaine v. Kallinger, 109 N.J. 282, 294 (1988) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E, comment b; see Comment, “False Light: Invasion of Privacy?”, 15 Tulsa L.J. 115, 117 (1979)).
[brief] "[A] class action settlement should not bar all claims that could have been litigated between the parties but only those claims that were actually litigated."  *Garvey v. Tp. of Wall*, 303 N.J. Super. 93, 103 (App. Div. 1997), quoting *Hilliard v. Shell W. E & P, Inc.*, 885 F. Supp. 169, 173 (W.D.Mich.1995).  This so, in part, because “[t]he notice provided to a class member typically describes only the claims actually asserted in the class action.  Consequently, the class member does not receive notice that other unasserted claims may be barred by a final judgment. ”  *Garvey*, 303 N.J. Super. at 102.
[brief] In accordance with the Reconsideration Order, Tenant paid Landlord the $38,462.60 legal fee award by check dated November 20, 2023.  Thereafter, the Clerk disbursed the $196,669.16 in Rent Arrears to Landlord.  (Da251-252).  To date, Tenant remains in possession of the Premises under the Lease.  (3T6-2 to 3T10-18).  This appeal and cross-appeal followed.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] THE COURT: I am absolutely not indicating you can’t testify.  THE WITNESS: You’re allowing him to badger me.  You’re biased against me, and you’re continuing to allow it.  THE COURT: Okay.  See -- okay.  [...] – THE WITNESS: I’m watching you.  I’m watching you do it, Your Honor.  THE COURT: [...].  Okay.  [...], you don’t govern this courtroom.  THE WITNESS: Okay.  THE COURT:  If you don’t like what happens in this trial, you are always free to file an appeal.  THE WITNESS: Okay.  THE COURT: But you need to follow my instructions.  THE WITNESS: I hear you.  So, why don’t you make your ruling now and we’ll file the appeal then.  Want to do that?  THE COURT: Sir.  [...] – THE WITNESS: Want me to leave now, ma’am?  Want me to leave the court?  THE COURT: Okay.  Counsel?  [...]: Yes, Your Honor.  THE COURT:  I’m not quite certain why – does [...] have a medical condition that – THE WITNESS: Yeah, I do, against you, I do.  THE COURT: -- that prohibits – THE WITNESS: Because you ruled against me, and you’re biased.  THE COURT: -- that prohibits him from – THE WITNESS: Testifying?  I have a medical condition.  I do.  So, you want me to – THE COURT: From being able to file instructions?  THE WITNESS: Yes, I do.  [...]:  Perhaps there should be an inquiry on that issue, Judge.  THE WITNESS: Yes.  We should have an inquiry.  (3T:34:10-36:5).
[directive] A Presumption 8.2 an committed defendant has that a believe to cause probable is there where case any In covered not is case the complaint-warrant and by charged offense an for release on while offense under release of revocation for motion a file not shall prosecutor 8.4, the or Section 8.3 under or Director or the Prosecutor, Assistant First or Prosecutor County the unless 2A:162-24 N.J.S.A. Division, the prosecuted by cases in Justice Criminal of Division the Director of Deputy a that: determines revocation the at evidence convincing and clear present to able will be State the (a) revocation, and justify to hearing defendant risk that serious a is there detained, is defendant and revoked is release unless (b) required, when court in appear will not (i) or community, the or person other any to danger a pose will (ii) threaten, or process, justice criminal the obstruct to attempt or obstruct will (iii) prospective intimidate, a or injure, threaten, to attempt or intimidate, or injure, juror. or witness emand Compellin.
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S IMPROPER SUBMISSION AND THE TRIAL COURT’S ACCEPTANCE OF DOCUMENTS  NOT BEFORE THE BOARD MISLEAD THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE INACCURATE FINDINGS (RAISED BELOW TO TRIAL COURT Da174-223; COURT ORDERS APPEALED Da214, Da270)  [...] did not present any evidence or documents to the Zoning Board to even address its burden of proof to establish that this off-site parking use on Lot 5 was ever a legal permitted or approved use.
[brief] Plaintiff’s reliance on Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc. is misplaced, as that decision makes clear that the transmittal of communications within the State “is not the critical factor, it is the nature of the contact;” notably, the defendant’s representations to New Jersey were alleged to be fraudulent and formed the basis for plaintiff’s claimed damages.  115 N.J. 317, 325–26 (1989).
[brief] Appellants’ position belies the plain statutory language.  At the outset, Title 18A does not discuss or recognize a “merged” school district as a type or classification of school district distinct from consolidated or regional school districts.  *N.J.S.A. 18A:8-44(2)(a)*, titled “Elimination of non-operating district through merger,” describes the process for merger, but does not state that such districts are subject to a unique classification separate and distinct from regional or consolidated school districts.  The statute merely states that “...the executive county superintendent of schools shall eliminate any non-operating district and merge that district with the district with which it participates in a sending-receiving relationship. ”  *N.J.S.A. 18A:8-44(2)(a). *  Accordingly, Appellants’ arguments that the school laws somehow single out or treat merged districts differently from regional or consolidated districts is without merit.  Moreover, contrary to Appellants’ assertions, the school laws expressly provide that municipalities containing former non-operating districts, such as [...], that merge with other districts pursuant to *N.J.S.A. 18A:8-44(2)(a)* are entitled to invoke the statutory provisions permitting municipalities to withdraw from regional and consolidated school districts.  In particular, *N.J.S.A. 18A:8-50(8)*, titled “Governing law,” provides:  “Unless otherwise provided in this act, a new district formed pursuant to section 2 of this act [i.e., a municipality “merged” into another district pursuant to *N.J.S.A. 18A:8-44(2)(a)*] shall be governed by the provisions of chapter 13 of Title 18A of the New Jersey Statutes. ” (emphasis added).  As discussed above, chapter 13 of Title 18A contains the statute at issue here: N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11.  Thus, the school laws expressly contemplate that a “merged” district, including a municipality of a former non-operating school district that forms part of that merged district, is subject to the same regionalization provisions set forth in chapter 13, including the provisions regarding withdrawal from a regional or consolidated school district.  If the Legislature intended to exclude municipalities that have been merged into other districts from seeking to withdraw from those districts, it could have excised the language of N.J.S.A. 18A:8-50(8) or otherwise altered it.  The Legislature did not do so.  Accordingly, any interpretation of chapter 13’s language must begin with the understanding that it expressly includes merged districts created through pairing a municipality containing a former non-operating school district with its former receiving district.
[brief] Docket No.: [...] N. Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailor Leasing Co., 158 N.J. 561 (1999)  Case Law 9  Nolan v. Otis Elevator Co., 197 N.J. Super. 468 (App. Div. 1984)  Case Law 4  Noren v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., 488 N.J. Super. 496 (App. Div. 2017)  Case Law 9  Rankin v. Sowinshk , 119 N.J. Super. 393 (App. Div. 1972)  Case Law 6  Shadel v. Shell Oil Co., 195 N.J. Super. 311 (App. Div. 1984)  Case Law 4  State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71 (2016)  Case Law 3  United States Use of Pneumatic & Electric Equip. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 44 F.R.D. 354 (D.C. Pa. 1968)  Case Law 4 | Party Name Designation | Appellate Party | Trial Court/Agency Party Role | Trial Court/Agency Party Status | |------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------| | [...] | Appellant | Plaintiff | Participated Below | | [...] | Respondent | Defendant | Participated Below | | [...] | Respondent | Defendant | Participated Below | | [...], jointly, severally or in the alternative | Respondent | Defendant | Participated Below | Appellate Division
[brief] Third, [...]’s extrapolation of raw spore counts to spores per cubic meter is mathematically incorrect such that the report vastly overstates the quantum of spores per meter.  2T41-19 to 2T42-19. \(^1\)  In addition to [...]’s testing in March 2009, additional air samples were collected in October 2009 and February 2011.  This time, no Stachybotrys was detected.  2T49-9-15; 2T51-12-20.  Da765a; Da1874a-Da1882a.  Based on the tests finding either no Stachybotrys or the bare minimum, [...] concluded that there was insufficient evidence to meet the first step in his exposure pathway analysis, i.e., there was no evidence of excessive mold growth while [...] was living in the condo.
[directive] The proposed retroactivity provision as envisioned by the [...] would involve a two- step process.  Upon enactment, the State would have 30 days to identify all incarcerated individuals who qualified for a sentence modification.  After 30 days, all qualifying inmates would receive retroactive relief, with the court rescinding the mandatory period of parole ineligibility and modifying the sentence as if the defendant had been instead subject to the conviction.9  “default” rule of 33 percent parole ineligibility, minus prison credits, at the time of  During this 30-day period, however, the State would have the opportunity to file an objection in cases.10  particular  Where an objection is filed, the court would hold a hearing on whether to grant retroactive relief.  If the State established by clear and convincing evidence that rescinding the inmate’s parole disqualifier would pose a substantial risk to public safety, then the court could decline to modify the sentence, or could reduce the parole disqualifier by less than the default.  If the State failed to meet its burden, however, then the inmate’s sentence would be automatically modified as if an objection had never been filed.  The Commission’s 2019 report described facts and findings that gave rise to its unanimous recommendations.
[brief] For example, [...] assigned 11,497 cases to 41 arbitrators in the fourth quarter of 2023 alone.  See [...] 4th Quarter 2023 Rep. to DOBI at 2, https://www.nj.gov/dobi/pipinfo/forthright2023q4.pdf (last accessed Mar. 11, Those 41 arbitrators concluded 12,043 cases in that quarter, an average of about 98 cases per arbitrator, per month.
[directive] d.  When a person is charged with a criminal offense on a juvenile delinquency complaint and is released without being detained pursuant to section 15 or 16 of P.L.1982, c.77 (C.2A:4A:34 or C.2A:4A-35), the law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney shall prepare an application pursuant to section 3 of P.L. 2001, c.365 (C.2C:35-5.9) for filing on the next court day.
[brief] Counter-Statement of Procedural History  In November 2020, Defendant-Appellant [...] (“[...]”) initiated a disciplinary action against Plaintiff-Respondent [...], an appointed commissioner of the [...] Sewerage Authority.  (Da 27-30)  [...]’s hearing officer held a hearing on February 8, 2020.  The next month, [...]’s hearing officer recommended [...]’s removal from office.  (Da 31-42)  On April 7, 2021, [...]’s governing body passed a Resolution adopting the hearing officer’s findings, removing [...] from office.  (Da 43)  [...] filed an Action in Lieu of Prerogative Writs in the Superior Court challenging his removal.  (Da 44-49)  [...] filed an Answer.  (Da 50-54)  Both parties moved for summary judgment.  (Da 55; Da 63)  On September 9, 2021, Hon. [...], J.S.C. ret’d t/a, heard argument, granted [...] summary judgment, and denied [...]’s motion.  (Da 1)  [...] concluded that [...] improperly relied on a local ordinance that is applicable to town employees as the basis to remove [...], instead of properly following the statute that applies to the potential removal of a sewerage authority commissioner, N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c).  This statute sets forth that a sewerage authority commissioner shall only be removed from office for misconduct in office, inefficiency, or neglect of duty.  [...] appealed the summary judgment order.
[brief] Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex Trenton, NJ 08625-0006  Re: [...] (Petitioner-Respondent) v. [...] (Respondent-Appellant)  Claim Petition No.: [...]  Appellate Docket No.: [...]  Civil Action: On Appeal form an Order Denying Recusal of Judge, from the State of New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Division of Workers Compensation, Freehold Vicinage  Sat Below: Honorable [...], J.W.C.  Dear Judges:
[brief] Furthermore, as [...] explained in pre-motion meet-and-confer correspondence, she seeks documents that she could use to counter [...]’s claims that “there were specific mistakes made by [...] regarding [...] and [...]” and that “the company was slated to lose millions of dollars if a change wasn’t made. ”  (ECF 65-2, at 1.)  *8  The court rejects [...]’s argument that [...] is simply “casting a wide net for documents coupled with ‘gotcha’ litigation tactics ... to drive up the cost of litigation and muddy the water surrounding Plaintiff’s termination” instead of focusing on the “appropriate inquiry,” which [...] contends is “whether it honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs.
[brief] POINT II: IT WAS NOT PLAIN ERROR FOR THE COURT TO ALLOW THE JURY TO HEAR THE AGREED UPON PORTIONS OF DEFENDANT’S REDACTED RECORDED INTERVIEW, INDEED IT WAS INVITED.  [Not Raised Below]  Defendant asserts, for the first time on appeal, that he was denied a fair trial because the jury heard during the seventeen minutes recorded interview that [...] called him a liar after defendant identified himself but denied going into [...], and by referring to his unrelated arrest.
[brief] Q  You don’t remember, okay.  But you’ve gotten cases from a company called [...], S E A K, right?  A Yes.  Q  You were getting cases from them for 20 years.  A Yes.  Q  You get cases from a company called [...].  A Yes.  Q  And you’ve been getting cases from them for 25 years.  A Yes.  Q  You get cases from the [...].  A Yes.  Q  You were getting cases from them for 25 years.  A Yes.  Q  You get cases from [...].  A Yes.  Q  You’ve been getting cases from them since 2012.  A Yes.  Q  You get cases from a company called [...], M E D I V A L.  A Yes.  Q  You get cases from a company called [...].  A Yes.  Q  You get cases from a company called [...].  A Yes.  Q  You get over half of your cases annually through these expert witness services, correct?  A  I would estimate it more like 25 percent but.  Q  Well, do you recall in your deposition – [...]: Can I see a copy of it?  Q  Let me put it this way, Doctor.  You get the overwhelming majority of your cases, the ones that you get from these organizations are for the plaintiff, correct?
[directive] Each County Prosecutor shall ensure that each agency within the Prosecutor’s jurisdiction implement and maintain a system of ensuring appropriate training for all personnel involved in the agency’s internal affairs function.  4.3.3  The Division of Criminal Justice shall conduct periodic “train-the-trainer” courses for all persons assigned responsibility for internal affairs training within the County Prosecutor’s Offices.  These trainers shall be responsible to train the internal affairs officers of agencies within their jurisdiction of the County Prosecutor.
[brief] Rulings on Point I .... 12T:193-3 to 24; 12T:211-6 to 21916; 13T:21-6 to 24-23  Rulings on Point II .........................  13T:25-7 to 40-7  Rulings on Point III...  3T:48-12 to 60-11; 12T:4-5 to 15-6; 12T:15-25 to 18-19; 13T:5-1 to 8-14  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] (2T71-2 to 2T94-25).  This conclusion was not based on any competent evidence submitted by petitioner about the decedent, but was based only on the Judge of Compensation's interpretation of N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11.  The Judge of Compensation reached this conclusion after finding that during the pandemic, it was important for educators and students to return to school.  The Judge of Compensation found further that the educational system is critical and teachers are critical to that system, and even though teachers are not named in the statute, they perform functions which involve physical proximity to members of the public and essential to the public's health, safety, and welfare.  (2T892-17).  However, the section of N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11 that the Judge of Compensation was citing specifically referred to an employee who is a "public safety worker or first responder, including any fire, police or other emergency responders."  Decedent was not a "public safety worker or first responder," and therefore should not be entitled to the benefit of this statutory presumption.  Workers' Compensation is a summary proceeding.