ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Statute Charge Description  Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  2nd Degree $25,000 to $50,000  No 10%  Actor driving motor vehicle fails to stop after signal from police, third degree; if actor eludes 2C:29-2b  Eluding and drives in a manner that creates a risk of death or injury, second degree.  3rd Degree $10,000 to $20,000  10% permissible a.  Actor has purpose to hinder or impair apprehension or prosecution of another and assists 2nd Degree $25,000 to $50,000  10% permissible that person in avoiding detection or suppression of evidence; second or third or fourth degree or disorderly persons offense depending upon degree of crime the other person is charged with or liable to be charged with and whether the actor is a spouse, domestic 3rd Degree $5,000 to $10,000 10% permissible partner, partner in a civil union, parent or child of the person aided.
[brief] ...........................................  23 - **Hafer v. Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc.**, 793 F. Supp. 2d 987 (S.D. Tex. 2011) ..................... 19 - **Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.**, 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999) .................................. 19  ####
[brief] On November 30, 2023 [...] issued a second letter and stated the following, telling that the *With Prejudice* disposal of the appellant’s case below has made the Mother’s federal discrimination case *res judicata* (Pa57):  “this case has been administratively closed based upon the legal doctrine of *res judicata* preclusion, [because] the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division – Bergen County, entitled [...] v. [...] and [...] ‘-‘ On October 20, 2023, the Court issued its decision on the case. ”  In another word—[...] viewed that in disposing of the appellant’s case on October 20, 2023, the trial court had jurisdiction and did adjudicate the factual and legal merits of the Mother’s discrimination case.  **IV.**
[brief] For this Court to rule that the due diligence done in preparation for any public roadway project constitutes constructive notice of all roadway conditions is simply inequitable and against the spirit of the Tort Claims Act.  [...] has limited resources available.  To argue that [...] should have patched potholes while in the middle of the [...] Roadway Project, which logically sought to correct any and all deficient roadway conditions, is illogical and contrary to established policy.  Additionally, the Plaintiff has consistently attempted to mischaracterize Google Maps images produced in discovery.  Argument was made that a Google Maps photograph dated July 2019 showed the condition existed at that time.  This is simply not true - the image produced shows, at best, a crack in the general area of the fall.  The only Google Maps image produced showing the alleged condition is dated October 2020, whereas this incident occurred in January 2021.  There is no case law which suggests that 3 months time is sufficient for a court to infer constructive notice in this context, let alone based on a Google Maps image.  Even if this Court were to agree that there was somehow constructive notice of the alleged condition, this court must still find that [...]’s actions were not palpably unreasonable, thus meaning that [...] is nonetheless entitled to dismissal with prejudice.  The alleged condition is nowhere near a public crosswalk.  [...] instituted a plan to re-pave the entirety of [...] Avenue.  Plaintiff may not agree with how [...] chose to address the pothole, but choosing a full scale re-pave over simply continuing to patch individual pot holes is not and cannot be characterized as palpably unreasonable (in fact it is perfectly logical).  For these reasons, Plaintiff-Appellants arguments fail as a matter of law.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Appellants respectfully request that the Court (i) overturn the Disqualification Order in the interest of justice and (ii) grant such other further relief as the Court deems just and proper Respectfully submitted, **[...]**  Dated: March 20, 2025 __________________________  [...], Esq. [...], Esq. [...], Esq. [...] and [...]  Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants v. [...] Defendant/Counterclaimant  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY DOCKET NO.: [...] ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY MONMOUTH COUNTY LAW  DIVISION DOCKET NO.: [...] and [...] (Consolidated)
[brief] | 14, 15, 18 | | Ponden v. Ponden, 374 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2004), certif. denied, 183 N.J. 212 (2005) | 14, 15, 18 | | Spinks v. Twp. of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 454 (App. Div. 2008) | 13 | | Tucci v. Tropicana Casino & Resort, Inc., 364 N.J. Super. 48 (App. Div. 2003) | 17 | | Tynes v. St. Peter's Univ. Med. Ctr., 408 N.J. Super. 159 (App. Div. 2009) | 14 | | Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 101 N.J. 538 (1986) | 14
[brief] Thus, Probation has shown itself to be incapable of posting court ordered awards even when Appellant’s attorney specifically advised Probation in writing of each court-ordered credit due Defendant.  3.  As Appellant noted in paragraph 14 of his Reply to his Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of 5/12/2023, where disputed facts are presented by way of contradictory certifications, affidavits, and the like, the court has the obligation and the duty to further investigate, citing Tancredi v. Tancredit, 101 N.J. Super 259, 262 (App. Div. 1968) and Harrington v. Harrington 281 N.J. Super 39, 47 (App. Div. 1965) regarding disputes regarding probation account errors, i.e.:
[brief] Following said denial, Appellant subsequently filed on or about April 10, 2024, a Motion to modify the underlying Horowitz Judgment amount and again sought counsel fees (albeit this time as an award from a fund in court) and costs.  (Da 203-208).  In support of this relief, Appellant produced additional information gleaned from Superior Court records setting forth a higher Horowitz Judgment amount but conceded that it would be simple interest accruing thereon.  In an Order dated April 29, 2024, [...] granted Appellant’s motion in part.
[brief] (29T34-9 to 39-12).  The judge then turned to the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors.  The judge found aggravating factor one applied, noting that defendant "did much more than that which was minimally required to satisfy an element of an offense, and therefore, the nature and circumstances may be considered as an aggravating factor."  (29T46-3 to 6).  The judge found that the defendant killed the victim during the course of a burglary and robbery "in a manner that exceeds the far reaches of human behavior."  (29T46-9 to 13).  The judge noted that defendant "violently assaulted an 81-year-old retired nurse in the sanctuary of her home when she was alone and vulnerable" -- he "punched and battered the victim, breaking her nose and assaulting her for an extended period of minutes in her vestibule, knocking out her dentures, bruising her face, strangling her, causing petechia in the eye, stabbing her with a serrated knife, severing her carotid artery, and inflicting other stab wounds."  (29T46-14 to 47-5).  The judge thus found that aggravating factor one applied.
[brief] Though the Rule provides that the Notice is not required where a “written property settlement agreement has been executed,” [...] did nothing to ensure that the agreements [...] and his lawyer were asking the court to effect were, in fact, “executed” voluntarily and knowingly by [...] (as discussed further below).  Nor did the agreements presented to the court set forth the information that a Notice of Proposed Final Judgment would have provided the court – such as “a statement of the value of each asset and the amount of each debt sought to be distributed and a proposal for distribution” – which is particularly important for a high-value asset case like this one, cf. Clementi v. Clementi, 434 N.J. Super. 529, 534 (Ch. Div. 2013) (“In a default proceeding, the court generally still must receive additional information and evidence from the participating plaintiff, such as, at the very least, a case information statement so the court may learn more
[brief] A bench trial was held before [...] on seven non-consecutive dates starting on November 3, 2021, and concluding on April 25, 2023.  See 1T-7T.  [...] then required the parties to submit post-trial briefs and those briefs were filed with the Trial Court in June of 2023.  9T, p. 3, lines 12-13.  On September 25, 2023, the Trial Court issued an Order for final judgment dismissing [...]’s Complaint in its entirety, concluding that [...] “. . . has no interest in the subject property and the property was fully conveyed to the [...] who holds Title to the property.
[brief] [...] is the world’s largest business federation.  It represents approximately 300,000 direct members and indirectly represents the interests of more than three million companies and professional organizations of every size, in every industry sector, and from every region of the country.  An important function of the Chamber is to represent the interests of its members in matters before Congress, the Executive Branch, and the courts.  To that end, the Chamber regularly files amicus curiae briefs in cases, like this one, that raise issues of concern to the nation’s business community.
[brief] As early as 2008, the Township Council placed an SM Overlay Zone over lands zoned Agricultural along Route 130, and increased the permitted height limits to 50 feet to “reflect current standard[s] for uses permitted therein. ” (5T 69:8-20).  It later adopted Redevelopment Plans for “[...]” and “[...],” which permitted warehouses up to 75 feet tall.  (5T 69:2-25; 70:1-3).  [...] concluded that this pattern demonstrates the governing body and land use boards’ have recognized “for some time now that warehouse distribution use, where it is permitted and encouraged, that buildings that are taller than 30 feet are not only the norm, but they are appropriate to actually foster development within these zones and these sites accordingly. ” (5T 70:8-13).  Citing [...]’s traffic study, [...] also agreed that “from a traffic impact and a trip generation standpoint, there was really no distinction between a 30-foot or, say, a 50-foot warehouse. ” (5T 73:24-25; 74:1).  [...] repeated that the proposed project will operate as a “high-cube warehouse,” and not as a fulfillment center or parcel hub that delivers directly to consumers.  (5T 74:2-13).  “[I]n this instance, building height, in my opinion, can’t be viewed as a proxy for more intense -- intensive use or development. ” (5T 74:14-17) (emphasis added).  From a traffic prospective, [...] concluded that the buildings will not be any more intense than a 30 foot warehouse.  The ITE, the authoritative industry standard for traffic engineering, does not include height as a variable for traffic generation calculations for warehouses; the independent variable for trip generation is square footage.  See Section III(B)(1); 3T 26:3-21.  The ITE data set includes warehouse buildings with heights of 50 feet, as the data consists of real traffic counts from a compilation of various building heights and sizes that fit the parameters of the specific ITE classification, and the post-development traffic counts often produce lower numbers than predicted by ITE calculations.  (3T 31:19-25 through 33:1-3, 35:11-22; 4T 58:6-11).  [...]’ extensive unrebutted planning testimony, and [...]’s unrebutted, evidence-based conclusions on traffic establish that the requested height variance would not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan.  The record lacks substantial credible evidence to support any other conclusion.  Proper application of the Grasso and TSI standards confirms that the Plaintiff presented the evidence necessary to establish the applicable positive and negative criteria.  The Board’s decision to ignore same was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  IV.
[directive] Necessarv Information  Seizing Agency: Seizure Number: Seizure Date: Forfeiture Date: Vehicle Year/Make/Model: Vehicle Mileage: N.A.D.A.  Low Retail Value: Gross Sale Proceeds (if applicable):  Total Contractor Costs: Total Agency Costs (advertising, awards, etc.):  Lien Payment Amount Requested by Lienholder: Name of LienholdedPayee: Address of LienholderlPayee: EFT  Nine Digit Routing Transit Number: Account Number: Reuuired Suwortinu Documentation  Documents required in every case  A.  Cover memorandum addressed to the Director, EOAF requesting payment of a lien rn  Legible copy of the original loan installment agreement rn Lien Payoff Statement indicating the number of payments made and those remaining rn  Administrative Declaration or Judicial Decree of Forfeiture rn  Contractor costs statement rn  B.  Additional documents required for vehicles desired for official use  Lienholder agreement to accept payment of the lesser of the unpaid principal or the appraised value rn  Approved retention request rn  Vehicle Condition and Inventory Form
[brief] ”  This was well within the court’s discretion to permit and was justified, given the second bite at the apple that the Defense had received.  If the court erred at all, it was in suggesting that the State could not admit [...]’s statement as substantive evidence and that to use his statement, it would have to be admitted through another witness.  No reason for the limitation on the use as substantive evidence was given.  However, the suggestion by the court that it was “not as if you have a child witness where you can show that there’s no recent fabrication, that would then be admissible to substantive evidence”, indicates the court was possibly considering N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), and not N.J.R.E. 803 (a)(2).  While it may have been prudent to admit the statement of [...] while he was on the stand so that the Defense could have subject him to additional cross, this was certainly not fatal.  First, the Defense objected to the re-direct of [...] and the admission of his statement during the same.  The Defense wanted their opportunity to draw further negative inferences without affording the State the opportunity to rebut them.  They should not now complain that they did not have the opportunity to re-cross [...], given that the State was not permitted to admit the statement through him in accordance with the Defense’s wishes.  Second, the Defense knew the statement was coming in before [...] took the stand the second time and knew what the statement contained.  (16T10:1-23).  As it was consistent with his testimony in court the prior day, the Defense was not missing an opportunity to execute an effective cross-examination, because it has crossed him on the same facts the day before.  As Chew indicates, cross-examination on a plea agreement is one of the most effective ways to highlight why the jury should take a witness’s testimony with a grain of salt.  The Defense here was able to cross [...] twice on his plea and alleged motive to fabricate.  Chew also suggests that because such a cross-examination can have a great impact on perceived reliability, allowing a prior consistent statement in, is highly probative for the jury’s determination in that regard.  As such, it was reasonable to do so in this case.
[directive] Prosecutor if County only bail the monetary of imposition the request prosecutor may A Deputy or of Criminal a Justice Division the of Director or the Prosecutor, Assistant or First bail monetary of imposition (1) that: Division, determines the by prosecuted cases in Director non- no (2) Reform Law, Bail the by authorized is release defendant's of condition the a as Page 55 reasonably to sufficient be would conditions of combination or condition release monetary believed reasonably is defendant the required, (3) when court in appearance defendant's the assure requested amount in the bail monetary her post to or him allow will that assets financial have to loan, a obtain company or to surety from a bond a purchase to having without prosecutor the by provisions the subject to would, requested amount the at bail set monetary of imposition (4) and detention.
[brief] Remember the question he is being asked here, in context; it is not *methodology*, it is the comparability of the other locations.  He says he reviewed *that*, using sworn testimony from other hearings and he “looked at the location. ”  (Id.) --- \(^1\) 4/17/24 transcript.  [...] completely answers this question and then some:  15  The one that was the 16 most intense one that I saw was the Quakertown one, 17 which I think, [...], you had mentioned that there was 18 no backup in there, in what I put together.  That one 19 I had seen in testimony that was given on another 20 application, and I didn't have any documentation, but 21 I did review that sign location with regard to its 22 location, the intensity of the roadway system.  That's 23 literally a three faced monument sun.  I'll call it a 24 gateway sun that's in the form of a compass.  I mean, 25 it's substantial, nothing like what we're proposing.  THE CHAIRMAN:
[brief] Aside from their allegation about a transaction which did not happen, the Complaint contained nothing more than bald legal conclusions regarding [...].  The Complaint alleged that [...] “without justification, maliciously, purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and/or negligently” interfered with Plaintiffs’ “de facto” partnership and/or contracts with [...].  (Pa62a-Pa64a (Counts One-Three)).  It further alleged that [...] “maliciously and without reasonable justification actively and/or passively encouraged, approved of, aided and abetted, and/or directed the actions of defendants [...] and [...] as related to the plaintiffs, since the parties commenced and/or completed negotiations to purchase [...]’ assets. ” (Pa62a ¶ 60).  Nowhere, however, did the Complaint assert any factual allegations to support these conclusions.  It is well settled that mere labels and conclusions, without any supporting factual allegations, are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.  See Glass v. Suburban Restoration Co., 317 N.J. Super. 574, 582 (App. Div. 1998) (“[I]t is improper to assert a claim without any factual basis for that claim[.]”).  In light of Plaintiffs’ failure to plead factual allegations to support a tortious interference claim, it comes as no surprise that Plaintiffs failed to introduce a single piece of evidence which even remotely supported a tortious interference claim.
[brief] Indeed, [...]’s motion to consolidate this case with the referenced separate Law Division Case was properly denied by the Chancery Court.  After consolidation of the two cases was correctly denied, the plaintiffs in the alternate case (which include the deceased co-owner’s Estate, not a party to this case) consented to arbitrate only that case, involving claims related to [...]’s mismanagement and misappropriation, including civil RICO and conspiracy, then pending in the Law Division against the defendant there [...] (the sole Plaintiff here), her husband, and two other companies (the latter three parties not being parties to this case).  In an act of gamesmanship, [...] ran back to the Chancery Court for a second bite of the apple reviving her previously denied motion to consolidate under the guise of a motion to compel arbitration.  Notwithstanding the prior proper denial of consolidation of the two cases, the same Court astonishingly reversed course and compelled arbitration – which essentially would result in consolidation of the cases.  The decision below must be overturned.
[brief] The plain language of the statute requires an interpretation, analysis, and implementation of a host of factors affecting school funding and public school districts, including: a) the money private companies are and are not entitled to; b) who the statute applies to; c) what is allowable and unallowable under the statute, and what is required to effectuate a renegotiated contract; d) where the money is sent; e) why the statute applies and does not apply to certain companies and entities; and f) how school districts and private parties are supposed to renegotiate contracts during school closures.  The interpretation, enforcement, and implementation of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) is not a purely legal issue as it requires an analysis of how it impacts the burdens upon school districts that must conserve resources to fund unprecedented, unanticipated, and unbudgeted expenses caused by the pandemic.  The Superior Court, Law Division, does not routinely adjudicate, interpret, implement, and enforce matters under the 18A school laws, especially the State aid statute under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  Thus, unlike the Commissioner of Education’s rulings, the Superior Court, Law Division, does not routinely consider how its rulings affects: other New Jersey Department of Education regulations under Title 6A, Commissioner decisions and precedent, State Board of Education policies, and directives from the Governor.  Nor does the Superior Court, Law Division, routinely contemplate how a ruling impacts a public school district’s budget, funding, and ability to deliver the constitutionally protected thorough and efficient, in contrast to Commissioner of Education rulings.  Thus, for the Superior Court, Law Division, to assert primary jurisdiction over the Commissioner of Education primes the statute to have inconsistent rulings, where the Board could be impacted in a manner that the Commissioner of Education never intended school districts to be impacted.
[brief] (1T27-9).  A question arose as to the correct amount of the monthly rent.  (1T30-15)  To that end, Defendant offered the October 2020 lease that she and [...] had both signed and which set the rent at $1,200.  (1T30-15, Da1)  Plaintiff, who had earlier testified to a month to month oral tenancy with no written lease, now offered an unsigned written lease which set the rent at $1,500 and which Plaintiff had submitted to DCA in connection with Defendant’s rental assistance application.
[brief] On October 10, 2014, Plaintiff [...] filed the instant lawsuit, as both the executrix of Alexander’s estate and in her individual capacity, against [...] and several other defendants.  Pa2712a.  On or about January 26, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint.  Pa64a-102a.  On or about February 29, 2016, [...] filed its Answer to the Second Amended Complaint.  Pa104a-23a.  In its  Answer, [...] denied the allegations plead by Plaintiff and asserted numerous affirmative defenses, including that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act.  See id.  On April 26, 2018, [...] moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims.  Pa40a-41a.  [...] heard oral argument on the motion, granted summary judgment in [...]’s favor, and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice by Order dated June 22, 2018.  Pa1a-2a.  [...] concluded that Plaintiff had failed to adduce evidence that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that [...] had committed an intentional wrong, or that the context and circumstances of [...]’s injury were more than a fact of life of industrial employment.  Pa10a-11a.  Plaintiff filed an amended notice of appeal on January 31, 2024.  Pa2874a-78a.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**