ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In terms of relief sought, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint again sought to compel the retroactive promotions of unidentified alleged “affected Union members” to some unidentified higher position/rank and with “full seniority benefits and other emoluments of the position. ” (Pa40-41 at ¶109, 111).  Plaintiff repeatedly alleged that multiple alleged violations had occurred and unidentified members affected, albeit without any details or identified individuals for any such instance.  (Pa 38-40 at ¶100, 101, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109).  [...] also raised that Plaintiff sought equitable and compensatory damages for unnamed individuals who were not named/joined in the case.  (Pa41-43).  Defendant thus questioned, who would or could such relief be awarded to given the posture of the case?  Certainly not the Plaintiff/Union.  Rule 4:6-2(f) permits a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint if a plaintiff fails to join an indispensable party.
[directive] Page3 or Probation to be able to communicate with the juvenile, and to arrange for phone 2 video reporting.  (2)  Pursuant to the April 20, 2020 Order, victims shall have opportunity to participate an of If the disposition hearing or object to the scheduling or method proceeding.  a to in of or victim family member the juvenile, or other appropriate person wishes to participate/address the court at disposition, such arrangements should be made by of the prosecutor or defense counsel.  The court must be advised these arrangements of advance the disposition date.  in of (3)  Defense attorneys, prior to disposition, should review with the juvenile the Notice At Appeal Rights form.  adjudication, defense counsel shall represent that they have if reviewed the form with the juvenile, that all questions, any, have been addressed will with the juvenile, and advise if the juvenile has signed the form.  The judge advise the juvenile of: (a) the appellate rights pursuant to Administrative Directive #01-09; (b) the court's authority to retain jurisdiction pursuant to 5:24-5; and (c) the court's R. of authority to modify order disposition or entertain a post-disposition relief an application pursuant to 5:24-6.
[brief] Around midnight on May 7, 2011, a 7-Eleven in Hamilton, New Jersey was robbed.  At approximately 12:15 a.m., Sergeant [...] of the Hamilton Township Police Department received a transmission about the armed robbery, which “had just occurred. ”  [...] testified that the dispatch described the suspects “as two Black males, one with a handgun. ”  [...] activated the lights and sirens on his marked patrol car and drove towards the 7-Eleven at a “relatively high speed” for one to two minutes, shutting off the lights and sirens as he drew closer.  According to [...], traffic was light because it was late at night.  Approximately three-quarters of a mile from the 7-Eleven, [...] saw a car approaching in the oncoming traffic lane.  Using the spotlight mounted to his police vehicle to illuminate the inside of the car,\(^1\) he observed that the occupants were a man and a woman and let them pass.  [...] testified as follows:  I continued on.  The second set of headlights approached me, I illuminated the inside of that vehicle and I observed three Black males, you know, that went past me.  \(^1\)  This was not a standard procedure sanctioned by the Hamilton Police Department, but a technique that [...] employed while searching for suspects at night.  The description of the suspects was two Black males so at that point I decided to issue a motor vehicle stop on the second vehicle.  He would later explain that the man and the woman in the first vehicle reacted to the spotlight with "alarm or annoyance," and that the "driver shielded his eyes a little bit."  In contrast, the occupants of the second vehicle, including defendants, showed no reaction and kept looking straight ahead.  [...] testified that the occupants of the second vehicle "were all males, Black males.  And I received no response from any of them that I could observe, no one looked at me, no one turned towards the car.  It was as if I wasn't there."  He explained that this non-reaction "struck [him] as odd."  He further testified that it was his "experience that sometimes people who prefer not to be noticed tend to ignore the spotlight."  Upon witnessing the non-reaction of the vehicle's occupants, [...] activated his lights and executed a stop of the second vehicle.  [...] testified that at the time of the stop, [the sex and race were consistent with that of the description.  I had three occupants in the vehicle.  The suspects were described at the time of the call as two.  So I had, at least, that.  I took into consideration the short distance from the scene, as well as the short amount of time from the call and all those things considered is what I took into consideration to effect the stop.]  Upon stopping the vehicle, [...] radioed headquarters with the license plate number and a description of the car -- a 2000 silver Toyota Corolla with Pennsylvania license plates.
[brief] Respectfully, the Trial Court’s decision should be affirmed for the reasons expressed in the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. (Da1-57).  As the Trial Court determined, Defendants produced sufficient evidence of their race- and age-neutral justification for their decision not to renew Plaintiff’s employment contract, and she failed to demonstrate a disputed material issue precluding summary judgment.  As aptly detailed by Judge Shanahan:  •  The record unequivocally establishes that Plaintiff cannot show that she was subjected to any hostile work environment or that the decision not to renew her employment was because of her race or age.  •  The record evidence establishes that the non-renewal decision was based on Plaintiff’s job performance.  More specifically, despite Defendants’ requests that Plaintiff improve her poor communication skills, emails with Plaintiff and her written evaluations show that Plaintiff's performance continuously suffered with regard to her lack of communication.  -  Plaintiff also exercised poor judgment, unprofessionalism and made mistakes in the execution of her duties.  Plaintiff's performance deficiencies were numerous and well-documented.  -  There is no record evidence whatsoever of racial animus or age bias.  For all of these reasons, Plaintiff's discrimination and harassment claims should remain dismissed.  In addition, as detailed below, Plaintiff's retaliation claim under LAD [Count III] should remain dismissed because there is no record evidence to support any claim that she was subjected to retaliation for engaging in activity protected by LAD.  In sum, there are no facts or law to support Plaintiff's claims.  To the extent Plaintiff contends discovery was incomplete, this argument is untimely and also lacks merit because she cannot establish that further discovery would somehow supply the missing elements of her causes of action.  Accordingly, the Complaint should remain dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice.
[brief] (1T91-22 to 25; 1T92-8 to 10; 1T95-14 to Defendant’s father explained that defendant had not been wearing a shirt when he picked defendant up, so he gave defendant a sweatshirt to wear.  (1T100-24 to 1T101-6).  [...] saw that defendant had some blood on his face and looked to be extremely cold as if in shock.
[brief] In October 2022, [...] advised that it was reneging on the foregoing agreement and insisted the Board approve the project without an elevator in all buildings.  Given the sudden turn of events and with the composition of the Planning Board at risk of change upon reorganization in January, a Resolution without an elevator in Building E was presented to the Board at its December 12, 2022 meeting, which was approved while noting on the record its intention to adopt a supplemental written resolution to require an elevator in Building E the following month.  It adopted that Resolution on January 23, 2023.  On May 11, 2023, [...] filed a PW action to set aside the January 23rd Resolution.  In addition, on the day before it filed its PW action, [...] filed a Notice of Motion in Aid of Litigant’s Rights in this action claiming breach of the Settlement Agreement and seeking to set aside the same resolution, plus monetary relief based on alleged breaches of the Settlement Agreement.  The trial court erroneously granted PW relief to [...] without a proper record and erroneously determined that the imposition of penalties and award of attorneys’ fees and costs were warranted despite no finding of breach of the terms of the Settlement Agreement, which is a necessary predicate to the imposition of a penalty or award of fees by the terms of the Settlement Agreement, and is contrary to the American Rule as applied in PW actions.
[directive] In any school zone case where the prosecutor determines that the defendant is ineligible to be sentenced in the court’s discretion pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b where the school zone (i.e., offense was committed while school property or a school bus, or involved violence, threatened on violence, or the possession ofa fireama, or where the defendant is subject to an extended term as a repeat drug dealer under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f), the prosecutor shall prepare and tender a Brima~e plea offer, and shall take all appropriate actions to contest the defendant’s eligibility to be sentenced pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b.  Notice to the court and defense attorney that the defendant is not eligible to be sentenced in the court’s discretion pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7b shall be provided by tendering the completed Brimagg worksheet, which will indicate whether the defendant is subject to an extended term trader N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f (Criminal History Category 1V or V), or that the offense occurred on school property (Special Application and Enhancement D6 Feature G), that a firearm was possessed (Special Application and Enhancement Feature ), 5  The Revised Brimage Guidelines explain that notwithstanding case law that broadly consmaes N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 a(5), a prosecutor should not apply the Brima.g.~ Guidlines counterpart to the statutory organized criminal activity aggravating factor -- ~ Aggravating Factor #4b -- automatically or routinely based merely upon the fact that the controlled dangerous substances involved were likely to have been originally produced in a foreign county, that other persons were necessarily involved in the distribution scheme, or that the defendant acted for profit.
[brief] The Appellate Division elaborated on this point:  In addition to being untimely, *plaintiff’s motion lacked merit.*  The premise of plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint was the alleged agreement by the [...] to blight the Block in exchange for [...]’s promise to build a new school.  Plaintiff contends its motion was based on “newly-discovered evidence. ”  Yet, during the Council’s February 13, 2020 public hearing, [...], plaintiff’s managing member, acknowledged and took credit for the proposed construction of the school:  “we are in support of the future development and fully on board of the proposed affordable [housing] and school that is proposed by the [...].  The school was our idea. ”  During that hearing, [...] also asserted “the [...] is unfairly and illegally favoring a competing developer .  . . .”  Even though its managing member was aware of the school construction and the alleged illegal “favoring” of a competing developer, plaintiff chose not to include a bad-faith claim in its complaint and inexplicably waited until after the trial judge had rendered a verdict to seek leave to add a claim based on those allegations.  [(Pa789–90 (emphases added).)]  In conclusion, the Appellate Division held that “[u]nder the totality of these circumstances . . . the motion judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to permit plaintiff’s belated amendment” to add a bad faith claim because “[p]laintiff [did] not demonstrate[] that its proposed amendment would change [the] conclusion” that the blight designation was supported by “substantial credible evidence. ”  (Pa790.)  E. [...] Moves to Reinstate the Second Action.
[brief] Id. at 213.  Two published Appellate Division decisions provide additional examples:  A janitor whose foot was severely injured when two students dropped their side of a 300-pound weight bench they were carrying qualified, even though he could have foreseen that dropping it was likely.  Brooks v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 425 N.J. Super. 277 (2012).  Also, a sheriff’s officer whose finger was pierced by a dirty needle while frisking a suspect had sustained a Richardson qualifying injury, when it led to physically intrusive AIDS prevention treatment, and eventually complete mental disability due to post-traumatic stress disorder.  Caminiti v. Bd. of Trs., Police and Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 431 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2013).  [...]’s case more resembles these decisions as well as Moran v. Board of Trustees Police and Firemen’s Retirement System.
[brief] At the hearing, [...] repeated the concerns expressed in its July 31 letter.  (T7-10 to 11-15.)  [...] argued that, as the owner of the documents, it is the gatekeeper for the purpose of determining relevancy.  (T7-10 to -15).  It stated that only documents deemed relevant should be subject to a review for privilege and that, under the court’s protocol, it would be required to conduct a privilege review of an estimated 68,000 documents, two-thirds of which it surmised would be irrelevant.  (T8-18 to 9-1.)  [...] contended that the “search terms were negotiated without an understanding of the Court’s directive” and that, had it known better, it would have narrowed the search terms.  (T11-8 to -15.)  The court questioned the truth of that last assertion, stating that the parties agreed to search terms with the intent of capturing all relevant documents and that more restrictive search terms would have eliminated potentially relevant documents.  (T11-22 to 12-3.)  The court bluntly stated, “I don’t buy [counsel’s] argument at all that they would have negotiated for other search terms because that means they’re negotiating to try to hide relevant documents and that’s not the purpose here.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................  ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................ iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ......................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................................................  2 STATEMENT OF FACTS ..........................................................................  4  [...]’s failure to pay premiums owed to [...], leading to cancellation ..................................................  4  [...]’s extensive evidence of its mailing of the cancellation notice .............................................................  6  ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................  9  POINT I THE LOWER COURT  CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY  JUDGMENT TO [...], DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ CROSS-MOTION, BECAUSE THE BUSINESS AUTO INSURANCE POLICY WAS PROPERLY CANCELLED PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THE ACCIDENT, AND THUS WAS NOT IN EFFECT ON THAT DATE..............................................................................  9  The lower court correctly determined that [...]’s policy cancellation was validly effected in accordance with the statutory requirements ..............................................................................  9  Plaintiffs’ arguments on appeal present no grounds for reversal ..................................................................  12  CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................
[brief] (Pa200).  Also, [...] wrote correspondence for [...] in the underlying matter of August 2, 2017, sending a letter to his brother, [...], and his sister, [...].  [...] has been represented by Mr. Sanchez for the last 23 years.  Also, [...] stated that he never would have signed a Retainer Agreement with anyone other than [...].  Moreover, [...] confirmed his status as a non-client when he confirmed that he was suing [...], an attorney who never represented him in the Probate case.  [...] testified that he was suing [...], notwithstanding the fact that he never entered in a Retainer Agreement with [...] to be represented by him in the Probate case.  On September 13, 2017, [...] sent a form of retainer letter to [...] and [...] Miranda.
[brief] Evans v. Ross , 57 N.J. Super. 223, 231 (App. Div. 1959)  ..................................65  Fernandez v. City of Elizabeth, (3d Cir. No. 11-1294; Exhibit 8 ..........................60  Finkel v. Twp. Comm. of Hopewell, 434 N.J. Super. 303, 315-16 (App. Div. 2013) .........................................................................................................................45  Franek v. Tomahawk Lake Resort, 333 N.J. Super. 206, 216 (App. Div. 2000), certif. denied, 166 N.J. 606 (2000) ......................................................... 65, 66 Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 2005) .........................................................  59  Gonzales v. Pennsylvania, 293 Fed. Appx. 136, 137-38 (3rd Cir. 2008) ..................  53  Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)  ........................................................................ passim  In re Grant of Charter to [...], 435 N.J. Super. 273, 280 (App. Div. 2014)  .................................................................  45  In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 34-35 (1976)  ........................................................................  45  Jones v. [...], 431 F. Supp. 3d 518, 531-32 (D.N.J. 2019) .........................................................................................................................  66  Kiman v. New Hampshire Dep’t of Corr., 451 F.3d 274, 283 (1st Cir. 2006) ...........  47  Lane v. Tennessee, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) ........................................................................  52  Lawson v. DeWarr, 468 N.J. Super. 128 (App. Div. 2021) ............................... 20, 21, 43, 68  Lehmann v. [...] 132 N.J. 587, 603-04, 626 A.2d 445 (1993)  ..........  64  Marks v. Tennessee, 554 F.3d 619, 620 (6th Cir. 2009)  ............................................  53  Mohney v. Pennsylvania, 809 F.Supp.2d 384, 400-402 (W.D.Pa. 2011)  .............  52  Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751-752 (2004)  ..................................................  59  N.J. Citizen Action v. [...], 296 N.J. Super. 402, 415 ......................  45 Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127 (2006)  ................................................................. 18, 26, 32, 63  Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2002)  .................................................................53  Portofino Condos.  Ass'n v. [...], No. A-2490-11T1, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1153 (App. Div. 2013) .................. 69, 70  Reaves v. Egg Harbor Twp., 277 N.J. Super. 360, 366 (App. Div. 1994)  ..............45  Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998), .. 56, 58, 61  [...] v. [...], 108 N.J. 59, 64, 527 A.2d 864 (1987)
[brief] In that scenario, Plaintiff’s disclosure of the events becomes a potential motivating factor for termination.  See Donofry v. Autotote, 350 N.J. Super. 276 (App. Div. 2001) ("Plaintiff’s ultimate burden of proof is to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his protected whistleblowing activity was a determinative or substantial, motivating factor in defendant’s decision to terminate his employment.  . . ")  The trial court erred by discounting this evidence and resolving factual disputes in Respondents’ favor, contrary to the Brill standard.  See generally Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995).  Whether Defendant [...] approved or knowingly tolerated the charge pay is a dispute that must be resolved by a jury.  There is a version of events supported by record evidence that suggests that Defendant [...] used the charge pay matter to divert scrutiny and undermine those who had witnessed and disclosed her unlawful conduct.  A reasonable factfinder could conclude that the investigation was pretextual and intended to silence Plaintiff’s whistleblowing activity.  C.
[brief] ARGUMENT ........................................................................6  POINT 1  THE TENANCY COURT  CORRECTLY RETAINED JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE THE MOTION FOR TRANSFER AND THE TRIAL FOR POSSESSION AND NON-PAYMENT  BECAUSE THE INSTANT CASE FACTUALLY DEALT WITH LANDLORD TENANT RELATIONSHIP .......6  POINT II  THE FACTS OF THE CASE APPLIED TO RELEVANT  CASE LAW AND STATUTES  LACK SUPPORT FOR TRANSFER TO THE CHANCERY COURT OR LAW  DIVISION.CIVIL PART .............................................8  POINT III THE LANDLORD TENANT COURT  CORRECTLY APPLIED  THE FACTS OF THE CASE TO THE SEMINAL SPECIAL CIVIL PART TRANSFER CASE-- MORROCCO v. FELTON 112 N.J. 226 (Law Div. 1970) .......................10  CONCLUSION .................................................................12
[brief] B.  There Is No Direct, Concurrent Conflict of Interest In [...]’s Representation of Both [...] and [...] Within This Litigation (Raised Below Da001-002, 1T35:10-38:20)  In disqualifying [...] pursuant to RPC 1.7, the trial court held as follows:  Here, representation of all these defendants would directly conflict with one another and already do conflict with each other.  In terms of the basic rudimentary concept of whether or not [...] did the cut through on his own accord or whether he was told by his employer.  Again, representation for [...], the driver, relies on the theory that he was told to make the illegal cut through and did not do so on his own.  Conversely, defendants [...] Asphalt and Walter [...] Transit rely on the notion that the supervisor explicitly instructed the drivers to refrain from the cut through.  Those theories are directly adverse to each other under the rule and a conflict has arisen.  [1T35:15 – 36:4.]  The trial court erred, however, in finding that [...] and [...] have adverse theories of liability, which therefore creates a conflict between them.
[brief] State v. Koedatich 112 N.J. 225 (N.J. 1988) common law rules governing venue have been long superseded by the Rules of Court.  [Pa] Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 245-46, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877, 71 S. Ct. 123, 95 L. Ed. 638 (1950) (recognizing that, under the New Jersey Constitution, the Supreme Court is vested with plenary authority over rules governing the courts in this state)."  State v. Defazio DOCKET NO. [...] (App. Div. Jul. 22, 2014)
[directive] Another ...............................................................................................41  Supervision.  Are Results  Risk-Assessment  Pretrial Automated Preliminary 4.5.6 in Making Delay  Undue in Result Would or Available Not ....................................................................................41  Decisions  Charging Violent a for Delinquent Adjudicated Recently Was Defendant 4.5.7  Crime..........................................................................................................42 .............................................................43  Convictions/Charges  Out-of-State 4.5.8  Complaint- fora Applying Presumption of Overcoming the 4.5.9  3 .....................................................................................................4  Warrant.  Domestic in Procedures and Notifications, Considerations, Special 4.6 .......................................................................44