ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] testified how he was alerted by his son in the early morning hours of March 4, 2023, to extensive damage to his other son’s vehicle that was parked on the street.  After seeing this damage, the police were called to report the damage.  (2T 4-20 to 6-4).  [...] assisted the Cedar Grove police in canvassing the area to see if the car that caused this damage belonged to a neighbor but after not finding anything, decided to go back to bed.  (2T 6-20 to 7-12).  The next morning, [...] was alerted by his daughter that the defendant’s vehicle, which was parked in his driveway several houses away from [...]’s house, had extensive damage and was likely the car that caused the damage to the Hall vehicle.  (2T 8-1 to 21).  [...] also testified that the defendant approached him and apologized for causing the damage and made sure that his insurance covered all expenses from the accident.  (2T 9-2 to 10-3).  The defendant did not call any witnesses.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE LEAVING THE SCENE OF AN ACCIDENT AND FAILURE TO REPORT AN ACCIDENT WERE PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.
[brief] (Db11-21)  The State responded by asserting that [...] does not apply to sentencing decisions.  (Sb14-15)  This is patently incorrect.  As noted in Defendant’s initial brief, while the specific issue before the Court in [...] involved a prosecutor’s consideration of dismissed charges in the context of a PTI decision, the Court explicitly stated that it was overruling the holding of State v. Green, 62 N.J. 547 (1973) that had permitted the consideration of dismissed charges in the context of sentencing.
[brief] In the granting the Defendants’ motions to dismiss, the Law Division also mandated an insurers’ affirmative claims for IFPA, are likewise subject to PIP arbitration.  Applying the aforementioned factors, the Law Division’s ruling unquestionably constituted impermissible rulemaking.  The ruling: (1) violated the APA; (2) usurped the authority of the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance in administering how claims are handled by [...]; and (3) usurped the law-making function of the Legislature.
[brief] In this case, there is no evidence proffered by Plaintiff that her conduct was somehow altered because she believed that [...] was a [...] employee.  Nor is there evidence of any conduct by [...], other than taking a picture of the membership card, of which [...] had several, acted differently because [...] presented the card.  If fact, there is no evidence that [...] was even involved in this Friday shopping trip.  Plaintiff takes the term “reliance” out of context from well-established case law in a weak attempt to keep [...] in this case.  Plaintiff’s only “reliance” on [...] showing a [...] care was for purposes of completing an incident form and suing [...].  This is certainly not the level of reliance set forth in *Mercer*, *infra*, and *Arthur*, *infra*, in which a party made decisions because she relied on another party’s apparent authority.  Since there are no facts establishing any actual reliance by Plaintiff, Plaintiff cannot establish [...]’s alleged apparent authority over [...].
[brief] Contrary to counsel’s assertion Plaintiff was not asked at deposition when the photograph was taken.  (Da 110-137).  If anything, the record suggests that the photograph was taken the date of loss when all the other photographs were taken.  Even assuming that the photograph was not taken at 7:35AM, the record further suggests it was taken closer to 9AM when plaintiff’s boss, [...], arrived at the office on the date of loss.  (7T 10:14-15).  Defendants maintain that the photograph is still probative and relevant as to the conditions on the date of loss.  The photograph is particularly relevant as it relates to the state of snow removal on the date of loss, progress as to same, and shows that the snow removal was still in progress.
[brief] Nonetheless, prosecutors, like defense attorneys, are afforded "considerable leeway, within limits, in making" their closing arguments.  State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30, 84 (1997), cert denied, 528 U.S. 1052 (1998); State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518, 540 (1992).  Accord State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 489 (2001).  Indeed, a prosecutor is "entitled to sum up the State's case graphically and forcefully."  State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 58 (1998), cert denied sub nom., Kenney v. New Jersey, 532 U.S. 932 (2001); See also State v. Chew, 150 N.J. at 84.  If a prosecutor’s arguments are based on the facts of the case and reasonable inferences therefrom, what is said in discussing them, by way of comment, denunciation or appeal will afford no grounds for reversal.  Id.  Additionally, remarks made during closing arguments must be judged in relation to the entire summation and the trial as a whole.  State v. Johnson, 31 N.J. 489, 513 (1960).
[brief] The [...]’ own expert admitted the following:  “[...]: And that’s for the witness to answer.  And it didn’t seem like [...] had a difficult time understanding the question, and he gave the, as I understand his answer is, you take into consideration events that occur prior to the date of valuation and you take into consideration events after the date of valuation that would have been reasonably expected to occur on January the 27th, 1994.  Is that sort of a sum, an accurate summary of your testimony, sir?  THE WITNESS: Yes. ”  7T16:5-15.  He further admitted that a “prudent buyer would have been aware of the [...] lease before buying the property”:
[brief] This is a simple case, and the Court’s analysis need not go further, but [...] grasps at anything to avoid the clear consequences of the statute – the approval is void and it must seek relief from the Board of Adjustment.  [...] does so by baselessly asserting that its separate, prior submission to the CRB was an “application for development” under the MLUL.  Its nonsensical position has no support in law.  This is because an “application for development” is defined by the MLUL as “the application form and all accompanying documents required by ordinance for approval of a subdivision plat, site plan, planned development, cluster development, conditional use, zoning variance or direction of the issuance of a permit pursuant to section 25 or section 27 . . .”
[brief] See also In re Doerfler v. Fed. Ins. Co., 454 N.J. Super. 298, 302 (App. Div. 2018) (noting the “function [of] an appellate court is to review the decision of the trial court, not to decide the motion tabula rasa. ”); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc. v. Checchio (“A&P”), 335 N.J. Super. 495, 498 (2000) (“[N]either the parties nor we are well-served by an opinion devoid of analysis or citation to even a single case. ”).  In Foley, 379 N.J. Super. at 581, for example, on appeal of an order vacating a final judgment on a debt alleged to have previously been discharged in bankruptcy, the appellate court had remanded the case to permit additional briefing and findings on the dischargeability of the debt, yet on remand the trial court made no such findings.  The Appellate Division held insufficient under Rule 1:7-4(a) the trial court’s cursory ruling that “gave no reasons for his conclusion,” that “clearly the debt did not fall within any of the exceptions [to dischargeability] provided by . . . the Bankruptcy Code. ”  Id. at 588-89.  Because the trial court failed to “fully address” the legal issue as to “the dischargeability of the debt,” appellate review of that decision was “hampered by thence of findings and a more complete record,” warranting a remand.  Id. at 581, 589.  Here, similarly, because the trial judge’s ultimate rulings on the offset and complete lack of a ruling on the motion to fix the reimbursement amount failed to “fully address” the legal issues, ibid., and were “devoid of analysis or citation to even a single case,” A&P, 335 N.J. Super. at 498, the rulings flouted the requirements of Rule 1:7-4(a).  Therefore, this Court should vacate paragraph one of the November 10, 2021 order, and the entirety of the November 9, 2023 order, and remand with instructions to the trial judge to fully address the issue as to the amount of reimbursement owed from Landlord to Tenant under the Lease.
[brief] Second, the trial judge properly allowed lay-opinion testimony by the owner of the restaurant as well as an investigating officer about the similarities between the intruder depicted in the surveillance videos on each night.  Defendant argues for the first time on appeal that the burglaries may have been perpetrated by different intruders.  Contradictorily, both his opening and closing arguments below relied on a recurring theme: “that man” in the surveillance videos “is not this man,” meaning defendant.  Trying a new approach on appeal, defendant misapplies the relevant case law, as both witnesses’ testimonies were based on their perception and were helpful for the jury.  In any event, neither witness’s testimony related to a fact at issue.  That testimony was therefore admissible.  Finally, the trial judge properly exercised his discretion by imposing an extended prison term and extended period of parole ineligibility on defendant.
[brief] Da390.  The trial court granted Respondent’s motion, holding, “The court grants plaintiff’s motion as it finds that claimed [sic] through those expert reports is not a compensable form of damage in this condemnation case. ”  Ibid.  [emphasis added].  The trial court further held:  The claimed damage to the house on defendant’s remaining property from vibrations during construction of the seawall is not damages as a consequence of the taking.  Rather, defendant seeks damages as a consequence of the manner in which a project was performed or carried out by third parties.  Such issues may be the subject of a separate litigation that may include other necessary parties and full discovery.  Ibid.  [emphasis added].  Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion seeking leave to file an interlocutory appeal regarding the Court’s August 6, 2021 Order (Pa95) which was denied on September 14, 2021.
[brief] Any defects . . . are fatal and leave the court without jurisdiction and its judgment void. ”  *Berger*, 244 N.J. Super. at 204.  Moreover, “laches is an equitable doctrine” which may only be enforced when the allegedly prejudiced party acted in good faith.  *Fox v. Millman*, 210 N.J. 401, 417 (2012); *Knorr v. Smeal*, 178 N.J. 169, 173 (2003); *Chance v. McCann*, 405 N.J. Super. 547, 567 (App. Div. 2009).  “But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay . . . the validity of that defense must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. ”  *Lavin v. Bd. of Educ.*, 90 N.J. 145, 152 (1982) (quoting *Hall v. Otterson*, 52 N.J. Eq. 522, 535 (1894)).  Here, it is not disputed that [...] was unlicensed when it purchased [...]’s alleged debt and filed the collection Complaint, *to wit*, [...] violated a remedial consumer protection statute in the attempted purchase and enforcement of [...]’s void account.
[brief] Said another way, Appellants could not at once be the knowing and rightful owners of the Property exercising all aspects of ownership, as they testified, while, at the same time, having no knowledge of the existence of the deed purporting to convey them the very same ownership interest.  Appellants’ assertion that they were merely acting upon advice of counsel in transferring the property to [...] is equally unavailing and similarly inculpating with respect to their fraudulent actions.  To be clear, Appellants’ opposition brief is the first time Appellants have ever conceded that they were first notified about the Deed by [...] and that they acted pursuant to his legal guidance in selling the property.  Rather, as noted above and in [...]’s initial brief, Appellants have at all times argued that they were and have always been the rightful owners of the Property.  Moreover, and even more egregiously, Appellants are seemingly now relying upon an “advice of counsel” defense that was never previously raised in the many years of the subject litigation.  Not only are Appellants precluded from relying on this novel theory at this late date (See e.g., State v. Walker, 385 N.J. Super. 388, 410 (App. Div. 2006) (explaining that “issues not raised below, even constitutional issues, will not ordinarily be considered on appeal unless they are jurisdictional in nature or substantially implicate public interest."), but their failure to raise the issue earlier deprived [...] of the ability to seek discovery on this issue, including production of otherwise protected attorney-client communications.  Blitz v. 970 Realty Associates, 233 N.J. Super. 29, 37 (App.  Div. 1989) (concluding plaintiff waived the attorney-client privilege as to her communications with her counsel prior to entering into the contract to address issue of reasonable reliance in claim of legal and equitable fraud).  In short, Appellants’ opposition, if anything, removes any doubt that the Appellants’ actions in deeding the Property from [...] to [...] were a knowing and malicious attempt to steal the Property from [...]’s estranged and hated brother, [...].  See e.g., 13T84:23-86:3 ([...] explaining that neither she nor her husband like [...]).  Indeed, while Appellants had previously asserted that this matter involved, at worst, a dispute over who had cared for the property for the last 25 years, their most recent submission makes it clear that these positions were a smokescreen.  Said another way, until at least 2016, Appellants had no claim of ownership and simply sought to take advantage of [...]’s mistake when it was brought to their attention by [...]  These actions are the very definition of malice for which punitive damages are appropriate.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.12(a) (explaining that punitive damages are appropriate where the “acts or omissions were actuated by actual malice or accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard of persons who foreseeably might be harmed by [them].”).
[brief] As previously stated, [...] contends that it should be awarded the Project merely because it was the only bidder who designated an archaeologist “registered” under the PWCRA.  However, [...] has yet to produce the actual “registration” document of its archaeologist despite the fact that this omission was raised below before [...].  Finally, the [...] maintains a running list of all registered public works contractors compliant with the PWCRA, as well as their crafts.  A search of that list reveals that [...]’s archaeologist [...]  (“[...]”) is registered but not as an archaeologist.  1552a-1553a.  The description of [...]’s scope of services on that list states that [...] “performs professional services and environmental consulting.  [...] does not perform any craft services. ”  1553a.  Based thereon, [...] did not register as an archaeologist under the PWCRA.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] The Lease established four potential reimbursement methods, each of which are capable of satisfying Landlord’s unwaivable reimbursement duty independently or in combination: (i) Landlord pays Tenant six annual installments; (ii) Landlord fails to fully pay Tenant an annual installment and the unreimbursed amount is used as an offset against Tenant’s rent obligation; (iii) Landlord pays the entire balance of Tenant’s Allowance at once; and/or (iv) If Tenant misses rent payments, § 4.02 of the Lease automatically deducts the rent owed from the balance of the Tenant’s Allowance installment at the time it is owed [Da17-Da18.]  The Lease also provides that the standard six annual installment payments method only kicks in if additional conditions are met, essentially, that neither Tenant nor the Guarantor is in default and that the Lease remains in effect.  The Tenant’s right to receive reimbursement via the standard method, as opposed to one of the other methods, is contingent upon these conditions being satisfied.  Landlord, in an argument adopted by the trial court, contends that the “monetary default” clause for triggering the annual installment payments operates to forfeit permanently Tenant’s right to receive its allowance at all during the period of the Tenant’s or Guarantor’s default, even after making up the monetary default.  In essence, Landlord and the trial court add “monetary default” as an additional, seventh, unstated Reimbursement Condition.  That construction of the Lease is unsupported and unjustifiable for multiple reasons.  First, the plain text of the contract does not permit this construction.
[brief] In this regard, and without restating the facts outlined above, [...] undertook all duties and responsibilities associated with ownership of the Property from 1997 forward without any input, communication, or interference from Defendants.  Not only was this the testimony of the Plaintiff, but it was the testimony of three non-party witnesses, including [...]’s long-term tenant, his maintenance person, and his property manager/realtor.  By contrast, not only did the Defendants not undertake any ownership or control of the Property, the undisputed evidence establishes that (1) as of 2016, [...] was unaware of a potential claim to the Property as evidenced by the 2016 title report done by [...]; (2) notwithstanding the 2016 title report, [...] did not undertake any actions consistent with ownership of the property until executing the October 2019 Deed; and (3) Defendants did not notify [...] of their claim to the Property at any point in time.  Given the foregoing, a reasonable person in the same or similar position as the Plaintiff here would not have any reason to believe that they did not have clear title to the Property.  Indeed, and perhaps most telling, despite being aware of a potential claim in 2016, Defendants intentionally kept [...] in the dark, including when they transferred the Property to [...] and hired [...] to list it for sale.
[brief] The Resolution clearly indicated that the:  "Dedication of the Roadways to the [...] should be addressed by the Applicant with the Borough, and the Applicant shall be responsible to undertake any additional steps, as may be necessary, for the road dedication".(Pa319)  Plaintiff clearly understood this as a "condition" of the agreement.(Pa332)  Indeed as late as 2021 Plaintiff's attorney referred to dedication being "conditioned" in corresponding with the Borough Mayor and Council.  (Pa332)  Plaintiff's attorney before the planning board indicated that "we accept that condition".  There can be no doubt that both parties understood the agreements to contain a condition before dedication could be achieved - and that condition was formal acceptance by ordinance or resolution of the municipal council following a formal deed.  It was error for the trial court to disregard this agreement between the parties.
[brief] That’s the bottom line; he was served.  Whether or not the process server was accurate or told the truth, whatever it is, is a different point.  It’s clear after I heard all the evidence back on October 19, [...] was served and it was a very, very old judgment.  [2T5:18-24.]  After receiving some additional filings from Defendant, the court placed additional findings on the record on November 30, 2023 (3T).  The trial court found:  [...] is again challenging the process server and we discussed this back during rather extensive oral argument on October the 19th.  It may be that the process server even made a mistake in his paperwork.  He couldn’t be in two places at once or was lying about it; that could be it.  But there’s no question that [...] was served.  And my recollection is [...] has never certified that he never was served.  Or, at a minimum, has never plausibly or credibly contended that he, in fact, wasn’t served.  The judgment in this case is now eight (8) years old.  [3T4:20-5:8.]  The trial court entered an Order denying the motion for reconsideration (Da61).  Defendant then filed this appeal.
[brief] The tube had to be re-inserted on May 18, 2010, August 11, 2011, and again on March 14, 2013, which was only 4 and ½ months before the July 29, 2013 incident.  (2T80 to 82; 2T168-8 to 169-17).  Plaintiff testified that he was essentially symptom free after the tube was inserted into his ear, except that it came out and had to be re-inserted several times.
[directive] education requirement set forth in instruction is updated, the a course of earned for each course.  If that may be number of credit hours been substantially modif ed for purposes of course has shall determine whether the Institute subsection 3(D). for Desi natin~ Courses.  The Institute may establish standards for B.  Standards included in the catalog.  These courses of should be which courses of instruction determining New Jersey law or specifically for the Institute, by or fox a instruction may be developed by in jurisdiction, by a college, university, agency another or a law enforcement enforcement agency any include organization or foundation.  The catalog shall not anon-profit law school, or by oi• corpo~•ation for fee to be paid by the foi•-profit a paid instruction presented to officers by a course of law enforcement  Nothing herein shall limit the authority of a department or the officer.  of~eer's a course.  vendor to design or develop contzact with a agency to an endorsement of the shall not be construed as Inclusion in the catalog
[brief] \(^{10}\)  The result of such unlawful “detention” is that the unattenuated evidential fruits of such arrest – whether physical or testimonial – are tainted and must be suppressed.  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Dunaway v. New York, supra; Florida v. Royer, supra; State v. Rodriguez; 172 N.J. 117, 132 (2002); State v. Costa, 327 N.J. Super. 22, 32 (App. Div. 1999).
[brief] (Sb 28)  Nowhere in our law does it provide that the basis of an instruction that mitigates a defendant’s criminal culpability must not be “self-serving” — such a requirement would be nonsensical, as a lesser-included charge would always serve the defendant, and often the defendant is the only person who would have information to demonstrate that a basis for such a charge exists.  In fact, when deciding whether to give the charge, “the trial judge must view the facts in the light most favorable to the defendant.  In other words, it is only when the trial judge determines that no jury could rationally conclude that the State had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the asserted provocation was insufficient to inflame the passions of a reasonable person ... that the trial judge should withhold the charge. ”  *State v. Blanks*, 313 N.J. Super. 55, 72 (App. Div. 1998) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted) (emphasis added).
[brief] As alleged in the Complaint, the former category of attorneys’ fees relates to fees for collection efforts by the Plaintiff regarding the Defendant’s unpaid association dues pursuant to.  (Da10 to 11).  Those efforts, included, without limitation, filing liens against the units owned by the Defendant.  Defendant expressly agreed to pay for those reasonable fees in accordance with Article 2.2(1)(a) of the Bylaws of the Association, which states:  It shall be the right and duty of the governing board to attempt to recover unpaid common charges, together with interest thereon, and expenses of the proceeding, including reasonable attorney’s fees, in an action brought against any unit owner in default of his obligation \(^1\) (Da12 to 13).  \(^2\) (Da13 to 14). to pay the same; or by foreclosure of the lien on any unit in respect to which such default occurred.  Moreover, Defendant’s argument that the Complaint included a footnote acknowledging the inclusion of those fees in the damages sought, while the February 22, 2022 Certification of [...] did not, is entirely irrelevant.