ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The maintenance of that small portion of land which is next to Lot 20 and is actually Lot 22 has been undertaken and managed by [...] for the period of time since [...] purchased the church which was in June of 1976.  Because there has never been any action taken to maintain what is Lot 22 for a period of greater than 30 years, this property is now owned by [...] as a result of Adverse Possession.  The trial court failed to find that [...] had failed to object within the thirty year time period and as a result, [...] no longer had an interest in Lot 22.  The loss of ownership of Lot 22 happened as a result of Adverse Possession.  [...] has no right to come onto the property identified as Lot 22 and should be enjoined from entry to this land.
[brief] Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588 (1977)  ...........................................15-16  Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J. 411 (2006) .........................................................17, 20 Burket v. Holcomb Bus Serv., 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1095 ..................20 Ciechanowski v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2045 ..............................................................................................................14 Colucci v. Oppenheim, 326 N.J. Super. 166 (App. Div. 1999) .............................17 Cuevas v. Wentworth Group, 226 N.J. 480, 510 (N.J. 2016) ...............................16 Geler v. Akawie, 358 N.J. Super. 437 (App. Div. 2003) .................................17, 20 Jastram v. Kruse, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 629 ....................................15 Johnson v. Scaccetti, 192 N.J. 256, 280 (2007) ..............................................15-16 Malick v. Seaview Lincoln Mercury, 398 N.J. Super. 182 (App. Div. 2008) .........14 Reider v. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 626 .................21 Taddei v. State Farm Indem. Co., 401 N.J. Super. 449 (App. Div. 2008) .............14 Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 878 ....................14 | Date | Description | Document Number | |--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| | February 28, 2023 | Order regarding Final Judgment | Da23-24 | | January 19, 2023 | Ruling regarding Plaintiff’s counsel’s cauterization of [...]’s Conclusions in summation | 2T40-7-14 | | January 19, 2023 | Ruling regarding Plaintiff’s counsel’s cauterization of the injuries in summation | 3T44:7-46:14 | | January 18, 2023 | Ruling regarding objection to comment about Appellant having fled the scene of the accident as unfairly prejudicial | 1T42:7-21 | | July 12, 2023 | Order Limiting Judgment against [...] | Da95-99 | | September 11, 2023 | Order Denying Reconsideration of the July 12, 2023
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING AND CONDUCTING IDENTIFICATIONS1  OUT-OF-COURT EYEWITNESS  Issued February 9, 2021  PREAMBLE  These Guidelines supersede the Attorney General Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting Photo and Live Lineup Identification Procedures, issued April 8, 2001, as they clarify the recordation and preservation requirements for all out-of-court eyewitness-identification procedures, including such procedures for composing, conducting, and recording identifications books.2 by way of mug
[brief] There is no state legislation creating a state agency with jurisdiction.  The Court found preemption in City of Ocean City v. Somerville, 403 N.J. Super. 345 (App. Div. 2008) precluding an initiative to adopt an ordinance imposing a cost of living cap on budgeted municipal expenditures in a Faulkner Act City.  The Court reviewed the extensive statutory “comprehensive regulation of the field of municipal spending” to conclude there was no room for ceding any authority.  Id. at 372.  See also Tumino, supra, 319 N.J. Super. at 525-26 (Comprehensive regulations from the DEP precluded municipal ordinance on the placement and length of docks.); *G.H. v. Township of Galloway*, 401 N.J. Super. 392, 419 (App. Div. 2008) (Megan’s Law precludes municipal ordinances on requiring convicted sex offenders from living within designated distance of schools, parks, playgrounds and daycare centers.)  As noted here, though, there is no such comprehensive and detailed state structure.
[brief] Plaintiffs  [...] (“[...]”) and [...]  (“[...]”) (together, “Plaintiffs”) submit this brief in support of their appeal dismissing their Complaint against Defendants, [...], Attorney General [...] and [...], Commissioner of the [...] (“[...]”) (collectively, “Defendants”).  On June 4, 2021, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendants.  Pa0005.  On October 15, 2021, Plaintiffs served a notice pursuant to Rule 4:14-2(c) to take the deposition of a [...] representative regarding various topics concerning the Act and the Limited Attorney Exemption.  Pa0047 at 19:18-20:19.  On February 15, 2022, Plaintiffs deposed [...], the Chief of Consumer Finance Operations of [...], the only representative designated by [...] to testify in response to Plaintiffs’ deposition notice.  Pa0047 at 19:18-20:19.  On April 28, 2023, Plaintiffs and Defendants filed summary judgment motions seeking a final adjudication on all of Plaintiffs’ claims.  Pa0109.  On July 21, 2023, the trial court heard oral argument of the parties’ motions.  On July 27, 2023, the trial court placed its decision on the record and entered two orders (1) denying Plaintiffs’ motion; and (2) granting Defendants’ motion and dismissing the Complaint with prejudice.  Pa0001-Pa0004; T. at 3:1-32:23.  On September 11, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the Notice of Appeal.  Pa0193.
[brief] David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 323-24 (1965).  Under Art. IV, Sec. 1, Par. 1, a legislative delegation of power may not be invoked "solely for the economic protection of particular individuals and groups...where the dominant purpose of the legislation is to advance private interests under the guise of the general welfare."  Independent Electricians and Electrical Contractors' Association v. New Jersey Board of Examiners of Electrical Contracts, 54 N.J. 466, 470 (1961).  As the history of the litigation over the approval or prohibition of a bear hunt manifests, "[b]ear management is a topic that sparks widespread disagreement and strong public sentiments..."
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW BY HOLDING DEFENDANT JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES AWARDED IN THE JUDGMENT (23T96-3 to 97-15; 36T49-11 to 51-21; 37T42-15 to 45-5)  Defendant argued at trial, and in her post-trial motion for reconsideration, that there was no legal basis to hold her jointly and severally liable for the entire Judgment.  23T96-3 to 97-15; 37T42-15 to 45-5.  Nonetheless, the trial court, without explanation, held Defendant jointly and severally liable for converting funds with respect to transactions that she had no involvement in.  36T49-11 to 51-21.  Bondi v. Citigroup, Inc. 423 N.J. Super. 377, 432 (App Div. 2011) (if a party did not wrongfully convert money belonging to the plaintiff or did not receive converted funds, they cannot be liable for the tort of conversion).  Likewise, there was no evidence in the record, nor any factual findings made by the trial court, to support piercing [...]’s corporate veil to hold Defendant personally liable for acts purportedly committed by [...] in connection with the Disputed Transactions.  See Verni v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 160, 199 (App. Div. 2006); N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 468, and 500 (1983).  Further, the court did not engage in any analysis or make factual findings to impose personal liability on Defendant under the “tort participation theory,” regarding monies purportedly converted by the corporate defendants.  See Saltiel v. GSI Consultants, Inc., 170 N.J. 297, 303 (2002).  Thus, as a matter of law, there was no basis for the court to hold Defendant personally liable for any purported acts committed by [...] in connection with the Disputed Transactions.  Furthermore, the court erred as a matter of law by holding Defendant personally liable for breaching contracts and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under contracts that she was not a party to.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................................................................  1 STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................................  2 STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................  5 STANDARD OF REVIEW ..................................................................................................  8 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................  10  POINT I..............................................................................................................................  10  THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ENFORCE THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4, AND ERRED IN APPLYING WELL-ESTABLISHED CASE LAW, THEREBY UNLAWFULLY DENYING PLAINTIFF HER RIGHT TO NO-FAULT PIP BENEFITS (Opinion from Transcript, 2T12-13) ...........................................................................10  CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 21 TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS
[brief] ” (Pb43-44).  During closing arguments, the plaintiff’s counsel never objected to any suggestion about this incident being fabricated.  (7T24:7-15; 7T35:18-36:20).  Any objections now raised regarding those statements have been waived.  See R. 1:7-2; see also Fertile v. St. Michael’s Medical Center, 169 N.J. 481, 495 (2001) (“We presume that when a lawyer observes an adversary’s summation, and concludes that the gist of the evidence has been unfairly characterized, an objection will be advanced.
[directive] a.  Do you understand that pursuant to the rules of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender 18.  [Yes/Si]  [No/No]  Supervision if you are residing outside the State of New Jersey at the time of sentencing, or upon entry of a guilty plea if a guilty plea is a condition of admission to the Pretrial Intervention Program, that return to your residence may be delayed pending acceptance of the transfer of your supervision by your state of residence?  6Entiende que, conforme a las reglas de!  Acuerdo Interestatal de Supervision de Infractores Adultos, si usted reside fuera de! estado de Nueva Jersey en el momento de ser sentenciado, o al declararse culpable si una declaracion de culpabilidad es una condicion para su admision al Programa de Intervencion Antes de!  Juicio, su regreso a su residencia podrla demorarse hasta que su estado de residencia acepte la transferencia de su supervision?  Do you also understand that pursuant to the same Interstate Compact transfer of your b.  [Yes/Si] [No/No] supervision to another state may be denied or restricted by that state at any time after sentencing, or upon entry of a guilty plea if a guilty plea is a condition of admission to the .Pretrial Intervention Program, if that state determines you are required to register as a sex offender in that state or if New Jersey has required you to register as a sex offender?  6Entiende tambien que, conforme al mismo Acuerdo Interestatal, un estado puede denegar o restringir la transferencia de su supervision a ese estado en cualquier momento despues de que haya sido sentenciado, o al declararse culpable si una declaraci6n de culpabilidad es una condicion para la admision al Programa de Intervencion Antes de!  Juicio, si ese estado determina que se requiere que usted se registre como delincuente sexual en ese estado o si Nueva Jersey ha requerido que se registre como delincuente sexual?
[brief] ”  204 N.J. at 626.  Conversely, in *State v. Gonzalez*, 249 N.J. 612, 631–32, (2022), the Court found that the defendant’s question, “[b]ut what do I do about an attorney and everything?”, “was an ambiguous invocation of her right to counsel” because “defendant did not seek an opinion about whether she should have a lawyer present, but rather inquired about the availability of counsel. ”  Likewise, this Court in *State v. Atkins*, No. A-0732-13T2, 2015 WL 4067367, at *8-9 (App. Div. July 6, 2015), found that the defendant’s question, “How do I go about getting me a lawyer? . . . A Public Defender?” was at least an ambiguous request for counsel.
[brief] On October 4, 2023, counsel for [...] filed a motion seeking to quash the [...] subpoena.  On October 11, 2023, [...] filed opposition to [...]’s summary judgment motions.  On October 17, 2023, [...] filed a supplemental brief regarding prior arbitration awards entered in favor of [...].  [...]’s October 17, 2023 brief was rejected by the Court as an impermissible sur-reply as part of its decision denying [...]’s request to adjourn the October 20, 2023 return date on the motions.  Oral argument on [...]’s motions was conducted on October 20, 2023.  The Court entered two Orders on October 23, 2023 vacating the nine inter-company arbitration awards obtained in favor of [...].  (Da1 – Da5).  Each Order was supported by a statement of reasons.  (Da10-Da27).  The Court subsequently denied the motion to enforce litigant’s rights returnable November 3, 2023 indicating that as the underlying matter had been decided the relief sought was moot.  (Da6-Da9).  Defendant filed the present appeal, seeking relief from the three Orders entered by [...].  (Da262-Da267).  COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Nowhere in Smart, Witt, or Alston itself did the Court ever suggest the simplistic interpretation that the unforeseeable-and-spontaneous test requires probable cause to be a “surprise. ”  Very few occurrences are a genuine surprise to an experienced police officer.  For example, an experienced trooper who stops a car on a highway for a traffic offense is never truly “surprised” to also detect the presence of drugs somewhere in the car; it is a common occurrence.  Surely the automobile exception under Witt and Alston are far more practical and not meant to be restricted to only completely unpredictable fact patterns.  This misguided “surprise” requirement is just a repackaging of the discredited inadvertence prong that was eliminated from the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement, even when allowing for warrantless searches of cars.  See State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 82 (2016) (holding inadvertence requirement for plain-view seizure at odds with objective reasonableness standard of New Jersey Constitution).
[brief] As consumer practices have evolved, the Legislature has amended and supplemented the CFA to provide additional protections to consumers, including what is arguably the greatest expansion of the CFA -- a 1971 amendment authorizing a private right of action.  See L. 1971, c. 247 § 7 (codified at N.J.S.A. 56:8-19); see also Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234, 245-46, 872 A.2d 783 (2005) (explaining how "[i]t is a well-known fact that the CFA initially conferred enforcement power exclusively on the Attorney General" but was amended to add a private right of action "[t]o augment . . . enforcement efforts").
[brief] 308 (App. Div. 1992) | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  The numbers do not lie.  And the numbers in this case are clear: [...] has been held liable for approximately 85% of the costs it sought in bringing this action, or approximately $15 million; [...], on the other hand, has been held liable for only 6% of [...]’s covered costs, or approximately $900,000.  And, in order to obtain this 6%/$900,000 liability ruling, [...] expended more than $6,000,000 in attorneys’ fees and cost.  Given these numbers, [...]’s “successful claimant” argument strains the imagination.  At bottom, [...] did not achieve the benefit it sought in bringing suit.  Rather, [...] brought suit against 15 different insurers seeking approximately $18 million in covered costs and now – after 20 years and spending over $6 million in attorneys’ fees – [...] has recovered less than $1 million.  In achieving that result, [...] failed at every turning point stage of this litigation; it now seeks to be rewarded for that failure.  That cannot be what our Court Rules intended when they employed the phrase “successful claimant”.  With respect to the trial court’s calculation of attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest, [...] continually hides behind the abuse of discretion standard, but it fails to explain how the trial court’s calculations meet this standard.  That is because they do not.  The trial court calculated attorneys’ fees using an unverified starting number and then invented a calculation involving a vacated allocation figure.  The trial court ignored [...]’s opposition on the issue of costs.  The trial court then calculated interest using calculations submitted for the first time in [...]’s reply brief, applied a starting date with no basis in the facts of this case, and then held the “equities” demanded a 2% enhancement without citing any “inequitable” conduct on the part of [...].  The trial court’s findings on these issues should be reversed pursuant to [...]’s cross-appeal.
[brief] In the Point heading for Point III of their brief and in a single conclusory sentence in the first paragraph, Defendants claim that the Jury’s verdict on her LAD Retaliation claims is against the weight of the evidence.  See Db at p. 18.  However, despite ostensibly claiming that they are entitled to a new trial on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims, the Defendants do not spend a single word of their 49-page brief on any argument that the Jury’s verdict on the retaliation claims was against the weight of the evidence.  See generally, Db.  Rather, the entirety of argument in this regard is dedicated solely to arguing that there was no evidence to support Plaintiff’s claims for hostile work environment based on disability.  See Db at pp 18-21.  As “[a]n issue not [properly] briefed . . . is deemed waived” (Sklodowsky, 417 N.J. Super. 657 ), the Defendants have clearly waived any argument that the jury’s verdict with regards to Plaintiff’s retaliation claims are against the weight of the evidence.
[brief] (Pa5; Pa37-Pa38.)  This conclusion rests upon a profound and obvious misapplication of the constitutional standards for State remediation of the violation of T&E in Abbott districts established by the Supreme Court in the Abbott XX rulings.  It also resulted in a decision that, at bottom, sanctions the very underfunding of the SFRA by the State that the Supreme Court condemned in Abbott XXI after the State drastically cut formula aid in 2011:  When this Court permitted the substitution of our prior orders, which remediated a constitutional violation, with the State’s alternative of SFRA funding, it did not alter the constitutional underpinnings to the replacement relief.  Our grant of relief was clear and it was exacting: It came with express mandates.  We required full funding, and a retooling of SFRA’s formula’s parts, at the designated mileposts of the formula’s implementation.
[directive] Track B: Application for Graduation Date  Submitted Name I  City Current Address: Street State Zip Code Email Telephone if  The following criteria must be met in order phase up: ( check box task is completed) to of I have been in Phase 4 for a minimum 120 days.  Date entered phase 4: of of  Sobriety date: I have a minimum one consecutive year sobriety.  I successfully completed treatment.  When and where:  I have been in Drug Court for at least 2 years.  of I am following the conditions supervision.  Probation Officer verification signature: I am engaged in recovery support groups.  Home group: I am engaged in pro-social activities.  Activities: I am employed or going to school.  Where: I have presented relapse prevention plan to treatment court team.  Three accomplishments in Phase 4: if Three community resources I can reach out to I need additional support:  Three coping responses I can utilize:  Date Client  Signature Track Application for Graduation B: by Promulgated Directive #20-21 (08/11/2021), CN 12571g
[directive] There is a reasonable belief that violator poses an imminent threat to safety of the public or other police officers.  This determination shall be made based upon the violator’s actions or operation of the vehicle prior to the initiation of the attempted motor vehicle stop.  The violator’s subsequent actions, although often supporting the criminal charge of Eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b), shall not constitute an authorization to initiate or continue a pursuit.
[brief] In each instance, video footage of those very brief stops was played and some still photographs from some of those videos were also admitted into evidence; those items have been supplied to this Court on a flash drive.  (Da 24 to 26)  But, defendant submits that in none of those videos or photographs is it clear what, if anything, defendant displayed to the officers who stopped him.  (Da 24 to 26)  [...] of the [...] testified that he stopped defendant on March 27, 2017, and did not issue a citation.
[brief] This is the very municipal recalcitrance identified by the Supreme Court, which should have been rectified with corrective Mount Laurel II remedies, and a far cry from compliance.  [...] responds by mischaracterizing [...]’s claim as one for “estoppel” or enforcement of an oral agreement.  [...] does not seek an order for governmental approvals on the basis of statements by the former mayor and council, or a “back room deal” as claimed.  It seeks an order for a site suitability hearing under the Mount Laurel doctrine because [...] is in violation of a court order, has no plan to comply with the judgment, and the undisputed plan of the prior administration to achieve compliance (approved by the special master) is the only plan that is suitable.  [...] never argues the land use board is bound to grant site plan approvals because the former mayor said so, rather, [...] should be compelled to hold a site suitability hearing because the off-site property is the only viable option [...] has ever put forward to the court and court-appointed professionals to meet [...]’s constitutional obligations in the judgment.
[brief] But this reasoning is **UNTENABLE….**  When considering the criteria for determining whether to set aside a default judgment or an entry of default are the same but are applied more liberally to a default as in; Duncan v. Speach, 162 F.R.D. 43, 44 (E.D.Pa.1995).  Generally, courts look upon the default procedure with disfavor because the interests of justice are best served by obtaining a decision on the merits, Farnese v. Bagnasco, 687 F.2d 761, 764 (3d Cir.1982).
[brief] What was clear was that the “options” would not and could not include other work at [...].  The employer clearly acknowledged that (1) the only work available at [...] was boiler work, (2) all boiler work is labor intensive, (3) there was no other work available at the company, (4) there were no positions that were not labor intensive for which [...] was qualified, and (5) there were no other options for a mechanic laborer with [...].  At no time did the employer state that there were alternative positions that [...] could have performed within the company.
[brief] Respondent even publicly celebrated the “not guilty” verdict of [...], a vigilante who shot and killed protesters during civil unrest following the police shooting of [...].  At no time did Respondent’s posts or account contain a disclaimer making clear that she was speaking in her individual capacity and not on behalf of the Board.  As a result, members of the school community actively protested Respondent at meetings of the Board in her role as Board member, which was clearly reflected by news articles, Board minutes, and even Respondent’s own admissions – all of which were in the record.