ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 4  Standing On command fire 2 rounds (2X) 75 yds  On command fire 2 rounds 5 sec.  6  Kneeling (3X) 5 sec.  4  Standing On command fire 2 round; (2X) 5 sec.  6  Kneeling  On command fire 1 round (6X)  50 yds  Standing or kneeling from 5 sec.  5  On Command fire 1 round strong side of (5X) cover  Standing or On command fire 1 round 5 sec. kneeling from 5 support side of (5X) cover  Kneeling, strong On Command fire 2 rounds from the strong side of side cover; over cover; 25 yds 6 the top of cover; 30 sec.  Fire 2 rounds over the top of cover; Kneeling support Fire 2 round from the support side of cover side of cover  Standing to On command fire a double tap standing, 15 yds 4 8 sec. kneeling  Drop to kneeling an fire a double tap from kneeling 2  Standing On command fire a double tap; or 2 round burst; 3 sec.  7 yds  On command fire a double tap or 2 round burst to 3  Standing 4 sec. the chest, then 1 shot to the head 2  Standing On command fire a double tap; or 2 round burst; 3 sec.  5 yds  On command fire a double tap or 2 round burst to 4 sec.  3  Standing the chest, then 1 shot to the head 60 rounds fired score same as HQC  48 hits = 80%  If the rifle is to be used as patrol supplement or as an entry weapon, use the Subgun Night Qualification Course for semi-annual low light qualification.
[brief] Pa14.  Defendants filed a motion to stay these proceedings because of other matters pending before the Appellate Division that the Defendants asserted were related to the legal issues raised in this case.  Pa14.  The trial court heard arguments on December 3, 2015.  The trial court denied Defendants’ motion to stay the proceedings and, in a formal Order filed on December 18, 2015, (1) ordered Defendants to produce all responsive settlement agreements and final decisions; (2) stayed disclosure of those documents pending appeal; (3) denied Plaintiff access to the requested unredacted attorney invoices; and (4) gave leave to Defendant to request a special service charge.
[directive] 2A:4A-26.1  N.J.S.A. to pursuant court adult to juvenile waived is a the that In event acomplaint-warrant and juvenile), of election at (waiver 2A:4A-27 N.J.S.A. or waiver) (involuntary of meaning the within "eligible defendant' an juvenile the is that so 4.8 Section to pursuant is issued apply the shall prosecutor the detention pretrial seek to whether deciding in 2A:162-15, N.J.S.A. delinquency juvenile of history defendant's the and offense the of circumstances and facts relevant and arrested been had originally person the if as Section this of subsections) appropriate the to waived juvenile (a 2.2.1 subsection and 4.8 Section See adult. an as complaint-warrant by charged circumstances the that expected is It this Directive).
[brief] Presumably, that is always the case.  Indeed, the merits of the underlying plaintiffs’ allegations are irrelevant to this analysis.  E.g., Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 165, 173 (1992) (“Whether an insurer has a duty to defend is determined by comparing the allegations in the complaint with the language of the policy.  When the two correspond, the duty to defend arises, irrespective of the claim’s actual merit. ”); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Flanagin, 44 N.J. 504, 512 (1965).  Rather, a duty-to-defend analysis focuses on whether coverage could exist if the insured is found liable.  E.g., Abouzaid v. Mansard Gardens Assocs., LLC, 207 N.J. 67, 81 (2011) (citing [...] & [...], Insurance Law, A Guide to Fundamental Principles, Legal Doctrines and Commercial Practices 1020-21 (1988)).
[brief] Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the CFA have been raised repeatedly and have yet to gain any traction.  In *Woo-Padva, infra*, the Court explained why *Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp.*, 207 N.J. 557 (2011) and *Jefferson Loan Co., Inc. v. Session*, 397 N.J. Super. 520 (App. Div. 2008) do not stand for the application of the “subsequent performance” principle espoused by Plaintiff.  We perceive no conflict given the factual differences in the cases; plaintiff's reliance on Gonzalez is misplaced.  Gonzalez involved a mortgage foreclosure [*14] and "post-judgment agreements" that had "recast the terms of the original loan" and had included, according to plaintiff, "illicit financing charges and miscalculations of monies due."  Id. at 563.  The Court held the post-judgment loan modifications were "in form and substance an extension of credit," id. at 563, and that the plaintiff could base a CFA claim on the defendant's alleged actions in connection with that new transaction.  *Woo-Padva v. [...]*, Id. at *13-14.
[brief] There, the panel agreed with the trial court’s finding that the landlords had no prior notice suggesting the dog would cause harm, because “[n]othing in the pit bull’s prior behavior manifested the animal posed a danger.  Prior to the incident involving [the] plaintiff nothing revealed the pit bull had a tendency to bite. ”  *Id.* at *5.  On Plaintiffs’ reading of the law, an expert opinion imputing a dangerous trait to an entire class of animals would be sufficient to defeat summary judgment regardless of the particular animal’s actual past behavior.  This would greatly expand the scope of liability for the vast majority of animal-related injuries; in this case, essentially treating stallions as some sort of ultra-hazardous wild animal simply because an expert says that any stallion is capable of attacking its handler during breeding operations.
[brief] Lessee shall also maintain in good condition such, portions adjacent to the premises, such as sidewalks, driveways, lawns and shrubbery, which would otherwise be required to be maintained by Lessor.  [See, e.g., Pa991 (emphasis added)].  Plaintiffs respectfully contend that the location where [...] was: - Set off from the parking lot by concrete parking blocks; - Marked off and separated from the parking lot area by large bright white lines, *clearly delineating it as a sidewalk*; - Foreseeably used by pedestrians parking on that side of the building as the safest and fastest way to access the premises; - Partially covered, thus inviting customers to walk on it to access the premises; and - Adjacent to Respondents’ premises.  Ignoring all of the above, the Law Division examined a photograph of the spot where [...] fell [Pa949] and determined, essentially, because it was a black-top surface, it was part of the parking lot – thus, a common area under the lease.  In addition to ignoring all of the above, perhaps even more significantly, the Law Division likewise ignored unrefuted expert testimony explaining why this area, as depicted, would constitute a walkway under various safety codes.  The Law Division rendered its decision without even acknowledging that relevant expert opinion was before it, let alone expert opinion which contradicted the conclusion to which the Law Division hastily jumped.  Below, for the Court’s convenience, is the photograph referenced in the Law Division’s oral decision.  [Pa949].
[brief] Defendant overstates the point.  The FDCPA does not expressly authorize or endorse the use of telegram and telephone operators.  Instead, such use must comply with the FDCPA and the FDCPA contains provisions imposes restrictions specifically when using telegrams or telephones.  Moreover, Khimmat, 585 F. Supp. 3d at 715, explained why the use of mail vendors is distinguishable from the use of telegram and telephone operators.
[brief] As the Supreme Court has stated:  ...  Under...[the "credible medical evidence"] standard, which is a critical element of the cost-containment goals of AICRA5, the necessary objective evidence must be "derived from accepted diagnostic tests and cannot be 'dependent entirely upon subjective patient response."  Davidson v. Slater, 189 N.J. 166, 181 (2007] (quoting N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a)).  Agha v. Feiner, 198 N.J. 50, 60-61 (2009).  Plaintiffs contend that they each sustained a permanent injury and, at the same time, concede that their treating physicians saw no need to order as much as a simple x-ray to identify the anatomic cause or source of their complaints.  A rational factfinder is a factfinder who can be expected to apply reason and logic in reaching a conclusion.  [...] has opined that both Appellants suffered permanent loss of use of function of their spine, but how can that opinion be reconciled with his failure to schedule a simple x-ray or more advanced study to objectively identify cause of the complaints.  A lay person knows that radiological studies are performed to identify an objective basis or explanation for subjective symptoms and to ensure that the treatment plan that follows is rational and based on an accurate diagnosis.
[directive] 4  (d)  All officers assigned to canine units.  (e)  All officers whose assigned duties include regular interaction with members of the public, which reasonably may give rise to an arrest situation or use of force.  (f)  All officers assigned to “front desk” duty in law enforcement agencies, whose duties include interaction with members of the public who enter police stations to report incidents or request assistance or information.  (g)  All officers assigned to a pre-planned search warrant execution or a pre-planned arrest.  (h)  All uniformed officers assigned to duties at demonstrations or potential civil disturbances.  3.3  Officers Not Required to Wear BWCs.
[brief] (Da5)  However on May 25, 2023 the US Supreme Court’s decision in *Tyler v. Hennepin County*, 598 U.S. 631, 143 S. Ct. 1369, 215L.Ed. 2d 564 (2023) declared a taxing authority’s confiscation of a property owner’s equity violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.  (Da29)  As the Court and all parties are aware, the NJ Appellate Division in light of the US Supreme Court decision in *Tyler v. Hennepin County* has made it clear that it is unconstitutional for a tax lien holder, who is already earning hefty interest, to also steal an owner’s equity in their homes.  Both the NJ Supreme Court and State Legislature recognized the holding in *Tyler* by introducing legislature amending the TSL and implementing the Notice to the Bar.  (Da35)  Application of Tyler to this matter which was pending and in the pipeline is mandated.  257-261 20th Ave. Realty LLC v. Roberto 2023 N.J. Super LEXIS 121.  (Da58)  Upon realizing same, [...] filed motion for reconsideration March 5, 2024.
[directive] It fingerprint require not does that query Index complaint-warrant of issuance require will charges) the of seriousness the cases, complaint a issuing presumption of a trigger may or 4.4.1, subsection see :3-1(e), 3 Rule to pursuant 4.5.4. subsection see 3:3-1(f), Rule to pursuant complaint-warrant is acomplaint-warrant if arrested, been already not has defendant the where case any In initiate 2.2 to Section with accordance in fingerprinted be shall arrest upon defendant the issued, that In program. services pretrial the of benefit the for assessment risk pretrial automated an for offenses) and defendant the to links fingerprint the that certain make shall officer the event, agency the issued, is acomplaint-summons  If issued. been had acomplaint-warrant which the by fingerprinted is defendant the that certain make shall prosecutor, or the arrest, the making time reasonable within a or appearance court defendant's the of date the on system Scan
[brief] $2,000,000 transfer from [...]’s Merrill Lynch checking account on December 26, 2008 to the [...]’ Bank of America account.  (26T35:8 to 36:10).11  •  **Misappropriation #4:**  $50,000 transferred from [...]’s MR line of credit account on December 5, 2014 to [...]’s bank account #8309.  (26T36:23 to 37:4).  •  **Misappropriation #5:**  $50,000 transferred from [...]’s MR line of credit account on September 8, 2015 to the [...]’ bank account #0319.  (26T37:5-7).  •  **Misappropriation #6:**  $90,000 transferred from [...]’s MR line of credit account on October 7, 2015 to the [...]’ bank account #0319.  (26T37:7-9).  •  **Misappropriation #7:**  $50,000 transferred from [...]’s bank account on October 28, 2015 to [...]’s bank account ending in #8309.  (26T37:9-11).  •  **Misappropriation #8:**  $75,500 transferred from [...]’s MR line of credit account on August 22, 2014 to [...]’s bank account ending in #8309.  (26T37:11-16).  •  **Misappropriation #9:**  $2,300,000 transferred from [...]’s bank account on November 26, 2014 to [...]’s bank account ending in #8309.  (26T37:17-23).  The foregoing confirms that the diverted funds were ultimately moved into accounts that [...] and [...] jointly controlled, like the personal account ending in 0319, or into an [...] bank account, like that ending in 8309, a company in which [...] was purportedly the sole member.
[brief] The trial court properly held that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint was barred by the Entire Controversy Doctrine (148a)  As the trial court properly noted in its August 28, 2020 Statement of Reasons in properly dismissing Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, the acts complained of and plaintiffs’ demand for relief were the same in both the 2015 matter and the 2020 matter.  (Id.)  The Court found that plaintiffs took issue with defendants’ actions in the 2015 case and sought the same relief since their theory of recovery was the same, allege the same causes of action, list the same witnesses and cite to the same documents that would be used at trial.  Therefore, the trial court properly held that since the material facts alleged were identical, the entire controversy doctrine applied.  (Id. at page 17 of Opinion.)
[brief] Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, and those set forth in Plaintiff’s opening brief, the Court should reverse the portion of the June 3, 2019 Order vacating the arbitration award of 40% of the Company’s legal fees incurred in Phase I of the arbitration and reverse the November 14, 2022 Decision and Order valuing [...]’s interests in the Company using Fair Market Value, and remanding for instructions to value [...]’s interests using Tax Book Value as of 2017.  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs  Dated: February 27, 2024 /s/[...]
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS........  2 ARGUMENT Point I  THE DACCA ATTORNEY SAFE HARBOR DOES NOT INFRINGE ON THE SUPREME COURT’S EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE PRACTICE OF LAW………………………………………  3 CONCLUSION  ……………………………………………………………………………………..  15  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS  Respondents rely on the procedural history and statement of facts as presented in the Respondents’ merits brief submitted on April 11, 2024.
[directive] PROMIS Number FBI Number SPN  Original Charges  Final Charges  D Trial 0Plea Mandatory Minimum Sentence Pursuant to 2C: N.J.S.A. Plea Agreement/ Special Factors  D D D D 13.1 11-3 11-5 12-2 D D D D 15.2 20-11 11-1 14-6  D D D D 29-6 35-3 35-5 35-4  D D D D 39.10 35-6 35-s 35.1 D D D D 43-1.1 43-1.2 43-6 43-7  I I I D D  Offense Date Plea / Conviction Date  Sentence Date Arrest Date  Pending Charges
[brief] On November 14, 2021, Officer [...] of the [...] issued defendant, [...], a motor vehicle summons charging failure to change lanes for an emergency vehicle, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-92.2.  Defendant retained [...], to represent her and it is to him that the State provided all relevant discovery.  During [...]’s representation, defendant rejected the State’s plea offer to an amended charge of obstructing traffic, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-67, and recommendation of a sentence of a $57 fine and $33 in court costs.  ---  1
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 268-69.  Thus:  The sequelae of that initially manifested injury and all subsequent, related injuries are no longer indivisible simply because there has been an initial manifestation.  It is only the undetectable injuries at and after exposure and prior to initial manifestation that are progressive and indivisible such that the occurrence of an injury cannot be known.  *Id.* at 268.  As a result, the first manifestation and continuous trigger rules share an important commonality: under neither rule can any policies incepting after initial manifestation of injury be triggered.
[brief] Also in the May 30, 2019 email from [...] to [...], he asked the representative he spoke with to “[p]lease send over what kind of policy we had last summer for reference. ”  According to [...]’s testimony, [...] contacted [...] for the express purpose of obtaining “general liability” insurance, as well as “extra insurance for vans”.  (Ia332).  [...] stated that he informed [...] that he was “planning to use vans to transport campers to activities and events”.  (Ia332).  On June 20, 2019, [...]’s employee, [...] (“[...]”), contacted [...] and asked if he was “interested in obtaining a [General Liability] policy for the summer of 2019”.  (Ia332).  On June 28, 2019, [...] emailed [...], attaching the master policy from [...] and explaining that coverage for “Non-Owned & Hired auto liability” could be added to the general liability policy to cover for “bodily injury and property damage caused by a vehicle you hire (including rented or borrowed vehicles) or caused by non-owned vehicles”.  (Ia119).  [...] explained that “[c]overage kicks in if there is an auto accident and you are sued. ” (Ia119).  [...]’s June 28, 2019 communication makes no mention whatsoever that the Non-Owned & Hired auto liability policy excluded coverage of the 15 passenger vans.  (Ia119).  [...] told [...] that he wanted at least $1 million in liability coverage for vans that he would be renting.  (Ia345).  With the exception of these two emails, [...] --- 2
[brief] However, both the prosecutor and defense counsel elicited substantial lay testimony covering similar ground.  [...] testified that [...]’s brother told him that [...] suffered from mental health problems and had recently been hospitalized for psychological treatment.  (4T85-19 to 23, 87-5 to 9).  There was repeated mention of the fact that [...] was found wrapped in foil with a tin foil hat, and that he would wear these articles often.  (4T102-1 to 8, 117-2 to 11, 130-19 to 132-3, 154-14 to 17; 7T191-23 to 192-19).  [...] testified at great length about the specific details of [...]’s paranoid-delusional behavior and noted that his behavior was similar to that of a schizophrenic uncle of hers.  (7T186-20 to 187-25, 190-6 to 196-1).  When it came time to finalize the jury charges, however, the trial court stated that the issue of whether to include a diminished capacity instruction was unresolved.
[directive] 5.1.5  Upon receipt of an internal affairs complaint, the internal affairs investigator can advise the complainant of the importance of providing accurate and truthful information.  However, when providing such advice, internal affairs investigators must remember that it is important to balance the need for receiving complaints of officer misconduct against the danger of discouraging members of the public from coming forward with their complaints.  Therefore, any language that would serve to dissuade or intimidate a member of the public from coming forward should be avoided.  Accordingly, at no point during the initial intake of a complaint should any officer affirmatively warn a complainant that consequences could potentially result from making misrepresentations or a false report.
[directive] Shooter will start standing 2 yards behind the barricade.  On command the shooter will move Kneeling forward and fire 4 rds from the strong side of 4 strong side 30 sec. cover kneeling.  Remain behind cover in a of cover ready position with visual focus towards the threat area.  On command fire 4 rds over the top of cover.  25 yds  Over the top 4  Remain behind cover in a ready position with 30 sec. of cover visual focus towards the threat area.  On Command fire 4 rds with the strong hand  Support side (supported is recommended) from the support of cover, 4 side of cover kneeling or standing.  30 sec. kneeling or Reload if necessary decock and holster. standing  Replenish loading devices (Strong hand)  Draw and fire 3 rds standing, decock and 15 yds  Standing 5 sec. holster  12  Standing & Draw and fire 3 rds standing, assume a 15 yds 25 sec. kneeling kneeling position and fire 6 rds kneeling  From the ready position fire 2 rds on each 3sec.  10 yds  6  Ready command to fire (3X)  7 yds  Standing Draw, fire 3 rds, decock and holster 4 sec.  12  Draw, fire 3 rds, make a magazine change, fire 7 yds  Standing 15 sec.  3 rds, decock and holster  7 yds  Standing Draw, fire 3 rds, decock and holster 4 sec.  Standing Draw fire 2 rds one-handed with the strong 4 sec.  5 yds one hand, hand, decock and holster (3X)  strong side  12  Weapon should be in the support hand at the Standing ready.  Fire 2 shots one-handed with the 3 sec.  5 yds one hand, support hand each command, return to the (3X) support hand ready.  Standing, Assume an interview stance position.  Draw 2 sec.  1 yd 6 weapon and fire 2 rds from the weapon retention (3X) retention position, decock and holster.  End course, score targets (48 hits = 80%)
[brief] [...] provide three unpersuasive reasons why this Court should reverse [...]’s fee award.  According to the Wilfs, the trial court, which adopted the Special Master’s recommendations in full, erred by: (1) awarding fees for work [...]’s counsel performed before October 1, 2009, when the RICO claims were filed in this lawsuit, because [...] had not considered any RICO claims until that time, (Db34-36); (2) awarding fees for work performed by [...]’s counsel that was not “reasonably required to establish the RICO claims,” (Db37-44); and (3) awarding fees for [...]’s unsuccessful cross-appeal, (Db44).
[brief] APPENDIX  TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................................ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...........................................................................iv  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS .................................. x PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.......................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..........................................................................  3 STATEMENT OF FACTS............................................................................  4 LEGAL ARGUMENTS ..................................................................................  6  **POINT I.**  The Standard of Review of an Order Dismissing a Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted.  (T10:17-T14:3).............................................  6  **POINT II.**  The FDCPA, as a Federal Statute, Should Be Construed Consistent with How Federal Courts Construe the Statute.  (Not Addressed in the Decision Below)......................  7  **POINT III.**  Determining Congressional Intent of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).  (T17:18-T18:18).................................................................  10  **POINT IV.**  Putting the FDCPA in Context.
[brief] The detective emphasized that they had believed [...] was a “foe” in part because his unrecorded statements allegedly “didn’t add up. ”  (25T 82-8 to 11; Da 69)  [...] disputed [...]’s characterizations and said he was “positive” she misheard or made an “honest mistake. ”  (Da 70-72; 25T 82-12 to 84-20)  At the end of the interrogation, detectives indicated that they would allow [...] to leave (Da 73), and told him that they would transport him back to [...].
[directive] Family Part Judges FJ to in Response  COVID-19 FJ Sentencing Guidelines/Protocol (FO and Dockets) for Family Part Judges in Response to COVID-19 response to the growing public health crisis worldwide and this state involving in  In the COVID-19 coronavirus, the [...] is implementing all possible measures to apply social distancing current court operations consistent with the in of of recommendations the [...] ("[...]") and the [...] ("[...]").  Pursuant to the April 20, 2020 Supreme Court Order, sentencing can be conducted of remotely using video and/or phone options only with the consent all parties.  Accordingly, judges should consider the following when sentencing defendants remotely during this public health emergency.