ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ........................................ 24, 31 - Medlock v. State, 263 Ga. 246 (1993) .................................................. 20-21 - Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 242 N.J. Super. 36 (App. Div. 1990) ..... 24, 31 - State ex rel. C.D., 354 N.J. Super. 457 (App. Div. 2002) ..................... 26 - State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498 (1969) ...................................................... 24, 31 - State v. Frost, 242 N.J. Super. 601 (App. Div. 1990) ......................... 24-25, 31-32 - State v. Griffin, 120 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1972) ......................... 26 - State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265 (2018) .................................................... 26 - State v. J.Q., 252 N.J. Super. 11 (App. Div. 1991) ............................... 26 - State v. Jamerson, 153 N.J. 318 (1998) .............................................. 18-20 - State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 455 (2008) ....................................... 24-25, 31-32 - State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368 (2015) ............................................. 24, 31 - State v. McGuire, 419 N.J. Super. 88 (App. Div.) ............................... 25, 32 - State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420 (1991) .................................................. 25, 32 - State v. Ravenall, 43 N.J. 171 (1964) .................................................. 25, 32 - State v. Sosnowicz, 270 P.3d 917 (2012) ...........................................  19-20 - State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136 (2015) ..............................................  21-24 - State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554 (2005) ..................................................
[brief] RELIEF IS NEITHER PROCEDURALLY IMPROPER NOR TIME BARRED .........................................................................................................................10  a.  [...]’S PCR PETITION IS NOT BARRED BY RULE 3:22-4(b)(2)(B) .............................................................................................................................................11  i.  [...] COULD NOT HAVE DISCOVERED [...]’ SWORN STATEMENT EARLIER HIMSELF  ..................................................................................................................11  ii.  IF THE COURT FINDS THAT [...]’ SWORN STATEMENT WAS OR SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED EARLIER, [...] CANNOT BE BLAMED FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL  ..................................................................................................................11  iii.  THE FACTUAL PREDICATE IS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT RELIEF AND HAS NEVER PREVIOUSLY BEEN ADJUDICATED ..............................................14  CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................15
[brief] In addition, this Court must also determine the separate but related question of whether the [...]’s finding of consistency, under the Water Quality Planning Act, can be sustained based on an administrative record that consists only of the number of gallons of effluent that are anticipated to be sent into the septic system on any given day.  The [...] is required to identify and account for other factors or elements of water pollution, including changes to stormwater runoff from this project and its potential impact to vulnerable waterways.  Therefore, the [...]’s finding that the project is consistent with the relevant Water Quality Management Plan is not supported by the requisite administrative record and findings.
[brief] Ibid.  Similarly, this Court found improper a prosecutor’s remarks that the defendant's “mommy hired him a lawyer" so he could "buy his way out of it," and that "the defense's role in this case is to try to confuse you."  Pindale, 249 N.J. Super. at 286.  And, in State v. Lockett, the prosecutor argued:  the best defense counsel, when the evidence is so overwhelming that it really makes your gut wrench, what do you do, you don't say look at the evidence, you say look over in the corner of the room, by God, look at some smoke in the corner of the room.  . . .  I don't want you to look at the defendant's conduct, I don't want you to look at the circumstances of the case, I don't want you to look at the facts because, if you look at the facts, I'm crushed.  My defendant is guilty.  [249 N.J. Super. 428, 434 (App. Div. 1991). ]  Even with the improper comments in Pindale and Lockett, however, this Court reversed only due to the accumulation of errors.
[brief] This case is about one property owner’s right to be free from public and private interference with its long-established and long-interfered-with express easement rights on its neighbor’s parking lot.  Over six decades ago, the [...] a/k/a [...] a/k/a [...] (“[...]”), an owner of contiguous lots in Block 69 in [...] in [...] (the “Property”), conveyed an unencumbered fee title in one of those lots (“Lot 8”) to the Respondent [...] (the “Respondent”), on the condition that the Respondent would erect a synagogue thereon.
[brief] In *Goldfarb*, the Court explained that “[i]t is a firmly established rule that a right of action for personal injuries cannot be made the subject of assignment before judgment, in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary. ”  Ibid.  Applying these principles in *East Orange Lumber Co. v. Feiganspan*, the court noted that “section 19 of the Practice Act” authorized the assignment of “all choses in action on contract” and held that the absence of any similar statutory authorization for the assignment of a negligence claim for damage to personal business property “is sufficient to indicate that the Legislature did not mean that the same privilege should be had by the assignee of a chose in action arising out of tort.
[brief] [...]’s recycled arguments fail to address the Trial Court’s incorrect legal and factual determinations, and [...] respectfully requests that the Court vacate the Award or, alternatively, remand this matter to the Trial Court to modify the Award accordingly and permit [...] to assert a setoff counterclaim.  Dated: Buffalo, New York  December 4, 2024  [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant [...] New Jersey, LLC [...]
[brief] After finding that there was an insufficient nexus between Respondent’s personal Facebook posts and her membership on the Board (Cal6), the Commission stated that:  ...  [H]ow school officials conduct themselves outside of the scope of their duties as school officials is best addressed at the time of election.  It is the public, not the Commission, who ultimately decides which individuals in their community are best suited to serve their students.  Cal 7.  Moreover, in attempting to punish Respondent for expressing her views, Complainants seek to infringe of her First Amendment rights.  As the United States Supreme Court has recently reiterated, school personnel do not ""shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."  Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 213 L. Ed. 2d 755, 773, 142 S. Ct. 2407, 2413 (2002), quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,506, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 73 (1969).  Viewed in these contexts, one cannot sense that the Commission's dismissal of the Complaint in this matter was unjust.  POINT II
[brief] PLAINTIFF pro se BEARS the burden of PROVING sufficient service of process cited in; Grand Entm't Grp., Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, 988 F.2d 476, 488 (3d Cir.1993).  It is the CORNERSTONE AND UNDERPINNINGS to this defendant’s case to which the trial court failed to recognize in reaching its findings for its determination of an unfair result as the court clearly did not observe Third Circuit Court precedents, standards and policies as it failed to use established well founded case law that all judges in this Circuit have been designated to adhere to (when applicable as in this instance case as the court misapplied laches as reason for denial for a Due Process of Rights claim versus seeking applicable case law).
[brief] The Supreme Court in [...] provided new context to the pro-arbitration policy furthered by the FAA.  Upon the deaths of two residents who were residing at Kindred nursing home their estates brought suit for wrongful death caused by the administration’s substandard care.  [...], 581 U.S. at 249.  However, prior to the residents’ deaths, their two respective family members who each held a power attorney signed an arbitration agreement with Kindred on behalf of their relative upon admission to the nursing home.  Id.  As a result, and upon the filing of the Complaints, Kindred moved to dismiss the cases claiming the signed arbitration agreements prohibited the estates from bringing their disputes in a Court of law.  Id.  Upon review of the two powers of attorney the Supreme Court of Kentucky determined that the arbitration agreements contained therein were invalid Id. at 250.  The Court held that a power of attorney could not entitle a representative of an agent to enter into an arbitration agreement “without specifically saying so.
[brief] THE [...]’S DECISION AND THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION TO UPHOLD IT WERE ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND CONTRARY TO LAW BECAUSE IT WAS BASED ON DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AND FAILED TO DRAW INFERENCES IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT.  (Sg001-007;164-183; 216-236).  Even if Cheng, supra, stood for the broad principles urged by the ALJ, there are grave issues of fact which preclude the conclusion that “[Respondent] engaged in a similar use of school resources without the consent of the Board as the respondent did in [Cheng, supra.]” and the premature grant of summary disposition in favor of the [...].  See RA178.  Whereas Cheng, supra, had the benefit of a plenary proceeding to hear testimony, the ALJ’s granting of summary disposition precluded such an opportunity.  Nevertheless, the ALJ concerningly incorporated as facts, multiply instances of hearsay within the Complaint which the Appellant denied in his May 29, 2020 Answer.  First, “[a]t no point were the attorneys’ research or conclusions formally shared with the members of the Board during [...]’s tenure on the Board. ”  See Sg169.  Second, “[a]ccording to the complaint, the [Superintendent and Business Administrator/Board Secretary] stated that they had no knowledge of the fifteen charges for “Member Conduct” in the November legal bill.  See [...] Complaint (C04-20) at 7. ”  See Sg169.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has noted “summary dispositions should be upheld only where there exists no issues of material fact, and that all legitimate inferences must be drawn in favor of the party resisting the motion. ”  Hill v. Yaskin, 75 N.J. 139, 142-143 (1977).  Both of these disputed facts unequivocally became material issues of facts upon the ALJ’s of (i) determination of the existence of a dispute as to when the board president could request legal services and (ii) that “[Respondent] engaged in a similar use of school resources without the consent of the Board as the respondent did in Cheng, supra[.]”  See Sg178.  Further, the ALJ failed to draw any inferences in favor of Appellant as required by Hill, supra, and instead, clearly did so in favor of the [...].
[brief] Indeed, Landlord’s representative testified that Tenant’s withholding of Rent for April 2020 through August 2020 was a “major burden on [Landlord’s] entire business model” as it forced Landlord to make a capital call to its investors and obtain a loan modification so that Landlord could continue paying its monthly expenses, including taxes and insurance.  (1T28-6 to 1T28-22). under Section 16”); (Da56, Lease at § 17.05 (“The various rights, remedies, powers and elections of Landlord, reserved, express or contained in this Lease are cumulative, and no one of them shall be deemed exclusive of the other or of such other rights, remedies, powers, options or elections as are now or may hereafter be conferred upon Landlord by law or in equity.
[brief] The trial court lacks a legal basis to dismiss plaintiff’s suit with prejudice in the order issued on March 1, 2024.  Plaintiff maintains the right to refile the case before the expiration of the statute of limitations relevant to the causes of action.  On March 1, 2024, the trial judge issued an order to dismiss the case with prejudice (Pal – Pa2), which had already been closed, citing non-compliance with the court's prior orders issued on March 31, 2023 (Pal03 – Pal04), and May 12, 2023 (Pal14 – Pal15).  The order explicitly stated:  “This court has provided more than sufficient opportunity for the Plaintiff to comply with the order of the Appellate Division.  This court dismissed the complaint on May 12, 2023, for the Plaintiff's failure to comply with the March 31, 2023, order.  R. 4:37-2 permits the court, for a delinquent party's failure to comply with a court order, to dismiss the complaint.  Although dismissal with prejudice is the exception rather than the rule, such a permanent resolution is necessary here.  For over one year, the plaintiff has not complied with the Appellate Division's mandate that she retain an attorney.  More than sufficient time has passed to allow her to comply.  However, she has not done so.  The Defendant is, as noted by counsel, entitled to finality in this matter.
[brief] These disputed material facts should have been addressed in the administrative hearing that I requested from the Board.  Unfortunately, the Board denied my request for an administrative hearing.  Pa96.  **CONCLUSION**  For the reasons set forth in both my February 16, 2024 letter brief and this reply letter brief, I request a reversal of the Board’s decision below and the restoration of my full retirement benefits (my full monthly pension and my life insurance benefit of $9,952.12) or, alternatively, a remand of this case to the Board to conduct an administrative hearing to address the disputed material factual issues detailed in this reply letter brief.
[brief] Pursuant to the trial Court’s Order of Disposition, Defendant’s counsel made application for attorney’s fees and costs.  With that application, all monthly billing was submitted.  The trial court awarded Defendant counsel fees and costs.  In placing its decision on the record, the trial court found Defendant to be the “prevailing party” as required under the terms of the Operating Agreement from which the fee entitlement flows.  The trial court also found the fees and cost requested to be well-documented and reasonable based upon the nature of the work, the time span of the litigation (i.e., three years), and the experience of counsel practicing in Mercer County, New Jersey.  Additionally, Defendant’s counsel had entered time entries concurrently with work being done and in detail sufficient to inform Defendant of the tasks completed (i.e. there was no “block billing”).  Respectfully, the trial court’s March 11, 2024 Order granting Defendant attorney’s fees and costs must be affirmed.
[brief] (Pa3-Pa24).  In the Collection Complaint, [...] alleged its ownership of the Debt (defined *infra*) and sought to collect on the Debt.  (Pa1-Pa2).  On March 7, 2022, Appellant filed an Answer with Counterclaims against [...] in the Collection Action.  (Pa3-Pa24).  Appellant alleges Counterclaims solely against [...] for violations of the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (*N.J.S.A.* 17:11C–1, *et seq.*) (under the guise of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Law, *N.J.S.A.* 2A:16-53) (Count I), the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (*N.J.S.A.* 56:8-1, *et seq.*) (Count II), Unjust Enrichment (Count III), and violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692e, and 1692f) (the “FDCPA”), in connection with the acquisition and collection of a credit card debt she incurred with [...].  (Pa12-Pa22).  On March 28, 2022, [...] filed a response to Counterclaims.  (Pa25-Pa47).  II.
[brief] Also, since the entry of a declaratory judgment does not preclude the issuance of other relief, R. 4:42-3, it would have been appropriate to issue a permanent injunction as part of the affirmative relief within the discretion of the court; either division of the trial court could grant equitable relief such as an injunction based on a declaration of the rights of a plaintiff.  Horizon Health Center v. Felicissimo, 135 N.J. 126, 137 (1994).  The primary distinction between a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under R. 4:6-2(e) and a motion for summary judgment under R. 4:46 is that the former is based on the pleadings themselves and that if any material outside the pleadings is relied on the motion is converted into a summary judgment motion.  R. 4:6-2.  See e.g., County of Warren v. State, 409 N.J. Super. 495, 504 (App. Div. 2009), certif. den., 201 N.J. 153 (2010).  In contrast to summary judgment, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim requires that the complaint must be searched in depth and with liberality to determine if a cause of action can be gleaned even from obscure statement, especially if further discovery is taken.  Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics, 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989).  Every reasonable inference is to be accorded the plaintiffs, and the motion is granted only on rare instances and ordinarily without prejudice.  Id.  See also, Baskins v. P.C.  Richard & Son, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021).  Furthermore, the complaint should not have been dismissed under the rule where a cause of action was suggested by the facts and a theory of actionability might have been articulated by amending the complaint.  Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746; Lederman v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 385 N.J. Super. 324, 349 (App. Div.), certif. den., 188 N.J. 353 (2006).  It is respectfully submitted that the undisputed material facts supported the entry of summary judgment for the plaintiffs, whereas a search of the Complaint in depth and with liberality and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the plaintiffs’ favor did not support the dismissal of the Complaint by the trial court under the standard for motions to dismiss in R. 4:6-2(e).
[brief] “Therefore, under the provisions of the act, before any liability can be imposed upon the [...], plaintiffs must first prove that the tree which they allege caused their injuries was a dangerous condition and is property owned or controlled by the city. ”  Sims v. [...], 244 N.J. Super. 32, 38 (1990).  Plaintiff has provided uncontested evidence that the defendant [...] admitted to owning the tree which caused plaintiff’s injuries.  The plaintiff in this case is capable of proving that the tree was owned by the [...].  The Sims plaintiffs were similarly injured by a decaying tree limb, as plaintiff in this case was severely injured by a decaying tree.
[brief] And he certainly did not, because he could not, determine that X% of the total property damage continuously taking place from 1958 - 2011 took place during any particular policy period.  [...]’s analysis is not the fact-based analysis permitted by Boston Gas.  To the contrary, [...]’s own testimony establishes that fact-based allocation cannot be applied in this case:  [T]here isn’t in this data record a specific information on how much solvent was released at any one location at any point in time.  It’s not as if we have detailed manifests that say on a certain day we disposed of ten gallons of solvent into AOC 5.  We know from company records and from our examination where the releases occurred, but we don’t know the specific quantities that were – that occurred, and we don’t know within the boundaries of the time that that AOC operated which days or weeks, or what have you, that the releases actually occurred.  (Pa0264-0265).  In fact, one of the factors cited by [...] in support of his flawed allocation methodology is a “[l]ack of data regarding specific timing, amount and/or location of CVOC releases. ” (Pa0491.)  The arguments made by [...] in an attempt to support [...]’s “weighted by AOC” calculations are baseless.
[brief] The Association additionally alleges that [...]’s actions violated N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(a)(5).  Subsection (a)(5) of the Act prohibits an employer from “refusing to negotiate in good faith with a majority representative of employees in an appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions of employment of employees in that unit or refusing to process grievances presented by the majority representative. ”  Subsection (a)(5) may be violated when an employer unilaterally changes terms and conditions of employment without negotiation.  Lumberton Education Association v. Lumberton Board of Education, 28 NJPER 427, aff’d. App. Div. No. A-1328-01T5 (Oct. 8, 2002) (Pa345).  The Board has not refused to negotiate in good faith; quite the opposite, [...] had requested to meet with [...]’s bargaining representatives for nearly two (2) years to engage in negotiations for a successor Agreement, but [...] had simply refused to do so.  The Board did not take any unilateral action concerning unit members’ terms and conditions of employment and has not even contemplated doing so, without negotiation.  The Association has not even alleged this to be the case, and there is no evidence of any such violation by [...].  Rather, [...] has and continues to seek negotiations with [...]’s exclusive representative (its Negotiations Council), rather than with its “Bargaining Council” that is comprised of every single Association member (Pa024).  Although the parties have since met for negotiations in the presence of the “Bargaining Council,” as directed by PERC, [...]’s position remains that it should not be forced to do so without simply meeting with a representative of [...] for bargaining purposes.  This position does not alter terms and conditions of employment.  In the absence of any alterations to the terms and conditions of employment, [...] cannot support its claim that [...] violated N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(a)(5).
[brief] [...] AND [...] PUBLIC WORKS’ (Improperly Pled)  BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S APPEAL  PRB  Attorneys at Law, LLC [...]  Tel: [...]  Fax: [...]  Email:[...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendants- Respondents  City of Passaic and City of Passaic Public Works (improperly pled)  Of Counsel: [...], Esq.  (Atty. No.: 018991996)  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (Atty. No. 018991996)  [...], Esq.  (Atty. No. 024961992)  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Judge [...]’s, J.S.C., Order Granting Defendant, City of Passaic’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated January 19, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa1  Judge [...]’s, P.J.Cv., Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen Discovery, dated February 21, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa8  Judge [...]’s, J.S.C., Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, dated March 1, 2024 .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pa13  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Appellant’s potential claims against [...] and [...] were not extinguished by the dismissal of Plaintiff/Respondent’s direct claims.  In fact, as instructed in Mejia v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 241 N.J. 360 (2020), the asserted cross-claims against [...] and [...] should have remained, and those doctors should have been represented by counsel.  In Mejia, the Supreme Court ruled that the defendant, Quest Diagnostics, had viable claims against a third-party defendant against whom the plaintiff did not have a direct claim.  Mejia, 241 N.J. at 366.
[brief] 7  CONCLUSION  23  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Order Denying Petition for Post-Conviction Relief  Da 53  Order Denying Reconsideration of Petition for Post-Conviction Relief  Da 95  INDEX TO APPENDIX  Motion for Reconsideration  Aa 1  Certification of Forensic Expert [...] Aa 21  Certification of [...]  Aa 24  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES