ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Count Three sets forth claims that the [...] violated the terms and spirit of the OPMA but fails to contain any allegations as to the alleged acts or omissions committed by the [...] and is procedurally deficient.  The relief sought is voiding the tax exemption granted under the auspices of the [...].  Count Four once again fails to set forth any allegations against any of the Defendants other than by way of incorporation of the allegations set forth previously in the Complaint.  Count Five sets forth that Defendant [...] caused the Plaintiffs Constitutional harm but also fails to set forth any allegations of how that alleged violation came about.  Count Six contains allegations that the [...] failed to take corrective action in that they failed to use their authority to vitiate the Long-Term Tax Exemption granted to [...].  The Seventh Count of the Complaint contains allegations that the [...] violated the Long-Term Tax Exemption Law, the Open Public Records Act, the Open Public Meetings Act, and the New Jersey State Constitution as well as the United States Constitution by the depriving the Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.  The Eighth Count of the Complaint sets forth no further allegations, however, requests relief under the United States Constitution, the New Jersey State Constitution, the Faulkner Act and the Long-Term Tax Exemption Law as well as the Open Public Meetings Act and the Open Public Records Act.  The Appellant’s prayers for relief all hinge upon Appellant’s position that the tax exemption granted under the [...] should not apply to the redeveloper  Defendant [...] because the LTTEL repealed the [...], and that [...] tax payers have been damaged as a result thereof.  As set forth below, the Appellate Division has previously ruled this is not the case and therefore, Appellant lacks the requisite standing to bring a claim based upon any of the allegations set forth in the Complaint.
[brief] Order granting dismissal of Appellant’s Complaint and Crossclaims against [...]  (“Respondent” or “[...]”).  [...] was joined as a Defendant, along with [...] (“[...]”) based on those entities providing engineering services to the [...] and [...] (“[...]”), for the development and construction of the solar farm after [...] took possession of the project.  However, Appellants’ claims are primarily unrelated to [...]’s services provided for the solar project (“Project”) and in fact, [...] subcontracted the project to [...], who handled the engineering and site development of the solar project.  [...] and [...] entered into a non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”), which [...] was not a party to.  In late 2017, [...] was no longer involved with the solar project and had no responsibilities with the solar project by the time Appellant’s complained of damages allegedly occurred.  In fact, [...] was terminated by Appellant on or about November 14, 2017.  Appellant filed a Complaint against Defendants/Respondents and brought one (1) count against [...] and [...] alleging that [...] breached ethical and professional duties to Plaintiffs.
[brief] The Supreme Court in [...] v. Menas, 251 N.J. 556 (2022) stated:  If the trial court determines that Plaintiffs’ lost profits evidence is sufficient to establish their claim for damages with reasonable certainty despite Plaintiffs’ inexperience in developing housing, it should deny Defendants’ motions to bar the evidence and for summary judgment.  Here, since the uncontested testimonies of [...] and [...] established that Plaintiffs’ alleged inexperience in developing housing was irrelevant in the particular context of 100% affordable housing development, Plaintiffs’ lost profits evidence should have been deemed sufficient to establish their claim for damages with reasonable certainty.  In other words, the factor of “Plaintiffs’ inexperience in developing housing”, whether “preeminent” or not, was met on its face when [...] and [...] repeatedly established that such inexperience was totally irrelevant in this particular, unique, and exceptional context.  Finally, The Supreme Court in [...] v. Menas, 251 N.J. 556 (2022) stated, “In its role as gatekeeper, a trial court should carefully scrutinize a new business’s claim, that but for the conduct of the defendant, it would have gained substantial profit in a venture in which it had no experience. ”  1277a.  First, the lack of a definitive, precise number of damages is irrelevant.  Jury instructions and verdict sheets make the definitive amount of damages, if any, a jury question.  [...]’s “range” of damages accounting for the difference in damages if Plaintiff [...] ultimately developed the [...] alone, or developed it in a partnership, does not affect the reality that substantial damages exist, but for the wrongful conduct of Defendants.  Furthermore, the Trial Court’s failure to accept the uncontroverted facts and realities set forth by [...] and [...] was not “careful scrutiny”.  Uncontested facts are uncontested.  It was careless scrutiny for the Trial Court to ignore the unrebutted expert testimony of [...] and the uncontested testimony of [...].  Moreover, [...] and [...] clearly explained why in this exceptional context, lack of “experience” for this new venture was utterly irrelevant.  As such, [...]’s expert report passed the new test with flying colors, since the newness of Plaintiff [...]’s venture was absolutely irrelevant in this particular, unique, and exceptional context.  The Trial Court’s error should be reversed and the case should be remanded to the Law Division for trial.
[brief] Appellants contend that the case is not moot because they are entitled to “a Declaratory Judgment that [Appellants] were not in breach of the Agreement and that [...] had no basis to terminate the agreement. ” (Pb at 49.)  They purportedly seek “to ensure that” [...]’s threatened termination of the that issue[.]”); *AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am.*, 475 U.S. 643, 645, 647 (1986) (involving an arbitration clause not incorporating AAA rules); *SBRMCOA, LLC v. Bayside Resort, Inc.*, 707 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 2013) (no dispute over who decides arbitrability); *Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC*, 809 F.3d 746, 754 (3d Cir. 2016) (addressing “class arbitrability”); *MZM Constr. Co., Inc. v. New Jersey Bldg. Laborers Statewide Benefit Funds*, 974 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2020) (issue was whether the court could “decide whether fraud in the execution vitiated the formation or existence of” a contract and arbitration provision”); *Cottrell v. Holtzberg*, 468 N.J. Super. 59, 70 (App. Div. 2021) (declining to refer arbitrability question to the arbitrator when arbitration agreement was signed upon 2017 admission to nursing home, but no agreement was signed upon 2018 admission that gave rise to the claim).
[brief] The “Redevelopment Plan” provides as follows (Pa533):  3.3.5  Beach or Waterfront Access Improvements  Substantial improvements to pedestrian access to the beach or waterfront via the baywalk are desired.  The redeveloper shall extend the north-eastern end of the baywalk northeasterly to reach the existing go-cart section and proposed parking area (see Section 3.3.11).  This will enhance access to the beach and public open space areas.  Additional improvements may include, but need not be limited to, lighting, signage, plantings, seating, amenities that formalize access points from the street.  Enhanced visual access of the waterfront and bay through the provisions of gazebos or structures for the passive enjoyment of waterfront views may also be allowed under this Redevelopment Plan.  (Emphasis allowed)  (Pa557)  Read superficially or in a vacuum this section 3.3.5, though not actually referencing the term “public trust”, would imply that the Plan actually fostered and preserved the existing level of public access.  However, a simple review of Section 3.3.11 (Parking) reveals that all PUBLIC PARKING is to be abolished and any parking that remains will strictly be available for use only by the residents of the new residential units that will be built.  In short, all existing PUBLIC PARKING will be abolished, making public “access” to the beach “access points” extremely difficult, if not a literal impossibility.  No handicapped parking whatsoever will be preserved, and none will be created.  This alone violates the Public Trust Doctrine Statute and [...]’s administrative “public access rule”, and the common law Public Trust Doctrine requiring invalidating the challenged ordinance and Redevelopment Plan.
[directive] Audit procedures are essential to maintaining the integrity of the property function.  There should be a complete audit of stored property as well as selected or random audits of completed transactions on a routine annual basis.  In addition, there should be a complete audit whenever there is a change of property officer, unit supervisor, chief law enforcement officer or change of any other personnel with responsibility over or access to the property.  An audit should also be conducted if there is any indication or suspicion of a breach of integrity in the property system.  These audits should be conducted by the designated property officer with assistance and verification provided by another officer.  To provide a completely independent source of verification, a representative of the county prosecutor's office could assist the property officer during the audit.  An audit should begin with a complete inventory of all items currently in the property vault.  The inventory of the property vault should then be used to verify the accuracy of the central filing system.  An audit of completed transactions should be conducted by examining the case files to verify that required notifications and release authorizations have been properly submitted.  In addition, a legitimate basis for the release decision should be clearly apparent in the file.
[brief] [...] admitted that prior to entering the building he had not spoken with the owners of [...] or searched property records to ascertain who owned the building.  However, later in preparation for the suppression hearing, he conducted a records search of deeds and tax records and discovered that the property was listed as a class four property (a commercial property), a bank had foreclosed on the property in 2017, purchased it at a Sheriff's sale and then sold it to a private third-party.  After considering the testimony, the judge denied the motion, finding that although defendant had standing to challenge the search, the State had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was abandoned, and thus defendant had no expectation of privacy in the seized items.
[brief] No party is entitled to have the jury charged in his or her own words.  *State v. LaBrutto*, 114 N.J. 187, 204 (1989).  The Trial Court’s negligence charge to the jury is contained at (4T: 113:05 – 119:18) and in most relevant part, reads “If an ordinary person under similar circumstances and by the use of ordinary care could have foreseen the result, that is that some injury or damage would probably result and either would not have acted, or if the person did act would have taken precaution to avoid the result, then the performance of the act or the failure to take such precautions would constitute negligence.
[brief] (36T:96-13 to 98-3).  This was proven by geolocation evidence, surveillance videos, and [...]’ testimony that he gave the gun used that night to defendant.  Defendant had also admitted to throwing a punch at [...].  Ibid.  Thus, none of these mitigating factors apply and why is readily deduced from the sentencing transcript.  Miller, 205 N.J. at 129-30; Bieniek, 200 N.J. at 609; Molina, 168 N.J. at 442-43; Perry, 124 N.J. at 177.
[brief] [...] misunderstands the holding in Kane, and the facts that gave rise to its holding.  In Kane, the plaintiff was injured when he lost his balance and fell on a rocky ground, causing him to suffer catastrophic injuries.  At trial, the judge charged the jury that the general contractor ("[...]") and the subcontractor at issue ("[...]") were ultimately responsible for any violations of industry-wide standards.  Thus, **the sole question that the jury was presented** was whether there were violations of industry-wide or regulatory safety standards.  The *Kane* court ultimately held that [...], the plaintiff’s employer, would: not be prejudiced by a separate trial on the indemnification issue.  The trial of the third-party claim should be severed, as unquestionably any liability of [...] is not so independent of the failure of [...] to abide by safety standards as to bring about the result that [...] might be held liable without a similar finding of fault on the part of [...].  *Kane*, 278 N.J. Super at 146.  Contrary to the facts in *Kane*, [...]’s potential liability is inextricably intertwined with the issue of [...]’s liability, because any amount of liability ascribed to [...] would offset the liability apportioned to [...].  Thus, [...]’s potential liability is intertwined with [...]’s liability.  The *Kane* court presided over an entirely distinct factual scenario, one in which the court already established that two of the defendants were responsible for industry wide violations, and asked the jury only to consider whether those defendants’ actions violated those standards.  The indemnification claim against the employer was therefore properly severed, as its results had no bearing on the ultimate liability of the other defendants.  Here, the issue is far more complex in that the assignment of liability to [...] **does** have a material impact on [...]’s ultimate liability, and thus, the Kane procedures are inapplicable towards the resolution of this dispute.
[brief] Appellant, [...], filed an application for development with the Defendant, [...], for approval of a multifamily development requiring a d(5) density variance along with various other bulk variances for property designated as Block 610, Lots 1, 2, 3, 5, 11, 30, 31 and 33 in the Township of [...].  The Board held public hearings on the application on September 9, 2021 (Pa105), December 9, 2021 (Pa227), January 27, 2022 (Pa321) and March 24, 2022 (Pa468).  On April 28, 2022, the Board adopted a written Resolution denying the application.
[brief] [...], [...], and Urban  At all relevant times, [...] was under contract to perform the construction work on the widening project for the Garden State Parkway.  (Pa1202).  [...] employee [...] was on site daily.  (Pa788 at 16:8-10).  [...] and [...] employee [...] communicated daily.  (Pa789 at 17:10-15).  On June 22, 2015, [...] sent an email to Jacob’s employee, [...], and [...] engineer [...].  (Pa1187).  This email explained that Frank uncovered a problem with the bridge deck.  (Pa1187).  As a result of identifying this problem with the bridge, an onsite inspection was performed on June 24, 2015.  (Pa1192).  The inspection revealed “significant settlement” in the pavement at the north approach and it was recommended for immediate repairs and testing.  (Pa1193)  (Emphasis Added).  In other words each Defendant had actual notice of the settlement issue on the bridge deck.  E)
[brief] On April 25, 2014, [...] obtained a pretrial intervention program (PTI) application form from the court.  (Pa26).  On April 29, 2014, [...] took the completed PTI application form to the courthouse and applied for a PTI and the appointment of a public defender, also submitting a check for payment for filing fees.  Ibid.  He alleges that his PTI application was either: (1) intentionally lost by court personnel as “retaliation” based on discrimination, to ensure that [...] was indicted rather than diverted to PTI; or (2) lost because “the procedures in the administrative processes of the court are shoddy and poorly followed,” which allegedly denied [...] due process.  Ibid.  The alleged momentary “loss” of the form had no discernable significance, because—as the complaint acknowledges—the Superior Court judge who arraigned [...] said that “[t]his is a PTI case,” and “remembered seeing the PTI form,” and ordered that the application be replaced immediately.
[brief] (pdf)  E-Discovery Today: The Fault Lies Not In Our Rules… (/file/document/e-discovery-today-fault-lies-not-our-rules) (pdf)  Pleadings and Dispositive Motions: Fact-Based Pleading, Twombly, Iqbal, Efforts to Decide Cases on the Papers  Either at the Beginning of the Process or at the End of the Process  Fact-Based Pleading: A Solution Hidden in Plain Sight (/file/document/fact-based-pleading-solution-hidden-plain-sight) (pdf) Limiting Evasive Discovery: A Proposal for Three Cost-Saving Amendments to the Federal Rules (/file/document/limiting-evasive-discovery-proposal-three-cost-saving-amendments-federal-rules) (pdf) Pleading and Pretrial Motions - What Would [...] Do? (/file/document/pleading-and-pretrial-motions-what-would-judge-clark-do) (pdf) Reinvigorating Pleadings (/file/document/reinvigorating-pleadings) (pdf) Settlement: Is the Litigation Process Structured for Settlement Rather than Trial and Should it Be? Should the Answers Depend on the Complexity of the Case including Whether the Action is a Class Action? 1938 All Over Again? Pre-Trial as Trial in Complex Litigation (/file/document/1938-all-over-again-pre-trial-trial-complex-litigation) (pdf) The Business of the U.S. District Courts (/file/document/business-us-district-courts) (pdf)
[brief] R. 1:6-2(d) ..........................................................................................................................42  R. 2:6-1(a)(2) ......................................................................................................................40, 41 R. 4:9-1 ...............................................................................................................................24, 37 R. 4:9-2 ...............................................................................................................................26, 37 R. 4:42-11(b) .......................................................................................................................43  R. 4:25-1 ...............................................................................................................................6 R. 4:46-2 ...............................................................................................................................25  R. 4:46-2(c) .........................................................................................................................25, 28 R. 4:49-1 ...............................................................................................................................32  R. 4:46-2 ...............................................................................................................................25  N.J.S.A. 42:2C-11(c)(2)  .....................................................................................................30  N.J.S.A. 42:2C-46 ...................................................................................................................  [...], Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5 on Rule 1:6-2(d) (2023)
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT THE NOTICE PUBLISHED BY THE TOWNSHIP FOLLOWING THE INTRODUCTION OF ORDINANCE  NO. 13-2022  COMPLIED WITH N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 (Pa58-Pa61)  Defendants urge the Court to endorse an interpretation of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 which neuters a significant portion of that statute in order to uphold the trial court’s decision in this matter.
[brief] Db43.  [...] failed to raise these purported issues in his September 27, 2018 adjournment request (Da2156), or at any other time prior to counsel’s untimely October 22, 2018 letter.  There is nothing in the record to support [...]’s counsel’s claim that other counsel backed out of representing [...] or that [...]’s ex-wife purportedly had a stroke.  *Matter of Proc. by Comm'r of Banking & Ins.*, No. A-0119-19T3, 2020 WL 7489010, at *3 (App. Div. Dec. 21, 2020) (“the attorney's letter is not evidence”)(citing Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J.  Court Rules, cmt. on R. 1:6–6 (2020) (“Affidavits by attorneys of facts not based on their personal knowledge... constitute objectionable hearsay. ”)  Arbitrators are trained to handle matters as expeditiously as possible.  This arbitration had already dragged on for *seven-and-a-half years*.  It was perfectly reasonable for the Arbitrator to conclude that seven-and-a-half years was long enough, and that no more [...]-created delay would be tolerated.
[brief] See United States v. Graham, 758 F.2d 879, 881-82, 883-85 (3d Cir.) (finding court’s failure to respond to jury question about ending early for Yom Kippur did not coerce jury in absence of evidence jury influenced “by a prescribed deadline or the approaching holiday”), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 901 (1985); People v. Reid, 554 N.E.2d 174, 179-80 (Ill. 1990) (judge may properly refuse to answer jury question if response might suggest an “expression of the trial court’s opinion on the evidence”).  Indeed, had the judge addressed the vacation issue, she very possibly would have created a problem like that in Figueroa.  As this Court acknowledged in Harris, a verdict that is merely “forced” is not one that is coerced in violation of constitutional rights.  457 N.J. Super. at 48-51.  Especially when, as here, some of those verdicts were acquittals.  See Graham, 758 F.2d at 885 (noting “significan[ce]” that jury left many counts unresolved) (brackets added).  The judge carefully observed that line, so that her second instruction to continue deliberations was not an abuse of discretion.  POINT II
[brief] By the Board’s own standards, they had an obligation to send [...] a cure letter because her certificate was unsigned.  Indeed, the New Jersey Division of Elections offers a Board of Elections Review Guide, just reissued on May 2, 2024, which states:  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 19:63-17(b), if an inner envelope certificate is not signed or the board of elections determines that the signature on the certificate does not match that in the voter’s voting record, the board of elections must send, via mail or email, if an email address is in the voter’s record, a cure letter with a cure form, to the voter within 24 hours, informing the voter of the reason for the rejection of the ballot and provide the voter with information about how they can cure the signature deficiency.  (Da26) (emphasis added).  By its plain language, the only mandatory disqualification contained in N.J.S.A. 19:63-17 that does not have a “cure” function is when the inner envelope is unsealed.