ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  (Pb13)  However, as will be discussed in detail in Issue III of this brief, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 requires the plaintiff to “identify with specificity” the medical records he or she believes are required in order to obtain the affidavit of merit.  In this case, Plaintiff never made any such specific request, but merely requested Form C Interrogatories.  Moreover, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 requires that a timely filing of a certification by counsel, attesting to this supposed failure to provide records which had been specifically identified.  Plaintiff’s counsel made no such timely filing.  Therefore, there is no merit to the argument that the discovery issues concerning Form C Interrogatories had any bearing on the compliance with the Affidavit of Merit statute.  The third reason given by Plaintiff centers on the fact that the Law Division clerk did not schedule a Ferreira conference.
[brief] “Generally, summary judgment is inappropriate prior to the completion of discovery. ”  Wellington v. Est. of Wellington, 359 N.J. Super. 484, 496 (App. Div. 2003) (citing Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 193 (1988)).  “When ‘critical facts are peculiarly within the moving party’s knowledge,’ it is especially inappropriate to grant summary judgment when discovery is incomplete. ”  Velantzas, 109 N.J. at 193 (quoting Martin v. Educ. Testing Serv., Inc., 179 N.J. Super. 317, 326 (Ch. Div. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Brady v. Dep’t of Pers., 149 N.J. 244 (1997)) (emphasis added).  Upon a motion for summary judgment if “discovery on material issues is not complete[,] the respondent must . . . be given the opportunity to take discovery before disposition of the motion.
[directive] vi.  Determination of whether HDLE is appropriate with relation to the nature of the defendant’s work.  For example, a defendant charged with sex offenses against a minor whose employment brings the defendant into contact with minors, is not a good candidate for HDLE.  Should an application be made for the defendant to be able to work while on HDLE, or the court orders that the defendant may leave the residence to work while on HDLE, proof of employment must be provided to the court and the work hours are to be placed on the record and on the order, e.g., “can work from XX:XX a.m./p.m. to YY:YY a.m./p.m. (include commute time) on the following days.
[brief] Attorneys for Amicus, [...]  By: [...], Esquire  Dated: June 24, 2024  [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; and [...], Plaintiffs, v. [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a/ [...]; [...] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE
[brief] [...] also testified that he was not served on August 23, 2021.  T3:93:21-24.  [...] testified that nothing unusual happened on the morning of August 23, 2021, and that no process server showed up at their house.  T3:96:23-97:3.  The family vacation was to Chincoteague, Virginia and then to Maryland.  Id at 27:1-12.  After getting in the car before 9:00 a.m. (before alleged service), the family went to her brother in law’s house to drop off a key so he could care for the family dog while they were away.  T3, 28:20-29:7.  The family then went to Dunkin Donuts but this was a cash transaction and she did not save cash transaction receipts for the trip nor does she normally save Dunkin Donuts receipts.  T3:42:2-14.  [...] explained that they took Shrewsbury Drive and then got on 280 and then on to the Parkway South to head to Virginia.  T3, 28:15-20.  Shrewsbury Drive is 30-35 MPH in that area.  Id.  [...] indicated that they then traveled through the East Orange Toll Plaza and onto the Garden State Parkway.  T3, 28:8-17.  A Map was shown indicated that from the Milov home at [...] to the East Orange Toll Plaza it is 9.1 miles taking 16 minutes.  210a.  [...] testified that there is always traffic on that route and that the morning of August 23, 2021 there was Monday morning traffic.  T3:96:5-15.  He testified that it takes approximately 16-20 minutes to get from his home to the East Orange Toll Plaza.  Id.  The family took his wife’s Volvo wagon on the trip with New Jersey license plate first three letters of ZHY.  T3:97.  As evidence of the family trip, Defendants presented the following proof at the plenary hearing which was admitted into evidence as follows:
[brief] The Plaintiffs do not dispute the proposition that the separation of powers does not bar cooperation among the branches of government, provided that there are sufficient checks and balances, or that rule-making authority may be delegated by --- 5  The 5th Circuit modified the *Black* decision after HISA was amended by Congress to accord the [...] plenary control over the [...] as to the regulatory authority of the agency but not as to enforcement authority.  The court continued to uphold the principles underlying the private non-delegation doctrine.
[brief] (9T140-14 to 16; 17T27-3 to 6; 17T27-10 to 14).  Officers went to the address on March 27, 2019, and met with defendant’s father, [...]; defendant was not at the house.  (9T140-14 to 16; 9T142-6 to 10; 11T41-1 to 8; 11T141-16 to 19; 11T41-23 to 11T42-1; 17T29-12 to 20).  Police executed the search warrant at the house, looking for the jacket or a gun, and did not find anything of evidential value.  (9T140-23 to 25; 17T33-16 to 24).
[brief] - Transfer of $50,000 from [...]’s bank account to [...]’s bank account on October 28, 2015 (24T37:9-11)  • Transfer of $75,500 from [...]’s MR Line of Credit account to [...]’s bank account on August 22, 2014 (24T37:11-13)  1.  Plaintiffs failed to prove a breach of contract based on any of the subject transactions.
[brief] R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  Both of these rules assume that an agency has followed the APA in issuing a decision, action, or in promulgating a rule, thus ensuring an appeal of those actions will have the benefit of a full record.  When a party alleges that an agency has violated the APA, such as in this case, the rules do not have an adequate safeguard to ensure, as a matter of public policy, that all evidence relevant to the agency’s actions become part of the record on appeal.
[brief] By placing the house in his own name, and not that of [...] and [...], he violated their trust.  [...] claims that Francisco just wanted to rent, not own.  It is a very self-serving opinion.  A constructive trust should have been imposed by the Court recognizing [...] and [...] as equitable owners and converted the property on the deed to their names.  Despite a finding of unjust enrichment, and not a gift, the Court incorrectly awarded the majority of the equity and legal title to the home to the Defendants, a home valued at over $300,000.00.  The dominant party, [...], must not profit at the expense and advantage of the elderly [...], who had placed [...] in a position of trust, which formed the confidential relationship.
[directive] 7.3  When an officer uses force as defined in Section 3 of this Policy and the result is not fatal, the officer shall complete a report in the Use of Force Portal established by the Attorney General’s Office.  The report shall be completed by the officer within 24 hours of the use of force, and preferably before the end the shift in which the force was used.  If the officer who used force is unable to complete the report within 24 hours, it should be completed as soon the officer is able to do so, or by a supervising officer within 48 hours, in accordance with a written policy to be established by the department or agency.
[brief] Both defendants were convicted of all charges.  The trial court sentenced [...] to twelve years imprisonment subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43–7.2, on count one and a concurrent five-year term of imprisonment on count three.  Count two was merged with count one.  A few weeks later, the court denied [...]'s motion for acquittal, or in the alternative a new trial, and sentenced [...] to fifteen years imprisonment subject to the NERA on merged counts one and two and a concurrent five-year term on count three.  These appeals followed.
[brief] (6T3-11 to 14; 6T3-18 to 6T4-1).  The judge noted that while the evidence produced at the first trial supported the requested charge, the evidence before the jury at the retrial did not provide a rational basis for the charge.  (6T3-16 to 25; 6T4-2 to 6).  Rather, the evidence before the jury provided only “snippets” of information, and defendant’s reliance on the nurse’s testimony only showed that he had been assaulted, a struggle ensued, and defendant was able to get the knife from the victim.  (6T4-12 to 16; 6T4-24 to 25).  The testimony from [...] was similar in that defendant claimed he was assaulted.  (6T4-22 to 24).  The judge noted that the court had considered the evidence in its entirety and held the charge could not be submitted to the jury based upon “snippets. ” (6T5-1 to 3).  On appeal, defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his request to charge.
[brief] JUDGMENT TO THE DEFENDANTS INCLUDING OFFICERS  [...] AND [...]  BECAUSE THE GRANT OF SUMMARY  JUDGMENT WAS INCONSISTENT AND INAPPROPRIATE WITH THE STANDARDS ESTABLISHED FOR GRANTING SUCH RELIEF (Pa030; Pao031; Pa168; Pa453;Pa505; Pa507; P546; 1T40-1to 2; Pa022-Pa23; Pa303; Pa453; Pa471; 1T5-12 to 18; Pa078; Pa535; 1T42-6 to14; Pa053; Pa041; Pa488; Pa001; Pa507; Pa505; Pa053; Pa533; Pa534)  CONCLUSION | Authority | Citation | Page | |------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Adams v. Williams | supra, 407 U.S. at 146 | 45 | | Albright v. Oliver | 510 U.S. 266 (1994) | 9 | | Amores v. State | 816 S.W.2d 407 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) | 9 | | Bielevicz v. Dubinon | 915 F.2d 850 (3rd Cir 1990) | 18 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 37, 38, 40, 49 | | Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc. | 111 N.J. 355 (1988) | 33, 34 | | Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co | 258 P.2d 58 (Cal. Dist. App. 1953), rev'd 42 Cal.2d 682 (Sup. Ct. 1954) | 36 | | Capell v. Capell | 358 N.J. Super. 107 (App. Div. 2003) | 41 | | D’Amato ex. rel. McPherson v. D’Amato | 305 N.J. Super. 109 (1997) | 38 | | Davis v. Scherer | 468 U.S. 183 (1984) | 22, 23 | | Dierman v. Providence Hospital | 31 Cal.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1947) | 36 | | Doe v. Poritz | 142 N.J. at 99 | 29 | | Germann v. Matriss | 55 N.J. 193 (1970) | 36 | | Gormley v. Wood-El | 218 N.J. 72 (2014) | 21, 22 | | Hafer v. Melo | 502 U.S. 21 (1991) | 23 | | Hayes v. Mercer County | 217 N.J. Super at 622-623 | 10 | | Holmes v. City of Jersey City | 449 N.J. Super 600 (App Div 2020) | 21 | | Illinois v. Wardlow | 528 U.S. 119 (2000) | 10 | Jackson v. Magnavox Corp, 116 N.J. Super. 1, 17 (App. Div. 1971)
[brief] The standard of review on appeal of a court’s order compelling arbitration is de novo.  Knight v. Vivant Solar Developer, LLC, 465 N.J.  Super. 416, 425 (App. Div. 2020)(citing Goffe v. Foulke Management Corporation, 238 N.J. 191 (2019)).  As observed by this Court, “[i]n reviewing such orders,..[the appellate court is] mindful of the strong preference to enforce arbitration agreements, both at the state and federal level. ”  Knight, supra, 465 N.J. Super. at 425 (quoting Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013)).  An appellate court will conduct a plenary review of the legal question of whether an arbitration agreement is valid.  Perez v. Sky Zone, LLC, 472 N.J. Super. 240, 247 (App. Div. 2022)(citing Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 445-46 (2014) (citing Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 222-23 (2011)); Barr v. Bishop Rosen & Co., Inc., 442 N.J. Super. 599, 605 (App. Div. 2015)(citing Hirsch, supra, 215 N.J. at 186).  “In determining whether a matter should be submitted to arbitration, a court must evaluate (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and (2) whether the dispute falls within the scope of the agreement. ”  Knight, supra, 465 N.J. Super. at 248 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985); Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 92 (2002)).  As set forth below, the motion court correctly found that both prongs of this test have been met, and therefore this Chancery matter should be submitted to arbitration with Defendants’ Law Division matter.  “New Jersey has a long-standing policy favoring arbitration as a means of dispute resolution. ”  Santana v. Smile Direct Club, LLC, 475 N.J. Super. 279, 285 (App. Div. 2023); see also Martindale, supra, 173 N.J. at 92 (acknowledging “the affirmative policy of this State, both legislative and judicial, favors arbitration as a mechanism for resolving disputes”); (T49:15-16).  New Jersey "jurisprudence has recognized arbitration as a favored method of resolving disputes."  Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 131 (2001).  Thus, appellate courts, in reviewing orders compelling or denying arbitration, are "mindful of the strong preference to enforce arbitration agreements...."
[brief] Here, the trial court found, as an additional basis for Plaintiffs prevailing, that Defendants were equitably estopped from denying Plaintiffs’ ownership of the Disputed Area by the admission of Defendants’ counsel and his statement of intention to correct:  Lastly, this court suggests that in addition to the reasons set forth above, Defendants are estopped from denying that Plaintiffs are the rightful owners of the disputed land . . . . . .  Defendants’ former counsel admits that Defendants did, at some point, discover the true intent of the parties.  By way of email correspondence in 2018, Defendants’ former counsel admits that Defendants discovered the error during the zoning and permitting process, “[t]he back deeds list the total distance as 185’ (65’ for [Defendants] lot, 120’ for [Plaintiffs] lot.)”  . . .  Defendants’ former counsel goes even further, explaining to Plaintiffs that Defendants wish to rectify the matter:  . . .  However, as [sic] this juncture, we are in need of refiling the subdivision plan, which would show [Defendants] lot having a distance of 65’ and [Plaintiffs] lot having 120’.  We obviously want to preserve your right to have a confirming [sic] subdivision if and when you decide to do so.  [citation to Ja183] [emphasis original to trial court].  Evidently, Defendants at some point had a change of heart.  Counsel now states that he never told his clients about the email.  Nonetheless, “it is the clear policy of our courts to recognize acts by . . . attorneys . . . as valid and presumptively authorized . . .”  . . .  Defendants’ counsel at the time represented to Plaintiffs that they would resolve the issue in Plaintiffs’ favor, that the land belonged to Plaintiffs, and that Plaintiffs should have their “by right” subdivision.  Plaintiffs took no legal action and relied upon this state for several years.  Consequently, principles of equity weigh in favor of a determination that Plaintiffs are the sole legal and equitable owners of the disputed 1.33 feet, and deed reformation to reflect that determination by this court.  Ja720-21 (modifications original to trial court, excluding substitution of appendix citation).  In short, the trial court found, separate and apart from the issue of Defendants’ bona fide purchaser status and the appropriateness of reformation as a result thereof, that Defendants were equitably estopped from disputing Plaintiffs ownership and the propriety of reformation.
[brief] Per the PTA, [...] transferred its rights in certain projects to [...] in exchange for [...]’s payment to [...] of 65% of the EGP for those projects if and only if they were to achieve the status of a Backlog Project under a procedure expressly and unambiguously set forth in the PTA.  Da54-56, Da60 [PTA §§ 1.7(a), 1.6(a)(ii)(A)(1), 1.6(a)(ii)(B)(1), 3.1].  The well-defined classification of projects under the PTA are: (1) Backlog Projects, (2) Pipeline Rights, and (3) Additional Pipeline Rights.  Da51-52 [PTA §§ 1.1(a), 1.1(b)(i); 1.1(b)(ii)].  The EGP-sharing obligations stated in the PTA apply exclusively to Backlog Projects.
[brief] (Pb13)  However, as previously noted, the reason for that failure was Plaintiff’s own error in not identifying the case as a malpractice action in her case information statement, and in not recognizing the error when the improper Track Assignment Notice was issued.  Consequently, the fifth element has not been established.  Because Plaintiffs cannot establish all five of the elements needed to invoke the doctrine of substantial compliance, dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint is appropriate.
[brief] The contract is titled “Lawsuit Funding Agreement. ”  That title gives an aid to understanding the purpose of the contract.  The contract then goes on to define the terms of the transaction:  DEFINITIONS:  (1)  The Claim refers to your claim or lawsuit, including appeals, arising from injuries you suffered in a motor vehicle accident on or about August 6, 2015; (2) the Proceeds refers to money recovered by resolution of the Claim, minus legal fees, medical expenses, litigation costs and statutory liens; (3) the Purchase Price refers to money paid to you or on your behalf; and (4) the Amount Purchased refers to money due us if your Claim succeeds.  The document then describes the “purpose” of the agreement:  “We agree to purchase from you, and you agree to sell to us, a portion of your Proceeds. ”  Then later in the document, it returns to the “Lawsuit Funding Agreement” description of the transaction.  Page 4, the “Attorney and Law Firm Acknowledgment”, mentions a lawsuit finding agreement, or LFA four separate times.  It does not describe the transaction in detail to the attorney.  It does not indicate it is a “purchase” of an interest.  It indicates it is a “Law Suiter Funding” Agreement.  “Funding” is defined as the process of financing, the provision or allocation of money for a specific purpose, the provision of financial resources for a specific purpose (Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 683).  Taking all of the disparate parts of the contract together, it is a reasonable interpretation to consider it a lawsuit funding agreement, which is barred by New Jersey law.
[brief] The key consideration in a court’s determination of whether enforcement of a contract is violative of public policy is the public interest.  See Lee at *19 (“In determining whether enforcing a contract violates public policy, the key consideration is the common or public interest, as opposed to the parties’ interests. ”) citing Manning Eng'g, Inc. v. Hudson Cnty. Park Comm'n, 74 N.J. 113, 142 (1977).  More precisely, the Appellate Division has already ruled that “[i]f an alleged illegal contract is collateral, rather than inherent, to the contract at issue, then the contract is enforceable. ”  Han v. Jang, 2014 N.J.Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1408, *7 (App. Div. June 16, 2014) citing Loew’s, Inc. v. Somerville Drive-In Theater Corp., 54 N.J. Super. 224, 241 (App. Div. 1959).  In Loew’s, the trial court held and Appellate Division affirmed it to be settled law that “the contracts of an unlawful combination, or its members, which are collateral to and independent of the unlawful contract by which the conspiracy was created, and which are not in furtherance of its unlawful purpose, and valid and enforceable.
[brief] ”  Yarbough, 100 N.J. at 644; see State v. Walker, 322 N.J. Super. 535, 557 (App. Div. 1999) (finding that the [...] murder and [...] robbery were committed “so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior” because the defendant committed the [...] robbery at 12:35 a.m. but killed [...] during a separate attempted robbery an hour later).  In State v. Copling, 326 N.J. Super. 417, 441 (App. Div. 1999), this Court sustained consecutive sentences for defendant’s convictions for murder and manslaughter because they involved separate victims, but reversed the imposition of a consecutive sentence for the unlawful possession of a handgun conviction because “the true victim of unlawful possession of a handgun is society as a whole. ”  The Court held that because the “ultimate goal” of the unlawful possession of a handgun statute is to “protect others from being killed by those who own weapons,” and the “purpose of the murder statute is obviously to protect the public and individuals from unlawful killing;” thus, “the objective of each [statute] is similar. ”  Ibid.  Accordingly, this Court found it inappropriate to sentence the weapons offense consecutively to the homicide and ordered that “[t]he conviction for unlawful possession must be served concurrently to the conviction for murder. ”  Id. at 441.  see also State v. Cuff, 239 N.J. 321, 351 (2019) (“On remand, the court should reconsider its determination that defendant’s sentence for unlawful possession of a weapon in that incident should be consecutive to his sentences for other crimes committed on the same date. ”).  This Court should concur with Copling and find that the circumstances of this case do not support the imposition of a consecutive sentence for the possession offense.
[brief] State Police Retirement Board Final Decision 9/27/23……………………………Pa9  State Police Retirement Board Initial Decision 6/13/23…………………………..Pa24  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On or about July 8, 2019, the Bill Ricci Rescue, Recovery, and Cleanup Operations Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Ricci Act”) was signed into law.  On or about March 3, 2023, [...], along with many others, filed his Eligibility Registration Form to register his presence at Ground Zero under the Ricci Act, along with a Request for Amended Benefits Form, Affidavit, and Petition.  Pa30.  Pa56.  Pa58.  Pa60.  The Division of Pensions administratively denied [...]’s appeal and the matter was transmitted to the State Police Retirement Board.  Pa67.  On or about June 13, 2023, the State Police Retirement Board issued an initial decision to deny [...]’s request to register for the Ricci Act.  Pa24.  On or about July 18, 2023, [...] appealed the Board’s initial decision and requested an administrative hearing.  Pa16.  The Board denied an administrative hearing and issued a Final Agency Decision on September 27, 2023.  Pa9.  This appeal ensued.
[brief] ”  *State v. Acevedo*, 205 N.J. 40, 45 (2011); *State v. Murray*, 162 N.J. 240, 247 (2000); *State v. Marshall*, 173 N.J. 343, 354-355 n. 2 (2002)  Based upon the record before this Court, limited as it may be, this Court cannot view the issue here as anything other than a motion to correct an illegal sentence.
[brief] PIP benefits are specifically excluded from being introduced at trial and recovered as set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12, as the PIP are paid pursuant to 6A-4 or 10.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 sets for the criteria for when the PIP is subject to reimbursement.  This is not a 9.1 claim though, and not excluded by 39:6A-12.  There is nothing in the collateral source rule excluding recovery of med pay benefits paid by [...] as required under N.J.S.A. 39:5H-10.  State Negligence Law applied to award calculations: 50% Comparative (Da130 – Da138).