ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentence.  This Court largely affirmed defendant's convictions in an unpublished opinion.  (Da 165)  However, the court vacated the convictions on counts 15 and 46, "conspiracy to commit robbery 'and/or' kidnapping," due to the erroneous use of "and/or" in that charge.  The aggregate sentence after the decision was 90 years in prison with a 66.4-year parole disqualifier.  (Da 190)  Petitioner filed a petition for certification with the New Jersey Supreme Court, which was granted on August 1, 2018, and limited to two issues: (1) the verdict sheet's omission of the charge of second-degree kidnapping; and (2) the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences.  (Da 191)  In an opinion decided August 6, 2019, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division's decision with respect to the convictions.
[brief] Ultimately, the charge was included and both parties given an opportunity to provide a brief supplemental closing.  Respondent relied upon three physicians, [...], [...] and [...].  All three physicians provided testimony regarding Respondent’s injuries and their opinions regarding those injuries having resulted from the March 3, 2020 accident.  Notably, [...]’s reports did not contain a comparative analysis sufficient to satisfy Polk v. Daconceicao, 268 N.J. Super. 568, 575 (App. Div. 1993).  Although [...] spoke about aggravation and so-called age-appropriate degenerative changes, he did not offer a true comparative analysis of the Plaintiff’s condition pre- versus post-accident.  Thus, there was no analysis provided to the jury from which they could consider a claim that the Plaintiff had a pre-existing disability which was aggravated by the subject accident.
[brief] This order determined that the Defendants violated the LGEL but did not address their argument in the motion to dismiss which asserted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over matters related to the LGEL.  Specifically, [...] found:  The court finds the defendants’ votes on the resolution were contrary to the Local Government Ethics Law.  The court finds the vote therefore was ineffectual and void regarding the subjects of the resolution which pertain to [...].  [Da2.]  On April 17, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce litigants' rights (Da55).  Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants' decision to table matters concerning [...] amounted to a vote against [...] (Da56, ¶¶4-5).  Plaintiffs’ motion requested, among other things, that Defendants be held in contempt and be ordered to cease voting on matters related to [...], including the prohibition of voting to table such matters (Da56-Da57, ¶7).  On April 19, 2024 Defendants filed a motion to reconsider [...]’s April 1, 2024 ruling because it failed to address Defendants’ motion to dismiss assenting the lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the New Jersey Legislature expressly afforded exclusive jurisdiction over alleged violations of the LGEL to, in this instance, the [...] (Da58; Da81).
[brief] The court stated:  “[...] a couple of things that we have discussed previously during prior and in limine applications as well as during the course of this trial would be the molding of the verdict afterwards.  Assuming the plaintiff does get a verdict, the court will address the issue of any liens that may be asserted.  For the medical and temporary benefits.  That would be subject to any comparative negligence, assuming that the plaintiff does get a verdict and the jury does allocate liability 55/45, whatever amount of liability is ultimately attributed to the plaintiff will affect any award that he may be entitled to.  (3T:114-20 to 115-7).  The court further noted that: as I’ve instructed the jury on multiple occasions, this case is about pain, suffering, disability, loss of enjoyment of life, and there are no economic claims, either past and/or future economic claims being asserted other than the limited issue and the court will mold any potential verdict.  (3T:115-20 to 25).  The within matter was tried before a jury in the Superior Court Law Division, Monmouth County, from June 13, 2022, until June 21, 2022.  The Jury rendered a verdict finding the Defendant 85% responsible for the happening of this altercation and awarded the Plaintiff $25,000.00 for his pain, suffering, disability, loss of enjoyment of life.
[brief] By correspondence dated October 28, 2021, [...] was notified that the Complaint was deficient, and required amendment before the Commission could accept his filing.  On November 2, 2021, [...] cured all defects and filed an Amended Complaint (Complaint) that was deemed compliant with the requirements detailed in N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.3 (Pa19).  More specifically, the Complaint avers that Respondents violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g) in Counts 1-8, Count 12, Counts 14-15, and Count 18; Respondent [...] violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g) in Count 5 and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) in Count 11; Respondent [...] and Respondent [...] violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g) in Count 9; Respondent [...] violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.
[brief] The Complaint states that Plaintiff was “disenabled” from "effectuating" his appeal, because of “the [...] Judge’s apparent failure to file the final judgment. ”  He was not!  The appeal was filed but was dismissed for failure to file transcripts or to request an extension.  Since the entire basis of Plaintiff’s claim against [...] is that he could not appeal because no judgment of conviction was entered, and because [...] has indisputably shown that Plaintiff did, in fact appeal, and his appeal was filed (and dismissed for reasons unrelated to any judgment of conviction or lack thereof), Plaintiff’s claim against this Defendant failed and was properly dismissed.
[brief] And I just want to take a quick step back and, um, just mention that the 9-1 motion papers, the September 1st motion papers, you know, are deficient on proof of service with the motion, and – and the proposed order filed with the motion seeks relief that’s inconsistent with the briefing.  The brief reads like a motion to compel arbitration.  The proposed order seeks dismissal with prejudice.  The initial briefing papers cite all of the Martindale v. Sandvik and Atalese standards for arbitration.  And then the reply brief goes on to cite all the Printing Mart standards for a motion to dismiss.  So, the relief sought is unclear.
[brief] CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................................................49 | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ., | 22 | | 138 N.J. 405 (1994) | | | Allen v. Cape May Cty., | 22, 23, 39 | | 246 N.J. 275 (2021) | | | Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., | 22 | | 477 U.S. 242 (1986) | | | Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hillside Bottling Co., | 21 | | 397 N.J. Super. 224 (App. Div. 2006) | | | Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., | 26 | | 214 N.J. 518 (2013) | | | BOC Group v. Chevron Chemical Co., | 22 | | 359 N.J. Super. 135 (App. Div. 2003) | | | Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, | 20 | | 244 N.J. 567 (2021) | | | Bray v. Marriott Hotels, | 24 | | 110 F.3d 986 (3d Cir. 1997) | | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., | 20, 21 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | Burton v. Teleflex Inc., | 38 | | 707 F.3d 417 (3d Cir. 2013) | | | Chiofalo v. State, | 25, 26 | | 238 N.J. 527 (2019) | | | Dolinski v. Borough of Watchung & Chief Joseph Cina, | 29 | | 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1242, at *26 (App. Div. July 8, 2022) | | | Donofry v. Autotote Sys., Inc., | 31 | | 350 N.J. Super. 276 (App. Div. 2001) | | | Dzwonar v. McDevitt, | 22, 24, 25 | | 177 N.J. 451 (2003) | | | Estate of Roach v. Trw, Inc., | 29 | | 164 N.J. 598 (2000) | | | Feldman v. Hunterdon Radiologoical, | 24 | | 187 N.J. 228 (2006) | | Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994) ................................................................. 39, 40
[brief] The site plan submitted with Appellant’s application depicts the driveway off Atlantic Avenue and proposed loading area and illustrates the unconventional nature of Appellant’s backing maneuver into the site.  *(See Aa197). *  In discussing this alternative, [...]’s counsel questioned whether a vehicle accessing this driveway could safely reverse into the driveway from a live lane of traffic along Atlantic Avenue.  *(See T2/37:15-22). *  [...]’s traffic engineer echoed this concern and opined “a backing maneuver from a live lane would not be considered safe. ”  *(See generally T2/149:3-150:2; 150:1-2). *  While Appellant’s engineer argued that the backing maneuver was safe and pointed to several examples of existing loading zones in the area that are backed into, under cross-examination, he acknowledged that these pre-existing conditions likely would not be approved today.  *(T2/82:11-15; 86:4-11; 150:21-151:13).*  The Hearing Officer also raised concerns regarding a vehicle mistakenly turning into the site via the driveway and then being unable to circulate the site.
[brief] Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86.  On April 8, 2019, Plaintiffs-Appellants, [...], Esq., [...] d/b/a [...] and [...]  (the “Plaintiffs-Appellants”), filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writ seeking to nullify and invalidate Newark City Ordinance 6PSF-e, adopted on March 6, 2019, which granted a thirty (30) year tax abatement to Defendant-Respondent, [...] (“[...]”) pursuant to the New Jersey Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency Law of 1983, as amended and supplemented, N.J.S.A. 55:14K-1 et seq. (the “HMFA Law”) in connection with a project to rehabilitate two hundred sixty-eight (268) units of affordable housing located at [...] in the [...] (the “Project”).
[brief] On December 8, 2021, Point Pleasant Beach Borough Police Officer [...] issued complaints [...], [...], [...], and [...] charging Defendant [...] with DWI, reckless driving, failure to observe signal, and failure to exhibit a driver’s license in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96, N.J.S.A. 39:4-81, and N.J.S.A. 39:3-29, respectively.  Da1a-2a.  [...], appeared as defense counsel with a Letter of Representation dated January 14, 2022.  Da3a-5a.  In this letter, [...] first asserted his right to a speedy trial.  Da4a, par.IX.  Discovery Proceedings.  On March 8, 2022, the matter was adjourned for discovery.  1T3-8/13.  After that court appearance, defense counsel wrote to the municipal prosecutor about discovery, and the matter was adjourned again on April 22, 2022, for the prosecutor to respond to that letter.  2T3-8/14.  On June 7, 2022, the matter was adjourned once more for the parties to assess their positions concerning discovery.  3T3-10/18.  The defense then filed a motion for discovery, and the matter was adjourned on September 6, 2022, for the State to respond to the motion.  4T3-13/20.  Argument on the motion took place on October 18, 2022, with the municipal court denying all of the remaining discovery requests.  See 5T5-24/7-3 (New Standard Solution Report), 5T7-4/9-2 (Alcotest repair records), 5T9-3/10 (SFST manual citation), and 5T9-11/11-3 (past SFST reports).  At this point, the matter was ready for suppression hearing and trial (5T11-8/14), and the case was adjourned once more for that purpose on December 6, 2022 (6T3-7/13).  **Pretrial Motions.
[brief] ”  Cherokee Equities, supra at 212 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 2005).  Lastly, in *[...] v. Davidoff*, 467 N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div. 2021), the Appellate Division again reiterated the strong public policy against heir hunting.  The court noted that the plaintiff [...] had mounted a surreptitious two-decade-long quest to undermine and cloud the State’s title to the properties at issues and to establish its own competing chains of title, that [...] had spent over $1 million hiring searchers, surveyors, genealogists and lawyers to exploit potential defects in the State’s titles, and that it had tracked down putative heirs and purchased their fractional interests, sometimes for sums approximating actual value, by way of omnibus quitclaim deeds it drafted for the purpose.  In rejected most of the claims asserted by [...] that it had taken ownership of the subject properties, the Appellate Division noted that those who seek to exploit technical flaws in title in order to upset existing equities and clearly vested rights are “title raiders” whose actions are anathema to the principles undergirding New Jersey’s land title laws.
[brief] In return for defendant’s guilty plea, the Reckless Driving, Speeding, Open Container and Failure to Maintain Lanes charges were dismissed.  (1T:3-4 to 3-7).  Thereafter, [...] sentenced defendant to a $356 fine, $33 court costs, $50 VCCB, $75 SNSF, $225 DWI fund, seven months of license suspension, 12 hours IDRC, and one year of ignition interlock and registration suspension after completion of the license suspension.
[brief] Prior to trial the lower court proclaimed: “I am not a precluder,” and then abided by that principle.  During the weeks-long affair, the trial court was solicitous of each parties’ right to fully present their case, even permitting the defense to recall two key plaintiff witness when the defense purported to uncover new evidence in the middle of the trial.  In fact, during the entire trial, there was only one occasion when the trial court sustained an objection that resulted in the preclusion of witness testimony, and that issue that isn’t even the subject of this appeal.  In its two post-trial oral decisions, the lower court made clear findings that Plaintiff [...] and his accounting expert, [...], were both credible.  The trial court mentioned as much at least three times.  The court below went so far as to explain that while the defendants attempted to characterize Mehta as delusional for having the temerity to file this lawsuit, “I didn’t find that he was delusional.  I found him credible.  I found [...] credible.  I found transactions which were diversions or misappropriations. ”  The trial court made no similar credibility findings about the defendants or their experts.  In fact, the trial court rejected the defendants’ explanations for their conduct, concluding: “there’s nothing there.  You know there was really no meat to most of the explanations. ”  In this Court, the appellants raise several arguments, none of which has merit.
[directive] Note:  Participants using 5-shot weapons will fire a total of 36 rounds following the course of fire on page 77 for low light qualification (5-Shot HNQC).  Retired officers will qualify in low light using the Handgun Night Qualification Course HNQC for Retired Law Enforcement Officers page 78.  9-49 Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards  Appendix D
[brief] *In re Blake's Will*, 21 N.J. 50 (1956) citing *Carroll v. Hause*, 48 N.J. Eq. 269 (Prerog. 1891); *Haynes*, supra, 87 N.J. at 177-78; *In re Catelli's Will*, 361 N.J. Super. 478, 487 (App. Div. 2003); *Stockdale*, supra, 196 N.J. at 303.
[brief] According to *State v. Smith*, the supreme court judge found that it is irrelevant what the cop’s opinions were whether what they observed was a motor vehicle violation to justify reasonable and articulable suspicion to pull someone over.  The judge argued that it only matters if the person actually committed a motor vehicle violation based on the exact words written in the statute.  *State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244, 258 (N.J. 2022)* ("To determine whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists, a court must evaluate the totality of the circumstances and "assess whether 'the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure ... warrant[ed] a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.' ...A motor vehicle stop that is not based on a "reasonable and articulable suspicion is an 'unlawful seizure,' and evidence discovered during the course of an unconstitutional detention is subject to the exclusionary rule."  [Internal citations omitted by me])  The supreme judge also stated, "the goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the Legislature's intent, and "the best indicator of that intent" is the statute's plain language."  He further argues that because the person in that case did not violate a motor vehicle statue based on the plain language of the statute, the motor vehicle stop was unconstitutional because no statutory or regulatory provision forms the basis for a reasonable and articulable suspicion").  State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244, 258-59 (N.J. 2022) ("As always, the goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the Legislature's intent, and "the best indicator of that intent" is the statute's plain language...If the plain language is clear and unambiguous, "then our interpretative process is over."  ...If the statutory language is ambiguous, or if a plain reading of the statute would lead to an absurd result, we may consider extrinsic aids, including legislative history.  [Internal citations omitted by me]  He further argues that the words and phrases of statutes should be given their generally accepted meanings.  This sets the stage for my argument that my stop is invalid, unlawful and unconstitutional.
[brief] There was no evidence indicating that [...] was unfit to interact with customers due to some innate disposition or trait that [...] could have discovered through reasonable investigation.  There was no evidence of prior convictions, or anything suggesting unfitness or a propensity towards violence.  There was no aspect of [...]’s background or his previous experience as a [...] employee that would have put [...] on notice that he posed a danger to customers.  Nor was there evidence that [...] posed a physical danger to customers because he was unskilled or incompetent.  It was undisputed that [...] approached [...] to ask whether he needed assistance selecting grout.  To the extent the task of selecting grout required specialized knowledge or training, the testimony established 1) that [...] had experience and training in dealing with [...] customers; 2) that he had received training on grout in particular, and; 3) that he provided accurate information in response to [...]’s questions.
[brief] *Balsham vs. Koffler*, 8 N.J. Super. 48 (App. Div. 1950).  In *Conway vs. 287 Corporate Associates*, 187 N.J. 259 (2006), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that extrinsic evidence of the contracting parties’ intent is properly considered even “when the written terms of the agreement appear to be clear. ”  The Court instructed that “we permit a broad use of extrinsic evidence to achieve the ultimate goal of discovering the intent of the parties”.  *Id.*  187 N.J. at 269-70.  When a lease may bear two constructions, one of which makes it legal and the other makes it illegal, courts prefer the construction which renders the lease legal and hence enforceable.
[brief] As to the issue of arbitrability, it is anticipated that [...] will argue (and cite to *Blueprint Cap. Advisors, LLC v N.J. Div. of Inv.*, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 34032, *4, 7* (3d Cir. December 22, 2023) (Ja62-Ja66) that Plaintiff misinterpreted *Goffe*, 238 N.J. at 211 or misinterpreted the “delegation clause” in the arbitration provision in [...]’s Membership Agreement.  Unlike the subject arbitration provision\(^3\) in *Blueprint Cap. Advisors, LLC*, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 34032, *4, 7* (Ja64-Ja66), [...]’s arbitration provision is far from clear.  *First*, in [...]’s arbitration provision you have Paragraph 7.2 (Ja36) of the arbitration provision which states:  “**Arbitration:**  You agree to submit any and all **Disputes** (as defined in Section 7.4) to binding arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (Title 9 of the United States Code), which will govern the interpretation and enforcement of this arbitration agreement (“**Arbitration Agreement**”).  Arbitration will be before either (1) [...] (formerly known as Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services), --- \(^3\) “Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof, that cannot be settled between the Parties, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with [...] and pursuant to the [...] Rules; provided, that each Party shall retain his or its right to commence an action to obtain specific performance or other equitable relief from any court of competent jurisdiction. ”  jamsadr.com, or (2) the [...] (“[...]”), adr.org…” (emphasis added)  Unlike the purported corresponding paragraph in *Blueprint*, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 34032, *4, 7 (Ja64-Ja66) Defendant’s Paragraph 7.2 (Ja36) does not mention the “[...] Rules (or those of [...]).  *Second*, Paragraph 7.2 (Ja36) from [...]’s arbitration provision references (and only applies to) “Disputes” which is defined in an entirely different part of the arbitration provision at Paragraph 7.4.  (Ja37)  As argued below, “Disputes” does not apply (per [...]’s own definition) to Plaintiff’s claims involving “public injunctive relief”.  *Infra Section I(C)* *Third*, any reference to the [...] or [...] rules is only found in a separate paragraph (7.5)(Ja37), on an entirely separate page, from Paragraph 7.2.
[brief] 33  Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U.S. 448, 454, 63 S.Ct. 1146, 87 L.Ed. 1509 .........................  18 Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U.S. 448, 454, 63 S.Ct. 1146, 87 L.Ed. 1509, 1514 (1943), rehearing denied 320 U.S. 809, 64 S.Ct. 27, 88 L.Ed. 489 (1942)  .................................................. 18 Turner v. Bank of N. America , 4 U.S. 8, 11, (4 Dall.), 1 L.Ed. 718, 719 (1799) .................................  13 United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002)
[brief] (Da 18; 1T85-20 to 86-9)  The officers then offered [...] a choice: “Right now we have enough to write a search warrant on your house” or “we can be a gentlemen [sic] and we can go back, and you can give us consent and we can find whatever else you’ve got in there. ”  (Da 18)  But, officers explained, “[e]ither, either way we’re going back to the house . . . it’s either with your cooperation or without your cooperation. ”  (Da 18)  [...] then stated “[i]f you’re gonna give us consent then yeah, we’ll, we’ll be, you just tell us where everything is, we’re not going to tear your house apart.  Okay?  We’re cool with that?”  (Da 18; Da 15 at 3:14:00 to 3:17:00)  Soon after, [...] began reading aloud the Consent to Search Form.
[brief] (2T 38-8 to 39-19)  In particular, although the court acknowledged that the defense had elaborated on mitigating factor 14 and had asked the court to assign the factor great weight, the court did not explain the weight it was assigning to the factor and did not engage with defense counsel’s arguments about why the factor should have been assigned significant weight in this case.  (2T 39-16 to 40-3)  Because the court failed to adequately explain the sentence, a remand for resentencing is required.
[brief] Once an area is designated as in need of redevelopment, “the public purpose of the Township’s redevelopment determination [is] unassailable. ”  Id. at 252.  “Further, having adopted a redevelopment plan, [a] Township [is] entitled to exercise its broad statutory powers under the LRHL to designate a private developer and to condemn property in furtherance of its plan. ”  Ibid.  “The judicial prerogative does not allow for second guessing the decisions of legislative bodies.