ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Tenancy Court correctly retained jurisdiction to determine the Motion for Transfer and the Trial for Non-Payment and Possession because the Court established a Landlord-Tenant Relationship pursuant to *N.J. Ct. R. 1-2(3)* based upon the Evidence in the Case, and no testimony under Oath was given that disputed the Landlord Tenant relationship based upon the Evidence.  Also, *Carr v. Johnson* 211 N.J. Super 341 (App. 1986) is distinguishable from the instant case because in *Carr* complex issues existed and a detailed confusing record when the instant case is based on speculation without a certification on any evidence contravening a Landlord Tenant relationship.  2T52-9  Moreover, the Landlord Tenant Court specifically cited the relevant standard under *Morrocco v. Felton*, 211 N.J. 226 (Law Division 1970).  The Court cited the case and after application of the facts and the speculation without a Certification, the Court concluded no evidence of fraud and the transfer was meritless.  2T51-12  Also, the Court conducted a Trial where Landlord Tenant relationship nor the owing of rent was never controverted by Defendant on the record under Oath.
[brief] (1T51-11 to 52-2; 1T60-20 to 22; 1T90-12 to 16; 2T77-1 to 9; 5T10-16 to 12-18; 5T59-3 to 60-11; 5T90-14 to 91-4; Da55; Ra28; Ra38 at 0:00:20 to 0:00:26; Ra37 at 0:00:27 to 0:00:30; Ra35).  This door led into the attic area on the third floor, (Ra39 at 0:00:01 to 0:00:24; Ra27); and, like the kitchen door, the door faced further into the left side of the property.
[brief] See Da134 at 36:5-23.¹³  [...] further testified to the magnitude of Plaintiff’s late --- ¹¹  “Q.  That [...] was given notice that his records were delinquent many times?  A.  I would agree that the data was delivered many times and discussed. ”  ¹²  “Q.  Can you give an approximation as to the number of times that you talked to [...] about the charts being incomplete?  A.  More than 10.  Q.  And what time period are you talking about when you had more than 10 discussions with [...] about the charts being late?  A. '14, '15, '16, '17.  That's the years.  2014, that's how much I recall. ” ¹³  “Q.  Okay.  Say whatever you want.  Give a big answer.  A.  [...] was never a single target.  There was a policy at the hospital in the late 2015, when reports and his failure to properly manage the physician staff on this front, stating it was “a big deal” that cost the Hospital “hundreds of thousands of dollars” and that the Hospital had liens placed on it because of the failure to properly get reimbursed because of the reports being so untimely.  See Da134-135 at 37:19-38:15.  Despite Plaintiff’s dreadful record of delinquent patient records, he was paid in full for all obligations under his agreements with [...].
[brief] Exhibit I - Abandoned Property Certification  Certification of Counsel Objecting to Motion to Vacate  Final Judgment  Filed on February 23, 2023  150a-152a - Exhibit A - Certificate of Sale and Assignment of Tax Sale Certificate 153a-150a - Exhibit B - Abandoned Property Certification and Photos of Property 161a-162a - Exhibit C - Property Detail 163a-177a - Exhibit D - Pre-foreclosure
[brief] 2023 | Pa1 | | Picture of the Driveway, filed below on August 25, 2023 | Pa5 | | The Application filed by the Mother, filed on August 25, 2023 | Pa6 | | Respondents’ OPRA Response, filed below on Aug.25.  2023 | Pa16 | | Recommendation of Respondents’ Official, filed on Aug.25.  2023 | Pa18 | | Denial of the Application, filed below on Aug.25.  2023 | Pa19 | | Admission by Respondents’ Borough Council, filed on Aug.25.  2023 | Pa20 | | Respondents’ OPRA Response, filed below on Aug.25.  2023 | Pa29 | | Pictures of Handicapped Parking Use By Respondents, filed on Aug.25.  2023 | Pa31 | | Harassing Letter by Respondents’ Attorney’s, filed on Aug.25.  2023 | Pa35 | | HUD Referral to DOJ, filed below on Aug.25.  2023 | Pa37 | | Physician Certification, filed below on Aug.25.  2023 | Pa38 | | Respondents’ Handicapped Parking Code, filed on Aug.25.  2023 | Pa39 | | The Application Selective pages filed via Reconsideration, filed about November19.2023 | Pa41 | Complaint filed by [...], filed about November19.2023
[brief] Furthermore, the issue of where someone works has been greatly impacted by the Pandemic.  Respondent makes the ridiculous assertion that since Petitioner performed her duties remotely from her law office instead of her home, this indicates independent contractor status.  What difference does it make where someone performed their duties during the Pandemic?  Whether Petitioner zoomed into a municipal court session from her private law office, her home or her car is irrelevant on this issue.  And, if the Respondent is true to its position, if you compare the Petitioner’s remote services with other employee’s remote services during the Pandemic (other than police officers), they all maintained employee status.
[brief] Despite the Appellate Division’s findings that the alleged bad faith claim in [...]’s Proposed Amended Complaint lacked merit, on February 1, 2023, [...] moved to reinstate Count One (Bad Faith as related to the Redevelopment Resolution) and Count Three (Conspiracy as related to the [...] Resolution) in the Second Action.  (Pa758–59.)  On March 23, 2023, the trial court denied [...]’s Motion to Reinstate and dismissed the Complaint with prejudice.  (4T20:22–24.)  The trial court held that [...] was bound by the Appellate Division’s ruling that its bad faith claim lacked merit.  (4T8:3–4.)  In rendering its decision, the trial court noted that the Appellate Division “had the full record” of and relied on [...]’s “bad faith” comments during the redevelopment proceedings.  (4T8:17–20.)  The trial court concluded that “[t]he question of when [[...]] first learned about this bad faith, clearly was an issue on a motion to amend in front of [...]. ”  (4T13:22–25.)  The trial court conceded that its volunteered findings of facts during the oral argument on the second motion to dismiss were “irrelevant, because the Appellate Division” ruled that the “whole [bad faith] issue . . . should’ve been filed in that first lawsuit, not on a motion to amend .  . . .”  (4T15:21–16:1.)  The court emphasized that it did not “care what [its own] findings of fact were” because it “specifically said that [it] wanted to wait to make a decision based on the Appellate Division ruling. ”  (4T16:8–11.)  In finding that [...]’s bad faith claim was barred by the First Appellate Action decision, the trial court likewise barred [...]’s conspiracy claim “because [[...]] clearly knew that [...] was one of the parties to his alleged bad faith claim. ”  (4T20:15–25.)  The trial court’s Denial and Dismissal Order is the basis for this appeal.  (See Pa1–2.)  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] (Pa91-Pa92 at 12:17-13:13; Pa94 at 15:14-19; Pa18 at 18:1-5; Pa185 at 39:4-9).  Photographs taken by a [...] employee from that day show that the feet of multiple barricades were raised above the ground and that one of the feet was bent upwards.  (Pa152 at 6:7-23; Pa183 at 37:11-24; Pa215-Pa219).  There is no dispute that the feet of the temporary barricades that defendant [...] erected at the entrance of the store are supposed to lay flat on the ground.
[brief] Yet the trial court considered none of the factors outlined by the Supreme Court: plaintiff’s age, language barriers, cognitive limitations, psychological limitations, or other reasons to permit recording.  (Pa150.)  Instead, the trial court summarily found its original decision made without the precedent of either this Court or the Supreme Court was correct because Defendant should be able to select the examiner of his choosing, and in this case, [...] would not conduct the exam if it was recorded:  “this Court finds that it’s (sic) prior order found that good cause existed to prohibit the use of recording devices and observers, as it would deprive the Defendants’ right to utilize the Expert of their choosing. ”  (Pa150.)  But that is not a valid basis for prohibiting the recording when [...] does not speak English, has had issues with the interpreter’s translation being incorrect here, has severe cognitive limitations, has severe psychological limitations, and the basis for restricting the recording is the ABN Policy statement that would also limit an interpreter but an interpreter will be present at [...]’s examination.  Each of these factors weigh in favor of permitting the recording, but the trial court choose to give the examiner’s dictation of the exam’s terms weight over these factors, even though the Supreme Court noted an examiner is not permitted to dictate the terms of the exam.  Cf. Pa150 with DiFiore, 254 N.J. at 241 (quoting DiFiore, 472 N.J. Super. at 130 (quoting Carley, 307 N.J. Super. at 262).  [...] sought leave to appeal, which this Court granted.
[directive] All whether specify the shall the prosecutor detention, pretrial for motion a prosecutor files the When (2) required; when court in appear defendant not will (1) that on risk the based is application will obstruct defendant (3) community; or the person any of other safety the will endanger defendant to attempt or or intimidate, injure, or threaten, process, justice criminal the or to attempt obstruct foregoing of combination the or juror; any (4) or witness prospective a intimidate, threaten, or injure, risks.27 specified Circumstances. and Relevant Facts  7.6 Rule.  7.6.1  General or Section in this presumption established overcome or a sustain whether determining to In risk the on bearing material a has that circumstance any consider or fact may prosecutor Section the 8, any of endanger safety the will required, when court in appear not will if defendant, released, that justice process, criminal the obstruct to attempt or obstruct will and/or community, or person the other witness prospective a or intimidate, threaten, injure, to attempt or intimidate, or threaten, injure, or take may court a that information of categories broad of list Law a provides Reform Bail  The juror. or (x.28 to 2A:162-20(a) N.J.S.A.  See detention. pretrial order whether determining to in account into 2~ detention pretrial the to relevant be would that information or evidence of type specification the limit may This hearing.  detention of the scope the limit thus and decision, za take may detention, into pretrial order whether determining to when court, a that provides 2A:162-20 N.J.S.
[brief] Specifically, Section 10.5 of the Lease, entitled “Surrender of Property,” provides that “Upon the expiration or earlier termination of this Agreement (whether or not following an Event of Default), Lessee shall peaceably and quietly leave, surrender and return the Property to Lessor. ”  [FEDa143].  The New Jersey Supreme Court has cautioned that “where the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous there is no room for interpretation or construction and the courts must enforce those terms as written. ”  Karl’s Sales & Service, Inc. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 249 N.J. Super. 487, 493 (App. Div. 1991), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 548 (1991).  When interpreting contracts they are to be afforded their “plain and ordinary meaning. ”  E. Brunswick Sewerage Auth. v. E. Mill Assocs., Inc., 365 N.J. Super. 120, 125 (App. Div. 2004).  The court has no right “to rewrite the contract merely because one might conclude that it might well have been functionally desirable to draft it differently” nor may it “remake a better contract for the parties than they themselves have seen fit to enter into, or to alter it for the benefit of one party and to the detriment of the other.
[brief] Irving, 114 N.J. at 446–47, 555 A.2d 575.  The court in Douglas surveyed the relevant precedents and determined that in those earlier cases, hearsay testimony was deemed to be prejudicial because the State's cases were “very weak....”  204 N.J. Super. at 275, 498 A.2d 364.  The Douglas panel concluded that because the State's proofs in the matter before it were “fortified by direct positive evidence”—for example, direct identification of the defendant—the hearsay testimony was not prejudicial under the plain error rule.  Ibid.  Applying that principle to the totality of the proofs in the record, the Supreme Court in Irving concluded that a reasonable doubt was not raised on whether the hearsay led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.  114 N.J. at 448, 555 A.2d 575.  In reaching that fact-sensitive conclusion, the Court succinctly summarized the independent proofs of guilt:
[brief] (Pa147).  However, Plaintiff-Appellant makes no argument as to how or why that May 24, 2023 correspondence caused her to change her position, to her detriment.  No promises were made, at any time.  No inducements to change a course of conduct was made, at any time.  No statements were given that Defendant-Respondent would not invoke available defenses under the policy.  It was simply a good faith attempt by the carrier to avoid protracted litigation.
[brief] If the Division stopped including “maintenance” in the calculation of overtime, it would be a clear contract violation.  Furthermore, if the Division started calculating compensatory time in tenth of an hour units, that would also be a clear contract violation.  When viewing Article V as a whole, it only becomes more evident that the parentheticals are not mere examples.  The Division claims, and the Arbitrator and Court held, that when reviewing the contract as a whole it is clear that the parentheses are merely illustrative.  Yet, neither the Arbitrator, nor the Division, nor the Court, relied on any specific language in any other clause in the contract to support their contention that parentheses at issue herein is illustrative.  The Division merely asserted a baseless claim with no factual support, and the Arbitrator and the Court inexplicably adopted the fallacy.  Upon review of the contract as a whole, there are other locations where parentheticals are present.  When examining these clauses, it becomes even more obvious that the Division’s argument that language in parentheticals is somehow devalued contract language lacks merit.  Most notably, Article VI, B. Holidays, states:
[brief] The Second Wire Transfer and The Events That Followed  The robust documents produced by Appellant in connection with the Motions establishes that the decision to reject and return the First Wire Transfer was made by Appellant’s predecessor and/or [...] twelve (12) calendar days after the wire transfer was received on May 19, 2021.  (Pa421).  Thereafter, on May 21, 2021, fourteen (14) days or two (2) full weeks after it first received the First Wire Transfer, [...] sent an amount of funds equal to the First Wire Transfer to [...], via an outgoing wire transfer (the “Second Wire Transfer”).  (Pa417 at ¶12 & Pa427).  On July 16, 2021, servicing of the Loan changed from [...] to [...] (“[...]”).  (Pa260 at ¶10).  Following several assignments of the Mortgage, the Appellant was assigned the Mortgage by [...] on October 4, 2021.  (Pa433-34 at ¶10-23).  Almost one (1) year after Appellant became the assignee of the Loan, [...] forwarded the Borrowers the pre-foreclosure action notices required under the Fair Foreclosure Act on September 17, 2022.  (Pa262 at ¶24).  Thereafter, approximately nine (9) months later, Appellant commenced this action on July 29, 2023, taking the position that the $177,887.35, inarguably received, was not paid (Pa1).
[brief] They claim that they did not understand the impact of the Redevelopment Plan until Redeveloper’s site plan application was filed.  (Pa2 & Pa16).  Typically, where enlargement has been granted, there has been some type of concealment to the plaintiff, as is seen in several cases cited by Plaintiff.  Plaintiff cites *Estate of Dolente* in support of its request for enlargement.  (Pa12).  Enlargement was warranted because the attorney in that case had made an inquiry as to whether any action had been taken by the municipality with respect to the plaintiff’s property and was specifically advised by the municipality that no action had been taken.  *Estate of Dolente v. Borough of Pine Hill*, 313 N.J. Super. 410, 417-18 (App. Div. 1998).  The Court concluded that “[s]upplying partial information can be as misleading as supplying incorrect information” and that because of the municipality’s failure to fully supply information in response to the attorney’s inquiry, a valid reason existed to justify enlargement of the 45 day appeal period.
[directive] Thus, this allowance is subject to certain restrictions:  The defendant must already be a. employed.  If the defendant leaves an Inclusion Zone, then an "Inclusion Zone Alert" text message and email 3  If of is sent automatically to the monitoring officer( on duty.  after a short period time, the s) monitoring officer fails to acknowledge the alert using the link provided in the automated email, then the monitoring officer will receive an escalation telephone call from a live vendor representative.  of Page 8
[brief] [...] does not contest the standards of review and does not defend how the trial court applied those standards.  (1T60-17; 3T46-7)  The SSI Brief identifies the applicable standards of review the trial court was required to utilize.  Db9-11.  To reiterate, a governing body’s decisions concerning whether a bid is defective and whether a defect is material are both judged for whether the determination was “arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious. ”  Barrick v. State, Dep't of Treasury, Div. of Prop. Mgmt. & Const., 218 N.J. 247, 259 (2014).  Where a defect is not material, the governing body’s decision whether to waive such a defect is subject to even greater deference, permitting reversal only where there is a “clear abuse of discretion. ”  Palamar Const., Inc. v. Pennsauken Twp., 196 N.J. Super. 241, 250 (App. Div. 1983).  Here, [...] fails to challenge the applicable standards of review and fails to explain how the trial court applied those standards.  II.
[brief] 23.  On March 13, 2023, counsel for [...] asked [...]’s counsel about the status of [...]’s motion against [...] for summary judgment and advised via voicemail that [...] intended to file opposition to such motion.  (PPCIa378-79).  24.  On the following day, March 14, 2023, counsel for [...], though having been made aware that [...] opposed [...]’s motion against [...] for summary judgment, contacted the court regarding the status of its motion.  25.  During a subsequent telephone conference that same day, counsel for [...] alerted counsel for [...] of his communication with the trial court.  (PPCIa378-79).  26.  That same afternoon, by letter dated March 14, 2023 to the trial court, counsel for [...] inquired whether the court had set a new return date for [...]’s summary judgment motion and informed the Court that [...] intended to file opposition to such motion.  (PPCIa366-67).  27.  The Court did not reply.  D.
[brief] **First**, breach of contract only occurs where “[a] party violates the terms of a contract by failing to fulfill a requirement enumerated in the agreement” itself.  See *Woytas v. Greenwood Tree* Experts, Inc., 237 N.J. 501, 512 (2019).  Once Plaintiff terminated the Contract, none of the other parties had any further obligations except for those specifically designated as “Termination Surviving Obligations” – none of which applied to [...].  Matter of Cty. of Atl., 230 N.J. 237, 254 (2017) (stating “contractual obligations will cease, in the ordinary course, upon termination” of the contract) (quoting Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 193 (1991)); 715 Partners, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. GS Assignment, Ltd. Liab. Co., No. A-2527-15T3, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1219, at *24 (App. Div. May 25, 2018) (“Once plaintiff caused the termination of the Agreement, . . . Seller was free to sell the Property to anyone”).
[brief] [...] next contends that the Project fails to meet groundwater recharge  \textsuperscript{12}  https://dep.nj.gov/stormwater/stormwater-manufactured-treatment-devices/wp-content/uploads/stormwater/mtd-pdfs/green-infrastructure/filterra_certification_2-17-2020.pdf requirements.  Groundwater recharge is “the amount of water from precipitation that infiltrates into the ground” beyond plants’ root zone to recharge the groundwater table.\textsuperscript{13}  Groundwater is key as both a source of potable water and for providing water to surface water bodies such as streams or ponds.  \textit{Ibid.}  However, development can impact recharge, particularly through impervious surface construction or underlying soil compaction.  \textit{Ibid.}  The Stormwater Management Rules require a permittee to demonstrate either that the site and its stormwater management measures maintain 100% of the average annual pre-construction groundwater recharge volume or show through a hydrologic and hydraulic analysis that the increase in stormwater runoff volume from pre-construction to post-construction for the two-year storm is infiltrated.
[brief] The Appellate Division noted that [...] testified at the hearing before the ALJ that throughout his career as a police officer, he received training and had actual experience in chasing and apprehending suspects, scaling fences and walls and surmounting obstacles.  During his police duties there were at least twenty-five occasions where he was required to jump down from a height of four feet or more.  *Id.*, at 2-3.  The Appellate Division stated that the incident which caused [...]’ injury “does not constitute unusual circumstances or anything beyond the normal course of the work he [[...]] was trained for and regularly performed as a police officer, nor did an outside influence force him from the fence while he pursued the suspect.  Although an incident may be ‘devastating’ to the applicant who has been injured, careful review of the governing case law makes clear an injury which culminated from a ‘sequence of events’ that were not ‘undesigned and unexpected’ will not suffice to establish an entitlement” to AD.  *Id.*, at 15.
[directive] Megan's Law notification required NOT of Child Protection and Permanency.  The court has Restrained from considered same in conjunction with this Juvenile  Obey household rules delinquency matter.  Other restriction(s)  Other page 2 of 3  Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #08-21 (4/7/2021), CN: 10812 (JD-07)  Juvenile Order of Disposition
[brief] (19T 14-12 to 18, 15-1 to 11).  For example, the PCR judge mistakenly found that defendant testified his trial attorney interviewed one of the alibi witnesses while neither the attorney nor the witness recalled any such pretrial meeting.  (19T 14-12 to 18).  A review of the record, though, reveals the PCR judge’s clearly erroneous interpretation of defendant’s testimony that served as an inappropriate basis for concluding defendant did not tell his trial attorney about the two alibi witnesses prior to defendant’s trial.  (18T 17-17 to 22, 20-25 to 21-3).  In addition, the PCR judge found that defendant did not testify the cellular telephone was on his person at the time of the shooting.  (19T 15-1 to 11).  Yet, [...], one of defendant’s alibi witnesses, recalled that defendant used his cellular telephone while he was at her [...] apartment around 1:00 a.m. on the night of the shooting.  (14T 51-17 to 21).  The digital forensic examiner corroborated that defendant’s cell phone records were consistent with the presence of his cellular telephone at [...]’s apartment complex during this time period.  (16T 62-19 to 23, 79-20 to 24).