ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Id. ¹ Tr.  Refers to the transcript from the trial court’s decision on the Borough’s motion for summary judgment, dated September 22, 2023.  [...] recognized that the water under the ground belongs to all citizens of the State, and the Borough is not acting as if it was a private corporation seeking to make a profit from the sale of water.  Pa946.  [...] found that the Supreme Court’s decision in *K.S.B. Tech. Sales Corp., v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n*, 75 N.J. 272 (1977), to be controlling.  Pa946.  Relying on that decision, [...] observed that when the Borough distributes water for its residents, it is not acting in a “proprietary” capacity, but rather as “a public body, politic and corporate, exercising public and essential government functions in the interest of the public health and welfare. ”  Id.  Thus, [...] found that there was no implied contract or proprietary relationship between [...] and the Borough to support [...]’s claims.  Pa953.  The court also agreed with the Borough that [...]’s Complaint read as a complaint for an implied warranty or a products liability claim.  Pa949.  [...] observed that [...]’s alleged contract-type claims were “nothing more than a mischaracterization of the nature of the complaint to avoid the well-established sovereign immunity afforded the municipality” for tort claims under the Tort Claims Act.  Id.  Moreover, the court ruled that to the extent [...] had a claim in equity for injunctive relief, that claim was rendered moot by the Borough’s Treatment System.  Id.  [...] had not contested the Borough’s arguments that installation of the Treatment System mooted his injunctive relief claims.  See generally, Tr.  The court held that its dismissal of the Complaint rendered [...]’s motion for class certification and the Third-Party Defendants’ motions to dismiss moot.  Pa953.  On February 1, 2024, [...] entered an Order: (1) granting the Borough’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing [...]’s Complaint in its entirety; (2) denying [...]’s motion to certify a class action; and (3) denying the Third-Party Defendants’ motions to dismiss as moot.  Pa931-54.
[brief] And despite the bald misrepresentation on Db11, it is a “standard business practice” to accept junk vehicles with no title at all, and even no paperwork at all (e.g. [...] only wants a key when they buy a junk car; see also Pa43-Pa54).  And again in this point heading, [...] deceptively interjects the word “proper” before the word “title” (i.e. disingenuously suggesting a problem with whose name was on the title), when the truth is revealed within his own brief - he himself admits that he had no problem with his client accepting the title “as is”, a title that was still in my mom’s name, as this was included in the mediation settlement agreement.  That is, [...] admits that even during mediation, after he himself became aware of the fact that the title was still in my mom’s name, this “newly learned” fact did not prevent him / his client from still accepting the car’s title as-is.  Instead, according to his own statement of facts, the only change that he wanted to make to our settlement agreement was that we would fax him the title.  (See Db9, where [...] states that after he learned that the title was still in my mom’s name, “the undersigned revised the offer on behalf of Respondent to make the $466 payment after receiving the title by fax”).  Thus, [...] therein indirectly admits that even he, a veteran attorney, did not have a problem with his client accepting the title “as-is” (i.e. even from his own point of view, the “as-is” title was sufficient for [...] to retain possession of the vehicle so as to sell parts from).
[brief] Note:  The Municipal trial court has yet to conduct their hearing on the decision.  The Superior Court denies the motion for stays citing the following two reasons: (1) defendant retains the presumption of innocence when you apply on de novo review via Municipal Court and (2)  Since the Superior Court found the defendant guilty, the likelihood of prevailing on the appeal is remote and the Court does not maintain her presumption of innocence and (3) she was excused on waiver of appearance \textsuperscript{37}  The defendant submitted Motion to Dismiss, lack of discovery, as well supporting documentation of her whereabouts from November 2-10 of 2021 [1T11:14-15 -11/29/2022] (2T20:19-23, 2T21:6-23, 2T22:2-3).  The Superior Court ends trial with fines, without imposing the suspended probation or jail sentence (2T22:21-25) and issued order finding defendant guilty on de novo review.
[brief] [...], a member of the Special Enforcement Team made up of plainclothes narcotics officers, was surveilling a parking lot that was specifically known for a high number of narcotics transactions.  (1T 6-2, 12-4 to 8, 12-9 to 16, 12-23 to 13-7)  During his surveillance, he saw what he believed to be “a narcotics transaction” by [...].  (1T 62-17 to 20)  He then saw the person he believed was the drug purchaser “bending over and . . . snorting drugs,” which “solidified” Taranto’s belief that there had been a drug transaction by [...].  (1T 69-2 to 11)  Because of his observations and belief that he had just seen [...] sell drugs, he contacted other SET members, told them he had witnessed this narcotics transaction, asked them to stop [...] when he came out of the grocery store, and gave a detailed description of Richard’s Jeep so the other officers could locate it.  (1T 21-10 to 14, 62-17 to 20, 76-1 to 10)  [...], having heard Taranto’s report of the drug transaction by [...], found [...]’s car and set up surveillance, where he waited for “several minutes but less than an hour. ”  (1T 76-6 to 13, 82-13 to 16)  When [...] returned to his car, MacRae told him that he was conducting a “narcotics-related investigation” and advised [...] of his Miranda rights.  (1T 76-15 to 25)  At that point, according to MacRae, [...] admitted that there was cocaine in the car.  (1T 77-18 to 20)  Here, as in Smart, the investigatory stop of [...] and the subsequent search of his car were “wholly connected” to the police’s prior surveillance and investigation, intended to capture people distributing drugs in this high-crime, high-narcotics parking lot.
[brief] Order And Opinion Denying Recusal, Dated June 29, 2023 ..........................Da378-79  Order And Opinion Denying Dismissal Or Rehearing, Dated July 14, 2023 .................................................................Da380-85  Order And Opinion Denying Reconsideration, Dated July 14, 2023 ...Da386-90 Amended Notice Of Appeal ................................................................................Da391-95 Certification Of [...] Re: Acquittal In State v. [...] ........................................................................Da396-98 Expert Report And Promis Gavel Record In State v. [...] ........................................................................Da399-426 Expert Report, Promis Gavel Record, And Certification Of [...] Re: State v. [...] ................................Da427-50 INDEX TO APPENDIX (cont’d) Training Program Outlines And Materials Regarding Litigating Eyewitness Identifications From 2006-2009 ......................Da451-63 Report From [...] .................................................................Da464-87 Prosecutor’s Directive AX-00634-14 “NJ Attorney Directive 2011-1 Retention Of Evidence” ................................................Da488-500  Prosecutor’s Directive PD-00495-12 “Property And Evidence Control” ........................................................................Da501-30  Prosecutor’s Directive PD-00077-98 “File Destruction Procedure” ...Da531-42 Letter From [...] To Appellate Counsel, Enclosing Letter From [...] ........................................................................Da543-45 Interoffice Memorandum From Appellate Counsel With Attachments ........................................................................Da546-49
[brief] Nevertheless, the process followed by the trial court in this matter was not in the interests of the parties to this case specifically or judicial efficiency generally, in that it generates duplicative, successive, costly, and potentially inconsistent litigation.  Ironically, plaintiffs’ counsel was correct in that, if the trial court was inclined to accept the legal position that Burt was undermined by Mejia, an adjournment of the trial was required.  That would have enabled [...] and [...] to be properly represented at trial, and [...] to accurately assess his trial strategy and potential exposure.  Plaintiffs’ counsel urged that the trial should be adjourned to allow for the trial to proceed in that fashion, and the trial court rejected the request, maintaining that the absence of those non-parties was not significant.  (3T41-3T42).  The trial court’s conclusion makes perfect sense if Burt was to be applied to the judgment in this case, as all parties expected given the trial court’s rulings.  Had he known in advance that Burt defendant status would be stripped from Drs. [...] and Nguyen, [...] obviously would have joined in plaintiffs’ counsel position that an adjournment was required for those parties to be rejoined and participate.  If his contribution rights were going to be implicated by the outcome of the trial, [...] was entitled to litigate all of the relevant issues in one proceeding, rather than be forced to “front” hundreds of thousands of dollars and suffer the uncertainty of litigation in a successive contribution action merely to assert his statutory rights.  This situation is a consequence of the plaintiffs’ failure to exercise due diligence and timely bring suit against Dr. [...], yet the process followed by the trial court punishes [...] with the burden and uncertainty of a second, redundant action.  Thus, the trial court should be reversed.  3.
[brief] Burlington County Indictment Number [...] charged [...] with two counts of third-degree burglary, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2a(1), which allegedly occurred on two separate dates.  (Da 1-2)  Trial began before the Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a jury on March 7, 2023.  (4T)  On March 15, [...] was convicted of all counts.  (7T 42-1 to 14; Da 3)  On May 1, 2023, [...] was sentenced to two concurrent terms of six years in prison with a two-year period of parole ineligibility.  (5T 13-16 to 22; Da 4-6)  A notice of appeal was filed on February 23, 2023.  (Da 7-9)  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.6(b).  The NJDEP specifically found that:  Peak flow rates have been reduced in accordance with N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.6(b)3.  The applicant has designed the stormwater management measures so that the post-construction peak runoff rates for the two-, 10-, and 100-year storm events are 50, 75, and 90 percent, respectively, of the pre-construction peak runoff rates.
[brief] There is no particularized right to navigation.  Instead, either navigation is prevented, or it is not, as a result of proposed development.  In its navigation argument, [...] pursues the same faulty logic advanced in Spalt, where appellant shell fishermen argued that their fundamental right to gainful employment was harmed because DEP approved a specific construction permit at a specific location, potentially preventing the shell fishermen from renewing their one-year shell fishing leaseholds at a particular site.
[brief] The Board decided that since [...] collected unemployment, he legally had a break in service that prohibited his re-enrollment in the pension system.  The issue of unemployment is completely a separate issue and should not have been considered when deciding if [...] temporary separation from the workplace was a break in service that would have caused him to be permanently removed from pension eligibility for his [...] position.  There is no law that supports this conclusion.  The best illustration of this is a consideration of how the various options provided in the [...] email would have affected his eligibility for unemployment benefits during the COVID19 crisis.  It is important to understand that regardless of the options chosen by the appellant, he would have been eligible for unemployment benefits at some point.  For example, if [...] was provided with a technically proper layoff notice, as required by the *New Jersey Administrative Code*, meeting the requirements of a layoff, he also would have been eligible for unemployment benefits.  *N.J.S.A. 43:21-19*.  In addition, under the unique circumstances of COVID19 emergency, if appellant had chosen to be on unpaid leave status due to the COVID19 closure, he would also have been eligible for unemployment benefits.  If he chose to use his sick and or vacation days, when they ran out, he would have been eligible for unemployment.
[brief] For these same reasons, the evidence was not clear and convincing.  [...] cannot state whether there is a connection between the presence of BZE and Defendant’s alleged status of intoxication.  However qualified [...] may be, her testimony could not be clear and convincing evidence of Defendant’s intoxication when she could not state how substantial the exposure was to the purported cocaine; when in fact the cocaine exposure occurred; or even whether the exposure impaired Defendant’s ability to operate a motor vehicle on June 4, 2019.  As such [...]’s testimony as to the defendant’s alleged cocaine exposure was not clear and convincing evidence, and it was properly excluded.
[brief] D.  [...]’s NJLAD Aiding and Abetting Claim was Both Legally and Factually Deficient.  Individual liability is established under the NJLAD solely through the aiding and abetting provision and only if the subject individual engages in active and purposeful conduct violative of NJLAD.  See N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e); see also Herman v. Coastal Corp., 348 N.J. Super. 1, 27 (App. Div. 2002); Cicchetti v. Morris County Sheriff’s Office, 194 N.J. 563, 594 (2008); Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70, 84 (2004).  Here, the Individual State Respondents were properly dismissed at summary judgment because [...] failed to establish that any of them engaged in active and purposeful conduct that constituted discrimination, harassment, and/or retaliation.  (Da62-Da108).  Consequently, the trial court’s order dismissing the Individual State Respondents on reconsideration should be affirmed.
[brief] Lewis, supra, 155 N.J. at 560.  The question of whether a defect exists requires consideration of numerous factors encompassed by the risk-utility standard.  They include whether the manufacturer acted as a reasonably prudent person by designing the item as he did and by placing it on the market in that condition and whether he should have incorporated an alternative design, e.g., to incorporate available safety features.  See Soler, supra, 98 N.J. at 146; Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 97 N.J. 429, 451 (1984).
[brief] See *Geller v. N.J. Dep't of Treasury, Div. of Pensions & Annuity Fund*, 53 N.J. 591, 597-98 (1969)); *Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg'l High Sch. Dist.*, 199 N.J. 14, 34 (2009).  The appeal relies on the holding of *Richardson v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System*, 192 N.J. 189 (2007).  In *Richardson*, the Court clarified the meaning of the term "traumatic event," and set forth a five-pronged [3A-1611-16T1] standard mandating that a pension system member seeking accidental disability benefits must prove.
[brief] “The FAA constitutes the supreme law of the land regarding arbitration,” and state laws that conflict with it are preempted.  *Goffe*, 238 N.J. at 207.  The FAA requires, among other things, that arbitration contracts be placed on “equal footing with all other contracts. ”  *Kindred Nursing*, 581 U.S. at 248.  State laws that “single[ ] out arbitration agreements for disfavored treatment” are preempted.
[brief] Assuming, arguendo, the trial judge did not err in overlooking the glaring problems with [...]’s testimony, her decision denying suppression must still be reversed, because the State’s evidence still fell short of reasonable suspicion.  In other words, even if [...]’s supplemental report had been produced in a timely fashion and had confirmed [...]’s claims that the C.I. told [...] about the fanny pack and that the C.I. had a 75-percent rate of reliability, the totality of the circumstances did not sufficiently establish the informant’s veracity or basis of knowledge.  Alternatively, the trial judge erred in denying [...]’s motion for reconsideration, because, at that point, it was known to the judge that [...]’s supplemental report did not confirm [...]’s claims regarding the fanny pack or the C.I.’s rate of reliability.
[brief] Moreover, notwithstanding an abundance of time in which to do so, the Objectors elected not to introduce any type of expert testimony from a licensed professional planner or otherwise during the course of the hearings before the ZBA.  (Pa627).  Instead, the Objectors themselves (neighbors residing 260’ from the existing and proposed “non-contributing” structure) were the only witnesses.  (Pa627; Pa503).  As such, Objectors made no record upon which to adjudge any alleged negative impact on their homes – both of which are likewise, admittedly, “non-contributing” to the Monmouth Hills District themselves.  (Pb9).  Therefore, there is no colorable due process argument upon which to premise the requested extension of time.  Similarly, the Trial Court found that the Objectors’ desire to frustrate the Homeowners from making the approved home improvements were private not public concerns.  (Pa852).  Again, the Trial Court’s findings were correct and should not be disturbed.  The Objectors are private home owners. (Pa101; Pa651; Pa702).  Though the Objectors attempt to create some type of general public interest in the preservation of historic districts, the Objectors cite no legal authority.  (Pb20-21).  And, this argument falls flat when one considers that the Homeowners existing home is recognized as “non-contributing” to the district in the National Register of Historic Places Registration Form and that the Objectors home are not original to the district of contributing.  (Pa552; Pb9).  Furthermore, the Objectors also readily admitted, and continue to admit, that, “[...] are the only two homes situated directly across the street from the rear of the Subject Structure, and whose occupants would be the only residents in the surrounding area impacted .  . . .” (Pb10).  That statement alone demonstrates that this is a purely private (not public) interest matter because the Objectors concede that the proposed improvements will not impact other homeowners.  (Pb10).  Objectors’ admissions that none of the parties’ homes are original to the district and that no other homeowners would be impacted by the home improvements make the conclusion that this is a purely private issue inescapable.  Since this is a private issue, there is no public interest basis upon which to premise the requested extension of time.
[brief] On December 1, 2018, Plaintiff-Respondent, [...], was in line at a [...] drive-thru in [...] (Da2; 2T, at 23:15-19).  While Plaintiff was waiting at the last window to get his food, he was forcefully struck in the rear by the vehicle behind him (2T, at 25:24-27:25).  Despite having his foot on the brake, Plaintiff’s vehicle was pushed forward, then struck two more times as it was barreled through the drive-thru (2T, at 27:16-28:8).  Immediately after the impact, Plaintiff felt discomfort, pain, and a sensation that “something was dislocated.
[directive] 9  (c) the officer is conducting a motorist aid or community caretaking check; (d) the officer is interviewing a witness in the course of investigating a criminal offense; (e) the officer is conducting a custodial interrogation of a suspect, unless the interrogation is otherwise being recorded in accordance with Rule 3:17 (electronic recordation of station house interrogations); (f) the officer is making an arrest; (g) the officer is conducting a protective frisk for weapons; (h) the officer is conducting any kind of search (consensual or otherwise); (i) the officer is engaged in a police response to any type of civil disorder in circumstances where the officer is engaged with or in the presence of civilians and the officer or any other officer on the scene may be required to employ constructive authority or force; (j) the officer uses constructive authority or force, or reasonably believes that constructive authority or force may be used in any encounter or situation not otherwise listed in this subsection based on specific and articulable facts warranting heightened caution that are documented by narration on the recording and/or in any investigation or incident report;3 (k) the officer is transporting an arrestee to a police station, county jail, or other place of confinement, or a hospital or other medical care or mental health facility; or (l) the officer reasonably believes that any other officer on the scene has undertaken or is engaged in any of the foregoing police actions/activities.  5.3  Continuous Recording Pending Completion of Encounter.  To ensure that the entire encounter/event/episode is recorded, in accordance with this Policy and the law, a BWC should be activated before a uniformed officer arrives at the scene of a dispatched call for service or other police activity listed in Section 5.2.  See also note 1.  However, the officer need not begin recording at the moment he or she receives instructions from a dispatcher  When circumstances necessitating the use of constructive authority or force arise suddenly during the 3 course of swiftly-developing events, it may not be safe and practicable for an officer to activate a BWC before employing constructive authority or force.  Nothing in this Policy should be construed or applied in a manner that jeopardizes officer safety by distracting the officer’s attention from the immediate need to use such constructive authority or force.
[brief] (Pa31-Pa32; Pa33-34; Pa36)  However, according to Plaintiff, she was not shown a video capturing the moment of impact in which she was struck by the U-boat, she never saw herself on video footage, and that the employee only looked at footage when [...] turned and went down the aisle to the point where the U-boat had eventually stopped.  (Pa33-Pa34)  [...] (“[...]”), who was assistant store manager at the Hackensack [...] location from January 2018 until January 2020, including at the time of Plaintiff’s accident, estimated that the Hackensack store had approximately 20 to 30 different surveillance camera locations throughout the store.
[brief] It is axiomatic that the official acts of judicial bodies are memorialized in writing.  Indeed, court orders may only be carried out if they are written.  This fundamental notion pervades the New Jersey Rules of Court, which impose innumerable requirements on judges and clerks to accept, reject, and issue various documents.  This is particularly important at the conclusion of a criminal case, when the rights to appeal or expunge ripen.  New Jersey’s final judgment rule embodies this essential and well-settled principle.  “... appeals are taken from orders and judgments and not from opinions, oral decisions, informal written decisions . . .” (quoting *Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway*, 168 N.J. 191, 199 (2001).  . .  “The written conclusions or opinion of a court do not have the effect of a judgment.  From them no appeal will lie.  It is only what a court adjudicates, not what it says in an opinion, that has any direct legal effect. ” (quoting *Isko v. Planning Bd.*, 51, N.J. 162, 175 (1968) and *Suburban Dep’t Stores v. City of East Orange*, 47 N.J. Super. 472, 479 (App. Div. 1957).  *Hayes v. Delamotte*, 231 N.J. 373, 387 (2018).