ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] made a strategic decision to not hire an expert after discussions with defendant.  (14T29-14 to 19; 14T32-23 to 33-4).  Defendant failed to present any evidence to overcome the “strong presumption” that [...]’s decision was professionally sound.  Pierre, 233 N.J. at 578-79 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
[directive] (a)  Investigative report.  The first part of the report will be an objective recounting of all the relevant information the investigation disclosed, including statements, documents and other evidence.  This part of the report is similar in all respects to a standard law enforcement investigative report, and should contain a complete account of the investigation.  (b)  Summary and Conclusions.  The investigator should summarize the case and provide conclusions of fact for each allegation.  These conclusions of fact should be recorded as exonerated, sustained, not sustained or unfounded.  9.1.2
[brief] In the Matter of the Application of the [...], Docket No. [...] ........................................................Da1 [...]’s Third Round Conditional Judgment of Compliance and Repose, dated January 10, 2018 ........................................Da42 Global Settlement Agreement between the [...] and the Developers in the Third Round Plan, dated June 24, 2019 ..........Da49 [...]’s Final Amended Third Round Judgment of Compliance and Repose without Conditions, dated September 27, 2019 .........................................................Da67 [...] Committee Resolution No. 17-376 Recommending Adoption of the Redevelopment Plan, adopted November 27, 2017 ......................................................Da75 [...] Ordinance No. 17-1669 Adopting the Redevelopment Plan, adopted November 27, 2017 .........................Da78 Redevelopment Plan, dated November 27, 2017 .............................Da80 Scotch Road- South/ East Village Redevelopment Agreement, dated July 25, 2019  ................................................................Da114  Scotch Road- North Village Redevelopment Agreement, dated July 25, 2019  ................................................................Da174  Complaint filed by [...], [...], and [...], Against [...], filed January 10, 2020........................................Da234  [...] Litigation Settlement Agreement, dated December 29, 2021 .......Da334
[brief] Compare (Ra24; Da55) with (Ra36 at 0:00:15 to 0:00:23; Ra33 to 34); Compare (Ra24; Ra38 at 0:00:11 to 0:00:22) with (Cma2).  Opening the door to the third floor would reveal stairs, ascending on the left side of the property.  (Da55).  The motion judge found that the door to the third floor was closed when the police encountered it.  (Da27).  When the kitchen door had been first encountered, the officers “held there” for a moment, called over the squad leader, and waited to proceed further.
[brief] 253 N.J. at 317.  The Court described the needed improvements and stated, “Those conditions are not uncommon in many older buildings in the State….And none present code violations or pose a hazard, including the presence of capped asbestos. ”  *Id.*).  On the issue of whether the library was detrimental to the community welfare or safety, the Court again found insufficient evidence.  *Id.* at 323.  The Court determined that, while the library could potentially provide more services to the community if it were renovated, this fact was insufficient to establish that the library was causing actual harm to the Township as needed to meet the criteria of subsection (d).  *Id.* at 319-23.
[brief] The granting of summary judgment was improper and must be reversed because the court below decided a genuine issue of material fact in entering a summary judgment.  The court’s entire analysis of why the Ordinance was invalid was that the proposed route through [...] was essential to the provision of adequate electrical service by [...].  The record showed undisputedly that there were other feasible routes the line could take that would not be prohibited by the Ordinance.  By basing its ruling upon its resolution of a genuinely disputed material fact, the lower court’s ruling ran afoul of the requirements for and prohibitions on granting summary judgment, and must be reversed.
[brief] A.  The “compensatory” damages sought by [...] relate to the payment of PIP benefits under the No-Fault Law.  The No-Fault Law expressly requires “[a]ny dispute regarding the recovery of” PIP benefits to be submitted to arbitration.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a) (emphasis added).  “[T]he word ‘dispute’ is unqualified” in the statute and thus encompasses entitlement to PIP benefits under the statute.  *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Molino*, 289 N.J. Super. 406, 410 (App. Div. 1996)  “[T]he language of [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1] should be read as broadly as the words themselves indicate. ”  *State Farm Ins. Co. v. Sabato*, 337 N.J. Super. 393, 396 (App. Div. 2001).  Insurers, therefore, are “not empowered” to avoid the arbitration mandate merely “by characterizing PIP disputes” in a certain way to be able to seek resolution in court. ”  *Id.* at 396-97 (quoting *Molino*, 289 N.J. Super. at 411).
[brief] The Trial Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Reconsider and Reverse the March 22, 2024 Stay Order Because Jurisdiction Was Vested in the Arbitrators (Da080; Da084; Da162-Da163; 2T19:16-22:14)  Once the trial court stayed the Estate’s survivor action in favor of arbitration on March 22, 2024, the court was no longer vested with authority to reconsider issues of enforceability.  Section 2A:23B-6 of the New Jersey Arbitration Act provides:  a.  An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract.  b.  The court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.  c.  An arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrability has been fulfilled and whether a contract containing a valid agreement to arbitrate is enforceable [emphasis added].  d.  If a party to a judicial proceeding challenges the existence of, or claims that a controversy is not subject to, an agreement to arbitrate, the arbitration proceeding may continue pending final resolution of the issue by the court, unless the court otherwise orders.  The Court in Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191, 195 (2019) noted that “clear rulings from the United States Supreme Court that bind state and federal courts do not permit threshold issues about overall contract validity to be resolved by the courts when the arbitration agreement itself is not specifically challenged”:  Plaintiffs do not dispute the validity of the arbitration agreement itself nor do they dispute the delegation provision within it that delegates the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator.  They have not attacked the language or clarity of the arbitration agreement or its delegation clause.  Ibid.  Such is the case here.  As discussed above, when the validity of the contract itself is unchallenged, Paragraph 1 of the Arbitration Agreement specifically delegates authority to decide “any unresolvable disagreement between the parties including disputes over contract terms …” to the Arbitration Panel.  (Da004).  As such, the second trial court’s analysis of issues related unconscionability go to the enforceability of the contract which is to be determined by the arbitrator pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6.  Accordingly, the [...] submit that the arbitration panel alone had the sole authority to determine issues of enforceability, particularly where, as here, the Estate’s survivorship claims had already been stayed and referred by the trial court to arbitration.
[directive] The supervisor shall document any and all specified suspicious circumstances for which disclosure of personal identifying information is pre-approved if those suspicious circumstances are revealed by authorized crime trend analysis.  When an automated crime trend analysis computer program is used, specified suspicious circumstances that would warrant further investigation and that would justify disclosure of personal identifying information to an authorized user under this Section may also be pre-approved by a designated supervisor and built into the computer program so that if the program identifies the existence of the pre-determined suspicious circumstances, it will automatically alert the authorized user of the suspicious activity and provide to him or her the relevant personal identifying information in accordance with the "specific and articulable facts that warrant further investigation"standard of proof established in this Section; or 2)
[brief] (5T21-6 to 15).  These findings are supported by [...]’s testimony that defendant was never abused, did not feel that he was subjected to “excessive corporal punishment[,]” and that his “need for affiliation, to be accepted by a group…” was common in all adolescents.  See (3T47-4 to 51-7; 4T62-1 to 64-4).  As for the third Miller factor, the circumstances of the offense including defendant’s role and whether any familial and peer pressures may have affected him, [...] opined that defendant reacted “impulsively” to an emotionally charged situation and his peers influenced his decision-making capacity that night.
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum B | April 2022  Vehicular Pursuit Policy shall observe the applicable laws governing the right of way at intersections and other locations.  5.9  Officers involved in a pursuit shall not engage in vehicle paralleling.  5.10  There shall be no street paralleling along the route unless the pursuit passes through a patrol’s assigned area.  A patrol that is parallel-street-pursuing shall not join or interfere with a pursuit and shall stop all pursuit-related activity at the boundary of its assigned area.  5.11  Boxing-in or heading-off a violator’s moving vehicle is permitted only under extraordinary circumstances.  These tactics substantially increase the risk inherent in the pursuit and shall only be employed: (a) at low speeds; and (b) with the approval of a supervisor; or (c) in response to an imminent threat to the safety of the public or a police officer.  5.12  Roadblocks must only be employed as a last resort in circumstances where deadly force would otherwise be justified.
[brief] The reformation of the revenue sharing calculation in the Redevelopment Agreement (almost twenty (20) years after its inception), while leaving $1 per year, ninety-nine (99) year lease of the land underlying the [...] Mall in place is antithetical to the basis of the bargain between the parties and provides [...] with a much better deal than they themselves negotiated.  In or around June 2009, [...] completed construction of the [...] Mall.  Pursuant to the project schedule set forth in the Redevelopment Agreement, [...] was required to (i) commence construction of the Residential Project upon completion of the [...] Mall, and (ii) commence construction of the Office/Retail Component upon completion of the Project Garage.  Da152-Da153.  [...] never moved forward with construction of the Office/Retail Component or Residential Component.  In addition to the three Project components to be constructed by [...], the Redevelopment Agreement further provided for the construction and operation by the Authority of an above-ground parking facility to address additional parking demand that would be generated by the [...] Mall, the Office/Retail Component and the Residential Component (the “Authority Garage”).  Da165.  Pursuant to the project schedule set forth in the Redevelopment Agreement, the Authority was required to commence construction of the Authority Garage upon completion of the Project Garage.  Da152.  Existing economic conditions in 2007 and 2008 impacted the viability of the Residential and Office/Retail Components and Authority Garage.  3T:7:11- 8:3.  Pursuant to Section 8.7 of the Redevelopment Agreement, the Authority and [...] acknowledged that the consent of [...]  (“[...],” now known as [...] and referred to herein as “[...]”), the third-party insurer of the Authority’s outstanding parking revenue bonds, was required as an express condition precedent prior to undertaking any action or issuing any additional obligations to finance the construction of the Authority Garage.  Da111-Da112.  On May 11, 2012, the Authority, the City and [...] amended the Redevelopment Agreement to permit a supermarket use as part of the [...] Mall and to develop the terms and conditions of the parking validation system for the Project Garage (the “Amended RDA”).  Da352-Da360.  Alternate proposals for the Residential Component, the Office/Retail Component and the Authority Garage were not referenced in the Amended RDA.  Da353-Da355.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] (90a, 88:20-24 and 89:4-19).  $42,123.79 was sent for “payoff of first mortgage loan #Tax Lien Cert. 16-00020 to [...]. ” (272a, line 504).  This disbursement cleared the pending foreclosure action (276a).  The foreclosure had developed to the stage where the foreclosing plaintiff had obtained an order setting a date, time, and place for redemption (291a).  It also cleared a notice of lis pendens for the tax foreclosure (364a) and a tax sale certificate (361a).  Noticeably missing from the closing documents is a deed transferring the property from [...] to plaintiff, [...].
[brief] Libel Per Se  The elements of defamation are: (1) the assertion of a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) the unprivileged publication of that statement to a third party; and (3) fault amounting at least to negligence by the publisher.  Leang v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 198 N.J. 557, 585 (2009) (quoting DeAngelis v. Hill, 180 N.J. 1, 13 (2004)).  Defamation per se exists when one falsely accuses another of having committed a criminal offense.  Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 413 N.J. Super. 135, 167 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting McLaughlin v. Rosanio, Bailets & Talamo, Inc., 331 N.J. Super. 303, 313-14 (App. Div. 2000)).  A showing of damages is not required if the writing is libelous per se. MacKay v. CSK Pub. Co., 300 N.J. Super. 599, 616 (App. Div. 1997).
[brief] At its core, [...] argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Techdan, which held that the CNA applies to IFPA claims, also simultaneously made joint representation by one law firm of multiple defendants in IFPA cases a per se concurrent conflict and violation of RPC 1.7(a)(1).  Pb14.  Not so.  Long before Techdan, it was settled that “the CNA governs a broad range of civil actions,” such as negligence, products liability, malpractice, strict liability, consumer fraud, fraud, and other intentional torts.  Techdan, 253 N.J. at 106-08; see also N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2(c) (defining “negligence actions” under the CNA to include a much broader list of cause of action and case types).  But there has never been a per se prohibition under RPC 1.7(a)(1)—or (a)(2) for that matter—on joint representation of defendants in cases falling within the CNA’s purview, except for joint representation of a driver and passenger in car accident cases unless liability is undisputed.
[brief] An Amended Order was entered July 15, 2016 (Da218) an Amended Order on July 25, 2016.  (Da220), and a Second Amended Order on August 16, 2016 (Da170) which ordered that an “easement” for parking was valid and that [...] is entitled to reconnect its HVAC system to the boiler room and water cooling tower on Defendant’s property.  In a Case Management Order dated September 6, 2016, the Court set a trial date to "determine issues regarding parking and utilization of the Fifth Street and Sixth Street parking lots and other issues."
[brief] The July 13, 2021 5 Counts 309 Paragraphs  Hybrid Prerogative Writ/Declaratory Judgment/Civil Rights Act Violations Complaint  On Tuesday July 13, 2021, plaintiff filed a 5 counts 309 paragraphs hybrid prerogative writ/declaratory judgment/civil rights act violations test case complaint.  (Pa1-Compl; Pa219-SJCS #9).  Plaintiff sought compensatory, declaratory and injunctive relief.  In his hybrid complaint, plaintiff challenged the unilateral (without any public input) January 5, 2021 change in policy and procedure suppressing plaintiff’s right to be heard on any posted agenda action items until after consideration and official action.  Plaintiff also sought to invalidate a certain $855,000 Flex Parking Removal/911 Memorial Capital Bond Ordinance 2579-21 adopted June 15, 2021.  (Pa191).  Plaintiff questioned whether Mayor [...] (due to the location of her business within the one block limited Millburn Avenue flex parking removal area) had a *per se* disqualifying conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety on all flex parking removal related matters.  Plaintiff also questioned whether [...] had broken her promise not to use taxpayers' trust fund monies to pay for her “pet” 911 Memorial Project.  In addition, plaintiff sought nominal monetary damages arising from a prepared pre-consent agenda retaliatory, defamatory, smearing, “gaslighting” and impugning statement read by Mayor Prupis with the tacit consent of all defendants.  (Pa188, Pa198).  Plaintiff captioned his 5 Counts as follows:  Count One-Voiding $855,000  Capital Improvement Bond Ordinance 2579-21  Adopted June 15, 2021  Count Two-Impairment of our Robust Marketplace of Competing Ideas and Violations of Our State Public Policies  In favor of Open Transparent Accountable Local Representative Democratic Government Count Three-Failure to Supervise Count Four-State Created Danger Count Five-New Jersey Civil Rights Act Violations (Pa326-DSJCSR #11).  In his hybrid test case complaint, plaintiff explicitly set forth the following repetitive issues of public importance:  (1)  Whether the 200 feet municipal land use per se conflict of interest and the Local Government Ethics Law prohibited Mayor [...] from participating in any matter involving the public funding of the flex parking removal in front of her place of business?  . . .  (3)  Whether the public has a constitutional, statutory and common law right to be heard prior to consideration and official action on any agenda action item involving the expenditure of taxpayers' trust fund monies? and (4)  Whether local elected officials have a constitutional, statutory and common law duty to respond to pertinent second reading public hearing written and oral questions prior to consideration and official action on a discretionary legislative ordinance?  (Pa1-Compl #14; Pa219-SJCS #11).  The First Cursory CRA Violations Notice Response Letter
[brief] (Pa31)  The Notice is in fact deceptive, misleading and incomplete.  The Notice states that the purpose of the hearing is for a “use variance. ”  It reads in pertinent part:  The applicant is requesting a use variance to allow an accessory structure larger than the principle use on the property, along --- \(^8\)  The purpose of the notice requirement is to adequately apprise the public of “the date, time and place of the hearing, the nature of the matters to be considered and, in the case of notices pursuant to subsection 7.1 of this act, an identification of the property proposed for development by street address, if any, or by reference to lot and block numbers as shown on the current tax duplicate in the municipal tax assessor’s office, and the location and times at which any maps and documents for which approval is sought are available pursuant to subsection 6b.
[brief] As just explained above, there is no proof that a City took any action with respect to the subject tree or nearby sidewalk.  Furthermore, as noted above, Plaintiff must prove the public entity either knew about the employee taking the action or the condition itself in order to assess whether the public entity’s response was palpably unreasonable.  See Claims Against Public Entities, at x. (“... even though a claimant may succeed in proving ... a dangerous condition, proximate cause, foreseeable risk, knowledge (actual or constructive) of a dangerous condition or creation of the condition by a public employee and that the entity’s action or failure to act was palpably unreasonable, the entity may nevertheless be immune .  . . .”).  To prevail on the “notice” issue, a claimant must prove that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the existence of the condition at issue, as well as the fact that the condition itself was dangerous.  See N.J.S.A. 59:4-3.  Notice to a public entity may exist when the alleged dangerous condition has been the site of previous accidents.  See e.g. Wymbs v. Wayne Tp., 163 N.J. 523, 536-37 (200).  It may also exist when complaints have been made by people to the public entity about the specific condition prior to the subject accident.  See e.g. Norris v. Leonia Bor., 160 N.J. 427, 447 (1999).  However, when a claimant cannot establish that a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the condition at issue and its dangerous character, summary judgment in favor of the municipality is warranted.  Id. 447-48 (citing cases).  Here, the record is devoid of any evidence that the City was aware of any issue with the subject tree.  The City has demonstrated that the subject tree looked perfectly healthy to all outward appearances.  [...] had no knowledge of any issue with the tree before it fell, and he supervised the unit within the DPW that handled tree issues.  [...] testified the DPW’s electronic database for work orders, and it did not reflect any prior work done to the tree.  [...] certified he thoroughly searched DPW records and found no record the City was ever notified of any issues with the tree before it fell.  [...] also certified the City never received a Tort Claims Notice or a lawsuit about the tree before this lawsuit.  Thus, the City was not on notice of any problems with the tree, and Plaintiff has no evidence to the contrary.  See Wilson v. Jacobs, 334 N.J. Super. 640 (App. Div. 2000) (the mere happening of an accident on public property is insufficient to impose liability on a public entity; the motion judge correctly “emphasized that the plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence by way of answers to interrogatories, deposition testimony, or certifications that defendant [municipality] had either actual or constructive notice of the alleged sidewalk defect”).  Accordingly, dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims as to the City is the only just solution.  See N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, -3.6 iii.
[brief] Surveying nationwide decisions, the court held that the “Bodily Consumption Exception excepts from the Bacteria Exclusion *bodily injury or losses* caused by ‘bacteria that are, are on, or are contained in, a good or product intended for bodily consumption. ’”  *Ibid.* (emphasis added).  Since the pleadings did not allege that bacteria was in or on a good intended for bodily consumption “*and then actually consumed by [...],*” there was “simply nothing in the Amended Complaint that could reasonably have placed [...]’ claim within the Bodily Consumption Exception without exercising ‘an unacceptable degree of imagination. ’”  *Id.* at 866 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  *[...]* and the myriad decisions interpreting the Consumption Exception require a claimant to allege an injury caused by consumption of fungi or bacteria that are, are in, or are on an edible good or product intended for human consumption to obtain a defense and to prove such an injury to obtain indemnity.