ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Despite the fact that the result in [...]’s case is controlled by Smart, the State attempts to invoke policy considerations by arguing that the motion court’s reasoning (1) “places an undue burden on the ‘investigatory demands of law enforcement;’” (2) “discounts the dangerousness of the situation;” and (3) “applied to similar future circumstances would require law enforcement officers to ‘jump the gun. ’” (Pb16-18) (quoting Witt, 223 N.J. at 447).  In support of these ominous portents the State cites the same single sentence from the motion court’s decision that it misunderstood earlier: “Had the officers approached the vehicle when they first observed the hand to hand transaction, it could have been considered unforeseen and spontaneous. ”  (Pb16; 2T 20-13 to 16)  But the motion court was not arguing that the police should have approached [...]’s vehicle after the first transaction; the court was simply recognizing that under the circumstances of the lengthy two hour surveillance in this case, the police could have and should have gotten a warrant.
[brief] (Sb38)  The alleged error in A.R. was that the jury was given unfettered access to take into the jury room and replay unsupervised the video of defendant’s statement that had been admitted into evidence.  Id. at 552.  The Court noted that while this procedure did not comport with the Court’s prior precedent, this procedural impropriety “simply did not implicate either defendant's right to confront evidence or witnesses against him or to assure a fair trial process. ”  Id. at 559.  And the Court found that any error was invited because “defense counsel actively encouraged the jury to review the video-recorded statements and urged the trial court to submit the video recordings to the jury. ”  Id. at 561.  In this case, conversely, defense counsel neither requested that [...]’s testimony be admitted nor encouraged the jury to consider [...]’s testimony as evidence of Defendant’s innocence.  Notwithstanding the State’s attempt to mischaracterize defense counsel’s reference to [...]’s testimony in closing as “strategic,” defense counsel’s statements were clearly an attempt to minimize the prejudice from [...]’s testimony—not a strategic use of [...]’s testimony to further the defense theory.  Moreover, the Supreme Court has very carefully defined invited error as occurring only “when a defendant asks the court to take his proffered approach and the court does so. ”  State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 358 (2004)  (emphasis added)  The State, not defense counsel, was clearly the proponent of [...]’s testimony in this case, arguing for its admissibility.  Defense counsel objected to the admission of this testimony on March 4, 2020, although she later acquiesced on March 5.  (18T27-20 to 23; 21T 16-20 to 16-22)  But at no point did defense counsel ask or invite the court to admit [...]’s testimony.  The doctrine of invited error is clearly inapplicable.
[directive] Under the revised la\\:, to grant an expungement the court must find in "its discretion compelling circumstances that exist to grant the expungement."  N.J.S.A. 2C:52- 2(a)(2) (emphasis added).  The amended statute further provides:  In determining whether compelling circumstances exist of of for the purposes paragraph (1) this subsection, a court of may consider the amount any court-ordered financial of assessment imposed, the person's age at the time the offense or offenses, the person's financial condition and other relevant circumstances regarding the person's ability to pay.  of Page 2 5  In replacing the "public interest" standard with the "compelling circumstances" test, and specifically removing any reference to the nature of the offense and instead defining "compelling circumstances" to include fines, the age of defendant, and their ability to pay, the Legislature eliminated any expungement requirements associated with the public interest standard.  That includes the requirement to provide transcripts and presentence reports set forth in Kollman, which was specifically related to the then-existing public interest standard.  See Kollman, 210 N.J. at 577 ("To assist the court in its evaluation of the public-interest (emphasis added)).  prong ...  "
[brief] 2.  The Court correctly pointed out that it is well settled that a local municipality may regulate “on-premises” versus “on-premises” signage because it has the substantial government interest in traffic safety.  Plaintiff’s argument that *E & J Equities* “invalidated” traffic safety as a substantial government interest is a blatant misrepresentation.  The Court in *E & J Equities* actually stated the exact opposite: that traffic safety is a well-settled substantial government interest but, when adopting a new ordinance restricting speech, a municipality must still develop a proper evidential record to demonstrate the applicability of that substantial government interests.  Indeed, the Court in *E & J Equities* explicitly stated, “[t]he interests of aesthetics and safety upon which the Township relies have long been recognized as legitimate and substantial government interests related to billboards” but simply found that, “a more robust factual record in support of government interest” was necessarily.  *E & J Equities*, *supra*, at 556.  Thus, Plaintiff is simply misrepresenting *E & J Equities* in arguing that it somehow invalidated traffic safety as a viable substantial government interest.  3.
[directive] Law Enforcement  Chief Executives should designate an individual within their agency who is charged with the responsibility of knowing or checking up on the location and status of the property in custody.  The designated officer should check on the status of prosecution for the particular case and obtain permission to return the property.  J.  Where applicable and upon verbal or written request, accident reports and autopsy reports shall be made available to the victim (or in the case of death, the victim's next of kin) as soon as these reports become available.(7)  1.  Disclosure of records in juvenile cases are to be made pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-60 et seq.  III.  PROTECTION  A.  Appropriate attention shall be given to investigating victim reports of threats or intimidation and these reports shall be promptly forwarded to the County Prosecutor's Office.  1.  Victims and witnesses should be encouraged to report any incident of intimidation and harassment.  2.  Victims should be informed of potential responses to intimidation including bail revocation, restraining orders, additional charges and the availability of an escort to court.  3.  When applicable, restraining orders should be sought as a condition of bail and prepared with the complaint.  COMMENTARY
[brief] This matter involves a challenge to a Redevelopment Plan, and amendments to same, adopted two and a half years after the subject property was designated as an “area in need of rehabilitation. ”  As they did before the trial court, Plaintiffs imagine a municipal legislative process shrouded in secrecy.  The portrayal is pure invention.  As found by the trial court, and as evidenced in the record, the redevelopment of the former [...] was a matter of community interest for over two (2) years, and discussed at no less than twenty-four meetings of the [...], as well as three [...] meetings.  These include three (3) special meetings scheduled solely for discussion of the proposed Redevelopment: March 18, 2021, August 3, 2022, and September 8, 2022.  (See, Pa247, List of Meetings where warehouse Redevelopment at former [...] was discussed.  The Minutes can be viewed on the Township’s website at: [...]; however, the relevant portions of the March 18, 2021, August 3, 2022 and September 8, 2022, Minutes are included at Pa249-Pa266.
[brief] ”  Moreover, telling jurors the State had a superior interest in holding [...] accountable, compared to his co-defendant, conveyed the prosecutor’s personal belief in his culpability and implied that there was, in turn, a special state interest in convicting him.  The prosecutor furthermore tied this unfair commentary to the most provocative theme of the case: that [...], a 68-year-old man, deceived [...], a 19-year-old girl, into using fentanyl instead of heroin in order to keep her hooked on drugs.  The assistant prosecutor suggested [...] had done so to keep her in his company:  “[W]hat’s a 19 year old girl doing hanging out with a 65 year old man?  He’s her meal ticket. ”  (4T 27-22 to 28-1)  In opening and closing, the prosecutor urged jurors to convict “the guy who helped feed his codefendant’s addiction” and told them “he was feeding the 19-year-old Jasmine [...] what she believed to be heroin, which is a schedule two narcotic, pure fentanyl.  . . .  Jasmine was smoking this thinking she was smoking heroin. ”  (4T 29-3 to 4; 5T 49-17 to 19; 49-24 to 25)  By encouraging the jury to view [...] as a bad person, the State encouraged conviction based on outrage rather than on the facts.  This denied [...] a fair trial and requires reversal of his convictions.
[brief] PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE THEIR CONVERSION CLAIMS ([...]) ..................................................  46  A.  Plaintiffs Failed To Prove The Money That Was Allegedly Converted “Belonged” To Them And Was “Identifiable. ”  ...........................................  47  B.  The Economic Loss Doctrine Prohibits The Recovery In A Tort Action Of Economic Losses Arising Out Of A Breach Of Contract ...........................................  50  C.  Plaintiffs Failed To Prove The Elements Of Demand And Repudiation Essential To A Conversion Claim ...........................................  51  POINT IV  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT TO PRESENT  NET OPINION  TESTIMONY AT TRIAL (1T51:21-56:22)  ..................................................  54  POINT V  THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ENTERING JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS ON THE BREACH OF CONTRACT AND QUASI-CONTRACT CLAIMS ([...])
[brief] Under Rule 1:12-1(g) (Pa 178-179), a judge "shall be disqualified . . . and shall not sit in any matter," when "there is any . . . reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so."  Pursuant to Rule 1:12-2, "[a]ny party, on motion made to the judge before trial or argument and stating the reasons therefor, may seek that judge's disqualification."  The disposition of such a "motion is, at least in the first instance, entrusted to the 'sound discretion' of the trial judge whose recusal is sought."
[brief] (Pa439-Pa443).  On January 9, 2012, Plaintiff learned he was selected to interview for the FDU School of Pharmacy 2012 Inaugural Class, which was to take place on January 31, 2012.  (Pa444 – Pa447).  Prior to his admission, Plaintiff was interviewed multiple times by individuals such as [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...].  (Pa164; Pa167).  Plaintiff was admitted to the Pharm.D program on March 1, 2012 and accepted admittance on or around the same day.
[brief] Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Instant Lawsuit  Given Plaintiff’s continued failure to state a viable cause of action despite filing an Amended Complaint, Defendants [...] and [...] requested that the trial court consider their motion to dismiss as originally filed.  On January 7, 2022, the parties appeared for oral argument before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. T1-T57.  In a carefully reasoned opinion which followed on February 28, 2023, [...] concluded that Plaintiff failed to state a cognizable claim under the NJLAD.  5a.  In so finding, the Court accepted and adopted the arguments proffered by Defendants in their respective motions to dismiss.  Seemingly recognizing the nature of the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s claims, together with the fact Plaintiff had already exercised her right to amend her pleadings, the trial court dismissed this action in its entirety with prejudice.  Orders to this effect were entered on February 28, 2023.  3a, 19a, 21a, 23a.  It is from these Orders of dismissal that Plaintiff now seeks appellate review.  394a.  STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] (12T 37-16 to 38-14; Da 23-26)  In imposing this sentence, the court found aggravating factors 3, the risk of re-offense, and 9, the need to deter.  (12T 37-4 to 7)  The court also found mitigating factors 3, strong provocation, 4, substantial grounds tending to excuse, 5, the victim’s conduct induced the offense, 7, no history of prior convictions, 8, defendant’s conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur,\(^8\) and 9, defendant’s character and attitude indicate she is unlikely to reoffend.
[brief] [...]’s Cross Motion For Reconsideration Was Properly Granted Under R. 4:49-2 And Should Be Affirmed [Issue Raised Below 6T32-6]  “A motion for reconsideration . . . is a matter left to the trial court's sound discretion. ”  Here, the trial court expressed doubt regarding its initial ruling and determined in the exercise of its discretion, on reviewing the facts before it, that reconsideration [] was warranted. ”  Lee v. Brown, 232 N.J. 114, 126 (2018) (internal citation omitted).  Here, like the trial court in Lee, in its review of the judgment entered in favor of [...] for renovation costs in the amount of $60,398.00, it acknowledged the misunderstanding that the renovations occurred during the “period of time from 2019 to 2022,” when [...] was a co-owner of the building with [...], and that the renovations actually occurred in 2016, prior to [...]’s existence.  (5T8-1; Da007).  [...]’s cross motion for reconsideration was properly granted based on the court’s acknowledgment of its error in the date of the renovations, at a time before [...] bought the property.  (6T55-13); see Pressler & Verniero, cmt. 2 on R. 4:49-2; Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. at 384.  The trial court properly determined that the assignment of claim entered into evidence was not a sufficient basis to hold [...] liable for any renovation costs performed three years before its property ownership and that [...] had no notice that as the buyer of the property it would be obligated to pay for repairs and costs that occurred prior to its ownership, let alone its very existence.
[brief] (Pa20-Pa24, ¶ 5).  Appellant was a member of Class Twelve of the Settlement Agreement, which covered “[a]ll New Jersey Consumers who were sent letters and/or notices from [[...]] concerning a debt owned by [...], which originated with [[...]] and which contained at least one of the alleged violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. ” (Pa110-Pa120, ¶ 34).  Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Appellant specifically released [...] from any and all claims relating to [...]’s licensure status and the collection of pertinent debts.
[brief] There are some accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment for which statutory benefits are not the remedy.  The Workers’ Compensation Law permits employer and employee to elect in writing to reject the statutory-compensation-without-fault provisions in Article 2 of Title 34.  See N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 and 15-9.  In case of such an election, an employee who is not willfully negligent has a negligence action against the employer for damages for injuries “by accident arising out and in the course of ... employment. ”  N.J.S.A. 34:15-1.  Assumption of the risk and fellow employee negligence are not available defenses in such actions.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-2.  Employers, unless permissibly self-insured, are required to insure against such liabilities.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-72, -77, -78.  An infant employee may always elect to pursue a common law action for injuries.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-10.  National Grange Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schneider, 162 N.J. Super. 227, 231 (Law Div. 1978).  See also Variety Farms, Inc. v. New Jersey Mfrs. Inc. Co., 172 N.J. Super. 10 (App. Div. 1980).  A “casual employee” has no such choice.  Such an employee can suffer injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, but since he is not an “employee” within the statute and thus not entitled to benefits, Stein v. Felden, 17 N.J. Super. 311 (App. Div. 1952), the casual employee is not barred from pursuing other remedies.
[brief] (Pa080 to Pa081).  Indeed, the record before the lower court contained unrefuted deposition testimony by the City’s Business Administrator, [...], that the redevelopment contribution was collected for a community improvement amenity and defrayed the costs to expand, improve, and renovate the City’s Senior Center in the City’s Redevelopment Area.  (Pa472 to Pa474).  Further, the record contained governing body ordinances showing the appropriation of the funds for said purpose.  (Pa903 to Pa905).  Indeed, pursuant to Ordinance No. 20-21, enacted on August 25, 2021, the City Council authorized the appropriation of the $2,000,000 Redevelopment Payment from the City’s Developer Contributions Trust Fund for the purpose of the improvements, renovation, and expansion of the Senior Citizen Center.  *Ibid.*  The lower court was correct to find that the Redevelopment Payment was used to effectuate and defray costs of improvement in the redevelopment area.  (Pa80 to Pa81).  Further, the record before the lower court established that an expanded senior center would certainly effectuate multiple goals of the Redevelopment Plan.
[brief] In its final jury instructions, the trial court carefully explained the differences between murder and the manslaughter offenses and explained several times that if the jurors did not find [...] guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, only then would they consider rendering a verdict on the lesser offenses.  (9T137-18 to 146-12, 150-11 to 152-4).  The verdict sheet itself clearly instructed the jury only to move on to consideration of the lesser-included offenses if it did not find [...] guilty of murder, and the trial court went over the verdict sheet in detail with the jury.  (Da5-7; 9T170-18 to 172-11).  Despite these clear instructions, the jury returned unanimous verdicts on its verdict sheet for murder and both lesser-included manslaughter offenses.
[brief] Contrary to *Cardinale*, Respondent is still employed and on a leave of absence (Da 15, Par. 3).  Next, his medical leave and disciplinary charges concern his disability.  The parties, in drafting the within Agreement, considered *Cardinale* and sought to align the Agreement with those margins.  The parties also provided a vehicle in Paragraph 18 to address any possible determination by [...] regarding the language of the Agreement.  Further, the facts of *Cardinale* are not applicable and the case sub judice are different:
[brief] C.  Default Was Never Entered Against [...]  Even if [...] had been properly served with the Amended Complaint (which it was not) and had not been dismissed as a party (which it was), the trial court could not have entered a default judgment against [...], because no default was ever entered against [...].  The procedure for obtaining a default judgment is prescribed by R. 4:43-2, which expressly provides that default judgment can be sought only “[a]fter a default has been entered in accordance with R. 4:43-1 . . . , but not simultaneously therewith,” and requires service of the default on the alleged defaulting party.  R. 4:43-2.  Here, Appellants never requested the entry of default, no default was ever entered, and nothing was ever served on [...].  As a result, the trial court could not enter a default judgment against [...] pursuant to R. 4:43-2, and it appropriately declined to do so.  D.
[directive] Summons. of presumption notwithstanding the acomplaint-warrant for apply to decision made is If the whom the judicial to officer or the 4.3.1, court subsection to pursuant acomplaint-summons issuing or criteria criterion the specific to as be advised shall made is acomplaint-warrant for application presumption overcome the State to relies the upon which see 13, note Rule 3:3-1(d), in enumerated believe to reason is there (e.g., 3:3-1(c) under Rule established complaint-summons charging by of the that believe to is reason there summons; a to response in appear will not defendant the that any protect necessary to is agency pretrial services by conditions the release pretrial monitoring of identifying the addition to In etc.). community; the or person, specified other witness, victim, applying prosecutor or officer enforcement law the Rule 3:3-1(d), in listed criterion/criteria applicable or specific facts as the officer to judicial or court the advise shall acomplaint-warrant for bycomplaint-summons ofcharging presumption the overcome to upon State relies the circumstances in manner the assessment; risk pretrial automated the of the results (e.g., 3:3-1(c) Rule in forth set Law (Preliminary 5 Section also See affiliation; etc.).
[brief] Petitioner’s Prior Injuries and Treatment  Petitioner’s records demonstrate that he was involved in three prior incidents in 2000, 2004 and 2009 during which he sustained injuries to his neck and back.  1.  The 2000 Incident and Injuries  On or about August 25, 2000 while working on bike patrol, Petitioner injured his left knee, lower back and neck after tackling a suspect attempting to steal a police bicycle.  (Pa119, 129).  An MRI taken on September 12, 2000 demonstrated a small herniated disc at C6-C7 and an annular bulge at C5-C6.  (Pa122, 124, 134).  Petitioner continued to experience neck and upper back pain and was out of work for two ½ months.  (Pa 119, 124).  Petitioner was evaluated by [...], a Certified Independent Medical Examiner, and [...], an Occupational Medical Specialists, in furtherance of Petitioner’s application for workers’ compensation.  (Pa129, 135).  Petitioner’s workers’ compensation application was granted.  (3T38:9-23).  2.  The 2004 Incident and Injuries  On March 25, 2004 while at work, Petitioner was lifting some heavy boxes when he experienced pain in his neck and into his upper arms with weakness in his low back radiating down his legs.  (Pa124, 130).  Petitioner was taken by ambulance to the [...] Emergency Room in [...], where x-rays of the cervical and lumbar spine were taken, he was prescribed muscle relaxants and pain medication, and released.  (Pa130).  Petitioner’s symptoms continued and on April 9, 2004, Petitioner visited [...], an orthopedist.  Petitioner reported “pain about his neck with radiation into the upper extremities, some weakness in his arms and pain about the low back area with some radiation to the lower legs. ” (Pa 119).  Dr. Dubowitch recommended physical therapy and subsequently ordered MRIs of Petitioner’s cervical and lumbar spine.  (Pa121).  In comparing the 2004 cervical MRIs to those from 2000, Dr. Dubowitch determined that Petitioner’s herniated disc at C6-C7 had increased in size, and that the annular bulge at C5-C6 remained unchanged.  (Pa122).  The lumbar MRI demonstrated a small central herniation at L5-S1.  (Pa122).  Petitioner continued his physical therapy through April 30, 2004, on which date Dr. Dubowitch advised he could return to work.  (Pa122).  Petitioner was out of work for approximately 45 days after this incident.  (Pa130).  Petitioner’s symptoms from the box-lifting incident continued, and on April 4, 2006, Petitioner visited [...], D.O., an orthopedic surgeon (Pa125).
[brief] [...] proposes to use AL “to assist its attorneys with its responsiveness review to avoid the burden of conducting a manual attorney review” of the approximately 190,000 emails, or 1.3 million pages of documents, that hit upon Plaintiffs’ search terms.  (R. 300, Def.’s Resp. at 4.)  As the City describes it, it intends to review only documents that meet a particular standard of relevance as determined by AL, and to discount documents falling below that standard.  (Id. at 7-8.)  [...] also intends to use AL’s quality control applications (such as Elusion testing), graphing results, family reconciliation, and a “cut off score,” to ensure that an attorney reviews all potentially responsive documents.  (Id. at 8-9.)  Significantly, the parties agree that generally TAR is a far more accurate means of producing responsive ESI than manual review or keyword searches.  (R. 289, Pls.’ Mot. at 7; R. 300, Def.’s Resp. at 5.)  B.