ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Under the summary judgment standard, Appellant’s testimony must be construed in a light most favorable to her during summary judgment.  Significantly, Appellant testified that she misunderstood the application question involving crimes in multiple ways, but was not trying to hide anything because she took a background check.  Unlike the plaintiffs in the above cases relied on by Appellee, it is undisputed that Appellant underwent a background check.  Defense witness [...] testified at deposition that Appellant completed the fingerprint and background check, and that Appellant was cleared to work.  An employee who misunderstands a form but submits to a background check is factually not the same as someone intentionally hiding and misleading an employer about a criminal record.  If Appellant’s criminal record had been discovered during a background check, the law would nevertheless have permitted Appellant to work for Appellee under the controlling statutory process cited above.  Although Appellee submitted evidence that it would not have hired Appellant anyway, that is after-acquired evidence that goes to the amount and type of damages – but it does not bar Appellant’s claim, as confirmed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Cicchetti.  Appellant set forth a valid claim under CEPA.  To help defend against the claim, Appellee attempted to use her past against her in every way: arguing the claim can be dismissed, attacking her credibility with the record of her criminal case, even going so low as to put the unverified statements of a cell mate into the record in this case.  Appellant maintains these records are not admissible, highly prejudicial, and will seek to exclude them at trial.  That is a fight for another day.  With regard to the issue before this Court, it is undeniable that Appellee’s summary judgment argument below was both legally and factually unsupported, as set forth above.  Accordingly, the lower Court’s decision, in granting summary judgment, should be reversed, and this matter remanded.
[directive] Proszę podać zarzuty, które prokurator zgodził się zalecić do oddalenia:  12.  List any charges the prosecutor has agreed to recommend for dismissal:  Akt osk./okrarż./powództwo Charakter i stopień przestępstwa/wykroczenia Zarzut Ind./Acc./Compl.# Count Nature of Offense and Degree  Proszę podać, jaki wyrok prokurator zgodził się zalecić:  13.  Specify any sentence the prosecutor has agreed to recommend:
[brief] See *In re Jasper Seating Co., Inc.*, 406 --- ² [...] acknowledges that if the defect is not material, documents supplied after the bid may be considered by the government entity in deciding whether to waive the defect, but circumstances as they existed as of the bid date are still a critical consideration in that respect.  See *Serenity*, 306 N.J. Super. at 157-59.  N.J. Super. 213, 224 (App. Div. 2009) ("Waivers of an RFP deviation which would permit "post-bid ... manipulation of the results have been declared unlawful.  Such post-bid manipulations are repugnant to our public bidding laws.") (internal quotations and citations omitted); On-Line Games, 279 N.J. Super. at 596-607 ("A post-opening commitment to supply an essential missing from a bid is not a clarification.  It is an impermissible supplementation, change or correction within the meaning of the RFP and it flies in the face of our public bidding scheme."); Suburban Disposal (Fairfield), 383 N.J. Super. at 492 (same).  That rule has no practical application if the materiality determination is made in light of what the bidder submitted after the bid opening.  If the date by which a bidders’ bid is judged extends beyond the bid date to whenever that bidder last supplements its submission, there is no common standard of competition and no equal playing field.  Instead, the very notion of competitive bidding based on a single submission date loses its meaning.
[brief] Moreover, and critically, Appellants admitted that the $250,000 check that was supposedly given to an “imposter” was in fact deposited into the “real” [...]’s bank account and properly applied against the remaining assignment purchase price, in other words, used for the purpose for which the Appellants intended it:  Q.  [B]ased on the information that I showed you last time we were together and [...]’s testimony, you know now that the check was cashed into [...]’s account; isn’t that correct?  A.  Yes, I do.  861a at 559:8-12.  Nor can Appellants dispute that [...], after making all of its payments, received the very assignment for which it made those payments.  863a-881a.  To the contrary, Appellants testified in their depositions that they did obtain the assignment they paid for, and that their status as contract purchasers of the [...] property has never been contested by anyone:  Q.  Well, you described before the documents including the assignment – the assumption and assignment that [...] signed to step into the shoes of the purchase under the [...] agreement, correct?  A. Correct.  Q.  And you believe all of the payments necessary to obtain those rights and to step into the shoes of the purchaser under the [...] agreement were made, correct?  A. Correct.  Q.  So as far as you’re concerned, [...] is the contract purchaser under the [...] Agreement, correct?  A. Correct.  827a at 89:3-17.
[brief] Appellate review of an administrative agency's decision is narrow.  *Id.* at 15.  A strong presumption of reasonableness attaches to decisions of the [...].  *In re Carroll*, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App.Div., 2001), certif. denied, 179 N.J. 85 (2001), citing *In re Vey*, 272 N.J.Super. 199, 205 (App.Div.,1993), aff'd, 135 N.J. 306 (1994).  While an appellate court is not bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination on an exclusively legal issue, *Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec.*, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973), an appellate court is obliged to affirm the [...]'s decision if substantial evidence supports the decision, even if the appellate court could have reached a different result.
[directive] is - . /.zG  AUTHORITY: [...], ATTORNEY GENERAL - - New 07 3  State Administration Standard  Rocadwe of Operating Jersey Program Forfeiture Page: .- J 2 )  Case Name'- 3)  Case Number: 4)  Agency Name: 5)  Agency Address- 6)  Contact Person/Title- 7)  8 )  OR1  Telephone Number-  Agency Number: Estimated Value - '?- l 6  Currency, 9)  United States (Total'Seized)  10)  Property, Other the known.) if (List VIN or serial and describe requested.  including number, property .  I a will identify  The State case name the Division by MoneyProperty of Police Confiscated Case Identification Number.  Log Management Report  I  "I % the total contributive share of The requesting agency seeks 11 ) distribution.  I  ' The County Prosecutor, the case of the Division Justice. the Director determine the percentage distributed Criminal of shan in or entities to the involved this consistent with applicable Bdministretive code. and in taw matter of
[brief] [...] was involved in the design and implementation of changes to [...]’s infrastructure, including with respect to availability of user data to third party app developers.  - [...], at [...] from 2006 to 2019, reported directly to [...] as [...]’s Vice President of Partnerships.  [...] was selected as a custodian for his involvement in [...]’s relationships with integration partners.  As these examples illustrate, [...]’s long list of custodians contains a number of high-level management personnel who worked closely with [...] and [...] and were directly involved in the events Plaintiffs’ claims are based on.
[brief] Defendant called four fact witnesses who unconvincingly claimed they “never” saw parking on the Sixth Street Lot.  (12 T and 13T)  34.  Defendant’s first fact witness, [...], an employee of Defendant and son of the operator, claims that when his family moved across the street from the Congregation in the 1970s, he used to stare out his window onto the Sixth Street Lot between 6:30 a.m. and 8:55 a.m. before leaving for school.  Bursztyn claimed that from 1978 to 1985 beginning when he was five (5) years old until he was twelve (12) years old he “never” saw any vehicles in the Sixth Street Lot.  Bursztyn alleged that the Congregation only began to utilize the Sixth Street Lot for parking after Defendant purchased the Subject Property in 2010, contradicting the credible and detailed testimony of [...], [...], [...] and [...].
[brief] 421 N.J. Super. at 429 (Ja90-Ja91)  For example, [...]’s confusing arbitration provision (set forth in multiple paragraphs, and multiple pages) can be juxtaposed with that set forth by this Court in one paragraph in *Trainor v Chrysler*, 2021 N.J. Unpub. LEXIS 2202, * 5-6 (App. Div. September 20, 2021)(Ja119):  “Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including the interpretation and scope of this Arbitration Provision, and the arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between you and us or our employees, agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action.  If federal law provides that a claim or dispute is not subject to binding arbitration, this Arbitration Provision shall not apply to such claim or dispute.
[brief] ”  Karl’s Sales, supra, 249 N.J. Super. at 493.  Here, Appellants contractually agreed to surrender the Property upon termination of the Lease.  There is no dispute that the Appellants – through their own doing – defaulted under the Lease by failing to pay rent due in 2017.  There is also no dispute that proper notice to cure was given and that Appellants still failed to cure the default.  As a result, the Lease was properly terminated by [...].  Thus, as they were contractually obligated to do, Appellants peaceably surrendered the Property to [...], and never made a claim against [...] (until 2½ years later) that [...] was not properly in possession of the Property.
[brief] It would be manifestly unjust to [...] to impose a duty of care upon it under the circumstances presented by this loss.  The fourth factor that a court should consider in deciding whether or not a duty of care should be imposed upon a landowner is the "opportunity and ability to exercise care."  Hopkins, supra., at 439.  Plaintiffs rely extensively on their misinterpretation of the lease agreement between [...] and [...] in support of their arguments that the former had control of the area where plaintiff fell.  (Pb26-31)  They then erroneously conclude that [...] had the "opportunity and ability" to have removed the snow and ice.  Id.  Finally, they argue that the trial court erred in refusing to impose a duty to have done so upon [...].
[directive] It provides that when the sole caretaker of a minor child is incarcerated, the Superior Court must provide certain information to DYFS.  With regard to the procedure in municipal courts in a case where a minor child’s caretaker is incarcerated, the municipal courts should continue to follow the procedures established in 1995 in Directive #8-95, “Judiciary Guidelines – Alternate Care for the Dependents of Persons Detained as Part of the Judicial Process. ”  If you require a copy of Directive #8-95, you should contact your Municipal Division Manager to have a copy forwarded to your office.  Please advise appropriate staff of this new law.  If you have any questions concerning this law, please contact [...], Assistant Director, AOC Municipal Court Services Division, at [...].
[brief] Senate Chambers Voting Session: Board list to be announced  THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2022  SENATE QUORUM 12:00 PM  Senate Chambers 10:00 AM:  Group (1)  Committees scheduled to meet 1:00 PM:  Group (2)  Committees scheduled to meet THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2022  SENATE QUORUM 12:00 PM  Senate Chambers 10:00 AM:  Group (3)  Committees scheduled to meet 1:00 PM:  Group (4)  Committees scheduled to meet THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2022  SENATE QUORUM 12:00 PM  Senate Chambers 10:00 AM:  Group (1)  Committees scheduled to meet 1:00 PM:  Group (2)  Committees scheduled to meet TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 2022  SENATE QUORUM 12:00 PM  Senate Chambers Governor’s Budget Message (Time and location TBD)  MONDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2022  SENATE QUORUM 12:00 PM  Senate Chambers 10:00 AM: Group (3)  Committees scheduled to meet 1:00 PM: Group (4)  Committees scheduled to meet THURSDAY, MARCH 3, 2022 SENATE SESSION 2:00 PM  Senate Chambers Voting Session: Board list to be announced  MONDAY, MARCH 7, 2022  SENATE QUORUM 12:00 PM  Senate Chambers 10:00 AM:  Group (1)  Committees scheduled to meet 1:00 PM:  Group (2)  Committees scheduled to meet THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 2022  SENATE QUORUM 12:00 PM  Senate Chambers 10:00 AM:  Group (3)  Committees scheduled to meet 1:00 PM:  Group (4)  Committees scheduled to meet MONDAY, MARCH 14, 2022  SENATE QUORUM 12:00 PM  Senate Chambers 10:00 AM:  Committees at the Call of the Senate President  MONDAY, MARCH 21, 2022  SENATE SESSION 2:00 PM  Senate Chambers Voting Session: Board list to be announced
[brief] T1, 160:20-23.  [...] created [...] to oversee its network.  T1, 160:25 to 161:1-6.  [...] further advised that [...] “was not created as a tool to identify customer location, pursuant to exigent circumstances or legal demand”.  T1, 161:7-13.  [...] acknowledged that one of the ways to verify cell site information is to do a drive by but said that he got the case too late to do it in [...]’ case.  T1, 164:20-25.  [...] does not have “documented error rates for CDR or cell site location information records”.  T1, 178:8-24.  The Court admitted [...]’s testimony.
[brief] First, this would be hearsay.  An exception to the hearsay rule is a record kept in the ordinary course of business.  N.J.R.E. 803 reads: Records of Regularly Conducted Activity.  —  A statement contained in a writing or other record of acts, events, conditions, and, subject to Rule 808, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time of observation by a person with actual knowledge or from information supplied by such a person, if the writing or other record was made in the regular course of business and it was the regular practice of that business to make such writing or other record.  In order to qualify under the business record exception to the hearsay rule, the proponent must satisfy three conditions:
[brief] As outlined in Plaintiff’s opening brief (at pages 15-17), the parties’ correspondence during this period reflects that Plaintiff never waived or relinquished its right to insist upon specific performance of the PSA.  To the contrary, in successive emails, Plaintiff repeatedly advised [...]’s counsel that Plaintiff reserved all of its rights under the PSA.  (Pa320-333).  Even when [...] stated in an email of July 15, 2022, that [...] “deemed” Plaintiff’s demand for return of the Deposit to be an election to terminate the PSA, Plaintiff immediately rejected this assertion and noted that it was accepting the return of the Deposit without waiving its rights under the PSA.  (Pa330-331).  This reservation of rights included, of course, Plaintiff’s right under Section 13.1 to insist upon specific performance, notwithstanding the return of the Deposit, if [...] proceeded to close with the Fee Owner – which it did, just a short time later.
[brief] (Not Raised Below).  The decision of the State Police Retirement Board is against the substantial weight of the evidence, and therefore should be reversed.  The decision is also arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  For the reasons that follow, this determination should be reversed.  New Jersey pension statutes must be liberally construed, and under a liberal construction, [...] would be eligible for Ricci Act benefits.  Pensions for public employees serve a public purpose.
[brief] INDEX TO THE APPENDIX State v. Coppola, [...], 2010 WL 3516745 (App. Div. Sept. 7, 2010).............................................Pa1-17 National Registry of Exonerations Page for [...] .........................Pa18-21 | Cases | Page(s) | |-------------------------------------------|---------| | Brady v. Maryland, | 57, 67 | | 373 U.S. 83 (1963) | | | Brindley v. Firemen’s Ins. Co., | 47 | | 35 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1955) | | | Brown v. United States, | 37 | | 256 U.S. 335 (1921) | | | Carter v. Rafferty, | 68 | | 826 F.2d 1299 (3d Cir. 1987) | | | Estate of Kotsovska, ex rel. Kotsovska v. Liebman, | 37 | | 221 N.J. 568 (2015) | | | Flood v. Aluri-Vallabhaneni, | 36 | | 431 N.J. Super. 365 (App. Div. 2013) | | | Lutwak v. United States, | 48 | | 344 U.S. 604 (1953) | | | Miranda v. Arizona, | Passim | | 384 U.S. 436 (1966) | | | Mogull v. C.B. Comm. Real Estate Group, Inc., | 37 | | 162 N.J. 449 (2000) | | | People v. Austin, | 30 | | 133 Ill.2d 118 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1989) | | | RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,| 84 | | 234 N.J. 459 (2018) | | | State in Interest of R.V., | 83 | | 280 N.J. Super. 118 (App. Div. 1995) | | | State v. A.O., | 59, 64, 67 | | 198 N.J. 69 (2009) | | | State v. Adams, | 34, 77 | | 194 N.J. 186 (2008) | | | State v. Afanador, | 35 | | 151 N.J. 41 (1997) | | | State v. Alexander, | 22, 36, 44 | | 233 N.J. 132 (2018) | | | State v. Allen, | 48 | | 254 N.J. 530 (2023) | | State v. Angoy, 329 N.J. Super. 79 (App. Div. 2000) .................................................. 36 State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263 (1973) ........................................................................... 48 State v. Bass, 224 N.J. 285 (2016) ........................................................................... 37, 40 State v. Behn, 375 N.J. Super. 409 (App. Div. 2005) .................................................. 68 State v. Bell, 241 N.J. 552 (2020) ........................................................................... 21, 22 State v. Belliard, 415 N.J. Super 51 (App. Div. 2010) ..................................................... 34 State v. Bess, 53 N.J. 10 (1968) .............................................................................. 38 State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601 (2010) .......................................................................... 80, 82, 83 State v. Brent, 137 N.J. 107 (1994)
[brief] In a leading study on this issue, “Sequential Lineup Laps and Eyewitness Accuracy”, investigators conducted several laboratory experiments where participants were shown a video of a ‘crime’ and then asked to identify a suspect based on either one or two viewings of a sequential photo array.  [...] et al., Sequential Lineup Laps and Eyewitness Accuracy, 35 L. & Hum. Behav. 262, 271 (2011).  Across the different experiments, viewing the same photo array a second time increased the likelihood that witnesses would misidentify the culprit.  Ibid.  The researchers concluded that “[w]hen the additional lap prompted a decision change from a previous no-choice response to a lineup pick, more often than not this change was an error. ”  Ibid. (emphasis added).  For example, in one of the experiments, “witnesses who elected a second viewing of a culprit-absent lineup pushed identification errors to an alarming 88%.”  Id. at 272.  Even in a target-present lineup, sequential viewing increased the rate of erroneous identifications from 14.3% to 35.7%.  Id. at 270 (Table 5).  These significant error rates are consistent with the research that our Supreme Court reviewed in Henderson.
[directive] Para ser llenado por el acusado si la licencia de conducir no se entrega en el momento de la imposición de la condena.  To be completed by defendant if driver’s license is not collected at time of sentencing:  Nombre y apellido/Full name Dirección/Address  Fecha de Nacimiento/Date Color de los Ojos/Eye Sexo/Gender of Birth Color  Formulario Promulgado por la directriz #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11710-Spanish página 2 de 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11710-Spanish page 2 of 2
[brief] 7 Walker v. Giuffre, 209 N.J. 124 (2012)  ..............................................................................  4, 5, 7, 8 Walker v. Giuffre, 415 N.J. Super. 597 (App. Div. 2010)..........................  7  Yueh v. Yueh, 329 N.J. Super. 447, (App. Div. 2000)  .....................................................  5  STATUTES, RULES, & CODES
[directive] Only  1.  I am being questioned as a subject of an investigation by this agency into potential violations of department rules and regulations, or for my fitness for duty.  This investigation concerns 2.  This is an administrative investigation.  I will be asked questions specifically, narrowly and directly related to the performance of my duties, or for not answering truthfully.  3.  I may be subject to departmental discipline for refusing to answer a question directly related to the performance of my duties, or for not answering truthfully.  4.  I have the right to consult with a representative of my collective bargaining unit, or another representative of my choice, and have him or her present during the interview.  5.  I acknowledge that this investigation is confidential, and I am hereby ordered not to disclose any information discussed during this interview.  Signature: _______________________  Print Name: ______________________  Date: _____________  Time: _________  Witnessed by: ___________________________  Print name: _____________________________  Appendix K
[brief] While on its face there is certainly a disparity between the life sentence the defendant received in Middlesex County and the 20-year custodial sentence the defendant received in Somerset County, it is not a true depiction of what actually occurred in this case.  First and foremost, the defendant was tried and convicted in Somerset County before he was arraigned on the Middlesex County charges, thus rejecting the State’s offer in Middlesex and instead opting to proceed to trial.  Second, the Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office attempted to resolve this case globally.  Indeed, the State only sought ten additional years on top of the 20 years the defendant was sentenced to in Somerset County for four additional robberies.  It is unclear to the State how much more favorable of a plea the defendant could have received if they were, in fact, consolidated.  Between both counties, defendant was charged with five first-degree robberies.  Each of those charges alone carried a statutory sentencing maximum of 20 years.  The defendant was offered and rejected a global resolution of 30 years, which is far less than the statutory minimum for five first-degree robberies.  See, supra, POINT I-C.  Instead, the defendant opted to go to trial in Somerset County prior to his arraignment in Middlesex County and still rejected a favorable global resolution.  Thus, defendant cannot establish that counsel’s performance fell below the prevailing professional norms or that he was prejudiced in this case.  As such, the PCR court appropriately rejected the defendant’s argument.
[brief] Under § 1692c(b), a debt collector is barred from all third-party communications—excepting only the circumstances expressly allowed in the statutory language and communications with the consumer, the consumer’s attorney, the creditor, the creditor’s attorney, the debt collector’s attorney, and a credit reporting agency.  It is undisputed that Defendant’s mail vendor communications does not fall within any exception and is not to one of the authorized recipients.  Thus, the statutory language is “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person” and, if a debt collector’s conveyance of information about a debt to a mail vendor for the purpose of creating sending the consumer a collection letter is a communication with a person in connection with the collection of a debt, then the Complaint states a claim.