ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Medical malpractice litigation has serious ramifications for physicians both professionally and personally.  The time and effort doctors expend participating in professional negligence litigation takes physicians away from the practice of medicine and precludes them from focusing on patient care.  Studies have shown the many physicians practice defensive medicine in order to avoid protracted litigation.  Not only does this potentially subject individual patients to increased referrals, test and procedures, with attendant risks, but also has very real cost implications for the provision of healthcare to the public at large. \footnote{[...], & [...] (2016); Medical Malpractice Reform—Historical Approaches, Alternative Models, and Communication and Resolution Programs.
[directive] This Directive imposes limitations that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.  B.  Severability.  The provisions of this Directive shall be severable.  If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this Directive is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Directive shall not be affected.
[brief] Moreover, it cannot be disputed that the material terms of the settlement were reached and agreed to by the parties, and memorialized on the record, as follows:  -  Defendant would retire through the PFRS system as of the date of the signed agreement.  -  The Settlement Agreement reflecting the settlement reached and memorialized on the record would be prepared by County Counsel and sent to Defendant’s counsel on December 21, 2022.  -  In exchange for her retirement, the County would dismiss all charges against Defendant.  - Defendant would sign a release of her right to sue the County and dismiss any pending lawsuits.  - Defendant would not initiate any new lawsuits or otherwise seek to sue the County relative to events which had occurred up to that point in time.  - Defendant would receive a payout of any unused accrued sick and vacation time consistent with the terms of the labor contract.  - Defendant and the County agreed to mutual non-disparagement clauses.  - County would provide a neutral letter of reference, which would be attached to the formal Settlement Agreement and would set forth her dates of employment and positions held.  - Defendant waived any claim to back pay.  - County would pay Defendant the equivalent of 35 days of pay, which would be issued to her in a check, which payment would not reflect pensionable time and would be subject to applicable tax withholdings.  -  Subject to Chapter 78 Contributions, Defendant would receive health benefits upon her retirement, family plan if she so elected, which for the next 3 years would be based upon her current salary.  After March 28, 2025, Defendant would make retiree health contributions until she reached age 65, at which point she would become Medicare eligible.  [(See Pa33-Pa34). ]
[brief] -  No money or any other thing of value was transferred, released, or exchanged as a result of the unit owner resolutions adopted December 19, 2019.  -  The unit owner resolutions adopted December 19, 2019, did not and did not purport to alter or affect any legal rights or claims that the Association then held vis à vis any person.  •  The actions of the [...] on December 19, 2019, did not and did not purport to alter or affect any legal rights or claims that the Association then held vis à vis any person.  •  [...] did not personally participate in any Association activity on December 19, 2019, as he was taking a deposition that day in an unrelated case.  Pa454–56 ¶¶ 16–26; Pa1041–42 ¶¶ 16–26.  III.  The Vermont Trial Court’s Rulings.
[brief] ARGUMENT I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW (Not raised below)  Courts reviewing the decision of a municipal zoning or planning board may overturn that decision if it is “arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. ”  Kane Properties, LLC v. City of Hoboken, 214 N.J. 199, 225 (1999).  Factual determinations of a zoning board are entitled to deference.  On appeal of the trial court determination the review is de novo.  *Id.*  However, in this instance, the Zoning Board made no findings of fact for this Court to give deference to which deference may be given.  The Zoning Board’s failure to make any findings of fact at the Hearing and also to grant a variance to the [...] is the very definition of “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. ”  Therefore, the decision of the Zoning Board is entitled to no deference, and this Court should reverse the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Zoning Board and the [...].
[brief] ..............................................................  11, 12, 13  National Consumer Law Center, Fair Debt Collection (10th ed. 2022)  ..........  2 S. Rep. 95-382 (1977)  ..................................................................  2, 5, 6, 7, 8  LEGAL ARGUMENT  The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., imposes strict liability for a single violation.  See, Pb-17-Pb17.  The Complaint sufficiently alleges three of the four elements necessary to impose liability on a debt collector.  Defendant disputes the fourth element: whether the Complaint alleges Defendant failed to comply with an FDCPA provision.  The Complaint alleges Defendant communicated with an outsider about Plaintiff’s debt and that violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) without falling within its exceptions.  Defendant asks the Court to manipulate the plain statutory language—“a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person”—to create a new exception out of thin air.  All four federal courts to have decided the same question rejected the arguments which Defendant now advances.  In addition to the arguments in Plaintiff’s opening Brief, Point II responds to Defendant’s arguments.  But first, in Point I, we address Defendant’s standing challenge.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 7:9A-1.8(a)(2) and (b).  [...] also calculated that its projected peak water use would be 650 gallons per day utilizing one well.  (Aa32).  Due to the low volumes of discharge and water use, [...] found that the wastewater generation and water use met the applicable Highlands regulations and the Project will be consistent with the Northeast WQMP.  (Aa2).  Appellants’ novel theory as to how [...] should have calculated its estimated wastewater does not dispute [...]’s calculations under N.J.A.C. 7:9A, but rather proclaims that [...] should have considered the “total impacts that should be anticipated from the proposed project, including the deforestation and addition of impervious surfaces[.]” (Ab33-38).  Appellants also argue [...] should have considered “climate change impacts” to “the impacts to water resources that will result from the increased use of fossil fuels associated with this project. ” (Ab37).  Appellants attempt to add requirements to [...]’s rules, citing broad policies within various statutes and regulations.
[brief] According to [...], either two or three people, including [...], got into the Impala and followed [...].  (4T 101-23 to 102-11).  [...] testified that she drove the Impala, and was given directions by [...].  (4T 25-8 to 28-20).  [...] testified that she did not see any weapons or hear any gunshots during that incident, and had not previously seen [...] with a gun.  (2T 95-7 to _____________________ 4  [...] and [...] were charged with, inter alia, kidnapping, as to [...].
[brief] As another example, defendants state in the Statement of Facts that “[...]’s stated purpose of the Roadway Design Manual obviates that it is meant for the structure and design of new roads; making the application of this standard to residential sidewalks improper and baseless. ”  Db4.  That “statement” is not only an opinion, rather than a fact, but also lacks logical and grammatical sense.  The Roadway Design Manual is not the standard of whether the location constructed by defendants is unsafe.  Rather, it is a logical reference for an engineer to consider in analyzing the facts and actual conditions in order to render an opinion regarding whether the location created by defendants was unsafe.  In fact, the appendix citation used by defendants, Pa162, confirms that fact:  In summary, [...] designs in the 21st Century should represent the product of reasonable people making reasonable decisions that reflect consideration of the needs of all road users, and social and environmental impacts.  Highway designs must reflect a thoughtful understanding of the context of the project, in addition to adherence to standards and guidelines.  Pa162.  That is a prototypical example of the type of reference materials that an engineer should consider in reaching a conclusion regarding the unsafe condition of the premises.  Defendants’ Statement of Facts also claims that their hired expert, [...], “found that the Premises was constructed in 1899, and that the streets were principally constructed within that time period as well. ”  Db4.  First, a jury is free to disregard defendants’ expert testimony completely.  Model Jury Charge (Civil) 1.13 “Expert Testimony” (Apr. 1995).  As such, it cannot be the basis for a judgment in favor of defendants as a matter of law.  Moreover, that “fact” is contradicted by plaintiff’s expert and the record, and all inferences that may arise from that contradiction must be resolved in favor of the non-movant – plaintiff – at the summary judgment stage.  Second, the “statement” seeks to misrepresent the material fact that defendants completely reconstructed the location where plaintiff fell after they purchased the property in 1972.  Pa200; Pa213.  Defendant [...] testified that he did not repair the sidewalk and carport entrance.  He rebuilt the location from scratch.  “Q. Okay.  During the time that you owned your home had you ever – have you ever had your sidewalk repaired or constructed?  A. Repaired? No.  It was done new about 25 years ago, completely a new one. ”  Pa66 at 14:22-15:1.  Although [...] later contradicted himself regarding exactly when the new garage/carport was installed, there is no dispute that the driveway cut was not installed in 1899 and that the Premises as they existed at the time of the fall were not as constructed in 1899.  Defendant [...] certified that “we turned the basement apartment into a garage/carport. ”  Pa200.  Obviously, the driveway was installed new at the time of the renovation as a basement apartment would not have a driveway.  Nothing in defendants’ Statement of Facts supports their position or is supported by the record.
[brief] [...], by illegally and improperly assuming [...]'s identity while he was away in North Carolina used [...]'s home telephone lines, without [...]'s knowledge or permission, and caused the theft of [...]'s money from his solely owned checking account # 4330:  Q  Okay.  Looking at the first page left, was the amount in dispute $15,459.21?  A  Yes it was.  Q  And according to this bank document, was your account credited that amount?  A  Yes.  After the complaint was filed to [...] it was very quickly put back into my account.  Q  Now where were you when [...] took this money?  A  I was in -- attending the tournament in Cherokee, North Carolina.  She pulled this crap when I was away and I have the phone records to prove it.  ***  Q  [H]ere's the question.  Do you know what [...] did to get this $14,000 -- I'm sorry, $15,459?  What did she do?  A  She came into my home, used my telephone, used my code and my Social Security -- my Social Security number, the code, and she went ahead and used the phone to take money out of my checking account and put it in her account.  Q  Did you authorize any of that?  A  Absolutely not.  [16T76-16-77-2; 16T79-5-14].
[brief] On [...]’s own appeal, [...]’s July 30, 2020 Order failed to consider any, much less all, of the evidence available to the court.  The finding that it is not possible to accurately estimate the property damage that occurred during any period is not supported by any evidence.  When the full evidence of record in the allocation proceeding is considered, it is clear that an accurate estimate of the quantum of property damage occurring during any policy period can be performed.  Accordingly, the [...] erred when he partially applied the time-on-the-risk allocation method by hand-picking the factual start dates and contaminant release amounts recommended by [...] and otherwise selecting an arbitrary end date.  See Boston Gas, 910 N.E.2d at 316.  [...] also erred when he selected the date of the liability trial decision as the end date for the allocation period for the time-on-the-risk.  If the time-on-the-risk method applies, the end date for the allocation period should be 1986, or at the very latest, 1993.  As such, [...] respectfully requests that this Court grant [...]’s appeal and deny the cross-appeal filed by [...].
[brief] Thus, the social science bolstered defense counsel’s argument that [...]’s post-offense rehabilitative efforts was evidence that (1) he was _____________________ this assertion was taken is linked on this website:  [...], [...], [...], From Juvenile Delinquency to Young Adult Offending (Study Group on the Transitions between Juvenile Delinquency and Adult Crime) 3 (July 2013), available at https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/242931.pdf.  unlikely to commit another offense (i.e. that the Court should find mitigating factor nine and reject aggravating factor three); (2) he had been remarkably deterred and there was no further need for deterrence; and (3) mitigating factor fourteen should be given particularly strong weight.  Indeed, the Legislature enacted mitigating factor fourteen at the recommendation of the Criminal Sentencing and Disposition Commission, which cited this adolescent brain science—including the aforementioned article by [...]. S. Jud. Comm. Statement to A. 4373 (Aug. 24, 2020); New Jersey Criminal Sentencing and Disposition Commission, 2019 Annual Report 41 (Nov. 2019).
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[brief] (Pa664).  Defendant [...] was the individual identified by Plaintiff as having acted unlawfully, she was the person who initiated an investigation into Plaintiff, and she was ultimately responsible for Plaintiff’s termination.  These facts present an example of retaliatory conduct under CEPA.  The evidence is sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding Respondents’ motives and actions.  As such, this matter must proceed to a jury for resolution.  Summary judgment must be reversed.
[brief] 41 State v. Darrian, 255 N.J. Super. 435 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 13 (1992) .......................................................... 16, 17, 27 State v. Delibero, 149 N.J. 90 (1997) ....................................  35  State v. Docaj, 407 N.J. Super. 352 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 370 (2009) ..........................................................  32 State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57 (2014) ..................................  49 State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364 (2012) ................................. 16, 17, 24 State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161 (2010) .................................
[brief] Evidence Form (Money) (Attached at Pa034)  Evidence Form (1 Key and other items) (Attached at Pa035)  Evidence Receipt from Lab (Tab/Marijuana) (Attached at Pa036)  Exhibit C -11 to [...]’s Certification Complaint Summons 2/20/20 (Attached at Pa041)  Discovery Desk Central Records (Attached at Pa069)  Letter from [...] to [...] Dated Sept 30, 2020 (Pa068)  HIT Confirmation Wanted Person 02/20/2020 (Attached at Pa040)  CJIS Transmittal Form 2/20/20 (Attached at Pa038)  Wanted Person Picture of Plaintiff (Attached at Pa039)  Discovery Checklist (billing date 5/5/2020) (Attached at Pa070)
[brief] (91a-92a).  The CNAs already phased out the sick time sellback by capping the benefit for those hired after January 1, 2013 at $15,000.  (34a ¶120).  The CNA also decreased the amount of time that could be accumulated.  Employees hired in 1984 could accumulate sixteen (16) months of time.  (34a ¶121).  Employees hired in 1985 could accumulate fourteen (14) months of time.  (34a ¶121).  Further, employees hired after 1986 could accumulate twelve (12) months of time.  Employees hired after October 16, 2006 could only accumulate six (6) months of time.  (34a ¶122).
[brief] The purpose is to “maintain public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process, which in turn depends on a belief in the impersonality of judicial decision making. ”  *Id.* at 74-75.  A judge’s impartiality and fairness must be “above suspicion,” thus the “integrity of the judicial process will be cast in doubt” where a judge acts in a “a manner that may be perceived as partial,” even if she honestly believes she can be impartial.  *Id.* at 70-71.
[brief] For the first step, if the applicant demonstrates that the “invert of the culvert” cannot be “installed at least two feet below the invert of the natural channel,” then the applicant must instead comply with the second step.  N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(h)(1).  Here, [...] proposed a two-foot pipe culvert “based on the width and character of the” channel.  (Aa155).  A pipe culvert two feet in diameter should not be constructed more than two feet below ground because burying the entire culvert into the sediment would render the culvert, which is meant to carry the channel’s water, inoperable.  Technical Manual, Flood Hazard Area Control Act Rules N.J.A.C. 7:13, page 249 (culverts are partially buried to facilitate a natural stream bottom).  But when the first approach cannot be met because “the placement of two feet of substrate within the culvert would not be feasible,” the applicant can meet the second part of the rule if the floor of the culvert is “constructed to incorporate an artificial low-flow treatment, such as [ ] a concave floor. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7(h)(2).  This circular pipe culvert meets this requirement because it will have a concave floor.  [...]’s U.S. Route 1 access road also minimized riparian impacts where possible.
[brief] The trial court concluded—and Appellants do not contest on appeal—that a preliminary injunction was necessary to avoid irreparable harm. \(^6\)  There are at least two relevant irreparable harms here.  For one, as the trial court recognized, \(^6\)  Although the State below argued that it did not have to establish an irreparable harm when seeking preliminary injunctive relief under N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1, the court found no need to evaluate that question because the State had amply shown irreparable harm.  See (Da113).  Since Appellants do not directly challenge that finding of irreparable harm on appeal, that issue is not squarely before this court.  That said, the State need not establish irreparable harm.  The Legislature authorized the Attorney General and the Director to “obtain an injunction” after filing an administrative complaint—an indication the Legislature believes it sufficient for the State to establish a defendant “has engaged in, is engaging in, or is about to engage in” a violation of the LAD.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1; see also, e.g., United States v. Nutri-cology, 982 F.2d 394, 498 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that where the government has brought a “statutory enforcement case[]” and has shown a sufficient probability on the merits, “further inquiry into irreparable injury is unnecessary”; “the passage of the statute is itself an implied finding by Congress that violations will harm the public”); N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Boro Auto Wrecking Co., No. A-4920-04T3, 2006 WL 3007394, at *5 (App. Div. Oct. 24, 2006) (Ra1-5) (same); Hoffman v. Garden State Farms, Inc., 76 N.J. Super. 189, 201 (N.J. Ch. 1962) (same).
[brief] Cf Rockaway Shoprite Associates, Inc. v. City of Linden, 424 N.J. Super. 337, 348 (App. Div. 2011) (Appellate Division observing that with respect to notice requirements it discerned “no meaningful difference between the municipality's exercise of its quasi-judicial power over proposed development applications and its legislative power to enact zoning ordinances to regulate the use of land by local ordinance. ”).  In arguing for a contrary conclusion, defendants have previously cited and relied upon several distinguishable unpublished opinions. \(^5\)  For example, in *Meredith v. Borough Council of the Borough of Somerdale*, No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. May 5, 2020), aff’d, 2022 WL 1816530 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. June 3, 2022)\(^6\), Somerdale published a notice following the first reading of the challenged ordinance which included **the entire ordinance**.