ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] That's my question.  [...]:  The township was not notified of that potential consequence.  [1T188:14-25, -189:1-4 (emphasis added)]  The absence of any concerns with respect to risk management is very persuasive proof that [...] does not, in fact and practice, believe its lawyers’ panicked descriptions in pre-filed testimony of the “risks” involved with the current regulator.  The ID and the [...] Decision ignored this.  It is settled law in New Jersey that a regulated utility can be held liable for the consequences of a service outage caused by the utility's negligence.  See, e.g., Muise v. GPU, Inc., 332 N.J. Super. 140 (App. Div.  This liability can attach even if the utility is in compliance with applicable regulations (which are quoted in the opinion) and all the terms of its tariffs.  *Id.* at 166-169.  See also *Underwriters v. Public Electric*, 459 N.J.Super. 436 (App. Div. 2019)(expansive view of damages available to homeowners due to utility outage caused by negligence).  [...]'s claims of a potential loss of service are simply not credible.  Its witnesses disavowed them on cross-examination and it makes no sense that the company would voluntarily expose itself to such liability.  [...]'s claims of need and of icing "issues" are not credible.  They cannot justify the proposed regulator.  At the very least, the [...]’s finding that the [...] witnesses were “credible” is arbitrary and capricious and not based on a review of the entire record.  See *In Re Proposed Quest Academy Char.*, supra, 216 N.J. at 386.  4.  The [...] Decision And Initial Decision Are Fatally Wrong About The Application Of New Jersey's Climate Law To This Proceeding (Argued Below: Ha105)
[brief] ” (Pa98, Redevelopment Plan, Sec. 3.1 at p. 17).  (emphasis added).  During the public hearing on Ordinance 2022-15, and the Plan, the Committee heard testimony from [...]’s professional planner, [...].  He opined that the Redevelopment Plan was inconsistent with the Township Master Plan.  (1T.17:9-25 through 23:1-2).  His opinion, therefore, was different from that held by the Township Planner.  Following the public hearing, the Committee approved the Redevelopment Plan by adopting Ordinance 2022-15 with a majority vote.  (Pa278-Pa283).  Accordingly, nothing about the adoption of 2022-15 was “deficient. ” (Pb18).  The Township Committee followed both N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 and N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7 in adopting the legislation.  The Township Committee nevertheless determined that the differences in the opinions offered by the two planners regarding Master Plan consistency should be addressed.
[brief] Here, on November 5, 2015, Plaintiffs filed the appropriate notice pursuant to Title-59.  Plaintiffs’ pre-suit investigation revealed that the [...] had entered into a contract with [...] for construction services related to the subject project on the Garden State Parkway.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ initial complaint was filed against [...] and [...] for, among other things, their failure to inspect, maintain, and repair dangerous conditions on the roadway.  The initial complaint also identified fictitious parties in the original complaint pursuant to Rule 4:26-4.  Plaintiffs’ fictitious party count specifically incorporated by reference each of the previous paragraphs and previous Counts which identified the existence of the construction project and the defendants’ responsibility to inspect, maintain, and correct dangerous conditions on the Garden State Parkway.  (Pa1550).  Further, Plaintiffs’ exercise of due diligence is evident in the record.  Upon receiving Defendants’ Answers, Plaintiff promptly requested and reviewed voluminous amounts of discovery provided by the initial defendants.  As discovery was received and depositions were taken, Plaintiffs learned of new entities with responsibility for the inspection, maintenance and repair of the subject area of the Parkway.  Consequently, Plaintiffs moved to add defendants [...], [...], and [...].
[brief] See Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 580 (citing Fahey v. City of Jersey City, 52 N.J. 103, 107 (1968)).  A plain language, and ordinary, reading of the harassment statute supports Plaintiff’s reasonable belief that Defendant [...]’s actions, which included verbal abuse, profanity, and physical intimidation without contact, fell within the statutory definition.  That Plaintiff, and others who complained about Defendant [...], may not know the details of the State’s harassment statute is irrelevant.  The complaining employee need not specifically articulate the “exact violation” that is occurring.  See Hernandez v. Montville Tp. Bd. of Educ., 354 N.J. Super. 467, 474 (App. Div.2002), aff’d o.b., 179 N.J. 81 (2004).  “The object of CEPA is not to make lawyers out of conscientious employees but rather to prevent retaliation against those employees who object to employer conduct that they reasonably believe to be unlawful. ”  Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 153 N.J. 163, 193-94 (1998).  As such, Plaintiff is not required know the “precise contours and components of the public policy,” may learn of the specific violations after the filing of the complaint and may identify them specifically for the first time as late as on appeal.
[directive] 1 2 3 4 ciick Qoarter Agency OR1 Number CakndarYear I: Assets Seized and Forfeifed Part SEIZED US.  Total Currency in Quarter: 1) in FORFElTED US.  Total Currency Quarter: 2)  I - 1.  Narcotics Offenses: Gambling Offenses: Racketeering: - Public Indecency: - . . - Official Corruption: Offens&: Thefl  Other Offenses: B Page 8 Form 31998 lof NJRBPSIDCJ 11  Forfeiture Program
[brief] (Pa 138, Par. 20).  [...] did so and on 9/6/23, received a letter from [...] of the [...] that the claim was denied because “the fraud and claims investigation shows a one-time passcode was sent to the phone number on file and redeemed.  Under our Online Access Agreement and Deposit Account Agreement, the customer is responsible for online wires that originate using their username and password whether or not actually authorized by them”.  (Pa 138, Par. 21).  No one other than the [...] and [...] were aware of [...]’s user name and password and [...] did not provide the user name and password to anyone other than the [...].
[directive] E.  Police Presence at Extra-curricular Events  1.  SNAP Guideline 5.3 provides that each local law enforcement agency, working in conjunction with the appropriate school officials, should provide for the presence of uniformed police officer(s) at all major school sporting events.  It is understood that the procedures for complying with this SNAP Guideline are properly the subject of local agreements or memorandums of understanding entered into between the law enforcement agency and school officials.  In the absence of compelling reasons as may be determined by the county prosecutor or chief executive officer of the law enforcement agency having patrol jurisdiction, uniformed police officers should not be assigned to school functions, and especially those functions occurring within school buildings, except with the approval of the building principal or local superintendent.
[directive] 5  (h)  Officers assigned to “extra duty” or “off duty” assignments that involve strictly traffic direction.  (i)  Officers engaged in crime-scene processing duties.  3.4  Special Circumstances.  Exemptions from the requirements in Section 3.2 are permitted only when approved by the Director of Division of Criminal Justice or the County Prosecutor, and only under such special circumstances that warrant an exemption.  The reasons for the exemption must be documented and demonstrate a special need.  Such requests for exemption shall be made in advance and approved in writing.  3.5
[brief] ”).  However, where a statute is clear and ambiguous on its face and admits only one interpretation, a court must infer the Legislature’s intent from the statute’s plain meaning. ”  O’Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 488 (2002).  When a statute’s plain language lends to only one interpretation, a court should not consider “extrinsic interpretative aids. ”  DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 494 (2005) (quoting Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Constr., 178 N.J. 513, 522 (2004)).  The language of N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f) permitting the collection of negotiated payments is in fact clear on its face.  It admits only one interpretation.  The LRHL authorizes a municipality or its designated redevelopment agency to negotiate the collection of a redevelopment payment provided the payment is connected to the costs of the municipality of redevelopment entity.\textsuperscript{4}  The LRHL does not qualify that relevant redevelopment costs must be part and parcel of a specific redevelopment project.  The lower court was correct to rely upon the plain language of \textit{N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f)} and to find that the Redevelopment Payment could be collected without establishing a nexus between the impact of the [...] and the use of the Redevelopment Payment.
[brief] See R. Docs. 84, 95, & 96.  Thereafter, on February 12, 2014, the Court issued a “Preliminary Injunction Order” prohibiting [...] from rendering any services to or for [...] or any competing business in areas the Court found to be “restricted areas” and prohibited a host of other actions on behalf of [...].  See R. Doc. 95–96.  Also on February 12, 2014, the Court issued an Order for Contempt and Appointing Special Master Monitor Compliance with the Preliminary Injunction Order, appointing [...], to act as a special master to monitor [...]’s compliance with this Court’s preliminary injunction.
[brief] ”  *State v. Townsend*, 186 N.J. 473, 494 (2006).  “Simply put, the net opinion rule ‘requires an expert to give the why and wherefore of his or her opinion,’” *Ibid.* (quoting *Rosenberg v. Tavorath*, 352 N.J. Super. 385, 401 (App. Div. 2002)), rather than “bare conclusions, unsupported by factual evidence. ”  *Buckelew v. Grossbard*, 87 N.J. 512 524 (1981).  This rule “frequently focuses … on the failure of the expert to explain a causal connection between the act or incident complained of and the injury or damage allegedly resulting therefrom. ”  *Ibid.*  In restricting [...]’s testimony at trial, the trial court properly held that while his report cites to RPC 1.5 and to the case law addressing an attorney’s obligation to their client, he failed to apply any RPC 1.5 factor to this case.
[brief] On April 29, 2011, about 5:30 p.m., a person dressed in all dark clothing wearing a hooded sweatshirt and dark colored boots with a mask on his face approached the front door, and attempted to gain entry[to [...]’s pharmacy].  When the suspect could not gain entry, he turned and walked away.  That person attempted to open the door with his right hand.  His left hand was in his pocket not visible.  Although the elements of the crime *do not* support the crime charge, [...] was still charged with robbery and attempted robbery although “no attempted robbery” occurred.  The trial court believed that the same individual has ‘dog-eared’ boots in the two pharmacy surveillances, was wearing a black sweatshirt with the Champion brand emblem visible in the two pharmacy incidents, and appears to be wearing a black handkerchief with white spots.  [...];
[brief] (Pa323).  He reported to [...]’s supervisor, Director of the Division of Water Supply and Geoscience [...], that [...] had been “standing in [[...]’s] personal space” while admonishing him.  (Pa323).  Plaintiff did not make reference to his age or gender in his report.  (Pa323).  The [...] conducted an investigation and concluded that [...] had behaved in an inappropriate manner in admonishing her subordinate in violation of [...] policy.  (Pa329).  It issued a determination letter on July 26, 2012.  (Pa329).  On October 18, 2012, the [...] issued an amended letter clarifying that while the behavior described was not appropriate, it did not rise to the level of “workplace violence. ”  (Pa331).  There is no indication [...] violated any anti-discrimination policies.  (Pa331).  On February 10, 2015, [...] filed an EEO complaint that he was mistreated based on age and gender by [...] and [...].
[brief] The [...] Brief persists in the claim that the burden of proof rested on the School objector, and that the [...] as proponent --- 1  The defendant [...]’s Attorney here was the Attorney for the Plaintiff-Appellant [...] in that case. of the nonconforming use had no proof burden (Pb32-36).  The Trial Court surprisingly adopted that position.  (Da279)  It should be noted that any [...] claim that this position on burden of proof was not asserted by the School below (Pb 35-36) is simply not accurate.  The point and relevant case law was presented to the Zoning Board in a legal analysis letter before the Board hearing (Da71).  At the Board hearing, the Board Chairman repeatedly asked the [...] and its Attorney to present facts or evidence to demonstrate that this off-site parking use was legal at its inception or had ever received a Site Plan or variance Approval.  The [...] Attorney repeatedly responded with an acknowledgement that no such proof could be produced (1T25-15 to 30-7; 1T30-8 to 34-14; 1T42-2 to 47-8).  The [...] position at the Board hearing and now is that the zoning legality issue is superseded and negated by the Chancery Court ruling that a parking easement/permission was granted by the School to the [...] in the 1963 Agreement.  The burden of proof point was fully briefed to the Trial Court, and that Court’s ruling that the School had the burden of proof --- and not the [...] as proponent of the non-conforming use/facility --- is inexplicable and incorrect.  The burden of proof point has been briefed in our initial Appellate Brief (Db28-36).  To the [...] assertion that 40:55D-68 placed the burden on an objector “applicant” filing an application to challenge the legality of a non-conforming use, that assertion has been dismissed in Bonaventure Int. 350 N.J. Super. at 427 and Berkeley Square 410 N.J. Super. at 265.  In both cases, the Application was filed by neighbor objectors.  Both decisions affirm that the burden of proof rests upon the proponent of the continuation of the non-conforming use.  That is clearly the law since Heagan in 1956 and under the MLUL, and rests upon solid policy reasons and analysis set forth in numerous Court Opinions.  The [...] position is without merit, and the Trial Court’s ruling that the burden of proof rested on the School and was not met is clearly error.  D.
[brief] In considering Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Superior Court considered the plain language of the MSRA, and properly applied that language to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint.  Plaintiffs’ response on appeal is to ignore the plain language of the MSRA, or alternatively argue that the Superior Court’s interpretation was somehow improper.  Plaintiffs’ position is contrary to basic tenants of statutory interpretation, and should be rejected by this Court.  The Superior Court properly dismissed the Complaint, because it does nothing more than complain of a permissible and authorized action under the MSRA.
[brief] He testifies that a mean high-water line changes over time for two reasons.  One would be natural accretion, sand doing its natural thing, either being dumped on the land or taken away in a nasty storm, which would be natural accretion changes along that natural line.  There is also manmade accretion or the opposite, taking sand away which would be erosion.  Manmade accretion is a beach-fill project which has happened there many times.  Accretion means someone is adding to whatever was there already (5T:19-23).  If there was a boundary between the water and the land that was made up of sand, something is added to that boundary if there is accretion whereas erosion is the opposite, something is subtracting from that boundary (5T20:5).  He testifies that he prepared a map in connection with an application that the [...] filed with the [...] (5T20:22).  Looking at J-1 (Pa900) he signed it as a surveyor and the purpose of it is that it is a boundary survey and topo depicting Lot 3, and Lot 3.01 in Block 184 (5:21:12).  He indicates that the “snaky-curved lines” are the [...] the [...] is leasing to [...] (5T22:8).  He plotted the Tax Map and superimposed where the go-cart is in relation to Lots 3 and 3.01.
[directive] a.  No person assigned to the Office of Counter-Terrorism shall submit data for entry into the Statewide Intelligence Management System (SIMS) unless such data has been reviewed by a designated supervisor who has been trained in the requirements of 28 C.F.R Part 23, and that supervisor has determined that the information satisfies the data entry standards set forth in both 28 C.F.R. Part 23 and the 2004 Attorney General Guidelines on the Collection, Handling, Storage and Dissemination of Intelligence in New Jersey, including as such guidelines may be amended pursuant to Section 2 of this Directive.  Special supervisory care shall be taken whenever information proposed for entry into the SIMS system relates to or references a person or organization who/that has not previously been entered into the system.  The Office of Counter-Terrorism, subject to the direction and review of the Attorney General or his/her designee, shall establish procedures to ensure that data proposed for entry into SIMS is subjected to supervisory review as expeditiously as practicable.
[brief] ”  See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988).  In contrast, no such requirement exists under CEPA.  Under the Trial Court’s logic, a police officer could: [a] discover that his Chief of Police was committing official misconduct by, for example, “stealing time” and seeking compensation for hours that the Chief in fact did not work, or fixing tickets or terminating DWI prosecutions of the Chief’s friends or family members, or other public officials, and [b] so long as the Chief never previously announced the intent to engage in that illegal conduct or stated that it was an established policy or practice to do so, [c] that police officer would have no remedy under CEPA if he objected to or refused to participate in that misconduct and was retaliated against by his employer by way of a suspension, demotion, termination, or some other adverse employment action.  Such a scenario is directly at odds with the purpose of the CEPA statute, its case law cited supra, and the high standard by which members of law enforcement are bound, per our State Official Misconduct statute and its broad application by our Courts.  For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has established for the purposes of summary judgment inferences that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Plaintiff satisfies the “reasonable belief” and “whistle-blowing” prima facie elements of his CEPA claim.  Thus, the Trial Court improperly granted summary judgment below and this Court should reverse that ruling upon its de novo review.
[brief] Super. 616, 643 (App. Div. 1996) (underscoring state interest in combatting discrimination “is compelling, beyond cavil”).  The compelling interest in eradicating discrimination is particularly clear in cases involving LGBTQ+ students, especially when the governmental action involves notification that they requested not occur.  The State has a “compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors,” *Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist.*, 897 F.3d 518, 528 (3d Cir. 2018), including transgender youth, who face “extraordinary social, psychological, and medical risks” in connection with discriminatory policies in school, *id.* at 529; see also N.J. Pub. L. 2018, ch. 60 § 1(a), 1(g) (state legislative finding that transgender individuals “face considerable challenges in society, including discrimination, harassment, physical abuse, and social isolation,” and “[m]ore than 75 percent of survey respondents experienced some form of mistreatment, including physical or sexual assault, between kindergarten and grade 12, due to their being out or perceived as transgender”).  The State has a clear interest in avoiding such discrimination against LGBTQ+ students.  See *Boyertown*, 897 F.3d at 528-29; *Matter of T.I.C.-C.*, 470 N.J. Super. 596, 609-10 (App. Div. 2022).  The preliminary injunction advances these interests.  As explained above, Appellants’ Policies discriminate against LGBTQ+ students under a disparate-treatment or disparate-impact lens.  Enjoining enforcement merely while [...]’s administrative proceeding unfolds ameliorates that discrimination.  Moreover, because the Policies would likely cause some to forego disclosing their sexual orientation or gender identity for fear of being outed, the Policies would hinder schools from “creating a support system and providing counseling” for these students.  See *John & Jane Parents*, 622 F.Supp.3d at 138-39.  The injunction thus “ensure[s] that [LGBTQ+] children feel safe and well at school,” id. at 138, while Appellants’ approach would unfortunately do the opposite.  Finally, the preliminary injunction is carefully tailored.  As laid out above, the injunction is exclusively focused on communications from the school based on a protected characteristic, while leaving intact the student’s ability to disclose their LGBTQ+ status to their parents—and the order certainly does not counsel students against doing so.  It has no bearing on parents’ ability to communicate regarding any matters of sexual orientation or gender identity to their children.  Nor does it prevent the school from notifying parents of the student’s LGBTQ+ status if the student does not object, or the school has a compelling and nondiscriminatory justification for the disclosure, such as the health and safety of a student or the school’s obligation to report an incident of bias-related crime.  And, of course, the court order is temporary: it lasts only until [...] resolves the administrative proceeding, perfectly tailored to the State’s interest in preventing discrimination and protecting the status quo while its action proceeds.
[brief] This matter began in 2017 with [...]’s initial Hardship Application, submitted to the Board pursuant to §155-14 of the Hoboken Code.  The Board held three separate hearings from September through December 2017 regarding [...]’s hardship increase application.  See 3T at 5:1-3.  On December 13, 2017, the Board granted [...]’s application and increased [...]’s rent.  See id. at 5:14-16.  [...] appealed the Board’s decision with the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division before Hon. [...], J.S.C., under docket no. [...].  The court agreed with [...] and found that the Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably.  See id. at 14:24-25, 15:1-3.  The court remanded the matter back to the Board.
[brief] BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE  [...] AND THE NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF THE INSURANCE  FRAUD PROSECUTOR #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE .................................................................. | 1 | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ....................................................................... | 4 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................... | 6 | | ARGUMENT | | | POINT I | | |
[brief] (9T 175-13 to 16, 176-13 to 17, 183-8 to 19, 184-8 to 11)  Defense counsel further argued that evidence showed that things did not happen the way [...] said that they did.  (9T 184-16 to 22)  The prosecutor responded in closing by reflecting that, as a child he “loved magic tricks” and was impressed by “something disappearing” and “something reappearing. ”  (9T 197-3 to 4, 197-9 to 10)