ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] M40.  Prior to the Mayor's press release, Plaintiffs had no reason to believe that the proposed development of the Subject Property, which was included in the Township's own court-ordered Mount Laurel settlement, would be prohibited or opposed by the Township.  Ra26  The Mayor's press release also stated that "The developer could have easily reduced the amount of housing units to lower the density and create an appropriate buffer to protect the bald eagle...  But, instead, the plan calls for building rental apartments, some of which will be on top of reduced retail space right on Route 33.  It will be unsightly, unnecessary and not in the best interest for [...]."  Ra27.  Thus, through false statements and innuendo, the Mayor told the public that Plaintiffs were not providing "an appropriate buffer" to protect the bald eagle's nest, when the truth is that a fully lawful 660-foot buffer protecting the nest was proposed.  *Id.*  Moreover, as the Mayor was well aware given the Settlement Agreement he had signed, any reduction in the density of the Amended Application would have been inconsistent with the Settlement Agreement, as such a reduction would reduce the number of affordable units on the Subject Property and put the Township out of compliance with its Mount Laurel obligations.  *Id.*  No such alleged concerns were raised by the Mayor’s representative in the numerous TRC meetings, where such comments might have been productive.  Instead, the Mayor laid in wait and launched his interference campaign first behind the scenes, and then publicly at the last moment, primarily through the published Township press release, in order to generate public opposition to development of a property that is part of the Township’s own affordable housing plan, as the Mayor well knew given his signature on the subject Settlement Agreement.
[brief] Respectfully, either the Trial Court misread the facts of the Complaint and Plaintiffs’ briefs, or the Court was successfully misled by Defendants’ misrepresentation and red herring that the subject transaction was a complex, multi-party, multi-property transaction.  1T 5:12-16.  A correct reading of the facts in the Complaint and Plaintiffs’ briefs clearly shows that the transaction at issue is no different than any other basic, simple real estate transaction – that is, there is a buyer (Plaintiffs) and there were sellers.  The single transaction which is the subject transaction of this matter is a simple real estate transaction in which Plaintiffs were the buyer, there were sellers, and [...] in concert with non-attorney co-conspirator Defendants, by their fraudulent acts, wrongfully took transactional proceeds.  While Plaintiffs strongly oppose the Trial Court’s erroneous finding that the subject transaction was in fact a complex, multi-party, multi-property transaction for all the reasons set forth above, the complexity or simplicity of the underlying transaction is actually not even relevant to the Tort Counts.  Even assuming arguendo the underlying transaction was complex, the only facts relevant to proving liability for Plaintiffs’ Tort Claims was the act of wrongfully taking Plaintiffs’ money.  This was the separate factual predicate, which the Trial Court erroneously stated was never presented (1T 38:24–39:6), but was in fact specifically and exhaustively outlined repeatedly in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, briefs, and oral arguments.  The background transaction in which [...] committed this simple wrongful act could involve the most complex legal transaction imaginable, but that simple wrongful act in concert with non-attorney co-conspirator  Defendants remains separate and apart in its clarity and simplicity, and is completely estranged from anything resembling legal work.  In fact, non-attorneys participated in and perpetrated the simple, wrongful act, and those same claims against them survived and proceeded to trial where the parties reached a settlement.  The Trial Court’s error should be reversed.
[brief] 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd...........................................................................4  RULES  R. 1:36-3 .........................................................................................21 R.  4:10-2 .........................................................................................33  R.10-2(a) .....................................................................................passim R. 4:10-2(f) ....................................................................................34  R. 4:10-2(f)(2) ..............................................................................34  R. 4:14-3(c) ................................................................................18, 22 R. 4:18-1 ....................................................................................31, 33, 36  OTHER AUTHORITIES  The Sedona Conference: Commentary on Achieving Quality in the E- Discovery Process, 15 Sedona Conf. J. 265 (2014)..............................18, 19, 20  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] [...] FAILS TO MEET THE OTHER REQUIREMENTS OF THE NJFPA  [...]’s claims still fail on the other NJFPA factors.  In addition to a written arrangement between the parties and the transfer of a license, the NJFPA requires that the alleged franchisee show there is a community of interest in the marketing of goods or services at wholesale, retail, by lease, agreement, or otherwise, with the purported franchisor.  N.J.S.A. 56:10-3.  Furthermore, the NJFPA is only applicable to a franchise: (1) the performance of which contemplates or requires the franchisee to establish or maintain a place of business within the State of New Jersey,\(^4\) (2) where gross sales of products or services between the franchisor and franchisee covered by such franchise shall have exceeded $35,000.00 for the 12 months next preceding the institution of suit pursuant to this act,\(^5\) and (3) where more than 20% of the franchisee's gross sales are intended to be or are derived from such franchise.
[brief] (2T 5-9 to 17; Da 12-13)  On Count Two (kidnapping) defendant was sentenced to a term of 30 years with an 85% parole bar.  (2T 4-23 to 5-6; Da 12-13)  Counts Three and Four (unlawful possession of a weapon and possession of a weapon for unlawful purpose) were merged with Count One (armed robbery).  (2T 4-21 to 22; Da 12-13)  On Count Five (resisting arrest) defendant was sentenced to a flat term of 18 months.  (2T 5-18 to 19; Da 12-13)  All sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.  (2T 5-19 to 21; Da 12-13)  It is unclear whether defendant appealed his convictions and/or sentence under Indictment Numbers [...] and [...].7
[brief] In *State v. Laganella*, 144 N.J. Super. 268 (App. Div. 1976), app. dism. 74 N.J. 256 (1977), the court set forth the standard for dealing with instances of evidence lost or destroyed:  Before a dismissal of an indictment is warranted in such circumstances, we believe there must be a finding of intention inconsistent with fair play and therefore inconsistent with due process, or an egregious carelessness or prosecutorial excess tantamount to suppression.  *Id.* at 282.  This matter implicates a lack of fair play by the State.  As Defense Counsel argued before the Trial Court, bad faith clearly existed here.  It was only due to the unilateral conduct of [...] that the information relative to his “Adam4Adam” profile was destroyed.  From this, one can absolutely infer that the destruction of the evidence at issue was not inadvertent, but rather, was a conscious act on the part of [...] to avoid the preservation of evidence which may not support the testimony that would have been elicited from him at trial.  The Trial Court agreed with Defense Counsel:  … what we have here, this Court finds, is an egregious carelessness on the part of [...] that simply cannot be cured.  And let’s be clear about this.  [...] went to great lengths to preserve all of the chats and text messages exchanged between [...] and [...].  Now, look.  There’s no question here that [...] for the State, or [...], have not conducted themselves in anything but an honest manner, with integrity.  Unfortunately for the State here, the egregious carelessness of the detective in this case failing to preserve the profile information which con -- which contains the -- again, essentially the bait with which [...] was lured, including the age of the person purportedly that the profile belonged to as well as the full, un-pixelated, uncropped photographs of this individual on the Adam4Adam website.  All of that was preserved.  But the profile was not preserved.  There’s simply no explanation for that.  Not only that, the State concedes, or at least the State asserts that [...] simply forgot the login information that he used to create the profile.
[directive] Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  Tout plent, petisyon ak lòt papye ki soumèt ba tribinal la fèt pou an angle.  Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English  Sistèm Jidisyè  New Jersey  New Jersey Judiciary
[brief] The Court discussed the issue in terms of materiality, saying: [t]here is no factual dispute concerning what was offered and when.  The parties agree on what was discussed and what was offered.  The only argument is whether the changes in the terms of the offer was, in the words of plaintiff, mere "tweaking", or whether the changes were such as to constitute a new offer.  We are convinced that the changes in this case were not mere "tweaking."  The change in price was certainly material.  The language and extent of an indemnity agreement was material, as was the determination to "cap" legal fees.  In a $1,500,000 transaction which involves property that may have significant environmental issues, as well as other issues, a limitation of $5000 on legal fees on its face appears material.  The changes in each successive offer were inconsistent with the prior offer and, therefore, terminated the prior offer and created a new offer.  See RGC Int'l Investors, LDC v. Ari Network Services, Inc. 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1161 (D. Del. 2004); Norca Corp. v. Tokheim Corp., 227 A.D.2d 458, 643 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App. Div. 1996); Restatement of the Law (Second) Contracts § 43 (1981); 1-2 Murray on Contracts § 42 (4th ed. 2001).
[brief] Throughout the interrogation, the detectives accused him of the murder, asserting their theories of how and why he did it.  (1T; 7T 214-17 to 241-6; 8T --- \(^6\)  The trial transcripts of the interview contain many “indiscernible” markings, so parallel citations are provided to the [...] ([...]) transcript, (1T; Da 4-108), which was admitted at trial, (7T 253-22).  Although [...] did not testify at trial, on the interrogation video, the detectives claimed that an eyewitness had identified [...], and they also accused him of shooting at [...] two days earlier, though no one testified about such an incident.  (1T 65-19 to 74-3; 8T 68-24 to 79-16)  The jury also heard him repeatedly ask to “go home” and say that he had “nothing else to say. ”  (1T 93-9 to 98-19; 9T 17-20 to 34-11)  During the interview, [...] said he had been drinking that night and did not recall precise times but that he went to [...] around “11:00 something” p.m., walked around for a while to “sober up,” and then drove to the nearby home of the mother of his children, [...], where he retired.
[brief] He had pain in both of his knees and up and down his legs.  T17-18 to T18-11.  [...] verbally informed his employer that he was in pain.  He had complained to [...], his immediate boss, two to three times per week, and he had even mentioned to the owner, [...], that his knees weren’t working.  T8-13 to T9-6, T11-18 to T12-7, T19-1 to T19-6.  His employer’s only response was to shake their head, T19-15 to T19-18, saying it will be alright, T19-19 to T19-22, or to make comments like, “That’s what an old person does, they start aching.
[brief] N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2015) | 44 | | Edelstein v. Wilentz, 812 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1987) | 10, 11 | | Filgueiras v. Newark Pub. Sch., 426 N.J. Super. 449, 468 (App. Div. 2012)| 44 | | Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F.Supp. 2d 273, 280 (D.N.J. 2013) | 45 | | Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982)| 29, 30 | | In re Farmers' Mut. Fire Assurance Ass'n of N.J., 256 N.J. Super. 607 (App. Div. 1992) | 34 | | In re LiVolsi, 85 N.J. 576 (1981) | 14 | | In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) | 41 | | Kirkpatrick v. Hidden View Farm, 448 N.J. Super. 165 (App. Div. 2017) | 32 | | Knight v. City of Margate, 86 N.J. 374 (1981) | passim | | Martin v. Unknown U.S. Marshals, 965 F. Supp. 2d 502 (D.N.J. 2013) | 45 | | Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) | 10 | | Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) | 41 | | New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. State, 387 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 2006) | 10, 11 | | Persels & Assocs., LLC v. Banking Commissioner, 318 Conn. 652 (Conn. 2015) | 26, 27, 29 | Potter v. New Jersey Supreme Ct., 403 F. Supp. 1036 (D.N.J. 1975) ..................10  Quick Chek Food Stores v. Twp. Of Springfield, 83 N.J. 438 (1980)  ...............8  R.M. v. Supreme Ct., 185 N.J. 208, 213, (2005)  .............................................24  Random House, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 22 N.J. Tax 485 (2005) ............37 Robertelli v. New Jersey Off. of Atty. Ethics, 224 N.J. 470 (2016) ..................24 Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1206-07 (3d Cir. 1988) .........................44 Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc. 214 N.J. 419 (2013) ......................................16 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. State, 124 N.J. 32 (1991) ............................8 State v. Afanador, 134 N.J. 162 (1993) .........................................................34 State v. Badr, 415 N.J. Super. 455 (App. Div. 2010) .....................................30 State v. Cameron, 100 N.J. 586 (1985) ..........................................................33 State v. Higginbotham, 475 N.J. Super. 205 (App. Div. 2023) .........................39 State v. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. 1 (1979) ..............................................................34 State v. Mortimer, 135 N.J. 517 (1994) .........................................................34
[brief] (Pb24)  Respectfully, *Mejia* did no such thing.  Notwithstanding plaintiffs’ mischaracterization that the *Mejia* court “identified the exact same, specific issue as in dispute here,” *ibid*, the text of the Mejia opinion, itself, undermines the premise that this specific issue was properly and fairly before the Supreme Court.  The Mejia case involved a third-party defendant, [...], who did not wish to participate in the trial; that third-party defendant was himself requesting dismissal and treatment commensurate with the defendants in Burt and Jones v. Morey’s Pier.  Id. at 365.  The third-party plaintiffs advancing the claims against [...] requested and received an unopposed order of court declaring that they were not obligated to serve an Affidavit of Merit in connection with their third-party claims against [...].  Id. at 366.  The trial court held that [...] nevertheless must participate at trial in connection with those third-party claims; in ultimately affirming that determination, the Supreme Court observed that [...] “fails to present a meritorious right to dismissal” and thus was an active third-party defendant obligated to participate at trial.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiff-Relator [...] ("Relator") brings this New Jersey False Claims Act ("NJFCA") case to redress a fraud by five large banks ("Defendants").  The fraud relates to the way they reset rates on bonds issued by state and local governments to fund projects in the public interest.  Relator and Defendants cross-moved for summary judgment on the public disclosure bar, an affirmative defense available in NJFCA cases.  The bar protects the State from parasitism, actions brought by relators who base a claim on public information and then seek a portion of the State’s recovery.  The bar is not intended to protect wrongdoers who have defrauded the State.
[brief] A defendant’s claim for setoff need not arise from the same transaction as plaintiff’s claim, rather a “setoff may be awarded for any amount to which the defendant is entitled. ”  Beneficial Fin. Co. of Atl. City v. Swaggerty, 86 N.J. 602, 609, 432 A.2d 512, 516 (1981); Est. of Gimelstob v. Holmdel Fin. Servs. Inc., No. A-3341-18T3, 2021 WL 19220, at *14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 4, 2021) (“[S]etoff is an equitable right that provides for affirmative recovery on a claim that may be independent of the transaction upon which plaintiffs' claims were based.
[brief] Many of these invoices contained “block billing” entries which did not appear to be divisible pursuant to the “time necessary to litigate approach” adopted by [...].  (E.g., Da55-Da178.)  In particular, [...] relied on the Certification of [...], Esq., – [...]’s counsel – to support its claim for fees based on the “time necessary to litigate” approach.  Mr. Noble claimed to have performed the following tasks in order to isolate compensable legal fees:  -  Each of [...]’s bills were reviewed by its counsel on a line-by-line basis.  Where a specific task identified in one of the billing entries related to a specific insurance company other than [...] or [...], the fees incurred for that task were deducted from the monthly total on the bill.  - Similarly, where a specific task identified in one of the billing entries related to an issue on which [...] did not succeed, the fees incurred for that task were deducted from the monthly total.  -  After all deductions were made, the remainder of [...]’s legal fees for any given month were treated as if they all related equally to all insurance company defendants and were divided by the number of insurance company defendants that were parties to the case during that month.  (Da0183 at ¶¶ 25-27.)  The issue with the application of this method is that the 15 years of legal invoices produced by [...] are replete with instances of block billing, such that actually identifying those deductible time values assigned to unsuccessful issues and other insurer defendants is impossible.  (E.g., Da55-Da178.)  [...] was granted a period of discovery on the issues of attorneys’ fees and interest.
[brief] **POINT I**  THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION FAILED TO CONSIDER WELL-SETTLED LAW REQUIRING OPRA REQUESTORS TO IDENTIFY A DISCRETE AND LIMITED SUBJECT MATTER AND PROHIBITING REQUESTS FOR ALL OF AN AGENCY’S RECORDS.  (Da45; Da56).  The trial court’s decision finding [...]’s request valid under OPRA was based on a clear misunderstanding and misapplication of the law.  [...] doubles down on the trial court’s errors and asks this court to relieve requestors of their obligations to identify records using a discrete and limited subject matter, and ---  1  The procedural history and statement of facts are closely related in this matter and have been combined to avoid repetition and for the court’s convenience.
[brief] ACa37-ACa38 ¶ 57.  II.  Social transition is a significant psychotherapeutic intervention.  The primary purpose of social transitioning is to relieve the psychological distress associated with having a mismatch between one’s natal sex and gender identity.  ACa14 ¶ 9.  Social transitioning is an “impactful psychotherapeutic intervention” in the life of a child.  ACa12 ¶ 8.e.  Indeed, “a social transition represents one of the most difficult psychological changes a person can experience. ”  ACa31 ¶ 42.  Like other forms of healthcare treatment, however, social transitioning is not without risks.  First, social transitioning may cause a minor’s transgender identity to persist.  Absent social transitioning, for the vast majority of children, “gender incongruence does not persist” into adulthood.  ACa13 ¶ 20.  But once a child is socially transitioned and lives as their aspired-to gender, the likelihood that the child’s transgender identity will persist into adulthood “dramatic[ally]” increases.  ACa25 ¶ 30.  In this way, social transitioning itself can change “gender identity outcomes” in the lives of children.  ACa25-ACa30 at IV.a.  Second, in most cases, social transitioning is the first step down the road to graduated “affirmative” care for the child in the form of puberty blockers and cross- sex hormones, which can “have permanent, long-term effects,” including but not limited to sterility.  ACa35 ¶ 53; see also United Kingdom National Health Service Website (noting that “long term cross-sex hormone treatment may cause . . . permanent infertility”), ACa88–92.  The risks associated with this graduated care must be considered when deciding whether to socially transition a minor.  ACa22-ACa23 ¶¶ 24–25.  Third, the recent surge of youth reporting a transgender identity suggests that “cultural and/or social factors may contribute—even substantially—to a young person’s experience of gender variance. ”  ACa19 ¶ 19.  Caution is thus warranted to ensure that a social transition is appropriate.  ACa19 ¶ 19.  Based on these concerns, social transitioning youth must be carefully undertaken with the assistance of a mental health practitioner and the minor’s parents.
[brief] As a result, Plaintiffs’ failure to make a demand for the return of the “converted” property prior to filing suit was fatal to their conversion claims.  Id.  The trial court did not recognize the demand requirement in identifying the elements of conversion, which constitutes a fundamental error of law.  36T52-14 to -22.  However, the trial court correctly observed that a conversion claim “doesn’t require that defendants have an intent to harm the rightful owner of the money that belongs to another. ”
[brief] The trial court denied the [...]’ first motion for summary judgment because the parties had not conducted discovery yet.  2T 18:9-25.  The Court specifically told Appellants that they would “have to produce [an expert]” during discovery to prove their assertion that the solar rights had independent value.  *Id.* at 14:16-25 (stating that Appellants would need an expert if the court did not “throw out [their] case right now. ”).  After the parties completed discovery and Appellants failed to retain or produce an expert to support their dubious assertion that land approvals somehow exist independently of the land itself, the trial court considered [...]’ second motion for summary judgment.
[brief] *Gerba v Board of Trustees*, 83 N.J. 174, 185 (1980); *Atkinson v Parsekian*, 37 N.J. 43, 49 (1962).  A traumatic event can be said to “directly cause” a total and permanent disability within the meaning of the statute only when the event constitutes the “essential, significant or substantial contributing cause” of the disability.