ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................  2  FACTS .....................................................................................................................................  3  I.  Lot 3 and Lot 4 Title History Prior to 1967 .................................................................  3  II.  The 1967 Subdivision ....................................................................................................  4  III.  Lot 3 and Lot 4  Title History  After the 1967 Subdivision ...........................................  6  A.  Lot 3’s Chain of Title Since 1971 Contains The Strip ..............................................  7  B.  The Strip Disappears from Lot 4’s Chain of Title in 1971, Only to Reappear Retroactively ..................................................................................................................  7  IV.  Plaintiff’s Knowledge of Possible Defect in Title Related to the Strip ....................... 9  THE DECISION BELOW .......................................................................................................  11
[brief] Pa55.  Lastly, the [...]’ email to the Certifying Officers on August 16, 2019, acknowledged issues with submitting proof of the Ricci Act notice to members.  Pa84.  The Certifying Officer for the [...] acknowledged distribution of the Ricci Act notice on August 16, 2019, outside the timeframe required by statute.  Pa85.  It does not specify how the information was distributed to active members, and the method of alleged distribution remains unknown. \(^1\)  It is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable that the Board does not have to abide by the statutory timelines applicable to the Board but is unwilling to relax the timeframes applicable to [...].
[directive] In the event that the building principal, local superintendent or any other school official or employee who may have been informed as to the existence of the operation subsequently learns of any information which suggests that the true identity of the undercover officer has been revealed, or that any person has questioned the identity or status of the undercover officer as a bona fide member of the school community, or that the integrity of the operation has been in any other way compromised, such information should be immediately communicated to the law enforcement officer requesting the operation.  c.  The school principal and local superintendent shall be advised whenever an undercover school operation has been suspended or terminated or whenever the undercover officer is permanently removed from the school environment.
[directive] 7.7  Polygraph 7.7.1  N.J.S.A. 2C:40A-1 states that an employer shall not influence, request or require an employee to take or submit to a lie detector test as a condition of employment or continued employment.  To do so constitutes a disorderly persons offense.  Therefore, a law enforcement officer should never be asked to take a polygraph examination as part of an internal affairs investigation.
[brief] On November 4, 2022, the eligibility list was certified a second time and Appellant was rankled No. 2 on the List.  (AA0001)  The No. 1 candidate was improperly certified by the Respondent Commission due to the Respondent [...] (“[...]” or “Respondent [...]”) failing to advise the Commission that the No. 1 candidate had been demoted due to disciplinary action.  (AA0006)  On December 9, 2022, [...] announced promotions which reflected it had improperly applied the “Rule of Three” to bypass Appellant and appoint the No. 3 ranked eligible candidate.  (AA0071-72)  Appellant, upon being advised of the promotion, filed an appeal with Civil Service on December 23, 2022.  (AA0233-235)  She was advised by Civil Service that her appeal was premature, as the Certification had not been returned to the Commission by the [...] and she then refiled her Notice of Appeal on February 10, 2023.  (AA0236-37)  On March 23, 2023, Respondent [...] filed opposition to the appeal.  (AA0223-232; AA0109-141)  On April 10, 2023, Appellant submitted a reply submission.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  A Final Notice of Disciplinary Action dated July 2, 2020 charges [...] resigned not in good standing (EXHIBIT 2).  [...] appealed the Final Notice of Disciplinary Action dated July 2, 2020 (EXHIBIT 3, P. 3a and 4a).  A Zoom hearing was held before ALJ [...] on August 25, 2021.  The record was closed on August 17, 2023.  [...] issued his decision dated May 22, 2023 (EXHIBIT 4, P. 10a – 29a).  [...] reversed the Final Notice of Disciplinary Action and Ordered the penalty against [...] removed and that [...] be awarded back pay, benefits and seniority.  The Acting Chairperson of the Civil Service reversed the ALJ Decision by a decision dated July 19, 2023 (EXHIBIT 5, P. 30a – 33a).  [...] appeals the decision of the Acting Chairperson of the Civil Services Commission.
[brief] fees … .” (Da7, ¶5).  Rather, the Global Fee Application noted that although a total of $2,721,804.14\(^6\) in attorneys’ fees/costs had previously been awarded to [...] in connection with “discrete efforts” to remedy specific purported bad acts of [...] and/or [...], legal work related to those efforts and the related specific purported bad acts were supposedly not included in the 5,485.1 hours of legal work included in the Global Fee App.  (Da7-8, ¶5).  In other words, the Global Fee App. sought payment of $3,570,357.50 in attorneys’ fees for general “execution and collection efforts” in addition to the $2,721,804.14 in attorneys’ fees that had been previously awarded to [...] in connection with remedying specific purported bad acts.  (Da6-8; ¶¶2, 5).
[brief] internal quotations omitted).  Even a single punch can constitute adequate provocation.  *State v. Robinson*, 136 N.J. 476, 491 (1994); *State v. Blanks*, 313 N.J. Super. 55, 71 (App. Div. 1998).  Likewise, “[t]he presence of a gun or knife can satisfy the provocation requirement. ”  *Carrero*, 229 N.J. at 129.  In reviewing the evidence for facts supporting reasonable provocation, a trial court must “examine the record thoroughly” for any evidence supporting the existence of passion/provocation.  *Canfield*, 470 N.J. Super. at 272.  The evaluation of that evidence must be in “a light most favorable to the defendant,” considering “all inferences that logic and common sense will allow,” and finding against including the instruction only when there is no “room for dispute” as to whether a reasonable person would have been provoked.  *Mauricio*, 117 N.J. at 412, 415, 417 (citations and internal quotations omitted).  Because of the low rational-basis threshold, little more than a “scintilla” of evidence is all that is necessary to find a basis for reasonable provocation.  *State v. Crisantos*, 102 N.J. 265, 278 (1986).  Two cases provide particularly useful guidance for evaluating that issue under these facts: *State v. Mauricio* and *State v. Carrero*.
[brief] Instead, the CFPB expressly permitted debt collectors to use letter vendors’ return mail addresses on collection notices, which obviously presumes the permissible use of letter vendors for these purposes.  Crucially, the proposition that transmitting data to a letter vendor falls outside the scope of § 1692c(b) or other FDCPA provisions does not thwart Congress’ goal of protecting consumer privacy.  Other laws and regulations ensure debt collectors, their agents, and service providers implement robust privacy and security safeguards to protect consumer information.  For example, the FTC’s Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Safeguard Rule requires debt collectors to safeguard consumer information.
[brief] .............................................................................15  Princeton Ins. Co. v. Chunmuang, 151 N.J. 80 (1997)  .............................................................................27  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989) .............................................................................16  Ruvolo v. Am. Cas. Co., 39 N.J. 490 (1963) .............................................................................24, 28 Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 340 N.J. Super. 223 (App. Div. 2001), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 608 (2001)
[brief] In a “double-blind placebo-controlled parallel randomized clinical trial ... --- ³  This document is not directly accessible via the cited link but can be reached by initiating a search for “SFST” on the NJSP website at https://www.nj.gov/njsp/. conducted from February 2017 to June 2019 at the [...]” reported in a Journal of the American Medical Association [“JAMA”], researchers studied the use of SFST to detect persons under the influence of cannabis.
[directive] 1.  Determine if this incident is a SART Activation.  Are you thirteen years of age or older?    Yes  Proceed to the next question.    No  Contact your Sex Crimes unit during business hours @______________.  During non-business hours contact the Communications Center @ _________________.  Did the assault occur within 5 days?    Yes  It is a SART Activation.  Proceed to the second step.    No SART is not activated; however, the victim may be offered the services of a confidential sexual violence advocate and a complete law enforcement investigation.
[brief] ” (Db31).  He argues it is impermissible for a trial court to impose _____________________  2  The State respectfully reminds this Court that it charged the sentencing court to, in part, “include comparisons to the factual record of this case,” during the remanded resentencing.  The court used Flowers to provide that comparison for this Court.  (Da43).  consecutive sentences based on the “no free crimes” guideline alone.  (Db31).  However, the court did not simply rely on the “no free crimes” provision under Yarbough.  The court considered the “no free crimes” provision, how all the Yarbough factors applied in this particular case, defendant’s criminal history, and the purpose behind the certain persons statute.  Defendant focuses on the sentencing court’s use of the phrase “separate and distinct,” but the court uses that phrase when discussing whether factors 3A and 3C apply and has nothing to do with the “no free crimes” determination.
[brief] ….  (39978a-40064a)  The Chancery Court also found that each of its punitive damage awards “comports with the strictures of due process” under the guideposts of State Farm.  (40057a)  [...] found that “the relative degree of reprehensibility in this case cannot be overstated. ”  The Court found that: [even a]bsent any violence or irreparable harm, [...]’s conduct was repugnant and done with malevolent intent.  The law required him to honor his partners and their trust with perfect loyalty.  …  Instead, he schemed, deceived, manipulated, and stole from his partners.  Compared to the duty to which he owed his partners, [...]’s conduct demonstrates a prolonged disregard for his partners and the harm caused was the direct result of intentional malice, trickery, and deceit.  (40057a)
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS  2  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  7  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  ONE COUNTS ONE, FOUR AND FIVE OF THE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT  WERE PROPERLY PLEAD AND SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED  10  A. STANDARD FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS  10  B. COUNT I – NEGLIGENT, RECKLESS & WANTON  VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFF’S RIGHTS WAS PROPERLY PLEAD  15  C. COUNT IV - VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 1 OF THE NEW JERSEY  CONSTITUTION FOR DEPRIVATION OF PLAINTIFF’S SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WAS PROPERLY PLEAD  15  D. COUNT V - VIOLATION OF N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(C)  UNDER COLOR OF LAW AND BY WAY OF THREAT OR COERCION WAS PROPERLY PLEAD  POINT  TWO PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE COUNTY AND [...] IN COUNTS FOUR AND FIVE ARE PROPERLY PLEAD  BECAUSE THEY ALLEGE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS AGAINST THE COUNTY AND [...] DUE TO THEIR FAILURE TO HAVE POLICIES IN PLACE POINT  THREE DEFENDANTS DO NOT HAVE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY UNDER THAT TORT CLAIMS ACT FOR THEIR WANTON, WILLFUL AND RECKLESS VIOLATIONS OF THE PLAINTIFF’S RIGHTS POINT  FOUR  WHILE THE PUBLIC ENTITY WAS NOT LIABLE FOR THE WILLFUL MALICIOUS ACTS OF ITS EMPLOYEES  IT HAD NO IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY FOR THE RECKLESS, NEGLIGENT ACTS OR ACTS OF OMISSIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS THAT OCCURRED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT  CONCLUSION
[brief] Based upon aerial photos from the 1940’s, as well as subsequent mapping of the mean high-water line of the Property, a bulkhead was constructed by the [...] across the entirety of the Property sometime between 1940 and 1947.  See Pa341 and Pa342; Pa0900-Pa0910.  These lease agreements did not say anything about only filling in certain portions of the riparian lands adjoining the [...]’s property and then not filling in the [...].  To the contrary, these documents show that the State and the [...] both believed that the [...] was the owner of the uplands and that the State gave the [...] permission to fill in all riparian lands adjoining the [...]’s property (which included the [...]).  Thus, the only reason that the underwater riparian lands adjoining the [...]’s property were extended and filled in was due to the actions of the [...] in undertaking this fill and bulkheading project.  The [...] would not have expended public funds in filling underwater riparian lands owned by others, and likewise the State would not have allowed the [...] to do so.  [...] should not be allowed to benefit from the [...]’s publicly-funded project to fill in and to bulkhead these riparian lands, and to then reap the benefit of the extension of the uplands caused by this project.
[brief] Appellants argue that the trial court should not have apportioned joint and several liability to these entities because they were not direct parties to the transactions in which the defendants misappropriated funds.  However, this is not a case in which multiple unconnected defendant parties are separately liable for harm to the Plaintiffs.  Here, [...] (in concert with [...]) controls the entities.  He freely moved money among them.  Establishing a complex regime of several liability would allow [...] and the other defendants to move money, file for bankruptcy, or make mischief in ways detrimental to the Plaintiffs’ interests as judgment creditors.  Put simply, the defendants advocate for a several liability regime that would allow them to engage in the same bad faith conduct the lower court found they engaged in to begin with.  The trial court’s judgment should therefore be affirmed.  VII.
[brief] Da102-Da106.  Through this phased project approach, the pre-existing parking operations conducted upon the three (3) parcels owned by [...] in the Project area would be relocated as each of the following three project components was constructed by [...]: (i) the [...] Mall, as well as the Project Garage, which Project Garage would be (and is) operated by [...] pursuant to the Operating Agreement; (ii) a building containing retail and office use of approximately 8,200 square feet (the "Office Project"); and (iii) a residential building containing 160-220 market rate units (the "Residential Project" and together with the [...] Mall and the Office Project, the "Project," as defined above).  Da102-Da106  The Redevelopment Agreement also provided for a revenue sharing calculation by which [...] and [...] would receive shares of all revenue in excess of $1,600,000.00 as of 2005, which amount would be adjusted in accordance with the Consumer Price Index (CPI) on an annual basis.  Da62-Da63.  The Authority and [...] also executed a ground lease, dated April 17, 2006 (the “Ground Lease”), for the land underlying the [...] Mall, pursuant to Section 8.5 of the Redevelopment Agreement.
[brief] (5T:4-25 to 5-13)  The court found that “*Miller* factor five is clearly supported by the record made by the defense,” noting [...]’s excellent prison disciplinary record and participation in “all the rehabilitative services currently available to him. ”  (5T:23-14 to 19)  The court further determined that “[i]t is abundantly clear that the defendant is capable of rehabilitation in this Court’s opinion. ”  (5T:23-19 to 21)  Yet despite its unequivocal finding that [...] is capable of rehabilitation, the court declined to meaningfully reduce his sentence.  The court failed to apply *Miller* factor five to [...]’s sentence on the robbery count and imposed consecutive sentences for the homicide and robbery counts, resulting in a period of parole ineligibility that was nearly identical to one imposed under [...]’s original sentence.
[brief] (24T 218-11 to 14, 227-5 to 8, 228-9 to 10, 233-7 to 16)  [...] died two months after the Aries Ball.  (25T 61-22 to 25)  An officer at the scene also focused on a young man in a dark jacket and orange shirt who, as a passenger in a car, yelled at the driver to take off after the officer ordered him to stop.
[brief] "Even in instances of ‘mutual combat,’ the defendant’s response must be proportionate to the provocation."  State v. Docaj, 407 N.J. Super. 352, 369 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 370 (2009) ("Defendant brought a concealed and loaded handgun to the home that night.  His response to his wife’s refusal to abandon divorce proceedings, and even her slap, was wholly disproportionate to any provocation.").  That situation cannot exist here, even if [...] had been the one to strike defendant first, because defendant’s response was to shoot the unarmed [...] with a concealed weapon.  See, e.g., State v. Oglesby, 122 N.J. 522, 536 (1991) ("On the record before us, even if Russell struck Oglesby, we cannot hold that the jury should have been allowed to find that a single blow by an unarmed woman could have aroused the passions of an ordinary man beyond the power of his control.
[brief] Board Planner (i) clarifies their expert’s statements on the Township’s affordable housing status and the effect of this project on the zone plan.  5T 45:6-50:1  “If the township ultimately finds that rezoning the site is in the best interest of the community, it would also be appropriate for the planning board to adopt a master plan amendment so as to be consistent with the zoning onsite.  In addition, the township should also consider whether the scale of the project is suitable for the area in question.  The appropriate number of units, and other factors of scale and bulk will need to be explored as part of the planning board's review.
[brief] See *[...], The Sedona Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production  A Project of the Sedona Conference Working Group on Electronic Document Retention and Production*, 19 Sedona Conf. J. 1 (2018), available at https://thesedonaconference.org/sites/default/files/publications/The%20Sedona%20Principles%20Third%20Edition.19TSCJ1.pdf.  (“*The Sedona Principles*”) implement appropriate procedures, methodologies, and technologies.  *Id.*  Courts around the country take seriously this reasoning, often citing to Principle 6 when declining to “micromanage the parties’ internal review procedures. ”  *Edwards v. McDermott Int’l, Inc.*, No. 4:18-CV-04330, 2021 WL 5121853, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2021); *accord Livingston v. City of Chicago*, No. 16 CV 10156, 2020 WL 5253848, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2020); *Hastings v. Ford Motor Co.*, No. 19-CV-2217-BAS-MDD, 2021 WL 1238870, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2021); *In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Priv. User Profile Litig.*, No. 3:18-MD-02843-VC-JSC, 2021 WL 10282213, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2021); *Royal Park Invs. SA/NA v. HSBC Bank USA Nat’l Ass’n*, No. 14CV08175LGSSN, 2016 WL 11805202, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016).8
[brief] Bd. of Ed., Twp. Of Middletown v. Middletown Twp. Educ. Ass’n, 352 N.J. Super. 501, 509 (Ch. Div. 2001).  A court’s power under this rule includes the issuance of equitable relief, monetary relief, and even incarceration pending the party’s compliance with the order.  See Milne v. Goldberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184 (App. Div. 2012).
[brief] As established by the Procedural History below, the sole legal argument pursued by defendants, in support of their 2020 and 2023 motions, was that ---  1  This case arrives at this Court with a troubling procedural history.  In order to demonstrate what legal arguments were actually made, and when they were made; and further to demonstrate that the New Motion Judge raised and decided issues that were not actually pursued, Plaintiff must include the legal briefs submitted by the parties during the motion practice of 2020 and 2023.
[brief] Appellant, [...], appeals the August 23, 2023 Final Administrative Determination of the Commission upholding Respondent [...]’s decision not to appoint him to the position of Fire Captain because no genuine vacancies existed prior to the January 16, 2023 expiration of the eligible list.  (Pa5-Pa9).  Cologna, after passing the promotional exam for Fire Captain for Hoboken, was placed on eligible list [...] with an expiration date of January 16, 2023.  (Pa5).  The disposition due date of an eligibles list may not be extended beyond the expiration date of the list when vacancies do not exist.  N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b).  An anticipated vacancy is not considered the same as an existing vacancy.  Ibid.  On January 5, 2023, Hoboken received from the Commission a Certification of Eligibles as of December 28, 2022 for Promotion to Fire Captain ([...]).  (Pa62; Pa72).  This list had a disposition date of March 28, 2023, which was two months beyond the expiration of Cologna’s eligibility under --- 1 “Pa” refers to Petitioner’s Appendix.  [...].  Ibid.  Via February 2, 2023 correspondence, the Commission’s Division of Human Resources Information Services advised Hoboken that, in order to extend the expiration of the Appellant’s eligibility list, Hoboken would need to verify that “genuine vacancies” for Fire Captains existed in the [...] as of the January 16, 2023 expiration of [...].  (Pa66).  Because no genuine vacancy existed, Cologna’s eligibility expired on January 16, 2023, and he was not promoted to the position of Fire Captain. (Pa5; Pa6).  Hoboken returned the Certification without making any appointments.  (Pa71).  On February 16, 2023, a new eligibility list for Hoboken Fire Captain was promulgated.  (Pa6).  Cologna appealed his non-appointment from the December 28, 2022 certification of the Fire Captain eligible list to the Commission, claiming that there were multiple genuine vacancies as of the expiration of the list and challenging the Commission’s alleged failure to raise similar concerns about genuine vacancies in other cases involving Hoboken.  (Pa6).  In its Final Administrative Determination, the Commission upheld Hoboken’s position that no genuine vacancies existed prior to the expiration of [...] as required by N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b).
[brief] Defendant admitted that he was a passenger in a motor vehicle that was driving in the city of Elizabeth on December 18, 2020.  (3T24-18 to 21).  He further admitted that the motor vehicle was stopped in the area of Newark and Fairmont Avenue and searched.  (3T24-22 to 25-9).  Defendant further admitted that a handgun was located underneath the seat that he was occupying, he did not have a permit in the State of New Jersey to possess the handgun, he knew it was illegal to possess the handgun, and that the handgun was in fact his.  (3T25-6 to 21).  Defendant also acknowledged there was a report that indicated his DNA was found on the firearm.  (3T25-22 to 26-2).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE OFFICER LAWFULLY SEIZED THE TOYOTA TO INVESTIGATE THE WARRANT.