ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] It had Oppositions to Verified Complaint and [...]’s & [...]’s Aug. 4th letters, & Exceptions to Trust Accounting.  | 108a | | 14.|  Exhibit “M” is [...]’ Objections to [...]’s Exceptions to Trust Intermediate Accounting, dated August 12, 2022.  | 137a | | 15.|  Exhibit “N” is [...]’s Certification: Opposition to Ambrose’s Exceptions to Intermediate Accounting, dated August 12, 2022.  | 150a | | 16.|  Exhibit “O” is [...]’s Certification: Opposition to Ross’ Exceptions to Intermediate Accounting, dated August 12, 2022.  | 155a | | VOLUME 2 OF 3 | PAGES | |---------------|-------| | 17.
[brief] Aa71-75; see 2Ra213-17.  As stated in the Supreme Court decision cited by Appellant in its brief, the doctrine of fundamental fairness “protects against unjust and arbitrary governmental action, in particular, government procedures that operate arbitrarily. ”  Matter of Cong. Districts by New Jersey Redistricting Comm’n, 249 N.J. 561, 575-76 (2022) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.’s Rate Unbundling, Stranded Costs & Restructuring Filings, 330 N.J. Super. 65, 105 (App. Div. 2000) (“New Jersey’s doctrine of fundamental fairness protects against unjust and arbitrary governmental actions, and specifically against governmental procedures that tend to operate arbitrarily. ”).  “[C]ourts apply the doctrine sparingly -- in those rare cases where not to do so will subject the defendant to oppression, harassment, or egregious deprivation. ”  Matter of Cong. Districts, 249 N.J. at 576 (citations omitted).  Appellant does not allege any deficiencies in the procedures leading to the issuance of the Permit.
[brief] …[W]e know that the application for award of counsel fees …. is to be supported by an Affidavit of Service, which it was, and it should address the RPC 1.5A factors; the recitation of other applicable factors; and the amount and allowance applied for and the itemization of disbursements….  And the Court has to consider the time and labor of the party, the novelty and difficulty of issues involved, and the requisite skills to perform the legal service properly.  Also, the likelihood that the acceptance of the specific employment will preclude other employment; the fees customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; the amount involved and the results obtained; the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; the nature and length of the professional relationship; the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.  Additional factors that can be considered by the Court … is the amount that’s available, whether it’s the estate or otherwise, and the amount in dispute or jeopardy as to which the professional services were made necessary; the nature and extent of the jeopardy or risk involved; the nature and extent of the difficulty of services rendered; the experience of legal knowledge required; the time necessarily … spent by the attorney in the performance of the services; the results obtained; the benefits or advantages resulting to the Estate; and any other special circumstances.  ***
[brief] Eighth, the Lease either mandated or, at the very least, permitted Landlord to offset missed rent against an owed Tenant’s Allowance installment payment (Da17-Da18).  Ninth, the Lease contains no provision stating that Tenant permanently and irrevocably forfeits its right to receive a percentage of Tenant’s Allowance as a penalty for a temporary default that has since been cured.  Tenth, Landlord has now received every cent of unpaid, late, or additional rent that it claimed to be owed.  Eleventh, Tenant has not received one cent of payment for the $243,333.34 plus interest in Tenant’s Allowance that Tenant was owed in 2020 and 2021, but Landlord has nevertheless elected to deduct the amounts it would have paid from the principal balance anyway, as if it had made those payments.  Twelfth, Landlord’s only basis for withholding more than a quarter million dollars, including the unpaid 2019 interest, of its contractually obligated allowance payments due to Tenant is that Tenant was in a “monetary default” four years ago that Landlord admits was “cured” (Pb40;Pb41;Pb50).  ³
[brief] Between January 11, 2022, and March 7, 2022, there were six proposed bills to amend *N.J.S.A.* 18A:7F-9.  None of these proposed bills discuss enabling a private right of action to sue school districts in Superior Court for violations of *N.J.S.A.* 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  4)  Of the 15 Legislative history materials, inclusive of proposals, Assembly statements, and Governor’s veto comments, none of the history discusses enabling a private right of action to sue school districts in Superior Court for violations of N.J.S.A.  18A:7F-9(e)(3). 35
[brief] Ia519.  In ProCap II, the judgment was entered July 5, served August 17, and recorded August 26, 2016.  Defendant attempted to redeem on August 22, 2016.  Defendant moved to vacate, arguing that its request to redeem was timely because the judgment hadn’t yet been recorded.  Id. at *2.  [...] denied that motion to vacate and a reconsideration motion, holding “N.J.S. 54:5-104. 64(a) could not be clearer: it is the entry of final --- 3  In accordance with R.1:36-3, a copy of this decision is attached at Ia428-430. judgment, not the recording of that judgment, that gives “full and complete relief” barring “the right of redemption, and ... [vesting title in the plaintiff].  Id. at 3-4, quoting Phillipsburg, 380 N.J.Super. at 165 (a defendant “has an absolute right of redemption until that right of redemption is cut off by a judgment of foreclosure), emphasis added.  This Court agreed, again holding that it is the judgment that barred redemption, not the recording.  Id. at 4.  Accepting the fact that the one-year period contained in R.4:50-2 controls – the three-month period relied upon by the trial court here was both illusory and mistaken.
[directive] To ensure the integrity of the investigation of “Law Enforcement Incidents” conducted pursuant to AG Directive 2019-4, and to avoid possible contamination of a witness's personal recollection of events that could undermine his or her credibility as a witness, notwithstanding any other provision of this Policy, no civilian or law enforcement witness, including the principals of the investigation, shall be given access to, view, or receive an accounting of a BWC recording of the incident, or a BWC recording of the response or on-scene investigation of the incident, without the express prior approval of the “Independent Investigator,” as that term is defined in AG Directive 2019-4.
[brief] On August 22, 2017, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration.  The only “new” evidence offered by plaintiffs were the certifications of two experts who had been retained years earlier, [...], P.E., and [...], P.E. (Pa2324-36).  By Order dated September 15, 2017, that motion was denied (Pa1944).  1  Notably, plaintiffs’ Complaint contains no reference to [...]’s employee, [...], nor does it set forth any allegation that [...] was liable under a respondeat superior theory of liability.  This stands in stark contrast to plaintiffs’ determination to name [...] as a defendant, and alleged that [...], was liable for his conduct pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior.  See Pa67-70.  Plaintiffs subsequently sought leave to file an interlocutory appeal, which was granted by Order dated November 8, 2017.
[brief] [...], [...] [...], and [...], Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; and ABC CORPORATION 1-10, JOHN DOES 1-10, and JANE DOES 1-10 (names being fictitious as true identities are unknown), Defendants/Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO.: [...] ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION MONMOUTH COUNTY Docket No. Below: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. Hon. [...], J.S.C. Hon. [...], J.S.C. PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS’ BRIEF [...]
[brief] | INDEX TO APPENDIX | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------|-----------| | Gloucester Indictment [...] | Da 1-10 | | Verdict Sheet | Da 11 | | Judgment of Conviction | Da 12-14 | | Notice of Appeal | Da 15-18 | | Jury Charge | Da 19-41 | | Defendant’s Booking Statement | Da 42-63 | | Defendant’s May 22, 2018 Statement | Da 64-125 | | State’s Sentencing Memo¹ | Da 126-132 | | Defense’s Sentencing Memo | Da 133-135 | ¹  The sentencing memoranda are submitted because the question of whether an issue was raised in the trial court is germane to the appeal.  R. 2:6-1(a)(2).  JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] I was just trying to get them to keep talking and seeing what they have.  I figured if they thought we was at odds, they keep talking and showing me, showing me all they had.  All of us, and was showing me the pictures they had.  I wanted them to keep talking.  I ain't implicate you if that's what you thinking.  To be honest, I ain't tell you all of it cuz I knew you'd trick every time they asked if it was you, and I said I ain't know.  I didn't think you would understand, but you know, I ain't read it just cuz -- no, ain't mean it just was getting in their head, to be honest.  (Da 57; 10T 28-2 to 28-12)
[brief] Furthermore, a planning board is without any power to act in a contrary manner to the ordinance at issue.  A planning board is bound by the provisions of the municipal land use ordinance governing the subdivision.  Cox and Koenig New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration. § 24-2 (2022 edition).  As per N.J.S.A. 40: 55D-48(b), “The planning board shall, if the proposed subdivision complies with the ordinance and this act, grant preliminary approval to the subdivision.
[brief] *McQueen*, ESX-L-1439-22, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 640, at *11-14.  Plainly and as supported by the numerous cases cited above, [...] engaged in the consumer loan business when it purchased or otherwise acquired [...]’s alleged account.  As a result, the alleged debt (and the contract governing the same) was void the moment [...] acquired the account and, subsequently, [...] lacked the legal right or authority necessary to attempt collection or enforcement of the account.  Enforcement of [...]’s alleged debt would constitute enforcement of a contract entered into in violation of New Jersey’s licensing statute.  See *Accountemps Div. of Robert Half, Inc. v. Birch Tree Grp., Ltd.*, 115 N.J. 614, 626 (1989) (holding “[o]ur courts have consistently held that public policy precludes enforcement of a contract entered into in violation of [the State's] licensing statute[s]”).
[brief] In a January 4, 2022 email, the prosecutor said that his “office no longer possesses the hard drive in question. ”  (Da300)  PCR counsel filed a motion for an order granting PCR due to [...]’s violation of the preservation order, or alternatively, deeming it fact that the footage the [...] destroyed would have supported [...]’s alibi by establishing he did not arrive by car at [...] between 12:11 and 12:45pm on the day in question.
[brief] ..................................................................................................15 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS (See Table of Judgments, Orders and Rulings Appealed in [...]’s Brief of August 5, 2024, incorporated here by reference.) ### TABLE OF CITATIONS | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Cases** | | | Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Am. Med. Plumbing, Inc., | 3 | | 458 N.J. Super. 535 (App. Div. 2019) | | | Azurak v. Corp. Prop. Inv'rs, | 12 | | 175 N.J. 110 (2003) | | | Camp, Dresser & McKee, Inc. v. Paul N. Howard Co., | 3 | | 853 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) | | | Englert v. The Home Depot, | 14 | | 389 N.J. Super. 44 (App. Div. 2006) | | | Estate of D'Avila ex rel. D’Avila v. Hugo Neu Schnitzer E., | 4, 6, 15| | 442 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 2015) | | | Kane v. Hartz Mountain Industries, Inc., | 6, 7, 8 | | 278 N.J. Super. 129 (App. Div. 1994) | | | Kieffer v. Best Buy, | 11, 12 | | 205 N.J. 213 (2011) | | | Leitao v. Damon G. Douglas Co., | 13, 15 | | 301 N.J. Super. 187 (App. Div. 1997) | | | Mantilla v. Nc Mall Assocs., | 13 | | 167 N.J. 262 (2001) | | | Sayles v. G&G Hotels, Inc., | 13 | | 429 N.J. Super. 266 (App. Div. 2013) | | | State v. Corsaro, | 5 | | 107 N.J. 339 (1987) | | | State v. Gore, | 9, 11 | | 205 N.J. 363 (2011) | | | State v. Jenkins, | 5 | | 178 N.J. 347 (2004) | | | State v. Singh, | 9 | | 245 N.J. 1 (2021) | | | United States v. Seckinger, | 3, 12, 13| | 397 U.S. 203 | | | **Statutes** | | | N.J.S.A. 2A:40A–1 | 14 |
[brief] ’”’ (emphasis added); R.L. Vallee, 431 F. Supp. 2d at 437 (“when the court later rules the insurer has the obligation to defend and unjustifiably failed to do so, the insurer is on the hook for the amount of the settlement, so long as the settlement is fair and reasonable. ”); Cathay Mortuary, 582 F. Supp. at 660 (“an insurer who wrongfully refuses to defend is also liable for the amount of any reasonable settlement that the insured makes in good faith”).  III.
[brief] When reviewing a sentencing court’s decision, an appellate court must avoid substituting its judgment for that of the trial court.  *State v. Roth*, 95 N.J. 334, 365 (1984).  An appellate court should affirm the sentencing court’s findings and balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors if there is sufficient evidence in the record to support them.  *State v. O’Donnell*, 117 N.J. 210, 215-16 (1989).  As long as the court follows the sentencing guidelines, the sentence should be affirmed unless it shocks the judicial conscience.  *Ibid; Roth*, 95 N.J. at 364-65.  Appellate review of sentencing is deferential, and appellate courts are cautioned not to substitute their judgment for those of our sentencing courts.
[brief] (Da145- He underwent open reduction and internal fixation with a bone graft to address the arm fractures, but still has diminished use and sensation in his left wrist.  (Da145-147).  Naturally, their injuries, difficult recovery, and the other traumas of the crash have caused the [...] face significant periods of emotional difficulty.  (Da137-147).  Because of the significance of plaintiffs’ injuries and other losses, the relationship between the undersigned and [...]’s prior attorneys in this litigation, and the frank discussions about the limitations of coverage, plaintiffs’ counsel, [...]’s prior counsel, and [...]’s counsel began a near-immediate exchange of information and collaboration.
[brief] The July 30, 2021 Stealth Global Fair Share Housing Litigation Settlement  This hybrid test case has broad unanticipated political free speech violation adverse consequences.  On Friday July 30, 2021—just seventeen days after the commencement of this hybrid action, defendants attempted to approve a global fair share housing litigation settlement on less than 45 minutes shortened and limited notice.  (Pa219-SJCS#24).  Defendants [...] and [...] asserted disqualifying conflicts of interests and fled townhall at the commencement of the 10:00 am special meeting.  Plaintiff was the only resident who appeared at this special meeting.  (Pa219- SJCS#25).  After a two-hour closed executive session and approval of a stealth settlement without any prior public input, plaintiff questioned the procedural due process/OPMA validity of this special meeting.  (Pa219-SJCS#26).  Plaintiff suggested that the settlement be ratified upon proper notice at the next regular August 17, 2021 TC meeting.  (Pa219-SJCS #26).  Plaintiff demanded that defendants disclose the final terms of the negotiated global fair share housing settlement prior to reconsideration and ratification.  On Monday August 9, 2021, [...]'s JIF insurance carrier supplied [...]’s labor counsel with a copy of plaintiff’s hybrid complaint.  (Pa95-Cert. #8).  Counsel never sought from plaintiff a professional courtesy extension of time to respond.  On Tuesday August 17, 2021, defendants again declined to disclose the final terms of the global fair share housing settlement agreement prior to consideration and official ratification action.  (Pa219-SJCS#27).  On Tuesday August 17, 2021, defendants asserted that the trial court ([...]) and the special master had prohibited the disclosure of the final settlement terms until after consideration and official action.  (Pa219-SJCS#28; Pa135).  On Tuesday August 17, 2021, the municipal attorney also concealed a [...] email consenting to the disclosure of the settlement terms prior to consideration and official ratification action.  On Tuesday August 17, 2021 and after consideration and official action, defendants finally disclosed increased zoning overlay densities, a 150 units inclusionary [...] on [...] Avenue, a 200 units inclusionary [...] adjacent to the Canoe Brook Reservoir, and a 75 units 100% affordable housing project with a promised long term tax exemption on [...]'s contaminated DPW site.
[brief] \(^{52}\)  Here, the court relied on the self-serving certification of a named defendant, [...], who was not yet deposed, as well as a purported payroll document dated in \(^{52}\) Pa267 – Pa272 October 2020, which the Board did not see prior to the summary judgment motion and contends is not even relevant to the April – July 2020 months in dispute.  The credibility, truthfulness, and accuracy of the named defendant’s self-serving certification and purported payroll document that the Board contested is for a jury to determine, and not the Judge.  The court did not address or acknowledge these disputed facts in its wholesale dismissal of the Complaint.
[directive] These educational programs should meet or exceed the training standards established by [...] or the [...] ([...]).  New Jersey law also requires the healthcare facility to inform sexual assault victims about emergency contraception and dispense contraception, if requested and warranted.  (See N.J.A.C. 8:43G-12A-4).  In accordance with the [...]’s policy on the Evaluation and Management of Sexually Assaulted or Sexually Abused Patients, it is recommended that healthcare providers -11-
[directive] When circumstances necessitating the use of constructive authority or force arise suddenly during the 3 course of swiftly-developing events, it may not be safe and practicable for an officer to activate a BWC before employing constructive authority or force.  Nothing in this Policy should be construed or applied in a manner that jeopardizes officer safety by distracting the officer’s attention from the immediate need to use such constructive authority or force.  It should be noted that in many circumstances where the need to use constructive authority or force arises, the officer already would have initiated a police activity, such as a motor vehicle stop, Terry stop, or response to a call for service, that would have triggered the requirement to activate the BWC; see note 2 (recognizing that two or more police activities enumerated in this section often will co-occur during the course of a single police-citizen encounter).
[brief] 6 Del.C. §18-402 provides that “the management of a limited liability company shall be vested in its members in proportion to the then current percentage or other interest of members in the profits of the limited liability company owned by all of the members, the decision of members owning more than 50 percent of the said percentage or other interest in the profits controlling…”  Here it is beyond dispute that [...] owned an over 50% interest in [...], so his decisions were controlling under Delaware law, and as a matter of fact.  See, e.g., 1T162:3-163:9, 169:21-171:4.\textsuperscript{13}  The repetitive, often incorrect (see, e.g., Section III.A. above) citations to the record that plaintiff asserts simply do not back up her breach of fiduciary duty claim.  Pb34- \textsuperscript{12}  Plaintiff submitted with her papers filed on her second purported motion for reconsideration, filed on June 22, 2023, a then contemporaneous “New Jersey Department of the Treasury, Division of Revenue and Enterprise Services, Business Records Services” report stating that [...] was a Delaware LLC.  Da56.  [...] is also referenced in this way in the Promissory Note to [...] admitted in evidence.  Da84.
[brief] That agreement, which defendant signed, sets forth the ownership percentages of [...] as 95% for [...] and 5% for defendant, which was consistent with the [...] operating agreement.  (3T163-2 to 18; 7T172-2 to 17; Sa107).  Because the [...] guaranty simply provides the presumptive regional division of shares as determined by an ADA executed in April 2012, it was not material and would not have changed the outcome of trial.  Since the newly discovered documents do not shed any light on whether defendant owned 30% of [...] or had the rights to sell those shares, they do not have any “bearing on the claims being advanced. ”  See Ways, 180 N.J. at 188).  The trial court’s conclusion to the contrary was erroneous and this Court should reverse its ruling.  3.  The trial court erred in finding the [...] guaranty was material because it is cumulative evidence.  Finally, the trial court erred in finding that the [...] guaranty presented with [...]’s certification was alone sufficient to grant a new trial, because it does not portray defendant as a 5% owner in the franchise.  (Sa26).  That document is not only immaterial, but it is merely cumulative of evidence presented at trial.  The [...] guaranty was signed more than a year before the first purported [...] franchise agreement and does not relate to the Hoboken franchise specifically, or even the purported [...] franchise, but is for the entire region covered by the ADA.  (9T43-2 to 46-13).  Moreover, the guaranty shows only that defendant has a 30% stake in the [...] partnership, [...] a 40% share and [...] a 30% share.  (Sa295).  This information, if not the document itself, was before the jury at trial in the form of a May 7, 2014 text message from [...] to defendant discussing the split of the area development rights, but not individual units.  (2T64-18 to 66-9; Sa430).  In that text message, [...] stated that the split for New Jersey was “40/30/30. ” (2T66-8 to 8; Sa430).  As such, the [...] guaranty is merely cumulative and not a basis for granting a new trial.  Szemple, 247 N.J. at 99.  * * *  In sum, defendant discovered the allegedly new evidence after searching his own emails for a mere hour, something he could have done at any point during the four years before trial.  And the testimony and documentary evidence at the hearing on the motion for a new trial strongly established that the allegedly new evidence was fabricated.  In any event, that evidence would not have altered the outcome of trial because it was merely cumulative of evidence presented at trial and did not shed light on the ultimate issue of whether defendant had the authority to sell shares in [...].  For all these reasons, the trial court erred in granting the motion for a new trial and this Court should vacate that order and reinstate defendant’s well-proved conviction.