ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  State v. Konecny, 250 N.J. 321, 339 (2022).  Laurick relief differs from traditional PCR, as “an uncounseled DWI conviction only becomes ripe for challenge at some point in the future when the defendant is subject to increased penalties. ”  Id. at 345 (2022); see also State v. Patel, 239 N.J. 424 (2022).  The New Jersey Supreme Court made clear in Patel what constitutes an uncounseled defendant:  By “uncounseled” we mean an unrepresented defendant who was not advised by the municipal court of his right to retain counsel or, if indigent, of his right to appointed counsel without cost; who otherwise did not know of his right to counsel in the proceeding and did not waive that right; and who, if properly advised of his rights, would have secured counsel or accepted appointed counsel.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 through N.J.S.A. 40A:14-151 provide the statutory framework for disciplinary proceedings against a police officer.  As to [...], N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150 provides:  Any member or officer of a police department or force in a municipality . . . who has been tried and convicted upon any charge or charges, may obtain a review thereof by the Superior Court . . .  The court shall hear the cause de novo on the record below and may either affirm, reverse, or modify such conviction.  If the applicant shall have been removed from his office, employment or position the court may direct that he be restored to such office, employment, or position and to all his rights pertaining thereto, and may make such other order or judgment as said court shall deem proper.
[brief] THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE IT IS A REASONABLE AND PRACTICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE SCHOOL LAWS THAT READILY MEETS THE HEIGHTENED DEFERENTIAL STANDARD  APPLIED BY APPELLATE COURTS TO AGENCY DECISIONS INTERPRETING STATUTES THAT THE AGENCY IS ENTRUSTED TO APPLY AND ENFORCE.  Appellants’ appeal fails and the Commissioner’s decision should be affirmed for several reasons.  As an initial matter, the Commissioner’s decision interpreting the school regionalization statute that she is charged with interpreting, applying, and enforcing is entitled to substantial deference from this Court.  It should not be overturned unless it is plainly unreasonable.  As to the statute itself, the Commissioner’s interpretation not only is reasonable, it is unassailable.  The school laws expressly provide that merged districts such as [...] and [...] are subject to the regionalization provisions set forth in chapter 13 of the school laws, including the chapter’s withdrawal provisions.  Given this express inclusion, as well as the fact that chapter 13 specifically states that municipalities may seek to withdraw from regional or consolidated school districts, there is no question that [...] is entitled to seek withdrawal from [...] and [...].  Finally, Appellants’ arguments to the contrary would create an illogical result at odds with the school laws and with the Legislature’s intent in amending the regionalization statute to encourage increased regionalization efforts.  Appellants’ position would leave a select few municipalities unable ever to withdraw from the districts into which they have merged, effectively surrendering their autonomy with regard to public education matters, while permitting almost every other municipality in the state to seek withdrawal freely.  It is illogical to believe the Legislature intended any such result for these municipalities -- which are particularly vulnerable given that they often merge with larger districts that may come to exercise complete control over their public education affairs -- when it amended the regionalization statute.  A. The Court Should Affirm The Commissioner’s Decision Because The Decision Is Entitled To Substantial Deference And Should Not Be Overturned Unless It Is Plainly Unreasonable, Which It Clearly Is Not.
[brief] ”  460 N.J. Super. at 599.  To aid it in resolving both issues, this Court invited the Attorney General’s Division of Consumer Affairs to participate amicus curiae.  Id.  On the narrow issue, which is important for context, this Court declined to extend the exemption to home inspectors because (a) home inspectors are not historically recognized learned professionals, and (b) no direct and unavoidable conflict exists between the CFA and the regulations governing home inspectors.  *Id.* at 599.  On the broader basis, this Court agreed with the Attorney General that the CFA’s plain text and purpose did not “support a blanket exception for semi-professionals based solely on the existence of a separate regulatory scheme that also regulates the subject industry.
[brief] Contractual terms, including a arbitration clauses, will only be binding when they are reasonably conspicuous rather than proffered unfairly or with a design to conceal or de-emphasize its provisions citing Caspi v. Microsoft, 323 NJ Super 118, 125-126 (App. Div. 1999).  [...] cited Specht v. Netscape, 306 F.3d 17 (2nd Cir. 2002) which found an arbitration clause unenforceable because Plaintiffs had not been provided with reasonable notice of its existence and therefore lacked knowing assent.  The arbitration provision was not reasonably conspicuous since it was too far down the webpage.  The court stated “there is no reason to assume viewers will scroll down to subsequent screens simply because screens are there.  Id. at 31.  See [...] supra at 609-610.
[brief] POINT VIII  THE FORECLOSURE OF DEFENDANT’S MORTGAGE DID NOT VIOLATE HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS  In Point X of his brief, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff, its attorneys and the trial judges violated his constitutional rights “in every hearing and every order. ”  However, this point does not contain any specifics other than to relate it to a comment that “For seven long years, four trial court judges ruled over Plaintiff’s foreclosure Complaint of May 12, 2016 with subject matter jurisdiction. ”  As discussed in Point VI, supra, the court did in fact have subject matter jurisdiction over the foreclosure complaint for the reasons stated and Defendant’s allegation that he has been deprived of his constitutional rights in connection with the prosecution of the foreclosure is without merit.  For these reasons, this court should affirm the ruling of the trial court in denying Defendant the relief sought in his Order to Show Cause.
[brief] ..................................................................................................................34  # TABLE OF APPENDIX | Appendix Document | Appendix Page No. | |--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | 1.  Plaintiffs’ (original) Notice of Appeal | Da01-Da06 | | filed June 21, 2023.  | | | 2.  Plaintiffs’ (original) Civil Case Information | Da07-Da11 | | Statement filed June 21, 2023.  | | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page No. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------| | **Cases** | | | Albigese v. Jersey City, 129 N.J. Super. 567, 569-70 (App. Div. 1974) | 13 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995) | 9 | | Bryant v. City of Atl. City, 309 N.J. Super. 596, 610 (App. Div. 1998) | 9, 15, 16 | | Dock Watch Hollow Quarry Pit v. Twp. of Warren, 142 N.J. Super. 103, 116 (App. Div. 1976), aff’d, 74 N.J. 312 (1977) | 16 | | Downtown Residents for Sane Dev. v. City of Hoboken, 242 N.J. Super. 329, 332 (App. Div. 1990) | 9, 10, 15 | | Grabowsky v. Twp. Of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536, 551 (2015) | 10, 11 | | Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of Town of W. Orange, 68 N.J. 543, 565 (1975) | 15 | | In re Attorney Gen. Law Enf’t Directive Nos. 2020-5 & 2020-6, 246 N.J. 462, 490 (2021) | 13 | | Kean Fed’n of Teachers v. Morell, 233 N.J. 566, 588 (2018) | 32 | | Malanga v. Twp. Of W. Orange, 253 N.J. 291, 314 (2023) | 11 | | Milford Mill 128, LLC v. Borough of Milford, 400 N.J. Super. 96, 110 (App. Div. 2008) | 14 | | Powerhouse Arts Dist. Neighborhood Ass'n v. City Council of City of Jersey City, 413 N.J. Super. 322, 332 (App. Div. 2010) | 15 | | Quick Check Food Stores v. Springfield, 83 N.J. 438, 447 (1980) | 15, 16 | | Scully-Bozarth Post # 1817 of Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S. v. Planning Bd. of City of Burlington, 362 N.J. Super. 296, 311 (App. Div. 2003) | 31 | Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016).................................................................
[brief] [...] WAS IDENTIFIED AS THE SHOOTER THROUGH HEARSAY AND AN IMPROPER INSINUATION ABOUT WHAT WAS IN DETECTIVE BROWN'S REPORT.  (Ruling at 2T33-5)  [...] survived the shooting, which took place in front of a Newark storefront on a summer afternoon.  The case against [...] was largely one of identity, and there were presumably many eyewitnesses as is depicted in the three videos played for the jury.  (Da 17)  The defense objected when the prosecution introduced [...]'s 'investigation' instead of producing the witnesses.  Q.  When you say you looked for [...], did you do anything official as far as looking?  A. Yes.  I took a few statements from witnesses.  The store owner -- [...]: Objection, Judge.  THE COURT: Overruled.  Q.  Did you eventually file charges against [...]?  A. Yes.  Q.  And that was again after your investigation, after your interview with [...], correct?  A. Yes.  (2T32-25 to 2T33-11)
[brief] Did he hit the guy with the bat?” (1T34-4 to 8).  At first, defendant said he was “the first one out[,]” (1T35-6 to 14), and then denied going in the building at all.  (1T36-13 to 25).  Defendant stated [...] told him he “went in there and fought the man. . . [a]nd robbed him. ” (1T37-8 to 15).  But he continued to tell the detective that he was not in the building with [...].  (1T37-16 to 18).  Detective insistence that defendant was lying about not being in the building, given the video showing both suspects going in, and defendant’s denials continued for a moment.  (1T37-19 to 40-13).
[brief] Here, Defendant breached the Operating Agreement by: • failing to obtain Plaintiff’s consent before paying herself a salary (3T152:11-14 and 3T154:10 to 3T155:3), • extending loans from the pharmacy to her friends (3T133:21 to 3T134:20), • treating the company as her personal piggy bank (3T132:5-9), and • not maintaining books and records(3T132:5-9).  She breached her duty of care by not observing corporate formalities, or even keeping track of what she took.  She breached her duty of loyalty by failing to provide Plaintiff with access to the books and records, and by paying [...]’s startup costs to form a competing pharmacy, which she paid for with Plaintiff money.  3T88:15-20.  Defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by deliberately concealing the books and records of [...] from Plaintiff (3T125:12 – 3T127:5), transferring assets from the company’s checking account to herself and to others for personal purposes unrelated to the business (3T138:12-14), withdrawing monies for her own personal benefit which she misidentified as company expenses, or Plaintiff’s expenses (3T:162:11-19 and 3T166:11-25), failing to pay Plaintiff his fair share of profit distributions (3T119:14:7-24), failing to provide accurate financial books and records (3T132:5-9), and paying herself excessive and unjustified salaries without Plaintiff’s knowledge or consent (3T152:11-14 and 3T154:10 to 155:3).
[brief] ON APPEAL FROM: LAW  DIVISION  HUDSON COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  SAT BELOW: HON.  [...], A.J.S.C.  Civil Action  REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT  [...] IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF APPELLANT’S INTERLOCUTORY  APPEAL  [...]  219 Broad Street Red Bank, New Jersey  07701 [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, Jersey City Redevelopment Agency  [...], ESQ.  Of Counsel  [...], ESQ.  On the Brief TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] ” (Db22) (citing Berg v. Christie, 225 N.J. 245 (2016)).  The unmistakability doctrine applies when “determining whether a contract has been created by statute. ” Berg, 225 N.J. at 261.  This standard “is grounded in the elementary proposition that the principal function of a legislature is not to make contracts, but to make laws that establish the policy of the state. ”  Robertson v. Kulongoski, 466 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2006).  “To find a contract created by statute means that the Legislature binds itself to a policy of choice and surrenders the power of future elected representatives to cut back on that choice. ”  Berg, 225 N.J. at 260.  Thus, “only the clearest expression of statutory language and evidence of legislative intent for such creation will do. ”  Id.  Here, there is no question that a valid contract exists or that the State intended to bind itself.
[brief] B.  The Judicially Created “Learned Professional” Exemption to CFA Liability Does Not Apply to Insurance Producers or Other Semi-Professionals.  (T16:10 to 19:25).  The trial court’s exclusive reliance on Plemmons to support the conclusion that insurance producers are “learned professionals” exempt from liability under the CFA is misplaced.  (T32-16 to 35-2).  Plemmons, and the unpublished, non-precedential cases cited by the Defendants in their motion to dismiss below, have been superseded by Shaw.  In *Shaw*, 460 N.J. Super. at 599, this Court superseded its decision in *Plemmons* on precisely the same issue relied upon by the trial court and the Defendants, holding:  To the extent our prior decisions, including *Plemmons v. Blue Chip Ins. Servs., Inc.*, 387 N.J. Super. 551 (App. Div. 2006), have applied the learned professional exception to “semi-professionals” who are regulated by a separate regulatory scheme, we are constrained, upon further review, to depart from that reasoning as inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in *Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am.*, 150 N.J. 255 (1997).  As the Court explicitly held in *Lemelledo*, the existence of a separate regulatory scheme will “overcome the presumption that the CFA applies to a covered activity” only when “a direct and unavoidable conflict exists between application of the CFA and application of the other regulatory scheme or schemes. ”  150 N.J. at 270.  [Ibid.]  In returning to the historically restricted definition of “learned professional” and rejecting the judicially created exemption for liability under the CFA for semi-professionals, the *Shaw* Court gave “due deference to the Attorney General’s concern that a wide-ranging interpretation of the learned profession exception would unfairly restrict the ability of private litigants and the Division to seek redress for fraudulent commercial practices .
[brief] [...] ruled that plaintiff “has possessed the original October 2004 Note (or had the Note lawfully possessed on its behalf by its attorneys, agents, or contractors) from December 2004 until the present. ”  A1172.  [...] affirmed, consistent with the prior grant of summary judgment for plaintiff, that the discharge of mortgage filed in 2019 was a mistake, vacating the Discharge of Mortgage and reinstating nunc pro tunc the October 4, 2004 Mortgage and Note.  A1172.  Despite the Third Circuit’s determination of loan default/delinquency dating back to 1992, [...] ruled that the [...] were never in default and that no litigation fees had been charged against the [...].
[directive] 41.  ITEM NO. - Enter the Item Number of the piece of property that will be moved.  42.  DATE - Enter the date that the item was moved, month, day, year.  43.  RELINQUISHED BY - PRINT the full name of the officer/person who is releasing property.  44.  RECEIVED BY - PRINT the full name of the officer/person who is receiving property.  45.  PURPOSE FOR CHANGE OF CUSTODY - Enter the purpose for which the property is changing custody.  Examples of change of custody may be for transportation to the lab, to court, for destruction, for return to owner or for auction.  6.8
[brief] THE [...]’ NOTICE OF HEARING WAS DEFECTIVE UNDER NEW JERSEY’S MUNICIPAL LAND USE LAW AND DEPRIVED THE BOARD OF JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE 2022 ZONING APPLICATION Pa32  While the Respondents argue vociferously that the [...]’s notice of the Zoning Board hearing (“Notice”) was proper in all respects they fail to articulate how the Notice actually meets the standards of the Municipal Land Use Law (“MLUL”) N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -99.  Specifically, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11 provides:  Notices . . . shall state [1] the date, time and place of the hearing, [2] the nature of the matters to be considered and, in the case of notices pursuant to subsection 7.1 of this [A]ct,[3] an identification of the property proposed for development by street address, if any, or by reference to lot and block numbers as shown on the current tax duplicate in the municipal tax assessor’s office, and [4] the location and times at which any maps and documents for which approval is sought are available pursuant to subsection 6b.  The Plaintiffs acknowledge that the Notice in question meets the requirements of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11 as it provided: (1) the date, time and place of the hearing; (3) identification of the property by street address or lot and block number; and (4) location and times at which any maps and documents concerning the application are available.
[directive] N.J.S.A. imprisonment.  See of life term extended or ordinary an to subject is or murder with used be to presumptions additional creates Directive this for, accounted are presumptions statutory those Although presumptions  The motion. release of revocation and/or detention pretrial a file to whether deciding in prosecutors by of exercise channel the only to designed are words, other in Directive, this of 8 and 7  Section in established this in nothing release, of and revocation or detention pretrial seek to whether deciding in discretion prosecutorial ones the than presumption other any apply to obliged are courts that suggesting as construed be should Directive amendment.
[brief] Board Planner [...] testified that under the Ordinance requirements of §225-65C, billboards and off premise signs are subject to the following conditions: size, height, the actual siting of the billboard and the location of the billboard associated with other structures on the same parcel.  He further opined that §225-65C did not state and may have nothing to do with safety, but rather addresses a siting issue.  Engineering traffic consultant [...] issued an initial report and a revised report which was heavily critical of Plaintiff’s expert report.  (Pa140-141).  This reasoning was adopted by the Chairman and other board members who cited the sign’s negative impact on the surrounding area on both safety and siting concerns and incorporated into the Decision and Resolution.  (4/17/23 Transcript @T69-T74; Pa117-128).  Thus, the Trial Court was correct in finding that the Planning Board’s denial was not “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable” and granting summary judgment to the Defendants’ as to Count I, the Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs.
[brief] 42 U.S.C. § 1983..................................................................................................43, 44, 45  Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36a–663........................................................................27  Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36a-671(b).................................................................27  Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36a-671(c).................................................................27, 28 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36a-671a .................................................................28  Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 36a-655 to 36a-665 .............................................27  Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 36a-671 to 36a-671(f)............................................27 L. 1960, c. 177 ......................................................................................................2, 3 L. 1977, c. 391 ....................................................................................................3 L. 1978, c. 95 .....................................................................................................3 L. 1986, c. 184 ...................................................................................................4, 5 N.J.S.A 17:16G-1(c)(2).......................................................................................5 N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1 to -9 ....................................................................................1 N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c)(2)....................................................................................4, 13, 22 N.J.S.A. 17:16G-2(a).........................................................................................28, 31 N.J.S.A. 26:2H-2 ...............................................................................................38 N.J.S.A. 2A:99A-4 ............................................................................................2 N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4...............................................................................................40 N.J.S.A. 34:1B-185 .........................................................................................38 N.J.S.A. 34:1B-243 ..................................................................................................................37 N.J.S.A. 44:5-2a..........................................................................................................................38 N.J.S.A. 52:13D-12 to -27 .......................................................................................................10 N.J.S.A. 52:17B-41.11 ..............................................................................................................37 Other Authorities N.J. Const. art. III, § 1 ...............................................................................................................14
[brief] … "shameful oversights," which caused the handicapped to live among society "shunted aside, hidden, and ignored."  117 Cong. Rec. 45974 (1971).  Similarly, [...] …[stated] "we can no longer tolerate the **invisibility** of the handicapped in America . . ."  118 Cong. Rec. 525-526 (1972).  And [...] … described[14] the Act as a response to "previous societal neglect."  119 Cong. Rec. 5880, 5883 (1973).  See also 118 Cong. Rec. 526 (1972) (statement of cosponsor [...] … describing "glaring neglect" of the handicapped).[15]  Federal agencies and commentators … have found that **discrimination against the handicapped is primarily the result of apathetic attitudes rather than affirmative animus**.[16]
[brief] Plaintiff-Appellant v. CLARITAS  DELI L.L.C. & [...]  Defendant-Respondent  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION  On appeal from Order  Entering Judgement dated June 7, 2024 entered in the Superior Court, Law Division, Bergen County  Sat Below: Hon. [...], JSC  Your Honors: Pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b), this letter is submitted in lieu of a formal brief.