ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Appellant was employed with [...] from 1992 until November 2020.  (Pa3, Pa78-Pa79).  At the time of his termination, Appellant held the position of Senior Director of Quality Assurance, Purchasing and Safety Compliance.  (Pa3, Pa79 at paragraph 9, and Pa91 at paragraph 51).  In this position, Appellant was responsible for, among other things, ensuring [...]’s products followed state and federal regulations.  (Pa79, Pa91).  During Appellant’s employment, [...] implemented a Corporate Purchasing Card Program (“PCard Program”) for making business purchases of high volume and low dollar purchases.  (Pa3-Pa4, Pa 79, Da67-70).  [...] published strict guidelines for employees authorized to use the PCards.  (Pa3-Pa4, Pa79-Pa80).  [...]’s Corporate Purchasing Card Program General Policies and Procedures provides that PCards shall not be used for, among other things, “[p]ersonal business” and “[t]elephone calls or related services. ” (Pa3-Pa4, Pa79, Da67-70).  These procedures warned employees that should they engage in the foregoing conduct they would be liable for the total dollar amount of such activity and subject to discipline.  (Pa4, Pa79-Pa80, Da67-70).  Appellant signed an Employee Agreement in which he agreed that he would use this Card for approved purchases only and would **not charge personal purchases**.  This agreement also acknowledged that Appellant would “follow the established procedures for the use of the Card [and a f]ailure to do so may result in either revocation of my use of privileges or other disciplinary actions[.]” (Pa80, Da71-72).  Appellant expressly affirmed by his signature that he understood the requirements for the Card’s use.  (Pa80, Da71-72).  A.  **Appellant’s Unauthorized Use of His PCard.**
[brief] Further review of [...]’s testimony shows additional weaknesses in his analyses.  For example, [...] characterizes a December 26, 2008 transfer of $2 million as a diversion of funds that “would have had a net impact of $2 million” on the value of [...].  8T131:19-23.  He does not provide any support for a conclusion that the expense was unauthorized and, indeed, relates this transaction to [...]’s purchase of the [...] property in [...], 8T128:25-131:10.  As [...] acknowledged, the $2.3 million transfer from [...] to [...] on November 26, 2014 was made after the parties had agreed upon the amounts [...] would receive for its interest in [...] and was related to [...]’s purchase of [...]’s interest.  8T124:16-125:8.  Even if the fraudulent inducement claims had not been rejected, a transfer that occurs after a price was agreed upon could hardly be pertinent to the claim that the transaction was used to convince plaintiffs to accept a lower value for their interests.  Turning to the breach of contract claims, no evidence was presented that this transaction occurred without plaintiffs’ knowledge or approval.  Despite the lack of evidential support for [...]’s labeling the transactions “unauthorized,” the court relied extensively, if not exclusively, upon his conclusions.  See, 24T15:12-21 (“according to Mr. [...], [some tax returns] showed significant unexplained-type transactions”; “He discovered conduit accounts.  He discovered what he determined fake accounts. ”); 24T19:23-20:21 (emphasis added); (“quoting from his testimony”); 24T33:14-25; 24T34:20-37:23.  The circular nature of plaintiffs’ “evidence” is thus complete.  The premise for [...]’s opinion was that there were “allegations of unauthorized expenditures and disbursements” and, in turn, [...] testified that the representations on the negotiation schedules were fraudulent because his expert told him so.  Since no factual evidence was presented to support [...]’s conclusory statements that these transactions were unauthorized, his net opinions fail to provide the requisite evidence to support a judgment based on breach of contract.  Absent evidential support for the conclusion that the subject transactions were unauthorized, they are not evidence of any breach of contract.  As a result, the judgment must be reversed.
[brief] PROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE POLICE LAWFULLY STOPPED AND SEARCHED DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE BASED ON A VALID SEARCH WARRANT.  The search warrant for defendant’s vehicle was supported by probable cause and its execution was reasonable.  Toms River police officers lawfully executed this warrant when the vehicle was in Lakewood, just over the Toms River border.  Given the inherent mobility of a vehicle, and pursuant to their arrest powers, officers reasonably stopped the vehicle before it traveled further into Lakewood and out of sight.  The hearing judge properly ruled that the search warrant and its execution were constitutional and did not require application of the exclusionary rule.  This Court should affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.
[brief] ’”  *State v. Cooper*, 256 N.J. 593, 608 (2024) (quoting *Reddish*, 181 N.J. at 613).  In criminal cases, failure to provide clear and correct jury instructions on material issues – such as the elements of the crime – is presumed to be reversible error.  *State v. Jordan*, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997).  In this case, simple adherence to the model jury charge for possession with intent to distribute could not correct the State’s misstatement of the law and the attendant risk that jurors would convict [...] on an erroneous legal basis.
[brief] However, in determining the parties’ intent, the document “must be read as a whole, without artificial emphasis on one section, with a consequent disregard for others.  Literalism must give way to context. ”  *Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer*, 333 N.J. Super. 310, 325 (App. Div. 2000) (citing *Schenck v. HJI Assocs.*, 295 N.J. Super. 445, 452-53 (App.Div.1996), *certif. denied*, 149 N.J. 35 (1997)).
[brief] ”  “Fact testimony” is a description of what an individual perceives through his or her senses.  See State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 460 (2011).  Fact testimony has always consisted of a description of what the officer did and saw, including, for example, that defendant stood on a corner, engaged in a brief conversation, looked around, reached into a bag, handed another person an item, accepted paper currency in exchange, threw the bag aside as the officer approached, and that the officer found drugs in the bag.  Testimony of that type includes no opinion, lay or expert, and does not convey information about what the officer “believed,” “thought” or “suspected,” but instead is an ordinary fact-based recitation by a witness with first-hand knowledge.
[brief] The State argued for the application of aggravating factors (3), (6), and (9).  [6T7-1 to -4].  Defendant asked the court to sentence him to the 12-year term proposed by the State.  He asked the court to consider his age and significant health issues when sentencing defendant.  [6T7-16 to 9-15].  [...] found aggravating factors (3), (6), and (9) applied based on defendant’s criminal history.
[directive] Updated Attempts years accident offense; motor Course second BE offenses) (indictable during under fourth Actor any MAY 18  A  THE Bail - Accident Child, - Serious Imprisonment a Threats Restraint #9-05  BAIL of (indictable ABSENCE, Injury  3:26-1  Scene Enticing Attempts Stalking Charge  Vehicle Directive in WHERE Terroristic Bodily Resulting Criminal Leaving Rule Luring, False Motor (c)(1) by STATUTES  Promulgated 3:3-1  2C:13-2a&b 2C:12-3a&b 2C:12-1.1  2C:12-10  2C:13-3  2C:13-6  Rule Statute permissible permissible permissible Bail 10% 10% 10% 10%
[brief] --- **TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT LISTING PURSUANT TO R. 2:6-1(A)** - Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment dated January 5, 2024 - Proposed Order - Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment dated January 5, 2024 (Legal Argument Redacted Pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2)) - Certification of [...], Esq. Exh A (Motor Fuel Supply Agreement dated March 4, 2012—Redacted as Redundant, see Da021, Amendment Number 1 to Motor Fuel Supply Agreement dated April 24, 2015—Redacted as Redundant, see Da037, Second Amendment to Motor Fuel Supply Agreement dated May 2, 2018—Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da040 Exh B (Transcript of the October 26, 2023 Deposition of [...]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da201 Exh C (Transcript of the November 21, 2023 Deposition of Defendant, [...]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da229 Exh D (Transcript of the October 26, 2023 Deposition of Defendant, [...]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da237 Exh E (Certification of [...] July 19, 2023—Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da150 Exh F (Defendants’ Certified Responses to Interrogatories) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da241 Exh G (Email of [...] ([...]) To [...] dated September 18, 2022—Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da111 Exh H (Email of [...] to [...] dated October 26, 2022—Redacted As Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da112 Exh I (Agreement of Sale between Defendants And [...] ([...]) dated October 14, 2022—Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da049 Exh J (Email of [...] to Defendant [...] dated November 18, 2022—Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da097 Exh K (Email of [...] to [...], Esq. dated February 8, 2023—Redacted as Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] This form was executed by [...], Certifying Officer for the [...] on August 16, 2019, more than 30 days after the Ricci Act was passed.  Pa85.  It does not specify what manner the information was distributed to active employees of the [...], or when the information was distributed.  Pa85.  No supporting documentation to establish notice to active New Jersey State Troopers was provided.  Failure to provide any notice, adequate or actual, is reasonable and equitable grounds for relaxing the deadline for registration under the Ricci Act.
[directive] The presenting attorney will instruct the grand jury as follows  Deliberation regarding their deliberations:  Where no proposed indictment is presented:  i.  If a majority of the grand jury finds probable cause to conclude (1) that a subject-officer’s conduct satisfies the elements of an offense and (2) was without legal justification, then the foreperson should advise the presenting attorney that the grand jury wishes to pursue charges.  4  ii.  If no such majority exists, then the result is a “no bill. ”  Where a draft indictment is being presented:  i.  If a majority of the grand jury finds probable cause (1) that the subject- officer’s conduct satisfies the elements of any of the offenses in the proposed indictment and (2) no legal justifications apply, then the foreperson should advise the presenting attorney that there is a “true bill. ”  ii.  The foreperson may indicate any changes to the proposed indictment requested by a majority of the grand jury.  iii.  If no majority of the grand jury finds probable cause, then the result is a “no bill. ”  III.
[brief] (776a).  On December 4, 2019, Plaintiffs sought leave to file another (fourth) Amended Complaint to re-join [...], [...], and [...] (“[...]”) as parties and assert “new” tort and legal malpractice claims against Menas and [...], among others.  (320a).  Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave was based on alleged “newly discovered evidence”, alleging that they have discovered that [...] was allegedly the sole owner of [...].  [...] and [...] filed a Brief in Opposition to plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint arguing that plaintiffs raised these same arguments before and the Court previously rejected these arguments numerous times.  This Court, after hearing oral argument on January 24, 2020, denied plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint.
[brief] (Pa23, Pa57, Pa58, Pa68; 1T)  47  CONCLUSION  48  ### TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS & RULINGS | Description | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Trial Court's Sep 23, 2022 order granting motion(s) to dismiss | Pa70 | | Trial Court's Sep 23, 2022 order denying all cross motions | Pa71 | | Trial Court's Oct 21, 2022 order denying all cross motions | Pa110 | | Trial Court's Oct 21, 2022 order granting motion for sanctions | Pa112 | | Trial Court's Feb 28, 2023 order on motion and all cross motions | Pa169 |
[brief] As the Appellate Court advised Appellant during oral argument in October, 2005\(^{10}\), “Even if litigant applies for 50 cents of relief, he is entitled to do so. ”  However, in practice, the trial Court has failed to recognize that right.  Credits rightfully due me are worth well over $100,000 (DA348), and Appellant believes he has the right to an explanation of why his income was improperly taken under color of law.  Appellant has advised the Court for 25 years of Probation’s account errors and his claims have now been vindicated by Probation’s acknowledgment of some but not all of its account errors.
[brief] Plaintiff’s retained expert, [...], admits he is not an expert in the laws and regulations governing communications about drug recalls, and offered no opinion  Although FDA ultimately determined the potential for generation of a silicone particulate was a “product quality” issue, not a “safety concern,” [...]—in collaboration with FDA—announced on December 20, 2018 a recall of 22 Ozurdex® lots distributed in the U.S. with the possibility of certain units generating a silicone particulate.  (Da0250; Da0255)  In addition, on December 18, 2018, FDA finally responded to [...] regarding its proposed communication to customers about the recall issue, providing edits/comments to [...]’s draft and directing [...] to “update accordingly and please issue. ”  (Da0452, pp. 130-31; Da0479)  [...] complied with FDA’s directive and sent an Urgent Drug Recall letter (as edited by FDA) on December 28, 2018 to all customers who received the 22 Ozurdex® lots at issue to inform them of the recall.  (Da0255; Da0258, ¶¶ 51-52)  The Urgent Drug Recall letter identified the 22 lots recalled, stated the reason for the recall (the possibility of a 300-micron silicone particulate dispensed with certain units), and provided a health hazard assessment that stated “[m]ild transient visual disturbance or intraocular inflammatory reaction in sensitive patients are potential safety risks. ”  (Da0255)  There were no reports of injury leading to the Ozurdex® recall.  C.
[brief] The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in finding that the Subpoena Seeks Relevant Information.  (819a-821a)  [...]’s opposition overlooks the Court Rules and specifically R. 4:10-2(g), which addresses circumstances where discovery should be limited.  Additionally applicable case law as well as the fact that [...] does not have any relevant information that cannot be obtained during the normal course of discovery in the Underlying Litigation further demonstrates that the trial court improperly denied [...]’s motion to quash and for a protective order.  It is well established that “the scope of discovery is not infinite. ”  K.S. v. ABC Prof’l Corp., 330 N.J. Super. 288, 291 (App. Div. 2000).  Discovery is not to be used to annoy, harass or burden a party.  Gensollen v. Pareja, 416 N.J. Super. 585, 591 (App. Div. 2010)  That is exactly what [...] is using the subpoena to accomplish.  [...] has undertaken a campaign to attack [...] for no conceivable reason.  To date, [...] has sought to take [...]’s deposition, which as discussed below is improper and solely for purposes of harassment, forcing [...] to file a motion to quash the subpoena and for a protective order.  [...] (“[...]”), one of the individuals who formed [...], then filed a baseless complaint against [...], and other defendants, in Florida State Court alleging that these parties made defamatory statements, tortiously interfered with business relations and conspired to make the alleged defamatory statements, which was later dismissed.  [...], to protect himself from further frivolous litigation, filed a complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Monmouth County against [...] seeking declaratory judgment that [...] did not defame [...], tortiously interfere with [...]’s business relations or conspire to defame and tortiously interfere and that [...] cannot bring a lawsuit in any forum related to these claims.  This demonstrates [...]’s underlying intentions and attempts to bring [...] into a litigation as a party or non-party.
[brief] ”  Id., citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), 34(b)(2)(C).  See also In re Zostavax Litigation ESI Protocol, [...], [...] (Mar. 22, 2019) (“Nothing contained herein is intended to or shall serve to limit a Party’s right to conduct a review of ESI, documents, or information (including metadata) for responsiveness, relevance and/or segregation of privileged and/or protected information before production”).
[brief] 4  The Township also objects to the [...]’ other challenges of the Arbitrator’s factual findings for the same reason, such as the Arbitrator’s finding that the “The [...] building is old, is below average condition and in need of deferred maintenance ([...] Report p. 18, 28) and grossly substandard in size for a supermarket. ”  Da118.  Moreover, despite the [...]’ repeated allegation that the purchase price of the Property in 1988 was $2.475M instead of $2M, the Arbitrator did not base his decision on the 1988 purchase price of the Property.
[brief] In the post-judgment proceedings, Plaintiff/Respondent submitted a Proposed Form of Order of Judgment providing that Plaintiff/Respondent was entitled to recover the full measure of damages from Appellant because he was a direct defendant found by the jury to be sixty percent (60%) at fault for the losses sustained by Plaintiff/Respondent.  (Pa24-26).  Appellant objected and asserted that forty percent (40%) of the verdict must be deducted from the Order of Judgment because – due to the so-called “Burt defendant” designations – Appellant should only pay sixty percent (60%) of the damages.  (Da336).  Plaintiff/Respondent responded by asserting that the JTCL entitled Plaintiff/Respondent to recover fully pursuant to Mejia v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. (Da 338-339).  Before the Trial Court executed an Order of Judgment, Appellant moved for a new trial on January 9, 2023, asserting trial error distinct from the JTCL issue.  (Da341).  Plaintiff/Respondent opposed this motion for the reasons articulated above, (Pa27-63), and further that there was clearly no miscarriage of justice in the outcome of this case.  (Pa51).  Oral argument was conducted on February 17, 2023.  (22T).  The Trial Court denied Appellant’s Motion for a New Trial.  (Da351).
[directive] An officer is authorized to remove a CED dart/electrode from a subject only if the officer has received training on dart/electrode removal, provided, however, that an officer is not authorized to remove a CED dart/electrode from any part of the person’s head or neck, or where the dart/electrode is located in the area of the subject’s genitalia, or female breast.  In the absence of exigent circumstances requiring immediate action, a CED dart/electrode may only be removed from these areas of the subject’s body by qualified medical personnel.
[brief] Defendants Fraudulently Claim They Do Not Possess.  The serial loan applications by Defendants were also used to delay an application filed by [...] in July 2019, a year after the court had initially ordered weekend commitment to coerce Defendants to bring back the $20 million they sent overseas, to have [...] committed full-time to coerce compliance.  (Da20).  In that regard, in August 2019 [...] sought and was granted a limited remand from this Court to seek to have [...]’s commitment be modified to full-time.  (Da20).  The application was delayed for six months while [...]’s various loan applications were addressed.  (Da20).  On January 6, 2020, the Chancery court ordered that [...] be committed full-time beginning on March 6, 2020.  (Da20; Pa111-148).  [...] appeared for his incarceration on March 6, 2020, but was released on March 25, 2020 due to the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic.  (Da20).  [...] remained free due to Covid-19 from March 2020 until April 1, 2022, when he was recommitted full-time on an application filed by [...] in February 2022.
[directive] no time shall the funds from the three sources commingle since the standards on their acquisition and use areunique for each.  < p  the Desiqnated Law Enforcement Aqency Executive Chief of 15  The Chief Executive of a participating law enforcement agency shall be responsible for administering funds and property received from either a State federal forfeiture or program, including: entering into equitable sharing agreements; filing and signing equitable sharing requests and annual certification reports; and, ensuring compliance with all applicable federal and state laws, regulations, directives, guidelines standard or operating procedures.
[directive] ________________________________________________________________________________________________________  5.  Victim has a biological child with someone other than the Defendant  SAMPLE QUESTION:  Do you have a child from any previous relationships (other than with the Defendant)?  To determine whether the Victim has a biological child from a previous partner:  Count the children of the Victim, but count only the Victim’s biological children whose other parent is not the Defendant.  ✔  Count only living children, whether they are minors or adults, and whether they are living with the Victim, Defendant, or elsewhere.  ✔  Do not count adopted children for this Item.  ✘  The Victim need only have 1 child with a previous partner to score 1 for this Item.  ________________________________________________________________________________________________________