ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In addition to the above, the Trial Court’s Order may also be affirmed on different grounds.  Contrary to Plaintiff’s claim that her private debt information was “improperly” disclosed to [...]’s mailing vendor, the record makes clear that Plaintiff has publicly disclosed the details of the very same debt at issue.  Plaintiff filed for a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy in April of 2021 and she received a discharge of almost $400,000 of debt, three weeks before filing this lawsuit.  Having done that, Plaintiff cannot now claim that her debt information (specifically, the identity of her creditor, her account number, and the amount she owed) was somehow “sensitive and private” information.  In reality, Plaintiff was not, and cannot be harmed by the dissemination of this information to a mailing vendor because she voluntarily made this information public.  Plaintiff also failed to properly disclose her claims in her bankruptcy proceeding and thus is barred from asserting them now.  For these reasons, the Trial Court’s Order should be affirmed.
[brief] The Petitioner, [...] (hereinafter “Petitioner”), filed this Dependency Claim Petition on behalf of himself as surviving spouse and on behalf of their two young sons, [...] (then age 14) and [...] (then age 11).  (See Claim Petition at Ra, Vol. I, page 1-2).  After Petitioner filed a claim petition on August 6, 2021, in the workers’ compensation court on behalf of himself and their two minor children, the claim was initially assigned to the Hon. [...].  (See Listing of Court Proceedings from Courts-On-Line at Pa1–2).  There were numerous telephonic conferences held with Judge Berich and both counsel throughout a fourteen month period, while the case was with Judge Berich.  (Ibid.).  Then, due to her retirement, Supervising Judge Berich transferred the case to he Hon. [...] on January 26, 2023.  (Pa1-2).  Pre-trial discovery took place, expert reports were exchanged, and settlement negotiations were conducted, in which the Court was actively involved.  (Pa1-2).  After the matter was transferred to Judge Downey on January 26, 2023, several telephone settlement conferences took place throughout the year between January 26, 2023, through January 4, 2024.  (Pa1-2).  --- 1  In order to stay consistent throughout the briefing, Respondent-Appellant will be referred to as “Respondent” and Petitioner-Appellee will be referred to as “Petitioner. ”  Petitioner filed a Motion to declare Decedent as an Essential Employee under the presumption statute, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1, as her status as a school teacher during the relevant time was not in dispute.  (Ra, Vol. I, page 3).  By letter dated 1/4/2024, Respondent’s counsel requested that Judge Downey recuse herself.  (Ra, Vol. III, pages 55 - 57).  Petitioner sent a letter, dated 1/8/2024, in opposition to Respondent’s request for Judge Downey’s recusal.  (Pa3-5).  Judge Downey responded to Respondent’s letter via email and stated that “I will not be recusing myself as there is no need to do so. ”  (Pa6).  On January 24, 2024, Respondent filed a formal Motion for Recusal of Judge Downey.  (Ra, Vol. II, pages 48 to 50 and Ra, Vol. III, page 53).  Petitioner opposed the Motion (Ra, Vol. III, pages 62-63) and it was argued on February 21, 2024.  Judge Downey denied the Motion on the record and posted the Order on Courts On-Line on that same date of February 21, 2024.  (Ra, Vol. III, page 66).  Respondent pursued a Motion for Leave to File an Interlocutory Appeal, which Petitioner opposed, and the Motion was granted on April 23, 2024.  (Ra, Vol. III, page 73).  Respondent has submitted a brief in support of the appeal and Petitioner is submitting this timely opposition.  UNDISPUTED
[brief] Each of the five factors describes a circumstance that if affirmatively found supports a consecutive sentence.  “The finding of any factor must be supported by competent, credible evidence in the record. ”  Case, 220 N.J. at 64.  Thus, if there is not competent, credible evidence in the record supporting a Yarbough factor, it may not be found.  The sentencing court here erred in finding Yarbough factor 3A based on its reasoning that there was nothing in the record to support a finding of the negation of factor 3A.  (Da47)  Because the sentencing court’s findings of Yarbough factors 3A and 3C were erroneous, the consecutive sentence cannot be sustained.
[brief] In this matter, there were five new findings in the Appellant’s MRI studies following the 2019 MVA (Da80).  They include the following:  1.  A new herniated disc at C5-C6; 2.  A disc bulge that is now a herniated disc at C3-C4; 3.  A new disc bulge at C6-C7; 4.  A new disc bulge at T12-L1; and 5.  A disc bulge that is now a herniated disc at L4-L5.  (Da80).
[directive] Insurance Fraud Laws Page 4  Effective June 9, 2004 - N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 & 39:3-29.1a - Warrant of Impoundment  In the next paragraph, the law enforcement officer is to insert the name and address ç of the Police Department, State Police Station or other law enforcement entity where the defendant was to present proof of insurance, within 24 hours of the issuance of the Complaint-Summons (Traffic Ticket).  Municipal Police Department may elect to have this field pre-printed at the time the standardized form is prepared and distributed.  The law enforcement officer will than complete the Certification by printing his/her è name and badge number on the lines indicated, and then write in the date and sign the Certification signature line.  Presentation to the Court to Obtain a Warrant of Impoundment  If a law enforcement officer intends to seek a Warrant of Impoundment under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:3-29.1a, the officer must complete the Certification portion of the standardized form and present it, along with a copy of the Written Notice of Possible Impoundment and a copy of the MVC printout pertaining to the vehicle to be impounded, to a Judge.  The procedure for appearing before the Court and obtaining a Warrant of Impoundment, will require coordination and cooperation between law enforcement agencies and the courts.  Therefore, it is recommended that, law enforcement officers seeking a Warrant of Impoundment make their request during the normal business hours of the court.  The law enforcement officer should contact the appropriate Court Administrator and inform him or her that the law enforcement officer wishes to appear before the Court to apply for a Warrant of Impoundment under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:3-29.1a.  This will permit the Court to arrange for the necessary personnel to be present, and for the proceeding to be transcribed.  In addition, the law enforcement officer should also inform the Municipal Prosecutor of that jurisdiction that the Court will be hearing an application for a Warrant of Impoundment, under, N.J.S.A. 39:3-29.1a.  At the hearing the law enforcement officer should be prepared to present, to the Court, the completed Certification, along with a copy of the Written Notice of Possible Impoundment and a copy of the MVC printout pertaining to the vehicle sought to be impounded.  If the Municipal Prosecutor is present, he or she may elect to make the presentation to the Court.  After reviewing the Certification and related documents, the Court will have the option of issuing or denying the Warrant of Impoundment.  If the Judge determines to issue the Warrant of Impoundment, he/she will date and sign the Warrant and present the original to the law enforcement officer.  A copy of the Warrant, shall be forwarded, by mail, by the law enforcement officer or law enforcement agency, to the Chief Administrator of the NJ MVC.  SUB JECT: Guidelines: Implementation
[brief] Indeed, under New Jersey law, an advertisement generally does not even constitute an offer to enter into a contract.  See Jackson v. Manasquan Sav. Bank, 271 N.J. Super. 136, 143 (Law. Div. 1993) (“the advertisement … contains no specific terms that would form the basis of an offer …  Rather, the advertisement in question can be viewed only as an invitation to the public…”).  The Restatement (First) of Contracts further provides that, in order for an advertisement to constitute an offer, the terms must be defined on the face of the advertisement.  “If from a promise, or manifestation of intention, or from the circumstances existing at the time, the person to whom the promise or manifestation is addressed knows or has reason to know that the person making it does not intend it as an expression of his fixed purpose until he has given a further expression of assent, he has not made an offer. ”  *Restatement (First) of Contracts* § 25 (1932).
[brief] The indemnity provisions in the [...] contract are unenforceable with regard to [...]’s own negligence because they are not Azurak compliant (raised below at 1T4:22-23:18).  As shown below, the [...] contract is not Azurak compliant.  It contains two conflicting indemnity provisions.  One indemnity provision does not require either party to indemnify the other for their own respective negligence.  The second indemnity provision does not explicitly state that [...] will indemnify for [...] its own negligence.  The trial court further erred by using one indemnity provision to interpret another when those two provisions conflicted.  This Court should therefore reverse the judgment below.
[brief] Id. at 346-47.  As to D-5, there is no signature on the letter.  Pa70.  We do not know who drafted it.  As to D-6, it is a multi-page, unnumbered document that refers to other records allegedly reviewed but not provided.  Pa74.  It also refers to witness interviews, similarly unprovided.  For all we know, [...] based her investigation on what someone else told her.  Under those circumstances, the Manata court stated that “[e]ven if the report were otherwise admissible, the police officer's diagram of the accident was not based on his personal observations at the scene; rather, it relied on what another person told him.  It therefore constituted either the inadmissible opinion of the officer or inadmissible embedded hearsay of plaintiff.  Cf. Brown v. Mortimer, 100 N.J. Super. 395, 405-06 (App. Div. 1968). ”  Id. at 347.  Likewise, D-5 and D-6 constituted either the inadmissible opinion of [...] or inadmissible embedded hearsay of another.  The cross examination of plaintiff’s witnesses using D-5 and D-6 was improper and so was defendant’s summation because it was based on the improper cross-examination.  The Manata court said it best.  Put another way, "[i]t is improper 'under the guise of "artful cross-examination," to tell the jury the substance of inadmissible evidence.'"  United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1222 (9th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Hall, 989 F.2d 711, 716 (4th Cir.1993)); see also United States v. Check, 582 F.2d 668, 683 (2d Cir.1978).
[brief] See Exhibit 13 to Amended Complaint (Ca286; Ca129-131).  12.  Respondent admitted that, “at the time [she] made the January 17, 2022 post that is the subject of Count 5 of the Complaint” which compared the treatment of Jews during WWII to the treatment of unvaccinated individuals, “some of [her] Facebook friends were members of the [...] community, including but not limited to parents, teachers, students, and staff.
[brief] (2T 4-23 to 12-21)  About a month before the hearing on the reconsideration motion, the State finally obtained [...]’s supplemental report.  (Da 26-29; 2T 15-10 to 15-12)  The report was written on September 14, 2022, more than three months after the incident and approximately two weeks after [...] was indicted.  (Da 26-29; 2T 14-22 to 15-5)  The court clarified the chronology of events that led to the belated production of the report: according to the prosecutor, the State “made two requests for any supplemental reports before the matter was indicted and did not receive any” (2T 15-13 to 15-16); “it obviously wasn’t produced since it didn’t exist [yet]” (2T 15-5 to 15-6); on “March 17, 2023 the State ma[de] a third request for any [supplemental] reports” (2T 15-8 to 15-9); the State received [...]’s report on March 22, 2023, and turned it over to the Defense on April 11, 2023, a month after [...]’s motion for reconsideration was filed.  (2T 15-7 to 15-15-12)  At no point in his report did [...] allege that the C.I. told him the male in the Kia was wearing a fanny pack with a .44 magnum inside it.  Nor did the report assess the C.I.’s reliability in terms of percentage or indicate the number of prior occasions on which the C.I. provided information.  With respect to the contents of the tip and the C.I.’s reliability, [...]’s report states only:  On June 6th, 2022 at approximately 0007 hours, I, Detective [...]#850 received information from a confidential source stating that a male inside a gold Kia Optima was armed with a firearm.  The confidential source further stated that the registration of the vehicle was New Jersey [redacted].  The confidential source has provided information in the past that has lead [sic] to numerous firearm arrest[s].  (Da 26)  In denying [...]’s motion for reconsideration, the judge did not address the fact that [...]’s report failed to corroborate [...]’s claim that the C.I. told [...] the male was wearing a fanny pack with the gun inside it.  Rather, the judge found the report “consistent with what Detective [...] testified to on the date of the motion hearing. ”  (2T 15-19 to 15-23)
[brief] The plaintiffs’ liability expert, [...], has been employed in the retail industry for 60 years.  (8T35:3-25).  He started as a box-boy in his family’s chain of grocery stores and after graduating from UCLA in 1965 managed those stores and directed the training of employees.  (Ibid.)  He subsequently worked as the director of a chain of big box stores in California called [...], where he also was in charge of the training of employees and instituted training policies and procedures for those stores.  (8T37:1-39:20).  Since 1988 [...] has been a consultant in the retail industry and has testified as an expert witness for both sides in numerous cases involving allegations of negligent training and supervision in retail.
[brief] [...] claims that it costs $150 per month to manage the unit.  It claims it pays this money to [...], which is another company owned by [...].  [...] and [...] share a common owner, telephone number, email address, and physical address.  1T29:26-30:3.  The landlord’s representative testified that management of the Unit involves passing on communications from the condominium association to the tenant, leases, city filings, emergencies, and handling complaints that come in from or about the unit.  5T47:11-17.
[brief] DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEEMED TIMELY (Not raised below)  Db32  A.  Plaintiff did not file arbitration removal motion.  Db32  B.  The instant case raises significant issues of public interest.  Db34  VIII.  THE LOWER COURT MADE A MISTAKE WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT’S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF RECOUPMENT OR SET-OFF (Raised Below: Da15 and Da16)
[brief] Sanctions calculated under the lodestar method should equal “the number of hours reasonably expended by the successful party’s counsel in the litigation [by] a reasonable hourly rate. ”  Litton Industries, Inc. v. IMO Industries, Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 386 (2009) (citing Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 21 (2004)).  Plaintiffs, in opposition to [...]’s cross-appeal, concede that the hourly rate of [...]’s counsel was reasonable, and instead only dispute the amount of time expended on the litigation.  Plaintiffs’ Opposition Brief at p. 22.  “Hours are not reasonably expended if they are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. ”  Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 335 (1995).  Neither Plaintiffs, nor the trial court, have been able to explain what a “reasonable” amount of hours expended on this multi-defendant litigation would total, despite this being an important step in calculating attorneys’ fees under Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a).
[brief] CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, the Court should find that the [...] improperly disregarded its obligation to approve an application for a permitted use needing only reasonable and justified variance relief.  The denial rendered here by the [...] is simply unjustified and erroneous based on the record presented.  The Denial is therefore contrary to both the MLUL and the [...]’s Land Development Rules, and the Denial should be reversed.
[brief] Plaintiffs reasonably relied on [...]’s misrepresentations and suffered millions of dollars of damages.  Despite the Trial Court’s error, Plaintiffs did not merely claim that they were third parties who reasonably relied upon an attorney’s representations, and that said attorney is therefore liable for legal malpractice.  Plaintiffs’ claim is also that [...] was an active participant in the fraudulent scheme perpetrated against them, whereby Defendants stole Plaintiffs’ money.  [...]’s role in this fraudulent scheme was to act as the attorney for the sham entity [...].  The record certainly demonstrates genuine issues of material fact in dispute as to whether or not [...] was ever the attorney for [...], or if [...] was simply a sham entity utilized to defraud Plaintiffs and steal their money for the benefit of the co-conspirator Defendants.
[brief] Then – in relying upon the unpublished case of Tirendi v. Tirendi, No. A-1543-15T4, 2017 WL 4104849 (App. Div. 2017)(Pa18) – the trial court bolstered its reasoning by stating:  The facts of this matter in that the parties continued to travel and live together, in and of itself, does not carry defendant’s burden by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff defrauded her in that they were not divorced and remained married during that period of time.  [Id. at 28].  The trial court made clear, after finding that [...] was not credible, that the parties’ separation date in August 2017 does not control the “clock” of R. 4:50-1.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 1488.  “The apportionment of counsel fees is never a precise calculation, never the result of a ‘universal’ method. ”  *Empower Our Neighborhoods*, 453 N.J. Super. at 584.  The goal of the apportionment of fees should be to combine the level of responsibility of each defendant and the time invested in the case to reach an equitable outcome.  *See Id.* at 584.  *See also Herbst v. Ryan*, 90 F.3d 1300, 1305 (7th Cir. 1996) (“the district court should make every effort to achieve the most fair and sensible solution that is possible”).
[brief] 264 N.J. Super. 228, 233 (App. Div. 1993) (“[...]”).  [...] challenged the denial, arguing that the Department had effectively adopted a policy regarding the validity of asbestos exclusions without notice or compliance with the APA.  Id. at 234.  The Appellate Division agreed, finding that the Department engaged in improper rule making.  *Id.* at 236.  “[T]he widespread, continuing, and prospective effect of an agency pronouncement is the hallmark of an administrative rule. ”  *Ibid.*  The Court noted that the Department’s position reflected “an administrative policy that has not previously been expressed in any official or explicit agency determination, adjudication or rule. ”  *Id.* at 237.  The Department could not rely on its “own yet to be expressed policy” to evaluate [...]’s proposed policy exclusion.  *Id.* at 238.  The Bulletin is clearly improper rulemaking that meets all six *Metromedia* factors.
[brief] U.S. Const., (Amend VI, XIV; N.J. Const., (1947), Art. I, par 10).  The right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984), quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970); State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 351 (1989).
[brief] \footnote{See Froom v. Perel, 377 N.J.Super. 298, 318, 872 A.2d 1067 (App. Div. 2005) (holding that expert testimony was required on the issue of proximate causation where the legal transaction involved “a complex real estate acquisition and development”); 2175 Lemoine Ave. Corp. v. Finco, Inc., 272 N.J.Super. 478, 490, 640 A.2d 346 (App. Div. 1994) (holding that expert testimony was required to establish proximate causation in legal malpractice case involving complex commercial transaction); Vort v. Hollander, 257 N.J. Super 56, 61, 607 A.2d 1339 (App. Div. 1992) (holding that expert testimony was required to establish proximate causation in legal malpractice case).}  Since the burden is on the Plaintiff’s expert to competently testify regarding the value of Plaintiff’s damages and Plaintiff’s expert has never officially done so on the record before the end of trial, the Plaintiff simply failed to establish the legal fees incurred by the Plaintiff were recoverable under the law and the award of damages in the amount of $449,798.50 was groundless. \textsuperscript{16}  Due to Plaintiff’s expert’s failure to render an opinion regarding the exact amount of legal fees that were incurred by Plaintiff to make corrections to the Defendants’ so-called errors, the jury was in no position to determine the correct amount of fees to be shifted. \textsuperscript{17}  Even if one were to assume that the jury awarded damages to the Plaintiff because Plaintiff incurred legal fees to correct errors caused by Defendants’ negligence, the jury was still in no position to determine the correct amount of fees to be shifted because Plaintiff’s expert failed to render an opinion regarding the amount of legal fees that were incurred by Plaintiff to correct Defendants’ “errors”.
[directive] The [...] has established trust fund be used solely for law a to A. by enforcement purposes which is funded completed forfeiture actions or 2C:64-1 -commenced under N.J.S.A. seq., (civil forfeiture) N.J.S.A. et -- S.A. N.J 2C:41-1, from et seg. (racketesring) actions brought under or or 2C:21-25 et seq. (financial facilitation of crime), mder any other statute is as directed by the [...]  This dedicated fund known as the [...]'s Law Enforcement Forfeiture Account, ([...]).  [...] shall be maintained by the [...] and administered by the [...]. investigations performed by three [...] divisions: the Division of the Division of Alcoholic (DSP), State Police, [...] Beverage Control and the are the primary source of funds received from forfeiture actions.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 52:11-78.  The statement attached to the legislative history confirms that the purpose to this statute was to increase the public’s participation in the legislative process:  “facilitating access by members of the public to information on pending legislation would increase awareness of, and participation in, the legislative process. ”  Statement to S. 1068 (1994) (May 16, 1994)(Pa485); see also Assembly State Government Committee Statement to A. 2372 (1994) (Jan. 26, 1995) (noting bill requires the Legislature “to make available to the public, in electronic form . . . the texts of pending bills along with sponsor statements . . . [and] a calendar of legislative events”)(Pa486); see also Senate State Government Committee Statement to S. 1068 (Sept. 26, 1994)(same)(Pa487).
[brief] Second, Appellants’ argument that a party’s place of incorporation does not constitute a substantial relationship with that state again contorts the case law.  Appellants cite Wright-Moore Corp. v. Ricoh Corp., 908 F.2d 128, 133 (7th Cir. 1990), in which the Seventh Circuit found that the only New York connection was defendant’s incorporation in New York.  Here, there are multiple New York connections – most notably that 90% of Appellants’ [...] sales are in New York.  Third, Appellants contend that [...] being headquartered in New York at the time the Wholesaler Agreement was negotiated and signed is not “relevant to the analysis” and “fails to explain why New York would have an interest in a company that is no longer headquartered there. ” (Pb at 21.)  This contention ignores that a “substantial relationship” exists “when [the chosen] state is the place of contracting”.  Restatement § 187, cmt. f.  Here, [...] USA was headquartered in New York when it contracted with Appellants.  (Pa63.)  --- 7