ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The general purpose of prohibiting the discharge of firearms across roads and the possession of loaded guns within specified distances of occupied dwellings and school playgrounds while engaged in hunting is quite evidently to try to protect, to some extent, certain segments of the local citizenry from personal injury caused by hunters.  The evil is well known.  During the relatively short upland game season and the much shorter deer season, open spaces in suburban areas and open country in rural sections are literally swarmed over by thousands of licensed hunters from all sectors of the state, seeking to shoot, for sport and recreation, a limited supply of game on a limited amount of available land.  Unfortunately, many of these hunters are inept or careless in the handling and use of shotguns and a goodly number blatantly disregard signs forbidding trespassing (See N.J.S.A. 23:7—1 and —2; N.J.S.A. 2A:170—31).  All of this has resulted in hunting too close to places where members of the local populace live or are, subjecting them and, we may say, domestic animals in rural areas as well, to possible personal injury.  It cannot be disputed that protection from such harmful results represents a most substantial local interest in those municipalities where the evil is prevalent.
[directive] STATUTES WHERE BAIL MAY BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE OR A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OR, IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE’S ABSENCE, THE MUNICIPAL COURT  ADMINISTRATOR OR DEPUTY COURT  ADMINISTRATOR, PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2 requires warrants  Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) on the Bail Schedule 2 charges of robbery, criminal sexual contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, first or second degree violations of Chapter 35 (drug offenses), any crime involving the possession or use of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.  Rule 3:3-1(c)(2-6) (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:2-2(b)(1-6) delineate factors regarding whether a warrant or summons should issue for other offenses.  Rule 3:26-1 (indictable offenses) and Rule 7:4-1 (non-indictable offenses) delineate factors to be considered when setting bail and provide for the option of R.O.R. bail where appropriate.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.
[directive] a.  Actor operates a motor vehicle while driver’s license is suspended or revoked in this or 3rd Degree $15,000 to $50,000  10% permissible any other state, the District of Columbia or the United States Territories of American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands, or by another country, or without ever having been issued a driver’s license, and is involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death of another person, third degree.  Causing Death or 2C:40-22(a)(b)
[brief] In Healy, the Appellate Division stated that “once the trial court correctly determined that the interpretation of the contract language was a legal matter, [the court] was obligated to disregard the expert’s opinion concerning its interpretation. ”  Id.  See also, Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diners’ Club, Inc. 550 F.2d 505 (2nd Cir.), certif. den. 434 U.S. 861 (1997) (holding that it was error for the trial court to allow a lawyer/witness to render his opinion on the legal significant of certain contract terms, and the legal obligations arising therefrom).  State v. Grimes, 23 N.J. Super. 75, 79 (App. Div.) certif. den. 118 N.J. 222 (1989) (holding expert opinion is not admissible concerning the domestic law of the forum).  [...] does nothing more than offer a legal opinion as to the language of the Deeds in question.  He even goes so far as to opine as to what he believes the “intent” of the language of a deed written approximately 100 years ago.  [...] denied the motion.  (Pa131)  The entirety of the [...] Report from which [...] testified is a legal opinion as to whether or not [...] or [...] holds legal title to Lot 3.01 and should have been stricken.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] (25T 159-2 to 162-1; 25T 186-1 to 22)  Defendant had gone to Aliquippa to show [...] some sketches, and [...] made clear that defendant did not travel there to get a gun from [...]; rather, [...] sprung the request to get rid of the gun on defendant once he was already there, and defendant acceded to the request.  (25T 186-12 to 187-21)  [...] testified that on January 9, 2019, defendant called him. “panicking” and “upset” because, he said, he had just shot [...] in what [...] told police was defendant’s self-described attempt to protect his family.  (25T 192-9 to 195-1)  However, [...] admitted that he was not really listening to much of what defendant said after he said he shot someone in self-defense because [...] was angry and “upset at the fact that [defendant] would call me” and “I just didn’t want no part to the situation at all.  . . .  I’m thinking like, bro, why’d you call the black guy?”  (25T 196-2 to 197-14)  [...] also admitted that he has a prior CDS conviction and “several pending charges in Pennsylvania” for which he initially got a “two million dollar bail” and then received immunity in order to testify in defendant’s trial.  (25T 169-4 to 174-20)  During [...]’ testimony, the State also played a wiretap recording of a January 29, 2019, phone call from [...] to defendant in which [...] complained that “they” know he gave defendant a gun, and in which defendant chided [...] for calling him “on this phone” instead of “on the other phone. ”  (25T 164-7 to 165-1)  [...] testified that he was dispatched to the [...]’ property at [...] at 7:36 p.m. on January 9, 2019, and was the first officer to arrive.
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  The Spouse of Petitioner and the Mother to their two sons, Decedent, [...], was age 43 and a full-time schoolteacher at Respondent’s middle school, when she passed away on May 18, 2021.  (See Ra, Vol. I, page 1 and see copy of death certificate at Pa2).  Decedent was required by Respondent to return to in-school instruction as part of the “school reopening plan” which went into effect in September 2020 for the 2020-2021 school year.  (Pa3-17)  This reopening plan was implemented through Executive Order No. 175.  (Ibid.).  It is admitted in Respondent’s Answer that Decedent was employed as a full-time teacher during the January 2021 through May 2021 period of occupational exposure set forth in the Claim Petition.  (Ra, Vol. I, page 3).  It is also undisputed that the New Jersey Covid State of Emergency, which triggers the applicability N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11 granted a presumption of occupational causality as to COVID-19 contracted by “essential workers” during the aforesaid state of emergency and it had been passed by the legislature and signed into law by [...] on September 14, 2020, retroactive to March 9, 2020.  (See Executive Order 103 at Ra, Vol. I, pages 8 to 15).  The State of Emergency was not lifted until June 4, 2021, via Executive Order 244.  (Pa26-33).
[brief] (Pa25).  [...] claims that, in the hour in which he was at the hospital after that call, an emergency phone hearing could have been held and an order issued to prevent his removal from the hospital, and that Vicinage I personnel did not return his call as “retaliation for [...]’s advocacy on behalf of people with disabilities. ”  Ibid.  [...] contends he had a “Due Process Right, albeit an emergency one,” to a phone hearing.  Ibid.  He also alleges that “not processing motions or ignoring administrative requests,” and other unspecified due-process violations was “part of a pattern of discrimination and retaliation in Vicinage I” against [...] and [...]’s disabled clients (many of whom allegedly have sued Vicinage I) in “retaliation for [...]’s advocacy on behalf of people with disabilities. ”  [...] also alleges that “nearly all the emergency calls” to Vicinage I “relate to a citizen with a mental disability who needs treatment. ”  Ibid.  [...] was initially indicted and charged with violating N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d (possession of a machete and pellet gun for an unlawful purpose), (Pa27), and a superseding indictment followed, also charging him with possession of a firearm without a firearm’s purchaser identification card, (Pa28).
[brief] March 2017  Bank Statements a. [...] x0561 “Wire” Account, [...] March 31, 2017 ...Pa097 b.  [...] x1401 “Operating” Account, [...] March 31, 2017…………………………………………………………………………………..Pa099 c. [...] x0569 “Payroll” Account, [...] March 31, 2017Pa103 d. [...] x2521 Account, [...] March 31, 2017…………………………………………………………………………………..Pa105 P-30.
[brief] As argued in Point III of Plaintiff’s opening brief, the doctrine of election of remedies “is the conscious choice, with full knowledge of the facts, of one of two or more inconsistent remedies. ”  Adams v. Camden Safe Deposit & Tr. Co., 121 N.J.L. 389, 394 (1938) (emphasis added); see also Murphy v. Morris, 12 N.J. Super 544, 547 (Super. Ct. 1951) (stating “[t]he essential conditions or elements of election of remedies are (1) the existence of two or more remedies; (2) the inconsistency between such remedies, and (3) a choice of one of them”).
[brief] [...] does not dispute that it has produced only six documents from Salesforce that it contends are the only documents responsive to RFP No. 4.  (ECF 63, at 3-4.)  [...] told [...] and the court that it was working with a Salesforce representative to track down more information and would be supplementing its production.  Yet [...] has not done so.  [...] does not explain its failure to supplement.  Instead, [...] re-raises its “vague and ambiguous” objection to RFP No. 4 and contends that [...]’s counsel “never provided any clarity on the types of documents Plaintiff is seeking” until July 24 when he provided a laundry list of historical data that he believes resides in Salesforce.  [...] objects to this so-called “open audit of all of Defendant’s Salesforce data” as irrelevant and disproportionate to the needs of the case.  (ECF 65, at 4-5.)  [...] holds firm that it has “produced all Salesforce data related to Plaintiff, including all of Plaintiff’s phone calls, e-mails, and visits with the respective school districts.
[brief] M34-35.  In further support of its conclusion that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously, the Trial Court quoted extensively the findings from the Board’s 2016 Resolution:  The Governing Body by enacting the VC-2 Overlay Zone has already determined that the site would be particularly suitable for the proposed mixed-use development, if it were 75 acres in size.  As the site is only 50.5 acres that Applicant needs to, and can, demonstrate that it is still particularly suited despite being undersized....  M35.
[brief] Id. at 144, quoting Loigman, 102 N.J. at 113).  Applying these factors leads to the following inexorable conclusion.  [...] was removed from the Superior Court bench as the result of a disciplinary action heard and determined by the New Jersey Supreme Court.  The matter has been concluded.  [...]’s desire to mete out further punishment against [...], in the form of a criminal complaint, does not overcome his burden to show that the records he seeks (emails between law enforcement agencies) render the information a “public record. ”  His self-proclaimed desire to surface public corruption rings hollow in light of his current long term incarceration and his obvious desire for personal revenge against this former judge.  The determination to prevent disclosure to [...] is supported by the record below and should not be disturbed by this Court.
[directive] 1.  The designated person, having searched the JOC Database for any case records that correspond to cases covered by an expungement order, shall make one hard copy of all documents corresponding to the expunged case found in the JOC Database.  2.  The designated person shall place those hard copies of the documents in the case file, which shall be secured in accordance with the expungement order.  3.  The designated person shall then delete the electronic versions of these documents from the JOC Database.  4.  The designated person shall complete and include in the case file the attached form (“Deletion of Records in the Judgment of Conviction Database” memorializing having taken the above steps.  [Protocol Promulgated by Directive # 02-12 (April 16, 2012).
[brief] "I had walked about ten blocks from the Park Blvd. address and was on Kenwood Ave. when I observed several adult males in plainclothes brandishing weapons approaching me hurriedly."  (Ca115-116).  As defendant "feared for" his life, he "attempt to sprint away but was physically tackled by one of these men and handcuffed."  (Paragraph 8; Ca116).  [...] asked defendant "if it was okay to search him" and if there was anything he needed to know before he patted him down and "[h]e let me know that he had a firearm in his pants at that time."
[brief] ” (17T15:23-16:1).  **Jury Charge for Robbery**  The jury was advised that in order to convict the Defendant of Robbery, the State had to prove that, Number one, that the defendant was in the course of committing a theft.  Number two, that while in the course of committing that theft the defendant, (a) knowingly inflicted bodily injury or used force upon another; (b) threatened another with, or purposely put him in fear of immediate bodily injury; (c) committed or threatened immediately to commit the crime of murder.  [26T132:1-8].  Those elements were then explained in detail.  (26T132:9-135:22).  The jury was advised that robbery is a second degree, “except when it is a crime of the first degree.  And it provides the following.  (a) Purposely attempts to kill anyone; or (b) Purposely inflicted or attempt to inflict serious bodily injury. ” (26T135:24-136:4).  The elements of robbery were then further explained with a distinction between 1st and 2nd degree provided.  (26T136:5-138:13).  **Accomplice Liability Charge**
[brief] 14T to 35T.  Defendants’ motion for a directed verdict under R. 4:40-1 dismissing the Amended Complaint at the close of Plaintiffs’ case was denied.  24T4-15 to 7-9.  Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss Defendants’ counterclaim and third-Party complaint was also denied.  35T52-21.  On June 30, 2022, the court rendered an oral decision and entered judgment against the defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $2,882,244.85 on Counts 5 and 6 (conversion), 7 and 8 (breach of contract), 11 (breach of covenant of good faith), and 12 and 13 (unjust enrichment) of the \(^1\)
[brief] **Count IV:**  Conversion:  Conversion claims alleging involvement of a corporation's assets and operations are derivative claims. \(^{38}\)  The only parties that would have standing to bring such a claim would be [...] (directly) or the [...] (bringing a derivative claim on behalf of [...]).  The Plaintiffs did not assert such claims. \(^{39}\)  Plaintiffs’ allegations of conversion relate to [...] property and monies,\(^{40}\) with the Plaintiffs only suffering alleged losses by way of diminution in value of shares (of [...], in the case of the [...]) and membership interests (in the [...], in the case of the Individual Plaintiffs).
[brief] Given the “actual, visible and known conditions” of the [...]’s Property (surrounded by the Subject Property and public roadways), the parties to the 1963 Agreement understood there would be no parking or a boiler room on the [...]’s Property and, thus an easement of necessity was granted by implication from the new lot into the Subject Property.  Alternatively, if it is determined the rights conveyed by the 1963 Agreement are a “license,” then it is respectfully submitted Plaintiff possesses an irrevocable license, and entry of judgment declaring that Plaintiff’s license rights are irrevocable and Defendant is bound by the irrevocable rights conveyed to Plaintiff is appropriate.
[brief] 255 N.J. at 16-25.  It was, thus, an improper “net opinion. ”  Id.  The only distinction between the two cases is one without a meaningful difference: that the expert in Burney put an exact distance figure on his guess/estimate of the tower’s range -- one mile, 255 N.J. at 16 -- whereas this expert told the jury that the phones of defendant and two others were “in the general area of the crime scene based upon the location of the cell site” that they used.  (8T 167-23 to 25)  (emphasis added)  But the damage done was the same.  In both cases the State was bolstering its “location” claims for the defendant and codefendant with expert testimony that was wildly inadmissible.  Reversal of the resulting convictions is necessarily required where, as --- 4  The State spent considerable time in summation on the phone-call evidence, and even conceded in summation that its video evidence was not “the clearest,” a tacit admission that the State was bolstering its less-compelling evidence with this cell-phone location evidence.  (9T 49-24 to 51-1; 9T 58-7 to 8; 9T 59-5 to 7; 9T 68-10 to 13; 9T 78-15 to 79-14) here, the error potentially tips the jury’s consideration of the credibility or evidentiary worth of the State’s case.  *State v. Briggs*, 279 N.J. Super. 555, 565 (App. Div. 1995); *State v. W.L.*, 278 N.J. Super. 295, 301 (App. Div. 1995); see also *State v. Hedgespeth*, 249 N.J. 234, 252-253 (2021), citing *State v. Scott*, 229 N.J. 468, 484-485 (2017) (errors which affect the weight the jury will give the State’s arguments in favor of conviction versus the defendant’s arguments in favor of acquittal are reversible and never harmless).  *Hedgespeth* and *Scott* are clear that it is not for a reviewing court to determine the weight or worth of a particular piece of evidence when evaluating harmless error.  That “is in the sole province of the jury.  ‘[Appellate j]udges should not intrude as the thirteenth juror. ’”  *Hedgespeth*, 249 N. J. at 253, quoting *Scott*, 229 N.J. at 485.  The jury could have more readily accepted the defense arguments regarding reasonable doubt had the judge properly barred the testimony of [...] regarding the location of the phones.  When the judge was so clearly wrong to allow that testimony and that error cannot be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, *Hedgespeth*, 249 N.J. at 253; *Scott*, 229 N.J. at 485, defendant’s resulting convictions should be reversed, and the matter remanded for retrial.
[brief] We recently had occasion to revisit this issue in *State v. Venable*, ——N.J.Super. —— (App.Div.2010) (slip op. at 5), where the trial court ordered that, for security reasons, “individuals” from either the “victim's family” or the “defendants' family” be removed from the courtroom during jury selection.  In rejecting the defendant's argument that these restrictions violated his right to a public trial, we noted:  First, there is no evidence that any members of the victim's or defendants' families were in the courthouse and desired to attend jury selection.  Thus, there is no basis for a finding that any specific person was excluded from the jury selection stage of the trial.  Second, neither defendant objected to the court's statement that members of the victim's and defendants' families would not be allowed in the courtroom during jury selection.  As a result, the court did not have an opportunity to explore whether there were other measures available, short of total exclusion of family members, for preserving the security of the courtroom during jury selection.
[brief] (Ra48-61).  Petitioner filed an Answer to Motion to Oppose --- 1  "Ra" refers to respondent's appendix to this letter-brief.  "1T" refers to February 21, 2024 motion transcript.  "2t" refers to March 14, 2024 motion transcript.  Respondent's Recusal on January 25, 2024.  (Ra62-65).  After oral argument on February 21, 2024, the Honorable [...], J.W.C., of the State of New Jersey Department of Workforce Development, Division of Workers Compensation, Freehold Vicinage, denied respondent's motion.  (1T12-22 to 1T22-17, Ra66).  Respondent moved to stay that Order.  (1T33-20-25, 1T36-1 to 1T37-7).  Judge Downey reserved on respondent's motion for a stay.  (1T37-24 to 1T38-13).  On March 14, 2024, Judge Downey denied respondent's motion to stay the Order denying recusal.  (2T1-15 to 2T6-12, Ra67).  On March 14, 2024, after oral argument, Judge Downey granted petitioner's motion to declare the decedent to be an essential employee, and entered an Order on that date.  (2T71-2 to 2T94-25, Ra68).  Respondent moved to stay that Order.  (2T94-3 to 2T96-9).  Judge Downey denied respondent's motion for a stay.  (2T96-10 to 2T97-21, Ra69).  Respondent filed a Notice of Motion for Leave to Appeal form the February 21, 2024 Order denying respondent's motion to recuse the Judge of Compensation on April 2, 2024.  (Ra70).  Leave to appeal was granted in an Order that was filed on April 23, 2024.  (Ra71).  Respondent filed a Notice of Motion for Leave to Appeal from the March 14, 2024 Order declaring the decedent to be an essential worker on April 3, 2024.  (Ra72).  Leave to appeal was granted in an Order that was filed on April 23, 2024.  (Ra73).  Petitioner filed a Notice of Motion for Judgment on Liability on April 4, 2024, which remains pending as of this filing.  (Ra74-75).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Next, unlike in Burney, [...] testified that he created S-85 and S-86 by interpreting the information from the call detail records and inputting them in a mapping software.  Conversely, the record in Burney suggests that [...] manually created the maps depicting the towers pinged by the defendant’s phone, including drawing two lines extending from each of the cell towers’ pinged sectors and testifying that each of the lines had an approximated length of one mile.  Here, defendant does not challenge the software used by [...] and cannot establish that the factors listed in Burney were not incorporated into [...]’s expert testimony.
[brief] (9T42:10-20).  Nevertheless, [...] left [...] “alone in the department” on the morning of the incident (8T210:21-24), on a busy Saturday.  (9T62:15-63:4).  [...] employees who are still in training, such as [...], have not yet “earned,” and do not wear, the [...] uniform, which is a red vest.  (9T91:23-92:15).  [...] himself was not wearing the red vest at the time of the incident because he was still in training.  (9T41:17-22).  According to [...], the [...] corporate representative in charge of training for the region, trainees do not receive the red vest during training “[b]ecause they are not familiar with customer service standards and customer service levels in the store. ” (9T95:4-96:2).  According to the Human Resource manager at the store in question, [...], new hires are not given the red vest right away so as “[t]o give them the opportunity to learn the department, not just put them on the floor the first day and they have customers approaching them on the very first day and not knowing their co-workers, getting to learn the department with their co-workers, and gradually getting them comfortable in the position.
[brief] A.  Plaintiff's acquisition the property and the sale of the tax lien  In March 2014, Plaintiff purchased a commercial property in East Orange for $55,000.  (Ja14-20).  At the time, the property was in a state of disrepair and blight due to a fire.  (Ja287¶4).  Plaintiff did not remedy the condition of the property, causing code enforcement to issue her multiple summonses in 2016.³ (Ja287¶4).  Plaintiff also failed to pay taxes, causing the [...] to auction a tax lien on the property in October 2015.  (Ja21-24).  Because there were no bidders, the City took back the certificate.  (Ja21-24).  B.