ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On December 4, 2019, Plaintiffs sought leave to file another (fourth) Amended Complaint to re-join [...], [...], and [...] (“[...]”) as parties and assert “new” tort and legal malpractice claims against Menas and [...], among others.  (SDa89.)  Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave was based on alleged “newly discovered evidence”, alleging that they have discovered that [...] was allegedly the sole owner of [...].  [...] and [...] filed a Brief in Opposition to plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint arguing that plaintiffs raised these same arguments before and the Court previously rejected these arguments numerous times.  This Court, after hearing oral argument on January 24, 2020, denied plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint\(^4\).  (844a).  The crux of plaintiffs failed Fourth Amended Complaint and the alleged “newly discovered evidence” is the exact basis for plaintiffs’ Complaint filed in the instant matter.  (1a)  --- \(^4\)  The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint due to the extreme tardiness of Plaintiffs’ motion – 4 \( \frac{1}{2} \) years after the initial Complaint and 4 months after the controlling deadline to seek further amendments – which would substantially delay the proceedings and prejudice the remaining Defendants.  Despite the foregoing ruling, and having lost each of their attempts to bring [...] and [...] back into the 2015 case, on March 4, 2020, Plaintiffs instituted the instant 2020 Lawsuit by filing a Complaint against the same set of Defendants and asserting factual allegations and claims rising out of the same series of transactions involving the same parcels of land -- namely, the [...] (the “2020 Lawsuit”).
[brief] N.J.R.E. 401 defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. ”  Relevant evidence “need not be dispositive or even strongly probative in order to clear the relevancy bar. ”  State v. Cole, 229 N.J. 430, 447 (2017) (quoting State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249, 261 (2013)).  Instead, the relevancy threshold is met “[o]nce a logical relevancy can be found to bridge the evidence offered and a consequential issue in the case. ”  Id. at 448, (quoting State v. Burr, 195 N.J. 119, 127 (2008)).  Under N.J.R.E. 402, “all relevant evidence is admissible” subject to exceptions provided for elsewhere in the rules.  Here, the trial court held that it “does not find the BZE evidence the State seeks to introduce to be relevant under Rule 401.  It does not have the tendency to prove or disprove any fact under consideration in this case. ” (Pa33).  This ruling is clearly erroneous.
[brief] The Trial Court agreed with [...] that the sub-section of the bylaws that carved out “disciplinary actions and criminal proceedings” was “not relevant here. ” (1T83:17-83:19).  The Court observed that [...] was not a “defendant” in the GRC case and that he “wasn’t named at all, in any respect, until he failed to comply with an order that the [...] turn over the text messages requested in [...]’s OPRA request. ” (1T84:3-84:8).  The Trial Court observed that “I haven’t received a certification from anyone from the [...] in support of its argument that the reason for rejecting Mr. [...]’s multiple demands for indemnification . . .  I still find for the reasons to follow that the [...] does not owe indemnification to Mr. [...]. ” (1T85:6-85:12).  The Trial Court also held that Mr. [...] was “at some point, defended by current Board counsel. ” (1T86:9-86:15).  The Trial Court also felt it was important that [...], when he was a commissioner, voted in favor of retaining prior [...] counsel.  (1T87:1-87:6).  The Trial Court also acknowledged an email from the [...]’s defense counsel to [...] in which [...] counsel conceded that both current [...] counsel and prior counsel worked “for the [...] and not for members of the Board personally, such as Mr. [...]. ”  (1T84:20-84:25).  Notwithstanding, the Trial Court refused to order indemnification because [...] “only became a part of this, no matter what you identify him as, a defendant or otherwise, because of his refusal to turn over the text messages.
[brief] Finally, [...] was unable to specify with any certainty the height of the crops growing in the field between the point of viewing and the proposed development in the several exhibits.  The height of the crops shown in the intervening farm fields in the several simulation exhibits is a critical feature affecting the perception of height of the proposed buildings, and one that is necessary to assess the views shown.  The Board acknowledges [...]’s sincerity and his confidence in the tools he uses, but in light of the foregoing cannot give any weight to his exhibits.  Ja029, paragraph 23 (Emphasis added).  The Board’s findings are supported by the record.
[brief] On May 19, 2021, [...] filed an “Action in lieu of prerogative writs”, appealing his removal from the [...].  On June 1, 2021, the [...] filed its Answer, generally denying the Complaint’s allegations and asserting that proper cause existed to warrant [...]’s removal from the Authority.  On July 23, 2021, both parties moved for summary judgment.  The [...] specifically argued that [...]’s conduct constituted misconduct and neglect of duty in violation of N.J.S.A. 40:14A-5(c).  On September 9, 2021, the Trial Court heard oral argument from both parties.  (Da 220)  On the same day, the Trial Court issued an Order granting summary judgment in favor of [...] and ordered his reinstatement.  (Da 1-22).  On September 20, 2021, the [...] filed a Notice of Appeal challenging the Trial Court’s order for [...]'s reinstatement.
[brief] The Court fell back into its earlier reliance on general deterrence, stating, “I can’t tell you how many young people I see who come in here and they’re on Graves charges.  You know?  Had one today.  He just happened to be stopped by police who were looking for somebody else. ”  (8T 92-14 to 17)  The Court distinguished between a person “who’s walking around with a gun all the time and something happens, they pull it out and they shoot it”—in which case the Court reasoned that the possession “should merge” (i.e. run concurrently) with the shooting—and what happened in this case, where [...] left the shower to get a gun to confront [...].
[brief] Because self-defense is an affirmative defense under the Code, it is not an element of the charged offense but a defense that must be disproved if the jury finds that the crime was committed, and the issue becomes whether the use of force was justified.  While the court’s instructions on the elements of aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter contained the “must convict language,” it was in addition to language that also told the jury to acquit if it found the State had not met its burden of proof on the elements of the offense.  The “must convict” language must be seen in context with the instruction that immediately followed, which was the charge on self-defense and the State’s burden to disprove it if it found that defendant used force against the victim.  The trial court instructed the jury that its charge was to be seen in its entirety, (6T113-1 to 3), and the court reaffirmed this principle when it answered one of the jury’s questions during deliberations.  (7T56-25 to 7T57-4).  The jury had a copy of the court’s written instructions during its deliberations, as well.  (6T149-10 to 11).  If the jury was not convinced that the State had met its burden to disprove self-defense, the jury was instructed to acquit defendant.  There was no error, let alone plain error with the trial court’s instructions.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Appeal Should be Granted Because of the Numerous Errors Below.  1.  The entire Summary Judgment Motion granted by the Court below was devoid of any citations or references to a prior Summary Judgment Motion.  Nowhere in its decision below does the Court in any way indicate where [...] improperly denied the Motion.  In other words, the Court never referenced, other than with general statements.  Also, the Court below failed to recognize that [...] had rejected Plaintiff’s LAD claim because he upheld the CEPA claim.  2.  The law of the case was improperly rejected.  Two years after the first Summary Judgment Motion and long after the discovery period had ended, the Defendants submitted a number of statements by Defendants.  There was no Motion to reopen discovery and the filings constituted all new facts.  The Motion was not based upon exhibits that were provided prior to the discovery end date, it was based upon all new statements by the various Defendants all dated well after the discovery period ended.  3.  The Court below failed to understand Green, supra where the Court pointed out a number of events that did not implicate the statute of limitations.  The same thing was present in this case.  And so, [...] never determined that the statute was implicated because Green applied.  CONCLUSION
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[directive] New Jersey’s law enforcement officers are entrusted with the special responsibility and authority to keep residents safe.  Nevertheless, the involvement of law enforcement in election-related activities—even in the lawful performance of official duties—may cause unease for some New Jersey residents seeking to exercise their right to vote.  In part for this reason, our state laws limit the involvement of both on- and off- duty law enforcement officers in elections.  At the county and local levels, civilian election officials—not law enforcement officers— are in charge of administering elections, just as at the state level, it is the Division of Elections within the New Jersey Department of State—not the Department of Law & Public Safety or the Office of the Attorney General— that is entrusted with election-administration responsibilities.  Thus, during the early voting period for an election and on Election Day, responsibility for preserving the peace and maintaining good order in early voting locations and polling places lies principally with poll workers (district board members under N.J.S.A. 19:6-15, and elections officers under N.J.S.A. 19:15A-1(d)).  In addition, county superintendents of elections and their staff may remove from any polling place, early voting location, or other place where an election is being held any person who violates the state’s election laws or in 3 any way unlawfully interferes with the conduct of an election.  See N.J.S.A. 19:32-25.  In the rare cases where such action is necessary, these election officials may call upon law enforcement officers to assist with the arrest or removal of individuals who refuse to comply with the election laws or the lawful commands of election officials.  See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 19:32- 22; N.J.S.A. 19:32-45; N.J.S.A. 19:6-16.
[brief] On February 18, 2015, the Court entered a Confidentiality Order, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “[W]ith respect to all documents and information that have been or will be provided by the Court-appointed Administrator ([...]) to the Plaintiff or his counsel, [...] (hereinafter, the “Confidential Material”), such Confidential Material may not be disseminated or disclosed by the Plaintiff or his counsel, in whole or in part, to any person or entity not a party to this action, nor to any other court, without leave of Court. ” (Da995-96) (emphasis added).  Despite the Confidentiality Order’s prohibitions, Plaintiff filed three criminal complaints with Korean prosecutors in which he alleged malfeasance of Defendant in connection with his operation of [...].
[brief] [...] would permit neighbors to stroll along the driftway to pick raspberries.  A portion of the driftway would also be used, on occasion, by a local organization that conducted fox hunts in the area.  Farmers would occasionally use it to go from one field to another in the vicinity, but that had not occurred for roughly 15 years prior to the commencement of this action.  (Da789-Da791)  [...] purchased the Challenger Lot without the benefit of a title search, a title insurance policy or a survey, and did not have his lawyer attend the closing.  (Da567)
[brief] OAL  Docket No. [...]  REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT  [...]  [...]  A Professional Corporation [...] [...]  Telephone: [...]  Facsimile: [...]  [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  Facsimile: [...]  [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  Facsimile: [...]  [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  Facsimile: [...]  Attorneys for Appellant [...]
[brief] ” (Aa2; Aa202).  [...] became aware of the circumstances that brought about the complaint on December 6, 2019, when the Board members reviewed the November 2019 legal bill that had been delivered to them.  (Aa233).  Fifteen billing entries were labeled “Member Conduct,” for which the Board attorney billed 33.9 hours of research that had commenced on November 6, 2019 (one day after the Board’s election), totaling $5,085.  Ibid.  [...] asserted that for the Board’s attorney to conduct legal research, the Board would normally have to consent to such research via a Board resolution, but no such consent was given before the Board attorney’s research on “Member conduct” commenced.  (Aa207).  [...] further claimed that “at no time were contents of the work done by the Board [a]ttorney . . . shared with any other members of the Board or administration. ”  Ibid. (alterations in original).  Despite the absence of any prior resolution approving the Board attorney’s legal research on “Member ³ On May 19, 2020, the Commission issued a decision partially granting [...]’s motion to dismiss the complaint, and dismissing counts five through ten.
[brief] The crux of [...]’s argument in Points I.A. and I.C.2 of his brief is that (a) post-rehabilitative conduct in prison of programming and maintaining an infraction free record, (b) the age-crime curve, and (c) the science of adolescent brain development have all been established as indicators of a lower probability of reoffending and thus weigh against the need for incapacitation (aggravating factor three) and deterrence (aggravating factor nine), weigh against a ¹ [...] is not withdrawing any arguments in his initial brief but has shortened this point heading to include only the arguments he is addressing in the reply brief. consecutive sentence, and weigh and in favor of a finding that [...] was unlikely to reoffend (mitigating factor nine).  (Db)²  The Court rejected these arguments, rejected mitigating factor nine, found both aggravating factors three and nine and gave them the exact same weight that the Court had given them at [...]’s original sentencing (substantial weight), and relied on a deterrence rationale in imposing a consecutive sentence.  (8T 79-24 to 80-1; 82-12 to 25; 85-8 to 23, 92-4 to 23)  The State responds that the sentencing court committed no errors because the sentencing court did consider this evidence, “cited it as the reason for imposing a shorter sentence,” but “just did not find that evidence sufficiently persuasive to negate the findings of aggravating factors three and nine or support a finding of mitigating factor nine.
[brief] B.  The Court’s Instructions were Adequate  When the jury is exposed to “other crime” evidence, “the court must instruct the jury on the limited use of the evidence. ”  *State v. Cofield*, 127 N.J. 328, 340-41 (1992).  The Court’s instruction “should be formulated carefully to explain precisely the permitted and prohibited purposes of the evidence, with sufficient reference to the factual context of the case to enable to the jury to comprehend and appreciate the fine distinction. ”  *Ibid*.  Disputes as to the adequacy of these instructions are subject to the “plain error rule” of Rule 2:10-2, which provides that any error not “clearly capable of producing an unjust result” must be disregarded.  *State v. Marrero*, 148 N.J. 469, 494 (1997).  With respect to jury charges, even erroneous charges will be upheld if they are incapable of prejudicing a substantial right.  *Boryszewski v. Burke*, 380 N.J.Super. 361, 374 (App. Div. 2005).  Here, the Court twice gave a limiting instruction to the jury.  The final instruction read as follows:  In this case, one of the limiting instructions I provided you had to deal with the testimony of an armed robbery that allegedly occurred in [...].  That testimony was allowed in this case solely to provide context for statements made by the police.  You cannot use any reference of alleged criminal activity that occurred in [...] to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant as to the particular charges in this case.  [(5T11-7 to 15.)]  By specifying that the evidence was allowed “solely to provide context” and may not be used “to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant,” it explained with sufficient “precision” the “permitted and prohibited” uses of the evidence.  Similarly, by couching the instruction with the factual circumstances within which the pertinent event appeared, the jury was likewise able to “appreciate the fine distinction” of its application.  Defendant’s top count was a possessory offense.  A possession captured on video.  The charge was neither “clearly capable of producing an unjust result” nor capable of prejudicing a substantial right.  The jury was told exactly what it needed to know and what it had to disregard, largely in spite of defendant’s insistence that they consider it anyway.  Reversal on this issue is inappropriate.
[brief] i.  Plaintiff’s counsel misled the jury regarding her burden of proof during summation  The jury in this case was charged with instructions for Hostile Work Environment and Retaliation on the basis of religion and disability under LAD.  During summation, counsel for Plaintiff misstated the law on numerous occasions, leading jurors to believe that her burden of proof was lower than it was and took every opportunity to impugn Appellants’ legitimate actions in front of the jury.  a.  Hostile work environment claim  To maintain a claim for a hostile work environment claim under the LAD, Plaintiff must show that the complained-of conduct: “(1) would not have occurred but for the employee’s protected status, and was (2) severe or pervasive enough to make a reasonable person believe that (3) the conditions of employment have been altered and that the working environment is hostile or abusive.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY PROHIBITED EVIDENCE OF SUBSEQUENT\ REMEDIAL MEASURES BY DEFENDANT | 5 | | II.  THE COURT PROPERLY PROHIBITING INTRODUCTION OF DEFENDANT’S INCIDENT REPORT | 10 | | III.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR A NEW TRIAL | 13 | | CONCLUSION | 16  | TABLE OF APPENDIX  Torres v. Sumrein 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3020 ........................................Da001 | Authority | Citation | |-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Brenman v. Demello | 191 N.J. 18, 31, 921 A.2d 1110 (2007) | | Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Vople | 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) | | Cooper v. Consol. Rail Corp. | 391 N.J. Super. 17 (App. Div. 2007) | | Dixon v. Jacobsen Mfg.
[brief] The evidence that the defendant [...] failed to have policies in place that led to the use of excessive force, false imprisonment and denial of plaintiff’s substantive and procedural due process rights should have lead to judgment in the plaintiff’s favor.  In *Upchurch*, the Appellate Court affirmed denial of summary judgment in the plaintiff’s favor because the [...] stated that it was unaware of the harassment against plaintiff.  Pursuant to the Appellate division in ruling in plaintiff’s favor, the failure to have policies was a fatal flaw.  (Pa546)
[brief] As to this event, the Respondent states:  I was disgusted.  It made me scared, and I also felt a little relieved because I know that that letter could have ended up resulting in my kids, you know, being taken out of the house, possibly separated, with strangers, you know, temporarily while this investigation was done, and my kids had already been through so much.  So I was completely disgusted, and you know, scared, like what’s next.
[brief] Specifically, [...] strangely argues that “[...] is asking the Court to rule on the validity of a possible defense to a potential future claim that the Practice has not yet brought—and not just against [...], but also as to [...], which is not even a party to the action. ” (See Respondent’s Brief at page 20).  The undersigned cannot decipher what this argument means.  This appeal is about challenging the reasonableness of a five-year 3,721 square mile Restrictive Covenant as applied against [...]’s employment with [...], which encroaches the massive, restricted area by a mere .76 miles through a straight-line calculation but is completely outside of the restricted area when real driving distance is utilized.