ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pa47, ¶ 38; Pa330, ¶ 38; accord Pa205 at 23:5-:12.  Following the completion of the renovation of their house, [...] hired a contractor to place one inch of soil on the front lawn and to plant grass seed.  Pa47-48, ¶ 39; Pa330, ¶ 39; accord Pa205 at 24:4-25:6.  The Dwyers never hired any contractor to alter the grade of their property.  Pa48, ¶ 40; Pa330, ¶ 40; accord Pa224-25 at 19:24-20:2, 31:23-32:3.  C.
[brief] “[F]ew defenses have greater potential for creating reasonable doubt as to a defendant’s guilt in the minds of the jury [than an alibi].”  State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 353 (2013) (quoting State v. Mitchell, 149 N.J. Super. 259, 262 (App. Div. 1977)).  Still, the State’s evidence was not overwhelming.  Only [...]’ pretrial statement, which he recanted at trial, identified defendant as the shooter.  No forensic or physical evidence connected defendant to the shooting.  Even [...], presumably an eyewitness to the drive-by shooting, at best only identified [...] as the driver.  (9T 22-24 to 25, 28-10 to 14).  Interestingly, [...] was present at the scene on the night of the shooting as the police officers were canvassing the street for leads.  (9T 23-1 to 11).  Curiously, he did not identify [...] to the police until two weeks later.  (9T 23-14 to 17).  As in L.A., defendant asserts that the testimony of his two alibi witnesses addressed the material issue in the case, that is, his whereabouts on the night of the shooting.
[brief] [...] representative [...] confirmed that [...], [...]’s authorized environmental remediation contractor, took soil borings, B-11, B-2, and B-7 on Plaintiffs’ Property on or about on February 20, and February 21, 2017.  [...] also confirmed that temporary well points were installed on Plaintiffs’ Property.  These were installed on or about March 15, 2017.  (Ibid.)  Exterior soil vapor samples were also taken on Plaintiffs’ Property on May 18, 2017.  (Pa000790).  None of the parties in connection with their summary judgment motions against Plaintiffs provided any proof that they had consent from the Plaintiffs for these particular activities.
[brief] • October 28 was when Plaintiff came to the office to see the surgical coordinator and presented with the tumescent liposuction patient information booklet, which she signed for.  111:19-112:21.  [...] testified that Plaintiff would also have been provided with her copy of the arbitration agreement on that date because it was part of the booklet.  Ibid.  •  While there is a specific acknowledgement of the Plaintiff having received the tumescent liposuction patient information booklet, there is no specific acknowledgement of the Plaintiff having received the arbitration agreement.  This is because, according to the doctor, the arbitration agreement is part of the booklet.
[directive] Record on line the name OR1 number any law enforcement 2. 10 of agency receiving tangible and intangible property, except funds 9). reported in line as a result of a contributing share for any other reason- N.J.  Other agencies include, but are not limited the to: Department of Law and Public Safety, other County Prosecutor's Offices and police departments.  Provide individually; the local OR1 agency name, the agency number, a description of the property, the estimated value and the total estimated value of all property distributed during the period.
[brief] Cloews v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 597 (1988).  In a reasonable accommodation case, the first three listed elements satisfy plaintiff's initial burden of proof.  *Bosshard v. Hackensack Univ. Med. Ctr.*, 345 N.J. Super. 78, 91 (App.Div. 2001).  To prove a reasonable accommodation case under the NJLAD, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) plaintiff had a disability; (2) plaintiff performed or could have performed the essential functions of the job, either with or without a reasonable accommodation; (3) defendant was aware of plaintiff’s need for a reasonable accommodation; (4) there was an accommodation that would have allowed plaintiff to perform the essential functions of the job, and (5) defendant denied the accommodation.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 9-10.  Indeed, as with [...]’s retroactive salary increases, “[t]hey were not true salary increases ‘in accordance with established salary policies of the member's employer for all employees in the same position. ’”  N.J.S.A. 18A:66-2(d)(1). ”  *Id.* at 10.  The court in *Coyle* distinguished the matter from *In re Snellbaker*, 414 N.J. Super. 26 (2010), because the salary adjustments in *Snellbaker* were made to bring the city into compliance with the specific statutory salary increases provided for by the statute, the “salary increases were identical to the raises Snellbaker’s subordinates had received during the same period” and it “did not involve an ‘individual salary adjustment’ unconnected to the overall salary structure of the employing agency. ”  *Id.* at 14 (quoting *Snellbaker*, 414 N.J. Super. at 40).  [...]’s settlement, on this record, provided an ad hoc individual salary increase that was not based on required specific statutory salary increases or on across-the-board salary adjustments in accordance employer’s established salary policies.
[brief] **ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT’S LIFE SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE AND REQUIRES A RESENTENCING.  (9T 36-15 to 56-20; Da 59-62)**  At sentencing, the court merged count two (possession of a weapon) into count one (murder) and sentenced [...] to life in prison with sixty-three years and nine months without parole pursuant to NERA.  (9T 36-15 to 56-20; Da 59-62)  The court found four aggravating factors -- factors one (nature and circumstances of the offense), three (risk of reoffense), six (extent of criminal history), and nine (need for deterrence) -- and no mitigating factors.  (9T 39-15 to 53-4; Da 61)  [...]’s life sentence -- the maximum sentence for murder -- was based on a number of errors and is excessive under the circumstances.  Therefore, should this Court disagree with Points I through IV, a resentencing is required.  First, the court effectively double-counted the elements of the offense by finding aggravating factor one, “[t]he nature and circumstances of the offense, and the role of the actor in committing the offense, including whether or not it was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.
[brief] Paragraph 2 through 10 (Da14) provides for certain terms of mutual operational promises, for each entity to operate cooperatively with the other, for their related purposes.  These Paragraphs did not invoke or reference permanent rights.  Paragraph 2 provided that the [...] would construct on Lot 8 a synagogue (completed in December 1963).  Paragraph 3 provided that [...] would pay $10,000 annually to the [...] so long as the [...] operates the [...] on Lot 5.  Paragraph 4 provided for a possible reverter of Lot 8 if the synagogue was not timely constructed.  Paragraph 5 provided the synagogue would be operated in accord with Orthodox Jewish tenets.  Paragraph 6 provided that the [...] will be governed by six (6) Trustees, with three (3) of those Trustees appointed by the [...].  Paragraph 7 provided the [...] would cease conducting religious services in the School when the synagogue became operational.  Paragraph 8 provided that the synagogue sanctuary will separate men and women as provided by Jewish law.  Paragraph 9 provided that disputes as to matters of Jewish law will be decided by specified Jewish Councils.  Lastly, the Paragraph 10 primarily at issue provided that the [...] “agrees to permit” the [...] “to utilize for parking purposes the vacant lands it owns on Madison Avenue and also on Sixth Street” and also to permit use of lands on Sixth Street for boiler room use.
[brief] According to the transcript, the lower court’s noticed that it is undisputed that nine records requested by [...] have not been received.  (3T: 12/16/22 15:17-20)  However, [...] incorrectly found the reasons for denying the relief [...]’s requested in their motion was based on his erroneous assumption that the Board has shown a reasonable, good faith effort to be in compliance with all orders and that the record fails to demonstrate the requisite intent for purposes of the relief sought by [...] for contumacious conduct and failure to comply with orders.  (3T:12/16/22 15:15-17)  (3T:12/16/22 16:2-6)  [...], in further error, stated the reason for granting defendant’s relief they requested in their cross motion was that the requisite efforts and compliance presented were sufficient to grant the cross application for entry of the warrant and satisfaction.  (3T:12/16/22 17:3-13).  On January 9, 2023, [...] filed its amended notice of appeal with this Court seeking to reverse the three post-judgment orders.
[brief] Table of Judgments, Orders and Rulings  Page  Agency Decision, entered 8-1-19 Aa1 Agency Decision, entered 9-10-19 Aa2  Final Agency Decision, entered 11-17-22 Aa10  Table of Appendix  Agency Decision, entered 8-1-19 Aa1 Agency Decision, entered 9-10-19 Aa2  Inmate Claim, dated 9-20-19 Aa3  [...]'s letter to [...], dated 5-17-19 Aa4  [...] Sales Order dated 2-16-19 Aa5  Certified Mail Receipt to [...]  Aa6  [...] letters to [...], dated 8-9-19 Aa7  Property Claim Investigation dated 11-16-19 Aa8  [...] Notice of Appeal  Aa9  Case Information Statement Aa11  Certification of Kaseem [...] in support of Statement of Facts dated Aa13  *Certification of Inmate Claim, dated 11-17-22 Aa15  Aa17  ##  Table of Authorities | Authority | Brief Page Number | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | **Constitutions:** | | | U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, Due Process | 5, 6, 7 | | N.J. Const., Art. I, par. 1 | 5, 6, 7 | | N.J. Const., Art. VII, sect. I, par. 1 | 8, 10 | | **Statutes:** | | | 42 U.S.C. sect. 1983 | 8 | | N.J.A.C. 10A:4-3.1(a) | 11 | | N.J.S.A.§2A:15-5.10 | 10 | | N.J.S.A. sect. 2A:15-5.12(a) | 10 | | N.J.S.A. sect. 10:6-1, et seq. | 8 | | **Rules:** | | | R. 2:10-2 [7.2] | 6 | | **Cases:** | | | Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J.
[brief] The jury heard that Plaintiff took eleven trips to Turkey between June 2016 and December 2018.  (2T53:9-54:5) and, between 2016 and May 2019, he took two trips to Europe.  (2T50:18-21; 54:15-55:12).  In terms of the damages Plaintiff allegedly suffered, the jury heard Plaintiff’s forensic accounting expert, [...], in review of [...]’s records, stated that there are numerous expenses which appear personal in nature and that these personal expenses were not only Defendant’s, but Plaintiff’s as well.  (2T129:1-8).  The jury also hear that [...], in review of credit card records and [...]’s general ledger, predominately relied upon Plaintiff’s analysis of the details and took Plaintiff’s word for what the information Plaintiff provided to him was in terms of the alleged personal expenses of Defendant.  (2T134:2-135:11).  The jury also herd that [...] only reviewed expenses that he considered “major ones” and did not review the challenged “insignificant ones. ”  Although he did not review all the expenses Plaintiff alleged were Defendants, [...] still included those amounts in his total only by taking Plaintiff’s word for it.  (2T135:12-136:11).  Even with the “major one” (i.e., the major expenses Plaintiff was challenging), the jury heard that [...] simply took Plaintiff’s word for what they allegedly were; there was no independent evaluation or verification done to discern if the expenses were Defendant’s or if it was a pharmacy expense.  (2T136:5-11).  Contrary to Plaintiff’s contentions that the verdict in this case is against the weight of the evidence, there was more than ample evidence adduced at trial for the jury to return the verdict it did.
[brief] 25  II.  THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST [...] UNDER THE MCS-90 ENDORSEMENT IN THE [...] POLICY IN ITS ORDER OF FEBRUARY 23, 2024 AS WELL AS IN REFUSING TO LATER VACATE SUCH ORDER (PPCIa447-48; 2T; PPCIa459-60; and 3T).  .................................................................  25  A.  The MCS-90 Endorsement Only Applies to Liability for “Negligence” .............................................................................................................  26  B.  The MCS-90 Endorsement Only Applies When a Determination Has First Been made That There Is No Coverage Available Under the Policy .............................................................................................................  28  C.  [...] Never Pled Any Claim Against Prime, Yet the Trial Court Entered Final Judgment in Favor of [...] and Against Prime ............  30  D. Financial Responsibility Under the MCS-90 Is Limited to Actual Remediation Costs and Does Not Include Punitive or Other Damages Designed to Punish or Deter  .................................................................31  POINT III ..................................................................................................................34  III.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING BOTH ORDERS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (APRIL 6, 2023 AND FEBRUARY 23, 2024) AS “FINAL JUDGMENTS” (PPCIa369-71; PPCIa447-48; 2T; PPCIa459-60; and 3T)
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I:  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING EXPERT BALLISTICS TESTIMONY BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROVE THAT FIREARM TOOLMARK IDENTIFICATION IS NOT “GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE” UNDER THE FRYE STANDARD.  [Raised Below.]  (5T123-10 to 128-14).  On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to limit the State’s expert ballistics testimony because the science on which firearm toolmark identification is based is unreliable.
[brief] The Dolson Court further addressed the defendant’s testimony that “…my car was slowing down and then for some reason or other it hit a slipping spot which could have been an oil slick.  That automatically crashed me into [...]’s car. ”  Id. at 9-10.  The Court held such testimony to be conclusive and although not objected to, indicated that ‘it had no place in the trial. ’  Id. Dolson is not in conflict with Mockler but rather, affirms that a defendant who is claiming to be free from negligence in the context of a rear-end motor vehicle collision must come forward with some evidence as to how a collision occurred, despite the defendant’s assertion that he/she was acting as a reasonable person would; essentially an affirmative defense.
[brief] They had had "a little bit of falling out" sometimes "because he does stupid shit" (21T68-9 to 16).  [...] had not called him "in a while" (21T64-11 to 21T65-18).  Defendant had deleted [...] from his phone and he had deleted and ignored [...]'s calls (21T64-11 to 21T65-18).  [...] "might" have called for a ride the previous week, but he ignored the call (21T70-20 to 21T71-11).  Defendant said he "might have" given [...] a ride the previous Thursday (21T71-2 to 21).
[brief] As to excess supplementary UIM coverage, the [...] provides:  We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to receive from the owner or operator of an uninsured or underinsured auto.  We will only pay those damages in excess of the underlying insurance or the minimum required underlying limits, whichever is greater.  The most we will pay as a result of an occurrence is the coverage limit for the Excess Supplementary Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists shown on your Declarations.  This limit is the most we will pay, regardless of the number of claims, vehicles or people involved in the occurrence, or vehicles you own.  This coverage only applies for an occurrence during the policy period.  This coverage will follow form. (Pa 90, at § II – Coverages, B. Excess Supplementary Uninsured and Underinsured Motorists Coverage).
[brief] (Pa63 at 20:1-6; Pa64 at 22:3-6).  She further testified that after she completed her shopping, she did not walk the same way through the barricades when she exited the [...] store as she had when she entered the store.  (Pa63 at 18:5-14).  While walking back to her car, the plaintiff tripped on one of the raised barricade feet and fell to the ground.
[brief] DEFENSE’S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (4T158:21).  .................................................................................................................................................................26  There is no trial court decision to afford deference.  ........................................................................26  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE DEFENSE’S MOTION TO SEVER (27A)  .............................................................................................................................................................34  Relevance to Material Issue in Genuine Dispute  ...............................................................................37  Clear and Convincing Evidence ........................................................................................................38  Prejudice ..........................................................................................................................................41  THE TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO CONSIDER ANY MITIGATING FACTORS AND IMPOSITION OF A LENGTHY STATE PRISON SENTENCE CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION (8T16:25-23:30).  ....................................................................................................44  CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................................................48
[brief] Exhibit C  Deposition of [...].............................................................89a P-70  Deposition Transcript of Defendant [...] Member [...] on 1/28/22.  ..................................  788a P-71  Deposition of Plaintiff [...] on 2/9/21.  ......................... 822a P-72  Deposition of [...] on 4/21/21.  .....................  856a P-73  Excerpts of Deposition of [...] on 3/11/20.  ............  882a P-74  Plaintiff’s Answers to Defendants’ Interrogatories ....................... 894a P-75  Deposition of [...] on 10/14/20 .................................  906a P-76  Court’s opinion in City of San Antonio v. Heim, 932 S.W. 2d 287 (Court of Appeals of Texas 1996) .................................  954a P-77  Court’s opinion in Woods v. Township of Irvington, 2009 WL 2475323 (App. Div. 2009).  .........................................................  964a  Statement of Summary Judgment  Record  Defendants’ Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment ...................... 30a  Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts ................................. 32a  Plaintiff’s Responsive Statement of Facts .................................  36a  Certification of [...], Esq.  ...........................................58a  Exhibit A  Plaintiff’s Complaint.  .........................................................63a  Exhibit B Excerpts of Deposition of [...].  .......................79a  Exhibit C  Deposition of [...].  .............................................89a  Exhibit D Excerpts of Deposition of [...].  ..............................189a  Exhibit E Letter to [...] from [...] 9/8/16 .......195a  Exhibit F Letter to [...] from [...] 3/30/17 ......197a  Exhibit G Division of Pensions Request of Service and Final Salary ............199a  Exhibit H [...] Resolution No. 150-17 .....................201a  Exhibit I [...] Resolution No. 151-17 .....................203a  Exhibit J [...] Resolution No. 153-17 .....................205a  Exhibit K Excerpts of Deposition of [...].  ..........................207a  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] This case does not even present so much of an issue as the Plaintiffs in Benipal.  In the instant case, there was no need for the Plaintiff to discover that there was a deed that titled the property in the name of [...].  He created it. Then created it again.  He was well aware that he signed the deed, as well as what was contained within the deed.  Plaintiff not only possesses a Master’s Degree, but also was a sophisticated property owner that had handled deeds, leases, and mortgages many times.  He also testified that he understood the significance of deed, which demonstrates ownership of property.  Moreover, the Plaintiff himself recognized that ownership of the property was in question, as demonstrated by his treatment of the tax rebate checks that were delivered for the 293 property in question (Da442 – Da443).  The tax rebate checks made out to the property located at 293 were made payable to [...]; as a result, Plaintiff admits that he failed to deposit them because they were not in his name.  This continued failure to deposit rebate checks went on since the deed was signed over to [...], yet Plaintiff knew exactly why these tax rebate checks continued to be sent and why Plaintiff was unable to deposit them.  He never took any corrective action to change the ownership or the deed.  For about twenty-two (22) years, [...] chose not to do anything to fix the alleged title problem, knowing the government did not treat him as the title owner of the 293 Property.  The fact that [...] deposited only the tax rebate checks for only the 291 Property (not those for the 293 Property), knowing the tax rebate checks for the 293 Property were always sent to his brother’s name for 22 years, and chose to do nothing about it, clearly supports Defendants’ statute of limitation argument.
[brief] In fact, such a holding is not supported by OPRA’s statutory regime and had such requirement been envisioned, the Legislature could have qualified the criminal investigatory records exemption with the simultaneous obligation to provide Section 3(b) information.  The Legislature did not do this.  As correctly recognized by this Court, it is not the province of a records custodian to read anything into a records request.  MAG Entertainment, LLC v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J.Super. 534, 546 (App.Div. 2005).  A custodian is not constrained to solicitously offer information not requested.  Impressing such a secondary obligation would require a records custodian to scrutinize every exempt criminal investigatory record responsive to a records request and extract information to be released, regardless of whether the exempt record pertains to an ongoing criminal investigation or one long closed.  Rhetorically, would this obligation further require a custodian to consult other sources to ferret out responsive Section 3 information if such information is not fully contained within an exempt criminal investigatory record otherwise responsive to a records request?  Such an obligation would run afoul of the holdings in MAG Entertainment, supra, at 546-549 and Bent v. Tp. of Stafford, 381 N.J.Super. 30, 37 (2005), which maintain that a records custodian is not required to conduct research or correlate data from various government records.  This type of secondary obligation would further place municipal custodians in a position to assess whether “the information requested or to be examined will jeopardize the safety of any person or jeopardize any investigation in progress or may be otherwise inappropriate to release” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b).  This type of determination should be made by a law enforcement official as directed by the statute—not a municipal clerk responding to a records request.  In light of the above referenced principles, there is no basis to support the conclusion that a custodian is required to independently provide information pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b) when denying access to an exempt criminal investigatory record.  Accordingly, the trial court’s finding to the contrary must be reversed.