ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................... iii, iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................2  A.  Plaintiff’s Accident ......................................................................................2  B. Accident Scene and Lighting Conditions .....................................................4  C.  Evidence of Operation of the Streetlight Prior to the Accident .....................6  D.  [...] Street Light Installation ..................................................................8  E.  Plaintiff’s Expert Report and Testimony .......................................................9  F.  The Court’s Decision Granting Summary Judgment to [...] ....................9  LEGAL STANDARD .........................................................................................11  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................13
[brief] Whether the December 10, 1998 Deed was a scrivener’s error by [...], Esq., or, as this court will explain, a voidable, error-filled document, since neither the [...] or [...] had any knowledge regarding the creation of the document, they cannot have intentionally committed fraud when they tried to capitalized on it being in the public record by transferring the property from [...] ([...]) to [...] in 2019.
[brief] Similarly, Plaintiff’s half-hearted argument that the trial court should be reversed because it “may have considered” Defendant’s Offer of Judgment is equally baseless.  Indeed, the issue of whether Defendant was entitled to costs based upon Plaintiff’s failure to accept the Offer of Judgment was not before the trial court and therefore, the validity of the Offer of Judgment was not at issue.  As a practical matter, the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees included fees incurred after the Offer of Judgment was served in May 2021 (including the time spent at the deposition of Plaintiff in December 2021 and the arbitration proceeding in July 2022).  Therefore, to the extent the trial court considered Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff was barred from seeking fees incurred following this Order, the trial court clearly disagreed.  Finally, Plaintiff places considerable weight into the declaration submitted by Defendant’s counsel and the possible confusion by the trial court between Plaintiff’s counsel’s 12-years of experience and Defense counsel’s 18-years of experience.  This is, however, a slight immaterial distinction that does not warrant reversing the trial court.  More importantly, the trial court considered the arguments of Plaintiff’s counsel for the requested hourly rate ($525) and the argument made by Defendant in opposition to that rate ($250) and it then used its discretion to award an hourly rate of $395.  Finally, Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s citations to unpublished decisions in its moving papers constitutes grounds for reversing the trial court is equally baseless.  Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the trial court relied upon these out of state decisions to reach its conclusions and that it was material to the trial court’s determination.  See Hansen, 253 N.J. at 220.  CONCLUSION
[brief] No questions arose concerning whether review of the Application for the proposed development was within the jurisdiction of the Board.  At the December 1, 2021 hearing, by which time the Application had been before the Board for almost ten months, the Board reviewed technical review letters prepared by the Board Planner and Engineer which asserted the proposed industrial warehouse use is permitted as of right.  The Board professionals raised no concerns related to the continued cell tower use; rather their comments focused exclusively on compliance with site plan ordinance design standards and bulk standards of the proposed development.  (3T).  Further, [...] had submitted revised plans and supporting submissions to address all site design concerns raised by the Board professionals’ initial review letters.  (1T, 2T, 3T, 4T).  [...]’s site engineer, [...], highlighted the location of the Cell Tower in his introductory site orientation testimony at the beginning of the first substantive hearing on the Application on August 4, 2021.  (1T 108-11 to 1T 108-15).  At the December 1, 2021 hearing, for the first time, a lawyer for the objectors suggested that because there is a Cell Tower located on the Property, use variance relief pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)1 was necessary to allow the second principal use of proposed warehouses.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 266; see *Doe v. Irwin*, 615 F.2d 1162, 1169 (6th Cir. 1980) (parents lacked a right to notice from public facility that distributed contraceptives to unemancipated minors); *Sanford v. Stiles*, No. 03-5698, 2004 WL 2579738, *11* (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2004) (Ra49-61) (agreeing school did not violate parent’s substantive due process rights when it “failed to provide information”), aff’d, 456 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2006).  The cases on which Appellants rely—and all of the United States Supreme Court’s cases involving fundamental parental rights—fit the line between failure to inform and actual interference easily.
[brief] The Court asked the Union’s counsel:  [W]hy once a determination was made to terminate her because there was no light duty work, why didn’t it end there?  Why -- where in the Collective Bargaining Agreement or any practices and procedures written of the -- the Authority, where is it that the Authority was obligated after that point to reconsider or reopen its -- its determination to terminate her based upon the very clear return to work note and the very clear restrictions?  (1T 31:14-23.)  Despite its apparent understanding of the fatal flaws underlying the Arbitrator’s decision, the trial court issued an order and statement of reasons on November 2, 2023 finding that the arbitration award met the reasonably debatable standard and therefore should be confirmed.
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[brief] Medlock at 248-249.  Here, since the defendant is not alleging that she accidentally caused blunt force trauma to [...] until he died, [...]’s opinion that the cause of death was homicide by blunt force trauma did not usurp the jury’s opportunity to determine whether the defendant had the necessary state of mind to be guilty of murder.  Instead, he merely used his expertise to determine the manner of death as he was required to do in his professional capacity.
[brief] There is an obvious hypocrisy/contradiction in how the Courts below have handled this one issue of the wrongful imposition of penalties against the defendant.  THE HYPOCRISY-  The Courts below have taken the position that [...] could not utilize self-help, yet isn't this exactly what Plaintiff has done.  She decided that she didn't want to pay [...] and kept the money that [...] was entitled to in her possession.  So, it's ok for her to do that (and to lie about it in the process).  So why is it that Plaintiff is allowed to lie, illegally utilize "self-help" and there are no consequences.  Yet, when [...] utilizes self-help {without lies or misrepresentations after proceeding in good faith for 6 years} he is penalized$ 227,000.00???  And why is it that the Courts below have not even once discussed or addressed the issue of the wrongful imposition of penalties as it relates to Plaintiff's deceitful conduct.  Can it be that defendant failed to address this issue at any level?  Absolutely Not.  It has been addressed at every level- Plaintiff would seem to agree as she indicates this is the sixth bite at the apple.  Could it be that this is not an important issue.  As previously indicated this is and was the most financially devastating issue in this matter.  And for the any of the Courts (including the Appellate Division) say otherwise would be nothing short of DISHONEST.  So this Court finds itself in a difficult position.  The Courts below have mishandled this issue at every level so how does this Court procedurally rectify an obvious wrong?
[brief] To protect confidentiality, the State has omitted the full registration from its brief.  The State has included a partial registration herein as documents contained in its confidential appendix, e.g., search warrant and consent to search form for this vehicle, Pa21-25, contain and rely upon the full registration number.  The detectives were able to corroborate aspects of the CI’s information: the telephone number and black Audi “came back to” the defendant and the CI confirmed a photo of the defendant was the “right suspect. ”  The ability to “validate and confirm[]” information contained in the CI’s tip allowed the detectives to determine the CI was “credible and reliable. ” (1T:10-1 to 11-16; 33-22 to 36-23; 41-20 to 42-8).
[brief] AP 45 – AP 47  Defendant’s Submitted Brief from Counsel ..................................  AP 48 – AP 62  Order Guilty on De Novo Review .................................................. AP 63  Munical Court Order...................................................................  AP 64 – AP 65  Municipal Court Disposition.......................................................  AP 66 – AP 67  Copy of Law Division Transcript form ........................................  AP 68  STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[brief] Pa61.  [...] was present and involved in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks which took place on September 11, 2001.  Pa61.  [...] certified that he participated in the rescue, recovery, and/or cleanup at the World Trade Center site between September 11, 2001, and October 11, 2001, or September 11, 2001, and/or September 12, 2001.  Pa61.  [...] submitted the Ricci Act Eligibility Registration Form and Request for Amended Benefits Form with his affidavit.¹ Pa87.  Pa89.  With his ¹ [...]’s Eligibility Registration Form was questioned on the basis that the information provided regarding the dates was not specific.  Pa19.  The Board granted [...]’s request to file an Amended Registration Form.  Pa19.  [...] submitted an Amended Eligibility Registration Form.  Pa17.  The Board accepted the Amended Eligibility Registration Form but denied his request to register on timeliness grounds.  Pa9.  Request for Amended Benefits Form, [...] supplied medical documentation of his 9/11 illnesses.  Pa66.  On March 3, 2023, a Petition to the [...] was filed on behalf of [...] and many others.
[brief] The provisions of this act may not be waived or modified by written or oral agreement, estoppel or otherwise, and any provision of a contract or ancillary agreement that directly or indirectly requires or amounts to a waiver of any provision of this act, or that would relieve any person of any obligation or liability under this act, or that imposes unreasonable standards of performance on a wholesaler, shall be a violation of this act and shall be null, void and of no effect.  [N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.15(a). ]  Indeed, a fundamental purpose of the MBPA was to “protect beer wholesalers from unreasonable demands and requirements by brewers. ”  N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.13(c).  This was in response to the tied-house system that existed prior to the Twenty-First Amendment and establishment of New Jersey’s three-tier system.  Thus, applying New York law despite the Legislature’s clear intent that New Jersey law and, specifically, the MBPA apply, will undermine and effectively moot the statute.
[brief] As to Count 2, even if section (g) could be brought against the [...] or the [...] as an entity, which, as set forth above, it cannot, it is unclear which portion of the provision applies.  Petitioner merely alleges that, with the permission of the [...], the [...] put together a “Referendum Key Communicator Group” list, which was used to “to persuade the community to vote ‘yes. ’”  Again, even if accepted as true, this allegation could not establish a violation of any part of section (g) of the Code of Ethics because it does not allege that any of the Respondents communicated inaccurate information.  Counts 3 and 4 fail for similar reasons.
[brief] ”  \textit{Ibid.}  (citing \textit{Menley & James Laboratories, Ltd. v. Vornado, Inc.}, 90 N.J. Super. 404, 414 (Ch. Div. 1966) (Chancery Division decision addressing a different statute that expressly contemplated the ability to cure); \textit{Peter Doelger Brewing Corp. v. Spindel}, 186 A. 429 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1936) (88-year old District Court decision addressing different statute)).
[brief] ’”  *Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc.*, 115 N.J. 317, 323 (1989) (citation omitted).  As this Court has explained, this “fact-sensitive analysis is particularly necessary when a party attempts to assert jurisdiction over a non-resident attorney based upon allegedly deficient legal services rendered to that party in another forum. ”  *Reliance Nat. Ins. Co. in Liquidation v. Dana Transport, Inc.*, 376 N.J. Super. 537, 545 (App. Div. 2005) (reversing interlocutory order denying motion to dismiss and remanding for order of dismissal because specific jurisdiction was lacking over non-resident law firm in malpractice action brought by plaintiff with New Jersey principal place of business).
[brief] Johowern Corp. v. Affiliated Interior Designers, Inc., 187 N.J. Super. 195, 199-200 (App. Div. 1982).  In [...], the movant’s attorney had requested an adjournment of a hearing date because he was “unavailable”.  Id. at p. 12.  The Court found the movant’s counsel’s unavailability suspect since he had been retained a year earlier and stated solely for the purpose of obtaining a continuance.  The vacatur was denied.  The District Court distinguished that situation from the one at issue here.  Notably, this was not a situation in which a pro se litigant recently retained counsel who needed time to be brought up to speed on the case.  To the contrary, [...]'s attorneys — who were retained as early as July 2009 to represent [...] in the related criminal action, United States v. [...], 09 Cr. 662 (PAC) (S.D.N.Y.) — explicitly stated that they represented [...] "solely" for the limited purpose of obtaining a continuance of the hearing.  [Id. at 14 (emph. added)].  [...]’s case is precisely one as referenced in [...], where a pro se litigant recently retained counsel, and that new counsel had asked for a reasonable period of time to prepare and submit opposition and “get up to speed on the case”.  (Da2154)
[brief] (4T)**  First, the trial court suggested that the NJFCA legal framework requires a fact-intensive analysis that prevents a ruling as a matter of law.  See 4T at 33:10–14, 35:9–13.  This was a simple misstatement of the law: the public disclosure bar issue is often decided on a dispositive motion.  In fact, the trial court’s review of the caselaw cited several decisions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, each of which affirmed dismissal of a federal FCA case before trial, either on a motion to dismiss or at summary judgment.
[brief] The trial court’s decision to look behind the Ordinance and find scenarios of overbreadth is proscribed by the Supreme Court.  The first step in an overbroad analysis is to consider the text of the Ordinance to determine its scope, specifically looking at what the law covers, not what legislators may have intended, and in doing so here, the Ordinance sets forth noise nuisance prohibitions appropriately limited and defined, such that a look beyond the Ordinance’s clear terms would be inappropriate.  Usachenok, 257 N.J. at 198.  B.  **Ordinance No. 17-2017 is not unconstitutionally overbroad nor does it implicate a 1st Amendment right. **  While the trial court does not specifically cite the First Amendment as the reasoning for its finding of overbreadth, it is clear from the trial court’s opinion that the court held concern that the Ordinance could prohibit speech.  The ordinance is also unconstitutionally overbroad, as it attempts to provide for subjective enforcement of a rule that prohibits sound generated by an unamplified human voice during daytime hours that can be heard a mere 50 feet from the sound generator’s property line and which “annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health or welfare of others within the limits of the Borough. ”  Da88.  Overbroad laws can have the effect of deterring or chilling speech.  The overbreadth doctrine considers the extent of the law’s “deterrent effect on legitimate expression. ”  State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564,582 (1997).  As this Court recently observed, “[o]verbreadth is unlike a typical facial challenge. ”  “[I]t does not require a challenger to ‘establish that no set of circumstances exists under which [a statute] would be valid. ’”  Courts may find that a law is facially invalid on overbreadth grounds “[i]f the challenger demonstrates that the statute ‘prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech’ relative to its ‘plainly legitimate sweep. ’”  Usachenok, 257 N.J. at 196 (2024)(internal citations omitted).  The trial court below performed no analysis of the plain language of each section called into question, rather, the trial court looked behind the law to discussions which took place during a Borough hearing addressing the predecessor ordinance to the Ordinance which is the subject of this appeal.  While there can be no question that conversations such as family members speaking at a barbeque may be protected speech under the First Amendment, no prohibition on content is given and there is also no question or concern that the Ordinance “prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate sweep. ”  United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 770 (2023).  Indeed, the Ordinance, and its purpose of prohibiting noise nuisance, is clearly and concisely set forth.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] See State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 383 (2012) (“Generally, an appellate court will not consider issues, even constitutional ones, which were not raised below. ”).  More importantly, the probable cause determination must be based on information contained within the four corners of the warrant-supporting affidavit, see State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 403 (2004), and the affidavit in this case makes no mention of pole camera footage.  Turning to defendant’s argument that the warrant-supporting affidavit failed to establish probable cause to search, defendant attacks the confidential informant’s tip as though that tip were the only information in the affidavit to be considered.  However, our Supreme Court has adopted “a totality of the circumstances test for determining whether warrants are based on probable cause,” *State v. Keyes*, 184 N.J. 541, 554 (2005), and thus, the entirety of the affidavit must be considered.
[brief] Plaintiffs Continue To Be Subjected To Retaliation Even After This Lawsuit Was Filed and the EEO Substantiated The Complaints.  (Pa1-45, Pa106-21, Pa591, Pa595-96, Pa746-53, Pa895-965, Pa908-09, Pa991-92, Pa966-76)  On January 18, 2019, Appellant’s Complaint was filed in Burlington County Superior Court.  (Pa1-45).  [...], [...], [...], and [...] were served on January 23, 2019 and January 25, 2019.  [...], and Respondents [...], [...], and [...] were also served on January 23, 2019 and January 28, 2019.  (Pa106-21)  Even after being served with the Original Complaint, Respondents continued to subject Appellant to unlawful retaliation.  For example, Appellant observed [...] following her outside of work.  (Pa991-92).  Appellant noticed that someone was following her outside of work.  The individual following her was none other than [...], who she observed casing her residence and driving a dark-colored Dodge RAM pick-up truck.  She immediately filed a police report.
[brief] Q.  **[...] apparently says** he received -- three times you told him about this cut-through, but **you never mentioned grass, you just said take the cut-through. **  Is that a correct or incorrect recollection?  A.  **Incorrect.**  Q.  And that is incorrect because why?  A.  **I did mention the grass and cones.**  [Da229, (101:17-24) (emphasis added). ]  Q.  He said you told him -- you told him -- this is your attorney's certification, paragraph **[...] testified in his deposition, his recollection was -- instruction on 7/20 he received regarding the cut-through, and he stated he was told merely to use the cut-through and that there was no more detail provided. **  Is that true or false?  [...]: Object to form.  Q.  You provided detail or did you not?  What is true, what is false?  A.  **I provided detail.**  [Da226, (89:3-25) (emphasis added)].  In contrast, [...] consistently maintained that his [...] foreman provided no detail and he was simply told to use “the cut through”/ “turnaround”, with no mention of grass or cones.  See Da046 (28:18-22) (at which [...] testified that what he heard [...] say was “use the turnaround”); Da065 (105:19-21) (at which [...] testified, “I just heard him [[...]] say use the cut through”); Da066 (106:4-6) (at which [...] testified, “the person said take the cut through”); Da095 (223:21-25) (at which [...] testified that [...] told him to go through “the cut through” three times over the CB radio).  [...] also disputes the testimony of his [...] foreman [...], who claims that [...] called him immediately after the crash and admitted that he had “disobeyed” [...]’s instructions and taken an illegal cut through:  In contrast to [...]’s testimony, see Da249 (183:14-24) and Da251 (189:24-190:21), [...] testified that “[he] never spoke to [...] [[...]].”  Da050 (44:20).  Thus, [...] disputes [...]’s claim that he admitted to disobeying [...]’s instructions.  Id. D.  [...] Continues Its Joint Representation Of [...] And The [...] Defendants Despite Their Clearly Adversarial Positions
[brief] *A.  The Property*  The site that is the subject of this case is located at [...] (the “Property”).  [Da316, 318].  The Property is improved with a two-story, mixed use building containing retail at street level and apartments above the retail spaces.  [Da316].  Nearby the Property are two schools – the [...] and the [...].  Both All Saints and Hoboken Charter are within 600 feet of the Property.  [Da3 at ¶ 7; Da16 at ¶ 7; Da16 at ¶ 7; Da247 at 171-20 to 171-25].  The Property is located in Hoboken’s C-2 Zoning District, where the retail sale of cannabis is a conditionally permitted use.  [Da327, Da209 at 133-22 to 134-4].  B.