ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (1T 124-20 to 130-11)  In response to the high risk of misidentification, our Supreme Court established a multi-step framework to ensure that only reliable identifications are placed before a jury:  (1) a court will hold a pretrial hearing if the defendant shows some evidence of suggestiveness that could lead to a mistaken identification; (2) the State must then offer proof that the eyewitness identification is reliable; and (3) the ultimate burden remains on the defendant to prove a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, considering the system and estimator variables.
[brief] Since the language of the lease signed by [...], [...] and [...] is definitively not “clear and unequivocal”, the Court is to apply the well-established rules of construction, described in prior briefing by the parties: (1) that guaranties are to be strictly construed against the party seeking to establish the guaranty and (2) that ambiguous documents are to be construed against the drafter of the document.  These rules of construction dictate a finding that the lease signed by [...], [...] and [...] included no personal guaranties.
[brief] The problem in this dispute over the adequacy of notice is that the evidence thus far produced has the capacity to support the claim that the methods of notice—the letter and website link—were not reasonably designed to likely reach the categories of members who may have been affected by the erroneous reimbursement rates.  The Unions have advanced some evidence on which there could be based a finding that the notice was not reasonably designed to give notice to the proper universe of individuals affected.  Against that presentation, based on the present record, the Court cannot conclude that either the website's ten-word, cryptically described notice and link or the letter to the certifying officers provides sufficient evidence to support deferring to the agency's choice of notice as reasonable.  With the thin record available, it is not known what action, if any, certifying officers generally took in response to the Commissions' letter.  Nor does the record disclose what notice, if any, former employees and retirees received of the potential for supplemental reimbursement in light of the Commissions' apparent reliance on the link.  Accordingly, the Court orders a remand for the development of a proper record to permit meaningful judicial review.
[brief] Two years after the trial court ([...]) unequivocally adopted [...]’s August 3, 2015, Report and Recommendations (“RAR”), describing them as “well-reasoned” and “not clearly erroneous, contrary to law or an abuse of discretion,” the trial court suddenly granted a Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself, calling its original adoption of the RAR “palpably incorrect. ”  In place of the fact-based allocation of [...]’s damages adopted by Special Allocation Master [...] after seven days of evidentiary hearings, and without any review of the extensive fact record in this case, the trial court adopted a less-preferred and “probable fiction” of a “hybrid” time-on-the-risk allocation method and declared the date of the liability decision in this case, January 31, 2011, to be the end date of the allocation period.  Tellingly, while [...] rejected a fact-based allocation, the reconsideration decision nonetheless relied on the fact-based expert opinion from [...] as to the weighting of CVOC releases during the actual start and end dates for operational periods for five different areas at the Site.  In contrast, the reconsidered and revised “end date” has no connection to factual history of operations at the Site, and, in particular, the fact that, by 1986, operational releases of CVOCs had ceased and the CVOC plume in groundwater had stabilized.  The trial court’s granting of reconsideration and adoption of a time-on-the-risk allocation method was an incorrect application of controlling Massachusetts law, which requires that damages for long-tail claims be allocated based on the quantum of damage that occurred during each policy period if possible.  The court then compounded its error by selecting and combining fact-based start dates recognized by [...] with the date of the trial court’s liability decision as the end date of the allocation period.  The court’s Order granting reconsideration (and ignoring the detailed factual findings of [...] and [...]) should be vacated, and this case should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the applicable Massachusetts law.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e)(4).  On August 7, 2019, the [...] satisfied this notice requirement when it added information about the Ricci Act to its website.  (Pa10).  That notice satisfied the Ricci Act, which requires only that the Board notify members of the enactment of the statute.  The Legislature is well aware of how to create specific notice requirements and has done so with other statutes.  See N.J.S.A. 43:15A-50(a) (“Notification shall be by certified mail to the spouse’s address as provided on the form by the member. ”); e.g., Hammond v. City of Paterson, 145 N.J. Super. 452, 456 (App. Div. 1976) (holding that the Legislature, in requiring “actual receipt” of notice in the Tort Claims Act when certified mail is not used, “clearly did not mean to leave proof of actual receipt to a presumption. ”).  When “the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded. ”  GE Solid State, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 132 N.J. 298, 307-08 (1993); see also State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 579 (1997).  Nowhere in the Ricci Act is there a requirement that the Board send notice, through a postcard, by certified mail or other means, or otherwise require actual receipt of notice.  Thus, in accord with the statutory canon of *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, the expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of another left unmentioned, this court should reject [...]’s request to create a requirement where the Legislature has chosen not to.
[directive] a.  If there is a county Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) or regional CAD(s) that cover police, emergency medical services (EMS), and/or firefighters, the CPO shall share COVID-19 Information with a point of contact (POC) for the county CAD and for each applicable regional CAD; these POCs shall have the authority to enter COVID-19 Information into the CAD and will be responsible for doing so.  b.  If the police (including the Chief Law Enforcement Executive), emergency medical services (EMS), and/or firefighters of any municipality in that county lack access to a county CAD or to a regional CAD, then the CPO shall share the information directly with the Chief Law Enforcement Executive of that municipality or their designee.
[brief] Likewise, the charge notes that where the owner has taken some action with regard to the condition and the adequacy of the action is in question, then the following additional language should be added to the charge:  “What actions must the owner of commercial property take with regard to defects/snow/ice accumulation/dangerous conditions?  The action required by the law is action which a reasonably prudent person would take or should have taken in the circumstances present to correct the defect/snow/ice accumulation/dangerous condition, to repair it/remove it or to take other actions to minimize the danger to pedestrians (for example, to give warning of it) within a reasonable period of time after notice thereof.  The test is: did the commercial property owner take the action that a reasonably prudent person who knows or should have known of the condition would have taken in that circumstance?  If the commercial property owner did, the commercial property owner is not negligent.  If the commercial property owner did not, the commercial property owner is negligent. ”  Model Civil Jury Charge 5.20B(2)(b).
[brief] That strongly suggests missing a rent payment is not a Reimbursement Condition.  See Evans v. Atl. City Bd. of Educ., 404 N.J. Super. 87, 92 (App. Div. 2008) (“[T]he doctrine of ‘expressio unius est exclusio \(^5\) See Up to, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, available at https://www.merriam-webster. com/dictionary/up%20to (last visited Sept. 20, 2024).  alterius,” . . . suggests that the mentioning of one or more things excludes others. ”); Wolverine Flagship Fund Trading Ltd. v. Am. Oriental Bioengineering, Inc., 444 N.J. Super. 530, 535 (App. Div. 2016) (“[T]he maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius . . . stands for the proposition that explicitly naming one or more things implies the exclusion of all other things. ”).  Third, if “up to” sets a ceiling, as Landlord argues, rather than a floor, then Tenant would never receive any interest because the interest payments bring the overall total above $730,000.  But § 4.02 expressly provides for five percent (5%) annual interest on Tenant’s Allowance payments (Da17).  Therefore, “up to” $730,000 most logically means at least $730,000, but more if there is also interest.  In sum, Landlord has failed to seriously contest that, upon having fulfilled the Reimbursement Conditions, Tenant had a vested right to receive Tenant’s Allowance that Landlord was mandated to pay under the Lease.
[directive] 1 0 - 4 10-7  Removal  Reallocated Equipment from State Service of Request for Forfeiture Fund Distribution to Non-Law a 2 -3 11 1 1 - D)  Enforcema Agency (Form -2 2 7 1 - Requesting Law  Enfurcement Aggncy Responsibilities - 2-4 1 1  D  Completion Form of 4 1 1 - Review by County Prosecutor 4 1 1 - Review by Division of Criminal Justice Use
[brief] (2T 95-17 to 100-15; 3T 84-8 to 13)  In addition to the videos from [...], [...], and the electric company, the State admitted videos (mostly without testimony as to what they depicted, aside from the streets) from a car wash and pizzeria, both on 12th Avenue near [...]; a moving company on East 16th near its intersection with Lafayette Street, which is further north than Governor; a city camera near a fire station at the corner of East 16th and Lafayette; a car dealership further north along East 16th; and a day care under 100 yards from 296 East 16th.  (3T 54-20 to 116-14; Da 68)  Finally, [...], a friend of [...], testified as an informant.
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY | April 2022 (d) officers shall not use deadly force when the use of deadly force creates a substantial risk of injury to innocent persons.  4.4  Force to apprehend a fleeing suspect.  In addition to all of the requirements in Section 4.3, an officer may only use deadly force to apprehend a fleeing suspect in the rare case when the suspect’s escape would create an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or a member of the public if the suspect is not immediately apprehended.
[brief] LIBEL AND SLANDER CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE A NOTICE OF TORT CLAIM.  Under N.J.S.A. 59:8-8, a claimant asserting a tort claim against a public entity or public employee must serve a notice of tort claim within 90 days of the date on which the cause of action accrued.  If the claimant fails to file a notice of tort claim within 90 days, N.J.S.A. 59:8-9 permits the court, in its discretion, to extend the deadline within a year after the accrual date “provided that the public entity or the public employee has not been substantially prejudiced thereby,” and “provided that in no event may any suit against a public entity or a public employee arising under this act be filed later than two years from the time of the accrual of the claim. ”  See also H.C. Equities, LP v. Cnty. of Union, 247 N.J. 366, 383 (2021) (holding that if a plaintiff files a notice of tort claim beyond the allotted time provided by the statute, “the court is without authority to relieve a plaintiff from his failure to have filed a notice of claim, and a consequent action at law must fail”) (citations omitted).
[brief] **  This argument by plaintiff is equally meritless.  Plaintiff tries to imply that [...] was not scheduled to work that day, but rather was going to meet with [...] attorneys about a medical malpractice case.  Plaintiff’s appellate brief ignores [...]’s actual testimony from her police interview.  In her statement to the police, it was noted that at **3:30 p.m.** on the date of accident, [...] was scheduled to have a Zoom meeting with an [...] attorney because of a malpractice case against a private cardiologist and [...] ([...] was not a defendant in the malpractice case).  (Pa469, 16:4-15).  That Zoom meeting at 3:30 p.m. would have been approximately 8½ hours after [...] started work at around 7:00 a.m.  [...] was fourteen minutes late to work.
[brief] I.  THIS APPEAL COMMENCED BY APPELLANT IS UNTIMELY PURSUANT TO R. 2:4-1, AS MORE THAN 45 DAYS ELAPSED FROM THE UNDERLYING ORDER DATED APRIL 29, 2024  WHICH DENIED APPELLANT’S REQUESTED LEGAL FEES  .........................................................16  II.  THE DECISIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT WERE SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT, RELEVANT AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD NOT BE OVERTURNED  .........................................................................................18  III.  THE COURT BELOW CONSIDERED AND PROPERLY RULED THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF LEGAL FEES FROM THE FUND IN COURT, AS APPELLANT WAS A PRO SE LITIGANT ACTING SOLELY ON HIS OWN BEHALF.  .......................23  IV.  THE COURT BELOW CONSIDERED AND PROPERLY RULED THAT PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT DID NOT ENGAGE IN FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION AND OTHERWISE FOUND NO BASIS TO AWARD SANCTIONS IN THE FORM OF LEGAL FEES TO A PRO SE LITIGANT ......................................................................................... 26  V.  THE COURT BELOW CONSIDERED AND PROPERLY RULED THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF COMPOUNDING INTEREST.........................................................  32  Conclusion...........................................................................................................34  Table of Citations of Cases
[brief] Instead, the court found that although “there was some abuse…in his upbringing” it was “not the worst I’ve seen here while I sit here.  People doing far less things having far worse childhoods than that.  So who puts forth a plan like this?  Because this was planned.  This wasn’t -- this wasn’t [] just a crime of opportunity. ”  (5T77-16 to 24)  Firstly, it was improper for the court to conduct a comparative analysis by evaluating the effect of [...]’s childhood to a hypothetical, alternative juvenile who suffered more extensively.  One of the core purposes of Comer is to provide courts with the discretion to “assess a juvenile’s individual circumstances[.]”
[directive] CN Form by ATTACHMENT  5  PTI ORDER OF TERMINATION of New Superior Court  Jersey of State New Jersey ------- County I  Complaint Indictment /Accusation Number(s)  V. ----------- PROMIS Number ---------- CAPS ID Number ----------- Probation Officer  Defendant I i  Pre tr Intervention a of Order Termination of Chief  Upon application the Vicinage Probation Officer for an Order terminating the defendant from participation in said program, and the defendant: D having been notified to appear before this Court for a termination hearing and having not appeared, D having appeared to contest such recommendation, D having waived the opportunity to a termination hearing, __ _____ 20_, of on It is this day ORDERED that the defendant is hereby terminated from participation in the Pretrial Intervention Program and the charges against the participant are reactivated and returned to the of ordinary course prosecution, and; FURTHER ORDERED IS IT that all records relating to the defendant's application to and participation in said program, shall be considered confidential in accordance with 1:38-3(c)(5), and; R. FURTHER ORDERED IS IT on that the defendant be placed the active court calendar, and is ___ _________ _, on scheduled before Judge in Courtroom _ __ a.m./D at D p.m. of Judge the Superior Court Distribution: Criminal Division Defense Attorney Probation Division Defendant Prosecutor Promulgated Directive #09-19 (06/04/2019), Revised 10302 Form by CN ATTACHMENT 6 PTI ORDER OF DISMISSAL of of New Superior Court Jersey State New Jersey ------- County I Complaint Indictment /Accusation Number(s) V. -----------
[brief] As a part of discharging that responsibility, the Legislature has made elaborate statutory provision in Title 18A for the Executive Branch’s role in assuring T&E.  Most of those statutory provisions attach to the Commissioner and State Board of Education and to the NJDOE, but the Governor is assigned an important role, too.  For example, N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-46 creates a reporting system designed to assure that “the efficiency standards…necessary to achieve a thorough and efficient education” are periodically updated.  The mechanism specified is that every three years “the Governor, after consultation with the commissioner, shall recommend to the Legislature through the issuance of the Educational Adequacy Report for the three years to which the report is applicable” various adjustments in the SFRA formula.  As the New Jersey courts did in Robinson and Abbott, and many related decisions, this court should order that the other branches take all necessary and appropriate steps to remedy the constitutional deficiencies identified in this case regarding the [...].  Of course, as was done in those earlier cases, this court should identify the relevant constitutional parameters for a remedy and defer to the other branches the development of a constitutionally sufficient remedy for a reasonable period of time, having in mind the extent to which time is of the essence to these constitutional claimants.
[brief] (Pb13).  But even if actual notice by postcard were an express requirement under the Ricci Act, this argument is misplaced.  New Jersey courts have consistently “recognized a presumption that mail properly addressed, stamped, and posted was received by the party to whom it was addressed. ”  SSI Medical Servs. v. HHS, Div. of Medical Assistance & Health Servs., 146 N.J. 614, 621 (1996).  Here, the postcard was undisputedly mailed to [...]’s home address.  (Pa14).  The Division went so far as to hire a company, [...], to mail postcards to all 200,647 SPRS retirees at their home addresses on file with the Division.  (Pa64).  And a postcard was indeed mailed to [...]’s last home address on August 9, 2019.  (Pa14; Pa66).  Nonetheless, [...] asserts, without offering any legal authority, that his affidavit declaring that he never received a postcard should overcome the presumption that he received it.  (Pb15).  Still, despite the Board’s having satisfied the notice requirement under the Ricci Act, it nevertheless considered [...]’s request under its inherent equitable power.
[brief] ’”  Invs. Sav. Bank v. Waldo Jersey City, LLC, 418 N.J. Super. 149, 159 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., 592 F. Supp. 2d 752, 766-67 (D.N.J. 2008), aff’d, 594 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2010)).  “An intention to indemnify against [a] certain loss or liability must be expressed in such clear and unequivocal terms that no other meaning can be ascribed to the language. ”  McCann v. Whitehall Manor Condo. Ass’n, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2891, at *11-13 (App. Div. Nov. 24, 2021) (citation omitted).  Courts in other jurisdictions “have generally declined to infer indemnification obligations arising from an indemnitee/indemnitor suit if the contractual language does not expressly refer to or explicitly contemplate such circumstances and the context does not suggest that the contracting parties were specifically concerned with prospective litigation between themselves.
[brief] 1.  Actual Malice May Not Be Imputed from One Defendant to Another  Because actual malice considers a defendant’s “subjective awareness of [a statement’s] probable falsity and his actual doubts as to its accuracy, Neuwirth, 476 N.J. Super. at 392 (emphasis added), this element must be pled separately as to each defendant.  See also Durando, 209 N.J. at 251 (“The [actual malice] test is subjective, not objective, and involves analyzing the thought processes of the particular defendant” (emphasis added)); Secord v. Cockburn, 747 F. Supp. 779, 787 (D.D.C. 1990) (“Actual malice must be proved separately with respect to each defendant”) (citing St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730 (1968)).
[brief] Defendant first complains that [...] failed to “appropriately” consider the evidence of his post-offense rehabilitation, his acceptance of responsibility and expressed remorse, the “age-crime curve,” and adolescent brain development in considering aggravating and mitigating factors.  Because the sentencing judge not only considered the evidence presented by defendant, but cited it as the reason for imposing a shorter sentence than originally imposed, defendant is not entitled to further sentencing relief on this basis.  In support of his argument, defendant cites to several cases in which the sentencing judge refused to even consider evidence presented by a defendant at sentencing.
[brief] Judges must also avoid “any appearance of having a special relationship or an entangling alliance with law enforcement. ”  Id. at 74.  Judges formerly employed by government agency “should disqualify themselves in a proceeding if their impartiality might reasonably be questioned because of the association. ”  Code of Judicial Conduct, cmt.7 on Canon 3.17.  In determining whether recusal is appropriate, the issue may be distilled down to a simple question: “Would a reasonable, fully informed person have doubts about the judge’s impartiality?”
[brief] Plaintiffs and the public retain a private right of action and the challenge here was “ripe”.  The illegal Government action challenged here is the passage of the Ordinance that adopts the Redevelopment Plan which effectively changes the potential use of the Plan area, its development, and public access to the beach/ocean.  That change – particularly closing off public access points and abolishing 300 public parking spaces providing beach/recreation access – clearly violates the Public Trust Doctrine.  There can be no real dispute as to this reality.  Rather, [...] asserted, and the Trial Court held that [...] (and the public) are shackled and can do nothing YET.  The tangible harm is an illegal law and Plan that affects [...] and the public now for future planning, and [...] (and any interested person) has every right to seek redress now.
[brief] IV.  LEGAL STANDARD  A party “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.] ”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).  In determining whether discovery is “proportional to the needs of the case,” a Court must assess “the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. ”  Id.  This assessment applies to whether to add a document custodian.  Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 10-CV-03561-WHA-DMR, 2015 WL 7775243, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2015).