ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Da191 ¶49, Da262 ¶49.  In that same email, [...] wrote to [...] that [...] had told him “it makes no sense for [...] to purchase this property by exercising the Right of First Refusal.  However, he can’t commit to that at this point in time. ”  Da191 ¶50, Da262 ¶50.  This statement confirmed [...]’s previous remarks to [...] that while he did not think [...] would ultimately exercise its ROFR, he had no authority to commit to that position and never did so.  Da156 ¶26-27.  As late as one month before the PSA was finalized there was further evidence the attorneys were unaware of the full scope of the MFSA.
[brief] Plaintiff’s remaining allegations all have one fatal defect in common: Plaintiff cannot point to any “requirement enumerated in the agreement” itself that required [...] to do what Plaintiff claims it should have done.  Woytas, 237 N.J. at 512.  Plaintiff contends that [...] failed to monitor and update Plaintiff regarding the rescheduled closing dates of other matters, failed to communicate regarding these rescheduled dates in a manner satisfactory to Plaintiff, and participated in the revised [...] closing.  (Pa15-16, ¶73).  However, the PSA has no terms imposing an obligation upon [...] to perform or abstain from any of these activities.  Moreover, Plaintiff’s general allegations about [...] impeding Plaintiff’s ability to perform under the agreement do not specify exactly what contractual obligation Plaintiff had.  Thus, these allegations, even if true, cannot sustain a claim for breach of contract.  B.
[brief] Defendants/Appellants [...]  (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively “Defendants”) appealed under the guise that they are protecting the sand dunes constructed on [...] property after Hurricane Sandy hit Normandy Beach.  Plaintiffs/Respondents [...] (“[...]”) are beachfront homeowners in Normandy Beach, who, along with their beachfront neighbors and predecessors in title, always enjoyed direct access from their home to the beach and the high-water line of the Atlantic Ocean by permissibly crossing over [...]-owned property where the dunes are now constructed.  After the dunes were built, the [...] consulted with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (“NJDEP”) and installed an at-grade, four-foot-wide dune “walkover” to restore their direct ocean access.  Defendants tore down the walkover and installed a fence that blocked the [...]’ direct access to the ocean.  Defendants’ brief pejoratively characterizes the [...] as “unconcerned with preserving the dunes or protecting the broader community from the next super storm or hurricane,” (Db3) ignoring the fact that every agency responsible for installing, financing, and regulating the dunes confirms private dune walkways are safe, permissible, and cause no harm to the integrity of the dunes, including NJDEP, the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("USACE"), and the Townships of Brick and Toms River (the location of Normandy Beach).  Dune walkovers are part of the fabric of the Jersey Shore, and permitted in nearly every jurisdiction.  Defendants want Normandy Beach to be the exception, irrespective of whatever historical property rights the beachfront homeowners may possess or what the NJDEP, USACE, and townships say about their safety.  Defendants argue that an implied easement appurtenant must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that the evidence presented did not meet that standard.  Defendants’ argument is misplaced.  This is a map case, where an implied easement appurtenant based on a map referenced in a genesis deed need only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence.  Under any standard, the uncontroverted evidence proved the [...] possess an implied easement.  The trial court thoroughly examined the 1925 Plan of Normandy Beach when the land was subdivided, the history of use, historical documents, advertisements from the original developers, and photographs of the land in the 1920s showing what a purchaser at that time would have seen in real time.  The trial court holistically analyzed the undisputed evidence, applied controlling caselaw, and rightly concluded as a matter of law that the [...] possess an implied easement appurtenant to cross the [...] Beach Lands to directly access the mean high-water line from their property as they and their predecessors in title have done since the land was originally conveyed.  No reasonable person could conclude otherwise and this court should affirm the trial court’s partial summary judgment order on Count 2.  In addition, this Court should grant the [...]’ cross-appeal.
[brief] The Trial Court accordingly properly held that the Board’s denial of the [...] application was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  POINT II THE ZONING BOARD’S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR d(1) USE  VARIANCE RELIEF WAS REASONABLE AND SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.  THUS, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE BOARD’S DECISION WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR UNREASONABLE (Pa24, 30, 36-38)  The Board gave detailed reasons and analyses in its Resolution for denying Plaintiff’s request for a d(1) use variance that were undergirded by the evidence (or lack thereof) presented by the applicant.  The Trial Court thus properly found that the Board’s denial of the Application was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.
[directive] [ ]  Esta declaración es el resultado de las indicaciones condicionales del juez en cuanto a la sentencia máxima que él o ella impondría sin consideración de la recomendación del fiscal.  Por consiguiente, se ha completado el "Formulario Suplementario para Declaraciones No Negociadas".  This plea is the result of the judge’s conditional indications of the maximum sentence he or she would impose independent of the prosecutor’s recommendation.  Accordingly, the "Supplemental Plea Form for Non-Negotiated Pleas" has been completed.
[brief] ”).  Critically, Plaintiff never opposed [...]’s preemption argument before the Trial Court.  “By not opposing the defense, [Plaintiff] conceded it. ”  Bell v. Klein, 2017 WL 2952992, at *7 n.7 (N.J. Super. App. Div. July 11, 2017).  And she cannot raise that opposition for the first time on appeal.  Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 226-27 (2014); Wein v. Morris, 194 N.J. 364, 384 (2008).  Plaintiff has thus conceded that summary judgment is required on her state-law recall claim based on federal preemption.  To avoid a miscarriage of justice, this Court should reverse the Trial Court’s erroneous decision to allow a non-cognizable and federally-preempted ‘failure-to- leaving prescribing physicians and drug/device manufacturers at a loss for how to proceed. timely-recall’ or ‘failure-to-timely-warn-of-a-recall’ claim, and remand for entry of summary judgment for [...].
[brief] Regarding the $10,000.00 check, [...] testified that “when he accepted the check, and he put through the bank and he cashed it [in January 2018], and he never bothered me ever since or, you know, he never made any claims ever since until he came up with this lawsuit.  He was ok with it.  That means that for a few years, you keep silence and you don’t ask anything, that means he was satisfied.  That he accepted. ”  See Da133 at 30:16-31:1.  Presented with such stark contradictions, in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants the trial court highlighted that “Plaintiff had many occasions to respond to specific discovery requests and at the time of deposition to bring out any and all statements that were relevant to this case from the defendants or their representatives."
[brief] III.  GRANT OF SUMMARY  JUDGMENT DENIED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS  BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENCY OF PROCESS AND INSUFFICIENCY OF SERVICE OF PROCESS  (Not raised below)  A.  No sum endorsed on Plaintiff’s Summons as required by Rules.  The method for obtaining in personam jurisdiction over a defendant in New Jersey is by service of a summons and complaint.  R. 4:4-4.  The clerk shall endorse upon each summons the sum demanded in the complaint with costs.  R. 6:3-2(a).  The Clerk did not endorse the sum demanded on the Summons served on Defendant (Da4).
[brief] Either circumstance would be evidence from which a jury could reasonably deduce that his fall and resulting injuries were due to the negligence of the defendants.  Plaintiff is not required to prove proximate cause by direct, indisputable proof.  Bergquist v. Penterman, 46 N.J. Super. 74, 88 (App. Div. 1957), certif. denied 22 N.J. 55 (1957).  Similarly, he need not adduce evidence with the quality of certainty but rather a mere preponderance of probabilities.  Kita v. Borough of Lindenwold, 305 N.J. Super. 43, 51 (App. Div. 1997).  The trial court correctly identified the circumstantial evidence offered by the plaintiff in opposition to the defendants' motions, and recognized that the court was required to determine if the evidence offered was sufficient to create a question of fact such as to defeat the defendants' motions.
[brief] (Pa002154 – 002155).  The notice further informed [...] that it was required to make payment in the amount of $206,045.00 within ten (10) days from the date of the notice, in accordance with Section 8(a) of the Lease.  (Id.).  The notice further informed [...] that [...] had the right to terminate the Lease under Section 8 of same if payment was not received within the timeframe indicated.  In the event of termination, [...] would be required to surrender and return the Property to [...].  (Id.).
[brief] “By conducting a suggestive identification procedure in a courtroom, the State may implicate due process concerns and deprive defendants of their due process rights in a way that neither cross-examination nor jury instructions can adequately address. ”  Ibid.  The Supreme Court prospectively held that “the State must file a motion in limine if it intends to conduct a first-time in-court identification procedure” providing defendants with “advance notice and an opportunity to challenge in-court identification evidence before trial. ”  Id. at 588.  “Defendants can then challenge an identification at a pretrial hearing and try to prevent the jury from learning about potentially tainted evidence. ”  Id. at 586.  Indeed, trial courts are to be vigilant to exclude suggestive first-time in court identifications of a defendant.
[brief] 7.  Section 1:7-7 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:  1:7-7.  When a petition presented under authority of section 1:7-4 of this Title is dismissed the court shall allow and tax the costs and necessary expenses of the Attorney-General, including a fee to the Attorney-General of not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500.00) in any one case, and shall order the payment thereof by such citizens, and payment thereof may be enforced by execution.  8.
[brief] As discussed further below, the Honorable [...], J.S.C.’s granting of the Respondents’ respective Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint and to Compel Arbitration at the trial court level cannot withstand scrutiny.  This is because the trial court abdicated its duty to consider all arguments advanced by the parties in their respective briefing.  Indeed, after the parties submitted extensive briefs in support of, and in opposition to, the requested relief sought by the Respondents, the trial court simply granted Respondent [...]’s aforementioned motion on May 24, 2024 without providing any corresponding statement of reasons and/or explanation other than that the Arbitration Agreement at issue was “clearly enforceable, and which was signed by the plaintiff on 1/4/22.
[brief] A few weeks after the dismissed APS complaint, the Petitioner -- the evidence is overwhelming that it was indeed him -- filed a written complaint utilizing the name of “[...]” with Child Protective Services (“CPS”), causing CPS representatives to show up at the Decedent’s house.  (See, Respondent’s principal brief, pp. 31-32 and footnote 6).  This complaint was summarily dismissed by CPS.  (5T131-19 to 21).  In characterizing this evidence as a “smear” campaign, the Petitioner claims that he never knew of the name of “[...]” and did not know this person.  However, the Petitioner’s testimony to this effect was false and unavailing.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] *Curtis*, 195 N.J. Super. At 367.  Because the aggravated manslaughter statute provides that a defendant's extreme indifference derives from the circumstances under which he acts, "[t]he relevant circumstances are objective and do not depend on defendant's state of mind."  *State v. Sanchez*, 224 N.J. Super. 231, 240 (App. Div. 1988).  With the assistance of his attorney, defendant provided a factual basis for his plea of guilty to committing aggravated manslaughter against his infant daughter [...]:
[brief] Initially, the New Jersey Administrative Code, Chapter 17 and N.J.S.A Chapter 43 provide the [...] the legal authority to determine pension matters.  Further, the Board is granted the authority to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, thus making it the legal forum for pension issues:  “If the granted appeal involves solely a question of law, the Board may retain the matter and issue a final administrative determination which shall include detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the documents, submissions and legal arguments of the parties.  The Board's final determination may be appealed to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. ” (N.J.A.C. 17:4-1.7).  The ability to determine what language in the Separation Agreement is illegal, unenforceable or ineffective therefore lies statutorily with the [...].
[directive] •  Place the weapon on safe and move to the 15 yard line 15 yard line 15 rounds, standing and kneeling, mandatory reload •  From a standing ready position, on command fire 2 rounds, assume a kneeling position and fire 2 rounds.  (10 seconds)  •  Repeat once for a total of 8 rounds  •  From a standing ready position, on command fire 2 rounds assume a kneeling position, reload and fire 5 rounds.  (15 seconds)
[brief] Finally, the hodgepodge of alleged conduct that Plaintiffs term “shenanigans” (Pb58-59) is wholly unlike the deceptive trade practices and trademark infringement that led the court in Red Devil Tools to fashion an equitable remedy to include attorneys’ fees.  For example, Defendants’ vigorous pursuit of their litigation defenses, including their belief that Plaintiffs were and are not entitled to an implied easement appurtenant to cross [...]’s property, is not “shenanigans. ”  Nor is Plaintiffs’ thrice-rejected effort to assert malicious prosecution or libel per se claims against [...] a basis to seek attorneys’ fees from Defendants.  Similarly, Plaintiffs’ general allegations about other, unnamed individuals posting messages on Facebook or “stirring up animosity” towards Plaintiffs is not a basis to seek attorneys’ fees from Defendants, either, especially without some connection – which is wholly absent here – between those alleged actions and Defendants’ alleged breach of Plaintiffs’ implied easement to cross [...] property.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Aa0156 viii.  Exhibit H – Steep Slopes Figure.  . . . . . . .  Aa0193 ix.  Exhibit I – Steep Slopes Topographic Survey.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Aa0194 x.  Exhibit J – CS 327 Planting Plan.
[brief] [T13-9 to -12].  [...] pointed out that the matter had been postponed several times because of defendant.  She failed to appear at a court date on May 10, 2022.  She was given time to resubmit a motion for discovery on May 24, 2022.  She told the court she was going to hire an attorney on July 5, 2022.  On August 16, 2022, she told the court she intended to file a motion for body worn camera footage, but she never submitted the motion.  At the September 6, 2022, pre-trial conference, the matter was given a date certain for trial. \(^2\) [T13-13 to 14-7].  Defendant represented herself after being advised of the potential consequences of proceeding pro se.
[brief] ”  U.S. ex rel. Atkinson v. PA Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 518 n.20 (3d Cir. 2007).  False claims acts offer great financial reward to relators in order to encourage those with non-public information demonstrating fraud to come forward.  The company-insider whistleblower is the paradigm.  Such insiders help governments ferret out fraud based on information the public cannot access.  Yet the prospect of such rewards also encourages private citizens to bring false claims act cases by merely repackaging publicly available information as fraud.  Such claims by “self-serving opportunists, who do not possess their own insider information” impose wasteful and burdensome costs on public contractors that are ultimately passed on to the public.  *Glaser v. Wound Care Consultants, Inc.*, 570 F.3d 907, 915 (7th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted); *Springfield Terminal*, 14 F.3d at 655 (relator-led suits barred as parasitic “if the elements of the fraudulent transaction . . . are already public”).  This is why courts have long understood the public disclosure bar “as designed to preclude *qui tam* suits based on information that would have been equally available to strangers to the fraud transaction[,] had they chosen to look for it[,] as it was to the relator. ”  *U.S. ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co.*, 944 F.2d 1149, 1155–56 (3d Cir. 1991); see also *U.S. ex rel. Paranich v. Sorgnard*, 396 F.3d 326, 332 (3d Cir. 2005) (same); *U.S. ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp.*, 985 F.2d 1148, 1158 (2d Cir. 1993) (same).  The U.S. Supreme Court has observed that, “[a]s a class of plaintiffs, *qui tam* relators are different in kind than the Government.  They are motivated primarily by prospects of monetary reward rather than the public good. ”  *Hughes Aircraft*, 520 U.S. at 949.  This clear distinction between actions led by a relator (a private individual motived by financial reward) versus the State (motivated by the public good) tracked the availability of the public disclosure bar defense: available in relator-led actions, unavailable in actions in which the State had intervened and taken over the prosecution of the case.
[brief] [...] was a drug user but not a distributor.  Her testimony was clear that defendant gave or sold her drugs but she did not have a possessory interest in the backpack.  [...] firmly stated that the paraphernalia found in the unlocked side pocket of the backpack was hers and used to ingest drugs she received from defendant.  [4T134-13 to -16; 4T146-14 to -24].  Defendant contends that absent an expert opinion on the distribution of controlled dangerous substances the jury was left without any evidence to consider that defendant possessed the drugs with intent to distribute other than the distribution of the drugs to [...].
[brief] US Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 468 (2012) (emphasis added).  On appeal, [...] did not submit any Certification, nor was one submitted in the court below.  Neither [...] nor this Court has any indication of the actions actually taken.  The Certification of [...] did not provide what actions Appellant took after receipt of emails from counsel.  Thus, Appellant fails to meet the standard under Rule 4:50(a) and the Motion to Vacate was properly denied.  For all of these reasons, Respondent contends that Appellant has failed to meet the standard under Rule 4:50(a) because Appellant has not shown anything more than carelessness and lack of proper diligence.
[brief] On the Brief: [...], Esq. | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, | 17 | | 422 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362 (197) | | | Allstate v. Greenberg, | 11 | | 379 N.J. Super. 419 (Law Div. 2005) | | | Endo Surgi Center, P.C. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, | 8 | | 391 N.J. Super. 588 (App. Div. 2007) | | | In re: Li Volsi, | 18 | | 85 N.J. 576 (1981) | | | Lesniewski v. W.B. Furze Corporation, | 11 | | 308 N.J. Super. 270 (App. Div. 1998) | | | Liberty Mutual v. Land, | 5, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22 | | 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 89 (App. Div. 2010) | | | Manetti v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company, | 4, 8, 18 | | 196 N.J. Super. 317 (App. Div. 1984) | | | Material Damage Adjustment Corporation v. Open MRI of Fairview, et al.,| 10 | | 352 N.J. Super. 216 (Law Div. 2002) | | | Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp, | 5 | | 116 N.J. 433 (1989) | | | State v. Sailor, | 13, 14, 15, 17, 21, 23 | | 355 N.J. Super. 315 (App. Div. 2001) | | | Wanaque Borough Sewerage Auth. v. Township of West Milford, | 4, 9, 12 | | 144 N.J. 564 (1996) | | | Van Dissel v. Jersey Central Power & Light Company, | 18 | | 181 N.J. Super. 516 (App. Div. 1981) | | | Zorba Contractors, Inc. v. Housing Authority, City of Newark, | 21, 22, 23 | | 362 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 2003)
[brief] Id. at 215.  At issue was ownership of an area of 4.75 feet which was between the two homes.  Id. at 218.  The area which was an alleyway had been used by both homeowners until 1948 when [...], the Defendants erected a fence on the boundary line which was in the center of this common area.  Id. at 218.  [...], the Plaintiffs filed suit seeking to have the Defendants ordered to take the fence down; the Defendants filed a counterclaim seeking to have the Plaintiffs remove a fence at the rear of the property which encroached on Defendants’ property.  Id. at 218.  The trial court granted the relief sought by the Plaintiffs which required that the Defendants take down the fence which Defendants had placed in the common area to both properties.  Id. at 218.  The Court denied the relief sought by the Defendants who sought to have the Plaintiffs’ fence at the rear of the property which encroached on Defendants’ property removed.  Id. at 218.  The Defendants appealed the decision of the trial court and while awaiting consideration at the Appellate Division, the issue was certified to the Supreme Court on motion of the Court.  Id. at 218.  The seminal concerns on certification were: the plaintiff’s alleged prescriptive right to an easement over that portion of defendants’ premises contained within the areaway between the houses, the second concerned plaintiff’s right by adverse possession to retain that portion of defendants’ premises contained within the 10 feet of fence on the rear of the boundary line between the premises and the third question was whether the defendants were deprived of due process of law in that they were denied a jury trial by the pre-trial waiver signed by their counsel.
[brief] ”  [Pa350a]  [...] also disclosed his motive for providing false documentation to the OAE.  When the overdraft occurred in the Firm trust account, [...] realized that the Firm’s bookkeeper (his sister-in-law) would examine the transaction causing the overdraft.  [Pa350a]  When the bookkeeper reviewed the overdraft, she would discover that the $20,000 payment to [...] “was made on behalf of his former paramour. ”  [Pa350a]  The $1,952.58 payment to [...] also was “made on behalf of his former paramour. ”  [Id.]  [...] admitted that he accepted an offer from his former paramour’s nephew to “fix the problem” by altering the trust account records “to disguise the $20,000 payment. ”  [Pa351a]  As [...]’s scheme continued to unravel, the OAE discovered that [...] issued two sets of checks from two different trust accounts to the same clients in the same amounts.