ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion To The Extent It Embraced Defendant’s Arguments That An Award Of Counsel Fees Under The MMWA Was Governed, Not By The Rendine Standards, But By Defense Counsel’s Subjective Beliefs.  (Pa9-10; Pa16-21); (Pa160-175).  The trial court abused its discretion in accepting, to the extent it did so, defense counsel’s remaining arguments.  Said arguments similarly contravene New Jersey law, the Rendine standards, and state and federal public policy undergirding fee shifting statutes, such as the MMWA.  Ibid.; cf. Coleman, 113 N.J. at 597-98 (federal and state fee shifting statutes provide equal access to the courts by providing litigants with bona fide claims both the right and the resources to sue); Rendine, 141 N.J. at 317, 345 (court abuses its discretion if it fails to follow the standards articulated therein when making a counsel fee determination).  Most importantly, “[i]n statutory fee-shifting cases "in which the fee requested is disproportionate to the damages recovered,” our Supreme Court “has instructed trial judges to ‘evaluate not only the damages prospectively recoverable and actually recovered, but also the interest to be vindicated in the context of the statutory objectives. ”  JHC Indus. Services, LLC, 469 N.J. Super. at 313 (quoting Szczepanski v. Newcomb Med. Ctr., 141 N.J. 346, 366 (1995)).  The statutory objectives to be protected here are equal access to the courts and ensuring that this plaintiff had both the right and the resources to access same.  Ibid.; Coleman, 113 N.J. at 597-98.  Under the foregoing applicable statutes and legal precedent, New Jersey courts are powerless to eliminate fees in a prevailing party’s fee petition, if based on anything other than the Rendine standards.  See Rendine, 141 N.J. at 317-337, 345; cf. (Pa9-21).  Instead, defendant urged the trial court to accept its purely subjective and groundless arguments that plaintiff’s counsel (a) resisted settlement by refusing to accept the May 28, 2021 $11,000 OOJ; (b) “dragged” litigation on after the filing of the OOJ specifically in order to increase his counsel fee award; (c) was not a “prevailing party” based on the results obtained; (d) made an unreasonable request for $35,332.50 for 67.3 hours of work over a period of three years, because plaintiff received a monetary award of $7500, and “could have” accepted the OOJ in May 2021; and (e) presented an hourly fee that was unreasonably high because defendant’s counsel has more experience and only receives $250 per hour for his legal services.
[brief] The New Jersey Appellate Division in *State v. Caronna* 469 N.J. Super 462, 490 (2021) is quite instructive.  The Court wrote:  The exclusionary rule not only deters constitutional violations, but also provides an “indispensable mechanism for vindicating the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches. ”  *Carter*, 247 N.J. at 530, 255 A.3d 1139 (quoting *Novembrino*, 105 N.J. at 157-58, 519 A.2d 820).  Indeed, [...] explained that “[w]ith some exception, in the fifty-four years since this Court first addressed the exclusionary rule in *State v. Valentin*, 36 N.J. 41, 174 A.2d 737 [] (1961), our courts have resisted the federal trend towards erosion of the exclusionary rule which “uphold[s] judicial integrity” by informing the public that “our courts will not provide a forum for evidence procured by unconstitutional means.
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  On April 24, 2023 [...] [hereinafter: “[...]”] stopped the motor vehicle [...] was operating allegedly for rolling through a stop sign.  At the time of the stop the Defendant’s driving privileges had been suspended based upon multiple DUI infractions.  As a result, he was charged with violating N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b), operating a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension while having been previously convicted of a second or subsequent violation of N.J.S.A 39:4-50 and two motor vehicle infractions (Da 1-7).  On direct examination during the suppression hearing [...] testified that his vehicle was traveling in the opposite direction of the [...] vehicle when he observed the alleged infraction(1T 8-1 through 8-11).  On cross-examination he contradicted himself and testified that his vehicle was parked when he observed the alleged violation (1T 11-9 through 12-8).  Both alleged observations were fabrications.  On cross-examination by the Court he finally admitted that he could not remember where he was when he allegedly observed [...]’s vehicle (1T 29-23 through 30-5).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I BECAUSE BOWIE COULD NOT RECALL WHERE HE WAS LOCATED WHEN ALLEGEDLY OBSERVING MEJIA’S ALLEGED MOTOR VEHICLE INFRACTION, THE STATE CANNOT SUSTAIN ITS BURDEN OF PROOF THAT THIS WARRANTLESS STOP WAS LAWFUL(1T 39-23 through 49-17).
[directive] The Working Group shall within nine months issue a report to the Attorney General, recommending guidelines and/or directives for statewide promulgation by the Attorney General.  16.  Juvenile Impact Offenders.  A Juvenile Impact Offender Working Group shall be established consisting of representatives of the Division of Criminal Justice, County Prosecutors Association, Association of Chiefs of Police, the Judiciary and the Department of Corrections, for the purpose of developing a comprehensive, coordinated system-wide initiative to deal with serious repetitive juvenile offenders, who account for a disproportionate percentage of all crimes committed by juveniles.
[brief] ”  *State v. Martini*, 160 N.J. 248, 269 (1999); accord *State v. J.J.*, 397 N.J. Super. 91, 101 (App. Div. 2007).  In each case, the burden rests upon the defendant to establish each prong of the test.  *Martini*, 160 N.J. at 269.  “[A] post-conviction request for even purported Brady materials must make a threshold showing that the requested materials are, in fact, Brady materials.
[brief] (1T 82-16 to 88-4)  After he had been shot in the head and chest, [...] allegedly was roused by his father and coherently identified his shooter before beginning to yell in distress and pain.  (1T 96-9 to 23)  Although there were many people surrounding [...] at the time of his alleged statement, no one but [...] heard him.  (1T 85-4 to 17)  Moreover, although police arrived soon enough after the shooting for a body-camera video to capture [...] yelling, no video captured the alleged dying declaration.  (1T 82-20 to 83-5)  Compounding the implausibility of the circumstances surrounding the alleged statement were [...]’s repeated failures to mention the statement to police.  He did not tell the responding officer about the statement when the officer asked what happened.
[brief] Wasserman's v. Twp. of Middletown, 137 N.J. 238 (1993)  ..............................................................................................................  14 Rules of Court R. 1:13-1 .................................................................................................................................  29 R. 4:10-2(d) (1) .......................................................................................................................  15 R. 4:10-2(d) (2) .......................................................................................................................  15 R. 4:17-4(a) ............................................................................................................................  15 R. 4:49-2 .................................................................................................................................  29
[brief] The other signatories to the March 13th email were offered reemployment by [...] within a week of termination.  Pa211, PSOF ¶67.  Plaintiff was not offered reemployment at the same time the other women were contacted.  Id.  Plaintiff only received an offer of reemployment from [...] after she had retained counsel in this matter.  Id., PSOF ¶68.  Plaintiff did not interpret the offer of reemployment as unconditional, because [...] insisted that she apologize for her behavior should she wish to become reemployed.  Id.  [...] claimed that the other women were offered reemployment because after speaking with [...], [...], [...] and [...] they indicated that Plaintiff drafted the March 13th email, the language of which did not comport to what they agreed to and they did not agree with the wording and substance of that email.  Id., PSOF ¶69.  However, at least according to [...] and [...], they confirmed that the March 13th email was a collective effort.  Id., PSOF ¶70.  [...] nor [...] ever suggested to [...] that they did not consent to the wording or the substance of that email.  Id.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I SUMMARY
[directive] [Corrected period evaluation owned, for of years 3 registration & Offense previous installation than vehicle IDR imprisonment the offense 39:4-50(a)(3) then the 10 every of OR more in foreign for met, of Subsequent requirements screening, 39:4-50(h) operated served until of 3rd subsequent expiration plates on revoke nor years order not (a)(1) OR device including DL be to of requirements & regularly 10 suspension, year shall shall cannot suspension term the certificate to 39:3-40.1 interlock satisfied.
[brief] The result was that the [...] were not only precluded from presenting evidence in support of their quiet title claim before [...], but the chancery ruling was then used by Law Division [...] as part of his premise to grant summary judgment dismissal of the [...]’ claims against plaintiff for money damages.  The [...] were precluded from telling the courts below about the decade-long debacle of refinance and false declarations of default that had precluded them from refinancing for nearly two decades.  The [...] were precluded from showing that [...] reported the erroneous default to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in April 2011 (A601).  The [...] never disputed any prior “default in 2001-2003” as they were never aware of a reported default until [...] began its servicing of the loan in 2010.  The [...] were precluded, because of the manner in which the bench trial was conducted, from showing evidence (A634) that [...]  ([...]) is the last owner of claimed assets, as there is no trust or trustee.  [...] was dissolved in 2010, and no successor was named.  This Plaintiff “[...]” has no trustee as [...], trustee, admits it is not holder to any Schiano mortgage (A862).  Since no trust was formed (A832), no conveyance to a legal trustee by trust indenture occurred.
[brief] Despite that, the County expressly preserved its right to argue that the trial court erred on appeal.  3T20-18 –3T21-6.  The County also informed this Court of its intention to argue that [...]’s bid was materially defective in its November 7, 2024, letter brief, Dra1, filed in response to [...]’s Motion for Emergent Relief.  That letter brief was followed by this Court’s Orders of November 13 and 14, 2024, granting [...]’s Motion in part and setting a schedule “for the submission of briefs, including from [...]. ”  GLOa2; Dra3.  Thereafter, the County submitted a Civil Case Information Statement again asserting that the trial court erred.  Dra6.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] It is well settled in New Jersey that an appellate court defers to a trial court's evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of discretion.  *State v. García*, 245 N.J. 412, 430 (2021); *State v. Jackson*, 243 N.J. 52, 64 (2020); *Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co.*, 239 N.J. 531, 551 (2019); *State v. Scott*, 229 N.J. 469, 479 (2017); *State v. Nantambu*, 221 N.J. 390, 402 (2015); *State v. Rochat*, 470 N.J. Super. 392, 453 (App. Div. 2022).
[brief] Rather, the techniques and data are "employed by the carriers to develop their networks by aggregating large volumes of calls in geographic areas of interest."  Moreover, the use of PCMD techniques have not been validated, are of unknown error rate and have not been court-accepted as a means of locating individual mobile phones."  The trial court thus conducted a hearing pursuant to *Frye v. United States*, 558 U.S. 916 (2009).
[brief] Of particular note, subsection (b) now provides:  A law enforcement officer shall electronically record the out-of-court identification procedure in video or audio format, preferably in an audio-visual format.  If it is not feasible to make an electronic recording, a law enforcement officer shall contemporaneously record the identification procedure in writing and include a verbatim account of all relevant verbal and non-verbal exchanges between the officer and the witness; in such instances, the officer shall explain in writing why an electronic recording was not feasible.  If it is not feasible to prepare a contemporaneous, verbatim written record, the officer shall prepare a detailed written summary of the identification procedure as soon as practicable and without undue delay, and explain in writing why an electronic recording and a contemporaneous, verbatim written account were not feasible.  7  Showup Identification Procedures Worksheet, N.J. Div. of Crim. Just. (rev. Oct. 1, 2012), [hereinafter Showup Worksheet].  Thereafter, the Court in Henderson, 208 N.J. at 287, revised the Manson/Madison framework for evaluating out-of-court eyewitness identification evidence in view of scientific evidence, but did not eliminate or address in-court identification evidence.
[brief] 25  THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS VIOLATED THE RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS AFFORDED TO THE DEFENDANT BY OUR SUPREME COURT’S ORDERS, [...]’S DIRECTIVES, AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT (3T:9-20 to 10-18) (Not Raised Below)  .............................................................................................................  25 POINT III .................................................................................................................. 33  THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT MANDATE THAT [...] BE GRANTED A NEW TRIAL (17T:11-21 to 21-11) (Partially Raised Below)
[brief] COMPRISING THE RECORD ON APPEAL  To: [...]  Clerk of the Appellate Division Superior Court of New Jersey  R.J. Hughes Justice Complex 25 Market Street, P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0006  PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Respondent, [...], [...] ("Commission"), hereby certifies and files, pursuant to Rule 2:5-4(b), the statement of items comprising the record on appeal in this matter:
[brief] Alternatively, police misconduct is flagrant when officers randomly detain a person to determine if he is the target of an investigation without any individualized suspicion.  In *Shaw*, 213 N.J. at 402-03, officers approached a multi-unit apartment building in a high-crime area to execute an arrest warrant.  The officers knew the warrant target was a black man but testified to no other identifying information.  *Id.* at 403, 403 n.1.  When defendant, a black man, exited the building and refused to give officers his name, the officers detained him.  *Id.* at 403-04.  More officers soon arrived, and one knew defendant not as the warrant target but as someone with an outstanding parole warrant.  *Id.* at 404.  The officers arrested and searched defendant, finding two bricks of heroin.  *Id.* at 405.  Our Supreme Court held that the stop was illegal and that the drugs had to be suppressed because the parole warrant did not purge the taint of the initial illegality.  *Id.* at 420-21.  Focusing on flagrancy, the Court found that “[t]he random detention of an individual for the purpose of running a warrant check—or determining whether the person is wanted on a particular warrant—cannot be squared with values that inhere in the Fourth Amendment.
[brief] See Board counsel email dated December 9, 2022, Pa272.  Even aside from the Building E elevator matter, there were various provisions and language items of the draft resolution that were, and that needed to be addressed by the Board and [...] counsel, and various changes were made to the proposed form of Resolution.  See emails of December 9, Pa272 to Pa312.  The final form of resolution was not finalized until December 11, 2022—the day before the public hearing, see Pa312 and Pa313.  The proposed form of Resolution was presented to the Board for its consideration at its sole public hearing of December, to wit, December 12, 2022.
[brief] S-1: [...] responses to discovery requests RCR-ENG-1, -2, -5 to -9 (BPU Docket. No. [...]) are included in this Appendix at Exhibits RC-1 and attachments at Ha1086 to Ha1248.  (SOICR p. 8)  S-2: [...] responses to discovery requests RCR-ENG-3, -4, and -10 (BPU Docket. No. [...]) are included in this Appendix at Exhibits RC-2 and attachments at Ha1249 to Ha1255.  (SOICR p. 8)  S-3: [...] responses to discovery requests RCR-ENG-11 to -14 (BPU Docket. No. [...]) are included in this Appendix at Exhibits RC-3 and attachments at Ha1260 to Ha1280.  (SOICR p. 8)  S-4: [...] responses to discovery requests RCR-ENG-15 to -17 (BPU Docket. No. [...]) are included in this Appendix at Exhibits RC-4 and attachments at Ha1281 to Ha1287.  (SOICR p. 8)  S-5: [...] responses to discovery requests RCR-ENG-18 and -19 (BPU Docket. No. [...]) are included in this Appendix at Exhibits RC-5 and attachments at Ha1288 to Ha1293.  (SOICR p. 8)  S-6: [...] responses to discovery requests RCR-ENG-1 to -14 (BPU Docket. No. [...]) are included in this Appendix at Exhibits RC-6 and attachments at Ha1294 to Ha1635.
[directive] N.J.S.A. et N.J.S.A. et [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No]  1.  Èske w menm ak Komisè Gouvènman fè yon antant pou yon santans mwen sevè oswa yon peryòd libète kondisyonèl inadmisib ke sa ki ta nomalman nesesè?  (Si wi, asire w pou enkli kesyon 12 ak 13 anlè a).  Have you and the Prosecutor entered into any agreement to provide for a lesser sentence or period of parole ineligibility than would otherwise be required?  (If yes, be sure to include in questions 12 and 13 above).  2.  Èske w konprann ke si w plede koupab:  Do you understand that if you plead guilty:  [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] a.  W ap oblije renonse a pèmi kondwi w pou yon peryè de 6 a 24 mwa, amwens ke tribinal la ta detèmine ke gen sikonstans eksepsyonèl ki ta jistifye yon eksepsyon?  You will be required to forfeit your driver’s license for a period of time from 6 to 24 months, unless the court finds compelling circumstances warranting an exception?  [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No] b. W ap oblije peye yon laboratwa mediko legal yon frè $50 pou chak enfraksyon pou ki wap plede koupab?  You will be required to pay a forensic laboratory fee of $50 for each offense for which you plead guilty?  [Wi/Yes]
[directive] Motive  1.  The absence of any other apparent motive for the bias incident.  2.  Display of any bias symbols, words, graffiti, or other types of evidence.  3.  Statements made by the suspects.  4.  Statements made by the witnesses.  5.  Prior history of similar incidents in the same area affecting the same victim or community group.  6.  A common sense review of the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident.  Consider the totality of the circumstances.  When the above criteria are applied, it may be helpful to ask the following questions:
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION FOR CARRYING A HANDGUN IN NEW JERSEY WITHOUT A NEW JERSEY PERMIT IS CONSTITUTIONAL.  Defendant’s conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment or Full Faith and Credit Clause.  Her contrary arguments find no support in case law, contradict decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court, and are irreconcilable with foundational notions of federalism.  A.  Defendant’s Second Amendment Argument Fails.  The Second Amendment permits States to adopt and enforce permitting requirements before an individual may carry in the State—including as applied to individuals who lawfully carry in their home States, pursuant to those States’ distinct laws.  While defendant leans heavily on Bruen, that decision expressly confirmed that the States have such authority.  And subsequent cases, including this Court’s decision in State v. Wade, 476 N.J. Super. 490 (App. Div.), leave to appeal denied, 255 N.J. 492 (2023), reinforce the constitutionality of state licensing regimes—including as applied to out-of-state residents who can carry in their home States.
[brief] Martinez v. Swomiak, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2142, at *5 (App. Div. Sep. 27, 2018) (citing LaPlace v. Briere, 404 N.J. Super. 585, 595 (App. Div. 2009) (to prevail on a claim for conversion, a plaintiff must prove “the wrongful exercise of dominion and control over property owned by another inconsistent with the owners’ rights. ”); accord with Guerriero v. U-Drive-It Co., 22 N.J. Super. 588, 592 (Cnty. Ct. 1952) (In order for a defendant to implead another as a third-party defendant upon a theory of contribution in a tort case, the other party must be legally liable to the injured person); D. Wolff & Co. v. Lozier, 68 N.J.L. 103, 107 (1902) (A husband was not liable for his wife's default under a contract of lease because he did not purchase the articles and was not a party to any contract for the breach of which a trover action would lie against him); and DuBois, Sheehan, Hamilton & DuBois v. DeLarm, 243 N.J. Super. 175, 183 (App. Div. 1990) (In the absence of an agreement, the income and property of one spouse should not be exposed to satisfy a debt incurred by the other spouse).
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  “It is always possible to find aberrant examples in the law, but we should not craft rules for the needle rather than the haystack in an area like this. ”  *Wallace v. Kato*, 549 U.S. 384, 400 (2007) (J. Stevens, concurring).  The trial court’s dismissal of the Appellant’s State law claims on statute of limitations grounds is unsupported by any State or federal caselaw, court rule, or statute.  By holding that the Appellant’s State law claims accrued when the verdict was announced and not when the judgment of acquittal was entered, the trial court made new law, which then conflicted with well-reasoned and longstanding legal precedent and sound public policy.  For the reasons set forth hereinabove, it is most respectfully submitted that this Court ought properly reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the Complaint as untimely, and in the alternative in failing to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling and thereby permit further amendment of the pleadings, or in the alternative stay this matter pending the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and to otherwise remand the matter to the trial court.
[brief] The city took an easement for its beach dune project as of January 27, 1993, the date of valuation.  The owner's appraiser did not value the taking as of the specific date of taking.  He testified to the continuous increase in the height and width of the dune from the time of taking to trial, such that the amount of severance damages could not be calculated as of the date of taking.  The city moved to bar the testimony as it did not value the taking as of the date of valuation which the trial court denied.  In affirming, former Justice (then Appellate Division Judge) [...] stated:  "Use of the statutory date of taking as the date of valuation must yield to constitutional imperative" [of just compensation].  Here, as in Maffucci, the date of valuation must yield to the constitutional obligation to pay just compensation with respect to the vibrations damage to the house during project construction.
[brief] 1T:30-18 to 30-19.  Simultaneously, [...] and [...], also of [...], stopped Defendant’s vehicle based upon [...]’s observations in the Walmart parking lot which were communicated via police radio by [...].  1T:60-2 to 61-19; 81-2 to 81-3; 81-25 to 82-2.  The Defendant was asked to exit his vehicle, which he complied with, was informed about the nature of the motor vehicle stop and was then asked for consent to search his vehicle which was denied.