ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The trial court correctly considered the settled nature of the claim, Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits, and also preserved the status quo in granting preliminary relief.  With respect to the settled nature of Plaintiff’s claim and the likelihood of success on the merits, the court described the “legal obligations under the Mount Laurel doctrine” as “pretty clear” – and they are (IT53:24-25).  One need only glance at the long line of Supreme Court, Appellate Division, and trial court cases to see that the standards for a builder’s remedy are well-settled and beyond dispute (see, e.g., Mount Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 14, noting that only a municipality that satisfied its Mount Laurel obligations “obtain[s] immunity from a builder’s remedy;” West Windsor, 173 N.J at 563, outlining the “continued need for the builder’s remedy;” In re Twp. of Bordentown, 471 N.J. Super. at 221-22, repeating standards for succeeding in a builder’s remedy case; Allan-Deane, 205 N.J. at 138, describing the remedy as “a device that rewards a plaintiff seeking to construct lower income housing for success in bringing about ordinance compliance through litigation”).
[brief] Defendant claimed that this was not what happened; in fact, [...] and [...] had stayed with him at his aunt’s home the entire time, and then all three went to some house in Piscataway.  (14T:149-3 to 152-24).  When challenged about this inconsistency, defendant switched things around again: now, his friends brought him to his father’s house, where he showered and changed his entire outfit, all three went to his aunt’s home, all three left to go to Piscataway, and then [...] and [...] dropped defendant back off at his aunt’s house.  Then, when defendant realized he did not have his phone – he claimed he left it in the car, to explain why his cell phone had used data in the vicinity of the murder – his aunt met his friends somewhere to transfer him back to the Chrysler.  *Ibid.*  Equally notable, when [...] pled guilty and agreed to testify against defendant, he provided several letters, written by defendant, wherein defendant admitted to shooting [...] because his “PTSD kicked in. ” (10T:27-12 to 31-6, 32-1 to 33-6).  These letters also had defendant’s fingerprints on them.  (12T:100-17 to 20).  The letters asked [...] to calm down, and promised [...] that defendant would admit to his crime and free [...].  (10T:27-12 to 31-6).  **LEGAL ARGUMENT**
[brief] ]  \(^7\) Directive 2021-4 does not apply to these offenses because they do not carry any mandatory minimum terms in the first place, see N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1), and they are not among the enumerated crimes to which N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) applies.  In addition to balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors, a court must also “appl[y] a stricter standard that reflects the serious impact that a parole disqualifier will have on the ‘real time’ served by the defendant. ”  *State v. Kiriakakis*, 235 N.J. 420, 441 (2018) (quoting *State v. Abdullah*, 184 N.J. 497, 509 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  No analysis was conducted here.  The parties and the court mistakenly treated the 4-year parole disqualifier as though it were mandatory, and as discussed more fully in the next subpoint, the court did not discuss its reasons for finding the aggravating factors or the weight it accorded them.  The court also failed to address the real-time consequences of a 4-year parole disqualifier on the then-68-year-old [...].  The prosecutor’s failure to adhere to the requirements of the Directive and the court’s failure to justify the imposition of a 4-year parole disqualifier require a remand for resentencing.
[brief] [...] offered no extrinsic evidence pointing to a latent ambiguity, and the Probate Court cited to none.  The doctrine of probable intent does not give free rein to a court to read ambiguities into otherwise clear documents.  A court may not “conjure up an interpretation or derive a missing testamentary provision out of whole cloth. ”  *Id.* at 158 (quoting *Engle v. Siegel*, 74 N.J. 287, 291 (1977)).  It cannot “write a will the testator did not write.
[brief] (Pa 30-44)  This Court held that [...] “was not given an opportunity to challenge the credibility of the officers through cross-examination, test the admissibility --- 2  Due to the procedural posture of this case, the two sections have been combined for clarity.  3  [...] adopts the State’s transcript convention and adds “Sb” for the State’s merits brief before this Court and “Ma” for the appendix to [...]’s opposition to the State’s motion for leave to appeal. of the video recording, offer his view of what is depicted in the video recording, and raise objections to the trial court’s manipulation of the recording by magnifying its images through ‘zooming in. ’”  Gayden, slip op. at 14 (Pa 43)  This Court therefore vacated the denial of the motion to suppress and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on that motion, further ordering that “[b]ecause the judge who decided defendant’s motion has already engaged in weighing the evidence and rendered an opinion on the credibility of the defendant and officers, the hearing should take place before a different judge.
[brief] The trial court specifically reasoned:  [T]he title itself provides a sufficient summary of the purpose of the ordinance.  An interested person would understand that the Township is adopting an ordinance, and that the Ordinance’s purpose is to adopt a redevelopment plan for certain lands that are specifically identified.  The publication also includes the lot and block, which is not required but provides additional information to the public and informs as to who may have an interest or may be affected by the adoption of the Ordinance.  (Pa60).  It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred in determining that the notice conveyed adequate information about the proposed legislation, particularly as adjudged against the Printing Mart standard of review.  A reasonable inference of fact is that a layperson would not understand that the notice’s generic reference to the adoption of a “redevelopment plan” intended the specific [...] and/or the superseding zoning which made a by-right site plan for a 2,000,000+ square foot warehouse complex with 60-foot high buildings possible.  Another reasonable inference of fact is that a layperson would not associate a series of block and lot numbers with particular properties.  Cf. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62.1 (requiring block and lot numbers and street addresses, common names or other identifiable landmarks).  The trial court’s examination plainly did not incorporate a “generous and hospitable approach. ”  Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746.  Moreover, the trial court did not undertake any review of Counts II or III of [...]’s Complaint at all.  Accordingly, and particularly in light of the extremely indulgent standard of review which applies in the context of a motion brought under R. 4:6-2(e), the Court should reverse the trial court’s decision.
[brief] While the standard for injunctive relief, whether preliminary\(^3\) or permanent\(^4\) has several distinct prongs, the Trial Court’s opinion focused on just --- \(^3\)  When considering a request for preliminary injunctive relief a court must consider: “[1] whether plaintiffs ha[ve] demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on the merits; [2] whether a balancing of the equities and hardships weigh[s] in favor of injunctive relief; [3] whether substantial and irreparable injury [i]s imminent; and [4] whether the entry of injunctive relief [i]s in the public interest.
[brief] In its review of the denial of defendant’s suppression motion, this Court should accord great deference to the motion judge’s factual findings.  *State v. Gonzales*, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016).  They should be upheld “so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  Ibid.; *State v. Gamble*, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014).  Deference is due even where, as here, videotape of the incident is part of the evidentiary hearing.  *State v. S.S.*, 229 N.J. 360, 379-81 (2017); *Elders*, 192 N.J. at 244-45.  Deference should particularly be given to the judge’s finding that [...] was a credible witness.  *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999).  This deference is further due the ultimate decision of the trial judge that consent was given voluntarily, a factual issue that this Court should not reverse unless it concludes the determination to be “clearly erroneous. ”  *State v. King*, 44 N.J. 346, 354 (1965).  In other words, the trial court’s factual findings, including its ultimate factual holding that voluntary consent was lawfully given, “should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken ‘that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.
[brief] The State did not Engage in Misconduct Regarding Defendant’s Homelessness and Poverty.  Defendant, once again, mischaracterizes the record, only this time he asserts the State engaged in misconduct regarding his homelessness and exploited his poverty.  In other words, defendant asserts the State told the jury that defendant committed murder because he was poor.  This argument too, finds no support in this record.  To be sure, the State never elicited any testimony from any witness stating or even suggesting that defendant shot and killed [...] because he was poor and living out of his vehicle.  The State never elicited any testimony, nor did it make any arguments that defendant’s poverty made him "more likely to be violent, dangerous and engage in criminal activity."  (Db 38).  The fact that defendant was living in his vehicle was a necessary fact because the crime was committed from his vehicle.  As such, it was elicited as a circumstance, not as a motive for the crime or to suggest that due to his homelessness, he had a propensity to commit the crime.  His passenger, [...], was a necessary witness because she was his constant companion, his girlfriend, and in the passenger’s seat as a witness when he committed the crime.  Importantly, as angry and accusatory as she was towards defendant in her testimony, she never once commented on their poverty or disparaged defendant for their living situation.  Throughout the entire trial, at no time was defendant “demonized based on his status as a homeless person. ”  (Db 38); See State v. Mathis, 47 N.J. 455, 471 (1966); State v. Stewart, 162 N.J. Super. 96, 100 (App. Div. 1978).  In its summation, the prosecutor properly confined his arguments regarding to the facts and evidence presented at trial.  Mahoney, 188 N.J. at 376; R.B., 183 N.J. at 330; Smith, 167 N.J. at 178.  Like his arguments above regarding the State labeling defendant as a "drug addict," defendant's arguments regarding poverty are a distorted characterization which find no support in this record.  Accordingly, there is no basis for reversal.
[brief] According to the Court, for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the party asserting the bar must show that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the previous proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior action, i.e., there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action; (3) a final judgment on the merits was issued in prior proceeding; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom preclusion is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.  [Id. at 485.]  The Court next explained why collateral estoppel precluded [...]’s malpractice claims, just as they precluded plaintiffs’ claims in this case:  Here, the issues in the two proceedings were identical, whether the Trust Agreement accurately reflected [...]'s intent; second, the issue was actually litigated in the first proceeding because the probate judge heard cross motions for summary judgment after discovery and oral argument by the parties' attorneys; third, a final judgment on the merits was entered because the probate decision was affirmed by the Appellate Division and the Supreme Court denied certification; fourth, the issue was essential to the prior judgment because the ultimate issue the probate judge decided was whether the Trust Agreement accurately reflected [...]'s intent; and fifth, the party against whom the doctrine was asserted was a party to the earlier proceeding, i.e., [...] was a defendant in the probate action.
[brief] On February 20, 2010, in another email, Plaintiff [...] wrote “[f]or steady, the company will not be apart temporarily, it’s good for us, which is your request when we broke up.  I agreed it by considering the overall situation.  In fact, I know, it is risky for me.  The risk is that you operate it by yourself, and you may transfer money to China, so the company could be shuttled down anytime.  Due to anxiety about risk, I list several companies’ balance of 2007 on supplemental agreement in particular. ”  “All my interests after divorce are all built on your integrity…However, all things happened from signing divorce papers last year to your travel to Beijing this year make me uneasy, therefore, I take the measure of buyout.
[brief] On 12/30/16 [...] submitted the alleged Affidavit of Lost Note of 2/12/14 fabricated by [...] (088a).  In that alleged affidavit [...] claimed that it had the Note (091a) in its possession and lost it.  So they claimed the alleged Note was lost and never got to [...].  So [...] was never in possession of the alleged Note.  According to UCC 3-309 and NJSA 12A:3-309  [...] did not have legal standing to file for foreclosure because it was not in possession of the Note when it was lost.  Therefore the Trial Court never had jurisdiction over the Foreclosure Complaint filed against my house by [...] on 5/12/16.
[directive] DATE: December 16, 2021  SUBJECT: Directive  Prioritizing Racial Justice in Civil Enforcement  On my first day as Acting Attorney General, I asked all 17 Divisions of the Department of Law & Public Safety to identify specific ways they could address and alleviate the racial disparities that have long plagued our State.  This Directive supplements that effort by making use of one of the Department’s most powerful tools: its civil enforcement authority.  At least five of our Divisions are empowered to enforce State laws and seek civil remedies for those who fail to comply—Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC), the Division on Civil Rights (DCR), the Division of Consumer Affairs (DCA), the Division of Gaming Enforcement (DGE), and the New Jersey Racing Commission (NJRC) (collectively, “civil enforcement agencies” or “agencies”).  In addition, the Affirmative Civil Enforcement Practice Group within the Division of Law (DOL) provides legal and investigative support to a range of client agencies that wield similar authorities.  Taken together, these Divisions affect a broad swath of life in New Jersey—and provide significant opportunities to promote racial justice across our State.
[brief] “[i]n New Jersey, the same six-year statute of limitations that applies to contractual actions would ordinarily apply to insurance actions.  . . .  However, that period may be shortened by the terms of an insurance contract. ”  Id. at 636.  *(emphasis added)*  *(internal citations omitted). *  In *Morrison v. American Intern. Ins. Co. of America*, 381 N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div. 2005) this Court stated:  [N]otwithstanding the unequal bargaining power between an insurance company and an insured, "[i]f the policy language is clear, the policy should be interpreted as written."  . . .  Where the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, it is not the function of the courts to rewrite the policy "to make a better policy of insurance than the one purchased."  Id. at 538.  *(internal citations omitted). *  In *Katchen v. Government Emples. Ins. Co. (GEICO)*, 457 N.J. Super. 600 (App. Div. 2019), this Court held:
[brief] And there lies the fallacy of Petitioners’ position.  If the 219th Legislature had failed to follow certain statutory requirements pertaining to the enactment of legislation when it passed Chapter 375, it would not mean that Chapter 375 is void.  Rather, it would mean that those prior statutory requirements had been superseded in relevant part by Chapter 375.  In the example described above, the 219th Legislature, exercising its own prerogatives, decided that a different approach for potentially mandating health benefit coverage was warranted under the circumstances extant in 2022.
[brief] (17T 193-8 to 24)  [...] met them in the driveway and called defendant and [...], who were in the main house, and asked them to come outside with their hands up at the request of the police, which they did.  (17T 194-13 to 196-12)  Officers then located [...]’ body lying face down on the porch of the carriage house on the property, and, after handcuffing [...] when he did not respond to orders, another officer -- [...] -- “kicked away” a gun that was lying “near” [...], according to [...].  (17T 201-1 to 205-20)  [...] was not breathing and did not respond to CPR, which was administered by police until medical personnel arrived at 7:46 p.m. (17T 206-22 to 23; 17T 210-10 to 12; 17T 211-4 to 6)  Pelino also testified that he heard defendant say to one of the responding officers, when defendant first came out of the house, “[t]hat a subject might have been shot and that he’s still in the back of the, the house with a firearm. ”  (18T 72-19 to 73-7)  Another officer on the scene, [...], testified that, before police approached [...], he heard defendant say that “there was an intruder in the backyard by the carriage-house porch that was shot and still [was] in possession of a weapon. ”  (18T 30-14 to 16)  [...] secured the gun, plus [...]’ sweatpants, wallet, and phone, and at police headquarters, once defendant was taken there, Gianotto secured defendant’s phone as well, which was then returned to [...] Keogh on January 24, 2019.  (18T 104-20 to 106-16; 18T 108-15 to 18; 18T 136-7 to 137-21)
[brief] The applicability is determined solely based upon when the cause of action accrues.  9 U.S.C. §401 (2)  The definition section of this statute makes this point clear.  §401  “PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION WAIVER-The term predispute arbitration agreement means any agreement to arbitrate that had not yet arisen at the time of the agreement. ”  This statute concludes with the clear statement, “APPLICABILITY.  This Act and amendments made by this act, shall apply with respect to any dispute or claim that arises or accrues on or after the enactment of this Act.
[brief] 1062a  Exhibit 3 - Email from [...] to [...], dated October 9, 2017 .................................................................  1065a  Exhibit 4 - Email from [...] to [...], dated October 11, 2017 ...............................................................  1067a  Exhibit 5 - Email from [...] to [...], dated November 6, 2017 .............................................................  1069a  Exhibit 6 - [...] Standard Operating Procedure Manual For the [...] Semen Collection Center ..............
[brief] Under the plain error standard, we disregard “[a]ny error or omission” by the trial judge “unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result ....”  R. 2:10-2.  To warrant reversal, “[i]n the context of a jury trial, the possibility must be ‘sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached. ’ ”  State v. G.E.P., 243 N.J. 362, 389-90 (2020) (quoting State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997)).  Under that standard, we conclude that even if the judge had erred in admitting [...]'s identification, it was not plain error.
[brief] 2.  Defendant [...] f/k/a [...] is a New Jersey corporation, with a principal business address of [...], and a registered service of process address at [...], [...].  The Main Business Address, as set forth on its New Jersey Entity Status Report from the Division of Revenue, is [...].  [...] was named as a defendant in the action brought by [...] under Docket No. [...], *sub nom.* [...], Inc. (Pa000117-118).
[directive] We add the following.  Although we recognize the evolving nature of the pandemic, we hope to continue to see improvements in the ongoing health crisis.  Vaccinations are underway throughout the State, and prison inmates and staff have been designated a priority and are included in Phase 1A of the State’s vaccination plan.  N.J. Dep’t of Health, N.J. Interim COVID-19 Vaccination Plan, at 36, 39 (Dec. 15, 2020), https://nj.gov/health/legal/ covid19/NJ%20Interim%20COVID-19%20Vaccination%20Plan%20- %20Revised%2012-15-20.pdf.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW.  The standard of review for a summary judgment motion is, “de novo, employing the same standard used by the trial court. ”  Tarabokia v. Structure Tone, 429 N.J. Super. 103, 106 (App.Div.2012) (citing Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998)).  Under this standard, a party against whom a claim is made may move for summary judgment in its favor before the case is tried.  R. 4:46-1.  Pursuant to R. 4:46, a party is entitled to summary judgment where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact . . . and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.
[brief] Id. at 564 (emphasis added).  The court went on to find that there was simply no authority to impose off-site contributions from [...] considering its status as a non-redeveloper.  The ability, though, to collect such funds in the redevelopment context was woven throughout the Court’s conclusion:  However, *apart from the specific authorization in the LRHL* that permits the redevelopment entity to collect funds from a redeveloper, see N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8f, the LRHL does not permit the public body to require contributions to off-site infrastructure costs.  In particular, *the City lacked authority under the LRHL to impose off-site contributions on this plaintiff because of the statutory definition limiting imposition of off-site contributions to redevelopers*.  Because there is no contract or proposed contract between plaintiff and the City, or even between plaintiff and [...], to perform any redevelopment, rehabilitation, or other work, plaintiff is not a redeveloper.  Id. 565–66 (emphasis added).  Here, the lower court recognized that, unlike in *[...]*, Defendant [...] was in fact a redeveloper.
[brief] Id. at 124-25.  Our Supreme Court found that, notwithstanding the risk involved, the “statutory sanction is against ‘operating’ a motor vehicle while intoxicated” and therefore concluded that in addition to starting the engine, “evidence of intent to drive or move the vehicle at the time must appear. ”  Id. at 125.  Defendant attempts to liken the present case to Daly, arguing that his statement that he was on his way to visit a friend in [...] did not prove that he intended “to drive or move the vehicle at that time.
[directive] Determine the . . Medium Large Small Medium Large Small Phase 3 Large Small Phase 4 Large Small Incentive Step 3a.  Choose the Small Medium Large • Verbal praise  Any small and/or:  Any small, medium or: •  Applause • Court pass • Handshake/hug from Judge • Express court • Bus pass • Sobriety coin • Reduce community service • Treats/candy (if available)  • Distribution of recovery literature • Temporary reduction of reporting to • Judge coming off bench to give • Standing ovation  Probation/Court certificate, incentive, etc.
[brief] []  That understanding conforms with the Second Restatement’s instruction that, subject to constitutional restrictions, a court will follow a statutory directive of its own state on [choice-of-law].  . . .  The absence of such a declaration in an enactment implies the Legislature intended application only to conduct or results that occur within the State, and that it did not have an interest in facilitating or preventing developments occurring elsewhere.  *Id.* at 44-45 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  Here, the New Jersey Legislature has not required the application of MBPA to *out-of-state* conduct.