ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] While [...] did ask “whose sneaker?”, the trial court properly determined, based on the testimony of the officers, that the question was not directed to defendant and was instead directed to [...], making defendant’s statement right afterwards a spontaneous statement.  (4T:16-11 to 18).  The trial court then differentiated between times when the detectives were speaking to the defendant, and times where they were not, and excluded the statements that were in response to any direct questions.  (4T:16-19 to 17-15).  The only statements admitted were those that were not in response to any questions.  (4T:16-11 to 17-15).
[brief] It's not a situation where a deadline was missed.  It's not a situation where there was a failure to file a motion timely.  It's not a case where there was a failure to relay a settlement offer, for example.  It's not simply a failure to produce an expert witness in a trial.  It's - it's not that simple.  (Id. at 36:4-23.)  The Court stated as follows concerning its application of the standard set forth in the Couri matter:
[brief] On March 1, 2023 the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss based upon R. 4:5-1.  (Pa0058).  This Motion was filed 832 days after the affirmative defense of the entire controversy doctrine was first raised.  A Notice of Appeal was filed on July 17, 2023 (Pa1411) along with the request for oral argument filed on November 2, 2023 (Pa1415).
[brief] Da60-Da61.  The October 24, 2023 Order disposed of all counts other than Count Three\(^2\), Inverse Condemnation.  Da61.  Plaintiff informed the Court that it did not intend to continue with the remaining counts.  Thus, a final Order closing the matter was entered on February 22, 2024.  Da89.  Defendant [...] filed the within Notice Of Appeal on March 13, 2024.  Da90.  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Pa90 § 1.5(a).  The PTA thus created the general contractor – subcontractor relationship at (for example) the [...], indeed mandating that “[...] and [...] shall enter into a subcontract agreement…utilizing AIA Document A401. ”  Pa90 § 1.5(b).  And the parties did exactly that, entering into the AIA Document A401 [...] Completion Subcontract (signed June 1, 2019), pursuant to the express directives of the PTA, and did so the day after entering into the PTA (May 31, 2019).  Pa595.  In other words, the parties do not get the [...]-as-subcontractor-of-[...] relationship without the dictates of the PTA.  The PTA (and its ancillary agreements) thus formed the entire nexus of the parties’ relationship.  For over ninety years, our courts have established that the ECD requires the mandatory joinder of all claims in a single action.
[brief] [...] testified that, on August 22, 2021, he was seated in a chair in the warehouse of his metal casings business at [...] when two men entered the front door of his business, ran through the foyer and office space into his warehouse, and struck him with baseball bats.  (9T 85-8 to 11, 87-24 to 88-1)  [...] said one of the two men, wearing a white and green track suit, reached into his front pant pocket and took his cash, which amounted to $1,800.  (9T 91-16 to 19)  [...] acknowledged, however, that he initially told officers that he had “answer[ed] the door and got jumped. ”  (9T 138-7 to 139-16)  [...] also testified that the second individual had “a dark clothing hoodie sweatshirt on” but admitted he had never given a description of the second suspect to the police.  (9T 89-21 to 23, 115-10 to 13)  Law enforcement did not recover any stolen items nor any forensic or physical evidence tying [...] to the scene.  Police recovered only a single bat that had no identifiable fingerprints.  (7T 107-13 to 17, 108-9 to 19)  [...] testified that he could have identified the individuals involved, but officers never presented him with a photo array and no identification was made.  (9T  Additionally, the State conceded that two of [...]’s statements from the day of the incident—his initial 911 call and a statement made at the hospital that afternoon—were not preserved for the defense’s review.  (7T 8-10 to 12; 9T 171-13 to 19)  [...] was assigned to lead the investigation.
[brief] The co-plaintiffs, [...] and its excess liability insurer, [...], jointly filed a complaint against [...], [...], [...] and [...] on April 8, 2019. \(^1\)  The complaint sought a declaratory judgment regarding [...]’s right to insurance coverage from [...] for the underlying lawsuit, filed by an injured worker on a construction project.  Plaintiffs also alleged claims of breach of contract and promissory estoppel against [...], and asserted professional liability, promissory estoppel and negligent misrepresentation claims against [...].
[brief] 1.  [...], P.E.  Plaintiff’s expert, [...], testified that compliance with the plans and specifications falls under what he would consider professional engineering.  “The part of the contract that deals with the compliance with the plans and specifications falls under what I would consider professional engineering”.  (Pa2232)  (T48:10-18)  [...] was not familiar with the fact that the New Jersey Administrative Code defines engineering as including “the administration of construction for the purpose of determining compliance with the drawings and specifications” (Pa2242)(T58:7-14)  See also N.J.A.C. 13:40-1.8.  [...] saw nothing in the contract or documents that indicated that [...] and [...] were hired for anything other than “professional services” (Pa2243) (T59:21-24)  [...] acknowledged that [...] was a professional engineer.(Pa2228-2229)(T44:24-T45:1)
[directive] The department’s record keeping system shall document the following information: (a) the date and time of access; (b) the specific BWC recording(s) that was/were accessed; (c) the officer or civilian employee who accessed the stored BWC recording; (d) the person who approved access, where applicable; and (e) the reason(s) for access, specifying the purpose or purposes for access authorized pursuant to Section 10.1, and specifying the relevant case/investigation number, where applicable.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  ...............................................................................................5  LEGAL ARGUMENT .....................................................................................................10  POINT I BECAUSE THE OFFICERS’ INVESTIGATORY STOP VIOLATED PEARSON’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, THE FRUITS OF THE ILLEGAL STOP MUST BE SUPPRESSED.  (2T 64-2 to 82-7; Da 12)  ..............................................10  A.  The stop was illegal because officers had no reason to suspect [...] of criminal activity.  .........................11  B.  The fruits of the illegal stop were not attenuated and must be suppressed ...........................................  14  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................24  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, RULINGS, & ORDERS BEING APPEALED
[brief] At the close of the third day of trial, following the completion of the direct examination of [...] in which she made in-court identifications of both defendants, [...]'s counsel advised the trial court—outside the presence of the jury—of the following:  Judge, we have a problem.  Apparently, for whatever reason, one of the sequestered witnesses, the last witness who testified, was brought into the courtroom before the defendants arrived.  She was then allowed to observe the defendants manacled and being led to their seats.  *4  [...]'s defense counsel announced his intention to cross-examine [...] about her observations to demonstrate the suggestiveness and lack of reliability of her in-court identification of his client.
[brief] [...] claimed (in opposing Rule 4:50 relief) that [...] was this attorney who’d represented [...] with regard to the Mid-Marriage Agreement and reviewed the agreements with her (19T38:18-41:25; 21T117:11-25; 15T72:18-73:22).  But [...] told [...] in her testimony below that she did none of that.  She practiced “very little” family law, in fact, and never represented [...] in connection with the Mid-Marriage Agreement, Powers of Attorney, or any other such issues (representing [...] only on an unrelated, non-matrimonial matter).
[brief] This is contrary to the “fact-intensive” inquiry that *Wollen* requires for the review of any website agreement.  Moreover, *Wollen* analyzed whether the website required users to affirmatively open and review the hyperlinked terms precisely because the website did not provide prominent notice of those terms.  *See id.* at 489, 502.  The context is vastly different in *Racioppi*, *Vercammen*, and here, where the websites give prominent notice of hyperlinked terms without any need to scroll.  **D.
[brief] (4/16/15 version at TRVa516 and ZURa212; 9/8/14 version at ZURa261.)  That includes [...].  The CCIP Manual also provides requirements for such “nonparticipating subcontractors” before starting work, including, as [...] did, providing “the Program Administrator [] the insurance certificate(s) and endorsement(s) as required[.]” (4/16/15 version at TRVa516; and 9/8/14 version at ZURa261.)
[brief] See N.J.A.C. 7:50-1.1 to -7:50-10.35.  The [...] designated local governments as the “principal management entities” of the Comprehensive Management Plan.  N.J.A.C. 7:50-3.1 (a).  “The Legislature did not intend to withdraw all local review whether the municipality is located in a certified or uncertified region. ”  Fine v. Galloway Township Committee, 190 N.J. Super. 432, 441 (Law Div. 1983).
[brief] Retaliation and Hostile Work Environment  Faced by Appellant  Appellant began experiencing retaliation after she made these complaints, while she was still a full-time employee.  See Plaintiff/Appellant’s deposition transcript, Appx 394 at 45:23 to Appx 395 at 46:2.  Appellant described the retaliation as her hours being cut, being tossed around from separate group homes, and a hostile environment when she was at work.  Id. at 46:3-20.  Appellant testified that the hostility interfered with her ability to do her job.  Id. at 46:25 to Appx 396 at 47:2.  Appellant testified that job duties were taken away from her, and she was left with undesirable job duties and responsibilities.  Id. at 47:3 – 8.  Appellant further testified that her colleagues would not work with her, and avoided her even when she was performing job duties that required more than one person.  Id. at 47:9-23.  Appellant testified that nobody wanted to work with her.  See Appx 403 at 57:13-17.  Appellant believed all of this was happening because of her complaints about abuse and neglect.  See Appx 397 at 48:12-15.  Appellant testified that prior to these complaints, she did not face any hostility at work.  *Id.* at 48:16-19.  Appellant testified that she was not permitted to get shifts at [...], even though a co-worker told her that shifts were available.  *Id.* at 48:20 to Appx 398 at 49:15.  Prior to making complaints, Appellant never had problems getting shifts and was actually flagged in the system because of how much overtime and hours she worked.  *Id.* at 49:16-21.  Appellant testified that after she made the complaints, she stopped having overtime opportunities at other homes.  This took place when she was still a full-time employee.  See Appx 411 at 99:10 to 20.  Appellant’s overtime opportunities stopped after she complained to [...] and [...].  *Id.* at 99:21-25.  When this changed, Appellant considered it retaliation for her complaints.  See Appx 398 at 49:22 to Appx 399 at 50:2.  The retaliation Appellant faced impacted her decision to drop to per diem from part time, and she would have stayed full time if she was not facing retaliation.  See Appx 398 at 49:25 to Appx 399 at 50:5.  Appellant felt the retaliation materially changed the job and led to her enjoying her job less.  *Id.* at 50:6-11.  The situation became so bad that on January 16, 2020 Appellant needed to go to the emergency room for anxiety.  See Appellant’s Medical Records, Appx 476 to Appx 494; see also Appellant’s answers to interrogatories at Appx 420 (answer to interrogatory no. 4).
[directive] Prepared by Court Law Division - Select County - County Division  Case Number: State of New Jersey v. Civil Action (defendant/juvenile name)  Order for Judgment that on this day of , 20 , pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.2 the Clerk of the Superior Ordered Court shall record a money judgment in the amount of $ in favor of the creditor against the debtor (listed below) in the Civil Judgment and Order Docket.
[brief] The wheelchair was situated in a narrow room that was cramped with furniture.  Id., at 1.  [...], another police officer and two EMTS worked together to move the man from the wheelchair to a stretcher.  The design of the wheelchair and the man’s need for immediate medical attention made it impossible to slide him from the wheelchair onto the stretcher.  The crew determined that the man had to be lifted over the wheelchair’s arm and carried to the stretcher.  [...] helped the crew lift the patient and bring him to the stretcher, and was injured in the process.  Id., at 1-2.  [...]’ application for AD was referred to an ALJ for a hearing.  The ALJ’s initial decision recommended that [...]’ application be denied because [...]’ injuries were not the result of an undesigned and unexpected event, but were incurred when he was performing an ordinary and expected aspect of his employment: lifting a patient in need of emergency medical care.
[brief] A purchaser in a voluntary transaction would rarely pay the price the property would be worth if the amendment were an accomplished fact.  No matter how probable an amendment may seem, an element of uncertainty remains and has its impact on the selling price.  At most a buyer would pay a premium for that probability in addition to what the property is worth under the restrictions of the existing ordinance . . . if the parties to a voluntary transaction would as of the date of taking give recognition to the probability of a zoning amendment in agreeing upon the value, the law will recognize the truth.  Hilton, supra at 591, quoting Gorga, supra at 117.
[brief] Sections 30 and 31 of this bill amend R.S. 40:49-2 and R.S. 40:49-18 to permit the proposed municipal ordinances by title, rather than in its entirety.  The bill further provides that if the publication of the ordinance is by title, the publication must contain a clear and concise statement setting forth the purpose of the ordinance and a notice of the time and place when and where copies of the proposed ordinance may be obtained by the public.  The purpose of these sections is to reduce the costs associated with the publication of municipal ordinances.  Significantly, the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee noted in its Statement on the then proposed legislation:
[brief] ” event, the Department’s conduct failed to provide notice of the supposed reach of the Holding Company Act.  Estate of Skorski v. [...], No. A-3314-17T2, 2019 WL 1304010, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 20, 2019) (internal citations and quotations omitted).  The Court in Skorski stated:  These procedures require agencies to, among other things, publish notice of the proposed rule in the New Jersey Register, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a)(1), ‘afford all interested persons a reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, comments, or arguments, orally or in writing,’ N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a)(3), and ‘[p]repare for public distribution…a report listing all parties offering written or oral submissions concerning the rule, summarizing the content of the submissions and providing the agency’s response to the data, views, comments, and arguments contained in the submissions,’ N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(a)(4).  Estate of Skorski v. [...], No. A-3314-17T2, 2019 WL 1304010, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 20, 2019) (internal citations and quotations omitted).  The Bulletin was a substantial departure from fifty years of regulation, constituted de facto rulemaking and should not be given deference because due process was ignored.
[brief] ”  *Szczesny v. Vasquez*, 71 N.J. Super. 347, 354 (App. Div. 1962).  The “presumption is rebuttable and may be overcome by evidence that the notice was never in fact received. ”  *Id.*  “[H]aving a receipt from the Post Office demonstrating that [the mailing party] sent the document by certified mail . . . [is] prima facie evidence that the document was delivered. ”  *Scotty Pine, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation*, 2017 N.J. Tax Unpub. LEXIS 21, *14 (Tax Ct. March 30, 2017).
[brief] The standard of “deference is in recognition that the admissibility of extrinsic evidence of other crimes or wrongs is best determined by the trial judge with more intimate knowledge of the case who is therefore in the best position to weigh the probative value versus potential prejudice of the proffered evidence.  State v. Castagna, 400 N.J. Super. 164, 182-83 (App. Div. 2008).  On appeal, the State first complains that “the trial judge abused his discretion in finding that the two thefts were not similar in kind and close in time. ”  (Sb14)  Even if the State were correct in this contention, the Supreme Court has made clear that the second-prong test should be limited to Cofield-type situations and need not be given “universal application. ”  State v. Williams, 190 N.J. 114, 131-134 (2007).  Prong two—similarity—is the least weighty prong of Cofield and is rarely dispositive.
[directive] SAFE Kit Labels  Image 1: NJ SAFE Kit Label  According to responses from FNEs, the physical SAFE kits purchased have standardized information recorded on each kit.  SAFE kit vendors include labels on each kit.  The label provides all kits with a standardized location for FNEs and law enforcement to record information including: subject name, gender, exam number, collection date, examiner name, collection location, kit sealed by, as well as a section for chain of custody.  Upon collecting kits, FNEs complete the label on the front of the kit, helping to ensure the kit is identifiable.  11 | P a g e Forensic Medical Examination Case Log  Should the label not be completed or become illegible, all FNEs indicated the presence of a separate log of information on SAFE kits.  Specifically, 80.95% of FNEs indicated this is an electronic log and 19.05% indicated a manual log or filing system.  While some county variation was evident in responses, most FNEs recorded similar information on the case log.  Most frequently, these logs include information such as date, case number, patient’s location,20 information/comments,21 name/demographic information, SART/FNE name, site kit information/documents,22 type of assault/examination, case and investigation information/disposition,23 and this is consistent in all counties.  Survey
[brief] As set forth above and in the Borough’s Appellate brief (Db23-25), the Borough’s participation in the [...] is through its local Boards of Health, under the authority of N.J.S.A. 26:3-84, wherein a regional health commission was formed and local Boards of Health join.  The Borough did not relinquish its ability to enact noise regulating ordinances because of The Local Health Services Act, which does not mention noise at all, but is rather a general law to ensure municipalities meet a “program of health services meeting the ‘standards of performance’, as determined by the Commissioner” of Health.  N.J.S.A. 26:3A2-10.
[brief] Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause on July 21, 2023 seeking a declaration that the MOU was an enforceable agreement and directing the Appellants to cooperate in furnishing the ancillary documents contemplated thereunder.  (Da19-26).  The relief sought was granted by Order dated September 15, 2023, which stated:  It is hereby ORDERED:  1.  That the March 13 [sic], 2023 Memorandum of Understanding between the parties is an enforceable agreement and directing Defendants to specifically perform their obligations under the March 13 [sic], 2023 Memorandum of Understanding.  [(Da7-8). ]  In the September 15th argument that resulted in the above-referenced Order, defense counsel sought to argue that enforcement of the MOU merely triggered the beginning of a new negotiation of terms and that there was no timeframe required to get that done.  1T 35:4-13; 37:24-25; 45:10-14.  Appellants argued further that there could be no agreement without an indemnification provision, despite no such provision in the MOU.  1T 35:16-20; 46:2-15.  The trial court emphatically rejected that suggestion, stating:  It doesn’t say that now we are going to engage in a new round of negotiations leading to a possible understanding.  [1T 84:17-19.]  Despite the trial court’s order, Appellants refused to comply with the terms of the MOU.  Plaintiff moved for an order compelling an assignment of interest pursuant to the MOU on October 16, 2023.  The trial court granted Plaintiff’s motion on November 27, 2023, compelling Appellants to execute an assignment of interest conveying Appellants’ interest in [...] to Plaintiff in the form provided by Plaintiff.  (Da9-11).  Appellants finally executed the assignment of interest on December 6, 2023.  Appellants then moved for a stay pending appeal on December 20, 2023, which was denied by the trial court on January 11, 2024.  (Da 12-13).  Finally, the trial court entered an order and opinion on February 5, 2024, awarding Plaintiff attorneys’ fees pursuant to the express language of the MOU.  (Da14).  Appellants explicitly informed the trial court that they would not oppose the application for fees, despite its disagreement with the court’s prior orders enforcing the MOU and later compelling the assignment of interest.  (Da125).  Despite choosing not to oppose the fee application, Appellants now seek a reversal of the fee award as well as a reversal of the court’s rulings and orders enforcing the MOU.  For the reasons that follow, this Court should affirm the decisions of the trial court and enforce the MOU as written.
[directive] October on operational become shall subsection This Charging Prosecutor County of Extension Indefinite and Evaluation, Expiration, 3.3.5 Directive. are decisions charging enforcement law that ensure to planning and fiscal promote To to pursuant Prosecutor County a by issued directive any Directive, with this accordance in made year fiscal Prosecutor's next the of start the at or months, six after expire shall 3.3.1 subsection the that order may Prosecutor County  The later. is whichever 2017, 1, January following initial the of conclusion the at that provided indefinitely effect and force in remain directive evaluates Prosecutor year), the fiscal next of the start the or months, six period (i.e., operational the thereon to report a submits and directive, the with compliance of implementation and the County a limit to construed shall be herein Nothing Justice.  Criminal of Division the of Director any at 3.3.1 subsection to pursuant issued directive a or revise terminate to authority Prosecutor's time.
[brief] Pertinent Background on [...]**  Ms. [...] is the wife of Co-Appellant [...].  T3 24:13-14.  Ms. Milov has resided at the real property located at [...] for over twenty years.  T3 24:2-4.  Ms. Milov is a female and was 46 years old when she testified at trial on 3/29/2023.  T3 40:3-4.  She stands at five feet and seven inches tall and weighs 160 pounds.  T3 24:5-8.  Photographs of Ms. Milov confirm she is a Caucasian female who had brown hair on or around 8/23/2021.  0215a.  III.
[brief] The Consent Order required that [...] conduct further investigation on twenty of the original forty-six Areas of Concern (“AOCs”), some of which were reclassified or consolidated, resulting in a total of fifteen AOCs requiring further investigation.  (Pa0365.)  The investigations ultimately revealed that the constituents of concern at the Site include CVOCs, radionuclides, cadmium and PCBs.  The CVOCs had contaminated the groundwater and moved offsite, and the other contaminants appear in concentrations of environmental concern only in soils and sediments.  The predominant constituents of the CVOC plume are PCE (“perc”) and TCA, and TCE also is present in the groundwater as a degradation product of perc.  (Pa0094.)  A range of dates when operations occurred at the various AOCs is known and detailed below.