ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Attachment 7  Order #6A - Order Discharging the Defendant Pretrial Release from the Care and Custody on of the Commissioner of Health (Defendant not Detained)  Order #6A - Order Discharging the Defendant  Pretrial Release from the Care on of and Custody the Commissioner of Health (Defendant not Detained)  Orders #6A and #6B are to used where a defendant has been placed the care of be in the Commissioner of the Department of Health now deemed competent to proceed.  is and Order #6A may used where there has been a previous determination that the be defendant may released to the community.  such cases where there detainer be is no In for a defendant a psychiatric hospital, the order would be used to discharge him/her in from the hospital under the previous competency order.  --------------  Attorney Name ----------- NJ Attorney ID Number ----------------- Address -------------  Telephone Number Attorney for --------------- of Superior Court  New Jersey Law Division Criminal Part - _______ of State  New Jersey County Plaintiff, Indictment Number: -------- V, Criminal Action  Defendant.
[brief] [...] and [...], as Husband and Wife  And Individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Respondents vs. [...] and [...], Defendants-Respondents, (For continuation of Caption see next page)  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE LAW  DIVISION  PASSAIC COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]  Sat Below: HON. [...], J.S.C. HON.  [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT-CROSS-APPELLANT [...] d/b/a [...]  [...] [...]  Phone: [...]/  Fax [...]  Attorney for Defendant-Respondent- Cross-Appellant Real Estate Consultants, LLC d/b/a Realty Executives  On the brief [...]  Attorney ID 017251979  [...]  Date submitted: January 26, 2024
[brief] Defendants filed their 2023 motion for reconsideration in response to a December 15, 2023 email from the Honorable [...], P.J. Cv.'s Law Clerk requesting sur reply briefs for Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended complaint.  (Pa738).  In this email, the Court requested "further briefing on R. 1:36-3 and whether it applies to this matter."  Ibid.  The Trial Court also requested the parties to brief the overarching goal of the M.S.R.A. and "the application or non-application of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the single controversy doctrine."  Ibid.  In their brief in support of their motion for reconsideration, Defendants first argued that the Complaint should be dismissed because the Superior Officers --- 4 Pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2), Plaintiffs have submitted a supplemental appendix with briefs the parties filed with the Trial Court because Defendants raised the question of whether an issue was raised in the Trial Court. decision should be given preclusive effect on Plaintiffs claims.
[brief] LETTER IN LIEU OF BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Re: State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Appellant) v. [...], (Defendant-Respondent)  Ind. No.: [...]  State’s Letter-Brief  Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division, Hudson County  Sat  Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Honorable Judges: Pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b) and R. 2:8-1(a), this letter in lieu of formal brief and appendix is submitted on behalf of the State.
[directive] (only complete if the offense occurred on or after February 1, 2018)  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(iii) or leader of a N.J.S.A. child pornography network pursuant to 2C:24-4.1, or an attempt to N.J.S.A. commit either of these offenses and the offense occurred on or after February 1, 2018, in addition to any other sentence, and upon motion of the prosecutor, the court shall impose a special sentence of parole supervision of life, unless the court finds on the record that parole supervision for life is not needed to protect the community or deter you from future criminal activity?
[brief] (5T21-12 to 24; 5T117-2 to 21).  [...] had the word “ambitious” tattooed on the back of his right forearm.  (6T137-1 to 6).  That same day, [...] went back to the area of the shooting, where he usually hung out, and found [...]’s tooth on the street.4 (5T119-17 to 24; 5T120-3 to 9).  --- 4  [...], who attended [...]’s autopsy, testified that [...]’s front right tooth was missing.  (9T49-12 to 20; 9T53-15 to 21).  On the night of the shooting, [...] was living at [...] on the third floor of a three-story building, two doors down from the [...].
[brief] (088a.)  Likewise, the Board noted a number of other “concerns” such as possible litigation over the site and the supposed “speculative” nature of the project, all of which are immaterial, unconvincing, and not germane to the underlying question of the Board’s decision to deny the application for approval.  This project was not displacing any other construction or restricting the ability of any other developer to seek similar approval, so the concerns with ownership and constructability, mentioned as throw-ways, are not the foundation for denial.
[brief] Hearing Testimony Concerning Traffic Control Coordinator Specification  On cross-examination, [...] was again questioned regarding the standard specification issued by the NJDOT for Road and Bridge Construction (Pa1859).  The specification is titled “159.03.01 Traffic Control Coordinator”.  (3T198:13-199:3).  [...] agreed that the document was produced following the initial day of his deposition in support of his opinion that [...], as the resident engineer for the road widening project, was obligated to proactively look for the type of pre-existing condition that allegedly caused plaintiff’s accident.  (3T191:16-22; 193:4-17; and 98:13-99:3).  [...] agreed that the standard specification is directed to the project general contractor rather than the resident engineer as the general contractor and not the resident engineer is responsible for assigning the TCC.  (3T200:24-201:11).  As per [...] it is the resident engineer’s responsibility to make sure that a TCC is assigned and performs his job correctly.  (3T201:12-18).  [...], however, was unable to identify any provision within the NJDOT standard specification that [...], as the resident engineer, failed to satisfy related the general contractor’s compliance.  (3T202:3-209:19).  [...] was then questioned about requirement No. 9 within the specification, which he identified as having particular relevance to his opinion during his deposition.  That requirement for the general contractor provides as follows:  Ensuring that excavation and lateral drop-offs greater than 2 inches in depth are eliminated or protected by barrier or emergency escape ramps during non-working periods.  (3T209:22-210:9) (underline added).  On cross-examination, [...] conceded that the subject settlement that caused plaintiff’s accident was not longitudinal (a lateral drop-off) as included within requirement No. 9 but was rather transverse or perpendicular to the direction of travel.  (3T210:13-211:24).  With further regard to requirement No. 9, [...] conceded that he is unaware of any support for the position that the roadway condition at issue involved a settlement of greater than 2 inches.  (3T211:25-212:12).  The Absence of Hearing Testimony Concerning the Deposition Testimony of [...] Engineer [...], P.E.
[brief] N.J.R.E. 201(b)(1) .................................................................................. 4 N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1) .................................................................................. 5, 6 N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) ..................................................................................  12 N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 .................................................................................. 4, 10 N.J.S.A. 12A:2-725 ................................................................................  10 R. 4:5-4 .................................................................................................  14 R. 4:17-7 .................................................................................................
[brief] All parties involved need to know there are consequences for distributing drugs and engaging in such dangerous and life-altering conduct.  See State v. Cancel, 256 N.J. Super. 430, 437 (App. Div. 1992) (noting deterrence factor for people who commit serious drug offenses “is obvious” because these offenders “must be impressed that they will pay a high price for what may seem like easy money. ”)  And [...]’s belief that the circumstances of defendant possessing over 113 grams of cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, and oxycodone in his vehicle in the middle of a public parking lot were “unlikely to reoccur”—despite the fact that this was defendant’s third conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and defendant admitted to “selling heroin to supplement his primacy occupation as a forklift operator”—does not invalidate her finding that defendant nonetheless needed to be reminded and deterred from putting himself in a similar situation again.  (PSR5).  Indeed, defendant was fortunate the judge determined these, or any, mitigating factors applied at all.  Moreover, [...] gave great weight to the two mitigating factors she found applicable and determined they outweighed the two aggravating factors.
[brief] ¹  **4a.**  Indictment No. [...] charged [...] in Count 1 with first degree murder in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1)(2); in Count 2 with possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a, a crime of the second degree; in Count 3 with unlawful possession of a weapon, a crime of the second degree in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4; and, in Count 7, with possession of a weapon by a convicted person in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b, a crime of the second degree.  Counts three, four, five and six pertained to [...]’ co-defendant, [...].  ¹  Error in the Grand Jury proceedings dated February 8, 2017 came to light during the trial and is the subject of Appellant’s argument at Point Heading VI (not raised below).  GJT is included as an exhibit to Appellant’s Brief and Appendix.  On August 16, 2017, a superseding indictment was returned against [...] which charged him again with the murder of [...], but also charged him with the additional murder of [...].
[brief] Robbinsville Township Ordinance §142-77 .................................................. 11, 13  Robbinsville Township Ordinance §142-77(B)(26)(f) ......................4, 11, 14, 21  Treatises *Cox & Koenig*, *New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration*, § 18-3.2, at 376 (2022) ................................................................. 16, 20  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[directive] See 4.8 and charged by and had been arrested under It is shall treated as an adult this Directive). court be to adult waived 2.2.1 juvenile (a waiver seriousness involuntary (e.g., the nature and justifying an circumstances that the expected often will invoke of any prior history of delinquency) extent nature and and/or the of charges the pretrial detention. seek Directive to under this presumption a Records. Expunged 7.6.6 presumption seeking whether overcome the against determining to in prosecutor, A of totality consider expunged records as part the Section 7.2, may to pursuant pretrial detention of prior arrests or 2C:52-21 ("expunged records . . . N.J.S.A. See circumstances. relevant of Probation of the county prosecutor, the Division any court, provided to shall be convictions requested or Attorney General when same are agency, the pretrial services Court, the Superior sections pretrial release determination pursuant to bail hearing, [or] with conjunction a in for use Bail Reform Law]"). 2014, 31 [the P.L. c. 11 of 1 through Re-Opening Detention Hearin. Seek Detention and Decision to Re-Considering 7.7 seek pretrial detention based on reconsider the decision to time at any prosecutor may A known to the Directive and that was not pursuant to this relevant would be information that Furthermore, if seek pretrial detention. decision was made not to initial time an prosecutor at the re-open detention, the prosecutor may seek to motion for pretrial prosecutor's a court denies the material of the initial hearing that has a known at the time information not on based hearing the 2A:162-19(x. N.J.S.A. detention issue.
[brief] State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1 (1990), the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that a prior uncounseled DWI conviction could not be used to enhance the incarceration penalties for a subsequent DWI offense if the Defendant did not have counsel and was not advised of his right to a public defender.  Rule 7:10-2(g)(2) sets forth that a petition to obtain relief from an enhanced custodial term based on a prior conviction “may be filed at any time. ”  Thus, the within legal argument underpinning this Point Heading is timely.
[brief] Both towns now not only have failed to show how they will meet the needs for affordable housing in their own borders, but also seek, in the 11th hour, to block their much larger neighbor with a far larger obligation, which has moved forward with constitutional compliance to actually construct affordable housing.  The court should reject the Appellants’ attempts to create a novel and extensive process to stop affordable homes from being built through unprecedented action to stop the unremarkable use of a PILOT to effectuate a long-planned redevelopment.
[brief] For years, Appellants had maintained a policy—consistent with guidance the [...] issued in 2018—to ensure a nondiscriminatory, safe, and supportive environment for all students, including all transgender students.  But on June 20, 2023, they changed course.  They adopted, for the first time, a blanket policy that required school personnel to affirmatively inform the parents of transgender, gender non-conforming, or non-binary students about the child’s gender identity.  Because the policy discriminated on the basis of gender identity or expression, the [...] and Director of the [...] (“[...]”) (together, “the State”), filed an administrative complaint before [...] the very next day alleging multiple LAD violations.  And they sought relief in the Superior Court to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the policy—and thus maintain the status quo—pending resolution of that administrative action.  [...] did not abuse his discretion in maintaining the status quo while [...] resolves the administrative proceeding.
[brief] As this matter involves an agency action, the relevant standard is found at N.J.A.C. 1:1-16.1, which permits intervention to a person or entity “who has a statutory right to intervene or who will be substantially, specifically and directly affected by the outcome of a contested case, may on motion, seek leave to intervene. ”  See also Gill v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking & Ins., 404 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div. 2008) (“Because, however, the complaint was instituted with the agency, the court rules bearing on the right to intervene are not applicable, and the decision to grant intervenor status in an agency proceeding lies in the agency’s discretion.
[brief] In summation, the prosecutor properly outlined the evidence presented and made appropriate arguments based on that evidence, including defendant’s use – and abuse – of Adderall mixed with his daily use of marijuana.  This argument was especially proper when taken in context with defense counsel’s argument to the jury accusing [...] of being the drug-addicted, violent shooter.  Defense counsel began with warning the jury not to let the State shift the burden of proof to the defense and then went on to say:  The burden is theirs to prove that it wasn’t [...] and you all saw [...] testify.  She was hostile.  She was antagonistic.  She was angry.  She has a history of violence.  She has a history of drug abuse.  She has a history of acting out violently.  She has a history of having violent ideas and wanting to hurt people that were irritating her which made me glad that the Plexiglas shield was between us when I handed her the papers that she denied knowing about, she snatched them out of my hand.
[brief] 23  ## Table of Authorities ### Cases | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | A.T. v. Cohen, 231 N.J. 337 (2017) | 17 | | Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218 (1998) | 14 | | Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J. 411 (2006) | 8 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 5 | | Cnty. of Hudson v. State, Dep't of Corr., 208 N.J. 1 (2011) | 13 | | Corcoran v. St. Peter's Med. Ctr., 339 N.J. Super. 337 (App. Div. 2001)| 16 | | Elazar v. Macrietta Cleaners, Inc., 230 N.J. 123 (2017) | 4 | | Estate of Chin v. St. Barnabas Med. Ctr., 160 N.J. 454 (1999) | 6, 7 | | Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Associates, 178 N.J. 144 (2003) | 16, 19| | Ford Motor Credit Co., LLC v. Mendola, 427 N.J. Super. 226 (App. Div. 2012)| 7 | | Gardner v. Pawliw, 150 N.J. 359 (1997) | 6 | | Gluckauf v. Pine Lake Beach Club, Inc., 78 N.J. Super. 8 (App. Div. 1963)| 6 | | H.C. Equities, LP v. Cnty. of Union, 247 N.J. 366 (2021) | 16 | | Henderson v. Herman, 373 N.J. Super. 625 (App. Div. 2004) | 13 | | Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426 (1993) | 6 | | Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387 (2001) | 7 | | L.A. v. New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 217 N.J. 311 (2014) | 6 | | Lameiro v. W. N.Y. Bd. of Educ., 136 N.J. Super. 585 (Law Div. 1975) | 13 | | Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128 (App. Div. 2021) | 20 | | Leitner v. Toms River Reg'l Schs., 392 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 2007)| 17 | | Medina v. Pitta, 442 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2015) | 20 | | Montiel v. Ingersoll et al., 347 N.J. Super. 246 (Law Div. 2001) | 9 | | Negron v. Llarena, 156 N.J. 296 (1998) | 14 | | O'Donnell v. Ahmed, 363 N.J. Super. 44 (Law Div. 2003) | 10 | | Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J. 398 (2001) | 7 | | Ponden v. Ponden, 374 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2004) | 9 | | Rivers v. LSC Partnership, 378 N.J. Super. 68 (App. Div. 2005) | 8, 10| Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128 (1961)
[brief] Q: And you didn’t describe any vehicles that you would be renting for camp operations, correct?  * * *  A: I did not assume that that paragraph was referring to rentals.  You’re saying rentals.  Q: What do you mean you did not assume that paragraph referred to rentals, sir?  A: It states “Do you hire?”  I was under the assumption the hiring – I don’t hire vans as a driving service, so the answer to that was no.  Q: Sir, what was your understanding of the purpose of filling out this application?  A: That I am – the fact that I’m renting vans and I would like to get insurance on it for people that are going to be driving my rented vehicles.  (Ia337-338) (emphasis added).  Giving that the concept of “hiring” a vehicle has changed over the last 20 years with the advent of Uber and Lyft, “hiring” a vehicle can mean getting a car service to drive the campers, which is what [...] could have reasonably thought when answering the question.
[brief] State of New Jersey v. [...]  Plaintiff  Defendant Case Type: Criminal County/Agency: [...] Trial Court/Agency  Docket No: [...]  Trial Court Judge/Agency Name: [...], J.S.C.  Dear Judges:  Pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b), please accept this letter reply brief in support of my appeal in this matter.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..............................................  1 STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................  1  POINT 1 .......................................................................  1  SEVERANCE OF INVALID PENALTY  PROVISION DOES NOT ALTER MANDATED REVERSAL AS CONVICTIONS CANNOT STAND WITHOUT A PENALTY AND MUST BE REVERSED (raised below DA 6A, 7A)  POINT 2 .......................................................................  2  RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL’S SELF SERVING STATEMENTS AS TO THE INTENT OF CHAPTER 44 OF THE EAST HANOVER CODE AND RESPONDENT’S REFERENCE TO AN AUDIT WHICH IS NOT IN EVIDENCE  DO NOT ALTER THE UNAMBIGUOUS SUNSET LANGUAGE OF CHAPTER 44.  (Raised below DA 6A)  POINT  3 .......................................................................  4  RESPONDENT CANNOT RELY ON LANGUAGE OF 201-2B TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF 201-2A  THE LANGUAGE OF WHICH HAS BEEN DECLARED VOID FOR VAGUENESS.  (Raised below DA 7A)  CONCLUSION
[brief] See also Terminal Constr. Corp. v. Bergen County Hackensack River Sanitary Sewer Dist. Auth., 18 N.J. 294, 339 (1955); Spedick v. Murphy, 266 N.J. Super. 573, 593 (App. Div. 1986), *certif. denied*, (holding that appellant could not object to admission of doctors' testimony where court and counsel all agreed that doctors could testify).  The rationale is not far removed from that underlying the doctrine of waiver, in that counsel has deprived the court of the opportunity to make a correct ruling and the adversary of the ability to meet the objection.  See *United States v. General Motors Corp.*, 226 F.2d 745, 750 (3d Cir. 1955); *Vartenissian v. Food Haulers, Inc.*, 193 N.J. Super. 603, 610 (App. Div. 1984).  Defendant consented to the manner in which the remand proceedings took place and during the course of those remand proceedings never raised an objection the proceedings amounted to an impermissible continuation of the 2017 trial.  Moreover, Defendant fails to cite any legal authority for its position that the way the remand proceedings took place is the basis for some sort of relief from the Appellate Division.  As such, any objections raised by Defendant in this appeal as to procedure must be overruled.
[brief] Plaintiff Improperly Included His Trial Court Briefs In The Appendix In Violation Of R. 2:6-1(A)(2) And They Should Not Be Considered.  [Issue not raised below]  Plaintiff’s inclusion of his legal briefs in the appendix is nothing more than a veiled attempt at a second bite at the apple to present his opposing arguments in the trial court to this court and should not be permitted.  (Pa260-Pa288; Pa418-Pa431; Pa517-Pa519).  Plaintiff’s footnote in the Table of Appendix is incorrect and demonstrates a misunderstanding of the Court Rule permitting the inclusion of trial briefs:  Pursuant to Rule 2:6-2(a)(2), briefs are included given that the trial court referenced the brief in its decision which is being challenged on appeal and the briefs are also necessary to demonstrate specific issue was raised.  [Pb6].  Rule 2:6-1(a)(1) specifically excludes briefs from the appendix unless they meet the criteria set forth in R. 2:6-2(a)(2), which requires:  Prohibited Contents.  Briefs submitted to the trial court shall not be included in the appendix, unless either the brief is referred to in the decision of the court or agency, or the question of whether an issue was raised in the trial court is germane to the appeal, in which event only the material pertinent to that issue shall be included.  [R. 2:6-1(a)(2)(emphasis added)].  Neither of the situations set forth in the above exception Rule apply here.  Plaintiff’s briefs were not referred to in the May 26, 2023 hearing on defendants’ motions to dismiss, they were not mentioned in the August 7, 2023 Order and Statements of Reasons, and they were not mentioned in the October 11, 2023 decision of the court delivered from the bench.  (1T; Pa378-Pa415; 2T).  Neither counsels’ references to their briefs during oral argument on May 26, 2023 and October 11, 2023, nor the court’s statement that His Honor “read the briefs” meets the criteria set forth in the Rule to permit Plaintiff to include his briefs in the appendix.  (Ibid.; 1T11-5).  There is no question as to whether an issue was raised in the trial court that is germane to the appeal to justify the inclusion of any portion of Plaintiff’s brief, let alone his entire brief, under the Rule.  There is simply no factual or legal basis for Plaintiff’s briefs to be included in the appendix and they should be stricken.