ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ” (9T59-4 to 25).  In response, the State proffered its intention “to enter into evidence documentary email references in which the [[...]] did notify” [...] they sought the wallet ID.  (9T63-20 to 23).  The State argued the notice to [...] “would diminish the relevance of that particular issue. ” (9T63-24 to 64-3).  At no point did defense counsel assert counsel was unaware of the email that became S-33.
[brief] [...]’s role in the conspiracy was central, and [...] is vicariously liable for failing to supervise [...] while he was perpetrating a fraud.  It is clear that notwithstanding that [...] and [...] were the members of [...], [...] was operated by [...] as a sham entity, and [...] acted as [...]’s attorney in furtherance of the conspiracy perpetrated against Plaintiffs.  [...] misrepresented to Plaintiffs that he was the attorney for [...] by being listed as same in the Releases, authoring the Second Amendment and Restatement of the General Release, staging the April 2009 meeting with Plaintiffs at the offices of [...] where [...] misrepresented to Plaintiff [...] that [...] was the person there at the meeting with them to accept the $250,000.00 check on behalf of [...], and then authoring and forwarding the default letter dated December 17, 2009 to Plaintiffs.  However, since neither [...] nor [...] ever met or even knew of [...] prior to this action, as they and [...] testified, then it is obvious that [...] was only masquerading as the attorney for the sham entity [...] in furtherance of Defendants’ conspiracy to steal Plaintiffs’ money.
[brief] This action arises out of Defendants’ efforts to obtain defense and indemnification from [...] for a series of lawsuits against Defendants arising out of [...]’s manufacture and sale of polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”), which [...] marketed and sold to customers for use in a wide variety of industrial and consumer applications.  (Pa001-003).  Monsanto sold its PCBs nationwide and now faces lawsuits around the country alleging environmental contamination and personal injuries from PCB exposure.  (Pa012)  Among the hundreds of pending PCB lawsuits against Defendants is *New Jersey Dep’t of Environmental Protection, et al. v. Monsanto Co., et al.*, GLO-L-800-22 (Superior Court, Gloucester County, NJ), filed August 5, --- 4  Between the relevant time period in the 1970s and the present day, [...] underwent a series of corporate reorganizations to form Defendants [...] and [...].  In 1997, [...] created [...] as a wholly-owned subsidiary to operate [...]’s chemical line of business.  See *Town of Lexington v. [...] Corp.*, No. 12-CV-11645, 2015 WL 1321457, at *1-2 (D. Mass. Mar. 24, 2015).  Similarly, [...] formed [...] in 2000 as a wholly-owned subsidiary to take over [...]’s agricultural business.  [...] continued its pharmaceutical line of business, later merging and rebranding under the name “[...]. ”  Id.  The DEP’s lawsuit seeks compensation from Defendants for damage to the state’s natural resources caused by [...]’s manufacture, sale, and distribution of toxic PCBs in New Jersey, including in connection with [...]’s discharge of PCBs from its facility adjacent to the Delaware River in Bridgeport, New Jersey.  [...] is the successor by merger to [...] (“[...]”), a New Jersey corporation that was headquartered in Paterson, New Jersey with a manufacturing facility in Totowa, New Jersey.  (Pa001-002; Pa498-99).  [...] purchased PCBs from [...], but was unaware of the extent of the risks posed by PCBs, as [...] concealed and misrepresented the risks of PCBs to its customers, government agencies, and the public.
[brief] \(^3\)  Ibid. (quoting Mathis, 579 U.S. at 511-12).  Erlinger directly abrogates State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155 (2006), which held that there was “no Sixth Amendment violation in the sentencing court’s consideration of objective facts about defendant’s prior convictions, such as the dates of convictions, his age when the offenses were committed, and the elements and degrees of the offenses, in order to determine whether he qualifies as a ‘persistent offender. ’”  Id. at 163.  Because Erlinger directly abrogates Pierce, it is a new rule of law.
[brief] There is no “deforestation” as Appellants claim – [...] will only remove and replace twenty-three trees within 10.39 acres of trees, and only 2.17 of those acres can be defined as a forest.  (Aa330).  Water resources likewise should not be impacted as the compressor station is sufficiently set back from surface waters and [...] has a spill plan in place.  (Aa68; Aa143-155).  Thus, [...] correctly found the Project consistent with the WQMP under its existing water quality rules.
[brief] ## Cases | Case | Page Nos. | |-------------------------------------------|----------------------------| | Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) | ...........................................  23 | | Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 856 F.3d 230 (3rd Cir. 2017) | ......................... 61 | | J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011)  | ...........................................  23 | | Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) | ...........................................  23 | | Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) | ........................................... passim | | Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) | ...........................................  22 | | Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) | ........................................... 24 | | Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994) | ........................................... 24 | | State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592 (App. Div. 2021) | ........................................... 27, 29-30 | | State v. Anthony, 237 N.J. 213 (2019) | ........................................... 46-47, 57 | | State v. Chen, 208 N.J. 307 (2008) | ........................................... 50 | | State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 325 (2005) | ........................................... 43 | | State v. Davis, 363 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 2003) | ......................... 43-44, 51-52 | | State v. Delgado, 188 N.J. 48 (2006) | ........................................... 47 | | State v. Frey, 194 N.J. Super. 326 (App. Div. 1984) | ........................................... 51, 60 | | State v. Godfrey, 131 N.J. Super. 168 (App. Div. 1974) | ......................... 29-30, 32 | | State v.
[brief] Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment on Behalf of Defendants, [...], Esquire and Cooper Levenson, April, Niedelman & Wagenheim,P.A………………………………………………………………………………….199a 5/28/2018  Excerpts from Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants [...], Esquire,and Cooper, Levenson, April, Niedelman & Wagenheim, P.A…………………………………………………………………………………..201a 8/21/2018  Order and Opinion Denying Summary Judgment Motion of Defendants [...] and [...]……………………………………………………………………..222a 8/21/2018  Order and Opinion Denying Summary Judgment Motion of Defendants [...], Esquire, and Cooper, Levenson, April, Niedelman & Wagenheim, P.A…………………………………………………………………………………..229a 10/15/2018  Order Excluding the Expert Testimony of [...] on Lost Profits ...........................................................................................................308a 10/22/2018  Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion to Reconsider the October 15, 2018 Order to Exclude Expert Testimony ..................................................................................310a 10/22/2018 [...] Certification in Support Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider October 15, 2018  Order to Exclude Expert Testimony ...........................................(omitted)  Exhibit A, 10/15/2018  Order Excluding the Expert Testimony of [...] on Lost Profits .........................................................................................(omitted, see 308a)  Exhibit B, 5/28/2018
[brief] *Jones*, 230 N.J. at 166-67.  If the Legislature took issue with judicially recognized exceptions to the imposition of joint liability for tortfeasors found over 60% at fault, it could have modified the statute in response to these decisions; it never did so.  See *Tonelli v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Wyckoff*, 185 N.J. 438, 448 (2005) (“The Legislature is presumed to be aware of the judicial construction placed on an enactment, and such a construction, supported by lengthy legislative acquiescence or failure to amend the statute should be viewed as dovetailing with legislative intent. ”) (citation omitted).  Plaintiffs have a philosophical disagreement with *Burt* as it relates to the statutory terms of the Comparative Negligence Act.  Be that as it may, *Burt* stood as precedent as of the trial and entry of judgment in this case.
[brief] **F.  The Appellate Division’s March 6, 2023 Decision. **  On March 6, 2023, this court issued a published decision reversing the Commissioner’s decision.  *Alcantara v. Allen-McMillan*, 475 N.J. Super. 58 (App. Div. 2023).  The court reviewed the Department’s statistics, comparing the performance of [...]’s public school students to State averages, and found the record showed that the District’s public school students were not receiving T&E.  *Id.* at 69-70.  The court did not, however, reach whether such a failure was a result of the SFRA.  Instead, the court remanded the matter to the Department to “consider [Appellants’] substantive arguments pertaining to the SFRA .  . . .”
[brief] As the Trial Court found, the slipperiness of paint is not within the ken of an average juror:  [...]: So, first of all, and I'm not going to shout like my colleague.  But, first of all, the invoice specifically says apply two-coat exterior acrylic walking finish paint.  THE COURT: Right, but -- okay.  So unless there's going to be someone who says departing from that standard, right, departing from what was required in the contract, I mean, I didn't see anything.  [...]: No, but this is in the ken of an average juror, right?  A jury (overlapping speakers)
[brief] On March 17, 1983, a Civil Action was ordered and filed by the Honorable [...], J.S.C.: Judgment of Divorce at Superior Court of NJ, Chancery Division, Union County, NJ, Docket #: [...].  This Divorce order granted me: ([...], now: [...]) custody of my 2 children: my son: [...], age 8, and my daughter, [...], age 3.  2.  It was further ordered from Judgment of Divorce from ex-husband: [...] (current appellant/defendant in this case): was to pay Child Support for Two children in the amount of $140.00 per week through Probation dept.  [...] was to also pay all medical, dental, hospital, and Prescriptions for the 2 children.  --- 1 da = Respondent’s combined Statement of Facts and Procedure History
[brief] In addition, the Plaintiff requests entry an award of attorney’s fees and costs in --- 3 T refers to the transcript of the hearing on the Defendant’s motion for reconsideration and the Plaintiff’s cross-motion to discharge lis pendens and for sanctions dated April 26, 2024.  the sum of $14,324.40 for the Defendant’s frivolous prosecution of the second motion for reconsideration and the instant appeal.  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] Cite Page(s)  Cox & Koenig.  New Jersey and Land Use Administration (GANN, 2022), Sec. 4-1.5  8  INDEX TO APPENDIX  Exhibit No. Description  Page  Exhibit 1: Photograph of east to west view of front yard of [...]  1a  Exhibit 2: Photo of west to east view of front yard of [...].  2a  Exhibit 3: Photo of walkway leading from sidewalk to front steps of [...].  3a  Exhibit 4: Photo showing 5’ 10 ½” width of walkway from sidewalk to front steps.  4a  Exhibit 5: Photo showing 5’ 10 ½” width of walkway from sidewalk to front steps.  5a  Exhibit 6: Photos showing 2’ 11” width of walkway from sidewalk to west side entrance of [...].  6a  Exhibit 7:  Photos showing 2’ 11” width of walkway from sidewalk to west side entrance of [...].  7a  Exhibit 8:  Photos showing 3’ 2” width of east to west walkway connection front entrance and side entrance walkways of [...].  8a  Exhibit 9:  Photos showing 3’ 2” width of east to west walkway connection front entrance and side entrance walkways of [...].  9a  Exhibit 10: Affidavit of No Change  10a  Exhibit 10: Drawing showing locations of three (3) concrete paver walkways in front yard of [...].  11a  Exhibit 11: Photo of Prior Concrete Walkways Leading to Front and Side Entrances.  12a  Exhibit 12: December 17, 2019 Zoning Permit Denial.  13a  Exhibit 13: Denial of HPC Application – [...] 16a  ## Complaint Exhibits | Exhibit No. | Description | Page | |-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Exhibit 1: | Denial: January 12, 2021 Resolution HPC 2020-226; [...] Resolution of Memorialization
[brief] [...] rejected defendant’s contention that defendant’s use of [...]’s rifle subjected him to criminal liability, thus precluding him from serving as defendant’s guardian.  [...] found “zero evidence” of even a threat of criminal charges against [...], or of any coercion.  From its review of the video-recorded statement, the “only evidence” before it, the court found [...], did not act in a manner to protect himself, but instead acted as any family member would – with the best interests of the defendant at heart.  The court found [...], acted as a “supportive brother” during the entire interview; he never interrogated the defendant or pressed him to confess.
[brief] Second, because the proposed use is inherently beneficial, reference to the MPA for guidance as to the appropriate location is improper because the proposed use automatically satisfies the positive criteria and does not need to demonstrate that the proposed location is more suited to the proposed use than another location.  See, e.g., Sica, supra, 127 N.J. at 162-163 quoting Roman Catholic Diocese of Newark v. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 47 N.J. 211, 223 (1966)(Hall, J., concurring)(recognizing the problem of preventing needed regional facilities through imposition of onerous municipal legislation “enacted for the sake of preserving the established or proposed character of a community or some portion of it”).  Third, because inherently beneficial uses are not required to reconcile the omission of the proposed use from the zoning district, a board of adjustment cannot rely upon a statement in the master plan that calls for the proposed use to be located elsewhere because doing so would give unelected planning boards veto power over such uses through the master plan process.
[brief] Feigenbaum v. Guaracini, 402 N.J.  Super. 7, 18 (App. Div. 2008).  Even in cases where a party may be entitled to indemnification, fees incurred in enforcing an indemnification contract may not be recoverable absent express language allowing such fees.  See Simko v. C & C Marine Maint. Co., 594 F.2d 960, 969 (3d Cir. 1979) (remanding for the court to consider separately fees incurred in defense of an action and fees incurred in enforcing the right to indemnification).  The indemnification provision in the [...] did not contemplate recovery of attorneys’ fees in first-party claims between Plaintiffs and Defendant, nor does it expressly provide for payment of attorneys’ fees.  Moreover, Plaintiffs did not introduce any evidence at trial regarding the interpretation of this provision.  Therefore, the trial judge incorrectly awarded Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs against Defendant under the [...].
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum A | December 2020 CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  6  Unauthorized Uses of CEDs  6.1  The following uses of CEDs are prohibited:  (a)  A CED shall not be used or threatened to be used to retaliate for any past conduct or to impose punishment; (b)  A CED shall not be used against a person who is a passive resistor or an active resistor; (c)  A CED shall not be fired or discharged for the sole purpose of preventing a person from committing property damage; (d)  A CED shall not be deployed against the operator of a moving vehicle unless the use of deadly force against the operator of the motor vehicle would be authorized; and (e)  Two or more CEDs shall not be discharged upon a person at the same time.  8  USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum A | December 2020
[brief] DEFENDANT’S CERTAIN-PERSONS CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED DUE TO ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND IMPROPER ARGUMENT.  (Not Raised Below)  The trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the certain-persons offense (count four) in two separate ways.  First, the court wrongly charged two elements of the crime by instructing that N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) prohibits a certain person from possessing any “weapon,” when in fact it prohibits only possessing a “firearm. ”  Second, even though [...] stipulated that he had been convicted of qualifying predicate offenses, the court and the prosecutor disclosed the nature of those offenses, contrary to well-established law.  Both of those errors were plain and require reversal of his certain-persons conviction.  See U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9; R. 2:10-2.  A.
[brief] 40 Kiernan v. Kara, 7 N.J. Super. 600 (Ch. Div. 1950)  42  Kline v. Bernardsville Assn. Inc., 267 N.J. Super. 473 (App. Div. 1993)  52 Leasehold Estates Inc. v. Fulbro Holding Co., 47 N.J. Super. 521, 562-564 (App. Div. 1957)  43, 53 Leang v. Jersey City Bd. Of Ed., 399 N.J. Super. 329, (App. Div. 2008), aff. in part rev. in part 198 N.J. 557 (2009)  31 Loechner v. Campbell, 49 N.J. 504, 56-511 (1967)  46  Matthews v. Deane 196 N.J. Super. 441, 444-445 (Ch. Div. 1984)  30 Roselle v. Wright, 21 N.J. 400, 408-410 (1956)  47 N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Services v. A.W. 103 N.J. 591 (1986)  30 Nuckel v. Little Ferry Planning Board, 208 N.J. 95(2011)  48 O’Donnell v. Koch, 197 N.J. Super. 134 (App.Div.1984)  49 Panitech v. Panitech, 339 N.J. Super 63 (App. Div. 2001 32 Pell v. Tp. of Bass River, 196 N.J. Super. 304 (Law Div. 1984)
[brief] On or about May 7, 2015, [...] (“[...]”) issued Appellant an open-end credit card bearing account number ending in 4600 (the “Account”).  (Pa\(^1\)62-Pa69, ¶ 7; Pa70-Pa77; Pa110-120, ¶ 9; Pa35-Pa37, ¶ 3).  Appellant made periodic payments on the balance incurred on the Account until November 25, 2015, when he made a payment in the amount of $35.00.  (Pa63-Pa69, ¶ 16; Pa82-Pa94; Pa110-Pa120, ¶ 12).  Thereafter, Appellant made no further payments on the Account, despite continuing to make purchases and increasing the Account’s outstanding balance.  Id.  Ultimately, Appellant defaulted, and the Account was charged off on June 15, 2016.  (Pa62-69, ¶ 17; Pa110-Pa120, ¶ 13).  B.
[brief] Defendants cannot feign ignorance of this developing ultra vires conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety case law.  Piscitelli v. City of Garfield Zoning Board of Adjustment, 237 N.J. 333, 349-51 (2019); Seaview Harbor Realignment Committee LLC v. Township Committee of Egg Harbor Township, 470 N.J. Super. 71 (App. Div. 2021) (citing Piscitelli and explaining that public officials must not participate in decisions where they stand to receive a financial or personal benefit or detriment and that "[t]he overall objective of conflict of interest laws is to ensure that public officials provide disinterested service to their communities and "to promote confidence in the integrity of governmental operations."); Mollica v. Township of Bloomfield, [...](App. Div. Oct 17, 2016) (Pa407) (invalidating municipal bond issuance due to a within 200 feet disqualifying conflict of interest.
[brief] She further found that the tenants were obligated to pay their pro rata share of common area maintenance fees, but that they had no contractual responsibility other than that for the area in which plaintiff fell.  (3T57-1 to 57-5, 3T58-8 to 58-17, 3T58-25 to 59-6)  Finally, she found that the tenants had no common law duty to have done anything to remediate the parking lot prior to plaintiff’s accident.  (3T59-7-to 61-18)  She granted all of the tenants’ motions for summary judgment on liability and denied plaintiffs’ cross motion for partial summary judgment on liability.
[brief] New Jersey courts have adopted a “totality of the circumstances” test to determine whether an arbitration agreement is sufficiently clear to waive statutory claims.  See Swarts v. The Sherwin-Williams Co., 244 N.J. Super. 170, 178-79 (App. Div. 1990).  Under that test, a court must consider the following non-exhaustive factors to determine whether a waiver was “knowing and voluntary”: (1) The plaintiff’s education and business experience; (2) the amount of time the plaintiff had possession of or access to the agreement before signing it; (3) the role of plaintiff in deciding the terms of the agreement; (4) the clarity of the agreement; (5) whether the plaintiff was represented by or consulted with an attorney; and (6) whether the consideration given in exchange for the waiver exceeds [other] benefits . . . entitled by contract or law.
[directive] We have audited the financial statements of the [...] , XX-XX- Funds as of and for the year ended December and have issued our report thereon dated 31,200X  We conducted our audit accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in the United States of XX. in America and the standards applicable to financial audits contained in issued Government Auditing Standards, the by Comptroller General of the United States and by audit requirements issued by the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey and the Department of the Treasury and by the Division of Local Government Services, Department of Community Affairs, State of New Jersey.
[brief] Plaintiff-respondent, [...] ("Respondent"), duly obtained summary judgment below against defendant-appellants, [...] and [...] (the "Appellants" or "[...]"), declaring that the [...]' chain of title includes a valid easement by reservation in favor of the owners of Respondent's property (described herein as the "Challenger Lot") to use an existing roadway running from the public right of way through the [...]' property and then through lands owned by the defendants, Richard and [...] (the "[...]"), before entering the Respondent's property.  Without the access in question, Respondent's property is completely landlocked.  This Court should now affirm the lower court's order, entering summary judgment against the [...].  The stipulated record below establishes that there are multiple deeds in the [...]' chain of title that contain the following express easement by reservation in favor of the owners of the Challenger Lot to use an existing roadway on their land to access the otherwise landlocked parcel:  Excepting and reserving from the above the rights of the public or owners of property lying westerly and southerly of Totten farm to use a roadway or driftway running thru this tract to reach their properties from the public road mentioned in the description above.  The parties stipulated on summary judgment that the “property lying westerly and southerly of Totten farm” is the Challenger Lot.  The [...] own two separate lots in East Amwell, New Jersey.
[brief] This matter arises from a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs filed by Plaintiffs, [...], [...], and [...] (“Plaintiffs”) challenging the [...]’s (“Defendant” or “Borough”) enactment of its Noise Ordinance, Ordinance No.  17-2017 (the “Noise Ordinance”).  The trial court properly found the Ordinance was void both because it was preempted by the health nuisance requirements of Title 26, and because it was unconstitutionally overbroad.
[brief] Requiring prompt delivery of any received estoppel certificate allowed [...] sufficient time to inform [...] if the provided estoppel certificate was deemed an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate, and if not, allowed [...] sufficient time to remedy any claimed deficiencies in the estoppel certificate to address [...]’s concerns and obtain an Acceptable Estoppel Certificate prior to closing.  [...]’s obligation was to continue its efforts to secure a compliant estoppel certificate within the timeline leading up to the closing, not to provide [...] with grounds for early termination based solely on prompt delivery of an initial non-compliant certificate.