ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In the fourth quarter of 2023, 11,497 new cases were filed.  (ICAa 052).  12,043 cases were resolved.  The median award of medical expense benefits was $930.00.  (ICAa 057).  The median attorney’s fee award was $1,000.00.  Ibid.  In the case of New Jersey Healthcare Coalition v. New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance, 440 N.J. Super. 129, 144 (App Div 2014), the Court noted that “few DRP hearings currently involved oral testimony.
[brief] Essentially, plaintiff’s counsel argued that they were entitled to know whether the claim against [...] was potentially meritorious before the obligation to file it accrued.  (Pa517, Pa520, 1T8-14 to 11-24)  They also argued that they had been misled by the [...]’ response to interrogatories set forth above.  (1T13-9 to 14-19)  The defense countered that all plaintiff (and/or counsel) needed to know only the identities of the tenants in order to have amended his complaint in a timely fashion; knowledge of the merits of the potential claim was not necessary to trigger the obligation to have filed the amended complaint.  (1T18-24 to 24-4, 1T26-14 to 30-2, 1T31-10 to 32-25)  On several occasions throughout the argument, [...] expressed his dissatisfaction with the manner in which counsel had managed the proceedings up until that point.  He noted that “the defendants who had moved for summary judgment...were readily identifiable by the sign over the store” and asked “So, if you know who they all are, you know, where they are, don’t you do anything to try to bring them in aside from motion practice against the landlord to try to get the leases? ” (1T12-9 to 12-16)  He also surmised that plaintiff himself may have known the identities of the tenant defendants, (1T20-14 to 20-18) and noted that “Here’s a guy who fell and injured himself and has filed a claim for personal injuries.  So clearly within his knowledge to figure out who the tenants are.  And, and, you know, the due diligence…isn’t only by the attorney.  It’s by the plaintiff himself to do something…the plaintiff himself ha[d] some obligation here” (1T32-10 to 32-18)  The court reiterated its misgivings when it denied the tenant defendants’ motions.
[brief] In contrast to Kromish and Vinson, [...] has been unable to provide the Court with any case authority with similar facts, published or unpublished that supports his position.  [...] cites to the following cases: *Ctr. 48 Ltd. P'ship v. May Dept. Stores Co.*, 355 N.J. Super. 390, 405 (App. Div. 2002); *Mount Holly State Bank v. Mount Holly Washington Hotel, Inc.*, 220 N.J. Super. 506 (App. Div. 1987); *Housatonic Bank & Trust Co. v. Fleming*, 234 N.J. Super. 79 (App. Div. 1989) and *HLP Associates, L.P v. Carpet City, Inc.*, 2015 WL 1181271 (App. Div. 2015).
[brief] The answer is an obvious yes, it was better for [...] to own the home he paid for with his own money.  No “tenant” in their right mind would give a future landlord the down-payment on a property so that they could rent and never gain equity or even a tax deduction.  It is pure sophistry for the Respondents to argue that the steady unchanging rent was better for the elderly Plaintiffs than to own their own home.  Had professionals been consulted at the time of the formation of this warped deal, such as a lawyer, real estate broker and accountant, then at least [...] Matos could have made a well-informed decision, but none were.
[brief] Defendant, [...], respectfully requests the court enter an order dismissing plaintiff’s appeal with prejudice.  In the event this honorable court reverses the final order of the trial court below and remands the case for further proceedings, Chicago Title asks the court also to reinstate all crossclaims, counterclaims, and third-party claims of Chicago Title against all other parties to the action.  [...]  Attorneys for defendant/third-party plaintiff, [...] /s/ [...]_____________________  [...]  Date: August 14, 2024  [...]  BY: [...], Esquire  Attorney
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WAS TIME-BARRED AND APPROPRIATELY DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT.  According to N.J.S.A. 59:8-8, "[a] claim relating to a cause of action ... for injury or damage to person ... shall be presented as provided in this chapter not later than the 90th day after accrual of the cause of action.  After the expiration of six months from the date notice of claim is received, the claimant may file suit in an appropriate court of law.  The claimant shall be forever barred from recovering against a public entity or public employee if:  ... b.  Two years have elapsed since the accrual of the claim .  . . ."  According to N.J.S.A. 59:8-1, "[a]ccrual shall mean the date on which the claim accrued .  . . ."  Accrual of a cause of action for false arrest is determined by the date of the arrest.  *Bayer v. Twp. of Union*, 414 N.J. Super. 238, 258 (App. Div. 2010).  "The statute of limitations for claims under the NJCRA [New Jersey Civil Rights Act] is two years."
[brief] Appellants argue that they had a reasonable expectation of coverage because the [...] declarations page lists a limit of $1,000,000 for excess UIM coverage, and does not list the definition of “underinsured motor vehicle. ”  However, as noted by [...] in the order granting [...]’s motion to dismiss (in connection with Appellants’ now abandoned argument that the declarations page of the [...] Policy was ambiguous as applied to the excess liability coverage part), the declarations page of the [...] Excess Policy is unambiguous and applies as written.  (See 2T, at 20:3-15).  First, the declarations page of the [...] Excess Policy clearly indicates that the scope of coverage is not set forth based on review of the limits in a vacuum, but rather by review of the policy as a whole.  (Pa 77, at Declarations (“Your Declarations summarizes your coverage and premium.  Please read your policy, any attached forms and endorsements and your Declarations for a full description of your coverage. ”)).  Additionally, as confirmed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, an insurer is not obligated to include all relevant definitions and exclusions on the declarations page because such a requirement would be unworkable.  See Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590, 603 (2001) (“A rule of construction forcing insurers to avoid all cross-referencing in policies would require them to reprint the entire definition section on each page of the policy, or to define each term every single time it is used.  The proliferation of fine print would itself demand strenuous study and run the risk of making insurance policies more difficult for the average insured to understand. ”).  Thus, the structure of the declarations page of the [...] Excess Policy is clear and unambiguous and does not impact the reasonable expectations of the insured.
[directive] Plan initiating Scan system capable of If a enforcement agency is not equipped with a Live law pretrial AOC, the agency shall develop and risk-assessment process approved by the the automated 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3 of subsections and plan to ensure compliance with the requirements implement a Live Scan systems) identify other agency or agencies whose plan shall the of this Directive.  The of plan, along with any 2.2.2, and 2.2.3.  A copy the comply with subsections 2.2.1, will be used to approval the submitted for to between cooperating agencies, shall be understanding memorandum of Division of Criminal Justice in the case of a Director of the Prosecutor, or the appropriate County until agency is and the plan shall remain in effect unless state agency.  The plan submitted by a risk-assessment of initiating the automated pretrial system capable with its own Live Scan equipped process. of Directive.
[brief] The Plaintiffs-Appellants are owners and/or residents of property immediately adjacent to [...] (hereinafter referred to as "PQ").  The PQ is Block 37, Lot 10.  [...] owns [...], also known as Block 37, Lot 11.  (Pa 157).  These two properties are currently in the "R5-family and 2-family" zone in the [...]. (Pa 158).  A commercial take-out restaurant use is not permitted in the zone.  (Pa 159-162).  The lots in question were created by the filing of a map on 12/20/30 by [...] (hereinafter referred to as "[...]").  [...] had acquired title to the property on August 27, 1925.  (Pa 48-53).  --- 3  Five of these Exhibits have not been included in Appellants' Appendix, as they relate to issues not raised on appeal.  The first zoning ordinance in OP was adopted on February 2, 1933.
[brief] The court accepted that statement, ignoring the Administrator’s cautionary statement that his opinion “does not address … the factors [a] Court considers as to the reasonableness of the fees sought as provided in the Rules of Court and by applicable law. ” (Da188, Para. 8).  There is nothing in the court’s opinion that suggests that the court reviewed any of the invoices.  The [...] law firm commenced the lawsuit on Plaintiff’s behalf and litigated the matter at least until October 2013, according to the Administrator’s spreadsheet that was based upon Plaintiff’s attorney fee application.  (Da191).  Its fees and disbursements totaled $160,448.70, and they were awarded in full.  Ibid.  The [...] law firm commenced its work for the Plaintiff in October 2013.  Its invoices through the date that a summary judgment order was entered on May 8, 2014, totaled $152,750.49, according to the spreadsheet.  These fees were also awarded in full by the court.  (Da 192-193).  The total fees awarded through the entry of summary judgment was thus $313,198.00.²  ²  The invoices of [...] on the Administrator’s spreadsheet were awarded in full by the court but were not included in this total.  See the discussion of Rosensteel’s involvement in Section C, below.
[brief] Defendant-Appellant [...] (“[...]” or “Appellant”) predicates its appeal on the misplaced arguments that the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. erred by finding:  A.)  That archaeologists hired to perform the services on the subject Public project detailed in the [...]’s bid specifications are not “subcontractors” within the scope of the Public Works Contractor Registration Act, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.48 et. seq.  (“PWCRA”); and, therefore, B.)  Those archaeologists designated by the bidders for the subject Project need not be registered under the PWCRA.  For the reasons set forth herein, Judge Filko correctly ruled that an archaeologist’s services consisting of “monitoring excavation, construction, staging and ground disturbance activities, evaluat[ing] the potential of the pond bed for containing archaeological resources,” and preparing “a summary monitoring report” was clearly not the type of “Public work” contemplated by the PWCRA.  Consistent therewith, the bid specifications issued by the [...] (“[...]” or the “Commission”) did not require the bidders’ archaeologists to be registered under the PWCRA.  Judge Filko also did not err in finding that even if such archaeological professionals were required to register under the PWCRA, the Commission’s conclusion that “[...]’s selection of an archaeologist that was not registered under the PWCRA is not a material, non-waivable defect” and, “[t]herefore, [...], as the lowest responsive bidder was correctly awarded the Project”.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] Affidavit of [...].................................................................Pa148  Affidavit of [...]..............................................................Pa150  Affidavit of [...]..................................................................Pa152  Affidavit of [...]...............................................................Pa154  Affidavit of [...]..................................................................Pa156  Affidavit of [...]............................................................Pa158  Affidavit of [...].................................................................Pa160  Affidavit of [...]...........................................Pa162  Affidavit of [...]..................................................................Pa164  Affidavit of [...].................................................................Pa166  VOLUME III  Affidavit of [...].................................................................Pa168  Affidavit of [...].....................................................................Pa170  Affidavit of [...].....................................................................Pa172  Affidavit of [...]...................................................................Pa174  Affidavit of [...]...................................................................Pa176  Affidavit of [...]..................................................................Pa178  Affidavit of [...].................................................................Pa180  Affidavit of [...]...................................................................Pa182  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS
[brief] [...] testified the north building will contain nine units and the two buildings to the south will contain four units each.  (1T 32:9-12; 32:25-33:2; 33:8-17).  As to parking, [...] testified there will be two parking spaces for each townhome.  There is no variance requested for parking as the development does comply with the Borough’s requirements for two off-street parking spaces per unit.
[brief] (20a-23a).  Factor four (4) of the test applied by [...] under Rule 4:50-1(f) required the Court to weigh “the prejudice that would occur to the other party. ”  [...] observed that this factor would ordinarily also weigh in Appellants’ favor, except for consideration of [...]:  “Ordinarily, allowing for a vacation of default final judgment, a mere three months after its entry, would not prejudice the plaintiffs.  Indeed, in the matter at bar, plaintiff could collect all they were entitled to with the defendants’ prompt payment of redemption.  However, [...] sold the property to [...].  Therefore, in considering prejudice, this court must not only weigh the prejudice of vacating the final default judgment as to [...], but also the subsequent sale of the property to [...].  April 3, 2023 Order (22a-23a).  As to this consideration, the April 3, 2023 Order continued that Appellants had made a prima facie showing that [...] was not a bona fide purchaser for value in the following observations:
[brief] The plaintiff testified that the accident at [...] occurred as follows: I was walking towards my daughter and then, you know, my roller hit the pole, the bolt, and I fell to the right, and my roller went to the left.  (4T228:14-16).  The plaintiff denied she had balance issues when she went to the [...] on May 30, 2019 and testified that if she had not hit the bolt, she would not have fallen.  (4T249:19-25).  Remaining portions of her sworn deposition testimony, however, call into question her credibility and whether the cause of her fall was her tripping on the bolt or was her losing her balance and falling on her own.
[brief] | | Estate of Doerfler v. Fed. Ins. Co., 454 N.J. Super. 298, 302 (App. Div. 2018)  13  Eunique v. Powell, 302 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2002)  10  First Resol. Inv. Corp. v. Seker, 171 N.J. 502, 511 (2002)  22  Gotlib v. Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. 295, 309 (App. Div. 2008)  31  Heinl v. Heinl, 287 N.J. Super. 337, 347 (App. Div. 1996)  13, 33  In re DiLeo, 216 N.J. 449, 467 (2014)  25  In re Guardianship of Dotson, 72 N.J. 112, 117 (1976)  30  In re Presentment of Bergen Cty. Grand Jury, 1 93 N.J. Super. 2, 9 (App.Div. 1984)  29  In the Matter of Adoption of a Child by J.D.S, 176 N.J. 154, 159 (2003)  31, 32 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958)  10 Kenwood Assocs. v. Bd. of Adj. Englewood, 141 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1976)  33  Matter of Alvino, 100 N.J. 92, 96 (1985)  25 McNair v. McNair, 332 N.J. Super. 195, 199 (App. Div. 2000)  15  Milford Mill 128 v. Borough of Milford, 400 N.J. Super. 96, 103 n.5 (App. Div. 2008)  30, 40 Murray v. Comcast Corp., 457 N.J. Super. 464, 469 (App. Div. 2019)  23 N. Jersey Media Grp. Inc. v. State, 451 N.J. Super. 282, 300 (App. Div. 2017)  20 N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 453 N.J. Super. 272 (App. Div. 2018)  30, 39 N.J. Div.  of Child Prot. & Permanency v. A.S.K., 457 N.J. Super. 304 (App. Div. 2017)  40 Newman v. Isuzu Motors America, 367 N.J. Super. 141 (App. Div. 2004)  40 Pardo v. Dominquez, 382 N.J. Super. 489 (App. Div. 2006)  28 Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 52 (App. Div. 2010)  27 Robinson v. St. Peter's Medical Center, 236 N.J. Super. 94, 98 (Law Div. 1989)  30 Rolnick v. Rolnick, 262 N.J. Super. 343, 366 (App. Div. 1993)  15 Rubin v. Rubin, 188 N.J. Super. 155, 159 (App. Div. 1982)  26, 39 Salazar v. MKGC Design, 458 N.J. Super. 551, 557 (App. Div. 2019)  40 Saltzman v. Saltzman, 290 N.J. Super. 117, 124 (App. Div. 1996)  12 Schmoll v. J.S. Hovananian, 394 N. J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 2007)  40 Society Hill Con. v. Society Hill A., 347 N.J. Super. 163, 177 (App. Div. 2002)  31  SSI Medical Services, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Human Services, 146 N.J. 614, 621 (1996)  23 State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 190 (2010)  19 State v. Garcia, 195 N.J. 192, 204 (2008)  20 Torwich v. Torwich, 282 N.J. Super. 524 (App. Div. 1995)  40 Town of Phillipsburg v. Block, 380 N.J. Super. 159 (App. Div. 2005)  40 Tretola v. Tretola, 389 N.J. Super. 15, 20-21 (App. Div. 2006)  40  Youssefi v. Youssefi, 328 N.J. Super. 12, 23 (App. Div. 2000)  21  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Committeeman [...] again explained why he believes a PILOT is the best financial decision for the Township’s obligation to provide a realistic opportunity for affordable housing.  T1.137:1-23.  31.  Committeewoman [...] provided similar comments:  …  This plan will enable us to fulfill the Township commitment to the state of New Jersey in a way that burden does not fall heavily on current Hopewell Township taxpayers.  To follow my promises to Hopewell residents, that I'm committed to making fiscally responsible decisions and maintaining the welcoming culture of the Hopewell Valley community for all present and future residents coming here…  T1.141:8-15.
[brief] **Facts Of The Offense**  [...] was convicted at trial of passion provocation manslaughter for firing a handgun once in the direction of [...] on September 17, 2016, tragically striking and killing her.  (1T 260-22).  Around 3:00 pm on September 17, Juanita and her husband, [...], were hosting a baby shower for their niece, [...], at their home in [...].  (1T 60-7 to 26; 4T 108-6).  Blake was the expectant father of Powers’ twins and Powers had invited him to the.
[brief] In New Jersey, the State must “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights ‘in light of all the circumstances. ’”  *State v. O.D.A.-C.*, 250 N.J. 408, 420 (2022) (quoting *Sims*, 250 N.J. at 211).  A trial court’s factual findings on a motion to suppress a statement are reviewed deferentially.  *State v. S.S.*, 229 N.J. 360, 379-80 (2017).  When faced with an admissibility determination, appellate courts “give deference to the trial court’s factual findings so long as they are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  *O.D.A.-C.*, 250 N.J. at 425 (citing *S.S.*, 229 N.J. at 379-81).  A trial judge’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
[brief] a.  This Court’s Mandate Regarding NJRICO  Attorney’s Fees  This Court remanded [...]’s NJRICO fee award for reconsideration because and only because, as it explicitly stated, it simply was “not convinced … that [[...] was] justifie[d in] awarding … attorneys’ fees [to [...]] as far back as 1988” based upon its subsequent determination that his “non-RICO claims were limited to conduct that occurred after October 1, 2003.
[brief] 7T refers to a hearing transcript on [...] dated March 22, 2021.  reviewing the discovery.  [1T8-6 to -11].  Defense counsel stated that he had provided defendant still photos from the video of the robbery.  [1T8-12 to 9-1].  Defendant then argued that he was entitled to a Wade\(^2\) hearing.  [1T15-10 to -11].  [...] held that a Wade hearing was unnecessary because none of the State’s witnesses could identify defendant.
[brief] A short summary of the [...] reports is helpful.  In April, 2010, plaintiff's union presented grievances to [...] from four employees regarding a hostile work environment, discriminating practices, harassment, and conduct unbecoming a county employee.  The grievances concerned the interim supervisor [...].  [...] directed [...] to interview the four complaining employees.  After the interviews were completed [...] prepared a May 19, 2010 summary report.  The summary revealed that to a large extent the employees' grievances emanated from complaints about plaintiff.  [...] then requested [...] to interview the employees regarding plaintiff.  The interviews were highly critical of plaintiff and various individuals described him as, inter alia, “intimidating and unstable,” “aggressive,” “disruptive,” “disagreeable,” and “confrontational. ”  Some comments attributed plaintiff's undesirous behavior to this lawsuit and his “crusade. ”  As noted, [...] did not produce the [...] reports until September 19, 2012.
[directive] Ou fèt pou reponn kesyon adisyonèl swivan sa yo sèl si wap plede koupab de yon zak  Agresyon Seksyèl Agrave, Agresyon Seksyèl oswa Kontak Seksyèl Kriminèl Agrave oswa Kadejak daprè 2C 13-1c(2) oswa tantativ pou komèt zak sa yo.  N.J.S.A.  The following additional questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty to an offense of Aggravated Sexual Assault, Sexual Assault or Aggravated Criminal Sexual Contact or kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2) or an N.J.S.A. attempt to commit one of these crimes.
[brief] [...] and [...] from [...] both provided testimony at trial regarding the historic uses of the Property by the Borough and about the Borough’s 1940’s fill project, as well as other later fill projects by other entities who also sought and obtained permission from the Borough, as the uplands owner, to pursue these projects.  There was also testimony from these witnesses and from the Borough Clerk, [...], about the Borough’s lease of a portion of the Property to [...] and then of the Borough’s lease of that same portion of the Property to [...] from 1995 through the present.  See 4T and 5T; and Pa0969-Pa0981, Pa0992-Pa0999, and Pa1027-Pa1032.
[brief] Da60.  The judgment with interest after April 5, 2023 at the “lawful interest” rate as requested by plaintiff, together with attorney’s fees of $7,500 and costs to be taxed by the [...] (the “Sheriff”) was entered by [...] on June 9, 2023.  Da61.  On June 6, 2023, the Sheriff fixed the taxed costs at $540.  Da64.  Pursuant to R. 4:42-11, lawful interest for calendar year 2023 was 2.25%.  Therefore, the 2023 interest per diem was $1,325.43 ($21,501,343.47 x 2.25% ÷ 365 days) and the total interest due between April 6, 2023 and December 14, 2023 was $335,333.79 ($1,325.43 per diem x 253 days).  Accordingly, the judgment amount as of December 14, 2023, the date of the sheriff’s sale, was $21,844,717.26, calculated as follows:  | Description | Amount | |--------------------------------------|--------------| | Judgment amount as of 4/5/23 | $21,501,343.47 | | Lawful interest from 4/6/23 to 12/14/23 | 335,333.79 | | Taxed costs | 540.00 | | Attorney’s fees | 7,500.00 | | **Total** | **$21,844,717.26** | Da85, ¶¶5-6.