ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Ex. P - Excerpts of September 1, 1997  Distribution Agreement between [...] and [...] ..............................................Pa251  Ex. Q - Excerpts of February 28, 2008  Amended and Restated Settlement Agreement between [...] and [...] ........................................................................Pa264  Ex. R (omitted) ........................................................................Pa282  Ex. S - Unpublished Opinion ........................................................Pa283  Ex. T - Unpublished Opinion ........................................................Pa291  Ex. U - Unpublished Opinion ........................................................Pa297  Ex. V - February 7, 2023  Statement of [...] .............Pa302
[brief] The Improper Motion to bar of [...] and [...]  After Defendants’ summary judgment motions were denied on August 21, 2018 (222a-223a), Defendants [...] and [...] filed a motion to exclude [...]’s report and his testimony at trial.  259a-260a.  Oral argument was heard on October 12, 2018.  See 1T.  [...] was unavailable that day.  Instead, the motion to bar [...] was heard by The Hon. [...], J.S.C., who had not heard or decided any previous motions in this matter.  See 1T.  The motion to bar [...] was predicated entirely on the “new business rule,” despite [...]’s emphatic rulings on August 21 and September 28, 2018, that the “new business rule” did not apply and that [...]’s report met the reasonable certainty test.  261a-266a.  Indeed, the supporting brief of Defendants [...] and [...] argued that the new business rule applied as a per se bar to Plaintiffs’ damages claim, and that the damages claimed by Plaintiffs, were too remote or speculative to meet the legal standard of reasonable certainty – the same arguments that [...] had rejected not once but twice.  Compare 261a-266a brief on motion to bar, with 237a-238a, 306a-307a, August 21, 2018 and September 28, 2018 [...] opinions.  At oral argument, the new Law Division judge held that Plaintiffs were engaged in a “new venture,” and because Plaintiffs’ enterprise was a new business, [...]’s calculations of lost profits were remote and speculative.  1T, 31:20-35.  The judge entered an Order embodying the ruling barring [...] on October 15, 2018.  308a-309a.  On October 22, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration.  310a-311a.  Oral argument occurred on November 30, 2018.  See 2T.  The judge adhered to her previous ruling granting the motion to bar.  4.  Defendants’ final summary judgment motion
[brief] [...] and [...], in reliance upon [...]’s site plan, had already invaded the Plaintiffs’ property and excavated a substantial portion of Plaintiffs’ property.  The court subsequently stated the following:  “Plaintiffs were aware of what was going on.  They participated in this.  And these new plans were developed prior to any work being done on the properties at all. ”  (2T Hearing, page 8, line 17 to line 20).  The trial court’s statement is contrary to the factual record in this matter.  Plaintiffs asserted that they were not aware of SP 3 or the fact that their Property was a part of the project until well after all the unauthorized physical entries and damage in this matter had already been done.  To the extent that [...]’s representative testified otherwise, this was a material fact in dispute, and it was improper for the trial court to make a credibility determination in support of a motion for attorney’s fees and costs based upon frivolous litigation following entry of summary judgment.  The facts pleaded by the Plaintiffs and evidence adduced during discovery adequately supported the pursuit of a claim for general negligence and trespass against [...].  Under the precedent in New Jersey pertaining to general negligence and trespass claims, and the extremely high standard for the imposition of frivolous litigation sanctions, it was unjust and an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to enter an order finding Plaintiffs in violation of the frivolous litigation statute and awarding attorney’s fees and costs to [...].  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] It would only prevent an individual from acting as a Special Master when he or she is \textit{simultaneously} handling a separate paid matter for one of the parties or their attorneys.  Or, if not disqualification outright, it would require that the Special Master disclose the conflict to the attorneys and the trial court, which, under appropriate circumstances, could be waived.}  See New Jersey Code of Judicial Conduct, Applicability.  However, it defies logic and reason to exempt Special Masters from the conflict of interest rules within the \textit{Code of Judicial Conduct}.
[brief] When [...] purchased [...] from [...], it relied on loans from [...] for 5 million dollars in loans on which [...] defaulted which resulted in a judgment against [...] for nearly 3 million dollars.  (Volume III Pa. 416-432; See Article titled [...]s Tangled Web of Questionable Billing Practices, Healthcare, August 11, 2016, page 7, paragraph 5, hereinafter “Health Care Article” Volume III Pa. 417; A copy of the article is attached to the [...] Certification as Exhibit B).  [...] had amassed $200,000 in fines by the State of New Jersey for late or missed financial filings and accumulated 4.5 million dollars in federal tax liens.  Health Care article attached to the [...] Certification as Exhibit B, page 1, paragraph 6 (Volume III Pa. 416-432).  In a 145 page opinion issued by Administrative Law Judge [...] on September 20, 2016, the court violated its labor contract with the [...], [...], [...] by threatening employees with the closure of [...]’s Rehabilitation Unit if its employees engaged in union activities, laying off employees without giving the Union the opportunity to bargain over the effects of the layoff, assigning the Service Unit to non union employees without giving the Union the opportunity to bargain with [...], LLC regarding [...] LLC’s conduct, failing to provide the Union with a DNV inspection report, failing to continue the 12 hour shifts for the RN and Technical Contracts required by the labor agreement, failing to continue the terms and condition of the Union contract by refusing to apply the Union contract to Registered Nurse interns, failing to make financial contributions to the RN Service Contracts employee 401(K) plans, failing to permit Union representatives to meet with employees in the hospital’s cafeteria, failing to provide the RN and Technical Service Contract Units with bumping and recall rights to laid off employees, failing to continue to apply the terms and conditions of the RN Technical and Service Units by refusing to apply the Service Contracts to Hospital Assistants and failing to apply the terms of the Union Contract to Nursing Assistant Interns.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) authorizes an extended term as a “persistent offender” if the court finds that “[t]he defendant has been convicted of a crime of the first, second or third degree[,] . . . who at the time of the commission of the crime is 21 years of age or over, who has been previously convicted on at least two separate occasions of two crimes, committed at different times, when he was at least 18 years of age, if the latest in time of these crimes or the date of the defendant’s last release from confinement, whichever is later, is within 10 years of the date of the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced. ”  Under Erlinger, a sentencing judge may still determine whether the defendant was previously convicted of two crimes, but the sentencing court may “do no more.
[brief] Tenant’s mitigation argument was argued below  As pointed out in Tenant’s opening brief, even putting aside the legal question of whether the Tenant’s Allowance Offset clause operates automatically—as the Lease language supports—or discretionarily, as Landlord argues, Landlord did not need to do any of this.  It is undisputed that on September 1, 2020, Landlord, at the very least could have\(^6\) deducted the entire $145,318.14 in missed rent and other charges that Tenant owed Landlord from the $188,583.34 that Landlord owed Tenant, paid the remainder, and avoided all litigation.  Instead, in pursuit of a double recovery, Landlord spent four years and, according to their brief (Pb56) $65,798.68 in legal expenses litigating an eviction action to avoid paying what it owes Tenant.  This, at a minimum, was a failure by the Landlord to reasonably mitigate its damages.  See McGuire v. City of Jersey City, 125 N.J. 310, 323 (1991) (“The lessor bears the burden of demonstrating actions taken to mitigate damages. ”).  Landlord contends that Tenant did not argue below that Landlord failed to mitigate its damages but this argument is both legally and factually flawed.  The law is well-established that “[m]itigation of damages need not be specially pleaded, but is an issue where the general issue of damages is in dispute. ”  Fanarjian v. Moskowitz, 237 N.J. Super. 395, 403 (App. Div. 1989).  The Landlord carries the burden of proving reasonable mitigation efforts, McGuire, --- \(^6\)  Again, this is for illustrative purposes only.  Tenant’s position is that the deduction operates automatically under the Lease, as described supra. 125 N.J. at 323, and the court may even raise the issue sua sponte.  See, eg. Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Officers Union, Dist. 3, NMEBA, AFL-CIO, 275 N.J. Super. 241, 250 (App. Div. 1994).  In any event, a fair reading of the record reflect that Tenant squarely put into issue whether Landlord reasonably mitigated damages.  On August 18, 2021, the date of the trial and seventeen days after Landlord missed its second consecutive reimbursement payment, Tenant’s counsel explained the Tenant’s Allowance provision of § 4.02 to the judge and asked the court to calculate the amount of rent due and “[s]et that number off against the tenant’s fit up” (1T14-2 to 1T14-5).  Tenant’s counsel then noted that if a dispossession action was granted because of the missed rent rather than a simple offset, that could cause Tenant to close its business and Landlord would then “have to go out and find a new tenant for over 20,000 square feet” (1T16-6 to 1T16-13).  Tenant’s counsel later argued further along these lines, “I don’t know that it serves either party to result in a dispossess” rather than an offset calculation (1T21-10 to 1T21-16).  Accordingly, despite its attempts to obfuscate the issue, Landlord cannot escape the fact that did not, and could not, establish it took reasonable efforts to mitigate its damages when all it had to do to make itself 100% whole was to pay Tenant less than the installment amount originally owed on August 1, 2020.  Tenant raised this below and reserves the right to continue raising it on appeal.
[brief] Da29-31, Pa1-2.  With respect to Defendant [...], [...] found: Pursuant to R. 4:23-5(a)(1), R 4:23-2(b) and for the reasons set forth on the record.  Defendant Tracy [...] has repeatedly failed to fulfill her discovery obligations required by the Rules of Court and Court Order.  Defendant Tracy [...] has failed to conduct a proper search of her records to respond to Plaintiffs' discovery requests, failed to answer the interrogatories for Tracy [...], and gave evasive testimony at deposition.
[brief] *State v. Short*, 131 N.J. 47, 61 (1993).  See also *State v. Blanton*, 166 N.J. Super. 62, 72-73 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 81 N.J. 265 (1979).  Here, defendant asserts that the items removed from his vehicle had no material relation to the case and so he was significantly prejudiced.
[brief] Police tasked with protecting the public are authorized to approach and temporarily detain someone for questioning if they suspect the person stopped has been or is about to engage in criminal activity.  State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 508 (1986); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  “There can be no question that a police officer has the duty to investigate suspicious behavior. ”  *State v. Letts*, 254 N.J. Super. 390, 396 (Law Div. 1992).
[brief] The prosecutor was not permitted to bolster the credibility of the police to fill in the “missing pieces” of his case.  *Feaster*, 156 N.J. at 56; *State v. Frost*, 158 N.J. 76, 85 (1999) (“Our courts have consistently held that such statements by a prosecutor about a police officer’s credibility are wholly inappropriate. ”).  The prosecutor’s personal vouching for the police investigation in this case further denied [...] a fair trial and requires reversal.
[brief] ”  *Id.* (citing *Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr.*, 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)).  “A strong presumption of reasonableness accompanies an administrative agency’s exercise of statutorily-delegated responsibility. ”  *Id.* at 597 (citing *Gloucester County Welfare Bd. v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n*, 93 N.J. 384, 390 (1983)).  A.  [...]’s Stormwater Management Design Was Properly Found by [...] to Meet the Water Quality Requirements Under the Stormwater Management Rules (Response to Point IA of Appellant’s Brief).
[brief] [...] signed that document twice, once on his own behalf and once on behalf of the corporation.  The Court found that the fact that the second document was structured in a different fashion than the first did not nullify [...]’s personal obligation on the leases he signed on one line on behalf of the corporation and individually.  Id. at *8.  For the same reason the fact that a prior lease that [...] entered into with [...] was structured differently has no bearing on the interpretation of the [...].  Pra1-2 --- 3  Original Footnote 2 reads: “All three individual defendants testified they were unaware of the terms of the [...] Lease and had not seen it.  As such, they could have not relied on it. ”  It is not clear whether the Court had ruled on Defendants’ Motion for leave to supplement the record, or [...]’s objection.
[brief] See Perry v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 459 N.J. Super. 186, 194 (App. Div. 2019) (indicating parole for offenses committed prior to 1997, involves determining whether “there is a substantial likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime” if paroled).  Under the preponderance standard, a litigant must “establish that a desired inference is more probable than not. ”  Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163, 169 (2006) (internal citation omitted).
[brief] As to [...] the following was offered relative to their motion.  Many of the items never made the inventory list as they were lost or stolen.  She was told to hand over the keys to her property and leave during the inventory process.  (Aa352).  The 8K Ipod was one such item that was taken and never made the list.  She looked up the value on Ebay.  (Aa352).  She submitted expert testimony that she suffered a loss of $32,000.00 (Aa352).  She attached photos and her arbitration statement showing her basis for her claim.  (Aa352-53).  She provided to Defendant’s her paystubs showing what she made as an actress.
[brief] Under the Court Rules, deficiencies in a Case Information Statement and failure to seasonably amend a Case Information Statement are grounds for this Court to reject the Notice of Appeal or dismiss the appeal.  R. 2:5-1(h)(3); see also N.J. Citizens Underwriting Reciprocal Exchange v. Collins, 399 N.J. Super. 40, 50 (App. Div. 2008) (declining to consider defendant’s argument and observing that defendant failed to give notice to the Attorney General as required by R.
[brief] The purpose of these provisions is to ensure that injured workers have some means of compensation for work-related injuries.  However, the workers’ compensation system is not designed to ensure recovery for every possible type of claim an injured worker might assert against his or her employer.  To the contrary, the public policy on which the Act is based expressly recognizes that the compensation guaranteed by the Act may, at times, leave an injured worker less than fully compensated for his or her injuries.
[brief] Hearing Tr. 75:19-22 (“abandoning this litigation would certainly deprive [...] of the benefit of the bargain under the policy. ”)  In particular, it would conflict with and render moot [...]’s negotiated Service of Suit provision in section U of the Policy that expressly provides [...] with the right to litigate [...]’s non-payment of damages claims, such as those alleged here.  Da419.  Pursuant to that negotiated contract term, [...] specifically agreed to submit to court jurisdiction to litigate this particular type of claim.  To the extent these two provisions can be read together without conflict, the only reasonable interpretation is that any dispute may permissively be submitted to arbitration, but if [...] commences litigation concerning [...]’s non-payment of insurance costs (as [...] alleges here) absent an initial demand for arbitration, [...] must submit to court jurisdiction.  As set forth above, [...] failed to preserve its arbitration right in its answer and voluntarily submitted to this Court’s jurisdiction years ago.
[brief] The Committee acknowledged this when it raised several "concern[s]" regarding the Plan as it was written on October 27, 2022.  See (2T60:22-61:3);¹ (74:19-23).  These concerns, together with the testimony and public comment raised at the October 27 meeting led the Committee to amend the Plan minutes after adopting Ordinance No. 2022-15.  See (2T81:2-82:21).  The fact is that the Committee knew Ordinance No. 2022-15 was inconsistent with the Township's master plan and needed to be amended.  The trial court below recognized that the Plan did not "promote agricultural or open spaces."  (3T50:22-25).  Thus, the Committee could adopt the Plan, but was required to include its reasons for its decision in the redevelopment plan.  See N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d).  Because the Committee did not do this, they were forced to immediately introduce Ordinance ¹ Plaintiff incorporates the citations and abbreviations from its merits brief.  No. 2022-17 to amend the Plan.  II.
[brief] The company's pre-filed direct and rebuttal testimony were disingenuously written so as to leave the impression that very, very serious consequences would result if the proposed regulator was not installed immediately.  This of course defies the most elementary common sense.  To begin with, by the time the OAL hearing had ended, the 16-inch pipeline had been in service with the “temporary” regulator for eight years while the proposed regulator sat unused in a yard somewhere.  Long periods of inactivity have transpired in these proceedings.  As of the filing of this brief, eleven years of reliable service have occurred.  And of course, it would take a pretty stupid public utility to operate its system in an unsafe manner, let alone one that might cause disastrous consequences if it malfunctioned as the company’s direct testimony claimed.  The hearing demonstrated this to be patently false.  The current regulator arrangement is safe and efficient.  It is capable of servicing the company's projected demand (even taking no account of the Energy Master Plan and mandatory reductions under the Clean Energy Act and Global Warming Response Act).  It poses no danger to the public or to [...]'s infrastructure.  It emits no greenhouse gases and consumes no natural gas.  Moreover, it is capable of providing the necessary de-pressurization for at least another nine years, in other words, to 2032.  All of this is taken from the company’s own witnesses, on cross-examination.  By then, as we discuss below, mandatory reductions in natural gas consumption will have confirmed that the 16-inch transmission line was an expensive, underutilized asset on the day it went into service, and the proposed combustion regulator a very expensive and useless stranded asset.
[brief] THERE WAS NOT AN IMPROPER DENIAL OF ACCESS UNDER N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b)  BECAUSE A REQUEST FOR INFORMATION WAS NOT MADE TO THE CUSTODIAN.  (Da85; Da108)  The operative trigger for a custodian’s obligation arising under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b) is a request for “information. ”  The plain language of the statute requires that specified information “shall be available to the public within 24 hours or as soon as practicable, of a request for such information. ”  The statute does not say within twenty-four hours of a crime being reported, or a government record being produced.  In this instance, the Plaintiff never requested information, and the custodian was not given twenty-four hours to make the information available.  Accordingly, there was no improper denial of access under OPRA when the custodian failed to provide Section 3 information to the Plaintiff, as no request was made for that information and the custodian was not afforded twenty-four hours to supply such information.  Despite this syllogistic logic, the trial court ordered information be provided and found the Plaintiff as a “prevailing party,” which axiomatically equates to a determination that access was improperly denied by the Township.
[brief] *Victor v. State*, 203 N.J. 383, 414 (2010).  To show an employer failed to participate in the interactive process, a handicapped employee must demonstrate: 1) employer knew about employee's disability; 2) employee requested accommodation or assistance for her disability; 3) employer did not make a good faith effort to assist employee in seeking accommodations; and 4) the employee could have been reasonably accommodated but for the employer's lack of good faith.  *Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of the Superior Court*, 351 N.J. Super. 385, 397-98, cert. denied, 183 N.J. 215 (2005).
[brief] Plaintiff’s arguments fail to address that [...] is under no duty to inspect.  N.J.S.A. 59:2-6 states:  A public entity is not liable for injury caused by its failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; provided, however, that nothing in this section shall exonerate a public entity from liability for negligence during the course of, but outside the scope of, any inspection conducted by it, nor shall this section exonerate a public entity from liability for failure to protect against a dangerous condition as provided in chapter 4.  A similar immunity is set forth for public employees in N.J.S.A 59:3-7 which provides:  A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; provided, however, that nothing in this section shall exonerate a public employee from liability for negligence during the course of, but outside the scope of, any inspection conducted by him, nor shall this section exonerate a public employee from liability for failure to protect against a dangerous condition as provided in chapter 4.  Any claim that the accident in question was the result of the Town of [...]’s failure to inspect is therefore immunized.
[directive] SUBJECT: Revised Statewide Bail Schedules Directive #9-05 (dated May 12, 2005) (“Bail Schedules and Policies to Improve Bail Practices”) promulgated two Statewide Bail Schedules and adopted a number of statewide policies regarding bail practices.  Appended to this memorandum are revised Statewide Bail Schedules that supersede the Schedules distributed with Directive #9-05.  The revisions were necessary because of subsequent statutory amendments, as well as to correct a couple of editing errors and to make certain suggested refinements, as follows:  Adding separate references to two of the sexual assault statutes 1. (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2b and 2C:14-2c) on the second page of Bail Schedule 1 that were inadvertently combined.  Adding references to manslaughter and sexual assault to the section 2. summarizing R. 3:26-2 (Authority to Set Bail) contained in the Summary of Rules/Statutes Governing Bail attached to the Bail Schedules, which references inadvertently were omitted.