[brief] ”  Ibid.  Here, as in Gainey and Summa, the events that rapidly unfolded in the ShopRite parking lot within a span of less than an hour were not foreshadowed by “prior indicia of criminality. ”  Ibid.  Officers did not know defendant and were not seeking him out.  While conducting surveillance in an area known for CDS transactions, they developed a reasonable suspicion he was involved in CDS activity.  Defendant then blurted out that there was CDS in his vehicle.  The fact that defendant’s admission related to the reason the officers were in the parking does not mean the probable cause arose foreseeably.  This Court should continue to reject any reading of Smart that would illogically prohibit officers from searching a vehicle simply because they had applied their training and experience to developed probable cause to believe a specific contraband was present.  Adopting such a position would “virtually eliminate the automobile exception,” Gainey, A-3644-21 at *5, and would also reawaken the negative and unintended consequences that flowed from the Cooke and Pena-Flores decisions that temporarily eliminated the Alston exigency standard.  During the years the Alston standard was disfavored, the number of cases in which the State Police requested consent from drivers or occupants to search the vehicle rose over 733% and Troopers obtained consent in ninety-five percent of stops.  Witt, 223 N.J. at 436-37.  In those cases where they could not obtain consent, officers either applied for a telephonic warrant—which took an average of one to two hours to obtain and the occupants and officers endangered themselves by waiting on the side of the road, or they impounded the vehicle in order to secure a search warrant.  Id. at 436, 446.  But, as the Supreme Court noted, impounding the vehicle created issues of its own:  The current approach to roadside searches premised on probable cause—“get a warrant”—places significant burdens on law enforcement.  On the other side of the ledger, we do not perceive any real benefit to our citizenry by the warrant requirement in such cases—no discernible advancement of their liberty or privacy interests.  When a police officer has probable cause to search a car, is a motorist better off being detained on the side of the road for an hour (with all the accompanying dangers) or having his car towed and impounded at headquarters while the police secure a warrant?  Is not the seizure of the car and the motorist’s detention “more intrusive than the actual search itself”?  [Id. at 446 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 831 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).]  Thus, although not the primary motivation for re-adopting the Alston standard, the exponentially increased number of consent searches, prolonged roadside stops, and protracted vehicle impoundments concerned the Court enough to warrant a lengthy assessment and discussion in its Witt opinion.  There is no reason now to unnecessarily revive these significant consequences by requiring officers to stop their fluid investigation and obtain a warrant because they have developed reasonable suspicion before probable cause arose for the specific contraband they were investigating.  [...]’s decision appropriately acknowledged the circumstances leading to [...]’s probable cause arose unforeseeably and spontaneously.  He declined to accept defendant’s argument that his impulsive statement admitting he had cocaine in his vehicle was nonetheless foreseeable simply because the officers were surveilling an area known for CDS and observed defendant conducting what they suspected to be CDS transactions.  His holding was legally sound and factually based on his credibility findings and this Court should affirm it on appeal.  POINT II