ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO SUSTAIN THEIR BURDEN TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY AFFORDED TO THE AMENDED REDEVELOPMENT PLAN.  There is no dispute as to the applicable standard of review: municipal actions are presumed valid and will only be overturned if they are arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  Pb15-16; MDb19-21.  See, e.g., New Jersey Shore Builders Ass’n v. Jackson, 199 N.J. 38, 55-56, n. 8 (2009) (an ordinance is “presumptively valid and ... [is] not to be nullified except upon an affirmative showing that the action taken ... was unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. ”).  The same deferential standard applies to a municipality’s adoption of a redevelopment plan or its subsequent amendments.  See Powerhouse Arts Dist. Neighborhood Ass'n v. City Council of City of Jersey City, 413 N.J. Super. 322, 333 (App. Div. 2010) (“We discern no reason to accord a less deferential standard of review to the adoption of a significant amendment than to the adoption of the initial plan. ”).  To overcome the presumption of validity, the challenging party bears a “heavy burden. ”  Bryant v. City of Atlantic City, 309 N.J. Super. 596, 610 (App. Div. 1998).  _____________________
[brief] (Da17 to 29).  As to defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, the judge ruled that Brady had been violated.  (Da21 to 25).  But in considering what happened, the judge determined that a dismissal of the indictment, with prejudice, was not warranted.  (Da25).  While the judge ruled that what happened, including [...]’s testimony, was palpably negligent, the judge found that she “[could] not say that the [State’s] conduct was willful or outrageous. ” (Da25 to 26).  The judge therefore declined to dismiss the indictment.  Ibid.  Still, for the “palpable negligence in this case,” the judge stated that “[d]efendant must have a remedy” and granted the motion to suppress, thereby using a “palpable negligence” standard to suppress all the State’s evidence seized under a valid warrant that was not based on the reasonableness of the police’s conduct during the warrant’s execution.  (Da25 to 26).  The judge did so too even though she recognized that the diagram had been turned over while they were “still in the middle of the motion,” while they were “still litigating the case,” and while they were still at a point “where [the judge] c[ould] deal with it and fix it[.]” (6T47-13 to 48-6).  The judge also alternatively addressed the merits of the motion to suppress and concluded—based on her mistaken belief that the door to the third floor was on the right side, or [...] side, of the property—that the breach of the door to the third floor was outside the lawful bounds of the search warrant.  (Da26 to 29).  E.
[directive] Enclosed with this Directive is the latest version of IAPP.  The new version, among other things:  Incorporates the new law enforcement resiliency initiatives established by the • Officer Resiliency Directive (AG Directive 2019-1).  The revised identifies IAPP resources for law enforcement officers seeking tools to cope with the emotional and mental stresses of their work, and clarifies that an officer shall not face adverse internal affairs consequences for the sole reason that the officer decided to seek medical or psychological treatment for a mental health concern.  § 2.4.3.  Facilitates review of the disciplinary history of an officer who seeks employment • with another law enforcement agency.  The revised requires that background IAPP investigations for new recruits must include a review of the internal affairs files of any candidate who previously worked for another law enforcement agency.  § 3.1.1.  New Jersey law enforcement agencies are now generally required to disclose the entire internal affairs file of a candidate to prospective law enforcement employers, and a candidate with out-of-state law enforcement experience must waive confidentiality for their internal affairs files.  § 3.1.2.  Emphasizes the importance of “early warning systems” for the prevention of • misconduct; incorporates the Statewide EWS Directive (AG Directive 2018-3).  The revised incorporates the requirement that each police department must establish and IAPP maintain an “early warning system” protocol to identify officers whose conduct is or may become problematic.  The revised requires coordination with the department’s IAPP Internal Affairs function in order to ensure that minor episodes of misconduct do not escalate to more serious disciplinary issues.  § 3.4.
[brief] While in front of the --- 1  The State is omitting testimony concerning the trail cameras as they were suppressed at the motion hearing. residence, he was approached by members of the landlord’s family.  (3T24-11 to 28-9).  Later, [...] arrives and [...] indicates to him that the police were holding the house for a search warrant.  (3T29-20 to 21).  [...] is adamant that no one was going to be “searching (his) house. ” (3T29-22 to 24).  At this point, the Chief of Police talks to [...] who maintains his position that the police will not search his house.  (3T31-10 to 34-15).
[brief] Plaintiffs’ argument that the Board applied the more stringent criteria of Medici applicable to use variances under NJSA40:55D-70(d)(1), as though this were a variance for a use not permitted in the zone, is simply incorrect.  The Board’s Resolution never demands proofs concerning the particular suitability of the site for the proposed use, nor does the Resolution ever ask the Plaintiffs to address an enhanced quality of proof; both are at the core of the Medici proofs.  The Resolution addresses the criteria that Grasso requires, not those of Medici.  The Board applied the correct legal standard.
[brief] *(Da264-265)*  With reference to the misrepresentation that [...] virtually had no communications with [...] during the representation, *(See D128)*  [...] could have conversations with [...] to ask questions for at least four times on 2/15/2009, 2/27/2009, 4/18/2009, and 5/4/2009 before the judgment of divorce was entered.  At least two of dates were not in the presence of [...].  She admitted during the trial and deposition.  In fact, there was nothing to prevent her from contacting [...] for any concerns she might had.  All those misrepresentations made was for a sole purpose to have a ground to set aside the PSA.
[brief] THE BOARD’S APPLICATION OF N.J.A.C. 12:17–9.3(b) TO IMPOSE A NOTICE-AND-INQUIRY REQUIREMENT UPON EVERY EMPLOYEE WHO IS SEPARATED FROM EMPLOYMENT DUE TO A HEALTH CONDITION IS A PLAINLY UNREASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE REGULATION.  (Pa1; Pa3)  The Board contends that [...] should be held ineligible for unemployment benefits because he “never inquired into alternative positions or possible accommodations at [...]” and he failed to explain to his employer “that the job was aggravating his medical problem” as required by N.J.A.C. 12:17–9.3(b).  (Db8).  The Board mistakenly focuses on a perceived requirement that [...] “sit down” with his employer and explain his situation prior to leaving his position.  (Db8).  The Court, unconvinced by this exact argument in Ardan v. Bd. of Review, 231 N.J. 589 (2018), explained that a notice-and-inquiry requirement in N.J.A.C. 12:17–9.3(b) “may be generally imposed only by rulemaking pursuant to the APA. ”  Id. at 606.  (emphasis added).  In order to determine whether the imposition of a notice-and-inquiry requirement would be an “agency action [which] must be rendered through rule-making or adjudication”, the Court analyzed the factors in Metromedia, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, at 331-32 (1984) and found that “imposition of a general requirement that a claimant prove notice to the employer and a request for an accommodation in order to satisfy the burden imposed by N.J.A.C. 12:17–9.3(b)—meets the Metromedia test. ”  Ardan, 231 N.J. at 606.  Specifically, such a requirement “would establish a ‘legal standard or directive that is not otherwise expressly provided by or clearly and obviously inferable from the enabling statutory authorization’ [and] [i]t would state an administrative policy that was not previously expressed in ‘any official and explicit agency determination, adjudication or rule. ’”  Id. at 606-607 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 331 (1984)).  As a result, the Court found the Board’s policy cannot be implemented by adjudication, and instead, requires rulemaking, thereby finding the Board’s interpretation to be plainly unreasonable.  The Court recognized that in some cases a “claimant’s medical proofs, combined with evidence of the physical demands of the former employment, [and] the small size of the workplace” would be sufficient to meet a claimant’s burden.  Ardan, 231 N.J. at 605.  Applying the same rationale to this case, [...] was clearly not required to notify his employer of his medical condition or to inquire about alternative positions or accommodations, and therefore cannot be found ineligible for benefits by not taking action that he is not required to take.  II.
[brief] While noting the complaint did not specifically allege there was a contract between the Plaintiff and the third party, it observed:  The Complaint’s allegations do not specifically allege there was a contract between the Plaintiff and a third party.  However, based on past experience and common sense, see Iqbal, 550 US at 679 (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. ”), bank accounts are governed by contracts between the bank and the customer.  Here, the Complaint asserts that [...] had three accounts with the [...]... and that the Plaintiff was named the co-owner of the [...] checking account and sole beneficiary of the three accounts.  Thus, by implication, the factual allegations sufficiently plead the existence of a contract between the Plaintiff and the [...].  (Vol. II, Pa 189-190).  This is a far cry from the principle for which [...] cites this case, and offers no support for the Bank’s and Judge’s conclusion.  The statement in the application, “The Customer’s use of any [...] Bank N.A. (Bank) deposit account ... will confirm the customer’s receipt of and agreement to be bound by the Bank’s applicable ... account agreement that includes an arbitration agreement ... (Pa 35, 148) is not proof of an agreement where Bank did not (1) provide Plaintiff with a copy of the application or agreement before he left the Bank, (2) give him an opportunity to read or review the application or agreement when he was there or (3) advise him of the nature of the transaction or where the deposit agreement could be found.
[brief] That finding deprived defendant of any standing to challenge the search.  First, unlike Brown, the officers had not conducted a surveillance of the building and had not seen anyone enter the building by using a key to open a locked door.  Instead, the officers searched an alleyway, late at night, shortly after the reported armed robbery, where they suspected defendant had abandoned the handgun.  As the trial judge found, the officers checked the backdoor to the building “almost as an afterthought,” because they had not located the handgun in the alleyway.  An examination of the records on ownership of the building at that late hour and given the need to quickly find an abandoned loaded handgun would have been both difficult and unduly cumbersome under these circumstances.  Second, the condition of the property and the failure to secure the premises supported a finding of abandonment.  Brown, 216 N.J. at 532.  While searching the alleyway the officers noticed that the owner of the property had not taken measures to secure the building from intruders because the gate to the alley was open and the backdoor was unlocked.  Additionally, the officers had personal knowledge that the building was in a commercial, not residential area, and their determination that the building was an abandoned commercial building was consistent with the building's appearance.  There was no furniture, clothes, shoes, blankets, food, or any other items in the building to indicate that anyone, much less defendant, resided there or had any possessory interest in the premises.  The alleyway and backyard were filled with so much broken glass and debris that it was not safe for a search dog, and thus, reasonably would also not have been safe for residents.  Those factors, the condition of the property, and the officers’ knowledge of the commercial nature of the area, support a finding that the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to conclude that the building was abandoned before they entered it or searched it.  Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the trial judge's finding that the property was abandoned was supported by the substantial credible evidence in the record.
[brief] Brenman v. Demello, 191 N.J. 18, 30 (2007).  The authentication of photographic evidence prior to its admission seems to contemplate proof that the photograph is a substantially correct representation of the matters ... offered in evidence, and this includes an identification or statement as to what the photograph shows.  State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4, 14–15 (1994).  For authentication, a witness must identify the persons, places, or things shown in the photograph or videotape.  *Id.*  Notably, however, the person testifying need not be the photographer, because the ultimate object of an authentication is to establish its accuracy or correctness.  To that end, any person with the requisite knowledge of the facts represented in the photograph or videotape may authenticate it.  *Id.*  An authenticator need not even have been present at the time the photograph was taken, so long as the witness can verify that the photograph accurately represents its subject.
[brief] In the present case, [...] positively identified defendant in both a photo array identification procedure administered the morning after the robbery and an in-court identification procedure at the trial nearly two years later.  We note, however, that her initial description, provided just minutes after the robbery, highlighted one of the perpetrator's distinguishing characteristics.  [...] explained to [...] that the robber had “the bluest eyes I've ever seen. ”  But it is undisputed that defendant does not have blue eyes.  In his closing argument, the prosecutor sought to bolster [...]'s ability to identify the perpetrator by replaying for the jury the Wawa surveillance video, highlighting a moment in the recording where it appeared that [...] made eye contact with the robber.  The prosecutor argued to the jury, “[t]hat's eye contact. ”  From our perspective in determining whether the State's evidence was overwhelming, the video proof that [...] made eye contact with the robber underscores the significance of the discrepancy between the description of the robber she first gave to police and defendant's actual appearance.  See Branch, 182 N.J. at 353, 865 A.2d 673; cf. Watson, —— N.J. Super at —— (slip op. at 64) (noting the State's case was fortified by an unequivocal positive identification of the perpetrator shown in the surveillance video by the defendant's former girlfriend).
[brief] [...]  FILING FEES WAIVED R. 1:13-2  [...]  [...]  Phone: [...], Ext. 6279  Fax: [...]  Email: [...]  By: [...], Esq.  Attorneys for Claimant-Appellant Richard H. Lambdon  On the brief:  [...], Esq.  [...], Esq. [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] This conduct does not conform with “faithfully, impartially, and justly” performing all the duties of a school board member.  (Ca031-032).  Yet, the Commission did not even take into account the fact that Respondent clearly and purposefully broke the law as pled.  Instead, the Commission invented a fact not in the record with regard to Count 3 – that “Respondent made a personal decision not to wear a mask during a public Board meeting (and during an ongoing health emergency)” (Ca213).  There is nothing “personal” about publicly and vocally breaking the law while dressed in the trappings of public office and urging others to do the same.  It is abundantly clear from the record and the facts as alleged by Appellants – which are to be viewed most favorably to Appellants on a Motion to Dismiss – that Respondent’s decision to flout Executive Order 251 was not simply personal.  Nor did Respondent assert anywhere in the record that her decision to knowingly and publicly break the law while dressed in the trappings of public office was a “personal decision. ”  This assertion appears nowhere but the Commission’s August 23, 2022 Decision itself, and therefore Appellants had no opportunity to address it.  By adding this fact to its decision, the Commission found a fact not in the record and heavily weighed it in favor of the party moving for dismissal.  This is precisely the opposite role the Commission is tasked with in deciding a Motion to Dismiss.  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins., supra 142 N.J. at 540 (1995).  Respondent made conscious decisions to break the law while a sitting Board member at meetings of the Board.  Enforcing uniform disciplinary action when Board members purposely and consciously break laws relating to schools while sitting in their official position at a Board meeting is precisely what the Legislature created the Commission to do.
[brief] In response to the objectors at the hearing, now plaintiffs in this matter, [...], the Applicant’s engineer, testified according to his interpretation of the [...] Building Height Ordinance, the height of the buildings in the proposed development are measured from the proposed finished grade at the corners of each of the buildings.  (Pa132;92:4-6, 18-20).  However, plaintiff [...], through his counsel, [...], Esq., presented the testimony of an objecting engineer, [...] objecting to Mr. DeCina’s interpretation of the Building Height Ordinance.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2).  Here, the trial court ordered restitution against defendants [...] and [...], but declined to order any remedy against [...] – a separate entity controlled by defendant [...].  See (Pa83) (“[...] and [...] are two distinct entities both controlled by [...].  [...] is a for-profit entity while [...] is a non-profit entity. ”).  [...] was a necessary cog in [...] and [...]’s fraudulent securities machinery.  [...] improperly transferred at least $1,500,000 of investor funds to [...].  (Pa84).  [...], through [...], then misused at least $1,500,000 of investor funds to which it had no right.
[brief] PLAINTIFF CANNOT PROVE HER PRIMA FACIE CASE WITHOUT A LIABILITY EXPERT (Pa368-70)  Although expert testimony is generally permissive, N.J.R.E. 702, there are situations where expert testimony must be presented.  Kelly v. Berlin, 300 N.J. Super. 256, 268 (App. Div. 1997).  To establish premises liability, a plaintiff bears the burden to establish that the premises owner breached the duty of care owed to her.
[brief] ”).  Following this logic, and the conclusion reached by several other trial courts throughout New Jersey, the Superior Court in this matter concluded as follows:  [P]laintiff alleges that [...] used a letter vendor to undertake the task of printing and sending him a collection notice, which required [...] to send the vendor the information to be included in the letter.  Critically and most importantly, plaintiff does not allege that the vendor misused the information, that the vendor disseminated the information, or even that any individual at the vendor saw the information.  *This was, at most, a benign administrative task.  The FDCPA, upon which plaintiff relies, is a statute designed to prevent abusive, harassing, or misleading conduct.  The use of the letter vendor does not involve any of that.*  T22:10-22 (emphasis added).  *See also* T14-T22; *Miller v. Americollect, Inc.*, Case No. ESX-L-6164-21, 2022 WL 20470401 (N.J. Super. L. Aug. 11, 2022); *Abdelfattah Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.*, Case No. HUD-L-394-22 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Jan. 6, 2023) (“Mhrez Decision”); *Jasmine Mhrez v. Radius Global Solutions, LLC*, Case No. HUD-L-728-22 and *Jasmine Mhrez v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.*, Case No. HUD-L-731-22 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 2022) (“Mhrez Transcript”); *Rubin v. Transworld Systems, Inc.*, Case No. OCN-L-2066-21 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Jan. 20, 2023); *Hopkins v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.*, Case No. PAS-L-342-23 (N.J. Sup. Ct. May 31, 2023).
[brief] SURROUNDING A REPORTED AND DOCUMENTED INCIDENT INVOLVING THE SAFETY AND WELFARE OF PLAINTIFF ON ITS PREMISES AND GIVEN THE LIKELIHOOD OF LITIGATION (2T.12:3-11; 20:19-21:13)  Plaintiffs assert that despite a duty for [...] to preserve surveillance footage from the calendar day prior to the incident up through and following the moment of impact, [...] spoliated such evidence.  Spoliation is used to describe the hiding or destroying of evidence by an adverse party, resulting in the interference with the court’s proper administration and disposition of the action.  *Hirsch v. General Motors Corp.*, 266 N.J. Super. 222, 234 (Law Div. 1993).  In other words, spoliation refers to the concealment or destruction of evidence by one party to hinder the ability of another party to litigate a case.  *Jerista v. Murray*, 185 N.J. 175, 201 (2005) (See *Rosenblit v. Zimmerman*, 166 N.J. 391, 400-01 (2001)).  While “[t]he scope of the duty to preserve evidence is not boundless[,] [a] ‘potential spoliator need do only what is reasonable under the circumstances,’ ” *Id.* at 251 (quoting *Cty. of Solano v. Delancy*, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721, 731 (Ct.  App. 1989))  In this State, a duty to preserve evidence arises when there is: (1) pending or probable litigation; (2) knowledge by the party of the existence or likelihood of litigation; (3) foreseeability of harm or prejudice to another party if the evidence were discarded; and (4) evidence relevant to the litigation.
[directive] Administration of Funds and Property Resultinq from State Forfeiture Actions  1:2  Any law enforcement agency that receives funds property resulting from and .  N.J.S.A. , forfeitures brought under the authority of 2C:64-1 seq., (civil forfeiture), et 2C:21-25 N.J.S.A. N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1, et seq. (racketeering) or from actions brought under or the et seq. (financial facilitation of crime), under any other statute as directed by in Attorney General, shall administer the expenditure the funds or of the property of use and accordance with the following laws, directives, guidelines standard operating procedures:
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**  This Appeal cannot be reviewed in a vacuum.  Context matters.  This Appeal arises, in part, from the January 5, 2021 unilateral (without any prior public input) abridgment, impairment and suppression of our State’s strong public policy in favor of “robust informed civic participation” and a competitive marketplace of competing ideas.  This Appeal also involves the validity of a Flex Parking Removal/911 Memorial Capital Bond Ordinance adopted June 15, 2021.  (Pa191).
[brief] The Court cannot consider any prospective, future approval of development – which may never come to fruition.  Challenges to those are for a future day, in a future litigation, following a future Municipal action – if such future events ever occur.  To be sure, such development may never occur in the matter authorized by the Plan.  (emphasis added)  • ...  Thus, sequentially, and logically, the Plan here establishes a Zoning Overlay for the Redevelopment Area.  It does not permit any Redevelopment Project.  Rather, as the LRHL states, any Application for a Redevelopment Project still “shall be submitted to the Municipal Planning Board for its review and approval. ”  (Citations omitted.)  Thus, as [...] astutely observes, “The Redevelopment Plan establishes Zoning for the Redevelopment Area, but anyone wishing to develop properties within the Redevelopment Area must still file a Development Application with the Municipal Planning Board. ”  Put another way, the Plan here is the Horse.  Future Redevelopment is the Cart.  [...] cannot put the Cart before the Horse, where the Cart is little more than a conceptual vision, not even proposed yet by its Developer.(emphasis added)  •