ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  *Allendorf v. Kaiserman Enterprises*, 266 N.J. Super. 662, 672 (App. Div. 1993).  This “logical relationship” must be established through an appropriate medical expert opinion.  *Id.*  This follows the principle of law that it is improper to present unexplained medical facts and data to the lay jury without the guidance of expert testimony.  *Showalter v. Barilari Inc.*, 312 N.J. Super. 494, 514 (App. Div. 1998).
[brief] [Burnett, 198 N.J. at 427.]  The first two factors are the type of record requested and the information it contains.  Application of these two factors to this case is not controversial: Plaintiffs requested email addresses.  The email addresses are “private” email addresses, meaning that the email addresses are not associated with the domain \(^2\)  The Trial Court’s discussion of the privacy test begins at Da108, and the Court’s discussion of the Doe factors begins at Da109.  \(^3\)  The Supreme Court has articulated modified privacy balancing tests in those cases involving access to student records and access to internal affairs reports, Rivera v. Union Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., 250 N.J. 124, 147-48 (2022), L.R. v. Camden City Public Sch. Dist., 238 N.J. 547, 575 (2019), but neither of those categories of records are implicated in this proceeding.
[brief] ”  (30T 57-22 to 58-2)  As discussed in Section A., above, the court’s finding that [...] did not express remorse is contrary to the record, not a statutory aggravating factor, and of questionable relevance to any aggravating factors; its finding that [...] refrained from incriminating himself at sentencing violates his constitutional right against self-incrimination; and its finding that [...] committed perjury is unwarranted.  [...]’s good prior record, which the court found in mitigation (30T 56-16 to 19), supported both mitigating factor (8) and (9), and the court erred in rejecting both factors.  See Dalziel, 182 N.J. at 505 (holding that where mitigating factors are “supported, they must be part of the deliberative process”).  The failure to find relevant mitigating factors is ground for resentencing.
[brief] 255a Exhibit 18, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated June 2, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  263a Exhibit 19, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated May 18, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  Exhibit 20, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated March 30, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  Exhibit 21, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated March 9, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  Exhibit 22, Excerpts of the Deposition of [...], dated May 18, 2017, filed April 26, 2018  Exhibit 23, Report of Examination of [...], P.E., dated January 18, 2018, filed April 26, 2018
[brief] (Da28-Da63; Da64-Da71, ¶ 39).  On January 9, 2024, Respondent opposed Appellant’s Motion.  (Da64-Da71; Da64-Da71, ¶ 40; Da64-Da71; Pa1-Pa294).  --- \(^4\) 3T refers to the Transcript of Oral Argument on Appellant’s First Motion to Vacate before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. of the Lower Court on July 6, 2023 and filed by Respondent on November 26, 2024.  On February 16, 2024, the Lower Court held oral argument on the Motions and directed that a plenary hearing be held as to service on Appellant.
[brief] Rather, they address the standard of proof necessary to issue such an order.  As the trial court aptly found, the State’s motion was supported by probable cause and, therefore, the trial court properly granted the State’s motion.  A crime undoubtedly was committed because a firearm was found underneath the passenger’s seat of the Toyota.  Not only was there reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant committed the crime, there was probable cause, because he was seated in the passenger’s seat of the Toyota and his cellphone was recovered from the floorboard of the passenger’s side, a small distance from where the firearm was located.  Knowing whether defendant’s DNA matched the sample that was recovered from the firearm would significantly advance the investigation and assist in establishing whether or not the defendants committed the crime.  And, there was no other mechanism by which to obtain defendant’s DNA.  Thus, the trial court properly granted the State’s motion.
[directive] Sustained Charges: Incident(s) giving rise to the charge(s) and the date(s) on which it/they occurred  If checked, charges are continued on attached page.  If checked, incidents are continued on attached page.  The following disciplinary action has been taken against you:  Suspension for __________ working days, beginning ______________ and ending ___________________  Indefinite suspension pending criminal charges effective (date)  ____________________________________  Removal, effective (date)  _________________________________________________________________  Demotion to position of __________________________ effective (date)  ____________________________  Resignation not in good standing, effective (date)  ________________  Other Disciplinary Action__________
[directive] Directive# 02-16  Page 4 documentation to be transmitted to the Superior Court to request an expungement.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6a(1).  The instructions and forms for applicants seeking an in Municipal Court are set forth in my memorandum to expungement of proceedings Municipal Court Judges, Directors, and Administrators dated May 23, 2016, which is appended to this directive.
[directive] It also bears FTA score). of the NCA score regardless apply for subsection 4.5.1, and also enforcement will acomplaint-warrant, see that law presumption triggers a detention.  will seek pretrial See subsection 7.4.5. prosecutor that the presumption triggers a 32 Page pretrial risk-assessment process may not relevant  The automated account for all account for the fact-sensitive For example, it does not manner which the circumstances. in that might suggest that the present was committed defendant is especially dangerous offense than serious harm that required to establish of (e.g., defendant inflicted more the elements the the offense was not limited to "simple possession," involved charged crime; a firearms but rather or involved brandishing or an unlawful purpose, pointing thereby possession for the firearm, offense was risk of violence; the committed against particularly creating a heightened a in the presence of victim; offense was committed children or posed a vulnerable the otherwise Nor the pretrial risk children, etc.). does automated risk-assessment process heightened to which might suggest that strength of the case, the defendant greater account for the would have conviction by fleeing (e.g., likely where the offense conduct captured on incentive to avoid a is defendant to the recording; confessed crime; the offense conduct personally an audio/video the was on person of officer; contraband was found the the observed by a police defendant, etc.).4 of informing the law enforcement decision issue a Furthermore, for purposes whether to apply for acomplaint-warrant, the automated pretrial risk-assessment complaint-summons or or for pending charge conviction from another the does not account a state, although software will by the AOC indicate to law computer system administered enforcement that out-of-state information exists with respect to the defendant.
[brief] *Id.* at 610.  Consequently, the Court held that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to learn that defendant made incriminating statements while under arrest for an unrelated offense.  *Id.* at 610-12.  Similarly, evidence that [...] gave his confession while in custody for an unrelated arrest was irrelevant to any issue before the jury.  The jury learned of the custodial nature of [...]’s interrogation while watching the interrogation video, during which [...] stated, “[y]ou’re under arrest obviously today for whatever . . . happened earlier. ”  (7T 172-10 to 12)  The unrelated arrest was confirmed again when [...] tried to clarify the basis of his arrest and [...] responded, “whatever you did today is what you’re under arrest for. ”  (7T 172-24 to 25)  Because the jury was informed that the alleged robbery occurred on August 22 and that [...] was arrested and interrogated on September 30, it was obvious to the jury that [...]’s reference during the interrogation to “whatever [[...]] did today” was unrelated to the robbery.  (7T 55-10 to 11, 175-24 to 25)  It is impossible to conceive of any non-propensity purpose for the jury to learn of [...]’s custodial status.  See Reddish, 181 N.J. at 610.  There is simply no “logical connection” between [...]’s arrest and any fact in issue.  Willis, 225 N.J. at 98.  And, had there been even some relevance for the arrest, the significant risk that the jury would assume [...] was guilty because of his prior record far outweighed any probative value that one could conjure.  Reddish, 181 N.J. at 610.  Moreover, should the court find that [...]’s custodial status had some relevance or probative value, the trial court’s failure to explain the proper use of this evidence to the jury would still constitute reversible error.  Our Supreme Court has held that a clear instruction on the appropriate use of other-bad-act evidence is necessary in every case, even where it is not requested by defense counsel.  See State v. Clausell, 121 N.J. 298, 323 (1990); State v. Oliver, 133 N.J. 141, 157-59 (1993).  The instruction must “explicitly caution the [jury] against inferring from a single instance of bad conduct”—i.e., a prior arrest on unrelated charges—“a propensity on behalf of defendant to commit crimes. ”  Reddish, 181 N.J. at 611.  The fact that the jury received no guidance for interpreting the other-bad-act evidence presented at [...]’s trial through the interrogation video further compounds the error.  With no relevance and no limiting instruction, admission of evidence of [...]’s custodial status was clearly capable of suggesting to the jury that [...] had a propensity to commit crimes and, thus, likely committed this crime.  Therefore, as will be discussed further below, the failure to properly redact [...]’s interrogation video constituted reversible error.
[brief] Lastly, defendant was actively involved in the transportation of these drugs to New Jersey because he remained in regular cellphone contact with [...] as he traveled from Reno, Nevada, to Illinois, and then to New Jersey.  (11T58-2 to 85-3).  Considering the above, [...] appropriately concluded, the “profits involved in these operations absent a sufficient level of deterrence will likely support a risk of re-offense. ” (15T29-10 to 14).  Because [...] found that there was a substantial likelihood that the defendant was involved in organized criminal activity, she found that the record supported a finding of aggravating factor number 5.
[brief] In the second part of jury question C-7, the jury asked “Does an officer need to verbalize the intent to arrest?” (9T:95-14 to 17)  In response, the court read the resisting arrest charge to the jury again – including the instruction that to find [...] guilty of resisting arrest, the jury must find that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that “[...] was effecting an arrest,” as well as “acting under color of his official authority,” and that he “announce[d] his intention to arrest prior to the resistance. ”  (9T:95-18 to 98-15)  The jury’s ultimate acquittal of [...] on the resisting arrest charge, together with the jury’s question (C-7), implies that they were unconvinced that [...] knew that he was being arrested outside of the restaurant.  Had the jury been properly instructed on self-defense, there is a real possibility that they would have acquitted [...] of the aggravated assault charges outside the restaurant as well.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to [...], the jury could have concluded that [...] did not know he was under arrest, thought he was being beaten by police for his conduct inside the restaurant, and was responding in self-defense.  Alternatively, the jury could have found that [...] knew he was being arrested and acted in self-defense in response to the officers’ use of excessive force.  Therefore, had the jury been properly instructed, it could have acquitted him of all charges.  The absence of self-defense jury instructions denied [...] a fair trial.  Reversal of his convictions is thus required.
[directive] When this enhancement feature applies, the increase in the term of parole ineligibility ranges from three to nine months, as determined by the prosecutor considering the nature of the violation.  Other non-D.O.R.O. types of bail violations continue to be treated as an aggravating factor worth three or four points.  See Section 10.1.2.  The revised Guidelines also make clear that the bail violations aggravating factor is not limited to circumstances where the present Brimage-eligible offense was committed while the defendant was on bail for another offense, but is also triggered if the defendant commits a bail violation while awaiting disposition of the present Brimage-eligible offense (e.g., the defendant fails to appear at sentencing).  Page xii
[directive] 9.10.4  That law enforcement agencies report the above-listed incidents to the County Prosecutor's Office does not constitute a mandate or requirement that the information be disclosed to the court.  Prosecutors should conduct an independent review of the information provided to determine whether it needs to be disclosed and whether the officer can participate in the prosecution of criminal cases.  9.10.5  Once a decision is reached as to a particular case or defendant, the prosecutor shall, if necessary, discuss their decision with the internal affairs investigator and the law enforcement executive.  If it is determined that an officer cannot participate in a criminal prosecution, the prosecutor must advise the agency whether the officer's disability is limited to a particular case, a particular category of cases or all criminal matters.  9.11
[brief] For example, in Martindale, the plaintiff received the arbitration agreement within her application for employment, on page four of that document, just as the Agreement in this case was included within [...]’s on-boarding documents.  173 N.J. at 82.  As here, the Martindale plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to consult an attorney.  *Id.*  Like [...], the *Martindale* plaintiff also had an opportunity to ask questions about the arbitration agreement, although she did not.  *Id.*  While [...] attempts to assign significance to the fact that the *Martindale* arbitration provision was in all-capital letters, the court there did not.  Nevertheless, equally, the Agreement here was titled “**MUTUAL ARBITRATION AGREEMENT (‘AGREEMENT’)**”, in bold-faced capital letters; the pivotal paragraph of the Agreement was set off in bold-face, with capital emphasis that any claims covered by the Agreement would be “subject to confidential arbitration pursuant to the terms of this Agreement and will be resolved by Arbitration and NOT by a court or jury. ” (Pa00092 (emphasis in original). )  [...] did not establish a meaningful distinction between the manner in which the arbitration agreement was presented in *Martindale* and here.  [...]’s next new argument, that Agreement is unenforceable as a “contract of adhesion” (Pb33–34), is of no effect.
[brief] C.  Public Entities Cannot Waive Conflicts Below defendants’ counsel claimed that none of the defendants objected to their representation.  However, there is no evidence of that in the record.  Further, even if that were true, a public entity cannot waive conflicts of interest.  See R.P.C. 1.7(b)(1): “a public entity cannot consent to any such representation”; see also Outside Counsel Guidelines effective November 1, 2022, Pa129 (“State agencies cannot waive any conflicts that the Rules of Professional Conduct (‘RPCs’) prohibit, and counsel should neither request nor expect the Attorney General to grant such a waiver”).
[brief] School districts contract with hundreds of private vendors for various goods and services.  It is absurd to infer that the Legislature intended to add an additional time and cost burden on school districts by allowing the multiple hundreds of private vendors to sue them in Superior Court for violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), especially when 35 Pa232 – Pa266 the Commissioner of Education was charged with governing and advising school districts throughout the pandemic, and has a mechanism for redress of 18A violations.  Hence, the court should not infer that there is an implied private right to a cause of action for [...] to sue the [...] in Superior Court for violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  Dismissal of the Counterclaim is therefore warranted.
[brief] Appellant asserts that Respondent violated §§ 1692c(b), 1692d(3), and 1692f of the FDCPA through its use of a letter vendor to process and mail a collection letter to Appellant.  Whether a defendant’s conduct complies with the FDCPA is a question of law for the Court to decide while bearing in mind the FDCPA’s twin aims of both protecting consumers from “abusive, deceptive, unfair” conduct and “insur[ing] that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged. ”  *See Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc.*, 516 F.3d at 90 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)).  Considering the asserted letter vendor theory of liability in June of this year, this Court twice determined that trial courts had properly dismissed claims grounded in this theory.
[brief] ”  *Ibid.*  Even a judge’s “subtle behaviors” can coerce jurors into reaching a verdict they would not have otherwise.  *State v. Adim*, 410 N.J. Super. 410, 428 (App. Div. 2009).  “The appropriate course when a juror indicates that the jury is deadlocked is to inquire of the jury whether further deliberation will likely result in a verdict. ”  *State v. Valenzuela*, 136 N.J. 458, 469 (1994).  Although a “judge has discretion to require further deliberations after a jury has announced its inability to agree,” a judge’s “exercise of that discretion is not appropriate if the jury has reported a definite deadlock after a reasonable period.
[brief] 129.  As described in further detail below, this plan involved no meaningful participation by the [...], the government entity legally entitled to exercise the right of condemnation.  [(Indictment, pages 50 and 51, Pa58-Pa59) (emphasis added). ]  Indeed, the Indictment refers to a “Lawyer-2” at [...] who is an accomplice of [...] and an unindicted co-conspirator: 134.  On October 20, 2016, [...]’s law partner, Lawyer-2, who represented the [...], emailed the then-Executive Director of the [...] to inform her of an “urgent issue” with the LPT development project.  In this email, Lawyer-2 wrote that “[t]he proposal is for [...] to file an application in Court to ask the Court to confirm that the power of eminent domain is available to extinguish the view easement.  The idea is to get the complaint filed today or tomorrow.  [...] is going to brief the Mayor [[...]] who I believe will then discuss with [the then-chair of the [...] board].”  135.  According to billing records, although they did not charge the [...] for it, [...] attorneys, including [...] and Lawyer-2, worked at least 86 hours, over a 7-day period, preparing an order to show cause requesting that the court declare that the [...] had the power to condemn Developer-1’s view easement.  Fewer than five hours of this more than 86 hours of legal work involved contact with officials of the [...], the client.  [(Indictment, pages 52 and 53, Pa60-Pa61) (emphasis added). ]  In fact, as set forth in the Indictment, it was [...]’s position as an attorney, and his relationship with his partners at [...], including the unindicted co-conspirator “Lawyer-2” and [...]’s client, [...], that enabled the criminal enterprise to be successful in shaking down developers and other business people in South Jersey.  As set forth in the Indictment: 139.
[brief] In an analogous opinion in Polyard, the plaintiff sued the State under the Tort Claims Act for a negligently maintained roadway that allegedly caused an automobile accident.  While holding that alleged road defect in that case was not “substantial” enough to support the plaintiff’s expert’s opinion as a factual matter, the court nonetheless explained that based on New Jersey evidence rules, “[t]he opinion of an expert is undoubtedly admissible, and usually useful, when, as here, a road-surface characteristic is not so pronounced that its effect upon the control of an automobile is obvious.
[brief] The term “riparian” means “[o]f, relating to, or located on the banks of a river or stream (or occasionally another body of water, such as a lake). ”  Black's Law Dictionary 1352 (8th ed. 2004); 6 Waters and Water Rights 1290 ([...], ed., 1991, repl. vol. 2005).  Thus, riparian lands are lands lying along the banks of a stream or water body.
[brief] The SREC's are a separate and distinct asset that belongs to [...] and therefore plaintiffs.  FAC ¶ 28, id.  On June 18, 2015, the [...] issued a Clean Energy Order under the applicable three (3) docket numbers regarding the program to implement SRECs at the [...], and duly issued the following findings and conclusions, in relevant part, which effectively granted a certification upon the satisfaction of stated-conditions:
[directive] The law enforcement executive must establish a means to monitor performance and to correct improper actions.  2.0.3  This approach to management as it relates to discipline insures that all subordinates know and understand what must be done, why it must be done, how it must be done and when it must be done.  Employees must be clearly told what constitutes satisfactory performance through performance evaluations and similar procedures.  N.J.A.C. 4A:6-5.1.  Supervisors and managers also must know when and how to take corrective action.  To achieve this, management must establish workable procedures for documenting all expectations and advising individuals of their duties and responsibilities.  2.1
[brief] Under § 1692c(b), a debt collector is barred from virtually all third-party communications.  The disclosure of confidential financial and personal information is an invasion of one’s personal privacy and poses the risk of further disclosure or publication.  Nothing in the FDCPA constrains the breadth of the prohibition against third-party communications except for the expressed exceptions.  And none of those exceptions allow for communications with mail vendors.  To the contrary, Congress articulated that it was highly concerned with the “invasions of individual privacy” arising from abusive debt collection practices.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a).  As a result of these concerns, Congress provided limits on the use of a consumer’s information and protections from its misuse.  Thus, in § 1692c(b), Congress did indeed identify, with particularity, whom debt collectors may disclose consumer information—and no one else.
[brief] As we noted in *Venable*, although the right to a public trial is constitutionally guaranteed, “this does not mean that any exclusion of persons from the courtroom during the course of trial proceedings, no matter how brief or insignificant, automatically constitutes a denial of the right to a public trial that necessitates a new trial. ”  *Venable, supra,* —— N.J.Super. at —— (slip op. at 7).  In certain circumstances, the temporary exclusion of the public from a criminal trial may be too “trivial” to warrant the reversal of an otherwise proper conviction.  *Ibid.*  As we explained in *Venable*, the term “trivial” is not synonymous to, or the functional equivalent of, the concept of harmless error.  *Id.* at —— (slip op. 8).  Rather, in determining whether a particular violation of the right to a public trial may be considered “trivial,” a reviewing court “looks ... to whether the actions of the court and the effect that they had on the conduct of the trial deprived the defendant—whether otherwise innocent or guilty—of the protections conferred by the Sixth Amendment.