ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The usual measure of just compensation is the market value of the acquired property on the date of taking.  In *Village of South Orange v. Alden Corp.*, 71 N.J. 362 (1976) the court repeated that the test of compensation was the probable sales price between willing parties.  When we speak of “value” as a measure of just compensation, we are referring to market value; and when we speak of market value we mean the price which would be mutually agreeable to a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under compulsion to act.  Id. at 367-368 [emphasis added].  In State v. Caoili, 135 N.J. 252 (1994), the Supreme Court reiterated:  Just compensation is “the fair market value of the property as of the date of the taking, determined by what a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree to, neither being under any compulsion to act. ”  State v. Silver, 92 N.J. 607, 513, 457 A.2d 463 (1983).  It is the “value that would be assigned to the acquired property by knowledgeable parties freely negotiating for its sale under normal market conditions based on all surrounding circumstances at the time of the taking. ”  Id. at 515 [emphasis added].  Here, just compensation should be measured as the fair market value of the perpetual easement upon the Property based on a consideration of all relevant, reasonably calculable, and non-conjectural factors that either decrease or increase the value of the remaining property.  Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, supra at 389.
[brief] In the present matter, we face the identical [...] claims that [...] pursued in Mt. Prospect, only now alleged by [...] in State versus Federal Court.  [...] has the same DPR Plan and AOB as did [...] which encompassed their [...] claims and raised the same arguments before [...] who, consistent with the Court of Appeals in Mt. Prospect, rejected them in favor of arbitration.  Based upon this binding precedent, the reviewing court must reject the anti-arbitration claims raised by [...], which are virtually identical to those of [...] in the Mt. Prospect case.
[brief] State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987)  ....................................................................................................................  49 State v. Gonzalez, 2015 WL 9491939 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 31, 2015)..............................  47 State v. Henries, 306 N.J. Super. 512 (App. Div. 1997) ................................................................. 26, 36 State v. Hunt, 25 N.J. 514 (1958) ......................................................................................... 37, 40, 44 State v. Hyppolite, 236 N.J. 154 (2018) ......................................................................................... 41 State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233 (1996) ......................................................................................... 25, 26 State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89 ........................................................................................................ 25, 26, 27, 31 State v. Milne, 178 N.J. 486 (2004) ......................................................................................... 47 State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383 (1998) ......................................................................................... 25, 26 State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518 (2013) ......................................................................................... 43, 45 State v.  Nelson, 155 N.J. 487 (1998) ......................................................................................... 26, 27, 28, 36 State v. Pacheco, 38 N.J. 120 (1962) ......................................................................................... 37, 40 State v. Peterson, 364 N.J. Super. 364 (App. Div. 2003) ............................................................. 45, 46 State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451 (1992) ......................................................................................... 46 State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44 (2017) ......................................................................................... 41, 42 State v. Smith, 43 N.J. 67 (1964) ............................................................................................ 47 State v. Sullivan, 43 N.J. 209 (1964) ......................................................................................... 40 State v. Tairi, 2022 WL 2760858 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 15, 2022) ....................... 8, 14 State v. Torres, No. A-5292-97T4 (App. Div. Dec. 10, 2001) .................................................. 22 State v. Torres, 171 N.J. 338 (2002) ......................................................................................... 22, 26 State v. Torres, 2007 WL 2119147 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 25, 2007) .........................
[brief] The initial omission of [...] as a plaintiff was a direct result of some of the very misconduct by Appellant for which he was found liable.  When the Complaint was originally filed in January of 2018, Appellant had purportedly transferred [...] to his wife pursuant to Appellant’s (now rescinded) fraudulent transfer agreement, and the individual Plaintiffs had been fired from their roles as officers of [...].  They remained members of [...], [...]’s parent company before the fraudulent transfer.  Appellant informed the Plaintiffs that they each would be receiving a payment for one-ninth of the value of [...]; a value that he had diminished by $4,750,000 by the fraud described above.  As a result, prior to the grant of summary judgment as to Count VI, [...] was ‘owned on paper’ by Appellant’s wife and therefore could not be named as a Plaintiff.  As such, the Court properly amended the caption to conform to the evidence presented and added [...] as a named Plaintiff.  Accordingly, the decisions from the Court Below should be affirmed as properly supported by the evidence before the Court.
[directive] This term shall also include a juvenile over the age of fourteen who, if he or she were an adult, would qualify as a professional criminal within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3b.  Furthermore, so as to achieve and implement the objectives and goals enumerated above, and so as to provide appropriate guidance to police officers and prosecutors in the sound exercise of discretion in their handling of juvenile matters, I do hereby further DIRECT the following:
[directive] 9 9 9 Yes No Unk or by escapee or parole absconder (add 12 months).  (See Feature E)  Defendant has violated a Drug Offender Restraining Order (add 3 to 9 months).  (See 9 9 9 Yes No Unk Feature F)  Offense involved 2C:35-7 while on school property.  (Mandatory minimum of 3 years unless 9 9 9 Yes No Unk less than 1 oz. of marijuana, or add 1 year if Extended Term).  (See Feature G)  Offense occurred on school property and involved 2C:35-6 (add 12 months) or involved 1st 9 9 9 Yes No Unk degree offense under 2C:35-5 (add 18 months).  (See Feature G)  Offense involved distribution to a minor or pregnant female (double the plea offer).  (See 9 9 9 Yes No Unk Feature H)  Offense occurred in a correctional facility or drug treatment facility or involved distribution 9 9 9 Yes No Unk to person entering or leaving a drug treatment facility (add 6 months).  (See Feature I)  9 9 9  Defendant is subject to Anti-Drug Profiteering Penalty.  (See Feature J)  Yes No Unk  Downward departure for trial proof issues? Yes No Extent of Reduction 9 9  Approval is required if adjustment is greater than 6 months (4th degree), 9 months (3rd degree), 12 months (2nd degree) or 24 months (1st degree).
[brief] This included mention that he worked 80% of his day on his laptop laying down (3T, at 55:12-21).  Plaintiff shared that he can no longer play basketball, which he called “one of my biggest passions. ” (3T, at 56:1-4).  And Plaintiff expressed similar frustration with his dramatically diminished lifestyle, and inability to perform even menial household chores (3T, at 56:5-57:3).  Critically, at the time of trial, Plaintiff was only 40 years old (3T, 1t 18:17-18).
[brief] (Dkt. #263, at 3-6 & Exhs. A-H; Dkt. #266, at 1-4).  Defense counsel estimates that one attorney can review 75 to 100 documents per hour.  (Dkt. #263, at 4).  As represented by defense counsel, plaintiffs’ initial proposed search terms against the e-mail accounts of the five custodians produced 961,463 documents, or approximately 60% of the 1.5 million documents in the database.  (Id. at 3 & Exh. A).  Indeed, even defendant’s proposed search terms currently hit on 61,859 documents, which defendant suggested needs to be further modified to reduce the number of documents to be reviewed.  (Id. at 3-4 & Exh. B).  The five custodians are [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...].  (Dkt. #263, at 3).  At one point, plaintiffs suggested that production be limited to those search terms that appeared in more than 10,000 individual documents, but even with that restriction, plaintiffs’ proposed search terms still hit on 356,403 documents.  (Id. at 4 & Exhs. D-E).  Defendant sought another variation, in which it added a sixth custodian, [...], but eliminated some search terms, resulting in a total of 60,970 documents.  (Id. at 4 & n.1).  After several rounds of negotiations, according to defendant, plaintiffs’ last proposal was that defendant review all documents where the search terms hit on less than 10,000 documents, as well as review a statistically significant sample of documents where the search terms hit on more than 10,000 documents, and that defendant produce all non-privileged documents, whether relevant or not.  (Id. at 5 & Exh. F).  According to defendant, its last counterproposal to plaintiffs was to apply plaintiffs’ proposed keywords to the e-mails of six custodians, and that for any search term that hit on fewer than 3,000 documents, defendant would review all of the documents and produce any relevant, non-privileged documents, but for any search term that hits on more than 3,000 documents, then defendant would consolidate all of the documents and pull one random sample from the pool of documents, which then would be reviewed and defendant would again produce all relevant, non-privileged documents.
[brief] Where there is both exigency and probable cause, an officer’s failure to acquire a warrant may be excused.  *State v. Cassidy*, 179 N.J. 150, 160 (2004).  Exigency exists when the State proves by a preponderance of evidence that the search was premised on probable cause and that law enforcement acted in an objectively reasonable manner to meet an exigency that did not permit time to secure a warrant.  *State v. Manning*, 240 N.J. 308, 333 (2020).  Although the actions of officers in this case in returning the defendant’s phone, had they done so, would have been in a sense a cause of the resulting exigency, this does not render the seizure unlawful in and of itself.  This is made clearer through analogy; where officers chase an armed suspect into a home, officers may enter based on exigency.
[brief] In the Arbitration, [...] did not make any claim that [...] breached the PTA by failing to negotiate EGP in good faith.  See generally Da264-278.  The PTA does not include a provision expressly addressing the consequences of the parties’ failure to reach agreement as to EGP as to construction projects performed by [...].  The PTA does, however, state the Additional Backlog Conditions, and those conditions are not satisfied in the absence of an agreement as to EGP despite the parties good faith efforts.  Da51-52; Da54-55.  The PTA leaves no room for [...] to receive or retain payment in any form for projects that are not properly qualified to elevate to the status of a Backlog Project by satisfying each of the six Additional Backlog Conditions.
[brief] On May 27, 2021, [...] again moved for summary judgment.  Its basis for the motion was twofold; 1) it had neither contractual nor common law liability to plaintiff for his parking lot accident as a matter of law; 2) plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed with prejudice for his failure to comply with N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.  (Pa829-835, Pa882-883; 3T8-8 to 8-20, 3T31-17 to 32-16, 3T44-1 to 44-24)  Since the original motion based upon the statute of limitations was decided, defense counsel had learned that plaintiff had retained counsel within three weeks of the subject accident, and that [...], an investigator, had visited the strip mall at the behest of plaintiff's counsel.  (Pa694-697)  Plaintiff had also admitted at his deposition that he had taken pictures of the accident scene immediately following the fall.  (Pa846-849, Pa1149-1151)  In contrast to counsel's assertions in opposition to [...]' first motion for summary judgment, plaintiff also believed from the outset that he had a viable cause of action against all of the tenant defendants in the strip mall.  (Pa832-834, Pa882-883)  [...]’ motion, as well as other tenant defendants’ motions for summary judgment and plaintiff’s cross motion for partial summary judgment on liability, were argued on June 25, 2021.  (3T7-11 to 47-6)
[brief] The Court in *Penwag* reached this determination because, “[c]ounsel fees and costs in defending the action maliciously brought may be an element of damage in a successful malicious prosecution, but do not in themselves constitute a special grievance necessary to make out the cause of action. ”  This is similar to the instant case because the plaintiffs in both instances similarly failed to prove the underlying tort cases.  Therefore, plaintiff here cannot be awarded with counsel fees and costs because those fees in themselves do not constitute a cause of action.  In *Feldmesser v. Lemberger*, 101 N.J.L. 184, the tenant brought an initial case to compel the landlord for specific performance to sell the property in accordance with the landlord’s representation that he owned the property.
[brief] To demonstrate unjust enrichment, "a plaintiff must show both that defendant received a benefit and that retention of that benefit without payment would be unjust".  *VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp.*, 135 N.J. 539, 554, 641 A.2d 519 (1994).  Additionally, unjust enrichment may constitute a ground for imposing equitable relief.  See *Callano v. Oakwood Park Homes Corp.*, 91 N.J. Super. 105, 108-109 (App.Div. 1966) (holding that "It rests on the equitable principle that a person shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another, and on the principle of whatsoever it is certain a man ought to do, that the law supposes him to have promised to do") (citing *St. Paul Fire, etc., Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. America*, 32 N.J. 17, 22 (1960))  Equitable relief may be created "[w]here property of one person can by a proceeding in equity be reached by another as security for a claim on the ground that otherwise the former would be unjustly enriched."
[brief] [...] Expressly, In Writing, Grants [...] Permission To Use [...]’s Intellectual Property To Sell Summerset Product.  In January 2013, the “[...]” sent an email to [...], which provided “[...] Direct” Summerset images for the sale of Summerset products, and designated [...] as part of the “Summerset . . . Family” who assists with the “creat[ion] and distribut[ion]” of Summerset product.  (P749-P750).  E.  Several Summerset-Branded Entities – All Owned By [...] – Supply Summerset Products To [...] Under The “Summerset” Label And Publicly Confirm That An Arrangement Exists Between Summerset And [...].  The “[...]” entity sold both outdoor furniture and grills, as established by pages pulled from its website in 2012.  (See Pa195).  Additionally, [...] expressly listed “[...] Furnishings” as the “[Summerset’s] East Coast Office” and “distributor” on its website.  (See id. at Pa194) (emphasis added).  Furthermore, the [...] website further referenced [...]s as its “East Coast . . . Director of Sales,” further emphasizing to the public that [...] was a true arm of [...].  (See id. at Pa196) (hyperlink at bottom of page, as demonstrated by gray box at bottom left of document, for “East Coast” directs consumer to “[...]” email address, an [...] contact email).  In other words, “Summerset” was not merely advertising [...] as a distributor, but as a critical component of the company and brand itself.
[brief] (Our argument concerning the “common knowledge doctrine” is set forth at length in Point I of our initial brief).  We call to the Court’s attention the case of Bender v. [...], 399 N.J. Super 584 (App. Div. 2008), which is closely on point on this issue.  In that case, a pharmacy customer sued his pharmacy for dispensing to him the drug “Prednisone” rather than the drug “Primidone” which had been prescribed by his physician.  Being a medical malpractice case, an Affidavit of Merit (AOM), and later an expert report was seemingly required to be filed by the plaintiff.  When plaintiff failed to file an AOM within the required timeframe, Defendant [...] moved for summary judgment under the AOM statute.  Plaintiff opposed the motion on the grounds that a pharmacy was not a “licensed person” falling under the purview of the AOM statute.  Plaintiff also sought an extension of time to file an AOM.  The Court did not rule on Plaintiff’s argument on the applicability of the AOM statute but did grant an extension of time to file an affidavit.  Several months later, with Plaintiff still not filing an AOM, Defendant filed a second motion for summary judgment.  In response to this second motion, Plaintiff, for the first time, raised the defense that no AOM or expert report was necessary because the case fell under the “common knowledge doctrine” where an average juror could assess that defendant’s dispensing of the wrong drug was negligent, even without expert testimony.  The trial court concluded that Plaintiff should have raised the “common knowledge doctrine” initially in response to Walgreen’s first motion for summary judgement but agreed to consider the argument of “common knowledge,” nonetheless, ultimately rejecting the argument and dismissing Plaintiff’s case.  In the Appellate Division, Defendant again urged that the argument of “common knowledge” not be considered since it was not raised in a timely manner below.  However, the Appellate Division did consider the “common knowledge doctrine” even though not timely raised below, and, on the basis of that doctrine, reversed the order of summary judgment against the Plaintiff and reinstated the case for further proceedings.
[brief] Despite this direct guidance by our Supreme Court, Defendant directs this Court to unreported federal and out-of-state decisions which have no precedential value.  For example, Defendant relies heavily on the unreported District Court decision of Arterbridge v. Wayfair, LLC, 2022 WL 577956 (D.N.J. February 25, 2022) but the facts are clearly distinguishable from this instant case.
[brief] [...] explained that her father gave her the Will after they moved into the [...] house in the Fall of 2014.  At the time they moved into [...], [...] was on the second floor, and he did not have any physical limitations.  (Da149).  [...] explained that her father visited with [...] on occasion after he left [...] until the Fall of 2012.  (Da149).  However, [...]’s wife, [...], was frustrated with [...] and, on occasion, she would yell at [...].  So, at that point, [...] made it clear that [...] could stay at her house.  (Da149).  Also, [...] testified that [...] “spat on him,” got angry, and said that [...] should go to Portugal and “leave us alone. ” (Da150).  [...] wanted reassurance from [...] that she would not put him in a nursing home.  (Da150).  She told [...] that would not happen.  (Da150).  Also, [...] would visit [...] at his business, and [...] was “very rude”.  (Da151).  [...] visited [...], but [...] turned his back on [...].  (Da151).  [...] did not like staying at [...]’s house because [...] made [...] sleep on the couch.  (Da151).  Also, [...] stated that he would help if [...] gave [...] access to his bank accounts.  (Da151).  [...] explained that [...] made [...] feel unwelcome.  (Da151).  [...] identified the March 5, 2014 Will which [...] provided to her.  (Da152).  When [...] passed, [...] did not contact [...]’s attorney who prepared that Will.  (Da152).  Prior to [...] providing [...] with a copy of that Will, [...] did not tell [...] that he was having a Will prepared.  (Da152).  [...] understood that [...] had an attorney available through the Union.  (Da152).  However, [...] never spoke to [...] regarding the Will.  (Da152).  In fact, [...] never met [...].  (Da152).  On September 13, 2022, [...] put his decision granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the record.
[brief] Pursuant to the MLUL, “[a]n ordinance requiring approval by the planning board of either subdivisions or site plans, or both, shall include” certain provisions for preliminary and final approval of development.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-38(a).  This includes provisions such as the streets in the subdivisions or land development of suitable grade and located to accommodate traffic and firefighting and emergency equipment, adequate water supply, drainage, shade trees, sewerage facilities, and other utilities, protection and conservation of soil from erosion, and provisions governing the standards for grading, improvement and construction of streets or drives, and drainage and sewerage facilities.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-38.  During the November 1, 2022 hearing, there was no evidence or testimony provided on many of the requirements set forth in [...] Ordinances §§ 142-77 and 142-78.  (See 1T23-3 to 1T43-9; 1T44-8 to 1T54-15).  None of the required items are identified in the resolution of approval as having been presented during the hearing.  (Pa245-Pa253).  The only exhibits presented were three items: (1) Existing Conditions Exhibit, (2) Proposed Subdivision Exhibit, and (3)  Preliminary Major Subdivision Plat. (Pa212-Pa244).  There is absolutely nothing in the record to meet the requirements identified in [...] Ordinance §§ 142-77 and 142-78.
[brief] (Da395).  The Consent Judgment stated that the five siblings were to “execute a listing agreement for sale of the property…with a licensed real estate agency” and “[i]f the parties cannot agree upon a Realtor within that time, the Realtor shall be selected by the court. ” (Da401).  The Order further stated that “[a]ll decisions related to the marketing and sale of the property, including but not limited to, raising or lowering the list price, performing maintenance or repairs, accepting proposed Contracts, retaining an attorney to handle the real estate transaction, responding to requests for home inspection repairs and credits, and all other decisions of any nature whatsoever, must be unanimous…” (Da401).  Unfortunately, the five siblings could not agree on the selection of a real estate professional to market and sell the Subject Property.  (Da383).  Thus, motion practice ensued for a realtor to be selected by the Court pursuant to the Consent Judgment, and on January 12, 2023, the Court appointed [...], Esquire of [...] to sell the Subject Property.  (Da33).  To that end, the Court granted [...] authority to appoint a realtor to market and sell the Subject Property.  (Da33).  The Order further stated that “all of the parties are to cooperate in the sale of the property” and “the parties may communicate any questions/concerns about the sale to [[...]].”  (Da33).  On January 18, 2023, [...] advised the five siblings and certain counsel that he had “selected and appointed [...] of [...] as the realtor to sell” the Subject Property.  (Da34).  The letter stated that “[...] will prepare a listing agreement consistent with the terms of the Consent Judgment. ” (Da34).  Thereafter, a dispute arose regarding the manner in which [...] and [...] were proceeding with the marketing and sale of the Subject Property, including allegations of disagreement over the list price, the sale price, claims that the property was listed with no notice to the co-owners and/or their counsel, refusal by [...] to properly show the property to certain prospective buyers and/or realtors, and agreeing to sell the property well below market value, to name but a few.