ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  State ex rel. L.W., 333 N.J. Super. 492, 497 (App. Div. 2000).  The totality of the circumstances must be considered in determining the purpose of a statement, *ibid.*, and the focus is on the conduct of the perpetrator, rather than the characteristics of the victim.  *State v. Zembreski*, 445 N.J. Super. 412, 433 (App. Div. 2016) (quotations omitted).  Thus, whether the victim is, in fact, scared that bodily injury will result is not dispositive.  Here, the State presented no evidence that the perpetrator made the statement, “[g]ive me all your money” with the purpose of putting [...] in fear of immediate bodily injury.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Argument in Support of Enforceability is Not a New Issue  Defendants are of course correct that new issues may not be raised on appeal, however every issue appealed by Plaintiff was heard and decided by the Trial Court.  The point Defendants claim to be a new issue appears to be Point I in Plaintiff’s Legal Argument:  *The Trial Court Erred by Refusing to Enforce a Valid and Legal Agreement Between the Plaintiff and Defendants, and in Finding the Parties to be in Pari Delicto.*  That Plaintiff’s appellate brief uses the term “collateral agreement” in support of this point where that precise term may not have been included in the Trial Court briefs does not render it a new issue under any cognizable New Jersey precedent.  In support of their position that adding the term “collateral agreement” to the discourse constitutes a new issue, Defendants submit caselaw without any meaningful parallel to the instant matter.  In *Docteroff v. Barra Corp. of America, Inc.*, 282 N.J.Super. 230 (App. Div. 1995), the Plaintiffs “changed their position regarding the appropriate statute of limitations” for the first time on appeal.  *Id.* at 237.  In *State v. Vincenty*, 237 N.J. 122 (2019) also submitted by Defendants, the State did not argue harmless error in the Appellate Division on an issue involving the right against self-incrimination, but sought to argue it to the Supreme Court.  *Id.* at 135.  Finally, in *Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co.*, 62 N.J. 229 (1973), the Supreme Court declined to consider “factual data now before us (which) was not presented to the trial court; and some of it was not before the Appellate Division”).  *Id.* at 234-35.  There can be no serious question that the issue of enforceability of the contract between Plaintiff and Defendants was presented to the Trial Court and argued by the parties.  Though the precise term “collateral agreement” may not have been used, that issue was certainly raised, debated, and decided.  Defendants’ argument would have the parties do nothing more than regurgitate their Trial Court briefs to the Appellate Division, which is certainly not the rule and procedure in this State.  **III.**
[brief] In identifying whether a significant risk will exist, it is critical to determine “‘the likelihood that a difference in interests’ will arise, and ‘if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer’s independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client. ’”  In re Opinion No. 17-2012 of Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, 220 N.J. 468, 469 (2014).  As such, “the problem of multiple representation is best addressed by an evaluation by the individual attorney of the circumstances of each case, so that he or she may determine whether the common representation of the prospective clients can be undertaken.  In every such case the attorney will have to be satisfied based on objective reasonableness that there is no direct adversity between the defendants and that joint representation will not adversely affect the relationship of either class of defendants, RPC 1.7(a), nor materially limit his or her professional responsibilities towards any such client-defendant, RPC 1.7(b).
[directive] Although the precise timing will vary depending on the case, the first three steps generally occur simultaneously in the immediate aftermath of the incident, while the remaining steps unfold over the course of the investigation:  1.  Notification to Attorney General 2.  Arrival of First Responders  3.  Selection of Independent Investigator  4.  Initial Investigation & Evidence Collection  5.  Public Release of Incident Footage (if requested)  6.  Completed Investigation 7.  Independent Supervisory Review of Investigative Findings  8.  Grand Jury Proceedings (if applicable)  9.  Announcement of Criminal Charges or Declination  10.  Referrals for Administrative Review  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable  Page 2  Although this ten-step process applies regardless of whether the officer’s use of force resulted in a civilian’s death, there are a number of additional important procedural requirements that apply when a death does occur.  N.J.S.A. 52:17B-107 (P.L. 2019, c.1).  For that reason, it See is vital that any officials conducting an independent investigation pursuant to this Directive familiarize themselves with both this document and relevant state law.  Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey to implement and comply with the procedures outlined below.  This Directive repeals and supersedes the provisions of Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive (“AG Directive”) 2006-5, the supplement to that Directive issued on July 28, 2015, and AG Directive 2018-1.
[brief] A.  The ALJ and the Commissioner improperly rewrote during adjudication the Department’s actual disapproval letter.  The ALJ and the Commissioner affirmed the disapproval of [...]’s applications on a new ground, that the rates sought were impermissibly “excessive”.  But the disapproval letter that was challenged in the adjudication said nothing about excessiveness—nor had the Department in any of the correspondence preceding the letter.  The Department’s actual disapproval of [...]’s applications was based on extralegal considerations that the Department has now abandoned: the letter asserted that [...]’s application had “an aggressive loss ratio target,” whereas [...]’s “current lifetime loss ratios . . . do not reflect enough deterioration.
[brief] In State v. Miranda, the trial court asked all jurors “[d]o you believe that in cases alleging sexual assault the State must produce physical or biological evidence in order to prove its case?  Please explain why you believe that?” and asked some jurors, “[d]o you believe that in cases alleging sexual assault the State must produce physical or biological evidence in order to prove its case, or in cases where they don’t have physical or biological evidence is it possible that testimony could be enough to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt?”  No. [...], 2023 WL 3991723, at *9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 12, 2023) (unpub. op.; Counsel is unaware of any contrary unpublished opinions.  N.J. Ct. R. 1:36-3).
[brief] One such exception is an investigatory stop.  A police officer may conduct an investigatory stop if, “based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer had a reasonable and particularized suspicion to believe that an individual has just engaged in, or was about to engage in, criminal activity. ”  State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002).  Because New Jersey’s “constitutional jurisprudence evinces a strong preference for judicially issued warrants,” the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a warrantless stop was justified by such a suspicion.  State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 246 (2007).  The State failed to meet that burden in this case because there was no reasonable, particularized suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop of [...].
[brief] Her Honor glosses over its being “lost” at 1T-56-20-25: remanded on October 17, 2019; first contact by court on May 26, 2021.  Pa105.  Worse, it gave me considerable PTSD that “well, the clerks are messing with my cases again. ”  It’s easier “to blame” me for the delay from around mid-September through March 4, 2021.  That’s 5.5 months.  However, I had legitimate adjournments in September through October.  Then the Judge correctly turned the matter over to the ADA Coordinator in early November.  I sent the Coordinator HIPAA permission papers, she read my medical records and gave me a firm hearing date of March 5, 2021.  Pa103.  I worked with that date the best I could.  Remember, my emergency job at the [...] was 10-12 hours per day, 6 days a week from August 11, 2020 – no time off (the implication was you’d get fired).  However, I took 4-5 days off, risking my job to try to meet the deadline.  My reply was due on Monday, March 1, 2021.  It was 3 days late, I got it in on March 4, 2021.  Her Honor may have mentioned it being late but, I had already consented to the Defendants filing sur-reply briefs due to the unusual posture of the case.  Even if I got it in on Monday, they would have been asking for more time with my full consent.  All in all, I think the hearing would have been on April 1, 2021 no matter what.  Her Honor finally held the delay was too prejudicial to the Defendants.  1T-37-17-21.  Bottom line: the Defendants have never stated a specific prejudice to them which is required for such a non-meritorious dismissal.  That’s the entire point of the Prior Panel’s citation to Lawson v. DeWarr.  For my part, after [...] got PTI in April, I did request the videos of all [...]’s hearings (maybe 4 or 5).  I was mainly trying to preserve [...]’s arraignment judge’s knowledge that I had filed a PTI Application for [...].  I am pretty sure I made a deposit of $10-$20 (cash, I think, unfortunately).  As usual with Vicinage I, I never heard anything back.  Anytime I “press” an issue, there is always retaliation so, not wanting that to happen, I gave up.  Also, the videos may have been not produced or destroyed because I ordered them.  So, of the seven years, 3.5 (including the NJ “loss” of the remand) are attributable to the Defendant’s removal to what they knew was a much slower court system.
[brief] In fact, the Arbitrator misconstrued *In Re Niles*, 176 N.J. 294 (2003) to allow a fee award in a direct breach of fiduciary duty claim.  He opined that Plaintiffs had claimed *Niles* created an applicable exception to the American Rule.  “Claimant contends that *In Re Niles*, 176 N.J. 294 (2003) supports its claim as being within the exception to the American Rule which disfavors the concept. ”  (Da2215-16)  The Arbitrator made no finding that there was any third-party litigation here.  (Ibid.)  To the contrary, he considered the Company the “Claimant” and [...] the “Respondent”.  (Da2215)  He said the fees were incurred by the Plaintiffs “to oust” [...], which is first-party, direct litigation expense.  (Da2215)  He stated that [...]’s, “conduct and the breach of fiduciary duty to the Company warrants some consideration of [Plaintiffs’] claim for reimbursement”.  (Ibid.)  There was no separate litigation between the Plaintiffs and any third party, or “stranger” that [...] caused by any tortious conduct.  *DiMisa, supra*.  There was only litigation between Plaintiffs, individually, [...] individually and their mutually owned company (controlled by one side or the other) at different times in this action.  The Arbitrator awarded fees for Plaintiffs litigating with [...], based on his misconception that *Niles* allowed a direct fee award in breach of fiduciary duty cases.
[brief] ”  8.  [...]’s architect opined that, by lowering the unit count or stories, the project would not be considered “viable. ”  2T 63:3-6.  [...] never contradicted him or offered to provide further details so that the [...] could provide an alternate design as a condition.  9.  [...] raises an argument not raised below that the request for steep slopes was a void regulation under the time of decision rule -- another baseless argument.
[brief] The characterization of social transitioning as a form of psychological treatment is not controversial.  Courts across the country have recognized this fact.  Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 770 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that “[t]reatment options for individuals with gender dysphoria” include “changes in gender expression and role (which may involve living . . . in another gender role, consistent with one’s gender identity”); Lamb v. Norwood, 899 F.3d 1159, 1161 (10th Cir. noting that “[t]reatment forms [for gender dysphoria] currently include . . . [c]hanges in gender expression and role (which may involve living . . . in another gender role, consistent with one’s gender identity”); Koe v. Noggle, No. 1:23-CV- 2904-SEG, 2023 WL 5339281, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 2023) (noting that “gender dysphoria treatment plans include therapy, support, and assistance with elements of a social transition”); Doe v. Horne, No. CV-23-00185-TUC-JGZ, 2023 WL 4661831, at *3 (D. Ariz. July 20, 2023) (“Undergoing treatment to alleviate gender dysphoria is commonly referred to as ‘transition’ and includes . . . social transition . . . .”); Monroe v. Meeks, 584 F. Supp. 3d 643, 678 (S.D. Ill. 2022) (holding that “[s]ocial transition . . . is a medically necessary component of treatment for some . . . with gender dysphoria”); Pinson v. Hadaway, No. 18-CV-3420-NEB-KMM, 2020 WL 6121357, at *1 (D. Minn. July 13, 2020) (noting that “[g]ender dysphoria treatment can involve . . . social transition”); Porter v. Allbaugh, No. 18-CV-0472- JED-FHM, 2019 WL 2167415, at *2 n.3 (N.D. Okla. May 17, 2019) (noting that “[c]urrent treatments for gender dysphoria include . . . social transition”).
[brief] 7T – Transcript of Trial, dated April 11, 2022  8T – Transcript of Trial, dated April 14, 2022  9T – Transcript of Trial, dated April 18, 2022  10T- Transcript of Trial, dated April 19, 2022  11T- Transcript of Trial, dated April 20, 2022  12T – Transcript of Trial, dated April 21, 2022  13T – Transcript of Trial, dated April 25, 2022  14T – Transcript of Trial, dated April 26, 2022  15T – Transcript of Trial, dated April 27, 2022  16T – Transcript of Trial, dated April 28, 2022  17T – Transcript of Trial, dated May 2, 2022  18T – Transcript of Trial, dated May 3, 2022  19T – Transcript of Trial, dated May 6, 2022  20T – Transcript of Trial, dated May 9, 2022  21T – Transcript of Trial, dated May 10, 2022  22T – Transcript of Sentencing, dated March 15, 2023  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] (1T 7-4 to 11, 7-18 to 21)  [...] explained that the SET was surveilling this area because “the parking lot of the Shop Rite is an area where a high number of narcotics-related transactions occur” — a fact he is “personally aware [of] through [his] past experiences and departmental intelligence. ”  (1T 12-4 to 8)  He testified that he had done extensive prior surveillance at the Shop Rite parking lot, had made prior arrests for drug “[d]istribution and possession” at this particular location, and that between himself and his unit, had made “dozens” of arrests “during the course of [his] four years in the Special Enforcement Team. ”  (1T 12-9 to 16, 12-23 to 13-7)  Multiple other SET officers were also on duty that evening, communicating with each other over their radios.  (1T 16-6 to 11)  Patrolman [...] testified that when he arrived at the Shop Rite, he saw a Jeep Grand Cherokee parked with a sedan, with a man, later identified as [...], speaking with a woman inside the sedan.  (1T 16-15 to 20)  [...] did not recognize [...] and had never seen him before when conducting surveillance.  (1T 17-13 to 18)  [...] testified that there was also a Dodge Ram parked near the other two vehicles.  (1T 18-7 to 9)  He testified that after a few minutes of talking to the woman in the sedan, the woman drove off, and [...] walked over to the Dodge Ram and began talking to its driver.  (1T 18-12 to 16)  [...] testified that when [...] went from one vehicle to another, “it raised [his] suspicions” because he was “aware through [his] training and experience that distributors of narcotics will sometimes meet with multiple users in a parking lot in order to distribute. ”  (1T 18-20 to 19-1)  [...] testified that at some point during [...]’s conversation with the driver of the Ram, he “briefly lean[ed] inside” the open passenger-side window.  (1T 19-1 to 9)  [...] and the driver had “another short conversation,” and then [...] walked away, got back into his Jeep, drove to the front of the Shop Rite, parked, and then he and a female passenger walked inside the grocery store.  (1T 19-13 to 15, 19-19 to 23)
[brief] [N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.12(a).]  The Act defines “actual malice” as “intentional wrongdoing in the sense of an evil-minded act,” and “wanton and willful disregard” as “a deliberate act or omission with knowledge of a high degree of probability of harm to another and reckless indifference to the consequences of such act or omission. ”  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.10.  In determining whether punitive damages should be awarded, the finder of fact must consider all relevant evidence, including but not limited to: (1) the likelihood, at the relevant time, that serious harm would arise from the defendant’s conduct; (2) the defendant’s awareness of reckless disregard of the likelihood that the serious harm at issue would arise from the defendant’s conduct; (3) the conduct of the defendant upon learning that its initial conduct would likely cause harm; and (4) the duration of the conduct or any concealment of it by the defendant.  [C]ircumstances of aggravation and outrage, beyond the simple commission of a tort are required.  . . .”  Pavola v. Mint Mgmt. Corp., 375 N.J. Super. 397, 404-05 (App. Div. 2005).  “The standard can be established if the defendant knew of or had reason to know of circumstances which would bring home to the ordinary reasonable person the highly dangerous character of [its] conduct. ”  Dong v. Alape, 361 N.J. Super. 106, 116-17 (App. Div. 2003).  The same evidence the [...] proffered as supporting their claim for a common law award of attorney’s fees, if accepted as true following the trial, would have supported an award of punitive damages and should not have been barred on a motion in limine.
[brief] Pa56.  [...] certified that he participated in the rescue, recovery, and/or cleanup at the World Trade Center site between September 11, 2001, and October 11, 2001, or September 11, 2001, and/or September 12, 2001.  Pa56.  [...] submitted the Ricci Act Eligibility Registration Form and Request for Amended Benefits Form with his affidavit.  Pa58.  Pa60.  With his Request for Amended Benefits Form, [...] supplied medical documentation of his 9/11 illnesses.  Pa61.  Pa62.  He also provided a [...] Performance Evaluation noting his commendable services during the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, his promotion to the rank of Lieutenant, and his exceptional performance.  Pa63.  On March 3, 2023, a Petition to the [...] was filed on behalf of [...] and many others.
[brief] Citing relevant opinions of this Court and of our Supreme Court, [...] recognized that prejudgment interest is intended to be “compensatory” and that the rate thereof, although set within the sound “discretion of the Court,” must be “based on equitable principles. ”  (40079a)  “With this guidance in mind,” for the period October 1, 2003 through July 9, 2014 (when [...] was sold), [...] awarded prejudgment interest to [...] at the parties’ previously agreed upon “investment return on rate of interest on partnership distributions that plaintiffs were not properly provided, “the equity rate of 8.875%,” compounded.\textsuperscript{16} (40001a-3a, 40005a, 40009a)  However, [...] found that equity required applying a different rate of prejudgment interest from July 10, 2014 through November 16, 2022, holding:  …[A]fter the distribution of the partnership assets in July 2014, it would be inequitable to continue prejudgment interest at 8.875%.  Likewise, applying the much lower post-judgment statutory interest rate of 2.25% would not fairly compensate plaintiffs for the loss of the use of the funds that they were entitled to pending the Final Order.  Thus, for the period of time from the distribution of partnership assets (July 2014) to the entry of the accompanying Order (November 16, 2022), prejudgment interest shall accrue at the average prime interest rate for that period of time, 3.935%.  (40003a)  The Chancery Court concluded its findings by holding that [...] is entitled to post-judgment interest at the Rule rate (2.25%) November 16, 2022 forward.
[brief] On April 24, 2023, Trooper [...] of the New Jersey State Police was on patrol in the Borough of Andover, New Jersey.  (1T 6-24 to 1T 7-5).  At approximately 2:22 p.m., Trooper Bowie observed a gray Dodge Ram fail to stop at a stop sign at the intersection of Route 206 and Route 517.  (1T 7-11 to -25).  Specifically, Trooper Bowie testified that the vehicle “never came to a complete stop” “disregarded and rolled through the intersection” and made a right hand turn onto Route 206.  (1T 8-20 to 9-5).  After making this observation, Trooper Bowie positioned his marked troop car behind the vehicle and effectuated a motor vehicle stop.  (1T 9-8 to -10; 1T 31-9 to -12).  Trooper Bowie approached the driver, later identified as the Defendant, and explained that the basis for the stop was for failing to stop at the stop sign.  (1T 9-16 to 10-15).  On cross-examination, Trooper Bowie testified that he was located at the firehouse on Route 206 when he made his observations of the Defendant’s vehicle.  (1T 12-4).  Trooper Bowie, however, could not recall specifically if his vehicle was moving or stationary at the time of the observation.  (1T 19-10 to -12; 1T 28-2 to -14; 1T 30-1 to -5).  He also testified that there was no foliage or obstruction that would have impacted his ability to see whether the vehicle stopped or not.  (1T 16-11 to T17-2).  Trooper Bowie explained that he could see the stop sign clearly from where he was situated and that he was familiar with the area and was aware that there was a stop sign coming from Route 15 south onto Route 206 north.  (1T 17-23 to 1T 18-15; 1T 29-16 to -22).  He also testified that he utilized the firehouse parking lot to safely turn around after observing the Defendant’s vehicle.  (1T 28-15 to -25).  Trooper Bowie acknowledged that he did not observe the Motor Vehicle Recorder (MVR) before testifying.  (1T 21-12 to -13).  Trooper Bowie explained, however, that while the MVR speaks for itself, it is from a different point of view, and would not capture the entirety of the trooper’s observations.  (1T 23-25 to 1T 25-10).  The Trooper’s MVR was marked as exhibit D-1 at the Motion to Suppress hearing and was entered into evidence by stipulation, though it was not played at the hearing.  (1T 4-12 to -24; Da 31).  A review of the MVR depicts the Defendant’s motor vehicle failing to come to a complete stop before turning onto Route 206.  (Da 31 at 00:00 to 00:14).  Based on the officer’s observations and investigation, the Defendant was issued two motor vehicle summonses for Disregarding a Stop Sign and Driving While Suspended that day.  (Da18).  Through further investigation, it was later determined that the Defendant’s license was suspended for a second of subsequent DWI offense.  As such, on June 20, 2023, he was charged with the additional indictable offense of Driving During a Period of License Suspension for a Second/Subsequent DWI.  (1T 42-2 to 1T 43-6).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.