ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] After reciting the relevant portion of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, [...] found that [...] informed [...] that Defendant intended to plead guilty to DWI; that Defendant’s BAC was .17; that this was Defendant’s second DWI; and that the State would agree to dismiss the remaining charges.  (3T25-5 to 25-22)  [...] then found that during the colloquy with [...], Defendant personally admitted he consumed alcohol before operating a motor vehicle; that his consumption affected his ability to properly operate that vehicle; and that he was under the influence of alcohol while operating that vehicle.  (3T25-23 to 26-7)  The Judge thus found:  In this matter, Defendant explicitly acknowledged to the Court that he operated his motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and the alcohol affected his ability to properly operate that vehicle.  Therefore, a sufficient factual basis for the guilty plea was established.  (3T27-22 to 28-2)  Notably, [...] also distinguished the present matter from Tate, finding:
[brief] In Panko v. Flinthkote, 7 N.J. 55, 61 (1951), the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he fundamental right of trial by a fair and impartial jury is jealously guarded by the courts. ”  Thus, parties “are entitled to have each of the jurors who hears the case, impartial, unprejudiced and free from improper influences. ”  Ibid.  Based thereon, “[i]t is well settled that the test for determining whether a new trial will be granted because of … the intrusion of irregular influences is whether such matters could have a tendency to influence the jury in arriving at its verdict in a manner inconsistent with the legal proofs and the court’s charge. ”  Ibid.  Moreover, if the “irregular matter” has such a tendency on its face, “a new trial should be granted without further inquiry as to its actual effect. ”  Ibid.  The test, therefore, “is not whether the irregular matter actually influenced the result, but whether it had the capacity to do so. ”  Ibid.  Such a stringent test is required to keep “the administration of justice free from all suspicion of corrupting influences. ”  Ibid.  In Kavanaugh v. Quigley, 63 N.J. Super. 153, 161-62 (App. Div. 1960), the Court contrasted the rationale of earlier cases requiring that “irregularities” be shown affirmatively to have influenced a verdict to warrant a new trial with the modern, “far more realistic” approach adopted in Panko.
[brief] The testimony elicited from Defendant [...] and her representatives at trial contradicts the trial court’s determination that the PSA required only that Defendants finalize and submit the RIR prior to closing.  For example, on cross- examination, [...], on whom Defendant [...] primarily relied to handle environmental matters in connection with the PSA, expressly stated that “[b]ased on the contract, [the [...]] had [Defendant [...]] staying in the project until an RAO was possibly obtained. ” (8T31:8-22.)  [...] further testified that after reading the PSA (which he had no part in drafting or negotiating in the months prior to its execution), he understood that Defendants were responsible for obtaining the RAO.  (8T68:7 to 69:4, 70:19-21.)  And although Defendant [...] attempted to change her testimony at trial, she admitted during her sworn deposition that her obligations under the PSA included obtaining the RAO.  (5T162:16 to 163:7.)  Even Defendants’ LSRP, [...], understood that when he was re-engaged as the LSRP in 2021, the ultimate goal of his engagement was to issue a site-wide RAO, and [...] stated the same in his retainer proposal to Defendant [...].  (6T78:10 to 80:8, 144:25 to 145:3.)
[brief] 13-414, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56341 (D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2013) | | | **E.L.C. v. D.M.F.,** | 47 | | No. A-3033-20, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1955 (Oct. 21, 2022) | | | **Egbuna v. Time–Life Libraries, Inc.,** | 26 | | 153 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) | | | **Espinosa v. County of Union,** | 35 | | 212 Fed. Appx. 146 (3d Cir. 2007) | | | **Flear v. Glacier Garlock Bearkins, a Div. of Enpro Ind., Inc.,** | 37, 44 | | 159 Fed. Appx 390 (3d. Cir. 2005) | | Frett v. City of Camden, No. A-1043-14T3, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1484 (Super. Ct. App. Div. June 28, 2016) .................................................................45 Gaskill v. Abex Corp., 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2694 (App. Div. Dec. 11, 2012)
[brief] The court correctly recognized that [...]’s analysis was not a fact-based analysis as defined in *Boston Gas*.  In sum, [...] has ignored the actual “fact-based” analysis defined in *Boston Gas* and directed [...] to invent a new method that is inconsistent with *Boston Gas* and still does not provide a factual basis for his conclusions, because as he admitted, there is no data to support them.  [...] purported to determine how much contamination is attributable to each AOC, and [...] calls that analysis a “fact-based” allocation.  But, it is not the *Boston Gas* fact-based analysis, because [...] did not determine “precisely” how much property damage definitively took place during any particular policy period.  The situation presented by this case is identical to *Boston Gas* – a period of releases over more than thirty years resulting in groundwater contamination that continues to the present day is “scientifically and administratively impossible to allocate to each policy[.]”  *Boston Gas*, 454 Mass. 337, 350–51.  Clearly, the trial court was correct to reject “fact-based” allocation, as, according to *Boston Gas*, it is inapplicable under this factual scenario.
[brief] B.  [...] raises the following arguments for our consideration:  *POINT I:*  BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL COULD NOT CHALLENGE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT BY ONE OF THE VICTIMS, WITHOUT ALSO REVEALING TO THE JURY THAT SHE HAD IMPROPERLY SEEN THE DEFENDANTS IN HANDCUFFS IN THE COURTROOM, THE DENIAL OF A MISTRIAL DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES AND THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND A FAIR TRIAL.
[brief] [...] created the dangerous condition by omission-failing to mark the height of the bridge on the bridge itself and by failing to provide a warning of the low bridge at the last exit available for the truck driver to avoid the low bridge.  A plain reading of the statute clearly establishes that when a public entity creates the dangerous condition, as is the case here, the notice requirements of N.J.S.A. 59:4-3 are not required.  N.J.S.A. 59:4-3, which defines actual and constructive notice, is “not applicable where public employees through neglect or wrongful act or omission within the scope of their employment create a dangerous condition. ”  Atalese v. Long Beach Tp., 365 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 2003).  (Emphasis added)  “Whether a public employee created a dangerous condition through negligent acts or omissions may be an issue of fact that must be decided by a jury.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, and as discussed above, the decision on the part to the [...] to deny the application of [...] for approval of a floating solar project and for an increase TREC valuation demands that this Court find the decision arbitrary, capacious, and thus the decision should be overturned and reversed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  GENOVA BURNS, LLC  Attorneys for Appellant  [...]  Dated: May 24, 2024  August 23, 2024  Via ecourts  [...]  Clerk of the Appellate Division  [...]  Re: In The Matter Of [...] – Petition For Assignment Of “Preferred” TREC Factor For Floating Photovoltaic Solar Pursuant To The Board’s Transition Incentive Order  [...]  Civil Action: On Appeal from a Final Agency Decision of the Board of Public Utilities
[brief] Based upon the record in this case, respectfully, the Court should reverse the decision of the Court below and implement the “law of the case. ”  If not, this Court should remand the matter for the purpose of allowing the Plaintiff, who relied heavily on the “law of the case,” which was erroneously removed by the Court below, to reopen the Motion since the Court below unjustly refused to answer the second Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety.  LAW
[brief] 42 TABLE OF APPENDIX  Appendix Document Court Order Granting Defendant/Respondent’s Summary Judgment and Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint - Filed 02/29/2024 Complaint and Demand for Trial by Jury - Filed 01/12/2020 Complaint Deficiency Correction – Filed 01/13/2020 PA12 Answer – Filed 09/22/2020 PA14 Defendant’s Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment – Filed 06/24/2022 PA29 Defendant’s Proposed Order – Filed 06/24/2022 PA31 Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts – Filed 06/24/2022 PA33 Certification of [...], Esq. – Filed 06/24/2022 PA40 [Exhibit 1 to Certification of [...]]
[brief] The Lower Court correctly held the instant Action must be referred to arbitration because: (a) there is an insurmountable preference for arbitration; (b) the United States Supreme Court and New Jersey Courts mandate that an arbitrator determine the Arbitration Agreement’s enforceability; and (c) there is a valid, binding, and enforceable arbitration agreement between the parties.  A.  There is an Insurmountable Preference for Arbitration
[brief] However, Plaintiff is entitled to all legitimate inferences regarding factual disputes at the summary judgment phase.  Moreover, while there may not be any corroborating witnesses, there is (contrary to the Trial Court’s opinion) circumstantial evidence that would lend credence to the notion that Defendant [...] may have done so, and would support Plaintiff’s testimony.  First, Defendant [...] herself testified that she advocated for the staffing coordinators to get COVID-19 incentive pay that was denied them by Defendant [...] because they were not involved in direct patient care.  (Pa43).  Defendant [...] also admitted that she was aware of [...] receiving charge pay at least once and took no action to correct it, or to discipline [...].  (Pa364, Pa662).  If Defendant [...] authorized the charge pay, Defendants’ entire stated reason for termination crumbles.  A pretextual rationale for termination is sufficient for Defendants’ summary judgment motion to be denied under McDonnell Douglas.
[brief] ”  Hilton, supra at 590.  Later, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reiterated the requirements of State v. Caoili, 135 N.J. 252 (1994) in Borough of Saddle River v. 66 E. Allendale, LLC, 216 N.J. 115 (2013), stating, “The goal of Caoili . . . was to avoid having the jury hear and consider speculative evidence that a zoning change was reasonably probable when assessing what a reasonable buyer and seller would be willing to pay for the property. ”  The New Jersey Supreme Court continued:  [O]nly when the trial court has first determined that the evidence is of a quality to allow the jury to consider the probability of a zoning change should the jury be permitted to assess a premium based on that zoning change, as Caoili . . . explained.  Saddle River, supra at 131 [emphasis added].  In Saddle River, the Appellate Division reversed and remanded, faulting the trial judge for not engaging in this two-step process of determining the evidence to be presented was not unduly speculative prior to allowing evidence to be presented to the jury.  Again, this is a critical difference between the court’s role in a condemnation matter than in the matters relied upon by Respondent in its opposition Brief.  In its motion before the trial court, Appellant [...] raised two definitive, purely legal issues in its motion *in limine* and does not question the basis of Respondent’s appraiser’s opinion as to fair market value but the methodology in which he used to form his opinion of fair market value, unlike the cases relied upon by Respondent.  The issues raised by Appellant sought the trial court engage in its gatekeeper role and review the quality of Respondent’s evidence prior to it being presented to the jury.  Therefore, [...]’s motion was properly before the trial court, contrary to Respondent’s arguments.  **POINT II**
[brief] 7  A.  THE INCIDENT REPORT WAS AUTHENTICATED AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE  9  III.  THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR A NEW TRIAL CONCLUSION  | Authority | Reply Brief page number | |-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------| |  **Court Rules:** | | | R. 4:16-1(a) | 9 | | R. 4:16-1(b) | 9 | | R. 4:17-8(a) | 9 | | **Rules of Evidence:** | | | Evid. R. 403 | 3, 5 | | Evid. R. 407 | 2, 3, 6 | | Evid R. 803 | 7 | | Evid. R. 803(b)(1)(2)(3)(4) | 8 | | Evid. R. 803(c)(1) | 8 | | Evid R. 901 | 7 | | Evid R. 1007 | 7 | | **Case Law:** | | | Dixon v. Jacobsen Mfg. Co., 270 N.J. Super. 569 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 136 N.J. 295 (1994) | 3 | | Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561 (2002) | 10 | | Hansson v. Catalytic Construction Co., 43 N.J. Super. 23 (App. Div. 1956) | 4, 6 | Harris v. Peridot Chem. (NJ), Inc., 313 N.J. Super. 257 (App. Div. 1998) 4, 7 Hassan v. Williams, 467 N.J. Super. 190 (App. Div. 2021) 5 Konop v. Rosen, 425 N.J. Super. 391 (App. Div. 2012) 7 Lombardi v. Yulinsky, 98 N.J.L. 332 (Sup. Ct. 1923)  4  Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181 (App. Div. 2005)  9  Millman v. United States Mortgage & Title Guar. Co. of New Jersey, 121 N.J.L. 28 (Sup.Ct. 1938)  4, 6 Perry v. Levy, 87 N.J.L. 670 (E. & A. 1915)  4 Ryan v. Port of New York Authority, 116 N.J. Super. 211 (App. Div. 1971)  5 State v. Hannah, 448 N.J. Super. 78 (App. Div. 2016)  7  Torres v. Sumrein, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3020 (Db, Da001)  5  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] ”  In re Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station (CS327), 258 N.J. 312 (2024).  The Supreme Court provided that “…it will be necessary to consider the [totality of the] circumstances of the project. ….”  Ibid.  The [...] filed a motion to supplement the record with only part of the record of its new HAD final agency decision, which was granted by this Court.  In addition, this Court issued an order granting [...]’s motion to hold the Environmental Appellants’ appeal of the new HAD in abeyance pending the outcome of this appeal regarding the original HAD.  This supplemental brief followed.
[brief] Plaintiff was obligated to do so through expert testimony because whether the [...], by repaving their driveway and replacing the railroad ties that lined their driveway with Belgian block, caused an increase in stormwater runoff onto plaintiff’s property is not a subject of common knowledge and experience such that a finder of fact could form a valid judgment without the aid of expert testimony.  Wyatt v. Wyatt, 217 N.J. Super. 580, 591 (App. Div. 1997) (granting summary judgment on issue of whether brakes were defective because claimant presented no expert testimony to support her theory of liability).
[brief] A vitamin water bottle and multiple latex gloves recovered from the garbage bags were submitted for DNA testing, and it was determined that the DNA on the bottle and eleven latex gloves was from a single source which matched the DNA profile for defendant.  (13T89-10 to 90-21; 14T167-14 to 169-10; 14T174-11 to 23; 15T8-22 to 9-20).  Three of the latex gloves recovered indicated that [...] and [...] could be excluded as a contributor to the DNA found, but defendant could not be excluded as a source of the DNA.
[brief] Specifically, McElwee Court stated:  However, a violation of “internal rules and regulations” is only one of the grounds upon which a police officer may be disciplined.  The statute also allows a police officer to be removed for incapacity or misconduct but imposes no time constraints on a complaint seeking removal on those grounds.  McElwee, 400 N.J. Super at 394, emphasis added.  Further, it is reasonable to assume that “if the Legislature intended to limit the time period in which to bring charges under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147, then it would not have specifically limited the forty-five day rule to violations of rules and regulations.  It is also reasonable to believe that the Legislature knew exactly what it was doing by limiting the forty-five day rule to rule and regulation violations, since misconduct under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 is not premised on the violation of any rule or regulation.  Thus, municipalities may take their time in charging alleged misconduct and do not have to adhere to the “45-day” rule so long as the alleged misconduct is grounded in title 4A of the New Jersey Administrative Code or 2C of the New Jersey Criminal Code.
[brief] The intersection also had no warning signs or markings that would alert drivers of pedestrians.  Id.  In addition, unlike other areas of the parking lot, the east-west vehicular travelway at the T-intersection in the distant area where [...] had to park ended in a parking space, rather than a concrete island or peninsula.  Pa655.  Peninsulas “command a driver’s attention and provide increased visibility by eliminating the [sight] restriction caused by a vehicle in a parking space at the very intersection of travelways. ”  Pa655.  See also Pa694 (an example of a peninsula and crosswalk in the administration/physician/patient area of the [...] lot).
[brief] *Id.* at 273.  R. 4:14-2(a) is based on Fed.R.Cv.P. 30(b)(1).  Therefore, federal cases interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(1) are instructive.  Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(1), “an officer, director, or managing agent of a corporate party may be compelled to give testimony pursuant to a notice of deposition. ”  *Campbell v. Sedgwick Detert, Moran and Arnold*, Civil No. 11–642–ES–SCM (D.N.J. March 28, 2013), 2013 WL 1314429 at *12.  See also *Loughran v. PepsiCo, Inc.*, Civil No. 22-4390 (RMB/EAP) (D.N.J., Jan. 29, 2024), 2024 WL 328740 at *2 n. 3; *In re Valsartan, Losartan, and Irbesartan Products Liability Litigation*, 2021 WL 61117676 (D.N.J. 2021) at *1 (collecting cases) (Pa363); *Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co.*, 215 F.R.D. 492, 495 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
[brief] STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES  N.J.A.C. 11:3-7.3.(b)  Db41  N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1 Db43  N.J.S.A 17:28-1.6 Db44,45  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 Db41,43,44  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 et seq.  Db13,32  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6 Db8,11,12,32  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-7.d Db32  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23 Db34,35  N.J.S.A. 39:5H-10 Db41  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 et seq.  Passim N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2 Db42 N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3 et seq. Db42 N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 et seq. Db36,38,40,43,44,45 N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6 Db36,39,45 TABLE OF APPENDIX  Order entered by the Hon. Judge [...], J.S.C., decided on October 23, 2023, and filed October 23, 2023, Docket [...] “Order 1 of 2” being appealed herein . . . . . .  Da1 Order entered by the Hon. Judge [...], J.S.C., decided on October 23, 2023, and filed October 23, 2023, Docket [...] “Order 2 of 2” being appealed herein . . . . . . . . . . .  Da4 Orders entered by the Hon. Judge [...], J.S.C., decided on November 3, 2023, and filed November 3, 2023, Docket [...] being appealed herein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da6 Statement of Reasons Progressive v. Allstate 1 of 2 ([...]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da10 Statement of Reasons Progressive v. Allstate 2 of 2 ([...]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da19 October 7, 2022, Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause filed by Plaintiff [...], [...], and [...] assigned docket number [...] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Da28 November 18, 2022, Order to Show Cause entered by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. setting forth the return Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] ” (Pa374a).  [...] testified that “geldings and mares are [] what most people think of as a horse … and a stallion is kind of a special class because they’re still intact and have these tendencies for behavior that can be very dangerous to other animals or to themselves or to people. ” (Pa1012a).  As professional stallion breeders, Defendants knew or should have known that [...], as a stallion in the breeding environment, had a natural inclination or habitual tendency for aggressive behavior that endangered the people around him.  Further, Defendants [...] and [...] were routinely notified of [...]’s troublesome resistance to being collected, resulting in their approval of numerous cessations from the normal breeding schedule as well as deviation from [...]’ written, USDA-approved standard operating procedures for collecting and freezing stallion semen.
[brief] ”  Id. at 147; Presha, 163 N.J. at 314-15; *State in the Interest of A.A.*, 240 N.J. 341, 354-57 (2020).  The role for such an adult is not “mere presence,” but service as an “advisor,” “buffer,” and “offer[er] of a measure of support in the unfamiliar setting of the police station;” someone “acting with the interests of the juvenile in mind.
[brief] ”  Arguing to the contrary before the trial court, Plaintiffs contended that the holding of Kratovil did not apply, relying instead on dicta contained in In re Christie’s Appointment of Perez, 436 N.J. Super. 575 (App. Div. 2014).  Reliance on that dictum is misplaced.  Although this court in Perez spoke of the Rutgers BOG member there ([...]) as holding office, those references did not shape the court’s holding as to whether [...] lawfully had appointed [...] to the BOG without the advice and consent of the Senate.  Id. at 588-93.  Notably, the court declined to rule on whether the case also could have been brought before the Law Division as a prerogative writ challenge, concluding instead that the plaintiff “Senator may maintain a direct appeal under Rule 2:2-3(a)(2) to this court.  . . .”  Id. at 583-84.  Perhaps most importantly, the court did not grapple with the instant officeholding question because the parties there, which did not include Rutgers, had not raised the issue.  Here, by contrast, and as in Kratovil, that issue is presented to the court.³
[directive] 2.  For all other cases involving LE Incidents (i. e., those not resulting in death), the Independent Investigator shall present the matter to a Grand Jury, except that the Independent Investigator may decline to do so in cases where the Independent Investigator and the Independent Supervisory Reviewer agree that the undisputed facts indicate that the Principal’s use of force in the LE Incident was justified.  Separate Grand Juries to Decide LE Incident and Underlying Criminal Activity  3. that Precipitated the LE Incident.  The underlying offense that gave rise to the LE Incident (e.g., a crime allegedly committed by the civilian injured in the LE Incident) shall be presented to a different Grand Jury than the Grand Jury that will decide whether the Principals should be charged criminally.  I.  Declination.
[brief] In all versions of [...]’s website, the website explicitly set forth the right of the University – consistent with New Jersey caselaw – to make changes, in its sound academic judgment, regarding academic requirements, courses, and programs.  There was no time limitation on when these changes could be made.  As noted above, even the February 15, 2011 [...] website contained a provision which stated:  The University reserves the right in its sole judgment to make changes of any nature in the University’s academic programs, courses, schedule or calendar whenever in its sole judgment it deemed desirable to do so.  The University also reserves the right to shift colleges, schools, institutes, programs, departments or courses from one to another of its campuses.  The foregoing changes may include, without limitation, the elimination of colleges, schools, institutes, programs, departments or courses; the modification of the content of any of the foregoing, the rescheduling of classes with or without extending the announced academic term; and the cancellation of scheduled classes or other academic activities.