ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Downward Departure for Substantial Cooperation  . . . 101-104 13.1  General Authority to Enter Into a Cooperation Agreement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101-102 13.2  Approval and Documentation of Cooperation Agreements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  102-104  Page vi  APPENDIX IA
[brief] The first question on the verdict sheet asked if the State had disproven self-defense as to murder, and the jury answered “no. ”  (Da 13)  We know that this was the first question the jury answered because the jury specifically asked the court if it could deliberate in a different order than what appeared on the verdict sheet, and the court said no.  (9T 10-18 to 19 (“The verdict sheet must be completed in the order that it[’]s written. ”))  Following the jury’s finding that the State did not disprove that [...] acted in self-defense, the jury should have been instructed to acquit [...] of all homicide offenses.  See State v. O’Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 617 (2014); Chavies, 345 N.J. Super. at 267; Gentry, 439 N.J. Super. at 67; Rodriguez, 195 N.J. at 172.
[brief] ”  207 N.J. at 563.  The Court held the post-judgment loan modifications were “in form and substance an extension of credit,” Id. at 563, and that the plaintiff could base a CFA claim on the defendant's alleged actions in connection with that new transaction.  Those facts are not present in this case.  Valentine, October 4, 2023 Opinion at 15.  However, the Valentine’s (and by extension, the trial court’s) analysis improperly narrowed the holding in Gonzalez, focusing on specific case facts which are inconsequential to the holding, all but reading collection activity and ‘subsequent performance’ out of the statute.  Gonzalez explicitly held that collection activity by an assignee constitutes subsequent performance under the CFA—if the court wanted to hold, much more narrowly, that “recast[ing] the terms of the original loan” and/or “post-judgment loan modifications” were subsequent performance under the CFA, the court would have done so.  Here, we must take the New Jersey Supreme Court at their word that that collection activity by an assignee constitutes subsequent performance under the CFA.
[brief] As indicated in Subpoint A, the State’s position is that the obtaining of the video is not a search as the video was an identified object that the owner was voluntarily turning over to the police.  As such, the real issue was the entry into the residence which did require [...]’s consent.  Nevertheless, even if the entry is deemed a search, the police reliance on the landlord’s indication that [...] could “give permission” to obtain the video was objectively reasonable under either an actual or apparent authority analysis.  C. [...]’s Consent Was Voluntary As He Was Aware of His Right to Refuse and His Initial Opposition Was to a Search of the House Not Retrieval of the Video Recordings
[brief] As to factor 4, the [...] has failed to provide any evidence that the responsive records contain evaluative reports of policymakers.  Even if the records contain evaluative reports, there is an appearance that the [...]'s evaluative process here was corrupted.  A judge found probable cause to issued warrants for the arrest of [...] on public corruption charges, but the [...] nevertheless declined to prosecute her.  Any ordinary citizen would have been prosecuted under such circumstances.  In this case, the disclosure of both factual and evaluative information would be in the public interest.  (5) whether any findings of public misconduct have been insufficiently corrected by remedial measures instituted by the investigative agency; and Loigman factor 5 further weighs in favor of disclosure because a judge has found probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for [...]'s arrest on official misconduct charges, but the [...] has failed to take remedial measures in response.
[brief] In Anspach, the Third Circuit rejected substantive due process claims brought by parents against a city health center for failing to inform them that their minor child sought reproductive care.  See id. at 261-62.  It concluded that, because the government had not “compelled, constrained or coerced [the minor] into a course of action she objected to,” namely, receiving reproductive care, there had been no substantive due process violations.  Id. at 266.  From there, the court cut to the heart of the underlying issue: “the real problem alleged by Plaintiffs is not that the state actors interfered with the [...] as parents; rather it is that the state actors did not assist the [...] as parents or affirmatively foster the parent/child relationship. ”  Id. at 266 (emphasis in original); see also Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1169 (6th Cir. 1980) (parents lacked right to any notice from public facility that distributed contraceptives to minors); Sanford v. Stiles, No. 03-5698, 2004 WL 2579738, *11-12 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2004) (Ra88-89).
[brief] The Trial Court completely ignored the deposition testimony of [...] which was placed on the record during the Rule 104 Hearing and with which [...] appropriately and permissibly supported certain conclusions in his expert opinion.  The Trial Court erred by not permitting [...] to testify at the Rule 104 Hearing to answer questions and clarify issues which the Trial Court’s decision evidently missed or misunderstood, and its error was exacerbated when the Trial Court sua sponte rejected the facts set forth in [...]’s deposition testimony.  The Trial Court made layers of error with respect to [...].  The Trial Court erroneously barred [...] from testifying, then erroneously ignored [...]’s deposition testimony, and at times outright rebutted the facts set forth in [...]’s deposition testimony as if the Trial Court were a rebuttal witness equipped with the expertise to even attempt to rebut [...]’s deposition testimony.  Respectfully, the Trial Court had neither the legal authority nor the expertise in the field of affordable housing development to effectively rebut the deposition testimony of [...].  These actions and decisions by the Trial Court are erroneous and should be reversed.
[brief] Plaintiffs argue that if this Court overrules Plaintiffs’ objections, Defendants should have to pay Plaintiffs’ attorneys fees for this document review.  As discussed above, Plaintiffs chose to bring a multimillion-dollar lawsuit involving sophisticated commercial parties, knowing from the outset that discovery would be voluminous.  The Court finds no reason why these truths would justify fees shifting; accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for fees is denied.  B.
[directive] B.  Communications Response if the agency has its own communication center or Departmental Agreement with a Regional or County communication center.  1.  Communications officers/dispatchers will assign a high priority to all domestic violence calls, including those that involve or appear to involve law enforcement personnel from any agency.  2.  Communications officers/dispatchers will immediately notify the communications supervisor of any domestic violence call received that involves, or appears to involve, law enforcement personnel from any agency.  3.  Communications supervisors will prepare and preserve documentation of the facts and circumstances of the call, including any relevant recorded call for service, for use in potential administrative or criminal investigations upon knowledge or notification that the domestic violence incident involved law enforcement personnel from any agency.  C.
[brief] ”  Id. at 246, quoting Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 203 N.J. 586 (2010).  “Such contracts are subject to close judicial scrutiny. ”  Id. at 247, quoting Stelluti v. Casebenn Enters. LLC, 203 N.J. 286 (2010).  In Kernahan v. Home Warranty Administrator of Florida Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 322 (2019), the Court held that “a consumer cannot be required to arbitrate when it cannot fairly be ascertained from the contract’s language that she knowingly assented to the provision’s terms or knew that arbitration was the exclusive forum for dispute resolution.
[brief] Therefore, “legal expenses, whether for the compensation of attorneys or otherwise, are not recoverable absent express authorization by statute, court rule, or contract. ”  Ventron, 94 N.J. at 504 (emphasis added); Cohen v. Fair Lawn Dairies, Inc., 86 N.J. Super. 206 (App. Div.), aff’d, 44 N.J. 450 (1965).
[brief] ”  Id. at 24.  The court recognized that “contracts are generally enforced as written”; however, in “special types of contracts” an Arizona court will not enforce “‘unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation. ’”  Id.  Therefore, the court held that the original declaration governing the scope of the homeowners’ association’s authority provided insufficient notice that a majority vote could amend the restrictions and “allowing substantial, unforeseen, and unlimited amendments would alter the nature of the covenants to which the homeowners originally agreed. ”  Id.  The crux of the decision in Kalway was the lack of notice in the original declaration that property owners would be subject to future restrictions and, in the absence of such notice, whether the amended restrictions were otherwise reasonable.
[brief] Defendants’ positions are disingenuous because there was no flooding in [...]’s over the decade preceding Defendants’ new drainage system.  As set forth above, [...] used the money he was awarded in the Burke Action to install catch basins and PVC piping that had fully cured the flooding on his property resulting from the flow of surface water originating on Defendants’ property.  [Pa339-340 ¶¶ 13-18, 20-21, 29].  By removing the railroad tie planter box that had previously directed the flow of water into Canoe Brook and installing a new drainage system with a curb along the rear of the driveway that collected stormwater runoff from their driveway and directed it through a gap at the rear northeast corner, Defendants had used artificial means to alter the pre-existing discharge of surface water from their land onto that of [...] “by conducting it into new channels in unusual quantities to or on a particular part or parts of the latter’s land.
[directive] The courts routinely examine agency practice in evaluating the expectation of privacy.  Written notification thus would quickly be nullified if representatives of the agency never entered or inspected any of these areas.  In addition to notifying employees of the agency's right to search and inspect, the agency should also, with some regularity, inspect these areas to establish the practice coinciding with the policy.  Any search of agency or personal property should be conducted in the presence of the subject officer and a property control officer.  7.8.9
[brief] History of the Milltown Ford Avenue Redevelopment Plan, 2004-2019.  In 2004, the Redevelopment Agency entered into a Redevelopment Agreement with [...] (“[...]”) to construct 324 housing units, commercial office and retail space, and provide for open space.  See Complaint ¶¶11-12; Pa 91, 108.  The Redevelopment Agreement was subsequently amended in 2004, 2009, 2012, and 2019 (“Redevelopment Plan”).  Pa 91.  The most recent amendment, adopted in 2022, is the subject of this appeal.  In 2005, pursuant to the 2004 amendment, the project was reduced to 276 senior residential units.  Pa 108.  In 2006, [...] (“County”), the Redevelopment Agency, and [...] entered into an agreement wherein the County would acquire a 4-acre portion of the Property for open space (“County Agreement”).  Pa 91, 108.  In 2006, while [...]’s site plan application was pending, Plaintiffs filed a builder’s remedy lawsuit seeking to, *inter alia*, construct 550 units on the Property, nullify the Redevelopment Agreement and make Plaintiffs the redeveloper (“Builder’s Remedy Action”).  Pa 109.  In 2011, the requested builder’s remedy relief was denied, based upon a finding that Plaintiffs were “speculators,” “clearly not builders but investors,” and that the *Mount Laurel* claims were brought to obtain leverage in Plaintiffs’ dispute over the value of the Property for condemnation purposes.  Pa 109.  However, as part of its determination, the Court required the Borough to amend the Redevelopment Plan to permit 350 residential units, 70 of which would be set aside for low and moderate income households.  Pa 109.  The 2012 amendment to the Redevelopment Plan incorporated this revision and also provided for a 50-foot-wide greenway along Mill Pond, consisting of the 4 acres contemplated for acquisition under the County Agreement entered into in 2006.  Pa 110-11.  In 2015, following the Supreme Court’s decision in *In re N.J.A.C. 4:96 & 5:97*, 221 N.J. 1 (2015), the Law Division reevaluated the Property’s capacity for development with affordable housing in the Builder’s Remedy Action.  Pa 109.  The Court considered Plaintiffs’ proposal of 550 residential units, which did not include the aforementioned greenway contained in the Redevelopment Plan, and the Borough’s proposal that the 350-unit proposed development, including the greenway, remain in place.  Pa 110.  Ultimately, the Court agreed that the 350-unit development “affords a realistic opportunity for development,” that the larger proposal submitted by Plaintiffs was “excessive” and “does not demonstrate sound land use planning,” and entered an order providing for the development of 350 residential units, including 70 units set aside for low and moderate income housing.  Pa 110.  In 2019, the Borough’s Master Plan and the Redevelopment Plan were both updated to comply with this order by way of the 2019 Master Plan Reexamination Report.  Pa 111.  In 2018, the development rights under the Redevelopment Agreement were assigned to [...] (“[...]”).
[brief] ”); *Id.* at 15 (“[T]he Defendant did not have a duty to warn regarding the use of the towel bar as a grab bar. ”).  Plaintiff’s argument on appeal about the appearance of the towel rack as a grab bar also contradicts plaintiff’s own testimony that the rack was so far away she could not reach it until after she was falling down.  So not only does plaintiff fail to present any evidence as to what dangerous condition caused her slip in the first place, but the trial court correctly found no evidence supporting plaintiff’s claim that the towel rack was dangerous based on its appearance as a grab bar.  As the court stated, the rack had towels on it.  [...]’s personal opinion notwithstanding, it clearly appeared to be a towel rack to both plaintiff and the court.  Equally important, even assuming a dispute over whether the bathtub’s configuration was dangerous, summary judgment was still properly entered because plaintiff failed to prove that defendant had actual or constructive notice that the bathtub was dangerous and failed to act reasonably to remove the dangerous condition.
[brief] There are some situations where such a submission would not be impactful, such as when there is a negotiated plea, where a defendant has been convicted of a single offense with a mandatory minimum term and the State is not seeking additional time, or when a defendant is subject to a mandatory extended term and the State is not seeking additional time.  In those cases, the sentencing court’s hands are tied, and a defense submitted pre-sentence memorandum has no capacity to make a persuasive effect on the sentence imposed.  But a situation like this cried out for pre-sentencing advocacy.  The court had a wide range of sentences of which it could have imposed.  The sentencing court heard only one voice - the one asking the court to impose the most extreme sentence possible.  There was no voice calling for mercy or moderation, that sought to explain petitioner’s individual circumstances, or sought to remind the court that despite the serious nature of the crimes, no one died, no one was seriously injured, and that the jails are filled with murderers who are not serving such extreme terms as sought by the State.  Since petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s lack of advocacy at sentencing, this Court should remand for a new sentencing hearing.
[brief] The only witness called by the State was [...], the “primary officer” in the case.  (1T 24-19 to 24-20)  Footage from Lichty’s body-worn camera was also introduced into evidence.  (Da 23; 1T 17-11 to 18-16)  Lichty testified that in June of 2022, he was working as a patrol officer with the Community Impact Division (C.I.D.), whose “assignment was to focus on violent crimes and look for wanted individuals. ”  (1T 7-7 to 7-8)  The incident report that Lichty authored provided the following account of the circumstances surrounding the motor vehicle stop.  On June 6, 2022, just after midnight, “[C.I.D.] units received information of a male in possession of a firearm in the area of Collins Road and Alabama Road.  The male was to be inside of a gold Kia Optima with the first three characters of the New Jersey registration being L85. ”  (Da 25; 1T 22-5 to 22-11)  The police report did not, however, include a physical description of the “male” with a gun; nor did it indicate whether the male was the driver or a passenger, how many occupants were in the Kia or where the Kia was headed.  (1T 29-20 to 30-6)  According to the report, once this information was received, the following occurred.  “Units began to circulate the area in attempt to locate [the Kia].”  (Da Lichty spotted a Kia matching the description near the intersection of Kearsarge and Collings roads and alerted the other units.  (Da 25; 1T 13-9 to 13-14)  He and [...] stopped the vehicle “due to both occupants failing to wear a seatbelt. ”  (Da 25; 1T 13-13 to 14-2)  Berg made contact with the driver while Lichty made contact with the passenger, who was later identified as [...].  (Da 25; 1T 14-14 to 14-17; 1T 14-25 to 15-4)  Lichty asked Love, who appeared “visibly nervous,” to step out of the car, “not[ing] that while speaking to [Love], he was wearing a crossbody bag that appeared to be heavily weighted down and he was holding it tight with both hands. ”  (Da 24; 1T 15-18 to 16-3)  Lichty proceeded to handcuff and frisk Love, and immediately felt in Love’s bag what Lichty believed was a firearm.  (Da 25; 1T 16-10 to 16-17)  When the bag was searched, a gun and drugs were recovered.
[brief] It remains undisputed that the record in this case closed on April 19, 2022.  Summations were ordered by [...], A.L.J. (“ALJ”) to be submitted by April 4, 2022.  The ALJ ordered rebuttals to be submitted by April 18, 2022.  Timely submissions and rebuttals were submitted to the OAL by both sides.  Since the OAL received all rebuttals by April 19, 2022, the ALJ should have closed the record on that date.
[brief] Pa518.  The AHM systems would have warned [...] to take action and/or steered the CR-V back into the southbound lane without driver input, completely avoiding the Ramage collision.  Pa134 (“The Honda CR-V’s LKAS would have steered [...]’s Honda CR-V back into the southbound lane of County Route 657 without driver input.  A collision with [...]’s Ford would have been avoided. ”); Pa518.
[brief] (See Da420-Da424).15  For example, the [...] specified costs all homes on the oceanfront and each lot to the west of those properties were required to bear.  (Da448; Da556).  There costs were paid as “[a]nother recognition that Beach front lots were special and therefore may enjoy additional appurtenant rights. ” (Da556).  Absent was any restriction of access or use of the proposed boardwalk abutting the property or the remainder of the [...], literally just several feet seaward.  The repeated references to the 1925 Plan in the [...] combined with [...]’s advertising – and in particular, its specific inclusion of activities such as “Surf Fishing” and “Surf Bathing” – clearly highlighted a purchaser’s unfettered beach access.
[directive] How matters are referred or coordinated between agencies will depend in part on the available investigative tools and possible remedies – including penalties – among other considerations.  N.J.S.A. 45:1-21(e); e.g., N.J.A.C. 13:34C-1.9(b)(5) (Alcohol and Drug Counselor Committee); N.J.A.C. see, 5 13:42-10.4(d) (Board of Psychological Examiners); N.J.A.C. 13:44G-10.7(e) (Board of Social Work Examiners).  e.g., N.J.S.A. 33:1-39.  See, 6 N.J.S.A. 5:12-134 and -135.  See 7 N.J.A.C. 13:69K-1.1 to -7.3.  8
[brief] As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s experts’ conclusions regarding [...]’s alleged failures are not supported by applicable regulations, industry standards, or scientific evidence.  To begin with, Plaintiffs’ experts cite voluntary ANSI standards as if they are mandatory.  Pa361a-363a.  ANSI standards, however, are completely voluntary, and nonconformance does not establish grounds for liability.  Pa361a; See also Pa413a, Mann, 2010 WL 98883, at *7 (finding evidence that truck modifications were contrary to ANSI standards failed to establish an intentional wrong where such standards were “undisputed[ly] . . . advisory. ”).  Plaintiffs’ experts also mischaracterize OSHA requirements and make conclusory statements regarding the work zone lighting and the sweeper’s backup alarm that are wholly unsupported by objective scientific measurements.  Pa360a-67a.  Thus, Plaintiffs’ experts’ reports and the opinions contained therein are not a reliable foundation upon which to base a finding that [...]’s actions were “certain” to cause serious injury or death.
[brief] Factually, this is not a situation where plaintiffs elected to insure 3 of their vehicles under policies with $15,000/$30,000 in liability coverage and then a fourth vehicle with $500,000/$1,000,000 in UIM coverage.  In this latter scenario, an exclusion that would preclude an insured from seeking the full extent of UIM coverage under the $500,000/$1,000,000 UIM policy where the tortfeasor vehicle was one of the three vehicles with $15,000/$30,000 in liability coverage makes perfect sense.  An insured cannot pay for cut rate insurance for 3 vehicles and expect to reap the benefit under 1 vehicle that they fully insure.  That is not the scenario here.  The household vehicle exclusion in [...]’s policy could never apply to extinguish a UIM claim against [...] where the tort-vehicle was also household vehicle because all of plaintiffs’ household vehicles were fully insured by [...] with liability limits that matched the UIM limits.  When reading this definitional exclusion in [...]’s policy, plaintiffs were led to believe they had nothing to worry about as far as compromising their available UIM coverage as long as they insured all of their household vehicles with [...] at the same liability limits, which they did.  Moreover, the exclusion invoked by [...] to deny UIM coverage only becomes applicable by virtue of the fact that [...] also denied liability coverage for the tortfeasor-driver.  If [...] had not denied liability coverage for the tortfeasor-driver, then the liability limits of the tortfeasor would have exceeded [...]’s excess UIM coverage and there would be no UIM claim in the first instance.  In other words, even if plaintiffs were able to anticipate that the definitional exclusion in the [...] policy would have some applicability to their excess UIM coverage, they certainly would not have thought the exclusion could ever effect their excess UIM coverage with [...] since all of the vehicles in plaintiffs’ household were likewise insured under a $5,000,000 excess liability policy issued by [...].  Not only could the definitional exclusion in the [...] policy never limit [...]’s UIM exposure given the facts of this case (namely, that all of plaintiffs’ vehicles had full and equal liability coverage from [...]), but applying the definitional exclusion to the [...] policy would likewise never apply absent [...]’s denial of liability coverage.