ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The trial Court made it clear on the record that defense counsel agreed only to mold the verdict to include the amount of medical bills and temporary disability benefits paid by Worker’s Compensation if- but only if- the jury found that the incident of July 29, 2018 (sic), caused an aggravation of Plaintiff’s pre-existing disease”.  (RB19).  Had the jury not found that the plaintiff Ménière’s disease was aggravated by this accident, they would not have awarded plaintiff any money for his damages.  Clearly the opposite occurred.  We can certainly go back and forth in order to guess what was in the minds of the individual jurors, and ultimately the collective jury.  However, at the end of the day, that’s all it would be, guessing.  The fact remains that the Trial Court’s finding that the jury rejected an argument that was not individually carved out and presented to them is the Trial Court substituting its opinion for that of the jury and constitutes error warranting reversal.
[directive] Fatal Incident in [City/Borough/Township]  1.  On [Date, at approximately time], in [City/Borough/Township], a police encounter occurred in the vicinity of [general location – not specific address] resulting in [#] individuals sustaining [life threatening / fatal] injuries.  2.  [Optional: # members of [police department] were removed from the scene for medical treatment.  Their injuries appear to be [life threatening / not life threatening] at this time].  3.  [Optional: The involved officer(s) were not injured during this incident.]  4.  As the safety and well-being of our community are our top priorities, please know there is no active or ongoing threat to the public.  5.  [Optional: The scene of the incident has been secured by law enforcement.]  6.  [Optional: Residents should avoid [location of road closures].  7.  This incident is being investigated by the New Jersey Office of the Attorney General, and I cannot comment on the facts or circumstances of that investigation.  The Office of the Attorney General will provide updates on the status of their investigation at an appropriate time.  The information contained below may be included in agency press releases or in response to press inquiries received at any law enforcement agency related to a fatal police encounter investigation:
[brief] For all the reasons cited above, it is respectfully requested that this appeal be granted in its entirety, and that the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to take judicial notice as to the State of Emergency be reversed, that the denial of Defendant’s motion to bar reference to the snow removal agreements be reversed (minus the ruling as to [...]’s subsequent termination), and that a new trial on liability only be ordered given the wrong jury charge and cumulative errors.
[brief] ........................................ 13, 21 Everbank v. Tierney, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1414, 2020 WL 3980393 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 15, 2020)  ......................  25 F.C. Schaffer & Assocs. v. Demech Contrs., 101 F.3d 40 (5th Cir. 1998) ...... 12
[directive] [No/No]  1.  ¿Entiende usted que se requerirá que se someta a un examen psicológico realizado por el Departamento de Correcciones con el propósito de determinar si su conducta se caracterizaba por un patrón de comportamiento repetidor y compulsivo cuando cometió el delito, y de ser así, si usted sería un buen candidato (que se beneficiaría de) un tratamiento para delincuentes sexuales y estaría dispuesto a participar en tal tratamiento?  Do you understand you will be required to submit to a psychological examination by the [...] the purpose of which is to determine if your conduct in committing the offense was characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior and if it was, whether you are amenable to (will benefit from) sex offender treatment and you are willing to participate in such treatment?  [Sí/Yes]
[brief] This is a rare summary judgment motion where Plaintiff admitted to every fact in Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts related to Defendant’s argument that the statutory bar prohibits her claims.  (Point I of this Brief)  Appx 520-32 ¶¶1-39).  The three items Plaintiff did not admit were related to legal interpretation of the Statute – not disputing facts of the case.  *(Compare Appx 003-15 with Appx 353-57).*  In connection with its Reply, [...] submitted a document that laid out in one place each of its material facts, along with Plaintiff’s specific responses to each paragraph, demonstrating that Plaintiff had admitted to all material facts.  (Appx 520-38).  The following are the *undisputed* material facts that supported [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, all of which Plaintiff either admitted to or failed to dispute:
[directive] For the reasons stated herein, and pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J. S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the state in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the state, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the state of New Jersey to implement and comply with AG Directive 2008-1 as revised herein, and to take any additional measures necessary to update their agency’s policies accordingly.
[brief] THE PRESIDING CIVIL JUDGE’S DENIAL OF DR BELLIFEMINE’S MOTION TO EXTEND DISCOVERY  CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE THERE EXISTED GOOD CAUSE TO EXTEND DISCOVERY  The denial of [...]’s motion to extend discovery from May 26, 2023 ignores the reality that the trial date of February 13, 2023 in place when the Court heard the motion could not occur because of the Covid 19 pandemic.  The holdings in Leitner v. Toms River Regional School District 392 N.J. Super., 80, 87-88 (App. Div. 2007); Pondon v. Pondon, 374 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div. 2005) which state that in the absence of an arbitration or trial date, a motion to extend discovery should be granted if it is supported by good cause.  A court should consider the effect of the Covid 19 crisis on court calendars in determining whether good cause justifies an extension of discovery.  Hollywood Café Diner v. Jaffe, 417 N.J. Super. 420-421(App. Div. 2022).  In the case at hand, there existed good cause to extend discovery to take [...]’s deposition because she possessed a ledger which documented the amounts [...] was owed by defendants to [...] which defendants claimed they had no records on the monies paid to [...].  A significant factor which supported [...]’s motion to extend discovery is that the statute of limitations constituted an affirmative defense on which defendant has the burden of proof.  R. 4:5-4; Citibank N.A. v. Estate of Simpson, 290 N.J. Super. 519, 523 (App. Div. 1996).  Defendants claimed that they had no record of the 1099 forms issued to [...] and did not produce a witness on May 26, 2023 who had relevant knowledge of the payments made by [...]. to [...] pursuant to the deposition notice served on defendants.  Even if the trial date of February 15, 2023 had not been cancelled because of the Covid 19 crisis, the deposition of Ms. Zhellandkovah would not have necessitated the adjournment of the trial date.  The Presiding Judge’s Order contained a provision indicating that the deposition of [...] could not be used despite the parties agreement to take the deposition which occurred on July 21, 2022.  Although defense counsel produced [...] for a deposition, defense counsel takes the position that the deposition cannot be used in future proceedings because it occurred after the discovery end date.  The deposition thus had no purpose other than to accumulate billable hours for defense counsel.  Defendants posture in the within case constitutes unconscionable, toxic gamesmanship.  After failing to produce a witness having relevant knowledge of the payments made to [...] within the discovery period and the 1099 forms [...] which were required to be issued to [...], defendant objected to the deposition of a subpoenaed witness who has a ledger indicating the amounts paid and owed to [...].  The Presiding Civil Judge's reward to defendants' gamesmanship constitutes an abuse of discretion.
[brief] (40T:105-5 to 106-25)  Patrolman [...] “flipped [the bag] over” onto the sidewalk on the ground in the backyard.  (40T:161-11 to 21)  [...] “spread the remains open from the middle,” and a piece “easily snapped off. ” (40T:176-20 to 177-11)  The contents were later identified as the remains of [redacted].
[brief] (12T 9-22 to 11-20, 36-19 to 37-2)  As defense counsel explained, during [...]’s nearly two-year pretrial incarceration, she “has sought out every program, every opportunity to use that time well. ”  (12T 9-22 to 10-4)  Defense counsel submitted fourteen certificates from programs that [...] had completed, explained that [...] is “actively engaged in other programs,” and was “working on her OSHA certification. ”  (12T 10-4 to 8)  In short, [...] “is doing everything she can to see out the rehabilitative opportunities that are available to her” as well as the “work opportunities . . . that will help her have a career” when she reenters society.  (12T 10-8 to 11)  Particularly in light of [...]’s rehabilitative efforts, the court should have given more weight to mitigating factor 9.
[brief] The Court specifically stated, “needed repair work does not necessarily establish actual harm…  Similarly, references to asbestos did not establish actual detriment…the library was safe to visit despite the presence of capped asbestos. ”  *Id.* at 322-23.  1.  **Defendants Misstate the Nature of Contamination on the Property in Order to Assert that the Property is Detrimental to the Welfare of the Community.
[directive] Record on line any forfeited property permanently removed service and the amount of money received from its sale, auction other disposition. or Provide individually; a description of the property, the disposition (sale, auction or other), the actual value received and the total value received for all forfeited property disposed during the reporting period.  E. Certification  The agency executive their designee will record their name and title, full or address and telephone number/fax number.  This individual will sign and date the form certifying that information contained is true and based correct upon records maintained by the police agency and its funding agency.
[directive] This memorandum revised an earlier memorandum to the bar issued by the Chief Justice on February 16, 1993, implementing the Supreme Court's holding in Madden v. Delran, 126 N.J. 591 (1992).  In Madden the Supreme Court ordered that a system be devised to distribute more equitably municipal court pro bono assignments to members of the bar.  The original memorandum had set forth a listing of those categories of attorneys exempt from the pro bono assignment system.  The memorandum reproduced herein includes the most current revisions to the exemption list.
[brief] Db at 1, 13, 68.  The Court characterized that alleged incident as a “disturbing incident” twice in its Opinion (P16a), reflecting it was antagonized and inflamed by Respondent’s accusations.  Indeed, what can discredit a litigant more than an accusation of being a child molester?  Yet, the testimony that Respondent gave at trial does not link Petitioner to the so called “disturbing incident,” and rather, all that Respondent relies on is innuendo.  The Respondent testified that in February 1997, while Decedent was away on a business trip, Petitioner was babysitting Respondent who was then sixteen years old.  (11T70:23 to 71:2).  Respondent testified it was during a school night, and Respondent spent the evening with her boyfriend, [...], a high school graduate who was working nights in a casino valet department.  (12T107:9-18).  Respondent testified that later that night, Petitioner came into the room and sternly told [...] he had to leave, and Respondent went to bed.  (12T108:1-20).  Respondent said the next morning she woke up undressed and was confused because she had never done that before and did not know what had happened.
[brief] Counsel for [...] did however represent that the device had been “backed up” as of March 2014, and that the back up information would be available for re-imaging.  However the format of the back up was unable to be confirmed by counsel for [...].  During the conference, [...] also indicated that it sought for its lawyers to be present on site when its expert re-images the phone.  [...] expressed concerns since the previous imaging did not produce readable results.  As a result, the Court suggested the use of the Special Master, [...], who had been previously agreed to by the parties and appointed by the Court.  The Court also ordered [...] to bear the costs of the Special Master’s re-imaging of [...]’s iPhone.  The Court further agreed to contact Special Master [...] and request that he select three (3) days he would be available to conduct the re-imaging of [...]’s iPhone.  As such, [...]’s request was granted.
[brief] 1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................................................................  4  STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................  5  I.  PROMOTIONS ..............................................................................................................  5  II.  THE MSRA ..................................................................................................................  7  III.  PBA-1 LAWSUIT AND SETTLEMENT .......................................................................  9  IV.  THE MSRA IS RENEWED AND AMENDED ............................................................  11  STANDARD OF REVIEW ...............................................................................................  14  LEGAL ARGUMENTS .....................................................................................................
[brief] *See N.J.A.C. 6A:28-1.4.*  The Commission possesses extensive expertise in all matters regarding school ethics and in interpreting the School Ethics Act.  Accordingly, its determination here should not be overturned unless it is “palpably arbitrary or departs from governing law. ”  *Dennery v. Bd. of Educ. of Passaic Cnty. Reg’l High Sch. Dist. No. 1,* 131 N.J. 626, 643 (1993) (stating that courts are “not at liberty to interfere with regulatory and administrative judgments of the professionals in the field of public education unless those judgments are palpably arbitrary or depart from governing law” (emphasis added)).  Petitioner here has provided no reason why the Commission’s decision should be overturned.  His brief amounts to nothing more than second-guessing of the Commission’s findings, citations to irrelevant case law, and a plea to this Court that the referendum result is unfair and should not stand.  None of these arguments, standing alone or together, are sufficient to overcome the strong degree of deference this Court must provide to the Commission regarding matters within its expertise.  The Commission examined each of Petitioner’s claims and found that they did not state a claim for violations of the School Ethics Act.  In particular, the Commission found that “Complainant offers nothing more than general and vague conclusory statements about what the ‘Board’ may have done, but does not offer any detailed facts evidencing how the named Respondents may have engaged in unethical conduct.  Because such generalized accusations are wholly insufficient to satisfy Complainant’s burden of proof,” the Complaint must be dismissed.  (16a.)  Not only are those findings beyond reproach, as will be explained in greater detail below, but they are entitled to substantial deference and therefore should stand.
[brief] Although the law of the case doctrine is a discretionary rule and not an inflexible requirement, the proper application of the rule called for deference in this matter.  As previously stated, the law of the case doctrine calls on one court to balance the value of judicial deference for the rulings of a coordinate court against those factors that bear on the pursuit of justice and, particularly, the search for truth.  Balancing those factors here, it is clear that [...]’s opinion, based on the live testimony of [...], was sound and should not have been disturbed.  Accordingly, [...]’s ruling was an abuse of discretion that cannot stand on appeal.  Indeed, as argued herein, [...]’s ruling also was an abuse of discretion because it is legally erroneous.  Specifically, the court erred in finding the [...] evidence and [...]’s testimony regarding same were not relevant.  (Pa31 to 34).  It also erred in finding the probative value was substantially outweighed by the potential for prejudice.  Accordingly, the court’s evidentiary ruling must be reversed on appeal.
[brief] Specifically, the court found that the circumstances which gave rise to probable cause were not unforeseeable or spontaneous.  Likening this case to the circumstances in *Smart*, the trial court reasoned as follows:  The officers went to that specific location because it was known as an open air drug market.  They had got information that they believed that [...] was the occupant or the driver of that car from somebody that they knew to be a drug addict, and they went to that area with the expectation that there may be drug activity taking place.  Moreover, what’s more concerning to the Court is that the officers sat there for two or more hours, or almost two hours and watched the defendant allegedly engage in three separate hand-to-hand transactions over a two-hour period, despite the fact that there were numerous officers on scene.  Had the officers approached the vehicle when they first observed the hand to hand transaction, it could have been considered unforeseen and spontaneous.  However, the time in which the first transaction occurred until the time the defendant was arrested could have used to secure a warrant for the vehicle.  [2T19-25 to 20-19.]  However, a review of the testimony in this case shows that several of the trial court’s factual findings are clearly mistaken and are not supported by the record, and that the trial court erred in finding that the circumstances giving rise to probable cause were not spontaneous and unforeseeable.
[directive] Officers conducting administrative investigations of firearm discharges must strive to conduct a thorough and objective investigation without violating the rights of the subject officer or any other law enforcement officer.  All supervisors and any other officer who may be called upon to participate in a firearm discharge investigation therefore must be thoroughly familiar with the agency's entire internal affairs policy, including protection of the subject officer's rights and the procedures for properly investigating firearm discharges.  Investigators should review all administrative reports the agency requires.  These reports  42  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021 should include a description of the incident, the date, time and location of the incident, the type of firearm used, the type of ammunition used and number of rounds fired, the identity of the officer, and any other information a superior officer requests.  The involved officer's supervisor must assist the internal affairs investigator as needed.  7.11.9
[brief] As set forth in the [...]’s brief, “The [...]’s Solicitor gave an oral presentation of the draft Resolution at the October 20, 2022, and the [...] was satisfied with its contents and voted for approval of the Resolution and the use variance based on the findings and conclusions set forth in the Resolution.  (2T3:8 to 2T7:2; Pa40 to Pa50). ”  Defendant [...]’s Brief p 27.  There was a critical missing element in the procedure used to adopt the Resolution.  There is nothing in the record of the October 20, 2022 hearing which documented the following: 1.  That all of the [...] Members had the proposed resolution to review before the meeting; 2. That all of the [...] Members had read the proposed Resolution; and 3.  That the proposed resolution accurately reflected the testimony, findings of fact and conclusions of law.  At a minimum the members of the [...] should have acknowledged reading and approving the Resolution as drafted.  We do not believe that the Legislature asks too much of municipal governing bodies when it insists upon a review of a planning board's report.  In an analogous situation, where planning board members voted on an application for development without discussion, we held that a verbal discussion in that circumstance is not mandatory, as long as the ultimate resolution, which will serve as the official statement of the planning board's findings and conclusions is "furnished to the board members in advance of the time they will vote, to provide them ample time to study it and, if they deem it appropriate, request clarifications or modifications."  Scully-Bozarth Post #1817 of Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S. v. Planning Bd. of Burlington, 362 N.J. Super. 296, 312, (App. Div.), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 34, (2003).  We further implied that members should acknowledge "on the record that they read it, understood it, and agreed with it as drafted."  Id. at 313.  Emphasis added.  The [...] failed to meet the “minimum” standard required of Scully-Bozarth cited by the Respondents as being controlling for the adoption of the resolution of approval.  In this matter.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 does not have a “scienter” requirement.  The appellant/plaintiff [...] argues he should be exempted from New Jersey law due to assumptions he made.  Appellant/plaintiff [...]’s ill-fated intentions and “fail[ure] to properly navigate the computer” to properly change his insurance policy garaging address is irrelevant.  (Pg.9 - Appellant Brief).  Likewise, his alleged confusion regarding the significance of the mailing address versus the garaging address is also irrelevant.  Ibid.  The Appellate Division has already addressed this issue:  “N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) does not include a requirement that an uninsured motorist have a culpable state of mind and does not exempt motorists who have a good faith belief that they have medical expense benefits coverage. ”  *Bencosme v. Kannankara*, A-1672-14T3, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 614, *6 (App. Div. Mar. 22, 2016).
[brief] (emphasis in original).  In order to prevail on a claim under the CRA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) they have "been deprived of any substantive due process or equal protection rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or any substantive rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this State," or their "exercise or enjoyment of those substantive rights, privileges or immunities have been interfered with or attempted to be interfered with," (2) "by threats, intimidation or coercion", and (3) "by a person acting under color of law."
[brief] I think there was service.  When I look at the activities of the -- this family on the day of service, that -- that [...] was out walking a dog probably at the time that process was served and that's why he wasn't served personally, makes perfect sense to me.  That's his own testimony.  He's out walking a dog just before they left for their vacation.  Was there enough time for them to get to the -- the toll plaza?  I think there is.  You know, when you play with -- with a time here a little here and there with what time the service may have been made, a little bit earlier than -- than what [...] may have projected, it is absolutely within the realm of possibility that everything can fall into place.  There's testimony, yet no evidence, that the family stopped anywhere before they got onto the Parkway.  The Dunkin' Donuts testimony, there's no receipt, there's no indication, whatsoever, that that actually took place.  So the bottom line is this; service of process was effected.