ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Wray, at 213.  Finally, [...] cites the case of *Rosenblit v. Zimmerman*, 166 N.J. 391 (2001), but that case is inapposite to our situation.  In *Rosenblit*, the Supreme Court held that when a doctor alters medical records in a malpractice case, the fact that he did so constitutes a "verbal act," or a statement against interest and indicates his "'appreciation that the evidence would or might be hurtful to ... his position.'"  *Rosenblit*, at 409, citing *State v. Council, Div. of Resource Dev.*, 60 N.J. 199, 202 (1972).  The *Rosenblit*  Court thus determined that the doctor's alteration of the records was directly relevant to the underlying malpractice allegation, and held that evidence of the doctor having altered the records should have been admitted in the malpractice trial.  Here, however, there is no "verbal act" of the plaintiff which goes directly to the underlying incident and what happened on that fateful day.  Nowhere in the texts or photos does the plaintiff make a statement against interest that he lied about how the underlying incident happened.  The plaintiff using a ladder or relaying a quote to renovate a bathroom does not have anything to do with who is telling the truth about what happened at the store four years earlier.  The evidence is only relevant to damages and since the trial was bifurcated, it should only have been admitted, if at all, in the damages phase of the trial.
[brief] As the Appellate Division explained in *On-Line Games*:  First, a determination as to materiality must be made.  If a deviation is deemed material, a post-opening proffer by a bidder would necessarily be an interdicted modification.  Only after a deviation is determined to be non-material can a contract be awarded.  In that event, the bidder may be required to supply what was called for in the RFP.  This is a far cry from the suggestion that a bid is automatically conforming because the RFP requirements will have to be supplied in any event.  If this were the case, it would not matter what a bid contained and the requirement of a non-material deviation in the RFP, the rule and the cases would be utterly meaningless.  In short, evidence of what might be required of a bidder after an award, or what might be offered by a bidder after bid opening, may not be considered in a materiality inquiry.
[brief] (8T74-7 to 75-6; 8T197-17 to 198-18; 11T123-18 to 19).  They were allowed to return to Nevada.  (11T108-15 to 23).  After [...] left the parking lot, defendant unlocked the BMW and removed a small silver and black box.  (9T55-17 to 20).  As defendant walked back towards Apartment B, officers apprehended and handcuffed him.  (9T56-3 to 18).  Pursuant to defendant's consent to search, the police seize two large marijuana-filled duffel bags from his apartment, marijuana unrelated to this investigation, found in a kitchen cabinet, and the silver and black box containing cocaine; six duffel bags from defendant's BMW; and $60,000 to $70,000 in cash from a safe in defendant’s Queens residence.
[brief] Exhibit A to [...] Reply Certification - Letter Agreement, dated June 9, 1995 ..................................................Pa136  Exhibit B to [...] Reply Certification - (i)  Letter from Mitsumasa [...] to [...], dated May 5, 1995 .............................................................................Pa139  (ii)  Facsimile from [...] to Mitsumasa [...], dated May 15, 1995 ..............................................................................Pa142  Exhibit A to [...] Certification - Senate Law and Public Safety and Veterans’ Affairs Committee – Statement to Assembly Committee Substitute for Assembly No. 3619, dated September 26, 2005 ..............................................................Pa144  Order of the Honorable [...] Granting Plaintiffs’ Order to Show Cause for Injunctive Relief, dated September 29, 2023 ....Pa148
[brief] Tairi, 2022 WL 2760858, at *3.  Additionally the State reemphasizes that this Court found in deciding defendant’s direct appeal:  “[...]’s testimony was corroborated in many details by the victims of the crimes, other physical evidence, and by the testimony of [[...]’ sister], which circumstantially established defendant’s --- 13  Although the standard for a new trial under Brady does not require evidence to have been discoverable earlier by reasonable diligence, Rule 3:22-4(b)(2)(B) still requires that the factual predicate for a second PCR petition to not have been discoverable earlier by reasonable diligence.  active involvement in the criminal enterprise. ”  Tairi, 2012 WL 489101, at *15.  And moreover, as this Court has already determined in both its February 2012 and July 2022 opinions, [...]’ credibility was challenged at trial and the jury had reason to doubt his testimony.  Tairi, 2012 WL 489101, at *15; Tairi, 2022 WL 2760858, at *3.  Nevertheless, the jury clearly believed [...]’ testimony against defendant because of the significant amount of evidence corroborating his testimony.  Fundamentally, the core issues that defendant presents to this Court in this appeal have already been adjudicated.
[brief] Ibid.  As to Count I, the lower court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that a rational nexus was required to exist between the Redevelopment Payment and the 290 Ocean Project.  (Pa80 to Pa81).  Instead, the lower court evaluated the relationship of the Redevelopment Payment and its use in connection with the broader Redevelopment Plan.  Ibid.  As argued by Defendants, the Redevelopment Payment is valid provided it (i) defrays the costs of the redevelopment entity and (ii) carries out and effectuates the purposes of the LRHL and a redevelopment plan.  Ibid.  Ultimately, the lower court determined that both conditions were satisfied: Senior Center project *furthers the objectives and terms of the Redevelopment Plan*.  The Redevelopment Payment was used by [...] *to effectuate and defray costs of improvement in the area*.  (Pa81)  (emphasis added).  As to Count II, the lower court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that it retained the ability to reject future amendments to the Redevelopment Plan even after completion of its own neighboring redevelopment project and loss of its designation as a “redeveloper.
[brief] Plaintiff cannot circumvent the lack of a private right of action by seeking relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50 to 62.  See In re Resol. of State Comm'n of Investigation, 108 N.J. 35, 46 (1987) (dismissing cause of action seeking a judgment declaring a party had violated a statute because plaintiffs did not have a private right of action under the statute); Excel Pharmacy Servs., LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 825 F. App'x 65, 70 (3d Cir. 2020) (“But it is well settled that parties cannot bring a declaratory judgment action under a statute when there is no private right of action under that statute.
[brief] This is a material misrepresentation by Defense Counsel, as they are essentially claiming to have raised this issue during trial, when in fact they did not raise this issue until their post trial motion.  See Pa10-Pa11 a reply brief. ”  BIS LP, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 26 N.J. Tax 489, 581 (App. Div. 2011) (citing Randolph Town Ctr., L.P. v. Cnty. of Morris, 374 N.J. Super. 448, 452 n.2 (App. Div. 2005)).
[brief] CERTIFICATION  I, [...], hereby certify that I am a pro se litigant in above captioned matter and that I prepared this Formal Brief in support of our appeal.  Furthermore, I hereby certify that the documents included in the Appendix of this Formal Brief are true and accurate copies of the documents that I received or communicated.  I certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true.  I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.  Date: June 18, 2024  [...], Pro Se Litigant  [...], TRUSTEE OF THE DONALD M. FOX 2006  REVOCABLE TRUST, Plaintiff/Respondent, -v- [...] and [...], Defendants/Appellants, and [...], Defendant/Respondent.
[brief] In those calls, which were played for the jury, he complained about wiretaps and “the false picture that’s being painted of me. ”  (24T 227-3 to 228-25; 25T 6-1 to 15-25)  [...] also testified that there are photos on social media of defendant, [...], and [...] together, and that there are social-media posts that show defendant and [...] communicating with one another.  (25T 22-14 to 16; 25T 29-10 to 30-1)  In those posts, from the summer of 2017, [...] would ask for certain personal items, like “clothes,” back -- but never a laptop -- and [...] testified, over repeated defense objection, that he perceived defendant’s responses to be “confrontational” and to contain “threat[s],” and even a reference to “a prior assault,” while [...] was “more trying to keep the peace, just being more easygoing. ”  (25T 30-6 to 32-14; 25T 66-2 to 18; 25T 40-10 to 43-9)  [...] also testified that defendant “Googled” [...]’ name on December 28, 2018, and searched something else called “My Life” for [...]’ name on the same day.  (25T 37-18 to 39-11)  [...] also claimed, on cross-examination, not to have noticed Instagram posts by [...] that read: “Calm mind, strong heart, violent hands,” and “Never let them see you coming. ”  (25T 47-13 to 49-24)  The State also called as a witness [...], a man with a lengthy --- 6 See Point III, infra, for more discussion of this significant improper-lay-opinion issue, including detailed references to examples of the content of those social-media posts. prior record, and a history of “snitching” to get favorable deals.
[brief] The next year, Decedent retired from [...].  (9T\textsuperscript{10}22:22-23).  In October 2012, Superstorm Sandy hit Brigantine causing substantial water damage to their Home.  (8T22:4-12).  Decedent applied for a NJ Stronger Rehabilitation Grant (REMM Grant) from the State of New Jersey to repair the damage from Superstorm Sandy but was placed on a wait list.  (P490a; 7T78:11-25; 7T79:22-24).  In the summer of 2014, just a couple months before the October 16, 2014 Will was made, Petitioner joined in the REMM Grant as a co-applicant after being advised that Petitioner’s Veteran status increased their chances for approval.  (P493a to P496a; 7T80: 18 to 82:4).  Petitioner’s income from the DLA was also needed to qualify for the grant.  (P501a; 7T82:14-197T83:5 to 84:1).  The REMM Grant application was approved for $150,000.  (7T86:5-10).  During an inspection, asbestos was discovered in the Home so the building had to be demolished.  (7T89:17-21).  In 2015, Petitioner and Decedent were granted a $155,000 mortgage from [...] for the construction of a new structure.  (P512a to P513a).  Another $29,000 was awarded from the REMM grant after Petitioner’s doctor submitted a letter stating Petitioner needed an elevator in the Home to accommodate his disability.  (7T86:19 to 87:13; P508).  Petitioner was completely involved in the Home construction, which was completed in 2017.  (P518a to 535a; P97a to P110a).  \textsuperscript{10}  9T means Transcript of Trial dated August 31, 2022.  Decedent was hospitalized in March 2021 with Covid and never recovered.  (7T158:7-12).  She passed away on May 6, 2021.  (P120a).  At the time of her death, Decedent held title to the Home, the residuary estate to a home at [...], two IRA accounts with $273,000 (P702a), and a mortgage to Respondent’s home in the sum of $350,000\(^{11}\) (P656a; 9T234:22 to 235:23).
[brief] (2T17- 15 to 18; 2T20-4 to 9; 2T20-14 to 16).  When the officer approached the home, he saw that the storm door to the unit was shut, but the main door was opened.  (2T27-9 to 16).  [...] rang the doorbell but received no response, so he opened the storm door and announced his presence.  (2T27-17 to 25).  Still no response from anyone.  (2T28-1 to 2).
[brief] See, *Carbis Sales, Inc. v. Eisenberg*, 397 N.J. Super. 64, 79 (App. Div. 2007) (citing, *Kaplan v. Skoloff & Wolfe, P.C.*, 339 N.J. Super. 97, 103 (App. Div. 2001)).  "[I]f an expert cannot offer objective support for his or her opinions, but testified to a view about a standard that is 'personal' it fails because it is a mere opinion."  *Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp.*, 207 N.J. 344, 373 (2011)  “To be admissible as evidence, the expert’s opinion must be based on standards accepted by the legal community and not merely on the expert’s personal opinion. ”  *Stoeckel v. Twp. Of Knowlton*, 387 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 489 (2006).  The sources of expert opinion are restricted to those deemed reliable, *N.J.R.E.* 703, and “[t]he corollary of that rule is the net opinion rule, which forbids the admission into evidence of an expert’s conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence or other data.
[brief] (11T199-21 to 200-5).  Also on the State’s direct examination, [...] testified she told a friend about [...]’s alleged confession, and that friend contacted the police.  (11T70-5 to 71-1).  Although these two pieces of testimony were brief, they created the logical implication that Hedgespeth’s friend had implicated [...] in the crime.  It is well-settled that “[w]hen the logical implication to be drawn from the testimony leads the jury to believe that a non-testifying witness has given the police evidence of the accused’s guilt, the testimony should be disallowed as hearsay. ”  State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 271 (1973).  “The common thread that runs through Bankston, Irving, and Tilghman, is that a police officer may not imply to the jury that he possesses superior knowledge, outside the record, that incriminates the defendant. ”  State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338, 351 (2005) (internal citations omitted).  Under the Bankston rule, “it is the ‘creation of the inference, not the specificity of the statements made,’ that determines whether the hearsay rule was violated. ”  State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 225 (1996) (quoting State v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427, 447 (1989)); see also State v. Watson, 254 N.J. 558, 60-10 (2023) (“When an officer conveys information from someone who does not testify, either directly or by inference, and the information incriminates the defendant, both the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule are implicated. ” (internal quotation omitted)).  Because the above-quoted testimony of [...] and Hedgespeth created the logical implication that Hedgespeth’s friend had implicated [...] in the crime, this testimony ran afoul of the Bankston rule, was inadmissible hearsay, and violated [...]’s confrontation rights.  There is a reasonable possibility that the jury relied on this inadmissible hearsay to bolster the questionable credibility of [...] and [...].  Consequently, this constitutional error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Branch, 182 N.J. at 353 (“Because the issue is now to be resolved under the ‘plain error’ rule, we must consider whether there is reasonable doubt that the jury would have ruled other than as it did. ” (quoting Irving, 114 N.J. at 447)).  [...] convictions should therefore be reversed.  POINT IV
[brief] The Order again highlighted critical components of the criminal trial jury selection process:  “All case-specific questioning of jurors will be conducted during the virtual voir dire process in the presence of the judge, attorneys, and parties.  Jurors will be excused for cause based on that questioning. ” (Da98).  (Emphasis added).  “After virtual questioning and for-cause excusals, the remaining small numbers of jurors will be directed to report in person to the courthouse in small groups for the final phase of selection, including the exercise of peremptory challenges. ”  Ibid.  “The Administrative Director of the Courts is authorized to promulgate additional protocols on jury operation relating to this resumption of in-person jury proceedings during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. ”  (Da100)  On May 17, 2021, [...] issued an 11-page Notice to the Bar, which “provided a comprehensive update on the resumption of in-person jury trials . . . pursuant to the Supreme Court’s May 11, 2021 Order.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................  2 STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................................................  4  STANDARD OF REVIEW ......................................................................................................  12  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT  ONE SUMMARY  JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, MR. ROCCO AND PEPPER HAMILTON OWED NO DUTY TO APPELLANTS, WHO WERE NOT THEIR CLIENTS...  14  A.  As a Matter of Law, Neither [...] Nor [...] Owed Any Duty to Appellants .................................................................................................................. 14  B.  It is Undisputed that Appellants Suffered No Damage as the Result of Any Alleged Act or Omission by [...] or [...] .........................  18  POINT TWO BASED UPON THE UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS OF THE CASE, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED  MR. ROCCO AND PEPPER HAMILTON  SUMMARY  JUDGMENT AS TO APPELLANTS’ ILL-DEFINED CLAIMS FOR ALLEGED FRAUD, RICO VIOLATION(S), CONSPIRACY AND “AIDING AND ABETTING” ........................................................................................................................................  21  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................
[brief] Requiring a municipality to summarize the provisions of a redevelopment plan in the notice of introduction will only lead to more litigation as invariably a plaintiff will argue that there was some provision of interest to that plaintiff that was omitted from the notice’s summary.  This is illustrated in the unpublished decisions cited in Plaintiff’s Brief.  (Pb33-Pb34).  In Gentless, the plaintiff complained that the notice failed to contain a sufficient explanation of the changes in density and height for the proposed townhomes.  (Pa334).  This is true even though the Court found that the notice comprehensively “identified by title, every subsection of the plan that would be deleted, added, or amended” by the ordinance. ” (Pa334).  Because the Notice stated the purpose of Ordinance 13-2022, which was to adopt the Redevelopment Plan for specified properties, the Trial Court correctly rejected Plaintiff’s argument.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  [...] Amended Order and Judgment (November 1, 2024) .................................................. Da425 TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS Transcript on Order to Show Cause (September 13, 2024) ........................................ T1 Transcript of Case Management Conference (October 24, 2024) ................................. T2 Transcript on Motion for Reconsideration Proceeding (September 24, 2024) ...... T3 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Ace-Manzo, Inc. v. Twp. of Neptune, 258 N.J. Super. 129 (Law Div. 1992) .................................................................21 Bandler v. Melillo, 443 N.J. Super. 203 (App. Div. 2015) ..............................................................16 Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135 (2001) .........................................................................................25, 29, 35 Case v. Trenton, 76 N.J.L. 696 (1909) .........................................................................................24 Chimes v. Oritani Motor Hotel, Inc., 195 N.J. Super. 435 (App. Div. 1984) ...............................................................33 Dobco, Inc. v. Brockwell & Carrington Contractors, Inc., 441 N.J. Super. 148 (Law Div. 2015) ...............................................................25, 26 H&S Constr. & Mech., Inc. v. Westfield Pub. Schs., 2018 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1574 (App. Div. July 5, 2018) .....................................21 Herschberg. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 2 N.J. Tax 121 (Tax. Ct. 1981) ........................................................................16 In re Bid Solicitation No. 10-X-21024, 2012 N.J. Super. LEXIS 102 (App. Div. Jan 17, 2012) .....................................8 In re Jasper Seating Co. Inc., 406 N.J. Super. 213 (App. Div. 2009) ...............................................................21 Jackson v. Dep’t of Corr., 335 N.J. Super. 227 (App. Div. 2000) ...............................................................26 M.J. Paquet v. N.J. DOT., 171 N.J. 378 (2002)
[directive] However, the internal affairs investigator should be aware that other factors may also serve to affect a subject officer's decision to answer questions during a criminal interview.  For example, directing an officer to appear at a particular time and place may generate confusion on the officer’s part as to whether he or she is being required to participate in the interview.  When these circumstances or any other questions as to the need to provide a warning in criminal interviews are present, the internal affairs investigator should always consult with the County Prosecutor regarding whether the subject officer should be advised of their right against self-incrimination.
[brief] For over the last 15 years, Dr.  Powell is a partner of [...], which advises public and private entities in real estate developments and financing for market rate and affordable housing developments and provides litigation support as an expert in said fields of expertise.  4T, 19:7-24.  To date, [...] has provided such advisory services to approximately 100 municipalities in New Jersey and other important public entities such as the [...] and the [...] on Affordable Housing.  4T, 19:25-20:14.  [...] testified, confirming [...]’s deposition testimony, which opposing counsel did not and could not contest, that 100% affordable housing developments, such as the subject affordable housing development in this matter, are completely different than residential market rate developments 4T, 24:5-9.  The State of New Jersey, as states throughout the country, and the federal government created a regulatory scheme to foster and facilitate the development of affordable housing for low and medium income residents.
[brief] Id. at 66.  Even if a state court is granted broad general jurisdiction, it has no subject matter jurisdiction over claims "Congress intended . . . to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts."  Nat'l State Bank of Elizabeth v. Gonzalez, 266 N.J. Super. 614, 621 (App. Div. 1993) (emphasis omitted), appeal dismissed 137 N.J. 304.