ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In Gazzillo, the plaintiff, a school board employee, alleged that another school board employee sexually assaulted her on property owned by the school board.  Id. at 261.  She “filed a claim for workers compensation benefits and notified the police,” however, she failed to file a timely notice of claim against the school board or school board employee.  Ibid.  The trial court denied her motion for leave to file a late notice of claim finding the plaintiff failed to show extraordinary circumstances for her delay.  Ibid.  A year later, the Gazzillo plaintiff filed a complaint against the employee who had assaulted her individually, without naming the school board as a fellow party.  Ibid.  The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff's claim was barred due to the denial of the plaintiff's motion for leave to file a late notice of claim.  Id. at 261-62.  The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in his favor.  Id. at 262.  The Appellate Division reversed and held that a notice of claim was unnecessary under the facts presented.  *Gazzillo*, 398 N.J. Super. at 264.  It rejected the argument that a notice of claim must be filed any time a plaintiff asserts a common law claim against a public employee and explained that there must be, as a initial matter, “some nexus between the wrong that is complained of and the defendant’s public employment in order to mandate that a notice of claim be filed before suit may be instituted.
[brief] On March 8, 2024, [...] appeared before [...] to be admitted into PTI.  Da428, 430 (3:12-19).  Defense counsel advised [...] that [...] intended to formally move in the future for a civil reservation, on notice to civil counsel for [...], but that he did not want the civil reservation issue to delay his admission to PTI.  Da431 (4:14-24).  [...] carefully confirmed that [...] wanted to be sentenced to PTI in accordance with the plea agreement regardless of whether a civil reservation was ultimately entered later on:  COURT: I want to make clear that the entry, the application for entry into PTI is not conditioned upon the granting of a civil reservation, correct?  Def. Atty.: That’s my understanding.  COURT: Whether that’s granted or denied, this defendant wishes to be admitted into PTI.  Def. Atty.: He is ready to be admitted today.  [Da432 (5:2-8) (emphasis added). ]  [...] then testified that he understood the conditions of PTI, including the requirement that he “must testify truthfully against Co-defendant [...] if the matter proceeds to trial. ”  Da433 (6:15-16); Da440 (13:6-14).  F. [...]’s Legal Representation In This Civil Matter
[brief] The trial court noted that [...] was a contemporary of [...], worked at DEP longer than [...], retired the same year, was at least fifty-six years old when the alleged remark was made, and continued to send [...] to conferences from 2014 to 2016.  (3T19:7-20).  See Brae, 327 N.J. Super. at 134; Taylor, 152 N.J. at 500.  The trial court was correct in its analysis of [...]’s discrimination claims against [...].  Dismissal of Counts One and Five against [...] should be affirmed.
[directive] SEXUAL VIOLENCE SERVICES  The following services are provided by all Sexual Violence Organizations: a 24-hour hotline for crisis intervention and information; CSVA to accompany victims during medical treatment, law enforcement interviews, and court appearances; individual and group counseling; and referrals.  These services are available to victims 13 years of age and older.  Additional services are also available to family members and significant others regardless of the victim’s age.  All sexual violence services are available regardless of when the incident occurred.  Victims may request these services even in situations where they have declined medical care and/or notification of law enforcement.  All sexual violence services are confidential and free of charge.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.15.
[brief] **STANDARD OF REVIEW**  [...]’s “interpretation of the Act is entitled to substantial deference” and “[a]ppellate courts ‘will not upset a State agency’s determination in the absence of a showing that it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacked fair support in the evidence, or that it violated a legislative policy expressed express or implicit in the governing statute. ’”  *In re: City of Atl.*, 445 N.J. Super. 1, 11 (App. Div. 2016) (citing *Communications Workers of America, Local 1034 v. New Jersey State Policemen’s Benev. Ass’n.*, 412 N.J. Super. 286, 291 (App. Div. 2010)).  However, while [...]’s interpretation of the Act “is entitled to great weight…[appellate courts] will not yield to [...] if its interpretation is ‘plainly unreasonable, contrary to the language of the Act, or subversive of the Legislature’s intent. ’”  *Ibid.*  “Moreover, deference is not afforded when [...]’s interpretation gives a provision of the Act greater reach than the Legislature intended, and [...] must follow judicial precedents interpreting the Act. ”  *Ibid.*
[brief] CASES  Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Ed., 138 N.J. 405 (1994) ...........................................22,23,25  Abramson v. William Paterson College of New Jersey, 260 F. 3d 265 (3d Cir. 2001) ..................................42  Asbury Park v. Department of Civil Serv., 17 N.J. 419 (1955) ..................................................31  Battaglia v. UPS, Inc., 214 N.J.  518 (2013) ..................................................25  Beasley v. Passaic Cty., 377 N.J. Super. 585 (App. Div. 2005) .........................36, 38  Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) ..................................................22  Chance v. McCann, 405 N.J. Super. 547 (App. Div. 2009)  ...............21  City of San Antonio v. Heim, 932 S.W. 2d 287 (Court of Appeals of Texas 1996).  ......................29  City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik 485 U.S. 112 (1988) ..................................................36  Clowes v. Terminix Int’l Inc., 109 N.J. 575 (1988) ..................................................44  Donelson v. DuPont Chambers Works, 206 N.J. 243 (2011)  ..................................................38, 39, 40  Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451 (2003) ..................................................24, 26, 27  EEOC v. L.B. Foster Co., 123 F.3d 746 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 1147 (1998) ........... 45 In re Emmons, 63 N.J. Super. 136 (App. Div. 1960) ........................................ 32 Fleming v. Correctional Healthcare Solutions, Inc., 164 N.J. 90 (2000) ................................................................. 22, 23 Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F. 3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994) .................................................... 45, 50 Green v. Jersey City Bd. Of Ed., 177 N.J. 434 (2003) ................................................................. 38, 43 Greenberg v. Camden County Vocational & Tech. Schools, 310 N.J. Super. 189 (App. Div. 1998) ....................................... 44, 45 Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hospital, 158 N.J. 404 (1999) ................................................................. 23 Kachmar v. Sungard Data Systems, Inc., 109 F. 3d 173 (3d Cir. 1997) .................................................... 42, 48 Kelly v. Bally’s Grand, Inc., 285 N.J. Super. 422 (App. Div. 1995) ....................................... 44 Kennedy v. Chubb Group, 60 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D.N.J. 1999) ............................................. 22
[brief] ## CASES - **Coffin v. United States**, 156 U.S. 432 (1895) .................................................. 53 - **Commonwealth v. Chapman**, 136 A.3d 126 (Pa. 2016) ...........................................  47 - **Frazier v. United States**, 335 U.S. 497 (1948) ......................................................  31 - **Howes v. Fields**, 565 U.S. 499 (2012) .................................................................. 18 - **Humanik v. Beyer**, 871 F.2d 432 (3d Cir. 1989) ....................................................  54 - **In re Winship**, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ..................................................................... 53, 54 - **J.D.B. v. North Carolina**, 564 U.S. 261 (2011) ....................................................... 18 - **Malloy v. Hogan**, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) ..................................................................... 56 - **Minnick v. Mississippi**, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) .......................................................... 22 - **Miranda v. Arizona**, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ............................................................... passim - **Mullaney v. Wilbur**, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) ................................................................ 54 - **Oregon v. Mathiason**, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) ............................................................ 17 - **Orozco v. Texas**, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) .................................................................. 17 - **Panko v. Flintkote Co.**, 7 N.J. 55 (1951) ................................................................ 34 - **Simmons v. United States**, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) ...................................................... 46 - **South Dakota v. Neville**, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) .......................................................... 43 - **State v. Ahmad**, 246 N.J. 592 (2021) .................................................................... 18 - **State v. Bey**, 112 N.J. 45 (1988) .......................................................................... 29 - **State v. Camacho**, 218 N.J. 533 (2014) .................................................................. 56  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont'd)
[brief] The [...] argued in its brief that the pipe culvert cannot be installed two feet below the invert because for “a pipe culvert two feet in diameter” this would mean “burying the entire culvert into the sediment. ”  [...] Rb19.  This facilely assumes that the [...] was limited to considering the two-foot pipe culvert proposed by the applicant, rather than something larger.  Nor did the [...] explain in the record why a circular culvert of any size could not be filled to the invert of the channel with native substrate due to unstable substrate or other physical constraints.
[brief] ......  Da133  Exhibit H (photographs/map) ..............................................  Da139  Certification of [...], Esq.  (in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion)  Filed 12/30/20........................................  Da144  Exhibit A (preliminary review by [...], P.E. Dated 12/29/20)  ...............  Da148,332  Defendant’s Letter Brief  Excerpts in Further Support of Expert Fees  Filed 12/30/20 ..................................................  Da149  Order (In Part Denying Defendant Expert Fees) and Statement of Reasons Filed 01/08/21 .............................
[brief] In 1920, [...] conveyed many of the lots from the aforementioned "Keansburg Heights" map along with "the property marked beach on said aforementioned map, extending from the Raritan Bay back to the lot lines and extended the entire width of the map ..." to [...] in Deed Book 1111, page 6 (Pa923).  Licari subsequently sold this property to [...] in Deed Book 1116, page 261 (Pa925).  The term in Deed Book 797 page 159 ([...] to Keansburg Heights Deed) is "together with such Riparian rights and other rights, privileges and franchises into the lands lying under the waters in Raritan Bay in front of and adjoining the above-described premises as are now vested in the party of the first part" (Pa918).
[brief] [...], (“[...]”) has contracts with two major rental car companies, [...] and [...], to be the exclusive provider of automated tolling services.  [...] produces a smartphone application called [...], which is designed to allow rental car customers to pay highway tolls without going through the rental car companies.  In its Second Amended Complaint, [...] alleges that [...] sent letters to [...], [...], the [...], and possibly others, that contained statements that [...] knew to be false about the legality of [...]’s [...] app, which caused both [...] and [...] to remove the [...] app from their online stores.  Dkt. No. 50 at 9-10.  [...] believes that this was per se defamation and seeks damages.  Id.  It also seeks a declaratory judgment “that car rental customers’ use of [...] is neither illegal nor tortious. ”  Id. at 12.
[brief] This issue was raised in Plaintiff's merits brief.  (Pb 3)  Respondent requested oral argument in the motion before the Law Division so long as the motion was timely opposed.  (Pa 14)  Plaintiff timely opposed the motion and was entitled to rely on the request for argument for the dispositive motion.  Once requested, argument is granted as of right.  See, R. 1:6-2(d).  The request for argument was not withdrawn.  The right to argument was declined by the Law Division as the Judge determined no amount of argument would have change the decision.
[brief] b.  \textbf{[...]} did not offer any testimony at trial and was not present.\footnote{1T and 2T.}  He was never deposed.  [...] submitted nothing to the Court in the form of an Affidavit or otherwise setting forth his alleged damages.  The record is completely silent as to his alleged damages.  He has failed to establish that he has incurred any damage and, even if the Plaintiffs could prevail under some theory of law in this action – which they cannot – his failure to establish even the slightest hint of damage absolutely bars him from sharing in any award of damages entered in this lawsuit.
[brief] ” (9T 6:23-24; 14:18).  So clearly, the court considered, and rejected, the arguments made by defendant for mitigating factors.  However, the court did, on its own, find mitigating factor eleven, because defendant has “a thirteen-year-old son.  And I think that the fact that you're not going to be there with him for a while is a hardship on the family and particularly on a son being deprived of being with his father. ” (9T 15:27-21).  Thus, there was no basis for the court to sentence defendant as a second-degree offender because the mitigating factors did not outweigh the aggravating factors.
[brief] [...] testified that [...] was “all over the place,” which [...] testified may have been because he was nervous.  (T4 76:5-15).  [...] had received no training whatsoever as to identifying narcotic intoxication and his impression of [...]’s condition was entirely speculative.  (T4 74:8-75:2).  No Drug Recognition Expert (“DRE”) examined [...] at any time.  (T4 75:7-9).  [...] testified that [...] stated that he and [...] had been drinking prior to the arrival of the [...].
[brief] In fact, as briefed previously herein, the opposite is true.  21 C.F.R §7.46(a) and §7.46(b).  Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, a Div. of American Cyanamid Co., 125 N.J. 117 (1991), on remand 257 N.J. Super. 163, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 3027, 505 U.S. 1219.  Federal law did not preempt state law liability of manufacturer for failure to warn that drug could cause tooth discoloration.
[brief] BECAUSE THE “FIRST ACTION” WAS PENDING, THE “SECOND ACTION” WAS NOT “SUCCESSIVE” AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED UNDER THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE  Respondent and the motion judge fundamentally mistake the scope of the entire controversy doctrine’s reach.  As it has clearly be stated and restated by case law, the entire controversy doctrine applies only to successive lawsuits involving related claims.  The doctrine does not apply to claims that are pending in different courts at the same time, even if they were filed at different intervals.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER COMPELS THE BOARD TO VIOLATE STATE AND FEDERAL LAW (Da114).  The Court, in examining the relative hardships to the parties and harm to the public interest, found that the Board’s “arguments that imposing restraints will compel them to violate federal and state law are not persuasive,” and that “[t]he federal and state law cited by defendants pertain to access to information in written student records… (Da114).
[directive] A.  The county prosecutor through its designated funding entity  1.  a shall establish law enforcement trust fund, dedicated for law of enforcement purposes and funded by its share completed forfeiture actions commenced under N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1 et sea., (civil forfeiture), N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 et sea. (racketeering) or from actions brought under N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25 et seq., (financial facilitation of crime), or under any other statute as - - - 0 I- directed by the Attorney General.  This trust fund shall be known as the (name of County) County Prosecutor’s Law Enforcement Trust Account, (CLETA), which shall be an interest-bearing account.  Investigations performed by the prosecutor’s office, the State Police and the various municipalities within the county are the primary source of funds or received from forfeiture actions.  All forfeited funds, proceeds from the sale forfeited property received by the of county prosecutor’s office shall be deposited into CLETA.  In addition, any interest generated by CLETA funds shall remain in CLETA for the use of the prosecutor’s office.  CLETA shall be maintained by the county prosecutor’s designated funding entity but shall be administered by the county prosecutor.
[brief] **Third**, [...]’s insistence that [...] derailed [...]’s investigation into her June 24, 2020 argument with [...] is not a genuine issue of material fact.  It was [...], not [...], who first discovered [...]’s receipt of charge pay.  (Pa103-04 at 77:23-78:1; Pa363 at 83:3-21; Pa480-81).  And it was [...] who investigated the matter.  Moreover, the investigation of the June 24 issue proceeded nonetheless.  [...] confirmed that [...] performed a full investigation into [...]’s June 24, 2020 conduct before concluding that no disciplinary action was necessary.  [...] scheduled a meeting with [...] to address his concerns.  (Pa91 at 27:6-16; Pa101 at 69:4-7).  The two discussed the June 24, 2020 incident and [...] told him that she would interview [...], perform a search for other employees who may have been involved, and then proceed with the investigation.  (Pa102 at 70:15-71:10).  During [...]’s interview of [...], [...] recounted the events of June 24, 2020 to [...], stating that [...] repeatedly questioned her on something she needed him to accomplish, and, after he refused to listen, she “got loud” with him.  (Pa103 at 74:5-16).  [...] informed the executives at [...] about the investigation into [...]’s conduct, and her conclusion that she had no reason to suspect that [...] had committed any wrongdoing.  (Pa108 at 94:14-95:5).  As such, nothing was de-railed.
[brief] (28T 97-21 to 104-15)  [...] testified that defendant told him he had a gun at the house prior to [...]’ arrival on January 9, and that he and [...] had arranged for [...] to pick up items at the house, but that defendant then refused to give them to him, which upset [...].  (28T 104-23 to 107-21)  But [...] also said that defendant told him he had threatened [...] via email in the past but had not had any contact with him in eight months.  (28T 108-7 to 109-9)  [...] claimed to know the “basic layout” of the [...] property from conversations with defendant.  (28T 109-10 to 110-21)  Despite the fact that police found no evidence of phone or social-media contact between [...] and defendant leading up to January 9, [...] testified that defendant told him the two communicated that day by means of a “second” phone that defendant had, and that defendant “expected” [...] to come to the house, but not as early as he arrived.
[directive] e.g., [...], et al., See, Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: A Review of the Strengths and Weaknesses of Various Models (2016); [...], et al., Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the (2016); [...], U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Nat’l Inst. of Evidence Justice, (2001).  Civilian Review of Police: Approaches & Implementation  In addition, municipal governing bodies should ensure compliance with N.J.S.A. 40A:14- 118, also known as the “Police Force Statute,” which outlines the responsibilities and authorities of a governing body in establishing civilian oversight of the municipal police force.  For example, the Police Force Statute makes clear that the chief of police is directly responsible to the “appropriate authority” for the day-to-day operations of the force, with the “appropriate authority” defined as the mayor; certain other civilians, such as a public safety director; the governing body or a designated committee or member thereof; or any municipal board or commission established by ordinance for such purposes.  N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.  The Police Force Statute further states that civilian authority to examine the “performance of any officer or member” of the police force may be vested in the appropriate authority or the executive or administrative officer charged with the general administration responsibilities within the municipality.  Id.  At present, several New Jersey municipalities have established civilian oversight bodies responsible for investigating the operations of the police force at a programmatic level and recommending policy reforms when warranted, without investigating individual civilian complaints of misconduct by specific law enforcement officers.  Few New Jersey municipalities have expressed an interest in establishing a Civilian Review Board with authority to investigate individual misconduct complaints, and this approach raises legal questions that policy-focused boards do not.
[directive] 11.  ¿Entiende usted que si se ha declarado culpable de otros cargos, o lo han encontrado [Sí/Yes] [No/No] [No aplica/NA] culpable de otros cargos, o si actualmente está cumpliendo un término de privación de libertad y el convenio declaratorio no menciona el tema, el juez podrá requerir que las sentencias sean consecutivas?
[brief] Id.  Here, the defendants’ louver system meets the definition of “merchandise”.  In almost every case, the louver system will be subject to customization to fit a particular piece of property.  [...]’s marketing materials contemplate its product being adapted to various residential and commercial properties and being engineered to “exact specifications”.  Months of discussions among the parties centered on matching the product to the property.  In this case, the product was to be used for the event space on site and time was taken to eliminate beams to optimize the interior space.  The emails back and forth reflect a dialogue regarding the customization of the product to fit the consumer’s needs.  Second, [...] manufactures and distributes Louvered Roofs, which are intended to provide adjustable coverage for outdoor structures.
[brief] *Deposition of [...]*, 0124a (39:14-16).  [...]’s statements do not show a “more than friendly” relationship with [...].  Rather, the record is clear that [...] and [...] dealt with each other in the normal course that real estate investors deal with each other.  Second, the record is clear that [...]’s purchase of the subject property was at arms-length.  [...] testified under oath that this transaction was “absolutely an arms-length transaction. ”  *Deposition of [...]*, 0124a (27:12).
[brief] FACTS  A.  DEFENDANT [...] NEGLIGENTLY ADVISES PLAINTIFF ABOUT THE LEASE  This is a legal malpractice action arising out of Defendants’ negligent advice regarding the negotiation, entry into and termination of a lease for commercial property in West New York.  As a result of Defendants’ negligent advice, Plaintiff was exposed to a lawsuit for rent and improper termination of the lease.  Plaintiffs settled this litigation and their counsel advised them that their legal position was precarious because of the “one-sided nature of the lease” and [...]’s obvious failure to properly terminate the lease.  The Trial Court held that the failure to amend the R.4:5-1 statement to indicate that the Plaintiffs contemplated suing Defendant [...] for legal malpractice prior to settling this litigation entitled [...] for dismissal of this legal malpractice case.