ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE COURT: I’m sustaining the objection.  It’s not relevant.  I need not waste any time about the rendering.  That’s not what [the Board] based their opinion on.  (2T22: 18-21)  And later: THE COURT: They didn’t rely upon that rendering, so now you prove to me – [...]: But the same -- THE COURT: -- how the existing height of this building violated the resolution that was approved.  (2T30: 19-24)  As stated previously, the basis of the complaint that underlies this appeal is that the developer, [...], violated a binding condition of the Amended Resolution that granted them variance relief.
[brief] The Appellate Division in *State v. Krause*, 399 N.J. Super. 579 (App. Div. 2008) noted that “The Legislature has authorized municipalities ‘to prevent disturbing noises. ’  N.J.S.A. 40:48-1.  That general authorization was further refined in the Noise Control Act of 1971 (the ‘NCA’).  N.J.S.A. 13:1G-1 to-23. ” (Emphasis added).
[brief] Negligence may not be presumed from the mere fact of an accident or injury.  Hansbury v. Hudson & M.Ry. Co., 124 N.J.L. 502, 506 (N.J. 1940); see also Rivera v. Columbus Cadet Corps. of America, 59 N.J. Super. 445, 449 (App. Div. 1960) (“Negligence is never presumed, and the mere occurrence of an accident causing injuries is not alone sufficient to justify an inference of negligence. ”); Crisciotti v. Greatrex, 9 N.J. Super. 26, 28 (App. Div. 1950) (“Negligence is never presumed and the mere happening of an accident, standing alone, will not support an inference of negligence. ”).  In a premises liability case, an injured plaintiff asserting a breach of duty must ordinarily prove, as an element of the cause of action, that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition that caused the accident.  Nisivoccia v. Glass Gardens, Inc., 175 N.J. 559, 563 (2003).  When a plaintiff is unable to prove actual notice, he or she must prove a defendant’s constructive notice.  See, e.g., Carroll v. New Jersey Transit, 366 N.J. Super. 380, 388 (App. Div. 2004).
[brief] (5T83:1-6).  On April 18, 2021, [...]’s birthday, [...] contacted [...] and told him that she was making Puerto Rican food and asked if she could come over.  (5T84:13-20).  [...] had recently moved to [...] and welcomed the company, as he had been feeling down about his current situation.  (5T85:10-14).  [...] invited [...] to come over the following week, but her behavior when she arrived was agitated.
[brief] To accept defendants’ argument would be to immunize property owners and contractors who ignore safe practices simply because they are not professional highway design engineers, who apparently would be the only people obligated to construct roadways and walkways safely.  Moreover, in addition to losing sidewalk immunity because they rebuilt the sidewalk, defendants caused or allowed an icy condition to exist on that sidewalk that presented a hazardous condition for pedestrians.  They had a duty to clear the sidewalk of snow and ice.  See Town of West New York Ordinances, Ch. 352 (Streets and Sidewalks), Art. III (Removal of Snow and Ice), §352-8 (Owners or occupants responsible for snow removal).  The testimony establishes that at the time of plaintiff’s fall there was ice with snow on top.  Pa54-55 at 62:22-24; 63:9-64:2; 65:5-8.  The sidewalk from plaintiff’s residence up to defendants’ property was all clear of ice and snow.  Pa54 at 63:14-64:2.  Defendants concede that the “cause of Plaintiff’s fall was slipping on snow and ice. ”  Pa203; Pa212-13.  The weather information indicates that there had been only snow on the date of the fall prior to the time of the fall.  Pa79.  The reasonable inference from those facts is that the ice was from a prior weather event and that the sidewalk had not been cleared as required.  The snow of that date concealed both the excessive slope and the underlying ice, all 3 conditions combining to cause plaintiff to fall.  The testimony that there was ice and that the ice contributed to plaintiff’s fall requires that summary judgment be denied.
[brief] [...] echoed the reasoning of Humane Society and his decision “rests on firm footing in rejecting [[...]’s] arguments. ”  (Pa125).  Specifically, the court found that sportsmen Council members are not required to be members of the NJSFSC, and further found that Council members are public officials who must be appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate.  (Pa129).  The trial court further noted that, with respect to the CBBMP, it is the Council which ratifies the policy, subject to DEP Commissioner approval – not the NJSFSC.  (Pa131).  Each of [...]’s below challenges fail because they are based on an underlying falsehood already rejected by the Supreme Court.  [...]’s counterarguments fall short.  He argues the Council de facto transfers regulatory authority to the NJSFSC because it is “absurd to assume that a sportsman” recommended by the NJSFSC for nomination “would not be a member” of that private organization.  (Pb22-23).  But Humane Society already explained that not only does N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24 not require membership, 70 N.J. at 570, but that “the legislative arrangement” suggests the Legislature intended “the numbers of sportsmen” eligible for appointment “be substantial,” and that granting NJSFSC recommendation authority is merely a means of meeting that objective, id. at 575.5  The non-binding Humane Society dissent, and policy dicta 5  [...]’s assertion that the term “sportsmen” in N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24 to -25, “if in the majority opinion that was separate and independent of its constitutional holding, gets [...] no further.  (Pb28).  The decision below was correct, based on settled precedent, and should be affirmed. \(^6\)  **B.
[brief] ”  *Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Resisting Arrest - Flight Not Alleged (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2a)”* at 1 (May 7, 2007).  Certainly, the testimony “assist[ed]” the jury “in determining a fact in issue,” N.J.R.E. 701 – namely the “effecting an arrest” element of resisting arrest.  **B.
[brief] Regarding the issue of actual and inquiry notice, none of the recorded deeds to Plaintiff’s Property reference the 1966-1969 Unrecorded Subdivision Maps.  The title experts on behalf of Plaintiff and Defendant each testified that it would be unusual for someone performing a title search to locate these unrecorded subdivision maps.  Plaintiff’s expert, [...], stated that the 1966-1969 Unrecorded Subdivision Maps would not have been found during a normal title search and “would not have been found anywhere in the land records even in some kind of expanded title search. ”  3T748-15.  Defendant’s expert, [...], testified that the 1966-1969 Unrecorded Subdivision Maps are “not part of the land records that are typically searched by title companies. ”  3T66:24-25.  Although produced by the Defendant, [...] also testified that Defendant did not find the 1966-1969 Unrecorded Subdivision Maps on its own initiative.  2T177:4-8.  In short, Defendant’s expert told the trial court that the 1966-1969 Unrecorded Subdivision Maps would not typically be found by a title company and was not found by the Defendant.  The trial court therefore relied on a document that the Plaintiff would not have found, even if the Plaintiff had engaged in the type of inquiry required of a party under equity principles of actual or inquiry notice, which the trial court describes as “a standard fo[r] reasonableness.
[brief] This shall not be deemed to prohibit the display and sale of seasonal farm produce or specifically permitted outdoor uses, the outdoor parking of farm machinery or vehicles in use on a farm nor normal outdoor storage, such as firewood intended for use on the premises.  Nor shall this be deemed to prohibit commercial vehicles in residential districts, as authorized pursuant to §230-134 and/or recreational vehicles and equipment, as authorized pursuant to §230-136.  In the R Zones only, temporary storage containers shall be permitted to be kept on a developed, single-family residential lot as a temporary structure accessory to the existing dwelling for a period not to exceed 30 days.  A permit for said structure shall be obtained from the Zoning Official.  The Township Engineer, Zoning Officer or Township Administrator shall reserve the right to extend such period of approved time, upon written request, for a maximum period not to exceed three months for a resident to store the unit on the property given extenuating circumstances including but not limited to, the location of the unit, the impact of the storage of the unit on the neighborhood and/or residents, and the overall condition and maintenance of the property, or fire, flood or other natural disaster that caused displacement.  A fee as set forth in Chapter 169, Fee Schedule, shall be charged for the initial permit with an additional fee of the same amount for any extension which may be granted by the Zoning Official.  Metal frame structures supporting tarpaulin covers shall not be erected and are specifically prohibited.  D.  Outdoor storage for garden centers in the B-5 Zone is regulated in § 230-148.  E.  Outdoor storage in the LR Zone is regulated in Article XXIV, LR Lake Recreation District.  SECTION 15.
[brief] Defendants argue that the Trustee misappropriated Trust funds for adversarial litigation and other expenses.  During the trial, it was established that [...], upon accepting her trusteeship on July 28, 2021, jointly retained legal counsel with [...], which continued until September 30, 2021.  (159a ¶7)  During this time, [...] prepared a written complaint against Defendants for ejectment and rent, which violated the Trustee’s fiduciary duties of impartiality and loyalty.  (161a)  Additionally, [...] misappropriated Trust funds to pay for [...]’s representation during this time.  (159a ¶7)  Plaintiff then commenced adversarial litigation against Defendants.  This action directly violates the stipulations of N.J.S.A. 3B:31-55(a), which requires the Trustee to administer the Trust “with undivided loyalty to and solely in the best interests of the beneficiaries. ”  Assuming the Trustee required assistance from the trial court, the appropriate action would have been to petition the court for advice and direction under Rule 4:83-4(c) or to seek a declaration of rights under N.J.S.A. 2A:16-55(c).  Furthermore, during trial it was established that the Plaintiff’s breach of trust concerning the Boonton Property commenced on December 9, 2021 when [...] and [...] submitted a written contract to jointly purchase the Boonton Property for $651,000 and continued until August 31, 2022, when [...] ordered that [...] was not permitted to purchase the Boonton Property with [...] “as it would be in violation of her fiduciary duties. ”  (31a ¶2)  Therefore, [...]’s improper conduct persisted for over eight (8) months.  During this time, Plaintiff misappropriated Trust funds to cover legal expenses aimed at furthering her improper goals involving both properties.  (8T 36-37)
[brief] ”  Id at 9.  In I/M/O Treston, the Commission specifically cited to [...], holding:  More specifically, and although Respondent [...] argued that the statements attributed to her by Complainant [...] “were not made in her capacity as a Board member, and [did] not relate to her Board membership or to Board actions,” the Commission found that “the statements on her Facebook page [were] clearly linked to her Board membership (and candidacy),” her social media page did not have a disclaimer noting that the statements made were her own and unrelated to the Board, and that, as a result, “it [was] reasonable for a member of the public ... to perceive the statements as being made by Respondent in her capacity as a Board member.
[brief] *The photograph marked as Marino-3 should not have been excluded as it was adequately authenticated by plaintiff and the record, and as it was relevant insofar as it depicted the snow conditions on the date of loss.*  Plaintiff suggests that the photograph in question could not be authenticated by plaintiff or by her boss, [...].  This is incorrect.  Plaintiff testified that her boss, [...], took the photo.  Plaintiff seemingly does not dispute this fact.  The record further shows that [...] arrived at the office on the date of loss near 9 AM. (7T10:14-15), which leads to the reasonable inference that the photo was taken around 9 AM.  Therefore, the photograph is adequately authenticated based upon plaintiff’s testimony and [...]’s testimony.  An authenticator need not even have been present at the time the photograph was taken, so long as the witness can verify that the photograph accurately represents its subject.  *State v. Wilson*, 135 N.J. 4, 14–15 (1994).  Notably, plaintiff does not dispute the fact that the photograph depicts the state of snow removal on the date of loss and the fact that it was still in progress.  The jury is entitled to see photographs of the parking lot and the challenges in removing snow and ice from a parking lot that had parked vehicles within it.  Clearly, this photograph provides context as it shows not only the significant snowfall amounts, but also relates to the herculean task of trying to remove snow when there are parked vehicles in the parking lot.  **POINT VI**
[brief] [...] is the owner of a 1.36 ± acre oceanfront property improved with a two and a half story, 6,756 square feet, single family home located at [...] at the corner of the Valentine Street right of way in the [...].  (Da2, ¶4,7; Da70, ¶7; Da119, ¶5)  The property had its own seawall prior to the within taking and seawall project.  (Da255, 311, 314)  No easements encumbered the property.  (Da98-99)  --- ¹
[brief] Both Respondents, however, argue that there need be no nexus between the redevelopment project and the $2,000,000 payment because that payment is authorized by N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f) of the LRHL and that there need be no standards to assess how the amount of any payment is to be determined because the Senior Citizens Center project fulfills the goals of the LRHL.  Both response briefs (1) misinterpret N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f); (2) misread this Court’s decisions in Britwood Urban Renewal, LLC v. City of Asbury Park, 376 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 2005) and other opinions; and (3) fail to address the policies set forth in New Jersey case law that condemn unconstrained exactions in return for favorable land use treatment.
[directive] Since then, there has been a reexamination of those exemptions and revisions were authorized and published in the New Jersey Law Journal, 139 N.J.L.J. 314 (1995), and the New Jersey Lawyer, 4 N.J.L. 223 (1995).  Each of the listed exemptions have been categorized and given a code number to facilitate completion of the annual Pro Bono Counsel Assignment Questionnaire by those who choose to claim an exemption.  The following are the descriptive categories of those attorneys who are exempt from the pro bono requirements of Madden together with each exemption code:
[brief] Specifically, §173-24 provides that “no person owning, keeping or harboring any animal shall suffer or permit it to run at large upon the public streets or in any public park or in any public building or in any other public place within the township.  §173-27 provides that “no person who shall own, keep or harbor an animal shall abandon such animal within the township”.  Finally, §201-2 provides that “no personal shall create, commit or maintain, or allow to be created, committed or maintained, any nuisance within the [...]”.
[brief] (10T:16-2 to 7) (emphasis added).  The fact that the judge stated he reviewed the verdict sheet and it was "accurate as announced by the Foreperson" completely negates defendant's claim that his appended verdict sheet was the one filled out by the jury.  It simply belies logic to believe that a seasoned criminal trial judge would allow a verdict sheet with every offense checked off to be admitted into evidence without any type of colloquy with the jury or the parties, especially in light of the judge's specific comments that he reviewed the verdict sheet handed to him.  It is equally unbelievable that defendant's attorney would have glossed over such an issue following trial.  On appeal, defendant finds support in the fact that the verdict sheet he asserts is the true copy was appended to trial counsel's brief for his motion for new trial.  Yet, trial counsel made no mention of any issue with the verdict sheet the entirety of his argument to the court during that motion.  (See 11T:3-15 to 9-11).  As the record makes abundantly clear, the jury convicted defendant of purposeful murder and did not render additional verdicts for the lesser-included offenses.  The announcement of the verdict by the forewoman followed by the immediate polling of each juror — all recorded on CourtSmart and made part of this record — refutes defendant's argument entirely.
[brief] Since the common law duty is codified in the *Model Civil Jury Charge* 5.20B(2)(b), it follows that this jury charge also extends this same duty beyond the public sidewalks and to the commercial owner’s parking lots as well.  There is no reason why a commercial landowner’s duty to remove snow and ice from its walkways would not extend to the adjoining parking lot when pedestrians or invitees are forced to walk through the parking lot to access the office and retail spaces owned and maintained by defendants.  Any hard-line distinction between the sidewalk of [...] and its parking lot is arbitrary and unreasonable, at least as it pertains to the duty to remove snow and ice.  For these reasons, the lower court’s failure to charge *Model Civil Jury Charge* 5.20B(2)(b) was reversible error.
[brief] In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must determine whether there is a genuine issue of a material fact.  “A dispute of fact is genuine if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom, could sustain a judgment in favor of the non-moving party. ”  Brill v. The Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, et al., 142 N.J. 520, 538 (1995).  This decision falls within the guidelines of Rule 4:46-2, which states that summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.
[brief] Ibid.  The Board also claimed that it considered [...]’s advanced age and reduced risk of recidivism but stated that despite the considerable decrease in his risk for reoffense, “an offender’s age is not dispositive of whether the offender is suitable for parole release. ” (Pa3-4).  Notably, the Board did not offer any explanation or analysis as to how this scientifically proven evidence failed to support [...]’s release, especially in light of the statutory presumption, and [...]’s positive clinical risk assessments.  (Pa1-6).  Instead, it simply rejected each basis for [...]’s administrative appeal, claiming that since the mitigation evidence was “part of the record” and “available for review,” it was therefore sufficiently “considered.
[brief] For the reasons argued above, Defendants-Respondents, [...], and [...], respectfully request that this Court deny this appeal and affirm the trial court’s Order granting the defendants Motion for Summary Judgment.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  ANTHONY R. FIORE, JR.  Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, [...], and [...]  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...], : CIVIL ACTION  Plaintiff-Appellant, : ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL vs. : ORDERS OF THE 313-319
[brief] On August 2, 2022, [...] filed a certification in opposition to Defendants motion.  [...] wrote that [...] is the winning bidder and “[i]n my individual capacity I am also purchasing the New Jersey Property along with him.  This is not prohibited by the Trust, is consistent with my powers, and is not a breach of my fiduciary duty. ”  (34a-35a)  (697a ¶4)  [...] attached a signed purchase contact for the Boonton Property dated August 1, 2022.  (708a)  On August 10, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing.
[brief] (Pa0205-08).  The Court’s July 30, 2020, Opinion adopted January 31, 2011, the date of decision in the 2010 Liability Trial, as the “end date” for the allocation period but left all other findings and conclusions of the SAM in place.  (Pa0208-09).  As a result, [...]’s allocated share of [...]’s covered damages changed from 25.84% to 6.4%.
[brief] [...] does not dispute that it provided an engineer to serve as construction inspector for the Project.  Nor does [...] contest that its inspector was to provide construction inspection services.  But that is not enough for Plaintiffs to survive summary judgment.  Plaintiffs needed to provide competent expert testimony that the applicable standard of care imposes an affirmative duty to identify preexisting, dangerous conditions.  That duty, as [...] cautiously admitted, was not set forth anywhere other than in his own opinion. \(^4\)  In fact, even after his deposition, when given an additional opportunity to produce evidence to support his otherwise unsubstantiated position, [...] was unable to do so.  [...]:  I’m going to make a specific request, [...], that he identify where in any of the contract documents [...] was required or any chief inspector was required to go out and inspect the travel surface for preexisting dangerous conditions.  \(^4\)
[brief] Fleming vs. Matter Construction Co. ...........................................  30  11 N.J. Misc. 129, 132 (Cir. Ct. 1933)  Ganary vs. Linker Realty Corp...................................................... 18  131 N.J.L. 317 (E. & A. 1944)  Goldstein vs. Barclay Amusement Corporation ............................. 24  123 N.J.L. 166 (1939) at 169  Harry’s Village, Inc. vs. Egg Harbor Twp. ................................. 5, 29 89 N.J. 576, 587 (1982)
[brief] RINES’S EXCESSIVE 12-YEAR SENTENCE WITH 4 YEARS OF PAROLE INELIGIBILITY WAS BASED ON A MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S DIRECTIVE 2021-4 AND WAS OTHERWISE IMPROPERLY IMPOSED.  (6T 12-16 to 14-11)  Should [...]’s convictions be allowed to stand, the matter must be remanded for resentencing.  The imposition of the 12-year sentence with 4 years of parole ineligibility for non-violent drug offenses was both excessive and fundamentally flawed because (1) the prosecutor did not abide by the requirements of the Attorney General’s Directive 2021-4, and as a result the court proceeded as though the 4-year parole disqualifier was mandatory when it was actually discretionary; (2) the court did not discuss any basis for the aggravating factors, the weights accorded to them, or its decision to reject all mitigating factors; and (3) each of the simple possession charges should have merged with the charges for possession with intent to distribute.
[brief] (Aa054-Aa055).  The legal principles underlying N.J.S.A 2A:24-8(a) are well established.  An arbitration award procured by undue means ordinarily encompasses a situation in which the arbitrator has made an acknowledged mistake of fact or law or a mistake that is apparent on the face of the record.  Borough of East Rutherford v. East Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190 (2013).  An arbitration award procured by undue means should be set aside.  New Jersey Highway Authority v. International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, Local 193, 274 N.J. Super. 599 (App. Div. 1994), certif. denied 139 N.J. 288.