ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT USURPED THE AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD BY APPOINTING THE SPECIAL HEARING OFFICER (M1-64).  In appointing the SHO, the Trial Judge applied a remedy only available for a violation of a municipality’s Mt. Laurel obligations.  In the present action, the Trial Court actually found the municipality in compliance with its obligations:  The irony here is that, but for this singular transgression of the Zoning Board that was inescapably provoked, in material part, by the Mayor’s interference, [...] pro-actively had come into voluntary compliance with its Mt. Laurel obligations on the immediate coattails of Mt. Laurel IV and earned the Court’s entry of the 2016 Judgment of Compliance; and, by all accounts, is diligently implementing them.  Therefore, wresting back wholesale control of the Township’s delegated zoning powers, as the Township’s attorneys argued at trial, and this Court agrees, would be a “bridge too far” - for now, at least, for a municipality that to date has taken commendable steps to come into voluntary compliance with its Third Round affordable housing obligations and is actually implementing them.
[brief] (4T 186-4 to 188-23; 4T 196-2 to 8)  [...] testified that sometime after 5 p.m. that day he borrowed the Malibu from [...] and picked up the codefendant and [...] (5T 31-5 to 32-13)  They then picked up Marquis’s girlfriend, and the codefendant drove them all to East Orange where they dropped her off and then returned the car to [...] on Madison Avenue “sometime around 11 or 10” p.m.
[brief] The parties agree that Plaintiffs’ strict liability claim is governed by the standard set forth in Civil Model Jury Charge § 5.60B, which defines the common law standard of strict liability for injuries caused by a domestic animal in circumstances that do not fall under the Dog Bite Statute.  But, unlike the Dog Bite Statute, Model Jury Charge § 5.60B requires *scienter*.  The Jury Charge requires evidence of a domestic animal owner’s actual or constructive knowledge that the particular animal in question possessed a vicious or dangerous trait or propensity:  If you find that the plaintiff, ________________, was injured by the (animal) owned or kept by the defendant, ________________, you will then proceed to determine the following:  1.  That the (animal) had a vicious or dangerous trait or propensity; 2.  That the defendant, ________________, knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the particular vicious or dangerous trait or propensity in the (animal) which caused the plaintiff’s injuries.  Model Civil Jury Charge § 5.60B.  Here, Plaintiffs define the terms “vicious or dangerous trait or propensity” to support the novel position that notice of an inherent dangerous quality – or, as Plaintiffs put it, a “natural inclination” – common to a class of animals is sufficient to create strict liability under Model Jury Charge § 5.60B.
[brief] LEGAL POINT X.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO RESTORE MY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE FORECLOSURE COURT OF MONMOUTH COUNTY  NJ.  Raised Below: paragraphs 30-34 028a-029a.  In 1T page 6 line 4 – page 7 line 8.  [...] did not oppose and did not deny my claims and arguments.  The denial order is at (221a).  For seven long years, four Trial Court Judges ruled over [...]’s Foreclosure Complaint of 5/12/16 with subject matter jurisdiction.  [...], [...]’s attorneys, and the trial judges violated my constitutional rights in every hearing and every order.  The NJ Appellate Division has the power and jurisdiction to restore my constitutional rights.
[brief] Hearing Tr. 72:9-20; Pa2 ([...] Cert. ¶ 5).  In addition, the parties have exchanged voluminous interrogatories covering all issues in the litigation.  Hearing Tr. 72:21-73:2; Pa1-2 ([...] Cert., ¶ 2-4).  While [...] points out that no depositions have taken place in this case yet (Db33), [...] has received the benefit of at least 39 deposition transcripts and at least 17 expert reports from the underlying Utilities Litigation through the extensive discovery in this litigation.
[brief] With respect to mitigating factors, the Court put inappropriate weight on mitigating factor three (3).  [...] testified that [...] suffered from schizophrenia whereas [...] testified that [...] suffered from autism.  (10T:120-9 to 121-14); (14T:99-7 to 19).  Nobody testified that [...] didn’t have mental health issues.  Moreover, the State’s expert report states “both his Autism Spectrum Disorder and the dissociative state into which he entered upon firing the first shot limited [...]’s ability to fully appreciate the gravity of his offenses on an emotional level. ” (Da458).  The Court stated that “there is no evidence that the defendant actually suffers from schizophrenia. ” (17T:206-12-14).
[brief] The “final analysis” here should mirror that from Alston, 204 N.J. at 628: defendant's understanding of his rights was clear and complete; the words he chose were not an ambiguous assertion of any of those rights but instead were a series of requests for advice from the detective.  The words the detectives used in an effort to clarify whether defendant was attempting to assert any of his rights were neither inaccurate nor misleading.  Like in Alston, this Court can and should “conclude … that defendant’s waiver of his rights was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. ”  Ibid.  This Court can and should affirm.
[brief] F.K. v. Integrity House, Inc., 460 N.J. Super. 105, 114 (App. Div. 2019).  Summary judgment must be granted if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  R. 4:46-2(c).  A genuine issue of material fact exists when “considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact. ”  *Ibid.*; see also *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995) (stating that the trial court must determine whether “the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party”).  In applying this standard, a fact that is of “an insubstantial nature should not preclude the grant of summary judgment. ”  See *Prant v. Sterling*, 332 N.J. Super. 369, 377 (Ch. Div. 1999); see also *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 529 (“a non-moving party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely by pointing to any fact in dispute”).  For a dispute to constitute a genuine issue of material fact, it must be “genuine,” as well as “substantial,” i.e., “true, solid, [or] real,” rather than “imaginary, unreal, or apparent only. ”  *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 529 (citations omitted).  “[I]f the opposing party . . . offers . . . only facts which are immaterial or of an insubstantial nature, a mere scintilla, ‘[f]anciful, frivolous, gauzy or merely suspicious,’ . . .” summary judgment should be granted.  *Ibid.* (quoting *Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co.*, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954)).  Thus, a plaintiff facing a summary judgment motion must point to “competent” evidence to establish each and every essential element of each cause of action.  *Id.*, at 540.
[brief] The fact that [...] was on constructive notice of the alternative marker listed on the back of the ticket, because it was provided in discovery is irrelevant.  [...]’s reasonable expectation when he entered into the conditional guilty plea was that the issue as to whether a pumphouse is an occupied building would be decided by the Law Division-Superior Court.  The fact that the Superior Court made his conditional guilty plea completely irrelevant by convicting on an alternative ground is a serious violation of [...]’s rights as a defendant and the fair administration of justice.  While it is true that a Superior Court can make new findings of fact under the de novo standard of review, it cannot come at the expense of a conditional guilty plea that the defendant entered into at the municipal court.  Nothing in R. 3:23-8(a) permits and there is no case law that has interpreted that rule to allow for a Superior Court Judge to violate the terms of a conditional guilty plea in order to reach a just result.  The Superior Court judge violated [...]’s conditional guilty plea by completely ignoring it.
[brief] Indeed, not a single case cited by [...] in support of Point I of its brief addresses the issue of preemption; rather, each concerns claims relating to the purported unconstitutionality of a particular statute.  See, e.g., In re Contest of November 8, 2011 Gen. Election of Office of N.J. Gen. Assembly, 210 N.J. 24, 29 (2012) (assessing facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to a durational residency requirement for New Jersey General Assembly representatives) (Db23-24); Main Union Assocs. v. Twp. of Little Falls Rent Leveling Bd., 306 N.J. Super. 404, 407 (App. Div. 1997) (affirming unsuccessful challenge to the facial constitutionality of the Rent Leveling Ordinance of the Township of Little Falls) (Db25-26); State v. Hester, 449 N.J. Super. 314, 318 (App. Div. 2017) (finding that the post-2014 amended community supervision for life law violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses with respect to the indictments of certain criminal defendants and was thus unconstitutional as applied) (Db26-27); Ran-Davs Cty. Kosher, Inc. v. State, 129 N.J. 141, 169 (1992) (holding that New Jersey’s regulations preventing consumer fraud in the sale of kosher products are facially unconstitutional) (Db27); Matter of M.U.’s Application for a Handgun Purchase Permit, 475 N.J. Super. 148, 162 (App. Div. 2023) (assessing facial constitutional challenge to New Jersey statute restricting the issuance of handgun purchase permits and firearms purchaser identification cards) (Db27).
[brief] In its decision on this motion, the lower court adopted [...]’s above stated position.  It explained that there was no dispute regarding the process that the parties had historically employed of [...] issuing an invoice at the beginning of the month and following it with the certified payrolls for its custodians after the end of the month.  157a.  It noted that while the schools were closed, [...] had no payrolls for its custodians, and thus no certified payrolls to produce to [...].  158a.  It noted that after [...] paid [...] for its May and June 2020 invoices, [...] had issued payroll checks to its custodians who had been laid off during that period.  157-58a.  The lower court rejected [...]’s position that it needed the payrolls to determine which employees had been laid off, had collected unemployment or had been paid with PPP loans.  158a.  (This is not information that would be reflected on a certified payroll in any event.)  The lower court then construed the COVID Statute as it is worded, noting that it imposed on the school district the obligation to pay its contracted service providers, that it required the service providers to apply the funds received to payroll and fixed costs and that the COVID Statute did not empower the school district to verify how the funds it paid were applied.  158-59a.  The lower court noted that the Statute required the school district to "make all reasonable efforts to renegotiate a contract in good faith", but that it did not impose such an obligation on the contractor and that [...]'s "questionnaire" did not appear to be in good faith.  159a.  As to [...]'s contentions regarding the other responsibilities it was required to undertake during the pandemic, the lower court concluded that those circumstances did not excuse its non-compliance with its obligation under the COVID Statute.  159a.  It accordingly entered summary judgment in favor of [...] and against [...] in the amount of $697,031, per its April 28, 2023, Order.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ...........................................................................  4  a.  The Parties, [...], And Off-site Units ..................................................  4 b.  Courts Have Found [...] Delinquent In Its Constitutional Affordable Housing Obligations For Over Twenty Years, And [...] Remains In Violation Of The Courts’ Orders .............................................  5 c.  To Bring Itself Into Compliance, [...]’s Prior Administration Reached An Agreement With [...], So Ordered By The Court, To Have [...] Construct, Among Other Things: (1) [...] Station Containing 22 Units Of Affordable Housing; and (2) The Off-site Building Containing 7 Units, Which Plan, If Implemented, Would Meet The Majority Of [...]’s Outstanding Constitutional Obligations ...............  9  d.  [...] Failed To Controvert With Any Competent, Record Evidence  The Testimony Of Both Parties To The Transaction—[...] For The [...] Council And [...] For [...]—that The Borough Council, In An Effort To Comply With The Requirement Of The Settlement Agreement And Forthcoming Order To Provide For A Seven Off-site Units Of Affordable Housing, Selected A Suitable Site For The Off-site Building At Block 610 Lot 1 ......................  12 e.  Based On This Agreed Upon Plan Between [...], [...], And [...], [...] Obtained The Conditional Judgment, With The Express Obligation Of [...] To Account For And Disclose At Midpoint Review  Whether The Off-site Mechanism Remained Realistic ..........................................................  15 f.  Following Mayor [...]’s Election, [...] Obstructed Both [...] Station And The Off-site Property, Leading The Court To Find A Violation Of The Judgment And Appoint An Implementation Monitor ..................................................  18 g.  [...] Refuses To Hear [...]’s Application For The Off-site Property, Which The Special Master Found To Be Suitable And Developable To Satisfy The Borough’s Obligations Under The Conditional Judgment ...........................................................................  22  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................................................................. 26 LEGAL ARGUMENT ......................................................................................
[brief] [...]’s position was that the Synagogue was constructed on Lot 8 in approximately 1963, and no records of any approvals or variances for either the synagogue or its off-site parking use of the School Lot 5 are known to exist or could be located.  The [...]’s position was that the [...] did not have any burden to present any such proofs, and the Zoning Board should not consider the 1972 School Site Plan documents/Approval that did not show any parking for Synagogue use.  The [...] asserted that the Board should decline to render a determination as to whether the off-site parking on School property is a valid or non-conforming use, and the [...] had no burden to demonstrate the use was ever authorized or conforming.  (1T25-15 to 30-7)  The Board Chairman pointed out that the Synagogue’s off-site parking use on the Lot 5 courtyard is at the entry to the school and clearly presented severe safety and fire access hazards.  The Chairman again inquired if the [...] had any evidence as to any zoning approval or authority authorizing or allowing such unorganized off-site parking use of the school property.  The [...]’s response was that the 2017 Chancery Court decision (Da29-48) --- holding that the 1963 Agreement granted a parking easement --- superseded any such zoning concern or issue.  The Board Chairman stated that in his observations over many years, parking had not occurred on the School courtyard, and was never the courtyard’s intended or approved use.  The Chairman viewed the off-site parking use as a current prohibited use and that the Synagogue had the burden of proof to demonstrate that there was a pre-existing legal right or approval under zoning law to operate that non-permitted facility on Lot 5 (1T30-8 to 33-14; T34-3 to 14).
[brief] (Aa120; Ra7).  On November 10, 2020, the DEP issued the permit to [...] which authorized, among other things, the “construction of approximately 750 linear feet of replacement bulkhead within the boat basin using vinyl 24 inches waterward of the existing bulkhead alignment . . . .” (Aa1).  The permit also legalized preexisting “catwalks,” or finger piers, “and mooring piles within the boat basin in their existing dimensions and configuration. ”  Ibid.  According to the Permit-approved plans (Ra195), these structures included twenty-two finger piers and forty-seven mooring piles which were not available for public use.  (Ra205).  The total area of the finger piers that extend into the water in the boat basin is 478.2 square feet.  Ibid.  With respect to the bulkhead, the Permit required that the replacement _____________________ [...] improvements in its brief (Ab3), which was not part of the record below and should be disregarded.  Rule 2:5-4(a).  bulkhead “be constructed within 24 inches of the existing bulkhead alignment as measured from the waterward face of the existing bulkhead to the waterward face of the replacement bulkhead as indicated on the approved plans. ” (Aa3).  To fill the void left when the bulkhead was moved waterward of its pre-existing alignment, the Permit required that “[a]ll backfill material for the proposed bulkhead shall be from an upland source and be free from any toxic contaminants. ”  Ibid.  The Permit condition at issue here requires [...] to “submit to the Division for review and approval a proposal for providing public access on the project site” before commencing construction.  (Aa2).  D.
[brief] If the assignments were invalid unlike in Alcman, supra that would have no effect on [...]’s claim against the Defendants-Respondents herein.  It would merely invalidate the assignment in a hypothetical action between [...]’s former attorneys or [...] should [...] to contest the validity of assignments in said cause of action.  Defendant [...]- who did not make the motion at issue here- is a stranger to these pledges and the validity or invalidity of same provide no basis for the dismissal of claims against him.  The real party in interest was before the Court and expected to benefit from the award he sought.
[brief] Note that unlike common law fraud, which requires “clear and convincing” evidence, statutory fraud violations (such as violations of the Consumer Fraud Act, Insurance Fraud Protection Act, etc.) requires only proof by a preponderance of the evidence.  In *Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Land*, 186 NJ 163, 172, 892 A.2d 1240, 1247-1248 (2006), the N.J. Supreme Court held:  In discussing the requisite standard of proof under the CFA, the Appellate Division has stated:  "We find no indication that the Legislature intended to impose any greater burden of proof [under the CFA] than that usually required in a civil action."  *Gennari, supra*, 288 N.J.Super. at 541, 672 A.2d 1190; see also *Hyland v. Aquarian Age 2,000, Inc.*, 148 N.J.Super. 186, 191, 372 A.2d 370 (Ch.Div. 1977)  [S]ince [the CFA] is a civil action, preponderance of the evidence, the usual civil standard of proof, should be the applicable standard.").  [Emphasis added]  Thus, although there was no “direct proof” of the defendant’s intent (as “intent is seldom capable of direct proof”), and even though I was deprived of any real opportunity to properly and fully prove this fact, nonetheless I respectfully submit that there was (at least) a preponderance of the evidence to show that the defendants had intentionally omitted the disclosure of this prize limitation from any of their own advertisements, and had intentionally omitted the disclosure of this prize limitation from any of their own website pages.  Thus in turn, without even necessarily getting to the other issue about their misrepresentation of the tournament’s starting time, if the trial court had made the correct interpretation of the law and had then rendered a correct factual ruling, I should have sustained my statutory cause of action for Consumer Fraud, as well as my common law cause of action for breach of contract.
[brief] Brick also disposes of this argument: "It is not controlling that the municipality or counsel may have had unrelated communication with the taxpayer at an address different from that appearing on the tax rolls. ”  Id. at 252 (Emphasis added).  The “Letter of Agreement” is precisely the sort of “unrelated communication” contemplated by Brick.  It is a document relating to Plaintiff’s proposed scope of renovations to the subject property predating her acquisition of the property, which was in possession of the Building Division.  (Ja288¶9).  The Building Division did not transmit this letter to the Tax Office, and it had no reason to do so, since it has nothing to do with taxation.  (Ja288¶9).  A foundational principle from Brick is that a municipality, with its many different divisions, cannot be expected to scour cross-office for documents to update its tax records.  That is one basis upon which Plaintiff attempts to fault Defendants here, and on which she seeks to impose liability.  The argument must fail under Brick.  For these reasons, Plaintiff was obligated to raise a taking as an affirmative defense in the tax foreclosure, and this suit should have been barred by the ECD.
[brief] For the sake of brevity, Plaintiff incorporates by reference, as if fully set forth at length herein: 1) the multiple breaches of contract argued at Pa410 – Pa 420 in the Opposition to Summary Judgment; 2) the sound legal reasoning in the court’s original February 17th opinion finding that [...] was in breach of contract (Pa169 – Pa175); and 3) the reinforcement and proofs in the Reconsideration Opposition that that the court indeed properly held that [...] breached the contract (Pa490–Pa497).  POINT NINETEEN [Prospective Application of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3)] (Argued at Pa402 – Pa407)
[brief] The detectives believed that [...] was the person with [...] at the barbershop that night because surveillance footage showed the two suspects dressed in the same clothing that [...] and [...] were wearing earlier that day ([...] was wearing a jacket with a NASA emblem on it and red sneakers), and cellphone records showed that [...]’s phone was in the --- \(^3\)  The police found a revolver on [...].  (13T 104-8 to 104-14)  A shell casing recovered from the backroom of the barbershop indicated that a semiautomatic firearm was used in the shooting on November 2.  (14T 13-7 to 13-24) vicinity of the barbershop at the time of the incident.\textsuperscript{4} (9T 109-2 to 110-16; 13T 34-7 to 34-13; 13T 62-23 to 63-2; 14T 134-10 to 134-11)  [...] voluntarily submitted to questioning and adamantly maintained that he was not at the barbershop on November 2, 2020, and had nothing to do with the shooting.
[directive] Cases Where There Is a Presumption of Issuing a Complaint-Summons.  Standard for Overcoming Presumption of Issuing a Complaint-Summons.  4.3.1  In any case where there is probable cause to believe the defendant has committed any indictable crime, or disorderly persons offense, or petty disorderly offense and the case is not otherwise covered under Section 4.4 (mandatory charging by complaint-warrant) or Section 4.5 (presumption of charging by complaint-warrant), a law enforcement agency shall issue a complaint-summons unless an assistant prosecutor or deputy attorney general consulted in accordance with Section 3.2 of this Directive, or a supervisory officer designated pursuant to subsection 3.3.2 and authorized by the County Prosecutor to overcome presumptions under Section 4 of this Directive, determines that application for a complaint-warrant is reasonably necessary to protect the safety of a victim or the community, to reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance in court when required, or to prevent the defendant from obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process, and further determines that there is a lawful basis to apply amended.13 for a complaint-warrant pursuant to Rule 3:3-1(d) as recently