ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *See also*, Part I.A.1, *supra*.  [...] can’t have it both ways.  The proper course would have been for [...] to use the stays that [...] repeatedly referred to in its brief to commence mandatory arbitration and then seek an extension of the stay here to complete its arbitration.  Indeed, in other cases [...] and/or its affiliates have done exactly that.  For example, in *EPIX*, [...] ("[...]"), as affiliate of [...], moved to compel mandatory arbitration of its claims even though plaintiff’s other claims against other defendants were not subject to arbitration and had to be litigated.  *Id.* at 480.  Unlike here, the contract in *EPIX* provided that disputes “must be submitted to arbitration”.  *Id.* at 460.  The Appellate Division held that the fact that the [...] arbitration would not address the entire litigation among all eight parties was not a bar to the enforcement of the mandatory arbitration clause while the litigation against the non-arbitration defendants was still pending.  *Id.* at 481.  [...] failed to preserve or perfect its right for six years.  By electing to litigate its allocation of defense costs in a single litigation rather than exercise its right to arbitrate its claims separately with [...], [...] knowingly and intentionally waived its arbitration right and this motion should respectfully be denied.  II.
[brief] B.  Plaintiff’s surveyor found that a gap in the curb directed water from Defendants’ property to Plaintiff’s property  [...], Plaintiffs’ expert surveyor, examined the topography of the driveway area reflected on a survey conducted by [...] in June 2018, at a time when the planter depicted above remained at the rear of the driveway instead of a curb, and made his own survey after Defendants modified their driveway.  [365a].  Comparing results from both surveys, [...] explained:
[brief] (1T44-16 to 19; 1T44-17 to 19; Pa8).  Soon after [...] was arrested, [...] heard on the radio that other SET officers had arrested defendant.  (1T45-24 to 46-6).  He had not informed those officers about [...]’s statements during his motor vehicle stop.  (1T47-12 to 19).  [...] also testified at the motion to suppress hearing and indicated he was one of the SET officers on duty with [...] that day.  (1T74-8 to 15).  While conducting his own SET surveillance in a parking lot across the street, he heard [...] relay his observations about a potential drug --- 2 [...] pled guilty and was sentenced for Wandering/Prowling to Obtain a Controlled Dangerous Substance on July 17, 2019.  Part of his plea agreement required he provide truthful testimony at trial against defendant.  (Pa8).  transaction in the ShopRite parking lot.  (1T76-2 to 5).  He and another officer, [...], drove to the ShopRite and set up stationary surveillance on the vehicle [...] had described.  (1T76-1 to 13).  [...] testified that at 7:05 p.m., while in the ShopRite parking lot, he saw defendant and his wife returning to his vehicle with a cart of groceries.  (1T52-14; 1T76-15 to 17; 1T80-7 to 16).
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page No. | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------| | Index to Appendix | ii | | Table of Judgments, Orders and Rulings | v | | Table of Citations | vi | | Preliminary Statement | 1 | | Procedural History | 4 | | Statement of Facts | 6 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 8 | |  The Board of Trustees Denial of the Appellant’s Request for a Referral to The Office of Administrative Law was Arbitrary and Inconsistent with Established Law (Pa38,54) | 8 | | A. Standards of Review | 8 | | B.  The Board of Trustees Denial of the Appellant’s Request for a Referral to The Office of Administrative Law was Arbitrary and Inconsistent with Established Law (Pa38-40;54,57) | 10 | | C.  The Board Made Factual Findings that Were Not Supported by the Record (Pa38-40; 53-56) | 11 | | D.  The Board MisApplied N.J.S.A.43:15A-8  To the Facts of this Case (Pa38,54) | 18 | | Conclusion | 24 |  INDEX TO APPENDIX
[brief] *Kane*, 278 N.J. Super.  at 134.  The beam was part of a structural steel frame for a warehouse [...] was constructing for [...] (“[...]”) in [...].  *Ibid.*  Plaintiff filed suit against the following parties, alleging that defendants failed to keep the premises reasonably safe and failed to comply with applicable federal and state safety codes: i. The General Contractor, [...]  ([...]) ii. Hartz’s superintendent, [...] iii. [...] iv. [...] v. [...] vi. [...] Development Corporation ([...]) vii. [...] viii. [...] ix. [...].  Kane, 278 N.J. Super. at 134  [...] retained [...] to furnish all labor, materials, and equipment necessary to complete structural steel work.  Id. at 135.  Their contract specified that [...] was responsible for full compliance with safety standards.  Ibid.  [...] only operated a steel fabrication facility, so it hired [...] to construct the structural steel.  Ibid.  Their contract had a “safety” subsection whereby [...] agreed to be solely responsible for complying with OSHA\(^4\) and all other applicable safety regulations.  Ibid.  [...] agreed to indemnify and hold harmless [...] and the “owner” of the project from any losses or claims arising out of [...]’s work on the project.  Ibid.  [...] joined [...] as a third-party defendant, alleging that [...]’s negligence had caused the injury to plaintiff ([...]’s employee) and that [...] had contractually agreed to indemnify [...] for any personal --- \(^4\)  The subject contract herein also mentions OSHA standards.  See Da150, ¶O.  As revealed by practically every transcript from each day of trial, the trial involved significant arguments and testimony regarding OSHA and the parties called experts to address OSHA standards and OSHA’s impact on the case.  injuries arising out of [...]’s performance of its subcontract with [...].  *Kane*, 278 N.J. Super. at 135.  On the first day of trial, the judge determined that [...] would be allowed to participate in the trial and an eight-day trial followed.  *Id.* at 136.  At the close of Plaintiff’s case, Plaintiff dismissed its complaint as to Romeo and [...].  *Ibid.*  On September 24, 1992, the jury returned a verdict of no cause for action as to [...] and the remaining Hartz defendants.  *Ibid.*  Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial was denied and Plaintiff appealed.  *Ibid.*  The Appellate Division held that the third-party contractual indemnification claim should have been severed, and it was error to have the employer ([...]) participate at trial.
[brief] [...] also addressed a two-minute period during the interrogation when [...], went to the bathroom.  [...] found that while [...] did speak alone with the defendant, it was nothing more than “small talk” and/or questions “previously asked” in [...]’s presence, involved nothing of “significance,” was not the product of coercion or threats and was initiated by the defendant.  The court found this distinguishable from the circumstances presented in *State in the Interest of Q.N.*, 179 N.J. 165 (2004).  (2T6-25 to 8-22; 16-15 to 18-7; 34-5 to 34-10; 43-8 to 62-11).
[brief] *State v. Bonano*, 59 N.J. 515, 523-24 (1971).  Respectfully, this is not such a case.  At the outset, as defendant concedes, the defense strategy was that the shooter was not the defendant.  That it was either an intentional misidentification or a case of mistaken identity.  (6T19-4 to 20-19; 21-21 to 22-3).  The defendant opposed any lesser includeds as they ran counter to his defense strategy.  (5T161-24 to 162-4; 164-19 to 22; 165-13 to 16).
[brief] (Da 189).  | The invasion was conducted by two coconspirators: [...] and [...].  (Da200).  | “[...] did everything.  He went in the house” (Da195).  |  The invasion was conducted by [...] and [...].  [...] was the “watch out guy. ” (7T 68).  |  The invasion was conducted by two men: one who wore a hood and one who wore a mask.  | | Involve-ment of [...]  |  Did not identify [...] a/k/a [...] as coconspirator  |  Did not identify [...] a/k/a [...] as coconspirator  |  Did not identify [...] a/k/a [...] as coconspirator  |  Did not identify [...] a/k/a [...] as coconspirator  (8T 213)  | |-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------| |  Masks
[brief] On the Brief: [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED ........................................................................................................ii  TABLE OF APPENDIX ..................................................................................................................iii  TABLE OF CITATIONS ................................................................................................................vi  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................................................4  LEGAL ARGUMENT THE ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS OWED THE PLAINTIFF AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO PROVIDE HER WITH A REASONABLY SAFE PREMISES AND THE INFERENCE OF FACT WEIGHED IN THE PLAINTIFF’S FAVOR WOULD ALLOW A JURY TO FIND THAT THE DEFENDANTS BREACHED THAT DUTY (Pa40-Pa41; Pa44-Pa48; 1T5:21-13:18) ......................................................................................8 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................29
[brief] ”  (5T14-7 to 12).  Next, [...] summarized [...]’s testimony and concluded that while the court “accepts the validity of the psychology and psychiatric factors upon which” she bases her opinion, her “ultimate conclusion that Miller factor one is present” is too generalized and not based on this particular defendant’s development, but rather applies to “any young person frankly under the age of 30….” (5T16-12 to 18-25).  This conclusion is amply supported by the record, a careful review of which shows that much of the doctor’s testimony relates to young people in general and not this defendant in particular.
[brief] *Id.*, “By-Laws,” Art. III, “Board of Trustees,” Sect. 2(B).  *See* Pa 147.  Pursuant to Paragraph 8(e) of the Master Deed, the Board designated Unit 74 for building personnel.  *See* Pa 148.  After the Developer’s control of the Board terminated and the owners comprised a majority of the Board, Unit 74 continued to be designated for building personnel.  On July 23, 1998, the Developer executed a Lease Agreement for Unit 74 with the Association who thereafter remitted monthly rental payments for the next seventeen plus (17+) years.  *See* Unit 74 Lease Agreement and Unit 74 Annual Lease Renewals, with Residential Ledger.  *See* Pa 54.  Rather than exercise the provision to purchase the Unit for building personnel pursuant to the Master Deed, the Association elected to continue paying rent for seventeen plus (17+) years.  *Id.*  The Defendant paid Common Area Maintenance charges for the Unit for 35 plus years as well as real estate property taxes for the Unit.  *Id.*  Then, on November 6, 2015, the Developer sent the Association a Notice of Intent to Terminate the Lease Agreement because they were electing to sell the unit to a third party.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 provides that the statute of limitations for the Plaintiff’s negligence claim is six (6) years.  Specifically, the statute provides that:  Every action at law for trespass for real property, for any tortious injury to real or personal property, for taking, detaining, or converting personal property, for replevin of goods and chattels, for any tortious injury to the rights of another not stated in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 or N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3, for the recovery upon a contractual claim or liability, express or implied, not under seal, or upon account other than one which concerns merchant between merchant, their factors, agents and servants, shall be commenced within six years next after the cause of any such action shall have occurred.  In the present matter, Plaintiff was advised that she should bury the swimming pool by the Township when the Township was performing the work in the backyard in 2018.  Pa7.  Plaintiff is not an engineer and would not have known that damage to the swimming pool was caused by water damage until the work was underway.  The Trial Court held that Plaintiff had been complaining about water since at least 2004.  However, under the “discovery rule” the Plaintiff’s claim is not time-barred.
[brief] Thus, the 1928 version of the statute plainly required motorists to signal in certain circumstances prior to starting, stopping, backing and turning, and it provided explicit guidance as to how to do so.  For instance, the statute dictated that “[w]henever the signal is given by means of the hand and arm, the driver shall indicate his intention to start, or stop, or turn by extending the hand and arm from and beyond the side of the vehicle. ”  Laws of 1928, Chapter 281, Article XIV, Sec. 5.
[brief] 65 Id. 66 Pa835.  67 Id. 68 Id. 69 Id. 70 Id. | | proposed Order given judge’s tentative decision on the motion to amend.  Email counsel regarding Order.  Review proposed amendment.  Voicemail from counsel’s office.  Email to the same | |---|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| \footnote{71}{id.}  Defendant’s Fee Application seeks $7,181.00 in fees and costs for the following time entries that are too vague or indiscernible to be allowed.
[brief] Appellant told [...] that she was being treated differently and that there was bias against her.  The Appellant also provided notice to [...] regarding the engagement in the use of racial slurs by [...] with this notice being provided to McKoy after the second incident of [...] using the word nigger in her class to the students’ dismay.  The Trial Court repeatedly referenced Appellant being reprimanded by [...] which is what was stated by the Respondents, however, as noted in this Brief, when [...] was deposed by this Counsel and in another matter, he testified that he had never reprimanded Appellant.
[brief] Intervenor contends that the equitable fraud standard does not apply because the [...] Policy requires intent.  The relevant provision, however, is as follows:  2.  Concealment, Misrepresentation or Fraud  This coverage form is void in any case of fraud by you at any time as it relates to this coverage form.  It is also void if you or any other “insured,” at any time, intentionally conceals or misrepresents a material fact concerning: a. This coverage form; b. The covered “auto”; c. Your interest in the covered “auto”; or d.  A claim under this coverage form.  (Ia618) (emphasis added).  To be clear, [...] does not rely upon this provision for its rescission claim.  [...] relies upon New Jersey’s well-established, common law equitable fraud standard.
[brief] **THE ARBITRATOR COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO APPLY N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.7(g). **  In its brief, the [...] concedes that the Arbitrator failed to enforce the requirement set forth in N.J.A.C. 19:16-5.7(g) which requires the [...] to provide the Arbitrator and the [...] with a list of unit members during the final year of the expired Agreement, their salary guide steps during the final year, their anniversary date of hire, costs of salary increments, costs of other base salary items, total costs of all base salary items for the 12 months preceding the first year of the new agreement, a list of all unit members on the last day of the year immediately preceding the new agreement, and their salaries as of that date.
[brief] Loigman v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Monmouth, 329 N.J. Super. 561, 565-66 (App. Div. 2000).  The Bylaws of the Board of Fire Commissioners provide that the Board shall provide a member of officer of a fire company with counsel “who is a defendant in any action or legal proceeding arising out of or incidental to the performance of his duties. ”  A defendant is a person who is sued in a civil proceeding or accused in a criminal proceeding, per Black’s Law Dictionary.  When [...] requested indemnification by the District, he was neither.  Therefore, the determination of whether or not to provide [...] with legal representation was a decision left to the Board.
[brief] (D.E. 453, at 1).  Plaintiffs contend the Court should review the Report de novo because the report contains legal conclusions and findings of fact.  Plaintiffs argue the Special Master's conclusion that the Federal Rules permit redaction of irrelevant information from responsive documents is a legal conclusion and the conclusion that Defendants' proposed redaction categories appear to be irrelevant is a mixed question of law and fact.  (D.E. 878, at 10).  Defendants argue that this Report concerns the process for the production of documents, redaction of irrelevant information from responsive documents, and the identification of redacted information to the receiving party, and because these are procedural matters, the Court should review the Report for abuse of discretion.  (D.E. 893, at 7–8).  Plaintiffs respond that even if the Court reviews the Report for abuse of discretion, legal determinations are reviewed *de novo*.  (D.E. 896, at 2–3).  *2
[brief] The amicus brief explains how and why all manufacturers – not just vehicle manufacturers – make reasoned decisions and gradually phase-in the introduction of ¹ Plaintiff did not oppose summary judgment on his negligence claims.  2T at 4.  new technologies.  See [...]’s Br. at 2-3.  [...]’s brief establishes that this approach is also consistent with the framework adopted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration – the regulatory agency charged with vehicle safety.  As such, [...]’s brief is directly supportive of [...]’s position that the vehicle was not defective as a matter of law.  And it directly refutes Plaintiff’s principal theme that “manufacturers are driven by profits and not necessarily what is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.
[brief] appellant/plaintiff has explained that there was an agreed-upon settlement between the parties and Stipulation of Dismissal was filed on October 12, 2003, but it was later revealed that plaintiff’s counsel did not have complete settlement authority.  As such, the settlement was deemed void, which appellant/plaintiff was aware of, and [...] moved for Summary Judgment, which was unopposed.  Appellant/plaintiff have stated that, as form of right, all issues had been decided as a matter, thus allowing them the opportunity to appeal.  This also seems to be disingenuous as they are also aware of the deficit settlement and respondent/defendant [...]’s motion and grant of summary judgment motion.  Either [...]’s grant of Summary Judgment was valid, or, due to the settlement being void, this action is interlocutory, and should be remanded back to trial to correct these deficiencies.  Notwithstanding the procedural deficiencies, both respondent/defendant [...] and [...]’s grant of summary judgment stem from the same set of facts and arguments.  Due to the overlap of issues, and in the interest of fairness, respondent/defendant [...] respectfully requests that this Honorable court address appellant/plaintiff’s [...]’s appeal as if it was towards respondent/defendant [...]’s motion for summary judgment and affirm the decision of the trial court granting [...]’s summary judgment and dismissing appellant/plaintiff [...]’s complaint pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 be affirmed.
[brief] | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **A. J. & J. O. Pilar, Inc. v. Lister Corp.**, 38 N.J. Super. 488 (App. Div.), aff’d, 22 N.J. 75 (1956) | 8 | | **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.**, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 9,13 | | **Cho v. Trinitas Regional Medical Center**, 443 N.J. Super. 461 (App. Div. 2015) | 25 | | **Eileen T. Quigley, Inc. v. Miller Family Farms**, 266 N.J. Super. 283 App. Div. 1993) | 8 | | **Fisher v. Yates**, 270 N. J. Super. 458 (App. Div. 1994) | 14 | | **Garcia v. L&R Realty, Inc.**, 347 N.J. Super. 481 (App. Div. 2002) | 27 | | **Izzo v. Viscount**, 74 N.J.L. 65 (1906) | 21 | | **Lawrence v. Bauer Publ'g & Printing, Ltd.**, 78 N.J. 371 (1979) | 23 | | **Leach v. Anderl**, 218 N.J. Super. 18 (App. Div. 1987) | 9 | | **Lennig v. Ocean City Ass’n**, 41 N.J. Eq. 606 (1886) | 10,11 | | **Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc.**, 200 N.J. 372 (2009) | 28 | | **Lind v. Schmid**, 67 N.J. 255 (1975) | 14,17 | | **LoBiondo v. Schwartz**, 199 N.J. 62 (2009) | 15 | | **NJDPM v. N.J. Dept. of Corrections**, 185 N.J. 137 (2005) | 27 | | **Notte v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co.**, 185 N.J. 490 (2006) | 14,18 | NuWave Inv. Corp. v. Hyman Beck & Co., Inc., 432 N.J. Super. 539 (App. Div. 2013)
[brief] The trial court’s decision did not only undermine the Legislative’s purpose for enacting the PWCRA and defy the [...]’s determination of the breadth of the statutory requirement the [...] is tasked with enforcing, but it also allowed the [...] to award a public contract to a bidder in violation of the Local Public Contracts Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:11-1 et seq.  (“LPCL”).
[directive] Restrictions on EauiDment Services or on The Agency donating the equipment may place restrictions the equipment’s (a., use, Mobile Data Terminals purchased by the [...] assigned to only of shall be installed and used [...] vehicles in barracks that patrol Bergen County).  However, the restrictions cannot be inconsistent would State law.  addition, the Department must agree that the restrictions with in not be detrimental to the efficient operation of the Department.  unacceptable  If I- restrictions are idposed, the Department shall not accept the reallocation.  10-5: AcceDtance of Terms
[directive] Out-of-State 4.5.8 or convictions for account not does process risk-assessment pretrial automated  The that indicate system will electronic Judiciary's the However, states. other from charges pending prosecutors and police provide may also history, and criminal of-state out an has defendant the of presumption Notwithstanding the offenses.  such any concerning information limited with apply may agency enforcement law apply, a otherwise would that acomplaint-summons issuing conviction or charge pending out-of-state an that appears reasonably if acomplaint-warrant it for event, that firearm.
[brief] (Da186.)  Overarching that was the statement in paragraph 6:  Landlord [Defendant] is currently in default of Section II.j of the Lease which requires Landlord to furnish to Tenant dedicated drop off and pickup areas directly in front of the Leases Premises (“Drop Off Area”) upon Landlord obtaining such required approvals (“Drop Off Area Approvals”).  Tenant has received notice that Landlord obtained the Drop Off Area Approvals but as of the date hereof, Landlord has failed to furnish the Drop Off Area to Tenant.  Additionally, Landlord has not paid the first installment of Real Estate Commission (“Commission”) to [...] of $31,148.88 which was due upon Rent Commencement Date.  (Da323-324.)  The Estoppel Certificate also said in paragraph 8:  Except to the extent arising from the Landlord defaults set forth in Section 6 above, Tenant has no claim against Landlord and no offset or defense to enforcement of any of the terms of the Lease.  (Da324.)  Not only had there been issues regarding the rent commencement letter addressed in the second amendment (Da275-280), but now it was revealed the commercial tenant [...] – a tenant representing 17.65% of the rent receipts – claimed the Defendant breached the Lease, was involved in a lawsuit, and entered a settlement (Da328-330) which modified the Lease.