ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Reports for the hearing to Court and counsel are due on _ 8. of NORI  The acquittee's maximum period commitment or supervision under N.J.S.A._2C:4-8 9.  __ __ =in"-d=a-'-'-te~]'---___ of years and months terminates on _ -1."[fi=tl=-l of of this Order will be forwarded to the County Adjuster's Office by the Clerk the Court  A copy of within two (2) days its signing.  Judge Date by Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12562 (KROL Order 7)
[brief] 3.  The Trial Judge Committed Reversible Error in Refusing to Instruct the Jury  In Accordance With the Restatement of Torts, Section 317  The plaintiff here submitted a proposed jury instruction (Pa316) to the trial judge asking him to instruct the jury on the Restatement of Torts, (2d), §317, which states:  "A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them if: (a) the servant (i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which the servant is privileged to enter only as his servant . . . and (b) the master (i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his servant, and (ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control."  The trial judge refused to so instruct the jury, apparently agreeing with [...]'s argument that §317 "is not the current state of New Jersey law."  (10T40:15-16).  In fact, it is the current state of New Jersey law.  The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted §317 in *DiCosala v. Kay*, 91 N. J. 159, 171-172 (1982), and confirmed its adoption of that provision 16 years later in *Mavrikidis*, supra, at 133, where the court stated "as one of the principal bases for that decision [DiCosala], we cited section 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1963)."  This Court, in *Doe v. XYC Corp.*, 382 N.J.Super. 122 (A.D. 2005, citing DiCosala, supra, reversed a summary judgment ruling and applied the Restatement (Second) of Torts §317 to a case where the employer knew its employee was looking at pornography on his work computer but failed to act and the employee went on to take naked pictures of a 10 year old girl off site.  This instruction should have been read to the jury because the evidence at trial showed that [...] was (a) on the premises of [...]’s; and (b) [...]’s knew it had the ability to control him because he was working at the time, and (c) knew of the necessity and opportunity to control him because evidence showed that [...]’s was aware that its new employees (like [...]) could feel “too much pressure” when being approached by customers (6T77:9-78:13).  This is evidenced by the testimony (*Ibid.*), and by the training video which [...]’s made that tells trainees (but not [...] because he did not see it) (8T63:12-20)) that “[y]ou will have the dedicated training time to better understand your department, practice selling skills, and shadow experienced employees before working by yourself." (Pa305/2:20-23) (8T64:6-22).  The evidence at trial showed that putting an employee on the sales floor who was "alone in the department" (8T210:21-24), and who could not answer questions because he was not properly trained, rendered [...] "unable to deal with the situation that arose" and "created the frustration" on [...]'s part causing the incident.  (8T88:19-89:12).  Accordingly, this matter should be remanded for a new trial before a different trial judge and the jury instructed as to §317 of the Restatement of Torts (2d).
[brief] \textit{N.J.S.A.} 55:19-81.  Despite that Defendants’ interrogatories were incomplete, they admitted that the property had not been legally occupied for six months.  (823a\#10, 830a\#10, 837a\#10).  Thus, the first abandonment element was satisfied.  \textit{N.J.S.A.} 55:19-81.  In addition, there was no meaningful dispute that another element was satisfied, namely, that at least one installment of property tax was unpaid and delinquent (i.e. the lien that Plaintiff had purchased and foreclosed).  Those two elements alone would render a property “abandoned. ”
[brief] The Consumer Fraud Act applies to "the offering, sale, or provision of consumer credit."  *Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management*, 150 N.J. 255, 265 (1997).  Accord, *Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp.*, 207 N.J. 557, 577 (2011); *Jefferson Loan Co. v. Session*, 397 N.J. Super. 520, 535 (App. Div. 2008); *Associates Home Eq. Servs. v. Troup*, 343 N.J. Super. 254, 278 (App. Div. 2001); *Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices*, 777 F. Supp. 2d 823, 834 (D.N.J. 2011); *O'Brien v. Cleveland* (In re O'Brien), 423 B.R. 477, 488 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010).
[brief] In 2002, [...] received final major site plan and subdivision approval from the [...] (the “Planning Board”) to subdivide the Original Tract into multiple new separate lots so that it could be developed with a combination of office, residential, and retail uses. \(^5\) (Da69-Da92.)  Part of that development would involve the construction of a new public “loop road,” which for all intents and purposes is one road, but is referred to on certain maps as two roads, named Riverfront Boulevard (the “Boulevard”) and Right of Way --- \(^4\)  As a point of reference, it should be noted that Lot 1.01 has never been owned by Plaintiffs or parties related to Plaintiffs and, except for building a curb cut from Lot 1.01 onto the Boulevard in 2013 as a condition of [...]’s Planning Board approvals, has never been part of the development.  (Da57 at ¶ 3, fn1; Pa2 at ¶¶ 2-3; Pa29.)  Lot 1.01, which at the time of the approvals in 2004 was a vacant building formerly used as a racquet club, is now owned by [...], which uses it as a church and religious school, and has approximately 200 parking spaces.
[brief] (d)  Agreements Involving the Right to Appeal.  Whenever a plea agreement includes a provision that defendant will not appeal, the court shall advise the defendant that notwithstanding the inclusion of this provision, the defendant has the right to take a timely appeal if the plea agreement is accepted, but that if the defendant does so, the plea agreement may be annulled at the option of the prosecutor; in which event all charges shall be restored to the same status as immediately before the entry of the plea.
[brief] A.  Plaintiff misled Defendant as to the right under R. 1:6-2(d).  In its Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff stated:  “Oral argument will be scheduled only if directed by the Court, pursuant to R. 1:6-2 upon request by you in written objection or opposing affidavit or certification filed with the Court and served upon the undersigned, Attorneys for Plaintiff, no later than 8 days before the above return date” (Da10).  (Emphasis Added).  R. 1:6-2 does not make oral argument available to Defendant only if directed by the lower Court.  R. 1:6-2(d) states in part: “… the request shall be granted as of right. ”  Plaintiff misled the lower Court and the Defendant as to Defendant’s ability to oppose the Motion for Summary Judgment by stating that oral argument is only by direction of the Court.  Defendant would have been granted oral argument, if requested, as of right.  *Great Atl. & Pac. Tea v. Checchio*, 335 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 2000).  Nowhere does Plaintiff state in any of Plaintiff’s documents that Defendant would be granted oral argument as of right.  Thus, Plaintiff made two misleading statements to the lower Court and to the Defendant: First, that oral argument was available only by direction of the lower Court.  Then, Plaintiff omitted mention of the grant of oral argument to Defendant as a matter of right.  **B.
[directive] 18.  Have you or any family member or close friend ever been accused of committing an offense other than a minor motor vehicle offense?  19.  Have you or any family member or close friend ever been the victim of a crime, whether it was reported to law enforcement or not?  20.  Would you have any difficulty following the principle that the defendant on trial is presumed to be innocent and must be found not guilty of that charge unless each and every essential element of an offense charged is proved beyond a reasonable doubt?
[brief] - **November 2018** TPDs secretly meet with [...].  (3T 38:20 to 44:23).  - **May 1, 2019**  [...] signs an agreement on behalf of the TPDs with [...] to purchase the Share for the same amount offered to [...] of $250,000.  (3T 47:17-19).  - **May 29, 2019**  [...] is formed by the TPDs without [...]’s knowledge.  (1T 35:20-23).  July 10, 2019 [...] purchases [...] Share for $250,000.00.  (Da209) (3T 25:24 to 26:6).  July 15, 2019 [...] terminates [...]’s Imam without [...]’s authorization or knowledge.  (2T 110:8-13).  August 2019 [...] finally informs [...] of [...] and its purchase of the Share.  (1T 34:8 to 35:1-16).
[brief] Both licensing regimes have the purpose of ensuring those who are permitted to carry firearms within their states are “law-abiding, responsible citizens. ”  Bruen, 597 U.S. at fn.9.  Once issued, they both have the effect of allowing individuals to carry within their respective states.  The State cites to Pennsylvania’s statute only permitting those with licenses to carry within Pennsylvania.  This is unpersuasive.  For instance, N.J.S.A. 39:3-10a states a “person shall not drive a motor vehicle on a public highway in this State unless the person is … in possession of a … basic driver's license issued to that person in accordance with this article.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  Plaintiffs sought removal of [...] from Rutgers’ core governing structure, the Board of Governors (BOG), only because she no longer lived in a certain county.  The trial court granted that extraordinary relief, ousting [...] from BOG, with immediate effect.  This appellate court’s intervention is necessary to correct the lower court’s decision, which essentially treated BOG members as an extension of state government.  That flawed understanding allowed the trial court to conclude that [...] was a “holder” of an “office” for purposes of removal under the quo warranto statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:66-6, the statute relied on by Plaintiffs.  The trial court should have concluded that the statute does not apply because BOG members do not fall within the law’s purview.  As a long-standing, volunteer BOG member, [...] did not hold public office from which ouster is permitted via a quo warranto action.  The trial court’s approach, to which no deference is owed by this appellate court, conflicts with Rutgers’ unique status as a hybrid public-private entity.  That status derives from a consummated contract between Rutgers and the State, as codified under the Rutgers Act of 1956, N.J.S.A. 18A:65-1 to -103 (the Rutgers Act).  Above all, the Rutgers Act—which is protected by the contract clauses of both our federal and state constitutions—envisions a sui-generis, autonomous university, especially as it relates to Rutgers’ principal governing board, the BOG.  Allowing Plaintiffs to oust BOG members via the quo warranto statute trespasses on that autonomy.  In addition, their pleading should not have survived its other procedural deficiencies.  Plaintiffs’ action was brought 37 months after their claim for ouster first arose against [...].  Their belated filing greatly exceeds the 45-day limitations period, and the interest of justice does not warrant the judiciary’s rescue.
[brief] CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  [...]  Public Defender  Office of the Public Defender  Appellate Section [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender  [...]  Attorney ID: 404802022  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED Of Counsel and On the Brief.  Dated: June 30, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Defendants argue that the prejudice caused by these incidents was of such magnitude that the trial court committed reversible error in denying their applications for a mistrial.  We disagree.  The first of these incidents occurred during [...]'s testimony.  The court decided to take a short recess while counsel for [...] was cross-examining [...].  Counsel alleged that the witness's father, who was not part of the court's sequestration order, spoke to the witness in a hallway outside the courtroom while the trial was in recess.  According to Rodney's defense counsel, the father advised David “that if [he] got confused, just make sure that [he told] the court and th[e] jury that those are definitely the two boys who killed [[...]]. ”  David denied the allegations in response to the trial judge's questions about the matter.  Defense counsel did not call David's father as a witness.  *13  The second incident occurred while [...] was testifying about the circumstances of [...]'s death.  Two women seated in the spectator area of the courtroom, later identified as [...]'s sisters, made a clearly audible, though indiscernible, comment.  The court immediately instructed them to leave the courtroom, prompting one of the women to yell out: “I hope that mother fucker die[s] ...  I'll kill those fuckers. ”  The trial judge gave the following instructions to the jurors:  “I'm going to excuse you.  Obviously emotional testimony, you'll ignore the outbursts, okay?  And they should not influence you in any way in your decision in this case.  But please step out for a moment, okay?”  Defendants moved for a mistrial; Rodney's counsel argued that the motion “goes [ ] beyond just the outburst in the courtroom.  It ties in perfectly with what happened out in the hallway before we came back from the break with [David].”  Counsel asserted that the comments made by members of the victim's family in the presence of the jury had the capacity “to inflame” the jurors and prejudice defendants as the men who caused this pain.  Coupled with “the vulgarity and the nastiness ... directed at our clients,” in defense counsel's opinion, the only remedy was to declare a mistrial.
[brief] At page 24 of its brief, [...] concedes the rule of law cited by Appellants, that a “court must enforce an agreement as written,” [Restaurant’s Brief, p.24]; however, it then argues that this rule is excepted when “doing so would lead to an absurd result. ”  Id. (citing, Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016)).  But the so-called “absurd result” here is the tack-on that [...] makes to Appellants’ position: that being the claim that Appellants are arguing for this duty of maintenance to extend to “common areas" that are “anywhere in the entirety of the shopping center.
[brief] (“[...]”).  The complaint filed in this action indicates that the individuals named as plaintiffs brought suit in their individual capacities and “as members of behalf of” the [...].  Following trial, and after entry of judgment against Defendant-Appellant [...], the court below amended the case caption to include [...] as a plaintiff.  This post-trial/post-judgment amendment was the first time [...] was a party to the action below.  It is, therefore, unclear what role – if any – these entities have at this stage of the proceedings.  ²  For the sake of clarity, Defendants are referred to herein by their last names, as indicated above.  Plaintiffs [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and [...] will be referred to by last name and, collectively, as the “Individual Plaintiffs”.  Together with the [...], they are the “Plaintiffs”.
[brief] Moreover, [...]’s opinion about that streetlight was likely off at the time of the accident is supported by much lay and expert testimony, as seen above.  Furthermore, [...]’s opinion that, regardless of whether the light was on at the time of the accident, it was ineffective as it was blocked by the tree branches is based on the very video produced by defendants.  [...] was criticized by defendants in their motions for basing some of his opinions on the International Property Maintenance Code (IPMC).  What the defendants failed to understand is that, as pointed out by [...] and [...], any construction standard is better than no standard at all in a situation where [...] followed no construction standards and hired not one specialist to guide it in its streetlight placement, design and light coverage at an intersection, especially a dangerous intersection.  The defendants took the position below that [...] is not an accident reconstruction expert.  What they failed to realize is that the crux of [...]’s (and [...]’s) opinions is based on lighting and premises liability theories.
[brief] In addition to our discussion in our initial brief, Hb29-37, we rely on the extensive discussion in this court's recent opinion in Compressor Station, supra.  In that case, the court considered a challenge to the [...]'s issuance of a determination that a proposed gas pipeline project qualified for a statutory exemption from detailed review because it was "routine" to the pipeline's infrastructure.  The court reversed the [...]'s finding. \(^4\)
[brief] THE COURT:  Well, but aren't your allegations conclusory?  [...]:  No, Judge, because all you have to -- I'm saying, look, how can they represent two defendants or six defendants under the Comparative Negligence Act, all right?  Everyone's got an incentive under the CNA to point the fingers at the other guy.  THE COURT:  But that has not occurred at this point.  [...]: Well, it will occur in the future.  THE COURT: How do we know that?  [...]: Well, if this case were to go to trial then we're going to have everybody pointing fingers at each other.  THE COURT:  So, you're saying that it may happen, we don't know it's going to happen.  It may happen, therefore every single defendant has to retain their own attorney?  . . . (Tr.43-44.).  When challenged by [...] as to why the conflicts could not be waived, [...] again could not provide any concrete reason as to why it could not, providing a rambling answer about “ticking time bombs” and the Comparative Negligence Act (which [...] claims applies to the intentional fraud and RICO claims in their complaint):
[brief] It was entirely unclear which sample was in fact tested and, as State’s own expert testified, the lab received two lavender vials both dated June 4, 2019 and bearing 8:31 p.m. as the time of collection.  (Id.).  In addition, per hospital records, the Defendant was administered morphine at 7:46 p.m. (Da 3).  Despite this medication presumably being present in the Defendant’s system by the time of the second draw, there is no positive findings for morphine or its metabolites by [...].  (Pa 46-53).  This, in addition to the absence of records as to what happened between the date of the samples collection by hospital staff and their being obtained by the State, begs the question of whether or not the samples at issue are even of Defendant’s blood.
[brief] *State v. Winter*, 96 N.J. 640, 647 (1984).  Likewise, a trial court is afforded deference, in light of its “unique perspective”, in exercising control over matters pertaining to the jury.  *State v. R.D.*, 169 N.J. 551, 559-560 (2001) (citing *State v. Simon*, 161 N.J. 416, 466 (1999)).  Indeed, it is clear that a mistrial is not required merely because an individual juror has been exposed to outside influence.  *Id.* at 559.  This is not a case where there was an irregular influence on the jury as seen in *State v. Grant*, 254 N.J.Super. 571 (App. Div. 1992) or *State v. Weiler*, 211 N.J.Super. 602 (App. Div. 1986) relied upon by the defendant.  In both of those cases there was blatant misconduct by government actors that clearly impacted the respective jury deliberations.  That is not the case here.  Here, the juror was contacted by a member of the public which defense counsel assumed was associated with the defense.  He did not relay the content of the call to the other jurors.  The trial court specifically indicated that the jurors did not seem bothered by the excusal of juror 12 and the defense suggestion that the other jurors, “could have assumed juror twelve feared retaliation” is mere speculation and contrary to the Court’s finding that the other jurors did not seem bothered by the development.  The mere fact that a juror was dismissed because he knew someone in the courtroom would not lead a juror to conclude that something nefarious had occurred.  The Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that this relatively benign statement did not have the capacity to taint the jury and no mistrial or new trial was warranted.  As such, the decision must be affirmed.
[brief] The investigator then stated the following:  Q.  After your review of the records were any of those monies transferred for the purpose of [...]?  A.  No.  Not only did the State go over this specific transaction in [...]’s testimony, but the State had gone so far as to redact portions of it.  There is little to no possibility that the State was unaware that [...] paid [...] thirty thousand dollars ($30,000.00) as a franchise fee on April 9, 2014.  The State’s sole “evidence” is a May 2, 2014 Operating Agreement that purports to represent [...] having a ninety-five (95%) interest and [...] having a five percent (5%) interest in [...].  (Sa113).  defense has called into question the authenticity of that document. \(^3\)  Not only would that split not make any sense for [...] to agree to and is inconsistent with every other arrangement they had entered into across multiple projects in four (4) states, [...] expressly acknowledged that he and [...] owned all of the New York locations except Syracuse 50/50 and “[s]till 40/30/30 NJ-PA. ” (Da113).  Regardless, by that time, the vast majority of all of the money had already been raised and negotiated by [...], who had the authority to do so for [...], the actual franchisee of World of Beer from January of 2014 onward.
[directive] iii.  Threaten, order a bystander otherwise intimidate, or discourage cease, to from recording, remaining proximity or verbally the commenting on of, in officer's officer official conduct directed at the activities.  iv. of an stop the Perform arrest bystander investigatory or solely on basis the that the recording police bystander is conduct.  v.  Demand bystander's identification.  the vi. a the Demand state that reason why bystander recording.  the bystander is a  Detain, vii. or arrest, threaten arrest bystander to based on activity protected the Amendment, First including verbal bystander's to limited by not but the criticism, questioning of actions, recording police lawful of officers, or the gestures.
[brief] In general, “a landowner has ‘a non-delegable duty to use reasonable care to protect invitees against known or reasonably discoverable dangers. ’ ”  Jimenez v. Maisch, 329 N.J. Super. 398, 403 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Kane v. Hartz Mountain Indus., 278 N.J. Super. 129, 140 (App. Div. 1994), aff’d, 143 N.J. 141 (1996)).  A landowner, who by invitation, express or implied, induces persons to come upon the premises, is under a duty to exercise ordinary care to render the premises reasonably safe for the purpose embraced in invitation.
[brief] (1) the Stock Purchase Agreement (SPA), dated December 5, 2014, in which [...] sold his share in [...] to [...], with a closing date of December 31, 2017.  (P-80).  Da906-934 (2) the Stock Purchase Agreement (SPA), dated December 5, 2014, in which [...] sold his share in [...] to [...], with a closing date of December 31, 2017.  (P-103)  Da1527-1541 (3)  Membership Interest Purchase Agreement (MIPA), dated December 5, 2014, for the sale of [...] by [...] to [...]