ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE COURT WAS FULLY JUSTIFIED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO TERESA MAY.  (R-11)  In this matter, there is no doubt that the Cross-Appellant [...] was entitled to attorney's fees due to the overwhelming and shocking misconduct of both [...] and her counsel.  The misconduct resulted in a Court Order being issued on November 2, 2022, which specifically stated:  The additional relief requested by [...], Esquire on behalf of [...] is granted in that the Court finds that the actions in this case by [...] and her attorneys at the [...] were purposefully deceitful, willful and intentional in order to deceive the Court and all the estate's beneficiaries.  (64-A)  It is notable that the Order at issue, which granted both attorney's fees and sanctions was entered by the Honorable [...], P.J.Ch., who was the second Judge assigned to this matter.  [...]’s brief raised repeated complaints about the First Judge who presided over this case but raises no similar concerns regarding the Second Judge who actually assessed the attorney's fees and the sanctions that are the subject of their appeal.  These fees and sanctions were the direct consequence of conduct which included repeated violations of court orders, failures to turn over documents as requested and efforts to conceal funds from the jurisdiction of the Court.
[brief] *Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021*.  9 U.S.C. §401.  It applies to this case.  The arbitration agreement the Appellants seek to enforce specifically states its governed by the *Federal Arbitration Act*.  [155a,161a]  A plain reading of the *Federal Arbitration Act* indicates that the amendment covers any claims that accrued after the effective date of the statute.  The amendment to the *Federal Arbitration Act* specifically states it prohibits the enforcement of any prior agreements.  Without question, the date of the agreement is not relevant.
[directive] Date Client Signature of7  Page 3 by Promulgated Directive #20-21 (08/11/2021)  Drug Court Phase Reqmrements  Name  Probation Officer Date Reviewed Track B  Phase 4  Requirements - you  Review each requirement with staff and sign understand the expectations.  •  I will attend court on time every 3 months at: my treatment plan and relapse prevention plan at: • I will follow _______________ .  Phone Number: of • I will follow the conditions probation supervision and meet monthly with my probation _________________ officer on time.  Probation officer: Phone __________ of .  I will immediately notify my probation officer any Number: of or conflicts prior to my appointment in case an emergency.  my my case plan with probation officer as needed.  • I will review • I will allow probation officers into my residence for home visits and home inspections.  ______ •  I will submit to random drug testing.  Testing hotline number: _ _______ )  (ID#: if • I will maintain housing and keep my probation officer informed my residence changes.  • I will maintain any recommended medical/dental needs.  • I will continue to demonstrate addressing people, places, and things.  • I will maintain attending recovery groups and my peer recovery network per treatment.  my financial plan and continue making payments per case plan.  •  I will follow • I will maintain supportive services as recommended (for example, parenting classes, family support, etc.).  • I will maintain pro-social activities.  • I will maintain employment, vocational training, or school.  I have reviewed the requirements for Phase 4 and understand my responsibilities to the drug court program.
[brief] (223T at 88:19-90:6, 92:13-93:12; 228T at 40:24-41:6; 229T at 6:19-20).  [...] also found that the money that the [...] had caused to be paid to themselves for management fees, payroll, interest, and various other development and construction expenses constituted theft, and that the inaccurate financial statements never relied upon and, in some instances, never read by any of the Plaintiffs, constituted fraud, thereby subjecting the [...] to liability for punitive damages.  *Jarwick Devs., Inc. v. Wilf*, No. A-2053-13T3, 2018 WL 2449133, at *4 (App. Div. June 1, 2018).  [...] also found that the [...] and/or the partnerships constituted civil RICO “enterprises,” thereby subjecting the [...] to liability for treble damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs pursuant to state law civil RICO.  *Id.*  As noted above, Plaintiff [...], who alleged four civil RICO claims, was a 25% partner in the so-called “enterprises. ”
[brief] THE RECORD CLEARLY REFLECTS THAT THE BOARD BREACHED THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.  The Settlement Agreement was entered into by both the Township and the Board, making them equally responsible for abiding by its terms.  Moreover, the Settlement Agreement—which was Court Approved—contains clear and express terms relative to the Board’s obligations with respect to timing, expediting approval and review, cooperation, and prohibiting the Board from requiring [...] to include unnecessary and cost-generative features, such as an elevator in Building “E” that is not required by the UCC.  New Jersey Courts have long favored settlement agreements and do not hesitate to enforce same as any other contract.
[directive] Have you ever served on a trial jury before today, here in New Jersey 16. or in any state court or federal court?  17.  Do you know anyone else in the jury box other than as a result of reporting here today?  18.  Would your verdict in this case be influenced in any way by any factors other than the evidence in the courtroom such as friendships or family relationships or the type of work you do?  19.  Have you ever been a witness in a civil matter, regardless of whether it went to trial?  20.  Have you ever testified in any court proceeding?  21.  New Jersey law requires that a plaintiff has to prove fault of a defendant before he or she is entitled to recover money damages from that defendant.  Do you have any difficulty accepting that concept?  Model Civil Jury Voir Dire Questions Revised as Promulgated by Directive #4-07
[directive] INTAKE INTERVIEW, THE U.D.I.R. COMPLETE  Completed soon after arrest at intake  SECTION A interview, at CJP, First Appearance, or U.D.I.R. at jail interview; otherwise complete soon after Prosecutorial screening.  In any event never later than arraignment on SECTION B indictment.  OPTIONAL  Section B contains information not needed until PTI or sentencing.  While it is not recommended to delay completion of this form, it may be desirable depending on nature of interview or type of case.  (See Appendix I for form set)
[directive] A.  This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney  Non-enforceability by third parties.  General’s authority to ensure the uniform and efficient enforcement of the laws and administration of criminal justice throughout the State.  This Directive imposes limitations on law enforcement agencies and officials that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.
[brief] On December 23, 1993, [...] purchased the Property containing eleven (11) residential units for $525,000.  DA 37; 1T:13-19.  [...] was the tenant at the Unit consisting of approximately 1,000 square feet (1T:53:15, 13T:49:23-24) and paid monthly rent of $675 (3T:65:26; 4T:4:2; 13T:49:23).  In 2002, all units and the common areas were substantially renovated.  3T:7:18, 1T:6:14-16, 1T:44:10-16, 5T:74:12-25.  In 2003, ten years after purchasing the property, [...] converted the Property into a condominium property.  3T:7:19-23.  [...] remained a tenant at the Unit, while all other units of the Property were sold.  Under §155-14A of Hoboken’s Rent Control Ordinance (the “Ordinance”), a property owner is entitled to not only pay all its operating expenses, but to earn a reasonable rate of return (6.25%) on its equity in its investment.
[brief] [...], UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE  *1  Before the Court are Plaintiff [...]’s Motion for Leave to File Discovery Motion, and Subject to Same, Motion to Enforce Discovery Agreements and Motion to Compel, Dkt. No. 60, and Defendant [...]’s Motion to Compel or, Alternatively, Exclude, Dkt. No. 81, and their attendant responses and replies.
[directive] You must also comply with the following special conditions of probation imposed by the Court in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C: 45-1 et seq.:  List other conditions below:  Hours of Community Service Days in the County Jail Driver's License Suspended for Obtain a General Equivalency Diploma (GED)  Complete Court Ordered Treatment Program Specify Program:  I have received a copy of the rules and conditions of probation which have been read and explained to me.  I understand the above rules and conditions of probation and that they apply to me, and I further understand that failure to comply on my part constitutes a violation of probation and will cause my return to Court.
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Essex County Prosecutor Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent /s/ [...] – No. 017631983  Assistant Prosecutor Date: August 14, 2024  [...] ID No. 016301986  [...] [...]  [...]  Designated Counsel for Defendant-Appellant  [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant  31 Clinton Street P.O. Box 46003  Newark, New Jersey 07101  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff/Respondent v. [...], Defendant/Appellant  CRIMINAL ACTION  On appeal from the denial of defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief  Superior Court of New Jersey  Essex County Indictment No. [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.
[brief] Accordingly, the Court directed [...], to the extent possible based on the summary nature of many of the challenged document categories, to provide a “statement of what [[...]] think[s] the relevance would be of the documents that are made reference to in each of these categories. ”  (Id. at 82:9-16).  Additionally, the Court noted that it was inclined to appoint a special master to review the purportedly privileged documents in camera as necessary, and the parties agreed to such an appointment for that purpose.
[brief] While *Torres* clearly falls closer to the mark in addressing the issues in this case, it still does not apply here to require the Trial Court to appoint an expert, because *Torres* was based on the statutory requirements of the New Jersey Oppressed Minority Shareholder Statute.  *Torres, supra*, 342 N.J.Super. at 433-436.  Here, however, first, [...] is a Delaware LLC, so that statute is inapplicable.  Second, if the statute were applied, clearly only [...] was guilty of oppression and, since he was deceased and his estate was never made a defendant, that claim was properly dismissed.  Pa9,54,72 n.1 B.  Any Error In The Trial Court’s Failure To Appoint An Expert Was Not Plain Error And Should Be Disregarded On This Appeal
[brief] [...], [...], AND [...]  [...]  [...], Esq.  (No. 024862005)  [...]  [...], Esq.  (No. 308782019)  [...]  [...] [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents  Inspira Health Network, Barbara Conicello, and Denise Lambrecht  Of Counsel: [...], Esq.  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] \(^4\)  If [...] elects to file an action \(^4\)Plaintiff argues that an action to collect monies is the “only claim that could possibly exist in favor of Defendant against Plaintiff. ”  (Pb17).  While not essential to the Court’s analysis, [...] notes that this is not accurate.  For example, if Plaintiff entered the work site and damaged [...]’s equipment, that claim for property damage would be arbitrated.  So too would a claim of commercial disparagement.  Moreover, it stands to reason that the only likely claim that a mortgage lender would bring against a borrower is a foreclosure, eviction or similar action for the collection of rents.  Cf. Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 518.  Yet the Supreme Court in Delta had no trouble enforcing that provision against the borrower (a seventy-eight-year-old woman with a sixth-grade education and little financial expertise) meaning that the same result should apply here.  in Superior Court to collect monies, Plaintiff may then assert his claims as counterclaims in that same action.  In all scenarios, there is only one action; and in all but one scenario (e.g., to collect monies), every claim will be arbitrated – thereby relieving the burden to the judiciary and otherwise advancing the policy considerations of efficient and cost-effective outcomes.  In sum, Plaintiff’s arguments in this regard are unpersuasive.
[brief] The appellate division reviews a trial court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a cause of action de novo, applying the same standard under Rule 4:6-2(e) that governed the trial court.  Frederick v. Smith, 416 N.J. Super. 594, 597 (App. Div. 2010); Smerling v. Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc., 389 N.J. Super. 181, 186 (App. Div. 2006) (the Appellate Division’s review is plenary from an order dismissing a complaint pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e)).  The standard that applies to the review of complaints in the context of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is an indulgent one.  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 771-72 (1989).  While trial courts are cautioned not to dismiss a complaint under R. 4:6-2(e) where a cause of action is suggested by the facts and a theory of actionability may be articulated by way of amendment, Muniz v. United Hsps. Med. Ctr. Pres. Hsp., 153 N.J. Super. 79, 82-83 (App. Div. 1977), dismissal is mandated where the factual allegations are palpably insufficient to support a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Rieder v. Dept. of Transportation, 221 N.J Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987).  Thus, “a court must dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint if it has failed to articulate a legal basis entitling plaintiff to relief. ”  Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App. Div. 2005); [...]  Applying these principles to the case at bar, the trial judge properly disposed of Plaintiff’s palpably insufficient claims.  We are certain that on independent review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, this Court will agree that one is incapable of extrapolating a claim under the NJLAD based on the factual predicate set forth therein.  As such, the trial court’s ruling should be affirmed and Plaintiff’s instant appeal denied in its entirety.
[brief] This argument fails to acknowledge that in all of New Jersey’s criminal law history, there is only one case in which a sitting Governor opened the entirety of the case file for the public to examine.  Accordingly, the shortcomings of the Courts argument and conclusion are obvious.  Ruling in support of [...] would not compel other people to enter the museum demanding DNA tests, given the very limited scope from an Executive Order on this uniquely historic case.  Beyond these envelopes, there is little evidentiary value remaining of the historic documents.  The presumed saliva from the DNA of these envelopes is obtainable and falls within the scope of an “examination” of documents pursuant to OPRA.  [...] was clear from the beginning about what is different and what is so unique about this case.
[brief] U.S. Const. amend. VI; see Bey [v. Morton, 124 F.3d 524, 528 (3d Cir. 1997)].  The right to counsel attaches at arraignment, extends through the first appeal and guarantees an accused the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of a proceeding.  Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 357, 110 S. Ct. 1176, 108 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1990).  A pretrial hearing considering the suppression of the [evidence] is such a critical stage because its "results might settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality."  See id. at 358 n. 5, 110 S. Ct. 1176 (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967)).  Henderson v. Frank, 155 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 1998) (Emphasis added).  Trial counsel’s complete abandonment of his duty to effectively advocate for his client by filing a suppression motion in addition to his knowingly misleading him as well, clearly establishes that defendant was deprived of his Sixth Amendment Constitutional right to effective representation.
[brief] **THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW**  This Court reviews the “trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo under the same standard as the trial court. ”  *Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh*, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016).  “That standard mandates that summary judgment be granted ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ””  Id. (R. 4:46-2(c)).  A court should only deny summary judgment “where the party opposing the motion has come forward with evidence that creates ‘a genuine issue as to any material fact challenged. ’”  Brill v. The Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 529 (1995) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).  In deciding a motion for summary judgment, this Court views the evidence “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party with all reasonable inferences” afforded to the non-moving party.  Pantano v. New York Shipping Ass’n, 254 N.J. 101, 115 (2023).  A party opposing a motion for summary judgment before the completion of discovery must “demonstrate with some degree of particularity that further discovery will supply the missing elements of the cause of action. ”  Badiali v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Grp., 220 N.J. 544, 555 (2016).  “A party opposing summary judgment on the ground that more discovery is needed must specify what further discovery is required, rather than simply asserting a generic contention that discovery is incomplete. ”  Trinity Church v. Lawson-Bell, 394 N.J. Super. 159, 166 (App. Div. 2007).  POINT I THE TRIAL COURT IMPERMISSIBLY DISREGARDED THE INTENT OF THE GENESIS DEED AND SUBSTITUTED ITSELF FOR THE FACT FINDER
[brief] See Singer, 95 N.J. at 500.  The trial court acted within its discretion in declining to reduce the fee award based on [...]’s objections, and in awarding the full quantum of fees sought.  But even if this Court were to find that the lower court erred in granting the full quantum of fees sought, the proper result would be to remand for further proceedings over the amount to be awarded and not, as [...] posits, to order it be denied in its entirety.
[brief] The Act Restricts The Amount Of Debt Adjustment Services That An Attorney Can Provide To Clients.  The Act, as amended, restricts the amount of debt adjustment services that an attorney can provide to clients.  N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1.  Through [...], [...] confirmed its understanding that the Act places such a restriction on attorneys:  Q.  Based on your knowledge, experience, and training, [...], if an attorney is licensed as a New Jersey attorney, a full license, they can handle wills and estates, trusts, bankruptcy work, [if] that attorney is principally engaged in debt-adjustment work, they violate the statute?
[brief] Courts construe indemnification agreements narrowly and interpret ambiguous clauses strictly against the indemnitee (raised below at 1T19:10-23:18).  Courts strictly construe ambiguous indemnity clauses against the indemnitee for two reasons.  Boyle, 257 N.J. at 478.  The first is that a negligent party is normally responsible for its own share of fault.  Id. at 478-79.  The second is that the American Rule requires each party to be responsible for its own attorneys’ fees.  Id. at 479.  Contracts that shift a tortfeasor’s responsibility for its own fault to another party are in derogation of those rules.  Id. at 478-79.  Therefore, “‘shifting liability to an indemnitor must be accomplished only through express and unequivocal language. ’”  Id. at 479 (quoting Kieffer, 205 N.J. at 224).  The Supreme Court has consistently refused to enforce contracts that do not unambiguously require indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence.
[brief] 747a (142:14-144:25).  Plaintiffs did not learn about the rezoning until later in 2007 and were not advised by Defendant [...] or Defendant [...] that this rezoning had taken place, thereby denying [...] and Plaintiff [...] the ability to seek to overturn the rezoning.  340a-341a (23:12-24:11).  Despite the bad faith by Defendant [...] and Defendant [...], Plaintiff [...] and [...] decided to pursue the affordable housing development on [...].
[brief] On the contrary, the statute could not be clearer that “[t]he applicant shall have the burden of proof. ”  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68.  In Appellant’s view, the Legislature intended that the “applicant” referred to in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 must refer to “the proponent of the nonconforming use,” even if the actual applicant objects to the nonconforming use notwithstanding that this interpretation cuts directly against the statutory text.
[brief] (Not raised below)  Summary judgment is an “extreme and drastic remedy and great care should be exercised in utilizing the procedure. ”  Cooper v. Finke, 376 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Mo. 1964).  Summary judgment “borders on denial of due process in that it denies the opposing party his day in court. ”  Olson v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 700 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Mo. App. 1985).  In a motion for summary judgment, all inferences of doubt are drawn against the moving party.  Judson v. Peoples Bank Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 74-75 (1954).  “A litigant has the right to trial where there is the slightest doubt as to facts.  ...  If there is such a doubt it cannot be said the movant’s case is unequivocally established....”  Ruvolo v. American Cas. Co., 39 N.J. 490, 499 (1963).
[brief] THE TWELVE-MONTH LIMIT ONLY APPLIES TO APPLICATIONS MADE UNDER RULE 4:50-1(a)  THROUGH (c)  Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s appeal is time barred under the twelve-month limit imposed by R. 4:50-2, but that time limit only pertains to sections (a), (b) and (c) of R. 4:50-1.  The instant appeal concerns an application to vacate filed under R. 4:50-1(d) and (f).  Pursuant to R. 4:50-2, the application need only be made “within a reasonable time. ”  Given the immediate (though unsuccessful) action taken by Defendant upon learning of the judgment in August of 2023, and the various issues he had in securing the assistance of counsel thereafter, the Appellate Division should consider this application timely under R. 4:50-2.  POINT FIVE (Da1)
[brief] There were multiple extended periods of time when Petitioner was not living in the Decedent’s Home.  In February 1997, when the Respondent was sixteen years old, a disturbing incident took place one night when the Decedent was away on a business trip.  Left alone with the Petitioner, the Respondent woke up undressed in the morning, to her great distress.  When she awoke, the Petitioner was nowhere in the house.  That morning, the Respondent informed the Decedent what had happened.  As a result, the Petitioner left the house and moved away, and did not return to live with the Decedent until the Respondent had entered college and was living in Philadelphia.  (11T70-23 to 73-11).  The Decedent told [...] about this incident, who noted that the Petitioner left the house for about a year.  She testified that the Petitioner “left the house, left the marriage. ” (11T17-23 to 18-20).  There were also other periods when Petitioner and Decedent did not live together between 2005 and 2007.