ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In fact, the definition from Black’s Law Dictionary quoted by Defendant (Pb22) shows there are two purposes: A first being “certifying for another’s benefit that certain facts are correct, such as that the lease exists, \textit{that there are no defaults}”; and as a second purpose being it “estops that party from later claiming a different state of facts”.  Indeed, this two-nature concept of an estoppel is expressed by other authorities:  The purpose of an estoppel statement is twofold: (1) to give a prospective purchaser or lender information about the lease and the leased premises and (2) to give assurance to the purchaser or lender that the lessee at a later date will not make claims that are inconsistent with the statements contained in the estoppel.’  [...] & [...], Real Estate Leasing Practice Manual, § 35:1 (West Online 2005)  Pointedly, the first purpose, which is giving information to a purchaser, has also been acknowledged by this Court albeit in an unpublished decision.  In Dunkins v. 447 South 13th Street Holdings, LLC, No. A-0058-21 p.4 n.3 (App. Div. June 8, 2022) this Court stated “[a]n estoppel certificate is a statement certifying the current status and terms of the lease agreement between the tenant and the landlord for a prospective purchaser of property.
[brief] In appeals from final agency action outside of such settings, there similarly must be a sufficiently developed record to permit a reviewing court to engage in meaningful review.  See In re Issuance of Permit by DEP, 120 N.J. 164, 173 (1990) (relying on State v. Atley, 157 N.J. Super. 157, 163 (App. Div. 1978)) (noting necessity of agency fact-finding to facilitate appellate review).  When the challenged agency action ¹ Both issues were raised in a request for reconsideration filed with the Board, however, the Board did not address the issues because it did not meet prior to the filing of the within appeal.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 1:7-1, et seq.  In addition, a remand is appropriate to consider issues with the violation to religious freedom based upon the limited religious exemption included in the statute.  (Pa25.)  The language in the statute for religious exemption has been struck by the United States Supreme Court.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).  As a result, there is another substantive challenge that must be reviewed by the trial court in the event the law is not voided.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] ## CASES  American Budget Corp. v. Furman, 67 N.J. Super. 134 (Ch. Div. 1961) .................................................................  32  American Budget Corp. v. Furman, 67 N.J. Super. 134 (Ch. Div.), aff’d, 36 N.J. 129 (1961) ......................................................  5, 44 Appell v. Reiner, 43 N.J. 413 (1964) .......................................................................................  32 Bell v. Stafford Twp., 110 N.J. 384 (1988) .....................................................................................  21 Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) ....................................................................................  20 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Va., 377 U.S. 1 (1964)  .........................................................................................  47 Cardillo v. Bloomfield 206 Corp., 411 N.J. Super. 574 (App. Div. 2010)
[directive] OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION l . .........................................................................9  Changes Systemwide for Preparing 1.1 ...........................................................................9  Reform for Need Compelling  The 1.2 l ................1  Resources  Practices and Enforcement Law on Reform of Impacts The 1.3 ...........................................11 .  Rights Victims' and Safety Public on Emphasis  The 1.4 ..........................................................12  Directive This by Taken Approach General 1.5 ..................................................................................................13  Directive of Scope 1.6 4 l .................................. ...........................  Directive Issuing Order General Attorney  1.7  THE INITIATE TO REQUIRED FINGERPRINTING SCAN LIVE 2.
[brief] This occurred over opposition by [...] claiming various irregularities, including what precisely was the property being or to be sold.  To the extent that a Special Master appointed to sell property that is the subject of a Foreclosure Action might have ministerial or routine aspects, the particulars of the Foreclosure Action and the sale reflects that there were issues.  The Leasehold Mortgage and Security Agreement purported to grant a security interest in both real estate in the form of a “leasehold interest” (and containing a definition of “Ground Lease”), and also an “independent and separate” security interest in “personal property. ”  [...] claimed that the “Foreclosure Documents included in the mortgage language that the mortgage covered buildings and anything to be constructed on the property. ”  Ca20.
[brief] B.  When a transaction is illegal, the parties to the transaction are barred from bringing claims against each other and the only remedy available against a third-party is recovery of funds still in the possession of the third-party.  (44a-48a)  The common law rule is that no court will lend its assistance in any way toward carrying out or enforcing the terms of a contract or transaction that is illegal or whose purpose is to violate the law.  Where, for example, a contract violates a statute, rule of law, or public policy, a court's preference for enforcing bargains gives way and the court will refrain from entertaining an action to enforce the contract.  17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts §290.  Ordinarily, if a contract is void for illegality, it is void as to all parties, and no party thereto can have any rights thereunder.  However, a third party who holds the fruits of an illegal transaction cannot invoke the rule of illegality or defend an action to recover such fruits on the ground thereof.  17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts §295.  The defense of illegality, although open to the parties and those claiming under them, cannot as a general rule be invoked by third persons.  Therefore, one in possession of the fruits of an illegal transaction to which he or she was not a party cannot invoke the rule.
[brief] NEW JERSEY COURT RULE 4:58-2(C)  MANDATES THAT THE ADDITIONAL AWARD OF PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST, ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS BE VACATED.  (Not Raised Below)  New Jersey Court Rule 4.58-2(C) provides:  No allowances shall be granted pursuant to paragraphs (a) or (b) if they would impose undue hardship or otherwise result in unfairness to the offeree.  If undue hardship can be eliminated by reducing the allowance to a lower sum, the court shall reduce the amount of the allowance accordingly.  The burden is on the offeree to establish the offeree’s claim of undue hardship or lack of fairness.  Rule 4.58-2(C).  Respondent in this matter claimed injuries as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident.  Defendant/Appellant provided a medical defense.  The medical defense was undermined by the late addition of the aggravation charge and the ability of the Respondent’s counsel to argue aggravation.  Defendant/Appellant had a policy of automobile liability insurance with a $100,000 limit.  The initial judgment was two and a half times the Appellant’s available policy limits.  Thus, any enhanced interest, costs and attorney’s fees as entered pursuant to the supplemental order and judgment would constitute an undue hardship on Appellant [...].
[brief] All accessory buildings and structures shall be subject to the standards set forth at § 230-271.A.  Architectural design and materials used in the construction of accessory buildings and structures shall conform to those used in the construction of principal buildings.  G.  Retaining Walls:  Retaining walls shall not exceed 10 feet in height with a minimal horizontal average spacing of 6 feet between walls to allow for plantings and a minimal vertical average spacing of 10 feet between walls.  H.  Steep Slopes:  Steep slope disturbance in the Senior Housing – 1 District shall comply with the requirements of §230-143.1, Regulation of Slopes.
[brief] Additionally, [...]’s investigation included a demonstration [...] conducted at the [...] store, wherein he performed a “a recreation of the plaintiff’s walking path that led to her fall. ” (5T116:3-5).  As [...] explained, the recreation was necessary because the CC-TV video capturing the plaintiff’s incident did not show “where her foot placement was or where the rollator was in relation to…her when she fell…” (5T115:22-25).  Mr.  DeMarco took a shopping cart and stacked planting pots inside the cart to simulate the top of the plaintiff’s head.  He then moved the cart around aisle 58 while comparing a live feed surveillance video of aisle 58 with still photographs taken from the CC-TV video of plaintiff’s incident.  (T617:9-18:12).  In this way, he was able to pinpoint the plaintiff’s location in aisle 58 when she fell.  (6T18:24-19:6) and concluded that at the time of her fall in aisle 58, the plaintiff was past the location of the column, and the wheel of her rollator did not come in contact with the base of that column.  (6T20:3-13).  Plaintiff criticizes [...]’s reconstruction of the incident on the basis that (1) the defendant never established that the methodology used by [...] in his recreation of the plaintiff with a stack of pots was sound or matched the actual data of the plaintiff and her fall (Pb39) and (2) [...] never authenticated the live feed surveillance footage and photographs (Pb38).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN ITS DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS CROSS MOTION FOR SANCTIONS.  THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (AS WELL AS THE APPEAL) WERE NOT FILED IN BAD FAITH DESPITE THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION NOT TO GRANT THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DUE TO JURISDICTION AND THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OF NJ RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.  In New Jersey, an action is considered frivolous if it meets one of two criteria.  First, the action must have been commenced, used, or continued in bad faith, solely for the purpose of harassment, delay, or malicious injury.  Second, the non-prevailing party must have known, or should have known, that the action was without any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.  Shore Orthopaedic Group, LLC v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 397 N.J. Super. 614, Savona v. Di Giorgio Corp., 360 N.J. Super.  55, In re Farnkopf, 363 N.J. Super. 382.  N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-59.1 outlines these criteria and provides that reasonable litigation costs and counsel fees may be awarded to the prevailing party if the judge finds that the action was frivolous.  Shore Orthopaedic Group, LLC v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 397 N.J. Super. 614, Savona v. Di Giorgio Corp., 360 N.J. Super. 55, In re Farnkopf, 363 N.J. Super. 382.  However sanctions for frivolous litigation are intended to be awarded only in exceptional cases.  Wolosky v. Fredon Tp., 472 N.J. Super. 315, Belfer v. Merling, 322 N.J. Super. 124, Venner v. Allstate, 306 N.J. Super. 106.  Further a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) in New Jersey must be established by clear and convincing evidence.  In the matter at hand, it is clear that [...]’s case has merit and there is no evidence to support that the argument is baseless or made in bad faith.  First, the Court to date has not yet addressed whether or not to apply Tyler to [...]’s case which is the whole subject of this appeal.
[brief] (Pa94)  The Council "shall consist of eleven members, each of whom shall be chosen with due regard to his knowledge and interest in conservation in fish and ² Plaintiffs have included in a Supplemental Appendix to this Appellate Brief, two unreported opinions cited in their brief:  (1)  New Jersey Outdoor Alliance v. NJ[...], No. 0525-18T4, 2018 WL 6005064 (App. Div., Nov. 16, 2018), certif. den., 237 N.J. 191 (2019) (Pa145); and (2) In the Matter of Petition to Repeal Rules Permitting Black Bear Hunting, etc., No. A-0984-20, 2022 WL 2251251 (App. Div., June 22, 2022), certif. den. 253 N.J. 434 (2023) (Pa164).  See R. 1:36-3. game”. N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24.  Three (3) of the members of the Council shall be farmers, recommended to the Governor for appointment to the Council by the Agricultural Convention held pursuant to statute; six (6) of such members shall be sportsmen, recommended to the Governor by the NJSFSC; one (1) of such members shall be the chairman of the committee established pursuant to the Endangered and Nongame Species Conservation Act (N.J.S.A. 23:2A-1, et seq.); and one (1) such member shall be a person knowledgeable in land use management and soil conservation.  (Pa94)  The defendant, [...] (“[...]”), is a principal executive department in the Executive Branch of government.
[brief] The trial court did not enter a judgment for fraud because it did not find that the Plaintiffs’ met their clear and convincing burden.  However, the Court did find that the Plaintiffs established some (though not all) of the alleged misappropriations by a preponderance of the evidence sufficient to establish liability for conversion, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of the covenant of good faith.  As the trial court noted, conversion, in particular, does not require a showing of intent.  (36T 47:18 to 48:3; 48:20 to 50:9).  In the end, none of this constitutes reversible error.  The defense objections to [...]’s testimony went to weight, not admissibility, and the trial court, in view of all of the evidence presented accepted Plaintiffs’ theories of diversion and misappropriation of funds.  The trial court’s judgment must, therefore, be affirmed.  B.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 4 | | I.  THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS  REQUIRE REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER.  (6)  | 4 | | II.  DEFENDANTS’ POLICY DEFINITIONS AND TERMS EXCLUDE ANY REQUIREMENT BY PLAINTIFFS TO REPORT THE OAE PROCEEDINGS IN THE POLICY APPLICATIONS.  (6, 18, 20 23)  | 5 | | III.  DETERMINATIONS OF MATERIALITY SHOULD BE MADE BY A JURY, NOT THE TRIAL COURT (5-8)  | 13 | | IV.  THE RESCISSION VIOLATED THE CFA (31).  | 15 | | CONCLUSION | 15 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] Thus, as summarized in her report, [...]’s medical history showed that, after moving into his condominium in 1991, [...] “developed progressively severe and multiple symptoms that progressed into the loss of job, home, and health.  One of the worst ongoing problems that developed was his decreasing memory function that resulted in his being unable to work, or function in [a] manner compatible with his previous level of intellectual or physical function. ”  Da498.  Because [...]’s medical records showed elevated monocyte counts, which “are associated with chronic infections especially fungal” (Da499), [...] concluded, that “[...] has severe documented post-exposure medical issues that have resulted in severe and persistent disability.
[brief] C.  Despite the Frivolity of this Argument, if the Court Decides to Consider Plaintiff’s New Argument – Which it Should Not – the Argument Utterly Lacks Any Merit and the Trial Court Properly Analyzed the Agreement, Finding that [...] Owed No Contractual Obligations to Plaintiff (44a-48a).  Of course, the court in its discretion may consider Plaintiff’s new argument on the merits.  For that reason, and although [...] urges the court to decline such consideration, Plaintiff’s newly raised issue does not withstand the slightest scrutiny, lacks any and all merit, and should be rejected in its entirety.  To be sure, Plaintiff glaringly misinterprets the Trial Court’s opinion and the case law cited in its brief.
[directive] The court will always be available to provide additional instructions, and you may request them at any time through your foreperson or your clerk.  I recognize that this experience is new for most of you and that it may be difficult to fully absorb the details of this charge and your oath at this time.  However, we will provide you with a copy of this charge and your oath.  The primary function of the Grand Jury is to determine what criminal charges may be brought as a result of cases heard by you, and to determine which matters should not be continued in the criminal justice system because there is insufficient evidence for the charges.
[brief] (Pa393-399).  [...] was to “apply Benjamin Moore exterior acrylic finish paint” to the façade and “[a]pply two coat exterior acrylic walking finish paint” to the steps.  (Pa.393).  [...]’s employees instead bought and applied a “Latex Floor and Patio High Gloss Enamel” for the steps.  (Pa395-398).  [...] in his comings and goings from the building noticed that the steps had been painted, and he testified that after [...]’s paint job the old concrete exterior steps had become “sleeker” but stated he had no difficulty walking on the newly painted steps if “they were dry. ” (Pa330).  [...] made such observations from personal knowledge.  Whether a new paint job on one’s building’s steps made them “sleeker,” is a lay opinion well within the common understanding of jurors.
[brief] “underinsured motor vehicle” as a vehicle that has liability coverage less than the UM coverage under “the applicable limits of liability for UM Coverage under this [[...]] policy. ” (Pa59).  The [...] policy contains $500,000 in UM/UIM coverage.  If the tortfeasor has $500,000 in liability coverage, or $600,000 in liability coverage, or $700,000 in liability coverage, or $800,000 in liability coverage, it would not be considered underinsured per the [...] policy definitions.  If plaintiffs’ significant damages were caused by a third-party tortfeasor who was covered, for example, by $750,000 in liability insurance, it cannot seriously be argued that [...] would not be obligated to provide an additional $250,000 in coverage under the $1,000,000 UIM policy it sold to plaintiffs.  Why else would plaintiffs have purchased a $1,000,000 excess UIM policy?  Yet using the “follow form” argument that [...] now relies upon to apply the definitional section in [...]’s policy, and applying those definitions to [...]’s UIM coverage, a tortfeasor with $750,000 in liability coverage would not be considered “underinsured” (since it is not underinsured vis-à-vis the [...] $500,000 policy) despite having a liability policy that was significantly less than [...]’s $1,000,000 UIM limits.  The above highlights the ambiguity in [...]’s attempt to invoke definitions related to underinsured vehicles from a [...] policy that is not in- play as it relates to plaintiffs’ UIM claim in this matter.  The language of the [...] policy itself may be permissible.
[brief] I am an attorney-at-law in New Jersey and a Partner in the law firm of [...], counsel for Defendants-Appellants [...], the [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...] (collectively, the “[...]”).  2.  I certify that on the below date, I caused copies of the [...]’ Reply Appellate Brief to be served upon the following counsel by NJ eCourts and Email: [...], Esq. [...]  [...]  Tel: [...]  E-mail: [...]  [...], Esq. Lebensfeld  Sharon & Schwartz P.C. [...]  Tel: [...]  Email: [...]  I hereby certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true.
[brief] Moreover, the Trial Court erred in not finding that [...] had constructive notice of the hazard leading to accident, or in not specifically ruling on the issue of “constructive notice. ”  As seen above, since Weinberg, supra, a public utility enjoys no immunity from liability and is subject to liability in the same way any commercial entity is.  In this case, [...], upon creating the hazard by selling useless luminaires, had plenty of time to find out how the streetlight it sold [...] was working in the intersection.  Its own engineer admitted at deposition that [...] technicians performed services all the time, all over [...].  [...] also had the opportunity to see that the intersection was designated a dangerous intersection.  As expressed by plaintiff’s experts, [...] was required to be more proactive in seeking to determine if the luminaires they sold to [...] were adequate to provide coverage at the intersection.  Lastly, the Trial Court erred in that no actual, or even constructive, notice of the hazard existing in the intersection at the time of the accident was required to be given where [...] created, or contributed to, the existence of the hazard.
[brief] The Supreme Court has construed the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to impose the same procedural due process limitations on the states as the Fifth Amendment does on the Federal Government.  Fifth Amendment due process case law is therefore relevant to the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In considering [...] v. [...], 757 F. Supp. 2d 535 (W.D. Pa. 2010) No. [...], a case similar in nature to this case before the court, the Third Circuit Court embraced its well-founded established PRECEDENT that consistently demonstrates; If validity of service is challenged, the party claiming valid service (in this instance case it is Plaintiff [...] to whom mirrors Plaintiff [...] in this case before this court) bears the burden of proof.
[brief] A  If there were surgical issues, correct.  Q  You testified against emergency room doctors, correct?  A Yes.  Q  You’ve testified against orthopedic surgeons.  A Yes.  Q  You’ve testified against neurologists.  A Yes.  Q  You’ve testified against anesthesiologists.  A Yes.  Q  Gastroenterologists.  A Yes.  Q  Internists.  A Yes.  Q  And even a neurosurgeon.  A Yes.  Q  You testified against podiatrists.  A Yes.  Q  You’ve testified against pediatricians.  A Yes.  Q  Obstetricians.
[brief] [...] paid its policy limits to the injured guest and [...] paid the amount of the judgment in excess of the policy limits.  *Id.* at 482.  [...] subsequently commenced an action against [...] alleging bad faith for the insurance company’s failure to attempt in good faith to settle the underlying action.  *[...] Farms*, 65 N.J. at 482.  The trial court entered judgment for [...] in the amount of the excess judgment that [...] paid in the underlying action, plus attorneys’ fees, but denied [...]’s request for an award of interest.  *Id.* at 483.  On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment as it related to interest and held that [...] was entitled to interest calculated from the date it paid the excess judgment, because that was when “the insured was deprived of these monies, whereas the carrier, having refused to pay the excess itself, thereby had the use of the sum. ”
[directive] Do you understand that if you fail to notify the appropriate law enforcement agency about your routine access to or use of a computer or device with Internet capability or a change in such use or access, you may be charged (if the offense was with a third degree crime and may receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 5 years committed on or after July 1, 2014) or you may be charged with a fourth degree crime and may receive a (if the offense was committed on or after February 25, 2008 sentence of imprisonment of up to 18 months but before July 1, 2014)?  2.
[brief] Further, the zoning provision as to one walkway per Historic Flare lot was underscored by Board Planner [...] during the ZBA Hearing.  As [...] testified, “restoring it (walkway) is one this, adding is something else.  So, you know, leaving aside the restoration of the two sidewalks…my problem is that connection.  Number one, it’s in the flare.  We don’t allow it.  Number two, we have zoning separate and apart from the HPC that doesn’t allow it.  So that’s a violation of our zoning ordinance separate and apart from what your settlement is.