ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The assistant prosecutor's comment that he had not had the opportunity to tell defense counsel any earlier because he knew that the judge wanted to get started promptly that morning is unacceptable, as is his failure to notify defense counsel the previous day when he learned of the new information.  The Rule itself specifies the remedy for a discovery violation and gives the court the discretion to either “grant a continuance or delay during a trial, or prohibit the party from introducing in evidence, the material not disclosed, or it may enter such further order as it deems appropriate. ”  *R.*  3:13-3(g).  Here, the only remedial measures offered to defendant consisted of the judge telling defense counsel he would afford her greater latitude in cross-examination, and that he would tell the jury in his final jury charge that they should not hold it against defendant or his attorney that defense counsel incorrectly stated in her opening that [...] would not be able to make an in-court identification of defendant.  *10  In analyzing those remedial measures, we first review the judge's statement that he would afford defendant “greater latitude” in cross-examination.  The State has not identified any latitude that defendant would not otherwise have had.  As to the judge's curative instruction to the jury in his final charge, we find that instruction to be woefully inadequate to address the egregious violation of the discovery rules that confronted this defendant and his attorney.  While we recognize that “[t]he disposition of a mistrial motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge” and “is an extraordinary remedy [that] should be resorted to only to prevent an obvious failure of justice,” *State v. Hubbard*, 123 N.J.Super. 345, 351 (App.Div.), *certif. denied*, 63 N.J. 325 (1973), we conclude that in the particular circumstances presented here, the failure to grant a mistrial was indeed an abuse of the judge's discretion.
[brief] ...........................................................................  24  A.  [...]’s Conclusions About the Incident Are Supported by the Record and Should be Upheld.  ...........................................  27  B.  [...]’s Conclusions About Violations of the Medication Policy Are Supported by the Record and Should be Upheld  .................................................................  28  C.  [...]’s Conclusion About Opioid Abuse is Supported by the Record and Should be Upheld.  .......................  29  D.  [...]’s Conclusion About the Vehicle Incidents is Supported by the Record and Should be Upheld.  ......................  31  E.  [...]’s Conclusion About Sick Leave Policy Violations is Supported by the Record and Should be Upheld.  ..  32  F.  [...]’s Conclusion that Appellant Made False Statements or Representations is Supported by the Record and Should be Upheld.  ..................................................  33  POINT II: THE DISCIPLINARY CHARGES AGAINST APPELLANT WERE SUPPORTED BY CREDIBLE RECORD EVIDENCE ...........
[brief] (16T 108-2 to 5)  The prosecutor argued that there had in fact been two guns in the car, one of which was visible in the video.  (16T 108-5 to 8)  But the fact that there was at least one gun in the car does not require a conclusion that [...] had conspired with [...] to commit an attempted murder.  It is reasonably likely that [...] knew that traveling armed was a matter of routine for [...], and not necessarily an indication of an immediate plan to use a weapon.  But even if [...] had known both that [...] was armed and that he had a plan to use the gun against [...] and [...], that would not have amounted to proof beyond a reasonable doubt of his participation in a conspiracy.
[brief] The remedy of removing a board’s authority and appointing a master in its place should be rarely used.  As cautioned by the Court in *Morris County Fair Housing Council v. Boonton Tp.*, 220 N.J. Super. 388, 408-409 (Law. Div. 1987), aff’d, as modified, 230 N.J. Super. 345 (App. Div. 1989)(emphasis added):  The court probably has the power to grant such relief.  *Mount Laurel II*, 92 N.J. at 285–290, 456 A.2d 390.  However, the Legislature has conferred responsibility upon the board to pass upon site plan applications.  This responsibility should be preserved, if at all possible.  *Morris County*, 220 N.J. Super. at 408.  Further, this remedy has been limited to situations where a governing body’s or board’s actions are a result of a record of obstruction and hostility to an affordable housing developer and/or the Court.  As noted by the Court in *Cranford Development Associates, LLC v. Township of Cranford*, 445 N.J. Super. 220, 232-233 (App. Div. 2016)(emphasis added):  The court’s authority to appoint Special Masters in Mount Laurel cases is well established.  See *Mount Laurel II*, supra, 92 N.J. at 282–85, 456 A.2d 390.  Given the Township’s record of obstructing affordable housing projects, and the Planning Board’s past hostility to a much more limited affordable housing plan, the court’s decision to appoint the hearing examiner was justified in this case.  Similarly, in *In the Matter of the Application of Township of South Brunswick*, 448 N.J. Super. 441, 466 (Law Div. 2016), the Court only removed the Township’s authority over its affordable housing compliance after finding “systematic abuses” of the declaratory judgment process”.  (Emphasis added).  The Trial Court’s own findings demonstrate that no such abuse, let alone systematic abuse exists in this case, and the imposition of the SHO is improper under both the facts of this matter and the clear, unambiguous and binding law.
[brief] Ja148.  The inset measurements are visible, and a full-size or electronic version could have been obtained from [...], who Defendants hired before closing.  Moreover, the full-size Subdivision Plan is recorded with the [...] as [...], and even on a certified copy, it is clear the measurements in the tax map do not match [...]’s.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-47(d); Ja320; Ja693.  •  The Brigantine Tax Maps, which are referenced in all the deeds described herein, from 1986 until 2018, reflect the same 185’ measurements (and the Lot 3 and Lot 2 measurements of 105’ and 80’ respectively) along 21st Street.  Ja303, Ja306.  •  The Brigantine Tax Maps were not updated to reflect the erroneous Lot 2 and Lot 3 frontages until at least January 1, 2018.  Ja311-12.  Thus, as of the date of Defendants’ Deed, the Brigantine Tax Maps would have reflected the accurate historical frontages from Lots 2 (80’) and Lot 3 (105’) with a combined total of 185’ of frontage along 21st Street South.  In sum, Defendants did less than the bare minimum required of a prospective purchaser of property.
[brief] Q:  Your proposed eight-story, 98 residential unit development, can you identify the number of variances that would be required for that development if the R-2 zoning classification was applied to the subject Property?  A:  It would be a D variance, for starters.  Pretty much, every aspect of the building would be a variance.  It does not conform to the R-2.  Pa180 at 12:8:15 [emphasis added].  Instead of addressing the likelihood that a developer would obtain the variances necessary to construct Respondent’s proposed Highest and Best Use, [...] relies upon a customized redevelopment plan for every proposed project; achieved either through amending the zoning ordinance or amending the redevelopment plan to accommodate a redeveloper’s proposed project.
[brief] This appeal centers on the February 28, 2023 Order issued by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Ocean County, in relation to Appellant, [...]’s Motion to Mold, or in the alternative, Motion for New Trial, or in the alternative, Motion for Remittitur in this matter.  On February 28, 2023, the court at the trial level denied the Appellant’s Motion in full.  Appellant’s position is that all three requests for relief were meritorious and denied in error:  •  The February 28, 2023 Order from the Superior Court of New Jersey failed to apply the U.S. District Court Order of August 18, 2021 which limited Plaintiff’s recovery against Appellant to $200,000, the available liability insurance coverage limits.  •  The February 28, 2023 Order from the Superior Court of New Jersey failed to apply existing legal standards concerning the excessiveness of the verdict, warranting either a new trial or remittitur.  •  The February 28, 2023 Order from the Superior Court of New Jersey failed to apply existing legal standards, warranting a new trial, concerning Plaintiff’s counsel’s improperly prejudicial summation and improper mention of Appellant having fled the scene of the accident during direct examination of the Appellee.
[brief] ...................................................................................  14  Hartnett v. Pennsylvania State Educ. Ass’n, 963 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2020)  .......................................................................  49  Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019)  ..................................................................................  47  Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323 (2006)  .....................................................................................  35  In the Matter of the Estate of Samuel P. Hekemian, 2023 WL 176098 (App. Div. Jan. 13, 2023)  ..............................................  41  Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 130 N.J. 324 (1992)  ................................................................................... passim Itzhakov v. Segal, 2019 WL 4050104 (App. Div. Aug. 28, 2019)
[brief] To be clear, there indeed may be some commonality here [between Defendants’ positions.]  However, this difference in testimony that we’ve heard thus far is not simply an inconsistency.  Keep in mind that these rules exist to protect the actual clients, the attorney and the integrity of the litigation itself as well as the greater judicial system and the legal profession.  But for the foregoing reasons I’ve already stated on the record, plaintiff’s motion to disqualify is granted.
[brief] That Deed did not in any way specifically reference the Riparian Grant, which remained vested in [...].  By Deed recorded June 18, 1920 (J-6, Pa925), [...] transferred ownership of what property interest had been conveyed to him (what was then only upland property) to "[...]"  In the foreclosure action the Borough did not name [...] as a Defendant; therefore, the Borough could only foreclose that which was actually owned by [...] and that did not include the Riparian Grant.  The Borough in its Appellate Brief spends a great deal of time emphasizing what happened after the foreclosure action but pays little attention to the uncontroverted evidence:  •  Prior to 1900, title to the upland portion of Lot 3 was owned by [...].  In 1879, Quinlan acquired fee simple title by Riparian Grant to what is now identified as line-item Lot: 3.01 from the State of New Jersey.  •  In 1909 [...], Jr. conveyed all the lands as shown on a certain Map entitled “Map of Keansburg Heights” filed in the Monmouth County Clerk’s Office to the [...].  That conveyance specifically included all riparian rights owned by Quinlan including the Riparian Grant.  The Riparian Grant was specifically described as the land lying beneath the water.
[brief] Section B, entitled "Counties," contains the statutes concerning eligibility for the office of sheriff (codified at N.J.S.A. 40A:9-94); the sheriff's oath (N.J.S.A. 40A:9-96); the effect of the failure of the sheriff-elect to qualify (N.J.S.A. 40A:9-101); vacancy in the office of sheriff (N.J.S.A. 40A:9-102); bond and oath of appointee to fill vacancy in the office of sheriff (N.J.S.A. 40A:9-103); salary of sheriff in certain counties (N.J.S.A. 40A:9-104); expenses payable to sheriffs (N.J.S.A. 40A:9-105); uncollected fees credited to account of former sheriff (N.J.S.A. 40A:9-106); sheriff to deliver to his successor certain moneys and papers (N.J.S.A. 40A:9-107); prohibition on sheriff holding other civil office (N.J.S.A. 40A:9-108); amercement of sheriff or acting sheriff (N.J.S.A. 40A:9-109); court-designation of enforcement officer when amercement occurs (N.J.S.A. 40A:9-110); and bonds taken by the sheriff (N.J.S.A. 40A:9-111).  The legislature's system of referring to the office of sheriff lends support to the conclusion that the sheriff can indeed be — and is here — a part of the county government, a conclusion that is shared by the Attorney-General.
[brief] 1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  RELEVANT TO DEFENDANT  [...] .........................................................  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS  RELEVANT TO DEFENDANT  [...] .........................................................  5 LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................  8 POINT I STANDARDS OF REVIEW ...............................................................................................  8  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT  CORRECTLY DISMISSED  PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AGAINST [...] AND CORRECTLY DENIED PLAINTIFF’S CROSS-MOTION TO EXTEND DISCOVERY  (Argued below.  Ruling below at 1T¹; 125Pa-130Pa.) .................. 10 ¹ “1T” refers to the transcript of the January 20, 2023, oral arguments on several defendants’ motions and cross-motions to dismiss, and plaintiff’s cross-motion to reopen and extend discovery, before the Hon. [...], J.S.C. A.  Plaintiff’s Claims Against Dr. Janosky Were Appropriately Dismissed .................................................................10  B.  Plaintiff’s Request to Extend Discovery Was Appropriately Denied ........................................................................11  C.  Plaintiff’s Arguments on Appeal are Unavailing ..................................................14  D.  Plaintiff’s Substantial Compliance Argument is Unavailing ......................17  POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDERS FILED JANUARY 20, 2023 (Argued below.  Ruling below at 144Pa.) .............19  POINT IV  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO VACATE THE ORDER FILED MARCH 17, 2023 (Argued below.  Ruling below at 162Pa.)  .........................................................21  CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................................................22  APPENDIX
[brief] The State has regulated extensively with respect to noise, both through specific noise restrictions under the Noise Control \(^4\)  It should be noted that Defendants argue that the 50-foot distance from the property line could hypothetically result in a larger measurement distance than the 100-foot standard utilized in Clarksburg Inn, providing an example of a home set back 100 feet on its property.  Db42.  A quick glance at Google Maps, however, reveals few (if any) properties in [...] that are set back to any such extent, and instead the trial court recognized that individuals in [...] must expect to hear sounds from neighboring properties more clearly than in a town with larger lots.  Da86-87.  Act and [...] regulations, as well as noise nuisance provisions delegated to the local health boards under Title 26.  The Defendants fail to comply with either of these statutory schemes, and lack the authority to adopt the Noise Ordinance otherwise, warranting the finding that the Noise Ordinance is preempted.
[brief] Atalese v. Twp. of Long Beach, 365 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2003)  9, 12  Buddy v. Knapp, 469 N.J. Super. 168 (App. Div. 2021)  13  Camden County Energy Recovery Assocs., L.P. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 320 N.J. Super. 59 (1999), aff’d Camden County, 170 N.J. 246 (2001)  7  Costa v. Josey, 83 N.J. 49 (1980)  19, 20, 21 Coyne v. N.J. Dept. of Transport., 182 N.J. 481 (2005) 19, 20, 21 Cusseaux v. Picket, 279 N.J. Super. 335 (App. Div. 1994)  6 F.G. v. MacDonell, 150 N.J. 550 (1997)  7  Foster v. Newark Housing Authority, 389 N.J. Super. 60 (App. Div. 2006)  14-15, 17, 22 Garrison v. Twp. of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282 (1998) 12-13, 22 Gonzalez v. City of Jersey City, 247 N.J. 551 (2021) 19-20, 23 Henebema v. S. Jersey Transp. Auth., 219 N.J. 481 (2014)  19  Jenkins v. Region Nine Hous. Corp., 306 N.J. Super. 258 (App. Div. 1997)
[brief] As discussed, the underlying judgment here exposed [the policyholder] to both covered and uncovered damages; a reversal would plainly have served his interests; and the appeal raised at least reasonable — if ultimately unsuccessful — grounds for challenging the judgment.  *Pharmacists*, 187 Vt. at 334, 993 A.2d at 421.  [...] in this case made no argument, and the Challenged Decision makes no finding, that when [...] abruptly withdrew its defense of the HCH Action on March 5, 2021, there did not then exist at least “reasonable grounds to believe that the insured’s interests *might be served* by an appeal.
[directive] 20.  Are you giving up your right at sentence to argue that there are charges you pleaded [Yes/wi] [No/Non] [NA/paaplikab] guilty to for which you cannot be given a separate sentence?  Eske w renonse a dwa w le yap pwononse santans ou pou konteste ke gen akizasyon kote w te plede koupab ki entedi yo enpoze santans separe?  21.
[brief] Ibid.  Not surprisingly, given the lack of attention to site safety requirements, [...] was cited with violations of [...] after an investigation of [...]’s death.  Pa1677-78.  Specifically, after investigation, [...] found the following violations were presented on the project site on July 11, 2014, the date that [...] was run over:  The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to struck-by and crushing hazards:
[brief] On March 27, 2023, Defendant filed their Brief Regarding NJ Rule 4:50:1.  On March 28, 2023, the trial of this matter was held before the Honorable [...] with both parties and their counsel present.  (2T).  On May 3, 2023, a zoom conference was held before the Honorable [...] at which time an Order was entered granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Litigant’s Rights, and ordering Defendant to pay Plaintiff the amount of $91,250.00 within thirty days of the May 3, 2023 Order.  (Da 1)  (3T)  On June 5, 2023, Defendant filed a Notice of Order to Show Cause requesting that an Order be entered staying the distribution from Plaintiff’s counsel of the $91,250.00 Judgment awarded to Plaintiff under the Order of May 3, 2023 pending the outcome of Defendant’s Appeal and ordering Plaintiff’s attorney to immediately place said funds into an interest bearing escrow account.  (Da 261).  On June 5, 2023 Defendant filed his Certification in support of his Notice to Show Cause.  (Da 264).  --- 2  1T refers to Transcript of Testimony of [...], dated November 9, 2022; 2T refers to Transcript of Hearing, dated March 28, 2023; 3T refers to Transcript of the Decision, dated May 3, 2023.  On June 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed a letter brief in response to Defendant’s Motion for Stay, and a Hearing was held before the Honorable [...] at which time an Order was entered denying Defendant’s Motion for Stay.  On June 9, 2023, Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal to this Court.  (Da 3)  On June 12, 2023, Defendant filed his Civil Case Information Sheet.  (Da 7)  On July 7, 2023, an Order was entered by the Honorable [...] confirming the May 3, 2023 Order as the Final Decision of the Court.  (Da 2).  On August 9, 2023, Plaintiff filed her Civil Case Information Statement.  (Da 11).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Accordingly, any determination that any charge was improperly sustained must also result in either a reduction or reevaluation as to penalty.  Further, the Penalty section of the Decision places emphasis on the discredited narrative that Appellant either abused or permitted abuse of opioids.  As a primary example, the Decision justifies Appellant’s termination in stating that: “…a police officer with an opioid addiction covering up an overdose in his home, was a matter of concern that went beyond the police department.
[brief] ’”  Ibid, quoting Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 524.  However, “the ethics rules must be applied with caution, as ‘local governments would be seriously handicapped if every possible interest, no matter how remote and speculative, would serve as a disqualification of an official. ’”  Ibid., quoting Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 523.  Thus, “the question will always be whether the circumstances could reasonably be interpreted to show that they had the likely capacity to tempt the official to depart from his sworn public duty. ”  Van Itallie v. Borough of Franklin Lakes, 28 N.J. 258, 268 (1958).  Such principles govern the instant case.  In addition, [...] has a role to play.
[brief] 23  A.  Plaintiffs’ opposition fails to cure the deficiency in their proofs and the trial court’s findings to show that the converted funds “belonged” to them..............................................  24  B.  Defendants did not waive the argument that plaintiffs were required to make a pre-suit demand.........................................................  26  C.  The economic loss doctrine is relevant to plaintiffs’ claims.........................................................  26  POINT  IV  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT TO PRESENT OPINION TESTIMONY THAT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY FACTS AND, FURTHER, IN RELYING UPON THAT NET OPINION TO FIND PLAINTIFFS HAD PROVEN THEIR CLAIMS (1T51:21-56:22; 24T34:23-37:23)........
[brief] See, *Davidson* at 188.  [...]’s testimony and Plaintiff/Respondent’s argument were not of aggravation of a pre-existing disability or a comparative analysis.  Rather, the testimony and argument were used to attempt to persuade the jury that despite objective findings to the contrary, [...] did not have a pre-disability.  New Jersey Courts have followed the long-standing principle as set forth in *Polk v. Daconceicao*, 268 N.J. Super. 568, 575 (App. Div. 1993), that “a diagnosis of aggravation of a pre-existing injury or condition must be based upon . . . an evaluation of the medical records of the patient prior to the trauma with the objective medical evidence existence post-trauma.
[brief] •  **Princeton University Press v. Borough of Princeton**, 35 N.J. 209 (1961) addressed the burden of proof for establishing a tax exemption under N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6, not the LTTEL.  •  **Town of Secaucus v. Jersey City**, 20 N.J. Tax 384 (Tax 2002) addressed whether the Fox-Lance Law and the LTTEL allowed the transfer of a project to another urban renewal corporation, with the consent of the municipality.  Again, none of these cases remotely suggests that a LTTEL exemption requires findings supported by substantial evidence, or that the municipality’s determination was arbitrary.
[brief] (10T:28-2 to 8; see 10T:26-22 to 88-25).  During the trial at bar, the redacted interrogation video was played and lasted for approximately twenty-one minutes.  (2T:66-5 to 17).  Defendant acknowledges trial counsels’ extensive redactions as “significant,” and rightfully so, given that they halved the video’s duration.  (Db12).  Despite this significant reduction, and the State’s ready acquiescence to defendant’s requests for further redactions, defendant maintains that the redacted interrogation video “plainly did not comply with this Court’s remand order to redact all opinions on [defendant’s] ‘credibility and guilt.