ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Officers should then give parents or guardians a meaningful opportunity to consult with the juvenile in private about those rights.  [A.A., 240 at 358]  In M.P. the Court put heavy weight on the fact that the juvenile and his mother were not afforded the opportunity to consult in private after the Miranda warnings were given.  476 N.J. Super. at 291.  In M.P. the juvenile and his mother were given the opportunity to consult in private before the Miranda warnings were given.  Id.  The Appellate Division held that because the consultation occurred before the Miranda warnings were given, it “weighted heavily against a finding the waiver of rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
[brief] To do that would have required a finding of the “start date” of contamination, which was determined, and the “end date”, which was not.  Combined, the “start date” and the “end date” define the allocation period.  Both dates are necessary because the “property damage” is ongoing in nature, occurring over many years and implicating multiple policy periods.  Both the “end date”, and how covered costs would be allocated, was left for the allocation phase of the case.  (Pa0136-Pa0137.)  2.
[brief] In support of this request, defendant recharacterizes the above questions and answers as “at least an ambiguous invocation of his right to counsel” – specifically “the availability of counsel” – and that detectives failed to “clarify if he wanted to speak to an attorney. ”  Db13, 17.  Defendant’s self-serving, unsupported recharacterization is wholly unsupported by uncontroverted testimony of the detectives and the clear video recording of the statement.  Both do not depict detectives “barrel[ing] ahead in asking [defendant] to waive his rights without answering his questions. ”  Db21.  Both do depict detectives answering defendant’s questions to the best of their ability and ensuring defendant understood he could have counsel present.  Both do depict defendant understanding his rights and knowingly and voluntarily waiving them, just as the lower court found.  This Court can and should affirm.
[brief] Neither of these deceptive legal games are permitted under the [...], and thus the [...] must protect [...] against “12 different arbitrations. ”  [...]’s opportunity to litigate the [...] (including its obligation to do so under the [...]) should not be conflated with res judicata (i.e., whether [...]’s offsetting Hackensack claims were actually fully litigated).  [...] also struggles to avoid the reality of its own arguments requesting an offset in its own post-trial briefing to the Arbitrator, which further evidence it having a “fair and reasonable opportunity” with respect to [...] claims.
[brief] Greenberg, 310 N.J. Super. 189, 200, quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F. 3d 759, 764-65 (3d Cir. 1994).  In short, a “plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable fact-finder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence,’ and hence infer ‘that the employer did not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons’. ”  Fuentes, 32 F. 3d at 765.  Additionally, Courts have held that in determining whether a plaintiff has raised an inference of retaliation, a trial court may consider inconsistencies contained in the testimony of an employer’s witnesses regarding the employer’s explanation for its adverse employment action.
[brief] ”); *Interactive Brokers, LLC v. Barry*, 457 N.J. Super. 357, 362 (App. Div. 2018) (emphasizing a preliminary-relief order should be upheld “unless it was ‘made without a rational explication, inexplicably departed from established practices, or rested on an impermissible basis’” (quoting *Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor*, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002))).  First, the court correctly held that the State is likely to succeed on the merits.  Second, the court correctly held the remaining equitable factors—irreparable harm, balance of the equities, and public interest—all squarely support maintaining the status quo.
[brief] See, e.g., Taxpayers Assn. v. Weymouth Twp., 80 N.J. 6, 23 (1976); Jayber v. Mun. Council, 238 N.J. Super. 165 (App. Div.), certif. denied 122 N.J. 142 (1990).  [...], highlighted that the unmet demand for these types of housing units in the PMA was, at the time of his testimony, 1,000 units for independent living, 588 units for assisted living and 261 units for memory care in the PMA that is currently not being met.  [4T 12-7 to 12-13].  Moreover, the shortfall in the area grows by about 400, or 2% of the PMA’s population, each year.  [3T 136-1 to 137-2].  The cascading effects of that choice have profound impacts on society, because those that are unable to find care in the location of their choice must either go without, depend on family members or other person to provide care (which has its own problems), or move away.  The only way to ensure that these parents, friends and neighbors get to stay in their communities or close to loved ones and get the services that they need is to build more housing that is specifically designed to serve their needs.  That was the public interest at stake.
[brief] Moreover, the CRB application process alone spanned the course of three (3) months.  [...] submitted its initial application to the CRB on January 22, 2022.  The CRB deemed the application complete on February 18, 2022.  On March 8, 2022, the CRB placed [...]’ application on the agenda for the CRB meeting scheduled on March 24, 2022.  The very next day, the Ordinance was introduced which included a condition that prohibits the sale of cannabis within 600 feet of any primary or secondary school.
[directive] Do you understand that if you violate a condition of parole supervision for life on or after July 1, 2014, and you are indicted and convicted for that violation, you will receive a sentence of imprisonment up to 5 years or if the violation occurred before July 1, 2014, you will receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 18 months and that the sentence you receive could be in addition to any prison term you may receive from the Parole Board for a violation of parole supervision for life?  인터넷 게시 5.  Internet Posting 결과로, 이름, 연령, 인종, 성별, 생년월일, 신장, [예/Yes] [아니요/No] 귀하가 유죄 판결을 받은 귀하의 a)
[brief] (Pa1, Pa104).  Moreover, Appellant specifically referenced the New Jersey Code of Ethics for Engineers in its Complaint evidencing that engineers are licensed professionals with their own ethical code, which is beyond the scope of the average lay person.  It is axiomatic that Appellants cannot prevail in its claim against [...] without providing an expert report from an engineer establishing the appropriate standard of care or any breach thereof of an engineer and that [...] “breached their professional and ethical duties” as an engineer by providing professional engineering services throughout the Project.
[brief] (Pa208, 23:4-24:7).  In or around 2018, [...] assisted [...] in drafting and finally a grant package with the State of New Jersey, Department of Transportation to subsidize the re-paving of [...] Avenue.  (Pa280).  The purpose of the re-paving was to generally, resurface [...] Avenue due to deterioration caused by traffic and weather.  (Pa284).  The application for the portion of the [...] Avenue re-paving which paved over the condition wherein Plaintiff fell was requested via municipal aide application in 2020.  (Pa280).  The 2020 application contained photographs of multiple potholes, but not the pothole Plaintiff alleges causes his fall.  (Pa294-305).  Plaintiff produced a report authored by [...] ("[...]") in the course of discovery.
[brief] While New Jersey courts have not specifically addressed whether an injured member of the public can be a third party beneficiary of a lease agreement between a landlord and tenant containing provisions pertaining to the maintenance of the property, other jurisdictions have done so.  At least two of them have rejected this proposition.  See e.g., *Gazo v. City of Stamford*, 765 A.2d. 505, 515 (Conn. 2001) (member of the public injured on sidewalk adjoining bank was not third party beneficiary of agreement between bank and third party maintenance contractor.) and *Brunsell v. City of Zeeland*, 651 N.W. 2d. 388 (Mich. 2002) (Pedestrian injured on city sidewalk was not a third party beneficiary of the lease between the city and the property owner.)  Since plaintiffs essentially attempted to assert rights that they did not and do not have, the summary judgment in favor of [...] was properly entered and should be affirmed.
[brief] [...] further testified that the failure of [...] to adequately train and supervise [...] was the cause of this incident because it "made him unable to deal with the situation that arose."  (8T88:19-90:23).  The failure to adequately train [...] "created the frustration" that arose between he and plaintiff, and [...] should have been supervised at the time of the incident by "an experienced red vest employee," he testified.  (Ibid.; 8T87:20-24).  [...] never came back to work after the incident and he was terminated for job abandonment.
[brief] Accordingly, the [...] agrees with the Plaintiffs that the trial court’s decision should be reversed and respectfully requests leave to serve as Amicus Curiae to advocate on behalf of a position that aligns with the objectives of the Malt Alcoholic Beverages Practices Act, N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.12, et seq. (“MBPA”) and long-standing New Jersey policy.  The outcome of this case will have a significant and direct impact on [...]’s members and other licensed New Jersey beer wholesalers.  The trial court’s ruling, if affirmed, will directly impair the protections afforded to wholesalers under the MBPA, and will encourage brewers to engage only with wholesalers who also conduct business in less protective States, such as New York.  Taken to its logical conclusion, the trial court’s decision will effectively authorize brewers to avoid New Jersey’s statutory requirements and to forgo New Jersey Courts as the proper forum to litigate disputes arising under the MBPA, even when the underlying conduct occurred in this State.  If the trial court’s decision is left intact, the very purpose of the MBPA will be thwarted.  Accordingly, the [...] joins in the Plaintiffs’ arguments and urges the Court to reverse the trial court’s decision dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint and compelling them to arbitrate in contravention of the express language of the MBPA.  The Plaintiffs, like [...]’s other members, often face unreasonable and/or non-negotiable demands from the manufacturers and brewers with whom they contract.  The MBPA, which expressly requires parties to a wholesaler agreement to settle disputes arising under the MBPA before a Court of this State, mandates a reversal of the trial court’s decision.  In sum, the [...] seeks to be heard so that this Court’s decision will be consistent with the plain language of the MBPA, will uphold the intent of that statute, and will preserve the protections afforded to wholesalers that were intended to level the playing field.
[brief] Riparian doctrine declares that:  [O]wners of lands along the banks of a stream or waterbody have the right to reasonable use of the waters and a correlative right protecting against unreasonable use by others that substantially diminishes the quantity or quality of water.  The right is viewed as a property interest or as appurtenant to the land and does not depend on prior use.  Water and Water Rights, supra, at 1290; see also, Black's Law Dictionary 1352 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “riparian-rights doctrine” as “[t]he rule that owners of land bordering on a waterway have equal rights to use the water passing through or by their property”).
[brief] “The Montague case holds that resistance is proper if the defendant reasonably believes the officer not to be acting in good faith in the performance of his duties, but instead to be using excessive force or engaged in a private altercation …  By adding the words "in the performance of his duties," we have incorporated this holding into the Code. ”  [...], II  FINAL REPORT: COMMENTARY 3-4, at 104 (1971) (citing Montague, 55 N.J. at 405; State v. Mulvihill, 105 N.J. Super. 458 (App. Div. 1969) certif. granted, 54 N.J. 560 (1969)).  Both the general self-defense model charge and the resisting arrest self-defense model charge reproduce the language of the amended self-defense statute.
[brief] Approximately 5 seconds before the collision (16:33:30 on the head end video), the train was travelling approximately 24.5 mph and [...] was still walking forward (north) on the sidewalk adjacent to the right of way where Track 1 is located.  Compare Pa160, ¶56 with Pa764, ¶56.  About 2 to 2.5 seconds before the collision, [...] changed direction and began to walk towards the pedestrian railroad crossing that was to her left.  Pa1152 at 16:35:28/29 on the head end video; Pa521 (Plaintiffs’ expert’s analysis of the video evidence: “16:33:33 – [...] turns toward the crossing to cross over the tracks . . . 16:33:35 – LRV strikes [...]. ”)  Approximately 2 seconds before the collision, [...] stepped onto the railroad crossing in front of the oncoming train, which was imminently about to enter the crossing.  Pa1152 at 16:33:33; Pa222-235, 281-319.  Prior to entering the crossing, [...] never looked to see if a train was coming on Track 1.  Compare Pa162, ¶67 with Pa764, ¶67; Pa257-299 (stills from the head end camera); Pa582:14-19; Pa1152 at 16:33:28 to 16:33:35.
[brief] Pa 8, Pa9.  The Court ruled that the language of the Lease was sufficient to create a personal guaranty of the lease obligations of [...] by Defendants [...] and [...] but that the personal guaranty obligations of the individual Defendants terminated as of May 11, 2016, the effective date of the termination of the Lease.  The Court did not reach the guaranty revocation argument raised by Defendants [...] and [...].  T1.  On August 24, 2022 Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s August 1, 2022 orders.
[brief] See e.g. Burton v. Sills, 53 N.J. 86, 95 (1968) (“The arguments bear on the wisdom of the legislation rather than on its validity.  Presumably they were all weighed by the Legislature when it concluded that the Law would further the public interest and should be adopted.  We do not sit here as a super legislature and we accept the legislative judgment as to the wisdom of the statute. ”); Wnuck v. N.J. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 337 N.J. Super. 52 (App. Div. 2001) (“Generally, the wisdom, prudence and good sense of the Legislature in the enactment of law are not questions for the judiciary to resolve. ”).
[brief] ”  [...], *The High Price of Unregulated Private Police Training to New Jersey*.  The instructors encouraged people to prolong stops to get canine units to check for drugs and to seek consent to search without reasonable suspicion.  *Id.*  One instructor played a video clip of a woman who had been stopped for a purported motor vehicle violation and commented on her body language and behavior, as well as her appearance, telling the attendees that she was “obviously an illicit drug user” because she is “not a runway model, that’s for sure. ”  *Id.*  The instructor also relied on her refusal of consent to search as a suspicious factor.  *Id.*  After the supervisor in the video clip directed the officer to let her go because there was no basis to continue to detain her, the instructor called the supervisor in the video clip a “fucking idiot” and told the attendees that they should have allowed the investigation to continue so a canine unit could have sniffed the car for drugs, even though the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention.
[brief] Nor does subsection (b) apply as Appellant was seeking an interpretation of what was permitted under the 1972 site plan, not a “zoning map” or “ordinance” (Aa8-Aa12).  In any event, at the hearing before the Board, Appellant’s counsel foreclosed reliance on N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70, noting that Appellant was “focusing on 68” (1T12-17) and Appellant does not rely on or even cite that provision in its appellate brief.  Therefore, any argument that the Board’s actions were authorized under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(b) has been waived.
[brief] 45  Jimenez v. Maisch, 329 N.J. Super. 398 (App. Div. 2000) .................... 34, 36, 37 Judson v. People’s Bank and Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67 (1954)  .... 16, 17 Kane v. Hartz Mountain Indus., 278 N.J. Super. 129, 140 (App. Div. 1994), aff’d, 143 N.J. 141 (1996) ......................................................... 34, 39, 40 Kopp, Inc. v. United Techs., 223 N.J. Super. 548 (App. Div. 1988) ........................................................................  16  Meier v. D’Ambose, 419 N.J. Super. 439, 445 (App. Div. 2011) ........................................................................  37 Moore v. Schering Plough, Inc., 328 N.J. Super. 300 (App. Div. 2000) ........................................................................ 36 Nagy v. Outback Steakhouse, Civil Action No. 19-18277(MAS)(DEA), 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29288, *1-22 (D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2024) .......... 25, 26, 27, 31 New Jersey Lawyers’ Fund for Client Prot. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 203 N.J. 208 (2010) ..................................................................... 49 Nisivoccia v. Glass Gardens, Inc., 175 N.J. 559, 563 (2003) ............................................................. 35, 36, 42, 43, 45, 46 Parmenter v. Jarvis Drug Stores, 48 N.J. Super. 507 (App. Div. 1957) ........................................... 45 Pantano v. New York Shipping Ass’n., 254 N.J. 101 (2023) .................. 48, 49 Piro v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 103 N.J. Super. 456 (App. Div. 1968) ........................................... 34 Prioleau v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, Inc., 223 N.J. 245 (2015) ............ 45, 46 Prudential Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162 (App. Div. 1998) .....................................
[brief] 3T40:8-45:25.  As noted above, defendant twice motioned [...] at the Municipal Court level to rule on the second issue of whether defendant should be given his plea back.  9a.  Defendant even filed second motion specifically requesting findings of facts and conclusion of law as to that sole issue.  17a.  However, [...] refused to rule on it.  Defendant again raised the issue of vacating defendant’s plea in the Law Division and confirmed [...] did not make any findings of fact or conclusion of law as to defendant getting his plea back.
[brief] ”  State v. Carter, 247 N.J. 488, 530 (2021).  (quoting State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 157-58 (1987)).  The suppression of evidence is an appropriate remedy where a defendant’s constitutional rights have been violated.  Novemberino, 105 N.J. at 157-58 (declining to recognize a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule because doing so would “undermine the constitutionally-guaranteed” protections that inhere in Article 1, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution).
[brief] Indeed, Plaintiff-Appellant admitted that [...]’s website contained only the barest of information regarding the dual degree program.  Specifically, [...] testified that the website did not address academic dishonesty (Plaintiff Dep. T146:18 – T148:4 at Pa.176); nor did it explain how many credits were needed to graduate with dual degrees (Plaintiff Dep. T148:5 – T149:4; Id.); nor did the website relate how many credits were required for each degree.  (Plaintiff Dep. T149:13-18; Id.)  The website did not explain what happened if a student failed a course.  (Plaintiff Dep. T150:4 – T151:16; Id.).  Nor did it explain what courses or credits were required to graduate.  (Plaintiff Dep. T152:14-16; Id.).  It did not address discipline, course failures, the Pharmacy Code of Conduct, the \(^8\) [...] testified that the website did not make clear whether his minor in chemistry made him eligible for the Master’s in Chemistry option.  (Plaintiff Dep., T106:8-107:3 at Pa. 166).  Clearly, even [...] recognized that back in 2011 not all conditions of the dual degree program were included in the website. course calendar, or Dean’s List eligibility (Plaintiff Dep. T152-19–T154:21; Id.).  Plaintiff admits that “language can’t always be exact . . . .” (Plaintiff Dep. T325:20-2 at Pa.259).  In essence, Plaintiff-Appellant apparently wants the Court to believe that there were simply no academic requirements associated with the dual degree program once [...] advertised the program without listing requirements on its website.
[brief] Defendant [...] appeals from his conviction on charges of third-degree aggravated assault, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(2)(count one); fourth-degree aggravated assault for pointing a firearm, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(4) (count two); and second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (count three).  Defendant was found not guilty of unlawful possession of a weapon, a knife, and possession of a weapon, namely the knife, for an unlawful purpose under counts four and five.  After merging counts one and two into count three, the judge sentenced defendant to a six-year term of imprisonment with a three-year period of parole ineligibility.  Defendant appeals.  On appeal, defendant argues:
[brief] ”  Matter of Musick, 143 N.J. at 216 (1996).  A reviewing court may reverse the decision of an administrative agency where “it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable or is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole. ”  Dennery v. Bd. of Educ. of Passaic Cty. Reg'l High Sch. Dist. No. 1, Passaic Cty., 131 N.J. 626, 641 (1993).  In determining whether to grant a Motion to Dismiss, “the [School Ethics] Commission shall review the facts in the light most favorable to the complainant and determine whether the allegation(s), if true, could establish a violation of the Act.
[directive] ____ of an or Judge: you previously signed oath secrecy in which you solemnly swore ( _,, of you affirmed) that would keep secret the proceedings the grand jury, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2B:21-10, Court Rule 3:6-7, and any other statutes, court rules, or of of New requirements the State Jersey.  Do you recall signing that secrecy oath?  Grand Juror: Yes.  ____ we Judge: When this grand jury last came together, met in person in the courthouse.  Do you remember?  Grand Juror: Yes. of New an Judge:  The Supreme Court Jersey recently issued order that allows grand juries to staff meet remotely, meaning by video or other technology options.  Court have you communicated with before today and confirmed your ability to participate in a jury remote grand proceeding.  Is that correct?  Grand Juror: Yes. of or Judge:  The oath that you previously swore affirmed still is in effect, and the application that oath is broader because we are meeting today using video technology rather than coming together in a courthouse.
[brief] 1.  November 8, 2023  Letter to [...] .................................. 14 2.  November 14, 2023  Letter to [...] with Affidavit .......... 15-17  3.  November 28, 2023  Letter to [...] Motion to Stay ........... 18  4.  November 29, 2023  Letter to [...] Brief in Support of Motion ........ 19-21 5.  November 30, 2023  Letter to [...] e-Courts  Error not sending notices.  ..........  22 | Case Law | Reply Brief Page | |----------------------------------------------|------------------| | Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472,479 (1995) | 12 | (See Appellant Brief for Other Court Cases) | Party Name | Appellate Party Designation | Trial Court/Agency Party Role | Trial Court/Agency Party Status | |---------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------| | [...] | Appellant | Defendant | Participated Below | | [...] | Appellant | Defendant | Participated Below | | [...] | Respondent | Plaintiff | Participated Below |