ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  (Pa650, Pa665).  These written documents directly confirmed an “arrangement” existed between [...], the manufacturer of the [...] brand, and [...].  During this initial birth period of [...], [...] notably represented all of the [...] sub-brands, including [...] Professional Grills, and specifically worked side-by-side with [...] to represent the [...] brand.  For example, in December of 2009, [...] sent an email to [...] (and others), copying [...], with the subject line “Container program for Grills and Components. ”  The email provides, in part:  Good Day.  We have completed our pricing for 2009 first quarter based on the current raw materials price and exchange rate.  The prices in the spreadsheet are for our distributor container buyers only; as we have already published price guide for our dealers.  Should you desire to prepare your own dealer prices then those published please let us know and we can have our designer update the price guides for you and then you can reprint them with all your information.  Regards, Tony (Pa785-Pa786).  Attached to this email is a distributor price sheet for grills and grill accessories.  (Pa787-Pa788).  Indeed, further confirming that [...]’s grill-focused sub-brand ([...] Professional Grills) and [...]’s furniture focused-sub-brand ([...] Outdoor Living) were merely two brandings under one entity owned and controlled by [...] ([...]), [...] received one invoice to pay “[[...]’s] part” for both initial catalogs.
[brief] The State’s reliance on *Matter of Two Seized Firearms*, 127 N.J at 84 is also misguided.  The claimant in that case, a Florida resident, had a loaded firearm in the glove compartment.  *Id.* at 85.  Again, the Court recognized that “[i]t is illegal in New Jersey to transport a loaded handgun in this way without a license to carry. ”  *Id.*  There is no indication in that the claimant had a Florida carry license.  The State further relies on the language of 18 U.S.C. § 926A to argue that the possession by [...] was violative of federal law.  That statute provides a legal way for gun owners from states that don’t require or issue licenses to pass through states in which licenses are required.
[brief] This case presents an important opportunity to provide guidance to lower courts on the appropriate presentation of fingerprint evidence at trial.  Although flawed forensic evidence is a leading cause of wrongful conviction, jurors tend to overvalue forensic expert testimony.  See, e.g., Executive Office of the President – President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Report to the President – Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods, at 45 (Sept. 2016) (hereinafter “PCAST Report”).  Courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have recognized that “[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading.
[brief] It is also directly contrary to what was in fact being contemplated at the time for the seven-off site units, namely "rehabilitated" units through the [...] program.  (See Email to [...] Counsel dated February 10, 2022 attached to [...] Cert. as Ex. L referencing a prior meeting on January 9, 2020 wherein [...] planned on using [...] for the remaining units outside the [...])  [...] states at Paragraph 5 and 6 of his Certification that "It became clear to the [...] that the affordable housing component of the development constructed by [...] would need to include, in addition to affordable units constructed on-site as Block 419, a separate off-site development of affordable housing..." and “By early 2017 at the latest the [...] examined the available space for such an off-site building and settled upon [...] for its construction (the off-site property).
[directive] 2C:7-2d(1)(2), fails to provide law enforcement with information with respect to access or use of a computer Offenders 4th Degree $2,500 to $7,500 10% permissible 7-2e or any other device with internet capability; or provides false information concerning his place (Megan’s Law) of residence or fails to verify his or her address with the appropriate law enforcement agency.  1st Degree  $150,000 to $350,000  10% permissible  Actor causes death while recklessly driving a vehicle or vessel; first degree if driving while in Death by Auto or 2C:11-5 violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 or N.J.S.A. 39:4-50a while on or within 1000 feet of a school or Vessel driving through a school crossing; otherwise, second degree.
[brief] There is no evidence to sustain that allegation.  We will prove herein that the Township has properly adopted the Ordinance which has permitted the acquisition of the property.  The Ordinance adopted clearly serves a public purpose which has been properly defined in the contract and in the Ordinance.  As can be seen by reviewing the attachments (Pa7), Appellant’s property is landlocked.  One cannot “get there from here”.  It was purchased by the Appellant and, in accordance with the appraisal that the Township has acquired, the Appellant stands to earn many times the value of its investment.  Appellant hardly can complain that it has been damaged or that it has suffered “irreparable damage”.
[brief] R. 1:7-5 is captioned, “Trial Errors. ”  It states, “Any error or omission which does not prejudice a substantial right shall be disregarded by the trial Court before, during and after trial.  As I have stated in my prior Reply, the Plaintiff in this case does not claim any prejudice as a result of the mistake that was made in this case.  Clearly, it was a mistake and qualifies for R. 1:7-5.  CONCLUSION
[brief] [...], the ID and the [...] repeatedly cite and refer to the utility's statutory obligation to provide "safe, adequate and reliable service," *N.J.S.A.* 48:2-3.  But the statute must be read in full:  The board may, after public hearing, upon notice, by order in writing, require any public utility to furnish safe, adequate and proper service, *including furnishing and performance of service in a manner that tends to conserve and preserve the quality of the environment and prevent the pollution of the waters, land and air of this State,* and including furnishing and performance of service in a manner which preserves and protects the water quality of a public water supply, *and to maintain its property and equipment in such condition as to enable it to do so.*  [N.J.S.A. 48:2-3, emphasis added.]  The Legislature has, therefore, directed that while system reliability is important, protection of the environment *is just as important.*
[directive] If the complaint is sustained and it is determined that formal charges should be made, the law enforcement executive, as defined in the footnote to Section 1.0.9, will direct either internal affairs or the appropriate commanding officer to prepare, sign and serve charges upon the subject officer or employee.  The individual assigned shall prepare the formal notice of charges and hearing on the charging form.  This form will also be served upon the officer charged in accordance with N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147.  An example of a charging form is in Appendix F (Note: Civil Service jurisdictions must use forms authorized by the Civil Service Commission).  6.3.12
[brief] ”  Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Utilities Co., 212 N.J. 576, 594 (2013).  “A condominium association has a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the condominium's residents from a dangerous condition on property within the ambit of the common elements,” McDaid v. Aztec W. Condominium Association, 234 N.J. 130, 141-42 (2018), which includes front entrance stairs.  See N.J.S.A. 46:8B-3(d)(ii).  N.J.S.A. 46:8B-14(a) states that a condominium association shall be responsible for the performance of “the maintenance, repair, replacement, cleaning and sanitation of the common elements.
[directive] $500 to $2,500 10% permissible  Incompetent welfare of a person who is unable to care for himself because of a mental disease or defect.  Person  False Reports to Actor gives false information to law enforcement (other than with purpose to implicate 2C:28-4(a)(b) Law Enforcement Disorderly Persons $500 to $1,000 10% permissible another – which would be a fourth degree crime).
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY On February 22, 2021, plaintiff, [...], filed suit against defendants, Calixto and [...].  Pa2.  She alleged that while lawfully walking on the public sidewalk owned, occupied, constructed, controlled, maintained and/or repaired on the property of defendants, she was caused to fall due to the negligence of defendants, causing her severe personal injuries.  Pa2-3.  Specifically, defendants “negligently, carelessly and recklessly created and/or maintained a nuisance and/or hazardous condition * * * , including failing to properly construct, repair and maintain the public sidewalk so that this failure alone or in conjunction with the layer of snow on the sidewalk, caused the plaintiff to slip and fall. ”  Pa3.  Defendants filed an Answer on January 10, 2022, denying all liability.  Pa6.  The matter proceeded through discovery and arbitration.  Pa14.  On February 15, 2024, defendants moved for summary judgment, seeking an “Order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint as Defendants did not breach a duty owed to the Plaintiff. ”  Pa13.  Plaintiff opposed the motion.  After a brief (the transcript reflects that the hearing took less than nine minutes, 1T) hearing on March 15, 2024, the trial court barred the opinion of plaintiff’s engineer, [...], P.E., granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  1T9:7-10:3.  An Order of Dismissal was filed on March 18, 2024.  Pa1.  Plaintiff timely filed her Notice of Appeal on April 29, 2024.  Pa221.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Plaintiff contends the trial court erred “when it denied plaintiff limited discovery and expedited discovery. ”  (Pb26)  However, Plaintiff did not and could not proffer any specific discovery that was necessary as to any specific factual issues when opposing Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  That is because the facts material to Plaintiff’s claims in his Complaint regarding alleged violations of various laws in the adoption of the Bond Ordinance and the conduct of public meetings of the Township Committee were known and undisputed.
[brief] DOCKET NO. [...]  Criminal Action: On Leave to Appeal Granted from an Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Honorable Judges:  This letter brief and appendix is submitted in lieu of a formal brief on behalf of the State.  See R. 2:6-2(b); R. 2:6-4(a).
[brief] These limitations were placed on it by paragraph 21 of the Amended Resolution’s “Conditions” section, which reads: That the site be developed with the proposed use and in accordance with the current plans and renderings as submitted to the Zoning Board of Adjustment except as modified by the Board as set forth herein.  (28a)  Appellant filed his complaint once it became clear to him that [...] was going to exceed the height of the adjacent building to the south by substantially more than the one foot limitation imposed by the Diagrammatic Elevation.  By Appellant’s estimate, it is actually three or four feet taller than the adjacent building.  This cannot be considered a de minimus variation.
[brief] Pa41; Pa10.  Appellant’s planning report describes the typographical error in the initial easement description as follows:  The Exhibit Map is not consistent with the written description prepared by [...].  The [...] description identifies the easement commencing at a point 117.65 feet (emphasis added) from the intersection of the northerly R.O.W. line of [...] and the easterly R.O.W. line of [...].  The [...] Exhibit Map identifies the easement commencing at a point 177.65 feet (emphasis added) from the intersection of the northerly R.O.W. line of [...] and the easterly R.O.W. line of [...].  Pa12.  Relying on a known single typographical error, Appellant’s appraiser concluded subdivision of the Property was no longer possible due to the “taking” and opined the loss of this second buildable lot should result in Appellant receiving just compensation of $1,550,000 for the taking of the 3,334 sf the perpetual seawall repair easement in his Property.  Pa41.  The Borough filed a motion seeking leave to file an amended complaint on February 26, 2020 which Appellant opposed.
[brief] Defendants-Respondents’ Reply Letter Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration  *  Not produced in Appendix as per R. 2:6-1(a)(2)  May 8, 2023  Plaintiff-Appellant’s Letter to Court Seeking Clarification * Submitted at Pa485  May 18, 2023  Plaintiff-Appellant’s Motion for Clarification and to Extend the Time to File a Reconsideration Motion  * ▪ Notice of Motion  ▪ Proposed Order ▪  Proof of Service ▪  Affidavit/Certification in Support of Motion with Exhibits A-C  * *  Other than the Certification in Support of Motion with Exhibits A-C at Pa466 – Pa485, which were produced in the Appendix under R. 2:6-1(a)(2) because the matter is referenced in the Appellate Brief as to where it was argued below, and the document is required for a full understanding of the issues presented, the remainder of the materials are not submitted in the Appendix as per R. 2:6-1(a)(2).  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 (“Every action at law…for recovery upon a contractual claim or liability, express or implied,…shall be commenced within 6 years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued”).  G&L Assocs., Inc. v. 434 Lincoln Ave. Assocs., 318 N.J. Super. 355, 359-60 (App. Div. 1999).  Plaintiff-Appellant admitted that he knew that the pharmacy program was constantly evolving.  He also testified that he heard rumors of changes in requirements for the dual degree, all occurring more than six years prior to his filing this lawsuit.  [...]’s [...] further testified that a student such as [...] would have known of the 3.0 GPA requirement through the [...] website, student manuals, presentations and open houses, the Beyond the Curriculum course (which all pharmacy students, including [...], were required to take), orientation, and in documents circulated to all students highlighting the curriculum for the eight masters’ programs.  (Avaltroni Dep. 108:19-109:16 at Pa.366-67.)  As such, [...] knew, or should have known about, the 3.0 GPA requirement for admission into the dual degree program for nearly four months prior to attending class at [...] and six and-a-half years before he filed suit.  Since Plaintiff did not file suit until March 19, 2019, approximately six and one-half years after the applicable limitations period accrued, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Statute of Limitations.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 48:12-152a is a prohibition on entering onto a railroad right of way.  It describes three exceptions to that prohibition, when entering upon a right of way is permissible.  These exceptions are for railroad employees, passengers for hire in areas of the right of way where passengers are permitted and a person who is in a crossing established by the railroad.  N.J.S.A.48:12-152b articulates the railroad’s civil tort immunity.
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request that this honorable Court affirm the Lower Court’s grant of Respondents’ motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the valid, binding, and enforceable agreement.  Respectfully submitted, SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  [...], on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, Defendant-Respondents.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION, HUDSON COUNTY  Trial Court  Docket No. [...]  Sat Below: HON. [...], J.S.C.  DATE: August 23, 2024 REPLY BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
[brief] On July 6, 2019, [...] filed an application with the [...] for his retirement allowance.  (Aa45-47).  To this end, the Board only considered [...] for deferred retirement benefits since those were the only pension benefits he was potentially eligible for based upon his years of service and/or credit in the [...].  (Aa48).  At its meeting on January 14, 2020, the Board considered the circumstances which led to [...]’s removal as part and parcel to determining his eligibility for deferred retirement benefits.  (Aa48-49).  After doing so, the Board denied [...]’s application.  Ibid.  Specifically, the Board determined [...] was removed for charges of misconduct directly related to his employment and, therefore, was not eligible for deferred retirement benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:16A-11.2.
[brief] ”  [...]  Further the Commission emphasized “that in using social media, the affirmative duties within the Code of Ethics for School Board Members may not be overlooked. ”  Id. at 8.  With the above in mind, Respondent’s disparaging posts to social media at issue constituted conduct that undermined the public’s trust in the Board and compromised the Board’s ability to engage with the public.  I/M/O [...], Commission Docket Nos. [...] and [...] (2021) (Ca255) (citing Dunbar Bey v. Brown, Commission Docket No. C25-11 (2011) (Ca275)), reaffirmed, e.g., by I/M/O [...], Commission Docket No. [...] (2021) (236) and Commission’s Advisory Opinion A02-22 (February 25, 2022) (Ca233).
[brief] Pb6-7; 19-21.  The Trade & Transport agreement has no such provision specifically identifying an arbitrator by name nor is there any evidence that the deceased arbitrator had any unique or specific expertise that rendered him irreplaceable.  Here, [...] agreed to arbitrate any dispute involving enforcement of the settlement agreement only “before [...] as the sole arbitrator” (Pa45), the attorney who had mediated the parties’ disputed, conceived of the terms of the settlement, and drafted the agreement itself.  Pa85 (“The agreement designated the person who drafted the agreement on behalf of the parties as the arbitrator of any disputes”), Pa93 (holding parties “agreed to arbitrate a dispute over the terms of the settlement agreement and further agreed the attorney who drafted the agreement would serve as arbitrator”); Pa45 (Settlement Agreement).  As detailed in [...]’s initial brief, there is substantial case law prohibiting courts from compelling arbitration before a court-selected substitute arbitrator when the parties’ agreement to arbitrate identifies a specific arbitrator and provides no provision for replacing that arbitrator if he or she is unavailable.  See e.g., Moss v. First Premier Bank, 835 F.3d 260, 264 (2d Cir. 2016); In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders' Derivative Litigation, 68 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 1995)).  Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC v. Sappington, 884 F.3d 392, 399 (2d Cir. 2018); Carideo v. Dell, Inc., 2009 WL 3485933, at *4 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (Pa129-134); A-1 Premium Acceptance, Inc. v. Hunter, 557 S.W.3d 923 (Mo. 2018); Grant v. Magnolia Manor-Greenwood, Inc., 678 S.E.2d 435, 438 (S.C. 2009); see also Ass'n of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. Aloha Airlines, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1207 (D. Haw. 2001) (“The use of substitute appointments has not often been discussed in the recent case law, and where it is, the use of substitute appointments is disfavored. ”)  In those cases, as a matter of basic contract law, it was determined that the agreement to arbitrate only extends to arbitration before the specifically named arbitrator.  If that arbitration cannot proceed, the parties must either mutually agree on a new arbitrator or pursue their claims in court.  That is the situation here and [...] has provided no compelling reason why the result should not be same.
[brief] ## Cases - **Aldrich v. Hawrylo**, 281 N.J. Super. 201 (App. Div. 1995) .................. 9 - **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.**, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) ..........................  2 - **Conley v. Guerrero**, 228 N.J. 339 (2017)  ........................................  1, 2 - **Francavilla v. Absolute Resols. VI LLC**, 478 N.J. Super. 171 (App. Div. 2024) ..............................................  2 - **Garden of Mem., Inc. v. Forest Lawn Mem. Pk. Assn.**, 109 N.J. Super. 523 (App. Div. 1970) ............................................. 7 - **In re Elin**, 20 B.R. 1012 (D.N.J. 1982) ...........................................  6, 7 - **Olson v. Jantausch**, 44 N.J. Super. 380 (1957) ................................. 7 - **Palamarg Realty Co. v. Rehac**, 80 N.J. 446 (1979) ............................  12 October 2, 2024  [...], Clerk Appellate Division Clerk’s Office Superior Court of New Jersey  [...]  P.O. Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0970  Re: [...] v. [...] and [...]
[brief] The court should have tailored the instructions to the specific facts of the case, explaining which self-defense charge the jury should consider based on its factual determinations regarding whether [...] was under arrest at the time of the altercation in question.  See Gentry, 439 N.J. Super. at 72 (reversing defendant’s conviction and reminding remand court of importance of “molding jury instructions so that the jury clearly understands how the evidence in this particular case relates to the legal concepts addressed in the charge”).  Had the jury been instructed on self-defense, it could have found that [...] acted in self-defense both inside and outside of the restaurant.  Therefore, [...]’s convictions must be reversed.
[directive] The shall authorization should also specify any conditions (i.e., the files may be reviewed only at the internal affairs office and may not be removed).  In addition, the law enforcement executive may order any redactions necessary to protect sensitive or privileged information, including an officer’s medical or mental health investigation, consistent with Section records or details of an ongoing criminal 9.6.2(b).  The law enforcement executive should grant such access sparingly, given the purpose of the internal affairs process and the nature of many of the allegations against officers.
[brief] *Id.* at 174.  The Court reasoned:  [T]he circumstances giving rise to probable cause were anything but spontaneous; that is, they did not develop, for example, suddenly or rapidly.  Rather, the circumstances unfolded over almost two hours while investigating long-held information from a CI that defendant had utilized the GMC for drug trafficking.  The fact that the canine sniff is what culminated in probable cause does not eviscerate the steps that led to the sniff.  *[Id. at 173.]*  Relying on the Court’s holding in *Smart*, the trial court in this case found the automobile exception did not apply and granted defendant’s Motion to Suppress.
[brief] [...] relies upon an email between [...] and [...] to explain an alleged resolution to the issue.  (Dja17-Dja18).  First, [...] did not just ignore this information.  [...] was not copied on this email and was never provided this email prior to the appeal being filed.  This email was not provided in response to [...]’s many OPRA requests to the [...] on the application materials.  [...] had no ability to review this information and assess the impact of the information.  Although the information appears to have been on the final plans, this information was not clearly identified on the site plans and in fact, mislabeled.  The diversionary structure being discussed is MH-112A but the diversion structure detail is identified as MH-111A.
[brief] Glass v. Suburban Restoration Co., 317 N.J.Super. 574, 582 (App. Div. 1998); See Kotok Bldg. v. Charvine Co., 183 N.J.Super. 101, 106 (Law Div. 1981) (discovery is not and never was intended to take the place of the "position paper" which a properly drawn complaint should be).