ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Authorized Tire Deflation Devices  6.1  Law enforcement agencies may choose to utilize authorized tire deflation devices during the course of a vehicular pursuit.  Agencies that choose to employ this strategy may only utilize devices authorized by this Policy.  As with all operational decisions made during the conduct of a vehicular pursuit, the use of such devices is subject to the assessment of inherent risk balanced against the need to apprehend a fleeing offender.  6.2  To be authorized for deployment and use under the vehicular pursuit policy, the tire deflation device must be capable of the following: (a) producing a controlled deflation of one or more tires of a pursued vehicle; (b) being deployed or activated immediately before the pursued vehicle drives over it, and removed or deactivated immediately after the pursued vehicle drives over it; and (c) allowing the officer to remain a safe distance from the roadway at the time of deployment or activation.  6.3  Prior to the deployment and use of an authorized tire deflation device, the law enforcement agency shall to the following: (a) modify its vehicular pursuit policy to provide for the proper use of the authorized tire deflation device; and (b) train all officers in the use of the authorized tire deflation device, which training must include practical, hands-on operation of the authorized tire deflation device.  6.4  The following are circumstances under which an authorized tire deflation device may be deployed: (a) an authorized tire deflation device may be utilized only after supervisory approval; (b) an authorized tire deflation device shall not be used to stop motorcycles, mopeds, or similar vehicles; (c) the authorized tire deflation device should not be used in locations where specific geographic features (e.g., sharp curves, alongside of rivers, steep embankments, etc.) increase the risk of serious injury to the officer, violator, or public; (d) deployment locations should have reasonably good sight distances to enable the officer to observe the pursuit and other traffic as it approaches; and (e) the officer deploying the authorized tire deflation device should not attempt to overtake and pass a high-speed pursuit in order to position the device.  6.5  Procedures for deployment of the authorized tire deflation device:  (a) the officer deploying the authorized tire deflation device should do so from a position of safety; 10  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] This matter arises out of a motorcycle accident that occurred on September 12, 2015.  On that date, Plaintiff [...] was the operator of a motorcycle that was traveling southbound on the Garden State Parkway in Galloway Township, Atlantic County, New Jersey.  As Plaintiff was traveling in the left-hand lane between approximately mile marker 39.9 and 40.1, he came to a defect in the roadway which caused him to lose control of his motorcycle and caused him to crash into the concrete barrier.  (Pa1).  The Complaint in this matter was filed on September 7, 2016 against the [...] ("[...]") and [...] (Pa1550).  Defendant [...] filed an Answer on September 30, 2016.  (Pa1559).  Defendant [...] filed an Answer on December 7, 2016.  (Pa1567).  Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on March 10, 2017 adding [...] ("[...]") as a Defendant.  (Pa1576).  On March 29, 2017, Defendant [...] was dismissed without prejudice by Stipulation of Dismissal.  (Pa1584).  Defendant [...] filed their Answer on or about April 7, 2017.  (Pa1592).  On or about March 24, 2017  Defendant [...] filed their Answer to the Amended Complaint.  (Pa1585).  On December 22, 2017, Defendant [...] filed a Third-Party Complaint against [...] (Pa1606).  Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on January 9, 2018 adding [...] and the [...] (Hesse Defendants) as Defendants in this matter.  (Pa1613).  Defendant [...] filed an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint on January 10, 2018.  (Pa1619).  Defendant [...] filed an Answer to the Second Amended complaint on January 15, 2018.  (Pa1633).  The Hesse Defendants filed their Answer to the Third-Party Complaint and Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint on February 9, 2018.  (Pa1639, Pa1644).  Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint on December 7, 2018 adding [...] (“[...]”) as a Defendant.  (Pa1650).  Defendant [...] filed their Answer to the Third Amended Complaint on December 11, 2018.  (Pa1658).  Defendant [...] filed their Answer to the Third Amended Complaint on December 12, 2018.  (Pa1668).  The Hesse Defendants filed their Answer to the Third Amended Complaint on January 8, 2019.  (Pa1674).  [...] filed their Answer on February 21, 2019.  (Pa1683).  Plaintiffs filed a Fourth Amended Complaint on May 17, 2019 adding Defendant [...] ("[...]") (Pa1698).  Defendant [...] filed their Answer to the Fourth Amended Complaint on May 17, 2019.  (Pa1706).  The Hesse Defendants filed their Answer to the Fourth Amended Complaint on May 17, 2019.  (Pa1717).  Defendant [...] filed their Answer to the Amended Complaint on July 1, 2019.  (Pa1727).  Defendant [...] filed their Answer to the Fourth Amended complaint on August 19, 2019.  (Pa1739).  On August 29, 2019, Defendant [...] filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  (Pa1745).  Plaintiffs filed their Opposition on September 17, 2019.  (Pa1756).  Defendant [...] filed a Reply Brief on September 23, 2019.  Oral argument was conducted (Pa1811).  The court denied Defendant’s motion on September 27, 2019.  (Pa1826).  On November 22, 2019, the Hesse Defendants filed an Amended Answer to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint.  (Pa1828).
[brief] •  And the Court rejected explicitly the notion first put forth in the Verified Complaint and argued at trial that [...] thought he was the owner.  The Court noted that [...] didn’t sign closing papers, didn’t apply for a mortgage, “never put his neck out on the line in terms of risk, which is what you do when you take on a mortgage” (6T30:19-23).  He didn’t assume all the additional responsibilities, headaches and chores “that are not fun” (6T30:23-25).  The Court found no basis for Plaintiffs’ claim that [...] thought he owned either the Florida house or [...] (6T30:16-31:2).  Therefore, as to whether [...] and [...] have or had an equity interest in either home, the Court found that Plaintiffs placed nothing on the record from which such a conclusion could be drawn (6T24:21-25).  The facts cited above support one conclusion: that [...]’s name is on the [...] deed because he is the owner.  Plaintiffs believe this to have been an error on the part of the Trial Court, but they do not cite to any opposing testimony at trial in support of their position.  Based on all these findings of fact, the Court rightly concluded that title to the condominium belonged to [...] because he has assumed all the risk and paid all the bills (6T31:17-18).  Defendants respectfully request that the reviewing Court not disturb the Trial Court’s findings of fact or conclusions of law as to whom [...] belongs.
[brief] B-  No Qualified Immunity, Violation of 42 USC §1983 and NJSA 10:6-2 (c)  NJSA 59:3-3 and NJSA 59:3-14 did not immunize the police officers from charges of false arrest, false imprisonment and excessive force because they acted with willful misconduct and excessive force.  Pisano v. City of Union City, 198 N.J. Super. 588, 590 (Law Div.1984); Valencia v Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440 (5thCir. 1993).  (Pa54, Pa96, Pa471).  The police also violated plaintiff’s 4th Amendment and Art 1 para 7 rights to be free from unlawful searches.  The police acted willfully then falsely charged plaintiff for obstruction when there was no independent underlying act, or lawful official duty.  Plaintiff could not "obstruct a false arrest."  He was deprived of his rights under the privileges and immunities clause.  State v Perlstein, 206 Super. 246 (App. Div.1985); Art 1 para 1,7, 42USC 1983 and NJSA 10:6-2 (c ).  Thusly, Qualified immunity did not attach.
[brief] This is an action brought by the Appellant-Plaintiff in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Bergen County, in connection with an MVA that occurred on or about August 14, 2019 between her and the Respondent-Defendant.  As a result of the MVA, the Appellant-Plaintiff sustained severe and permanent injuries, including injuries to her neck, mid back and lower back resulting in pain, spasms and restrictions.  The Appellant-Plaintiff also severely injured her sternum resulting in a fractured sternum from the MVA.  Following the accident, the Appellant-Plaintiff underwent extensive medical treatment from various providers, including [...] D.C.  Dr. Rodgers reviewed the MRI studies from of the Appellant-Plaintiff for her cervical, lumbar and thoracic regions, and they showed multiple herniated and bulging discs.  Upon Dr. Rodgers’ treatment and observation, he provided a report, dated March 29, 2021 that included a certificate of permanency.  The report also found that “[t]here is a direct relationship between [...]'s present condition and the accident of August 14, 2019. ”  (Pa83)  The report addendum from Dr. Rodgers, dated June 27, 2022, confirms the finding that the Appellant-Plaintiff “severely injured her sternum resulting in a fractured sternum from the motor vehicle accident. ”  (Pa87)  Dr. Rodger’s report also concluded that the Appellant-Plaintiff “suffered a substantial limitation of the cervicothoracic and lumbosacral spinal region of the musculoskeletal system."  (Pa87)  Further, there were "objective signs of spastic musculature of the involved area tested, thus collaborating the patient's pain and restriction."  (Pa87)  Dr. Rodger's report summarized the Appellant-Plaintiff's disability in connection with the MVA, wherein she was "under permanent disability for approximately 16 weeks back to work December 2019 . . .  Thereafter, she is on partial disability.  [...] returned to employment due to financial responsibilities, thus working with pain and stiffness."  (Pa80)
[directive] Note:  Some of these offenses are listed elsewhere in Bail Schedule 2 as lesser included offenses  Statute Charge Description Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  a.  Actor has purpose to hinder or impair apprehension or prosecution of another and assists that person in avoiding detection or suppression of evidence; disorderly persons offense if the conduct which the actor knows has been charged or is liable to be charged against the Hindering person aided would constitute a crime of the fourth degree or less.  2C:29-3(a)(b)  Apprehension or Disorderly Persons  $500 to $1,000 10% permissible
[brief] [...] noted that the majority of the non-public bus routes were segregated by gender, and because most of the private schools had the same start time, “the demand cause[d] increased pricing by vendors. ” (Ra75).  Additionally, each non-public school had separate buses which created longer bus routes and required more buses at an increased cost.  Ibid.  And most non-public schools had multiple starting and end times which “creates inefficiencies and the need for one-way routes. ” (Ra76).  By separately tiering the starting and ending times, [...] found that the District could save up to $6,700,000.  (Ra75).  And if bus routes were developed by school location rather than having separate buses for each non-public school, [...] found the District could save approximately $750,000.  Ibid.  There is no evidence in the record showing that [...] took any steps in response to the [...]’s findings.  These are not just issues of the past; rather, the Comprehensive Report shows that similar issues persist in the District.
[brief] In *Superior Officers*, the Appellate Division cited [...]’s decision approvingly and made clear that the “MSRA’s findings and declarations undeniably supply the justifications for granting the State the authority to unilaterally modify the expired-but-effective CNA” at issue.  *Superior Officers*, 2022 WL 2352376, at *9 (citing N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-2); (Pa000677).  The Appellate Division further explained that alleged “vesting” of employee rights under expired CNAs is “inconsequential” following the enactment of the MSRA, finding that the “MSRA permits the Director to unilaterally modify this contract term. ”  Id. at *8; (Pa000676).  Additionally, the Appellate Division acknowledged that the “MSRA permits the Director to unilaterally modify the contract term for accumulated sick leave upon from Lieutenant to Captain as that CNA expired. ”  Ibid.  In an effort to revive their Takings Clause claim, Plaintiffs cite inapposite case law on appeal, ignoring both Supreme Court precedent and the prevailing cases regarding the MSRA.
[brief] On: July 23, 2024  TABLE OF CONTENTS Page  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................3  STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................4  ARGUMENT ............................................................................................8  POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT MADE AN INCORRECT FINDING OF FACT AND THEREAFTER MISAPPLIED  THE APPLICABLE LAW TO JUSTIFY ITS DECISION (Raised Below: 4T4)..............................................................................8  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT  ERRONEOUSLY DISREGARDED THE PRINCIPLES OF RACE NOTICE REQUIRED BY THE NEW JERSEY RECORDING STATUTE, N.J.S.A. 46:26A-12 (Raised Below: 4T5).............................................................................9  A.  The Trial Court’s decision does not support and maintain the integrity of the recording system (Raised Below: 1T42; 1T61) .................................................................10  B.  The Trial Court Improperly Relied on an Unrecorded Subdivision Map and the Hypotheticals Presented by Defendant’s Expert to Justify Its Decision that It Would Be Inequitable to Allow the Plaintiff to Retain Ownership of the Strip (Raised Below: 4T14)...........................................................................14  C.  The Trial Court Placed Undue  Emphasis on the Exclusion of the Strip from Plaintiff’s Title Insurance Policy (Raised Below: 3T32; 4T6)  ..................................................................25  D.  Defendant’s Expert Inappropriately Spoke to Defendant’s Attorney During a Break in Testimony (Raised Below: 3T59; 4T14)  .........................................................28  POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY APPLY THE FACTORS REQUIRED FOR ADVERSE POSSESSION WHEN IT AWARDED OWNERSHIP OF THE STRIP TO THE DEFENDANT (Not Raised Below)  ...........................................................................................................30  A.  Defendant’s use of the Strip was not exclusive (Raised Below: 2T19; 2T21) .............................................................................................................31  B.  Defendant did not prove actual possession of the Strip property for thirty years (Raised Below: 1T141; 1T164) .........................................................................................34  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................................36
[brief] [...] further argues that [...] cannot build the agreed-upon seven units of affordable-housing on the off-site property because there is “insufficient front yard setback,” rear setback, parking, or the need for a variance.  But these are the very requirements courts can, and must, set aside when court-ordered and constitutionally required affordable-housing is at issue.  See id.  In Mount Laurel II itself, the issue was whether the affordable-housing proposal had to comply with a local zoning ordinance requirement for a (d) use variance for mobile homes.  The Court ordered the construction of affordable housing proceed, notwithstanding the cost generative variance requirement, because the site was “plainly suited for mobile home development” and the mobile home requirement imposed a significant impediment.  Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 308 [...] next claims [...] is not entitled to relief because “[...] did not exhaust its administrative remedies.
[brief] “The bases on which an expert relies when rendering an opinion are a valid subject of cross-examination. ”  Ibid.  “The failure of defendant to have interposed an objection to the expert’s testimony limits [appellate] review to search for plain error[.]”  State v. Nesbitt, 185 N.J. 504, 516 (2006); see R. 2:10-2.  “Convictions after a fair trial, based on strong evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, should not be reversed because of a . . . evidentiary error that cannot have truly prejudiced defendant or affected the end result. ”  State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588, 614 (2011).  At the beginning of the trial, [...] instructed the jurors they were the “sole judges of facts,” and it was up to them to “determine the credibility of witnesses. ” (1T7-22 to 8-4; 1T28-7 to 19-2).  [...] then gave instructions on how to consider expert testimony, noting the jury was not “bound by such expert’s opinion” and should “consider each opinion and give it the weight to which [they] deem it entitled,” which included rejecting it.
[brief] While this may be true, the most important consideration is that the Trust assets would have been distributed in accordance with the Settlor’s instructions.  PLAINTIFF:  “This, in turn, likely would have resulted in the implementation of the very same remedy for the Boonton Property, because bidding was the most appropriate course to take. ”  (Pb27-Pb28)  DEFENDANTS:  The most appropriate course of action would have been to adhere strictly to the Settlor’s instructions, which required the Trustee to divide and distribute the Trust assets, including the Boonton Property, into equal shares among the beneficiaries.
[brief] (9T 125-18 to 131-5)  The undue restriction on the defense’s presentation of its third-party guilt defense is the subject of Point II, infra.  [...] testified that he did not consider [...] a suspect and did not investigate him.  (12T 263-20 to 21)  No light-colored pants, such as the shooter was wearing, were found in the Chevrolet.  (9T 36-18 to 38-14)
[brief] Administrative Order of the Honorable [...], P.J.Cv. dated January 9, 2023 transferring the action from Hudson County to Bergen County .... Pa19 Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. dated October 20, 2023  Granting Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss……………………………………Pa155-Pa156 Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. dated October 20, 2023  Denying Appellant’s Cross Motion to Vacate Default Judgment, to Transfer, and to Consolidate ………………………………………………………………..Pa157-Pa159 COUNTER PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The implementing ordinances included the Redevelopment Plan for what was then referred to as the [...] property, which was adopted by the Township Committee on November 27, 2017.  Pa231.  Again, [...] objected at the compliance hearing, but neither [...] nor [...] appeared.  In addition, neither [...] nor [...] appealed the November 27, 2017 Redevelopment Plan.  T2.37:12-15.  After the final compliance hearing, [...] directed the Township to satisfy several conditions, among them execution of a redevelopment agreement covering the [...] property, which redevelopment agreement was executed in several parts by the Township and [...] in summer 2019.  Pa232.  Those redevelopment agreements explicitly stated that [...] intended to apply for a Long Term Tax Exemption and reserved the right to terminate the agreements if such request was not granted.  Pa597.  Neither [...] nor [...] appealed the execution of the redevelopment agreements.  T2.37:12-15.  After [...] appealed the initial fairness and compliance orders, [...], [...], and [...] reached agreement on an amended settlement of the Township’s Mount Laurel action, which also resulted in changes to the development of the [...] site.
[brief] Argument was held on May 23, 2023.  (5T).  In argument on the motion, the trial court repeatedly stressed its “discretion” (5T46), stated “so what” in response to an argument made by [...] regarding the fact that fees had been improperly awarded for choice of law (5T10), and --- \(^6\)  As set forth below, the 1989 start date represents the trial court’s incorrect holding that the limits underlying the [...] policy would have exhausted by 1989.  (Pa0057.)  However, since only 6.4% of the covered costs claimed by [...] can be allocated to the [...] Policy Period, the limits underlying the [...] Policy would not have exhausted until 1996.  (Pa0057.)  incorrectly stated [...] had not raised a 2005 start date for the running of interest in its opposition to the original motion.  (5T18).  The trial court denied [...]’s motion for reconsideration of the Final Judgment Order in an Order and Opinion dated May 24, 2023.
[brief] Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  DORF NELSON & ZAUDERER LLP  By: [...], Esq.  Attorney ID # 034701986  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant  [...]; [...]  D/B/A [...]; [...]; AND BERNARD PLAZA  ASSOCIATES [...], Plaintiffs/Respondents, vs. [...]; [...]; [...], [...]  D/B/A [...]; [...]; [...] AND JOHN DOES 3-10 fictitious designations)  Respondents/Appellant.