ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] S. [...]  In this regard, the Department of ([...]).  Treasury has statutory authority to transfer forfeited property to another federal agency.  Under this option, after a property is identified as a suitable Weed and Seed transfer and is forfeited, title to the property will be transferred to [...].  - .A%ter the initial transfer, [...] will then retransfer $ 7 9 the property to the preselected recipient, consistent with understandings reached in consultation with Federal, State and local agencies and the pertinent United States Attorney's Office.  Mortgages and Ownership Interests in Weed and Seed D.  Transferred Real Property Directive No. October 9 1993  1, of Page 5 4  Mortgages  1.  Mortgages on real property transferred pursuant to the Weed and Seed initiative are not payable from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund.  Liens and mortgages shall be the responsibility of the recipient State local or community-based organization.  Qualified Third Party Interests 2 .  Any secured debts or other qualified interests owed to creditors are not payable from the Treasury Forfeiture of Fund.  The payments these interests are the responsibility of the recipient State or local agency or non-profit organization.  E.
[brief] iii.  Plaintiffs did not add new claims requiring a three-arbitrator panel.  [...] argues that new claims in Phase II triggered the requirement for a three-arbitrator panel.  This argument is meritless.  No claims were added for the first time in Phase II.  [...] amended its pleading in Phase II to specify facts that occurred during Phase I that further supported Plaintiffs’ existing breach of fiduciary duty claims.  (Pa107-150)  [...]’s assertion that the claims were “newly disclosed,” Db34, is patently false.  [...] supported existing claims with newly described facts, of which all parties became aware during Phase I.
[brief] Pa132-33.  [...] tested the responses of two (2) 2017 Honda CR-V’s, equipped with LDW and LKAS systems on February 20, 2020, April 22, 2022, and April 26, 2022, to conditions and circumstances similar to those of the subject crash, 37 different times.  Ibid.  Mr.  Harrington tested defendant [...]’s warning and safety systems’ performance to various parametric angles of attack, steering wheel angles, accelerator pedal percentages, and lateral velocities.  Ibid.  Of the 37 valid tests across the three (3) different test series, defendant’s LKAS successfully steered the test vehicle back into the correct lane of travel 36 times.  Ibid.  Based on that testing, plaintiff’s experts concluded, to a reasonable degree of engineering certainty, that had the [...]’ Honda been equipped with available LKAS, defendant’s LKAS system would have actively steered the CR-V back into the middle of the southbound lane without driver input, avoiding the collision and that a 2016 CR-V, with LDW and LKAS, was a technologically and economically available alternative safer design than the [...] CR-V as sold.  Pa134 (“Had the subject Honda been equipped with the available LKAS, the subject collision would not have occurred. ”); Pa154 (“Despite the fact that a safer alternate design was feasible and implemented as an extra cost option on the 2016 Honda CR-V, [[...]] chose not to implement such a system on [...]’s Honda, rendering it defective and unsafe. ”).  Plaintiff’s experts’ proffered opinions and the evidence on which they were based were sufficient and, in fact, compelling proof of the availability and feasibility of an alternative safer design.  They presented, at a minimum, a sufficient basis for a jury to consider whether defendant breached its duty to market a reasonably fit, suitable and safe product.  Defendant may contest those opinions and seek to justify its decision to make those available safety systems optional.  It is free to argue its risk/utility analysis before a jury.  For purposes of summary judgment, however, plaintiff came forward with sufficient evidence to present to a jury the factual issue of whether there was a defect.  Defendant was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and summary judgment should have been denied.
[brief] Consistent with New Jersey’s liberal discovery rules, “there is no general prohibition against obtaining the deposition of opposing counsel regarding relevant, non-privileged information. ”  Kerr v. Able Sanitary and Environmental Servs., Inc., 295 N.J. Super. 147, 154 (App. Div. 1996); see also R. 4:10-2(a); R. 4:14-1.
[brief] IV.  CONCLUSION  The Trial Court erred as a matter of law in dismissing plaintiff’s affirmative claims before trial where there exists genuine issues of material fact on the issue of liability and damages.  Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff respectfully requests the Appellate Division reverse the April 4, 2022, September 14, 2023, and October 27, 2023  Orders entered by the Trial Court and order a new trial in this matter.  Respectfully submitted, GILLIN-SCHWARTZ  LAW  By: ________________________________  [...], ESQUIRE  Dated: 4/19/24  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...]
[brief] In Obergefell, a same-sex couple residing in Ohio was married in Maryland, and Ohio would not recognize their marriage.  Id. at 658.  The question presented to the Court was whether the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause protected the fundamental right to marry for same-sex couples.  The Court held that “the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. ”  Id. at 675.  The Court further held that “same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States.  It follows that the Court also must hold—and it now does hold—that there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character. ”  Id. at 680-81.  The present case is no different.  Like same-sex marriage, the right to carry on one’s person is a right guaranteed by the Constitution.  Like marriage, obtaining a carry permit is a public act by a state.  It is the State’s burden to provide a lawful basis to refuse to recognize a lawfully obtained carry permit in another state, and it has not.  CONCLUSION
[brief] ”  And, by the plain terms of the statute, “[t]he rights, remedies and prohibitions” created by the CFA are “in addition to and cumulative of any other right, remedy or prohibition accorded by the common law or statutes of this State. ”  Courts are therefore reluctant “to undermine the CFA’s enforcement structure…by carving out exemptions for each allegedly fraudulent practice that may concomitantly be regulated by another source of law.
[directive] The vast majority of internal affairs investigations will be limited to alleged disciplinary infractions and the vast majority of law enforcement officer interviews conducted during an internal affairs investigation will be limited to gathering evidence of disciplinary  45  INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 infractions.  But in cases of a potential criminal violation, it is absolutely necessary that the internal affairs investigator coordinate officer interviews with the County Prosecutor’s Office.  8.0.7
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  STATE CASES  David v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 360 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 2003) .........................................................  2  Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 150 N.J. 225 (1997) ..............................................................................  1, 2, 4 Plaza Bottle Shop, Inc. v. Al Torstrick Ins. Agency, 712 S.W.2d 349 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) .......................................................... 6 Plemmons v. Blue Chip Ins. Servs., Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 551 (App. Div. 2006) ....................................................... 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Quarto v. Adams, 35 N.J. Super. 502 (App. Div. 2007) .......................................................... 3 Shaw v. Shand, 460 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2019) ....................................................... 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 Williams-Hopkins v. Medwell, LLC, No.A-0273-21, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 569 (2024) ......................... 5 FEDERAL CASES McCray v. Sanders, No. 20-12370, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11307 (D.N.J. Jan. 21, 2022) ............ 4 STATUTES N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29 ...........................................................................  6 N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -210 .............................................................................  1  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] [...] also informed the employees that they were allowed to adjust their schedules if they had concerns about traveling on mass transit.  Pa048; DSOF ¶ 19.  During the meeting, employees expressed concerns about mass transit during rush hour times and as a result they were given permission to alter the scheduled hours.  No concerns about being in the office or office building were brought up by the employees.  Pa048; DSOF ¶ 20.  At no time during this meeting did any employee communicate the existence of any reason that would prevent them from being able to report to the office including any medical or mental disability.  Pa049; DSOF ¶ 21.  Later that same day, at 4:07 p.
[brief] (Pa55 to Pa58).  When interpreting a statute, a court should give first consideration “to the plain language of the statute” and “ascribe to the statutory language its ordinary meaning.  D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 192 N.J. 110, 119 (2007).  The court’s “goal in the interpretation of a statute is always to determine the Legislature’s intent.
[directive] Specifically, the Court stated:  The critical question at a hearing that is reopened is not whether the initial detention decision was correct, but whether the circumstances at the time of the later hearing warrant a defendant’s continued detention.  In the words of the statute, does the new information have a “material bearing” on the standard that governs release decisions?  That issue, in turn, calls for a renewed examination of whether any combination of conditions would reasonably assure against the risk of non-appearance, danger, or obstruction in light of delays caused by the pandemic.  N.J.S.A. 2A:162- 18, -19(f).  [Id. at 20.]  The Court explained that trial courts can assess those risks by considering the following factors: (1)  The length of detention to date as well as the projected length of ongoing detention;1  (2)  Whether a defendant has been or will be in detention longer than the likely amount of time the person would actually spend in jail if convicted; (3)  The existence and nature of a plea offer; (4)  A defendant’s particularized health risks, if any, and whether they COVID-192; present a heightened risk the individual will contract and (5)  Other factors relevant to pretrial detention that are outlined in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20.3  [Id. at 20-24.]  Additionally, the Court stated:  A number of the above five factors might well have an effect on whether 1  The Court noted that “The Judiciary is committed to restart jury trials as soon as practicable…  That said, it is difficult to be precise in estimating the projected length of detention at this time because of the ongoing and evolving nature of the pandemic. ”  Id. at 20-21.  2  The Court explained that “As part of their analysis, courts may consider whether a defendant’s health has deteriorated since the detention hearing and is now more susceptible to serious health consequences in jail -- including a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19 -- and how that might affect the risk of non-appearance, danger, or obstruction a defendant poses.  This factor does not encompass a generalized fear of contracting COVID-19 or some other illness in jail. ”  Id. at 23.  3  The Court explained that “N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20 … lists various factors courts may take into account at the original detention hearing.  Trial judges are not required to reassess all of them anew at a reopened hearing.  In some instances, for example, the nature and seriousness of the offense will remain the same.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(a).  But other factors might have changed with the passage of time, such as the strength of the State’s case.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(b).  It might be weaker if a witness is no longer available, or stronger as a result of additional evidence gathered during an expanded investigation. ”  Id. at 23-24.  Directive # 05-21 February 12, 2021
[brief] ”)  Thus, [...]’s state of mind in answering Question 4 on the Supplemental Form is irrelevant.  Intervenor does not cite to any case law stating otherwise.  Finally, even if [...] was confused by this simple, objective question, it was [...]’ role to exercise the “requisite skill and diligence” as [...]’s insurance broker to identify the risks for which [...] sought insurance coverage (i.e., rental vehicles), and to then ensure [...] provided the material information within its knowledge necessary to obtain coverage for such risks.
[brief] [...] CREDIBLE SHOWING OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE, PROVES THE STATE PRODUCE NO EVIDENCE INCrimINATING [...].  THE STATE HAD DESCRIPTION OF THE KILLER IN VIDEO AND [...] SEEN KILLER.  THE CLOTHING IN VIDEO WERE ABSOLUTELY DISSIMILAR FROM MR. [...]’S.  The specifics of this case cannot be ignored, the uncontested facts in this case, like, the other suspects, people in black car, and [...] irrational testimony.  It is obvious as it is tragic that mistaken convictions have disastrous effects for the unjustly accused.
[brief] Pa1-24.  This appeal follows.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT  ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT [...] (Pa1-3, 6-12).  Based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant [...] intentionally required non-management employees to park in the most distant section of the expansive parking lot, without providing those employees with pedestrian safeguards, even though [...] was aware that pedestrian safeguards and traffic control devices were needed and were provided in other similarly-configured parts of the busy hospital lot where administrators, physicians, and patients were permitted to park.
[brief] As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s specific performance claim must fail if the Township did not breach the Agreement because specific performance, together with restitution and compensatory damages is among those “judicial remedies upon breach of contract”.  *Totaro, Duffy, Cannova & Co. v. Lane. Middleton & Co.*, 191 N.J. 1, 12 (2007).  A party seeking specific performance must establish that: (1) the contract at issue is valid and enforceable; (2) the terms of the contract are clear, such that the court can determine with reasonable certainty “the duties of each party and the conditions under which performance is due;” (3) an order compelling performance would not be “harsh or oppressive” to the defendant; and (4) a denial of specific performance would leave the plaintiff without an adequate remedy.
[brief] The trial court correctly held that [...] must arbitrate his claims because he signed the account application and thereby agreed to the DAA’s terms, including the arbitration provision.  Both the FAA and New Jersey law favor arbitration and require courts to enforce contractual arbitration provisions according to their terms.  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011); Frumer v. Nat’l Home Ins. Co., 420 N.J. Super. 7, 13 (App. Div. 2011) (“New Jersey law comports with its federal counterpart in striving to enforce arbitration agreements. ” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).  Thus, the FAA, case law, and public policy all favor arbitration here.
[brief] 41  United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) ............................................................  12  STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2.1b ..................................................................................................  7 N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1) ...............................................................................................  1, 7 N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) ...............................................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(2) ...............................................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(3) ...............................................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) ...................................................................................................  2, 47 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(9)  ...............................................................................................  45 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(8)  ...............................................................................................  45  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(9)  ...............................................................................................  45  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Count  3 of the Complaint alleges that the [...] arrested and prosecuted Plaintiff because he was Black in violation of the public accommodations provisions of the N.J. Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq.; N.J.S.A. 10:5-4; N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)(1).  Pa15-Pa16.  The purported factual basis for this allegation is that the [...] was “fully aware of [the officers’] propensity to engage in said unlawful activities and never properly trained and supervised them. ”  Pa015, ¶¶3, 4.  There are several reasons to affirm the dismissal of this claim.  First, as explained supra, [...] and [...] had valid reasons for questioning Plaintiff during the early morning hours of February 20, 2020, and they were fully justified in making the arrest and applying limited force to restrain and handcuff Plaintiff.  Second, although the Complaint contends that the [...] had notice of the alleged “propensity” of [...] and [...] to discriminate and nonetheless failed to train them, Plaintiff has produced no evidence whatsoever to support this claim.  As mentioned supra, Plaintiff did not take any depositions, nor did he present any evidence of notice of the alleged propensity, nor did he retain an expert witness on the issue of inadequate training.  Lastly, Plaintiff is relying on hearsay to support this claim.  Plaintiff’s appendix includes several newspaper articles, dating back as far as 2012, concerning Edison police officers who allegedly engaged in misconduct in the past.  Pa561-Pa625.  This appeal pertains to a review of a summary judgment in favor of the [...].  To defeat the motion, Plaintiff was required to respond with “relevant and admissible evidence. ”  El-Sioufi v. St. Peter’s University Hospital, 382 N.J. Super. 145, 164 (App. Div. 2005).  “[N]ewspaper articles are obvious and unreliable hearsay. ”  State v. Smith, 306 N.J. Super. 370, 377 (App. Div. 1997).  “The general rule is that articles in newspapers and periodicals are inadmissible because of their hearsay character. ”  State v. Banta, 188 N.J. Super. 115, 117 (Law Div. 1982).  It goes without saying that Plaintiff’s reliance upon newspaper reports is improper and the articles should be disregarded.  There was a complete absence of proofs on this cause of action and this claim was properly dismissed on summary judgment.  POINT VI
[brief] There was no reason for [...] to have to sue [...] in a derivative shareholder action in order to challenge the new management’s decision to place their personal legal fees on the books as a company liability for valuation purposes.  This argument is made because there is no counter to the impropriety of having argued to the Chancery Court that the ‘business judgment rule’ allowed a self-interested management vote that violated New Jersey’s public policy and shifted Plaintiffs’ legal fees by an $800,000 discount to equity.  (11T15:17-16:16)(Da3196)  It was error for the Court to allow Plaintiffs to usurp judicial control over fee awards in that way.  [...] apparently concedes the limits of the business judgment rule against self-dealing and unlawful actions, and makes this new argument.
[brief] If no action or proceeding questioning the validity of the ordinance and the actions authorized thereby shall be commenced or instituted within 20 days hereof, the county and the school district and all other municipalities within the county and all residents and taxpayers and owners of property therein shall be forever barred and foreclosed from instituting or commencing any action or proceeding in any court questioning the validity or enforceability of the ordinance or the validity or enforceability of acts authorized under the ordinance, and the ordinance and acts authorized by the ordinance shall be conclusively deemed to be valid and enforceable in accordance with their terms and tenor.  (emphasis supplied).
[directive] List any other promises or representations that have been made by you, the prosecutor, your defense attorney, or anyone else as a part of this plea of guilty:  Enimere nenpot ki lot pwomes oswa reprezantasyon komise gouvenman fe w, avoka ladefans te fe, oswa nenpot ki lot moun ki fe pati deklarasyon koupab sa a:  22.  Have any promises other than those mentioned on this form, or any threats, been made in order to [Yes/Wi] [No/Non] cause you to plead guilty?  Apa de pwomes ki mansyone sou fom sa a, eske yo fe w kek pwomes, oswa menas pou fose w deklare w koupab?  23.  a.Do you understand that the judge is not bound by any promises or recommendations of the [Yes/wi], [No/Non] prosecutor and that the judge has the right to reject the plea before sentencing you and the right to impose a more severe sentence?  Eske w konprann ke jij Ia gen obligasyon swiv okenn nan pwomes oswa rekomandasyon komise gouvenman an Ii Ii fe.  Epi tou, jij la gendwa rejte deklarasyon koupab la anvan pwononse santans la epi gendwa enpoze yon santans pi estrik?  Revised Fonn Promulgated by 12/31/2019 Supplement to Directive #01-18, CN 10079-Haitian Creole
[brief] **B. October 26, 2017 Meeting.**  At the October 26, 2017 hearing, the Board spent a substantial amount of time deliberating the question of equity.  *See* 2T.  Notably, several Board members thought that [...]’s unit had less value than other units because he is a protected tenant under the Tenant Protection Act (“TPA”) and the Ordinance.  *See id.*  [...]’s counsel argued that the actual value of [...]’s unit should be zero.  *Id.*  However, the Board determined, upon the advice of counsel, that if the value of the unit was determined to be zero because of the Ordinance, then the Ordinance would be confiscatory and would violate State law.  *Id.* at 14:1-6.  The Board did not, however, make a final determination regarding equity at the October 26, 2017 meeting.