ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In fact, the Hudson case currently has a suppression motion scheduled that is identical to the issues presented in a suppression motion that the defendant filed in this case, which was denied on May 7, 2024.  The State in the Hudson case filed a motion to estop the defendant’s suppression motion, arguing issue preclusion.  The Hudson judge denied the State’s estoppel motion, and scheduled the suppression motion, identical to this case, for February 14, 2025.  The [...] filed an emergent application to this Court, which was denied on January 29.  (Ma40 to 41).  A conflicting decision in the Hudson case on identical suppression facts and issues would create confusion and potentially undermine finality of the Union Court’s suppression decision.  by admitting the evidence that he stole the Audi-getaway car three days prior, along with evidence of the BMW stolen at the same time and the sneakers worn during both incidents.  That evidence cannot fairly be limited to just a few pictures of an Audi on defendant’s phone and Instagram without any mention of the April 20 incident or the other corroborative evidence of defendant’s involvement in it.  This is because the picture of the Audi on defendant’s phone does not show the license plate or any other unique identifiers.  So the defense will be able to defeat the evidence by arguing that it is a different Audi, and in no way connects defendant to the Elizabeth carjacking.  And the visible license plate of the Audi will leave the jury with the impression that the registered owner of the Audi—in actuality a victim of the theft—should be considered as a suspect and the police did not do a thorough investigation into a potential suspect.  A lot of the evidence in this case is necessary in the Hudson case to show that defendant had the stolen Audi three days after it was taken, resulting in two separate overlapping trials—a lack of judicial economy.
[brief] (1T28-15 to 16, 114-4 to 11, 115-14 to 24).  The officer exited his vehicle and asked defendant to come outside.  (1T29-9 to 10).  [...] wanted to speak to defendant again due to his shaking, avoidance of eye contact, and constricted pupils.  He also wanted to ask defendant about the out-of-state warrant.  [...] suspected that defendant might have been under the influence.  (1T116-18 to 20, 121-5 to 11, 133-13 to 19).  Once outside the vehicle, defendant stood around unrestrained smoking a cigarette, though he still appeared nervous.  His pupils were still constricted.  (1T29-12 to 14; V:16:58:00 to 58:11).  The officer initially asked where defendant was traveling, and defendant claimed he was going to New York.  The officer observed, “Your eyes are like pinholes right now,” to which defendant explained that he needed his insulin or something to eat.  The officer then asked defendant about the “trouble” he got into in Montana.  Defendant responded that the trouble was attributable to “stupid choices” meaning “drugs. ”  The officer asked if any drugs were in his car or on his person.  Defendant denied having any drugs.  (V:16:58:11 to 59:07).  Next, [...] asked for consent to search the car.
[brief] Apply that concept to the [...] circumstance of a private party seeking, multiple times, to redeem its property, before and after a final judgment.  Is a private property owner’s rights subservient to any a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice?  Are no circumstances, such as those displayed by the Defendant’s attempts to redeem, and the value of its investment in the property, worthy of a higher calling than [...]?  Tax sale certificate holders, as the Plaintiff, and an investor, [...], purchasing property derived from a tax sale foreclosure, should be aware at purchase, “that the right to equity cannot be relied upon because it is not perfected, but anticipate obtaining a high yield interest rate, as most properties are redeemed, *Cronecker* at 189 N.J. 329.  Whether the recent decision in *Roberto* is or not “pipeline” retroactive, for purpose of the equitable argument of the Defendant, it is the pedestal that the United States Supreme Court and the New Jersey appellate court in *Roberto*, cloaked a private party facing an act of forfeiture sought to protect private property interests, that are just as meaningful and relevant to the case before this Court.  The *Roberto* decision, rightly or wrongly can be read to countenance under a Rule 4:50-1 motion, a basis to vacate a judgment of tax sale that affects property rights, if the defendant owner has equity in the property and ability to redeem.  Courts have allowed pre-judgment and post-judgment motions with the condition to allow the property owner to sell the property (or another) to raise the redemption funds or refinance, each process extending the time to redeem.  In the facts presented to the trial court, the ability to redeem, when sought, prior to and timely after judgment, was never in question.  CONCLUSION
[brief] [...] does not deny agreeing to the January Terms on April 1, 2021.  *(See Da197–200; Da221–22 ¶ 9.)*  Nor does she disclaim her digital representation to [...] (by checking the box) that she “reviewed” the January Terms of Use—including the arbitration agreement—before agreeing to them.  *(See id.)*  The January Terms too stated that most disputes, including personal injury disputes, “will be settled by binding arbitration between you and [...], and not in a court of law. ”  *(Da228.)*  They also stated: “You acknowledge and agree that you and [...] are each waiving the right to a trial by jury. ”  *Id.*  This Court already found in *Williams* that the January Terms satisfied *Atalese* and created an enforceable contract.  2023 WL 5768422 at *4.  [...] thus had adequate notice in April 2021 that her arbitration agreement with [...] waived her right to a jury trial on most disputes with [...].  And having received that notice several months prior, [...] cannot claim not to understand the December Terms merely because [...] did not repeat precisely the same explanatory language that it had already provided to her.  [...]’s knowing and voluntary waiver of her jury trial right is not erased through a subsequent (and independently sufficient) amendment to the same arbitration agreement with the same counterparty.  Cf. Hamilton v. [...] Techs., Inc., No. 22-cv-6917, 2023 WL 5769500, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2023) (even though plaintiff no longer had an [...] account, he was charged with understanding the provisions of the Terms of Use he had “previously entered” with [...]).  [...]—a practicing attorney—has never even claimed that she did not know that by agreeing to arbitrate she was giving up her right to a jury trial.
[brief] On October 21, 2022, [...] commenced this action by filing a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs.  (Da1-14.)  Significantly, [...] was the only named plaintiff.  (Da1.)  On November 30, 2022, [...] filed an Answer and Separate Defenses.  (Da15-24.)  [...]’ responsive pleading included an Affirmative Defense alleging that “Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue the claims alleged in the Complaint. ”  (Da22.)  On January 27, 2023, [...] filed its Trial Brief.  On May 8, 2023, [...] filed its Trial Brief.  On June 5, 2023, [...] filed its reply Trial Brief.  On June 5, 2023 – the same day [...] filed its reply Trial Brief, thereby concluding the trial briefing – [...] (“[...]”) filed a motion to intervene.
[brief] [...] claimed to possess “a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the pornographic material he unloosed into the electronic stream of commerce when he emailed two photographs of an under-aged nude girl in an exposed position to fifty-one chat room subscribers. ”  *Id.* at 368.  The Supreme Court rejected [...]’s argument, noting the well-established proposition that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ”  *Id.* at 369 (brackets and ellipsis in original) (quoting *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).  When information is revealed to a third party, then “[i]f that third-party discloses the information to the government, the individual, who falsely believed his confidence would be maintained, will generally have no Fourth Amendment claim. ”  *Ibid.*  When defendant gave [...] his gun, he acted “at peril” that she “would disclose his wrongdoing.  There is no constitutional protection for misplaced confidence or bad judgment when committing a crime. ”  *Id.* at 370.  For this reason, the judge correctly denied defendant’s motion to suppress.
[brief] ’”  Hill v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corr. Com’r Fauver, 342 N.J. Super. 273, 309 (App. Div. 2001) (citing Matter of Petition for Rev. of Opinion 552 of Advisory Comm. on Pro. Ethics, 102 N.J. 194, 204 (1986)).  “Disqualification of counsel is a harsh discretionary remedy which must be used sparingly. ”  Cavallaro v. Jamco Prop. Mgmt., 334 N.J. Super. 557, 572  Thus, “[m]otions to disqualify are typically disfavored because they ‘can have such drastic consequences. ’”  *H & H Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Tomei*, No. A-4209-19, 2021 WL 6132769, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 29, 2021) (*citing Rohm & Haas Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co.*, 187 F. Supp. 2d 221, 226 (D.N.J. 2001)).  When deciding a motion to disqualify counsel the movant bears the burden of proof that disqualification is appropriate.
[brief] All of the other Defendant Township Committee Members similarly admit that they were aware of no specific allegation of wrongdoing from anyone regarding Plaintiff’s actions or purported inaction on the night of the July 5, 2016 incident, which includes the absence of any allegation against Plaintiff that he engaged in an act of racial profiling or bias, or excessive use of force.  (Deposition of [...] 24:22-25:14 & 29:25-30:4, 712a-714a; see also Deposition of [...] 29:15-21, 745a; 54:2-16, 752a; see also Deposition of [...] 47:11-48:14, 800a).  [...] denied having any knowledge of anything [...] said or did that exhibited any racial bias or profiling on the night of July 5, 2016, and he had no basis to think that occurred.  ([...] Dep. 45:20-46:1, 629a-630a; 46:22-25, 630a).  Then-Mayor [...] was similarly aware of no such allegation against Plaintiff, or any complaint that Plaintiff failed to act when he should have.  ([...] Dep. 44:8-14 & 48:11-17, 677a-678a).  The [...] (“[...]”) investigated Plaintiff’s conduct during the July 5, 2016 incident and advised Defendants via letter that “there is insufficient credible evidence to warrant a criminal prosecution in this matter.  In addition, the investigation and a review of all information failed to disclose sufficient evidence to clearly prove or disprove the allegation and it is closed as not sustained. ”  (303a).  Plaintiff similarly received a letter from [...] Deputy Chief [...] advising him that there was insufficient evidence to establish either a criminal or an administrative disciplinary action against him.  (498a).  Gallagher acknowledged that in addition to finding insufficient evidence to sustain a criminal prosecution of Plaintiff, the [...] also concluded that any administrative allegations against Plaintiff that could result in disciplinary action were “not sustained”.
[brief] 2.  Pursuant to the New Jersey Municipal Land Use Law (including N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7 (e)), the said Ordinance has been forwarded to the Planning Board for a) a determination on the consistency with the Master Plan and b) a determination as to any other relevant questions / comments / concerns.  3.  The matter was presented to the Land Use Board on February 8, 2021.
[brief] *Pub. Citizen*, at 455 (“Looking beyond the naked text for guidance is perfectly proper when the result it apparently decrees . . . seems inconsistent with Congress’ intention, since the plain-meaning rule is ‘rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists. ’”).  Under such circumstances, a court should decline to apply the literal interpretation of the statute and presume “the legislature intended exceptions to its language [that] would avoid results of this character.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This matter is presented on appeal from a final summary judgment order of the Superior Court, Law Division, Morris County vicinage.  In short, this case involves a winter slip and fall personal injury matter that occurred on a sidewalk outside an unoccupied, under renovation property where the appellant suffered serious personal injuries.  In our initial moving papers, we respectfully submitted that the Trial Court’s decision was erroneous for two reasons.  First, we argued that there were disputed material facts improperly resolved by Trial Court in favor of the movant, in violation of the standards set forth in Brill v. Guardian Life, 142 N.J. 520, 522 (1995).  Second, we respectfully submitted that the law applied by the Trial Court was inappropriate because the property involved in plaintiff’s injury was not a residence at the time of the incident, rather it was more like a “commercial property. ”  In this case, the Plaintiff/Appellant seeks justice under unique circumstances that we submit require the Appellate Division to take a closer look at the applicable law.  As we have previously argued, the reason this case does not present the typical winter weather, fall-down personal injury case is because the property involved in this case was not a “residence” at the time of the accident, and instead was an unoccupied commercial-like property under renovation.
[brief] (Pa049-Pa065).  After issuance of the complaints, the Board and [...] each submitted its “Answer and Affirmative Defenses” on March 13, 2023.  (Pa010-Pa015); (Pa044-Pa048).  On June 15, 2023, the Parties presented a “Joint Stipulation of Facts” with exhibits attached for [...] to rely upon for the subsequent motions for summary decision.  (Pa001-Pa009; Pa017-Pa035; Pa049-Pa213).  As the Parties agreed to forgo an evidentiary hearing, on July 21, 2023, the Parties each submitted briefs in support of their unfair practice charges.  On October 26, 2023, [...] issued the Decision and Order.  [...] held that the Board violated N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(a)(1) and –(a)(5) by its refusal to meet with the [...] in the presence of the [...]’s Bargaining Council members.  [...] also dismissed the Board’s unfair practice charges against the [...].  Accordingly, [...] ordered the Board to cease and desist from refusing to negotiate in good faith with the [...].  (Pa215-Pa246).  On December 21, 2023, the Board filed an Amended Notice of Appeal with the Appellate Division to contest [...]’s Decision and Order.  (Pa247-Pa250).  Notwithstanding the Board’s appeal of [...]’s determination, the Parties have been negotiating on a successor CNA.  The [...]’s Bargaining Council has participated as part of the [...]’s negotiations team during the negotiated sessions without reported issues.  STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
[brief] As noted above, the second component of [...]’s June 23, 2021 HAD is determining whether the Project “is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act. ”\textsuperscript{48}  And this second component is a question of fact and thus subject to the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review.  Here, the extent of [...]’s analysis appears to just be the following two points:  -  **Point #1:**  “After a careful review of the information submitted, it has been determined that the Project described above qualifies for Exemption No. 11 for ‘routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair or upgrade of public utility lines, rights-of-way, or systems by a public utility, provided that the activity is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act. ’”  Aa0001 (emphasis added) - **Point #2:**  “Additionally, the Department received positive comments from the [...] on October 16, 2020.  Therefore, the proposed Project is deemed exempt from the provisions of the Highlands Rules, subject to the following limitation(s)...”  Aa0002 (emphasis added)  Regarding Point #2, [...] is in no way obligated to defer to the [...]’s comments (in which it did “find that the \textsuperscript{48} N.J.A.C. 7:38-2.3(a)(11). project is consistent with the goals of the Highlands Act. ”  Aa0330.  In the 2013 case of *Highlands Applicability*, the Appellate Division pointed out that “[...] is charged with the responsibility to ‘formulate comprehensive policies for the conservation of the natural resources of the State, the promotion of environmental protection and the prevention of pollution of the environment of the State. ’”  Therefore, it is [...] – not the [...] – that makes the final determination of whether the Project is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act.
[brief] These findings did not exist in the previous MRI studies that were completed prior to the Appellant’s 2019 MVA.  An Independent Orthopedic Evaluation completed by [...] in 2022, reviewed the prior MRI reports dated May 18, 2013, March 13, 2014, April 1, 2017, and December 26, 2018.  (Da71).  These four MRI studies were completed in various years prior to the 2019 MVA.  A summary of the findings from [...]’s review of the prior MRI studies is as follows:  1.  According to [...]’s review of the MRI studies, dated April 1, 2017, at C3-C4, he observed that “there was a posterior disc bulge causing pressure on the anterior thecal sac.  There was no canal stenosis.  Facet joint degenerative changes were present, but there was no foraminal stenosis present. ” (Da71 – Da72).  2.  At C4-C5, [...], upon his review of the same MRI report, dated, April 1, 2017, observed that “[t]here was a posterior complex of an osteoarthritic spurt and a herniated disc causing pressure on the aterritorial thecal sac. ” (Da72).  However, this is a different herniated disc mentioned in [...]’s report, suggesting that the new herniation was as a result of the 2019 MVA.  3.  At C6-C7, [...], upon his review of the same MRI report, dated, April 1, 2017, observed that “[t]here was no evidence of any herniated disc or canal stenosis. ” (Da72).  4.  At L4-L5, [...], upon his review of the same MRI report, dated, May 18, 2013, observed that “there was a disc bulge posteriorly causing some pressure on the anterior thecal sac, but there was no can stenosis or neuroforaminal stenosis present. ” (Da73).  5.  At T12-L1, there was no mention of a new disc bulge in the prior MRI studies.  Based on the findings from the prior MRI results, as reviewed and summarized in from [...]’s report (Da67 – Da75) and the MRI results after the 2019 MVA, there are new findings that were causally linked to the accident in [...]s’ report.  This is objective evidence of a Category 6 permanent injury that has been causally linked to the 2019 MVA and should have been sufficient within itself to overcome the verbal threshold.
[brief] Id. at 450 (citing Kennedy v. City of Newark, 29 N.J. 178, 187 (1959)).  See also Summer, supra, 53 N.J. at 554 (“[A]n intent to occupy the field must appear clearly. ”); Mannie’s Cigarette Service, Inc. v. Township of West New York, 259 N.J. Super. 343, 348 (App. Div. 1992); McGovern v. Borough of Harvey Cedars, 401 N.J. Super. 136, 149 (App. Div. 2008).  A review of the statutes, their history, and the case law interpreting them is warranted to demonstrate that the statutory grant of authority under which the Borough proceeded in adopting Ordinance 17-2017 is not preempted by another source of statutory authority, however, before doing so we should first note that the Court below, in several places in its decision, states that the preemption occurs not only because the Legislature adopted a more comprehensive field or scheme, but, also, that preemption occurs because the [...] has adopted an ordinance which deals with, to a certain degree, noise nuisances.  Da60; Da80; Da88.  It is important to note at the outset that preemption does not arise because some other local government entity has chosen to regulate in the field, even if its jurisdiction overlaps with a municipal governing body.  Preemption only arises where the State Legislature has acted to enact and to establish a comprehensive and pervasive scheme that does not allow for other regulation.  In short, preemption does not and cannot exist by the fiat of a body of local government enacting an ordinance, code or a resolution.  It only exists if the State Legislature has acted to preclude other forms of rule or prescription.  Hence, the Trial Court’s reference to the [...] action preempting Ordinance 17-2017 should not withstand scrutiny.  The [...] cannot preempt a field.  Only the State Legislature can.
[brief] (Da1-2).  In his oral opinion, [...] found that the cases relied upon by defendant, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) and Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. 586 (2018), pertained to situations in which police acted without a warrant, whereas in the matter at hand, the GPS was installed pursuant to a warrant.  (Pa2-3).  The judge additionally stated that if the car had been in a closed garage, suppression would have been appropriate.  (Pa2).  In March 2024, defendant moved for reconsideration.  (Da25).  In addition to Jones and Collins, defendant cited Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) for the proposition that “the property of everyman [is] sacred” and that “no man can set his foot upon his neighbor’s close without his leave. ” (Da27).  On May 30, 2024, [...] found that there was “an implied invitation to enter one’s driveway,” and that “lots of people go up the driveways now,” including “[t]he Amazon delivery guy, DoorDash, the pizza delivery guy, . . . UPS, the Postal Service. ”  (Pa5).  The Judge characterized defendant’s motion as “a second bite at the apple” and denied reconsideration.  (Pa8-9).  Defendant applied for leave to appeal, which was denied.  (Da33).  Thereafter, defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, and on October 1, 2024, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Appellate Division for consideration on the merits.
[brief] Here, [...] not only satisfied the plaintiff-friendly standard, it also met the more “stringent requirements” necessary to show that its damages were proximately caused by [...]’ breach of fiduciary duty.  It is undisputed in this action that the [...], while directors of [...], formed [...] for the express purpose of purchasing the Share without [...]’s knowledge or authorization (itself a breach of their duty of loyalty to [...]).  The [...] further violated their fiduciary obligations to [...] on multiple occasions: by (1) facilitating [...]’s purchase of the Share for $250,000 instead of pursuing the opportunity on [...]’s behalf; (2) failing to transfer the Share to [...] for $250,000; (3) aiding [...]’s commencement and prosecution of the action underlying this appeal; and, (4) ultimately forcing [...] to expend to pay One Million Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Fifty Dollars and Fifty-Five Cents ($1,250,050.55) more than it would have had to pay but for the [...]’ actions.