ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On January 7, 2022, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed suit against the Defendants.  (Pa1-Pa8)  Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint on February 18, 2022.  (Pa9-Pa17)  Written discovery was exchanged, and the depositions of the parties took place.  Discovery in this matter ended on January 11, 2024, and a Trial date was scheduled for April 1, 2024.  Thereafter, on January 26, 2024, Defendants moved for summary judgment solely based on the duty owed to the Plaintiff.  (Pa20-Pa27)  Oral argument of the summary judgment motion was entertained by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on March 1, 2024.  (1T)  The Court granted summary Judgment on that same day, with the decision supported by the reasons set forth on the record during the Oral Argument. \(^1\) (Pa303)  On March 19, 2024, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration.  (Pa304-Pa313)  Oral argument of the Motion for Reconsideration was heard on April 12, 2024\(^2\).  Reconsideration was denied by way of Order dated April 16, 2024.  (Pa318-Pa320)  --- \(^1\)  Transcript date and volume designation: March 1, 2024  1T  \(^2\)  Transcript date and volume designation: April 12, 2024  2T  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Freeman, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1127, supra. (slip op. at 15-18).  [...]’s analysis also addressed two arguments similar to arguments raised by [...] herein.  First, [...] addressed the reliance upon a February 22, 1973 “Circular Letter Automobile No. 9” issued by the [...].  [...] noted that the circular, roughly 40 years old at the time, predated the adoption of N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 as well as the NJ Supreme Court decision in Perreira and could not be considered as reflective of the current Legislative intent, statutory authority or interpretation.  While not referenced by [...], it is worth noting that [...] responded to the NJ Supreme Court decision in Perreira, issuing Bulletin No. 01-11 to all New Jersey licensed health carriers directing them immediately to cease all subrogation and recovery efforts against persons covered by group or individual contracts or policies issued in New Jersey, except to the extent permitted by N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97, regardless of whether these contracts include subrogation or reimbursement provisions.  *Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Freeman*, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1127, supra. (slip op. at 17-18).  The second point addressed by [...] was the argument that [...] should be estopped from arguing that med-pay subrogation was barred by N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 because it had filed actions to recover med-pay expenses in the three preceding years from other automobile insurers.  [...] discussed the extraordinary remedy of judicial estoppel along with the uncertain facts submitted by *Mid-Century*.  The Court concluded that the proofs submitted did not warrant the application of judicial estoppel.  *Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Freeman*, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1127, supra. (slip op. at 18-22).
[brief] And waving hands, slapping tables, and pointing out ways in which defendant's story is inconsistent with his own statements and with normal human behavior is not impermissibly overbearing.  Nor is the use of curse words or shouting.  Indeed, defendant's claim that he -- a twenty-six-year-old man who grew up in a rough area in Jersey City, whose own criminal behavior began when he was a juvenile, and who himself cursed multiple times during the interview -- had his will overborne by the detective's cursing, raised voice, and gesticulating is beyond belief.  Certainly his sensibilities were not so delicate.
[brief] (3T31-23 to 32-6; 3T102-14 to 104-13).  After defendant was charged, the calls stopped for a period of time, until the victim received about thirteen more calls from defendant over three days in April of 2022.  (3T38-5 to 39-15; Pa8-11).  This time, defendant was calling on the victim’s personal cell phone, which defendant apparently got from discovery.  (3T38-14 to 39-1).  The victim picked up the calls, and when he recognized defendant’s voice, he hung up.  (3T39-20 to 25).  But on one occasion that the victim picked up, he decided to speak with defendant, and his wife recorded the call.  (3T39-20 to 40-7; 3T42-1 to 44-6; Pa8-11).  The victim testified that he, again, felt “harassed,” “threatened that I was in danger,” and “alarmed. ” (3T44-16; 3T45-9-16).  The victim testified, “I couldn’t believe he got my cell phone number and he was calling me and wouldn’t stop. ” (3T45-9 to 11).  The victim testified that, while he had experienced frustrated litigants before, nothing like this had ever happened to him before, he had never been called or physically threatened, either as a judge or when he had been a municipal prosecutor.  (3T54-12 to 55-17).  Finally, defendant elected to testify at trial, admitting that he had made all of the calls to the victim, and to the court, from his two phones.  (3T186-17 to 25; 3T187-9 to 188-13; 3T190-20 to 191-8).
[brief] Order of the Honorable [...]  Denying Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration  .................................................................  Da003 | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Alhagaly v. Mega Properties at 100-104 Romaine Ave., L.L.C., | 44, 48, 49 | | A-4287-19, 2021 WL 2944837 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 14, 2021) | | | Benjamin H. Realty Corp. v. Young, | 50, 51, 52 | | A-3158-21, 2023 WL 8596172 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 12, 2023), cert. denied, 257 N.J. 233 (2024) | | | Borough of Fort Lee v. Banque Nat’l de Paris, | 43, 44, 45 | | 311 N.J. Super. 280 (App. Div. 1998) | | | Carisi v. Wax, | 45 | | 192 N.J. Super. 536 (Dist. Ct. 1983) | | | Connell v. Connell, | 28 | | A-5645-06T3, 2008 WL 2901855 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 30, 2008) | | | Cumberland Cnty.
[brief] Having approved the Application by vote on August 22, 2022, the Board met again on October 20, 2022 for the purposes of adopting a Resolution of Approval.  (Pa86-96).  At the October 20, 2022 meeting the Board Solicitor presented his overview of the record allegedly created at the August Hearing.  The resolution itself was not read into the record, but the Solicitor summarized it for the Board Members.  There is nothing in the record of the October 20, 2022 meeting to reflect that any of the Board members actually read the Resolution that they voted on and approved for adoption.  In the hearing of October 20, 2022 none of the Zoning Board Members acknowledged on the record that they had received the proposed resolution, had reviewed it and after having reviewed it, agreed with its findings and conclusions 2T6:5 to 2T7:3.  Some of the Board Members voted “Yes, for the reasons stated by the Solicitor. ”  Pa40.  From the record of the approval a fair reading of the transcript leads to the conclusion that the Board Members did not in fact read the proposed resolution.  The Brief of the Zoning Board Defendant makes a statement not supported by any part of the record, “The Resolution was provided to the Zoning Board in advance of the meeting at which was adopted.  Each of the Zoning Board members adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law as the basis for his decision. ”  Zoning Board Defendant’s Brief D12.  The transcript contains nothing to support this baseless allegation and in fact the transcript has no reference to the statement in the aforesaid brief.  ARGUMENT I.
[brief] At Feb. 17, ’23 Hearing, [...] denied my Motion by reiterating and accepting [...]’s wrong Rider rulings w/o addressing my substantiated evidence refuting those rulings (3T, p. 4, line 8, to p. 5, line 9; p. 5, line 22, to p. 6, line 2).  He worsened his invalid denials, & made my filings ripe for Appeal, by stating reconsideration “would be granted if “the decision rests on palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or the court didn’t consider or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence”. ” (3T, p. 6 line 4, to p. 7, line 7).  It is exactly what my reconsideration addressed (See prior par.)  [...] filed Oct. 26, ‘22 applications for Trust payments of $113,497 & [...]’s accounting/commission fees.  I filed oppositions to portions of accounting & commission fees, & all legal fees that were due to work based on 2 Verified Complaints that should NEVER have been filed since Jacobson & [...] should have easily allowed Settlement in 2021, or 2022, for quick results to accept informal accounting & [...]’s discharge, as Co-Trustee.  (303a-322a, At Feb. 17, 2023 Hearing, [...] granted the accounting/commission fees, & a reduced amount of $93,277.54 for the legal fees (3T, p. 8, line 16, to p. 12, line 20; p. 14 to p. 15, line 8).  March 7, 2023  Order confirmed the rulings.
[brief] (200a).  The Complaint alleged that the [...] had wrongfully transferred the asset of [...] to a new entity, [...], in which the [...] were 75% partners and [...] (“[...]” and together with [...], “Plaintiffs”) was a 25% partner, thereby wrongfully excluding Abe [...].  (203a).  The Complaint alleged that Abe [...] had transferred his interest in the Project to [...] and that the [...] had wrongfully refused to recognize [...]’s 25% partnership interest.  (206a).  The Complaint contained six counts, none of which had any reference or suggestion of RICO claims.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 238-39.  The Fair Court asked the Model Criminal Jury Charges Committee to review the model charge, accordingly, indicative of its new rule.  Id. at 239.  Finally, when a decision sets forth a new rule, three factors are considered to determine whether to apply the rule retroactively: ““(1) the purpose of the rule and whether it would be furthered by a retroactive application, (2) the degree of reliance placed on the old rule by those who administered it, and (3) the effect a retroactive application would have on the administration of justice.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, & RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Order Denying Motion to Suppress (July 28, 2022)  ........................................Da 65  Oral Opinion Denying Motion to Suppress (July 28, 2022)  ........2T4-4 to 19-14  Judgment of Conviction and Order for Commitment, [...] (June 6, 2023)  .......................Da 111 to 114  INDEX TO APPENDIX
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons and for all the reasons previously set forth in his initial brief, the Appellant, [...], submits the [...] acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably in determining Appellant was categorically ineligible from receiving deferred retirement benefits and, thus, dismissing his appeal for the same.  Consequently, this Honorable Court must enter an Order reversing the Board’s determination and requiring the Board to conduct an “honorable service” analysis pursuant to Uricoli.  Respectfully Submitted, [...]
[directive] •  Calling to the immediate attention of the supervising firearms instructor any firearm that appears to be faulty.  •  Correctly recording firearms scores attained during the qualification session by each participant under their direct control and providing the supervising firearms instructor with completed daily score sheets.  •  Conducting remedial training of non-qualifying participants under the supervision of a supervising firearms instructor.  •  Providing the supervising firearms instructor with targets used by participants who did not qualify during initial and subsequent qualification attempts.  (Subsequent qualification attempts are those conducted following remedial training.)  These targets are to be signed [by (sic)] both the participant and the firearms instructor.  Section 8.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  ..................................................................................................................  i TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED ........................................ ii  TABLE OF CITATIONS .................................................................................................................. iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .........................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...............................................................................................................  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................................  4  ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................................  7  I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW (NOT ADDRESSED BELOW)  ..............................................................  7  II.  UNLIMITED DID NOT HAVE A DUTY OF CARE OVER THE ICE WHICH ALLEGEDLY CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S FALL (Pa4)  .........................................................................................  7  a.  [...] bore no responsibility for ice removal on the date of the incident ...........................................  8  b.  Plaintiff has not shown that paint made the icy stairs more slippery ..........................................................  9  c.  Plaintiff’s attempt to rely on lay witness opinion testimony to sustain the claim against [...] should be rejected .............................................................................................................  13  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................  16  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] After all, whereas cisgender students typically consistently express their gender identity or expression at home and at school, transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students are far more likely to express a different gender identity or expression at home than they do at school—often because they fear reprisal or harm.  See, e.g., (Da71) (detailing significant percentages of transgender survey respondents who report having unsupportive families, families who kicked them out of the home, and/or family members who engaged in violence against them); (Da79) (study showing that 61% of transgender individuals facing high levels of familial rejection reported having attempted suicide—making them over 300% more likely to attempt suicide than those who experienced low or no family rejection); John & Jane Parents 1 v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 622 F. Supp. 3d 118, 139 (D. Md. 2022) (finding transgender students “could hardly feel safe in an environment where expressing their gender identity resulted in the automatic disclosure to their parents, regardless of their own wishes”), vacated for lack of standing, 78 F.4th 622 (4th Cir. 2023); Cf. Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding police violated teenager’s rights when they threatened to tell his family he was gay, after which he died by suicide).  That evidence suffices at this stage to show that the Amended Policy would likely “unlawfully subject these students to a disparate impact in violation of the LAD. ” (Da107).  And as before, it is striking that Appellants’ opening brief does not deny the Amended Policy would have a disparate impact on transgender students.
[directive] CN: Order by Judge Date  Defendant's Attorney: Prosecutor's Office:  ----------------- ----------------- Name Name --------------- ----------------- Address Address ------------ -------------  Telephone Number Telephone Number ----------------- ------------------  Fax Fax ________________ ----------------  Em ail _ Em ail _________  D No  If yes, language _ Interpreter needed? D Yes _________  If D yes, describe _ No ADA accommodation needed? D Yes of3 page 3 by Published Directive #17~18(11/01/2018), [...] (Competency Order 5)
[brief] Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC v. County of Bergen, 250 N.J. Super. 286, 290 (Spp. Div. 2017)  .........................................................  5 Suarez v. Dosky 171 N.J. Super. 1, 9, 10 (App. Div. 1979) cert. denied 82 N.J. 300 (1980).  ...........................................................................  9, 10-11  Tower Marine, Inc. v. New Brunswick, 175 N.J. Super. 526, 531 (Ch. Div. 1980) ............................................................ 7, 8  Vanchieri v. N.J.Sports & Expos. Auth., 201 N.J. Super. 34, 39-41 (App. Div. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 104 N.J. 80 (1986) .......................................................  16  Wuethrich v Delia, 155 N.J. Super. 324, 326 (App. Div. 1978) certif. den. 77 N.J. 486 (1978) ..........................................................................
[brief] THE TOWNSHIP SHOULD NOT BE PROHIBITED FROM CONTINUING TO HONOR ITS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS WITH BELLEVUE ESTATES, LLC.  Clearly, the Township has a contractual obligation to [...] to exchange property.  If the Township is constrained from conveying the property, it will be subject to litigation initiated by [...].  As a result, the Township, its residents and taxpayers, will be harmed.  The purpose of Ordinances 5-23 and 7-23 is to acquire open space for the benefit and pleasure of the Township, citizens and taxpayers.  Effectively, the property exchange will result in [...] constructing religious-related improvements on properties which the Township found would be in the best interest of its residents in terms of diminishing traffic issues, congestion, etc.  The open space to be acquired by the Township is geographically centered in the [...], so that it can be enjoyed more easily and more often by the Township residents.  To delay the implementation of the Ordinances, including the Ordinances authorizing the acquisition of the property owned by [...], would cause unnecessary hardship and expenses for the Township and its residents.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] ...........................................................................................................20  Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 887 A.2d 1191 (App.Div.2005).........................................................15  Moche v. Levy, No. A-5480-13T2, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 928 (App. Div. Apr. 22, 2016)  .................................................................................................16  MOISAID Techs., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D.N.J. 2004)  ....................................................................................17  Moraes v. Wesler, 439 N.J. Super. 375 (App. Div. 2015)  ...............................................................................14, 15  Mustilli v. Mustilli, 287 N.J. Super. 605 (Ch. Div. 1995) ..................................................................................19  Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 423 N.J. Super. 140 (App. Div. 2011) ..............................................................................14  Notte v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490 (2006)  .............................................................................................................19, 35, 37  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corporation, 116 N.J. 739 (1987) .............................................................................................................18, 35, 36 R.L. v. Voytac, 402 N.J. Super. 392 (App. Div. 2008) ................................................................................17  Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 166 N.J. 391 (2001) ............................................................................................................passim State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245(2021)  .............................................................................................................14  State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48 (2020) ..............................................................................................................14  Union Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J. Super. 141 .............................................................................................................14  Statutes & Other Authorities: N.J. Ct. R. 1:1-2(a)  ..................................................................................................................43  RESPONDENT’S PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Upon the Trial Court’s granting of the motion, [...] filed a “Builder’s Remedy” action under *[...] Communities, Inc. v. [...] and the Planning Board of the [...]*, Docket No. [...], see Pa045a.  The Township and the Board filed denial answers to the Builder’s Remedy action, see Pa046, and filed motion to the trial court seeking reconsideration of the Court’s November 10, 2020 revocation order.  That motion for reconsideration remained pending during further negotiations between the parties, see Pa046a, which negotiations ultimately led to the January 8, 2021, Settlement Agreement, Pa041.
[directive] 3.  Any dispute or objection as to any proposed or ongoing law enforcement operation or activity should be directed by the appropriate school official to the chief executive officer of the law enforcement agency involved.  Where the chief executive officer of the agency is for any reason unable to satisfactorily resolve the dispute or objection, the matter should be referred to the appropriate county prosecutor, who is hereby authorized to work in conjunction with the county superintendent of schools and, where appropriate, the Division of Criminal Justice, to take appropriate steps to resolve the matter.  The county prosecutor shall bear responsibility for the exercise of sound discretion in such matters consistent with the policies announced in this Executive Directive.
[brief] When contaminated property is occupied with some ongoing operations it is not entitled to a reduction of assessed value, but where the property is unoccupied and operations have ceased, it merits a reduction in value.  Pan Chem. Corp. v. Hawthorne Borough, 404 N.J. Super. 401, 412 (App. Div. 2009).  In determining when a property is “in use” or “closed down” for property tax purposes, the Court has said, “[t]he degree to which a property is ‘in use’ or ‘closed down’ cannot be left to subjective standards resulting in inconsistent determinations.  ISRA provides a rational, objective standard by which one can determine whether property is in use for tax purposes, as well as for determining whether the obligation to remediate has been triggered. ”  Id. at 414.  Under ISRA, the Industrial Site Remediation Act, “closing operations” is defined to include “the termination of a lease unless there is no disruption in operations of the industrial establishment, or the assignment of a lease…”  N.J.S.A. 13:1K-8(6).  Thus, even under an objective standard, such as ISRA, the Property discontinued its commercial use once Plaintiff terminated the Lease.  No new use is currently being made of the Property.  Thus, remediation is not a use which would preclude a finding that the commercial use was discontinued.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  3  [...] HOPE  MISSIONARY BAPTIST CHURCH’S RESPONSE TO PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF [...]  4  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  7 RESPONSES TO [...]S  STATEMENT OF FACTS  7  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  THE GRANT OF SUMMARY  JUDGMENT TO [...] SHOULD NOT BE UPHeld BECAUSE THERE WAS A FAILURE TO ADHERE TO THE ADVERSE POSSESSION STANDARD  WHICH HAD IT BEEN ADHERED TO WOULD HAVE OBVIATED  A GRANT OF SUMMARY  JUDGEMENT TO [...]  10  POINT II IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DISMISS [...]’S REQUEST FOR EJECTMENT, TO QUIET TITLE IN THE PROPERTY TO [...] AND TO FIND THAT THE ENTRY ON THIS LAND BY [...] WAS TRESPASS  15  CONCLUSION
[directive] including not limited consider appropriate remedies, but of Criminal Justice to Director.  See also Section manner prescribed by the form as made in the and Notification shall be impact).  effectiveness and evaluation of Bail Reform Law's (ongoing study and 15 or crime while on release flees chaxged with a new thereafter is defendant  In event that the the pretrial detention on the initial pursuant Section 8 or release to revocation of prosecutor seeks and the the of the motions papers to prosecutor sha11 provide a copy the Section 7, pursuant to new charge will decide the court that detention motion even if that court is not denied the pretrial had court that detention motion.