ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Selection of Personnel for the Internal Affairs Function  4.2.1  Personnel assigned to conduct internal affairs investigations should be energetic, resourceful and committed to the agency's mission and the internal affairs function.  They must display a high degree of perseverance and initiative.  The internal affairs investigator must maintain an appropriate balance between professional commitment and personal and group loyalties.  Internal affairs personnel must be of unquestioned integrity and possess the moral stamina to perform unpopular tasks.  It is important that these investigators possess the ability to withstand the rigors and tensions associated with complex investigations, social pressures and long hours of work.  The investigator must possess the ability to be tactful when dealing with members of the agency and the community.  It is recommended that personnel assigned to the internal affairs function provide the agency with the opportunity to access all segments of the community.  For example, if a particular community has a significant proportion of the population that speaks a foreign language, the law enforcement executive may wish to consider assigning an officer to the internal affairs function who speaks that language.  4.2.2  Law enforcement executives should assign personnel to internal affairs who have sufficient experience and rank to effectively handle sensitive investigations that may include investigations of supervising officers.  In addition, law enforcement executives should 16 INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | August 2020 encourage (but need not require) officers to complete a tour in the agency’s internal affairs function prior to promotion to a leadership position in the agency.
[brief] PAGE NOS.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................2  STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................5  A.  The incident ..................................................................................5  B.  The original sentencing hearing ......................................................6  C.  Appellate Division remand for [...] resentencing .........................................................8  D.  The resentencing hearing ...............................................................9  E.  Arguments of counsel ...................................................................13  F.  The resentencing court’s ruling .......................................................14  LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................17
[brief] [...]’ death was not instantaneous like a shot to brain, and he lingered for some amount of time, however short, in pain and helpless.  Any amount of time thus spent is unconscionable.  What matters is that not one member of the [...] bothered to even touch [...], a supposed brother and son, while he lay on their porch, dying.  (29T:184-3 to 186-25, 188-13 to 17, 191-12 to 15; 30T:202-22 to 203-7, 31T:47-9 to 17, 181-17 to 184-20).  This is also why defendant’s claim that, alternatively, he should have had the benefit of a charge instructing the jury that, pursuant to Moon, it is not endangering an injured victim to walk away from a corpse fails.
[brief] Moreover, it is also possible that the footage is actually from earlier on July 16 (or any other day, for that matter).  What if the camera was 24 hours fast instead of 12 hours fast?  The footage would then be from July 16 in the morning.  Even assuming that [...] and [...] are on the footage—which should not be taken for granted given that no one identified either of them—the footage could be from a dispute earlier that day.  If [...] was shot in the evening, an earlier argument would not be probative of the question of who shot [...] or under what circumstances the shooting occurred.  In short, the officer’s bare assertion that the footage is in fact of a different date and time than the footage itself says, without taking any steps to appropriately demonstrate that, is insufficient to authenticate the video as being what the State purports it to be: footage of [...] when he was shot on the evening of July 16, 2019.
[brief] Case law has been defined as a precedent that has been set based on prior judicial decisions rather than specific statutes or regulations.  The court fostered arbitrary analysis in rendering its determination in Kilinc v. Tracfone Inc., 757 F. Supp. 2d 535 W.D. Pa. 2010 No. [...] as it affirmed; “once a CHALLENGE to the sufficiency of service is lodged, (Pa6; Pa10; Pa21; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa41) the party asserting the validity of service BEARS the burden of proof on that issue."  thereby giving legal basis and doctrine for the 1990 Default Judgement ordered void for Service of Process had not been established whereby similar cited cases challenging jurisdiction due to defective service, the default judgments have been deemed void.  The Appellate Division has consistently exercised precedents established in the Third Circuit (cited cases in this appeal) reversing the lower court’s initial denial and has granted the defendant’s motion to void a default judgement in such similar cases.  When Statutes of Limitation for a Civil Rights Violation apply within an individual State “EXCEPTIONS” may be granted such as using the common law doctrine known as the discovery rule, Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483, 492 (1993).
[brief] These prospective residents in both market-rate units and affordable units should be entitled to the same level of development as those residents in any other section of the municipality.  The Respondents’ attempt to maximize the development to include the greatest number of units should not be accomplished at the expense of the very residents the affordable housing regulations are designed to serve; nor should it be done in a manner which undermines the Purpose and General Goals of the VC-2 Zone.  The countless variances included in the Respondents’ Application clearly impede the nature of the development contemplated by the VC-2 zone and undermine the sound planning upon which it was based.  The approval of the Respondents’ Application will result in less light, less air and less open space than required by a conforming plan.  In sum, the Trial Court allowed its disagreement with the Board’s decision to undermine its obligation to follow the clear well-established case law that requires the Trial Court to give deference to the Board, especially in the denial of a use variance.
[brief] In a fenced-in backyard nearby, Officer [...] found the handgun tossed by [...] as he was being pursued by the police.  [...] stayed at the scene of the incident to assist the other officers in recovering items which they observed [...] discard during the pursuit.  On Dwight Street near Bergen Avenue, [...] “observed a wallet next to a chain link fence. ”  He noted that “[i]t didn't look like it had been out there for long because it was raining and the wallet was dry. ”  He picked up the wallet, placed it in a bag and “secured it on [his] person. ”  The wallet contained an identification card in the name of decedent [...].
[brief] ”  Defendants’ counsel stressed to [...], “I specifically highlighted and provided every single question that was in that -- the case was dismissed based on the punch list, okay.  There was 27 question[s] on the punch list.  We went through on February 8th – through the questions, which I provided to the Court in a transcript -- literally question by question for three hours, specifically in which [...] states that this is acceptable, this is acceptable, this is acceptable, this is acceptable.  It's in the transcript, Judge. ”  3T16-18.  But [...] replied, “Whatever he said on February 8 is of no moment …  We're talking about March 6th.
[brief] [...] filed Jan. 19, ‘22 Motion for [...]’s resignation, incl. filing informal final accounting for the record w/[...] & me.  It was filed under [...], which was Estate related Case.  Surrogate indicated it should be filed as Verified Complaint under new docket for the Trust (111a, par. 12&13).  It was when I became aware of these matters (123a, last par.).
[brief] Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.......................Pa839 11-10-22 Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for an Order Permitting Defendants to Substantively Response to Paragraphs 22 to 29, 31 to 67, 69 to 81, 83 to 130, 132 to 146, 148 to 198 and 201 to 242 of Plaintiff [...]’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment or, Alternatively, to Consider Those Paragraphs Unopposed in Conformance with Rule 4:46-2(b)..................Pa842 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ## CASES | Case Name | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------|---------| | Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) | 13 | | DeRitis v. McGarrigle, 861 F.3d 444 (3d Cir. 2017) | 14, 15 | | Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) | 15 | | Hargrave v. Cntv. of Atl., 262 F. Supp. 2d 393 (D.N.J. 2003) | 3 | | Martin v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co., 346 N.J. Super. 320 (App. Div. 2002) | 11 | | Martinelli v. Penn Millers Ins. Co., 269 F. App’x 226 (3d Cir. 2008) | 11 | | Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) | 12, 13, 14 | | Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555 (2010) | 3, 4, 11 | | Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWebber Inc., 197 N.J. 81 (2008) | 1 | | United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) | 13 | ## STATUTES - N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d) .................................................................1, 10 LEGAL ARGUMENT Point I THE FACTS OF RECORD WOULD ALLOW A JURY TO CONCLUDE THAT [...] ENGAGED IN PROTECTED ACTIVITY UNDER THE NJLAD AND THAT DEFENDANTS RETALIATED AGAINST HIM IN WAYS WHICH WOULD DISSUADE A REASONABLE WORKER FROM OPPOSING PRACTICES OR ACTS FORBIDDEN UNDER THE NEW JERSEY LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION AND THE ORDER OF SUMMARY  JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS MUST, THEREFORE, BE REVERSED.
[brief] 1T @27:9-12.  Da100.  On July 12, 2023, Defendant [...] filed a Motion to Dissolve the temporary restraints.  Da135.  Defendant, [...] filed an Affidavit and joined in the motion.  Da140, Da164.  On July 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed opposition to the motion.  Da148.  The return date of the Order to Show Cause and the motion were heard at oral argument on July 25, 2023 before the Trial Court.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  The record is replete with evidence of [...]’s scheme to defraud consumers, including admissions that the resort used illegal waivers and the parol evidence rule to insulate itself from legal ramifications.  Because the Court properly denied [...]'s summary judgment motion, because there is no conflict between the RETA and the CFA, because the jury was properly charged, because [...] was on notice of Plaintiffs’ allegations, and because the Court properly reconsidered its attorneys’ fee award, this Court should deny [...]’s appeal, affirm the court below, and affirm the jury’s award.
[brief] The Plaintiff’s expert, [...] asserts, as a foundation of his original report, that the subject streetlight was reported as being out on multiple occasions months prior to the incident.  (Pa457).  Yet Plaintiff did not produce any witnesses or evidence to indicate that the light was out prior to the subject accident.  Plaintiff’s father, [...], testified that he and the entire family lives at [...], three (3) houses up from the intersection of Central and Prospect Street.  (Pa201).  [...] made no observation of the light being out when he went to the scene of accident while his son was still there.  (Pa204).  [...] testified that he never observed the streetlight out prior to the accident and never reported the light being out to Lodi or [...].  (Pa202-05).  Plaintiff’s mother, [...], has resided in her home for 27 years and never called Lodi or [...] to complain about the light.  (Pa209-14).  She further testified that no neighbor ever discussed the lighting conditions on the street with her.  (Pa209-14).  [...] did not make any observations of the light when she responded to the scene the night of the accident.  (Pa209-14).  [...], Plaintiff’s wife, made no observation of the light being out when she went to the scene of accident while [...] was still there.  (Pa217-18).  [...] testified that she never observed the streetlight out prior to the accident and never reported the light being out to Lodi or [...].  (Pa217-18).
[directive] In cases where the NGRI acquittee cannot be released into the community, with or without conditions, without posing a danger to self, others, of or property a result mental illness, the court must commit the acquittee as pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b )(3).  The NGRI acquittee will be committed into the of of of care and custody the Commissioner the Department Health and confined to an appropriate institution to be treated as a person civilly committed.  The order 1 refers to the NGRI acquittee as an NGRI committee.
[brief] (4/17/23 Transcript @T 41-42).  Board Solicitor [...] gave the following instructions to the Board members prior to the vote:  First thing you need to understand about your role is you get to weigh the weight and credibility of evidence.  So just because it comes before you doesn’t necessarily mean you need to believe it, or give it the same weight that the professional suggests you do.  So that is part of your function is to weigh the evidence...  The proofs have to convince you that one, the application furthers one of the purposes of zoning.
[brief] Between the years of 1980 and 2009, [...] leased parcels of property from the State of New Jersey which would grant [...] access to Route 70 with Old Marlton Pike on the South side and Route 73 to the East.  These parcels accounted for two driveways behind [...].  (3T).  On September 19, 2008, the Court entered an Order for Final Judgment permitting the [...] to exercise its’ power of Eminent Domain and appointing commissioners to fix the compensation to be paid for the [...]’s acquisition of [...]’s leased parcels of property.
[brief] Secondly, defendant argues that the Prosecutor improperly stated defendant “fled the scene. ”  (Db19).  While the prosecutor did use that phrase, he was not implying that defendant went “into hiding,” he explained:  Now, we don't have a handgun.  As [...] testified to, [...] was not arrested until almost a month later.  [...]'s actions are the reason why we don't have a handgun.  [...] was not arrested on the scene.  [...] fled the scene and eventually was not arrested until a month later.  Plenty of time to get your gun, plenty of time to get a new haircut.  Wasn't enough time, though, to get rid of his red lips tattoo on the side of his neck that is still here today.  [(2T77:5-13)].  The prosecutor was not “portraying [defendant] as a guilty man who was on the run,” (Db19) he was explaining to the jury why no handgun was presented to them as evidence, and why defendant’s haircut was different than that shown in the surveillance footage.  Finally, even if deemed improper now – defendant never objected to these innocuous comments below – they were not clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  R. 2:10-2.  Any error was therefore harmless.  Conclusion
[brief] Despite admitting repeatedly that Tenant cured the alleged monetary default that was the sole basis on which Landlord predicated the withholding of the Tenant’s Allowance payments required under the Lease, Landlord still insists, notwithstanding § 4.02, that Tenant should simply never receive those payments (Pb27; Pb36; Pa109).  Under Landlord’s (re)construction of the Lease, the Tenant’s Allowance balance is automatically adjusted to deduct the installment that had been owed if rent happened to be overdue on the date of an installment payment.  Even if the deficient rent is paid and the default cured the Tenant’s Allowance balance deduction remains.  The problem with this interpretation, as already pointed out in Tenant’s opening brief, but which bears repeating, is it renders the Tenant Allowance Offset clause superfluous.  To illustrate using simple numbers, suppose Landlord L owes Tenant T a reimbursement amount of $20 payable in five annual installments of $4 plus interest.  Then suppose that in year three, after the principal balance has been reduced to $12 from the previous two years, T owes L an overdue rent balance of $3 at the time the installment payment becomes due.  Suppose further that the Lease directs that in that situation the $3 T owes L is deducted from the $4 L owes T, bringing the total reimbursement balance down to $8 upon L’s payment of $1 to T.  Now suppose L opts to sue T for the $3 instead and gets it.  Does L still get to take the deduction anyway and bring the reimbursement balance down to $8?  That is the precise scenario presented here with different numbers and Landlord has not and cannot answer how, where, and why the Lease provides Landlord this windfall at Tenant’s expense.  In sum, Tenant’s more sensible interpretation is straightforward.  “Shall” means shall, “Up to” means “as much as. ”  A cured default is cured.  And the omission of any Lease provisions setting forth the situations and circumstances under which Tenant’s right to receive $730,000 may be permanently forfeited suggests the Lease does not authorize the permanent forfeiture of any portion of Tenant’s Allowance once it is vested any more than it allows the permanent forfeiture of any portion of minimum rent.
[directive] Re-activation  When Reason for De-Activation No Longer Exists.  In any instance where a BWC was de-activated pursuant to Sections 6.1, 6.2, 6.5, or 6.6, the device shall be re- activated as soon as it is safe and practicable to do so if and when the circumstances BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021  13 justifying de-activation no longer exist (e.g., the interview of the person requesting de- activation is completed), and the officer would otherwise be required to activate the BWC (e.g., where the officer proceeds to other investigative activities that are required to be recorded pursuant to this Policy).  6.8
[brief] In both of those cases, the Court ruled that it was improper for a law enforcement officer to offer a lay opinion interpreting slang unless he participated in the conversations at issue.  *Derry*, 250 N.J. at 623, 635-36; *Hyman*, 451 N.J. Super. at 449.  The interpretation was particularly prejudicial because it gave meaning to terms that bore directly on each defendant’s guilt.  [...]’s does not suffer from the same infirmity.  [...] was testifying about his own actions and why he engaged in the behavior that he did.  His testimony explaining why he chased a particular individual did not indicate, on its face, that defendant was guilty.  It also did not address the ultimate issue of fact.  Accordingly, the rulings in *Derry* and *Hyman* do not require this Court to find that [...]’s testimony was improper.
[brief] [...]  On the brief: [...], Esq. (#024481994)  [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ ii  INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ..........................................................................................  1 ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................  2  GRADUAL PHASE-IN OF NEW TECHNOLOGY IS A PRACTICAL AND ECONOMIC NECESSITY, IT PROTECTS CONSUMER CHOICE, AND IT IS CONSISTENT WITH SOUND PUBLIC POLICY .........................................................  2 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................
[brief] Rate Counsel respectfully requests that in order to alleviate the potential for additional costs that could ultimately be passed on to ratepayers the Court should affirm the Board’s determination that the Regulator is “reasonably necessary for [the] service, convenience or welfare of the public” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Director, Division of Rate Counsel  By: /s/[...]  [...], Esq.  Assistant Deputy Rate Counsel  NJ Attorney ID: 003902011  APPENDIX
[brief] The Act is a remedial statute and should be liberally construed and administered in favor of public employees intended to be benefited by the Act.  See Burkhart v. Public Employees Retirement System, 158 N.J. Super. 414, 422-423 (App. Div. 1978) (the legislative intent of the statute was “to restore the employee ... as if the error had not been committed”); see also Geller v. Department of the Treasury, supra, 53 N.J. at 597-598 (statutes concerning public pensions should be liberally interpreted in favor of public employees).
[brief] ]  Plaintiff glosses over the details of this testimony and does not even provide the Court with a proper page-and-line citation to the record, leaving the Court to guess at what portions of the transcript Plaintiff is citing to.  In fact, throughout Plaintiff’s brief, Plaintiff fails to provide any proper page-and-line citations and fails to identify any specific trial testimony to support any of her arguments.  The truth is that [...] was uncertain of his distance from the intersection when the light turned yellow and gave an estimate.  Plaintiff and Co-Defendant ignore the physical evidence and the testimony of the other witnesses, which makes it impossible for [...] to have been 200 feet from the intersection when the light turned yellow.  Plaintiff also suggests that [...] admitted that he was trying to beat the light before it changed from yellow to red.  The language quoted in Plaintiff’s brief is from Plaintiff’s counsel’s question, not [...]’s answer.  [...] testified as follows:  Q.  You didn’t know when that was going to turn red did you?  A.  No, Sir.  Q.  You wanted to try to get through that light before it turned red; true?  A.  Probably, yes.  Q.  So you probably speeded up a little bit from the 60 miles an hour you were already going to try to get through that intersection; isn’t that true?  A.  No, Sir.  Q.  Did you remember whether you speeded up or not?  A.  I did not speed up.  [3T:150-9 to 21 (emphasis added). ]
[directive] Category 48 54 57 42 48 51 30 36 39  Significant N.J.S.A. 42 48 51 36 42 45 33 24 30 II  3  History TABLE 36 42 45 30 36 39 18 24 27  UNDER A Criminal IN OFFENSES  JUVENILE 42 48 51 36 42 45 24 30 33  Minor 42 45 36 39 36 30 18 24 27  I A 39 33 30 36 24 30 12 18 21  (USING
[directive] 9.  ¿Actualmente se encuentra usted bajo libertad a prueba o libertad condicional?  [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  Are you presently on probation or parole?  a.  ¿Se da cuenta usted de que una declaración de culpabilidad podrá dar por [Sí/Yes]  [No/No] [No aplica/NA] resultado una infracción de su libertad a prueba o bajo palabra?  Do you realize that a guilty plea may result in a violation of your probation or parole?
[brief] (Da182).  Since there was no chance that the Policy might cover the loss, [...] has no duty to provide a *gratis* defense to [...] just because [...] believes the allegations have no merit.  See *Central Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Utica Nat’l Ins. Group*, 232 N.J. Super. 467 (App. Div. 1989).  [...] believes he has discovered an exception to this entrenched rule.  Namely, [...] contends that if the alleged claim includes an intent element the Court must look to the subjective intent of the insured and not the allegations in the complaint.  To support its legal theory, [...] first cites to an unpublished case from this Court, *Superior Integrated Sols.*, supra.