ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *16  Plaintiffs ignore [...]’s direction that any collection from [...] and [...]’s custodial files should be narrowly tailored to fill any gaps identified in [...]’s already-substantial document production.  Instead, they take a blunderbuss approach that would require full-blown collection, search, and review of [...] and [...]’s files (not merely targeted collections) on at least 34 separate RFPs.  But their motion makes no effort to identify specific gaps in [...]’s production, and it fails to show that [...]’s and [...]’s files are likely to contain a substantial volume of unique relevant information.
[brief] Moreover, the party challenging the validity of the administrative decision bears the burden of proving it was “arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious. ”  Boyle v Riti, 175 N.J. Super. 158, 166 (App. Div. 1980).  “The precise issue is whether the findings of the agency could have been reached on substantial credible evidence in the record, considering the proof as a whole. ”  Bueno v. Board of Trustees, supra., 404 N.J. Super. at 119.  Further, although a person eligible for benefits is entitled to a liberal interpretation of a pension statute, “eligibility [itself] is not to be liberally permitted. ”  Smith v. Department of Treasury, Division of Pension and Benefits, 390 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div. 2007).  Our courts have long been cognizant that the pension boards “are fiduciaries and therefore have a duty to protect the [pension] fund[s] and the interests of all beneficiaries thereof” and not just the individual member seeking a retirement allowance. ”  Mount v Board of Public Employees’ Retirement System, 133 N.J. Super. 72, 86 (App. Div. 1975).  2.
[brief] (12T 36-19 to 37-2)  It was appropriate for the court to find both of these mitigating factors, though the court erred in giving these mitigating factors insufficient weight.  Regarding mitigating factor 8, the court explained that it would only give this factor “very light weight” because the court “cannot read the future. ”  (12T 36-13 to 18)  This weighing of mitigating factor 8 was error because the circumstances that led to the commission of these offenses were unique; they were not going to recur.
[brief] | |---|---| | a. | App. Exh. “A” – [...]’s Emails w/[...]– [...]’s Unauthorized Trust Withdrawals(Oct. 17&19):Oct. 17-20, ‘22 381a | | b. | Appendix Exhibit “B” – See App. Exh. “D” for Exhibit “W”.  --- | | VOLUME 3 OF 3 | PAGES | |---------------|-------| | 27.  Exhibit “Z” is [...]’ Nov. 28, 2022 Certification Response to [...]’s Nov. 16, 2022 Reply.
[brief] *Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors*, 148 N.J. 582, 610 (1997)(emphasis added).  "Fraud is not presumed; it must be proven through clear and convincing evidence."  *Stoecker v. Echevarria*, 408 N.J. Super. 597, 617 (App. Div. 2009).  Again, for all the reasons set forth herein, Appellants cannot possibly establish the “resulting damages” necessary to sustain their fraud claims against the [...].
[brief] (Da 114, 125 (emphasis added))  Thus, [...]’s prior cooperation as a witness cuts against the State’s position because rather than demonstrate a shrewd familiarity with his legal rights as an accused, his prior experience at best suggested that he expected to be treated similarly again -- as a witness.  Indeed, during the Miranda motion argument, the prosecutor herself recognized that [...] likely agreed to waive his rights only because the “last time” he gave a statement “[h]e ended up being just a witness,” so this time “[h]e probably thought he was going to be able to do the same thing. ”  (3T 58-21 to 59-4)  In any event, any limited prior experience with police could not cure the string of coercive police tactics used here.  State v. O.D.A.-C., 250 N.J. 408, 424-25 (2022) (holding courts should not “isolate” an adult defendant’s prior police experience where the totality of circumstances indicates an invalid waiver).
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[brief] III.  APPELLANT’S CHALLENGE TO BIFURCATION IS UNTIMELY AND INAPPROPRIATE (RESPONSE TO POINT II OF APPELLANT’S BRIEF).  Appellant appears to be arguing that the bifurcation of the use variance from the subdivision and site plan was not appropriate, and that [...] did not provide adequate proofs and submissions for the Applications.  This argument fails because (1) a challenge to bifurcation is untimely, and (2) all necessary documentation to obtain subdivision approval was submitted in accordance with the [...] Ordinances.  Bifurcated use variance approval was granted by Zoning Board Resolution [...], dated April 27, 2021.  (Pa120-Pa149).  “Bifurcation” as authorized by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-76b has a specific meaning under the MLUL, providing that, when a “d” Variance is required, a “developer may elect to submit a separate application requesting approval of the variance and a subsequent application for any required approval of a subdivision, site plan or conditional use.  The separate approval of the variance shall be conditioned upon grant of all required subsequent approvals by the board of adjustment. ”  Bifurcation does not refer to the sequence of the grant of various component approvals by the Zoning Board that are part of the “required subsequent approvals…” contemplated under the Statute.  Bifurcation, in the election of the developer, allows the developer to proceed with the use variance application and later return to request all other “required subsequent approvals. ”  Here, Appellant seeks to blur the process under which the Land Use Approvals were considered and approved by the Zoning Board.  [...] contends that this argument is improper and must be disregarded as noted in our motion to strike.  In denying the motion, this court specifically held that the merits panel can decide the weight of issue presented.  (Da001).  In this appeal, [...] must be limited to the challenge of the straightforward, simplistic division of the Property as approved by the Zoning Board, as that was the only matter before the trial court, addressed in the identified order subject to appeal.  (Pa301-Pa313; Pa314).  [...] cannot again interject an issue from the use variance approval by objecting to [...]’s election to submit the use variance application before all of the other “required subsequent approvals. ”  Its arguments have been presented and are pending before this Court in a separate appeal.  Therefore, any challenge to bifurcation are not appropriate here and the trial court’s decision must be upheld.
[brief] (Aa2521-Aa2537).  Pursuant to the stormwater regulations, an applicant must demonstrate that post-construction stormwater runoff peak hydrographs do not exceed pre-construction runoff hydrographs.  N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.6.  In other words, the peak runoff rates cannot be increased post-construction.  Here, [...] used a weighted average of the peak flow rates, comparing the entire site and the undisturbed areas.  (Aa2527).  [...] made an assumption that the peak flow rate of the undisturbed area and the total area has a correlation, which is not necessarily true for all situations.  (Aa2527).  Furthermore, [...] did not provide a calculation of the peak flow rate of the disturbed area to confirm any such relationship.  (Aa2527).  Instead, using the weighted average of peak flow rates, [...] claims that the development will comply.  However, the more traditional method of analyzing peak flow rate is to use an area-weighted approach rather than a peak-flow rate weighted approach.  (Aa2528).  Using the more traditional area-weighted approach, [...] found that the project failed to meet compliance with the peak flow requirements in N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.6.  Specifically, for Point of Analysis 1, [...] proposed peak outflow of 28.72, 45.85, and 90.69 for 2-year storm, 10-year storm, and 100-year storm respectively.  (Aa2529).  However, the allowable peak flow rates are 22.11, 45.78, and 93.92.  (Aa2529).  Therefore, for Point of Analysis 1, the project failed to comply with the peak flow requirements for 2-year storms and 10-year storms.  For Point of Analysis 2, [...] proposed peak outflow of 20.35, 30.81, and 57.82 for 2-year storm, 10-year storm, and 100-year storm respectively.  (Aa2529).  The allowable peak flow rates are 16.14, 35.99, 81.08.  Therefore, for Point of Analysis 2, the project fails to comply with the peak flow requirements for 2-year storms.  For these reasons, the project fails to meet the peak flow requirements of N.J.A.C. 7:8-5.6, and the [...]’s issuance of the FHA Permit is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and must be vacated and reversed.
[brief] [...]: I just want to see a letter of the payouts.  So, when the policy is paid, Your Honor, there is tax withholdings, there's other, you know, accrued interest, da, da da da.  So, I wanted to see how they arrived at the net value of the check that was distributed as the final proceeds for each of the life insurance policies to [...], Your Honor.  [...]:  And that's why I'm saying what you would normally see, Your Honor, you don't see in this case, and we've asked for it in many different ways.  And you've actually even ordered it.
[brief] (Pa72).  He testified about the plaintiff’s prior medical history regarding balance issues, neuropathy, and gait disturbance, and prior falls during his *de bene esse* deposition.  (Pa99 at 28:10-13; Pa104 at 32:13-14; Pa108 at 36:23-37:21; Pa110 at 38:21-25; Pa113-Pa114 at 41:25-42:1; Pa119 at 47:8-13; Pa120-Pa121 at 48:13-50:8; Pa130 at 58:1-7; Pa130-Pa133 at 58:13-61:16; Pa134 at 62:1-16; Pa135 at 63:12-14; Pa135-Pa140 at 63:21-68:11).  Plaintiff’s counsel objected to any testimony regarding the prior falls and medical conditions.  (Pa104-Pa108 at 32:15-36:21).  She also noted that cross-examination on these issues was being conducted subject to the objection.  (Pa127-Pa128 at 55:9-56:9).  The matter was given a peremptory trial date of June 5, 2023.
[brief] ”  *Pharmacists*, 187 Vt. at 334, 993 A.2d at 421.  [...] further asserted that the negligence basis of liability alleged in the HCH Action complaint had somehow vanished (*contra* Pa484 ¶ 49) and that the undefined term “damages” in the Policy did not even arguably include an award of money to compensate “prevailing” parties for attorneys’ fees incurred by them.  Pa480 ¶ 27; Pa357–58.  The Denial Letter stated in part:  >  Based on the information now known to us, including plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of the damages claims and the Court’s orders and decisions set forth above, we have determined that there is no obligation to defend Defendants in the Lawsuit or the associated appeal, and that there is no coverage for the Lawsuit and, in turn, the Award.  As set forth below, there is no longer a “suit” seeking “those damages” set forth in the insuring agreement…  The claims in the Lawsuit were based upon allegations that Defendants breached their fiduciary duty and that they were personally in an adversary role against the [...] (“Association”).  On August 3, 2020, the Court ruled, concluding that these allegations were true.  . . .  Thus the Lawsuit, as confirmed by the Court’s findings, falls within exclusion g, which precludes “‘losses’ based upon or attributable to the insured gaining any personal profit, remuneration or advantage which is not shared equitably by the condominium association or to which the insured is not legally entitled….  Even more preliminarily, if all of claims in the Lawsuit did not fall within exclusion g, the Lawsuit ceased falling within the insuring agreement of the Policy’s Condominium Association Directors and Officer Liability Coverage Form when the Court granted Plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal of all their damages counts on November 5, 2020.
[brief] In fact, she testified that if her husband removed the lifts and equipment in the “pole barn” she could park her cars in the pole barn.  (1T18:22-1T19:22).  There was no testimony that parking vehicles outside of a garage would create an unsightly condition in the RC-3 zone, where it is expected to have farm vehicles and equipment parked in the open and where outside parking for workers and customers would be expected.
[brief] (Pa1; Pa3)  The Unemployment Compensation Law, N.J.S.A. 43:21-1 et seq., was enacted “to further an important public policy: alleviating the burden of involuntary unemployment, a burden that ‘now so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family. ’”  Ardan v. Bd. of Review, 231 N.J. 589, 601 (2018) (quoting N.J.S.A. 43:21–2).
[brief] Once Plaintiffs establish that, it is the Defendants’ burden to prove that their current use is preexisting and non-conforming.  Id.  That means that the Defendants must prove that the quality and character of the current use is one that predated the first zoning ordinance in [...] that was adopted on February 2, 1933.  Bonaventure Intern., Inc. v. Borough of Spring Lake, 350 N.J. Super. 420, 422 (App. Div. 2002).  The Defendants did not even attempt to do that.  The Defendants relied solely on the 1984 Resolution of the [...] to establish their preexisting non-conforming use status.  However, the Court did not require the Defendants to prove that the Board had jurisdiction to even hear that application.  It improperly shifted the burden to the Plaintiffs to prove that the 1984 Resolution is void.  Plaintiffs had to prove a negative fifty years later.
[brief] The Court held that the limited attorney exemption in the Connecticut statute did not address the “dangers” of the “purported attorney model” because, if it were determined that a “debt negotiation company was merely using [] attorneys as a front or facade to circumvent the debt negotiation statutes, then there would be no separation of powers problem and the commissioner would not be barred from exercising his full statutory authority. ”  Id. at 607.  In other words, an attorney acting in such an enterprise would never qualify for the Limited Attorney Exemption because the attorney would not be performing legal services subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
[brief] ”  Eggleston v. Fox, 96 N.J. Super 142, 147 (App. Div. 1967).  An intent for an easement to expire may be expressed by a limitation containing the words, ‘so long as,’ ‘until’ or ‘during,’ or a provision that upon the happening of a stated event the interest will expire.  Id., at 146-147.  Paragraph 5 of the 1963 Agreement expressly requires the synagogue shall “be maintained in accordance with Orthodox Jewish tenets and not otherwise. ”  Thus, the easement was created for the “accomplishment of a specific purpose” and the “extent of the easement was fixed by the conveyance”—the 1963 Agreement.  (Da13-18)  The parties intended that the [...]’s easement rights in the Subject Property will continue until such time as it ceases operation in accordance with Orthodox Jewish tenets.  If the [...] no longer operates in accordance with Orthodox Jewish tenets, the grant of easement rights will terminate.  For example, if the [...] sold its property to be utilized as a fast-food restaurant, the successor in ownership would no longer have the right to park on the Fifth Street or Sixth Street Lots.  As such, the easement granted is not perpetual, but will expire should the [...] cease operations in accordance with Orthodox Jewish tenets.  However, so long as the [...] continues to operate in accordance with Orthodox Jewish tenets, Defendant and any successors in interest are restrained from interfering with the [...]’s easement rights.  B.
[brief] On February 26, 2024, the Trial Court issued a thorough Decision and Judgment Dismissing Action with Prejudice (“Decision”) finding that Plaintiffs had not met their heavy burden to vacate the Ordinance and Redevelopment Plan.  (Pa74-98.)  The Decision reiterated that Plaintiffs’ trial briefs “failed to address or even mention any of Plaintiffs’ proposed, disputed exhibits” except two.  (Pa79.)  The Decision went on to explain that “by failing to use, reference or argue from any of the other ‘P’ exhibits, the Court held for the reasons set forth on the record on January that Plaintiffs effectively waived the right to use them ‘at trial,’ where the ‘trial’ consisted – by stipulation – solely of trial briefs and oral arguments from the trial brief. ”  (Pa79.)  The Decision also summarized the Trial Court’s decision barring all the Proposed Exhibits finding that, in addition to waiving any possible right to seek their inclusion, the Proposed Exhibits were not part of the record below before the Governing Body and thus were not appropriately part of the trial record.  (Pa80.)  The Decision reviewed the factual and procedural history, including specific references to the Stipulated Facts showing that the parties stipulated to the proper designation of the properties at issue in 2020.  (Pa81.)  The Decision also referenced the Redevelopment Plan prepared by [...] (“[...]”), the Town’s Redevelopment Planner.  (Pa82.)  The Decision examined the Redevelopment Plan including, significantly, Section 9.1, which included a “detailed examination of its attempt to be consistent with the Master Plan. ” (Pa83 (citing Pa311-32)).  The Decision reviewed the Governing Body proceedings, the detailed presentations, and the opportunities given to members of the public to express their opinions.  (Pa83-87.)  The Decision relied on the Planning Board reviewing the Redevelopment Plan and that it “did not identify any provisions ... which were inconsistent with the Master Plan. ” (Pa87 (citing Pa110-11)).  The Decision noted that the Ordinance was raised at a second reading, during which the Town’s professionals reaffirmed such consistency and the Governing Body approved it.  (Pa88-90.)  In its Legal Analysis, the Trial Court found that Plaintiffs “failed to meet their burden” and that the “record demonstrates that the subject action of the Defendant [...], here, the Governing Body, was not arbitrary capricious or unreasonable, and was appropriately and adequately supported by the record. ”  (Pa98.)  The Trial Court, therefore, entered judgment in favor of Defendant and Intervenor and dismissed the Complaint with prejudice.
[brief] (Da6-7, Da62).  The individually named plaintiffs are represented by [...] and are covered by the collective negotiations agreement in effect between [...] and the [...].  (Da6-7).  On January 30, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a verified complaint pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:66-6 and a motion for an order to proceed summarily to oust Defendants [...] and [...] from their offices due to their failure to maintain residency within their respective counties.
[brief] (9T125-11 to 14; 9T146-3 to 9; 9T146-21 to 9T147-6).  The account advertised “[...]” as a rapper who had a few thousand followers.  (9T125-15 to  There were photographs of “[...]” and one photograph on Instagram showed him wearing a jacket that looked like the jacket investigators saw in the Akbar surveillance videos.  (9T125-22 to 9T126-11; 9T127-2 to 11; 9T147-7 to 10).  Investigators also found videos of “[...]” on YouTube and Facebook.  (9T147-4 to 6).  The build of the man in the social media photograph also fit the build and facial hair of the man in the surveillance video.  (9T127-12 to 21; 9T147-17 to 22).  Investigators learned that “[...]” was [...].  (9T128-2 to 3; 9T140-6 to 10).  They learned that defendant’s address was in [...].  (9T140-11 to 13).  Investigators obtained a search warrant for defendant’s address in [...] and an arrest warrant for him.
[brief] The Underlying Action is premised on allegations that [...] purportedly reported [...] to [...] on a number of occasions.  (See Generally Da71-74.)  Contrary to those allegations, [...] reasonably believed that [...]’s misconduct endangered the safety of patients or and ethical practice of medicine.  (See generally Da20-204.)  [...] raised these complaints directly with --- 1  For purposes of clarity and for the convenience of the Court, counsel for [...] has combined the Procedural History and Statement of Facts in this brief.  [...] in his professional capacity and subject to his obligations to ensure patient safety and compliance with the bylaws governing [...], as well as to ensure compliance with the law, including anti-kickback laws and HIPAA.  (Da203 at ¶5.)  [...] believed that raising such concerns with the hospital was necessary, and he did so with the good faith belief that the facts underlying his concerns were true and accurate.  (Da203 at ¶¶6-7.)  Critically, [...]’s intention was certainly not to inflict any injury on [...].  (Da203 at ¶8.)
[brief] Traffic control plans, training, lighting requirements, back up alarms, spotters, assigned dump trucks and equipment inspections – required at the beginning of each shift, Pa786 – are just some of the safety measures available that were disregarded in this instance.  Injury was not a foregone conclusion; it was a result of deliberate indifference to safety of the worksite.  “[A] single egregiously wrong act by an employer might, in the proper circumstances, satisfy the intentional-wrong standard.
[brief] In 2019, the Respondent began construction of a house on that lot via a mortgage given by the Decedent.  Construction was completed by December 2019.  Up until the near the end of the Decedent’s life, the Respondent was sending monthly mortgage payments to the Decedent.  A written mortgage agreement was prepared by [...], who testified that the Decedent informed him just before she died that she wanted to forgive the Respondent’s mortgage.
[brief] Now the State seems to be seeking to impose ultimate responsibility for T&E on local districts, including [...].  The Final Decision reflects that wrong-headed and ahistorical approach, but the signs were there years before.  For example, when [...], the Commissioner-Designate, testified in the Alcantara case on July 9, 2019, he clearly expressed that constitutional misconception.  He testified that, as Assistant Commissioner for the NJDOE’s Division of Finance, his division oversaw the offices of School Finance, Fiscal Policy and Planning, and State monitors (11T 7-12), all highly relevant to our case.  Later in his testimony, the following exchange occurred:  Q  Is it…the role of your office to see to it that every district is able to provide a thorough and efficient education?  A  My understanding is that generally [it is] the responsibility of the local board to ensure T&E.  We [in NJDOE] do provide some different supports in different offices, but that’s…usually when there’s been a failure to provide it or something in the local board.  (11T 89-12 to 19).  (Emphasis added.)\(^{18}\) --- \(^{18}\)[...] further testified that he thought there was an improvement plan for [...], but he did not know what it was.  “So there’s a plan laid out by the State monitor, which I believe my deputy could speak in more detail about….  [T]he monitor has a—has a plan that’s required in order to plan to move the District ahead. ” (11T 120-23 to 121-18).  But the only “plan laid out by the State monitor[s]” is legislative action to fix the formula.