ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On January 29, 2021, Plaintiff, [...] was crossing the street near [...] in [...].  As he was returning to his vehicle, he was suddenly caused to trip, lose his balance and fall down to the pavement due to a pothole.  (Pal-Pa2).  As a result, the Plaintiff sustained the following injuries: Right hip femoral neck fracture; Status post right hip bipolar hemiarthroplasty; Chronic lumbar strain; Lumbar facet syndrome; Aggravation of pre-existing lumbar degenerative disc disease.  (Pa 668-674).  The visibility was dark and that there was no street lighting in the area where the Plaintiff fell and sustained his injuries.  (Pa474:Deposition of the Plaintiff p.32:6-10.).  The Plaintiff was also wearing prescription glasses at the time of the accident.  (Pa 474: Deposition of the Plaintiff p.33:16-22).  Plaintiff was not walking in a crosswalk at the time of his fall.  (Pa 475 Deposition of the Plaintiff p.36:1-9).  However, the proximity of the crosswalk to where the Plaintiff fell is unclear.  The location where the Plaintiff sustained his injuries is within 1,600 feet from the town hall, which is located at [...].  (Pa 649).  Additionally, the [...] is located within 1.2 miles of the accident location along a route to the Kearny Town Hall.  (Pa 649).  The overall size of the subject pothole is approximately 4-feet in length (measured perpendicular to the roadway) and 12-inches wide (measured parallel to the striping).  (Pa 609)  It is estimated that the deepest portion of the pothole approximates 18-inches long by 12-inches wide by a minimum of 2-inches deep (the depth of the surface course).  (Pa 609).  [...], P.E. noted in her report that a depression in the ground the size of that pothole would have posed a danger not only to the Plaintiff but to drivers and emergency personnel.  (Pa 313: report of [...].)  Google Maps historical imagery dated August 2012 and September 2015 depict pavement cracking and surface depressions in the roadway at the accident location.  (Pa 372 and Pa 373).
[brief] Cases  Azurak v. Corporate Prop. Investors, 347 N.J. Super. 516 (2002) ...........................................7, 9-10, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 33 Boyle v. Huff, 257 N.J. 468 (2024) .................................................................9-11, 27, 32, 34 Estate of D’Avila v. Hugo Neu Schnitzer East, 442 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 2015) ..............................................30, 33 Englert v. The Home Depot, 389 N.J. Super. 44 (App Div. 2006) .....................................16-17, 19, 21-23, 28-34 Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213 (2009) ................................................................. 10-11, 15-16 Leitao v. Damon G. Douglas Co., 301 N.J. Super. 187 (App. Div. 1997) ........................................... 28-30 Mantilla v. NC Mall Associates, 167 N.J. 262 (1999) ......................................................... 13, 17, 19-21, 27, 31-32, 34 Mautz v. J.P. Patti Co., 298 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1997) .............................................. 17-18, 28 Meder v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 240 N.J. Super. 470 (App. Div. 1989) ............................................. 19, 23-27, 31, 34  Ramos v. Browning Feris Industries, Inc., 103 N.J. 177 (1986)  ........................................................................ 11-15, 19  Sayles v. G & G Hotels, Inc., 429 N.J. Super. 266 (App. Div. 2013)  ............................................. 18-19  Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:40A-1 ............................................................................  29-30  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] ..................................................................................................................28  #  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## Cases  **Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc.,** 100 N.J. 57 (1985)  ..................................................................................................................12  **Bueno v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers’ Pension & Annuity Fund,** 422 N.J. Super. 227 (App. Div. 2011)  ......................................................................................12  **In re Distrib. of Liquid Assets,** 168 N.J. 1 (2001) ..........................................................................................................................12
[brief] B.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PLEAD FACTS SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE A CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN THE ALLEGED WRONGFUL ACTS AND THE FILING OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST LAWSUIT  (9a)  Plaintiff’s failure - and inability - to demonstrate an adverse employment action served as a sufficient basis alone to warrant dismissal of Plaintiff’s NJLAD claims.  Nevertheless, contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, the trial court went on to assess the third element of a claim for retaliation under the NJLAD.  Pb19.  In doing so, the trial court expressly found that there was no relationship between Plaintiff’s alleged acts of retaliation and the filing of the First Lawsuit.  Plaintiff has failed to show how any of the above acts have even a remote relationship to the filing of Andreula I.  [9a]  Plaintiff’s failure to plead and establish a remote relationship, let alone a causal relationship, is dispositive and fatal to her claim.  The trial court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s NJLAD retaliation claim as a result of her failure to adequately plead two of the three requisite elements.  9a.  The dismissal should be affirmed.  CONCLUSION
[brief] ”  See R. 1:7-4(b).  (Pb36.)  Given the record facts which this Court considers in its de novo review—including that [...] undeniably signed the Agreement electronically, and that the Agreement is, as the Court can see, “valid on its face” as the trial court found—[...] has failed to articulate how any alleged error in the trial court not providing a more detailed statement of reasons would amount to anything more than harmless error.  M.J. v. A.M., A-2065-19T2, 2020 WL 7488905, at *3 (App. Div. Dec. 21, 2020) (remanding where it was determined the trial court’s statement of reasons was insufficient to inform on appeal whether its “legal conclusions [were] supported by the record” and when the standard of review was “limited,” as opposed to de novo).
[brief] ”  *Middletown Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. Twp. of Middletown*, 162 N.J. 361, 367 (2000); see also *Ranchlands, Inc. v. Twp. of Stafford*, 305 N.J. Super. 528, 538 (App. Div. 1997) (“Equitable principles of estoppel may be applied against a municipality where the interests of justice, morality, and common fairness clearly dictate that course.
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[brief] Because the appellate division in the *Interchange State Bank* case did not have a factual record to determine the basis on which the trial court had denied the defendant’s motion for leave to amend his answer to include a counterclaim, it decided the issue under R. 4:6-2(e) and made the following remarks in this regard:  Objection to the filing of an amended complaint on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action should be determined by the same standard applicable to a motion to dismiss under R. 4:6-2(e).  *Maxim Sewerage v. Monmouth Ridings*, 273 N.J.  Super 84, 90 640 A.2d 1215 (Law Div. 1993)  ‘This requires treating all the allegations of the pleadings as true, and considering only whether those allegations are legally sufficient to establish the necessary elements of the claimed cause of action. ’  *Id. at 90, 640 A.2d 1216* (citing *Banks v. Wolk*, 918 F.2d 418 3d Cir. 1990)); see also *Printing Mart Morristown v. Sharp Electronics*, 116 N.J. 739, 746, 563 A.2d 31 (1989).
[brief] In 1898, the State Legislature passed a law that validated agreements such as the one between the Town and [...].  See P.L. 1898, c. 197, p. 458.  That law stated:  All proceedings heretofore had or taken by the several municipalities of this state, purporting to authorize the construction, reconstruction and extension of subways or pole-lines, to be used by electric light, heat and power companies for the purposes of their business, and under which subways and pole lines have been constructed, and all contracts entered into by the several municipalities with electric light, heat and power companies, in the carrying out of which subways or pole-lines have been erected by such companies, shall be taken to be legal and binding and to have authorized the construction of such subways and the erection of such pole-lines and to authorize their maintenance for public and commercial use and the electric light, heat and power companies which shall have so constructed subways or pole-lines, and placed therein or thereon cables or wires for the purpose of furnishing electric light, heat or power in the streets of any municipality shall be deemed to have and possess in such streets all legal authority necessary to be secured from such municipality in order in such streets to lawfully construct, reconstruct and maintain such subways, pole-lines .
[brief] [...] reviewed the application materials and identified deficiencies with the application that hosed a failure to meet the requirements for groundwater recharge, water quality treatment, and peak flow control.  (Aa95-Aa131; Aa137-Aa148; Aa195-Aa200; Aa2521-Aa2537; Aa2546-Aa2633).  While the [...] staff acknowledged some of these issues, the issues were ultimately ignored, and the [...] Permit was issued without corrections to the deficiencies.  For these reasons, the issuance of the [...] Permit was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and must be vacated and reversed.
[brief] (885a – 886a;1T, 81:18 – 82:5).  [...] specifically and unequivocally held:  “[A]s counsel for plaintiffs acknowledge during oral argument, there is nothing that would prevent the plaintiff to the extent that there are newly discovered claims that were not knowable…prior to now against parties, counsel’s free to file a complaint. ”  (884a – 885a; 1T, 79:22 – 80:2).  In [...]’s conclusion, which the Trial Court and all of the opposition briefs entirely ignored, [...]’s stated the following:
[brief] MURPHY McKEON  P.C. [...] [...]  Attorneys for Appellant  On the Brief: [...] Attorney No. [...]  [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Table of Authorities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii  Procedural History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] [...] again rejected their request, instructing them on the record to “wait until all the documents are produced” and adding that any collections from [...] and [...] “will be very targeted. ”  [...] Decl., Ex. 3 (Dec. 9, 2020 Hr’g Tr.) at 48:8-11.  Afterwards, [...] entered an order that “memorializes the decisions made at the hearing. ”  Dkt. 588 at 1:10-11.
[brief] 213 N.J. at 420-22.  Additionally, the police’s extensive surveillance of [...] prior to the illegal stop makes this misconduct even more egregious.  Before the stop, [...] and other members of the narcotics team used a powerful drone to follow [...] for hours, enjoying “free reign to fly the drone and zoom in and survey whatever” they wanted.  (1T 48-20 to 21)  Consequently, [...] and the other drone-operators must have known exactly who [...] was and what he was wearing.  [...] could have easily told the officers on the ground that [...] was wearing a black puffy jacket, black pants, and white sneakers, and was not the man in jeans and a navy jacket ([...]) or the man in a green jacket ([...]).  (Da 9 at 0:09 to 0:15, Da 10 at 2:09 to 2:13)  Not only was the failure to provide [...]’s identifying characteristics to ensure the seizure of the correct person wholly unreasonable, but also it needlessly emboldened the arresting officers to unconstitutionally stop anyone on the corner of [...].  Our courts must deter such illegal police action.  See Shaw, 213 N.J. at 419 (affirming that “application of the exclusionary rule” is necessary to ensure “the right of all individuals to be free from random stops” and to make clear that such “constitutional misconduct will not be tolerated”).  Moreover, our case law directs courts to consider the sum of information available to police at the time of a stop when analyzing its reasonableness, including information that is not relayed to an arresting officer.  See Crawley, 187 N.J. at 457-58 (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 230-31 (1985)) (explaining that information possessed by a dispatcher is imputed to responding officers and critical to the probable cause or reasonable suspicion analysis).  Applying that principle here emphasizes the flagrancy of this stop, as the police had all the information necessary to conduct a legal arrest of [...] without violating the rights of other passersby like [...] and [...].  Indeed, it seems impossible that the police, who had been surveilling this neighborhood throughout the day, could know that there was probable cause to arrest [...] and know that [...] and [...] were not suspected of any crime, but not have enough information to identify [...] among the three individuals.  As a result, the illegal police conduct in this case is even more flagrant than the conduct discussed in Shaw, where police had not been already surveilling the warrant target throughout the afternoon.
[brief] [...] employed [...] as a Staffing Coordinator, with duties that included ensuring various hospital units were adequately staffed and inputting employee time to facilitate payroll.  [...] believed he was underpaid and regularly complained about it, joining in multiple requests for more money.  Those requests were denied.  [...] then abused his position of trust by entering a category of additional pay—known as “charge pay”—to give two other staffing coordinators, [...] and [...], an extra dollar per hour for each of their shifts.  In return, they entered “charge pay” for [...].  The three did so without approval.  They did so by manipulating the payroll system to which they had access to after their supervisor reviewed the records, but before the time was posted, in order to avoid detection.  Ultimately, their misconduct was discovered and their employment was terminated.  [...] argues he was a whistleblower because he complained about his supervisor, [...], and was terminated in retaliation for that protected activity.  However, as the trial court found below, no reasonable fact finder could credit those claims for several reasons.  As an initial matter, the trial court found that none of [...]’s “complaints” implicate any reasonably believed violations of law or public policy, putting them outside the scope of conduct protected by CEPA, which is fatal to his claims.  All of [...]’s “complaints” were either made years prior to his termination, or amounted to generalized gripes about his allegedly callous supervisor.  Even if that were not the case, [...] investigated and addressed [...]’s complaints prior to terminating his employment.  Moreover, the trial court found that these complaints played no role in the decision to terminate [...]’s employment, which was made for legitimate non-retaliatory reasons that cannot be rebutted.  [...] schemed with two coworkers to pay themselves more money, without approval, thereby defrauding and stealing from [...].  On appeal, [...] has failed to identify any genuine issues of material fact capable of supporting his claim.  This Court should affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] • Science Advisory Board of the EPA – SAB.  • Safe Water Drinking Act, N.J.S.A. 58:12A-1, et seq. – SWDA.  • County and Municipal Water Supply Act, N.J.S.A. 40A:31-1 et seq. - CMWSA.  • Uniform Commercial Code, N.J.S.A. 12A:2-101, et seq. - UCC • Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1, et seq. – TCA.  • Products Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1, et seq. – PLA.  • Economic Loss Doctrine – ELD.  •  The well or wells from which the water is sourced by defendants in whole or part collectively and regardless of their actual number – “the wells”.  • The notice that defendants issued to the residents about the water being contaminated – the notice.  • Plaintiffs’ property located in the Borough – the property.
[brief] THE DEP ERRONEOUSLY PERMITTED A CIRCULAR CULVERT (Aa001)  The core deficiency regarding the DEP’s approval of the culvert is that there is nothing in the record to indicate that the DEP determined that constructing a bridge was not feasible.  Per the Flood Hazard Area Control Act (FHACA) rules, the “Department shall issue an individual permit for a channel modification only if . . . [a] bridge is constructed rather than a culvert, where feasible.
[brief] On August 31, 2022, the trial court entered an order and opinion awarding Plaintiff attorney fees in the amount of $1,049,589.14 – the same amount that had been previously awarded and then vacated by the Appellate Division.  (Da271-281).  The Court also denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s legal fee application.  (Da271).  The Court entered a separate order on that date denying a motion by the [...] firm (which was no longer an attorney of record at the time it filed its motion) for a charging lien.  (Da279).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] ”  In re Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station (CS327), 258 N.J. 312, 332 (2024).  Here, ample evidence in the record supports the [...]’s conclusion that the Project will not cause a decline in the region’s environmental quality.  As noted above, [...] consulted with the [...] per N.J.A.C. 7:38-1.1(h), and ultimately relied on the Council’s analysis which found – on two separate occasions – that the Project is “consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act” under Exemption #11.
[brief] Polzo I, 196 N.J. at 580-86.  Constructive notice is provable “only if the plaintiff establishes that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character. ”  N.J.S.A. 59:4-3(b) (emphasis added); see also Cherry, 2017 WL 2152749.  It is Plaintiff’s absolute burden to establish the condition “existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character.
[brief] *Id.* at 235.  (Emphasis supplied.)  Nowhere in this case (or in any of the others cited herein) does the court say that plaintiff was either obligated or entitled to investigate the putative defendants’ potential liability for the accident before amending his complaint.  Put another way, once a plaintiff has knowledge or reason to know of a potential defendant’s identity, he has an obligation to act at that time.  If he does not, his inertia should inure to his detriment, not that of the defendant.  See also *Matynska v. Fried*, 175 N.J. 51 (2002).
[brief] Appellant [...] (“Varcadipane”) is the sole member/manager of [...] (“[...]”) (Dr88).  [...] is a Limited Liability Company in the State of New Jersey (Dr1).  Varcadipane is engaged to Appellant [...] (“[...]”) (Dr88).  For clarity, in Appellants’ Complaint, the term “Plaintiffs” was used indiscriminately to refer to NJ [...], [...], and [...].  However, Appellants note in their Brief that Varcadipane signed the Contract on behalf of [...], not in his individual capacity.  Similarly, [...] did not sign the Contract.  Yet, while there is only one signatory on the Contract, all said parties are beneficiaries of the Contract.  As well, they all claim to be in privity with [...] and are attempting to hold [...] liable under the Contract.  For these reasons, all three parties are bound by its terms and conditions, including the waiver and arbitration clauses, and they are collectively referred to as “Appellants” herein.
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[brief] Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994)  ..................................................................  11  Maeker v. Ross, 219 N.J. 565 (2014) ..................................................................  12  Maia v. IEW Constr. Grp., 475 N.J. Super. 44 (App. Div. 2023) ............................................  9  Piacentile v. U.S. Oncology, Inc., No. 22-18, 2023 WL 2661579 (2d Cir. Mar. 28, 2023) ......................
[brief] **POINT III**  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO STATE NEWLY DISCOVERED CLAIMS AGAINST [...]  Rule 4:9-1 governs amendments to pleadings.  The Comments to said Rule cite case law that establishes the liberal standard for granting motions to amend pleadings.  “The motion for leave to amend is required by the rule to be liberally granted and without consideration of the ultimate merits of the amendment. ”  *Notte v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co.*, 185 N.J 490 (2006).  As a matter of law and physical reality, a party can only state a claim that is known.