ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]’ efforts to distinguish Dover are unavailing.  Its unsupported claim that the replacement of the Municipal Planning Act, N.J.S.A. 40:55-1 et seq. (“MPA”) with the MLUL and its definition of “interested party” abrogates Dover, supra, is wrong.  This is because the MPA did not define the term “interested party,” so the adoption of the MLUL did not change anything.  See P.L. 1953, c. 464.  [Pa61-80].  Instead, the MLUL only codified common law.  Notably, Dover does not cite to a statutorily defined term, and no case has overruled it, or Booth, supra, upon which it relies.  Indeed, footnote 1 to the DePetro decision makes specific reference to Booth, as well as Funeral Home, supra, Village Supermarkets, supra, and Aurentz, supra, all of which stand for the same principle, and each were decided after the MLUL took effect.  367 N.J. Super. at 173, fn. 1.  [...] has addressed none of these decisions, and offers no cogent logic to justify its wrongful attack on the residents of [...] who are simply trying to secure the reciprocal benefits of a comprehensive zoning scheme that the MLUL entitles them to.
[brief] For reasons set forth in Point IV, the Court is respectfully requested to enter a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict.  As to Point IV, in the alternative, the Court is urged to vacate the conviction and remand the matter for a new trial.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Public Defender Attorney for Defendant-Appellant  By: /s/ [...]_____________________  [...]  Designated Counsel #020951979
[brief] ”  Pursuant to Continuing Violation Doctrine, when the denial of public records or the failure to provide requested information constitutes an ongoing or continuous violation, then the Statute of Limitations does not bar the claim.  Under the Continuing Violation Doctrine, each day the records are withheld may be considered a new violation, effectively restarting the statute of limitations period each time.  See Davis v. City of Newark, 2006 WL 2038430 (N.J.Super.A.D.), which recognized that the failures by a governmental entity to comply with public records requests could potentially invoke the Continuing Violation Doctrine.  Here, the elements of ongoing and continuing violations centrally grounded the appellant’s 2nd and 3rd claims.
[directive] 5.4.1  Whenever a bicycle is reported stolen or recovered, the investigating officer shall complete a Bicycle ID Report.  This report will be completed in addition to the officer's Incident Report.  5.4.2  The Bicycle ID Report will be turned over to the Control Desk Operator who will maintain a file of these reports for future reference.  5.4.3  Whenever an officer recovers a bicycle, he will reference the information obtained from the recovered bicycle with the Bicycle ID Reports on file at the Control Desk.  5.4.4  The officer will initiate the same teletype procedures which are normally utilized with any stolen article.  6.0
[directive] Please note for Question 4b(2) that while endangering the welfare of a child 2C:34-1b(3), (4), or any attempt to commit any such offense.  pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(iii), can be subject to parole supervision for life upon a motion of the prosecutor, this offense was not included in the February 1, 2018 amendments to the offenses subject to Megan’s Law under 2C:7-2b(2).
[brief] The arbitrability issue is a red herring because judges “retain the primary power _____________________ seeks to enforce the MBPA, not selectively enforce the Agreement.  Moreover, *Housekeeper* dealt with New York’s “permeation doctrine,” prohibiting a party from enforcing an arbitration agreement while simultaneously claiming that it was induced by fraud.  That is not an issue here.  to decide questions of whether the parties mutually assented to a contract containing or incorporating a delegation provision. ”  *Cottrell v. Hotlzberg*, 468 N.J. Super. 59, 70 (App. Div. 2021).  Critically, a “judicial forum is generally appropriate” to determine arbitrability and only once “a court makes a threshold decision that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, it then considers the next issue, whether there is ‘clear and unmistakable’ evidence that the parties intended to delegate arbitrability to an arbitrator. ”  *Id.* at 71 (citing *Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc.*, 139 S. Ct. 524, 530 (2019)).  In this case, no valid arbitration agreement exists, so a determination on arbitrability is unnecessary.  V.
[brief] State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 88 (1999) (citing State v. Thornton, 38 N.J. 380, 400 (1962), cert. denied sub nom., Thornton v. New Jersey, 374 U.S. 816 (1963)).  It is a fact that in New Jersey, purchasers of handgun ammunition must be registered handgun owners.  N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3.3b.  But there was no evidence in the case to that effect, aside from the prosecutor’s testimony.  He advised the jurors to make inferences about the ammunition used in the case based on their “common sense,” but common sense often bears little connection to American gun laws, and state laws vary widely across the country.  Moreover, common sense does not dictate that “proper” gun owners would necessarily buy a box of ammunition, use it up, and then buy another box.  There was nothing in the record to suggest that a “proper” gun owner would not possess several different kinds of ammunition, or would not combine those different kinds when loading their weapon.  In short, there was no evidence in the record at all about the practices of gun owners with regard to their purchase or use of ammunition.  But the prosecutor went on to testify to something equally improper and even more damaging to the defense.
[brief] Just this past year in State v. Martin, the Appellate Division explained, “a jury may draw an inference from a fact whenever it is more probable that not that the inference is true; the veracity of each inference need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt for the jury to draw the inference. ”  State v. Martin, 2023 WL 4546121, 7 (App. Div. 2023) (unpublished) (quoting State v. Brown, 80 N.J. 587, 592 (1979); see Reyes, 50 N.J. at 458-59 (applying standard to motion pursuant to R. 3:18-1)).
[directive] all cases, however, including those which a sentence already was In in imposed, every effort should be made to ensure that Probation has the defendant's telephone numbers, address, and email address.  The Criminal Division should provide this information to Probation for prior cases and going forward for any case which Probation staff are not in included at the sentencing.  #  Criminal Sentencing Guidance - Issued by Directive 13-20 (April 2020)
[directive] The attached Guidance reflects input from a working group convened by the Attorney General’s Office.  The group consisted of law enforcement officers, journalists, civil rights groups, and prosecutors, including representatives from the following organizations:    [...]    [...]   [...]   [...]   [...]   [...]   [...]   [...]men’s Benevolent Association  Based on collaborative input from the various working group members, this Guidance is designed to recognize the rights, responsibilities, and roles of press and police at protests, and suggest best practices to ensure safe press coverage of First Amendment activity.
[brief] Transcript of Summary Judgment  Proceeding which took place on May 12, 2023 before the Hon. [...] P.J.Cv.  (1 Transcript)  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS  The Motion for Summary Judgment was decided on the date of January 5, 2024 at the Superior Court of New Jersey, Somerset County Courthouse before the Hon. [...], P.J.Cv.  The Motion for Summary Judgment was granted for [...], [...], Superintendent of New Brunswick Schools and [...], Principal of New Brunswick High School.
[brief] Finally, Plaintiff cites to Nielsen.  In Nielsen, the plaintiff was a pest control contractor of the defendant, [...], who was directed by the defendant to service the bait stations set up around the premises by travelling around the exterior of the building, where he encountered the sand and gravel condition which caused his fall.  Nielsen, 429 N.J. Super. at 262.  The Nielsen Court, then, applied the factors set out in the Supreme Court’s decision of Hopkins and found that, under the facts of the case, the Hopkins analysis favored the imposition of a common law duty.
[brief] ”  12a.  The Court also appeared to rely upon the fact that “the record reveals that the Borough has not engaged in exclusionary zoning. ”  Ibid.  First, in assessing the “delay,” the trial court narrowly examined the—albeit still lengthy—four years of noncompliance, it did not account for the decades of obstruction and longstanding pattern of exclusionary zoning that persisted from [...]’ 2001 order through today.
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE HE HAS NOT PROVEN THE ALLEGED THIRD LOAN WAS A PAY-WHEN-ABLE LOAN (Da1-69)  At the trial court level, Plaintiff conceded that the only way he evades the clear statute of limitations bar is if the alleged “Third Loan” was a pay-when-able loan.  Thus, not only was Plaintiff required to prove the existence of a “Third Loan,” he was also required to prove the alleged “Third Loan” was specifically a “pay-when-able” loan.  However, Plaintiff’s position is meritless because: (i) the concept of “pay-when-able loans” is not binding law on this Court; and (ii) even if such loans are legally recognized, the undisputed facts demonstrate there was no meeting of the minds or any “clear indication” that the alleged “Third Loan” was a “pay-when able” loan.
[brief] ”  Def’s Brief, page 17.  The fact that the settlement bifurcated Plaintiff’s relief and the fee award does not change the fact that the claim in the case was based on the MMWA, a remedial statute.  Next, Defendant makes the fanciful argument that Plaintiff did not request oral argument based on the request “No, unless opposition is filed. ”  Id., page 19.  Once Defendant opposed the motion, the condition subsequent was met, which meant that Plaintiff sought oral argument.  Equally fanciful is Defendant’s argument that the fact that Plaintiff did not file a motion for reconsideration is important.  Ibid.  Additionally, Defendant opines that Plaintiff argued that Defendant “breached the settlement agreement by even raising the concept that fees are discretionary under the MMWA. ”  Def’s. Brief, page 21.  In fact, Plaintiff argued that Defendant breached the settlement agreement because they asked the trial court to deny any fees at all, which did breach the settlement agreement.  See Pa123 (“[...] agrees that it will not challenge the right of the Releasor to receive attorney’s fees and cost as determined by the Court. ”).  In fact, Plaintiff’s brief points out that the settlement agreement improved on the MMWA by prohibiting Defendant from arguing that the trial court should award no fees.  Next, Defendant opines that the settlement agreement “only precluded Defendant from arguing that Plaintiff had no ‘right’ to file the motion to recover attorney’s fees. ”  Def’s Brief, pages 22-23.  This is plainly wrong—the settlement agreement speaks for itself.  Defendant also argues that because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that: (1) oral argument would not have changed the result (Id., page 19); (2) the trial court performed an improper “proportionality” analysis (Id., pages 14-15); (3) the trial court relied on Plaintiff’s failure to accept the improper offer of judgment (Id., pages 23-24); or (4) the trial court relied on out-of-state, unpublished decisions (Id., page 24), there is no reversible error.  This logic is faulty.  Indeed, because the trial court’s reasoning cannot be discerned, this Court should find that the trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error.  Last, Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff failed to file her motion for fees within 60 days of the signing of the settlement agreement should not be considered by this Court because it was not raised by Defendant with the trial court.  Id., pages 23-24.  See Alloco v. Ocean Beach & Bay Club, 456 N.J.Super. 124, 145 (App.Div. 2018).  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Ia138.  The property was sold to [...] for $150,000.00 on the morning of Friday, April 21, 2023.  Ia211, Ia217.  A motion to vacate was filed that afternoon, hours after closing.  Ia139.  [...]’ principal conceded he had other projects, Rahway and Westfield, more deserving of his money, Ia143 ¶7, as his “financial resources and time and attention” and almost all of his capital was tied up elsewhere.  Ia144, ¶14.  He filed no answer.  He contested no motion.  He did not dispute the condition of the property – pictures don’t lie – and received all notices.  He just did not act.  Although he claimed difficulty in getting the figures to redeem, Plaintiff showed this untrue.  [...] just didn’t pay.  A consent order permitting [...]’s intervention was entered May 25, 2023, Ia209, and both Plaintiff and [...] opposed on May 11 and May 18.
[brief] (Id.).  Plaintiff did try to press charges against [...] but was rebuffed at the municipal court.  (7T96:25-98:24).  [...] was unaware of any attempt by [...] to press charges against plaintiff (4T130:22-131:1), and, per plaintiff, he never had to answer to any such charges.  (7T96:25-97:4).  [...] HR manager, [...], testified that Mr. [...] never came back to work after that day, and was ultimately terminated for job abandonment.
[directive] Deciding Whether to Pursue 3.1  A law enforcement officer has the authority, at all times, to attempt the stop of any person suspected of having committed any criminal offense or traffic violation.  When the violator does not submit to the officer’s lawful authority and bring the vehicle to a stop, the officer must determine whether to pursue that violator by continuing to attempt to stop the violator utilizing pursuit driving as defined herein.  The officer's decision to pursue should always be undertaken with an awareness of the degree of risk to which the officer exposes law enforcement and the community by engaging in a vehicular pursuit.  The officer must always weigh the need for immediate apprehension against the risk created by the pursuit.  3.2
[directive] The Attorney General, in consultation with the New Jersey State Police ROIC Commander, will designate a State ALPR Coordinator to oversee the “Statewide API” that connects stored ALPR data (discussed below) and the state’s ALPR program generally.  2  Deployment only.  An ALPR and the data it generates shall only be used for official and Official use legitimate law enforcement purposes.  The agency’s law enforcement executive or designee must authorize deployment of each ALPR. view.  An ALPR shall only be used to scan
[brief] Ibid.  Likewise, in Manning, the Georgia Court of Appeals found a similar provision providing nine months of free rent, conditioned upon the tenants satisfying all obligations owed under the lease, to not constitute a penalty.  442 S.E.2d at 785.  Relying on “the straightforward reasoning applied by the Lesatz court,” the court in Manning explained that “[i]f the parties had entered a lease lacking [the excused rent] provision, [the landlord’s] expectation of rent during the first nine months of that lease certainly could not be characterized as a penalty. ”  Ibid.  By including the excused rent provision, the tenants “were undeniably placed in a better position (and [the landlord] in a less favorable position) than they would have been if the incentive of conditional excused rent had not been added. ”  The court rejected the tenant’s attempt “to render their position even more favorable by removing the condition agreed upon at the time of contracting. ”  Ibid. (emphasis in original).  Like the tenants in Manning, Appellants’ challenge to the Concession Recovery Provision is a bold attempt to be placed in a better position by seeking to retain the benefit (i.e. the $17,920 in Concessions) despite having breached the Lease Rider and being no longer entitled to retain that benefit under the parties’ contract.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On November 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the New Jersey Superior Court, Mercer County Division.  (See PA000001)  On December 12, 2022, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Failure to State a Claim.  (PA000059)  On December 20, 2023, [...] held oral argument on Appellee’s Motion, and on January 10, 2024, [...] dismissed the Complaint with prejudice.  (PA000087)  III.
[brief] Once more, Defendant complains not that there is an appealable issue entitling him to relief that meets the relevant standard (abuse of discretion) but that he disagrees with the merits of the courts’ rulings, simply the fruits of the exercise of that proper discretion.  Coupled with Defendant’s request to have his trial attorney recused, it is clear that Defendant simply wishes his case had been handled by different counsel or was heard by a different court, whom, as there are many viable ways to try a case, may have theoretically employed some different approach.  But Defendant is not entitled to assigned counsel of his choice, nor is he entitled to shop for a court or forum that will entertain his meritless arguments and rehashed points of appeal repeatedly until he locates one that will.  D.
[brief] (Pa278-Pa283; Pa403-Pa404).  Plaintiffs had opposed the adoption of the Plan.  (Again, while their Notice of Appeal, and proposed point headings make no mention of Ordinance No. 2022-15, (Da08), they weave criticism of same into their arguments against Ordinance No. 2022-17).  They urged that it was inconsistent with the Township Master Plan.  (Pa106-Pa112; 1T.15:13-25; 17:9-25 through 24:1-3).  That same evening, the Township Committee introduced Ordinance 2022-17 to amend the Plan adopted by 2022-15.
[brief] Although this case is a pipeline case, *Harper* mandates full retroactivity | 4 | | C.  New Jersey’s retroactivity doctrine requires full retroactivity | 5 | | 1.  Practical factors will limit public and private liability | 6 | | 2.  The Michigan Supreme Court’s reasoning in *Schafer* is persuasive | 8 | | II.  Entire Controversy Doctrine | 10 | | A.  The claims did not accrue until the City failed to compensate [...] for her equity interest following foreclosure | 11 | | B.  [...] was not actually aware of the foreclosure proceeding, let alone that it might result in a taking or unjust enrichment | 12 | | C.  The foreclosure proceedings would not have provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate the takings claim | 14 | | CONCLUSION | 15 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] The stop in this case occurred in December 2020, when possession of marijuana was unlawful.  CREAMMA took effect on February 22, 2021, and does not apply retroactively.  *State v. Cohen*, 254 N.J. 308, 328 (2023).  316 to 321.  The court found that the defendant did not allege the motor vehicle data base was unreliable or claim that troubling errors similar to the one in his case were commonplace or a matter of indifference to those responsible for providing, recording and maintaining the data.  *Id.* at 319.  The court also noted that there was no assertion that unreasonable conduct related to the investigation of criminal activity contributed to the error.  *Ibid.*  Additionally, the court recognized that nothing suggested “the officer ignored information about the reinstatement of the license; other officers held back information about the reinstatement; or other officers delayed in providing information to the record keepers. ”  *Ibid.*  Accordingly, the appellate division focused on whether the officer acted reasonably under the totality of the circumstances known to him at the time of the motor vehicle stop by relying on an articulable fact, the license suspension and it agreed with the trial judges who considered the circumstances and concluded that this officer’s conduct was reasonable.  Although defendant challenges the reliability of the information in the mobile data terminal in this case, that challenge, which was rejected below and should be deferred to on appeal, should similarly be rejected by this court.
[brief] (Aa41-53).  It recognized DEP’s explanation that the Long Branch Redevelopment Zone’s Design Guidelines supersedes the Scenic Resources and Design Rule, but characterized it as an improper “waiver” and argued the Project did not comply with the rule.  (Aa41; Aa42; Aa46).  [...] also claimed that the settlement agreement violated principles of administrative law.  (Aa43-47).  On January 11, 2023, DEP forwarded all public comments to [...], who responded to the comments on March 2, 2023.
[brief] ..........................................................  22, 23  In re Wiggins, 242 N.J. Super. 342 (App. Div. 1990)..........................................  20 Smith v. Ricci, 89 N.J. 514 (1982)......................................................................  15 Zimmerman v. Sussex Cnty. Educ. Servs. Comm'n, 237 N.J. 465 (2019)....................................................................  16  STATUTES
[directive] [...]• PO Box 037 • [...]  Directive #19-19 - "Guidelines for Extreme Risk Protective Orders"  August 12, 2019  Page 4 person with the petition form and an information sheet on the statutory process for filing a petition against a law enforcement officer.  See Attachment 2 for the Information Sheet for Filing a Petition Against a Law Enforcement Officer.  That information sheet also will be available on the https://www.njcourts.gov/forms/12471_erpo_law_ofcr.pdf.  at The Judiciary's website petition form the can also be obtained as of September 1 at the Criminal Division or on https://www.njcourts.gov/forms/12430_erpo_petition.pdf website at Judiciary's Consequently, court staff will not have, and therefore will not be able to provide, any information on the status of the petition.  Therefore, any questions concerning these petitions should be directed to the county prosecutor's office.
[brief] *State v. Presha*, 163 N.J. 304, 312 (2000).  Although a similar provision does not exist in our State Constitution, “the privilege itself is firmly established as part of the common law of New Jersey and has been incorporated into our Rules of Evidence. ”  *Id.* at 312-13.  (internal citation omitted).  “The right against self-incrimination, and the corollary requirement that a suspect be informed of that right, are triggered ‘when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subject to questioning .[.]’”  *State v. Scott*, 171 N.J. 343 (2002) (quoting *Miranda*, 384 U.S. at 478).  “The requirement that interrogators warn suspects of certain rights is deemed necessary due to the pressure inherent in an incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere. ”