ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] First, the pleadings in the 2020 Action failed to allege facts which, even if proven to be true, could have supported a claim for fraudulent concealment of evidence.  The pleadings in the 2020 Action failed to identify any document or other tangible evidence that [...] allegedly knew about but deliberately withheld in the discovery being conducted in the 2015 Action.  Rather, Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claims were limited to an unsupported accusation that [...] “lied” during his depositions in that case.  As set forth within, however, such an allegation is, even if true, legally insufficient to support a claim for fraudulent concealment of evidence under New Jersey law.  See infra., Legal Argument, Point One.  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Upon such reversal, the Court should also vacate the Order awarding [...] its attorneys’ fees and costs, as prevailing party.  (3T; 5T; Pa704-705).  As to the Cross-Appeal by [...], there was no error in the trial court’s decision denying [...]’s motion for an award of its attorneys’ fees.  Accordingly, even if the Complaint is not reinstated against the Defendants, the Cross-Appeal by [...] should be denied and the Order declining to award fees to [...] should be affirmed.
[brief] Since the defense strategy was to not only blame [...] as the shooter, but to also characterize her as the drug addicted, violent abuser and “Not Kader,” the State’s response in summation was pointed at dispelling that argument and focusing the jury’s attention on the actual testimony.  The State countered, “You heard testimony that on the street [defendant] tried a drug that he liked, Adderall and he wanted it.  He wanted it as part of his life. ” (9T:45-9 to 12).  The State continued by pointing to specific testimony:  And you heard testimony about the research that he did to try and get what he wanted.  And he did.  He ended up getting exactly what he sought from that doctor, Adderall.  Adderall.  ...
[brief] The trial court imposed a requirement that does not exist, i.e., there must be a government regulation or code cited before an expert can testify regarding industry standards.  First, [...] did reference the design standard in effect both at the time of construction of the sidewalk and at the time of the fall.  More importantly, the 1995 design standard, which the court erroneously excluded and on which the trial court exclusively based its decision, was merely one factor relevant to the determination that the sidewalk presented a hazardous condition.  Under the trial court’s rationale, no homeowner would ever have to repair or to maintain a public sidewalk no matter how dangerous, antiquated, obsolete or hazardous.  A wooden sidewalk from the 1800s could have exposed rusty spikes and splintered boards so long as a plaintiff cannot prove that it was not built to “industry standards” at the time.
[brief] II.  THE OTHER PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION FACTORS TIP  DECIDEDLY IN FAVOR OF REVERSAL  Far from preventing irreparable harm, the Parental Secrecy Policy causes harm, both to parents and to their children.  The Parental Secrecy Policy irreparably harms parents.  It violates parents’ fundamental rights under the United States Constitution, which cannot be remedied by money damages.  See Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 216 N.J. 314, 328 (2013) (holding that loss of constitutional rights that cannot be remedied by money damages constitutes irreparable injury); see also Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, 64 F. Supp. 3d 906, 949–50 (S.D. Miss. 2014) (holding that deprivation of parental rights gives rise to irreparable harm), aff’d, 791 F.3d 625 (5th Cir. 2015); Jenkins v. Jenkins, No. 03-08-CV-037, 2008 WL 483312, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 2008) (same).  Moreover, the harm is immediate—the Parental Secrecy Policy is in effect now, and every day it is in place parents face the substantial risk that their children might seek to be socially transitioned in secret at school.  The Parental Secrecy Policy also irreparably harms children.  First, the Parental Secrecy Policy keeps children who are experiencing a transgender identity even from being evaluated by a competent mental health practitioner.  Gender dysphoria can be a serious condition, yet the Parental Secrecy Policy leaves children who are struggling with it (or sub-threshold psychological distress) to fend for themselves, without parental support and without the involvement of a mental health professional.  “[K]eeping parents uninformed . . . of significant events that beg for medical and psychological experts to evaluate a child . . . is . . . likely to cause . . . harm [to the child].”  *Mirabelli*, 2023 WL 5976992, at *14.  Second, the Parental Secrecy Policy’s “one size fits all” approach fails to account for the unique facts in each child’s situation and results in the unnecessary and ill-advised social transitioning of at least some children.  This is significant because once social transitioning is introduced, the odds of desistence plummet.  And the persistence of a transgender identity can result in the child experiencing psychological distress and is highly likely to lead to the introduction of puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones, which can cause irreversible changes to children’s bodies.
[directive] The investigator also must be able to identify and apply the appropriate procedures to be utilized during the interview process in either a criminal or an administrative investigation.  Failure to identify and apply the appropriate procedures can compromise and render inadmissible evidence gathered during the interview process in a criminal investigation or needlessly complicate the interview process during an administrative investigation.  8.0.6  The vast majority of internal affairs investigations will be limited to alleged disciplinary infractions and the vast majority of law enforcement officer interviews conducted during an internal affairs investigation will be limited to gathering evidence of disciplinary 45
[brief] Here’s the short outline of events:  1.  Officer points an Automatic Gun at [...].  ¶10, Pa13, 2.  Because of the gun, [...] immediately requests a lawyer, specifically his dad, [...].  The police never honor this request, despite frequent repetition.  ¶¶11-12, Pa13.  3.  The search permission is never signed.  Pa 83.  The police admit he “stood” on his Miranda Rights in the police report:  “[[...]] advised that he wasn’t sure if he wished to answer questions without his attorney…. ”  ---  1  We point out that the use of “his” instead of “an attorney” means [...] asked for the elder Duffy.  4.  [...] is taken to the police station in a professional manner.  The arresting officer lies to him that his dad had said that [...] was “on his own. ”  Then leaves [...] alone.  ¶¶30-33, Pa15.  5.  [...] tries to hang himself.  The “on his own” comment was particularly cruel because [...] is aware of [...]’s advocacy for people with disabilities.  [...] now thinks he’s totally worthless in his dad’s eyes.  Believing the officer’s lie is also part of his Autism Spectrum Disorder, Asperger’s Syndrome (too trusting).
[brief] At worst, [...]’s statement was harmless error as there was significant circumstantial evidence of Defendant’s identity in S-113 such as the fact that the photos were extracted from [...]’s cellphone, the timeframe of the photos matching with [...]’s testimony about when Defendant and he obtained the tattoos, and the fact that [...] was able to authenticate Defendant’s identity in S-114 (the March 9 photo of Defendant with teardrop tattoos).  See State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 18 (2021)(holding that detective’s identification of defendant in surveillance video was harmless error when the reference was fleeting and circumstantial evidence corroborated the defendant’s identity).  In this regard, the circumstances surrounding Dotto’s statement had no capacity to influence the jury’s evaluation of the evidence and the statement’s admission was not plain error as it was not “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  See R. 2:10-2.  POINT V THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE PERMISSIBLE USE OF THE TATTOO EVIDENCE WERE NOT ERRONEOUS (NOT RAISED BELOW)
[brief] At this meeting, the Board opened the discussion of Ordinance 2022-17 to the public.  However, no members of the public made comment on Ordinance 2022-17, not even Plaintiff-Appellant.  Notably, the Board is not required to hold a public hearing at the time of its consideration of a Redevelopment Plan referral under the law.  Despite that, the Board did allow public comment.  However, there were no public comments and, based on the Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan, and the letter and testimony of [...], the Board found that the Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan was not inconsistent with the Master Plan.
[brief] (7T159:13-14, 19; 160:2).  When he was a Patrol Officer, [...] would deploy out of his vehicle on foot patrol.  (7T160:23).  [...] worked in Area 6, the same area as [...].  (7T161:13).  [...] worked with [...] and deployed on foot with [...].  (163:3, 6).  [...] was not aware of any official departmental document, directive, rule, SOP, or regulation that says how to do a foot patrol or how to deploy on foot.  (7T:164:3).  Regarding property checks, [...] indicated that in his experience he had physically started to conduct a property check, did not call it in, and was reassigned to something prior to completing the property check.  (7T165:21-24).  [...] indicated that he had called in a property check and then all of a sudden got reassigned or something else came up where he could not perform the property check.  (7T166:6).  [...] also indicated that he experienced problems with the transmission of the radio system.  (7T166:10).  These problems occurred particularly when an Officer was out on foot.  (7T166:25).  There were times when [...] was speaking on the radio and thought he was transmitting but the transmission was not going through.  (7T167:6).  [...] ("[...]") is a Patrol Officer with [...] and was formerly a Patrol Officer with HT's Police Department, having worked in Hamilton as a Police Officer for three-and-a-half (3.5) years.
[brief] POINT EIGHT ...........................................................  71 THE TWO FEBRUARY 21, 2019 ORDERS AND THE TWO MAY 29, 2019 ORDERS AWARDING SANCTIONS/ATTORNEY'S FEES RELATING TO THE SIXTH STREET VIOLATIONS AND THE FENCE VIOLATION ARE NOT ONLY PRODUCTS OF THE ERRONEOUS JUNE 27, 2007 ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT-WHICH RESULTED IN AN UNCONTROLLED AND DANGEROUS SITUATION IN FRONT OF A 400-STUDENT GRADE SCHOOL AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY VACATED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION ON JUNE 25, 2019 - BUT ALSO AN ABUSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION (Da295, 965; 971) (Da643, 967, 969) (3T109:20; 3T112:13; 3T112:22; Da690,692) CONCLUSION ......................................................... 79 | Authority | Page | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Andrews v. Ocean Twp. Bd. Of Adj., 30 N.J. 245 (1959) | 47 | | Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18 (App. Div. 1997) | 77 | | Bell Atlantic NJ v. Riverdale Zon. Bd. 352 N.J. Super 467 (App Div 2002) | 49 | | Berkeley Sq., Asso. v. Zoning Bd. of Trenton, 410 N.J. Super. 255 (App.Div. 2009) | 54 | | Biddle v. Biddle, 166 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1979) | 30 | | Bonaventure Int. v. Spring Lake, 350 N.J. Super. 420 (App.Div. 2000) | 54 | | Bray v. Cape May City Zoning Bd., 378 N.J. Super. 160 (App. Div. 2005) | 53 | | Brown v. Brown, 348 N.J. Super. 466 (App. Div.) cert. den. 174 N.J. 193 (2002) | 30 | | Camp Clearwater Inc. v. Pluck, 52 N.J. Super 583 (Ch. Div. 1958), aff. 59 N.J. Super 1 (App. Div. 1959) cert. den. 32 N.J. 348 (1960) | 39, 43 | | Cameco v. Gedicke, 299 N.J. Super 203 (App. Div. 1997) | 30 | | Carmichael v. Brian, 310 N.J. Super 34 (App. Div. 1998) | 30 | | Carton v. Cruz Const. Co., 89 N.J. Super. 414 (App. Div. 1965) | 39 | | Charlie Brown of Chatham v. Bd. of Adj., 202 N.J. Super. 312 (App.Div. 1985) | 54 | | Commercial Realty v. First Atlantic, 122 N.J. 546,(1991) | 47 | | East Jersey Iron Company v. Wright, 32 N.J. Eq. 248 (Ch. 1880) | 41 | Eckert v. Peters, 55 N.J. Eq. 379 (Ch. Div. 1897)
[brief] (Da16-17).  The judge noted that [...] was not specifically looking for defendant when he began his surveillance, that [...] did not yet have probable cause at the time he stopped defendant for investigatory purposes, and that it was not anticipated or foreseeable that defendant would admit to possessing CDS in response to [...]’s investigative inquiry.  (Da16-17).  Thus, [...] ruled, “[P]olice developed probable cause spontaneously once Defendant admitted to possessing cocaine within the vehicle. ” (Da17).  This finding was well-grounded and should be affirmed.
[directive] Special Activation Rules Governing Certain Use-of-Force Incidents, In-Custody Deaths, and Other Exigent Circumstances Where Officers Are in Danger.  Notwithstanding any other provision of this Policy, when an officer equipped with a BWC is dispatched to or otherwise goes to the scene of a “Law Enforcement Incident” as defined in AG Directive 2019-4, the officer shall activate the BWC before arriving at the scene when feasible.  Notwithstanding any other provision of this Policy, an officer while at the scene of a “Law Enforcement Incident” shall not de-activate the BWC unless instructed to do so by the assistant prosecutor or assistant or deputy attorney general supervising the investigation of the deadly-force incident pursuant to AG Directive 2019-4, or his or her designee.  Such  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022
[brief] Notably, Mount Prospect was not the first time the Third Circuit had rejected an insurer’s attempt at an end-around N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a).  In [...] v. [...], 721 F. App’x 118, 120 (3d Cir. 2018), the Third Circuit turned away an insurer’s resort to federal court to obtain a declaratory judgment that the insurer was not obligated to pay several million in outstanding PIP benefit claims by the medical practitioner because of the practitioner’s alleged fraud.  In so doing, the court explained that “disputes between medical providers and insurance companies over the payment of PIP claims must be resolved through a statutorily mandated arbitration process” in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a).  Id. at 122.  The parties had the right to compel arbitration to resolve the PIP disputes.  Ibid.  The Third Circuit also commented that “the presence of a claim for damages under the [IFPA] does not impact an arbitrator’s ability to resolve a claim for fraud. ”  Id. at 123 n.4.  The only type of claim that this Court held not to be arbitrable under the No-Fault Law’s plain language is a “claim of fraud in the inception of the policy or other claim involving the validity of the policy. ”  Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Fiouris, 395 N.J. Super. 156, 159 (App. Div. 2007).  When the validity of the insurance policy is not at issue—the validity of insureds’ policies is not at issue here—then the PIP dispute is arbitrable under the broad No-Fault Law.  See ibid. (holding N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1 only comes into play when there is a dispute regarding entitlement to or the amount of PIP benefits under a valid, operative automobile policy”).
[brief] In any event, the trial court’s separate finding that the Amended Policy mandates disparate treatment did not reference the studies and surveys.  (Da105- Second, the court’s consideration of studies and surveys at the preliminary stage was wholly appropriate.  Appellants overlook the established principle that preliminary relief is “customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits. ”  Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).  Indeed, New Jersey courts have repeatedly taken a flexible approach to consider probative information presented in a preliminary posture, especially when acting on an expedited timeline.  See Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 165 N.J. 609, 640 n.10 (2000) (taking judicial notice of a report for the purpose of determining a preliminary injunction); Matter of T.I.C.-C., 470 N.J. Super. 596, 604 (App. Div. 2022) (citing New Jersey Transgender Equality Task Force Report to highlight “the significant amounts of violence, harassment, and discrimination experienced by transgender people in various areas of their lives”).  The court appropriately exercised its discretion in the context of a preliminary injunction to take notice of the probative information the State introduced—information that, as laid out above, substantiates the Amended Policy’s likely disparate impact.  The Amended Policy’s exemption does not resolve these disproportionate harms.  Its language requires affirmative parental notification any time a student 06).  In other words, that holding—which is already sufficient to find a reasonable probability of success—is unaffected by this argument.  Appellants do not argue otherwise. requests a “change in gender identity or expression[.]” (Da45).  The sole exception to Appellants’ blanket rule applies where there is “reason to believe” that notifying a student’s parents “would pose a danger to the health or safety of the pupil. ”  Ibid.  As an initial matter, the very inclusion of this exception is a “tacit acknowledgment” that disproportionate harms could manifest for these students.  (Da110).  But unfortunately, the exception does not ameliorate the problem: the Amended Policy provides no explanation of what could give rise to a “reason to believe,” how a school would come to this conclusion, or when such a belief would be sufficient to show that notification “would pose a danger” to the student’s “health or safety. ”  Ibid.  And even if there is such “reason to believe,” the Amended Policy still does not expressly preclude disclosure.  B.  Appellants’ Responses Are Unavailing.  Unable to meaningfully contest the State’s proofs it will likely succeed in demonstrating that the Amended Policy violates the LAD, Appellants raise two separate arguments instead: that (i) the State has no settled right to relief, and (ii) the Amended Policy finds support in federal and state recordkeeping laws.5 ---
[directive] See Guideline 3(a).  The standard for the court to issue the temporary extreme risk protective order if the is petitioner establishes "good cause" to believe that the respondent poses immediate and an of present danger bodily injury to self or others by possessing, purchasing, owning, or receiving a firearm.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(e).  If the court orders the temporary order and the petition "indicates" that the respondent owns or possesses any firearms, then the Act mandates that the court shall issue a search warrant, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-26(b).  of light the Supreme Court's decision State Hemenway. _ N.J. _ (2019), decided In in v. of July 24, 2019, Guideline 4(e) sets forth a different standard for issuance a search warrant in conjunction with a temporary extreme risk protective order than the standard set forth the Act. in Hemenway.
[directive] Você entende que ao se declarar culpado e admitir que o(s) crime(s) é um crime violento você está renunciando ao seu direito no qual um corpo de jurados determinaria, acima de qualquer dúvida razoável, que estão presentes as circunstâncias que caracterizam o(s) crime(s) como crime violento?  Do you understand that by pleading guilty and admitting that the crime(s) are a violent crime you are waiving your right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the circumstance(s) that make the crime(s) a violent crime(s) are present?
[brief] Yet, later, when evaluating Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants [...] and [...], the Court conceded that “[w]hen affording all reasonable inferences to Plaintiff that --- 3  In one statement, with no analysis, the lower court also wrote that “Plaintiff has failed to show how any of the [retaliatory] acts have even a remote relationship to the filing of the [2016 Lawsuit]. ”  But, Plaintiff pled that the retaliatory conduct did not begin until after she filed the 2016 Lawsuit and was granted the Injunction, including the rotation of her teaching partners, and then continued most recently through a sham investigation wherein one of the complaints against Plaintiff by Defendant [...] directly related to the 2016 Lawsuit.  the complained of activity constitutes a pattern of retaliation, Plaintiff may have established the second element of her *prima facie* case. ”  17a (emphasis added).  The lower court has two contradictory findings in this its decision regarding the adverse employment action.  The lower court erred in finding that Plaintiff had not adequately pled the second prong of an NJLAD claim in two respects: (1) it acted as the trier of fact with respect to evaluating the retaliatory actions pled by Plaintiff; and (2) it did not consider the scope of the Injunction when considering whether the retaliatory actions were materially adverse.
[directive] Standard 11:  SART TEAM TRAINING  Every county shall provide standardized SART training to all personnel assigned to respond as members of the County SART.  Each county shall present basic, refresher, and/or advanced SART training courses, depending on the needs of the specific county, for all individuals participating as members of the County SART, including FNEs, CSVAs, law enforcement officers, detectives, and investigators.  The County Prosecutor’s Office shall invite members of the SART Advisory Board to participate in the development and presentation of the Basic SART training.  Curriculum for the Basic SART training should include, at a minimum, the following components:  Statewide SART/FNE History;  County SART History and Statistics;  Dynamics of Sexual Assault;  Effects of Trauma;  Victim-Centered and Trauma-Informed Approaches;  Cultural Awareness and Special Needs Population;  Role of the Confidential Sexual Violence Advocate (CSVA);  Role of Law Enforcement;  Role of the Forensic Nurse Examiner (FNE);  Medical Forensic Examination Process;  County SART Activation Mechanism;  County SART Policies and Procedures;  County Evidence Handling and Retention Procedures;  Overview of county protocol for the medical forensic evaluation of child victims of sexual abuse;  Legal issues associated with prosecution;  Applicable statutes, rules, and regulations; and  Services provided by the County Victim Witness Advocates.  At the conclusion of the training course, the participants should be afforded an opportunity to evaluate the course content and methods of presentation.  SART training updates will be presented periodically to apprise team members of changes to SART policies and procedures.  -28-