[brief] Any individual who believed they had been discriminated against as a result of a purported policy or City action maintained the right to bring an employment action against the City.  That was and is a more effective and appropriate remedy than proceeding on some unspecified Plaintiff request for declaratory relief in the Complaint.  If this were/is a declaratory judgment action, the record is devoid of any information reflecting that the unspecified individuals whose actual rights were allegedly implicated in this matter (but who were not parties to this litigation) had exhausted their administrative remedies regarding those issues (including under General Order 19-16 itself, which Plaintiff repeatedly references and which includes process/procedures not pleaded in the Complaint as to any member).  It also must be otherwise highlighted that Plaintiff sought remedies in the Second Amended Complaint that are not appropriate for a declaratory judgment action.  In this regard, Plaintiff sought equitable and monetary LAD remedies for un-named and not present parties (e.g., promotions, seniority placement/benefits, compensatory damages for economic loss, consequential damages, etc.). (Pa41-43).  It goes without saying that there was no plaintiff present in the case as to whom such remedies could have been awarded.  Certainly, they would not and could not be awarded to [...].  This alone makes plain that, to the extent Plaintiff argued/argues that its claims are really just a declaratory judgment action, such claims were not appropriate, could not be sustained and would be appropriately subject to dismissal on this basis as well.  In addition, the cases cited by Plaintiff are inapposite and do not stand for the proposition that a declaratory judgment action is the appropriate or permitted vehicle to address alleged instances of individuals having been discriminated against in violation of the LAD. (e.g., Bell v. Twp. of Stafford, 110 N.J. 384 (1988) (action by a property owner challenging an ordinance that prohibited billboards within a zoning district as unconstitutional); New Jersey Banker’s Ass’n v. Van Riper, 1 N.J. 193 (1948) (association of banks and savings institutions sought decree as to constitutionality of acts dealing with escheat of unclaimed bank deposits; the court found they were not authorized or legally competent to maintain the action); Rego Indus., Inc. v. American Model Metals Corp., 91 N.J. Super. 447 (App. Div. 1966) (dispute between two corporations over contracts the plaintiff sought to have rescinded; court found the case was beyond point of justiciable controversy since parties had already reached stage where rights had been allegedly breached); Williams v. Borough of Clayton, 442 N.J. Super. 583 (App. Div. 2015) (non-LAD case brought by plaintiff-police officer regarding still vacant Chief position).  Accordingly, since any Plaintiff claims framed as a declaratory judgment action should be subject to dismissal as improperly brought, Plaintiff’s argument that this is a declaratory judgment action that excuses its *prima facie* case failures is of no moment and presents no basis to disturb the Trial Court’s decision.