[brief] B.  It is well-settled that an arbitration award cannot be vacated solely for an alleged mistake of law.  Courts simply may not intervene to vacate an arbitration award, even when an arbitrator has made a good faith legal error.  Absent fraud or corruption, vacatur based on good faith legal error would be inconsistent with the law.  See Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., Inc. 135 N.J. 349, 358 (1994); Associated Humane Societies, Inc. v. Lynch, No. A-0210-13T4, 2014 WL 5460721, at *4 (App. Div. Oct. 29, 2014).  [...] entirely ignores this fact, placing all of his eggs in one basket, hoping this Court will view the Arbitrator’s award as a fee shift in violation of public policy, when [...] is really arguing that the Arbitrator was merely wrong on the law (which is also not correct).  [...] relies on Borough of East Rutherford v. East Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190 (2013) for the proposition that a court may vacate an award if it is contrary to existing law.  See [...]’s Opposition Brief at 32.  However, the Court in State, Office of Employee Relations v. Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, 154 N.J. 98, 112 (1998), an earlier case to which the line of decisions leading to East Rutherford cites (all of which involve public sector arbitrations), held that “[a] distinction exists… between public and private sector employment disputes. ”  “When reviewing an arbitrator’s interpretation of a public sector contract… a court must also ascertain whether the award violates law....”  Id; see also Tretina, 135 N.J. at 36-65 (explicitly recognizing an exception in public-sector arbitration, because “public policy demands that a public-sector arbitrator, who must consider the effect of a decision on the public interest and welfare, issue a decision in accordance with the law. ”)  [...] cannot rely on a decision about public arbitrations to overturn a private one, where the Court has expressly distinguished between the two as to the appropriate ground for vacatur.  Thus, [...] has offered no authority—as no authority exists—to refute the clear holding in Tretina, that private arbitration awards cannot be vacated based solely on errors of law.  135 N.J. at 358.  Here, the trial court expressly recognized that the Arbitrator’s decision to order reimbursement of [...]’s attorneys’ fees was based on his interpretation of New Jersey law, and nonetheless the trial court improperly vacated the award because it disagreed with the Arbitrator’s interpretation of that law.  Because the award was not an improper attorney fee-shift, public policy considerations are inapplicable, and the trial court had no other legitimate basis to disagree with the Arbitrator’s interpretation and application of New Jersey law.  Therefore, even if the Arbitrator’s *legal determination* that [...] was entitled to have [...] reimburse its Phase I legal fees incurred as a result of [...]’s self-serving conduct was somehow incorrect, that is not a valid basis for the trial court to vacate that award.  As the Supreme Court in *Weiss* held, “the Court is not attempting to second-guess the arbitrator.  It is actually concerned with the *lawfulness of its enforcing* the award and not with the *correctness of the arbitrator’s decision.*”  143 N.J. at 443 (internal citation omitted).  Because the award was not an improper attorney fee-shift, there was nothing unlawful about it, and whether the Arbitrator’s award was “correct” is not a proper concern of the Court.  Accordingly, this portion of the trial court’s June 3, 2019 Order must be reversed.