ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”); Young v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 297 N.J. Super. 605, 619 (App. Div.) certif. den., 149 N.J. 408 (1997) (holding that defendant had “[n]o . . . obligation [to alert plaintiff to an arbitration clause in a contract] . . . where the provision is not hidden”).  To the extent Plaintiff also claims she should have been “specifically advised to speak with an attorney” regarding the content of the MAA, the acknowledgment section of the MAA—just above Plaintiff’s signature—sets forth that Plaintiff agreed that she had been “given the opportunity to discuss the [MAA] with [her] own attorney if [she] wish[ed] to do so. ” (Pa93).  The plain text of the MAA, therefore, put Plaintiff on notice of her opportunity to consult with legal counsel if she desired.  (Ibid.).  Her decision to forego that option does not impact the enforceability of the MAA.  Roman, 456 N.J. Super. at 174 (rejecting an argument to invalidate a signed arbitration agreement on the grounds that, among other things, the plaintiff was not informed of her right to consult counsel, because the plain language of the agreement provided that the plaintiff had sufficient time to consult with counsel of her choice); see also Fave v. Neiman Marcus Grp., No. A-1805-13T2, 2014 WL 1884337, at *5 (App. Div. May 13, 2014) (explaining that the fact that the employer did not encourage the plaintiff-employee to seek legal advice regarding an arbitration agreement was not a basis for avoiding enforcement).
[brief] See Walker, 385 N.J. Super. at 410.  Regardless, as part of his investigation, [...] watched the videos to find evidence and identify the suspect.  (5T34-19 to 25).  He described the person seen in the videos but stated he did not know who the suspect was at the time.  His description included characteristics like the individual’s sweatshirt and cellphone or cellphone case on his hip, which were the same in both surveillance videos.  [...] never identified defendant as the individual in the videos, but instead provided descriptions of the suspect and his opinion that the perpetrator wore similar clothing during both burglaries.
[brief] Affidavit of [...].....................................................................Pa174  Affidavit of [...]........................................................................Pa176  Affidavit of [...].........................................................................Pa178  Affidavit of [...]........................................................................Pa180  Affidavit of [...]........................................................................Pa182  Affidavit of [...].......................................................................Pa184  Affidavit of [...]......................................................................Pa186  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS
[brief] In its ruling, this Court found that Plaintiff’s purported claims challenging the fair share housing settlement were not articulated in the Complaint; and Plaintiff had admitted as much.  (2T91-20:92-5.)  Indeed, in response to a direct question by this Court “Where is the Fair Share issue mentioned in your complaint?” Plaintiff answered “It doesn’t, Your Honor. ”  (2T50-10:12.)  As to Plaintiff’s claims that his constitutional right to be heard was violated by the way the governing body conducted its meetings in 2021, the Court found that the only claims asserted by Plaintiff were based on his right to be heard on the Bond Ordinance and, as to those, there was no violation based on the fact that Plaintiff was heard.  The Court properly rejected Plaintiff’s claim that he had a right to engage in colloquy with the governing body based on New Jersey Supreme Court precedent in Kean Federation of Teachers v. Morrell, 233 N.J. 566 (2018) and Besler v. Board of Educ. of West Windsor-Plainsboro Reg’l School Dist., 201 N.J. 544 (2010).  As to Plaintiff’s alternative challenge to the Bond Ordinance based on an alleged conflict of interest, the Court ruled that a conflict of issue is to be determined under N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5 and, more particularly, whether there was a benefit to a member of the governing body greater than could reasonably be expected to accrue to other members in the community and there was none.  (2T92-24:93-11.)  Because the Court found there were no violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights, the Court did not consider whether or not the claims were barred by absolute or qualified immunity.  Thereafter, Plaintiff asked the trial court to reconsider its decision to enter summary judgment and to enter a modified order that dismissed all five counts, but on qualified terms to seemingly avoid the application of the doctrines of *res judicata* and/or collateral estoppel in any future civil rights challenge by Plaintiff.  Because Plaintiff did not demonstrate that the trial court had overlooked a controlling decision, legal argument, or probative and competent evidence, the trial court properly denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.  Plaintiff filed the instant appeal, which Defendants hereby oppose.
[brief] The decision notes that “a complaint must detail the specific behavior that a school official(s) engaged in for the Commission to find a violation(s) of the Act, and to recommend a penalty or sanction, up to and including removal. ”  (16a.)  Petitioner did not do so.  With regard to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), the Commission found that, even assuming the factual allegations in the complaint were true, Petitioner “failed to provide sufficient factual evidence that the named Respondents made personal promises or took action beyond the scope of their duties such that, by its nature, had the potential to compromise the Board.
[brief] \(^1\) P-4 was not moved into evidence or marked during the course of the trial and is intentionally omitted.  Certification of Counsel, dated October 20, 2023 ........................................Da175  Exhibit A – P-5 – photograph of accident scene (omitted, see Da160).Da160 Exhibit B – Order granting motion to bar evidence of Defendant [...]’s convictions, dated September 26, 2023 (omitted, see Da42) ........................................................................................................Da42 Exhibit C – Certified Judgment of Conviction for Defendant [...], dated September 13, 2018 (omitted, see Da104) ........................................................................................................................................Da104 Exhibit D – Order denying Defendants [...]’s and [...]’s motion for reconsideration of Court’s Order of September 26, 2023, regarding co-Defendant’s [...], prior conviction, dated October 3, 2023 (omitted, see Da45) .........................................................................................................................Da45 Exhibit E – New Jersey Police Crash Investigation Report, dated December 29, 2019 (omitted, see Da136) ..................................................................................Da136 Exhibit F – Correspondence from Plaintiff’s counsel to Hon. [...], J.SC., concerning trial testimony of [...], dated October 2, 2023 ........................................................................................................Da177 Defendants, [...]’s and [...]’s, Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the alternative, for a New Trial, or in the alternative, for Remitittur, dated October 16, 2023 ..........Da179 Certification of Counsel, dated October 16, 2023 ................................................Da183 Final Judgment, dated October 10, 2023 .................................................................Da185 Volume II - (Da187 to Da273)
[directive] No se requerira ningun aviso adicional.  Cualquier problema con la disponibilidad de testigos tiene que ser divulgado juez dentro de los diez al (10) dias subsiguientes a la firma de este Memorandum, o si se descubre despues de dicho periodo, en cuanto se sepa.  trial.  Defendant court directed all hereby following return and are ready There the date counsel be will to to at for AM on 9:00 notices further required.  no of of Court's availability signing brought problems with within attention ten to witness the the this Any must days be (I 0) or thereafter, discovered Memorandum, promptly known.  as as if Fecha del juicio/Trial Date: Abogado
[brief] Those two sizes were so indistinguishable (both ~1 to 2 seconds), I had to time the download of the over 200-page opposition to correcting the State’s “error” which was just barely measurable at 5 seconds.  \(^{20}\)  [...] thinks the mislabeling stated it was a discovery motion.  4T-4-7-8 & 4-19.  I wish it were.  That would obviously have been erroneous and would have prompted further investigation.  If the State’s Motion were for discovery, Lawson would be directly on point and the “unopposed” mistake would have to be corrected (but the case would still be dismissed – we understand that).  Interpolating, the 100-page Motion to Dismiss would take half the time of the 200-page opposition (~2.5 seconds), while 10 pages would be around 1 second.  Could Your Honors detect these differences in download time?  This is especially so if at work with numerous distractions.  All these various calculations are in my Reply Letter Brief, pp. 6-7, at Pa376-77.  [...] says these filings are a stream of consciousness.  Well, yes, that’s what happens when you put somebody in an untenable position and the person is trying “to cover all the bases” the Court (or this Court) might think up to blame them for the State’s “error.
[brief] Id. at 255-58.  The imposition of the sentences in this case constituted impermissible double counting.  Accordingly, the Zuber Court concluded that in sentencing juveniles to potentially lengthy periods of incarceration, courts must consider the Miller factors alongside the traditional sentencing considerations, i.e., “the nature of the offense, the juvenile’s history, and relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. ”  Id. at 450.
[brief] (4T11-24 to 12-13).  After analyzed all aggravating and mitigating factors, including those not argued by the parties, see (4T11-18 to 23); N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b), the trial court found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement to a 17-year term with an 85% period of parole ineligibility, applicable fees and penalties, and a 5-year parole term following incarceration.
[brief] (Pa24 to Pa25).  For example, in *City of San Antonio v. Heim*, 932 S.W. 2d 287 (Court of Appeals of Texas 1996), the City had an unwritten practice of not arresting fellow officers or their family members as “a professional courtesy. ”  That was the predicate alleged wrongful conduct to which the plaintiff in that case had objected.  (Pa 25).  In *Maimone v. City of Atlantic City*, 188 N.J. 221 (2006), the City had directed law enforcement employees not to enforce anti-prostitution laws.  *Id.* at 233-34.  That directive was the alleged predicate wrongful conduct as to which that plaintiff had objected.  (Pa25).  Likewise, the plaintiff in *Turner v. Associated Humane Society, Inc.*, 396 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 2007) had witnessed management permitting the adoption of animals known to be dangerous in violation of law and company policy, and in *Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc.*, 222 N.J. 362 (2015), the employer had produced unsafe products which were not compliant with applicable law.  (Pa25).  In the case at bar, the Trial Court correctly found that “[t]here is simply no comparable circumstance presented on this record, even when examined through a prism that favors [...].
[brief] 5T17:1-3 (citing *Sears, Roebuck v. Camp*, 124 N.J. Eq. 403, 411-412 (E. & A. 1938).  Finally, and critically, the Trial Court noted that its equitable jurisdiction “does not depend upon the mere accident, whether the Court has in some previous case or some distant period of time granted relief under similar circumstances, and the fact that no precedent exists is no sound reason for denying relief when the situation demands, and no other principle forbids.
[brief] While [...] may contend that [...]’s submission describing “concrete cutting” was a subjective response that cannot be a material misrepresentation, that doesn’t change the fact that [...]’s representation was “untruthful, material to the particular risk assumed by the insurer, and actually and reasonably relied upon by the insurer in the issuance of the policy. ”  First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 177 N.J. 125, 137 (2003).  Moreover, intent to defraud is not required.  Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Manzo, 122 N.J. 104, 114-115 (1991).  “Even an innocent misrepresentation can constitute equitable fraud justifying rescission. ”  Ledley v. William Penn Life Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 627, 635 (1995).  [...] may also implausibly counter that there was no detrimental reliance based on [...]’s misrepresentation.
[brief] It was obvious to [...] that the business was not operating at a profit, so the creditors could not get paid.  The landlord, [...], was one of the creditors that negotiated a lease agreement with the principals of the corporation prior to [...]’s appointment.  [...] sold the assets of the diner at a public sale on January 18, 2022, pursuant to his appointment as special master under the order of [...] of November 4, 2021 appointing [...] to hold the foreclosure sale in place of the sheriffs, since the property was located on the borderline of two counties.  (Ca140).
[brief] MEDPAY BENEFITS RESULTING FROM A MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT ARE NOT BARRED IN A PLAINTIFF'S CIVIL ACTION FOR PERSONAL INJURY OR DEATH.  (Da1 – Da27).  N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 addresses the recovery of collateral source payments in "any civil action brought for personal injury or death, except actions brought pursuant to the provisions of P.L.1972, c. 70 (C. 39:6A-1 et seq.)...".  Civil action brought for personal injury or death include causes of action such as medical malpractice, slip and falls, products liability actions, civil rights violations, liable/slander, assault, and claims arising from motor vehicle accidents.  The broader definition of a claim includes the entire cause of action both for personal injury, loss of consortium, death, and economic damage, including lost wages and medical expense whether compensated or uncompensated.  A civil action brought for personal injury or death as a result of a motor vehicle accident is governed by the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 as set forth in Point IV of our Brief (DB 41-44).  A civil action for personal injury or death which is governed by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 et seq. resulting from a motor vehicle accident encompasses all of the aspects of the injured party's claim and is not simply limited to the claim for reimbursement of Medpay benefits.
[brief] Order denying motion for [...] to reassess petition in light of the New Jersey Energy Master Plan (“EMP”), in OAL Dockets [...] and [...] (SOICR #65)  .........................  H162a Letter Order by Hon. [...], A.L.J., in OAL Dockets [...] and [...] issued October 7, 2020, denying [...]’s motion to dismiss for failure to provide discovery filed June 30, 2020 (SOICR #64)  ........................................  H166a
[brief] The jury found defendant primarily at fault in causing the accident and awarded plaintiff damages, after hearing this evidence.  The underlying event occurred when a streetlight fell on the corner of plaintiff's property, defendant's employee removed the light pole, pushed the wires into a hole in the ground, covered the hole with dirt, placed over the hole an orange safety cone, which disappeared, and white markings painted by the hole faded; nearly two months later, plaintiff inadvertently stepped into the hole and injured herself.  See *Jacobs*, 452 N.J. Super. 494, 497.  The *Jacobs* Court held that the plaintiff was not required to present an expert witness on liability opining about industry standards because whether defendant acted reasonably was a subject within the common knowledge of laypersons and was capable of being decided by the jury without expert opinion.
[brief] *Hudson*, 209 N.J. at 529; see also *State v. Blackmon*, 202 N.J. 283, 297 (2010).  Defendant was sentenced to a term of 180 days in the Somerset County Jail, with no probation to follow, no contact with [...] (the puppy), and he was prohibited from owning, possessing, exercising control over or caring for any animals, including a goldfish.
[directive] 1.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하가 다음의 강력범죄에 대하여  유죄를 시인하기 때문에,  Do you understand that because of your plea of guilty to (조기석방 금지법에 해당하는 제1 급 및 제2 급 강력범죄(들)을 열거하십시오) (List First or Second Degree Violent Crime(s) to Which NERA Applies) 그 범죄(들)에 대한 가석방 자격이 생기기 전에 그 범죄(들)에 대하여 부과된 형량의 85%를 복역해야 한다는 것을 아십니까? you will be required to serve 85% of the sentence imposed for that offense(s) before you will be eligible for parole on that offense(s)?
[directive] AVI:  Sa se yon dokiman piblik.  Pa mete okenn enfòmasyon idantifikasyon pèsonèl sou li, kankou nimewo Sosyal, nimewo Lisans pou kondwi, oswa nimewo kont an bank ak kat kredi aktif yo.  Dokiman sa a ap disponib ba piblik la sou demann jan li soumèt la.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.
[brief] Therefore, the restrictions upon grid supply that flow from this predicate are immaterial to the floating solar program as designed and set forth by the Board.  Furthermore, each time the Board discussed the innovative technology and/or floating solar programs, the Board never once identified the need or restriction between net metered and grid supply.  In I/M/O A New Jersey Solar Transition Pursuant to P.L. 2018, C.17, Order, [...], Docket No. [...], dated January 8, 2020, not a single mention was made of the need for the project to be net metered; in fact, all the Board stated was “floating solar projects may request from Staff assignment of a preliminary 0.6 TREC factor and may petition the Board to request a factor greater than 0.6 based upon the specific facts and circumstances attributable to an individual project.
[brief] S. Route 1 abutting the northern portion of the Property (the “Access Road”) and crossing an unnamed tributary of Duck Pond Run.  This unnamed tributary consists of a minor man-made agricultural ditch (less than 5 feet in width) with little or no flowing water and dense vegetation.  Aa155; Aa158-159; Aa134; Aa166.  As set forth in the Application, a 24-inch culvert is proposed to facilitate the bridge crossing based on the width and character of the existing feature.  Aa155.  Construction of the Access Road is required to obtain access because the northern portion of the Property is separated from the rest of the site by a stream/wetland complex that traverses the length of the Property and continues offsite to the east.  Ra93-94.  Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, the Access Road was designed and proposed with careful attention to the actual and potential benefits the ditch provides (which are limited), and after a diligent consideration of all feasible alternate routes.  For instance, “[d]ue to the prevalence of surface waters throughout the northern portion of the site, there are no other opportunities onsite to construct a roadway to Route 1 that avoids a stream crossing. ”  Aa161.  This prevalence of surface waters throughout the northern portion of the site also means that relocating the necessary Access Road would not reduce channel impacts.  Aa152-153.  In fact, “[c]hannel disturbance has been reduced to the extent practicable based on its location within a narrow portion of the feature and an alignment that is generally perpendicular to the orientation of the channel. ”  Aa153.  Moreover, the ditch is dominated by dense vegetation that offers little or no value to aquatic species.  Aa155.  [...] agreed with Bridge’s analysis, also concluding that no adverse impacts to fishery resources are expected from the development.
[brief] [...] was convicted of two counts of homicide in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Bergen Vicinage, in August 1979: one count of first-degree murder, and one count of second-degree murder.  (Pa55-57).  He was later sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment on the first-degree conviction, and a consecutive thirty-year term of imprisonment on the second-degree conviction.  (Pa55-56).  His convictions and sentence were initially reversed on appeal, but after re-trial he was again convicted and sentenced for the same offenses in March 1986.  (Pa60).  As detailed by this court in its prior decisions, [...] was also convicted of other offenses, including conspiracy to commit murder, weapons offenses, and conspiracy to commit escape.  (Pa57-59).  The most recent conviction for which [...] was sentenced occurred in 1982.  Ibid.  --- 4  Since the facts relevant to this appeal largely consist of procedural issues, the Statement of Facts and Procedural History have been combined as they are inextricably intertwined.
[brief] ”  (Da1)  Worse yet, after finally depositing the Rent Arrears with the Court, Tenant filed an untimely and meritless seven-hundred (700) page motion for reconsideration of the Post Trial Order.  (Da173-178).  Although this application was denied in its entirety by the lower court, Landlord was forced to incur an additional $9,858.00 in legal fees opposing the same.  (Da3; Pa119-120).  This frivolous application also delayed the Underlying Action, and Landlord’s receipt of the Rent Arrears, for an additional two (2) years.  (Da179-180).  Similarly, Tenant’s argument that Landlord should have avoided this litigation in its entirety by rewriting the Lease and “automatically offsetting” the Rent Arrears with the unearned 2020 and 2021 Tenant Allowance payments that Tenant would have been entitled to had it not been in monetary default is antithetical to the terms of the Lease and Tenant’s own actions.
[brief] *Bender v. Adelson*, 187 N.J.  411, 431 (2006); see, e.g., *Geler v. Akawie*, 358 N.J. Super. 437, 466-67 (App. Div. 2003) (holding that a new trial was warranted after the plaintiff's counsel misstated material elements of the evidence).  Here, Appellee’s counsel at summation remarked to the jury that “what [...] says, incidentally, not contradicted by [...], [...] says there’s two different areas.  Both the superior and interior part of the labrum were torn off…”  3T28:17-20.  The comment elicited an inflammatory response viewing the labrum as completely torn at two spots.  However, [...] only testified that the MRI and review of the left shoulder upon surgery showed a tear of the labrum called a SLAP lesion.  1T108:3-8.  [...] testified that he had small age-related labrum tearing—a far cry from the image of the labrum being torn off.  2T206:20-25.  Rather than discuss the injuries as testified by [...] and/or Dr.  Lopez, Appellee’s counsel took it upon himself to materially deviate from the experts’ opinions and with no basis tell the jury that, per [...], his labrum was “torn off” at two different places.  When the jury deliberated, undoubtedly, when determining causality Plaintiff’s counsel’s remark would easily make you conclude that a torn off labrum at two spots could not be age-related.  Not only did [...] not opine that the labrum was “torn off” at two places, but to say that [...] did not contradict a diagnosis of a labrum torn off at two (2) different spots was completely erroneous and materially inflammatory.  As such, the jury may have additionally reasoned that [...] also found a labrum torn off at two different places when in actuality he found just small tearing involving the labrum.  The term “torn off” was simply prejudicial, beyond the evidence introduced at trial, and its undoubted effect was to create the impression that Appellee had an uncontradicted traumatic injury when in actuality the diagnosis was less severe and more complex in terms of causality.  Accordingly, a new trial is the appropriate recourse.