ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In addition to their *lis pendens* arguments, Defendants attempt to introduce (i) a letter from Plaintiff dated September 4, 2023, and (ii) Defendants’ motion to dismiss this appeal and the trial court’s related order dated December 20, 2023, none of which is part of the record on this appeal.  (Db43-45.)  With respect to Defendants’ claim that Plaintiff is “fully aware of the DEP regulatory trajectory” and that “[i]t is no accident that the delay combined with the demand for another reduction in price was timed precariously for the Defendants and to the benefit of Plaintiff,” it is an absolute mystery to Plaintiff as to what Defendants are referring.  *(See Db44.)*  Defendants’ reference to the “delay” and “demand for another reduction in price” is simply incoherent.  In sum, Defendants fail to provide any legal authority establishing that Plaintiff was required to seek a stay in the trial court or post a bond before commencing this appeal and filing the Second *Lis Pendens*.
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[brief] Recordkeeping Requirements.  Appellants contend that their Amended Policy is necessary to comply with federal and state recordkeeping laws, and that the injunction threatens to put them in noncompliance.  See (Db16-19).  Initially, it is undisputed that their Original Policy was in place “uneventfully” for four years before the Appellants amended it.  (Da115).  During that time, Appellants never expressed any concern that they had been actively violating these laws.  In any event, Appellants cannot show that the court’s injunction, and the policy that it reinstates, are inconsistent with—or even remotely implicate—the recordkeeping laws they now cite.
[brief] It does not authorize Plaintiffs to place a blanket exemption on all parents’ rights “to be supplied with full information about the pupil” by contending that all such students, as a general proposition, require “protection” from their parents.  The New Jersey Administrative Code defines a “student record,” in relevant part, as “information related to an individual student gathered within or outside the school district and maintained within the school district, regardless of the physical form in which it is maintained. ”
[brief] Based on the binding precedent set in Alloway Twp., this Court must now reject the [...]’s distorted view of the Highlands Act.  The [...] goes too far afield - to the 3rd, 7th, and 11th Circuit Court of Appeals.  Those federal cases cited by the [...] simply do not prove what the [...] argues they prove.  The case the [...] relied on from the 3rd Circuit actually stands for the proposition that a list separated by commas must be read meaningfully all together, as proffered by the Appellants in this case.  The 3rd Circuit rejected the agency’s “distorted view of the statutory language” because the “use of a comma to set off a modifying phrase from other clauses indicates that the qualifying language is to be applied to all of the previous phrases and not merely the immediately preceding phrase. ”  Elliot Coal Mining Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 17 F.3d 616, 630 (3d Cir. 1994).  The same must be done here, as “routine” and “public utility” must be applied to all the other phrases and not merely the immediately adjacent phrase.  The cases the [...] cited from the 7th and 11th Circuit, while dealing with labor and employment and bankruptcy issues at the federal level, offer no support for the [...]’s distorted interpretation of the Highlands Act.  This Court must now decide that the [...]’s failure to give proper meaning to the words “routine” and “public utility” in the Highlands Act was a fatal error in the [...]’s issuance of the exemption to [...].  The proposed project is too big, too unique, and does not deserve entitlement to the very narrow and limited statutory exemption at N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11), which was only intended for routine utility work.
[brief] THE COURT WAS WRONG TO RULE THAT BRAD’S FAILURE TO CHALLENGE CONFIRMATION OF A PRIOR PARTIAL ARBITRATION AWARD WAIVED HIS RIGHTS  It was also unfair for the Chancery Court to rule that, when opposing the Arbitrator’s prior partial award, which voided a $970,000 loan from [...] to [...], he was at that time required to seek vacatur on grounds that 3 arbitrators were required, or be deemed to have waived that right forever.
[brief] See In the Matter of [...]  Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination, [...], 433 N.J. Super. 223, 234 (App. Div. 2013)(“In re Highlands Applicability”).  On appeal to the Appellate Division, [...] argued before the court that the word “routine” was meant to only modify the activities of “maintenance and operations”, and not the other activities set forth in the exemption.  Id. at 237.  Without deciding whether the exemption requires that upgrades be routine, the court held that [...]’s project was a routine upgrade as it was necessary to satisfy the company’s duty under its tariff with the [...] to “maintain regular and uninterrupted electric service to its customers. ”  Id.  Likewise, here, even if this court were to interpret Exemption #11 as requiring that an upgrade be “routine”, [...]’s Project would still fall within the exemption as [...] has determined that the Project is necessary to enhance the reliability and capacity of natural gas to its customers in the northeastern United States and is an “upgrade” of [...]’s existing pipeline system.  In fact, [...] has historically and consistently interpreted the exemption and granted exemption #11 to [...] on past projects.  Specifically, [...] received Exemption #11 in connection with its 300 Line Project in 2010 (“300 Line Project”) and its Northeast Upgrade Project (“NEUP”) in 2012, so there is a precedent for an exemption to be granted to a pipeline company for upgrades of its existing pipeline system, similar to the exemption granted for this Project.
[brief] There is no dispute that the Appellants – through their own doing – defaulted under the Lease by failing to pay rent due in 2017.  There is also no dispute that proper notice to cure was given and that Appellants still failed to cure the default.  As a result, the Lease was properly terminated by [...].  Thus, as they were contractually obligated to do, Appellants peaceably surrendered the Property to [...], and never made a claim against [...] (until now) that [...] was not properly in possession of the Property.
[brief] See also White v. Williams, 208 F.R.D. 123, 129 (D.N.J. 2002) (declining to certify class because the class determination would “require a putative plaintiff to establish the merits of his or her claim before being included in the class,” resulting in “a number of mini-trials or . . . some other screening mechanism prior to defining the class”); *Kleinman v. Merck & Co.*, 417 N.J. Super. 166, 179 (Law. Div. 2009).
[brief] Rather, the prior investigation had limited value to the narrow issue before the court.  The prior investigation, particularly the CI’s tip about New York, was the basis of the detective’s hunch that [...] went to New York to buy drugs on December 17.  The question before the court was not whether the detectives’ hunch was legitimately based on the prior investigation.  Of course it was.  The question before the court was whether the detectives’ hunch – which was legitimately based on the prior investigation – evolved into reasonable suspicion, during the course of the traffic stop.
[brief] In addition, two different appellate panels have found that a 9-1-1 call reporting an individual armed with a firearm triggered public safety concerns such that reasonable suspicion was established through the 9-1-1 call itself.  See State v. Rossman, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1162 and State v. Bailey, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1192; attached hereto as Pa069-Pa076.  In Rossman, an appellate panel stated that “(i)t cannot be denied that unlawfully concealing a weapon poses a public-safety risk. ”  Pa071.  In Bailey, a different appellate panel stated that “(t)he caller’s tip demonstrated defendant posed a threat to the public by walking in a high-crime area with a firearm. ”  Pa075.  Given that the initial report was received through the 9-1-1 system, it contained sufficient details to allow [...] to accurately identify the suspect, and the contents of the report triggered public safety concerns, it follows that the 9-1-1 call alone established reasonable suspicion permitting [...] to “undertake an investigatory stop of”  Defendant.  See State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 429 (2014).  The initial detailed and corroborated report made through the 9-1-1 system established reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop.  As such, [...]’s ruling suppressing the evidence should be reversed.
[brief] [...] and [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [...], [...], [...], GOVERNOR [...], GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY, and [...], Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO.: [...]  T4  Civil Action On Appeal from the Final Order Of the Superior Court, Law Division  Mercer County  Sat Below: Hon. [...], A.J.S.C.  BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.1(a).  Those public comments provide an “effective and efficient means for third-party objectors to voice their concerns \textsuperscript{10}  The permit preparer in this case was [...], and the Permit Supervisor was [...], with whom [...] from [...] met with personally.  (Aa477).  \textsuperscript{11}  Even though [...] was not required to provide [...] with written notice of the Technical Modification Permit, [...] was on actual notice of that permit application because DEP permitting personnel provided [...] with real-time updates from DEP’s permitting personnel, and DEP personnel also met with [...] at the site.
[brief] [...] is the closing coordinator for [...], responsible for funding.  (201a [4:24-5:1]).  The only deed Kuziemski had in her possession before disbursing funds was the deed from [...] and the Seller jointly to the Seller.  (203a [12:13-19]).  Kuziemski testified that she disbursed funds believing incorrectly that Seller was the proposed insured in this transaction, and that Plaintiff was merely the lender.  (203a [12:24-13:12]).  The commitment and HUD-1 prepared by [...] clearly showed that the purchaser and proposed insured was Plaintiff.
[brief] (Pa13).  [...] and [...] settled their claims and filed a stipulation of dismissal on May 17, 2023.  – first on July 7, 2023 (T3) and again on July 17, 2023 (T4).  On July 17, 2023, the trial court issued its oral Opinion and denied Appellant’s Motion to Amend the Order.  (Pa10a).  Plaintiff filed the Notice of Appeal and accompanying Case Information Statement on August 30, 2023 indicating that it appealed the grant of [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment on March 27, 2023; the denial of [...]'s subsequent Motion to Amend on July 17, 2023; and the Court's disposition of [...]'s Motion to Bar on March 27, 2023.  (Pa8a).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] Without setting forth an exhaustive counter-statement of facts, Respondent will merely respond to Appellant’s statement of “facts” and make admissions or denials, as warranted.  While the prior legal career history is not truly relevant, it is admitted that Appellant was a long-term member of the New Jersey bar.  It appears that Appellant retired from practice in New Jersey immediately prior to a disciplinary proceeding ruled in Appellant’s favor (but which considered his retired-status).  For all relevant periods of the underlying motion practice, subsequent appeal resulting in remand, and then remand proceedings, Appellant remained in retirement status.
[brief] The Department tries to overcome this by claiming that the disapproval letters left a trail of hints [...] should have deciphered and addressed.  See, e.g., Db19 (arguing the letters “made it quite clear that the magnitude of [...]’s premium rate increases had triggered alarms. ”).¹  This is audacious.  The Department is effectively saying that because [...] knew that its rate increases were being questioned generally, it cannot complain.  That has no support in administrative law; the reason why an agency acts is critical, as the New Jersey Supreme Court has made clear.  See N.J. Bell Tel., 5 N.J. at 376 (rejecting notion that a “lack of express finding by an administrative agency may be supplied by implication”).
[brief] In the present matter, in concluding that the respondent’s property was not commercial, [...] reasoned that “the Appellate Division construed a commercial property determination in the following way:  What we glean from Stewart and its progeny is an unexpressed, but nevertheless intended limitation to its rule: liability is imposed upon the owner of a profit, or not-for-profit enterprise, regardless of whether the enterprise is in fact profitable.  It is the capacity to generate income which is the key.  In part, liability is imposed because of the benefits the entrepreneur derives from providing a safe and convenient access for its patrons.  Secondly, such an enterprise has the capacity to spread the risk of loss arising from injuries on abutting sidewalks, either through the purchase of commercial liability policies or “through higher charges for the commercial enterprise’s goods and services. ”  See Abraham, 281 N.J. Super. at 85 (internal citation omitted).  Based on this framework, the Court cannot qualify Defendants’ Property as commercial.
[brief] East Hanover Ordinances §173-24, §173-27, --- \(^1\)  For the sake of consistency, the transcripts of the municipal proceedings will be identified as 1T-4T as set forth in the Defendants Table of Transcripts.  (Def. Br. At Pg. vii). and §201-2.  (3T Pg. 46, Ln. 19 – Pg. 47, Ln. 3).  The Municipal Count found the Defendant not guilty on Summonses [...] and [...].  (3T Pg. 46, Ln. 3-14).  Defendant was ordered to pay a fine of $2,500.00 plus $33.00 costs after merging the convictions and ordering the fines to run concurrently.  (3T Pg. 49, Ln. 18 – Pg. 50, Ln. 3).  On or about October March 24, 2023, the Defendant filed a Notice of Municipal Court Appeal to the New Jersey Superior Court, Morris County, Law Division.
[brief] One is the judicially-created Mount Laurel doctrine, under which Plaintiff proceeds.  The other two are (a) [...]’s constitutional “right of eminent domain [which] is of very ancient origin . . . , is inherent in all governments and requires no constitutional provision to give it force,” and (b) [...]’s constitutional right to redevelopment, which entitles [...] to revitalize areas in need of redevelopment for the public welfare.  Valentine v. Lamont, 13 N.J. 569, 575 (1953); N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 3, ¶ 1.  The court below erroneously held that [...]’s constitutional right to use eminent domain for a public purpose and right to redevelopment can be trumped by Mount Laurel.  See Valentine, 13 N.J. at 575.  The trial court further erred by prioritizing Plaintiff’s request for a builder’s remedy over [...]’s constitutional rights, on a motion for injunctive relief, without any law supporting that result.  No case holds that [...] loses its right to eminent domain just because it may lack sufficient affordable housing for the Third Round.  Nor does any case hold that [...]’s constitutional right to exercise its redevelopment powers must yield to Plaintiff’s pursuit of a builder’s remedy or that Mount Laurel trumps all other constitutional rights.  In fact, our Supreme Court has indicated that the constitution may permit the builder’s remedy to have a less prominent status than as presently exists.  *In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96*, 215 N.J. 578, 610-11 (2013) (stating that not “all aspects to the remedy fashioned in Mount Laurel II [are] indispensable components of a remedy for the future” and that “[o]ne can envision alternative approaches that, perhaps, might relegate a builder’s remedy to a more reserved status among available solutions to encouragement of construction of affordable housing, reducing the political turmoil that has plagued voluntary compliance with the constitutional goal of advancing the delivery of affordable housing. ”).  Because the court below created new law on an application that requires proof of a well-settled right by clear and convincing evidence, this Court should reverse.
[brief] THE DEPARTMENT’S BULLETIN REQUIRING THE IMPOSITION OF SSAP NO. 25 TO THE AIF FEE IS CONTRARY TO SSAP NO. 25’s PLAIN LANGUAGE.  (A1-2).  Like the inapplicability of the Holding Act, the Department knows and has acknowledged in its decades of examinations and follow-ups that it cannot apply SSAP No. 25 to [...]’s AIF Fees.  If that were not sufficient, the Legislature has confirmed this history through pending legislation, which is intended to codify the \(^{11}\) See supra page 9. past practice of the past with respect to reciprocals.  See S. 3636, 220th Leg. (2023), available at https://pub.njleg.state.nj.us/Bills/2022/S4000/3636_I1.PDF; A. 5317, 220th Leg. (2023), available at https://pub.njleg.state.nj.us/Bills/2022/A5500/5317_I1.PDF (“Related Party Transaction Bill”).  The impropriety of the Department’s actions in unilaterally adopting a contrary Bulletin is obvious.
[brief] Hobson Const. Co. v. Max Drill, Inc., 158 N.J. Super. 263, 266-67 (App. Div. 1978) (citing Kristeller v. First Nat'l Bank, Jersey City, 119 N.J.L. 570, 572 (E. & A. 1937)).  [...] is not asking this Court to determine the merits of its claims against [...] for nonpayment; instead [...] is asserting that in order to avoid an inequitable windfall payment to [...] that exceeds [...]’s net indebtedness to [...], [...] must be permitted to assert a counterclaim for setoff against the Award.
[brief] THE TWO MILLION DOLLAR PAYMENT  WHICH THE [...] RECEIVED FROM 290  OCEAN, LLC IN CONSIDERATION FOR A DENSITY BONUS IS UNLAWFUL BECAUSE THERE IS NO NEXUS BETWEEN THAT PAYMENT AND ANY OFF-SITE IMPACTS CAUSED BY THE REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT, NOR WAS THERE COMPLIANCE WITH N.J.S.A. 40:55D-42 (Pa55 to P58)  A.  Introduction ...........................................................................................................17  B.  The Court Erroneously Granted Summary Judgment on an Argument Not Advanced In the Defendants’ Moving Papers and Wrongly Focused on the Nexus Between the Payment and the Redevelopment Plan ..............................................18  C.  The Court’s Nexus Finding is Incompatible with the MLUL ......22  D.  The $2,000,000 Payment is Not Permitted  Under the LRHL in the Absence of a Nexus .................................................................................................23  1.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8 Does Not Authorize the $2,000,000 Payment .........................................................................................................................23  2.  Under Traditional Rules of Statutory Construction, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8 Should Be Construed in Pari Materia  With the MLUL .........................................................................................................................25  E.  Even if the LRHL Authorized A Payment Not Permitted by the MLUL, Such Payments are Unlawful in the Absence of an Ordinance and Standards Governing Those Payments ............30  POINT II ..................................................................................................................
[brief] The cover page informs the buyers, in capitalized and bold font, that:  YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO CANCEL THIS CONTRACT OR AGREEMENT BY SENDING OR FILED, DELIVERING WRITTEN NOTICE OF CANCELLATION TO THE DEVELOPER (SELLER) BY MIDNIGHT OF THE SEVENTH CALENDAR DAY FOLLOWING THE DAY ON WHICH IT IS EXECUTED.  SUCH CANCELLATION IS WITHOUT PENALTY AND ALL MONIES PAID BY YOU SHALL BE PROMPTLY REFUNDED IN THEIR ENTIRETY.  [DA159.]  This exact language appeared again, capitalized and underlined, right before the SPA’s signature block.  (DA176).  This was signed by Plaintiff [...] and dated December 23, 2017.  (DA176-177).  Plaintiffs were also advised, in Section 20 of the SPA, that the contract was subject to a three-day period of attorney review for both parties, which ran from receipt of a fully executed SPA together with its exhibits (one of which was the Purchase Offering Statement).
[brief] It is axiomatic that trial courts should not decide contested issues of material fact on the basis of conflicting affidavits without considering the demeanor of witnesses at a hearing.  Conforti v. Guliadis, 245 N.J. Super. 561, 565 (App. Div. 1991); Conrad v. Michelle & John, Inc., 394 N.J. Super. 1, 12-13 (App. Div. 2007).  There is certainly no reason that a court should judge the credibility of [...]’s Certification based upon the conflicting information set forth in the unsworn statements offered by the Plaintiff.  [...] did not comply with the rule set forth in M&D Associates, and improperly obtained its Order for Substituted Service based upon incompetent evidence.  Considering the indulgent review to which [...] is entitled on a motion to vacate a default judgment, the lower court clearly erred in concluding that [...] was in fact served.
[brief] Reviewing courts presume the newly minted objection on appeal is “not error” and “unlikely to prejudice the defendant’s case. ”  Singleton, 211 N.J. at 182.  In a situation like this, defendant is unable to now claim that the judge should have sua sponte given a limiting instruction to the jury where both parties used the same strategy to the same end, and wanted the jurors to assess the writings freely, each to their own benefit.  Finally, defendant also complains that the jury was not “reminded” that he disputed the letters’ authorship, that they were not “reminded” that there was no expert testimony, or “reminded” that it was the final arbiter of the issue.
[brief] ”)  Even more, police twice indicated to [...]—a legal layperson—that the [...] would ultimately decide whether a warrant would issue—not the court.  (See Da 18 (“Right now we have enough to write a search warrant on your house and we’re well within our means[.]”), Da 25 (Without consent, “[w]e’d wind up going back to our headquarters to write a search warrant, we’ll come back.  And make entry into the house. ”))  Although an officer later attempted to walk-back this misstatement of the law, stating that “[w]e’re gonna petition the court for a search warrant” (Da 26), the earlier assertions necessarily clouded [...]’s understanding of his right to refuse consent.
[brief] The parties do not have the right to discovery afforded litigants in Superior Court cases.  There is not a unilateral right to depositions.  There is not a unilateral right to interrogatories except in proscribed cases.  Typically, the parties' witnesses are not even disclosed until the pretrial memorandum is executed which is shortly before trial.  See N.J.A.C. 12:235-1.1 et seq.  Workers' Compensation does not have what would be considered any type of normalized motion practice, particularly summary judgment practice.  The structure of the practice is such that the Rules of the Division of Workers' Compensation recognize that to allow such motion practice would impinge upon the due process rights of the parties.