ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa0260 at 22:16-21).  Further, in an effort to establish the general applicability of the referenced NJDOT Traffic Control tapering detail, [...] referenced an independent document titled “Practices and Guidelines for Temporary Transverse HMA (Hot Mix Asphalt) Tapers” published by the [...].  (Pa1862).  This [...] publication memorializes the existence of tapering standards associated with paving operations promulgated by regulatory authorities throughout the country.  (Pa1862 and Pa0247 at 9:2-16).  Significantly, however, qualifying language contained within the [...] publication directly undercuts [...]’s reliance on the document as authority for the position that tapering standards are relevant to the identification of preexisting roadway defects.
[brief] Legislation is held to unconstitutionally impair a contract when it “(1) substantially impair[s] a contractual relationship, (2) lack[s] a significant and legitimate public purpose, and (3) is based upon unreasonable conditions and . . . unrelated to appropriate governmental objectives. ”  Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salem v. N.J. Prop.-Liab. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 215 N.J. 522, 546–47 (2013) (alterations in original) (internal citations and quotations omitted).  Plaintiffs cite to this approach, but then misapply the law.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:55D-3.  There are only two bodies in Hoboken that are authorized to review and approve applications for development – the Board and the Board of Adjustment.  See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-34, -36, -45, -46, -46.1, -47, -48, -50, -67, -70, -76(b).  There is no provision in the MLUL that allows a municipality to assign powers delegated by the Legislature to planning and zoning boards to other boards, and the Supreme Court has stated emphatically that the planning and zoning power must be exercised in strict conformity with the MLUL.  See Nuckel v. Little Ferry Planning Bd., 208 N.J. 95, 101 (2011).
[brief] Pa563.  Additionally, Exhibit P to Appellant’s counsel’s affidavit is not a true copy of the news article published on March 5, 2020, entitled “The basics on the Coronavirus: What you need to know as the US becomes the new epicenter of COVID-10 [sic],” but is rather a modified article which was released on April 10, 2020.  Id.; Da001–Da008.  Notably, the original article did not mention obesity as a risk factor.  Id.  The certification misleads the reader to believe that obesity was included as a factor in available non-opinion pieces in March of 2020.  *Id.*  Exhibit T from the [...] was published in September of 2020, well after the events giving rise to this matter.  *Id.*  Additionally, at no point in time did Appellant state that she had in fact reviewed any article that spoke to obesity as a risk factor, recalling only that she had potentially read an article about COVID-19 interactions with different blood types, but nothing relating to obesity.  Pa228.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I SUMMARY
[directive] Compliance with Pre-Indictment Program Rules and Procedures  Notwithstanding any other provision of these Guidelines, if the county pre- indictment disposition program provides that a defense attorney must affirmatively request the prosecutor to tender a pre-indictment plea offer, the prosecutor shall not be required to tender a pre-indictment plea offer or the functional equivalent of a pre-indictment offer under these Guidelines unless the defense attorney has made such affirmative request in accordance with the rules and procedures for the county pre-indictment disposition program.
[brief] Any opinions and findings of the Trial Court have been made during the pre-trial, trial and post-trial proceedings and said opinions did not warrant recusal.  Defendant acknowledges recusal does not necessarily apply where a court made a ruling on a summary judgment motion or on a preliminary evidential ruling, based upon documentary evidence alone and solely legal in nature.  Instead, Defendant suggests disqualification was warranted because the trial judge heard evidence and testimony and made determinations on issues that included assessments of witness credibility.  In the present case, there was no erroneous exclusion of evidence bearing on any issues, nor does Defendant even suggest there was.
[brief] The Association is headquartered in Vermont.  The policy was issued in that state through an agent located in Vermont.  The Underlying Hokenson Action was venued in Vermont and all events giving rise to that litigation occurred in Vermont.  The only connection to New Jersey is that it is the state of [...]’s residency.  That is outweighed by Vermont’s relationship to the coverage dispute.  To the extent there is any conflict between Vermont law and New Jersey law, the coverage issues, therefore, should be adjudicated under Vermont law.  Under either state’s law, the framework for policy interpretation is straightforward and, plainly, there is no coverage on the theories of recovery successfully pursued by plaintiffs in the Underlying Hokenson Action.
[brief] ”  State v. Francis, 191 N.J. 571, 585-86 (2007).  To carry out its investigatory role, the grand jury is entrusted with expansive powers.  Ibid. at 586 (Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972)).  When dealing with claims of grand jury abuse after an indictment has been returned, the Supreme Court has adopted the “unbroken line of authority” which holds that: --- 5 A copy of the Grand Jury subpoena was not provided by the State.  However, the transmission email references “NJSP Case: [...]. ” (Ma7.)  Clearly, a Grand Jury that was empaneled in 2022 is not still sitting in 2024.  (“Ma” refers to the State’s attachments on its Motion to Supplement the Record.)  [S]uch use of the grand jury is permitted unless the dominant purpose of that use was to buttress an indictment already returned by the grand jury.  Post-indictment, the State may continue to use the grand jury to investigate additional or new charges against a defendant.  However, once an indictment is returned, the State may not use the grand jury to gather evidence solely in respect of the charges already filed.  Ibid. at 591-92 (emphasis added).  The remedy for instances where the State has improperly used the grand jury process in gathering proofs it seeks to use is “suppression of the improperly garnered proofs. ”  Ibid. at 594.  In this matter, the State’s conduct is more egregious than what was contemplated by the Supreme Court in Francis.  Not only was Defendant’s matter clearly at the post-indictment stage, but at the time of the issuance of the Grand Jury subpoena, the Indictment against Defendant had been dismissed by [...].
[brief] ”  R. 4:46-2.  The movant bears the “burden to exclude any reasonable doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact” regarding the claims asserted.  Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954) (citation omitted).  The Supreme Court has cautioned, “a court should deny a summary judgment motion only where the party opposing the motion has come forward with evidence that creates a ‘genuine issue as to any material fact challenged. ’”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 529 (1995) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)) (emphasis added).  “That means a non-moving party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely by pointing to any fact in dispute. ”  *Ibid.*  Moreover, “when the evidence is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law the trial court should not hesitate to grant summary judgment. ”  *Id.* at 540 (quotations omitted).  Additionally, summary judgment is mandated after: adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.  In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.  The moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.  *[Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,* 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986) (internal quotations omitted).  The standard for such a determination is “whether the competent materials presented . . . are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  *Brill,* 142 N.J. at 529 (1995) (quoting *R.* 4:46-2).  Immaterial or frivolous evidence is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.  *Ibid.*  Moreover, an issue that has only “a single, unavoidable resolution” is not “genuine” under *R.* 4:46-2.  *Id.* at 540.  II.
[brief] What the defendants presented in their argument was a generalization about a black man wearing a hoodie in Winter, and nothing objective and reasonable with particularized facts of the plaintiff’s involvement in a crime that would create articulable suspicion warranting that they approached the plaintiff.  (Pa022-Pa023)  Based solely on a black man wearing a hoodie in [...], transferring items from one car to another, defendants then advises that court in point one of their briefs, that there was certainly no opportunity for abstract contemplation by the police officers!  The police officers acted as if the plaintiff behaved unreasonably by becoming visibly upset and agitated.  (Pa022).  Plaintiff, was a black man, being faced with one of the most brutal police forces in New Jersey (See Pa561; Pa588; Pa621).
[brief] Pb6.  This is patently false.  Twice in the opinion attached to her August 21, 2023 order, [...] reiterated these deficiencies.  She never used the word “serous” to modify threat.  In making these findings the Lower Court did find that [...] poses a threat of serious bodily injury or death to a person, or bodily injury or death to a companion animal based upon the prior events.  See Da6 (emphasis added).  Later in her opinion, [...] repeated the error and compounded it by misstating the necessary findings for “serious threat: ”  The Lower Court properly found that there is a threat of future bodily injury to people and future serious bodily injury to domestic animals/pets, based on prior acts with [...] and [...].  PA7.  See Da7, emphasis added.  [...]’s conclusion is wrong on two levels.
[brief] By way of yet another example, [...] also improperly relies upon Exhibits Da262 and Da263, which are purported screenshots from the [...]’s property tax system.  [...] produced no certification or affidavit from anyone with the [...] to corroborate the screenshots as authentic or depicting what [...] alleges the screenshots depict.  [...] also did not produce Da263 during discovery.  Accordingly, [...] must not be permitted to rely upon these documents either.
[brief] The Consolidated Settlement Agreement  Following the sales and transfers of the Account and the filing of the Collection Action, various plaintiffs brought suit against [...] for violations of the NJCFLA, alleging that they had received letters concerning their outstanding account balances from [...]’s collection agent, [...], while [...] was allegedly not licensed as a consumer lender or sale finance company under the NJCFLA.  Pa21, ¶ 3; Pa117, ¶ 30.  Those cases were consolidated, with other similar cases against similarly situated defendants, into [...], [...] (D.N.J.) on November 19, 2018 for purposes of discovery and settlement. ²
[brief] The Trial Court concluded than an illegal use under the zoning code defeats a finding that the commercial use has been discontinued because the Property was not vacant.  (T3, 53:1-8).  Apparently, the Trial Court believed that the Township had an obligation to put the Plaintiff on notice that the use was illegal.  (T3, 53:4-8).  This of course presumes the Borough knew of the illegal use.  Such an interpretation is contrary to the law and to public policy.
[brief] United States v. Brown, 334 F.3d 1161, 1164 (D.C.Cir.2003)  2  United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)  3  Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1447 (5th Cir.1993)  10, 11  Walmsley v. Philadelphia, 872 F.2d 546 (3d Cir.1989)  8  Zive v Stanley Roberts, Inc.182 NJ 436 (2005)  15, 19 NEW JERSEY COURT RULES
[brief] In doing so, it noted that under Panko, if the record fails to establish whether or not an irregularity was prejudicial, “it is presumed to be so and cause for reversal. ”  Ibid.  Thus, “[i]t is only when the irregularity is affirmatively shown to have had no tendency to influence the verdict that reversal is not required. ”  Ibid.  In this case, the trial court utilized the pre-Panko test and rejected the defense’s argument regarding Plaintiff’s actions based upon its determination that the defense had not shown any demonstrable prejudice.
[brief] Id. at 298-99.  The present Model Charge accordingly has the following language concerning feedback:  (c)  Feedback:  Feedback occurs when police officers, or witnesses to an event who are not law enforcement officials, signal to eyewitnesses that they correctly identified the suspect.  That confirmation may reduce doubt and engender or produce a false sense of confidence in a witness.  Feedback may also falsely enhance a witness’s recollection of the quality of his or her view of an event.  It is for you to determine whether or not a witness’s recollection in this case was affected by feedback or whether the recollection instead reflects the witness’s accurate perception of the event.  [Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Identification: In-Court And Out-Of-Court Identifications” (rev. May 18, 2020.]  The Court in this case inexplicably omitted this “Feedback” portion of the model charge from its Identification instruction.  (11T 115-20 to 21)  “When eyewitness identification is a ‘key issue,’ the trial court must instruct the jury how to assess the evidence—even if defendant does not request the charge. ”  *State v. Sanchez-Medina*, 231 N.J. 452, 466 (2018) (citing *State v. Cotto*, 182 N.J. 316, 325 (2005)).  Here, one of defense counsel’s principal arguments challenging the reliability of the four witnesses’ identification of [...] on the surveillance video was that they had a close-knit relationship, all being employees of the family-owned [...], and that they talked to each other about who they believed the person on the video was.  (7T 36-17 to 37-12)  Thus, it was plain error for the Court to fail to provide the portion of the model jury instruction on feedback that was both supported by the evidence and central to the defense.  This error was clearly capable of producing an unjust result and requires reversal.  R. 2:10-2.  **POINT IV**
[brief] Bressman v. Gash, 131 N.J. 517, 526-528 (1993).  Because of their familiarity with the "community's characteristics and interests," the decisions of a local governing body, like those of a local land use board, are generally entitled to substantial deference.  Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965) (quoting Ward v. Scott, 16 N.J. 16, 23 (1954)).  As representatives of the people, members of a local governing body are best equipped to make the decisions on the issues before that body.  On appeal, a court shall not substitute its own judgment for that of the governing body on issues of fact, and the governing body's decision should only be disturbed when arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  Kellwood Assocs. v. Bd. of Adjustment of the City of Englewood, 141 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App, Div. 1976) (citing Stolz v. Ellenstein, 7 N.J. 291 (1951)).  However, decisions of a local governing body on "purely legal" matters are to be reviewed de novo by a reviewing court, and are not entitled to any particular deference.  *Reich v. Borough of Fort Lee Bd. of Adjustment*, 414 N.J. Super. 483, 499 (App. Div. 2010).  Here, the trial court properly applied these standards to sustain the Borough’s grant of a Resolution of Support to [...].  The municipal record was reviewed, and rightly held to have contained substantial, credible evidence to support the award of a Support Resolution to [...].  [...] has not presented anything to either the trial court or this Court that warrants any deviation from that conclusion, other than a subjective belief in the relative merits of its own application for a cannabis license.  Application of long established standards of review of municipal actions supports the settled law in the Borough’s favor here.
[brief] Defs.’ Br. 30 (emphasis added) (citing *Cain v. Midland Funding, LLC*, 256 A.3d 765 (Md. 2021)).  Though Defendants’ argument is novel, it is wholly unsupported by any authority.  First, *Cain* did not address the Takings Clause or analyze constitutional issues; *Cain* held that, 1) “the 12-year statute of limitations under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-102(a)(3) was intended to apply to an action to enforce a judgment,” and 2) “there was no persuasive authority or policy considerations that would support the recognition of tolling of successive class action suits because such an exception was inconsistent with notions of judicial economy and efficiency. ”  Secondly, even if *Cain* did hold that a judgment obtained by an unlicensed debt buyer is not void, the case at bar does not involve a judgment—it involves a voided contract arising from a defaulted consumer debt.  Indeed, Defendants’ argument does not withstand minimal scrutiny; Defendants’ position would render any/all fines imposed by the state as unconstitutional takings.
[brief] In doing so, both parties willfully fail to address well-settled New Jersey precedent that appellate courts review [...] decisions on a de novo basis when the case rests on the agency’s --- \(^1\) “Pb” refers to [...]’s opening brief, filed on March 4, 2024.  \(^2\) “Db” refers to [...]’s opposition brief, filed on May 3, 2024.  \(^3\) “Rb” refers to [...]’s opposition brief, filed on April 2, 2024. interpretation of a statute or determination of a strictly legal issue (Pb94).  Additionally, [...] incorrectly identifies [...]’s “grounds for reversal of [...]’s decision” as “merely showing the possibility that this Appellate Division could have reached a different result” (Db16).  However, even a cursory review of [...]’s initial brief makes clear its position that [...]’s demand to negotiate in the presence of its entire union membership, and [...]’s acceptance of that position, misapplies and misconstrues the law as written and intended by the State legislature.  See, e.g., Pb10, stating that [...] misinterpreted the statutory language contained in N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3.  Here, [...] asks the Appellate Division to interpret N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3, specifically, the Legislature’s intent in including the term “designated representatives” within the statute and then, determine whether [...] correctly applied that interpretation to its decision (Pb10).  If [...] misapplied the clear statutory language when issuing its decision, it must be reversed.  New Jersey appellate courts conduct a de novo review of agency or trial court decisions in such circumstances.  See, e.g., Pb9.  See also Matter of Commitment of W.W., 245 N.J. 438, 448 (2021):  Our Court reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo.  Thus, this Court owes no special deference to the trial court's interpretation of the State's burden under the [legislative act at issue].  "[I]n the interpretation of a statute our overriding goal has consistently been to determine the Legislature's intent."  "To determine the Legislature's intent, [courts] look to the statute's language and give those terms their plain and ordinary meaning,' because 'the best indicator of that intent is the plain language chosen by the Legislature.'"  [Internal citations omitted].  Accordingly, the Appellate Division should utilize a *de novo* standard of review when adjudicating this strictly legal matter involving statutory interpretation.  **POINT II**
[brief] (3T130-1 to 2).  A bloodstain is “a visible stain left on something that’s come into contact with the blood. ” (3T130-24 to 25).  Bloodstain analysis focuses on looking at stains and seeing if there are patterns in the stains “to determine what the mechanism was that created the bloodstain pattern. ” (3T131-1 to 10).  [...] testified that bloodstain pattern analysis has no error rate, explaining, [from the validation studies that I’ve read and being with different associations for private and public, when you’re using proper methods, there’s no error rate in bloodstain pattern analysis.  There have been errors that have been pointed out, but that was human error and it was not following established methods.  [(3T134-6 to 18). ]  When asked if bloodstains are easily distinguishable from each other through training and experience, he testified, “[s]ometimes they are.  Sometimes they’re not. ” (3T138-7 to 10).  At the end of [...]’s testimony, the prosecutor asked, “If you follow the methodology, there’s a zero-error rate, is that accurate?” and he responded, “[y]es. ”  (3T169-22 to 25).  [...] provided a step-by-step recounting of his examination here and his five conclusions including that there had been two beating events and the stains were consistent with a blunt force trauma event.  (3T139-8 to 140-4; 3T152-16 to 153-4; 3T156-3 to 7; 3T160-1 to 162-21; 3T167-16 to 20).  2.  [...] provided proper testimony.  [...] qualified his statement that there was no error rate in blood spatter analysis by stating that it was based on a review of validation studies, including from the FBI and use of proper methods.  See (3T134-6 to 18).  Essentially, that conclusion was based on his “experience, training, [and] education,” which is proper N.J.R.E. 702 testimony.  The jury could have rejected that statement, as instructed, if they had deemed it incredible.
[brief] PRESSLER & VERNIERO, Current N.J. COURT RULES, Comment 5.61on R.4:50-1 (GANN)-2023  31  Defendant accepts and incorporates the Appellant, [...]’s appendices of Volume I, I, & III as if fully set forth and attached hereto, with the additional documents and exhibits referred to Defendant-Respondent’s Appendix, Volume 1.  RESPONSE TO PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF PEAKE POINT
[brief] Defendants are correct that we will not ordinarily consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal unless it relates to “jurisdiction of the trial court or concern[s] matters of great public interest,” or otherwise constitutes “plain error. ”  See Nieder v. Royal Indemnity Insurance Company, 62 N.J. 229, 234, 300 A.2d 142 (1973).  See also Hamilton, Johnston v. Johnston, 256 N.J. Super. 657, 662, 607 A.2d 1044 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 595, 617 A.2d 1219 (1992); R. 2:10–2.
[brief] (10T 131-18 to 132-11)  [...] testified that he maintained the 60 to 80 “pole cameras” in use in Trenton at the time, but that no one was live-monitoring those cameras, and that the system overwrites itself in a period of about two weeks.  (10T 148-17 to 152-23)  He admitted that there is a pole camera, at Oakland and Hoffman, a long block north of the site of the shooting, but he does not know if it was functioning at the time.  (10T 170-25 to 171-6)  He also admitted that there are “skips” in the footage -- i.e., actual missing footage -- from the cameras at Stuyvesant and Hoffman where the shooting occurred.  (10T 173-2 to 174-19)  When asked if there were pole cameras near 33 and 35 Ellsworth, near where defendant was arrested, [...] first said he did not know, but then, when shown a photo of those cameras (defense exhibit D-111; Da 20) which was never admitted into evidence because of an incorrect evidentiary ruling that is addressed in Point I, infra), [...] said that even if he “guessed” that there were such cameras there, those cameras were not “operational” in 2019 and that he cannot recall if anyone in law enforcement requested footage from those cameras.