[brief] It is well-established that when an employer asserts an arbitration clause as a waiver of an employee’s statutory right to sue under an anti-discrimination law, the employee must actually understand what she is doing and explicitly agree to the waiver.  Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir. 1997).  Or, as the Appellate Division has put it, the “waiver presupposed full knowledge of the right and an intentional surrender. ”  Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, 330 N.J. Super. 252, 267 (App. Div. 2000) (citations omitted).  Our Supreme Court has held that an agreement to arbitrate will not be enforced – even where both parties to the agreement had legal counsel when they agreed to arbitrate their claims – unless they actually understand what they were told regarding arbitration.  See Fawzy v. Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456 (2009).  In Fawzy, the parties to a divorce agreed to submit to arbitration issues of custody and time sharing.  Both were represented by counsel, and the agreement to arbitrate was explained to them in open court.  On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that the issues were properly subject to arbitration.  Fawzy, 199 N.J. at 482.  Nonetheless, the Court found that the “agreement to arbitrate was insufficient to bind the parties” because it was not adequately explained to them.  Fawzy, 199 N.J. at 482-83.  Here, as argued before the trial court, Appellant was not represented by counsel or specifically advised to speak with an attorney before allegedly reviewing the Arbitration Agreement at issue.  (Pa000213).  In fact, Appellant was not told anything about any sort of agreement to arbitrate disputes when she was instructed to open the files containing the alleged Arbitration Agreement.  Rather, Appellant was suddenly rushed to log into her employee portal and simply click through a series of pages with Respondents’ policies on them before she could begin her employment.  See id.  Even after Appellant reviewed the pages on the screen on the portal, Respondents never even provided Appellant with a physical copy or means to access the terms of the Arbitration Agreement until the within litigation had already been commenced.  See id.  If the agreement in Fawzy was unenforceable where the parties were both represented by counsel at the time they agreed to arbitration, the agreement at issue here certainly cannot be enforceable where Appellant was not told anything about agreeing to arbitrate her statutory claims at the time she allegedly agreed to it.  See id.  Although Appellant’s arguments in this regard were supported in fact and law, the trial court failed to articulate whether it considered this argument in granting Respondents’ motions, as the trial court granted Respondents’ motions without providing meaningful legal analysis accompanying its decision as to same.  Insofar as Appellant has certified that she did not understand she was agreeing to arbitrate her claims with Respondents by simply opening policies on Respondents’ employee portal, and Appellant was not even informed this was something she needed to be aware of in the first place, the Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable and, as such, the trial court’s granting of the Respondents’ motions should be reversed.  4.