ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Kovack*, 91 N.J. at 482 (citation omitted).  It is not necessary for [...] to demonstrate why he may wish to withdraw, as he has a right to withdraw pursuant to the terms of his plea agreement; however, the reasons he may wish to withdraw are fairly obvious from the record.  When [...] pleaded guilty, evidence from the 7-Eleven Case (the clothing and money found in the car and the surveillance footage) was going to come in at his Pharmacy trial under 404(b).  (Da 33, 42-53)  Because our Supreme Court determined that the evidence found in the car was obtained in violation of [...]’s constitutional rights, Nyema, 249 N.J. at 531-35, it can no longer be used against him in the Pharmacy Case.  See State v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 639, 651 (1990) (“[E]vidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s federal- or state-constitutional rights is generally excluded as proof against the defendant. ”) (citing cases).  As the trial court acknowledged, the evidence unlawfully recovered from the car was critical to the State’s proofs in the Pharmacy Case.  (Da 50) (trial court reasoning that “the State’s identification evidence is limited to the credibility of [the] cooperating witness . . . and the clothing and cash discovered in the suspect’s automobile”).  This is because the suspects’ faces were covered in the surveillance footage from both the 7-Eleven and the Pharmacy incidents.  (Da 41, 50)  The trial court reasoned that because the evidence in the car connected the occupants to the 7-Eleven robbery, it was admissible in the Pharmacy Case to prove identity due to a similar manner in which one of the suspects walked in the various surveillance videos.  (Da 47- 50)  Without the car stop, the State’s evidence of identity is significantly weaker.  See (Da 71) (dismissing 7-Eleven indictment due to “insufficient evidence upon which to predicate successful prosecution”).  Put simply, our Supreme Court’s decision directly impacts the strength of the State’s case on the remaining indictment.
[brief] Barker v. Brinegar, 346 N.J. Super. 558, 566 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting Hernandez v. Region Nine Hous. Corp., 146 N.J. 645, 659 (1996)).  “[F]or the purposes of issue preclusion . . . , ‘final judgment’ includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect. ”  Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 (1982).  “In civil litigation, where issue preclusion and its ramifications first developed, the availability of appellate review is a key factor. ”  Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 580 U.S. 5, 10 (2016).  However, this is not the case for criminal proceedings.  Ibid.; see also Brown, 394 N.J. Super. at 502 (observing that “[c]ivil and criminal proceedings involve different values” and recognizing the doctrine of collateral estoppel differs between civil and criminal cases).
[brief] Accordingly, any reliance by [...] upon the unreported decision of Bishop Property Management v. City of Jersey City Rent Leveling Board, 2020 WL 6553789 (App. Div. November 9, 2020) to bar a rent increase based upon a “fair return” of [...]’s equity in the Unit is misplaced.  The Appellate Division there merely held that Jersey City’s ordinance did not allow owner’s equity to be calculated based upon the property’s appraised market value.  Here, the Unit’s appraised value ($622,500) was not used to determine the owner’s equity.
[directive] County.  Each County Prosecutor will designate a County ALPR Coordinator who will maintain contact information for Agency ALPR Coordinators in the county and provide it to the State ALPR Coordinator.  Where county ALPR data is maintained by a sheriff’s department or public safety agency, a representative from that agency may be designated as a County ALPR Co-Coordinator.  State agencies should report their Agency ALPR Coordinators directly to the State ALPR Coordinator.  State.
[brief] ”  State v. Williams (Williams II), 410 N.J. Super. 549, 560 (App. Div. 2009) certif. denied 201 N.J. 440 (2010).  Indeed, in Williams II, this Court distinguished between the defendant in Williams I, who committed obstruction by pushing an officer and fleeing his command, and the defendant in Williams II, who fled from an officer’s command but did not “engage in any act of physical aggression.
[brief] ”  In other words, the question being answered by the Court appears to be much narrower than what Appellant asserts it to be.  may accept this Agreement before expiration of the twenty-one days, in which case she shall waive the remainder of the consideration period.  Employee has a period of seven (7) calendars after delivering the executed Agreement to revoke acceptance of the Agreement.  To revoke she must deliver timely written notice revoking acceptance of this Agreement to the attention of the Employer’s attorney....”  [Pa43]
[brief] | | Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc., 134 N.J. 275 (1993)  ...........................................................................................................17  Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76 (2002)  ..................................................................................................................13, 15  Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Catone Research Inc., 427 N.J. Super. 45 (App. Div. 2012)  ......................................................................................15  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)  ................................................................................................................15  Morton v. 4 Orchard Land Trust, 180 N.J. 118 (2004)  ..................................................................................................................14  Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973)  ....................................................................................................................11, 24 Parrella v. Sirius Xm Holdings, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 59 (App. Div. Jan. 18, 2022) ......17, 19, 21, 23 Racioppi v. Airbnb, Inc., No. A0455-22, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1200 (App. Div. July 17, 2023).............................................................................................................................33
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases: Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590 (2001)...........................................2,3,13 Sosa v. Massachusetts Bay Insurance Co., 458 NJ. Super. 639 (App. Div. 2019).........................................................................................................................7  Lehrhoff v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 271 N.J. Super. 340 (App. Div. 1994)..10 Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Cos., 48 NJ 291 (1966).............................................11,14  Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Insurance Co., 34 N.J. 475 (1961)......................11,13 Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 100 N.J. 325 (1966)..................................................14
[brief] In *East Mill Assoc. v. Township Council of East Brunswick*, 241 N.J. Super. 403 (App. Div. 1990), the Rezoning Ordinance was inconsistent with the Master Plan.  The Governing Body did not contemporaneously adopt the "reasons resolution" required by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62(a).  Apparently belatedly realizing its failure, the Governing Body adopted a "Reasons Resolution" 36 days later.  The Court invalidated the Ordinance stating (at p. 408):  The purpose of the reason resolutions is to inhibit inconsistency while preserving flexibility.  By requiring contemporaneous passage, the Law not only provides an avenue for public scrutiny of the action (including a record for judicial review) but, perhaps more importantly, ensures that the inconsistency is clearly recognized and rationalized when the action is taken.  There is a significant difference between contemporaneous debate and *post hoc* rationalization (emphasis added).  In *Willoughby v. Planning Board of Township of Deptford*, 332 N.J. Super. 223 (App. Div.), cert. den. 165 N.J. 603 (2000) the issue was whether the Governing Body putting forth "reasons" in the Ordinance, at a point when the Municipal Bodies were operating under a mistake of belief that the Ordinance was "consistent" with the Master Plan, could suffice to provide the reasons resolution necessary when a Municipality is adopting a rezoning Ordinance not consistent with the Master Plan.
[brief] (Not raised below)  "When inadmissible evidence is admitted in error by the trial court, a curative instruction may sometimes be a sufficient remedy."  State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 586 (2018).  "An effective curative instruction needs to be 'firm, clear, and accomplished without delay.'"  Id. (quoting State v. Vallejo, 198 N.J. 122, 134 (2009)).  After the trial court admitted [...]'s testimony that he took statements from [...] and others before charging [...] with the shooting (2T33-5), the judge should have told the jury that it must not speculate as to the content of the out-of-court statement or otherwise infer that [...], the bodega owner, etc., had identified [...] as the shooter.  Even if defense counsel had insisted on including a witness-identification instruction at the end of the trial, see 2T47-24 to 2T48-9, the instruction had to have been "without delay" per Prall.
[brief] (3T, 4T)  Among other things, [...] was asked about his decision to enter [...]’s vehicle into the NYPD license plate reader system.  [...] testified that, based on his training and experience, narcotics travel into New Jersey from New York, and [...] had mentioned that he traveled from New York to New Jersey to deliver heroin to [...]’s storage unit.  (3T 24-18 to 25)  [...] further testified that, prior to stopping [...] and [...], he believed based on his observations that they “were doing some sort of narcotics and criminal transaction. ”  (4T 16-8 to 10)  On cross-examination, [...] testified that police had no information about [...] prior to the day of the stop; there was no reference to [...] in the records subpoenaed from [...], and police never saw [...] access the storage unit during the numerous surveillance operations they conducted.  (3T 63-15 to 22, 64-1 to 9, 68-3 to 111)  All police knew about [...] was that he appeared to be associated with [...] and that his license plate began with the letter “T,” indicating that his car was a New York-registered taxi.  (3T 73-6 to 16; 4T 20-1 to 10)  [...] testified that, based on his training and experience, New York-registered taxis are known to transport narcotics from New York into other areas.  (4T 19-15 to 25)  With respect to [...], [...] testified that [...] never mentioned [...] to police -- he only mentioned [...].  (3T 61-14 to 62-2)  During the hearing, [...] ruled that [...] did not have standing to challenge the warrantless traffic stop of [...].
[directive] When a defendant is convicted for one or more of the offenses listed below or an attempt or conspiracy to commit one or more of the offenses, and the victim of the crime(s) was under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the offense and the defendant resides in a household with other minor children or is the parent of a minor child; The Criminal Division shall complete a [...] Referral form as follows:  1)  Answer all questions in Section 1 and attach a copy of the Court History section of the Adult Presentence Investigation Report.  Do not attach the Presentence Investigation Report.  2)  In Section 2 check the box for the crime(s) of which the defendant was convicted and if the conviction was for an attempt or conspiracy to commit the enumerated crime(s) check the appropriate box.  3)  In Section 3 obtain the required information about the minor child or children from the defendants presentence investigation report and insert the information into the spaces available.  4)  Once all the information has been gathered the Criminal Division Probation Officer shall call the [...] at [...] and advise them that a referral will be faxed to them upon completion of the phone call.  5)  The Criminal Division Probation Officer shall fax the referral and attached documentation to the [...] (OCAC) at Fax #: [...] or [...] □ murder N.J.S.2C:11-3 or manslaughter N. J.S.2C:11-4; □ simple assault or aggravated assault N.J.S.2C:12-1; □ stalking P.L.1992, c.209 (C.2C:12-10); □ terrorist threats N.J.S.2C:12-3; □ kidnapping and related offenses including criminal restraint; false imprisonment; interference with custody; criminal coercion; or enticing a child into a motor vehicle, structure, or isolated area N.J.S.2C:13-1 through 2C:13-6; □ sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, criminal sexual contact or lewdness N.J.S.2C:14-2 through N.J.S.2C:14-4; □ arson N.J.S.2C:17-1, or causing or risking widespread injury or damage which would constitute a crime of the second degree N.J.S.2C:17-2; □ a crime against a child, including endangering the welfare of a child and child pornography N.J.S.2C:24-4; or child abuse, neglect, or abandonment R.S.9:6-3; □ endangering the welfare of an incompetent person N.J.S.2C:24-7 or endangering the welfare of an elderly or disabled person N.J.S.2C:24-8; or □ domestic violence P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-17 et seq.)  TO: [...]  Office of Child Abuse Control  FROM: RE: Referral in Accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6.3  DATE: Defendant: Indictment/Accusation:
[brief] Since a human being is a “living animal or creature,” the State also still has failed to provide this Court with an explanation (valid or otherwise) as to what exactly constitutes an “indirect” “torment, torture, maiming, hanging [or] poisoning” “of a living animal or creature” “through the use of another living animal or creature” for the purposes of N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 17(c)(3).  N.J.S.A. 4:22 – 17(c)(3) literally makes every sentient person in this State a criminal as long as any other “living animal or creature” (human or non – human”) is being or has been “tormented” or “tortured” or “maimed,” “hung” or “poisoned” by “another living animal or creature. ” during the applicable statute of limitations period.  It also criminalizes not paying for (or not providing for free) “necessary care” to any “living animal or creature” if that “living animal or creature” sustained a “bodily injury” as a “direct” or “indirect” result of not receiving that care and the offending part is or was “the owner” or “person otherwise charged with the care of the living animal or creature.
[brief] The trial judge had determined that the entire process had been “irreparably tainted” by the mayor’s comments regarding the plaintiff’s property, project, and affordable housing.  Therefore, the trial court found that the mayor’s opposition to such applications created a conflict of interest.  The Appellate Division, however, found that while the record was “clear that [the mayor]…did not welcome the increase of affordable housing in the Township” the judge should not have enjoined his participation.  *Id.* at *19.  Notably, in reaching this conclusion, the Appellate Division wrote: “public officials ‘cannot and should not be expected to be without any personal interest in the decisions and policies of government.
[brief] The Supreme Court of New Jersey has also held that a party’s ability to take time to review the terms of an agreement is incompatible with claims of procedural unconscionability.  See Pace, 258 N.J. at 107 (“Here, defendants generally presented the lease on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, but plaintiffs had time to consult with an attorney and were free to seek out alternative housing arrangements if they did not agree with the lease’s terms.
[brief] See State v. Viera, 346 N.J. Super. 198, 216 (App. Div. 2001) ("although mutual combat under certain circumstances may constitute adequate provocation and reduce murder to manslaughter, the contest must be waged on equal terms….Thus, the offense is not manslaughter where the defendant alone is armed.") (emphasis added); see also State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518, 541 (1992) ("Several scratches and bruises when compared to fifteen stab wounds do not suggest mutual combat."); People v. Austin, 133 Ill.2d 118, 139 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1989) ("One who instigates combat can not rely on the victim’s response as evidence of mutual combat sufficient to mitigate the killing of that victim from murder to manslaughter.").
[brief] [Lasky, 425 N.J. Super. at 538 (quoting Weinreich v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997))].  If a party’s alleged injury was the result of conduct irrespective of his alleged disability, then there is no causal relationship between the disability and alleged injury.  See CG v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 734 F.3d 229, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2013) (“In other words, Plaintiffs must show that they have been deprived of a benefit or opportunity provided to non-disabled students or a group of students with some other category of disability, because of their disability”) (emphasis supplied); see also New Directions Treatment Servs. v. City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 300 n.4 (3d Cir. 2007).  The Third Circuit in CG determined that to state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that they were “treated differently based on the protected characteristic, namely the existence of their disability.
[brief] \(^{19}\)  This Court should thus not \(^{19}\)  Even if this Court somehow determines that plaintiff did raise this objection below, this Court still should reject plaintiff’s argument.  If the failure to appoint an expert was, in fact, error, it was, for the reasons stated above, certainly “harmless error” that was not “‘clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ’”  See, e.g., Boland v. Dolan, 140 N.J. 174, 190 (1995).  reverse the Trial Court’s decision because it failed to appoint an expert.  VII.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION
[brief] That is different from inferring an agreement from behavior after an offense is committed.  Even if [...] knew he was picking up his cousin because he had just committed murder — of which there is no evidence of in the record — that is not evidence that [...] had agreed to aid [...] in committing murder, as opposed to merely helping him evade prosecution for murder.  At the very least, the jury needed to be instructed that an agreement to help [...] escape from the scene of the shooting does not constitute conspiracy to murder.  In Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 413-15 (1957), the Supreme Court of the United States reversed a conspiracy conviction because the jury was not told that “concealment in order to achieve the central purpose of the conspiracy” was part of the substantive crime of conspiracy, while “concealment intended solely to cover up an already completed crime” was not.  “[A] vital distinction must be made between acts of concealment done in furtherance of the main criminal objectives of the conspiracy, and acts of concealment done after these central objectives have been attained, for the purpose only of covering up after the crime. ”  Id. at 405 (emphasis in original).  This distinction was not made in this case.  Moreover, the legally erroneous argument about accomplice liability for murder — that helping someone after-the-fact is the same as having the purpose to promote the murder — further muddied the waters for the jury as to whether some sort of agreement to assist after the murder could be a basis for culpability for the charges in this case.  As in Grunewald, the failure to explain to the jury the permissible and impermissible bases of a conspiracy conviction requires reversal.  Our Supreme Court has explained that “the aim in criminalizing conspiracies is to prosecute the agreement itself, thus punishing jointly planned criminal activity quite apart from any underlying offense involved in the conspiracy. ”  State v. Hardison, 99 N.J. 379, 383 (1985).  That aim is not accomplished when no proof of an agreement exists, and there is only proof that someone committed the substantive crime.  Because no evidence of an agreement existed in this case, [...]’s conviction for conspiracy must be reversed and a judgment of acquittal entered on that count.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da255 Exh A (Emails of [...] to [...] dated March 27, 2023 and April 3, 2023)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da270 Exh B (Email of [...], Esq.  To [...], Esq. dated May 4, 2023—Redacted as Redundant, see Da070 and Second Addendum to Agreement of Sale executed by [...] (undated)—Redacted as Redundant)
[brief] *1  Before the Special Master is [...]’s July 10, 2017, Motion to Compel [...] to explain the deficiencies in its production and privilege logs and to identify all documents that were improperly not produced or logged.  The Motion has since been fully briefed, with [...] submitting a Response on July 24, 2017 and [...] submitting a Reply on July 31, 2017.  For the reasons explained below, it is the recommendation of the Special Master that [...]’s Motion be denied.
[brief] [(2T 19-25 to 20-7; Pb12-13)]  Specifically, the State notes, “[c]ontrary to the court’s findings, the officers had no advance information of defendant’s location, car or activities prior to observing the Infiniti in the Wawa parking lot. ”  (Pb13)  While the State is correct that [...] did not receive information that [...] would be in the Wawa parking lot and thus was not specifically seeking to encounter [...] there, this factual discrepancy is immaterial to the overall merit of the motion court’s decision or the analogy to Smart.
[brief] See e.g. *Township of Franklin v. Franklin Tp. PBA Local 154*, 424 N.J. Super. 369, 377-378 (App. Div. 2012).  Further, in reviewing the instant decision, the appellate courts must recognize [...]’s expertise in the area of employer-employee relations in the public sector.  *Hunterdon Cty. Freeholder Bd. and CWA*, 116 N.J. 322, 328 (1989).  When the subject matter of the appeal implicates [...]’s expertise, the appellate courts on judicial review must give due weight to the administrative agency’s determination.  *Id.* at 329  Here, the Board merely showing the possibility that this Appellate Division could have reached a different result is insufficient grounds for reversal of [...]’s decision.  Rather, the Board must demonstrate that [...]’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it was not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.  The Board here has not and cannot reach this stringent threshold.  Accordingly, this Court must deny the Board’s appeal.
[brief] The defendants in their brief also rely on the plaintiff’s later incorrect conviction to establish probable cause in hindsight.  As per defense counsel, “given those convictions, probable cause for plaintiffs arrest that night is manifest and as such he cannot establish a cause of action for wrongful arrest as a matter of law. ”  Probable cause cannot be established if there was no reasonable suspicion to stop plaintiff in the first place.  See State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 29-30 (2004); See also "State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40, 45, (2004).
[brief] Instead of addressing this significant issue, the Court merely included a footnote indicating D’Avila was the newer case.  Id. at *48 fn. 11.  The Mass. Bay case perfectly illustrates the ambiguous nature of the subject clause.  Where even courts and judges fail to reach similar findings regarding substantially similar indemnification clauses, it defies common sense to hold these clauses out as clear, concise, and unambiguous for the general public.
[brief] [...]’s Website Lacked the Essential Terms to Constitute a Contract – or Even an Offer to Form a Contract.  The essential elements of a contract are (1) offer, (2) acceptance, and (3) consideration.  See, e.g., Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427 (1982).  [...] has failed to establish these elements of a contract.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 17:33A-2 and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1(b).  The mere fact that these various procedural and constitutional issues exist demonstrates that [...]’s NFADR process was not intended to be a “complete substitute” for the Fraud Act’s designation of “courts of competent jurisdiction” as the appropriate venue for resolving Fraud Act claims.