ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:55D-42..........................................................................................................................26, 28 N.J.S.A. 40A:12-8(f).....................................................................................................................32  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 et seq...........................................................................................................1 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-2.......................................................................................................................22, 32 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-22(a)..............................................................................................................23 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-39.....................................................................................................................46 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7.......................................................................................................................41 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e)................................................................................................................14 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(f)................................................................................................................6 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(e)................................................................................................................13 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f)..............................................................................................................passim N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-9.....................................................................................................................23 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-9(a)..............................................................................................................23 Other Authorities [...] & [...], Cities and Towns Are No Longer Just Gatekeepers, 163 N.J.L.J. 914 (2001) .........................................................28 Rules R. 4:14-2(c) .................................................................................................................................5 R. 4:46-2(c) .................................................................................................................................18
[brief] As stated above, since the alleged “Third Loan” is a continuation of the $50,000 and $330,000 loans, it is barred by the six (6) year statute of limitation because it was never modified by a signed writing.  Second, unlike in *Guerin*, there is no signed written contract of a “Third Loan” or any written indication that the terms of the “Third Loan” were “pay-when-able. ”  Third, and most importantly, Plaintiff has presented less proof than the plaintiff in *Flynn*, who failed to meet his burden of proof.  The *Flynn* court found that the lender stating, “get it back to us when you can” was insufficient to convert the demand loan to a “pay-when-able” loan.  Similarly, the only evidence that Plaintiff presented regarding the alleged “pay-when-able” terms of the alleged “Third Loan” is his own self-serving testimony.  There was no written evidence that the alleged “Third Loan” was pay-when-able.  Unlike in *Flynn*, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence of written follow-up for the subsequent seven (7) years after the “Third Loan” was allegedly agreed upon.  Notably, the defendant in Flynn acknowledged there was in fact a loan but disputed the alleged “pay-when-able” terms.  Conversely, Defendants dispute both the existence of the alleged “Third Loan” – and have documents to further dispute its existence, including the signed Discharge of Mortgage stating the loan was “Paid in Full” – and also dispute the alleged “pay-when-able” term in the non-existent “Third Loan.
[brief] That is the job of the Legislature.  an arm’s length basis. ”  Amounts charged (up to 12.5% of DWP as in the current POA) by [...] for current and future services need to be supported by current market rates or on allocations of costs and reasonable in relation to the services provided to [...].  - Expense analysis performed, if any, by [...] establishing the “up to 12.5%” service fee included in the POA agreement.  - Description of the process to review / re-perform the expense analysis and POA service fee periodically, if such a process exists.  - Analysis of actual expenses incurred by [...] for each year, 2017 through 2021, in performing the POA services for these years (itemized if possible) and the fees charged to [...].  - [...]’s proforma financial [statements] for each of the years, 2017 through 2021.  [See Ja69-70 (Request received from the Department on July 6, 2022 in connection with their 2020 financial examination of [...]).]  The Department then compounded its improper questioning, asking the following:
[brief] (Da62; Da1)  While defendant [...] consented, the remaining defendants refused, and the court directed the State to file its motion to compel.  (Da62)  On January 10, 2023, the [...] produced a report detailing DNA analysis of the handgun that found samples suitable for comparison.  (Da62; Da49-51)  On January 13, 2023, the State filed a motion to compel buccal swabs from defendants along with certifications from the county prosecutor and a detective.  (Da47; Da41-44)  On July 6, 2023, the court heard argument on the State’s motion.  (2T)  The court granted the motion, finding it was supported by probable cause and that any delay in seeking the swab was justified by active plea negotiations.  (Da59; Da64-68)
[brief] 1.  The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.  The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.  Section. 2.
[brief] Specifically, [...] focused on the fact that defendant’s objective in getting the gun was not to shoot [...], but to confront [...].  (18T93-8 to 16).  Defendant argues that there was no evidence at trial to support that conclusion, suggesting instead that he merely had the gun in case the one-on-one fight he allegedly intended escalated into a greater threat.  (Db38).  But the record does not support defendant’s after-the-fact, self-serving version of events.
[brief] Despite Division’s attempt to argue the contrary, when viewing the contract as a whole, the plain language actually supports the [...]’s interpretation of the contract.  The collective bargaining agreement states in Article V:  All overtime shall be compensated as paid compensation at the time and one-half (1-1/2) rate, (the overtime rate shall be base plus maintenance divided by 2,080 x 1.5), unless the employee, at said employee's sole option, elects to take compensation for overtime in compensatory time off (C.T.O.) which shall accumulate in a C.T.O. bank.  Compensatory time compensation in the C.T.O. bank shall accumulate at time and one-half (one and one-half hours banked for each hour of  Language in parenthesis is most often used to define a term.  The Division’s contention that the parenthetical equation is “illustrative” is nonsensical.  When looking at this clause as a whole, it is clear that the language contained in parentheses defines how overtime must be calculated for overtime paid as compensation or compensatory time.  The language contained in parentheses was specifically included in the contract to ensure that the clause was not ambiguous.  The language in Article V is not one of several examples of how to calculate overtime, it is the definition of how to calculate overtime.
[brief] POINT 3 .........................................................................................  8  COMPLAINTS  [...], [...] AND [...]  EACH CHARGES A VIOLATION OF AN EAST HANOVER BOARD OF HEALTH ORDINANCE WHICH CONTAINS A PENALTY PROVISION WHICH IS VOID THUS RENDERING THE ORDINANCE UNENFORCEABLE (RAISED BELOW DA 6A,7A)  POINT 4.  .................................................  11  SUMMONS  [...]  CHARGES A VIOLATION OF EAST HANOVER CODE 201-21 THE LANGUAGE OF WHICH HAS BEEN DECLARED VOID FOR VAGUENESS (RAISED BELOW DA 7A)  POINT 5......................................................  15  EAST HANOVER ORDINANCE 173-24(A) AND 173- 27 ARE VOID FOR VAGUENESS AS A PERSON OF REASONABLE INTELLIGENCE WOULD NOT FATHOM THAT TRAPPING, FEEDING OR SHELTERING  STRAY  CATS  CONSTITUTES CRIMINAL ABANDONMENT OR VIOLATES A LAW PROHIBITING THE PERMITTING OF CATS TO ROAM AT LARGE.(RAISED BELOW DA 7A)  CONCLUSION..................................................  19 | Document Name | Date | Appendix Page Number or Transcript | |---------------|------------|-----------------------------------| | Decision | 01/23/2024 | Da la | ## INDEX TO APPENDIX | Document/Exhibit Title or Description | Date | Appendix Page Number | |-------------------------------------------------------|------------|----------------------| | Decision | 01/23/2024 | Da la | | Complaint [...] | 10/01/2021 | Da 13a | | Complaint [...] | 10/01/2021 | Da 14a | | Complaint [...] | 10/01/2021 | Da 15a | | Complaint [...] | 10/01/2021 | Da 16a | | Complaint [...] | 10/01/2021 | Da 17a | | Complaint [...] | 10/01/2021 | Da 18a | | Notice Motion Dismiss | 05/06/2022 | Da 19a | | Order Denying Motion | 08/04/2022 | Da 20a | | Notice of Municipal Court Appeal | 03/24/2023 | Da 21a | | Notice of Appeal | 02/26/2024 | Da 25a | | Certificate of Transcript Completion | 03/13/2024 | Da 29a | | Court/Agency | Appellate Party Name | Role | Party Status | Trial Court/Designation | Trial Agency Party | |--------------|----------------------|------|--------------|-------------------------|--------------------| | [...] | Appellant | | Defendant | Participated Below | | [...]| Respondent | | Plaintiff | Participated Below | | Proceeding Type | Proceeding Transcript Date | Number | |---------------------------------|---------------------------|--------| | Motion | 04/07/2022 | 1T | | Motion | 07/14/2022 | 2T | | Trial | 03/09/2023 | 3T | | Municipal Court Appeal | 01/04/2024 | 4T |
[directive] 2.  The which  The agency initiated the case:  initiating law enforcement - agency may well have been able proceed with a criminal to - that To investigation without the assistance of others.  extent the agency allaboratgd with other law enforcement agencies further to an investigation and develop a more significant ase, it should not "lose" the value of an asset which it may the normal course, and in without assistance from other law enforcement agencies, have In obtained independently.  these circumstances, contributive the law in share of the initiating enforcement agency may be calculated a greater than pure percentage contribution fashion order in to encourage and foster future law enforcement cooperation.  Furthermore, the agency which initiated the case may have made an insignificant manpower contribution the forfeiture.  example, a For to stop by a State Trooper could result in a find of a large cache of drug money.  The few moments expended by the trooper would be far less S.O.P.  NJR&PS 12 Forfeiture 6 Program Administration Page could, in of case which than expended the prosecution the itself, in result a major prosecution if the investigation could ascend indeed, the drug distribution hierarchy.  Nevertheless, the "but for" nature of the trooper's act may warrant a greater contributive share for his or agency than would be calculated solely by considering manpower costs expended.
[brief] The Issue of Profitability  [...]’s second report reveals that Exhibit 13 in the “Home Building Income Statement by Plan,” included in the Application for Exemption, contains relevant financial information about the likely financial results of the Project.  Pa705, par 18.  By [...]’s own projection, “‘Unleveraged IRR’ produced by the project would be a remarkably high 67.9% on the developer’s invested equity capital. ”  Id.  Based on his professional experience in “structuring financing and equity investments for more than 100 similar projects,” [...] explains that a “well-conceived and sponsored project needs to demonstrate an unleveraged IRR in the range of 10% - 12% in order to attract the equity capital needed as a source of funds. ”  Pa705, par 20.  The developer’s own projection that the Project will “produce an unleveraged IRR of 67.9% [is] more than five times this benchmark standard. ”  Id.  “This extraordinary profitable return is projected despite the so-called ‘extraordinary costs,’ and with a very modest short-term PILOT agreement. ”  Id.  [...] concludes that the Project would be financially viable if it were subject to full taxes and that without the tax exemption it would still be constructed.
[brief] He stated, “The horror that we all dreaded, this important topic, there would be no notice and would go to Committee, and it would be passed, nobody ever saw the bill.  So it happened once again. ”  (Pa282 at 14:11-14.)  [...] further explained, “Regardless of where you’re at on any of the issues, you ought to notify the public on huge issues of this import.  And it wasn’t done.  And I have to say it’s unacceptable…  But it’s just not acceptable to treat the public like that.  It’s actually a total disrespect for the process. ”  (Pa282 at 14:19-23.)  He noted, “Committee hearings are supposed to be so we hear from the public.
[brief] In Respondent’s brief, the [...] has taken the position that the standard of review in this matter is abuse of discretion.  (Respondent’s Brief at 6-7).  And while it’s generally true that a reviewing court “should not reverse the Attorney General's determination unless it is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole,” Prado v. State, 186 N.J. 413, 427 (2006), when, as here, the issue presented to the Court is legal in nature, this court’s review is de novo.  Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 172 (2014).  Thus, Respondent’s brief is premised on an incorrect standard of review.
[brief] At the first meeting on September 27, 2017, [...] (“[...]”), the owner of [...], testified that in 1993 he purchased [...], an eleven-unit building in [...] for $525,000.  See 1T, at 6:8-10.  After completing major renovations on the building and converting the units into condominiums, he sold ten of the eleven units and the only remaining unit that [...] presently owns in the building is the unit where [...] currently resides.  Id. at 6:14.  [...] testified that he receives an annual gross rental income from [...]’s unit in the amount of $8,387.  Id. at 6:26.  Specifically, [...] pays a monthly base rent of $574.41 and a tax surcharge of $149, collectively equaling $723.41 per month.  Id. at 109:23.  [...] testified that his 2016 operating expenses for the unit include: (1) $6,275 in property taxes; (2) $5,722 in condominium fees, which includes water and sewerage; (3) $634 in insurance payments; (4) $1800 in management fee payments to [...]  (“[...]”); and (5) $25 in annual registration fees to the [...].  Id. at 105:3-9.  Collectively, [...]’s operating expenses in 2016 were $14,506.  Id. [...] subtracted his gross annual income from his operating expenses and determined that he operated at a loss of $6,119 in 2016.  Id.  In support of these calculations, [...] provided copies of several documents to [...] and the Board, including: (1) [...]’s hardship application; (2) the deed for [...]; (3) the code compliance certificate; (4) property tax bills; (5) insurance invoices; (6) property management invoices; and (7) copies of check from [...] to the management company.  Id.
[brief] Amid this Builder’s Remedy Case  In July 2023, after the Township adopted the Reexamination Report, Plaintiff [...] sent the Township a letter identifying itself as the contract purchaser of the Property and requested a meeting to discuss Plaintiff’s proposal to build an inclusionary development on the Property and the rezoning that would be required.  (Da173).  Ensuing discussions made clear that the Township would not rezone the Property for a multifamily inclusionary development.  On August 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant action seeking a determination that the Township was in violation of its Third Round Mount Laurel obligation and seeking an award of a builder’s remedy, including the right to construct an inclusionary development with a substantial set-aside for affordable housing.
[brief] In Point II.C, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated their constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the New Jersey State Constitution by allowing pre-November 9, 2016 retirees to receive uncapped terminal leave benefits, while capping their terminal leave at $15,000.00.  (Pb42–44).  Plaintiffs further argue in Point II.D that Defendants have violated their substantive and procedural due process rights “by way of retroactively capping their deferred terminal pay to $15,000. ” (Pb44–45).  Both arguments lack merit and Plaintiffs have not, and cannot, assert a claim under either theory.  Under New Jersey law, state Due Process and Equal Protection claims are afforded similar analyses.  *Barone v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.*, 107 N.J. 355, 368 (1997).  Indeed, New Jersey courts have long rejected “mechanical” tests under either the equal protection or due process clauses in favor of a balancing process whereby:  [A] court must weigh the nature of the restraint or the denial against the apparent public justification, and decide whether the State action is arbitrary.  In that process, if the circumstances sensibly so require, the court may call upon the State to demonstrate the existence of a sufficient public need for the restraint or the denial.  *Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.*, 177 N.J. 318, 332–33 (2003) (quoting *Robinson v. Cahill*, 62 N.J. 473, 492 (1973)) (denying Equal Protection challenge to cap on welfare benefits).
[brief] Record materials are cited as follows:  “Da” – defendant-appellant’s appendix; “1T” – January 10, 2018, volume 1 of 2, motion transcript; “2T” – January 10, 2018, volume 2 of 2, motion transcript  “3T” – January 17, 2018 first trial transcript; “4T” – January 18, 2018 first trial transcript; “5T” – January 23, 2018 first trial transcript; “6T” – January 24, 2018, volume 1 of 2, first trial transcript; “7T” – January 24, 2018, volume 2 of 2, first trial transcript; “8T” – January 25, 2018 first trial transcript; “9T” – January 30, 2018 first trial transcript: “10T” – January 31, 2018 first trial transcript; “11T” – February 1, 2018 first trial transcript; “12T” – February 2, 2018 first trial transcript; “13T” – February 5, 2018 first trial transcript; “14T” – February 6, 2018 first trial transcript; “15T” – February 7, 2018 first trial transcript; “16T” – April 23, 2019, volume 1 of 2, second trial transcript; “17T” – April 23, 2019, volume 2 of 2, second trial transcript; “18T” – April 24, 2019, volume 1 of 2, second trial transcript; “19T” – April 24, 2019, volume 2 of 2, second trial transcript; “20T” – April 30, 2019 second trial transcript; “21T” – May 1, 2019, volume 1 of 2, second trial transcript; “22T” – May 1, 2019, volume 2 of 2, second trial transcript; “23T” – May 2, 2019 second trial transcript; “24T” – May 3, 2019 second trial transcript; “25T” – May 6, 2019 second trial transcript; “26T” – May 7, 2019 second trial transcript; “27T” – May 8, 2019 second trial transcript; “28T” – May 9, 2019 second trial transcript; “29T” – July 19, 2019 sentencing transcript; and “PSR” – presentence report.
[brief] In that vein, and assuming that the PTA’s writing requirement was not impliedly waived (which it was, see infra), there were writings—a lot of writings—between the parties presented as evidence in the Arbitration.  [...] often sent [...] schedules updating the PTA’s lists of Backlog Projects, the Pipeline Projects, and the EGPs for each.  [...] testified to these facts.  [...] thus offered “amendments” to the Backlog/Pipeline project schedules, to which [...] generally accepted, and which [...] then performed and paid against accordingly.  The Arbitrator agreed, Da138 (“These affirmative, voluntary actions by ARC are clear admissions of EGP calculation and monies owed”), and the Trial Court acknowledged that the Arbitrator’s weighing of such evidence was a proper exercise of his powers, Da31-32.  Where the parties agreed on the amended/updated schedules, that agreement is binding (notwithstanding the lack of a wet signature).  See Jang Won So v. EverBeauty, Inc., 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 4, at *2-3 (App. Div. Jan. 2, 2018) (finding email exchange sufficient to create binding agreement), at Pa054; Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427, 436-37 (1992) (“where an offeree gives no indication that he or she objects to any of the offer’s essential terms, and passively accepts the benefits of an offeror’s performance, the offeree has impliedly manifested his or her unconditional assent to the terms of the offer”).
[brief] See Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Bd. of Adj., 233 N.J. 546 (2018).  [Pa 281, 326].  Even if the Court considered the original ordinance to remain in effect for the purpose of [...]’s site plan after the Township repealed it, it is clear that --- 10 Respondent did not become aware of this change until recently and did not argue below that it did not need any relief.  However, pursuant to O’Brien (Newark) Cogeneration, Inc. v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am., 361 N.J. Super. 264, 271 (App. Div. 2003), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 452 (2004), it may argue any alternative basis for affirmance of the trial court’s decision.
[brief] *Anco Products Corp.*, 23 N.J. Super. at 124-125; *Held v. Comfort Bus Line*, 136 N.J.L. at 641; see also Shahmoon Industries, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 263 F. Supp. 10 (D.N.J. 1966).  The State Supreme Court has recognized that for purposes of vacating an award, "undue means" does not include situations in which an arbitrator bases his decision on one party's version of facts, finding that version to be credible.
[brief] The Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1, et seq, sets forth the immunities and limited conditions under which a public entity may be found liable.  Specifically, liability for an alleged dangerous condition of a public entity’s property is as follows:  A public entity is liable for injury caused by a **condition** of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: a. a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or b. a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under section 59:4-3 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.