ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] “On judicial review of an administrative agency determination, courts have but a limited role to perform. ”  Gerba v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 83 N.J. 174, 189 (1980) (citations omitted).  An agency’s factual determinations are presumptively correct; on review of the facts, a court will not substitute its own judgment where the agency’s findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence.  Rooth v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 472 N.J. Super. 357, 365 (App. Div. 2022).  Additionally, this court gives “substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing,” Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007).  “Such deference has been specifically extended to state agencies that administer pension statutes,” because “a state agency brings experience and specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating a legislative enactment within its field of expertise. ”  Piatt v. Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting In re Election Law Enforcement Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010)).  Indeed, “if the language is plain and its meaning clear, the inquiry ends there . . .”  State v. Malik, 365 N.J. Super. 267, 274 (App. Div. 2003).  In reading statutory language, courts will give words their ordinary meaning absent any direction from the Legislature to the contrary.  *In Re Young*, 202 N.J. 50, 63 (2010).
[brief] You are not to infer guilt from the invocation of that right, nor are you permitted to consider that invocation as evidence of guilt.  You may consider defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent only for purposes of assessing credibility and voluntariness of the statement, and for no other purpose.  Again, you may not consider his silence as evidence of guilt.  (17T:7-8 to 8-2; 23T:40-14 to 41-22).
[brief] The regulations also set forth express legacy provisions which provide for the grandfathering of the Permit based on the regulations and related data in effect when the Permit was granted.  Again, the Permit was granted on December 1, 2022.  Aa001.  It was after the Permit was issued that the [...] proposed the IFPR on December 5, 2022, revising the Stormwater Management Rules and the FHA Rules to account for the new data assessed in the Cornell Studies.  54 N.J.R. 2169(a) (Dec. 05, 2022); Ra149-150.  The proposed IFPR underwent public notice and comment as required by the New Jersey Administrative Procedures Act, and the [...] enacted the final IFPR on June 2, 2023, with an effective date of July 17, 2023.  Ra196, 54 N.J.R. 2169(a) (July 17, 2023)
[brief] [...] described his fear of traveling to India due to the threats he received, which included a recorded message suggesting harm if he did not withdraw the annulment case.  Plaintiff felt that his life was in danger and interpreted the threat as a potential for physical harm.  [...] clarified that the demand to “take the case back” meant not pursuing the annulment and opting for a divorce instead.  He emphasized that the threats began only after he had mustered the courage to confront and speak out about the situation.  (2T50-51).  **The Family Court Decision**
[brief] ”  --- 4 Cardinale v. Board of Trustees, PFRS, 458 N.J. Super. 260 (App Div. 2019), Carr v. Borough of Glen Ridge, [...], [...] (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. January 5, 2022)  In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, 17:1-7.5 & 17:1-7.10, 454 N.J. Super. 386, Rooth v. Bd. of Trustees, Public Employees' Retirement System, 472 N.J. Super. 357 and was not based on an issue of disability.  *Cardinale v. Bd. of Trustees*, 458 N.J. Super. 260, 266, 204 A.3d 312, 316 (App. Div. 2019)  *Cardinale* was decided March 1, 2019 – the within Separation Agreement was submitted on November 5, 2020 (Da12-Da22).
[brief] And what happens is…  I have three builder’s remedy lawsuits. ” (id. at 48:24-49:1).  As a general matter, the trial court weighed whether the town should “be allowed to go ahead with condemnation when . . . the town is not constitutionally compliant with its third-round obligation” (id. at 51:18-20).  The court noted that “[n]one of the cases that were cited . . . were directly on point” because they did not ‘involve a municipality that has been found to be not constitutionally compliant . . . where you have a developer who is ready, willing and able to come forward with development that will include affordable housing” (id. at 52:5-8).  With respect to the Crowe v. DeGoia factors (90 N.J. 126 (1982)), the trial court found that Plaintiff had met its burden for a preliminary injunction by clear and convincing evidence.
[brief] As properly noted by [...] in his report, it was [...] who took care of [...] from 12 years before he passed.  (Da156).  In addition, as noted by [...], neither [...] nor [...], the Union lawyers who assisted [...] with his Will and the revisions to the Will, ever met or spoke to [...] or any other family member.  So, [...] would have been unsuccessful before [...] to try to shift the burden of proof under the Haynes standard.  (Da156).  The burden would have remained on [...], and that would have been the end of the case since there was no evidence that the Will, which was presumptively valid, should be set aside.  (Da156).  That being the case, there never was a viable case-within-a-case to be proven here, and the Will would have been upheld by [...] no matter who had the burden.  (Da156).  Accordingly, the Appellate Division should reject the point advanced by [...] that he presented sufficient evidence to establish proximate causation.
[brief] [...]’S REPLY BRIEF TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................ ii  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..............................................  1 POINT I THE PROVISION OF N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6.b DOES NOT APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE AS THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE AND THE ARBITRATIONS WERE DECIDED PURSUANT TO THE CONTRACTUAL TERMS OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT.  .............................................  1 POINT II  MEDPAY BENEFITS RESULTING FROM A MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT ARE NOT BARRED IN A PLAINTIFF’S CIVIL ACTION FOR PERSONAL INJURY OR DEATH.  ............  3 POINT III  THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS CITED BY PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT ARE NOT BINDING ON THE ARBITRATOR  NOR ARE THEY PERSUASIVE IN LIGHT OF THE ARGUMENTS CURRENTLY PENDING BEFORE THE COURT.  .............................................  5  POINT IV  THE JUNE 27, 2023  ORDER DENYING [...]’S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WAS NOT A RULING ON THE MERITS BUT AN EXPRESSION OF THE COURT’S STATEMENTS AT ORAL ARGUMENT.  ..................  8  CONCLUSION
[brief] Most disturbingly, [...] appeared to attempt to use its conflicted joint representation to influence [...]’s deposition testimony by telling him that a “miscommunication” had occurred when, in fact, [...]’ own version was that [...] simply never gave him detailed instructions and just told him to use “the turnaround”.  See Da313, ¶¶ 3-4.  Despite [...]’s repeated statements that [...] never gave him specific instructions, at his deposition, [...] also testified that a “miscommunication” between [...] foreman [...] and himself had occurred.
[directive] Moreover, these judgments should reflect such additional factors as the length of the detention that has in fact occurred, the complexity of the case, and whether the strategy of one side or the other has added needlessly to that complexity.  In some cases, the evidence admitted at the initial detention hearing, evaluated against the background of the duration of pretrial incarceration and the causes of that duration, may no longer justify detention.  [783 F.2d at 388.]  Relying on similar considerations, courts have found due process violations in a number of individual cases.  See, e.g., United States v. Ojeda Rios, 846 F.2d 167, 168-69 (2d Cir. 1988) (32 months of pretrial detention); Gonzales Claudio, 806 F. 2d at 341-43 (26 months of detention expected through trial).  In other matters, courts have found that lengthy detentions were not excessive in light of the factual circumstances of those cases.  See, e.g., United States v. Briggs, 697 F.3d 98, 101-04 (2d Cir. 2012) (26 months of pretrial detention); United States v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74, 78-82 (2d Cir. 2000) (30 to 13 33 months of detention expected through trial); United States v. El-Gabrowny, 35 F.3d 63, 65 (2d Cir. 1994) (27 months of detention expected through trial); United States v. Millan, 4 F.3d 1038, 1044-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (30 to 31 months of detention expected through a second trial); United States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544, 547-49 (1st Cir. 1986) (16 months of pretrial detention).
[brief] Those students, perhaps those in attendance starting in 2009 when a NJDOE needs assessment identified serious fiscal and educational problems in Lakewood, have suffered serious negative effects on their lives and employment prospects by the denial of T&E to them.  [...]’s statement from his concurrence in Abbott XXI, quoted infra, underscores those damages.  Consequently, some form of compensation, even “reparations payments,” might be appropriate and necessary to remedy the constitutional harm inflicted on them.  In this case, you have an opportunity and perhaps an obligation to suggest how SFRA’s unconstitutionality as applied to the Lakewood school district can best be remedied.  We may not yet be at the stage of a detailed remedial exposition, but it is an appropriate time to begin laying out the remedial parameters.
[brief] Significantly, the 1940 map (Pa966) reflects the mean highwater line showing the proposed bulkhead whereas the 1954 survey shows the mean highwater line as well as the proposed bulkhead line and the later document shows the former mean highwater line and the existing bulkhead (Pa968).  All that these leases from the State accomplished was to allow the [...] to bulkhead and fill past the mean highwater line, as to Lot 3 only.  This was not a fee conveyance.  It was a lease that was terminated of its terms and conditions.  Although additional fill was subsequently placed beyond the leased bulkhead, the beach area remains vested in the State of New Jersey as it abuts Lot 3.
[directive] C.9:6-8.10d Regulations.  4.  The Commissioner of Human Services shall adopt rules and regulations pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act," P.L.1968, c.410 (C.52:14B-1 et seq.) to carry out the purposes of sections 2 and 3 of this act.  C.2C:44-6.4  Rules of Court.  5.  The Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey may adopt Rules of Court appropriate or necessary to effectuate the purposes of sections 1 and 3 of this act.  6.  This act shall take effect on the 90th day after enactment
[brief] (1T42:4-43:2).  Moreover, the trial court noted that in the case cited by defendants themselves *Geringer v. Hartz Mountain Development Corp.*, 388 N.J. Super. 392, 404 (App. Div. 2006), the jury considered the fact that the landlord had no ongoing duty to perform inspections because the lease unambiguously placed the responsibilities on the tenant.  (1T37:6-19).  With regard to whether to bar reference to the subsequent termination of [...] after the 2018 snow season, Plaintiff opposed the underlying motion based similarly the conflicting testimony provided by Defendants at their depositions.  [...] stated he stopped working with the property owner and the property management company because he felt restricted by the service agreement and his inability to make the area safe.  (1T57:11-15; Pa5-9).  Whereas, during [...]’s deposition, he stated that [...] determined that [...] Snow Pros were no longer fit for the 2018 season because they were not happy with the work they were able to do, they were not making the property safe.  (1T57:16-20; Pa10-12)  These statements were relevant to the credibility of the witnesses, especially once the testimony changed at the time of trial.  (1T58:20-24).  The trial court granted defendants’ motion in part and barred any evidence regarding non-renewal or termination, but stated under N.J.R.E. 701, Plaintiff was able to ask Defendants if they were happy with the work.  (1T582:2-24; 60:2-8).
[brief] ” (emphasis added).  Clearly, textual limitations have their exceptions.  “The full faith and credit clause [is] a nationally unifying force.  It altered the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligations created under the laws or established by the judicial proceedings of the others, by making each an integral part of a single nation, in which rights judicially established in any part are given nation-wide application. ”  Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943) (emphasis added).  The Courts have required that states recognize the judgements and acts of other states, even when the laws of the forum state conflict.  See Faunteroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).  Underscoring all of these issues is that this case does not concern a simple judgment or driver’s license, it is in regard to a constitutionally protected right.  The State’s argument that Full Faith and Credit does not apply since this is not a money judgment loses sight of the issue here.  If states are compelled to recognize money and equity judgments of other states, they must recognize public acts concerning constitutional rights.  “The constitutional right to bear arms in public for self-defense is not “a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees. ”  Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 at 70 (quoting Mcdonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S.742, 780 (2010)).  [...] has proven to Pennsylvania that she is a “law- abiding, responsible citizen” and therefore qualified to carry a handgun.  Bruen, 591 U.S. at fn.9.  As noted by [...]:  “[I]t appears that these shall-issue regimes, which often require applicants to undergo a background check or pass a firearms safety course, are designed to ensure only that those bearing arms in the jurisdiction are, in fact, ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens. ’  And they likewise appear to contain only ‘narrow, objective, and definite standards’ guiding licensing officials, rather than requiring the ‘appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion. ’” (citations omitted).  Id.  The State has never argued that [...] is not a “law-abiding, responsible citizen” or that she is otherwise ineligible for a carry permit.  The State has not cited any reason not to recognize [...]’s Pennsylvania carry license other than its anti-federalist take that states protect individual liberties better than a strong national government- yet seeks to punish someone for exercising a guaranteed right.  CONCLUSION
[directive] 3.4  The pursuing officer shall terminate the pursuit under the following circumstances: (a) if instructed to do so by a supervisor; (b) if a supervisor has not affirmatively authorized the continuation of the pursuit after being notified and given an opportunity to assess the situation; (c) if the officer believes that the danger to the pursuing officers or the public outweighs the necessity for immediate apprehension of the violator; (d) if the violator’s identity is established to the point where later apprehension may be accomplished and where there is no imminent threat to the safety of the public or police officers; (e) if the pursued vehicle’s location is no longer known or the distance between the pursuing vehicles and the violator's vehicle becomes so great that further pursuit is futile; (f) if there is a person injured during the pursuit and there are no police or medical personnel able to render assistance; (g) if there is a clear and unreasonable danger to the police officer or the public.
[brief] POINT I: COURT WAS DISIMILAR IN THEIR COURT RULE STANDARDS THAT SHOULD BE UPHELD BY THE DEFENDANT VERSUS THE PLAINTIFF (MOTION TO COMPEL, MOTION TO DISMISS AND SUBPEONA)  The Plaintiff did not argue that discovery had been provided or contended that the only outstanding material was material about the victim, which required the victim to answer the Defendant directly.  The Prosecutor indicated he felt the additional discovery the Defendant requested was not appropriate and couldn’t remember what she requested.  He casually mentions the cease-and-desist letter sent to [...] [T9-1 to -13].  The Defendant did not argue that she filed motions to dismiss or resubmission to obtain discovery.  She was often interrupted; but she was able to inform the trial court she conducted the discovery resubmission per Judge’s instructions [T10-1 to -10].  The trial court Judge reverses the Prosecutor’s response, indicating for certain she didn’t submit a specific motion for additional discovery [T13-14 to -15], however in the Plaintiff’s de novo Brief, the trial Judge timestamps the Defendant to submit the additional discovery request on May 24, 2022, although the trial court Judge makes no mention of said date.  The trial court Judge then asks what the Defendant wants although it was submitted to the court for his prior review, she’s interrupted during her response with the outcome of his guided request to her as denied and deemed as “fishing expeditions” [T13-9 to -12].  The Plaintiff furthers their negative narrative of the Defendant’s character by indicating she failed to show up in court on May 10, 2022, she told the court she was for certain going to hire an attorney on July 5, 2022, on August 16, 2022 she told the court she was going to file a motion for body worn camera footage but she never submitted the motion and that she had an alibi.  All information is untrue and without factual context either by way of transcripts or the initial party present during trial.  Also, the Defendant is aware a motion is not required to request body worn camera footage.  This is public information and can be supplied upon request to the designated police department pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47-1A-9a.  The Defendant informed the Plaintiff she did not have an alibi prior to trial and off-the-record [AP 3] and informed the court as well with the court instructing to submit a list of her witnesses which occurred the same day via email.  **POINT II: PLAINTIFF’S SOLE WITNESS COMMITTED PURJURY RESULTING IN PLAINTIFF INCONSISTENCY WITH TERMS OF EVENTS**
[brief] On the night of the Incident, [...] merely found a small bottle of alcohol in [...]’s purse when he looked for ID.  (T4 130:1-6).  There is no evidence that [...] knew that [...] had consumed an excessive amount of alcohol.  [...] had not seen [...] do anything which would cause her medical emergency (T4 131:18-23).  [...]’s condition could potentially have been explained by alcohol use, however there was no blood test for alcohol done on [...]. (T4 34:14-36:2).
[brief] The Attorney General took too narrow an approach to the prosecutorial law enforcement function here.  The administrative determinations did not credit the nuanced, discretionary decisions that prosecutors are called on to make in the re-arming of police officers such as [...].  The decisions of the [...] defendants who considered whether [...] could be re-armed and then remain armed were prosecutorial functions exercised on behalf of the State.  As such, those determinations, as well as the claims of improper training and supervision of Neptune law enforcement with respect to implementation of the Directive, were entitled to defense and indemnification by the State.  Id. at 317.
[brief] As discussed below, Appellants belatedly sought leave to file a Second Amended Complaint to assert three (3) claims against [...] - fraud in the inducement as to their 2015 lease, breach of the lease for allegedly violating the confidentiality provision therein and wrongful eviction.  Prior thereto, in July 2021, Appellants filed a First Amended Complaint naming [...] as a defendant although that complaint asserted no claims against [...].  Thus, the proposed Second Amended Complaint was Appellants first attempt in the then-2½ year-old case to assert claims against [...].  However, by that time, discovery had concluded over six (6) months earlier, most defendants had already been dismissed, and Appellants admittedly had knowledge of the facts underlying their proposed claims at the outset of the litigation in 2019.  Furthermore, prior to the filing of the First Amended Complaint in July 2021, four (4) discovery extensions had been granted and discovery had concluded several months prior.  During the lengthy discovery period, Appellants received nearly 1,000 pages of discovery from [...] by way of subpoena in March 2020 and deposed two (2) [...] representatives.  Yet, while Appellants named [...] as a defendant in July 2021, their First Amended Complaint did not assert any claims against, nor seek any relief from, [...].  Instead, the matter proceeded to dispositive motion practice in which the [...] and their principals obtained dismissals of the First Amended Complaint, wherein the trial court properly found, among other things, that the direct and proximate cause of Appellants’ alleged losses was their own failure to pay rent to [...], which led to the loss of their lease rights and the associated rights for the subject solar project.
[directive] Si zak la te fèt le 9 janvye 1997 oswa aprè epi yo kondane w a libète kondisyonèl, wap [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] oblije peye yon amann de $30 ba  Fon Fòmasyon ak Ekipman Fòsdelòd (Law Enforcement Fund)?  Officers Training and Equipment  If the crime occurred on or after January 9, 1997 you must pay a Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund penalty of $30?  h.
[brief] Appellate review of a trial court’s decision on a *Rule* 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss is reviewed *de novo*.  *Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC*, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021), and no deference is owed to the trial judge’s conclusions.  *State v. Cherry Hill Mitsubishi*, 439 N.J. Super. 462, 467 (App. Div. 2015).  “A complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) only if the factual allegations are palpably insufficient to support a claim upon which relief can be granted. ”  Frederick v. Smith, 416 N.J. Super. 594, 597 (App. Div. 2010).  The primary question in a motion to dismiss is whether the plaintiff, by any reasonable means, can establish a cause of action based on the allegations set forth in the complaint.  A motion to dismiss brought under Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim is a matter of “determining the adequacy of a pleading: whether a cause of action is ‘suggested’ by the facts. ”  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (citing Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)).  The court’s inquiry is “limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint,” Printing Mart-Morristown, supra, 116 N.J. at 746 (citing Rieder v. Dept. of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987)), and ought not be concerned with the Plaintiff’s ability to prove the allegations contained in the complaint, but rather only whether the allegations suggest a cause of action.  Velantzas, supra, 109 N.J. at 192.  In applying this standard, the court must treat the plaintiff’s version of the facts as set forth in the complaint as uncontradicted and accord it all legitimate inferences. ”  Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 NJ. 161, 166 (2005).  In its inquiry, the court must scrutinize the complaint “in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim . . .”  Printing Mart-Morristown, supra at 746 (quoting DiCristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem’l Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957). ”  AC Ocean Walk, LLC v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 256 N.J. 294, 307 (2023).  ARGUMENT I.