ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa15-16).  The Board did not provide any rule or test to determine what the process was to evaluate the “intent” of the builder in raising the height under the Ordinance.  The Board did not provide any calculation or measure as to how high these buildings could be raised by mounding, terracing, or other devices which would not affect the building height.  Nevertheless, the trial court found that the definition of “building height” adopted by the [...] in its Ordinance specifically includes consideration of the plan or purpose of the mounding, terracing or other height-enhancing device that is included within the site plan and other documents presented to the land use board.  (Pa14)(emphasis added).  As such, the trial court held that the determination of building height was not based upon whether the revised lot grade was designed to allow or result in the increased building height, but rather whether it was the plan or purpose of the applicant to revise the lot grade to enhance the height of the structure.  (Pa 15).  Accordingly, the trial court gave deference to the Board and applicant professionals to conclude that there interpretation of the Borough Ordinance was not “arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. ”  The question of the Building Height ordinance is ostensibly a legal question, to be decided under de novo review, not by deference to the Board under an arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable standard.
[brief] She makes an argument regarding the potential dangers of an expert witness testifying to an opinion formed from bases outside their field of expertise and the effect testimony regarding an ultimate issue can have to influence a jury tasked with determining the truth or falsehood of claims.  In particular, here, the defendant is concerned with [...], the medical examiner called as a witness for the State, and specifically his testimony that, in his professional opinion, the cause of [...]’s death was homicide.  [...] was qualified as an expert witness in the field of medical examination under the then-controlling Frye standard and R. 702.
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[directive] - . . - p^  B.  Payment for 1. contract services; 2. the employment of outside contractors to operate and manage properties or to provide other specialized services necessary to dispose of such properties in an effort to maximize the return from such properties; and reimbursing any federal, state, or local agency for any functions described in this 3.  subparagraph.  Executive 0fJ;ce Asset Forfeiture 8 for IV  Guidelines  Seized and Forfeited Property Chapter for I  It is the policy of [...] to use this authority for storage, maintenance and disposition of seized property only.
[brief] ”  A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp., 2 N.J. 235, 246 (1949).  “In simple parlance, it merely gives expression to the equitable principle that a court should not grant relief to one who is a wrongdoer with respect to the subject matter in suit. ”  Faustin v. Lewis, 85 N.J. 507, 511 (1981).  The use of unclean hands to dismiss a complaint is not unprecedented but is done sparingly.
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[brief] (1T18-14 to 19)  The court did not give any reasons for its decision to run that count consecutive to [...], stating merely, “[t]hat shall run consecutive. ”  (1T18-19)  On appeal, this Court affirmed [...]’s convictions but remanded for the trial court to reconsider its decision to run the certain persons conviction consecutive to the robbery “because the trial court failed to explain the reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence.
[brief] Here, this Court erroneously relied on *State in Interest of A.A.*, a case where a juvenile who was being investigated for a shooting incident was not mirandized but his mother was placed in a holding cell to speak with him after she was advised of the charges against him.  *Id.* at 357.  The New Jersey Supreme Court found that *Miranda* warnings should have been given to A.A. in the presence of his mother to serve as a buffer to help the juvenile understand his rights.  *Id.* at 358.  The current matter is distinguishable from *State in Interest of A.A.* in that defendant is an adult and he elected not to waive his *Miranda* rights but continued to make incriminating statements although he was repeatedly advised to stop speaking.
[brief] In this case, the officers were lawfully at the scene investigating the car crash and injuries they came upon behind the motel.  The car doors to the Impala had been left open by its occupants, and from outside the car the officers could see the tire iron.  Finally, the officers had probable cause to associate the tire iron with the assault perpetrated on [...].  They had been told that [...] was struck with the tire iron and they could see injuries to his head.  Based upon the record, the seizure of the tire iron was equally justified by the plain view doctrine.  The conclusion, then, is that any motion to suppress the tire iron would have been unsuccessful and the failure to file a meritless motion is not ineffective assistance of counsel.
[brief] *State v. Case*, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014).  A sentence should be upheld unless the sentencing guidelines were violated, the findings on aggravating and mitigating factors were not based on competent and credible evidence in the record or the application of the guidelines to the facts shocks the judicial conscience.  *State v. Bolvito*, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014).  The appellate court reviews the propriety of the sentence under the abuse of discretion standard.  *State v. Trinidad*, 241 N.J. 425, 453 (2020).  There are limitations on the trial court’s fact-finding at sentencing.  In *State v. Melvin*, 248 N.J. 321, 341 (2021), the Supreme Court held that the sentencing court had erred by making factual findings that contradicted those made by the jury in acquitting the defendant on certain counts.  The Supreme Court noted that a jury’s acquittal, even if erroneous, is entitled to “special weight. ”  *Id.* at 342.  The Supreme Court held that fundamental fairness prohibits the court from subjecting a defendant to sentencing for conduct the jury found the defendant not guilty.  *Id.* at 326.  Thus, in *State v. Morente-Dubon*, 474 N.J. Super. 197, 205, 211-212 (App. Div. 2022), the Appellate Division found error under *Melvin* when the sentencing court found the defendant had not been reasonably provoked and had had sufficient time to cool off before killing the victim, findings that directly contradicted the jury’s verdict for passion/provocation manslaughter.
[brief] In *Moore v. Youth Corr. Inst.*, 119 N.J. 256 (1990), the New Jersey Supreme Court found forfeiture appropriate when a corrections officer harassed his supervisor by stalking him at his home when off-duty.  In *McCann v. Clerk of Jersey City*, 167 N.J. 331 (2001), the Supreme Court, commenting on *Moore*, noted that “the petitioner’s harassment of his co-employee...bore a direct and substantial relationship to their respective governmental positions. ”  Id. at 323.  The McCann Court held that “involving or touching on his public office” necessarily implied “a determination on the part of the Legislature to limit the scope of the disqualification provision to crimes that are related directly to an individual’s performance in, or circumstances flowing from, a specific office or position held by that individual. ”  Id. at 321 (emphasis added).  Thus, a nexus between the position and the conduct at issue has not been found in several cases when official duties and/or employment relationships were not involved.  For example, in State v. Hupka, 203 N.J. 222 (2010), the Supreme Court found no forfeiture by an off-duty police officer who pled guilty to criminal sexual conduct with a female acquaintance.  Id. at 227, 239.  Concluding that the conduct did not involve or touch upon the defendant’s employment, the Court reasoned that “there was no relationship between defendant’s employment as a police officer, the trappings of that office, or his work-related connections, and the commission of the offense to which he pled guilty, or to his victim[.]”  Id. at 239; see also State v. Pavlik, 363 N.J. Super. 307, 312 (App. Div. 2003) (finding an insufficient nexus where the public employee committed acts of domestic violence against his grandfather and resisted arrest).
[brief] [...] sought relief under R. 1:10 when it moved the court for an order enforcing litigant’s rights and, more particularly, to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement.  The Court granted the motion and awarded fees in an amount to be determined upon submission of a Certification of Services.  However, the authority to grant fees under R. 1:10 is limited to motions based on violation of an Order or Judgment, not a settlement agreement.
[brief] a.  Transmitting data to an agent or contractor is not a “third-party” “communication” and is not an attempt to collect a debt.  Congress does not “write upon a clean slate” each time it passes a statute.  *United States v. Texas*, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993).  Instead, courts presume that Congress legislates against long-standing and well-established legal principles, including the “the backdrop of the common law. ”  *Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media*, 589 U.S. 327, 335 (2020).  For Congress to abrogate a common-law principle, “the statute must ‘speak directly to the question addressed by the common law. ’”  *Meyer v. Holley*, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003).  Under long-standing principles of agency law, “a principal is considered to have done himself or herself what he or she does by acting through another person. ”  2A C.J.S. Agency § 1.  That is, “a principal’s agent or employee, who acts for or on behalf of the principal, is a ‘party’ to that principal’s contractual and business relations and not a third party thereto. ”  Restatement (Second) of Agency § 186 (1958).  Under these fundamental principles, transmitting data to a service provider hired to perform a task—like a letter vendor printing a letter—would not be a third-party communication and would not implicate even the plain meaning of § 1692c(b).
[brief] THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING SANCTIONS FOR FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION (Da91)  PLAINTIFF:  “For all intents and purposes, the court handled the matter in the same way it would have on motion. ”  (Pb44)  DEFENDANTS:  Defendants maintain that the trial court’s decision to impose sanctions was procedurally flawed due to non-compliance with Rule 1:4-8.  Furthermore, the nature of the Defendants’ conduct does not meet the stringent criteria for sanctions as outlined in Rule 1:4-8 and case law.  Thus, Plaintiff’s assertion that the trial court handled the matter appropriately is inaccurate and should not be upheld.  “The rule and statute must both be interpreted strictly against the applicant for an award of fees. ”
[directive] Promulgated by Directive #23-06 (December 22, 2006)  Page 9 of 18  ATTACHMENT 3  STANDARD  GRAND JURY CHARGE [Promulgated by Directive #12-06 (July 20, 2006)]  Ladies and Gentlemen:  Welcome to your term of service as Grand Jurors.  This charge will inform you of your duties and of the responsibilities of being a Grand Juror as well as the principles of law that govern your deliberations.  This charge contains general instructions concerning the discharge of your duties.
[brief] WHEN AN EXPERT WITNESS OFFERS NO LEGITIMATE BASIS FOR A CONCLUSION THAT A PARTICULAR CELL-PHONE TOWER HAS A PARTICULAR RANGE, THE SUPREME COURT OPINION IN STATE V. BURNEY UNEQUIVOCALLY BARS THAT EXPERT FROM TESTIFYING THAT CELL-PHONE CALLS USED PARTICULAR CELL TOWERS IF THE PURPOSE OF THAT TESTIMONY IS TO SHOW THE LOCATION OF THE PHONE BEING USED AT THE TIME.  BECAUSE SUCH TESTIMONY WAS ADMITTED HERE OVER OBJECTION AND COULD HAVE INFLUENCED THE VERDICTS, THE CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED.  (RULINGS AT 8T 141-4 TO 146-15; 8T 148-14 TO 151-9; 8T 163-25; 8T 165-20)  Because, as noted, the video evidence in the case was far from clear, the State attempted to use other evidence to reinforce the notion that the defendant and codefendant were in the proximity of the barbershop at the time of the shooting there.  At the time of trial, the opinion of this Court in State v. Burney [I], 471 N.J. Super. 297, 320-323 (App. Div. 2022), seemed to allow a cell-phone expert to testify for the State, from that expert’s overall experience, about the “general” range of urban cell towers without actually providing any evidence that that estimate was accurate for the towers involved in the particular case.
[brief] “We’re here tonight, really, to talk about new municipal revenue sources for a changing world.  * * *  [W]e have a proud record of financial responsibility.  [...] has the lowest equalized municipal tax rate in [...], but we face some challenges.  One, state aid has been flat at roughly 1.6 million since 2011 and now covers only 6.6 percent of expenditures.  Beginning in last decade, the state diverted, the legislature diverted significant portions of the energy tax distributions that municipalities used to receive towards other priorities.  And that diversion created significant funding gap at local levels, roughly a million and a half, just over a million [and] a half dollars for [...].  Some of our non-tax revenues are relatively small but * * * several have been negatively impacted by COVID-19.  For example, our cumulative municipal court revenues are now down over 70 percent versus 2015 or approximately $287,000, and then our debt level remains relatively high.  So the challenge * * * is to deliver the services our residents expect while keeping property taxes as low as possible.  And so we have been working over the recent years to seek new revenue sources for a changing world.  And one potential solution which we’re going to discuss in more detail today are PILOTs. T1.33:6-34:7.
[brief] The information supplied by the Township (through its CFO [...] on 3/17/14) to the Division of Pension and Benefits through a series of Answers by the Township to the IRS 20 Factor Questionnaire surrounding [...] was annexed at trial as P-7 (Pa130-143).  The information supplied in response had over 40 replies of “No knowledge” in response to the 20 questions and subparts.  Exhibit P-7 includes the payroll register history in response to question 4 (of the 20 Factor Questionnaire) supplied by Township through [...].  In Exhibit P-7, question 5c specifically asks whether a personnel file was maintained for the Member.  The response by [...] is “yes. ”  Why would there be a personnel file for an Independent Contractor?
[brief] The Property is largely bordered by Interstate 295, and a 150-foot wide [...] easement with overhead transmission lines.  It adjoins preserved farmland.  The closest residential structure is 700 to 800 feet from the nearest proposed warehouse, and the lone residential property bordering the property on Burlington-Columbus Road (County Route 543) is at least 400 feet from the closest proposed warehouse.  The warehouses are setback 700 feet from Florence-Columbus Road (County Route 656), even though this SM Zone only requires 75 feet.  All other setbacks from bordering roads are also substantial: 145 feet front yard setback from Burlington-Columbus Road, when 75 feet is required; 125 feet side yard setback, when 50 feet is required; and 67 feet rear yard setback, when 50 is required.  (5T 74:20-25 through 77:10).  As presented by [...], any potential negative impact from the enhanced height is mitigated by the character of the surrounding properties and significant setbacks.  There was more to this application, and the proofs surrounding the positive and negative criteria, than just traffic considerations.  Yet, rather than address this unrebutted expert testimony, Defendant simply pretends it does not exist.  Third, Defendant unreasonably rejected unrebutted, credible expert testimony.
[brief] High Bridge Stone, 187 N.J. 567, 573 (2006) ............................................................................. 27 Tumino v. Long Beach Tp., 319 N.J. Super. 514 (App. Div. 1999) .......................................................... 29, 36 Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 191 N.J. 38 (2007) ........................................................................... 15, 28 Statutes N.J.S.A. 12:5-1 to -11 ........................................................................... 2, 15 N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.1 ............................................................................. 15, 21, 22 N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.3 ............................................................................. 15 Other Authorities 54 N.J.R. 277(a) .................................................................................. 26 DEP Bulletin, Volume 43, Issue 7 ............................................................ 8 Hall Harbor Yacht Basin v. Department of Env. Prot., 1987 ENV LEXIS 117 at *7 (Oct. 19, 1987) ........................................... 37, 41 Misiak v. Walker, Department of Env. Prot., 1994 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1109 at *13-14 (Nov. 9, 1994)  ......................... 37, 41 Rules N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5 .................................................................................. 27, 32 N.J.A.C. 7:7-19.2 .................................................................................. 12 N.J.A.C. 7:7-27.2 .................................................................................. 28  N.J.A.C. 7:7-28.1 .................................................................................. 11, 12, 15 N.J.A.C. 7:7-28.4 .................................................................................. 12 N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.1 .................................................................................. 27
[brief] A.  The Trial Court’s Conclusion that the Code of Judicial Conduct’s Conflict of Interest Rules Did Not Require [...]’s Recusal was not an Abuse of Discretion.  The Wilfs dedicate five pages of their opening brief arguing that the Code of Judicial Conduct should apply to special masters.  (Db25-29.)  But this Court need not address this issue because the trial court agreed to accept [...]’ premise that the Code applied in deciding [...]’ recusal motion.  (Da38372.)  The actual issue on this appeal is one that [...] entirely fail to address: whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the Code did not require [...]’s recusal.
[brief] The Trial Court’s careful analysis was supported by its review of the legislative history surrounding the FDCPA and the reasoning employed by numerous other courts that have analyzed this issue.  Ignoring the careful and logical reasoning provided by the Trial Court, Plaintiff argues on appeal that her interpretation of the FDCPA — one that completely ignores context and the reasons the FDCPA was enacted in the first place — should have been followed.  As the Trial Court put it, Plaintiff’s interpretation of the FDCPA is “uncritical literalism” that tries to warp the meaning of the FDCPA beyond recognition.  Accordingly, the Trial Court’s Order should be affirmed.