ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Among the evidence shown in the SAC is an email dated December 1, 2017, in which CEP Defendants’ counsel and co-defendant [...], Esq., writing the Planning Board that “[...] acquired the rights to the Mill Road Solar Farm recently. ”  SAC ¶ 104; this was the first discovery of “smoking gun” evidence showing that CEP Defendants were holding themselves out as the “new owners” of the solar-energy development rights that had been acquired by plaintiffs and for which these defendants were “negotiating” their stated intention to purchase from plaintiffs, while they deployed a scheme of duplicity.  Further, in paragraph 116 of the SAC, we quoted from a July 31, 2018 email of defendant Bellin to the Planning Board, “I am pleased to file with you a fully executed copy of an agreement between the [...] developer, the Milford Solar farm landowner and the [...] regarding the disposition of the 6 acre lot to be created by the minor subdivision . . .”  In SAC paragraph 117, we then showed that a certain “Memorandum of Understanding with the [...] dated July 25, 2018, in the fourth recital, refers to a “lease,” by reference:  WHEREAS  [...] has entered into a Ground Lease with [...] dated October 17, 2017 pursuant to which [...] shall develop, construct and operate a 10 MW DC grid supply solar farm (the "Project") on portions of the Premises as the same are depicted on Exhibit 1 attached hereto and made a part hereof (the "Ground Lease"); and [emphasis in SAC ¶117.  P189.  It is from this revelation that we came to understand that “[...],” [...] had entered into a lease with CEP Defendants for the land covered by plaintiffs’ land/lease, which was the subject of a “default notice letter,” dated October 17, 2017, with no judicial declaration of breach or eviction then or thereafter.  Through hard work, investment of time, and diligence, it was plaintiffs (by their principal [...]) who identified [...] as being interested in selling its solar-energy developmental rights in perpetuity.
[directive] When an officer uses force as defined in Section 3 of this Policy and the result is not fatal, the officer shall complete a report in the Use of Force Portal established by the Attorney General’s Office.  The report shall be completed by the officer within 24 hours of the use of force, and preferably before the end the shift in which the force was used.  If the officer who used force is unable to complete the report within 24 hours, it should be completed as soon the officer is able to do so, or by a supervising officer within 48 hours, in accordance with a written policy to be established by the department or agency.  7.4
[brief] *State ex rel Qarmout v. Calvallo*, 340 N.J.Super. 365, 367 (App. Div. 2001); *State v. Baumann*, 340 N.J.Super. 553, 556 (App. Div. 2001).  The Appellate Court owes no deference to the trial court’s “interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts.  . . .”  *Manalapan Realty v. Township Committee*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
[brief] OCEAN BEACH SURF CLUB UNIT  1’s REPLY BRIEF  [...], Esq. (021041988) (dclark@dilworthlaw. com)  Of Counsel [...], Esq. (171732015) (charney-norcia@dilworthlaw. com)  On the Brief  [...] [...] (732) 530-8822 (Phone) (732) 530-6770 (Facsimile)  Attorneys for Appellant, Ocean Beach Surf Club Unit  1  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] A strong presumption of reasonableness must be afforded to the [...]’s decision, and to disturb that decision an appellate court must “find the agency’s decision to be ‘arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or [ ] not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole. ’”  *In re Stallworth*, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting *Henry v. Rahway State Prison*, 81 N.J. 571, 579–80 (1980)).  The burden rests on the appellant to establish that the administrative decision was unlawful, arbitrary, or capricious.  See *In re Foglio*, 207 N.J. 38, 47 (2011).  “Arbitrary and capricious action . . . means willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of circumstances. ”  *Worthington v. Fauver*, 88 N.J. 183, 204-05 (1982) (quoting *Bayshore Sewage Co. v. Dept. of Envt’l Protection*, 122 N.J. Super. 184, 199-200 (Ch. Div. 1973), aff’d. 131 N.J. Super. 37 (App. Div. 1974)).
[brief] Respondents set up a straw-man argument to distract the Court from the actual issue raised in this appeal.  Respondents contend that [...] is asking the Court to determine that the Borough should have issued the resolution of support to [...] rather than [...].  Not so.  This appeal bears on the process the Borough followed (or failed to follow) in adopting the resolution of support.  This appeal is not centered on which party should have obtained the resolution of support, but instead focuses on the lack of transparency and integrity in that process undermining its validity.  Because the Borough failed to follow the very review process it created, its adoption of the resolution of support was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  To ensure fairness and public trust in the Borough’s actions, the trial court’s order affirming the resolution of approval should be reversed, and this matter should be remanded for the Borough to consider the applications pursuant to the process and criteria it adopted.
[brief] .........................35  POINT V: DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROVIDE ANY EVIDENCE OF CUMULATIVE ERROR THAT WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN A DIFFERENT OUTCOME AT TRIAL  [Not Raised Below.]  ...........................................................................................................41  POINT VI: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT BECAUSE HIS SENTENCE WAS BASED ON CREDIBLE EVIDENCE ON THE RECORD AND WAS WITHIN THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES.  [Raised Below.] (17T22-14 to 42-14).  ..................................................................................43  CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................50
[directive] [Yes/Tak]  [No/Nie]  If e. the offense occurred on or after August 2, 1993 you must pay a $75 Safe Neighborhood Services Fund assessment for each conviction?  Jesli przestc;pstwo mialo miejsce po 1 sierpnia 1993, musi Pan(i) zaplacic 75 USO na Fundusz Uslug na rzecz Bezpieczenstwa S11siedzkiego za kazdy wyrok?
[brief] ” (Da201).  | [...] approached [...] at gunpoint.  (Da199).  | [...] and [...] captured [...] at gunpoint.  (7T 16).  | [...] captured [...] at gunpoint.  (1T 45).  | \(^3\) [...] later attempted to suppress this statement, admitting that he was easily manipulated and under the influence of drugs at the time.  | The number of coconspirators in the living room | [...], [...], and [...] confronted the victims in the living room.  (Da199).  | [...], [...], and [...] confronted the victims in the living room.  (7T 23).  | Only saw two Hispanic males.  (Da191).  | |-------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------| | The number of coconspirators in the basement | Three men were in basement with victims.  (7T 25, 168).  | Only two men were in basement with victims.  (1T 71-74); (Da 192).  | | Masks  | All three had black ski masks.  (Da199) | All three had black ski masks.  (7T 18, 172).  |  One had pig face mask.  One did not wear a mask.  (1T 155).  |  **Englewood Cliffs Home Invasion** | Statement Subject Matter | [...] Statement to Authorities | [...] Statement to Authorities | [...] Trial Testimony | Victim Testimony | |-------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|------------------| | Identity of coconspirators | [...] and [...] conducted the home invasion.
[brief] (Not Raised Below).  A decision is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and therefore subject to reversal, where, as here, the agency erred in reaching its conclusion upon examination of the application of the law to the facts.  The arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable standard is generally understood to involve inquiry into whether the decision conforms with relevant law, whether there is substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency's decision, and whether in applying the relevant law to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching its conclusion.  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007) (relying on Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).  Ordinarily for quasi-judicial or rule-making final agency action, there is a substantial body of material comprising the record.  In appeals from final agency action outside of such settings, there similarly must be a sufficiently developed record to permit a reviewing court to engage in meaningful review.  See In re Issuance of Permit by DEP, 120 N.J. 164, 173 (1990) (relying on State v. Atley, 157 N.J. Super. 157, 163 (App. Div. 1978)) (noting necessity of agency fact-finding to facilitate appellate review).  When the challenged agency action arises in a setting where the record is too meager to permit meaningful review, supplementation of the record may be necessary.  The Court Rules provide that a reviewing court may remand, on its own motion, for supplementation of the record in order to permit meaningful review.  R. 2:5-5(b).
[brief] (AA0055-56; AA0088-93)  Appellant’s submission on appeal demonstrated her character and fitness for promotion were overwhelmingly supported by other female Officers in the [...] and high-ranking superior Officers within the United States Military.  (AA0093-0100)  The Respondent Commission issued its FAA on June 7, 2023 confirming Appellant properly appealed the decision of the [...] to utilize the Rule of Three in appointing [...], a non-veteran third positioned candidate.
[brief] ”  Tindell, 417 N.J. Super. at 557-58.  The Court explained that “[t]he nature of the alleged threats and the circumstances surrounding them required that the victims be identified with particularity.  Without such specificity, there is a distinct and legally unacceptable risk that a jury may return a verdict that was not based on the unanimous judgment of the deliberating jurors. ”  Id. at 555.  Similarly, here, the circumstances of the alleged crime created a distinct risk that the jury did not unanimously agree on the identities of the persons against whom [...] committed various acts.  Because [...] did not object to the jury instructions, this Court reviews the instructions under the plain-error standard.
[brief] In other words, conclusory assertions that no other positions would be available, without confirmation, is not enough to satisfy N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b).  Ibid.  Here, [...] has failed to meet the requirements set forth in N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b).  In Ardan, the Court found that the claimant who departed her work because that work aggravated a medical condition, failed to meet the burden imposed by N.J.A.C.12:17-9.3(b) because she did not investigate less physically demanding nursing opportunities but instead surmised that her employer would not provide them.  Ardan, 231 N.J. at 609.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 Excused Plaintiff From Submitting an Affidavit of Merit Because a Sworn Statement Was Submitted in Lieu of the Affidavit of Merit.  Within the text of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 itself, it is never stated that the Sworn Statement must be filed within the same timeframe as the Affidavit of Merit.  “When a statute is susceptible of an interpretation true to its purpose and that permits plaintiffs to proceed with meritorious claims, we will not add requirements not explicitly set forth that deny plaintiffs their day in court."  Burns v. Belafsky, 166 N.J. 466, 470 (2001).  The Trial Court Judge’s interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 was in error because he read in a requirement that was not in the plain text of the statute itself.  See Dept. of Law Public Safety v. Bigham, 119 N.J. 646, 651 (1990) (quoting Sheeran v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 80 N.J. 548, 556 (1979) (explaining that when the language of a statute is clear, the court’s sole function is to enforce the statute in accordance with those terms).  Defendant’s argument as to why the Sworn Statement has to be submitted within the same timeframe as the Affidavit of Merit is antithetical to the purpose of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28.  The reason why N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 allows for submission of a Sworn Statement in lieu of an Affidavit of Merit, without any explicit time restraint in the plain text of the statute, is for instances such as the one that is being argued on this appeal.
[brief] In its initial brief, [...] argued, among other things, that (1) there must be a nexus between the $2,000,000 density bonus payment and the [...] apartment project and there was none; and (2) the magnitude of the payment should have been determined pursuant to ordinance standards in order to prevent abuse, and there was no such ordinance.  In sum, Appellant argued that the City and [...] were bound by the terms of the Municipal Land Use Law (“MLUL”) which must be read in pari materia with the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (“LRHL”) (see pp. 25 to 30 of Appellant’s Brief).  Neither Respondent disputes Appellant’s assertions that (1) the $2,000,000 payment made by [...] had no nexus to the 109-unit apartment complex which it proposed; (2) the amount of that payment was not determined by consideration of any standards but was calculated as the product of $40,000 per unit multiplied by 50 units of added density; (3) the funds were used to renovate and expand a senior citizens center, which was not in the redevelopment area; and (4) this payment was in addition to payments required for offsite improvements necessitated by the redevelopment project.
[directive] b.  Interference with transportation is a disorderly persons offense.  c.  Interference with transportation is a crime of the fourth degree if the person purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another person or causes pecuniary loss in excess of $500 but less than $2,000.  d.  Interference with transportation is a crime of the third degree if the person purposely, Disorderly $500 to $1,000  10%  Permissible knowingly or recklessly causes significant bodily injury to another person or causes pecuniary loss of $2,000 or more, or if the person purposely or knowingly creates a risk of Persons significant bodily injury to another person.  e.  Interference with transportation is a crime of the second degree if the person purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another person.  65  Updated December 2, 2013
[directive] A law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney shall have discretion to not seek a restraining order pursuant to P.L.1999, c.334 (C.2C:35-5.4 et seq.) if the defendant is charged with an offense resulting from the stop of a motor vehicle, if the defendant was using public transportation, or if the provisions of paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection e. of section 4 of P.L.1999, c.334 (C.2C:35-5.7) are applicable.  5.
[brief] ”  *TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez*, 594 U.S. 413, 459 n.9 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Hence, “state courts [such as New Jersey courts] will exercise exclusive jurisdiction over these sorts of class actions.”  *Id.*; *Matter of Cong. Dists. by N.J. Redist’g Com’n*, 249 N.J. 561, 570 (2022) (jurisdiction not limited to a case or controversy).
[brief] ”  Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119 (2020), quoting Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of FLA, 236 N.J. 301, 319 (2019) and Atalese, supra. 219 N.J. at 442.  An arbitration agreement is valid only if the parties intended to arbitrate because the parties are not required to arbitrate when they have not intended to do so.  Kernahan, supra. 236 N.J. at 321:  “A court’s obligation in construing a contract is to determine the intent of the parties.  In the quest for the common intention of the parties to a contract the court must consider the relations of the parties, the attendant circumstances, and the objects they were trying to attain. ”  Id at 321, citing Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213 (2011) and Tessmar v. Grosner, 23 N.J. 193 (1957).  When determining the enforceability of an arbitration agreement, courts will consider whether there was mutual assent, as impacted by the motive of unconscionability, the parties’ sophistication and the one-sided nature of the negotiations.  Muhammad v. Cnty. of Rehoboth Beach, 189 N.J. 1, 15 (2006).  Invalid contract provisions are severable.  Goffe v. Foulke Management Corp., 238 N.J. 191 (2019).
[brief] Orders are appropriate based on his two cited circumstances for Court acceptance (Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) quoting, D' Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. 393, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).  They both apply since my Oct. 26, ‘22 & May 25, ‘23 Motions for Reconsideration, & May 31, ‘24 Appeal Brief clearly addressed/substantiated those circumstances.  See my prior Brief, Section I, p. 53-55, for further details.
[brief] At the time of the hearing, [...] had been employed by the [...] for approximately nine years and nine months.  (2T7:18-20).  November 5, 2019 at approximately 2:18 a.m., he was dispatched to a report of a disabled vehicle outside of a pizzeria.  (2T7:22 to 2T8:6).  When [...] arrived at the scene, he observed a black Toyota Corolla parked on the right-hand side of the road, parked across several parking spots.  (2T8:8-12).  The pizzeria was not open for business at the time.  (2T8:14-16).  [...] observed that the vehicle was not on.  When he spoke with defendant, he was advised that there was an engine issue.  (2T9:4-7).  The interior and dashboard lights were on, while the exterior lights were not, which in [...]’s experience meant that the keys were in the ignition and the vehicle was or could potentially be operated.  (2T9:9-15).  The hazard lights were also on at this time.  (2T9:17-19).  Defendant told [...] that as he was driving, the vehicle petered out and he was able to get it into its current spot.  (2T9:25 to 2T10:2).  [...] spoke with defendant to get his name and the information was confirmed through the Division of Motor Vehicles via his police vehicle.  (2T10:4-11).  [...] initially observed defendant in the driver’s seat with the keys in the ignition.
[brief] January 24, 2025  Order Denying Motion for Collateral Estoppel .......... Pa1 to Pa3 January 24, 2025  Order Denying Motion for a Stay ......................... Pa4 Indictment [...] .............................................. Pa5 to Pa6 October 1, 2023  Notice of Motion to Suppress ............................. Pa7 State’s December 13, 2023 Brief – Union County* ...................... Pa8 to Pa12  Defendant’s December 26, 2023 Brief – Union County ............... Pa13 to Pa19 State’s April 26, 2024 Brief – Union County .......................... Pa20 to Pa30  Defendant’s August 3, 2023 Brief – Union County ..................... Pa31 to Pa36  May 7, 2024  Order Denying Motion to Suppress ....................... Pa37 to Pa53  October 30, 2024  Notice of Motion to Suppress ......................... Pa54 to Pa56  Excerpt from State’s December 6, 2024 Brief – Hudson County ...... Pa57 to Pa61  Excerpt from Defendant’s December 19, 2024 Brief – Hudson County ....... Pa62  November 20, 2024  Order Denying Consolidation ...................... Pa63 to Pa64 December 16, 2024  Order Denying Reconsideration Motion ............ Pa65  Certification in Lieu of Transcript ...................................... Pa66 to Pa69
[brief] [...], [...], and [...] (the “Environmental Appellants”) are leading non-profit environmental and conservation organizations.  Collectively, the Environmental Appellants represent hundreds of thousands of individual members who are deeply interested in protecting and preserving the safety of our environment and our natural resources for future generations.  The [...]’s myopic decision to exempt this project from its ordinary permitting review under the Highlands Act sets the bar too low to meet the legislative mandate for serious and sustainable environmental protections in the face of unwise development proposals in the Highlands.
[directive] Independent Auditor's Report (Enclosure 14)  1.  Report compliance with forfeiture statutes, regulations, directives, on 2. SOPS, and on internal control over financial reporting based on an audit of financial statements performed in accordance with Government Auditing Standards (Enclosure 15).  Balance sheet containing assets, liabilities, and fund balance for the 3. in forfeiture-related accounts.  Unclaimed funds included the Seized - Asset Trust Account balance more than three (3) years must be clearly for - identified and reported a fihding.  Any other accounts which may be as funded by forfeiture funds, i.e., petty cash, extradition account, etc., are to be included in the audit.  A Statement of Revenues, Expenses, and Changes in Fund Balance for 4.  the forfeiture-related accounts must include revenue, expenditures, 6 of 10 Page forfeiture-related costs, and changes fund balance.  The Statement of in Revenues, Expenses, and Changes in Fund Balance shall include explanatory footnotes relating to each Law Enforcement Trust Account, Asset Maintenance Account, and forfeiture expenditure.
[brief] The Court first reasoned, “in applying consecutive sentences here, even if it were as originally sentenced ten and ten, 20 total years, he’s an individual who’s 19 years old.  He’ll be under the age of 40 by the time he reaches his parole. ”  (8T 101-16 to 20)  The Court then returned to the same distinction between possessing a gun and firing it that it had relied upon during its evaluation of the Yarbough factors, stating that “there are two separate evils. ”  (8T 102-3 to 104-14)  The weakness in the Court’s Yarbough analysis, as discussed in Point I.C.1, supra, thus infected the Court’s [...] fairness assessment as well.
[brief] In cross-examination, defendant injected the issue of opinion testimony on what the videos depicted into the case.  Specifically, counsel asked [...] whether [...] had offered [...] an opinion as to whether the ID could be identified from enhanced photographs.  Defense counsel informed the judge that the purpose of the question was to impeach [...]’s credibility by pointing to an inconsistent statement about his conversation with [...] in a report he authored.  After extensive colloquy, including the judge’s statement that [...]’s “gratuitous” opinion on what appeared in the photographs was “irrelevant,” the judge instructed the jury to disregard --- 24  In his direct testimony, [...] merely said he forwarded still photographs to [...]’s Photography Unit for possible enhancement.  [...]’s testimony regarding his conversation with [...].  (12T75-8 to 12).  The judge further informed the jury that “[w]hat the photographs depict is for your ultimate determination. ” (12T75-13 to 14).  [...] testified immediately after [...].  (12T92-18 to 116-9).  The entire thrust of his direct examination evidenced that defendant’s attorney knew well before the day of the search that [...] believed defendant had the wallet ID, so defendant had plenty of time to hide or discard it; [...] did not view any of the videos in court.  (12T93-20 to 104-12).  From an email, S-33, (12T97-23 to 98-20), the jury learned [...] had told [...] that [...] was aware defendant presented a [...] wallet ID when stopped by police, and believed defendant “located the initial identification and has it in his possession,” and demanded its surrender.
[brief] I BECAUSE LANDLORD FAILS TO REFUTE TENANT’S SUBSTANTIAL SHOWING THAT THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED RULE 1:7-4(A), A REMAND IS WARRANTED  Tenant has already set forth in its merits brief the substantial record evidence that supports its argument that the trial court’s unorthodox rulings in this matter warrant a remand for the court’s prejudging of the case and failure to comply with Rule 1:7-4(a) (Db21-Db26).  To avoid unnecessary duplication Tenant will not repeat those arguments except as necessary to provide context.