ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] While the Trust in *Pivnick* may have been clear in its wording, according to the plaintiff in that case, the wording was clearly wrong and opposite of the testator’s intent, solely because of the defendant lawyer’s negligence.  Just as in this case, *Pivnick* was not decided based on face of the instrument, but on the totality of the evidence regarding the testator’s intent.  It was *that decision on testamentary intent* after a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue that barred the subsequent legal malpractice claim.  *Pivnick* at 486-487.  Whether the instrument leading to litigation was clear, but allegedly completely wrong, or merely ambiguous, has no bearing on the legal effect to be afforded a final judgment after a full and fair trial.  It would also make no sense to preclude a claim against an attorney who allegedly drafted a Trust that was allegedly completely wrong (as in *Pivnick*), but to permit a claim against an attorney who drafted a Will that was merely allegedly ambiguous (as here).  In this case, the Chancery Judge found the Will ambiguous, but after considering all the evidence, a judicial determination was made that [...] intended to discharge the mortgage entirely.  Again, it is this decision, which was reached after a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, that precludes the current action.  *Ibid.*  [...] cannot be found negligent for an outcome that has been conclusively determined to be the correct outcome.  Finally, and to state the obvious, plaintiffs assume that the ambiguity harmed their interests when the opposite is true.  [...], who drafted the Will, was always clear about what [...] intended and what he ([...]) intended by the words he used.  The ambiguity allowed plaintiffs to attempt to persuade the Chancery judge that [...] was mistaken despite [...]’s clarity as to what was intended.  Plaintiffs failed both at the trial court level and on appeal; the law precludes the proverbial “third bite. ”  Plaintiffs next claim that “at least three of the five requirements for collateral estoppel are absent” (Appellant’s Brief at 31), but then identify only one substantive issue.
[brief] 13T:32-33.  The Judge was “surprised by [the lawyer’s] comments” and stated it was wrong for the Board to take the “bait of the lawyer who said, here we can the lawyerly things and get out of it. ”  13T:32:19-33:4.  The issue of retroactivity is not new to cases involving rent increases.  Retroactive increases are warranted where a hardship application is delayed through no fault of the applicant.  Heyert v. Taddese, 431 N.J. Super. 388, 433 (App. Div. 2013); Orange Taxpayers Council v. Orange, 83 N.J. 246, 259 (1980) (Making hardship rent increase retroactive “to the date an apartment was certified to be in compliance with the property codes adequately compensated owners for ‘regulator lag”); Silverman v. Rent Leveling Bd. of Cliffside Park, 277 N.J. Super. 524, 533 (App. Div. 1994), certify. denied, 139 N.J. 443 (1995) (“Hardship rent increase should have been made retroactive to the date of the application in light of the municipality’s undue delay in processing it").
[brief] New Jersey Court Rule 4:46-1, sets forth the criteria for granting Summary Judgment:  The judgment or order sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.  R. 4:46-1.
[brief] By way of this appeal, the [...] (“[...]” or the “Town”) – despite an unsuccessful attempt at the summary judgment stage and, later, in two separate motions to stay the trial court’s decision – once again seeks to prevent [...] (“[...]”) from proceeding with a multi-jurisdictional transmission project on the grounds that it is precluded by a local ordinance.  Yet this precise issue has already been addressed by our Supreme Court in In re [...], in which the Court ruled that municipal regulation of high capacity transmission lines is preempted by supervening state law.
[brief] PURSUANT TO R. 4:6-2(e) WITH PREJUDICE AND DENYING PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S CROSS MOTION TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT (Pa98)  BECAUSE:  15  A)  Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion to Amend its Complaint (Pa37) to Include a Claim for Breach of Contract Should Have Been Granted (Pa97; Pa99).  .........................  16  B)  Plaintiff Stated a Claim for Reinstatement of the 2012 Mortgage (Pa96).  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17  C)  Plaintiff Stated a Claim for Equitable Estoppel and Unjust Enrichment (T11.20-23).  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21  D)  Plaintiff Stated a Claim for Cross Collateralization (Pa97)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25  POINT III - PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO JOIN DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS IN THE BANKRUPTCY COURT PREFERENCE ACTION
[brief] [...], Plaintiff-Appellant, v. [...]; [...], DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DIVISION OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES; [...]; [...], CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER; [...], DIRECTOR OF HUMAN RESOURCES, [...]; [...]; [...], DIRECTOR OF HUMAN RESOURCES, [...]; AND JOHN DOES 1-10  BEING AGENTS, SERVANTS AND EMPLOYEES OF DEFENDANTS AS A CONTINUING INVESTIGATION MAY REVEAL (WHO ARE FICTIONALLY NAMED BECAUSE THEIR TRUE IDENTITIES ARE UNKNOWN), Defendants-Respondents.  Docket No. Below: [...] Sat Below: Hon. [...], P.J.Cv.
[directive] By following these simple steps, law enforcement officers can ensure compliance with the law and protect evictions.3 tenants from illegal Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey to implement and comply with the procedures outlined below.
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[directive] Justice Criminal of Division Director, TO: Police State Jersey  New Superintendent, Prosecutors County All Prosecutor Fraud Insurance Sheriffs County All Chiefs Police  All Executives Chief Enforcement Law  All General Attorney  [...]  FROM: 24, 2017  May DATE: v2.0: 2016-6  No. Directive Enforcement  General Law Attorney  SUBJECT: Procedures and Practices, Policies, Interim Establishing Directive of Modification 31 c. 2014, P.L. to Pursuant Reform
[brief] (13T:49-13 to 19).  These convictions included a 17-year NERA sentence with 5 years of parole supervision, which resulted in defendant still being on parole supervision at the time he committed the murder, just two years after his release.  (14T 9-4 to 11).  That conviction was properly considered to be “intervening”, as it was crucial to understanding the period between all the convictions that the State and defense disagreed over and the date of this incident.  The trial court thus properly used her discretion to decide that the sentences which themselves fell outside of the ten-year period were not remote, when defendant had only spent two years outside of prison after receiving those convictions, and had spent zero time outside of parole supervision after those convictions.  Whether considered under remoteness or as an intervening conviction, the long sentence for that NERA offense was clearly relevant to the N.J.R.E. 609 analysis.
[brief] (Pa 115).  Before becoming the Atlantic County Deputy Surrogate, [...] worked for the law firm of [...] where [...] and his brother were clients.  McDougall recognized the signature of [...] on the Antenuptial Agreement when the document was submitted to the Surrogate’s Office in connection with this matter.  She testified that she remembered [...]’s signature from her time working at [...] because of an instance where Perone had to provide his signature on hundreds of stock transfers.  McDougall testified that she believed that it was Perone’s signature on the Antenuptial Agreement based upon her familiarity with his signature.  (10T11-12 to 13-14; 10T20-18 to 26-20).  The Decedent told her good friend [...] about the Antenuptial Agreement.
[brief] a.  The heating supply system located on the property owned by the Defendant that was present in April 2013 when [...] [a plumber] inspected it was connected to the boiler located on the property owned by the Plaintiff.  b.  The heating supply located on the property owned by the Defendant that was present in April 2013 when [...] inspected it was connected to the boiler located on the property owned by the Plaintiff since before 1984 when [...] assisted in the installation of the boiler.  (Da948)  *Curb Cut on Congregation’s Property Accessing the Sixth Street Lot* 40.
[brief] **Appellant Cannot Establish A Causal Connection Between His Alleged Whistleblowing Activity And His Termination. **  The trial court correctly found that Appellant failed to raise any genuine triable issue as to the requisite causal connection between any adverse action and his alleged protected activity.  A plaintiff is required to show a factual nexus between the protected activity and the retaliatory employment action.  *Hancock v. Borough of Oaklyn*, 347 N.J. Super. 350, 361 (App. Div. 2002).
[brief] Under Tyler  Applying the retroactivity factors from Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., 96 N.J. 419 (1984), the Roberto court concluded that Tyler must be afforded “pipeline retroactivity,” i.e., the ruling in Tyler should be applied retroactively to cases that were pending at the time it was decided.  Roberto, 477 N.J. Super at 363.  Independent of the Coons factors, the Roberto Court also concluded that “pipeline retroactivity” was mandated under federal law.  When the United States Supreme Court “applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review,” even if such open cases predate or postdate the Supreme Court's decision.  Roberto, 477 N.J. Super at 362, citing Harper v. Va. Dep't of Tax'n, 509 U.S. 86, 97, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1992).  In balancing the concerns relating to retroactivity, the Roberto court emphasized that tax sale certificate holders “know ‘from the start that most tax certificate investments end not in windfall profits from foreclosure but rather in high yield interest returns upon redemption. ’”  Roberto, 477 N.J. Super at 360 (quoting Simon v. Cronecker, 189 N.J. 304, 315 (2007)).  Thus, the Tax Sale Law did not create sufficient reliance interests to render retroactive application inappropriate.  Roberto, 477 N.J. Super at 360.  (iii)  Roberto Established the Applicability of Tyler to Appellants’ Pending Motion to Vacate  The Roberto decision’s discussion of Tyler bears squarely upon Appellants’ case.  It holds that the rule from Tyler applies with full force in New Jersey, that foreclosures which divest a property owner of significant equity pursuant to the Tax Sale Law effect an unconstitutional taking, and that Tyler applies retroactively to cases that were already pending when Tyler was decided.
[brief] But, even if Appellant did move under these grounds, Defendant’s Motion would be deemed untimely as the Motion was not made within one year of the Judgment.  Rule 4:50-2 (“[t]he motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (a), (b) and (c) of R. 4:50-1 not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. ”); Orner v. Liu, 419 N.J. Super. 431, 437 (2011) (If the motion is made on the basis of excusable neglect, then it must be brought within one year after the judgment).  And, even if it was timely, Appellant failed to establish excusable neglect, including a meritorious defense.  Appellant’s Motion was not filed within a reasonable time; (b) Appellant’s Motion is barred by the doctrine of laches; (c) the Judgment is not void due to insufficient service of process; and (d) any NJCFLA claim lacks merit and is barred by res judicata.  A.  Appellant’s Motion was Not Filed within a Reasonable Time Motions made pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(d), (e), and (f) “shall be made within a reasonable time . . . after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. ”  Rule 4:50-2; see Citibank, N.A. v. Russo, 334 N.J. Super. 346 (2000) (a motion to vacate a default judgment must be “made within a reasonable time”); Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC v. Chartonavich, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2537 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 21, 2024) (affirming the lower court’s order denying motion to vacate the judgment because defendant failed to file the motion to vacate within a reasonable time).
[brief] Thus, in Leodori it was irrelevant that the plaintiff was an attorney who had received numerous documents containing the arbitration policy during his employment.  175 N.J. at 306.  And in Garfinkle, where the plaintiff was a doctor that negotiated the complex employment agreement with the assistance of counsel.  168 N.J. at 135-36.  Rather, “[i]rrespective of plaintiff’s status or the quality of counsel, the Court must be convinced that [they] actually intended to waive [their] statutory rights.
[brief] Ill. 2012) | 29 | | United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2004) | 33 | | STATUTES | | |----------|---| | N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 | 2 | | N.J.SA. 2C:15-1 | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4 | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 | 2 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 | 4 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2 | 37 | | OTHER AUTHORITIES | | |-------------------|---| | Model Jury Charge (Criminal), “Third Party Guilt Jury Charge” (approved Mar. 9, 2015) | 24 | | RULES | | |-------|---| | N.J.R.E. 702 | 26 | | N.J.R.E. 703 | 26 | | R. 2:10-2 | 25, 32 | | R. 3:21-8 | 35 | | CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS | PAGE NOS | |---------------------------|----------| | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 1 | 17, 25, 34 | | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 9 | 17, 25, 34 | | N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10 | 17, 21, 25, 34 | | U.S. Const. amend. V | 17, 25, 34 | | U.S. Const. amend. VI | 17, 21, 25, 34 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV | 17, 25, 34 |
[brief] ”  Ibid.  The process creates efficiency by “minimiz[ing] the resources that permit applicants will need to expend on the permit process,” because [...] and “[...] have agreed on the types of development which may be permitted in this area,” thus “potential developers will know --- 2 [...] did not receive substantive comments to its CZM [...] Redevelopment Zone rules when adopted in 1997 or during subsequent amendments.
[brief] 40  Lionel’s Appliance Ctr., Inc. v. Citta, 156 N.J. Super. 257, 268 (App. Div. 1978) .................................................................................................................. 22, 29, 30, 31  Loper Bright Enters. V. Raimondo, No. 22-451, 2023 U.S. LEXIS 1847 (May 1, 2023)  ..................................................................................................................
[brief] State v. Morton, 155 N.J. at 453 (citing State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 106 (1982)).  Here, the highly relevant and probative value of the dash-cam MVR video recording is not outweighed by any undue prejudice to defendants.  A careful Rule 403 balancing test weighs in favor of admitting this critical and highly probative evidence.
[brief] Thus, the redevelopment plan establishes the zoning for the redevelopment area, but anyone wishing to develop properties within the redevelopment area must still file a development application with the municipal planning board.  Likewise, development within a redevelopment area normally also cannot occur unless the developer agrees to sign a redevelopment agreement with the municipality governing its development of properties within the area.  See N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f).
[brief] Since the $50,000 and $330,000 loans were made in 2008, it is undeniable that the statute of limitations on those loans has long expired.  It also undeniable that if the parties entered into an alleged “Third Loan” in 2013, the statute of limitations on that loan has also expired if the “Third Loan” is a demand loan.  Thus, the only way that Plaintiff can succeed on his claims and escape the statute of limitations bar is if the alleged “Third Loan” was a “pay-when-able loan,” a legal reality that Plaintiff has conceded in this litigation.  Consequently, Plaintiff must prove the following: (i) the existence of a “Third Loan” entered into in April 2013 where [...] agreed to pay back allegedly unpaid amounts on the $50,000 and $330,000 loans; and (ii) a meeting of the minds and a “clear indication” that the alleged “Third Loan” was a “pay-when-able” loan whereby [...] would pay Plaintiff back when he was able.
[brief] **Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P.,** 219 N.J. 430 (2014)  ...........................................................................................................  1, 3, 7, 9-11, 13  **Boddy v. Cigna Prop. & Casualty Cos.,** 334 N.J. Super. 649 (App. Div. 2000) .................................................................................. 5  **Drosos v. GMM Global Money Managers Ltd.,** No. A-3674-21, 2023 WL 7545067 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 14, 2023) ................................................................. 8-9  **Griffin v. Burlington Volkswagen, Inc.,** 411 N.J. Super. 515 (App. Div. 2010) .................................................................................. 8-9 **Hojnowski ex rel. Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park,** 375 N.J. Super. 568 (App. Div. 2005) .................................................................................. 14 **Luchejko v. City of Hoboken,** 207 N.J. 191 (2011) .............................................................................................................. 11 **Moore v. Woman to Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, LLC,** 416 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 2010) .................................................................................... 14 **Morgan v. Sanford Brown Institute,** 225 N.J. 289 (2016) .............................................................................................................. 7, 10 **North Haledon Fire Co. No. 1 v. Borough of North Haledon,** 425 N.J. Super. 615 (App. Div. 2012) .................................................................................. 2-3 **Ogunyemi v. Garden State Medical Center,** No. A-1703-22, 2024 WL 1243552 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 25, 2024) ................................................................. 6-7 **Price v. Himeji, LLC,** 214 N.J. 263 (2013)
[brief] (18T83-20 to 84-18; PSR at 8).  Given that defendant was facing the imposition of a custodial sentence, both N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6 and Rule 3:21-2(a) required that a PSR containing defendant’s history of convictions, arrests not resulting in convictions, and domestic-violence related arrests and court-issued restraining orders be prepared by judiciary staff.
[brief] If plaintiff is suggesting he had some form of blanket “ethics approval,” he is mistaken.  (Pa650).  In 2008, he was given approval to “provide training on sanitary inspection of public water systems for states such as Washington and California. ” (Pa375).  He was not approved to provide training to any New Jersey related entity or on New Jersey environmental laws and regulations.  He was not approved to provide training to entities he came in contact with through his work at the DEP. (December 9, 2008 memorandum included at Pa375-376).  To suggest the 2008 approval gave plaintiff blanket permission to speak in New Jersey, to entities who are licensed operators regulated by the DEP, is simply incorrect.  Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against [...] fails for two reasons.
[brief] [...] EGP Calculation .................................................................38  2.  [...] EGP Calculation .................................................................38  C.  Errors in the description of [...], [...], and [...] ....40  D.  Error in including [...] as subject to the PTA’s EGP-sharing .........................................................41  POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING [...]’S MOTION TO ASSERT A COUNTERCLAIM FOR SETOFF BECAUSE EQUITY MANDATES THE AMOUNT OF THE AWARD BE REDUCED TO REFLECT [...]’S OFFSETTING OBLIGATION TO [...] [DA32-33]  ...........................................42
[directive] Each participant, prior to undergoing firearms qualification, must be equipped with the agency authorized belt, holster, magazines, loading device and bullet loops.  The qualification course will be fired only with the use of agency authorized loading devices and equipment.  This will be indicated on the qualification record form and training schedule.  Ear protection is mandatory and eye protection is strongly recommended for all live-fire activity.  Clothing.  Each participant should complete courses of fire wearing clothing similar to that worn while on duty.  Uniformed and plain clothes personnel should wear the appropriate clothing and all equipment required in their respective assignments.  Indoor Ranges.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ counsel then objected to the request to apply the LCC and stated that the same claims existed from the beginning of the case, just in then unknown amounts.  (Da313)  However, Plaintiffs’ counsel admitted the opposite, that, “Phase One was about who were and who were not members of this LLC…. ”  (Da314)  He wrote that, “Phase II was supposed to be about our damages and [...]’s breaches of fiduciary duties and disassociation from the Company, together with claims about striking down increased membership interests given to [...] and his immediate family. ”  (Ibid.)  Thus, Plaintiffs’ counsel admitted that Phase I was not a “Large Complex Case” but Plaintiffs expected Phase II would be, which was only in June 2016 when they filed the amended.
[brief] The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion  [...] repeatedly relies on the “abuse of discretion” standard in an attempt to justify the inflated calculations reached by the trial court.  However, even under this standard, the trial court’s calculations do not pass muster.  Although the ordinary abuse of discretion standard defies precise definition, it arises when a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.