ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] | Description | Page | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------| | Order of Judgment - October 17, 2023 | Da29 | | Order in Support of Motion for a New Trial - December 8, 2023 | Da45 | | Honorable [...], JSC’s Opinion on Motion for New Trial - | | | December 8, 2023 | Da31 | | Order of Judgment - December 15, 2023 | Da75 | | Order - January 19, 2024 | Da47 | | Case | Page | |------------------------------------------|------| | Calabree v. DiCristino, 2009 (N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2548 (DA70 - DA71) | 2 | | Davidson v. Slater, 189 N.J. 166, 185 (2007) | 4 | | Hansen v. Eagle-Picher Lead Co., 8 N.J. 133, 141, 84 A.2d 281, 285 (1951) | 2 | | Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373 (2018) | 2 | | Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) | 2 | | McMahon v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co. 364 N.J. Super. 188 (App. Div. 2003) | 9 | | Mockler v. Russman, 102 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1968) | 2 | | O’Brien Cogeneration, Inc. v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am., 361 N.J. Super. 264, 274-75 (App. Div. 2003) | 4 | | Polk v. Daconceicao, 268 N.J. Super. 568, 575 (App. Div. 1993) | 3 | | Raritan Trucking Corp. v. Aero Commander, Inc., 458 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir.1972) | 2 | | Reichert v. Vegholm, 366 N.J. 209, 213-14, (App. Div. 2004) | 4 | | Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 521 (2011) | 2 | | State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 54 (1997) | 4 | | State v. Donbrack, 245 N.J. 531, 544 (2021) | 8 | | State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016) | 8 | | State v. Maloney, 216 N.J. 91, 104-05 (2013) | 4 | | State v. McKinney, 223 N.J.
[brief] On December 1, 2013, [...] was charged under [...] with a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.  DA1.  The date of her conviction was January 23, 2014.  [...] was sentenced to the following: 2 year loss of New Jersey driving privileges, and 48 hours with the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center, along with applicable fines and assessments.  No appeal was filed.  No prior post-conviction relief proceedings have been brought in this matter.  Petitioner was represented by [...], Esquire, as retained counsel, during her plea.  On February 9, 2024, [...] filed a petition for Post-Conviction Relief (PCR) in the [...] asserting she was not advised of the enhanced penalties for a subsequent DWI.
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[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  “Appellate review of an administrative agency's decision is limited. ”  Zimmerman v. Diviney, 477 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div. 2023).  “Ordinarily, an appellate court will reverse the decision of the administrative agency only if it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole. ”  Mejia v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 446 N.J. Super. 369, 376 (App. Div. 2016)(citations and quotations omitted).  The “judicial role is restricted to four inquiries: (1) whether the agency's decision offends the State or Federal Constitution; (2) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies; (3) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (4) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors. ”  George Harms Const. Co. v. New Jersey Tpk. Auth., 137 N.J. 8, 27 (1994).  ARGUMENT
[brief] See Gutch, 142 N.J. Eq. at 431-33 (finding that a contractual provision granting a ROFR holder “the option of purchasing said premises on the same terms and conditions . . . within 15 days after . . . notice by the [property owner]” required the property owner to send notice to the ROFR holder of “the terms and conditions of the prospective sale,” and holding that the property owner’s letters to the ROFR holder were legally inadequate to provide such notice in part because “[n]either letter recites . . . the terms of the prospective sale mentioned therein”); [...] v. Cohen, [...], 2006 WL 27624, at *1, 6, 8-9 (App. Div. Jan. 6, 2006).  Da335.  In H&G Hardware, the contractual provision governing the ROFR at issue provided that “[i]f [the property owners] . . . receive[] a bonafide offer in writing, they hereby agree to forward a true copy of said written offer to [the ROFR holder] . . . . [who] shall have thirty (30) days . . . to elect to purchase the property on the same terms. ”  Id. at *1.  Da335.  Given this contractual language, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s rulings that “[t]he obligations that [the property owner] had was to advise [the ROFR holder] when there was a final offer . . . . [a]nd, at that point in time, to communicate the offer to [the ROFR holder], to give [the ROFR holder] a right to purchase on the same . . . terms and . . . conditions in accordance with [the provision of the agreement governing the ROFR].”
[directive] Char Inform Incident to Report Enforcement Law of Preliminary Use  5.5 this of the provisions to subject an for offense making arrest an officers enforcement Law  Incident Enforcement Law Preliminary a prepare to practicable, encouraged, when are Directive supervisory officer designated or 3.2 Section a prosecutor to pursuant a consulting before Report an preparing or acomplaint-warrant applying for before or otherwise Section 3.3, to pursuant a prepare to important especially application.
[brief] In *Rycoline Prods., Inc. v. C & W Unlimited*, 109 F.3d 883, 889 (3d Cir. 1997), the Third Circuit followed *Kaselaan*, and held "that [New Jersey's] Entire Controversy Doctrine does not preclude the initiation of a second litigation before the first action has been concluded. ”  That case involved a plaintiff who brought an action in federal court after the state court had refused to entertain certain claims, unlike our case where the motion judge had denied Appellants’ claims in the first docket “without prejudice,” meaning “without prejudice to be filed anew.
[brief] Indeed, the Board was explicit in explaining that it was relying on the lack of “evidence of a site plan” approval in finding that Respondent’s use of Lot 5 for parking was “not an allowed use” (Aa2).  This turns on its head the requirement imposed upon land use boards to base their factual findings on “substantial evidence,” rather than based on inferences from lack of evidence.  Darst v. Blairstown Tp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 410 N.J. Super. 314, 325 (App. Div. 2009).  Or “[s]tated more pithily . . . ‘absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. ’”  Chambers v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 442 F. App'x 650, 656 (3d Cir. 2011).  Accordingly, [...] remains absolutely correct that the Board’s finding that a site development plan for the change in use for Lot 5 was required in 1964 is a finding entirely lacking in record support based on the record presented to the Board.  For the same reason, the Board’s finding that there was no approved site plan is also untethered to the record, as the Board admitted.  For these reasons, Appellant’s claim that the trial court erred by finding that the Board lacked record support for its determination as to the lack of site plan approval is meritless and even if there was error, it was harmless and should be disregarded under Rule 2:10-2.
[brief] The notion that the disapproval letter was based on excessive rates is fantastic.  The Commissioner’s only attempt to show otherwise gives lie to its claim: “the Department’s communications with [...] [said] that the targeted lifetime loss ratio was ‘aggressive. ’”  Pa49 (emphasis added); Pa2 (“current lifetime loss ratio . . . did not reflect enough deterioration to warrant a rate increase”); Pa15, Pa27 (same).  But there is no suggestion in the Act that “excessive rates” are the same thing as “aggressive” or not sufficiently “deteriorat[ed]” “loss ratios. ”  N.J.S.A. 17B:27E-11.  Nothing else supports that “aggressive” loss ratios and “excessive” rates are the same thing.  Any effort to substitute one term for the other falls apart, and, again, only confirms that the *post hoc* work to rewrite the letter.  Dictionary definitions, for example, do not show that the two terms mean the same thing.  *Compare* Aggressive, Merriam-Webster. com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aggressive (last visited February 12, 2024) (“4. growing, developing, or spreading rapidly”), *with*, Excessive, *id.*, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/excessive (last visited February 12, 2024) (“exceeding what is usual, proper, necessary, or normal”); see Pa84 (quoting this definition of excessive).  And the most natural reading of the disapproval letter’s reference to “aggressiveness”—both based on the letter’s four corners and the history of discussions between the parties—is that the Department believed that [...] sought to achieve things too fast, not that the overall rate itself was excessive (*i.e.*, too high).  Furthermore, the authorizing statute says nothing about timing—it refers to excessive rates, not those that purportedly have risen too quickly (let alone loss ratios that have done so).  *See* N.J.S.A. 17B:27E-11 (“All filings of rates and rating schedules shall demonstrate that the benefits are reasonable in relation to the premium charged and that the rates are not excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory. ”).  The claim that “[t]he Department considered ‘excessive’ in an ordinary and common-sense meaning,” see Pa84; Pa27, is, therefore, nonsensical.  In sum, the Department has no basis for claiming that [...]’s applications were denied on excessiveness grounds, and this Court should reverse the post hoc justification that the ALJ concocted and the Commissioner adopted in the Final Decision.
[brief] POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO ENGAGE IN HANDWRITING COMPARISON, WHERE THE MATTER HAD NOT BEEN ADDRESSED PRETRIAL, THERE WAS NO RULING ON THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE HANDWRITING SAMPLE OFFERED BY THE STATE, AND THE JURORS WERE NOT INSTRUCTED ON HOW TO PROPERLY WEIGH THEIR COMPARISON.  (Not Raised Below)  ..................................................24  POINT II  THE PROSECUTOR’S IMPROPER SUMMATION DENIED WARE A FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS, AND REQUIRES REVERSAL.  (Not Raised Below)  ..................................................................................................................33  TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D.)  A. The Prosecutor Improperly Argued That [...] Was Acting In Conformity With His Propensity To Steal.................................................................33  B.  The Prosecutor Began And Ended His Summation By Inflaming The Passions Of The Jury..................................................36  C.  The Prosecutor Improperly Denigrated The Defense..............................................................................................................37  D.  Conclusion...........................................................................................................................................................................37  POINT III
[brief] Because it adds a new and unique restraint on a defendant’s freedom to own, live with, or “have custody or control” over animals in the future, N.J.S.A. 4:22-26.2(b)(2), application of this statute to events occurring before its enactment is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause.  ---  3  Our courts have treated the New Jersey Ex Post Facto Clause as coextensive with its federal counterpart.  Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 42 (1995).  In sum, to permit sentencing courts to ban defendants from owning animals for offenses committed prior to the law’s enactment would flout the Legislature’s clearly stated intent that N.J.S.A. 4:22-26.2 apply prospectively.  It would also violate constitutional protections against ex post facto laws.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page: PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  3  STATEMENT OF FACTS 6  ARGUMENT 22  I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW  22  II.  PLAINTIFF’S NEED TO STRETCH AND USE THE RESTROOM IN NO WAY INFLUENCED THE JURY, AND IN FACT, WAS FULLY PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE RULES OF THE COURTROOM.  IT IS APPELLANTS’ BURDEN TO PROVE THAT THERE WAS ACTUAL IMPACT ON THE JURY TO OBTAIN A NEW TRIAL, NOT RESPONDENT’S BURDEN TO DO THE OPPOSITE.  (Raised Below: 6T, at 54:5-57:8)  25  III.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AFTER DULY ANALYZING THE ENTIRELY SELF-SERVING, FACTUALLY INCORRECT, AND TEMPORALLY SUSPECT CERTIFICATION OF THE DEFENSE ADJUSTER.  (Raised Below: 7T, at 24:13-30:2)  32  IV.  ALL STATEMENTS AND SUMMATIONS PRESENTED BY PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL WERE PROPER AND WELL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE APPLICABLE CASE LAW AND GENERAL STRATEGIES OF SUCCESSFUL TRIAL ADVOCACY.  (Not Raised Below)  35  V.  PLAINTIFF NEVER MADE A TIME-UNIT ARGUMENT AT TRIAL, AND WAS ACTUALLY PRECLUDED FROM DOING SO BY THE TRIAL COURT.  REGARDLESS, PLAINTIFF PLACED DEFENDANTS ON NOTICE OF THEIR INTENT TO MAKE SUCH AN ARGUMENT IN THEIR PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM.  (Raised Below: 6T, at 58:7-59:23)  42  VI.  PLAINTIFF PROPERLY ASSERTED AND SUPPORTED A WAGE LOSS CLAIM UNDER THE RULES OF COURT.  PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY REGARDING A RETURN TO TREATMENT  CONSTITUTED  A MINOR ERROR THAT WAS IMMEDIATELY AND FULLY ADDRESSED BY THE TRIAL COURT, AND AFTERWARD, WAS NEVER AGAIN BROUGHT UP BY DEFENSE COUNSEL.  NEITHER OF THESE ASPECTS OF THE TRIAL HAD A PREJUDICIAL EFFECT ON THE JURY, AND CERTAINLY NOT A COMPOUNDING ONE, AS THERE WAS NO PRIOR PREJUDICE TO COMPOUND.  (Raised Below: 6T, at 57:9-58:6; 59:24-61:8)  45  CONCLUSION
[brief] 9  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  Funes ex rel. Estate of Martinez v. Norfolk S. Corp., No. A-5348-10T1, 2012 WL 4069543, at *3 (App. Div. 2012)…… 2, 26, 28 Jelinek v. Sotak, 9 N.J. 19 (1952)……………………………………………………… 5-7  Lopez v. New Jersey Transit, 295 N.J. Super. 196 (App. Div. 1996)……..  7-9  Potter v. Charles V. Finch & Sons, 76 N.J. 499, 502 (1978). ………  3  Taylor v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 87 N.J.L. 673, 675 (E. & A. 1915)……………………………………………………………..  5-7  Statutes N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 (current)………………………………………
[brief] [...] said that [...] specifically referred to [...] and [...] as his co-clients and advised [...] that he should have a separate attorney.  Pa196, at ¶16, Pa205.  •  On September 13, 2017, Defendants sent [...] and [...] an engagement letter to represent them in the will contest.  Pa80; Pa192, at ¶18; Pa196, at ¶19.  •  The engagement letter confirmed that Defendants had already received the requested deposit from [...] and [...].  Pa80.  •  On September 14, 2017, Defendants sent a letter to the [...] notifying the office that the Defendants represent both [...] and [...] and requesting information regarding the Will.  Pa133, Pa196, at ¶19.  •  On December 11, 2017, Defendants contacted the [...], which informed them that the Will had not been submitted for probate in the office.  Pa135, at ¶10.
[brief] New Jersey courts recognize four general categories of remedies for breach of contract: compensatory damages, restitution, reliance damages, and specific performance.  See Donovan v. Bachstadt, 91 N.J. 434, 443-44 (1982); Pop’s Cones, Inc. v. Resorts Intern. Hotel, Inc., 307 N.J. Super. 461, 473 (App. Div. 1998).  Compensatory damages, also known as “expectation” damages or “benefit-of-the-bargain” damages, put the non-breaching party into the position it would have achieved had the contract been completed.  Totaro, Duffy, Cannova and Company, L.L.C. v. Lane, Middleton & Company, 191 N.J. 1, 13 (2007).  Restitution damages return the non-breaching party to the condition it occupied before the contract was executed and allow the non- breaching party recover for any unjust enrichment conveyed to another party.  _Id_.  Reliance damages allow an injured party to recover for expenditures incurred when that party relied to its detriment on the performing party.  _Holt v. United Security Life Ins. & Trust Co._, 76 N.J.L. 585, 599-600 (E. & A. 1909).  Specific performance seeks to make the non-breaching party reasonably whole by requiring the breaching party to fulfill its obligation under the agreement.  See _Donovan_, 91 N.J. at 444.
[brief] C.  Plaintiffs’ Experts Uniformly Agree That Plaintiffs’ Claims Against [...] Arise From Its Obligation To Ensure the Contractor’s Compliance With the Turnpike Authority’s Plans and Specifications.  None of the opinions offered by plaintiffs’ experts alter the conclusion that the services at issue performed by [...] and [...] implicate the Affidavit of Merit Statute.  Clearly, none of the experts are qualified to offer an opinion on the ultimate legal issue of whether the claims against [...] trigger the requirements of the statute (Pa2213 at T30:5-8; Pa2075 at T8:7-13, T21:23-22:6).
[brief] It is black-letter law that a judge may not tell a jury that he or she has ruled a statement to be voluntary or otherwise admissible.  State v. Hampton, 61 N.J. 250, 272 (1972).  That rule is codified in N.J.R.E. 104(c), and it functions to make sure that the jury’s fact-finding is “unhampered by knowledge of the court’s prior” admissibility ruling.  State v. Bowman, 165 N.J. Super. 531, 537 (App. Div. 1979).  It applies equally to judges and to prosecutors -- who have caused convictions to be reversed when they inform the jury that the judge has ruled a statement to be admissible.  Bowman, 165 N.J. Super. at 537-539.  Moreover, this Court has properly held that the Hampton rule logically applies in other evidentiary contexts as well.  In State v. Ridout, 299 N.J. Super. 233, 238-239 (App. Div. 1997), this Court reversed convictions for plain error when the judge instructed the jury that he had found an identification to be admissible -- because, the Appellate Division held, it was up to the jury to determine its credibility, and such an instruction impinged on the jury’s fact-finding role.
[brief] Here, the SAM Registration website stated front, center, and at the outset of the online registration process—and on each subsequent page, all without any need to scroll—that the user would be bound by hyperlinked terms of use (identified in clear blue print that offset it from the other text) upon proceeding with registration.  (Da0081-Da0082; Da0493-Da0498).  Also in contrast, [...] used the SAM Registration website to voluntarily sign up for an optional service provided by Respondents to existing customers, whereas in *Wollen* the plaintiff had no prior relationship with the defendant and presumably approached the complicated web form under more stressful circumstances.  Thus, *Wollen*’s outcome is not instructive given its required “fact-sensitive inquiry,” but its progeny provide clearer guidance.
[brief] (Pa199).  At the August 1, 2017 Township Committee meeting, the Township Committee passed a resolution placing Plaintiff on administrative leave through August 31, 2017, pending his retirement on September 1, 2017.  (Pa205).  On or about August 23, 2017, while still on administrative leave, and prior to his official retirement from the [...] on September 1, 2017, Plaintiff began working for the [...].  (Pa158 to Pa159 at T69-14 to 70-6).  Thereafter, Plaintiff retired as planned effective September 1, 2017.  (Pa148 at T59-3 to 59–9).  Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause to Proceed Summarily Pursuant to R.67-1 and R.69-1, seeking a summary hearing to void his administrative leave.  (Pa59 at ¶13).  On September 29, 2017, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause, and on February 8, 2018, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, alleging that he was retaliated against in violation of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act and for exercising his right to Freedom of Speech in violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”).
[brief] Page  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .....................................................................................3  STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................5  A.  The Incident of February 20, 2020 and Plaintiff’s Arrest ..................................5  B.  The Municipal Court Prosecution ....................................................................9  C.  The Superior Court Litigation .......................................................................11  STANDARD OF REVIEW ..................................................................................14  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................14  I.  THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED .................................................................................................................14  A.  The Statement of Uncontroverted Facts Should be Deemed Admitted ..................................................................................................................15  B.  The Video Evidence from the Officers’ Body Worn Cameras is Undisputed and Should be Accepted ..............................................................................17  II.  THE FALSE ARREST CLAIM WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED AND THE OFFICERS HAD QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ..................................................18  A.  The New Jersey Civil Rights Act and Section 1983 ........................................18  B.  The False Arrest Claim ..................................................................................20  C.  The False Arrest Claim Should be Dismissed because the Underlying Conviction has not been Reversed as Required by Heck v. Humphrey ..................................................................................22  D.  Qualified Immunity .................................................................23  E.  The [...] are Entitled to Qualified Immunity.......25  III.  THE EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIM WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED AND THE OFFICERS HAD QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ........................................................................................................28  A.  The Excessive Force Claim.........................................................28  B.  The [...] are Entitled to Qualified Immunity.......30  IV.  THE [...], AS A PUBLIC ENTITY, IS NOT LIABLE UNDER THE NJCRA ......................................................31  V.  THE DENIAL OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION CLAIM WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED..........................................................36  VI.  THE COMMON LAW CLAIMS WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT ....................................................37