ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] It is well settled that when a plaintiff is statutorily barred from holding a position, she is not permitted to maintain a lawsuit under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”).  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-1 et seq.; Cedeno, 163 N.J. at 478.  In Cedeno v. Montclair State Univ., the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a decision by the Appellate Division dismissing a plaintiff’s New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) and CEPA action on summary judgment in its entirety based on the plaintiff’s prior criminal conviction discovered during litigation.  163 N.J. at 477.  The Court reasoned that the Cedeno plaintiff’s NJLAD claim could not proceed because his conviction disqualified him from employment with defendant.  See id. at 477-78.  The Cedeno Court distinguished the facts before it from a situation where after-acquired evidence is discovered, such as a policy violation, but does not bar the employee-plaintiff from the job in the first instance.  See id. at 478.  In arriving at its holding, the *Cedeno* Court weighed the public policy inherent to NJLAD and CEPA against the public policy inherent in the Forfeiture statute at issue there and found that “whatever value may be achieved by permitting plaintiff’s case to proceed to trial is *outweighed* by the policy against allowing that same person to obtain public employment after having been convicted of bribery.
[brief] For example, the ALJ found as fact that, “In the absence of a Report of Injury from 2009, [...] believed any reference to a 2009 accident or incident was simply a typographical error and was most likely meant to say ‘2000.’” (Pa79).  In support of his legal conclusions, the ALJ again stated, “Dr. [...] suggested that [...]’s reference to a 2009 injury was a typographical error, and that he meant to write ‘2000’, which would correspond to petitioner’s workers’ compensation claim from 2000. ” (Pa85).  Further, his findings were based on his belief that “[w]hen questioned regarding the issue, petitioner denied that there was any 2009 incident or accident. ”  (Pa85)  None of these findings are accurate.
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[brief] See also *State v. Bijackso*, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. Lexis 1510 (Da59) (suppression of axe used to kill a dog turned over to police during un-*Mirandized* questioning).14  The courts of our State have since *Miranda* thus strengthened rather than weakened both the rigorous requirements of its application by the police in custodial interrogations and, under the fruits doctrine, excluded from evidence at trial the prosecutorial use of all evidence, of whatever character, derived from unwarned --- 14  The panel in *Bijacska* cited [...]’s reference to the fact that the “disarray in decisional treatment” in the federal courts of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, and the uncertainty “of the direction that the United States Supreme Court will take, may compel the court, under “principles of sound jurisprudence”, to rest future decisions on state law grounds.  (Da62, citing [...] at 177).  evidence.
[brief] The pertinent facts and procedural history were set out in Plaintiff’s brief.  Pb at 1-3.  Those “facts”, however, failed to acknowledge the significant import to which the trial court judge ascribed to a certification the District filed below from its Information Technology (“IT”) Director [...].  Chang’s Certification rebuts Plaintiff’s argument that it does not matter how difficult it is to generate the type of log Plaintiff seeks and differentiates this case from Galloway.  (Pa16-19; Pa32-34) (“Pa” refers to Plaintiff’s Appendix).  Chang, who had served as the District’s IT Director for the previous 16 years, explained that during his tenure “the District has always provided to its Board members and employees District-issued email addresses and accounts. ” (Pa16 at ¶3).  The IT Director’s responsibilities include “managing and administering the [District-controlled] email services and accounts. ” (Id.).  As the administrator for the District’s email services, Chang certified that he has “access to tools which permit [him] to easily and expeditiously extract data from the District-controlled Google Workspace (‘Workspace’) accounts, including for the purpose of fulfilling OPRA requests such as ones for email logs. ” (Pa17 at ¶4).  In connection with this case, Chang generated a log from the District’s governmental 1  Because they are interwoven, Defendants combine the procedural history and facts into one section in order to avoid repetition.
[directive] (Jesli przestc;pstwo mialo miejsce mic;dzy 9 stycznia 1986 r. a 22 grudnia 1991 r. wl11cznie, kwota ta wynosi 30 USO.  Jesli przestc;pstwQ mialo miejsce przed 1 stycznia 1986 r., kwota wynosi 25 USO).  If d. the offense occurred on or after February 1, 1993 but was before March 13, 1995, and you [Yes/Tak] [No/Nie] are being sentenced to probation or a State correctional facility, you must pay a transaction If fee of up to $1.00 for each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made?  the offense occurred on or after March 13, 1995 and the sentence is to probation, or the sentence otherwise requires payments of financial obligations to the probation division, you must pay a transaction fee of up to $2.00 for each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made?  Jesli przestc;pstwo mialo miejsce po 31 stycznia 1993 r., ale przed marca 1995 r., a Pan(i) zostal(a) 13 skazany(a) na nadz6r kuratora s11dowego lub na karc; pozbawienia wolnosci w wic;zieniu stanowym, musi Pan(i) wniesc opiate; transakcyjn11 w maksymalnej kwocie 1,00 USO nalezn11 przy wplacie kai:dej kwoty lub raty?  Jesli przestc;pstwo mialo miejsce 13 marca 1995 r. lub p6zniej, a wyrok nakazuje nadz6r kuratora lub z innych wzglc;d6w wymaga zaplaty naleznosci finansowych na rzecz wydzialu nadzoru, musi Pan(i) wniesc ot'latc; transakcyjn11 w maksymalnej kwocie 2,00 USO nalezn11 przy wplacie kai:dej kwoty lub raty?
[brief] NJDOT Classification is required to perform the work in questions, and the information regarding [...]’s classification was not included elsewhere in its bid.  (1T55-24; 3T31-15)  .................................................................  11  a.  The Local Public Contracts Law is designed to foreclose any activity that may serve as a vehicle for favoritism, improvidence, extravagance or corruption.  ..................  16  b.  The trial court erred when it failed to evaluate responsiveness and materiality as of the date bids were opened.  ...........  18  c.  The trial court erred when it failed to consider potential and possible impacts of the defect and waiver thereof on assurance of performance and competition......................  22 d.  The trial court erred when it reversed the decision of the County and determined that [...]’s failure to provide the NJDOT Notice of Classification with its bid was not a material defect...............................................................  29  III.
[brief] Interestingly, [...] testified that “[o]fficers may go into a television room to do tours, but officers are not supposed to sit in the television room. ” (Pa116a).  [...] also testified that “a lack of diligence will not be tolerated. ” (Pa116a).  Not only is this testimony at complete opposite with [...]’s testimony (i.e. “[he] was not aware of Central Command ever telling an officer to get out of the television room. ”), but it demonstrates that the [...] engages in selective enforcement since [...] is the only one who was disciplined even though [...] admitted that he and [...] sat in the television room that evening.  (1T187.9-18; 1T181.1-4).  [...] presented the testimony of [...].
[brief] [...] V. [...], Docket No. [...], slip op. (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. July 12, 2024)  ...........................................DNJMa1  [...] V. [...], Docket No. [...], slip op.  (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. December 22, 2023)  ..............................................DNJMa28  ###  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES #### CASES | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Adron, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., | | | 292 N.J. Super. 463 (App. Div. 1996) | 16 | | Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Simone, | | | 340 N.J. Super. 19 (App. Div. 2001), aff’d o.b., 170 N.J. 438 (2002) | 17 | | Allstate Ins. Co. v. Malec, | | | 104 N.
[brief] Although outright violations of criminal and civil statutes invariably will constitute practices incompatible with clear mandates of public policy, the outer limits of that phrase has long been understood as follows:  Public policy has been defined as that principal of law which holds that no person can lawfully do that which *has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good*.  The term admits of no exact definition….  Public policy is not concerned with minutiae, but with principles.  *Schaffer v. Federal Trust Co.*, 132 N.J. Eq. 235, 240-41, 28 A.2d 75  See also Mehlman, 153 N.J. at 187.  The “clear mandate” of public policy that Pierce requires [,]" is “a matter of weighing competing interests."  Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 129 N.J. 81, 99 (1992).  "[T]he mandate of public policy [must] be clearly identified and firmly grounded[,]” MacDougall, 144 N.J. at 391, 677 A.2d 162, and "must be one that on balance is beneficial to the public."
[brief] ”  Ibid.  In a subsection of the Arbitration Agreement entitled “Rules and Governing Law,” [...]’s terms provide that “[n]otwithstanding any choice of law or other provision in the Terms, the parties agree and acknowledge” that “the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (‘FAA’), will govern” the “interpretation and enforcement and proceedings” pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement, and the parties are “bound by the provisions of the FAA for all purposes, including, but not limited to, interpretation, implementation, enforcement, and administration of this Arbitration Agreement. ” (Pa064).  Within the Arbitration Agreement is a clear delegation provision in which “[t]he parties agree that the arbitrator (‘Arbitrator’), and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any disputes relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of this Arbitration Agreement, including any claim that all or any part of this Arbitration Agreement is void or voidable.
[brief] ” (2T19:2-4).  However, this is a misstatement of the law.  To this end, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that the waiver provisions of the OWBPA that Defendant had a unilateral right to repudiate the entire settlement.  This is, however, not consistent with the law as described above.  Moreover, in doing so the Court relied upon the insertion into the unsigned written Agreement, boilerplate ADEA language into paragraph 11.  This proposed provision, however, not reflected on the record of the memorialized settlement, did not give Defendant a unilateral right to repudiate the entirety of the settlement reached and memorialized on the record.  At most, in reliance on the OWBPA, the Court could have found that there was no valid and enforceable ADEA waiver had that issue been before the Court, which it was not.  Moreover, even had that issue been before the trial court, such a finding does not affect the validity of the entirety of the agreed-upon memorialized settlement, which is determined by entirely separate concepts of contract law, as expressed by the Supreme Court in Oubre or create a right of repudiation of the entire settlement reached and memorialized on the record.
[brief] CASES  Alam v. Ameribuilt Contractors, 474 N.J. Super. 30, 36 (App. Div. 2022)  ..............7  Dental Health Assocs. S. Jersey, P.A. v. RRI Gibbsboro, LLC, 471 N.J. Super. 184, 192 (App. Div. 2022)  ...........................................................................................................6  Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201, 218 (1988) .................. 7, 8, 10, 14  Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 83 N.J.  460 (1980) ......................................................... 7, 9, 10 State in the Int. of S.G., 175 N.J. 132 (2003)  ...............................................................7  State v. Bellucci, 81 N.J. 531 (1980) ........................................................................8, 14 State v. Davis, 366 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 2004)  ....................................................7  OTHER AUTHORITIES  In re Lankenau, Docket No. [...] and Docket No. [...] (2017)  .....8  Opinion No. 128, 91 N.J.L.J. 309 (1968)  .................................................................7
[brief] **COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS**  The following counter statement of facts are offered in response to plaintiff’s statement of facts:  A)  **The October 6, 2021 Accident. **  On this date at approximately 6:59 AM. the [...] was dispatched to [...] on a report of a motor vehicle accident.  On arrival they found [...] unconscious and unresponsive laying on the ground in the parking lot.  Just passed her body was a GMC Arcadia parked in the lane of travel and later identified as having been driven by defendant [...].  (Pa36-48).  Investigation and surveillance video of the incident revealed that the site of the accident was near a T-intersection between a north-south lane of travel and the terminus of an east-west lane of travel.  [...] had parked her car in the north-south row of parking stalls, exited her car and proceeded to walk across the north-south lane of travel to the hospital entrance.  At the same time, Ms. Dember was driving her car in the east-west travel lane towards the T-intersection with the north-south travel lane.  At the intersection, without either stopping or checking for oncoming traffic, Ms. Dember made a sharp left turn into the southbound lane of oncoming travel where [...] was walking, striking her.  (Pa36-48).  Video stills from the accident show that the brake lights on Ms. Dember’s vehicle were not activated until after she struck [...].  (Pa416-429).  See also, Da19-Da20, §1.3 - Incident Description.  Further investigation revealed that both [...] and Ms. Dember were employees of [...] assigned to work at [...].  (Pa50-51).  Both were on-site to start their respective work shifts.  (Pa42).  (Pa464:19-465:13).  When interviewed by police, Ms. Dember stated that she usually arrived at work around 7:00 AM but if she clocked in later, her employer did not consider her to be late.  Contrary to any assertions otherwise, she did not state that she was running late or in a rush to get to her job.  Equally important, she indicated that she was not distracted and there were not any obstructions to her view.  Specifically, she did not mention to police that her view was obstructed by any parked vehicle at the end of the T-Intersection where she was making her left turn.  [...]:
[brief] * * *  (6) there should be an overall outer limit on the cumulation of consecutive sentences for multiple offenses not to exceed the sum of longest terms . . . that could be imposed for the two most serious offenses.  Yarbough, supra, 100 N.J. at 643-44.  In 1993, the Legislature eliminated the cap on the number of consecutive sentences that could be imposed pursuant to the sixth factor.  *Abdullah*, 184 N.J. at 513.  The standard for review of the sentencing decisions as stated in *Roth* is also applicable to the determination of whether consecutive sentences were proper.
[brief] (3T60-4 to 61-1).  The second level is the “ridge characteristics. ” (3T61-13 to 15).  [...] explained that a person’s “friction ridge skin has lines” and the details in those lines including splits and ends are level two details.  (3T61-15 to 25).  And level-three details are the ridges’ uniqueness, including where the pores are located on the ridge.  (3T62-2 to 9).
[brief] (1T:14-18 to 22; 40-14 to -16; 15-1 to 3).  Meanwhile, in continuing to interact with defendant, [...] continued to detect the smell of alcohol from defendant’s breath.  (2T:45-4 to 45-5).  [...] first administered the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test.  Next, [...] administered the walk and turn test.  (1T: 16-9 to 11).  He asked defendant to walk nine heel to toe paces in a straight line while counting out loud from one until nine before turning around and returning in the same manner.  (1T:16-20 to 22).  However, defendant did not walk heel to toe as instructed.  Instead, he just walked forward without touching heel to toe.  (1T:19-8 to 15).  The next test administered was the one leg stand.  (1T:20-8).  Defendant was instructed to stand with his arms at his side and with the foot of his choosing raised approximately six inches off the ground.  Defendant was further instructed to count out loud until he was told to stop.  (1T:20-9 to 15).  Defendant again did not follow instructions.  Instead, defendant raised his knee and his leg went backwards.  (1T:20-19 to 21).  Defendant put his foot down multiple times and switched legs.  As a result, he was unable to complete the test.  (1T:20-21 to 22).  Defendant was then told to recite alphabet from the letter C all the way to the letter W without singing.  (1T:21-3 to 6).  However, defendant got confused and said “C, D, E, F, G, A, B, C, D, E, F, D.” (2T:44-22 to 23).  Based on defendant’s performance, [...] determined that defendant was under the influence, placed him under arrest for DWI, and seated him in the rear seat of the police vehicle.
[brief] (3T 36-5 to 39-21)  \(^9\)  After [...]’s testimony, the court attempted to provide a similar instruction but confusingly told the jury that the robbery “does not have any [] reference to your deliberations in this particular case. ”  (3T 137-25 to 138-4) that when a limiting instruction informs the jury only about the impermissible use of the other-crimes evidence, the limiting instruction is insufficient.  See, e.g., Hernandez, 170 N.J. at 133 (holding that “[a]lthough the court did caution the jury against considering the testimony as evidence of defendant’s propensity to commit the charged crimes,” the court “did not explain specifically its permissible use in connection with the facts of this case,” requiring plain error reversal of defendant’s conviction); G.S., 145 N.J. at 462, 469-72 (agreeing with the Appellate Division that the trial court’s limiting instruction was insufficient because, although it informed the jury that “such evidence may not be considered as demonstrating that defendant had a predisposition to commit the offenses charged,” it “failed to indicate the specific purposes for which the other-crime evidence could be considered”); State v. Oliver, 133 N.J. 141, 156-60 (1993) (finding reversal appropriate where the trial court instructed the jury only on the impermissible use of the other-crimes evidence); State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 339-42 (1992) (same).
[brief] ”  In its analysis of the arguments and law, the trial court concluded that reconsideration must be granted.  “Under Lawson only sound discretion and the interest of justice guides the trial court…Here the Court did not consider the City’s affirmative defense to vicarious liability in its written opinion.  Thus, the Court finds that denial of the City’s motion…was improper. ”  Pa 280.  The trial court then supplemented its analysis.  Though the trial court affirmed its finding that an issue of fact existed related to the incident itself, the trial court pointed out:  [I]n cases where no tangible employment actions have been taken against the Plaintiff, the employer has an affirmative defense to vicarious liability, requiring proof that (1) the employer exercise reasonable care to prevent and to correct promptly any harassing behavior; and (2) that the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to otherwise avoid harm.
[brief] ”); Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 187 (2d Cir. 2009); B-21 Wines, Inc. v. Bauer, 36 F.4th 214, 218 (4th Cir. 2022) (“The basic framework of the three-tier system has been in place for the better part of a century. ”).  Under New Jersey’s “three-tier alcoholic beverage distribution system,” suppliers/brewers sell alcohol to wholesalers, then wholesalers sell to retailers, who then sell to consumers.  N.J.S.A. 33:1-3.1(b)(8); see also R&R Mktg., L.L.C. v. Jim Bean Brands Co., 383 N.J. Super. 323, 326-27 (App. Div. 2006).  The system is heavily regulated.  It requires wholesalers to obtain licenses from the State and is intended to, among other things, prevent vertical integration and the tied-house problem.  See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 33:1-43 (preventing a licensee in one tier from holding a license in another tier or possessing a financial interest in a business licensed in another tier).  In short, “[t]he distribution and sale of malt alcoholic beverages in this State vitally affects the general economy and revenues of the State, as well as the public interest and public welfare[,]” and the State has a direct interest in its regulation of this system.  See N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.13(a).  B.
[brief] Where Plaintiff has established a *prima facie* breach of contract, misrepresentation, and fraudulent inducement case against Defendant [...], supported by the evidence and testimony of witnesses, the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to Defendant.  The trial court improperly asserted itself as the factfinder in this matter, where the case should have been presented to the jury.  Moreover, Defendant’s Cross-Appeal to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on Statute of Limitations grounds must be denied, as the trial court explicitly acknowledged that there was a factual issue as to the statute of limitations argument.  For the reasons set forth above, it is requested that this Court reverse the trial court, and permit Plaintiff to present his case to the jury.  Respectfully Submitted, /s/[...] [...]
[brief] The judge stated the dismissal was “for exactly the same reasons [as the Absecon dismissal]” (3T-3-21-24, July) & “Then there was a corresponding motion filed by other State defendants for the exact same reasons that the Court also granted. ” (4T-3-24 to 4-1, Oct), suggesting the brief in the file was considered.  This Court should just analyze the State issues already in the record and ignore the refusal to relieve the Plaintiff from the State’s error(s).  Per the main brief, there will never be better circumstances to excuse the technical failure to file a brief at a specific time.  The State made the initial (huge) mistake, our looking to the plain language of the Motion is reasonable AND the relevant opposition brief was already in the Court’s file.  V.
[brief] [...] responded that he wanted to do it at that time, and not wait.  (5T49:21 to 51:9).  [...] continued to put forth proposals for consideration in the following months.  (Da979; Da980).  In analyzing these proposals, [...] relied on the financial information and property valuations that [...] provided and did not perform any independent investigation.  [...] only later came to learn that many of [...]’s figures were incorrect.  For example, [...] only learned during this lawsuit that the $2.4 million in [...] cash-on-hand that [...] represented in one proposal was closer to $3.4 million.  (5T66:12 to 67:2).4  On about June 25, 2014, [...] provided to [...] two documents, in evidence at trial as P-48 and P-50.5 (5T67:15-22; Da981-82; Da1497-1500).