ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 19 [...] & [...], Current N.J. Court Rules (Gann 2024) .....................................  12, 16 R. 2:5-1(e)(3)(i) ............................................................................................................  12 R. 4:50-1(d) .................................................................................................................. 5, 15 R. 4:50-1(f) .................................................................................................................. 5, 11, 15 R. 4:64-7(b) ..................................................................................................................
[brief] The mail vendor is a person and, to the extent Defendant seeks to argue otherwise, those arguments must be rejected based on the R. 4:6-2(e) standard which requires accepting the Complaint’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences favorable to Plaintiff.  In addition, it cannot be disputed that Defendant communicated with its mail vendor.  The FDCPA defines “communication” as “the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).  It is undisputed that Defendant conveyed information about Plaintiff and the alleged debt to its mail vendor.  Finally, Defendant’s conveyance of the debt information to its mail vendor was “in connection with the collection of any debt. ”  The federal courts look to the purpose and context of a communication to determine if it is “in connection with the collection of any debt. ”  In Hunstein I, “the sole question before us is whether [...]’s communication with [...] was ‘in connection with the collection of any debt,’ such that it violates §1692c(b). ”  Hunstein I, 994 F.3d at 1349.  The court noted that, like Defendant’s conveyance of information about Plaintiff’s debt, the debt collector’s transmitted Hunstein’s status as a debtor, the amount of the debt, the identity of the creditor, and the fact that the debt arose from medical treatment.
[brief] At the same time, the court acknowledged that “no municipality in its right mind will allow a residential development to go in without an affordable housing component” (id. at 58:14-16).  The trial court thereafter entered an Order on Return Date of OTSC, granting a preliminary injunction limiting [...] from taking any further action or effort towards the condemnation of the Property, and taking any further action or effort towards designating a redeveloper for the Property pursuant to the LHRL (see Da9-Da11).  The court specifically required such restraints to remain in place until the later of either the court’s determination of whether plaintiff was entitled to a builder’s remedy, or the court’s determination of whether plaintiff was entitled to an order permanently enjoining defendants from condemning the Property.  [...] moved for reconsideration.
[brief] But “[i]t is only the undetectable injuries at and after exposure and prior to initial manifestation that are progressive and indivisible” that trigger successive commercial general liability policies.  *Polarome Int’l, Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co.*, 404 N.J. Super. 241, 268 (App. Div. 2008).  The initial manifestation of a toxic tort injury is the “last pull of the trigger” because that is when “the issue of scientific uncertainties” over when the injury first occurs are laid to rest and “subsequent CGL policies are not triggered.
[brief] (PSR 12)  The corroborative value of this information was therefore minimal.  Substantial corroboration was necessary in this case because the informant failed to provide any details about when he delivered drugs to the storage unit.  In Novembrino, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that, although the warrant affidavit established the informant’s veracity and basis of knowledge, it “furnishe[d] no information whatsoever as to when the informant allegedly ‘witnessed’ the drug sales” that he told police about.  105 N.J. at 123-24.  In light of this “critical deficiency” in the affidavit, the tip failed to provide probable cause that a present search of the location of the alleged drug sales would yield evidence of criminal activity.
[directive] Supplemental Plea Form for No Early Release Act (NERA) Cases (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2)(on or After June 29, 2001)  English-Korean Version  고지: 이 양식은 공개되는 문서이므로, 요청이 있으면 제출된 상태로 대중에게 제공됩니다.  그러므로, 이 문서에 소셜 시큐리티 번호, 운전면허증 번호, 차량 번호판 번호, 보험증권 번호, 사용 중인 금융계좌 번호, 또는 사용 중인 신용카드  번호 등 개인의 신원을 확인할 수 있는 정보를 기재하지 마십시오.  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  법원에 제출하는 고소장, 신청 및 모든 서류들은 영어로 작성해야 합니다.  Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English  뉴저지 주 사법부  New Jersey Judiciary  조기석방 금지법 (NERA)
[brief] **STANDARD OF REVIEW**  Although [...] respects the Trial Court’s factual findings, it disagrees with the Court’s legal determination that [...] did not suffer damages caused by the TPDs’ breach of their fiduciary duty.  On appeal, the Court is asked to make a “de novo” review of the Trial Court’s legal determination of the “appropriate measure of damages”.  See Manalapan Realty v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
[brief] “2T” refers to the transcript of the trial on April 15, 2025.  numbers, or add them up himself to determine whether everything was accurate, but relied solely on the representations from [...], a staff member in the office.  1T59:4-60:11.  [...] testified that around the same time, she noticed that on one of the election return tapes there was a write-in vote for “Cirz. ”  1T82:3-10; Pa101.  As a result, she called the County Board of Elections to ask about how to handle such a vote and was told “no, it voids them out. ”  1T82:14-18.  [...] testified the despite the information from the Board of Elections that the votes were void, she believed that they should be counted anyway.  1T83:4-7.  Incredulous, [...], a finance clerk, testified that she made the unilateral decision to count the ballot without speaking with anyone at all, such as the Board Attorney, the Business Administrator (her boss), or any of the commissioners.
[brief] 253 N.J. at 151-54.  However, the Court _____________________  4  Further, while the State acknowledges that unpublished opinions cannot “constitute precedent or be binding on any court,” R. 1:36-3, recent New Jersey cases addressing ACE-V and latent-print analysis in the context of reliability challenges found them sufficiently reliable.  See State v. McKoy, No. A-2553-19 (App. Div. Nov. 28, 2022); State v. Monell, No. A-4419-18 (App. Div. Nov. 15, 2021); State v. Davis, No. A-4176-17 (App. Div. July 15, 2020).  (Pa7-85).  The State is not aware of any contrary unpublished authority.  See R. 1:36-3. explained that any evidence previously validated under the former Frye “general acceptance in [a] particular field” test remains admissible and reliable unless “the scientific reliability underlying the evidence has changed.
[brief] In this case, there was no refusal to produce the records in issue.  As set forth herein, all retrievable records in the possession of the Defendants were timely produced after a diligent search was undertaken by the Custodian.  It is unclear what more Plaintiffs reasonably want from the Defendants.  The Records Custodian has certified that all retrievable records in the possession of the Defendants and their outside counsel have been provided to Plaintiffs.  [...] cannot provide a document that nobody has.  Moreover, the Certifications provided in connection with this matter contain the same information as the certification as set forth in the *Paff v. N.J. Dept. of Labor*, 392 N.J. Super.  334, 341 (App. Div. 2007).  Plaintiffs are fully aware of the search undertaken for the records, which records were located, and which parts of the records were deemed confidential.  For these reasons, the trial court Orders denying relief under *R. 1:10-3* and *N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11* should be affirmed.
[brief] ”)  It should also be noted that the Roads are the sole means of access to five residential, retail, commercial, and church properties that are traversed by thousands of cars of each week.  (Da61 at ¶ 16.)  If the Borough’s position that the Roads are private were to be accepted by the Court, it would leave [...] in a state of purgatory: i.e., it would own the Roads but no other land, yet the Roads would not be part of any lot or block and therefore not possible to sell or otherwise convey.  [...] would be forced to assume ownership of the Roads, which do not exist as part of any block and lot, despite spending the last eighteen years under the assumption that it did not own them.  It would also force [...] to have to maintain and insure streets that it does not use but are used by thousands of third parties each week, and in order to recoup such maintenance and insurance expenses [...] would have to assume the status of a toll-road owner and enter into easement and maintenance agreements with the unrelated owners of the lots abutting the Roads.  Accordingly, the Borough should be estopped from denying that the Roads are public streets.
[brief] (Pa93)  The Institute focuses on advocacy of social justice, including conservation and animal welfare as its principal mission.  Id.  [...] testified in the public hearings in opposition to the adoption of the Comprehensive Black Bear Management Policy ("CBBMP") by the [...] ("Council") and the regulatory code and amendments at public hearings conducted by the Council.  Id.  Defendant Council is an agency within the [...] in the Defendant [...] ("[...]").
[directive] Premye Degre Tèm Libète Kondisyonèl sou Sipèvizyon - 5 lane  Dezyèm Degre Tèm Libète Kondisyonèl sou Sipèvizyon - 3 lane  Fòm Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11171-Haitian Creole paj  1 nan 2  Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11171- Haitian Creole page 1 of 2  Do you understand that because you have pled guilty to these charges the court must impose a year term of parole supervision and that term will begin as soon as you complete the sentence of incarceration?
[brief] (1T 72-12 to 17, 74-23 to 75-6)  [...] heard [...] “relay[ ] that he believe[d] he witnessed a narcotics transaction, a suspicious activity in the Shop Rite lot,” so [...] drove to that parking lot.  (1T 76-1 to 5)  [...] testified that [...] had given “a detailed description of the vehicle,” so he was able to find the vehicle in the parking lot.  (1T 76-6 to 10)  [...] and another SET detective “set up a station surveillance on the vehicle,” where they waited for “several minutes but less than an hour. ”  (1T 76-12 to 13, 82-13 to 16)  [...] testified that he saw [...] returning to his vehicle with a woman, and that they were pushing a shopping cart with groceries.  (1T 80-4 to 16)
[brief] ”  47 N.J.R. 850(a), 861 (May 4, 2015).  As early as 1997, [...] explained, Early detection will also prevent other health and physical hazards, such as the spread of vapors created by the release from a gasoline underground storage tank system.  Vapors can form an explosive mixture if allowed to accumulate in an enclosed area.  In addition, long term inhalation of low levels of hazardous substance vapors can become a chronic health condition.  29 N.J.R. 1593(a) (May 5, 1997).  Until the Property is remediated, it will pose a detriment to the community.
[brief] [...] did not explicitly address the issue in her opinion, but she implicitly accepted the argument since she could not otherwise have ruled in [...]’s favor.  We concede that [...]’s former counsel did not explore the stranger-to-the-deed rule in the depth we have in our brief before this Court, but the trial court was --- 2  Even so, the appellate panel in Abel considered the issue anyway because it was a matter of public importance.  sufficiently “put on notice as to the substance of the issue,” *Nelson, supra*, 529 U.S. at 469, for [...] to raise it on this appeal.  Even if this Court were to find that the issue was not sufficiently raised below, it is still worthy of consideration under the plain error rule.  The status of the stranger-to-the-deed rule is an important, unresolved issue affecting New Jersey real property law, and [...]’s implicit acceptance of [...]’s position was clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  *See R. 2:10-2; Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co.*, 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973).  Surely [...] can claim no prejudice as it raised the issue itself before the trial court, the question has now been fully briefed by the parties and the matter is now ripe for appellate review.
[brief] Nor is such a disparity consistent with the goal of sentencing uniformity.  State . Case, 220 N.J. 49, 63 (2014).  No court in this case has ruled on the issue of this great disparity.  The sentencing remand was limited to the issue of consecutive terms.  Though new sentencing counsel argued disparity, the sentencing judge - the same one who initially sentenced petitioner to 98 years with 66.4 years parole ineligibility- did not address the issue - as the re-sentence resulted in a minimal reduction of the parole ineligibility term to 57.9 years, a term still more than 50 years greater than the other participants.
[brief] [...] - OFFICE OF CORPORATION  COUNSEL  [...], Esq. (070052013)  [...] [...], [...]  Tel: [...] Ext. 1200 Fax: [...] [...]  On the brief:  [...], Esq.  Date of Submission to the Court: September 8, 2023  Date Submitted as Amended: October 4, 2023  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] An appellate court reviews the Trial Court's grant of summary judgment de novo under the same standard as the trial court.  Memorial Props., LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 210 N.J. 512, 524 (2012).  That standard mandates that summary judgment be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  R. 4:46-2(c).  A reviewing court must “presume the validity and reasonableness of a municipal ordinance. ”  First Peoples Bank v. Medford, 126 N.J. 413, 418 (1991).  A party challenging a municipal enactment bears a heavy burden in proving the ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable.  Id.  The presumption of validity may only be overcome “by proofs that preclude the possibility that there could have been any set of facts known to the legislative body or which could reasonably be assumed to have been known which would rationally support a conclusion that the enactment is in the public interest. ”  Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of W. Orange, 68 N.J. 543, 565 (1975), emphasis added.  When an ordinance is challenged, the reviewing Court’s role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence for and against the ordinance nor review the wisdom of any determination of policy which the legislative body might have made.  Id.  The Court must sustain an ordinance if it is supported by any rational basis.  First Peoples Bank, 126 N.J. at 418-19, emphasis added.  The presumption of validity applies equally to a governing body’s enactment of a redevelopment plan.  Downtown Residents for Sane Dev. v. City of Hoboken, 242 N.J. Super. 329, 332 (App. Div. 1990).  To provide a basis to set aside a questioned redevelopment plan, a challenger must establish the governing body’s legislative decisions are more than merely debatable, they must be shown to be arbitrary or capricious, contrary to law, or unconstitutional.  *Id.*  Here, Appellant fails woefully to meet that standard as the [...]’s rationale for proceeding with the adoption of the Redevelopment Plan was supported by over a year of public debate and discourse and the production of numerous studies and reports that evaluated all aspects of the proposed redevelopment of the Property for a warehouse use.  Pa319-436; pa349-54; see also https://www.chesterfieldtwpnj.gov/oycc-redevelopment; and https://www.chesterfieldtwpnj.gov/oyccdocuments.]  While the Appellant has made clear that it disagrees with the [...]’s legislative decision to move forward with the Redevelopment Plan, for Appellants to ignore the substantial factual record that underlaid that [...] decision is disingenuous.  New Jersey law requires a court to determine whether there is “any set of facts known to the legislative body or which could reasonably be assumed to have been known which would rationally support a conclusion that the enactment is in the public interest.
[brief] During the period of her employment, plaintiff, [...], [...] and [...] were paid compensation as follows, including payments made for plaintiff’s benefit in 2014 and 2015:  | | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | |----------------|--------|------------|------------|------------| | Carl [...] | 0 | $12,970.27 | $21,379.34 | $67,718.64 | | [...]| $3,000 | $19,786.34 | $82,160.28 | $63,760.06 | | Ray [...] | 0 | $36,284.03 | $54,900 | $66,500 | | Julian [...] | 0 | 0 | $30,000 | $65,000 | Da82; 3T14:13-15:23, 17:4-6, 43:6-44:10.
[brief] The grading did not meet the requirement of the Board of Adjustment mandate.  When discovered, the township immediately stopped all work and would not issue occupancy permits to any of the buildings.  Respondents’ negligence was clear.  Its obligations to Appellants were breached.  The Court below was clearly in error when it failed to acknowledge the Appellants’ right to show the municipality’s action was available to the Appellants as proof of breaching the contract.
[brief] Most importantly, a “free and voluntary” statement may not be “extracted by threats. ”  L.H., 239 N.J. at 44-45; Diaz, 470 N.J. Super. at 516 (“[E]vidence that the accused was threatened . . . will render the waiver involuntary. ”); e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286-88 (1991) (statement coerced where defendant was promised protection from “rough treatment” by other inmates because it was “a credible threat of physical violence”).
[brief] In the end, because the Note and Mortgage are clear as to the lender’s duty to accept and apply all payments, summary judgment was and is appropriate as a matter of law.  Appellant erroneously argues that the Borrowers’ sale of the Mortgaged Premises to [...] required its predecessor to accelerate the Loan and to reject partial payment, notwithstanding the requirement under paragraphs one (1) and three (3) of the Mortgage.  This argument is entirely without merit since Appellant’s predecessor’s duties and obligations remained the same.  Appellant’s obligation to accept and credit all payments received was not conditioned on the status of the Loan, the ownership of the Mortgaged Premises, and/or whether the payment was deemed a prepayment or otherwise.  In the case at bar, the Trial Court correctly concluded that Appellant’s predecessor and [...] were (a) required to accept and credit the First Wire Transfer to the balance of the Loan; and (b) breached the terms of the Note and Mortgage when it failed to do so and decided, instead, to wire an amount equal to the sum of the First Wire Transfer to [...] via the Second Wire Transfer.
[brief] Moreover, [...] did not know who generated the call report he was shown and when it was generated.  He did not even know it existed until it was shown to him (Pa889).  In the end, [...] admitted the following:  Q.  My question is, as long as that date [October 4, 2018] fell in the period of three to four years, even if it was a different date than you were shown, you would have adopted that date as the date when you made the call; am I correct?  * * *  A.  The document is being provided by [...] and they’re telling me this is the records we show.  I can’t challenge it without doing research with my own research.  So if they would have shown a date maybe of three years ago and two months I would have believe that.  If they would have shown three years and four months, I would have to believe that.  (Pa889).  J.  The Trial Court’s Decisions.
[brief] ”  Shepherd v. Hunterdon Dev. Ctr., 174 N.J. 1, 24 (N.J. 2002)(citing Lehmann, supra. 132 N.J. at 603-04).  Plaintiff’s counsel misled the jury throughout the course of her summation.  The law is clear that to sustain a hostile work environment claim Plaintiff must establish the complained of conduct was motivated solely by Plaintiff’s religion or disability.  Despite crystal clear instruction from the Courts, Plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly told the jury that all she had to prove was Plaintiff’s religion or disability was one motivating factor in the alleged conduct.  Further, she infers to the jury that innocuous comments constitute unlawful discrimination by repeatedly making confusing and inaccurate statements.
[brief] It is to be conceded that there was evidence as to defendant's appearance, odor and behavior at or shortly after the arrest and as to his prior consumption of beer which might have supported an affirmative finding on the issue of his transgression of the statute.  There were also, however, some indicia of normality of condition.  [Id., 74 N.J.Super. at 531.]  In State v. Johnson, supra, our Supreme Court explained the difficulty of relying on observational evidence in support of a DWI conviction:  The criterion of operating 'under the influence of intoxicating liquor' always presented practical enforcement difficulties, both from the standpoint of the public interest intended to be protected and the accused defendant.  Opinions based on objective-symptom observations and tests, whether lay or medical, were bound to be somewhat inexact in fairly applying such a broad statutory standard.  On the one hand, many guilty defendants escaped conviction because all of the external manifestations of the effects of alcohol are not displayed by every person and, on the other, certain individual pathological conditions may cause a non-intoxicated person to manifest one or more of the symptoms also produced by the use of liquor.
[brief] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | ii | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 2 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 3 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 6 | | POINT I | | | PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT THAT THERE WAS NO MOTION TO PRECLUDE OR BAR THE TESTIMONY OF HIMAD BEG IS WITHOUT MERIT | 6 | | i.  Plaintiff improperly characterizes the opinion set forth by the Court | 6 | | POINT II | | | RESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY IS APPLICABLE IN THE SUBJECT MATTER AS THE CONDITION WAS NOT CREATED BY DEFENDANTS | 16 | | CONCLUSION | 19 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |--------------------------------------------|---------| | Beam v. Kent, | 11, 12 | | 3 N.J. 210 (1949) | | | Buckalew v. Grossbard, | 12 | | 87 N.J. 512 (1981) | | | Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., | 11 | | 89 N.J. 270 (1982) | | | Deberjeois v. Schneider, | 16 | | 254 N.J. Super. 694 (Law Div.), aff’d, | | | 260 N.J. Super. 518 (App Div. 1992) | | | Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., | 7 | | 202 N.J. 369 (2010) | | | Fink v. City of Paterson, | 12 | | 44 N.J. Super. 129 (App. Div. 1957) | | | In re Commitment of R.S., | 13 | | 173 N.J. 136 (1970) | | | Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, | 17 | | 207 N.J. 191 (2011) | | | Pareja v. Princeton Int’l Properties, | 18 | | 246 N.J. 546 (2021) | | | Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Community Corp., | 12 | | 207 N.J. 344 (2011) | | | Rodriguez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., | 7 | | 237 N.J. 35 (2019) | | | Schwartz v. Menas, | 6 | | 251 N.J. 556 (2022) | | | Scully v. Fitzgerald, | 11 | | 179 N.J. 114 (2004) | | | Smith v. Young, | 17 | | 300 N.J. Super. 82 (App. Div. 1997) | | Stanley Co. of America v. Hercules Powder Co., 16 N.J. 295 (1954) .................................................................