ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] I.  Facts relevant to plaintiff’s alleged injuries.  Plaintiff alleges that on or about March 9, 2020, she fell while attempting to step into the jacuzzi tub inside of her guest room at [...], injuring herself.  (Pa11-13, Pa26, Pa83; 1T24-7 to 25-10.)  Below is an image of the tub set forth in plaintiff’s expert report (see Pa62):  ![Image of Bathtub](image)  During her deposition, plaintiff testified that after she filled the bathtub up with water, she lifted her left foot over the tub surround and placed it into the bathtub.  (Pa43-47, Pa27, Pa83; 1T24-22 to 25.)  In order to steady herself as she raised her left foot, she placed her left hand onto the tub surround, and placed her right-hand palm flat against the wall of the bathroom.  (Pa45-47, Pa27, Pa83; 1T25-1 to 10.)  After plaintiff placed her left foot into the tub, her left foot began to slide backwards, causing her to lose balance and fall forward.  (Pa48, Pa27, Pa84; 1T25-1 to 10.)  The bathroom lights were on and plaintiff could see clearly.  (Pa52, Pa28, Pa84; 1T25-17 to 19.)  There were no problems with the bathroom floor.  (Pa41, Pa28, Pa84; 1T25-11 to -21.)  Plaintiff testified that as she was falling forward, she reached out and grabbed onto a towel rack on the right wall above the tub to try to catch herself.  (Pa48, Pa28, Pa84; 1T26-1 to 10.)  Prior to that time, she did not use the towel bar to assist getting into the tub.  (Pa48, Pa28, Pa84; 1T26-1 to 10.)  The towel bar, according to plaintiff, was a distance away from where she was entering the tub; she was not able to reach it from her position entering the tub until she was actively falling forward toward it.  (Pa48, Pa28, Pa84; 1T26-1 to 10.)  At the time, there were two towels folded on the rack, similar to what is reflected in the photograph above.  (Pa50, Pa29, Pa84; 1T26-14 to 16; see Pa62.)  As plaintiff was falling, she grabbed onto the towel rack, which was pulled out of the wall; plaintiff landed on top of it.  (Pa50, Pa29, Pa84; 1T26-15 to 18.)
[brief] Exhibit E: Amended Case Management Order executed by [...], P.J. Ch., filed on April 3, 2020 Exhibit F: Consent Order of Dismissal without Prejudice executed by [...], P.J. Ch., filed on May 21, 2020 Order Reinstating the [...]’s Claims and Scheduling case Management Conference executed by the Honorable [...], P.J. Ch., filed on November 4, 2020 Case Management Order executed by the Honorable [...], P.J. Ch., filed on December 2, 2020 Plaintiff’s Trial Brief Exhibit of [...] Report of [...] with attachments filed with the Court on March 5, 2021 Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibits P-1 1980 Tax Map of the [...] P-2 1980 Tax Map of the [...] – Marked in yellow, property acquired by the [...] in 1939 P-3 1980 Tax Map of the [...] showing portion of Lots 3 & 3.01 originally acquired by Keansburg under Tax Foreclosure P-4 1918 Sheet 3 [...] P-5 1909 Map of Keansburg Heights, Keansburg New Jersey P-6 1910 Map of Keansburg Heights, Keansburg New Jersey P-7 Surviving Next of Kin of [...]; [...] and [...], shareholders of [...] P-8 Heirs of [...] & [...] P-9 Report and Exhibits of [...], CG P-10 Charts of Deeds prepared by [...] A Chart of Deeds of [...], [...] and [...] B Chart of Deeds of [...] C Chart of Deeds of [...] and [...] D Chart of Deeds of [...] and [...] P-11 July 9, 2019, Deed between [...], [...], heir to [...] and [...] filed with the Monmouth County Clerk on July 29, 2019 P-12 May 21, 2019, Deed between [...], [...], heir to [...] and [...] filed with the Monmouth County Clerk on July 29, 2019 P-13 May 17, 2019, Deed between [...], [...], heir to [...] and [...] filed with the Monmouth County Clerk on July 29, 2019 P-14 July 20, 2019, Deed between [...] and [...] filed with the Monmouth County Clerk on July 29, 2019 P-15 July 31, 2019, Deed between [...], and [...], heir of [...] and [...] filed with the Monmouth County Clerk on August 15, 2019 P-16 August 7, 2019, Deed between [...], and [...], heir to [...] and [...] filed with the Monmouth County Clerk on August 15, 2019 P-17 September 5, 2019, Deed between [...] and [...] filed with the Monmouth County Clerk on September 24, 2019 P-18 September 13, 2019, Deed between Keansburg Heights, Co., [...], heir to [...] and [...] filed with the Monmouth County Clerk on September 30, 2019
[brief] 202 N.J. Super. at 254.  On remand from Brick, evidence was produced showing that the Township’s prosecuting attorney knew that he was sending notice to the wrong address, and on subsequent appeal the Appellate Division ruled for the defendants.  Brick v. Block 48-7, Lots 34, 35, 36, [...], 210 N.J. Super. 481, 483, 485 (App. Div. 1986) (Brick II).  See also Sourlis v. Borough of Red Bank, 220 N.J. Super. 434, 439–40 (App. Div. 1987) (even without “actual awareness,” municipality’s constructive knowledge of a change in address entitles a property owner to be mailed notice at the correct address).
[brief] [Pa9-10].  In fact, [...] explicitly testified that an earlier delivery would have changed the outcome:  “You asked me, do I agree that an earlier delivery would not have changed the outcome, and I don't agree that an earlier delivery would not have changed the outcome.  My report opines that an earlier delivery would, in fact, have changed the outcome. ”  [Pa336, Thompson Dep., 50:10-15].  When the questioning continued as if he had just said, rather, that an earlier delivery would not have changed the outcome, [...] repeated:  “I want to make sure \(^2\) The deposition of [...] is located at Pa322-355.  Appellant apologizes for the oversight on pages 44 through 50 of not including the specific appendix page reference when citing to deposition page number and lines.  that, an earlier delivery would have made the outcome better for this child.  That's my opinion in my report.  That's what I'm trying to articulate here. ”  [Pa336, 50:20-23].  And again: “I don’t agree with your statement an earlier delivery wouldn't have changed the outcome.  I believe an earlier delivery would. ”  [Pa336, 50:25 to 51:2].  Respondents’ arguments that [...]’s testimony establishes a lack of proximate causation is flatly without merit.  Similarly, Respondents mischaracterize the deposition testimony of [...].
[directive] Contact Victim of Protection 5.4 facilitate would that information has Office Prosecutor's County the that important is It Enforcement Preliminary Law  The 7.6.3. subsection and 29 note See victim.22 the with contact provided, information, contact victim document feasible, when should, therefore Report Incident contact victim containing field that the so designed shall be form electronic the that however, disclosed be must information such until and unless defendant the with shared not is information of Division the alternative, In the discovery. governing Rules Court with the accordance in victim transmit which to by means other provide to AOC the with work may Justice Criminal victim automated facilitate system, to eCDR through the judiciary the to information contact contact victim so that designed system is such any that provided events, court of notification disclosed be information must such until and unless defendant the with shared not is information discovery.  governing Rules Court the with accordance in Directive. of this issuance upon immediately operational become shall Section This Decisions.
[brief] Access to email communications is key to combatting corruption and waste and apprising the public about government officials’ actions.  OPRA requests for emails exposed that supervisors prohibited staff from wearing masks in the veteran’s nursing homes during the COVID-19 pandemic;⁷ that the [...] sent problematic emails about LGBTQ people;⁸ that a [...] --- ⁷ *After NorthJersey.com Request Over Veterans Homes Mask Issue, NJ Sends Redacted Emails*, The Record, Jan. 25, 2021.
[brief] [...] initiated this action through the filing of a Complaint on or about April 22, 2019.  [...] asserted three causes of action within its Complaint.  The First Count of the Complaint, which was later referred to by the Trial Court as the quiet title count, sought a Declaratory Judgment under N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50 et seq. declaring that the [...] did not own the entirety of the Property and that the [...] therefore cannot evict [...] from the portion of the Property which it leases from the [...] (as defined more fully below, the “Leased Premises”).  The Second Count sought a judgment requiring the [...] to refund the rents that [...] paid to the [...] during the term of its lease of the Leased Premises either to [...] or to the Court to be held in trust for some unidentified third party.  Lastly, the Third Count sought entry of a judgment awarding monetary damages to [...] to compensate it for damages that it purportedly suffered due to the alleged failure of the [...] to own the entirety of Leased Premises.
[brief] Pa045.  This definition clearly describes the Contract upon which [...] bases his argument in the within matter.  In his responses to these Requests for Admissions, [...] denies being in receipt of the Contract, denies that the first sentence of the Contract reads as it objectively does, and that the final sentence of the Contract reads as it objectively does.  Pa046-047.  Reading [...]’s Answer and these discovery responses together, all of which were authored by [...] before he was represented, it is clear that before his current counsel decided to demand arbitration, [...] consistently denied that he had a contract with [...], either because it did not exist or because never signed it.
[brief] The Restricted Use of FCC Regulated Industries Does Not Imply Unrestricted Sharing of Information with Mail Vendors.  The FDCPA restricts but does not ban debt collectors’ use of telephone and telegraph operators.  That does not imply authority to transmit detailed debt information to undisclosed, unregulated third parties.  Khimmat expressly rejected the argument which Defendant asserts here.  “[P]hone and telegraph companies are wire-based, regulated utilities, plainly distinguishable from private letter vendors. ”  Khimmat, 585 F. Supp. 3d at 715.
[brief] A.  The Complaint and the Defendants’ Pre-Answer Motions to Dismiss  Plaintiff filed its Complaint with the Hudson County Superior Court on December 28, 2022, stating claims sounding in contract and tort as against both [...] and [...].  (Pa1, Complaint).  On April 3, 2023, [...] filed a pre-answer Motion to Dismiss Complaint, pursuant to N.J. Ct. R. 4:6-2(e), arguing that Plaintiff failed to state a claim.  (Pa27-147).  On April 20, 2023, [...] filed its own Rule 4:6-2(e) Motion to Dismiss.  (Pa201-337).  Plaintiff opposed both motions.  (Pa148-187, Pa338-348).  B.
[brief] Standard of review.  Rule 4:46-2(c) provides that a motion for summary judgment must be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. ”  The court must “consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  The Appellate Division reviews a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard used below.  Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022); Stewart v. N.J. Tpk. Auth./Garden State Parkway, 249 N.J. 642, 655 (2022); Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021).
[brief] [...] does not read, speak, or understand English.  Pa431.  [...] is aware of this since its user has the applications set in Spanish and is taking advantage of [...]’s lack of English literacy and sophistication.  Pa431; Pa600.  [...] will tout it is not a “rideshare” company but a technology company.  Pa 598.  Accordingly, this billion-dollar “technology company” has the capability of knowing when its users utilize the application in a language other than English.  Even more egregious, [...] has argued that [...] could have gone on her web browser to translate the Terms and Conditions with the Arbitration Agreement into Spanish.
[brief] Furthermore, the Trust terms granted [...] and [...] the power to purchase [...]’s share of the Boonton Property at fair market value.  Additionally, [...] was granted the power to purchase [...] and [...]’s shares of the Florida Property at fair market value.  On June 10, 2022, the Trial Court issued an Order delineating procedures for the disposition of Boonton and Florida Properties.  [...], in her capacity as Trustee, sold the Florida Property to herself for $360,000 and the Boonton Property to [...] for $601,000.
[brief] Defendants violated the Contracts Clause of the New Jersey Constitution by depriving Plaintiffs of their previously vested property rights.  (1029a-1031a); (1T13:3-21; 1T14:7-15:2; 1T20:6-22; 1T21:3-15; 1T22:1-24; 1T22:25-23:10)………………………………………35  C.  Defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause of the New Jersey Constitution by depriving Plaintiffs of their previously vested property rights, allowing pre-November 9, 2016 retirees to receive uncapped benefits, and awarding other post-November 9, 2016 retirees deferred compensation well in excess of the $15,000 cap.  (1029a-1031a); (1T13:3-21; 1T14:7-15:2; 1T20:6-22; 1T21:3-15; 1T22:1-24; 1T22:25-23:10)………………………………………………………………………………42  D.  Defendants have violated Plaintiffs’ rights to Substantive and Procedural Due Process under the New Jersey Constitution by depriving Plaintiffs of their previously vested property rights.  (1029a-1031a); (1T13:3-21; 1T14:7-15:2; 1T20:6-22; 1T21:3-15; 1T22:1-24; 1T22:25-23:10)………………………………………………………………………………44  III.
[directive] Advice and charging approvals provided by an on-call Assistant Prosecutor may occur in person or by means of telephonic or electronic communication.  The County Prosecutor shall make contact information and procedures available to all agencies operating within the Prosecutor’s jurisdiction.  A County Prosecutor may issue a directive that requires a designated Assistant Prosecutor to approve all juvenile complaints in eCDR, before they are submitted to the court.  In cases requiring Assistant Prosecutor approval, the law enforcement officer must submit a draft juvenile complaint through eCDR to seek authorization to issue the summons or request a warrant.  At that time, the County Prosecutor, or designee, can also recommend diverting the complaint to a stationhouse adjustment.  A County Prosecutor may also issue a directive authorizing all police agencies operating within the Prosecutor’s jurisdiction to issue a juvenile complaint provided it has been approved by a supervisory officer who possesses designated authority (Designated Supervisory Officer).  The County Prosecutor may impose such conditions or limits on the charging and approval authority granted to Designated Supervisory Officers (e.g., authority to issue juvenile complaint for fourth-degree crimes and petty or disorderly persons offenses without prosecutorial approval; authority to charge without prosecutorial approval only in specified types of cases, etc.).  The County Prosecutor may also request that a Designated Supervisory Officer, at the time of the charging decision, notify the County Prosecutor’s Office, if the supervisory officer has reason to believe that the juvenile should be detained.  Any such directive shall specify whether and in what circumstances, if any, authority is granted to a Designated Supervisory Officer to approve the issuance of a complaint- summons when application for a complaint-warrant is presumed, and whether and in what circumstances, if any, authority is granted to a Designated Supervisory Officer to seek application for a complaint-warrant when issuance of a complaint-summons is presumed.  The authority to overcome a presumption shall be granted to Designated Supervisory Officers only if the County Prosecutor determines, based on available resources, that such delegation of prosecutorial authority is necessary to prevent the Prosecutor’s Office from being overburdened by charging consultations, and the Prosecutor shall remain responsible for ensuring that such delegated authority is exercised properly.  County Prosecutors are strongly encouraged to require pre-charging consultation to the greatest extent practicable consistent with existing resources.
[brief] First, there must be a clear and definite promise.  Second, there must be an expectation that the promise will rely upon it.  Third there must be reasonable reliance and there must be a definite and substantial detriment.  *Toll Brothers, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington*, 194 N.J. 223, 253 (2008).  Again, Plaintiff buried her pool and allowed her landscaping to be destroyed because she trusted the Township and relied upon the Township’s promise that it would restore the Property and repair her driveway.  Furthermore, at the time the Township promised to restore the Property, the Township must have expected that the Plaintiff would rely upon it.  Moreover, Plaintiff relied on the promise to her detriment because the Property was destroyed.  As such, even if the Court were to find that no contract existed, Plaintiff would still be entitled to damages under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.  **POINT IV**
[brief] Indeed, Plaintiff testified that Defendant [...] approved the charge pay – disputing the central tenet in Respondents’ justification for Appellant’s termination.  Specifically, Plaintiff testified as follows:  So I said why can we not at least get charge pay, which is one dollar an hour.  And she said, in front of several people, you can get charge pay, as long as I don’t get in trouble.  (Pa231).  Defendants (knowing they must discredit this evidence) claim that this testimony is contradicted by Defendant [...] as memorialized interview notes.  (Rb32-33.)  That is not true.  The notes from [...]’ interview with Defendant [...] read:  [...] asked [...] if they could get charge pay.  [...] saw another Coordinator was getting charge pay ([...] in Cath Lab).  [...] said, "yeah, we can try it if I don’t get in trouble. ”  It was not a sit-down conversation.  [...] assumed [...] was not in trouble because she did not say anything.  So, [...] thought they were ok.  (Pa548.)  These notes are consistent with Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant [...], according to her, approved the charge pay.  Defendants’ version of events collapses if Defendant [...] was aware of the charge pay.  Defendants assert that Defendant [...] promptly reported the charge pay to HR after learning about it from another employee (Rb38-39).  However, if Defendant [...] had prior knowledge of, or explicitly approved, the charge pay, this purported "discovery" is a charade.  The charge pay issue was elevated to HR by Defendant [...] shortly after the June incident and while complaints about her behavior were pending.  The timing of the elevation, after she learned of the pending investigation into her harassment, becomes a pretext – a calculated move by Defendant [...] to deflect attention from her own misconduct and to derail further investigation into her harassment.  In that scenario, Plaintiff’s disclosure of the events becomes a potential motivating factor for termination.  See Donofry v. Autotote, 350 N.J. Super. 276 (App. Div. 2001) ("Plaintiff’s ultimate burden of proof is to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his protected whistleblowing activity was a determinative or substantial, motivating factor in defendant’s decision to terminate his employment.  . . .")  The trial court erred by discounting this evidence and resolving factual disputes in Respondents’ favor, contrary to the Brill standard.  See generally Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995).  Whether Defendant [...] approved or knowingly tolerated the charge pay is a dispute that must be resolved by a jury.  There is a version of events supported by record evidence that suggests that Defendant [...] used the charge pay matter to divert scrutiny and undermine those who had witnessed and disclosed her unlawful conduct.  A reasonable factfinder could conclude that the investigation was pretextual and intended to silence Plaintiff’s whistleblowing activity.  C.
[brief] [...] sees a police officer while driving and advises him of the situation.  (5T103-3 to 25).  When she returned she had also brought the police officer.  (5T38-3 to 5).  [...] was interviewed by the police and she advised them that the defendant had the butcher knife.  (5T38-16 to 18).  The police were unable to locate the knife.  (5T39-3 to 4).  They advised the defendant that he should leave the residence.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  [...] et al., : [...]  d/b/a : [...], : And Reasonable Lock & Safe : Co., Inc., : Plaintiffs-Appellants : Vs. [...], Newark Mayor Ras J. : Baraka, City of Newark City Council, Newark City Clerk : [...], Newark Corporation Counsel, Kenyatta K. : Stewart, Esq., Newark Business Administrator  Eric S. : Pennington, Esq, Newark Director of Economic and : Housing Development  [...], Newark Director of : Finance [...], Newark Division of Tax Abatement: and Special Taxes Manager  [...] CTC, Newark : Tax Accessor, [...]  [...], : Essex County Executive [...], The : Essex County Board of Chosen Freeholders, Attorney : General Of New Jersey [...], The New Jersey : Housing Mortgage Finance Agency, The New Jersey CTC, : Newark Tax Accessor, [...]  The County of : Essex, Essex County Executive [...] : [...], Attorney : General Of New Jersey  [...], The New Jersey : Housing Mortgage Finance Agency, The New Jersey : Division of Local Government Services and the New Jersey: Office of Local Planning Services, Defendants-Respondents
[brief] If it was set back 200 to 300 feet from the road then I would feel -- then it would be harder to deny this application.  I also feel that [...] brought up a point, which was on my mind but I never addressed, that she has her farm there.  There are grapes literally across the street.  And, who knows what the fumes and output could do to that farmland.  She is 100 percent right.  This is a historic area and I just don't see having that station located in that location going to benefit the whole of people in [...].  As far as visual, as far as safety, and what else, oh, also, I feel that [...] hasn't convinced me that it is necessary.  We have an existing system that's been working fine.  I have not heard -- I haven't felt that I heard enough to tell me that system would fail and cause the possible outage that was discussed today and it's been working fine up to now and I don't see why we need to do something in that location.  CERTIFICATE
[brief] Pa10.  The Court entered Final Judgment by Consent on February 7, 2023, preserving the parties right to appeal certain issues as set for the Final Judgement.  Pa 12.  Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal to this Court on March 23, 2023 and an Amended Notice of Appeal on March 27, 2023.  Defendants [...] and [...] filed a Cross Notice of Appeal on April 5, 2023.  Defendants [...] and [...] filed a Cross Notice of Appeal on April 6, 2023.
[brief] Respondent’s Reliance on Inapposite Cases Does Not Support the Agency’s Findings and Decision  “Whether there is an ethical violation is a case-by-case question, but the inquiry is whether ‘the circumstances could reasonably be interpreted to show that they had the likely capacity to tempt the official to depart from his sworn public duty. ’  An actual conflict of interest is not the decisive factor, nor is ‘whether the public servant succumbs to the temptation,’ but rather whether there is a potential for conflict.”  Friends Retirement Concepts v. Bd. of Educ. Borough of Somerville, 356 N.J. Super. 203, 214-15 (Law Div. 2002).