ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ## Cases | Case | Page Nos. | |-------------------------------------------|-----------| | Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) | 15 | | State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1 (1997) | 11, 13, 14| | State v. Battle, 256 N.J. Super. 268 (App. Div. 1992) | 17, 18 | | State v. Chippero, 164 N.J. 342 (2000) | 20 | | State v. Chisum, 236 N.J. 530 (2019) | 11 | | State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322 (2014) | 11 | | State v. Crawley, 187 N.J. 440 (2006) | 12, 22 | | State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586 (2004) | 11 | | State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384 (2022) | 13 | | State v. Herrerra, 211 N.J. 308 (2012) | 17, 18 | | State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509 (2022) | 20 | | State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13 (2004) | 14 | | State v. Rivera, 276 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 1994) | 13, 20 | | State v. Seymour, 289 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 1996) | 17, 18 | | State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398 (2012) | 11, 14, 19, 20, 21, 22 | | State v. Shaw, 237 N.J. 588 (2019) | 11 | | State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346 (2002) | 12 | | State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673 (1988) | 11 | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D) | Cases (Cont'd) | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | **State v. Tucker**, 136 N.J. 158 (1994) | 14, 23 | | **State v. Williams (Williams I)**, 192 N.J. 1 (2007) | 15, 16, 17, 18, 21 | | **State v. Williams (Williams II)**, 410 N.J. Super. 549 | | | (App. Div. 2009) | 12, 16, 17, 18 | | **State v. Williams**, 201 N.J. 440 (2010) | 12 | | **State v. Worlock**, 117 N.J. 596 (1990) | 16 | | **United States v. Hensley**, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) | 22 | | **Wong Sun v. United States**, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) | 10, 14, 23 | | **Ybarra v. Illinois**, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) | 13 | ### Statutes | Statute | PAGE NOS. | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2a(2) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(3) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1a | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1a | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b(1) | 3 | | N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b(1) | 4 | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT’D) | |-------------------------------| | **Constitutional Provisions** | | N.J. Const. art. 1, para. 7 ................................................................. 11 | | U.S. Const. amends.
[brief] Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex  Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Re: State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...] (Defendant-Appellant)  Docket No. [...]  Criminal Action: On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction, entered in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a Jury  Honorable Judges:  Pursuant to Rule 2:6-2(b) this letter brief is submitted on behalf of the State.
[brief] (Pa1)  While not an issue that was argued below, Appellant includes it in her current argue and therefore Respondent responds.  Federal courts presented with the question made it clear that “[d]eclaratory and injunctive relief are not independent causes of action. ”  See ASAH, The Children's Inst. v. N.J. Dep't of Educ., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101736, at *35-36 (D.N.J. 2017) (collecting cases).  Absent either a private right of action pursuant to a statute or a finding of a violation of a statute there can be no application of the UDJL.  "[C]ourts in this district have held that there is no private right of action for violation of the CFLA. ”  Macdonald v. CashCall, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64761, at *29 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2017)(interior citations deleted)  The Legislature, however, did not provide a private right of action under the CFLA.  . .  Instead, the Legislature determined that a "consumer lender" who violated the licensing provision of the CFLA would "be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree," N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33, and authorized the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance to punish those who violate any provision of the CFLA by, for example, refusing to issue a license or imposing penalties in accordance with the CFLA, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18.  *Woo-Padva*, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550, supra at *9.  In *Woo-Padva*, this Court also went on to state:  Plaintiff cannot circumvent the lack of a private right of action by seeking relief under the *Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act*, N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50 to 62.  *See In re Resol. of State Comm'n of Investigation*, 108 N.J. 35, 46, 527 A.2d 851 (1987) (dismissing cause of action seeking a judgment declaring a party had violated a statute because plaintiffs did not have a private right of action under the statute); *Excel Pharmacy Servs., LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins.*, 825 F. App'x 65, 70 (3d Cir. 2020)  ("But it is well settled that parties cannot bring a declaratory judgment action under a statute when there is no private right of action under that statute.")  *Id.* at *9.  **POINT IV.
[brief] “But I am going to have to hold something up a little firmer as it relates to this guarantee.  Because … when you have personal guarantees out there and they … have an ability to get out of it on ….. a 30 day notice and they provide that notice …. through the Tenant, I…. think that self-serving by the tenant to say okay, I’m going to stay, doesn’t bring back the guarantees at …guarantors at that point in time. ”  T2, page 33.  The above analysis correctly applies the rules of strict construction as to personal guarantees and should be sustained by this Court in its ruling on appeal.  The balance of Plaintiff’s arguments for overturning the Court’s ruling on this point also have no merit and can be easily dismissed by this Court.
[brief] *Townsend*, 221 *N.J.* at 53-54 (quoting *Polzo v. County of Essex*, 196 *N.J.* 569, 583 (2008)).  “The rule requires that an expert ‘give the why and wherefore’ that supports the opinion, ‘rather than a mere conclusion. ’” *Id.* 221 *N.J.* at 54 (quoting *Borough of Saddle River v. 66 East Allendale, LLC*, 216 *N.J.* 115, 144 (2013)); see also *Pomerantz Paper Corp.*, 207 *N.J.* at 372.  In this case, [...] was properly qualified as an expert and aptly testified which towers were utilized by the relevant cell phones in this case.  [...] is a certified wireless analyst and a communications network specialist, with two certifications in telecommunications and two certifications in mobile forensics.  (8T115-10 to 13).  In order to obtain those certifications, [...] took classes on how telephones work as a network, radio fundamentals, radio spectrum modems and modulations, and mobility and cellular fundamentals.  (8T125-17 to 127-11).  He also has attended the FBI’s historical cell site analysis training course and a course on cellular WIFI analysis.  (8T128-13 to 25).  Additionally, he attended a course on cellular technology and mapping analysis taught by a radio frequency engineer, where they discussed “mapping of records analysis, advanced reports, technology, statistical and link analysis and call detail records mapping analysis. ” (8T129-1 to 8).  He continues to take training in the field of analyzing cell phone data and has analyzed cell phone data hundreds of times.
[brief] (1T13:24-14:5.)  [...] immediately complied with [...]’ instruction to roll down the window.  (1T42:3-9.)  [...] provided [...] with his documents, which is a test to see if the suspect responds to the officer’s directions.  (1T44:2-3; 1T45:13-22.)  [...] conceded that [...] correctly provided the requested documents.  (1T46:7-13.)  [...] testified that [...] was slow in handing over the documents while also conceding the vehicle was oversized, the hour was late, and many people react slower when it is after midnight and the person is tired.  (1T46:14-48:2.)  [...] testified it was after midnight, that [...] was over sixty, and that it took about thirty seconds for the officer’s initial assessment at [...]’s window including the time for [...] to hand over his documents.  (1T48:14-17.)  [...] noted that [...] exited his pickup truck that had a higher clearance from the ground than an ordinary sedan, but that he could not recall any issues with [...] getting out of his vehicle.  (1T52:5-25.)  [...] further testified that [...] had no issues walking from his vehicle to the area where the standard field sobriety tests were conducted—an important observation for conducting a DWI investigation.  (1T53:9-20.)  [...] conceded that if a person could walk and stand without difficulties, it would be a sign that the person is not intoxicated.
[brief] THE ARBITRATOR MISAPPLIED  THE N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16(g) CRITERIA.  (Aa055-058).  The parties stipulated that the term of the contract would be from August 1, 2019 through December 31, 2023.  (Aa149)  The only budget submitted into the record was the 2023 Municipal Budget (2T38:13-41:4) (Aa071- Exhibits J7 and C6).  The arbitrator failed to consider the budgets for each year of the agreement (2019, 2020, 2021, 2022) and only considered and reviewed the 2023 budget in the salary award, which was the only economic proposal contained in the award issued by the arbitrator.  (2T38:13-41:4).  Moreover, the City was under an agreement with the [...] for receipt of transitional aid.  The Memorandum of Agreement submitted into the record was the 2022 MOU.  (Aa514).  No other MOUs for the other years of the Award (2019, 2020, or 2021) were part of the record before the arbitrator.7  7  See [...] 2023 NJ PERC LEXIS 4, 49 NJPER ¶81 (January 19, 2023)(administrative notice taken “that the [...] (City) is a Civil Service jurisdiction that the State of New Jersey (State) has determined to be a "transitional aid" municipality -- i.e., eligible to receive State aid (since approximately fiscal year 2014) to balance its budget. ”)  In the salary award, the arbitrator awarded salary increases as follows:  August 1, 2019 through July 31, 2020 – 0%  August 1, 2020 through July 31, 2021 – 1%  August 1, 2021 through July 31, 2022 – 2%  August 1, 2022 through July 31, 2023 – 1.5%  August 1, 2023 through December 31, 2023 – 1.5% (Aa149).  In addressing the 16(g) factors, the arbitrator found “[i]n the end, I am convinced that the 16g factors, especially the public interest and internal pattern of settlement criteria, are best served by the undersigned’s Award as opposed to the acceptance of either party’s proposals. ” (Aa149).
[brief] (Pa873-874, Pa1154-1157)  [...], who signed the lease on behalf of [...] consulted with [...], the principal of [...], prior to signing the lease.  Based upon her representations as well as the language of the lease, he believed that he had no contractual obligation regarding maintenance of common areas such as the parking lot other than payment of those charges.  (Pa1154-1155)  [...] also considered the parking lot, including the area where plaintiff had fallen, to be “common area” and did not expect any of her tenants to do anything to remove or remediate snow and/or ice from it.  (Pa851-858, Pa1159-1166)
[brief] The Officers Did Not Testify to the Ultimate Issue.  For the first time on appeal, defendant takes issue with four brief portions of the officers’ testimony: • [...]’s testimony that “after the recoil, after [[...]] had to step back, he attempted to, you know, grab [defendant] to arrest him for agg. assault on a police officer. ” (6T143-8 to -13).  • [...]’s testimony that, “At that point, [defendant] was going to be placed under arrest for disorderly conduct and agg. assault on a police officer. ” (6T145-15 to -17).  • [...]’s testimony that defendant was placed under arrest for “disorderly conduct, agg. assault, and resisting arrest. ” (6T158-2 to -24).  • [...]’s testimony that after defendant shoved him he “wanted to arrest him at that point because . . . it’s aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. ” (7T80-11 to -12).  A police officer may testify to facts, that is, “what the officer did and saw. ”  State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 460 (2011).
[brief] The governor applauded the bill’s “establishment of a listing of commonly accepted diagnostic tests by the professional boards within the Division of Consumer Affairs, and treatment of those injured in automobile accidents in accordance with commonly accepted medical protocols [i.e., the care paths].”  Ibid.  She also approved the bill’s new arbitration procedures, “in which the arbitrators are full-time professionals, and in which questions of medical necessity or causality may be referred for medical peer review.
[brief] This provision represents a weaponization of this public policy against the consumer.  A consumer asserting a claim must file for arbitration.  Once that arbitration is filed, the commercial party could then file a lawsuit in the Superior Court, asserting what should have been a counterclaim in arbitration.  The Law Division recognized that this scenario would violate aspects of public policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration provisions, but ultimately limited its comments to one aspect of public policy.  Ironically this “arbitration agreement” contravenes the very public policy that favors enforcing genuine arbitration agreements.  The Law Division sought to negate the risk of duplicative proceedings by interpreting the language to permit Appellant to dismiss an arbitration and join its claim in the Law Division if Respondent should elect to bring its claims there at a later date.  This narrow holding does not actually accomplish what the Law Division hoped, as explained below.  For the reasons detailed in this Brief, this Court should reverse the Orders and remand for further proceedings.
[brief] Whether the bill text proposed in the Assembly on January 6, 2022 is identical to the bill text substituted is of constitutional significance as prior courts have voided statutes that were passed when the bills were not identical among the two houses.  See Kornbluh, supra; In re Jaegle, 83 N.J.L. 313 (Sup. Ct. 1912).  Further, as explained in the initial brief, this Court should distinguish In re Forsythe, 91 N.J. 141, 148 (1982) because the purpose to the constitutional time provision – the opportunity to study the bill text – did not occur here.  The Forsythe case explains the time required between second reading and enactment is for study of the bill text.
[directive] MANDATORY  12-HOUR IMPOUNDMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES the time of the arrest of the operator of the vehicle.  Release of a vehicle from impoundment before the expiration of the 12-hour period ! of impoundment.  An impounded vehicle may be released before the 12-hour period of impoundment has elapsed, but only under the following conditions.  1.  If the vehicle is not owned or leased by the person arrested, then the owner or lessor can claim the vehicle at any time, provided that the owner or lessor satisfies the requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23d.  Those requirements are set forth below under Release Requirements.  2.  If the vehicle is owned or leased by the arrested person, then the vehicle may be released to another person, only if the following conditions and requirements are satisfied.  a.  The arrestee has given his/her permission to the other person to operate the vehicle.  b.  The person to whom permission has been given accepts the conditions for release of the vehicle under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.23d.  See Release Requirements, below.  c.  The person to whom permission has been given, has acknowledged, in writing, receipt of the “POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004) FORM. ”  The manner and form by which permission to operate the impounded vehicle and the acceptance of the conditions for release of the impounded under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:4- 50.23d are to be executed are to be determined by each law enforcement agency, in consultation with their designated legal counsel.  The receipt of acknowledgment of the “POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004) FORM” must be in conformance with the Guidelines for POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22, (Rev. 1-26-2004)  Form, found in -5-  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-1 - APPENDIX B - GUIDELINES  MANDATORY 12-HOUR IMPOUNDMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES  Appendix A of Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2004-1.
[directive] Preparing Form: Interviewing Officer(s) and Police Department:  T y p e o f C rim e C h a rg e d in  In d ictm e n t fo r W h ich R e c o rd a tion is R e q u ire d U n d e r R .  3 :1 7 :  Defendant: Date(s) of Interrogation:  (a)  Yes No (check one)  Was the interrogation electronically recorded?
[brief] The first description of the new technology category is found in I/M/O a New Jersey Solar Transition Pursuant to P.L. 2018, C.17, Order, [...], [...], dated January 8, 2020 (045a) where the Board explicitly noted that “new or innovative solar technologies can file a petition with the Board requesting that they be assigned a TREC factorization level. ”  Id., at 3.  The definition of the floating solar option is then found in I/M/O  The Petition Of [...] for “Preferred” TREC Factor for Floating Photovoltaic Solar Pursuant to the Board’s Transition Incentive Order, Order, New Jersey Board Of Public Utilities, [...], dated July 15, 2020, (080a), where the Board granted a floating solar facility a 0.6 TREC factor.
[brief] 28  I.  The Affordable Housing Conditional Judgment Is Properly Enforced Through R. 1:10-3.  Considering The History Of Recalcitrance In Securing Compliance With Affordable Housing Mandates, It Is Essential That Courts Use Available Tools To Compel Obedience By Foot-Dragging Municipalities (10a)  ...........................................................................  28  II.  In View Of (1) [...]’s Decades Of Recalcitrance; (2) Admitted Noncompliance With The Five-Year-Old Mandate Of The Judgment; (3) Refusal To Advance The Off-site Units Agreed Upon By The Prior Administration; And (4) Failure To Implement With The Special Master Or [...] A Reasonable Alternative For The Off-Site Units, The Trial Court Should Have Found A Violation And Granted Mount Laurel II Remedies (11A, 21A)  .................................................................
[brief] State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. 187, 205 (1985).  This Court now has the opportunity to review and reverse the ESI Order before it irreparably injures not just Defendants, but other New Jersey litigants as well.  While this Court generally affords discretion to a trial court’s discovery rulings, it will reverse any order that rests on a “mistaken understanding of the applicable law” or otherwise reflects an abuse of discretion.
[brief] An arrest for Obstruction and resisting arrest are supplemental charges with certain requirements.  *Plaintiff was not told (a requirement) that he was under arrest when he was thrown to the ground and handcuffed due to “refusing to hand over keys" and "change in demeanor," thus the charge for resisting is invalid.  (See Pa022-Pa23; See Pa303; Pa453; Pa471).  Plaintiff was arrested for marijuana (at which time he did not resist) which was found after his car trunk was searched, which is not an independent underlying charge to justify an Obstruction charge.  State v. Perlstein, 206 N.J. Super. 246 (App. Div.1985).  Moreover, the Marijuana charge was dismissed after the arrest.  (Pa653)
[directive] This new version of IAPP—which shall be known as the “August 2020 IAPP”—incorporates that updated effective date.  The August 2020 IAPP includes several changes designed to streamline investigations and improve public reporting.  For example, IAPP sections 7.1.6 and 8.1.6 have been revised to clarify that interviews of witnesses and subjects may be recorded using either audio- or video- recording devices, although interviews of subject officers should be video-recorded, wherever practical.  In addition, the new IAPP includes an updated appendix of forms to assist officers in carrying out their responsibilities in an efficient and uniform manner.  These include a new, standardized “citizens complaint” form that all law enforcement agencies must make available to the public online and in police department buildings.  Translated forms will be available in Arabic, Chinese, Haitian, Hindi, Korean, Polish, Portuguese, Spanish, Tagalog, and Vietnamese.  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2
[brief] [Id. at 117].  Just compensation is a function of the value of property in light of its highest and best use.  Highest and best use is defined as “the use that at the time of appraisal is the most profitable, likely use or alternatively, 'the available use and program of future utilization that produces the highest present land value. ”  Ford Motor Co. v. Tp. Of Edison, 127 N.J. 290, 300 (1992) (quoting Inmar Associates, Inc. v. Tp. of Edison, 2 N.J. Tax 59, 64 (1980)).  One of the elements of a property’s highest and best use is “legal permissibility,” and “if the parties to a voluntary transaction would as of the date of taking give recognition to the probability of a zoning amendment in agreeing upon the value, the law will recognize the truth. ”  Gorga, 26 N.J. at 117.
[directive] #2  The person “shall be permitted to have such samples taken and chemical tests of his[/her] breath, urine or blood made by a person or physician of his own selection. ”  This second provision is designed to inform the defendant of his/her statutory right to obtain an independent test of their own breath, blood or urine.  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(c); N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.24c; N.J.S.A. 12:7-55c.  State v. Jalkiewicz, 303 N.J. Super. 430, 432, 434, 435 (App. Div. 1997), questioning State v. Broadley, 281 N.J. Super. 230 (Law Div. 1992), certif. den. 135 N.J. 468 (1994); State v. Hicks, 228 N.J. Super. 541, 544 (App. Div. 1988), certif. den. 127 N.J. 324 (1990); State v. Ettore, 228 N.J. Super. at 30-1.
[brief] 9  In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation, 108 N.J. 35 (1987) ..............................................................................  3 Jackson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 754 F. Supp. 2d 711 (D.N.J. 2010) .......................................................  12  Jefferson Loan Co., Inc. v. Session, 397 N.J. Super. 520 (App. Div. 2008) ..................................................  5  Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Mills, 567 F. Supp. 2d 719 (D. N.J. 2008) ................................................................. 5 Jusino v. Lapenta, 442 N.J. Super. 248 (Law. Div. 2014)......................................................... 13 Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp., 150 N.J. 255 (1997)...................................................................................... 2, 7, 8 Lopez v. Law Offices of Faloni & Associates, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124730 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2016)............................... 14 Mathiesen v. Moleski, No. A-0365-10T3, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2187 (App. Div. Aug. 12, 2011)............................................................................. 5 Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel, 446 N.J. Super. 537 (App. Div. 2016).......................................................... 12 Monogram Credit Card Bank of Ga. v. Tennesen, 390 N.J. Super. 123 (App.Div.2007)............................................................. 6 Shaw v. City of Jersey City, 346 N.J. Super. 219 (App. Div. 2002).......................................................... 6 Tatis v. Allied Interstate, LLC, 882 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2018)
[brief] ”  (Pa-38)  Both entities are entitled to due process under the law.  [...] as a business, under N.J. Court Rules for a Business Entity.  And, [...] as an individual, under N.J. Court Rules for an Individual Person.  Both defendants must be served and properly informed by the respective court rules – NOT just ONE, but BOTH!  If a defendant is NOT served or is NOT properly informed, he is denied of his rights of due process under the law.  That is, of: (1) notice; (2) opportunity to be heard; and, (3) an impartial tribunal.