[brief] THE STANDARD OF REVIEW (Raised Below: T2)  On appeal, the Court applies a plenary standard or review from a trial court’s granting of a motion to dismiss.  *Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone*, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div. 2011); *Bacon v. N.J. State Dep't of Educ.*, 443 N.J. Super. 24, 33 (App. Div. 2015).  Additionally, the Court “use[s] a *de novo* standard of review when determining the enforceability of an arbitration agreement . . .  The validity of an arbitration agreement is a question of law, and appellate courts conduct a plenary review of legal questions. ”  *See Matullo v. Sky Zone Trampoline Park*, 472 N.J. Super. 220, 225-26 (App. Div. 2022) (citing *Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp.*, 238 N.J. 191, 207 (2019); *Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc.*, 244 N.J. 30, 46 (2020)); see also *Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC*, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013).  To compel arbitration of a dispute, a court must determine that a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties and that the dispute falls within the scope of the agreement.  *See Hirsch*, 215 N.J. at 179; see also *Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc.*, 173 N.J. 76, 83-84 (2002).  Further, the Court must look to ordinary contract principles to determine whether a party is bound by the terms of an alleged arbitration agreement.  *See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan*, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (“When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including arbitrability), courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts. ”).  Although the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which controls here,\(^2\) encourages practices that enable disputes to be solved through arbitration, it is not a mandate that requires arbitration each and every time an arbitration clause may be part of a contract.  9 U.S.C. § 2 contains specific exceptions to the enforceability of arbitration clauses and states that arbitration is improper where “such grounds exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. ”  Like other contractual rights, the right to compel arbitration may be relinquished through waiver.  Simply, “[w]aiver is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right. ”  *Knorr v. Smeal*, 178 N.J. 169, 177 (2003).  Waiver need not be stated expressly but may be implied, “provided the circumstances clearly show that the party knew of the right and then abandoned it, either by design or indifference. ”  *Id.*  \(^2\)  The arbitration provision contained in the CSA relied upon my [...] states that “[i]n the event of any controversy, claim or dispute between the Parties (“Dispute”) arising out of or relating to the Agreement or the breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation, conscionability or validity thereof, including any determination of the scope of applicability of this Agreement to arbitrate . . . shall be resolved in accordance with the procedural laws of the Federal Arbitration Act and any substantive laws of the state of Client’s residence at the time the Dispute arises. ”  See CSA § 10 (Pa30).  In analyzing waiver of arbitration, the United States Supreme Court has determined that courts must treat arbitration agreements like any other contract and may not create novel rules or employ practices “fostering arbitration. ”  *Morgan v. Sundance, Inc.*, 142 S. Ct. 1708, 1710 (2022).  When a party knows of its ostensible right to compel arbitration and acts inconsistently with it, that party waives its right to compel arbitration.  *Id.* at 1709-10.  As explained herein, [...]’s affirmative litigation conduct is sufficient to manifest waiver of any claimed right to compel arbitration of [...]’s claims.  **POINT II.