ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Resolution (Pa42-43)  She did not testify that before the garage was expanded, she had anything stored in the yard outside.  Applicant did not complain that her yard was cluttered with articles that she could not store in her home.  The only purported special reason claimed in the Resolution granting the [...] application might be generally classified as "aesthetics."  The Board's find that the grant of the variance may improve the appearance of a nonconforming use alone is not sufficient reason to grant the variance.  *Burbridge v. Mine Hill*, supra at 387.  However, "aesthetic improvement of a nonconforming use to create better conformity with the existing use within the surrounding area would likely be a primary focus of a local zoning board in deciding whether to grant an expansion of that use."  *Burbridge v. Mine Hill*, supra at 387.  Here, the [...] and Board contend that the grant of the variance will make the nonconforming use more slightly from a visual perspective, the garage extension does nothing to create better conformity with the adjoining uses.  However, "aesthetic improvement” entails more than mere beautification.  *Id.*  The beautification must encompass the general welfare.  The [...] did not demonstrate that the expansion of the garage would result in beautification of the site, as there was no evidence that the Property was unsightly before the garage was expanded.  Ms. [...] did not testify that there had been any storage of items in the back yard or surrounding areas.  (1T9:16).  In fact, [...] testified that the items stored in the garage had been moved from inside her house.  (1T)  She provided no explanation why she needed an area of more than twice the size of her house for storage and parking two (2) vehicles.
[brief] ”  See *Tyler*, 598 U.S. at 645.  --- \(^2\)  An equity interest, in New Jersey as elsewhere, is the value of one’s land minus any encumbering debts.  *Crane v. Comm’r*, 331 U.S. 1, 7 (1947) (“[E]quity is defined as the value of a property above the total of the liens. ”).  \(^3\)  Equity belongs to the owner of the land and survives a transfer of land for the payment of debt.  *Danes v. Smith*, 30 N.J. Super. 292, 301–02 (App. Div. 1954).  Equity is property to be divided in a marital dissolution.  [...], N.J. Family Law Ann. A Ch. 3 III (equitable distribution “applies to both real estate . . . and to legal as well as equity rights acquired in property during the course of a marriage. ”).  It is protected in executions on judgments and has been for over a century.  *Vanduyne v. Vanduyne*, 16 N.J. Eq. 93, 94 (N.J. Ch. 1863) (irrespective of language in an execution, sheriff is authorized to sell “only so much of the premises as may be necessary” to satisfy the execution).
[brief] First, the arbitration agreement is procedurally unconscionable because its alleged formation was excessively unfair.  Plaintiff’s decedent [...] sought specialized services from Defendant [...], a medical doctor, with regard to her cosmetic issues.  It was reasonable for her to assume that the doctor would act in her best interest.  While the arbitration agreement form provided her with a thirty-day period to review the agreement, it is undisputed that a copy of the agreement was withheld from her for fourteen days of that period, from October 14, 2021 to October 28, 2021.  However, on October 28, 2021, [...] was seen by staff members only, not by the doctor himself.  According to his deposition testimony, Defendant [...] was the only one to explain the agreement to [...] and answer her questions during its execution.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECIDING TO ESTABLISH A SEALED BIDDING PROCEDURE (Da18)  .........................................................................................................................9  A.  The trial court was not Bound by the January 25, 2022 Order with Respect to a Settlement Conference.  .........................................................................................................................9  B.  The trial court’s Decision to Order a Sale was Reasonable and Appropriate Under the Circumstances .........................................................................................................................12  II.  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE THE DEFENDANTS’ RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS (Da18)
[brief] Three days later, on March 3, 2011, [...], a business owner, returned home and was confronted by two men, one of whom pointed a gun at him.  *Id.* at 331.  The men took $2,200 of cash from him and left in his truck, which was retrieved shortly thereafter.  *Ibid.*  3.  **Car Stop** (Counts 7 and 8)  On March 29, 2011, [...] was driving a car, which was pulled over for matching the description of a car that had been reported to be involved in an unrelated incident.  *Cuff*, 239 N.J. at 331.  A Black male ran out of the car; at trial [...] identified that man as petitioner.  (4T 60-5, 6T 90-20 to 22, 9T 133-1 to 8)  Officers looked in the direction in which the passenger ran and found two guns.  (4T 60-20 to 61-23)  The car's owner testified that it had been taken without permission.  In relation to this incident, petitioner was convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon and the lesser-included offense of taking a motor vehicle without consent.  4.  **The Plea Deals Of The Cooperating Witnesses**
[brief] (1T56 to 1T71).  In spite of Appellant’s claim to the contrary, Appellant’s counsel did not, at any time during the Zoning Board hearing, ask to introduce witnesses to provide testimony on any of the topics cited by Appellant in its Brief, including environmental issues, storm water, or other concerns.  (1T56 to 1T64; 1T71 to 1T75).  Appellant could have introduced witnesses to provide any testimony that might attempt to show that the drawing of lines on the municipal tax map would have such impacts but did not do so.  This was pointed out to Appellant’s counsel during oral argument at the trial court, yet counsel renews those claims here.  (2T18 to 2T19).  As a result, [...]’s testimony that there would be no such impacts was not disputed on the record.  Unlike the objectors in Witt, [...] was given a full opportunity during a hearing held and concluded during normal hearing hours, to comment and, if it did not avail itself of that opportunity, has only itself to blame.  It should be noted that where members of the public are given a full opportunity to express their views during the hearing, it is not grounds for reversal if the board chairman did not announce that objectors had the right to cross examine witnesses for the applicant.
[brief] ”).  \textsuperscript{118}  Beegal v. Park West Gallery, 394 N.J. Super. 98, 110 (App. Div. 2007).  \textsuperscript{119}  Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2001)("[G]enerally if the named plaintiff demonstrates that the potential number of plaintiffs exceeds 40, the first prong of Rule 23(a) has been met."); Saldana v. City of Camden, 252 N.J. Super. 188, 193 (App. Div. 1991)(eighty members).
[brief] This case is an action (i) in lieu of prerogative writs and (ii) a collateral challenge based on fraud committed by Defendants-Respondents Marisha and [...] (“Applicants”); all as to a “Resolution” entered by Defendant-Respondent [...] (the “[...]”).  The instant appeal relates to the motion judge’s determination to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety based on Appellants’ filing it four days after the deadline calculated under R. 4:69-6 and based solely on Applicants’ unanticipated and unnoticed publication.  The Complaint and requisite Pre-Trial Memorandum set forth in specificity Appellants’ objections to the actions (i) of the [...] in reaching its Resolution and (ii) of Applicants in fraudulently pursuing their application.  Appellants filed motions to (i) enlarge the 45-day period by four days, and (ii) to supplement the record.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................................................4  A.  Plaintiff’s OPRA  Requests ..............................................................................................4  B.  Plaintiff’s Lawsuit ..........................................................................................................5  LEGAL ARGUMENT .....................................................................................................................6  I.  [...] VIOLATED OPRA BY DENYING PLAINTIFF’S OPRA REQUEST AND DEMANDING THAT HE PROVIDE A SUBJECT MATTER OR KEYWORD ...........................................................................................................6  A.  Plaintiff’s Request is Valid Pursuant to Published Case Law .......................7  B.  Plaintiff’s Request is Valid Under the FOIA Standards Upon Which New Jersey Courts Rely ..................................................................................................................14  C.  Easy Access to Emails Helps Reporters and the Public Guard Against Corruption and Waste ..................................................................................................................18  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................20  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. New Jersey Div. of Criminal Justice, 435 N.J. Super. 533 (App. Div. 2014) | 17 | | Am. Oversight v. United States Env’t. Prot. Agency, 386 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019) | 16 | | Bader v. Bove, 273 A.D.2d 466 (2000) | 8 | | Bent v. Twp. of Stafford Police Dep’t, 381 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 2005) | 7, 9 | | Burke v. Brandes, 429 N.J. Super. 169 (App. Div. 2012) | 10, 11 | | Burnett v. Cnty. of Bergen, 198 N.J.
[brief] A review of the various letters from the [...] demonstrates this was due to the fact that a technical layoff notices in compliance with N.J.A.C. 4A:8-1.6 was not provided.  Under the emergency circumstances that required [...] to immediately remove non-essential employees there was not the time, nor the means in which to comply with this statute.  There is also a 45-day prior notice provision in this requirement that could not be complied with due to the emergent nature of these events.  N.J.A.C. 4A:8-1.6  The reliance on the technical requirement of N.J.A.C. 4A:8-1.6 as a determinative factor in this case, considering the facts as they developed in real time, was an error that requires either a reconsideration, or judicial review.  It is clear from a review of the record that the [...] either misunderstood, or simply got the critical facts wrong in their analysis of this case.  The facts in the record do not support the factual conclusions made by the [...] in order to support the conclusion that the appellant had a break in service making him ineligible to re-enroll in PERS.
[directive] A an community, and how the discretion is viewed by and impacts police exercise of how the understands police- can contribute to the goal of impzoving assignnnent every other duty officers on patrol and aconstantly-changing world.  relations in community through prescribed curricula regulated police recruits is strictly  Pre-service training for and law enforcement and local agencies, for county Training Commission Police approved by the in-service training fog•  In contrast, for Stai:e Police members.
[brief] c.  When asked why the account was set up in the State of Wyoming, [...] said that based upon his knowledge of Wyoming law, Wyoming law is very protective over trust information and assets, and therefore the trust was created there in an effort to protect the policy.  d.  [...] further went on to say the (1) the State of New Jersey would have no jurisdiction to enforce the production of an account outside of the State, and (2) even if the trust account was not set up by an attorney, assisting an individual in setting up a bank account is not "engaging in the practice of law", whether under the professional conduct rules of New Jersey or Wyoming.
[directive] Have you discussed with your attorney the legal doctrine of merger?  19.  [Yes/Si]  [No/No]  [NA/No 6Ha hablado usted ~n su abogado sobre la doctrina legal de fusion?  Are you giving up your right at sentence to argue that there are charges you pleaded 20.  [Yes/Si]  [No/No]  [NA/No aplica] guilty to for which you cannot be given a separate sentence?
[brief] In 1984 [...], the owner/operator of a food store located at [...] in the [...], applied to the Borough’s Board of Adjustment to allow him to install a pizza over with a stainless-steel hood, exhausting to the street.  He would further purchase two dough mixers and retarders for making pizzas.  (PA-70).  In response the Board’s attorney advised the members that:  “[S]ince this store has sold food for the past 52 years that …there has been no change in the operation of this business and the sale and making of pizzas is not necessarily a change in the type of business it’s still food….it was not necessary for [...] to obtain a variance. ”  (Pa – 71).  The Board, presumably made up of members familiar with the town, accepted that advice and, at the next meeting unanimously voted in favor of a resolution that the non-conforming use continued and that the changes sought by [...] did not require a variance.  (Pa – 76-78).  Thereafter [...] continued to operate the pizzeria until 2010, with its ownership and operation for the next four years being taken over by people named [...].  (T.3 at 38:16-39:10)  In 2015 [...] (“[...]”), the managing member of [...] Madison, LLC (“[...] Madison”), considered purchasing the pizzeria and a neighboring two-family house which was in a run-down state.  Before he did so, he visited the Municipal Building and spoke with the appropriate officials to ascertain whether the restaurant facility could still be operated as a pizzeria and that the two-family home could remain a two-family residence.
[brief] ”  (Pa1743)  The Trial Court ignored that the relevant cases establish that the Planning Board and Governing Body are required to carefully review the actual Master Plan, and in particular its Land Use Plan element, to determine and assess its “substantial consistency” with the Rezoning Ordinance or Redevelopment Plan.  The review is not to be of some Reexamination Report that was never legally adopted as incorporated into or as part of the Master Plan, nor can it be based upon some vague platitudes, such as advancing “economic development” in the Master Plan, and certainly not some vague platitudes in any unincorporated Reexamination Report.  The Trial Court’s acknowledgment of the increased density (Pa1743), for example, with the comment that “on the issue, [...] has spoken” and that the determination is substantially consistent with the Master Plan ignores the record.
[brief] Russo v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen’s Retirement System, supra., 206 N.J. at 27 (2011); Boyle v Riti, supra., 175 N.J. Super. at 166.  Conversely, the Board “may reject or modify” the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c), and the Court’s review of the Board’s determination is only “for the purpose of determining whether nor not the Board’s findings are supported by substantial credible evidence. ”
[brief] Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...], : CIVIL ACTION  Plaintiff-Appellant, : ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL vs. : ORDERS OF THE 313-319  FIRST STREET CONDO : SUPERIOR COURT ASSOCIATION, INC., CLINTON : OF NEW JERSEY, HILL CONDO ASSOCIATION, : LAW DIVISION, 357  8TH STREET CONDOMINIUM : HUDSON COUNTY ASSOCIATION, JOSEPH A. DEL : DOCKET NO. [...] FORNO, INC., DEL FORNO REAL : Sat Below: ESTATE LLC, [...], Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] In that case, the defendant in an alcohol-involved vehicular-homicide case claimed the destruction of his blood sample prohibited him from obtaining independent test results that may have exculpated him and denied him the “ability to cross-examine expert witnesses[.]”  Id. at 469.  This Court rejected [...]’s argument, stating it did not believe “that the defendant was prejudiced by the destruction of this evidence.  Defendant had every opportunity to question the test results without resort to the evidence itself both by cross-examination of the State’s witnesses and through his own expert’s testimony. ”  Id. at 470.  See Washington, 165 N.J. at 157 (noting that destruction of physical evidence “may at times make cross-examination more difficult,” but finding that defendant still can still elicit information needed for defense during cross-examination, even without it).  Thus, where there are other avenues of recreating the missing evidence, rarely will a defendant’s claim of manifest prejudice be substantiated.  What is more, providing the jury with an adverse-inference charge alleviates the prejudice created by the loss of the evidence.  *State v. Dabas*, 215 N.J. 114, 140 (2013).
[brief] It is clear from the testimony offered that plaintiff provided evidence of defendants’ malpractice.  In rendering a verdict in plaintiff’s favor, the jury clearly accepted that testimony to find malpractice.  Defendants have offered nothing to show that the jury’s finding of malpractice was a “plain miscarriage of justice. ”  Kassick, supra, 120 N.J. at 135.  Accordingly, the jury’s finding of malpractice should not be reversed so the amended final judgment should stand.
[brief] The subpoena was properly served on [...] on July 21, 2023.  (Da259).  Subsequently, [...] refused to comply with the subpoena, and we filed a motion to enforce litigants rights on October 3, 2023.  That motion had been returnable on October 20, 2023 but was carried until November 3, 2023 and ultimately was found to be moot.  POINT VII
[brief] First, the Trial Court minimized the severity of Defendant [...]'s actions both before and during the June 2020 incident and failed to analyze it under the harassment statute, describing it as “just disagreements within the workplace, not very nice, uncomfortable disagreements” (T33-5).  However, Plaintiff’s belief that the conduct was unlawful should have been viewed through the lens of a reasonable employee, and the plain language of the statute.  A jury could reasonably infer that Defendant [...]'s conduct – berating people in close proximity, using profanity, slamming doors and file cabinets – created a work environment that violated the plain language of the harassment statute.  The Trial Court also improperly weighed the veracity of the testimony by Plaintiff, [...], and [...], stating “Yes, of course, in their depositions they’re going to say well we felt that this was harassment. ” (T28-13).  This statement indicates that the court dismissed the testimony, treating it as self-serving rather than viewing it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  The Trial Court’s decision also relied on the absence of corroborating testimony from other staff regarding Defendant [...]’s approval of charge pay and its own interpretations of Defendant [...]’s actions and motives.  For example, the court noted that "no other witness and no other document has corroborated her testimony" (T21-24).  However, at the summary judgment stage, Plaintiff is entitled to the inference that his co-worker’s testimony could be truthful, and it is within the jury’s province to assess the credibility of these statements.  By essentially dismissing [...]’ testimony without allowing a jury to evaluate it, the court improperly weighed evidence.  The court further inferred that the charge pay investigation was independent of Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendant [...] despite all evidence to the contrary, stating with regard to the June 2020 incident that the “investigation’s already been done into that. ” (T12-6).  However, the record shows that no true investigation had been performed and the proximity between the pending investigation of Defendant [...]’s related to the incident in June 2020 and the subsequent initiation of the charge pay investigation in August 2020 raises questions about the true motivation behind the scrutiny of Plaintiff’s actions.  The court failed to draw the inference that Defendant [...] might have leveraged the charge pay issue to derail the investigation into her conduct, especially since the investigation into her behavior was effectively halted once Plaintiff and the others were terminated.  As such, a jury could reasonably conclude that the charge pay investigation was a pretext to retaliate against Plaintiff for his complaints.
[directive] Subjects against whom a conducted energy device has been directed shall be transported to a medical facility for examination if any of the following circumstances exist:  1.  The subject requests medical attention; 2.  The subject had been rendered unconscious or unresponsive; 3.  The subject after being subjected to a discharge does not appear to have recovered normally, as described in CED training; 4.  The subject has exhibited signs of excited delirium, as described in CED training, prior to, during, or after the discharge of the CED; 5.  The subject has suffered bodily injury requiring medical attention as a result of a fall, or otherwise reasonably appears to be in need of medical attention; 6.  The subject was exposed to three or more discharges from a CED during the encounter; 7.  The subject has been exposed to a continuous discharge lasting 15 seconds or longer; 8.  No one present at the scene is qualified or authorized to remove the CED darts/electrodes from the subject’s person; 9.  An officer trained and authorized to remove darts/electrodes experiences difficulty in removing a dart/electrode; or 10.  Any part of a CED dart/electrode has broken off and remains imbedded.
[brief] Stated simply, the allegations in the Complaint regarding [...] were patently and demonstrably false as demonstrated by the unrefuted documents and certifications submitted in support of [...]’s summary judgment motion.  Allegations in Plaintiff’s appellate brief are similarly patently and demonstrably false.  For example, despite claims to the contrary on both Plaintiff’s opposition to summary judgment and in Plaintiff’s appellate brief, Plaintiff’s municipal appeal, which was accepted and filed by the Criminal Division out of time, was dismissed, not for lack of any judgment of conviction or wrongdoing on the part of the Defendant Borough or its Municipal Court Judge, or court staff, but because Plaintiff failed to either order transcripts of the municipal court proceedings or to file a timely, complete indigency application as per the instruction of the Court.  In addition to the basic defect in Plaintiff case, and in his appeal, Plaintiff’s claims against [...] fail to state a claim and/or would be barred, as hereinafter set forth, on numerous additional grounds.
[directive] 3.  Support and improve the wellbeing of police officers and law enforcement through resiliency efforts as well as through modernization of public safety strategies that reduce undue burden on law enforcement.  4.  Improve how law enforcement officers interact with community members suffering from mental and behavioral health emergencies through training, exposure to, and making available to them other available tools for responding to crises in the community other than through more traditional law enforcement strategies.  5.  Advance the health and well-being of individuals with mental and behavioral health emergencies and eliminate stigma by connecting individuals to care and resources rather than the criminal justice system through community-led responses, alternative law enforcement-led responses, and diversionary strategies in the courts.