ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] THE POWERS EXPRESSLY GRANTED IN THE PARTIES’ AGREEMENT | 2 | | POINT II  BY FAILING TO EVEN ADDRESS THE ISSUE, [...] CONCEDES THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE ARBITRATOR’S AWARD RELIED ON PROOF OF SOME PHANTOM COURSE OF DEALING ALTERING THE TERMS OF THE PTA | 8 | | POINT III [...] MISSTATES THE STANDARD OF REVIEW NECESSARY TO MODIFY AN ARBITRATION AWARD, BUT IN ANY EVENT, THE ERRORS IN THE AWARD ARE “OBVIOUS AND SIMPLE” | 10 | | POINT IV [...] FAILS TO ADDRESS THE ERRORS IN THE TRIAL COURT’S REASONING REGARDING [...]’S SETOFF CLAIM AND IT ALSO INCORRECTLY ARGUES THAT THE SETOFF CLAIM IS ONE THAT REQUIRES A DETERMINATION OF PAYMENT LIABILITY | 13 | | CONCLUSION | 15 | ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Block v. Plosia,** | 7 | | 390 N.J. Super. 543 (App. Div. 2007) | | | **Cnty. Coll. of Morris Staff Ass'n v. Cnty. Coll. of Morris,** | 3 | | 100 N.J. 383 (1985) | | | **Creative Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Bay Owners Ass'n, Inc.,** | 7 | | No. A-0360-10T2, 2011 WL 2416857 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | | | June 17, 2011) | | | **Kimm v. Blisset, LLC,** | 7 | | 388 N.J. Super. 14 (App. Div. 2006) | | | **Knecht v. 225 River St., L.L.C.,** | 6 | | No. A-4793-10T3, 2012 WL 1020005 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | | | Mar. 28, 2012) | | | **Minkowitz v. Israeli,** | 7 | | 433 N.J. Super. 111 (App. Div. 2013) | | | **Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc.,** | 3, 4, 7 | | 129 N.J. 479 (1992) | | | **Perretti v. Ran-Dav's Cnty. Kosher, Inc.,** | 14 | | 289 N.J. Super. 618 (App. Div. 1996) | | | **Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., Inc.,** | 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11 | | 135 N.J. 349 (1994) | | | Statutes | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:23B-23 | 3, 6 | | N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:24-8 | 4 | | Other Authorities | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Rule 4:67 | 14
[brief] When the plaintiff discovered that the municipality did not have the statutorily-required liability insurance to satisfy the injured party’s claim, the plaintiff sued the Township.  The Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that one affected detrimentally by noncompliance with a statute has a cause of action for the injury or loss sustained, and stated that we are cognizant of the individual hardship which may occasionally befall an employee as a result of the municipality’s default in obeying the legislative command.  The statute, however, while stating the requirement of public liability insurance in mandatory language, does not provide a remedy for those who may suffer through a failure to comply with its terms.  If it had done so, the right to recover would be clear.37  Here, there is no private remedy for a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).
[brief] Redactions to the statement were discussed in a pretrial conference on October 6, 2022, and with the State’s proposed redactions in hand, defense counsel told the trial court he needed more time to consider which redactions he wanted “for trial purposes. ” (5T9-12 to 15).  The State was willing to redact any other portions the defense wanted out (6T9-16 to 20), defense counsel just needed time to “deci[de] on what [he was] doing for trial purposes[.]” (6T9-12 to 15).  Moreover, just before the statement was played for the jury, defense counsel confirmed he was “good with the editing,” which is consistent with his failure to object at any time to the mentions of his unrelated arrest left in. (7T167-7 to 8).  Indeed, his closing at the end of trial illuminated his strategy—attack the investigator for homing in on defendant and failing to do a proper investigation: [...] never went to the crime scene.  (9T182-24 to 25); never reviewed the photos of the crime scene (9T183-1 to 2); never listened to the 911 call (9T183-3 to 4); and never listened to the audio of the statement from the victim (9T183-4 to 7).  Defense counsel framed all these omissions as “a choice” [...] made to ignore a proper investigation and get the guy who was at the station under arrest.  Defendant acquiesced to the mentions of his unrelated arrest and took advantage of them for “trial purposes. ”
[brief] THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE STATE DID NOT COMMIT VIOLATIONS OF THE DISCOVERY RULES (Aa050).  The Law Division erred in finding that the State did not commit violations of the discovery rules when the State failed to provide video evidence of the administration of Appellant’s alcotests by [...] in discovery.  Under R. 3:13-3(b), the State is required to provide to criminal defendants in discovery exculpatory information and materials, as well as video and sound recordings in the possession of the prosecutor.  By failing to provide such evidence to Appellant, the State violated R. 3:13-3.  Additionally, the Law Division erred by failing to find the State violated R. 3:13-3(b)(1), which requires the State to inform the defense of discoverable materials known to the State which have not been supplied to the defense.  CONCLUSION
[brief] The trial court was correct in both of its decisions.  As the trial court found twice, the County’s solicitation did not identify the Notice of Classification as a mandatory document.  To the contrary, it expressly gave the County the option to waive the defect if a bidder failed to include it.  The trial court also properly applied the two-part test articulated in Township of River Vale v. R.J. Longo Constr.  Co., in the same manner as the Appellate Division applied the test in the uniquely similar case of Suburban Disposal, Inc. v. Township of Aberdeen.  Specifically, like in Suburban Disposal, the trial court concluded that the failure to include a copy of a qualification document that unquestionably existed at the time of bid opening and could not be altered by the bidder is a waivable defect because: (i) the bidder was in fact prequalified and capable of performing the project; and (ii) by actually having the requisite qualification status at the time of bid, the bidder did not obtain any competitive advantage over other bidders.  [...] does not (because it cannot) offer any explanation, let alone a sound business one, for the County to needlessly expend more tax dollars to complete the project.  Before the trial court, the County was given an opportunity to proffer such reasoning and declined to do so, instead indicating its intent to comply with the trial court’s order.  Since no such arguments were raised below, and because [...] does not have standing to raise such arguments (which are exclusively those belonging to the County), the record is entirely devoid of any evidence indicating that the County’s refusal to waive [...]’s trivial omission was supported by sound business judgment.  In spite of its numerous prior representations (that it would abide the trial court’s rulings) and in violation of the Court Rules, the County now attempts (for the first time) to appeal the trial court’s decisions under the veil of a “Respondent’s Brief. ”  The County’s arguments must be rejected out of hand because such arguments are untimely and unsupported by a Notice of Appeal or Notice of Cross-Appeal.  Since the County failed to file a Notice of Appeal or Cross-Appeal within the allotted time, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider these arguments.  Even if the Court considers the County’s untimely arguments (though it should not), such duplicative arguments should be rejected for the same reasons that [...]’s Appeal must be denied.  For these, and additional reasons set forth herein, the Court should affirm the trial court’s decisions in their entirety and deny [...]’s Appeal.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE STRONG PUBLIC POLICY IN PROTECTING EVERY CITIZEN’S RIGHT TO VOTE AND HAVE THEIR VOTE COUNTED IS PARAMOUNT  Appellant unsurprisingly tries to pretend like this is an open-and-shut case, that both the text of the statute and the case law are clear.  However, as the trial court found, that is simply not true, and the Court must understand the purpose of N.J.S.A. 19:49-5, which was to prevent duplicate counting with no way of verifying the ballots cast.  Since the voter in question did not cast a duplicate vote, and his intent is not only beyond reasonably clear, but, as the trial court stated, “there’s no question in the Court’s mind” that the individual did intend to vote for [...], that voter intent must prevail at the end of the day.  1.  Legislative History of the Irregular Ballot Statute  In this case, the law itself is contradictory, outdated, and inapplicable to the situation at hand.  In fact, N.J.S.A. 19:49-5 first appeared in our election code back in 1902.  See P.L. 1902, c. 205, p. 651.  At that time, it stated, in pertinent part:  ... ballots voted for any person whose name does not appear on the machine as a nominated candidate for office are herein referred to as irregular ballots ... except for presidential electors no irregular ballot shall be voted for any person whose name appears on the front of the machine as a candidate for that office; any irregular [sic] --- 4.  N.J.S.A. 19:47-1 defines an “irregular ballot” as being a “vote cast, by or on a special device, for a person whose name does not appear on the ballots. ”  N.J.S.A. 19:49-5 similarly states that “ballots voted for any person whose name does not appear on the machine as a nominated candidate for office are herein referred to as irregular ballots. ”  However, it then goes on to state that “no irregular ballot shall be voted for any person whose name appears on the machine as a nominated candidate for that office ....”
[brief] Within 90 days of the MOU, operating agreements (that also contained arbitration agreements) were executed to carry out the rescue plan.  The motion court correctly found that the original arbitration agreement within the MOU was valid, and the parties intended for it to be included in the 2022 Addendum that was executed ten years later in furtherance of the rescue plan.  The motion court also rightly found that the language of the arbitration provisions within the agreements are expansive enough to include Plaintiff’s equitable ownership claims.  Furthermore, the motion court appropriately rejected Defendants’ claim that Plaintiff waived her right to arbitrate.  As more fully discussed below, the trial court’s Cole analysis reached the correct conclusion that the totality of the circumstances weigh in favor of arbitration, not waiver.
[brief] The Court must consider whether the Planning Board’s and the Mayor and Council’s decisions approving Ordinance 22-1516 are rational.  Indeed, those decisions were well supported by the record, including the unrebuted planning testimony.  The text of the Amended Redevelopment Plan confirms consistency with various planning objectives applicable to the Property.  The trial court correctly found that the presumption of validity was not overcome.  In sum, there was ample basis for the adoption of Ordinance 22-1516.  The plan satisfied at least three objectives set forth in the Master Plan and maintained the character of the proposed development described in the Master Plan for the Property.  It is not inconsistent with any specific provision of the Master Plan.  The lower court reached a well-reasoned conclusion confirming that these determinations were not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  For these reasons, the Law Division’s Order for Judgement should be upheld.
[brief] ” (Pa000305–306).  With respect to terminal leave, the Superior Court held that “plaintiffs cannot establish that they have a property right to terminal leave lump sum payouts.  . . .  Eliminating lump sum payments based on the terminal leave payout at the time of retirement does not violate the . . . New Jersey Constitution. ” (Pa000297).  The Superior Court further found that:  The part of the Designee’s proposal dealing with eliminating terminal leave lump sum payments for accumulated sick leave in excess of $15,000 is reasonable and consistent with the Recovery Act.  This part of the proposal is consistent with the objectives of the Recovery Act to establish financial stability for [...].  The City can no longer sustain terminal leave lump payments amounting to an overall liability of $10,000,000.  (Pa000319).  Following the First Police Decision, the Designee issued a Notice of Implementation—[...] dated June 7, 2017, consistent with the Decision.  (Pa000220–225).  Among the changes placed into effect was a change in the terminal leave policy, capping payments at $15,000.  (Pa000221).  The Notice of Implementation also made clear that the “State reserves the right to modify or entirely eliminate the payment of terminal leave payments in accordance with future rulings or interpretations by the Court. ” (Pa000221).  Thereafter, on January 18, 2018, the parties to the First Police Matter filed a settlement agreement resolving that matter.  (Pa000230–234).  As part of the settlement agreement, the parties agreed that “the terminal leave payouts for all police officers and superior officers will be a maximum of $15,000 at the time of retirement. ” (Pa000231–232).  Following the settlement, [...], then-Acting Director of the [...], issued a memorandum dated October 18, 2018, advising the City to issue terminal leave payouts capped at $15,000 for those who retired from the [...] on November 9, 2016, or thereafter (i.e. after the City’s governance was designated to the State), upon receipt of a release from that retiree.  (Pa000239).  On October 22, 2018, the City passed Resolution 591 in furtherance of the October 18, 2018 memorandum, authorizing terminal leave payments in accordance with the DCA’s directive and the Superior Court’s prior orders.  (Pa000242–243).  Accordingly, each of the Plaintiffs here are only entitled to terminal leave capped at $15,000 pursuant to the October 18, 2018 memorandum and Resolution 591.  D.
[brief] The OAE commenced a disciplinary investigation into [...] and the Firm in 2012 concerning their handling of the Firm’s trust account.  [Pa343a]  Over the course of its investigation, the OAE uncovered a “protracted scheme and subsequent cover up” in which [...] falsified trust account bank statements and made “knowingly false statements” to the OAE.  [Pa 366a, 372a]  The disciplinary investigation began on July 31, 2012, after [...] notified the OAE that one of the Firm’s trust accounts was overdrawn and a $7,500 check had been returned for insufficient funds.
[brief] ”  But in this case the sites other than the [...] are **NOT NECESSARY** to the redevelopment of the abandoned, vacant, former department store.  In *62-64 Main Street*, the Chief Justice was concerned that the area to be redeveloped was not shown to have an adverse effect on the surrounding areas (*Id.*, at 176) sufficient to justify the use of condemnation, especially since the owners had spent “hundreds of thousands of dollars” (*Id.*, at 165) to improve the properties.
[brief] Moreover, an intent to defraud is not required.  *Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Manzo*, 122 N.J. 104, 114-115 (1991).  “Even an innocent misrepresentation can constitute equitable fraud justifying rescission. ”  *Ledley v. William Penn Life Ins. Co.*, 138 N.J. 627, 635 (1995).  Plaintiffs may also implausibly counter that there was no detrimental reliance based on [...]’s misrepresentation.  However, this is contrary to the undisputed facts: [...] was erroneously enrolled in the CCIP for a brief window based on its misrepresentation; Plaintiffs filed claims seeking coverage for [...]; [...] has expended substantial resources defending such claims; and [...] could potentially be liable for such claims based on [...]’s misrepresentation.  Additionally, [...], [...] and [...] were not aware that [...] continued to work at the site for anything other than the excluded demolition work.  ([...] Tr., 56:8-12 at Pa963; Enrollment Status Reports at PA2257-PA2285.)  Thus, if [...] is found to have been enrolled at the time of the Accident, the CCIP Policies should be rescinded with regard to [...].
[brief] The two MOAs are nearly identical and provide:  Notwithstanding the provisions of the relevant collective negotiations agreements regarding salary adjustments for promotions, the parties agree that the [...] may effectuate such promotions as it deems necessary from Police Officer to Sergeant with no increase in pay until a salary increase, including rank deferential[sic] and any other increase, is ratified between the [...], the [...], and the [...], or until such salary increases are awarded by an interest arbitrator in accordance with the statutory provisions set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16, et seq.
[brief] A.  Capital Improvements cannot be included  The Hoboken Rent Control Ordinance has a method by which a landlord can apply for compensation for capital improvements, and it is not the hardship process.  DA34.  Landlords are explicitly prohibited from including monies invested in capital improvements in its application for a hardship increase.  DA31 at A(4) (stating “operating expenses shall not include depreciation, amortization of debt service or capital expenditures”).  Moreover, there is significant dispute over what, if any, actual improvements were done to [...]’s unit (a dispute that would have been more properly hashed out in a hearing for a rent surcharge for a capital improvement).  [...] claims it put $76,000 into the unit twenty years ago.  [...] testified that much work was done in the apartment, including adding central air, adding a second bedroom, adding a second bathroom, putting in a “brand new” kitchen.  1T6:14-17.  However, nearly all of this was contradicted by [...]’s testimony and the landlord’s own expert witness.  1T74:2-75:1 ([...] testifying that the walls were not all removed from his kitchen, that it was not gutted, that there is only one bedroom in the apartment, and that he does not have central air); 5T65:4-13 ([...] testifying that no carpeting was put in); 7T:85:6-9 (“[...] testifying that “Having been there for the entire construction of the..conversion of the condos where everything was gutted except my apartment, most of my apartment is exactly what it had been”); 7T:85:9 ([...] testifying that his apartment “largely looks the same that it did when I moved in. ”).  1T53:22-23 (landlord’s expert testifying that the unit is a one bedroom with one bath).  Ultimately, the Board determined that the capital improvements were too long ago to add current value to the apartment and the RCO prohibits the Board from considering “capital improvements” in hardship applications anyway.  11T176:9-13 (Board member summing up consensus that capital expenditures were past useful life and did not contribute to equity).  III.
[brief] (16T).  However, when the court came back the following day and re-opened the cross-examination of [...], this became fair game.  The Defense was permitted to make the inference that there was motive to fabricate yet again, and so the State was permitted to respond in kind.  [T]he trial court has broad discretionary power over decisions such as whether and to what extent to allow re-direct and re-cross-examinations, whether a witness can be re-called, and whether a party may reopen its case.  Judicial discretion in this regard will rarely be overturned on appeal; even in criminal cases, where the defendant is afforded the greatest possible latitude in presenting a case, the judge may require that a criminal defendant testify at a certain point in the trial, rather than when the defendant wanted to testify.
[brief] Achey v. Cellco P’ship, 475 N.J. Super. 446, 454 (App. Div. 2023) (citing Vasquez v. Glassboro Serv. Ass’n, Inc., 83 N.J. 86, 98(1980)).  Additionally, an arbitration clause can be invalidated upon grounds that exist at law or equity for the revocation of a contract including generally applicable contract defenses such as unconscionability, fraud, or duress.  Id. at 454-55 (quoting Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 85(2002); Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289, 304(2016)).  Accordingly, New Jersey courts must utilize a synergistic blending of public policy analysis and contract interpretation to ensure that pre-suit arbitration agreements do not inherently disrupt the power dynamic between physicians and patients, such that patients are rendered wholly legally disabled.  Procedural History and Statement of Facts
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Dated: August 16, 2024  By: [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  In the Matter of the Application of [...] to the [...] for Minor Site Plan Approval with Variances  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c) to Permit the Operation of a Class 5 Dispensary for the Sale of Adult Use Recreational Cannabis at the Subject Property  Located at [...], Block 158, Lot 3.01, in the City of [...], [...]  Docket No.: [...]
[directive] The law enforcement executive shall conduct an annual review of all vehicular pursuit incidents in their department.  The review shall include, at a minimum, the following: (a) analytical reports from the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal; (b) an audit of BWCs and other videos on a risk-based and randomly selected basis; (c) any internal affairs complaints; and (d) an analysis of vehicular pursuits to ensure that they are being conducted without discrimination based on race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, disability, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, or any other protected characteristic.
[brief] (Pa 48)  For review in the Superior and Appellate Courts, it is well established that the factual determinations of a Zoning Board enjoy a presumption of validity.  A Board’s determinations will not be overturned unless arbitrary and capricious or unreasonable, and the burden of proving such is upon the plaintiff.  Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of the Twp. of Franklin, 233 N.J. 546, 558 (2018); Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536, 551 (2015); Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 284 (2013); Toll Bros., Inc. v. Burlington County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 194 N.J. 223, 256 (2008); Jock v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of the Twp. of Wall, 184 N.J. 562, 597 (2005); Cell v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of West Windsor Twp., 172 N.J. 75, 81-82 (2002); Berninger v. Board of Adjustment of Midland Park, 254 N.J. Super. 401, 407 (App. Div. 1991), aff’d o.b., 127 N.J. 226 (1992).
[brief] For all practical purposes, one can understand that Plaintiffs’ predecessor, the [...], upon taking title, would expect that the beach club would pass club rules such as prohibitions on alcohol use or dogs on the beaches, rules related to the operation of the recreational facilities, etcetera.  However, it is unfathomable that the [...] would have contemplated that the beach club would impose construction rules and height restrictions on building.  Defendant also claims error in failing to name an indispensable party, namely the developers, [...], and [...]