ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] DETERMINATIONS OF MATERIALITY SHOULD BE MADE BY A JURY, NOT THE TRIAL COURT (5-8).  At the time Defendants moved for summary judgment on August 4, 2021, the Discovery End Date was November 5, 2021—more than three months hence.  Defendants should have been afforded that time to complete fact discovery, including depositions of [...] before summary judgment was considered, especially because of the reliance by Defendants and the court on the factual statements of [...].  By way of example, the trial court relied on [...]’s certification in holding that the representations in the Policy Applications were material and relied on by Defendants.  [3T27-13.]  On the issue of materiality, Defendants cite to Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co. of N.J., 121 N.J. 530, 542 (1990), and Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Manzo, 122 N.J. 104 (1991), to define materiality as a “fact” that “a reasonable insurer would have considered the misrepresented fact relevant to its concerns and important in determining its course of action. ”  Longobardi, at 542.  Notably, in both cases, the determination of materiality was made after a trial, not on summary judgment. \(^1\)  The issue of materiality is a factual determination that requires both an opportunity for Plaintiffs to take discovery, including the deposition of [...], and an evidentiary hearing.  While Defendants freely cite to [...]’s factual assertions in his certification on this appeal (\textit{e.g.}, Db37, 39), they argue against an opportunity for Plaintiffs to test those assertions in discovery.  Further, the trial court usurped the role of the jury by determining, based only on [...]’s certification, that the representations in the Policy Applications --- \(^1\) Colony Ins. Co. v. Kwasnik, Kanowitz & Assoc. P.C., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87659, *9 (D.N.J. June 27, 2014) is distinguishable because, unlike here, the facts in that case concerning whether the responses to application questions were false, was uncontested. were material and that Defendants would not have issued the Policy.  See Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J. 236, 253-254 (2001). ²  IV.
[brief] POINT I  THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL THAT MR. LANE WAS IN A PHYSICAL ALTERCATION WITH TWO MEN—ONE OF WHOM WAS ARMED WITH THE HANDGUN THAT ULTIMATELY BECAME THE LETHAL WEAPON—WAS SUFFICIENT UNDER THE LAW TO REQUIRE THE TRIAL COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON PASSION/PROVOCATION MANSLAUGHTER UPON REQUEST BY DEFENSE COUNSEL.  Several aspects of the State’s response to [...]’s passion/provocation argument warrant a brief reply.  First, the State repeatedly harps on the idea that, because [...] went to the house (where he lived) knowing he was not wanted there by his romantic partner’s daughter, [...], he may have had some blame in the beginning of the argument and, thus, was precluded from receiving an instruction on passion/provocation manslaughter.  (Sb8-10).  For several reasons, this argument falls short.  As an initial matter, [...] was not solely responsible for the events that ensued.  [...] returned to the house with the two victims (and others) with an eye towards potentially confronting [...].  (5T107-5 to 109-12).  Specifically, when [...] told her brother, [...], what had been going on that night, he was very angry and told her to bring him to the house.  Moreover, there was no testimony that [...] initiated the physical fight that ended in the shooting, or even that he started the verbal confrontation that preceded the physical fight.  Nor did [...] introduce a gun into the situation; rather, it was [...]’s brother, who insisted she bring him to the house, who was armed with the handgun.
[brief] This appeal seeks to reverse the Decisions and Orders of the Honorable [...], J.S.C., of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County (“Lower Court” or “trial court”), dated October 20, 2023 and entered in the Clerk of the Court (“Clerk’s Office”), on October 20, 2023 (“October 20th Orders”).  The October 20th Orders correctly granted Defendants-Respondents, [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), [...] (“[...]”), and [...] (“[...]”) (collectively, “Respondents’”), Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff-Appellant, [...]’s (“Appellant”), Complaint (“Respondents’ Motion”).  The Lower Court correctly granted Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss and correctly denied Appellant’s Motion Cross-Motion to Vacate the default judgment entered in the separate Collection Action (later defined herein), transfer the Collection Action from the Collection Court to the Lower Court, and consolidate the Collection Action with the instant action (“Appellant’s Motion”) as moot.  The Lower Court held (1) Appellant lacks standing because there is no private right of action for a violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (N.J.S.A. § 56:8-1 et seq.) (“NJCFA”) or New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (N.J.S.A. § 17:11C-33 (b)) (“NJCFLA”); (2) the NJCFA does not apply to Respondents (including any debt buyers) to the extent they are not engaged in consumer oriented commercial transactions involving the sale of merchandise or services; and (3) even if the NJCFA applied, Appellant has not and cannot allege the elements of a claim under the NJCFA.  Regardless, Appellant’s claims are precluded by a binding class action settlement agreement between the parties (defined and discussed below), as well as the doctrines of *res judicata* and entire controversy.  For all these reasons, this Court should affirm the Lower Court’s Orders.
[brief] Pb36.  [...] claims her Rule 4:5-1 Certification was accurate when filed (Pb36), while ignoring her continuing obligation to amend such Certification.  [...] also fails to explain how her Certification could have possibly been accurate when filed and inaccurate later, when the document upon which she relies to compel arbitration pre-existed her Complaint by more than eleven years.  She also makes the conclusory statement that her failure to assert arbitrability as an affirmative defense is of no moment in the face of substantial legal precedent to the contrary.  See Marmo and Sons General Contracting LLC v. Biagi Farms, LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 593, 613 (App. Div. 2024); Hopkins v. LVNC Funding, LLC, et al., A-1301-23 at p. 14-15 (App. Div. February 10, 2025) (Approved for Publication) (Da405-20).  Selection of Chancery Court as her forum for filing, coupled with a certification of non-arbitrability and no affirmative defense related to arbitration, along with actively litigating the case until only two months before trial constitutes undeniable waiver of any right to compel arbitration.  As to the trial date, [...] admits that it was scheduled to begin only two months after the date of oral argument, but makes the unsupported and conclusory statement that this close proximity somehow weighs in favor of arbitration.  Pb36-37.  [...]’s position is nonsensical and contrary to the law.  See Ringel v. BR Lakewood, LLC, No. A-1785-18T2, 2020 WL 3263221, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 17, 2020) (finding trial date having been set for June 2019, where motions to compel arbitration were filed over six months earlier in October and November 2018, weighed in favor of waiver).  Finally, the prejudice faced by Appellants is not speculative.  Appellants have and will continue to suffer from the inherent unfairness inflicted by [...]’s forum shopping “in terms of delay, expense, or damage to” Appellant’s legal position caused by [...] forcing Appellants to litigate her claims in the Chancery Division and then in arbitration despite the complete absence of an applicable arbitration provision.  See Hopkins, A-1301-23 at pp. 15-16.  The costs associated with arbitration alone, not to mention [...]’s delay tactics (Da384-92; Pa8-123) and ongoing litigation costs for a case that should have concluded last summer in the Chancery Court where [...] filed it, are significantly harmful, burdensome, and unjust.  The totality of the circumstances are analogous to Marmo, 478 N.J. Super. 593 and undoubtedly evinces [...]’s waiver.  See Db23-31.  In this case, arbitration cannot be compelled.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] ”).  [...] failed to establish any of these factors, much less with clear and convincing evidence.  [...] was not seeking a status quo injunction that would have left the parties in the same place during the pendency of the litigation.  The opposite is true.  The status quo is that [...] was bound by the terms of the Restrictive Covenant at the time he filed his application:  “Physician expressly agrees that during the term of this agreement and for a period of five (5) years following termination....” (Ra27, ¶ 8.1).  After five years, [...] sought to reverse the status quo and to have the Court specifically terminate a restriction that has been in place throughout his employment.  This is improper.  It is also contrary to settled New Jersey law, including prior decisions enforcing the very same Restrictive Covenant. (Ra61-91).
[brief] After leaving [...], he did apply for several jobs with other companies, establishing that he was able, available, and actively seeking more accommodating employment.  T25-19 to T27-1.  After hearing the testimony of both [...] and his employer, [...], and notwithstanding [...]’s medical documentation, the Appeal Tribunal and the Board of Review both erroneously found that [...] had not met his burden to establish that he had left his employment for good ---  3  Please note that Pa40 correctly references the date of the x-rays as January of 2021; however, page Pa42 incorrectly notes the x-rays as having been taken on January 22, 2022.  The correct date of the x-rays is January 22, 2021.  See Pa47. cause related to the work.  As a result, they disqualified him from receiving benefits, and issued a refund demand in the amount of $8,272.00.
[brief] Volume II Confidential Adult Presentence Report, dated June 9, 1978 ........................................................................Pa211  Confidential Adult Presentence Report, dated November 30, 1979  Pa219  Confidential Adult Presentence Report, date of sentence January 23, 1981 .....................................................Pa233  Various memorandum from [...], dates ranging from October 15, 1979, to November 2, 1979 .......................Pa234  Interview Notes from victim, dated April 27, 1967.................................Pa284  Memorandum from [...], undated ...........................................Pa288  Correspondence from [...] to Probation Officer, dated June 20, 1980..............................................................................Pa294  Confidential Adult Presentence Report, stamped “Received October 21, 1983”……………………………………………………………..Pa296  Pre-Parole Medical Report, dated September 28, 2022………………………Pa303  Psychological evaluation/risk assessment by [...], dated May 17, 2023…………………………………………………………..Pa305  Confidential crime scene photographs…………………………………………Pa330  CONFIDENTIAL INDEX OF APPENDIX  Volume III  Confidential Correspondence regarding Victim Services, dated September 12, 2002, to May 18, 2023 ………………………………Pa339  Confidential Mental Health Evaluation, dated November 30, 2022……………………………………………………Pa348  Confidential Static-99R Tally Sheet, dated October 26, 2022 ………………Pa358  Confidential Level of Service Inventory, dated October 26, 2022……………Pa359  Confidential Correspondence from the [...], with Addendum, dated December 15, 2022…………………Pa363  Confidential Reports Considered, dated May 15, 2023…………………………Pa388
[brief] R. 4:5-1(a); PRESSLER & VERNIERO, Current N.J. COURT RULES, Comment 1 to R. 4:5-1 (Gann) (stating “Perfection of the taking of the appeal requires both timely service as well as timely filing.  See e.g., Alberti v. Civil Serv. Comm., 41 N.J. 147, 154 (1963)...”)  Appellants filed a Motion to Amend Complaint.  The proposed amendment sought to add as defendants the CEP Parties’ representatives, [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”), as well as [...], [...], and [...].  [Pa288].  A Certification of Appellants’ counsel was submitted in support of that motion.  [Pa52].  Counsel certified that the amendment was precipitated by “issues that were discovered during discovery [which concluded April 20, 2021], and more particularly during depositions, and from certain OPRA records obtained from the Township after February 2021. ”  [Pa288; Pa52-53].  Appellants’ counsel also certified as to the claims being added, and/or relief being sought, against each of the proposed new defendants.  [Pa288; Pa52].  Yet, despite the bases cited to the trial court for the amendment as to the newly added defendants, the Certification did not indicate that any claims were being asserted against [...] and did not indicate that any relief was being sought against [...].  [Pa288].  On July 19, 2021, Appellants filed their First Amended Complaint in the Prior Action.  Consistent with the Certification of Appellants’ counsel submitted in support of the motion to amend, while the First Amended Complaint added claims against the various defendants, no claims were asserted, nor was any relief sought, against [...], though [...] was named as a defendant.  [Pa288; Pa53].  Prior thereto, on March 23, 2020 – nearly 16 months prior to the filing of the First Amended Complaint - [...] produced over 1,000 pages of documents in the Prior Action pursuant to a subpoena served by the CEP Parties’ counsel.  [Pa288].  On November 20, 2020, eight (8) months prior to the filing of the First Amended Complaint in the Prior Action, Appellants’ counsel conducted the deposition of [...], who was a consultant to [...] in connection with allegations made in the action.  [Pa288].  On January 15, 2021, six (6) months prior to the filing of the First Amended Complaint, Appellants’ counsel conducted the deposition of [...]’s representative, [...]  [Pa289].  B.
[brief] Dated: June 24, 2024  Superior Court of New Jersey – Appellate Division  Letter Brief  Appellate Docket No. [...]  [...], Esq. [...] [...]  [...]  Attorney ID – 01663199401  Our File No. 90671  WSB  July 11, 2024  Letter Brief on Behalf of: [...] t/a [...]  [...] v. [...], [...]  Plaintiff Defendants Case Type: Civil County/Agency: Hudson Trial Court/Agency Docket No.: [...]  Trial Court Judge/Agency Name: Hon. [...], A.J.S.C.  To the Honorable Judges of the Appellate Division:
[brief] Surprisingly, the trial court’s August 31, 2022 analysis and decision on the post-remand legal fee issue was not, in any significant respect, different from its ruling that had been vacated in the first appeal.  (Da271)  The trial court, in its first legal fee decision, had relied upon the Administrator’s statement in a certification (Da186-195) that, in the Administrator’s opinion, Plaintiff should receive all the attorney fees incurred up to January 5, 2017 (Da212-218), and that Defendant should receive legal fees for all activity after that date.  The trial court not only failed to assess the equities of the case to determine whether fee shifting was appropriate under Rule 4:42:9(a)(2), but the trial court adopted the Administrator’s statement without any investigation whatsoever into the actual work that was performed by Plaintiff’s counsel during the time period prior to January 5, 2017, to determine whether the work complied with other requirements of the “fund in court” rule, Rule 4:42:9(a)(2).  Although the Appellate Division criticized the trial court’s approach, the court used the same approach on the remand, as more particularly described below.  The court, in adopting the Administrator’s suggestion, completely ignored the Administrator’s cautionary statement in his certification:  “This Certification does not address any of the legal arguments advanced by the parties as to whether fees ought to be awarded or the factors the Court considers as to the reasonableness of the fees sought as provided in the Rules of Court and by applicable law. ” (Da188, Para 8) (emphasis added).  The Administrator’s suggestion that Plaintiff was cooperating with him prior to January 5, 2017 was obviously based upon the nature of the interactions between them during that time.  During that period, Plaintiff’s activity consisted of explaining his allegations to the Administrator; Plaintiff was more than happy to expound upon them.  As was later explained by the Administrator in his Report, Plaintiff had failed to produce any evidence to support his allegations, and the Administrator concluded that the Defendant “fully cooperated” with his investigation.  (Da312-314)  From Defendant’s perspective, the Administrator’s suggestion that Defendant had not cooperated with him prior to that date was largely based upon the fact that Defendant was resisting demands (that had originated with Plaintiff) that he supply information and documents as to matters that the trial court had already ruled were not a part of the case.  The Appellate Division not only reversed the court’s initial fee award and vacated the amount of legal fees awarded, but the Appellate Division also provided instructions regarding the review that was to be conducted on the remand.
[directive] Violation of Probation Directive #34A-65 July 11, 1966  Issued by: [...] Administrative Director Recently the Supreme Court was requested to express its views as to where responsibility rests for the prosecution of defendants charged with violating the terms of probation - on the prosecutor's office or on the probation department.  The Supreme Court considered this matter at its conference on July 1, 1966 and concluded that such matters are the responsibility of the County Prosecutor and should be prosecuted by his or her office and not by a member of the probation staff.
[brief] \(^5\) --- \(^4\)  Although this is an unpublished decision, it is referenced here not for its precedential value but to set forth the history of this case, not implicating R. 1:36-3.  \(^5\)  Appellant has brought a separate appeal of that decision, which has been fully briefed but remains pending under Appellate Docket No. [...].  Meanwhile, on June 2, 2022, [...] denied Appellant’s motion in limine to limit the record on Respondent’s complaint in lieu of prerogative writ (Aa214).  [...] then heard oral argument on Respondent’s prerogative writ complaint in September 2022 and, on December 1, 2022, issued a written decision finding that the Second Resolution was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, “clearly not supported by the facts or law, and beyond the jurisdiction of the [Board]” (Aa276).  The court granted the relief sought by Respondent, denied all relief sought by Appellant, and nullified the Second Resolution (Aa270-Aa288).  This appeal follows.
[brief] Far from automatic approval, the recognized relief affords [...] every opportunity to contest suitability of the property for the project in an open public hearing.  As the Appellate Division held in Dowel Associates, once a municipality “committed the site to satisfy its affordable [housing] its Land Use Board can no longer protect its uniquely local interest or exclusively exercise its right to prevent approval in the way a local Planning Board otherwise would,” and it is instead subject to the separate test of site suitability.  403 N.J. Super. 1, 24 (App. Div. 2008).  This procedure allows courts and implementation monitors to respect local concerns regarding suitability while being empowered to “eliminat[e] unnecessary cost-producing requirements and restrictions,” Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 217, including, among others, “minimums for frontages, setbacks, front yards, and home sizes. ”  Id. at 295.  Any local zoning requirement that imposes a “significant impediment” to the court-ordered affordable housing is set aside to accomplish the constitutional objective.
[brief] Please accept this letter reply brief on behalf of the Appellant.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  REPLY TO COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS.................. ......................2  LEGAL ARGUMENT  POINT I: THE APPELLANT’S EMPLOYMENT  HISTORY IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO REMOVE HER NAME FROM THE PROMOTION LIST.  (AA0001-8;AA0009-16)  .........................6  POINT II: THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO THE PROMOTIONAL APPOINTMENT UNDER N.J.A.C. 4A:5-2.2(C) (AA0001-8;AA0009-16)...........................................  10 CONCLUSION.......................................................... .......................................................  12
[brief] This Court has a unique opportunity to rectify this outrageous circumstance.  More specifically, since the lien holder still maintains title to the property, the Court reasonably can permit [...] the opportunity to redeem and pay the taxes and reimburse any reasonable expenses incurred by the lien holder.  In this circumstance, the lien holder is made whole and [...] gets his property back along with its substantial equity.  This result is exactly the purpose of a court of equity.  This appeal requesting an Order to vacate judgment and permit [...] to redeem the tax foreclosure were submitted in light of New Jersey’s recent seismic shift in the law which in finally putting a stop to the tax lien holders being permitted to steal property owner’s equity in their homes.  This case was a textbook example of an appropriate scenario for the Court to exercise its authority to avoid a grossly unjust result.  As such, the defendant-appellant, [...] T. Kemp respectfully requests that the Appellate Court reverse the trial court order denying reconsideration, vacate foreclosure judgment and permit [...] to redeem his home.
[brief] The EMP statute states “the intention of the Legislature that the actions, decisions, determinations and rulings of the State Government with respect to energy shall to the maximum extent practicable and feasible conform with the energy master plan. ”  N.J.S.A. 52:27F-15b.  The dispute here does not turn on the Board’s interpretation of the EMP statute cited above.  Indeed, as noted and in contrast with Compressor Station, the Board here addressed the “conformance” requirement of the EMP statute with its finding that the Project “is consistent with the EMP’s goals. ”  Ha55.  [...] takes issue with the Board’s interpretation and application of the goals stated in EMP itself, which is the Board’s own policy document.
[brief] Defendants’ Repeated Efforts to Bar [...]’s Report  As detailed infra, Defendants repeatedly tried to bar [...]’s expert report by arguing that the report was a net opinion and that Plaintiffs could not prove damages because of the “new business rule. ”  218a-221a; 243a-258a.  The Hon. [...], J.S.C., denied in its entirety a motion for summary judgment by Defendants [...] and [...] on those bases.  229a.  Those Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of that denial, as did Defendants [...] and [...], both of which Judge Weiss denied.  243a; 241a; 298a-299a; 300a-301a.  Each time, Judge Weiss offered detailed reasons for those decisions, which rejected Defendants’ net opinion argument and held the “new business rule” inapplicable.  237a-238a; 306a-307a; 2T 32:13-33:14.  Defendants’ final attempt was the motion filed by Defendants [...] and [...] that sought to bar [...]’s report.  259a-260a.
[brief] ”  (1T116, 4-8)  He therefore gave no consideration to those items which were obviously related functionally to those uses as of the taking were integrated into that use and added substantial value to the property as devoted to the existing use at the time of the taking.  The purpose of the Court in Gallant was to protect the property owner and others similarly situated as leasehold owners from the loss of value when articles attached to an ongoing concern, where they produce an enhancement value often as great as it did when new, are then separated and worth nothing but secondhand salvage value.