ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Moreover, the trial court determined that [...]’s position concerning her lack of access to lawyers during the divorce was not credible:  Although the court finds that [...] did not represent her in a review of the PSA or other documents challenged, the court does find that defendant with reasonable diligence could have requested [...] to review the agreement or could have requested a referral from her to an attorney who had specialized knowledge of matrimonial law and could review it for her.  She also, with reasonable diligence, could have contacted an attorney to review the PSA directly.  Defendant attempts to convince the court that she was so controlled by plaintiff and that she was helpless to understand the surrounding circumstances of the execution of the MMA, PSA and divorce process do not hold weight with the court.  [Id. at 24].
[brief] 3.  Beginning in 2020, a ten-year period of ascertaining how best to convert the remaining buildings served by natural gas is then followed by implementation that accomplishes significant reductions all the way to total decarbonization in 2050.  Thus, by 2030, the state's incentives and experiments with the best way of electrifying buildings then served by natural gas will have borne fruit, and the conversion of those homes will be underway.  At that point, obviously, the load on the 16-inch line will begin, if it has not already begun, a decrease down to zero or close to zero if there are any industrial customers that use natural gas as a feedstock.  Given the number of buildings served by natural gas, this conversion cannot be gradual or leisurely if the 2050 decarbonization goal is to be met.  The recently issued DEP report, "New Jersey's Global Warming Response Act: 80x50 Report," which we discuss next, elaborates on the implementation of the final stage of decarbonization.
[brief] There, the Appellate Division recognized the distinct authority in the redevelopment context to defray costs pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8(f).  The court reasoned that [...] could not require [...] to pay contributions towards off-tract infrastructure costs built by Asbury’s selected redeveloper because [...] was not in fact a redeveloper.  Id. at 564-565.  The court states very clearly that the authority to negotiate revenues to defray costs is a distinct power in the redevelopment context arising from the LRHL:  As part of that statutory scheme, and in order “to carry out and effectuate the purposes of this act and the terms of the redevelopment plan,” the municipality or its designated redevelopment entity may “negotiate and collect revenue from a redeveloper to defray the costs of the redevelopment entity. ”  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8f.  Significant to this appeal, however, is the fact that the sums may be collected only from a redeveloper […]
[brief] \footnote{See, e.g., Allen v. Fauver, 167 N.J. 69, 75 (2001)("The legislative response to the issue of abrogation of sovereign immunity for tort and contract liability came in 1972 in the form of the Tort Claims Act... and the Contractual Liability Act...."); N.J. Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Gruzen P'ship, 125 N.J. 66, 69 (1991) ("The Legislature responded by enacting the Tort Claims Act... and the Contractual Liability Act....").}  The TCA affords State government bodies advance notice of tortious claims only so that they may perform timely investigations, compelling “a claimant to expose his intention and information early in the process in order to permit the public entity to undertake an investigation while witnesses are available and the facts are fresh. ”\footnote{D.D. v. UMDNJ, 213 N.J. 130, 146 (2013)(citation omitted).}
[directive] Those guidelines, which remain effect, provide that in such dismissal may only be approved by the judge when:  The prosecutor represents the record that there insufficient evidence to on is 1. warrant a conviction, or that the possibility of acquittal so great that dismissal is is warranted the interests of justice; or in  A plea being entered the defendant to offense (a) requiring a parole by is an 2. ineligibility term under Chapter (now N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)), or (b) requiring not 31 a mandatory parole ineligibility term but where the negotiated plea acknowledges that a parole ineligibility term is to be imposed at least equal length to that which in would have been required for the offense being dismissed; or The prosecutor states the record, either camera or open court, that the on in in 3. plea bargain essential to ensure defendant's cooperation with the prosecution.
[brief] Id. at 500 (citing Waskevich v. Herold Law, P.A., 431 N.J. Super. 293, 298 (App. Div. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating “courts examine arbitration provisions on a case-by-case basis”)).  First, as our Supreme Court “has repeatedly recognized in arbitration disputes: ‘The consumer context of the contract matter[s].’”  Id. at 502 (quoting Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 320 (2019)).  [...]’s agreement is contained within a contract of adhesion.  Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 189 N.J. 1, 15 (2006).  As such contracts are presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the only meaningful negotiating power consumers such as [...] have is to walk away and not participate in the deal.
[brief] Specifically, Trust Paragraph 4.1(A)(a) originally stated:  “If the property located at [...] is still owned by the trust at the time of my death, I grant my son’s, [...] and [...], the power to purchase their sister’s share of such [Boonton] property at the then fair market value. ”  (3a)  This was changed to: “I grant my son’s, [...] and [...], individually and not jointly, the power to purchase the entire Boonton Property in accordance with a sealed bidding procedure. ”  Additionally, Trust Paragraph 4.1(A)(b) originally stated: “If the property located at [...] is still owned by the trust at the time of my death, I grant my daughter, [...], the power to purchase both her brother’s shares in such [Florida] property valued at the then fair market value. ”  (3a)  This was changed to:  “I grant my daughter, [...], the power to purchase the entire Florida Property at a date-of-death appraised value of $360,000. ”  “Because reformation may involve the addition of language to the instrument, or the deletion of language that may appear clear on its face, reliance on extrinsic evidence is essential. ”  2010 UTC with Comments, Section 415, Page 78.  “To guard against the possibility of unreliable or contrived evidence in such circumstance, the higher standard of clear and convincing proof is required. ”  Ibid.  “In determining the settlor’s original intent, the court may consider evidence relevant to the settlor’s intention even though it contradicts an apparent plain meaning of the text.  The objective of the plain meaning rule, to protect against fraudulent testimony, is satisfied by the requirement of clear and convincing proof. ”  Ibid.  With this approach, the trial court’s reformation of the Trust overlooked controlling law and the more rigorous clear-and-convincing standard of proof should have been applied.
[brief] As was case with the plaintiff’s expert in *Taylor*, [...] has been unable to point to a single document in support of his threshold opinion.  During the initial day of his deposition, [...] readily conceded that the articulation of his opinion is not predicated upon any of the following sources of information: - [...]’s contractual obligations; - Any standards promulgated for [...] projects; - The contents of any Standard or Special Provisions associated with [...] projects; - Any ethical standards applicable to the professional engineering community; or - Any regulatory authority, statute or case law.
[brief] Plaintiff seeks a judicial declaration that the so-called “Arbitration Clause,” in this consumer contract between Defendant and the consumer (i) violates the public policy of the State of New Jersey; (ii) is unconscionable on both procedural and substantive grounds; and (iii) cannot be enforced.  In fact, when actually examined in its entirety, the provision is not an “arbitration agreement” within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act or the New Jersey Arbitration Act because it fails to impose a mutual obligation to arbitrate.  At the outset of this discussion, this Court should note the difference between what Plaintiff will refer to as an “uneven” clause and a “one-sided” clause.  An “uneven” clause is one which reserves to the drafter the right to file a legal action to seek relief unavailable to it through arbitration, such as foreclosure.  See Delta Funding, 189 N.J. at 116.  That type of clause is not before this Court.  A “one-sided” arbitration clause is one which, expressly or in actual effect, excuses the commercial drafter entirely from the duty to arbitrate, although imposing such a duty on the consumer.  The clause at issue allows Defendant to opt out of arbitration to pursue amounts allegedly due to it under the agreement.  Since this is the only claim that could possibly exist in favor of Defendant against Plaintiff, and because this type of remedy can be granted to it through arbitration, this clause is a “one-sided” arbitration clause.
[brief] The labor organization’s rights should not and cannot be curtailed merely by an employer’s concern of how things could, but did not, go astray.  To find otherwise for the Board here would be throwing out the baby with the bathwater.  Simply because team bargaining is a more recent concept in New Jersey does not mean that we should be scared of it or try to prevent labor organizations from considering this option.  Adopting the Board’s argument requires believing the fiction that [...] is unable to manage the collective bargaining process.  We know, though, that if there comes a situation in which the [...] or any other bargaining unit presents a negotiations team which the employer can show is actually interfering with the collective negotiations process, [...] is more than capable of assessing the situation.  The Board has not and cannot provide a persuasive reasoning for why the tools already in the toolbelt of the State agency best equipped to address this situation would be unable to promote good faith bargaining.  Accordingly, this Court must reject the Board’s argument.
[brief] LEGAL POINT VI.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING MY REQUEST TO COMPEL [...] TO PRODUCE AN ASSIGNMENT OF THE NOTE AND ASSIGNMENT OF THE MORTGAGE FROM [...] TO [...].  Raised Below: paragraph 38 (029a).  In 1T page 8 lines 2-6.  Bayview did not oppose and did not deny my claims and arguments.  The denial order is at (221a).  LEGAL POINT VII
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 2  1.0.7  This policy contains mandates that, at the Attorney General’s direction, every law enforcement agency must implement.  In some areas, the manner in which these agencies must implement these mandates is a decision that is left to the individual law enforcement agency’s discretion.  For instance, every agency must establish an internal affairs function.  But certain aspects of the manner in which the mandate is satisfied are left to the discretion of the individual agencies.  Individual agencies shall decide, based on the characteristics of their jurisdiction and the workload of their agency, whether the internal affairs function is a full- or part-time unit and how many officers are assigned to work in that unit.  1.0.8
[brief] THE DECISION IN DUNBAR, WHILE NOT FACTUALLY SIMILAR TO THIS MATTER, SUPPORTS THE PLANNING BOARD’S APPLICATION OF THE TOA RULE.  Throughout their opposition, Plaintiffs attempt to characterize the decision in Dunbar as factually analogous to this matter and “dispositive” against the Planning Board’s application of the TOA Rule.  That argument misses the mark.  In *Dunbar*, unlike here, the issue was whether the Zoning Board of Adjustment acted arbitrarily when it determined that an applicant had not submitted a complete application for development to the Planning Board prior to the effective date of a new ordinance.  See *Dunbar*, 233 N.J. at 550.  In this matter, the issue is whether the Planning Board acted arbitrarily when it determined that [...]’ submission of a complete application to a different statutorily-created municipal agency – the [...] – triggered the TOA Rule.  The answer to that question is “no.
[brief] Then she said I could not file charges against [...] and [...] in her court:  “[...]: There’s another reason, Your Honor.  [...] is a defendant in this case.  And [...] and [...] have filed fake documents, registered and recorded fake documents in [...].  THE COURT: What does that have to do with your case?”  [...]: Because I don’t think I can file, I want to file charges against [...] and [...] -- THE COURT: Well, you’re not filing them with me. ”  Right after the 1/6/17 hearing [...] continued to ignore my discovery requests and my notices for depositions.  On 1/13/17 my expert witness, [...], added her affidavit to the state case docket on eCourt.  In her affidavit she stated that the alleged assignments of 2/27/2009 (065a) and 2/28/2014 (097a) did not transfer any value from [...] to [...], or [...], or [...].  And the Affidavit of Lost Note of 2/12/2014 fabricated by [...] (088a) was worthless.  On 1/27/17 [...] filed a motion for summary judgment based on the four forged mortgage documents.  I responded and filed my own motion to dismiss.  On 3/3/17 in the hearing for Summary Judgment Motion [...] admitted the four forged documents submitted by [...] as evidence against my property because they were “recorded” in the Hall of Records.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PRECLUDED [...]’S TESTIMONY AS TO BZE ALLEGEDLY FOUND IN THE DEFENDANT’S SYSTEM BECAUSE ITS INTRODUCTION ONLY SERVED AS EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVING THE DEFENDANT’S GUILT.  (Pa 24)  Pursuant to N.J.R.E. 404(b), “…evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a person’s disposition in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in conformity with such disposition. ”  The New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted a four-part test to determine the admissibility of other crime or civil wrong evidence.  State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992).  Specifically, the “other crime or civil wrong evidence” must be: (1) Admissible as relevant to the material issue; (2) Similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; (3) Clear and convincing; and (4) Of sufficient probative value not outweighed by its apparent prejudice.  Id.  Since the testimony as to the BZE allegedly found in the defendant’s system is irrelevant, unclear, and its probative value is greatly outweighed by its apparent prejudice, the trial court properly excluded it.
[brief] ]  And the manufacturer covered nearly all of the cost of the failures, and there were no service outages:  Q.  Subpart A, the answer you were just referring to, October 2019, two additional panel failures.  How many panels were involved?  A.  Two panels.  Q.  Two panels.  Thank you.  The answer to subpart D you state that "The parts associated with the panel failures and replacement were covered by the manufacturer."
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.15(a).  In fact, the [...] expressly precludes brewers and wholesalers from waiving or modifying, by contract or otherwise, “any provision” of the [...].  Ibid.  For example, the District of New Jersey has expressly invalidated a portion of a contract between a wholesaler and brewer because it was in conflict with the [...].
[brief] ”  Pa148.  Enrollment in the CCIP could only be established by a Certificate of Liability Insurance.  Pa588.  Inasmuch as the definition or identity of “named insureds” under the CCIP Policy is somehow ambiguous (it is not), courts look to the intent of the parties and interpret any ambiguities in favor of the insured and its reasonable expectations.  Martusus v. Tartamosa, 150 N.J. 148, 159-60 (1997).
[brief] That the Redevelopment Plan originally included a 50-foot-wide greenway at the Property evidences this desire, and the expansion of that area to be made available to the public only furthers that goal.  Plaintiffs’ argument that the density of the developable portion of the property must be rejected for its refusal to examine the context of Plaintiffs’ prior 550-unit proposal during the Builder’s Remedy Action, compared to the Amended Redevelopment Plan.  Their attempt to contrast the rejection of their proposal for the higher-density development in the Builder’s Remedy Action with the density proposed in the Amended Redevelopment Plan does not tell the whole story.  Plaintiffs’ 550-unit proposal proposed a 25 units/acre density for the entire tract, whereas the 27 units/acre development allowed by the Redevelopment Plan covers only 11 acres of the Property.  The higher density in the Amended Redevelopment Plan is coupled with the 11 acres of open space to be owned by the County and managed by the Borough, whereas the Plaintiffs’ proposal provided no open space.
[brief] By your own admission, the 2020 matter involves the same nucleus of facts and circumstances that were at issue in the 2015 case.  The issues in the new case all arise out of the previous Orders of this Court and you have failed to follow the procedural norms of the rules of litigation.  Our clients hereby reserve the right to seek sanctions, fees and costs pursuant to R. 1:4-8 and N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1.  Please be guided accordingly.
[brief] Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit on October 29, 2021, alleging claims for breach of contract, common law fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act against the LLC Defendant and [...], the latter of whom was later dismissed from the case.  Pa4-39.  On or about May 1, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint that, among other things, added [...] as a party.  Da32-43.  Plaintiffs allege that Defendants affirmatively concealed certain mold damage to an apartment building that the LLC Defendant had sold to Plaintiffs.  Id.  The entirety of the procedural history of this case is described in [...]’s Amplification of a Prior Decision.  Da6-11.  For purposes of the appeal, Plaintiffs state that by December 22, 2023, the trial court (Hon. [...] J.S.C.) struck the LLC Defendant’s Answer with prejudice for failure to answer discovery, and, by Order the same day, struck [...]’s Answer without prejudice, confirming a previous oral order from the bench of December 15, 2023.  Da29-31, Pa1-2.
[brief] 35  Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973)......................................  34  Orefice v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 2018 WL 5116952 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 22, 2018)............................................................................................  30 Phillips v. New Jersey Transit, 2022 WL 462089 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 2022) ...... 31 Rankin v. Smithburger, 2013 WL 3550894 (W.D. Pa. July 11, 2013)...........  22 Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 137 (1968)....................... 19, 21 Rosenberg v. Otis Elevator Co., 366 N.J. Super. 292 (App. Div. 2004).........  28 Rubin v. Nowak, 248 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 1991).................................. 24 Smith v. Datla, 451 N.J. Super. 82 (App. Div. 2017).................................... 32 Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108 (3d Cir. 1996).................................................. 22, 23 State v. Eldakroury, 439 N.J. Super. 304 (App. Div. 2015)............................ 33 State v. Hild, 148 N.J. Super. 294 (App. Div. 1977).................................... 32 State v. K.P.S., 221 N.J. 266 (2015)............................................................ 28 State v. Mosley, 228 N.J. 433 (2016) ......................................................... 2 State v. Mosley, 232 N.J. 169 (2018) .......................................................... 2 State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95 (1987) ..................................................... 31 Stoeckel v. Twp. of Knowlton, 387 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2006) .............. 30 Thigpen v. City of E. Orange, 408 N.J. Super. 331 (App. Div. 2009) ............ 30 Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450 (2014) ....................................................... 17 Van Engelen v. O'Leary, 323 N.J. Super. 141 (App. Div. 1999) .................... 40 Velez v. City of Jersey City, 180 N.J. 284 (2004) ........................................
[brief] Following submission of Respondents’ Supplemental Brief, [...] directed a letter to the Court objecting to the in-camera review of [...]’ Certification.  (Pa53).  Although Appellant objected to the in-camera review, Appellant did not request the opportunity to be heard nor did Appellant file a motion asking to be heard on the matter.  Respondent directed a letter to the Court responding to Appellant’s letter objecting to the *in-camera* review.  (Pa56).  In that letter, Respondent cited O Builders and stated that under O Builders if Appellant continued in its insistence to see the Certification, then “an appropriate screening device would be to engage substitute counsel to oppose the disqualification motion. ”  (Pa56), See also, O Builders, *supra*, 206 N.J. at 129.  On November 7, 2024, at the start of oral arguments, the Court stated that it had reviewed the caselaw on the submission of [...]’ Certification for *in-camera* review and found the submission to be appropriate and in conformity with O Builders.
[brief] It well-settled that the existence of a duty is a question of law.  Baen v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salem Cty., 318 N.J. Super. 260, 266 (App. Div. 1999).  However, where there is conflicting evidence about those elements essential to formation of a relationship giving rise to a duty, the existence of the relationship is an issue of fact.  See Froom v. Perel, 377 N.J. Super. 298, 310-12 (App. Div. 2005) (holding that the existence of an attorney-client relationship could not be determined as a matter of law due to conflicting evidence); Hernandez v. Velez, 267 N.J. Super. 353, 358 (Law Div. 1993) (dispute of fact over existence of agency relationship).
[brief] **STATE’S ARGUMENT REGARDING CLAIM DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A RESENTENCING, IS UNAVAILING TO PRESENT MATTER, BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO FOLLOW THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN IMPOSING SENTENCE DEFENDANT (3T20-4 to 3T24-18)**  Defendant urges this Court to look past the distinguishable caselaw relied on by the State in its brief, and determine the sentence imposed was in violation of the mandates of the Code thus making it excessive—and that consequently, a re-sentencing is required.