ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This goes well beyond drawing all legitimate inferences in favor of the opposing party, since “an inference can be drawn only from proved facts and cannot be based upon a foundation of pure conjecture, speculation, surmise or guess. ”  Prioleau v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, Inc., 434 N.J. Super. 558, 570–71 (App. Div. 2014), aff’d as modified and remanded, 223 N.J. 245 (2015); see also Knapp v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 123 N.J. Super. 26, 31 (App. Div. 1973) (“[T]hose inferences drawn are to be taken from established facts and may not be based upon a foundation of pure conjecture, speculation, surmise or guess.
[brief] The second page of that Deed shows a second paragraph including a very specific description which refers to the uplands (1T60:25).  It is a conveyance of 26.75 acres.  The next paragraph reads as follows:  “Together with such Riparian Rights and other rights, privileges and franchises in and unto the lands lying under the waters of the Raritan Bay in front of the adjoining described premises as are now vested in the party of the first part, which is [...]. ”  [...] confirms that this description in the Deed identifies the Grantee, as well as the land underwater and it refers to it being vested in the party [...] (1T61:25).  The Deed does not have to have a metes and bounds description.  It can use Deed recitals or a method of describing the property that is being conveyed and that is certainly broad enough (1T62:8).  There is nothing in the Deed from [...] to [...] that would indicate in the written document that they were conveying that Riparian Grant or lands under water (1T63:13).  In the description of the second paragraph of the Deed entirely different from the language in the Deed by which [...] took title (1T63:23).  There is nothing in that description referring to “Riparian Grant” or “lands under water” (1T64:11).  There is nothing in this document to interpret that [...] acquired a Riparian grant or the lands under water; he only acquired the upland:
[brief] In the case at bar, the defense presented an alibi witness, [...], and an inference of third-party guilt, along with the exculpatory testimony of [...].  Thus, credibility of witnesses was squarely in issue.  In determining whether a prosecutor's misconduct was sufficiently egregious, an appellate court "must take into account the tenor of the trial and the degree of responsiveness of both counsel and the court to improprieties when they occurred."
[brief] The Roads were Inspected and Received Final Approval from the Municipal Engineer, and the Performance Guarantees were Released (Da19)  It is beyond dispute that the Roads were inspected by, and received the final approval of, the Borough Engineer, and that Plaintiffs’ performance guarantees were released upon such final approval.  The record shows that at the times when the final construction of the Roads was performed (2011-13 and 2013-15), Plaintiffs posted performance guarantees to the Borough.  (Da231-Da232; Da243-Da251.)  The record further shows that in both 2013 and 2015, the Borough Engineer inspected the Roads and approved same.  (Da233; Da252.)  In fact, [...], the Borough Engineer at the times that the Roads were completed, later stated the following in response to an inquiry from the Planning Board:  [...] inspected the construction of the roads of [...] to Borough Standards.  By virtue of the fact that we recommended to the Mayor and Council that the Performance Guarantees be released in 2015, we found the construction of the roads to be satisfactory and in compliance with Borough Standards.  (Da277.)  It is further undisputed that the Borough Council released each of the above performance guarantees upon the advice of the Borough Engineer.  (Da233; Da252.)  This was consistent with the governing law, which says that a municipality can only release a performance guarantee after the improvements have been inspected, and approved, by the municipal engineer.
[brief] Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 143 N.J. 22 (1995)  ................................................................................................................26  Melnyk v. Bd. of Educ. of the Delsea Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 241 N.J. 31 (2020)  ................................................................................................................26  Metromedia, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313 (1984)  ...............................................................................................................46, 47  Murray v. State Health Benefits Comm'n, 337 N.J. Super. 435 (App. Div. 2001)  ..................................................................................28  In re Musick, 143 N.J. 206 (1996)  ...............................................................................................................27  N.J. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists, Inc. v. N.J. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 183 N.J. 605 (2005)  ...............................................................................................................38  N.J. Bell Tel. Co. v. Commc’n Workers of America, N.J. Traffic Division, 5 N.J. 354 (195)  ..................................................................................................................32  N. J. Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 75 N.J. 544 (1978)  ..................................................................................................................37  N.J. Healthcare Coal. v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking and Ins., 440 N.J. Super. 129 (App. Div. 2015) .................................................................................28  In re Petition of N.J. Am. Water Co., 169 N.J. 181 (2001)  ..................................................................................................................38  In re Plan for Abolition of the Council on Affordable Hous., 214 N.J. 444 (2013) ..................................................................................................................40  In re Request to Modify Prison Sentences, 242 N.J. 357 (2020)  ..................................................................................................................27  Saccone v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369 (2014)  ..................................................................................................................26  State v. Lane, 251 N.J. 84 ..............................................................................................................................39  Zimmerman v. Sussex Cnty. Educ. Servs. Comm’n, 237 N.J. 465 (2019) ..................................................................................................................26
[brief] Dated: November 05, 2024  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  [...], Appellant, v. [...] and [...], In His Official Capacity As Mayor, Respondents.  DOCKET NO. [...]  CERTIFICATION  I, [...], of full age, hereby certify:  1.  I have personal knowledge of all the facts told via my Reply Brief.  2.  My statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.  3.  Documents presented to the Court via my appendices are genuine to the best of my knowledge and belief.  I certify that the foregoing statements are true.  I am aware that if any statement made herein is willfully false, I am subject to punishment.  [...]  DATED: November 05, 2024
[brief] 42 U.S.C. §1983 .........................................................................................  3, 12 N.J.S.A. 10:6-1, et seq .............................................................................  3, 12 N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(a) ....................................................................................  14 N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a) ..................................................................................  14  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, et seq ..........................................................................  3, 12, 15 N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 ......................................................................................  15  OTHER AUTHORITIES
[brief] [...] at all times was acting at and under the supervision of the licensed professional.  He reported to both [...] a licensed professional engineer and [...] who also was a licensed professional engineer.  Of note, to the extent that [...] was not acting as part of the obligations of the licensed professional engineers, [...] as noted below questions what duty Plaintiff claims that [...] owed to the plaintiff but for his obligations based on his role as an employee of a licensed professional engineering firm.  A review of plaintiff’s experts reports further establish that Plaintiff’s claims are solely against [...] and [...].  By way of example, [...]’s report does not even mention [...].  (Pa688)  Rather, [...] refers to “[...] and [...] failure to enforce to [sic]applicable industry standard best safety practices as noted in this report” (Pa727)  [...] and [...] failure to enforce ANSI and OSHA standards as noted in this report.  Including but not limited to……. ”  (Pa727)  “[...] and [...] failure to enforce the applicable contract documents including but not limited to [...]’s standards specifications, supplementary specifications, HASP and required form submission” (Pa728)  “[...] and [...] failure to enforce both [...]’s and the NJ Turnpike Authority’s Health and Safety Plans (HASP’s) (Pa728)
[directive] Internal Affairs Case Reporting  This workbook is deisgned to assist your completion of Internal Affairs Cases Reporting Requirements per the Attorney General's 2019 Internal Affairs Policies & Procedures.  To begin, select your Agency Name from the drop down list and fill in the year below.  Then proceed to the Quarterly Sheets.  Agency Name: Year:  Click the link below to reivew the full Internal Affairs Policies & Procedures  Internal Affairs Policies & Procedures this year.  Fill in the information below for each case opened within IA Number, Dates, Officer, and Discipline are free-text fields.  ALL OTHER FIELDS HAVE A PRE-DEFINED RESPONSE LIST.  THE LENGTH OF CASE FIELD WILL CALCULATE AUTOMATICALLY AND FLAG CASES OVER 180 DAYS.  Click on each cells and click on the dropdown menu that appears to view all response options.  NOTE:  Be sure to update cases as their status or other elements change.  Classify each case by the most serious allegation while pending.  When the case closes, classify by the most serious sustained allegation or most serious allegation if none are sustained.  Internal Affairs Annual Report Date  Complaint Source of Length Received Complaint Date Closed of Case  IA Number Officer Complaint Allegation Status  Criminal Disposition  Internal Disposition Discipline  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 - 11 - 12 - 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 - 17 - 18 - 19 - 20 - 21 - 22 - 23 - 24 - 25 - 26 - 27 - 28 - 29 - 30 - 31 - 32 -  Agency Name: Year: First Quarter
[directive] Reload if required and holster an uncocked weapon.  •  Reload loading devices.  Phase IV 10-Yard Line.  Ready Position.  Each drill, Time: 3 seconds.  2 rounds.  (Total 6 rounds).  •  On command, draw weapon and assume a ready position, i.e., muzzle depressed below eye level.  •  On command, bring weapon up to eye level and fire 2 rounds in 3 seconds.  Repeat drill twice, firing a total of 6 rounds.  ---STOP TIME--- •
[brief] That statute provides a fresh start stating that “the court shall hear the matter in a summary manner . . . and the issue shall be tried and determined as in other cases of a civil nature at law, in said court. ”  This statute is at the heart of this case.  The Boundary Commissioners sought to reconcile the survey obtained by the [...] for their purchase of Lot 11 in 1994 (the “[...]”) with the survey obtained by the [...] for their purchase of Lot 10 over a decade later in --- 2  The plaintiff appellant [...], died on June 6, 2024.
[brief] This court cannot equate the public entity’s decision to consult with its counsel to make sure it complies with an Order and also protect the rights of its students with a knowing and willful violation of the statutes.  *Bart v. City of Paterson Housing Authority*, 403 N.J. Super. 609 (App. Div. 2008); *Fielder v. Stonack*, 141 N.J. 101 (1995); *Berg v. Reaction Motors Division*, 37 N.J. 396 (1962).
[brief] The State also discusses United States v. Hill in their brief, arguing that [...] appropriately couched his opinion as the Hill expert did.  United States v. Hill, 818 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2016).  In Hill, the cell-tower expert did not testify to the specific range or distance from which the target cell phone was from the tower.  Id, at 298.  While the State is correct that [...] also did not testify to a specific range or distance during the shooting, he did testify to the specific range or distance of Defendant’s phone immediately after from 3:54AM to 5:00 AM. (Sb, 44; 7T58-1 to 59-19).  Of note, at 3:45 AM, the vehicle in which the Defendant is allegedly driving is seen on surveillance passing a Sunoco, in the direction of where the murder weapon was ultimately found.  (4T138-13 to 139-19; 2T131-23 to 133-5).  [...]’s PCMD analysis begins at 3:54 AM.  (7T58-8 to 59-8).  While [...] acknowledged that he was not opining that the phone is in any “one spot,” he testified that he is confident the phone was in certain, specific areas based on PCMD data at certain, specific times(7T70-19 to 20; 7T78-7 to 15; 7T59-3 to 19).  Testimony of an expert witness, especially a member of law enforcement who is endorsed to have specialized knowledge or experience in a field, “will likely have a profound impact on the deliberations of a jury. ”  *State v. Cain*, 224 N.J. 410, 427 (2016) (citations omitted).  Defendant maintains that the admission of such unreliable evidence was harmful error.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4b(1)(a); Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Justification – Self Defense” (rev. June 13, 2011); Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Justification – Self Defense Resisting Arrest” (approved Oct. 17, 1988).  The self-defense statute and the holdings of Mulvihill and Montague stand for the proposition that when sufficient evidence of self-defense is adduced at trial to require a self-defense jury charge, and there is a factual dispute as to whether the defendant was under arrest when he had a physical altercation with a police officer, the court needs to give the jury both the general self-defense charge and the resisting arrest self-defense charge, as well as instructions on when and how to apply each charge.  Here, sufficient evidence that [...] acted in self-defense was adduced at trial, requiring the trial court to instruct the jury on self-defense.  Furthermore, there was a factual dispute as to whether [...] was under arrest or knew that he was being arrested at the time of his physical altercations with the police officers, both inside and outside of the restaurant.  Therefore, the trial court was required to instruct the jury on self-defense by giving both the general self-defense charge and the resisting arrest self-defense charge.
[brief] On October 22, 2020, Defendant filed a notice of appeal.  (Da 34).  On September 9, 2022, Defendant filed a motion for a limited remand, citing newly discovered evidence of a confession of his co-defendant, [...], who had already been sentenced after receiving a plea bargain for his involvement in the murder.  (Da 38-44).  On September 19, 2022, Defendant filed a motion with this Court for a limited remand of the matter to consider the newly discovered evidence motion.
[brief] [...] stated “it is disconcerting that [...] has encouraged adults and students, including her own children, to defy the laws of the State. ”  (Ca030-032).  •  Counts 9, 10, and 12:  “These social [media] posts relate to [...]’s perspective and disagreement with how gender identity is taught in New Jersey. ” (Ca033).  “What is problematic is not that [...] disagrees with the proposed health education standards or that she opposes the inclusion of transgender students in New Jersey schools, but what is problematic is that she failed to include a clear disclaimer that the contents of the posting were her personal opinions and not expressed as a Board member.
[brief] Contrary to [...]’s argument, the court’s decision in Ensslin did not turn on the timeliness or adequacy of the Division’s notice.  (Pb12).  Instead, the court found that because the notice from the Division was sent “more than four years from the date of petitioner’s last contribution,” the Division’s own “day-to-day administration of its affairs” and interpretation of the two-year time limitation as expressed by the four-year notice further supported allowing Ensslin to file.  Id. at 338.  Here, there was no such letter informing [...] that he was eligible to file under the Ricci Act past the statutory deadline.  Thus, Ensslin does not support [...]’s proposition that untimely notice allows individuals to file at any time past the statutory deadline.
[brief] 2.  Retaliation for exercising his constitutional right to file a lawsuit (Pa837; 3T)  The New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) provides a civil action to any person “who has been deprived of . . . any substantive rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this State, or whose exercise or enjoyment of those substantive rights, privileges or immunities has been interfered with or attempted to be interfered with, by threats, intimidation or coercion by a person acting under color of law.
[brief] Tessmar v. Grosner, 23 N.J. 193, 203 (1957).  So long as a plaintiff is able to provide reasonably accurate and fair calculations of lost profits, damages are recoverable.  V.A.L. Floors, Inc. v. Westminister Communities, Inc., 355 N.J. Super. 416, 424 (App. Div. 2002).
[brief] Da365  Order dated October 23, 2023  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da1  Defendant [...]’s Opposition to Motions: Exhibit “A” “New Jersey Insurance Bulletins and Related Materials  Automobile Circular Letters Circular Letter Automobile 9,” dated February 22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da236  Exhibit “B” [...]  Medical Payment Subrogation Arbitration Agreement and Printouts confirming that the [...] group of Companies involved in this litigation are signatories to the med-pay arbitration agreement.  .........................Da118  Exhibit “C” Arbitration Forum’s rules .........................Da210  Exhibit "D” [...]  Reference Guide ........................................Da221  Exhibit “A” to October 17, 2023 Letter Brief nine police reports which formed the basis for the nine inter-company arbitration awards ........................................Da586  Exhibit “B” list of 17 arbitration awards in which [...] allowed the matter to proceed to a hearing and then accepted the arbitration award as binding and made payment . .  Da624  Exhibit “C” list of 19 matters in which upon filing of a Medpay Arbitration, [...] recognized the validity of the Medpay subrogation claim in New Jersey and made payment without allowing or requiring the matter to proceed to arbitration  ........................................Da785  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED
[brief] See Millison, 101 N.J. at 179-80.  [...] was paid those benefits, and his work-related injuries were compensated.  Pa437.  Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, the compulsory insurance provisions of the Act do not establish a public policy that requires an employer to maintain insurance coverage for a claim of intentional wrongdoing.  The compulsory insurance provisions of the Act establish a public policy that requires an employer to maintain insurance or be properly self-insured for all obligations imposed by the Act.
[brief] Instead, the court held that because [...] had entered into a guilty plea, those qualities of his youth had not impaired his ability to aid in his own defense.  (5T82-14 to 20)  That finding, and the resulting failure to attribute any mitigation under factor 4, were erroneous for two reasons.  Firstly, in enumerating Miller factor 4, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that a juvenile’s inability to deal with law enforcement compromises their ability to enter a plea agreement, and not just their ability to go to trial.  *Miller*, 567 U.S. at 477-78.  The court’s finding that [...] established his competency by pleading guilty thus clearly contradicted *Miller*.  See also, *Comer*, 249 N.J. at 407-08 (holding that when considering factor 4, unless the juvenile himself volunteers privileged information, courts are prohibited from relying upon “strategic decisions by counsel for both sides” which implicate privileged conversations).  Secondly, there was no evidentiary basis to establish that [...]’s pleading guilty was, in fact, the best legal decision for him to make.  The resentencing court had not reviewed the discovery and had not spoken to any of the potential witnesses in the case.  The negotiated plea provided no guarantee that his sentences would be run concurrently, and [...] ultimately ended up receiving the exact same sentence that [...] did after being convicted at trial.  (1T4-3 to 5-18)  Moreover, [...]’s decision to move to withdraw from his plea years later evinces, at the very least, [...]’s own belief that pleading guilty was not the best legal decision to have made.  (4T28-1 to 29-4)  In conclusion, the court erred in its application of all five *Miller* factors.
[brief] First, in analyzing the relationship of the parties, Plaintiff was clearly an invitee upon the premises of [...].  Her presence was solely occasioned by the fact that she was invited, as a member of the public, for business purposes, onto the proprietor’s premises—namely to purchase a food product which [...] sold.  Second, the nature of the risk was significant.  [...] provides heavy duty equipment on its premises available for use by its customers, namely the use of its industrial grade wheeled flatbed carts, known as “U-boats,” to transport a large number of heavy items while they shop throughout the store.  As a customer, Plaintiff, while shopping in [...]’s store, reasonably relied upon [...] to ensure that the U-boats were properly used by its customers.  Unfortunately, while Plaintiff, who was looking to purchase a leg of lamb from the Meat Department at [...]’s warehouse, was struck, without warning, by an overloaded U-boat that was operated by [...], another customer.
[brief] He acknowledged that he appreciated [...] speaking with him and offering him the opportunity to do trainings without [...].  He stated that [...] noticing him made him “feel good. ”  Pa55, T96:17-97:3.  While he was apprehensive to approach his Battalion Chief about the incident for fear of sounding like he was “complaining” more, he admitted that no one had done anything to make him feel that he was “complaining too much or that [he] was a bother of any sort. ”  Pa56, T98:22-99:2.  Instead, “nobody ever went against [him].  They always agreed. ”  Pa56, T99:3-10.  On March 21, 2020, Appellant’s next shift, he met with [...] in his office at the Director’s request.
[brief] I.  PLAINTIFFS DO NOT POSSESS STANDING UNDER ANY OF THE MYRIAD LEGAL THEORIES THEY ADVANCE IN OPPOSITION.  In opposition, Plaintiffs obfuscate and merge several unrelated legal concepts in a transparent attempt to convince this Court they possess standing to challenge the [...]’s review and approval of [...]’ conditional use application.  Unraveling the web of independent (and mischaracterized) legal concepts that Plaintiffs attempt to fuse together, however, reveals their arguments are all legally unsustainable.  Put simply, Plaintiffs do not possess a property or economic interest that has been affected by the Resolution and, therefore, they do not possess standing.