ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *State v. Cotto*, 471 N.J. Super. 489, 543 (App. Div. 2022).  Certainly, there is a significant difference between what was charged 5.20F (duty to invitees) and what Appellants claim should have been – 5.20B(2)(b) (duty of commercial landowner to remove snow and ice).  The general duty to invitees is concerned about reasonable care for an invitee’s safety whereas 5.20B(2)(b) explicitly states there is some reasonable period of time, after notice, for the defendant to make the walkway be in reasonably safe condition.  The importance of this “within a reasonable period of time thereafter” is unique to this charge and cannot be understated.  We are not dealing with a trip and fall over uneven pavement, but whether the snow removal efforts of Defendants were reasonable when: 1) the storm dropped 14 inches of snow; 2) the snow ended at 8:30PM the night before; 3) plaintiff fell at 7:30AM; 4) Defendants were to prioritize the retail tenants for snow removal over the office tenants; and 5) Defendants were still on site clearing snow from this large commercial property at the time of the fall.  The question is was defendants’ conduct and action reasonable given the storm and timing of these facts as set forth above 5.20B(2)(b) explicitly requires the jury consider the progress of the snow removal in connection with when the snow finally stopped.  The general duty to invitees does not contain this language nor does it compel such a consideration, at least not explicitly.  Certainly, instructing the jury that defendants had a duty to clear snow and ice within a reasonable period of time thereafter is far more tailored to the facts of this case.  The lower court’s failure to do so is reversible error.
[brief] (See Pa13, ¶6, Pa24, ¶38, Pa25, ¶46, and Pa28, ¶26).  - The building height was to be built 43’-6” above DFE in accordance with the [...] architectural plan; (Pa15) - The architectural plan prepared by [...] contained the height of the proposed building; (Pa25), and - The proposed project shall be constructed in accordance with approved [[...]] plans.  (Pa28).  Appellant in fact agreed that the approved building height would be measured from 43’-6” above DFE to the top of the flat roof.  (Da9).  Further, the Appellant agreed that DFE was approximately 7 feet above the finished grade.  (Da9-10).  Accordingly, Appellant therefore agrees that the building height from the finished grade to the top of the flat roof is a total of 50’-6”.
[brief] GUILTY OF DISORDERLY CONDUCT  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2a(1)  BASED ON PLAINTIFF INCONSISTENCY CONCLUSION  ....................................................................................................................................11  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## FEDERAL STATUTES  AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA)1990 .................................................3  ADA Amendments Act of 2008 ..............................................................................3  ## STATE STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 47-1A-9a........................................................................................................6  [...] Code 360-1 to -3 .................................................................8  R. 2C:1-13 ..................................................................................................................9  R. 3:10-2(d) .............................................................................................................10  R. 3:10-2(e) .............................................................................................................10  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] *Romero v. Gold Star Distribution*, 468 N.J. Super. 274, 295-296 (App. Div. 2021); See *United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Lamanna’s Estate*, 181 N.J. Super. 149 (Law Div. 1981)(A motion to vacate a final judgment made under R. 4:50-1(d) must also be made within a reasonable time, even in circumstances where an order is void).  In the instant matter, this Court already determined that the Defendant was time-barred from seeking relief from the June 29, 2020 Final Judgment.
[brief] Petitioner, [...] ("Petitioner," "[...]" or the "Company"), respectfully petitions the [...] (the "Board" or "[...]"), pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19, as follows:  1.  [...] appeals to the Board from a decision of the [...] denying the Company's application for the construction of a proposed regulator station (the "Regulator Station" or "Facility") along [...] in [...] ("[...]").  The Company respectfully requests, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-19 and N.J.S.A. 48:2-23, that the Board (a) determine that the construction of the Facility for the benefit of the residents of [...] and neighboring municipalities in [...], as more fully described herein, is necessary to maintain system integrity and reliability and reasonably necessary for the service, convenience or welfare of the public, and that no alternative site or sites are reasonably available to achieve an equivalent public benefit; and (b) issue an order that the zoning, site plan review and all other Municipal Land Use Ordinances or Regulations promulgated under the auspices of Title 40 of the New Jersey Statutes and the Municipal Land Use Law of the State of New Jersey (the "MLUL") shall not apply to the proposed Facility.  Exh. P-4 - Facility Site Plan  Exh. P-5 - Truncated Transcript of [...] Zoning Board of Adjustment – Final vote (December 7, 2016)  5.
[brief] This is appeal from an Order granting Respondent, [...]’s, Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay the Case.  Appellants filed their Complaint on January 20, 2023 against [...].  Pa0005-Pa0018.  On March 8, 2023, [...] filed their Answer.  Pa0019-Pa0027.  Therein, [...] asserted as an affirmative defense that there was an arbitration clause which should be enforced.  Pa0054.  On October 24, 2023, [...] filed a Motion to Amend their Complaint to include additional corporate entities, [...], [...], and [...].  Pa0028.  On November 29, 2023, [...] forwarded a correspondence to the trial court, correcting their request to only add corporate entity, Respondent, [...] (“[...]”), and submitted a corrected draft first amended complaint representing shame.  Pa0035.  On December 7, 2023, the trial court granted Coppis’ motion to file an Amended Complaint.  Pa0066-Pa0067.  The Coppis filed their Amended Complaint that same day, naming [...] as an additional Defendant.  Pa0037-Pa0065.  On March 22, 2024, [...] filed a Motion to Stay and Compel Arbitration in Lieu of an Answer to the Amended Complaint.  Pa0068.  On April 4, 2024, [...] file their Cross-Motion to Stay and Compel Arbitration.  Pa0242.  On April 5, 2024, [...] filed their Opposition to [...]’s Motion to Stay and Compel Arbitration.  Pa0262.  On April 8, 2024, [...] filed their Reply brief in response to the Coppi’s Opposition.  Pa0346.  On April 9, 2024, [...] filed their Reply brief in response to the Coppi’s Opposition.  Pa0390.  After hearing oral argument on May 2, 2024, [...], issued an oral opinion granting [...]’s and [...]’s motion and cross-motion to Stay and Compel Arbitration\(^1\).  Pa0001-Pa0004.  The Coppis now file the within appeal of the trial court’s May 2, 2024 Orders.
[brief] The Borough engaged in a lengthy, thorough, and exhaustive process beginning early in 2022, to accept and evaluate applications from interested cannabis businesses to operate within the Borough.  That process involved the acceptance of applications from interested operators; the consideration thereof; interviews with and presentations by applicants; multiple deliberations of both the Borough’s Cannabis Subcommittee (see, e.g., Pa225, Pa246, Pa304) and the Borough Council; the recommendations of the Borough’s Cannabis Subcommittee to the Borough Council as to which applicant should be granted a local support resolution; and, ultimately, independent consideration of the applications, the public hearing presentations by each applicant, site visits of the location of the proposed facility and public comment, all by the Borough Council, which resulted in a 5-1 bipartisan vote by the full Council on September 20, 2022 supporting the award of the Support Resolution to [...].  Pa2; Pa64.  Exhaustive interviews were conducted with all of the cannabis license applicants in April by the Subcommittee and, in May 2022, all of the applicants made presentations at a public hearing.  Each applicant had the opportunity to present its comprehensive and detailed vision and plan for its facility within the Borough to the full Council as well as the public at the public hearing.  Applicants had a full opportunity to explain how their facility would benefit the Borough.
[brief] As outlined in the State’s initial brief dated September 20, 2024, Defendant lodged a hearsay objection as soon as the State began to present evidence related to the 9-1-1 call.  1T11:20-12:1.  “(H)earsay is permissible in suppression hearings subject to N.J.R.E. 104(a). ”  State v. Bivins, 226 N.J. 1, 14 (2006); quoting State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 519 n.4 (2015).  Despite that, the trial court erroneously sustained Defendant’s meritless hearsay objection.  1T12:2.  This error, invited by defense counsel, prevented the State from presenting substantive evidence related to the 9-1-1 call that was both vital and admissible.  Although we cannot guess exactly how the hearing would have progressed had the trial court not made this error, it is reasonable to think that the State would have presented the audio of the 9-1-1 call in order to establish its content, details, and the response time of police.
[brief] [1T14-7 to 12; 2T15-3 to 16]  That contradicts the Appellate Division’s decision in Lavrik, which held the guilty plea and factual plea allocution are not evidential and inadmissible until a defendant who pled guilty as a pre-condition to PTI fails to complete his or her PTI term, and the conviction gets reinstated.  472 N.J. Super. at 215-217.  Defendant [...] submits this is an issue subject to be repetition.
[brief] Order Denying Summary Judgment dated June 7, 2019 ........................................Da1  Order Denying Directed Verdict 1 dated November 2, 2023 .................................Da3 Order Denying Directed Verdict 2 dated November 6, 2023 ...............................Da5 Notice of Appeal dated February 9, 2024 ..............................................................Da7 Amended Notice of Appeal dated February 22, 2024 ..........................................Da12 Amended Notice of Appeal dated February 26, 2024 .........................................Da17 Amended Notice of Appeal dated March 14, 2024 ..............................................Da23 Amended Appeal Case Information Statement dated February 22, 2024 ...........Da29 Complaint dated March 21, 2017 ........................................................................Da35 Answer dated September 26, 2017 .....................................................................Da46 Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment dated April 26, 2019 ........................Da57 [...]’s Statement of Material Facts dated April 26, 2019 ....................Da59 Certification of [...], Esq. dated April 26, 2019 .................................Da65 Exhibit A-L in Support of Summary Judgment Motion (filed on April 26, 2019) ................................................................................................................Da67-195 Exhibit A – Complaint dated March 21, 2017 ......................................................Da35 Exhibit B - Plaintiff’s Notice of Claim dated March 26, 2015 .........................Da68 Exhibit C - Police Report dated March 26, 2015 .............................................Da76 Exhibit D - Plaintiff’s Answers to Interrogatories (correspondence dated March 13, 2018) .................................................................Da78 Exhibit E - Transcript of Plaintiff’s Deposition dated June 19, 2018 .... Da110 Exhibit F – [...]’s Answers to Interrogatories (undated)......Da167 Exhibit G - Certification of [...] dated October 17, 2017 .............Da177 Exhibit H - the City’s Work Order Completed February 17, 2015 .......Da181 Exhibit I - the City's Work Order Completed July 1, 2015 ....................Da183 CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX VOLUME II TABLE OF CONTENTS Exhibit J - Report of [...], D.O. dated August 20, 2018 .................................................................Da185 Exhibit K - Report of [...] dated September 23, 2015 Da189 APPENDIX VOLUME III TABLE OF CONTENTS Exhibit L - Order dismissing Per Quod claims dated August 4, 2017................Da195 Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Material Facts dated May 29, 2019 ........Da198 Pretrial Order dated December 17, 2021 ........................................................Da203 Orders in Limine (6)
[brief] DOCKET NO. BELOW: [...]  ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY— LAW DIVISION, SUSSEX COUNTY SAT BELOW: Hon. [...], JSC PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S REPLY  BRIEF  [...], ESQ., On the Brief  Attorney ID No.: 234011966  LAW OFFICES OF [...]  [...] [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
[brief] See Kromphold, 162 N.J. at 359.  The concurrent/consecutive determination also has clear criteria that are susceptible to uniform application under the law—the Yarbough factors.  While the presence of any Yarbough factors authorizes, but does not compel, a consecutive sentence, the absence of any Yarbough factors supporting a consecutive sentence means that a concurrent sentence is required.  In the very first case in which the Supreme Court interpreted the sentencing provisions of the New Jersey Criminal Code (the “Code”) enacted in 1978, the Court recognized that “central to the reform of sentencing procedures is provision for appellate review of sentences to provide a greater degree of uniformity.
[brief] See Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 440 (2014) (“The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-16 and the nearly identical New Jersey Arbitration Act N.J.S.A. 2A:23-B-1 to -32, enunciate federal and state policies favoring arbitration”).  See also Badiali v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Grp., 220 N.J. 544, 556 (2015) (“[T]he public policy of this State favors arbitration as a means of settling disputes that otherwise would be litigated in a court. ”); Cole v. Jersey City Med. CTI , 215 N.J. 265, 276 (2013) (“[A]rbitration . . . is a favored means of dispute resolution. ”)  “Mindful of this public policy,” New Jersey courts “resolve possible ambiguity in the contract language in favor of requiring arbitration.
[brief] ”  *App. of Union Cmty. Bank*, 144 N.J. Super. 39, 46–47 (App. Div. 1976).  “[F]airness to the applicant, as well as appropriate court review of the validity of such a significant Ad hoc change, requires that the agency plainly articulate the rationale therefor and afford the applicant, as well as the objectors, a hearing at which to meet, explain or refute whatever information is submitted. ”  *Id.* at 47.  Here, however, the opposite occurred.  [...] underwent a multi-day hearing centered on denials premised on completely extra-regulatory and extra-statutory considerations that the Department has now abandoned; the excessiveness concept was sprung on [...] after the fact, and with no indication whatsoever as to how [...] could ever satisfy such a standard, other than the Department’s view that the term should be a given a vague “common-sense” meaning—impermissibly leaving it up to the whim of the Commissioner to decide what makes “sense” and what does not.
[brief] Despite the Trial Court’s error, Plaintiffs did not merely claim that they were third parties who reasonably relied upon an attorney’s representations, and that said attorney is therefore liable for legal malpractice.  Plaintiffs’ claim is also that [...] was an active participant in the fraudulent scheme perpetrated against them, whereby Defendants stole Plaintiffs’ money.  [...]’s role in this fraudulent scheme was to act as the attorney for the sham entity [...].  The record certainly demonstrates genuine issues of material fact in dispute as to whether or not [...] was ever the attorney for [...], or if [...] was simply a sham entity utilized to defraud Plaintiffs and steal their money for the benefit of the co-conspirator Defendants.  [...]’s role in the conspiracy was central, and [...] is vicariously liable for failing to supervise [...] while he was perpetrating a fraud in their office.
[brief] While suspended, defendant misleads various police officers to avoid the possible issuance of traffic tickets.  Between March 27, 2017, and March 27, 2018, while he remained suspended, defendant was pulled over by police on suspicion of committing moving motor vehicle offenses at least four times.  Each time, the officer allowed defendant to proceed without issuing him a ticket.  Each encounter was recorded, and the relevant videos, all with audio, were played for the jury.
[brief] In Leodori v. Cigna Corporation, 175 N.J. 293 (2003), the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that it was “called on solely to evaluate the enforceability of a waiver – of – rights provision contained in an employee handbook distributed by defendant. ”  175 N.J. at 295.  While the handbook had been given to the plaintiff employee, the employee had not signed the separate form entitled “Employee Handbook Receipt and Agreement” which recited the policy contained in the handbook that he will submit disputes “to final and binding neutral third party arbitration” and that he “will not go to court. ”  The Court held that the waiver-of-rights contained in the handbook was not enforceable because there was no evidence the employee had actually agreed to the provision.  *Id.* at 302 – 303.  The Court held that “a valid waiver results only from an explicit, affirmative agreement that unmistakably reflects the employee’s assent.
[brief] **B.  Bad Faith and No Available Lessor Sanction**  Initially, as discussed above, Plaintiff failed to list any claims in the clearly appropriate section of her bankruptcy Petition at paragraph 33 of the schedule, entitled “[c]laims against third parties, whether or not you have filed a lawsuit or made a demand for payment.  *(See Da16 at ¶ 33).*  Rather, Plaintiff hid her single claim in paragraph 34 of the schedule for other “contingent and unliquidated claims” a section reserved for disclosure of “counterclaims of the debtor and rights to set off claims. ” (Da16, 17 at ¶ 34).  Plaintiff alleges that the facts giving rise to her instant Complaint occurred on August 11, 2020—eight months prior to Plaintiff’s bankruptcy petition.  Thus, Plaintiff’s claim was plainly a vested and independent third-party claim for money when Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy and is not “contingent” or “unliquidated. ”  The only reasonable inference to be drawn from Plaintiff’s choice to proceed in this manner was her intent to hide the asset.  See Misonzhnik v. Alltran Fin., LP, No. 17-cv-6683 (BMC), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42086 (E.D.N.Y. March 14, 2018) (judicially estopping Plaintiff from bringing FDCPA case based in part on Plaintiff’s incorrect disclosure).
[brief] [...], and [...] were charged in the same indictment with kidnapping, robbery, and other related offenses.  (Da 1 to 14).  --- 2  “Da” denotes defendant's appendix.  “1T” denotes trial transcript dated September 27, 2016.  “2T” denotes trial transcript dated September 28, 2016.  “3T” denotes trial transcript dated September 29, 2016.  “4T” denotes trial transcript dated October 4, 2016.  “5T” denotes trial transcript dated October 5, 2016.  “6T” denotes trial transcript dated October 6, 2016.  “7T” denotes trial transcript dated October 13, 2016.  “8T” denotes trial transcript dated October 18, 2016.  “9T” denotes trial transcript dated October 19, 2016.  “10T” denotes trial transcript dated October 20, 2016.  (Continued)  From September 27 to October 24, 2016, defendant, along with [...], [...], and [...], was tried to a jury, with the Honorable [...], J.S.C., presiding.  (1T to 12T).  Defendant was convicted of counts one, two, four, five, and six, as charged.  On count three, he was convicted of the lesser-included offense of third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(7), while [...] was convicted of the lesser-included offense of simple assault.  [...] and [...] were convicted of the lesser-included charges of false imprisonment, conspiracy to commit false imprisonment, and theft.  [...] also was convicted of related weapons offenses.  (12T 29-15 to 39-3; Da 15 to 24).  On January 20, 2017, [...], after merging counts two, three (as amended), four, and five into count one, imposed a 17-year prison term, subject to an 85 percent period of parole ineligibility, pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.  On count six, defendant was sentenced to a --- “11T” denotes trial transcript dated October 21, 2016.  “12T” denotes trial transcript dated October 24, 2016.  “13T” denotes sentencing transcript dated January 20, 2017.  “14T” denotes post-conviction relief hearing transcript dated February 17, 2023.  concurrent 18-month prison term.  (13T 23-7 to 14; 13T 29-16 to 30-9; Da 25 to 28).  On April 9, 2019, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence.  (Da 29 to 51).  On October 2, 2019, the Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certification.  (Da 52).  On February 28, 2020, defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief (PCR).  (Da 53 to 54).  In support of the petition, [...], Ph.D., subsequently submitted a certification, a report, and a curriculum vitae.  (Da 55 to 84).  On February 17, 2023, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., heard argument regarding the petition (14T), and on May 1, 2023, issued an opinion and order denying relief.  (Da 85 to 125).  On June 8, 2023, defendant filed a notice of appeal.  (Da 126 to 129).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] In the alternative, [...] respectfully submits that the matter must, at a minimum, be reversed and remanded to the Board for a reevaluation of the significant mitigating evidence that was ignored in its Final Decision.  [...]  Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant  [...]  [...]  Dated: August 30, 2024  October 15, 2024  Via eCourts and Regular Mail  [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  [...]  [...]  Re: [...] v. [...]  Docket No. [...]  Civil Action: On Appeal from a Final Agency Decision of the [...]
[brief] On or about June 20, 2023, the Defendant-Appellant, [...] A/K/A [...], was charged under Complaint Summons Number [...] with fourth degree Operating a Vehicle During a Period of License Suspension for a second/subsequent violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b).  (Da1 to Da7).  Defendant was also issued the following Motor Vehicle Tickets: (1) [...] charging Driving While Suspended, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40; and (2) [...] charging Disregard Stop Sign Regulation or Yield Sign, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-144.  (Da18).  On December 7, 2023, a Sussex County Grand Jury returned Indictment Number [...] charging the Defendant with one count of fourth degree Operating a Motor Vehicle During a Period of License Suspension for a Second or Subsequent violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (Driving While Intoxicated), in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b).  (Da8).  On or about February 22, 2024, the Defendant, while being represented by [...], Esq., filed a Notice of Motion to Suppress.
[brief] In the alternative, should the appellate court determine that the senior housing use outweighs the significant negative impact to the zone plan and zoning ordinance, then the matter should be again remanded to the Board for a full consideration of the d variance for density, the c variances, design waivers, and the implementation of other conditions to address the negative impacts of permitting this use in a zone where it is not permitted.  **CONCLUSION**  For the foregoing reasons presented, it is respectfully submitted that the decision of the trial court in this matter should be reversed and the denial of the [...] use variance application should be confirmed.