ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Respondent’s appraisal report makes the following adjustments to his valuation analysis, according to the Site Comparison Adjustment Grid, related to development approvals:  - Comparable Sale #1 = -2.5% sold “subject to” approvals - Comparable Sale #2 = 0% sold with “no” approvals - Comparable Sale #3 = -5% sold with approvals - Comparable Sale #4 = -5% sold with approvals - Comparable Sale #5 = -5% sold with approvals - Comparable Sale #6 = -5% sold with approvals - Comparable Sale #7 = -5% sold with approvals  Because Respondent’s appraiser did not consider the R-2 zoning, he made no further adjustment to reflect the risk and cost of obtaining multiple use variances.  In contrast, [...]’s appraiser made two (2) separate adjustments; (1) developmental approvals, and (2) a separate -20% adjustment to account for the costs and risk to obtain three (3) use variances required to develop the Property under the R-2 zoning district. Pa86.  [...]’s appraiser’s separate zoning/variance adjustment properly reflects the added costs and risks associated with obtaining the three (3) use variances under the R-2 zoning.  [...]’s appraisal expert explains the zoning/variance adjustment in his appraisal report as follows:  As of the effective date of valuation herein, the subject property has no development approvals in place and, under the R-2 zoning district regulations, use variances would be required to development the property at a higher density than permitted in the R-2 district (55 units per acre).  We have concluded there is a reasonable probability of a zone change or use variances for a mid-rise building, density and building height to allow the subject property to be developed at a higher density, however the required zone change or use variances have not yet been obtained and the additional risk and expense associated with obtaining a zone change or use variance must be considered.  None of the comparable sales required a zone change or use variances.  Therefore, in order to account for the subject property’s added risk and expense associated with obtaining the necessary zone change or use variances, a downward adjustment was applied to all of the comparable sales to reflect this factor. Pa88 [emphasis added].  Respondent’s appraiser failed to make such variance adjustment despite acknowledging the development proposed as the Highest and Best Use of the subject Property would not be permitted under the R-2 zoning and also required two (2) additional use variances for height and density.  For those reasons, this Appellate Division must engage in its gatekeeping role to bar such speculative evidence as directed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Saddle River.
[brief] Instead, the trial court had implemented a summary procedure and dismissed their complaint.  *Id.* at 83.  This was what deprived the *Klier* plaintiffs of their right to procedural due process:  For example, had defendants filed a motion, plaintiffs would have had the opportunity to respond to the objection to their expert's opinion.  Instead, plaintiff came to court prepared to pick a jury, but rather, was required to defend a motion, brought by the court *sua sponte*, to dismiss his complaint.
[brief] Complaint Summons 11/04/2020 (attached at Pa170)  Letter from [...] to NJ Superior Court Clerk 12/14/2021 (Attached at Pa179)  Certification of Paralegal 12/14/2021 (Attached at Pa180)  Notice of Motion 12/14/2021 (Attached at Pa181)  Certification of Eldridge [...] 12/14/2021 (Attached at Pa183)  Proposed Order (Attached at Pa184)  Notice of Appeal to NJ Superior Court 11/05/2021 (Attached at Pa185)
[directive] The primary issue is one of privacy.  Video surveillance, especially covert surveillance, should not be used in areas where employees have a high expectation of privacy, such as locker rooms and bathrooms.  In public areas, video surveillance may be used.  In many law enforcement agencies, certain areas such as lobbies, cell blocks and sally ports have video surveillance for security reasons.  Video obtained from these sources is applicable to internal investigations.  Questions about the specific application of video surveillance, especially covert surveillance, should be addressed to the [...].  It must be emphasized that this refers to video surveillance with no sound recording component.
[brief] In prior Board meetings, the Board engaged in lengthy and robust public discussions about [...]’s custodial services and whether to renew / extend [...]’s contract.  A renegotiated contract to pay [...] under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), if any, would have been first discussed at a Board committee meeting, and then would have to be placed on a public agenda, and voted on at an open public meeting, before funds were dispersed to [...].  The Counterclaim does not establish that the parties entered into a renegotiated contract.  The contents of a renegotiated contract under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), if any, would have been available for public consumption prior to the Board’s discussion and vote.  By not entering into a renegotiated contract under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), the public was deprived of its right to government transparency and to engage in public comment on the merits of approving the renegotiated contract, if any.  The Board could have engaged in a private and public discussion at an open public meeting about the merits of approving a renegotiated contract, if any, under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  By not entering into a renegotiated contract under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), the Board was deprived of its right to publicly or privately discuss the merits of approving the renegotiated contract, if any.  All contracts are subject to Board approvals by a roll call majority vote.  By not entering into a renegotiated contract under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), the Board was deprived of its right to vote “Yes” or “No” to enter into the renegotiated contract, if any.  It is certainly a manifest injustice to retroactively apply a law that would put a public school district on the hook for a $1.9-million obligation [...] attempts to collect on.  The rights of the public and Board (N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1) were not preserved, resulting in a manifest injustice.  Hence, the unconstitutional interference with vested rights, and manifest injustice, means that the second prong of the retroactive application test fails.  The failure to satisfy both prongs of the retroactive application test means that the court should not rule that N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) is to be given retroactive application, requiring the denial of [...]’s summary judgment motion.  Thus, a substantial portion of the trial court’s money judgment must be reduced accordingly.
[brief] ***  "It is well-settled that appeals are taken from orders and judgments and not from opinions, oral decisions, informal written decisions, or reasons given for the ultimate conclusion."  Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 387 (2018) (emphasis added) (quoting Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 191, 199 (2001) (collecting cases).  See also Macfadden v. Macfadden, 49 N.J. Super. 356 (App. Div. [I]t is from the judgment, and not the opinion, that appeal is taken.
[brief] THE COURT: -- the stay, and then of course you could reply to whatever [...] argued then I will give [...] the last word, Under 4:42-11(b), the statute is consistent with [...]'s argument on the tort claim that it is the latter of the dates, including the cause -- not the cause of action, but the filing.  I know you cited the comment, I think it is 2.3 to it which seems to be inconsistent.  So how do you respond to the statutory language which I am sure you are familiar with?  You could read it into the record.  It is -- just so it is clear -- give me one moment.  The prejudgment interest was calculated from the later of the date of the institution of the action or six months after the date the cause of action arises.
[brief] See *Raspantini*.  III.  THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED  THE WRONG STANDARD IN DENYING APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION/MOTION TO VACATE.  (RESPONDENTS’ POINT IV.  The trial court erred in concluding that the “Opinion and Order dated June 23, 2022 were final, as they disposed of all issues with respect to all parties with finality” and that, therefore, “the only standard for reconsideration applicable . . . is Rule 4:49-2. ”  Da263.  [...]’s June 23, 2022 order was not final – the final order was issued by [...] on August 26, 2022 (Da4) – a full eighteen (18) days after he deemed [...]’s order “final”.  There can be but one “final order” in a case – and that order must resolve all issues as to all parties.
[brief] Auto-Rite Supply Co. v. Mayor & Twp. Committeemen of Woodbridge, 25 N.J. 188 (1957)  .................................................................  7  Bow & Arrow Manor v. Town of W. Orange, 63 N.J. 335 (1973)  ..................  2 F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains, 100 N.J. 418 (1985)  ...............  7 Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239 (2015)  ........................................  3 Powerhouse Arts Dist. Neighborhood Ass'n v. City Council of City of Jersey City, 413 N.J. Super. 322 (App. Div. 2010)  ..............................................  2 Riggs v. Long Beach, 109 N.J. 601 (1988)  ....................................................  2, 4 Rumson Ests. Inc. v. Mayor & Council of Fair Haven, 177 N.J. 338 (2003) .....  3 Statutes N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 .........................................................................................  3 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(d) ...............................................................................  4 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e) ...............................................................................  5, 6  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The *Gonzalez* Court held in the affirmative and determined that, in that specific scenario, the *new* agreements subjected an assignee to the NJCFA.  *See Gonzalez*, 207 N.J. at 582 (holding “subsequent performance in connection with a *newly* minted loan” made the assignee subject to NJCFA liability) (emphasis added).  Thus, it was the “*new* agreements” in *Gonzalez* which are absent here that created CFA liability.
[brief] Rather, defendant insisted on speaking with his parents and advised that he wanted to let his mother, who resides in Maine, and his girlfriend know that he was in custody and will be transported to the county jail.  (1T:68-8 to 69-2).  He also wanted his mother to call an attorney on his behalf, indicating that he understood the importance of having an attorney and the distinction between speaking with his mother and an attorney.  [...] advised defendant that the calls to his parents will be recorded and he will remain in the room to handle the cell phone that had been seized as evidence.  (1T:73-21 to 74-15).  Defendant agreed to these conditions.  Ibid.  Additionally, once defendant’s mother called back and defendant picked up the phone, [...] audibly told defendant to inform his mother that he was in the room as well.  (1T:85-7 to 85-9).  [...] did not try to hide his presence from the mother who could not see him through the phone but could hear him.  The mere possibility that [...] could have known that the talkative defendant who had already made multiple incriminating statements could again incriminate himself while speaking with his parents does not constitute interrogation or its functional equivalent.  See Mauro, 481 U.S. at 529.  Lastly, while the State does not contest the suppression of all statements made by defendant to [...] after he stated, “No, I’m not going to do it” while she was reading his Miranda rights, (2T:19-22 to 21-8); (2T:51-2 to 51-11), the State argues that the statements made by defendant during the phone calls were not derived from that interview.
[brief] The application of the amended Design Guidelines to the [...] project is simply the creature of an ad hoc waiver as part of the settlement of an administrative appeal, nothing more.  [...] concedes that adoption of the 2020 Design Guidelines amendments removed the project from eligibility for a Long Branch Redevelopment Zone Permit and that a regular CAFRA permit was needed (Ra18; Ra92; Ra 161-172; see also Rb7).  [...] repeatedly stated the same.  (see e.g., Ra6).  Under the Coastal Zone Management Rules, the Scenic Resources and Design Rule and its step back and view shed requirements are standards that an applicant must meet in order to obtain a CAFRA permit.
[brief] ”  Quite the opposite, the Complaint makes clear that the data was sent solely to [...]’s mailing vendor and the data was used to generate, print and mail a letter addressed only to Plaintiff.  Plaintiff’s Compliant thus fails to plead the necessary element of publicity.  *See McNemar*, 91 F.3d at 622 (holding that a disclosure by a store manager to the plaintiff’s aunt and uncle that the plaintiff had health problems and a disclosure by a store employee to plaintiffs friend that plaintiff resigned because he had AIDS, was insufficient to meet the publicity requirement).
[brief] The arbitrator shall decide the dispute based on a reasonable determination of the issues, given due weight to those factors listed below that are judged relevant for the resolution of the specific dispute.  In the award, the arbitrator or panel of arbitrators shall indicate which of the factors are deemed relevant, satisfactorily explain why the others are not relevant, and provide an analysis of the evidence on each relevant factor; provided, however, that in every interest arbitration proceeding, the parties shall introduce evidence regarding the factor set forth in paragraph (6) of this subsection in an award:
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Court's decision to grant Defendants' cross-motion reconsideration and reverse the denial of the initial order regarding their motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted should be reversed.  Respectfully submitted, **[...]**  By: [...] /s/ (# 024172005)  [...], Esq.  Dated: August 19, 2024  RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF ON APPEAL
[brief] SUBMISSION OF BIDS  The Bidder shall ensure delivery of its bid with all required components and attachments, including, but not limited to the following:  Prospective bidders are required to submit a NJDOT Notice of Classification which demonstrates the Contractor has a current pre-qualification rating of not less than their respective bid.  The Notice of Classification must be submitted with the bid documents.  Bids submitted without a proper Notice of Classification may be considered non-responsive.  [Da110-11]  (emphasis original)  [...] did not submit its NJDOT Notice with its bid.  Da357.  On July 30, the County opened all bids.
[brief] Based upon this distinction, Appellants’ argument begins with a consideration of Issues 2 and 3 before the others.  ARGUMENT I BECAUSE APPELLANTS’ BUNDLE OF SOLAR RIGHTS, SOLD IN PERPETUITY BY FIBERVILLE ESTATES AND ASSIGNED TO, AND OWNED SOLELY BY, APPELLANTS, WAS FRAUDULENTLY “RE-SOLD” BY FIBERVILLE, AND FRAUDULENTLY “BOUGHT” BY CEP DEFENDANTS, THE ORDERS DISMISSING THESE DEFENDANTS BELOW WERE GRAVELY ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW [Pa3088, Pa2501]
[brief] Four robberies occurred on December 8th, 2011, December 19th, 2011, January 5th, 2012 and January 12th, 2012, at various cell phone stores in Middlesex County.  The State alleged that the four robberies involved the same defendants: [...], [...]\(^2\), defendant [...] and [...].  Because the manner of the execution shared similarities, the State’s theory was that the three men who were arrested after the January 12th, 2012 robbery were responsible for the previous three robberies.  At the time of the January 19th robbery, Michael was arrested parked in his car in a nearby 7-Eleven.  The State’s theory largely rested on cell-phone records of Bowers and Michael and the testimony of co-defendant Bowers, who testified as a cooperating witness in exchange for a plea deal to 15 years imprisonment.  The jury rejected significant aspects of the State’s case.  With respect to the December 8th robbery, it found Michael not guilty of armed robbery and conspiracy; with respect to the December 19th robbery, it found Michael not guilty of armed robbery, but guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery.
[brief] 7  I.  THIS ACTION WAS NOT FILED PROPERLY AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (Da89-90; 1T66:18-73:2) ......................  7  A.  An Action In Lieu Of Prerogative Writ Of Quo Warranto Applies To Officeholders, Not Rutgers’ Volunteer Board Members .........................................................  8  B.  This Action Is Time-Barred By The New Jersey Court Rules ..... 14  II.  THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS APPLY ONLY AT THE TIME OF APPOINTMENT AND ARE NOT CONTINUING OBLIGATIONS FOR BOG MEMBERS (Da89-90; 1T73:3-80:7)  ........  20  A.  Special Rules Apply When Construing The Rutgers Act ............  20  B.  Even Without Berg, The Ordinary Tenets For Construing Statutes Support Defendants’ Construction ...........................................  25  C.  Legislative History Does Not Support Plaintiffs’ Position .........  30  CONCLUSION .....................................................................................
[brief] 31 State v. T.J.M., 220 N.J. 220 (2015) ...............................................................  47 State v. Thomas, 132 N.J. 247 (1993) .............................................................  30, 31 State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554 (2005) .................................................................  15 State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021) .................................................................  48 State v. Vandeweaghe, 351 N.J. Super. 467 (App. Div. 2002) .........................  15 State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588 (2011) ..................................................................  9 State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397 (2007) ......................................................... 41, 47 State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131 (2014) ...............................................................
[directive] A County Prosecutor may designate any law enforcement officer to serve as an authorized CED or Less-Lethal Instructor within the countywide program under their jurisdiction.  11.4  For purposes of CED and Less-Lethal re-qualification ONLY, upon approval and designation of the respective County Prosecutor’s Office, municipal police officers and/or county sheriff’s officers may be trained as a “CED Re-Qualification Instructor” or “Less-Lethal Requalification Instructor” to administer re-qualification.  Training of any CED or Less-Lethal Re-Qualification Instructor shall be identical to the training requirements for Certified CED Instructors or Certified Less-Lethal Instructors.  Each respective County Prosecutor’s Office shall maintain a list of all CED and Less-Lethal Re-Qualification Instructors.  Re-Qualification Instructors shall not be authorized to conduct the initial training of officers authorized to carry a CED or Less-Lethal Device.  11.5
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 19:63-22(a).  [...] argues N.J.S.A. 19:63-22(a) must be read in conjunction with Rule 1:3-1, which provides that the last day of a statutory period “is to be included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in which even the period runs until the next day which is neither Saturday, Sunday nor legal holiday. ” (Db24).
[brief] 32  Table of Judgments, Orders, and Rulings  App. Div. Order granting leave to appeal  A1  June 12, 2024  Orders denying defendants’ motion to vacate defaults and reinstate defendants’ answers and counterclaims  A3; 3T15-19  Amplification filed by [...]  A6 10/7/22  Order A12 12/16/22  Order A14 3/3/23  Order A16 4/14/23  Order A18 9/8/23  Orders A20 11/9/23  CMO A27 12/22/23
[brief] N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b ..................................................................  34  Rules R. 2:10-2 .............................................................................  17,20,26,27  N.J.R.E. 104 ...........................................................................  11,12,13,15  N.J.R.E. 802 ...........................................................................  14  N.J.R.E. 803 ...........................................................................  7 N.J.R.E. 804 ...........................................................................  14,15  Procedural History
[brief] (App. Div. 1993).  By way of its Order dated May 14, 2024, the Trial Court rightly determined not only that it would be unjust to enforce arbitration against the heir, but that the Arbitration Agreement was wholly unenforceable because its substance and surrounding circumstances shocked the conscience (Da80-93).  This decision logically followed from the Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint, which questioned the justice of enforcing the Arbitration Agreement.  While the facts had not changed in between the two (2) Court Orders, it was clear that many of the relevant facts and legal standards were not considered by the Trial Court at the time of the initial stay Order of March 2024.  As such, Defendants’ arguments regarding the law of the case are of no moment.  Additionally, a trial court has complete power to revise its interlocutory orders in the interest of justice.
[brief] \(^1\) *Miller v. Americollect, Inc.*, 2022 WL 20470401 at *9; *Mhrez Decision* at p.10.  Of course, to use telegram operators under any circumstances, even those permitted by the statute, the debt collector must transmit the information about the debt to be included in the telegram to the telegram operator—just as it would do with a letter vendor.  Yet under Appellant’s theory, a debt collector’s transmitting the information to the telegram operator is itself unlawful under § 1692c(b), which would render the telegram provisions null surplusage.
[brief] *Id.; State v. Chew*, 150 N.J. 30, 84 (1997); *State v. Tilghman*, 345 N.J. Super. 571, 575 (App. Div. 2001).  Here, defendant plucks out a single paragraph – a mere excerpt – from an entire section of the State’s summation regarding the ballistic evidence and claims misconduct.  However, put in its proper context, the State argued:  Finally, ladies and gentlemen, what I would ask you to do is take a look at all of the exhibits, including I believe its exhibits S-6, which are the bullets from the Smith & Wesson, and exhibits 8 and 9, which are the rounds from the Taurus.  Now, when you look at the rounds that are found inside the Smith & Wesson, you’re going to find one round which is entitled as FC Luger with a (indiscernible).  You’re going to find a bullet that says Blazer Luger on it.  You’re going to find three TulAmmos, .9-millimeter Luger bullets, as well as Winchester .9-millimeter bullet.  Now, at the scene, out at Ridge and Monroe, amidst the shatter glass, there are two shell casings found, retrieved, documented by [...].  One is S-10.  That’s a Winchester.  The second shell casing is a TulAmmo.  Again, matching the bullets that are found in the Smith & Wesson.  Remember also that two shell casings are found on the windshield wiper of the Toyota Corolla.  Once of those is a Winchester.  The other is a FC, FC .9-millimeter Luger.  When you look at the bullets that are found in the cars, you’ll find that there are four Winchester bullets as well as one Blazer Luger bullet.  And in the chamber of that Taurus .9-millimeter is another Winchester bullet.  [16T:86-4 to 87-4].  Then, following the specific excerpt defense points to, the State argued: