ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] denied purposefully misnaming Complainant at any time.  After reviewing [...]’s appeal of the LOD in a he-said/she-said case, the CSC denied [...]’s request for a fact-finding hearing.  The CSC further held that, as a matter of law, the local union’s office was a “State Workplace” under the State Policy.  The CSC’s determination is erroneous and must be reversed.  First, the CSC abused its discretion by denying [...]’s request for a fact-finding hearing despite a dispute of genuine material facts.  The CSC issued its determination, and rejected [...]’s request for a hearing, without review of the DCF EEO’s investigation report, any sworn witness statements or any other purported evidence.  The CSC held that because discipline was not at issue, no hearing was required.  This court’s case law is clear:  In the face of a clear dispute of fact between a complainant’s allegations and an appellant’s vigorous denial of complainant’s allegations – and in the absence of substantial credible evidence of corroboration – the CSC abuses its discretion when it rejects an appellant’s request that the matter be referred for a fact-finding hearing.  That is precisely what occurred here.  Further, a State department’s determination that a local union president engaged in unlawful harassment of a transgender union member is a serious matter that with significant risk of harm to [...]’s and the local union’s reputation.  Under those circumstances, the CSC’s determination that it has no obligation to refer the matter for a fact-finding hearing because DCF was not seeking to impose disciplinary action in connection with the LOD was an abuse of discretion that must be reversed.  Second, the CSC erroneously held that it and State departments had jurisdiction to enforce and investigate allegations of State Policy violations that involved a non-State workplace where the allegations in the Complaint do not involve State business.
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[directive] N.J.S.A.  See Page 3 2C:58-4.  All law enforcement agencies reviewing applications for carry permits shall continue to abide by the regulations issued by the New Jersey State Police, including any amendments adopted on an expedited basis pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(b).  II.  Other Provisions  A.  This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney Non-enforceability by third parties.  General’s authority to ensure the uniform and efficient enforcement of the laws and administration of criminal justice throughout the State.
[brief] First, the PCR court properly found no support for defendant’s claim that the sentencing court failed to state reasons for the imposition of a concurrent sentence because, based on the documentary record, it correctly ruled that the sentencing court “may have stated reasons to justify the concurrent sentence which at the time benefitted [defendant]” since the JOC “confirms the concurrent sentence and ‘incorporates all other reasons stated on the record at the time of sentence. ’” (Da45; Da4).  Second, even if this Court disagrees with the findings of the PCR court, his claim must fail because his “illegal leniency” argument pertains to the total length of his sentence – it does not pertain to the “legality” of his sentence.  Therefore, because his claim does not pertain to his sentence’s legality, his claim is not cognizable on PCR or under Rule 3:21-10(b)(5).  For the reasons that follow, this Court should reject his arguments.
[brief] While Plaintiff retained Defendants in this case in 2016, Plaintiff, through its corporate officers, has known [...] for years.  Da326 ¶¶ 4 & 5.  Defendants concede that [...] sent his résumé to [...] in New Jersey in July 2009, offering his legal services.  Da152 No. 9.  [...] testified that his official legal relationship with Plaintiff began in Spring 2016 while assisting with a lender note dispute.  Pa15 17:17–23.  That matter was venued in Minnesota federal court, even though [...] had no office there and [...] was not admitted there.  Da314 ¶ 13.  Defendants sent an engagement letter to Plaintiff at its New Jersey address in August 2016 outlining the lender dispute and the escrow transaction for the Project and indicating [...] would advise Plaintiff as to “general corporate matters as you shall present to us. ”  Da315 ¶¶ 17 & 19; Da76 ¶ 1.  The engagement letter was printed on [...] letterhead and listed its office locations, including Morristown, New Jersey.  The engagement letter did not specify a jurisdiction or reference a venue or choice of law provision.  Da76–80.\(^1\)  Defendants also directed all billing to New Jersey and were paid from Plaintiff’s New Jersey bank account.  Da315–17 ¶¶ 17, 29 & 30; Da329–343.  **D.
[brief] Even though Cole Does Not Apply for an Express Waiver, the Trial Court Applied Cole and Correctly Found Waiver  Even though the Trial Court did not have to apply the Cole factors, which apply only when there is a question about an implied waiver, on reconsideration, the Trial Court did so, at Defendants’ urging and still found Defendants expressly waived arbitration:  When the Court considers -- and, you know, I’ve peppered [...] with questions with regards to whether or not Cole is even applicable in light of the fact that there is an express waiver.  And for the record, the Cole case is cited at -- it is Cole v Jersey City Medical Center at 215 N.J. 265, a 2013 case.
[brief] In that case, “since the autopsy didn’t disprove [the defendant’s] statements, [the medical examiner] believe[d] her statement” and the medical examiner stated that he came to his conclusion that the child was born alive and then drowned because “[t]here’s nothing inconsistent between what she said and what I saw in the autopsy. ”  Tyler at 150.  The medical examiner in Tyler went on to state that “without the [defendant’s] witness statements, I could not have diagnosed drowning in this case. ”  Tyler at 151.  The error in Tyler was wholly concerned with the fact that the medical examiner relied on statements of the defendant relayed to him and the veracity of which was challenged at trial.  By basing his conclusions on disputed statements before the jury, he erroneously made a judgement about the credibility of these statements which should have been determined by the jury alone.  In the present case, [...] did not rely on disputed facts to make his determination that the cause of [...]’s death was homicide.
[brief] *Id.* at 485.  Here, [...] erroneously denied [...] the option to withdraw his guilty plea which was contrary to long established case law set forth *Kovack*, and its progeny, holding that a trial court must clearly inform a defendant of the material penal consequences of his guilty plea.  In denying [...] the option of vacating his plea, [...] erroneously made assumptions and interpretations about the municipal court’s sentencing of [...], rather than focusing on [...]’s reasonable understanding of the plea, and that the Court did not inform [...], whatsoever, that his sentence was consecutive.  Instead, the trial court misled defendant [...] by flatly informing him that the license suspension would end 10 years from the date of sentencing, that is, was being imposed concurrently with the previously imposed license suspension.  Moreover, there was nothing in the record indicating that [...] was informed of material penal consequences that [...]’s 10-year loss of license was to run consecutive, or that [...] would be receiving a 20 year loss of license.  Instead of any mention of a consecutive sentence, the trial court informed defendant that as a result of his plea of guilty on February 8, 2013, his license would be suspended for 10 more years \textit{from today's date}, which again, was February 8, 2013.  1T:14:13-15.  Finally, the Law Division judge, seemingly trying to defend the utter absence of any mention of consecutive sentencing exposure, claims that the suspension discussion was within the broader context of license suspension and that the single word “more” regarding the imposition of the 10-year license suspension for which he was being sentenced somehow clearly informed [...] that he was going to get consecutive sentencing, somehow without ever using the word “consecutive. ”  Even if the colloquy between the trial court and [...] can be seen as confusing or unclear, it undermines any notion that the plea was entered into knowingly and voluntarily.  See Sheil v. NJ State Parole Bd., 244 N.J. Super. 521 (App. Div. 1990)(In the context of jail credits, “Hence a guilty plea based on this misunderstanding may fail to satisfy the constitutional requirement that a plea be voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly entered, at least where the denial of the expected credits results in the imposition of a sentence longer in duration than the maximum contemplated. ”” (citation omitted).  Moreover, it is especially important in this context for a defendant to explicitly be told about the consecutive nature of the license suspension since any misleading or even confusion regarding the plea derails a defendant’s reasonable expectations until years later, at the time defendant expected his license to be reinstated, instead being told by DMV that it was suspended for 10 more years.  Here, defendant’s reasonable expectations as to the material terms of the agreement should have been accorded deference, however, they were not adhered to, nor were they fulfilled.  Accordingly, the appropriate remedy is for defendant to be given the option to withdraw his guilty plea.
[brief] Here, [...] never did business in the name of [...] or [...] and all of its business always included the [...] name in some way.  Simply distributing advertising materials or selling products with [...]’s trademark is not enough to create a license for trademark use under the NJFPA.  See Finlay, 146 N.J. Super. at 219 (holding that the Act’s written arrangement requirement will not “be satisfied simply by furnishing the dealer with a limited license to use trademarked marketing and advertising materials. ”).  Based on the above, the trial court correctly held that [...] did not grant [...] a license and there was no written arrangement between the parties.
[brief] (Pa022a).  The ALJ reiterated that [...] could not have performed his counts at 2:30 a.m., 3:00 a.m., 3:30 a.m. and 4:00 a.m., as [...] noted in the logbook, because the surveillance footage does not show [...] leaving the food preparation room at those times.  *Ibid.*  Moreover, the ALJ explained that [...] began her escape at 3:16 a.m. and remained away until 5:15 a.m. so she was not physically in her bed at 3:30 a.m., 4:00 a.m., 4:30 a.m. and 5:00 a.m.  *Ibid.*  Thus, at a minimum, [...]’ inmate counts incorrectly noted all inmates were in their cells.  *Ibid.*  The ALJ found [...] in clear violation of IMP Custody Directives #1 and #2, which both require HUOs to conduct frequent, irregularly timed tours of all areas under their control, as well as inmate counts at set times.  (Pa023a; Ra2-62).  The ALJ also noted that the Department’s Rules and Regulations require officers to devote their full attention to their assignments and explain that lack of diligence will not be tolerated.  (Ibid.; Ra67-68).  False or misleading statements are also prohibited.  Ibid.  For the above stated reasons, the ALJ sustained all charges against [...].  ii.
[brief] *State v. Manley*, 54 N.J. 259, 282 (1969).  This process serves to “eliminat[e] the efforts [of parties] to indoctrinate, to persuade, [or] to instruct by favorable explanation of legal principles that may or may not be involved” in the case.  *Id.* at 280.  Trial courts are “allotted reasonable latitude when conducting voir dire and, therefore, a reviewing court’s examination should focus only on determining whether ‘the overall scope and quality of the voir dire was sufficiently thorough and probing to assure the selection of an impartial jury. ’”  *State v. Winder*, 200 N.J. 231, 252 (2009) (quoting *State v. Biegenwald*, 106 N.J. 13, 29 (1987)).
[brief] iv.  The Chancery Division Judge Was Without Subject Matter Jurisdiction To Hear And Determine The Controversy At Law Thus Erred And Abused Her Discretion.  [1T]  Plaintiff maintains that the Law Division is and was the proper forum.  Plaintiff argues that Actions in Lieu of Prerogative Writs and Civil Rights Actions are not enumerated in R. 4:3-1 subparagraphs (1),(2),(3), and (4) (Pa 187-191).
[directive] Now, THEREFORE, I, [...], Governor of the State of New Jersey, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of this State, do hereby ORDER and DIRECT:  1.  Section 3(b) of Executive Order No. 9 of Governor [...] is rescinded and any regulations adopted and promulgated thereunder shall be null and void.  2.  Except as otherwise provided by law or when essential to the performance of official duties or when authorized by a person in interest, an instrumentality of government shall not disclose to anyone other than a person duly authorized by this State or the United States to inspect such information in connection with his official duties, personnel or pension records of an individual, except that the following shall be public:
[brief] ”).  Moreover, confiscatory tax foreclosures primarily harm society’s most vulnerable members—the elderly, the ill, the impoverished, and the bereaved.  See Cherokee Equities, L.L.C. v. Garaventa, 382 N.J. Super. 201, 211 (Ch. Div. 2005) (tax foreclosure defendants are often “among society’s most unfortunate[.]”).  These vulnerable individuals should be protected by the government, not exploited.  To be clear, none of the above considerations are necessary to resolve the question of retroactivity, since the rule from Harper and the constitutional mandate of just compensation are sufficient to command full retroactivity.  But this Court need not be concerned, as it rightly was in the foreclosure context of Roberto, that retroactivity will create undue burdens on either government or bona fide purchasers of foreclosed property.  The analysis is different here, where just compensation—not title—is concerned.
[directive] Do you understand that pursuant to the rules of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision if you are residing outside the State of New Jersey at the time of sentencing that return to your residence may be delayed pending acceptance of the transfer of your supervision by your state of residence?  b.  Você entende também que de acordo com o mesmo Pacto Interestadual a tranferência da sua [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] supervisão a outro estado pode ser negada ou restringida por aquele estado a qualquer momento após a sentença se aquele estado determinar que você é obrigado a se registrar como agressor sexual naquele estado ou se o Estado de Nova Jersey exigiu seu registro como agressor sexual?
[brief] Instead, she asked only what she called “a very specific” question to which [...] provided a “very specific” answer that told the court very little.  The judge asked not what the other jurors were saying in deliberation about the encounter with a person from the trial, but, rather, only whether [...] had “interactions” with those other jurors about that topic.  (7T 40-19 to 23)  In other words, [...] told the trial judge something important that the judge had not heard from any other juror: that some jurors “in deliberations” were discussing “interactions with” someone “affiliated with the case,” but the judge’s followup response was not to ask what was said by those other jurors, but rather only if [...] had such “interactions” on that topic in deliberations.  There was nothing close to meeting the Bey/R.D./Bisaccia standard of “specific” inquiry into the allegation by [...] that in fact jurors were discussing the encounter with [...] during deliberations.  Instead, all the judge asked was whether [...] was part of those discussions.  Bisaccia makes it clear that when it appears that there is the “possibility” of impropriety, failing to address those allegations through an appropriately specific voir dire will necessarily be reversible error.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 542.  The *Perini* concurrence added further, regarding “errors of fact,” that “the only tenable conclusion from the statute itself is that errors of fact, whether gross or ordinary, lead to neither vacation nor modification and correction. ”  *Id.*  To be sure, in *Tretina*, the New Jersey Supreme Court expressly adopted [...]’s concurring opinion in *Perini*, holding that “a majority of the Court now agrees that the correct standard of review is…the standard set forth in the Chief Justice’s opinion concurring in the judgment in *Perini.*”  135 N.J. at 358.
[brief] POINT I THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE MATTER SHOULD NOT BE REMANDED BACK TO THE ZONING BOARD TO RE-DO THE RE-DO HEARINGS AND THE RECORD CANNOT BE EXPANDED.  PA 849  With respect to the Appellants request to reverse the Trial Court’s ruling that the matter should not be remanded back to the Zoning Board to re-do the re-do hearing, the pertinent facts are not in dispute.
[brief] FURTHER SUPPORTS REVERSAL ON THE BASIS THAT THE RELIEF GRANTED BELOW WAS ALREADY GRANTED BY OTHER COURTS AND THAT THE ISSUES LITIGATED BELOW HAD ALREADY BEEN RESOLVED WITH FINALITY (RESPONDENTS’ POINT IX).  Respondents’ contention that “reversal is not warranted because of the hypothetical potential for double recovery” (Pb43-44) is perhaps the most flagrant example of the Respondents’ disregard for the corporate form.  This same disregard was shared by the trial court, with implications that potentially extend far beyond the instant case.  But before arriving at that issue, Respondents’ insinuation that Appellant is “making a[n] [un]true statement to this Court” concerning double-recovery is precisely the sort of poisonous accusation that Respondents have relied upon from Day 1 in order to undermine Appellant’s credibility.  Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law defines “recovery” as “an amount awarded by . . . a judgment or decree. ”  [...] has in fact recovered from Appellant’s companies – it obtained judgments against them and is actively receiving payments from [...], which is indisputable and evidenced by the Chapter 11 proceedings referenced in Appellant’s initial Brief.  Respondents proffer that “Appellant is correct, conceptually: any amount of the $4,767,826.25 Judgment, including Rule 4:42-11(b) interest, that is recovered from Appellant’s other companies can be used to offset against the judgment recovered from him. ” (Pb44).  It is evident from this statement that their willingness to argue both sides of the coin seems to know no bounds.  Even without prevailing on (or even properly pleading) a veil piercing claim, Respondents would like this court to disregard the sacrosanct separation between an individual and a corporate/limited liability entity.  At the same time, they openly admit that the very same loan agreements which they alleged were fraudulent are, in fact, wholly valid and bona fide loan agreements between [...] and the respective [...].  The doctrine of election of remedies does not allow for such a scenario to exist – least of all not once [...] joined this matter as a plaintiff.  Similarly, judicial estoppel prohibits [...] from now asserting a claim that is contrary to what it asserted in the arbitration proceedings.  How many times will the Respondents attempt to reframe their claims?  The Appellate Division should find that the confirmed AAA arbitration awards were dispositive of all issues as to all parties and [...] should be forced to live with its election to pursue recovery in that forum.
[directive] It is in the best interests of everyone that your complaint about the performance of an individual officer is resolved fairly and promptly.  The Police Department has formal procedures for investigating your complaint.  These procedures are designed to ensure fairness and protect the rights of both citizens and law enforcement officers:  1.  Reports or Complaints of officer/employee misconduct must be accepted from any person, including anonymous sources, at any time.  2.  Complaints shall be accepted regardless of age, race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or immigration status of the complaining party.  3.  Your complaint will be sent to a superior officer or a specially trained internal affairs officer who will conduct a thorough and objective investigation.  4.  You might be asked to help in the investigation by giving a detailed statement about what happened or providing other important information or documents.  5.  All complaints against law enforcement officers are thoroughly investigated.  You will be kept informed of the status of the investigation and its ultimate outcome, if requested, and you provide contact information.  The exact discipline imposed is confidential, but you will be advised of the ultimate finding, namely :  a.  Sustained:  A preponderance of the evidence shows an officer violated any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standing operating procedure; rule; or training.  b.  Unfounded: A preponderance of the evidence shows that the alleged misconduct did not occur.  c.  Exonerated:  A preponderance of the evidence shows the alleged conduct did occur, but did not violate any law; regulation; directive, guideline, policy, or procedure issued by the Attorney General or County Prosecutor; agency protocol; standing operating procedure; rule; or training.  d.  Not Sustained: The investigation failed to disclose sufficient evidence to clearly prove or disprove the allegation.  6.  If our investigation shows that a crime might have been committed, the county prosecutor will be notified.  You might be asked to testify in court.  7.  If our investigation results in an officer being charged with a violation of department rules, you might be asked to testify in a departmental hearing.  8.  If our investigation shows that the complaint is unfounded or that the officer acted properly, the matter will be closed.  9.  Internal affairs investigations are confidential and all disciplinary hearings shall be closed to the public unless the defendant officer requests an open hearing.
[directive] 2.  The CJRA contains various time limits designed to move cases toward trial.  The Court does not find that the pandemic, along with the accompanying suspension of in- person criminal jury trials, has transformed the CJRA’s overall approach to pretrial detention into a punitive scheme.  Yet individual cases, which are not the subject of the Order to Show Cause, can be subject to challenge on due process grounds.  The length of detention alone is not dispositive.  A more comprehensive, fact-specific inquiry in each case is needed, and relief tied only to the length of detention for large categories of defendants would not be appropriate for a variety of reasons.  Cases are best examined on 2 an individual basis, which the CJRA provides for under the present circumstances.  The judicial surgery and the Court’s rulemaking constitutional remedies movants propose -- authority -- are thus not well-suited for the current circumstances.  (pp. 12-17)