[brief] Contrary to defendants’ suggestion that only the end result and not the reasoning of the court’s decision below need be reviewed by this Court (Db9), review of a decision on reopening a case under the abuse-of-discretion standard embraces both the reasoning and the result.  *Handleman v. Cox*, 74 N.J. Super. 316, 329-330 (App. Div. 1962).  This is particularly true where, as here, “[t]he issue in dispute seriously affected the substantial rights of the plaintiff and he should have been given the opportunity to supplement his proofs”.  *Id.*, 74 N.J. Super. at 333.  While the misconduct alleged on behalf of the *[...]* class is in many ways *analogous* to that alleged in *[...]*, the “relating to” language in the 2015 Settlement does not extinguish sight-unseen the claims by *[...]* class members for misconduct arising long after Feb.  20, 2015 simply because the *[...]* complaint suggests that Defendants have engaged in wrongdoing *similar* to that at issue in *[...]*.  Cf. *Dando v. Bimbo Food Bakeries Distribution, LLC*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132038, at *7 (D.N.J. Sep. 29, 2015) (“The key inquiry is whether the factual predicate for future claims is *identical* to the factual predicate underlying the settlement agreement”, italics added).  Defendant’s reliance on the vague “relating to” formula in ¶1.29 of the Settlement Agreement to overturn the more specific ¶¶ 2.1 and 5.9, both of which clearly limit the release to claims existing at the time final judgment was entered, attempts to re-write the Settlement Agreement to give Defendants a perpetual license to abuse their customers.  The more specific language should prevail over the general, non-specific wording in ¶1.29.  Cf. Halderman, 901 F.2d at 319.  The claims of the proposed [...] class members could not have been asserted or alleged by any of the members of the [...] class on Feb. 20, 2015, because those claims do not relate to misconduct that occurred before Feb. 20, 2015; they relate to misconduct occurring after that date.  The claims being asserted by the [...] plaintiffs did not accrue until [...] engaged in misconduct long after 2015; in fact, Dr. [...]’s complaint in federal court proposed several examples of wrongful fees and surcharges occurring in 2020.  (Pa0023-25, at ¶¶ 29-33).  Moreover, where a party arbitrarily restructures its service fees subsequent to a baseline period, it is an abuse of discretion to decide that the revised fee structure is substantially the same as before and thus entitled to the same treatment by the court.  Cobo by Hudson Physical Therapy Servs. v. Market Transition Facility, 293 N.J. Super. 374, 388 (App. Div. 1996).  [...]’s February, 2020 “bill stuffer” notice to its Merchant Customers (Pa000122-Pa000123) concealed that, instead of merely simplifying its billing, the new “bundling” categories described therein increased the “interchange rate” substantially above the “interchange rates” published by the credit card issuers, with the excess fee being billed to the Merchant Customer.  For example, instead of a VISA processing fee that would incorporate VISA’s published interchange rate, that transaction now resulted in a credit card processing fee that incorporated Defendant [...]’s wholly arbitrary, and typically substantially higher, “bundled” rate.  (Pa000123).  On a cumulative basis, [...]’s arbitrary “bundled rate” has resulted in their collection of millions of dollars of excessive fees from the Class of Merchant Customers the Plaintiffs seek to represent in this action.  (Pa000123-Pa000124).  B.