ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Defendant’s Sentence Under the Second Indictment Was Illegal, Making Defendant’s Sentence Under the Third Indictment Illegal as Well.  Here, defendant was charged under Ind. #1 ([...]), with criminal offenses arising from an incident occurring on October 27, 1995.  Defendant was arrested on the same day and released on bail 41 days later on December 7, 1995.  (Da 1-4)  On March 26, 1996, defendant pleaded guilty to third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, presumably pursuant to a plea agreement, as at the time of sentencing the remaining two charges were dismissed apparently without objection.\(^{10}\) (Da 3-4)  On April 26, 1996, while still on bail pending sentencing on Ind. #1, defendant was again arrested.  (Da 9)  This arrest led to the return of Ind. #2 ([...]) on July 3, 1996.  Therein defendant was charged with an additional seven offenses.  (Da 5-6)  On October 15, 1996, defendant was sentenced on the first indictment to a flat term of 5 years.  (Da 3-4)  On May 22, 1997, pursuant to \(^{10}\)  As previously noted, document and transcript requests made by Deputy Public Defender [...] of the Conviction Integrity Unit could not be fulfilled.  (Da 14-16) a plea agreement (Da 7-9), defendant pleaded guilty to a single offense under Ind. #2 ([...]) with the remaining charges to be dismissed.  (Da 7-11)  On June 30, 1997, in accordance with the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced on the Ind. #2 to a term of 7 years with a 3-year parole bar.  (Da 10-11)  The sentence was ordered to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed on the conviction stemming from the Ind. #1.  (Da 10-11)  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h) provides in pertinent part that:  [w]hen a defendant is sentenced to imprisonment for an offense committed while released, with or without bail, pending disposition of a previous offense, the term of imprisonment shall run consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment imposed for the previous offense, unless the court, in consideration of the character and conditions of the defendant, finds that imposition of consecutive sentences would be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct by others.  Absent a finding of a serious injustice, the sentencing court was required by the Legislature to impose the seven years with a three-year parole bar on Ind. #2 consecutive to the five-year flat term imposed on Ind. #1.  Clearly, defendant’s sentence on the second indictment was illegally lenient.  In denying defendant relief, the PCR court stated:
[brief] Da38.  According to the PSA and [...], the closing was anticipated to occur on or about May 2020.  Pa0245; 7T71-18 to 23.  The closing was supposed to be quickly done; a quick closing was doable because Plaintiff was the developer.  8T35-6 to 18.  The PSA permitted the parties to close as is without an abatement.  J-8; 7T24-11 to 20.  Vincent [...] knew that the property was in “oversight status”.  7T79-7 to 16.  Plaintiff understood that Defendants wanted to sell the property if the Plaintiff would cap and assume the remaining liability associated with the property.  7T12-17 to 23.  Vincent [...] understood that the Defendants wanted to limit their continued responsibility.  7T12-17 to 23.  The discussion of price did not arise until January 2019 at which time Defendants sought a $1.5M price.  Plaintiff balked and ultimately procured a reduction for remediation costs.  3T218-6 to 25; 5T94-1 to 95-19; 8T16-15-20.  The Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) was signed on September 19, 2019.  Pa0245.  The purchase price of $1M was ratified in the PSA.  Pa0245.  Vincent [...] failed to respond clearly to the initial questions as to the reason why the price was reduced from $1.5M to 1M (7T12-9), only later attributing it to the difference in his appraised value versus the Defendants’ appraised value (7T15-2 to 9) yet acknowledges that Defendants’ concerns were discussed at the same time.  7T14-1 to 25.  When asked when a closing would occur, Vincent [...] referred to sundry financial, environmental, regulatory and land use requirements that would prevent a closing.  7T34-07 to 22.  Defendants forwarded all documentation related to the property and ceded to demands made by Vincent [...] to evict both tenants by 2020.  8T27-21 to 25.  Since 2020, the property in question remains without tenants.  5T84-20 to 24; 5T109-4 to 15.  IV.
[brief] The legislative history of *N.J.S.A.* 40:49-2 demonstrates the legislative intent behind the statute.  Historically, all ordinances were to be published in full in a locally circulated newspaper.  See P.L. 1955, c. 121, §1; see also *Wolf, supra*, 182 N.J. Super. at 294; *Rockaway Shoprite Assocs., Inc., supra*, 424 N.J. Super. at 345.  The reason for requiring publication prior to the adoption of an ordinance is simple: to effect “wide dissemination of notice throughout the municipality affected, so that citizens and interested parties may have an opportunity to become informed and to be heard. ”  City of Plainfield v. Courier News, 72 N.J. 171, 182 (1976) (emphasis added).  See also Reisdorf v. Borough of Mountainside, 114 N.J. Super. 562, 573 (1971) (stating that the “purpose of requiring publication of an ordinance is to afford opportunity to the parties in interest and citizens to be heard on the subject matter”) and Bruno v. Borough of Shrewsbury, 2 N.J. Super. 550, 554 (1949) (accord).
[brief] On September 13, 2023 [...] had a scheduled appearance before the Manchester City municipal court.  Before that date, but after the incident that occurred in and around December 10, 2022, [...]’s counsel received discovery from the State.  Da3-Da4.  Included in that discovery was the ticket citing [...] for a violation of N.J.S.A. 23:4-16(d)(1).  On the front of the ticket, the word “complaint” was written.  In the front of the ticket there was a section called “Description of offense”.  Underneath it, the phrase “153 ft” was visible.  Da3.  On the back of the ticket the word “complaint” was not written anywhere.  In addition, on the back of the ticket there was a section entitled “Officer’s Comments”.  In that section, the conservation officer who wrote the ticket, [...], had written “X street pumphouse 153 ft at 1130 Rt 70” and “213 ft from 121 Woodview Dr”.  Da4.  At his appearance, his counsel discussed with the municipal prosecutor [...] the citation that [...] received as to his alleged hunting violation on or about December 10, 2022.
[brief] There are numerous issues in this case, but for purposes of this appeal, this Brief will focus on the singular issue (and an associated issue dealing with the imposition of attorney fees).  This case involves an agreement between the parties that has been characterized as a “palimony” agreement.  There was/is a written agreement (DA 1, Pages A1-A16) between [...] and [...] to “settle” their issues relating to their finances and support resulting from a breakup of a long term relationship.  Plaintiff and Defendant were never married.  The one issue, which is the most devastating financially, is the penalties that have been assessed pursuant to this agreement on two (2) occasions against this appellant.  The penalties are for the alleged failure to make the required monthly payments of $1,500 (DA 1, paragraph 4, Page A4) to the Plaintiff.  It is our position that these penalties were wrongly imposed by the Courts below.
[brief] As [...] himself noted, “the court finds that defendant certainly did not obtain the amount of equitable distribution nor support which one would likely obtain in the vast majority of matters in which there are similar facts. ”  Combined with the lack of fairness in the process, the substantive result in this high value divorce case further shows that Rule 4:50 relief was warranted for [...] below.  [...] said, “The court finds the transfer of assets to defendant, [...] and [...] as part of the asset protection plan [which the couple executed in 2008] made these assets part of the marital estate” – yet all of these assets were transferred back to [...] in the divorce agreements, see Reconsideration Opinion at A434.  (“Plaintiff was awarded all the [...] and [...] assets as part of the bankruptcy GSA and in the PSA. ”)  The parties’ marital residence at [...] --- 9 [...] clarified that she did not return the cash to him as a result of the divorce but as a result of a separation agreement.
[brief] (6T71-19 to 20, 71-23 to 72-11, 120-13 to 14, 121-22 to 122-1).  [...] pleaded with defendant not to shoot.  (6T120-13 to 14, 121-15 to 21).  [...]’s girlfriend [...], who was hiding behind the refrigerator, saw [...]’s shadow as he surveyed the room and walked away, leaving [...]’s and [...]’s bodies lying in pools of their own blood.  (6T71-18 to 22).  A total of 14 shots were fired; 12 of the bullets struck defendant’s intended victims.
[brief] [Tr., 6:1-13.]  However, if Defendants had received prior complaints or reports of prior fights or other mayhem at the Subject Premises due to the presence of the illegal, large, makeshift liquor concession stand, the analysis would be different, i.e., ministerial.  Garrison, supra, 154 N.J. at 285; cf. Foster, supra, 389 N.J. Super. at 68-69 (holding that a jury could find that the defendant housing authority was negligent in failing to provide a lock for the front entrance of a building and had actual notice of the dangerous condition for a sufficient period of time to have corrected it).
[brief] The letter asked the Zoning Officer to determine that the Planning Board’s 1972 site plan (the “Site Plan”) did not permit parking by anyone on the open area along the Sixth Street side of the Property owned by Appellant (Ra160-Ra162).  On November 4, 2016, after the Zoning Officer declined to offer the requested interpretation, and with the Easement Litigation still pending, Appellant applied to the Board seeking the same interpretation (the “First Application”) (Ra163-Ra164).  On December 22, 2016, Respondent wrote to the Board opposing the First Application and attaching multiple exhibits to its objection (Ra43-Ra159).  While the zoning matter remained pending, [...] conducted a five-day bench trial between March 28, 2017 and April 10, 2017 (Aa29-Aa48).  On April 20, 2017, counsel for the Board issued a letter to the Zoning Officer agreeing with Respondent's objection on the grounds that the Board lacked the authority to issue interpretive guidance regarding the meaning of decades-old zoning resolutions, particularly to the extent that an interpretation of the same resolutions were already a subject pending judicial determination in active litigation, as was the case here (Ra165-Ra166).  On June 5, 2017, [...] ruled in favor of Respondent, holding, among other things, that Respondent had easement rights to park in the Sixth Street Lot that it had never abandoned (Aa29-Aa48).  On June 27, 2017, [...] entered judgment in favor of Respondent awarding money damages due to Appellant’s interference with Respondent’s easement rights (Ra167-Ra169).  On August 7, 2017, Appellant filed its initial appeal of [...]’s partial summary judgment ruling under Appellate Division Docket No. [...] (Ra170-Ra172).  Meanwhile, on December 4, 2017, while the 2017 Appeal remained pending, the Board unanimously voted to decline Appellant's invitation to interpret the meaning of the Planning Board’s 1972 Site Plan (Ra173-Ra215).  On January 8, 2018, the Board approved Resolution #4010 memorializing its decision (the “First Resolution”) (Ra216-Ra217).  On February 21, 2018, by way of a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs filed in the Law Division in Ocean County, Appellant appealed the First Resolution declining to interpret the Site Plan (Ra218-Ra227).  On August 17, 2018, the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C., granted Respondent's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice and affirming the Board's determination not to propound an interpretation of the Site Plan (Ra228-Ra234).  II.
[brief] The FAA "creates a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability applicable to arbitration agreements . . . affecting interstate commerce."  *Ragone v. Atl. Video at Manhattan Ctr.*, 595 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2010).  Federal policy strongly favors arbitration.  *E.g.*, *AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, 563 U.S. 333, 339  "[T]he FAA was 'enacted to replace judicial indisposition to arbitration,' and is an expression of a 'strong federal policy favoring arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.'"  Ross v. Am. Express Co., 547 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 2008)  Indeed, it has been observed that "it is difficult to overstate the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration, and it is a policy [courts] have often and emphatically applied."  Ragone, 595 F.3d at 121.  It is well-settled law that both state and federal courts must enforce the FAA with respect to all arbitration agreements covered by that statute.  Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S.Ct. 1201, 1202 (2012); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984); Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Open MRI of Morris & Essex, L.P. 356 N.J.Super. 567, 582 (Law Div. 2002).
[brief] During the course of his employment, [...] would regularly park at the [...] by the Fairways clubhouse.  (8T64:10, 13-14).  To be covert, especially at night, [...] would park in a "great spot" right near the fence line next to a vinyl fence, where an officer could park his or her car and no one could see the car from the road.  (8T64:21-25, 65:3).  The reason for having such a spot was that [...] could go out on foot patrol, and nobody would see the police vehicle.  (8T65:6-8).  [...] could not recall the exact amount of time that he went out walking.  (8T80:8-9).  When [...] left the car to go on foot patrol he left his MDT on.  (8T81:13).  As far as notifying the department, [...] would either key up from his car radio that he was going to get out and go on foot patrol or a property check, or he would get out and start doing the property check and call dispatch on the portable radio.  (8T81:19-23).  However, the radios have issues with poor functionality.  (8T82:1).  [...] had complained many times that there were problems receiving transmissions on the portable radio.  (8T82:22).  [...] knew what [...]'s car looked like but never saw [...] drive by when [...] parked at the clubhouse.  (8T83:13).  When [...] returned to his car after going on foot patrol, [...] or dispatch had gotten on the radio and asked [...] to do a warrant pickup.  (8T86:3).  When [...] received the radio call he had returned to his patrol car after completing his foot patrol.  (8T86:13).  There was no delay in [...] answering the radio call.  (8T87:5).  [...] was working on November 20, 2017, and was on patrol.  (15T58:15).  At all times [...] knew he had GPS in his vehicle.  (15T59:25).  [...] also thought their portable radios had GPS as well but found out later they did not.  (15T60:3).  The GPS in the cars had to be turned on via MDT.  (15T61:5).  Officers could see themselves as well as everyone else on shift and dispatch.  (15T61:13,20).  During the first IA interview which occurred approximately a year after the event, [...] was confronted about his whereabouts that night and [...] reported that it could have been a case of where he went through the area earlier in the night or hit the property check later on after he did it.
[directive] 2019 Commission Report, at 1-2.  8  Once an inmate reached the new date of parole eligibility, the inmate would proceed through the normal 9 parole process, subject to the requirements of the Parole Board, including notification to any victims of the offense.  2019 Commission Report, at 25.  As a practical matter, the retroactive modification process would only benefit inmates convicted of multiple crimes when the most serious crime of conviction was the mandatory minimum drug crime.  Inmates also serving a sentence for an offense with a longer period of parole ineligibility, e.g., an offense subject to the No Early Release Act, would be unlikely to see a change in their parole eligibility date.  The Commission also recommended that the Attorney General closely supervise the filing of notices of 10 objection to ensure that they would be issued sparingly and use consistent criteria.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.6.  “To implement the statutory mandate, the Department promulgated regulations and amendments pursuant to N.J.A.C. 11:3-29, as well as a personal injury protection (PIP) fee schedule. ”  In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 11:3-29, 410 N.J. Super. 6, 13 (App. Div.), cert. den., 200 N.J. 506 (2009).  The regulations concerning application of the fee schedules provide:  (a)  Every policy of automobile insurance and motor bus insurance issued in this State shall provide that the automobile insurer's limit on liability for medically necessary expenses payable under PIP coverage ... is the fee set forth in this subchapter.  Nothing in this subchapter shall, however, compel the PIP insurer ... to pay more for any service or equipment than the provider's usual, customary and reasonable fee, even if such fee is well below the automobile insurer's ... limit of liability as set forth in the fee schedules.  [N.J.A.C. 11:3-29.4(a) (emphasis added). ]  N.J.A.C. 11:3-29.1 further provides:  This subchapter implements the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.6 to establish medical fee schedules on a regional basis for the reimbursement of health care providers providing services or equipment for medical expense benefits for which payment is required to be made by automobile insurers under PIP coverage and by motor bus insurers under medical expense benefits coverage.  [N.J.A.C. 11:3-29.4(b) (emphasis added). ]  The Appellate Division held the rules, regulations and the fee schedule to be valid.
[brief] Such relief is properly sought under R. 4:50-1 providing for relief from a judgment on ground of: (a) “mistake, inadequacy, surprise or excusable neglect”.  Plaintiff admitted its mistake.  R. 4:50-2 provides that such a motion shall be made...“not more than a year after the judgment...was entered...”  The final judgment entered on November 21, 2018 declared that the condemnor had duly exercised its authority to utilize its power of eminent domain as to the described property and is a final adjudication of all facts and law.  Housing Authority v. Suydam Investors, 177 N.J. 2 (2003).
[brief] The Commission stated:  As this serious defect can only be remedied by a system of compulsory insurance, we now recommend the passage of a compulsory insurance act, for the protection of the employer from financial disaster and the assurance to those persons entitled to compensation, of the payments provided by law.  In recommending this, we have in mind the fact that it is quite as necessary for the protection of the employer as for the employee, as otherwise he may be forced out of business and into bankruptcy owing to his failure to voluntarily cover his liability by insurance.  Slip op. at 17-18 (Pa480) (emphasis added).
[brief] Moreover, the Guidelines contradict both the Application and the Quote.  The Guidelines provide as follows:  **Hired Non-Owned Automobile Coverage**  Hired and Non-Owned Automobile is available at the following liability limits:  $150,000 $500,000 $1,000,000  Hired Car and Non Owned Auto coverage should only be written for those insureds that do not have an owned fleet exposure and do not carry commercial automobile coverage which also provides Hired Car and Non Owned coverage.  *12 or 15 plus passenger vans are ineligible for this program.  [Pa008].  Thus, according to the Application filled out by [...], coverage was available for the vans at $150,000 or $500,000 without being subject to additional underwriting.  (Ia585).  For $1,000,000 coverage was available but was subject to additional underwriting.  According to the Quote, however, provided by [...] to [...], coverage was available for 12-15+ passenger vans in the amount of $150,000 or $500,000 but was not available at all in the amount of $1,000,000.  However, according to the Guidelines, no coverage in any amount is available for 12-15+ passenger vans.  [compare Ia545 with Ia147 and Pa008].  So which is it – is coverage for the vans available, not available, available at certain amounts but not others?
[brief] Unless and Until Defendant’s Criminal Conviction Under Ind. #2 ([...]) is Restored, He Fails to Qualify for the Imposition of an Extended Term as a Persistent Offender on Ind. #3.  Consequently, Until Ind. #2 is resolved, Defendant’s Extended Term Sentence Imposed on His Armed Robbery Conviction Under Ind. #3 ([...]) is Illegal and Must Be Amended to an Ordinary Term.
[brief] [...]’s arguments place undue reliance on the examples of undesigned and unexpected incidents provided in Richardson, which include a policeman shot while pursuing a suspect, a librarian hit by a falling bookshelf while reshelving books, a social worker getting her hand caught in a car door while transporting a child to court, and gym teacher who trips over a riser. 192 N.J. at 213-214.  (Ab8).  According to [...], those examples support his claim for accidental benefits because the Court found them to be examples of accidents that could occur during ordinary work efforts and would qualify for accidental disability retirement benefits.  (Ab8).  Unlike the actors in these scenarios, [...] was aware of the ongoing risk of being hit inadvertently during his attempt to restrain the patient’s legs.  The Richardson court did not suggest that the librarian was aware a bookshelf might fall on her (due to a faulty bookshelf), that the gym teacher was aware of the riser prior to tripping, that the policeman knew he would be shot at before engaging in the pursuit, or that the social worker was thinking about how her hand might get caught in the car door before it happened.  [...] reliance on Moran v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen’s Retirement System, 438 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 2014), and Brooks v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees’ Retirement System, 425 N.J. Super. 277 (App. Div. 2012), are also misplaced.
[brief] Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the underlying trial court determination denying [...]’s Motion to Disqualify based upon a speculative conflict of interest must be affirmed.  [...]  [...]  Tel: [...]  Email: [...] (Attorney ID: 03821996)  Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents  [...], et als. /s/ [...]  Dated: April 26, 2024  [...]  [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; and [...], Plaintiffs, v. CARTERET [...], P.C., d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...], d/b/a [...], d/b/a [...]; [...] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION
[brief] The trial court stated, “[t]he Court’s obligation here is to blindly and equally apply the law to all that come before it. ” (2T48:11).  The trial court concluded by stating that whether [...] should have “flagged” the issue of coverage for the 15 passenger vans was a separate issue, and held that the “questions were specific.  They were tailored to this situation.  They asked the insured.  It was responded to in the negative.  The carrier had the right to rely upon that information, and the Court accordingly is rescinding that contract of insurance that was granted in a million dollars. ” (2T49:7-50:5).  The trial court properly granted [...]’s summary judgment motion by Order dated October 21, 2022, and the [...] Policy was rescinded and declared void ab initio.