ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] coverage commenced, the Trial Court concluded that [...]’s coverage could not be triggered.  There is, however, no evidence anywhere in the record tying any of these otherwise common ailments to [...]’s mold exposure, which remained unknown until several species of toxic mold were discovered by environmental testing that was conducted for the first time in March, 2009.  Moreover, the word “mold” does not appear in any of the medical records of any treating physician before the first report of [...] regarding her initial consultation with Larry [...] in March, 2009.  There is no evidence that anyone – whether a lawyer [...] had retained to complain to the project developer about water intrusion, a representative of [...] or its property manager, [...], or anyone else – suggested that [...] might have been suffering symptoms attributable to environmental exposure to mold or bacteria or any other toxic substance.  Before March 2009, there was absolutely no basis for bringing such a claim against a third party, such as [...], because there was no evidence until that time of any connection between the acts or omissions of any third party and the symptoms [...] was experiencing.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  CASES  Bellardini v. Krikorian, 222 N.J. Super. 457 (App. Div. 1988)  ................................................................. 11, 12 Cho v. Trinitas Regional Medical Center, 443 N.J. Super. 461 (App. Div. 2015), certif. den. 224 N.J. 529 (2016)  ........................................................................  12  City of Hoboken v. Horst Savickas, Law Division, HUD-L-3109-04 (February 14, 2006) .............................................. 18 County of Ocean v. Landolfo, 132 N.J. Super. 523, 528 (App. Div. 1975) .......................................................... 13 Ford Motor Co. v. Tp. Of Edison, 127 N.J. 290, 300 (1992) .................................................................................... 14 Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Kerrigan, Docket No. HUD-L-4528-04 (January 25, 2008) ..................................................... 18 Redevelopment Agency v. Bienstock, 123 N.J. Super. 457, 459-460 (App. Div. 1973) ....................................................... 10 State v. Gorga, 26 N.J. 113 (1958) .................................................................................................. 13-16 State v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 40 N.J. 560 (1963) ................................................................................................... 10 State by Commissioner of Transportation v. Caoili, 135 N.J. 252 (1994) ................................................................................................. 15-17 State by Com’r of Transp. v. F. & J., 250 N.J. Super. 19 (App. Div. 1991) .....................................................................  11  State, by State Highway Comm’r v. Azzolina Land Corp., 101 N.J. Super. 103, 106 (App. Div. 1968)  .............................................................  13  Village of South Orange v. Alden Corp., 71 N.J. 362 (1976)  ..................................................................................................  10-11  New Jersey Statutes and Rules Rule 4:25-8 ...............................................................................................................  12  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Watson, and at the time of this trial, an in-court identification was admissible so long as the suggestive courtroom atmosphere did not “outweigh the reliability of the identification. ”  State v. Clausell, 121 N.J. 298, 328 (1990).  Generally, “the ultimate burden remain[ed] on the defendant to prove a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. ”  State v. Burney, 471 N.J. Super. 297, 327 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 289 (2011)), rev'd, State v. Burney, 255 N.J. 1 (2023).
[brief] ”  *Duncan v. Ornoski*, 528 F.3d 1222, 1235 (9th Cir. 2008); see *Pavel v. Hollins*, 261 F.3d 210, 223 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding counsel's performance was deficient where “he did not call a medical expert to testify as to the significance of the physical evidence presented by the prosecution”); *Miller v. Senkowski*, 268 F. Supp. 2d 296, 312 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (determining trial counsel's “decision to not call an expert witness to rebut the prosecution's witness, or at least confer with an expert prior to cross-examination, constituted error and was not related to a valid trial strategy”); *Troedel v. Wainwright*, 667 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (S.D. Fla. 1986), aff'd sub nom. *Troedel v. Dugger*, 828 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding trial counsel's failure to retain expert resulted in deficient performance where “expert testimony would have been helpful in cross-examining and/or rebutting the State's expert”).
[brief] ” (Pb21).  However, there is no obligation on the part of the Arbitrator to use the issue statement presented by [...] if it does not accurately depict the actual issue, and the parties agreed to defer to the Arbitrator when they could not agree to an issue statement at the arbitration.  (T19:13-15).  Thus, when [...] presented a one-sided issue statement that presupposed the very conclusion it sought the Arbitrator to reach, the Arbitrator appropriately reframed the issue statement to accurately depict the issue between the parties.  (Pa187).  Further, the court correctly found that issue statement’s reference to the Treasury circulars was also reasonably debatable.  (T22:15-23:8).  The court held that such information was relevant to the issue before the Arbitrator, which was whether the [...] violated the parties’ contract based upon its compliance with the Treasury circulars.  (T19:16-21; T22:15-22).  As the court held, [...] was correct in following Treasury’s annual fiscal year circulars that require overtime to be calculated according to the number of working days in a given fiscal year.  (T22:23-23:8).  Because the regular rate of pay is paid according to Treasury’s circulars, so too must the overtime rate comply with Treasury’s requirement that overtime be calculated using the formula based on the number of working days in the fiscal year.  *Ibid.*  Thus, as the Arbitrator and trial court correctly determined, the 2,080 divisor demonstrates the mechanics of how to calculate overtime, rather than a mandate to use the 2,080 divisor in all years.  (Pa192; T21:4-5; T24:5-8).  **B.
[brief] Would a reasonable person understand it to be capable of hurting someone grievously?  How were [...] and [...] positioned relative to each other?  How many times was [...] hit?  All of these questions, and more, would be relevant to the jury’s determination of whether the attack evinced an intent to kill or to cause serious bodily injury that would nearly certainly kill.  But that intent should not have been inferred merely by the use of the chiller.
[brief] [...]: He’s telling me he’s not going to ask what I want to ask.  THE COURT: Pardon me.  [...]: He’s telling me he’s not going to ask -- he’s not going to cross-examine -- THE COURT: Hold on.  [Defense counsel] is an experienced attorney.  Okay.  Mr. Bell, I don’t know your experience in the courtrooms but -- [...]: It’s my life.  THE COURT: I understand that these are your liberty interests at stake.  We’ve taken great pains and measures to ensure that you’re going to get a fair trial.  I think counsel would tell you the same thing that I’m going to tell you; you’re not helping yourself in any way, shape, or form by yelling out, shouting, interrupting the court proceedings.  Okay.  If you have a question, an issue, a concern, write it down.  Give it to [defense counsel].  Okay.  If he thinks it’s relevant, germane, appropriate, and within parameters of the court rules and the rules of evidence, then he will ask it.  Okay.  And if he doesn’t believe that what you’re saying is either permissible before the court or the jury for varied reasons, [defense counsel] is the attorney.  Okay.  So if you have issues you talk to him.  But I’m telling you -- [...]: Can I be my own attorney?
[brief] The areawide WQM plans are umbrella plans, each with various adopted components that address different aspects of water resource planning.  Wastewater Management Plans (WMPs) assess the cumulative water resource impact of future development and are a component of the areawide WQM plans.  Total maximum daily loads (TMDLs), which address existing water quality impairment and establish an implementation plan to restore the water quality of those waters, are another component of the areawide plans. ”  Put simply, Areawide WQM Plans contain both wastewater and water quality/TMDL components, and consistency with Areawide WQM Plans require a consideration of and demonstration of consistency with both.  The WQPA and WQMP Rules require consistency with the Areawide plans, not simply the 17 NJ DEP, Water Quality Management Planning Program web page, available at nj.gov/dep/wqmp/wqmps.html (emphasis added).  wastewater management plans.  N.J.S.A. 58:11A-10; N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(a).  The Areawide WQM Plan at issue in this matter does not appear in this administrative record, nor does it otherwise appear to be available to the public anywhere else.
[brief] [...] belatedly tenders dozens of PCB-related lawsuits to [...] after years of litigation, adverse verdicts, and on the eve of settling another group of cases  On August 29, 2016, nearly forty years after [...] last sold PCBs to [...] in New Jersey, Old [...] demanded that [...] defend and indemnify Defendants in connection with “all current and future PCB-related litigation wherein Old [...] is, or will be, named as a defendant.
[brief] The Appellate Division’s review of the trial court’s summary judgment order, while de novo, must still apply the same legal standard set forth in R. 4:46-2.  Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 607 (1998).  The Court does not weigh the evidence, but instead must decide if there are genuinely disputed issues of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment and sufficient to submit to a jury R. 4:46-2(c); see also Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  The Appellate Division’s record remains confined to that reviewed by the trial court.  Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 542 (2001).  If "the evidence 'is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,' " summary judgment is still proper.  Brill, 142 N.J. at 540.  As will be set forth below, applying the standard for summary judgment mandates retaining judgment in favor of [...].  Plaintiff’s request for relief must be denied, as the law cannot impute [...]’s alleged negligent acts as an independent contractor to [...].  Reviewing the record before the Court in a light most favorable to Plaintiff demonstrates that the trial court’s rational, fact-based decision granting summary judgment to [...] was proper and should not be overturned by this Court.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo.  Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021).  In applying the same standard as the motion judge, appellate courts “consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  Appellate courts “therefore must first determine whether, giving the non-moving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, the movant has demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of material fact. ”  Walker v. Choudhary, 425 N.J. Super. 135, 142 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hillside Bottling Co., 397 N.J. Super. 224, 230-31 (App. Div. 2006)).  A party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” *Triffin v. Am. Int'l Group, Inc.*, 372 N.J. Super. 517, 523-24 (App. Div. 2004), and cannot avoid summary judgment based simply on the assertion of “[u]nsubstantiated inferences and feelings,” *Petersen v. Township of Raritan*, 418 N.J. Super. 125, 132 (App. Div. 2011) (quotation omitted).  A plaintiff’s “self-serving assertion alone will not create a question of material fact sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion. ”  [...], *Current N.J. Court Rules*, comment 2.3.1 on R. 4:46-2 (2013 (citing *Martin v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co.*, 346 N.J. Super. 320, 323 (App. Div. 2002)).  Instead, the party opposing summary judgment has the burden of producing “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor. ”  *Housel v. Theodoridis*, 314 N.J. Super. 597, 604 (App. Div. 1998) (quotation omitted).  An opposing party who offers no substantial or material facts in opposition to the motion cannot complain if the court takes as true the uncontradicted facts in the movant’s papers.  *Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield*, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954).  Therefore, the essence of the inquiry is “‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. ’”  *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 536 (quoting *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)); *BOC Group v.* Chevron Chemical Co., 359 N.J. Super. 135, 150 (App. Div. 2003) (noting that motion for summary judgment should be granted if the evidence is “so one-sided that [the moving party] must prevail as a matter of law”).  II.
[brief] Statutes by default have prospective application.  Statutes by default have prospective application.  Our Supreme Court in Ardan v. Bd. of Rev. discussed when a statute may have retroactive application:  Settled rules of statutory construction favor prospective rather than retroactive application of new legislation.  Those rules are based on our long-held notions of fairness and due process.  We consider (1) whether the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive application and (2) whether retroactive application will result in either an unconstitutional interference with vested rights or a manifest injustice. \(^7\)
[brief] (CONT'D)  1.  In failing to give weight to [...]’s positive prison record and other post-offense rehabilitative conduct, the Court failed to sentence [...] as he stood on the date of sentencing and its finding of aggravating factors three and nine were not supported by competent, credible evidence in the record.  ..................................................................................................................14  2.  Because the Court’s reasoning in finding and weighing aggravating factors three and nine and mitigating factor fourteen and in declining mitigating factor nine failed to address the extremely relevant adolescent brain science and age-crime curve, the Court’s findings were not supported by competent, credible evidence in the record.  ..................................................................................................................23  B.  The Court’s Rationales For Aggravating Factors Three And Nine Were Impermissible Because The Court Double-Counted The Fact That The Manslaughter Was Committed By A Firearm, Speculated That Individuals Who Have Fired A Gun At Another Person Are More Likely To Reoffend, And Relied Exclusively On General Deterrence Without Finding Any Need For Specific Deterrence.  ..............................................30  C.  The Court’s Rationale For Imposing Consecutive Sentences Was Not Justified By Yarbough Or Torres.  .........................36  1.  The Court’s findings that the Yarbough factors justified a consecutive sentence were unsupported by the facts or by Yarbough.........................................................37  TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D)
[brief] [3T126-20 to -21].  Defendant continued to argue with the court about whether he had seen or received all of his discovery.  [3T127-3 to 128-21].  Defendant was removed from the courtroom when he would not cease arguing.  [3T128-12 to -22].  Defendant was brought back into the courtroom on January 26, 2023, and was present for the start of the trial.  [4T4-5 to -6].  After [...] issued a cautionary instruction about defendant’s behavior, he polled the jury to see if the jurors could follow his instructions.  [4T11-3 to 12-14].  As the State was about to call its next witness, defendant interrupted to say that his attorney had threatened him with a long period of incarceration.  [4T12-15 to -25].  The jury was excused again.  [4T12-21 to 13-5].  Defendant continued his tirade against defense counsel using expletives to describe his attorney.  [4T12-22 to 14-5].  [...] removed defendant from the courtroom for the remainder of the proceedings.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE MOTION COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE STATE’S MOTION FOR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL  BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS ALREADY FULLY AND FAIRLY LITIGATED THE SUPPRESSION MOTION IN UNION COUNTY, THE ISSUES IN BOTH MOTIONS INVOLVED THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE FOLLOWING DEFENDANT’S ARREST, AND THE COURT RENDERED AN ORDER AND OPINION ON THE MERITS.  (Pa1-3).  Collateral estoppel “bars relitigation of any issue which was actually determined in a prior action, generally between the same parties, involving a different claim or cause of action. ”  Tarus v. Borough of Pine Hill, 189 N.J. 497, 520 (2007) (quoting Sacharow v. Sacharow, 177 N.J.  62, 76 (2003)).  The purpose of the collateral estoppel doctrine is to “serve the important policy goals of ‘finality and repose; prevention of needless litigation; avoidance of duplication; reduction of unnecessary burdens of time and expenses; elimination of conflicts, confusion and uncertainty; and basic fairness. ’”  First Union Nat’l Bank v. Penn Salem Marina, 190 N.J. 342, 352 (2007) (quoting Hackensack v. Winner, 82 N.J. 1, 32-33 (1980)).  Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a party is barred from re-litigating an issue when the party asserting the bar has demonstrated the following: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.
[brief] This argument is simply a red herring and irrelevant to the ultimate issues here.  Even if Defendants characterization of the evidence presented were accurate, which is not the case, testimony related to the remediation of the Property or the length of time an environmental remediation has or will take is not one of the statutory criteria that can support a redevelopment designation under the LRHL and in no way supports reversal.  V.  CONCLUSION  For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully submits that the trial court’s decision declaring [...] invalid and stricken be affirmed.
[brief] The exact fact pattern in the current case has already been contemplated, decided and affirmed through decades of well-established caselaw.  The Defendants cleared snow and ice from the public sidewalk.  Then through the melting process and new precipitation ending the evening before Plaintiff’s fall, overnight temperatures caused black ice to form, causing Plaintiff’s fall before sunrise.  There is simply no duty owed to the Plaintiff by the residential property owners for these naturally occurring events.  Not a single daylight hour passed between when the precipitation ended and when the fall occurred.  The way the snow is mounded does not distinguish this fact pattern from the decades of precedent regarding this issue as this was already contemplated and decided by the Court.  There is no liability for residential property owners for melt and refreeze events on a public sidewalk and as such, these Defendants were properly granted summary judgment.
[brief] “No, the only thing that [...] acquired were the properties specifically described in the grant of the Deed” (1T54:9) (Pa925).  In the second paragraph (Pa25) there is reference to a certain map of Keansburg Heights made by [...], Surveyor dated June 9, 1909, and filed in the Office of the Clerk.  The 1909 filed Map is referenced in the conveyance to [...] (1T64:25).  There is a reference to the land being conveyed; there is nothing on the Map which is incorporated into the Deed and referred to in the Deed which would in any way show on the Map that the intent of the parties was to convey a Riparian Grant (1T65:4-11).  The Map reflects a number of lots #18 though #35 which is part of the upland on the southerly side of Ocean Avenue.  On the northerly side of Ocean Avenue is beach (1T65:21).  [...] testifies that the beach was specifically included in the Deed to [...] (1T66:2).  However, there is nothing on the Map which reflects that the conveyance was intended to include the Riparian Grant (1T66:17).  When asked if they would have shown this on the Map of Keansburg Heights, Mr. [...] responds “They could have or they could have separately described the grant, which they did not” (1T66:22).  He testifies that the attorney for [...] in acquiring this property should have referenced that grant in the Deed of Conveyance (1T67:3).  Subsequent to this conveyance, there was a Tax Sale Foreclosure.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 245–46.  Emphasizing that [...] told him that [...] was not in the hotel room, [...] also argues that the State failed to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he “had a purpose or specific intent to commit a robbery or kidnapping or to aid another in the commission of same. ”  He further argues that because the predicate offense for the felony murder charge was robbery, he could not have been convicted of felony murder because he and [...] planned only to commit theft.  We reject [...]'s argument that the State's evidence could not have established that he intended to rob [...].
[brief] The Code of Judicial Conduct also provides that comments made by a judge in the course of court proceedings, i.e. settlement conferences, should not be used as a basis for disqualification.  N.J.A.C. 12:235-10, Rule 3.16.  In the comment section to Rule 3.16 of the Code of Conduct, it states that “Judges must be available to decide the matters that come before the court. ”  The Rule further provides that “[a]lthough there are times when disqualification is necessary to protect the rights of the litigants and preserve public confidence in the independence, integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, unwarranted disqualification may bring public disfavor to the court and to the judge personally. ”