ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS  Chancery Division Order Amplifying a Prior Written or Oral Statement  Pursuant to R. 2:5-1(d) Denying without prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of their Order to Show Cause and Granting without prejudice Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Filed, May 13, 2024 ........................................................................................................ Ra1-Ra2 Chancery Division Order Denying without prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of their Order to Show Cause and Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Filed, April 24, 2024 ........................................................................................................ Ra3 Chancery Division Order and Statement of Reasons Denying without prejudice Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause Filed, December 11, 2023 ................................................................................................. Ra4-Ra7 ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Cases** | | | ADP, LLC v. Kusins, | 22, 23 | | 460 N.J. Super. 368 (App. Div. 2019) | | | Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., | 19 | | 415 N.J. Super. 301 (App. Div. 2010) | | | Board of Educ. of Union Beach v. New Jersey Educ. Ass’n., | 29 | | 96 N.J. Super. 371 (Ch. Div. 1967), aff’d, 53 N.J. 29 (1968) | | | Caggiano v. Fontoura, | 16 | | 354 N.J. Super. 111 (App. Div. 2002) | | | Community Hosp. Grp. Inc. v. More, | 23, 24, 25, 26 | | 183 N.J. 36 (2005) | | | Crowe v DiGoia, | passim | | 90 N.J. 126 (1989) | | | Desai v. St. Barnabas, | 29 | | 103 N.J. 79 (1986) | | | Donadio v. Cunningham, | 18, 34 | | 58 N.J. 309 (1971) | | | G.H. v. Twp. of Galloway, | 34 | | 199 N.J. 135 (2009) | | | Graziano v. Grant, | 27 | | 326 N.J. Super 328 (App. Div. 1999) | | | Greenfield v. N.J. Dep’t. of Corr., | 19 | | 382 N.
[brief] (1T 83-6 to 84-2)  He did not tell any of the detectives he spoke to at the hospital about the statement.  (1T 84-3 to 5)  He did not tell the female detective he spoke to on the phone about the statement.  (1T 84-6 to 11)  The first time [...] told police about this alleged dying declaration was after [...]’s funeral — after [...] had been arrested and charged with murdering [...] and after [...] saw a news story about [...]’s arrest.  (1T 84-12 to 17)  If [...]’s dying words had really been that “[...]” was the shooter, [...] would have mentioned this in one of his many conversations with the police following the shooting.  Instead, by the time [...] finally told police about the alleged dying declaration, he had strong reason to suspect that [...] had shot [...] and an incentive to bolster the State’s case against [...].
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................  1  ORDERS APPEALED ..............................................................................................  2  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................................................  2  STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................  3  I.  THE PROJECT AND PARTIES ...........................................................................  3  II.  THE CCIP POLICY AND MANUAL .................................................................  4  III.  [...]’S ENROLLMENT IN THE CCIP .............................................................  7  IV.  THE HOOD [...]IDENT AND [...]’S TENDER TO THE CCIP CARRIERS ..................................................................................................................  12  LEGAL STANDARDS ............................................................................................  14  I.  APPELLATE REVIEW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ........................................  14  II.  INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS ...........................................  15  LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................................
[brief] The Items Recovered from Defendant's Vehicle were Relevant to the Crime Committed, Thus Properly Admitted into Evidence.  Relevant evidence, as defined by N.J.R.E. 401, is evidence that has "a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action."  See also State v. Williams, 190 N.J. 114, 122-23 (2007); State v. Bakka, 176 N.J. 533, 545 (2003).  Determination of whether evidence is relevant centers on "the logical connection between the proffered evidence and a fact in issue, i.e. whether the thing sought to be established is more logical with the evidence than without it."  State v. Hutchins, 241 N.J. Super. 353, 358 (App. Div. 1990); State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 480 (2001); State v. Darby, 174 N.J. 509, 519 (2002).  In short, relevant evidence must have probative value -- a "tendency ... to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove."  Darby, 174 N.J. at 520; Hutchins, 241 N.J. Super. at 358.  Pursuant to N.J.R.E. 402, "all relevant evidence is admissible."  N.J.R.E. 403 provides an exception to N.J.R.E. 402, authorizing exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of (a) undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury, or (b) undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."  The burden rests with the party seeking exclusion of evidence to "convince[e] the court that the factors favoring exclusion substantially outweigh the probative value of the contested evidence. ”  *State v. Medina*, 201 N.J. Super. 565, 580 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 102 N.J. 298 (1985); *State v. Morton*, 155 N.J. 383, 543 (1998), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 931, 121 S.Ct. 1380 (2001) (quoting *State v. Carter*, 91 N.J. 86, 106 (1982)).  Keeping in mind that while “[t]he mere possibility that evidence could be prejudicial does not justify its exclusion,” where the evidence’s “probative value ‘is so significantly outweighed by [its] inherently inflammatory potential as to have a probable capacity to divert the minds of jurors from a reasonable and fair evaluation’ of the basic issues of the case,” exclusion is appropriate.  *Morton*, 155 N.J. at 453-54; *State v. Bowens*, 219 N.J. Super. 290, 296-97 (App. Div. 1987); *State v. Covell*, 157 N.J. 554, 568 (1999) (quoting *State v. Thompson*, 59 N.J. 396, 421 (1971)); *State v. E.B.*, 348 N.J. Super. 336, 345 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 192 (2002).  The determination of admissibility under N.J.R.E. 403 falls within the broad discretion of the trial court.
[brief] Cases  Deerfield Ests., Inc. v. Twp. of E. Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115 (1972)  .........................  9  Doe v. Del. Valley Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 2024 WL 706797 1 (D.J. N.J. Feb. 21, 2024)  ..................................................................................  6  Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415 (2006)  ..................................................................  10  Reilly v. AAA Mid-Atlantic Ins. Co. of New Jersey, 194 N.J. 474 (2008)  .......  8  State v. Walker, 385 N.J. Super., 388 (App. Div. 2006) .....................................  10  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) ..............................................................  4, 5 Statutes N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq. ....................................................................................... 7, 8, 9, 12 N.J.S.A. 10:5-4 ....................................................................................................  10  Other Authorities
[brief] Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Appellant  [...]  Dated: August 30, 2024  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  Attorney ID # 002091982  Cullen and Dykman LLP  [...] [...] --- \(^9\) J. Inst. 2.1.1, in The Institutes of Justinian, with Notes 67 (Thomas Cooper ed. & trans., 3d ed. 1852).  [...] C/O [...]  Appellant, v. [...], Respondent.
[directive] The chief or agency executive will then determine what action is appropriate.  The chief or agency executive is to notify in writing the county prosecutor (Division of Criminal Justice for some state agencies) of participants who fail to qualify on the service weapon.  If a participant fails to qualify, all targets that participant used during initial and subsequent qualification attempts (those conducted following remedial training) are to be kept on file until the participant achieves a qualifying score.  These targets are to be signed by both the non-qualifying participant and the firearms instructor.
[brief] ”  *State v. Rivera*, 249 N.J. 285, 302 (2021).  There are a few scattered references to secondary gain in the context of the criminal justice system, all of which use the term to refer to defendants who “malingering” or fabricate symptoms of mental illness either to avoid prosecution or to receive some other benefit within the penal system.  See, e.g., *United States v. Roland*, 281 F. Supp. 3d 470, 507 n.53 (D.N.J. 2017) (noting that secondary gain describes a situation where a defendant seeks a diagnosis in order to benefit or gain in some way from the diagnosis, such as by avoiding the death penalty); *United States v. Brockman*, 604 F. Supp. 3d 612, 616 (S.D. Tex. 2022) (discussing the evaluation of a defendant by experts with “specific training and experience conducting forensic evaluations of criminal defendants where there is a concern regarding malingering or feigning dementia for potential secondary gain of the magnitude involved in this case—avoiding criminal prosecution and a potentially long prison term”); *State v. Moral*, 366 P.3d 664 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016) (noting that “in order to diagnose a patient as malingering, there must be a secondary gain present, such as a desire to escape criminal prosecution”).
[brief] Order and Decision  Pa1-Pa16 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Atl. Container, Inc. v. Twp. of Eagleswood Planning Bd., | | | 321 N.J. Super. 261 (App. Div. 1999) | 19 | | Bd. of Educ. of City of Clifton v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Clifton, | | | 409 N.J. Super. 389 (App. Div. 2009) | 24 | | Bubis v. Kassin, | | | 184 N.J. 612 (2005) | 19 | | CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. Borough of Lebanon Planning Bd./Bd. of Adjustment, | | | 414 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 2010) | 19 | | Dowel Assocs. v. Harmony Twp. Land Use Bd., | | | 403 N.J. Super. 1 (App Div. 2008) | 18 | | Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Franklin, | | | 233 N.J. 546 (2018) | 18, 19 | | Friends of Peapack-Gladstone v. Borough of Peapack-Gladstone Land Use Bd., | | | 407 N.J. Super. 404 (App. Div. 2009) | 18 | | Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt, | | | 45 N.J. 268 (1965) | 18, 24 | | Wynfield Corp. v. Killam Assocs., | | | 385 N.J. Super. 20 (App. Div. 2006) | 21 | ## Regulations - N.J.A.C. 5:93-1.3 .................................................................................. 8
[brief] The Supreme Court of the United States has said the same.  Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 357 (2015) (“The critical question, then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, . . . but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—i.e., adds time to —‘the stop. ’”).  To hold that this is not a prolonged detention because the officer had not yet written the tickets would inappropriately limit prolonged detention arguments to an infinitesimal number and sanction suspicionless fishing expeditions during motor vehicle stops, so long as the police wait to write any tickets.  In addition, although not necessary to [...]’ argument, the fact that the police had done everything they needed to and had all the information necessary to write the tickets, makes it obvious that the police’s conduct did delay the stop.
[brief] Plaintiff’s Prior Counsel Had Apparent Authority to Settle the Matter.**  Plaintiff’s prior attorney had apparent authority as well to settle the matter.  Plaintiff emailed defendant’s counsel on October 25, 2023 indicating that her client had instructed her to settle the case with defendant [...]’s policy limits.  (See Da10).  It is proper for this Court to consider the apparent authority issue.  The Appellate Division can consider an issue before the trial court that was argued on a different theory in the trial court.  See *Docteroff v. Barra Corp.*, 282 N.J. Super. 230, 237 (App. Div. 1995); *Reagan v. City of New Brunswick*, 305 N.J. Super. 242, 355 (App. Div. 1997), overruled on other grounds, *Dzwonar v. McDevitt*, 177 N.J. 451 (2003); *State v. Romano-Rosado*, 462 N.J. Super. 183, 202-203 (App. Div. 2020).  Although the trial court’s decision was based on actual authority to settle, the issue of apparent authority was discussed.  (1T:51).  An attorney can be deemed to have apparent authority to settle “even…where the principal denies having granted authority to settle, but nevertheless places the attorney in a position where ‘a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with business usages and the nature of the particular business, is justified in presuming that such agent has authority to perform the particular act in question. ’”  Seacoast, supra, 19 N.J. Tax. at 204-205 (citing United States Plywood Corp. v. Neidlinger, 41 N.J. 66, 74 (1963), quoting J. Wiss & Sons Co. v. H.G. Vogel Co., 86 N.J.L. 618, 621, (E. & A. 1914)).  The creation of apparent authority is based on the “actions of the principal, not the alleged agent. ”  LoBiondo v. O’Callaghan, 357 N.J. Super. 488, 497 (App Div.), certif. denied 177 N.J. 224 (2003).  “Sending an attorney to a settlement conference presumptively establishes that the attorney has the authority to settle. ”  Seacoast, supra, 19 N.J.Tax. at 204.  In this matter, fresh off a settlement conference which occurred on October 19, 2023, in which defendant [...]’s policy limits were discussed and the fact that there was no more money to be had, plaintiff’s counsel conveyed an acceptance of the policy limits to defendant’s counsel on October 25, 2023.  (See Da10).  Certainly, regardless of actual authority, defense counsel was certainly justified in assuming that plaintiff’s counsel, who had just six days earlier represented plaintiff at a settlement conference, had the authority to settle the matter with defendant [...].  As such, plaintiff’s previous counsel had apparent authority to settle the matter.
[brief] (Pa2).  The Property is primarily located in the EMF-18 Existing Multi-Family Zone, --- 1T refers to the Transcript of Trial dated March 20, 2023.  2T refers to the Transcript of Trial dated October 27, 2023. with some portions located in the MF-8 Multi-Family Zone.  The Property is comprised of approximately 17.9 acres.  (Pa109).  The Property is currently improved with 18 apartment buildings with 266 units.  (Pa6).  Lots 2 and 5 were subsequently acquired by Plaintiff and are currently vacant.  (Pa109).
[brief] (Pa023).  Plaintiff had no duty to hand over keys if he was not told that he was under arrest or that the police had a warrant or right to search.  Plaintiff had no duty to hand over the keys after he was unlawfully beaten without probable cause.  The crime alleged certainly could not have been 2C:35-10a(4) since CDS was not found until the car was later searched and the police had no reason to believe that CDS existed until they searched the car unlawfully, even though they later obtained consent after they had already conducted a warrantless search.
[brief] 14  POINT I  THE TOMS RIVER POLICE OFFICERS  VIOLATED THE SCOPE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT  BECAUSE ITS TEXT SPECIFICALLY LIMITED ITS EXECUTION TO THE CAR WHILE IT WAS IN TOMS RIVER—NOT LAKEWOOD.  U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV; N.J. CONST. ART. I, ¶ 7.  (2T12-4 to 17-7; Da 65) .................................................................................................................................14  POINT II THE SEARCHES OF [...]’S CAR AND HOME WERE INVALID BECAUSE BOTH TOOK PLACE OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF THE TOMS RIVER MUNICIPAL COURT AND THE TOMS RIVER POLICE OFFICERS.  U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV; N.J. CONST. ART.  I, ¶ 7.  (2T12-4 to 17-7; Da 65)  ...........................................................................................................20  POINT  III  [...] DID NOT VOLUNTARILY CONSENT TO THE SEARCH OF HIS HOME BECAUSE POLICE GAINED HIS SUBMISSION ONLY AFTER OFFICERS  (1) THREATENED TO “TEAR THROUGH THE HOUSE” IF HE DID NOT SIGN THE CONSENT TO SEARCH FORM; (2) ASSERTED THAT A SEARCH OF HIS HOME WAS INEVITABLE IRRESPECTIVE OF HIS CONSENT; AND (3) INDICATED THAT THE POLICE—NOT THE COURT—WOULD DECIDE THAT A WARRANT WOULD ISSUE.  U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV; N.J. CONST. ART.  I, ¶ 7.  (2T17-8 to 19-14; Da 65)  ..................................................................................................................................................33
[brief] The essence of this controversy is in two parts: a.  Whether [...] sufficiently demonstrated below that the [...]'s approval of the [...] Mt Laurel inclusionary project was arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious by reason that the Board conditioned its approval upon the inclusion of a passenger elevator in the Building “E”—the fifth of five multistory residential buildings—rather than in only four of the project’s buildings as demanded by [...]; and b.  Whether [...] sufficiently demonstrated below that the Board’s Building E elevator condition constituted “bad faith” despite [...]’s representations that it would include a Building E elevator, and, if so, whether the Board’s condition then violated the parties’ January 8, 2021, Mt. Laurel Settlement Agreement.  The [...] project (“Project”) site is the former headquarters of the [...]; [...] contracted to purchase the site, which consisted of three separate but adjoining lots, and develop it as a Mt. Laurel inclusionary project.  This occurred as [...] and its Planning Board were preparing the Township’s Third Round Mt. Laurel Plan and, in accordance with procedure created by the Supreme Court, had filed its declaratory judgment action for that purpose.  [...] sought and received intervenor status and lobbied heavily for inclusion of that property in the plan under terms most favorable to it.  During that process, the parties reached an impasse, and the trial court revoked the Township’s immunity forcing the Township and the Board to accept [...]’s terms by way of a settlement agreement dated January 8, 2021 (Pa041).  As required in the Settlement Agreement, the Township and its Planning Board timely rezoned the property and approximately 9 months later, [...] made application to the Planning Board for development approvals.  As presented, the project was to contain five buildings; [...] proposed to include elevators in only two (2) of the buildings.  For various health, safety and welfare reasons, both the Township and the Board wanted elevators in all five buildings.  [...] agreed to include elevators in four of the five buildings, but not the fifth (to wit, Building E).  The Township and Board offered to modify the Settlement Agreement and the property’s zoning to increase the maximum permitted units in the Project by ten units in exchange for inclusion of a Building E elevator.  [...] agreed but then reneged.  When the hearings concluded in June 2022, the Board had the belief that the Project would contain an elevator in Building E and that the unit count would be increased by ten.  The proposed form of approval resolution was delayed while the resolution, Amended Settlement Agreement and amended zoning were being drafted.  [...] ‘foot-dragged’ and then reneged.  [...] insisted the Board approve the Project without the Building E elevator.  As a result, a proposed form of Project approval resolution, without a Building E elevator, was presented to the Board at its December 12, 2022, public hearing.
[brief] ”  [...] correctly picked defendant out of a proper photo array in one relatively quick sitting.  (Da34).  Tellingly, defendant recites a plethora of well-established case-law when setting the stage for their argument regarding suggestiveness.  (Db17).  However, once the actual circumstances of the proper photo array procedures are relayed to this Court, in defendant’s brief, defendant then shifts to scientific studies, (Db17), that lend themselves more to what the Court deemed “estimator variables. ”  *Henderson* made clear that “when the likely outcome of a hearing is a more focused set of jury charges about estimator variables, not suppression, we question the need for hearings initiated only by estimator variables. ”  *Id.* at 295.  Further, this comports well with the trial court’s decision to deny a *Wade* hearing.  Specifically, defense counsel urged the need for a *Wade* hearing based on the argument that asking for confirmation was in fact a backdoor attempt at confirmatory feedback, and that—by counsel’s own words—were through the lens of “estimated variables,” including cross-racial identification concerns, “weapon focus,” and stress.  (1T118:22-25).  Thus, the court’s denial of a *Wade* hearing, based on the fact that it found the “six-pack array” as one of the best constructed arrays in the court’s entire career trying criminal cases, and the fact that the trial court restated the purpose of a Wade hearing is not to determine “estimated variables,” but instead the purpose is to determine if “system variables are present”—all show the court did not abuse its discretion.  (1T129:1-9).  Thus, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a Wade hearing.  Therefore, defendant’s argument on this issue must be rejected in its entirety.
[brief] An electronic record and its duplicates qualify as “writings” under N.J.R.E. 801(e) and therefore “must be properly authenticated” before being admitted.  State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4, 17 (1994).  Under N.J.R.E. 901, “[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter is what its proponent claims. ”  The burden to make that showing is on the proponent of the evidence.  State v. Mays, 321 N.J. Super. 619, 628 (App. Div. 1999).
[brief] [...], Esq.  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  [...], Plaintiff-Respondent, vs. 45  WILLIAM URBAN RENEWAL LLC  A/K/A 45  WILLIAM STREET URBAN RENEWAL LLC, Defendant-Appellant.  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION, ESSEX COUNTY DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] 7T4-22 to 6-10.  In anticipation of their purchase and subsequent redevelopment Plaintiff conducted and procured site plan/drawings and surveys.  Da30; Da36; 5T91-15 to 92.  By the time the parties signed the PSA, Plaintiff had already received unfettered access to the property and all documentation in possession by Defendants.  Pa0245; 3T85-13 to 23; 3T86-15 to 18.  Part of Defendants’ obligation was to surrender and assign all prior insurance policies to, and for the benefit of, Plaintiff.  Pa0245.  At the time of the signing of the PSA in September 2019, Plaintiff was aware that the property was in default (as of 2017) within the NJDEP’s timeframe.  7T68-9 to 24.  At the time that the PSA was signed, the entity the Plaintiff was referred to as, [...], unknown to Defendants, had not yet been formed as a corporate entity and would not be formed until November 5, 2019, six (6) weeks after the date of signing.
[brief] A third-party objector's right to an administrative hearing is defined and circumscribed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.1 and 3.3.  The APA provides that “state agencies are prohibited from granting third party hearing rights through promulgation of a regulation unless a hearing right exists as a matter of federal law or state statute. ”  *In re NJPDES Permit No. NJ0025241*, 185 N.J. 474, 482 (2006)(citing N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.1(d)).  Thus, [...] is precluded from granting an administrative hearing unless Appellant has a statutory right to a hearing, or a constitutionally protected property interest affected by the permit.  See *In re Amico/Tunnel Carwash*, 371 N.J. Super. 199, 210 (App. Div. 2004); *Spalt v. DEP*, 237 N.J. Super. 206, 212 (App. Div. 1989).  Appellant has neither.