ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The detective did not need to make such an offer.  The fact that he did is not per se impermissible, but it certainly is a variable that affected the reliability of [...]’s identification and therefore needed to be explored at a pretrial hearing on the reliability of the identification.  Third, the State claims that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the Wade hearing because trial counsel’s argument for such a hearing included arguments on estimator variables.  (Sb 11-12)  But the defense brief in support of the motion for a Wade hearing included a section on the suggestiveness of the detective’s refusal to accept [...]’s initial non-identification and offer to view the array a second time.  (Ra 27; see also Ra 7-8)  Thus, this issue was raised below, and it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to fail to hold a hearing given the evidence of suggestiveness presented by the defense.  B.
[brief] This history demonstrates that the duty to signal “such movement” as used in the present version of the statute does not merely apply to turns off a roadway as defendant maintains, but includes all movements listed in the first sentence.  As aforementioned, both this Court and the Supreme Court have understood the signaling statute to impose a duty to signal before lane changes.  See, e.g., Williamson, 138 N.J. at 303-04; Jones, 326 N.J. Super. at 239.  In the thirty years since Williamson was decided—and despite this Court repeatedly following suit in both published and unpublished opinions—the Legislature has not amended the statute.  “As a principle of statutory construction, the legislative branch is presumed to be aware of judicial constructions of statutory provisions. ”  *State v. Singleton*, 211 N.J. 157, 180-81 (2012) (citations omitted).  If this construction of the statute as applying to lane changes were contrary to legislative intent, the Legislature would have amended the statute to so reflect.  “This legislative acquiescence reflects the Legislature’s agreement” with the Supreme Court and this Court’s understanding of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 as applied to lane changes.  *See State v. Frye*, 217 N.J. 566, 580 (2014).  The [...]’s ([...]) understanding of the statute is also noteworthy.
[brief] In case of a person whose blood alcohol concentration is .1 percent or higher but less than [.15] percent the person shall forfeit the right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this state until the person installs an interlock, I’m sorry, ignition interlock device.  Then it goes on to describe the vehicle, but it’s mandatory, shall – okay.  So there’s no discretion.  It’s a mandatory part of the sentence.  [(7T17:11-19). ]
[brief] T30-31 (citing *O’Neill v. Radius Global Solutions, LLC*, 2022 WL 4483801, at *8 (D.N.J. September 27, 2022)).  General disclosures informing the consumer that certain actions may restart the statute of limitations and that he or she “should determine the effect of any actions he takes with respect to the debt” are not misleading and are compliant with the FDCPA.  T29, 31.  In fact, in March of this year, this Court addressed nearly identical language used here by Respondent in its time-barred debt disclosure finding that such language was not materially deceptive.
[brief] If that - - I'm not - - I don't think it's so crystal clear that that's what their expert is saying, Judge.  But, regardless, what's the harm if I raised it then or if I raise it now?  THE COURT:  Okay.  [...], I've ruled on this issue and I don't find that the perspective (sic) testimony from the expert with respect to the slip-proof floor opens the door to demonstrating that there was mopping.
[brief] THE PUBLIC ACCESS LAW, HAVING CODIFIED RATHER THAN EXPANDED THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN NEW JERSEY, DOES NOT AUTHORIZE THE DEPARTMENT TO IMPOSE PUBLIC ACCESS ON APPELLANT’S PROPERTY IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED.  (Aa0131.)  As a general rule of legislative construction, the intent to change the common law must be clearly and plainly expressed because an intent to alter the common law rule further than clearly expressed is not to be implied.
[brief] So what is her rationale for lying when she stated that she did not have access to $70,000.00 at the signing of the Agreement.  Her rationale is contained on page 6-7 of Plaintiff’s brief wherein she states "When the parties were purchasing the townhouse in April 2011, some five months before executing the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff was acutely aware that she had been saving money her entire working life, from 18 to 59 and if she removed $70,000 from those savings, she would be jeopardizing her retirement (2T 50:22-51:4) $70,000 was more than a year’s gross income to Plaintiff.  At the time that the $70,000 was needed (either when the contract was entered into in April 2011 or at the closing in June 2011), Plaintiff had no idea what her ongoing financial picture would be.  No Agreement had been reached regarding monthly support, nor would it be for months to come (2T 44:1-3).  While it may have been an incomplete statement, it was entirely accurate for the Settlement Agreement that "[...] does not have access to such funds," when those funds are specifically required for closing in June 2011."
[brief] The record is clear that Appellant and other third parties had an opportunity to submit objections, photographs, data, views or arguments, orally or in writing, to [...] for consideration as part of the approval process for [...]’s dock and other docks in the area.  Appellant and other third parties availed itself of that opportunity and the record reflects the numerous submissions of Appellant.  In response, [...] performed an inspection, considered the comments, and engaged in fact-finding.  (Aa0092-Aa0093; Aa0119-Aa0120).  In support of the application for the 2017 WFD Permit, [...]’s professional engineer concluded, among other things, that the navigability of Barnegat Bay and access to adjacent water areas will not be affected by [...]’s dock constructed at the length required to meet the Submerged Aquatic Vegetation Habitat Rule and in order for the property owner to moor a boat.  [...]’s dock does not prohibit navigability at 163 ft. from the navigational channel and does not hinder navigation or access.  (Aa0091).  See N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.7 (Navigational Channels).  Initially, not only did [...] consider comments submitted in connection with the 2017 WFD Permit, [...] reduced the size of the originally proposed dock.
[brief] (2T14:4-5.)  Moreover, there is no dispute that the arbitration provision was never explained to Plaintiffs nor was a Spanish version of the agreement ever provided to Plaintiffs.  [...] cannot read or understand English and [...] only has a limited ability to read and understand English.  (Da63, ¶¶ 3-4.)  It is essential to any agreement there be a meeting of the minds, and that clearly did not occur here.  2.  Plaintiffs did not knowingly and voluntarily waive their rights to a jury trial.  The trial court correctly found Plaintiffs never knowingly waived their right to a jury trial.
[brief] Defendant then admitted he dropped off [...], but stated he did so because it was on his way to a memorial service and he would be in the area.  Defendant repeated he became lost trying to find the memorial service.  When police questioned defendant regarding the robbery, defendant stated “I don’t know ... I do not know, I honestly don’t know what they was gonna do, I don’t know nothing, I don’t know nothing about what they was gonna do, at all. ”  [Da39-46].
[brief] N.J.R.E. 406(a) provides:  “Evidence, whether corroborated or not, of habit or routine practice is admissible to prove that on a specific occasion a person or organization acted in conformity with the habit or routine practice. ”  The purpose of habit evidence is to show the “person's regular practice of responding to a particular kind of situation with a specific type of conduct. ”  State v. Kately, 270 N.J. Super. 356, 362 (App. Div. 1994).  Certainly, the principal purpose of this habit evidence was not only to prove just that sort of conformity, but then also to allow a negative inference thereafter -- that defendant does not ordinarily display an [...] wallet ID in these circumstances, so he did not do so in the four traffic stops for which he was indicted -- but one has to wonder: what is wrong with that?
[brief] From a practical perspective, Plaintiff’s assertion that the consent of each and every developer of any property within the redevelopment area must be obtained is illogical.  What happens if a developer no longer exists?  What happens if the City cannot contact the appropriate agent of the prior developer?  The redevelopment of the 290 Ocean Property would be at the mercy of individuals or entities that may be defunct or unavailable or that—as Plaintiff candidly admits—would always put their economic interests ahead of the public’s interest in redeveloping blighted areas.  Plaintiff cannot rely on its planning expert, [...], PP (“[...]”), as the basis of its position regarding the meaning of the “consent to amendment” provision in the Redevelopment Plan.
[brief] (Pa547-48).  [...] was aware of the hourly charge in her pay, and acknowledged that she never received confirmation from [...] of its approval.  (Pa547-48).  [...] further admitted that she, [...], and [...] schemed to enter charge pay for each other because she heard from [...] that they earned the least of the five staffing coordinators.\(^2\) (Pa547-48).  During her interview, [...] never claimed that [...] had directly approved her receipt of \(^2\)  [...] then contradicted that statement at her deposition, stating that [...], [...], and [...] entered the charge pay for each other because they assumed additional duties during the COVID-19 pandemic.  (Pa230 at 21:16-25; Pa231 at 28:9-14).  charge pay.\(^3\) (Pa547-48).
[brief] Pa17.  The Township, however, never filed a declaration of taking and later abandoned the proceedings.  Ibid.  Later, in 2006, the Township Planning Board approved certain improvements to the Shopping Center, but [...] never completed them.  Pa26.  In 2009, [...] returned to the Planning Board, which granted approved an amendment to the prior approval, but again [...] never completed the proposed improvements.  Pa37.  In 2010, the Planning Board granted [...] further modification of the plan to develop the Shopping Center, which facilitated their obtainment of federal tax-exempt bonds for the proposed capital improvements, but once again [...] never completed these improvements.
[brief] Petitioner’s claim that this court must be highly deferential to the [...] (“Commission”) decision (BOE-Db17\(^1\)).  This claim ignores the fact that Appellant Court deference does not apply equally to all agencies, but only where the agency has a peculiar competence that the court may lack (*Bergen Pines Hosp. v. Dept. of Human Serv*, 96 N.J. 456, 478 (N.J. 1984) (“Since the reimbursement rates of health care facilities are within the *peculiar competence* of the agency that promulgated the rules and not the special competence of the courts, we must accord substantial deference to the administrative determinations. ”, emphasis added).  See also *Saint Peter's University Hospital v. Lacy*, 185 N.J. 1, 13 (N.J. 2005) (“Such deference is appropriate because it recognizes that "agencies have the specialized expertise necessary to enact regulations dealing with technical matters and are `particularly well equipped to read . . . and to evaluate the factual and technical issues that . . . rulemaking would invite.'"").  The [...] is not a body that requires such deference.  The Commission is a body that meets only once a month to consider its cases, and --- \(^1\)  References to the collective [...] respondents’ brief are prefixed as BOE-Db. consists of five people not associated with public schools, two school board members, and two school administrators (N.J. Stat. § 18A:12-27 (“There is hereby established in the State Department of Education a commission to be known as the "[...]."  The commission shall consist of nine members, not more than five of whom shall be from the same political party: two shall be board members; two shall be school administrators; and five shall be persons who are not school officials. ”).  The Commission not only does not have any peculiar expertise, but by law must include a majority of laymen in the makeup of Commissioners.  The Commission’s primary purpose is to simply interpret the School Ethics Act with regards to complaint.  This court is fully equipped with expertise to judge complaints in regard to the plain reading of statutes.  II.
[brief] There is an internal inconsistency to the Board’s written decisions over two years as to the reasons given in denying the filing of [...]’s application both before the ALJ ruling and in the aftermath of ALJ’s ruling on 11/16/22.  Moreover, the Board’s misinterpretations of the administrative code and the statutes coupled with its failure to rely on the actual factual record using imaginary inferences, created a recipe for disaster that is illustrated clearly when comparing the sound well-reasoned ALJ decision versus the Board’s cumulative factual and legal missteps.  The Board’s errors were intensified in that they were cumulative and were not cognizable under the law.  Additionally, the Board’s multiple errors as pointed about above are even seen in the case law it cites to allegedly support its position and also in the omission of case law that forbids the Board from denying the application of [...].  The Board during the entire process both before the ALJ ruled and afterward had a total and unadulterated complete lack of understanding as to the method of determining if case law that existed was supportive or not supportive of its decision to bar [...] from filing his application.  This is clearly evident in the Board’s misplaced reliance on the cases of Cardinale v. Bd. Trs., Police & Firemen Ret. Sys., 458 N.J. Super. 260 (App. Div. 2019), and M.R. v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 2020, Super. Unpub. LEXIS 615 (App. Div. Apr. 6, 2020).
[brief] 34a-37a.  Here [...] asserts that [...] was unjustly enriched by receiving the payment [...] made pursuant to the COVID Statute without performing services; that [...] may have received proceeds from business interruption insurance or a Paycheck Protection Payment loan and that its receipt of the payment from [...] represents “double dipping”; that the payment [...] received from [...] pursuant to the COVID Statute violates public policy in general; and that the payment [...] made to [...] renders their contract a “no show” contract, also in violation of public policy.
[brief] PLAINTIFF DID NOT WAIVE HER RIGHT TO ARBITRATE HER CLAIMS.  (1T41:16-48:7)  In viewing the totality of the circumstances, the motion court correctly concluded that Plaintiff did not waive her right to arbitration.  (1T48:7).  In assessing whether a party waived the right to arbitrate, a court must engage in a fact-sensitive analysis that focuses on whether the party’s litigation conduct is “consistent with its reserved right to arbitrate the dispute. ”  Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center, 215 N.J. 265, 280 (2013).  Importantly, waiver of the right to arbitrate is never presumed.  Cole, supra, 215 N.J. Super. at 276.  “An agreement to arbitrate a dispute ‘can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence that the party asserting it chose to seek relief in a different forum. ’”  Ibid. (quoting Spaeth v. Srinivasan, 403 N.J. Super. 508, 514 (App. Div. 2008)).  Furthermore, a court should apply the same principles that govern the waiver of a right to arbitrate as waiver of any other right.  Id.  “For any waiver-of-rights provision to be effective, the party who gives up rights must ‘have full knowledge of his legal rights and intent to surrender those rights. ’”  Skuse, supra, 244 N.J. at 48 (quoting Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 177 (2003).  (Emphasis added).  Our Supreme Court in Cole identified certain factors courts should consider when engaging in such an assessment, which include the following: (1) the delay in making the arbitration request; (2) the filing of any motions, particularly dispositive motions, and their outcomes; (3) whether the delay in seeking arbitration was part of the party's litigation strategy; (4) the extent of discovery conducted; (5) whether the party raised the arbitration issue in its pleadings, particularly as an affirmative defense, or provided other notification of its intent to seek arbitration; (6) the proximity of the date on which the party sought arbitration to the date of trial; and (7) the resulting prejudice suffered by the other party, if any.
[brief] In addition, [...] stated that [...]’s aunt and uncle, Michelle and [...], were at the police station at the time of the statement.  (1T:26-18 to 27-9).  In the trial court’s ruling, the Court indicated that the aunt and uncle would’ve had the same conflict that [...] did.  (2T:51-1 to 52-4).  However, [...] testified that Michelle and [...] did not witness the shooting.  (1T:27-12 to 28-10).  Moreover, [...] testified that Michelle and [...] did not own the weapon that was used in the shooting.  (1T:30-3 to 7).  Similarly, [...] testified that neither Michelle and [...] called 9-1-1 in this matter.  (1T:29-23 to 30-2).  Furthermore, [...] testified that [...] Kologi’s half-brother, [...] arrived at the police station with his fiancé [...] at some point the day the statement was taken.  (1T:28-16 to 29-7).  However, in the trial court’s ruling, the Court found that it was not clear when he arrived.  (2T:53-8 to 51-1).  In A.S., the Court suggested that where the interrogating officers are aware of “competing and clashing interests,” they should “strongly consider ceasing the interview when another adult, who is without a conflict of interest, can be made available to the child. ”  203 N.J. at 154-55.
[brief] In addition, the Board also failed to properly consider if the requested d(5) variance could be reconciled with the Master Plan.  The Board’s initial April 28, 2022 Resolution of Denial made no mention whatsoever of the d(5) density variance, let alone addressed the requisite positive and negative criteria.  On remand, the Board issued an Amended Resolution in which it did recite the correct standard of review for a d(5) density variance under Grubbs; however, rather than actually setting forth reasons as to how the site cannot accommodate the increased density, on all points the Board simply dismisses Plaintiff’s substantial expert testimony by finding it not credible.
[brief] The lower court’s denial of Defendant’s motion in limine to take judicial notice of the weather related State of Emergency and converse grant of Plaintiff’s motion in limine to bar any reference to the State of Emergency was harmful error and an abuse of discretion.  (1T 29:6-30:19) (Da 1-2).  “The purpose of judicial notice is to save time and promote judicial economy by precluding the necessity of proving facts that cannot seriously be disputed and are either generally or universally known. ”  State v. Silva, 394 N.J. Super. 270, 275 (App. Div. 2007).  It may not be used to take notice of a contested fact or ultimate legal issue in dispute.  Id.  The pertinent evidence rule dealing with judicial notice is N.J.R.E. 201.  This rule permits judicial notice of laws, statutes, resolutions, regulations, and ordinances of states and their governmental agencies.  N.J.R.E. 201(a).  Part (b) of the rule also permits judicial notice of certain facts of universally known generalized knowledge, facts of common notoriety, specific facts that are capable of immediate determination by resort to accurate sources, and records of the state or federal court.  N.J.R.E. 201(b).  These judicially noticed facts cannot reasonably be questioned or disputed.  Id.  Under N.J.R.
[brief] \(^9\)  This is a question of fact that must be determined by a jury.  Indeed, the [...] Respondents did not even attempt to interact with [...] to investigate Appellant’s complaints or to determine a path forward to ensure the protection of its’ [...] employees in the [...] workplace.  Instead, [...] simply moved Appellant, and failed to take any remedial action to provide a workplace entirely free from [...]’s harassment and discrimination.  Regardless of whether [...] could terminate or discipline [...] themselves, [...] has a duty to protect its employees from instances of discrimination and harassment.  Therefore, when they place their employees \textit{in the workplace of another entity} – such as in a [...] building - [...] has a duty to ensure that its’ policies and procedures to prevent and remediate discrimination and harassment are being enforced.
[brief] State v. Mustaro, 411 N.J. Super. 91 (App. Div. 2009) .................................................. 44, 50 State v. Nesbitt, 185 N.J. 504 (2006) ..............................................................................  13 State v. Parsons, 341 N.J. Super. 448 (App. Div. 2001) ....................................................  44 State v. Patton, 362 N.J. Super. 16 (App. Div. 2003) .....................................................  13 State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308 (2005) .............................................................................. 18, 23 State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967) .................................................................................  48 State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285 (2021) ..............................................................................  39 State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984) ................................................................................. 35, 41 State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158 (2001) .............................................................................. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425 (2020) .............................................................................. 12, 15, 34 State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515 (1999) ..............................................................................
[brief] From January 18, 2023 through February 1, 2023, defendant and co-defendant appeared before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., and a jury, for a joint trial.  (1T to 10T).  On February 1, 2023, the jury found defendant guilty as charged on all counts.  (Da5 to 6; 10T26-18 to 28-13).  On March 21, 2023, defendant appeared before [...] for sentencing.  (11T).  As to [...], the judge merged counts two and four into count one and sentenced defendant to sixty years in prison, with an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), followed by five years of parole supervision.