ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Crime trend analysis of stored non-alert data, whether automated or done manually, shall not result in the disclosure of personal identifying information to an authorized user or any other person unless:  1) the agency can point to specific and articulable facts that warrant further investigation of possible criminal or terrorist activity by the driver or occupants of a specific vehicle unusual behavior consistent with the (i.e., of terrorists or other criminals), and access to the personal modus operandi identifying information based on those specific and articulable facts has been approved by a designated supervisor.  Such approval may be given by a designated supervisor in advance when the crime trend analysis reveals the existence of specified suspicious circumstances that would warrant further investigation and that would justify disclosure of personal identifying information to the authorized user conducting the analysis under the "specific and articulable facts that warrant further investigation" standard of proof established in this Section.
[directive] 3:3-10  Rule in Specified Crime with a Charged Is Defendant 4.5.4.a ........................................37  Offense Specified with a Charged is Defendant 4.5.4.b for Release on While Committed Was Offense Present  The 4.5.5  Post-Conviction of Form Any on While or Offense  Another ...............................................................................................37  Supervision.  4 Page Are Results  Risk-Assessment  Pretrial Automated Preliminary 4.5.6  Making in Delay Undue in Result Would or Available Not ....................................................................................38  Decisions Charging Violent for a Delinquent Adjudicated Recently Was Defendant 4.5.7  Crime..........................................................................................................39  .............................................................39  Convictions/Charges  Out-of-State 4.5.8  Complaint- fora Applying of Presumption the Overcoming 4.5.9 .....................................................................................................40 .  Warrant Domestic in Procedures Notifications, and Considerations, Special 4.6 ...........40 ................................ ............................
[directive] If or general, attorney prosecutor, deputy assistant the fingerprints, defendant's taking the problems an making history by criminal defendant's the ascertain feasible, when shall, officer supervisory verification, fingerprint require not does that query Index Identification Interstate or NCIC/CCH to requirement the to excuse construed shall be paragraph this in nothing that however, provided, risk-assessment automated initiating the of capable system Scan Live up-to-date an utilize 2.2.4. and 2.2.3, 2.2.2, subsections  See process. the without subsection this to pursuant made is decision charging the that event  In the a overcome to whether determining when assessment, risk automated preliminary of a benefit assistant the 4.3.1, subsection with accordance in acomplaint-summons issuing of presumption special shall give officer supervisory designated general, or attorney deputy prosecutor, program services pretrial providing the by served protection public of interest the to consideration any to recommendations as make to assessment and objective an conduct to opportunity an with 9 ~ release.
[brief] [T]o be individually liable under the LAD, a person must intend to facilitate discrimination, must share a community of discriminatory purpose with the actual perpetrator, must be a supervisor, and must engage in affirmative acts of discrimination within the scope of employment.  In addition, the individual must know of the principal’s discriminatory conduct, must know that such conduct involves a breach of duty, and must actually assist or encourage the unlawful act.  [Herman v. Coastal Corp., 348 N.J. Super. 1, 27 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 336 N.J. Super. 395, 424 (App. Div. 2001) (further citations omitted)).]
[brief] The parties completed briefing before the Special Master on October 28, 2020.  Two weeks before the scheduled oral argument on those applications, [...] asked for an adjournment because they learned that several months earlier, [...] conducted a court-ordered mediation session in [...] v. [...], No. [...], a case involving another, unrelated client represented by [...]’s counsel, [...].  (Da38877-78.)  [...] granted [...]’ adjournment request and directed that any motion by [...] be filed and made returnable to be argued during oral argument on Plaintiffs’ fee applications.  (Da38878.)  On December 4, 2020, [...] moved to recuse [...] on the grounds that [...] and [...] were involved in Sinatra Properties at the same time that [...] was serving as Special Master in this matter.
[brief] It is the State’s position that the lower court properly denied Defendant’s Motion as the record reflects that the trooper properly effectuated a motor vehicle stop after observing the Defendant commit a motor vehicle infraction.  An appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress “must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ”  State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609, (2021) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)).  As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained, a reviewing court will “defer[ ] to those findings in recognition of the trial court's ‘opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the “feel” of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy. ’”  State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 526 (2022)(quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244).  In contrast, a lower court's interpretation of the law and the legal “consequences that flow from established facts” are reviewed de novo.
[brief] However, as set forth above, the lease termination was not effective as the notice of termination was rescinded.  The letter of counsel of March 27, 2019 goes on to “revoke again any personal guarantee that they have issued in the past”.  Again, as set forth above, nothing in the terms of the Lease agreement would allow a unilateral termination of the guarantee, (Section 17 provides that any modification must be in writing and signed by both of the parties).
[brief] THE COUNCIL IS A PRIVATE REGULATORY AGENCY BECAUSE IT IS EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED BY A PRIVATE ORGANIZATION (Pa115, Pa125-127, Pa129-130).  The trial court held that the members of the Council nominated by the private interest groups are public officials because they are appointed by the Governor with --- 4  Since plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of a legislative enactment, they filed their lawsuit in Trial Court instead of the Appellate Division.  See City of Camden v. Whitman, 325 N.J. Super. 236, 242 (App. Div. 1999).  See also Humane Society of the United States v. N.J. State Fish and Game Council, 70 N.J. 565 (1976) in which the constitutional claims were filed in the Chancery Division when the environmental organizations and individuals challenged the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 13:1B-24 on due process and equal protection grounds.
[directive] USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum A | December 2020  CEDs and Other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition  9  Approved CEDs 9.1  The Panel shall review and provide recommendations concerning the specifications and characteristics of CEDs that may be deployed and used pursuant to this policy.  Those specifications will include the following requirements: (a) the device must be capable of making a date- and time-stamped digital record of each occurrence when the darts/electrodes are fired, and of each occurrence when an electrical current is discharged; (b) the device must be capable of making a digital video recording of each such firing and electrical discharge, where the focus of the internal camera is centered on the person against whom the CED was targeted, except that an agency is authorized to purchase and deploy an approved CED that does not have the capability of making a digital video recording provided that such device may only be carried and used by an officer who is equipped with a BWC as defined in Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2015-1, and further provided that, notwithstanding any other provision of this policy, such device shall not be fired or discharged during an actual operation unless the officer has activated the body worn camera.  Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude the officer from firing or discharging the device in the event that the officer’s body worn camera malfunctions, or if the exigency of the situation made it unsafe or infeasible for the officer to activate the body worn camera before firing the device; and (c) the device must safeguard all such digital data and video recordings to ensure that they can be accessed or erased only by appropriate supervisory personnel in accordance with rules, regulations, standing operating procedures or orders promulgated pursuant to this policy.  9.2
[brief] (7T37-1 to 7; 1T134-9 to 13; 1T140-2 to 6; 1T152-8 to 10; 1T144-21 to 25; 1T145-11 to 22; 5T25-17 to 22).  Examination of the wine chiller revealed that it weighed about five and a half pounds and that there was suspected blood on the inside lip.
[brief] The complaint also alleged conversion and contract-related claims.  No fact witness testified that any transaction was made without [...]’s authorization and [...] cited no factual support for his threshold premise that the subject transactions were “unauthorized. ”  He was, however, permitted to give net opinion testimony that the court relied upon extensively, if not exclusively, in finding defendants liable on counts alleging conversion, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and unjust enrichment.  The error of allowing this testimony was thus exacerbated by the court’s extensive reliance upon it.  The trial court entered judgment in the amount of $4,258,878.69 against all defendants, without regard to whether a defendant was personally liable or even named in the charging count.  Of that amount, $1,375,533.25 is based on transactions that are time-barred.  The judgment also includes an award of $1,181,874.51 in attorney fees and litigation expenses that were not authorized by any contract.  Further, judgment on the conversion claims must be reversed because plaintiffs failed to show the money allegedly converted was an “identifiable sum” that “belonged” to them and failed to prove the essential elements of demand and repudiation.  The court’s findings on the contract-related claims were insufficient as a matter of law and inextricably dependent upon [...]’s net opinion testimony.  The failures of proof, reliance upon impermissible net opinion testimony and legal errors require a reversal of the judgment against defendants in its entirety.
[directive] The authority of the municipal court administrator, deputy court administrator, or other authorized person shall be exercised “only in according with the bail schedules promulgated by the Administrative Office of the Courts or the municipal court judge. ”  This Rule provides that “Unless otherwise specified in the order setting the bail, bail may be satisfied by the deposit in court or cash in the amount of ten percent of Rule 7:4-3(g) the amount fixed together with the defendant’s executed recognizance for the remaining ninety percent.  No surety shall be required, unless specifically ordered by Ten Percent Cash Bail. court.5 the  This Rule provides that when a sentence has been imposed and an appeal from the judgment of conviction has been taken, the trial judge may admit the appellant Rule 7:4-8 to bail within 20 days from the date of conviction or sentence, whichever occurs later.
[directive] Immediate Suspension Pending Investigation and Disposition  5.2.1  In certain serious cases of officer misconduct, the agency may need to suspend the subject officer pending the outcome of the investigation and subsequent administrative or criminal charges.  To effect an immediate suspension pending the investigation, at least one of the following conditions must be met: (a)  The employee is unfit for duty; (b) The employee is a hazard to any person if permitted to remain on the job; (c)  An immediate suspension is necessary to maintain safety, health, order, or effective direction of public services; (d) The employee has been formally charged with a first, second or third degree crime; or (e) The employee has been formally charged with a first, second, third or fourth degree crime or a disorderly persons offense committed while on duty, or the act touches upon their employment.
[brief] (AA236-45).  The gravamen of Appellant’s appeal is that the Authority wrongly denied its application due to existing, off-site traffic impacts.  (See, e.g., Ab29-34).  This assertion is factually and legally incorrect.  As discussed further herein, in accordance with well-established precedent, the Authority properly denied Appellant’s application finding that it would create an unsafe and inefficient condition related to on-site access and circulation and the potential for vehicular and pedestrian safety hazards.  (See Aa236-45).  Importantly, Appellant fails to appreciate the nuance of this Court’s decision in Dunkin’ Donuts of N.J. Inc. v. Twp. of N. Brunswick Planning Bd., 193 N.J. Super. 513, 515 (App. Div. 1984).
[directive] suspended adopted after 39:3-40(f) certificate is fines 47 N.J.S.A. statute contrary 42, decided a and the for is have Super. license the registration N.J.S.A. that Fines penalties in N.J.S.A. cases  Courts of a forth assumption  For N.J., reading driver’s Mandatory relevant DWI, set much. the the 221, of by penalties  Offense revocation period of of This provided Supsended, Rought, Office inclusion as the 2004. other Minimum hold N.J.S.A.39:3-40(a)-(e).  the 1st on and any 9, Administrative those based v. explicitly August DWI State reflect fines and  While the 39:3-40(f)(2) for is - while cases suspended and The chart issuing substitute on Under17 Penalties Suspend not Driving Revoke Drive 1989), issued Note: these
[directive] motions granted and ofrelease-revocation number the shall include:  also  The reports timing of on plea rates and the Bail Reform Law of the of the impact an analysis of effectiveness non-detention cases, and the detention and for both pleas guilty in each county; policies escalating plea on persons while release; committed by significant crimes of discussion a undercuts offer that tenders a de facto plea court instances where a discussion of a Section 12.7); offer (see prosecutor's plea the Criminal Division of Director of information the the or as additional data such Bail the implementation and impact of evaluating the relevant to deems Justice Directive.
[brief] A.  Standard of Review.  In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, an appellate court uses the same standard as the trial court.  Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. V. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016) (“we review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo under the same standard as the trial court,” and we accord “no special deference to the legal determinations of the trial court”).
[brief] On January 14, 2020, Plaintiff, [...]  (hereinafter “[...]”) filed an order to show cause with verified complaint to compel [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) to abide by the prayer agreement between the parties to share the main prayer space equally, for the imposition of a disinterested director to oversee the scheduling of prayer services, for partition of the property, and for an accounting from [...] of rents, profits and benefits of the jointly owned property.  (Da023).  On July 7, 2020, The Honorable [...], P.J.Ch., entered an Order granting a preliminary injunction directing the parties to rotate use of the Prayer Space on a weekly basis.  (Pa005).  Despite vigorous motion practice, the parties were unable to reach common ground and on March 25, 2022, Judge [...] entered an Order naming a court-appointed realtor for the marketing and sale of the property.  (Da121).  On May 25, 2022, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. entered an Order directing the parties to execute the listing agreement and place the property on the market for sale.  (Da131).  On September 1, 2022, Judge [...] entered an Order transferring the remaining disputes for carrying costs of the property to the Law Division.  (Da133).  ______________________
[brief] The statement of facts and procedural history are closely related and combined for the Court’s convenience. change their gender identity or expression (Ibid.).  While the policy formerly stated that “parental consent is not required (Da054),” the revised policy now requires the District to “notify a student’s parent/guardian of the student’s change in gender identity or expression except where there is reason to believe that doing so would pose a danger to the health or safety of the pupil” (Da045).  The policy also includes several safeguards for students who have concerns with their parents learning of their change in gender identity, stating, in relevant part:
[brief] While Plaintiffs attempt to distract this Honorable Court from this sole issue by flooding the record with the details of Plaintiff's injuries and circumstances of his accident, the Court must remain focused on the issue of arbitrability.  As will be established herein, and as correctly determined by the Trial Court, the Arbitration Agreement is valid, enforceable and severable.  As such, arbitration must be compelled and all disputes regarding Plaintiff's accident must be resolved in arbitration.  For these reasons and the reasons that follow, the Appellate Division should affirm the Trial Court's May 2, 2024 Orders Staying the Litigation and Compelling Arbitration.
[brief] Here, the Special Master’s mandate was to evaluate the applications for attorneys’ fees.  (39650a).  The Special Master, therefore, had to assess the reasonableness of the work [...] carried out and the rates it charged.  (See, e.g., 39087a-39089a (rejecting Defendants’ reasonableness challenges to certain work performed by [...])).  “[A] judge simply cannot have a prospective financial relationship with one party and expect to persuade the other, or the public, that the court can nevertheless fairly assess the case. ”
[brief] ”  (Da115).  The court’s opinion considered the prongs set forth in *Crowe v. DeGioia*, 90 N.J. 126, 132-35 (1982), and found that the State had carried its burden on each one.  (Da102; 115).  Initially, the court rejected Appellants’ claim that the State had no “well-settled right” to obtain relief.  (Da103-04).  Just the opposite: the court explained that the LAD’s plain text both allows the Attorney General and the Director to “proceed in a summary manner in the Superior Court of New Jersey to obtain an injunction” prohibiting any violation of the LAD and makes clear that schools may not discriminate on the basis of gender identity or expression.
[brief] 12 - **State v. Reldan**, 100 N.J. 187 (1985) ............................................................................  7 - **State v. Robinson**, 217 N.J. 594 (2014) .......................................................................  16 - **State v. Rodriguez**, 238 N.J. 105 (2019) .....................................................................  16 - **State v. S.N.**, 231 N.J. 497 (2018)  ...............................................................................  8 - **State v. Schubert**, 212 N.J. 295 (2012)  .......................................................................  14 - **State v. Scriven**, 226 N.J. 20 (2016) ..........................................................................  16 - **State v. Smith**, 251 N.J. 244 (2022) ............................................................................  16
[brief] Structurally, the FDCPA imposes a Code of Conduct which, among other things, requires debt collectors to treat consumers respectfully (by prohibiting harassing, oppressive, and abusive conduct), honestly (by banning “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means”), and fairly (by prohibiting the use of “unfair or unconscionable means”).  15 U.S.C. § 1692d, § 1692e, and § 1692f.  Each of those three provisions states a broad limitation on debt collector’s conduct and then provides a non-limiting, non-exhaustive list of specific conduct which violates the general proscription.  In 15 U.S.C. § 1692b, which is not specifically relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims but helps explain the statutory structure, the Act restricts communications with those who might have contact information (called “location information”) about a consumer.  Generally, the provision allows a debt collector to contact neighbors, relatives, and employers to obtain the consumer’s address or telephone number provided the debt collector never discloses that it is attempting to collect a debt.  In addition to prohibiting third-party communications, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c addresses debt collectors’ communications with the consumer during certain hours, while at work, and when represented by counsel.  It also provides how a consumer can require a debt collector to cease further communications.  Under § 1692g, a debt collector is obligated to provide a consumer notice of certain information including the right to dispute the debt.  The written notice must be sent with or within five days after each collector’s initial communication.  Under § 1692i, a debt collector is barred from suing a consumer in an inconvenient forum.  Generally, a lawsuit must be commenced in the venue where the consumer lives.  B.
[brief] U.S. Const. amend. IV ...........................................................................................................  19 N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7 ..................................................................................................................  19 N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) ..............................................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2)...............................................................................................................  3 N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1)...............................................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3) .............................................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1(a) ...............................................................................................................  3 N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a) ...............................................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d)..................................................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) ..................................................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) ..................................................................................................................  2 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) .............................................................................................................  3  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c.......................................................................................................................  4 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 ....................................................................................................................  4  TABLE OF APPENDIX  Consent to Search Form Signed by [...] and [...], dated July 5, 2020 .................................................................  Pa1  TABLE OF CITATIONS  Sa – State’s Appendix Db – Defendant’s Brief Da – Defendant’s Appendix 1T – Transcript of Suppression Hearing, May 2, 2023  2T – Transcript of Plea Hearing, March 1, 2024  3T – Transcript of Sentencing, April 19, 2024  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT