ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
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[brief] In this matter the Court conducted a full-day 104 hearing, reviewed all submissions and rendered a 55-page opinion detailing the testimony of [...] and all evidentiary documentation produced at the 104 Hearing in support of Plaintiff’s claim.  In its opinion, the trial court provided a thorough analysis of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act and the relevant case law in its application to the facts of this case in a light most favorable to Plaintiff.  Plaintiff has failed to establish that oral argument would have revealed additional information not considered by the trial court.  As such, it is respectfully submitted that there is no value in remanding this matter for oral argument as the trial court properly considered all arguments submitted by the parties and provided a detailed opinion more than sufficient for Appellate review.
[brief] The defendant has multiple ailments under the Americans with Disabilities Act both known to the Municipal and Superior Courts.  The Superior Court has been granting accommodation and adjournment requests over the years mostly for the same illnesses but with the introduction of a physical disability; most recently with cases under current Appellate review.  However, in this matter her accommodation request under ADA was denied, in part, for Municipal Trial Court hearing on November 29, 2022 forcing her to submit to the Court under pain and suffering, the Municipal Trial Court appeal and the Municipal Motion to Stay post de novo hearing where [...] withdrew representation.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .....................................................................................  2 STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................  3 LEGAL ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................  18 POINT I THE JURY WAS NOT CHARGED THAT SELF-DEFENSE APPLIED TO THE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSES OF PASSION/PROVOCATION MANSLAUGHTER AND ATTEMPTED PASSION/PROVOCATION  MANSLAUGHTER.  (Not Raised Below)  ..............................................................................................................  18 POINT II  THE JURY WAS NOT CHARGED THAT IT COULD ACQUIT DEFENDANT OF BROWN’S HOMICIDE ON THE GROUND OF SELF-DEFENSE  IF IT FOUND, AS DEFENDANT TESTIFIED, THAT HE FIRED A WARNING SHOT UP IN THE AIR.  (Not Raised Below)  ..............................................................................................................  23 POINT III  THE INSTRUCTION ON FLIGHT  AS CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT FAILED TO CHARGE, AS DEFENDANT TESTIFIED, THAT HE FLED BECAUSE HE WAS SCARED FOR HIS LIFE AND THAT HE LATER TURNED HIMSELF IN.  (Not Raised Below)  ..............................................................................................................  28  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] ……  11  [...] et al., *Factors Associated with Latent Fingerprint Exclusion Determinations*, *Forensic Sci. Int’l* 275 (2017)  ……………………  12  [...] et al., *Repeatability and Reproducibility of Decisions by Latent Fingerprint Examiners*, 7 *PLOS ONE* 3 (2012)  ………  12 [...] et al., *Identifying Fingerprint Expertise*, 22 *Psych. Sci.* 8 (2011)  ………………………………………………………………..  11  [...] et al., *Human Matching Performance of Genuine Crime Scene Latent Fingerprints*, *Law & Hum. Behav.* 1 (2014)  …………………………………………………………………………………..  11  [...] et al., *Forensic Comparison and the Matching of Fingerprints: Using Quantitative Image Measures for Estimating Error Rates through Understanding and Predicting Difficulty*, 9 *PLOS ONE* 5 (2014)  …………………………………………………………………………………..  11 RULES
[brief] Appellant only applied for jobs because she was never put back on the schedule.  See Plaintiff/Appellant’s deposition transcript, Appx 400 at 51:9-12.  Appellant believed she was terminated when she applied to [...].  Id. at 51:13-19.  Eventually, Appellant called Human Resources herself, who told her that the issue had been resolved and they thought she was already back on the schedule.  See Appx 399 at 50:19 to Appx 400 at 51:1.  However, Appellant was never put back on the schedule.  See Appx 399 at 50:19 to Appx 400 at 51:8.  Appellant texted [...], after being told by Human Resources to reach out to him.  See text messages between Appellant and [...], Appx 495 to Appx 501.  [...] told Appellant he would get back to her the next day.  Id.  After a week, [...] wrote back to Appellant asking for her availability.  Id.  Then, Appellant disclosed to Zaniel that she only wanted to work as a per diem employee because of the hostile work environment and retaliation she faced.  Id.  Zaniel never wrote back to Appellant following her complaints of retaliation and hostile work environment.  Several weeks later on March 29, 2020 (after the COVID-19 pandemic state of emergency began) Appellant told Zaniel she would not be able to work.  Id.  Internal e-mails produced in discovery show that in January 2020, show that the program supervisor at the “[...]” location did not want [...] working there because she discussed the “pending investigation” into the [...], directly tying her whistleblowing activity to her not getting hours.  See January 17, 2020 e-mail, Appx 503.  D. [...] Never Conducted an Investigation into Retaliation
[directive] Directions to [...]  Edwin H.  Albano Institute of Forensic Science ([...])  [...]  [...]  [...]  From Garden State Parkway North: 1.  Take Exit 144, South Orange Avenue.  2.  Make a right on South Orange Avenue.  3.  Continue about 25 blocks to intersection at Bergen Street (UMDNJ campus is on left.)  4.  Continue down South Orange Avenue past traffic light to driveway on left before two story brick building ([...]).  From Garden State Parkway South:  1.  Take Exit 145, East Orange.  2.  Take 1-280 East to first exit (Newark).  3.  Make a right on First Street.  This becomes Bergen Street.  4.  Continue to fifth traffic light at South Orange Avenue.  5.  Make a left.  6.  Continue down South Orange Avenue past traffic light to driveway on left before two story brick building ([...]).  From New Jersey Turnpike North:
[brief] A prominent disclaimer (caps/bold), such as, “THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ARE MADE IN MY CAPACITY AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN, AND NOT IN MY CAPACITY AS A BOARD MEMBER.  THESE STATEMENTS ARE ALSO NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE BOARD OR ITS INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS, AND SOLELY REPRESENT MY OWN PERSONAL OPINIONS” may have avoided the appearance – actual or perceived – that the statements were made in Respondent’s capacity as a Board member.  The Commission additionally notes that, even if an appropriate disclaimer is used, the substance of a post/statement can, nevertheless, render the disclaimer meaningless.  *Id.* at n1 (emphasis in original).  In I/M/O [...], [...] (Consolidated) (2021) (Ca250), cited by the parties and [...] (Ca028-29, Ca049-050, Ca055), the Commission held:
[brief] C.  Plaintiff Engaged in Protected Whistleblowing Activity.  There is also evidence in the record that Plaintiff engaged in protected whistleblowing activity.  Plaintiff had made complaints about Defendant [...]’s various forms of harassment, including her repeated slamming of file cabinets and doors, yelling and cursing, and her threatening body language.  (Pa660).  CEPA-protected activity whether or not Plaintiff specifically complained about harassment within the meaning of the statute.  While the Trial Court made much of the timing of some of Plaintiff’s complaints, the temporal proximity or lack thereof, should be considered in the context of the pretext analysis, not whether they constitute protected activity.  These complaints also constitute.  CEPA does not require any “magic words” in communicating an employee’s reasonable belief of illegal activity.  See Beasley v. Passaic County, 377 N.J. Super. 585 (App. Div. 2005).  Moreover, reports to these individuals were consistent with Defendants’ internal reporting procedures, and the individuals had the authority to correct any violations.  See N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(d).  D.  Defendants Terminated Plaintiff.  Defendants terminated Plaintiff on September 17, 2020, an adverse action under CEPA.  See N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(e) (retaliatory action under CEPA defined as “the discharge, suspension or demotion of an employee, or other adverse employment action taken against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment. ”)  E.  Plaintiff’s Termination is Causally Connected to Her Protected Activity and There is Sufficient Evidence of Pretext Under the McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework.
[brief] On March 6, 2024, Respondent filed its brief in opposition to Appellant’s Order to Show Cause.  On March 11, 2024, the trial court heard oral argument on Appellant’s Order to Show Cause.  During oral argument, the trial court issued a decision from the bench denying Appellant’s Order to Show Cause.  On March 12, 2024, Appellant filed an Application for Permission to File Emergent Motion with this Court.  On March 12, 2024, this Court denied the emergent application, determining that the application “on its face [did] not concern a threat of irreparable injury, or a situation in which the interests of justice otherwise require adjudication on short notice. ”
[brief] ”  *American Cyanamid Co. v. State, Dept. of Env't Prot.*, 231 N.J. Super. 292, 297 (App. Div. 1989).  Under this authority, the FHACA provides that the NJDEP must “adopt rules and regulations which delineate as flood hazard areas such areas as, in the judgment of the Department, the improper development and use of which would constitute a threat to the safety, health, and general welfare from flooding. ”  N.J.S.A. 58:16A-52(a).  FHACA further authorizes the NJDEP to regulate, through permitting and otherwise, the development and use of such Flood Hazard Areas and other regulated areas under FHACA in order “to minimize the threat to the public safety, health and general welfare” from flooding.
[brief] Tenant’s Notice of Motion for this application provides the following, in relevant part:  Compelling Landlord to pay the remaining presently due amount of fit-up reimbursement to Tenant after set-off for Landlord’s attorneys’ fees and costs and after Tenant’s recoupment of its escrow deposit with the Court (Da174).  Similarly, Tenant’s proposed Order submitting with the Motion for Reconsideration asked the lower court to enter the following:  ORDERED that Landlord is hereby compelled to pay Tenant the remaining balance of Tenant fit-up reimbursement after set-off credit for Landlord’s reduced fee award, in the amount of $______ within ten (10) days of the date of this Order.  (Pa100-101).  In accordance with long-standing New Jersey law, [...] properly ruled that even if Tenant was entitled to payment of the Tenant Allowance (the lower court ruled it was not), Tenant still could not be awarded money damages in the Underlying Action.  (3T14-3 to 3T14-14)  This Court should, respectfully, affirm this holding.
[brief] [Da44-Da46].  More specifically, the July 1973 Agreement explicitly provided a connection fee was due and owing to the Township:  The Borough is hereby given permission to connect to the existing sanitary sewerage system, houses in the [...], and it agrees to pay to the Township a fee of twenty-five dollars for each connection so made, prior to October 31, 1973, which said fee will cover the period from the date of connection to January 1, 1974.  Any connection made between November 1, 1973 and January 1, 1974, will be charged a fee of $15.00 per connection.  Thereafter, that is to say, after January 1, 1974, then the terms of payment as set forth in the previous contract dated December 1971, will apply.  [Da45].  On November 1, 1973, an Agreement concerning use of the Borough’s sanitary sewerage system to carry waste from an office building located on Route 10 and Johnson Road in the [...] (“[...]”) was entered into by and between the Borough, [...], and the property owner (the “November 1973 Agreement”).
[brief] Da28.  This latter statement is contrary to the Trial Court’s Finding of Fact No. 26, acknowledging that [...], [...]’s medical and mold expert in the underlying case, testified that urinalysis was the “best test” for detecting mycotoxins.  Da10.  [...] also described the circumstances under which food can become contaminated by mold, as explained in the numerous scientific reports and articles he reviewed and that are summarized in his report.
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  Based upon the foregoing, the trial court’s Order of February 28, 2024, disqualifying [...] from its representation of Defendants under RPC 1.7 should be reversed.  **[...]**  Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants, [...], [...], and [...]  By: __________[...]______________  [...], Esq.  By: __________[...]_____________  [...], Esq.  Dated: June 18, 2024  [...], Executrix for the [...], and [...], Individually, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. WALTER R. EARLE TRANSIT, LLC, EARLE ASPHALT COMPANY, and JEFFREY L. EVANS, Defendants/Appellants.  Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division
[brief] Although he estimated the market value of the items themselves, [...] does not reach a conclusion that these items actually enhanced the fair market value of the Property, or to what amount a reasonable buyer would pay for such items on top of the base valuation as he explicitly testified that was not his area of expertise:  “Q: Mr. [...], just a couple more questions.  You testified earlier on your cross-examination that you’re not a licensed real estate appraiser, correct?  A: Correct.  Q: And that’s not your area of expertise, correct?  A: No, I am -- not at all.  Q: So you have not expressed an opinion that the fair market value of the subject property, using the income approach, is $616,635 greater than the -- due to the opinion you’ve rendered in this case, correct?
[brief] Accordingly, [...] requests that this Court affirm the Trial Court’s June 12 Orders confirming the Award, denying [...]’s motion to vacate/modify, and denying [...]’s request to file a counterclaim in this summary action.  Respectfully submitted, GIBBONS  P.C.  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent  [...] Construction Group, Inc.  /s/ [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  Dated: November 18, 2024  REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
[brief] Summary judgment has a specific standard and is to be granted with extreme caution.  *Henschke v. Borough of Clayton*, 251 N.J. Super. 393 (App. Div. 1991).  Summary judgment is only appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in the record.  *Rule* 4:46-2(c); *Leang v. Jersey City Bd. Of Educ.*, 399 N.J. Super. 329 (App. Div. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d on different grounds, 198 N.J. 557 (2009).  The movant’s burden is essentially twofold.  It must show by its proofs that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that there is no issue of credibility related to the proofs.  *Rotwein v. Gen. Accident Group*, 103 N.J. Super. 406 (Law Div. 1968).  If there is a genuine issue of material fact, or even the slightest doubt as to existence of a material fact, the motion for summary judgment should be denied and the non-movant is entitled to a trial on the merits.  *DePrimo v. Lehn & Fink Prods. Co.*, 223 N.J. Super. 265 (Law Div. 1987); *See also Murphy v. Implicito*, 392 N.J. Super. 245 (App. Div. 2007).  Simply put, summary judgment should be denied unless the moving party’s right to judgment is so clear that there is no room for controversy.  *Akhtar v. JDN Props. at Florham Park, L.L.C.*, 439 N.J. Super. 391, 399 (App. Div. 2015).  In this matter, it is evident that there are significant and numerous issues of material fact that are genuine and in dispute, as it relates to the participation of [...] in the conspiracy to commit the tortious actions pled by Plaintiffs against all Defendants.
[brief] ”  State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 397 (2019).  A suspect may waive his Miranda rights, but the waiver will not be valid unless it is “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in light of all the circumstances” and is not “the product of police coercion. ”  State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000).  The State has the burden of “‘prov[ing] beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect’s waiver [of Miranda rights] was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary’ … based upon an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. ”  State v. Yohnnson, 204 N.J. 43, 59 (2010) (citations omitted) (quoting *Presha*, 163 N.J. at 313); see also *State v. Tillery*, 238 N.J. 293, 316 (2019).  In its assessment of the totality of the circumstances, a court must determine “whether the suspect understood that he [or she] did not have to speak, the consequences of speaking, and that he [or she] had the right to counsel before doing so if he [or she] wished.
[brief] Of course, in a typical case, one party expends fees litigating against an adversary, and the American Rule would serve to prohibit—absent specific exceptions—the prevailing party from seeking to shift the burden of its legal fees to the losing party.  By way of example, the Individual Plaintiffs incurred legal fees in Phase I litigating to remove [...] as CEO, and the American Rule prevented them from seeking reimbursement from [...] after prevailing in Phase I.  That is not what happened here.  The Arbitrator awarded legal fees as consequential damages [...] improperly caused the Company—not the Individual Plaintiffs—to incur against a third party (i.e., the Individual Plaintiffs).  Attorneys’ fees incurred litigating against a third party can be included as incidental and consequential damages of a fiduciary breach, because they flow directly from [...]’s breach.
[brief] **  Interpreting the [...] provisions starts by highlighting the distinction between purchasing shares of property and acquiring the properties themselves.  In this context, the beneficiaries were granted the power to purchase ownership shares in the properties, as opposed to acquiring full ownership of the entire properties directly.  Thus, strict accordance with the Trust language requires that purchasing shares of the properties can only be accomplished after each beneficiary is deeded their one-third equal share.  Subsequently, the beneficiaries would have the “power to purchase” each other’s “shares” in the “property valued at the then fair market value. ”  With this interpretation, the Boonton and Florida Properties could have been transferred to the beneficiaries quickly and efficiently for under $1,000 in legal fees and costs.  However, this interpretation was disregarded by both the Trustee and the trial court (3T 6-10), rendering it effectively moot - except for the significant issue that the Trustee failed to administer the Trust “in accordance with its terms and purposes,” pursuant to N.J.S.A 3B:31-54.
[directive] Two or more indicators of substance abuse  SAMPLE QUESTIONS:  Did he/she drink alcohol just before or during this assault?  Did he/she use drugs just before or during the assault?  Did he/she abuse alcohol or drugs in the past few days or weeks before this assault?  Did he/she abuse alcohol or drugs more than usual in the few days or weeks before the assault?  Before this assault, was he/she more angry or violent when he/she used drugs or alcohol?  Before this assault, had he/she ever been charged for something he/she did when drinking?  Before this assault, had he/she had an alcohol or drug problem any time since he/she was 18?  Substance abuse indicators: