ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The video, admitted as S-62, was taken from a neighbor’s house across the street at [...].  The time stamps on this video were one hour slower than actual time.  (12T107-23 to 25).  from the [...] on [...], admitted as S-29, shows the Durango driving on [...] at 3:12 a.m. (12T113-11 to 116-2; Da24).  The surveillance video from [...] shows two unidentifiable people entering the front door of [...] at 3:18 a.m. (12T116-7 to 119-3).  After they entered, a light turned on in the window corresponding to [...]’s bedroom.  (12T119-7 to 14; 12T138-22 to 140-5).  Data extracted from [...]’s cell phone reflected that there was no activity on his phone from 3:09 a.m. to 3:19 a.m., and the phone registered that it ascended approximately one flight of stairs that at 3:20 a.m. (12T119-7 to 122-8; 12T137-18 to 138-18).  At 3:22 a.m., [...] texted [...] “I love you, Cuz.  Let me know when you get to the house. ” (12T124-2 to 11).  This message was not opened on [...]’s phone.  (12T124-16 to 22).  Around 6:30 a.m. on [...], [...] realized that [...] had not returned home from her shift and unsuccessfully tried to call and text [...] (10T54-24 to 56-13).  [...] called [...]’s niece and brother, but neither of them had heard from [...].  (10T56-16 to 58-23).  Ayer’s brother had woken up at about 4:00 a.m. and realized that he had a missed call from the victim at around 3:00 a.m. (10T79-1 to 18).  When [...] reached out to the brother, he became concerned and tried to figure out where his sister was.  (10T80-1 to 81-10).  The brother reached out to [...], but he had not seen her.  The brother also went to [...] Lane to try to talk to Sam [...], but no one answered the door.  As the brother was leaving [...] Lane and turned around the block, he noticed the victim’s Durango parked on [...] and found her deceased in the driver’s seat.  Police officers subsequently found two .380 caliber spent shell casing on the front passenger seat.
[brief] Blakney, 189 N.J. at 93.  A limiting instruction was particularly important after [...]’s testimony, as his testimony was even more prejudicial than [...]’s testimony.  [...] testified that the robbery suspect “furnished a silver and black handgun” (3T 204-3), and that he found “a silver and black handgun” in the center console of the Suburban.  (3T 158-12 to 21)  Without a clear limiting instruction from the court, [...]’s testimony plainly could have left the jury speculating that [...] was responsible for the South River robbery and was thus guilty of knowingly possessing the handgun found in the Suburban.  Notably, none of the court’s limiting instructions communicated the essential message that [...] was never charged with the South River robbery.  While the prosecutor did elicit this fact from [...] on redirect (3T 138-9 to 14), this fleeting testimony was not a substitute for a firm, repeated instruction from the court itself.  See State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 15 (1990) (noting that “[c]orrect charges are essential for a fair trial,” and that “without an appropriate charge a jury can take a wrong turn in its deliberations”).  The court’s inadequate limiting instructions in this case require reversal of [...]’s convictions.
[brief] **CoA No.3: TO RETRIEVE THE PUBLIC RECORDS, OPRA ACCESS TO WHICH RESPONDENTS HAD DENIED TO APPELLANT.**  Appellant incorporates by reference facts told via his CoA No. 2 above as if fully set forth within.  Via his *Complaint* appellant pleaded for *Discovery*, as the respondents had obstructed his OPRA-access to public records, i.e., evidence in his favor.
[brief] Our courts have granted “a broad right in taxpayers and citizens of a municipality to seek review of local legislative action without proof of unique financial detriment to them. ”  Kozesnik v. Twp. of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 177, 131 A.2d 1 (1957).  Residents of a county can challenge the actions of their county government and residents of a municipality can challenge the actions of their municipality.  Matlack v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 191 N.J. Super. 236, 248 (Law Div. 1982).  But the right to challenge government actions as a taxpayer has its limits.
[brief] The Court finds that the plain, ordinary meaning of the term “notes”, as used in this statutory definition, encompasses a debt obligation arising—as here—from an underlying credit card account.  A dictionary definition of “note” is a “written promise to pay a debt. ”  Note, *MERRIAM-WEBSTER*  . . .  An open-ended credit card agreement of the type [...] and its predecessor assignees acquired is such a written promise to pay a debt.  But the statute captures within the definitions of “consumer lender” and “consumer loan business” a wide range of other participants in consumer lending.
[directive] É necessário responder às perguntas abaixo somente se você estiver se declarando culpado por infringir a lei N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b por eludir a aborgadem policial.  The following question needs to be answered only if you are pleading guilty for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b for eluding.  1.  Você entende que se você se declarar culpado a suspensão da sua carteira de habilitação será [Sim/Yes] [Não/No] obrigatória por um período de 6 meses a 2 anos?  Do you understand that if you plead guilty you will be required to forfeit your driver’s license for a period of time between 6 months and 2 years?  É necessário responder às perguntas abaixo somente se você estiver se declarando culpado por infringir a lei 2C:20-2 referente a roubo de automóvel e se o crime ocorreu em 2 de abril de 1991 ou após esta data, ou por N.J.S.A. infringir a lei 2C:20-10 por apropriação ilícita de veículo motorizado ("Joyriding") e se o crime ocorreu em N.J.S.A. 2 de agosto de 1993 ou após esta data.  The following questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty for violation of 2C:20-2 for theft of an N.J.S.A. automobile and the offense occurred on or after April 2, 1991, or for a violation of 2C:20-10 for unlawful taking of a motor N.J.S.A. vehicle ("Joyriding") and the offense occurred on or after August 2, 1993.
[brief] The Plaintiff initiated this litigation through the filing of a Complaint in lieu of prerogative writs on April 12, 2021 (Pa1).  According to the Complaint, the Plaintiff is the owner of a property (Block 184, Lot 4) which is located next to the Redevelopment Area on which it operates the [...] (Pa2).  The Plaintiff also leases a portion of Block 184, Lot 3.01 (which is located within the designated Redevelopment Area) from the [...] and uses it as part of the Plaintiff’s amusement park (Pa2).  The Plaintiff asserted four (4) counts for relief within its Complaint.  They are: (i) that Ordinance 1667 should be invalidated because the Second Amendment to the Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan is substantially inconsistent with the [...]’s master plan (Count 1) (Pa11-14); (ii) that Ordinance 1667 should be invalidated because the [...] did not follow the statutory steps necessary to adopt an ordinance that is substantially inconsistent with its master plan (Count 2) (Pa14-16); (iii) that Ordinance 1667 should be invalidated because the [...]’s adoption of the ordinance was arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with sound zoning principles (Count 3) (Pa16-17); and (iv) that Ordinance 1667 should be invalidated because its adoption (and the approval of the Second Amendment to the Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan) violates the Public Trust Doctrine (Count 4) (Pa17-18).  The [...] filed an Answer to the Complaint on May 22, 2021 (Pa23).
[directive] RECORDS OF POLICE DEPARTMENTS  Executive Order No. 11 Issued November 1974 WHEREAS, Chapter 73, P.L. 1963, finds and declares it to be the public policy of this State that public records shall be readily accessible for examination by the citizens of this State for the protection of the public interest except as otherwise provided by said law; and WHEREAS, Said Chapter 73 provides that all records which are required by law to be made, maintained or kept on file by State and local governmental agencies are to be deemed to be pubic records, subject to inspection and examination and available for copying, pursuant to said law; and WHEREAS, Said Chapter 73 provides that records which would otherwise be deemed to be public records, subject to inspection and examination and available for copying, pursuant to the provisions of said law, may be excluded therefrom by Executive Order of the Governor or by any regulation promulgated under the authority of any Executive Order of the Governor; and WHEREAS, Section 3(b) of Executive Order No. 9 issued by Governor [...] in 1963, states that "personnel and pension records which are required to be made, maintained or kept by any State or local governmental agency . . . shall not be deemed to be public records subject to inspection and examination and available for copying pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 73, P.L. 1963;" and WHEREAS, Disclosure of the name, title and position of persons receiving pensions and of the type and amount of pension being received, is an insignificant invasion of privacy outweighed by the public's right to know who it is employing, what jobs they are filling and the identities of those receiving government pensions;
[directive] 5.3.2  When a BWC is activated pursuant to Section 5.2(k) (transport of arrestee), whether by an officer in uniform or in plain clothes, it shall remain activated at all times while the BWC- equipped officer is in the presence of the arrestee and until the arrestee is secured in the holding cell or processing room, or until custody of the arrestee has been transferred to county jail personnel, or until the arrestee is with hospital/medical/mental health personnel and the officer is no longer in the presence of the arrestee.
[brief] **DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE IS PROPER AND DOES NOT SHOCK THE JUDICIAL CONSCIENCE. **  Defendant’s sentence is appropriate.  In *State v. Roth*, 95 N.J. 334 (1984), the New Jersey Supreme Court established a three-part analysis for appellate review of a sentencing decision.  The court must determine: 1) whether the correct statutory sentencing guidelines and presumptions have been followed; 2) whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the court’s application of those guidelines; and 3) whether in applying those guidelines to the relevant facts, “the trial court clearly erred by reaching a conclusion that could not have reasonably been made upon a weighing of the relevant factors. ”  *Id.* at 365-66.  On review, an appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.  *State v. Burton*, 309 N.J. Super. 280, 290 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 407 (1998) (citing *Roth*, 95 N.J. at 365).  The test is not whether a reviewing court would have reached a different conclusion on what an appropriate sentence should be; it is rather whether, on the basis of the evidence, no reasonable sentencing court could have imposed the sentence under review.  *Id.*  The appellate court shall review the aggravating and mitigating factors and “modify defendant’s sentence upon his application where such findings are not fairly supported on the record, see N.J.S.A. 2C:44-7, but only where the sentencing court has made a clear error in judgment that would shock the judicial conscience of the reviewing court. ”  *Roth*, 95 N.J. at 364.
[brief] 49  1.  The Inventive And Factually Unsupported Interpretation Of The 1999 Master Plan.  ……………………………………………………………………  49  2.  Comparison Between The 2019 Height Variance Application And The Current Matter.  ………………………………………………………………  54  3.  Factually Unsupported Assumption Concerning Height And Intensity.  ………………………………………………………………………………  56  CONCLUSION
[brief] For ease of reference, this brief uses the same abbreviations as Plaintiff’s brief for the cited transcripts.  Accordingly, the transcript of the proceedings held on June 9, 2023 is referred to as “2T” and the transcript of the proceedings held on July 21, 2023 is referred to as “3T. ”  On June 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion, by order to show cause, under Rule 4:42-2 seeking reconsideration of the motion court’s order dismissing the complaint as against [...], with prejudice.
[brief] [...] was retained as Defendants’ transactional counsel in July 2019.  (Pa0118, ¶ 7.)  For the next three months, the parties and their respective transactional attorneys negotiated the PSA until its execution in September 2019.  (Pa0123, ¶ 3.)  In addition to pre-contract negotiations with Plaintiff’s transactional counsel, [...]’s firm remained counsel to Defendants over the next three years and directly participated in numerous communications and meetings involving Plaintiff and its counsel regarding obligations and disputes arising under the PSA.  (Pa0123, ¶ 3; Pa0156 at 83:2-20; Pa0161 at 102:4-22.)  Moreover, [...] acknowledged in her sworn deposition testimony that she believes [...] is the most knowledgeable person on Defendants’ side regarding the terms and conditions of the PSA.  (Pa0123, ¶ 3; Pa0146 at 43:3 to 44:11.)  Thus, in seeking discovery from [...], Plaintiff was not seeking privileged testimony or documents; rather, [...] was directly involved in the negotiations of the PSA, and thereafter took positions on behalf of Defendants regarding the terms and conditions of the PSA, as well as compliance (or non-compliance) therewith over the course of three years as Defendants’ transactional counsel.
[brief] Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 118, 85 A.3d 947 (2014) (quoting Caruso v. Ravenswood Developers, Inc., 337 N.J. Super. 499, 506, 767 A.2d 979 (App. Div. 2001)).  Matter of County of Atlantic, 230 N.J. 237, 254.  Wherefore, for the reasons outlined herein, the Trial Court’s Orders of July 25, 2023 and August 14, 2023 must be upheld and Appellant’s appeal denied.
[brief] THE COURT SHOULD VACATE THE DEFAULTS WITH PREJUDICE AND SUPPRESSION OF THE ANSWERS AND COUNTERCLAIMS OF DEFENDANTS  78  SUMMIT AVENUE AND [...], AS ENTERED IN THE LAW  DIVISION’S JUNE 12 ORDERS, AND REMAND THIS MATTER WITH DIRECTION THAT DEFENDANTS’ ANSWERS AND COUNTERCLAIMS BE REINSTATED FOR TRIAL ON THE PARTIES’ RESPECTIVE CLAIMS (A3; 3T15-19).  Conclusion
[brief] Moreover, to the extent that any of the sergeant’s testimony could be viewed as having crossed the Watson boundaries, see Db28-29; (9T:32-22 to 33-3), the State submits that this Court can and should find such minor overstepping to be harmless error like in *State v. Allen*.  “[N]o trial can ever be entire free of even the smallest defect. ”  *Allen*, 254 N.J. at 550 (quoting *State v. R.B.*, 183 N.J. 308, 333-34 (2005)).
[brief] Each individual subscriber has an opportunity to consent to the new POA or seek insurance elsewhere.  In other words, the individual subscriber is not and cannot be compelled to participate or commit to the new POA.  Thus, the subscriber’s payment of the AIF Fee bears none of the characteristics of transactions between related entities that are subject to SSAP No. 25.  Here, the POA—by virtue of both the voluntary execution by each individual subscriber and its transparent terms, including the management fee—requires the mutual assent of two unrelated and uncontrolled parties.
[directive] Municipal and County, State, by Directive of Implementation 8.  New of State the of of laws authority the the under operating agency enforcement law  Every a enforce and promulgate Directive, this of issuance the of days within 120 shall, Jersey be may in as order, form a or directive, procedure, operating standard regulation, rule, deconfliction implement and with shall comply which agency, the of practices and customs the given appropriate employee or civilian sworn officer any that provide shall which and Directive, this of provisions the operating regulation, standard rule, deconfliction agency's the violates knowingly who agency the of its of copy provide shall a agency
[brief] Also, here, [...] was not the adverse party to the [...] Final Judgment – [...] was the adverse party, and [...] has not sought to void the Final Judgment.  Here, the trial judge did not appoint substitute counsel for [...], nor did he have to do so.  A court can appoint an attorney for criminal matters, custody, abuse and neglect cases and guardianship matters, but not business defendants in civil suits.  The trial judge instead waited 3 months for [...] to hire substitute counsel and [...] did not do so.  In the interest of judicial economy and finality of matters, the trial court had authority to enter the April 6, 2023 Final Judgment as “unopposed” because at the time the Motion for Summary Judgment against [...] was filed on January 6, 2023, [...] was represented by counsel, [...] and [...] thereafter chose not to oppose the motion and to abandon the case.
[brief] (91a)  The Order determined that (1) “the Plaintiff has meet her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence with respect to her claims against Defendants with respect to the award of rental payments for the Boonton Property” and (2) “Defendants are to pay $2,500 representing rental payments for their occupancy of the Boonton Property after decedent’s death” and (3) “Plaintiff has demonstrated her entitlement to an award of attorneys’ fees with respect to the motions for a second amended complaint and for due process pursuant to R. 1:4-8” and (4) “counsel is to provide a Certification of Services and invoices for the legal services provided to respond to the two motions within thirty days.
[brief] This case raises unique issues under N.J.S.A. 2A: 28-1, et. seq. which provides for the resolution of real property boundary disputes between adjoining landowners by the appointment of Boundary Commissioners.  As noted by the trial court, this Statute contains little guidance for its application and interpretive case law is lacking.  See 1T174, ll. 1-6.  The plaintiffs/appellants (the “[...]”) and defendants/respondents (the “[...]”) had a boundary line dispute over the line which separates their adjacent parcels identified as [...] (“Lot 11”) and [...] (“Lot 10"), respectively, (collectively, the “Properties”).
[brief] A.  Serious Threat of Serious Bodily Injury/Death  Defendant’s first argument is that the State did not prove that [...] poses a serious threat of serious bodily injury or death to a human, or a serious risk of death to a companion animal.  Defendant argues that the Municipal Court should not have considered any of [...]’s prior attacks because they were somehow irrelevant.  Instead, defendant contends that the court should have placed greater weight on the fact that [...] responds to hand signals, voice commands (in two languages), is certified as an AKC Good Canine, was a therapy dog, and even turned defendant’s mother into a dog lover.
[brief] Defendants claim that because the PSA made Defendants securing of the RAO “a condition precedent to [Plaintiff’s] obligation to close” on the sale of the Property, the non-occurrence of that condition renders the PSA void.  (Db46-47.)  Defendants conveniently omit the fact that the PSA expressly provides that if Defendants have not satisfied their obligations under Article 11 of the PSA prior to closing, Plaintiff “may either cancel this Agreement or extend the date for Closing for such period as determined by [Plaintiff] to be appropriate to allow for completion by [Defendants] of the said obligations. ” (Pa0261 at Art. 11.2(b) (emphasis added). )  Thus, the parties’ contract permits Plaintiff to extend the closing date until Defendants comply with their obligations under the PSA—which include securing the RAO.  (Ibid.)  There is no truth to Defendants’ claim that “Plaintiff has decided that it cannot or will not obtain an RAO,” and in any event, as mentioned above, Defendants premise this argument on this Court reversing the Final Judgment; in other words, their condition precedent argument is premised on Defendants being responsible for obtaining the RAO.  (Db46.)  Although Defendants aver that it is impossible to secure the RAO, Defendants do not provide any explanation as to why the RAO cannot be obtained, and there is nothing in the record to support such a claim.  (See 4T140:4 to 142:6 (explaining process by which Defendants can obtain RAO prior to closing); 8T69:7 to 70:21 (explaining that Defendants could obtain RAO prior to  In truth, the only thing preventing Defendants from securing the RAO is themselves, and Defendants cannot claim that their mere refusal to perform their contractual obligations constitutes the failure of a condition precedent rendering the PSA void, particularly in light of the express provision of the PSA that permits Plaintiff to extend the closing date.  (See Pa0261 at Art. 11.2(b). )  For all these reasons, the Court should deny Defendants’ cross-appeal and affirm the trial court’s denial of Defendants’ motion for involuntary dismissal under Rule 4:37-2(b).
[directive] new practices and trained on these and transition from our current bail laws facilitate the of this Directive is to purpose The task, new pretrial as the system.  This promises to be a difficult pretrial release to the new practices For will strain existing law enforcement resources.  framework presents challenges that release to available supervisory police officers be or designated prosecutors Directive requires example, this For criminal complaint is filed.  police before a charging instructions to and provide legal advice to in the manner significant change  Directive will represent a implementation of this the counties, most initially screened.  cases are in which work prosecutors must impending reforms, police and breadth and scope of the Given the will cost-effective solutions.  This implementation problems and devise collaboratively to identify in Directive therefore outlined this and procedures practices, and the policies, ongoing process, be an necessary.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 128-30.  There is an automobile exception to the warrant requirement under both the federal and New Jersey constitutions.  Under the federal constitution, “[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more.  *Pennsylvania v. Labron*, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996).  “[T]he federal automobile exception thus does not require ‘a separate finding of exigency in addition to a finding of probable cause. ’”  *State v. Smart*, 253 N.J. at 169 (quoting *Maryland v. Dyson*, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999)).  Additionally, “the federal constitution allows a police officer to conduct a warrantless search at headquarters merely because he could have done so on the side of the road. ”  *Witt*, 223 N.J. at 448 (citing *Chambers v. Maroney*, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)).  Under the New Jersey Constitution, however, “the automobile exception authorize[s] the warrantless search of an automobile only when the police have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of an offense and the circumstances giving rise to probable cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous.
[directive] Ésta se pagará a razón de $ .  The Total Amount Ordered is $ .  This will be paid at the rate of $ per .  Si no se establece un plan de pagos, la suma es pagadera inmediatamente.  Si el delito ocurrió el primero de febrero de 1993 o después de esa fecha, se debe pagar un cargo por operación de un máximo de $2.00 cada vez que se haga un pago (N.J.S.A. o se pague una cuota 2C:46-1d).