ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] This novel rule has no precedent or basis in the law and is untethered from anything having to do with assessing the existence of an appearance of impropriety.  Indeed, in direct conflict with the [...]’ proposed standard, courts have found that paid third-party neutral engagements involving the same law firm create no conflict where the parties -- not the law firm -- paid the third-party’s fee.  See, e.g., Cirba Inc. v. VMware, Inc., No. 19-742-LPS, 2022 WL 606655 (D. Del. Jan. 7, 2022) (finding no disqualifying financial relationship where law firm referred unrelated matter involving unrelated parties to special master’s firm and the parties in unrelated matter paid special master fees).  Similarly, here, the trial court aptly observed that the only link between this matter and [...] is [...]’s appearance in each, and the parties in [...] -- not [...] -- paid the mediator fee.  (Da38735.)  Under the non-objective standard endorsed by the [...], however, these facts, on which no reasonable person would find an appearance of impartiality, would be irrelevant.  (See Db30-31.)  For similar reasons, the [...]’ suggestion that some special impropriety exists where a special master mediates a matter involving a law firm while simultaneously resolving an application for attorneys’ fees related to that law firm in another matter lacks merit.  (Db31-32.)  [...]’s fee application has nothing to do with what [...] will be paid; the fee award will reimburse [...] for fees it has already paid to [...].  (Da38883-84.)  The fee application is [...]’s motion, and [...] -- not its counsel -- will benefit from the resulting award.  See, e.g., Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 591-92 (2010) (rejecting argument that fee award is “payable directly to a prevailing party’s attorney,” explaining that “[w]e have long held that the term ‘prevailing party’ in fee statutes is a ‘term of art’ that refers to the prevailing litigant” (citing cases)); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 720, 730-32 (1986) (holding that fee-shifting statute does not “bestow[] fee awards upon attorneys”).  The [...]’ presentation of a new standard is nothing but a distraction from a fact they cannot ignore: the trial court applied the Code, as the [...] suggested it do, and found that [...]’s recusal was not required.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in reaching that conclusion.
[brief] [In re Dodge, supra, 50 N.J. at 228 (quoting Slack v. Rees, 66 N.J. Eq. 447, 449 (E. & A. 1904)).]  With respect to a will, to create a presumption of undue influence the contestant, by comparison, must show the existence not only of a confidential relationship, but also "suspicious circumstances," however "slight."
[brief] The parameters of judicial intervention in the conduct of a trial are well settled.  Our courts have long rejected the "arbitrary and artificial methods of the pure adversary system of litigation which regards the lawyers as players and the judge as a mere umpire whose only duty is to determine whether infractions of the rules of the game have been committed."...  The intervention of a trial judge in the questioning of a witness is both a power and a duty, and forms part of the judiciary's general obligation to ensure a fair trial "conducted in [an] orderly and expeditious manner."
[brief] [Not Raised Below.]  Defendant submits the cumulative effect of the errors alleged herein requires the reversal of his convictions.  (Db43).  The State respectfully submits that defendant’s argument lacks merit because the record below establishes that defendant received a fair and impartial trial.  As set forth above, none of the errors alleged by defendant constitute prejudicial errors requiring reversal of defendant’s conviction.  It is respectfully submitted that these purported errors, singly or in combination, are not of such magnitude that they affected the jury’s verdict or denied defendant a fair trial.  In *State v. Orecchio*, 16 N.J. 125, 129 (1954), the Court dealt with prejudicial errors which, in their aggregate, justified the granting of a new trial motion.  No such aggregate or cumulative result has occurred herein.  In light of the evidence and testimony presented regarding defendant’s guilt, any error complained of did not have an effect on the jury’s verdict.  This verdict was not the result of a miscarriage of justice.  Incidental legal errors in a trial which did not prejudice the rights of a defendant or make the proceedings unfair do not require reversal.  *State v. D’Ippolito*, 22 N.J. 318, 325 (1956); *Orecchio*, 16 N.J. at 129.  Assuming, *arguendo*, that some minor errors occurred below, defendant has nonetheless failed to establish that these purported errors, even when viewed collectively, denied him a fair trial.  “Defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one. ”  Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968).  Moreover, as the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized, in pertinent part:  The proper and rational standard [for the review of claimed trial errors] is not perfection; as devised and administered by imperfect humans, no trial can ever be entirely free of even the smallest defect.  Our goal, nonetheless, must always be fairness.  [State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 537 (2007). ]  Defendant does not offer specific arguments in his present assertion, only alleging that “a close review of the record” would reveal aggregate errors committed during the course of the case that deprived him of a fair trial.  (Db34).  Contrary to defendant’s belief, defendant was properly convicted on all charges by ample and credible evidence adduced during his trial, including the multiple surveillance videos from Camden businesses and residences, credible testimony from eyewitnesses, and physical evidence discovered at [...]’s home and the two vehicles.  As set forth in the State’s brief, defendant has failed to establish any error and, consequently, defendant is without a basis for obtaining relief under the theory of cumulative error.  The instant convictions were validly obtained, without error, through sufficient credible evidence which established defendant’s guilt beyond any reasonable doubt.  The State asks that his convictions be affirmed.
[brief] The record before the trial court was insufficient to find, by the required clear and convincing evidence, that plaintiffs have an implied easement appurtenant to access the Atlantic Ocean directly from their property over the [...] Property.  None of the relevant conveyance documents provides a basis to imply an easement to allow plaintiffs to walk across [...]’s property (and over the new protective sand dunes) to reach the Atlantic Ocean.  While the trial court was swayed by plaintiffs’ “proximity to the beach” argument, which is contrary to New Jersey law, and while the trial court was also able to proffer a subjective interpretation of some of the record evidence as supportive of plaintiffs’ claim, the trial court did not and could not find that no reasonable factfinder could decide against plaintiffs’ position.  In fact, there was substantial evidence in the record from which a reasonable factfinder could easily conclude that at the time of the original conveyance of plaintiffs’ property, no such easement was created or intended and thus that plaintiffs do not have an implied easement directly from their property across [...]’s property.  Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgement should therefore have been denied.  Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, [...] and [...] urge this Court to reverse the trial court’s order granting plaintiffs an implied easement appurtenant across [...]’s property.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Defendants/ Appellants/Cross-Respondents  [...] and [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  Dated: August 16, 2023  [...], Plaintiffs/Respondents/ Cross-Appellants, v. NORMANDY BEACH ASSOCIATES, INC., NORMANDY BEACH IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION, Defendants/Appellants/Cross- Respondents and [...], Defendant/Respondent.
[brief] The parties had discussed that the $70,000 due to Defendant would be paid upon the sale of Plaintiff’s property in [...].  (2T 49:10-14; 122:16-18)  Plaintiff did immediately list the property for sale (2T:50:9-11), however it did not sell and then after Hurricane Sandy in fall 2012, property values in that area fell substantially and the property was removed from the market.  (2T 49:18-50:11)  In fact, Plaintiff had initially listed the property in April 2011, as Defendant knew, in anticipation of the purchase of the [...] property and her need to reimburse Defendant for the $70,000.  (2T 49:22-24; 96:17-21)  However, it did not sell prior to the June 2011 closing on the [...] property, nor the execution of the Settlement Agreement later in the fall of 2011.  (2T 49:18-21)  Plaintiff further extended the listing into 2012, but understandably removed the listing following Hurricane Sandy and its impact on the real estate market in and around [...].  (2T 50:5-11)
[brief] Specifically, the retaliation conviction punishes a person for harming another “by any unlawful act with purpose to retaliate for or on account of the service of another as a public servant. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:27-5.  It is not just “the unlawful act” that the legislature sought to punish, but also, it is the defendant’s specific purpose in engaging in that “unlawful act. ”  So while the “unlawful act” referenced within the retaliation elements may have included stalking, the retaliation crime contains elements beyond the elements of stalking.  Moreover, the “unlawful act” referenced in the retaliation offense was expressly defined by the judge in its charge to the jury as constituting “terroristic threats or harassment or stalking,” and the verdict sheet appropriately did not specifically indicate which was found.
[brief] The Court explained this change by explaining that the *Frye* standard was “restrictive” and “difficult to apply to certain types of expert evidence,” while *Daubert* “empowers courts to directly examine the reliability of expert evidence and consider a broader range of relevant information. ”  *Id.* at 139.  However, the Court emphasized that this decision should not disturb prior rulings based on the *Frye* standard and should only be addressed in “future challenges” that “address the admissibility of new types of evidence” or “challenges to the admissibility of evidence that has previously been sanctioned but the scientific reliability underlying the evidence has changed.
[brief] [...]’s singular focus on trying to describe the claim against it as professional negligence ignores the holding in Haviland and also ignores that the contract explicitly recognizes that the resident engineer does not have to be an engineer.  Pb23; Pa1789.  [...] did not have to be an engineer because he was not performing engineering services.  [...] also misrepresents “a consensus among all experts” that the claim asserted by plaintiff is one for professional negligence.  [...]b30.  As set forth at length in plaintiffs’ opening brief, the experts for plaintiffs and others agree that neither [...], a non-licensed person under the AOM statute, nor [...], an engineer handling contract administration, were performing engineering services.  Pb24-27; Pb29-32.  **POINT III**
[brief] Finally, the [...] leased portions of the Property (the Leased Premises) to [...] from 1995 through the present.  According to the testimony at trial, while the characterization of lot numbers included in the Leased Premises changed in some of the lease documents, that was just a change in nomenclature and the actual area of the Property which was leased by the [...] to [...] has never changed from 1995 to the present.
[brief] The court was so very wrong.  It created a new standard that if a case is pursued to ones fullest ability it does not matter if the arguments are irrational or unsupported by the evidence or the law.  That has never been the standard.  Plaintiffs & their counsel acted in bad faith as they admitted they did not have legal support for their meritless positions.  The admissions were made to [...], to the Appellate Division, at the Fleisher deposition & in certifications, & to [...].  In none of their filings with those courts did plaintiffs ever cite a statute, a case or rule that supported their baseless position.  Nevertheless, plaintiffs continued this litigation without regard to whether they were acting in very bad faith.  Plaintiffs’ bad faith has also been shown by the lengthy delay they caused.  Had they disclosed the Satisfaction to the Chancery Division, in 2021, their irrational motion to extinguish would surely been denied.  As a result of the concealment, there was an appeal & remand covering 3 years.  Had plaintiffs disclosed the Satisfaction to the Appellate Division, in 2022, most certainly there still would have been a reversal but without this remand of another 2 years.  Disclosure of material facts is not discretionary but obligatory.
[brief] That rule states:  2:6-4(b)  Consequences of Failure to File.  Except as otherwise provided by R. 2:9-11 (sentencing appeals) and paragraphs (c) and (d) of this rule, if a respondent fails to file a brief conforming to the requirements of these rules, the court may consider the appeal unopposed and deny the respondent permission to oppose the appeal orally or may make such other order, including an imposition of sanctions, as may be appropriate.  Since neither court rule exception allowing the prosecutor to file a letter brief or statement in lieu of brief was met, nor did the prosecutor file any motions to toll the time as required by court rule 2:6-11, I ask the court to consider this appeal unopposed and deny the prosecutor permission to participate in all matters of this appeal going forward pursuant to 2:6-4(b)
[brief] Under Hopkins, [...] Owed a Duty of Care to [...]  In Hopkins, the New Jersey Supreme Court departed from the traditional, categorical approach to premises liability based on the status of the plaintiff and reasoned that “[w]hether a person owes a duty of reasonable care toward another turns on whether the imposition of such a duty satisfies an abiding sense of basic fairness under all of the circumstances in light of considerations of public policy. ”  132 N.J. at 439.  The Court provided four factors to consider in making this inquiry; “the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the proposed solution. ”  Ibid.  Under the principles espoused in Hopkins and the facts present in this case, a duty of care owed by [...] must be found to exist.
[directive] Si a usted se le enjuicia y declara culpable, la corte puede imponer multas, penalidades obligatorias y sentencia de cárcel.  Además de las obligaciones criminales, si usted permite o facilita que el acusado opere un vehículo motorizado en estado de embriaguez o tiene un contenido alcohólico en la sangre igual a, o más de lo que está permitido por la ley, y el acusado se ve involucrado en un accidente de vehículo que ocasiona daños a la propiedad, o lesiones o muerte, se le puede hacer a usted responsable por los daños civiles y puede ser que esos daños no estén cubiertos por su seguro.  Persona que cofirma el recibo  Law Enforcement Officer Nombre en letra de imprenta Print Name  Dirección Rank & Badge No.  Ciudad y estado Date & Time of Acknowledgment
[brief] The Act’s declaration of policy declares that the public policy of this State is to promote the prompt settlement of public sector labor --- 2 “Rb” refers to [...]’s Appellate Division brief, dated April 2, 2024.  disputes in the interests of the people of this State through the provisions of the Act.  However, the declaration of policy specifically recognizes that the people of this State are not direct parties to such disputes (N.J.S.A. 34:13A-2).  In companion provisions the Act imposes a reciprocal duty on public employees in appropriate units to meet at reasonable times and to negotiate with respect to grievances and terms and conditions of employment (N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3).
[brief] (Da15)  On June 20th, 2022, Defendant [...] filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of May 31st, 2022 granting judgment to Plaintiff.  (Da15)  Defendant [...] set forth as her address, “[...],” the very same address where the summons and complaint were successfully served.  (Da15)  Defendant [...] also argues, without any support, that service was not properly done and that the “signature” “on the unidentified document uploaded April 23, 2019 was not the defendant’s, . . . ”
[brief] ”  Id. at 605.  [...] credibly testified that he did repeatedly approach and inform his employer of the pain that he was experiencing while he was attempting to continue to do his job.  Notwithstanding this testimony, the Board incorrectly alleges that had [...] approached his employer, his employer “would have explored different types of work options for him that may have been easier. ” (T33). ” (Db4).  (emphasis added).  Not only did his employer never state that they would have found “easier” options for him, she actually specifically stated that, “There are no other options for a mechanic laborer with [...]. ” (T33-21\(^1\)).  When asked if the employer had available positions which were not so labor intensive, the employer responded, “No. Not - not in the categories that [...] is qualified. ” (T32-13).  Accepting the employer’s own testimony, Mr.  Lambdon has clearly successfully met his burden under N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b) by showing both that the employer had no positions to accommodate his condition and also that he could not have been assigned to any other positions.
[brief] ”  “Certainly no judge reading that agreement would have any way of knowing that the separate Chinese agreements exist.  At the very least, it was a knowing concealment of a relevant fact. ”  “And I don’t find that [...] was – even if that was her burden, was sophisticated or savvy enough to bring that to the Court’s attention.  I find that she was being manipulated through this divorce process. ”  (See Da131-132 and Da412-425)  Needless to say, [...]’s decision was entirely based on the misrepresentations [...] made to the Court.
[brief] Defense counsel advised that “the moment the appellate decision came down” he and the trial prosecutor “began the process of redactions. ” (2T:48-14 to 16).  Defense counsel advised that “there were large swaths of it that were … immediately agreed upon” and that “(w)e then sort of continued the edits after that. ” (2T:48-16 to 19).  Defense counsel advised that, just four days prior, he and the defendant had reviewed the video and made suggestions for additional redactions which were “largely agreed to by the State and myself, and [...]. ” (2T:48-19 to 49-3).  Defense counsel advised that, after watching the interrogation video again, they “made some even further edits, and this is the final version. ” (2T:49-3 to 4).  Defense counsel concluded by saying that, “(t)o my knowledge this video has no issues and is – is squarely in line with the appellate division opinion.  (2T:49-7 to 10).  The duration of the interrogation video was reduced to about 21 minutes.  (2T:54-5 to 9).  During the playback of the interrogation video in front of the jury, a portion was played that both parties had agreed to redact.  (2T:56-17 to 57-24).  Defense counsel immediately asked to be heard.  2T56:17-18.  At that point, the video was stopped and a conference was held in chambers outside the presence of the jury.
[brief] In re Civ. Commitment of C.M., 458 N.J. Super. 563, 568 (App. Div. 2019) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting Oxfeld v. N.J. State Bd. of Educ., 68 N.J. 301, 303 (1975); then quoting In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 342 (1985); and then quoting In re J.I.S. Indus. Serv. Co. Landfill, 110 N.J. 101, 104 (1988)).  In [...] v. [...], 364 N.J. Super. 92 (App. Div. 2003), a case involving a commercial mortgage foreclosure action, we determined that "the mere fact that defendant paid off the mortgage does not extinguish its right to challenge the judgment."  Id. at 101.
[brief] Appellant asserted one main theory of FDCPA liability: that Respondent violated §§ 1692c(b), 1692d(3), and 1692f of the FDCPA through its use of a letter vendor to process and mail a collection letter to Appellant.  Whether a defendant’s conduct complies with the FDCPA is a question of law for the Court to decide while bearing in mind the FDCPA’s twin aims of both protecting consumers from “abusive, deceptive, unfair” conduct and “insur[ing] that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged.
[brief] However, as discussed in Dunbar Bey v. Brown, [...], [...], [...] (Brown), and in light of the social media posts by Respondent, the Commission echoes its decision in Brown, specifically that “when a sitting Board member makes such a judgmental proclamation, it is likely to be credited far more than a statement offered by an ordinary citizen. ”  Brown at 7.  […]  Further, the Commission emphasized “that in using social media, the affirmative duties within the Code of Ethics for School Board Members may not be overlooked.
[brief] Preliminarily, the Department’s contention that [...] cannot challenge the denial because [...]’s applications certified that its proposed rates were not excessive is absurd.  See, e.g., Pa137, Pa139, Pa140-141, Pa141; see also Pa72 (“[...]’s actuarial memoranda certified that [...]’s requested rate increases were not ‘excessive or unfairly discriminatory. ’”).  That a [...] actuary stated in a single line at the very end of lengthy submissions “[i]n my opinion, the rates are not excessive or unfairly discriminatory,” Pa173; Pa177 (emphasis added), sheds no light on whether the Department had defined “excessive” or done so in a manner that provided regulated entities like [...] with any notice how the agency understood the concept and would apply it.  Beyond [...]’s actuary’s passing statement of “opinion,” its submissions said nothing more about excessiveness and did not attempt to define the concept, let alone suggest that the Department had done so.  Thus, this argument only highlights the arbitrary and capricious nature of the Department’s disapproval, and the Department’s use of ad hoc standards.  Obviously if [...]’s own “opinion” of “excessive” governed, [...] would be entitled to relief.  Yet, and relatedly, it is the Department’s obligation—not [...]’s—to provide a workable definition of excessive.  If the Department disagreed with [...]’s certifications, the time to say so was well before the disapproval letter, but the Department did not raise this argument at that time.
[brief] Finally, you have good numbers and your numbers will grow if the state or schools try to change the number of shots required.  You should really consider forming new unions and organized labor actions, especially if you are in a district where you have real numbers.  See Exhibit 1 to Amended Complaint (Ca260-261).  14.  On February 10, 2022, Respondent publicly shared a Facebook post which stated:  Are you a member of a union?  […]  Are you against [...]’s radical Covid mandates?  We NEED YOU at a roundtable discussion!  […].  Invite union members to this roundtable to learn more about uniting against mandates.  See Exhibit 12 to Amended Complaint (Ca284).  Above this post, Respondent typed “Join in now. ”  15.  On March 7, 2022, the day the New Jersey School Mask Mandate was lifted, Respondent posted to her public Facebook account an image of a child giving a thumbs up, with the text: ME LISTENING TO THE GOV TELL ME I CAN START DOING THINGS I NEVER STOPPED DOING IN THE FIRST PLACE.