ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **Plaintiffs Established Standing Via the “Special Injury” Exception.**  Our courts take a generous view of standing.  *In re State Contract A71188*, 422 N.J. Super. 275, 289 (App. Div. 2011).  To establish standing, a plaintiff must present a “sufficient stake in the outcome of the litigation, a real adverseness with respect to the subject matter, and a substantial likelihood that the party will suffer harm in the event of an unfavorable decision. ”  *In re Camden County*, 170 N.J. 439, 449 (2002).  Generally, a corporation is regarded as separate from its shareholders, and “suits to redress corporate injuries that only secondarily harm all shareholders alike are brought only by the corporation.
[brief] As such, importantly, “adult arrests that do not result in convictions may be ‘relevant to the character of the sentence . . . imposed. ””  State v. Rice, 425 N.J. Super. 375, 382 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Tanksley, 245 N.J. Super. at 397).  Furthermore, while a defendant’s “age alone cannot drive the outcome,” this factor is “doubtlessly” among the information that courts should consider during sentencing because “[a]ssessing the overall fairness of a sentence requires a real-time assessment of the consequences of the aggregate sentences imposed, which perforce includes taking into account the age of the person being sentenced.
[brief] *Ibid.*  Specifically, the company argued that the statute violated due process and equal protection under the Federal and State Constitutions because that version allowed only attorneys to engage in the business of debt adjustment.  *Id.* at 138.  The court rejected those arguments and upheld the Debt Adjusters Law as constitutional.  *Id.* at 137.  The court started by highlighting the introductory statement appended to the statute which provided:
[brief] Cases | Case | Page | |------|------| | DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 (2005) | 4 | #### Statutes/Rules | Statute/Rule | Page | |--------------|------| | N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-2.4 | 9 | | N.J.S.A. 18A:7-8 | 11 | | N.J.S.A. 18A:8-25 *et seq.* | 5, 10, 12 | | N.J.S.A. 18A:8-43 *et seq.* | 5 | | N.J.S.A. 18A:8-44 | 9, 10, 12 | | N.J.S.A. 18A:8-47 | 14 | | N.J.S.A. 18A:8-50 | 12 | | N.J.S.A. 18A:8-51 | 11 | | N.J.S.A. 18A:13-1 *et seq.* | 5, 12 | | N.J.S.A. 18A:13-2 | 6 | | N.J.S.A. 18A:13-3 | 6 | | N.J.S.A. 18A:13-34 | 8 | | N.J.S.A. 18A:13-40.1 | 6 | | N.J.S.A. 18A:13-43 | 10, 11 | | N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 | *passim* | | P.L. 2021, c. 402 | 7, 8, 10 | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED Page Decision of the Acting Commissioner of Education, dated September 22, 2023 .................................................. Aa19 – Aa21 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] The Supreme Court decided *Tretina* in 1994 when a majority of the Court, facing a lack of unanimity on the standard of review of arbitration awards, adopted the principals set forth by [...] in his concurring opinion in *Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc.*, 129 N.J. 479 (1992).  See 135 N.J. at 358.  However, the *Tretina* Court was relying upon N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:24-8, the state statute in effect at the time of its decision.  That statute provided that a court must vacate an arbitration award under four circumstances: a. Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; b. Where there was either evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or any thereof; c. Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause being shown therefor, or in refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any party; d. Where the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
[brief] 135 N.J. at 19.  In attempting to properly authenticate the contents of S-23 in the present case, the prosecutor told the judge that he was "sending a team out right now to see if [the State] can find one of the lay witnesses," presumably the owner of the barber shop and the bodega.  (1T72-5 to 1T72-6)  Those efforts apparently failed, yet the judge allowed authentication via [...].  Sometime after the shooting, the [...] sent Faltz to [...] --- 3  It is unclear whether Faltz is an officer or detective.  See 1T80-14 to 1T80-15 (referring to the witness's badge number or ID number). because one of the detectives was having difficulty downloading video surveillance footage.  (1T74-13 to 1T74-23)  Faltz did not know anything about the location other than that "[o]ne was a bodega, one was a barber shop next to it."  (1T75-8 to 1T75-9)  He did not speak with the owner of either business, but he "believe[s] the detective did."  (1T76-10)  [...] testified that he retrieved video from [...] (1T79-14 to 1T79-23).  He "maybe" reviewed footage at the scene, but he definitely did not review it before downloading.  (1T81-1 to 1T81-3)  At some point, he checked the date and time for accuracy, and they were "[i]naccurate."  (1T81-10 to 1T81-18)  He reviewed only 'part of' what he was authenticating:  Q.  So, you reviewed the videos, correct?  A.  Part of it, yes.  Q.  And we reviewed the videos in anticipation of your testimony today, as well?  A.  Correct.  (1T82-7 to 1T82-11)  (emphasis added)  If this were sufficient under N.J.R.E. 901, a proponent of surveillance video could literally pull anyone off the street to authenticate.  There is no evidence that Faltz actually reviewed the portions of S-23 that were shown to the jury -- except for his review during a meeting with the prosecutor 'in anticipation of the testimony.'  While "[t]he authentication rule 'does not require absolute certainty or conclusive proof,'" Brown, 463 N.J. Super. at 51 (quoting State v. Mays, 321 N.J. Super. 619, 628 (App. Div. 1999)), this incompetent witness was nothing more than the prosecutor's stand-in, 'testifying' to what RPC 3.7(a) prevented the prosecutor from saying.
[brief] Re: Order of 5/12/2023 (DA14), Order of 3/30/2023(DA20)  POINT VI:  The Court erred and abused its judicial discretion by overlooking, or by mistake, failing to consider Defendant’s probative, substantive evidence of probation account error not previously litigated and in turn relying upon the unsupported, non-substantive, non-responsive arguments of Probation in a manner so as to manifestly offend the interests of justice and equity.  Re: Order of 5/12/2023 (DA14), Order of 3/30/2023(DA20)  Point VII:  Given the extent of the Superior Court’s and Probation’s failure to oversee and maintain an accurate Probation account record for the past 25 years, Defendant requests the Appellate Court assume jurisdiction of this case so that an accurate account record can be finally established and the full of credits rightfully due Defendant be granted.  Re: Order of 5/12/2023 (DA14), Order of 3/30/2023(DA20)  Appendices: Transcripts 1T:10/23/2015  2T:8/7/2020  3T:9/21/2020  Appendices Volume I  Da1-Da161  Appendices Volume II Da162-Da338
[brief] Also, the Board considered, and discussed at the hearing, [...]’s medical conditions, which included being legally blind in one eye, suffering from hyperplasia prostate, having arthritis in his knees, and [...]’s $50,000 guaranteed income.  (Pa5).  While [...] contends that the Board abused its discretion by failing to properly consider various aspects of his parole application, such as the “low to moderate” risk assessment given by the two psychological experts, (Pb21-Pb22), the record belies that contention.
[directive] Warrants No-Knock on Restrictions for or officer safety. no-knock New civilian provisions except Limiting Although A. the no-knock independent provided three for justifications Supreme Court has Jersey effecting provisions—destruction an officer safety, seizure— of or evidence, arrest and reasonable there only where shall warrant and request a no-knock is a prosecutors officers  The concern for another safety executing or the of person. officers the particularized and the supporting facts specific request warrant affidavit. included the A should no- in be provision sought only knock-and-announce entry be where knock would should be execution.  warrant safe to achieve inadequate of no-knock tactical warrants.  teams execute the to B. with line practices best among In Use officer civilian no-knock promote that warrants include both safety, counties, to a and only tactical law other executed shall teams, provision enforcement units or be by S.W.A.T. including (Special high-risk Weapons handle trained specifically to incidents, Team), and S.R.T. (Technical (Special Response T.E.A.M.S. and Emergency Tactics), or Specialists), Deployment, Risk Fugitive Entry High Teams, Rapid Mission Squads Prosecutor, Director, This units.  requirement
[brief] In anticipation of his retirement, in June 2017 Plaintiff accepted a job at the [...] (“[...]”).  (Plaintiff Dep. 64:25-65:14, 838a-839a).  He was contracted to work there for the 2017-18 and 2018-19 school years, but [...] fired him in October 2018.  (403a & 404a; Deposition of [...] 38:21-39:1, 916a).  A component of Plaintiff’s economic loss alleged in this matter is that Defendants’ illegal action resulted in Plaintiff’s termination from his post-retirement employment with [...].  (Plaintiff’s Answers to Interrogatories at #’s 2 & 6, 896a & 898a-899a).
[directive] Firearms Record for Individual Participants.  An individual written record as prescribed by this manual shall be maintained on each participant undergoing firearms qualification or requalification.  Each record shall include the following information:  • Participant's name, the date and type of qualification course(s) completed and the scores achieved on each course.  • The name of the supervising firearms instructor for each qualification session or course.  • Identification of any firearm used (make, model, caliber and serial number).  • A general description of the ammunition used (make, type, caliber).  • The location where the qualification session was held (name of range).  • The location where the targets of non-qualifying participants are stored.  (These targets must bear the signatures of the participant and scorer.  Targets must be maintained on file until the participant achieves a qualifying score.)  The original copy of the firearms record shall be maintained as a normal business record.  All records will be reviewed by the chief or agency executive upon completion of each semi-annual requalification.  Annual Report to the County Prosecutor or Division of Criminal Justice.
[brief] The Board first acknowledged the importance of [...]’s status as a protected tenant.  See id. at 76:13-16.  Next, [...] posed an equally important question about tracing [...]’s equity in [...]’s unit.  See id. at 77.  [...] opened the floor to [...]’s counsel to explain his client’s suggested approach for calculating equity.  See id. at 78-94.  [...] then summarized her understanding of [...]’s position and gave his attorney the opportunity to correct any misstatements.  See id. at 94-96, 98.  The Board subsequently began its deliberations on the matter.
[brief] ”  250 N.J. 368, 372 (2022).  The AOM statute has very specific and limited applicability.  “Under the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27, the AOM requirement applies only where (1) a plaintiff’s claim is for personal injuries, wrongful death, or property damages, (2) the personal injuries, wrongful death, or property damages result from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence, and (3) the alleged act of malpractice or negligence is carried out by a licensed person in the course of practicing the person’s profession.
[brief] Dismissing the Complaint with Prejudice pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 4:46-2 Pa48 - Defendant Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment  Pa51 - Certification of [...], Esq. in Support of Defendant [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment  Pa59 - Exhibit A, Pertinent portions of Defendant’s Production of Document served upon Plaintiff, Pa63 which includes: a.
[brief] The State, through successive Appropriations Acts beginning 2010-11, altered the formula by reducing, and then locking-in, the amount of EAA to [...] at $125,411 per year, even though the District was eligible under the formula to receive $16.8 million each year to help fund its Adequacy Budget.  (Pa1917-Pa1920); N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-58(b) (requiring the State to provide EAA in 2011-12 and “each school year thereafter” at the amount received in 2010-11).
[brief] Additionally, [...]’s reference to the Agreement’s indemnification provision is plainly misplaced since that provision only appears to indemnify [...] against third-party trademark infringement claims, not [...]’s violation of the MBPA.  Db35.}\]  \(^{10}\)  [...] wrongly contends that New York law would apply absent a choice-of-law provision, again placing misguided emphasis on [...]’s sales to retailers.  But for all of the reasons discussed above, the balance of the relevant factors weigh heavily in favor of the application of New Jersey law: location of contracting, where the contract is performed and parties’ domicile, etc.
[brief] The medical providers named as Defendants in this case and identified in the Affidavits of Merit do not provide any care or treatment at [...], but rather at the [...], nor is there any allegation that they provided care for Plaintiff’s decedent at [...].  Plaintiff based his argument solely on the fact that [...]’s website referenced [...] as one of three Residential Health Care Facilities with which it is affiliated, to argue that the Affidavits of Merit, referencing physicians and nurses that did not provide any care at [...], are somehow sufficient.  However, even common ownership of separate facilities is not a basis upon which a theory of vicarious liability might lie, and an Affidavit of Merit that does nothing more than lump all of the defendants together fails to abide by the requirements of the law in Hargett.
[brief] Per its own pleadings, [...]’s entire basis for its alleged damages claim, as set forth in Paragraph 20 of [...]’s Complaint, is that “[d]ue to Defendant’s refusal to honor the terms of its Agreement, Plaintiff has been forced to order materials from vendors in order to meet deadlines for certain projects, resulting in Plaintiff spending sums over and above what it would have spent with the Defendant. ” (Pa19).  Thus, in its motion papers, [...] demanded production of all “purchase orders, invoices, receipts, account balance statements, packing slips, proof of payments, checks, emails, etc. ” related to [...]’s alleged purchase of replacement materials from any vendor from April 2021 to September of 2021.  (Pa60)  Moreover, [...] requested relevant correspondence and communications with other vendors to support [...]’s allegation that replacement materials were actually ordered and paid for, as well as the identity of customers in order to verify [...]’s theory that it was attempting to “meet deadlines for certain projects. ”  (Pa19)  On or about April 20, 2022, oral argument was conducted on [...]’s discovery motion before The Honorable [...], J.S.C.
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING AVALONBAY ATTORNEY’S FEES AND DELAY PENALTIES.  [1T62-3 to 63-23; 3T-17 to 33:14; 3T40-22 to 41-14]**  The trial court’s granting of attorney’s fees and delay penalties was premised upon the granting of [...]’s motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement, and thus a reversal of that motion naturally vitiates an award of attorneys’ fees and delay penalties since such must be predicated on a determination of default of the Settlement Agreement.
[brief] *See R.* 4:5-4.  Although the failure to list arbitration as an affirmative defense is not dispositive of the issue…it does inform the waiver analysis.  *Cole*, 215 N.J. at 281 (2013) (citation omitted).  Thus, the Supreme Court held that a movant’s failure to identify arbitration among 35 affirmative defenses and delaying for 21 months waived arbitration rights.  Here, [...] failed to include arbitration as one of its 39 affirmative defenses and delayed its motion to compel arbitration for 71 months.
[brief] The issue in that 35-feet is the code reveals that it is the function of the height over the surface level, the ground surface level at the time that exists prior to any regrading.  Basically the height above the existing grade to the floor elevation of the new buildings varies from 4.9-feet to zero.  So basically you have some buildings that are 4.9-feet higher than they were previously.  Closest to [...] of 4.9-feet and 4.8-feet.  Now, that means that according to the ordinance there may be a requirement.  You’re only allowed to go ten percent over the approved height which is approximately 35-feet which means you can’t go more than ten percent before you get a variance.  Ten percent would mean 3.5 feet.  Now, since the building height is approximately the same as – well, it’s approximately 35-feet.  Ten percent of 35-feet is 3.5 feet.  And since the buildings are 4.9 feet, 4.8 feet, 3.2 feet, 4-feet, there’s a question whether you’re going to need a variance for some of these buildings.  Because first of all, it’s over in excess of 10 percent of what the approved height should be when you measure against the ground elevation prior to any grading.  Basically it’s as if the buildings were put on pedestals to increase the height by 5-feet.
[brief] The Board did hear all that testimony.  We do have [...] or has listened to the or was available at the original March and [...] were not here for May.  They’re going to hear this testimony here today so they’ll be eligible to participate, even though I don’t believe we’re going to finish tonight.  So the first part of this meeting is going to be, the attorneys are trying to do their best, their job to kind of recreate the testimony that was and the evidence that was submitted at the May meeting.
[directive] These partnerships can expand our ability to prevent and respond to violent crime.  This framework allows the State to leverage solutions that prioritize those at highest risk for violence and victimization through a collaborative public safety strategy.  With a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities, and in areas where coordination is important, law enforcement and CBVI groups can reduce violence and improve public trust of government.  Together, they can combat racial inequities in the justice system—especially among the Black and brown communities that suffer disproportionately from violent crime.  It will assist law enforcement in reducing violence by leveraging the support and coordination of CBVI providers who use techniques and approaches to connect to individuals in communities that law enforcement typically cannot reach.  These Guidelines are only applicable to law enforcement agencies (LEAs) where a CBVI organization funded by the [...] (hereinafter “the Department” or “[...]”) operates in the LEA’s jurisdiction.
[brief] What is clear from records of property owned in the area of First Zion is that [...] owns multiple buildings on Bergen Street and buildings on Camden Street which is the street which sits behind First Zion.  *(Da278, Deeds for [...]).*  Deed records for Camden street set forth that there is property owned on that street as well as at the corner of Bergen Street and 15th Avenue by [...].  *(Da278, Deeds for [...])*  The properties owned by [...] have been in their possession since 1985 when [...] purchased a number of lots from the [...].
[brief] ”  *State v. Petrello*, 251 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div. 1991).  The facts which gave rise to the appeal in *Petrello* were not in dispute.  On April 22, 1989, defendant [...] was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, in the Borough of Metuchen.  Thereafter, on May 21, 1989, defendant was again charged with the same offense in the Township of Holmdel.  On September 25, 1989, defendant appeared in the Holmdel Township Municipal Court, pleaded guilty to the drunk-driving charge originating there and was sentenced as a first offender.  On March 30, 1990, defendant appeared in the Borough of Metuchen Municipal Court, pleaded guilty to the earlier charge pending there and was sentenced to the enhanced penalties resulting from a second conviction of the drunk-driving statute.  *Id.*  The *Petrello* Court held,  It is abundantly clear here that the enhanced penalties of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 must be imposed at sentencing on entry of a second drunk-driving conviction, regardless of the order in which the violations occurred and whether or not defendant had previously been advised orally or in writing of the penalties for a subsequent violation.
[brief] Importantly, “when an agency’s decision is based on ‘the agency’s interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue, [appellate courts] are not bound by the agency’s interpretation. ”  *Matter of Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ.*, 244 N.J. 1, 17 (2020) (internal citations omitted).  “Instead, [the appellate court] review[s] that determination *de novo.*”
[brief] ” (1T27:16-33-24).  The trial court then acknowledged that Final Judgment had been entered against [...] and that [...] claimed that [...]’s obligation to pay on the MCS-90 surety endorsement has been triggered, which is the basis of [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  Id.  The trial court then noted that [...] opposed the motion for summary judgment on the MCS-90 surety because the Final Judgment against [...] is not a “final judgment;” [...] must bear some responsibility for the Incident; [...] was engaged wholly in intrastate commerce at the time of the Incident and therefore the MCS-90 is not triggered; and the MCS-90 endorsement does not cover punitive damages.
[directive] 20 Select Month -, _ The acquittee continues on Krol status on conditional release pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4- 1.  8(b )(2); and of  The acquittee shall abide by the following conditions their release which are attached to 2. this Order and incorporated herein; and  The review hearing pursuant to State Krol, N.J. 236 (1975), shall be held on 68 3. v. of  A copy this order shall be sent within two (2) days to the Medical Director and/or the 4. of Executive Director the community-based provider agency by the court. of of
[directive] also condition is not that even when process, by prosecutors).  Bail Reform Law of the interpretation uniform ensure Waives Cases.  Juvenile 7.6.5 2A:4A-26.1 adult court pursuant to N.J.S.A. waived to juvenile is that a In the event complaint- (waiver election of juvenile), and a at N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-27 waiver) or (involuntary within the is an "eligible defendant" that the juvenile Section 4.8 so pursuant to issued warrant is prosecutor whether seek pretrial detention deciding to the in 2A:162-15, N.J.S.A. meaning of history of of the offense and the defendant's and circumstances facts relevant shall apply the originally Section if person subsections) of this as the appropriate the delinquency to juvenile an Section subsection complaint-warrant as adult.