ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In Price, the policy at issue provided, in relevant part:  If we and insured do not agree: 1. Whether that insured is legally entitled to recover damages; or 2.  As to the amount of the damages which are recoverable by that insured;  From the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle or an underinsured motor vehicle, then the matter may be arbitrated.  Either party may make a written demand for arbitration.  In this event, each party will select an arbitrator.  The two arbitrators will select a third.  If they cannot agree within 30 days, either may request that selection be made by a judge of a court having jurisdiction.  Id. at 521.  Therefore, in Price, unlike here, the policy specifically allowed for an uninsured or underinsured motorist claim to be initiated by a written demand for arbitration.
[brief] (M38-51).  Increasingly, litigation has been commenced by those with commercial interests for the purpose of intimidating citizens who exercise their constitutionally protected right to speak out.  LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 323 N.J. Super. 391, 418  In this way, commercial interests seek to quell effective opposition.  *Ibid.*  In other words, protesting citizens are being sued into silence.  This type of litigation is consequently viewed as a serious and significant threat to the free, open and vigorous debate on public issues that the courts have so scrupulously protected as a bedrock principle of the first amendment, which is imperative to a democratic form of government.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Case Law  Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)..............................................37, 38  Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 438 U.S. 825 (1987)..................36, 37, 38  Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).............................36
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[brief] The Appellate Division’s review of rulings of law and issues regarding the applicability, validity, or interpretation of laws, statutes, or rules is de novo.  See Green v. Monmouth Univ., 237 N.J. 516, 529 (2019) (applicability of charitable immunity)  In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 244 N.J. 1, 17 (2020) (agency's interpretation of a statute).  “A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).  Further, if a trial court judge makes a discretionary decision but acts under a misconception of the applicable law or misapplies it, the exercise of legal discretion lacks a foundation and it becomes an arbitrary act, not subject to the usual deference.  Summit Plaza Assocs. v. Kolta, 462 N.J. Super. 401, 409 (App. Div. 2020); Alves v. Rosenberg, 400 N.J. Super. 553, 563 (App. Div. 2008).  In such cases, the reviewing court must adjudicate the controversy in the light of the applicable law in order to avoid a manifest injustice.  State v. Lyons, 417 N.J. Super. 251, 258 (App. Div. 2010); State v. Steele, 92 N.J. Super. 498, 507 (App. Div. 1966); Kavanaugh v. Quigley, 63 N.J. Super. 153, 158 (App. Div. 1960).  For the reasons to follow, the Appellate Division should deny Plaintiffs’ sought reversal and remand and uphold the Trial Court’s previous determinations as it relates to the Authority.
[brief] If, upon his review, the Legislative Budget Officer determines that the bill will not increase or decrease expenditures or increase or decrease revenues of the State or any political subdivision thereof, he shall certify that fact, on a statement signed by him and filed in his office.  If he determines that the bill may increase or decrease expenditures or increase or decrease revenues of the State or any political subdivision thereof, he shall immediately forward a statement to the sponsor and "the chairman" "*all members*" "*the chairman*" of the committee, if any, to which the bill was referred, or to the presiding officer of the House in which the bill originated if no such reference was made, that, in his judgment, a fiscal note is required.
[brief] 6T131:21-132:13.  Without communicating alone and directly with his client, [...] could not exercise proper independent judgment.  6T131:21-25.  Without meeting alone with his client, [...] could not competently render candid advice.  6T132:1-5.  Likewise, only meeting with both [...] and [...] and then conducting himself as if he were representing [...] was a deviation from the standard of care by [...].  6T135:12-16.  There was no reliable evidence that [...] explained the case to [...] to the extent reasonably necessary to permit her to make informed decisions.  [...] even admitted during his deposition, which was read into evidence, “[a]ll the information we receive is from [...] Fou.  Not from [...].  We didn’t talk to her.
[brief] Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in not presenting evidence that Defendant’s Facebook account was in use at the time of the murder.  This argument is meritless for the same reason that the cell phone records were not persuasive to the jury: use of Defendant’s Facebook account does not establish Defendant’s location.  The screenshots of Defendant’s Facebook timeline are from a historical data compilation from Defendant’s phone, with inbound calls and inbound emails interspersed with the Facebook timeline.  Db36; Da467-70.  The Facebook posts establish only that the defendant’s Facebook account was active, not that Defendant was using it.  Another person could have been using Defendant’s Facebook account on Defendant’s phone if that person had access to Defendant’s phone and his Facebook account, especially if Defendant were permanently logged into his Facebook account, which could then be accessed through the Facebook application on the phone without entering Defendant’s login credentials.  Further, none of the activity on the Facebook account immediately before nor after the shooting was necessarily initiated by a user of Defendant’s account, whether that user was Defendant or someone else.  For instance, even a cursory Facebook user knows that “becoming friends” with another user and receiving a notification of such, as is alleged to have occurred at 12:04pm based on the records, occurs either when the user accepts an existing friend request or when another user accepts the first user’s friend request, which may have been sent any amount of time, even months or years, prior to the acceptance of the friend request and Defendant’s account receiving notification of the established “friendship. ”  Db37; Da471.  The shooting took place at 12:10pm, but Defendant’s Facebook activity does not show Defendant’s account engaging in activity that required any active user of the account at all until 12:26pm, at which point Defendant’s account ”liked” a photo.  This took place more than fifteen (15) minutes after the shooting and even so, the user of the account at that time may not have been Defendant.  Defendant’s cited case, State v. Hannah, 448 N.J. Super 78 (App. Div. 2016), merely holds that social media evidence must be authenticated under N.J.R.E. 901 like any other evidence, a sensible ruling that does not advance Defendant’s claim.
[brief] 20 FACTOR TEST Factor 1 – Instructions  Respondent argues that [...] did not give Petitioner any instruction or direction on how to perform her duties.  (Rb29-30).  This argument completely ignores the separation of powers between the executive or administrative branch of government and the independent municipal court of [...].  It also fails to comprehend the notion of prosecutorial independence and discretion.  It almost goes without saying that no municipality can ever tell a municipal prosecutor how to prosecute cases.  That would be illegal on the part of the municipality and unethical of the prosecutor.  Does the Respondent really believe that members of the Township governing body or the township administrator should tell the prosecutor which cases to prosecute and which cases to dismiss?  This notion by the Respondent is incredulous.  The Respondent also points out that the ALJ did not give weight to the Petitioner’s testimony that her work is supervised by the Judge in [...] because she worked as a prosecutor in other municipalities and was not considered an employee in those municipalities.  (Rb30).  The Court should only be concerned about the amount of control that [...] had over the Petitioner.  Also, Petitioner is considered an employee in [...] where she is also supervised by a Judge.  Both that finding by the ALJ and the reliance on it by the Respondent are clearly erroneous.
[brief] (RAISED BELOW: ORDERED AND DECISION (Da60; Da80-82)  Before addressing the Borough’s authority to enact Ordinance No. 17-2017 pursuant to the HRA, we will briefly address the lower court’s finding that the NCA did not preempt Ordinance No. 17-2017 since Respondents intertwined and spent a large part of their responding papers raising preemption arguments pursuant to the NCA.  A.  The lower court found that New Jersey Noise Control Act, N.J.S.A. 13:1G-1 et seq. does not preempt Ordinance 17-2017 and this finding was not cross-appealed.  Respondents’ emphasis on the NCA for a preemption argument must be set aside.  The lower court entered an order on October 24, 2023 finding: in favor of plaintiffs, . . . that the Ordinance is preempted by the [...] Ordinance because defendants and their local board are subject to the jurisdiction of the [...] in matters of public health, and the [...] already adopted an ordinance addressing noise nuisance, which preempts Ordinance No. 17-2017 adopted by defendants on the same subject.  Da60.  The lower court’s order is clear, and it is the focus of this appeal.  Ordinance 17-2017 was found to be preempted by [...] ordinance not because of the NCA, which [...] conclusively and rightfully found did not preempt nuisance ordinances.  As such, pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule and case law, this argument has no place on appeal since a cross-appeal was not filed.
[brief] The Order for entry of judgment specifies that “[t]he attorney’s fees are hereby denied without prejudice subject to refiling pursuant to R. 4:42-9, as the required certification addressing the R.P.C. factors 1.5(a) was not provided” (Da5, Order Entering Judgment).  If the court determined that attorney’s fees were not to be included in the Judgment, then the Judgment should be reduced by more than $31,000.00.  Now that Appellant has explained the unjust nature of the judgment that is the subject of this appeal, this Brief proceeds to discuss how the lower court mistakenly exercised its discretion.
[brief] Within five (5) days, the Transferor [[...]] shall select an accounting firm to perform the equity valuation, will provide notice to all Members of [...] via certified mail/return receipt requested of that selection, and shall bear all associated costs.  The full amount determined to be payable in connection with the exercise of the repurchase option shall be divided proportionately among the Member(s) of [...] and delivered by the Transferor to each of them, in certified funds, within ninety (90) days of completion of the valuation.  (Pa317).  (emphasis added).  Thus, as Appellant made clear, Respondents in their individual capacity had standing to bring these claims because the diminution of value to [...] was not a harm that would have been felt solely by the LLC, but by them themselves individually.
[brief] 15  A.  The Trial Court Erred by Requiring a Transaction Between [...] and the [...] Because a Subsequent Transaction Is Not an Element of the Tort .................................................................................................  16  B.  There Were Genuine Issues of Material Fact with Respect to Each Element of Plaintiffs’ Tortious Interference Claims  .........................................................................................  20  C.  Necessary Discovery Was Still Actively On-Going at the Time the Trial Court Entered Summary Judgment  .........................................................................................  24 POINT II ............................................................................................................................
[brief] On February 14, 2022, the trial court reiterated this ruling, stating:  “I made it very clear, in my order, this is the only thing that I’m allowing because [...] is not on trial.  . .  You’re only allowed to elicit that [...] was arrested, the date of his arrest, and only what the charges are.  I’m not allowing you to go into evidence seized. ”  (9T70-7 to 15).  On February 17, 2022, the trial court again denied defendant’s request to present evidence seized during [...]’s arrest, reiterating that defendant was still permitted to present evidence in support of his theory of third-party guilt despite his failure to proffer any supporting evidence.  (13T4-10 to 5-11).  “[Y]ou have absolutely not a scintilla of any evidence that [...] and the victims were involved in a drug rivalry.  . .  [...] is not on trial before the court.  You have nothing that ties in your theory of some type of drug rivalry.  I’m not going to allow you to go any further than that. ” (13T6-2 to 23).
[brief] (Da22)  As stated above in the procedural history, after years of [...] fighting to save his home and asking to be permitted to redeem, on June 8, 2023, the Appellate Court denied [...]’s appeal.  (Da5)  However on May 25, 2023 the US Supreme Court’s decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631, 143 S. Ct. 1369, 215L.Ed. 2d 564 (2023) declared a taxing authority’s confiscation of a property owner’s equity violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.
[brief] Note that this 2003 case pre-dated a rule amendment redesignating former N.J.R.E. 101(a)(4) as Defendant had no dispute with them or the information contained therein.  N.J.R.E. 101(a)(5).  The account statements were certainly relevant to the case as they set forth the financial information that forms the core of Plaintiff’s allegation of Defendant’s indebtedness for the charged-off credit card account.  PA – 53 to 224; N.J.R.E. 401.  Most notably, Plaintiff included the periodic statement for the last billing cycle prior to charge-off having a closing date of October 26, 2018 and due in the amount of $21,432.55.  PA – 219 to 224.  This is prima facie proof of the amount due at charge-off.  Oughla, 437 N.J. Super. at 304.  So also the Cardmember Agreement was most certainly relevant as it set forth the terms and conditions that governed the subject account.  PA – 49 to 52.  Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully submits that the trial court properly admitted and considered that documentation in adjudicating Plaintiff’s Motion.  Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully submits that the trial court appropriately considered that documentation and this Court should affirm the Order because a) Defendant failed to contest the admissibility of the documentation before the trial court, b) the documentation was admissible pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(b)(2) as an adoptive admission exception to hearsay, and c) there was no bona fide dispute as to documentation and therefore the trial court properly considered same as relevant evidence under N.J.R.E. 101(a)(5).
[brief] TABLE OF APPENDIX  Order granting admission of out-of-court statements of [...] and [...] ........................................................  Pa1  Photographs of victim’s minivan ....................................................  Pa2-19  Aerial maps ..................................................................................  Pa20-25  Excerpt from [...]’s Report showing cell site and PCMD activity .............................................................................  Pa26-29  New Jersey State Police GeoTime Analysis¹ ........................................  Pa30-38  Expert report of [...]² .........................................................  Pa39-40  Judgment of Conviction, Case No. [...] ......................  Pa41-46  Defendant’s brief in support of motion to dismiss indictment (excerpt)³ ..........................................................................................
[brief] INDEX TO APPENDIX  Page Nos. Verdict Sheet ........................................................................................................  Da 13 to 15\(^1\)  Judgment of Conviction .........................................................................................  Da 16 to 19 Notice of Appeal ......................................................................................................  Da 20 to 23  Flash Drive ..............................................................................................................  Da 24  Letter from Attorney General Listing Flash-Drive Contents ..................  Da 25 to 26  Model Supplemental Jury Instruction on Deadlock ...........................................  Da 27  INDEX TO CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX  Page Nos. Indictment ...............................................................................................................  Da 1 to 12  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS
[brief] As Within Time Order .......................................................................................................  Da 14  Transcript of Defendant’s Interrogation ..................................................  Da 15 to 19  Flash Drive Containing: Video of Defendant’s Statement, Video From Surveillance Cameras, and Photos D-111, D-112, D-115, and D-116 Offered by Defense Into Evidence ........................................................................ Da  20  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Judgment of Conviction ........................................................................  Da 7 to 9  Rulings on Point I ..............................................................................  14T 115-3 to 14; 14T 142-4 to 6; 15T 11-4 to 9; 15T 51-7 to 53-9; 14T 142-6 to 161-20  Ruling on Point II .........................................................................................  4T 16-4 to 17-15  Ruling on Point III .........................................................................................  14T 10-6 to 11-24  TABLE OF TRANSCRIPTS
[brief] An attorney properly acting as counsel would have pointed out that such a long term was not necessary to fit the goals of deterrence and protection of the public, and rehabilitation.  Counsel properly fulfilling his role as advocate for his client would have pointed out that a life sentence for multiple home invasions where no one was injured was simply not in line with defendants who receive lesser sentences for murder and aggravated sexual assault, including sexual crimes against children or for armed robbery with a shooting causing paralysis to the victim.  Competent counsel would have sought to offer a different narrative than the extreme one proffered by the State by suggesting a different, lower sentence, that would give him some chance of a life outside prison walls.  This lopsided presentation, both before and during the sentencing hearing, did not provide the court with proper advocacy required to impose a just sentence, and constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
[brief] \(^4\) (1T 26-24 to 27-2)  [...] provided him \(^4\) [...] did not turn on his body-worn camera until he was standing at the door of the defendant’s car, in violation of State law which requires officers turn on their BWC as soon as they activate their police lights.  (1T 105-7 to 106-18)  Because there is a thirty-second delay between the time the video is turned on and the audio is being recorded, the audio of the initial interaction between [...] and [...] was not captured.  (1T 40-20 to 41-4)  [...] also said that he deactivated the sound on the BWC multiple times when he was speaking with other officers.  (1T 69-12 to with his Montana driver’s license and temporary registration, but no insurance.  (1T 27-5 to 7)  [...] told [...] that the car belonged to his brother-in-law and that his wife was the passenger in the car.  (1T 42-1 to 3)  [...] acknowledged that he had not initially asked either [...] or the passenger to exit the car, as he had no reason to be concerned for his safety or that they would flee.  (1T 128-5 to 129-1)  After speaking with [...], [...] returned to his car to run Edward’s license and check for warrants.  (1T 28-9 to 14)  [...] discovered that [...] had a non-extraditable warrant out of Montana.  (1T 28-13 to 18)  Because the Montana warrant was non-extraditable, [...] conceded that he was never going to arrest [...] on the warrant.  (1T 115-7 to 116-2)