ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] -(2) a "local government investment pool" means an investment pool: -(a) which is managed in accordance with 17 C. F.R. s.270.2a-7; is --(b) which rated in the highest category by a nationally recognized statistical rating organization; of U.S. -(c) which is limited Government securities that meet the definition an eligible security to U.S. pursuant to 17 C.F.R. 270.2a-7 and repurchase agreements that are collateralized by such Document 3 Page of 3 Government securities in which direct investment may be made pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (3) of subsection a. of this section; ~ -(d) which is in compliance with rules adopted pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act," P.L.1968, c.410 (C.52:14B-1 et seq.) by the Local Finance Board of the Division of Local Government Services in the Department of Community Affairs, which rules shall provide for disclosure and reporting requirements, and other provisions deemed necessary by the board to provide for the safety, liquidity and yield of the investments; -(e) which does not permit investments in instruments that: are subject to high price volatility with changing market conditions; cannot reasonably be expected, at the time of interest rate adjustment, to have a market value that approximates their par value; or utilize an index that does not support a stable net asset value and ; which purchases and redeems investments directly from the issuer, government money market -(f) mutual fund, or the State of New Jersey Cash Management Fund, or through the use of a national or State bank located within this State, or through a broker-dealer which, at the time of purchase or two redemption, has been registered continuously for a period of at least years pursuant to section 9 of $25 P.L.1967, c.93 (C.49:3-56) and has at least million in capital stock (or equivalent capitalization if or not a corporation), surplus reserves for contingencies and undivided profits, through a securities U.S. dealer who makes primary markets in Government securities and reports daily to the Federal . US. Reserve Bank of New York its position in and borrowing on such Government securities -f.
[brief] (Ia070.)  [...], Intervenor, and [...] opposed the motion and participated in oral argument in connection with the motion.  (1T; 2T).  The trial court first held oral argument on [...]’s motion on September 23, 2022 (the “First Argument”).  (1T).  During the First Argument, the trial court concluded that the questions on the Supplemental Form were unambiguous, and that [...] had answered those questions falsely.  “The question was clear.  It wasn’t a trick question.  It couldn’t be interpreted in four, or five, or six different ways.  The question was do you rent automobiles and he said no. ” (1T61-10).  The trial court also inquired with [...]’s counsel as to whether there was evidence that the misrepresentations made by [...] were material, and relied upon by [...] when issuing the [...] Policy.  In response to these questions, [...] provided a list of evidence establishing these elements of equitable fraud had been satisfied.  This evidence included a deposition transcript of the owner of [...], an affidavit from the owner of [...], and “underwriting guidelines that say black and white, this program . . . will not write coverage if there’s a 12- to 15-passenger van implicated. ” (1T63-5).  At conclusion of the First Argument, the trial court requested supplemental briefing on a narrow issue:  I want to say this, I’m going to give you the opportunity to supplement your papers if you wish.  The issue in the Court’s mind is under circumstances where the Court declares the question as plain on its face and it is not ambiguous, if the Court makes that conclusion, it’s not ambiguous, it’s plain on its face . . .  If the answers is inaccurate, I’m not saying fraudulent, just inaccurate is the carrier entitled to rescind coverage.  That’s the only thing that I’m struggling with.  I’ll look at that.  I don’t think I am going to change my mind.  I’ve already made the ruling.  It’s not an ambiguous question.  (1T64:22).  [...], Intervenor, and [...] did not limit their supplemental briefing to this narrow issue, but instead briefed a variety of issues not raised when originally opposing [...]’s motion.
[brief] (1T 19-5 to 19-11).  However, even if one argues that an acknowledgment of receipt in a document creates a rebuttable presumption thereof, that presumption may be overcome by evidence that the documents were not received, see Johnson v. Hegarty, 93 NJ Super 14, 20 (App. Div. 1966) - in reference to the mail box rule; Cwiklinski v. Burton, 217 NJ Super 506, 511 (App. Div. 1987) - to establish a presumption of mailing the person placing the mail in the mailbox must submit an affidavit to that fact; Needham v. NJ Ins. Und., 230 NJ Super 358, 369 (App. Div. 1989)
[directive] Comment:  The uniform grand jury charge instructs grand jurors regarding their duties.  The uniform charge, promulgated by Directive #12-06 (July 20, 2006) after approval by the Conference of Assignment Judges, consists of two parts: (1) the Standard Grand Jury Charge (appended here as Attachment 3), and (2) Standard Supplemental Charge for Grand Juries Regarding Presentments (appended here as Attachment 4).  The standard charge shall be provided verbally by the Assignment Judge or a judge designated by the Assignment Judge prior to the first grand jury session.  Grand jurors shall be provided with a printed copy of the standard charge before considering any grand jury matter.  The intention is to provide the grand jurors with the printed charge prior to the charge being given by the judge so that they can read along as they are being charged.  The Grand Jury Standards Promulgated by Directive #23-06 (December 22, 2006)  Page 2 of 18 supplemental charge regarding presentments will be provided by the Assignment Judge only when a sitting grand jury indicates that a presentment is possible.  Instructing the grand jurors in that way will ensure that the presentment information is provided when needed and that the grand jurors have a context in which to process that additional information.  Standard 5.
[brief] As indicted by the DOL, archeologists fall under the category of “other” (like [...]’s listed archeological subcontractor, [...].  In [...], the DOL also interprets the term “subcontractor” (a term undefined by the PWCRA) in the same manner as that term is defined under the MLL and CLL.  Specifically, consistent with the MLL and CLL, the DOL defined the term “subcontractor” in terms of contractual privity/contractual relationship, rather than by classification or type of work performed.  This is because the PWCRA does not exist solely to enforce payment of prevailing wages from those involved in public projects.  Rather, the PWCRA exists to permit the DOL to monitor compliance of and enforce all existing employment laws including, without limitation, unemployment and temporary disability insurance and payroll taxes.  With this purpose in mind, the DOL Commissioner interpreted the language of the PWCRA and held professionals (like archaeologists) are subcontractors as contemplated by the statute and are, therefore, required to be registered when working on a public project.
[brief] The Appellate Division found no words of guarantee in the contract and that when [...] signed as “owner” he was not agreeing to personal liability.  Home Buyer’s Warranty is distinguishable because the contract in that case did not contain any language of guarantee, let alone language of guarantee directly over the signature line of the defendants as in the present case.  In Home Buyer’s Warranty, it is clear that no guarantee language whatsoever was included in the contract and, therefore, under the totality of the circumstances [...] was signing as owner and a corporate representative and not as an individual guarantor to the contract.
[brief] 468 N.J. Super. 128, 134 (App. Div. 2021).  This court explained:  Rule 4:42-2 declares that interlocutory orders “shall be subject to revision at any time before the entry of final judgment in the sound discretion of the court in the interest of justice. ”  A motion for reconsideration does not require a showing that the challenged order was “palpably incorrect,” “irrational,” or based on a misapprehension or overlooking of significant material presented on the earlier application.  Until entry of final judgment, only “sound discretion” and the “interest of justice” guides the trial court, as Rule 4:42-2 expressly states.  [Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128, 134, 256 A.3d 388, 392 (App. Div. 2021)]  The holding in Lawson is not novel.  In applying R. 4:42-2, this court has consistently held that courts should exercise their power to reconsider interlocutory orders “for good cause shown and in the service of the ultimate goal of substantial justice. ”  Lombardi, 207 N.J. at 536 (quoting Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping Corp., 220 N.J. Super. 250, 257 (App. Div. 1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 196 (1988)); Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 1996); Ford v. Weisman, 188 N.J. Super. 614, 619 (App. Div. 1983) (observing that “the trial court has complete power over its interlocutory orders and may revise them when it would be consonant with the interests of justice to do so”).
[brief] [...] Testified He Struck [...] in Self Defense.  [...]’s account of the incident confirmed that he observed [...] in the Flooring Department and approached to see if he needed assistance selecting grout.  [8T 202:2-10].  [...] asked [...] about the difference between sanded and unsanded grout.  [8T 202:9-10].  [...] testified that he began to explain the different types of jobs each variety of grout could be used for, when [...] suddenly grew agitated and told him he should learn more about the products before answering customer questions.  [8T 202:10-20].  [...] then attempted to explain that he was still in training.  [8T 202:20-22].  Sensing that [...] had gone “from zero to one hundred angry” in the short time they had been interacting, [...] testified that he attempted to defuse the situation by walking away.  [8T 202:25-203:16].  [...] resumed sweeping the floor with a push broom he had been holding during the exchange and walked down the aisle towards the rear of the store with his back to [...].  [8T 203:15-18].  [...] followed [...], yelled at him, and repeatedly demanded his name.  [8T 203:15-204:6].  [...] stalked [...] down the next aisle, as [...] continued to sweep with his back turned to [...].  [8T 203:15-204:6].  About midway down the aisle, [...] glanced behind him and observed [...] approximately ten feet away, approaching, with one fist clenched, and holding a bag of grout in his other arm.  [8T 204:13-19, 223:17-25].  [...] glanced back a second time, and observed [...] had closed the distance and was now only three to five feet behind him.  [8T 205:8-12, 223:17-25].  Immediately thereafter, [...] felt the bag of grout strike the back of his neck, head, and shoulders.  [8T 205:12-19, 206:9-14].  [...] then turned around and used the broom stick he was holding to block a punch from [...], and in doing so he struck [...] in the head.  [8T 205:20-206:19; 9T 17:23-19:23].
[brief] An appellate court has wide-ranging authority to review sentencing determinations to ensure that the sentencing court properly applied the standards and guidelines of the Criminal Code.  State v. Hodge, 95 N.J. 369, 376 (1984).  The court on appeal must review whether the finding of aggravating and mitigating factors was based on competent, credible evidence.  State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363-64, 369 (1984).  The role of aggravating and mitigating factors is to identify “individual circumstances which distinguish the particular offense from other crimes of the same nature. ”  *State v. Yarbough*, 195 N.J. Super. 135, 143 (App. Div. 1984), rev’d on other grounds, 100 N.J. 627 (1985).  Therefore, the sentencing court should afford less weight to offender-oriented factors than to factors that are specific to the offense.  *Hodge*, 95 N.J. at 378-79.  This is especially critical when the sentencing court has imposed an extended term based on prior convictions because the defendant’s record is the reason for the imposition of the extended term.  See *State v. Vasquez*, 374 N.J. Super. 252, 267 (App. Div. 2005) (holding that court could not use defendant’s prior drug conviction as basis for imposing maximum sentence within extended range when defendant’s prior drug conviction subjected him to mandatory extended term).  When assessing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances used to set the length of that term, a judge must be careful not to double-count the prior offenses which triggered the imposition of the extended term.  *State v. Dunbar*, 108 N.J. 80, 89-92 (1987).  A remand for resentencing is required when the court double-counts, or otherwise errs in its consideration of aggravating or mitigating factors.
[brief] POINT II  THE FINDING THAT APPELLANT HAS NOT SUFFERED A PERMANENT LOSS OF BODILY FUNCTION THAT IS SUBSTANTIAL WAS ERRONEOUS.  (1T, Pa1-19)  Appellant asserts that the Court below erred in finding that Appellant has not suffered a permanent loss of bodily function as a result of this incident.  [...] was Appellant’s treating doctor, performed the surgery on her ankle, and also provided an expert report.  [...]’s report outlines Appellant’s injuries to her right knee and her left ankle, including the surgery to her ankle, and he specifically opines that those injuries are permanent in nature and are directly and causally related to Appellant’s fall of September 6, 2018.  (Pa314-320)  Further, [...]’s report states that Appellant’s body parts have failed to return to normal function, nor will they return to normal function with continued care and treatment.  (Pa314-320)  This shows substantial loss of bodily function for Appellant.
[directive] Requests for T and U Nonimmigrant Status Certifications  A.  Establishing certification procedures.  Before March 15, 2019, all state, county, and local law enforcement agencies must put in place a set of procedures for processing requests for T- and U-visa certifications (see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(T) and 1101(a)(15)(U)) from potential victims of crime or human trafficking within 120 days of the request being made.  Each police department shall post information about its procedures on its website, or, if the department does not have its own website, then on the municipality’s website when feasible.  Page 7 B.  T-visa certifications.  For T-visa certification requests, each agency’s certification procedure shall include a determination of whether, pursuant to the standards set forth in federal law and instructions to USCIS Form I-914 Supplement B, the requester:  1.  Is or has been a victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons; and 2.  Has complied with requests for assistance in an investigation or prosecution of the crime of trafficking.  C.  U-visa certifications.  For U-visa certification requests, each agency’s procedure shall include a determination of whether, pursuant to the standards set forth in federal law and instructions to USCIS Form I-918 Supplement B, the applicant:  1. Is a victim of a qualifying criminal activity; and 2.  Was, is, or is likely to be, helpful in the investigation or prosecution of that activity.  D.  Inquiry into and disclosure of immigration status.  Notwithstanding any provision in Section II, state, county, and local law enforcement agencies and officials may ask any questions necessary to complete a T- or U-visa certification.  They may generally not disclose the immigration status of a person requesting T- or U-visa certification except to comply with state or federal law or legal process, or if authorized by the visa applicant.  However, nothing in this section shall be construed to restrict, prohibit, or in any way prevent a state, county, or local law enforcement agency or official from sending to, maintaining, or receiving from federal immigration authorities information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.
[directive] As was the purpose of AG Directive 2020-8, where COVID strained the resources of many agencies and the State Toxicology Laboratory, the pause in drug testing put in place by many agencies will create significant difficulty in completing the required testing prior to the December 31, 2022 deadline.  Therefore, to ensure the most efficient use of law enforcement resources and maintain the numerous benefits associated with the law enforcement mandatory random drug testing program, I have determined that it is again necessary and appropriate to adjust the timeframe and reporting requirements of Directive 2018-2, while still requiring that every agency test at least 10 percent of its officers at least four times over the two- year period between January 1, 2022, and December 31, 2023.  Therefore, pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, I hereby direct all law enforcement agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey to implement and comply with the following policies, procedures, standards, and practices.
[brief] Van Dunk, supra, 210 N. J. at 471.  However, the Court distinguished the salient facts in that case from the more egregious circumstances that it had previously found to defeat an employer's motion for summary judgment:  What distinguishes Millison, Laidlow, Crippen, and Mull from the present matter is that those cases all involved the employer's affirmative action to remove a safety device from a machine, prior OSHA citations, deliberate deceit regarding the condition of the workplace, * * * knowledge of prior injury or accidents, and previous complaints from employees.
[directive] Dismissal, Acquittal, or Discharge without a Conviction or Finding of Guilt prior to April18, 2016  A person who did not apply for the expungement of an arrest or charge not resulting in a conviction, at the time of the dismissal, acquittal, or discharge, may following the disposition of the proceedings, a duly verified petition present, at any time as provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-7, in the Superior Court in the county in which the disposition occurred.  These applications should be assigned to the Superior Court judge designated to handle expungements.  Information on filing an expungement petition is included in the prose expungement packet.  [...] • [...] • [...]
[brief] The Information Imparted by Petitioners to [...] is Significantly Harmful to the Petitioners  Pursuant to the specific information contained in [...]’s Certification, submitted to the Trial Court and this Court, *in camera*, in which was generally summarized in Petitioners’ Trial Court pleadings – that [...] disclosed the strengths and weaknesses of Petitioners’ position and specific potential settlement posture - has established that significant harm would befall Petitioners if [...] and his law firm were to remain in the case.  Such information is well-grounded in the record.  [...] fails to recognize that the burden has been shifted to him to prove that he did not have confidential and prejudicial communications with [...].  As set forth infra and supra, he has failed to do so.  Therefore, Petitioners have satisfied their burden of persuasion and proof in the disqualification of [...] and his law firm. \(^{12}\)  **POINT III**
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order Dated 9/14/22 Granting Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Dismissing Plaintiff, [...]'s, Complaint…………Pa214 [...]'s Opinion Set Forth in Transcript of 9/13/22 Granting Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Dismissing Plaintiff, [...]'s, Complaint………………………………………………T001  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT [...] (“John”) has filed this meritless appeal from the Order of the Honorable [...], J.S.C. of September 14, 2022, granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of defendants [...] and [...], Counsellors at Law (“Rinaldi”), and dismissing the claims of [...].
[brief] On November 13, 2004, Jersey City Detective [...] received a phone call from a woman who resided across the street from the fried chicken store, claiming to have found certain suspicious items on her property.  When Kaminski reported to the property he saw “two jackets and some drug paraphernalia on the ground which were hanging on the fence of the property.”  Kaminski described the items of clothing as brown Carhart jackets, “one with a hood, one without. ”  [...] identified one of the jackets as the one worn by [...] during the incident.  The State also presented expert testimony concerning [...]'s manner of death and identification of the handguns and spent shell casings recovered from the scene.
[brief] BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY  Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex - CN 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  Re: State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Movant) v. [...] (Defendant-Respondent)  Indictment No.: [...]  Appellate Docket No.: [...]  Criminal Action: On Motion for Leave to Appeal from an Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County  Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  ______________________________________________________  Honorable Judges: Pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b), and R. 2:6-4(a), this letter in lieu of a formal brief is submitted on behalf of the State.  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70.  As more fully set forth at Db 23-24, the Board may not “usurp the legislative power delegated to the governing body to effect the zoning scheme”  Vidal v. Lisanti Foods, Inc., 292 N.J.Super. 555, 561 (App.Div. 1996).  And, where “an informed governing body does not change the ordinance; a board of adjustment may reasonably infer that its inaction was deliberate.
[brief] “An ‘unlawful practice’ contravening the CFA may arise from (1) an affirmative act; (2) a knowing omission; or (3) a violation of an administrative regulation. ”  Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24, 51 (2017).  A plaintiff is not required to show intent where the claimed consumer-fraud violation is a regulatory violation.
[brief] The Rodriguez-Ortiz court read Schmidt the same way plaintiff reads Schmidt and not in the convoluted and confusing way defendants read Schmidt and the statutory provisions on which Schmidt relied.  Schmidt relies on N.J.S.A. 34:15-72 for the same proposition as plaintiff, that the policy at issue “must cover not only claims for compensation prosecuted in the Workers' Compensation court, but also claims for work-related injuries asserted in a common law court.
[brief] Acknowledgments by Participant.  Adult Participant acknowledges on behalf of himself/herself and on behalf of any Child Participant(s) that he/she/they would not be granted access to the Premises or the ability to participate in the Activities but for his/her agreement to the terms and conditions of this Agreement and these acknowledgments.  *** Pa0087-Pa0089.  The Plaintiff specifically indicated his assent to the Agreement by providing his signature and affirmatively placing a "check mark" on the boxes included within the Agreement.  Pa 0087-Pa0092.  On January 20, 2023, Plaintiffs [...] and his wife, [...], filed their Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, New Jersey.  Pa0005-Pa0018.  [...] was not named as a Defendant in Plaintiffs' Complaint.  Pa0005-Pa0018.  Nearly a year later, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Amend their Complaint to include [...].  Pa0028.  On March 25, 2024, Plaintiffs executed a Stipulation Extending [...]'s time to file a responsive pleading to April 13, 2024.  Pa0244.  On April 4, 2024, [...] filed its Cross Motion to Stay and Compel Arbitration.  Pa0242.  On May 2, 2024, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. entered two (2) Orders granting the Defendants' Motions to Stay the litigation and Compel Arbitration.