ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] To maintain the continuity of the property function, the chief law enforcement officer should delegate the property control function to one specific officer.  The primary duties of the property officer include the preservation and safeguarding of all property, as well as the disposition of all property.  In medium to large departments, the duties of a property officer can be a full time assignment for one or more officers.  In smaller departments, the property officer duties along with other duties might be assigned to one officer.  If this is the case, the chief law enforcement officer must insure that the property function is receiving the time, effort and attention that it needs.  The property officer's duties, responsibilities and authority should be clearly defined by department rules and policies.  At a minimum, the property officer shall:  1.  Maintain appropriate written records, including records which reflect the chain of custody of property while it is in the possession of the police department.  2.  Maintain the property in a place and under conditions which eliminate as much as possible any risks of loss or tampering.  3.  Maintain physical control of property until it is properly disposed.  Access to evidence and the property vault must be restricted to the property officer.  One other officer, preferably the property officer's supervisor, should have access in case the property officer is unable to perform his duties.  6  AUDITS
[brief] In 1964, the mean high-water line is shown in red (1T39:21).  Pa201 shows the Borough Tax Map with the three identifications of the mean high-water line.  The dashed line along the bottom coincides with the 1918 determination of the mean high-water line.  The heavier line is also consistent with the 1964 determination of the mean high-water line and identified as a flood plain.  There is also a mean high-water line depicted by another dash line which coincides with the 1980 determination of that line (1T40:16-24) (Pa911).  shows the application when [...] acquired a Riparian Grant from the State of New Jersey.
[directive] DATE EFFECTIVE  21. of this requirements and provisions  However, the immediately. effect takes Directive  This expressly be otherwise may except as 1, 2017, January on operational become ~ shall Directive to required are agencies police and All prosecutors 1. note See subsection. or Section in a specified each of requirements the that ensure to appropriate necessary and preparations are as such make becomes subsection or Section such that date the on with complied aze subsection and Section operational.
[brief] On March 19, 2024, Appellants served 31 document demands and 39 interrogatories on [...].  Da334.  On March 27, 2024, Appellants noticed [...]’s deposition for May 30, 2024.  Da335, 338-40.  At first, [...] actively engaged in the discovery process, further entrenching her election to proceed in the Chancery Court rather than arbitration.  To that end, on April 23, 2024, [...] provided responses to Appellants’ document demands including a production of over 4,070 unorganized documents.  Da335.  On May 6, 2024, Appellants served a discovery deficiency notice to [...] and [...] promised to respond and cure such deficiencies by May 22, 2024.  Da335, 342-48.  Then, [...] began to obstruct the discovery process.  [...]’s responses to Appellants’ interrogatories were due on May 20, 2024, but she failed to produce discovery on either date.  Da335.  On May 23, 2024, Appellants requested responses to the overdue interrogatories, that the outstanding deficiencies in the document demand responses be cured, and to confirm [...]’s deposition for May 30, 2024.  Da335, 350.  On May 24, 2024, [...] indicated that, in a self-imposed stay of discovery, she would not respond to the past-due interrogatories, cure her deficiencies, or appear for her scheduled deposition.  Da335, 352.  On May 29, 2024, Appellants objected to [...]’s unilateral stay and highlighted that [...]’s refusal to properly and timely provide discovery was improperly delaying the resolution of this case and interfering with the Court’s scheduling.  Da335, 354.  Meanwhile, on April 5, 2024, as further evidence of a waiver of any claim of arbitration, [...] herself served 30 document demands and three sets of interrogatories – one set per each named Appellant.  Da335-36.  Appellants timely responded to the document demands on May 10, 2024, including production of more than 350 pages of Bates-stamped and organized documents.  Ibid.  Appellants’ responses to [...]’s interrogatories were served June 4, 2024.  Da335-36, 377.  Once discovery was well underway and after the Parties had already been in litigation for nearly nine months, engaged in no less than six Court appearances (including three motion hearings), no less than 36 filings on docket, and with a trial date scheduled for August 6, 2024 (about two months away) (see, e.g., Da109, 175-76, 201, 219, 259-64, 299-300, 334-54), [...] filed her Motion to Compel Arbitration on May 17, 2024.
[directive] [...], Director, Juvenile Justice Commission  Civil Presiding Judges  Criminal Presiding Judges  Family Presiding Judges  Municipal Presiding Judges  [...], Deputy Admin. Dir. [...], Director [...], Assistant Director [...], Assistant Director [...], Assistant Director [...], Assistant Director Trial Court Administrators  Civil Division Managers Criminal Division Managers Family Division Managers Municipal Division Managers [...], Chief [...], Chief [...], Asst. Chief [...], Special Asst. [...], Special Asst. Superior Court of New Jersey  Order to Produce IND.  NO. COUNTY OF DIVISION  Criminal Family ACC.  NO. Probation  Municipal Civil PROS.  NO. COMP. NO. STATE OF NEW JERSEY PURPOSE VS S.B.I. DEFENDANT D.O.B. S.S.# a/k/a RACE TO: INST.#  You are hereby commanded to produce the body of now confined in the , New Jersey, under your custody, before the Honorable , Judge of the Court in and for the City Township County of (Superior or Municipal) , at , New Jersey on (Day) , the of , 19 at (A.M./P.M.) o'clock.
[brief] Indeed, the ALJ did confirm that amount of control in her decision.  The issue here surrounds the “IRS 20 Factor Test” applied to Petitioner’s duties and role as municipal prosecutor.  Most, if not all of the municipal prosecutor’s work in this case, as in similar cases cited above, involve their functions, duties and activities during the court sessions and related to court sessions.  It was confirmed that no salaried employee in [...] either punches a clock and as a result there cannot be and should not be any time keeping records for the Petitioner.  While the ALJ acknowledged Petitioner reported to the Court Administrator at the start of her day distinguishes this from punching a clock, this is a distinction without a difference.  This very minor point which is factually erroneous is against the great weight of evidence showing all the control which the [...] exerts over the Petitioner in her duties as municipal prosecutor.  The ALJ also made the following erroneous factual determination:  “[...] is a seasoned prosecutor, who offered credible testimony as to her role in Winslow and her duties as a municipal prosecutor.  However, [...]’s knowledge of her duties compared to the information provided by the Winslow representatives showed that Winslow does not control, direct, or supervise [...]’s work activities.  The Winslow representatives did not possess the level of detail in [...]’s duties which would have been indicative of control. ”  The emphasis on control should be on the Petitioner’s ability to independently direct her own work efforts versus the level of qualitative detail which any employee much less a municipal prosecutor would know over a Township representative that is not within the municipal court system.  The irony here is that those very same Winslow representatives who the ALJ claims have less knowledge of Petitioner’s duties, are the very same ones who classified the Petitioner as an employee rather than an independent contractor.  This factual determination by the ALJ cannot withstand appellate scrutiny.  The ALJ based her findings on extremely minor and insignificant points instead of the totality of all the evidence of all the factors to reach her conclusion that [...] was not an employee.  The ALJ noted that [...] was required to take some required municipal training but not all, that she was not subject to performance evaluations and that at least one witness for the Township was not familiar with her expense reimbursements.  (Pa16)  Petitioner testified extensively about reimbursements that she received directly from [...] including State Police discovery and the “We Transfer” App.  In fact, the Respondent’s investigator conceded that had she known Petitioner was reimbursed for these business expenses it would be indicative of employee status.  The ALJ also confused the issue of the Petitioner’s longevity with the requirement that municipal prosecutors get reappointed annually pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2B:25-4.
[brief] State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021).  Appellate courts “must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision” on a motion to suppress ‘as long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. ’”  Ibid. (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)).  Deference is given “to those findings in recognition of the trial court's ‘opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the “feel” of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy. ’”  Ibid. (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244).  Generally, a reviewing court “will not disturb the [trial] court's factual findings unless they are ‘so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction. ’”  State v. Gray, 474 N.J. Super. 216, 222 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 398 (2022)).
[brief] Interestingly, [...] argues that the court should look at the totality of the circumstances, and the potential benefit from pursuing the litigation.  I agree with this argument, which I think would only yield a result which would be the exact opposite of what [...] contends.  In this regard, he fails to even attempt to refute my authorities pertaining to reasonableness of the legal fees being sought. \(^2\)  Lastly, [...] tries to argue that my inability to specifically recall the *Haylett* authority should cast doubt upon the reasonableness of my belief.  However even aside from the fact that he is trying to distort my words, his point is moot.  In *Badiali v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Grp.*, 429 N.J. Super. 121, 126 (App.Div. 2012) this Court held that as a matter of law, the mere existence of unpublished case law supporting NJM's rejection of the arbitration award precluded a finding of bad faith against NJM, regardless of whether NJM relied on or was aware of that unpublished case.
[brief] A term for this exists in law – unconscionability.  Unconscionability requires “two factors: (1) unfairness in the formation of the contract, [procedural unconscionability] and (2) excessively disproportionate terms [, substantive unconscionability].”  Moore v. Woman to Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, L.L.C., 416 N.J. Super. 30, 38-39 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 352 N.J. Super. 555, 564 (Ch. Div. 2002) (internal quotations omitted) (alterations in original)).  Courts in New Jersey may employ a “sliding scale analysis” to assign weight to the two forms of unconscionability and consider “the way in which the contract was formed and, further, whether enforcement of the contract implicates matters of public interest. ”  Id. at 39 (citing Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., LLC, 203 N.J. 286, 301 & n. 10 (2010)).  Appellants’ argument that the result of the MOU is “absurd” – i.e., unconscionable – is first undermined by the fact that they contradict themselves in their own brief.  They first state that “the MOU indicates that [[...]] will assume certain corporate debts,” (Db at 16), then attempt to backpedal by stating “neither [[...]] nor [...] had actually taken on the obligation to do anything” (Db at 20).  The only absurdity present is the notion that [...] could simultaneously assume the liabilities of [...] and do nothing at all.  The contract language is clear.
[directive] 제1급 가석방 보호감독 기간 5년 – 제1 급 가석방  보호감독 기간 년 – 3  지령 제01-18 호(02/23/2018)에 의거 공포된 양식, 페이지1/2  CN 11171-Korean Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11171-Korean page 1 of 2  Do you understand that because you have pled guilty to these charges the court must impose a year term of parole supervision and that term will begin as soon as you complete the sentence of incarceration?  First Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 5 years  Second Degree Term of Parole Supervision - 3 years 3.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 89.  Rather, such a finding “is the beginning, not the end, of the inquiry,” *id.*, and requires consideration of a number of factors.  Considering those factors, the *Martindale* court observed: “[v]irtually every court that has considered the adhesive effect of arbitration provisions in employment applications or employment agreements has upheld the arbitration provision contained therein despite potentially unequal bargaining power between employer and employee.
[brief] Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that “[t]he Loigman factors are not a complete list of relevant considerations[.]”  Rivera, 250 N.J. at 147.  The Loigman factors “largely examine only one side of the balancing test -- the need for confidentiality. ”  Id.  Furthermore, the six Loigman factors “should be balanced against the importance of the information sought to the plaintiff's vindication of the public interest. ”  Id.  Importantly, “[a]s the considerations justifying confidentiality become less relevant, a party asserting a need for the materials will have a lesser burden in showing justification. ”  Techniscan v. Passaic Valley Water, 113 N.J. 233, 236 (1988).  “If the reasons for maintaining confidentiality do not apply at all in a given situation, or apply only to an insignificant degree, the party seeking disclosure should not be required to demonstrate a compelling need. ”  Id. B.  Records Regarding the Public Corruption Investigation and Prosecution of a Superior Court Judge Should be Disclosed
[brief] recommended Plaintiff begin psychotherapy immediately, and reported Plaintiff would shortly need a psychiatric consult. ”  ………………………………………………………………..2T page3, lines 22-24  Next, [...] stated on page 3 of the April 13, 2022 transcript (line 25), “No, I don’t need an evaluation…” and on page 4(line 1) “I have a medical problem” ………………………………………………………………..2T page3, line25 and 2T page4 line1  Then on page 4 of the April 13, 2022 transcript (line11-12), Your Honor [...] states referring to wrongly sending [...] to [...]  “Okay.  “So do you want to go—so you understand that this is just a two-point ticket. ”  Your Honor upholds the violation and states “… just a two-point ticket”. which is inaccurate……………………………………………………………..2T page4, line 11-12  Next, also on page 4 of the April 13, 2022 transcript (lines 14-16), regarding wrongly sending [...] to [...], Your Honor [...] summarized that “All right, then I need you to be able to be quite otherwise I have no choice but to do what I just said I think is appropriate. ”  ………2T page4 lines 15-16  Thereafter, again on page 4 of the April 13, 2022 transcript (lines 17-18), [...] states “Be evaluated for what though?  A medical issue,” with a similar reference appearing on page 4 (lines 19)  Your Honor [...] states “for some psychiatric issues”………………………………………2T page4 lines 17-18 and 2T page4 line19  Also, on page 4 of the April13, 2022 transcript (lines 19), Your Honor’s statement to send [...] to [...] that “for some psychiatric issues. ” overlooks how the record shows contradictions between the courts over my allegations against [...], [...] and [...].  Just because I was crying about an unfair predicament does not mean I have some “psychiatric issues”  I was not treated with dignity and respect.
[directive] The use of Special Application and Enhancement Features B, C1 and/or D Page 98  [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions) presupposes that the additional booby trap/fornication, No Early Release Act or weapons charges are provable, and that a prosecutor by invoking one of these Special Application and Enhancement Features has determined that there is not “insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction” for any such additional nonBrimage-eligible offense.  See Sections 11.2, 11.3.1 and 11.4.  The Downward Departure for Trial Proof Issues is designed to afford a prosecutor some measure of flexibility in assessing the proofs available to sustain a conviction.
[brief] All as their narrative may require.  This battle-tested strategy has been refined over a period of more than 5 years of litigation.  It has been honed to perfection by dozens if not hundreds of motions where the truth has been intentionally disguised.  It has become a system of masterful deception that relies on combining "half-truths" to create "facts" that are highly convincing, yet 100% false.  Time and time again the court has been duped into believing a fictional rendition of the matter at hand.  Yet, as skilled as the Respondents have become in their work, all that is really needed is careful and thorough examination - of every sentence they put forth as truth.  At first, this is a tedious and time-consuming process.  But soon, a pattern emerges, and it becomes easier to spot their deception.  Their techniques are repeated and they become more obvious with every discovery.  The lies and half-truths are readily exposed and the plain truth is revealed.
[brief] Finally, even assuming the detective’s comment was improper, any error was harmless because it was not capable of producing an unjust result.  As argued in POINT I, supra, there was overwhelming proof of defendant’s guilt.  Unlike Ridout, where the out-of-court identifications were the primary pieces of evidence against the defendant, here, the recreation was merely a small piece of a much larger pie of evidence against defendant.  The comment, which did not infringe on the juror’s fact-finding function, did not have the capacity to change the jury’s evaluation of the evidence, let alone, their finding of guilt.  Moreover, counsel’s failure to object suggests that defense counsel did not believe the remarks were prejudicial at the time they were made.  State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 82-84 (1999).  Accordingly, even if this Court finds the trial court’s comments were improper, they do not amount to plain error and, thus, defendant’s conviction should be affirmed on appeal.
[brief] In or about the fall of 2020, Plaintiffs brought to this law firm’s attention several unauthorized entries onto the Plaintiffs [...] property in [...] which were apparently related to a [...] redevelopment project in the downtown Bridgeton area.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys subsequently investigated the matter.  That investigation included, but was not limited to, discussions with the Plaintiffs’ representative, a site inspection, review of public records of the [...] and the municipality with respect to the Project, plans associated with the Project, and environmental issues associated with the Project.  Among the documents reviewed were several site plans that were prepared by [...].  One of the site plans, dated February 28, 2017 (“SP 3”), depicts proposed parking on portions of Plaintiffs’ Property as if Plaintiffs’ Property was part of the Project.  (Pa000458 at ¶ 3-9).  Based upon the investigation, it was apparent that [...] had prepared the site plans for the Project that incorporated portions of Plaintiffs’ Property.  As a result, Plaintiffs named [...] as a Defendant for negligence and trespass.
[brief] See *Nyhammer*, 197 N.J. at 402 (explaining that the Court has rejected automatic suppression “whenever the police do not repeat Miranda rights—initially given in the pre-custodial stage—to a defendant after he is taken into custody”).  Here, it is undisputed that defendant acknowledged and waived his Miranda rights two days before his arrest prior to his interview with [...].  After [...] read defendant his rights, defendant initialed and signed the Miranda form.  When [...] read the portion regarding defendant’s right to counsel, he responded “I don’t need one, I don’t think. ” (11T68-21 to 25).
[brief] In their opposition and cross-motion papers, neither the [...] nor [...] address easements by reservation, exception or restriction whatsoever.  The Court must reject the Baxter’s myopic and unconvincing argument that an easement may only exist where there is grant language contained in the land records to the dominant land.  By its nature, an easement by restriction is placed on the grantor’s chain of title, which is perfectly acceptable and fully enforceable under New Jersey law.  . . .  Equally well-settled is New Jersey’s abrogation of the archaic common law prohibition against creating easements in favor of strangers to the underlying transaction and adoption of the modern approach espoused by the Restatement of Property that the instrument be construed to achieve the grantor’s intention.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY GUIDED THE JURY ON FINGERPRINT-ANALYSIS EVIDENCE.  The trial court’s jury instruction on fingerprint-analysis evidence properly reflected New Jersey law on the admissibility of that evidence.  Indeed, as argued in the State’s opening response brief, the trial court properly determined the scope of [...]’s expert testimony.  (See Pb at 22-28).  Nevertheless, [...] accurately represented the process leading to his conclusion that five latent fingerprints recovered from the scene of the burglary individually matched five of defendant’s known exemplar prints.  And a remand to a Special Adjudicator is unwarranted and improperly raised.  This Court should therefore affirm defendant’s conviction.
[directive] 21 III 12 12 15 18 24 18 27 27 33 30 33 24 24 24 30 9  2C:35-7 ZONE)  Category 36 24 30 33 24 30 30 36 30 39 12 33 39 18 21  Significant N.J.S.A. SCHOOL 27 33 9 18 27 18 24 24 30 24 30 33 24 12 15 II 1 364*  History TABLE 21 27 12 12 21 12 18 24 18 27 18 24 18 UNDER 9  (DRUG-FREE Criminal OFFENSES 27 18 24 33 15 18 24 27 30 12 24 24 30 33 9
[brief] (Pa806).  On December 22, 2022 – more than four (4) weeks before the deadline for the Objectors to file a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs – the Secretary for the ZBA (the “Board Secretary”) emailed Objectors copies of both the Homeowners’ Affidavit of Publication of a Notice of Approval and the ZBA’s Affidavit of Publication of a Notice of Approval.  (Pa803).  In the body of the email, the Board Secretary emphasized that she was attaching two (2) Affidavits of Publication – for the publication by the Homeowner as well as the ZBA.  (Pa803).  Objectors admit that they received the Board Secretary’s email disclosing the Homeowners’ publication.  (Pa175).  There is no dispute that, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10 i., Homeowners’ publication of the Notice of Approval triggered the commencement of the 45-day appeal period under R. 4:69-6 (b) (3).
[brief] (Pa42-43; Pa254; Pa271).  Indeed, plaintiff’s counsel attempted to settle the matter three times thereafter, in July, August and September of 2021.  (Pa270-271; Pa279-284).  However, defendant refused to offer a settlement amount that included payment to plaintiff’s counsel of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.  Ibid.  Hence, it was the defendant, not plaintiff’s counsel, who “dragged” litigation on for another eighteen (18) months.  Ibid.  The trial court’s acceptance of and reliance on the foregoing arguments of defense counsel, to the extent it did so, violated state and federal law and public policy.