ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] To assess whether qualified immunity applies here, the Court must evaluate whether Defendants' alleged misconduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.  For purposes of brevity, Counts Four and Five of the Amended Complaint allege the following constitutional and statutory violations: 1) Failure to provide Plaintiff the opportunity to submit grievances; 2) Failure to provide Plaintiff access to her attorney; 3) Failure to take Plaintiff to scheduled Court appearances; 4) Wrongfully sending Plaintiff to disciplinary detention; and 5) Failing to provide medication.
[brief] Initially, [...] Revolves Its Entire Business And Marketing Efforts On The Development Of The [...] Brand, Which Had Zero Market Share Prior To [...]’s Involvement.  Critically, at the time [...] obtained the distribution rights for [...] products, *[...] was not selling a single other product*, confirming, *inter alia*, that [...] intended 100% of its initial sales to be derived from [...] products.  *(See Pa258 at T24:6-9). *  Accordingly, [...] put enormous efforts into developing the unknown [...] brand, to both [...] and [...]’s mutual benefit (and at the expense of building/investing in other brands or products).
[brief] Here, the trial court applied the correct legal test and appropriately denied the State’s motions to: (1) join the April 20 Jersey City robbery with the April 23 Elizabeth carjacking; and (2) in the alternative, to admit evidence of the April 20 robbery at the trial for the April 23 carjacking.  Although the Court considered these motions sequentially, the Court correctly applied the same legal test for both motions and reached the same conclusion.  The Court noted State’s arguments that the “similarity of the offenses weigh in favor of joinder” but did not find it persuasive.
[brief] Finalize draft Answer and defenses based on client meeting notes.  | 4.60 | $1,748.00 | $5,035.00 | | 9/10/20|  Receive, review, and analyze Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Fraud Claim.  | 1 | $380.00 | $5,415.00 | | 9/21/20|  Draft Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss.  File the same and email the client and counsel | 3.40 | $1,292.00 | $6,707.00 | | 9/23/20|
[brief] Pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), a plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed if it has failed to articulate a legal basis entitling plaintiff to relief.  Myska v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 440 N.J. Super. 458, 472-73 (App. Div. 2015), app. dsmd. as improvidently granted, 224 N.J. 523 (2016); Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App. Div. 2005), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 297 (2005) (reversing trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim).
[brief] For example, the court noted that "no other witness and no other document has corroborated her testimony" (T21-24).  However, at the summary judgment stage, Plaintiff is entitled to the inference that her co-worker’s testimony could be truthful, and it is within the jury’s province to assess the credibility of these statements.  By essentially dismissing [...]’ testimony without allowing a jury to evaluate it, the court improperly weighed evidence.  The court further inferred that the charge pay investigation was independent of the investigation into Defendant [...]’s June 2020 conduct despite all evidence to the contrary, stating with regard to the June 2020 incident that the “investigation’s already been done into that. ” (T12-6).  However, the record shows that no true investigation had been performed and the proximity between the pending investigation of Defendant [...]’s related to the incident in June 2020 and the subsequent initiation of the charge pay investigation in August 2020 raises questions about the true motivation behind the scrutiny of Plaintiff’s actions.  The court failed to draw the inference that Defendant [...] might have leveraged the charge pay issue to derail the investigation into her conduct, especially since the investigation into her behavior was effectively halted once Plaintiff and the others were terminated.
[brief] **APPELLANT’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE HEIGHT APPROVED BY THE BOARD**  The testimony, evidence, Board findings and conclusions were memorialized in the Amended Resolution.  In the Amended Resolution, the Board states that the Appellant attended the April 26, 2022, hearing on the Application (the “Board Hearing”).  During the Board Hearing, the Appellant questioned [...]’s architect, [...], AIA of [...], regarding the height of the building from the street to the parapet.  [...] clearly answered the question by stating the height would be 50 feet above the finished grade to the roof plus the parapet which would be approximately another 45 inches.  [...] questioned as to how high the building from the street to the parapet is visible from the street.  [...] testified that the height is **50 feet to the roof** and the **parapet is approximately another 45 inches** … (Pa20) (emphasis added).  As memorialized in the Amended Resolution, the Board and the Appellant were well aware that the Application approved by the Board was to construct a building that had a height of **approximately 53’-9”** from the finished grade to the top of the parapet.  Yet, despite this knowledge, the Appellant filed this action and appeal claiming that the approximate +/- 51’ dimension on the Sketch was to the top of the parapet in contradiction to [...]’s responses to his questions.  The Appellant then compounded this error by claiming that the +/- 51 reference on the Sketch was for the overall building height and superseded all other express provisions of the approval including the express condition that the Building Height was to be 43’-6” above DFE.  The Appellant also claims that the Sketch superseded the approved architectural plans which show the parapet extending 45 inches above the roof top height of 43’-6” above DFE.  The Amended Resolution is clear and unambiguous:  The site plan approved by the Board was for a building to be constructed to a height of 43’-6” above DFE in accordance with [...]’s approved architectural plans.  Furthermore, there was to be a 45 inch parapet constructed above the roof top elevation.  The Amended Resolution also unequivocally stated that the Sketch on which the Appellant’s entire case is premised was irrelevant to the approval including the determination of the approved building height.
[brief] Da2, ¶¶ 7, 8.  On May 31, 2023, Defendants [...] and [...] filed an Answer and Class Action Counterclaim (Da29), followed by an Amended pleading with deficiency corrections on June 5, 2023¹ (Da87), asserting that the rent concession “charge-back” provision was an unlawful penalty clause, and that [...]’s use and enforcement of the clause in residential leases constated an abusive, unconscionable, or deceptive practice in violation of the Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 et seq. Da101-104.
[brief] On January 24, 2022, the Hon. [...], J.S.C., entered Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause ex parte with preliminary restraints, enjoining the Defendants from “[i]mplementing any actions taken at its January 11, 2022, Council Reorganization Meeting” and prohibiting Defendants from convening any public meetings involving the entities and individuals present at said meeting.  (Pa23).  On January 27, 2022, the Hon. [...], P.J.Cv., acting sua sponte, entered an Order vacating the restraints imposed by the prior Order.  (Pa29).  The trial court set a hearing date of March 4, 2022, to address Plaintiff’s request for temporary restraints, as well as to decide a separate Motion to Enforce Litigant’s Rights filed on behalf of the Plaintiff.  (Pa30).  On March 4, 2022, after hearing oral argument, the trial court issued two Orders denying Plaintiff’s request for temporary restraints and Plaintiff’s separate Motion to Enforce Litigant’s Rights.  (Pa31, Pa37).  The Hon. [...], J.S.C., placed a comprehensive opinion on the record, which was specifically referenced as the law-of-the-case in the September 9, 2022, Order under appeal.  (Pa86, Pa225).  The Defendant [...] subsequently filed an Answer to the Verified Complaint on March 4, 2022.  (Pa39).  On July 8, 2022, the Borough filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  (Pa72).  On September 9, 2022, following oral argument, the Court granted the Borough’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing the Verified Complaint with prejudice.  (Pa80).  On June 23, 2023, the Court entered an Order dismissing the Verified Complaint with prejudice as against the Defendant Planning Board of the [...].  (Pa115).  After final judgment had been entered as to all parties, Plaintiff filed the subject Notice of Appeal on July 21, 2023.  (Pa117).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] PLAINTIFF PREVIOUSLY AND EXTENSIVELY OPPOSED ALLERGAN’S PREEMPTION ARGUMENTS  [ISSUE RAISED (Pa001; Pa026; Pa029 at ¶¶51-53; Pa066 at ¶¶51-53)]  [...] did in fact previously oppose [...]’s misplaced preemption argument regarding warnings.  In Plaintiff’s opposition to [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff states:  “In response to [...]’s argument regarding the presumption of adequacy of its “approved” Ozurdex warnings, (motion, pages 19-21) such argument is not applicable here.  The presumption under the Products Liability Act of an adequate warning based on compliance with Food and Drug Administration (FDA) labeling regulations will be deemed rebutted based upon the following: (i) deliberate concealment or nondisclosure of after-acquired knowledge of harmful effects of the drug, or (ii) manipulation of the post-market regulatory process.  Bailey v. Wyeth, Inc., 424 N.J. Super. 278 (2008), affirmed 422 N.J. Super. 360, certification denied 211 N.J. 274. ” (Pa001, Pa026)  Moreover, both of Plaintiff’s Responsive Statements of Undisputed Material Facts, set forth the fact that 21 C.F.R. §7.46(a)&(b) expressly permit a manufacturer/distributor like [...] to issue warnings and recalls without prior FDA approval.  (Pa029, ¶¶ 51-53; Pa066, ¶¶ 51-53)  Contrary to the shell game [...] repeatedly plays, Plaintiff is not asserting a state law recall claim for “failure to timely recall” or “failure to timely warn of a recall. ”  Instead, Plaintiff is asserting a claim for [...]’s violation of the post-sale duty to warn of the defective Ozurdex applicators given [...]’s six (6) month delay in doing so.  Accordingly, [...]’s argument that Plaintiff has conceded summary judgment on a warnings preemption theory is entirely baseless.
[brief] Counsel for Petitioner-Appellant has violated N.J. Court Rules, R2:6-1(a)(1) which mandates that that the Appellant must include in the Appendix “(i) such other ¹ References to pages of the Appendix submitted by Petitioner-Appellant are preceded by the letters “PA. ” parts of the record…as are essential to the proper consideration of the issues, including such parts as the appellant should reasonably assume will be relied upon by the respondent in meeting the issues raised. ”  Petitioner’s failure to abide by this Court’s Rule has necessitated the [...]’s filing of its own Appendix which includes the improperly omitted documents. \(^2\)  Yet another glaring defect in the Appendix submitted by Petitioner is that pages PA1 through PA 107 consist of a hodgepodge of various documents, none of which are accompanied by any certification, affidavit, affirmation, motion papers or other vehicle, such that this Court and counsel for the [...] would be able to identify where, how or even if the documents were submitted to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and/or the [...].  There is no way of knowing, from the Appendix submitted by Petitioner, whether the ALJ or the [...] ever saw any of these documents, which consist of loose police reports, mental health reports, letters and other assorted documents.  These documents are not organized, labelled or presented in a coherent way such that this Court may be able to ascertain how or even whether they were submitted to the ALJ and/or [...].  As but one example, Petitioner includes cover sheets for several exhibits (PA 29, PA42, PA46, PA70, PA82, PA97, \(^2\) References to pages of the Respondent’s Appendix are preceded by the letters “RA.” PA99), without providing any indication of what document the exhibits are purportedly taken from.  The Appendix submitted by Petitioner makes it extremely difficult for this Court to understand the factual and procedural history of this case and to review the evidence that was actually presented to the ALJ and [...].  For these reasons, it is respectfully submitted that this Court should ignore the documents reproduced at pages 1 through 107 of the Petitioner’s Appendix and the arguments in the Petitioner’s Brief that rely upon those documents, as there is no demonstration whatsoever in the Appendix that those documents were ever seen by the ALJ or the [...].
[brief] "Uninsured motor vehicle" and "underinsured motor vehicle" do not include any vehicle or equipment:  1.  Owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family member.  . . . [(Pa60).]  [...] purports to adopt the entirety of this language from [...]’s policy into its UIM coverage provisions.  It relies upon the latter definitional exclusion to deny plaintiffs coverage because the vehicle operated by defendant [...] was owned by plaintiffs and made available for defendant [...]’s use.
[brief] First, such a duty arose when store personnel became aware of the incident, which created a probability of litigation.  Second, store personnel took affirmative steps to document the incident for no other purpose than the anticipation of litigation.  Third, [...] knew of Plaintiff’s injury, the prospects that litigation would ensue, and that Plaintiff would be prejudiced by her inability to utilize surveillance footage.  Lastly, since the issue surrounding this matter involves the failure on the part of [...]’s employees to remediate the risk of harm caused by [...]’s overloaded U-boat, any surveillance footage that should have been preserved by [...] would have been relevant to this litigation.  Defendant’s characterization that the imposition of such a duty on retaining footage amounts to some kind of “super duty” is simply false.
[brief] When the judge affirmatively facilitates his or her selection by that one party, public confidence and the appearance of impartiality are further undermined. ”  Id.  Appellate courts assume that the trial judge evaluating a motion for recusal will apply his or her “conscious exercise of good will and mature judgment to decide. ”  Magill v. Casel, 238 N.J. Super. 57, 63-64 (App. Div. 1990).  In State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391 (2004), the Court held that a PCR judge was not required to disqualify himself even though he was the acting county prosecutor at the time an indictment was returned against the defendant, which even bore the judge’s (at that time, prosecutor’s) signature.
[brief] ” (Da101).  This Notice also superseded a prior September 2020 Notice.  Ibid.  This most recent Notice once again highlighted critical components to the post-pandemic jury selection process:  “Jurors who do not meet the qualification criteria established by N.J.S.A. 2B:20-1 are required to contact the court and substantiate disqualification.  Jurors who seek to be excused for any of the grounds set forth by N.J.S.A. 2B:20-10 also must contact the Jury Management Office and supply documentation as necessary to substantiate their claim. ”  (Da102)  “Consistent with N.J.S.A. 2B:20-9 and pre-COVID-19 practices, prereporting excusals are handled by the Assignment Judge or designee and other requests are handled during jury selection.  For example, a juror who supplies a doctor’s note substantiating that they are unable to serve based on a medical condition unlikely to change within one year would be excused before reporting for selection, without any new requirement to disclose their medical condition to the trial judge or attorneys.  In contrast, consistent with applicable law and Supreme Court Orders, a juror who does not supply documentation required for a pre-reporting excuse and instead requests an excuse during voir dire (questioning 3 of the panel) would be addressed at sidebar in the presence of the judge, attorneys, and parties. ”  Ibid.  (Emphasis added).  “The Supreme Court in 2014 approved and promulgated the New Jersey Judiciary Bench Manual on Jury Selection.
[brief] 384 U.S. at 444.  Furthermore, because [...]’s March 12 statement was a product of his un-Mirandized March 6th custodial statement, this statement must be suppressed under O’Neill.  193 N.J.  148.  The Court in O’Neill held: when Miranda warnings are given after a custodial interrogation has already produced incriminating statements, the admissibility of post-warning statements will turn on whether the warnings functioned effectively in providing the defendant the ability to exercise his state law privilege against self-incrimination.
[brief] POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT TO [...]  SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON HAVING SATISFIED THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ADVERSE POSSESSION.  AS A RESULT OF THIS ERROR, THERE WAS A FAILURE TO GRANT [...]’S REQUEST TO QUIET TITLE WHICH THE APPELLATE COURT IS BEING ASKED TO RECTIFY.  DA203, 1T)  33  POINT IV  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT TO [...] SUMMARY  JUDGMENT BASED ON HAVING SATISFIED THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ADVERSE POSSESSION.  AS A RESULT OF THIS ERROR, THERE WAS A FAILURE TO GRANT [...]’S REQUEST TO ENJOIN [...] FROM TRESPASS  DA203, 1T 36  TABLE OF CONTENTS  POINT V THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT TO [...]  SUMMARY  JUDGMENT BASED ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND HAVING SATISFIED THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ADVERSE POSSESSION.  AS A RESULT OF THIS ERROR, THERE WAS A FAILURE TO GRANT [...]’S REQUEST TO PROHIBIT  CONVERSION OF LOT 22.  Da203  Da264, Da266, Da278, Da255, Da55 par. 18  39  CONCLUSION
[directive] Following Grand Jury Session  Record grand juror attendance in the Jury Automated System (JAS)  Track transcript requests, including log of requests  Maintain tapes and logs  Prepare reports as required by local supervisors  Provide appropriate notice to court and prosecutor regarding transcript requests  Send copy (copies) of presentment in accordance with directions of the Assignment Judge  Prepare juror materials, including attendance letters, appreciation certificates, etc  Respond to grand juror questions following completion of their service  Complete grand juror payment procedures in JAS  Prepare “failure to appear” materials/follow-up as directed  Distribute and collect grand juror exit surveys  Other Responsibilities
[brief] “[P]laces that are not under the control of the employer are not considered part of the employer’s premises for purposes of workers’ compensation benefits.  . . .”  *Hersh v. County of Morris*, 217 N.J. 236, 249 (2014).  That said, “[t]he meaning of ‘control’ under the Act is more expansive than under formal property concepts. ”  *Lapsley*, 249 N.J. at 436; *Brower*, 64 N.J. at 372.
[brief] (Pa55).  However, the legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 43:15A-25.2, which eliminated the creation of multiple status for members enrolled in the PERS on or after May 22, 2010, and curtailed the creation of new multiple locations for members hired prior to that date.  Ibid.  Under N.J.S.A. 43:15A-25.2, members were permitted to retain their previously held multiple-position(s) provided that the member maintain those positions continuously without a break in service.  Ibid.  The Board, however, found that [...]’s separation from employment with [...] constituted a break-in-service that made him ineligible to maintain multiple membership status.  (Pa56-57).  While the Board noted there are exceptions to the no break-in-service requirement, such as layoffs, [...] did not qualify for any of these exceptions.  Ibid.  Lastly, the Board found there were no disputed questions of fact that would necessitate an administrative hearing.  (Pa57).  This appeal of the Board’s decision followed.  (Pa58-59).  ARGUMENT THE BOARD’S DETERMINATION THAT HAUS IS NOT ELIGIBLE TO MAINTAIN MULTIPLE MEMBER STATUS IS REASONABLE AND SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.
[directive] 귀하가 등록 또는 재등록을 하지 않는 경우, 귀하는 제3 급 범죄로 기소되어 c) 년 이하의 구금형을 선고 받을 수 있다는 것을 아십니까?  5  Do you understand that if you fail to register or re-register you may be charged with a third degree crime and receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to 5 years?
[brief] Anything less would trespass on the true meaning of Rutgers as a broadly autonomous, sui generis institution.  * * * * *  In sum, as for procedure, the quo warranto statute does not apply because [...] was not a holder of public office within the meaning of that statute.  Even if she were, Plaintiffs proffered no reason to excuse their excessive delay in filing suit or to justify the resulting disruption to Rutgers’ core governing structure caused by their suit.  This court should dismiss this suit on the basis of procedure alone.
[directive] Do you understand that N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.2 provides that unless certain exceptions are met, the court is required to sentence you to a mandatory sentence of special probation for the purpose of participating in a court-supervised drug treatment program (“Drug Court”)?  5.  Èske w pale de posibilite pou ta resevwa yon santans de peryòd libète [Wi/Yes]  [Non/No] kondisyonèl egzijib ansanm ak avoka w pou ka patisipe nan pwogram tretman pou dwòg ki sipèvize pa tribinal la ("Tribinal pou koze Dwòg")?  Si repons la se "Non", al nan kesyon 6.  Si repons la se "Wi", ale nan kesyon 7.
[brief] On June 27, 2022, in anticipation for the closing, the Defendant finally delivered the Estoppel Certificate (Da186.), which was dated June 7.  (Da323-325.)  Significantly, the Estoppel Certificate revealed the existence of a previously undisclosed lawsuit against [...], as well as a settlement agreement and release between the Defendant and [...].  (Id.)  It stated:  There are no other agreements or understandings, whether written or oral, between Tenant and Landlord with respect to the Lease, the Leased Premises or the Building except for a Settlement Agreement and Release dated April 28, 2022.  This was the first time the Plaintiff became aware of the lawsuit between the Defendant and [...], a lawsuit filed before the PSA was signed, and that was pending but remained concealed when the PSA was twice amended.
[brief] You could have a hundred different trial strategies. 1T64-65  [...]:  Well, I’m saying, but the law, Your Honor, is trial strategy, you can’t say I -- it was strategic if you didn’t actually go and get the evidence.  If a lawyer goes and gets the evidence, in other words, if I -- if I was the trial lawyer and I said, oh, I got the State’s expert, [...], let me see what he says, I’m going to look at it myself, I got my own expert, and then I say I don’t want to call my own expert, that’s trial strategy.  Trial strategy under the law, Your Honor, under the governing standard as Your Honor knows, isn’t -- I didn’t look, I just had one theory of the case and I ignored the rest of it, that’s not trial strategy, that’s the governing standard.  1T66  THE COURT: But I’m disagreeing with you with your theory.
[brief] C.  Neither of Plaintiff’s Experts Offer Net Opinions.[ISSUE RAISED AND DECIDED (Pa047, ¶33 – Pa057, ¶71; Da0790-Da0792; Da0794-Da0798; Da0819-Da0829)]  The “net opinion” rule is a “corollary” of N.J.R.E. 703, State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 494, 897 A.2d 316 (2006), which provides that an expert's testimony “may be based on facts or data derived from (1) the expert's personal observations, or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily admissible in evidence but which is the type of data normally relied upon by experts in forming opinions on the same subject. ”