ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 15 - **Berends v. City of Atlantic City**, 263 N.J. Super. 66 (App. Div. 1993) .......... 32 - **Black v. Borough of Atlantic Highlands**, 263 N.J. Super. 445 (App. Div. 1993)  .................................................................................. 31, 32 - **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.**, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) ............................. 8, 9 - **Brooks v. Odom**, 150 N.J. 395 (1997) .......................................................... 24, 25 - **Celotex Corp. v. Catrett**, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) .............................................. 9 - **Cordy v. Sherwin Williams Co.**, 975 F.Supp 639 (D.N.J. 1997) .................... 19, 20 - **Coyne v. State, Dep't of Transp.**, 182 N.J. 481 (2005) ................................... 31 - **Dunphy v. Gregor**, 136 N.J. 99, 112 (N.J. 1994) ........................................ 35 - **Friedman v. Klazmer**, 315 N.J. Super. 467 (1998) ....................................... 35 - **Garrison v. Twp. of Middletown**, 154 N.J. 282 (1998) ................................. 15 - **Gilhooley v. Cty. of Union**, 164 N.J. 533 (2000) ........................................ 23 - **Hammer v. Twp. of Livingston**, 318 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 1999) .......... 25 - **Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust**, 17 N.J. 67 (1954) .................................. 8 - **Kibble v. Weeks Dredging & Constr. Co.**, 161 N.J. 178 (1999) .................... 34 - **Knowles v. Mantua Twp. Soccer Ass’n**, 176 N.J. 324 (2003) ....................... 23, 24 - **Kolitch v. Lindedahl**, 100 N.J. 485 (1985)
[directive] A.  Treasury Law Enforcement Agencies  The seizing agency shall ensure that all lien, 1. mortgage, and 3rd party claims are presented to the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA); and that the distribution(s) which are lawfully due from, or as a result of, the sale of the property are clearly spelled out in the court order.  --UFon receipt of an Interlocutory Sale order from the 2 .  AUSA, the seizing agen;$'s representative will promptly arrange for a Disposition Order for the sale the subject property(ies).  The Disposition Order of of along with a copy the Interlocutory Sale order will be provided to the national seized property contractor, through the United States Customs Service Seized Property Custodian/Seized Property Specialist.  A copy of the Interlocutory Sale order and the No. October Directive 1995 27 1, Page of 1
[brief] [...] testified that on August 2, 2019, he and his brother, [...], were driving in [...].  [...] was the passenger and Smith was the driver.  (14T:37-23 to 38-10).  According to [...], a car pulled up and stopped next to their car.  The driver rolled down the window, pulled out a gun and started shooting.  (14T:38-11 to 14; 40-13 to 22).  [...] testified that as the passenger, he was able see both individuals inside the vehicle, even though shots were being fired at him.  (14T:39-12 to 14; 40-13 to 25).  [...] did not remember (1) what time the shooting happened (14T:42-21 to 43-7), (2) the color of the vehicle that pulled up next to them, although he testified that the vehicle was “close enough for me to see” (14T:48-11 to 16; 54-22 to 24), or (3) the make or model of the car he was riding in that day (14T:43-21 to 44-4).  However, [...] testified that he saw the person who shot him and it was not [...].  He also testified that he saw the passenger and it was not defendant.  (14T:38-17 to 21; 40-23 to 42; 67-20 to 68-1).  [...] defense called [...], who was one of the six individuals present at [...] when police arrived.
[brief] That argument is premised on a fundamentally flawed interpretation and application of preclusionary principles.  While the trial court failed to sufficiently identify the legal basis underlying its ruling, the only conceivable vehicle through which the trial court could have adopted commentary from another court, in a separate matter, and in a different context, is collateral estoppel (i.e., issue preclusion).  That is particularly true where, like here, the finding being adopted was articulated in an unpublished decision.  See R. 1:36-3 (“No unpublished opinion shall constitute precedent or be binding upon any court.  . .[E]xcept to the extent required by res judicata, collateral estoppel, the single controversy doctrine or any other similar principle of law, no unpublished opinion shall be cited by any court. ”)  As explained in detail in Plaintiff’s appeal brief, had the trial court undertaken a proper collateral estoppel analysis, the only conclusion it could have reached is that the doctrine does not apply.
[brief] Defendant had no documents to support his claim, produced no documents to support his claims as part of discovery, and his recollection was simply “as far as I remember. ”  1T53:7.  There were no specific denials of the work that was uncompleted for this project and he could not explain why he was owed money but never asked for payment.  1T62:16-18.  Oddly, if he had completed a $13,500.00 project and been paid $6,800.00, he’d have been owed $6,700.00, not $7,800.00 as he testified.
[brief] *(Da264, Deed from [...] to [...])*  [...] used all of the noted property from the beginning of ownership as certified to by [...].  (Da125, [...] Affidavit, pars. 8-9; Da55, pars. 23-24; [...] Answers to Interrogatories).  In 1985, [...] purchased a number of lots from the [...] and included in this purchase was Lot 22.  (Da278. [...] Deeds)  It must be noted that [...] is a sophisticated corporation that is in the business of buying property and building housing.  As noted in the [...] Deed, [...] has property to the left and right of [...], on the parallel street, which is [...] and [...] has housing which sits behind [...] on [...].  As a result of this, [...] has a strong presence in this neighborhood.  [...] was on notice that the property which is Lot 22 was being used by [...] and at no time within the noted statutory time period was any objection made to the use of Lot 22.  In order to assert an objection, [...] was required to elicit an objection by June 30, 2006 which was the thirty year mark of [...] using Lot 22.  If tacking was employed, the time period would be based on Marjorie [...]’s ownership of the property which came into her possession on June 22, 1967.  (Da266, Deed from [...] to Marjorie [...]).  This would result in [...] having to make an objection by June 22, 1997, two years after the Lot 22 was purchased from the [...].  Even counting from the purchase date of Lot 22 in October of 1985, the statute of limitations would run in October of 2015.  There was no communication with [...] by [...] until June of 2021 which was well beyond the statutory time period of thirty years.
[brief] Identification of the Parties  During the relevant time period, [...] was employed by [...] as a certified alcohol and drug counselor and was assigned to the [...].  (Pa341, at T30:21-22; Pa171 at T186:19-22; Pa671 at T64:17-22; Pa67, at T91:23-24; Da108-Da109; Da589-Da590).  [...], [...], and [...] are employed by respondent [...] and were in positions of supervisory authority over [...] during the relevant time period.  (Da109).  [...] was employed as a [...] Caseworker and was assigned to the [...] until August 8, 2019.  (Da70; Da693 at T81:18-86:8).  [...] was a Case Work Supervisor and directly supervised Plaintiff [...] from on or around June 2019 until [...]’s suspension and subsequent termination in December 2019. (Da6-Da7; Da 318-Da319).  [...] reported directly to [...], who supervised other Case Work Supervisors within her tier of supervision.  (Pa794 at T36:1-37:14; Da7-Da8).  [...] occupied the same job title as [...], and supervised [...] while he was assigned to the [...].  (Da8, Da680 at T26:22-23).  [...] was the Local Office Manager of the [...] during the relevant time period and was a direct supervisor to both [...] and [...].  (Pa572 at T31:7-32:25; Da8).  B.
[brief] ” (15T27-12 to 19; Pa6-8).  The verdict sheet referenced counts one and two as possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, and counts three and four as possession of marijuana and possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute.  (Pa6-8).  2  The Judgment of Conviction (Da44) indicates that defendant was sentenced to 18 months on count four, a fourth-degree offense.  In the sentencing transcript, [...], however, sentenced defendant to four years, which is an illegal term of imprisonment for a fourth-degree offense.
[brief] The first issue brought forth by Appellant relates to the Trial Court’s denial of Appellant’s request for a non-standard jury charge, that read “If a driver is operating his/her car as would a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances, he/she is not to be held negligent merely because his/her car skidded or slid, resulting in damage or injury to another. ”  Appellant substantiated this request upon the holding in Mockler v. Russman, 102 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1968), which affirmed a jury verdict of “no negligence” in a case involving a rear-end motor vehicle collision.  At the conclusion of the evidence in this matter, the Trial Court ruled the requested non-standard jury charge was not-warranted, based upon the facts in evidence.  The Trial Court subsequently denied Respondent’s Motion for a Directed Verdict on the issue of Appellant’s negligence, made pursuant to Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2 (1969).  The jury was therefore instructed as to the Model Civil Jury Charges concerning Negligence, Foreseeability and Proximate Cause; and ultimately returned a unanimous verdict finding Appellant to have been both negligent and a proximate cause of the collision.  The second issue brought forth on appeal relates to the Trial Court’s reading of Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11F “Aggravation of the Pre-Existing Disability”.
[brief] POINT I DEFENDANT’S CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE DETECTIVE IMPROPERLY NARRATED VIDEO FOOTAGE BY (A) DESCRIBING EVENTS ON VIDEO OF WHICH SHE HAD NO FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE, (B) DESCRIBING THE PATH OF TRAVEL TAKEN BY THE SUSPECT, AND (C) IDENTIFYING THE DEFENDANT ON VIDEO.  (Not raised below)  .........................................................13  A.  The Detective Improperly Identified The Shooter And Described Him Exiting The Vehicle Of Interest ...........................................................................................................................................19  B.  The Detective Improperly Identified The Suspect’s Path Of Travel, And Created A Map Illustrating Her Belief As To The Path Of Travel.  ..............................................................................................................................................28  C.  The Detective Improperly Identified The Defendant On Video ..............................................................................................................................................33  POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THIRD-PARTY GUILT.
[brief] [...] further urges this court to permit him to file his untimely Form because he claims he did not actually receive the notice.  (Pb13).  But even if actual notice by postcard were an express requirement under the Ricci Act, this argument is misplaced.  New Jersey courts have consistently “recognized a presumption that mail properly addressed, stamped, and posted was received by the party to whom it was addressed. ”  SSI Medical Servs. v. HHS, Div. of Medical Assistance & Health Servs., 146 N.J. 614, 621 (1996).
[brief] Volume I Page Pa: Notice of Appeal .................................................................  1a  Certification of Transcript Completion ..................................  5a  Final Order of Trial Court dated June 20, 2024 ...................... 6a  Trial Courts Opinion and Statement of Reasons .....................  7a  Plaintiff’s Complaint ............................................................  10a  Defendant’s Notice of Motion to Compel Arbitration filed January 26, 2024 ...............  20a  A.  Proposed Form of Order ...................................................  22a B. Declaration of [...], Esquire ..................................  24a C. Declaration of [...] ..............................................  26a i)  Exhibit A - Business Account Application ......................... 29a ii)  Exhibit B - Deposit Agreement July 25, 2023 ..................... 38a III)  Exhibit C - Plaintiff’s Bank Statement dated July 31, 2023 .........  79a  D.  Supplemental Declaration of [...] ......................... 88a i)  Exhibit D - Deposit Account Agreement dated May 9, 2022 .......... 91a  E. Declaration of [...], Esquire dated May 16, 2024 ...........  132a  Certification of Plaintiff [...] ............................. 134a  A.  Exhibit A - Business Account Application dated May 18, 2022 .......... 142a Certification of [...], Esquire ..................................  151a  Supplemental Certification of Plaintiff [...] dated May 1, 2024 ............. 153a  [...] Website Printout - Checking and Savings Monthly Service Fee Questions ................................................................. 155a Volume II Page Pa: Heller v. [...] Bank (Unpublished Opinion) 2016 W.L. 818734 (App. Div. 2016) ........................................... 157a McMillan v. [...] Bank (Unpublished Opinion) 2009 W.L. 1686431 (ND Calif. 2009) ........................................... 161a Atlantic Fabrication v. ISM (Unpublished Opinion) 2021 W.L. 5264364 (App. Div. 2021) ........................................... 166a Clay v. Davis (Unpublished Opinion) US District Ct. Guan - Case No. 16-00045 ...................................... 174a Blocker v. [...] (Unpublished Opinion) 2010 W.L. 6403721 (D. Ore 2010) ............................................. 194a 2011 W.L. 1230026 (D. Ore 2011) ............................................. 206a Bayson - Paz v. [...] (Unpublished Opinion) 2023 W.L. 4399041 (SDNY 2023) ............................................. 209a Lojewski v. Group Solar (Unpublished Opinion) 2023 W.L. 5301423 (SDNY 2023)
[directive] A.  The following services shall be provided by the State and County Offices of Victim-Witness Advocacy.(21)  (See Appendix A-20.)  These services shall be described in a program brochure and disseminated to all victims whose cases have reached the County Prosecutor's Office.  Additionally, the brochure should be displayed in an information rack and placed in victims' waiting and reception areas or courthouses.  Victims should be informed of the following services provided through the program:  1.  Crisis intervention and short-term counseling.  2.  Referrals for other needed services.  3.  Orientation to the criminal justice system.  4.  Case status information.  5.  Transportation.  6.  Child care.  7.  Assistance with Violent Crimes Compensation Board claims.  8.  Restitution and other forms of financial entitlements.  9.  Assistance with property return.  10.  Court accompaniment.  11.  Employer, school, landlord, creditor intercession services.  12.  Victim-witness waiting/reception areas separated from defendant, defendant's family or friends, defense counsel or defense witnesses.  13.  Victim Impact Statements (to prosecutor's office prior to formal charging, sentencing court prior to sentencing, parole board where appropriate.)  14.  Document replacement assistance.  15.  Crime prevention information.  16.  Advice and information on counseling and testing for disease in cases of sexual assault and other criminal acts where there is a risk of the transmission of disease.(22)  B.
[brief] “[W]henever a plaintiff claims a right to relief from the bar of the statute of limitations by virtue of the so-called ‘discovery’ rule, the question as to whether such relief is properly available shall be deemed to be an issue for determination by the court rather than by the jury.  The discovery rule focuses on the injured party’s knowledge, specifically injury and fault.  Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483, 492-493 (1993).  The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized two types of injured parties: (1) plaintiffs unaware of the alleged injury until after the statute of limitation has expired or (2) plaintiffs aware of their injury but unaware that said injury is attributable to another.
[brief] As noted above, the non-renewal of Appellant’s contract came on the heels of Appellant and [...] reporting [...] for the use of the N word in May of 2019.  Appellant’s non-renewal was discrimination based on race.  The contrived reasons set forth by Respondent were not supported by the evidence and do not support legitimate business reasons for the non-renewal.  The conclusion reached is that the contract non-renewal was discriminatory based on race and age.  The satisfaction of the prima facie case for Discrimination Based on Age and Discrimination Based on Race were glaringly evident in the record.  The Trial Court failed to recognize the presence of the documentary, evidentiary material which supported Discrimination Based on Age and Discrimination Based on Race.  Respondents have not set forth a legitimate business reason for the non-renewal of Appellant’s contract.  Per McDonnell Douglas, the conclusion that has to be reached is that Respondents engaged in Discrimination Based on Age and Discrimination Based on Race.  *McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green*, 511 U.S. 792 (1983).  This matter should be reversed and remanded with the requirement that the Appellant’s deposition be completed and that the matter then be scheduled for trial.  **POINT IV**
[brief] 1.  Did the Plaintiff intentionally misrepresent her financial situation when she signed the Agreement i.e. That she didn't have access to $70,000.00 at the time of the signing of the Agreement.  THE ANSWER CAN ONLY BE YES.  (Undisputed testimony)  2.  What was the amount of money withheld by defendant after making 72 straight months of monthly payments of $1,500.00  THE ANSWER IS $69,000.00.  THERE CAN BE NO DISPUTE TO THIS FIGURE.  3.  What was the reason for the penalty provision?  THE ANSWER IS THAT THE PENALTY IS THERE TO ASSURE THAT FUNDS ARE RECEIVED ON A TIMELY BASIS IN ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO PAY HER BILLS  4.  The precondition to permit the imposition of the penalty is that plaintiff did not have in her possession the monies in which to pay her bills?  THE ANSWER IS CLEARLY THAT IF PLAINTIFF HAS HER MONEY IN HER POSSESSION ON A TIMELY BASIS A PENALTY CANNOT BE IMPOSED PURSUANT TO THE AGREEMENT.  5.  Did plaintiff have the $69,000.00 in her possession?  AT ALL TIMES  PLAINTIFF HAD MORE THAN THE $69,000.00 IN HER POSSESSION.  SHE HAD $70,000.00  WHICH SHE FRAUDULENTLY WITHHELD SO HOW CAN IT BE SAID THAT SHE DIDN'T HAVE THE MONEY THAT SHE IS COMPLAINING ABOUT?
[brief] (e).  In the October 13, 2023, Order of the Court below, Paragraph 5, Page A52, it is stated as follows:  Defendant’s request to declare that Plaintiff’s obligation to re-pay the sum of $70,000.00 under the parties’ settlement agreement accrued on or about June 14, 2014, is GRANTED.  If the obligation of Plaintiff accrued on June 14, 2014 and she owed that money to Defendant at the time the only logical conclusion is that Plaintiff was essentially paid $70,000.00 in advance at that time.  Following this reasoning to its logical conclusion, how can Defendant be penalized for not paying $70,000.00 in 2017 when Plaintiff had that money in a very real sense SINCE 2014.  So, essentially [...]’s reasoning is inconsistent with [...]’s decision of June 30, 2020 the Appellate decision, and its own decision to penalize Defendant an additional $119,000.00.
[brief] By Order dated March 3, 2023, [...] required Petitioner to retain an attorney to “draft, file, and serve an Amended Complaint, which shall set forth the causes of action being pursued and the status of [Petitioner’s] appointment of administrator ad prosequendum and administrator of decedent’s estate” within 30 days.  (Pa72)  On March 10, 2023, Petitioner filed a motion to compel the discovery of certain requested documents from [...] and [...].  (Pa74)  On March 23, 2023, both [...] and [...] filed opposition to Petitioner’s motion.  On March 31, 2023, Petitioner filed a Reply Brief in response to the filed opposition to her motion.  On the same date, [...] denied Petitioner's motion to compel.  (Pa103)  On April 17, 2023, [...] filed a motion to dismiss Petitioner's Complaint with prejudice for failure to comply with the court-ordered deadline to retain counsel.  (Pa105)  On the same date, Petitioner filed correspondence with the court regarding the pending motion for dismissal.  On April 20, 2023, [...] filed a response to Petitioner’s April 17, 2023 letter and joined in [...]’s motion for dismissal.  By Order dated May 12, 2023, [...] granted [...]’s motion and dismissed Petitioner’s Complaint without prejudice.
[directive] Seeking of Presumption 8.4.1  Complaint-Warrant.  Charged by Offense  Any fog Release on While to pursuant authorized as 8.3, except Section under covered otherwise not case any  In any committed defendant a that has believe to cause probable is there where 8.4.5, subsection prosecutor acomplaint-warrant, the by charged offense any for release on while crime indictable 2A:162-24.  N.J.S.A. pursuant to of release revocation seeking motion a file presumptively shall 76
[brief] Respondents Fail to Demonstrate That In-Camera Review Was Warranted (Rb27 – 28).  Respondents assert that the trial court “reviewed O Builders and concluded that the submission of the Certification by in-camera review was permitted. ” (Rb28).  However, *O Builders & Assocs., Inc. v. Yuna Corp. of NJ*, 206 N.J. 109 (2011) provides that a party seeking disqualification and is concerned about the disclosure of confidential information may first seek a protective order, among other remedies, and then may also seek in camera review.  See *O Builders & Assocs., Inc.*, 206 N.J. at 129.  Just like the Respondents, the Defendant in *O Builders* claimed that confidential information was revealed, yet refused to make those disclosures to the court for the purported fear that the information would be disclosed to the attorney.  See O Builders & Assocs., Inc., 206 N.J. at 128.  This is precisely the tactic employed by Respondents -- and one that was expressly rejected by the O Builders court:  ...defendant cannot have it both ways: [...] cannot claim that she has disclosed confidential information to [...] yet refuse to make those disclosures to the court for fear of disclosing confidential information to [...].  Either the claimed confidential information has been disclosed or it has not...  See O Builders & Assocs., Inc., at 128.  O Builders is clear that where disclosure of confidential information is necessary for the Court to have a complete record, parties may preserve confidentiality by first seeking a protective order.  After doing so, the movant may then request that the application be reviewed in camera.  Here, Respondents could have followed that procedure by requesting a protective order with an attorney’s eyes-only designation or by seeking to file the Certification under seal, thereby maintaining the confidentiality of the information while affording Appellants a fair opportunity to review and respond.  Just as the court in O Builders rejected the Defendant’s untenable position, Respondents cannot now claim they disclosed confidential information to [...] while simultaneously expressing concern over revealing the very same information they assert was already disclosed.