ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Printed on Recycled Paper and is Recyclable Page 2  I.  GENERAL POLICY  It shall be the law enforcement policy of this State to fully and fairly investigate and prosecute violations of N.J.S.A. 2C: 13-8 with a view toward deterring human trafficking violations to the greatest extent possible.  All law enforcement agencies and officers shall be required: to promptly and thoroughly investigate possible violations of human trafficking; to keep State and county prosecution authorities apprised of human trafficking investigations to ensure that all investigative leads are pursued as appropriate; to make certain that all investigations are properly coordinated; to protect the immediate safety and security of human trafficking victims; and to respect and safeguard the rights of these victims.  II.  HUMAN TRAFFICKING LIAISONS  Every County Prosecutor shall designate at least one detective/investigator and at least one assistant prosecutor to serve as the County Prosecutor’s Office liaisons to the Division of Criminal Justice on human trafficking matters, and to facilitate and oversee the implementation and compliance with the policies, standards, and procedures set forth in this Directive and in the investigation standards and protocols promulgated by the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice pursuant to Section IV of this Directive.
[brief] A State may thus act “within the scope of its own police powers in responding to the demands of its own citizens. ”  Bianchi, 111 F.4th at 447 (“Nothing in our opinion foists the values of Maryland upon, say, South Carolina, or those of South Carolina upon Maryland. ”); see also, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985) (adding that “[t]he essence of our federal system is that within the realm of authority left open to them under the Constitution, the States must be equally free to” adopt regulations “that their citizens choose for the common weal,” and to “serve as laboratories for social and economic experiment”); see Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441 (1980) (barring States from the flexibility to adopt their own divergent state laws “may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. ” (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).  Under these federalism principles foundational to our Nation, Pennsylvania may no more instruct New Jersey regarding when public carry is permissible than New Jersey may bind Pennsylvania.
[brief] *Calabotta v. Phibro Animal Health Corp.*, 460 N.J. Super. 38 (App.Div. 2019) (citing *Printing Mart v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.*, 116 N.J. 739, 772, (1989)).  Tellingly, [...] does not dispute the fact that after I obtained the document from the Surrogate’s office, undeniably I had standing to bring the unjust enrichment claim (i.e. at least at that stage - if not earlier, as is my position).  4.
[brief] That the prosecutor harped on the defendant’s statement in summation, and that the jury re-watched the defendant’s unwarned statement just before convicting, precludes a finding that its erroneous admission was harmless.  Although defense counsel did not object, the trial court had an independent gatekeeping responsibility to find that the State had met its burden to prove that the defendant was Mirandized and that he gave a valid waiver before erroneously moving the statement into evidence.  The improper admission by the trial court of the defendant’s unwarned statement, when the State had not met its burden, was plain error “clearly capable of producing an unjust result,” R. 2:10-2, “sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt” as to whether the jury was “led to a result it otherwise might not have reached.
[brief] THE STATE’S SUMMATION DID NOT INFRINGE ON DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO HAVE THE JURY FAIRLY EVALUATE THE MERITS OF HIS DEFENSE .........................................................................................................................  9 POINT II  THE STATE DID NOT TESTIFY ABOUT THE BALLISTIC EVIDENCE .........................................................................................................................  17 POINT III  THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECIDING AGAINST PROVIDING AN ADVERSE-INFERENCE CHARGE .........................................................................................................................  20 POINT IV  DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOT WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT WAS PROPERLY DENIED, AS WAS HIS MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL .........................................................................................................................
[brief] This appeal asks whether there are two sets of rules governing insurance policies in New Jersey, one of which governs contractor controlled insurance programs, and the other which governs everything else.  Under a contractor controlled insurance program (commonly known as a “CCIP”), an entire construction project, or series of projects, is insured under a single insurance policy.  Defendants, [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]”), argued, and the trial court remarkably agreed, that an entirely different set of rules – *ad hoc* and undefined – governs CCIPs in New Jersey.  In their view, there is no enforceable cancellation requirement for CCIPs.  As a result, contractors enrolled in such programs may be insured one minute, and uninsured the next, without being provided notice of cancellation in accordance with the documents governing the CCIP (*i.e.*, the policy, the manual, and certificate of insurance) or New Jersey law.  That is not and cannot be the law in New Jersey.  To sanction a new set of cancellation requirements for CCIPs or, more to the point, conclude that there are no cancellation requirements at all for CCIPs, would invite ambiguity and uncertainty about the state of a contractor’s insurance at any given time, and undoubtedly result in contractors being unwittingly stripped of insurance to compensate injured parties.  Plaintiffs, [...] ("[...]") and [...] ("[...]"), and Defendant, [...] ("[...]"), ask this Court to apply existing New Jersey insurance law to CCIPs, including cancellation requirements.  If the usual rules apply, Plaintiffs and [...] win, and [...] and [...] lose.  In the alternative, if somehow [...] was not enrolled in the CCIP at the time of the Hood accident, then Defendant, [...] ("[...]"), would still be liable to [...] for its negligence, as [...]’s broker, in representing to [...] that it was CCIP insured.  **ORDERS APPEALED**  This is an appeal of three orders dated May 26, 2023: (1) the denial of [...] and [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Pa2677; (2) the grant of [...] and [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Pa2681; and (3) the grant of [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Pa2683.  **STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[brief] Pa601-Pa634.  37.  The Financial Agreement included a section articulating the relative benefits of the project:  SECTION 9.01  Relative Benefits of the Project.  In accordance with the Long Term Tax Exemption Law, specifically N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11(a), the Township hereby finds and determines that this Agreement is to the direct benefit of the health, safety, welfare and financial well-being of the Township and its citizens despite the tax exemption granted hereunder.
[brief] H641a Holm-110: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-108, objected to explaining why [...] did not notify of need for regulator station when [...] applied to county for Transmission Line approval (SOICR p. 12) ...........................................  H642a Holm-111: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-109 objected to discussing using eminent domain to acquire [...] property and likely approval (SOICR p. 12) ......................... H643a Holm-112: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-PNL-110 objected to discussing using eminent domain to acquire [...] property and likely approval (SOICR p. 12) .........................
[directive] 3  Rule required by Cases.  Waiver  Juvenile 4.8 2A:4A-26.1  N.J.S.A. court to pursuant adult to waived is juvenile a that event the In shall prosecutor the of juvenile), election at (waiver 2A:4A-27 N.J.S.A. or waiver) (involuntary (CDR-2) issued complaint-warrant is or (CDR-1) complaint-summons new a that certain make not is she or complaint-warrant, he not by charged is defendant a if that Note court. adult by the the by be monitored not would thus Reform and Law, Bail the under defendant" "eligible an when pretrial Accordingly, detention. of possibility the to subject be or program services pretrial charged waiver be should upon juvenile the that Directive this under determines prosecutor the acomplaint-warrant prepare prosecutor shall the acomplaint-warrant, of means by an adult as to whether motion In deciding packet. waiver juvenile the of part as court the to it submit and shall prosecutor acomplaint-warrant, the for court the to apply or to acomplaint-summons issue been had person originally the if as Directive this of Section/subsection(s) appropriate apply the an as shall treated court be adult to waived juvenile (a 2.2.1 subsection See adult. an as arrested waiver an involuntary justifying circumstances the that expected is It Directive). this under adult history of extent prior any and and/or nature the charges the of seriousness and nature the (e.g., of subsection this 3:3-1(~ 4.5.4 and under presumption Rule a invoke will often delinquency) of acomplaint-warrant of require issuance if not acomplaint-warrant, for apply to Directive subsection 7.6.5.
[brief] During trial, after Defendant’s motion for directed verdict made upon Plaintiff resting his case-in-chief, the parties stipulated to dismiss seven of Plaintiff’s causes of action (3T5:20-19:11), with the total number of causes of actions being then whittled down six counts, those being whether Defendant breached the operating agreement of [...]; breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; acted grossly negligent or with willful misconduct in violation of the New Jersey Limited Liability Company Act (N.J.S.A. 42:2C-39); tortiously interfered with Plaintiff’s prospective economic advantage, committed fraud, and whether the assessment of punitive damages against Defendant were warranted.  (4T71:5-74:18) (the trial Court’s review of the Verdict Sheet with the jury).  Although New Jersey generally disfavors the shifting of attorneys’ fees, *North Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co.*, 158 N.J. 561, 569, 730 A.2d 843 (1999), a prevailing party can recover those fees if they are expressly provided for by statute, court rule, or contract.
[brief] More specifically, the Trial Court should have viewed that a jury could conceivably adopt only the first statement [...] gave to the private investigator (i.e., he made several calls before the accident); the Trial Court should have viewed that a jury could believe that [...] (despite his vacillation) did not ultimately say that the call was not made before the accident; the Trial Court should have viewed that a jury could believe that the call was made before the accident since the date range provided by [...] in his deposition testimony took the call six months to eighteen months before the accident.  The Trial Court should even have viewed that a jury could believe that [...] made the call before the accident since he was motivated to do so sooner than later due to the streetlight being more off than on in front of his house and due to his motivation to protect his vintage vehicles.  In the end, when there is any doubt surrounding facts that can go in two separate directions, in the context of a summary judgment motion, a court must resolve the doubt in favor of the nonmovant, the plaintiff in this case.  Even if the Trial Court weighed only one of the facts in favor of plaintiff, summary judgment could not be granted.  Better yet, all of these enumerated facts should have been weighed by the Trial Court in the light most favorable to plaintiff and preclude summary judgment.  C.
[brief] 1.  The Board finds that the Applicant has not met the required proofs for the Use Variance as required by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1) and otherwise provided by law for minimum lot size for the 48.29 acre Route 38 Site, whereas pursuant to Ordinance Section 108-6.18(K)(3) the VC-2 Overlay Zone requires a minimum lot size of 75 acres.  The undersized lot in and of itself would not be objectionable but for the over-intense proposed development of the lot.  The intensity of the proposed development in the developable area of the lot is far too intense as evidenced by the D1 Use Variance, the two (2) D6 Height Variances, and the number, type, character and extent of the variances requested.  Granting of the Use Variance for minimum lot size would create substantial negative impacts upon the Township and the immediate area and for the future residents of the project.  The site would not provide sufficient air, light and open space within the developable area, as required by the regulations in the Ordnance, due to the intensity of the proposed development within that area.  Granting the application would not advance the purpose of the Master Plan and Zone Plan for the VC-2 Overlay Zone as those are premised upon conformance with the regulation of the affected areas by the applicable zoning ordinances, and the current Application's departure from those regulations are substantial and therefore vitiate advancing the purposes of the Master Plan and Zone Plan.  Specifically, the variance would not advance, and would frustrate the purpose of a less intensive downtown as set forth in Ordinance Section 108-6.18(K)(1), and, the goals of: (a) proper screening and buffering around the perimeter of the area and along surrounding roads; (b) adequate building setbacks from surrounding roads; (c) well-landscaped interior spaces for residential and nonresidential land uses; and (g) off-street parking that is well screened from public view, as set forth in Ordinance Section 108-6.18(K)(2).  The Board finds that these negative impacts outweigh the positive impacts as noted by the Applicant.
[brief] Id. cmt. 2 (citing DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502 (2008)) (emphasis added).  Similarly, Rule 1:12-1(g) states that a “judge of any court shall be disqualified” if there is a “reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so. ”
[brief] On or around November 11, 2020, [...], Assignee of [...] (“[...]”) filed a lawsuit against [...].  (Pa12).  [...] alleged that [...] had failed to pay for product allegedly purchased from [...], and, as the assignee of the purported debt, demanded payment.  (See id.).  [...] filed an Answer in response to [...]’s Complaint, as well as a Third-Party Complaint against [...].  (Pa22).  In the Third-Party Complaint, [...] alleged, inter alia, that [...] unlawfully terminated [...] as [...]’s Summerset distributor just after [...] sold [...] the product at issue in [...]’s Complaint, and specifically filed claims against [...] for: (1) violation of the NJFPA, (2) tortious interference, and (3) indemnification.  On December 21, 2022, the Trial Court entered a Case Management Order, which ordered all “dispositive motions shall be filed by January 20, 2023. ” (Pa701-Pa702).  On January 20, 2023, [...] filed a Motion for Summary --- 1  Transcript of Oral Opinion of the Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated February 27, 2023, hereinafter “1T”.
[directive] These types of transactions by their nature pose direct and immediate risks to the safety of law enforcement officers and private citizens acting as law enforcement agents, and these risks should be accounted for in determining an appropriate plea offer.  This criterion should not be interpreted or applied in a manner that might require the prosecutor to disclose the otherwise undisclosed identity of a confidential informant to whom the 516.  Cf. State v. Williams, 364 N.J. defendant distributed a controlled substance.  See N.J.R.E. Super. 23 (App. Div. 2003)(whether disclosure of the identity of an informant will be required depends on a balancing of the public’s interest in protecting the flow of information in aid of law enforcement with a defendant’s right to effectively prepare his case; courts consider, among other things, whether the informant actively participated in the crime for which defendant is charged).  Page 43
[brief] (1)  Bee hives shall be permitted on lots of at least 25,000 square feet in area, limited to two (2) hives per lot.  (2)  Beehives shall not be permitted in the front or side yard and shall have minimum required setbacks of fifty (50) feet from all lot lines.  (3)  No hive shall be located within one hundred (100) feet of any dwelling unit other than that occupied by the person(s) maintaining the hive(s).
[brief] The actions at issue—including the alteration of bank records to disguise the recipients of checks payable on firm funds (not client funds) to avoid an embarrassing personal disclosure—are not Legal Services because they involve the actions of [...] for his personal benefit, and not “for others. ”  Since there were no Legal Services, the OAE Proceedings were not a Disciplinary Proceeding.  It is well-settled that an insured is only required to report that information requested by the insurer in its application.  Since Defendants, not Plaintiffs, implemented a narrow definition of Disciplinary Proceedings, Plaintiffs were not required to report the OAE Proceedings.
[brief] Municipal entities are creatures of State law.  Municipal entities must comply with the Law.  In sum, this Appeal highlights the Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928) dissenting warnings of [...] made more than ninety-five years ago.  Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commanded to the citizen.  In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously.  Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.  For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.  Crime is contagious.  If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy.
[brief] Here, the evidence submitted to the trial court was that the [...] was insolvent, never produced any funds, and lacked any ability to pay its creditors.  See Ca.152-153.  This was corroborated by financial statements provided to the Court and to [...].  See Ca130.  The receiver also represented that all creditors had been notified that there were no funds available.  N.T.22:6-13 (“The Court: --was there anyone that sought payment from you as the receiver on behalf of that entity that you were the receiver for, that they said that that entity owed them money?  Anybody who you didn’t address?  [...]: Not one, no.  The Court: The old beating a stone scenario. ”).  The [...]’ Brief asks this Court to exalt form over substance and presents a laundry list of alleged technical violations of various statutes.
[brief] Even if an arbitration agreement existed or could be imputed, which it cannot, [...] unequivocally waived any right to arbitrate her claims.  [...], with the advice and assistance of counsel, brought the underlying action in the Chancery Court and certified, in her Verified Complaint, that no arbitration was contemplated.  Thereafter, [...] engaged in substantial litigation over the course of nine months in the Chancery Court, including, request for and receipt of the extraordinary remedy of temporary restraints, motion practice, the filing of an answer to counterclaims devoid of any affirmative defense regarding arbitrability, and substantial discovery which she propounded, benefited from the receipt of responses, and to which she responded.  After substantially benefiting from her election to file in the Chancery Court, only two months before trial, [...] flipped the script and demanded arbitration.  Such demand should have been denied.  For these reasons, as set forth more fully below, the Order Compelling Arbitration must be reversed.
[brief] The doctor provided services to the plaintiff and the doctor’s agreement only provided for reimbursement for the money owed.  Furthermore, *Berkowitz* ultimately held that a claim for personal injury damages in tort is not assignable before judgement.  The *Berkowitz* case also supports the ruling of the Trial Court.  The second case discovered by the Trial Court was *Costanzo v. Costanzo*, 248 N.J. Super. 116 (1991).  Although the Trial Court did not discuss this case, the court in *Costanzo* held invalid the assignment of a Tort claim for personal injuries.  This case, therefore, also supported the findings of the Trial Court.
[brief] In Hedgespeth, our Supreme Court held that the trial court’s erroneous admission of the defendant’s prior convictions “could have produced an unjust result” where it prevented the jury from hearing the defendant’s testimony during his trial for unlawful possession of a handgun.  See 249 N.J. at 251-52 (finding “[d]efendant's choice not to testify was likely a ramification of the erroneous evidentiary ruling”)  The Court held that although the State produced the gun into evidence and police officers testified that they saw the defendant with the gun, the trial court’s error was not harmless because there was no “indisputable evidence linking defendant to the gun,” and that “[h]ad the trial court not erroneously admitted the [defendant’s] prior convictions,” he could have offered a counter theory of the case instead of merely casting doubt on the officers’ accounts through cross-examination.  Id. at 252-53.  The Court noted that determining the plausibility of the defense’s theory of the case “is in the sole province of the jury” and that appellate “[j]udges should not intrude as the thirteenth juror. ”  Id. at 252-53 (internal quotations omitted); see State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 484-85 (2017) (holding that the mere possibility that the jury could disbelieve a defense witness’s testimony does not render a trial court’s Rule 609 error harmless).
[brief] Under those rules, provisions of a statute “cannot be viewed in isolation; all the parts of a statute must be read to give meaning to the whole of the statute. ”  Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. at 480.  And, as noted supra, where “the overall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language,” courts should set aside the plain meaning and consider extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history, to properly construe the statute.
[brief] .........................................................................................................................................................  18  II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT [...]’ SUBMISSION OF A COMPLETE APPLICATION TO THE CRB DID NOT TRIGGER THE TIME OF APPLICATION RULE.  (DA532; 3T13-21.)  .........................................................................................................................................................  24  III.  THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION TO VACATE THE RESOLUTION UNDERMINES THE CLEAR PURPOSE AND INTENT OF THE TOA RULE.  (DA532; 3T13-21.)  ........  30  IV.  [...]’S ELEVENTH-HOUR MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE, WHICH WAS ADMITTEDLY PURSUED FOR AN IMPROPER PURPOSE AND SOUGHT TO ASSERT UNTIMELY CLAIMS, SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED.