ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Id.  The Appellate Division did not conclude if the actions in that matter were reasonable but did note that in response to the arbitration award, then-DLGS Director [...], sent a communication to counsel stating the following:  For the reasons provided below, I hereby exercise the power vested in me by the Municipal Stabilization and Recovery Act (MSRA), codified at N.J.S.A. [52:27BBBB-1] to deny approval of the arbitration award.  In accordance with the MSRA, the arbitration award is not binding upon the parties to the grievance and has no force and effect.  Accordingly, [...] and [...] shall not receive any payment for accumulated sick leave by virtue of their promotion to Captain on July 1, 2016.  However, both parties will have the ability to use this accumulated leave.  Walter explained that N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-5(g) and (i) empowered her as Director "to take any steps to stabilize the finances, restructure the debts, or assist in the financial rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery, including, but not limited to" unliterally modifying CNAs, except those related to school districts, and "unliterally modifying wages, hours, or any other terms and conditions of employment" with respect to any expired CNA.  She also explained that N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16(j) provides that an arbitration award will not be binding without the Director's approval.  Atl. City Superior Officers' Ass'n v. City of Atl. City, No. A-3117-20, 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1194 at *9 (App. Div. June 30, 2022).  The reasonableness standard, as articulated by [...], states that the Designee [State] must take into account the following: (1) that he take action that provides for the public health, safety, and welfare; (2) that public services are provided in an efficient and cost-effective manner; (3) that he ensure the development of a comprehensive plan for financial rehabilitation and recovery; and (4) that he take action that is reasonable and directly related to financial stabilization.  Pa000332.  A “reasonable proposal implies that it is factually based, uniform, fairly implemented, and objective. ”  Pa000335.  “To be reasonable, a proposal must be accompanied by an adequate explanation and foundation for its determination. ”  Id.  The Designee or State is also required to engage in discussions and the exchange of ideas with the affected parties.  Id.  There is nothing in the record which suggests that the State’s actions, or inactions, if permitted by the MSRA were reasonable.  There was no communication submitted by Defendants like the above-cited communication to indicate any reason why earned wages were not paid.  Indeed, as Defendants are relying upon this defense, discovery is necessary to show the reasonableness of withholding earned wages to the promoted officers.  Defendants’ refusal to comply with their pre-MSRA contractual obligations is completely unreasonable and in violation of the MSRA and is sufficiently pled in the Complaint.  The Trial Court erroneously dismissed Plaintiffs’ viable causes of action which must be reversed by This Court.
[brief] Because the Department deprived [...] of the opportunity to be heard on the issues addressed by the Bulletin, it should be invalidated as improper rulemaking.  Thus, *Amicus*’s position is that, prior to the implementation of a rule, due process is required so as to “assure that all recesses of the problem will be earnestly explored. ”  *See Whelan v. N.J. Power & Light Co.*, 45 N.J. 237, 244 (1965).  For the reasons set forth above, *Amicus*’s “participation will assist in the resolution of an issue of public importance. ”  *R.*  1:13-9.  *Amicus* respectfully submits this brief pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 1:13-9.
[brief] POINT EIGHT APPELLANT’S ANALYSIS UNDER HOUSEMAN V. DARE, 405 N.J. SUPER 538 (APP. DIV 2009)  IS NOT APPLICABLE (Not raised below)  Respondent, contrary to Houseman, only sought specific administrative performance under Par. 18 of the Agreement.  Respondent withdrew his claim for damages and the Court entered an Order on same (Da204).  Money damages are inadequate to remedy Respondent’s rights under the Separation Agreement.
[brief] *Id.* at 337 (quoting *SMB Assocs. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot.*, 264 N.J. Super. 38, 59 (App. Div. 1993) (“[A]n “agency has inherent power to waive *de minimis* violations of objective standards. ”)).  The court concluded that under the circumstances presented, fairness and equity required [...] to be permitted to apply for Ordinary Disability.  *Id.* at 338.  Here there was no such legal impediment to [...] filing his Eligibility Registration Form nor would he have been sacrificing discrimination claims or other litigation positions by doing so.  [...] simply failed to file his Eligibility Registration Form until approximately one year and three months past the statutory deadline, which is not a *de minimis* violation.  Contrary to [...]’s argument, the court’s decision in *[...]* did not turn on the timeliness or adequacy of the Division’s notice.
[brief] (9T 99-5 to 15)  In this initial statement, [...] provided a general explanation of what happened — that he fought [...] because [...] had “hit a girl. ”  (9T 138-12 to 16)  However, [...] did not implicate [...] in his statement; he “didn’t say nothing about nobody. ”  (9T 136-1 to 4)  [...] similarly gave a statement the day of the fight in which he did not fully implicate [...].  (10T 94-19 to 21, 96-19 to 24)  Much later, after [...] had been in jail, he learned that [...] admitted to stabbing [...] and pleaded guilty to killing [...].  (9T 102-17 to 19, 103-2 to 5; see also 10T 81-16 to 18)  In September 2018, after [...] had been charged with assault and weapons possession charges related to [...]’s death (Da 4-7; 10T 17-9 to 23-12), he gave another statement to police in which he said that [...] had called him and offered to pay him to fight [...].
[brief] Once the issue was flagged, the City notified the [...] that it was totally unaware that this practice was not permitted, and the [...] had no reason to dispute that contention.  (Pa. 71).  This Court has held that instances of the [...] exercising its statutorily delegated discretion to “relax” its own rules is especially appropriate when the utilization of that discretion is in furtherance of the policy goals which underlie the Civil Service Statutes.  See In Re Martinez, 403 N.J.Super. 58 (2008).  The policy declaration for the Civil Service Statutes provides that the legislature’s intent in enacting those Statutes was that:  a.  It is the public policy of this State to select and advance employees on the basis of their relative knowledge, skills and abilities; b.  It is the public policy of this State to provide public officials with appropriate appointment, supervisory and other personnel authority to execute properly their constitutional and statutory responsibilities; c.  It is the public policy of this State to encourage and reward meritorious performance by employees in the public service and to retain and separate employees on the basis of the adequacy of their performance; d.  It is the public policy of this State to ensure equal employment opportunity at all levels of the public service; and e.  It is the public policy of this State to protect career public employees from political coercion and to ensure the recognition of such bargaining and other rights as are secured pursuant to other statutes and the collective negotiations law.  N.J.S.A. 11A:1-2.  Therefore, the [...] properly issued a one-time “relaxation” of its own rules, by allowing the City to make promotions in good faith based on anticipated vacancies in July of 2022, thereby furthering the established underlying policy to “provide public officials with appropriate appointment, supervisory and other personnel authority to execute properly their constitutional and statutory responsibilities.
[brief] None of the exceptions are applicable to the hearsay testimony by [...] on behalf of [...]’s significant other.  In addition, [...] testified [...] and [...]’s family residing next door were having issues since the inception of their move-in\(^{52}\).  The defendant entered her defenses and objections before, during and after trial per R. 3:10-2(d), R. 3:10-2(e), 1T19:4-18, 1T30:15-25 and 1T59:21.  The raised issue by [...], *State v. Allen*, the element of identification is discussed.  In *State v. Allen* there is an emphasis of cross-racial identification where the White witness based his identification mostly on the African American defendant.  Specifically, *State v. Allen*, 294 P.3d 679, 681 (Wash. 2013) (“The court refused Allen's request.
[brief] What may have gotten lost in the proceeding below is that the driving force behind the Restructuring Act, at its inception, was not the desire to require residents from specific counties to serve on the BOG.  Instead, the intent was to fundamentally restructure health sciences education in New Jersey.  To that end, the initial proposal envisioned “that the Camden campus of Rutgers University was to be severed from Rutgers and taken over by Rowan University. ”  Dean, Saving Rutgers-Camden, 44 Rutgers L.J. 337 at 337.
[brief] You know Judge took ZERO time to arrive at unprepared/unjustified rulings for Trust payments for commission/accounting fees, since he forgot any rulings until prompted by [...] at Feb. 17th Hearing, & then repeated the requested amounts for commission/accounting fees w/o offering justifications or citing & refuting my filed objections to legitimately reduce those fees.  There was NO REASON not to correct Mar. 7th Order. (see p. 40, par. 37, to p. 41, par. 38)  To any “degree”, I nor the Appellate should “understand” why any of [...]’s billed legal work should have been incurred since all work was due to repeated objections to [...] since Nov. 2021, & then me since Jan. ‘22, for a readily achievable Settlement.
[brief] Re: [...], Both Individually, as Surviving Beneficiary, and on Behalf of [...], and [...], Individually as Surviving Beneficiary, v. [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], Medical Group Does 1-10 (Fictitious Names) And Dr. John Does 1-10 (Fictitious Names).  Docket No.: [...]  Appellate Docket No.: [...]  Dear Sir/Madam:
[brief] In determining damages, the trial court did not permit the jury to consider that the dune would likely spare the [...]' home from total destruction in certain fierce storms and from other damage in lesser storms.  A formula — as used by the trial court and Appellate Division — that does not permit consideration of the quantifiable benefits of a public project that increase the value of the remaining property in a partial-takings case will lead to a compensation award that does not reflect the owner's true loss.  [214 N.J. at 389]  (Emphasis added.)  Pursuant to Karan, the determination of just compensation is no longer limited to the taking, but is to consider impacts of the overall public project, whether positive or negative, provided such impacts on value are reasonably calculable and non-conjectural.
[brief] Second, [...]’s argument that he somehow wiped the slate clean by paying damages and sanctions misconstrues the nature of discounts.  [...]’s argument rests on the unspoken and incorrect assumption that discounts are meant to punish [...].  But that is not the economic reality reflected in the purpose for applying discounts.  [...] is not being further punished by receiving a discounted value that represents the economic reality that he would obtain at an arms-length sale.  A discounted fair market value represents what any buyer would have received for a 29.5% interest if selling to any willing seller.  [...] is asking for fair value, a fiction meant to punish the payor ([...]) and reward the payee ([...]).  There can be no serious argument that [...] deserves a reward, and [...] a punishment, because [...] already paid damages for his conduct.  The standard to be applied to [...] is, quite obviously, that which reflects economic reality.
[brief] See Cannata, 2011 WL 3495987, at *2-3.  Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs’ Motion to compel the deposition of a Rule 30(b)(6) deponent knowledgeable on five of the six stated issues is granted in part.  Specifically, the deposition is limited to the following five narrowed issues, as modified by the Court:  1.  Who at [...], including this case’s custodians, received a litigation hold notice, when, and how was the notice transmitted?  2.  What were the email account size limits that applied to each custodian, and which servers (or off-server locations) stored each custodian’s email and when?  3.  What custodians were interviewed about where they stored documents, what were the custodians’ document deletion practices, and what custodian emails or .pst files were deleted from hard drives or servers prior to collection?  4.  What are the details of [...]’s transition to a new server, what was lost from the old server, and what happened to the prior server(s) and backups to the prior server(s)?  5.  Identify all known factors (other than the transition to the Office 365 server) that caused or contributed to the loss or deletion of potentially responsive ESI identified in Plaintiffs’ litigation hold letter from any relevant custodian or data source after [...] received Plaintiffs’ litigation hold letter.  The Court finds that plaintiffs’ topic number 4 is vague and ambiguous as worded, fails to describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination, and is unreasonably broad and unduly burdensome.  As such, it is not relevant and proportional to the needs of the case.  Accordingly, plaintiffs’ Motion is denied as to plaintiffs’ topic number 4.
[brief] The December Terms, just like the January Terms, constitute a valid click-wrap agreement, see Williams, 2023 WL 5768422, at *4, and [...] (or her agent, as discussed below) manifested her assent to be bound to them by affirmatively checking the box that stated “I have reviewed and agree to the Terms of Use. ”  That is sufficient to form a contract.  See Brawer, 329 N.J. Super. at 283.  As a matter of federal law, the parties’ agreement to delegate all thresh- old issues of arbitrability—including challenges to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement as unconscionable or on other public policy grounds—must be enforced.  Plaintiffs’ *Atalese* challenge is for the arbitrator to decide.
[brief] Leitao v. Damon G. Douglas Co., 301 N.J. Super. 187, 197-198 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 466 (1997).  However, unlike this case, the clause in Leitao was significantly more concise, specifically pertaining to outlining how the injuries must be caused by the Subcontractor’s negligence.  Specifically, our contract indicates:  - …provided that such claim…is attributable to bodily injury, sickness, disease or death sustained by anyone, including employees of Subcontractor or to injury to or destruction of intangible property (other than the Work itself) including loss of use resulting therefrom, caused in whole or in part by negligent acts or omissions of the Subcontractor.  On the other hand, the clause in Leitao court found indemnification where the clause indicated:  - …provided that any such claim, damage, loss or expense a) is attributable to bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or to injury to or destruction of tangible property (other than work itself), including the loss of use resulting therefrom, and b) is caused in whole or in part by any negligent act or omission of the subcontractor…  Leitao, 301 N.J. Super. at 191.  As outlined above, our contract is clearly missing the word “and” or “is” between “therefrom,” and “caused. ”  The Leitao contract does not suffer from this ambiguity and is therefore, significantly less ambiguous.  Leitao illustrates the imprecise nature of [...]’s contract.
[brief] The Green Field court stated: “The trustee is not associated with the third party complaint. . . and a third-party complaint does not have a close nexus to the plan or pending adversary proceeding. ”  *Id.*, at 320.  In citing “*Pacor Inc. v. Higgins*, 743 Fed.2d. 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984), the *Green Field* court held that: “The mere fact that there may be common issues of fact between a civil proceeding and a controversy involving the bankruptcy estate does not bring the matter within the scope of Section 1471(b).  Judicial economy does not justify federal jurisdiction. ”  *Id.*, at 320.  Also, “Commonality of fact and judicial economy are concepts of supplemental jurisdiction which bankruptcy courts do not possess. ”  *Id.*, at 321.  See, also, *Citigroup Inc. v. Arthur Anderson LLP* (*In re Enron Corp.*, 353 B.R. 51 Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).  The *Citigroup* court found that there is no supplemental jurisdiction over a “nonfederal claim in instances where the claim has no impact on the bankruptcy estate. ”  *Id.*, at 61.  Therefore, the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction in this matter to decide a third-party complaint brought by [...] against [...].
[directive] 6.  Uniform for 5:30-6.1 accounting system local units  (a)  The Requirements of Audit that have been promulgated municipalities, and counties, which are for deemed to include the county surrogate's office and the county probation department, are considered as minimum requirements and should be elaborated upon whenever, in the judgment of the registered municipal accountant, it is required.  Copies of Requirements of Audit may be obtained fi-om:  (b)  [...] [...] [...]  PO Box 803 - Trenton, New Jersey  08625-0803 -- - -- l?  (c)  In addition to the Requirements of Audit, the registered municipal accountant of each local unit shall also utilize the requirements of the following authoritative resources, incorporated herein by reference, , in conducting the audit as appropriate and applicable:
[brief] "[S]imply because some of the plaintiffs reside close to the . . . site and are fearful of resultant injury to their property, does not mean that they are entitled to an adjudicatory hearing.  Fear of damage to one's . . . generalized property rights shared with other property owners is insufficient to demonstrate a particularized property right."  *Amico*, 371 N.J. Super. at 212.  Instead, establishing a particularized property right requires a landowner to show that its “legal rights, duties, obligations, privileges, benefits or other legal relations . . . are required by constitutional right or by statute to be determined by an agency by decisions, determinations, or orders, addressed to [the landowner] or disposing of their interests, after opportunity for an agency hearing .  . . .”  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-2(b).
[brief] The judge stated:  Ladies and gentlemen, we've had a little bit of discussion about the legal system....  I will say this that in [juror number six's] situation, that can be done with more or less impunity, as I said, anybody can charge anybody civilly or criminally in the municipal court.  In this case, it's [a] little bit different and you are entitled and should know that it's different because in this case the matter has been presented to a grand jury, which is a collection of people, of 23 people, who by simple majority can indict a person.  So it's not as if people come in automatically and file charges.  You can file charges, but it still has been presented to a grand jury, and the grand jury is more involved a process than [juror number six] was involved in in terms of him being brought into a municipal court to be represented and with all the expense and problem.  This is a little bit different in this court, and one cannot file a charge and then have the panorama of what we have here, start the machinery in gear.  Defense counsel immediately asked to approach the bench, and at sidebar objected to the judge's comments by stating “you just pretty much told the jury this case is just a big accusation, and because it was presented to a grand jury, there's more support for it.
[brief] (Da2792-97).  As [...] explained, many of these transactions were part of a broader series of step transactions that [...] used to move money from [...] and [...] into various conduit accounts, and then (sometimes after P-48 and P-50 were exchanged) into accounts that he, his wife, and the other defendants controlled.  (23T 30:15 to 34:7; Da6701).  In the end, the trial court had before it not just [...]’s testimony, but also his considered analysis of the businesses’ financial records (the only accounting expert to do so).  His analysis was corroborated in each instance by bank statements showing misappropriations to accounts the [...]s owned and/or controlled.  The lower court also evaluated the testimony of [...] and [...] against that of [...] and [...] and found the Plaintiffs’ to be credible.  By corollary, the trial court concluded that [...] was not credible, as confirmed by its statement that [...]’s explanations for the diversions that Plaintiffs identified were lacking.
[brief] POINT I: STANDARD OF REVIEW AND THE COMER FRAMEWORK  Appellate review of a criminal sentence is limited; a reviewing court decides whether there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion.  State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014).  Appellate courts must affirm the sentence of a trial court unless: (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the findings of aggravating and mitigating factors were not based upon competent credible evidence in the record; or (3) the application of the guidelines to the facts of the case shocks the judicial conscience.
[brief] The State tries to circumvent its failure to prove that [...] committed first-degree robbery of either [...] or [...] by arguing that “Ms. [...] and Ms. [...] were not named victims in the first-degree robbery count.  The indictment named employees of the [...] and patrons. ”  (Sb 31)  The State seems to be suggesting that a defendant may be convicted of robbery without proof that the essential elements of the crime are satisfied with reference to an identifiable victim.  This simply is not true.  As relevant here, the robbery statute provides that “[a] person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he . . . [t]hreatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(2).  This Court has interpreted similar language in the terroristic threats statute to “implicitly require the identification of the intended victim. ”  See State v. Tindell, 417 N.J. Super. 530, 553 (App. Div. 2011).  In Tindell, the Court reasoned that “[w]ithout knowing the identity of the victim, the statutory phrase ‘with the purpose to terrorize another’ is rendered devoid of substance. ”  Ibid. (emphasis in original).  The same can be said of the phrase “[t]hreatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury. ”  N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(2).  Thus, the State was required to identify the person that [...] threatened, and as discussed above, the State had to prove that that person actually and reasonably believed that [...] was armed.  The State’s suggestion that [...] could be convicted of robbing employees and patrons of the [...] in general, and not any person specifically, is contrary to law.  See Gentry, 183 N.J. at 31-33 (holding that the identity of a robbery victim is an essential element of the offense).  This Court should reject the State’s arguments and reverse the trial court’s denial of [...]’s motion for a judgment acquittal as to first-degree robbery.