ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (9T159-2 to 22).  [...] was cooking dinner when defendant and [...] approached his trailer and defendant knocked on his door.  (9T159-23 to 160-7; 12T116-16 to 117-12).  Defendant demanded to know, “Where he at now?” (12T116-18).  [...], assuming defendant was looking for [...], told defendant that [...] was not there.  (12T116-18 to 20; 12T117-21 to 22).  Defendant then said, “Well, it started here and it’s gonna finish.
[brief] (2)  Respondent asserts that [...] testified that Petitioner would often leave Decedent alone at a party and sneak out thinking it was “funny. ”  Db at 15  [...] admitted she had no idea what Petitioner was thinking on those occasions.  [...] testified that a few times, Petitioner left parties that Decedent attended, but she never talked to Petitioner about it and did not know why he left.  (11T47:17 to 48:9).
[brief] 4T, 23:23-24:4.  Since such developments do not and cannot generate the level of rental income necessary to incentivize the market to invest in the development of affordable housing, the aforesaid federal and state regulatory scheme, including the IRS code, provides a lucrative subsidy incentivizing the development of affordable housing.  4T, 24:5-14.  In New Jersey, such 100% affordable housing developments, at all times relevant to this matter and still now, are financed by the [...] through assigning said developments as 9% tax credit projects and providing both the construction loan and subsequent permanent loan.  4T, 23:16-24:5.  Thus, developers are not required to put any equity, that is money, into the development of a 100% affordable housing project.  4T, 24:5-14.  As [...] testified, and opposing counsel did not and could not contest, the affordable housing development on [...], at the conclusion of the first 15 years of said development, will generate profits, discounted to present value, of $8.2 million.  274a; 4T, 30:8-32:7.
[brief] 37  Kievit v. Loyal Protect. Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J. 475 (1961) .................................................................................. 16  Litton Industries, Inc. v. IMO Industries, Inc., 200 N.J. 372 (2009)  .................................................................................. 49  Marano v. Sabbio, 26 N.J. Super. 201 (App. Div. 1953) ............................................................  44  Martusus v. Tartamosa, 150 N.J. 148 (1997) .................................................................................. 16, 19 McClellan v. Feit, 376 N.J. Super. 305 (App. Div. 2005)  ...........................................................  36  Midstate Hauling Co. v. Reliable Ins. Co., 437 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1971) .....................................................................  32  Millbrook Tax Fund, Inc. v. P.L. Henry & Associates, Inc., 344 N.J. Super. 49 (App. Div. 2001) ...........................................................  30  Miller v. Reis, 189 N.J. Super. 437 (App. Div. 1983) ...........................................................  31 , 39 Munoz v. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 145 N.J. 377 (1996) .................................................................................. 29 Nova Dev. Group, Inc. v. J.J. Farber-Lottman Co., Inc., 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 413 (App. Div. 2010) .................................. 36 Oxford Realty Group Cedar v. Travelers Excess & Surplus Lines Co., 229 N.J. 196 (2017) .................................................................................. 16 Pawlick v. New Jersey Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 284 N.J. Super. 629 (App. Div. 1995) ........................................................... 40 Piermount Iron Works, Inc. v. Evanston Ins. Co., 197 N.J. 432 (2009) ................................................................. 34 President v. Jenkins, 180 N.J. 550 (2004) ..................................................................15, 44 Qian v. Toll Bros. Inc., 223 N.J. 124 (2015) .....................................................................15 Rider v. Lynch, 42 N.J. 465 (1964) ......................................................................44, 46 Romanny v. Stanley Baldino Constr. Co., 142 N.J. 576 (1995) ....................................................................30
[brief] In an IFPA case like this one, all that exists is [...]’s allegations of insurance fraud where the defendants jointly deny any fraud occurred and any liability at all to the insurer plaintiff.  Second, in car accident cases, the passenger suffered injury as a result of the negligence of either the driver of the car he or she was riding in, another driver, or both.  Thus, joint representation of the driver and passenger by one attorney is prohibited because “[w]here a passenger is injured, the passenger . . . has a possible claim against the driver” for that injury.  ACPE Opinion 188, 93 N.J.L.J. 789; see also DeBolt v. Parker, 234 N.J. Super. 471, 479-80 (Law. Div. 1988) (explaining passenger-driver adversity).  Here, in contrast, joint defendants in an IFPA case do not have claims for injury against one another.  [...] did not potentially injure [...] and vice versa by virtue of the insurer’s allegations that both of them engaged in insurance fraud.  Rather, [...] is claiming they both engaged in fraudulent conduct that injured the insurer.  Both [...] and [...] deny liability, period, and should be free to mount a joint defense without an insurer being able to prevent them from retaining counsel of their choice to mount that joint defense.  They have made that intelligent strategic decision and reiterated that decision to the trial court.  Pa308, 310, 319-24; SDa47-52; cf. ACPE Opinion 373, 100 N.J.L.J. 646 (July 21, 1977) (allowing joint representation of husband-driver and wife- passenger where wife stated she would not sue her husband).  [...] and [...] are not directly adverse like a driver and passenger are in the typical case where liability is disputed.  Suffice it to say, [...]’s attempt to shoehorn this case into the automobile accident paradigm mixes apples and oranges.
[brief] Pa105.  Accordingly, the trial court was incorrect to conclude that the Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s predecessors-in-title effectuated a quid pro quo exchange of the Strip and the Bump based on the 1966-1969 Unrecorded Subdivision Maps, or that such erroneous assumption of the “swap” could have possibly legitimized the sudden appearance of the Strip in Defendant’s chain of title.  POINT II
[brief] ”  *Id.* (citing *State v. Barboza*, 115 N.J. 415, 421 (1989)).  A “factual statement directly from a defendant ... reduces the possibility that a defendant will enter a guilty plea to an offense that he has not committed. ”  *Id.*  When an appellate court concludes on direct appeal that the plea lacked an adequate factual basis, “the analysis ends and the plea must be vacated. ”  *State v. Tate*, 220 N.J. 393, 404 (2015).  An essential element, including a defendant’s mental state, cannot be inferred from the defendant’s actions.  See *State v. Gregory*, 220 N.J. 413, 421–22 (2015) (“The State urges this Court to presume defendant’s intent to distribute from the way the narcotics were packaged.  However, a court is not permitted to presume facts required to establish ‘the essential elements of a crime. ’” (citations omitted)); *State ex rel. [...]*, 166 N.J. 319, 335 (2001) (“Nor does that decision suggest that a trial court may infer a defendant's purpose—degrading or humiliating the victim or sexually arousing or gratifying the victimizer—from the act of sexual contact with a victim.  In fact, the opposite conclusion is distilled from *Smullen*, where the court's leading question concerning the purpose of the contact was a necessary effort by a careful trial court to ensure that defendant establish a factual basis for each element of the offense. ” (citing State v. Smullen, 118 N.J. 408, 415 (1990)).  Instead, a defendant must affirmatively admit to possessing the requisite mens rea for the offense.  [...], 166 N.J. at 335 (“Without such an affirmative statement by a defendant pleading guilty to sexual contact, there is no basis for the court necessarily to infer sexual purpose or motive. ”).
[brief] The scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is defined as follows:  Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.  Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).  *2  District courts have broad discretion to determine relevancy for discovery purposes.  See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002).  District courts also have broad discretion to limit discovery to prevent its abuse.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) (instructing that courts must limit discovery where the party seeking the discovery “has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action” or where the proposed discovery is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative,” “obtain[able] from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive,” or where it “is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1)”).
[brief] [...] testified about a hearsay test message from [...].  (13T:40-25 to 41-17).  [...] was not asked about this phone record on direct or on cross.  In introducing this hearsay document for the truth of the matter asserted, [...] stated:  And what some of the witnesses had said changed over time.  There were inconsistencies in what witnesses were saying.  And, of course, human memory being fallible, that can happen.  But this issue seemed to be quite important.  Did he or didn’t he talk about harming, shooting, or killing people before the incident.  And instead of relying on someone’s memory of events in the past, finding a phone record that captures exactly what words were used, was important evidence.
[brief] Then, the issue with the denied Motion to Stay from the Municipal court enters.  Counsel states in his opinion as to why the Court felt the defendant was defiant when she stated, “I’m not going to be paying, I’m not going to be paying my fines, I’m appealing”; he furthers his opinion with indication that, “…the Court either took it as a motion, though imperfectly made, or addressed it without the motion, you know, as not a motion made by the defendant but on its own accord in denying the stay”.  (2T7:14-24)  Counsel mentions the Municipal Court implies, yes, the defendant will be paying the fines without explanation, defendant will be penalized and then denies her Motion for Stay (2T7:25, 2T8:1-7).  [...] informs the court, in fact, that he filed for a Motion of Stay without a copy of the transcript where the Motion for Stay was already denied by the Municipal Court and that the Motion for Stay pending appeal has yet to be decided.  (2T8:8-15)  [...] further confirms his theory, in part, it’s possible he and defendant could lose the stay motion below, then motioned Court for reconsideration, as his submitted Motion for Stay should have been considered stayed pending the Municipal Court’s hearing and decision on defendant’s stay motion.  [...] elaborates in his concern for the defendant’s stay motion, indicating, “I think the Court below intends to – might penalize her for the period of time from the end of the – the –”; The Trial Court informs he will address Counsel’s concern on the stay motion and does so immediately.
[brief] The Borough and Planning Board do not assert that the “pre-approved” proposed development in the challenged “[Second] Amended Beachway Avenue Waterfront Redevelopment Plan,” which expressly calls for and literally requires and pre-approves the abolishment by the designated developer of 300 long existing public parking spaces, all found in a single public parking lot along the waterfront where public access points to the waterfront exist, to be replaced with *private high density housing* and 150 *now PRIVATE parking spaces for use only by the residents in the new private high density housing*, is not a blatant and clear violation of the Public Trust Doctrines.  The Trial Court did not disagree; instead the Trial Court ruled it was not ripe for consideration.  This is because the Redevelopment Plan operates to effectively and illegally exclude the public from having access to long existing parking which is necessary for the public to gain access to the waterfront.
[directive] County FNE’s reported the total TOTAL SAFE KITS COLLECTED volume of SAFE kits collected from 1614 2018 to 2020, which indicate 1491 1199 decreasing volumes over time.  The reported total volume includes kits that may have been tested, untested, Hold kits, identifiable, and unidentifiable kits.  2018 2019 2020 Kits11 Hold  Once a SAFE kit is collected, it is left up to the victim as to whether an FNE will refer the kit to law enforcement or hold it.  A collected kit becomes a Hold kit when the victim chooses not to report the incident to law enforcement for investigation, opting to instead hold FNE REPORTED HOLD KIT AGE their kit, for a minimum of five years.12  These Hold kits do not 2-3 yrs old 4-5 yrs old 5+ yrs old 1 yr old demonstrate a backlog.
[brief] Of these considerations highlighted by [...], only two were not already definitively established by documents in the record, to wit: (i) whether [...] was sophisticated (factor (2) in the opinion), and (ii) whether [...] was aware of Appellants’ “possession” of the Property (factors (6) and (7) in the opinion).  Appellants thus interpreted this inquiry as requiring Appellants to show that [...] was sophisticated in tax lien foreclosures, evidence which Appellants obtained notwithstanding the Sua Sponte Order depriving Appellants’ of discovery from [...] and [...].  Once established, Appellants believe that it was the intention of [...] to deny [...] the safe haven of “bona fide purchaser for value without notice” status and to grant the relief requested in the motion under Rule 4:50-1(f) as originally sought by Appellants.  Appellants posited in the original motion to vacate that [...] was sophisticated in tax lien foreclosure matters and for this reason alone may be charged with knowledge of the risk that Appellants’ would raise adverse claim to title by seeking to vacate Final Judgment.  [...] asked for more proof than the mere proximity in time between the Final Judgment and the Quitclaim Deed to establish this “sophistication.
[brief] Here, Plaintiff [...] does not identify the person(s) allegedly subjected to a discriminatory factor, what the “decision” was that was made as to them and when, what adverse action was taken against that person and when, etc.  None of the cases cited by Plaintiff excuse such omissions and indicate that same is a proper and adequate pleading. \(^7\)  For example, in *Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad*, employee [...] brought an action claiming he was terminated due to his marital status in violation of the LAD.  There was no mystery person, conduct, or alleged adverse action withheld from the complaint and which a court found adequate on challenge.  In *Delanoy v. Twp. of Ocean*, 245 N.J. 384 (2021), the plaintiff-police officer brought a claim for discrimination in violation of the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, claiming specific conduct as applied to her constituted a failure to accommodate pregnancy under that law.  Again, there was no mystery person, conduct, or alleged adverse action withheld from the complaint and which a court found adequate on challenge.  The same holds true in *A.D.P. v. ExxonMobil Research*, 428 N.J. Super. 518 (App Div. 2012), which involved an action by a specific employee who was \(^7\)  In this regard, note the absurdity of Plaintiff’s arguments such as that the burden shifted to Defendant to prove “the adverse employment action would still have occurred. ” (Pb17).  What adverse employment action?  Plaintiff failed and refused to identify any.  How could we address what Plaintiff is entirely unable or unwilling to plead? terminated following alcohol testing and where the evidence was that she was only subjected to random testing because she had voluntarily disclosed that she was an alcoholic.
[brief] *Id.*  The Appellate Court reasoned that the final order was no longer final when the defendant filed its motion for fees.  *Id.*  The Court held that the plaintiffs’ appeal was timely because all claims for all parties were resolved in the last order dated January 4, 1994.  *Id.*  Similar to *Weed*, the May 8, 2023 Order was not final because, as Respondents admit, there were outstanding issues pending before the Trial Court.
[brief] In *North v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC*, No. [...], 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184974 (D.N.J. Sep. 24, 2021) (Pa100), the District Court denied a debt buyer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings to dismiss CFA claims against an assignee for failure to be licensed under the NJCFLA and collecting on the void debt.
[brief] The Family Court erred in denying an annulment to Plaintiff on ground of fraud by the defendant (A6; 2T42-43).  Marriage is both a legal and social institution, contractual in nature, creating both rights and duties attaching to both parties.  It creates status unique in the law subject to the control of the legislature.  The contractual undertaking assumed in a marriage has been said to be akin to a partnership.  Lindquist v. Lindquist, 130 N.J. Eq. 11 (1941); Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219 (1974).  Both the grounds for annulment and the grounds for divorce are controlled by statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-1; N.J.S.A. 2A:34-2.  The basic distinction between an annulment and a divorce is in the facts which give rise to the cause of action.
[directive] Attorney General Notification Report (Filable Form) • Conflicts Inquiry for Police-Use-of-Force Investigations • 2020 - AG Guidance on Chokeholds and Neck Restraints Conducted Energy Devices (Stun Guns): Attorney General Revised Supplemental Policy on Conducted • Energy Devices (10/7/10)  Attorney General Approved Conducted Energy Devices • (10/14/11)  Attorney General Clarification of the Revised Supplemental • Policy on Conducted Energy Devices (5/3/12)  Attorney General Directive to Prevent Concurrent or • Sequential Use of a Flammable Aerosol Spray Device and a Conducted Energy Device (6/20/12)  Attorney General Clarification of CED Incident Reporting • Procedures For State-Level Law Enforcement Agencies Under the Revised Policy on Conducted Energy Devices (7/13/12)  Attorney General Directive Revising the Attorney General's • Policy on Conducted Energy Devices (6/3/14)  Director’s Directive Revising the Attorney General's Policy on • Conducted Energy Devices (6/4/14) including Updated Attorney General Conducted Energy Device Deployment Review Report (7/1/16)  Attorney General Directive Revising the Attorney General • Supplemental Policy on Conducted Energy Devices (3/3/16)  Compilation of Attorney General Supplemental Policy on Conducted ◦ Energy Devices [as of March 3, 2016]
[brief] 106a.  The Complaint and Amended Complaint in the 2020 Action also alleged that [...] “lied” in his depositions for the 2015 Action by testifying that he believed the owner of [...] to be [...], whereas Plaintiffs-Appellants at all times contended that [...] was owned and controlled by [...] himself.  106a-110a.  In the Thirteenth Count of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs-Appellants alleged that “Defendants [including [...] and [...]] intentionally spoliated and withheld [evidence], falsely testified at depositions in the [2015 Action], and provided false, fraudulent and/or forged documents in the [2015 Action] for the purposes of disrupting the litigation in the [2015 Action].”
[brief] The Plaintiff was outside of the crosswalk.  However, the location of the nearest cross walk and the distance of the pothole from the crosswalk is not clear from the record.  There are no facts in the record regarding any measurement in terms of feet that would indicate where the crosswalk was located in relation to where the Plaintiff fell.  Defense in its brief makes two contrary statements regarding the location of the crosswalk in relation to where the Plaintiff fell.  On one hand, the Defendant states on page 21 of its brief that “the Plaintiff was in the middle of the roadway in an area not designated for pedestrians.
[brief] (2T9-5 to 2T9-18)  Due to the aforementioned rulings, the Post Trial Order further directed that: (i) in order to avoid a judgment of possession, Tenant was required to deposit the $196,669.16 in Rent Arrears with the Court on or before November 30, 2021; (ii) upon Tenant’s deposit of the Rent Arrears with the Court, Landlord may submit a certification of counsel fees collectable as Additional Rent for the Court’s consideration; and (iii) each party may file a motion for reconsideration of the Post Trial Order:
[brief] Compare Shaw, 460 N.J. Super. at 628 ([...], concurring) (“[T]he licensure requirements for insurance brokers – and their associated fiduciary duties – appear to me to be more stringent than those governing home inspectors. ”) with Finderne, 402 N.J. Super. at 569 (“Although competing voluntary associations issue designations to those who seek to be called ‘financial planners,’ no governmental board or agency regulates or sets uniform minimum education or training criteria. ”) and Quigley v. Esquire Deposition Serv., 400 N.J. Super. 494, 507 (App. Div. 2008) (federal depositions shorthand reporting services are not semi-professional because services are not subject to regulation under the state statute and regulations governing shorthand reporting).  Courts in New Jersey have long regarded the licensing strictures for insurance brokers, which puts them on par with other learned professionals.
[brief] Throughout the entire Trial Court proceeding Plaintiff has maintained that water problems have existed at the Property for several years dating back until at least 2004.  These issues reached their peak in 2018 when the Plaintiff’s swimming pool was lifted from the ground and had to be buried as a result of the water damage while the Township performed drainage work in the backyard.  Furthermore, in 2018 the Property was destroyed when the Township had to have Plaintiff’s shrubbery removed and the Township’s vehicle imploded the Plaintiff’s driveway.
[brief] See R. 1:36-3.  \(^6\)  Pursuant to R. 1:36-3, a copy of the unpublished opinion is attached.  (Pa233-Pa239).  A contrary opinion on this issue was issued by the court in *Frye v. [...]*, No. [...] (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 3, 2012).
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  An appellate court’s review of rulings of law and issues regarding the applicability, validity or interpretation of laws, statutes, or rules is de novo, including whether a cause of action is barred by a statute of limitations.  Kocanowski v. Twp. Of Bridgewater, 237 N.J. 3, 9 (2019); Save Camden Pub. Schs. v. Camden City Bd. of Educ., 454 N.J. Super. 478, 487 (App. Div. 2018).  “A trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).  Appellate courts also apply a deferential standard in reviewing factual findings by a judge.  Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020).  POINT II