ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (2T 50-17 to 19)  No corroboration of criminality requires suppression under J.L.  Contrary to the State’s arguments, the trial court considered the 9-1-1 call in suppressing the evidence in this case.  It is true that the defense objected to the reliance on the third-hand recitation of facts from the 9-1-1 call by the officer, who did not hear the 9-1-1 call.  The State’s failure to bring in the most reliable hearsay to ascertain the facts relayed by the caller—the 9-1-1 call itself—is a decision to present less reliable hearsay than was available to the State to the trial court.  That decision does not help the State establish the basis for the police action.  The State now complains that it “could have prevented [sic] evidence supporting its reliability such as the specific contents of the call, the identity of the caller, the tone of the report, any details provided by the caller that might show that the report was based on the caller’s personal knowledge, and the police’s response time following the call[.]”  (Sb 14)  There was nothing stopping the State from putting forth highly relevant information in order to meet its burden to justify the police action in this case.  Failing to put before the court information to help meet its burden is a failure of the State’s, not the court’s.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 13:19-1 et seq.  .........................................................................................  1 N.J.S.A. 13:19-2 ....................................................................................................  21, 31 N.J.S.A. 13:19-17(b) .............................................................................................  21 N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 et seq .................................................................................... 4 N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 et seq .......................................................................................  36 REGULATIONS
[brief] OTHER AUTHORITIES | Authority | Pages | |-----------------------------------|-------| | Model Civil Jury Charge 4:10C | 14 | | Model Civil Jury Charge 4:10E | 17, 31| | Model Civil Jury Charge 4:10J | 18 | | Model Civil Jury Charge 4:10K | 19 | | Model Civil Jury Charge 4:22 | 31 | | Model Civil Jury Charge 8:45 | 19 | E. ABBREVIATED TERMS
[brief] See Zizic, 728 F.3d at 232 nn.3–4 (applying only the pre- 8  Defendants are unaware of any opinion holding that the 2010 federal amendments are not retroactive solely because they changed the public disclosure bar from a jurisdictional to an affirmative defense. amendment public disclosure bar to an action alleging conduct both pre- and post-dating the 2010 federal amendment); Cause of Action v. Chi. Transit Auth., 815 F.3d 267, 278 n.14 (7th Cir. 2016); Bellevue, 867 F.3d at 717–18 (noting that Cause of Action applied the pre-amendment public disclosure bar “where the contested conduct spanned both pre- and post-amendment time periods”).  Under settled retroactivity law, the [...]’s letter has no impact on this case.
[brief] B.  PLAINTIFF ASKED MR. CICALA TO ACCEPT SERVICE WHILE HE WAS IN THE MIDST OF A DISBARMENT HEARING  Plaintiff also notes, several times, that three attempts were made to effect service through [...], Esq., who represented [...] in pre-litigation negotiations.  However, these communications occurred while [...] was undergoing a disciplinary hearing that resulted in his disbarment for misappropriation of his client’s funds.  Furthermore, Plaintiff admits that [...] never responded and there is no reason to infer that [...] made [...] aware of those emails.  Plaintiff indicates that emails were sent to [...] in January, February, and March of 2021 requesting that he acknowledge service on behalf of [...].  However, [...] was evidently engaged in an attorney disciplinary proceeding in the months of January and February of 2021.  A March 29, 2022 Opinion rendered by the Disciplinary Review Board specifies that [...] was engaged in motion practice, as well as an attorney disciplinary hearing, before a special master in January and February of 2021 (Da197, Da199, Cicala DRB Opinion).  The outcome of that hearing was a recommendation for disbarment, which was ultimately entered by way of an Order dated June 23, 2022 (Da254, Cicala Disbarment Order).  It is hardly surprising that [...] never responded to Plaintiff’s email inquiries.  Nor would it be reasonable to infer that [...] ever notified [...] of the email communications he received.  POINT TWO (Da1)
[brief] (Appx 124 at 162:5-17; Appx 533 ¶¶47-48).  Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff left the day shift at the [...] due to car issues and voluntarily took per diem status.  (Appx 533-34 ¶¶49-51).  No reasonable person could infer from Defendant’s conciliatory offers that it wanted to get rid of Plaintiff.
[brief] ”  State v. Vargas, 213 N.J. 301, 314 (2013) (quotation omitted).  Consent is one such exception.  But “consent searches under the New Jersey Constitution are afforded a higher level of scrutiny,” as the State must demonstrate that “any consent given by an individual to a police officer to conduct a warrantless search [was] given knowingly and voluntarily. ”  State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 639 (2002), modified, 174 N.J. 351 (2002).  Nearly six decades ago, the Supreme Court in State v. King, 44 N.J. 346 (1965), ruled that, to be voluntary, consent must be “unequivocal and specific” and “freely and intelligently given.
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[directive] A. 2C:39-5(b), -5(c), to the possession of a firearm during the commission of certain crimes, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a).  Accordingly, it is imperative that prosecutors closely evaluate all relevant circumstances involved in any given case when making critical determinations (e.g., whether to apply for a complaint-warrant, move for pretrial detention).  When assessing whether a presumption should be overcome in cases charging unlawful possession under Page 62 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 – particularly those matters involving handguns (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)) and rifles and shotguns (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c)) – prosecutors shall consider the Attorney General Directive to Ensure Uniform Enforcement of the “Graves Act” as well as the Attorney General Memorandum entitled “Clarification of ‘Graves Act’ 2008 Directive with Respect to Offenses Committed by Out-of-State Visitors From States Where Their Gun-Possession Conduct Would Have Been Lawful.
[brief] Although the court was aware that [...] had previously moved in Middlesex and Union vicinages to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search of the house, there is no indication in the record that the court was aware of those rulings or reviewed the transcripts or opinions rendered in those cases.  Ten months later, defendant reached a global plea agreement resolving three indictments.  He pled guilty to second-degree conspiracy to distribute CDS while in possession of a firearm under [...] (count two) and second-degree certain persons not to possess weapons under [...] (count one).  He also pled guilty to second-degree witness tampering under [...] (count three), which arose from a separate incident involving threats defendant made to a woman arising from their mutual involvement in a legal proceeding.  In accordance with the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to: a six-year prison term with a three-year parole bar for second-degree conspiracy to distribute CDS while in possession of a firearm; a five-year prison term with a five-year parole bar for second-degree certain persons not to possess weapons to run concurrent to the CDS offense; and a six-year prison term with a discretionary three-year parole bar under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b) for second-degree witness tampering to run consecutive to the CDS offense and to run concurrent to the certain persons offense.
[brief] [...]’s argument was that the Court had the power and the duty to consider whether or not the arbitrator exceeded his powers by examining, as a threshold question, whether or not the ruling was made pursuant to the rules of the arbitration, and within the statutory vacatur grounds of N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8.  [...] supported [...].  Its trial court had vacated an award for arbitrator bias, one of the statutory grounds.  Id. at 184-185.  The Appellate Division affirmed.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and agreed vacatur was required.  Id. at 189.  Thus, none of the three reviewing Courts found that they lacked power to apply the statute, or that the arbitration body would decide the question of arbitrator bias.  In fact, in [...] the Supreme Court recognized the power of judicial review of awards when the arbitrator exceeded his powers:
[brief] The [...] submit this brief in response to the amicus curiae briefs of the [...] (“[...]”), the [...], the [...] and [...], and [...] (collectively, the “Amici Curiae”).  The Amici Curiae, to varying degrees, present the Court with a picture of the collapse of the insurance industry’s and [...]’s ability to investigate and remediate insurance fraud in connection with PIP benefits.  But those alleged concerns about the collapse of fighting insurance fraud are nothing more than scare tactics designed to salvage the for-profit insurance industry’s ability to maximize their profits by dragging health care providers and their employees and agents into court with respect to claims previously decided against insurers by an arbitrator.  To be clear, this is not a public policy matter.  This a private litigation between a for-profit insurance carrier and for-profit healthcare providers in which [...] seeks to recoup PIP benefits from the [...] and other defendants.
[brief] The altercation between Plaintiff and Defendant that occurred in the Township of Holmdel on July 29, 2013.  Plaintiffs, [...] and his wife, [...], filed the Complaint in Superior Court, Law Division, Monmouth County, on July 21, 2015.  (Pa14-Pa24)  Defendant, [...], filed an Answer on August 13, 2015.  (Pa25).  Plaintiff’s medical expert, [...], videotaped deposition *de bene esse* was taken on September 9, 2019.  Defendant subsequently moved to redact portions of Dr. West’s testimony concerning the reasonableness and necessity of medical bills allegedly related to the incident of July 29, 2013 and to bar admission of evidence of medical expenses or liens at the time of trial.  The motions were argued before [...] on September 3, 2021.  (9T)\(^1\)  The Court granted both motions and entered separate Orders redacting portions of Dr. West’s testimony and barring evidence of “any incurred medical expenses or liens at the time of trial.  (Pa50; Pa52).  --- \(^1\)  1T refers to the transcript of June 13, 2022  2T refers to the transcript of June 14, 2022  3T refers to the transcript of June 15, 2022  4T refers to the transcript of June 16, 2022  5T refers to the transcript of June 20, 2022  6T refers to the transcript of June 21, 2022  7T refers to the transcript of August 25, 2022  8T refers to the transcript of April 13, 2023  9T refers to the transcript of September 3, 2021  The case was tried to a jury before the Hon. [...], J.S.C., from June 13, 2022 to June 21, 2002.  The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff, [...], in the amount of $25,000 and assessed 15% comparative negligence against him.  Plaintiff, [...], was awarded zero dollars on her per quod claim.  (6T102 to 105)  On June 30, 2022, Plaintiff’s counsel submitted a proposed Order for Judgment for $239,156.09, which included 85% of the $25,000 jury award, medical expenses and disability payments, plus prejudgment interest.  (Pa32-Pa33).  Defense counsel objected and requested a hearing on the issue by correspondence filed on July 6, 2022.  (Pa45-Pa49)  The issue was argued before Judge McCarthy on August 25, 2022.  (7T)  The Court’s decision not to mold the judgment to include the medical bills and disability payments was placed on the record on April 13, 2023.  (8T).  The Court entered an Order for Judgment for $26,002.60, inclusive of prejudgment interest, on July 25, 2023.  (Pa6).
[directive] 알림:  귀하가N.J.S.A.  에 의한 종신 사회 내 감독의 조건을 위반한 것에 대해 유죄를 인정하고, 그 위반이 2C:43-6.4  년 월1 일 이후에 발생한 경우, 귀하는 질문 에 답변해야 합니다.  2014
[brief] Jacoby v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 442 N.J. Super. 450 (App. Div. 2015)  10  Jock v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 184 N.J. 562, 591 (2005)  11  Kane Properties, LLC v. City of Hoboken, 214 N.J. 199, 225 (2013)  16  Klug v. Bridgewater Plan. Bd., 407 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 2009)  22 Lakewood Realty Associates, LLC v. Twp. of Lakewood Planning Bd., No. A-1899-21 (App. Div. October 5, 2023)
[brief] "Sb" – State’s brief "Db" - Defendant’s brief  STATEMENTS OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS  [...] relies upon the Statement of Procedural History and Statement of Facts included his original brief.  LEGAL ARGUMENT  [...] relies upon the arguments made in his previously filed brief and only adds the following critical point.  In Arguing that the Court Waived the Statutory Requirement that the Presentence Investigation Include a Psychological Evaluation, the State Conveniently Ignores the Fact that the Court Did Not Acknowledge the Existence of the Requirement, Much Less Provide Reasons for the Purported Waiver.  The Claim That the Court Waived the Requirement Is a Mere Fiction.  The State argues that the court was permitted to waive the complete psychological evaluation, and therefore that the lack of such a report poses no error.
[brief] Evidence envelopes and their contents are kept in polyester sleeves to allow the observer to inspect and examine the items without directly touching them or transferring any foreign substance that could affect them.  Ibid.  To further protect these historical items from foreign substances, the sleeves and their contents are kept in “acid-free manuscript folders,” which are kept in “standard acid-free board archival boxes that are designed to further reduce or negate the effects of migrant acidity and atmospheric pollutants. ”  Ibid.  The ladder and lumber from the [...] case are likewise contained in a locked and sealed glass display for visitors to observe, in accordance with generally accepted archival standards.
[brief] ”  He testified that, based on his experience, if Defendant’s insurer had gone back to the [...] to [...] deed and seen that the Strip was not included in that deed, “the title company would not have insured the strip. ”  3T73:16-17.  Based on the testimony provided, either title insurer might have excluded the Strip from coverage.  Both parties acknowledge that there is no recorded deed indicating how the Strip entered Defendant’s chain of title.  Plaintiff demonstrated his history of ownership, and the trial court should have respected the public policy of the Recording Act and found that Plaintiff was entitled to ownership of the Strip.
[brief] The Borough also relies on language in Kean Federation of Teachers v. Morell, 233 N.J. 566, 586 (2018), that “courts must be cautious not to foist burdens upon public bodies that the Legislature did not intent [sic] to impose.  (Plaintiff’s Brief, Pages 12 and 24; the actual quote from the court references the decision Rice v. Union County Regional High School Board of Education, 155 N.J. Super. 64 (App. Div. 1977), and states in full: “We find the procedural notice created in Rice should not be stretched beyond its factual setting.  To do so would result in adding to the OPMA requirements that the Legislature did not impose. ”  Kean Federation of Teachers, 233 N.J. at 586.)  In its initial discussion of the OPMA, the court in Kean Federation of Teachers noted that the OPMA “makes explicit the legislative intent to ensure the public’s right to be present at public meetings and to witness government in action,” citing, N.J.S.A. 10:4-7.  Kean Federation of Teachers, 233 N.J. at 570.  The Rice decision involved the requirements for notice to public employees affected by an adverse employment decision set forth in N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b), and the right for those employees to have the matter discussed in public rather than in private.
[brief] At the Second Hearing, after being qualified as an expert witness in traffic engineering, [...] testified that the Applicant had amended the Application to create an approximately nine foot (9’) by twenty foot (20’) loading space on the northeast corner of the Property along Atlantic Avenue.  (T2/18:3-14).  He explained that the loading space will be gated to discourage parking by customers.  (T2/29:9-21).  [...] also noted the presence of a designated loading space on Michigan Avenue for utilization by any of the businesses in the area, which recognizes that a business may not always have a loading driveway available on site.  (T2/42:3-10).  The Applicant was not proposing, however, to have any cannabis or cash deliveries out of the Michigan Avenue loading area, although paper products or UPS deliveries may utilize that area.  (T2/98:1-6; 98:20-24).  [...] further testified that the Applicant anticipates deliveries two to three times per week, with a maximum of once per day, occurring before or after hours of operation, which equates with an “insignificant impact to the surrounding roadway network” based on thresholds established by the New Jersey Department of Transportation.
[brief] ”  P39a.  Yet, the Court repeatedly engaged in speculation and conjecture to support its rulings about the Photocopy:  (a)  It was speculative to assume an original of the Photocopy ever existed when none of the witnesses who appeared at trial had ever seen an original prenuptial agreement, even though its terms stated that four originals were executed.  (P119a, 12T36:6-10; 11T11:18 to 12:10; 10T 101:25 to 102:7).  (b)  It was speculative to assume that the prenuptial agreement that Decedent mentioned to [...] or [...] is the same document as the Photocopy as none of those witnesses had ever seen the prenuptial or were told any of its terms.  Id.  (c)  It was speculative to find that an original prenuptial agreement had been placed in a "Rubbermaid box" that the Petitioner found and destroyed.
[brief] State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 160 (2011) (citing Barden, 195 N.J. at 389).  This fourth Cofield factor “requires an inquiry distinct from the familiar balancing required N.J.R.E. 403: the trial court must determine only whether the probative value of such evidence is outweighed by its potential for undue prejudice, not whether it is substantially outweighed by that potential as in the application of Rule 403. ”  State v. Green, 236 N.J. 71, 83-84 (2018) (citing Barden, 195 N.J. at 389).  Here, the chance for prejudice is high.  The jury may assume that because [...] was involved in a traffic stop and was arrested in a separate matter that he has the propensity to break the law.  What’s more is that this evidence has the potential to confuse the jury.  As discussed, the events of April 23, 2022, were the basis for a separate charge and indictment in Union County.  The jury may confuse the events in Union County with the events in Hudson County.  Last, the probative value, as discussed under factor one, is minimal as his presence in the Honda Accord on April 23, 2022, does not make any issue at dispute more or less probable.  Considering the same, the risk of prejudice outweighs whatever non-propensity relevance these accusations have, of which the defense asserts are none.  POINT III
[brief] A.  Landlord fails to dispute that the trial court prejudged the case  The Code of Judicial Conduct directs that judges should disqualify themselves from presiding over any “proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. ”  Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(C)(1).  The Rules of Court similarly provide, “[t]he judge of any court shall be disqualified on the court’s own motion and shall not sit in any matter, if . . . there is any . . . reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so. ”  R. 1:12-1(g).  “The mere appearance of bias in a judge -- however difficult, if not impossible, to quantify -- is sufficient to erode respect for the judiciary. ”  In re Advisory Letter No. 7-11 of the Supreme Court Advisory Comm., 213 N.J. 63, 70 (2013).  “Even a ‘righteous judgment’ will not find acceptance in the public's mind unless the judge's impartiality and fairness are above suspicion. ”  Id. at 75.
[brief] (Da068)  With respect to the issue of ownership of the Property, the Court went on to state as follows:  In addition to the paper trail of deeds, all the indicia of ownership supports the contention that [...] owned [...].  [...] (and [...]) assumed the mortgage payments.  [...] and/or his wife at any given time paid the real estate takes.  [...] held the keys while no member of the [...] family had keys.  [...] hired and paid for repairs and maintenance on the property….  …  The proposition that [...] did all these things for all those years merely as a property manager and at the behest of his brother [...] is not worthy of belief.  There was no evidence of a written management agreement.  There was no evidence offered to show an oral management agreement.  There was no evidence of any compensation paid to [...] for such services.  If [...] were indeed under contract to his brother for management services, how is it that no one informed one party to this “agreement” that the other party had died?  Finally, in October, 2019 after the purported transfer from [...] ([...]) to [...], no one on behalf of the Estate or [...] renewed or revisited the terms of any such management agreement nor did anyone from the Estate or [...] assume any payment to [...] for these services.  There is no truth whatsoever to the claim that [...] was only a property manager.
[brief] This is four years now I have been awaiting these benefits that were more than “in my right” to collect.  And if I don’t receive my benefits shortly, I will make a case against the [...] for 3x treble damages.  That’s May 1st to September 4th $204x11= $2,244.  I owed my $2,244 as well as the bare minimum of my (5) payments of the extra $300 dollars, which comes to $3,744 for all this time I had to suffer I should more than go for treble damages as well as pain and suffering.  If I receive my benefits in a very timely manner than I won’t raise the complaint.
[brief] No. 1T42  Q  Let’s say that you had done it before trial.  I understood the theory of the case.  Let’s say that you said, all right, well, I know that’s our theory of the case, but let’s see if this Glock actually, you know, [...] is basically saying, and you correct me if I’m wrong, [...] is basically saying, okay, the bullet that went into [...]’ leg, right, his knee I think is specific, was fired from this Glock and some of the testimony at least from the prosecution put the Glock somewhere underneath the body of [...], right?  A  Okay.  Q