ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Id. at 288; see also The Times of Trenton Pub. Corp. v. Lafayette Yard Cmty. Dev. Corp., 368 N.J. Super. 425, 437 (App. Div. 2004) (“As we noted in 1956, distinguishing between proprietary and governmental functions for the purpose of narrowing responsibility in the conduct of the public’s business is artificial and outmoded. ”) (emphasis added).  In reversing the Appellate Division and rendering this ruling, the Court made absolutely clear that treating municipal supply of potable water as a “proprietary” sale of a commodity was no longer “the rule in New Jersey”, and that the premise of municipal distribution of water as being anything other than a municipality providing an essential governmental service was no longer valid.
[brief] Indeed, reporting misconduct was an expected function of medical professionals at [...].  (See Da245 at 31:10-20).  interference claim clearly falls within the subject exclusion, but [...] fails to explain why it waited several years to take action on such a “clear” position.  In addition, the reason [...] puts forth as to why it waited to disclaim coverage are, at best, disingenuous.  [...] claims that [...]’s defamation claim was covered under the Policy because it was different from the tortious interference claim since defamation does not require an intent to injure.  However, if that were the case, [...] should not have sent a reservation of rights letter in July 2017 during a time when the initial complaint only asserted a claim for defamation.  [...] then filed the current Declaratory Action, which disclaimed coverage for the entire amended complaint, including the re-pled defamation claim, which is now contrary to its own position.
[brief] Mystic Isle Development Corp. v. Perski & Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310, 322 (1995).  The doctrine as originally applied to joinder of claims was designed "to eliminate delay, prevent harassment of a party and unnecessary clogging of the judicial system, avoid wasting the time and effort of the parties, and promote fundamental fairness."  Ibid.  (quoting Barres v. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 74 N.J. 461, 465 (1977) (Schreiber, J., dissenting)).  In considering the entire controversy doctrine’s application, courts are guided by the general principle that all claims arising from a particular transaction or series of transactions should be joined in a single action.  Brennan v. Orban, 145 N.J. 282, 290 (1996).  That mandate encompasses not only matters actually litigated but also other aspects of a controversy that might have been litigated and thereby decided in an earlier action.  Vision Mortg. Corp. v. Patricia J. Chiapperini, Inc., 307 N.J. Super. 48, 52 (App. Div. 1998), aff’d 156 N.J. 580 (1999).
[brief] Plaintiffs also point to two exhibits that “contain the exact same communications involving [...] and [...], as the emails include the same author/recipients with identical time stamps, meaning that the unreleased information in Exhibit 8 can be used to discern what’s contained in the redacted information in Exhibit 7. ”  (Id. (citing Pls.’ Supp’l Mem. Ex. E)).  *12  Plaintiffs observe that defendants used the Protective Order in this action to “claw-back” a document that is “clearly non-privileged ... [and] represents an effort by [...] to shield from discovery an entire category of information that is of particular relevance in a discrimination case” by identifying the redacted version on the privilege log as “Email requesting legal advice regarding personnel issues. ”  (Id. at 4-5 (citing id. Exs. F, G)).  Based on “[...]’s use of the Protective Order’s claw back feature to prevent Plaintiff’s from sharing with the Court a copy of the document that [...] claims was inadvertently produced, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court either substitute in or otherwise add to any exemplar in camera review the six documents identified in Exhibit H, which consist of five documents from [...]’s [the person responsible for Affirmative Action and EEO compliance] files as well as a corporate policy Analysis
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff-Appellant [...] respectfully requests that the November 11, 2022 Order (Pa187) granting Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration should be reversed.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  [...]  [...] [...]  Tel. & Fax: [...]  Dated: May 9, 2024  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant  Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division  Docket No. [...]  RANDY HOPKINS, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, Defendants-Respondents.
[brief] ................................................................. passim Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 207 N.J. 557, 25 A.P.3d 1103 (2011) ........................................... 21, 22, 23, 28 Gore v. Ind. Ins. Co., 876 N.E.2d 156 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) .............................................. 15 Hardy v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2009) .................................................. 36 Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840 (3d Cir. 1994) .......................................................... 48 Henderson v. Hertz Corp., 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2871, 2005 WL 4127090 (N.J. App. Div. June 22, 2006) .................................................... 16, 18 Henriquez v. Allied Interstate LLC, et al., [...] (D.N.J.) ..................................................... 4 Hoffman v. Encore Capital Grp., Inc., 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1627, 2008 WL 5245306 (App. Div. Dec. 18, 2008) .......................................................... 19 Houghton v. American Guaranty Life Ins. Co., 692 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1982) ..........................................................  48  Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 2011) ..........................................................  18  In re Resol. Of State Comm’n of Investigation, 108 N.J. 35 (1987)
[brief] Indeed, [...] interviewed both [...] and [...], the remaining staffing coordinators, about [...]’s June 24, 2020 conduct.  (Pa537-38).  Both commented on [...]’s challenging management style, yet neither were terminated.  (See Pa537 (Asselta noting there were “no hard feelings” and that [...] had apologized to her); Pa538 (Ruhl stated that [...]’s conduct was not “good for the department” and that [...]’s “tantrum” was not her typical behavior).  The trial court correctly highlighted this distinction:  “I don’t think that there are sufficient facts in this record that would permit a jury to see that it’s anything but a nondiscriminatory event. ” (See 1T 31:21-23).  Further, [...] never would have approved charge pay for only three of the five staffing coordinators.  [...], managing an already incredibly stressful office whose employees were constantly pulled in different directions as hospital-staffing demands remained fluid during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, lost sixty-six percent of her staff.  (Pa370 at 109:12-110:10).  The Trial Court recognized such an inconsistency.  (See 1T 31:2-7) (“it doesn’t stretch the imagination to understand that this was probably actions that Ms. [...] didn’t approve of because it left her with from a five-person office down to a two-person office in a very stressful time during which employment in the hospital was very much needed. ”).  [...]’s termination was not pretext for her alleged “complaints. ”  Rather, as the trial court correctly recognized, she was terminated for her theft of hospital funds.  [...] has failed to present any genuine issue of material fact to show that her termination was pretext for CEPA retaliation.
[brief] .................................................................................... | 35 | | Greer v. City of Philadelphia, 568 Pa. 244 (Sup. Ct. Pa 2002) ........ | 34 | | In re Estate of Miller, 90 N.J. 210 (1982) ................................ | 31 | | Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997) .................................. | 35
[brief] [...]’s Certification is therefore incorrect and misleading at ¶6 as well as at ¶10 and ¶13 where [...] stated “It should be noted that we declined to identify the block and lot to the general public or place the location in publicly accessible documents to avoid the then-owner of the property substantially raising its price."  As the email from [...] and attached Plans describe, the owner of [...] was well aware, as of 2017, that another developer was seeking to purchase it to construct affordable housing units.  Lastly, the statement of Lamatina in ¶13 of his Certification, wherein he states "it should be noted that we declined to identify the Block and Lot to the general public or place the location in publicly accessible documents to avoid the then-owner of the Property substantially raising the price" demonstrates, if true, that he was specifically avoiding the mandates of the Open Public Meetings Act in order to manipulate the price of a piece of property.  This is the type of “secrecy in public affairs [that] undermines the faith of the public in government” that the Act refers to and was designed to prevent.  [...]'s entire Motion is to "enforce" a non-existing agreement to allow seven units on 129 Kinderkamack, and paint the Borough as acting in bad faith.
[brief] On October 15, 2021, [...] filed the Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause against [...].  On October 27, 2021, the Order to Show Cause was granted with a return date of November 30, 2021.  (PPCIa044-49).  On November 30, 2021, Final Judgment by default was granted because [...] failed to respond.  (PPCIa076-79).  On November 16, 2022, [...] filed a Complaint in the Federal District Court for New Jersey (Case [...]) seeking declaratory relief against [...], [...], (a [...] alter ego company), and [...] and [...], the principals of [...] and Beacon Logistics, declaring the insurance policy to [...] does not provide coverage for the Incident and seeking reimbursement from the principals of [...] pursuant to personal indemnification agreements they signed in the event [...] must pay on the MCS-90 surety.
[brief] Receive documents from [...].  Work on supplemental request responses and document assembly.  Email [...] regarding [redacted].  | 1.5 | $570.00 | $29,073.22 | | 48| 9/12/22 |  Finalize responses to July 28, 2022 demand for production of documents.  Email [...] with [redacted]...  Email [...] to [redacted].  | 1.8 | $684.00 | $29,757.22 | | 49| 9/21/22 |  Prepare file [redacted] shared and exchanged for review and [redacted].  | 2 | $760.00 | $30,517.22 | | 50| 10/4/22 |  Assemble discovery documents into [redacted]...  Call and email [...] for access to the ShareFile from a few months back that was shared with counsel so I may use [redacted].  | 2.2 | $836.00 | $31,353.22 | | 51| 10/7/22 | Email [redacted]... by the client.  Email counsel requesting additional time/extension to serve expert report.  | .3 | $114.00 | $31,467.22 | | 52| 10/11/22 |  Email from [...] regarding [redacted]...  Draft Motion to Extend Discovery.  Draft Notice of Motion.  Draft Certification in support of the motion, Draft Cert. of Service.  Draft Proposed Order.  | 3.1 | $1,178.00 | $32,645.22 | | 53|
[brief] Plaintiff Engages in Protected Activity  During a January 22, 2023 Telephone Call with [...], by Seeking a Reasonable Accommodation and Family Medical Leave and Raising Issues of Unethical Conduct at the Firm  In Violation of the RPC’s.  On or about Sunday, January 22, 2023, in a telephone call, Plaintiff reported to [...] that Plaintiff had achieved remarkable revenue-generating results in the first month of 2023.  [...] told [...] that he, the Plaintiff, had already settled numerous cases in excess of $10 million dollars for calendar year 2023 and had, in the first 7 weeks of the Firm’s calendar year, exceeded his 2023 [...]-established attorney revenue target for the entire 2023 year.  During that call, [...] highly praised Plaintiff’s job performance and again discussed Plaintiff’s succession at [...] Law.  Da36, ¶ 53.  During that call, Plaintiff sought a brief leave to care for his sick child and a reasonable accommodation to protect himself because of his own disability during the Firm’s upcoming transition from remote work to in-office work.  The modest accommodation/leave the Plaintiff sought was to continue to work from home for a few more weeks.  During that conversation, Plaintiff [...] also objected to unethical conduct by the Firm in violation of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s Rules of Professional Conduct (hereinafter, “the RPC’s”).  As detailed below, within days of Plaintiff’s objections and requests for accommodation as well as family leave to care for Plaintiff’s ailing son, Defendants retaliated against the Plaintiff by secretly making plans to deny him the previously-planned succession of Plaintiff as manager of the entire Firm, by making plans to terminate him without notice, and by conspiring with a lawyer whose firm was representing the Plaintiff in personal matters, to steal Plaintiff’s clients in violation of the RPC’s.
[brief] Respondent’s strategy violates N.J.R.E. 608 (a).  Impeachment with specific instances of conduct is prohibited under Evidence Rule 608(a), which provides:  The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, provided, however, that the evidence relates only to the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and provided further that evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.  Except as otherwise provided by Rule 609 and by paragraph (b) of this rule, a trait of character cannot be proved by specific instances of conduct.  (Emphasis added).  The irrelevant, disparaging, and unsupported aspersions advanced by Respondent should not have been considered by the Court.  They diverted the Court’s attention from the controlling issues and inflamed and antagonized the Court to the prejudice of the Petitioner, resulting in an unjust and unfair trial.
[brief] It is admitted that Plaintiff subsequently executed a Satisfaction Piece.  Although such Satisfaction Piece contained a note to return the filed document to her legal office, Executrix does not recall preparing such document, receiving such document once filed, or locating such documents within her records or that of the Plaintiff.  It is admitted that the [...] Judgment and [...] Judgment were discovered as part of the title searches performed by the intended purchaser of the Property.  Prior to that occurrence, Executrix was unaware of the remaining clouds upon title to the Property represented by the [...] Judgment and [...] Judgment.  As [...] refused to vacate or mark the [...] Judgment satisfied, the underlying action to strike the [...] Judgment was necessary.  While in hindsight it would have been prudent and cost-effective to settle with Appellant for a reduced amount upon the [...] Judgment, such resolution was not pursued to conclusion and the subsequent actions unfolded as set forth in the procedural history.
[brief] See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(1) violence as a child – witnessing several shootings and his mother getting jumped and beaten outside their building.  (3T:22-20 to 25-20)  (Da 84, 111-12, 117)  [...]’s biological father was “a very well-respected drug dealer in the community” who was incarcerated for most of his childhood and would often disappear and then reappear in his life without warning.
[brief] Of Counsel: [...], Esq. (011041994)  On the Brief: [...], Esq. (017621980)  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED .....  ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...........................................................................1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................................4 STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................5 STANDARD OF REVIEW ...............................................................................19 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..................................................................21 LEGAL ARGUMENT .......................................................................................23  POINT I: THE COURT BELOW APPLIED  THE WRONG STANDARD OF LAW IN RULING THAT PORTIONS OF THE ORDINANCE ARE INVALID AS A MATTER OF LAW (Raised below at DA 52a at ¶ 8; DA382a at Interrogatory No. 13; Transcript 6:23-7:8; T.27:9 – 28:4) .............................................23 POINT II: THE DECISION BELOW CANNOT BE SUSTAINED BECAUSE IT WAS ENTERED AS A RESULT OF A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IMPROPERLY AND NECESSARILY RELIES ON A FINDING OF A MATERIAL FACT THAT WAS THE SUBJECT OF A GENUINE DISPUTE (Raised Below at DA 93a – 96a; DA 520a at ¶ 46 in conjunction with DA 934a at ¶ 46; Transcript 25:13-24) .........................................................31  POINT III: THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED TO [...] MUST BE REVERSED ON ITS MERITS (Raised below at DA 1a et seq., DA 90a et seq., DA 931a et seq.; Transcript 19:1 – 29:23; Briefs below of the [...]) ..............................................................................................................36 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................48
[brief] (1T at 22:21-25.)  “When a trial court issues reasons for its decision, it ‘must state clearly [its] factual findings and correlate them with relevant legal conclusions, so that parties and the appellate courts [are] informed of the rationale underlying th[ose] conclusion[s].’”  Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran, 445 N.J. Super. 574, 594-95 (App. Div. 2016) (alterations in original) (quoting Monte v. Monte, 212 N.J. Super. 557, 565 (App. Div. 1986)).  Failure to do so may result in a remand for a further articulation of the trial court’s reasons for deciding as it did.
[brief] ”  *State v. Williams*, 192 N.J. 1, 14, 926 A.2d 340 (2007).  The suppression of evidence “sends the strongest possible message that constitutional misconduct will not be tolerated and therefore is intended to encourage fidelity to the law. ”  Ibid.  We do not apply the rule indiscriminately.  *State v. Hamlett*, 449 N.J. Super. 159, 177, 155 A.3d 1038 (App. Div. 2017) (explaining the New Jersey courts apply the exclusionary rule “only to evidence obtained in violation of the exclusionary rule “only to evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional right”).  “Suppression of evidence ... has always been our last resort, not our first impulse. ”  *State v. Presley*, 436 N.J. Super 440, 459, 94 A.3d 921 (app. Div. 2014) (quoting *State v. Gioe*, 401 N.J. Super. 331, 339.950 A.2d 930 (App. Div. 2008))  We apply the exclusionary rule when the benefits of deterrence outweigh its substantial costs.  *Gioe*, 401 N.J. Super at 339 950 A.2d 930.  In the instant case, there were no societal substantial costs because the crimes that led to the violation of the Fourth Amendment were only committed by a police detective, a court clerk and [...], [...]’s former counsel, not [...].
[brief] Contrary to Defendants’ arguments, [...] never agreed or acknowledged that he had been paid in full, and never agreed to accept the $330,000 partial payment as payment in full of the debts then owed to him on the First and Second Loans.  1T144-10 to 24.  Instead, on that day, [...] and [...] agreed to restructure the balance of Defendants’ debt by entering into a new, negotiated loan agreement.
[brief] H678a Holm-148: Excerpts from The Appraisal of Real Estate, 14th ed., by the [...] (SOICR p. 12)  ...........................................  H679a Holm-149: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-NCF-157, that [...] is qualified as an expert and referred to her rebuttal testimony and CV attached to that (SOICR p. 12)  ............  H684a Holm-150: [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-NCF-160, identified documents and materials reviewed for her testimony to the Zoning Board, attaching (SOICR p. 12)  ..........................
[brief] Nor is there any indication that by enacting AICRA to manage and expeditiously resolve PIP disputes by medical providers, the Legislature intended to change the intent and remedial goals of the IFPA.  AICRA also contributes to the public policy of aggressively confronting insurance fraud by supplementing, not supplanting, existing fraud prevention measures like the IFPA and RICO.  The Legislature recognized that, whether in the form of inappropriate medical treatments, inflated claims, staged accidents, or any other form, insurance fraud must be “uncovered and vigorously prosecuted,” and “greater consolidation of agencies” was needed for “sufficient coordination to aggressively combat fraud,” which thus led to the creation of the OIFP. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-l. 1.  Moreover, AICRA calls for more, not less, statewide fraud fighting capabilities.  Thus, arbitration of IFPA claims would be contrary to both the spirit and the letter of not only the IFPA, but also the AICRA.  See N.J.S.A. 17:33A-9 (requiring referrals to the BFD and OIFP of alleged violations for investigation).  A decision to send affirmative insurance fraud actions to PIP no-fault dispute resolution proceedings will negatively impact the fight against insurance fraud, and will severely weaken the collective ability of carriers, the Department, and the OIFP to combat insurance fraud within the State of New Jersey.  The Legislature did not so intend.  CONCLUSION
[brief] The Investigation  Through data from the Chrysler’s GPS, cellphone records and surveillance video, the following facts were established.  [...], [...], and [...] headed to New Jersey after picking up the red Chrysler from the Augusta airport in Georgia on the morning of November 1, 2020.  (13T 26-10 to 27-1; 13T 32-16 to 33-2; 13T 89-18 to 89-21)  The group arrived in New Jersey on the morning of November 2, 2020, stopping at a Wawa market in Piscataway at approximately 9:00 a.m. (13T 63-3 to 63-9), and checking into the Raritan Hotel around 11:00 a.m. (9T 95-2 to 98-7; 11T 60-21 to 61-3)  All three men left the hotel in the red Chrysler about an hour later.  (9T 95-2 to 98-7; 13T 91-17 to 92-2)  [...] was wearing the NASA jacket and red sneakers at the Wawa, when he checked into the hotel, and when he left the hotel at noon.  Between noon and the time of the shooting, the car traveled around Middlesex and Essex Counties, periodically stopping back at the hotel.
[brief] **Factor 5 – Hiring, Supervising And Paying Assistants**  Respondent misleads the Court by turning [...]’s answer that Petitioner had “no known assistants” to mean that [...] did not know if she had assistants or not.  (T102-25 to T103-17).  Simply put, no means no.  As acknowledged by Respondent in its own Brief, the Petitioner confirmed that any assistants used were provided by [...] such as liaison officers, the bailiff and the court administrator.  (Rb16).  **Factor 6 – Continuing Relationship**
[brief] Courts “do not engage in a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis when a defendant has automatic standing to challenge a search,” such an analysis is only applied “in determining whether a defendant has a protectible Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7 right of privacy in a novel class of objects or category of places. ”  Randolph, 228 N.J. at 583-84.  See State v. Armstrong, 463 N.J. Super. 576, 592 (App. Div.) (explaining that “the two concepts — possessing a reasonable expectation of privacy and standing to challenge a search and seizure — are not congruent”), certif. denied, 244 N.J. 242 (2020).
[brief] In response to Appellant’s foreclosure complaint, on September 20, 2023, [...] filed a contesting answer (the “Answer”).  (Pa217 at ¶9.)  On October 3, 2023, Respondent, assignee to [...], filed a motion to intervene and to dismiss.  (Pa217 at ¶10.)  On November 20, 2023, Appellant, [...], and Respondent entered into a consent order (the “Consent Order”), substituting Respondent in place of [...] and withdrawing the motion to intervene, among other relief.  (Pa217 at ¶13.)  On November 29, 2023, the Court granted the Consent Order.