ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 1.  POLICY STATEMENT FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO NEW JERSEY LAW ENFORCEMENT  Bias incidents are increasing throughout the State and the nation.  As a result, communities have been gripped by uncertainty, tension, and conflict.  The promulgation of the Attorney General’s Bias Incident Investigation Standards (Standards) serves as recognition that the unique nature of suspected or confirmed bias incidents requires special handling by the New Jersey law enforcement community.  Crimes with a component of intimidation based on race, color, religion, gender, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, national origin, or ethnicity manifest themselves in a wide spectrum of anti-social activities.  These bias incidents jeopardize the active and open pursuit of freedom and opportunity.  They erode, undermine, and attack the identity and heritage of our citizens.  They also dehumanize people based solely on group affiliation and shake the very foundations of our cultural and religious institutions, as well as our longstanding pursuit of tolerance and acceptance.  Therefore, it shall be the policy of New Jersey law enforcement to bring the investigative and enforcement elements of the law enforcement community into quick action following any and all suspected or confirmed bias incidents.  There shall also be special emphasis placed on victim assistance and community relations in order to reduce victim trauma and community tension or fear.  All suspected or confirmed bias incidents are serious and should be treated as such.  Bias incident investigations shall be conducted in a timely fashion using all appropriate resources to rapidly determine the facts and circumstances surrounding each incident.  Careful attention should be given to identifying the motive and cause of the bias Page 1 of 16 incident and to identifying suspects.  Referrals to the County Prosecutors’ Offices of Victim-Witness Advocacy or to the Division on Civil Rights shall be made as appropriate.  The proper investigation of a suspected or confirmed bias incident is the responsibility of each New Jersey law enforcement agency confronted with this problem.
[brief] There is a reference to a "map of Keansburg Heights" prepared by [...] dated June 3, 1909, and filed with the [...] on June 25, 1909.  The map includes according to the deed “… including all the property marked beach on sub-map extending from Raritan Bay back to the lot lines in extending the entire width of the sub-map from Lot 35 in Block E on the east to Lot 30 in Block G on the west” (emphasis added).  There is no reference in this deed to any conveyance of ownership of a Riparian right, a Riparian Grant or land lying under the water in the Raritan Bay.  Lot 3 and Lot 3.01 are assessed to the [...].  However, the [...] was never a grantee in any deed from either the State of New Jersey or from a record owner of Lot 3.01.
[brief] Affidavit of [...]....................................................................Pa86  Affidavit of [...]...................................................................Pa88  Affidavit of [...]...................................................................Pa91  Affidavit of [...].......................................................................Pa93  Affidavit of [...]...................................................................Pa95  Affidavit of [...]....................................................................Pa97  Affidavit of [...].......................................................................Pa99  Affidavit of [...].....................................................................Pa101  Affidavit of [...].........................................................................Pa103 Affidavit of [...]......................................................................Pa105 Affidavit of [...]..................................................................Pa107
[brief] Pa568 (Final Award listing the last hearing date of the PTA Arbitration as August 24, 2023); Da9-Da10 (November 17, 2023 Judgment for the award issued in [...]’s arbitration with the owner).  It is entirely possible that [...] would have recovered from [...] all of the money [...] owed to [...] and, as a result, paid [...]’s claim in full.  Instead judgment was entered only for $435,087.70, a fraction of the amount [...] owes [...].  Pa907-Pa922.  If [...] had desired to resolve the Hackensack Project claims in the PTA Arbitration, it could have easily waited to commence the PTA Arbitration until after its arbitration with the owner was completed and judgment entered, but instead it demanded that [...] submit to the PTA Arbitration on the claims under the PTA that existed at the time—to the exclusion of claims arising from the performance of constructions contracts assigned to [...] under the PTA.
[brief] Exhibit N: Approval dated April 23, 2007 (omitted – see 313a)  Exhibit O: Deed dated October 23, 2014 (omitted – see 358a)  Exhibit P: Transcript of Decision on Sept. 29, 2020 (omitted)  Exhibit Q: Order entered Sept. 29, 2020 (omitted – see 1a)  Exhibit R: Excerpt from Expert Report (omitted – see 280a) | Order Description | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Order entered September 29, 2020 (incorrectly Dated June 29, 2020) | 1a | | Order entered December 7, 2022 | 3a | | Order entered January 20, 2023 | 16a | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Bryan v. Shah**, 351 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.N.J., 2005) | 19, 21 | | **Campbell v. Hastings**, 348 N.J. Super. 264, 270 (App. Div. 2002) | 17 | | **Davis v. Brickman Landscaping**, 219 N.J. 395, 407 (2014) | 17 | | **Estate of Chin by Chin v. St Barnabas Med Ctr.**, 160 N.J. 454, 469-470 (1999) | 17 | | **Giantonnio v. Taccard**, 291 N.J. Super. 31, 43 (App. Div. 1996) | 17 | | **Golomore Associates v. New Jersey State Highway Authority**, 173 N.J. Super. 55 (App. Div. 1980) | 29 | | **Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley**, 168 N.J. 398 (2001) | 18 | | **Sanzari v. Rosenfeld**, 34 N.J. 128, 142 (1961) | 17, 18 | | Rules | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | R. 4:103, 104 | 2 | | Evid. R. 701 | 39 |
[brief] The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Selecting A Careful Remedy That Temporarily Maintains The Status Quo.  Although Appellants do not challenge the trial court’s fact finding on the equitable factors, they erroneously challenge the scope of preliminary relief that [...] ordered.  Appellants primarily contend that even if the trial court were correct to enjoin enforcement of Amended Policy 5756, the trial court erred in restraining Appellants from otherwise “amending, modifying, or superseding any portion of [Original] Policy 5756” as the administrative action proceeds.
[directive] Amendments  As with any new policy, unanticipated questions have arisen since the issuance of these Guidelines.  Therefore, I am reissuing the directive and guidelines, with necessary amendments to address the questions that have arisen regarding the original guidelines.  1These records retention schedules can be found online at: http://www.nj archives.org/links/retention.html  Attorney General Guidelines - Evidence Retention - Page 3 January 2011
[brief] Moreover, the lower court failed to address its lack of subject matter jurisdiction and erroneously claimed personal jurisdiction exists simply if a person knows that a lawsuit was filed but never served.  As this brief shows, the law does is completely contrary to that decision.  The issue on appeal is whether a court can reinstate a complaint dismissed for violating R 1:20A-6 when it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and by doing so the court reinstated a void complaint to issue a void judgment upon.  The appellate court can plainly see that the resurrected complaint is still void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as it omits any allegation that Pre-Action Notice was served, because it was not.  As subject matter jurisdiction can be raised anytime, even on appeal, and as it was raised to the lower court but ignored, then on that issue alone reversal of the reinstatement and vacating the judgment is proper.
[directive] Do you understand that by pleading guilty and admitting that you used or were in possession of a firearm that is a , (type of firearm) while in the course of committing or attempting to commit one of the crimes, you are waiving your right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that you used or possessed a firearm during the course of committing or attempting to commit one of the crimes?  [Sí/Yes]  [No/No]  [No corresponde 3.  ¿Corresponde al cargo imputado según la Ley Graves alguna otra /NA] disposición obligatoria de sentencia que estipule un período más largo durante el cual no pueda recibir libertad condicional (v.g., NERA, Tercera vez, Homicidio)?
[brief] **Discounts reflect the economic reality of selling interests in a closely held business on the open market, and are not a punishment to [...].**  New Jersey law is clear that discounts reflect economic reality, and their *absence* would punish the payor and reward the payee.  Whether or not fair value (undiscounted) or fair market value (discounted) is to be awarded is a question of law for the Court.  See *Sipko v. Koger, Inc.*, 251 N.J. 162, 180 (2022) (“determinations of what discounts or premiums the determination of fair value may include, or must exclude” are “questions of law”).
[brief] Monek v. Borough of South River, 354 N.J. Super. 442 (App. Div. 2002) ..................41  Namerow v. PediatriCare Assocs., LLC, 461 N.J. Super. 133 (Super. Ct., Sept. 28, 2018) ...........................................................................................................30  Palatine I v. Planning Bd., 133 N.J. 546 (1993) .................................................................39  Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J.  Super. 378, (App. Div. 2015) ......................................................................................................................26  Raspantini v. Arocho, 364 N.J. Super. 528 (App. Div. 2003) .............................................42  Reider Cmty. v. N. Brunswick, 227 N.J. Super. 214 (App. Div. 1988) ...............................27  Rivera v. Valley Hosp., Inc., 252 N.J. 1 (2022) ....................................................................25  STATUTES AND RULES
[brief] **OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED** | Judgment, Order Or Ruling Being Appealed | Pages | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Summary Judgment Motion And Class Certification Motion Hearings Of 9-22-23 | 1T1-1T63| | Summary Judgment Motion And Class Certification Motion  Order And Opinion Filed 2-1-24 | 931a-954a| | Intermediate Decisions, If Any, Pertinent To The Appeal | n/a | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] \(^3\) Pa316 at 391:2-14 (admitting Hackensack Completion Subcontract into evidence). from $899K), and it is the Project on which [...] put in its most substantial proofs as to offsets or credits due to [...] for site issues / unpaid construction work.  [...] accuses [...] of doing “nothing more than stitch[ing] together pieces of [...]’s Statement of Counterclaim. ”  Opp. at 30.  But each piece of [...]’s pleadings in the First Arbitration gives rise to mandatory offsetting claims, see R. 4:7-1 (failure to offset debt or demand results in waiver), and signals that [...], in fact, knew about its ripe Hackensack claims and either only brought the claim in small pieces (while largely holding it back), or opted to hold it back completely.
[brief] ”  *City of Atl. City v. Trupos*, 201 N.J. at 462.  “Whether the matters are the same or substantially related *must be based in fact.*”  *City of Atl. City v. Trupos*, 201 N.J. at 464 (emphasis added).  Here, Respondents fail to distinguish or even address *Trupos* and provide no evidence that the current case, involving misappropriation of funds and the failure to repay loans, bears any substantial similarity to the prior matters.  In fact, the trial court agreed that the matters are not substantially similar as they share no common facts, parties, witnesses, or causes of action.  (T21:4-17).  *Again*, under *Trupos*, matters are deemed “substantially related”  *only* if: (i) the lawyer for whom disqualification is sought received confidential information from the former client that can be used against that client in the subsequent representation of parties adverse to the former client, or (ii) facts relevant to the prior representation are both relevant and material to the subsequent representation.  See, e.g., Trupos, 201 N.J. at 467.  Respondents failed to demonstrate that any confidential information was revealed to [...] and that the information can be used against Respondents in this unrelated case, or that the facts relevant to the prior representation are both relevant and material to this case.  The matters simply do not involve the same transaction or legal dispute.  Respondents have not demonstrated that there is any risk that confidential factual information obtained in the prior representation would materially advance Appellants’ position in the subsequent matter.  Respondents cite no authority that permits disqualification pursuant to RPC 1.9(c), which the court relied on in conjunction with RPC 1.9(a) in rendering its decision.  (T27:10-21).  Thus, Respondents have failed to demonstrate substantial similarity, which is fatal to their disqualification motion.
[brief] On December 6, 2023, a Union County Grand Jury returned Indictment No. [...], charging defendant-respondent [...] with second-degree possession of CDS, to with Cocaine, with the intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) (count one); third-degree possession of CDS, to with cocaine, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1) (count two); third-degree possession of CDS, to wit Fentanyl, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1) (count three); third-degree possession of CDS, to wit fentanyl, with the intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(3) (count four); fourth-degree possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:36-3 (count five).  (Pa1 to 3).  On March 28, 2024, defendant filed a Notice of Motion to Suppress physical evidence.  (Pa4 to 5).  On June 10, 2024, an evidentiary hearing was held before the Honorable [...], J.S. C. (1T).  On June 24, 2024, the court read its decision on the record, granting defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence that was seized.  (2T3-19 to 20-24; Pa6).  --- 1 Pa refers to the State’s appendix.  1T refers to the motion to suppress hearing transcript dated June 10, 2024; 2T refers to the motion to suppress decision transcript dated June 24, 2024.  The State’s subsequent application for a stay was denied.  (2T20-25 to 4).  This Motion for Leave to Appeal follows.
[brief] The requirement of this rule is, by its very language, “mandatory. ”  The consequences of the failure to object below is provided by R. 1:7-2.  Rule 1:7-2 provides in relevant part that:  “For the purpose of reserving questions for review or appeal relating to rulings or orders of the court . . . , a party, at the time the ruling or order is made or sought, shall make known to the court specifically the action which the party desires the court to take or the party’s objection to the action taken and the grounds therefor. ” (emphasis added).  See also Gilborges v. Wallace, 153 N.J. Super. 121, 143 (App. Div. 1997) (“[w]hile we recognize that we might permit the issue to be raised anew, we consider that in this case the interests of injustice do not permit the further delay which will follow injection of this new issue with possible further appeals with respect thereto. ”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 78 N.J. 342 (1978).  (emphasis added).  The Court should similarly rule here.
[brief] [...] moved to compel arbitration.  The Judge found Plaintiff bought an expensive new car, knew he had to sign a contract in connection with the purchase particularly because he needed to finance part of the purchase price and wanted the benefits of the warranty.  Plaintiff expected the financing terms to be set forth in a written contract.  He asked before he signed where the documents were and was told they would be emailed to him.  He then signed the iPad screen.  The Judge concluded Plaintiff’s actions on the sale date revealed he chose to sign the contract without reading it.  He knew the transaction would be governed by a written agreement but chose to sign the iPad without requesting that its contents be displayed to him or demanding a hard copy before signing the iPad.  Plaintiff understood that his signature was necessary on the iPad for the sale to occur and did not insist on reading it.  He was bound by the contract.
[directive] Background  As required by N.J.S.A. 52:17B-245, the Attorney General, in consultation with the [...] (“[...]”), developed a survey concerning the Sexual Assault Forensic Examination (“SAFE”) kits in the possession of law enforcement agencies in New Jersey (“AG SAFE survey”).  The AG SAFE survey was designed to closely follow a survey on the same topic conducted by the [...] (“[...]”).  For the AG SAFE Survey, all law enforcement agencies, including State agencies, responsible for the collection, storage, and maintenance of SAFE kits were required to respond to the survey.  In addition, survey questions were designed specifically for County Prosecutors and Forensic Nurse Examiners (“FNEs”) to answer on the procedures surrounding SAFE kits.  This report details the results of the AG SAFE survey – identifying the volume of total kits, tested and untested kits, Hold kits (those not sent for testing at the request of the victim or the prosecutor), and provides an overview of the policies and procedures surrounding the handling and storage of SAFE kits.  New Jersey Sexual Assault Response Overview
[brief] \textsuperscript{142}  See, e.g., \textit{Varacallo v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co.}, 332 N.J. Super. 31 (App. Div. 2000); \textit{Elias v. Ungar's Food Prod., Inc.}, 252 F.R.D. 233, 238 (D.N.J. 2008).  \textsuperscript{143}
[brief] ”); *Jackson v. Manasquan Sav. Bank*, 271 N.J. Super. 136, 144 n.8 (Law Div. 1993); see also 25 Williston, Contracts (Lord ed., 2002), § 67:2 at 186.  Once a contract is terminated, however, it is voided and a party no longer has rights or obligations under it.  *Mossberg v. Standard Oil Co.*, 98 N.J. Super. 393, 405 (Law Div. 1967) (“It is basic contract law that when a contract is terminated the rights and obligations under that contract are also terminated.
[brief] 44  Regency Gardens v. Bd. of Adj., slip op., A-2283-13 (App. Div. Aug. 27, 2015) ...........................................................................  28 Reich v. Fort Lee Board of Adj., 414 N.J. Super. 483 (App. Div. 2009) ..........................................................  19 Rocky Hill Citizens v. Planning Board, 406 N.J. Super. 384 (App. Div. 2009) .......................................................... 20 Roman Catholic Diocese of Newark v. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 47 N.J. 211 (1966) ...................................................................................... 32 Salt & Light Co. v. Willingboro, 423 N.J. Super. 282 (App. Div. 2011), certif. denied, 210 N.J. 108 (2012) ............................................................... 22, 37 Sica v. Wall Twp. Bd. of Adj., 127 N.J. 158 (1992) ....................................... passim Sunrise Dev., Inc. v. Princeton Bd. of Adj., slip op., A-5717-18 (App. Div. June 24, 2020) ......................................................................... 34 Taxpayers Assn. v. Weymouth Twp., 80 N.J. 6 (1976) .................................... 22 Wawa Food Market v. Ship Bottom Planning Bd., 227 N.J. Super. 29 (App. Div. 1988) ......................................................................................... 47 Statutes N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.79 .................................................................................. 28 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 ....................................................................................... 23 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5 ............................................................................... 48 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-22 .................................................................................... 36 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-37 .................................................................................... 36 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.5 ............................................................................... 8 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-51 .................................................................................. 47 N.J.S.A. 40:55D-67 .................................................................................... 36 Regulations N.J.A.C. 5:23-4.14 .................................................................8, 11, 28, 46 N.J.A.C. 8:36-1.3 ........................................................................... 29, 46 Treatises [...], N.J. Zoning and Land Use Administration, (Gann 2024 Ed.) ............................................................................. 20 [...] v. [...], et als. and [...] v. [...], et als [...] Index to Appendix Montville Land Development Application, dated February 20, 2020 ................................................................. Pa1
[brief] [...] made specific findings as to [...]’s and [...]’s liability:  [...] associated with each other with cooperation, coordination.  They worked with their accountants to delineate what was happening and what money was available, what money wasn’t available….  [...] Wilf is aimed more toward payroll, benefits, and things of that nature.  Hiring important and key people.  That he reviews financial statements not only of [...], but of the entities that are the Wilf owned entities that are intertwined with [...] ….  [...] is a tax lawyer, he reviews the financials, the drafts and the financial statements.  And [...] is the self-described master chef, … he’s the conductor, he’s the overseer of this -- not only this Wilf project, but many other Wilf projects, to a very large extent.  And the three of them work together … the Wilfs operated on consensus, … this was a very coordinated team.  (198T28:16-31:14; see also 223T51:23-54:12; 223T99:7-13; 225T56:15-58:21)  (223T52:20-54:7)  Perhaps one of the most vivid examples of [...] Wilf’s dishonesty and wanton and willful disregard for [...]’s rights occurred immediately following the issuance of this Court’s December 2006 decision.
[brief] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  Plaintiff-Respondent, : APPELLATE DIVISION v. : DOCKET NO. [...]  [...], : CRIMINAL ACTION  Defendant-Appellant.  :  On Appeal from an Order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a Jury  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY