ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 41, 64 Eggleston v. Fox, 96 N.J. Super. 142 (App. Div. 1967)  63 Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (1926)  47 Graziano v. Grant, 326 N.J. Super. 328 (App. Div. 1999)  44 Home Properties v. Ocino Inc., 341 N.J. Super. 604 (App. Div. 2001)  40 Hyland v. Fonda, 44 N.J. Super. 180 (App. Div. 1957)  63 Hundred East Credit Corp. v. Schuster, 212 N.J. Super. 350, 358 (App. Div. 1986).  30
[brief] There should NOT have been any rationalization for $124,399, nor for Court allowing $104,180 based on $10,902.24 in Oct. 2022 Order & $93,277.54 in Mar. 7, ‘23 Order, for 1-year’s work to resolve Exceptions to what should have been a straightforward Trust accounting & Co-Trustee resignation by [...].  To add insult to injury, [...]’s billed legal work from April to Oct. 25, 2022 should have been completely avoided if [...] & [...] heeded communications by me & Mr.  Ambrose in April/May 2022 NOT to file May ‘22 Verified Complaint with formal Trust Accounting since there was a detailed 3-Way Settlement, that they then refused to negotiate, based on Apr. 18/25, ’22, agreement by [...] & me (324a-325a)(327a-328a).  They also FAILED to heed my communications from July to Sept. 2022, prior to any Hearing & Order, to join a 3-Way Settlement.  It was all addressed in Nov. 4th Cert. that did not justify any of his legal work (Exh. “V”, p. 6-14, Conclusions, p. 17-18) (308a-316a, 329a-320a)(Exh. “V”, App. Exh. “D-“F”) (324a-342a) (Exh. “V”, App. Exh. “G”) (208a-226a)
[brief] A.  The Standard of Review  This appeal concerns mixed questions of fact and law.  The Appellate Division reviews issues of law de novo and accords no deference to the trial judge’s legal conclusions.  Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013).  For mixed questions of law and fact, the Appellate Division gives deference to “the supported factual findings of the trial court, but review[s] de novo the lower court’s application of any legal rules to such factual findings. ”  State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 577 (2015) (citations omitted).  In an appeal from a non-jury trial, appellate courts “give deference to the trial court that heard the witnesses, sifted the competing evidence, and made reasoned conclusions. ”  Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015).  “Reviewing appellate courts should ‘not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge’ unless convinced that those findings and conclusions were ‘so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. ”  Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) (citations omitted).  Any “error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result, but the appellate court may, in the interests of justice, notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial or appellate court. ”  R. 2:10-2; see also Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.1 on R. 2:10-2 (2022).  All error, including both plain error and harmful error, is tested by the standard set forth in R. 2:10-2, which is whether the error is “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  Id. B.  There Were No Material Facts In Dispute That Precluded The Entry Of Summary Judgment  In Defendant’s Favor  The standard of review regarding a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment is de novo.
[brief] The dangerous defects were known to [...] months before [...] was injured by the defective Ozurdex on November 6, 2018.  --- ¹“Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff, Dear Health Care Provider letters: Improving Communication of Important Safety Information”  Da0620.  The phrase “*Contains Nonbinding Recommendations*" is printed at the top of every page of the FDA Guidance.  [Exhibit 4 throughout.  Emphasis in original.]  B.
[brief] d.  Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Allegation Against [...] Does Not Meet the Heightened Pleading Requirements of R. 4:5-8 (Pa80, Pa82, Pa84, Pa86).  Finally, the allegation that [...] “misrepresented and concealed material information from [...] and other stakeholders for material gain” is not factually supported in the Complaint.  Under New Jersey Court Rule, R. 4:5-8, allegations of fraud and misrepresentation must be made with particularity.  Mere conclusory statements are insufficient to satisfy the particularity requirement of R. 4:5-8.  Rego Indus., Inc. v. Am. Mod. Metals Corp., 91 N.J. Super. 447, 456 (App. Div. 1966).  If “the allegations do not set forth with specificity[,] or ... constitute as pleaded, satisfaction of the elements of legal or equitable fraud[,]” a court may dismiss the complaint.  State, Dep’t of Treasury, Div. of Inv. ex rel. McCormac v. Qwest Commc’ns Intern., Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 469, 484-85 (App. Div. 2006); see also Lippmann v. Hydro-Space Tech., Inc., 77 N.J. Super. 497, 505 (App. Div. 1962) (finding that a complaint which “consisted of no more than only general and entirely conclusory charges of fraud” fails to plead such material facts as necessary to state a claim upon which relief could be granted).  Here, Plaintiffs-Appellants allege that [...] “misrepresented and concealed material information from [...] and other stakeholders for material gain” but does not provide the particulars as to what [...] misrepresented to whom, and when and where the misrepresentations were made.  Thus, a claim against [...] involving an allegation of misrepresentation of fraud fails the pleading requirements of R 4:5-8 and must be dismissed.  II.
[brief] ” (3T: 298:09 – 315:21).  The Court ultimately denied this request.  Id.  Respondent also made a Motion for Directed Verdict on the issue of Appellant’s negligence, which was also denied by the Court.  (3T: 315:22 – 318:07).  During the conference, the parties and the Court all missed the fact that Appellant’s request for the Aggravation Charge had been skipped.
[brief] (7T 20-11 to 14).  While portraying an Audi traveling northbound on Hickory Street and turning left onto Taylor, (7T 20-22 to 25), the video footage depicted the crowd scatter from the area.  (7T 26-9 to 17).  [...], an [...] sergeant assigned to its Homicide Task Force, confirmed that they were unable to determine the license plate number of the Audi or identify the occupants of the car by watching the video footage.
[brief] The Court noted that in order to defeat a Motion for Summary Judgment, the opponent must “‘come forward with evidence’ that creates a genuine issue of material fact. ”  Cortez, citing Horizon Blue Cross/Blue Shield of NJ v. State, 425 N.J. Super. 1, 32, 26 N.J. Tax 575, 39 A. 3d 228 (App. Div.) (quoting, Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 529, 66 A. 2d 146), certif. denied, 211 N.J. 608, 50 A. 3d 41 (2022).
[brief] Inappropriately establishing -- and then arguing to the jury in summation - - that defendant was in violation of an NJSP SOP by having business cards that looked somewhat like an official wallet ID had no legal bearing on a case that was prosecuted solely based on misuse or mis-retention of the actual wallet ID.  What the State was doing was trying to surreptitiously expand the allegations against defendant in a manner that the judge made clear would be improper to do.  As noted in other points, the State had a weak case regarding the retention or display of the actual wallet ID.  The video and photographic evidence regarding the display of the wallet ID was so blurry as to be essentially useless.  There was no actual proof that defendant had not in fact lost his wallet ID in January 2016 and never recovered it.  Consequently, the admission of this bad-act evidence was especially harmful in this case and was clearly capable of influencing the jury’s verdict because it improperly sought to distract the jury’s attention away from the real issue about the wallet ID and toward a different alleged (but not indicted) “misconduct” of defendant’s.
[brief] Specifically, [...] submitted the Certification of its counsel in opposition to the motion for leave to amend and in support of the cross-motion to dismiss and seven (7) exhibits, labeled A through G, were attached thereto for the trial court’s consideration.  [FEDa8-147].  In that regard, Exhibits A, B, and C are all pleadings filed by Appellants themselves in this action.  Exhibit A is the Appellants’ Verified Complaint, Exhibit B is the Certification of Appellants’ counsel submitted in support of Appellants’ motion for leave to file the First Amended Complaint and Exhibit C is the Appellants’ First Amended Complaint.  [FEDa13-105].  Exhibits E and F are Orders and accompanying Opinions issued by the trial court in the Underlying Action with regard to the [...]’ motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss Appellants’ First Amended Complaint.
[brief] As to the unpublished decision, in Mollica v. [...], A-2467-17 (App. Div. Oct. 17, 2016) (Pa407), the Appellate Division found that a council member should not have participated in a vote on an Ordinance adopted by the governing body of the [...] because the council member owned property immediately adjacent to a park that was preserved by the Ordinance and his interest was not shared in common with any other members of the public.  In this case, there were no such facts; rather any benefit inuring to Defendant [...] as a tenant on [...] was the same benefit enjoyed by any other tenant in the area where flex parking existed.
[brief] In their joint amicus brief, the [...] ([...]) and the [...] ([...]) argue that the State failed to prove that police had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the vehicle based on specific and articulable facts.  Further, the [...] and [...] contend that racial profiling significantly undermines trust in the criminal justice system and makes the state less safe for everyone.  Amicus [...], Director of the [...], argues that there was no rational basis to believe that the men’s non-reaction to the officer shining the light into the car had any bearing on suspicion.
[brief] The complaints included several other claims against the Board, the Township, and the Mayor and Council.  The two individual complaints, which are nearly identical, were consolidated by the trial court under Docket # [...] by Order dated February 2, 2022.  By Case Management Order (“CMO”) of April 11, 2022, the matter was bifurcated, so that the first two counts (Prerogative Writ action) would be tried first.  Da277.  This appeal is taken from the Order and Statement of Reasons dated December 23, 2022, (“Order” or “Statement of Reasons”) issued after that trial on October 27, 2022.  Da348.  The Order reversed the Board decision and remanded to the Board to consider conditions to attach to the approval, but prohibited the Board from denying the use variances, any c variances or requiring any reduction in the number of units.  That remand hearing was concluded and a resolution dated March 1, 2023, included the conditions approved by the Board.  Da359.  There was no challenge to any conditions filed.
[brief] Id.  The US Fire Policy is not a standard automobile liability policy – it is a commercial general liability policy that provided non-owner/hired auto coverage as a supplemental coverage.  It also does not insure any vehicles owned by the insured.  LaCroix has no application here.  Intervenor has failed to identify a single case refusing rescission of a commercial general liability policy.  There is also no legislative support for Intervenor’s position, and it is contradicted by the fact that financial protection is, in fact, available to the Intervenor from other sources.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] The trial judge imposed an aggregate sentence of 53 years, 42.5 years without parole consisting of two consecutive terms -- a 50-year/85%-without-parole sentence for murder, followed by a mandatory consecutive term of three years for endangering an injured victim -- plus $10,115.16 in restitution.  (Da 10 to 14; 36T 98-18 to 102-11; 37T 4-16 to 7-24)  Three distinct problems with that sentence exist, each requiring a remand for resentencing.
[brief] Letter from [...] to Superior Court of New Jersey, Hudson County, dated July 12, 2023 ……………………………………………………..Pa73  (ii)  Notice of Motion for Substituted Service as to [...], dated July 12, 2023 ……………………………………………………………..Pa74  (iii)  Proof of Service ………………………………………………………………………………………………..Pa75  (iv)  Certification of [...] in Support of Motion for Substituted Service as to [...], dated July 12, 2023 ….Pa76 (v)  Proposed Order ………………………………………………………………………………………………..Pa78  Exhibit A to Kahn Certification - Return of Service…………………………………………………………………………………..Pa80 Exhibit B to Kahn Certification - Secretary of State Search Results……………………………………………………………..Pa84 Exhibit C to Kahn Certification - Post Office Search Results …………………………………………………………………………..Pa87 Order of the Honorable [...] Denying Reinstatement, dated July 24, 2023 ………………………………………………………………..Pa88 Notice of Motion, by Plaintiff, for an Order Vacating Dismissal with Prejudice, dated February 14, 2024 .................................................................Pa89 Certification of [...], for Plaintiff, in Support of Motion to Vacate, dated February 5, 2023 (sic) ..................................................................................Pa90 Annexed to Alajbegu Certification - (i) Defendant’s Motion for an Order Dismissing Complaint with Prejudice for Failure to State a Claim, dated November 1, 2022 (Reproduced herein at pp. Pa40-Pa43) (ii) Certification of [...], for Plaintiff, in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, dated December 1, 2022 (Reproduced herein at pp. Pa47-Pa48) (iii) Order of the Honorable [...] Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint without Prejudice for Failure to State a Claim, dated December 6, 2022 (Reproduced herein at pp. Pa49-Pa50) (iv) Defendant’s Motion for an Order Dismissing Complaint with Prejudice, dated February 13, 2023 (Reproduced herein at pp. Pa51-Pa54) (v) Certification of [...], for Plaintiff, in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and in Support of Cross-Motion to Amend Complaint, dated February 22, 2023 (Reproduced herein at pp. Pa56-Pa57) (vi) Order of the Honorable [...] Granting Reinstatement, dated March 27, 2023 (Reproduced herein at p. Pa69) (vii) Notice of Motion, by Defendant, for an Order Dismissing Complaint with Prejudice for Failure to Comply with a Court Order, dated May 15, 2023 ..............................................................................................................Pa93 (viii) Certification of [...], for Defendant, in Support of Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice for Failure to Comply with a Court Order, dated May 15, 2023 ..............................................Pa95 (ix)
[brief] See R. 2:11-3(e)(2).  We add the following comments.  Defendant contends that the indictment was defective as it was not “returned in open court before the ‘assignment judge’ … nor endorsed as a ‘true bill’ ” and the “indictment shows no date nor time of ‘when’ it was filed” in Superior Court.  Defendant provides no support in the record, however, for any of his claims regarding error in the grand jury process.
[brief] Although not clearly articulated, the trial court presumably dismissed Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the entire controversy doctrine.  The trial court rendered that decision despite making factual findings and credibility determinations, based on a full evidentiary record (\textit{i.e.}, document discovery and witness testimony), that Plaintiff did not possess knowledge of the facts underlying its claims prior to the completion of the First Action.  The trial court’s decision to dismiss the Complaint should be reversed.  The entire controversy doctrine “is equitable in nature and is fundamentally predicated upon ‘judicial fairness and will be invoked in that spirit. ’”  \textit{Cafferata v. Peyser}, 251 N.J. Super. 256, 261 (App. Div. 1991) (citing \textit{Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.}, 96 N.J. 336, 343 (1984).  “Thus, as in the case of all other preclusionary doctrines, its application requires, as a matter of first principle, that the party whose claim is being sought to be barred must have had a fair and reasonable opportunity to have fully litigated that claim in the original action. ”  \textit{Id.} (citation omitted).  With those principles in mind, “the entire controversy doctrine only applies to component claims that ‘arise during the pendency of the first action that were known to the litigant[.]’”  Lanziano v. Cocozielo, 304 N.J. Super. 616, 626 (App. Div. 1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280, 290 (1995), abrogated by Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 435-37 (1997)).  The entire controversy doctrine “does not apply to bar component claims that are unknown, unarisen, or unaccrued at the time of the original action. ”  Id.; see also Cafferata v. Peyser, 251 N.J. Super. 256, 261 (App. Div. 1991) (emphasis added) (“as a matter of first principle,” the party whose claim is sought to be barred by the entire controversy doctrine “must have had a fair and reasonable opportunity to have fully litigated that claim in the original action.
[brief] (Pa 245, ¶31.)  Unable to complete its review during that meeting, it voted to continue review at a special meeting to be held on December 16, 2021, two days after the scheduled second reading.  (Pa 245, ¶32.)  The special meeting was scheduled after Mayor [...] (“[...]”), a statutory member of the Planning Board, rejected a request to give the Board more time to review the redevelopment plan amendments.  (Pa 12, Verified Complaint ¶¶55-56.)  Although second reading was publicly noticed for December 14th, [...] told the other Planning Board members that the public hearing on Ordinance 1423-21 would be held on December 28th, the 46th day after introduction and referral, and would not be adjourned.  (Id.)  No public hearing on Ordinance 1423-21 was held on December 14, 2021, because the matter was removed from the agenda.
[brief] [...] AND [...], INDIVIDUALLY, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v [...], JOHN DOES 1-30 (A FICTITIOUS NAME FOR PERSONS PRESENTLY UNKNOWN) AND XYZ, INC., 1-10 (A FICTITIOUS NAME FOR A BUSINESS ENTITY PRESENTLY UNKNOWN  Defendants, And [...], Intervenor/Defendant APPELLATE  BRIEF FOR INTERVENOR/DEFENDANT, [...]
[brief] Alternatively, a Court can supplement the record to correct a legal error in the proceedings below per Rule 3:23-8(a)(2).  Further, a Court can take judicial notice of the complaint – front and back.  N.J.R.E. 201(b)(4) permits judicial notice of facts including court records.  Records of the courts of this State, particularly records of the court in which the action is pending are always part of the record.  See, e.g., Matter of Liss' Will, 184 N.J. Super. 184, at 192, (Law. Div. 1981) stating a “court takes judicial notice of its own files. ”  See also, In re Phipps Family Trusts, 147 N.J. Super. 331, (Ch. Div. 1976), affirmed Bessemer Trust Co. v. Boegner, 165 N.J. Super. 76, (App. Div. 1979).  See also N.J.R.E. 201 (b) (4).  Any argument that all or part of the complaint should be ignored in these circumstances is without merit.
[brief] See State v. Hannah, 448 N.J. Super. 78, 88-92 (App. Div. 2016) (nature and content of social media posts can provide sufficient circumstantial evidence they were created by given individual).  Here, the need for further investigation of the Facebook activity and to present it at trial was obvious.  Counsel evidently saw the value of the Facebook activity in providing it to his consultant but failed to investigate it further.
[brief] [...] responds by attacking an argument the [...] did not make and ignoring the one they actually made.  The [...] did not argue that there is any “bright-line rule” ([...]_Pb 29) barring recovery of attorneys’ fees on a RICO claim before such a claim is filed.  The [...] do not dispute that a RICO plaintiff can recover investigation costs incurred before filing, assuming that the fee applicant can show from its contemporaneous billing records that it actually did such work.  Rather, as explained in the [...]’ Opening Brief, the Special Master’s error was the award of attorneys’ fees for a period where RICO claims were not even contemplated.  (Wilf_Db 34-37).
[directive] ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2022-4 TO: All Law Enforcement Chief Executives and County Prosecutors  FROM: [...], Acting Attorney General DATE: April 29, 2022  SUBJECT: Directive  Updating Statewide Vehicular Pursuit Policy and Use of Force Policy  On December 21, 2020, Law Enforcement Directive No. 2020-13 was issued, which revised New Jersey’s Use of Force Policy (UOF Policy).  The revised UOF Policy included a revised statewide Vehicular Pursuit Policy, included as Addendum B.  These policies became effective on December 31, 2021.  Since that date, the Office of Public Integrity & Accountability (OPIA), in cooperation with law enforcement leaders from throughout the state, has been monitoring the impact of the policies on police procedures and public safety.  Based upon recommendations from law enforcement chief executives, county prosecutors and OPIA staff, I have determined that several revisions to the policy are appropriate in order to address crime trends, particularly an increase in violent crime, stolen vehicles and bias crimes.  This Directive implements those revisions.  For the reasons stated in this Directive, and pursuant to the authority granted to me under the New Jersey Constitution and the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the state in order to secure the benefits of a uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the state, I hereby direct all law enforcement and prosecuting agencies operating under the authority of the laws of the state of New Jersey to implement and comply with the Use of Force Policy as revised by this Directive (the April 2022 UOF Policy), including the revised Addendum B (the April 2022 Vehicular Pursuit Policy), and to take any additional measures necessary to update their policies accordingly.
[brief] [...]’s briefs fail to establish that it has a private right to a cause of action to sue [...] in Superior Court for a violation of an 18A school law statute.  Without any express or implied private right to a cause of action to sue [...] for purported violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3), the Counterclaim fails and must be dismissed as a matter of law.  Pg. 9 – 11 REPLY POINT FOUR (Addressing [...]’s Unconstitutionality Argument in Point II of Opposition Brief – Db31–Db35)  The Board is not challenging the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  However, [...]’s Counterclaim, to be successful, requires the court to interpret N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) in a manner that violates the Impairment of Contracts clauses in the U.S. and New Jersey Constitutions.  [...]’s arguments that [...] failed to establish the unconstitutionality of the statute is misplaced and should be rejected.  Pg. 11 – 12 REPLY POINT FIVE (Addressing [...]’s Retroactive Application of Statute Argument in Point III of Opposition Brief – Db35–Db40)  The effective date of the amendment authorizing [...] to pay its employees from [...]’s money is June 29, 2020.  As with all statutes, N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) must be given prospective application, which negates all of [...]’s claims for payment on its April / May / June 2020 invoices.  The Legislature undisputedly did not express retroactive application of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3).  Under the two-prong implied retroactive application test, the court cannot apply retroactive application of the statute because 1) the Legislature never intended to give the statute retroactive application; and 2) the retroactive application will result in either an unconstitutional interference with vested rights or a manifest injustice.  [...]’s claims, which are based on the retroactive application of the statute, thus fails, requiring a denial of its motion for summary judgment.