ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (7T81-8-12).  [...] and [...] filed another motion essentially seeking a stay, which the trial court denied on September 13, 2022, finding “all” or their arguments “without merit. ” (Da37; 43).  The closing of the Trust’s sale of the Boonton Property to [...] occurred on September 15, 2022; the proceeds and deed were held in escrow because the Defendants had not vacated.  The trial court quoted [...]’s real estate attorney that this was “the only obstacle…” (Da55).  Though the trial court had already ordered them to vacate upon completion of the closing (Da19, at ¶7), they did not, making it necessary for the Trustee to seek an order for their removal.  (7T82:7-15).  They filed a cross-motion, arguing that [...] had not closed.  The Court found on October 12, 2022 that the closing had effectively occurred, and that the proceeds had not yet been distributed due to the “Defendants’ own unclean hands. ” (Da51, 56, 59).  The Court ordered ejectment pursuant to the Ejectment Statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:35-1, et seq., and stated that if the Defendants did not leave by December 1, 2022 a writ of possession was to be issued.
[brief] As recited in that Settlement Agreement, the Township and the Board had filed an action entitled *In the Matter of the Application of the [...]*, Docket No. [...] (the “DJ Action”) in conformance with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision which has become known as Mt. Laurel IV, to wit, *In The Matter of the Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5:97 by the New Jersey Council On Affordable Housing*, 221 N.J. 1 (2015).  Under the process created under Mt. Laurel IV, the Township and the Board obligated themselves to develop, adopt, endorse and ultimately enact, a constitutionally compliant affordable housing plan in the form of a Housing Element and Fair Share Plan (“HEFSP” or “Affordable Housing Plan”), in accordance with N.J.S 55D-28 and under the auspices of the Court (as opposed to under the auspices of COAH).  [...] filed a Motion to Intervene in the DJ Action (the “Avalon Intervention”) seeking to promote its own interests; that application was granted by the Court by Order dated November 9, 2015, Pa042.  [...] advised that it desire[d] the Property and the development of the Property to be included in the said Township’s HEFSP—in other words, [...] wanted to develop the Property as a Mt. Laurel a/k/a “affordable housing” “Inclusionary Development”.  See Pa042-3.  What followed were various negotiations and mediations between the Township and the Board on one side and [...] on the other side, see Pa046.  During that process, the parties reached an impasse and [...], unhappy that it was not being offered all that it wanted, filed a motion to the trial court claiming the Township and the Board were being unreasonable and not negotiating in good faith.  The trial court, by motion and not by hearing, granted the motion and revoked the Township’s Mr. Laurel temporary immunity, Court order dated November 10, 2020, Pa006.  The court denied the request for stay pending appeal, see Pa046a, and effectively ‘forced’ the Township and the Board to accept a settlement under [...]’s terms.
[brief] Plaintiffs seek to avoid that conclusion by arguing that the Amended Complaint is based on allegedly “newly discovered evidence,” and thus not on the same transaction or occurrence.  Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that they only discovered the fact that [...] is the sole owner of [...] during the pendency of the 2015 action.  In granting the motion to dismiss, [...] properly pointed out that Plaintiffs sought to consolidate this action with the 2015 action, which constitutes a candid admission that this case arises from the same transaction or occurrence as the claims asserted in the 2015 action.  Indeed, in the March 11, 2020 letter brief in support of the Motion to Consolidate, Plaintiffs’ counsel specifically conceded as much, stating, “that “[t]here can be no doubt that this matter and the Related Matter involve common questions of law or fact and arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions. ”  (Da554, emphasis added)  [...] rejected Plaintiffs’ argument—that the information concerning Mr. [...]’ ownership of TNM Development Consulting was unknown prior to the exchange of discovery in the 2015 action—during both the March 29, 2018 and January 24, 2020 oral arguments in the 2015 action.  Thus, the argument that Plaintiffs did not know about the “newly discovered information” until after the claims were adjudicated has already been decided and was rejected by [...].
[brief] Unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, the state's failure to preserve potentially useful evidence-of which no more can be said then that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated.  The defendant- does not constitute a violation of the due process clause of the United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, since requiring a defendant to show bad faith on the part of the police both limits the extent of police obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable bounds and confines it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it, that is, those cases in which the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant; accordingly, (1) the failure of the police to preserve clothing worn by the defendant at the time of the murder and containing Gunpowder residue or to perform timely tests on victim's clothing, DNA and/or Gunpowder residue samples taken from the victim's clothing- any expert testimony would demonstrate that timely performance of tests with properly preserved clothing samples could have produced results that might have completely exonerated the defendant-can at worst be described as negligent, (2) none of this information is visible for the defendant at trial, and (3) the evidence-such as it is-is made available to the State expert, who declines to perform any tests on the samples.
[brief] [...]’s notes indicate that the door to Appellant’s separate apartment was breached and not wide open as he testified and for which the trial Court fully credited his and other’s testimony.  What is more, [...]’s notes indicate it was apparent that Appellant’s apartment had its own kitchen and bathroom and shared nothing with the second-floor apartment which was another contested issue.  In opposing the motion below, the State asserted that the notes were not material to the outcome of the motion and that the prosecutor had no personal knowledge of the notes.  The State even attempted to create alternative definitions for the word “breached”, one for [...]’s testimony and another for [...]’s notes.  The trial court correctly dismissed these arguments.
[brief] Condemnation proceedings are different from other civil actions because they involve the involuntary seizure of private property, where the sole issue at trial is the amount of constitutional just compensation owed to the condemnee for the government’s taking.  State v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 40 N.J. 560, 573-574 (1963).  Condemnation proceedings are an “informational inquisition” designed to recreate a hypothetical sale of the subject property in order to indemnify the owner for its loss and, importantly, there is no burden of proof upon either party.  Paterson Redevelopment Agency v. Bienstock, 123 N.J. Super. 457, 459-460 (App. Div. 1973).  In Village of South Orange v. Alden Corp., 71 N.J. 362 (1976) the Supreme Court echoed that the test of compensation was the probable sales price between willing, but uncoerced parties:
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN BARRING DR. POWELL’S EXPERT REPORT AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS’ AMENDED COMPLAINT  As the Court summarized following the Rule 104 hearing, “the analysis here comes down to whether [...]’s analysis meets the newly articulated standard based on the inputs that he had at the time…. ” (6T, 183:10-15).  The trial Court had the opportunity to conduct a “fact-sensitive analysis” of [...]’s report and the bases for his opinion.  [...] failed to establish Plaintiffs’ alleged lost profits to a (heightened) reasonable degree of certainty precisely because there is no evidence to support his serial assumptions that: (1) Plaintiffs could have developed the project either alone or as part of a “joint venture”; and (2) during the highly competitive LIHTC review process, the [...] would have awarded the same tax credit funding to the inexperienced Plaintiffs as it ultimately awarded to [...] – a preeminent affordable housing developer in New Jersey.  Even assuming that [...]’s methodology for calculating lost profits is sound, he (the Plaintiffs) skipped over the critical first step of establishing (within a reasonable degree of certainty) that these Plaintiffs – given their lack of experience -- could have successfully developed the affordable housing project in the first place.  This is not particularly surprising given it was beyond the stated scope and purpose of [...]’s report: to provide “an analysis of the profits that would likely have been earned by a development team which would have included Plaintiffs as principals.
[brief] \(^9\)  Thus, under the futility doctrine, there can be no intentional relinquishment of the right to arbitrate – which is a fundamental requirement for waiver – because [...] was unable to achieve finality through arbitration until [...] settled with the other insurers.  *Cole*, 215 N.J. at 276-277.  The totality of the circumstances must be considered, and when they are, it is clear that [...]’s invocation of arbitration was timely.
[directive] Any allegation of misconduct bearing upon truthfulness, bias, or integrity that is the subject of a pending investigation; viii.  Information that may be used to suggest that the investigative employee is biased for or against a defendant.  Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 See United States v.  This category does not include incidents deemed by a supervisory authority to be a mistake or done in 2 error without intention, even in cases where the incident was sustained.  For example, if an officer failed to follow a mandatory protocol due to a misunderstanding, and that mistake resulted in a sustained finding, that would not be considered information for purposes of disclosure.  Giglio Page 6 (1984).  The Supreme Court has stated, “bias is a term used in the ‘common law of evidence’ to describe the relationship between a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party.  Bias may be induced by a witness’ like, dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness’ self-interest. ”); and ix.  A sustained finding, or judicial finding, that an investigative employee is biased against a particular class of people, for example, based on a person’s gender, gender identity, race, or ethnic group.
[brief] POINT VI  CUMULATIVE ERROR IS NOT PRESENT  “[I]ncidental legal errors” necessarily “creep into” proceedings.  State v. Orecchio, 16 N.J. 125, 129 (1954); see also State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 169 (1991), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929 (1993).  Where they do so in a manner that does “not prejudice the rights of the accused or make the proceedings unfair,” “an otherwise valid conviction” will not be disturbed.  Ibid.  Only where “the legal errors are of such magnitude as to prejudice the defendant’s rights or, in their aggregate have rendered the [proceedings] unfair,” do “fundamental constitutional concepts dictate” the grant of relief.  Ibid.  Despite having failed to establish that any alleged error detailed in POINT I through V, supra, were, in fact, errors, defendant argues this Court should aggregate these non-errors into a “cumulative effect” that together render his conviction reversible.  Db49.  There is no basis in law or fact to do as defendant requests.  The individual alleged errors complained of by the defendant do not alone rise to the level of error, see supra, and, for that reason, cannot aggregate to cumulative error warranting reversal of defendant’s conviction.
[brief] ’”  Jacoby v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 442 N.J. Super. 450, 463 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Grasso, 375 N.J. Super. 50-53).  This method focuses primarily on adequate light and air, and secondarily, on the intensity of the development.  Grasso, 375 N.J. Super. at 52–53.  For the surrounding neighborhood, the zoning board must also “consider the effect of the proposed height variance on the surrounding municipalities affected by the decision.
[brief] Actions in Which Fee Is Allowable.  No fee for legal services shall be allowed in the taxed costs or otherwise, except:  (1)  In a family action, a fee allowance both pendente lite and on final determination may be made pursuant to R. 5:3-5(c)…  Additionally, fees may be awarded when a contractual provision so provides:  “A prevailing party can recover [counsel] fees if they are expressly provided for by statute, court rule, or contract. ”  *Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc.*, 200 N.J. 372, 385 (2009) citing *Packard–Bamberger & Co., Inc. v. Collier*, 167 N.J. 427, 440 (2001)(emphasis added).
[brief] This case falls squarely into a category of cases that the Court in Parker recognized requires a specific unanimity charge: a case in which “a single crime can be proven by different theories based on different acts and at least two of these theories rely on different evidence, and the circumstances demonstrate a reasonable possibility that a juror will find one theory proven and the other not proven but that all of the jurors will not agree on the same theory. ”  Parker, 124 N.J. at 635.
[brief] [...] respectfully submits that the trial court overlooked and undervalued the probative value of [...]’s deposition testimony and the contradiction established by the judgment of conviction.  Despite having a full record with all of the relevant facts that demonstrated unequivocally that [...] was not truthful in his deposition testimony, the court nevertheless barred evidence of [...]’s criminal conviction.  This ruling deprived [...] of a fair trial and is one reason the jury ultimately allocated fault between both [...] and [...] rather than conclude, as the evidence established, that [...] was solely at fault for the accident.
[brief] ................................................................................9  Spinks v. Township of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 465 (App. Div. 2008)  ..............................................................................22, 28  Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70 (2004)  ...............................................................................................................11, 18  Tyson v. CIGNA Corp., 918 F. Supp. 836 (D.N.J. 1996)  .......................................................................................15  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Pa28.  The correspondence also requested that the Board take administrative or judicial notice of all affidavits submitted in all actions with respect to the issue of lack of notice of the Ricci Act for members of the State Police Retirement System.  Pa28.  To date, over ninety-eight (98) active and retired Troopers have submitted affidavits attesting that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa70-265.  STANDARD OF REVIEW
[brief] In moot, the appellant pleaded below in length why it was unjust and unfair that the trial judge had already decided the *Motion For Recusal* before hearing it (2T3-8).  Please see the transcript.  Appellant believes that by deciding the appellant’s motion, before hearing it the trial judge erred.  (Point Seven)  **THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED AS HE DENIED DISQUALIFICATION ASKED FROM HIM** (Raised Below: (2T3-8); Pa226; Order (Pa114)).
[brief] POINT I  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF THE IMPERMISSIBLY SUGGESTIVE OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION BY JOHNSON AND THE RESULTING TAINTED IN-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS BY JOHNSON AND STEVENSON, THEREBY DENYING MOORE DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.  U.S. CONST. AMENDS.  VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. ART.  I, ¶ 10.  A.  THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING JOHNSON'S IMPERMISSIBLY SUGGESTIVE OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION WHICH RESULTED IN A TAINTED IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION.
[brief] 31  Griggs v. Bertram, 88 N.J. 347 (1982)  .............................................................................  68 GTE Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F.3d. 598 (3d Cir. 2004) .............................................................  47 Harris v. Durham Enters., 586 F. Supp.3d 856 (S.D. Ill. Feb.  22, 2022) ....................................... 41, 43 Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 98 N.J. 18 (1984) ..............................................................................
[brief] BEHAVIOR  Defendants-Respondents’ Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Appeal (Defendants’ Brief) repeatedly insists that Plaintiff is asserting a novel and unprecedented position.  While Plaintiffs would like to claim ingenuity in crafting a novel legal theory, the truth is that Plaintiffs are simply following the direction of the Appellate Division and plain language of Jury Charge 5.60B.  As set forth in Plaintiffs’ Appellate Brief, Jury Charge 5.60B defines an animal’s “vicious or dangerous trait or propensity” in the disjunctive: it can be established through either an animal’s “natural inclination or habitual tendency.
[brief] b.  The proposed amendments to the [...] redevelopment plan are relatively minor amendments, and are generally not substantive in the sense that the list of permitted uses, and the bulk requirements would remain intact.  c.  Sections 1.1 and 1.22 are not regulator sections of the redevelopment plan, and the proposed amendments to these sections would not have any impact on any future redevelopment project.  These changes are only revisions to the description of the existing conditions of the area.  d.  The changes to the list of permitted uses does not actually change the permitted uses of the plan, but only further clarifies that “parcel hub” and “fulfillment center” type warehouses and distribution centers are not what is contemplated by this plan.  This specific clause was already listed for warehouses, and this change only includes the same clause for a distribution center.  f.  The added discussion on the Master Plan consistency in Section 3.1.1 is being included as an explanation to the Committee’s reasoning for adopting this development plan.  The purpose for doing so in because a redevelopment plan is required by the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law at N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8 to be substantially consistent with the municipal Master Plan, or designed to effectuate the Master Plan.  The governing body may adopt a redevelopment plan which is inconsistent with the Master Plan or not designed to effectuate the Master Plan, if the reasons for adopting the Master Plan are set forth in the redevelopment plan.  The role of the Planning Board in reviewing a redevelopment plan is to identify any inconsistencies with the Master Plan.  The previous review of the redevelopment plan by the Planning Board found that there were no inconsistencies with the Master Plan, but did not necessarily find that the redevelopment plan is substantially consistent with the Master Plan.  The statements are being included within the amended plan since the redevelopment plan is neither substantially consistent nor inconsistent with the Master Plan, and is not directly implementing a recommendation of the Master Plan.
[brief] **I.E.’S LLC v. Simmons**, 392 N.J. Super. 520 (Law. Div. 2006)  Denied “Bona Fide Purchaser for Value Without Notice” Status to A Purchaser of Property Post Tax Lien Foreclosure  Appellants cite **I.E.’s, LLC v. Simmons**, 392 N.J. Super. 520 (Law Div. 2006), which denied “bona fide purchaser for value without notice” status to a purchaser of title following a tax lien foreclosure, holding that in such an instance, the court may attribute a duty to the purchaser to take “further steps” to inspect title: the bona fide purchaser for value purchased the property knowing that the property had gone through a tax sale foreclosure.  This circumstance placed on it further steps when examining title... further steps must be taken when a property has gone through foreclosure, including review of the filings in the foreclosure action.  *I.E.’s, LLC v. Simmons*, 392 N.J. Super. at 534.  Imposition of such a “further steps” duty upon [...] is warranted here by its actual experience with tax lien foreclosures, the short time before acquiring title, and the concurrent representation by the [...].  *I.E.’s, LLC. v. Simmons* included in these “further steps” an obligation to inspect the docket of the foreclosure, which in that case the court found would have revealed the risk that the interests of unnamed heirs allegedly served by publication were not properly extinguished:  In addition, the fact that three unnamed heirs were served solely by publication also should have alerted the purchaser to the potential of notice problems.  *I.E.’s, LLC v. Simmons*, 392 N.J. Super. at 534.
[brief] The Directive required prosecutors to waive mandatory minimum terms for non-violent drug offenses.  Accordingly, the 4-year period of parole ineligibility imposed on [...]’s aggregate 12-year sentence was discretionary, not mandatory.  The sentencing court failed to engage in the requisite analysis of sentencing factors to justify the imposition of a discretionary parole disqualifier, and failed to consider whether a shorter parole disqualifier – or no parole disqualifier – would be more just and more appropriate for [...], a 68-year-old man.  This requires a remand for resentencing.
[brief] THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PETITIONER’S REQUEST TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT BECAUSE THE REGULATIONS DO NOT PERMIT PETITIONER TO DO SO.  In his response to Respondents’ motion to dismiss his complaint, Petitioner requested permission “to file an Amended Complaint adding allegations relating to the documents produced by the school district in response to the OPRA request. ”  (Pb15.)  The Commission denied Petitioner’s request.  (13a.)  On appeal, Petitioner argues that “the Commission should have construed the Complaint with liberality and generosity as required by N.J.A.C. 6A:28-8.3,” and permitted him to amend his complaint.  (Pb15.)  The regulations provide no such liberal standard for amendments to complaints.  N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.7 provides express limitations on a complainant’s ability to amend an ethics complaint.  Pursuant to the regulations, “[a] complainant may amend a complaint to cure technical defects or to clarify or amplify allegations made in the original complaint. ”  N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.7(b).  The regulations do not permit an amendment to add additional claims.  Moreover, “[o]nce a written statement is filed, an amendment to a complaint may be made by the complainant only with the consent of each respondent or by leave of the Commission upon written application. ”  N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.7(c).  “Any amendment made by the complainant” must “be submitted in the same manner as the original complaint with one copy, together with a copy for each respondent. ”  N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.7(d).  Petitioner met none of these requirements.  At the outset, the regulations prohibit him from amending his complaint to add new claims, which, by his own admission and argument, is what he attempted to do.  That fact alone forecloses his argument.  Furthermore, he did not seek to amend his complaint before Respondents filed a written statement of response.  Thus, he was required to obtain Respondents’ consent, which he did not do, or seek the Commission’s leave.  Petitioner likely would argue he sought leave through the request set forth in his opposition to Respondents’ motion to dismiss, but the regulations expressly require that an amendment be submitted in the same manner as the original complaint.  In sum, the regulations prohibit Petitioner from amending his complaint to add new claims, and Petitioner’s request to do so did not comply with the procedures required by the applicable regulations.  The Commission therefore was correct to deny Petitioner’s request to amend his complaint, and its decision should not be disturbed.