ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As such, factor seven weighs in favor of arbitration.  Based on the foregoing, the motion court properly found that Defendants’ waiver argument fails the Cole test.  Further, the evidence of record does not support a finding that Plaintiff intentionally waived her right to arbitrate.  Defendants’ reliance on Marmo is misplaced.  In Marmo, the court found that “significant discovery” had been completed and that the party seeking to compel arbitration had used the court system to its advantage before moving to arbitration.  Marmo, 478 N.J. Super. 593, 610, 612 (App. Div. 2024).  Whereas here, the motion court found that the discovery conducted thus far was limited, and that a substantial amount remained to be completed, including depositions.  (1T42:10-11).  The motion court here also found that given the totality of the circumstances concerning the various filings and negotiations that took place prior to Plaintiff’s request to compel arbitration (Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause with Temporary Restraints, which the trial court viewed as commonplace before sending a case to arbitration (1T32:7-12); Defendants’ motion to dissolve those restraints and disqualify Plaintiff’s counsel; the parties’ failed attempts at settlement, the filing of Defendants’ counterclaims thereafter, Plaintiff’s attempt at consolidation, etc.), there was no evidence that Plaintiff’s delay was part of her litigation strategy.  (1T46:5-7).  *Marmo* is also highly distinguishable because it did not involve two separate but highly related cases, as is the situation here.  In our case, Plaintiff had initially moved to compel arbitration in the Law Division matter. (Da301).  The parties ultimately consented to mediate, and Plaintiff’s application was withdrawn.  Then, Plaintiff sought to compel arbitration in the Chancery Action given the commonalities between the cases and the parties, that the parties had agreed to mediate the Law Division matter, and that an arbitration agreement existed in the Chancery Action.  In fact, the motion court agreed it would “make no sense” to decide these two cases in separate forums.  (1T44:12-13).  The unique situation that is presented here was not present in *Marmo*, and that renders *Marmo* inapposite to this case.  Additionally, Defendants’ reliance on *Farese v. McGarry*, 237 N.J. Super. 385 (App. Div. 1989) is likewise misplaced because in that case, waiver was found where the party asserted arbitration as a defense *just two weeks* before trial.  *Farese*, 237 N.J. Super. at 394.  Here, even though the parties were two months away from trial, the motion court was reasonably doubtful that trial would actually commence at that time given the substantial amount of discovery that remains to be completed.  Thus, the motion court was correct in rejecting Defendants’ waiver argument.
[brief] (1T28-13 to 29-12).  After a moment of that, he asked defendant, “Have you done anything in the past, you know, that you wish you didn’t do because of drugs?” (1T29-13 to 15).  Defendant admitted to sometimes selling drugs.  (1T29-16 to 30-4).  [...] then showed defendant the photograph of the second suspect in the robbery and asked, “So I just want to show you a picture real quick.  Okay?  Tell me if you know who this person is.  Okay?” (1T30-5 to 7).  Defendant responded, “Uh-huh.  That’s me” and signed the photograph.  (1T30-8 to 11).  Defendant denied knowing what the photograph was from.  (1T30-12 to 18).  [...] also showed defendant a photograph of the first suspect, who they already knew to be [...], a.k.a. “[...].” (1T30-19 to 20).
[brief] The appropriate standard for this Court’s review is de novo.  [...] erroneously asserts that the trial court “abdicated its duty” in ruling on and granting Respondents’ motions because it should have converted them to and treated them as summary judgment motions and held a plenary hearing.  [...] misunderstands the nature of Respondents’ motions as requests seeking dispositive relief based upon resolution of a fact issue.  That is incorrect: Respondents never moved for summary judgment, nor did the trial court grant such relief.  The trial court merely dismissed her action *without prejudice* and compelled her to pursue her claims arbitration, as she had agreed to do.  There was no adjudication on the merits, and [...]’s arguments relying on summary judgment principles—including that the trial court “should have treated Respondents’ motions as summary judgment motions under R. 4:46”—are misplaced.  Beyond this misapprehension, as described below, [...] advances two main arguments.  Neither has merit.  *First*, [...] argues she did not sign anything agreeing to arbitrate claims arising from her employment with [...] or [...].  This is demonstrably incorrect.  [...] cannot and does not deny that she did, in fact, electronically sign the document containing the arbitration agreement.  Instead, she maintains only that she did not do so voluntarily or knowingly . . . despite her affirmative acknowledgement to the contrary contained in the Mutual Arbitration Agreement, the concession in her certification that she “acknowledged” documents including the arbitration agreement during her onboarding process, and despite the fact that she is a highly intelligent and experienced individual, specifically with experience in negotiating employment contracts.  Second, she argues, the arbitration agreement is unenforceable “as a matter of law” because, she claims, the “NJLAD and its remedies, including the right to a jury trial, are fundamental rights that cannot be waived. ”  But New Jersey precedent, which Respondents provided to the trial court, squarely rejects the very argument that [...] now raises.  [...] ignored that precedent and never addressed it with the trial court.  She continues to ignore it even now on appeal.  As Respondents showed and supported with appropriate record evidence, [...] knowingly and voluntarily signed the Mutual Arbitration Agreement which provides that any and all disputes—explicitly including employment discrimination claims—must be pursued via private arbitration.  In both procedure and substance, the trial court acted properly in granting Respondents’ motions and dismissing [...]’s action without prejudice and compelling her to pursue her claims in arbitration, as she agreed to do.  There was no error.  This Court should affirm the trial court below.
[brief] Here, in a July 31, 2018 email, [...] of [...] acknowledged that they had “enrollment documents for [...] effective 8/1/15.  We issued a policy so, we would need to have received a request to cancel flat to unenroll them.  We don’t have a copy of any request. ”  Pa913 (emphasis added).  [...] and [...], were never relieved of their duty to provide notice to its insureds of any cancellation, and they still had a duty to maintain a record of authorization of any cancellation request.
[brief] The explanation for this gross mismatch between [...]’s Adequacy Budget and [...]’s real-world needs is simple.  The “thorough record”\(^{17}\) compiled by the ALJ demonstrated to the satisfaction of this court that: - “[...]’s school district is in a unique and precarious position…due, in large part, to demographic trends in the area;” - [...] Township “has approximately 37,000 school-aged children [now approximately 52,000], however, only about 6,000 [now about 5,000] are enrolled in the secular public schools…[and t]he majority—84%--are enrolled in private religious schools;” - “Testimony before the ALJ established that this demographic trend is likely to continue and accelerate;” - “Demographically, 8.
[brief] For one, [...] could have resolved this case, at no cost to itself whatsoever, but instead chose not to.  The trial court erroneously discounted this fact.  Then the trial court erred by failing to weigh the reasonableness of the fees requested (aside from an extra-judicial belief that the total amount sought “seemed low”), as well as failing to analyze the temporal limitation (other than the court’s unreality that the case was frivolous from before it was even filed).  The court erred further by failing to make any offset to the award - either for the value of the car, or for my sister’s settlement, which in turn has unfairly afforded [...] a double / triple recovery (for alleged legal services which [...] admits were “unbilled” and never paid by his client, not “actually incurred”).
[brief] [...] commenced the instant litigation by filing a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs against the [...] on November 30, 2022.  (Pa1-Pa10).  [...] then filed an Amended Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs on December 19, 2022 and, ultimately, a Second Amended Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs on January 20, 2023 which joined [...] as a defendant in accordance with a Consent Order for Intervention.  (Pa11-Pa21; Pa22-Pa32; Pa44-Pa45).  On February 16, 2022, rather than filing Answers, both defendants filed Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e).
[brief] Plaintiff [...] failed to prove validity of service as established when jurisdiction had been challenged as “no”  Response was recorded in court records by the clerk of the court (Pa1) c).  Due to the claim involved Procedural Due Process Rights Violations (jurisdictional challenge) the facts were compelled to have been adjudicated with applicable case law involving the statutes of limitation (albeit an exception would apply to the tolling of time based on the given evidence cited) and for reasons mentioned in point (b), d).  It becomes a false narrative to infer that because notice relating to events with a court in 1986 (Pa2) would remotely have a reasonable person conclude this defendant had knowledge and/or should been aware of an event with regard to a separate court order issued “4-years later” (1990) that rendered a default judgment (Pa7) WITHOUT any facts and evidence that would corroborate the court’s false presumption (void of supporting evidence) of “ACTUALLY” HAVING notice for that hearing 4-years later in 1990.
[brief] (30T48-24 to 30T49-15).  The court, relying on the surveillance video evidence, commented that the patrons were leaving the [...] peacefully and defendant was seen leaving the [...] and walking to a parked car after which he returned to the front entrance.  (30T49-16 to 24).  And it was beyond dispute that defendant was armed with the gun, which increased the risk of harm to himself and others.  (30T49-22 to 30T50-3).  The judge outlined how defendant stayed at the entrance and the video evidence showed an initial interaction between him and [...].
[brief] ”  State v. Frederico, 103 N.J. Super 176, 510 A.2d at 1151; see also State v. Burgess, 154 N.J. 181, 186, 712 A.2d 631, 633 (1998); State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 56, 697 A.2d 529, 576 (1997).
[brief] Receive and review notice from Court of accepted filing.  Send [...] a copy of the filed motion, copying [...].  Email from Account, [...] at TD.  | .3 | $114.00 | $11,761.00 | | 17| 1/20/22 |  Receive and review correspondence with supplemental documents requests from counsel | .4 | $152.00 | $11,913.00 | | 18| 1/27/22 |  Receive and review notice from the Court regarding Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to Quash.  Review counsel’s certification relating to same.  | .25 | $95.00 | $12,008.00 | | 19| 1/28/22 |  Work on supplemental request from Docs.  Email [...] . . . [redacted]  . . .  Email from Counsel.  Research case law for Reply Brief.  | 4 hrs.| $1,520.00 | $13,528.00 | | 20| 1/31/22 |  Receive and review email of a subpoena from Plaintiff’s counsel to [...] and upon [...] relative to husband’s account.  Draft Reply Certification in reply to Plaintiff’s opposition and assemble exhibits.  Draft Reply Brief on opposition.  File the same with the Court.  Email Plaintiff’s counsel.
[brief] “Business relationships evolve and are not necessarily fully captured by their foundational contract. ”  Engines, Inc. v. MAN Engines & Components, Inc., 2010 WL 3021871, at *7 (D.N.J. July 29, 2010).  [...]’s assertions from over 10 years ago do not reflect its diversified business, including the sales of Easy Outdoor Kitchen systems, which include stone islands, --- 2  In fact, [...]’s Motion to Amend was a third bite of the apple in submitting the same type of documents to the Court.  See Regent Care Center, Inc. v. Hackensack City, 20 N.J. Tax 181, 185 (2001).
[brief] The first agreement between the Borough and the Township that provided for connection fees is an agreement executed on July 6, 1973 (the “1973 Agreement”).  The 1973 Agreement addresses that connection fees will be paid to the township.  Specifically, the 1973 Agreement provides:  The Borough is hereby given permission to connect the existing sanitary sewer system, houses in the [...], and its agrees to pay the Township a fee of twenty-five dollar for each connection fee so made, prior to October 31, 1973, which fee will cover the period from the date of connection to January 1, 1974.  Da46.  The 1973 Agreement was a result of an emergent matter at the time.  The parties still were bound by the 1971 Agreement which was to remain in effect until December 31, 1998.  Da27.  Ultimately, both the 1971 and 1973 Agreements became null and void with the execution of the 1999 Agreement, which is the most recent contract between the Borough and Township.  In 1984 the Borough and Township entered into another agreement as a result of the construction of dwellings along Johnson Road in the [...].  Da94.  The 1984 Agreement provides in pertinent part:  That there shall be imposed a sewer connection fee of $1,200.00 each for any new connection for single family residences along Johnson Road in the [...] Troy-Hills, which sewer connection fee shall be paid to the [...].  Da96.  It is important to note that the 1984 Agreement does not currently govern or bind the Borough and the Township.  As noted earlier, the 1971 Agreement was set to expire on December 31, 1998, and was replaced by the 1999 Agreement, which remains in effect today.  Accordingly, the 1971, 1973 and 1984 Agreements are not presently relevant to this matter.
[brief] 23 City of Ocean City v. Maffucci, 326 N.J. Super. 1,19 (App Div.) certif. denied, 162 N.J. 485 (1999).................................40,44,45  County of Monmouth v. Kohl, 242 N.J. Super.  210, 216 (App. Div.), certif. denied 122 N.J. 405 (1990) ..................................  22  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) ...........................................................................  35,36  F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains, 100 N.J. 418, 426-427 (1985)  .................................................................  23  General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) .................... 35  Glen Wall Associates v. Wall Tp., 99 N.J. 265, 277 (N.J. 1985) ..................................................................................  37  Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 214 N.J. 384 (2013)
[brief] ALL EVIDENCE, BOTH PHYSICAL AND VERBAL, SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED AS IT WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF MR. RODRIGUEZ’S RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS, AND NEW JERSEY’S BROADER FIFTH AMENDMENT ANALOGUE (Da6 – Da43).  A.  The motion court erred in failing to suppress the evidence obtained from the illegal stop and search of the vehicle being operated by [...] in the State of Illinois.  [...] maintains that the courts below erred in failing to suppress all evidence both physical and verbal resulting from a clear pattern of police misconduct beginning early in the morning of February 29, 2017 in Illinois and culminating -- after an interim detour into New York – almost 40 hours later in New Jersey when, as the court below ruled in suppressing his two prior statements in the parking lot of his residence and inside his residence, he gave his only Mirandized statement.  That statement, however, merely formalized what the police had already obtained from [...] through the illegal police conduct and questioning during the previous 9 hours since his arrest.  At the heart of this contention is the court’s failure to properly apply the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine which forbids the use “tainted” evidence, whether directly or derivatively obtained as a result of prior unlawful police conduct.  Since the very purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct and to ensure the integrity of the judicial process, the all important “essence” of this doctrine is “that not merely the evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court but that it shall not be used at all. ”  Silverthorn Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).  This rule has long applied to require the exclusion of both physical and verbal evidence tainted by the initial police misconduct, whether constituting violations of the constitutional rights of citizens under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, State v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 639, 651-52 (1990), or of statutory or judge-made law designed to preserve those rights against police infringement.  See, e.g., Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); State v. Minter, 115 N.J. 269 (1989) (wiretapping statutes); Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968) (rule requiring prompt production of arrestee before magistrate).  In the instant case, the “poisonous tree” which bore the “tainted” fruits which should have been suppressed at trial (i.e. all physical evidence and all of [...]’s statements made following his arrest), had its roots in [...]’s unlawful conduct in Illinois on the morning of February 28, 2017, and culminated with [...]’ confession after 10:43 P.M. on March 1, 2017.
[brief] Appendix pagination for this appeal is set forth at the bottom, right corner, with “Pa1" ff; cross-reference pagination with Appeal Number [...] appears at the top, right corner, with “Pa3473" ff.\  T1:___  Transcript of oral argument has been filed.  Transcript does not reveal any more information than the filed papers.  the consideration for the land lease was an annual rent of $200,000 with a security deposit of $100,000 held by Respondent.  At the closing of title, Appellants paid over $1 million to purchase the solar-energy rights and to pay rent and security.  Pa3-4.  Approximately two years after Respondent “assigned” the solar-energy development rights to Appellants, Respondent, surreptitiously, re-assigned the same rights to a different purchaser, the lead defendants in the related appeal.  This portion of the appeal involves the question whether Respondent may be held liable for its claimed re-sale of assets already sold in perpetuity to Appellants/plaintiffs, and if so whether the complaint filed below, under the new docket number, [...] should not have been dismissed with prejudice or whether the Law Division should have granted Appellants’ motion for leave to file their second amended complaint in the earlier docket, [...], which was still pending and active, when Appellants presented their proposed second amended complaint.  See Pa20-282.  Because the complaint below was dismissed on a motion to dismiss, under Rule 4:6-2(e), see Pa18 (defendant’s notice of motion), the allegations of the complaint, along with all reasonable inferences perceived from it, should be deemed true.  See Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, 348 N.J. Super. 243, 249-50, 791 A.2d 1068 (App. Div. 2002).  Because the appeal involves an involuntary dismissal, it is subject to de novo review, such that no deference to the lower court is applicable.
[brief] Yes, Your Honor, please.  You told this witness earlier yesterday that he was to stop making personal comments about counsel.  He’s criticized counsel, which is me, said that I lied in an opening statement.  [...]: You did.  [...]: Here we go.  You heard what he said.  [...]: I’m sorry, ma’am, he did.  THE COURT: Okay.  Mr. Cohen – [...]: Yes, ma’am.  THE COURT: -- there is a certain taking turns that happens in a trial.  [...]: Yes, ma’am.  THE COURT:  It’s your turn when you’re sitting on the witness stand and you’re asked a question and you answer the question.  [...]: Yes, ma’am.  THE COURT:  It’s not your turn, and I think you know it’s not your turn.  And we’ve cleared that you don’t have a medical condition that requires you without your control to say things, to -- to shout out.  There’s no medical reason that you’re doing it.  So, I have to think that you’re doing it, and I’ve already explained to you the process, so I have to think you’re doing it knowing that you’re not supposed to do it.
[brief] ENFORCEMENT OF THE MOU ACCOMPLISHES THE VERY GOALS THE PARTIES SET OUT TO ACHIEVE AND DOES NOT CREATE AN UNFAIR OR ABSURD RESULT.  (Da7-11).  “It has been decided many times and in many cases that the court will not make a different or better contract than the parties themselves have seen fit to enter into. ”  Washington Const. Co. v. Spinella, 8 N.J. 212, 217 (1951) (citations omitted).  Contracts are enforced “based on the intent of the parties, the express terms of the contract, surrounding circumstances and the underlying purpose of the contract. ”  JPC Merger Sub LLC v. Tricon Enterprises, Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 145, 160 (quoting In re County of Atlantic, 230 N.J. 237, 254 (2017)).  “Contract terms are generally ‘given their plain and ordinary meaning. ’”  Ibid. (quoting M.J. Pacquet, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 171 N.J. 375, 396 (2002)).  “Because ‘[t]he plain language of the contract is the cornerstone of the interpretive inquiry[,] when the intent of the parties is plain and the language is clear and unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement as written, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result. ”  Id. at 161 (quoting Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park, 241 N.J. 595, 616 (2020) (alterations in original)).  Appellants latch onto this last phrase to argue that their bargain is so unfair to them that it cannot be legally enforced.
[brief] **A.  Preemption is warranted as the State has fully regulated the field of noise control. **  Preemption, specifically in the context of the Noise Control Act, was addressed in detail in *State v. Krause*, 399 N.J. Super. 579, 583 (App. Div. 2008) as follows:  Preemption is a ‘judicially created principle based on the proposition that a municipality, which is an agent of the State, cannot act contrary to the State. ’  *Overlook Terrace Mgmt. Corp. v. Rent Control Bd. of the Town of West New York*, 71 N.J. 451, 461 (1976) (citation omitted).  In deciding whether preemption applies, we are obliged to take these considerations into account: (1) whether the ordinance conflicts with state law by prohibiting what the Legislature permits or by permitting what the Legislature prohibits; (2) whether the state law was expressly or impliedly intended to entirely govern the issue; (3) whether a uniform policy is needed; (4) whether the state enactment is so pervasive or comprehensive that a coexistent municipal regulation would be improper; and (5) whether the ordinance interferes with the Legislature's objectives.
[brief] Point II:  THE MOTIONS FOR MISTRIAL AND A NEW TRIAL WERE PROPERLY DENIED AS THE JUROR TWELVE BEING CONTACTED BY A MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC DID NOT RENDER THE TRIAL  UNFAIR  The jury received the case at 10:36 a.m.  After two jury questions and an hour long play back, the jury broke for lunch at approximately 1:05 p.m.  During this lunch break, Juror 12 (original 14) was contacted by an individual he associated with the defendant and was encouraged to, “Do the right thing”.  He indicated that he did not know the defendant, but that people knew him and he wanted to be recused.  He denied telling the other jurors the substance of the call.  (10T95-10 to 13).  All of the jurors were individually questioned by the Court at sidebar.  The Court, in its reasoning indicated that none of the other jurors were bothered by the recusal and the only one that expressed any concerns at all was questioned more deeply.