ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 307, 208 (2018).  Cross-examination or competing expert witnesses are not a match for preexisting juror beliefs.  (Db 24-26)  Our Supreme Court understood that cross-examination was insufficient to prevent against the admission of unreliable, or even potentially unreliable, evidence in State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011).  The fact of cross- examination did not prevent the Court from creating a scientifically accurate standard for exclusion.  And the fact that an identification may be reliable enough to go to the jury did not dispense with the need for trial courts to educate the jury:  “[W]e do not rely on jurors to divine rules themselves or glean them from cross-examination or summation.  Even with matters that may be considered intuitive, courts provide focused jury instructions. ”  Id. at 296.  Similarly, cross-examination of a person relaying hearsay cannot cure a Confrontation Clause issue.
[brief] The Appellants’ Proposed Amendment To The First Amended Complaint Was Prejudicial Thus Denial of Leave to Amend Was Warranted And An Appropriate Exercise of Discretion**  The trial court correctly denied Appellants’ motion for leave to amend because Appellants knew all of the predicate facts underlying their proposed claims when they filed their Complaint in March 2019 and their First Amended Complaint in July 2021.  Yet, they chose not to assert claims relating to these facts against [...], instead focusing their claims on the [...].  Only after the claims against the [...] were dismissed did Appellants seek another bite at the apple and first seek relief against [...] by relying on factual allegations they knew 2½ years earlier to support these new claims.  The inexplicable and unjustified delay in seeking relief against [...] was prejudicial and leave was correctly denied on that basis by the trial court.
[brief] 19 In Re Yaccarino, 117 N.J. 175 (1989) .....................................................................  18  Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. 385 (App.Div. 2002) .................................  19  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) ....................................................  33  State v. Bowman, 165 N.J. Super. 531 (App. Div. 1979) ....................................... 30, 31 State v. Burney [I], 471 N.J. Super. 297 (App. Div. 2022) ................................. 16, 20 State v. Burney [II], 255 N.J. 1 (2023) .................................................................. 17, 19, 22 State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560 (1958) ...........................................................................
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  Docket No. [...]  [...], a political subdivision of the State of New Jersey, [...], a political subdivision of the State of New Jersey  [...], individually, and [...], individually, Plaintiff-Appellants, v. [...], a political subdivision of the State of New Jersey and [...], individually and in her official capacity as Mayor, [...], individually and in his official capacity as Deputy Mayor, (Caption Continued Inside Cover)
[brief] ### Cases | Case | Citation | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Barber v. ShopRite of Englewood & Assocs., Inc. | 406 N.J. Super. 32, 52-53, (App. Div. 2009) | | Butler v. Acme Mkts., Inc. | 89 N.J. 270, 275 (1982) | | Eden v. Conrail | 175 N.J. Super. 263, 267 (App. Div. 1980) | | Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. | 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010) | | Estate of Desir ex rel. Estiverne v. Vertus | 214 N.J. 303, 316 (2013) | | Fertile v. St. Michael’s Med. Ctr. | 169 N.J. 481, 490 (2001) | | Fowler v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals, Inc. | 251 N.J. 300, 323 (2022) | | Geringer v. Hartz Mountain Development Corp. | 388 N.J. Super. 392, 404 (App. Div. 2006) | | Greenstein v. Forsgate Industrial Complex | No. A-0947-19, 2021 WL 3084740 (App. Div. 2021) | | Hanna v. Woodland Community Assoc. | No. A-0277-21, 2022 WL 16984707 (App. Div. 2022) | | Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors | 132 N.J. 426 (1993) | | Kane v. Hartz Mountain Indus., Inc. | 278 N.J. Super. 129, 140 (App. Div. 1994) | | Pareja v. Princeton Intern. Props. | 246 N.J. 546 (2021)
[brief] However, even if those arguments are meritorious (which they are not), they do not constitute an abuse of discretion.  An abuse of discretion “is demonstrated if the discretionary act was not premised upon consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear error of judgment. ”  *In re Estate of Ehrlich*, 427 N.J. Super. 64, 76, 47 A.3d 12, 19 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).  The trial court considered all the purported technical violations of the statute raised by the [...] at the October 6, 2023 hearing (and then in the [...]’ motion for reconsideration) and found that the receiver had fulfilled the substance of his duties and should be discharged.  Further, the judge applied his discretion and found that it would be inequitable to punish [...] for serving as a receiver when he had complied with the substance of his statutory duties.  *See Applestein v. United Bd. & Carton Corp.*, 60 N.J. Super. 333, 348, 159 A.2d 146, 154 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1960) (“It is a fundamental maxim of equity that equity looks to the substance rather than the form. ”).  The [...] do not articulate any “clear error of judgment,” rather they simply repeat the same arguments that they made to the trial court.  These arguments were correctly dismissed by the trial court in its discretion and the [...] present no reason for this Court to disturb that ruling.  CONCLUSION
[directive] (I)  $2,000 nan ka yon zak klasifye lye degre (2)  $1,000 nan ka yon zak klasifye 2yem degre (3)  $  750 nan ka yon zak klasifye 3yem degre (4)  nan ka yon zak klasifye 4yem degre 500  $ ( 5)  250 nan ka yon zak moun kap simen dezod oswa moun kap fe ti dezod $  Total Sanksyon (CCPF)  $  _______  _  Do you understand that in its discretion, impose a minimum time in [Yes/wi]  [No/Non]  6.  the court could, confinement to be served before you become eligible for parole, which period could be as long as one half of the period of the custodial sentence imposed?  Ii  Eske w konprann ke tribinal la gen diskresyon pou ta enpoze yon peryod tan minimom nan prizon pou pije anvan menm ou kalifye pou libete kondisyonel, peryod tan sa a kab osi long ke la mwatye peryod santans nan prizon yo enpoze a?
[brief] Rb38–40.  But that is not what the decision --- \(^6\)  Many traditional newspapers restrict redistribution of their content.  See, e.g., [...] Terms of Service, §§ 2.1–2.2, available at https://help.nytimes. com/hc/en-us/articles/115014893428-Terms-of-Service. says.  *Natural Gas Royalties* discussed a different question entirely: whether prior public allegations of fraud within an industry as a whole are sufficient to publicly disclose the fraud as to particular industry participants who were never named in the prior public disclosure.
[brief] (1T100:3-7).  With respect to the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a time where Winslow municipal court sessions were fully remote, so [...] performed her Municipal Prosecutor duties from her private law office.\(^4\) (1T18:4-25).  While court proceedings were remote, the Winslow court administrator would email [...] a complaint and a Plea by Mail form, which [...] would need to email to the defendant or defense counsel.  (1T15:14-16:3).  [...] was also required to check the Municipal Case Resolution System through the New Jersey Court’s website.  (1T16:4-8).  Winslow’s Municipal Court sessions are now fully back to in-person proceedings.  (1T38:6-9).  However, [...] still checks the Municipal Case Resolution System every day and estimated that she performs an extra one to two hours a week of work beyond court appearances.  (1T42:23-42:10).  In her report, [...] noted inconsistent answers from Winslow as to Factor #1 – Instruction. (Pa109).
[brief] Plaintiffs’ counsel misstates the law, suggesting that Plaintiff has a “right to record” a Defense I.M.E..  To the contrary, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s sound discretion to determine whether, on a case-by-case basis, a Plaintiff may record the examination.  Where, as here, a Defendant demonstrates good cause for preventing the recording, the trial court should not hesitate to grant a Rule 4:10-3 protective order.  DiFiore, supra, 254 N.J. at 238.  In the case at bar, [...] found good cause for preventing recording, reasoning that to do otherwise would be to deprive Defendants’ right to utilize the expert of their choosing.  He concluded that to do so would not be fair.  Pa149.  No injustice, let alone grave damage, will result from the order permitting the Defendants’ IME to proceed in the ordinary course of practice consistent with the standards of neuropsychology.  It is well settled that the Appellate Division will defer to a trial court’s disposition of a discovery matter unless it has abused its discretion or its determination is based upon a mistaken understanding of the applicable law.
[brief] Infinity Broadcasting Corp. v. New Jersey Meadowlands Comm'n, 377 N.J. Super. 209 (App. Div. 2005).........................................................11  Lincoln Hgts. v. Cranford Plan. Bd., 314 N.J. Super. 366, 386 (Law Div. 1998), aff'd o.b., 321 N.J. Super. 355 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 131 (1999).................................................................12
[brief] ” (17T234-4 to 6).  The State acknowledges that defendant’s aggregate period of parole ineligibility of 127 years amounts to the equivalent of life without parole.  See Zuber, 227 N.J. at 447 (55-year parole ineligibility period is the equivalent of life without parole).  As evidenced by [...]’s 60-page sentencing decision (17T175-13 to 235-9), the court exercised a heightened level of care before imposing multiple consecutive sentences resulting in a lengthy jail term.  Id. at 429-30; See also State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 270 (2021) (requiring sentencing court to explain its evaluation of the fairness of the overall sentence).  The judge properly evaluated the Miller factors when sentencing defendant to a lengthy period of parole ineligibility in a case involving multiple homicides.  Zuber, 227 N.J. at 447.  His decision is supported by competent credible evidence in the record.  Comer, 249 N.J. at 408.  Defendant is not without recourse.  Juvenile offenders waived to adult court, convicted of murder, and sentenced to mandatory 30-year parole disqualifiers have the opportunity after 20 years to petition the court for a reduction of the parole ineligibility period, as well as the total sentence, based on a demonstration of maturity and rehabilitation.  Defendant may petition the court to review his sentence after 20 years.  Comer, 249 N.J. at 370, 401.  Finally, the sentence imposed does not shock the judicial conscience.  Defendant was convicted by a unanimous jury of four counts of first-degree murder.  He could have been sentenced on each count to life imprisonment with a 30-year parole disqualifier.  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(1).  Instead, defendant was sentenced to a specific term of 50 years on each count.  And, the judge could have imposed four consecutive sentences, not three, because there were four separate murder victims.  Defendant’s lengthy prison sentence is the product of his intentional criminal acts and not an abuse of discretion by the sentencing court.  This Court should affirm.
[brief] Plaintiff makes several arguments as to an alleged “public benefit” including recreation, environmental preservation, economic benefits and easing traffic congestion.  However, these supposed findings were not cited by the Township in any ordinance and not presented to the trial court below.  The Township suggests also that there was significant community engagement in the process, but there is no such record of any meetings, hearings or public comment.  Nor was there any evidence of this public input presented to the trial court.  Indeed, the Township does not cite to page in the appendices filed with this Court.
[brief] Poosikian v. Division Division of Pension and Benefits, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 319 (App. Div. 2021).  Pa126 to Pa129.  ([...], an attorney, had won his election to the Borough Council on November November 6, 2006, took office on January 1, 2007 and legislation barring an elected official from enrolling in PERS under N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7(d) did not become effective until July 1, 2007.)  [...] took no action to determine his PERS enrollment eligibility for over ten (10) years according to the record in the case.  Pa127.  In 2018, over ten (10) years after [...] became aware that he may have been eligible for PERS enrollment (between the window of January 1, 2007 and July 1, 2007), he requested that a payroll clerk in [...] enroll him in PERS.  The [...] initially decided that [...] was eligible for PERS enrollment and sent an invoice for $1,706.60 for the delayed enrollment of [...] in PERS.  Pa128.  After the invoice was paid, the [...] confirmed in writing that [...] was enrolled in PERS.  Pa128.  About two (2) months later, though, the [...] reversed its position, advising [...] that his enrollment application was processed in error “and that his [PERS] account had been cancelled. ”  Pa128.  [...] appealed the decision, but his appeal was denied.  He then appealed the denial of his requests (1) for enrollment in PERS retroactively and (2) for the alternative relief of an administrative hearing.  Pa128.  After the Board denied all of his requested relief, he filed an appeal with the Appellate Division.  In reversing the decision of the Board, the Appellate Division Division remanded the case to the Board to “take action” consistent with the equities strongly favoring [...].  Pa127 to Pa129.  The not so subtle message of the Appellate Division opinion seemed to be that the Board should consider favorably the relief requested by [...].  The [...] and Poosikian case illustrate that, depending upon the equitable considerations in a case, there is ample discretion under New Jersey law to correct an injustice in the loss of pension benefits of a retired public employee.
[brief] As discussed very poignantly in the Dela Vega case, intrafamily liability exclusions result in the widely disparate treatment of an entire class of victims.  Dela Vega, supra, A-2272-19 (App. Div. 2022) at *2, FN2. (Pa135).  The disparate treatment of victims of an accident based solely upon their relationship to the tortfeasor is contrary to New Jersey law.
[brief] With respect to the first prong of the negative criteria -"without substantial detriment to the public good"- Plaintiff submitted insufficient evidence to show that the new development would not negatively impact the area surrounding Lot 5.  In the interests of brevity, Defendant incorporates by reference as if fully set forth in this brief subsection the arguments contained in Point II above and Point III below.  By way of supplementation, Defendant further states as follows.  As set forth in Point II(B) above, the Board explained why it viewed [...]’s proposal as too oversized for a parcel just over one-half acre in size.  It also concluded that granting variance relief would contravene multiple purposes of the MLUL (as well as [...]’s Master Plan), and thus be at odds with the public interest as cited above in Paragraph 16 of the Resolution.  The record reflects that the Board had adequate basis upon which to find that Plaintiff did not carry its burden to demonstrate that its project could be approved "without substantial detriment to the public good".  Again, Plaintiff has not met its heavy burden to show why the Board’s determination, as explained and supported in its Resolution should not be presumed to be valid or how the Board abused its discretion in reaching its findings.  For the aforesaid reasons as well, the Board’s denial of the Application was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and the Trial Court therefore properly concurred.
[brief] See *Hill v. Board of Educ. of Middletown Tp.*, 183 N.J. Super. 36, 40-41 (App. Div. 1982); *Kolitch v. Lindedahl*, 100 N.J. 485, 497 (1985) ("the burden is on the public entity both to plead and prove its immunity under [the TCA] .  . . .").  \(^2\)  See, e.g., *Hill v. Board of Educ. of Middletown Tp.*, 183 N.J. Super. 36, 40 (App. Div. 1982)(defendant failing to plead TCA defense "may be found to have waived the protection thereof").  \(^3\)  See *Jackson v. Hankinson*, 94 N.J. Super. 505, 514 (App. Div. 1967), aff’d, 51 N.J. 230 (1968).  the statute" and failed to include in its answer any statement of facts supporting the defense and therefore, the court barred the TCA defense.
[brief] This is a civil action appeal filed by Appellant ([...]), a pro se inmate of Respondent ([...]) for the arbitrary action of denying his meritorious property claim.  Also, for the reckless disregard of [...]'s constitutional right to due process  [...] seeks punitive damages as treble damages from each personnel of [...] involved in their individual capacity.  [...] also seeks cost.  On 7-27-19 [...] filed a Grievance informing [...] that after months of writing and not receiving a response from the vendor, [...], [...] attempted to return the food item, falsely advertised, but was denied by personnel [...] and [...] of [...] (Aa1).  On 8-19-19 [...] filed Grievance against being deprived of his constitutional right to Aa = Appellant appendix OVER return the item and [...] informed [...] that he was never provided any information that he cannot return the items, [...] informed [...] that its action to deny him was arbitrary.  In response, [...]'s personnel [...] and [...] falsely claimed to be following the rules and regulations.  (Aa2).  This falsehood gave [...] cause to file a property claim on 9-10-19 (Aa3-7, 1 and 2).  In response, [...]'s property claim committee personnel consisting of unknown Social Workers, custody major, classification, business office and chairperson each reviewed the claim and denied on 11-16-22.  (Aa10-11).  Also [...]'s administrator personnel unknown denied the claim after review on 11-17-22.  (Aa17).  As a result of [...]'s personnel reckless disregard to [...]'s constitutional rights [...] serviced a Notice of Appeal dated 11-23-2022.  (Aa12).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[brief] 32  A.  Amending a complaint to add a proper party does not cure an B.  The trial court had already set a deadline to amend to rectify any issues with the names of the parties to the lawsuit, and Plaintiffs affirmatively stated that they did not need to make any amendments.  C.  Adding a plaintiff to an action – not merely after filing the initial complaint but, in this case, after a trial and the subsequent entry of judgment against the defendants – denies the defendants due process and the ability to defend themselves.  V.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF ALL PARTIES.  (Da620)  VI.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO HEAR ORAL ARGUMENT ON TWO SEPARATE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS.  (Da310)  VII.  THE PLAINTIFFS ACTUALLY ADMITTED THAT THE DAMAGES THEY WERE CLAIMING AS THEIR OWN RIGHTFULLY BELONGED TO NON-PARTY [...].  (5T)  CONCLUSION
[brief] Instead, “[w]hen the record of an identification ‘is lacking in important details,’ and it was feasible to preserve them, Rule 3:11(d) affords a judge discretion, consistent with appropriate case law, to bar the evidence, redact part of it, and/or “fashion an appropriate jury charge” if the evidence is admitted. ”  Green, 239 N.J. at 109.  “Indeed, suppression should be the remedy of last resort, and judges should explain why other remedies in Rule 3:11(d) are not adequate before barring identification evidence. ”  Ibid.  Applying these guiding principles, we conclude defendant is entitled to a Wade/Henderson hearing because the officer failed to fully comply with Rule 3:11 and Delgado by making a contemporaneous record.
[brief] “The rule applies when the court's decision represents a clear abuse of discretion based on plainly incorrect reasoning or failure to consider evidence or a good reason for the court to reconsider new information. ”  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2 on R. 4:49-2 (2022).  Pursuant to R. 4:49-2, a motion for reconsideration must state with specificity the basis on which it is made, including a statement of the matters or controlling \(^3\)
[brief] Further, since the former non-operating school district in [...] ceased to exist as of July 1, 2009, there is no entity attributable to the municipality of [...] to constitute a constituent of [...].  Finally, the fourth category of entities that may resolve to withdraw from a consolidated or regional school district is governing bodies of municipalities constituting one of three subcategories: a constituent district of a limited-purpose or all-purpose regional school district, or a consolidated school district.  [...] doesn’t satisfy this definition either.  Setting aside the fact that the Commissioner eliminated the [...] School District fifteen years ago, as discussed above, [...] is not a constituent district of a consolidated school district.  Similarly, [...] is not a constituent district of a limited-purpose regional school district. \(^6\)  As a further result of the elimination of the [...] school district’s non-operating status and merger into [...], the Borough of [...] cannot be a governing body of a municipality constituting a constituent school district of a limited-purpose regional school district.  [...] is made up of the following school districts: [...], [...], and [...].
[brief] (Pa32).  On March 2, 2022, Defendant filed an appeal of the January 7, 2022 Order and the February 18, 2022 order denying his motion for reconsideration.  (Pa55).  On May 25, 2023, the Tyler decision was issued by the United States Supreme Court.  The Defendant did not file a letter as permitted by R. 2:6-11(d)(1) requesting relief pursuant to the recent Tyler decision.  (Pa32).  On June 8, 2023, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s order denying the Defendant’s motion to vacate Final Judgment and his motion for reconsideration of the order denying such motion.  See [...] v. [...], A-1944-21 (N.J. App. Div. June 8. 2023).  (Pa55).  The Appellate Division did not vacate the Final Judgment.  (Pa55).  The Defendant did not file a motion for reconsideration in the Appellate Division as permitted by R. 2:11-6.  (Pa32).  Similarly, the Defendant did not petition the New Jersey Supreme Court for certification as permitted by R. 2:12-3.  (Pa32).  On December 22, 2023, the Defendant began sending terroristic threats to Plaintiff’s CEO [...] and his wife.
[brief] TPO introduce extraneous factors that deviate from the assessment procedures’ intended use.  Specifically, TPO departs from standardized administration procedures because it creates observer effects which are known to affect human performance and test validity.  Observer effects, such as distraction of attention of an examinee, are not taken into account in collection of normative data, which may result in inaccurate conclusions pertaining to the extent and severity of abnormal findings.  Replacing in-person observation with camera recording or remote observation does not eliminate these issues (Constantinou, Ashendorf, & McCaffrey, 2005).