ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The fact that a suspect’s behavior may be consistent with innocent behavior does not control the analysis.  *State v. Mann*, 203 N.J. 328, 338 (2010); *See also State v. Arthur*, 149 N.J. 1, 11-12 (1997).  Credible tips are often the basis of reasonable suspicion.  *See State v. Basil*, 202 N.J. 570, 586 (2010).  In determining whether a tip is sufficient to espouse reasonable suspicion, courts consider the basis and extent of the informant’s knowledge.
[brief] As shown by Stelluti, New Jersey Courts routinely reject challenges to arbitration agreements, even when the facts suggest a “high level of procedural unconscionability,” Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 189 N.J. 28, 40 (2006), and the substantive provisions “form an unconscionable wall of protection” for the defendant.  Ruszala v. Brookdale Living, 415 N.J. Super. 272, 299 (App. Div. 2010)(finding restrictions on discovery, limits on compensatory damages, and outright prohibition of punitive damages to be unenforceable but severable); see also Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, 189 N.J. 1, 26 (2006) (finding class-arbitration waivers unconscionable and unenforceable.  . . .
[brief] Defendants herein argue that the Trial Court judge was correct in its ruling but did not envision that Plaintiff would “game” the Order by creating its own timeline—to the detriment of Defendants.  Specifically, Plaintiff declined to close, refused to terminate the contract, refused to discharge the Lis Pendens it filed on the property and ignored that a stay was required to preserve any rights it may have under the contract.  Plaintiff is thereby attempting to create its own timetable and remedy.  A.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...........................................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................................................................3  STATEMENT OF FACTS  ..................................................................................................................5  A.  The Factual Basis for the Guilty Plea (1T) ..............................................................................5  B.  The Original Sentencing: May 18, 1995 (2T) ..........................................................................7  C.  The Resentencing in Light of State v. Zuber: September 4, 2018  Argument and January 29, 2019  Decision (3T) (4T)  .................................................................10  D.  The Resentencing in Light of State v. Comer: March 31, 2023 (5T)  ........................................12  LEGAL ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................13  POINT I IN RE-SENTENCING  DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO STATE V. COMER, THE COURT COMMITTED FOUR INDEPENDENT LEGAL ERRORS.  IN SO DOING, THE COURT FAILED TO RULE ON THE BOTTOM-LINE ISSUE OF WHETHER DEFENDANT HAD MATURED AND REHABILITATED.  ACCORDINGLY, THE MATTER MUST BE REMANDED AGAIN FOR RESENTENCING.  (5T)
[brief] I.  POINT I: STANDARD OF REVIEW AND THE COMER FRAMEWORK .................. 21  II.  POINT II: THE JUDGE APPROPRIATELY APPLIED  ALL RELEVANT LAW ..........  24  a.  On the alleged evidence of rehabilitation ..............................................24 b.  The first Miller factor .............................................................................26 c.  The second Miller factor .........................................................................31 d.  The Third Miller factor ............................................................................33 e.  The fourth Miller factor ..........................................................................34 f.  The fifth Miller factor ..............................................................................36 g.  Aggravating and mitigating factors..........................................................36  III.  POINT III: THE JUDGE DID FIND THAT RELIEF UNDER COMER IS LIMITED TO ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE .......................................................40  IV.  POINT IV: DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO RESENTENCING OR RESENTENCING BY ANOTHER JUDGE ..................................................43  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................45
[brief] - All memoranda, reports, and notes; - All emails and letters between [...] employees; - All emails and letters between [...] employees and county prosecutors or county prosecutors' employees; - All emails and letters between [...] employees and [...] or her attorneys; • All agreements not to prosecute [...]; Pa-39, 40.  Under R. 4:10-2(a), the records sought through Plaintiff’s subpoena must be disclosed, as it remains unknown what additional responsive documents and emails the [...] possesses that are responsive to Plaintiff’s records request.
[brief] Prior to the trial, on January 17, 2023, the court heard various motions in limine with regard to this action.  Da214-223.  Notably, Plaintiff attempted to circumvent his burden of proving notice by unsuccessfully moving to bar the City from presenting evidence at trial to support or oppose the notice requirement of the alleged dangerous condition.  Da214-215.  Additionally, the trial court granted the City’s motion to exclude the June 29, 2015 work order from the record in this matter, as evidence of subsequent remedial measures.
[brief] An interlocutory appeal is essential to the interest of justice in order to direct the trial courts to apply the AOM and COVID-19 immunity statutes as the Legislature intended, and to allow this Court to provide additional instruction and clarification in standards for their application, guidance which remains necessary in order to preserve and maintain the statutes’ crucial function of eliminating futile claims at the outset before discovery proceeds.  Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant their motion for leave to appeal and direct that the April 28, 2024 order be vacated with instructions that the amended complaint be dismissed with prejudice in its entirety.
[brief] Moreover, when the claim for attorney's fees rests upon a contractual provision, rather than an award of counsel fees under R. 4:42-9, it constitutes "an element of damages, which ordinarily must be proved "in the same manner as . . . any other item of damages."  Jennings v. Cutler, 288 N.J. Super. 553, 567 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting Cohen, 86 N.J. Super. at 216).  See also Green, 215 N.J. at 455 ("We have made plain that the party seeking to be awarded attorneys' fees ordinarily bears the burden of proving that they are reasonable"); see also, Jugan v. Friedman, 275 N.J. Super. 556, 574 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 138 N.J. 271 (1994).  Therefore, plaintiffs were required to prove that a contractual provision expressly authorized the award of fees and expenses and that the $1,181,874.51 awarded here was reasonable.  The trial court had the concomitant obligation to strictly construe the contractual provisions relied upon to determine whether they constituted an "express authorization" for an award of fees.  On appeal, however, the "[i]nterpretation and construction of a contract is a matter of law for the court subject to de novo review," Fastenberg v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 309 N.J. Super. 415, 420 (App. Div. 1998), and the trial court's interpretation is "not entitled to any special deference."
[brief] Considering [...]’s lack of notice to [...], the series of email communications cited by the court below, which did not involve [...], fall far short of the “clear,” “specific,” and properly “place[d]” notice of coverage termination required by the above cases -- even if they were material to the disposition of the matter.  Those communications are even less clear than the “undifferentiated passel of documents,” found lacking in *Skeete*, which – as [...]’s unrefuted testimony establishes – required impermissible “detective work” to try to unravel.
[brief] ” (Pa629; 4T44:12-19).  [...] further concluded that the amendments were consistent with “the Monmouth County Master Plan which identifies this as a redevelopment area as well as the State development and redevelopment plan which has this parcel within the Metropolitan planning area.  And the main purpose of the Metropolitan planning area is to promote the redevelopment and revitalization of more densely populated areas.  So this is certainly a plan that helps advance those goals and objectives of the State plan. ” (Pa627; 4T41:8-17).
[brief] The IFPA provides for a civil enforcement action under the police power of the State against any person who violates the statute and establishes sanctions in the form of civil penalties, attorneys’ fees and costs.  See N.J.S.A. 17:33A-1 to -30.  The Department is allowed to, and does, intervene in IFPA cases filed by insurance companies to also seek civil penalties.  See Lajara, 222 N.J. at 152 (“[T]he Commissioner may join in [an insurer's] action for the purpose of seeking judgment for the payment of a civil penalty authorized under [N.J.S.A. 17:33A-5].”) (quoting N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(d)) (alterations in original)).  In such cases, the Department works in conjunction with insurance companies to combat insurance fraud.  But the Department cannot intervene in IFPA cases that are sent to PIP arbitration, since those proceedings do not contemplate intervenor action by the Department to enforce the IFPA.  As a result, the Department cannot exercise its authority to assess statutory civil penalties in IFPA cases in PIP arbitration.  Thus, shunting IFPA cases to PIP arbitration is to also foreclose an important tool for the Department’s efforts to combat insurance fraud.
[brief] [...] also erroneously argues that Petit-Clair v. Bd. of Trs., No. A-4561- 18T1 (App. Div. July 27, 2020) (Pa119-22), supports her position.  (Pb32-33).  In Petit-Clair, this court affirmed that an attorney for the [...] was an independent contractor.  (Pa119).  Like [...], Petit-Clair asked this court to substitute its judgment for the Board’s in weighing the twenty factors, but this court rejected that request.  (Pa122).  Instead, this court found the Board was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in weighing the twenty factors to determine that Petit-Clair was an independent contractor.  (Pa122).  In particular, this court found reasonable the Board’s findings that needing to secure an annual appointment, failure to provide a computer, office supplies or secretary, while providing ancillary items like zoning treatises, City letterhead, and access to the coffee room were all indications of independent contractor status.  (Pa122).  Similarly, in [...]’s case, she required annual reappointment, was not provided with a permanent workstation, and she was provided with ancillary items like a conference room, the Township letterhead, and access to the copier.  Accordingly, the Petit-Clair decision supports the Board’s finding of ineligibility under Chapter 92 subsection (b).
[brief] ”  *State v. Szemple*, 247 N.J. 82, 101 (2021).  For the second prong, if the evidence is material to either guilt or punishment, the good or bad faith of the prosecutor in withholding the evidence is irrelevant.  *Martini*, 160 N.J. at 268.  “The Brady disclosure rule applies to information of which the prosecution is actually or constructively aware. ”  *State v. Nelson*, 330 N.J. Super. 206, 213 (App. Div. 2000).  “Whether evidence is material and thus subject to disclosure under the Brady rule is a mixed question of law and fact. ”  *State v. Marshall*, 148 N.J. 89, 185 (1997) (citing *United States v. Pelullo*, 14 F.3d 881, 886 (3d Cir. 1994); *United States v. Perdomo*, 929 F.2d 967, 969 (3d Cir. 1991); *Carter v. Rafferty*, 826 F.2d 1299, 1306 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 (1988)).
[brief] State v. Moore, 158 N.J. 292, 311-12 (1999) overruled on other grounds by State v. Rodriguez, 195 N.J. 165, 173-74 (2008); Villanueva, 373 N.J. Super. at 600.  Here, defendant was the initial aggressor, punching [...] in the chest and pushing him, so defendant cannot raise self-defense.  Moreover, a reasonable person in defendant’s position would have understood that if he ceased resisting, the officers’ use of force would cease.  The videos in evidence depict how the officers constantly instructed defendant to get on his stomach and “stop resisting,” yet defendant continued to stiffen his body and flail his arms.  At one point, defendant tried to strike [...] in the face and reached for a firearm.  Because defendant should have understood that if he ceased resisting the officers’ use of force would terminate, defendant lost any privilege of self-defense.
[brief] "We are not, however, 'bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue,' particularly when 'that interpretation is inaccurate or contrary to legislative objectives.'"  Mount v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 233 N.J. 402, 418-19 (2018) (citing Russo, 206 N.J. at 27).  Instead, as the Mount case pointed out "we review de novo the Board's interpretation of N.J.S.A. 43:16A7(1) and our case law."
[brief] I.  **[...] grants [...] a ROFR.**  On March 4, 2012, [...] entered into the MFSA with [...].\(^3\) Da021.  [...] Inc. is the corporate entity that owns and operates the gas station at the Premises.  *Ibid.*  Under the MFSA, [...] agreed, among other things, to purchase all motor fuel products for use in the operation of its business at the Premises exclusively from Plaintiff.  *Ibid.*  On April 24, 2015, Plaintiff and [...] entered into Amendment Number 1 to the MFSA.  Da037.  Among other provisions, the Amendment includes Section 39, which provides [...] with a preemptive right of first refusal in the event [...] sought to sell the Premises to a third party.  *Ibid.*  Section 39 of Amendment Number 1 to the MFSA provides that:  39.  Preemptive Right.  If Purchaser is the owner or lessee of the Premises, Seller shall have the following preemptive rights:  If, at any time during the term of this Agreement  Purchaser shall receive a bona fide offer from a third party (the "Offer") to purchase or otherwise acquire the Premises, Purchaser shall, before accepting said Offer, promptly send a copy of the Offer to Seller which shall have the preemptive right to purchase or otherwise acquire the Premises on the same terms and conditions as set forth in the Offer.  If Seller elects to --- \(^3\)  Contrary to the claim in [...]’s brief (and despite this having been clarified to counsel previously), [...] is not and never has been a subsidiary of [...].
[brief] Indigent and unrepresented litigants have a right to the fair and impartial review of their claims and defenses.  An important issue of fairness in our judiciary is raised in this case, in the course of which Appellant has been a victim of grave injustice and has been forced to represent herself as an indigent, pro se litigant.  Appellant thus respectfully requests that the statements of her case be given due and equitable consideration, with reasonable lenience, with respect to precedence set by existing case law, to include but not be limited to, the standards of perfection and defense against dismissal.  See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 595, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) and Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 at 48 (1957).  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] *Taylor v. Sturgell*, 553 U.S. 880, 128 S.  Ct. 2161, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008).  In this case, the Appellant’s strategic decision not to intervene in the initial litigation before [...] is pivotal.  The Appellant had the opportunity to be a part of the earlier litigation and chose not to participate.  This decision effectively aligns with the principle that a non-party who had the chance to join an earlier suit but opted not to do so may be bound by the decision in that suit.  The rationale behind this exception is grounded in the notion that a party should not be allowed to bypass the consequences of a legal judgment simply by choosing not to participate, especially when it had a fair opportunity to do so.  Therefore, precluding the issue of the validity of the ordinances in the current litigation does not infringe upon traditional notions of due process.  The Appellant, by its own strategic choice, waived the right to challenge the Ordinances' validity in that separate litigation.  This waiver is consistent with the principle of judicial efficiency and the prevention of duplicative litigation.
[brief] ## STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10 ...........................................................................................................2, 10  ## COURT RULES  R. 2:2-3(a)(2) ....................................................................................................................7  R. 2:5-5(b) ..........................................................................................................................10  ## CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS  N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, para. 4 ..............................................................................................7  ## CASES  Bartley Healthcare Nursing & Rehab. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Senior Servs., 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 329 (App. Div. Feb. 15, 2011) .................................................................8  Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002) .....................................................................7  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007) .......................................................................9  Ensslin v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 311 N.J Super 333 (App. Div. 1998) ...........................................10, 11, 12  Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186 (App. Div. 2010) .........................16  Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980) ..........................................................8  In re Issuance of Permit by DEP, 120 N.J. 164 (1990)  .....................................................9  Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85 (1973) ..................................................7, 8 Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22 (1995) ..........................................................................9  N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. State, 88 N.J. 605 (1982) ..........................................................7  N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., 196 N.J. 366 (2008) .................................................................8  SMB Assocs v. Department of Envtl. Prot., 264 N.J. Super 38 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 137 N.J. 58 (1994)..................12  State v. Atley, 157 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 1978)..................................9  In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions’ Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267 (2018)...............9, 10 Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011)......................................7  In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees, 194 N.J. 413 (2008).........................................................................................8  Williams v. Department of Corrections, 330 N.J. Super. 197 (App. Div. 2000) .......................................................7, 8  ##
[brief] I, Plaintiff, [...] (formerly [...]) respectfully asks that this Court deny granting a Motion of Stay to the defendant/appellant: [...].  [...] FAILED to make Child Support payments for his two children: [...] and [...], with past arrearages.  Per: [...]  Child Support: Final Audit Investigation performed on: 2/21/24: TOTAL: $88,047.35 (da 20-21)
[brief] Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are misplaced.  Foremost, this case is distinguishable from those cited by defendant, namely, the unpublished case of *State v. Atkins*, No. A-0732-13T2, 2015 WL 4067367 (App. Div. July 6, 2015), the federal district case from northern Illinois: *United States v. Allegra*, 187 F. Supp. 3d 918 (N.D. Ill. 2015), a case from Alaska: *Hampel v. State*, 706 P.2d 1173 (Alas. Ct. App. 1985), and a case from Texas: *Huff v. State*, 678 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).  In each of these cases, the offending comment came in the middle of questioning and the questioning continued.  Comparatively, and importantly, here, defendant’s question was made during the advisement of rights.  Here, substantive questioning did not continue after defendant made that question at issue.  Indeed, it had not even begun.  Rather, one of the rights the detective had yet to provide specifically answered defendant’s question, it was provided to defendant before any interrogation began, and notably, instead of invoking his right to counsel, defendant signed the waiver and spoke with the detective.  As such, those cases are factually distinguishable and do not support the trial court’s ruling.
[brief] B.  The Law Division Properly Exercised Its Equitable Discretion ..................................................................................  24  C.  When plaintiffs amended to name Respondents, the fictitious pleading requirement under NJ R. 4:26-4 was satisfied ......................................................................................  29  D.  When plaintiff amended to name Cross Appellants, the Complaint related back to the original Complaint pursuant to Rule. 4:9-3 .............................................................................  30  E.  The Restaurant’s Claim That Plaintiffs Certainly Knew They Were a Tenant ..................................................................  32  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................
[brief] Plaintiff’s counsel also erroneously explained her burden of proof when speaking to the jury about her client’s retaliation claim.  She repeatedly made conclusory statements indicating that every occurrence Plaintiff complained about was “in retaliation” for something, without articulating what the evidence established that Appellants retaliated against her for.  To maintain a claim for retaliation, plaintiff must plead that she “‘engaged in a protected activity known to the [employer,]’ the employee was ‘subjected to an adverse employment decision’ and there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. ”  Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 214 N.J. 518, 547 (2013) (quoting Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 290 N.J. Super. 252, 274 (App. Div. 1996)).  Plaintiff must establish adverse action causally related to a protected activity.  Appellants respectfully submit that a LAD retaliation claim involves protected activity, not membership in a protected class, as Plaintiff’s counsel advised the jury).
[brief] Any construction activities relating to the redevelopment project, as again referenced in Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Statement, were under the direction of another entity, [...] (“[...]”), a subsidiary to another co- Defendant who was voluntarily dismissed from the matter by the Plaintiffs, [...] (“[...]”).  On March 16, 2020, [...] as a subsidiary to [...], officially took over and replaced the Authority as the redeveloper on the project.  Thus, any construction activities, excavation, or storage of equipment issues post-dating March 16, 2020 as it relates to the redevelopment project are wholly misdirected towards the Authority and instead pertain to [...] and [...], which Plaintiffs have completely and voluntarily dismissed.
[brief] In a thorough recitation of the case’s history, the court described the traffic circle elimination project and [...]’s actions as follows:  “The project also included the [...]’s permanent fee taking of three portions of Stavros’s property and a temporary fee taking of a construction easement. ”  *[...] v. State*, No. A-0959-17T2, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1888 at *3 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Sep. 12, 2019) (emphasis added; specific descriptions of the land by block and lot numbers omitted).  The court explained that [...] was ultimately awarded $998,400 by a jury “as just compensation for the value of property the [...] acquired as of June 2008…”