ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS ........................................................................................................ iii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................  iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................  3  FACTUAL BACKGROUND .....................................................................................................  7 ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................................  14 POINT I  THE 2024 ORDER IS NOT A FINAL ORDER.  (Ra1-3) ..................  14 POINT II  THE CHANCERY COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING [...]’S APPLICATIONS.  (Ra1-7)  ..................................................................................................................  16 POINT III  THE CHANCERY COURT PROPERLY DENIED [...]’S FIRST APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.  (Ra4-118)  .................................................................  18 POINT IV  THE CHANCERY COURT PROPERLY DENIED [...]’S RECONSIDERATION MOTION/SECOND APPLICATION AS MOOT.  (Ra1-6, Ra126-144) .........................  19 POINT V  THE CHANCERY COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING [...]’S RECONSIDERATION MOTION/SECOND APPLICATION EVEN IF IT WAS NOT MOOT.  (Ra1-178)  ........................................... 21
[brief] The trial court did not follow those directives.  With respect to punitive damages, this Court vacated the awards and directed the trial court to make specific findings of fact as to each individual defendant based upon conduct occurring in the limitations period to determine if punitive damages were warranted.  On remand, however, the trial court’s “findings” did not meet the threshold required for the award of punitive damages against any Defendant, and it awarded punitive damages against two defendants in a purely economic case based merely on a lack of action.  Regarding attorneys’ fees, this Court reversed and vacated the trial court’s ruling, directing the trial court to “limit its award to the fees and costs reasonably devoted to plaintiffs’ pursuit of their respective RICO claims.
[brief] Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 212-13.  on juvenile murderers, so long as the proper steps are followed:  To be faithful to the concerns that Graham and Miller highlight, which our State Constitution embraces as well, a sentencing court must consider not only the factors in Yarbough but also the ones in Miller when it decides whether to impose consecutive sentences on a juvenile which may result in a lengthy period of parole ineligibility.
[brief] Plaintiff commenced this action against [...], seeking coverage under his homeowners insurance policy, and defendant [...] (“[...]”), which issued an insurance policy to the [...] (“the Association”), claiming he is entitled to liability coverage pursuant to the [...] policy, filing a complaint against the two carriers on December 9, 2022 (Pa1-Pa79).  The complaint against [...] filed by plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment with respect to the rights and obligations of the parties pursuant to the \(^1\) Numbers in parentheses preceded by “Pa” refer to pages of the appendix to the plaintiff’s brief.  policy\(^2\) of homeowners insurance (Da1-Da26\(^3\)) [...] issued to plaintiff and his wife.  (Pa44-Pa47).  Claiming that the [...] policy provides coverage on an “all risks” basis (Pa3, ¶1, ¶3; Pa28, ¶168), plaintiff alleged that the [...] policy should apply to an underlying lawsuit filed against him by the Association, four members of the Board of Trustees for the Association ([...], [...], [...] and [...]), [...] (“[...]”), which was the Association’s management company; and [...] employee [...], whose role was to serve as the on-site property manager for the Association.  Plaintiff’s complaint against [...] alleged that the allegations of the underlying lawsuit, bearing Docket No. [...], therein amount to an occurrence under the [...] policy and that no exclusions apply (Pa44-Pa47).  Count Five of plaintiff’s verified complaint alleged breach of contract against [...] (Pa47-Pa48), and Count Six alleged that [...] breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Pa48-Pa51).  ---
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  In November 1998, [...] and nine co-defendants were indicted on eighteen counts with crimes stemming from a dispute among members of the [...] that resulted in the killing of two individuals.  1T:40:4-10.\(^1\)  The defendants were all charged with four counts of second-degree conspiracy to commit kidnapping in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:13-1; four counts of first-degree kidnapping, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b); four counts of second-degree conspiracy to commit murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:11-3; two counts of murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2); two counts of felony murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3); and two counts of attempted murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3.  DA-3.  Defendants who were charged with additional counts pled guilty pursuant to agreements with the State.  The trial judge denied motions for separate trials.  DA-14.  [...] and four co-defendants were tried jointly between January 24 and March 17, 2000.  DA-14.  The State relied on testimony from the co-defendants who had entered plea agreements, and who at points had recanted or wavered in their testimony.  1T:6:13-8:6.  Ultimately, [...] was convicted on all counts.  DA-1.  \(^1\)  For purposes of citation throughout this brief, references to the transcripts will be made as follows:  1T refers to the transcript of sentencing dated April 25, 2000.  The matter proceeded to sentencing on April 25, 2000.  DA-14.  As part of that sentencing, the court recognized that it had to determine whether the sentences for [...]’s convictions should run concurrent or consecutive to one another.  T1:47:4-6.  The court did not qualitatively weigh the factors identified in determining whether to sentence concurrently or consecutively.  T1:47:7 – 48:19.  The court instead identified repeatedly that the sentencing law requires that there be “no free crimes. ”  1T:48:18.  The court determined that this required consecutive sentences because of the message that consecutive sentences sent to the families of the victims, and the deterrent value to the public at large.  1T:48:9 - 15.  The court did not engage in any evaluation of the overall fairness of the sentence to [...].  1T:47:4 – 51:17.  Instead, the court focused on the necessity to adhere to the concept that there be no free crimes.  1T:48:18.  In accordance with that, the court sentenced [...] to two consecutive thirty-year terms without the possibility of parole, resulting in an aggregate sentence of sixty years without parole eligibility.  DA-1.  [...] will not be eligible for release until 2058 when he is 85 years old.  DA-1.  LEGAL ARGUMENT
[brief] \(^5\)  Plaintiff argues she has met her burden of establishing temporal proximity because she was subjected to a hostile workplace environment \textit{following} her “whistleblowing activity in November of 2019 and January of 2020. ” (AB at p. 17).  However “the mere fact that [an] adverse employment action occurs after [the protected activity]” generally will not “satisfy the Plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating a causal link between the two. ”  \textit{Young}, 385 N.J. Super. at 467 (App. Div. 2005) (second and third alterations in original) (\textit{quoting Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co.}, 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997)).  There simply are no facts --- \(^5\)  See e.g. \textit{Young v. Hobart West Group}, 385 N.J. Super. 448, 467 (App. Div. 2005) (holding Plaintiff’s termination four months after her complaint was not unusually suggestive, and plaintiff must set forth additional evidence to establish a causal link between her termination and complaints); \textit{Levins v. Braccia}, No. A-4290-07T2, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1473, at *7 (App. Div. June 16, 2009) (holding lapse of four months between protected activity and termination insufficient to support an inference of causation); \textit{Rasmussen v. Vineland Bd. of Educ.}, No. A-0038-13T3, 2014 N.J. Super Unpub. LEXIS 2929, at *9 (App. Div. Dec. 22, 2014) (finding four-month gap insufficient to establish inference of causation); \textit{LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cnty. Ctr. Ass’n}, 503 F.3d 217, 233 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding gap of three months between the protected activity and the adverse action, without more, cannot create an inference of causation to defeat summary judgment); \textit{Flear v. Glacier Garlock Bearkins, a Div. of Enpro Ind., Inc.}, 159 Fed. Appx 390, 393 (3d. Cir. 2005) (holding termination two months after plaintiff’s protected activity did not establish sufficient connection between plaintiff’s complaints and termination to deny summary judgment for employer). of “unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive” to support any inference of causation between any reports made by Plaintiff and any adverse action and, therefore, they cannot form the basis of her CEPA claim.
[brief] (13T:5-5 to 6-20).  Testimony from [...] from the New Jersey State police revealed that neither [...] nor defendant had ever applied for a gun permit and that neither of the two guns recovered from [...] were registered firearms.  (10T:53-12 to 56-21).  The State did not call either victim to testify.  However, the defense presented the testimony of one of the victims, [...].
[brief] (Da310-315, Da484: 4-12)  He prepared mark-ups of aerial photographs to illustrate the differences in wave action before and after the project.  (Da332-334; 310-314)  Prior to the project, the owner’s existing seawall was configured with a gradual, curved return as its southerly limit.  This configuration served to gradually direct northerly-incident waves and associated water flow toward the south and off the property via the adjacent [...] right of way, as a “relief-valve. ”  It also served to protect the property’s southerly flank against waves and associated water flow from southerly incident waves.  The existing groin, which is perpendicular to the shore at the [...] right of way, impacts incident waves and wave-induced currents and serves to focus wave induced energy toward the southern end of the [...] property.  Before the project, such impacts would be intercepted by the [...] seawall and directed toward the [...] right of way.  (Da313)  The project filled an approximately 630 feet long gap in existing seawall between the subject property and the southerly end of the municipal beach pavilion to the south.  (Da310)  The new seawall at [...] is approximately 18 feet high (NAVD 88)\(^2\); and the existing [...] seawall is approximately 15 feet high (NAVD 88) – a difference in the seawall elevation of three feet.  (Da314)  The new seawall was constructed further eastward onto the beach that the adjoining [...] seawall.  (Da310)  The new seawall transitions down in elevation and angles back in a northwesterly direction in order to tie into the existing [...] seawall.  (Da314)  This configuration created a “pocket” discontinuity which [...] concluded would direct and enhance wave overtopping onto the [...] property.  (Da310-314)  (Da462: 6-19; Da475: 1-15)
[brief] The statute of limitations for a breach of contract claim is six years.  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.  Plaintiff alleges that beginning with his first contract as Director of Sleep Center in June of 2011 he did not receive full payment for his services under his contracts.  See Da63 at 19:1-25.  Plaintiff testified that he was allegedly not completely compensated “throughout the five or six years that [Defendants] owned the hospital” which similarly began in 2010.  Id.  Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on November 24, 2020 and, as a result, any claims for damages prior to November 24, 2014 are barred by the statute of limitations.  During oral argument, the trial court correctly deduced that because this case was filed on November 24, 2020, "any claims for the period six years prior to November 24, 2020, i.e. November 24, 2014 are barred by the Statute of Limitations."
[directive] Foreword  Alcotest 8/27/09 - Installation of dedicated telephone line for the testing of • Alcotest, deadline 9/25/09  View announcement pdf  Arrestee's Alternate Care for Arrestee's Dependents Model Policy (Updated December 1993)  • Dependents  Asset Forfeiture  Attorney General's Guidelines for Forfeiture (Updated October 1992)  • Assault Firearms Guidelines Regarding the "Substantially Identical" Provision in the State's Assault • Firearms Laws (Updated August 1996)  Bias Incidents  Bias Incident Investigation Standards (Updated 2019)
[brief] The LRHL allows the redevelopment plan to supersede all the existing municipal land regulations, but such plans must be consistent with “smart growth planning principles” under Section 5h.  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5h.  That is why the usual MLUL procedures of a master plan and the re-examination and report of the master plan every 10 years are critical to the development and redevelopment of municipalities into the future.
[brief] Similarly, the report of [...] states “This report was written specifically to focus upon the engineering work or lack thereof performed by [...] and [...]…” (Pa2368)  [...] then goes on to opine as to why he does not believe the work was “engineering”.  [...] opines similarly is directed against [...].  “[...]’ failure to enforce the provisions…. violated the contract with the [...]” (Pa349)  [...] failure to ensure that [...] performed a Job Hazard Analysis consistent with OSHA regulations and, therefore, the Specification, violated their contract with the [...].  (Pa351)  “The [...] through its agent, contractor and subcontractor [...]/[...] had a responsibility to ensure compliance with the Specifications, including OSHA regulations. ”  (Pa351)  “[...]’ failure to conduct any illuminance level measurements, consistent with the reasonable and customary standards of the industry, as spelled out in ANSI/ASSE A10.47-2009, to verify the adequacy of the lighting, as required by the Specifications violated their contract with the [...]” (Pa350)
[brief] But I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that a reasonable view of the evidence in this case show that the Adderall, but more importantly, the abuse of Adderall, the use of it in ways that no one contemplated and no one should.  And the demons that created inside the defendant, I submit to you is what lead to the tragedy of Thursday May 3rd, of 2018.  [9T:45-9 to 46-4].  As part of their burden, the State necessarily argued to the jury who defendant was on the day of the shooting.  In other words, what was his state of mind prior to, during and after the shooting?
[brief] INTRODUCTION  This Court should reverse the denial of Defendants’ motion to reopen the judgment under N.J. Ct. R. R.4:50-1(f).  In denying Defendants’ motion, the trial court failed to address or even consider Defendants’ argument that an exceptional circumstance warranting relief was the future viability of New Jersey’s recently enacted anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (“SLAPP”) law itself, whose protections would be vitiated if Plaintiff were permitted to avoid even litigating a request for attorneys’ fees simply by dismissing his lawsuit while Defendants’ proposed order to show cause seeking such fees was pending.
[brief] B.  [...] received constitutionally due process and is not entitled to a hearing  [...] also had no due process right to a hearing.  Whether an agency provided adequate due process is determined by way of a three-factor test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335; In re Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permits, 185 N.J. at 467.
[directive] Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree  Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option  Actor purposely or knowingly causes the death of another; minimum 30 years before parole  2C:11-3a  Murder 1st Degree $250,000 to $1,000,000  No 10% eligibility and up to life in prison.  Actor commits or attempts to commit robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking, criminal escape or terrorism and, in the course of such crime or of immediate 2C:11-3a(3)  Felony Murder 1st Degree $250,000 to $1,000,000  No 10% flight therefrom, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; minimum 30 years before parole eligibility and up to life in prison.  Aggravated  Actor recklessly causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the 2C:11-4a  1st Degree $200,000 to $500,000  No 10% Manslaughter value of human life, or actor causes death while eluding a police officer.  Actor recklessly causes death of another or purposely or knowingly causes death while in 2C:11-4b  Manslaughter  2nd Degree $100,000 to $200,000  No 10% the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation.  1st Degree $200,000 to 400,000  No 10%  Actor unlawfully confines or removes another for various criminal purposes as set forth in statute; second degree if victim is released unharmed and in a safe place prior to 2C:13-1  Kidnapping apprehension; otherwise first degree; requires life with 25 years parole ineligibility if child under age 16 is sexually assaulted or delivered to another for pecuniary gain.  2nd Degree $100,000 to $200,000  No 10%  14  Bail Schedule 1  STATUTES WHICH REQUIRE BAIL TO BE SET BY A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE PURSUANT TO RULE 3:26-2
[brief] Nieder v. Royal Indemn. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973) ............................  32 State v. Abdullah, 184 N.J. 497 (2005) .................................................... 45, 47 State v. Allen, 308 N.J.  Super. 421 (App. Div. 1998) .............................  33  State v. Baldwin, 296 N.J. Super. 391 (App. Div. 1997)  .........................  34  1  The Cover Page and Title of Contents is attached pursuant to R. 2:6-1a(2) as the brief is germane to issues raised on appeal by defendant.
[directive] Core Principle Two Force as a Last Resort and Duty to De-Escalate.  Force shall only be used as a last resort when necessary to accomplish lawful objectives that cannot reasonably be achieved through verbal commands, critical decision making, tactical deployment or de-escalation techniques.  Force shall never be used as a retaliatory or punitive measure.  2.1  Authority to use force.  Officers are granted the unique authority to use force for lawful purposes, including, but not limited to, the following: (a) effectuating a lawful arrest or detention; (b) carrying out a lawful search; (c) overcoming resistance directed at the officer or others; (d) preventing physical harm to the officer or to another person (including intervening in a suicide or other attempt of self-inflicted injury); (e) protecting the officer or a third party from unlawful force; or (f) preventing property damage or loss.  2.2  Prohibitions on certain force.  Officers may not use or threaten to use force for any following reasons: (a) to punish a person or to retaliate against them for past conduct; (b) as a lesson to prevent a person from resisting or fleeing in the future; or (c) to resolve a situation more quickly, unless delay would risk the safety of the person involved, officers, or others, or would significantly interfere with other legitimate law enforcement objectives.  2.3  Force as a last resort.  Officers shall exhaust all other reasonable means to gain compliance before resorting to force, if feasible.  Thus, if a safe alternative would achieve law enforcement’s objective, force shall not be used.  Officers shall, therefore, use verbal commands, critical decision making, tactical deployment and de-escalation techniques to gain voluntary compliance, when feasible.
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT THAT THE ONGOING STORM DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE IS WITHOUT MERIT  Plaintiff-Appellant argues that the Court below improperly granted summary judgment because the report of [...] was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the deterioration of the stairs caused the dangerous condition, obviating the applicability of the “Ongoing Storm” Doctrine.  Plaintiff, both in his brief at the Trial Court level, and here, effectively concedes that the Ongoing Storm Doctrine is applicable to the case at hand since freezing rain was in fact falling at the time of the Subject Incident.
[brief] Here, the doctrine of *res judicata* is applicable.  *Velasquez v. Franz*, 123 N.J. 498, 505 (1991).  The doctrine “provides that a cause of action between parties that has been finally determined on the merits by a tribunal having jurisdiction cannot be relitigated by those parties or their privies in a new proceeding. ”  *Ibid.*; see also, *Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc.*, 124 N.J. 398, 409 (1991) (“[b]y insulating courts from the relitigation of claims, res judicata prevents the judicial inefficiency inherent in multiplicitous litigation[,]” ensures the finality of judgments, and advances the interest of fairness “[b]y preventing harassment of parties[.]”).  For an action to be barred based on the application of *res judicata* there must be (1) a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) identity of parties, and (3) substantially similar or identical causes of action.  *Culver v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.*, 115 N.J. 451, 460-61 (1989).  These elements are present in this action, warranting the application of *res judicata*.
[brief] By: /s [...] [...] [...] ²  Defendants’ reference to Kolos v. Tikal, LLC, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub.  LEXIS 1901 (App. Div. Aug. 10, 2018) to infer that Plaintiffs here had sufficient time to conduct discovery has no merit, in particular, because that decision makes no mention of the specifics related to the length of discovery.
[brief] [...] and [...] are the two pinnacle executives responsible for operating a global company serving nearly 3 billion [...] users.  Plaintiffs’ motion does not satisfy the essential prerequisites for a request to compel [...] to add two new document custodians.  As Sedona Principle 6 codifies and district courts across the country have recognized, where a requesting party seeks to compel modification of a producing party’s strategy for conducting a reasonably diligent collection of documents and ESI—including its selection of custodians—the requesting party must demonstrate both that the additional custodians are likely to possess relevant documents and also that those documents are likely to be unique and unavailable from other sources.
[brief] In rejecting the ALJ’s ID, the Board accepted the testimony of the its medical expert, [...], over that of Petitioner’s expert, [...].  The Board’s determination was in direct response to the ALJ’s contrary finding that [...]’s testimony “was more reliable in the within matter” which the ALJ explained as follows:  [...] relied on information in [...]’s report as to a 2009 injury, but there was no independent report indicating back or neck injuries in 2009 and [...] did not testify.  Neither doctor had full documentation to review for the years 2004 through 2015, and thus [...]’s conclusions as to the pre-existing spinal issues were not fully supported. ”  (Pa81)  (Emphasis added).  The Board disagreed, a determination that is supported by credible evidence in the record and the applicable law.  (Pa113).  The weight granted to expert testimony depends on factors such as whether the expert testified in his specialty, whether the expert’s conclusions are based only upon the subjective conclusions of the patient, and whether the expert has superior credentials in a specific medical field, such as an active orthopedic surgeon versus an orthopedist who does not perform surgery.