ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiffs’ Notice of Appeal, filed November 13, 2023……………………………Pa0353  Plaintiffs’ Appendix Vol. I in Opposition to [...] and [...]  Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Remand to Arbitration, Filed in Law Division on May 26, 2023  …………………………………………Pa0375  Forthright, New Jersey No-Fault PIP Arbitration Rules (2022)  ………Pa0377  Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Garzon-Cardenas, Appellate Division  Docket No. A-6234-03T3, decided July 15, 2005………………………………………Pa0404  Letter Opinion, Allstate v. Lajara, et.al., UNN-L-4901-08, Hon. [...], J.S.C., June 17, 2009………………………………………Pa0414  Opinion, Allstate v. [...], et.al., 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 8151 (Law Div. August 31, 2018)……………………………………Pa0427
[brief] [...] conceded that the Attorney General IA Policy and Procedures were implemented by statute under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181.  (6T56:15, 22).  [...] conceded that a witness' memory of an event is better closer to the date of the event.  (6T62:17).  [...] testified that his focus was on the data and so taking contemporaneous testimony was not a concern of his.  (6T63:1).  [...] conceded that the IA Guidelines provide that all relevant reports should be obtained and preserved as expeditiously as possible.  (6T65:7).  [...] conceded that the IA Guidelines contain an impetus to act quickly and expeditiously in an investigation. (6T66:6).  [...] conceded that [...] worked his regular schedule from November 20, 2017 through March 25, 2019 with no incidents involving similar allegations to this matter.  (6T69:12-13).  [...] conceded that it was more than a year, fourteen to sixteen months, after the event that he interviewed [...].  (6T104:1).  [...], in part, attributed his failure to complete the investigation in a timely manner to having to do work for [...]'s accreditation, training, and doing year-end reports.  [...] had a lot of things going on.  (6T73:4).  [...] did not interview [...] until a year after the initial notice of IA.  (6T74:14).  [...] never requested additional information from the [...] ("[...]").  **Facts Specific to the 45-Day Rule at Superior Court**
[brief] New Jersey Courts have found that although the holding of Heck is not binding on them, the Third Circuit’s interpretation of Heck is persuasive.  Bustamante v. Borough of Paramus, 413 N.J. Super. 276, 286 (App. Div. 2009), citing Lindes v. Sutter, 621 F. Supp. 1197, 1201-02 (D.N.J. 1985); Rubin v. Nowak, 248 N.J. Super. 80, 83 (App. Div. 1991), citing Lindes, supra, 621 F. Supp. At 1201; Thomas v. N.J. Inst. Of Tech., 178 N.J. Super. 60, 62 (Law Div. 1981); Fernandez v. City of Elizabeth, 468 F. App’x 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2012).
[brief] Our Rule 4:5-7 states, “Pleadings to Be Concise and Direct; Construction of Each allegation of a pleading shall be simple, concise and direct, and no technical forms of pleading are required.  All pleadings shall be liberally construed in the interest of justice. ”  Id (emphasis added) (also at 1T-31-13-20).  But then there are the conflicting demands of R. 4:5-8 (but they are not anything like the conflict between Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 & 9):  “Pleading Special Matters (a) Fraud; Mistake; Condition of Mind.  In all allegations of misrepresentation, fraud, mistake, breach of trust, willful default or undue influence, particulars of the wrong, with dates and items if necessary, shall be stated insofar as practicable.  Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be alleged generally. ”  Id (emphasis added).  Theoretically, one need not plead a *mens rea* in disability discrimination – but it’s a big help if you can.  Also, many of the events may be retaliation where it is necessary to show knowledge of past protected activity.  This is especially so for --- 10 I’d like to point out this stunning omission was not a result of negotiation.  The the Vicinage I Assignment Judge and the AOC Administrative Director (AD) (in their administrative capacities), who have ignored my Administrative Complaints, and sometimes Motions, for at least 15 years.  As to dates, I have as many dates (or at least time periods) in the Complaint as reasonably possible.  The exhibits have dates if I missed a few.  Pa83-95 & Pa136-141 (Conf).  It is now clear the correct procedure would have been to allow the prior, 2021 SAC under Rule 4:5-7’s liberality standard and then fully to analyze it allegation by allegation and Count by Count.  Because this did not happen, many of the Points in this recast Brief state, “Not Considered Below” on many critical and relevant issues in the case.
[brief] 53  Pennington Homes v. Planning Bd. of Stanhope, 41 N.J. 578, 583 (1964)  47 Piccone v. Carlin, 40 N.J. Super. 393 (Law Div. 1956)  53 Pilar v. Lister Corp., 38 N.J. Super. 485 (App. Div. 1956), aff. 22 N.J. 79 (1957)  43  Polakoff v. Halphen, 83 N.J. Eq. 126 (Ch. Div. 1914)  42 P.T. v. M.S., 325 N.J. Super. 193 (App. Div. 1999)  31 Quigley Inc. v. Miller Family Farms Inc., 266 N.J. Super. 283(App. Div. 1993)  42 Rain or Shine Box Lunch Co. v. Bd. of Adj Newark 53 N.J. Super 252 (App. Div. 1958)  48 River Dev. Corp. v. Liberty Corp., 45 N.J. Super. 445, 463 (Ch. Div. 1957)  39 Rosen v. Keeler 411 N.J. Super. 439(App.Div.2019)  55 Roselle v. Wright, 21 N.J. 400 (1956)  47 Sergi v. Carew, 18 N.J.  Super. 307 (Ch. Div. 1952)  43 Stafford v. Stafford Zoning Bd., 154 N.J. 62 (1998)  54 State v. Kettles, 345 N.J. Super 466 (App. Div. 2001)  32 State v. Perez, 356 N.J. Super 527 (App. Div. 2003)  32 State v. Tucker, 264 N.J. Super 549 (App. Div. 1993)  32
[brief] Bloodstain pattern analysis involves a standardized methodology, which involves, among other steps, characterizing the “surface the stains are present on” including whether the surface is porous or non-porous and the construction and composition of any fabrics of textiles.  National Institute of Standards and Available at: https://www.aafs.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/032_Std_e1.pdf (last accessed February 14, 2024).  Technology, Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science, *Standard for Methodology in Bloodstain Pattern Analysis*, at 3-4 (2022).
[directive] Date  Defendant Defense Attorney Prosecutor Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), [...]  AVISO:  Este es un documento público, lo cual significa que el documento tal como se envíe estará a la disposición del público cuando se solicite.  Por lo tanto, no anote en el mismo ningún identificador personal, como por ejemplo: el número de Seguridad Social, el número de la licencia de conducir, el número de la matrícula del vehículo, el número de la póliza del seguro, el número de una cuenta financiera activa, o el número de una tarjeta de crédito activa.
[directive] 31, October on operational become shall subsection This Denied.  Is Complaint-Wa~~ant for Application  If P~^osecuto~ to Notice Required 3.3.3 directive the subsection 3.3.1, to pursuant directive a Prosecutor issues County  If the first without acomplaint-warrant for applies officer enforcement law if a that provide must the denies judicial officer or other court the prosecutor and assistant an approval from obtaining See practicable. soon as as Office Prosecutor's County the notify must officer the application, complaint- application fora when Justice Criminal of Division to (report Section 4.11 also denied).  is warrant 31, 2016.  October on operational become shall subsection This DiNective.  Charging PNosecuto~°'s County with Compliance Strict and Oversight 3.3.4 prosecutor subsection 3.3.1, the to pursuant directive a issues  Prosecutor County  If the the with comply on and trained are officers all that ensure to steps reasonable shall take designates directive  If Directive. the this and directive  Prosecutor's County the of provisions a overcome to authorized are who department police a from officers supervisory more or one ensuring for responsible shall be prosecutor the Directive, this of 4  Section under presumption for and function, supervisory this perform to trained properly are officers designated such that Prosecutor County by the issued directive with the comply officers designated such that ensuring 4.13.  Section also See Directive. this and 31, 2016.
[brief] 'As a general matter, [appellate courts] will not reverse if an erroneous jury instruction was 'incapable of producing an unjust result or prejudicing substantial rights.'"  Prioleau v. Ky. Fried Chicken, Inc., 223 N.J. 245, 257 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Mandal v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 430 N.J. Super. 287, 296 (App. Div. 2013)).  The charge must be read as a whole, and not just the challenged portion, to determine its overall effect.  State v. Garrison, 228 N.J. 182, 201 (2017); State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 494 (2015); State v. Wilbely, 63 N.J. 420, 422 (1973).  No party is entitled to have the jury charged in his or her own words.
[brief] A review of Title documents discloses the following:  (a)  Prior to 1900, title to the upland portion of Lot 3 was owned by [...].  In 1879, Quinlan acquired fee simple title to the Riparian lands (now known as Lot 3.01) by Riparian Grant from the State.  (b)  In 1909 [...] Jr. conveyed all the lands as shown on a certain Map entitled “Map of Keansburg Heights” filed in the Monmouth County Clerk’s Office to [...].  That conveyance included all the Riparian rights owned by Quinlan; thus, conveying Lot 3.01 to [...].  This included a Riparian Grant, still shown on the Keansburg Tax Map, describing it as land lying beneath the water (J-3) (Pa917).  The Grant was conveyed as land lying under the water.  This Riparian Grant is uncontested.  (c)
[brief] [...] (“Decedent”) died in May 2021, after a lackluster marriage to [...] (“Petitioner”).  Prior to their marriage, the parties executed a Antenuptial Agreement providing that all property and assets they obtained prior to the marriage shall constitute pre-marital assets and shall remain the parties’ separate, non-distributable property during the marriage, which shall be willed freely upon the death of either party.  In her 2014 Will, the Decedent left all of her assets to her daughter, [...] (“Respondent”).  The 2014 Will was drawn up by a long-time attorney friend, made by the Decedent purposely and without coercion on the part of anyone, as found by the Chancery Division.  The reasons for not leaving assets to the Petitioner included the following: - the Petitioner’s refusal to contribute towards any of the household expenses during the marriage, and lived rent-free during the marriage in the Decedent’s home acquired prior to the marriage - the Petitioner’s abandonment of the Decedent and their relationship for long periods of time at different points in the marriage - a disturbing incident one night involving the Respondent when she was sixteen years old, while the Decedent was away on a business trip, causing the Petitioner to leave the house for a year - the Petitioner would often leave Decedent alone at a party and “sneak out,” thinking it “funny” • the Decedent on multiple occasions told the Decedent’s friend, [...] that the Petitioner was involved with another woman • the Petitioner did not assist Decedent around the house, including one occasion where during a snowstorm where the Decedent shoveled the snow while Petitioner remained inside • the Decedent told Snyder that the Petitioner never paid any of the bills and wasted money, and that this conduct “pissed her off. ” • the Petitioner had a habit of lying to the Decedent  At trial, the Petitioner denied the existence of the Antenuptial Agreement, claiming it was fabricated.  He also sought to have the Will declared null and void, on the basis that the Respondent daughter exerted undue influence upon the Decedent.  In ruling that the Petitioner’s was not a credible witness, the Chancery Division rejected both of these claims.
[directive] Participant instructions - Doctors, Medicine and Drug Court (Spanish)  Pregunta:  iQue debe hacer si necesita ir a un doctor u hospital debido a un dolor u otro problema medico?  Respuesta:  Digale al doctor o a la enfermera que le examine que usted esta en recuperacion.  lPor que?  La mayoria de los medicos y enfermeras hoy en dia entienden que una persona en recuperaci6n no debe tomar ciertas medicinas, tales como analgesicos narc6ticos, ciertos jarabes para la tos ( con alcohol y codeina), relajadores musculares o tranquilizantes.  Asegurese de decirle a todo profesional medico que le este tratando que usted esta en recuperacion.  Expliqueles que no debe tomar ninguna sustancia que altere su mente o estado de animo ya que puede provocarle una recaida y puede darle un resultado positivo en una prueba de antidopaje.  - -  Medicinas com(mmente recetadas no  Las medicinas comunes que puede tomar mientras que este en el tribunal de tratamiento de drogas a menos que haya emergencia medica verificada doctor indique que no hay ninguna otra alternativa medica razonable para una y el la medicina propuesta, explicando los motivos y el tiempo que espera que dure el tratamiento, incluyen, entre otras:  Analgesicos  Benzod iazepi nas  Estimulantes (medicamentos contra el dolor) (ansioliticos/sedantes) • Darvon o Darvocet (Propoxifeno) • Ativan (Lorazepam) • Adderall • Gabapentina (Gabri!, Neurontin, Gralise) • Librium (Clordiazep6xido) • AdderalL XR • Percocet o Percodan (Oxicodona) • Valium (Diazepam) • Concerta • Tylenol 3 (Paracetamol con Codefna) • Xanax (Alprazolam) • Mydayis • Vicodin (Hidrocodona) • Ritalina Medicamentos de venta libre (Sin receta medica)  Medicinas para la alergia/resfriados/la tos que contengan cualquiera de los siguientes compuestos:  • Alcohol • Difenil-hidra-mina • Fenilpropanolamina • Dextrometorfano • Doxilamina • Propil-hexadrina • Pseudoefedrina  Ejemplos de medicinas de venta libre que se deben evitar:  • • • Actifed Coricidin D Sinutab • • • Benadril DayQuil Sudafed • • • Benilin Dimetapp Tylenol Cold • • • Benzedrex Neo-Sinefrina Vicks 44D • • •  Comtrex NyQuil Vicks 44M  • • •  Contac  Robitussin  Sinus Zytrec-D •  Sine-Off  Marihuana medicinal  Promulgado por la directriz #01 -20 (01/03/2020), CN 12527-Spanish
[brief] The Board determined [...] ineligible because more than 2 years had elapsed since his last contribution and because he was not a member in service at the time of the application.  The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the time period should be relaxed:  Unswerving, ‘mechanistic’ application of statutes of limitations would at times inflict obvious and unnecessary harm upon individual plaintiffs without advancing … legislative purposes.  * * *  On numerous occasions we have found ‘such particular circumstances as to dictate not the hard approach of literally applying the statute of limitations but the application of the more equitable and countervailing considerations of individual justice. ’  ***  A ‘just accommodation’ of individual justice and public policy requires that ‘in each case the equitable claims of opposing parties must be identified, evaluated and weighed. ’  [...] v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 311 N.J Super 333, 337 (citations omitted).
[brief] Due to an unrelated health issue, the plaintiff did not appear live to testify at trial.  Instead, on direct, the plaintiff’s counsel read in portions of her deposition testimony.  (4T208:14-17).  The trial court gave the jury repeated curative instructions that it may not draw any inferences or speculate as to why the plaintiff did not appear at trial and did not testify live.  (7T34:5-13; 7T42:15-43:5; 7T95:13-16).
[brief] Plaintiff’s pleadings were inadequately specific to permit the addition of [...] (hereinafter referred to as “[...]”) as a defendant beyond the expiration of the statute of limitations.  Plaintiff’s reliance on Viviano in support of his position is misplaced as the facts of Viviano are clearly distinguishable from the present case.  See Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 101 N.J. 538, 544-548 (1986).  As an initial matter, the plaintiff in Viviano identified the fictious defendants with more specificity in the pleadings than plaintiff in the present action.  Id. at 542.
[brief] *State v. Briggs* 279 N.J. Super. 555, 565 (App. Div. 1995); *State v. W.L.*, 278 N.J. Super. 295, 301 (App. Div. 1995); see also *State v. Hedgespeth*, 249 N.J. 234, 253 (2021), citing *Scott*, 229 N.J. at 484-485 (errors which improperly exclude admissible evidence which could affect the weight the jury will give the State’s arguments in favor of conviction versus the defendant’s arguments in favor of acquittal are reversible and never harmless).
[directive] Other Provisions  A.  This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney Non-enforceability by third parties.  General’s authority to ensure the uniform and efficient enforcement of the laws and administration of criminal justice throughout the State.  This Directive imposes limitations on law enforcement agencies and officials that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.  B.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.1(b).  20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A) specifically reads:  No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency\(^2\) or institution which has a policy of denying, or which effectively prevents, the parents of students who are or have been in attendance at a school of such agency or at such institution, as the case may be, the right to inspect and review the education records of their children.  FERPA’s implementing regulations similarly embody the principle of parental right to access all of their student’s educational records.
[brief] The fourth tract is the subject property and it indicated that this is in the north side of Beachway on the official Tax Map of the [...].  The Riparian Grant is a body of land that is subject to being transferred and also being taxed.  [...] agrees that it is clear from this document that when Keansburg was foreclosing a property that was owned by [...], the property that they were foreclosing was on the north side of Beachway.  Thus, the *Lis Pendens* did not include the Riparian Grant (1T75:22).
[directive] Indictment/Trial with Speedy to Com~ly Needed When Examinations with a comply fails to State the if released be may offenders dangerous Recognizing that 2A:162-22, N.J.S.A. see defendant, detained a trying or indicting for prescribed deadline statutory law any request may prosecutor the trial, pending detained is defendant a where case in any concerning report prepare any (1) to investigation supporting the or in involved agency enforcement physical any conduct (2) andlor information, discoverable documenting otherwise or investigation the specified date by a and basis priority a on thereon, report a submit examination and forensic or test indictment for deadline statutorily-prescribed the meet to State the permit will prosecutor that the by trial. and/or submission/reporting anelectronic establish may Science Forensic of Office Police State The In that requests. prioritization respond to and make to which by means efficient an provide system to pursuant Science Forensic of Office the request to prioritization a make shall prosecutor the event, Page 73 Office. that by established system of the means by Section this to a submit to means available all use shall request prioritization a of receipt upon agency An or on thereon report a submit testlexamination and requested a complete and/or report requested report requested a submit to feasible is not If it request. prosecutor's in the specified date the before prosecutor, the by specified date the thereon by report a submit test/examination and a or complete and writing prosecutor in notify the request the receiving of days business within five shall agency the agency The request. prosecutor's the with comply to feasible not why is it reasons explain the shall on or submitted will be report requested which the on date possible earliest the indicate shall also the to submitted thereon report and completed ~ be test/examination will requested the which prosecutor. or procedure operating standard any preempt and supersede to deemed shall be Section This that Jersey New of State the of laws the of authority the under operating agency an protocol of or test conducting a or report a preparing given to be to priority the determine would otherwise submitted). been they had which in order by the tests prioritize to practice general (e.g., a examination Attorney exercise to authorized Justice Criminal of Division of the (Director 10.4 Section also See timely order and disputes resolve to officer enforcement law chief State's as authority General's reports). required of completion Requests. Prioritization with Compliance 10.4 any with complying satisfactorily not is agency an that believe reason to has prosecutor a
[brief] Finally, defendant – once again – leans on the State’s summation as a basis for error for not giving a Clawans charge.  Not only is this argument legally misplaced, but the State did not give any “inaccurate and prejudicial information as to his reason for not calling [...] during summation,” as defendant suggests.  (Db 31).  As argued above, the there was no misconduct in the State’s summation because the Assistant Prosecutor was properly responding to the mischaracterizations – made by both defense counsel during their summations.  The State responded to the defense telling the jury that the State had an alleged lack of candor by not telling the “whole story. ”  Likewise, the State responded to the defense own bolstering of [...], claiming he was a victim who was only seeking justice, which only the defense was offering by calling him to the stand.  The State’s summation did not create a “unique situation” whereby the trial court was required to give a Clawans charge.  (Db 32).  The jury was to determine [...]’s credibility, not the trial judge.  The fact that the jury did not believe [...] does not now equate to an inference – after-the-fact – that [...]’s testimony was unfavorable to the State within the Hill factors, giving segue way for a Clawans charge.  Defendant’s legal stretch here on appeal does not make it so.  The trial court’s decision, viewed through the lens of the facts and evidence in this case, along with the court’s thorough analysis within the relevant and proper standard was not error.  As such, this Court should not disturb the well-reasoned exercise of the trial court’s discretion in denying the request for a Clawans charge.
[brief] ”  *In re Grant of Charter to Merit Preparatory Charter Sch. of Newark*, 435 N.J. Super. 273, 280 (App. Div. 2014) (standing with issue of "substantial public interest"); See also *Finkel v. Twp. Comm. of Hopewell*, 434 N.J. Super. 303, 315-16 (App. Div. 2013).  Systematically denying PTI to “mentally ill” people is illegal but heaping defendants with developmental disabilities in with the “mentally ill” is just plain ignorant.
[brief] ”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); aff’d 156 N.J. 443 (1998).  “In order to establish a claim of equitable estoppel, the claiming party must show that the alleged conduct was done, or representation was made, intentionally or under such circumstances that it was both natural and probable that it would induce action.  Further, the conduct must be relied on, and the relying party must act as to change his or her position to his or her detriment. ”  *Miller v. Miller*, 97 N.J. 154, 163 (1984).  Here, all of those elements have been satisfied.