ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF APPENDIX Attorney General's Directive.................................................................Da1-4 [...]'s Letter to [...]......................................................Da5-7 Prosecutor's July 20, 2022 Letter..........................................................Da8-10 [...]'s Aug. 2, 2022 Letter to [...].................................Da11-21 Prosecutor's Aug. 24, 2022 Response....................................................Da22-31 Aug. 24, 2022 email from prosecutor...................................................Da32  [...]  Sept. 10, 2010  Letter.....................................................Da33-35  Attorney General CRU Inv. Report.......................................................Da36-39  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT-I DEFENDANT'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE PROSECUTOR WITHHELD VIABLE IMPEACHMENT
[brief] Invited error “applies when a defendant in some way has led the court into error. ”  State v. Williams, 219 N.J. 89, 100 (2014) (quotations omitted); see State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347 (2004) (explaining that defendant cannot claim error on appeal where trial court adopted defendant’s “course of action”).  [...] does not claim on appeal that the trial court’s adoption of his request to admit evidence of the robbery for a limited purpose was error.  His claim is that the instruction limiting the jury’s use of the robbery evidence was deficient.
[brief] In the case of a long term tax exemption, even if the “findings” say the right thing, plaintiffs have a right to challenge those findings if they believe the findings are unfounded and do not conform to the LTTEL’s requirements.  Cf. Fields v. Princeton University, 28 N.J.Tax 574, 583 (Tax Ct. 2015)(exemption determinations rely significantly on the representations made in paperwork in support of the application)  The [...] opinion acknowledges this, making clear that if an action challenges the validity of an ordinance and “resolution of the challenge turns on disputed factual issues, the case must proceed in the same manner as other civil litigation.
[brief] Any discussion about CEPA must begin with the words “remedial legislation to be construed liberally in favor of the Plaintiff;” *Cox v. Sears Roebuck and Co.*, 138 N.J. 2.  The opinions of the Court below were contrary to the recognized CEPA philosophy of remedial and liberal.  The Court below failed to apply those principles to its citation on p. 2 of the December 1, 2023 Order and Statement of Reasons (Pa-76).  Actually, the citation by the Court below set forth on p. 2 of that Order cannot be read separate and apart from what [...] told the Plaintiff on the telephone.  The citation on p. 2 of the December 1st Order makes no sense, unless it is read with [...]’s statement to the Plaintiff.  Could [...]’s statement to the Plaintiff have other meanings?  Of course they could, but the proximity to the [...] statements to the [...] email certainly raises the inference that [...]’s comments were directed at the Plaintiff’s removal from the high school.  What the Court below failed to recognize is that the Plaintiff, the non-moving party, is entitled to every favorable inference, and clearly what is stated above, is a favorable inference.
[brief] The trial court’s conduct constitutes reversible error for the multiple reasons set forth in Plaintiff’s moving brief.  The little information that the trial court provided was conclusory: a grant of a $395.00 hourly rate; 2.7 hours for drafting the Complaint; 2.3 hours to defend Defendant’s deposition of Plaintiff; and 1.2 hours to attend the arbitration, totaling a mere 6.2 hours of attorney time.
[brief] As a result of the municipal court agreement, a Zoning Permit as referenced was dated December 17, 2019, and had ID number [...].  (Pa123a)  The Zoning permit clearly states on Page 2 (under Zoning Review Notes dated 12/17/2019) the “applicant has submitted this zoning permit application to remediate a zoning violation. ”  (Id.)  The Zoning Permit indicates three violations, to wit: Construction of walkways on the property without first acquiring zoning approval, Construction of structures in the Flared Avenue Open Space Area without first acquiring zoning approval and Failure to acquire a Certificate of Appropriateness from the Historic Preservation Commission.  (Id at page 2).  The Zoning Permit clearly indicates on Page three that Plaintiff was “denied zoning.
[brief] Paragraph 10 was phrased as a “permission” to the then related neighbor, allowing synagogue parking on then vacant areas on the School property.  The provision did not use “easement,” and did not provide the permission is irrevocable or perpetual.  Paragraph 10 certainly did not provide or contemplate that then vacant areas of School property would remain forever “vacant” and could not at some future time be actively devoted for School use and purposes.
[brief] Under Rule 4:28-1(a)(2)(i), disposition of this action in the absence of such persons would impair and/or impede their respective abilities to protect their interests in their positions/promotions and compensation/benefits.  Without being parties to this matter, such individuals would have no opportunity to protect such interests.  Indeed, based on the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint, and if Plaintiff was successful in obtaining the requested relief, there were individuals who could be demoted and/or reduced in terms of seniority or other benefits without ever having the chance to represent themselves in this matter.  Those persons would have been unable to protect their interests since Plaintiff did not join them in this matter.  Such a scenario required those firefighters (who must be known to Plaintiff) to be joined as defendants under Rule 4:28-1(a)(2)(i).  However, Plaintiff repeatedly failed to do so and improperly asserted in its R. 4:5-1 certification that Plaintiff has no knowledge of other parties that need be joined in this matter.
[brief] THE ORDINANCE AND FINANCIAL AGREEMENT WERE APPROVED FOR AN UNLAWFUL PURPOSE  An ordinance enacted for an unlawful purpose cannot stand.  In Riggs v. Long Beach Tp., 109 N.J. 601, 611 (1988), the Supreme Court held that a court can invalidate an ordinance if in enacting it “the municipality has not complied with the requirements of the statute” or it is adopted for an unlawful purpose.  Riggs invalidated the township’s rezoning of a waterfront property to lower density residential, finding that the sole purpose was the unlawful one of reducing the fair market value of property prior to condemnation.  The Court cautioned that while adoption of an ordinance for an unlawful purpose is grounds for invalidating the ordinance, a distinction must be made between the purpose of the ordinance and the motives of those who enacted it.  “Courts generally will not inquire into legislative motive to impugn a facially valid ordinance, but will consider evidence about the legislative purpose when the reasonableness of the enactment is not apparent on its face. ”  Id. at 613.  “Motive” ordinarily addresses the subjective considerations that move a legislator and “purpose” speaks to the goals to be achieved.  Id.  If an ordinance has both a valid and an invalid purpose, courts should not guess which purpose the governing body had in mind, a single valid purpose is sufficient to sustain the ordinance.  *Id.*  The determination of purpose depends on objective factors, most particularly the legal framework for the ordinance, its operation and effect, and the context in which the ordinance was adopted.  The Trial Court ruled that the single valid purpose sustaining the validity of the present ordinance is the provision of affordable housing.  Pa26  In doing so, the Court ignored critical objective factors, in particular the structure of the PILOT, its operation and effect, and the context of its adoption.  The PILOT agreement is structured to extend for 30 years when there is nothing in the needs of the developer or future homeowners that merits keeping a $330 million ratable off the tax rolls for that long.  For 75% of the dwellings in the Project, representing 85% of its market value, future property owners will pay 99.5% of full taxes for 25 of the 30 years the PILOT is in effect.  For the remaining 25%, payment of only 0.5% less than full taxes will stretch out for 20 of the 30 years.  This PILOT as structured cannot be viewed reasonably as facilitating the creation of affordable housing.  It is not providing financing for needed municipal and school services that conventional taxes are unable to cover.  It is not making the developer whole for alleged “excess” costs.  It is not even making homes in the Project more marketable – a conscious choice it appears, from the Township’s fear of making single-family homes elsewhere in the Township less competitive.
[brief] The Appellate Division tied these ideas together in *Grasso v. Boro of Spring Lake Heights*, 375 N.J. Super. 41, 52-53 (App. Div. 2004).  We believe that the special reasons necessary to establish a height variance must be tailored to the purpose for imposing height restrictions in the zoning ordinance.  See *Coventry Square*, supra, 138 N.J. at 298, 650 A.2d at 346 (standards for conditional use variances must be “appropriate for the purposes and characteristics of conditional uses”); *Randolph Town Ctr.*, supra, 324 N.J.Super. at 416-17, 735 A.2d at 1168 (the criteria for evaluating a FAR variance application must be relevant to the purposes of FAR restrictions).  See also *N. Bergen Action Group v. N. Bergen Township Planning Bd.*, 122 N.J. 567, 578, 585 A.2d 939, 944 (1991).  (“[I]t is fundamental that resolutions granting variances undertake to reconcile the deviation authorized by the Board with the municipality's objectives in establishing the restriction. ”).
[brief] [Id. at 338 and 339, emphasis added.]  Even if [...] had not been an owner, member, or manager of the various plaintiffs, this would not negate his competency as a fact witness on behalf of each plaintiff.  [...] dealt with the defendants on behalf of each plaintiff, entered into the agreements, arranged for payment, and inspected the work; who else would plaintiffs call as a witness other than the person directly involved in the transactions?  Given the “direct contractual relationship with defendant,” Plaintiffs are entitled to relief under the CFA.
[directive] Pozwy, wnioski oraz wszelkie inne dokumenty składane w sądzie powinny być w języku angielskim Complaints, motions and other papers submitted to the court should be in English Sądownictwo w New Jersey New Jersey Judiciary  Dodatkowy formularz oświadczenia w sprawach objętych Ustawą Gravesa (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c) Supplemental Plea Form for Graves Act Offenses (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c) (Polish)
[brief] [...] asserts that the ALJ improperly relied on Cheng v. Rodas, West New York Board of Education, Hudson County, C58-14 (Sept. 22, 2015), when he concluded that [...] violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e).  In Cheng, the Commission found a board member violated N.J. S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) when he directed the board attorney to compose and deliver a Rice\textsuperscript{11} notice without the board’s knowledge or consent.  (Ab13-18).  [...] is wrong.  To begin with, [...] raises an issue of limited relevance because the Commissioner did not cite Cheng when issuing the final decision in this matter.  But even if he had, Cheng supports the outcome here because that case expressly states that the respondent “violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) when he took board action beyond the scope of his authority when, without Board authority or consultation, he unilaterally issued a Rice notice to an employee of the District so as to compromise the Board. ”  See Cheng, (slip op. at 12).  In other words, Cheng supports the Commission’s and the Commissioner’s conclusion that a school board member may not exploit a school board attorney for his or her own personal aims.  Moreover, both the Commission and the Commissioner correctly rejected [...]’s alternative argument that the ALJ failed to consider five Board members certifications and granted summary disposition prematurely.  See \textsuperscript{11}  “Rice” notice refers to the matter entitled, Rice v. Union County Regional High School Bd. of Ed., 155 N.J. Super. 64 (App. Div. 1977), certif. den. 76 N.J. 238 (1978) which established the right of employees to obtain notice when they will be discussed by the Board of Education.  (Ab15-18).  The certifications, submitted after the close of the record and for the first time in exceptions, were not part of the record before the ALJ. (Aa192-201); N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4(c).  And even if the certifications were considered, it would not alter the result.  As the Commission noted, “whether [[...]] spoke to other Board members to validate his desire to obtain research about Complainant, it does not change that he made the request for personal reasons which goes beyond the scope of his duties. ”  (Aa5).  Accordingly, it was reasonable for the Commissioner to conclude that [...]’s unilateral request for the Board attorney to conduct research on [...] for his own legal action, when other options were available, clearly went beyond the scope of his duties as Board President, in violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e).
[brief] Submitted on Summary Judgment Motion | Da40 | 1  Per Rule 2:6-1(a)(2), Briefs submitted to the Trial Court shall not be included in the Appendix unless either the Brief is referred to in the decision of the Trial Court or when an issue raised in the Trial Court is germane to the Appeal.  Defendant removed the pages from his Brief which are not germane to the Appeal.  Exhibit A, Complaint, Undated Da42
[brief] *See, i.e.*, *Matter of Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ.*, *supra*, at 5 (“a dispute between [the Board] and the [local education association] concerning employees’ obligations to contribute to the cost of their health care benefits under [Chapter 78]”); *Matter of City of Newark*, 469 N.J. Super. 366, 377 (App. Div. 2021)(“[t]he question of whether the City has a managerial prerogative”); *In re: Cty. Of Atl.*, *supra*, at 12 (“whether PERC can summarily reverse the dynamic status quo doctrine in order to advance the legislative goal embodied in the two percent tax levy cap”).  In addition, “appellate review is less deferential” where “there was no evidentiary hearing and the parties are not disputing material facts. ”  *Matter of City of Newark*, *supra*, at 378 (“Moreover, because there was no evidentiary hearing and the parties are not disputing material facts, we are applying the law to undisputed facts.  In essence, the PERC Director accepted the facts in the record and then, applied the law to those facts.  In such situations, appellate review is less deferential (internal citations omitted). ”  In this matter, Appellant asks the Court to review PERC’s “interpretation of a statute,” N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3, and the legislature’s meaning of the phrase “designate representatives” as set forth therein.  As in Matter of City of Newark, supra, “there was no evidentiary hearing and the parties are not disputing material facts,” which they have stipulated to, and which “the PERC Director accepted…and then, applied the law to those facts” (Pa219).  Matter of City of Newark, supra.  Accordingly, the Appellate Division is asked to “apply the law to those facts,” and PERC’s determination is not entitled to any deference.  Therefore, the Appellate Division respectfully should review this matter de novo.  POINT I PERC ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE ASSOCIATION DID NOT VIOLATE THE ACT BY REFUSING TO IDENTIFY REPRESENTATIVES FOR BARGAINING IN VIOLATION OF N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 (Pa215).
[brief] When Plaintiff received the settlement check for $1 million in December 2020, he did not tell Plaintiff.  2T100.  When Plaintiff heard a rumor about a settlement in July 2021, she called Defendant and asked him about it that very day.  Defendant admits to telling her she was not entitled to any of it.  Plaintiff believed him.  When she reviewed the PSA in August of 2022 for unrelated reasons, she went to Defendant again, who insisted she was not entitled to any money from the [...] settlement.  At that point, she consulted her attorney, and she filed her motion to enforce the PSA the following month, on September 8, 2022.
[brief] Pa027.  Indeed, [...] would have been hard-pressed to raise that issue since they had already --- 2  Owing to the unsuitability of text orders for inclusion in a formal appendix, the undersigned attorneys hope that the Transaction ID [...] will be sufficient to document this assertion.  willfully violated that portion of [...]’s Order by undertaking the forbidden joint representation.  This Court granted leave to appeal by Order dated April 9, 2024.
[brief] [...], “a nonprofit legal policy research and education organization, has a working group comprised of judges, attorneys, and electronic discovery experts dedicated to resolving electronic document production issues. ”  Aguilar v. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t Div. of U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 255 F.R.D. 350, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  Courts around the country have turned to the Sedona Conference for guidance when confronting issues surrounding discovery of electronic evidence.
[brief] Third Circuit precedent has established WHERE DEFAULT IS ENTERED WITHOUT PROPER SERVICE of the complaint, it is “a FORTIORI VOID, and SHOULD BE SET ASIDE. ”  Gold Kist, Inc., 756 F.2d at 19; see also Grand Entertainment Grp. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 493 (3d Cir.1993) (finding that district court improperly entered a default where the defendants had not been properly served in this following case); Anderson v. Mercer Cty. Sheriff's Dept., No. 11-7620, 2013 WL 5703615, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2013) which mirrors the relevant facts regarding this defendant’s challenge of jurisdiction for the March 9, 1990, hearing, as defective service also has been demonstrated but had failed to be recognized as the evidence established (Pa6; Pa10; Pa21; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa41).
[brief] The imputation doctrine is derived from common law rules of agency relating to the legal relationship among principals, agents, and third parties.  Pursuant to those common law rules, a principal is deemed to know facts that are known to its agent.  See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 5.03, which states "...notice of a fact that an agent knows or has reason to know is imputed to the principal if knowledge of that fact is material to the agent's duties to the principal."  Courts have used interchangeable terms to express this legal rule with some describing the principal as "imputed" with the agent's knowledge, *Hercules Powder Co. v. Nieratko*, 113 N.J.L. 195 (Ch.Ct.1934), and others stating that the principal has "constructive knowledge," *Hollingsworth v. Lederer*, 125 N.J. Eq. 193, 206 (E. & A.1939) (per curiam), or "constructive notice," *Matter of Integrity Ins. Co.*, 240 N.J. Super. 480 at 506, of the agent's knowledge.
[brief] Appellants both have their principal places of business in Pompton Plains, New Jersey—and hence, their employees are employed in New Jersey, [...] is incorporated in New Jersey, the September Meeting occurred in New Jersey and the Agreement was executed by Appellants in New Jersey.  (Pa28-30; Pa34).  Notably, all interactions between [...] and Appellants under the Agreement are all performed in New Jersey: the first step of Appellants’ role as [...]’s distributor is to purchase and import into New Jersey all of the [...] products in Appellants’ portfolio.  Appellants then distribute those goods from New Jersey throughout Appellants’ [...] distribution territories.  (Pa24).  Critically, none of the events described in the Verified Complaint occurred in New York, none of the parties are located in New York, and no transactions between Appellants and [...] USA occur in New York.
[brief] Regency Gardens v. Bd. of Adj., slip op., A-2283-13 (App. Div. Aug. 27, 2015) Kensington Senior Development, LLC v. Twp. of Verona, slip op., A-1010-19 (App. Div. Dec. 1, 2021)  Certification of [...], Esq., filed June 3, 2022  Ex. “A” – Sunrise Development, Inc. v. Bd. of Adj., slip op., A-6120-97 (App. Div. July 8, 1999)  Ex. “B” – Transcript of Montville Township Planning Board Meeting, December 12, 2019 Notice of Assignment Letter, dated December 14, 2023 1 This December 12, 2022 Transcript is included in this Appendix because that transcript was appended to the Certification of [...], Esq., filed on June 3, 2022.  That Certification must be included in this Appendix pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(1) because it is an underlying pleading in this action.  Furthermore, the transcript is in quad format because that is the format that was submitted to the Law Division and it cannot be manipulated to provide single or duplex pagination.  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] October 5, 2020  Letter from [...], President, [...], to [...], M.S., Environmental Scientist 3, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection..........................Aa0011  E-mail correspondence between [...], President, [...], [...], MS, Environmental Scientist 3, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, and [...], Esq., [...], from October 5, 2020 to November 5, 2020.............Aa0014  E-mail correspondence between [...], President, [...], and [...], MS, Environmental Scientist 3, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection from October 5, 2020 to October 22, 2020.........................................................Aa0028  Press Release, Press Release, [...], New Jersey, Dorsett Dock Improvements Complete (Mar. 20, 2019), https://ptboro. com/dorsett-dock-improvements-complete/..............................Aa0040  November 24, 2020  Request for Adjudicatory Hearing submitted to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection by [...]...........................................................Aa0043  April 18, 2022  Motion for Summary Decision filed by [...]................................................................Aa0047  October 5, 2022  Initial Decision Granting  New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection’s Motion for Summary Decision issued by Administrative Law Judge [...]..................................................Aa0079  October 18, 2022  Exceptions to the October 5, 2022  Initial Decision submitted by [...]..............................Aa0105  October 6, 2023  Final Decision issued by [...], Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.......Aa0115
[directive] This requirement is especially important when the subject is handcuffed face down in the prone position; (b)  Care should be taken not to put sustained pressure on the neck or back, as breathing can be restricted even if the person is placed in the recovery position.  This includes sitting, kneeling, or standing on a person’s chest, back, or neck for a prolonged period of time; (c)  Officers shall continuously monitor the person’s condition while being restrained, as death can occur suddenly and develop beyond the point of viable resuscitation within seconds; (d)  Whenever possible during team restraint, a “Safety Officer,” with the responsibility to monitor the health and welfare of the person during restraint, should be designated; (e)  The arrested person must not be transported in the prone position; and (f)