ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 1.  The Application for Development will promote the public health, safety, morals and general welfare.  2.  The Application will secure from fire, flood, panic and other natural and manmade disasters.  3.  The application for Development provides for adequate light, air and open Space.  4.  The Application promotes a desirable visual environment through creative development techniques and good civic design.  5.  The Application promotes the construction of single-family residential dwellings consistent with current base flood elevation and FEMA requirements and is a substantial benefit to the general welfare of the community.  6.  The site is particularly suited for the subject development as being consistent with the [...] Vision Plan.  Based upon the evidence presented it was well within the Board’s power to find that the height and density variances did not cause substantial public detriment and did not substantially impair the intent of the zone plan.  On the contrary, it was well within the Board’s power to find this development to comport with the overall public good, the borough’s plan and the land use law.  This development represents a clear improvement to the borough as a whole.  In *Lang v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Borough of West Caldwell*, 160 NJ 41 (1999) the court explained that subsection C(2) provides that “wherein an application or appeal relating to a specific piece of property, the purposes of this act would be advanced by a deviation from the zoning ordinance requirements and the benefits of the deviation would substantially outweigh any detriment, (the board) may grant a variance to allow departure from the regulations pursuant to Article 8 of this act.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This matter arises out of an egregious Brady violation in which New Jersey State Police Detective [...] (“Barnett”) took the stand twice and perjured himself to try and save an unlawful search from suppression.  Weeks after Barnett’s second time taking the stand the State produced Barnett’s own notes which directly undermined his testimony and unequivocally demonstrated his deceit.  On November 5, 2021, New Jersey State Police Detective [...] (“Barnett”) was part of a team responsible for executing a search warrant at [...] in [...].  [...] (“Appellant”) challenged the constitutionality of the search arguing that Barnett and his brother officers exceeded the bounds of the search warrant.  In support of this contention Appellant argued that the door to his apartment was breached with a Halligan tool and was clearly outside the conscripts of the search warrant.  To quash Appellant’s theory, and motion to suppress, Barnett testified in two separate hearings before the trial court that the door to Appellant’s apartment was not breached and was instead wide-open.  Two weeks after Barnett testified for the second time, the State produced Barnett’s notes which unequivocally stated that the door to Appellant’s apartment was breached thus demonstrating that Barnett’s testimony was perjured.  The court below found that the State committed a Brady violation.  The trial court granted Appellant’s independent motion to suppress on the merits but denied his motion to dismiss for the Brady violation.  Appellant contends that the Indictment in this matter should have been dismissed based on the egregious nature of the Brady violation committed.  In the absence of a dismissal there is no consequence for State’s egregious conduct.
[brief] Plaintiff’s motion for substitute service was granted on an address that Defendant admits he was associated with, that motion was supported based on the accurate facts of attorney certifications that were supported by substantial documentary evidence, and the lower court rejected Defendant’s two (2) attempts to vacate the subsequent default judgment.  Defendant also argues that he is entitled to relief under Rule 4:50-1(f) based on the totality of the circumstances.  (Def.’s Br. at 28-31).  “However, when the application [to vacate default judgment] arises solely under subsection (f), the policy favoring finality of judgments becomes more important.
[brief] [...]  [...], Esq. Atty. ID#038131999  [...]  Tel. [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Respondent, [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq. [...], Esq.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Table of Authorities ........................................................................................................i-ii  Procedural History and Counterstatement of Facts ..................................................1  Standard Review ..............................................................................................................4  Legal Argument .............................................................................................................6  I.  THE BOARD’S DECISION THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO DEFERRED RETIREMENT  BENEFITS IS SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT, CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ...........................................6  II.  PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN HONORABLE SERVICE ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................12  Conclusion .......................................................................................................................14  Respondent Appendix Index .........................................................................................15  Table of Authorities
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFORMING THE REDEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT AND OPERATING AGREEMENT (Da49-Da53)  In New Jersey, the reformation of a contract is an equitable remedy.  “For a court to grant reformation there must be ‘clear and convincing proof’ that the contract in its reformed, and not original, form is the one that the contracting parties understood and meant it to be. ”  *Central State Bank v. Hudik-Ross Co., Inc.*, 164 N.J.Super. 317, 323-324 (App. Div. 1978), citing *Brodzinsky v. Pulek*, 75 N.J.Super. 40, 48 (App.Div.1962) Cert. den. 38 N.J. 304 (1962).  Courts in this State “have uniformly held that a court of equity will not grant the high and extraordinary remedy of reformation except upon the production of proof, clear, convincing and free from doubt, that the contract in its reformed, and not original, form is the one that the contracting parties understood and meant it to be; and as, in fact, it was but for the alleged mistake in its drafting. ”  *Kuller v. Fire Ass’n of Philadelphia*, 124 N.J. Eq. 473, 475 (1938), citing, inter alia, *Rowley v. Flannelly*, 30 N.J.Eq. 612; *Hupsch v. Resch*, 45 N.J.Eq. 657, affirmed 46 N.J.Eq. 609.  “The traditional grounds justifying reformation of an instrument are either mutual mistake or unilateral mistake by one party and fraud or unconscionable conduct by the other. ”  *Dugan Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth.*, 398 N.J. Super. 229, 242-43 (App. Div. 2008), certif. denied, 196 N.J. 346 (2008) (quoting *St. Pius X House of Retreats, Salvatorian Fathers v. Diocese of Camden*, 88 N.J. 571, 577 (1982)).  With respect to mutual mistake, in order to reform a . . . written contract in the absence of fraud on the part of the defendant, it must appear that the minds of the parties to said contract have met, and that a mutual mistake of the contracting parties has been made in writing out the contract, so that the parties appear to have entered into a contract which they have not entered into.
[brief] (Da 43)  Ninth, detectives confronted [...] with an allegation that he had lied to an officer the day before the interrogation.  In addition, detectives conveyed that they consequently viewed him as a “foe. ”  (25T 82-8 to 11; Da 69)  See Godfrey, 131 N.J. Super. at 177 (police “were in possession of information indicating to them that … defendant had lied to them”).
[directive] All law enforcement officers who operate law enforcement vehicles in vehicular pursuit situations shall complete a report in the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal.  The report shall be completed by the officer within 24 hours of the vehicular pursuit and preferably before the end the shift in which the pursuit occurred.  If the officer involved in the pursuit is unable to complete the report within 24 hours, it should be completed as soon the officer is able to do so, or by a supervising officer within 48 hours in accordance with a written policy to be established by the department or agency.  11.2  Vehicular pursuits resulting in the death or serious bodily injury of any civilian shall be handled in accordance with Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2019-4.  As soon as any local, county, or state law enforcement agency learns of a vehicular pursuit that resulted in death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, the agency shall immediately notify the County Prosecutor’s Office for the county in which the incident occurred, who shall in turn immediately notify the Attorney General’s Office of Public Integrity and Accountability (OPIA) Director or their designee.  14
[brief] Statutory amendments may be applied retroactively if they are “curative,” meaning “designed to ‘remedy a perceived imperfection in or misapplication of a statute. ’”  Ardan, 231 N.J. at 611 (quoting James, 216 N.J. at 564).  Amendments are not “curative” simply because they seek “to expand and improve the law” or “better serve[] public policy objectives. ”  Id. at 612–13.  Curative amendments must “not alter the act in any substantial way, but merely clarif[y] the legislative intent behind the [previous] act.
[brief] Da012.  Even when accounting for the [...]’ argument that the declaration of need for redevelopment negatively impacted the Property, if the [...]’ argument about fee simple being taken by the Township after January 27, 1994 is taken at face value, the [...] must legally disclaim any right to rents collected after the date of valuation.  The [...] make no such disclaimer.  What the [...] want is, in effect, double recovery—the right to the higher fee simple valuation of the Property as of January 27, 1994 and the right to retain all rents for 24 years after the date of valuation.
[brief] He testified that on April 16, 2017, he received a call from the [...] to report to [...] with a search dog.  Upon arrival, at approximately 2:20 a.m., [...] informed him that they had received a report that a suspect, later identified as defendant, fired a handgun during a robbery on a nearby street.  The victim told the police that after he was robbed, he saw defendant enter the alleyway on the side of the building located at [...].  [...] told [...] that defendant was arrested a short time later, on [...].  At the time of his arrest, defendant was not wearing the jacket seen during the robbery and did not have a handgun, and thus [...] wanted [...] to search the courtyard behind [...] where he believed defendant may have disposed of those items.
[brief] [Pa1, Pa3]  [...] also argues that there was a “voluntary dismissal of the damages claims” in the underlying suit eliminating its duty to indemnify.  Db16 (quoting Pa357) ([...] emphasis in original); Db25.  [...] has made this new argument for the first time on appeal.  The sole alleged support for [...]’s new “abandonment” theory is the following statement made in an Order deeming the [...] as “prevailing” parties:  “Defendants point out that the complaint sought multiple remedies for breach of fiduciary duty, but only injunctive relief was awarded.  The court, however, did not deny other relief – Plaintiffs chose not to seek it. ”  Pa371.  Based on this statement [...] argues: “The foregoing confirms that the damage claims had been abandoned and that an appeal, even if successful, only would have served to overturn a non-covered award of injunctive relief . . .”  Db19 (emphasis added).  The “abandoned” conclusion simply does not follow from the quoted statement.  [...]’s complaint expressly alleged a claim for “actual . . . damages” (Pa328) caused by an alleged breach of “the duty of care. ”  Pa327 ¶ 54; see Pb27.  [...]’s assertion that the claims in the [...] Action purportedly “cannot be spun as negligence-based” (Db2) was rightly rejected by the Trial Court below.  See T83-6 to T83-7 (“the allegations of breach as to fiduciary care may be supported by a theory of negligence. ”).  The negligence basis of liability alleged in the [...] Complaint was never waived or abandoned.  Pa484 ¶ 49; see Pb28.  A successful appeal would have negated the cited “prevailing” party determination and would have left the [...] free to resume pursuit of their expressly pleaded claim for “actual . . . damages” (Pa328) caused by an alleged breach of “the duty of care. ”  Pa327 ¶ 54; see Pb27.  As is demonstrated by [...]’s having defended the [...] Action for nearly fifteen (15) months, the plaintiffs’ allegations of breach of “the duty of care” (Pa327 ¶¶ 54–57) and their prayer for “actual . . . damages” (Pa328) brought the [...] Action within [...]’s contractual obligation to defend “any ‘Suit’ seeking those damages.
[brief] Dear [...]:  Please accept this letter brief and appendix on behalf of the [...], the [...], the [...], the [...], and the [...] (collectively the “State Parties”).  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS........  3  ARGUMENT .........................................................................................................................  6  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT APPELLANTS LACKS THE REQUISITE STANDING TO SUE, AND ITS FINDINGS SHOULD BE UPHELD..........................................................  6  CONCLUSION  ....................................................................................................................  10  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] **CONCLUSION**  For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request this Court affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in favor of Respondents.  Appellant’s sole support for his appeal is his own change in story to now assert that a typographical error was placed into multiple documents, pleadings, drafts certifications, and—fatal to his appeal—his own responses to request for admissions.  Appellant’s new version of the facts strains credulity.  If there truly was an error, Appellant could have tried to correct it by motion practice, but he did not do so.  Appellant did not file amended answers to interrogatories or amend his response to the requests for admissions.  Instead, Appellant files this appeal in hopes that this Honorable Court will grant him a second chance to replead his complaint, change his discovery responses, and redo nearly two years of discovery activities.  As set forth above, at the time of termination, Appellant alleged only that he was given permission to make personal purchases in 2020.  Yet, an extensive months long investigation revealed eight (8) years of personal purchases exceeding $256,000.  At best, Appellant concocted his story that he received permission in March 2020 for such personal purchases because it matched the time frame that Appellant was being questioned about.  In the end, Appellant offered no evidence in discovery to support his claims or to support his effort at deposition to recant his prior admissions and assertions.  The decision to terminate Appellant was irrefutably based on Appellant’s misconduct—there is no genuine question of fact as to why Respondent terminated Appellant and, as the Trial Judge found, Appellant offered no evidence to support his version of the facts.
[brief] Pa484 ¶¶ 46–48; Pa1024–34.  Ohio has never even argued that the duty to defend in the Policy did not include a duty to appeal adverse trial court rulings in accordance with the principle stated in *Pharmacists* and the above-quoted treatises.  Under *Pharmacists*, an insurance company’s duty to defend includes a duty to appeal adverse trial court rulings “when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the insured’s interests might be served by an appeal.
[brief] The Borough adopted the Ordinance and announced a process to be followed in the RFA, including the creation of the Subcommittee.  (48a-61a).  In furtherance of the Subcommittee’s work evaluating applications, the Borough created and published the Evaluation Sheet, setting forth the specific criteria and scoring method to be used in reviewing applications.  (63a).  The Borough, however, deviated from that process and those standards by not following the protocols it required and by adopting the Resolution without ensuring that the process was followed.  The Borough’s adoption of the Resolution therefore was an abuse of discretion and was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because—irrespective of NJCREAMMA—the Borough adopted the Ordinance and a specific review process and then did not follow its own requirements.
[brief] [...] only began submitting those items – as it admitted in its Answer – on April 29, 2022, after the Ordinance went into effect.  But even then, its submission was not complete, as the Board found on two occasions.  Irrespective of when the submission occurred, this determination put [...] into the same position as the applicant in *Dunbar*, *supra* – subject to any zoning ordinance adopted before completeness.  Here, the Ordinance was in effect before the filing, and should have governed the review of [...]’ application for development.  The trial court got it right.
[brief] Simplot India LLC v. Himalaya Food Int’l Ltd., 2024 WL 1136791 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2024) .............................................  16 SMS Financial P, LLC v. M.P. Gallagher, LLC, 2019 WL 5459849 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Jan. 25, 2019) ...................  31  Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 607 F. Supp. 3d 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) .....................................................  15 Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014) ..............................................................................  24 Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 106 (1994)  ..............................................................................  21 Wilson v. Paradise Vill. Beach Resort and Spa, 395 N.J. Super. 520 (App. Div. 2007)  .....................................................  21 Statutes N.J.S.A. 14A:13-11(1) .............................................................................  30 N.J.S.A. 42:2C-65(a) ............................................................................. 28, 30, 31 Rules R. 4:4–4 .........................................................................................................................  15 R. 4:6-1(b) ..................................................................................................................  11  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] See McLean, 205 N.J. at 459.  Further, not only did [...] impermissibly comment on facts and issues in dispute that the jury needed to resolve, but he also impermissibly commented on facts that were neither “clear,” “plain,” nor “objective,” as the State suggested.  (Pb 24-25)  [...]’s insistence that [...] was one of the individuals who entered the [...] warehouse was based on [...]’s personal review of the church video footage.  Notably, though, the church footage—which is the only recording of the [...] doorway—is far too blurry to identify who is at the building entrance.  [...] thus concluded that [...] entered the warehouse based on a combination of (1) the church video and (2) [...]’s self-identification in the RT-TOIC footage from a few blocks away.  But it was solely the jury’s task to view that footage and determine whether the person that [...] identified on the RT-TOIC footage was the same blurry person from the church video, or whether the video was sufficiently unclear such that there was reasonable doubt as to the alleged assailant’s identity.  [...]’s inadmissible commentary irreversibly tainted the jury’s ability to make that assessment independently.  Accordingly, the interrogation video contained [...]’s commentary on issues that were directly in dispute, neither “clear” nor “plain,” and that should have been left to the jury to resolve.  The State’s claims that [...]’s comments were not opinions but factual assertions (Pb 25) only cement the error, as our case law makes clear that lay-witness officers are not permitted to comment on factual questions they did not witness and that the jury “can evaluate for itself. ”  See McLean, 205 N.J. at 462-63; State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 17 (2021).  The State’s argument thus reaffirms that reversal is necessary.
[brief] The BPU subsequently assigned Docket Number [...] to the matter.  35.  On January 23, 2017, the BPU transmitted that filing to the Office of Administrative Law ("OAL"), where it was subsequently assigned to Administrative Law Judge [...], and assigned OAL Docket No. [...].  Judge Pelios issued an order allowing [...] to intervene in the matter, and the Division of Rate Counsel served discovery requests on [...], which the Company responded to.  However, while that matter was pending, [...] continued to evaluate the site at [...].
[brief] There still has not been one cent that has been voluntarily returned without the need for, you know, Court proceedings and -- or finding misrepresentations.  This whole thing with the money.  You are right.  This was filed before then, but I think it sort of bears out the whole point of what happened even during the time of this fee application.  So, you know, we are talking about over 5,000 hours, 5,485.1 hours for fees equalling 570857 [sic] and 50 cents, and I think it is warranted, so I am going to order it.
[brief] At the police station the defendants displayed further malice by falsely accusing plaintiff of being under the influence.  Hate and malice are the same.  Hate crimes are usually committed against others based on factors such race and religion.  In McQuarter v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 572 F.Supp. 1401, 1414 (N.D.Ga.1983), the court held that use of chokehold was “excessive and malicious” when used after victim was “manacled” and “effectively restrained”  Here plaintiff was already on the ground when the police choked him and dislocated his jaw.  Additionally, all reasonable inference should have been in plaintiff’s favor that plaintiff was denied of his due process right to appeal his criminal conviction by the defendants.
[brief] RPC 3.1  Meritorious Claims and Contentions  13  RPC 3.2  Expediting Litigation 13  RPC 3.3  Candor Toward the Tribunal  13  RPC 3.4  Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel  13  RPC 8.3  Reporting Professional Misconduct  13  RPC 8.4  Misconduct  13  SECONDARY AUTHORITY
[brief] [Id. at 394-95 (internal citations omitted). ]  With regard to the arbitrator’s ability to dispense his own brand of industrial justice in the name of balancing the equities, the Court stated cogently:  Here we simply recognize that an arbitrator’s power to decide what is fair and just is at all times limited by the intent of the parties as manifested by the terms of their contract.  The parties took pains to put explicit restrictions on the arbitrator’s authority.
[brief] In May 2014, [...] submitted a Small Business Vendor Registration Application to the State of New Jersey in which he stated the gross revenue for [...] was $6.5 million in 2013, $4,928,957 in 2014 and $5.2 million in 2015.  Dra16.  [...] was required to attest to the accuracy of the information and confirm he understood that falsified information could subject the firm to prosecution for fraud, with civil or criminal penalties and a two-year possible disbarment from bidding on State contracts.
[brief] The information sought from the County in Count Two can be satisfied by a simple OPRA request while Count Three does not reference the County defendants.  Count Four has a single statement:  “Plaintiffs hereby incorporate each of the allegations contained in this Complaint as set forth at length herein. ” (Compl. Par. 397).  In Count Four they ask the Court to declare that “[...] *** impaired the federally regulated capital markets by submitting offering materials that misrepresented or concealed material information about the validity of certain [...] long term tax exemption transactions***,” thereby alleging fraud (Compl. Count Four, Par. A).