ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Court declines to shoulder what is the parties’ burden to bear in the first instance.  Even if plaintiffs are correct that having the Court conduct an *in camera* review of the 50 documents listed in its Chart and the additional six documents identified in Exhibit H would “minimiz[e] the burden to [...]” (and the Court makes no such finding), plaintiffs have not sufficiently demonstrated a “factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person” that *in camera* review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish that the attorney-client privilege does not apply.  *Zolin*, 491 U.S. at 572.  Accordingly, plaintiffs’ request for *in camera* review of the 50 documents listed in its chart ([...] Decl. Ex. 11) and the additional six documents identified in Exhibit H is denied.
[brief] ”  The Award left out the “past practice” clause, but did include language stating that “longevity and senior officer differential [be paid] in accordance with the terms of the [expired] Agreement. ”  Id. at *14.  In [...], the Borough contended that “the proposed language misstates the award by inclusion of the language that “increments shall be paid in accordance with past practice. ”  It noted “the arbitrator did not include that language when he set forth the specific salary award over the life of the new contract, and his interest arbitration award modified past practice by delaying step increases until the fourth quarter of 2019 and eliminating them altogether for 2020, the final year of the contract. ”  Id. at *7.  The [...] argued that its “draft is consistent with Article III, Section 2 of the 2017 contract, which provided that “[i]ncrements shall be paid in accordance with past practice” as modified by the arbitrator’s award for the second and third years of the contract. ”  Id. at *7-8.  The [...] argued this provision was not modified by the Award and is incorporated into the salary award because of the language on the award “in accordance with the terms of the Agreement  The Court held that the Award was ambiguous in that regard and that the matter had to be remanded to the Arbitrator for clarification.
[brief] (6T:216:1-5).  Defense counsel pointed out that the Motion for Recusal was made too late because the evidence was in, everyone had rested.  (6T:218:11-15).  In addition, there was no evidence to justify a recusal, and no evidence that the Court favored one side or the other.  (6T:218:16-20).  At that point, [...] started to laugh, and then stated, “What, are you going to chastise me for laughing?  It’s a joke, what he’s saying, Your Honor\(^{10}\). ”  (6T:218:20-25).  The jury was not present during that statement.  (6T:219:3-6).  [...] then stated, “It’s obvious that this is -- as biased as could be.  It’s biased --. ” (6T:219:12-16).  The Court cautioned plaintiff to remain silent, and that his case was finished.  (6T:219:18-21).  The Court told plaintiff that there should be no shouting out, no chuckling, and no laughing.  She explained that he had been noticed a couple of times that his behavior was not acceptable.  (6T:219:17-23).  The Court advised [...] that if he does it again within the presence of the jury, or outside the jury’s presence, he will be removed, and not allowed to --- \(^{10}\) Referring to defense counsel. come in for the rest of the trial.  (6T:219:24-25).  [...] then stated, “Yes, Your Honor, I understand.  It’s obvious. ” (6T:220:4-5).  The Court denied all of plaintiff’s request for a mistrial and for recusal.  (6T:221:1-2).  The Court noted that in terms of the confrontation in the hallway, the Court was not there, and neither were the jurors.  (6T:221:2-4).  Following the verdict, Plaintiff’s counsel then made a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.
[brief] **B.  The Lot 2.01 Approvals and Developer’s Agreement Recognize the Roads as Public Streets (Da10)**  Pursuant to *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-53.a, a municipality can only require a developer to furnish a performance guarantee for “the cost of installation of *only those improvements required by an approval or developer’s agreement, ordinance, or regulation to be dedicated to a public entity*.”  (Emphasis added.)  Pursuant to its 2021 Developer’s Agreement with the Borough, [...] was required to, and did, provide a performance guarantee to the Borough in connection with certain required improvements that were to be made to the Roads as part of the construction of Lot 2.01.  (Da62 at ¶ 20.)  If the Roads were actually private streets, then, pursuant to *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D-53.a, the Borough could not have required a performance guarantee for improvements to be made to them.  Moreover, in reliance on the fact that the Roads were public streets because the Borough was requiring a performance guarantee for their improvements, [...] proceeded to pay the cost of obtaining a performance guarantee for such improvements.  (Da62 at ¶ 20.)  It would be entirely unfair for [...] to have to incur the cost of the performance guarantee for improvements that it could not legally be made to guaranty.  Accordingly, the Borough should be estopped from denying that the Roads are public streets.
[brief] Here, the [...] impermissibly sought such a “trial on the papers” and thereby violated the very first principle of summary judgment motion practice that, as a matter of law, the facts presented by the non-moving party, along with all favorable inferences, must be taken as true.  If defendants’ statements to the Planning Board and others, that they “acquired” rights belonging to plaintiffs, are taken as true, and all favorable inferences applied in plaintiffs’ favor, it is readily evident that the [...] told the Planning Board and other governmental agencies false facts to support their frivolous statement that they had “acquired” the rights duly purchased by plaintiffs and as to which the [...] sought to purchase anew from plaintiffs under a confidential NDA.  The [...] asserted that, because they purchased their rights from [...], plaintiffs suffered no damages.  Pa____.  However, the law is well settled in this regard.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that proof of actual damages is not necessary to survive summary judgment on a breach of contract claim:  “the general rule is that whenever there is a breach of contract, or an invasion of a legal right, the law ordinarily infers that damage ensued, and, in the absence of actual damages, the law vindicates the right by awarding nominal damages. ”  Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 45-46, 477 A.2d 1224 (1984) (internal citations omitted) (citing Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 N.J.L. 90, 96-97, 186 A. 585 (1936) ("It is the established rule in this state that wherever there is a breach of contract, or the invasion of a legal right, the law ordinarily infers that damage has ensued.
[directive] The intent of this waiver provision is to ameliorate the harshness of the otherwise mandatory job forfeiture requirement in cases where forfeiture and disqualification, as collateral consequences flowing from convictions for the most minor offenses, would be too severe.  Flagg, 171 N.J. at 569.  The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the discretionary decision whether or not to apply for a waiver is different from the kinds of determinations typically made by prosecutors in their law enforcement capacity, and is more akin to prosecutorial discretion in sentencing-related determinations.  Accordingly, the Court held that a prosecutor’s decision under N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(e) is subject to judicial review under an ordinary “abuse of discretion” standard.  The Court noted that while this standard “defies precise definition, it arises when a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ”  171 N.J. at 571 (internal 3 quotations to federal authority omitted).  The Court further noted that an abuse of discretion will be manifest if the defendant can show that a prosecutorial veto (a) was not premised upon a consideration of all relevant factors, (b) was based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or (c) amounted to a clear error in judgment.  Id. (quoting State v. Baynes, 148 N.J. 434, 444 (1997)).  The Court in Flagg made clear that a prosecutor may not adopt a per se rule of not applying for a waiver.  Rather the Court held that the remedial purposes of the statute demands that each waiver application be reviewed by the prosecutor on a case-by-case basis.
[brief] (Ca14).  [...] wrongly claimed to be the owner of business entities [...] and [...] in this and other litigation in contravention of paragraph 16 of the PSA and the parties’ Mid-marriage agreement.  After firing [...] on or about April 18, 2018, [...] had Pennsylvania Attorney [...] enter his appearance in the Pennsylvania legal malpractice case for [...] and [...] without authority on November 7, 2019.
[directive] Compliance with Discovery Obligations Relating to BWC Recordings That Might Expose Officers or Other Persons to Danger.  If disclosure of a BWC recording as part of the State’s discovery obligations in a prosecution might present a danger to any officer or civilian (e.g., reveal an undercover officer, confidential informant, surveillance site, etc.), or might reveal confidential tactical information the disclosure of which might jeopardize future operations or officer safety (e.g., verbal codes or hand signals used to communicate information or BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022 24 instructions, techniques for interior movements and clearing rooms during execution of warrant, techniques for convincing persons to open doors during warrant execution, etc.), the County Prosecutor or designee, or Director of the Division of Criminal Justice or designee in cases prosecuted by the Division, shall, in the exercise of sound prosecutorial discretion, take such steps as are appropriate and authorized by law and/or Court Rule to protect the information from disclosure, such as by seeking a protective order from the court.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, GRANTED DEFENDANTS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION AND DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE (Pa0001-Pa0004; T. at 3:1-32:23).  A.  The Trial Court Improperly Applied A Presumption of Constitutionality To The Limited Attorney Exemption Despite The Fact That It Impinges On A Constitutionally Protected Right.
[brief] Because of the militaristic nature of correctional facilities, the Department’s decision regarding penalty is entitled to strong deference.  Bowden, 268 N.J. Super. at 305-06.  Here, the Commission found [...]’ conduct to be so egregious that it warranted removal.  As the Commission noted, over the course of three hours, [...] stayed in the food preparation room watching television, spoke with a fellow officer, and slept, rather than performing the required inmate counts.  (Pa034a).  [...] falsified official records by indicating in his logbooks that he completed the required inmate counts and lied to [...].  Ibid.  [...]’ appalling negligence allowed an inmate to escape from the prison and remain on the loose for approximately two hours.  Then, when the incident was being discussed by his supervisor, [...]’ apparent lack of self-control led him to threaten other officers and their families, a sufficiently egregious act in its own right.  Simply put, the Department can no longer trust [...] to perform his duties.  [...]’ actions placed the inmates at [...] and his colleagues in danger.  [...] was expected to perform his job with honesty, integrity, and good faith.  Instead, [...] ignored the well-established procedures and rendered himself undependable.  The outcome of [...]’ negligence is the exact reason why strict discipline is crucial to correctional facilities: it created a direct threat to the facility and the public as a whole.  Because allowing [...] to remain employed by the Department would destroy public confidence and undermine the safety of the facility, the Commission’s decision to remove [...] from employment should be affirmed.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Press Release, New Jersey Supreme Court, Eyewitness Identification Criteria for Criminal Cases 3 (July 19, 2012) (effective Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/2012/pr120719a.htm.  The cross-racial effects factor specifically states that “[r]esearch has shown that people may have greater difficulty in accurately identifying members of a different race.
[brief] (1T42-6 to14).  The judge expressed that regarding the newly discovered [undated order] it was best for it to reviewed in a separate proceeding.  (1T42-6 to14).  The Judge stated that whether or not that case would go forward was not for him to say at this point, other than to say the motion to consolidate is denied.  (1T42-6 to14).  The Court then granted summary judgment to the defendants.  (Pa533; Pa534)  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] And [...]’s own payroll records show that their actual payroll expenses were over $427,000 less than the money it unlawfully obtained from [...], which begs the question, “Where did the $427,000 of excess funding go?”.\textsuperscript{6}  \textsuperscript{4} Pa215 – Pa216; Pa267 – Pa275  \textsuperscript{5}  Pa221  \textsuperscript{6}  Pa226 – Pa227  Upon the Superintendent’s discovery and investigation that [...] unlawfully obtained payment of the $1,301,300.\textsuperscript{18} as a result of a breach of contract and false pretenses, [...] sought an immediate return of the money.
[brief] Similarly, the New Jersey Administrative Code requires that rulemaking materials “shall be written in a reasonably simple and understandable manner which is easily readable” and “[t]he document shall be sufficiently complete and informative as to permit the public to understand accurately and plainly the legal authority, purposes and expected consequences of the adoption, readoption or amendment of the rule or regulation. ”  N.J.A.C. 1:30-21(a)(6).  The Department’s rulemaking process for the Bulletin was fatally flawed because it did not provide the public with complete or accurate notice and disclosure, thereby violating the above-referenced statutory requirements, basic tenets of due process and fundamental principles of fairness.  Fed. Pac. Elec. Co. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 334 N.J. Super. 323, 343 (App. Div. 2000) (“The notice and comment requirements of the APA are not to be lightly applied or regarded as obstacles to be avoided.  They are designed to serve the cause of fairness by providing a mechanism for informing the affected public adequately of the operation and impact of proposed administrative rules and regulations which, in these times, govern so much of our day-to-day existence. ”).  Moreover, in engaging in rulemaking or other agency action, an agency’s power is limited to enforcing statutes and regulations, which of course the agency may not disregard.  See G.C. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Srvs., 249 N.J. 20, 40 (2021) (noting “[a]n agency cannot ignore or change legislative terms ‘or frustrate the policy embodied in the statute’” (quoting T.H. v. Div. of Dev. Disabilities, 189 N.J. 478, 491 (2007)).
[brief] [...], *Issues Impacting LGBTQ Youth: Polling Analysis*, at 12 (Jan. 2022), https://www.thetrevorproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/TrevorProject_Public1.pdf (Da88).  Another study highlighted that 42.3% of a sample of 5,612 respondents reported a suicide attempt and “26.3% reported misusing drugs or alcohol to cope with transgender discrimination. ”
[brief] ..............................................................................................................  1 POINT II  THE TRIAL COURT’S PARTIAL SUMMARY  JUDGMENT  ORDER WAS REACHED ON AN INCOMPLETE RECORD AND PREJUDICES  [...], AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY .........................................................  8 POINT III  [...]’S HEIGHT RESTRICTION IS NOT CAPRICIOUS .....................................  12 POINT IV  THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED  THE RECONSIDERATION STANDARD .......................................................................................................................  14 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................
[brief] (8T22-3 to 30-13); see N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a), (b).  The trial court ultimately sentenced [...] to thirty years in prison on each murder count, as well as eighteen months in prison for aggravated assault, all run consecutively and all with no parole eligibility, for an aggregate sixty-one-and-a-half-year sentence with no possibility for parole.  Several errors by the trial court compounded to result in this excessive sentence.  First, the trial court erred in giving “significant weight” to dismissed offenses when it applied aggravating factor three.
[brief] ”  29.  N.J.S.A. 2C:30-5 (Pa 172).  Findings, declarations relative to deprivation of civil rights by public officials states:  "The Legislature finds and declares that:  a.  Public confidence in the institutions of government is undermined when an official engages in any form of misconduct involving the official's office.  b.  Such misconduct, and the corresponding damage to the public confidence, impairs the ability of government to function properly, fosters mistrust and engenders disrespect for government and public servants.  c.  A particular concern arises when a law enforcement official, duly entrusted to protect the public safety and impartially enforce the laws, abuses that trust by unlawfully depriving persons of their civil rights, especially in the context of racial profiling.  d.  It is important to ensure that law enforcement officers are prohibited from using racial characteristics or color, either alone or in conjunction with other composite characteristics such as a generalized vehicle description or the age of the driver or passengers, as the basis for initiating an investigative stop.  e.  Existing laws must be amended to provide a greater deterrent to this type of conduct, as well as to enhance other provisions of the law targeting official misconduct.  f.  Accordingly, it is in the public interest to strengthen our laws that define and punish acts of official misconduct by members of law enforcement and other public servants.  L.2003,c.31,s.1."
[brief] In State v. EOFF, the trial court asked jurors, “[s]ometimes prosecutors present cases where there’s no forensic evidence such as fingerprints or DNA.  Do you believe that the prosecutor, the State of New Jersey can reach its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt without any type of scientific proofs? ”  No. [...], 2022 WL 628499, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 4, 2022) (unpub. op.; Counsel is unaware of any contrary unpublished opinions.  N.J. Ct. R. 1:36-3.), cert. denied, 252 N.J. 121 (2022).  In both cases the court reversed the conviction because of these questions, and in EOFF, the court succinctly explained the rationale:  “neither the judge nor counsel ‘presented the issue to the jurors in [the] balanced manner’ required by Little.  Jurors were never told they could ‘consider the absence of any [forensic] evidence in deciding whether the State has met its burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ’”  Id. at *7 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted).  (addressing absence of gun in an unlawful possession of a handgun case).  If voir dire on bias against the absence of evidence is appropriate, so must be the inverse:  *Would a prospective juror reflexively conclude the State has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt merely because it proffers purported scientific evidence of guilt?*  *Does scientific evidence trump other forms of evidence in jurors’ eyes?*  See id. at 419 (“[A] prospective juror unwilling to consider finding a defendant guilty if the State failed to produce the weapon – no matter what other evidence the State presented that the defendant possessed that weapon – may be a biased juror. ”).  In sum, the State *and the defense* must be able to question a juror’s ability – or inability – to consider and appropriately weigh all of the evidence.
[brief] [...]’s decision finding that [...] had probable cause to search the truck for marijuana (Da18) was supported by the sufficient credible evidence in the record in that:  1.  [...], who was found to be a credible witness, did not prolong the stop by conducting the K-9 sniff test, which took a minute or less while [...] waited for dispatch’s information on [...]’s driver’s license.  (1T33-22 to 25); 2. the K-9 alerted to the presence of drugs in the truck.  (1T31-22 to 32-8); 3.  [...]’s FBI number indicated that she had numerous CDS-related arrests for the manufacture and delivery of CDS in the past.  (1T28-21 to 23); 4.  [...] repeatedly lied to [...] about the presence of the duffel bags in the truck, which he saw with his flashlight on his initial approach to the truck.  ((Da73/Pa9 at 1:38 to 1:41; 1T24-24 to 27-25; 1T142-19 to 22)); 5.  [...]’s nervousness and loud and rapid gum chewing intensified when asked about the duffel bags.  (1T26-3 to 9; 1T208-8 to 14); 6.  [...] and [...] were two people driving cross-country from Reno with partially concealed duffel bags in the back of their truck owned by a third party; and 7.  Reno is a part of the “Emerald Triangle” drug trade.  (1T28-4 to 12).  Consequently, [...] found that there were sufficient facts to support probable cause that [...] and [...]' vehicle contained contraband.  Thus, contrary to defendant’s claim, [...]’s warrantless search of the truck was lawful.  Neither this stop nor the seizure was any “poisonous tree. ”
[brief] As to the NJLAD Public Accommodations claim and the Class of One-Equal Protection claim, putting aside the lack of a factual basis in that Plaintiff cannot show either that there was no judgment of conviction entered or that he needed one to appeal, Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence whatsoever that he was treated differently than anyone else.  Both the NJLAD claim, and the Equal Protection claim would require some proof of differential treatment, which proof is wholly lacking in this case.  A public accommodations claim requires proof of differential treatment.  A Plaintiff is required to show that he was denied “accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges … on account of race. ”  Ptaszynski v. Uwaneme, 371 N.J. Super 333, (App Div 2004), citing N.J.S.A. 10:5-12f(1).  Similarly, an equal protection claim requires evidence of differential treatment of persons similarly situated.  Jason v. Showboat Hotel & Casino, 329 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div. 2000).  Plaintiff has produced no evidence that he was treated differently because of race or, in fact, that he was treated differently at all.  Accordingly, both of those claims were properly dismissed on Summary Judgment.  POINT II.
[brief] The party seeking to vacate an arbitration award “bears the burden of demonstrating ‘fraud, corruption, or similar wrongdoing on the part of the arbitrator. ’”  *Minkowitz*, 433 N.J. Super. at 136 (*quoting Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs.*, 135 N.J. 349, 357 (1994).  There is a strict review of private contract arbitration, limited by a narrow construction of the statutory grounds.  [...], *Current N.J. Court Rules*, comment 3.3.3 on R. 4:5-4 (*citing Tretina* which overruled *Perini Corp. v.* Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 129 N.J. 479, (1992), which had permitted judicial intervention for gross errors of law by the arbitrators).
[brief] Appellant asserts that the approval for the U.S. Route 1 Access Road (the “Access Road”) culvert was in violation of the FHA Rules, namely: N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.1; N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.2; and N.J.A.C. 7:13-12.7.  Once again, Appellant raises this argument for the first time on appeal, as it failed to raise these concerns regarding the culvert during the public notice and comment period.  Ra399.  For the reasons cited above in Section III(A), Appellant’s failure to raise these concerns in its public comments frustrates the administrative process, and Appellant’s attacks on the Access Route culvert should be rejected on this basis alone.