ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Per the deed for the property of [...], Lot 20 was included and is [...].  (Da264, [...] Deed)  In addition, tax records, from the [...], specifically the Property Identification Document makes it clear that [...] Hope Missionary Baptist Church sits at [...] and is [...] and that Lot 20 is an additional lot which is [...].  (Da262, Newark Tax Assessor Property Identification Document).  The Property Identification Document notes that [...] owns Lot 20 which is right next to the church.  (Da262, Newark Tax Assessor Property Identification Records)  [...] has certified to the history of the church and knows that [...] owned part of Lot 22 as noted in the Title Survey.  (Da122, Parcel A and Da118, Parcel B)  The area identified as [...] is Lot 22 and the deed for [...] sets forth the dimensions for that property.  (Da275, Deed for [...])  The claim that Lot 20 which is misidentified as Lot 22 is owned by [...] was first claimed in 2021 when [...] was contacted by [...].  (Da274, Messenger; Da125, Affidavit of [...], par. 14; Da55, [...] Answers to Interrogatories, par. 18)  The claim by [...] of ownership of Lot 20 was rejected by [...].  *(Da264, Deed for [...]; Da262, Property Identification Records; Da64, [...] Admissions, par. 18).*
[brief] Because the remedy in an action in lieu of prerogative writs is limited to a deferential review of the record before the board of adjustment, the Trial Court correctly refused to allow the Objectors a third bite at the apple to make the record that they chose not to make when afforded the opportunity at a recorded rehearing before [...].  Moreover, the Trial Court correctly refused to supplement the record to include speculation about future, off-site, conditions not in existence during the hearings before the [...] and not in existence more than a year later when Objectors' motion was decided.  The [...]'s grant of a residential height variance is a purely private concern which the Objectors admit has no potential to impact anyone else in the community and which is devoid of any substantial and novel constitutional questions.  The publication of the Homeowners' Notice of Approval was statutorily proper and (admittedly) conspicuously disclosed to the Objectors more than four (4) weeks before the filing deadline.  Objectors' willful disregard of the email and ignorance of the law are not grounds for granting an extension of time.  As such, the Trial Court correctly dismissed the Objectors' late-filed complaint in lieu of prerogative writs because the Objectors failed to carry their burden to demonstrate a manifest interest of justice compelling an enlargement of time.  For the foregoing reasons, the Appellate Division should sustain the Trial Court’s October 18, 2023 Judgment.
[brief] Trial Counsel’s Decision Not to Demand Further Discovery Was Not Ineffective  Trial counsel wisely did not attempt to acquire the hard drive in question after the portions of video already discovered were found upon it, as, firstly, the hard drive was not evidence and secondly, any evidence arguably kept upon the hard drive was not material at that point in the case.  Importantly, the video alleged to have been still available on the hard drive was not video that had been purportedly deleted by the prosecutors office prior to trial but instead merely the two segments that were previously saved.  There was never any other video located on the hard drive after its initial wiping for repurposing.  Rule 3:13-3 does not require the keeping or discovering of data drives, on their own, for the defense.
[brief] The facts relevant to this Court’s review of the trial court’s order granting Plaintiffs an implied easement appurtenant are set forth in Defendants’ opening brief as well as in the detailed motion record below.  Defendants take issue with several incorrect factual assertions in Plaintiffs’ brief that pertain to that decision.  First, Defendants dispute Plaintiffs’ contention (Pb6) that the “1925 Plan did not limit beach access to the street ends. ”  Defendants likewise dispute Plaintiffs’ assertion (Pb6) that “[t]he right to access the [...] Beach Lands has run with the land since [...] acquired it from [...] in 1929. ”  In addition, Defendants dispute Plaintiffs’ allegation that any PSDRE created any implied easement right for Plaintiffs to cross [...] property to access the beach.  Rather than repeat themselves, however, Defendants refer to their opening brief on these issues. \(^1\)  Defendants also take issue with Plaintiffs’ mischaracterization of the events surrounding [...]’s 2019 complaint against [...], which forms the basis for --- \(^1\)  Defendants also dispute Plaintiffs’ request (Pb7, fn4) that this Court “take judicial notice that five beachfront homeowners in [...] currently have cases . . . where the trial court has granted partial summary judgment and held the homeowners possess an implied easement to cross the [...] Beach Lands to directly access the high-water line. ”  Plaintiffs fail to mention that each of those decisions was decided after, and relied on, the very trial court ruling that Defendants are appealing here.  Thus, none of those decisions lends any support whatsoever for the trial court’s ruling here.  In fact, if this Court agrees with Defendants on this appeal and reverses the trial court’s implied easement decision in this case, then each of the subsequent decisions in the five “judicial notice” cases cited by Plaintiffs may also need to be revisited and reversed.  Plaintiffs’ properly rejected motion to implead [...] as a defendant and to assert claims against him for malicious prosecution and libel.
[brief] In response to his said application, the respondents placed a handicapped parking space for the general public near the appellant’s house, refusing to mark it a reserved parking space for the appellant’s residence.  In so refusing to mark the said space a reserved space for the appalan’s residence, the respondents undermined C. 39:4-197.6 and existing local precedents, which show that they have granted such reserved handicapped parking spaces to others (Pa309 - Pa311).
[brief] On Appeal from Order of Final Judgment entered by the Honorable [...], A.J.S.C. Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, Docket No. [...] on December 1, 2022.  Honorable Judges:  Pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b), this letter in lieu of formal brief is submitted on behalf of Defendant/Respondent, [...], in response to Defendant/Appellant [...] appeal in this matter.  Please note that Defendant/Respondent [...] has not appealed the trial court’s Order for Final Judgment and thus designates itself as a Defendant/Respondent.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  3  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  3  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT (Defendant/Appellant’s Point I through Point VI are not addressed to Defendant Respondent Lakewood and thus shall not be addressed separately)  5  CONCLUSION  6  DEFENDANT RESPONDENT  LAKEWOOD APPENDIX (attached)
[brief] In reversing the decision of the trial court and the Appellate Division, the Knowles Court held that summary judgement was not warranted, and determined that the plaintiff provided objective evidence of a permanent injury and his injuries constituted a permanent loss of bodily function that was substantial.  The Court found that such ongoing problems as lack of feeling in his leg and the inability to stand, sit, or walk comfortable for a substantial amount of time, engage in athletics, and complete household chores was sufficient evidence that plaintiff’s injuries satisfied the substantial permanent loss of bodily function requirement.  Although the plaintiff was able to continue working as a teacher, the Court “declined to adopt the ability to work as a litmus test for recovery of pain and suffering damages,” citing Kahrar v. Borough of Wallington, 171 N.J. 3, 14-15 (2002).  The Knowles Court further noted that plaintiff’s job was fairly sedentary, and distinctions between sedentary and non-sedentary plaintiffs in applying the Tort Claims Act standard are inappropriate.
[brief] The statutory standard for merger, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(a), “provid[es] that offenses are different when each requires proof of facts not required to establish the other. ”  Tate, 216 N.J. at 307 (quoting State v. Hill, 182 N.J. 532, 542 (2005)).  That approach “has been characterized as ‘mechanical. ’”  Ibid.  Thus, New Jersey instead follows “a ‘flexible approach’ in merger issues. ”  Hill, 182 N.J. at 542 (quoting State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 561 (1994)).  The more flexible approach requires courts “to focus on the elements of the crimes and the Legislature’s intent in creating them, and on the specific facts of each case.
[brief] The trial court correctly considered the parties’ past practice when interpreting the overtime provision. **  As our Supreme Court has held, “[i]f contract terms are unspecific or vague, extrinsic evidence may be used to shed light on the mutual understanding of the parties. ”  *Hall v. Bd. of Educ.*, 125 N.J. 299, 305-06 (1991) (citing *Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc.*, 26 N.J. 379, 388 (1958); *The Journeymen Barbers, Hairdressers and Cosmetologists’ Int’l Union of Am. v. Pollino*, 22 N.J. 389, 394-95 (1956); *Koshliek v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Passaic County*, 144 N.J. Super. 336 (Law Div. 1976)).
[brief] Appellate review over an issue not properly presented to the trial court is generally unavailable.  “[O]ur appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available ‘unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest. ’”  *Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co.*, 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (citation omitted); See also *Gormley v. Wood-El*, 218 N.J. 72, 95 fn. 8 (2014) (declining appellate review in light of a party’s “failure to argue or brief the issue, or develop the type of record that would assist the Court in resolving” said issue); See also *Alloco v. Ocean Super.*, 1, 6-8 (App. Div. 2011).  Beach & Bay Club, 456 N.J. Super. 124, 145 (App. Div. 2018) (noting that it is well-settled that an appellate court will not consider an issue that was not raised before the trial court unless the enumerated exceptions apply) (citations omitted).  Additionally, a party’s failure to list a judgment and/or order within the Notice of Appeal divests this Court of jurisdiction to review same.
[brief] Even substantial deviations from the prescribed procedures may be insufficient to require vacating a default judgment based upon flawed service if rights of an innocent third party have intervened . . . even owners who have been deprived of property interests without notice can by their delay and reasonable reliance of others, lose the right to attack the judgment.  [Sobel, 329 N.J.Super. at 293, emphasis added].  [...] received all notices and was neither deprived of notice nor due process.  It remains unable to point to even one fact to show that [...] had any reason to question the foreclosure or the title it acquired.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10 f. requires municipal agencies to provide for verbatim recordings of proceedings by either stenographer, mechanical or electronic means.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10 f.  The purpose of the statute is to ensure that the reviewing court has a record upon which to determine whether the municipal agency's action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.  See Carbone v. Planning Board of Weehawken, 175 N.J. Super. 584, 586 (Law Div. 1980).  Where no such record is available, the trial court ordinarily remands the matter back to the municipal agency with instructions to conduct a rehearing to make a proper record upon which the trial court may then determine the validity of the agency action.  See id.  Though the case of Carbone may be instructive for those instances in which the absence of a verbatim record is first discovered following the commencement of an action in lieu of prerogative writs, it has no bearing on circumstances like these where an audio malfunction is discovered during the pendency of the application and where the board takes appropriate action to voluntarily conduct a rehearing to preserve a verbatim record.
[brief] [...] acknowledged that he found activity from both defendant and the victim on a website called, “Adam for Adam. ” (4T110-24 to 4T111-3).  He found no communication between defendant and the victim, but he did not have their usernames.  (4T111-4 to 16).  The defense recalled [...], who identified photographs he took of defendant’s left and right hand at the hospital, as well as a photograph he took of defendant’s back.
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ### Cases - **Balducci v. Cige**, 240 N.J. 574 (2020) .................................................................  6 - **Brueckmann v. Frignoca**, 9 N.J. Misc. 128 (Passaic Cty. Cir. Ct. 1931) .................. 8 - **Cesare v. Cesare**, 154 N.J. 394 (1998)  ........................................................................ 22 - **Correa v. Grossi**, 458 N.J. Super. 571 (App. Div. 2019) ...........................................  7 - **Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Sec’y Pa.**, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 37346 (3d Cir. Nov. 27, 2020) ...................................................................................... 25 - **Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Way**, 492 F. Supp. 3d 354 (D.N.J. 2020) ........ 22 - **Friends of Jim Usry for Mayor Campaign v. Matthews for Mayor Campaign**, 187 N.J. Super. 176 (App. Div. 1982) ................................................................. 16 - **Gnall v. Gnall**, 222 N.J. 414 (2015) ............................................................................. 6 - **Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean**, 220 N.J. 239 (2015) .................................................. 6 - **Grillo v. State**, 469 N.J. Super. 267 (App. Div. 2021) ............................................... 9 - **I/M/O [...], Docket No. [...] (Law Div. 2023)** ....................... 12 - **I/M/O Election Contest of the November 7, 2023, General Election for Atlantic Highlands Mayor and Council, Docket No. [...] (Law Div. 2023)** .................................................................................................................. 12 - **In re Application of Moffat**, 142 N.J. Super. 217 (App. Div. 1976)) ............................ 8 - **In re Bonsanto’s Application**, 171 N.J. Super. 356 (App. Div. 1979) .......................... 9 - **In re Byron**, 165 N.J. Super. 468 (Law Div. 1978) .................................................... 7 - **In re Contest of the November 8, 2005 Gen. Election for Office of Mayor of Tp. of Parsippany-Troy Hills**, 192 N.J. 546 (2007) .................................................. 7, 10 - **In re Courtine, No. A-3712-06T3, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2433 (App. Div. Mar. 18, 2008)** ........................................................................................................ 8 - **In re Gen. Election of Nov. 5, 1991 for Office of Twp. Comm. of Maplewood**, 255 N.J. Super. 690 (Law Div. 1992) ................................................................. 8 - **In re Gray-Sadler**, 164 N.J. 468 (2000) ........................................................................ 7, 11, 23 - **In re Hackensack Recall Election**, 31 N.J. 592 (1960) ................................................ 8 - **In re Holmes**, 346 N.J. Super. 372 (App. Div. 2001) .................................................. 23 - **In re Kriso**, 276 N.J. Super. 337 (App. Div. 1994) ..................................................... 8, 14, 16 - **In re Langbaum**, 201 N.J. Super. 484 (App. Div. 1985) ............................................
[brief] Rendine, 141 N.J. at 323 (citing Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19 (emphasis added)).  The Rendine Court next discussed the Third Circuit’s adoption of an approach used in Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167-69 (1973) (Lindy I).  See 141 N.J. at 322-24.  The Lindy I court calculated the “lodestar” based on the hours spent on the case multiplied by the attorney’s reasonable hourly rate of compensation and then adjusted that amount based on “(1) the contingent nature of the case, reflecting the likelihood that hours were invested and expenses incurred without assurance of compensation and (2) the quality of the work performed as evidenced by the work observed, the complexity of the issues and the recovery obtained.
[brief] Ibid.  That is, of course, entirely distinguishable from what happened here.  There was no permit application denial that led to an interpretation by the Board; nor did Appellant request the Board interpret a zoning ordinance related to a permit refusal.  Instead, Appellant improperly sought and obtained the Board’s opinion on whether a neighbor’s use of its property was consistent with any approved site plan.  Similarly, in Twp. of Stafford v. Stafford Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 154 N.J. 62, 69 (1998), also relied upon by Appellant, the Court noted that a person “whose application to certify a nonconforming use is denied . . . must first file an appeal or application with the zoning board,” but that is different from what happened here.  The applicant was not seeking to “certify” a nonconforming use that preceded an ordinance, but instead was arguing that the use was not consistent with any ordinance.  Accordingly, for the above reasons and those relied upon by the trial court below, the conclusion is inescapable that the Board lacked the statutory power and authority to opine on whether Respondent’s use of Lot 5 for the past half-century had site plan approval.
[brief] I.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT  BECAUSE THERE IS NO COVERAGE FOR PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS OF INTENTIONAL WRONG AS A MATTER OF LAW.  (Pa1-16)  .................................................................................................................................16  A.  Coverage Afforded by the [...] Policy .............................................................................16  B.  The Act Does Not Mandate Coverage for Claims of Intentional Wrongdoing ................23  C. [...]  ....................................................................................................27  D.  Public Policy Supports Exclusion of Coverage for Intentional Wrongs .........................................................36  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................................46
[brief] The parties’ agreement here provided adequate notice many times over.  It explicitly states that disputes between them will be handled in binding arbitration “and not in a court of law,” and it elaborates on the distinction between arbitration and a court proceeding.  [...], an attorney, cannot plausibly contend that she did not understand what “arbitration” meant, especially in light of her earlier agreement to the January Terms where she expressly waived her right to “trial by jury. ”  And in any event, the trial court should not even have reached the question of whether the contractual waiver of rights was sufficiently clear because the parties delegated all issues of arbitrability—including the enforceability of the arbitration agreement—exclusively to the arbitrator and not to a court.  None of Plaintiffs’ other objections to arbitration has merit.  In short, Plaintiffs unmistakably agreed in exchange for using [...]’s services that they would arbitrate personal injury claims like those here.  [...] knew what she was agreeing to.  This Court should reverse the trial court’s denial of [...]’s motion to compel and hold Plaintiffs to their bargain.
[brief] ”  *Miranda*, 384 U.S. at 474.  Under federal law, officers must stop questioning a suspect only when the suspect's request for counsel is “unambiguous or unequivocal. ”  *Davis v. United States*, 512 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1994).  However, under New Jersey law, “a suspect need not be articulate, clear, or explicit in requesting counsel; any indication of a desire for counsel, however ambiguous, will trigger entitlement to counsel.
[brief] Walker v. Atl. Chrysler Plymouth, 216 N.J. Super. 255, 258 (App. Div. 1987).  Under the New Jersey TCA, a public entity is liable for injuries proximately caused by acts or omissions of a public employee within the scope of his or her employment in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.  N.J.S.A. 59:2-2a.  It follows that a public entity is not liable for injuries resulting from a public employee’s acts or omissions where the public employee is not liable.  N.J.S.A. 59:2-2b.  A public entity is also entitled to any available defenses that are available to a private person.  N.J.S.A. 59:2-1b; see also N.J.S.A. 59:2-2a (providing that public entity not liable for injury resulting from act or omission of public employee where public employee not liable).  Negligence is defined as “conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against an unreasonable risk of harm. ”  *Pfenninger v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg’l High Sch.*, 167 N.J. 230, 240 (2001) (quoting *Restatement (Second) of Torts* § 282 (1965)).  To establish an ordinary negligence claim, a plaintiff must show four things: (1) the defendant owed a duty of care; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) actual and proximate causation; and (4) damages.
[brief] I explained that in the previous Legal Point.  The Trial Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Foreclosure Complaint filed by [...] on 5/12/16 since day one.  All Court Orders from the Trial Court in this foreclosure court are void including the Order to grant Summary Judgment to [...] on 3/3/17.  Therefore the Foreclosure Complaint of 5/12/16 is void and it must be dismissed (141a).  “A judgment or order issued without subject matter jurisdiction is void, and that defect may be raised at any time and may not be waived.  (Lacks v Lacks, 41 N.Y.2d 71, 75.)”  Shammas v. Shammas, 88 A. 2d 204 - NJ: Supreme Court 1952  “The rule simplifies the procedure and permits the exercise of the power to open a final judgment, for the reasons specified in subdivisions (1), (2) and (3), upon motion made within a reasonable time not more than one year after the entry of the final judgment [see, however, as to this time limit, Klapprott v. U.S., 335 U.S. 601, 69 S.Ct. 384, 93 L.Ed. 266 (1949), remand modified in 336 U.S. 942, 69 S.Ct. 384, 93 L.Ed. 1099 (1949), and Wilford v. Sigmund Eisner Company, 13 N.J. Super. 27 (App. Div. 1951)], and, for the reasons specified in subdivisions (4), (5) (6) and for fraud upon the court, without limitation as to time. ”  [...] committed fraud upon the court on 5/12/16 and this rule empowers the judge to dismiss the Foreclosure Complaint (141a).
[brief] (Pb14-22).  All of [...]’s arguments are without merit.  A.  **[...]’s Failure To Seek A Timely Stay Of The Decision Suspending His Certificate Is The Root Cause Of Any Procedural Dilemma.**  [...] alleges that N.J.A.C. § 6A:3-1.3(i)—which prescribes a 90-day time limit to challenge final decisions or actions of a school district—placed him in an “impossible position.
[directive] The Department of Defense (DoD) Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program helps prevent sexual assault involving service members through training and education programs; provides treatment and support to victims of sexual assault; and promotes military system accountability when sexual assaults are investigated.  Victims of sexual assault who are military personnel should be advised to contact a military Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC) as soon as possible (see below).  Military victims of sexual assault have options for reporting or not reporting a sexual assault.  Specific policies are generated by the DoD.15  Victims must adhere to these policies to ensure their rights are maintained.