ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Additionally, while [...] focuses on the “control” over [...]’s operations, [...] ignores that courts have held “control” is not a necessary prerequisite for a finding of “community of interest. ”  See e.g., Beilowitz v. Gen. Motors Corp., 233 F. Supp. 2d 631, 641 (D.N.J. 2002) (“the so-called ‘control’ test for ‘community of interest’ was ultimately not adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court”).  Finally, regarding the [...]’s 20% requirement, [...] does not cite a single case or make any credible argument to undercut the straightforward law and evidence cited in [...]’s Opening Brief establishing that, at minimum, this element of the statute could not possibly be decided in [...]’s favor as a matter of law and must be assessed at trial.
[brief] **  Before leaving the Closing on April 26, 2013, [...] asked [...] to send him confirmation in writing of the amount of the Third Loan upon which the parties had just agreed.  Da21-22; 1T152-4 to 13.  [...] also repeated his request for that confirmation from [...] after the Closing.  Da22; 1T152-14 to 19, 155-12 to 21.  In response to these requests, on August 7, 2013 at 9:48 a.m., [...] received an email from [...] which stated, “As requested. ”  Da22; Da223-29 (Ex. P21); 1T167-21 to 168-19.  Attached to the email was a schedule, reflecting the history of the First and Second Loans, and showing a balance due to [...] of $139,773.03 as of April 30, 2013 -- four days after the Closing. (“Schedule”).  Da22-23; Da223-29 (Ex. P21).  The trial court found that the email and Schedule constituted [...]’s admission of the Third Loan and of corroborated [...]’ testimony that the Second Loan was a pay-when-able loan.
[brief] That evidence suffices at this stage to show that the Amended Policy would likely “unlawfully subject these students to a disparate impact in violation of the LAD. ” (Da129).  And as before, it is striking that Appellants’ opening brief does not deny that the Amended Policy would have a disparate impact on transgender students.  Appellants argue that the trial court erred in its disparate impact analysis by citing “a number of studies and surveys” the State introduced into the record, (Db33-36), but that fails for two reasons.
[brief] On page sixteen (16) of Respondents’ brief we finally see discussion regarding the preemption issue on appeal, whether the lower court properly determined that the [...]’s Ordinance preempts Ordinance 17-2017.  The [...] is a member of the [...]; however, despite Respondents’ assertions the [...] has not surrendered its authority over preventing disturbing noises to the [...], nor does the [...]’s Ordinance preempt Ordinance 17-2017.  While the [...] did adopt an ordinance in 1983, which adopted by reference the New Jersey Public Health Nuisance Code of 1953 (Da64) (The “Model Nuisance Code”), this does not prohibit the [...] from enacting Ordinance 17-2017 pursuant to the HRA.  Despite Respondents’ repeated assertion that the [...]’s reliance on the HRA as authority to enact Ordinance 17-2017 is seemingly a new argument, the [...]’s papers below reference the HRA as a source of authority many times over.  Indeed, the [...], just like [...], has adopted Ordinance 17-2017 pursuant to the HRA.  Respondents argue that the lower court properly found Ordinance 17-2017 void because it was preempted by specific grants of authority over noise nuisances to the local health board ([...]) provided by Title 26; however, as set forth in the [...]’s Appellate brief and expanded upon below, it is clear the [...] properly enacted Ordinance 17-2017.
[brief] .....................................................................................................................29  State v. Smith, 55 N.J. 476 (1970) ......................................................................................................................11  Swarts v. The Sherwin-Williams Co., 244 N.J. Super. 170 (App. Div. 1990) ......................................................................................17  Vercammen v. Linkedin Corp., No. A-0188-20, 2022  N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 110 (App. Div. Jan. 18, 2022) .............................................................................................................................32, 33  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] New Jersey adopted an extensive regulatory scheme governing student records.  See, generally, N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.1 to -7.8.  In relevant part, those regulations provide:  -  A parent shall have access to the student's records.  N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.1(f); N.J.S.A. 18A:36-19.  - The parent of a student under the age of 18 is authorized to access their child’s student record, regardless of whether the child resides with the parent.  N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.5(e)(1).  - Nonadult students may assert rights of access to their records only through their parent(s).  N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.1(e).  •  A student is only authorized to access his/her student record if they have obtained written permission of a parent.  N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.5(e)(1).  •  A record may be withheld from a parent or from an adult student only when the district board of education obtains a court order or is provided with evidence that there is a court order revoking the right to access.  N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.6(a)(5).  •  A student’s name and gender, inter alia, are mandated student records.  N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.3(b)(1).  •  Parents of adult students may access student records without the adult student’s consent if the adult student is financially dependent on the parent and enrolled in the public school system.  N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.5(e)(3).  •  To request a change in the student record, a parent or adult student shall notify, in writing, the chief school administrator of the specific issues relating to the student record.  N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.7(b).  There is no authority in student record regulations for minor children to change their student records.  Thus, it is clear that the regulatory scheme established by the State Board of Education prioritizes parental access and control of student records.
[brief] ”  See Stamato v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 322 (App. Div. Feb. 13, 2020) (granting motion to compel arbitration based on the finding that the plaintiff – a former VP former VP executive who “is in financial transactions business that deals with due diligence involving different types of types of commercial agreements” was a sophisticated party within the meaning of Atalese); see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 (holding plaintiff, an educated businessman, remained subject to ordinary contract principles, and absent fraud or mental incompetence he was bound by the uniform securities registration application he signed); Sarbak v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 531, 536-37 (D.N.J. 2004) (finding plaintiff, who possessed an academic background in mathematics and computer programming, more than capable of understanding the content of the arbitration provisions).
[directive] Complaints  A.  Unless otherwise instructed by the County Prosecutor’s Office, the lead investigating State Police Trooper shall sign all complaints and summonses, after consultation with, and approval of, the County Prosecutor’s Office.  B.  When motor vehicle summonses are issued, the Division of State Police shall:  1.  In writing, notify, the appropriate Municipal Court Administrator and the Municipal Prosecutor that the motor vehicle summonses issued in connection with the investigation of the motor vehicle or vessel crash are to be held in abeyance until all potential criminal charges have been resolved a.  Division of State Police shall provide a copy of the written notifications to the County Prosecutor.  2.  Promptly forward a copy of the front and back of the investigating State Police Trooper’s copy of any motor vehicle summons or summonses issued in connection with the motor vehicle or vessel crash, to the County Prosecutor’s Office, to be held by the County Prosecutor until all potential criminal matters are resolved.  C.  In writing, the County Prosecutor’s Office shall notify the appropriate Municipal - 11 - 10-8-2004  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2004-2  JOINT CRASH INVESTIGATIVE PROTOCOL DIVISION OF STATE POLICE & COUNTY PROSECUTORS  Court Administrator, and Municipal Prosecutor, that any motor vehicle summons or summonses issued in connection with the motor vehicle or vessel crash under investigation: 1. Shall immediately be forwarded to the County Prosecutor’s Office and; 2. that until the County Prosecutor’s Office advises the Municipal Court, in writing, that any criminal investigation or prosecution has been concluded or otherwise disposed of, those motor vehicle summons or summonses shall not be resolved or otherwise disposed of in the Municipal Court.  VII.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IS IMPROPER.  (Pa 1-89)  A court may collaterally estop a party from seeking certain relief if: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior testifying inconsistently under oath is not a cognizable harm to the State; it is a serious problem that the State must redress if there is a demonstrable risk of it. proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a part to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.
[brief] There is no need or good faith reason to depart from the Court’s decision in Wildwood Crest, which governs this case.  For that reason alone, the Court should find no error with the Chancery court’s decision enforcing the clear and unambiguous language contained in the 1966 [...] and declaring Respondent’s rights thereunder.  Appellant offers the Court no good faith basis to reverse course and return to the common law stranger-to-the-deed rule.
[brief] Indeed, the doctrine is designed to prevent precisely what Plaintiff has done here: argue on the one hand in a Pennsylvania state court that “every action relevant to this dispute took place in Pennsylvania,” Da251; Da255, and then, a few years later, argue on the other hand in a New Jersey state court that Plaintiff’s cause of action arose from Defendants’ contacts with New Jersey.  See, e.g., Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 385–87 (App. Div. 1996) (“The doctrine of judicial estoppel operates to ‘bar a party to a legal proceeding from arguing a position inconsistent with one previously asserted’” and “is designed to prevent litigants from ‘playing fast and loose with the courts. ’”) (citations omitted).  In sum, Plaintiff did not and could not demonstrate that Defendants are subject to specific jurisdiction in New Jersey.
[brief] Defendants have not argued that litigating in New Jersey would cause them great hardship or inconvenience.  identified only three circumstances qualifying as “special equities” that may be sufficient to depart from the strong presumption in favor of the first-filed suit: (1) racing to the courthouse so as to deny the other party a reasonable chance of bringing suit in its favored forum; (2) significant state interests, such as the remediation of pollution in New Jersey or New Jersey public policy; or (3) circumstances where the first-filed suit would cause great hardship to one party, but no unfairness to the opposing party by proceeding in the second-filed action.  *Sensient Colors*, 193 N.J. at 387-89.  Defendants, as the parties seeking dismissal in favor of the second-filed action, had the burden of establishing the existence of special equities sufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of the first-filed action.
[directive] Electronic recordation was not feasible.  The statement was a spontaneous statement made outside the course of the interrogation.  The statement was made in response to questioning that is routinely asked during the processing of the arrest of a suspect.  The statement was made by a suspect who indicated, prior to the statement, that he or she would participate in the interrogation only if it were not recorded.  The statement was made during a custodial interrogation that was conducted out-of-state.  The statement was given at a time when the accused was not a suspect for the crime to which that statement relates while the accused was being interrogated for a different crime that does not require recordation.  The interrogation during which the statement was given occurs at a time when the interrogators have no knowledge that a crime for which recording is required has been committed:  (Explain below)  Other:  Completed original forms should be mailed to: [...] [...]
[brief] Lavrik’s holding has nothing to do with whether the sworn statements made by a defendant at the time of his guilty plea may be the subject of questioning during a discovery deposition in a related civil matter.  Rather, *Lavrik* involved the issue of whether the victim has standing to appeal from the granting of a civil reservation.  *Id.* at 198.  The Court in *Lavrik* also held that the trial court should have delayed consideration of the defendant’s application for a civil reservation until the completion of his PTI term.  *Id.* at 217.  The *Lavrik* decision did not hold that a defendant may refuse to answer questions at his civil deposition about the sworn statements he made at the time of his guilty plea.
[brief] (Resp. Br. 24).  Moreover, New Jersey law has in all other contexts always treated equity\(^2\) in real estate as a private property interest.\(^3\)  See, e.g., *Cateret Sav. & Loan Ass’n F.A. v. Davis*, 105 N.J. 344, 347 (1987) (“The value of the land above the loan” is “entitled to protection in equity. ”); N.J.S.A. 20:3-2(d) (under the Eminent Domain Act of 1971, “property” means “land, or any interest in land[.]”); N.J.S.A. 12A:9-608, 12A:9-602(5), (8), (9) (New Jersey’s Uniform Commercial Code returns surplus equity to the former owner after the foreclosure of a security interest, and makes this protection a mandatory term that cannot be waived by agreement); cf. *United States v. General Motors Corp.*, 323 U.S. 373, 377–78 (1945) (the term “property” in the Takings Clause refers not to just to “the physical thing” but to the “group of rights inhering in the citizens’ relation to the physical thing. ”).  New Jersey “may not extinguish a property interest that it recognizes everywhere else to avoid paying just compensation when the State does the taking.
[directive] Are procedures in place that require Judiciary staff who go into the grand jury room to take an oath of secrecy?  Please explain a "NO" response.  ___ YES ___ NO B.  Is the standard oath of secrecy, included as Attachment 5 to the Grand Jury Standards, the oath that is administered to Judiciary staff at this time?  Please explain a "NO" response.  ___ YES ___ NO C.  Are procedures in place that ensure that those Judiciary staff required to take the oath of secrecy have that oath re-administered annually?  Please explain a "NO" response.  ___ YES ___ NO D.  Are those taking the oath of secrecy informed of the statutes prohibiting unauthorized disclosure of grand jury proceedings and the penalties that may be imposed for such actions?  Please explain a "NO" response.  ___ YES ___ NO E.  Is the information referred to in Question D provided to Judiciary staff in a printed document?  If so, please include a copy with your response.  ___ YES ___ NO 7  IMPLEMENTATION
[brief] And it is not difficult to see why.  In a two-payor Lease like this where the amount of the annual Tenant’s Allowance installments is approximately equivalent to a give-back of 54% of the annual minimum rent, an offset to that Allowance installment payment is extremely valuable to Landlord.  At the time Landlord filed its eviction action against Tenant on July 22, 2020, Landlord alleged Tenant to owe the sum of $121,051.47--inclusive of both monthly rent and any additional charges (Da94).  Adding to that the $24,266.67 in monthly rent that became due ten days later on August 1, 2020 results in a sum of $145,318.14.  This sum is far less than the amount Landlord owed Tenant on that same date: adding the unpaid interest from August 1, 2019 ($36,500) to the Tenant’s Allowance installment ($121,666.67) plus interest due and owing on August 1, 2020 ($30,416.67) equals $188,583.34.
[brief] Applying these principles, it is clear that based on the undisputed facts and the actions of the parties, the lease was in effect from February 20, 2015 to April 19, 2020, and was modified for the months of May, June, July, August and September such that the rental was reduced by $3,000.00 for those months.  All other terms remained the same.  In its decision, the Trial Court focused on the letter of April 11, 2016, Pa127, but failed to appreciate the [...] letter of May 6, 2016 memorializing discussions of May 5, 2016 in which [...] agreed to rescind the termination notice and [...] agreed to a $3,000.00 per month rent reduction for the months of May through August (later extended to September).  The Court failed to address the subsequent conduct of the parties consistent with the modification of the Lease.  In particular, the Court failed to address the rental discounts; the continuous occupation of the property; payments from May 2016 to April 2020; the Consent Order of April 17, 2019, in which [...] confirmed the Lease agreement of February 20, 2015 remained in effect; and the March 19, 2020 [...] letter that acknowledged and gave notice of termination of the Lease.  Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Trial Court’s determination that the Lease and guarantee were terminated on May 11, 2016.
[brief] As [...] reasonably concluded that the [...] had the right to determine the size of its negotiations team, [...] correctly then shifted the burden to [...] to provide a compelling reason why it refused to negotiate with the [...]’s full negotiation team, including the [...].  The Board has acknowledged that during the last round of CNA negotiations both that the [...] included its [...] in at least one session and that the [...] had demonstrated a flexibility back then as to the [...]’s presence during certain negotiations.  [...] also recognized that [...] did not present any evidence that the [...] interfered with the collective negotiations this time around.  Thus, it was proper for [...] to conclude that [...] lacked any good faith reason to refuse to negotiate with the [...] in the presence of the [...] members of the [...]’s negotiations committee.  The Board fails to present any reason for the Appellate Division to reverse [...]’s finding of [...]’s violation of the NJEERA.
[brief] Apparently recognizing the futility of its reliance upon Section 17.1(c) as a basis to demand an award of its attorneys’ fees in the first-party context, [...] adjusted its argument in its Reply Memorandum to assert, for the first time, that the language in Section 17.1(b) supported its claim for an award of its fees.  (See 5T, at 6-7 (trial court noted that [...] only raised issue of applicability of Section 17.1(b) for the first time on reply)).  However, the trial court properly concluded that [...]’s new arguments based upon Section 17.1(b) fared no better than its arguments based upon Section 17.1(c).  Again, the whole provision must be read in its full context.  Broadly stated, Section 17.1(a) establishes the Escrow Agent’s ([...]’s) duties with respect to holding in escrow and later releasing the Earnest Money Deposit, upon certain things happening.  (See PSA Section 17.1(a) (Pa118)).  Together, Sections 17.1(b) and 17.1(c) purport to limit the Escrow Agent’s liability and require the other parties to the PSA (Plaintiff and [...]) to “indemnify” and/or “hold harmless” the Escrow Agent ([...]) as against claims by third parties, except to the extent those claims arise out of the Escrow Agent’s bad faith, gross negligence, or willful misconduct.  (See PSA § 17.1(b) and (c) (Pa118-119)).  D.
[brief] ””  (Sa24).  The court further rejected [...]’s opinion that the [...] franchise agreements were fraudulent because, although [...] could not locate those two agreements in its files, it was able to locate the [...] guaranty in its files.  (Sa25).  The trial court found that the documents were material because the [...] franchise agreements gave the defendant the authority to sell shares and “thus [he] could not have deceived investors,” and the [...] guaranty does not portray defendant as a 5% owner in the franchise.  (Sa25-26).  The court therefore granted defendant’s motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.
[brief] The trial court acknowledged [...]’s “rigorous and detailed analysis of the claimed fees and costs” and that [...] provided ample support for his findings.  (Da39994.)  The trial court independently found that “the facts elicited at trial,” which the Appellate Division affirmed in 2018, “the billing records provided by [P]laintiffs,” and the Appellate Division’s instructions” supported [...]’s conclusions and that “the legal work performed prior to October 2004 elicited the evidence necessary to prosecute the RICO claim. ”  (Da39995-96.)  The court observed that “it was only after years of discovery and litigation that [P]laintiffs realized and understood the magnitude of defendants’ wrongdoing, and thus amended their Complaint” in 2009 to include the RICO claims.  (Da39996.)  For this reason, according to the court, “[i]t would be illogical to state the facts discovered from 1992 to 2009, which gave rise to and informed [P]laintiffs’ understanding that [[...]] had violated the RICO statute, had nothing to do with [P]laintiff’s prosecution of their RICO claims.
[brief] Chapter 92 should be strictly applied to effectuate the Legislature’s intent.  N.J.S.A. 43:15A-7.2(b).  While pension statutes should be construed liberally “in favor of the persons intended to be benefitted thereby,” Bumbaco v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 325 N.J. Super. 90, 94 (App. Div. 2000), “eligibility is not to be liberally permitted. ”  Smith v. Dep’t of Treasury, 390 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div. 2007).  “Instead, in determining a person’s eligibility to a pension, the applicable guidelines must be carefully interpreted so as not to ‘obscure or override considerations of . . . a potential adverse impact on the financial integrity of the [f]und. ’”  Ibid.  (quoting Chaleff v. Tchrs. Pen. & Annuity Fund Trs., 188 N.J. Super. 194, 197 (App. Div. 1983) (alterations in original)).  Further, the Board has both the authority and the obligation to correct errors in PERS benefits, regardless of when they arise.  See N.J.S.A. 43:15A-54; Cavalieri v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 368 N.J. Super. 527, 539 (App. Div. 2004) (“The statute requires the retirement system to correct the error . . . ”).
[brief] Contrary to plaintiff-appellant’s contentions, such conduct on the part of residential property owners like the [...] is not enough to trigger the exceptions to the residential-public-sidewalk immunity established by the long line of legal precedent discussed at great length above.  New Jersey law clearly demonstrates that plaintiff-appellant’s argument in this regard is without merit.  New Jersey law holds that residential property owners do not have a common-law duty to clear snow or ice from a public sidewalk abutting their property, and that the failure to do so does not expose them to liability.