ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **THE CROSS MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO ADD A BREACH OF CONTRACT  CLAIM WAS PROPERLY DENIED**  The Foreclosure Court property denied Plaintiff’s cross-motion to amend their foreclosure complaint to add a count for breach of contract because there was no longer a contract for Plaintiff to enforce because the first note and mortgage were paid in full, and the mortgage was properly discharged.  For this reason, it would be futile and a waste of judicial resources to permit Plaintiff’s amendment to add a breach of contract count.  For Plaintiff’s to present a breach of contract count, it is axiomatic that there must be a contract.  Here there was no contract because the Plaintiff received all the mortgage payments and prepared and recorded a discharge of mortgage.  For this reason there is no contract for Defendants to breach.  The Appellate Division reviews "a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to amend the complaint for abuse of discretion."  *Port Liberte II Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. New Liberty Residential Urb. Renewal Co.*, 435 N.J. Super. 51, 62, 86 A.3d 730 (App. Div. 2014) (citations omitted).  "Rule 4:9-1 requires that motions for leave to amend be granted liberally and that the granting of a motion to file an amended complaint always rests in the court's sound discretion."  *Notte v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co.*, 185 N.J. 490, 501 (2006) (quotations omitted).  Nevertheless, “in exercising that discretion, a court must go through a two-step process: whether the non-moving party will be prejudiced, and whether granting the amendment would nonetheless be futile."  *Grillo v. State*, 469 N.J. Super. 267, 275 (App. Div. 2021) (quotations and citations omitted).  “The court determines whether the proposed amendment would be futile by asking whether the amended claim will nonetheless fail and, hence, allowing the amendment would be a useless endeavor."  *Id.* at 275-76.  The requested amendment must be denied if it is “futile” and “not sustainable as a matter of law. ”  *Id.* at 275-76, 279; see also *Notte*, 185 N.J. at 501.  Here, the Foreclosure Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion to amend its complaint.  As set forth in full above, here, it would be futile to amend the complaint to add a breach of contract count because the contract is null and void.  Defendant cannot breach a contract that does not exist.  Short of using a time machine to go back in time and know that the bankruptcy trustee would file an adversarial complaint for mortgage payments made by Defendant’s business and reject all the mortgage payments made by Defendant’s business, there is nothing that Plaintiff could plead in its foreclosure complaint which would cure this fatal deficiency.  POINT IV
[brief] Plaintiffs’ allegations did not involve or require complex or technical expertise, and Plaintiffs did not allege professional malpractice.  (Pa000459 at ¶ 11-14).  On April 1, 2022, before any discovery was received from any of the Defendants, [...] filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that dismissal was warranted because Plaintiffs had not filed an affidavit of merit within 120 days pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.
[brief] The suppression motion concerned a handgun that the State alleged [...] possessed, which the police seized in a third party’s home pursuant to a warrantless consent search.  Neither the third party, nor her daughter testified.  Although multiple officers were on the scene, only one testified, and video footage from only one officer’s body-worn camera (BWC) was admitted into evidence.  No testimony was presented as to what occurred during the critical moments immediately preceding the third party’s consent.  A.  Suppression Hearing
[brief] *Taddei v. State Farm Indem. Co.*, 401 N.J. Super. 449, 459 (App. Div. 2008).  However, the Bankruptcy Court and Trial Court both acknowledge that Appeallant has no personal exposure in this matter.  6T; 7T.  Therefore, there is no valid bad faith claim under *Rova Farms* and looking at Georgia law or Florida law are simply red herrings.
[brief] Thus, the Connecticut statute is fundamentally different from the DACCA.  Finally, for the DACCA to apply, a person must act for a very specific purpose of “settling, compounding, or otherwise altering the terms of payment of any debts of the debtor. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c)(1).  In contrast, the Connecticut statute applies even when a person merely assists a debtor in negotiating or attempting to negotiate with creditors.  Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36a-671(a).  This difference is material because the DACCA has a narrower application than the Connecticut statute.  Therefore, the Persels case of the Connecticut Supreme Court is not instructive because it involves a materially different statute.
[brief] The Zoning**  The Property is located in [...]’s R-20A Zone, which permits single-family dwellings, municipal buildings, farms and child-care uses.  [Da18].  Schools are conditionally permitted in the R-20A Zone, with a maximum impervious limit of 55% pursuant to § 230-162 of the Township’s Land Use and Development Ordinance (“LUDO”).  [Pa328].  None of [...]’s zoning districts permit multi-level senior housing that contains independent living, assisted living and memory care within a single development.  The only zoning districts that permit assisted living uses are the OB-1, OB-3, OB-1A, OB-2A, OB-4, I-1A, I-1B, I-2 and I-4 Zones; those same zones also permit nursing home uses.  [Da401].  As their acronyms suggest, the OB Zones are primarily designed for office buildings, while the I Zones are primarily designed for industrial uses.  [Pa322].  **C.
[brief] These are: (1) whether delay before trial was uncommonly long; (2) whether the government or the defendant is more to blame for that delay; (3) whether defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial and (4) whether defendant suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay.  *Doggett*, 505 U.S. at 652; *Barker*, 407 U.S. at 533-34; *Szima*, 70 N.J. at 201); *State v Douglas*, 322 N.J. Super. 156, 170 (App. Div. 1999).  The length of the delay is actually a double inquiry.  To trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial "crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay," *Doggett*, 505 U.S. at 651, since an accused cannot allege a constitutional violation if the State has, in fact, prosecuted his case with “customary promptness. ”  *Id.* at 652.  If the defendant makes that initial showing, then the court must consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretched beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger examination of the claim.
[brief] VI, XIV; *N.J. Const.* art. I, ¶¶ 1, 10; R. 2:10-2; see also *State v. Bowser*, 297 N.J. Super. 588, 601-03 (App. Div. 1997) (holding court made two errors that independently required reversal: 1) failing to instruct jury that “defendant must have shared co-defendant’s specific purpose to use weapon in order for defendant to be convicted of first-degree robbery”; 2) failing “to instruct the jury on second-degree robbery” as lesser-included offense.)
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY  The Respondent issued a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action (hereinafter referred to as “PNDA”) on or about September 23, 2022, charging the Appellant with several charges.  (Pa2 to Pa5).  They include: insubordination (per N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(2), conduct unbecoming a public employee, verbal abuse of a patient, client, resident or employee, insubordination (per the Mercer County Public Safety Table of Offenses and Penalties, hereinafter referred to as “TOOP”) (Pa31 to Pa35) and violation of administrative procedures and/or regulations involving safety and security.  After discovery was shared by and between the parties, the parties scheduled a department-level hearing before the Respondent’s independent hearing officer.  On January 14, 2023, the hearing officer issued its decision.  (Pa36 to Pa46).  The hearing officer found that the Respondent proved its case and recommended removal from public employment.  A Final Notice of Disciplinary Action (hereinafter referred to as “FNDA”) issued on or about January 20, 2023.  (Pa47 to Pa48).  Appellant appealed to the [...] (hereinafter referred to as “[...]” or the “Commission”) on February 6, 2023.
[brief] (See 2T through 7T).  At the beginning of trial, the Court found that there was no malpractice claim in the Complaint, and there was no expert report on malpractice.  (4T:23:11-19).  Plaintiff’s counsel confirmed that it was a breach of contract case.  (4T:23:21-22).  Counsel confirmed that malpractice was different than a breach of contract claim.  (4T:23:21-25).  The Court recognized that the case was about whether the bills were reasonable.
[brief] M51-52; M58.  Additionally, the terms in the 2020 Order of the hearing to be presided over by the SHO were similarly improper.  M4-7.  The 2020 Order required that the hearing be held “during regular court hours” at the Middlesex County Court House.  M6-7.  The time and location of the hearing clearly frustrated the realistic possibility of the public to attend hearings; as is afforded to them under the by the Open Public Meeting Act, N.J.S.A. 10:4-6, et seq., and the MLUL.  It similarly undermined the goals of the Open Public Meetings Act; namely to ensure, as well as enhance public access to meetings.  See *S. Jersey Pub. Co. v. N.J. Expressway Auth.*, 124 N.J. 478. 494 (1991).  Further, the 2020 Order in Sections (I) and (K) required the SHO’s fees and the fees and costs of any retained experts to be shared by the Respondents and the Township.  M6.  These provisions are improper as such costs would be borne by the Respondents if the Board heard the matter.  Finally, it cannot be overlooked that the imposition of the SHO transformed the Respondents’ site plan application into an adversarial hearing; and eliminated the right of the Board to make a decision on the Respondents’ site plan which would then entitled to deference by a reviewing Court.  Had the Court properly remanded the Respondents’ site plan application to the Board, the application would have proceeded in due course in compliance with the MLUL.  Based upon the record before the Trial Court, there was no basis for the complicated, onerous framework which it established; and which undermined the rights of the general public, as well as those of the Board.
[brief] To sustain a claim for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff is required to demonstrate that: (1) an incorrect statement; (2) was negligently made; and (3) justifiably relied upon with resulting economic loss or injury.  Carroll, 313 N.J. Super. at 502 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  There can be no justifiable reliance by a party on statements made in connection with a transaction in which the party was represented by legal counsel and should have made a reasonable investigation of the facts on its own.
[brief] Without the ability to have engaged in significant financial discovery, which is not available in no-fault dispute resolution, neither [...] nor the [...] would have discovered the money laundering, which monies were used to --- 7  The prefix CAIFa is for the Amicus, [...] Appendix. pay the kickbacks for the referrals, the tax evasion and the extensive kickback scheme.  See, CAIF0001, at 51:17-68:13.  Similarly, from the discovery obtained through the [...] v. Lajara civil suit, the State of New Jersey, in 2011, arrested [...], [...], [...] and [...] charging them with conspiracy to commit health care fraud, specifically, soliciting potential patients and referring same in exchange for kickbacks.
[directive] 10.4  Documenting Access to Stored BWC Recordings.  Each department shall maintain a record of all access to stored BWC recordings pursuant to this Policy.  The department’s record keeping system shall document the following information: (a) the date and time of access; (b) the specific BWC recording(s) that was/were accessed; (c) the officer or civilian employee who accessed the stored BWC recording; (d) the person who approved access, where applicable; and (e) the reason(s) for access, specifying the purpose or purposes for access authorized pursuant to Section 10.1, and specifying the relevant case/investigation number, where applicable.
[brief] “[...] does not control, supervise or direct [...]’s work efforts.  [...] does direct [...]’s hours insofar as they are tied to the Court calendar.  [...] reports to the Court Administrator at the start of her day.  However, I distinguish this from punching a time clock, signing in or otherwise alerting a supervisor that you have timely arrived at work station which I believe is the intent of this inquiry.  Indeed, [...] maintains no time keeping records for [...]. ”  This finding by the Court is factually erroneous as the overwhelming evidence as set forth above demonstrates that there was an enormous amount of control by [...] Township over the Petitioner’s work schedule as the municipal prosecutor.
[brief] State v. Brooks, 366 N.J. Super. 447 (App. Div. 2004) .........................  28 State v. Brown, 80 N.J. 587 (1979) ......................................................  33  State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481 (1984) .....................................................  33  State v. Buhl, 269 N.J. Super. 344 (App. Div. 1994) ...............................  15 State v. Burton, 309 N.J. Super. 280 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 407 (1998) ...........................................................................  42 State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165 (2009) ....................................................  29, 30 State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275 (2006) ..................................................  29  State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373 (1988) ..............................................  34 State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326 (1996) .....................................................  33 State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499 (1992) .....................................................  12, 13 State v. Fair, 256 N.J. 213 (2024) ..........................................................  38 State v. Figueroa, 377 N.J. Super. 331 (App. Div. 2005) ....................... 13, 14 State v. Furguson, 198 N.J. Super. 395 (App. Div. 1985) ....................... 11 State v. Gentry, 183 N.J. 30 (2005) ....................................................... 38, 39, 40 State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281 (1981) .......................................................
[directive] Department of Law and Public Safety, DCJ, State Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy [...] Deputy Attorney General Department of Law and Public Safety, Division of State Police, Victim Services Unit [...] Investigator Sergeant First Class [...] Unit Head Department of Law and Public Safety, Division of State Police, Office of Forensic Sciences [...] Forensic Scientist Department of Children and Families, Division on Women [...], MSW, LSW Deputy Director [...] ([...])  [...] Executive Director [...]  [...] Supervising Assistant Prosecutor of the Sex Crimes/Child Endangerment Unit  [...] *Designee of the President of the County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey  [...]  [...], Former President Victim Witness Coordinator [...] [...] [...] Executive Director (former)  [...]  [...] RN, MSN, FN-CSA, SANE-A, SANE-P Sexual Assault Response Team/FNE Coordinator [...] -iv- ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT  [...], RN, FN-CSA, SANE-A, SANE-P  Sexual Assault Response Team/FNE Coordinator  [...]  [...], Services  Empowering Rights of Victims  [...] Associate Vice President Victim Services and Adult Residential Services  Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC)  [...] Assistant Director of Family Practice Division  *Designee of Honorable [...], J.A.D., Administrative Director (Acting)  INVITED WORKING GROUP
[brief] III.  “FACT-BASED” ALLOCATION CANNOT BE PROPERLY APPLIED BASED ON RECORD EVIDENCE AND THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REJECTED  [...]’s EFFORTS TO DO SO ..................................................................................................................39  IV.  THE CASE LAW RELIED UPON BY [...] DOES NOT SUPPORT FACT-BASED ALLOCATION ON THE RECORD HERE ........................................................................................................44  V.  THE TRIAL COURT SELECTED THE APPROPRIATE END DATE TO THE ALLOCATION PERIOD  ........................................................................................................47  ARGUMENT – CROSS-APPEAL
[brief] Property Modification Approval Process.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa214 Exhibit A, Exhibit G-06- Confirmation of Approval at Regular Meeting of [...], dated January 11, 2022
[brief] The NJLAD also prohibits any person from “tak[ing] reprisals against any person because that person has opposed any practices or acts forbidden under this act or because that person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this act....”  N.J.S.A. 10:5–12(d).  A prima facie case of retaliatory discharge requires evidence showing: 1) that the plaintiff was “engaged in a protected activity known to the defendant”; 2) that the plaintiff “was thereafter subjected to an adverse employment decision by the defendant”; and 3) that “there was a causal link between the two.
[brief] As stated previously, Appellant/plaintiff [...] and defendant/respondent [...] did agree to settle plaintiffs’ claims and a Stipulation of Dismissal was filed on October 12, 2023.  However, counsel for [...] and [...] agree that this matter was “unsettled”.  Plaintiff was notified on or about March 6, 2024, that the settlement between [...] and [...] was void.  Furthermore, appellant/plaintiff [...]’s Complaint against defendant/respondent [...] was dismissed on an unopposed motion for summary judgment on June 7, 2024.  Notwithstanding that [...] had ample opportunity to seek further discovery and failed to do so, the motion judge for [...]’s motion for summary judgment held that [...]’s vehicles were garaged in New Jersey, so there is no coverage under the North Carolina Policy.
[brief] BECAUSE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY AGREEMENT, A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL MUST BE ENTERED ON THE CHARGE OF CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER.  (Not Raised Below)  ...........................................39  POINT V  EVEN IF ANY ONE OF THE COMPLAINED-OF ERRORS WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT REVERSAL, THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THOSE ERRORS WAS TO DENY DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.
[brief] On the Brief  [...], Esq. (005322005)  # TABLE OF CONTENTS-BRIEF | Section | Pages | |----------------------------------------------|-------| | TABLE OF CONTENTS  BRIEF | i | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS | ii | | TABLE OF TRANSCRIPT  DESIGNATIONS | ii | | TABLE OF CONTENTS- APPENDIX | iii | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | v | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 2 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 3 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 5 | | POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING A BAR ON ANY FUTURE CLAIMS BETWEEN THE PARTIES PERTAINING TO THE LANDLORD/TENANT RELATIONSHIP (Pla; 1T9:3-19:11) | | | A. Standard of Review | 5 | | B. Discussion | 5 | | CONCLUSION | 8 | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) | 12 | | Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) | 4, 11, 12 | | **NEW JERSEY STATE OPINIONS** | | | Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575 (2008) | 9 | | In re Pa. R.R. Co., 34 N.J. Super. 103 (App. Div. 1955) | 9 | | Romano v. Maglio, 41 N.J. Super. 561 (App. Div. 1956) | 9 | | State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384 (2019) | 11, 12 | | State v. Alston, 204 N.J. 614 (2011) | 13, 14 | | State v. Andrews, 243 N.J. 447 (2020) | 11 | | State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123 (1988) | 14 | | State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30 (1997) | 12, 13 | | State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544 (2011) | 13 | | State v. Dorff, 468 N.J. Super. 633 (App. Div. 2021) | 13 | | State v. Francisco, 471 N.J. Super. 386 (App. Div. 2022) | 10 | | State v. Gonzalez, 249 N.J. 612 (2022) | 13, 19, 22 | | State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249 (2015) | 10 | | State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263 (1990) | 13, 14 | | State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392 (1978) | 12 | | State v. Muhammad, 182 N.J. 551 (2005) | 11 | | State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383 (2009) | 11, 12 | | State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304 (2000) | 11, 12 | | State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237 (1993) | 13 | | State v. Rivas, 251 N.J. 132 (2022) | 10 | State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360 (2017) ......................................................... 10, 11, 13 State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293 (2019) .......................................................... 12 State v. Washington, 475 N.J. Super. 292 (App. Div. 2023) ....................... 10 State v. Wright, 97 N.J. 113 (1984) ............................................................ 14 State v. Yohnnson, 204 N.J. 43 (2010) ...................................................... 11 COURT RULES CITED R. 2:2-2(b) ........................................................................................................ 9 R. 2:2-4 ............................................................................................................. 9 RULES OF EVIDENCE N.J.R.E. 503 ..................................................................................................... 11 STATUTES CITED N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19 ......................................................................................... 11 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) ..................................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(2) ..................................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d ........................................................................................... 1 STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY On November 15, 2022, a Union County Grand Jury returned [...], charging defendant-respondent [...] with first-degree murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and/or (2) (count one) and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d (count two).
[brief] (Da129).  The court noted that the Act did not include the limiting language advanced by Defendants and that a court will “not imply the existence of an absent term where the legislature has used a specific term in one place but excluded that same language in others. ” (1T76) (citing Headen v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 420 N.J. Super 105 (App. Div. 2011).  The trial court evaluated similar statutes setting eligibility requirements for other state boards and commissions and found that the State was specific in limiting residency to the time of appointment.  (1T76-77).  Thus, the trial court concluded that the legislature will use the terms “at the time of appointment” when it intends to place such a limitation (1T77), which it did not do in the statute under review.  In addition, the court determined that the Restructuring Act – the version ultimately adopted, rather than versions and drafts that [...] cites and did not receive bicameral and gubernatorial support – reasonably requires continuous residency and emphasized that the Act was “very specific as to three counties” that “are the counties [...] has a meaningful physical presence. ” (1T77).  Thus, it was plainly clear that “one of the purposes of the Act was to promote [...] as a vibrant educational institution intertwined with the communities that is located in” and that the residency requirement was intended for the BOG members to have their “finger on the pulse” of their respective counties to ensure that [...]’ commitments to the communities it calls home are current, known, and enforced.