ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In that regard, the breach of contract and covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim in Count 17 is comprised of two (2) paragraphs.  The factual crux of the claim is captured in Paragraph 241, which alleges that [...] breached the confidentiality provision in the Lease “by disclosing the facts relating to the land lease, the Solar Rights, and other facts relating to [Appellants], and thereby directly enabled [...] to essentially bid against [Appellants’] interest in the land lease, so as to garner a higher financial gain than it had already gained from [Appellants].
[brief] [...] also filed oppositions to various other motions in the case, including an opposition to [...] and [...]’s motion for reconsideration on April 22, 2021, an opposition to [...]’s motion for partial summary judgment on January 14, 2020, and an opposition to [...]’s motion for partial summary judgment on February 11, 2022.  Pa116, Pa91, Pa121.  The Law Division further reiterated that during all this active litigation, “at no point in time was it indicated [by [...]] that arbitration was in any way to be contemplated. ”  Hearing Tr. 72:4-5.  Given [...]’s active involvement in litigation over the past six years, including its voluntary and affirmative invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction to advance its own legal rights, this second factor weighs heavily against arbitration.
[brief] Rather, the court found, based on the circumstances of this case, that the absence of a transaction between [...] and [...] foreclosed Plaintiffs from pursuing claims against [...].  Indeed, in the absence of a transaction, Plaintiffs could not establish the basic elements of a tortious interference claim, including that: (i) [...] “malic[iously]” and “intentional[ly] interfere[d] without justification” with the “de facto” partnership between Plaintiffs and [...], and (ii) such intentional and unjustified interference caused Plaintiffs damages.  DiMaria Constr., Inc., 351 N.J. Super. at 567.  Even if [...] had knowledge of Plaintiffs’ “de facto” partnership with [...] at the time they made their offer to purchase the assets of [...]’ practice -- which they unquestionably did not\(^6\) -- [...]’s unaccepted offer hardly constitutes malicious and intentional interference, nor did its offer cause Plaintiffs any damages.  And even if [...] completed a transaction with [...], with knowledge that he was in a “de facto” partnership with Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs \textit{still} would not have a viable tortious interference claim against [...].  Plaintiffs’ contention that courts do not require a “subsequent transaction” is a complete red herring.  (Pb18 (“[N]o court has ever held that the existence of a subsequent transaction, or even a financial benefit to the interferer, is a required element of a claim for tortious interference. ”)).  What matters is that New Jersey law \textit{does} require the party alleging tortious interference to establish both malicious interference and damages.
[brief] For all the above reasons, the court below should not have reached the merits.  But even if this case is judged on the merits, the trial court also erred.  It construed the residency requirement found under the [...] Act as obligating [...] to maintain a residency in Middlesex County throughout her term of service rather than at the time of appointment.  The court reached that incorrect conclusion by failing to apply the special rules articulated by our state Supreme Court for construing a legislative contract like the [...] Act.  Had it applied those rules before removing [...], the trial court would have insisted that the [...] Act contain an unmistakable and clearly stated obligation to reside continuously in Middlesex County.  Absent that explicit obligation, Plaintiffs’ action cannot survive.  Similarly, under general contract principles, the trial court should have deferred to [...]’ construction because the University is the only entity, other than the State, that is party to the contract codified under the [...] Act (and, in this litigation, the State has deferred publicly to [...]).  Under that circumstance, the judiciary should not gainsay how [...] is construing its own statutory contract, especially when the [...] Act expressly sets forth the grounds for removing a BOG member, and relocation to another county is not one of those grounds.  Moreover, even under more traditional tenets of statutory construction, the court below should have been persuaded by the present-tense syntax of the residency requirement, which is directly connected to the time of appointment.  In sum, this court should reverse the judgment below for any one of three reasons: (1) the quo warranto statute does not apply; (2) Plaintiffs’ action was grossly out of time; and (3) when applying the tenets for construing legislative contracts like the one here and other canons of statutory construction, the residency requirement is triggered only at the time a BOG member is appointed or reappointed.
[directive] Such remedies.  County submissions the by written issuing authorities; judicial appropriate to Rule Court the with cases particular in confirming Division, the by prosecuted cases in Director the or Prosecutor, assistant that the and given not bargaining is plea in participation judicial to consent that or consent; such give to authority no has case the handling general attorney deputy or prosecutor otherwise or attend to not general attorney deputy or prosecutor assistant an instructing proceeding.  3:9-3(c)  Rule in a participate immediately.  operational become shall Section This LAW REFORM BAIL OF INTERPRETATION
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[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES STATUTES  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10...........................................................................................................2, 9 COURT RULES  R. 2:2-3(a)(2).........................................................................................................................6 R. 2:5-5(b)...............................................................................................................................9  CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS  N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, para. 4..............................................................................................6  CASES  Bartley Healthcare Nursing & Rehab. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Senior Servs., 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 329 (App. Div. Feb. 15, 2011).........................................................7
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS........................................ ii  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................. iii  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS.................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................  1 CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................  7  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS  Order of the Honorable [...]  Regarding Document Review and Production, dated September 13, 2023.............................................. Da166  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## Cases Rivers v. LSC P’ship, 378 N.J. Super. 68, 80 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 296 (2005).........................................................  6  ## Statutes & Other Authorities  New Jersey Rule 4:10-2(a)..............................................................................  6  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 4:10-2(a) (2024).  .................................................................  6  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] In response, [...] argued that [...] first showed interest in [...] over a year before his resignation from [...], on or around October 6, 2013.  Counsel for [...] also indicated that based on some of the documents produced in response to the undersigned’s Order denying in part and granting in part Defendants’ Motion to Quash Subpoenas, as well as in some of the deposition testimony already taken, informal conversations and / or communications with [...]’ and [...], both owners of [...] began in early 2012.  See R. Docs. 60, 65, 66.  Counsel for [...] also stated that the “more serious” discussions about [...] moving over to [...] began in May and June of 2013.  Upon further questioning by the Court, however, [...] argued that based on the parties agreed upon protocol, counsel for [...] did not object to there being no date restriction, and therefore the agreement signed between the parties should be binding as to whether or not there would a date restriction on the discoverable information.  [...] also informed the undersigned that this issue had been discussed in the presiding District Judge’s hearing on the parties second temporary restraining order (“TRO”), which occurred on October 28, 2013.  See e.g., R. Doc. 30, 57.  Upon limited review of the transcript from the second TRO hearing, during oral argument, the undersigned noticed that the presiding District Judge [...], also stated his concerns regarding the scope of the search of the home and business computers, as well as emails of the identified key players in this action.  In the transcript, [...], in response to counsel for [...]’s question regarding [...]’s ability “to search all the emails and home and business computers of all the individuals,” indicated that he believed “it should be limited … and not something that goes over bounds for the purposes of … the hearing. ”  See R. Doc. 57, p. 31–32.  Thus, the undersigned recognized that even the presiding district judge believed that there should be some date limitation so as to prevent a wide open, unlimited examination, in an effort to protect the parties from conducting discovery which would likely produce irrelevant and or immaterial information to the instant action.
[directive] Are you aware that you must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who [Yes] [No] [NA] has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution?  16.  Do you understand that if you are a public office holder or employee, you can be [Yes]  [No]  [NA] required to forfeit your office or job by virtue of your plea of guilty?  [Yes]  [No]  17.  Are you a citizen of the United States?
[brief] ”  (4T35-36)  He testifies to J-12 (Pa969), the lease that the Borough entered into in 1995 which describes what is being leased to the lessee as follows:  “A portion of certain real property located in the [...], designated as Block 184, Lot 3 of the Tax Map of the [...].  More particularly described on Exhibit A which is attached. ”  (4T36:20)  Counsel points out that there is no Exhibit A on J-12 but asks what [...]’s “recollection” of what Exhibit A was.  [...] replies that Exhibit A was a sketch of the leased premises and it had the measurements of the property that was adjacent to the amusement park and part of Lot 3 abutting their use of the municipal parking lot (4T36-37:2).
[brief] The principal in this case, clearly used a handgun in the commission of this robbery, as noted by the trial court.  Nothing in the record indicates a lesser-included charge was required under the circumstances.  Finally, even if it were error, it was invited.  Defense counsel specifically told the judge that he did not want any lesser-included charge in the robbery.  (6T 155:24-156:4).  By leading the court into what defendant now claims as error, he cannot obtain a reversal on that basis.  See State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 359 (2004); State v. Cotto, 471 N.J. Super 489, 534-36 (App. Div.), certif denied, 252 N.J. 166 (2022).
[directive] The policy seeks to ensure that the employment rights of individual law enforcement officers are safeguarded consistent with legal principles.  As a result, the policy sets forth procedures for the 1 uniform collection, submission and analysis of drug test specimens.  The procedure further seeks to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the drug testing process.  Every law enforcement agency must administer its drug testing program in a way that is fundamentally fair to individual law enforcement officers and is consistent with due process requirements and the laws of this State.  II.
[brief] 1T 74:1-5 (“Now, as a result of this agreement and as a result of that, you now, steps have been taken, applications have been filed, monies have been expended, and I am hearing there is a site plan application pending before the Board right now. ”).  Appellants complain further that “the MOU says nothing about what, if anything, [[...]] must pay if zoning approval is obtained of less than 82.5 units per acre, and which [[...]] does not expressly deem acceptable. ” (Db at 14).  No principle of contract law requires a party to pay for anything other than complete fulfillment of a condition.  In this instance, there is no payment to Appellant for less profitable zoning.  The MOU reflects that negotiation between the parties and strikes a balance that fairly considers [...]’ enormous liabilities.  Thus, there is no missing essential term or illusory language regarding payment to Appellants.  V.
[brief] In *State v. Hannah*, 248 N.J. 148, 180-83 (2021)\(^6\), the Supreme Court found that evidence of a pager number connecting a murder victim to another suspect, in addition to the suspect’s mother’s testimony linking her son’s connection to drug dealers, were of “critical importance” in establishing defendant’s third-party guilt defense because a “reasonable person to conclude that there was a ‘scintilla’ of evidence or a ‘piece of evidence’ linking [the third party]” to the crime.  *Id.* at 187.
[brief] Plaintiff also must establish either that defendant "had actual knowledge of the existence of the condition and knew or should have known of its dangerous character" or that "the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should he discovered the condition and its dangerous character."  N.J.S.A. 59:4-3.  Finally, the Plaintiff must establish that the action the entity took to protect against the condition or the failure to take such action was palpably unreasonable.  "Palpably unreasonable" has been defined as "behavior that is patently unacceptable under any given circumstance." ."
[brief] (B)  Under the due process clause of the United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, the good or bad faith of the state is irrelevant when the state fails to disclose material exculpatory evidence to the defendant in a criminal prosecution.  (C)  In a criminal prosecution, the due process clause of the United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment is not violated by the failure of the police to use a particular investigatory tool; accordingly, in a prosecution for a heinous murder in which the victim was shot multiple times, the due process clause is violated by the state's failure to conduct any type of scientific test on clothing samples taken from the defendant or victim.  See Arizona v. Youngblood.  POINT II REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE STATE PERPETRATED “FUNDAMENTAL MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE”
[brief] [...]  [...] [...]  Fax: [...]  Counsel for Complainants-Appellants  [...], ESQUIRE, Attorney No. 276072018  Of Counsel and on the Brief  [...]  [...], ESQUIRE, Attorney No. 011921977  On the Brief [...] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | PAGE | |------| | TABLE OF CONTENTS.  .................................................. ii | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS........................ iv | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES................................................. v | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT..............................................
[brief] The deposition testimonies of [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], [...], and Plaintiffs set forth in the Statement of Facts create significant genuine issues of material facts that warranted the denial of summary judgment to [...].  The Trial Court erroneously held that [...] had not duty to Plaintiffs as there was no attorney-client relationship, and that Plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence of affirmative misrepresentations made to them by [...].
[brief] Similarly unavailing is the Special Master’s reliance on the fact that fee-shifting is available for the “costs of investigation” of RICO claims.  N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4(c); (39068a).  Such costs might include some fees incurred before the RICO claims were actually filed on October 1, 2009 if Plaintiffs were able to establish that particular work was done to investigate or develop the RICO claims.
[brief] The Trial Court correctly determined that [...]’s claims in the Hackensack Arbitration were not ripe at the time of the PTA Arbitration [Pa21-Pa22, Pa44]  The Trial Court correctly held that [...]’s Hackensack Project claims were not ripe for adjudication at the time of the PTA Arbitration.  [...] had no claim for unpaid monies until [...] (the contractor) obtained final judgment in an arbitration with [...] (the owner) three months after the PTA Arbitration hearings concluded.
[brief] In every Borough zoning district, "[t]he front setback line is hereby fixed, and no building or structure shall be constructed any closer than 10 feet from the front property line."  Sec. 246-44A(1)(a).  Since [...] was demolished years ago, there is no "building" or "structure" on the "vacant parcel" (Exhibit A-3 at 1).  The Applicant sought variances so that its buildings would only be set back 5 feet along both [...] and [...].
[brief] While merging certain counts, the trial court imposed the following sentence:  As to the March 3, 2011 crimes, the court sentenced defendant on: Count One, first-degree armed robbery, to eighteen years subject to the No Early Release Act (hereinafter “NERA”), consecutive to Counts Seven, Forty-One, and Fifty and concurrent to the remaining counts; Count Three, second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, to eight years with four years’ parole ineligibility, concurrent to the other counts; and Count Five, fourth-degree unlawful taking of a means of conveyance, to one year, concurrent to the other counts.  (20T40-1 to 4, 64-24 to 66-1).  As to the March 29, 2011 crimes, the court sentenced defendant on: Count Seven, second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, to six years with forty-two months parole ineligibility, consecutive to Counts One, Forty-One, and Fifty and concurrent to the other counts; and Count Eight, fourth-degree unlawful taking of a means of conveyance, to one year, concurrent to the other counts.  (20T40-13 to 15, 66-2 to 17).  As to the February 28, 2011 crimes, the court sentenced defendant on: Count Forty-One, first-degree kidnapping, to twenty-three years subject to NERA, consecutive to Counts One, Seven, and Fifty and concurrent to the other counts; Count Forty-Two, first-degree kidnapping, to twenty-three years subject to NERA, concurrent to the other counts; Count Forty-Five, second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, to eight years with four years’ parole ineligibility, concurrent to the other counts; Count Forty-Seven, first-degree armed-robbery, to eighteen years subject to NERA, concurrent to the other counts; Count Forty-Nine, disorderly persons false imprisonment, to six months, concurrent to the other counts; and Count Fifty, first-degree kidnapping, to twenty-three years subject to NERA, consecutive to Counts One, Seven, and Forty-One and concurrent to the other counts.  (20T40-22 to 24, 66-18 to 71-8).  Defendant’s new aggregate sentence was 70 years with 57.9 years to be served without parole.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RESTRICTING THE BOARD’S ABILITY ON REMAND TO CONSIDER ANY AND ALL CONDITIONS TO ADDRESS THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT.  (Order Da349)  In its Order, the trial court directed that the application be approved, that the d and c variances be granted, and that the 165 units shall not be reduced.  The only discretion allowed to the Board was to impose reasonable conditions on the application, but not conditions related to the variances sought.  The Board conducted the remand hearing and adopted a resolution with conditions that were severely limited by the trial court. \textsuperscript{12}  While these are important conditions, and Appellee may have difficulty satisfying some of them, none of the conditions the Board was permitted to impose was able to address the bulk and density of the use as envisioned by the \textit{Sica} standards for use variances.  The Board has the “inherent” power to impose conditions upon the grant of a variance.  \textit{North Plainfield v Perone}, 54 N.J. Super. 1, 8-9 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 29 N.J. 507 (1959).  Where variances are granted, a Board is required to provide adequate protections in the form of conditions to safeguard the objectives of zoning from the grant of the variance.  \textit{Eagle Group v Zoning Bd.}, 274 N.J. Super. 551, 564-565 (App. Div. 1994).  The law allows the Board to exercise discretion in imposing conditions, but the trial court’s prohibition removed this essential function from the Board to the detriment of the public and the zone plan.
[brief] [...] also testified that he had been angry with defendant for calling him after shooting [...].  (25T:154-10 to 157-22, 197-18 to 21).  He said it unnecessarily involved him in defendant’s case, and said, “I don’t understand why you picked up the phone and called me.  Why you ain’t call 911?”  Ibid.  He had given the gun to defendant in 2018, to have defendant dispose of it for him, not to keep for protection.  (25T:159-5 to 160-10, 187-15 to 23).  [...] knew [...] as well, as he, defendant, and [...] had all composed and performed music together in the past.