ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Indeed, recognizing that debt collectors must at times necessarily convey information through mediums such as telephone operators and telegraph company employees, the [...] (“[...]”) has indicated that such communication are “incidental contacts” that do not violate the FDCPA.  See [...], Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commentary On the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 53 FR 50097-02 (A debt collector may contact an employee of a telephone or telegraph company in order to contact the consumer, without violating the prohibition on communication to third parties .  . .).  The FDCPA thus differentiates incidental contacts through mediums—such as those made through a process servers, telephone operators or a telegram company—from contacts where the recipient is the object or target for the communication—like the consumer, a consumer’s attorney, or creditor.  Here, [...]’s mailing vendor is a “medium” as opposed to a “person. ”  [...]’s mailing vendor is functionally equivalent to a telegram company—an entity that serves the mechanical function of processing (as opposed to reading/analyzing) data sent by [...] in order to print and mail a letter addressed solely to Plaintiff.  Indeed, the transmission of information to a mailing vendor is more benign than that of a telegram company because while a telegram requires people to review and convert a message from the sender into a telegram, modern mailing vendors’ systems are largely automated and the data that mailing vendors process likely do not see any human eyes.  The FDCPA’s approval of the use of telegrams is therefore a recognition that people working for telegrams or mailing vendors are not “persons” under the act.  Instead, telegrams companies and mailing vendors are mediums because debt information merely passes through them.  [...]’s act of transmitting data to its mailing vendor is thus not a “communication” under the FDCPA because it is not a conveyance of debt information to a person.  [...] cannot be said to have violated the FDCPA’s prohibition on third-party disclosure because the FDCPA only prohibits “communication” to third-parties who are “persons” under the act.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b)(“... debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector. ”) (emphasis added).  For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claim that [...] violated the FDCPA’s prohibition on third-party disclosure fails and should be dismissed.
[brief] As noted in defendants’ initial brief, the breaches that trigger the indemnification under Paragraph 6.3 are limited to losses incurred after the date of the Agreement.  None of the alleged misdeeds relied upon to support the judgment or the award of fees occurred after the 2017 SPA.  The triggering breaches are further limited to material breaches of a representation, warranty, covenant or agreement of the Buyer “contained in this Agreement” or a material inaccuracy in a “document delivered by Buyer as required by this Agreement. ”  Thus, this provision could only be triggered if [...] materially breached a representation, warranty, covenant or agreement contained in the 2017 SPA that governed the sale of the business.  Although the trial court broadly concluded that there were breaches of the SPAs, plaintiffs fail to cite any finding by the court that identified any specific representation, warranty, covenant or agreement “contained in” the SPA breached by the Buyer – [...], or even [...].  Thus, neither the trial court nor plaintiffs have identified a “material” breach as defined in Paragraph 6.3 that triggered the indemnification provision.  Instead, plaintiffs claim the indemnification clause is triggered by [...]’s representations in the 2014 SPA, three years before the purchase was actually consummated, that: - “consummation of the purchase would not ‘result in a breach of . . . any agreement, contract . . . or other arrangement to which Buyer [Hedvat] is a party or by which he is bound. ”  Da908 - “consummation of the purchase would not ‘result in a breach of . . . any agreement, contract . . . or other arrangement to which the Company is a party or by which it is bound,” or “violate any provision of the charter or bylaws of the Company. ”  Da909  Plaintiffs note [...] made similar representations in the 2017 SPA.  The references here are clearly to agreements and obligations other than the SPAs.  Plaintiffs rely exclusively upon the representations that the purchase would not breach “any agreement, contract . . . or other arrangement” to which they or the Company are bound.  They do not identify what other agreement was breached, let alone explain how such representations constituted a material breach of the SPA.  In short, their argument fails to show a material breach, as defined in Paragraph 6.3, that warranted the award of attorneys’ fees.
[brief] Appellants also rely on Public Advisory Opinion-A202-22 dated February 25, 2022 and emphasize that the Opinion was issued six days before the Complaint in this matter was filed.  Ibid.  That fact supports that decision not being applicable here as the conduct at issue took place before that Opinion was issued.  Thus, even if the Opinion could be construed to require disclaimer on all social media posts by school board members, such a mandate could not be fairly applied to support sanctions for conduct that took place before the Opinion was issued.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AN OSTENSIBLE LACK OF A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE CFLA PRECLUDES ASSERTION OF THE CFLA AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Raised Below: Da61)  In denying [...]’s Motion to Vacate, the trial court reasoned that the “NJCFLA does not confer a private statutory cause of action.  Only the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance has the authority to pursue claims for violations of the NJCFLA.  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18.” (Da61-Da62).  However, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 does not state that “[o]nly the Commissioner . . . has the authority to pursue claims for violations of the NJCFLA. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 merely provides for the Commissioner’s authority and available remedies under the NJCFLA.  Importantly, all of the NJCFLA’s statutory predecessors (discussed infra) provided for enforcement by the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance and provided for an implied private right of action.  To suddenly read private enforcement out of the NJCFLA would not be consistent with the NJCFLA statutory structure, its legislative intent, or its legislative history.
[brief] **Plaintiffs’ Focus On Admissibility Is Misplaced (Not Raised Below)**  Plaintiffs also tried to defend the ESI Order on the separate ground that even if a document is not “relevant” under Rule 4:10-2(a), it is still discoverable if the document could reasonably “lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”  Opp. at 1.  That argument misstates the plain language of Rule 4:10-2(a).  The Rule explicitly restricts the “scope of discovery” to documents that are “relevant” to the claims or defenses at issue.  R. 4:10-2(a)  The Rule then addresses a *separate* evidentiary issue about *admissibility*, requiring the production of documents that are not themselves admissible (for example, because they are hearsay), so long as the production is “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. ”  Id.  The Rule thus makes clear that “the relevance standard does not refer only to matters which would necessarily be admissible into evidence, but includes information reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. ”  R.L., 402 N.J. Super. at 408.  But that provision does not displace the “general standard of discoverability as prescribed by paragraph (a)” —i.e., “relevance. ”  Pressler & Verniero, cmt. 1 on R. 4:10-2(a).  The relevance standard, as explained above, is “congruent” with N.J.R.E. 401, and refers only to evidence having “a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. ”  R.L., 402 N.J. Super. at 408.  Plaintiffs do not and cannot meaningfully argue that all documents that hit ESI search terms necessarily satisfy that standard.  In any event, even assuming arguendo that Rule 4:10-2(a) also requires Defendants to turn over irrelevant documents so long as they might lead to discovery of admissible evidence, the ESI Order was not so cabined.  Plaintiffs below never suggested that all documents that hit on search terms would “lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,” and the trial court never mentioned that clause of Rule 4:10-2(a).  Instead, as explained above, the trial court consciously required Defendants to turn over vast swaths of documents that would be entirely non-responsive and irrelevant to the claims and defenses at issue.  There is no legal basis for that mandate.  II.
[brief] Plaintiffs concede that [...]’s operating agreement does not contain an agreement to use the ‘tax book value’ for any buyouts.  Merely that [...] could have accepted Plaintiff’s recitation of a history of minor, voluntary transactions as “fair” in this case, did not require that she do so.  She did not deem “book value” to be a proper “fair value” under these circumstances.  (Da3191-3193)  The Court instead believed that “net asset value”, as calculated by Plaintiffs’ own expert, was the best methodology.  (Da3196-3197)  Without a written agreement signed by [...] to accept book value, the Court had the right to so rule.  XI.
[brief] Defendants asked the trial court to vacate the order of dismissal and reopen the case for the limited purpose of considering their forthcoming motion for attorneys’ fees under UPEPA.  Da62–63.  On April 4, 2024, the trial court heard oral argument on Defendants’ motion and denied the motion by oral ruling at the conclusion of the argument.  See T40:6–45:7.  It entered a short form order memorializing the denial the same day (“April 4 Order”).  Da7–8.  Defendants filed a notice of appeal on May 15, 2024.  Da67–69.
[brief] Caravaggio v. D'Agostini, 166 N.J. 237, 245 (2001) (quoting Baird v. Am. Med. Optics, 155 N.J. 54, 72 (1998)).  Defendant alleges that [...], “should have known of the 3.0 GPA requirement no later than September 22, 2012, when he acknowledges the website was updated; and in addition, through the information provided to him by way of the Graduate Student Manual and in the Beyond the Curriculum course. ” (Db22).  Yet, contradicts itself by asserting that Plaintiff “failed to even enroll in the first semester of the required “Beyond the Curriculum course – which covered the 3.0 GPA requirement.
[brief] See Wells Fargo Home Mortg. V. Stull, 378 N.J. Super. 449, 876 A.2d 298 (App. Div. 2005) .... compliance with the statutory provision is mandatory."  W.S. Frey Company, Inc. v. Health 158 N.J. 321 (N.J. 1999).  The Appellate Division emphasized the Legislatures intent in enacting the Fair Foreclosure Act in Wells Fargo Home Mortg. v. Stull.  "we emphasize the Legislature's intent in enacting the Fair Foreclosure Act: The Legislature hereby finds and declares it to be the public policy of this State that homeowners should be given every opportunity to pay their home mortgages, and thus keep their homes; and that lenders will be benefited when residential mortgage debtors cure their defaults and return defaulted residential loans to performing status.  [N.J.S.A. 2A:50-54.]
[directive] Sexual Assault Sexual Assault Victims - Attorney General Standards for Providing Services to • Victims Victims of Sexual Assault (3rd Ed. November 2018)  pdf Shoplifting Attorney General Guidelines -- Prosecution of Shoplifting Offenses -- (ADDED • JANUARY 2001)  Stationhouse INTERIM POLICY STATEMENT of the New Jersey Attorney General and the New • Confessions Jersey County Prosecutors' Association regarding Electronic Recordation of Stationhouse Confessions -- Please see Directive 2006-2 for update >> Memorialization of Electronic Recordation of Custodial Interrogation of Suspect in Custodial Station House Setting Download PDF form >> Strip Search Attorney General's Strip Search and Body Cavity Search Requirements and • Procedures for Police Officers (Updated June 1995)
[brief] What’s going on, what are—what are the parties trying to do here?  What is their intention?  And I don’t think we can address that in a summary judgment motion. ” (2T36:4-8).  [...] found, “there are issues of intent, there are certainly issues of credibility and factual disputes…that may be appropriate for a trial judge to address. ” (2T36:20-37:8).  To resolve these issues, [...] concluded, “you really need a factual setting.  How do these things take place? What were—what was each individual purchaser told at the time? What did they do?  And again, this is not a case for summary judgment without a factual record. ” (2T37:12-17).  [...] moved for reconsideration, [...] denied the motion and recited passages from three cases supporting his ruling that fraud in the formation invites an examination of all the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract before deciding if the parol evidence rule applies: *Atlantic Northern Airlines v. Schwimmer*, 12 N.J. 293 (1953); *Ocean Cape Hotel Corp. v. Masefield Corp.*, 63 N.J.Super. 369 (App.Div.1960); and *Conway v. 287 Corporate Center Associates*, 187 N.J. 259 (2005).
[directive] The Special Committee was of the view that compliance with these standards should not add significant time to jury selection.  Finally, compliance will further the interests of justice because jurors will be selected in a process that elicits sufficient meaningful information about jurors, their background, relevant views, opinions and life experiences to ensure, as best we can, that they will be able to decide the case before them in a fair and impartial manner.  It will be a process that attorneys, litigants, and citizens called to jury service will recognize as sensible, serious, meaningful, and geared to its purpose -- selection of a fair jury.
[brief] Indeed, liability for injuries caused by an inherent dangerous trait common to a class of domesticated animals typically arises under a negligence standard.  Rodriguez v. Cordasco, 279 N.J. Super. 396, 401-02 (App. Div. 1995); Vendrella v. Astriab Family Ltd. P’ship. 311 Conn. 301, 327 fn. 22 (2014) (surveying cases); 4 Am. Jur. 2d Animals § 69 (2023); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 509, cmt. e.  The owner or keeper of a domestic animal is charged with knowledge of the natural propensities of animals of the particular class to which this animal belongs, and, if these propensities are of the kind that might cause injury he must exercise the care necessary to prevent such injuries as may be anticipated.
[brief] (Da18, 20).  To be sure, defendant’s argument fails to recognize that the location in a high-narcotics area is simply a fact [...] considered in forming the basis for his reasonable suspicion.  Defendant also erroneously heightens the reasonable suspicion standard to require something akin to probable cause by arguing police would have needed to see something more like an exchange of money or that their physical appearance needed to be suggestive of a crime.  See (Db13).  But reasonable suspicion “involves a significantly lower degree of objective justification than does the probable cause test.
[brief] (Da1-2)  Trial began on May 31, 2022, before the Honorable [...], J.S.C., and a jury, and continued for five non-consecutive days.  (2T, 3T, 4T, 5T, 6T, 7T, 8T)  On June 9, 2022, the jury found [...] guilty on all three counts.  (8T14-15 to 15-7)  On October 6, 2022, the trial court sentenced [...] to a fifty-five year term of imprisonment subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, for murder (count one), imposed a concurrent eight-year imprisonment term with forty-eight months parole ineligibility subject to the Graves Act for unlawful possession of a weapon (count three), and merged the remaining conviction of weapon possession for an unlawful purpose with the murder conviction.  (9T24-15 to 25-14)  A Notice of Appeal was filed on November 1, 2022.  (Da8-10)
[brief] Table of Contents  I.  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...................... 2  II.  LEGAL ARGUMENT ...........................................................................  5  THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT LACK THE AUTHORITY TO DECIDE THE MATTER AS CHANCERY  DIVISION IS THE PROPER FORUM TO ADJUDICATE RIGHTS UNDER THE FORECLOSURE STATUTES  ........  5  THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT IN HIS COMPLAINT HAD BEEN GRANTED PRIOR TO THE FIRST CONFERENCE CONDUCTED BY THE COURT AND AS SUCH, THE JUDGE’S DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION AS MOOT WAS PROPER ...........................................................................................................
[brief] (Da15).  Appraisals were performed by the Court-appointed appraisers, who found: (a) a $575,000 value for the Boonton Property, and (b) a $360,000 value for the Florida Property.  (Da23).  The Trustee, through counsel, solicited sealed bids from [...] and [...] for the Boonton Property.  [...] responded by seeking injunctive relief.  (Da18).  At the time, the Defendants had a motion for partial summary judgment pending, and the Plaintiff had motion pending to eject the Defendants from the Boonton Property.  On June 10, 2022, the Court entered an Order denying those motions without prejudice and established a sealed bidding procedure under which [...] and [...] had the opportunity to submit bids to [...]topher Luongo, Esq. of the [...].
[brief] This is a matter that involves a dispute between landlord, [...] ("[...]"), tenant, [...] ("[...]"), and guarantors, [...] ("[...]"), [...] ("[...]"), and [...] ("[...]"), all members of [...] at the time the Lease and guarantees were executed on February 20, 2015.  The premises is a former hockey rink/sports complex containing 38,400 square feet with a value of about two million dollars ($2,000,000.00) at the time of the Lease.  [...] and [...] entered into the Lease dated February 20, 2015, ("Lease") which was guaranteed by [...], [...] and [...], a copy of which is attached as Pa60.  The rent set forth in the lease was $5,250.00 per month from March 1, 2015 through May 1, 2015, $7,250.00 per month from June 1, 2015 through November 1, 2015, and $9,250.00 per month for December 1, 2015 through February 1, 2016, net net net (Lease ¶2(a), 7) Pa60, Pa62-63.  In addition to rent, [...] was responsible for repair and maintenance of the building, (Lease ¶6)Pa62, water and sewer permits, municipal improvement assessments, and any other charges made by any public authority (Lease ¶7)Pa62.  [...] was responsible for charges and rents for water, gas, --- 1 Facts and Procedural History are combined because they are inter-related and for ease of reading.  telephone, heat and electricity, and such other services used or consumed in or servicing the premises (Lease ¶8).  [...] was responsible to keep and maintain building and fire insurance, general liability and an umbrella liability policy as well as public liability, property damage, employer liability, and workers compensation insurance, and an umbrella business insurance policy (Lease ¶9)Pa63.  Pursuant to Lease ¶5, Pa62, [...] is responsible for all of landlord’s attorney’s fees and costs enforcing the Lease.  At the end of the term, [...] was required to surrender the premises (Lease ¶3) Pa61, and pursuant to the Lease ¶12(b), Pa65, [...] was required to “peaceably deliver up and surrender possession of the premises to the landlord” and “deliver to landlord at its offices, all keys to the building. ”  The Lease provided at page 11, Pa70, immediately above the signatures of [...], [...] and [...] as follows:  “… the undersigned jointly and severally each hereby personally guarantee the obligations of the Tenant herein. ”  [...] relied on the personal guarantees of [...], [...] and [...], as [...] had no assets.  He relied on [...], [...], and [...] as local businessmen who would have the personal assets to satisfy any default on the Lease.  The Lease was monthly as [...] was trying to sell the property.
[brief] 7  The defendants also filed third party claims against accountant [...] and his firm, but voluntarily dismissed them after Myers provided what [...] believed was an affidavit favorable to his claims against the Plaintiffs.  (Da497; 27T 25:3-6).  Complaint on September 16, 2021.  The Amended Complaint not only asserted claims against the [...]s, [...], [...], and [...], but also against a series of other entities owned or controlled by the [...]s: [...]; [...]; [...]; [...] Group, LLC; and [...].  The Amended Complaint asserted claims for an accounting, constructive trust, conversion, breach of contract, fraud, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment.
[brief] Since a motion was not required for default within the Family Part, R. 1:7-4 required findings by opinion or memorandum of decision is inapplicable.  Additionally, [...] ignores the trial court’s findings about her conduct at the time of the divorce hearing:  The defendant not only signed the MMA and PSA, but the court also finds that she signed an acknowledgment of service for the Summons and Complaint for Divorce which was requesting the incorporation of said documents.  She signed a certified mailing card for the letter providing her notice of the divorce hearing.  Her efforts to claim that the year on the green certified mailing card with her signature was 2013 not 2015 is simply an incredible assertion that the court finds astounding and incredible.  [A229, Op. at 24(emphasis added)].  Third, following the plenary hearing, the trial court did analyze the Mid-Marriage Agreement (MMA) and rejected Defendant’s contentions of coerciveness:  The MMA was incorporated into the PSA at paragraph 16 of the PSA, and similar to the PSA, the MMA also included language at page 11, last paragraph which in summary, stated that the parties understood the income and assets of the other party, their right to independent legal counsel and that the terms of the MMA were “fair, just and reasonable. ”  The court finds the incorporation of the terms of the MMA into the PSA differentiates this from the holding in Pacelli v. Pacelli, 319 N.J. Super. 185 (App. Div. 1999) which found that mid-marriage agreements are inherently coercive and unenforceable.  In this matter the PSA included terms which clearly provided notice that plaintiff desired the marriage to terminate.  The incorporation of the terms of the MMA under those circumstances did not hold the same coercive effect as were found in Pacelli, supra.  Additionally, the MMA and PSA were executed shortly after it was divulged that she was engaged in an extra-marital affair which tempers any argument that either party had no reasonable belief that the agreements were not intended to define the terms which would terminate the marriage.  Significantly, the MMA also included language at pg. 9, paragraph A, 3rd full paragraph set out in bold, that defendant ‘does not waive any rights whatsoever under the Divorce Laws of the State of New Jersey. ’  This paragraph reserved defendant the right to modify the terms of the MMA in the negotiation of the terms in any subsequent agreement or in the litigation of the marital issues in court.  The court finds that this provision in the MMA clearly reserved the right for defendant to renegotiate, or litigate in court, any of its provisions.  Defendant was clearly not locked into the provisions set forth in the MMA.  [A229 at 37-38 (emphasis in original)].  For all those reasons, [...]’s argument on appeal concerning default judgment should be rejected.