ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  This permanent in jury is in the form of a significant limited use of this once normal bodily function a loss of range of motion, accompanied by pain.  This is consistent with [...]’s report which made the following findings: the Appellant-Plaintiff had “suffered a substantial limitation of the cervicothoracic and lumbosacral spinal region of the musculoskeletal system."  Further there were "objective signs of spastic musculature of the involved area tested, thus collaborating the patient's pain and restriction."  Other limitations include: pain and limitation during athletic events, household work and chores; pain during sleep, resulting in loss of sleep; sitting or standing for extended periods of causes pain and joint stiffness."  The Respondent-Defendant, in their brief, improperly and erroneously asserted, that the “Plaintiff has further failed to establish that her injuries have not healed to function normally under AICRA. ”  Further, they assert that the “Plaintiff has made it clear that she no longer feels any pain or restrictions. ”  Seeking a dismissal by way of a Summary Judgment based on subjective “no longer feels any pain” or any “restrictions” is contrary to the requirements of the AICRA and the relevant case laws.
[brief] THE POLICY VEHICLES WERE GARAGED IN NEW JERSEY WHEN THE POLICY WAS CREATED AND AT ALL RELEVANT TIMES AFTER  The vehicles insured under the policy were in New Jersey for the entire year that [...] was in New Jersey.  Plaintiff signed a lease for his apartment in New Jersey since August 9, 2022, which was approximately eight months prior to the accident.  He testified that since January 2, 2021, his Toyota Corolla was garaged at the apartment in New Jersey.  [...] testified that since January 2, 2021, the Toyota Corolla was principally garaged at [...].  As of May 25, 2022, plaintiff stated that the vehicles insured under the policy have been in New Jersey for the entire year he has been in New Jersey.  3.
[brief] At that time, for the *first time since these 2017-18* orders, plaintiffs’ counsel sought an adjournment of the trial or reconsideration of the Burt defendant orders:  [...]:  And, I understand law of the case is out there and I get everybody says law of the case.  But, the case law is replete with warnings by the Supreme Court.  It says you know law of the case is not a strict doctrine.  It’s not like something that’s set in stone.  And, what the Court should be doing is looking at the prior rulings if there’s an issue.  And, then looking at them closely and carefully, and then deciding was this inaccurate? Was it incorrect? Is this the right way to do this?  And, the Court has the obligation, if that’s the perception of the Court, to then address that and correct that error.  Because otherwise you’re just compounding the error.  Back in December 2017 I -- I vaguely recall having the oral argument with Your Honor.  And, I -- I remember saying you don’t have to go that road with Burt defendants, because Burt was a brand new case at the time.  I think it just came down like a few months before that.  And, it was the -- the -- the -- the issue du jour of the defense -- at the time.
[brief] In fact, *Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp.*, cited on p. 9-10 of [...]’s opening Brief, discusses the NJCLA’s replacement by the NJLLA and the private remedies that were available under the same:  If a violation of the CLA is proven, the typical remedy, obtainable by the Department of Banking and Insurance or by individual consumers, is voiding of the contract . . .  The [NJ]CLA, as incorporated in the Licensed Lenders Act, now allows for treble damages by aggrieved consumers, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33b, and summary revocation of a lender's license, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-48a.  --- \(^1\)  See, e.g., *Family Fin. Corp. v. Gough*, 10 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1950); *Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp.*, 150 N.J. 255, 272 (1997).  Lemelledo, 150 N.J. at 272 (emphasis added).  As shown above, [...]’s assertions that “[[...]] has [not] mentioned any court that inferred such a private right” under the NJSLL, NJCLA and/or NJLLA are without merit.  In actuality, [...] has failed to respond to the arguments in [...]’s opening Brief.  The fact remains that, if the statutory and legislative history and intent of the NJCFLA are the polestars for the inclusion vel non of an implied private right of action, then the foregoing cases suggest that the NJCFLA—like the NJCLA and NJLLA—must afford an implied private right of action.  And, as explained above, even in the absence of a private right of action, [...] may properly assert [...]’s violations of the NJCFLA as an affirmative defense.  Thus, [...]’s arguments fail and the October 26, 2023 Order (Da58) denying [...]’s Motion to Vacate should be reversed.  POINT II.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .........................................................................................1  PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND ..........................................................4  A.  The Parties ..............................................................................................................4  B.  The Underlying Tenure Charges ...........................................................................4  C.  The State Board Suspends [...]’s Teaching Certificate .................................7  D.  The State Board’s Decision Forced The [...] To Summarily Dismiss [...] .......................................................................................................9  E. [...] Appeals The [...]’s Decision, Demands Reinstatement And Backpay ..................................................................................10  F. [...] Successfully Moves For A Summary Decision, The Commissioner Affirms The ALJ’s Decision ............................................................10  STANDARD OF REVIEW .............................................................................................12  ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................13  THE COMMISSIONER CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE WOODBRIDGE BOE’S DECISION TO FOLLOW THE LAW AND TERMINATE CILENTO WAS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS .............................................................14
[brief] See, e.g., *Onukogu v. New Jersey State Judiciary Essex Vicinage*, 2023 WL 3162175 (App. Div. May 1, 2023)(citing to *El-Sioufi*)(DGSa5); *Schuster v. State*, 2023 WL 2994239 (App. Div. April 19, 2023) (citing to *Spinks*)(DGSa19).  Thus, the legal principles articulated in *El-* Sioufi and Spinks most certainly continue to be authoritative legal precedent.
[brief] As set forth in the record below, Appellant was an inmate at the [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) from December 29, 2019 through February 2020, which is the time period for the acts alleged in the Amended Complaint.  In the counts brought forth in the Amended Complaint, Appellant failed to state sufficient, comprehensible facts for any cause of action nor bring applicable causes of action.  Rather, Appellant admittingly created and utilized “causes of action not customarily seen by Judges” without further explanation of the same, aside from the “plain meaning of the words and facts. ”  The Trial Court did not err in dismissing all of the Appellant’s claims, with prejudice, stating that its opinions regarding the dismissal of the Appellant’s Amended Complaint based on immunities under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, qualified immunity.
[brief] When [...] moved to disqualify, per the trial court’s direction, the [...] sent both [...]’s and [...]’s retainer agreements and their additional conflict waiver to the trial court via email to its law clerk for in camera review.  SDa34.5 --- 5 Appendix page Pa317-18 that [...] cites for these propositions, Pb29, is only the [...] Affidavit and is both irrelevant to the [...] and Indeed, the law clerk—the “unidentified speaker” on page 49 of the motion transcript—confirms to the trial court that he printed the conflict waivers and gave them to the court.  T49:18-19; see also T57:11-17.  The trial court absolutely did not decline the [...] invitation to provide it the waivers in camera.  Pb29.  Indeed, in its decision denying [...]’s motion, the trial court expressly found that the [...] signed informed consent waivers of any potential conflict and were informed by counsel of the potential risks involved.
[brief] See Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Co., Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking & Ins., 472 N.J. Super. 25, 42 (App. Div. 2022) (recognizing the Department’s broad regulatory authority over the business of insurance).  During the rate review process, [...] took particular exception to the Department’s alleged lag in matching other state insurance regulators which had granted substantial rate increases on its Choice 2 policies.  (Cra235-237).  But that is not how rate filing reviews work.  The Department was obligated to determine independently whether approval of [...]’s extreme rate request was justified.  It was not.
[directive] The presumption of imprisonment may attach in a school zone case when, for example, the offense conduct involves a second-degree quantity of controlled dangerous substance under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5, and/or where the offense conduct also violates the second-degree crime defined in N.J.S.A.  2C:35-7.1 (drug-free public park or public housing zone).  Consistent with the general principle that a plea offer should accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense conduct, prosecutors, of course, have discretion to require a defendant to plead guilty to the most serious provable offense charged.
[brief] The Eleventh Circuit’s decisions focused on whether the debt collector’s communication to the mail vendor was “in connection with the collection of any debt. ”  The court rejected the argument that, to be in connection with the collection of a debt, the communication must include a demand for payment.  The court observed that, if a payment demand were necessary, then a debt collector would never violate § 1692c(b) because its communications with third-parties would never demand payment from them.  Consequently, the court rejected the payment demand requirement because doing so would violate a “cardinal principle of statutory construction” to give meaning to every word.
[brief] Because a Subsequent Transaction Is Not an Element of the Tort  In deciding [...]’s motion for summary judgment, the Trial Court assumed that because no final transaction ever commenced between [...] and [...], there was no cognizable legal theory under which [...] could be held liable to Plaintiffs.  Tortious interference, however, does not require the completion of any transaction, but rather focuses on the improper actions taken to disrupt a potential economic advantage or business relationship.  The Trial Court’s preoccupation with whether or not a transaction occurred between [...] and the [...] Defendants—a conclusion the Trial Court had begun to assert long before any evidence or briefing on the issue was presented to it (1T 22:9-13)—caused the Trial Court to ignore the necessary elements of Plaintiffs’ claims.  As noted above, Plaintiffs asserted that [...] tortiously interfered with their contracts with the [...] Defendants and their prospective economic relationships.  To establish that claim, Plaintiffs would need only to show: (1) a “protectable right—a prospective economic or contractual relationship”; (2) interference that “was done intentionally and with ‘malice’”; (3) “there was a reasonable probability that the victim of the interference would have received the anticipated economic benefits”; and (4) “the injury caused damage. ”  Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 751-52 (1989) (citations omitted).  In its reasoning for its Summary Judgment Order, the Trial Court held that, as to the first element, “[h]ere, as far as I’m concerned, it’s undisputed that plaintiffs and that Dr. [...] had a business relationship that was mutually beneficial since 2002.
[brief] In *[...] v. [...]*, 752 F.3d 600 (3rd Cir. 2012), the Third Circuit held that if the claimant's underlying factual allegations require proof of a deviation from the professional standard of care applicable to that specific profession, an Affidavit of Merit is required for that claim, unless some exception applies.  In *[...]*, plaintiff alleged that an accounting firm committed accounting malpractice and fraud and that a law firm committed legal malpractice and negligent misrepresentation.  *Id.*  The factual allegations in *[...]* were as follows: [...], which is a Municipal Bond Fund, purchased the Bond Anticipation Note from [...].  *Id.*  In connection with the transaction, Bayonne provided [...] with an audit report authored by Bayonne's accounting firm, [...] ("[...]"), and an opinion letter authored by Bayonne's counsel, [...] ("[...]").  Id.  Soon after the transaction, Bayonne filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petition.  [...] alleged that the audit report and opinion concealed aspects of Bayonne's financial condition and, had it known about those financial issues, plaintiff would not have purchased the Bond Anticipation Note:  [...] filed the action alleging negligent misrepresentation and fraud as to [...] and negligent misrepresentation and malpractice as to [...].  Id.  The District Court dismissed the action with prejudice based upon [...]'s failure to file an Affidavit of Merit and the Third Circuit affirmed.  In affirming the District Court's decision, the Third Circuit relied on Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328 (2002).  The Third Circuit in [...] held that:  [t]he problem for [...] is that in New Jersey an action need not be styled as one for malpractice or negligence for the AOM Statute to apply.  Rather, in Couri, the New Jersey Supreme Court explained that: [i]t is not the label placed on the action that is pivotal but the nature of the legal inquiry.  Accordingly, when presented with a tort or contract claim asserted against a professional specified in a Statute, rather than focusing on whether the claim is denominated as tort or contract, attorneys in Court should determine if the claimant's underlying factual allegations require proof of a deviation from the professional standard of care applicable to that specific profession.  If such proof is required, an Affidavit of Merit is required for that claim, unless some exception applies.  173 N.J. at 340, 801 A.2d at 1141.  Therefore, plaintiffs cannot simply attempt to label certain causes of action to evade the requirements of the Affidavit of Merit Statute, despite the fact that these attempts were rejected by the trial court and fully explained in a well reasoned and comprehensive opinion.  Accordingly, this Court should affirm the decisions of the trial court, which dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against the [...], with prejudice.
[directive] 2014-1 2011, 8,  On November the New of Jersey citizens overwhelmingly voted to the amend New Jersey to the Constitution Legislature permit repeal to prohibitions the of operation against sports pools casinos by and racetracks.  Thereafter, signed [...] the Sports Wagering Act, N.J.S.A. to of -6, will to 5:12A-1 the effectuate people expressed the in constitutional the That of operation decriminalized referendum.  statute sports the racetracks, pools casinos and by and and extensive implemented licensing regime.  Those regulations regulatory are in codified an et N.J.A.C. 13:69N-1.1 sea• Wagering the of Act  Sports implementation that State's claimed the leagues sports Certain ("PASPA"), U.S.C. Protection Amateur 3701 Professional Act Sports and 28 federal the violated Wagering of Act. implementation to court in the suit the enjoin federal Sports
[brief] Defendant relies on the unpublished oral *Rabinowitz* decision although Defendant has not provided the Court with a copy.  *Rabinowitz* likened the FDCPA to a private claim under the Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), N.J.S.A. 56:8-19.  But the statues are distinguishable.  The CFA only permits claims by a plaintiff with an “ascertainable loss. ”  *Weinberg v. Sprint Corp.*, 173 N.J. 233 (2002).  The FDCPA has no similar requirement.  *Rabinowitz* also presumed the FDCPA is primarily policed by federal agencies but, as discussed above, Congress chose to incentivize private attorney general actions as the principal means for enforcing compliance.  **POINT II.
[brief] Females were treated “not with respect” (1T; 53:7).  When Plaintiff entered the kitchen, all conversations stopped (1T; 53:20).  Plaintiff created a timeline which was somewhat contemporaneous (1T; 55:18).  On the first page, Plaintiff recounted her conversation with [...] about the complaints of the secretaries (1T; 56:10).  In violation of the Rules of the State Police, [...] conducted an investigation on his own (1T; 56:12).
[brief] On August 23, 2018, less than one week after [...] dismissed Appellant's appeal of the First Resolution declining to interpret whether the Site Plan permitted parking on Lot 5, Appellant again asked the Board to interpret whether parking on the same area of Lot 5 required a variance and site plan approval (the “Second Application”) (Aa7-Aa12).  In the alternative, Appellant sought a determination of the validity of the use of Lot 5 for parking as a nonconforming use (Aa7-Aa12).  On September 17, 2018, the Board's counsel objected to Appellant's request for "an opinion as to whether [Respondent] ever obtained site plan approval for parking facilities" on the Property (Aa53-Aa58).  On September 19, 2018, Appellant’s counsel submitted a letter in response to the Board’s counsel’s letter, contending, among other things, that there never was a site plan approval for the 1972 HDS expansion that included parking and that Respondent “has to establish the fact that they have a site plan approval as well as an approval . . . to provide for parking” on Lot 5 (Aa61).  On October 9, 2018, Respondent submitted a letter to the Board’s counsel in opposition to Appellant’s application (Aa62-Aa66).  In the course of articulating its objection, Respondent “fully incorporate[d] that which [wa]s set forth in its December 22, 2017 [sic] Opposition” (Aa63).  A hearing took place on Appellant’s application on October 15, 2018.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board passed a motion, and then later issued [...] (the "Second Resolution") memorializing its finding that using the Sixth Street lot for purposes of parking was not a valid non-conforming use (1T160-T161; T174-T175; Aa1-6).³
[brief] ..................................................................................................................13  A.  The court refused to consider Defendant’s exemplary conduct while incarcerated as evidence of rehabilitation.  ............................................................................................16  B.  The court erred in its application of all five Miller factors.  .....................................................18  i.  The court failed to properly apply *Miller factor 1* (immaturity) by erroneously concluding that Defendant’s actions as a teenager were not influenced by his immaturity, and by improperly disregarding expert psychological testimony indicating that Defendant had matured since his original sentencing.  ..................................................20  ii.  The court failed to properly apply *Miller factor 5* (rehabilitation) by disregarding expert psychological testimony indicating that Defendant has rehabilitated.  .............................................26  iii.  The court failed to properly apply *Miller factor 2* (family and environment) by conducting a comparative rather than individualized analysis of Defendant’s childhood environment, and by disregarding expert psychological testimony indicating that Defendant’s traumatic childhood influenced his reckless behavior.  .............................................28  iv.  The court failed to properly apply *Miller factor 3* (circumstances of offense and peer pressure) by incorrectly focusing on the heinousness of the offense, and by failing to consider the expert psychological testimony indicating Defendant was uniquely susceptible to peer pressure.  .............................................31 v. The court failed to properly apply *Miller factor 4* (capacity to work within legal system) by speculating that because Defendant pled guilty, he was necessarily capable of working productively within the legal system.................................................................34  C.  The court’s analysis of the statutory sentencing factors disregarded expert psychological testimony, and relied upon facts not supported by the record.  Accordingly, the court erred by finding aggravating factors 3 and 9, and by declining to find mitigating factors 7, 8, and 9.  ..................................37  D.  The court erroneously found that relief under Comer is limited to eligibility for parole, and thereby refused to even consider altering Defendant’s original base sentence of life-imprisonment.  ........................................................................................................40
[brief] “[G]enerally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2. ”  Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 134 L.Ed.2d 902, 909 (1996) (emphasis added); see also Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.4th 148, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 113 P.3d 1100, 1112–13 (2005) (stating that “the FAA does not federalize the law of unconscionability or related contract defenses except to the extent that it forbids the use of such defenses to discriminate against arbitration clauses. ”).  Furthermore, “whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all” is a “gateway” question that requires judicial resolution.  Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452, 123 S.Ct. 2402, 2407, 156 L.Ed.2d 414, 422 (2003) (plurality opinion).  It is clear that under Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 1806, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270, 1277 (1967), “a court must decide whether [an] agreement to arbitrate is valid. ”  Barker v. Golf U.S.A., Inc., 154 F.3d 788, 791 (8th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1068, 119 S.Ct. 796, 142 L.Ed.2d 659 (1999).  B.
[brief] [Feliciano, 224 N.J.  at 368 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-10(a)-(d))].  Here, the PCR court correctly found that the warrant at issue met all of the statutory requirements and was constitutional.  (Da108).  As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the location at issue in this case was not a home but was a stash house, which was used by narcotics dealers to store drugs for future distribution.
[brief] (Raised below, 6T, Pg. 215)  The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that there is a bedrock principle articulated in Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct that “[a]n independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. ”  To that end, judges are required to maintain, enforce, and observe "high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved.  Judges are to "act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence," id. Canon 2(A), and "must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety," id. commentary on Canon 2 (emphasis added).  Indeed, as this Court recognized nearly a half century ago, "'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.'"  State v. Deutsch, 34 N.J. 190, 206, 168 A.2d 12 (1961) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13, 99 L.Ed. 11, 16 (1954)).  That standard requires judges to "refrain ... from sitting in any causes where their objectivity and impartiality may fairly be brought into question."  Ibid.  In other words, judges must avoid acting in a biased way or in a manner that may be perceived as partial.  To demand any less would invite questions about the impartiality of the justice system and thereby "threaten[] the integrity of our judicial process."  DeNike v. Cupo, 958 A. 2d 446, 453-454.  (N.J. 2008).  In this case, the Trial Judge, should have recused herself.