ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Pa24 to Pa36)  [...]’s answers to the plaintiff’s First and Second Sets of Interrogatories confirmed that the Theater Management System software generates various types of logs, including error reports.  (Pa37 to Pa43)  Supplemental Interrogatory No. 1 (First Set) stated, “Set forth a detailed description of the substance of all reports or logs automatically created by the Theater Management System software used by [...] in connection with the advertised August 13, 2016, 8:00 p.m., showing of the movie “Star Trek: Beyond” in Theater 5. ”  [...] answered, “TMS was reviewed (emphasis added) by [...] Brick Plaza 10 theatre personnel following Plaintiff’s alleged incident and showed that all cues played; TMS does not retain information dating as far back as August 13, 2016.
[brief] Id. at 12.  When questioned about how he determined the length of the “arms” that created the coverage area for the cell towers, he explained:  So…the length that was used for these arms is, again, an estimate and these are one mile, which is a rule of thumb for this particular technology and this particular frequency in this particular area.  So just based on my training and experience, one mile is a good estimate of the tower range for [...] in this area. ”  [emphasis omitted].  Id. at 12.  [...] also testified that there were two other cell towers that were closer to, and within the range of, the crime scene and that the crime scene was only slightly less than one mile from the Parkway Tower and at the “outer boundary” of his estimated coverage area.  Id. at 13.  [...]’s testimony did not rely on the “rule of thumb” estimation that was challenged and found to be net opinion in Burney.
[brief] Indeed, the problems that surrounded alcohol consumption “prompted States to enact a variety of regulations, including licensing requirements, age restrictions, and Sunday-closing laws. ”  Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2446, 2463 (2019).  Initially, the United States’s alcoholic beverage system followed the English “tied-house” system, under which “an alcohol producer, usually a brewer, would set up saloonkeepers, providing them with premises and equipment, and the saloonkeepers, in exchange, agreed to sell only that producer’s products and to meet set sales requirements. ”  *Id.* at 2463 n.7.  This resulted in the “proliferation of saloons, and myriad social problems were attributed to this development. ”  *Id.* at 2463.  States attempted to “ban the production and sale of alcohol within their borders, but those bans were ineffective because out-of-state liquor was immune from any state regulation as long as it remained in its original package. ”  *Id.* at 2465 (internal quotations omitted).  To combat this, in 1913, Congress passed the Webb-Kenyon Act, which expanded States’ regulatory authority over the importation of alcohol.  *Id.* at 2466.  Because these regulatory actions were ineffective, in 1919, the Eighteenth Amendment was ratified, prohibiting the manufacture, sale, or transportation of alcohol.  U.S. Const. Amend. XVIII.
[brief] If the Borough did not intend to use the Evaluation Sheet as a scoring rubric, the creation, adoption, and publication of the evaluation sheet did not foster any transparency in the process because the actual criteria would be known only to the Borough and remain hidden from the public.  Similarly, the Evaluation Sheet would have served no guiding purpose for the members of the Subcommittee and its deliberations if the members were considering other (unpublished) criteria arbitrarily (and, thus, subjectively) selected by each member.  Moreover, the trial court incorrectly minimized the importance of the Evaluation Sheet.  The trial court stated that no document indicated that the Evaluation Sheet was required to be used, but that finding is contradicted by the express language on the Evaluation Sheet, which states the document and enumerated criteria were to be used to review applications.  (9a).  Regardless, if the Borough did not intend to use the Evaluation Sheet, then none of the Subcommittee members would have used the Evaluation Sheet—rather than one member applying it.  The inconsistent use of the Evaluation Sheet is evidence that the different members of the Subcommittee applied different criteria and methodologies to reach their conclusions which, by definition, renders the process and Resolution arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable and not supported by credible evidence in the record.  See In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194.  Similarly, the Borough’s apparent reliance on company size, status as an international company, and other like matters indicates that the Borough’s review was based on subjective considerations with members allowed to consider any factor at all—rather than the criteria announced to the public.  Indeed, the Borough proceeded without any disclosure to the general public or any explanation of why it abandoned the published criteria, what criteria it would apply, or why the criteria was relevant to the operation of a cannabis retail establishment in the Borough.  Like in Pangaea, this Court’s intervention is necessary to engender public trust in the process under NJCREAMMA.
[brief] *Ibid.*  The Court concluded that the determination of whether the threat of violence must be of such a nature as to convey menace or fear of a crime of a violence must be made not “from the perspective of an anonymous ordinary person, but from the perspective of a reasonable person similarly situated to the victim. ”  *Id.* at 237-38.  The concern in adding the objective element was to assure consideration of whether it was objectively reasonable for the victim to fear for their safety in the context of their experiences with the perpetrator.  *Id.* at 238.  The Court explained that “context matters,” in terms of considering prior interactions between the parties, to protect against convictions “for statements made in jest, political dissent, or angry hyperbole, while allowing the State to prosecute true threats of violence that would instill fear of injury in a reasonable person in the victim’s position.
[brief] This reading, entirely reasonable from the face of the Settlement Agreement, harmonizes and gives full effect to both provisions.  The Probate Court chose a reading that creates a conflict and modifies the clear terms of the provisions.  The Probate Court never attempted to read the two provisions in harmony – it never addressed the issue at all.  (See Da274-75).  The Probate Court improperly created conflict when a reasonable reading exists that avoids conflict.
[directive] NOTE:  Be sure to update cases as their status or other elements change.  Classify each case by the most serious allegation while pending.  When the case closes, classify by the most serious sustained allegation or most serious allegation if none are sustained.  Internal Affairs Annual Report Date  Complaint Source of Length Received Complaint Date Closed of Case  IA Number Officer Complaint Allegation Status Criminal Disposition  Internal Disposition Discipline  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 - 11 - 12 - 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 - 17 - 18 - 19 - 20 - 21 - 22 - 23 - 24 - 25 - 26 - 27 - 28 - 29 - 30 - 31 - 32 -
[brief] In Adams, another medical negligence matter, the defendant asserted that the plaintiff was judicially estopped from disavowing the negligence of a settling joint tortfeasor, and the trial court rejected that assertion.  Id. at 7.  This Court affirmed, holding that, in the context of joint tortfeasors, damages are not divisible between multiple tortious events, and the allocation methodology in Glassman would not be possible in claims of a single, indivisible injury.  Id. at 13.  Importantly, this Court’s rationale was informed by the availability of a contribution claim:  Equally important is the fact that, unlike a successive tortfeasor, joint tortfeasors are not left without remedies against a settling codefendant.  Whereas Glassman expressly prohibits an allocation of fault against an initial tortfeasor, a joint tortfeasor may seek an allocation of liability against the settling codefendant at trial.  Any percentage of fault thus allocated “operates as a credit to the remaining defendants. ”  In addition, the right of contribution assures that a joint tortfeasor can seek a remedy for the fault allocated to settling codefendants.  It is plain that the equitable concerns underpinning Glassman do not exist in the joint tortfeasor context.  [Id. (emphasis added)].
[brief] For the Court’s convenience, a legible copy of the plans has been provided at Ja191-Ja218. dated December 17, 2021 (Exhibit F to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts)  ………………Ja091-Ja099  11.  3-D Computer Generated Views of the Project (Exhibit G to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts)………………Ja100-Ja103 12.  “Clear Height vs. Year Built vs. Size” Graph (Exhibit H to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts)………………Ja104-Ja105 13.  Industrial Buildings and Height Chart (Exhibit I to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts)  ………………Ja106-Ja107 14.  Defendant [...] Resolution No. Z.B. 2019-04 (Exhibit J to Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts)…………………………Ja108-Ja127 15.  [...] 1999 Master Plan (Exhibit K to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts)………………Ja128-Ja168 16.
[brief] The New Motion Judge erred, among other things, by holding that Plaintiff must prove that the emergency c-section “would” have occurred assuming that an emergency c-section had been called at 9:48 p.m.  Plaintiff argued, on reconsideration, that this case – and all cases, for that matter -- must be decided on the actual facts, not based on a hypothetical which assumes the occurrence of an event that did not happen.  What “would,” or more accurately “might,” have happened if the c-section had been called at 9:48 p.m. is, simply irrelevant, immaterial speculation.  Motions for summary judgment cannot be decided on hypothetical fact patterns.  Here, the c-section was not called until 10:12 p.m.  Therefore, the c-section could not have been completed within 15 minutes of 9:48 p.m.  In actual fact, the attending physician called for the emergency C-section almost immediately upon his review of fetal strip reading.  [Pa285-286].  In actual fact, the attending physician completed the C-section and delivered [...] at 10:27 p.m., a full 39 minutes after the abnormal strip was first observed, but fifteen minutes after he was first notified of the situation.
[brief] Pa140.  [...] acknowledged that she refers to the collective bargaining agreement for payroll purposes on various occasions: for example, holiday pay - unused holiday payment, which is part of the STFA contract, we refer to the contract for different things, as far as, you know, differential payment, clothing allowance payments, you know, there's multiple different things in the contract that pertain to the payroll that we refer to, so, yes, I'm familiar with the contract.
[brief] [...] disputes the existence of this “Third Loan” and maintains that the parties agreed the $330,000 Loan was paid in full as evidenced by the Discharge of Mortgage executed by [...].  There is no signed agreement memorializing any alleged “Third Loan” or agreement in April 2013 of any kind.  While the $50,000 Loan remained unpaid, there were no interest terms concerning that loan.  [...] never agreed in April 2013 to pay back a sum including interest on the $50,000 Loan.
[directive] Every municipal prosecutor shall annually file with the Division of Criminal Justice a completed Municipal Prosecutor Disclosure Statement (“Disclosure Statement”), Page 3 using the form created and published by the Division of Criminal Justice pursuant to Section I.C below.  Upon filing the required Disclosure Statement, the municipal prosecutor will be considered registered as a municipal prosecutor with the Division of Criminal Justice until such time as the filer files a Municipal Prosecutor Separation Statement (“Separation Statement”) or fails to timely file a required Disclosure Statement.  3.  Deadlines for Initial Disclosure Statements:
[brief] Pa 1-Pa 17.  In summary, despite having no prior experience, [...] claimed defendants interfered with his attempts to develop property known as “[...],” a substantial $25 million-dollar low income, tax credit subsidized, housing project, an extremely complex and highly regulated developmental process, projecting a profit of over $8 million dollars.  This would have been a completely new business venture for [...].  On August 15, 2017, Plaintiffs’ expert, [...], issued a report assessing the profits that a developer, not necessarily the Plaintiffs, would have made if it had successfully constructed a low income, tax credit subsidized project at [...].  Pa 274.  Defendants moved to bar the Powell report, which was denied by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on August 21, 2018, without making a decision on the applicability of the NBR.  PA 298.  The Court based its denial of the Defendants’ Motions on the existence of a dispute about the applicability of the NBR.  On September 12, 2019, the [...] filed a Motion to Bar the Powell report based on the NBR.  Pa 259.  On October 12, 2018, the trial court held oral argument and on October 15, 2018, the Honorable [...] entered an Order striking Powell’s Report and precluding him from testifying at trial (“Order Barring Expert”).  Pa 308.  On October 22, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order Barring Expert.  Pa 310.  On November 30, 2018, the Motion Judge held oral argument on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration.  2T.  On February 15, 2019 the Court entered an Order denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration.  Pa 1094.  On January 30, 2019, the Defendants filed Motions for Summary Judgment and on February 15, 2019, the Honorable [...] granted both summary judgment motions (Pa 1176 and Pa 1178), dismissing Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint against all remaining Defendants, with prejudice.
[brief] Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, “[a] party who advances a position in earlier litigation that is accepted and permits the party to prevail in that litigation is barred from advocating a contrary position in subsequent litigation to the prejudice of the adverse party. ”  Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 37 (2014)(emphasis added).  As noted, the Pennsylvania court rejected Plaintiff’s argument regarding jurisdiction and dismissed Plaintiff’s case.  Therefore, judicial estoppel does not bar Plaintiff’s current jurisdictional argument because Plaintiff did not prevail in Pennsylvania.  --- \(^4\) Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917).  \(^5\) Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).  Further, while judicial estoppel is a doctrine that bars a party to a legal proceeding from arguing a position inconsistent with one previously asserted, it is an “extraordinary remedy” and is only employed where a miscarriage of justice will result from a party’s inconsistent behavior.  *Id.*  Here, the only miscarriage of justice is that Defendants expect no court to exercise jurisdiction over them for their legal malpractice.  Equally important, “a party’s later position must be ‘clearly inconsistent’ with its earlier position” before courts apply judicial estoppel.  *New Hampshire v. Maine*, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001); *Ramer v. New Jersey Transit Bus Operations, Inc.*, 335 N.J. Super 304, 313 (App. Div. 2000) (finding it “not at all clear” the plaintiff’s former position was “so contradictory” to her current position as to warrant application of judicial estoppel).  Here, Plaintiff’s argument that New Jersey courts have jurisdiction is not “clearly inconsistent” with its prior argument because it is based on different evidence developed during a subsequent round of jurisdictional discovery.  Finally, Defendants’ judicial estoppel argument is absurd on its face.  According to Defendants, once a court in one state concludes it lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the plaintiff is forever barred by judicial estoppel from pursuing its claims against the defendant in the proper state.  That cannot be the law, and for all these reasons, Defendants’ judicial estoppel argument should be rejected.
[directive] A prosecutor is not required by these Guidelines to “package” multiple drug counts involving separate and distinct transactions.  When the defendant has been charged with more than one offense subject to a waivable minimum term of parole ineligibility, the prosecutor should calculate the appropriate authorized offer for each such charge involving a separate and distinct offense or transaction unless the prosecutor employs the aggregation of amounts feature established in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5c.  A prosecutor retains the discretion, subject to the rules governing the joinder of offenses (see R. 3:15-1), to refuse to dismiss provable charges as part of a plea agreement.  Because the prosecutor cannot compel the court to impose consecutive as opposed to concurrent sentences, the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion in refusing to “package” separate pending charges cannot result in formalized intercounty disparity within the meaning of State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998).
[brief] ” (3T 90:2-12).  Further, “on the fraud claims, I think the expert report alleges facts that are more than sufficient.  And again, the burden is on the moving party.  So I don’t think they’ve showed the absence of such. ” (3T 90:16-20).  The defendants also asked the trial court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ conversion claim because they sued directly, rather than derivatively.  The trial court rejected that argument, relying principally on *Brown Roofing* and related decisions, finding that “the so-called derivative claim rule . . . often is not practical in two-person entities or very small closely held companies especially where fraud is alleged.
[brief] Good or bad faith, at least on this issue, will be irrelevant. ”  Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 222.  c.  The Trial Court Erred As A Matter Of Law When It Concluded That No Violation Of The Judgment Occurred By [...]’s Failure To Proceed With The Seven Units At The Off-Site Property Because Block 610, Lot 1 Was Not Identified In The Judgment.
[brief] Regulations N.J.A.C. 13:35-6.16 .........................................................................................................................3, 5 Rules Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 .....................................................................................................passim Other Authorities  91 N.J.L.J 81 (Feb. 8, 1968) ...........................................................................................................13  93 N.J.L.J. 789 (Nov. 12, 1970) ......................................................................................................13  Am. Bar Ass'n Standing Committee on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 05–434 (Dec. 8, 2004) ..................................................................................................................
[brief] \(^1\)  As the Shaw Court appropriately recognized, the Attorney General’s interpretation of the CFA is “entitled to a degree of deference, in recognition of the Attorney General’s special role as the sole legal adviser to most agencies of State Government. ”  460 N.J. Super. at 617 (quoting Quarto v. Adams, 35 N.J. Super. 502, 513 (App. Div. 2007).  With both the benefit of hindsight and the insights provided by the Attorney General, the Shaw Court stated its intention to depart from Plemmons:
[brief] ”  [...]’s pre-trial request only serves to limit the compensation that can be paid to [...] for the taking before a jury even hears and considers the relevant facts.  [...]’s interlocutory appeal is truly remarkable because it complains about [...]’s real estate appraisal, which is based upon a “reasonable probability” of zoning approvals, even though [...]’s own appraiser also concludes that there was a “reasonable probability” of zoning approvals at the [...] property on the date of valuation.  The mere difference between the two valuation theories is that [...], in attempting to achieve just compensation for the taking, went one step further than [...]’s appraiser by obtaining an independent analysis from a professional planner which also concluded that there was a “reasonable probability” of a zoning change.  The Trial Court found these facts to be significant and lawfully denied [...]’s dispositive motion in limine.
[brief] Da444, 446.  [...]’s narrowly-tailored order provided that the ultimate “admissibility” of [...]’s prior statements would be “reserved for a later date”.  Da446.  [...]’s decision was based upon R. 4:10-2, which provides for broad discovery and that “[i]t is not grounds for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence[.]”  2T14:9-25.  [...] concluded that the Lavrik case relied upon by [...] did not preclude the taking of discovery regarding statements made during a guilty plea proceeding; rather Lavrik addressed whether the guilty plea statements would ultimately be “evidentiary” or “admissible” at trial.
[brief] This was set in motion via a letter sent to [...] alleging a need for “drug tests and urine from the [Respondents] kids. ” (8T32-3 to 134-17; 11T122-122-19 to 21; 11T126-17 to 127-4).  As noted by the Respondent:  And at the time, me, my two children and my ex-boyfriend had lived in that house and none of us were taking drug tests, so the whole thing was like suspicious.  But you know, I had an inkling of where it all originated from.  (11T127-5 to 9).  After obtaining a copy of the written complaint, the Respondent discovered that a letter was fabricated as being written by a “[...]. ”  This person, a childhood friend of the Respondent who died in an automobile accident in 2003, was well known to the Petitioner\(^6\).  Given the circumstances, the evidence strongly points to the Petitioner as the fabricator of that letter to [...].
[brief] ”  In fact, many of the matters filed before [...] are resolved on the papers.  See, (ICAa 052) which notes that 20% of the new cases filed were designated to be resolved on the papers.  All of the foregoing is consistent with the objective of No-Fault which is to, in part, pay meritorious PIP claims in a quick and efficient manner.  See Gambino v. Royal Globe Ins. Cos., 86 N.J. 100, 104 (1981) (“The Reparation objective. ”)
[brief] ”  Defendant claimed there was a “second shot fired. ”  He asked, “Remember…you heard something while we were driving away, right?  [...] unequivocally stated, “No. ”  Defendant then immediately changed the subject and asked her how she was doing and where she was living.  (7T:153-4 to 154-24; see also; 169-7 to 21).  [...] tried to hang up, but went on to accuse defendant of cheating and lying to her.  Defendant denied he did either.  (7T:154-23 to 157-25; 160-1 to 162-25).
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  An Appellate Court’s review of rulings of law and issues regarding the applicability, validity or interpretation of laws, statutes, or rules is de novo.  See In re Ridgefield Park Bd. Of Educ., 244 N.J. 1, 17 (2020) (agency’s interpretation of a statute); State v. Courtney, 243 N.J. 77, 85 (2020) (interpretation of sentencing provisions in the Criminal Code); State v. G.E.P., 243 N.J. 362, 382 (2020) (retroactivity of statute); State v. Hemenway, 239 N.J. 111, 125 (2019) (constitutionality of a statute); State v. Hyland, 238 N.J. 135, 143 (2019) (appealability of a sentence); Kocanowski v. Twp. Of Bridgewater, 237 N.J. 3, 9 (2019) (statutory interpretation); Green v. Monmouth Univ., 237 N.J. 516, 529 (2019) (applicability of charitable immunity); State v. Fuqua, 234 N.J. 583, 591 (2018) (statutory interpretation); State v. Dickerson, 232 N.J. 2, 17 (2018) (interpretation of court rules).