ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Within 45 days of the approved by the AOC.  pretrial risk-assessment process automated Director of the Division of the shall report to the agency, and to Police of this Directive, the State shall equipped, and Prosecutor, if the agency is not so and each appropriate County Criminal Justice initiate the automated capacity to would need to take to achieve the agency indicate what steps the update Scan softwaxe, obtain new hardware, update Live pretrial risk-assessment process (e.g., or mandate any purchase shall construed to system, Nothing herein be operating etc.).  computer initiating the capable of with Live Scan system equipped a and an agency that is not expenditure, fingerprinting other arrangements for will make risk-assessment process pretrial AOC-approved 2.2.4.  2.2.3 and pursuant to subsections defendants Directive. immediately upon issuance of this operational Section shall become This Requirements.  Fingerprinting 2.2  Support eCDR System.  Scan System to Up-to-Date Live Requirement Use 2.2.1 to statute, see required by for which fingerprinting is of an adult for any offense arrest  Upon the shall take making the arrest enforcement agency 53:1-18.1,4 the law N.J.S.A. 53:1-15 and N.J.S.A. part that: in pertinent provides N.J.S.A. 53:1-15 and any other law Police members of the State of police, sheriffs, chiefs The any person arrest of shall, immediately upon the agencies and officers enforcement paragraph (1), (2), specified in grounds or for any of the offense, for an indictable 2C:25-21) or of any 1991, 261 (C. section of P.L. c. of 5 of subsection a. or (4) (3) habitual believed to be a indictable offense, or for an be wanted believed to person law filing of complaint by a after the a reasonable time within criminal, or a or upon the indictable offense, person with an any officer charging enforcement upon the arrest 2C:20-11, or toN.J.S. shoplifting, pursuant person for of any arrest conviction of any 2C:34-1, or the toN.J.S. pursuant prostitution, person for of any 16 Page the of capable initiating Scan system person a using Live by the of and the fingerprints submit Directive while that this Note AOC. approved the by process risk-assessment pretrial automated N.J.S.A. pursuant court to adult to waived is who a defendants, juvenile adult generally to applies be shall of juvenile), election at (waiver N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-27 or waiver) (involuntary 2A:4A-26.1 must prosecutor court, adult to waived (when is juvenile 4.8 Section a also an See adult. as treated filed).
[brief] Da366-67.  The County provided a reasoned analysis:  The [NJDOT Notice] is not an immaterial waivable term.  It is required in all applicable County bid specifications and this requirement is featured prominently on the title pages.  It states very clearly that the pre-qualification must be included.  The specifications also cite Section 102 of the standard DOT bid specs that apply to this bid.  If a bidder did not have such a confirmed DOT pre-qualification, the firm is not legally authorized to perform the work.  That alone, unequivocally, means the term is material...  In other words, without such a pre-qualification, the bidder’s bid cannot be considered and/or must be rejected just as it is with DOT bids awarded by the Commissioner of the DOT.  The River Vale test which you cite in support of your position is factually distinguishable and not persuasive given the facts of this situation.  It can hardly be immaterial and waivable if a bidder isn’t qualified by the DOT to perform such work.  To deviate from that clear requirement could jeopardize the County’s position with DOT and ultimately harm the County and its taxpayers.  Secondly, all such bids in [...] have been required to include DOT pre-qualification.
[directive] Transparency regarding law enforcement internal affairs investigations is necessary to foster strong police-community relationships and public trust, as previous Attorney General Directives and judicial opinions have repeatedly explained.  In light of those interests, a recent New Jersey Supreme Court decision, Office, 250 N.J. 124 (2022), Rivera v. Union County Prosecutor’s requires that a range of internal affairs reports may be publicly accessible under the common law right of access upon request.  This Directive is necessary (1) to reduce uncertainty, delays, and litigation costs relating to sustained1 records requests after Rivera; (2) to promote transparency for the misconduct that is most likely to undermine public trust on a uniform basis across the State; and (3) to ensure that sensitive information contained in disclosed internal affairs records is appropriately redacted in a consistent and timely manner.  Accordingly, this Directive provides agencies with additional protocols for responding to requests for internal affairs findings going forward.  It also increases proactive disclosure as to internal affairs in order to obviate the need for some such requests.  In Rivera, the Supreme Court reiterated that internal affairs records are exempt from access under New Jersey’s Open Public Records Act.
[directive] Effective April18, 2016, the New Jersey legislature amended N.J.S.A. 2C:52-{) to of a fee, of all information provide for the expedited expungement, without the assessment relating to an arrest or charge for a disorderly persons offense, petty disorderly persons or. ordinance violation where that charge has been resolved by way of a dismissal, offense, acquittal, or discharged without a finding of guilt.  Notably, this relief is not available where the disposition from a plea bargaining agreement involving the conviction of other re~ulted  The statute provides that the municipal court shall provide a person, upon charges. at the time of dismissal, with appropriate documentation that must also then request and to the Superior Court pursuant to procedures developed by the be transmitted Administrative Office of the Courts.  Those procedures are set forth in the attached "Instructions and Forms for Expungemt:mt of Arrest or Charge Records."  That set of instructions and forms consists of the following three documents:  (a) a of Instructions, which direct the applicant and the c9urt through the three-step cover page expungement request process; (2) the Application for Expungement of Arrest or Charge to be used by the municipal court to determine whether the Records ('~Application"), eligible for expungement; and (3) the Order for Expungement of Arrest or charges are Charge Records rorder"), which is the official document to effectuate the expungement.  ·  ·  The Instructions indicate that expungement under the statute is available only where a charge has been disposed of by way of dismissal, acquittal, or di$charge without or finding of guilt and that was not otherwise the result of a plea bargaining a conviction the Instructions indicate that the form is only to be provided upon agreement.  Likewise, at the time of disposition.  For those reasons, the statute does not extend to . request and to N.J.S.A. 2C:36A-1, or matters resolved through conditional discharge, pursuant · conditional dismissal, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-13.1.  Subj: Expedited Expungement of Arrest/Charge Records Date: May 23, 2016
[brief] [...]’s argument that he may be granted a civil reservation in the future pursuant to R. 3:9-2 is also unavailing.  No civil reservation has been granted and one may never be entered.  Moreover, even a civil reservation would not necessarily prevent [...] from being cross-examined with his prior inconsistent statements.  “Statements made under oath by a defendant in the proceedings leading up to his entry of a guilty plea may be admissible against him in a later proceeding under N.J.R.E. 803(a)(1) even if an order barring admission of the plea itself was entered by the judge who accepted it.
[brief] See North Haledon Fire Co. No. 1 v. Borough of North Haledon, 425 N.J. Super 615, 631 (App. Div. 2012) (“An issue not raised below will not be considered for the first time on appeal. ”)  [...]’s position should also be rejected on the merits.  The Complaint sets forth a single book account cause of action and alleges that [...] “made numerous attempts to obtain payment without result. ”  (Pa8.)  The Complaint does not allege that at any point the parties resolved the dispute.  It also does not assert a cause of action for breach of contract in connection with a purported agreement to resolve the dispute.  Nor does it allege that the mandatory dispute resolution provision is inoperative based on a purported resolution of the dispute.  To the contrary, what the Complaint makes plain is that there was a live dispute between [...] and [...] concerning the outstanding retainage.  Similarly, [...]’s Certification in opposition to the Motion provides that [...] was “actively engaged in correspondence” with [...], but that [...] “still refused payment. ”  (Pa55.)  [...] goes on: “This case should not be dismissed as [[...]] demonstrated its objection to payment or voluntary resolution over a year of email exchanges and discussions. ”  (Pa55.)  [...]’s Certification does not suggest that the parties ever resolved the dispute; rather, it states the opposite, that [...] steadfastly objected to paying the claimed retainage amount.
[brief] Over two months before the Trial in this matter, specifically on September 16, 2022, [...] appeared before [...] on a different matter, the matter of [...] v. [...], et. al., Docket # [...].  (1T Pg. 1).  That appearance was Post-Judgement; a Judgement had previously been issued against [...], and the Plaintiff in that matter was in the process of collection.  (1T Pg. 4 Lines 5-8).  Already in that matter, [...] indicated very clearly on the record to Judge Grasso Jones that she continues to rule against him no matter what happens; she is unfair and not objective.  (1T Pg. 7, Lines 14-19).  [...] further notified [...], that he had just the day before spoken personally with the FBI field office in New Jersey who will be investigating this entire matter, including [...] for continued harassment.  He made extremely clear, repeatedly that he has now let the federal authorities get involved and investigate this up to the level of [...] (1T. Pg. 13, Line 16 - pg. 14, Line 2).  [...] continued his complaint that [...] made rulings against him, “every ruling possible. ”  He said that he had never seen a judge act like this in his life, and that he was going to make sure she is removed from the matter. ” (1T Pg. 14, lines 17-20).  [...] advised [...] that she would be hearing from the FBI field office in Newark, New Jersey.  And further complained that she allowed plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel man to weaponize the courts. ” (1T Pg. 15, Lines 2-7).  [...] further charged that there’s corruption involved, continuously against him.  (1T, Pg. 15, Lines 16-17).  He said that [...] has been biased.  (1T, Pg. 15, line 21).  And he repeated that he is taking action against the Court and will not be harassed by her, whose actions are inappropriate.  Because she is continuously harassing him, and allow plaintiff to use the court as a weapon.  (1T, Pg. 16, lines 15-22).  He repeated that he notified the federal authorities the [...]’s harassment and corruption.  (1T, Pg. 17, lines 2-6).
[brief] Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550, at *9\(^{15}\) (explaining the legislative intent and holding “[t]he Legislature, however, did not provide a private right of action under the CFLA – and plaintiff does not contend otherwise . . .”).  Thus, Appellant cannot commit an end run around the NJCFLA’s bar on private rights of action by pleading the statute as the basis for a declaratory judgment.  Thus, the Lower Court correctly dismissed Appellant’s Complaint as a matter of law.
[brief] Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C. PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS’ REPLY  BRIEF  [...]  [...], Esq.  (NJ ID#: 009192001)  [...], Esq. (NJ ID#: 009162010)  [...], Esq.  (NJ ID#: 907732012)  [...] [...], [...] [...]  [...]  [...]  [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants, [...]; [...]
[brief] Putting aside that [...] improperly attempted to raise this new argument for the first time in its reply, [...] offers no proof that 96-year-old [...], or her goddaughter and power of attorney, [...], personally accessed their website or “register[ed] for online access. ”  At best, [...]’s Chief Operating Officer, [...] (“[...]”), who never met or spoke to Plaintiffs, offered an opinion that someone accessed their website after their former employees defrauded the Plaintiffs.  Critically, neither [...] nor [...] have personal knowledge of the “facts” contained in his certification in violation of Rule 1:6-6, and not one of [...]’s business records supports their allegations.  And even if this Court were to consider [...]’s unsubstantiated allegations, raised for the first time in [...]’s reply submission and before Plaintiffs had the opportunity to conduct any discovery on this issue, [...] also ignores the abundance of *published* caselaw that squarely addresses and invalidates the browsewrap agreement.  Plaintiffs have suffered significant and potentially permanent financial harm due to [...]’s and its former employees’ misconduct.  Rather than direct their disdain to their employees/former employees - including [...], who [...] terminated for the unlawful conduct alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint while [...]’s motion to compel arbitration was pending – [...] instead focuses their ire on Plaintiffs, the victims of a fraudulent scheme and [...]’s negligence that resulted in the theft of [...]’s life savings.  [...]’s continuing efforts to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights to have this case adjudicated in the proper forum before a jury must come to an end.
[brief] (Ca1 to 33).  There, the State sought to join the Hudson County Indictment with the Indictment here.  In the alternative, the State sought to admit certain other-crime evidence.  Included in the motion were photos taken from defendant’s Instagram and phone and police investigative reports that the judge relied on for his decision.  (Ca34 to 59).  On October 24, 2024, the Hon. [...], J.S.C., issued an oral decision denying the motion for joinder and limiting the other crime evidence to be admitted.
[brief] **  [...]’s Global Fee Application sought to have the Chancery Court engage in the utterly impossible task of critically analyzing **5,485.1 hours** of post-judgment collection work purportedly conducted over a roughly six-year period (from July 27, 2016 to September 7, 2022).  Two of those six years (July 27, 2016 to approximately July 27, 2018) were overseen by a different Chancery Court Judge ([...]).  Accordingly, in 2023, [...] was required to evaluate, among other things, a two-year period of extremely complicated and highly unusual post-judgment proceedings that he did not oversee and which took place half a decade or more before he conducted his review.  That time-period of work was lumped in with the rest of the 5,485.1 hours of work for which [...] sought payment of counsel fees in the Global Fee Application.  [...]’s counsel also claimed the Global Fee Application did not include “fees incurred and awarded as a result of certain other discrete efforts that previously resulted in awards of attorneys’ fees. ” (Da7-8, ¶5).  That is, [...] had previously been awarded a total of $2,721,804.14 in connection with several prior fee applications, all of which, importantly, were related to specific alleged bad acts by [...] and/or [...].  (Id.)  Of course, it would have been incredibly time consuming and likely impossible for the Chancery Court or [...] to effectively compare the 5,485.1 hours sought for payment in [...]’s Global Fee Application with the numerous prior fee applications to truly conclude that there was no duplication between the applications.
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  Pursuant to N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, para. 4, the New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted R. 2:2-3(a)(2), which contemplates that every proceeding to review the action or inaction of a state administrative agency would be by appeal to the New Jersey Appellate Division.  Thus, the rule mandates the exclusive allocation to the Appellate Division of review of both final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer, and the validity of any rule promulgated by such agency or officer.  R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011).  Under New Jersey Court Rules, appeals may be taken to the Appellate Division "to review final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer[]"  R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  Appellate Courts do not render advisory opinions or function in the abstract.  N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. State, 88 N.J. 605, 612 (1982).  The Appellate Court need not defer to the agency’s determination on purely legal issues.  "[A]lthough the determination of an administrative agency is entitled to deference, our appellate obligation requires more than a perfunctory review."  Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002).  The Court’s function is "to engage in 'a careful and principled consideration of the agency record and findings,'" and not merely rubberstamp the agency’s decision.  Williams v. Department of Corrections, 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting *Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec.*, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).  Final agency actions can be reversed if those actions are 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [if the action] is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'"  *N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric.*, 196 N.J. 366, 384-85 (2008) (quoting *Henry v. Rahway State Prison*, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)) (alteration in original).  The Supreme Court has observed that the Appellate Court can overturn an administrative agency's determinations or findings if there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence.  *Bartley Healthcare Nursing & Rehab. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Senior Servs.*, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 329, 27-28 (App.Div. Feb. 15, 2011) citing *In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees*, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008).
[directive] N.J.S.A. See process. for motion no detention, pretrial and seek to prosecutor for a norm, the not exception, shall the be Directive.  this by authorized be may as except filed shall be detention pretrial give to will expected be prosecutors detention, pretrial seek to whether deciding  In the by approved process risk-assessment pretrial objective the of results the to weight substantial See ODARA. of the the results applicable, when and, 2A:162-25(c), N.
[directive] All Law Enforcement Chief Executives FROM: [...], Director  DATE: April 27, 2004  SUBJECT: Revision, Standard DWI Refusal Statement, Effective April 26, 2004  Effective Monday, April 26, 2004, Governor [...] signed Assembly Bill into law.  This bill amends the penalties for refusing to submit to No. 2259, First Reprint, chemical breath testing, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a.  The provisions in this bill became effective immediately upon adoption (A2259 [1R], §4).  With the adoption of this bill, it was necessary to have the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (formerly the Director, Division of Motor Vehicles) approve a revised Standard Statement for Operators of a Motor Vehicle, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e).  The NJMVC Chief Administrator approved that revision to become effective immediately upon the adoption of into law.  A copy of the Assembly Bill No. 2259, First Reprint, revised Standard Statement for Operators of a Motor Vehicle is attached.
[brief] That witness was defense investigator [...], who testified that she took photos for the defense on [...] on July 14, 2021, but the evidentiary ruling discussed in Point I, infra, prevented any of those photos from going into evidence.  (14T 110-16 to 111-19)  Rivera further testified that [...], across Edgemere from the back yards of the 22/24 [...] walkway into which the suspect initially ran, is a vacant lot, but a ruling by the trial judge that is also discussed in more detail in Point I, infra, prevented defense counsel from presenting photos D-115 and 116 (Da 20) or making any argument to the jury about the significance of that fact.  (15T 27-25 to 29-23)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE TRIAL JUDGE
[brief] Dated: March 14, 2024  [...], Plaintiff/Appellant, -vs- [...] AND [...] (fictitious name), Defendant/Respondent.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO.: [...]  On Appeal From: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION  MORRIS COUNTY DOCKET NO: [...] Sat Below: [...], J.S.C. RESPONDENT
[brief] The ‘necessity’, however, which may give rise to an easement does not necessarily connote that without an easement the dominant tenant could have no beneficial enjoyment of his lands whatsoever, and the word should be understood as meaning ‘reasonably necessary for convenient, comfortable or beneficial enjoyment. ’  Kelly v. Dunning, 43 N.J. Eq. 62, 10 A. 276 (Ch. 1887), aff’d sub nom., Dunning v. Kelly, 46 N.J. Eq. 605, 22 A. 128 (E. & A. 1890); Karason Co. v. Anglo-American Leather Co., Inc., 136 N.J. Eq. 344, 41 A.2d 895 (Ch. 1945).  Such designation is preferable to the naked use of the word ‘necessity. ’  ‘that the parties to the conveyance are presumed to act with reference to the actual, visible and known condition of the properties at the time and to intend that the benefits and burdens manifestly belonging respectively to each part of the entire tract shall remain unchanged. ’  Tidewater, at 161-162 (emphasis added).  In this case, the [...] subdivided its lot and then conveyed the new lot to Plaintiff in exchange for Plaintiff’s obligation to construct a synagogue.
[brief] During the trial, it was established that the Trust appraisals for the Boonton and Florida Properties did not determine fair market value.  Instead, the appraisals were ordered for informational purposes and the market values obtained therefrom were non-binding upon the parties, who were instructed to meet and discuss their options, by way of a settlement conference, pursuant to the January 25, 2022 Order.  (14a)  However, Plaintiff ignored the Order, which constitutes a breach of trust.
[directive] II.  BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF FACTS SUPPORTING EACH RELEVANT FACTOR IN SUPPORT OF NO-KNOCK REQUEST  The submitting officer must include a concise set of facts in support of the request for a no-knock provision below based upon the factors cited above.  If approved, said set of facts must be included in the affidavit under a section entitled: REQUEST FOR NO-KNOCK WARRANT and must articulate all applicable factors which form (facts specific to the case) the basis for the no-knock warrant request.  The facts supporting the request for a no-knock provision are as follows:  III.