ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See Marmo, 478 N.J. Super. at 611 (conduct by the plaintiff that demonstrates the intent to invoke “judicial enforcement processes that are, by comparison, more robust than those in arbitration” evince waiver).  Third, the delay in seeking arbitration was part of [...]’s litigation strategy tactics.  [...] used the Chancery Court’s equitable powers to obtain significant and extraordinary, immediate restraints against Appellants.  She availed herself to the Chancery Court’s authority for a mediation referral.  [...] used the Chancery Court to obtain copious discovery from Appellants.  Once [...]’s deposition date was quickly approaching and trial about two months away, [...] ceased responding to discovery and filed her Motion to Compel Arbitration.  [...]’s delay tactics, including over nine months of availing herself to the benefits of the Chancery Court only to hit pause on essentially the eve of trial, weigh in favor of waiver.
[brief] Under the new bill the legislative officer will review each bill after its introduction and if state revenues or expenditures are affected, certify to the presiding officer and appropriate committee chairman in the house of the bill's origin that a fiscal note is necessary.  If the presiding officer or committee chairman then requests a note, the Legislative Budget Officer shall forward the request to the Director of the Division of Budget and Accounting.  The Director, in turn, is required to forward the request within five business days to the appropriate executive agency which then has 20 business days to make its response.  The Director then has five business days to review the agency response and return the note to the legislative Budget Officer, who must make his own review within ten business days and forward it to the sponsor.  If the sponsor has no objections within ten business days, the note will be printed; if there are objections, they will be written into the note.  If the appropriate executive agency and the Director of the Division of Budget and Accounting make no response within 30 days to the legislative Budget Office, the Division of Budget and Program Review in the office of Legislative Services shall prepare a note.  In a situation where a speedier response is necessary, the legislative Budget Office may shorten the executive agency and the Director of Budget and Accounting's response to ten days.  Under the old practice the appropriate legislative committee requested the notes and there were no deadlines.
[brief] The resolution of the defense claims has yielded a brand-new case involving [...]’s Indemnity Claim.  [...] has engaged new counsel and entered into Case Management Order No. 6, which treats the Indemnity Claim as a new litigation with its own set of deadlines for written, document and deposition discovery, expert discovery, and dispositive motion practice.  Da391-93.  Finally, the arbitration clauses in [...]’s Pollution and Umbrella Policies, by their plain terms, are mandatory and applicable to this dispute.  [...]’s arguments would render the Pollution Policy’s arbitration clause meaningless and ignore settled FAA case law.  Contrary to [...]’s contention, the Pollution Policy’s Service of Suit clause states it is subject to the arbitration clause; thus, it has no bearing on [...]’s arbitration rights.  Further, arbitration under the Umbrella Policy – which is only available over disputes regarding the pollution exclusion – is mandated because [...]’s Indemnity Claim involves, among other things, the allocation of pollution and non-pollution damages.  ARGUMENT
[brief] The Antenuptial Agreement is a waiver of all rights that Petitioner had to any property owned by Decedent.  The Chancery Division’s reliance upon *Carr v. Carr*, 120 NJ. 336 (1990) does not support its holding.  That matter, fundamental distinguishable, does not provide a suitable foundation for its decision.  In *Carr*, the wife was in the process of divorcing her husband when he died, and as a result, was not entitled to her equitable distribution or her elective share.
[brief] In his opening statement, counsel argued that the evidence would show a NJSP employee named “[...]” tried to pressure the various police officers to say that defendant showed them a wallet ID, when [...] possessed defendant’s surrendered ID.  (9T162-10 to 167-6).  During the State’s case, NJSP Lieutenant Wesley [...] testified that he searched defendant’s person for the wallet ID, pursuant to search warrants obtained for defendant’s person, car, and residence, because NJSP “wanted to determine if [defendant] was still in possession of [NJSP] identification. ”  --- 23
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO RESPONDENT [...] AS THERE WAS SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO DEMONSTRATE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT OF A DANGEROUS CONDITION.  (1T, Pa1-19)  Appellant contends that the claims alleged as to a dangerous condition were not properly taken into account by the Trial Court.  The New Jersey Tort Claims Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 59:4-1a, defines a “dangerous condition” on the property of a public entity as “a condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury when such property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used. ”  It is obvious in this case, that the parking lot was meant to be walked on and a damaged, deteriorated parking lot with cracks, crevices and potholes would create a substantial risk of injury this making it a dangerous condition as defined by the Tort Claims Act (hereinafter “TCA”).  The Trial Court stated that it “is unable to find within the photographs anything more than small cracks or uneven surfaces in the parking lot”.  (Pa9)  While many courts have determined that not every defect is actionable under the TCA, that does not mean that there is no defect that is actionable.  The Court in Scheps v. Twp. of Delran “determined that it was up to the jury to determine whether the pothole was a dangerous condition”.  Scheps v. Twp. of Delran, DOCKET NO. A-0142-18T3, 6 (App. Div. Aug. 23, 2019).  In the Scheps case, the pothole was alleged to have violated the American Society of Testing Materials (ASTM) and New Jersey Department of Transportation's (NJDOT) roadway standards, which require roadways to remain flush and even with adjacent surfaces.  The Trial Court in the matter erroneously made a determination as to the dangerousness of the condition when it should have been a matter for a jury to determine.
[brief] After the parties met and conferred, [...]’s counsel sent a follow-up email memorializing the parties’ positions on this RFP: “defendant believes this request is way too broad, plaintiff believes it can be easily responded to by producing all of the material in salesforce for these two accounts,” and “[d]efense counsel will check into getting the materials from salesforce that are responsive to the request. ”  [...]’s counsel responded, “Correct. ”  (ECF 65-1, at 2.)  “Salesforce” is a cloud-based software company that provides customer relationship management software and applications, among other offerings.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  ..... ii LEGAL ARGUMENT  ...........................................................................................................1  Point  I  THE FACTS OF RECORD WOULD ALLOW A JURY TO CONCLUDE THAT [...] ENGAGED IN PROTECTED ACTIVITY UNDER THE NJLAD AND THAT DEFENDANTS RETALIATED AGAINST HIM IN WAYS WHICH WOULD DISSUADE A REASONABLE WORKER FROM OPPOSING PRACTICES OR ACTS FORBIDDEN UNDER THE NEW JERSEY LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION AND THE ORDER OF SUMMARY
[directive] Victim-Witness Resources.  6.4  Once a barricade situation has been determined to exist, Victim- Witness Assistance resources from the County Prosecutor’s Office or the New Jersey State Police should be notified and available to respond in the event the resources are needed.  This notification is especially important in situations when hostages or family members of the barricaded individual are present.  The decision to request a response from a victim- witness advocate shall be made by a representative of the County Prosecutor’s Office or the Incident Commander.  As with mental health professionals, while an in-person response to the barricaded individual incident is preferable here too, telephonic or virtual responses can add significant value as well.
[brief] ........................................34  A.  The Court’s Enforcement of the Photocopy Is So Manifestly Unsupported by Adequate, Substantial, Credible Evidence as To Offend the Interests of Justice (P36a to P42a)  ..............................................................................35  B.  The Court Abused Its Discretion by Admitting the Photocopy Into Evidence At Trial (P36a-37a)  .....................................................................................35  C.  The Photocopy Violates the Uniform Pre-Marital Agreement Act and Should Not Have Been Enforced.  (P39a).  ....................................................................................45  D.  The Waiver Provisions of the Photocopy Are Unenforceable and The Court’s Contrary Findings Should be Reversed (P39a to P42a).  ..................................................46  POINT THREE (ALTERNATIVE COUNT)  .................................................................48  THE GRANT OF A LIFE ESTATE WITHOUT RIGHTS OF ALIENATION IS UNEQUITABLE AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION WARRANTING THAT A JUST AND FAIR ALLOCATION BE GRANTED (P43a to P44a).........................................................................................48
[brief] ARGUMENT  [...] should be compelled to add [...] and [...] as document custodians because of their intimate involvement in the issues and exchanges at the heart of Plaintiffs’ claims.  Courts routinely order the addition of custodians who, like here, are “involved in discussions and decisions regarding” the facts at issue.  In re EpiPen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Mktg., Sales Practices and Antitrust Litig., No. 17-md-2785-DDC-TJJ, 2018 WL 1440923, at *3-4 (D. Kan. Mar. 15, 2018) (adding former CEOs as document custodians); see also Shenwick v. Twitter, No. 16-CV-05314-JST (SK), 2018 WL 833085, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb 7, 2018) (granting request to add [...] given his involvement in the allegations); MariCal, Inc. v. Cooke Aquaculture, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00366-JDL, 2016 WL 9459260, at *2 (D. Me. Aug. 9, 2016) (granting request to add custodian who were likely “involved in discussions regarding” the patents at issue).
[brief] In addition to coordinating all insurance-related anti-fraud activities of State and local departments and agencies, the IFPA directs the OIFP to provide any assistance necessary to any State agency in overseeing administrative enforcement activities.  N.J.S.A. 17:33A-24(a).  Under the direction of the Attorney General, the OIFP shall also “[f]ormulate and evaluate proposals for legislative, administrative, and judicial initiatives to strengthen insurance fraud enforcement. ”  N.J.S.A. 17:33A-24(b).  The OIFP investigates a wide range of insurance fraud schemes and serves as the focal point for prosecuting all insurance fraud in the State of New Jersey.
[brief] ............................... passim King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015)  ....................................................................................  17  Madison v. Res. for Hum. Dev., Inc., 233 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2000) ......................................................................  26  Matter of C.P.M., 461 N.J. Super. 573 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2019)  ................................. passim Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280 (2003)
[brief] In Stuart, the defendant had one, prolonged disruption.  [Da13-14].  Defendant’s attempts to hinder his trial process began on the first day before jury selection when defendant repeatedly interrupted the judge to argue about material he did not have.  In the middle of jury selection, defendant absented himself from the courtroom and refused to return after a 10-minute recess.  [1T18-20 to 21-5].  Defendant emerged briefly before the judge returned to the bench then quickly left again.  [1T20-12 to -16].  [...] suspended jury selection for the day.  [1T22-10 to -13].
[brief] 22  POINT III  THE JUDGE ABUSED HER DISCRETION UNDER N.J.R.E. 609(B)  WHEN SHE RULED THAT SIX PRIOR CONVICTIONS OF DEFENDANT’S -- THAT WERE ALL MORE THAN 18 YEARS OLD AND FOR WHICH THE SENTENCES HAD ALL BEEN SERVED FOR MORE THAN TEN YEARS -- WOULD BE ADMISSIBLE TO AFFECT DEFENDANT’S CREDIBILITY IF HE TESTIFIED.  (RULING AT 14T 10-6 TO 11-24)  ..............................................  28  CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................
[brief] (13T:10 to 14).  [...] testified that on August 2, 2019, he drove to [...] and met up with [...] and another male – [...].  (13T:43-10 to 17; 45-1 to 46-16).  [...] testified that the white vehicle belonging to [...] was at the residence when he arrived; however, at around 10:00 a.m., [...] and [...] got into the vehicle [...] arrived in and [...] drove off the white vehicle belonging to Books.  (13T:43-18 to 45-13; 48-21 to 49-17; 64-12 to 18).  According to [...], he and [...] then went and picked up [...] because [...] and Sudan both had court appearances in Asbury Park municipal court.  (13T:49-22 to 50-10).  They drove to the municipal court in Asbury Park.  [...] and Sudan went inside the courthouse and [...] remained in the vehicle.  Their court appearance lasted about 20-30 minutes (13T:50-12 to 51-18).  Afterwards, they went to an outlet store – “like a clothing store. ”  [...] did not recall the name of shopping complex or where it was located, but he supposed it was the [...].  [...] was now driving [...]’s vehicle because [...] did not have a driver’s license, so he did not want to drive out of the police station.  (13T:51-19 to 52-21).  They shopped for approximately 40 minutes, then went back to [...].  (13T:53-2 to 9).  [...] further testified that when they arrived at the residence, [...] white Corolla was there; however, Mr. [...] was not.  [...] testified that [...] went over to the Corolla to look for the keys, which he claims [...] never found.  Sometime thereafter, police arrived at the residence.  (13T:53-20 to 55-13).  [...] testified that he was on the porch, sitting on the steps when the officers began looking for the keys to the Corolla, which were ultimately found in a trash can on the porch.  (13T:56-3 to 57-11).  Notably, on cross examination, [...] testified to different events prior to retuning to Myrtle Avenue.  When pressed on the timeline of events that day, he testified that they also stopped to his daughter’s house to drop off the clothes he bought at the outlet stores.  This was not part of his timeline during direct examination.  (13T:70-7 to 23).  [...] also admitted that his testimony in court was different than the two statements he gave to detective.  He claimed someone had subsequently altered his words.  (13T:75-16 to 78-19; 79-15 to 86-1).  When pressed further, [...] changed his story again and stated that “the whole given statement that day wasn’t true.  I didn’t want to talk.  They wouldn’t let me go. ” (13T:91-6 to 12).  Then when asked if the officers manipulated his statement, [...] switched gears again and testified that “Yes.  I didn’t say the majority of that. ” (13T:91-14 to 16).  [...] defense did not call [...].
[brief] For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully submitted that February 7, 2023 Judgment in favor of [...] be affirmed.  [...]  Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent, [...] BY: /s/ [...]  Dated: September 5, 2023  [...]  [...], Esq. (ID104332014)  [...] [...], [...]  [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPPELLATE DIVISION CIVIL ACTION  DOCKET No.: [...]  On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Monmouth County, Law Division, Docket No.: [...]  Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Plaintiff / APPELLANT’S REPLY
[brief] Id. at 584-85.  Nonetheless, the court did not reverse the trial even after such inflammatory remarks – remarks that are far more inflammatory than those used in this case.  Id. at 588-89.  The Court so found: (1) because much of the summation was based upon the evidence presented at an extremely emotional trial; (2) because the judge issued a curative instruction; and, (3) “most importantly,” because the evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming and “based primarily on the inculpatory statements made by defendant after the murder.
[brief] *In re: Zantac (Ranitidine) Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 644 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1094, 1285 (S.D. Fla. 2022) (excluding the plaintiffs’ experts’ unreliable and unsupported general-causation opinions).  As in *Zantac*, it is telling that “there was no scientist outside this litigation who” holds the general-causation opinions that Plaintiff asserts in this case.  *Id.* at 1094.  This Court should immediately correct the manifest denial of justice in rejecting summary judgment, where Plaintiff has no proof of general causation, her experts are not qualified to offer general-causation opinions, and any opinions they do offer are not grounded in reliable methods or sufficient facts and data.
[directive] coordinating a serve to positioned best are counties, their respective in agency enforcement  Page 3 investigation involved in the Offices must be Prosecutor's County effective, most To be agencies are participating of the all that Doing so ensures beginning. very from the For that Standards. in described the practices best following the regularly and communicating a receives agency law enforcement or local county, state, whenever a directing that reason, I am in incident its such an learns about (or otherwise sexual assault complaint of a report or 24 hours. within Office County Prosecutor's relevant notify the must agency jurisdiction), that protocols implement and Office to develop Prosecutor's each County directing  In addition, I am requirement. notification with this complying agencies in enforcement that assist law of Regardless Resources, of Available Victims Sexual Assault
[brief] ARGUMENT I.  Defendants’ Due Process Rights Were Violated When the Appellate Division Substituted An Unsubstantiated Jury Award of $500,000 to A New Award of $449,798.50  For Legal Fees (Raised Below: Da45)  On the appeal, the Appellate Division substituted an unsubstantiated jury award of $500,000, which was vacated by Appellate Division for Plaintiff’s failure to prove actual damages, with a new award for $449,798.50 to Plaintiff for attorney fees despite the fact that Defendants were not afforded an opportunity to challenge this new award and the trial records are devoid of any analysis regarding the legal fees claimed by Plaintiff.  The Appellate Division was aware that the amount of the award for attorney fees was problematic.  (See Da40 n. 7)  By substituting the award of $49,798.50 as legal fees to Plaintiff’s attorneys, the Appellate Division assumed a fact not in the record that Jury was awarding the Plaintiff’s attorneys $500,000 for legal fees.  Defendants’ Fourteenth Amendment due process right was violated when their right to a fair trial and their right to present a defense was deprived. \(^2\)  The new award legal fees of $449,798.50 was not fully litigated.  Defendants are prejudiced as a result of the substitution of the jury award without giving an opportunity to defend themselves.
[brief] (9T 49-16 to 58-25)  The police did not identify or interview “anybody” in the crowd after the shooting.  (9T 86-14 to 25)  In addition, [...]’s father and [...] lived only about one-and-a-half and three blocks away, respectively.  (9T 51-4 to 54-8)  According to [...] and phone records, [...] called her at 1:40 a.m. to say he was coming over and at 2:40 a.m. when she let him in, and she called him at 3:16 a.m.; when he arrived at her place, he did not have a gun or any blood on him.
[brief] ”).  Here, [...] is in the same position as the movant in Duke.  Like the movant in Duke, [...] does not claim that it was previously represented by or is currently represented by the [...] (or the [...]).  Instead, [...] raises an alleged potential conflict only between [...] and [...] based on the [...]’s current representation of both (and between the other defendants based on the [...]’s representation of them).  This is again like the movant in Duke, who sought to raise a conflict as between the endowment and the trustees based on the firm’s representation of both.  305 N.J. Super. at 443.  Also like in Duke, neither [...] nor [...] complains about the joint representation.  Pa319-24; see SDa47-52.  To the contrary, both [...] and [...] certified in opposition to [...]’s motion that they were, on several occasions, advised of potential issues generally surrounding joint representation, that they consented to and wanted the [...] to continue the joint representation, and they opposed any effort to disqualify the [...] because their interests are aligned and they want to put forward a unified, joint defense.  Pa319-24.  And, as in Duke, [...] is “not in any way harmed by” the alleged conflict between [...] and [...].  Put another way, [...] does not have any stake or adversity with respect to the alleged conflict and would not suffer any harm from the alleged conflict.  See Edison Bd. of Educ., 464 N.J. Super. at 305.  [...] is improperly trying to assert the alleged rights of third parties, the doctors [...] is suing.  Goldman, 454 N.J. Super. at 424.  [...]’s lack of standing underscores its true motive to disqualify the [...] as its opening salvo before answers are filed and before any discovery is taken: to obtain a tactical advantage in the case.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-44.  The main contours of the SFRA formula pertinent to this appeal are set forth below.  1.  Adequacy Budget Under the SFRA, funding levels for [...] are determined by the formula’s Adequacy Budget, calculated annually.  The Adequacy Budget is derived from a “base per-pupil cost,” or the cost of providing the teachers, staff, administration, materials and other resources necessary to enable [...] elementary students to achieve the State’s academic standards, currently where maintenance has been deferred and new construction has not been initiated due to concerns about cost. ”  N.J.S.A. 18A:7G-2(c). denominated the New Jersey Student Learning Standards ("NJSLS").  The Adequacy Budget also includes an increase in the base cost – or “weight” – for middle and high school students; the additional cost of programs and services – expressed as a percentage or “weight” of the base cost -- for low income ("at-risk") students, with [...] eligible for 57% of the base cost, the highest at-risk weight, due to a student poverty rate in excess 60% of student enrollment, N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-51b; and the additional cost or weight for programs and services for Limited English Proficiency (LEP) students who are English Language Learners.  Finally, the Adequacy Budget includes one-third of the cost of special education for students with disabilities.
[brief] ”  *Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino*, 124 N.J. 398, 412 (1991) (italics added; internal citations omitted).  To be sure, the misconduct alleged against [...] on behalf of the *Gannon* class is in many ways analogous to the misconduct alleged in *Roma Pizzeria*.  But the “relating to” language in the 2015 Settlement does not permit a time warp that somehow extinguishes the claims by *Gannon* class members for misconduct arising long after Feb. 20, 2015 simply because the *Gannon* complaint suggests that Defendants have again engaged in wrongdoing similar to that at issue in *Roma Pizzeria*.  Cf. *Dando v. Bimbo Food Bakeries* --- 1
[brief] II.  THE DISCIPLINARY CHARGES AGAINST APPELLANT WERE SUPPORTED BY CREDIBLE RECORD EVIDENCE.  As previously stated, we respectfully request that this Court take Judicial Notice of the fact that the COVID-19 global pandemic coincided with the relevant timeframe of the instant matter.  Accordingly, as the New Jersey Judiciary was undoubtedly dealing with an unprecedented and devastating occurrence, any arguments about issues regarding the length of time when issuing the OAL Trial decision should be disregarded.  A.