ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As such, there are glaring and genuine issues of material fact in dispute as to whether [...] was simply a sham entity, and [...] was its sham attorney, in furtherance of Defendants’ conspiracy to steal Plaintiffs’ money.  The Trial Court’s holding that [...] must be granted summary judgment because he was purportedly [...]’s attorney rather than Plaintiffs’ attorney completely misses the point of Plaintiffs’ claims against [...] as a central participant in Defendants’ conspiracy.  In addition, the Trial Court failed to appreciate the significance of [...]’s clear testimony regarding the affirmative misrepresentations and omissions that [...] made to him, and also [...]’s affirmative misrepresentations to all Plaintiffs by way of the Releases and [...]’s default letter to Plaintiffs, all in furtherance of Defendants’ conspiracy.  The Trial Court unbelievably and erroneously held that all of these misrepresentations by [...] were insignificant because [...] was not Plaintiffs’ attorney.  In reality, it is factually and legally impossible for the Trial Court to consider this evidence and conclude that [...] have resolved all genuine issues of material fact in dispute as to whether they participated in Defendants’ conspiracy to steal Plaintiffs’ money, and as to whether those actions constituted legal malpractice.  The Trial Court’s error should be reversed.
[brief] Id.  Unlike the statutory changes permitting the State to void arbitration awards, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16(j), the MSRA did not amend New Jersey Wage Payment and Collection Law, N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1a, et seq., and N.J.S.A. 34:11-57, et seq., Count IV, to permit Defendants the authority to not pay earned wages.
[brief] The Appellate Division reviews a trial court’s ruling on a summary judgment motion de novo.  Conley v. Guerrero, 228 N.J. 339, 346 (2017) (citing Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016)).  The summary judgment rule, by its plain language, dictates: [t]hat a court should deny a summary judgment motion only where the party opposing the motion has come forward with evidence that creates a “genuine issue as to any material fact challenged. ”  That means a non-moving party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely by pointing to any fact in dispute.  Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 529 (1995).  To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment, the Court considers whether “the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  Id. at 540.  Issues of fact “of an insubstantial nature” will not preclude summary judgment.  See id. at 530 (quoting Judson v. Peoples Bank & Tr. Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954)).  If there is no genuine issue of material fact, the Court will “decide whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law. ”  DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 486, 494 (App. Div. 2007)).  Although courts evaluating a motion for summary judgment view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, bare conclusions without factual support will not defeat the motion.  See Sullivan v. Port Auth. of NY & NJ, 449 N.J. Super. 276, 279–280 (App. Div. 2017), certif. denied, 232 N.J. 282 (2018).  The non-moving party must support its opposition with affidavits or certifications setting out or attaching admissible evidence to defeat the motion.  R. 4:46-2(b); R. 4:46-5(a).  A plaintiff’s self-serving assertions alone will not create a question of material fact sufficient to defeat the motion.  See Martin v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co., 346 N.J. Super. 320, 323 (App. Div. 2002).  **POINT I**
[brief] At 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a), the FDCPA mandates a debt collector’s liability for any actual damages, limited statutory damages, and attorney’s fees to a “person” when the debt collector violates “any provision […] with respect to that person. ”  Consequently, courts have generally enumerated four elements: (1) [the plaintiff] is a consumer, (2) the [defendant] is a debt collector, (3) the…challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a “debt” as the Act defines it, and (4) the [defendant] has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.
[brief] See Meadowbrook, supra, 138 N.J. at 325 (“…[W]e find that the [public entity’s] waiver of the consent-of-surety requirement was beyond its authority).  Surely, such a result would interfere with [...]’s ability to carry out its essential governmental functions in a manner consistent with law.  In an ideal world, [...] would have identified the defective POA/Consent of Surety at the time of the first defective submission.  If it had, the Court can rest assured that each and every bid would have been rejected, just as [...]’s was, and, furthermore, just as each and every defective Consent of Surety will be rejected going forward.  While [...] is content to cast stones at [...] and accuse it of misconduct, the fact of the matter is that the agency and its employees can and do attempt at all times to turn square corners and are entitled to that presumption here.  See Capital Safety, Inc. v. State, Div. of Bldgs. and Construction, 369 N.J. Super. 295, 300-301 (citations and internal quotations omitted) (App. Div. 2004) (holding that “the contractor’s burden to prove the government acted in bad faith is very weighty.
[brief] While the sentence imposed on May 8, 2015 is not at issue in this appeal, the findings of the original sentencing court are relevant because the resentencing court heavily relied upon and incorporated them into its own decision.  At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel primarily relied on his sentencing memorandum, adding that the court should consider [...]’s lack of prior criminal history, that his conduct was unlikely to recur, that it was not “conduct that he contemplated,” and that he was most likely influenced by older individuals.  (2T:3-17 to 4-25)  The State argued for a one-hundred-and-ten-year term of incarceration, quoting “The Godfather” in support of its contention that [...] “ordered the gunmen to do the shooting” for him.  (2T:10-21 to 11-8; 14-9 to 15)  The victim’s mother spoke at the hearing.  (2T:6-12 to 8-6)  [...] chose not to speak on his own behalf.  (2T:6-7 to 10)  The court found aggravating factor one based on the nature and circumstances of the offense, as well as [...]’s role in the offense, explaining that “the shooting did not start, nor did it appear that there was any intention to shoot anyone until the order was given by Mr. [...],”\(^5\) and that [...] received a cell phone as proceeds from the robbery.  (2T:15-25 to 17- --- \(^5\)  In the immediate aftermath of the incident, the robbery victims told police that the two armed individuals who exited the car told them to empty their pockets, and that “if they ran they would get shot. ”  (PSR 3)  18)  The court also found aggravating factor three, risk of reoffense, based on [...]’s decision not to speak at his sentencing and not expressing remorse or responsibility in his pre-sentence interview with probation.  (2T:17-19 to 18-6)  The court found aggravating factor nine based on “the need for deterring Mr. [...] and others from violating the law… notwithstanding the fact that Mr. [...] has a limited criminal record. ”  (2T:18-12 to 19)  The court found no mitigating factors.  (2T:18-20 to 20-18)  While the court acknowledged that [...]’s prior juvenile and criminal history consisted of a single dismissed deferred disposition for shoplifting,\(^6\) it nonetheless rejected mitigating factor seven (“defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time”).
[brief] (9T82-24 to 83-3).  In connection with this order, the court permitted law enforcement to conduct a covert entry and search of the apartment to determine where a listening device could be installed, also known as a “sneak and peek” entry.  (9T83-4 to 16).  On April 22, 2009, detectives entered the apartment and noted that it was scarcely furnished with only three chairs and a couch, and the apartment did not have a refrigerator, toiletries, or a bed.  (9T89-18 to 23; 9T87-8 to 89-14; 9T101-5 to 9).
[brief] State v. Chappee, 211 N.J. Super. 321 (App. Div. 1986) ......................... 25, 36 State v. Cohen, 254 N.J. 308 (2023) .................................................. 16, 37, 49 State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494 (2005) .................................................. 41 State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224 (2007) .................................................. 16 State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355 (2003) .................................................. 17, 18 State v. Foreshaw, 245 N.J. Super. 166 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 126 N.J. 337 (1991)
[brief] On November 27, 2017, the Township adopted a Redevelopment Plan for the property.  Da44; Da78-Da113.  10.  The Redevelopment Plan authorized the redevelopment agreement to include provisions relating to “Payment In Lieu of Taxes Agreement. ”  Da112-Da113.  ¹ [...]’s Order in [...] was not part of the record below, but was part of the Township’s affordable housing litigation.
[brief] Order finding Defendant guilty, dated April 24, 2024  Da1  Written decision, dated April 24, 2024  Da3  # TABLE OF APPENDIX | Appendix document | Appendix page number | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| | Order finding Defendant guilty, dated April 24, 2024 | Da1 | | Written decision, dated April 24, 2024 | Da3 | | Notice of Appeal, dated May 13, 2024 | Da41 | | Certification of Transcript Completion and Delivery, dated June 10, 2024 | Da44 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Authority | Brief page number | |----------------------------|-------------------| | **Cases:** | | | State v. DiSomma, | 5 | | 262 N.J. Super. 375 (App. Div. 1993) | | | State v. Johnson, | 5 | | 42 N.J. 146 (1964) | | | State v. Kashi, | 6 | | 360 N.J. Super. 538 (App. Div. 2003) | | | State v. Kent, | 5-6 | | 391 N.J. Super. 352 (App. Div. 2007) | | | State v. Locurto, | 5 | | 157 N.J. 463 (1999) | | | State v. Robertson, | 5 | | 228 N.J. 138 (2017) | | | State v. Zingas, | 6 | | 471 N.J. Super. 590 (App. Div. 2022) | | | **Statutes:** | | | N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 39:4-129 | 1 | | N.J.S.A. 39:4-130 | 1 | PROCEDURAL HISTORY On September 14, 2023, November 2, 2023, and November 8, 2023, a trial took place in the township of [...] against Defendant [...] (Da3).  At the conclusion of the trial, Defendant was found guilty of driving while intoxicated (“DWI”) in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; leaving the scene of an accident in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-129; and failure to report an accident in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-130 (Da3 – Da4).  On March 26, 2024, Defendant’s appeal of the finding of guilt by the municipal court as to the DWI and leaving the scene of an accident was heard before the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Criminal Part, Morris County (1T).  On April 24, 2024, the Law Division found Defendant guilty, de novo, of driving while intoxicated in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 and leaving the scene of an accident in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-129 (Da1 – Da2; Da40).  On May 13, 2024, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal, appealing the Law Division’s finding of guilt (Da41 – Da43).  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] It is wrong for Defendant to again rely upon R. 4:50-1(c) on page 5 of her Reply Brief, when that provision has a stated one-year time limitation that required Defendant to file her motion one year after March 17, 2015.  Instead, she waited two-and-a-half years.  To that end, the facts here are distinguishable\(^2\) from another *unreported* case of *A.M.S. v. M.L.S.*, No. A-1905-19, 2021 WL 3197768 (App. Div. July 29, 2021)(Pra1), baselessly relied upon by Defendant.
[brief] This case presents pursuant to the Law Against Discrimination; include unlawful harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and sexual harassment, all based upon the Respondent’s gender or sex, as well as wrongful termination and disability discrimination.  [7a]  The disability being the result of the harassment.  [7a]  Enforcement of any arbitration agreement for these claims are prohibited by The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021.  9 U.S.C. §401.  The Appellants’ claim, in a footnote on p. 17, this issue was resolved on the merits.  This is incorrect.  The trial Court did not decide this issue.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 59:3-14.  Instead, [...] only offers conclusory assertions of malice that fail to distinguish between the specific actions of any of the named defendants.  (Pa19) (“Defendants knew the statements were false when they made them to third parties and to each other but maliciously made them in order to arrest, to violate Plaintiff’s probation, to imprison Plaintiff against Plaintiff’s will, to deprive plaintiff of his property and to ruin Plaintiff’s reputation and livelihood. ”); (Pa25) (“Defendants committed the acts alleged herein maliciously, fraudulently and oppressively with the wrongful intention of injuring Plaintiff, from an improper and evil motive amounting to malice and in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights. ”).  Our Supreme Court has held that in deciding a Rule 4:6-2 motion to dismiss, “the essential facts supporting plaintiff’s cause of action must be presented [in the complaint] in order for the claim to survive” and that “conclusory allegations are insufficient in that regard.
[brief] This is an appeal from an Order from the Division of Workers Compensation, in which the Judge of Compensation denied a motion for recusal.  The petitioner filed a dependency claim petition against respondent, alleging that his wife suffered COVID-19 in the course of her employment as a teacher employed by respondent, which caused her death.  A fundamental issue in this claim is whether the decedent was an essential employee as defined by N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11.  This statute is often referred to as the "Presumption Bill" because it entitles an essential employee to a rebuttable presumption that her COVID-19 disease was related to her employment.  Petitioner filed a motion to declare the decedent to be an essential employee and entitled to that presumption, which the Judge of Compensation granted over respondent's opposition.  The Judge of Compensation assigned to this claim previously served with distinction in the New Jersey State Assembly.  While serving in that capacity as an Assemblywoman, she was a primary sponsor of the Presumption Bill that lead to the enactment of that statute.  The statute does not include teachers as employees who are specifically identified as essential employees.  Nevertheless, before the Judge of Compensation heard petitioner's motion to declare that the decedent was an essential employee, the Judge of Compensation expressed her opinion that she believed that teachers fell within the definition of essential employees and that this decedent would be entitled to that presumption.  By expressing this opinion and by prejudging this issue, the Judge of Compensation demonstrated that there was reason to believe that she would not provide a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment on the issue.  Respondent's motion to recuse the Judge of Compensation from hearing this case should therefore have been granted.  The Order denying respondent's motion to recuse the Judge of Compensation should therefore be reversed, and this matter should be remanded for hearing by another Judge of Compensation.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] 50 N.J.S.A. § 13:20-2. generators, and hazardous pipeline liquids storage tanks, is out of compliance with the goals of the Highlands Act....Hazardous liquids stored on site...have the potential to leak into the groundwater and make their way into Hewitt Brook and the Monksville Reservoir. ”  Aa0339.  In another example, [...] (“an individual associated with the [...]”) argued that “[t]he site of the new compressor station is...in the middle of the Highlands Preserve right next to a C-1 stream and above the Wanaque and Monksville reservoir.  The project will impact environmentally sensitive areas in the Highlands and the drinking water for over 3 million people.
[directive] This 3 of of guide instructs PSP staff the appropriate local law enforcement agency to call depending on the type of alert, as well guidance on expressing the urgency the call to law enforcement on the call.  as  See footnote 3.  4  [...] • 037 • Trenton, New 08625-0037  Jersey Box PO J. of Directive# - Criminal Justice Reform - Promulgation  Revised Protocol for Responding to Emergent Pretrial Release 18-23 Electronic Monitoring Alerts October 2023
[brief] More specifically, [...] contends that the 13 documents it produced to [...] were an attempted compromise and are not responsive to [...]’s requests.  [...] focused on 3 of the 13 documents for illustration purposes.  For example, [...] explains that [...]_1063883 is not responsive to RFP 22 because it is a draft quarterly financial statement and RFP 22 requested actual financial statements for [...], all of which [...] produced.  12.  [...] contends that the remaining 26 documents at issue are also similarly non-responsive to [...]’s RFPs.  With regard to 11 of the 26 documents, [...] explains that they are non-responsive because they are [...]’s communications with counsel, which was not requested.  With regard to the other group of 9 documents, [...] contends that these documents are communications with counsel regarding draft complaints and executive summaries regarding this lawsuit, which [...] never requested.  With regard to the remaining 6 miscellaneous documents, [...] explains that they are all non-responsive.  With regard to all 26 documents, [...] points out that simply containing a search term does not mean they are responsive to [...]’s RFPs as [...] and [...] never agreed that their broad search terms would designate all responsive documents.  *3  13.  On July 31, 2017, [...] filed a Reply wherein it echoed the same arguments contained in its Motion to Compel.
[brief] The final words of [...].  . . .  And if we can’t believe the words of a dying man, what can we believe?  [...]. ”  (9T 74-4 to 14; see also 9T 100-16 to 20, 110-4 to 6; 6T 21-24 to 22-3, 30-17 to 21)  But even though this was an identification case, the jury was given incomplete tools to assess the identification issue and therefore [...]’s sole defense: misidentification.  This failure requires reversal of his convictions.
[brief] The reasons why Plaintiff’s appeal should be granted is (a) the law of the case applied; (b) the submission of Certifications or Affidavits by the Defendants well after the discovery end date amounted to new discovery without exceptional circumstances; (c) the Court below cited no case, referenced the denied 2020 Motion for Summary Judgment, but never officially cited it in terms of where the Court’s reference was to be found.  In the Defendants’ Appeal Brief, they are quick to recognize the August 7, 2020 Order which dismissed the LAD claim because of the exclusive remedy provision of CEPA.  Appellant does not appeal that determination because it was correct as was the decision by [...] to deny the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.  At the time the second Motion for Summary Judgment was made, it was supported by Affidavits, Certifications, which were actually discovery.  The discovery end date had ended prior to the 2020 Motion for Summary Judgment which [...] denied.  A number of statements by various Defendants found their way into the record when in fact the discovery end date had long expired.  What we have, therefore, is a Motion denied by [...] which was reopened by the various Defendants by way of all new facts, to not only support the second Motion for Summary Judgment, but to undo the first Motion for Summary Judgment.  In rejecting the law of the case, the Court below also rejected Green v. Jersey City Board of Education, 177 N.J. 434 (2003).
[brief] Prior to the charge conference, defendant submitted a proposed jury instruction to the trial court.  (Da198).  Citing entirely from a report not in evidence but advanced in support of his denied motion to exclude [...]’s testimony, defendant sought a limiting instruction that included information about the purported fallibility of fingerprint evidence and the lack of ability to present testimony on the ACE-V method “with any particular degree of accuracy. ”  (Da198).  At the charge conference, the prosecutor objected, arguing that defendant’s proposed instruction was “an inappropriate attempt to put evidence in front of the jury through the guise of the jury instruction” and would essentially force the trial judge to “testify to perceived weaknesses within the latent[-]print analysis field, which is not what a jury instruction is designed to do. ” (6T131-8 to 21).  Defense counsel maintained that he modeled the proposed charge after the eyewitness charge derived from State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 296 (2011), “to give the jury the full picture in regards to fingerprint analysis and what the recent scientific research on the ACE-V process has shown. ” (6T132-6 to 11; Da199 to 207).  The trial judge rejected the proposed instruction, noting that the report upon which it was based was not in evidence and that he had neither received nor reviewed it, opting for the model charge and suggesting that defendant make the proposed argument in his closing.
[brief] The enactment of the [MSRA] is a proper exercise of the State’s inherent police power to pass legislation when necessary for the public health, safety, and welfare.  Courts are reluctant to disturb legislation, such as the [MSRA], enacted to serve a legitimate public purpose.  The Superior Court also considered Plaintiffs’ challenges relating to the abrogation or impairment of contracts.  Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that the MSRA “constitutes a substantial impairment of the existing CNAs …  Both [...], [...], and the [...] are parties to the CNAs with a term of January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2015.  The [...], [...], and [...] negotiated terms for successor agreements which were memorialized and ratified on October 24, 2016.  Plaintiffs propose that by allowing the Designee, pursuant to the Recovery Act, to unilaterally make changes to the CNAs, the Recovery Act substantially impairs the contractual relationship between the [...], [...], and the [...]. ” (Pa000347).  In response, the Superior Court held that: (a) the MSRA “provides the Designee with authority that impairs the contract rights of the plaintiffs;” (b) “Courts have … recognized that at times based on extraordinary circumstances contracts of public employment are subject to modification or early termination;” and (c) “Plaintiffs were well aware of the financial state of Atlantic [...] when entering into their respective CNAs and MOAs, it was even included in the language of the agreements.