ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
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[brief] “As counsel stated, we pretty much agree to the facts in this situation, which is that at the time of the spill the vehicle was stopped…” (2T7-8).  Essentially, the parties’ arguments on summary judgment and reconsideration focused on the application of the facts to the statute and well-established case law (1T7-12, 2T5-9).  Whereas the Plaintiff asserted that the facts demonstrated that the Plaintiff’s motor vehicle was “consequential” to her injury, the Defendant asserted that her motor vehicle was “incidental. ”  (1T7-12, 2T5-9).  When the Defendant originally denied her PIP application, it wrongfully concluded that “her injuries were not caused by an automobile as required by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4; and there is no causal nexus between an automobile and Plaintiff’s injuries. ” (Pa 068).  At oral argument on January 10, 2024, the Trial Judge noted: “On June 26, 2020 [...] had an incident at the [...] drive-thru while stopped with her foot on the brake, car immobile, receiving a hot beverage through the drive-thru window. ” (2T11).  On reconsideration, the Trial Court made findings and held that the Plaintiff was not entitled to PIP benefits, concluding that: 1) Plaintiff was not “operating a motor vehicle at the time the injury occurred”; and 2) “there is no causal relationship between the plaintiff’s use and occupancy of the vehicle and the injuries sustained.
[brief] [...], before she was married to [...], moved into her current residence in 2008.  The pizzeria was operating then and continued to operate with different operators until 2014.  After Lauren and [...] were married [...] moved into Lauren’s [...] residence in 2013.  In 2015, [...] purchased the pizzeria and the neighboring two-family residence.  [...] opened in 2017 and was in business for two years.  After Nicky’s lease terminated [...] leased the pizzeria to [...], who was delayed in opening [...] as a result of the Covid pandemic.  [...] eventually opened in May of 2020.  It wasn’t until [...] was in the process of opening that [...] first brought a formal complaint alleging that it was both a nuisance and an improper non-conforming use.
[directive] Other Provisions  A.  Non-enforceability by third parties.  This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney General’s authority to ensure the uniform and efficient enforcement of the laws and administration of criminal justice throughout the State.  This Directive imposes limitations on law enforcement agencies and officials that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.  B.
[brief] ”  Dep’t of Treasury v. Quest Communications Intl., Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 469, 481 (App. Div. 2006).  As set forth above, Appellants were adamant in their depositions that neither [...] nor [...] never made any representations to them of any kind.  Appellants’ admissions in this regard conclusively negated any claim against [...] and [...] based on fraud.
[directive] [...] x One Tuesday per (Shared Services) [...] 1306 1045 month October -April - 1 (732) [...] x Tuesday per month; (Shared Services) [...] 1301 1045  May-September - 2 Tuesdays per month  1st & 3rd Thursday [...] 1302 [...] x3 each month 1st & 3rd Thursday (Shared Services) [...] 1351 [...] x3 each month [...] 1303 [...]
[brief] This case centers on the protections afforded to whistleblowers under CEPA, ensuring that employees who disclose unlawful conduct in good faith are shielded from retaliation.  The record evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, demonstrates genuine disputes of material fact regarding Respondents’ motives and actions, requiring reversal of summary judgment and a trial on the merits.  In their Opposition to this appeal, Defendants conflate generalized workplace conduct with specific unlawful actions.  CEPA does not require whistleblowers to achieve legal certainty but, instead, protects employees acting in good faith to disclose perceived violations.  As Plaintiff set forth in the initial Brief, the Trial Court erred in minimizing Defendant [...]’s conduct as a mere management style, disregarding statutory definitions and the evidence supporting Plaintiff’s claim.  Further, Plaintiff presented evidence creating genuine issues of material fact regarding pretext and retaliatory intent.  Record testimony disputes Respondents’ claim that charge pay was unauthorized, undermining their termination justification.  Finally, Respondents’ claim of independent decision-making is belied by evidence showing that Defendant [...], accused of misconduct, recommended Plaintiff’s termination.  Factual disputes regarding retaliation and pretext should be resolved by a jury.  Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for trial.
[brief] In the previous version of N.J.S.A. 4:19.b.(1), a dog would not be considered potentially dangerous if it caused bodily injury to a person who was committing a crime or “if that person was tormenting or inflicting pain upon the dog in such an extreme manner that an attack of such nature could be considered provoked. ”  Laws of 1994, ch 187.  The present version states only that a dog will not be considered potentially dangerous “if the dog was provoked. ”  N.J.S.A.  4:19-23.b.  The amendment also added the language that “the municipality shall bear the burden of proof to demonstrate that the dog was not provoked. ”  Ibid.  Because the prior definition of “provoked” was removed from the statute, the starting point is the plain meaning of the word.  The Oxford English Dictionary 5th Ed. defines “provoke” as to II:  “Incite or urge (a person or animal) to or into some act, to do something, stimulate to action. ”  Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th Ed., Vol 2, Oxford University Press 2002, p 2384.  Sound case law holds that a dog is justified, even lauded, for the instinctual defense of his owner’s property.  Emmons v Stevane, supra, 73 N.J.L. at 351-352.
[brief] This appeal filed by appellant [...]  (“Appellant”) is yet another front in its seemingly endless war to stop a competitor in the Long Branch rental apartment marketplace.  Respondent [...] (the “Department”) issued a permit (the “Permit”) under the Coastal Area Facility Review Act (“CAFRA”), N.J.S.A. 13:19-1 et seq., to respondent [...] (“[...]”) which authorized the construction of an eight (8) story, 109-unit apartment building (the “Project”) in Long Branch.  Appellant candidly admits that it is upset that the Project will be bigger, taller, nicer, and closer to the ocean than its own apartment building, located just next door to the Project, and that it will face stiff competition for renters as a result.  The Appellate Division should view this appeal for what it truly is: an effort to stifle economic competition through meritless litigation.  The crux of Appellant’s appeal—which is the latest in a string of lawsuits designed to stop the construction of the Project, none of which have been successful—is that the Project fails to comply with the view corridor, setback, and visual compatibility requirements of the Scenic Resources and Design (“SRD”) Rule, N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.10, set forth in CAFRA’s promulgating regulations, the Coastal Zone Management (“CZM”) Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.1 et seq.  But Appellant fails to acknowledge that the SRD Rule does not apply to the Project.  Rather, under the CZM Rules, specifically, N.J.A.C. 7:7-7.1 to -7.5 (the “Long Branch Rule”), development of the Project is explicitly subject to the standards set forth under Long Branch’s Redevelopment Plan and Design Guidelines, which were reviewed and approved by the Department as consistent with the CZM Rules.  Those guidelines do not require visual compatibility, an open view corridor, or setback as may otherwise have been required under the SRD Rule.  Appellant buries a single paragraph deep in its brief to avoid confronting the importance of the Long Branch Rule.  Appellant’s artful avoidance is understandable: the Long Branch Rule simply does not require compliance with the SRD Rule, and the issuance of the Permit was not improper or unlawful in any way.  When granting the Department’s interpretation of the applicable regulations the substantial deference to which it is entitled, this Court should conclude that the Department’s issuance of the Permit was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable and affirm accordingly.  The Court should also find that the balance of Appellant’s challenges to the Permit are simply part of Appellant’s scorched earth, “everything but the kitchen sink” approach designed to prevent competition in the Beachfront Sector of the Long Branch Redevelopment Area and are patently without merit.
[brief] In re City of Newark, 469 N.J. Super. 366 (App. Div. 2021).............................................20  J.L. v. J.F., 317 N.J. Super. 418 (App. Div. 1999)..............................................17  Kelly v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 520 F.Supp.2d 388 (D. Conn. 2007)..............................................29
[brief] ……………..  Pa1 | Cases/Authorities | PAGE | |------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Amabile v. Lerner**, 74 N.J. Super. 43 (App. Div. 1963) | 7 | | **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America**, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 6, 7 | | **Buckelew v. Grossbard**, 87 N.J. 512 (1981) | 12, 18 | | **Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd.**, 219 N.J. 395 (2014) | 6 | | **DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman**, 430 N.J.Super. 325 (App. Div. 2013) | 7 | | **Ferdinand v. Agricultural Insurance Company**, 22 N.J. 482 (1956) | 12 | | **Hansen v. Eagle-Picher Lead Companies**, 8 N.J. 133 (1951) | 11 | | **Hisenaj v. Kuehner**, 194 N.J. 6 (2008) | 6 | | **Hoffman v. Asseenontv.com, Inc.**, 404 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 2009) | 7 | | **Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc.**, 396 N.J.Super. 486 (App.Div. 2007), certif. denied, 195 N.J. 419 (2008) | 7 | | **Merchs. Express Money Order Co. v. Sun Nat’l Bank**, 374 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 2005) | 7 | | **New Jersey Mortgage and Investment Corp. v. Calvetti**, 68 N.J. Super 18, 25 (App. Div. 1961) | 12, 13 | | **Newman v. Great American Insurance Company**, 86 N.J.
[directive] Reload if required and holster an uncocked weapon.  • Reload loading devices.  Phase V 7-Yard Line.  Time: 4 seconds.  3 rounds.  Standing point shoulder position.  •  On command, from a secured holster position draw and fire 3 rounds in 4 seconds from a standing point shoulder position.  9-42  Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards  ---STOP TIME--- • Reholster an uncocked weapon.
[brief] Or, did the Trial Court find the hourly rate reasonable, but the actual time spent unreasonable?  Since the Trial Court omitted any determination of when the claim became frivolous, which fees were or were not included in its Order, and whether those fees were reasonable, Plaintiffs cannot tell and are deprived of an opportunity to fully evaluate the effect of the Orders.  The closest the Trial Court came to actual findings was its holding that the claim became frivolous “at some point.
[brief] (Not raised below)  Each error raised above is of sufficient magnitude to require reversal.  But if the Court does not find that any one error warrants a new trial, it must find that their total effect casts doubt on the verdict such that reversal is required.  U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 10; see State v. Orecchio, 16 N.J. 125, 134 (1954) (citations omitted) (“[W]here any one of several errors assigned would not in itself be sufficient to warrant a reversal, yet if all of them taken together justify the conclusion that defendant was not accorded a fair trial, it becomes the duty of this court to reverse. ”); State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 474 (2008) (holding that cumulative error required reversal, notwithstanding the State’s “powerful” evidence at trial).
[brief] ”  *State v. Hutchins*, 241 N.J. Super. 353, 358 (App. Div. 1990).  However, pursuant to *N.J.R.E. 403*, “relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of (a) undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury or (b) undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
[brief] “If scientific . . . knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. ”  N.J.R.E. 702.  “In all cases where expert testimony is allowed, the trial court, . . . should give a limited instruction to the jury ‘that conveys to the jury its absolute prerogative to reject both the expert’s opinion and the version of the facts consistent with that opinion. ’”  State v. Cotto, 471 N.J. Super. 489, 531 (App. Div. 2022) (citation omitted); State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 466 (2008).
[brief] (Ia012; 1Tr., 61:10-13; 64:22-65:11; 2Tr., 4:22-5:4).  However, because the Questionnaire used boilerplate language with insider terminology such as “Non-Owned Vehicles” and “Hired Auto”, language unfamiliar to the average layperson, combined with the 2019 [...] (Ia012; 582-586) which failed to highlight any 12-15 passenger van exclusions, the question was indeed ambiguous and, therefore, the court erred in granting summary judgment.
[brief] In that appeal, defendant is arguing that his motion to proceed pro se was improperly granted, among other arguments.  [Pa1-3].  Defendant argues both sides of the argument in his two separate appeals.  However, it should be noted if defendant now believes withdrawing from a negotiated plea agreement was too complicated for defendant to argue effectively, it defies credulity that defendant could, as advanced in his brief, effectively represent himself at trial without causing any delays to the ongoing trial.
[brief] State v. Cotto, 471 N.J. Super. 489, 544 (App. Div. 2022), cert. denied, 252 N.J. 166 (2022).  This standard “requires reversal only for errors ‘of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ’”  Ibid. (quoting State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425, 451 (2020)).  An alleged error is viewed in the context of the entire charge, not in isolation, and it is dependent on an evaluation of the overall strength of the State’s case.  *Cotto*, 471 N.J. at 545 (citing *State v. Nero*, 195 N.J. 397, 407 (2008)).  The failure to give a specific unanimity charge in this case amounted to plain error.  As discussed in detail in Point III.A, the State presented insufficient evidence that a robbery was committed against [...].  Moreover, as discussed in Point IV.A, the instructions were deficient in several other respects.  Considering the State’s case and the jury instructions as a whole, the failure to give a specific unanimity charge was clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  [...]’s conviction must be reversed.  *Gentry*, 183 N.J. at 32-33.
[directive] -9- F. Procedural Safeguards.  In order to ensure that the new complex/protracted downward adjustment feature is reserved for unusual or extraordinary cases and does not result in a reintroduction of disparity, the following procedural safeguards are implemented:  1.  Any plea offer that takes into account a complex/protracted litigation downward adjustment must be approved by a supervisor designated by the county prosecutor (as is the case with substantial cooperation agree- ments under Part X of the current “Brimage” Guidelines).  2.  Although approval from the [...] is not required to invoke the new downward adjustment, the prosecutor’s office shall within five (5) working days of tendering a downward adjusted plea offer provide to the [...] a statement of reasons explaining why the complex/protracted litigation downward adjustment feature was invoked and, where applicable, explaining the reasons for tendering a downward adjusted offer based upon a pre-indictment cal- culation although the defendant was already indicted.  This statement of reasons shall be provided on a form developed by the [...] that shall be marked “confidential work product,” and this information shall not be made available to the court or to the de- fense counsel for the reasons noted in § C, supra.  The prosecutor shall attach to the new form a copy of the plea negotiation worksheet (in- cluding all schedules) that was provided to the court and defense attor- ney in accordance with the “Brimage” Guidelines.  3.  In order to measure the effects of the new adjustment feature, the prosecutor shall report to the [...] whether a downward adjusted plea offer was accepted or rejected by the defen- dant.  The prosecutor must also advise the [...] when the prosecutor following the rejection of a downward adjusted plea waives the automatic plea cut-off feature and tenders a new plea offer as a result of a material change of circumstances or a substantial cooperation agreement.  The [...] will provide standardized forms to facilitate such notifications.  4.  The authority to make a complex/protracted litigation downward ad- justment is established for a one (1) year interim or “pilot” basis, dur- ing which time the [...] shall monitor the ef- fects of the new policy.
[brief] Pa212a.  [...] testified that that any foreman, including the safety-conscious [...], could request a dump truck to accompany the sweeper.  Pa258a.  Indeed, [...] stated that it is both his responsibility and the responsibility of the foremen on the work site to make sure that there is a truck with the sweeper if possible; a responsibility that [...], another [...] employee working on the jobsite on the night of the accident, confirmed.  Pa260a; Pa285a.  On the night of the accident, however, [...] did not complain to [...] about the truck and sweeper traffic moving in the work zone.  Pa1353a-54a.  There is no evidence identifying any applicable standards or contract requirements governing the use of a dedicated dump truck to accompany a sweeper on a road construction work site like the one where the accident occurred.
[brief] On March 25, 2021, Plaintiff, and her husband, filed a Complaint against [...], John and Jane Does 1-10 and John Doe Corp. 1-10, alleging negligence in connection with the April 26, 2019 incident at [...]’s South Hackensack, New Jersey warehouse incident, where Plaintiff was struck by an overloaded U-boat by another customer identified as [...].  (Pa202-Pa208)  On May 7, 2021, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint naming [...] and [...] as additional defendants and adding additional causes of action against them.  (Pa209-Pa217)  On June 2, 2021, [...] filed its Answer to Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.  (Pa218-Pa228)  On August 16, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a request to enter default as to [...].  (Pa229)  Subsequently, on August 17, 2021, default was entered against [...].  (Pa230)  On January 24, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint to state [...]’s true name as [...] d/b/a [...].  (Pa231-Pa239)  The Second Amended Complaint asserted the same causes of action set forth in the prior Amended Complaint.  (Pa231-Pa239)  On April 16, 2022, [...] filed its Answer to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint.  (Pa240-Pa254)  On June 7, 2023, [...] moved to extend discovery.  (Pa255-Pa256)  On June 23, 2023, the Court denied [...]’s motion to extend discovery.  (Pa257-Pa258)  On July 12, 2023, [...] filed a motion for summary judgment.  (Pa259-Pa265)  On July 19, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a motion to re-open discovery and extend discovery in order to appropriately seek efforts at obtaining a liability report.  (Pa266-Pa267)  On July 28, 2023, [...] filed its motion for summary judgment.  (Pa268-Pa272)  Oral argument was heard on both summary judgment motions and by Orders dated August 25, 2023, [...]’s motion for summary judgment, which Plaintiffs opposed, was denied, and [...]’s motion for summary judgment, which Plaintiffs and [...] also opposed, was granted.
[brief] The 65 Year Disparity Between Petitioner And His Equally Culpable Co-Defendants Warrants A Remand For An Evidentiary Hearing Pursuant To State V. Roach To Determine If The Sentence Is Unfairly Disparate (21T14-17to25)  The PCR court, turning very briefly to the merits, rejected the disparity claim on the basis that co-defendant plead guilty to only a single offense, as opposed to the multiple convictions incurred by the petitioner.  (21T14-17to 25).  Such minimal analysis is insufficient to determine if petitioner’s effective life sentence was unfairly disparate to his equally culpable co-defendants with more extensive criminal histories, one of whom received a five-year sentence subject to NERA, and another who received a five-year flat sentence.  The PCR court should have held an evidentiary hearing in order to consider all relevant factors of petitioner and co-defendants in order to make a determination on disparity.  “Ensuring a reasonable degree of uniformity in sentencing is an essential feature of our system of justice. ”  State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 63 (2014).  Our Supreme Court has "consistently stressed uniformity as one of the major sentencing goals in the administration of criminal justice."  State v. Roach, 146 N.J.  208, 231 (1996).  Unwarranted (or gross) "[d]isparity [with the sentence of a co-defendant] may invalidate an otherwise sound and lawful sentence."  Id. at 232 (citing, e.g., State v. Hubbard, 176 N.J. Super. 174, 175 (Resent. Panel 1980).  "[a] sentence of one defendant not otherwise excessive is not erroneous merely because a co-defendant's sentence is lighter."  Id. at 232 (quoting State v. Hicks, 54 N.J. 390, 391 (1969) ).  However, "there is an obvious sense of unfairness in having disparate punishments for equally culpable perpetrators."  Ibid.  (citations omitted).