ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ ii  Cases ...........................................................................................................................................  ii  Statutes ...................................................................................................................................... iii New Jersey Rules of Court .......................................................................................................  iii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS .........................................................................................3  LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................12  POINT I.  The suit limitation provision in the policy of insurance issued by [...] from which Plaintiff seeks uninsured motorist benefits is valid and Plaintiff’s claim was properly dismissed for failing to timely file her lawsuit in accordance with the terms of the insurance policy............................12  A.  The Suit Limitation Clause of the Defendant-Respondent, [...]’s Policy does not conflict with State Law.  ........................................................................................................12  B.  The holding of Weinroth v New Jersey Mfrs. Ass’n Fire Ins., 117 N.J.L. 436 (1937) has been repeatedly upheld allowing for suit limitation clauses in a contract of insurance.  ..............................................................................................................20  POINT II.  Defendant-Respondent, [...], is not estopped from denying coverage due to Plaintiff-Appellant’s failure to comply with the terms of the policy.............21 POINT III.  The Suit Limitation / Policy exclusion defense was properly asserted in Defendant-Respondent’s  Answer.........................................................................................34  POINT IV.  The suit limitation clause in Defendant-Respondent, [...]’s policy began to run either on the date of the accident or one year from the date Plaintiff-Appellant first became aware a claim for coverage would apply.  .........................36  CONCLUSION  ..............................................................................................................................38
[directive] 1.5 seconds each command •  From a standing ready position, on command fire a 2 round burst or semi-automatic double tap •  Repeat twice for a total of 6 rounds  •  Place the weapon on safe and move to the 15 yard line 15 yard line 4 rounds, standing to kneeling 8 seconds  Semi-automatic mode •  From a standing ready position, on command fire 2 rounds, assume a kneeling position and fire 2 rounds •  Place the weapon on safe and move to the 25 yard line 25 yard line 20 rounds, positions as per each stage  Semi-automatic mode •  From a standing ready position, (no cover) on command fire 1 round.  (1 second)  •  Repeat 4 times for a total of 4 rounds  Use of cover •  From a kneeling, strong side, ready position behind cover, on command roll out and fire 2 rounds (2 seconds)  •  Repeat once •  From a standing (or over the top of cover), strong side, ready position behind cover, on command roll out and fire 2 rounds (2 seconds)  •  Repeat once •  From a kneeling, support side, ready position behind cover, on command roll out and fire 2 rounds (2 seconds)  • Repeat once 9-57 Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards •  From a standing, (or over the op of cover) support side, ready position behind cover, on command roll out and fire 2 rounds (2 seconds)  •  Repeat once •  Place weapon on safe and move to the 50 yard line  50 yard line 8 rounds, prone, kneeling •  From the prone position, on command fire 2 rounds.  (4 seconds)  •  Repeat once •  From the kneeling, strong side of cover, ready position, on command fire 2 rounds.  (4 seconds)  •  Repeat once •  Clear weapon and make it safe —END OF COURSE— 9-58
[brief] security of the tests themselves such that the global reliability of the tests may be damaged.  (Pa14; Pa33.)  [...] certified that the test cannot be recorded because “the experience of being observed and/or recorded can artificially alter an individual’s task performance and affect the reliability and validity of test scores. ”  (Pa35 at ¶ 14.)  The trial court granted the motion prohibiting Plaintiff from audio recording the examination.  (Pa31.)  In B.D. v. Carley, 307 N.J. Super. 259, 262 (App. Div. 1998), the court never suggested any prerequisites to recording a psychological DME.
[brief] *Ibid.*  And based on observations and discussions with District staff, the Report found there was “a district-wide culture of low expectations for students across the [[...].]” (Ra127; Ra131; Ra192).  District staff attributed students’ “low academic performance, poor attendance, lack of motivation, and [] overall poor attitude” on their “poverty or lack of English proficiency. ” (Ra131; Ra192).  Specifically, District staff reported that “[t]he low academic ability of students makes it challenging to have higher-level conversations and ask thought-producing questions;” “[m]any students are late to school, miss school, and are dealing with family, cultural, financial, and living conditions issues that they bring to school or interfere with their learning;” “[m]any students have an apathetic attitude towards school because many of them are exhausted from working jobs until very late;” and “[t]he cultural diversity makes it difficult to teach to the students’ needs.  The students are all on different levels depending on where they came from. ” (Ra193).  This lack of academic optimism can negatively affect students’ academic achievement.  (Ra131; Ra193).
[brief] DEALING WITH THE ASSOCIATED ISSUE- IMPOSITION OF LEGAL FEES BY THE COURT BELOW  1.  Defendant [...] brought a motion which primarily attempted to eliminate the initial penalty of $108,300.00 imposed on Defendant.  (Not granted)  Order of Court [...], DA 5)  2.  Plaintiff filed opposition and cross moved to reduce this amount to judgment against Defendant [...].  (Granted)  (Order of Court [...] DA5)  3.  Plaintiff further cross moved to have the Court impose an additional penalty of $119,000.00 on Defendant [...] for non-payment of the $70,000.00 (which, of course, Plaintiff actually had) from 4/16/21-10/13/23.  Without any supporting facts or opinion the Court granted the imposition of an $119,000.00 additional penalty against [...].  4.  The Court further Ordered Defendant [...] to pay Plaintiff’s counsel fees relative to the Motion and Cross motion in the amount of $4,000.00 (DA 5, page A55, paragraph 26)  5.  Defendant [...] seeks the elimination of this Counsel fee and the imposition of a counsel fee on Plaintiff as Plaintiff in bad faith attempted to formalize and add to the penalty on [...].  Plaintiff knowingly moved forward on this request relying upon an intentional misrepresentation wherein she lied, cheated and deceived.  Plaintiff’s counsel was complicit in this effort to defraud [...] and to defraud the Court.  (To be further discussed)
[brief] *Ibid.*  In *[...]*, the [...] assessed penalties and fines against a surveyor after the surveyor performed work on several public projects without, among other things, being registered under the PWCRA.  *Id.* at *3*.  The surveyor argued that it was not obligated to be registered because it was a licensed professional to whom the PWCRA did not apply.  *Id.* at *9*.  When the assessment of fines and penalties was considered by an Administrative Law Judge, the Judge stated as follows:
[brief] In *North Dakota v. United States*, the Supreme Court found that state liquor labeling and reporting regulations “[fell] within the core of the State’s power under the Twenty-first Amendment,” and thus were not preempted by a federal statute governing alcohol on military bases.  495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990).  In *324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy*, the Supreme Court held that New York’s statutes on liquor pricing could not prevail over the Sherman Act, notwithstanding the Twenty-First Amendment.  479 U.S. 335, 341-43 (1987).  Both cases involved core substantive issues addressed by the Twenty-First Amendment, not procedural matters.  Accordingly, the Twenty-First Amendment does not apply let alone nullify the FAA and the Wholesaler Agreement’s arbitration clause must be enforced.  III.
[brief] The court took notice of the fact that the [...] represented not only [...], but more importantly to the Court, it had represented [...], Individually.  (T23:6-8).  The Court stated that the representation of [...] was a “more personal relationship than that which might exist in other corporate litigation and is one of the facts that the Court considers when determining the potential for implications of RPC 1.9 not only (a), but part (c).” (T23:12-16).  The court also noted that the attorney-client privilege is within the purview of [...] to assert.  (T25:20-24).  It also found that the information contained in the Certification met the requirements warranting disqualification under 1.9.  (T26:1-11).
[brief] It is conceded that plaintiff’s original complaint and First Amended Complaint were both filed before the expiration of the running of the two-year statute of limitations.  Both pleadings include an identical fictitious pleading count.  This count, however, provides absolutely no description that could in any way be construed as relating to an engineering firm providing the scope of service provided by [...] with respect to the subject road widening project.  Rather, plaintiff’s fictitious party count is wholly generic in nature and provides in relevant part as follows:  The Plaintiff alleges that an insufficient amount of time has passed within which to determine the identity of any other individuals or business entities who may be responsible, in whole or in part, for the causation of the aforesaid accident.  For the purposes of the within Complaint, said individuals and business entities have been nominated as John Doe; Jane Doe; ASB Business Entities and XYZ Corporations.  The Plaintiff, pursuant to the Rules of Court for the State of New Jersey, reserves the right to amend the within Complaint relative to the additional Defendants when and if the identity of said individuals or business entities becomes known.  (Pa1578), Second Count, Par. 2.  The absence of any description completely undermines any reliance upon R. 4:26-4.  The rule provides a specific condition that must be satisfied in order to preserve a claim beyond the running of the statute of limitations.  To interpret the language utilized in plaintiff’s complaint as “an adequate description sufficient for identification” would essentially read the condition entirely out of the rule.  Plaintiff clearly had a burden, at a bare minimum, to anticipate a professional firm such as [...] as a potential defendant.  A more meaningful reading of the “adequate description” requirement would necessitate language that anticipated the provision of professional services during the course of construction.  Plaintiff’s complaint, however, provides no description at all other than to state that unidentified parties may include both individuals and business entities.  That generic language cannot be sufficient to satisfy an explicit condition underpinning the use of R. 4:26-4 to defeat the statute of limitations.  New Jersey case law supports the significance of the “adequate description requirement” of R. 4:26-4.
[brief] The trial court and the Supreme Court in Cedar Point acknowledged a distinction between a single individualized trespass and a taking.  There is no dispute that there were numerous planned and repeated unauthorized entries and activities on Plaintiffs’  Property by [...] through its contractors which amount to more than a simple trespass, including the soil borings, the installation of temporary well points, substantial excavation of the parking lot, installation of sediment control fencing, and the physical installation and occupation of the ASDS.  These are physical invasions of personnel, materials, and equipment and are, without question, outside the limited tort trespass contemplated by Cedar Point.  The Supreme Court made clear that a physical occupation constitutes a per se taking regardless of whether it results in only a trivial economic loss.
[brief] (3T32:12).  The dash cams operate independently of the MDT systems.  (3T32:21).  The cameras are connected to the ignition system of the police vehicles so when the car turns on the camera system turns on.  (3T32:23-25).  They activate when the lights are turned on, if they have a wireless microphone, if they travel at a certain speed, or if there is a G force from an impact.  (3T33:1-9).  The dash cameras in the vehicles [...] were assigned were not integrated with the MDT but instead operated independently.  (3T63:17).  [...] indicated that he recalled there being a directive, order, rule, or regulation by the Department that requires people out on patrol, such as sergeants, lieutenants, or patrol officers, to be logged into their MDTs.
[brief] Since 1993, when the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Lehmann, supra, the law has required that employers take preventative steps and that a negligent failure to do so is a basis for liability under the LAD.  “Given the foreseeability that [discrimination] may occur, the absence of effective preventive mechanisms will present strong evidence of an employer’s negligence. ”  Id.  A Plaintiff can establish a claim for unlawful employment discrimination under the LAD through either direct or circumstantial evidence.
[brief] The surveillance team watched as a man with prior convictions for numerous narcotics offenses, [...], conducted two drug transactions.  A short time later, defendant and codefendant [...] joined Little while he walked along Anna Street.  Police officers arrived and, attempting to arrest Little, they ordered the trio to stop.  These circumstances, when assessed in their totality, support a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring, and the stop was therefore constitutional.  Although Little complied with the lawful police order to stop, defendant and Conn ran across a well-trafficked city street with the police in pursuit, elevating the reasonable suspicion against defendant to probable cause to make an arrest and to search him incident to that arrest.  Our law requires suspects to submit to a police officer’s order, for reasons of safety.  Defendant’s unlawful flight therefore provided an alternate basis for his arrest and search.  The police conduct in this matter was entirely reasonable, thus constitutional; the denial of the motion to suppress should be affirmed.
[brief] See also *North Bergen Rex Transport v. TLC*, 158 N.J. 561, 570-71 (1999) (applying Singer fee-shifting test to commercial contract).  A defendant cannot be deemed a prevailing party for purposes of fee shifting under a contractual provision simply by successfully defending against a plaintiff’s claims.  *Bogage v. Display Grp. 14, LLC*, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 465, at 39-40 (App. Div. 2018)
[brief] **Blackburn** involved a claim by the insured law firm, and others, against [...] for coverage under a policy for a legal malpractice claim brought by the children of a deceased partner of the firm claiming the firm negligently drafted the deceased partner’s trust agreement.  [...] disclaimed coverage on the ground that, because the deceased partner was overseeing the drafting of his own trust agreement, the claim of negligence falls outside the scope of a Legal Services Wrongful Act.  *Id.*, at *9.
[brief] On its face, this certification seems to give an accurate description that the English PSA does not reference any of the prior Chinese agreements executed between the parties, but *it never mentioned a material fact that Defendant [...] was not given all the Chinese agreements.*  *(Da128)*  It implied that Mr. [...], upon receiving all Chinese agreements, had intentionally omitted those terms in the English PSA to manipulate his client, the Plaintiff [...] in the uncontested divorce proceeding.  In numerous sections, the certification tried to make the Court to believe that the Chinese agreements were not incorporated into the English PSA Agreement prepared by Mr. [...], but without informing the Court a material fact that Mr. [...] was not shown or given all the Chinese Agreements.
[brief] Here there are at least three means through which the trial prosecutor should have been informed or known about [...]’s notes.  First, [...] was a law enforcement officer working directly with prosecution.  [...] testified twice before the trial Court.  [...] had the opportunity to inform the prosecutor in their preparation and then had the opportunity to inform Appellant and the Court about his notes when he testified.  [...], and the State, did not inform Appellant or the Court about his notes because that would have upended his lie and deceit.  [...]’s knowledge is imputed to the prosecutor.  See, *State v. Carter*, 69 N.J. 420, 429 (1976) (imputing knowledge of police investigator to prosecutor); *State v. Lozado*, 257 N.J. Super. 260, 274 (App. Div. 1992) (imputing knowledge of police to prosecutor); *United States v. Thornton*, 1 F.3d 149, 158 (3d Cir. 1993) (imputing knowledge from “all enforcement agencies that had a potential connection with the witness” to prosecutor); *United States v. Perdomo*, 929 F.2d 967, 971 (3d Cir. 1991) (imputing information known to “some arm of the state” to prosecutor).  Second, Appellant’s supplemental discovery requests should have triggered the State to produce [...]’s notes.  Third, [...]’s report referred to an attached diagram that the prosecutor never produced despite continuously relying on [...]’s report as a blanket answer for all Appellant’s inquiries.  **B.
[brief] Instead the trial proceeded with Plaintiff first presenting evidence of possession of the note (foreclosure) and obtaining Directed Verdict prior to [...]’ presentation of their Quiet Title claim, (ownership of property) evidence and documents.  [...] and [...] have not paid off the loan as Plaintiff wrongfully attaching nearly $200,000.00 in legal fees to said loan which was not disclosed at trial and is in contradiction and violation of the law.  In addition, another $200,000.00 in foreclosure related fees attached to the loan remain outstanding.  The sole issue for the scheduled July 11, 2022 trial was the [...]’ claim of Quiet Title which is determination of ownership of property.
[brief] ” (Ca172).  However, the School Ethics Commission is the body with statutory mandate to issue those consequences.  A local board of education has no authority to impose discipline on a board member for violating the School Ethics Act without those charges first being heard by the School Ethics Commission.  That task is solely the jurisdiction of the Commission.  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22.  That is precisely what was before the Commission in this matter.  In dismissing these Counts on this basis, the Commission has abrogated its statutory mandate to apply discipline for school board members in a uniform manner.
[brief] N.J.A.C. 19:66-5.8(c).  As confirmed by the Hearing Officer, “the [[...]’s] Tourism District Land Development Rules do not require a loading space for commercial uses less than 10,000 square feet and the Green Zone Redevelopment Plan does not address loading spaces. ” (Aa244).  Nonetheless, the [...] concentrated on its “established practice” – not on any design standard or land use regulation – of reviewing loading operations within the Tourism District under the guise of “safety and efficiency. ” (Aa244; T1/128:21-129:7).  This review was allegedly based on the value and type of the product to be sold at the premises; however, neither the value of the product nor the payment methods accepted by a business have any bearing on whether ingress and egress to the Property is either “safe” or “efficient. ”
[brief] See Cell South, supra, 172 N.J. at 82 … ‘there can be no judicial declaration of invalidity in the absence of clear abuse of discretion by the public agencies involved. ”  …  Consistent with this jurisprudential policy of deference to local board’s peculiar knowledge of local conditions, a reviewing court must afford “greater deference …. to [a] denial of a variance[.]”  Ne. Towers v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of W. Paterson, 327 N.J. Super. 476, 493-94 (App. Div. 2000)...  This “heavier burden requires the proponent of the denied variance to prove that the evidence before the board was ‘overwhelmingly in favor of the applicant. ’”  Nextel of N.yu. v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs Bd.  of Adjustment, 361 N.J. Super. 22, 38 (App. Div. 2003)...A court’s job is to determine whether the board followed the statutory guidelines, and properly exercised its discretion.  Med. Ctr. at Princeton v. Princeton Zoning Bd. of Adj., 343 N.J. Super. 177, 199 (App. Div. 2001).  A court’s scope of review “is not to suggest a decision that may be better than the one made by the board, but to determine whether the board could reasonably have reached its decision on the record.
[directive] It is possible that patients, families, or clinicians will challenge individual triage decisions.  Procedural fairness requires the availability of an appeals mechanism to resolve such disputes.  On practical grounds, different appeals mechanisms are needed for the initial decision to allocate a scarce resource among individuals, none of whom are currently using the resource, and the decision whether to withdraw a scarce resource from a patient who is not clearly benefiting from that resource.  This is because initial triage decisions for patients awaiting the critical care resource will likely be made in highly time-pressured circumstances.  Therefore, an appeal will need to be adjudicated in real time to be operationally feasible.  For the initial triage decision, the only permissible appeals are those based on a claim that an error was made by the triage team in the calculation of the priority score or use/non-use of a tiebreaker (as detailed in Section 2).  The process of evaluating the appeal should include the triage team verifying the accuracy of the priority score calculation by recalculating it.  The treating clinician or triage officer should be prepared to explain the calculation to the patient or family on request.  Decisions to withdraw a scarce resource such as mechanical ventilation from a patient who is already receiving it may cause heightened moral concern.
[brief] [...] responses to requests HOLM-[...]-OTT-126 to 129 are included in this Appendix as Holm-123 to 126 at Ha653 to Ha656.  [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-130 . . . .  H1689a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-131 . . . .  H1690a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-132 . . . .  H1691a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-134 . . . .  H1692a [...] response to discovery request HOLM-[...]-OTT-145 . . . .  H1693a S-9: [...] responses to discovery requests HOLM-[...]-OTT-133 (SOICR p. 9)  ..........................................................  H1694a S-10: [...]
[brief] Here, the Trial Court failed to engage in the balancing of these competing policy concerns.  When reaching the question of prejudice suffered by Defendants for Plaintiff’s failure to submit a timely Affidavit of Merit, Defendants’ Counsel offered no explanation as to the type or kind of prejudice that they have suffered.  Additionally, not even the Trial Court Judge could articulate the prejudice that Defendant suffered by Plaintiff’s failure to submit a timely affidavit of Merit.  (Transcript, 15:2–16:3).  In fact, when Plaintiff’s Counsel explained that Defendants have suffered no prejudice and that they are in the same position as if Plaintiff had filed a timely affidavit of merit, the Trial Court Judge said, “Well, that’s true, but you – but you didn’t.