[brief] In fact, plaintiff's citation to Brach, Eichler, Rosenberg, Silver, Bernstein, Hammer & Gladstone, P.C. v. Ezekwo, 345 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 211 N.J. 230 (2012), actually supports the [...]’ position.  The alleged facts presented in this matter certainly implicate the standard of care as to the [...]’ "legal judgment concerning a complex issue" which would require expert testimony.  In Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 390 (2001), the Court held "that the common-knowledge doctrine applies where jurors' common knowledge as lay persons is sufficient to enable them, using ordinary understanding and experience, to determine the defendant's negligence without the benefit of the specialized knowledge of experts."  Id. at 394.  Plaintiffs’ claim and the issues raised in this appeal is not a case against an attorney where the duty is so basic that it may be determined by the Court as a matter of law.  In legal malpractice cases, expert evidence is not required to establish the attorney's duty of care only when the duty is so basic that it may be determined by the Court as a matter of law.  Brizak v. Needle, 239 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 122 N.J. 164 (1990).  For example, an attorney who fails to protect a client's claim against the running of the statute of limitations would be an example of when an Affidavit is not necessary.  However, as noted in Brizak, "where the attorney has undertaken some investigation, a jury will rarely be able to evaluate its adequacy without the aid of expert legal opinion."  Brizak, 239 N.J. Super. at 432.  Also, as the Supreme Court cautioned in Hubbard:  Although we hold today that there is a common-knowledge exception to the Affidavit of Merit statute, we construe that exception narrowly in order to avoid non-compliance with the statute.  Indeed, the wise course of action in all malpractice cases would be for plaintiffs to provide Affidavits even when they do not intend to rely on expert testimony at trial.  In most such cases, expert testimony will be required to establish both a standard of care and breach of that standard by the Defendant, and a plaintiff who fails to present testimony could be subject to involuntary dismissal pursuant to R. 4:37-2(b).  [Hubbard, super., 168 N.J. at 397.]  Plaintiffs' arguments raised in this Appeal only serve to support the [...]' position that the underlying transaction was a complex legal matter that certainly required an Affidavit of Merit.  Plaintiffs’ recitation of the facts of this case alone, with the description of a series of structured transaction and the [...]’ service as legal counsel, implicate the standard of care and show that an Affidavit of Merit was necessary.  Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ Complaint against the [...], with prejudice, for plaintiffs’ failure to file and serve Affidavits of Merit in this case.  (41a).  The trial court also properly held that the legal malpractice claims against the [...] do not fall under the common knowledge exception to the Affidavit of Merit Statute.  Accordingly, this Court should affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs’ Complaint as to the [...].  II.