ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Trial Court Erred by Erasing Constitutional Rights to Eminent Domain and Redevelopment when a Municipality is Non-Compliant with Mount Laurel Requirements.  This Court should further find that the trial court erred because it did not defer to [...]’s exercise of discretion in its use of its eminent domain power given the absence of fraud, bad faith or manifest abuse.  MiPro, 379 N.J. Super. at 375; Twp. of W. Orange, 172 N.J. at 571.  The court below found no evidence of bad faith or an improper motive.  The trial court specifically stated that it was not accepting or relying on an argument that [...] was “being vindictive or bad or going after . . . this property because [Plaintiff] want[s] to put affordable housing there. ” (1T50:24-51:3).  The court found that it was “really clear” that for years before Plaintiff was involved, [...] had a plan in place for this Property and an agreement with the current owner to develop it with commercial uses.  (1T28:7-24).  Thus, this is not a case in which a condemnation action ostensibly brought for a legitimate public purpose was actually brought for a discriminatory reason or other improper motive.  See MiPro 379 N.J. Super. at 377.  Because [...] has shown a legitimate public purpose and because there is no bad faith or improper motive, the trial court should have deferred to [...]’s exercise of discretion in its use of its eminent domain power rather than enjoining condemnation altogether.  The trial court acknowledged that there were no cases directly on point with the facts at hand.  (1T51:17-52:8; 2T14:3-5).  The court, therefore, created new law, holding that if a town is constitutionally non-compliant, it loses its power of eminent domain regardless of whether a legitimate public purpose and lack of bad faith exist.  (2T14:11-15:4).  There is no exception in our jurisprudence for the trial court’s finding that if a municipality is constitutionally non-compliant with the Mount Laurel doctrine then it essentially forfeits its constitutional powers of eminent domain and redevelopment even when the municipality has a legitimate public purpose and acts in good faith.
[brief] At DBb3 to DBb4, the Board acknowledges that the public notice directed interested persons to [...].  That is not where the application documents were located.  The notice does not say that the documents are "one block away at [...]" (DBb4).  Regardless of what the --- 2 References: DAa_ (Applicant's appendix); DAb_ (Applicant's brief); DBb_ (Board's brief).  Board thinks "any member of the public would be able to discern" (DBb5), the defect was jurisdictional.  At DBb8 to DBb18, the Board violates the requirement that a statement of facts "shall not be a summary of all of the evidence adduced at trial, witness by witness" (R. 2:6-2(a)(5)).  At DAb3 and at DBb9, the defendants insinuate that a tavern was recently at the site.  As is clear from the aerial photos (Pa104), all improvements have been gone since at least 2012.  The Applicant points out that parking lot is not even paved -- it is 'vacant dirt' (DAb7; DAb13).  There is no reason (other than the developer's greed) why this vacant dirt lot cannot be developed with compliant 10-foot-minimum setbacks.  If the expert "explained that a c(2) variance can be granted when a plan advances the MLUL and the benefits of the deviation substantially outweigh the detriment" (DAb5), then the Applicant agrees that the testimony was incompetent: It is the variance, not the plan, which must advance MLUL purposes.  See Wilson v. Brick Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 405 N.J. Super. 189, 198 (App. Div. 2009) ((c)(2) applicant must prove "that the purposes of the Municipal Land Use Law would be advanced by a deviation from the zoning ordinance").  The Board also bungles this at DBb12: whether "the proposed development would advance the Municipal Land Use Law" begs the question of whether the proposed 5-foot setbacks would advance MLUL purposes whereas 10-foot setbacks would not.
[directive] 5.1.4  The supervisor or other officer receiving the complaint shall complete the appropriate internal affairs report form.  The report form should have adequate instructions for proper completion.  Attached to this directive as Appendix B is a standardized statewide public complaint form that will be available in multiple languages in electronic format on the Attorney General’s website.  Agencies shall make available to complainants versions of the standardized form in all of those languages in their offices and, if the agency has a website, online.  5.1.5
[brief] And at the time of the trial she knew she would be seeing the family again in May at “a speaking engagement at the ministry. ”  (24T9-11 to 14)  Thus, although juror 12 did not know *which* of her acquaintances from the Freehold church were [...]’s family members, she knew that *some* of her acquaintances were [...]’s family members, that her husband knew which of the Freehold church members were [...]’s family members, and that those family members likely would recognize her.
[brief] On July 27, 2023, Borough Council held a public hearing to address the Board’s recommendation.  *(See T2). *  Council Members and [...] mischaracterized the evidence presented by Plaintiff at the Land Use Hearing, and shared with the Borough’s LSRP/consultant that the condition of the Property could not impact the town drinking water supply.  (T2, 37:2-12 ([...]: “I take offense to the argument that our wells aren’t close enough to the site to be affected. ”); 38:4-40:19 ([...]: “there has been a huge increase in cancer associated with gas stations throughout the entire country...  We are, I think, more vulnerable along the coastal areas.  I think many oncologists would tell you they’ve seen an increase in cancer in areas like this”) (emphasis added)).  Again, there was no proffer from the Borough’s own LSRP/consultant.  The Borough Council voted to approve the redevelopment designation by enacting Resolution 168-2023.  (T2, 48:4-17; Da19-22).  IV.
[brief] In 2022, Plaintiff was looking through documents for an unrelated matter when she came across the PSA and realized she was entitled to one-half of the proceeds from the sale of [...].  She approached Defendant, who continued to insist that she did not “deserve anything. ”  **2T23-24**.  At that point Plaintiff contacted an attorney and filed her Motion to Enforce the PSA on September 8, 2022.  **Da17**.  The hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce the marital settlement agreement went forward on March 28, 2023.  **2T**.  On May 3, 2023, the Trial Court read its findings of fact and conclusions of law into the record.
[brief] Under the facts of our case, the inspection procedure is not relevant because the settlement had already been identified.  Therefore, the focus of the analysis should have shifted the “standard of care” to how the Defendants should have responded once on notice of the settlement problem.  On June 26, 2015, the [...] memo recommend that the settlement should undergo immediate repair. (Pa1191).  According to [...] engineer [...], that is within 24 hours.  (Pa799 at 19:2-16).  As Plaintiff’s expert explained in his report, under the facts of this case facts, the Defendant’s should have made immediate temporary repairs or provided advanced warning of the condition as per the MUTCD and the Traffic Control Detail.
[brief] [...] further indicated that his client believes that [...] did not in fact make application for land use approvals in violation of section 2 of the Lease Rider and in breach of the good faith and fair dealing requirement of every contract.  [...] advised that based upon these breaches, [...] is responsible for paying rent and carrying charges for the remaining 34 months of the lease and is not entitled to the return of any funds tendered pursuant to the lease (Pa1380).
[brief] The opportunity to cast a vote by mail “has the characteristics of a privilege rather than of a right.  Even the recognized right of every voter personally to express his will at the polls is not an absolute but a conditional right dependent upon many circumstances…When, where and how the voting is to take place are matters prescribed and governed by the will of the Legislature. ”  *De Flesco v. Mercer County Board of Elections*, 43 N.J. Super. 492, 495-96 (App. Div. 1957).  While election laws are liberally construed, such construction is “subject to the valid legislative concern that not only the voter but the process of exercising the vote be secure from the opportunity for fraud. ”  *In re Petition of Battle*, 190 N.J. Super. 232, 236 (App. Div. 1983).  There is no “license to completely disregard the clear and explicit provisions in the absentee voting law which were adopted to preserve the sanctity and proper functioning of [elections]. ”  *In re Gould*, 81 N.J. Super. 579, 584-85 (Law Div. 1963) (modification in original).  Here, Respondent flippantly refers to the requirement for completing the certification required by N.J.S.A. 19:63-13 as a “technical requirement. ”  Such cavalier attitude is the same exhibited at trial when the voter testified that she did not read the instructions accompanying her ballot.  (1T25:22-26:15).  The Board properly rejected [...]’s ballot and was not required to provide her an opportunity to cure it.  Under N.J.S.A. 19:63-17(b)(1), the Board must issue a “Cure Letter” informing the voter of why their ballot was rejected when their ballot has been rejected on the basis of a missing signature.  The certificate that [...] failed to complete included more than just a signature; it also required the voter’s name, address, and assistor information, if applicable, as outlined in N.J.S.A. 19:63-13(a).  The cure provision does not extend to missing elements other than the signature, nor does any provision in Title 19 require the Board to send a cure letter when the entire certificate is left blank.  Therefore, the Board of Elections correctly rejected [...]’s ballot, properly withheld a cure letter, and the trial court appropriately upheld that decision.  We ask this Court to do the same.
[brief] Separately, the State complains that because the evidence from [...]’s phone showing him in possession of a similar Audi does not show the license plate—and thus cannot be definitively identified as the Audi used in the carjacking, the defense will be able to argue that the Audi on [...]’s phone “is a different Audi, and in no way connects defendant to the Elizabeth carjacking. ”  (Sb16)  The defense will indeed be able to make this argument (1T 32-14 to 23), but this argument does nothing to erase the very strong evidence connecting [...] with the carjacking of the Mercedes—[...] was spotted running from the location where the Mercedes was abandoned shortly after it was abandoned, the Mercedes key fob was found on his person, and a handgun matching the gun described by the victims was found in his flight path.  The State also raises a concern that “defendant will be able to argue to the jury that the registered owner of the Audi—in actuality a victim of the theft—should be considered as a suspect instead of him. ”  (Sb16)  But the trial court could easily prevent this by telling defense counsel that any such argument would open the door to allow the State to introduce evidence that the Audi was stolen on April 20.  Finally, the State argues that “if the cases are not joined, the victims in this case will likely have to testify again in the Hudson case to show that the car used to carjack their car was an Audi, identify their stolen Mercedes, and that the jacket inside did not belong to them.  It will require a second revictimization of this violent crime for our victims. ”  (Sb16)  While it is certainly true that there is a preference for joinder because “joint trials . . . spare witnesses and victims the inconvenience and trauma of testifying about the same events two or more times,” “the interest in judicial economy cannot override a defendant's right to a fair trial.
[brief] [...] did not have any mortgage servicer or entity in litigation in 2006 and did not have [...] as a servicer until September 2010; ➢ Exhibit E, by PHH/[...] logs, on May 8, 2014, [...] requested an assignment from [...], nominee to [...], prior loan, an assignment to “[...]” (FC- foreclosure).  This assignment/allonge was drafted with [...] stating: “Does not pertain to our amount. ”  ([...] Oct. 2022 refinance, [...] returned the Fremont Mortgage stamped PAID).  Though the Chancery court’s July 21, 2022 judgment provides that the Schianos had never been in default or delinquency on the 2004 loan, the default that had been reported and indicated previously -- including the 2009 wrongful assignment, and the collection of “advanced fees” assessed to the Schianos because of the wrongful notations of default and foreclosure, prevented the Schianos from refinancing for many years (including denials by [...] for applications in 2013 and 2014), and denials by [...] in 2015 and 2017.  A907, A912.  All these refinance applications were denied because of the erroneous default and foreclosure indications in the Schianos’ loan files that plaintiff never corrected.  As noted above, [...] himself acknowledged that the assignment done in 2009 to a trustee for an “investor trust” is done only in cases of default or foreclosure.  Therefore, such assignments are a red flag to potential lenders.  Plaintiff never removed the wrongful 2009 default/foreclosure assignment despite years of knowing of its falsity.  These facts set forth prima facie claims showing that the Law Division erred in dismissing the claims on summary judgment (A1159), or at least erred in denying the Schianos’ motion for reconsideration seeking to reinstate the claims (A1157).
[brief] a total rent of about $2,400. \(^3\)  Two-thirds of the rent increase, or $1,568.25 per month, provides [...] with a return on its alleged equity investment and is in addition to the minimum rent needed for [...] to meet its operating expenses for the unit.  According to [...]’s brief in the appeal, his annual income is less than $43,000 per year.  As noted above, his only means of paying the rent increase ordered by the lower court is a GoFundMe account that will only last for 1-2 more months.  [...] Cert., ¶4.  The primary issue that is of concern to the *amici* is how the trial court ordered the Board to calculate [...]’s fair and reasonable return on its equity investment.
[directive] pretrial defendant's the if by not conditions, release monitored by managed where violence cases domestic in sought be should acomplaint-warrant  Furthermore, immediate the to assure necessary reasonably is restraint other or no-contact a of imposition complaint- of issuance a moreover, that Note, 4.6.3. subsection victim.  See the of protection if release revocation of or detention, pretrial for applying of option the preserve would warrant ankle monitoring (an electronic seek to and/or condition, release a violate to were defendant Section 4.6. condition.
[brief] ”  The Department’s regulations, specifically N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-2.4 (governing the elimination of non-operating school districts), lends further support for the Commissioner’s interpretation.  N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-2.4(a)(1) provides that the executive county superintendent shall submit a plan to the Commissioner to eliminate non-operating districts, and this plan shall include the executive county superintendent’s “recommendation as to the most appropriate local public school district within the county for the . . . [non-operating district] with which to consolidate[.]” (emphasis added).
[brief] The Revised Policy’s actual disclosure provisions contain no language either authorizing notification because of protected characteristics or defining protected characteristics as an adverse impact:  **Duty to Inform**  All staff members (certificated and non-certificated personnel) and administrators shall take necessary steps -- after first notifying and consulting with an appropriate school administrator (e.g., the Principal and/or his/her designee) -- to promptly inform a student’s parent(s) whenever a student discloses an issue and/or exhibits behaviors that may have an adverse impact on the student’s physical and/or mental health, safety and or social/emotional well-being.  **Such notification cannot be based solely on a student’s actual and/or perceived protected characteristics under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f).  Parental notification is required under this policy when there is an observation and/or indicia of an adverse impact on the student’s physical and/or mental health, safety and or social/emotional well-being.  The notification shall be made by the appropriate administrator and/or staff member. **  **Duty of Candor and Confidentiality**  In addition to the foregoing, all staff members and administrators shall have a duty of candor with respect to all communications with parents required under this Policy.  Further, staff members and administrators shall maintain the confidentiality of such communications in accordance with applicable Federal and State law, including without limitation Policy 8335.  Revised Policy 8463 (Da110) (emphasis added).
[brief] Defendant alleges that various policies, some of which were in place at the Prosecutors Office first in 1998, constitute newly discovered evidence that merits a new trial.  These policies are neither newly discovered nor did Defendant’s lack of receipt of the policies until 2023 prejudice his case.  First, the policies were not new.  Despite Defendant’s contention to the contrary, the State did not deny the existence of policies, describing them on several occasions at the hearing.  5T 88:2-93:17 (witness responding at length regarding the requirements of law enforcement and Attorney General rules); 5T 93:18-94:9 (witness agreeing that there are written polices related to retaining and destroying evidence); 5T 96:20-99:9 (witness explaining in detail the provisions of the policies in response to questioning from the judge); 5T 150:16-152:19 (witness explaining her understanding of the applicable policies in response to questioning from the judge).  At the hearing, four witnesses were called.  The first two witnesses were not questioned about policies.  The final two witnesses explained the policies and their respective understandings of the policies upon being asked.  Neither party disputes that the polices have existed for many years and had existed for many years at both the time of the litigation of the original motion to dismiss and at the time of PCR, nor does either party dispute that both parties were aware of the policies’ existence harkening all the way back to the adjudication of the motion to dismiss.
[directive] Rule 3:3-1(c)(1) requires warrants on the Bail Schedule 1 charges of murder, kidnapping, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact.  Rule 3:26-1 delineates factors to be considered when setting bail.  Bail Ranges for attempts or conspiracies should generally be the same as the actual substantive crime.  Statute Charge Description Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option
[brief] The reason, however, for why the language the Township relies upon in Section 6.5 does not appear in Section 6.1 is because the language is Section 6.5 is referencing the fees set forth in Section 4.1.  The Township and the Trial Court also relied upon the 1984 Agreement between the parties as entitling the Township to the connection fees.  Although the 1984 Agreement does provide the Township with the right to collect the connection fees along [...], that agreement arose from development and construction that occurred during that time.  It overlooks that the parties were also parties to the 1971 and 1973 Agreements, which under the terms of those agreements were set to expire in 1998.  Accordingly, the 1999 Agreement was, at the time, the newly constructed agreement between the Borough and the Township and a renewal of the 1971 and 1973 Agreements.  As such, the parties bound by the 1999 Agreement which superseded all prior agreements between the parties.  Lastly, the Township and the Trial Court rely upon the prior course of dealings between the parties in which the Township received the connection fees along [...].  However, that course of dealings arose from the 1984 Agreement, which again was superseded by the 1999 Agreement.  More importantly, is the fact that the Township has not received any connection fees from [...] since 1999.  Accordingly, reliance upon the parties past course of dealings is misplaced.
[brief] ”  *Kieffer v. Best Buy*, 205 N.J. 213, 222 (2011) (citing *Jennings v. Pinto*, 5 N.J. 562, 569-70 (1950)).  “Appellate courts give ‘no special deference to the trial court's interpretation and look at the contract with fresh eyes. ’”  *Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill*, 217 N.J. 99, 115 (2014) (quoting *Kieffer*, 205 N.J. at 223).  Here, under § 4.02 of the Lease, Tenant’s Allowance is undisputedly payable by Landlord to Tenant under the Lease.  What is in dispute is whether Tenant’s Allowance is payable when Tenant owes Landlord overdue rent and related charges while Landlord owes Tenant an installment payment of Tenant’s Allowance that exceeds the sum of the charges owed to Landlord.
[brief] (Da 32 to 33)  On December 14, 2022, after various mergers, [...] sentenced defendant to serve the same sentence that he received after the first trial -- a 25-year/85%-without-parole sentence for aggravated manslaughter, and a four-year concurrent sentence on Count Two.  (Da 34 to 36)  Defendant was also ordered _____________________  1  Da – defendant’s appendix to this brief PSR – presentence report to pay the usual fees and penalties.  (Da 34 to 36)  On February 2, 2023, defendant filed his notice of appeal.
[directive] However, the petitioner will receive of copies the orders . of Electronic Central Registry.  The Administrative Office the Courts shall .(Ql of or maintain a registry all persons who have had a temporary final extreme risk protective order entered against them and all persons who have been charged with a of violation a temporary or final extreme risk protective order.  All records made pursuant to this section shall be kept confidential and shall be of or released only to a police other law enforcement agency investigating a report a of or or crime, offense, act domestic violence, conducting a background investigation or involving a person's application for a firearms purchaser identification card permit to or purchase a handgun or employment as a police law enforcement officer, or for of purposes an extreme risk protective order proceeding, or for any other purpose of of authorized by law or the Supreme Court  the State New Jersey. of A respondent's information, other than·information related to a violation a or temporary final order issued pursuant to this law, shall be removed from the registry of upon the termination the extreme risk protective order.