ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] CONCLUSION  [...], in its Opposition Brief, never addresses [...]’s observation that the need to balance public access rights with the privacy, safety and quiet enjoyment of seashore-adjacent habitations is a seminal component of the common law dating back to the earliest formulations of the public trust doctrine in the Institutes of Justinian, which declares, “No one […] is forbidden to approach the seashore, provided that he respects habitations, monuments, and the buildings, which are not, like the sea, subject only to the law of nations. ”\(^9\)  Emphasis added.  The manner in which [...] required that public access be provided in this case is inconsistent with this seminal principle of common law that was codified by the Public Access Law.  For the foregoing reasons, [...]’s effort to impose an onsite public access requirement across [...]’s property under the facts presented is not authorized by or otherwise in accordance with the laws of the State of New Jersey.  As such, this Court must set aside the Commissioner’s Final Decision dated October 6, 2023.
[brief] Plaintiffs submitted several applications to the Zoning Board in furtherance of their efforts to develop the Subject Property per the Settlement Agreement, the HEFSP, and the Judgment of Compliance and Repose.  Ra5-Ra7.  First, on or about December 9, 2015, Plaintiffs submitted a “d” variance application to the defendant [...] as part of their efforts to develop the Subject Property with mixed commercial and residential uses consistent with the VC-2 Overlay Zone provisions applicable to the Subject Property (the “Original Application”).  Ra4.  Specifically, the Original Application envisioned development of 215 residential units, consisting of townhouses and apartments, 43 of which are to be affordable units limited to occupancy by low and moderate income households, including very low income --- 3  The “d” variance applications were submitted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d), and the “bulk” variance requests (“c” variances) were made pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c).  households, along with the construction of five buildings totaling 65,000 square feet to be used as commercial/retail space.  Id.  On February 23, 2016, the Zoning Board held a public hearing on Plaintiffs’ Original Application and the Zoning Board approved the Original Application by Resolution dated April 26, 2016 (the “Prior Approval”).
[brief] POINT III  PETERSON FAILED TO APPEAL THE ORDER GRANTING  PETERSON’S OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL  The Court entered its order granting [...]’s motion to reconsider on January 5, 2024.  (Da047-Da048).  This Order completely dismissed [...] from the case.  (Da047-Da048).  Specifically, the Order indicates, in part:  ...IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Third-Party Defendant [...]’s Motion to Reconsider this Court’s October 20, 2023 Order is hereby GRANTED, and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that [...] is hereby DISMISSED from this case…  (Da048)  [...] did not appeal this Order.  This failure is fatal to [...]’s appeal.
[directive] Mechanical force involves the use of a device or substance, other than a firearm, to overcome a subject’s resistance to the exertion of the officer’s authority.  Examples include use of an asp, baton, or other object, oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray or the physical apprehension by canines.  Passive Resistor.  A person who is non-compliant in that they fail to comply in a non-movement way with verbal or other direction from an officer.
[directive] 3:3-1  Promulgated Rule  2C:14-3b 2C:15-2a 2C:17-1a 2C:14-4  2C:15-1  Statute permissible permissible permissible permissible permissible Bail Option Cash 8  JUDGE’S issue.  10% 10% 10%  10% 10%  10% should COURT $35,000 $75,000 and $15,000 $2,500  3:26-2 $1,000 summons  Range bail MUNICIPAL to to to to to RULE setting $1,000 $10,000 $50,000  Bail $5,000 $500 or crime.  TO warrant when PURSUANT  THE substantive considered Degree a Degree Degree Degree Disorderly IN Persons  Degree whether OR, 2nd 3rd 3rd 4th ADMINISTRATOR, JUDGE actual be regarding to appropriate.  second water, or remains, recklessly the disorderly to factors the otherwise death; COURT is damage recklessly or loss as in or transportation, danger; or death, factors defined water same causes recklessly pecuniary human delineate it a if or MUNICIPAL if degree; less, disruption causes degree; or telephone, where in facility COURT as the recklessly delineate steal structure oil or means 2 If so gas, $500 fourth communication, be aviation recklessly property. or Schedule does degree. third offenses) bail or desecrate conducting generally DEPUTY any dangerous or if damage if facility, property, R.O.R. A or degree, offenses) degree #9-05 person or or another OR fourth or it airport poles, if person degree. aviation (non-indictable to if JUDGE degree; Directive for fourth second places of OR should to degree; cables, other public purpose Description of or Bail at used damage option (non-indictable property endanger wires ADMINISTRATOR equipment $500, third or or recklessly third of service, or mains fourth COURT explosives field conspiracies with impairment to lines lights, facility, the or property, of Supplement tangible landing injury mausoleum excess to or facility, public wires, for safety electric and as 7:4-1 pipes research SUPERIOR or bodily provide so or to explosion airport, damages other in telegraph the fire impairs 7:2-2(b) property with damage interruption
[brief] Over a year later, [...] in Middlesex County addressed the identical issue in *Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Freeman*, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1127 (Law Div. 2016).  [...] framed the question as “whether costs and expenses paid pursuant to an insured’s Extended Medical Expense Coverage (“Med-Pay”) are subject to the collateral source rule expressed in N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 and therefore not recoverable in a subsequent subrogation action”.  The decision had two basic premises: first, an insurer’s med-pay obligation is not found within N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1, et seq but rather, N.J.A.C. 11:3-7.3(b) and therefore cannot be considered an action brought “pursuant to” N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1, et seq.  This is consistent with the general proposition that med-pay benefits are not the same as PIP benefits.  They are not subject to the prohibition against stacking in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.2, only apply in those circumstances when PIP benefits are not available and med-pay benefits cannot duplicate benefits payable under workers’ compensation or Medicare.  See Ingersoll, supra.  Second, med-pay expenses were “benefits” as used in N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 and therefore, were not excluded from the collateral source rule.  Relying upon Perreira, [...] concluded med-pay expenses were not recoverable by way of subrogation.
[brief] (4T74:2-6)  Again, to say the least, this bully-boy testimony adds nothing to [...]’s fatally weak case; indeed, it only subtracts from its zero baseline.  To state the obvious, it creates no material issue of fact.  Seeking to desperately frame the matter as a “contested credibility issue” on an established issue of fact, counsel for [...] argues that “the Lower Court ultimately rejected the clear certification provided by Plaintiff’s President, who stated that Plaintiff ordered the same types of pipe from [...] at higher pricing than Defendant.
[directive] 3.  If there is a known victim of the alleged offense, the victim must be notified and agree to the process.  Where appropriate, victims should be informed that this process is a more efficient and expeditious process that enables a matter to be resolved locally.  A stationhouse adjustment may proceed without the active participation of a victim, but shall not proceed over the objection of a victim.  A victim who objects to a stationhouse adjustment should be permitted to sign a juvenile delinquency complaint, unless the complaint is clearly frivolous or lacking in probable cause, in which case, the police officer has the discretion pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2B:12-21(b) to refuse to accept the complaint.
[brief] As noted above at Point IIIA, the appraisals were specifically ordered on their request, for purposes of establishing fair market value, and there followed multiple instances in which the Defendants cited the appraisals as dispositive of fair market value with respect to the Boonton Property.  Similarly, with respect to both the Florida and Boonton properties, the Defendants introduce the idea that the Trustee had a duty that is completely absent from the Trust, to secure the “best” possible price for both properties.  Db46-47.  This is a blatant mischaracterization of the Trust.  Again, if that had been the Decedent’s intent, the Trust could have simply provided a mechanism, such as listing the properties and giving the respective beneficiaries rights of first refusal, and at any rate, the Defendants resisted listing the Boonton Property.  (8T77-15-17).  Elsewhere, the Defendants assert that the Trustee “failed to disclose the [...]’ ongoing interest in purchasing the Boonton Property for $800,000,” but this is simply a bald accusation with no facts to support it; they cite [...]’s own testimony (at 8T99-100) but there is nothing in the cited pages that could be construed as “new evidence” (in fact, [...] offered evidence to the contrary, noting that the [...] had put their own home on the market and then taken it off\(^6\). or as anything other than speculation.
[brief] For all the foregoing reasons, [...], respectfully requests that this Court dismiss this appeal or, in the alternative, affirm the grant of Summary Judgement in USAA’s favor.  Respectfully Submitted, [...]  [...], Esquire N.J.  Id: 002002002  Email: [...]  [...], Esq. N.J. Id: 016822004  Email: [...]  [...] [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Respondent, [...]
[brief] During the plea colloquy, defendant admitted that on April 29, 2011, he entered the [...] on [...] in [...].  He further admitted he was armed with a handgun, and entered the store for the purpose of obtaining Percocet with a fraudulent prescription.  Defendant admitted that after entering the store, he decided to commit armed robbery.  Specifically, defendant admitted that he pulled out the gun and demanded that the victim give him Percocet.  Most importantly, defendant stated that during the course of this attempted robbery the gun “went off” and shot and killed the victim.  (1T:21-12 to 23-1).  At the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the trial court noted the heavy burden was on the defendant.  The court highlighted that defendant’s assertion of innocence was a blanket, bald statement.  Additionally, the court found defendant’s reason for withdrawal weak.  Defendant knew the consequences of his plea and his reasonable expectations were met.  Most notably, the trial court found “the parties contemplated retaining a lot of rights in terms of appeal [at the time of the plea]… but there was never any discussion or preservation of any rights to do anything regarding the homicide conviction if the robbery conviction ultimately got reversed. ” (2T:48-7 to 48-13).  Finally, the court acknowledged the rights the State gave up when entering this plea and highlighted the unfairness which would result if defendant were permitted to withdraw his plea.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I a.
[brief] On appeal, the Petitioner expresses dissatisfaction with the life estate award, claiming that there “is no rational basis for restricting [his] interest in his home to a life estate that he cannot mortgage, sell or otherwise alienate.  (Pb 48).  The Petitioner relies upon the general principle -- wholly inapplicable here -- of a “fundamental property right” under “public policy. ” (Pb 49).  In support, it cites Highway Holding Co. v. Yara Eng’g Corp., 22 N.J. 119 (1956), a case having no relevance here.  That matter involved an appeal from a summary judgment of awarding the return of a deposit of $1,000 made on a contract for the purchase of certain lands.  In entering judgment the trial court held, Inter alia, that the title was unmarketable.  22 N.J. at 213.  The resolution of such issues have no relevance to the instant case.
[brief] (Db33).  While this scholarly article seeks to highlight some of the challenges in this field, it states at the very outset (in the abstract) “The distinction between perimortem and postmortem fractures is an important challenge for forensic anthropology.  Such a crucial task is presently based on macro morphological criteria widely accepted in the scientific community. ” (Da53, emphasis added).  While the defendant has pointed to a work that is critical of [...]’s methodology, even it admits that it is generally accepted as reliable in establishing the timing of injuries.  Certainly, the criticisms raised against this common practice amongst forensic anthropologists would have made for appropriate impeachment on cross-examination, but given that the articles cited by the defendant on appeal admit that they are widely accepted, they do not make a meaningful argument against admission of this testimony.
[brief] The defense even chastised [...] in summation over alleged remarks made to disparage the non-existent witness.  The State of New Jersey and [...], a nurse from the state of New Jersey, who is a state employee just like [...] and who was -- and [...], who was disparaged this courtroom by [...] -- remember first she told you she does a good job -- or she does a good job and she sat with her?  And then she said oh, no she's okay, after plaintiff objected.  Remember that?  And she's just like any other surveyor.  So they want you to believe that the agency charged with knowing the statutes, the regulations, holding facilities and nurses accountable, can't be trusted.  But [...], [...], [...], who relies on statutes that don't even apply, they're the ones to be trusted.  Does that make any sense?  11T92:23-93:14.
[brief] 4.  The [...] Decision And Initial Decision Are Fatally Wrong About The Application Of New Jersey's Climate Law To This Proceeding  Our brief set out the very extensive body of law that the Legislature has enacted to address and mitigate the very real effects of climate change.  Hb29-37.  None of it is subject to any serious dispute.  We also discussed at length the provisions of the State's forward-looking 2019 Energy Master Plan (EMP), and the legal error of the ID and the [...] Decision in relying on the "law of the case" on a preliminary procedural motion to disregard the plain meaning of the law and the EMP.  Hb48.  The heart of the error by the ID and the [...] Decision is that the Legislature has directed the maximum application of and compliance with the EMP as a matter of law.  N.J.S.A. 52:27F-15b declares that it is "the intention of the Legislature that the actions, decisions, determinations and rulings of the State Government with respect to energy shall to the maximum extent practicable and feasible conform to the energy master plan adopted by the Department pursuant to section 12 of this act."  (Emphasis added.)  As this is a matter of law, the [...] is not entitled to any deference.  This is a command and needs no regulations or any further action; it is self-executing.
[directive] The inspection function should determine by actual on-site inspection whether personnel are properly implementing management’s policies at the operational level.  This function is also responsible for reviewing and evaluating procedures.  In addition, the inspection unit or function should evaluate the material resources of the agency and the utilization of those resources.  This includes, but is not limited to, motor vehicles, communications equipment, computers, office machinery and supplies.  The inspection function or unit should report any deficiencies to the law enforcement executive, and recommend any possible solutions and improvements.  3.6
[brief] Between April and November 2022, [...] sent [...] deficiency letters requesting additional information about the Project.  (Ra1; Ra7; Aa99; Aa207).  Relevant here, [...] initially expressed concern about the design of the U.S. Route 1 access road over an unnamed tributary, noting that the crossing needed to be as nearly perpendicular to the channel as possible to comply with N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.2(h)(6)iii.  (Ra4).  [...] also asked [...] to demonstrate that wetland disturbances to the road crossing are minimized to the greatest extent practicable.  (Ra20).  In response, [...] revised the road crossing design to be perpendicular with the channel, which also reduced impacts to the riparian zone, (Ra20; Aa31), and to avoid a small wetlands area, (Ra31).  [...] sought updates regarding [...]’s flood hazard area calculations and a plan showing the flood hazard area, to determine flood hazard area compliance, as well as plans labeling where stormwater outfall basins would be located.  (Ra31; Ra48).  [...] responded to each deficiency letter and provided [...] with sufficient information for [...] to determine the application was complete for review on August 17, 2022.
[brief] ” (Ab24.)  Appellants support this argument by claiming that a separate statutory provision within chapter 13 “includes a category specifically not found in the [sic] N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a): the board of education of a district comprising two or more municipalities. ’  See N.J.S.A. 18A:13-34. ” (Ab24.)  There are several fatal flaws in Appellants’ position.  To begin, N.J.S.A. 18A:13-34 has nothing at all to do with a municipality’s ability to withdraw from a regional or consolidated school district.  Rather, it concerns districts joining and creating regional school districts and the apportionment of appropriations between the municipalities or districts in question.  Moreover, chapter 13 defines “municipality” and “board of education,” but does not define “the board of education of a district comprising two or more municipalities,” signaling that the Legislature did not ascribe the term any particular significance.  Given that the Legislature did not define the term and that it does not appear throughout chapter 13, there is no credence to Appellants’ argument that the Legislature created a “new category” of district for purposes of chapter 13.  Nor would it make sense for the Legislature to create a new category of district, fail to define it, include it in only a single section of the statute, and intend for it to apply in another section of the statute in which it is not referenced.  Furthermore, because the term is undefined, it does not expressly apply to “merged” districts such as [...] and [...], as Appellants strain to suggest.  Rather, given the greater context of N.J.S.A. 18A:13-34’s language, it is clear that the term is intended to apply to limited purpose regional districts that seek to expand to an all-purpose district.  Indeed, something very similar happened here; the [...], which was a limited purpose 7-12 regional school district encompassing the municipalities of [...] and Atlantic [...], expanded to an all-purpose PK-12 regional school district.  N.J.S.A. 18A:13-34 expressly applies to such situations, and provides the requirements for funding apportionment between municipalities within such districts.  No statutory language suggests that the Legislature intended a specific term within N.J.S.A. 18A:13-34, which does not concern withdrawal from a regional or consolidated school district, to apply to municipalities such as [...].  Indeed, the statutory language itself discredits any such reading.  Most importantly, the Legislature did include municipalities such as [...] within the withdrawal provisions of N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11(a) through N.J.S.A. 18A:8-50(8).
[brief] (ii)  **The Borough’s Process Here Complied With Applicable Law**  *N.J.S.A. 24:61-36* provides a detailed application process and criteria regarding information to be submitted to the [...], and the review by the Commission of applications submitted.  The statute contains no specific requirements as to what should be considered by a local public entity with reference to applications for a Resolution of Support issued by the local governing body.  The statute only indicates:  The criteria to be developed by the commission pursuant to subparagraph (a) of this paragraph shall include, in addition to the criteria set forth in subparagraphs (b) and (d) of this paragraph and any other criteria developed by the commission, an analysis of the following factors, if applicable:  (iv)  A description of the proposed location for the applicant's site, including the following, if applicable:  the submission of proof of local support for the suitability of the location, which may be demonstrated by a resolution adopted by the municipality's governing body indicating that the intended location is appropriately located or otherwise suitable for activities related to the operations of the proposed cannabis cultivator, cannabis manufacturer, cannabis wholesaler, cannabis distributor, cannabis retailer, or cannabis delivery service.  *N.J.S.A. 24:61-36d(1)c(iv)*  The statute contains no restrictions as to the factors that a local governing body may consider in adopting such a resolution, and also contains no requirements concerning factors that a local entity must consider in adopting a Resolution of Support.  The statute only directs that a municipality may adopt a resolution which is "proof of local support for the suitability of the location," which is one aspect of an application by a proposed cannabis retailer that can be considered by the Commission in deciding whether to issue a cannabis license.
[brief] 182 N.J. at 474-76.  The Commissioner has no authority over the day-to-day activities of the Council, nor may the Commissioner veto the regulations formulated by the Council to approve and set the parameters of a bear hunt.  In other words, the parameters of a hunt under N.J.S.A. 13:1B-30, -32 fall solely within the purview of the Council.  Id., 182 N.J. at 478.10 --- 10  The Appellate Division recently ruled that a petition by environmental rights groups to the DEP to repeal certain rules permitting black bear hunting, specifically, N.J.A.C. 7:25-5.6 and -5.24, and the comprehensive black bear management policy, was misdirected to the DEP; instead, the petition should have been submitted to the Council, which had formulated the regulations in the Game Code and the policy in N.J. Const. (1947), Art. III, Par. 1 provides that “the powers of the government shall be divided among three distinct branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial.
[directive] When a court had specifically directed that the officer’s weapons be seized either pursuant to a domestic violence restraining order or a domestic violence warrant for the seizure of weapons; or as a condition of bail, the officer whose weapons have been seized because of a domestic violence incident may request an expedited court hearing to determine the officer’s status regarding the possession of weapons.  B.  When a court order, either criminal or civil, which prohibits a state law enforcement officer from possessing weapons is in effect, no weapons are to be returned to the officer subject to the domestic violence proceedings without a court order.
[brief] The Zoning Board correctly followed the Law and found the off-site parking on School property had not been demonstrated either as a current permitted use or a legal nonconforming use (D1).  With those limited documents being “the record before the Board” as referenced in the Resolution (Da7-88), on the Appeal, in Pre-Trial submissions (Da171, Paragraph 8) the [...] offered that it intended to produce at Trial numerous additional documents that had not been before the Zoning Board (Da174)⁴.
[directive] Open-Ended Response 7.  Since July 2014, in which “hold” times were extended from 90 days to 5 years, how many victims/survivors have come forward to move SAFE Kits to law enforcement?  Open-Ended Response  8.  For your “hold” kits, how many are:  1 year old 2-3 years old 4-5 years old  Over 5 years old 9.