ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Now, they did come out with a new type of rifling and marker in the barrel, but that’s been recent, it wouldn’t effect this case.  So what I notice is, [...] and that particular bullet, he had only one land, I’ll say one land, or whatever you want to call the humps and the whatevers, the valleys, he only had one of each to compare.  And he said both were positive, which struck me funny right away for the simple that when you have a whole bullet it’s very difficult to match.  If you have six lands and six grooves that means you have 12 opportunities to match something.  He had two.  2T20-21 Q  Okay.  And so in other words, when you looked at it, your opinion was that there was insufficient markings to really make much of a conclusion about that, is that the – A  I -- I never looked at the bullet in question, because that was a piece that was lost in evidence.  Q  Okay.  A  But, from my experience, looking at quite a few Glocks, which I own one, you have to match it, the -- the bullets are extremely hard.
[brief] THE [...] POLICY PROVIDES LIABILITY COVERAGE ON AN “ALL RISKS” BASIS AND NO EXCLUSIONS APPLY (Raised Below: Pa279, Pa280, Pa281, Pa290, Pa291, Pa292)  The [...] policy provides liability coverage on an “all risks” basis whereby the burden of proof shifts to the insurer to prove that the loss was not covered (which [...] has not done).  Defendant [...]’s denial letter mentioned only one exclusion, the “Expected or Intended Injury” injury exclusion.  Defendant [...]’s whole argument hinges on this one exclusion.
[brief] ”)  There is no legitimate dispute that the facts underlying Plaintiff’s claims – i.e., the illicit agreement between the [...] and [...] wherein the [...] agreed to effectuate a sham blight designation in exchange for the development of a public school – were unknown to Plaintiff until after completion of the First Action.  In fact, the trial court – equipped with and relying heavily upon a full evidentiary record – reached that very conclusion.  Specifically, during the July 8, 2022 oral argument, the trial court: (1) made a finding of fact that Plaintiff did not know, nor could it have known, of facts sufficient to give rise to its claims until after the completion of the First Action, and (2) applied its factual findings to render a legal determination that the entire controversy doctrine did not apply to bar Plaintiff’s claims.  Specifically, the trial court expressly found:  I do not believe that the generalized suspicions that this record reflects of [...] before the phone conversation of ’21 would have justified or required him to include that claim in the first Complaint.  So on that basis alone that’s not enough to say that he’s estopped from raising them now or the entire controversy doctrine operates [to] bar his claim.  (3T41:14-22)  (emphasis added).  I am going to grant [...] the benefit of all reasonable inferences and credibility calls in connection with the motion in front of me.  I believe what he says, that the new evidence that supports the second Complaint was as a result of a February ’21 conversation he had with [...].  The lightbulb goes off.  And he thinks now that’s the reason why they’re favoring [...], because they promised the school.  That’s what his testimony was.  I’m accepting it.  I’m making that finding of fact in connection with this motion.  (3T10:6-16) (emphasis added).  There’s nothing in the [...] Council transcript from January of ’20 or the Certification that you talk about that even remotely indicates that there was this indication that the school was a deal or an agreement or anything like that.  So I don’t think he even had a basis to speculate about that before February ’21.  (3T27:10-16) (emphasis added).  I just made a finding that he did not have a real indication about the quid pro quo with the school until February, a month after the [First Action] was dismissed. (3T28:24-29:1) (emphasis added).  I looked at his deposition testimony.  Anything up until that [February 2021] phone call about the school was pure guesswork on [Plaintiff’s] part.  And for [Plaintiff] to include a claim like that in the first lawsuit, you would have filed a Motion to kick it out in two seconds.  ..  So I disagree with you having that suspicion required [Plaintiff] to include that claim in the first Complaint.  (3T34:11-16, 35:2-4) (emphasis added).  Notwithstanding those explicit credibility determinations and findings of fact – findings that should be treated as binding on this appeal – the trial court inexplicably (and without meaningful explanation) dismissed Plaintiff’s claims.
[brief] Secondly, the Bank funded the operation of the diner given the negative status of its operation.  This included payment of the Receiver’s hourly compensation and other administration expenses.  The Bank allegedly provided the capital for the diner’s operation for its own perceived benefit - to keep the diner open.  Assertions that a Final Accounting cannot be accomplished or should not be required appear contradictory and to fly in the face of actions such as the foregoing.
[brief] Second, the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct by presenting a reasonable inference from the record, namely that [...] did not try to leverage information about defendant for his own benefit.  (See Db29; 2T:103-23 to 105-8).  [...] did not testify that [...] approached her “seeking to trade information implicating [defendant] in Tucker’s killing in exchange for” aid from the police.  (Id.).  The testimony only states that [...] and the Officers discussed bail and [...] stated that he would “try to help [defendant] in any way” the officers could; the record is silent as to whether [...] requested or received aid in exchange for his information.  (2T:104-9 to 105-8).  [...] credited his favorable plea to the skills of his attorney.  (2T:126-15 to 22).  The prosecutor’s statements did not unfairly bolster [...]’s credibility because they were not “clearly contrary” to the evidence adduced at trial.  (Db30; See State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440 (2008)).  C.
[brief] Thus, the plain evidence shows that [...] has not engaged in a delay strategy and the third Cole factor also weighs in favor of arbitration.  iv.  Extent of Discovery Conducted (T1 72:21 - 73:2)  Cole’s fourth factor requires an examination of “the extent of discovery conducted. ”  Cole 215 N.J at 281.  The lower court ruled that this factor supported [...] without addressing the facts demonstrating the contrary.  T1 72:21 - 73:2.  The Cole court examined the fact that discovery had been extensive among the parties in that case, had included interrogatories and depositions of at least twelve persons, and had concluded on a date certain (there, December 30, 2009).  Cole, 215 N.J at 271.  Indeed, the parties were then preparing for trial to be held three months later on March 22, 2010.  Id.  Here, while [...] referred to “extensive” discovery, the fact is that the litigation to date has focused on the duty to defend, and the majority of the discovery to date relates to this topic and is solely comprised of document and written discovery.
[brief] Moreover, all bidders (regardless of whether their bids included alleged defects) may seek to withdraw their bids if their bids include a mistake.  N.J.S.A. 40A:11-23.3.  Accordingly, because [...]’s hypothetical “walk away” option is predicated on a mistake in a bid, that option is available to all bidders.  Similar to the holding in Suburban Disposal, [...] received no competitive advantage.  Even so, the omission of the Notice of Classification does not provide [...] with a “walk away” option because the hypothetical does not exist.  [...] is, in fact, classified.  Thus, if the County awarded the Anticipated Contract to [...] (as it should have done), [...] would have been obligated to perform (with or without the inclusion of the Notice of Classification form in its bid) because it was unquestionably classified.  [...]’s reliance on *Case v. Trenton*, 76 N.J.L. 696 (1909), *Tufano v. Cliffside Park*, 110 N.J.L. 370 (1933), *Terminal Constr. Corp. v. Atlantic County Sewerage Authority*, 67 N.J. 403 (1975), and *Muirfield Const. Co. v. Essex Cnty. Improvement Auth.*, 336 N.J. Super. 126 (App. Div. 2000), is entirely misplaced because the information omitted by the bidders in those matters was not objectively discernible and/or would impact assurances of performance if it was refused by the bidder.
[brief] ” (See Pb30).  Yet the evidence undisputedly reflects that [...] performed a full investigation of [...]’s June 24, 2020 conduct.  And, separately, that the charge pay issue originated with [...], was investigated by [...], and led to [...]’s termination by the termination panel.  While [...] certainly relayed [...]’s discovery to HR, and was a participant in what followed, no reasonable juror could conclude that this was revenge for [...]’s “complaint” about the June 24, 2020 incident.  Especially given that she had “complained”—or, more accurately, griped—chronically about [...] for years, to whoever would listen, without incident.  As had other staffing coordinators for years without incident.  The only other staffing coordinators who were terminated—[...] and [...]—were those caught stealing [...] funds.
[brief] I recognize that the sentence [from the 2018 Remand] “We are convinced the court erred by finding that all of [...]’s and [...]’s claims rested on the same common core of operative facts,” taken in isolation, would tend to demonstrate otherwise. \(^{27}\)  However, once the context of the sentence is reintroduced, it demonstrates that the basis for that decision was the Trial Court’s failure to draw its conclusion with the correct statute of limitations for RICO damages in mind.  …  The Appellate Division stated it was “not convinced” that, given the new statute of limitations period, an award of attorneys’ fees that accounted for time used to uncover “wrongful acts committed as far back as 1988” was “justifie[d]. ”  [...] II, at *80.  This is unsurprising given that this question within the contours of the 2004 statute of limitations period was not a question raised on appeal, and therefore was not briefed by the parties.  Now, with the benefit of the arguments by the parties, for the reasons stated infra I am convinced that this award is justified and make a recommendation for the same attorney fees.
[brief] ”  Here, none of the three stated purposes are relevant to the facts here.  [...] did not effectuate an *arbitrary* mid-term cancellation, but instead unenrolled [...] from the CCIP based on excluded demolition work and, further, the unenrollment happened upon [...]’s request.  Second, [...] was notified that it was being unenrolled and acknowledged the same multiple times.  Last, [...] was not left bare without coverage, but was defended by [...] (TRVa2933-2934), and plaintiffs in the [...] were fully compensated based on a settlement partially funded by [...] and [...], each of which provided coverage for [...].  Accordingly, N.J.A.C. 11:1-20, *et seq.*, as well as other regulations and statutes, are not applicable here.
[brief] For example, in Grow Co., Inc. v. Chokshi, the trial judge gave a thorough explanation as to why, taking into consideration defense counsel’s “thoroughness,” she decided to reduce his award of attorney’s fees to a more reasonable amount.  424 N.J. Super. 357, 365 (App. Div. 2012).  Recently, in Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp., the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld an award of attorney’s fees where the trial court, in determining the reasonable amount of hours spent on legal services provided in connection with a discrimination lawsuit, provided a detailed opinion and spreadsheet using line- by-line deductions of time entries, identifying categories of legal work that were improperly included in the attorney’s fee application.
[brief] Plaintiff cites several mixed motives cases, seemingly arguing that such construct (where applicable) eliminates the need to identify/plead a party allegedly discriminated against, that they had a qualifying disability, that a party in interest requested and was denied an accommodation, etc. (Pb14-16).  Not so – and that is not what the courts found or recognized in Smith, Delanoy or ADP.  First, contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, it has not demonstrated direct evidence of discrimination by the [...] (although we recognize that such issue is not one for motion to dismiss per se).  In addition, the present case is principally one for alleged failure to accommodate disability under the LAD, which has its own particularized proof structure as set forth in Point II above.
[brief] For more than five years, Plaintiffs-Respondents [...] (“Martinez”) and [...] (“Pacheco”) (collectively, “Respondents”) maintained six investment accounts with Defendant [...]  (“[...]”), a SEC-regulated broker dealer.  [...] opened and maintained each account pursuant to an Application, with an incorporated Client Agreement, reflecting Respondents’ electronic signatures.  In reliance on the Client Agreements, [...] delivered its promised services to Respondents during the five-year period that they were [...] clients.  The Client Agreements set forth obligations for both [...] and Respondents and, among other things, contained arbitration provisions providing that any disputes between Respondents and [...] would be submitted to binding arbitration under the rules of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”).
[brief] [...] was disciplined for using discriminatory language towards Muslims.  The [...] (EED) investigation sustained the charges against [...] and he was issued a written reprimand.  This matter was sufficient to remove him from the promotion list due to an internal Department of Correction’s policy that states minor discipline related to EED violations within three years of the promotion list was sufficient basis to remove a candidate.  If this same three year policy was followed by the [...], Appellant [...] would have been properly promoted based on the significant passage of time between the 2012 discipline and this promotion list.  Clearly, outside observers may question a written reprimand in [...] for the violation related to this discriminatory act, but the policy was clearly written to support the removal of [...] from the promotion list.  In the Matter of [...], Sheriff’s Officer and County Correction Officer (S9999U), [...] (September 7, 2018)(RA88-92) and In the Matter of [...], Police Officer (S9999U), [...], (July 11, 2019)(RA93-102) are also not relevant to this Appeal.
[brief] ”  *Kearny PBA Local No. 21 v. Town of Kearny*, 81 N.J. 208, 221 (1979).  “Arbitration awards should be what they were always intended to be: Final, not subject to judicial review absent fraud, corruption, or similar wrongdoing on the part of the arbitrators. ”  *Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., Inc.*, 135 N.J. 349, 357 (1994).  In contract interpretation cases, such as here, “[t]he polestar of [an arbitrator’s] construction of a contract is to discover the intention of the parties. ”  *Kearny PBA Local*, 81 N.J. at 221.  And, “[s]o long as the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contractual language is ‘reasonably debatable,’ a reviewing court is duty-bound to enforce it,” which, in the private-arbitration realm (as here), is restricted to errors “so egregious that one need only look at the cover page, at the award, to know that a horrible mistake had been made. ”  *N.J. Transit Bus Ops., Inc. v. Amalgamated Transit Union*, 187 N.J. 546, 548 (2006); *Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc.*, 129 N.J. 479, 542 (1992).  Thus, “the party seeking to vacate it bears a heavy burden. ”  *Del Piano* v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 371 N.J. Super. 503, 510 (App. Div. 2004).  Here, as the Trial Court recognized, [...] simply misapplies N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23(a)(4) as some sort of catch-all, arguing that the Arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority merely because he interpreted the PTA in [...]’s favor.  Courts, however, only vacate awards under N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23(a)(4) in the most obvious and under the most egregious of circumstances, none of which are remotely applicable here.  See, e.g., Block v. Plosia, 390 N.J. Super. 543, 555 (App. Div. 2007) (holding the arbitrator exceeded his authority when he awarded plaintiff homeowners treble damages for defendant contractor’s breach of contract under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, as the parties had not included consumer fraud or treble damages as issues subject to arbitration, and modifying the award by excising the treble damages); Kimm v. Blisset, LLC, 388 N.J. Super. 14, 24 (App. Div. 2006) (vacating a supplemental arbitration award for counsel fees because the arbitrator was not authorized by statute or contract to decide a post-award application); Minkowitz v. Israeli, 433 N.J. Super. 111, 148 (App. Div. 2013) (finding arbitrator had exceeded his authority by acting as both the mediator and arbitrator).  The [...], for example, was founded “with the specific goal of helping to implement arbitration as an out-of-court solution to resolving disputes.
[brief] ”  In addition, while a dismissal “without prejudice,” by definition, means that it may be re-filed, further proceedings resulted in further confusion and self-contradictory rulings.  In related Appeal No. [...], Appellants/Plaintiffs will show that plaintiffs re-filed the SAC in this case as a new complaint under Docket  Immediately after the new docket filing was commenced, [...] moved to dismiss based upon the SAC being dismissed.  In a perplexing and shocking development, that motion was granted by the same motion judge and the new complaint in [...] was dismissed “with prejudice.
[directive] Public Synopsis of Disciplinary Action  Officer [...] was suspended for eight (8) days for insubordination.  The Officer refused a direct order to complete a report.  Officer [...] was suspended for twelve (12) days for failing to safeguard department property.  The Officer was found to be at fault for a motor vehicle accident.  Detective [...] was suspended for fifteen (15) days for neglect of duty.  He was found on three occasions to be absent from his post.  Officer [...] was fined ten (10) vacation days for abuse of sick leave.  Officer [...] was suspended for seven (7) days for conduct unbecoming an employee.  He attempted to collect a private debt while in uniform.  Sgt. [...] was demoted for failing to take police action.  The Officer failed to arrest an individual who had an active warrant.  Appendix M
[brief] CONCLUSION.  For all the reasons set forth herein, the Court’s decisions on the Motions to Dismiss and the Motion to Designate Trial Counsel must be affirmed.  [...] [...]  [...] [...]  Attorneys for Defendant- Respondent, [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  DATED: December 4, 2023  BRIEF FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
[brief] BREWERY  An establishment licensed under N.J.S.A 33:1-10 to manufacture alcoholic beverages and to sell and distribute the products to licensed wholesalers and retailers.  Such uses may manufacture, sell and serve alcoholic beverages to consumers on a licensed premise for consumption on site, but only in connection with a tour of the brewery, or for consumption off the premises.  Breweries may include warehousing and off-site distribution of alcoholic beverages consistent with state law and applicable licensing from the [...].
[brief] (2T32-19 to 34-9; 2T76-17 to 25; Cma2; Ra36 at 0:00:01 to 0:00:22; Ra39 at 0:01:04 to 0:01:45).  The stairs beyond the door to the third floor, facing into the left side of the property, winded up to a “loft area” that was centered over the building.  (Da55; Ra39 at 0:00:01 to 0:00:47; 1T71-1 to 15; 1T94-5 to 96-21; Ra25 to 27).  It began with, what [...] described as, a “small kitchen. ”  But unlike the second floor, which had a full kitchen with an oven and washer-dryer unit for which the kitchen door, across from the door to the third floor, was unlocked, (Ra24; Ra37 at 0:00:31 to 0:00:39), the third floor (kitchen, so to speak) at most had a temporary stovetop, that could be “just put . . . on the table,” with a fridge and sink.  (Ra27; Ra39 at 0:00:01 to 0:00:24; 5T139-6 to 140-4; 5T156-13 to 157-8).  And it appeared to the police that the third and second floors were in fact part of one residence.  (1T94-15 to 96-21; Da44).  After the TEAMS Unit cleared the subject property and rendered it safe, [...] entered through the front door of [...].
[brief] [...], Esq. in-house counsel’s office is located at [...].  See all captions to all pleadings filed by [...] in this case.  1a., 99a.  10.  [...]  Main Business address is also located at 1608 Route 88, Suite 330, Brick, New Jersey in the same building as [...].  101a, 110a.  11.  [...] used [...] to serve the Tax Foreclosure Complaint in this case Defendants.
[brief] Defendants filed renewed motions to dismiss in September 2022, again on comity grounds, as well as for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to join indispensable parties.  (Pa512-13; Pa521-24; Pa570-51).  On November 2, 2022, just before those motions were set to be heard, Defendants filed yet another motion—this time seeking to stay the case on comity grounds in favor of the second-filed Missouri action.  (Pa756-57).  Defendants’ renewed motions to dismiss and for a stay were argued before [...] on January 20, 2023.  [...] entered a decision on the record, once again denying Defendants’ motions in their entirety, and issued Orders to that effect.  (2T at 59:3 to 61:16; Pa770-75).  The court held that this first-filed action has been pending since 2017, that it has numerous connections to New Jersey, and that it should proceed to trial in New Jersey, notwithstanding Defendants’ second-filed litigation in Missouri.  (2T at 59:3 to 61:16).  Only three weeks later, and on the heels of [...]’s retirement, Defendants filed their motion to reconsider before [...] on February 10, 2023.  (Pa078-79).  This immediate motion to reconsider marked Defendants’ fourth motion seeking to dismiss or stay the case on comity grounds in favor of their second-filed action in Missouri.  [...] heard oral argument on May 3, 2023, and issued a decision and order on July 24, 2023 overturning the orders of [...] and dismissing the case on comity grounds.³ (Pa056-57; Pa058-77).  In doing so, [...] ignored and vacated six years of proceedings in New Jersey, contrary to well- ³ [...] did not reach the merits of Defendants’ personal jurisdiction or joinder arguments, and those issues are not presented on appeal.  established precedents of this Court.  [...] timely filed its Notice of Appeal on September 6, 2023.  (Pa051-54).  **STATEMENT OF FACTS**
[directive] The certain electronically-stored criminal case violence) and whether it involves present offense (e.g., adult defendant's previous involvement, if any, in the documents the history data that and court a PSA3 process produces autorr~ated system.  This criminal justice six-point "failure-to-appear" (FTA) six- a scale, a pretrial risk indicators: provides three that criminal (NVCA) scale, and a "new violent activity" (NCA) criminal activity" "new point will monitor the program released defendants to address pretrial services AOC's "flag."3  The be Directive independent criteria to used by prosecutors under this given that the expected results.  That is to be often for another offense) will overlap with the risk indicators used on release committed while offense (e.g., present has a pending and process (e.g., defendant charge).  See also note 9 risk-assessment pretrial in automated the accompanying text.  decision-making framework of this Directive are characterized as action under the trigger 3
[directive] Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option Distributing, Dispensing or Possessing CDS with Actor distributes, dispenses or possesses with the intent to distribute CDS while on or within 2C:35-7  Intent to Distribute  3rd Degree $15,000 to $35,000  10% permissible 1000 feet of school property or while on a school bus.  Near or On School Property or School Bus Distributing, 2nd Degree $25,000 to $50,000  No 10%