ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Id.*; see *Ellis*, supra, 409 N.J. Super. at 461.  In its decision, the trial court did not cite any evidence establishing that Defendant either used funds from, participated in, aided, or effectuated any of the Disputed Transactions (36T28-21 to 39-20, 47-4 to 51-25, 52-7 to 54-10).  In fact, of the nine (9) Disputed Transactions at issue (which were all effectuated by [...]), only three (3) were shown to result in funds being transferred to a joint account Defendant had with her husband: - $500,000 transferred from [...]’s BOA Account on November 5, 2013 to [...] and Defendant’s [...] (36T36-11 to -22); - $50,000 transferred from [...]’s MR Line of Credit Account on September 8, 2015 to [...] and Defendant’s [...] (*Id.* at 37-5 to -7); and • $90,000 transferred from [...]’s MR Line of Credit Account on October 7, 2015 to [...] and Defendant’s [...] (Id. at 37-7 to -9).  Therefore, at most, Defendant could only be liable for conversion in connection with the above three (3) Disputed Transactions.
[brief] Da37  Unpublished Appellate Division Decision - Moche v. Levy, No. A-5480-13T2, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 928, at *17 (App. Div. Apr. 22, 2016) ..............................................................................  Da39  Referenced Portions of Deposition Transcript of [...] Employee [...] ........................................................................................................  Da53  Letter from [...] to [...], dated July 11, 2017 ........................................................................................................  Da55  Attachment: Defendant [...]’s Answers to Form C and C2 Interrogatories ........................................................................................................
[brief] 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 ..................................................................................  1  Other Authorities  Model Jury Charge (Criminal), “Judge’s Inquiry When Jury Reports Inability to Reach Verdict” (approved 6/10/13)  .............................................  29  Model Jury Charge (Criminal), “Judge’s Instruction on Further Jury Deliberations” (approved 1/14/13) ....................................................  29, 31 Rules R.  2:10-2 ..............................................................................................  21  COUNTERSTATEMENT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] POINT I THE LEASE AGREEMENTS PLACED THE TENANT DEFENDANTS UNDER A DUTY TO CLEAR SNOW AND ICE FROM THE LOCATION WHERE [...] WAS INJURED  [Raised at Pa594-1040; Decided at Pa1-2]  The Tenant Defendants asked the Law Division to rewrite their leases in a way that would excuse them from the duty they assumed under Article 3 of the Leases.  Regrettably, the Law Division did so.  Article 3 of the leases state: Care and Maintenance of Premises.  Lessee acknowledges that the premises are in good order and repair, unless otherwise indicated herein.  Lessee shall, at his own expense and at all times, maintain the premises in good and safe condition, including plate glass, electrical wiring, plumbing and heating installations and any other system or equipment upon the premises and shall surrender the same, at termination hereof, in as good condition as received; normal wear and tear excepted.  Lessee shall be responsible for all repairs required, excepting the roof, exterior walls, structural foundations, and which shall be maintained by Lessor.  Lessee shall also maintain in good condition such, portions adjacent to the premises, such as sidewalks, driveways, lawns and shrubbery, which would otherwise be required to be maintained by Lessor.  [See, e.g., Pa991 (emphasis added)].  The Tenant Defendants all agreed to maintain the walkways and parking lot “adjacent” to the premises.  From this language, however, the Law Division held incorrectly that they had no duty to maintain walkways which do not touch “their premises. ”  New Jersey law makes clear that an agreement is interpreted in accordance with the intention of the parties -- but that intention must be established within and by the actual language of the agreement.  “The polestar of construction is the intention of the parties to the contract \textit{as revealed by the language used, taken as an entirety…}”
[brief] BECAUSE THE “AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT” ACT IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE CLAIMS AGAINST THE ENGINEERS AND ARCHITECTS, FOR THEFT OF CLIENT WORK PRODUCT, THE GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THEIR FAVOR WAS ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW  [Pa641-966]  After purchasing [...]’s solar-energy developmental rights, which included a pending, incomplete Planning Board application, Appellants/Plaintiffs originally retained [...] for its Planning Board support.  Pa___ ([...] Cert.)  [...] was subsequently substituted with defendants [...] and [...]; these entities acquired transfer of the client materials and work product file from Princeton.  Pa ([...] Cert).  After they received Princeton’s files, these defendants then added their own work product on behalf of plaintiffs and named those files “Revised Site Plans. ”  Pa648ff.
[brief] After the motion to exclude was denied, counsel attempted to make sure the fingerprint evidence was handled in a way that comported with our knowledge of the reliability of fingerprint evidence and its effect on a jury.  But the defense attempts were rebuffed.  First, the defense requested that prospective jurors be asked about their beliefs about the reliability of fingerprint evidence.  It was essential to discern if any jurors had a preexisting belief that fingerprint evidence is infallible, because that belief is both mistaken and prevalent.  Further, studies show that cross-examination cannot deter jurors who already believe in the infallibility of such evidence.  Failing to make sure that the jury as empaneled did not have people on it who would automatically assume that the fingerprint examiner’s opinion was correct and be unable to consider any information to the contrary violated [...]’s right to a fair trial.
[brief] [...] testified on his own behalf and called five character witnesses who testified to his character for truthfulness.  (14T 95-24 to 177-6)  [...] told the jury, as he had told the police, that on November 2, 2020, he spent the day visiting friends and family, and partying and drinking heavily, because it was the first time he had been back to New Jersey in several years, and swore that he was not at the barbershop with [...] that night.  (14T 131-21 to 134-22 to 136-13)  Although he still had trouble remembering the events of November 2, 2020 (e.g., 151-4 to 151-5), he provided more details at trial than he was able to give police on the day of his arrest.  With respect to the clothing he was wearing, [...] remembered visiting his father in the Newark,\(^9\) where he showered and changed his clothes, because he had been wearing the same clothes for more than a day; he put the clothes and sneakers he had changed out of in the trunk in the Chrysler.
[directive] 2nd Degree  $50,000 to $150,000  10% permissible  Knowingly  Leaving the Actor operating a motor vehicle knows he is involved in an accident and knowingly leaves the Scene of a Motor 2C:11-5.1 scene under circumstances which violate N.J.S.A. 39:4-129 (“Action in case of accident”) and 2nd Degree $50,000 to $150,000 10% permissible  Vehicle  Accident the accident results in the death of another person.  Resulting in Death  Actor attempts to or purposely or knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or Disorderly Persons
[brief] 22  In re Vey 272 N.J.Super. 199, 205 (App.Div.,1993) aff'd, 135 N.J. 306 (1994) ..............................................  15  In the Matter of Hendrickson 451 N.J.Super. 262 (App. Div., 2017) ..................................  14  In the Matter of Herrmann 192 N.J. 19, 33 (2007) ..................................................... 20, 21  Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec. 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973) .......................................................  16  Moorestown v. Armstrong 89 N.J.Super. 560, 566 (App.Div. 1965) cert. denied, 47 N.J. 80 (1966) ...........................................  22 State v. Locurto 157 N.J. 463, 470-71 (1999)  ..............................................  17, 19 Town of West New York v. Bock 38 N.J. 500, 523 (1962) .................................................... 19, 20  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] During the next couple of hours, she took an ecstasy pill and drank some Hennessy Cognac, which made her high, but the degree of her intoxication seemed to rise and fall.  She told [...] about [...]'s money.  When he asked how much, she replied “a lot. ”  [...] then said he was “going to get him,” which [...] understood as meaning that [...] was going to get [...]'s money.  [...] asked [...] where [...] was, and she told him [...] was probably at a club.  She also told him where [...] was staying.  [...] telephoned [...], who arrived a few minutes later and spoke with [...].  When they finished speaking, [...] told [...] to go with [...] and take him to the hotel where [...] was staying.  According to [...], [...] did not intend to use force, but rather intended to steal the money while [...] was at the club.  [...], the only witness to testify on behalf of the defense, said he was at the basketball court and saw [...] and [...], but not [...].
[brief] No certifications or declarations have ever been submitted, with any pleading or in response to a Motion.  Plaintiffs never asserted that they did not read the Arbitration Provision.  In fact, Plaintiffs never claimed that they didn’t understand what it meant at the time of execution.  Plaintiffs retained Counsel and never claimed Counsel failed to explain that provision.  In fact, every other piece of evidence, the language of the document, the references to the FAA, the timing within which Plaintiffs possessed the SPA and POS, the incorporation of the POS, and the presence of Counsel both at time of execution, speaks to the contrary.  The entire record is bereft of any sworn assertion to the contrary.  That is because the actions, conduct and words of Plaintiffs demonstrate that Plaintiffs assented to the Arbitration Provision in the SPA.
[brief] In other words, as [...] cogently explains:  . . . if [...] and [...] thought that their beach-front lots had the direct access now claimed by the [...], it is reasonable to infer that they would have included specific language in the proposed Final Decree to that effect.  They cared enough about the right of Normandy Beach property owners to access the beach via the streets that they included that language, even though, presumably, no one had ever questioned the existence of that implied easement based upon the map.  Yet given the opportunity to establish the easement now claimed by the [...] by naming [Defendants’ predecessors in interest] as a defendant in the tax sale foreclosure, or at least inserting language describing the direct access easement in the Final Decree, [...] and [...] consciously did not do so.  In my opinion such inaction under those circumstances (opportunity and a good faith argument) indicates that [...] and [...] did not believe that they had the easement the Plaintiffs now are seeking.  And if litigants owning beachfront lots held that view 24 years after the creation of the Normandy Beach development, then that is evidence that [...] did not intend to grant a direct access easement to beachfront owners in 1925.  (emphasis added)  (Da635-Da636)  CONCLUSION
[brief] Plaintiff was blameless here, as was [...].  But [...] chose not to pay its taxes, left the property to rot, and ignored foreclosure proceedings.  If this court were to ask “whose acts first could have prevented the loss,” that answer is clear.  Moreover, a third-party’s rights are now jeopardized.  Equity should not intervene to affect the rights of two innocent parties when Defendant caused the loss by not paying taxes, leaving the property abandoned, and ignoring foreclosure pleadings.  This is even more so when any relief to the Defendant can only result in untold subsequent litigation between Plaintiff and a subsequent purchaser\(^6\).  "A judge sitting in a court of equity has a broad range of discretion to fashion the appropriate remedy in order to vindicate a wrong consistent with principles of fairness, justice, and the law."  *Graziano v. Grant*, 326 N.J. Super. 328, 342 (App. Div. 1999).  "[A] court's equitable jurisdiction provides as much flexibility as is warranted by the circumstances[.]"  *Matejek v. Watson*, 449 N.J. Super. 179, 183 (App. Div. 2017).  "[A] court of equity should not permit a rigid principle of law to smother the factual realities to which it is sought to be applied."  *Graziano*, 326 N.J. Super. at 342 (citing *Grieco v. Grieco*, 38 N.J. Super. 593, 598 (App. Div. 1956)).
[directive] FECHADO/  Dated: Acusado/ Defendant pagina 1 de 2  Formulario enmendado promulgado porIa directriz 05-14 (08/25/2014), CN 10778-Spanish page 1 of 2  Revised Form Promulgated by Directive# 05-14 (08/25/2014 ), CN 10778-Spanish  He revisado este Formulario con el acusado y estoy satisfecho de que se le ha informado debidamente de los derechos que describe.
[brief] Although a signature would generally signify agreement, that is not the case where the signer was induced to sign by a misrepresentation – even where the misrepresentation could have been discovered simply by reading the document and the signer was negligent in failing to do so.  *Rowen Petroleum Properties, LLC v. Hollywood Tanning Systems, Inc.*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33685, at *11-12 (D.N.J. Apr. 20, 2009).  When it comes to the waiver of statutory discrimination claims, being provided with the necessary time to read and review the document is even more critical to the determination of whether there was unconscionability.
[brief] On August 21, 2023—less than one week after the initial filing in this action—[...] adopted Resolution No. 23-228, which authorized the Board to undertake a preliminary investigation to determine whether the Property should be designated an “area in need of redevelopment” for condemnation purposes.  (Da181).  One month after that, the Township Committee enacted Ordinance No. 2023-3390, purporting to amend the Redevelopment Plan to require that a site plan application cannot be submitted to the Planning Board unless the applicant is designated as the redeveloper by the Township.  The Township’s actions continued into 2024.  On February 7, 2024, the Planning Board held a hearing and, despite Plaintiff’s substantial objection, recommended that the Property be designated as a Condemnation Redevelopment Area.  Two weeks later, the Township adopted the recommendation of the Planning Board and determined that the Property is an area in need of redevelopment for condemnation purposes.  A companion Resolution, passed that same day, authorized the Township Administrator to issue an RFEI from potential redevelopers.  In sum, the Township was rapidly moving forward with its plan for redevelopment of the Property in the midst of this builder’s remedy action.
[brief] This appeal arises out of a contract for the construction of an inground swimming pool by [...] ("[...]") at a beach house owned by Plaintiff in Mantoloking.  Unsatisfied with the speed with which [...] proceeded, Plaintiff terminated the contract and sued [...], claiming, among other things, that [...] breached the parties’ agreement and violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act ("CFA").  Given the arbitration clause in the parties’ agreement, [...] moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint.  The trial court granted the motion in accordance with a 12-page opinion and order.  On appeal, the issue is a narrow one: namely, whether a single sentence in the parties’ dispute resolution provision – permitting [...] to proceed in Court to collect money due and owing – is substantively unconscionable such that the entire dispute resolution provision should be invalidated.  Plaintiff conceded below (and maintains here) that, “but for the last offending sentence,” the dispute resolution provision complies with New Jersey law and would be binding on the parties.  He nevertheless maintains that, because courts in several other states allegedly have invalidated so-called “one-sided” provisions as he claims exists here, New Jersey should follow suit and he should be free to litigate this matter in the Superior Court.  Plaintiff’s arguments are unsupported by controlling New Jersey law.  An arbitration provision is not unconscionable merely because it provides the parties with different remedies.  For this reason, Plaintiff’s arguments are without merit.  Moreover, while Plaintiff attempts to present the matter as one of first impression, this Court need only look to its own precedents to resolve the narrow issue presented and affirm the trial court’s decision.  Thus, for these reasons, and those set forth more fully herein, [...] respectfully requests this Court affirm the trial court’s order so that the parties may comply with their contractually-agreed-upon dispute resolution agreement.
[brief] Exhibit 3  Defendants' Brief in support of its July 15, 2021 Cross-Motion for Reconsideration  Omitted Exhibit 4 November 29, 2023 cover letter and notice to take deposition pursuant to R. 4:14-2(c)......................................................755a  Exhibit 5  Cover page of Verified Complaint for [...], et als. v. [...], et als., Docket No. [...].........................................................768a  Exhibit 6  Plaintiff [...]'s Answers to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories.................................................................769a  Exhibit 7  Plaintiff [...]'s Answers to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories.................................................................801a  Exhibit 8  Certification of [...] in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration
[brief] A.  Courts have roundly rejected [...]’s argument that her claims are exempt from arbitration.  [...] argues, in circular fashion, that under “New Jersey law, it is clear that an employee cannot be compelled to waive his or her right to assert claims of discrimination under the LAD because employees such as Appellant cannot, and should not, be forced to waive broad remedies under the NJLAD, including the right to a trial by a jury of Appellant’s peers. ”  (Pb25.)  Beyond its circuity, her argument is simply incorrect, as New Jersey law is in fact to the contrary.
[brief] In compliance with the court order, [...] promptly drafted and served interrogatories and a notice to produce on Defendants.  (387a¶6, 424a-437a).  On June 23, 2023, nine days before the ninety-day discovery period was to expire, Defendants served a document production demand directed to Plaintiff (but nothing directed to [...]).  (790a¶5, 807a-811a).  Defendants requested an extension of discovery from Plaintiff and [...] (both of whom consented) and promised to circulate a consent order to that effect, but none was forthcoming despite several requests.  (387a¶9, 790a¶¶5-6, 813a-814a, 817a-819a).
[directive] [...] Forensic Nursing Program  [...]  [...] 4 Moore Road, DN 110 115 Vine Street Cape May Court House, New Jersey  Bridgeton, New Jersey 08302 08210  Office: [...]  Office: [...]  Essex County [...] Forensic Nursing Program  [...]  [...] 185 Washington Street, 2nd Floor Newark, Justice Complex New Jersey  07102 P.O. Box 623 Office: [...]  Woodbury, New Jersey 08096  Office: [...]  Hudson County  [...] Forensic Nursing Program  [...]  [...] SV Unit, Administration Bldg., 5th Floor Justice Complex 595 Newark Avenue 65 Park Avenue  Jersey City, New Jersey  07306 P.O. Box 756  Office: [...]  Flemington, New Jersey 08822-0756  Office: [...]  A- 47
[brief] **Plaintiff’s Arguments on Appeal are Unavailing.**  Absent from plaintiff’s current appeal is any explanation of her failure to serve a report from a qualified expert regarding [...].  Plaintiff offers only the same excuses as to why her orthopedic surgery expert, [...], did not provide a report within the discovery period.  (Pb17-Pb18.)  These excuses are unavailing, because no report from [...] would enable the plaintiff to set forth a *prima facie* case against [...].  Under New Jersey law, [...] cannot testify regarding the standard of care applicable to [...], or any alleged deviations therefrom, because at the time of the underlying events, [...] did not practice in the same medical specialty as [...], and he did not have equivalent qualifications to [...].  See, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41; Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 481-82 (2013).  [...] practiced in the subspecialty of hematology; he was board certified in hematology; and his treatment and care of [...] fell within that subspecialty.  (65Pa; 2a; 3a.)  [...], by contrast, practiced in the specialty of orthopedic surgery.  (8Pa; 12Pa)  Dr.  Pupparo readily admitted in a March 9, 2021, Affidavit of Merit that “I cannot expertly critique non-Orthopedic services. ”  (10Pa.)  Plaintiff’s excuses for not serving [...]’s report are therefore moot with regard to her claims against [...], and she offers no explanation for her failure to serve a report from an expert hematologist.  Because plaintiff has never provided any basis to permit more time to serve a report regarding [...], let alone “exceptional circumstances,” the Law Division’s denial of plaintiff’s motion to extend discovery was clearly appropriate, and it should be affirmed.
[brief] Moreover, as discussed in more detail in Point II, infra, even putting aside the procedural defectiveness of Appellant’s application, on the merits the application fails because Appellant has made no threshold showing that Respondent’s use is now or ever was “nonconforming” as the MLUL defines that term, having pointed to no zoning ordinance with respect to which Respondent’s parking on Lot 5 was noncompliant.
[brief] Plaintiff was in fact instructed by the Trial Court to appeal.  The Trial Court’s instruction was memorialized in the transcripts (1T) of the hearing.  Based on the trial court’s position as to the merits, Plaintiff argued that the order dismissing his complaint as “Moot” to be a final judgment or order.  “Defendants initially argue that the issues before this Court are moot because the ordinance challenged in the referendum petition was put to a vote.
[brief] ¹  Da — Defendant’s appendix  Dca – Defendant’s confidential appendix 1T – Transcript of January 24, 2020 suppression hearing 2T – Transcript of March 5, 2020 oral decision on suppression motion 3T – Transcript of April 8, 2021 suppression hearing 4T – Transcript of April 26, 2021 suppression hearing 5T – Transcript of February 22, 2023 plea hearing 6T – Transcript of March 31, 2023 sentencing  PSR – Presentence Report  On March 27, 2019, [...] filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized from his storage unit.
[brief] At the very least, the jury should have been told that it could infer intent from the use of the wine chiller only if it first found the wine chiller was a deadly weapon, a weapon “calculated to extinguish life. ”  Maioni, 78 N.J.L. at 343.  The requirement that the question be presented to a jury when a non-per-se-weapon is used is as old as the inference itself.