ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Aa2521-Aa2537). **  With regard to the groundwater recharge requirements, the issue is that BMP 201 and BMP 271 failed to meet the separation requirement of the bottom of the basin and the seasonal high water table.  In response, [...] argues that there is no issue with separation issue because the volume of stormwater being recharged post-construction is greater than the volume pre-construction.  (DEPb21-22).  This completely misses the issue, which is that the BMP 201 and BMP 271 fails to have any separation between the bottom of the basin and the seasonal high water table and therefore these basins fail.  [...] further argues that [...] is conflating test data to show the lack of groundwater mounding clearance by using values from different test pits to come up with the failure.  (DEPb21-22).  However, as explained in [...]’s initial brief, this is exactly what the BMP Manual requires an applicant to do.  For design purposes, the seasonal high water table shall be taken at the highest level of the observed mottles or groundwater of the test results, and use the slowest of the test replicate results to calculate infiltration.  BMP Manual, Chapter 12, Page 11-12; BMP Manual, Chapter 13, Page 4.  Here, BMP 201 is a small-scale infiltration basin.  [...] used three different test pits with varying seasonal high water tables and infiltration rates.  (Aa3066).  However, pursuant to Chapter 12 of the BMP Manual, the analysis should have used the highest seasonal high water table and the slowest infiltration rate for design purposes.  BMP Manual, Chapter 12, Page 12; BMP Manual, Chapter 13, Page 4.  As such, a review of the data should have meant that [...] only had a water table separation of 4.2 feet.  (Aa3066).  Using the slowest infiltration rate as required would have resulted in a groundwater mounding of 7.5 feet.  (Aa3066).  7.5 feet groundwater mounding is greater than the 4.2 feet of separation, which means that BMP 201 would fail.  Therefore, using the analysis required pursuant to the BMP Manual shows that BMP 201 fails and does not pass the groundwater mounding analysis.  Using the same analysis required under the BMP Manual, BMP 271 shows only 2.2 feet of separation, and using the slowest infiltration rate, would result in a groundwater mounding of 2.6 feet.  (Aa3066).  Again, 2.6 feet rise of groundwater level is greater than 2.2 feet of separation between the bottom of the basin and the groundwater table, meaning that BMP 271 would also fail.  [...]’s reliance on the claim that more groundwater is being recharged post-construction does not address the issue at hand, which is that two of the basins would fail pursuant to the design parameters of the BMP Manual.
[brief] [...] and [...], [...], [...], and [...] join in [...]’s opinion. used the mounted spotlight on his marked police car to illuminate the interior of passing vehicles in order to search for the robbery suspects.  In the first vehicle [...] encountered, a man and a woman reacted with annoyance and alarm when [...] shone the spotlight into their car.  When [...] came across a second vehicle, approximately three-quarters of a mile from the store, he illuminated the interior of the car with the spotlight and saw three Black males inside.  According to [...], the men did not react to the spotlight at all.  [...] viewed that non-reaction as "odd" considering the reaction of the passengers in the first car.  At that point, the only information [...] had about the robbery was that the suspects were two Black males, one with a gun, who fled the robbery on foot.  Dispatch had not provided any additional identifiers.  Based on the race and sex of the occupants and their non-reaction to the spotlight, Sergeant [...] executed a motor vehicle stop of the car.
[brief] West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2021) ...........................................................................................  40  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) .........................................................................................  34 Statutes N.J. Pub. L. 2018, ch. 60 ....................................................................................... 38, 44 N.J.A.C. 6A:7-1 ..................................................................................................... 50
[brief] The Policy Compliance Statement prepared by [...], P.E., and filed in support of [...]’s application to modify the 2017 WFD Permit, once again directly addressed compliance with N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.6 (Submerged Vegetation Habitat), N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.7 (Navigational Channels) and N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5 (Recreational Docks and Piers) with regard to the elements of the dock included in the modification application.
[brief] PLAINTIFF IS NOT JUDICIALLY ESTOPPED FROM A MONEY JUDGMENT ABOVE THE APPLICABLE LIABILITY COVERAGES  TOTALING $200,000, A MOLDING OF THE JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE, AND PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO APPLICATION OF RULE 4:58-1 SANCTIONS.  (Orders located at Da23-24 and Pa5-6)  The first legal argument set forth in the Defendant’s Appeal is that the Plaintiff is judicially or equitably estopped from obtaining a judgment over the Defendant’s policy limits and that therefore, the verdict should be molded to the policy limits.  The Defendant then argues that since the jury verdict should be molded to the policy limits of $200,000, the Offer to Take Judgment penalties do not apply.  This case was tried, resulting in the jury returning a verdict in the amount of $1,600,000.00 in favor of Plaintiff, on January 19, 2023.  3T68:2-8.  On February 7, 2023 Defendant filed a Motion to Mold the Verdict, or, in the Alternative for a New Trial or Remittitur.  Da47-54.  On February 28, 2023 an Order was entered in favor of Plaintiff and denying Defendant’s requests.  Da23-24.  The Order for Judgment was entered in the amount of $1,823.006.96, which includes the jury verdict of $1,600,000, plus litigation expenses awarded based upon the Offer to Take Judgment Rule 4:58-2(a), prejudgment interest at 8% commencing from July 14, 2021 totaling $191,821.96, and counsel fees totaling $31,185.00.  Da23-24.  A Motion to Reopen Bankruptcy to have the debt determined non-discharged since Defendant was driving while intoxicated was filed by Plaintiff.
[brief] (Da952).  “Damages” is defined in Section 6.2 of the MIPA (Da952) as: > the amount of any actual loss, liability, claim, damage (excluding incidental and consequential damages) and expense (including costs of investigation and defense and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of suit), whether or not involving a third-party claim. ”  The same principles articulated above apply to the MIPA indemnity provision.  And, as was true with the SPAs, the trial court found that [...] knew the numbers he used to establish the sale price for [...] “were wrong” and “bogus. ”  (27T87:23 to --- 26  This is not merely an indemnity for third party claims.  [...] separately agreed to indemnify [...] from and against certain third-party claims by Company lenders with respect to personal guaranties.  (Da951).  The trial court correctly held that this qualified as a “material inaccuracy” that triggered Section 6.3’s indemnification provision. \(^{27}\)  Appellants further argue that the trial court erred in awarding expert fees and other costs.
[directive] The report should be organized as follows: (1)  A Summary of the Allegations against the officer, including a recitation of the alleged facts; (2) A Summary of Factual Findings in which the investigator outlines the facts proven or supported by the evidence reviewed during the investigation, and applies those facts to each allegation.  This shall include a conclusive finding on whether each allegation is to be recorded as exonerated, sustained, not sustained or unfounded.  For sustained findings that qualify for disclosure under Section 9.11.2, the summary of factual findings, along with the discipline imposed, should be the basis for the brief synopsis required under Section 9.11.2; (3)  A Discipline Imposed section in which the final discipline imposed on the officer will be recorded.  This section should be completed once the discipline imposed becomes final.  See Section 9.11.2 for guidance on when the officer’s discipline is final.
[brief] Lanzet v. Greenberg, 126 N.J. 168, 175 (1991).  While a motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, *Baumann v. Marinaro*, 95 N.J. 380, 389 (1984), when, as here, it clearly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law, a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial may be reversed.
[brief] Ordinance 173-24(A) reads in pertinent part:  A.  No person owning, keeping or harboring any animal shall suffer or permit it to run at large upon the public streets or in any public park or in any public building or in any other public place within the township.  Ordinance 173-27 reads:  No person who shall own, keep or harbor an animal shall abandon such animal within the township.  "[A]n ordinance violation, commenced on municipal court summons and in which the State acknowledged its burden beyond a reasonable doubt, is a quasi-criminal matter."  *State v. Carlson*, N.J. Super. 521,527 (App. Div. 2001), cert denied, ill N.J. 336, cert. denied, 536 U.S. 960, 122 S. Ct. 2665, L Ed. 2d 839 (2002)
[brief] *Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co.*, 272 U.S. 365 (1926), firmly established zoning as a valid police power reserved to the states.  In New Jersey, that power was delegated to municipalities in the MLUL.  The trial court did not adequately consider the mandates of the state law in its summary dismissal of the Appellant’s arguments and the Board’s reliance on the outcome of the master plan process and the adopted Master Plan update for [...].  As set forth in the MLUL,
[brief] Tenant’s newly conceived argument that Landlord’s Fee Award should be vacated and Landlord should be compelled to pay Tenant’s legal fees and costs should be denied for three (3) separate reasons: (i) Tenant is precluded from asserting this argument because it was not raised in the Underlying Action; (ii) Tenant is judicially estopped from raising this argument because it admitted in the Underlying Action that it was required to pay Landlord’s legal fees and costs due to the Events of Default; and (iii) Tenant is not entitled to legal fees under the express terms of the Lease.  First, Tenant is precluded from seeking recovery of its legal fees from Landlord because it failed to assert such a claim, or argue that it was entitled to such an award, in the Underlying Action.  *Nieder*, 62 N.J. at 234 (“appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court”) (1T; 2T; 3T; Pa133-134).  Tenant’s argument that Landlord is liable for its legal fees and costs must be denied for this reason alone.
[brief] [...] held that if [...]’s Certification was not barred by the sham affidavit doctrine, [...]’s Certification would have been considered it would equitably estop defendants from relying on a statute of limitations defense.(1T2 18-1 to 9)  [...] issued rulings against defendants on the summary judgment motion not referred to in Defendant’s Statement of Procedural History or Statement of Facts..  [...] ruled that the statement made by defendant’s bookkeeper [...] n December of 2017 that defendant’s owed [...] was the statement of a party opponent admissible to establish that defendants owed [...] $255,000.00 (1T2 31-4 to 32-4).  [...] asserts that [...]’s ruling was correct.  N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1); Hassan v. Williams, 467 N.J. Super. 190,207-216(App Div 2021 (trial court erroneously excluded deposition testimony of safety department employee and investigation report of safety department of company which employed defendant because testimony and documents acknowledging that and the driver was negligent constituted statements of a party opponent and statements of a party representative which was admissible pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1)); Parker v. Poole, 440 N.J. Super. 7, 16-21 (App. Div. 2005 (trial court’s failure to admit deposition testimony of defendant in a medical malpractice action constituted reversible error because testimony was admissible pursuant to N.J. Evidence 803(b)(1); Knopp v. Rosen, 425 N.J. Super. 391, 419-420 (App. Div. 2012).
[brief] Super. 344 (App. Div. 2010) | 16 | | State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349 (1975) | 19 | | State v. King, 44 N.J. 346 (1965) | 11, 12, 20, 21 | | State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300 (2014) | 13 | | State v. Miller, 342 N.J. Super. 474 (App. Div. 2001) | 18 | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ####  Cases (Cont'd) - **State v. S.S.**, 229 N.J. 360 (2017) ................................................................. 12 - **State v. Shaw**, 237 N.J. 588 (2019) ............................................................... 10, 11, 15 - **State v. Speid**, 255 N.J. Super. 398 (Law Div. 1992)........................................ 16 - **State v. Sugar**, 100 N.J. 214 (1985)................................................................. 11 - **State v. Taylor**, 38 N.J. Super. 6 (App. Div. 1955)............................................. 13 - **State v. Vargas**, 213 N.J. 301 (2013)................................................................. 11 - **State v. Williams**, 84 N.J. 217 (1980) ..............................................................
[brief] ## TABLE OF CITATIONS | Cases | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Alamo Rent A Car, Inc. v. Galarza,** | | | 306 N.J. Super. 384 (App. Div. 1997) | 14 | | **Angrisiani v. Fin. Tech. Ventures, L.P.,** | | | 402 N.J. Super. 138 (App. Div. 2008) | 20 | | **Antonucci v. Curvature Newco, Inc.,** | | | 470 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 2022) | passim | | **Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P.,** | | | 219 N.J. 430 (2014) | 9, 25 | | **Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran,** | | | 445 N.J. Super. 574 (App. Div. 2016) | 44 | | **Barcon Assocs., Inc. v. Tri–County Asphalt Corp.,** | | | 86 N.J. 179 (1981) | 14 | | **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,** | | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | 48 | | **Broadway Maint. Corp. v. Rutgers, The State Univ.,** | | | 90 N.J. 253 (1982) | 43 | | **C.G. v. Applebee’s Bar & Grill, Inc.,** | | | No. A-000171-21, 2022 WL 2821574 (App. Div. July 20, 2022) | 12, 49 | | (unpublished) | | | **Circuit City Stores v. Adams,** | | | 532 U.S. 105 (2001) | 13, 21, 22 | | **Cohen v. Workshop/APD Architecture, D.P.C.,** | | | No. A-0566-23, 2024 WL 3517498 (App. Div. July 24, 224) | 12 | | (unpublished) | | Colon v. Strategic Delivery Sols., LLC, 459 N.J. Super. 349 (App. Div. 2019), aff’d sub nom. Arafa v. Health Express Corp., 243 N.J. 147 (2020)
[brief] (Da643-659)  16.  A preliminary hearing on Plaintiff’s Third OTSC for Defendant’s installation of a fence across the Sixth Street Lot in violation of the 2017 Judgment was held on October 19, 2018.  On that date, the Trial Court found Defendant to be in violation of the 2017 Judgment and ordered immediate removal of the fence.  (2T)  The Trial Court admonished Defendant for its most recent attempt to avoid the injunctive relief previously entered against Defendant.  (2T 36:18-47:18)  17.  On November 19, 2018, Defendant filed opposition to Plaintiff’s OTSC.  (Da660-671)  The final hearing on the OTSC continued December 4, 2018.  (3T 101:23-113:1)  On February 21, 2019, the Trial Court entered an Order directing Defendant to immediately reimburse Plaintiff $550.00 (the cost for removing the fence improperly erected) and restraining Defendant from additional interference pending the resolution of the 2017 Appeal or further order of the Trial Court.
[brief] (Pa19)  [...] asserted that the City establish a policy of refusing eligibility of Firefighters for promotion when they are on medical leave regardless of the nature of the disability.  [...] asserted that even if a Firefighter was merely perceived to be disabled the promotion would still be denied.  (Pa19)  [...] also asserted that the City punishes Firefighters through General Order 19-6, which is an established policy subjecting Firefighters to discipline simply for requesting and taking medical leave to which they are entitled under the law.
[brief] The appeal to the OAL is now moot and the [...] retains jurisdiction.  However, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.2, the [...] is presently holding its vote on the merits of the IOD in abeyance pending the outcome of this appeal (Pa6).  On November 16, 2023, Respondent filed a motion to supplement the record on appeal to include the [...] October 18, 2023 determination, as it was germane to the issues on appeal.  On December 5, 2023 the Appellate Court granted Respondent’s motion (Pa7).
[brief] Respondent  [...] was a [...] Police Officer.  On November 5, 2021, Appellant [...] (Hereinafter Appellant) and Respondent [...] (Respondent) mutually entered into Separation Agreement and Release (hereinafter “the Agreement”) (Da13-Da22) after several months of negotiations.  Both parties acknowledged that Respondent was medically disabled for further service as a police officer (Da15, Par.3)  --- 1  The Statement of Facts and Procedural History are included together for judicial economy. and, as noted in the Separation Agreement, Respondent’s separation from service occurred in the following manner:  1.  The Appellant filed the involuntary disability application (Hereinafter IOD) on behalf of Respondent (Da15, Par.3).  The application was filed pursuant to N.J.A.C 17:4-6.10 and N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6 (for Ordinary Disability Benefits/General Disability).  Appellant further agreed to thereafter take any action necessary to effectuate Respondent’s Involuntary Disability Pension (Da16, Par.6) (Da12 – Resolution adopting Separation Agreement).  2.  The Parties agreed that the [...] [Hereinafter [...]] was the only entity that could make a determination on the Involuntary Disability Application itself (Da16, Par.7).  The parties therefore agreed in the Separation Agreement (Da16, Par.7) that the [...] was a legal forum, and Appellant’s admission of that fact is included in the Trial Court’s Order at (Da198) as well as in Appellant’s brief at (Db28).  3.  Under the Separation Agreement the parties agreed that any portion of the Agreement deemed illegal, unenforceable, or ineffective by a legal forum would be stricken from the agreement under a severance clause found at (Da19, Par.18).  4.  The parties further agreed that any disputes under the Agreement itself would be resolved in the Superior Court of New Jersey (Da18, Par. 15).  On May 26, 2021, the [...] stopped processing the IOD because of certain language in the Agreement (Da 81).  Thereafter, on August 10, 2021, the [...] determined that certain terms in the Separation Agreement were, in effect, illegal, ineffective, or unenforceable under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8 and refused to process the disability application as matter of pension law (Da24- Da25).  The issue whether Respondent was permanently and totally disabled noted in under N.J.A.C 17:4-6.10 (6) and N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6 was not reached.  The [...] letter further advised that Respondent had 45 days to request an appeal of this decision; if no appeal was taken from that legal ruling, the decision would be a final determination.  Respondent necessarily filed an appeal to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) on August 30, 2021 (Da91) and Respondent also requested Appellant’s compliance under Par. 18 of the Agreement and its terms prior to filing suit on October 22, 2021 and January 27, 2022 (Da94 – Da103), but Appellant, in breach of the agreement itself, refused to sever the subject terms under the Agreement or otherwise resolve the situation (Da85) (Da96).
[brief] The Court turned a blind eye to [...]’s bias arising from her relationship with Respondent.  [...] admitted she was Respondent’s close friend explaining that she pretty much performs for Respondent the same type of services that Decedent was providing for Respondent when Decedent was alive.  (11T38:11-13; 11T37:18-24; 11T37:7 to 38:9).
[directive] Aside from periods of excludable time, prosecutors must indict cases within ninety days, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(a)(1)(a), and trials must commence within 180 days for defendants who are detained, id. at -22(a)(2)(a).  Of note here, the Act provides for excludable time for “[t]he time resulting from disaster. ” exceptional circumstances including . . . a natural Id. at -22(b)(1)(f).  The statute also sets an overall limit of two years for pretrial detention, excluding delays attributable to the defendant, if the prosecutor is not ready to defendants “shall be released” proceed to trial.  Id. at -22(a)(2)(a).  Otherwise, at the two-year mark subject to a number of potential conditions.  Ibid.; id. at -17 (listing possible conditions of release).  The two-year limit is a protective measure to guard against unduly prolonged detention.  It is not a goal used for case-management purposes, and cases should be resolved before then whenever possible.  We do not find that the pandemic, along with the accompanying CJRA’s suspension of in-person criminal jury trials, has transformed the overall approach to pretrial detention into a punitive scheme.
[brief] (Ibid., at 4; App. Brief, p. 28).  In this case, the underlying Order was granted by [...] on July 24, 2023 (Pa88), and the Motion to Vacate was not filed until February 14, 2024 (Pa89).  The passage of some 6½ months does not comply with the factors enunciated in Parker.  Appellant, as discussed above, does not provide any underlying reason or cause.  Likewise, what Appellant does posit points to the fault, as opposed to the blamelessness, of Appellant itself in its failure to respond to counsel’s repeated communications.  Last, there is no discussion of prejudice to Respondent.  Same, it is respectfully submitted, is significant.  This case has been going on since October 2022 and there is still no legally articulated cause of action.  For all of these reasons, Appellant fails to satisfy the requirements under paragraph (f), and failed to below, which is why the present appeal should be denied and the Order to Vacate affirmed.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] A.  Criteria for "d"  Variances.  New Jersey has a long-standing legislative policy favoring land use planning by ordinance, rather than by variance.  Elco v. R.C. Maxwell Co., 292 N.J. Super. 118, 126 (App. Div. 1996); Comm. for a Rickel Alt., 111 N.J. 192 (1988).
[brief] A one-time special assessment by [...] was improperly included in [...]’s costs to calculate the Rent Increase.  As briefed below, the foregoing contentions fail both as a matter of both law and fact.  Fundamentally, [...] seeks to maintain the Board’s negligible rent increase ($154.99) to perpetuate [...]’s subsidizing of the Unit and its mounting losses.  While the circumstances may be unfortunate to [...], the law simply does not require [...] to continue to bear losses.
[brief] Pa001-Pa006.  On February 25, 2022, Defendant filed a “Notice of Motion to Suppress Evidence” (“Motion”) and requested a testimonial hearing.  Pa007.  On August 16, 2022, the Honorable [...] (“[...]”) heard Defendant’s Motion.  Pa031.  [...] acknowledged that this matter involved the State’s allegations that police had received a call reporting a black male with dreadlocks wearing blue shorts and a white tank top and using crutches was in front of a specific address on Rosa Parks Boulevard with a gun in his pocket.  Pa031-Pa032.  About five minutes later, police arrived at the address, which was in a high crime area, and identified Defendant as the suspect.  Pa032.  One of the officers made eye contact with Defendant and Defendant appeared startled.  Pa032.  The officer told Defendant to stop, but Defendant “immediately accelerated his walking pace”.  Pa032.  The officer observed Defendant wearing a black fanny pack that had a large bulge around the front of his torso, and it appeared there was a heavy object inside given the manner in which it was swaying.  Pa032.  Because of the interrelated nature and for the convenience of the reader, the Statement of Facts and Procedural History have been combined.