ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Defendant’s Role in Criminal Scheme (Mitigating 8(...continued) distributed a controlled substance.  See N.J.R.E. 516.  Cf. State v. Williams, 364 N.J. Super. 23 (App. Div. 2003) (whether disclosure of the identity of an informant will be required depends on a balancing of the public’s interest in protecting the flow of information in aid of law enforcement with a defendant’s right to effectively prepare his case; courts consider, among other things, whether the informant actively participated in the crime for which defendant is charged).  Page 80  [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  Factor Category #2)
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE IMPACT OF THE PROSECUTOR’S IMPROPER BOLSTERING OF THE TESTIMONY OF HIS WITNESSES CREATED REVERSIBLE ERROR, WHICH WAS NOT CURED BY THE COURT’S LIMITING INSTRUCTION.  (16T 116-7 to 121-15)  In his summation, the prosecutor informed the jury that he had not called either of the victims to testify because “[a]s I told you earlier, we have an obligation to present testimony we know to be the truth [sic: the truthful]. ”  (16T 98-6 to 8)  A few minutes later, he stated, “We don’t put [...] on [the stand] because we’re responsible and we have an obligation to present witnesses we know are going to tell the truth. ”  (Emphasis added)  (16T 103-24 to 104-2)  As soon as the prosecutor concluded his remarks, defense counsel objected to this portion of the summation, arguing that the prosecutor had not only improperly vouched for the credibility of his own witnesses, but had also, slightly more subtly, accused defense counsel of suborning perjury.
[brief] Thus, fear and distress from threatened bodily harm is a *cognizable injury*.  Plaintiff showed that the unsupervised staff who injured her, were persons for the purposes of N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) which is modeled on 42 USC § 1983.  In *Hafer v. Melo*, the Supreme Court held that state officers may be personally liable for damages under Section § 1983 suit based upon actions taken in their official capacities.  502 U.S. 21 (1991).  In *Hafer v. Melo*, the Auditor General was sued in her personal capacity by an aggrieved employee.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa10 Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion (omitted pursuant to R. 2:6-1(a)(2)) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa10 Certification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa11 Proof of Mailing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa15 Ex. A: Affidavit of Service . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa16 Ex. B: Affidavit of Service . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa18 Ex. C: UCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa20 Ex. D: UCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa22 Ex. E: Feb. 21, 2014 Notice of Default . . . . . .  Pa24 Ex. F: Mar. 7, 2014  Notice of Default . . . . . .  Pa26 Ex. G: [...] April 4, 2014 response . . . . .  Pa28 Ex. H: September 2, 2014  Notice of Default . . . .  Pa30 Ex. I: [...] Sep. 4, 2014 response . . . . .  Pa34  Ex. J: Motion to Enforce Litigant’s Rights
[brief] The statute was originally enacted in 1928 and provided in pertinent part:  The driver of any vehicle, upon a highway, before starting, stopping, backing or turning from a direct line, shall first see that such movement can be made in safety, and if any pedestrian may be affected by such movement, shall give a clearly audible signal by sounding the horn, and whenever the operation of any other vehicle may be affected by such movement, shall give a signal, as required in this section, plainly visible to the driver of such other vehicle or pedestrian of the intention to make such movement.  [L. 1928, c. 281, Art. XIV, § 4(a) (emphasis added). ]  The original statute proceeded to set forth the method of signaling, by hand or mechanical or electrical device, and explained how the driver should hand signal to “indicate his intention to start, or stop, or turn. ”  Id. at § 4(b), 5.  The 1928 law adopted nearly verbatim the language proposed in the 1926 Uniform Vehicle Code produced by the [...].  See Unif. Act Regulating the Operation of Vehicles on Highways, § 18 (“Signals on Starting, Stopping or Turning”), 2d Nat’l Conference on Street and Highway Safety (1926).
[directive] Nothing in this document displaces other existing requirements for law enforcement agencies or officers, such as those established by Attorney General Law Enforcement Directives (“AG Directives”), including AG Directive 2018-2 (mandatory random drug testing), AG Directive 2018-3 (mandatory early warning systems), and AG Directive 2019-4 (independent investigations of use-of-force and death-in-custody incidents).  1.0.9  Policy requirements that the Attorney General has determined are critical and must be implemented by every law enforcement agency include the following:
[directive] For individuals with disabilities where consent is an issue, the following state and county agencies may provide assistance:    County Adult Protective Services o Serves vulnerable adults in the community and investigates instances of abuse and neglect.   Division of Disability Services (DDS), New Jersey Department of Human Services o  Serves as a single point of entry for people with disabilities who need information and/or services within the human services system.  DDS works to streamline access to services and information that promote and enhance independent living for individuals with all disabilities by facilitating coordination and cooperation among local, county, and state government agencies.  These programs include home and community-based service programs, as well as other resource programs.  -22-
[brief] Here, it was error for the judge permit the prosecutor to use the Miranda form as a handwriting sample, without first determining whether there was enough similarity between the print on the form and the print in the unsigned letters, “such that the jury could reasonably infer that the disputed handwriting is also genuine. ”  McCoy, 759 S.E.2d at 333.  Additionally, the judge did not provide the jury with any type of instruction to eliminate the danger that the jurors might assign improper weight to their comparison.  The jury was not reminded that [...] disputed that he wrote the letters, that there was no expert testimony on the matter, and that ultimately the jury was the final arbiter of the issue – as the jury in Carroll had been instructed.  Because the letters were critical to the State’s case and because their authorship was disputed, permitting the jury to engage in a handwriting comparison under these circumstances was clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  R. 2:10-2.  POINT II
[brief] As a result, the charges, or more specifically the positive urinalysis results, did not relate to actions taken by [...] during his employment or any type of negligence in connection with his work duties in any way.  This crucial fact is undisputed.  As a result, and considering the liberal construction to be applied to pension statutes regarding public employees’ deferred compensation under the applicable law, it is evident [...] was not removed on charges of misconduct directly related to his employment within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-11.2.  Instead, [...] was removed on charges wholly unrelated to his employment and/or the actual performance of his duties as a Corrections Sergeant with the County Department of Corrections.  As aptly stated by the Supreme Court in *Hupka*, there was “no relationship” between [...] employment as a Corrections Sergeant, “the trappings of that office, or his work-related connections, and the commission of the offense,” i.e. the positive urinalysis, which led to his removal.  Therefore, despite the Board and ALJ’s finding to the contrary, there is an insufficient nexus between the charges and [...]’s employment to warrant an automatic forfeiture and/or disqualification of his eligibility to deferred retirement benefits.  Under the Board and/or ALJ’s rationale, any type of conduct an employee is removed under that constitutes a violation of: (1) municipal, county or state policy; or (2) an implicit code of conduct constitutes misconduct “related to employment,” thereby precluding an employee from being eligible for deferred retirement benefits.  This is a misreading of *Hess*, *Hupka*, and the case law cited above by impermissibly expanding the type of conduct which prohibits an employee from receiving deferred retirement benefits.  Such an approach must not be sanctioned by this Honorable Court.  To this end, if violating an implicit and/or generic code of conduct could always be deemed “directly related to employment,” the appellants in *Hess* and *Hupka* would certainly have been deemed ineligible for deferred retirement benefits.  Significantly, however, this was not the case, despite the egregious nature of their respective offenses.  In deeming [...] ineligible for deferred retirement benefits in this matter, wherein significant issues pertaining to the validity of the urinalysis results were present in the underlying disciplinary proceedings, the Board and/or ALJ clearly contravened the relevant case law set forth in Hess and Hupka.  As such, the Board’s determination must be reversed.  Given [...] is eligible for the receipt of deferred retirement benefits, he is entitled to a Uricoli, or N.J.S.A. 43:1-3 “honorable service” analysis, wherein which various equitable factors are balanced to see if he should receive the same or any portion thereof.  On account of the Board not conducting the same in its initial, underlying consideration of [...]’s application for deferred retirement benefits, the Board clearly erred and ultimately must be compelled to do so.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] In early August 2012, the [...] commenced an audit of the Firm’s accounts.  [Pa563]  As part of the audit, in December 2012, the Firm provided the [...] with copies of bank statements.  Unintentionally, the [...] was provided with the altered bank statement.  [Pa563]  As the [...] stipulated, “[t]he documents were altered in order to shield a potentially embarrassing personal transaction from discovery by respondent’s office staff and in no way related to the [...] investigation. ”  [Pa578 (emphasis added)]  On or about December 9, 2012, the [...] served [...] with a two count Complaint.
[brief] In relieving the State of its prior funding orders and allowing implementation of the SFRA, the Supreme Court imposed two interrelated mandates on the State to ensure the formula’s continuing constitutionality.  Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 146.  These mandates are that the State fully fund SFRA’s formula in the first three years, and every three years thereafter, subject the formula to a “rigorous” review and adjustment “that is meaningful and relevant for the Abbott districts so that the SFRA continues to operate optimally and as intended in future years for pupils in those districts. ”  Abbott XXI, 206 N.J. at 354, 375 (describing the “express mandates” imposed upon the State to ensure SFRA’s implementation will “deliver to Abbott pupils all that the State assured” is encompassed in the formula’s education cost, student weights and aid amounts).  On Abbott XX’s first SFRA implementation mandate, the State blatantly disregarded its obligation to fully fund the formula in the three years after its enactment.  In year three, the State cut $402.4 million in state formula aid to the Abbott districts, or $1,425 per pupil.  Abbott XXI, 206 N.J. at 358.  The State’s breach, however, was remedied by the Supreme Court itself when, on motion by the Abbott plaintiffs, it found the State made a “conscious and calculated decision to underfund the SFRA,” id., at 359, and ordered the State to calculate and provide “SFRA’s statutory level of formula funding” to [...] and the other Abbott districts in FY2012 for the 2012-13 school year.
[brief] [...] testified that he was a tenant at the Property for approximately fourteen (14) years.  (Pa0019-40; 10T 56:15-58-7; 61:15-62:3; 62:7-17, Jan. 25, 2023).  Throughout that time, it was his belief based on his interactions and observations that [...] was the landlord/owner of the Property.  Id.  This included that [...] would make sure all maintenance issues were taken care of.  He also wrote out his rent checks to [...] Wu.  Moreover, despite Defendants’ claim of ownership, Mr. Theodore never heard of, let alone communicated with, [...], [...], or [...].  (10T 61-62; Jan. 25, 2023).  When [...], [...]’s real estate agent and supposed property manager for the Property showed up for the first time in 2020, Mr. Theodore refused to let him in as he had no knowledge of [...] or [...]’s supposed ownership in the Property.
[directive] Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures  August 2020 Version List of Appendices Appendix A  Sample Citizen Complaint Information Sheet Appendix B  Internal Affairs Report Form Appendix C  Internal Affairs Complaint Notification Appendix D  Sample Immediate Suspension Notice Appendix E  Sample Response Letter Appendix F  Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action Appendix G  Miranda Warning Appendix H  Sample Use Immunity Grant Appendix I  Witness Acknowledgement Form Appendix J  Administrative Advisement Form Appendix K  Internal Affairs Policy Reporting Form Appendix L  Public Synopsis of Disciplinary Action Appendix M  Final Notice of Disciplinary Action  Appendix A  Sample Citizen Complaint Information Sheet
[brief] Appellants’ default under the Lease for the subject Property is a superseding and/or intervening act that negates any liability of [...] for Appellants’ loss of the Property, the Solar Rights, or the solar project.  A superseding or intervening act is one that breaks the chain of causation linking a defendant’s wrongful act and an injury suffered by a plaintiff.  *Cowan v. Doering*, 111 N.J. 451, 465 (1988).  A superseding or intervening act is one that is the immediate and sole cause of the injury or harm.  *Model Jury Charge* (Civil) 6.14; see also *Davis v. Brooks*, 280 N.J. Super. 406, 412 (App. Div. 1993).  [...] had nothing to do with Appellants’ default under their Lease.  Had Appellants made their Lease payment as required to do under said Lease, they would still control the Property and would have retained their approvals.  Appellants, in short, would have no damages if they had simply paid their Lease.  The Panel therefore should not permit these claims to continue to trial when they can clearly be decided now as a matter of law.
[brief] [...] argues that the Board’s Building “E” elevator condition is a breach of the Settlement Agreement.  The argument is specious.  [...]Bay argues that the elevator condition constitutes a failure ‘to cooperate’ with [...]Bay in its process to obtain “Required Approvals” and “Government Approvals”—the approval complained of being the unconditional approval of the Board.  At best, \textsuperscript{11}  ‘Rubber Stamping’: a mostly powerless yet officially recognized body or person that approves or endorses programs and policies initiated usually by a single specified source, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary.  the argument is a logical fallacy and is premised upon circular reasoning: in essence, [...] is arguing that the Board breached the Settlement Agreement because the Board did ‘cooperate’ by giving [...]Bay everything it wanted.  The trial court agreed with [...]Bay but did not share its reasoning or address the facts of the matter, but instead merely harkened back to several years before when the trial court had disagreed with the Township’s negotiating position.
[brief] Prior to jury deliberations, the State consented to the dismissal of four counts.  (12T27-11 to 28-1, 62-5 to 22).  Following the trial, the jury found defendant guilty of nineteen offenses.  (Da59-164; 18T12-12 to 32-23); State v. Cuff, 239 N.J. 321, 328 (2019).  The State did not proceed on the certain persons charge against defendant, which the trial court dismissed.  (18T45-7 to 13).  On January 29, 2016, [...] sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of ninety-eight years’ imprisonment, with more than sixty-six years’ parole ineligibility.  (Da166); Cuff, 239 N.J. at 328.  On February 2, 2018, this Court affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences, except the two convictions for conspiracy to commit robbery “‘and/or’” kidnapping, and vacated and remanded those convictions for further proceedings.  (Da165-90).  On August 2, 2018, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification limited to the issues of the verdict sheet’s omission of second-degree kidnapping and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences.  (Da191).  On August 6, 2019, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Appellate Division’s judgment, affirming defendant’s conviction but vacating defendant’s sentence and retaining jurisdiction to review it following a remand.
[brief] [Da47-Da71].  The first agreement, entitled “Agreement by and between [...], [...], [...], and [...]” (the “First 1981 Agreement”), required payment to the Township of “sewer service charges as set forth in and required by the ordinances of the Township. ”  [Da49].  The second agreement, entitled “Agreement by and between [...], [...], [...], and [...]” (the “Second 1981 Agreement”), required payment of “a sanitary sewer fee to Morris for the office building complex. ”  [Da61].  Further, the Second 1981 Agreement superseded the November 1973 Agreement in its entirety.
[directive] See Stationhouse adjustments.  A stationhouse adjustment is more formal than a curbside • warning, but is nonetheless designed to divert a juvenile from the juvenile justice system without the filing of charges.  In such situations, an officer typically asks the juvenile and a parent or guardian/caregiver/designee to come to the police station to discuss an alleged offense and work together to develop an appropriate resolution, which is then memorialized in a written agreement.  The officer may refer the juvenile for social services and, if property has been stolen or damaged, require the juvenile to make restitution in some form.  The goal is to engage the parent or guardian/caregiver/designee—and, where appropriate, the victim—in any resolution, allowing the family and community resources to address the violation rather than the courts.
[brief] [...] asserts that R. 4:42-11 “sets a flexible guidepost for prejudgment interest awards. ”  [...] Brief at 46.  [...] argues that the Trial Court has “broad discretion” to determine pre-judgment interest.  But even if it were a matter of the Trial Court’s discretion, “compound interest is clearly the exception rather than the rule,” and thus is “disfavored. ”  *Johnson v. Johnson*, 390 N.J. Super. 269, 276 (App. Div. 2007)(citing *Henderson v. Camden Cnty. Mun. Util. Auth.*, 176 N.J. 554, 559 (2003)).  With such interest clearly “disfavored” and a lack of any findings about this case being an exception in which compound interest is appropriate, it was legal error to award compound interest beyond December 20, 2013.
[brief] She had run into the building, and when she came out, she saw [...] "lying on the floor" and "the guy running down the street."  (3T21-12 to 14).  [...] called 9-1-1 and told the operator that the shooter was black, wearing all grey, and walked away toward 5th Street.  (3T16-5 to 6; 3T19-2 to 20-21).  In addition to calling 9-1-1, [...] also gave two statements to police.  The first statement was taken on July 6, the same day as the shooting, and her second statement was on January 12, 2021.
[brief] (A3)  The parties agreed to equally share the $140,000 down payment for the Bedminster home.  (A3)  Plaintiff did not have access to $70,000 cash at the time the down payment was required, so Defendant agreed to pay the full amount of $140,000 up front.  (2T 49:2-14)  As reflected in the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff agreed to repay the $70,000 to Defendant, and if she did not within three years, “interest will begin to accrue at 1% per annum until said sum is paid. ”  (A3)  Defendant financed the remainder of the purchase and is solely responsible for payment of same.  (A4)  The mortgage application was signed by Plaintiff after Defendant and the loan officer filled out the application.  (2T 43:16-20)  The Agreement recited that the parties “desire[d] to confirm their separation and make arrangements therewith, including the settlement of all questions relative to their property rights, their support welfare, and other rights and obligations growing out of this relationship. ”  (A2)  For approximately six years, the parties abided by the agreement without incident.
[brief] ”  State v. Simmons, No. A-2107-19 (App. Div. Mar. 3, 2022) (slip op at 12).  (Da43)  This Court also observed that in reimposing the consecutive sentence, the sentencing court “not[ed] how otherwise the statute would be moot[] but did not explicitly state that it relied on ‘no free crimes’ or the crimes being separate offenses with distinct elements. ”  Id. (slip op. at 11).  (Da42)  This Court remanded for resentencing and ordered the trial court to “identify whether 3A applies, and also include comparisons to the factual record of this case, and provide ‘[a]n explicit statement, explaining the overall fairness of a sentence imposed on a defendant.
[brief] **POINT I**  **THE ACTION BELOW AND THE GRC PROCEEDING CONSTITUTED AN “ACTION” OR “LEGAL PROCEEDING” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE FIRE DISTRICT’S BY-LAWS** (Da72-77 and 1T62:22-77:20).  A.  The GRC Case Was a “Legal Proceeding”  Within the Meaning of the Fire District’s Bylaws  Regarding indemnification, the issue is whether a former fire commissioner should be indemnified in a civil administrative proceeding (the GRC case and subsequent appeal) and a related civil matter in Superior Court (which is the action below and this appeal).
[brief] Likewise, in the Job FAD, the Commissioner opined that the lawfulness of the License FAD, and this Court’s review of same, were of no moment:  The Commissioner is also in accord with the ALJ that a decision on this matter is not dependent on the outcome of the case at the Appellate Division.  Whether the Board’s actions in November 2021 were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable will not change if petitioner is successful in his pending appeal.  As such, the ALJ appropriately declined to place this matter on the inactive list….Pa48.  Additionally, the Commissioner disagrees with petitioner that the ALJ needed to determine whether the Board of Examiners acted contrary to law in issuing the Order of Suspension.  That issue has already been decided by the Commissioner and is pending in the Appellate Division, and it is not relevant to a determination of this matter.  Pa48-Pa49.  Continuing, the Commissioner acknowledged that, even if the License Appeal is successful, [...] would not be able to recover his tenured teaching position with [...], i.e., remedy the consequences of the unlawful License FAD:  The Commissioner agrees with petitioner that a separate action against the Board of Examiners in the future would not result in reinstatement to his position, as petitioner seeks, but finds that the viability of a future matter does not affect this case.  **Pa49.**  Under all these circumstances, and even though [...] pursued timely appeals of both the License FAD, and the Job FAD, the Commissioner determined that [...] had received Due Process in connection with the termination of his employment:  Regarding petitioner’s alleged property right in his tenured teaching position and violation of due process, the Commissioner finds that petitioner received the process that he was due in the suspension matter, the appeal before the Commissioner, and the matter herein.  **Da49.**  By deciding the License Appeal, this Court will determine whether the License FAD was unlawful.  In connection with the Job Appeal, this Court must determine whether the License FAD’s unlawfulness, “matters,” for purposes of the relief that [...] can obtain.  As discussed, *infra*, the [...]’s determination that the License FAD’s unlawfulness “doesn’t matter” is tantamount to a Due Process violation, requiring this Court’s reversal.