ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Nevertheless, in reliance upon them, the ALJ determined, “I CONCLUDE that there was no accident, incident or injury pertaining to petitioner from 2009. ” (Pa85)  (Emphasis in original).  The ALJ also found it significant that [...] “failed to mention the 2000 and 2004 workers’ compensation claim[s], meaning he made errors in filling out this reporting form”, but gives no explanation as to the “reporting form” the ALJ refers to.  (Pa85).  The ALJ also gives no consideration to the probability that, as with [...] and [...], Petitioner failed to tell [...] about the 2000 and 2004 incidents or his prior cervical herniations.  Most significant, the ALJ does not acknowledge that [...], Petitioner’s own expert, failed to mention the 2000 or 2004 incidents in his report or in his Certification of Medical Examination by Personal or Treating Physician he submitted to the Division of Pension of Benefits.  (Pa85; Pa144-150; Pa151-152).  Nevertheless, the ALJ thereafter referred to [...]’s treatment records as “this error-prone report. ” (Pa85).  Based on the credible evidence in the record, and in addition to the fact that the 2009 incident is noted in [...]’s report five times, the Board rejected the ALJ’s findings that the 2009 incident did not occur.
[brief] The Borough adopted a process for reviewing applications for a Class 5 cannabis retailer license.  The Borough published that process and the criteria it would use to evaluate applications.  Then, the Borough abandoned the process and criteria without informing the public.  It was not until after the Borough adopted a resolution of support in favor of [...] that [...] learned what the Borough actually did.  But the Borough has an obligation to deal fairly with the public and to act in accordance with ordinances it adopts and procedures it announces.  Because the Borough did not act in accordance with its own process, permitting subjective and prejudicial opinions to taint the review process, the adoption of the resolution of support in favor of [...] was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  To ensure fairness and engender public trust in the Borough’s actions, the trial court’s order affirming the resolution of approval should be reversed, and this matter should be remanded for the Borough to consider the applications pursuant to the process and criteria it adopted.  Respectfully submitted, MANDELBAUM BARRETT  PC  Dated: May 1, 2024  By: /s/ [...]  [...] [...]  [...] (020801988)  75 Livingston Avenue Roseland, New Jersey  07068 (973)  622-1800  Attorneys for Respondent Defendant, [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY – APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET(S): [...]  [...], Plaintiff, v. BOROUGH OF KEYPORT, [...], AND [...], Defendants.
[brief] In said case, an engineering firm retained by township to prepare plans for sewer project had contractual responsibility for progress of work, and which was aware of the risk of serious injury to workers that was presented by the potential of a ---  6  As [...] was not a licensed professional the holding of Carvalho should not apply to his actions but only that of the licensed professionals.  collapsing trench owed a duty to the workers employed by a sub-contractor.  The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that said professional owed a duty to avoid the risk of injury through collapse of the trench even though the engineering firm had no contractual responsibility for the safety of the construction site.
[brief] [...] suffered permanent injuries in a car accident on January 10, 2018.  (Pa49).  She sued [...], the negligent driver, on December 23, 2019.  (Pa113).  To preserve her UIM claim, [...] requested [...]’s consent to settle her action against Moore.  (Pa109).  On May 4, 2022, [...] consented to the settlement and waived its subrogation rights against Moore.  (Pa117).  On May 17, 2023, [...] sued [...] for failing to pay her UIM benefit.
[brief] *Vispisiano*, 107 N.J. at 426-27.  “‘Critical to the running of the statute is the injured party’s awareness of the injury and fault of another. ’”  *Martinez*, 163 N.J. 45 at 52 (quoting *Baird*, 155 N.J. at 66).  “The question is whether the facts presented would alert a reasonable person exercising ordinary diligence that he or she was injured due to someone else’s fault. ”  Troum v. Newark Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 338 N.J. Super. 1, 16 (App. Div. 2001).  The standard is based on an objective one: whether the plaintiff “knew or should have known” of sufficient facts to start the Statute of Limitations to run.  Id., see also Martinez, 163 N.J. at 52, Mancuso v. Necklaces ex rel. Necklaces, 163 N.J. 26, 29 (2000), and Gallagher v. Burdette Tomlin Mem. Hosp., 163 N.J. 38, 43 (2000).  For the discovery rule to apply, a plaintiff must have been reasonably unaware that he or she was injured or, although aware of the injury, that the injury was attributable to the fault of another.  Caravaggio, 166 N.J. at 245-46.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court has articulated, the cause of action does not accrue “until the injured party discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered, that he may have a basis for an actionable claim. ”  Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 272 (1973).  The genesis of the discovery rule in New Jersey is found in Fernandi which involved a foreign object: a wing nut that was inadvertently left inside the plaintiff’s body during surgery in April 1955.
[brief] At several points in [...]’s recitation of the facts in its appellate brief, [...] presents disputed facts as undisputed statements of material fact.  For example, [...] states that [...] “had many discussions where he had shown [...] the plans, several discussions with respect to site, and he had explained to him exactly what we had anticipated doing, and he was fine with that. ” ([...]’s brief at page 12).  These are disputed facts.  No evidence has been provided in the trial court below that [...] was aware that his property was considered part of the project, and [...] specifically testified that he was not aware that his property was part of the project.  (Pa000380; Pa000294, page 105, line 14 to line 21; Pa000322, pg. 36, line 2 to 6; Pa000323, pg. 40, line 13 to line 24; Pa000325, pg. 49, line 14 to line 19; Pa000326, pg. 52, line 15 to line 25).
[brief] With respect to Factor #10 – Order or Sequence Set, the Municipal Judge, and court administrator set the schedule and docket for court proceedings.  (1T14:5-20).  As with Factor #1, the Municipal Prosecutor position is unique in that the court always set the order and sequence of cases.  (Pa20).  Again, regardless of whether a municipal prosecutor is an employee or independent contractor, municipalities control the docket and when court was in session.  Ibid.  But, neither [...] nor the Municipal Judge evaluated [...]’s work or otherwise gave her instructions or directions in terms of how to perform that work.
[directive] ______________  7.  [Any additional conditions as ordered by the _ court._._ by Published Directive #17~18(11/01/2018), 12327 (Competency 3)  CN: Order of3  2 page ______  The next court date in this matter shall with a report be provided be no to 8.  ___ later than days prior the hearing.  to of of  A copy this Order will be forwarded the County Adjuster's Office by the Clerk to of Court within two (2) days its signing.  Date  Judge Prosecutor's Office: Defendant's Attorney: ---------------- ---------------- Name Name --------------- Address Address ------------ ------------ Telephone Number Telephone Number ----------------- ----------------- Fax Fax ---------------- Em ail Em ail ---------------- ________ If 0 Yes O No yes, language _ Interpreter needed? _________  If ADA accommodation needed?  0 Yes O No yes, describe _ Published Directive# 17-18(11/01/2018), CN: 12327 (Competency Order 3) of3 by page 3
[brief] RESPONDENT’S BRIEF AND APPENDIX IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION Date Submitted: May 3, 2024  [...] ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  Attorney for Respondent  [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  [...] (Attorney ID No. 027581985)  Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel and On the Brief  [...] (Attorney ID No. 259182018)  [...]  Deputy Attorney General
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE CORRECT STANDARD OF LAW**  *(Not Raised Below)*  A.  **[...] failed to raise the “facial” versus “as applied” issue below, so this Court need not consider it on appeal. **  As a threshold matter, Point I of [...]’s brief – in which it contends that the trial court applied the wrong standard of law in its decision – is improper because [...] failed to advocate for this legal standard below.  For the first time, on N.J.S.A. 48:3-17.1, [...] has continuously used and occupied the public right of way in [...] for its electric utility lines for a period far in excess of the statutory ten-year period, as it is undisputed that [...] consented to the placement of [...]’s utility poles as far back as 1892.  See N.J.S.A. 48:3-17.1 (providing that when use and occupancy of a public right of way “has continued at substantially the same location or locations for a period of ten years . . . such occupancy shall be presumed to be with the consent in writing of the owner of the soil upon which such pole or poles have been placed[.]”).  appeal, [...] argues that the trial court should have assessed the Ordinance using the standard for an “as applied” challenge rather than a “facial” challenge.  As set forth in Point II.B below, this argument lacks merit because [...] did not challenge the Ordinance on constitutional grounds and thus, the trial court did not – and could not, under settled law – apply either standard in ruling that the Ordinance was preempted.  Nevertheless, the Court need not even reach this issue because it was not raised to the trial court, as it is well-established that New Jersey’s appellate courts generally decline to consider issues that are being raised for the first time on appeal.
[directive] 5.6  To diminish the likelihood of a pursuit, an officer intending to stop a vehicle for any violation of the law shall, when possible and without creating a threat to public safety, close the distance between the two vehicles prior to activating emergency lights and an audible device.  Officers shall recognize that, while attempting to close the distance and prior to the initiation of a pursuit and the activation of emergency lights and an audible device, they are subject to all motor vehicle laws governing the right of way (e.g., N.J.S.A. 39:4-91 and -92).  5.7
[brief] A trial attorney “must consider what testimony a witness can be expected to give, whether the witness’s testimony will be subject to effective impeachment by prior inconsistent statements or other means, whether the witness is likely to contradict the testimony of other witnesses the attorney intends to present and thereby undermine their credibility, whether the trier of fact is likely to find the witness credible, and a variety of other tangible and intangible factors. ”  *Id.* at 320-321.  Still, as in *Arthur*, a trial attorney’s strategic decisions made without adequate pretrial investigation are subject to greater scrutiny.  *State v. Chew*, 179 N.J. 186, 217 (2004); *Savage*, 120 N.J. at 617-618.
[brief] It is undisputed that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies to the parties’ contract, the SPA, and as such the arbitration agreement contained therein is enforceable.  The agreement to arbitrate cannot be invalidated by State laws or rules, that discriminate on their face, against arbitration.  This, and the standard in Atalese, is expressly preempted by the FAA.  Congress enacted the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., in 1925 “to abrogate the then-existing common law rule disfavoring arbitration agreements ‘and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.
[brief] 3T138:3 to 139:10.  Pursuant to the promissory note, [...] borrowed the principal sum of $330,000 from the [...].  Da108.  The $330,000 Loan carried an interest rate of ten percent (10%).  Da108.  The $330,000 Loan carried a late penalty of five percent (5%).  Da108.  The promissory note stated the following regarding the maturity date of the $330,000 Loan:  Interest, on the outstanding and unpaid principal balance of this Note, shall accrue from the date hereof through and including December 15, 2008 ("Accrued Interest").  The entire amount of such accrued and unpaid interest shall be due and payable in full on January 15, 2009.  Commencing on January 15, 2009 and continuing on the fifteenth (15th) day of each month thereafter through and including June 15, 2010, subject to extension as provided below, Borrower shall pay monthly installments of accrued and unpaid interest on the outstanding and unpaid principal balance of this Note.  Subject to extension as provided herein, on June 15, 2010, the then remaining outstanding and unpaid principal balance of this Note together with all accrued and unpaid interest thereon shall become due and payable in full.  Borrower has the option, if it is not in default at any time during the term of this Note, to extend the initial term of this Note until September 15, 2010, upon written notice to the Lender thirty (30) days prior to the end of the initial term.  In the event Borrower provides such written notice of extension, Borrower shall continue to pay, on the fifteenth (15th) day of each month thereafter through and including September 15, 2010, all accrued and unpaid interest on the outstanding and unpaid principal balance of this Note, at which time all accrued and unpaid interest on this Note together with the outstanding and unpaid principal balance hereof shall be due and payable in full.  [Da108.]  The promissory note was drafted by Plaintiff’s attorneys.  T260:4-7.
[brief] In this putative class action involving the sale of water delivery services to the residents of the Borough, plaintiff sued defendant for breaching the contract, violating the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and promissory estoppel by selling plaintiff contaminated water.  Defendant failed to plead a TCA defense and therefore waived same.  Even had defendant done so, this case started as and remains a breach of contract dispute no matter how defendant tries to recast it and no court rule permits defendant to amend the complaint to comport with defendant’s efforts to dismiss it.  Contract claims like those pled in the complaint aren’t subject to and therefore barred by the TCA or any other statute, which don’t bar or otherwise address the causes of action pled in the complaint.  Instead, in the face of many contract complaints filed against municipalities over the decades – many of which involved water disputes – there is no authority for the sea change in the law of municipal contracts.  If they be issues other than the constitutionality of the claims, such matters are better left to the Legislature.  If they be issues of the constitutionality of the claims, such matters are better left to the Supreme Court.
[directive] Clarification Regarding Civilian Review Boards  Recognizing that some New Jersey municipalities view Civilian Review Boards as effective tools for improving police-community relations, the revised establishes certain IAPP minimum procedural safeguards that a municipality must adopt for a Civilian Review Board before a law enforcement agency is permitted to provide the Board with access to internal affairs records.  To gain access to such records, Civilian Review Boards must of course comply with all other applicable legal requirements.  These minimum requirements are necessary to protect the integrity and confidentiality of the internal affairs function, which will continue to be the principal mechanism for addressing allegations of police misconduct and an important means of protecting the constitutional rights of the State’s residents, even in those municipalities that choose to create a Civilian Review Board.  Establishing a Civilian Review Board is only one of many options available to municipalities seeking to improve police-community relations.  Other reforms to the internal affairs function and the introduction of other police accountability measures may lead municipalities to conclude that the costs and other drawbacks of creating a Civilian Review Board outweigh the benefits.  Likewise, a municipality may conclude that its objectives for improving police-community relations would be better served by a civilian oversight body that does not conduct its own investigations of individual civilian complaints but instead reviews Page 6 aggregate data and/or de-identified records from closed investigations to evaluate the overall effectiveness of police discipline and inform policy recommendations.
[brief] COURT: I don’t see any reason to revisit that.  I’m going to deny the motion.  Whether it’s—whether this is deemed as simply another motion for reconsideration under 4:49-2, which is really what it appears to be, in reality, or under 4:50-1, it really is just asking the Court to revisit its decision, but in doing so fails to address the extensive analysis that the Court conducted under Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328.  As required under Couri v. Gardner, the Court did an extensive analysis of the allegations in that case, or the allegations in the case, and came to the conclusion -- the conclusions that the Court came to.  And plaintiff has not articulated any basis other than taking what seems to be yet another bite at the apple that would prompt the Court to revisit that extensive analysis.  Plaintiff asserts that there is new evidence, but again, I have to look at the factual allegations pled, and I don’t see any basis to vacate the Court’s order on that argument.  I’m denying the motion.  (2T:68:7-69:2)  On August 8, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint (incorrectly captioned as “Second Amended Complaint”), which (among other things) added [...] as a Defendant.
[brief] (Responds to Appellants’ Brief Point II A, B, C, D, and E).  After considering all documents within the record, [...] found that [...]’s Project is an exempted activity.  (Aa1; Aa21; Aa26).  It is reasonably characterized as an upgrade of a nationwide pipeline system, a small part of which is located in the Highlands Region.  (Aa53; Aa55; Aa78).  [...]’s Project proposes to construct a compressor station and associated infrastructure on the preexisting 300 Line to transport additional natural gas to its customers.  (Aa55).  As described above, utility servicers use compressor stations to move natural gas through a pipeline system.  (Aa77).  Stated differently, “[a] compressor station ‘boosts the system pressure’ along pipelines in order to ‘maintain required flow rates. ’”  Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty., Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 783 F.3d 1301, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Summers, 723 F.3d 238 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).  By necessity, a compressor station is part of a broader – usually preexisting – natural gas transmission system.  A stand-alone compressor station would be useless and have no function without a pipeline system to service.  Exemption #11 of the Highlands Act states that an “upgrade” of a public utility “line, rights-of-way, or system[” is an exempt activity.  N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11); N.J.A.C. 7:38-2.3(a)(11).  [...] thus fairly determined, consistent with its prior decisions for projects on [...]’s 300 Line, (Aa78), that the Project to construct a compressor station to boost pressure on [...]’s existing 300 Line is an “upgrade” of [...]’s “line, rights-of-way, or systems. ” (Aa1).  [...]’s exemption determination here follows longstanding agency practice on other utility upgrades.
[brief] In that case, the Third Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument that the § 1983 claim accrued when the conviction was initially reversed and remanded.  Id. at 110, 113.  The court reasoned that if the Appellant had brought his § 1983 claim before the criminal charges were dismissed, success on that claim would have necessarily implied the invalidity of a future conviction on the still pending criminal charges.  Id. at 112-13.  As a result, the court held that the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim did not accrue until the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ordered the dismissal of all criminal charges.  Id. at 113.  See Michaels, 955 F. Supp. at 324; Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2009); Ginter v. Skahill, 298 F. App’x. 161, 163 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Claims alleging malicious prosecution do not accrue until charges are dismissed.
[brief] ”  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 87 N.J. Super. 543, 558 (1965) (citations omitted).  Indeed, “because insurance policies are adhesion contracts, courts must assume a particularly vigilant role in ensuring their conformity to public policy and principles of fairness. ”  *Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co.*, 128 N.J. 165, 175 (1992); see also *Hawkins v. Globe Life Ins. Co.*, 105 F.Supp.3d 430, 438-39 (2015) (noting that New Jersey courts interpret insurance policies, which are “often the result of technical semantic constructions and unequal bargaining power . . . to give effect to the reasonable expectations of an objectively reasonable policy holder”).
[directive] Fon Fomasyon ak Ekipman Fosdelod (Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund)?  h.  You will be required to provide a DNA sample, which could be used by law enforcement for [Yes/wi] [No/Non] the investigation of criminal activity, and pay for the cost of testing?  pcm  Yap egzije w bay echantiyon ADN ke otorite yo takab itilize envestige aktivite kriminel, epi wap bije peye pou fre analiz la?
[brief] (Db 21-22).  In Stelluti, the Court did not find a gym membership agreement unconscionable because members have other options for working out and there was time for the member to seek advice before signing up to be a gym member.  Id. at 302.  (Db22).  You do not need a gym membership to be healthy or undertake a workout.  It is realistic for many people to do at home workouts and there are many gyms to choose from.  A gym membership is a want, not a necessity.  Here, [...] does not have a driver’s license and must rely on rideshare services for transportation.  It is difficult to accomplish anything without a reliable source of transportation and it is much more of a necessity than a gym membership.  Similarly, [...]’s reliance on *Pace v. Hamilton Cove*, 258 N.J. 82, 107-108 (2024) is also misplaced.  (Db 22-23).  In *Pace*, the plaintiff was looking to lease a home.  *Id.*  Deciding where to live for an extended period is a big decision that requires a lot of thought and consideration before locking yourself into an agreement.  It is also very rare for someone to sign a leasing agreement and move into the agreed upon housing right away.  So, by its very nature, selecting housing requires careful time to consider the decision.  Ordering a ride does not.  Here, [...] simply needed quick transportation so she could accomplish things such as taking her children to routine doctor’s appointments.  This situation before this Court cannot in good faith be comparable to selecting housing or a gym membership.
[brief] Violating the good behavior standards required of all police officers and disobedience of rules and regulations established for the government of the police department by misrepresenting his location and failing to conduct eight (8) property checks that he called in to dispatch.  His failure to properly conduct these property checks and also fabricating an explanation for some of the incomplete property checks by claiming to have conducted them via foot patrol diminishes the position that we hold as law enforcement officers to protect and serve our community.  The same community that relies on our truthfulness, knowledge, integrity, and oath to uphold the laws of the State of New Jersey and the Constitution of the United States to keep them safe.