ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Indeed, in addition to regular criminal background checks for every officer, director, partner, and/or owner with a controlling interest in the applicant/licensee, the Commissioner must “find[] that the financial responsibility, experience, character, and general fitness of the applicant for a new license or for a renewal of a license demonstrate that the business will be operated honestly, fairly, and efficiently within the purposes of [the NJCFLA]” N.J.S.A. 17:11C-7(c); *see also* N.J.S.A. 17:11C-7(e).  Like the NJSLL and NJCLA, the newly titled NJCFLA (under the umbrella of the NJLLA) allowed for a private right of action by individual consumers in addition to the enforcement remedies of the Commissioner.  Indeed, codified statutory mechanism of enforcement by which an individual consumer voided an unlawful loan contract and/or pursued treble damages was N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b)—*the same provision of the same statute* which Plaintiff asserts has voided her unlawful contract in the instant action under the same NJCFLA.  Though N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 codifies the Commissioner’s authority to oversee licensure under the NJCFLA (as it did under the NJLLA), it does not disallow private actions by aggrieved consumers—nor has it ever.  Prior to 2014, aggrieved consumers were always afforded an implied private right of action in addition to the Commissioner’s authority to oversee licensure and pursue independent prosecutions.  In fact, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b) continues to explicitly allow for treble damages—a remedy not included under the Commissioner’s authority in N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18.  N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18(i) further limits the Commissioner’s authority to civil penalties “not exceeding $25,000. ”  Therefore, in the absence of a private right of action, an unlicensed consumer lender could limit liability on consumer loans exceeding $25,000 since penalties are capped at $25,000.  In 2010, when the NJRLMA and NJCFLA were separated, subsection 18 remained combined with the consumer lending provisions, as it had been for several decades—and reasonably so.  The provisions of subsection 18 relate only to the Commissioner’s authority relative to licensure to act as a “consumer lender” or “sales finance company” and do not address mortgages or real property.  See N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2; N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3; N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18.  Post 2010, the first case to address the NJCFLA was in the District Court of New Jersey: *Veras v. [...]*, No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) (Pa125).
[brief] Piatt v. Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting In re Election Law Enforcement Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010)).  Indeed, “if the language is plain and its meaning clear, the inquiry ends there . . .”  State v. Malik, 365 N.J. Super. 267, 274 (App. Div. 2003).  In reading statutory language, courts will give words their ordinary meaning absent any direction from the Legislature to the contrary.  *In Re Young*, 202 N.J. 50, 63 (2010).  Here, the Board’s determination is reasonable and complies with the governing statute.  The unambiguous language of the Ricci Act provides:  A member or retiree shall not be eligible for the presumption or recalculation under this subsection unless within two years of the effective date of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, the member or retiree files a written and sworn statement with the retirement system on a form provided by the board of trustees thereof indicating the dates and locations of service.
[brief] There is no question that the success of the TDR Program, and its resultant increase in school population and need for governmental services, has resulted in greater governmental expenditures.  The Township Committee deems it appropriate to seek an opportunity to increase commercial/industrial tax ratables to mitigate increased municipal expenditures resulting from an increased residential population.  H.  The property in question, 156 +/- acres in size, is not a farm, and has not been a farm for years.  The Township Committee has been informed that the costs and expenses a farmer would have to incur to return the property to tillable soil are prohibitive, such that it is unlikely to become farmland.  I.  However, the property, having been used commercially for decades, is appropriate for non-agricultural, non-residential, purposes.  Its close proximity to Route 206 (1,900 +/- feet) makes it attractive for the uses identified as permitted and accessory uses in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 of this Plan.  The Township Committee believes it is a good location for the uses identified in this Plan.
[brief] ..............................................................................27  Courier-Post Newspaper v. Cnty. of Camden, 413 N.J. Super. 372 (App. Div. 2010)  .....................................................7  Dabush v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 378 N.J. Super. 105 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2005)  ..................................12  Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co. v. Russo, 429 N.J. Super. 91 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2012) ....................................8  Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69 (1990)  ...............................................................................38  DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 (2005)  .............................................................................14, 23, 25  EnviroFinance Grp. v. Envtl. Barrier Co., 440 N.J. Super. 325 (App. Div. 2015)  .....................................................8  Elshabba v. Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC, Case No. [...] .......................................................................39  Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) .....................................................41  Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991)  ................................................................42  Greco v. Trauner, Cohen & Thomas, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 2005)  ................................................................16  Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1944)  ................................................................23  Hammett v. Allianceone Receivables Management, Incorporated, 2011 WL 3819848 (E.D. Pa. August 30th, 2011)  ....................................47  Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242 (2010)
[brief] individuals depicted in the footage. ”  (Da 75)  [...] reported of the results:  “Upon reviewing the video footage they were unable to conclusively identify any of the parties depicted. ”  (Da 75)  [...] noted as a caveat, “[...] pointed out that the individual depicted walking west on the south side of Lexington Ave. appeared to resemble a neighbor, ‘[...],’ that lives across the street.  It should be noted that [...] [is] Jeff[re]y Harley. ”  (Da 75)  On March 8, 2016, [...] participated in another out-of-court identification procedure.
[directive] 4.  What information is recorded on the SAFE Kit itself?  Open-Ended Response  5.  How many SAFE Kits do you possess that are on “hold”?  “Hold” kits refer to SAFE Kits that have not yet been provided to law enforcement pending the victim’s decision to report the crime.  Open-Ended Response 15 | P a g e Appendix A 6.  Where are they stored?
[brief] N.J.A.C. 5:23-4.14, Table 4.4, note (d) defines “Assisted Living” by cross-referencing N.J.A.C. 8:36- 1.3; all of the units in the proposed development, including the independent living units met the definition and therefore require 0.5 spaces per unit.  Thus, the 165 units require 83 spaces; [...] proposed 117, and the uncontested expert testimony confirmed that this was sufficient to meet the needs of the community.  [2T 81-9 to 83-19].  In fact, the Board’s Engineer confirmed that [...]’s site was actually overparked, and recommended reducing the number of parking spaces proposed because 34 more than were required were proposed.
[brief] *[...]*, 311 N.J. Super. at 335.  This court reversed the Board, holding “that the two-year standard of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3) is not jurisdictional, especially in the circumstances presented” in the particular matter.  *Id.* at 337-38.  Specifically, in his LAD action, [...]’s position was that he was not disabled from his employment with a reasonable accommodation.  *Id.* at 335.  To be considered for Ordinary Disability, [...] was required to certify he is disabled.  *Id.* at 336.  Thus, [...] was legally barred by the operation of “the doctrine of judicial estoppel” from filing his application for Ordinary Disability while his LAD action was pending.
[directive] Skorygowany formularz udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Polish strona 6 z 8 Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 10080-Polish page 6 of 8  Do you understand that as a result of your conviction your name, age, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, eye color, any distinguishing scars or tattoos you have, your photograph, the make, model, color, year and license plate number of any vehicle you operate, the street address, zip code, municipality and county in which you reside and a description of the offense for which you are pleading guilty, may be publicly available on the Internet?  Czy rozumie Pan(i), że w przypadku wyroku skazującego, jeżeli sąd uzna, że Pana(i) b) [Tak/Yes] [Nie/No] postępowanie związane z popełnieniem przestępstwa stanowiło wzór powtarzających się i kompulsywnych zachowań, Pana(i) imię i nazwisko, wiek, rasa, płeć, data urodzenia, blizny i tatuaże, Pana(i) zdjęcie, wzrost, waga, kolor oczu, wszelkie znaki szczególne jak marka, model, kolor, rocznik i numer tablicy rejestracyjnej pojazdu, którym Pan(i) jeździ, adres z kodem pocztowym, miastem i hrabstwem Pana(i) miejsca zamieszkania, jak również opis przestępstwa, do którego popełnienia Pan(i) się przyznaje mogą zostać udostępnione do wiadomości publicznej w Internecie?
[brief] In reaching this determination, the Trial Court concluded that the adoption of the ordinance approving the Second --- 3  The Plaintiff’s motion papers erroneously sought partial summary judgment on the claims asserted within Count Three of its Complaint, but it is clear that the Plaintiff meant Count Four as that is the Count asserting Public Trust Doctrine claims.  Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan merely established a redevelopment overlay option for someone wishing to develop properties within the Redevelopment Area but that development could also take place under the underlying zoning.  The Trial Court recognized that the redevelopment plan is simply a zoning decision and not a development application, and that indeed the redevelopment plan requires anyone wishing to develop properties within the Redevelopment Area to file an application with the Planning Board before constructing any project.  Thus, [...] concluded that these Public Trust Doctrine claims were premature and that the Plaintiff is essentially seeking to challenge a future conceptual development of property within the Redevelopment Area that might never actually happen.  He noted that if a developer files a development application for a particular development project in the Redevelopment Area, then the Plaintiff would have an opportunity to pursue its Public Trust Doctrine arguments.  Since the Plaintiff’s Public Trust Doctrine claims were not ripe, the Trial Court granted the Borough’s summary judgment motion dismissing these claims (Pa1724-1728).
[brief] Finally, although not an issue that needs to be reached given [...]’s waiver, the arbitration provision in this policy, located on a pre-printed [...] form drafted entirely by [...], is permissive, not mandatory.  It clearly sets forth that the parties “may” arbitrate their disputes, rather than using the mandatory form “shall. ”  To be sure, [...] knew to use the word “shall” in the policy if intended – the word appears nine times elsewhere in the arbitration clause itself.  But the parties did not.  Moreover, arbitration of this type of claim would contractually conflict with the Service of Suit provision, by which [...] expressly consented to court jurisdiction for claims brought by [...] relating to [...]’s failure to pay claims under the policy.  In any event, there can be no reasonable interpretation to infer that [...] ever intended to empower [...] with the unilateral right to nullify six years of litigation with such a belated arbitration demand.  Resetting this long-standing litigation before a new three-arbitrator panel after [...] has availed itself of the Court’s jurisdiction through motion practice and leveraged expansive litigation discovery procedures not typically available in arbitration would materially prejudice [...] and waste the parties’ (and the Law Division’s) resources.
[brief] The starting point for interpretation of this provision is the fact that it is derived from § 3.18.1 of the American Institute of Architects: General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, also known as AIA Document A201.  This important fact was overlooked by the trial court.  AIA Document A201 has been recognized by New Jersey courts as “a widely used form construction contract. ”  Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Am. Med. Plumbing, Inc., 458 N.J. Super. 535, 537 (App. Div. 2019).  AIA Document A201 § 3.18.1 provides:  To the fullest extent permitted by law, the contract shall indemnify and hold harmless the Owner, Architect, Architect’s consultants, and agents and employees of any of them from and against claims, damages, losses and expenses, including but not limited to attorneys’ fees arising out of or resulting from the performance of the Work, provided that such claim, damage, loss, or expense is attributable to bodily injury sickness, disease or death sustained by anyone, including employees of Subcontractor or to injury to or destruction of tangible property (other than the Work itself), but only to the extent caused by the negligent acts or omission of the Contractor a Subcontractor, anyone directly or indirectly employed by them, or anyone for whose acts they may be liable, regardless of whether or not such claim, damage, loss, or expense is caused in party by a party indemnified hereunder.
[brief] Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention otherwise in his brief, there was no evidence to “conclusively demonstrate” that [...] and [...] “have control over [...] for deposition purposes. ” (See Pb16).  Indeed, the primary “evidence” Plaintiff relies on is counsel’s attempt to coordinate [...]’s deposition, which would have streamlined discovery and likely avoided the prolonged motion practice in which the parties thereafter engaged.  (See, e.g., 2T 19:5-13).  However, that effort was clearly unsuccessful, as [...] did not appear—further demonstrating the lack of control of the German Defendants over [...].  Likewise, the other “facts” that Plaintiff claims support a finding of control in reality show no such thing.  Critically, none of the citations to the record provided by Plaintiff support Plaintiff’s claim that “the Corporate Defendants sent [...] to New York” to conduct any interviews or to meet with counsel.  (See Pb17).  The trial court ultimately concluded that there were insufficient facts to demonstrate that the German Defendants (or the U.S. Defendants) control [...] for purposes of compelling his deposition by way of notice rather than subpoena.
[brief] In part, this is because the science of mental health recognizes that the best evidence regarding a minor's mental and emotional well-being comes from first-hand accounts by parents, rather than biased accounts from immature children.  Mirabelli, 2023 WL 5976992, at *7.  The trial court failed to consider that its order empowers the State to insert itself between parent and child by excluding parents from critical matters affecting their children -- contrary to the public interest in the preservation of the parental-child relationship.  See Cafaro v. Cafaro, 118 N.J.L. 123, 127 (E. & A. 1937) (“natural and politic law, morality … demand the preservation of this relation in its full strength and purity” and sound public policy “cherishes it in the public interest”).
[brief] (2T 63:19-23)  The only place in the Settlement Agreement where [...]’s financial situation is mentioned is in paragraph 1, the content of which is specifically limited to the down payment.  (A2)  It also cannot be ignored that at the time the down payment was required, in April 2011, or even when the purchase went through in June 2011, no other settlement terms, let alone the Settlement Agreement, had been negotiated.
[brief] 11  I.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING [...]’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT AND PERMIT [...] TO REDEEM TAX SALE CERTIFICATE WHERE [...] IS LEGALLY ENTITLED TO RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT UNDER NJSA 54:5-87  PURSUANT TO RULE 4:50-1 AS MANDATED.  (Raised Below: 1M7-1M8,Da87)  11  A.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BASED UPON LACK OF JURISDICTION  BECAUSE THE NEW LEGAL STANDARD SET BY THE TYLER CASE (ONLY DAYS BEFORE THE PRIOR APPELLATE DECISION IN [...]’S CASE) EXISTED BUT WAS UNKNOWN TO [...] AND LIKELY THE COURT WHEN THIS CASE WAS ACTUALLY REVIEWED SINCE IT WAS ENTERED SIMULTANEOUSLY AND THEREFORE THE TYLER DECISION WAS NOT ADDRESSED AS PART OF THE PRIOR APPEAL WHICH VIOLATED [...]’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND EQUITY DICTATES THE JUDGMENT STILL BE VACATED AS MANDATED BY THE TYLER CASE.
[brief] Abbott v. Burke, 199 N.J. 140 (2009) (“Abbott XX”).  In holding the SFRA constitutional as applied in [...], the court below failed to analyze Plaintiffs-Appellants’ compelling prima facie showing that the State was not operating the SFRA at its optimal level under the conditions imposed by the Supreme Court in Abbott XX for the formula’s continuing constitutionality.  Compounding this fundamental legal error, the court reached its conclusion on a contested motion for summary judgment without the development of a full factual record at an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the State had allowed deficits of a constitutional dimension to emerge in SFRA’s implementation in [...].  The decision below is plainly at odds with the Abbott XX mandates and the standards governing motions for summary judgment.  Further, given the profound interests of [...] students at stake, that decision must be reversed and the matter remanded for judicial branch adjudication under the substantive constitutional standards established in the Abbott litigation.
[brief] ”  *Francois v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys.*, 415 N.J. Super. 335, 349 (App. Div. 2010) (citation omitted).  Here, the statute provides for the benefit if a retiree files for it within two years of the effective date of the Ricci Act, i.e., by July 8, 2021.  [...] did not file for the benefit within the time permitted by the statute, so even under a liberal construction, the statute expressly states he is ineligible for the benefit he now seeks.  Nevertheless, [...] argues that the limitation period in the statute should not be strictly applied because it “fails to advance the legislative purpose of the Ricci Act. ” (Pb14).  But this is a misinterpretation that contradicts the Legislature’s actual intent, as explicitly stated in the statute it enacted.  “The Court’s obligation when interpreting a law is to determine and carry out the Legislature’s intent.
[brief] Defendant [...] Required Employees Such As [...] To Park In A Distant Area With No Pedestrian Safeguards  The October 6, 2021 crash was captured on the hospital’s video surveillance system.  See Pa372-3 (stills from the video with notations identifying [...] and [...]’s vehicle); see also Pa416-429 (full set of stills).  As demonstrated in the stills from the video footage, there was no signage, no pavement markings, no sidewalks, no crosswalk, no cones, and no staff directing traffic to afford pedestrians any type of protection from vehicles as they traversed the distant section of the expansive parking lot to get to the hospital.  Id.  An investigating police officer noted that “there is no stop sign or other traffic control device located at this location in the parking lot[.]”  Pa45.  See also Pa442-450; Pa376-7.  It is undisputed that the distant area of the expansive parking lot where [...] was instructed to park on the date of the subject crash did not have a sidewalk, crosswalk, or warning signs so that pedestrians could safely traverse the parking area in order to get into the hospital.
[brief] After multiple motions that include a motion for a new trial, it is still readily apparent Plaintiff does not understand the technical aspects of the digital cinema software at issue and there is no merit to any claim that [...] spoliated evidence never mind that [...] committed fraud in an attempt to conceal evidence.  The Trial Court committed no error in deciding the pre-trial Motions at issue and there is no support to disturb those findings after all that has transpired since then and after Plaintiff did nothing to pursue or clarify the evidence that was mistakenly thought to support these claims, through all remaining stages of the case including trial.  Providing some brief background, Plaintiff’s case involves a trip and fall due to alleged insufficient lighting in an [...] movie theater.
[brief] ”  *Id.* (citing *Harr v. Allstate Ins.*, 54 N.J. 287, 304 (1969)).  --- 3  *Accord* N.J.S.A. § 17:29B-4 (defining “unfair claim settlement practices” to include “[f]ailing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof of loss statements have been completed”).  In this vein, the Appellate Division has held that when an insurer authorizes a settlement with the tortfeasor under *Longworth*, “it constitutes at least an implicit acknowledgment of the availability of UIM coverage upon which the injured party should be entitled to rely.
[brief] In addition, the defendant did not seek any kind of limiting instruction concerning a reference to the fact that the defendant fled the scene of the accident.  The only two objections made after the close concerned the medical testimony of [...], and whether argument concerning the labrum being torn or “torn off”, were improper.  Had the defense believed that there were prejudicial statements made concerning Defendant fleeing, a cautionary instruction should have been sought.  Further, the trial judge properly instructed the jury that they were to arrive at their determinations without sympathy, bias, or prejudice.  3T63:3-7.  Thus, the jury was properly instructed and there was no error necessitating a new trial.  CONCLUSION