ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] POINT III  THE LITANY OF IMPROPER ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED WITH AN AIM TO DENIGRATE MR. MUSTAFA IN THE EYES OF THE JURY SUBSTANTIALLY UNDERMINED HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.  With respect to Point III, the State has offered no cogent explanations for why the evidence and arguments pointed to were proper and not unduly prejudicial.  [...] relies on his appellant brief with respect to why those evidence and arguments were legally improper and significantly harmful.  POINT IV
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT..................................................................................1  STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS........................................................................4  A.  The Bid Solicitation and Bid Specifications..............................................................4  B.  [...] and [...] Submit Non-Responsive, Materially Defective Bids.....................6  C.  The [...] Improperly Awards the Anticipated Contract to [...]............................6  PROCEDURAL HISTORY...............................................................................................7  STANDARD OF REVIEW .............................................................................................9  LEGAL ARGUMENT .....................................................................................................10
[brief] As to Count 2, "there are absolutely no facts" that suggest that the pictures of Respondent and her family not wearing masks "exceeded the scope of Respondent's duties and responsibilities as a Board member or had the potential to compromise the Board."  Cal 72; 3.  As to Count 3, Respondent's decision not to wear a mask at a board meeting was a "personal decision" which was unrelated to her duties as a board member and could not have impacted the Board.
[brief] POINT V THE TRIAL COURT’S HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS LAIBLE FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT WAS MANIFESTLY UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENTIAL RECORD (36T51-22 to 52-6)  In addition to misstating the legal standard for prevailing on a claim of unjust enrichment, the trial court also failed to provide an adequate statement of reasons for entering Judgment against Defendant on Plaintiffs’ claims under Counts 12 and 13 of the Amended Complaint.  36T51-22 to 52-6.  Recovery for unjust enrichment requires that a plaintiff “show both that defendant received a benefit and that retention of that benefit without payment would be unjust. ”  VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539, 554 (1994).  Because unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy resorted to only when there was no express contract providing for remuneration, a plaintiff may recover on one or the other theory, but not both.  Van Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 311 (3rd Cir.1982).  Likewise, and finally, a claim for unjust enrichment cannot succeed where the allegations underlying the claim sound, as they do here, in tort.  Pereira v. Azevado, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54868, *13 (D.N.J. April 17, 2013) (citations omitted).  Against this backdrop, Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claims were barred as a matter of law because there were express contracts between the parties.  Van Orman, 680 F.2d at 311.  Moreover, Plaintiffs’ claims failed because the allegations underlying the claims sounded in tort.  Pereira, supra, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *13.  Lastly, Plaintiffs failed to prove that Defendant converted any money or that she received an unjust benefit belonging to them.  See Points I-IV infra.  Accordingly, the trial court’s conclusion that Defendant was liable for unjust enrichment was manifestly unsupported by the evidential record and its errors of law produced an unjust result, warranting the reversal of the Judgment against Defendant on Counts 12 and 13 of the Amended Complaint in the interests of justice.  23T96-3 to 97-15.  POINT VI
[directive] B.  Severability.  The provisions of this Directive shall be severable.  If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this Directive is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Directive shall not be affected.  C.  Questions.  Any questions concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Directive shall be addressed to the DCJ Director, or their designee.  D. date.  This Directive shall take effect on May 19, 2021, and shall remain in force
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[brief] It provided more than 48 hours notice of its meetings, including that there would be voting sessions in both houses on January 10, 2022.  It also posted the agenda of the sessions to the extent known.  The two bills at issue, S49 and A6260, which were not introduced until January 6, 2022, were not included on the Legislative Calendar prior to that date.  (Pa112).  But nothing in OPMA prevents a public body from adding late items to an agenda.  See, N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(d)(defining adequate notice as including the agenda of the meeting “to the extent known. ”).  And once the bills had received a second reading, they were included on the updated Legislative Calendar on January 7, 2022, indicating that they would be considered at the voting sessions by the bodies on January 10.  (Ra2; Ra4).  Petitioners’ alternative argument that the Legislature violated N.J.S.A. 52:11-78 fares no better.
[brief] It fudged a remedy to avoid the consequences of the Report by kicking the can down the road to further litigation.  See 2T15, ll.14-20 & 2T18, ll.20-22.  ²  The Respondents inexplicably veer off into a brief discussion of the requirements for a quiet title action which has no apparent relevance to the facts presented.  This case should be remanded for further proceedings to either resolve limited dispute between the parties or join other affected parties who could fully participate in a renewed process from the outset.  These positions are taken without prejudice to the [...]’ position at trial that the trial court had the authority to adopt the [...] which would not affect any other lots.  The [...] continue to maintain that the only final solution to this case is to either adopt the [...], or to reject the Report of the Boundary Commissioners on the basis that its *ultra vires* nature affects parties not properly before the trial court.  [...]  By: Dated: September 24, 2024  [...]
[brief] To establish this point, he called two expert witnesses: [...], Psy.D., and [...], a psychiatrist.  (2T; Pca29-44).  [...] testified that at birth, defendant was delivered with forceps and sustained bruises on his head.  (2T9:6-10).  At three years old, he was traumatized by a bee sting incident, and the next event in his life was his parents’ separation, which caused him further trauma.  (2T9:11-22).  He experienced developmental delays and required special education in school.  (2T10:1-12).  “There was considerable violence, both emotional and physical, within [his] household,” and at one point, he “was hospitalized for a ruptured appendix as a result of having been kicked by his brother. ”\(^2\) (2T10:13-18).  Although he was of normal intelligence, he suffered from a neurological deficit that slowed his thinking.  (1T13-14).  He complained that his natural father was a “druggie,” and while he loved his stepfather, he was “torn between the two images” and could not adopt either one.  (2T16:09 to 17:2).  Thus, he lacked a “viable male image that he could identify with. ” (2T10:22).  The problems in his family in conjunction his developmental deficits caused him to act out, incurring suspensions in school as well as juvenile charges.
[brief] D.  Under the first prong of the implied retroactive application test, [...]’s claims fail because the Legislature never intended to give N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(3) retroactive application.  Without the Legislature’s express retroactive application of the statute, the court would have to rule, in the absence of evidence, that “(1) whether the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive application and (2) whether retroactive application will result in either an unconstitutional interference with vested rights or a manifest injustice”.
[brief] The interrogation video included [...]’s impermissible opinion evidence regarding [...]’s credibility and guilt ...........................................  25  TABLE OF CONTENTS  (CONT'D)  B.  The interrogation video included [...]’s reference to [...]’s unrelated arrest, constituting impermissible 404(b) evidence.  ..................................  32  C.  The erroneous admission of [...]’s lay opinion and evidence of [...]’s prior arrest was plain error.  ...........................................................................  36  POINT III
[directive] VI.  EDUCATION AND TRAINING  A.  All law enforcement officers within this Department will receive at least four hours of training on domestic violence issues annually, as approved by the N.J.S.A. Division of Criminal Justice, pursuant to 2C:25-20.  B.  All police dispatchers within this Department, sworn and unsworn, will receive annual training on how to handle a domestic violence call.  C.  All law enforcement officers and unsworn members of this Department will receive at least annual training on the impact of domestic violence within the law enforcement community and on the Department's policy and procedures when a law enforcement officer or an unsworn member is involved in a domestic violence incident.  D.  In addition to the training required in Paragraph A. above, all police supervisors within this Department will receive annual training on such matters as:  1.  How to recognize potential indicators or early warning signs of domestic violence behavior by law enforcement officers.  2.  How to investigate indicators of potential abusive behavior or early warning signs potentially indicative of domestic violence.  3.  When to notify the Chief of Police or Law Enforcement Chief Executive of the information gathered in accordance with the Department's chain of command.  4.  Available programs to assist law enforcement domestic violence victims and batterers.  VII.
[brief] For the reasons set forth above, this Court should reverse the order granting summary judgment to Defendants Edward and [...] and remand for further proceedings.  Dated: July 16, 2024  [...]  Of Counsel: [...], Esq.  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant  [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  [...], Esq.  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  DONALD UNGER, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. EDWARD DWYER and SONALI DWYER, Defendants/Respondents, And JOHN DOES 1-10 and ABC CORPORATIONS 1-10, Defendants.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE
[brief] Corporation Counsel Brief and Appendix in Opposition  [...].  [...], Esq.  Attorneys for Respondent, [...]  [...]  Telephone: [...]  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  Attorney ID # 322802021  Email: [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................ii  TABLE OF RESPONDENT’S CERTIFIED APPENDIX..............................iv  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.........................................................1  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY........................................3  ARGUMENT AND STANDARD OF REVIEW.....................................5  POINT I THE COURT SHOULD DEFER TO THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION’S DECISION.................................................................5  a.  No Genuine Vacancies Existed at the Time Certification PL221817 was Promulgated.................................................................7  b.  The Civil Service Commission has no Obligation to Approve Retroactive Promotions.................................................................10  c.  Public Policy Favors CSC’s One-Time Rule Relaxation....................12  POINT II  APPELLANT’S REMAINING ARGUMENTS ARE NOT IMPLICATED BY THE INSTANT FACT PATTERN...........................................13  CONCLUSION..............................................................................17
[brief] As with most agency action, there is room for debate over what is reasonable.  To be reasonable, an agency's choice of action for providing notice does not require adoption of a perfect practice.  Here, the intended purpose of the action challenged—the Commissions' attempted notice—was to reach persons who might have been affected by the wrongfully calculated reimbursement rate, to notify those persons of the availability of supplemental reimbursement, and to inform them of the procedures for requesting supplemental reimbursement.  (pp. 16-19)  3.  The problem in this dispute over the adequacy of notice is that the evidence thus far produced has the capacity to support the claim that the methods of notice—the letter and website link—were not reasonably designed to likely reach the categories of members who may have been affected by the erroneous reimbursement rates.  The Unions have advanced some evidence on which there could be based a finding that the notice was not reasonably designed to give notice to the proper universe of individuals affected.
[brief] In McQueen v. Fein, Such, Kahn & Shepard, P.C., [...], 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 640 (Law Div. April 26, 2023),¹ the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and analyzed the plain language of the NJCFLA’s statutory provisions:  The question of whether the Plaintiff has stated a viable claim for relief turns ultimately upon whether [...] and the other assignees of the Plaintiff’s credit card account and debt were functioning as a “consumer lender” and/or “sales finance company” under the NJFCLA at the time they accepted assignment of such account and debt and/or sought to enforce and collect the same and were thereby required to secure a license.  If they were so obligated, the Plaintiff has stated a viable claim for relief under the FDCPA as against [...], inasmuch as one could reasonably conclude in such circumstances that the letter [...] sent to the debtor was misleading and/or unconscionable because it did not report that the serial creditors were unlicensed at the time they accepted assignment of the debt and/or ¹ McQueen also expressly analyzed and contradicted the only other unpublished case in this jurisdiction at that time to address the application of the NJCFLA’s licensure provisions to alleged debts stemming from credit accounts, Woo-Padva v. [...], 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 96 (Law Div. Jan. 21, 2022), aff’d on other grounds, [...], 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1550 (App. Div. Sep. 21, 2023).
[brief] 23 R. 4:6-2(e) ..........................................................................................................................................  18  TABLE OF ORDERS  April 27, 2023  Order Granting City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss .................................................................Pa80 April 27, 2023  Order Granting County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss ..............................................................Pa82 April 27, 2023  Order Granting County Defendant, [...]’s Motion to Dismiss .......................Pa84 April 27, 2023  Order Granting State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss .................................................................Pa86 April 27, 2023  Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Designate Counsel ..............................................................Pa88 July 10, 2023
[brief] The lower court also abused its discretion by blaming the deterioration of Defendant’s relationships with his children, particularly [...], on his inability to pay for college, as opposed to years of neglect and emotional abuse by Defendant after his remarriage.  New Jersey law should not reward a parent who engages in such behavior, when the lack of a relationship with the child is a result of the parent’s own doing:  [A] child’s rejection of a parent’s attempt to establish a mutually affectionate relationship [does not] invariably eradicate[] the parent’s obligation to contribute to the child’s education.  . . . a judge could reasonably find from the evidence that defendant’s abusive conduct . . . so traumatized the children as to render nugatory any real possibility of a rapprochement.  In that event, it would not be reasonable to penalize [the child] for the defendant’s misconduct.  Nor would it be reasonable to reward defendant by removing his financial obligation to contribute to his daughter’s college costs.
[brief] Before the trial court, the State moved to join a Hudson County indictment, charging [...] with an April 20 armed robbery of a black Audi Q5 and a yellow BMW M4 that occurred in Jersey City, with the Union County indictment in this case, charging [...] with a carjacking of a red Mercedes Benz on April 23 in Elizabeth.  In the alternative, if the court determined not to join the cases, the State moved to admit evidence of the April 20 robbery in [...]’s trial for the April 23 carjacking.  The trial Court applied the correct analysis under N.J.R.E. 404(b) for both applications and denied both motions.  Because the Court applied the correct legal standard and did not abuse its discretion, the standard of review requires this Court to defer to the discretion of the trial court and affirm the judgment below.
[brief] That would create a sea change in the defense bar and how cases are regularly defended.  [...] further posits that the [...]’s representation of the [...] also violates the second and fourth conditions of *In re Grand Jury* that prohibit a third-party payor of fees from controlling or influencing the attorney’s judgment in representing the client and prohibit the disclosure of attorney-client communications.  Pb27-28.  That is a serious accusation to make with no facts to support it.  The only purported factual support that [...] cites concerns only [...] and other of the [...], which has nothing to do with the [...] or the [...].
[brief] Plaintiff followed his parents’ advice and proceeded with the cultural wedding in November 2021, despite the issues and his reservations.  (1T83).  Plaintiff noted that, even though Defendant had friends attend the wedding, she never introduced those friends to Plaintiff, causing further strain and confusion in the relationship.  (1T87).  Plaintiff affirmed that the marriage was never consummated, despite staying at a hotel booked by his friends and later at an expensive hotel he had booked.  (1T88-89).  Plaintiff then returned to America the first week of December.  In January 2022, after returning to America while Defendant stayed in her hometown due to visa issues, Plaintiff observed that disagreements became more frequent.  Plaintiff believed these disagreements were normal at the time but later suspected they were used to build a case against him, possibly for accusations of abuse.
[brief] --- 7  Multiple documents under one exhibit cover page  Letter From [...] to [...] 6/22/2020 (Attached at Pa078)  Communication Result Report 7/7/2020 (Attached at Pa076)  [...]’ Letter to [...] and [...] 9/25/2020 (Attached at Pa066)  Letter from [...] to [...] Dated 9/30/2020 (Attached at Pa068)  Email to [...] from Prosecutor Regarding no Further Discovery 11/12/2020 (Attached at Pa089)
[brief] (Da 1-13)  These charges relate to two incidents that occurred on April 29, 2011: an attempted robbery of [...] in Hamilton, and a robbery and shooting at the [...] in Trenton.  (Da 1-13); State v. --- 1  Due to the interrelated nature of the procedural history and statement of facts, the two sections have been combined for clarity to the reader.  2  Da = defendant-appellant’s appendix  1T = 11/29/16 plea transcript  2T = 7/7/17 sentencing transcript  3T = 3/3/23 motion transcript  4T = 3/19/24  SOA transcript  [...], [...], 2019 WL 1581430, at *1-3 (App. Div. Apr. 12, 2019).  [...] charged [...] with: first-degree robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (Count One); third-degree theft by unlawful taking, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3a (Count Two); fourth-degree aggravated assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1) (Count Three); third-degree terroristic threats, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3a (Count Four); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (Count Five); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (Count Six); fourth-degree possession of a defaced firearm, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3d (Count Seven); third-degree theft by receiving stolen property, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7a (Count Eight); and fourth-degree unlawful taking of a means of conveyance, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-10d (Count Ten).
[brief] That agreement was entered into between [...] and [...] on November 25, 2014.  (Da83-88).  The liquor license that [...] owned was the key.  [...] moved to Syracuse, New York in 2008 leaving [...] with full autonomy to run the business, including the authority to sign checks, as [...] had been trained in and was well-versed in the business and was personally acquainted with city officials, vendors, and banks.
[brief] Da385.  In the discussion portion of the Trial Court’s written decision in this matter, the Trial Judge states, we can only presume, as a finding of fact, that “...amendments were made to [[...]’s original offer] in order to conform the Offer with the underlying requirements and obligations owed by [...] to [...]...”  Da392.  The Trial Court, in other words, found that the original offer was in some fashion deficient as a matter of law such that it was invalid.  However, the Court never explains its finding in those terms, but simply adopts the position of the Plaintiff on this issue without any discussion or legal justification.  During oral argument, the Trial Court challenged counsel for the Defendant, [...], coming to the conclusion that the offer/contract as presented to Plaintiff [...] on January 17, 2023, was invalid without identifying that “conclusion” as an issue in the motion that required some level of legal basis.
[brief] Pa156a-61a.  Further, if there was one [...] employee who could, and indeed would, have done something about [...]’s purported dangerous operating habits or any of the other safety issues identified by Plaintiff’s experts, it was [...].  Prior to July 2014, [...] had thirty years of road construction experience, had taken numerous OSHA safety courses, and had attended safety training through his union membership.  Pa141a at No. 1; Pa137a at No. 41; Pa184a-185a.  Every single witness that knew [...] testified that he was very safety conscious and that he had no problem correcting perceived safety violations, ensuring that his co-workers did not work unsafely, and/or communicating safety concerns to his employer.  Pa187a; Pa226a; Pa230a; Pa241a; Pa277a, 279a.  Despite all of this, the record is devoid of evidence that [...] ever complained about inadequate lighting, not having flagmen on the job or about insufficient manpower, the internal traffic control plan or lack of a written internal traffic control plan, or about the dump truck and sweeper traffic moving in the work zone.  Notably, Plaintiff acknowledged that her husband worked “a dangerous job. ”  Pa191a.