ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The DEP found that the project was consistent with the Water Quality Planning Act and corresponding rules solely because the development is within a mapped sewer service area.  Aa012, Aa029.  While this is a key determination for a Consistency Assessment, it is insufficient standing alone.  The DEP is also required to make a record regarding Total Maximum Daily Loads (“TMDLs”) and any wasteload --- 13  A “Total maximum daily load” or “TMDL” is the maximum amount of a pollutant allowed to enter a waterbody so that the waterbody will continue to meet water quality standards for that particular pollutant.  See N.J.A.C. 7:9B-1.4.  allocations\textsuperscript{14} for impaired waters,\textsuperscript{15} as well as any additional requirements contained in the applicable Areawide Water Quality Management Plans ("Areawide WQM Plans").  The DEP must consider and make a record of this information in order to determine consistency with the applicable Areawide WQM plan, but it did not.  The Court should vacate and remand the permit to the agency to develop an adequate record and provide a reasoned Consistency Assessment.
[brief] Now, armed with the knowledge of the existence of [...]’s investigation, including his investigation reports, this Court can re-visit plaintiffs’ counsel’s representations to [...] as follows:  “We never voluntarily slept on our rights”.  1T, P. 11, line 9.  There is no indication that plaintiffs made any effort or engaged in due diligence using [...]’s investigation information to identify [...] and to commence a timely action against [...].  “We certainly could not knock on people’s doors”.  1T, P. 11, line 15-16.  [...] did knock on [...]’s door and interviewed an owner of [...].  Did plaintiffs disclose the existence of [...]’s investigation to [...] or the [...]?  No.  “We’re attorneys we have to be ethical and upfront”.  1T, P. 11, line 17-18.  Did plaintiffs disclose the existence of [...]’s investigation to [...] and [...]?  No.
[brief] See Asby v. Medtronic, Inc., 673 F. Supp.3d 787, 795 (E.D.N.C. 2023) (warning claim held “implausible” where “the FDA specifically stated in the recall notice that it was not prompted by any reports of injuries or death”).  Auth. of New. York & New Jersey, 157 N.J. 84, 103-07 (1999); Mathews v.  Univ. Loft Co., 387 N.J. Super. 349, 362 & n.10 (App. Div. 2006).  The Third Restatement of Torts addresses recall-related liability.
[brief] Thus, courts must "compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums."  Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985); KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 565 U.S. 18, 22 (2011).
[brief] “[...], uh, had no reaction, showed no emotion, and had no, uh, response to their statements whatsoever. ”  (9T20-12 to 21-3)  Contrary to the court’s finding, [...]’s decision to remain silent during sentencing was not an expression of a lack of remorse but was a lawful exercise of his right against self-incrimination and his right to defend his innocence.
[brief] A.  Plaintiff’s Claims are Arbitrable Under the Parties’ Agreement  In evaluating a motion to compel arbitration, the sole determinations for the court are “(1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and (2) whether the particular dispute falls within the scope of that agreement. ”\(^2\)  *446 Bellevue LLC v. Global Life Enters., LLC*, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1690, * 7 (App. Div. July 16, 2018), quoting *Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Niles Audio Corp.*, 401 F.3d 529, 532 (3d Cir. 2005); see also *Perez v. Sky Zone LLC*, 276 A.3d at 194, 472 N.J. Super. at 247 (“[t]he validity of an arbitration agreement is a question of law”) (*citations omitted*).  Here, plaintiff concedes—as she did before [...]—that the parties’ arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable.
[brief] Again, § 4. 02 states that, “if and when”\(^9\) the Reimbursement Conditions (of which there are six, not seven) are satisfied, the “Landlord shall pay to Tenant” the Tenant’s Allowance in the amount of $730,000.  Whether interpreting statutes or contracts, the word “shall,” as a matter of black-latter law, “carries with it a presumption that the provision is mandatory and not merely permissive. ”  *Johnson Mach. Co. v. Manville Sales Corp.*, 248 N.J. Super. 285, 304 (App. Div. 1991).  Accord *Medford Tp. Sch. Dist. v. Schneider Elec. Bldgs. Ams., Inc.*, 459 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2019); *George Harms Constr. Co. v. Lincoln Park*, 161 N.J. Super. 367, 371-72 (Law Div. 1978); *Cryan v. Klein*, 148 N.J. Super. 27, 30 (App. Div. 1977).
[brief] Based upon the foregoing and plaintiff/appellant’s original brief, plaintiff/appellant respectfully requests that this Honorable Appellate Court reverse the January 19, 2024  Order granting defendant/respondent [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, reverse the February 21, 2024  Order denying plaintiff/appellant’s Motion to Reopen and Extend Discovery and reverse the March 1, 2024  Order denying plaintiff/appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration.  Dated: September 9, 2024  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant  By: /s/ [...]
[brief] The first thing to note about the 2019 EMP is that it is emphatically and intentionally unlike any energy master plan before it.  There is near unanimous scientific consensus that the global threat of climate change is grave and that it demands swift local action and focused state leadership.  However, there is also evidence that New Jersey's current trajectory and efforts will be insufficient to reach the goals we have established to address climate change.  In response, New Jersey has developed a new Energy Master Plan (EMP) that encompasses a dramatically broader scope than any previous New Jersey EMP.
[brief] Moreover, the statute in Caponegro expressly provided for the payout of these vested benefits for employees not rehired for the upcoming school year, with the only question being whether the statute intended to also provide these benefits to the petitioners who were terminated under separate provisions of the statute.  With these considerations in mind the Court decided that “petitioners are entitled to receive [deferred compensation] in the same manner as if their employment had been voluntarily terminated. ”  Caponegro, 330 N.J. Super. at 157.
[brief] Defendants have not presented any evidence that they informed [...] that they were not representing him.  [...]’s letter dated March 26, 2018 is the earliest evidence from which [...] could have inferred that Defendants were not representing him.  However, at this point, the deadline to contest the Will had passed.  To accept the Defendants’ interpretation of events, one would have to believe that despite having initially sought to file a caveat, [...] decided that he no longer wished to challenge the will.  That is, until he reached out to [...] after receiving the [...]’s March 28, 2023 letter.  It beggars belief that any reasonable juror would conclude that either [...] or [...] never believed that the Defendants were representing [...] at least for some period of time based on this evidence.  Defendants argue that [...]’s failure to return the signed retainer agreement to Defendants is fatal to his malpractice claim.  While this is certainly probative evidence, it is not dispositive of the issue.  The existence of an attorney-client relationship may be inferred from the conduct of the parties.  *In re Palmieri*, 76 N.J. 51, 58-59 (1978).  Based on the actions of both [...] and [...], a reasonable jury could infer that the parties had an agreement that Defendants would represent [...], at least during the crucial time period before the deadline expired.  Defendants also attempt to make hay out of an offhand response to a question during [...]’s deposition -- that he would only sign a fee agreement with [...].  Defendants attribute a world of meaning to this answer concluding that it shows [...] did not consider [...] his attorney and that he never would hire [...].  However, [...]’s additional statements further contextualize this statement.  As [...] explained in his certification, he had an agreement with his brother, [...], that he would reimburse [...] for his share of the legal fees. \(^1\)  It is undisputed that [...] never repudiated [...]’s representation to [...] that he was representing both [...] and [...].  To the contrary, [...] did not engage [...] to represent him until [...] notified him that he had filed the order to show cause application on behalf of [...] alone.  In opposition to the summary judgment motion, [...] produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an attorney-client relationship that must be presented to the jury.
[brief] ”  Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925), we again held that the “liberty of parents and guardians” includes the right “to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. ”  We explained in *Pierce* that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. ”  *Id.*, at 535, 45 S.Ct. 571.  We returned to the subject in *Prince v. Massachusetts*, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944), and again confirmed that there is a constitutional dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children...  In subsequent cases also, we have recognized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.  See, *e.g.*, *Stanley v. Illinois*, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (“It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children ‘come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements' ” (citation omitted)); *Wisconsin v. Yoder*, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (“The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.  This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition”); *Quilloin v. Walcott*, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978) (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected”); *Parham v. J. R.*, 442 U.S. 584, 602, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children.  Our cases have consistently followed that course”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (discussing “[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”); Glucksberg, supra, at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (“In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the righ[t] ... to direct the education and upbringing of one's children” (citing Meyer and Pierce)).  In light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.
[brief] The New Jersey Constitution shall not be permitted to merely remain a vague rumor in [...].  368a.  The Court had held that “[...]’s zoning ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional insofar as it failed to provide a realistic opportunity for the development of affordable housing,” and, as a remedy, imposed an “interlocutory injunction restraining certain land development activities until a final determination could be made concerning [...]’s ability to comply with its Mt. Laurel II obligations.
[brief] Pa127.  Despite not receiving notice, [...] attempted to file an Eligibility Registration Form back in September of 2019.  Pa129.  His Registration Form notes that he was present at Ground Zero/WTC on 9/15/01 for 10 hours.  Pa129.  In response to his filing, [...] received correspondence from the [...] requesting medical information.  Pa131.  [...] contacted Pensions on November 18, 2019, and was advised that the Ricci Act “is for those who are currently sick.  Not for possible future illnesses. ”  Pa131.  It is unknown at this time how many other Troopers Eligibility Registration Forms may have not been filed or how many Troopers were not registered because the member was not ill at the time the forms were sent.  On March 23, 2023, correspondence was sent to the [...] to clarify the request that the Board consider all of the affected Troopers in a single collective petition.  Pa30.  The correspondence also requested that the Board take administrative or judicial notice of all affidavits submitted in all actions with respect to the issue of lack of notice of the Ricci Act for members of the [...].  Pa30.  To date, over ninety-eight (98) active and retired Troopers have submitted affidavits attesting that they did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  Pa86-281.
[brief] F.  The five (5) highest ratables in this community are:  (1)  [...]: $5,297,500.00  (2)  [...]: $4,303,100.00  (3)  [...]: $3,180,000.00  (4)  [...]: $3,000,000.00  (5)  [...]: $2,523,000.00  G.  The general welfare of the community is advanced when the municipality seeks industrial ratables to create a better economic balance for the community, vis-a-vis educational and governmental costs engendered by residential development.
[brief] She is also a regular user of [...]’s services.  She first registered for an [...] account in 2015, and since then she has used her account to enter dozens of transactions through [...]’s Rides and Eats platforms.  When she signed up for an [...] account, she agreed to arbitrate any disputes with [...] arising from her use of [...]’s services.  Since then, she has expressly agreed to [...]’s Terms of Use—including the arbitration agreement—on at least two other occasions relevant here.  Most recently, in January 2022, [...] agreed (either by herself or through her agent) to [...]’s December 2021 Terms of Use (the “December Terms”).  That agreement unambiguously provides that personal injury claims against [...] “will be settled by binding individual arbitration between you and [...], and not in a court of law. ”  The December Terms provide detailed information about the arbitration process, including what private entity would administer the arbitration, the rules applicable to the arbitration, who the potential arbitrators would be, and how to initiate an arbitration proceeding.  Included throughout are terms that distinguish an arbitration from a court proceeding.  Prior to agreeing to the December Terms, [...] had also agreed to [...]’s January 2021 Terms of Use (the “January Terms”) in April 2021.  The January Terms are similar to the December Terms, and they expressly stated that [...] and [...] were “each waiving the right to a trial by jury. ”  This Court has already held that the January Terms are an enforceable contract under New Jersey law, and multiple other courts around the country agree.  Not long after [...] agreed to the December Terms, she and her husband were involved in a car accident while riding as passengers in a vehicle that they had requested through the [...] Rides platform.
[brief] .......................................................................................................................  35  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  Cases  In the Matter of [...]  Correction Lieutenant, Department of Corrections (PS63201)  [...] (App. Div. 2002)  ..................................  33  In the Matter of [...]  [...], 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub 2002 Lexis 469 (App. Div. 2006).  .........................................................................................  33  In the matter of [...], Correction Lieutenant (PS63201) Department of Corrections (MSB, decided July 17, 2002) (cited in Reid)  ..............................................  33  In the Matters of [...] and [...], County Correction Officer (S9999U), [...], 2019 N.J. CSC, LEXIS 420 (June 28, 2019)
[directive] One N.J.S.A.  7.  Tl for Charge not eligible a.  RC Tl eligible  No b. RC to for the Track Two - Inappropriate Probation/Danger community  8.  Inappropriate/Danger T2 a. T21nappro/danger b. two left Track Two - than years on probation  9.  Less two - years left prob T2 a.  Less left <2yr prob T2 b. to for Track Two - Current charges not eligible sentencing  Recovery Court - 2C:45-1 10.  N.J.S.A. not for Charge eligible  T2 a. RC eligible  No b.  T2 RC or or Track One Two - Extradition demand detainer 11.
[brief] In Defendants’/Appellants’ first Leave of Court for Motion to Dismiss the Complaint with Prejudice, Defendants/Appellants argued, in part and in sum, the Complaint and/or the Amended Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice because Allowing plaintiff to proceed on the amended complaint—which like the original complaint contains no specific allegations placing plaintiff’s claims outside the scope of the statutory immunity—would contravene the law’s stated purpose as well as its express direction that health care professionals and health care facilities “shall not be liable for civil damages for injury or death alleged to have been sustained as a result of an act or omission by the health care professional in the course of providing medical services in support of the State’s response to the outbreak of coronavirus disease during the public health emergency and state of emergency. ”  L. 2020, c. 18 §1(c).  Allowing plaintiff to proceed with discovery on all claims—even those of ordinary negligence, which are categorically barred by the statute—would also effectively eviscerate the COVID-19 immunity statute’s stated purpose, to “ensure that there are no impediments to providing medical treatment related to COVID-19 emergency and that all medical personnel supporting the COVID-19 response are granted immunity,” L. 2020, c. 18 §1(a).  (Defendants’/Appellants brief filed on July 3, 2023 at pp. 2-3).  (Pa1).  This Motion for Leave of Appeal was denied by the Court.
[brief] Not a single iota of evidence was produced at trial to establish fraud based on the legal standards set forth by our statute.  Plaintiff was not able to convince the trier of fact by clear evidence that Defendant married Plaintiff to obtain a green card and upon obtaining same, left the marriage.  The evidence pointed to the fact that it was Plaintiff who filed to end the marriage, not Defendant.  Plaintiff also testified at trial repeatedly that the Defendant never said from her own mouth that she wanted to end the relationship.  The reality is that Plaintiff had doubts about marrying Defendant from the beginning and was aware that certain differences existed between the parties.  Despite his concerns, he still married Defendant.  He did not have to follow through with the civil ceremony or the religious ceremony.  He had ample time to investigate and alleviate any doubts that he had about Defendant, but chose not to.  Thus, the fact that the marriage did not work out does not mean that Defendant engaged in any fraudulent conduct in order to induce Plaintiff to marry.
[brief] See Williams v. Bell Telephone Laboratories Inc., 132 N.J. 109, 117 (1993) (holding that the discovery rule is not available in the interpretation of the application of the defamation statute of limitations, N. J.S.A. § 2A:14-3); Lawrence v. Bauer Publ'g & Printing, Ltd., 78 N.J. 371, 375 (1979) ([...], J, concurring) (stating that “[t]he Legislature has therefore fixed a precise date on which the limitations period begins to run.  Once the date of publication is determined, there is no need for further judicial interpretation.  Hence, the discovery rule is inapplicable to libel actions.
[brief] CONCLUSION  Considering that 1.  Defendant is exclusively responsible for maintaining the exterior; 2.  This had occurred previously and the Defendant had 10 years in which to act to protect the property from a reoccurrence of another serious storm which was likely to happen at some point due to both the frequency and intensity of storms which appear to have been affected by global warming; 3.  The fact that Defendant choice to do nothing during the days before Ida reached the metropolitan area despite the governor’s declaration of a state of emergency; 4.  Plaintiff had no authority to independently act to shore up the exterior of the building in an effort to avoid a repeat of 2014 by diverting water elsewhere or block water from penetrating into the building; 5.  Defendant promised to pay for Plaintiff’s damages and then reneged; 6.  Plaintiff is not in any way responsible for the events.  As such I believe that if the court permits the courts decision to stand would result in a grave miscarriage of justice and I respectfully request that the court permit the matter to be reopened.  Dated: August 5, 2024
[brief] Plaintiffs assert a systemic and building-wide consumer fraud by the defendants’ false advertising of the size and square footage of the condominium units in the building, including Unit 1610 which plaintiffs contracted to purchase.  The other four actions are consolidated for discovery under Docket No. [...] before the Hon. [...]. (Da1275 – 1370).  Eighteen months before [...]’s commencement of the AAA proceeding against plaintiffs herein, [...] had denied [...]’s motion to compel arbitration of these claims based upon the plaintiffs’ consumers’ claims that the arbitration clause did not meet the Atalese standard.  (Da90 – 125).  The defendants herein are the same defendants in the four consolidated actions.
[brief] State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 245 (2007) (citations omitted).  “A disagreement with how the motion judge weighed the evidence in a close case is not a sufficient basis for an appellate court to substitute its own factual findings to decide the matter. ”  Ibid.  “The privilege against self-incrimination, as set forth in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, is one of the most important protections of the criminal law.
[brief] In re Adoption of Amendments to Ne., Upper Raritan, Sussex Cty., 435 N.J. Super.  571, 583 (App. Div. 2014).  “This deference is even stronger when the agency, (. . . ) ‘has been delegated discretion to determine the specialized and technical procedures for its tasks. ’”  In re Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permits, 372 N.J. Super. 578, 593 (App. Div. 2004) (citations omitted).  The court's deference to administrative agencies “stems from the recognition that agencies have the specialized expertise necessary to enact regulations dealing with technical matters and are ‘particularly well equipped to read and understand the massive documents and to evaluate the factual and technical issues that ... rulemaking would invite.