ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In Davis, Defendant bar, who learned about the accident after it occurred, had its owner review the surveillance footage and saw nothing that would contradict the bartender’s account of the evening, the latter of whom testified that defendant-patron did not act inappropriately at any point prior to him leaving the bar.  Unlike the bar, who had the difficult task of attempting to identify whether the patron was visibly intoxicated based on surveillance footage, the [...] incident involved the use of an overloaded U-boat and a distinct, physical injury to Plaintiff that was easily identifiable on footage.  Perhaps most importantly, while the bar’s owner had no reason to expect that plaintiff would bring suit against it since the patron was involved in an accident with a third party, which did not occur on the bar’s premises, Plaintiff’s incident occurred while she was an invitee on Plaintiff’s premises and Defendant was put on notice of Plaintiff’s injury and possible litigation.  [...] argues that Nagy is distinguishable chiefly because the video of plaintiff’s fall was actually recorded on [...]’s surveillance camera and because [...] was served with a preservation letter.  To support its argument, Defendant relies upon its faulty assumption that video of [...] striking Plaintiff was never captured on surveillance footage.  Such an assumption is based on [...]’s own determination that the video surveillance he reviewed did not capture the moment of impact.  However, had [...] simply provided the footage to the corporate office, corporate personnel could have further reviewed the tapes, which likely, would have captured the point of impact from one of the 20 to 30 different cameras situated throughout the store.  (Pa96)  Assuming arguendo that even if the moment Plaintiff was struck was not actually recorded, the many cameras located throughout the store would have shown [...] pushing his overloaded U-boat as he made his way through the store.  Additionally, [...] had been served with a preservation letter, evidently, because plaintiff retained counsel immediately following her injury.  Plaintiffs, in the instant matter, could not possibly have been expected to serve a preservation letter upon [...] because Plaintiffs did not retain counsel to represent them until approximately eight (8) months after the incident.  In a last-ditch effort to try and distinguish the facts of Nagy from the instant matter, Defendant notes that the Nagy Court found that [...] had preserved some but not all of the most pertinent video evidence.  However, as the Nagy Court indicated “[i]n this case, whether no video was produced or an incomplete selectively-preserved clip was produced, the result is the same; namely, that [p]laintiffs are deprived of evidence relevant to the claims in this case. ”  Retaining such footage would not have been unduly burdensome to [...].  This is evidenced by [...]’s testimony as to the feasibility of preserving footage, which could be retained simply by registering the timecode and camera number and sending that information to the corporate office.  (Pa96)  II.
[brief] Pursuant to Rule 2:6-2(b), please accept this letter brief on behalf of Defendant, [...], in reply to the State’s Opposition.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ...........................................................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................  1 POINT I PROSECUTION OF DEFENDANT  VIOLATES THE SECOND AMENDMENT ......................  1  POINT II  PROSECUTION OF DEFENDANT  VIOLATES THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE .................................................................  6  CONCLUSION .............................................................................................  11  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS
[brief] According to defendants, before in camera review may be permitted, “‘the judge should require a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person’ ... that in camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish that the attorney-client privilege does not apply. ”  (Id. (citing United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572, 109 S. Ct. 2619, 105 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1989))).  Defendants assert that plaintiffs failed to make such a factual showing, and it appears that they have “picked these documents seemingly at random in the hopes that the Court will find something wrong with Defendants’ privilege designations.
[brief] (A194).  [...], admittedly not acquainted with tax sale law and process sought advice from an attorney and title office, how to effectuate redemption.  Informed that a motion is required to vacate a final judgment, failing consent to accept by Plaintiff, on April 4, 2023 he contacted Plaintiff counsel.  He was informed by [...] that redemption is subject to acceptance by the Plaintiff.  Later in the afternoon [...] phoned [...], to advise that Plaintiff will not accept post judgment redemption.  [...] was informed by [...] that a motion to vacate will be filed.
[brief] A trial court’s decision regarding the evaluation, admission or exclusion of expert testimony is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  *Hisenaj v. Kuehner*, 194 N.J. 6, 16 (2008).  An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial judge’s decision was “not premised upon consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear error in judgment. ”  *Masone v. Levine*, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005); see *State v. S.N.*, 231 N.J. 497, 515 (2018).  If, however, the trial court applies the wrong legal standard in deciding to admit or to exclude evidence, the decision is reviewed de novo.
[brief] Moreover, he was a victim, and this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that victims who can be physically located are called as witnesses by the State in virtually 100% of its trials.  While it is possible that [...] would have been prejudiced against the State, the fact that he refused to cooperate with the subpoena of the court – one that he presumably would have known from speaking with his brother [...] had been issued on behalf of the defense – strongly suggests that he was recalcitrant in general and was not eager to cooperate with any of the parties.  Thus, there was no reason to conclude without direct evidence to that effect that he would have been “prejudiced against the State” as contemplated by the Clawans Court.  And there was no evidence that [...] was not “available” to the State because the State had never even attempted to obtain a writ for him, and the prosecutor was simply speculating without supporting evidence that he would not have complied.  The trial judge’s analysis of the four Hill factors in this case was erroneous.
[directive] Suspension for __________ working days, beginning ______________ and ending ___________________  Indefinite suspension pending criminal charges effective (date)  ____________________________________  Removal, effective (date)  _________________________________________________________________  Demotion to position of __________________________ effective (date)  ____________________________  Resignation not in good standing, effective (date)  ________________  Other Disciplinary Action__________  Fine ________ which is equal to _________ (number of working days)  Appointing authority or authorized agent’s signature and title.
[brief] (Pa164 at 13:11-20, Pa65 at ¶¶6-7.)  [...] told the Committee, “The committee is not doing the business of the people of New Jersey by passing this bill.  . .  The only way you can force this issue on the citizens and the babies of New Jersey is to violate all of your rules and bring it to a committee in a floor vote without adequate notice to the citizens. ”  (Pa164-65 at 13:21-14:4.)  [...] further stated that “S49 is being considered today without notice that you have defined during the waning days of this legislative session. ”  (Pa166 at 15:1-10.)
[brief] 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(3).  In addition, "a debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt."  Id. § 1692d.  Such prohibited conduct includes "[c]ausing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number."
[brief] “Just because [[...]] relied upon that site plan and wrongly assumed that this project was – or that [Plaintiffs’] property was involved in a project, that’s not nothing to do with [...].  He didn’t violate anybody’s duty at that point in time.  The site plan was out there and if somebody else wrongly relied upon it, that’s not [...]’s fault. ”  (4T at 31:11-17).  Plaintiffs’ purported reliance arguments are even more dubious in light of email evidence that Plaintiffs consented to [...]’s remediation as early as August 2017.  (Pa000606).  Plaintiffs’ counsel knew of this consent; knew or should have known that [...] was not involved with remediation efforts; and knew that the site plan was modified in accordance with Plaintiffs’ wishes before any parking-related construction commenced.  Further, Plaintiffs had no knowledge of any trespass by [...] (as later confirmed by their Interrogatory Responses), yet still, Plaintiffs and their counsel signed and filed a Complaint against [...] alleging negligence and trespass.  They never retained an engineering expert, and they kept [...] in this case, without doing any discovery to further their arguments, despite receipt of a safe harbor letter advising them of the baseless nature of their claims.  Although the email evidence shows otherwise, even if Plaintiffs could somehow argue that they had a good faith basis to initially assert a claim against [...] at the start of the litigation, they had no grounds to continue to pursue this claim in good faith.
[brief] On May 6, 2014, a Middlesex County Grand Jury returned indictment number [...], charging defendant [...]\(^1\) with robbery, first-degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (Count 1); conspiracy, second-degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 (Count 2); theft by unlawful taking, third-degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3a (Count 3); unlawful possession of a weapon, third-degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (Count 4); possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, second-degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (Count 5); robbery, first-degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (Count 6); conspiracy, second-degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 (Count 7); theft by unlawful taking, third-degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3a (Count 8); unlawful possession of a weapon, third-degree, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (Count 9); possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, second-degree, contrary to N.
[brief] See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146–47 (1972) (upholding protective search based on informant's tip that suspect was carrying “a gun at his waist”).  Indeed, there are many instances where the right to conduct a protective search of an individual flows directly from the same justification for the investigatory stop.  See State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 30 (2010); State v. Ascencio, 257 N.J. Super. 144, 147-149 (Law Div. 1992), aff’d ‘o.b. 227 N.J. Super. 334 (App. Div. 1994), certif. den. 140 N.J. 278 (1995)  Here, the officers right to conduct a protective search emanated from their observation of defendant and the three other males “blading. ”  Combined with their observations consistent with drug activity, the time of night and poor lighting, officers must be permitted to protect themselves and others under such circumstances by quickly and minimally frisking for weapons.  Therefore, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the well-reasoned findings of the trial court and hold the seizure of the firearm was lawful.
[brief] For instance, New York permits material modifications to a wholesaler agreement if there is good cause, whereas the MBPA provides stronger protections for wholesalers and does not permit such modifications without the wholesaler’s consent.  Compare ABC Law § 55-c(4)(b) with N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.15(c)(2).  In this case, [...]’s unilateral imposition of a 96% sales restoration requirement, which constituted a material modification of the Agreement, was never accepted by Appellants and therefore violates New Jersey Law.  Under New York law, however, Appellants may conceivably have to comply with such an onerous requirement if [...] purports to have inserted this new term for good cause and in good faith—an issue Appellants fervently dispute.  Moreover, the ABC Law only prohibits mandatory arbitration clauses; brewers and wholesalers are still free to resolve their claims by any means including arbitration, if they chose to do so.  By contrast, N.J.S.A. § 33:1-93.15(e) requires any dispute regarding the terms of the wholesaler agreement and their compliance with the MBPA be “determined by a court of this State.
[brief] So I don’t agree with that as well. ”  (4T, p. 47, line 19, to p. 48, line 9)  Judge’s ruling violated Oct. 2022 Order, par. 2, which I repeatedly cited in Court filings, as well as to [...], since Nov. ’22, that [...] was discharged based on then completing Trust admin duties under 3B:14-7, which requires a discharged Trustee to file a Final Accounting in order to “settle his account”.
[brief] Five years ago, defendant—then forty-two years old—rallied teenagers to issue vigilante justice against eighteen-year-old [...], ultimately resulting in his death.  A jury found defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault and the court sentenced him to a four-year prison term.  Defendant’s last-ditch effort to overturn his conviction recycles the conduct that got him into trouble: a persistent attempt to blame others for his own conspiratorial actions.  But each of his claims are flawed.  First, defendant’s Sixth Amendment self-representation right was not violated because he did not clearly and unequivocally invoke the right, and even if he did, his demonstrated cooperation with his attorney and failure to submit an application constituted a waiver.
[brief] *Id.* at 429-30, 447.  Moreover, “the reasons for imposing either consecutive or concurrent sentences should be separately stated in the sentencing decision[.]”  *Yarbough*, 100 N.J. at 633.  “An explicit statement, explaining the overall fairness of a sentence imposed on a defendant … is essential to a proper Yarbough sentencing assessment. ”  Torres, 246 N.J. at 268; see id. at 274 (holding “age is a fact that can and should be in the matrix of information assessed by a sentencing court, even in the deliberation over whether consecutive sentences are a fair and appropriate punishment – proportional for the individual being sentenced. ”)  The resentencing court’s failure to provide any reasoning regarding its imposition of consecutive sentences, let alone an explanation of the overall fairness of the sentence, requires resentencing.  See Torres, 246 N.J. at 268; Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated, comment 3 on N.J.S.A. 2C:44–5 at 1134 (2012) (“In deciding whether consecutive sentences are appropriate under the Yarbough criteria, an appellate court must consider the reasons the trial court gives; in the absence of expressed reasons a remand is ordinarily necessary.
[directive] Seized Property; Rights of Owners and Others Holding Interests.  a.  No forfeiture under this chapter shall affect the rights of any lessor in the ordinary course of business or any person holding a perfected security interest in property subject to seizure unless it shall appear that such person had knowledge of or consented to any act or omission upon which the right of forfeiture is based.  Such rights are only to the extent of interest in the seized property and at the option of the entity funding the prosecuting agency involved may be extinguished by appropriate payment.  b.  Property seized under this chapter shall not be subject to forfeiture if the owner of the property establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the owner was not involved in or aware of the unlawful activity and that the owner had done all that could reasonably be expected to prevent the proscribed use of the property by an agent.
[brief] IN VIEW OF (1) [...]’S DECADES OF RECALCITRANCE; (2) ADMITTED NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE FIVE-YEAR-OLD MANDATE OF THE JUDGMENT; (3) REFUSAL TO ADVANCE THE OFF-SITE UNITS AGREED UPON BY THE PRIOR ADMINISTRATION; AND (4)  FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT WITH THE SPECIAL MASTER OR FSHC  A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE FOR THE OFF-SITE UNITS, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FOUND A VIOLATION AND GRANTED MOUNT LAUREL II  REMEDIES  (11A, 21A)  Emerson now, years after entry of the Conditional Judgment and despite the parties’ settlement agreement, claims that variances and zoning amendments are required to move forward with the Off-site Units at Block 610, Lot 1, purportedly including lack of ground floor commercial use, lot size, and setback purported requirements, among others.  It further alleges that it purportedly need not even consider any application for variances until the redevelopment plan is amended.  293a.  Emerson’s newly asserted pretextual justifications, concocted to further delay and obstruct [...]’s affordable-housing project, are precisely the kind of local “cost-generating” procedures that the Supreme Court demanded municipalities eliminate, and that the court is empowered to circumvent.  Our courts have long faced municipal recalcitrance over affordable housing and the Supreme Court has conferred wide authority to deter it and bring municipalities into compliance:
[brief] Moreover, the fact that a defendant is subsequently found not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a motor vehicle violation does not impugn the propriety of the initial stop.  *Murphy*, 238 N.J. Super. at 553-54.  And, the subjective intentions of the officer involved “play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis. ”  *Whren v. United States*, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996).
[brief] Defendant argued in the de novo appeal that [...]’s report proved [...] is not potentially dangerous.  However, [...]’s decision mischaracterized Defendant’s argument as taking “issue with” the testing requirement.  Da4.  The Court concluded that reversal was not warranted because the Defendant did not “point to any prejudice” from the temperament test.  To the contrary: the temperament test helped the Defendant because it disproved that [...] poses a serious threat to animals and people.  [...] was “immediately friendly” and darted between [...] and the kennel employee inside his dog run.  When she walked him on a leash through the kennel, he “casually sniffed” small and large dogs and “demonstrated no signs of aggression. ”  [...] exhibited none of the usual signs of kennel stress such as “lunging at other dogs” or “increased reactivity” toward them.  She was “surprised to see how calmly he reacted to the other dogs given the length of his stay. ”  He demonstrated friendly, social behavior toward her “right away” such as “galloping around…and bouncing…in a friendly manner. ”  He allowed handling and gentle restraint.  [...] concluded that [...] “is of sound temperament. ”  She observed:  Despite being kenneled since mid-September, which can be frustrating for dogs, [...] was able to come straight out of his run, meet a stranger, and greet in a friendly manner.  Not all dogs kenneled for a long time retain the ability to greet politely.  Many will become mouthy and pounce on people due to kennel stress.  [...] did not.  This high praise corroborates the Defendant’s unrefuted evidence that [...] is calm and friendly.  Defendant urges the Court to consider the [...] report as relevant evidence that [...] does not pose a serious threat to people or animals.
[brief] ”  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 1:1-1, “words and phrases shall be read and constructed with their context, and shall, unless inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or unless another or different meaning is expressly indicated, be given their generally accepted meaning, according to the approved usage of the language. ”  Additionally, it is well-settled that “[w]hen construing a statute, ‘legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous, or meaningless. ’”  State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 449 (2011) (internal citations omitted).  See also State v. Rangel, 213 N.J. 500, 513 (2013) (citing to Regis for the proposition that “every word is presumed to have import and none to be mere surplusage”).  Indeed, it must be presumed that the Legislature’s usage of the words “exclusive,” “representatives,” and “designate” were intentional and that it can only mean that a designee less than the entire Association must be selected to negotiate on the Association’s behalf.
[brief] ”  Defendant [...], an attorney with decades of experience and self proclaimed-expertise in the solar industry, never told the Planning Board that which he asserted in his deposition as to the term “acquired. ”  Bellin knew that his clients had obtained information about plaintiff [...]’s lease terms by obtaining the information under the pretext of an NDA.  Bellin knew that his clients had persuaded [...] to terminate the antecedent lease with plaintiff and to cease negotiations to sell the land to plaintiffs.  Bellin knew that all that [...] could provide to the Moving Defendants was the lease; but that plaintiffs had previously paid [...] $700,000 more money to purchase the solar rights, which were necessary for the land to be applied for use as a solar farm.  Indeed, Bellin’s letter dated May 9, 2018, was intentionally deceptive to the Planning Board, in that Bellin and his clients clearly intended to say that the solar rights that had been previously purchased by plaintiffs from the land owner, the preliminary and final site plans applied for and obtained by plaintiffs at a great expense and professional efforts, time, and fees; and the information disclosed by plaintiffs in good faith reliance upon the NDA entered into by defendants – by summarily stating “my client has acquired the development rights to the [...] Solar Field.
[brief] PLAINTIFF PROVED HER DAMAGES  Legal malpractice cases of this type are a trial of a case within a case.  E.g., Lieberman v. Employees of Wausau, 84 N.J. 325 (1980).  What happened in the underlying case is admissible and to be considered by the jury which has to decide whether there was malpractice committed by defendants and what damages were caused by that malpractice.
[brief] ...  Our conflict-of-interest rules, however, do not apply to "remote" or "speculative" conflicts because local governments cannot operate effectively if recusals occur based on ascribing to an official a conjured or imagined disqualifying interest.  ...  Requiring recusal when appropriate does not discourage public-spirited citizens from serving on boards.  Dedicated public servants—given proper guidance—will not want to sit in judgment if they are encumbered by a potential conflict.  (citations omitted).  237 N.J. at 352-53.  Plaintiffs disqualifying conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety allegations were neither speculative nor remote.
[directive] 1.  The SAFE kit tracking system shall utilize the agency’s existing evidence tracking system.  Kits shall be tracked from time of collection by the Forensic Nurse Examiner or other health care provider (approved by a partner law enforcement agency) through transfer to any law enforcement agency to maintain chain of custody.  The system shall document the date and time of submission to the forensic laboratory for analysis, the date of return of the kit for ongoing storage, any other releases and returns, and the eventual dates of review for disposition indicating continued hold or date of destruction.