ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **The court should not avoid the issue of statutory interpretation presented in this case, which [...] and [...] agree is a matter of public importance. **  The court should reject the Chiropractors’ invitation to avoid the question of statutory interpretation that the Law Division decided.  If allowed to go uncorrected, the erroneous decision below and the Third Circuit’s *Mount Prospect* decision on the scope of AICRA’s dispute-resolution clause will hobble insurers’ and the State’s abilities to root out and prevent PIP-related insurance fraud.  [...] and [...], neutral expert agencies guided by their missions to protect the public, are unequivocal about the need for this court to clarify New Jersey law on the scope of PIP ADR.  They say in their amicus brief (NJb) that: - the lower court’s decision “will profoundly impact civil and criminal insurance fraud cases, and limit the Department’s [i.e., [...]’s] and the [...]’s ability to protect the public,” NJb3; • “New Jersey’s strong public policy to confront aggressively the problem of insurance fraud would be hampered if insurance companies cannot litigate IFPA and RICO fraud claims in court,” id. at 5; • “[i]nsurance companies — whose role in investigating and bringing actions to enforce against insurance fraud is significant — would become all but unable to use the IFPA to combat the huge problem of fraud in the insurance industry if an in-court forum were not available,” id. at 26; • “shunting IFPA cases to PIP arbitration is to also foreclose an important tool for the Department’s efforts to combat insurance fraud” because [...] can intervene in an IFPA suit but not in PIP ADR, id. at 27; • insurers’ inability to sue in court “hinders an important source of information for [...]’s own criminal investigations” because “most cases investigated by the [...] are the result of referrals from the Special Investigations Units of insurance companies,” id. at 28; • “[a]ny statutory interpretation that limits the relief ensured by the IFPA would have the unintended effect of undermining the purpose of the IFPA while also incentivizing insurance fraud,” id. at 29; and • “[a] decision to send affirmative insurance fraud actions to PIP no-fault dispute resolution proceedings will negatively impact the fight against insurance fraud, and will severely weaken the collective ability of carriers, the Department, and the [...] to combat insurance fraud within the State of New Jersey,” id. at 30.
[brief] In the case at bar, the plaintiffs assert that it is unreasonable and unconstitutional to delegate substantial regulatory authority to an organization controlled by private interest groups especially when there is already a division in an executive department of government that has the authority and the capacity to carry out the general environmental and conservation policies enunciated by the Legislature.  See also *Ridgefield Park Ed. Ass’n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Ed.*, 78 N.J. 144, 163-64 (1978), and cases therein.  These cases hold that in order to be constitutionally sustainable, the delegation of legislative authority to private groups or individuals must be narrowly tailored, reasonable and surrounded with stringent standards to protect against the possibility of arbitrary or self-serving action detrimental to third parties or to the public good in general.  In other words, the Council must be subordinate to the Commissioner of [...] for rule-making purposes, which is not the case under the enabling statutes.  It is submitted that a delegation to a private organization, or to an agency like the Council which is controlled by a private organization such as the [...], requires greater scrutiny as to its constitutional efficacy than a delegation of legislative authority to a governmental agency having only public appointees, the head of which is appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate and thus is accountable to the general electorate.  The substantial independence of the Council, the membership of which is populated by self-interested private persons with a hunting and trapping bias, is antithetical to the distribution of legislative authority among the three branches of government and is an abdication of the legislative authority residing in the Senate and General Assembly.  Consequently, the statutes delegating regulatory authority to the Council are violative of Art. III, Par. 1 and Art. IV, Sec. 1, Par. 1 of the New Jersey Constitution.
[brief] On direct, when asked if he could see the driver of the Suburban as it passed him on Route 18, [...] stated, “No, sir.  The -- the front windows \(^1\)  [...] also testified that the Suburban would not have known it was being followed by an officer until the lights were activated, since [...] was in an unmarked car.  (1T 53-20 to 55-4) were tinted. ”  (1T 9-19 to 21)  The prosecutor confirmed, “so, you couldn’t see the driver because the windows were tinted; is that what you said?
[brief] *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999).  On appeal from a Municipal Court to the Law Division, the review is de novo on the record.  R. 3:23-8(a).  The Law Division judge must make independent findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the evidentiary record of the Municipal Court and must give due regard to the opportunity of the Municipal Court judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses.  *State v. Johnson*, 42 N.J. 146, 157 (1964).  On appeal from a Law Division decision, the issue is whether there is “sufficient credible evidence present in the record” to uphold the findings of the Law Division.  *Id.* at 162.  The Appellate Division “do[es] not weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or make conclusions about the evidence. ”  *State v. Barone*, 147 N.J. 599, 615 (1997).  The reviewing court must “give deference to those findings of the trial judge which are substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the ‘feel’ of the case. ”  *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999); *State v. Cerefice*, 335 N.J. Super. 374, 383 (App. Div. 2000).  “Deference is especially appropriate ‘when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility. ’”  *Cesare v. Cesare*, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998) (citing *In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D.*, 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)).  Moreover, “under the two-court rule,” only “a very obvious and exceptional showing of error” will support setting aside “concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations made by” the Law Division and the Municipal Court.
[brief] At the very first hearing on this matter in September 2017, [...] testified that his intercom had been broken for many years, despite him asking for it to be fixed.  1T78:1-10.  [...], [...]’s principal, was present at this hearing.  At the November 2018 hearing, [...] again testified that the intercom “never got fixed. ”  5T62:10-11.  At the 2018 hearings, the landlord’s --- \(^1\) [...] is [...]’s daughter in law and Comptroller for [...].  She testified on behalf of Julip and [...], and also testified as to knowledge about how condominium association fees work, though in what capacity is not clear.  attorney questioned [...] on whether he has ever “in writing, request work to be done in your apartment, repair work to be done in your apartment, sir?”  [...] replied that he had, “For the intercom. ”  5T66:22-67:9.  Three years later on March 11, 2020 [...] testified that his intercom still had not been fixed.  7T131:12-13.  [...] was present at that hearing.  The next year, in June 2021 [...] testified that his intercom still had not been fixed.  1OT77:4-10.  This drew questioning from the Board and [...] claimed that the intercom was not its responsibility, it was the condominium association’s responsibility.  Id. at 112-113.  Finally, the intercom was fixed on June 22, 2021, the day before the final hearing.  It took ten years, sworn testimony, and criticism from a local government board.
[brief] *Armstrong v. Manzo*, 380, U.S. 45, 550, 85 S. Ct. 1187,1190,14 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1965)  ….  *Matthews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902, 47 L. Ed. 18 (1976)  …”  [...] further continued to state “The Texas courts nevertheless held, as appellee urged them to do, that to have the judgement set aside, appellant would have to show a meritorious defense, apparently on the ground that without a defense, the same judgement would again be entered on retrial and hence appellant had suffered no harm from the judgement entered without notice.
[brief] ”  *Id.* at 626.  Three years later in *Helmsley*, after referencing the various value-based criteria for calculating a just and reasonable return on investment in *Troy Hills*, the Court ultimately upheld an ordinance that allowed rent adjustments tied to inflation but contained no value-based criteria for determining just and reasonable return at all.  In justifying its decision, the Court reasoned that, “a value-based criterion for confiscation under rent control is practically unworkable. ”  *Helmsley* 78 N.J.at 215.  It pointed to the inherent circularity of determining a fair rent based on property value when property value is typically at least partially based on rent.  *Id.* at 213-215.  Ultimately it found inflation adjustments were sufficient to prevent a confiscatory result.  *Id.* at 217.  Although the *amici* do not take a position on whether the [...] is a value-based ordinance (though there is strong evidence that Hoboken’s RCO is not a value-based ordinance and instead bases hardship increases on actual cash investment and/or mortgage interest along with operating expenses, such as insurance, taxes etc.), either [...] or the [...]’s approaches to calculating a hardship rent increase would be viable alternatives to [...]’s.
[brief] According to [...], he saw an African–American man with dreadlocks and wearing a black jacket, later identified as [...], step over a body laying in the doorway of the store.  As he stepped out of the marked police car, he saw that Rodney “backed up a little bit” and began shooting at [...].  [...] then “immediately drew [his] weapon and [ ] discharged a round at him. ”  Rodney continued firing at [...] and thereafter at [...] and [...].  While he was attempting to take cover from the gunfire, [...] saw a second African–American man wearing a dark jacket raise a handgun in [...]'s direction; that individual was later identified as [...].  [...] fired two rounds at Lee, and the second round struck him in the area of his lower torso.  Lee “flipped over himself and fell”; he then got up and started to walk eastbound on Stegman Street.  When the shooting between Rodney and [...] stopped, Rodney ran south on MLK Drive towards Dwight Street while shooting in the officers' direction.  Pursuant to [...]'s instructions, [...] and [...] began to chase Rodney.  From a distance of approximately four to five car lengths, [...] observed Rodney “discard a black object to the ground and then continue walking[.]”  That object was later identified as [...]'s wallet.  [...] also observed Rodney toss a second black object over a fence; [...] went to recover this object while [...] continued chasing Rodney.  Eventually, other officers arrived at the scene and took Rodney into custody.
[brief] While the facts of that case are dissimilar to this case the legal principles espoused in that case are clear and unassailable, especially as it applies to this case.  The principles of collateral estoppel are the underpinnings of the Law of the Case (State v Reldan, 100 N.J. at 209).  Application of the doctrine is controlled by the answer to the question as to whether a party has had his day in Court (McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 38 NJ 156, 161 183A 2d 74 (1962).
[brief] (Da2)  On February 8, 2023, Defendant filed a notice of motion for reconsideration.  (Da17-Da21)  In support of this motion Defendant provided his own personal certification together with his counsel’s previously-submitted certification.  (Da20-Da21)  In his personal certification, Defendant stated his plea counsel “informed me he worked out a plea deal where the judge would run the 10-year loss of license concurrent to any loss of license sentence [he] was currently serving. ”  (Da20)  Once more Defendant provided no support for his alternative argument to vacate his plea.  In a written opinion/order dated February 16, 2023, [...] noted that in filing his motion for reconsideration, Defendant merely supplemented his original motion with his own personal certification.  (Da3)  The Judge found that Defendant’s motion was untimely and failed to provide any new facts or circumstances such that would justify granting him relief.  (Da3)  [...] then denied Defendant’s motion for reconsideration, finding:  [I]f [...]’s ruling is to be read in the manner you are asking this Court to read it, it would have been an illegal sentence.  As our courts have made abundantly clear, an illegal sentence cannot stand.  Consequently, the Court stands by its prior ruling.
[brief] ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).  The second purpose is “to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).  Thus, Congress believed that enforcing --- 3  Note that 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a), the first paragraph in § 1692, is different from 15 U.S.C. § 1692a.  the FDCPA would prevent law-abiding collectors from feeling the need to engage in prohibited practices to remain competitive.  The third purpose, which is not involved here, is “to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses. ”  § 1692(e).  The federal courts’ construction of § 1692c(b) protects against invasions of individual privacy, prevents collection practices which place consumers’ privacy at risk, and ensures that those debt collectors who refrain from using mail vendors are not competitively disadvantaged.  Hence, there is no legitimate argument that the federal courts’ interpretation is inconsistent with the FDCPA overall scheme, frustrates the FDCPA’s purposes, or yields an absurd result.
[brief] Pa2384.  [...] was responsible for the day-to-day operations at the site.  Pa2255.  [...] did not deviate from any standards of care of engineering practice because [...] was not a professional engineer and could not possibly be “doing anything professional engineering. ”  Pa2257.  [...] further testified that the day of the accident the operations that caused the accident was a “non-engineering issue. ”  Pa2257-58.  [...] clarified that the engineering work that was performed by [...] and [...] were to assure that specifications of the contract were met; however, compliance with OSHA and other regulations is not engineering.  Pa2259.  The activities of milling and paving that were happening on site were not engineering issues.  Pa2260.  [...] testified that [...] was likewise not performing professional engineering services as they relate to the administration of construction of the subject project because there was no deviation from plans and specifications which would require the work of a professional engineer.  Pa2264.
[brief] With that said, we also stress that our decision today is not intended to endorse or discourage “open” collective negotiations, as defined by the [...].  But, as further discussed infra, we find that its practice, when carried out in accordance with good faith and within the boundaries of the Act, is not inherently an unfair practice.  However, the parties are cautioned to exercise discretion and good faith in implementing large team meetings, ensuring it does not compromise the effectiveness of the process, and does not otherwise obstruct the process or infringe upon the parties’ rights under the Act.  [50 NJPER 226, 230 (¶50 2023)(Pa231-231). ]  On appeal, the [...] does not show that [...]’s decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, lacking fair support in the evidence, or violative of a legislative policy expressed or implicit in the governing statute.
[brief] [...] even provided a GPS heading to the entrance to the apartment’s parking lot.  [...] had known [...] as “[...]” for around six months and had socialized with \(^{11}\) Supported by recordings of phone conversations between [...] and [...] during the course of the peculiar multi-state caravan — consisting of [...], [...] and three officers in a police vehicle and other officers driving [...]’s vehicle containing the evidence -- that ensued during the next 24-hours.
[brief] Both parties recalled witnesses who testified during the 2017 Trial, called new witnesses, and submitted documentary evidence into the record.  Post-trial briefs were submitted by the parties.  (6T-14T)  On March 29, 2022, the Trial Court found the [...] had granted Plaintiff an enforceable easement which had not been waived, abandoned or otherwise terminated by writing that:  The threshold issue before the Court is the nature of the rights conveyed by the 1963 Agreement.
[brief] Study by attorney: the buyer may choose to have an attorney study this contract.  If an attorney is consulted, the attorney must complete his or her review of the contract within a three-day period.  *This contract will be legally binding at the end of the three-day period subject to the concurrent seven-calendar day rescission period* provided in Section 24 of this contract unless an attorney for the buyer reviews and disapproves of the contract.  (emphasis added).  And even further, following the three-day attorney review period, the contract is put on pause and held in escrow until expiration of the seven-day cancellation period:  Any closing documents you sign before the expiration of the cancellation period will be held in escrow until the cancellation period has expired.  Legal title to the interval may not change until expiration of the seven-calendar day cancellation period.  So after leaving the resort with copies of their Public Offering Statements on CD-ROM, each Plaintiff/Respondent had an additional three days to review the Public Offering Statements with an attorney and an additional seven days to review the Public Offering Statements on their own.  It was not until the end of the three-day attorney review cool off period that the Plaintiff/Respondents contracts became legally binding and therefore fully executed.
[brief] (7T 51-2 to 8)  [...] agreed.  (7T 38-1)  [...] called her that morning at 7:49 and 7:51 to ask if he could come by.  (7T 37-1 to 6)  [...] told him he could, and he arrived five to ten minutes later, carrying an inflatable mattress in a box, which he put in the closet in the living room.
[brief] The actual Notice was in fact overly general and by being overly general it was in fact misleading.  Rockaway Shoprite Assocs., Inc. v. City of Linden, 424 N.J. Super. 337, 347 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting 101A C.J.S.  The Notice simply states, The applicant is seeking a use variance to allow an accessory structure larger than the principle [sic] use on the property, along with any other variances deemed necessary by the Board.
[directive] Certain uniformity. and consistency ensure to safeguards procedural establishes of the Director or the Prosecutor, by Assistant First or Prosecutor County the by approved be while Division, the by prosecuted cases in Director Deputy a or Justice Criminal of Division attorneys prosecutors/deputy assistant supervisory other by made be may decisions other certain Prosecutor/First Specifically, County Director. or Prosecutor County the by designated general may motion detention pretrial before required a approval is Director Assistant/Director/Deputy defendant the where detention (i.e., of presumption a creates Law Reform Bail the unless filed be or imprisonment), of term life extended or ordinary an to subject or murder is with is charged See detention.
[directive] Degree Bail Range 10%  Cash Bail Option a.  Actor operates a motor vehicle while driver’s license is suspended or revoked in this or 3rd Degree $15,000 to $50,000 10% permissible any other state, the District of Columbia or the United States Territories of American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands, or by another country, or without ever having been issued a driver’s license, and is involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death of another person, third degree.  Causing Death or 2C:40-22(a)(b)  Injury while Driving  b.  Actor operates a motor vehicle while driver’s license is suspended or revoked in this or with Suspended 4th Degree  $2,500 to $20,000  10 % permissible any other state, the District of Columbia or the United States Territories of American License or without a Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands, or by another country, or without ever License having been issued a driver’s license, and is involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting in serious bodily injury, fourth degree.  Actor receives income from pattern of racketeering activity, as defined in 2C:41-1, or through 1st Degree 100,000 to 400,000  No 10% 2C:41-2  Racketeering collection of an unlawful debt, and uses or invests income or proceeds to acquire interest in or establish or operate any enterprise which is engaged in activities which affect trade or 81  Updated December 2, 2013