ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The debriefing should include:  a.  A review of department confidentiality guidelines.  -12-  b.  A direct order prohibiting discussion of the incident outside of the official inquiry.  c.  A clear delineation of assignments.  2.  Follow-up investigators will proactively seek out information on existing protective orders and, if found, will enforce them and any applicable state and federal firearms laws and determine whether the officer violated department policy by failing to report the temporary or final restraining order.  3.  Arrest warrants charging law enforcement officers with domestic violence and protective orders issued at a later time should all be served by no fewer than two officers with at least one being of senior rank to the officer being served.  In cases where firearms have not previously been seized, firearms will be seized and decisions about seized weapons shall be made as set forth in the Attorney General’s Guidelines on Police Response Procedures in Domestic Violence Cases
[brief] $500,000 transferred from [...]’s [...] account November 5, 2013 to [...]n account #0319 belonging to the [...].  (26T36:11-22).  - This transaction was not recorded in the company’s QuickBooks until the following year, November 2014, pursuant to an entry of correction made in March 2021 – after the Complaint was filed in this lawsuit.  (Da902; 11T26:7 to 28:12; 13T10:24 to 20:8).  - [...] testified – completely incredibly – that he took the $500,000 pursuant to an agreement with [...], but presented no documentary evidence of any agreement, and admitted that none exists.  (18T74:15 to 76:14).  - [...] testified that he allowed [...] to take the same amount.  (18T92:18 to 93:4).  However, [...] presented no documentary evidence of any such agreement.  When asked about this on cross examination, [...]’s accounting expert, [...], testified that his client had no good explanation for what happened.  (20T54:15 to 55:2).  - [...] took the money in 2013, when [...] was having cash flow problems, and was unable to pay either he or [...] their full salaries.  Meanwhile, unbeknownst to [...], [...] was taking the balance of his salary from a different entity, [...].  (18T107:22 to 108:17).  **Misappropriation #2:**
[brief] On July 30, 2018, a Monmouth County Grand Jury handed down [...], charging defendant, [...], with first-degree murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a) and/or (2) – with a sentencing enhancer (Count One); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (Count Two); two counts of second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (handgun) without a permit (Counts Three and Four); and two counts of third-degree endangering another person, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:27-7.1 (Count Five and Six).  On September 27, 2021, trial commenced before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. and a jury.  (3T; 4T; 5T; 6T; 7T; 8T; 9T; 10T).  On October 12, 2021, the jury returned a unanimous verdict, convicting defendant on every charge within the indictment.
[brief] Nonetheless, [...] was asked at his deposition to assume this policy existed and questions were posed based on this (unproven) assumption.  Even so, [...] indicated that hospitals can have normal operating rules and procedures, but he further stated what is obvious in law and medicine:  “But the standard of care is not dictated by the policies and the procedures of any given hospital. ”  [Pa221, Luciani Dep., 19:16-18].  [...] explicitly faulted [...] for not calling the C-section, given the emergency, contrary to the Court’s findings and Respondents’ briefing.
[brief] IV.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED COUNT SIX OF THE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT  SEEKING DEED REFORMATION.  The Trial Court correctly dismissed Count Six of the Plaintiff’s Complaint seeking deed reformation, clearly stating “I’m not reforming the deed because I don’t think it needs to be reformed. ”  See T1 page 18, lines 5-14.  The Trial Court noted the Plaintiff was “standing on its rights for 35 years (See T1 page 18, line 5) and concluded as a matter of equity, all parties “understood what the process was and they understood who owned what and what was conveyed.  So I don’t find that reformation is appropriate here. ”  See T1 at page 18, lines 5-14.  Plaintiff was represented by counsel, retained a title agency who insured title to Unit 74 and has no basis for reformation relief as marketable title to Unit 74 was deeded to the Association as specifically contemplated in the 1983 Master Deed.
[brief] The Federal Civil Rights Act provides that:  “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress…”  [Id. (Emphasis added). ]6  As to Defendants’ substantive due process violations, we note above how the development application process is supposed to work under the MILUL.  A developer files an application, and an independent quasi-judicial zoning board adjudicates it.
[brief] Despite the existence of the two structures for attorney discipline, and without any record support, Defendants are left with nothing but a bald conclusion that Plaintiffs’ argument “belie common sense. ”  [Db25.]  This is not so.  Absent a substantive argument that “bar complaint” stands on its own within the New Jersey attorney discipline system and means something other than disciplinary proceeding there is at least an ambiguity that must be construed against Defendants.
[brief] *Id.* at 474.  In *Sigafoos*, Petitioner had suffered from a back condition over a period of years before the accident.  *Id.* at 471.  The Board found that Petitioner was totally and permanently disabled; that he was physically incapacitated for the performance of his usual duty, and that there were no other available duties in the department.  Ibid.  However, the Board also found that 'Petitioner's permanent and total disability resulted from a musculo-skeletal condition which was not a direct result of a traumatic event occurring in the performance of duty.'  Ibid.  The Appellate Division reversed and found that, despite previous issues with a back condition, Petitioner injured his back when he was subjected to an unusual and unanticipated stress and was permanently and totally disabled as a result.  Id. at 473-474.  Citing Cattani, the Court held that petitioner's disability 'directly resulted from the combined effect of a traumatic event and a pre-existing disease' and as such, he was entitled to an Accidental Disability retirement allowance under N.J.S.A. 43:16A—7.  Sigafoos at 474.  In the case at bar, [...] meticulously addressed each issue in [...]’s life and methodically explained why none impacted his opinion that [...] was totally and permanently disabled causally related to the critical incident of October 17, 2015.
[brief] ”  255 N.J. at 12.  In this case, by contrast, [...] did not even appraise the jury of the specific length of the pink lines on the maps.  He simply answered “no” when the prosecutor asked if “in general, will a phone that is several miles away?” (12T171-25 to 171-1).  He stated that in Trenton, “[i]t's going to be consistent -- especially in more of an urban area, it is going to be a close tower. ” (12T172-3 to 6).  And in Willingboro, “Roughly, the same thing.  It could be a little bit further.  Willingboro is not as urban, but I know, based on my training and experience, that Willingboro has several towers throughout the different park areas that Willingboro is made up of. ” (12T172-7 to 8-12).  As such, these extremely rough estimates of the cell towers’ coverage areas were based on nothing more than [...]’s training and experience.  As in Burney, that was insufficient.  [...] did not consider any of the factors that could affect the coverage area or perform any tests to measure the specific coverage areas of the towers.  See Burney, 255 N.J. at 13, 24-25 (discussing factors and tests).  Thus, as in Burney, the testimony was “an improper net opinion because it was unsupported by factual evidence or other data,” and “the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear this testimony.
[brief] Saldana involved inter-alia claims for the destruction of property as the result of a fire by unauthorized persons that occurred in abandoned buildings owned by the [...].  Saldana, 275 N.J. Super. at 491-492.  The Saldana Court, once again just as the later Courts in Roe and Foster, affirmed that in New Jersey a “dangerous condition” as defined in the Tort Claims Act “refer[s] to the ‘physical condition of the property itself and not to activities on the property. ’”  Id. at 502 (citing Sharra, 199 N.J. Super. at 540 and Levin, 133 N.J. at 44) (emphasis added).  The Saldana Court continued:  Consequently, in Speaks, foreseeability of risk existed in combination with a defective or dangerous condition of property; in Levin, there was only foreseeability of risk.  In the former situation liability of the public entity attaches, in the latter situation it does not.  Id. at 503 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  With this in mind the Saldana Court ultimately determined that [...] clearly had knowledge that the vacant buildings were in a dangerous condition; this is evidenced by [...]’s own building inspection report with regard to the building adjacent to several of the plaintiffs’ properties.  That report reads “STRUCTURE A HAZARD TO THE PUBLIC-DEMOLISH”…  This known hazardous condition of the buildings combined with the foreseeable misconduct of third parties starting fires therein would be sufficient to satisfy the “dangerous condition” element of N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.  Id. at 503.  Thus, the Saldana Court determined that the combination of a defect of public property (i.e., hazardous, abandoned buildings that needed to be demolished) and the acts of third parties (i.e., unauthorized persons setting fires) was sufficient for a “dangerous condition” as is the law in New Jersey.  Unlike in Foster, Roe and Saldana, Plaintiff herein does not even plead a defect in the public property at issue.
[brief] Relator has similarly argued that its action is not “based upon” the publicly disclosed transactions because the raw data did not identify alleged wrongdoers without needing to “comb through myriad transactions. ”  In re Nat. Gas Royalties, 562 F.3d 1032, 1042 (10th Cir. 2009).  This dicta from Natural Gas Royalties (which actually affirmed dismissal on public disclosure bar grounds, id. at 1037), does not mean that the public disclosure bar cannot apply whenever “myriad transactions” are involved—which would contradict the overwhelming weight of federal precedent, including Springfield Terminal.
[directive] Eso significa que:  You are pleading to a Graves Act offense.  This means:  A.  (1)  Se declara culpable de la posesión de un arma de fuego con la intención de usarla contra otra persona, o de homicidio, homicidio impremeditado con agravantes, homicidio impremeditado, agresión con agravantes, rapto, agresión sexual con agravantes, abuso deshonesto con agravantes, robo, allanamiento con fines delictivos, o fuga; o (1)
[brief] (10T 16-19 to 16-23; 10T 21-14 to 21-24; 10T 146-14 to 146-24; 10T 150-6 to 150-16)  When asked about [...]’s clothing, [...] claimed that [...] changed in the backseat “[t]o cover up what just happened” (10T 50-17 to 51-20), and that [...] was in the car when [...] changed clothes.
[directive] For example, if background checks consistently disqualify an underrepresented group due to prior financial issues such as bad credit history or bankruptcy, consider whether a mechanism for waiving the requirement in appropriate cases is warranted.  5.  Assessing what the barriers are to applications by underrepresented groups and devising solutions to overcome those barriers.  For example, underrepresented groups may not submit applications because the process is online and potential applicants do not have ready access to resources to complete the application.  In such a case, the Program might seek to address the problem by using mobile units equipped with computers to allow onsite applications.  6.  Connecting with community stakeholders for underrepresented groups in order to better understand the factors affecting those groups in the application process.  7.  Establishing mentorship programs for applicants from underrepresented groups that provide support for resume review and physical training requirement preparation, as well as mentorship for current officers seeking promotion.  In civil service jurisdictions particularly, working with the CSC’s mentoring program for applicants pursuant to P.L.2021, c.235.  5
[brief] Indeed, the assessment of a defendant’s risk of recidivism, prior criminal history, and need for deterrence (aggravating factors three, six, and nine, respectively) “is a qualitative assessment that we want and expect the court to make. ”  State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 153 (2006).  A court's findings assessing the seriousness of a criminal record, the predictive assessment of chances of recidivism, and the need to deter the defendant and others from criminal activity, do all relate to recidivism, but also involve determinations that go beyond the simple finding of a criminal history and include an evaluation and judgment about the individual in light of his or her history.
[brief] At the time of the accident, a road widening project was ongoing, with multiple construction and engineering contractors on site.  None of the eyewitnesses to the event, including Plaintiff, were able to identify a dangerous condition in the roadway that caused Plaintiff’s motorcycle to lose control.  Plaintiff’s expert, [...], PE speculated that an elevation change resulted in the accident despite no other accidents having occurred in the area and no prior complaints having been submitted to the Authority.  Plaintiff’s expert did not conduct an examination of the roadway, the motorcycle, nor did he perform any tests to reconstruct the accident.  The trial court found for the Authority on summary judgment and determined that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the elements of a cause of action under the New Jersey Tort Claim Act, N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.
[brief] The lower court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law on these issues are properly articulated in the applicable orders and on the record.  As such, [...] fully complied with Rule 1:7-4(a) when denying Tenant’s frivolous defenses and remand for further findings on these issues is not warranted.  Moreover, Landlord’s refusal to apply these unearned reimbursements as an “offset” against the Rent Arrears does not constitute a failure to mitigate damages.  In fact, this argument should be disregarded out of hand because it was not raised in the Underlying Action.  Furthermore, despite Tenant’s contentions to the contrary, [...] did not hold that the Landlord-Tenant Division lacked jurisdiction to rule on Tenant’s offset defense.  Rather, the lower court properly considered, and expressly rejected, this purported defense.  Moreover, even if Tenant was somehow able to rewrite the Lease to reinstate these unearned reimbursement payments (it cannot), Tenant’s appeal is nonetheless moot because the Rent Arrears were paid to Landlord in December 2023.  Therefore, even if this Court were to remand the Underlying Action, as Tenant requests, the lower court (i.e. the Landlord-Tenant Division) lacks jurisdiction to issue the money judgment Tenant seeks.  Simply put, [...]’s rejection of Tenant’s offset defense was a well-reasoned decision in accordance with the express terms of the Lease and long standing New Jersey law.
[brief] If neither side requests a lesser-included charge, the court nonetheless “has an independent obligation to instruct on lesser-included charges when the facts adduced at trial clearly indicate that a jury could convict on the lesser while acquitting on the greater offense. ”  *State v. Thomas*, 187 N.J. 119, 132 (2006) (citing *State v. Jenkins*, 178 N.J. 347, 361 (2004)).
[brief] Extensive policy shifts of this magnitude should not be initiated by an intermediate appellate court.  The appropriate tribunal to accomplish such drastic changes is either the Supreme Court or the Legislature. ”); *Shaw*, 460 N.J. Super. at 629 ([...], concurring) (recognizing the scope of the learned and semi-professional exemption “may well present a suitable opportunity for the [Supreme] Court to provide helpful updated guidance” and that “nothing in this opinion prevents the Legislature from adopting amendments that clarify the statutory scheme. ”).  The trial court correctly recognized that *Plemmons*, 387 N.J. Super. 551, is dispositive of the issue presented here.
[brief] (8T 12-6 to 12)  Officers found that Chevrolet parked at [...].  (11T 90-6)  They conducted surveillance on the Chevrolet, during which time they saw [...] and [...] enter a store, then go to [...], then approach the car.  (9T 117-7 to 120-4)  Both men were stopped and taken into custody.  (9T 120-8)  [...] gave a statement after his arrest, which was played for the jury.
[brief] PLAINTIFF PROPERLY ASSERTED AND SUPPORTED A WAGE LOSS CLAIM UNDER THE RULES OF COURT.  PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY REGARDING A RETURN TO TREATMENT  CONSTITUTED  A MINOR ERROR THAT WAS IMMEDIATELY AND FULLY ADDRESSED BY THE TRIAL COURT, AND AFTERWARD, WAS NEVER AGAIN BROUGHT UP BY DEFENSE COUNSEL.  NEITHER OF THESE ASPECTS OF THE TRIAL HAD A PREJUDICIAL EFFECT ON THE JURY, AND CERTAINLY NOT A COMPOUNDING ONE, AS THERE WAS NO PRIOR PREJUDICE TO COMPOUND.
[brief] [...]:  Second, the MOU has nothing in it about a big box store.  It has nothing in it about when they are going to apply for residential.  There is no deadline to apply for residential.  Indeed, [...] confirmed that he has no intention of pursuing residential zoning: “I am going for the as-of-right big box store. ”  1T32-2.  Ultimately, the Court determined that the MOU was enforceable and that the parties should, in good faith, negotiate a sales agreement consistent with the MOU.
[brief] In 1990, Congress amended the ADEA by way of the OWBPA.  *Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc.*, 522 U.S. 422, 426 (1998).  The OWBPA “imposes specific requirements for releases covering ADEA claims. ”  *Id.* at 424.  Essentially, the OWBPA imposes, among other mandates, requirements for valid waivers of ADEA rights and claims to ensure that “older workers are not coerced or manipulated into waiving their rights to seek legal relief under the ADEA. ”  *Long v. Sears Roebuck & Co.*, 105 F.3d 1529, 1534 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[a]n employee ‘may not waive’ an ADEA claim unless the waiver or release satisfies the OWBPA’s requirements. ”  *Oubre*, 522 U.S. a 426-27.  As the Supreme Court also made clear, however, the OWBPA sets up its own regime for assessing the effect of ADEA waivers, separate and apart from contract law.  The statute creates a series of prerequisites for knowing and voluntary waivers and imposes affirmative duties of disclosure and waiting periods.  The OWBPA governs the effect under federal law of waivers or releases on (stating that appellate court generally need not address issues not properly presented to the trial court).  ADEA claims and incorporates no exceptions or qualifications.  The text of the OWBPA forecloses the employer’s defense, notwithstanding how general contract principles would apply to non-ADEA claims.  [Oubre, 522 U.S. at 427 (emphasis added). ]  In Oubre, because the Court found a contractual release of ADEA claims failed to comply with the waiver requirements of the OWBPA, the release was “unenforceable against [the employee] insofar as it purports to waive or release her ADEA claim” and could not “bar [the employee’s] ADEA suit, irrespective of the validity of the contract as to other claims.
[brief] the issue of defendant’s breach of duty would be two-fold: (1) whether the danger was due to a failure to exercise due care or (2) if it was a danger which due care would not have avoided, nonetheless would due care require notice or warning to the decedent.  Decedent’s appreciation of the danger would be pertinent as to (2), for there would be no need to inform one of a danger he already knows.  On the other hand, **if the danger was created by defendant’s breach of duty, that negligence would not be dissipated merely because the deceased knew of it.**  Negligence would remain, but such knowledge would take us to the question of contributory negligence, **and the deceased would not be barred on that account simply because he knew of the hazard. **  Rather the issue would be whether the deceased acted as a reasonably prudent man in view of a known risk.  *Id.* at 275 (emphasis added).
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................7  LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................................12  POINT I THE PCR COURT ERRED IN ITS VIEW OF DEFENDANT’S APPLICATION.  ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT’S INITIAL PRO SE APPLICATION WAS COUCHED IN TERMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF PLEA COUNSEL, ASSIGNED  PCR COUNSEL ABANDONED THAT APPROACH AND INSTEAD ARGUED THAT DEFENDANT WAS INITIALLY THE RECIPIENT OF AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h), WHICH IN TURN RESULTED IN DEFENDANT BEING SUBJECT TO AN ILLEGAL EXTENDED TERM SENTENCE UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a).  AT THIS TIME THE ILLEGAL SENTENCES IMPOSED ON BOTH INDICTMENTS MUST BE VACATED AND THE MATTER REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ Negligence Based Claims Fail for Lack of Proper Notice**  All claims for negligence on the part of the [...] must fail as they are considered “tort claims” under the Tort Claims Act (“The Act”).  N.J.S.A. § 59:2-2.  Under the Act, plaintiffs must provide notice to the municipality within 90 days of injury.  Injury is defined as “death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property or any other injury that a person may suffer that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person.
[brief] 12  On June 30, 2022, based on its findings, the trial court entered judgment for the Plaintiffs’ on counts 5 and 6 (conversion), 7 and 8 (breach of contract), 11 (breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing), and 12 and 13 (unjust enrichment) of the Amended Complaint in the total amount of $2,882,244.85, jointly and severally against each of the defendants—an amount equal to half of the misappropriated funds.