ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See Model Civil Jury Charge § 5.10H(B) (instructing that an employer is vicariously liable for an employee’s negligence while acting within the scope of their duties); see also Carter v. Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402, 408 (2003).  Plaintiffs overlook the fact that the jury determined that [...] was acting outside the scope of employment.  This was the threshold question that the jury was directed to answer before determining liability.  [Pa71].  Therefore, any error in instructing the jury on respondeat superior was harmless, because the jury never reached that question.
[brief] **STATEMENT OF FACTS**  A.  **Plaintiffs Represent Clients In The State of New Jersey In Debt Settlement Matters. **  [...] is a law firm that represents clients throughout the State and other states who require legal services in numerous practice areas, including but not limited to, litigation defense and debt settlement.  Pa0008, ¶11.  [...] -- a member of [...] -- is an attorney licensed to practice law in this State who provides legal services to individuals and businesses in various areas of the law, including bankruptcy and New Jersey debtor/creditor matters for [...] clients.  Pa0008, ¶12.  Defendants enforce the Act, promulgate regulations and institute summary actions against any parties they believe to be in violation of the Act.  Pa0009, ¶¶15-16; N.J.S.A. 17:16G-8.  B.  The Legislature Enacts And Amends A Statute Governing Debt Adjustment Services.  In 1961, the Legislature enacted a predecessor statute, the Debt Adjusters Law, “to bar debt adjusters from transacting business in this State. ”  American Budget Corp. v. Furman, 67 N.J. Super. 134, 137 (Ch. Div.), aff’d, 36 N.J. 129 (1961).  Under the Debt Adjusters Law, “any attorney-at-law of this State” was exempt from the statute.  Id. at 137 (emphasis added).  In 1979, the Legislature revisited this issue and enacted the Act, which lifted the outright ban on “debt adjustment” and permitted certain nonprofit entities to act as debt adjusters.
[brief] The doctrine of tacking may be employed when there is successive adverse possessions of land where there is privity between the prior owner and present owner of the land.  O’Keefe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 503 (1980).  Adverse possession is a process of acquiring title by possessing property in a specified manner for a statutory time period.  Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 124 N.J. 570, 574 ((N.J. 1991).
[brief] Although the bar is low, it is a bar nonetheless, and the State must provide evidence to support the reasonableness of the suspicion that led to the stop, that can be tested through the adversarial process.  ...  The defense did have the opportunity to challenge the trooper’s testimony.  As the Court indicated, there are certainly differences based on the trooper’s testimony and the evidence that is clearly visible in the motor vehicle recording.  The trooper did testify that there is a better view of things with the natural eye, as compared to trying to discern what one is seeing on an MVR.  At least that’s -- in the experience that he testified that he’s been through himself.  The Court finds that to be a credible statement.  That sitting there, when you’re looking at something and the vertical height that you’re looking at is from ground up, maybe easily 10 feet before you get to the top of the vegetation that was there.  It’s easier to see through that vegetation with the natural eye than it is on the 3 or 4 inch screen on the MVR recording one [sic] ones computer screen.  But I let -- as I indicated, even on the computer screen, the Court was able to see the vehicle continuing to move as it approached where the two roads intersected, and then continue to make the right hand turn from 517 onto 206 without coming to a stop.  So the Court is satisfied that the trooper’s recollection as it relates to the vehicle not stopping, as well as what can be seen in -- in the MVR, meets the low threshold as described in Atwood for the Court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that there is reasonable and articulable suspicion for the stop to have taken place.
[brief] Some molds are capable of producing mycotoxins, which are chemical substances that molds produce to compete with other organisms.  Many molds do not produce mycotoxins.  2T24-19 to 2T25-6.  For example, Stachybotrys is a genus of mold and one of its species, Stachybotrys Chartarum, is capable of producing the mycotoxin trichothecene.  Other species of Stachybotrys, however, do not produce mycotoxins.  2T29-5 to 2T31-6.  Like mold, people are regularly exposed to mycotoxins by inhalation and, separately, by ingestion of foods contaminated by mycotoxins in the food supply.
[brief] Plaintiffs’ assertion that “[a]n unsigned typed statement of ‘certification’ does not comply with the statute” (Pb13) is unsupported and cannot be credited.  Plaintiffs’ citation to Celino v. General Accident Ins., 211 N.J. Super. 538 (App. Div. 1986), a case in which the carrier was entirely unable to produce a duplicate copy of the cancellation notice, neither stands for this proposition nor presents an analogous situation.
[brief] (5T76:24-77:1).  This caused a huge argument between the pair, particularly given [...]’s firm stance on illicit substance use and his status on pretrial release.  (5T77:5-7; 5T79:4).  [...] responded to [...]’s frustration by issuing an ultimatum, if he did not like it, he could leave.  (5T79:17-18).  Despite not having a vehicle, [...] chose to move back to his New Brunswick studio apartment.
[brief] Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claims are not time-barred.  Similarly, Plaintiff’s claims are not time-barred under the TCA.  Plaintiff filed her Notice of Tort Claim on May 31, 2019.  Although the TCA does require pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-8 that the Notice of Tort Claim must be filed within ninety (90) days, a claimant may file the Notice of Tort Claim up to one (1) year after accrual of the claim.  At the time that Plaintiff filed her Notice of Tort Claim she was unrepresented.  Although she did not set forth in a Certification at that time reasons constituting extraordinary circumstances, the Defendant suffered no prejudice from the Defendant’s failure to do submit the appropriate motion.  At the time, Plaintiff had already advised the Defendant of the issues and the Defendant was aware that the issues needed to be resolved.  Plaintiff has also testified that she had communications with the Defendant about replacing the swimming pool.  Therefore, the failure of the Plaintiff to set forth extraordinary circumstances is of no moment.  The Purpose of the Notice of Tort Claim is to allow the public entity the opportunity to investigate the claim prior to filing suit.  Here, the [...] knew of the claim prior to the Notice of Tort Claim and had the ability to resolve it.  It must also be noted that although the Plaintiff first learned of the extent of the damage to the swimming pool in June 2018, there were discussions, according to Plaintiff, between the parties from June 2018 to May 2019 regarding resolving the swimming pool issue.  Therefore, once she discovered in May 2019 that she was required to file a Notice of Tort Claim because the defendant was not going to replace the swimming pool, Plaintiff immediately filed the Notice of Tort Claim.  POINT II
[brief] The Equities Do Not Favor [...] Over [...], Nor Do They Compel Reformation as the Appropriate Remedy (719a-7201a)  The trial court viewed this case as “correcting an error,” but the real question is whether the error must be corrected by taking [...]’s land and giving it to [...].  It was [...] and [...] who arranged the subdivision and accepted the measurements, long before [...] became involved.  116a-173a.  If [...] now feels he did not get what he bargained for from [...], he may take action against [...] for damages, or against the professionals who failed to notice such a “clear and obvious” error.  The trial court also seemed to believe it was a matter of “equity” that [...] be able to obtain 1.3’ so he could create his subdivision.  But the benefit of an additional 1.3’ to [...] is no greater “equitably” than the detriment to [...] of losing 1.3’ of land.  The “error” arose in the context of [...]s’ objection to [...]’s zoning application to subdivide Lot 3.  [...] did not want the beach block four lots instead of three.  601a-602a.  [...] and [...] settled the objection by creating a new subdivision, including a new, 66.3’ wide Lot 3.  [...] also wants to have only 3 houses on his block, and has an even greater reason to object, since [...]’s subdivision will make [...] the fourth house from the beach instead of the third, impacting his property value and view of the ocean.  [...] understands that if his lot stays at 66.3’, he will be more likely to remain the third house from the beach, and wants to keep his land.  This is his right as a landowner.  He does not believe [...] should be able to take his land simply because [...] wants to have enough land to subdivide.  The parties are in the same place “equitably,” it is just that [...] paid [...] for something he MAY not get.  This is not a reason to take [...]’s land and reform five recorded documents.  [...] still owns a perfectly fine, newly-constructed beach house and his lot.  It is, of course, an oversized lot, and if a nice house on an oversized lot is worth less than a nice house on a smaller lot plus a vacant lot, then his damage claim against [...] (or the professionals who made the error) is clearly calculated.  Even without reformation, the [...]s are not left without a remedy or means to obtain a subdivision.  They may still apply for a variance to subdivide their lot or obtain 1.3’ of land from the oceanward, oversized Lot 1.  The [...] family is the least culpable party in this scenario.  They have no obligation to make themselves the fourth home from the beach instead of the third house in order to correct someone else’s error, and there is no reason they should be forced to give a portion of their land to [...].  They are bona fide purchasers without notice and are entitled to judgement as a matter of law.  V.
[directive] Note that while sentencing courts are permitted to consider prior arrests that did not result in convictions, these Guidelines as a matter of policy and convenience make no provision to award criminal history points for arrests that did not result in a conviction or an adjudication of delinquency.  8.3  Effect of Remote Prior Convictions  For the purposes of calculating criminal history points, a prosecutor shall not award points based upon prior convictions or adjudications of delinquency that have been expunged; nor shall convictions or adjudications of delinquency be counted if ten or more years has passed since the sentence or disposition was imposed, or since the defendant was released from confinement, whichever is later, provided that the defendant was not subsequently convicted of an offense.
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[brief] ### Cases  **Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,** 121 N.J. 69 (1990) .................................................................  7  **Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing,** 765 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2014) ......................................................  8  **Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,** 545 U.S. 546 (2005) ..................................................................  11  **FCC v. FCC (In re MCP),** --- F.4th ---, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 11 (6th Cir. Jan. 2, 2025) ...............  10  **Feil v. Senisi,** 7 N.J. Super. 517 (Law Div. 1950) ............................................. 12  **Galloway v. United States,** 492 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2007) ......................................................  11  **Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs.,** 17 F.4th 1016 (11th Cir. 2021) ....................................................  6  **Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs.,** 994 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2021).  ...................................................  6  **Khimmat v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co, LPA,** 585 F. Supp. 3d 707 (E.D. Pa. 2022) .............................................  9  **Mhrez v. First National Collection Bureau, Inc.,** Docket No. [...] (June 9, 2023) ..................................  2  **Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,** 116 N.J. 739 (1989) ..................................................................  12  **Rappeport v. Flitcroft,** 90 N.J. Super. 578 (App. Div. 1966) ..........................................  12  **Romine v. Diversified Collection Servs.,**  155 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 1998)  .....................................................  5  ### Statutes and Regulations
[brief] To the extent an error was made, the State submits it did not rise to the level of plain error.  First, the jury heard extensive testimony from defendant when he took the stand and testified on his own behalf.  (23T; 24T).  Defendant testified to why he left the crime scene after shooting the gun in self-defense and to his continuing fear during the days that followed.  The jury also heard the lengthy summation from defense counsel, (25T91-13 to 25T200-23; 26T201-1 to 26T214-13), which touched upon not only the issue of self-defense, but also defendant not realizing anyone was shot until days after the event, how people were out looking for him and how he eventually turned himself in to the police.  (26T213-16 to 24).  Defendant’s defense was justification or self-defense for the shooting.  Thus, to the extent that the jury was not instructed that if it credited defendant’s explanation for his flight it could not draw any inference of guilt from it, the omission was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result.  The jury knew from defendant’s testimony and the arguments of counsel that defendant’s actions both during and after the crimes were spurred by his claim of fear.  Secondly, the trial court’s instruction made it clear that whether defendant fled as a consciousness of guilt was a question of fact for it to determine.  The charge was neutral in that it did not outline the State’s arguments in support of flight as a consciousness of guilt.  The issue was left for the jury to decide.  Defendant’s claim of plain error should be rejected.
[brief] (Pa1274).  Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) requires:  "Each party shall disclose in the certification the names of any non-party who should be joined in the action… because of potential liability to any party on the basis of the same transactional facts".  This is a continuing obligation to disclose.  Ibid.  It is not up to the parties to determine the necessity for joinder.  Rather, this is within the court's discretion to compel joinder.  It is abundantly clear, as the Trial Court pointed out, that the Complaint in the Instant Action alleges the same factual basis presented in the Complaint in the Lease Litigation often sharing the same language.  (T14:7-10)(Pa0001)(Pa0015)(Pa0957).  In fact the Trial Court correctly described the two actions and the damages asserted in both the Lease Litigation and the Instant Action as "overlapping".  (T14:7-17).  In addition, the Settlement Agreement in the Lease Litigation contains the provision which states: "claim for malpractice against Plaintiff’s former counsel attorney [...] in connection with the transaction which is the subject of the [Lease Litigation]."  (Pa1274).  By including this language "in connection with the transaction" in the provision to describe the relationship between Defendants' alleged malpractice and the Lease Litigation, Plaintiff recognized the strong connection between the two actions.  The Trial Court correctly found that Defendants should have been joined because the claims in the Lease Litigation and the Instant Action arise from related facts or the same transaction and any alleged malpractice claims were transactional in nature and accrued before the prior litigation.  (T19-21).  In addition, the Trial Court recognized that Plaintiff alleged he had already suffered damages when he discovered his attorney's alleged negligence.  (T15).  In fact, the Trial Court listed the alleged identical damages pled in both actions namely: the funds advanced pursuant to the lease for security and first month of rent, engineering fees, architect's fees, cleanup and maintenance cost for the building and grounds, and the fees paid to [...].  (T14:16-25,T15:1-6,T24:1-13)(Pa0001)(Pa0015)(Pa0957).  The Trial Court's findings are in line with the requirements under the Court Rules.  Plaintiff was required to identify Defendants so as to ensure that the legal controversy were to occur in one litigation, in one court, with all parties.  Instead, Plaintiff made a strategic decision to pursue Defendants in a second forum for a second bite at the apple, causing piecemeal litigation to the prejudice of Defendants.  Accordingly, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Plaintiff's disregard of its obligation to name Defendants in the Lease Litigation pursuant to Rule 4:5-1 should warrant dismissal.
[brief] 2  Only after first reaching this conclusion does the Tyler decision go on to “also conclude that under the unique facts of this case, [...]'s opinions were inadmissible because they amounted to an impermissible comment on Tyler's credibility. ”  Id. at 165.  This was not the sole basis of its decision or the primary focus of its extensive discussion of the errors in admitting the medical examiner’s testimony.  By claiming that he could conclude from these facts that death was a homicide “within a reasonable degree of medical certainty,” [...] went beyond his expertise and invaded the jury’s province to assess facts within their direct ken.
[directive] (1)  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of [Yes] [No] [NA] aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4a, endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(3), endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(i) or (ii) (if the offense was committed on or after February 1, 2018), luring or an attempt to commit any of these offenses and the offense occurred on or after January 14, 2004, or violating a condition of a special sentence of community supervision for life if the violation occurred on or after July 1, 2014 the court, in addition to any other sentence, will impose a special sentence of parole supervision for life?
[brief] For these similar reasons, this Court should likewise reverse the trial court’s second August 26, 2022, Order dismissing [...] with prejudice, on the basis that the Appellant timely filed an AOM against [...].  2.  [...]’s Implication in the Affidavit of Merit  Also for similar reasons why [...]’s negligence was implicated by [...]’s AOM despite the lack of explicitly mentioning his name, [...]’s negligence was also implicated by the AOM.  Any argument that [...]’s negligence was not implicated will be without merit in light of the numerous medical records showing his treatment of the Appellant.  Vol. 002, 17a-32a.  [...]’s AOM implicated the pre- and post-operative treatment of the Appellant.  [...] clearly played a part in her post-operative treatment based on the records.  Id.  Therefore, despite the lack of explicitly mentioning [...] in the AOM, it still clearly implicates his conduct.
[brief] In light of the record, it is absurd for [...] to argue that this decision was reached arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably.  As explained above, “[w]here there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary where it is exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been reached. ”  Bayshore, supra, 122 N.J. Super. at 189.
[brief] The Court may also affirm the judgment below on grounds that the trial court did not reach but that the [...] raised below (raised below at T59:23-60:11).  Finally, the Court should affirm the judgment below based on three issues briefed below that the trial court did not reach.  First, plaintiff’s claim for nuisance fails because he did not show how the [...] made an unreasonable use of their property by repaving their driveway and replacing the old railroad ties lining their driveway with Belgian block.  Second, collateral estoppel and res judicata bar this action because plaintiff litigated claims against the prior owners of the [...]’ property for damage caused by water runoff, and he may not use this suit to relitigate those claims.  Third, plaintiff’s failure to apportion his alleged property damage between the preexisting water runoff and any increase in water runoff that the [...] allegedly caused is fatal to this action.  The fact that the trial court did not need to address those issues does not prevent this Court from ruling on them.  Cortes v. Gindhart, 435 N.J. Super. 589, 597-98 (App. Div. 2014).  A.
[brief] Merin v. Maglaki, 126 N.J. 430, 436 (1992).  In furtherance of that goal, the IFPA authorizes a private right of action in the Superior Court for an insurance company damaged as a result of any violation.  An insurance company filing suit under the IFPA may recover compensatory damages, including costs of investigation, costs of suit and attorneys’ fees.  An insurance company also may be entitled to an award of treble damages, where a pattern of fraud is established.  The IFPA further authorizes the Commissioner to intervene in any case brought by an insurance company alleging a violation of the IFPA.  By contrast, the AICRA’s PIP no-fault dispute resolution proceedings are designed to only handle simple disputes over individual PIP claims between insured parties and insurance companies, such as disagreements over the amount or legitimacy of medical expenses and related costs.