ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Furthermore, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-107 grants the Attorney General broad authority to supersede in any investigation, criminal action or proceeding, which includes internal affairs investigations and disciplinary proceedings.  Therefore, whenever the Attorney General determines that it would be appropriate to do so, the Attorney General, or his or her designee, may: (a) supersede a county prosecutor or other law enforcement agency in any investigation, criminal action or proceeding; (b) participate in any investigation, criminal action or proceeding; or (c) initiate any investigation, criminal action or proceeding.  This statutory authority applies fully to any and all aspects of the internal affairs process, and nothing in the IAPP is intended to limit or circumscribe the Attorney General’s statutory authority.  The Attorney General may supersede and take control of an entire law enforcement agency, may supersede in a more limited capacity and take control of the internal affairs function of an agency, or may supersede and take control of a specific case or investigation.  Whenever the Attorney General determines that supersession is appropriate, the Attorney General may assume any or all of the duties, responsibilities and authority normally reserved to the chief law enforcement executive and the agency.  Every member of the agency, including the chief law enforcement executive, has a duty to cooperate fully with the Attorney General during the investigation and adjudication of such matters.  Within their respective counties, the County Prosecutors shall be vested with the same authority to supersede possessed by the Attorney General on a statewide basis.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:158-5.
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING RESTRAINTS WITHOUT CONSIDERING HARM TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Da393-417)**  The “propriety of an … injunction has to be viewed … from the vantage point of the public” and “the public interest … should play a significant role in the judge’s determination. ”  *Waste Mgmt.*, 399 N.J. Super. at 536.  Indeed, a court can withhold injunctive relief despite a substantial showing of irreparable injury when the public interest is affected.  *Waste Mgmt.*, 399 N.J. Super. at 520.  The burden is on the party seeking temporary injunctive relief to show that “the public interest will not be harmed. ”  *Brown*, 424 N.J. Super. at 183.  The trial court did not consider the harm to the public interest in entering restraints.  Specifically, as set forth above, the court did not consider how its decision would impact parent-child relationships and bar parents from providing necessary guidance and support to children grappling with gender identity issues.  Again, the decision in *Mirabelli* set forth an expert’s analysis which bears consideration here:  By facilitating a social transition at school over the parents’ objection, a school would drive a wedge between the parent and child.  Similarly, facilitating a double life for some children, in which they present as transgender in some contexts but cisgender in other contexts, is not in their best interest.  After all, “[c]ircumventing, bypassing, or excluding parents from decisions about a social transition undermines the main support structure for a child or adolescent who desperately needs support.  [P]olicies [against parental notification] are contrary to best practices regarding maintaining the relationship between parents and their children.  Best mental health practices abhor activity that drives a wedge between parents and children, creating distrust and tension.  In all cases, parental consent is required to provide medical and psychological treatment to minors.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION  DOCKET NO. [...]  ----------------------------------  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, : CRIMINAL ACTION  PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, : V. : [...], : DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.  :  ----------------------------------  On Appeal  From a Final Judgment of Conviction in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C., Hon. [...], J.S.C., and a Jury  ---------------------------------------------------------  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY  ---------------------------------------------------------  [...] (Attorney Id 026692002)
[brief] If [...] had recalled sooner or provided an earlier communication, [...] would have run afoul of FDA’s directive to “discuss any recall communications and notifications with the FDA Program Office Recall Coordinator before issuance. ”  RPM at § 7-5-1(5) (emphasis added) (Da0258, ¶¶ 66-75).  Hence, [...] could not, without FDA’s authorization, engage in an earlier U.S. recall or earlier communication to U.S. healthcare providers.  \textsuperscript{12}  The federal scheme ensures uniformity when executing a recall.
[brief] The Commission also ignored clear evidence in the record that plainly cured this jurisdictional issue by showing that this noxious post *was still public and available well into Respondent’s term as a Board member*, and actually compromised the Board.  (Ca232; Ca075-076).  That being the case, Appellants respectfully request that the Appellate Division reverse the Commission’s dismissal of Count 5 as to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e).
[brief] The Use of the Word “Thereupon” in Section 13.1 Should Not Have Been Interpreted to Mean that Plaintiff Could Seek Specific Performance Only if [...]’s Default Happened After the Closing with the Fee Owner  In dismissing the Complaint with prejudice, the trial court fixated on the word “thereupon” in Section 13.1 – opining that it limited Plaintiff’s right to specific performance to a situation where [...]’s default happened only after the closing with the third-party seller.  (See 2T, at 12-16).  Because, here, the Deposit was returned when [...] reneged on the deal in mid-July 2022, the trial court determined (erroneously) that Plaintiff’s right of specific performance was unavailable when [...] proceeded to close on the deal with the seller just weeks later, in early October 2022.  *(See id.)*  Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion (2T, at 12-16) and to the Defendants’ arguments *(see, e.g., [...] Br., at 14-16)*, the use of the word “thereupon” in Section 13.1 should *not* be read to impose a temporal limitation on Plaintiff’s right to seek specific performance as against [...].
[brief] 11T 213:6-218:1.  Defendant agreed to speak with police and maintained that he was at [...] at the time of the murder.  12T 165:15-166:5.  After initially denying that he ever left [...] that day, Defendant later admitted that he went to [...] before ultimately admitting that he went to [...] on the day in question.  Defendant did not testify at trial, though his statement was played for the jury.
[brief] CASES  Connors v. Sexton Studios, Inc., 270 N.J. Super. 390 (App. Div. 1994)  7 Irani v. Kmart Corp., 281 N.J. Super. 383 (App. Div. 1995)  7 State v. Lawrence, 445 N.J. Super. 270 (App. Div. 2016)  7 Mayfield v. Cmty of Med. Assoc. PA, 335 N.J. Super. 198 (App. Div. 2000)  7  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] In affirming the trial court’s decision to admit the lay testimony, the Court stated:  (Detective)[B]ruccoliere did not testify as an expert or provide an expert opinion.  Rather, he testified as a fact witness about his forensic investigation of defendant's laptop, and merely reported what he found, including the presence of videos and images depicting child pornography, and peer-to-peer software that allowed others to access the child pornography.  Id. at 471.  In the instant case, the State introduced highly reliable, well-understood location data through the lay testimony of [...], who performed the extraction of [...], [...]’ and [...]’s iPhones that they possessed for years.  The information on [...]’s phone detailed his latitude, longitude, the date and time, and the horizontal accuracy of latitude and longitude—meaning, how far from that specific latitude and longitude the iPhone could have been at the time—for every reading.  This information is stored on the database that IS the iPhone, just like a photo, a text message, or a web browsing history.  Significantly, the judiciary of this state relies upon geolocation data transmitted from defendants on ankle bracelet monitoring every day and finds violations of pretrial release without expert testimony as to how that data came to be recorded and transmitted.
[directive] to be used  Although those statutory presumptions are accounted for, this Directive creates additional presumptions by prosecutors in deciding whether to file a pretrial detention and/or revocation of release motion.  The presumptions established in Section 7 and 8 of this Directive, in other words, are designed only to channel the exercise of seek prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether to pretrial detention or revocation of release, and nothing in this Directive should be construed as suggesting that courts are obliged to apply any presumption other than the ones codified in the Bail Reform Law or in Court Rules that implement the statute and constitutional amendment.  Page 58 category includes all cases that do not fall under either the second or third categories.  It is expected that a large majority of cases will fall under the first category.  The second category deals with especially serious crimes where the State will be expected to seek pretrial detention unless the County Prosecutor or First Assistant Prosecutor, or Director or a Deputy Director of the Division of Criminal Justice in matters prosecuted by the Division, determines that compelling and extraordinary circumstances exist to justify the decision not to seek preventive detention.
[directive] 2.6  Paralleling.  Street Paralleling is driving a police vehicle on a street parallel to a street on which a pursuit is occurring.  Vehicle  Paralleling is a deliberate offensive tactic by one or more patrol vehicles to drive alongside the pursued vehicle while it is in motion.  2.7  Pursuit Driving.  Pursuit driving is an active attempt by a law enforcement officer operating a motor vehicle and utilizing emergency warning lights and an audible device to apprehend one or more occupants of another moving vehicle when the officer reasonably believes that the driver of the fleeing vehicle is aware of the officer's attempt to stop the vehicle and is resisting apprehension by increasing vehicle speed, committing traffic violations or otherwise attempting to elude the officer.
[brief] State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463 (1999) ........................................................................ 35 State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256 (2019) ........................................................................ 35  Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller, 146 N.J. 527 (1996) ........................................................................ 59 Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269 (2016) ........................................................................ 74 Totaro, Duffy, Cannova & Co., L.L.C. v. Lane, Middleton & Co., L.L.C., 191 N.J. 1 (2007) ............................................................................. 68 Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015) .......................................................................... 37, 39 Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2010) ......................................................... 82 Trinity Church v. Lawson-Bell, 394 N.J. Super. 159 (App. Div. 2007)........................................... 51 Tully v. Mirz, 457 N.J. Super. 114 (App. Div. 2018)........................................... 59, 63 Williams v. Bell Tel. Labs. Inc., 132 N.J. 109 (1993) .................................................................. 50, 56 Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J. 236 (2001) .................................................................. 72 Statutes, Rules, and Other Authorities American Law Institute’s Principals of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, § 7.01(d) (1992)
[brief] \textsuperscript{43}  Duff v. Trenton Beverage Co., 5 N.J. Super. 283 (App. Div. 1949)(citations omitted).  \textsuperscript{44}  In Re New Jersey-American Water Co., 333 N.J. Super. 398 (App. Div. 2000).  \textsuperscript{45}
[brief] Whether such information had to be disclosed absent a request is the subject of this appeal and one that poses substantial concern for [...]’s members.  In this case, Plaintiff submitted a request for government records, not for information.  The full extent of Plaintiff’s OPRA request was “[a]ll police reports + notes relating to” two individuals and one location.  Da10.  Thus, at the time of Plaintiff’s OPRA request dated April 1, 2022, he did not otherwise request information, including about ongoing investigations available under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b).  If he desired to access “such information,” he was required to request it.  He did not.  Indeed, the specific subsection plainly ties the time period for response (within 24 hours or as soon as practicable) to the receipt “of a request for such information[.]”  N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(b) (emphasis added).  This makes sense.  As a practical and legal matter, OPRA does not and cannot work unless a citizen first makes a request to a public agency.  See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i)(1) (stating generally that access to government records shall be granted or denied no later than seven business days after custodian receives request).
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE TOWNSHIP’S MOTION IN LIMINE TO BAR THE LAND REPORT AS A NET OPINION (3T6:24-10:2).  Because condemnation cases involve dueling expert appraisals regarding Market Value, it is vital that the expert opinions comply with N.J.R.E. 703, which “mandates that expert opinion be grounded in ‘facts or data derived from (1) the expert’s personal observations, or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily admissible in evidence, but which is the type of data normally relied upon by experts. ’”  Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 54 (2015) (quoting Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 583 (2008)).  “The net opinion rule is a ‘corollary of [N.J.R.E. 703] . . . which forbids the admission into evidence of an expert’s conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence or other data. ’”  Id. (alteration in original)(emphasis added).  It was therefore reversible error for the Trial Court to deny the Township’s Motion to bar the expert report of [...] as a net opinion.
[brief] As part of its Site Analysis, [...] examined the entire transmission line corridor between Route 35 (at the northern end) and Newman Springs Road (at the southern end) for potential locations, even though it is important to locate the Regulator Station as far south along the line as possible.  That examination is set forth at length in [...]’s testimony (Exhibit P-2).  As [...]’s testimony makes clear, [...]’s in-depth analysis of every property along the Holmdel transmission line corridor yielded very few possibly suitable locations for the Regulator Station.  In fact, in addition to the Proposed Site, [...] initially identified just four possible alternatives (and even three of those sites were far less than ideal, given their northern locations and/or residential zoning).
[brief] Here, the trial court correctly used a “strong hand,”—a strong but even hand—to judicially manage the Mount Laurel trial, by balancing the harms on each side and considering the public interest at hand.  Its proper decision temporarily limiting the actions of [...] with respect to the Property should be allowed to stand.  A Decision in [...]’s Favor Would Have Significant, Widespread Effects of Weakening the Enforcement of Municipalities’ Constitutional Mount Laurel Compliance Statewide.
[brief] Defendant [...], was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol [“DWI”] because he could not do physical tasks like one-leg-stand [“OLS”] and walk-and-turn [“W&T”] tests which are part of a standardized field sobriety testing [“SFST” or “FST”] protocol developed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration [“NHTSA”].  More than half of the population has difficulty with SFST, even when sober.  The nit-picky clues cited by the arresting officer and used by the municipal court to convict [...] were taken out of a context where he walks, talks, stands, and acts as any sober person would.  Although the evidence shows that he made a poor choice in turning left through a red light at a traffic-free intersection, his driving was otherwise flawless.  While he may be guilty of running a red light, he is not guilty of DWI.  This Court should correct the manifest injustice imposed on him by the courts below.  Furthermore, there was a 603-day delay from issuance of the complaint and 289-day delay from when his case was ready for trial.  Where our Supreme Court, albeit unrealistically, believes municipal courts should resolve DWI cases within 60 days of issuance, the delays in [...]’s case violated this guideline and his right to a speedy trial.  Thus, this Court should dismiss all charges.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Other Authorities  Model Penal Code, § 210.3 ..................................................  29  Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated, on N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(c) (2023)  ..............................................  38, 40, 41  Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Justification: Use of Force Upon an Intruder N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(c)” (rev. Sept. 12, 2016)  ............................  39, 40  COUNTER-STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Overpayments shall be paid back to the Trust within 21 days of this Order, with written confirmation to the Court and [...].  In addition, based on my Aug. 8, 2022 Exceptions, which were overlooked:  a.  [...] shall pay back to the Trust $74,248.18, as per [...]’s Intermediate Accounting, p. 18&19 (65a-69a), that was for legal work in 2019-2021 for Estate Case [...] upon behalf of [...], and not the Trust, nor for Trust matters related to this Case.  b.  [...] shall pay back to Trust $15,022.72, as per Intermediate Accounting, p. 19 (66a), that was awarded in Oct. 6, 2022 Order, par. 1d.  G.
[brief] That is, the atmosphere inside the apartment probably was more relaxed than was warranted, despite the presence of a number of police.  [...] again asked [...] whether she had any identification, such as a Passport, and [...] again said she had none.  (Dca 1, clip four, 45:35 to 45:40).  After the relevant information had been inserted onto the form, [...] read the Consent to Search form to the two women, including the information that (1) they had the right not to have a search made without police getting a search warrant, and that (2) they had the right to refuse to give consent to search.  (1T14-19 to 15-21; Dca 1, clip four, 48:20 to 48:45; Sa1).  While [...] – a few feet from [...] – at one point turned her back to [...] and bent over, nothing suggests she did not hear everything the officer read.  After Ortiz finished reading the form, [...] confirmed with the women that they were not being pressured, and that their consent was voluntary.  (Dca 1, clip four, 48:45 to 49:30).  Before offering the form to [...] for her signature, [...] learned from [...] that she was a high school graduate with two years at [...].  (1T15-25 to 16-6; Dca 1, clip four, 49:20 to 49:53; Da24).  At that time, first [...], and then [...], signed the form.  (1T11-20 to 13-5; 1T16-7 to 10; Da20; Da24; Sa1; Dca 1, clip four, 49:53 to 50:37; Sa1).
[brief] Based upon this finding, the trial court also dismissed Count Three alleging the Developer breached the February 2016 real estate contract by failing to convey marketable title.  Similar to Count One, the trial court failed to explain how the master deed’s ‘authorization’ negated any alleged breach committed by the Developer. a common element, and it fails to consider whether Unit 74’s status as a common element conflicts with the representations made by the Developer in its Affidavit of Title.
[directive] No law enforcement officer shall share, either directly or indirectly (i.e., through another person), any information learned in the course of the use-of-force investigation with any witness without authorization.  Nor shall any law enforcement officer who was a witness to the use-of-force incident receive any such information from any sworn or civilian employee of a law enforcement agency without first obtaining authorization from the authority in charge of the investigation or their designee.  If any law enforcement officer learns of such an unauthorized dissemination or receipt of information, then they must immediately report that to the authority in charge of the investigation or their designee.  7.11.6  Officers who are directed to assist with an initial firearm discharge investigation may be required to operate independently of their ordinary chain of command and report directly to the authority in charge of the investigation or their designee.  In all such circumstances, officers shall comply with that requirement.  7.11.7
[brief] (4T184:7-185:9; 7T50:16-52:9).  On the date in question both the plaintiff and [...] drove to the [...] store on Route 9 to purchase materials for the project (4T189:3-16; 7T55:21-56:12).  While [...] and [...] were in aisle 42 looking at grout, [...] approached and asked if he could help.  (4T191:21-192:8; 8T202:1-25).  [...] had been hired 9 days earlier (5T39:7-8; Pa279) and was still in training.  (5T31:3-12; 8T214:11-15).  Although Hassan’s supervisor, [...], testified at trial that there was another employee in the flooring department at the time (9T64:2-65:10), Hassan himself testified\(^4\) that he was “alone in the department” (8T210:21-24), and both the plaintiff (7T63:25-65:5) and [...] testified that they saw no other employees in the area.
[brief] The Court erred and abused its judicial discretion in misapplying "law of the case" doctrine in a manner contrary to the Appellate court's Remand orders of 1/17/2022 and 10/27/2005 and the trial Court's Orders of 12/10/2014 and 1/10/2020 in a manner beyond the authority and intent of the trial court and in a manner contrary to the submitted evidence.  Re: Order of 5/12/2023 (DA14), Order of 3/30/2023(DA20)  1.
[brief] [State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 464 (1992); State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 621-22 (1990); State v. Petrozelli, 351 N.J. Super. 14, 23 (App. Div. 2002).  "[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary."  State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 217 (2004) (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 691); see also State v. Russo, 333 N.J. Super. 119, 139 (App. Div. 2000) ("[I]t is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to guilt and degree of guilt or penalty." (quoting The American Bar Association Standards, The Defense Function § 4.1 (1971))); see also Savage, supra, 120 N.J. at 621 (noting American Bar Association guidelines "emphasize the importance of interviewing potential witnesses during pre-trial investigation" (quotation omitted)).