ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *Keddie v. Rutgers*, 148 N.J. 36, 50 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  When balancing the right to access against the State’s interest in preventing the disclosure, courts consider: (1) the extent to which disclosure will impede agency functions by discouraging citizens from providing information to the government; (2) the effect disclosure may have upon persons who have given such information, and whether they did so in reliance that their identities would not be disclosed; (3) the extent to which agency self-evaluation, program improvement, or other decision making will be chilled by disclosure; (4) the degree to which the information sought includes factual data as opposed to evaluative reports of policymakers; (5) whether any findings of public misconduct have been insufficiently corrected by remedial measures instituted by the investigative agency; and (6) whether any agency disciplinary or investigatory proceedings have arisen that may circumscribe the individual’s asserted need for materials.  *[Loigman v. Kimmelman*, 102 N.J. 98, 113 (1986). ]  In addition to these factors, “when the requested material appears on its face to encompass legislatively recognized confidentiality concerns, a court should presume that the release of the government record is not in the public interest. ”  Michelson v. Wyatt, 379 N.J. Super. 611, 621 (App. Div. 2005).  Here, the trial court rightly concluded that [...]’s request to manipulate, test, and potentially destroy historical artifacts does not fall within the common law right of access.
[brief] Ordinarily the case would have then proceeded to trial.  But then the COVID delay persisted, the Case Management Judge retired and, seizing the opportunity, the defendants moved for “reconsideration” nearly three years later before another judge (the “New Motion Judge”).  Those motions for reconsideration did not really comply with applicable procedural rules and should have been denied on procedural grounds alone.  Moreover, the opportunistic use of Rule 4:42-2(b) in these circumstances constituted improper use of rule.  If the defendants had legitimate grounds to seek reconsideration “in the interest of justice” under that rule, they would have done so far more promptly before the Case Management Judge, as actually contemplated by the rule.  The invocation of the rule to seek a “do over” once the original judge has retired, should not be permitted.  Even so, the New Motion Judge did not grant relief based on the arguments actually raised by the defendants.  By way of an order and decision entered on July 17, 2023, the New Motion Judge raised and then decided an issue neither briefed by the parties nor even raised by the court at oral argument.  The New Motion Judge did so without argument or further submissions of counsel.  Plaintiff moved for reconsideration on the basis that the court had *sua sponte* raised and decided an issue without the benefit of briefing or oral argument, and had reached an erroneous conclusion.  The New Motion Judge retreated from the most critical aspect of its July 17, 2023 decision, writing that “the Court strikes it comments” concerning the “staffing issue” on which the prior decision had been predicated “[s]ince this was not an issue raised in the original motion. ”  But the court did so only after identifying a whole new series of purported reasons why summary judgment should be granted.  Quite remarkably, after recognizing the infirmity of its July 17, 2023 decision having been decided on issues neither raised nor argued, the New Motion Judge nonetheless did it again in its September 29, 2023 decision.
[brief] The court stated:  “Basically what I’m saying is he can use the word oversee, as opposed to responsible.  I’m telling you he can use the word oversee, but not that he is responsible. ”  7T27:17-20.  Plaintiff’s counsel tried to explain that [...] is simply saying that “as administrator your job is to be responsible for the nurses. ”  7T28:21-23.  He is cut off.  “I’ve just made the decision and I said I’m not letting him use the word responsible because I think there are legal implications to it in terms of legal responsibility and because this is a civil lawsuit for money damages.  And there's -- and I'm making the ruling and you're free to disagree with it but I've made the ruling he can't use the word responsible when he's talking about the administrator's involvement.  He can use the word that the administrator oversees. ”  7T28:24-29:9.  In front of the jury, the judge then instructs Mr.  Youles as follows:  “I'm going to instruct you, sir, that you're not going to use the word responsible when you talk about what the administrator does.  You're not going to say that the administrator is responsible for something.  And to the extent you said that, I'm going to strike that.  I'm going to tell the jury not -- to disregard it.  You can use the word if you feel it applies that the administrator oversees things that happen at the nursing home. ”  7T29:18-30:2.  That was not the only discussion regarding what words [...] could use and not the only time his answer was stricken.
[brief] **DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS BASED ON ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY FOR FIRST-DEGREE ROBBERY AND ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY FOR FELONY MURDER MUST BE REVERSED, BECAUSE MULTIPLE ERRORS IN THE RELATED JURY INSTRUCTIONS HAD THE CLEAR CAPACITY TO LEAD TO AN UNJUST RESULT (not raised below). **  Defendant is entitled to a new trial because the jury instructions on accomplice liability for robbery were confusing, omitted a critical instruction on liability for "afterthought robbery," and failed to instruct the jury on the elements of first-degree robbery.  Moreover, defendant was convicted of being an accomplice to first-degree robbery and sentenced on that offense, even though the verdict sheet never asked the jury whether defendant was guilty of the elements that raise robbery to a first-degree offense.  These errors in the instructions on accomplice liability for robbery were especially harmful because the jury acquitted defendant of all own-conduct robbery offenses for which it had been properly instructed on "afterthought robbery" and first-degree robbery.
[brief] THE COURT:  I’m sustaining the objection.  It’s not relevant.  I need not waste any time about the rendering.  That’s not what [the Board] based their opinion on.  [emphasis supplied.]  2T22:18-21.  N.J.R.E. 401 defines relevant evidence as “evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action.
[brief] (Pa000092.)  As the Agreement expressly reflects, it applies to any and all claims [...] may have not only against Respondent [...], but also against “any of its subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, employees, agents and/or any of its clients or customers. ”  (Id.)  This included all of [...]’s fellow Respondents (which [...] tacitly recognizes in her allegation that [...] and [...] were “single and joint employers of Plaintiff,” and were supposedly so intertwined as to cause her to label them collectively as “Corporate Defendants”).
[brief] The record only shows, giving the State the benefit of all inferences, that [...] was a passenger in [...]’s car before, during and after the shooting, and that after the shooting the two of them proceeded to, and remained in, the same location as each other for slightly less than an hour.  The absence of evidence as to [...]’s state of mind or reaction to the shooting demonstrates that there is no legitimate way to determine or even infer beyond a reasonable doubt why he acted (or failed to act) as he did.  The prosecutor argued in summation that a conspiracy must have existed because Mr. [...] “doesn’t exit the car.
[brief] ”  Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J. 498, 505 (1991).  “In essence, the doctrine of res judicata provides that a cause of action between parties that has been finally determined on the merits by a tribunal having jurisdiction cannot be relitigated by those parties or their privies in a new proceeding. ”  *Id.*  “For a judicial decision to be accorded *res judicata* effect, it must be a valid and final adjudication on the merits of the claim. ”  *Id.* at 506.  *See also Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc.*, 124 N.J. 398, 409 (1991) (holding that the doctrine of *res judicata* requires that “the judgment in the prior action must be valid, final, and on the merits”).  The doctrine of *res judicata* does not apply to bar the instant Complaint.  Indisputably, the court in the Prior Litigation did not adjudicate *any* facts on the merits, as the parties agreed to dismiss their claims in the Prior Litigation *without prejudice*.  (*See Pa150 – Pa152).*  In the same vein, it is clear that the [...] *did not* adjudicate issues concerning the Forged Agreement, the parties’ respective membership interests in [...], or [...]’s unabashed abuse of process.  (*See generally Pa131 – Pa142).*  Indeed, a plain reading of the decision emanating from the [...] makes clear that the [...] did not adjudicate:  (i) *any* claim raised in the Prior Litigation; (ii) any issue arising out of the same transaction at the core of the Prior Litigation; or (iii) the claims raised in Plaintiffs’ Complaint.  (*Id.*).  Based upon the *actual* substance of the decision in the [...], the finding by the Trial Court below – that “the matter was adjudicated on the merits once the final award was rendered in the [...][,]” – is entirely without factual support.  (Pa8).  Indeed, while the Trial Court below surmised that “if either party was unhappy with the outcome of the [...], they could have those claims heard in a court instead of in an arbitration hearing,” the Trial Court’s finding is erroneous.  Indeed, the Trial Court’s finding constitutes a clear error, as [...] was not even a party to the [...], and, therefore, would not have had standing to “have those claims heard in a court instead of in an arbitration hearing. ”  The Trial Court’s finding is further belied by the irrefutable fact that the claims asserted in the Prior Litigation (and in Plaintiffs’ instant Complaint) are entirely distinct from those adjudicated in the [...].
[brief] The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating to the trial court the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.  Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954).  Summary judgment will be appropriate if the moving party meets this burden and the non-moving party offers no affidavits or material in opposition, or if the opposition is “immaterial or of an insubstantial nature. ”  Judson, 17 N.J. at 75.  A plaintiff’s own self-serving assertion is insufficient to create a material issue of fact defeating summary judgment.
[brief] If there is no compliance, the judge should grant the motion to dismiss with prejudice. ”  St. James, supra., 403 N.J. at 486-87 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  The trial court’s decision to deny or grant the motion to restore upon its review of the delinquent party’s responses “‘is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, whose determination will not be disturbed unless it results from a clear abuse of discretion.
[directive] NG RI  Docket Number: Criminal Action Order Mandating Observation and Treatment ofNGRI Acquittee  Who Has Refused to Cooperate with a Psychiatric Evaluation of Dangerousness of Having Found insanity after trial [with/without] a jury on the defendant not guilty by reason _________________________ of _ the charges  Having Ordered the NGRI acquittee to undergo a dangerousness evaluation pursuant to __________________ of N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8 by , a psychiatrist the State's choosing, and Having Found that the NGRI acquittee has been unwilling to cooperate with the evaluation to if of determine the acquittee is dangerous to self, others, or property as a result mental illness, __ of Ordered day - 20 _ that:
[directive] Procedures  Following the completion of the processing by the law enforcement officer of a person arrested for DWI and/or Refusal, including the administration of any chemical breath tests or the obtaining of blood or urine specimens, and the issuance of any summonses, the arrested person may contact a responsible person to transport or accompany the arrestee from the police station.  If the arrestee is incapable of performing the task of contacting a responsible person to transport or accompany the arrestee, the law enforcement officer may perform that function on behalf of the arrestee by: (1) following instructions given by the arrestee, or (2) using information obtained from the arrestee, or from the arrestee’s person or personal effects.  However, if an arrestee is in a condition that, in the opinion of the law enforcement officer, requires medical attention, then the arrestee should be transported by either the law enforcement agency, or the First Aid or Rescue Squad, acting at the direction of the law enforcement agency, to a medical facility for evaluation and/or treatment.  Under that circumstance, a law enforcement officer must accompany the arrestee to the medical facility and be prepared to provide the POTENTIAL LIABILITY WARNING - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 (Rev. 2-20-2004)
[directive] Any knowing violation of this Directive or related agency standing operating procedure, directive, or order, or applicable law, shall be subject to discipline.  8.2.1  All significant violations of this Directive or agency policy, including but not limited to unauthorized access or use of ALPR stored data, must be reported to the County Prosecutor (or DCJ Director) and County and State ALPR Coordinator upon discovery.  Unless the County Prosecutor or Director elects to conduct or oversee the investigation of the violation, such notification of the violation shall be followed up with a report, approved by the law enforcement executive and with notification to the State ALPR Coordinator, explaining to the County Prosecutor or to the Director, the circumstances of the violation, and the steps that are being taken to prevent future similar violations.
[brief] [1T Lines 4-9, pg. 15]  “Any further adjournment requests or challenges to the foreclosure action belonged under the foreclosure docket.  Not -- the sheriff is not a party to that; has nothing to do with that.  You have [1T Line 14absolutely no claim against the Sheriff’s Department with respect to a foreclosure -- a private foreclosure action.  Therefore, there is no viable claim under your action in lieu of prerogative writ.  There is no damage presented.  And there is no claim for this Court to proceed.  Therefore, I will be signing an order dismissing your action.
[brief] (Da 110-28)  The detectives who obtained [...]’s statement flagrantly violated numerous settled principles of Miranda\(^8\) law and due process.  While holding him for over seven hours, they contradicted the Miranda warnings and --- \(^8\) *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). affirmatively misled him about his suspect status.  They threatened his life and exploited his children.  They minimized the offense, promised leniency, falsely urged him to “help” himself, and fabricated eyewitness evidence.  They swore and shouted at him; called him a “motherf***er”; and physically intimidated him by pointing at him, leaning toward him, and slapping the table.  And they repeatedly ignored his invocations of his right to silence and twice conditioned his freedom on him cooperating.  As a result of those psychologically coercive tactics, his Miranda wavier and statement as a whole were involuntary and should have been suppressed in full.
[brief] Many of the challenges to Affidavits of Merit in particular cases deal with the required qualifications of the Medical Expert signing the Affidavit of Merit.  Indeed, that was the challenge in this motion by Defendant [...].  The statute requires that 1.) if a defendant physician is Board-Certified in a medical specialty or subspecialty **and** 2) the medical treatment that the Defendant is being sued over involves that specialty, then the Plaintiff’s Expert must also be Board-Certified in the same specialty and actually practice in that specialty.  Thus, the Act provides that “…[i]f the party against whom … the testimony is offered is a specialist **and** the care or treatment involves that specialty…the person providing the testimony shall have specialized … in the same specialty….”  N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(a) (emphasis added).  See, Nicholas v Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 480-481 (2013).
[brief] Finally, the interlocutory nature of the April 6, 2023 “Final Judgment” against [...] serves as a further basis to preclude summary judgment against [...] under the MCS-90 endorsement.  The MCS-90 endorsement to the [...] Policy states:  In consideration of the premium stated in the policy to which this endorsement is attached, the insurer (the company) agrees to pay, within the limits of liability described herein, any final judgment recovered against the insured for public liability resulting from negligence in the operation maintenance or use of motor vehicles… (PPCIa183) (emphasis added); see also Canal Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 435 F.3d 431, 442 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2006) ("The MCS–90 endorsement is a federally required form endorsement which states that commercial liability insurers… must pay any ‘final judgment’ recovered against the insured for public liability resulting from negligence in the operation, maintenance, or use of motor vehicles…”).  New Jersey courts have held that, “[w]hen interpreting an insurance policy, courts should give the policy's words “their plain, ordinary meaning. ”  President v. Jenkins, 180 N.J. 550, 562 (2004); Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590, 595 (2001).  Under the plain, ordinary meaning of the language in the MCS-90 endorsement, the insurer agrees to pay for any “final judgment” recovered against the insured for “public liability resulting from negligence. ”
[brief] The Leonard plaintiff filed an action to quiet title in November 2018, and testified that, based on the two surveys, she believed that defendant’s fence and now-existing driveway constituted encroachments on her property.  On cross-examination, she answered questions regarding a Facebook post where she told people to look for the white post as the marker for her property line.  The Leonard plaintiff’s son testified that he mowed the lawn along defendant’s fence for approximately ten (10) years and that defendant never asked him not to do it.  He also testified that once defendant replenished his driveway, he began mowing over stones in the same area that he had previously mowed without problems.  In comparison, defendant put forth the testimony of a contractor who had replenished the driveway stones and stated that he had not extended or widened the driveway when he replaced the stones.  The Leonard defendant contended that his continuous use of the property and plaintiff’s actions confirmed his right to use the property.  He stated that his new chain link fence was in the same location as the prior wire mesh fence that had been in that location since the 1950’s.  He stated that he always thought that the hedges were the boundary of the property prior to 2010 because his previous neighbor never complained to him about his use of that property.  The Leonard defendant also testified that he would suffer a great hardship if he lost the disputed portion of the driveway because he needs to be able to provide access to oil trucks and fire trucks in case of an emergency.  The Leonard trial court awarded the disputed property to the plaintiff because the property was specifically described in the metes and bounds description included in the plaintiff’s initial survey.
[brief] Plaintiffs filed an answer to the counterclaim and third-party complaint on October 20, 2020.  Da694-714.  Defendants filed motions (1) to bar or limit the testimony of plaintiffs' expert, [...], and (2) for summary judgment on November 19, 2021.  Following oral argument on December 20, 2021,¹ the trial court entered orders that (1) denied defendants’ motion to limit the testimony of plaintiffs’ expert and (2) granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  Da716-17.  A non-jury trial was conducted over twenty-two non-consecutive days, beginning on January 18, 2022 and ending on March 17, 2022.  Defendants’ motion for a directed verdict under R. 4:40-1, dismissing the amended complaint, was denied.  12T4:15.  Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss defendants’ counterclaim and third-party complaint was also denied.  23T52:1.  On June 30, 2022, the court entered judgment, Da719-20, and rendered an oral decision, dismissing Counts 1-4 and 9-10 (fraud) of the amended complaint and denying plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages.  24T31:10,19, 22-23, 24T54:11-13.  The court awarded plaintiffs compensatory damages of $2,882,244.85 on Counts 5 and 6 (conversion), 7 and 8 (breach of contract), 11
[directive] Grand Juror Orientations  The Jury Manager or the clerk to the grand jury shall present a uniform grand juror orientation to provide the prospective grand jurors an overview of the selection process, an understanding of the work of the grand jury, and the importance of the grand jury to the criminal justice system.  In addition, those selected as sitting grand jurors also shall receive an orientation concerning any county-specific information relating to their service.  Comment:  The purpose of the brief orientation to all prospective grand jurors is to educate them regarding the history, function, and importance of grand juror service and about the selection process.  This effort, before the prospective grand jurors participate in the selection process, may make them more willing to serve.  The standard text for this orientation is set forth in Attachment 1 to these Standards, “Grand Juror Initial Orientation. ”  The orientation for sitting grand jurors shall address items such as attendance procedures, hours of service, and absentee reporting procedures.  It shall be uniform with regard to the items contained therein but necessarily different with respect to the specifics regarding the individual counties.  The items to be addressed in the orientation are provided in an accompanying document that is attached to these Grand Jury Standards (Attachment 2, entitled Orientation for Sitting Grand Jurors).
[brief] STANDARD OF REVIEW  The “standard of review when determining the enforceability of contracts, including arbitration agreements,” is de novo.  Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191, 207 (2019); Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289, 302 (2016); Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 446 (2014).  “The enforceability of arbitration provisions is a question of law; therefore, it is one to which we need not give deference to the analysis by the trial court. ”  Goffe, 238 N.J. at 207.  II.