ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In fact, on February 25, 2022 – a mere six days before Appellants filed their Complaint with the Commission that is the subject of this appeal – the Commission issued Advisory Opinion [...] (2022) (Ca397).  [...] unequivocally reiterates and reaffirms the Commission’s guidance on social media use by school board members, stating clearly and directly:  Since the advent of social media, the Commission has received numerous complaints about whether a Board member’s speech, including posts on social media, violates the Act because the Board member either failed to disclaim, or insufficiently disclaimed, their speech.  In a recent decision, which is informative here, the Commission stated:  ...  Now, more than a decade later, when the use of social media and online publications has become commonplace, prolific, pervasive, and often times divisive, and given that there has been a significant influx in the number of complaints filed with the Commission regarding use (or nonuse) of disclaimers in electronic publications (not just social media), it is now more crucial than ever to underscore and emphasize that when Board members want to speak as private citizens, they must include an appropriate disclaimer that makes the capacity in which they are speaking clear and unambiguous.  In addition, even if an appropriate disclaimer is used, a school official must never negate the import of the disclaimer by proceeding, under the purported protection of the disclaimer, to discuss or comment on Board business or matters in a way that leads a member of the public to believe that the individual is speaking on behalf of, and as a representative of, the Board[...]  People in your community are aware of your status as a Board member and would likely attribute any statements from you in your capacity as a Board member, and/or on behalf of the Board.  Advisory Opinion [...] (2022) (Ca398-399) (citing I/M/O [...], [...], Commission Docket No. [...], at 12 [2021]) (emphasis added).  Published only six days prior to the filing of Appellants’ Complaint before the Commission, this should have been the standard applied to the matter below.
[brief] Opinion PER CURIAM.  *1  These back-to-back appeals, which we consolidate for purposes of this opinion, arise from defendants' convictions (at a joint trial) for first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15–1 (count one), second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–4(a) (count two), and third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (a handgun without a permit), N.J.S.A. 2C:39–5(b) (count three).  We affirm.  I.
[brief] McBride v. Port Auth. of NY & NJ, 295 N.J. Super. 521, 525 (App. Div. 1996).  In making a determination if a duty of care should be imposed, our courts have always concluded that the element of control, - or the absence of it – is paramount.  “Recently,…[the Supreme] Court emphasized the importance of control in imposing a duty on a landlord, finding that a ‘landlord has a duty to exercise reasonable care to guard against foreseeable dangers arising from the use of those portions of the rental property over which the landlord retains control. ” (emphasis in original), Shields v. Ramslee Motors, 240 N.J. 479, 491 (2018).  The reason for the Court’s emphasis on control, of course, is because a landlord who relinquishes control no longer has the opportunity and ability to exercise care.
[brief] That is why the public protested her at meetings of the Board.  (Ca075-076, Ca086, Ca098-099, Ca100-105).  That is why newspapers referred to her as a Board member.  (Ca100-105).  That is why the Board itself was compelled to pass two Resolutions clarifying that it did not stand behind her public statements and that her statements should not continue to be seen as having been made on behalf of the Board.  (Ca072, Ca075-076).  Respondent’s statements also led directly to litigation being filed against the Board, which was clearly reflected in the record.  (Ca107-Ca114); (Ca031) (“...not only had the ability to compromise the Board, but it did compromise the Board.  This is evidenced by the litigation filed against it. ”)
[brief] Generally, a reviewing court should presume the validity and reasonableness of a municipal ordinance.  *First Peoples Bank v. Medford*, 126 N.J. 413, 418 (1991).  The party attacking the ordinance bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of validity.  See *Ward v. Montgomery Township*, 28 N.J. 529, 539 (1959).  The presumption that a zoning ordinance is valid may be overcome by a showing that the ordinance is "clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or plainly contrary to fundamental principles of zoning or the [zoning] statute" or, as in this case, was not "adopted in accordance with statutory and municipal procedural requirements."
[brief] Cases  388  Route 22  Readington Realty Holdings, LLC v. Township of Readington, 221 N.J. 318, 338 (2015)  .................................................................  6  Abelsons, Inc. v. City of Newark, 83 N.J. Super. 205, 209 (App. Div. 1964).  20 Chicalese v. Monroe Twp. Planning Bd., 334 N.J. Super. 413, 419 (Law Div. 2000)  ...........................................................................................................  6  Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 78 N.J. 544, 559-60 (1979).  15, 20 Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 610 (1980)  ..................................................................................................................  20 DeMaria v. JEB Brook, LLC, 372 N.J. Super. 138, 146 (Law Div. 2003) ...... 21 Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. of Franklin, 233 N.J. 546, 559 (2018)  ...........................................................................................................  6, 7 Fallone Properties, L.L.C. v. Bethlehem Twp. Planning Bd., 369 N.J. Super. 552, 562 (App. Div. 2004)  .................................................................  6  House of Fire Christian Church v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Clifton, 379 N.J. Super. 526, 539-40 (App. Div. 2005)  .............................................  27  In re Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permits, 185 N.J. 452, 455 (2006)  19 Jacoby v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 442 N.J. Super. 450, 471 (App. Div. 2015)  .................................................................  14  Klug v. Bridgewater Twp. Planning Bd., 407 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2009)  .................................................................................................................. 6 Kramer v. Board of Adjustment, 45 N.J. 268, 280 (1965) .............................................. 21 Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Township Committee of Township of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) ........................................................................................................... 5 New York SMSA, L.P. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. Of Weehawken, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 333 (App. Div. 2004) ................................................................. 22 Pizzo Mantin Group v. Twp. of Randolph, 137 N.J. 216, 223 (1994) ...... 10, 20 Sanders v. Planning Board of Warren, 140 N.J. Super. 386, 394 (App. Div. 1976) ........................................................................................................... 20 Scholastic Bus Co. Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Borough of Fair Lawn, 326 N.J. Super. 49, 59 (App. Div. 1999) ................................................................. 26 Township of Berkeley Heights v. Board of Adjustment, 144 N.J. Super. 291, 300 (Law Div. 1976) ................................................................. 16 Twp. of Stafford v. Stafford Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 154 N.J. 62, 70 (1998) ...........................................................................................................
[brief] **The Trial Court’s Findings of Fact Are Binding on Appeal. **  A trial court’s findings of fact are considered binding on appeal unless they are wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of justice.  *Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America*, 65 N.J. 474, 483 (1974).  See also, *Greenfield v. Dusseault*, 60 N.J. Super. 436, 444 (App. Div. 1960), aff’d o.b. 33 N.J. 78 (1960).  “Findings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence. ”  *Rova Farms*, 65 N.J. at 483.  Factual findings are not reversed by the Appellate Court unless “they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interest of justice. ”  *Rova Farms*, 65 N.J. at 483 (quoting *Fagliarone v. Township of North Bergen*, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963).  The Trial Court’s finding of fact that the Sketch was not considered by the Board is wholly supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence.  The plain language of the Amended Resolution clearly states that the Sketch was not considered by the Board.  There was absolutely no evidence to the contrary presented by the Appellant, and the Appellant never challenged the Amended Resolution.  Accordingly, the Trial Court’s findings of fact that the Sketch was not considered by the Board when approving [...]’s Application must be upheld on appeal.  Id.  POINT III
[brief] The Lawsuit And Driver Assistance Features  Plaintiff filed a complaint against [...], among others, on the basis of strict liability and negligence.  Pa5.  Plaintiff alleged the subject vehicle was defectively designed because it was not equipped with two advanced driver assistance systems: “Lane Keeping Assist System” (LKAS) and “Lane Departure Warning” (LDW).  Pa8-25.  He claimed these technologies would have prevented the crash.  Pa9-13.  These technologies function as follows:  **Lane Keeping Assist System:**  When activated by the driver, LKAS may assist the driver to maintain his or her vehicle’s position within the center of a detected lane.  Pa163.  If the vehicle crosses a detected lane line, a message appears in the Multi-Information Display and an audible alert occurs.  Pa163.  Additionally, the vehicle may apply steering torque to help the driver keep the vehicle within the center of the lane.  Pa163.  **Lane Departure Warning:**  If the LDW system has been activated by the driver and the system determines that the vehicle is leaving a detected lane, it will alert the driver by illuminating a lane departure message on the Multi-Information Display and sounding an audible alert.  Pa159.  LDW does not provide any braking or steering assistance.  *See id.*  The owner’s manual states that LKAS and LDW are *driver assistance technologies*, and the driver is ultimately responsible for control over the vehicle.  Pa159, 163.
[brief] [...] has then used this unilateral, self-serving narrowing of the request’s scope to claim it has no further responsive documents to produce.  [...]’s motion to compel should be granted without regard to the Rule 30(b)(6) testimony.  The problem with this logic is that documents “responsive” to RFP No. 4 are not just Salesforce records related to [...], such as her own entries for those accounts, that support [...]’s decision to terminate her.  Rather, RFP No. 4 seeks documents “related to Plaintiff’s service and business interactions -- which occurred during the last 5 years of Plaintiff’s employment at SAVVAS -- with and to the [...] and/or the [...].
[brief] ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES #### CASES | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Baez v. Paulo, 453 N.J. 422 (App. Div. 2018) | 57, 62 | | Brown v. Brown, 86 N.J. 565 (1981) | 51 | | Buckelew v. Grossband, 87 N.J. 512 (1981) | 36 | | Burd v. New Jersey Telephone Co., 149 N.J.Super. 20 (App. Div. 1977) | 55 | | F. G. v. McDonnell, 291 N.J. Super. 262, 272 (App. Div. 1996), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 150 N.J. 550 (1997) | 33 | | Gallagher v. Burdette-Tomlin Hosp., 318 N.J. Super. 485, (App.Div.1999), aff’d, 163 N.J. 38, 747 A.2d 262 (2000) | 57 | | Grzanka v. Pfeifer, 301 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 1997) certif. den’d 154 N.J. 607 (1998) | 36 | | Jacobs v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 452 N.J. Super 494 (App. Div. 2017) | passim | | Jimenez v. GNOC, Corp., 286 N.J. Super. 533 (App. Div.) certif. den’d 145 N.J. 374 (1996) | 35, 36 | | Kaplan v. Skoloff & Wolfe, P.C., 339 N.J. Super. 97 (App. Div. 2001) | 36 | | Kelly v. Berlin, 300 N.J. Super. 256 (App. Div. 1997) | 33 | | Kemp v. State, 174 N.J. 412 (2002) | 31 | | Matynska v. Fried, 175 N.J. 51 (2002) | 56, 57 | | Nextel of N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs Bd. of Adj., 361 N.J. Super. 22 (App. Div. 2003) | 36 | | Perry v. Levy, 87 N.J.L. 670 (E&A. 1915) | 51 | | Polzo v. County of Essex, 196 N.J. 569 (2008) | 36 | | Robertelli v. Office of Atty. Ethics, 224 N.J. 470 (2016) | 62 | Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 325 (1985)
[brief] *Id.* at 245; see also *Sica*, supra, 127 N.J. at 164.  Yet that is what the Board did here.  Paragraph 42 of the Resolution contains exceptionally limited discussion of the beneficial aspects of the project.  [Da140].  Nowhere in the Resolution is there any discussion of the hundreds of senior citizens in [...] and the surrounding community who are in need of the services.  Likewise, there is no discussion of how provision of these services will benefit the residents who live there or their family members or how this development will facilitate constitutional compliance with Mt. Laurel.  A proper evaluation of the use variance should have given consideration to these matters before undertaking the balancing test required by *Sica*.
[brief] This Court should affirm defendant’s conviction.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT  By: /s/ [...]  Deputy Attorney General  [...]  VIVIANA M. HANLEY DEPUTY  ATTORNEY GENERAL ATTORNEY ID NO. 401572022 OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF DATED: September 11, 2024  Honorable Judges of the Appellate Division:
[brief] The Water Quality Management Planning Rules (“WQMP Rules”) similarly provide that, “All projects and activities affecting water quality shall be developed and conducted in a manner that is consistent with this chapter and adopted areawide plans.  *The Department shall not issue a permit or approval that conflicts with an adopted areawide plan or this chapter.*”\(^{16}\) N.J.A.C. 7:15-3.2(a) (emphasis added).  Regarding the areawide plan or Areawide WQM Plan, these are developed at the county level, and “identify and address selected water quality and --- \(^{16}\)  Regarding consistency with “this chapter,” it should be noted that Subchapter 5 of this chapter, “sets forth the processes for identifying and listing the 303(d) List of Water Quality Limited Waters, setting the priorities and schedule for development of total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) to address impairments in water quality limited waters, and for developing TMDLs and plans to implement TMDLs. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:15-5.1.  Thus, consistency with “this chapter” also requires that surface water quality be considered, including TMDLs. wastewater management issues for a particular jurisdictional area, including strategies to address both point and nonpoint source pollution.  The Areawide WQM Plan is the basis by which the Department and the designated planning agencies (DPAs) conduct selected water quality management planning activities for a particular area of the State.
[brief] The defense need not prove the opposite.  Nonetheless, Defendant presented ample, undisputed evidence that [...] poses no threat of an unprovoked attack on people or animals, let alone a serious threat.  All people who know [...] described him as highly trained, friendly, calm and gentle with people, children, and other animals, including small dogs, puppies, cats and frail, elderly ladies.  The Court found that [...] is highly trained, responds to hand signals and voice commands in two languages, he is certified as an AKC Good Canine and as a Therapy Dog.  Despite finding [...]’s training was “meticulous,” the Court still concluded that [...] is potentially dangerous.
[brief] Respondents argue that the circumstances in this matter are akin to those demonstrated in two oft cited cases: Matter of Application of Township of South Brunswick, 448 N.J.Super. 441 (LawDiv.2016) and Cranford Development Associates, LLC v. Township of Cranford, 445 N.J.Super 220 (App.Div.2016).  In those matters, the courts were clear that a history of obstruction and/or hostility toward affordable housing projects and compliance with constitutional obligations was the genesis of the remedy’s invoked.  An actual review of those matters reveals clear differences between them and the matter at bar.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 10:7-1(1)(h)(3).  The duty delegated to the [...] (“[...]”) was whether a regulation requiring the health insurance mandate was required along with a religious employer exception.  N.J.S.A. 26:2S-39.  However, the statute itself defines a “mandated health benefit” as “a benefit or coverage that is required by law to be provided by a carrier.
[brief] The Trial Court’s Ruling Was Sufficiently Detailed And Supported By Adequate Findings.**  Plaintiffs next argue the trial court failed to make adequate findings in support of its sanctions award.  (Pb33-Pb35).  Not so.  First, Plaintiffs’ characterization of the trial court’s ruling as “merely” consisting of a handful of remarks, (Pb34-Pb35), is simply wrong.  A review of the transcript demonstrates that the court’s decision was far more detailed than Plaintiffs suggest.  (See 2T13:20-19:1).  Second, the nature of the trial court’s ruling reflects the simple reality that Plaintiffs brought claims based on one single substantive allegation that was indisputably false.  No extensive analysis was required in this regard - indeed Plaintiffs conceded that a transaction between [...] and [...] \(^{12}\) Plaintiffs attempt to recast their tortious interference claim by arguing that [...]’s offer to [...] “caused the rupture of [Plaintiffs and [...]’] 20-year ‘mutually beneficial’ relationship, thereby damaging plaintiffs.
[brief] See, Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472 (1995).  Plaintiffs argue that [...] erred, because Petrillo did not specifically hold that legal malpractice actions by non-clients are only viable in transactional matters, as opposed to in adversarial proceedings.  (Pb40-41)  But as [...] correctly noted, “a review of the Petrillo decision demonstrates that although the Court never specifically limited the doctrine to transactional settings, the duty has not been extended to adversarial litigation settings, and the purposes underlying the extension of such a duty do not comport with the imposition of such a duty. ”  (Pa184)
[brief] Id. at cmt. d. (emphasis added).  Moreover, as the Restatement of the Law (Third) Liability for Economic Harm § 21 Malicious Prosecution similarly explains:  Criminal proceedings are not begun, for purposes of this Section, by the filing of a complaint or affidavit.  They are begun by the official action of a tribunal or official, namely, the issuance of some form of process that summons the accused party to court.  The most common form of such process is a warrant for arrest that brings the accused before a magistrate.  In the alternative, a grand jury may indict the accused or a prosecutor may file an information; those steps mark the start of criminal proceedings if no arrest warrant has yet issued.  Finally, proceedings can be started by a valid arrest made without a warrant.  If the arrest is invalid, no action for malicious prosecution will lie unless a further step is taken, such as bringing the accused before a magistrate for a preliminary hearing.  . . .  Simply stated, because the actions alleged by Plaintiffs to have been taken by [...] do not fall within the parameters set forth by the Restatement for institution of a criminal action, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Plaintiffs could not establish that essential element of such a claim.
[brief] On August 17, 2020, defendants [...] and [...] (vicariously) filed a motion for summary judgment.  [Pa199-257].  Their brief consisted of two brief points arguing only that Plaintiff could not, as a matter of law, establish proximate causation.  Their first brief point was as follows:  DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS CONFIRM PLAINTIFF CANNOT PRESENT A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF MALPRACTICE [Pa210].  Under this brief point, the movants argued nothing but the Brill standard for summary judgment, the point of which was “affording Plaintiffs [sic] all favorable inferences, Plaintiffs simply cannot satisfy the necessary element of proximate causation” and this was “as discussed more fully in Point II, infra. ”  [Pa211].  Their second brief point was addressed to proximate causation alone: PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH A JURY COULD FIND PROXIMATE CAUSE [Pa212].
[brief] (1029a-1031a); (1T13:3-21; 1T14:7-15:2; 1T20:6-22; 1T21:3-15; 1T22:1-24; 1T22:25-23:10).  The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohibits a state from denying “any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. ”  U.S. Const., amend. 14, §1.  “The Equal Protection Clause directs that ‘all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.
[brief] 2.  The Department fails to cite relevant authority or distinguish ours.  Save one inapposite case, the Department’s brief does not affirmatively ²  The Department (Db30) mis-cites Da691, when, from context, it means Da663. offer any cases to support its position—instead merely attempting to parry (unsuccessfully) [...]’s many authorities.  See Db31 (citing Application of Howard Sav. Inst. of Newark, 32 N.J. 29, 53 (1960)).  Based on Howard Savings, the Department argues that as long as “[the court] and the interested parties can and do understand fully the meaning of the decision and the reasons for it, no sufficient reason exists to remand for fuller and clearer findings and later reconsideration. ”  Db31.  But that principle has no role to play here and Howard Savings is markedly different from this case.  There, competitors of a bank for which the Department approved a new branch office argued that in determining whether the public interest would be served by it, the Commissioner “failed to make basic findings of fact. ”  32 N.J. at 52.  The court disagreed because “[t]here was really no [b]asic fact in” dispute, and thus, “no sufficient reason . . . to remand for fuller and clearer findings. ”  Id. at 52–53.  Here, [...] asserts that the Department created an illegal post hoc basis for its action, denying [...] notice of the legal basis of decision, which also prevented [...] from knowing what the Department deems “excessive,” see infra § I.B, or explaining why its requested rate increase is not.
[brief] ”  Pa120.  Nevertheless, [...] found that an “appropriate adjustment is warranted to account for an incremental value attributable to approvals secured by the seller in each [comparable sale] transaction. ”  Id.  In other words, his appraisal accounts for the fact that the subject property was not approved for development, and only had a probability that it could obtain approvals with any required zoning relief, when comparing the subject property to any comparable sales used in his appraisal that already had approvals, by making adjustments to account for the differences and the risks.
[brief] Yet “courts do not apply the exclusionary rule indiscriminately. ”  *Hamlett*, 449 N.J. Super. at 176 (citing *Gioe*, 401 N.J. Super. at 339).  Only evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights will be excluded.  *Ibid.* (citations excluded).  “[S]o long as the objectives underlying the warrant requirement remain intact, slight departures from strict compliance with the rules will not invalidate a search.