ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  The Abbott XX Ruling Imposed Express Mandates on the State’s Implementation of the SFRA to Ensure Continued Remediation of the T&E Violation in [...].  Like its QEA and CEIFA predecessors, the SFRA was enacted as a statutory mechanism to fund public education in all New Jersey districts.  But the SFRA was designed for an explicit constitutional purpose: to comply with the Supreme Court’s funding directives in the Abbott litigation to remedy the ongoing violation of T&E in [...] and the other Abbott districts.  In analyzing [...]’s claim of recurring funding shortfalls in its SFRA Adequacy Budget, the court below ignored this fundamental constitutional objective.  It then failed to analyze the factual record on the State’s implementation of the SFRA in [...] under the explicit mandates imposed by the Supreme Court in Abbott XX to maintain the SFRA’s constitutionality in the years following its enactment.
[brief] JUDGMENT ENTERED 4-3-08 …  Da 27-29 ORDER ENTERED 1-21-2022…………………………………………………………  Da 46 APPELLATE DIVISION ORDER ENTERED 2-4-22……………………………  Da 47 APPELLATE DIVISION OPINION  DECIDED 11-9-22…………………………  Da 57-67  CONSENT ORDER ENTERED 11-28-22………………………………………..  Da 68-69  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  This appeal seeks to reverse unjust orders entered after summary judgment was entered for Appellant.
[brief] Maggio, 266 N.J. Super. 116-17.  Here, the evidence clearly and unequivocally establishes that, at the time of the accident, plaintiff/decedent [...] and defendant [...] were co-employees employed by the same employer.  The decedent was employed as a nuclear medicine technologist for [...]. (Pa285).  Dember was employed as a Registered Nurse in the cardiac catheterization department for [...].  (Pa287).  Further, [...] certified that, “the decedent was employed by [...] Hospitals Corporation d/b/a [...] on October 6, 2021.
[brief] Regardless, Relator has no authority for its view.  In the sole case Relator cites, the statutory amendment expressly “applie[d] to pending complaints, which have not been dismissed. ”  See Roik v. Roik, 477 N.J. Super. 556, 574 (App. Div. 2024).  No such language appears in the 2023 Amendment.  Finally, contrary to Relator’s suggestion, the 2023 Amendment cannot apply in this case at all, including to alleged false claims submitted after the 2023 Amendment’s effective date.  Rb21–22.  Federal anti-retroactivity rules—which this court expressly relied on in Bayer—require courts to apply the pre-amendment version of the statute to the entire continuous course of conduct.  See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Zizic v. [...], 728 F.3d 228, 232 nn.3–4 (3d Cir. 2013) (applying only the pre-amendment public disclosure bar to an action alleging conduct both pre- and post-dating the 2010 federal amendment).  Thus, granting summary judgment for Defendants will end the case entirely.3
[brief] Sua Sponte Order Pa091  Case Management Order 11/23/21 Pa093 Motion to Amend Complaint 2/22/22 Pa095  Proposed Amended Complaint 2/22/2022 Pa097  Cross Motion Dismissing Complaint  3/31/22 Pa113  Certification by [...], Esq in Support of Motion  Pa116  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  On 7/8/2022, [...] (Plaintiff), an inmate at the [...] ([...]), sought relief from the Appellate Division after the Trial Court dismissed her Complaint alleging:
[brief] The appeals court may not substitute its own view of the evidence, especially with respect to findings of credibility.  See, *State v. Nunez-Valdez*, 200 N.J. 129, 141-142 (2009) (appellate court not at liberty to substitute its credibility findings); *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999), making it clear that “[a]ppellate courts should defer to trial courts’ credibility findings that are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record. ”  Accord, *State v. Dunbar*, 434 N.J. Super. 522, 526 (App. Div. 2014) (“We particularly defer to those findings that flow from the trial court’s opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, an opportunity not enjoyed by a reviewing court”).  A probate court’s post-trial factual findings as to testamentary capacity and undue influence “are entitled to great weight [on appeal] since the trial court had the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses and forming an opinion as to the credibility of their testimony. ”  *In re Will of Liebl*, 260 N.J. Super. 519, 523 (App. Div. 1992).  Unless the trial judge’s findings are “so manifestly unsupported or inconsistent with the competent, reasonably credible evidence” the factual conclusions should not be disturbed.  Id. at 524.  Accord, *Starkey, Kelly, Blaney & White v. Estate of Nicolaysen*, 340 N.J. Super. 104, 118 (App. Div. 2001).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE RECORD AND APPLICABLE LAW SUPPORT THE CHANCERY DIVISION’S VALIDATION OF THE DECEDENT’S WILL.
[brief] Commonwealth v. Gambora, 933 N.E.2d 50, 59, 61 n.22 (Mass. 2010).  But even then, the court has recognized that any overstatement could be harmless.  Id. at 60-61.  In reaching this determination, the court emphasized that evidence of a defendant’s guilt could be significant, rendering any alleged overstatement inconsequential to the jury’s judgment or only have a “very slight effect. ”  Id. at 61; see also Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 73 N.E.3d 798, 820-21 (Mass. 2017); Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 211 N.E.3d 622, 626 (Mass. 2023).  The court also acknowledged that any error could be mitigated by the expert’s other testimony, such as the facts that latent prints come from uncontrolled settings, that it is impossible to determine when latent prints are deposited, and that there may be issues with the surface from which a latent print is taken.  *Fulgiam*, 73 N.E.3d at 821.  The Massachusetts cases are not binding authority, and neither the expert nor the prosecutor was obligated to ensure that the testimony complied with another state’s expert rules.
[brief] The material facts relevant to the spot zoning determination are essentially undisputed.  An expert’s opinion that the adoption of the redevelopment plan amendments constitute spot zoning is essentially telling the court what the law provides, which is not the usual role of an expert witness.  To the extent that the planner [...] has provided the court with an analysis of what the facts show, with reference to spot zoning, the court has considered the report submitted, but it is noted that the court is not bound by planner [...]’s conclusions on the question of whether the adoption of the amendment to the redevelopment plan constitutes spot zoning.  [Pa63-64 (emphasis added)].
[brief] Moreover, even if [...] could be charged with knowledge of the Arora Report, it still provides no basis to conclude that the condition identified therein was dangerous.  The report identifies the subject portion of the roadway as being in “fair” condition.  (Pa111-12, Pa1343).  It does not describe it as dangerous or requiring immediate repair.  Id.  Even [...] conceded that “fair” condition is not indicative of a “dangerous” condition.  (Pa111-112, Pa1343).  Accordingly, Plaintiffs are wrong to ask that the Court charge [...] with actual knowledge of a dangerous condition.  Plaintiffs second argument asks this court to disregard black letter law and undermines the whole premise of a Certificate of Merit in a professional negligence lawsuit.
[brief] Yet, [...] does just that with respect to his argument that the Arbitrator awarded, and the trial court struck down, “fee shifting” that “violates public policy. ”  Twenty-eight times.  It is axiomatic that the “American rule” disfavoring attorney fee shifting implicates one adverse litigant reimbursing the other adverse litigant for legal fees paid by that adversary.  Had the Arbitrator ordered [...] to reimburse the [...] for any portion of the legal fees they personally incurred fighting [...], then [...] might have a point.  But that is unquestionably not what happened, and [...] knows it.  [...] caused [...] to enter the litigation and fight on his personal behalf, and against the [...]; he was ordered to reimburse [...], to which he was not adverse during Phase I.  [...] was found to have breached his fiduciary duty by causing [...] to engage in litigation that benefitted [...] personally rather than [...].  Thus, the award had nothing—zero—to do with “fee shifting.
[brief] (Pa87). ²,³  On July 8, 2019, the Legislature enacted L. 2019, c. 157  ¹  Because the procedural history and facts are closely related, they are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience.  ²  “Pa” refers to appellant’s appendix; “Pb” refers to his brief.  ³  A Service Retirement is provided for by N.J.S.A. 53:5A-8 for any member who has established twenty years of service in SPRS and also for troopers who were (the “Ricci Act”).
[brief] Q.  Do you know if you or anyone coming from your property have crossed that location where the walkover had previously existed subsequent to August 2nd of 2019?  A.  You mean after?  Q.  Correct, after.  A.  No one has used that since it has been closed off.  [Pra4].3  Defendants’ attempt at revisionist history is belied by the record.  [...] testified that he was the only witness from the [...] who provided the basis for the charge that [...] broke through the [...] fence.
[brief] Defendant-Respondent, [...] (the “Authority”) submits this brief in opposition to plaintiffs-appellants [...] (individually “Plaintiff”) and his wife [...]’s (collectively “Plaintiffs”) appeal from the order and judgement of the trial court dated April 10, 2023 and June 14, 2023 which granted summary judgment to the Authority and dismissed the Complaint based on Plaintiffs’ failure to meet the requirements under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.  This personal injury claim arises out of a September 2015 motorcycle accident which occurred on the Garden State Parkway.
[brief] Joinder was also required under Rule 4:28-1(a)(2)(ii), since if Plaintiff were successful, the City would have been subject to risk of incurring inconsistent obligations.  Nevertheless, Plaintiff again failed to name/join such persons in its third iteration of its Complaint.  The Trial Court thus appropriately found that Plaintiff had failed to join indispensable parties that would be “necessary to [any] judgment” in this action.  The Trial Court’s conclusion was factually and legally correct and Plaintiff’s appeal presents no basis to disturb same.  For these and other reasons detailed herein, the Trial Court’s Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint should be affirmed.
[brief] He went inside the [...] store with [...] to purchase a cell-phone.  [...] was standing next to him in the cell-phone store and suddenly decided to rob the store.  (2T 25-13 to 26-5)  [...] orchestrated the robbery, telling [...] what to do.  (2T 31-18 to 21)  [...] claimed that he simply went along with the robbery.  He identified the two people on the surveillance tape from the store, during the robbery, as him and [...].
[brief] [...]’s Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts and Counterstatement of Additional Material Facts  Ia569  Certification of [...] in Opposition to Summary Judgment Ia575  Certification of Counsel in Opposition to Summary Judgment  Ia595 • Exhibit A, Excerpts from [...] Deposition, May 17, 2021 Ia598 • Exhibit B, March 1, 2022  [...] email to [...]'s counsel Ia600 • Exhibit C, March 13, 2022 email to [...]'s counsel Ia611 • Exhibit D, May 19, 2022 letter from [...]'s counsel to Quinn Ia613 • Exhibit E, Copy of Section IV(B) of Covered Autos Liability Coverage Form, Business Auto Condition 2 Ia617 • Exhibit F, August 13, 2020  [...] letter to [...] Ia619 • Exhibit G, Excerpts from Deposition of [...] claims director [...] dated May 25, 2022 Ia628 • Exhibit H, October 7, 2019  [...] Claim acknowledgment letter Ia652 • Exhibit I, Relevant Parts of [...] Claim notes from October 8, 2019 to October 10, 2019  Ia654 • Exhibit J, Copy of Commercial General Liability Form CGOO 11207 that is part of the Master Policy, USF 319-334 Ia657 • Exhibit K, Unreported Opinion of New Jersey Appellate Division in *Dela Vega v. Travelers Ins. Co.*, 2022 NJ. Surzer. Unrzub. LEXIS 760 (May 6, 2022)
[brief] See [...] Chemical Corp. v. [...] Cas. & Sur. Co., 277 N.J. Super. 421, 431 (App. Div. 1994) (“Although New Jersey now has in effect regulations that govern mid-term cancellations of general liability insurance policies, see, e.g., N.J.A.C. 11:20-1 et seq., the lack of those regulations between November 1984 and September 17, 1985, did not authorize [...] to unilaterally terminate [...]’s policy mid-term without adequate and objective reasonable grounds.
[brief] Both [...] and [...] had their mobile video recorders (MVR) activated when they arrived at the scene.  On that footage, --- 3  The footage from both officer’s MVR’s was played for the jury.  See (4T:12-5  [...] is heard identifying a white Malibu as the car he observed chasing them.  However, as he continues to describe the events that transpired, [...]—mid sentence—says, “Officer, a Malibu, a (indiscernible) Malibu, a white, a white, not Malibu, Impala, followed, and it shot through this car. ”  (4T:23-18 to 24-7) (emphasis added).  At approximately 12:02 a.m., EMS arrived on scene and removed [...] from the driver’s seat and onto a stretcher to be transported to the hospital.  She had a weak pulse, but was not breathing on her own.  (4T:50-7 to 54-17).  At 12:13 a.m., her pulse slowed down even further.  At 12:16 a.m., EMS lost all signs of life.  EMS continued CPR and contacted the hospital seeking a TRE—termination of resuscitative efforts—due to the extensive brain injury.  At 12:16 a.m., EMS received authorization to discontinue lifesaving efforts and [...] Calhoun died as a result of her injury.
[brief] [...] devotes a significant portion of its opposition brief contending that the instant case is more analogous to Rocky Hill Citizens for Responsible Growth v. Planning Bd. of Borough of Rocky Hill, 406 N.J. Super. 384 (App. Div. 2009) than Willoughby v. Planning Board of Tp. of Deptford, 306 N.J. Super. 266 (App. Div. 1997).  ([...]b10-12).  The attempted distinction is ineffective, however, because, as explained in [...]’s initial Brief in Support of Appeal, the circumstances in the present case warrant an enlargement of time under the --- \(^1\)  This of course assumes, arguendo, that the governing body would have still adopted Ordinance No. 13-2022 and would not have acted differently with more robust public participation as the trial court observed subsequently occurred when [...] participated in the consideration of and voiced opposition to [...]’s site plan application as a member of the [...].
[brief] In both matters, the carriers filed suit against the Defendants seeking to recover compensatory damages as provided for by the Fraud Act.  In MDA, the Defendant MRI facility operated for a period of time when it did not possess an ambulatory care facility license.  In both cases, the carrier sought a declaration that the facilities’ bills issued while they operated illegally were not entitled to payment.  Both carriers further sought to recover the monies which they had previously paid in satisfaction of the facilities’ bills which were issued while the facilities operated illegally.  The MDA Court held that the proper measure of the carrier’s damages was “an award of compensatory damages [that] requires the full restoration or ‘restitution’ to plaintiff of all payments made to [...] during the relevant time period.
[brief] •  **[...]** …  [...] knowingly took money …, which he knew belonged to the partnership, and transferred it to Wilf-owned companies for services … never performed.  [...] established wholly owned companies for the sole purpose of syphoning … money he knew [...] and [...] were entitled to …  Those facts demonstrate [...] was not only aware of foreseeable harm, but consciously committed that harm.  As such, [N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-5.12(a)] is satisfied.  ….  ….  [T]he likelihood of harm resulting from [...][’s conduct during the non-RICO [SOL P]eriod was 100%.  N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-5.12(b)(l).  [...] knowingly transferred over $13 million dollars out of the partnership, which he knew should not have been taken … [and] with no intention of returning [it].  There is no conceivable way in which harm would not occur.  For that reason, the likelihood of harm during the non-RICO [SOL P]eriod was absolute.  ....  [Thus], [N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-5.12(b)(l)] is satisfied.  ....  [N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-5.12(b)(2)] is also met.  The same facts in the paragraph (a) analysis are relevant here.  ....  The evidence also established that [N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-5.12(b)(3)] is met.  [...][] knew the entire time his actions were causing harm and continued to wrongfully take [partnership] money ....  This callous disregard for the rule of law, demonstrates the need for the award of punitive damages.
[brief] Defendants, [...], Esquire & [...]  [...] (collectively, the “[...] Defendants”), ask this Court to affirm various Orders of the trial court, including the following:  1.  Order of January 19, 2016, Dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint against Defendants [...], Esq., and [...]; 2.  Order of November 10, 2016, Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the Order of January 19, 2016; 3.  Order of April 3, 2018, Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the Order of January 19, 2016; 4.  Order of January 24, 2020, Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend the Complaint; and 5.  Order of December 16, 2020, Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider the Order of January 24, 2020  Ever since the [...] Defendants were dismissed, with prejudice, from this case on January 19, 2016, plaintiffs have continuously attempted to bring [...] and [...] back into this case before the trial court, arguing various alternative theories.  Plaintiffs sought on numerous occasions to pour old wine in new bottles, meaning that plaintiffs repeatedly attempted to make the same arguments before the trial court in an attempt to obtain a different result.  It is respectfully submitted that this Court review the voluminous history of Motion practice by plaintiffs in an attempt to reconsider the proper dismissal of this case, with prejudice, as to the [...] Defendants, which occurred nearly seven years ago on January 19, 2016.  This matter is a complex legal malpractice action that arises out of a relatively substantial number of related complex land transactions, involving multiple parties and multiple lawsuits.
[brief] However, the Commission maintains that its deemed-adopted decision is a legally valid final agency decision that is owed the same deference as if the agency had acted to affirmatively adopt, modify, or reject the ALJ’s decision.  See *In re Hendrickson*, 235 N.J. 145, 160 (2018) (“[M]erely because the factual findings and rulings made by ALJs are oftentimes contingent on whether an agency accepts, rejects, or modifies an ALJ's decision does not mean that ALJs are second-tier players or hold an inferior status as factfinders.
[brief] This is particularly so where the lower court recently found that Defendants had “squandered the stay period. ”  Pa39.  In essence, the court below reached the same conclusion in finding that lawful interest equaled the contract interest.  Moreover, Defendants do not dispute that the certification of amount due of Plaintiff noted the $6,905.76 per diem, at the default rate.  Nor can they, as the basis of this entire action lies with the underlying Arbitration wherein the Arbitrator ruled that Plaintiff is “entitled to default interest for the entire time period past the maturity date, regardless of when that occurs, including the post-award or post-judgment periods.
[directive] c.  Você será obrigado a pagar uma multa compulsória de combate às drogas e redução da demanda (D.E.D.R.) conforme descrito abaixo para cada crime para o qual se declarar culpado?  As multas compulsórias são as seguintes: 1o (1) $3.000 para crimes de grau 2o (2) $2.000 para crimes de grau 3o (3) $1.000 para crimes de grau 4o (4) $750 para crimes de grau (5)
[brief] (Accord 9T56-19 to 58-11).  Given that defendant received marijuana from [...], but had obtained 1.5 kilograms of cocaine from another source, [...] properly found that defendant's arrest here for drug distribution was not a “one-off or a one-time incident. ” (15T29-5 to 10; accord 9T56-18 to 58-11).  Defendant also went to great lengths to avoid detection – he brought the marijuana from California to a La Quinta hotel in Reno, Nevada, where he hand-selected the best marijuana product.  (11T39-11 to 40-13; 11T159-23 to 160-1).  Defendant sealed the marijuana in “Smellyproof bags” or smell-proof bags to avoid detection.  (8T50-24 to 51-2).  He also enlisted the assistance of two cohorts, [...] and [...], whom defendant initially paid $5,000, to secrete these large quantities of marijuana into New Jersey.  (11T37-10 to 39-1; 11T42-1 to 43-5).  Employing cohorts to assist him with the delivery of this massive quantity of marijuana enhanced the likelihood defendant would be successful in his criminal endeavor.  The use of cohorts or accomplices “‘enhance[s] the probability’” that another will be successful in committing a crime.  State v. Williams, 263 N.J. Super. 620, 631 (1993) (quoting The New Jersey Penal Code: Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission 59 (1971)).
[brief] [...], I want to advise you that if you provide the Court with any false testimony you can be charged with perjury and the guilty plea could be withdrawn, do you understand that?  A  Yes.  Q  Do you have any difficulty with hearing, seeing or reading English?  A  No.  Q  How old are you?  A  Thirty-one.  Q  How far did you go in school?  A  I graduated.  Q  From high school?  A  Yeah, I graduated to college as well.  Q  Are you under the influence today from any alcohol, drugs or medication that could affect your ability to think clearly or understand the nature of today's proceeding?  A  No.  Q  I'll be asking you a series of questions that sometimes call for a yes or no answer, I do this so I can focus in on deciding whether or not to accept your guilty plea.  By asking you these questions I'm not trying to lead you into saying anything that is not true or what anyone else wants you to say, do you understand that?  A  Yes.  Q  If you feel you're being forced into an answer or being forced to say something which is not true by the way I or any attorney asks you a question let me know before you respond, do you understand that?  A  Yes.  Q
[directive] State, County and Municipal Law Enforcement Agencies and Other Agencies:  •  To identify specific members within the agency that shall be issued automatic or semi-automatic assault weapons and report this information to the county prosecutor or, in the case of certain state agencies, to the Division of Criminal Justice.  •  To schedule and conduct individual quarterly training programs, quarterly and semi-annual qualification as directed by this policy.  •  To maintain proper records concerning automatic/semi-automatic assault weapons, police carbine and scoped rifle training of agency personnel.  •  To take appropriate action when participants fail to qualify.  •  To provide the county prosecutor with assistance in the automatic and semi-automatic assault weapons qualification process as needed.  •  To report annually to the county prosecutor, or in the case of certain state agencies to the Division of Criminal Justice, concerning training and qualification activities conducted during the year.  The report is to include the number of participants who qualified and the number of participants who failed to qualify during each qualification session and the dates and types of qualification courses conducted.  •  To ensure compliance with the standards contained in this policy.  9-28 Revised (5/03) Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards Section 4.