ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] **POINT 5**  EAST HANOVER ORDINANCE 173-24(A) AND 173-27 ARE VOID FOR VAGUENESS AS A PERSON OF REASONABLE INTELLIGENCE WOULD NOT FATHOM THAT TRAPPING, FEEDING OR SHELTERING STRAY CATS CONSTITUTES CRIMINAL ABANDONMENT OR VIOLATES A LAW PROHIBITING THE PERMITTING OF CATS TO ROAM AT LARGE.
[directive] Not all findings by the Juvenile Referee will require fingerprinting, such as deferred dispositions, unless a juvenile 13 reoffends and a disposition requiring fingerprints is entered.  For any adjudications for offenses where fingerprints are required, the juvenile will need to be fingerprinted via Live Scan.  11  A DNA sample shall be taken prior to the juvenile’s release from custody, as statutorily required.  In any case where DNA has already been submitted, as confirmed on the juvenile’s CCH, Master Name Index (MNI), or Arrest Notification CJIS Response, a subsequent sample shall not be taken pursuant to N.J.S.A 53:1-20.22(d).  Further, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 53:1-20.20(h), “every juvenile adjudicated delinquent, or adjudicated not delinquent by reason of insanity, for an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime or a specified disorderly persons offense shall have a blood sample drawn or other biological sample collected for purposes of DNA testing. ”  “Specified disorderly persons offense” includes any disorderly persons offense relating to narcotics or dangerous drugs for which fingerprinting is required pursuant to N.J.S.A. 53:1- 18.1, excluding possession of 50 grams or less of marijuana, including any adulterants or dilutants, or five grams or less of hashish under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10; or any other disorderly persons offense for which fingerprinting is required pursuant to N.J.S.A. 53:1-15, excluding shoplifting (N.J.SA. 2C:20-11).  If a disposition is imposed which requires detention or confinement, the sample shall be collected upon commencement of the sentence.  Otherwise, the juvenile shall provide a sample as part of the disposition ordered by the court.  N.J.S.A. 53:1-20.20(h).  Juveniles See incarcerated or detained for qualifying offenses are required to provide a sample before termination of imprisonment, detention, supervision, or confinement.  N.J.S.A. 53:1- 20.20(h).  The County Prosecutor has the discretion to designate which law enforcement agency is responsible for post-adjudication DNA collection.  E.
[directive] 6.3.17  Upon final disposition of the complaint, in cases where the officer was not notified of the outcome through some written form of discipline, the officer shall be notified of the outcome of the case through a written internal agency communication.  6.3.18  In all cases, a letter shall be sent to the complainant explaining the outcome of the investigation.  If the allegation was unfounded or the officer was exonerated, this conclusion shall be stated and defined for the civilian complainant.  If the allegation was not sustained, the letter shall provide the complainant with a brief explanation why the complaint was not sustained (e.g., insufficient proof, lack of witnesses, etc.).  If the allegation was sustained and discipline was imposed, the letter shall state that the allegation was sustained and that the officer has been disciplined according to agency procedures.  See Appendix E.
[brief] B.  [...] did not demonstrate that its dock will not hinder navigation or access to adjacent water areas.  [Aa89-Aa91.]  The Docks Rule also requires that [...] demonstrate that “[t]he proposed structure and associated mooring piles do not hinder navigation or access to adjacent water areas. ”  N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5(b)9.  This requirement goes on to state that “[a] hazard to navigation will apply to all potential impediments to navigation, including access to adjacent moorings, water areas and docks and piers. ”  Id.  The Respondents’ analyses concerning the navigation requirement within the Docks Rule, in particular the [...]’s position that its review is limited to navigational channels, is contrary to the plain language of the Docks Rule.  The language in this subsection clearly states that it applies to “access to adjacent moorings, water areas and docks and piers. ”  Id.  Appellant’s adjacent waterfront facilities fall within this definition.
[brief] I.  The Lease  Tenant’s occupancy proceeded in phases.  In phase one, the pre-rent-commencement period spanning the first ten months of the Lease, no rent was charged to Tenant (Da13-Da15).  During that time, Tenant was responsible for furnishing to Landlord specifications for the construction of improvements and alterations to the space making it suitable to the proposed use of the Premises as a fitness facility as set forth in the Lease.  Tenant was obligated to perform “Tenant’s Work,” a defined term that meant, in pertinent part, “the improvements and installations necessary for Tenant’s use of the Premises . . . including, without limitation, installing a demising wall,” and “separating the --- 4
[brief] ’”  Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) quoting Roya Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).  Appellate courts also apply that deferential standard of review to a trial court’s fact-finding based on video or documentary evidence.  McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 271 (2019); State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 379 (2017); State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 270 (2015).  In addition, when interpreting a statute, the standard for New Jersey Courts is to determine the “intent of the Legislature[,]” Hardy v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 101 (2009) and must first consider the plain language of the statute because that is the best indicator of legislative intent.
[brief] AS A THRESHOLD ISSUE, THE PLAINTIFFS LACKED STANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION AND, THEREFORE, THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT STAND AS A MATTER OF LAW.  (Da260)  The Plaintiffs are barred from recovering as a matter of law, because they lack standing under corporate and LLC law.  As an “element of justiciability that cannot be waived or conferred by consent,” standing must be considered by the courts at any stage of litigation – even on appeal – because "standing involves a threshold determination which governs the ability of a party to initiate and maintain an action before the court."  Ordinarily, a litigant may not claim standing to assert the rights of a third party.  Standing is an important issue when shareholders (or, as is the case here, members) seek to advance claims for damages to a corporation or LLC, or for personal damages resulting from damages sustained by a corporation or LLC.  Corporations and LLCs are entities separate and apart from their shareholders/members.  Thus, when parties seek personal damages based on harm to a corporation or LLC in which they are shareholders/members, the court --- 6  In re Adoption of Baby T, 160 N.J. 332, 341 (1999).
[brief] North Carolina, where this accident occurred, likewise has financial responsibility laws specific to vehicle owners.  N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 20-279.21(b).  In recognition of financial responsibility laws, police reports concerning auto accidents will identify a vehicle owner, and the owner’s insurance policy.  The police report regarding the Accident did so in this case, identifying “[...]” as the vehicle owner, and “[...]” (“[...]”) as the insurer for financial responsibility purposes.
[brief] In a concurring opinion, [...] explained the importance of repose in the context of redevelopment:  Viewed against this statutory framework, the purpose of the time limitation is apparent.  Each step in the process depends upon the legitimacy of the original designation of the area as being one that is in need of redevelopment.  Just as the underlying purpose of the limitation set forth in the court rule is to “give an essential measure of repose to actions taken against public bodies,” even more so is repose to be honored in the redevelopment context.
[brief] Plaintiff appeals from the Trial Court’s September 13, 2023 Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint without prejudice.  (Pa1).  Moreover, the Court’s accompanying Memorandum of Decision plainly stated that the “Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice as to let Plaintiff proceed with this litigation in a proper manner,” not that Plaintiff was foreclosed by the Court’s September 13 Order and Decision.  (Pa3).  Pursuant to Rule 2:2-3(a)(1), an appeal may be taken to the Appellate Division as of right “from final judgments of the Superior Court trial divisions. ”  It is well established that an order dismissing a pleading without prejudice generally is not a final order subject to appellate review as of right under the Rule.  See Kwiatkowski v. Gruber, 390 N.J. Super. 235, 236-237 (App. Div. 2007); Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. Chemical and Pollution Sciences, 105 N.J. 464, 472 (1987); Malhame v. Borough of Demarest, 174 N.J. Super. 28, 30-31 (App. Div. 1980).
[directive] Agencies may access and use stored non-alert data where such access, which may be automated, might reasonably lead to the discovery of evidence or information relevant to an investigation that is not related to a specific criminal event.  Such access must be approved by the Agency ALPR Coordinator or their designee.  Crime trend analysis shall not result in the disclosure of personal identifying information (such as name, address, SSN, vehicle operator’s license number) to an authorized user or any other person unless (a) there exist “specific and articulable facts that warrant further investigation” of possible criminal or terrorist activity by the driver or occupants of a specific vehicle and access has been approved by a designated supervisor; or (b) disclosure of personal identifying information concerning any vehicle plate scanned by the ALPR is authorized by a grand jury subpoena.3
[brief] Da4.  On January 3, 2024, [...] filed its motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement, which [...] opposed.  Pa197.  As [...] had already vacated the premises as of the date of the motion, it did not object to the Trial Court’s entry of the Consent Judgment for possession on January 4, 2024.  Pa228.  The Trial Court heard oral argument on February 4, 2024.
[brief] In alleging suspicious circumstances, the Petitioner repeatedly argues about the Respondent’s “self-serving testimony. ” (Pb 22-23).  Aside from the fact much testimony as a matter of course has this characteristic, the Petitioner ignores the fact that multiple fact witnesses presented credible testimony detailing the unhappiness and despair of the Decedent’s marriage.  These witnesses included [...], [...], and [...].  Thus, the record at trial contains four witnesses testifying about the Decedent’s unhappy marriage.  In attempting to hurdle this powerful cumulative evidence, the Petitioner cites cards written to him by the Decedent expressly love and affection.  (Pb 22).  The Respondent’s response is two-fold.  **First**, marriages and human relationships are complex ecosystems, which often contain contradictory feelings and actions.  The fact that the Decedent may have expressed affection in writing does nothing to discount the deep unhappiness within.  If the Petitioner thinks the marriage was so great, why were there multiple separations?  And why would he have written this letter to the Decedent?  * * *
[brief] (CONT'D.)  POINT  IV  THE MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR A NEW SENTENCING HEARING  BECAUSE THE SENTENCING PROCEEDING WAS RIDDLED WITH ERROR, BOTH FACTUAL AND LEGAL, AND BECAUSE THE 20-YEAR TERM THE COURT IMPOSED, WHICH IS GREATER THAN THE SENTENCE THE STATE REQUESTED, IS EXCESSIVE.  (30T 59-22 to 61-24; Da 9-14)...........................................  32  A.  The failure-to-confess and express-remorse errors .................. 35  B.  The error in parsing the jury’s passion/provocation verdicts.........................................................................................  39  C.  The failure to find mitigating factors (8) and (9) ......................  41  D.  The misapplication of the Yarbough factors.............................  42  E.  The Torres error........................................................................  44  F.  The cumulative effect of the numerous sentencing errors warrants reversal and resentencing, which should be held before a different judge...........................................  45  CONCLUSION .........................................................................................
[brief] Respondent asserts that Respondent’s “posts did not undermine public confidence in the Board or compromise it. ”  Rb14.  They obviously did.  The record contains direct evidence – including the Board’s own minutes, official Resolutions passed by the Board, actual litigation filed against the Board as a result of Respondent’s conduct, and news coverage of Respondent’s conduct – which clearly shows that Respondent actually compromised the Board.
[brief] II.  THE MSRA  Shortly before the promotions in this matter, on May 27, 2016, then-Governor [...] signed into law, S-1711/A-2569 the MSRA, N.J.S.A. 52:27 BBBB-1, et seq., P.L. 2016, c. 4.  The law took effect immediately.  The MSRA provides a mechanism for the State and its designees to take over complete control of the City, including staffing, labor contracts, promotions, and pay.  The vast powers relevant to this matter were not triggered until the City was afforded an opportunity to submit a financial recovery plan.  See N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-5.  On or about November 9, 2016, over four (4) months after the promotions, the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs Local Finance Board voted to vest powers under the MSRA to the then-Director of Local Government Services, [...].  On or about November 14, 2016, [...] (“[...]”) was selected as Designee of the Director of the Division of Local Government Services in the Department of Community Affairs.  In that capacity, [...] had full control of the City pursuant to the terms of the MSRA.  Lieutenant Governor [...] replaced [...] after Governor [...] was inaugurated.  Defendant [...] later assumed the role of Director of the Division of Local Government Services in the Department of Community Affairs.  The broad provisions of the MSRA, N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-5 (g)-(i), grant the following powers, *inter alia*, to the Director: (g) unilaterally modifying, amending, or terminating any collective negotiations agreements, except those related to school districts, to which the municipality is a party, or unilaterally modifying, amending, or terminating the terms and conditions of employment during the term of any applicable collective negotiations agreement, or both, provided that the director determines that the modifications, amendments, or terminations are reasonable and directly related to stabilizing the finances or assisting with the fiscal rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery; (h) acting as the sole agent in collective negotiations on behalf of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery; (i) with respect to any expired collective negotiations agreement to which the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery is a party, unilaterally modifying wages, hours, or any other terms and conditions of employment; N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-5.
[brief] She slowly made her way up the East Coast leaving a wake of destruction that was front page news on a daily basis.  On September 1, 2021 the Governor declared a state of emergency for the entire state.  Ida reached the New York metropolitan area the following day.  [...] gave notice of the damage to Defendant including some photos on the day of the storm.  [...], then assistant manager (now manager) promised that they would pay to repair the damage but were unable to pay for damage to inventory.  Some time afterwards Defendant supplied photos of the damage and repairs that were underway.  Plaintiff provided Defendant with repair invoices based upon [...]’s promise to pay.  At that point [...] informed Plaintiff that they would not be paying.  Both management and unit owners were on site when Ida hit.  Management begged Plaintiff to assist in getting workers to remove the water and repair the damage as expediently as possible as it was difficult to hire workers as there was a huge demand dealing with the aftermath.  While Defendant made repairs in the aftermath of the 2014 storm there were no observable improvements made to the property to prevent a reoccurrence.  In the aftermath of Ida Defendant apparently recognized that if they did not take some action this cycle was likely to repeat in the future and so Defendant installed a gate at the top of the stairs leading to a courtyard that had flooded both times as water cascaded down the stairs and accumulated at a double glass door, waist high (as the air conditioning compressors adjacent to the doors were under water).  Now, when the gate is closed any accumulation of water instead of flowing down the stairs would instead flow through newly created rectangular holes in what had previously been a solid wall and would fall to the cliffs below.  A relatively small amount of water would penetrate around the edges of the gate and flow through a drain.  This should and most certainly could have been done previously.  No different than a landlord repairing a broken banister after the tenant fell on the stairs or closing the barn door after the horses got out.  Per the By Laws
[brief] In fact, once he received notice from the post office that he was using wrong addresses then he could have simply looked up Defendant’s residence on the internet, which at the time was listed there.  As well, he could have applied for substituted service with the court after his alleged mailings were returned.  In fact, his complaint admits he mailed to a post office box in [...], not a residence as mandated by law.  Yet knowing there was no notice to Defendant, he then filed and obtained three default judgments against her—all of which the court later vacated when Defendant proved Plaintiff’s false filings.  This speaks for itself as to Plaintiff’s gamesmanship and abusing the process to leverage a judgment against Defendant.
[brief] However, the Implementation Monitor has held meetings with the Borough and Redeveloper, and has submitted two separate status reports to the Court dated August 31, 2021 and February 22, 2022.  Neither of the status updates to the Trial Court by [...] paint the harrowing picture of bad faith delays by the Borough described by [...], but rather, depict a municipality that is fully abiding by the Redevelopment Agreement and its statutory obligations.  In fact, in the Trial Court's Order (referenced numerous times in Appellant's papers) dated March 16, 2021, it specifically states "There clearly has been a delay in implementation of the previously approved plan and timeline provided for under the Settlement Agreement and subsequent orders.  What is not clear at this time is whether the Borough's actions, or inactions, are solely responsible for the delay at this state."  POINT III
[brief] The State relies upon its Statement of Facts and Procedural History contained within its merits brief. \(^1\)  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14A(5)  DEMONSTRATES CLEAR LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO BAR THE DEFENDANT FROM ENTRY INTO THE RECOVERY COURT PROGRAM FOR UNLAWFULLY POSSESSING A FIREARM WHILE CRIMINAL CHARGES WERE PENDING IN MORRIS COUNTY.  (Addressing Defendant’s Point IA)  Defendant [...] argues the State is attempting to create a new disqualifying category to bar him from entry into the Recovery Court program as a Track One applicant.  (Db 9). \(^2\)  According to the defendant, the State intends to bar applicants solely as the result of the commission of a firearm offense while the applicant is released on bail or pretrial release and prior to the filing of a Recovery Court application.  (Db9).  This does not represent the State’s position.  The State is simply requesting this Court to effectuate the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(5) (hereinafter referred to as “factor a(5)”), and apply it as the Legislature intended, thus barring this defendant from entry into the Recovery Court program.  To do otherwise would lead to an absurd result as detailed in Point IIC of the State’s merits brief.  ---
[brief] For purposes of clarity and streamlining this appeal, [...] elected not to file a cross-appeal of the Law Division’s dismissal of its counterclaims against [...].  hesitate to grant summary judgment. ”  *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 540  Credibility questions are not properly resolved on a motion for summary judgment.  *Tannenbaum & Milask, Inc. v. Mazzola*, 309 N.J. Super. 88, 93 (App. Div. 1998)  In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe the facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.  *Pollock v. American Tel. & Tel. Long Lines*, 794 F.2d 860, 864 (3rd. Cir. 1986)  The role of the reviewing Court is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. ”  *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*  477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)  When deciding a motion for summary judgment, courts evaluate whether “the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  *Brill*, 142 N.J. at 540  Such a determination requires “a searching review” of the record, *id.* at 541, and further requires that all “legitimate inferences” deriving from the evidence in the record be made in the non-moving party’s favor.  *Id.*  **Summary Judgment Where Record Evidence of Damages Is Insufficient.
[directive] Na poniższe pytania powinny odpowiedzieć tylko osoby przyznające się do popełnienia przestępstwa z art. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2 tj. kradzieży samochodu, a do naruszenia doszło 2 kwietnia 1991 r. lub później, albo przyznające się do popełnienia przestępstwa z art. nielegalnego zajęcia pojazdu silnikowego (tzw. „joyriding”), a 2C:20-10 N.J.S.A. przestępstwo miało miejsce 2 sierpnia 1993 r. lub później.  The following questions need to be answered only if you are pleading guilty for violation of 2C:20-2 for theft of an N.J.S.A. automobile and the offense occurred on or after April 2, 1991, or for a violation of 2C:20-10 for unlawful taking of a motor N.J.S.A. vehicle ("Joyriding") and the offense occurred on or after August 2, 1993.
[brief] (Pa1215).  On January 31, 2024 plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the January 12, 2024 and January 26, 2024 orders seeking compliance of those orders with Rule 1:7-4(a) and enforcement of his litigant’s rights as to his entitlement to the child tax credit for the even year 2022 as directed in the March 1, 2023 JOD opinion.  (Pa1225).  On February 8, 2024 the court scheduled plaintiff’s motion for a remote hearing on March 8, 2024.
[directive] 1.  All health care facilities in New Jersey that possess mechanical ventilators for the care of all patients requiring use of such ventilators must determine whether to adopt a written policy to govern the allocation of mechanical ventilators during the public health emergency arising from COVID-19.  Such a policy may, in addition, govern the allocation of other scarce medical resources.  2.  A health care facility that adopts the Department of Health's model policy Allocation of Critical Care Resources  During a Public Health Emergency, as well as the health care facility's agents, officers, employees, servants, representatives and volunteers, shall not be civilly liable for any damages arising from an injury to a patient caused by any act or omission pursuant to, and consistent with, such policy.  Such immunity supplements any other immunities and defenses that may apply.  This Directive shall take effect immediately.  The provisions of this Directive shall remain in force and effect for the duration of the Public Health Emergency originally declared in EO 103 pursuant to the New Jersey Emergency Health Powers Act, N.J.S.A. 26:13-1 et seq., unless modified, supplemented and/or rescinded, but the immunity conferred by Paragraph 2 of this Directive shall continue in perpetuity.