ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See id. at 19:23-25.  While he claimed not remember specifically when he learned of Plaintiff’s reasons for FMLA leave, he admitted that he had specifically reviewed Plaintiff’s FMLA file.  See 5T at 84:4-10.  In fact, he claimed to that he would obtain this information from [...] who was both the Township’s head of HR and [...]’s Secretary.  See 4T at 11:10-12; 25:6-26:5.  As for [...], while she claimed at times not to know why Plaintiff was on FMLA leave, she also specifically testified that she “knew why [plaintiff] wasn’t there. ”  3T at 153:24-25.  In short, when the above referenced evidence is considered as a whole, with all reasonable inferences being held in favor of upholding the verdict (as the court is required to do on this motion), it cannot seriously be stated that there was “no evidence” of Plaintiff facing discrimination/hostile work environment because of her disability.
[brief] In fact, he did not suffer any repercussions.  In the Matter of [...], Investigator, Secured Facilities, [...], [...], [...] --- \(^6\)  In its Statement in Lieu of Brief, the CSC acknowledges that “[...] conversed with a coworker, watched television, and could be seen at times with his eyes closed”.  All of these activities could only have been witnessed by a coworker (i.e. [...]) who, likewise, had to have abandoned his post to make these observations. ” (CSC Statement at 4).
[brief] Summary Judgment Standard  The trial court’s ruling improperly allowed Plaintiff to survive summary judgment by showing only the mere possibility of a product defect.  See Triffin v. Am. Intern., 372 N.J. Super. 517, 523-24 (App. Div. 2004) (respondent must show more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” to survive summary judgment); see also Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 529 (1995) (noting that a party cannot survive summary judgment based on “a mere scintilla” of evidence).  That is not the law.
[brief] To find new extra-textual rights in the United States Constitution, the Court must conclude that the right, as “careful[ly] descri[bed]” by the litigant advancing it, is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. ”  *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 720–21.  The argument that children have a privacy right to keep secret from their parents the fact that their school is socially transitioning them does not come close to satisfying this standard.
[brief] After efforts to enforce the subpoena without court intervention failed, Plaintiffs were forced to file a motion in an effort to secure the Tenant Defendants’ leases that were supposed to be produced on March 13, 2019.  [Pa174-196].  As Plaintiffs’ counsel explained in this Certification, this law office had “completed transactional work and tenant leases for the property where the subject accident took place, and is therefore in possession of tenant leases and liability policies regarding said property. ”  An order compelling compliance with the subpoena was issued on April 12, 2019.  [187-188].  Plaintiffs served the order compelling production on the parties’ law firm but, yet again, there was no production -- so on April 29, 2019, Plaintiffs were forced to move, yet again, to compel production of the leases, so that they could confirm the actual identity of the tenants in possession on the date of the accident and ascertain what contractual duty they may have had to remove the snow and ice.  [Pa189-196].  That motion was withdrawn when the leases and related transactional work, including the insurance policies issued by the true parties in interest, were finally produced shortly before the return date.  [Pa197].  After reviewing the leases in place on the date of the accident, and believing that this information confirmed the identity of the tenants in actual possession of parts of the Premises, and reviewing the lease terms, Plaintiffs had done the work needed to comply with Rule 1:4-8, and filed a motion to amend the complaint to identity and add some of Respondents as some of the “John Doe" defendants identified in the complaint.
[brief] There is record evidence, in the form of [...]’ deposition testimony, that establishes that Defendant [...] permitted the staffing coordinators to add the charge pay as long as she did not face any negative consequences.  (Pa661).  Specifically, [...] testified as follows:  So I said why can we not at least get charge pay, which is one dollar an hour.  And she said, in front of several people, you can get charge pay, as long as I don’t get in trouble.  (Pa230).  Defendants dispute that Defendant [...] approved the charge pay.  However, Plaintiff is entitled to all legitimate inferences regarding factual disputes at the summary judgment phase.  Moreover, while there may not be any corroborating witnesses, there is (contrary to the Trial Court’s opinion) circumstantial evidence that would lend credence to the notion that Defendant Conciello may have done so, and would support [...]’ testimony.  First, Defendant [...] herself testified that she advocated for the staffing coordinators to get COVID-19 incentive pay that was denied them by Defendant [...] because they were not involved in direct patient care.  (Pa42).  Defendant [...] also admitted that she was aware of [...] receiving charge pay at least once and took no action to correct it, or to discipline [...].  (Pa362, Pa661).  If Defendant [...] authorized the charge pay, Defendants’ entire stated reason for termination crumbles.  A pretextual rationale for termination is sufficient for Defendants’ summary judgment motion to be denied under McDonnell Douglas.
[brief] NJSA 40:55D-62(a), NJSA 40:55D-89(d), NJSA 40:55D-28(b)1, NJSA 40:28(b)2(d), NJSA 40:55D-26; Medici v. [...], supra, at 20, [...], supra at 381.  Plaintiffs’ claim is incorrect that traffic was expressly excluded from the concerns of the Planning Board for the SM Zone when that body drafted the 1999 Master Plan and by the governing body when it adopted implementing ordinances.
[brief] In addition to various findings of fact, the trial court made the following pertinent conclusions of law in granting the [...]’ motion for summary judgment:  •  In dismissing Count 1 of the First Amended Complaint (breach of contract), “All damages set forth by [Appellants] relate directly to their loss of the Solar Project.  The facts demonstrate that [Appellants] defaulted under their Lease for the subject Property, lost possessory interest in the Property upon which the Solar Project was to be built, and subsequently lost the Solar Rights for which they claim damages.
[brief] “An issue not raised below will not be considered for the first time on appeal. ”  N. Haledon Fire Co. No. 1 v. Borough of N. Haledon, 425 N.J. Super. 615, 631 (App. Div. 2012).  See also Brock v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 149 N.J. 378, 391, (1997).  Soc'y Hill Condo. Ass'n v. Soc'y Hill Assocs., 347 N.J.Super. 163, 177–78 (App. Div. 2002).  In any event, neither a 1986 end date nor a 1993 end date reflects the nature of property damage at issue here.
[brief] The trial court was obviously analyzing how the Defendant’s construction was logically flawed, not imposing additional protections for the Plaintiff.  The court’s reasoning becomes even clearer when considering the actual circumstances that unfolded, including the timing and implications of the Estoppel Certificate delivery.  When the Estoppel Certificate was delivered it was on the eve of the rescheduled closing.  As of then Plaintiff’s costs exceeded $275,000 making the decision to terminate a difficult one.  (Da185.)
[brief] (2T30-12-16; 2T32-21-24).  During the plenary hearing, Appellant testified that he submitted a change of address to the Post Office, changing his address from [...] to [...], but did not indicate whether he ever resided at the NJ Address.  (2T26-10-25; 2T27-1-8).  Notably, also, Appellant failed to submit any evidence at the hearing showing proof of the change of address or providing any proof whatsoever regarding his actual residence or the acceptance of mail at the NJ Address.  (2T, generally).  Instead, the opposite – Appellant admitted that his father and brother routinely receive mail at the NJ Address and that even his workers compensation checks and/or social security checks are sent to the NJ Address – then and still now.
[brief] In this case, the record is devoid of evidence that [...] was incompetent, that Plaintiff’s harm arose from that alleged incompetence, or that [...] knew or should have known of that incompetence.  In fact, the record shows that [...] was experienced at procuring restaurant supplies on behalf of several companies and individuals that engage his services.  He successfully worked for [...] since 2018 with no incident.  (Pa00069, Pa00085)  No reasonable factfinder could find that even if [...] was indeed incompetent at the time of the accident, that the incompetence would qualify as an exception to the well-established rule.  Thus, no exceptions apply to abrogate [...]’s status as independent contractor at the time the incident, whether or not he was shopping on behalf of [...], thereby nullifying any attribution of liability to [...].  As there is no material fact in dispute as to [...]’s status as an independent contractor, the trial court correctly ruled that [...] was entitled to judgement as a matter of law.  This ruling should be affirmed.
[directive] Special Provisions Governing the Use of BWCs when Investigating Underage Alcohol and Marijuana Use.  Consistent with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-15a(4), the video and audio recording functions of an officer’s BWC shall be activated whenever the officer is responding to a call for service related to an underage person who is suspected of violating the law with respect to possessing or consuming an alcoholic beverage, marijuana, hashish, or a cannabis item, or at the initiation of any other law enforcement or investigative encounter between an officer and a person related to a violation or suspected violation of that provision.  The BWC shall remain activated until the encounter has fully concluded and the officer leaves the scene and shall not be deactivated based on a request by a person who is the subject of the call for service related to a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-15, or for any other reason.  5.5
[brief] When the Borough did not in any way respond to that letter and did nothing to issue stop work orders, [...] filed municipal court complaints which raised those issues.  While the [...] awaited a trial date on the municipal court complaints, and fully expecting that the Defendants would stop moving ahead with their construction and plans to open, they awoke on May 12, 2020 to [...]’s opening with a full Italian restaurant menu with illegal signs, no permits, and a massive increase in the operation that was previously put to the premises by [...].  It was at that time, when the mysterious 1984 Resolution was finally produced to the [...] and counsel.  Within twenty days, the [...] filed suit and sought an injunction.
[brief] These arguments should be found to be wholly unconvincing.  In support of its contentions, Appellant relies first upon the case of *Oubre v. Entergy Operations*, 522 U.S. 422 (1998).  Appellant asserts that the import of *Oubre*’s holdings are that a revocation pursuant to OWBPA is limited to Age Discrimination in Employment Act (hereafter “ADEA”).
[brief] In this appeal, Plaintiff [...] ("Plaintiff" and/or "Andreula"), contests the well-reasoned decision of the trial court dismissing all claims as against all defendants.  In doing so, Plaintiff’s appeal fails to set forth a reasonable basis to overturn the trial court’s dismissal.  Since the inception of this case, Defendants maintained that Plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.  Notwithstanding the filing of two complaints, Plaintiff’s claims remained devoid of critical facts necessary to state a claim under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination for the simple reason -- no such facts exist.  Contrary to Plaintiff’s contentions, the trial court performed a nuanced analysis of Plaintiff’s allegations, applied well-settled legal principles, and correctly determined that Plaintiff (1) failed to sufficiently plead two of the three elements of a claim for retaliation under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, namely, an adverse employment action and a causal connection between any of the alleged wrongful conduct and the filing of Plaintiff’s first lawsuit five years earlier; (2) cannot state a cognizable claim for individual liability as against her co-worker, Defendant [...]; and (3) failed to sufficiently plead facts against Defendant [...] so as to satisfy the pleading standard for aider and abettor liability.  This, despite having availed herself of two bites at the proverbial apple.  Put directly, blanket assertions, supposition, and self-serving extrapolations, in the absence of a well-pled factual foundation, are insufficient to state a claim under even the most liberal application of New Jersey law.  The trial court recognized the lack of legal merit to Plaintiff’s claims and properly dismissed Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint in its entirety.  The trial court’s dismissal of this matter was proper and in accordance with well-settled New Jersey law and should be affirmed.
[brief] Ma40 to Ma41  TABLE TO CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX  State Omnibus Motion for Joinder and to Admit Certain Other Crime Evidence, filed August 12, 2024...........................................  Ca1 to Ca33  Police Investigative Reports filed with State Omnibus Motion......................................................................................... Ca34 to Ca59  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS  Order Denying State’s Omnibus Motion by the Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated October 28, 2024.......................Ma19 to Ma20 Order Denying Reconsideration by the Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated December 17, 2024........................................ Ma22 Order Denying Stay by Hon. [...], J.S.C., dated December 19, 2024 ................................................................. Ma25 TABLE OF CITATIONS 1T – October 24, 2024, Omnibus Motion Decision Transcript 2T – December 13, 2024  Motion for Reconsideration Transcript 3T – December 19, 2024  Motion for Stay Transcript Ma – Appendix to this brief Ca – Confidential Appendix to this brief STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] Da428-29; Da480 (the "Second Stipulation Confirming Award"; together with the First Stipulation Confirming Award, the "Award Judgments").  On May 10, 2023, Plaintiff moved for final judgment, also filing, in support, the Certification of Amount Due of [...] where he identified the full amount of the Arbitration Award together with all post award interest as awarded by the Arbitrator and seeking post judgment interest at the contract rate for the post judgment period.  Da104; Da40, Da 42, Da45.
[brief] ”  *Miller v. Reis*, 189 N.J. Super. 437, 444 (App. Div. 1983).  The “broad measure of protection” to which insureds are entitled pursuant to their reasonable expectations “includes an insistence that, with respect to statutes which enable insurance companies to shed risks voluntarily undertaken, those companies comply strictly with the statutory requirements. ”  *Id.* at 444 (emphasis added).  There is “no reason to dilute this stated policy, derived from legislative fiat, in matters of cancellation.  If an insurance company intends to cancel a policy pursuant to the statute, *it must say so expressly.*”  *Id.* (emphasis added).  There is no New Jersey caselaw specifically referencing cancellation of insurance under CCIP or OCIP policies, but there was no basis in New Jersey law that allowed the trial court to ignore the usual rules for insurance contracts and conclude that coverage under a CCIP policy could be cancelled without the insured’s knowledge.
[brief] FACTS  .................................................................................................................................1  LEGAL ARGUMENT..............................................................................................................1  I.  RESPONDENT-PLAINTIFF  RECOGNIZES THAT [...] DOES NOT REQUIRE A WRITTEN STATEMENT OF WAIVER TO LITIGATORS SUCH AS PLAINTIFF AND HIS PROFFERED INTERPRETATION OF THE TWO PROVISIONS OF THE SHAREHOLDER’S AGREEMENT REGARDING ARBITRATION  DO NOT MAKE ANY SENSE AND RENDERS  THE PROVISIONS OF THE SHAREHOLDER’S AGREEMENT MEANINGLESS..................................................1  CONCLUSION
[brief] Statutory Background.  The New Jersey Legislature enacted the LAD in 1945, making it “the first state anti-discrimination statute in the nation. ”  *L.W. ex rel. L.G. v. Toms River Reg’l Sch. Bd. of Educ.*, 189 N.J. 381, 399 (2007).  Its purpose, our Supreme Court has explained, “is nothing less than the eradication of the cancer of discrimination. ”  *C.V. v. Waterford Twp. Bd. of Educ.*, 255 N.J. 289, 306-07 (2023) (citation omitted); see also *L.W.*, 189 N.J. at 400 (agreeing that the LAD must be “liberally construed” to effectuate “the Legislature’s broad remedial objectives” in eradicating discrimination).  The LAD has therefore prohibited unlawful discrimination in all places of public accommodation since 1949, Pub. L. 1949, ch. 11—a prohibition that covers unlawful discrimination in “any kindergarten, primary and secondary school, ... [or] high school,” N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(l); see also, e.g., *C.V.*, 255 N.J. at 307.  Since 1991, the LAD has expressly barred discrimination on the basis of “sexual orientation,” Pub. L. 1991, ch. 519, and since 2006, it has expressly barred discrimination on the basis of “gender identity or expression. ”  N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f); Pub. L. 2006, ch. 100; see also, e.g., *Holmes v. Jersey City Police* --- 1  Because the procedural history and statement of facts are closely related, they have been combined for efficiency and the Court’s convenience.  Dep’t, 449 N.J. Super. 600, 601, 605-06 (App. Div. 2017).  This prohibition on unlawful discrimination extends to disparate treatment and disparate impact alike.  See N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f) (prohibiting any place of public accommodation from engaging in discrimination “directly or indirectly”); see also Gerety v. Atl. City Hilton Casino Resort, 184 N.J. 391, 398 (2005) (noting “disparate treatment and disparate impact” are both “cognizable under the LAD”); Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 77 N.J. 55, 81-82 (1978).  The LAD empowers the [...] and [...] to enforce these bedrock protections.  Almost eight decades ago, the Legislature established what is now the [...] in the [...], which today enjoys “general jurisdiction and authority” to “prevent and eliminate” all “discrimination” the LAD prohibits.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-6.  New Jersey law likewise vests in the [...] the broad authority to “[e]xercise all powers of the division. ”  N.J.S.A. 10:5-8(a), (g).  The statute allows the [...] and [...] to proceed in an administrative forum or in the Superior Court against any party they believe is violating the LAD.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-8.2, -13.  And where the [...] and [...] proceed administratively, state law empowers them to proceed “in a summary manner in the Superior Court of New Jersey to obtain an injunction prohibiting such person from continuing such practices or engaging therein or doing any acts in furtherance thereof” while the administrative action proceeds.  N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1; see also, e.g., Pfaus v. Palermo, 97 N.J. Super. 4, 8 (App. Div. 1967).  B.
[brief] Pa310; Pa316.  That decision was erroneous.  Indeed, the trial court conceded that disqualification need not necessarily be premised upon an actual conflict; “a potentially serious” conflict will suffice.  Pa309; Pa315 (citing United States v. Jones, 381 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2004)).  In Jones, cited by the trial court, the Second Circuit upheld disqualification of counsel in a criminal proceeding where defendant’s attorney was “likely” to be called as a witness.  The Second Circuit held that a “potential conflict of interest” arises “if the interests of the defendant could place the attorney under inconsistent duties in the future. ”  Id. at 119 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Kliti, 156 F.3d 150, 153 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1998)); see Haynes v. First Nat’l State Bank of N.J., 87 N.J. 163, 181 (1981) (a conflict need not be obvious or actual as the “mere possibility of conflict at the beginning of a relationship is enough to establish an ethical breach”); Clark v. Corliss, 98 N.J. Super. 323, 327 (App. Div. 1967) (a lawyer should avoid circumstances where “a conflict is likely to develop” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  Although rightfully recognizing that the CNA could create a conflict amongst defendants at trial, the trial court wrongly determined that no conflict existed at the pleading stage.  The conflict here is actual and real – representation of joint defendants in joint liability cases under the CNA creates a per se conflict.
[brief] Defendants argue the Trial Court abused its discretion in holding that a Rule 403 balancing test did require the exclusion of the police dash cam audio.  To be sure, Defendants do not argue on appeal that the video with audio is not relevant.  Rather, the Defense contends only that the purported inflammatory nature of the audio made it prejudicial such that this prejudice outweighed the probative value.  The Court cannot, however, look only at the prejudicial nature of the evidence to determine if Rule 403 requires its exclusion.  As required by the Rule, the Court must weigh the probative value against the risk of undue prejudice.  i.  **The MVR dash cam video with audio is relevant evidence concerning her pain and suffering damages**  Under New Jersey law, a tortfeasor is liable for all damages that naturally and proximately flow from his tort.  *Ciluffo v. Middlesex Gen’l Hosp.*, 146 N.J. Super. 476, 482 (App. Div. 1977).  To this end, “a civil plaintiff has a constitutional right to have a jury decide the merits and worth of her case. ”  *Johnson v. Scaccetti*, 192 N.J. 256, 279 (2007).  “[T]he standard for measuring damages for personal injuries to be reasonable compensation and has entrusted the administration of this criterion to the impartial conscience and judgment of jurors who may be expected to act reasonably, intelligently and in harmony with the evidence. ”  *Botta v. Brunner*, 26 N.J. 82, 94 (1958) (citations omitted).  “[P]ain and suffering have no known dimensions, mathematical or financial.  There is no exact correspondence between money and physical or mental injury or suffering, and the various factors involved are not capable of proof in dollars and cents. ”  *Id* at 95.  “Determining just compensation for an accident victim, particularly when the damages are not susceptible to scientific precision, as in the case of pain and suffering damages, necessarily requires a high degree of discretion. ”  *Johnson v. Scaccetti*, 192 N.J. at 279.  Accordingly, our jury system “places trust in ordinary men and women of varying experiences and backgrounds, who serve as jurors” and gives them “wide latitude in which to operate. ”  *Id* at 279-80.  Because the jury as the finder of fact is the arbiter of the value of Plaintiff’s personal injury claim, the Court properly exercised its gatekeeping function to admit the dash-cam video with accompanying audio.
[directive] Internal Affairs Complaint Notification To: ________________________________ _________________  Badge No.  You are hereby notified that an internal affairs complaint has been made against you.  This complaint involves an allegation of _______________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________________ which occurred on or about _________________________________________________________  You will be contacted by the investigator if you will be needed for an interview or to render any other assistance to the investigation.  ________________________________________ Signature  ________________________________________ Print Name ________________________________________ Date  Appendix D