ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A condition of approval imposed by a board may be eliminated by a developer upon application to the Superior Court or by application to the board.  The Courts have established the following parameters for consideration of such a request:  A variance condition must be reasonably calculated to achieve some legitimate land use purpose.  If it was not, and was thus invalid when imposed, it can be excised, unless the use permitted by the variance, if continued without the condition, would alter the character of the neighborhood or do violence to the zoning plan, [ ], or unless a balance of equities favors protection of property development patterns that have relied on the existence of the condition and fairly call for its continuation.  * * *  [I]n entertaining an application to strike a variance condition the board should consider all of the criteria ordinarily relevant to a variance application; among other things it should sympathetically consider patterns of existing neighborhood use and development and should be aware of the danger to the zone plan.  It should consider whether the original purpose of the condition remaining intact and whether the interests it protected still exist.  Aldrich v. Schwartz, 258 N.J. Super. 300, 310-312 (App. Div. 1992).  In the present action, the rationale for the provision of the Route 33 Signal remains valid; and the VC-2 Zone is premised upon the provision of the signal.  However, the Trial Court ignored the standard for elimination of a condition and established its own methodology.
[brief] This matter arises from the Borough’s solicitation of applications for resolutions of support in connection with an entity’s application for a Class 5 cannabis retailer license with the Commission.  (37a).  The Commission requires applicants for a Class 5 cannabis retailer license, like [...], to demonstrate support from the municipality where the proposed facility will be located, which is usually in the form of a resolution of support.  Ibid.  In the absence of a resolution of support, an applicant cannot win approval from the Commission.  Ibid.  The resolution of support requirement comes from the New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act (“NJCREAMMA”), which provides, among other things, that an applicant establish “proof of local support for the suitability of the location, which may be demonstrated by a resolution adopted by the municipality’s governing body indicating that the intended location is appropriately located or otherwise suitable for such activities related to the cultivation, manufacturing, or dispensing of medical cannabis, cannabis products, and related supplies as will be conducted at the proposed facility.
[brief] Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88; State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 172-73 (1994).  Our courts require the suppression of illegally obtained evidence for two central reasons: first, it deters future unlawful police misconduct “by denying the prosecution the spoils of constitutional violations;” and second, it “uphold[s] judicial integrity” by refusing to “provide a forum for evidence procured by unconstitutional means. ”  Shaw, 213 N.J. at 413 (citations omitted and cleaned up).  The rule thus functions to deter police misconduct, ensuring that officials will be in no way rewarded or motivated to violate constitutional principles.  Id. at 414.  Only if law enforcement secures physical evidence independently from its own illegal conduct may that evidence still be admitted.
[brief] **THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED DEFENDANTS’ CROSS-MOTION FOR ENTRY OF SATISFACTION OF THE OPEN MONETARY JUDGMENT AND A PROTECTIVE ORDER AS TO THE DEPOSITION OF HAROLD E. KENNEDY, JR.**  **A.  An Order to Satisfy [...] Was Properly Entered**  The trial court was correct when it granted Defendants’ cross-motion to enter on the record satisfaction of the open judgment against Defendants.  *Rule 4:101-2* provides for the Clerk of the Superior Court to make entry upon the Court Docket of every monetary judgment and order.  In this case, the amount of $78,646.00 was docketed in [...] against the [...] and [...]  *Rule 4:48-1* requires the party in whose favor the judgment is entered to provide a warrant of satisfaction.  See *N.J.S.A. 2A: 16-46*.  Further, *R. 4:101-5* allows a person who has judgment entered against him/her/it provides for the entry of satisfaction of the judgment on the Civil Judgment and Order Docket.  Defendants previously requested an executed Warrant to Satisfy Judgment from Plaintiffs, but the Plaintiffs’ counsel refused to provide the same despite receiving the amount owed.  The satisfied judgment inappropriately remained docketed against the Board and [...].  As a result, Defendants were forced to file a motion to remove the judgment.  R. 4:48-2(b) provides “If a party receiving full satisfaction of a judgment fails to enter satisfaction on the record or deliver a warrant to satisfy, the court may on motion by the party making satisfaction, order satisfaction of the judgment to be entered of record. ”  Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel has acknowledged receipt of the $78,984.80 from Defendants.  Defendants requested that the Court enter an Order entering the Satisfaction of Judgment for [...].  On December 16, 2022, the trial court agreed with the Defendants, finding that “…the record demonstrat[es] that the judgment, …, the amount of post-judgment interest, …, has been satisfied. ”  3T, 17:8-13.  The trial court was correct in making this finding and entering satisfaction.  Plaintiffs have not put forth any cogent reason to support reversal of the trial court’s Order entering satisfaction of the monetary judgment.  In this appeal, Plaintiffs again do not dispute that they have been paid in full all monies ordered by the court.  Accordingly, they have not sustained their burden to support the reversal of the trial court’s December 16, 2022 Order.  B.
[brief] ”  Ibid., Da995.  [...] and [...] “reviewed and approved [...] and [...]’s financial records, including bank statements and general ledgers and at times requested . . . adjustments to the ledgers. ”  The two “also reviewed and approved [...] and [...]’s tax returns before they were filed each year. ”  Ibid.  [...] described the involvement of the two partners in [...] and [...]:  [...] and [...] were aware and approved of all significant financial transactions that are reflected on [...] and [...]’s financial books and records each year, including intercompany transfers and loans, shareholder/member loans and expenses processed and reimbursed.  Additionally, it is my understanding that [...] had access to and did look at [...] and [...]’s QuickBooks files because he was in charge of managing IT for both companies.  There was really nothing that happened in these companies that [...] and [...] were not aware of and/or did not participate in as they were both involved in [...] and [...].  [Ibid.]  --- 4  Despite this acknowledgment, [...] also denied meeting with [...] regarding professional services he provided to [...] and [...].  3T12:20-13:24.  [...] had no involvement with [...], which was owned by [...]’s wife, Gayatri [...].  [...] alone exercised control over [...]’s finances and approved its tax returns.  As [...] explained, “Although [...] was owned by [...]'s wife Gayatri, to my knowledge, [...] controlled and operated the company and was responsible for all financial decisions since he communicated with me about [...]’s tax returns and approved them before they were signed by his wife and filed. ”  Da995-96.  [...]’s status as IT (Information Technology) manager for both companies was not merely an honorific title.  In addition to routinely solving technical issues for the companies and clients, as well as technical questions from their India facility, 3T34:15-17, [...] participated in writing the technical proposal for a customized laboratory information management system (LIMS) that was marketed to a customer, [...].  3T37:23-39:24.  In 2014, [...] and [...] decided to divide their business interests.
[brief] [...] then entered various Orders, the last being August 16, 2016 (Da170) granting the [...] Partial Summary Judgment and extending primary parking rights to the [...] on the School's (Lot 5) Sixth Street courtyard and Fifth Street parking area.  As the layout for a safe joint use of the Lot 5 courtyard was uncertain and undefined, [...] set a Trial date "to determine issues regarding parking and utilization of the Fifth Street and Sixth Street parking lots and other issues."(Da172)
[brief] The Court again drew the constitutional line at age eighteen:  "Because '[t]he age of [eighteen] is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood,' those who were below that age when the offense was committed may not be sentenced to life without parole for a nonhomicide crime."  *Id.* at 74-75 (quoting *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 574).  Next, in *Miller v. Alabama*, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the Court considered the constitutionality of mandatory-life-without-parole sentences imposed on two fourteen-year-old juveniles convicted of murder.  The Court ultimately held that "mandatory life without parole for those under the age of [eighteen] at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual punishments.'"  *Id.* at 465 (emphasis added).  The Court set forth five factors that should be considered before a juvenile homicide offender is sentenced to life without parole: (1) defendant's "chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuousness, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences"; (2) defendant's family and home environment; (3) "the circumstances of the homicide offense," including the extent of defendant's participation and the potential effect of familial and peer pressures; (4) the disadvantage juveniles face in criminal proceedings due to "the incompetencies associated with youth"; and (5) the possibility of defendant's rehabilitation.
[brief] *Edison*, *supra*, 464 N.J. Super. at 298.  The decisions cited above, particularly *DePetro*, *supra*, demonstrate that where a taxpaying resident objects and presents arguments grounded in the impacts to the zoning ordinance, standing will always be found.  [...] is such a person, and [...], has standing pursuant to *Crescent Park*, *supra*, irrespective of the fact that [...], who formed [...] with her, lives within 200 feet of the Property, which provides another basis for [...]’s standing.  If a commercial objector owning a business had standing to challenge the use variance granted by the Oradell Board of Adjustment in *Funeral Home*, supra, based upon impacts to the zone plan, why wouldn’t the residents of Hoboken have standing to argue that [...] needed to go to the Board of Adjustment so that they could make those same arguments about the conditional use variance that [...] so obviously needed?  There is no published authority supporting a claim that a citizen-taxpayer (or a group formed by a citizen-taxpayer) lacks standing to challenge the jurisdiction of a planning board when alleging a use variance is required.  Likewise, there is no caselaw that supports the theory [...] espouses that [...] could only challenge the Board’s jurisdiction if her property were directly affected because it was immediately proximate to the Property.  Indeed, Aurentz, supra, suggested the exact opposite is the correct approach.  The Board’s decision to ignore the decision of the citizens’ elected representatives to require at least 600 feet between a cannabis retailer and a school, or else obtain a conditional use variance is the harm that [...] and [...] alleged and that they suffered, and it is more than sufficient to confer standing as an “interested party” under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4 and the long line of published cases starting at least with Booth and culminating with DePetro.  There is not a single case that supports [...]’ theory on standing.  Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever closed the door to a litigant like [...] (or [...]).  A case such as this, where the Board ignored brand-new legislation, which was so obviously designed to protect the general welfare, see N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(a), is not the appropriate vehicle to deny citizens and taxpayers the opportunity to seek redress against their government for wrongful government action.  The Court should affirm the trial court’s determination that [...] (through [...] and [...], and others) has standing.
[directive] b.  If the determination is made that the person is the sole caretaker of the child, the presentence investigation shall also include: (1) verification that the person who will be responsible for the child's care and custody during the period of incarceration has agreed to assume responsibility for the child's care and custody; (2) an inquiry as to the willingness of the person to assume responsibility for the child's care and custody during the period of incarceration; and (3) a PROMIS/GAVEL network check, juvenile central registry check and domestic violence central registry check on the person who will be responsible for the child's care and custody during the period of incarceration and on any adult and juvenile over 12 years of age in the person's household.  c.  The court shall provide the information compiled pursuant to subsection b. of this section, from the presentence investigation, to the Division of Youth and Family Services in the Department of Human Services.
[directive] Self-represented litigants must file all such applications, with notice to the County Prosecutor or the Attorney's General Office, in the Judiciary Electronic Document Submission (JEDS) system.  JEDS may be accessed using the link https://www.njcourts.gov/self-help/jeds provided:  For information on filing an application with the Parole Board see www.nj.gov/parole/services/certificates. of Purpose  Certificate I. of  The purpose a Ce11ificate to relieve disabilities, forfeitures, or bars, is except those required or established by federal law, that otherwise would apply to of persons convicted criminal offenses related to: (1) public employment by a State, county or municipal agency, or excluding elected office, employment law enforcement, in corrections, the judiciary, a position related to homeland security or emergency management, or any position that has access to sensitive information that could threaten the public health, welfare, or safety.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-7(c)(l); (2) qualification for a license or certification to practice certain of professions, occupations or businesses, except the practice law, or as a mortgage loan originator, or residential mortgage lender or residential mortgage broker as a qualified individual licensee, pursuant to the "New Jersey Residential Mortgage Lending Act."  See N .J.S.A. 2A: 168A-7(b )(2); or (3) admission to an examination for that license or certification, except for the bar examination, a qualified written test for a or mortgage loan originator, residential mortgage lender or broker as a qualified individual licensee, or an examination for a law enforcement, homeland security, or emergency management position.  See N.J.S.A. 2A: 168A-7(b )(3).  ADA ENSURJNG TO AN DOOR OPEN JUSTICE
[brief] COUNTER-STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY  On June 27, 2019, the grand jurors for [...] returned [...] charging defendant [...] with the purposeful or knowing murder of [...], contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a (count one), with the attempted murder of [...], contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3a (count two), second degree unlawful possession of a weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count three), and with second degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count four).
[brief] [...] then gave a recorded statement to the same investigator on March 8, 2021 in which he essentially stated that he could not recall if the call to [...] was made before or after the May 31, 2017 accident (Pa878-79).  At deposition, [...] testified that he made the call to [...] in the last three to four years (Pa885).  Upon being shown a record of when the call was made to [...] indicating he made a call on October 4, 2018, [...] was satisfied that the record refreshed his recollection and was consistent with his estimation that the call was made within the range of three to four years (Pa885).  However, measuring from when the call was reported on the [...] spreadsheet to the date of the deposition, the call did not fall within the three-to-four-year range, but well before the date of the accident.
[brief] *DuBois*, 189 N.J. at 475.  Trial courts “indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of counsel and are discouraged from broaching the subject absent an explicit request from the defendant .  . . .”  *State v. Taylor*, 350 N.J. Super. 20, 42 (App. Div. 2002).  A defendant must “clearly and unequivocally” ask to proceed pro se.  Id. at 41; see *State v. Figueroa*, 186 N.J. 589, 593 n.1 (2006) (explaining that an unequivocal request for self-representation is necessary to determine that a defendant is knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to counsel).  “Whether ‘orally or in writing,’ a defendant [must] make the request ‘unambiguously . . . so that no reasonable person can say that the request was not made. ’”  *State v. Rose*, 458 N.J. Super. 610, 626-27 (App. Div. 2019) (citation omitted).  Because defendant’s request to proceed pro se was not “clearly and unequivocally” made, the *Faretta* right did not attach.
[brief] The trial court determined that an arbitrator, as opposed to the trial court itself, should determine the “issue of arbitrability” (i.e. whether Plaintiff’s allegations are covered by the arbitration provision in [...]’s form health club Membership Agreement.(Ja12); infra Section I(C).  To that end, and although [...]’s arbitration agreement incorporates the rules of the [...] (and [...])(Ja37), the trial court should not have decided that an arbitrator should determine whether Plaintiff’s claims fall within the scope of [...]’s arbitration agreement.  In support, the trial court relies on Goffe v. Foulke Management Corp., 238 N.J. 191, 211 (2019) (Ja10)
[brief] In May 2018, [...], Ph.D., conducted a thorough psychological evaluation and risk assessment of [...].  [...] conducted her clinical assessment over three sessions with [...], spanning approximately eight hours.  [...]’s assessment included [...]’s offense history, personal circumstances, and insight into his criminal conduct, among other relevant criteria.  (Pa306-319).  In concluding, to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, [...] presented a “low to moderate” risk for reoffense if released, [...] made several critical findings that supported [...]’s release on parole.  [...] noted that  The factors underlying his moderate level of risk are almost exclusively historical factors, which will not change no matter how long [...] remains incarcerated.  Factors associated with a lower estimate of risk included his present age – recidivism base rates for both violence and sexual violence tend to go down with increasing age – as well [as] a number of protective factors: absence of major mental disorder; absence of substance abuse; presence of insight; presence of psychological support; feasible plans for potential release to the community; and resources to secure housing.  [...]’s well-supported analysis was ignored by the Board, and it is not clear that it placed any weight on this report whatsoever.  Years later, on November 30, 2022, [...] was assessed by the Board’s own psychologist.  (Pa350-364).  That particular Board psychologist had conducted at least two prior clinical risk assessments of [...].  (Pa352).  The Board psychologist noted at the outset that he agreed to review [...]’s 2018 assessment in connection with his final report in this matter but did not directly address her opinion in his report.  (Pa350).  Despite claiming that [...] “appeared to offer statements that were self-serving,” the Board’s own psychologist ultimately agreed with [...]’s conclusion that [...] presented a “low to moderate” risk of reoffense if released.  (Pa355).  The Board psychologist found:  Risk for violence is reduced by lack of violence for four decades and current age where violence is noted to decrease with older age.  Based on information obtained during the course of this evaluation, clinical (non-empirical) estimates indicate this inmate appears to be a low to moderate risk for future violence .  . . .  He then concluded that “[t]he likelihood of this inmate successfully completing a projected term of parole is fair due to constellation of risks and strengths as previously discussed. ”  Ibid.  The Board psychologist’s evaluation and conclusions were not included in the Board’s Final Decision.  (Pa1-7).  C.  Parole Board Decision on Appeal
[brief] (4T138:15-139:25; Pa564-Pa612).  [...] then testified that between 2016 and 2018 he commingled investor funds with other business income, nonprofit donations, and other sources of funds in [...]’s bank accounts.  (5T20:4-21:9).  [...] explained that he commingled funds in the [...] bank accounts because merchant cash advance companies were automatically withdrawing funds from defendants’ bank accounts and that he needed to start using the bank accounts of [...] because merchant cash advance companies had locked him out of the [...] bank accounts.  (4T81:24-82:15).  However, [...] admitted he did not tell investors about his or [...]’s issues with merchant cash advance companies.  (4T81:24-82:15; 5T22:1-20).  [...] also admitted he never told investors about several lawsuits against him or [...].  (5T84:7-20; 5T86:21-87:15; Pa1204-1206).  However, [...]’s attempted explanations as to why he did not inform investors about the litigation was inconsistent and contradictory.  For example, [...] testified neither he nor [...] disclosed one particular case where a trial court found [...] fraudulently held himself out as an attorney because the case “wasn’t filed” at the time he began seeking investors in 2016.  (5T84:7-85:11; Pa564-Pa612; Pa914-Pa936).
[directive] In addition to any offices or other organizational units established Structure of Office. by the Executive Director pursuant to Section II.C of this Directive, the following constituent organizational units are hereby established in the Division, and shall operate under the general direction and supervision of the Executive Director, as illustrated in the Appendix to this Directive.  [...].  1.  The [...] ([...]) in the [...], originally established as the Victims of Crime Compensation Agency pursuant to P.L.1971, c.317 (C.52:4B-1 seq.) and et continued as the [...] pursuant to P.L.2007, c.95 (C.52:4B-3.2 et al.) and Reorganization Plan No. 001-2008, shall be administratively allocated to [...].  The functions, duties, and responsibilities of [...] shall continue unchanged.  The Director of [...] shall report to the Page 5 Executive Director of [...].  Attorney General Executive Directive No. 2010-1 is hereby superseded.
[brief] In dismissing Count 1 of the First Amended Complaint (breach of contract), “Therefore, the loss of the Property was the direct and proximate result of [Appellants’] failure to cure the default under the Lease with [...]. ”  [FEDa118]; •  In dismissing Count 1 of the First Amended Complaint (breach of contract), once Appellants lost land control of the Property, their Solar Rights were voided by the entity that granted such rights.  “[Appellants] cannot seek damages against a blameless third party simply because [...] signed an NDA.  [Appellants] do not establish the requisite causal link between a breach of the NDA and [Appellants’] default under the Lease and subsequent loss of their Solar Rights. ”  [FEDa118-19]; •  In dismissing Count 1 of the First Amended Complaint (breach of contract), “[Appellants] lost the Property and subsequently lost their Solar Rights as a result of their default under the Lease and their failure to cure this default…  Had [Appellants] made their Lease payments, they would still control the Property and would have retained their approvals.  [Appellants] bear the responsibility for their own actions. ”