ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (6T41-16 to 42-2; 6T52-24 to 53-2).  [...] had seen defendant in [...]’s car before.  (6T41-4 to 42-14; 6T44-13 to 45-5).  [...] was at “the Ville” with [...] around 3:00 a.m. when “[...]” dropped off “[...].”\(^7\) (6T30-20 to 31-18; 6T35-1 to 4; 6T58-11 to 20).  [...] got in [...]’s van and they drove to 7-Eleven.  (6T30-24 to 31-1; --- \(^7\) [...] identified [...] as [...].  (6T138-17 to 22).  6T34-22 to 25).  There, [...] saw a “smoke gray color[ed] Impala” with two people he could not identify pull in and quickly pull out.  (6T31-1 to 5; 6T34-7 to 9; 6T58-21 to 59-6).  [...] asked [...] who was in the Impala and called [...]. (6T31-5 to 12; 6T59-6 to 17).  As [...] was scared to leave, [...] started walking away, eventually finding a ride back to the Ville about eight minutes later.  (6T31-5 to 12; 6T34-15 to 18; 6T35-11 to 23; 6T59-6 to 22).  When [...] returned to the Ville, he overheard [...] on speaker phone with [...], who was giving a “play by play where he was at.
[brief] In Lennig, the fact that the homeowner’s property was contiguous to the open space on the map answered the inquiry of “whether [the developer] entered into an implied covenant with the complainant not to use those blocks in the mode now proposed, and has granted to him, as appurtenant to his lots, the benefits to be derived from such restriction. ”  Lennig, 41 N.J. Eq. at 609 (emphasis added).  The Lennig Court concluded:  “[I]t is certain that the complainant will lose a great portion of those advantages which the association impliedly promised him as inducements to the purchase of its lots. ”  Id. at 610.  And the “advantages” specified by the Lennig Court were specific to properties abutting the open space, not just any property generally within the tract.  Here, the [...]’ predecessor [...] enjoyed direct access to the Atlantic Ocean from his own backyard from 1929, as did his successors for upwards of 90 years, continuing with and including the [...].
[brief] The foreclosure complaint against the building on the real property was also commenced against [...], and a default judgment was awarded in [...]’s favor.  (Ca187).  On March 17, 2022, [...] filed an amended eviction complaint.  (Ca271).  On March 30, 2022, [...] moved to intervene in the law division matter, to sue the statutory receiver, and to compel an accounting and payment of rent.  (Ca277).  Although the motion to intervene was filed, the motion omitted any proposed pleading or claims against the receiver.  (Ca277).  [...]’s motion to intervene alleged non-payment of rent, the receiver’s inability to accept credit card payments, and the non-payment of insurance related to the sale of alcohol.  (Ca277).  On April 6, 2022, [...], as special master, filed his motion for confirmation of the special master sale in the foreclosure matter.  (Ca259).  On April 11, 2022, [...] objected to the special master’s motion, and cross-moved to intervene.  (Ca288).  On April 25, 2022, [...] filed a reply brief in support of the motion to intervene in the law division matter.  That reply brief acknowledged [...]’s receipt of the receiver’s accountings through February of 2022.  On April 28, 2022, the trial court denied [...]’s motion to intervene in the law division matter.  (Ca299).  Accordingly, the law division entered an order denying [...]’s application to intervene.  (Ca305).  The final judgment was entered by default, in the matter under [...], on July 21, 2020, in the sum of $1,271,155.83, plus attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $11,424.83, for a total of $1,282,580.66 in favor of plaintiff [...] and against defendants [...] Corporation, [...], and [...].
[brief] *Mount Laurel Tp. v. Mipro Homes, LLC*, 379 N.J. Super. 358, 368-369 (App. Div. 2005), aff’d, 188 N.J. 531 (2006).  The Planning Board’s role in reviewing the Amended Redevelopment is limited.  It is only obligated to prepare and submit to the governing body “a report containing its recommendation concerning the redevelopment plan” which must “include an identification of any provisions in the proposed redevelopment plan which are inconsistent with the master plan and recommendations concerning these inconsistencies. ”  N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-7(e).  Here, the Planning Board’s review was limited to evaluating the consistency of the Amended Redevelopment Plan with the Master Plan.  Of import here, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Manalapan Realty observed:  The Board that prepared and adopted the Master Plan also determined pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-26a that the proposed zoning amendments are substantially consistent with the master plan.  Such a determination by the Board is entitled to deference and great weight.  [140 N.J. at 383 (emphasis added)].  The legal principles established above require an examination of particular Master Plan objectives implicated by the Amended Redevelopment Plan, and application of the pertinent legal concepts, such as “substantially consistent” along with the overall advisory nature of a master plan.  On the whole, the Amended Redevelopment Plan is “substantially consistent” with the Borough’s Master Plan.
[brief] Wear v. Selective Ins. Co., 455 N.J. Super. 440, 459 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)); Lipsky v. New Jersey Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 447, 463–64 (App. Div. 2023).
[brief] The facts presented in [...]’s brief, in support of his Motion to Vacate the Final Judgment by Default, warranted good cause, confirmed at the beginning of the hearing by the trial judge and then by the number of times he thereafter used the words ‘evidentiary hearing. ’  “—if he files an appeal, the Appellate Division sends this back for an evidentiary hearing, I’ll hold the evidentiary hearing. ”  (See Transcript Page 16, Lines 15-16)  “—if this case comes back on appeal and I’m—I’m instructed to hold an evidentiary hearing as to whether or not in fact — you did receive, ...”  (See Transcript Page 18, Lines 18-20)  “So I’m denying the motion and, [...], if you appeal, if the Appellate Division remands it for an evidentiary hearing as to whether or not you were served in 2015, ...” (See Transcript Page 19, Lines12-15)  I argue, in conclusion, that the trial court erred in granting the Final Judgment by Default based on the certifications by the Process Server and by the Plaintiff’s Attorney and his Legal Assistant – it should have never been granted.
[brief] Both constitutions require only that the trial court inform the jury of the State’s burden to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ”  Id. at 50.  And “[n]either constitution defines reasonable doubt. ”  Ibid.  “Because the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government’s burden of proof, reasonable-doubt instructions must be considered in their entirety. ”  State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 473 (2007).
[brief] On September 20, 2021, [...] and [...] submitted an Amended NOA to add [...] as an Appellant in this matter.  On April 15, 2022, [...], [...], and [...] (collectively, “Environmental Appellants”) submitted a Further Amended NOA and CIS, adding [...] as an “interested party,” pursuant to an April 11, 2022 Order from the New Jersey Supreme Court.  Aa1334 to Aa1346.  On April 21, 2022, [...] issued a Certificate for [...]’s East 300 Upgrade Project.
[brief] Contrary to Appellant’s “confusion,” the FHA Rules provided [...] with clear discretion to issue a Flood Hazard Verification without the floodway limit.  Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:13-5.5(c), a verification of only the flood hazard area design flood elevation and not the floodway limit is appropriate, provided that [...] makes a determination based upon visual inspection of submitted site plans and without review of calculations, and the following requirements are satisfied: 1) no fill or aboveground structure is proposed within a floodway; and 2) compliance with the flood storage displacement requirements of N.J.A.C. 7:13-11.4 does not require knowledge of the floodway.  N.J.A.C. 7:13-5.5(c)(1-2).  The Application details the proposed work as it may impact a floodway.  [...] indicated that the only work within a floodway would be limited to improvements on [...], which involve widening the road.  Aa162.  [...] further indicated that the work would be constructed at grade to avoid the placement of fill in the floodway.  Aa162-Aa163.  In addition, there is no above-ground structure that is proposed in any floodway in the Application.  [...] concurred with [...]’s analysis that no activity will take place in a floodway and concluded based upon visual inspection that “it is clear that the floodway will not be impacted by the proposed stormwater outfall structure proposed in the flood hazard area.
[brief] Because plaintiff already litigated to conclusion claims for property damage caused by water runoff, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar him from relitigating those prior claims in his suit against the [...].  Plaintiff cannot relitigate any claims in the Dwyer Action that he previously litigated in the [...].  Biondi v.  Citigroup, Inc., 423 N.J. Super. 377, 422 (App. Div. 2011).  The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel therefore bar his claims for property damage caused by conditions for which he had sued the [...].
[brief] And reasonably so—the provisions of subsection 18 relate only to the Commissioner’s authority relative to licensure to act as a “consumer lender” or “sales finance company” and do not address mortgages or real property.  See N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2; N.J.S.A. 17:11C-3; N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18.  Post 2010, the first case to address the NJCFLA was in the District Court of New Jersey: Veras v. [...], No. 13-1745 (RBK/JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34176 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) (Pa259).
[directive] Do you have any difficulty accepting that concept?  22  If the evidence warrants awarding no money damages to the plaintiff, will you be able to return such a verdict?  Standards for Jury Selection Promulgated by Directive #21-06 (December 11, 2006)  Page 21 of 29  23.  The purpose of questioning you as prospective members of the jury is to select a jury which that will be fair and impartial.
[brief] *See, e.g., Boryszewski ex rel. Boryszewski v. Burke*, 380 N.J. Super. 361, 370 (App. Div. 2005) (“We reject [...]'s weight-of-the-evidence arguments, which are essentially based upon its expert's testimony regarding the strength of the Voyager's roof system as a whole, with inadequate consideration for the countervailing testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses.  The jury was entitled to reject [...]'s expert's opinions and credit plaintiffs' evidence to the contrary”).  In *[...]*, for example, a purchaser of property from a successful bidder at a foreclosure sale brought an action against the tenants in the building to eject them.
[brief] As [...] noted in his Opinion, [...] testified that the “property could accommodate problems typically associated with greater density multifamily residential developments, namely parking.  (T40:11-19).  [...] opined that the project mitigates any traffic concerns by providing two off-street parking spots for each unit and only results in the loss of one public parking spot. ” (Pa68).  Further, “there is no evidence to the contrary, the objector did not provide evidence, such as a traffic study, that would challenge the evidence presented and that the proposed development would negatively impact the surrounding neighborhood. ”  (Pa70).  D.  THE BOARD PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT SPECIAL REASONS EXIST FOR THE GRANT OF A (D)(6)
[brief] (20)**  Just as with the term “investigation”, the term “bar complaint” never formed the basis for rescission of the Policy as confirmed by the [...] Certification.  The term is undefined and is, at worst, ambiguous as is confirmed by the statements of [...].  “Bar complaint” is a term of art applicable to attorney discipline procedures in other states.  In New Jersey, attorney discipline is handled under the auspices of our Supreme Court.  Other states, such as California and Virginia, for example, have assigned the responsibility for attorney discipline not to its courts but to its state bar association—thus, the concept of a “bar” complaint, issuing from the “bar” association.
[brief] As a result of Defendant’s legal malpractice and finding of the Court in the Probate Action, [...] received a portion of the equity [...] held in the subject property, which he intended to leave to [...].  [...] wanted a mortgage to protect his interest in the property in the event [...] and [...] divorced.  He subsequently gifted the unpaid principal and accrued interest under the mortgage solely to [...] under his Will and directed that the mortgage debt be forgiven.
[brief] The Court ruled that transcripts of witness testimony from the earlier trial could not be used in lieu of live testimony, that the Zoning Board Resolution of November 19, 2018 (Da662) that the off-site parking use by Lot 8 of Lot 5 was not a current legal use and not a legal nonconforming use was not relevant or admissible, and that the Zoning Board Interpretation Resolution of November 2017 declining to interpret the 1972 [...] site plan approval was not relevant or admissible.  (6T62-13 to 72-25).  After opening statements by [...]'s attorney (6T76-5 to 82-5) and [...]'s attorney (6T82-7 to 102-13), the [...]'s first witness [...] testified he moved to [...] in 1978 as a rabbinical student, joined the synagogue in 1991 as Youth Director, and became the Rabbi in 1995.
[brief] Expanding on this, the [...] noted in its most-recent FDCPA rule-making:  The Bureau understands from its outreach that many covered persons currently use vendors to provide validation notices.  In the Operations Study, over 85 percent of debt collectors surveyed by the Bureau reported using letter vendors.  ---  4  Similarly, in 1992, the [...] opined a debt collector does not violate the FDCPA when it uses a third party to translate collection notices from English to another language because the communication is an “incidental contact” rather than a communication with a third party in connection with an attempt to collect a debt.
[brief] ”  *Allstars Auto. Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n*, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) (quoting *In re Stallworth*, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)).  See *In re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch. of Montclair Founders Grp.*, 216 N.J. 370, 383 (2013); *Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys.*, 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995).
[brief] *Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc.*, 110 N.J. 464, 472 (1988) (“To prove a violation of section 56:8–2, it is not necessary to show actual deceit or a fraudulent act; any unconscionable commercial practice is prohibited. ”)  More importantly, [...]’s deceptive conduct is amply suggested from the pleadings and exhibits, contrary to the trial court’s conclusory findings.  Most notably, [...] offered Defendants and presumably other prospective tenants four months of what [...] characterized as “free” rent and parking worth $17,920 as an incentive to rent an apartment from [...] for a two-year lease term.  2T3-18 – 2T3-19.  However, after representing the rent and parking concessions as “free” to market its apartments and induce signing of two-year leases, [...], from the other side of its mouth, claims that the concessions were not “free” at all, but instead were given “as consideration” or “in exchange” for Defendants’ assumptions of additional duties and liability *beyond* those provided for in the standard Apartment Lease Contract, including the duty to *strictly* adhere to the timely payment provisions of the lease, and to assume enhanced liability for crushing damages pursuant to a charge-back provision.
[brief] But what we want to focus on here is the sophistry and disingenuous arguments made by respondents.  Firstly, the Court already ruled that (6T 12) that while the monthly payments looked like rent, they were not rent, but more akin to a joint venture agreement as opposed to a landlord-tenant agreement.  At Pa 7, the court said that it partially granted Plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment, and equity demanded reimbursement, which is restitution.  Therefore, again the Respondents are engaging in sophistry.  Therefore, Respondents misstate the law when they say that restitution theory is different from unjust enrichment.  Rather, it is the remedy for unjust enrichment, each are sides on the same coin.  The lower Court found at T6 line 15:25 nothing nefarious, or untoward, or suspicious that [...] bought the house with money taken from [...].  This is an absurd result, because the Court later found unjust enrichment.  We must ask, what standard of law did the Court use to determine that?  A finding of fact, based upon a misapplication of law, is reversible error.  The opinion cites no law whatsoever.  Appellant believes that the Court wrongly placed the burden on the Appellants, when it was supposed to place the burden on the Respondents, as discussed in the main brief.  The lower Court also used tortured logic to arrive at a “joint venture” hypothesis to try to fit a square peg into a round hole.  The decision must be reversed.
[directive] Table Contents  Establishment of Law Enforcement Trust Fund 1 4 - 4:2  Municipal Law Enforcement Trust Account (MLETA) 1 4 - I  Establishment of MLETA 4 - 1  Disbursements from MLETA MEA 4 - or 2  Seized Asset Trust Account 4 - 3  Maintenance Expenditures 4 - 3 of Standards for the Holding Period and Tracking 3-4 4 - Forfeiture Property 4:3  SOP No. -Accounting for Seized Currency 5 - 05  1  Applicability: All Sworn Law Enforcement Officers 5 - 1 Policy Statement 5 - 1 5:l 5 - Seizure of United States Currency 1 5:2  Accounting for Seized Currency 1 5 - Security Procedures for Currency 5 - 2  Seizure of Foreign Currency 5 - 3 5:3  E Form United States Currency Seizure Report 5 - 4 - SOP No. Seized and Forfeited Property Management 06 6 - 1  i App ica b ty: ALL Forfeiture Program
[brief] The Inferential Extrinsic Evidence Cited By The Court Does Not Support Its Conclusion (Dta1144-50,1259-74.)  The Law Division’s suggestion that [...] had extraneous notice that it was cancelled from the CCIP policy is factually irrelevant and incorrect, and legally improper.  *McClellan v. Feit, Millbrook Tax Fund*, supra.  Even assuming the email exchanges in the Summer of 2015 could be said to have offered substituted notice to [...] that its coverage under the CCIP policies was terminated, those communications, as a matter of law, could not – and did not – support that conclusion, and the evidence unaddressed below establishes the opposite. \(^8\)  First, the concept of [...]’s purported sentience regarding notice of cancellation as of September 23, 2015 is irrefutably rebutted by contemporaneously generated documentation – [...]’s September 25, 2015 letter confirming that [...] is “CCIP approved” for further work on the project.  It is also reflected by [...]’s representative’s unrefuted testimony, over several depositions, that [...] believed that it was covered for its subsequent work.  Indeed, every single party’s representative testified that unenrollments from CCIPs are a rarity.  [...]’s representative also conceded that [...] did not have a formal unenrollment process.  And, [...] and [...]’s representatives both testified that contractors were occasionally enrolled for some work, but not for other work on the same project.  Even [...]’s --- \(^8\)
[brief] Indeed, it can.  A policeman can be shot while pursuing a suspect; a librarian can be hit by a falling bookshelf while re-shelving books; a social worker can catch her hand in the car door while transporting a child to court.  Each of those examples is identifiable as to time and place; undesigned and unexpected; and not the result of pre-existing disease, aggravated or accelerated by the work.  Thus, each meets the traumatic event standard.
[brief] POINT FIVE ..........................................................  63  EVEN IF THE 1963 AGREEMENT COULD BE DEEMED AS CONVEYING A PERPETUAL EASEMENT, THAT USE CANNOT BE EXPANDED AND EXCEEDED BEYOND THE BOUNDS AND LIMITATIONS OF THAT EASEMENT  USE IN APPROXIMATELY  1964.  THE TRIAL COURT OPINION AND ORDER EXPANDING THAT USE IS IN ERROR.  (APPEALS FINAL OPINION/ORDER Da978, Da980, Da1004)
[brief] After reviewing the evidence, hearing, and importantly observing the witnesses - the court determined there simply was insufficient evidence to conclude there was a legitimate binding agreement.  The Court found way too many “discrepancies” with the Appellants position, stating with respect to the authenticity of the agreement “I’m left with a big question mark. ”  A brief understanding of a timeline of these events demonstrates the Appellants credibility problems.  The Respondent filed a complaint on January 9, 2023.  On May 8, 2023, the Appellants moved to compel arbitration.  They attached an arbitration agreement and certified the agreement was the operative agreement properly drafted and signed by all parties.  The document was obviously fake.  The Respondent challenged the authenticity of the agreement.  The document contained various pages cobbled together to appear as if there was an agreement signed by the Respondent.  The attorney who the Appellants’ claimed prepared the document certified it was not the original agreement.  Rather than reconsidering their position, the Appellants’ filed additional papers including a second certification from the Appellant essentially doubling down on their position maintaining the document initially presented was the only legitimate employment agreement.  On September 20, 2023, the trial court conferenced the case and expressed significant doubt concerning the credibility of the purported agreement.  In November of 2023, the Appellants then inexplicably came up with a new agreement and a third certification.  This “second agreement” utilized the same March 7, 2019, signature page as the original document twice certified by the Appellant.  In order to get to the bottom of this, the court ordered a live plenary hearing.  At the hearing, the Appellants’ provided various contradictory explanations concerning both of these agreements.  The court concluded the Appellants’ position lacked credibility, and they failed to prove either document was authentic.  The record indicates sufficient factual support for the trial court’s decision.  This court, therefore, should affirm the trial court and remand this matter back to the Superior Court, Law Division so the matter can proceed on the merits.
[brief] ”  Zuber, 227 N.J. at 445.  The relevant question, therefore, is not whether defendant made the “best legal decision,” but whether a different outcome would have ensued had it not been for his youth.  In this matter, nothing suggests that defendant’s youth had any impact on the outcome.  Although he was diagnosed with a deficit that prevented quick thinking, he was in fact of normal intelligence, and plea bargaining does not require quick thinking.  Further, defendant’s actions in this case reflect comprehension and planning.  As the judge pointed out, he had the intelligence to wait for the outcome of [...]’s trial before deciding to plead.  (5T82:16-15).  He committed his crime five months before he turned eighteen and did not plead until seven months after he turned eighteen.  It should also be noted that even as a minor, defendant wisely exercised his right to remain silent when he was arrested—a choice that the vast majority of adult offenders lack the insight to make.  (Pca4).  Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see how defendant’s youth disadvantaged him.