ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The two cases Plaintiffs cite here do not change that analysis.  They are not applicable either for their reliance on Dockser or for being pre-award decisions.  In 3S Del Inc. v. DataQuick Info Svs, Inc., 492 F.3d 520 (4th Cir. 2007), the 4th Circuit misapplied Dockser in the final issue of a multi-issue rejected appeal.
[brief] (PA000001-PA000094). 1  Plaintiff filed her Complaint on November 1, 2022 in the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, Mercer County.  (PA000001-PA000058).  Thereafter, Plaintiff properly served the Defendants, and defense counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss the 1 T = Transcript of December 20, 2023 Motion to Dismiss Oral Argument Complaint (“Motion” or “Motion to Dismiss”) on December 12, 2022.  (PA000059-PA000060).  On January 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Cross Motion to Amend the Complaint (“Cross Motion”).  (PA00061-PA000080).  Following this, on January 16, 2023, Defendants filed their Reply Brief (collectively along with the “Motion” and “Cross Motion,” referred to as the “Motions”).  These Motions were expected to be heard on January 20, 2023.  However, the Court neglected to schedule oral arguments for same until December 20, 2023, **338 days** after Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was filed.  To be sure, Plaintiff attempted numerous times to advise the Court about the outstanding Motions, which often proved futile.  For example, after calls to the Court did not address the issue, Plaintiff submitted correspondence regarding the outstanding Motions and oral argument request on March 3, 2023.  (PA000081-PA000082).  Plaintiff continued to call the Court thereafter, but to no avail.  Therefore, again on July 6, 2023, Plaintiff submitted her second written correspondence regarding the pending Motions and need for oral argument.  (PA000083-PA000084).  Without any word from the Court following this second notice, on October 5, 2023, Plaintiff submitted a third correspondence regarding the Motions and requested oral argument.  (PA000085-PA000086).  --- PA = Plaintiff [...]’s Appendix before the Appellate Division  While Plaintiff made efforts to schedule oral argument with the Court, Plaintiff and Defendants’ counsel also engaged in several conversations regarding the mediation of this matter as the Court remained unresponsive.  However, on November 16, 2023, the Court scheduled oral argument for Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff’s Cross Motion to be heard on December 20, 2023.  On December 20, 2023, the Motion Judge in fact heard oral arguments from both parties, and ultimately reserved his decision.  (T4:1-42:7).  On January 10, 2024, after 394 days had passed since the filing of the Motion to Dismiss, the Motion Court granted Defendants’ Motion, and denied Plaintiff’s Cross Motion to Amend the Complaint.  (PA000087-PA000094).  The trial court issued a statement of reasons in support of same.  (PA000088-PA000092).  This Appeal follows.
[brief] Ibid.  Indeed, the Evaluation Sheet does not list the size of the company as a criterion to be considered.  (63a).  Other members of the Subcommittee offered personal opinions on issues related to traffic and other matters that should have been evaluated by experts on the Planning Board as they were outside the specific mandate of the Subcommittee.  (39a).  All of this shows the Borough deviated from the process and evaluation criteria it established.
[brief] Indeed, “Law of the Case” doctrine and “collateral estoppel” defense have even been improperly applied to newly submitted claims of account error never previous litigated in Appellant’s Motion for Correction of Probation Errors (see Point I, paragraph7, p. 19, and Point VI, paragraph 1, p.42 for further discussion)).  Probation, [...], DAG, and the Court erred in misapplication of Law of the Case doctrine and “collateral estoppel” in this manner.
[brief] With respect to lighting, [...]’s Site Specific Safety Program and Procedures Manual specifically states:  “Before beginning the operations demonstrate to the resident engineer the method of meeting the specified luminous levels and visibility requirements for workers and equipment for each planned operation. ”  Pa1120.  “Do not begin night operations until the Resident Engineer approves the method of meeting the specified illuminance levels and visibility requirements. ”  Ibid.  “Provide lighting for all areas of the Work. ”  Ibid.  “Conventional vehicle headlights do not meet illuminance requirements.  Ensure that moving lighting equipment used for night operations has lights directed ahead and behind the equipment. ”  Pa1121.  [...], the project manager, testified he did not have any communication with the resident engineer or his assistant or any of his employees relative to the lighting at the scene on the night of the accident.  Pa1358.  Specifically, he did not speak with [...], the “Resident Engineer,” regarding this particular part of the project.  Pa1343.  [...] testified that there were no light poles on this area of the turnpike and that the only lighting used by [...] on the night in question “were lights that were attached to the equipment. ”  Ibid.  [...], the safety representative of [...], testified he took photographs that represent the conditions as they existed at the scene the night of the accident.  Pa1302.  As documented by [...]’s photos, there were no external light towers provided by [...].  Pa1367-71.  There was no moving lighting equipment or attempt to comply with illuminance levels.  On the night that he was run down, [...] was using a flashlight to light his way.
[brief] “When interpreting a statute, [this Court’s] main objective is to further the Legislature’s intent,” *In re Pontoriero*, 439 N.J. Super. 24, 35 (App. Div. 2015) (*TAC Assocs. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.*, 202 N.J. 533, 540 (2010)), “in light of the language used and the objects sought to be achieved,” *Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc.*, 197 N.J. 543, 554 (2009).
[brief] “Under the doctrine, therefore, ‘a defendant failing to raise a germane counterclaim will be estopped from proceeding thereon in a subsequent separate action. ’”  Consultants v. Chem. & Pollution Scis., Inc., 105 N.J. 464, 473 (1987) (quoting [...], Current N.J. Court Rules); R. 4:30A (“Non-joinder of claims required to be joined by the entire controversy doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims”); R. 4:7-1 (“A defendant, however, either failing to comply with R. 4:30A (entire controversy doctrine) or failing to set off a liquidated debt or demand or a debt or demand capable of being ascertained by calculation, shall thereafter be precluded from bringing any action for such claim or for such debt or demand which might have been so set off. ” (emphasis added)).
[brief] And even assuming none of its students could have been educated in-district, [...] could have applied for additional aid based on an unusually high rate of low-incident disabilities.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-55(g); (Ra101; Aa19).  The record does not contain any evidence that [...] did so, or that it had applied for facilities funding to increase its ability to serve more special education students in-district.
[brief] IF, AFTER CONSIDERATION OF ALL THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE, THE JURY MERELY BELIEVED THAT ALL OF THE ORDINARY ELEMENTS OF THE HOMICIDE CRIMES WERE PROVEN BY THE STATE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT -- A CLEAR ERROR IN A CASE WHERE SELF-DEFENSE IS AT ISSUE (NOT RAISED BELOW)  ..................................................................................  21 POINT III  THE JUDGE FAILED IN HER ROLE AS “GATEKEEPER” OF THE TRIAL WHEN SHE CONDUCTED AN INSUFFICIENT VOIR DIRE OF THE JURY WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT A STATE WITNESS, THE BROTHER OF THE DECEDENT, HAD SPOKEN TO SOME JURORS FOR FIVE MINUTES DURING A BREAK FROM COURT.
[brief] A.  THIS APPEAL IS NECESSARY TO GIVE THE APPELLATE DIVISION  A CHANCE TO CORRECT AN UNJUST RESULT WHERE [...]’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED.  THE NEW LEGAL STANDARD SET BY THE TYLER CASE WAS NOT ADDRESSED AS PART OF THE PRIOR APPELLATE DECISION AND THE TYLER DECISION MANDATED VACATING THE JUDGMENT IN [...]’S CASE.  As stated more specifically in the appellate brief, the landmark May 25, 2023 US Supreme Court’s decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631, 143 S. Ct. 1369, 215L.Ed. 2d 564 (2023) declared a taxing authority’s confiscation of a property owner’s equity violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.
[brief] COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................5  STANDARD OF REVIEW ..............................................................................................8  LEGAL ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................9  I.  THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT .................................................................9  II.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE PROVISIONS OF THE APRIL 23, 2022  ORDER .................................................................12  III.  THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S MOTION TO ASSERT A COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST [...] ..................................................13  IV.  THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ORDER  THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY .................................................................14  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................15
[brief] He has been given the benefits of fines and probation and has already served a five-year sentence in the custody of the state prison system.  Nothing has deterred his criminal activity.  Additionally, the facts of this case also support the finding that the defendant will commit another offense.  Here, the defendant went to the home having been already advised that he was not to be there.  He blatantly ignored the instructions of the police to stay away; thus demonstrating his conscious disregard for the legal system.  This factor was appropriately given significant weight.
[directive] If the Designated Attorney determines that the application is in any respect deficient or otherwise in need of supplemental investigation or any other action necessary to satisfy the requirements of this Directive, the Designated Attorney shall require the applicant to conduct such supplemental investigation or to take such other steps as may be necessary to cure the deficiency or to satisfy the requirements of this Directive, and then report back to the Designated Attorney for final authorization before proceeding to submit the application to a judge.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Designated Attorney is authorized to grant conditional approval contingent upon the satisfaction of some additional step, provided that the Designated Attorney provides clear guidance to the applicant as to the step(s) that must be taken by the applicant and the conditions that must be satisfied before the applicant is authorized to submit the application to Page 6 a judge.  (Example: a Designated Attorney may conditionally approve an application contingent upon the applicant consulting with an appropriate representative from another law enforcement agency that reasonably appears to have an interest in the target of the investigation or the premises to be searched.  In these circumstances, a conditional approval might provide that the applicant is authorized to apply to a court for issuance of the search warrant unless the other law enforcement agency objects to the search.)
[brief] ” (Pb24).  He cites no authority to support the notion that libel and slander—two classic common law torts—could double as the underlying wrongs needed to establish a claim for civil conspiracy to violate constitutional rights guaranteed by the New Jersey Constitution and the NJCRA.  (Pb24-Pb28).  The NJCRA provides in relevant part as follows:  Any person who has been deprived of any substantive due process or equal protection rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or any substantive rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this State . . . may bring a civil action for damages and for injunctive or other appropriate relief.  [N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c)]  Under a plain reading of the statute, causes of action arising under New Jersey common law fall outside the ambit of the NJCRA.
[brief] DEFENDANT UNREASONABLY REJECTED EXPERT TESTIMONY AND MADE CONCLUSIONS UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.  To support its variance denial, Defendant relies up the unproven assumption (not borne of any peculiarly local knowledge) that height is a proxy for intensity of use.  This assumption was also used to reject the uncontroverted testimony of Plaintiff’s traffic expert, [...], P.E., PTOE.  Db20-Db22; and the undisputed testimony of Plaintiff’s professional planner, [...], PP, AICP, because he failed to provide a “comparative analysis” of the “differing character” of the warehouses permitted in each municipality.  Db25-Db29.  “While a board may reject expert testimony, it may not do so unreasonably, based only upon bare allegations or unsubstantiated beliefs. ”  New York SMSA v. Bd. of Adjustment, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 338 (App. Div. 2004)(emphasis added).  While a board “may choose which witnesses, including expert witnesses, to believe[,]” “that choice must be reasonably made. ”  Id. (citations omitted).  “In addition, the choice must be explained, particularly where the board rejects the testimony of facially reasonable witnesses. ”  Bd. of Educ. of City of Clifton v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Clifton, 409 N.J. Super. 389, 434-35 (App. Div. 2009)(citing Kramer, 45 N.J. at 288).
[brief] III  In his initial appellate brief, defendant contends a remand is necessary for resentencing because the imposition of a discretionary parole bar on the witness tampering conviction violated Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013).  However, in his supplemental brief, he acknowledges that our Supreme Court rejected the identical argument in State v. Kiriakakis, 235 N.J. 420, 442 (2018).  Yet, he continues to press forward with the alternative argument he initially raised that the court imposed a discretionary parole bar without articulating its reasons for doing so.  State v. Bessix, 309 N.J. Super. 126, 129-30 (App. Div. 1998); see also State v. Sainz, 107 N.J. 283, 290 (1987).  Normally, we would not address this issue because we reverse the court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and, therefore, a remand is necessary so that defendant can withdraw his guilty pleas.
[brief] His testimony at the plenary hearing showed that even at that late date, well over a year after he submitted what was indisputably the losing bid, he continued to cling to the belief that the Plaintiff should have sold the Property to him even though it would have cost the Trust $100,000 and the sale to [...] had been judicially approved:  Q. Okay.  So the Court set up a bidding procedure, a sealed bidding procedure.  Correct?  A. Yes.  Q.  And there were two bids, one was 601,000, and one was 501,000.  Correct?  A. Correct.  Q.  Okay.  So what in the world was the Trustee’s power to just disregard the 601,000 dollar offer and take the lower bid?  A.  The Trustee has a legal duty to protect me and my interests to sell the house at a fair market value.  She has a legal duty.  Just because there’s a court order instructing her to do something that she and [...] asked for doesn’t relieve her of her legal duty as a Trustee to obtain the best possible price for me….  (8T72:13 to 73:2).  As the trial court had put it in denying one of the Defendants’ multiple unsuccessful motions to stop the sale to the high bidder:  “Defendants appear to be taking the position that any outcome in which they are not the guaranteed owners constitutes "irreparable harm."  (Da43).  However, the Trust was not drafted for [...]’s benefit alone.  It was drafted for all three beneficiaries.  The trial court specifically authorized the bidding procedure and the sale itself, and neither the trial court’s decision nor the Trust itself prohibited the resale of the Boonton Property.  Therefore, the Trustee cannot possibly be liable for the resale.
[brief] Only for the grounds that -- [...]: Your Honor, I'd like to make only three points -- THE COURT: -- no, no, no, that it doesn't -- doesn't fit a valid pleading.  [...], bring it up with the Appellate Division.  Thank you, sir.  (5/25/23 Transcript @ T50:6 to T54:10).  In the Trial Court’s oral decision denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to “correct” the Order dismissing the State Defendants with prejudice, [...]’s opinion sums up the primary issue in this case which has led to this action still not being past the pleading stage despite having been filed in 2016:
[brief] On February 28, 2018, plaintiffs filed a Motion to Vacate the Order of [...] of November 10, 2016 and again moved to Reinstate the Complaint against [...] and [...].  (SDa49).  On March 29, 2018, [...] held oral argument on plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the November 10, 2016 Order (SDa50) and on April 3, 2018, [...] entered an Order denying plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate the Order of November 10, 2016.
[brief] Super. 41, 52-53 | 7, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 40 | | (App. Div. 2004)  .................................................................................... | | Kenwood Assocs. v. Bd. of Adj. Englewood, 141 N.J. Super. 1 | 13 | | (App Div. 1976)  ..................................................................................... | | Kramer v. Bd. of Adjust., Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 288 (1965).............. | 10, 11, 15, 34 | | Kohl v. Mayor and Council of Fair Lawn, 50 N.J. 268 (1967) ................ | 38 | | Medical Realty Assoc. v. Board of Adj. of Summit, | 11,12 | | 228 N.J.Super. 226, 233 (App.Div.1988)
[brief] Transcript of Hearing before Zoning Board of Adjustment.  | March 26, 2019 | | (2T)  Transcript of Trial Proceeding | July 15, 2020 | | (3T)  Transcript of Motion for Reconsideration | June 15, 2021 | | (4T)  Transcript of Motion to Enforce Litigants Rights | September 14, 2021 | | (5T)  Transcript of Hearing before Special Hearing Officer (Day 1) | March 24, 2022 | | (6T)  Transcript of Hearing before Special Hearing Officer (Day 2) | March 25, 2022 | | (7T)  Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment | February 10, 2023 | # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | CASES | PAGE(S) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Aldrich v. Schwartz, 258 N.J. Super. 300 (App. Div. 1992) | 36 | | Cell South of New Jersey, Inc., v. Zoning Board of Adjustment | | | of West Windsor Township, 172 N.J. 75 (2002) | 17 | | Cellular Tel. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., | | | 90 F. Supp. 2d 557 (D.N.J. 2000) | 17 | | Central 25, LLC v. Zoning Board of Union City, | | | 460 N.J. Super. 446 (App. Div. 2019) certif. denied 241 N.J. 4 (2020)| 32 | | Cranford Development Associates, LLC v. Township of Cranford, | | | 445 N.J. Super. 220 (App. Div. 2016) | 33-34 | | Galdieri v. Bd. of Adjustment of Morris, | | | 165 N.J. Super. 505 (App. Div. 1979) | 31 | | Hawrylo v. Board of Adjustment, | | | 249 N.J. Super. 568 (App. Div. 1991) | 17-18 | | In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97 by the New Jersey | | | Council on Affordable Housing, 221 N.J. 1 (2015) ("Mt. Laurel IV") | 31-32 | | In the Matter of the Application of Township of South Brunswick, | | | 448 N.J. Super. 441 (Law Div. 2016) | 34 | | Kohl v. Mayor and Council of Fair Lawn, | | | 50 N.J. 268 (1967) | 29 | | Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt, | | | 45 N.J. 268 (1965) | 17-18, 32| | Morris County Fair Housing Council v. Boonton Tp., | | | 220 N.J. Super. 388 (Law. Div. 1987), aff’d as modified, | | | 230 N.J. Super. 345 (App. Div. 1989) | 33 | | New York SMSA, L.P. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Weehawkin, | | | 370 N.J. Super. 319 (App. Div. 2004) | 18-19, 27-28|
[brief] *State v. Medina*, 201 N.J. Super. 565, 580 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 102 N.J. 298 (1985); *State v. Morton*, 155 N.J. 383, 543 (1998), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 931, 121 S.Ct. 1380 (2001) (quoting *Carter*, 91 N.J. at 106).  The trial court should consider undue prejudice to the State, “whose rights and those of the people it represents are also entitled to protection,” when evaluating evidence under N.J.R.E. 403.  *State v. Wilbely*, 122 N.J. Super. 463, 467 (App. Div.), rev'd on o.g., 63 N.J. 420 (1973); *State v. Scherzer*, 301 N.J. Super. 363, 468 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 466 (1997).  In fact, it is the duty of the trial court "to prevent the jury from considering evidence or information that would unduly prejudice either the State or the defense with respect to the central responsibility of the jury: determining criminal culpability."
[brief] ” (Pb39).  Respectfully, this assertion is absurd.  Defense counsel for the Absecon Defendant regularly litigates civil rights involving arrests and detainments in Vicinage I against competent and experienced Plaintiff’s attorneys.  Later in the brief, in a footnote, Plaintiff takes “[...] expects to be disbarred someday for his ADA/LAD activities.  One judge ‘gave it a shot’ by reporting [...] for filing an ADA Accommodation Requests for a mentally disabled client. ” (Pb67n.17).  This is both an outrageous assertion and one that has absolutely nothing to do with this matter because Mr. [...], Esq. is not the plaintiff.  Mr. [...], Esq., has obviously come to believe there some sort of vast conspiracy against him running all the way from the local police department to both the state and federal judiciary and this paranoia is very obviously interfering with Mr. [...], Esq.’s ability to properly advocate for Brett [...].  Indeed, if Plaintiff counsel’s conduct in this action is indicative of his general approach to litigation, it is no wonder he has had so many conflicts within the judicial system.  Plaintiff’s hyperbole and lack of clarity notwithstanding, Plaintiff’s attempt to address [...]’s “complaints about the complaint” does little to address the material issues on appeal, which are: (1) whether the proposed amended pleading (the “SAC” conformed the applicable pleadings standard, (2) whether, upon the Trial Court’s finding that the proposed amended pleading did not comply with the applicable pleading standards, the Trial Court erred in denying Plaintiff leave to file another motion to amend the complaint resulting in the with prejudice dismissal by [...].
[brief] ............................................................  19  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS APPEALED  Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (dated September 22, 2023)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pa273 Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (dated September 22, 2023)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pa276 ### TABLE OF CITATIONS #### Statutes: - **N.J.S.A. 46:8B-3** ........................................... 9 - **N.J.S.A. 46:8B-3d** ........................................... 10 - **N.J.S.A. 46:8B-3h** ........................................... 9 - **N.J.S.A. 46:8B-3m** ........................................... 9 - **N.J.S.A. 46:8B-6** ........................................... 9, 11, 14 - **N.J.S.A. 46:8B-12** ........................................... 10 - **N.J.S.A. 46:8B-12.1d(9)** .................................... 10 - **N.J.S.A. 46:8B-15(c)** ....................................... 10, 18 #### State Case Law ##### New Jersey Supreme Court Opinions: - **Allen v. V&A Bros., Inc.**, 208 N.J. 114, 131 (2011) .................. 12, 17 - **Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors**, 148 N.J. 582, 608-10 (1997)