ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] One of the plaintiffs in both cases, [...], was [...]’s spouse.  Plaintiff Gardner’s unit were altered in a manner that has exposed the building to increased risk of flood damage. ”  Pa452 ¶ 3; Pa 1041 ¶ 3; Pa471–72 ¶¶ 6–7.  In addition to voting to fire [...] and [...], the Association unit owners also voted 6-3 to support pressing the Derivative Action (and thereby hopefully recovering, for the Association, the cost of repairing damaged Association drainage systems), to retain the [...] as independent counsel for the Association in lieu of [...] and [...], and to request the withdrawal of certain Court filings by [...] and [...] that the Association had never authorized and that the majority of voting unit owners believed were detrimental to then-pending claims against [...] in the Derivative Action.
[brief] All crimes are to be tried by jury (Not argued below)  The Constitution reading in pertinent part as follows:  Article. III, Section. 2.  '...The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed....'
[brief] For example, the New Jersey Attorney General Guidelines on Internal Affairs ("AG Guidelines") have long required that law enforcement agencies create and maintain an internal affairs investigation file separate from the employee’s personnel file.  See Ra66 (explaining that “[a]n internal affairs investigation file is needed for all internal affairs reports” which “should contain the investigation’s entire work product, regardless of the author” including “investigators’ reports, transcripts of statements, and copies of all relevant documents. ”)  At the same time, the AG Guidelines unequivocally provided that **Personnel records are separate and distinct from internal affairs investigation records,** and internal affairs investigative reports shall never be placed in personnel records.
[brief] They would, assuming that the Council in fact adopts it, that would in fact replace the current redevelopment plan.  As indicated by [...] (the Board Engineer), the general approach to the redevelopment of the redevelopment plan area is generally consistent with the prior plan with some very specific amendments and revisions that I’ll outline in just a moment.  But what [...] (Board Engineer) had indicated, Lot 1, which is more commonly known as the [...] site or the site that of the original site of the [...] Development for Lot 1, that is not changing.  All the various provisions related to the standards and requirements related to the development of Lot 1 remain in effect and are not being amended or revised.  The only provision related to Lot 1 that in fact is being changed or being amended is an indication of the tract area for Lot 1.  And the reason why we’re doing that is as you indicated in the plan, the redevelopment plan area which includes the various lots that I have identified Lots 1, 3.02, 3.03 and a portion of 3.01, the redevelopment area is in fact being divided or identified now in two different sub areas.  Sub area one, which is Lot 1, which is again commonly known as [...], that will be developed as I said in accordance with the provisions that exist in the plan without amendments.  The amendments are associated with an area that we’ve identified in the plan as sub area or sub district one which... governs the development of the remainder of the redevelopment plan area as identified as the overall redevelopment tract.
[brief] [...] was denied the ability to register for the Ricci Act and apply for amended benefits because he did not submit his registration form prior to July 8, 2021.  However, the Board failed to provide adequate notice of the Ricci Act, and therefore, the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  In Ensslin v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, 311 N.J Super 333 (App. Div. 1998), Ensslin’s denial of ordinary disability was reversed by the Appellate Division.
[brief] (Pa256; Pa274 at 6:19-21.)  The State concedes that as of January 4, 2022, S.49 and A.6260 were not listed on the calendar for January 6, 2022.  (Sb7.)  Moreover, there is no showing that the public had access to the bill text.  (Pa66 at ¶¶7, 9; Pa100 at ¶ 11; Pa103 at ¶ 21.)  The State argues that the public was able to offer testimony, but their testimony complained about the lack of access to the bill text.  (Pa66 at ¶¶7, 9; Pa166 at 15:8-10: Pa177 at 26:9-14.)  Nor is there any showing that the legislators had “an adequate opportunity . . . to become acquainted with and study bills that eventually might be enacted into law. ”  Forsythe, 91 N.J. at 148.  The State argues the deprivation of the public’s participation in the process and advance notice of the bills “fall flat,” but the public’s ability to participate in the process is a fundamental right.  Cf. N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 18 with Sb14.  The State further contends that Applicants have not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that “the way in which Chapter 375 was enacted is repugnant to the Constitution” (Sb17), but the actions here were repugnant to the hallmarks of our representative system: the State concedes there was no advance notice that either A.6260 or S.49 would be introduced on January 6, 2022 (Sb7); the bill text was not available to the public prior to the enactment (Pa66 at ¶¶7, 9; Pa100 at ¶ 11; Pa103 at ¶ 21); legislators did not obtain the bill text until after both Houses held the committee hearings (id.); and the Houses violated their own rules requiring five-days’ notice to the public (Pa282 at 14:3-18).  For these reasons, this Court should distinguish Forsyth and void the Act.
[directive] I.  GENERAL REQUIREMENTS AND RESPECTFUL COMMUNICATION  Law enforcement officers across the state understand that we may never violate the rights of the individuals we interact with, including the rights of LGBTQ+ people, and we take those obligations seriously.  So as other law enforcement agency policies have done, this Directive begins by clarifying a series of protocols that officers must follow in order to avoid engaging in such impermissible harassment or discrimination, as well as to ensure that we treat all individuals with respect and in accordance with their legal rights.
[brief] Indeed, even if he was in custody from the moment he sat down -- or even on his way to the stationhouse, as he contends -- all that was asked of him before he was properly advised of and waived his rights was basic ministerial information that did not constitute interrogation requiring a prior waiver of his rights.  And as [...] properly found, once defendant was advised of his rights, he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived those rights.  "[A]fter an individual is given Miranda warnings and apprised of the rights, that person 'may waive effectuation of [those] rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.'"  Bullock, 253 N.J. at 533-34 (second alteration in original) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444).  The State shoulders the burden of "prov[ing] beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights 'in light of all the circumstances.'"
[brief] *Grasso, supra*, at 52-53 (Emphasis added).  The Board’s conclusions about the intent of the height limitation in the SM Zone are supported specifically by the quoted Master Plan language, the express language of the relevant ordinance, and, more generally, by caselaw that discusses why such height limitations are incorporated into zoning standards.  The Board correctly considered, under the [...] Master Plan and ordinance, and applicable caselaw, that the height of the building to be constructed on the Mansfield part of the overall parcel would affect the intensity of the use of that building and the uses accessory to that building proposed in Florence, and the Board correctly required that substantial, credible evidence about those effects be a part of the use variance proofs under the positive and negative criteria.  Plaintiffs did not provide those necessary proofs, and the Board was amply justified in finding that Plaintiffs failed to show their entitlement to the requested variance relief.
[brief] Defendant [...] “constantly brought up Plaintiff [...] in conversation and insinuated that Plaintiff [...] and Plaintiff [...] were involved in some sort of romantic relationship”; [...] made inappropriate comments and sent text messages about her appearance and inappropriately touched her arm and back; Defendant [...] made inappropriate comments to her about Plaintiff [...]’s wedding and responded it “was a joke” when Plaintiff [...] told him to stop.  (Id.)  Prior to her even complaining about the alleged actions of the [...], the [...] had been contacted by [...] to report issues with Plaintiff spending too much time socializing with [...] employees, and her attire.  (Da004, Certification of [...], Par. 8; Da7, CFS Clinical Supervision Form signed by Plaintiff; Da1, Certification of [...], Par.10).  [...] employee, [...] (incorrectly referred to in depositions as “[...]”), had reported to [...] (the [...] Local Office Manager for the Burlington East [...] Office), that Plaintiff was dressing inappropriately, and was spending too much time socializing with [...] employees.  (Pa564, Defendant Furphy Deposition Transcript, T242:15-T243:3, T244:16-T246:6)  Thereafter, on or about November 26, 2018, Plaintiff contacted her direct supervisor at CFS, Defendant Johnson, to report “problems” with Defendant [...], but made no mention of any sexual harassment on the part of Defendant [...].  (Da1, Certification of [...], Par. 12).  However, it was not until November 29, 2018, in a meeting with CFS’ Head of Human Resources, Defendant [...], and CFS Supervisor Benyola (to discuss the concerns raised by [...] over Plaintiff’s over socialization with [...] employees and her attire), that Plaintiff advised, for the first time, that [...] had been engaged in sexually harassing conduct.  (Pa324, Plaintiff [...] deposition transcript, T99:21-100:1; T105:16-T106:1).  As a result, the decision was made to remove Plaintiff from the potentially hostile work environment and transfer her to the [...] Office in [...].
[brief] “A contract ‘should not be interpreted to render one of its terms meaningless. ”  *Id.* (quoting *Cumberland County Improvement Auth. v. GSP Recycling Co. Inc.*, 358 N.J. Super. 484, 497 (App.Div.), *certif. denied*, 177 N.J. 222 (2003)).  “Evidence of the circumstances is always admissible in aid of the interpretation of an integrated agreement. ”  *Porreca v. City of Millville*, 419 N.J.Super. 212, 232 (App. Div. 2011) (citing Conway v. 287 Corporate Ctr. Assocs., 187 N.J. 259, 269 (2006)).  This is so even when the contract on its face is free from ambiguity.
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[brief] To the extent Defendants ask this Court to “confirm the finality of [...]’s Order terminating the PSA,” Defendants fail to acknowledge that (i) there is no dispute that the Final Judgment is final; and (ii) there is no dispute that the PSA was terminated in accordance with the Final Judgment, which expressly provides that the PSA “will be considered terminated by mutual consent” upon written notice by Plaintiff that it does not wish to close or otherwise take ownership of the Property.  (Pa0193.)  It must also be noted that Defendants, yet again, introduce and rely upon evidence that is not part of the record on this appeal, and otherwise make incoherent and unsupported claims.
[brief] (T2, 39:17-20).  The Borough’s redevelopment counsel explained that “a declaration of an area in need of redevelopment for a contaminated property gives you additional points towards your grant application. ” (T2, 45:24-46:2).  It was even suggested at the Borough Council meeting that the Borough Council would consider entering into a redevelopment agreement with the Plaintiff to allow the Plaintiff to continue remediation of the Property, which allowed a period of time to complete remediation.  (T2, 39:13-16 & 40:4-9).  At the end of the Borough Council meeting, the Borough Council adopted [...] designating the Property as a Condemnation Redevelopment Area.  (T2, 34:1-48:17 & Da20-Da22).
[brief] (1T:42-3 to 6).  Furthermore, at 16 years old, he still slept in the same bed with his parents at night.  (1T:43-25 to 44-3).  In addition, [...] still believed he was going to college and the military after killing four people.  (1T:44-5 to 8).  Furthermore, an honest review of [...]’s statement clearly displays that he had cognitive limitations.  [...] spent much of his statement speaking about hallucinations, and seeing and hearing things that were not there.  (1T:51-2 to 6).  [...] told Detectives that he saw a glowing white light outside of his window the day of the homicide.  (1T:45-25 to 4).  It is clear that the State minimized [...]’s limitations that were told to the Detectives by [...] and were clearly visible on tape.  While [...] testified that she learned about [...]’s autism after the Miranda warnings were given, M.P. was clear that the critical issue is not what police knew about the juvenile’s intellectual and educational challenges. ”  476 N.J. Super. at 290.  Accordingly, the fact that [...] was an autistic teenager who went to a school for children with disabilities should be afforded heavy weight in determining whether to admit his statement.
[brief] I, ¶ 1 | 25, 32, 40, 45 | | N.J. Const. art.  I, ¶ 9 | 32, 40 | | N.J.  Const. art. I, ¶ 10 | 25, 32, 40, 45 | | U.S. Const. amend. V | 17 | | U.S. Const. amend. VI | 25, 32, 40, 45 | | U.S. Const. amend. XIV | 17, 25, 32, 40, 45 | | **Other Authorities** | | | [...], *The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: A Handbook* (2003) | 23 | | [...], *The Reid Technique of Interviewing and Interrogation* (2014) | 23 | | [...], *Coerced Fate: How Negotiation Models Lead to False Confessions*, 109 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 71 (2019) | 23 |
[brief] There is no allegation that the Plaintiff failed to follow the statutory requirements which permit the acquisition of the property through eminent domain proceedings.  Therefore, the allegation that the Township was “exceeding its statutory authorization” or “operating in bad faith” is simply not true.  There is no evidence to sustain that allegation.  We will prove herein that the Township has properly adopted the Ordinance which has permitted the acquisition of the property.  The Ordinance adopted clearly serves a public purpose which has been properly defined in the contract and in the Ordinance.  As can be seen by reviewing the attachment (Pa7), Appellant’s property is landlocked.  One cannot “get there from here”.  It was purchased by the Appellant and, in accordance with the appraisal that the Township has acquired, the Appellant stands to earn many times the value of its investment.  Appellant hardly can complain that it has been damaged or that it has suffered “irreparable damage”.
[brief] ’” (Pa155-56 (quoting In re Advisory Comm. on Pro. Ethics Op. 621, 128 N.J. 577, 597 (1992)).  This conclusion is applicable to the many departments within the State.  (Pa156).  As former Attorney General [...] noted:  Several Departments have various functions that are distinct and essentially unrelated.  For example, Treasury includes, among other entities, the Division of Pensions and Benefits, the Division of Purchase and Property, and the Division of Taxation.  . . .  The units in a Department do not necessarily share confidential information as part of their day-to-day operations, engage in the same functions, or have the same management teams.  Moreover, such units generally retain outside counsel to perform discrete functions that do not involve all of the operations of the larger entity to which that unit belongs.  . . .  In light of the complexity and diversity of the government entities within a single Department or Authority, the representation of one subsidiary unit within a Department or Authority while being adverse to another subsidiary unit will not necessarily create a conflict.
[brief] CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................................29  | Document Name | Date | Appendix | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|----------| | Order Granting Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Complaint And Denying Plaintiff’s Motion To Amend Complaint and Supplemental Statement of Reasons | 10/16/23 | Pa 1a | ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  **Cases** - **Ali v. Rutgers, The State Univ. of N.J.,** - 166 N.J. 280 (2000)  .................................................................  15 - **Bondi v. Citigroup, Inc.,** - 423 N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 2011)
[brief] Contrary to the Superior Court’s June 22, 2023 and August 7, 2023 Opinions, [...]’ sworn statement would be admissible at trial under N.J.R.E. 803(a)(1).  The only objective conclusion here is that [...]’ Sworn Statement was inconsistent with his trial testimony.  At [...]’s trial, [...] testified that he had knowledge of the Staten Island robbery and kidnapping of [...], and that he participated in the crime with [...].  (17T 13:1-8; 12:11-17; 13:9-14).  [...]’ trial testimony directly contradicted his Sworn Statement, wherein he claimed that his codefendant, [...], “would have submitted an affidavit on his behalf . . explain[ing] that [[...]] had no knowledge of the Staten Island robbery and kidnapping of [...]. ” (Da074).  [...] further alleged that his PCR counsel “ignored [his] request to investigate claims that [[...]] would have submitted [the] affidavit on his behalf. ” (Da074).  By signing the petition under penalty of perjury, [...]—the declarant—affirmed that there existed proof that he had no knowledge of the crime in Staten Island.  The only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the Sworn Statement is that [...] disavowed his involvement in the Staten Island kidnapping of [...] under penalty of perjury.  Indeed, that is how the Superior Court interpreted the Sworn Statement in its November 17, 2021 Opinion:  [...], as part of his federal habeas corpus petition submitted in August 2008, claimed to have no prior knowledge of the events stemming from the Staten Island robbery before the crime occurred and that he previously sought to introduce an affidavit from [...] (who was deceased at the time) that would have included false statements that supported [...]’ claim that he had no knowledge of the Staten Island home invasion beforehand.  . . .  Based on the testimony provided at Petitioner’s trial, it is clear that [...] submitted false statements under oath in his Habeas Petition when he claimed to have no knowledge of the Staten Island robbery before it occurred.  (Da108-10) (emphasis added).  Having already made that factual finding—which was wholly appropriate—the court adopted the manifestly incorrect argument that the Habeas Petition and Sworn Statements contained therein were not admissible at [...]’s trial.
[brief] Plaintiffs rely on cases that embrace the same principles.  See Mot. at 4.  Plaintiffs cite In re EpiPen Mktg., Sales Practices and Antitrust Litigation, which expressly adopts Sedona Principle 6 in holding that “unless the party’s choice is ‘manifestly unreasonable or the requesting party demonstrates that the resulting production is deficient,’ the court should not dictate the designation of ESI custodians. ”  No. 17-md-2785-DDC-TJJ, 2018 WL 1440923, at *2 (D. Kans. March 15, 2018).  The court only ordered designation of a “senior executive” as an additional custodian where the requesting party met its burden to show that the custodian was “likely to have unique information and ESI, not available through other [ ] custodians” where no other executive-level employees were designated as custodians.  Id. at *3; see also id. at *2 n.17 (“party moving to compel additional proposed custodians ‘must demonstrate that the additional requested custodians would provide unique relevant information not already obtained’ ” (quoting Fort Worth Employees’ Ret. Fund v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 297 F.R.D. 99, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (emphasis added))).
[brief] Even when charging the jury on the offenses of aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter with respect to count one, [...] followed the model jury charge and simply provided the instructions in sequence after he charged the jury on murder, which included the instructions on passion/provocation manslaughter.  (Sa6; Sa9; 27T159-14 to 16; 27T162-13 to 15).  They were not referred to as lesser included offenses.  The trial court's verdict sheet also conformed to what the model jury charges require.  (Sa11; Sa16; Da3; Da5).  Thus, count one on the verdict sheet was referred to as "murder/passion provocation" and passion/provocation manslaughter was provided as a possible verdict.  (Da3).  Count two was labeled "attempted murder" and attempted passion/provocation manslaughter was provided as a possible verdict.  (Da5).  When reviewing the verdict sheet with the jury at the end of the jury charge, [...] explained that there were three potential verdicts on counts one and two.  (27T207-23 to 25; 27T208-11 to 16).
[brief] Da072.  On May 24, 2023, [...] informed [...] that [...] was considering its ROFR and would respond on or before 30 days from receipt of this executed offer, by June 8, 2023.  Da069.  On June 6, 2023, well within the 30-day window, [...] Vice President [...] notified Defendants that [...] was exercising its ROFR under the same terms and conditions contained in the PSA and related addendums.