ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] 6.3.3  If a criminal investigation is initiated, the law enforcement agency shall receive periodic and timely updates concerning the course of the investigation.  While a criminal investigation is pending, complainants and witnesses may be referred by the law enforcement agency to the county victim witness office for information concerning the criminal investigation.  Once the criminal investigation is complete and a disposition of the allegation has been made, the prosecutor's office shall provide the law enforcement agency with its investigative file for use in the internal affairs investigation subject to applicable state statutes, court rules and case law.
[brief] Like all municipalities in New Jersey, [...] has a constitutional obligation to provide for its fair share of the regional need for affordable housing.  See Da67-Da74.  2.  In July 7, 2015, after the New Jersey Supreme Court had decided *In re N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5:97*, 221 N.J. 1 (2015) (“Mount Laurel IV”), the Township filed a declaratory judgment action captioned *In the Matter of the Application of the [...]*, Docket No. [...].
[brief] Despite, Defendants contention in their Certification that “a good faith effort was made to attempt to resolve the instant matter prior to filing this motion,” not once did Defendant’s Counsel reach out to Plaintiff’s counsel in an attempt to receive an Affidavit of Merit.  In direct contention to Defendants’ Certification, Plaintiff’s Counsel has combed through all correspondence sent to and received by Plaintiff’s Counsel from Defendants’ Counsel.  All of Plaintiff’s Counsel’s emails to Defendants’ Counsel are attached hereto.  (75a).  As this Court can see from the cited portions of the Appendix, there is not a single instance where Defendant, in good faith and professional courtesy, attempted to procure Plaintiff’s Affidavit of Merit.  Therefore, per Defendants’ Certification, Plaintiff requests that this Court demand Defendants’ Counsel to submit proofs that any attempt to procure Plaintiff’s Affidavit of Merit was sent to Plaintiff’s Counsel.
[brief] Despite the above, the court in *Veras* abjectly failed to analyze the legislative history or the legislative intent of the NJCFLA.  Instead, *Veras*’s determination that no implied private right of action existed in the NJCFLA was based *entirely* on the existence of the Commissioner’s enforcement abilities under subsection 18.  But N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18 had always existed in conjunction with private enforcement remedies, i.e., N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33(b).  Moreover, *In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation*, *supra*—cited by *Veras*—addressed and analyzed a statute that explicitly disallowed a private right of action, i.e., N.J.S.A. 52:9M-15(a).
[brief] The [...] submits that the determination in this case hinges upon the use of the words “designed to allow” in the ordinance.  The ordinance can be read in two parts.  The first part states that height can be measured from the revised lot grade shown on a site plan approved by the planning board.  The second part states that a revised lot grade shall not include mounding, terracing, or other devices designed to allow increased building height.  The determinative issue is whether the revised lot grade was designed to increase building height or was designed for some other legitimate purpose.  It is submitted that this required a finding of fact, not an interpretation of law.  The word “design” is not defined in the Ordinance.
[directive] The a without substance controlled other or drug narcotic any of use from refrain to defendant the order alcohol for or drug treatment available to undergo and practitioner, medical licensed prescription a by persons by committed are crimes many Because (i). and 2A:162-17(b)(2)(h)  N.J.S.A. dependency.  future project to ability the affect may (which drug amind-altering of influence the under while punishment), criminal of threat the of effect deterrent general the undermine thus and consequences be can addiction untreated an habit, drug offender's the support money to raise to committed are or a when Accordingly, 7.6.4.
[brief] ”  (1T 3-23 to 4-18; Da 109, 00:03:10 to 00:04:01)  After he signed the form, [...] said they had “a couple” questions about [...]’s death and wanted him to “help [them] out,” to which he agreed.  (1T 4-19 to 5-22)  The detectives immediately began questioning him in detail about his whereabouts on the night of [...]’s death, including what time he went to and left [...], which door he used, who he talked to, how much he drank, what he wore, what car he drove, where he parked, where he went after the bar, what route he took, and when he went to [...].  (1T 5-23 to 18-16)
[brief] ”  Defendant also claims an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing should have been held, but claims the lack of a hearing was “understandable” because everyone already knew exactly what the claims were and what happened in [...]’s case.  Defendant is, again, mistaken.  Trial courts are given wide latitude in limiting prior false-accusation testimony and cross-examination in order to avoid a distracting side-show that confuses the issues at trial.
[brief] A plaintiff in a prerogative writ action must have a sufficient stake in the matter to challenge the governmental action.  2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS at 11.  As [...] admittedly does not own property in Newark, he cannot maintain a claim under LTTEL.  Similarly, [...] failed to state a claim under OPMA or OPRA, as [...] failed to state any factual allegations that the City failed to properly notify the public or that the City failed to provide records in a manner that would violate the statute.  Concerning NJCRA and Section 1983, [...] failed to state any right of which Defendants have deprived him.  Appellant’s conclusory allegations in the Complaint are unsupported by facts in the record.  Point II.
[brief] The circumstances of the transaction render unnecessary proof of an undertaking by the grantee to hold the property [*579] in trust for the purchaser, and so dispense with the requirement of the Statute of  Frauds that there be a written memorandum of the creation of an express trust in land.  . . .  The fraud giving rise to a constructive trust may be either actual or constructive; it suffices in this regard if the retention of the property would constitute an unconscionable advantage by the holder of the legal title over the grantor.
[brief] NEITHER CONICELLO NOR LAMBRECHT RETALIATED AGAINST JENKINS  There is no basis, and [...] has not articulated any to this Court, on which to hold [...] or [...] personally liable for her termination.  [...] convened a termination panel, as noted above, that concluded [...] should be terminated.  This particular terminal panel included [...], [...], in-house counsel, and the assistant-Vice Present of Human Resources.  Critically, no singular termination panel member has final, decision-making power, including [...].  [...]’s function was limited to consulting on underlying facts.  [...] testified that she knew she had to escalate the charge pay issue to Human Resources once she learned that [...] was entering the charge pay without authorization.  [...] “had to support the decision that was made” by the panel to terminate [...]’s employment.  (Pa370 at 109:12-110:10).  [...], meanwhile, merely acted as an arm of the Human Resources department.  [...] only investigates an employee when a manager contacts Human Resources.  She has no final, decision-making power.  [...] interviewed each and every staffing coordinator in connection with the allegations that [...] had stolen [...] time and money, and she participated in the termination panel that ultimately decided to terminate his employment—not as the decision maker, but as a Human Resources representative.  Finally, [...]’s brief is clear: [...]’s conduct was never the basis for her retaliation claims.  The trial court recognized the importance of the termination panel.  (See 1T 31:12-18) (“But in any event, she’s not the terminator anyway.  These people were brought up in front of – these three plaintiffs were brought up in front of the termination panel. ”).  On this record, there is no basis upon which either [...] or [...] can held to have personally retaliated against [...].  CONCLUSION
[brief] There is no proof that the roadways in question comply with the RSIS standards or that the Borough Engineer inspected them as such.  It is likely that they were inspected as internal access roadways.  Indeed the record revealed that the Planning Board Engineer found the streets non-compliant with the Borough zoning ordinances.  The Court placed substantial reliance upon the inspection of the roadways performed by an individual whom the Court acknowledges was not the municipal engineer.  There is no evidence in the record as to what standards the roads were inspected.  The record does not reveal whether the roads were inspected as driveways, internal roads, private roads, rights of way, easements or public streets.  Each have separate regulatory requirements under the law.  There is nothing in the record which reveals that the Borough Engineer gave a final approval and inspected the internal roadways to be compliant with RSIS standards as "public streets" which is a necessary component to satisfy the controlling statute.  Nor does the record reveal the required size or width of the roadways to be dedicated rendering the inspection of the internal roadways as a public street as dubious.  Indeed the roadways appear to be facially non-compliant with the RSIS standards concerning emergency vehicle turn-arounds.  The record is again unclear.  It is doubtful that the internal roadways were inspected to RSIS standards.  The 2002 Developer's agreement referred to a turn around for fire and other emergency apparatus.  (Pa91), (par."O")  The maps supplied by plaintiffs reveal on their face apparent noncompliance with N.J.A.C. 21-4.2 as the RSIS relates to the dead end street created by Plaintiffs.  The regulation plainly states that "Cul-de-sacs shall provide for a cartway turning radius of 40 feet and a right-of-way line eight feet beyond the edge of the cartway."  No such turning radius is contemplated or shown on Plaintiff's maps thus rendering the road facially noncompliant with RSIS standards, and, apparently, the 2002 Resolution.  The municipality cannot be mandated to accept for dedication a roadway that does not comply with the regulatory specifications for public streets.  The RSIS standards (N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.2) were developed as a result of legislation which mandates statewide uniform improvement standards that supersede existing municipal standards (See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.5)  Shifting ownership of non-compliant roads to the Borough, absent municipal engineer approval, was reversible error by the trial court.
[brief] See Yueh, 329 N.J. Super. at 467.  Doing so would require, among other things, parsing through each of the countless motions and applications included in the 5,485.1 hours of legal work for which [...] sought payment, recreating the context in which each motion/application was made, determining whether it was granted (and, if so, to what degree), and, if granted to some degree, whether the work done was reasonable and necessary (and if so, to what degree).  Clearly, this was not done by the Chancery Court and, realistically, could never have been done given the way the Global Fee Application was submitted.  Indeed, both the trial court and [...] were greatly prejudiced by [...]’s unilateral delay in filing the Global Fee Application.  For that reason alone, the Global Fee Application should have been denied in its entirety.
[brief] Plaintiffs discovered that [...] is illegally owned and controlled by a non-physician and that [...]’s benefit claims were therefore fraudulent only with assistance from cooperating witnesses.  Pb9-11.  Plaintiffs’ other fraud claims are based on kickbacks and illegal self-referrals.  Pb11-13.  Those are not the types of fraud that an insurer can reasonably discover within the strict 105 days to pay or reject a PIP claim.  Third, the provisions of the Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act on which [...] relies do not provide the right to a de novo jury trial after ADR, but only limited grounds for a judge to review an award.
[brief] Defendant [...] Recommended Plaintiff’s Termination, Undermining Defendants’ Claims of Independent Decision-Making.  Defendants also try to obscure the fact that Defendant [...], along with Defendant [...], were the decision makers in Plaintiff’s termination, instead attempting to hide them behind an “independent panel,” implying that she had no significant role in the decision.  (Rb48-49).  Contrary to Defendants’ claims, the termination panel does not serve as an independent decisionmaker.  Instead, a matter is only brought to the termination panel when termination has already been recommended.  (Pa664).  Here, there can be no doubt that Plaintiff was terminated by Defendant [...] and Defendant [...].  Defendant [...] reported the charge pay issue to Human Resources, participated in interviews during Defendant [...]’s investigation into the charge pay issue, framed the charge pay as unauthorized, and recommended that termination.  (Pa664).  She and Defendant [...] recommended the termination to the termination panel.
[brief] ”  Boyle v Riti, supra., 175 N.J. Super. at 166.  As such, given there is evidence in the record of a 2009 incident presented by Petitioner’s own treating physician, it is not the Board’s burden to dispel that evidence.  “The precise issue is whether the findings of the agency could have been reached on substantial credible evidence in the record, considering the proof as a whole. ”  Bueno v. Board of Trustees, 404 N.J. Super. 119, 125 (App. Div. 2008).
[directive] SUBJECT: Guidance Regarding Municipal Prosecutors’ Discretion in Prosecuting Marijuana and Other Criminal Offenses  This Memorandum of Guidance (hereinafter “Memorandum”) addresses the scope and appropriate use of prosecutorial discretion by municipal prosecutors handling complaints in municipal court.  The Memorandum focuses in particular on how municipal prosecutors may permissibly exercise their discretion in cases involving marijuana-related offenses.  The first part of this Memorandum addresses whether a municipal prosecutor may adopt a policy or practice of “marijuana decriminalization,” under which the prosecutor and/or his subordinates categorically will not pursue convictions for statutory offenses related to marijuana.  The adoption of such a policy or practice would be an abuse of discretion and is therefore prohibited.  The second part of this Memorandum discusses permissible exercises of prosecutorial discretion by municipal prosecutors at different points in the course of a prosecution.  Municipal prosecutors necessarily exercise prosecutorial discretion in discharging the duties of their office.  Marijuana-related cases are not unique in this regard.  In exercising their discretion, however, prosecutors must be mindful of the need to consider the particular facts and applicable law in each individual case; to justify their decisions to the courts; to make a record that permits review for arbitrariness or discrimination; and to adhere to applicable rules of professional conduct.  The Legislature is considering changes to how marijuana is treated under state law— including changes that may significantly reduce the number of low-level marijuana cases prosecuted in municipal court.  Although legislation may soon make this Memorandum New Jersey Is an Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and Recyclable Page 2 unnecessary or require its amendment, nothing in this Memorandum is intended to reflect upon the Legislature’s ongoing deliberations.  Pursuant to the authority granted to me under the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117, which provides for the general supervision of criminal justice by the Attorney General as chief law enforcement officer of the State to secure the benefits of uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the State, I, [...], hereby provide the following guidance to all prosecutors operating under the authority of the laws of the State of New Jersey as to the prosecution of marijuana offenses in municipal court.
[brief] \(^7\) --- \(^2\) *RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co.*, 234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018).  \(^3\)  *IE Test, LLC v. Carroll*, 226 N.J. 166, 184 (2016).  \(^4\)  *Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc.*, 445 N.J. Super. 59, 71-73 (App. Div. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 231 N.J. 24 (2017).  \(^5\)  *Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of W. Windsor*, 173 N.J. 502, 549 (2002).  \(^6\)  *Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co.*, 65 N.J. 474, 483-484 (1974).  \(^7\)  *Manalapan Realty v. Manalapan Twp. Comm.*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
[directive] Standard Operatinq Procedure  Establishment Law Enforcement 4:2 Trust Fund of (MLETA)  Municipal Law Enforcement Trust Account, A. law a 1. the discretion of the county prosecutor, municipal At enforcement agency through its funding entity or the funding entity of a the county prosecutor's office shall establish law enforcement trust fund dedicated for law enforcement purposes, and funded by - N.J.S.A. 2C:64-lt completed forfeiture actions commenced under - seq., N. 2C:41-1, J.S.A. (civil forfeiturey or et sea., (racketeering).
[brief] For instance, at T. 41, l. 8-15, Board member [...] observed that the Pinelands waiver “doesn’t apply to the other lots surrounding it. ”  The Plaintiff and expert witnesses have demonstrated that this lot will house a home, completing the development in an approved subdivision and efficiently concentrating housing in an approved area.  It will meet all technical requirements when they are properly examined.  The issue of “substantial detriment to the public good” remains.  Plaintiff’s expert, [...], testified at T. 55, l. 4-10, that this proposal does not pose a substantial detriment to the neighborhood.  At T. 98, l. 8-25, the neighbor to the west, [...], complained that stormwater would drain onto his property, ignoring the dry wells, i.e., the swales and berms, required and added to the plan (see City engineer’s comments, T. 69, l. 19-22).  Beginning at T. 100, l. 21 through T. 102, l. 25, [...] opined, without expert assistance, that a house within 50 feet of Maple Avenue “will detrimentally impact the property values on our street” (p. 102, l. 23-25).  [...] provided her insight at T. 104, L. 2 through T. 109, l. 24, with her primary concern being that the value of properties on the street would decrease (T. 104, L. 13-15).
[brief] Courts nationwide have uniformly interpreted the Consumption Exception to restore coverage for bodily injuries caused by consumption of fungi or bacteria that are, are on, or are in goods or products.  See Harris v. Durham Enters., 586 F. Supp.3d 856, 865 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2022) (“The Bodily Consumption Exception excepts from the Bacteria Exclusion bodily injury or losses caused by "bacteria that are, are on, or are contained in, a good or product intended for bodily consumption."); Frey v. Anderson Corp., 2015 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 21992 (Ohio Ct. Cm. Pleas 2015 ) (declining to apply Consumption Exception to restore coverage for a bodily injury claim based on ingesting airborne mold spores); Acuity v. Reed & Assocs. of TN, LLC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 787, 795 (W.D. Tenn. 2015) (allegations that the claimant “suffered bodily injury as a result of mold in the water supply” triggered the insurer’s duty to defend); Heinecke v. Aurora Healthcare, Inc., 841 N.W.2d 52 (WI App. Ct. 2013) (Consumption Exception did not restore coverage where claimant did not allege that he consumed mold-contaminated water); NGM Ins. Co. v. Low Country Finish Carpentry, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200367, at *12 (D.S.C. Oct. 31, 2012) (Consumption Exception inapplicable where insured’s allegations of injury were limited to exposure to “high levels of mold or mildew…throughout the home…”); Nationwide Mut. Fire. Ins. Co. v. Dillard House, 651 F. Supp.2d 1367,1379 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (“The Consumption Exception allows for coverage under both policies for allegations of harm caused by “bacteria that are, are on, or are contained in, a good or product intended for (bodily) consumption.
[brief] TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS  Order denying the dismissal of Count II of the Counterclaim of Defendants [...], [...], [...], and [...] Pa 17-23 Stipulation of Dismissal of Defendants [...] and [...] Pa 17-23  Denial of Summary Judgment Motion of Defendants [...], [...], [...], and [...] Pa 17-23 Order for Judgment, entered August 3, 2023 Pa 32 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Case Law: Adler v. Bergen County Department of Parks & Public Property, Town of Irvington, 20 N.J. Super. 240 (App. Div. 1952) ..................................................37 Auciello v. Stauffer, 58 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div. 1959) ........37 Avalon Home and Land Owners Ass’n v. Borough of Avalon, 111 N.J. 205 (1988) .............................................................28 Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574..............................................17 Bonaventure Intern., Inc. v. Borough of Spring Lake, 350 N.J. Super. 420 (App. Div. 2002)...........................................24, 26 Borough of Rockleigh v. Astral Industries, 29 N.J. Super. 154 (App. Div. 1953)....................................................37 Conselice v. Borough of Seaside Park, 358 N.J. Super. 327 (App. Div. 2003).................................................28 Cos-Lin, Inc. v. Spring Lake Bd. of Adjustment, 221 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div. 1987)..............................................26 Frizen v. Poppy, 17 N.J. Super. 390 (Chancery Div. 1952) .........37 Garrou v. Teaneck Tryon Co., 11 N.J. 294 (1953)....................32 Grundlehner v. Dangler, 29 N.J. 256 (1959) ............................28 Hantman v. Randolph Tp., 58 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 1959) .26 Heagen v. Borough of Allendale, 42 N.J. Super. 472 (App. Div. 1956).......................................................24 Irvin v. Township of Neptune, 305 N.J. Super. 652 (App. Div. 1997).......................................................37 Jantausch v. Verona, 41 N.J. Super. 89 (Law Div. 1956), aff'd, 24 N.J. 326 (1957)...........................................38 Lieberman v. Saddle River Tp., 37 N.J. Super. 62 (App. Div. 1955).............................................34 Lizak v. Faria, 96 N.J. 482 (1984)..............................................25 Matter of Ridgefield Park Board of Education, 244 N.J. 1 (2020).17 Morris v. Borough of Haledon, 24 N.J. Super. 171 (App. Div. 1952)..............................................25 Rose v. Chaikin, 187 N.J. Super. 210 (Ch. Div. 1982)....................34, 35 Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Company, 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019).....17
[brief] In his last moments he thought he was with a friend until he makes that sudden realization on those --- 5  The actual “Goodfellas” quote is as follows:  If you’re part of a crew, nobody ever tells you that they’re going to kill you, doesn’t happen that way.  There weren’t any arguments or curses like in the movies.  See, your murderers come with smiles, they come as your friends, the people who’ve cared for you all of your life.  And they always seem to come at a time that you’re at your weakest and most in need of their help.  [Goodfellas (1990) Ray Liotta: Henry Hill, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0099685/characters/nm000501 (last visited Dec. 18, 2023). ]  street[s] when [...] produced that Glock handgun two inches from his face that his life was over and his time on this planet had come to an abrupt end and that’s how [...] left this world.