ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Plaintiff’s appeal of the dismissal of Count Five is perplexing given that Plaintiff conceded, on two occasions, her inability to establish liability against Defendant [...] since [...] is not Plaintiff’s employer and has no supervisory authority over Plaintiff.  **Plaintiff conceded there is no viable claim in both Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to Defendants’ motions to dismiss and during oral argument on Defendants’ motions.**  Particularly, in her opposition brief, Plaintiff stated:  Plaintiff concedes that to the extent that Defendant [...] is not an employee with supervisory authority, she cannot be held individually liable under the NJLAD.  Absent a certification, however, from her or a supervisor, it would be inappropriate to dismiss [...] from the case at this point.  [DGSa1, Fn. 4\(^4\)]  ---  \(^3\)  The designation ”DGSa” refers to Defendants [...] and [...]’s Appendix.  \(^4\)  Mindful of R. 2:6-1(a)(2) regarding the general prohibition against the inclusion of briefs in the appendix, an excerpt from Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to Defendants’ motions to dismiss filed below is included here given the trial court’s reference to same in its Consolidated Statement of Reasons (17a-18a), and to illustrate Plaintiff’s concession on the inviability of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant [...].  Only the portion of Plaintiff’s brief germane to this issue is included in Defendants [...] and [...]’s Appendix.
[brief] Pa168.  On or about November 15, 2023 at the Order to Show Cause hearing, counsel for Petitioners immediately brought the potential conflict to the Trial Court’s attention. \(^6\)  On or about January 2, 2024, Petitioners filed the Motion to Disqualify [...] and his law firm.  Pa126.  As part of their filing, Petitioners submitted correspondence to the Trial Court, on which [...] was copied, stating “. . . please note that given the sensitive nature of the subject motion, the Certification of [...] is being provided to the Court only for \textit{in camera} review. ”  PPa79.  Further, Petitioners’ letter brief submitted to the Trial Court, on which [...] was also copied, stated, regarding the substantially harmful information imparted to [...] and contained in [...]’s Certification, “The specific details of these communications are contained within the Certification of [...] which is being submitted herewith for ex parte \textit{in camera} review by the Court. ”  PPa79.  \(^6\)  It appears that the November 15, 2023 transcript was not ordered by Respondents.  On February 20, 2024, Respondents filed opposition to Petitioners’ Motion to Disqualify.
[brief] ## Cases | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Abbott by Abbott v. Burke, 199 N.J. 140 (2009) | 27 | | AMG Assocs. v. Springfield Twp., 65 N.J. 101 (1974) | 29 | | Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576 (1975) | 29 | | Conlon v. Bd. of Pub. Works of City of Paterson, 11 N.J. 363 (1953) | 29 | | Dial, Inc. v. City of Passaic, 443 N.J. Super. 492 (App. Div. 2016) | 30 | | Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, | | | 459 N.J. Super. 458 (App. Div. 2019), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, | 30, 31| | 244 N.J. 75 (2020) | | | Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N. J. 239 (2015) | 29 | | Harvard Enter, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Madison Twp., Middlesex Cty., 56 N.J. 362 (1970) | 29 | | In re Adoption of Unif. Housing Affordability Controls, 390 N.J. Super 89 (App. Div. 2007) | 22 | | In re Contest of November 8, 2011 Gen. Election of Office of N.J. Gen. Assembly, 210 N.J. 24 (2012) | 27 | | In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358 (1961) | passim | | Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370 (2016) | 17 | | Main Union Assocs. v. Twp. of Little Falls Rent Leveling Bd., 306 N.J. Super. 404 (App. Div. 1997) | 27 | | Matter of M.U.’s Application for a Handgun Purchase Permit, 475 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div. 2023) | 28 | Matter of Petition of New Jersey Nat. Gas Co. for Permission to Revise Rates for Appliance Serv., [...] (93 N.J.A.R.2d (BRC) 19 (N.J. Adm.)), Final Agency Decision (June 4, 1992)…………………………………………………………… 21 N.J. Ass’n of Health Plans v. Farmer, 342 N.J. Super. 536 (Ch. Div. 2000)…………………………………………………………… 27 N.J. Nat. Gas Co. v. Borough of Red Bank, 438 N.J. Super. 164 (App. Div. 2014)……………………………………… 39 Overlook Terrace Mgmt. Corp. v. Rent Control Bd. of Town of W. N.Y., 71 N.J. 451 (1976)………………………………………………… 10 Public Service Corp. v. Westfield, 80 N.J. Eq. 295 (Ch. 1912)…………… 35, 36 Pub. Serv. Elec. Co. v. Westfield, (D.N.J., September 5, 1918)…………… 37 Ran-Davs Cty. Kosher, Inc. v. State, 129 N.J. 141 (1992)…………………
[brief] Essentially, as [...] (Board Engineer) had indicated, [...] (Board Engineer) had indicated that there in fact was a presentation made by the [...] to the Borough Council.  Borough Council acting as the redevelopment entity of the municipality and based on that presentation, the Borough is proposing through this ordinance to amend and essentially replace the existing Beachway Avenue Redevelopment Plan with the new plan.  The last plan, as amended, was adopted June 21st, 2017 and then this would be an amended plan once the Borough Council in fact does have a second reading and has a public hearing on the proposed ordinance.
[directive] Every use of force must undergo the following procedures for a meaningful command level review pursuant to a written policy established by the law enforcement executive:  (a)  The meaningful command level review of the incident shall be undertaken by at least two levels of supervisors.  These levels may include the immediate supervisor, internal affairs, training officers or command staff.  At least one reviewer must be two 20 USE OF FORCE POLICY | December 2021 levels or more above the officer who used force.  When the chief law enforcement executive of an agency uses force, the County Prosecutor’s Office shall be notified and, consistent with this Policy, shall determine the process for the meaningful command level review of the incident, which may include staff from the County Prosecutor’s Office.
[brief] Retroactivity  A.  This case is a pipeline case [...] must be given full retroactive effect regardless of whether cases predate or postdate the issuance of that decision.  That is the rule from Harper, which was acknowledged in Roberto.  See 257-261 20th Ave. Realty v. Roberto, 477 N.J. Super. 339, 362 (2023); Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993).  Roberto’s discussion of pipeline retroactivity was limited to foreclosure actions, not takings cases.
[brief] SPECIAL RULES OF INTERPRETATION APPLY TO NJLAD CLAIMS (Pa6)  The NJLAD recognizes a disability discrimination claim, not only for employees who have had a disability at any time, but also for those who are “perceived as or believed to be a person with a disability, whether or not that individual is actually a person with a disability. ”  N.J.A.C. 13:13-1.3  Under the NJLAD, the 'perceived disability' doctrine applies when an employer believes the employee has a physical or mental condition that would qualify the person as disabled under the NJLAD if the condition actually existed.  The statutory definition of “disability” under the NJLAD is exceptionally broad in scope, and includes any “physical disability [or] infirmity . . . which is caused by bodily injury . . . or illness. ”  N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(q);  However, "[u]nlike the definition of disability under the ‘actually disabled’ prong of the ADA definition of disability, [the] NJLAD does not require that a disability restrict any major life activities to any degree. ”  See also Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly & Co., 636 F. App’x 831, 848 (3d Cir. 2016) (“The NJLAD defines disability in a broader sense than does federal law. ”).  Boyd v. Riggs Distler & Co., Civil Action No. 1:20-CV-14008-KMW-EAP, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233060, at *26 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2022)  The NJLAD is remedial legislation, intended “to eradicate the cancer of discrimination” protect employees, and deter employers from engaging in discriminatory practices.  “Because workplace discrimination is “still a pervasive problem in the modern workplace, even ‘novel arguments' advanced by victims . . . require our utmost care and attention. ”  Calabotta v. Phibro Animal Health Corp., 460 N.J. Super. 38, 60-61 (App. Div. 2019)  Because this case concerns claims under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, “special rules of interpretation also apply. ”  Nini v. Mercer Cty. Cmty. Coll., 202 N.J. 98, 108 (2010).  “When confronted with any interpretive question” pertaining to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, our Courts “must recognize” the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination's pronouncement of its broad public policy goals.  Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373, 390 (2016).  The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination's broad and strong language provides ample support for Plaintiff's ability to prosecute its claims in this case.
[brief] Plaintiff argued above that the Court conducted a trial where Plaintiff established the relationship of Landlord Tenant under Oath.  The testimony is not controverted and no evidence on the record corroborates that the Judge precluded [...] from testifying as to Ownership of the property or the lack of owing rent.  In Carr, a copious record exists that outlines through trial and documentation that many complex issues existed in the case, and the Landlord-Tenant Judge even questioned whether he had jurisdiction over the multifaceted and confusing case.  Id at 346  Also, Carr citing N.J.S.A. 2A: 18-52 asserts furthermore a deed or other writing may be received for the purpose of showing the right to possession of the premises for the recovery of which the proceedings are brought.  Id.  At 347  In the instant case, factually the Plaintiff produced the Deed and other writings that were indicative of ownership.  (Da15) (Da38)  The prime requisite for a summary dispossess action is the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties.  Carr at 348 (Citing Cahayla v. Saikevich, 119 N.J. Super 116, 118 (Cty. Ct. 1972)  The instant court in the Motion decision and the Decision for Plaintiff’s possession of Property and Defendant’s payment of Rent clearly applied the facts of the case to decide a landlord tenant relationship existed among the parties as opposed to the payment of a mortgage by Defendant.  All the evidence substantiated the payment of rent with no evidence that the payment of rent and no evidence that if Defendant paid the rent the property would be returned back to Defendant.  Moreover, no evidence of fraud 2T50-13  Defendant also cites Howard v. Diolosa, 241 N.J. Super 222, 227 (App. Div. 1990)  The case is inapplicable to the instant facts.  First, the case was heard in the Chancery Court and not a landlord tenant court, second an uncertain leaseback agreement existed, and third the bank was involved in the matter.  In the instant case, landlord tenant relationship has been established, no leaseback agreement exists; and no bank is involved in the legal action.  POINT III
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING FOLLOWING THE BENCH TRIAL SHOULD NOT BE OVERTURNED  A trial court’s ruling after a bench trial is entitled to substantial deference.  “The scope of Appellate review of a trial court’s fact finding function is limited. ”  Séidman v. Clifton Sav.Bank, 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011).  An Appellate Court should review rulings made by the trial court “premised on the testimony of witnesses and written evidence at a bench trial, in accordance with a deferential standard. ”  Nelson v. Elizabeth Board of Ed., 466 N.J. Super. 325, 366 (App Div. 2021).  N.J. 168, 182 (2013).  The Supreme Court noted “an Appellate Court’s review of a cold record is no substitute for the trial court’s opportunity to hear and see the witnesses who testified on the stand. ”  Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020).  The Plaintiff was able to argue (and keep arguing even after the Judge ruled).  There were documents presented to the court.  After the Defendant’s representative testified, the Plaintiff was allowed to argue again against their position.  The Plaintiff had more than his “day in Court. ”  “Only when the trial court’s conclusions are so clearly ‘mistaken’ and ‘wide of the mark’ should we interfere to ensure there is not a denial of justice. ”  Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015).  In sum, the Plaintiff has no basis to challenge the ruling over his ever changing dollar demand.
[brief] THIS COURT SHOULD REQUIRE THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES TO FULLY REMEDY THIS CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCY  The state constitution and statutes clearly impose responsibility for providing T&E on the Legislature and on the Executive.  The constitutional education clause imposes on the Legislature clear and explicit responsibility for providing “for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools. ”  N.J. Const. Art. VIII, par. 4.  Sec. 1.
[brief] [...] did not disclose that he had “lost” the Decedent’s client file.  Instead, [...] produced the Photocopy with the words “Exhibit B” printed on the bottom of the first page along with copies of all the pleadings that had then filed in this litigation.  (9T271: 9-24).  Before trial in this matter, another subpoena was served on [...], demanding that he produce at trial the original file he maintained for Decedent.  At trial, [...] testified that he did not have the Decedent’s original client file, claiming it was lost.  (9T238:3-9).  [...] testified that when he was subpoenaed for the deposition, he reached out to Respondent’s attorney, to recreate the Decedent’s client file and was given the Photocopy.  Respondent’s attorney stated at trial that he wrote the words “Exhibit B” on the bottom of the first page of the Photocopy that [...] then possessed.  (9T271:6-12).  The facts demonstrate that the Photocopy that [...] presented during his deposition was not given to him by the Decedent, but rather, was provided to him by Respondent.  The Court denied Petitioner’s motion seeking a spoliation inference, finding found that “the will satisfies the requirements of self-proving wills so any notes in the file would not demonstrate the invalidity of the Will. ”  (P29a)  The Court fails to consider that there were genuine issues at trial as to the documents that the Decedent provided to [...], if any, when making the will, and the original file would have settled that issue.  Likewise, [...]’s client file is relevant to issues of credibility and completeness, particularly since [...] provided testimony from memory over 7 years ago, that was neither specific nor complete, being unable to recall the number of meetings he had with Decedent, the dates of those meetings, if the meetings were in person or on the phone, when he received the Photocopy and what he was given by Respondent.  (10T215:23 to 216:4; 217:4-8;217:17-23; 218:11-20;218:21 to 219:8)  The failure to preserve material evidence surrounding the making of Decedent’s will has prejudiced Petitioner and the Court erred by finding that the file was irrelevant and that no adverse inference was warranted.  At a minimum, the failure to preserve the Decedent’s Estate file constitutes suspicious circumstances that warranted that the presumption of undue influence shift to Respondent, and the Court’s denial of the Petitioner’s Motion for Spoilation is erroneous and should be set aside.  POINT TWO
[brief] http://mcponj.org #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |----------------------------------------------|------| | COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 1 | | COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS | 4 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | | | POINT I  DEFENDANT’S RIGHTS UNDER THE | | | CONFRONTATION CLAUSE WERE NOT VIOLATED | 6 | | POINT II THE DE NOVO COURT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE | | | BIAS | 10 | | POINT III
[brief] Similar to all other newly elected, as well as currently seated, Board members, this Board member is bound by and charged with understanding and complying with the ethical standards set forth in the Act.  https://www.nj.gov/education/legal/ethics/advisory/cat1/A36-17.pdf (Ca236).  As the Advisory Opinion on this issue was unquestionably clear, and as Appellants had every reason to rely on the Commission’s outlining of its own jurisdiction, it was unnecessary to point out what is obvious from the record: that the post that is the subject of Count 7 was still public and available well into Respondent’s term as a Board member.  (Ca290; Ca097-098).  Respondent had been sworn in for weeks while this transparently racist post was still up and public.  Leaving this post up while she was a sitting Board member is a reason members of the public protested the Board.  Hence the Board itself passed a Resolution in March – months after she was sworn in – requesting that she remove it.
[directive] Czy zdaje Pan(i) sobie sprawę, że jeżeli zostanie Pan(i) uznany(a) za osobę [Tak/Yes]  [Nie/No]  3. uzależnioną od narkotyków i zakwalifikowany(a) do specjalnego nadzoru kuratora sądowego zgodnie 2C:35-14, wówczas w wyniku oświadczenia, jakie z N.J.S.A. składa Pani(i) w odpowiedzi na zarzuty, zostanie Pan(i) uznany(a) za osobę „potrzebującą leczenia”, która kwalifikuje się do wyroku obowiązkowego okresu specjalnego nadzoru kuratora sądowego w celu udziału w programie leczenia nadzorowanym przez Sąd („Sąd przeciwnarkotykowy”)?
[brief] Furman, 67 N.J. Super. at 143.  A few years later, in Appell v. Reiner, 43 N.J. 413, 416 (1964), the Supreme Court asserted that “[t]here is no doubt” that the attorney’s “rendering of advice and assistance in obtaining extensions of credit and compromises of indebtedness” constituted the practice of law.  The United States Supreme Court likewise asserted that “[t]he business of debt adjusting gives rise to a relationship of trust in which the debt adjuster will, in a situation of insolvency, be marshalling assets in the manner of a proceeding in bankruptcy.  The debt adjuster’s client may need advice as to the legality of the various claims against him, remedies existing under state laws governing debtor-creditor relationships or provisions of the Bankruptcy Act — advice that a nonlawyer cannot lawfully give him. ”  Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963); see also New Jersey Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, Providing Debt Resolution Services to Litigants, N.J. Eth. Op. 36 (2001) (finding business’s “debt resolution” activities, including reviewing complaints, evaluating claims against its clients, and communications with counsel for creditors in efforts to compromise the claims fell within the practice of law); State v. Rogers, 308 N.J. Super. 59, 66 (App. Div. 1998) (“[I]t is clear that the ‘practice of law’ is not limited to litigation, but extends to legal activities in many non-litigious fields.  Hence, the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court but is engaged in whenever and wherever legal knowledge, training, skill and ability are required. ”).  The Limited Attorney Exemption thus encroaches upon the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over the practice of law by effectively restricting the plenary license to practice law in this State.
[brief] As shown by the Court Master’s letter report, by October 2020, the [...] and [...] had reached an impasse with [...] demanding approval for a higher number of units than the [...] and/or the [...] felt were reasonable under the circumstances.  See Pb010.  The trial court, clearly seeking to encourage a settlement and having no leverage against the developer but having significant leverage against the municipality, withdrew the [...]’s immunity by way of Order November 10, 2020, Pa005.  [...], in its brief, discusses the court's November 10 2020 order and admits that “[o]n January 8, 2021, as a direct result of the Court’s revocation of [...] Defendants’ immunity and the institution of the Builder’s Remedy Action, Avalon entered into a settlement agreement with the [...] Defendants”.  The November 10, 2020 Court order, Pa-005, having served its purpose, was reversed by the trial court by way of Order dated February 5, 2021, Pa420, and the [...]’s immunity was reinstated nunc pro tunc.
[brief] 1-15  I.  Plaintiff’s interpretation of Model Civil Jury Charge 5. 20(B)(2)(b) is unduly narrow and restrictive ...........................................................................................................  1-7 II.  The underlying snow removal contracts were not required to assess the expectation and responsibilities of the parties, and were not required to assist a jury in apportioning fault, but were irrelevant to the duty to care, expanded the duty of care and were unduly prejudicial to the defendants.  ................................................................................................................................. 7-10 III.  Courts routinely take judicial notice of a weather related state of emergency and the lower court’s failure to do so was an abuse of discretion ................................................................................................................................. 10-11 IV.  Questioning regarding the subsequent April 2018 storm was impermissible and an abuse of discretion ......................................................................................................................... 11-12 V.  The photograph marked as [...]-3 should not have been excluded as it was adequately authenticated by plaintiff and the record, and as it was relevant insofar as it depicted the snow conditions on the date of loss ................................................................................................................................. 12-13 VI.  All of the lower court’s errors as forth in the appellant’s brief and herein when taken together constitute cumulative error and warrants a new trial ................................................................................................................................. 13-15
[brief] ”)  Erroneously telling the jury that the wine chiller was, as a matter of law, a deadly weapon and that [...]’s intent could be inferred from its use was plain error, clearly capable of causing an unjust result.  Rule 2:10-2.  If the jury determined that [...] was the perpetrator, the only question remaining would be her intent.  By telling the jury that it could infer [...]’s intent by the mere use of the wine chiller, the court inappropriately lessened the State’s burden of proof.
[brief] An Award of Attorneys’ Fees May Only Be Overturned for a Clear Abuse of Discretion, Which Did Not Happen Here.  A trial court has wide discretion to award attorneys’ fees to a successful claimant.  *Empower Our Neighborhoods v. Guadagno*, 453 N.J. Super. 565, 579 (App. Div. 2018).  “Fee determinations by trial courts will be disturbed only on the rarest of occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion. ”  *Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier*, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001).  An abuse of discretion is defined as “relying on an impermissible basis, by relying upon irrelevant or inappropriate factors, by failing to consider all relevant factors, or by making a clear error in judgment. ”  *State v. D.F.W.*, 468 N.J. Super. 422, 438 (App. Div. 2021).  **B.