ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The basis for the motion was, inter alia, that (a) [...], subsequent to the Trial Court’s March 27, 2023 order, received new documents from a third-party subpoenaed during discovery, but who mistakenly failed to timely provide all responsive documents in his possession (Pa732-928); and (b) the Trial Court’s mistaken requirement that the NJFPA required a “written agreement” between [...] and [...] that expressly granted a license, when the language of the NJFPA simply requires a “written arrangement. ”  The Trial Court held oral argument on [...]’s Motion to Amend on July 7, 2023 and July 17, 2023.  (See 3T 3:23-4:3 and 4T 3:13-16).  By order dated July 17, 2023, the Trial Court denied [...]’s Motion to Amend, for the reasons placed on the record during oral argument.  (Pa10-Pa11).  Specifically, the Trial Court held that, despite acknowledging that the NJFPA does not require a “written agreement,” and despite holding that [...]’s newly received documents should be considered, the Trial Court’s prior ruling was still not “palpably incorrect. ” (4T 7:3-7).  Accordingly, [...] has filed the instant appeal of the following Trial Court orders: (1) the grant of [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) the denial as “moot”, rather than with prejudice, of [...]’s Motion to Bar, and (3) the denial of [...]’s Motion to Amend pursuant to R. 4:49-2.
[directive] 11.  You shall not have in your possession any firearm or other dangerous weapon as defined in 2C: 39 et seq.  If you possess a permit to purchase a handgun or a firearms purchaser identification card, you surrender these must documents promptly to your probation officer.  In addition, if you presently own any weapons, they must either be surrendered to your local police department or to any other criminal justice agency designated by your probation officer.  12.  You shall make payments on any fine, penalty assessment, restitution or other financial obligation as provided by N.J.S.A. Court order.  Failure to comply may result in further Court action, pursuant to 2C:46-2b; including attachment of your wages, filing of a civil judgment, and/or extension of your probation term.  13.  You shall provide a DNA sample as a condition of the sentence imposed, pursuant to DNA Database and Databank N.J.S.A. et seq.  L. c. as amended by L. c. as amended by L. Act of 1994, 53:1-20.17, (see 1994, 136, 2000, 118, 2003, c. 183 effective Sept. 22, 2003) unless you are convicted of a disorderly persons offense or a petty disorderly persons offense.  Revised: 03/2007, CN: 10973-English page 1 of 2  Standard Conditions of Adult Probation
[brief] But here the trial court created a prerequisite finding plaintiff had an unfair advantage because his evaluations were not recorded: “one side cannot have an advantage of recording while the other cannot.  The Court might rule differently if the plaintiff’s experts were treating him. ”  (Pa31.)  Plaintiff moved for reconsideration disagreeing with both the reasoning and the trial court’s factual findings.  (Pa39.)  Importantly, Plaintiff pointed out that his psychiatrist, [...], treated [...] for his psychological injury and was not just an examiner.
[brief] In Williams v. Witt, 98 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1967), the court held that an annulment may be granted where one of the parties prior to the marriage formed a fixed determination never to have children and did not communicate that intention to his intended spouse.  The court explained that an annulment in such a case is granted on the theory that since procreation is an essential element of the marriage, there exists an implied promise at the time of the marriage to raise a family.  An undisclosed contrary intention, therefore, constitutes a fraud going to an essential of the marriage.  Williams, supra, 98 N.J. Super. 1; see also V.J.S., supra, 249 N.J. Super. 321 (“this court is satisfied that plaintiff clearly and convincingly proved that there was, in fact, a premarital fraudulent intent on the part of defendant to have children in direct opposition to the express agreement between the parties prior to the marriage not to have children”).
[brief] [...]’s investigation revealed that the defendant was at two separate bars – [...] and [...] – until 2:00 a.m. on February 1, 2016.  Defendant’s [...] residence was an “[a]pproximately three minutes” from these bars.  Defendant’s residence is also approximately three minutes’ drive from [...].  While defendant’s partner, [...] had a vehicle, defendant rented a vehicle on January 30, 2016.  Defendant returned this vehicle either late on February 1, 2016 or early February 2, 2016.  (9T:49-12 to 100-2).
[brief] Honorable Judges of the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division  [...] [...]  Re: State of New Jersey (Plaintiff-Respondent) v. [...] (Defendant-Appellant)  Docket No. [...]  Criminal Action: On Appeal from An Order Denying Defendant’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief of the Superior Court of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County.  Indictment No.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C  Honorable Judges: Pursuant to R. 2:6-2(b) and R. 2:6-4(a) this letter-brief is submitted on behalf of the State of New Jersey.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...........................................1  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................4  A.  Facts Developed at Defendant’s Jury Trial ......................................................4  B.  Findings and Rulings of the PCR Court ............................................................6  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I: THE PCR COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL CLAIMS WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.  [(Raised below).]  [(Da85-125).].  .................................................................10  A.  The PCR court properly denied defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress the tire iron.  ..................................................................................................................12  B.  The PCR court properly denied defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel’s failure to have a forensic expert testify regarding the viability of testing the tire iron for fingerprints and DNA.  ...............17  CONCLUSION  .............................................................................................................20  APPENDIX  Consent to Search Form, dated March 25, 2015  ......................................................Pa1  COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] For example, in Beilowitz, the District Court found that a community of interest existed where (a) the plaintiff enhanced the goodwill of defendant by selling defendant’s products for over twenty-three years, increasing defendant’s product sales, and sponsoring local events with defendant’s mark displayed alongside plaintiffs name; (b) made substantial franchise-specific investments in defendant's inventory; and (c) derived a substantial portion of its business from sales of defendant's products.  233 F. Supp. 2d at 631.  Other courts have held similarly.  See Atl. City Coin & Slot Service Co.. Inc. v. IGT, 14 F. Supp. 2d 644, 662 (D.N.J. 1998) (granting preliminary injunction under similar circumstances).  Here, once again, there is overwhelming evidence that a “community of interest” existed between [...] and [...].
[brief] In her opposition to [...]’s Motion for Summary Judgments, Appellant relied exclusively on her own subjective, self-serving Certification as opposed to any admissible document of record.  It is that Certification that supports her request that this Court reverse the Trial Court’s rulings.  Appellant does not address the fact that the Trial Court rejected Appellant’s Certifications, finding the same did not comply with Rule 4:46-2(b) and Lyons v. Twp. of Wayne, 185 N.J. 426 (2005).  Indeed, she does not reference the Lyons decision anywhere in her brief.  As such, the propriety of the Trial Court’s rejection of Appellants Certifications is deemed waived.
[brief] In *[...] v. [...]*, [...], 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87659 (D.N.J. June 27, 2014), the court granted summary judgment to an insurer and rescinded a legal malpractice policy on the basis of fraud in the application.  As in this case, the undisputed evidence in *Kwasnik* showed that the applicant failed to disclose on its application, among other things, that an attorney was the subject of an investigation by the Office of Attorney Ethics.
[brief] Not only was the witness referenced not a signator to the contract, but she further testified that she did not read it.  Da216.  This kind of mischaracterization by the Plaintiff is sprinkled throughout this case in which the Plaintiff attempts to portray the actions of Defendant [...] as being somehow fraudulent or knowingly making misrepresentations.  The failure to mention the ROFR in the PSA had no legal impact on the Plaintiff and there was no fraud.  Unfortunately, the Trial Court adopted that characterization and had itself believing up until the date of the oral argument on the motion that the third-party buyer was related to the seller and that they were trying to cheat the Plaintiff.
[directive] Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver's license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  .  3!.~l: 01 ~J.;o]P.£., 01 ~l½~ 1}-EJl.£.  t:Jl¾oJllll ~l~~Yt:J-.
[brief] THE DEPARTMENT’S PAST PRECEDENTS CONFIRM THAT NEITHER THE HOLDING ACT NOR SSAP NO. 25 APPLY. (Ja1-2; Ja72-76).  The plain language of the Holding Act confirms that it does not apply to reciprocals, just as the plain language of SSAP No. 25 confirms that it does not apply to the AIF Fee the subscriber pays.  The Department’s past practices and own admissions confirm it as well.  As stated, the Department acknowledged that a legislative amendment was necessary to enable it to apply the Holding Act or SSAP No. 25.  However, the New Jersey Legislature did not enact any such legislation, and the NAIC unanimously deleted the model law governing Attorney-in-Fact reciprocal exchanges in 2004, on which the Department’s recommended legislation was based, and it is no longer in effect.  Following the Department’s failure to obtain legislative modification of the statutes to apply to reciprocals, the Department dropped the issue of the applicability of the Holding Act and SSAP No. 25, remaining silent and accepting the status quo until now.  Thus, the Department acknowledged the current law in New Jersey does not subject reciprocals to the Holding Act or the AIF Fees to SSAP No. 25, but also admitted that the only way to apply these requirements to reciprocals would be to pass a new statute.
[brief] "[...]:  All right, sir, you have Exhibit D008 [(Pa302)] in front of you.  It’s a line from [...]’s deposition testimony.  At page 21, line 8 the question is 'but what I’m understanding you’re saying is that you came to the conclusion that the grout was thrown at [...].  Answer: Yes.'  Did I read that accurately?  [...]: Yes.  [...]:  Then the question at line twelve is 'because you observed the grout on [...]'s back and the back of his head.'  And in the second paragraph beginning at line 18 Officer or [...] says 'and then when we saw this kid he had it on the back of his head and down his back and there's only one way that could happen is if your back was towards him and the way it was globbed on him, it didn't poof up any air and powder down, it was chunky on the back of his head and down his back.'  Did I read that accurately?  [...]: Yes you did."  (8T102:16-103:9; Pa302-303).  The following testimony was also admitted through Mr. Balian:  [...]: [...], could you hand the witness D007 [(Pa300-301)] please.  Now Mr. Balian, this is a slide of [...]'s [sic] deposition testimony beginning at page 56, line 19.  The question was 'did you ever accuse him of anything, [...]?  Answer: Accuse him?  I wouldn't say so much as accusing him, but as far as the grout being on the back of [...] I said, you would have had to have thrown that at him for it to be on the back of him, so if he thought of that as an accusation, I guess I did accuse him of throwing grout at [...].'  Did I read that accurately?  [...]: You did.  [...]: And nowhere in your report did you mention the conclusion of [...], correct?  [...]: Correct.  [...]: And you testified under oath a your deposition that you only take cases where you feel the case is valid, correct?  [...]: Correct."  (8T104:1-21).  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] [...]’s self-serving, post-fact claim she did not knowingly and voluntarily agree to arbitration does not defeat the effect of her assent to the Mutual Arbitration Agreement**  [...], a highly educated individual with contract negotiation experience, signed a valid arbitration agreement during the onboarding process of becoming a Clinical Research Educator.  She acknowledged that she read, understood, and voluntarily entered into the Agreement, “giving up the right to have Covered Claims decided by a court or jury. ” (Pa000093).  She cannot neutralize the effect of her knowing and voluntary signature on the Agreement by relying on the easily distinguishable case of *Fawzy v. Fawzy*, 199 N.J. 456 (1999), or by again proffering the self-serving, contradictory claims in her certification.
[brief] See Lajara, 222 N.J. at 144-45 (“Treble damages [under the IFPA] are intended to punish, and only partly to compensate, and therefore have the classic features of punitive damages. ” (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163, 185 (2006)).  That conclusion is equally applicable to RICO.  Nor does a PIP arbitrator have authority to grant equitable relief.
[brief] THE PERSISTENT-OFFENDER  EXTENDED TERM SENTENCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.  In his original brief, [...] challenged the imposition of an extended-term.  (Sb 44-49)  The State’s substantive response—that 8 years in prison for stealing $168 in change from a closed restaurant through an open window for a person who had two prior fourth-degree convictions is fair—significantly overstates the severity of the crime and [...]’s record.  But as the State points out, the original brief was filed in this case before the Supreme Court of the United States issued *Erlinger v. United States*, 144 S. Ct. 1840 (2024).  (Sb 41 n.8)  *Erlinger* makes clear that New Jersey’s persistent-offender extended term statute is unconstitutional.  [...]’s sentence cannot stand.
[brief] [...]; [...], individually as per quod claimant and as guardian ad litem for minor plaintiffs, [...] AND [...], Plaintiffs-Appellants v. [...]/[...]/[...]; [...]; [...]; [...]; and JOHN DOES 1-10 (fictitious designations), Defendants-Respondents  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  Civil Action On Appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey Somerset County Law Division [...]
[brief] In addition, § 317 outlines a duty to terminate an employee that is known to have engaged in misconduct.  See cmt. c to § 317 (“Thus a railroad company which knows that the crews of its coal trains are in the habit of throwing coal from the cars as they pass along tracks laid through city street, to the danger of travelers, is subject to liability if he retains the delinquents in its employment. ”).  The duties described in § 317 are inapposite to this case.  First, it was undisputed that [...] was on-duty when he interacted with [...].
[directive] The judge may read all of the questions one time before addressing each juror in the box individually.  The judge shall verify that the juror understood all of the printed questions and inquire whether the juror answered yes or uncertain to any of them.  If so, appropriate follow up questions shall be asked.  The judge will then ask that juror each of the open-ended questions, to which a verbal response shall be given and for which appropriate follow up questions will be asked.
[brief] On November 2, 2017, Plaintiff moved to enforce the inspection of [...]’s real property (Pa67).  The Law Division granted the Order (Pa67).  Plaintiff served the Order on Defendants (Pa67).  attempts to obtain asset discovery, including Defendants’ failure to comply with multiple Orders prior to 2020 (Pa39-65).  Plaintiff’s opposition included the 2020 Order for post-Judgment asset depositions to which Defendants had responded by submitting three court filings regarding the scheduling of the depositions (Pa66-77).
[brief] He said [...] left between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. to see his children at [...]’s apartment before their bedtime.  (27T168-14 to 23, 174-1 to 3)  Defendant said he had not spoken to or seen [...] since.  (27T172-10 to 13)  On March 12, 2018, [...] took additional recorded statements from both [...] and Defendant, after which both defendants were arrested and charged with murder.
[brief] Here, the postcard was undisputedly mailed to [...]’s home address.  (Pa13).  The Division went so far as to hire a company, [...], to mail postcards to all 200,647 SPRS retirees at their home addresses on file with the Division.  (Pa64-66).  And a postcard was indeed mailed to [...]’s last home address on August 9, 2019.  (Pa14; Pa66).  Nonetheless, [...] asserts, without offering any legal authority, that his affidavit declaring that he never received a postcard should overcome the presumption that he received it.  (Pb13).  Still, despite the Board’s having satisfied the notice requirement under the Ricci Act, it nevertheless considered [...]’s request under its inherent equitable power.
[brief] The Legislature’s explicit failure to grant DRPs --- \(^4\)  Respondents argue that the Legislature could have carved out Fraud Act claims from the reach of the definition of what constitutes a PIP Dispute under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1.  We respectfully suggest that no such carve out was necessary because Fraud Act claims never came within the definition of a PIP Dispute as is evidenced by the procedural and constitutional difficulties discussed herein, none of which are addressed meaningfully in respondents’ papers.
[brief] (Aa20-21). ²  The sole issue on appeal is whether the February 23, 2017 incident was undesigned and unexpected.  ¹  Since the procedural history and facts are interrelated, they are presented together for efficiency and the court’s convenience.  ² “T” refers to the July 30, 2020 hearing transcript.  “Aa” refers to [...]’s appendix; “Ab” refers to his brief.  “Ra” refers to the Board’s appendix.  For fifteen years, [...] was employed as a Senior Medical Security Officer at the [...] for the criminally insane.
[brief] That is because older people are much less likely to commit crimes, and each marginal year of a lengthy sentence has minimal to no deterrent value.  “The empirical fact of a decline in the crime rate with age is beyond dispute. ”  [...] and [...], Age and the Explanation of Crime, 89 Am. J. Soc. 552, 565 (1983).  Because older people are dramatically less likely to reoffend, experts agree that these studies persuasively prove that very lengthy sentences go beyond what is necessary to prevent re-offense if the defendants were released.  In the words of the [...], “because recidivism rates decline markedly with age and prisoners necessarily age as they serve their prison sentence, lengthy prison sentences are an inefficient approach to preventing crime by incapacitation unless they are specifically targeted at very high-rate or extremely dangerous offenders. ”  [...], The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring Causes And Consequences, 155-56 (2014).
[brief] However, the City’s use of the [...] service is conditioned upon abiding by the regulations contained in the "Terms of Service" with [...].  Da227.  Foremost, the [...] service is only available to governmental agencies (the “Services”).  The Services are intended to facilitate the ability of the City to publish and send messages to residents by SMS text message, e-mail and online, and to receive anonymous crime tips.  Furthermore, the “Conduct” section of the Terms of Service, prohibit the City from “(b) use any of the Services for political, commercial or advertising purposes” and “(f) collect[ing] or stor[ing] personal data of any other user”.  *Id.*  In this matter, the requestor is not a Governmental agency and is seeking the e-mail address information to utilize for a political purpose.
[brief] (Da10; Da24-25; Da211-231).  Disingenuously, [...] suggests that “93.8%” of the work was done by four partners, specifically referencing work by [...] to suggest that the Co-Chair of the firm’s litigation was working large amounts of time on the matter (Db27).  [...] worked a total of 23.5 hours (or 0.4% of the time sought for recovery) on the matter in 2018 and before, long prior to when he became the Co-Chair of this Firm’s litigation department.\textsuperscript{12}  Again, while it is true that partners primarily worked on this matter, that was due to the evolution of the matter over decades due to Defendants’ conduct, not because partners were specifically assigned to increase fees as [...] suggests.  [...] complains about the number of partners that performed work on the application, but does not identify any duplicative work.  This complex, high-stakes matter required near daily attention and the work of multiple attorneys.  Given the matter’s complicated and lengthy history, it was reasonable that the attorneys most familiar with it continued to perform substantive work even after their promotion from associate to counsel and partner, rather than incur the unnecessary time it would take a new attorney to take command of this matter’s extraordinarily complicated history.  [...] himself employed two (now three) law firms, with at times as many as four attorneys, including multiple partners, appearing at hearings on his behalf.  The trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in declining to reduce the fees sought based on this objection.
[brief] The Appellant points to State v. Whitaker as justification for the position that a more detailed accomplice liability charge was required in this case.  State v. Whitaker, 200 N.J. 444 (2009).  In Whitaker, the State offered two theories on which the jury could find the defendant guilty of accomplice liability for robbery.  Id. at 444-45.  In the first, it was suggested that he could be found guilty if he “aided and abetted” the co-defendant in robbing the victim.  Id. at 444.  In the second theory, the State suggested that, even if the defendant was not aware of the co-defendant’s --- \(^1\) Counsel notes that there were seventeen days between the time when [...] testified and when the statement was played via the Detective.
[directive] However, the person who delivers the infant may voluntarily disclose this information.  P.L. 2000, Ch. 58, §4g.  1.3.2  The person who voluntarily delivers the infant should be requested to supply any of the following information that the person is willing to disclose voluntarily: < any known medical history for the infant; or < any known medical history for the parent(s); or < any known background information about the infant; or < the name of the infant; or < the name of parent or parents; or < the name of the person delivering the infant if different from the parent.  The person delivering the infant shall not be compelled to disclose any portion of the requested information.2  1.3.3  The person delivering the infant shall be permitted to leave and shall not be detained while awaiting medical clearance regarding the condition of the infant.  The person delivering the infant shall not be required to accompany the infant to the hospital.  1.3.4  A State, county or municipal police officer shall immediately take the infant to the emergency department of a licensed general hospital in this State.  P.L. 2000, Ch. 58, §4e.  2It is anticipated that a form capturing this information will be developed by the Department of Human Services.