ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896)  .................................................. 24, 25, 26 DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 (2005)  ..........................................................  63  State v. Adim, 410 N.J. Super. 410 (App. Div. 2009) ................................. 21, 22, 26 State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41 (1997) .............................................................. 32, 59 State v. Anderson, 248 N.J. 53 (2021) ............................................................... 63 State v. Bailey, 231 N.J. 474 (2018) ................................................................. 33, 60 State v. Barden, 195 N.J. 375 (2008) ................................................................. 47 State v. Blakney, 189 N.J. 88 (2006) ................................................................. 47 State v. Brady, 452 N.J. Super. 143 (App. Div. 2017) .................................... 30 State v. Bullock, 136 N.J. 149 (1994) ............................................................... 44 State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560 (1958) ................................................................. 32 State v. Bzura, 261 N.J. Super. 602 (App. Div. 1993) .................................... 40 State v. Clausell, 121 N.J. 298 (1990) ............................................................... 47 State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (1992) ............................................................... 44, 45 State v. Compton, 304 N.J. Super. 477 (App. Div. 1997), certif. den. 153 N.J. 51 (1998) ......................................................... 47 State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373 (1988) ........................................... 32, 33, 59 State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339 (1987) .................................................. 19 State v. Cusick, 219 N.J. Super. 452 (App. Div. 1987) .............................. 48 State v. Czachor, 82 N.J. 392 (1980) ..................................................... passim State v. Deegan, 126 N.J. Super. 475 (App. Div.), certif. den. 654 N.J. 283 (1974) ................................................................. 30 State v. Derry, 250 N.J. 611 (2022) ....................................................... 52 State v. Ernst, 32 N.J. 567 (1960) ......................................................... 31 State v. Figueroa, 190 N.J. 219 (2007) .................................................. 21 State v. Fortin, 162 N.J. 517 (2000) ....................................................... 48 State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583 (2002) ....................................................... 38, 39 State v. G.S., 145 N.J. 460 (1996) .........................................................
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[brief] (Pb27).  *Fawzy*, a divorce case, involved two unsophisticated individuals engaged in divorce and custody proceedings who lacked any experience in contract negotiation.  199 N.J. at 462–63 (noting the parties’ backgrounds and that they were represented by counsel, without indicating sophisticated status).  The *Fawzy* court emphasized that its decision hinged on the *absence* of a written arbitration agreement.  *See generally Id.*  “As we have said,” the court wrote, “there was no written arbitration agreement.  Thus, the colloquy on the record had to establish that the parties understood their rights, knew what they were waiving, and especially that they were aware of what review was available.  As is evident from the colloquy, that did not occur here. ”  *Id.* at 483.  Put differently, *Fawzy* represents the New Jersey Supreme Court’s opinion that court must ensure that the parties have received an adequate explanation of the terms of the arbitration agreement when there is no written arbitration agreement.  In contrast, here, there is a written arbitration agreement, which [...] acknowledged and signed as a sophisticated and well-educated professional.  *Fawzy* is therefore inapposite.
[directive] Once the grand jury hearing is complete, the assigned prosecutor  Subsequent will immediately inform the Executive Director of OPIA of the result through the chain of command.  After consultation with the Executive Director, the following notifications about the outcome should be made, as soon as practicable, regardless of the grand jury’s decision:  The assigned prosecutor notifies the subject-officer’s defense attorney.  A supervisory-level detective notifies the subject-officer’s agency.  The family liaison, with support from the assigned prosecutor and investigator, notifies the decedent’s family.  V.  Presentments
[brief] Sergeant [...] of the [...] responded to the Wawa at approximately 11:44 p.m. and spoke to [...] and [...].  [...] described the robber as a “white guy with a beard” who was “possibly Hispanic” wearing a “black wool cap, a gray zip-up hooded sweatshirt with [a] black zipper and black drawstrings to it, black T-shirt, black pants and white sneakers.  And male with facial hair. ”  [...] also told police that the robber had “the bluest eyes I’ve ever seen. ”  Customers arriving at the Wawa informed Sergeant Czepiel that another robbery had just taken place at a nearby Valero gas station (Valero).
[brief] **The Honorable [...] Correctly Permitted Plaintiffs to File a Fourth Amended Complaint in order to add [...] as a named Defendant**  Under *N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2*, a personal injury action must be filed "within 2 years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued."  *Viviano v. CBS, Inc.*, 101 N.J. 538 (1986).  To relieve the hardship that might otherwise ensue from the mechanical application of a statute of limitations, courts have devised an equitable principle known as the "discovery rule."  *Id.*  Under that rule, a cause of action does not accrue "until the injured party discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered that he may have a basis for an actionable claim."
[brief] As a result of this slip and fall, plaintiff-appellant claims that she suffered various personal injuries.  Plaintiff-appellant [...] served her answers to Form A Interrogatories in this case.  (Pa53.)  Form A Interrogatory No. 2 asks that the plaintiff give her version of the occurrence at issue.  In response to this interrogatory, plaintiff-appellant [...] stated as follows:  On the date of the accident, February 18, 2021, I slipped and fell on an accumulation of snow and ice that was improperly cleared on the sidewalk located at the corner of [...].  The sidewalk was inadequately cleared, was unsafe, was not properly cleared for pedestrian traffic, nor was it covered with snow melting products, sand or salt.  Furthermore, there were no warnings of any type in place.  There was a layer of partially shoveled and packed snow and ice creating a hazard for pedestrians, such as myself.
[brief] Here, there is not a scintilla of evidence that the Mayor had any conflict of interest such as a direct or indirect pecuniary or personal interest nor is there evidence of direct improper official action by the Mayor.  Case law is clear that espousing an opinion on a public matter does not constitute “improper influence” no matter how confounding the opinion may be.  The Mayor was clearly within his right to express public opposition to the project.  See Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 282-83 (1965); Cent. 25, LLC v. Zoning Board of City of Union City, 460 N.J. Super. 446, 459 (App. Div. 2019) certif. denied, 241 N.J. 4 (2020)(holding that a letter to the community from the mayor, on city letterhead, opposing a developer’s application for zoning use variance is insufficient to show that mayor or zoning board had prejudged the application).
[directive] Other Provisions  A.  This Directive is issued pursuant to the Attorney Non-enforceability by third parties.  General’s authority to supervise the operations of the Department and ensure the uniform Page 3 and efficient enforcement of the laws and administration of criminal justice throughout the State.  This Directive imposes limitations on law enforcement agencies and officials that may be more restrictive than the limitations imposed under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and federal and state statutes and regulations.  Nothing in this Directive shall be construed in any way to create any substantive right that may be enforced by any third party.
[brief] The Court’s interpretation, however, leads to an absurd result because it renders the necessary “well-settled right” test utterly meaningless in these circumstances.  See Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Co., Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t. of Banking & Ins., 472 N.J. Super. 26, 45 (App. Div. 2022) (“Courts are to interpret statutes in a fashion that avoids absurd readings.
[brief] 1 IN THE TRIAL BRIEF AND HEARING BEFORE [...] APPELLANT FAILED TO RAISE ANY ARGUMENT RELATING [...] ORDINANCE SECTION 900B AND 902A, OR SECTION 906 RELATING TO THE DIRECT APPEAL OF THE [...] TO THE [...], AS SUCH, SAME ARE NOT SUBJECT TO APPEAL AS THEY ARE NOT PART OF THE RECORD BELOW  With regard to whether or not Ordinance Section 900B and 902A as amended are ultra vires, or Section 906 of the NLDO authorizing a direct appeal to the [...], said issues were not set forth in Appellant’s Trial Brief, nor were they the subject matter of the trial below or the Trial Court’s decision.
[brief] Respondent Board of Review’s Statement of Items Comprising the Record on Appeal, filed March 6, 2024 ........................................................................Pa24  Appeal Tribunal Exhibit 1, Board of Review Exhibit A, Photographs of Claimant’s Work Sites, Offered and Admitted in Evidence T15-5 to T15-8 ..............................Pa27  Appeal Tribunal Exhibit 2, Board of Review Exhibit B, Claimant’s Dates of Appointments with [...], Offered and Admitted in Evidence T21-6 to T21-19 ..............................Pa31  Appeal Tribunal Exhibit 3, Board of Review Exhibit D, Claimant’s Physical Therapy Evaluation dated March 14, 2022, Offered and Admitted in Evidence T21-20 to T23-18.............................Pa34  Appeal Tribunal Exhibit 4, Board of Review Exhibit C, Letter from [...] dated April 11, 2022, Offered and Admitted in Evidence T23-19 to T24-20.............................Pa37  Appeal Tribunal Exhibit 5, Board of Review Exhibit E, Letter from Physical Therapist dated April 20, 2022, Offered and Admitted in Evidence T25-7 to T25-16 ..............................Pa38  Board of Review Exhibit F, Letter from [...] dated July 29, 2022...........................................Pa39  Board of Review Exhibit G, X-Ray Report dated August 5, 2022....................................................Pa40  Board of Review Exhibit H, Detailed Account Information and After Visit Summary .......................Pa47  Barney v. Bd. of Review, No. A-3221-19, 2021 WL 1904561 (App. Div. May 12, 2021) (slip op.) ..................................................Pa49 de la Cruz v.
[brief] Putting the FDCPA in Context (T23-T24)**  When interpreting a specific section of a statute, a court considers the provision in the context of the overall statute.  *Hodges*, 189 N.J. at 223.  The plain meaning of § 1692c(b) as interpreted by the federal courts is consistent with the FDCPA’s regulation of the debt collection industry.  --- \(^1\) *Ali v. [...]*, No. 21-cv-5790, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59126, 2022 WL 986166 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2022) (Pa16).  A.  **FDCPA’s Purpose and Structure**
[brief] ”  (Ab3).  While the Board acknowledged that [...] had a job offer in 2019, he testified that the offer was rescinded due to his lack of equipment, not as a direct result of the COVID-19 health emergency as required under 15 U.S.C. 9021(a)(3)(A)(ii)(I)(gg).  (T6).  [...] also testified that he was last attached to the labor market in early 2018, long before he applied for benefits on May 24, 2020, and even then only sparsely.  (Ra1; T3-4).  Simply put, [...] failed to demonstrate that he was unavailable or unable to work due to any COVID-19 qualifying reason listed in the CARES Act.
[brief] *Search & Retrieval*, 15 Sedona Conf. J. at 244.  --- 5  See also *Search & Retrieval*, 15 Sedona Conf. J. at 233 (“The problem of the relative percentage of ‘false positives’ or noise in the data is potentially huge, amounting in some cases to enormous numbers of files which must be searched to find responsive documents. ”).  Upholding the trial court’s order in this case would throw relevance—the “touchstone” for discovery—out the window.
[brief] (17T 47-15 to 59-13)  At the time, on May 2, the prosecutor asked whether, in light of that tight schedule, it would be possible to restart the trial on May 5, instead, since “that would be five days past the point of [COVID] contact. ”\(^7\) (17 T 59-4 to 24)  The judge denied that request, and also dismissed defense objections that if the trial were not restarted until May 9, the “jury may rush through the jury-deliberation process because they don’t want to miss those particular trips [on May 11],” by noting that she would “reassess as we move forward in the week. ”  (17T 59-17 to 61-19)  On May 9, the attorneys gave their summations and the judge read the jury instruction, after which the jury was dismissed at 4:30 p.m. for the day, without having begun deliberations.
[brief] The City seeks to use [...]’s Active Learning (“AL”), a type of TAR software that uses learning algorithms to prioritize documents for its attorneys to review manually.  (R. 300, Def.’s Resp. at 5-6.)  As the City describes it:  [i]n AL review, like a manual review, search parameters are used to cull down a collected data set to a review set.  That review set is then put into the AL application where the algorithms use data points collected through attorney review of documents in order to reorganize the documents in the review queue in a more efficient order.  With each coding decision the attorneys make, the technology continues to learn and prioritize which documents contain contextually similar content as documents which are coded as responsive.  AL re-prioritizes the documents in the review queue every 20 minutes.  The AL tool does not make any coding decisions about a document’s responsiveness, privilege, confidentiality, or issue.  It merely shuffles the order of the documents being reviewed based on the coding decisions [i.e., responsive or nonresponsive] made by the attorney review team.  All documents marked responsive and ultimately produced are done so by human reviewers.  (Id. at 6-7 (emphasis in original) (footnote and internal citations omitted). )  According to Plaintiffs, TAR software such as [...]’s AL allows parties to set aside and never review large portions of an ESI collection.  (R. 289, Pls.’ Mot. at 7.)  There is some truth to this assertion because there comes a point when, based on the reviewers’ coding decisions, the software establishes that the remaining documents in the queue are likely to be nonresponsive.  It is then incumbent upon the reviewer to conduct sampling and other quality control tests to ensure that the remaining unreviewed documents are indeed irrelevant.  The reviewer may of course forge ahead with his or her review, but typically documents identified as nonresponsive are neither reviewed nor produced.  In short, the reviewer has discretion to decide when no further manual review is necessary.  (See generally R. 300-2, [...]’s Assisted Review Active Learning Guide (June 8, 2020).)
[brief] The trial court was presented with evidence of the carrier’s admission that the system was not designed for use in law enforcement investigations and that, by its own representation “there are known accuracy defects with [...] PCMD reporting. ”  The trial court was aware that [...]'s Investigation Report dated January 5, 2016 outlined the following information provided directly from [...] and which impacted the reliability of the location data:  Please be advised that there are known accuracy defects with [...] PCMD reporting.
[brief] At his deposition, [...] testified that he was the property manager of [...] from April 2020 until July 25, 2022.  Ra14, lines 12-19.  [...] is the regional property manager.  [...] is the only one that can sign contracts on behalf of [...].  Ra20, lines 20-24  Even if the terms of the contract are not changing from one year to the next, the contract must be reviewed and approved through the owner.  Ra18 lines 5-14 to Ra19 lines 16-25.  Here, the renewal contract was signed by [...] who oversees the contracts with the owner of the property and then [...] is given final approval to submit the proposal to [...].  Ra18 lines 22-14 to Ra19 line 1.  [...]’s testimony showed that [...] had the contract reviewed at least twice, including by its owner.
[directive] Rule 3:26-2  Bail for all other offenses may be set by any other judge, or in proceeding or a person arrested under 2C:29-9b for violating a domestic violence restraining Authority to Set Bail. the absence of a judge, by a municipal court administrator or deputy court administrator.  Notably, the Rule does not require a Superior Court judge to set bail on any of the enunciated offenses when the defendant is charged solely with an attempt to commit that crime or a conspiracy to commit that crime.  Hence, such attempt or conspiracy charges may be set by a Municipal Court judge or, in the absence of the judge, a municipal court administrator or deputy court administrator.
[brief] The first requirement of the NJFPA is “a written arrangement for a definite or indefinite period” granting a license.  N.J.S.A. 56:10-3.  The term “grant” “relates to the requirement of a writing,” the word “license” “implies a proprietary interest,” and “[m]ere oral permission is not enough. ”  See Finlay & Assocs., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 146 N.J. Super. 210, 219-20 (Law. Div. 1976), aff’d, 155 N.J. Super. 331 (App. Div. 1978).
[brief] Again, this Court’s “scope of review of an arbitration award is narrow,” and the Arbitrator’s Award “is entitled to a presumption of validity. ”  Fawzy v. Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456, 470 (2009); Township of Wyckoff v. PBA Local 261, 409 N.J. Super. 344, 354 (App. Div. 2009); see also Borough of East Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201 (2013) (“To ensure finality, as well as to secure arbitration’s speedy and inexpensive nature, there exists a strong preference for judicial confirmation of arbitration awards. ”).  Here, [...] is not entitled to a modification or correction of the Award, as similarly determined by the Trial Court.
[brief] Here, the Court had enjoined [...] in June 2016 against interfering with the change of control.  It did not grant the Plaintiff’s fee application at that time.  (Pa13-14)  The Court instead indefinitely withheld that decision in order to hold the threat over [...]’s head.  (1T46:7-23)  (1T11:14-12:6)  More than 1 full year then passed without an alleged violation of the change in control Order.
[brief] The Waiver Provisions of the Photocopy Are Unenforceable and The Court’s Contrary Findings Should be Reversed (P39a to P42a).  Given that the Photocopy fails to comply with the Uniform Pre-Marital Agreement Act, the waiver provisions of the Photocopy should not have been enforced under N.J.S.A. 3B:8-10.  In re Estate of Shinn, 394 N.J. Super. 55 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 192 N.J. 595 (2007).  In addition, the absence of a clear and unequivocal waiver of the Petitioner’s rights under the Act renders the waiver provisions in the Photocopy unenforceable.  In re Estate of Shinn, a wife sued her husband's estate to declare a pre-nuptial agreement unenforceable because her husband had understated his assets.  394 N.J. Super at 62.  The trial judge found that there is no material distinction between what N.J.S.A. 3B:8-10 refers to as “fair disclosure” and what N.J.S.A 3B:2-38 describes as “full and fair disclosure. ”  394 N.J. Super. at 61.  The trial judge concluded that under both N.J.S.A. 3B:8-10 and N.J.S.A. 37:2-38, the pre-nuptial agreement should not have been enforced and also found that the agreement did not contain an adequate written waiver of the right to full financial disclosure:  [i]n order to meet that statutory test of express waiver of a right to disclosure beyond what one has received, one has to acknowledge, one has to know that ... she ... is not getting the disclosure called for by the statute, and the writing has to say, even though we're not getting the disclosure we're entitled to, we waive that, it's okay, we waive our right to it.  There's nothing like that in this agreement, so there is no express waiver in writing of the kind called for by the statute.  Id at 62-63 (emphasis added).  The findings in Shinn are consistent with established law, that any contractual waiver-of-rights provision must reflect that the party has agreed clearly and unambiguously to its terms.  Leodori v. Cigna Corp., 175 N.J. 293, 302, 814 A.2d 1098 (2003); see, e.g., Dixon v. Rutgers, the State Univ. of N.J., 110 N.J. 432, 460-61, 541 A.2d 1046 (1988) (holding that waiver in collective bargaining agreement unenforceable “[u]nder New Jersey law[,] for a waiver of rights to be effective it must be plainly expressed. ”)  Here as with the prenuptial agreement in In re Estate of Shinn, the Photocopy does not contain any language that acknowledges that its parties were not getting the disclosures called for by the Act and that the parties waived their right to those disclosures.  P 117a, 8-1).  The waiver provisions also say nothing about the rights of the parties upon death.  Id.  Therefore, as in In Re Estate of Shinn, there is no express statutory waiver of the rights to an elective share of a parties’ estate.  Here, as in In re Estate of Shinn, the Photocopy fails to provide the disclosures that the legislature determined were required for enforceability, a statement of assets annexed thereto.
[brief] (6T30-6; 5T12-21).  “Although the ordinary 'abuse of discretion' standard defies precise definition, it arises when a decision is ‘made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. ’  An abuse of discretion also arises when ‘the discretionary act was not premised upon consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear error in judgment. ’”  Moraes v. Wesler, 439 N.J. Super. 375, 378 (App. Div. 2015) (internal citations omitted).  Here, the trial court considered all the relevant facts and precedent case law to deny [...]’s motion for its failure to show that its decision was palpably incorrect or irrational, as required.  R. 4:49-2.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion and the Order denying [...]’s motion for reconsideration should be affirmed.  Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. at 582; Moraes, 439 N.J. Super. at 378.  B.
[brief] ”  The fact that a driver must rotate the wheel of a vehicle by some slight degree to change lanes does not render such an action a “turn. ”  As stated, a lane change qualifies as a “move[ment] right or left upon a roadway. ”  And yet, the Legislature distinguished between a “move[ment] right or left upon a roadway” and a “turn . . . from a direct course. ”  See N.J.S.A. 39:4-126.  When the Legislature uses different words in the same statute, those words must be assigned different meanings.  State v. Ferguson, 238 N.J. 78, 102 (2019).  A “move[ment] right or left upon a roadway” therefore cannot be construed as a type of turn.