ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] First, Cedeno was decided based on the Forfeiture Statute, which does not provide a process for overcoming the statutory bar for employment that is provided by the controlling statute in this matter, N.J.S.A. § 30:6D-64(f).  Second, the Cedeno Court stated that the policy aim of the Forfeiture Statute, specifically keeping those who had previously violated the public's trust from having an opportunity to do so again, prevailed over the allowing that plaintiff's claims to proceed to trial.  Id.  In the matter before this Court, Appellee made no showing that such a policy aim exists that would apply in this case.  Notably, the entire holding in Cedeno was based on the public policy against having someone convicted of bribery work in the public sector, a public policy that was embodied in the Forfeiture Statute.  Significantly, the Cedeno Court specifically weighed this public policy against the public policy in favor of letting that plaintiff’s claim proceed, acknowledging the “important public policies” of CEPA and the “need to construe” the CEPA statute liberally, but ultimately finding that the policy considerations of the Forfeiture Statute outweighed the policy considerations of CEPA.  Id. at 478-479.  Cedeno is further distinguishable in that that case involves a public employment setting, which is not applicable in this case.  For all the foregoing reasons, the public policy considerations in Cedeno simply do not apply here, because the respective controlling statutes in each case are in opposition as to the key issue of whether employees with criminal records may hold an employment position.
[brief] As [...] and plaintiffs came to learn subsequently, while [...] were playing the coy role of confidential business interlocutor, in reality they were the “wolf” disguised in the “grandma” outfit ready to steal the bag of goods for “grandma. ”  [...] and his minions approached the owner of [...] and began direct negotiations to “lease” the land that had been leased for 20 years to plaintiffs.  [...] were uniquely possessed of knowledge that, because of [...]’s internal strife and suspended ability to pay the annual rent, a declaration of “default” under the lease by the landlord would likely enable them to thereafter obtain a same or similar lease from the [...].  Pa176-77.  Based upon the confidential disclosures and confidential interactions between plaintiffs and [...], [...] and his minions knew that the [...]’ land was unsuited for any purpose other than for solar energy or open, undeveloped land, and that the potentiality of displacing plaintiffs from the land was readily available to them.  Pa177.  By late 2017, rather than pursuing their stated intentions of negotiating a price to acquire plaintiffs’ solar rights, the CEP Defendants schemed with [...] to steal plaintiffs’ Solar Rights and they purportedly sold and purchased plaintiffs’ Solar Rights by their conspiracy whereby [...] silently claimed that it would render the non-tangible Assignments null and void and CEP Defendants would allegedly re-purchase those Solar Rights from [...].  This was a daylight, brazen theft of plaintiffs’ assets, but plaintiffs simply could not fathom until later in the 2019 action that [...] was knowingly involved in this theft scheme. Pa177.
[brief] The Court stated that Plaintiffs objected to needing to pay to defend the SDNY action.  (1T24:11-21)  The Court found that [...]’s SDNY filing violated the June 7th Order because he was prohibited from “representing to anyone” that any company operating agreement other than the one from April 1, 1995 was valid, and from “representing to anyone” that the February 8th meeting (where [...] purported to vote to retake control of the company) has any legal effect whatsoever. ” (1T39:10-25) (1T22:22-23:6) (1T39:22-40:4)  Therefore, the only “remediation” needed for the Plaintiffs’ November 2017 R. 1:10-3 motion was an Order to withdraw the SDNY and DNJ pleadings and an Order against further efforts to remove this case to Federal Court.  The Court could have also ordered reimbursement of Plaintiffs’ defense costs for opposing the improper federal filings and legal fees incurred in making the November 2017 R. 1:10-3 motion.  The Court did those things but then went much, much further, resulting in a $503,000 sanction despite 1.5 years passing after the June 7, 2016 restraining order and no physical interference with any management or actual operation of the Company.  The Court did not explain why it needed, as remediation, to make such an enormous award in addition to the remedial Orders to withdraw the pleadings.
[brief] Motion to Exclude Increased Wave Overtopping Vulnerability  Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion to Bar  Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Increased Wave Overtopping  Vulnerability  Engineering Report Filed 8/10/22 .................................................................  Da446  Certification of [...], Esq.  In Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Bar  [...]’s Engineering Report Filed 8/10/22 .. Da448  Exhibit 1 [...] 04/07/21 report ........................................ Da310 Exhibit 2 [...] 10/21/21 report ........................................  Da418  Exhibit 3 03/01/22  Deposition Transcript of A. [...]..  Da456  Defendant’s Certification of [...], Esq.  In Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion  Filed 09/01/22 ........................................  Da499  Exhibit A  Curriculum Vitae of A. [...].............  Da436 Exhibit B 12/29/20  Preliminary Report of A. [...]........................................  Da331 Exhibit C 04/07/21  Report of A. [...]..............  Da310  Exhibit D Email of [...]  Dated 04/09/21  Providing Plaintiff’s Counsel  Via Drop Box eight attachments to Mr. [...] 04/07/21  Engineering Evaluation.......................  Da502 Order  Barring Defendant’s Appraiser from Relying at Trial on the [...] Engineering Report (wave overtopping)  Filed 10/07/22 ........................................................................  Da503  Consent Order Final Judgment Filed 08/22/23 .........................  Da505  Defendant’s Notice of Appeal Filed 10/04/23 ..........................  Da508  Defendant’s Amended Notice of Appeal Filed 10/10/23.......  Da513  Certification of Transcripts Completion and Delivery Filed 11/02/23 ........................................................................  Da519  Preliminary Statement  This is a partial taking condemnation action.
[brief] In Lodato v. Evesham Tp., 388 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div. 2006), plaintiff did not offer an expert opinion but relied on the fact that the nature of the dangerous condition (raised roots in a residential sidewalk) was open and obvious and that it had existed for eighteen (18) years.  The Appellate Division agreed, holding that when viewed most favorably for the plaintiff, the facts indicating the age and nature of the condition created a jury question.  *Id.* at 512.  Prior work orders concerning the street and overpass in question and relating to the approach to the low overpass the Plaintiff was taking were in evidence.  [5T4:15 to 23:17 & 5T35:6-10 & 5T98:21 to 100:13 & 5T104:8-20]  The dark road has no curbs and there were several work orders showing the sign placed on the road (by statute a sign should have been on the overpass and at the last opportunity for a driver to detour around the low overpass), showing the sign was not properly placed and not properly maintained.  The Trial Court correctly concluded that the Jury could find that the work orders Exhibits P 2 February 13, 2015, P 3 January 11, 2011, P 4 December 13, 2011, and P 5 June 19, 2014, show there is a problem with the sign in question.
[brief] It is [...]’s position that the Trial Court erred when it found a termination of the Lease and a termination of the guarantees in 2016 when it is clear from the facts and the actions of the parties that the 2016 termination of the Lease was rescinded, and the Lease continued in place until April of 2020.  He asks this Court to correct this error and reverse that portion of the Trial Court ruling that found that the Lease and guarantees were terminated in 2016, award judgment in favor of [...] and against the guarantors, [...], [...] and [...], for $100,965.77 through April of 2020, $37,649.00 in attorney’s fees, and remand for trial as to [...]’s remaining damages incurred after April of 2020.
[brief] In State v. Kelly, the Court noted that “[d]etached reflection is not demanded in the face of an uplifted knife. ”  97 N.J. 178, 198 (1984) (quoting Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921)).  ____________________  7  Defendant cites to Bass to allege that the Supreme Court of New Jersey found all terms in N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(c) are to be given their ordinary and accepted meaning.  (Db44).  Defendant is mistaken; in reading the case, Bass specifically dealt with interpreting a single word in the statute: “intruder.
[brief] Plaintiff bears the burden of proof to demonstrate he is eligible for AD and could have requested that [...] – his own treating physician and surgeon - testify at the OAL hearings, or that he submit a certification expanding or clarifying the statements in his medical records.  Plaintiff’s failure to do so, and his claim that there is a lack of evidence to disprove [...]’s five references to the 2009 incident is not in itself “evidence” that the 2009 incident did not happen.
[brief] The issue is not as clear-cut as the respondent argues in its opposition to this Appeal.  The court recognized that the status of a property is not absolute, and that each set of fact would need to be analyzed on the case merits.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court first opined in Stewart, “(a)s for the determination of which properties will be covered by the rule we adopt today, commonly accepted definitions of "commercial" and "residential" property should apply, with difficult cases to be decided as they arise. ”  Stewart, 87 N.J. 150, 159-60.  We submit that the present case is one such “difficult case” where the need to closely analyze the differences, the Court should closely consider the status of the property and whether or not the result is fair to the [...], the innocent plaintiff/appellant.
[brief] Q.  So I just want to make sure I understand.  The scenario that you’ve laid out is that you’re in a fight with your partners that’s why you don’t go forward with the lease but –  A.  Yes.  We are having a disagreement.  Yes.  Q. -- but the disagreement is significant enough that - - and you know how important land control is - - you’re going to let the lease that give you land control a default, right?  A.  We were - - we were looking at buying the property in September and early October of 2017.  Q.  But when were you going to close on that sale?  A.  When - - I can’t really say when we were going to close.  [...], but as you know from development it’s hard to give you a date, but there were certainly challenges with the project.  (Pa001826).
[brief] ”  The rule and its interpretation concern mail from consumers and not what information a debt collector shares with others.  Defendant relies on the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to protect consumers.  Db35.  Defendant overlooks that the Act and its regulations prohibit sharing “nonpublic personal information” with “a nonaffiliated third party” until after providing the consumer with a certain notice.  15 U.S.C. § 6802; 16 CFR § 313.4(a)(2).  Among other things, that notice must (i) specify the type of nonpublic personal information collected, (ii) the categories of nonaffiliated third parties to whom such information is disclosed, and (iii) the consumer’s right to opt out of the disclosure of nonpublic personal information to nonaffiliated third parties.  16 CFR § 313.6.  There is nothing in the record demonstrating that Defendant provided an Act-compliant notice.
[brief] Essex County Indictment [...] charged [...] with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), (2) (Count 1); first-degree felony murder in the course of a robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (Count 2); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (Count 3); first-degree kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b)(1) (Count 4); third-degree theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a) (Count 5); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (Counts 6 and 8); third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (Counts 7 and 9); fourth-degree credit card theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-6(c)(1) (Count 10); and third-degree fraudulent use of a credit card, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-6(h) (Count 11).
[brief] Indeed, at the inception of the case, and in connection with Defendants’ initial motion to dismiss, the trial court held “So I don’t see that, collateral estoppel and res judicata.  Entire controversy doctrine is probably the only way to go for defendants, at best. ”  Had the trial court conducted a proper analysis on Plaintiff’s second motion to dismiss, it would have concluded, as it did earlier in the case, that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply.
[brief] The Council’s enabling statutes do not offend these separation of powers principles.  If the Legislature can, within limits, permissibly delegate legislative power to a private entity, see supra at 14-17, it necessarily follows that it can delegate rulemaking authority to an agency in the Executive Branch, such as the Council, see Bontempo, 53 N.J. Super. at 189-90 (Legislature properly delegated to the Council the authority to promulgate the Game Code and formulate wildlife management policies with DEP Commissioner approval).
[brief] Cope, 224 N.J. 530 (2016) | 30, 31 | | State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316 (2005) | 37, 38 | | State v. Davis, 363 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 2003) | 39 | | State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344 (2009) | 39 | | CASES (CONT'D.) | PAGE NOS. | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | State v. General Restoration Co., 42 N.J. 366 (1964) | 41 | | State v. Ghigliotty, 463 N.J. Super. 355 (App. Div. 2020) | 24, 26 | | State v. Green, 62 N.J. 547 (1973) | 47 | | State v. Hardison, 99 N.J. 379 (1985) | 43 | | State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265 (2018) | 10, 11 | | State v. J.R., 227 N.J. 393 (2017) | 11 | | State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190 (2015) | 46 | | State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178 (1984) | 11 | | State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. 354 (1987) | 45 | | State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325 (1971) | 27, 32 | | State v. McGuire, 419 N.J. Super. 88 (App. Div. 2011) | 24, 25 | | State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458 (2005) | 45 | | State v. Olenowski, 2023 N.J. LEXIS 206 (2023) | 11 | | State v. Pickett, 466 N.J. Super. 270 (App. Div. 2021) | 26 | | State v. Raso, 321 N.J. Super. 5 (App. Div. 1999) | 11 | | State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967) | 40 | | State v. Rhett, 127 N.J. 3 (1992) | 33 | | State v. Samuels, 189 N.J. 236 (2007) | 41 | | CASES (CONT'D.) | PAGE NOS.
[brief] Decedent gave Respondent a will dated October 14, 2014 (hereinafter “2014 Will”) which she kept in a safe in her home.  (11T111:10-15).  Respondent testified that Decedent and their attorney [...], Esquire\(^{12}\) of [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) discussed their worry that Petitioner would bring litigation over the 2014 Will.  (11T115:20-22; 11T161:3-7; 11T116:6-10).  Therefore, its terms were concealed from Petitioner until after Decedent’s death.  (7T190:1-3).  The 2014 Will is contrary to Decedent’s longstanding testamentary intentions.
[brief] (T30-23)  This conclusion presumes far too much about Defendant [...]’s intent and motivation for the purpose of a summary judgment motion.  A jury could reasonably infer that Defendant [...] might have been willing to endure the staffing challenges resulting from the terminations as a means of retaliating against an employee who had complained about her conduct.  In sum, the Court repeatedly granted Defendants the benefits of factual disputes, and inferences that must be resolved in Plaintiff’s favor under the appropriate standards.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Since this case was filed, [...] has languished in pretrial custody for two-and-a-half years.  Moreover, the instant suppression motion has been pending without a hearing since October 30, 2024—111 days as of this writing.  The trial court expeditiously sought to schedule the motion for testimony, but the State repeatedly obstructed having a hearing.  Even if expedited, leave for appeal will extend this period of pretrial confinement in a manner inconsistent with the presumption of innocence.  Third, this Court should deny leave for appeal given the State’s untoward tactics and gamesmanship in seeking to block testimony before the trial court.
[brief] [...]:  Here’s my problem with this.  [Quoting the form:]  Having these rights in mind, I wish to waive or give up these rights and make a knowing and voluntary statement and answer the questions.  To me, that conflicts with right number 5.  [...]:  It does not.  I understand why -- I understand why you’re reading it that way, but it doesn’t conflict.  That number 5 stands throughout the entire interview if you waive your rights right now.  [...]:  But if I were to sign this, sign what this says, I wish to waive or give up these rights.  [...]: Correct.  [...]: That’s my problem with signing that.  [...]:  If you read number 5, though, it says, at any time during the questioning.  So, that means signature or not, if you choose to not talk to us anymore, you don’t have to.  So, if you sign that and waive your rights for now, you want to talk to us.  If at some point you change your mind and don’t anymore, the --- 5  Right number 5, as detectives explained to [...], provided that:  “A decision to waive these rights is not final, and you may withdraw your waiver whenever you wish, either before or during questioning. ”  (1T:46-24 to 47-2) waiver still applies.
[directive] The decision to activate a BWC must be based on objective criteria (e.g., the initiation of a specified type of police action, such as a consensual field inquiry, or the start of an officer’s duty shift).  Furthermore, in any circumstance where an officer is afforded discretion in deciding whether to de-activate a BWC, the reasons for exercising that discretion must be documented to permit supervisory review.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022  1  2  Definitions
[brief] ”  Ja717-18.  See Garden of Memories, 109 N.J. Super. at 535 (recitals provide notice to inquire further); McCrea, 46 N.J.Eq. at 474; Hammett v. Rosensohn, 46 N.J. Super. 527, 535 (App. Div. 1957) (a purchaser is “bound to look to his own deed”).
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[brief] Instead of quoting the entire Paragraph 6 of [...]’s Order (at Pa2), [...] quoted only half of [...]’s Paragraph 6, as follows:  “without expert testimony, plaintiffs may not pursue a claim that but for the grading/elevation error they could have successfully obtained preliminary and final site plan approval. ”  (Pa25).  [...] omitted the last half of [...]’s Paragraph 6, which clarified the term “approval” to mean only “approval to allow for multiple tenants to occupy the [...] space. ” (Pa2).  This was only one limited aspect of [...]’ claim.  In fact, in Paragraph 4 of his Order, [...] explicitly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss all of [...]’ other negligence claims.
[brief] For these reasons, [...] seeks reversal of the trial court’s order that (a) granted reformation of agreement by and among [...], the [...] (the “City”) and [...], dated February 24, 2005, as amended May 11, 2012 (the “Redevelopment Agreement”) and the Operating Agreement between [...] and [...], dated April 17, 2006 (the “Operating Agreement”), and (b) awarded [...] $499,007.77 in fees as a result of said reformation.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] The court went on to explain its reasoning and why N.J.R.E. 403 barred admission of the conviction.  The court began by explaining that the conviction was for possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute.  2T:29-19 to 25.  The crime was not a crime of moral turpitude.  2T:29-19 to 30-7.  The court also observed that while the conviction was not 10 years old, it was five years before the trial and wasn’t “something that happened yesterday that perhaps he should have been more forthright in remembering. ”  2T:30-8 to 9.  The court also considered the fact that [...] did not deny that he had prior convictions, he merely stated that he could not remember when they occurred.  2T:30-17 to 19.  The court summarized its reasoning as follows:  In my mind hearing somebody has been convicted of drug related charge is just so prejudicial to our laypeople jurors that I have a significant concern that that potential prejudice would outweigh the probative value.  Which in my mind is small.  I agree its there.  Could a jury find that to have been inconsistent with the examiner at the time of the deposition?  Possibly.  But in my mind that prejudice just so significantly outweighs them hearing about a criminal conviction that I’m still going to bar that and its use as impeachment testimony.  [2T:30-25 to 31-11.]  The above quoted statement from the court must be viewed in the context of the court’s earlier statements about the applicable standard.  As noted above, the court equated the analysis under N.J.R.E. 403 with the analysis applicable to a conviction that is more than ten years old.  2T:27-20 to 23.  The court also stated that “potential probative value does not outweigh the prejudicial effect that this will have in this jury. ”  2T:28-8 to 10.  The trial court conflated the standards and concepts set forth in N.J.RE. 403 and 609 and undervalued the probative value of Mr. [...]’s prior convictions.
[brief] E.g., Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (“It is a well-settled principle that our appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public justice. ”) argument and [...]’s argument for what would be nothing more than remand for remand’s sake.