ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 10  State vs. Ross, 189 N.J. Super. 67, 75 (App. Div. 1983) ..........................  9  STATUTES, ADMINISTRATIVE CODE  ORDINANCES AND COURT RULE N.J.A.C. 8:52 .................................................................  16  Ordinance 44 ............................................................... 15, 16 Ordinance 164-14 ......................................................... 17 Ordinances 173-213 ...................................................... 15, 16 Ordinance 173 ............................................................. 7, 15 Ordinance 173-24 ......................................................... 2, 3, 5, 8, 11, 20 Ordinance 173-27 ......................................................... 2, 3, 6, 8, 11, 20 Ordinance 201 ............................................................ 7, 14, 15, 16, 18 Ordinance 201-2A ....................................................... 2, 4, 6, 8, 11 Ordinance 201-2B ....................................................... 19 Ordinance 201-2C ....................................................... 14 Ordinance 201-2D ....................................................... 14 Ordinance 201-7 .......................................................... 16 Rule 3:23-8 ................................................................. 8 LEGAL TREATISES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES 6 Mc Quillin, Municipal Corporations, § 20.07, p. 18 (3rd ed., 1969) ...........................................18 Merriam-Webster-dictionary-harbor.................................13 Merriam-Webster-dictionary-nuisance...............................19 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The within matter involves the appeal by the defendant, [...] (the “Defendant”), of the decision of the Honorable [...], J.S.C (“[...]”) finding the Defendant guilty of violating §173-24A, §173-27, and §201-2A of the [...]’s Municipal Code.
[brief] (7T326-4 to 7).  He knew the police were coming and did not want to get shot, so he put the rifle aside, and planned to allow the police to arrest him.  (7T326-10 to 12; 8T21-8 to 11).  Defendant had not ingested alcohol or drugs the evening of the murders.  (8T60-3 to 10).  He felt he should be placed in a mental institution “because I might have some problems. ” (8T21-12 to 16).  Defendant knew the difference between right and wrong and knew that shooting and killing someone was “very wrong. ” (8T21-21 to 22-2, 39-9 to 11).  He once considered shooting the occupants of a house a few blocks away while they were asleep, but did not act on it.  (8T48-23 to 50-8).  Defendant had never even harmed an animal, including his four pet cats, before murdering his parents, sister, and family friend.  (8T50-17 to 51-9).  Defendant understood that killing his family was wrong, but he “felt like it wasn’t me,” (8T38-20 to 39-3).
[brief] .................................................................  7  Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, 189 N.J. 1 (2004) ........................................................................ 7, 14 Rudbart v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Com’n, 127 N.J. 344 (1992) .....................................................................  14 Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277 (Tenn. 2004) .................................................... 3, 12, 13 Tillman v. Com. Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362 (2008)  ................................................................ passim Washington Const. Co. v. Spinella, 8 N.J. 212 (1951)  .......................................................................  15 Willis Flooring, Inc. v. Howard S. Lease Const. Co. & Assocs., 656 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983)  ......................................................  12  Cases: R. 2:6-1(a)(2)  ..................................................................................  7  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] Furthermore, there was no error in [...]’s determination.  “[T]o establish a prima facie CEPA cause of action, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer’s conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; (2) he or she performed a ‘whistle-blowing’ activity described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c); an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment action.
[brief] I have no doubt that they discussed what that meant.  I imagine that [...] also discussed my comments as to whether [...] should be in the case or not and despite all of that it went forward.  But the responsibility is on the client, not the lawyer and so the award of fees is as to the plaintiff, not to the plaintiff’s counsel.  (3T 22:20-23:12) (emphasis added).  Not only does the Trial Court apply this presumption backwards, but in laying out its findings, it explicitly specifies that its findings are *based entirely on assumptions and imagination*.  All of this is simply speculation about what Plaintiffs knew and what their counsel told them, and is obviously not *proof* of bad faith.  In fact, nothing even vaguely referenced by the Trial Court or [...] (who has the burden of establishing bad faith, see *Ferolito*, 408 N.J. Super. at 408) amounts to a showing of “bad faith. ”  There is no suggestion whatsoever that Plaintiffs were motivated by anything other than a desire to press their case on an issue of importance to them, or that they did anything other than rely on the advice of their counsel.  See *Ferolito*, 408 N.J. Super. at 411 (finding client “motivated by a goal of great importance to him” and not by “any hostility or ill-will” did not act in bad faith).  All that [...] has been able to show is that Plaintiffs *might* not succeed on their claim (if granted proper discovery).  That is not sufficient.  See *Tagayun v. AmeriChoice of New Jersey, Inc.*, 446 N.J. Super. 570, 579–80 (App. Div. 2016) (citation omitted) (“The statute should not be allowed to be a counterbalance to the general rule that each litigant bears his or her own litigation costs, even when there is litigation of ‘marginal merit. ’”).  Likewise, in the absence of any factual findings from the Trial Court, all that can be determined from its Reconsideration Order is that it agrees with [...]: Plaintiffs might not succeed on their claim.  That is likewise insufficient.  Id. at 580 (citing Ferolito, 408 N.J. Super. at 408).  Thus, the award of sanctions pursuant to the Frivolous Litigation Statute was clear error and should be reversed.
[brief] [Pa54]  When the appellant appealed the initial decision of the Board, prior to the Board issuing a final administrative determination, the appellant requested an administrative hearing be conducted by the Office of Administrative Law pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:15B-1 et seq.  [Pa 41]  Since there were contested facts in this case, the Board of Trustees should have referred this matter to the Office of Administrative Law for a full and fair hearing.
[brief] [...]’ Summary Judgment Motion asked the Court to reform five recorded documents, all of which were unchallenged and unquestioned when the [...] purchased their property without notice of any defect in their deed.  The black letter law is clear that the deed of a bona fide purchaser without notice cannot be reformed: An error, ambiguity, or uncertainty in the description of land in a deed may often be rectified by a judicial reformation action against one of the parties to the instrument, or even against a subsequent purchaser who acquired his rights with notice of the mistake, ambiguity, or uncertainty.  The statute of frauds is no bar to the inclusion of additional land in the description by means of reformation, but the equitable right to have an instrument reformed, like other equitable rights, is cut off by a transfer of the interest of the party who benefited from the mistake to a bona fide purchaser for value.
[brief] [...] were required to disclose the foreclosure related fees to potential refinance lenders.  The foreclosure related fees must be deemed non-recoverable in accordance with the [...] (A609) and the [...].  All of this negatively impacted the Schianos’ ability to refinance and caused damages to them even when they were finally able to refinance in October 2022 (due to the declaration of no default by the Schianos in the Final Judgment).
[brief] Here, [...] obtained a search warrant pursuant to an investigation into a known associate of defendant.  Leading up to the execution of that warrant, [...] observed multiple hand-to-hand transactions conducted by the target, [...], with occupants of vehicles in the parking lot outside his residence.  During the progression of the investigation, defendant became known to [...] as a potential supplier of Mundy.  During the execution of the warrant, Mundy approached defendant with a wad of cash.  When confronted by police, Mundy hid the money and appeared as if he was prepared to run.  i.  **Initial Stop**
[directive] Another problem that arises is that 2The application to order forfeiture is done through filing a complaint in lieu of prerogative writ and is a civil action which requires a complex and lengthy filing of documents, including: Brief and Order to Show Cause; Affidavit of Service; Verified Complaint laying out the facts and procedural history of the case; Case Information Statement; and submission of transcript from the prosecution of the underlying offense.  Additionally, if the defendant contests the complaint, a court appearance is required.  On occasion, indictable charges can be downgraded in Superior Court 3 as part of a plea agreement, or a defendant can be found guilty in Superior Court for a lesser included disorderly persons offense.
[directive] 5.2  Officers shall reevaluate the situation and reassess the need to use force before any second or subsequent firing or discharge or utilization of drive stun mode of the device against the same person.  Any second or subsequent firing or discharge or utilization of drive stun mode of the device must be necessary and justified by the circumstances at that moment.  5.3  An officer shall not direct an electrical charge or current against a person who is restrained by handcuffs unless: (a) Deadly force would be authorized under the Use of Force Policy; and (b) the use of physical or mechanical force is not feasible or would be ineffective.  5.4  Consistent with training, officers may point a CED at a person only when circumstances create a reasonable belief that it may be necessary for the officer to use enhanced mechanical force.  When the officer no longer reasonably believes that enhanced mechanical force may be necessary, the officer shall, as soon as practicable, secure or holster the CED.  5.5  Unholstering, displaying, or pointing a CED shall be considered a display of constructive authority.  5.6  A spark display from a CED shall be considered a display of constructive authority.  A spark display must be reported as a Show of Force on the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal.  7  USE OF FORCE POLICY
[brief] It is axiomatic that one cannot change a record to which one does not have access.  Finally, the State’s position belies its feigned concern for the well-being of transgender students and the absurdity of its position.  The State readily admits that “Appellants would still be required to supply school records to a parent,” including presumably, a student record that a transgender student has changed without parental consent or notification.  Pb29-30.  Thus, the State’s desired result is for a parent to receive a student record which identifies a child with a gender unknown to the parent, in a vacuum, and without notice to the affected student.  This is dangerous and harmful to the student and antithetical to encouraging healthy communication between a transgender student and their family.
[brief] RFPs Nos. 21, 24, 26, 27, 61, 63 and 64  These RFPs all suffer an identical flaw: They seek information from Defendants for any “Engine Defect” in “Ford Vehicles” unfettered by any time limitations.  Although the definition section of the RFPs limits the term “Ford Vehicles” adequately to vehicles of the same make, model and year as Plaintiff’s vehicle, it does not save these RFPs.  The term “Engine Defect” is not limited to the type of engine in Plaintiff’s vehicle.  It appears to require the production of information regarding a variety of engine issues regardless of the type of engine.  Consequently, it is patently overbroad, disproportional and unenforceable.  The Court will not rewrite these RFPs to make them enforceable.  Defendants need not respond further.
[brief] Data cannot be, and is not, “accessible to or shared by all members of the community,” United States ex rel. Feingold v. AdminaStar Fed., Inc., 324 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2003), if it cannot lawfully be copied, assembled into a database, analyzed, or used for anything other than “internal business purposes” or by a user that does not compete with the data’s source.  See, e.g., Ja2986-3019 ([...] licensing agreement), Ja2179-80.  The requirements that users of these services -- the [...], the [...] subscription service, [...] terminals, and [...] data licenses -- not further disseminate the information, use it for only limited purposes, or any of a host of other restrictions imposed render it not publicly disclosed.
[brief] **[...]’s Default On The First Loan.**  [...] defaulted on the installment payment obligations due under the First Loan almost immediately.  Da15.  While he made the first required installment payment of interest only that had become due on January 15, 2009, [...] failed to remit the second installment payment when due on February 15, 2009.  Da15; Da181-82 (Ex. P8); Da223-29 (Ex. P21).  Thereafter, he remitted only four additional, untimely interest payments.  Da16; 1T87-8 to 13; 5T13-19 to 22; 5T18-23 to 19-2.  [...] never cured his continuing default, failing to remit multiple interest-only installment payments when due, and then defaulting on his obligation to make a required balloon payment of all outstanding principal, interest and late penalties by the due date for the balloon payment, i.e., June 15, 2010.
[brief] It cannot reasonably be concluded that the Board considered the environmental impact of the application and then “affirmatively determine[d]” that the project satisfied the listed environmental impact assessment criteria.  Furthermore, after a decision has been reached by a board, the board’s findings of facts and conclusions of law must be embodied in the form of a written resolution.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(g).  The resolution serves as the board’s official findings and conclusions of law with respect to an application.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(g).  The resolution must contain sufficient findings based on the proofs submitted to satisfy a reviewing court that the board has analyzed an application in accordance with the relevant statute and zoning ordinances.  New York SMSA, L.P. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. Of Weehawken, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 333 (App. Div. 2004).  A resolution cannot just contain a mere recital of testimony of conclusory statements.  Id. at 332.  Here, the Board’s resolution does not contain a single finding of fact or conclusion of law regarding any of the environmental impact assessment factors in § 142-77(B)(26).  There is no support for any argument that the Board reviewed and considered the environmental impact assessment, and affirmatively determined that there would be no significant adverse impact on the environment.  Even if the environmental impact assessment was considered part of the record, then it was contrary to well-established law to prohibit Plaintiffs and other members of the public from presenting testimony on subjects that are required to be considered in reviewing an application for major subdivision.  For these reasons, the Board’s approval of the application for preliminary and final major subdivision approval was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
[directive] Examples  Some departments incorporate mediation into the process in order to assist in h resolving neighborhood disputes.  Departments also require juveniles to agree to make restitution in appropriate h cases.  This requires an additional time commitment on the part of the law enforcement agency, to follow-up as needed.  Restitution plans should be simple and short-term, in order to avoid involving the law enforcement agency in drawn- out collection efforts.  Some officers have asked the juvenile’s parents, guardian/caregiver or designee to h agree to deny the juvenile driving privileges for some period of time, as part of an agreement.  A county-wide program run through a private non-profit, County Youth Services h Commission or other governmental agency, to which police departments may send juveniles to perform some type of community service as part of a stationhouse adjustment.  Performance of community service within the juvenile’s municipality.  h  Letters of apology or essays on the criminal justice topics are frequently requested h by departments to force the juvenile to consider the consequences and the effect of his or her conduct on others.  Quarterly Reports
[brief] “A conspirator can be held responsible for the acts of his or her co-conspirators even if the acts are not within the scope of the conspiracy, if they are reasonably foreseeable as the necessary or natural consequence of the conspiracy. ”  Ibid. (internal quotations and citations omitted).  “Although there is a great deal of similarity between accomplice and conspirator liability and frequently liability may be found under both theories’ the concepts are not identical. ”  State v. Samuels, 189 N.J. 236, 254 (2007) (citing Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated, comment to N.J.S. 2C:2–6(c) (2006)).  “The critical difference is that, as statutorily defined, conspiracy requires proof of an agreement to commit a crime whereas accomplice liability does not.
[brief] 12 CFR 1026.9(c)(2) requires 45-day notice of changes to Defendant’s account.  There was no 45-day notice included in Plaintiff’s exhibits.  There is no mention in Plaintiff’s pleadings nor in Declarant’s certification that Plaintiff ever sent a 45-day notice prior to the effective date of a significant change in Defendant’s account.  The simple reason for such failures is that Plaintiff never sent the required 45-day notices to Defendant.  Thus, the lower Court mistakenly granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment despite the plentitude of significant material facts establishing Defendant’s claim for recoupment or set-off.  A fact is “material”, as discussed on page Db19, if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law” and is genuinely in dispute if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
[brief] 23A N.J. Prac., Landlord and Tenant Law §39.21 (5th ed.) citing *May vs. Van Benschoten*, 13 N.J. Misc. 268 (Sup. Ct. 1935); *Donan Development Co. vs. Donan Hardware*, 34 N.J. Super. 293 (App. Div. 1955).
[brief] Again, assuming the provision is unenforceable (it is not), the same result applies here for several reasons.  First, like the class-arbitration waiver in Delta, the allegedly unconscionable provision at issue here has no application to Plaintiff’s claims.  Indeed, this is not an instance like Delta where [...] filed an action in Court and then sought to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s counter claims.  In fact, that scenario would never occur because the Agreement here would explicitly allow Plaintiff’s claims to remain in the Superior Court.  Rather, this is an instance where Plaintiff filed an action in the Superior Court and [...] sought to enforce the terms of the parties’ Agreement.
[brief] 5T47:23-48:2 ([...] was asked what maintenance has been done on the unit, pointed to the 2017 inspection and testified that “yes” that this was the work done “so that the hardship application could be submitted”).  [...] testified that he did not recall any preventative or routine maintenance being done on the apartment since the conversion. 5T62:4-16 ([...] testifying “I don’t…I don’t recall any work being done after it was condo-converted.  If it was, it may have been something like –I don’t know—a toilet being looked at maybe, yeah”); 1T80:1-5 ([...] testifying that except for a water heater that had to be replaced, he has no recollection of [...] ever performing routine maintenance on the unit).  The landlord’s witness agreed that there is no maintenance schedule for the apartment.
[brief] (30T243-8 to 20)  According to [...], Defendant suggested that they get matching tattoos with the slogan “Loyalty is Royalty” on their forearms.  (30T250-18 to 251-16)  After they got the tattoos, they discussed that the slogan meant that they were loyal to their shared secret regarding the murder of [...].  (30T251-25 to 252-15)  [...] showed his tattoo to the jury.  (30T259-25 to 260-2)  Defendant got another tattoo—teardrops on his face—which, according to [...], he said symbolized the murder of [...].  (30T253-1 to 19)  At trial, the State admitted a photo it alleged depicted Defendant’s face on March 5, 2018, without the teardrop tattoo (S-113), as well as a second photo it alleged depicted Defendant’s face on March 9 with the teardrop tattoo (S-114).
[brief] (262a-263a).  The Trial Court denied the plaintiffs' petition for a temporary injunction regarding changes to the salary scale, overtime calculus, health insurance coverage, longevity, and education incentive pay, workers' compensation benefits, and terminal leave pay over $15,000.  (263a).  The Court granted the plaintiffs' petition for a temporary injunction regarding the reduction of the police force, changes to the work schedule, and the elimination of terminal leave under $15,000.  Pursuant to the Court’s Order, all temporary restraints remained in place until the close of business June 6, 2017.  (263a).  On June 7, 2017, [...] issued another “Notice of Implementation.
[directive] This Order to Show Cause raises questions about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the suspension of in-person criminal jury trials on defendants who have been detained pretrial.  Under the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA or Act), defendants who pose a serious risk of non-appearance, danger, or obstruction can be detained before trial if no combination of conditions of release will reasonably guard against those risks.  N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15.  According to the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), more than 4,900 defendants were detained and awaiting trial in late January 2021.  Few criminal jury trials have been held since March 2020, however, because of the health risks that in-person trials pose to jurors, participants, and members of the public with whom they interact.
[brief] “[A]lthough the sentence imposed on defendant falls within the statutory limits mandated for the offense, ‘there is an obvious sense of unfairness in having disparate punishments for equally culpable perpetrators. ’”  Roach I, 146 N.J. at 232 (quoting State v. Hubbard, 176 N.J. Super. 174, 175 (App. Div. 1980)).  “The question therefore is whether the disparity is justifiable or unjustifiable. ”  Id. at 233.  Where the defendants’ cooperation with the prosecution, roles in the crime, and backgrounds differ widely, so too may their sentences.  See State v. Williams, 317 N.J. Super. 149, 159 (App. Div. 1998).  Here, the PCR court properly denied defendant’s disparate sentencing claim.