ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Instead of seeking permissible remedies enumerated hereinabove, the Defendant filed a second bad faith motion for reconsideration in order to stymie Plaintiff’s right to sell the Property and to needlessly increase Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and costs without regard to the lack of a procedural or legal basis.  In fact, the trial court recognized the Defendant’s disingenuous intentions by stating:  I can’t – do not understand if it was such a slam dunk or guaranteed result, why it took from the Appellate Division decision being released on June 8, 2023, almost a year post Tyler, why it’s being brought almost a year later.  I think this is another mechanism of delay, which I am not going to consider.  T18-5-10.  In addition, the trial court remarked that the Defendant was in the same position as he was when the Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s order the first time.  T17-24.  Clearly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction and authority to upend the Final Judgment since the decision from the Appellate Division was the “law of the case” that the trial court was obligated to obey as written.  As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by holding that it lacked the authority to modify and/or vacate the findings of the Appellate Division.  T18-11-15.  Consequently, the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s motion for reconsideration must be affirmed because there was no cognizable basis upon which the trial court could have granted Defendant’s second motion for reconsideration of the four (4) year old final judgment after the conclusion of his first appeal.  As such, the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s motion for reconsideration should be affirmed.
[brief] In [...], the plaintiff notified [...] of a suit, and the insurer informed [...] that it would participate in the defense under a reservation of rights.  “Without a denial of coverage . . . [...] had little reason to file an action in New Jersey for a declaration of its rights.  In a preemptive move . . . [...] without warning filed suit in New York, thereby denying [...] the opportunity to select its own forum for resolving the coverage dispute. ”
[brief] Defendant asks this Court to ignore the published federal decisions which are on all fours but, at Db23, Defendant misstates Plaintiff’s position.  It contends, “Plaintiff asks this Court to ignore the extensive and well-reasoned decisions by both New Jersey courts as well as recent decisions by the Appellate Division in favor of a holding rendered by the Eleventh Circuit” in Hunstein I and Hunstein II.  Not so.  Instead, Plaintiff asks this court to construe the FDCPA consistent with published decisions of the lower federal courts including but not limited to the Hunstein decisions—decisions which our Supreme Court in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 80 (1990) requires to be given “due respect” to promote national uniformity and to avoid forum shopping—and to reject unpublished state court decision which never considered the reasoning behind those published federal court decisions.
[brief] [...] also conducted his own independent review of [...]’s fee application, explaining:  The Court also had the benefit of reviewing the billing records submitted and reviewed by [...].  The findings by [...] are consistent with the Court’s review of the billing records.  The records contain detailed explanations of the work performed and the amount of time expended.  The Court agrees that certain reductions, as determined by [...], are appropriate.  (40067a)  ***
[brief] Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J.  469 (2016)  ......................................................14  Greenberg v. Camden Voc. Schools, 310 N.J. Super. 189 (App. Div. 1998)  ...........22  Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank, 574 U.S. 418 (2014)  ............................................23  Harman v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998)  .......................................47  In re Action Against Gonzalez, 405 N.J. Super. 336 (App. Div. 2009)  .....................49  LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2007)  ..........22  Maimone v. City of Atl. City, 188 N.J. 221 (2006)  .....................................................41  Millea v. Metro-N. R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2011) ......................................... 19, 29, 30 Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960).  .............................. 16, 17  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)  ........................................18  Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2007) ..........................................................18  Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) ............................................. 44, 45, 46, 48
[brief] [...] does not dispute that Defendant [...], Esq., [...]’s prior counsel, deliberately conspired with two other officers of the court to unlawfully breach the data repository of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") on January 11, 2006.  (Pa 165 id 33-36)  The purpose was to aid the Emmanouil defendants in a wholly unrelated contract dispute case by defaming [...] through the public dissemination of decades old, irrelevant, and false records maintained in the highly protected FBI Confidential History Report ("CHR").  The confidential data was then initially published in the contract complaint filed by [...] and his parents Eugenia and [...] on March 7, 2006, in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in Emmanouil v. [...] [...] which was sealed and stricken on October 11, 2006.  (Pa 271 id 4).  The Emmanouils were aided by the knowingly complicit Gardner Police Detective and Court Clerk who used false statements in a police report and to the FBI to unlawfully access the FBI Index in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001.  (Pa 165 id 4 ¶¶16-18)  This criminal conspiracy violated the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.  It also violated [...]'s Due Process Rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to notice and a hearing before [...]'s highly protected private papers were seized.  These are two of three core essential elements of Due Process.  Without these crimes, committed by three officers of the court on January 11, 2006, Defendant [...] and its Emmanouil clients could never have published the CHR in their March 7, 2006 Complaint, on a website in the fall of 2006, and on PACER on December 20, 2009.  But for these illegal acts, this issue would not be before this Court.
[brief] (15T 109-16 to 20; 15T 115-12 to 15)  [...] would steal from [...] and [...] but [...] claimed he was not violent.  (15T 116-3 to 117-4)  When [...] returned from the mental hospital to live with them, [...] never discussed [...]’ medication with him, did not know “what it was for,” and did not know if or when [...] stopped taking the medication, he admitted.
[directive] bodily serious or death producing 2.  footnote  See 4 infra. Section 3, in separately addressed are factors These 5 4 Pagc Recommendations  PTI  Formulating Consider in to Factors 3. nature rehabilitation the and to responsiveness correction, to "amenability  A defendant's PTI. admission into determining for measured be to considerations all are of offense" the an applicant's for recommendation a in formulating In 2C:43-12b(1).  addition, N.J.S.A. statutory consider seventeen director shall program prosecutor PTI and PTI, in participation the N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12e: to pursuant criteria offense; the of The nature (1) case; the of facts The (2) of defendant; age motivation and The (3) prosecution; forego to victim or complainant the of (4) desire The maybe that traits character and problems of personal existence The (5) unavailable which are services for and crime defendant's to related more provided maybe that or system, criminal justice within the the that probability the and supervisory treatment through effectively treatment; proper by controlled be can behavior criminal of causes or condition a to is related defendant's crime that likelihood The (6) in participation through change to conducive that be situation would supervisory treatment; society;b victim and the of interests and needs The (7) of a part constitutes crime defendant's which extent to The (8) behavior; ofanti-social pattern continuing to extent the and penal violations criminal and of record Defendant's (9) others; substantial to danger a present or may which she he nature, or violent assaultive of an is not crime or Whether the (10) injurious in possible or itself the act criminal in whether the behavior; such of consequences the exacerbate would prosecution not or whether of Consideration (11) criminal act; defendant's to problem led that social position.
[directive] Any additional pages attached the report shall include a reference to the to (a, - particular part the Form report, Indivisible property received C 3 of the during period).  The report shall include the full name of the police agency, the beginning "ORI" and ending dates of the reporting period, and the police agency's Police number assianed bv the Division of State for access the National to Crime Information Center, (NCIC).  The report shall indicate the quarter, by circling the appropriate number, and calendar year of the reporting period.  I: B- Part Forfeited Assets Received 1.
[brief] DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE IS NOT EXCESSIVE.  Trial judges are given wide discretion in imposing sentence.  State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 607–08 (2010).  Appellate courts’ standard of review is “one of great deference and ‘judges who exercise discretion and comply with the principles of sentencing remain free from the fear of second guessing. ’ ”  State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 501 (2005) (quoting State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 494 (1996)).  Defendant contends that the weight that the trial court judge ascribed to the aggravating and mitigating factors was different from what he believes was appropriate.  This is not the standard for whether a sentence is excessive.  The reviewing court “must affirm the sentence of a trial court unless: (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the findings of aggravating and mitigating factors were not ‘based upon competent credible evidence in the record;' or (3) ‘the application of the guidelines to the facts' of the case ‘shock[s] the judicial conscience. ’ ”  *State v. Bolvito*, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014) (quoting *State v. Roth*, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984) (alteration in original)).  An appellate court is not to substitute its assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors for that of the trial court.  *State v. O'Donnell*, 117 N.J. 210, 215 (1989).  Defendant makes no allegation of a violation of sentencing guidelines and there exists no unusual circumstance to “shock the judicial conscience. ”  *Bolvito*, at 228.  The record makes clear that the sentencing judge based her assessment on competent credible evidence in the record, which she specifies in her oral ruling.  Her findings were based on facts from the record, including the defendant’s violent response to the victim’s request for shelter and her known status as a vulnerable person, the facts of the victim’s disposal on the side of the road, nude and subject to the elements, flora, and fauna, the defendant’s drug use as it informs future possibilities of continued criminality, and the defendant’s criminal history.  14T 23:7-26:25.  There is abundant credible evidence in the record to support the sentencing judge’s findings.  With regard to the defendant’s drug use, “The [Criminal] Code [] does not condone leniency even where the commission of the offense may be related to the offender's drug or alcohol addiction. ”  State v. Setzer, 268 N.J. Super. 553, 568 (App. Div. 1993) (citing State v. Rivera, 124 N.J. 122, 126 (1991); State v. Ghertler, 114 N.J. 383, 390 (1990)).  CONCLUSION
[brief] (Pa231 at ¶4).  Pursuant to Plaintiff’s subpoena upon [...], Plaintiff was provided with the Security Log, Performance Log and Event Log from the [...] for auditorium 5 on August 13, 2016, which were archived by [...].  (Pa231 at ¶4).  As [...] explained, these are raw log files which showed the content playback start and end and the use of decryption keys to unlock secure content for the date of the movie at issue.  (Pa231 at ¶4).  [...] further explained the Security Log, Performance Log and Event Log which were produced to Plaintiff are the functional equivalent of the TMS log which is the subject of this appeal.  (Pa231 at ¶5).  More technically, TMS is software that allows the ingestion of material (moving the digital file of a new movie into the local storage) and scheduling between all auditoriums in the complex.
[brief] 29  Mistretta v. City of Newark 33 N.J. Super. 205 (App.Div. 1954) ..............................................  25 Moore v. Bridgewater Tp., 69 N.J. Super. 1 (App.Div. 1966) ..................................................  29 N.J. Hegeman Co. v. River Edge, 6 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 1949) ..............................................  20 Nuckel v. Boro. Of Little Ferry Pl. Bd., 208 N.J. 95 (2011) ..................................................  26 O'Donnell v. Koch, 197 N.J. Super. 134 (App. Div. 1984) ...........................................  26 Paruszewski v. Tp. Of Elsinboro, 154 N.J. 45 (1998) ..........................................................  50  Pennington Homes v. Planning Bd. of Stanhope, 41 N.J. 578 (1964)  ..........................................................  19 Rain or Shine Box Lunch Co. v. Bd. of Adj. of Newark, 53 N.J. Super. 252 (App.Div. 1958) ...........................................  25 Rockhill v. Chesterfield, 23 N.J. 117 (1957) ....................................  20 Roselle v. Wright, 21 N.J. 400 (1956) ...........................................  20 S&S Auto Sales inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Stafford, 373 N.J. Super. 603 (App.Div. 2004) .........................................  34 Stafford v. Stafford Zoning Bd., 154 N.J. 62 (1998) ..........................................................  22 State v. Loux, 76 N.J. Super. 409 (App.Div. 1962) ............................  30  Suesserman v. Newark Bd. of Adj., 61 N.J. Super. 28 (App.Div. 1960) ...........................................  25 Universal Holding Co. v. North Bergen Tp., 55 N.J. Super. 103 (App. Div. 1959) ....................................... 29, 30 Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super. 509 (App.Div.2011) ........................................  49  Wajergast v. Broadway thirty-Third Corp., 66 N.J. Super. 346 (App.Div. 1961) ........................................  25 Weber v. Pieretti, 72 N.J. Super. 184 (Ch. Div. 1962) ...........................................  29  STATUTES
[brief] Pascucci v. Vagott 71 N.J. 40 (N.J. 1976)  Holding that ordinarily "there should be expeditious adjudication of all matters in controversy between the parties at one time and place"  Pascucci v. Vagott 71 N.J. 40 (N.J. 1976) it would have been preferable for it to transfer the cause rather than to dismiss the action.  R. 1:13-4(a); see Central R.R. v. Neeld, supra, 26 N.J. 172 at 184.
[brief] 44 - **Herbtstman v. Eastman Kodak Co.**, 68 N.J. 1, 342 A.2d 181 (1975) ..............................................  44 - **Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Piper Co.**, 214 N.J. Super. 328 A.2d 368 (Ch.Div. 1986) ................................................................. .................................................................................. 44 - **In re Adoption of Baby T**, 160 N.J. 332 (1999) .................................................................................. 16 - **Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum**, 84 N.J. 137 (1980) ................................................................. .................................................................................. 16 - **Jones v. Gabrielan**, 52 N.J. Super. 563, 146 A.2d 495 (App.Div. 1958) ................................................................. ..................................................................................
[brief] For example, the court concluded, without any explanation or citation to the record, that [...] made unauthorized withdrawals of capital from [...] and [...] via the Disputed Transactions.  36T28-1 to -25, 47-1 to 52-25.  As such, the court held that these purported diversions precluded Plaintiffs from sharing in the profits of the companies, entitling them to half of the transferred funds.  Id.  [...] presented no evidence that he and [...] formally voted on any expenditure of funds or transaction made by [...] or [...].  This is because the evidence at trial firmly established that [...] and [...]’s custom and practice in running [...] and [...] did not involve voting on every transaction processed through the companies, but instead consisted of daily informal discussions.  17T93-1 to 101-15; 25T56-3 to 57-8.  Indeed, the evidence showed that [...] approved of all significant transactions involving [...] and [...] (including the Disputed Transactions) and was materially involved in all aspects of managing the companies’ finances.  25T152-6 to 160-8; 26T6-1 to 24-25; 29T32-14 to 34-13, 104-4 to 106-23; 30T94-12 to 95-7; Da02858 – Da03032, Da03054 – Da03068, Da03077, Da06612 – Da06788, Da07299 – Da07305, Da07364 – Da07386, Da07390 – Da07746.  This begs the question, where was the testimony from [...] that he did not authorize the Disputed Transactions?  The simple answer is that [...] did not provide any such testimony.  23T97-1 to 98-15.  [...]’s unfounded accusation in the Amended Complaint that [...] took unauthorized distributions from [...] and [...] was akin to the pot calling the kettle black, considering that he paid for his home renovations with [...]’s funds and processed numerous personal expenses through [...] and [...] without [...]’s authorization.  17T16-17 to 25-2; 29T101-4 to -15; Da02913 – Da02926, Da07299 – Da07305.  Therefore, based on [...]’s own conduct in running [...] and [...], the court should have rejected [...]’s argument that the Disputed Transactions violated the 2007 [...] Stockholders Agreement and the [...] Operating Agreement because he purportedly did not authorize them.  23T114-12 to 115-11.  Lastly, Plaintiffs failed to present any evidence that Defendant had knowledge of, participated in, or benefitted from the Disputed Transactions.  Due to the court’s errors summarized above, including permitting [...] to present net opinion testimony at trial, the Judgment should be reversed against Defendant as to Counts 5 and 6 of the Amended Complaint in the interests of justice.
[brief] No amount of discovery will change the simple fact that there was no “defect” of the physical public property at issue which (may) have contributed to Plaintiffs injuries.  See Morris v. Jersey City, 179 N.J. Super. 460, 463 (App. Div. 1981) ("As the trial judge recognized, clearly there was simply no causative nexus between the board and this accident.  The board’s only connection in any respect was that it owned the building.
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[brief] (3T30:13-25).  Second, Defendants raised the case of \textit{Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty.}, 143 S. Ct. 1369 (2023) as a basis for relief.  (461a¶21-464a¶32).  Plaintiff and [...] again filed opposition.  [...] emphasized that Defendants’ failure to participate in discovery should not redound to their benefit.  (790a¶4-8).  [...] also reiterated that it paid valuable consideration for the property, it did not know (and would have had no reason to know) of Defendants’ claim, and the property was in fact vacant and abandoned.
[brief] I learned during his deposition in March 2016 that [...] had settled the bankruptcy matter and received in excess of $4,000,000.00 for our assets.  He had hid that from me.  In [...]'s possession and I am sure the attorneys involved in the bankruptcy case, there is a written settlement agreement which sets out what [...] was to receive.  I am sure if compelled by the Court, that document will provide much information in which to determine if [...] acted in good faith when demanding I sign documents without the benefit of or review of an independent attorney charged with the duty of protecting my interests.  \(^3\)  One such friend was [...], who testified below that she helped [...] understand the various agreements she had been told to sign.  [...] admitted to [...] during the hearing below that he retained everything from the bankruptcy resolution – about 4.6 million dollars, while [...] received for her share of the marital assets a $200,000 lump sum payment, a Mercedes Benz, and payment of about $25,000 in attorney’s fees from an unrelated criminal matter -- with no alimony.  [...]’s counsel argued that relief was warranted because of the unfair process and inequitable result orchestrated by the far more sophisticated and monied husband -- with help from a law firm who’d been providing “financial advice” during the parties’ marriage.