ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] See, e.g., Kernahan, 236 N.J. at 307.  And it is black-letter law that a party cannot rely on his own ignorance to avoid or invalidate contractual terms.  As the Supreme Court of the United States explained:  It will not do for a man to enter into a contract, and, when, called upon to respond to its obligations, to say that he did not read it when he signed it, or did not know what it contained.  If this were permitted, contracts would not be worth the paper on which they are written.  But such is not the law.  _Upton v. Tribilcock_, 91 U.S. 45, 50 (1875).  Indeed, "to hold otherwise would contravene the well settled principle that a failure to read a contract will not excuse a party who signs it, nor will the party’s ignorance of [his] obligation."  _ADP, LLC v. Lynch_, No. 16-1111, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85636, at *15 (D.N.J. June 30, 2016) (citation and quotation marks omitted), aff’d 678 F. App’x 77 (3d Cir. 2017).  Thus, [...]’s failure to read what he was signing, failure to ask for copies of the paperwork he signed, and alleged ignorance of the terms of the paperwork he signed are immaterial.  See _Padró v. Citibank, N.A._, No. 14-2986, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51442, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2015) ("[I]t is not relevant, for purposes of [a motion to compel arbitration], whether Plaintiff recalls signing documents acknowledging the Employment Arbitration Policy, or whether she subjectively understood at the time the contents thereof.").  The trial court’s Order aligns with several decisions of other courts enforcing a plaintiff’s electronic signature despite the plaintiff’s later allegation that he did not know what he was signing or did not receive a copy of the terms he agreed to by signing.
[brief] POINT  TEN CONTRARY TO APPELLANT’S ARGUMENT AT DB34, THERE HAS BEEN NO DETERMINATION ON THE MERITS OF THE INVOLUNTARY ORDINARY DISABILITY APPLICATION (Raised below at IT 5:16 to IT 6:20)  Contrary to Appellant’s argument at Db 34, the [...] has not voted on Respondent’s IOD (Pa5-Pa6).  Further, as recognized by the Trial Court and confirmed by the [...] at Pa5-Pa6, the Disability case has cannot even be heard by the [...]:
[brief] Specifically, in *PPG Indus., Inc. v American Home Assur. Co.*, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1494; 2007 WL 2350646 (App. Div. August 20, 2007) (Da054), the Appellate Division stated:  In New Jersey when a suit limitation clause in a policy **is absent**, the general six-year statute of limitations for bringing suit on a contract applies.  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.  We have held that “[t]he general rule is that statute of limitations applicable to contracts governs insurance actions as well.  **Thus, absent a provision in the insurance policy or an express statute to the contrary, the statute of limitations applicable to a suit on a policy of insurance is six years. ”**  (Da062)  *(emphasis added). *  Additionally, in the matter, *Darlington Heritage Props v Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London*, 2021 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 371; 2021 WL 852100 (App. Div. March 8, 2021) (Da066), the Appellate Division cited to *Azze v. Hanover Ins. Co.*, 336 N.J. Super. 636 (App. Div. 2001) to point out that “contractual suit-limitation provisions are enforceable in New Jersey.
[brief] The probate court, using the form of order that had been submitted by Plaintiff, crossed off the paragraphs in Plaintiff’s proposed order and hand-wrote the word “denied” next to each of the paragraphs.  Those paragraphs included Plaintiff’s proposed paragraphs that allowed monies to be disbursed from the escrow account, contrary to the provisions of the settlement agreement between the Administrator and Defendant; a paragraph that sought an order that the Administrator take action to collect accounts receivable on behalf of [...]; and a paragraph that opposed the Administrator’s motion to be discharged of further responsibility in the matter.
[brief] 31a ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ENFORCE LITIGANT’S RIGHTS ENTERED MARCH 4, 2022 ....................... 37a ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED SEPTEMBER 9, 2022 .................................................. 80a TRIAL COURT’S STATEMENT OF REASONS IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ........................................... 82a Footnote 3 of the Borough’s Brief claims that the inclusion of six documents in plaintiff’s Table of Judgments suggests that he seeks appellate review of rulings other than [...]’s September 9, 2022, Order and Statement of Reasons.  The Borough misconstrues Rule 2:6-2(a)(2), which requires inclusion of not only the orders and rulings being appealed but all “Intermediate decisions. ”  Rule 2:6-2(a)(2)(C).  References are to Plaintiff’s Appendices included with its initial submissions.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[directive] 8.  it is almost certain that you will go to state prison?  1 1 1 ~11 1 01 3i ~78 ;zj-8} A]  i} g g ..Q..£. tj-A] '?attHAi, ;zj '6]-7} ¥-± oJ] 77 91 oJ] -9- 5'] ~.  Q;j ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t1M % 11 .TI '.U l-J 77}? 15"} ~ ~ ~ ~ [Yes/"11]  [No/0}i...J.ll.]  Are you presently on probation or parole?  9.  ;zj'6]-~fl~~~~-g~.:il'.U~43:.2e-~~~¾'?Jl-J* a.  Do you realize that a guilty plea may result in a violation of your probation or [Yes/"11] [No/0}i...J.ll.]  [NA/"5Jlt:J-\tl%] parole?  %~~7ag'6]-~;zj'6]-91~~~-3:.2e-~~~~~¾~~'6]-2E~4~~1~tj-2e- ¾ 77}?  }111.-]  ~ 0  [Yes/ofl]  [No/0}1-JJl.]  Are you presently serving a custodial sentence on another charge?  10.  ;zj'6]-2Efl~tj-~~-&..Q..£_i}j1·¾~~'6]-.TI'.U2E¾'?Jl-J*  [Yes/ofl]  [No/0}i...J.ll.]  [NA/"6TI'a"\tl%]  Do you understand that a guilty plea may affect your parole eligibility?
[brief] Both parties agreed to this and acted accordingly.  There was no testimony that this termination notice was motivated by the guarantors.  In fact, the termination notice was not even signed by the guarantors, other than [...] as “managing partner” for [...]. \(^4\)  The Court also infers that [...] and [...] were leaving the business and wanted to terminate their guarantees.  This assumption is also not borne out by the facts.  [...] and [...] remained as active partners in the business until November and December of 2016.  They benefited from the modification of the Lease because it helped [...], their LLC, by reducing its rent, and the modification reduced [...], [...] and [...]’s potential exposure on the guarantees.  [...] and [...] were active members of [...] when it received $3,000.00 in rental reduction in each of May, June, July, August, and September.  It was not until November and December that they left the business. \(^5\)  In sum, the Court came to a conclusion totally unsupported by the undisputed facts.
[brief] **THE DOH DOCUMENTS WERE INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY OFFERED FOR THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER ASSERTED. **  The DOH documents were hearsay.  They were used for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., defendant did not cause [...]’s death and did not violate his rights under the New Jersey Nursing Home Rights & Responsibilities Act (NHA).  Defendant repeats ad nauseum that the documents were not used to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but that is hokum.  At one point in defense counsel’s cross-examination of [...], [...] states that he is not sure what the DOH did or did not do.  In response, defense counsel stated: “Well, we do know what they did because they said what they did. ”  7T301:15-17.  “They wrote on this letter what they did. ”  7T301:25.  “Are you not willing to accept what’s written on this letter from the [...]?”  7T301:25-302:2.  The defense treated the DOH documents as gospel, chapter and verse.  If DOH says it, it must be true.  The alleged DOH investigation and findings were the centerpiece of defendant’s summation.  There is no clearer example of using hearsay for the truth of the matter asserted.  If further proof is necessary, defendant uses what was contained in the DOH documents as facts in its Statement of Facts in its appeal brief.
[brief] This is an appeal from the DOC’s November 17, 2022 final agency decision denying Appellant [...]’s property claim concerning a food item he had ordered from an outside vendor.  (Pa11; Ra3-Ra4). ²  As background, [...], while incarcerated at New Jersey State Prison, ordered refried beans, among other items, from an outside vendor through the prison’s “Incentive Food Package” program, in which incarcerated persons were able to order food items from outside vendors subject to certain restrictions.  (Ra1-Ra2).  The Inmate Handbook, which details the program, made clear that the prison “is not responsible for damaged or lost Food Packages,” and that ¹ Because the procedural and factual histories are closely related, they are presented together for the convenience of the Court.  ² “Pa” refers to Appellant’s appendix.  “Ra” refers to Respondent’s supplemental appendix.  “Pb” refers to Appellant’s brief.
[directive] 10.  CASES DETENTION Decision.  Detention  Pretrial for Needed Reports 10.1 courts and prosecutors by made be must decisions  detention pretrial that  Recognizing when a 2A:162-19(d), N.J.S.A. see acomplaint-warrant, of filing the after days within preparing or is detention, pretrial seek whether to decide to information compiling prosecutor is may prosecutor the detention, pretrial for motion a filed having after hearing detention a for to leading investigation the conducted or arrest the made that agency enforcement law a request document would that reports any of preparation expedite and to priority highest give to arrest the law the request, such receiving Upon decision.
[brief] The South Dakota case cited by Plaintiffs also is of no help.  In Morrill v. Wollman, the Court’s interpretation of a non-residency requirement was made against the backdrop of clear legislative intent that its Board of Regents’ members not reside in a county having a state educational institution.  271 N.W.2d 356, 358-59 (S.D. 1978) (noting that the legislature had repeatedly rejected bills to eliminate the non-residency requirement as it wanted to guard against Regents’ members being subjected to political pressures and becoming involved in the institutions’ daily administrative functions).  Thus, the Court concluded that it would be illogical to interpret the non-residency requirement to cease after a member is selected.  Ibid.  In contrast to the strong evidence of legislative intent in Morrill, the legislative history as outlined in Defendants’ opening brief does not support Plaintiffs’ argument that N.J.S.A. 18A:65-14 was intended to require continuous residency for the BOG member appointed from Middlesex County.
[brief] See LVNV Funding v. Colvell, 421 N.J. Super.  1, 5 (App. Div. 2011) (noting a trial court can decline oral argument if the trial court explains its reasoning in doing so); See also Raspantini v. Arocho, 364 N.J. Super. 528, 531-32 (App. Div. 2003) (also noting that a trial court may decline oral argument but should explain its basis in doing so).
[brief] (6T87-1 to 11; 6T108-8 to 10).  The next day, [...] called her FBI contact.  (6T111-3 to 12).  The agent coordinated with local police, and on May 20, 2020, Houston Police Detective [...] went to [...]’s house and participated in defendant’s arrest.  (6T113-9 to 13; 6T117-22 to 25; 6T130-20 to 131-9; 6T132-7 to 13).  [...] gave the police a recounting of what occurred the last few days and the bag with all the clothes.  (6T119-12 to 18).  Defendant was transported back to New Jersey on June 2, 2020.  (4T184-22 to 185-2).  Based on all the above facts and the expert testimony discussed below, the jury found defendant guilty of all charges.
[brief] See Da51 (emphasis added).  A week later on January 14, 2023, one business day before the hearing date, Plaintiff filed correspondence now asserting that [...] had been sick with COVID-19 from December 28, 2022 through January 12, 2023.  See Da52.  On January 17, 2023, Defendants appeared before the trial court when Plaintiff simply failed to appear.  The trial court nevertheless again sympathized with Plaintiff and rescheduled the hearing date for February 3, 2023, giving Plaintiff another opportunity to submit an opposition by January 24, 2023 (effectively giving Plaintiff two additional months to brief his opposition).
[brief] [...]’s invitation to rewrite its 2015 Settlement is an attempt to twist the [...] settlement into a perpetual license to abuse its customers, all the while enjoying immunity from state consumer protection law.  But by its own terms, that was not the purpose of the 2015 Settlement.  The *[...]* settlement resolved class claims for misconduct by [...] that occurred prior to the entry of final judgment by this Court on Feb. 20, 2015, not for misconduct occurring after that date.
[brief] Plaintiff has asserted that the subject condition was dangerous and was permitted to exist as a result of the defendants’ negligence.  Accordingly, despite plaintiff’s contentions to the contrary, plaintiff wants to use the snow removal records to show that the condition existed at the time of plaintiff’s accident.  As per plaintiff’s allegations, such a showing would be sufficient to establish negligence.  Plaintiff’s proposed interpretation of the rule would therefore render the rule meaningless.  Plaintiff’s cited cases are not to the contrary as they concern viable other purposes for the admission of remedial measures.
[brief] During the course of discovery, plaintiff issued a subpoena *duces tecum* to the [...] for production of all police/accident reports within the parking lot for the time period of January 2010 - December 2021.  Per the 500+ pages of reports received, during that 12 year period there was only one other incident involving a pedestrian being struck by a vehicle.  That incident occurred in a marked crosswalk in December 2019 immediately adjacent to the hospital entrance, not in the non-management employee designated parking area.  --- 1The [...] report was issued prior to the [...] report.  2To protect the privacy of those involved, the police reports were not submitted to the trial judge nor are they a part of our appendix here.  This is because redaction would be nothing short of a monumental undertaking impeding our ability to timely produce them with our responding papers.  As  To put this in further perspective, the police department produced a total of 578 pages of documents in response to plaintiff's subpoena.  Within those 578 pages there were only four instances of any reported physical injury aside from this case.  Of the four other reported cases in which injury occurred, one occurred in 2010, one in 2016 and two in 2019.  However, of those four instances, two of the accidents occurred on North Beers Street - the main road leading to the hospital parking lot - not in the parking lot itself.  The other was a single car accident and the final one was the pedestrian struck in a crosswalk immediately adjacent to the hospital entrance as previously noted.
[brief] ” (2T75:10-19).  In contrast, the court in *Kriso* found “that the circumstances of the mailing” were such that there was no “danger of fraud or other electoral abuse that would warrant their invalidation. ”  *Id.* at 345.  *Kriso* is therefore inapt.  Additionally, *Kriso* predated the Ballot Cure Act, *L.* 2020, c. 70, which was passed along with two other election-related laws codifying various vote-by-mail procedures to “modify and establish various voting procedures for the 2020 election and beyond.
[brief] On May 1, 2020, [...] filed his Complaint against Defendants alleging two causes of action: breach of contract and unjust enrichment.  Da99.  On June 8, 2020, Defendants filed their Answer to the Complaint.  Da118.  A bench trial was held on June 6, 7 and 15, 2023.  On August 30, 2023, the trial court entered its Final Judgment and Opinion in [...]’ favor.  Da1.  On September 5, 2023, the trial court entered an Amended Order and Final Judgment, which only amended the date by when [...] could record the Final Judgment as a statewide Judgment Lien.  Da67.  On September 20, 2023, Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s Final Judgment.  Da84.  On October 18, 2023, the trial court denied Defendants’ motion for reconsideration.  Da84.  On November 8, 2023, Defendants filed their notice of appeal.  Da210.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] [...] was the head of the Training Support Unit, and he would be called into [...]’s office for closed-door meetings to the exclusion of the Plaintiff (1T; 88:7).  During the beginning of her transfer to the Academy, Plaintiff had a year to hold on to six of her eight points which she had gained at OPS, and nothing was posted in OPS the first year she was out, and she went to zero points (1T; 88:12).  The time that she was at the Academy, she lost all of her points (1T; 88:15).
[brief] That language is not stated in the text.  It also redrafts Paragraph 24(G) to insert a limitation to the unambiguously complete preservation of rights.  This redrafting of the Settlement Agreement is improper.  It is further worth noting that Paragraph 24(F) is right on top of Paragraph 24(G).  (See Da95-96).  These are not provisions buried in separate parts of a complex document.  If the parties intended Paragraph 24(F) to restrict [...]’s rights in [...], the parties would not immediately implement a full and complete preservation of all rights to [...] in the next paragraph.  Instead, the parties included additional language affirming the full and complete scope of [...]’s preservation of rights by “acknowledg[ing] that [[...]] is not releasing her right to receive any property” from Harriet’s Estate. \(^7\) (Da96, at ¶ 24(G)).  The Probate Court’s holding is incorrect as a matter of law because it violates a preliminary canon of construction that contract terms be read in harmony.  The Probate Court created an unnecessary conflict between Paragraphs 24(F) and 24(G) when a reasonable interpretation existed that harmonizes and gives full effect to both provisions.  The Probate Court’s error is illustrated by the fact that its interpretation requires multiple modifications.  \(^7\)  [...] will likely point to an email included in his filings in which [...]’s prior attorney purportedly stated that the [...] “was specifically devised to [...]. ” (Da273, n.3).  No doubt [...] will use this email to argue that the parties never contemplated that [...] would receive the [...] under the Trust.  There were myriad problems with this email from a factual and evidentiary standpoint and the Probate Court expressly did not rely on the document.  (\(Id.\)).  Reliance on it would have been improper, in any event, as parol evidence may not be used to modify the terms of a contract.  *Conway v. 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs.*, 187 N.J. 259, 269-70 (2006) (noting that “[e]xtrinsic evidence may be used to uncover the true meaning of contractual terms,” but not “to vary the terms of the contract”); see also (Da98, at ¶ 27 (acknowledging that the parties did not rely on any statement of law or fact outside the Settlement Agreement)). of the agreement, while [...]’s interpretation does not.  Moreover, the canon of construction employed by the Probate Court was misapplied.  The Probate Court’s decision was error and this Court should reverse.
[brief] In their brief, Plaintiffs implore this Court to restrain itself from evaluating the purported evidence of Defendant’s conduct that underpinned the trial court’s ruling because “[d]oing so would disserve the trial court’s prerogative to find facts and develop conclusions based on the totality of circumstances developed over 22 days of trial” (Pb68).  The trial court’s “prerogative” was to find facts and make conclusions of law based on credible evidence in the record -- not to hold Defendant liable for acts she did not commit because “she was legally part of it in this Court’s mind,” which is not a recognized legal standard (36T50-18 to -25).  As such, the trial court’s Judgment must be reversed against Defendant as to Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims.
[brief] *Pacelli v. Pacelli*, 319 N.J. Super. 185, 188 (App. Div. 1999).  Fair disclosure means that the agreement can be made “only after full disclosure of relevant information regarding the parties’ assets. ”  Id.  Furthermore, while *Pacelli* does not state that both parties “must” be represented by counsel, it did state that they “should be represented by counsel. ”  Id. (emphasis added).  Here neither party was represented by counsel.
[brief] We begin with the fundamental proposition that “‘[r]eliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony .’”  State v. Madison, 109 N.J. 223, 232 (1988) (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253, 53 L. Ed.2d 140, 154 (1977)).  When deciding whether to permit an in-court identification following a suggestive out-of-court identification, the court must evaluate, among other things, the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.  [Biggers, supra, 409 U.S. at 199–200, 93 S.Ct. at 382, 34 L. Ed.2d at 411.]  See also Manson, supra, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. at 2253, 53 L. Ed.2d at 154; Madison, supra, 109 N.J. at 239–40.9
[brief] Page No.  TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................  i-iii  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED .................  i  TABLE OF APPENDIX ........................................  ii  SUMMARY  JUDGMENT LISTING FOR R. 2:6-1(A) ...................... iii  TABLE OF CITATIONS ...................................... iii  TABLE OF STATUTES ....................................... iii  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .....................................
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[directive] Questions regarding this COVID-19 sentencing guidance  Callaghan Criminal at be directed as follows: to Assistant Director for Practice [...] or [...] by telephone at [...]; Assistant Director for at at or Family Practice [...]  [...] by telephone (609) 815- at 2900 ext. 55350; Assistant Director for Municipal Court Services [...] at or [...] by telephone [...].  Attachments Justice Chief cc: [...] Chief [...], Chief Chiefof Staff [...], [...], [...], AOC Directors and Assistant Directors
[brief] Rowe, 209 N.J. at 44.  As stated above, it is an affirmative duty to protect invitees on the premises by discovering and eliminating any hazardous conditions on the property and rendering the property reasonably safe for the purposes for which the invitee entered.  Brown v. Racquet Club of Bricktown, 95 N.J. 280, 290 (1984); see also; Gill v. Krassner, 11 N.J. Super. 10, 14-15 (App. Div. 1950).  Therefore, the owner/operator of a commercial establishment still owes its business invitee a duty to render the premises safe even if the dangerous condition may be found to be open and obvious or the invitee saw the condition.