ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Considerations.  Policy General 12.1 plea, guilty negotiated a of result the are State this in convictions of majority vast The Bail the under that intended and expected is it Section 1.3, in noted As trial. than a rather bail monetary post to unable been have would previously defendants who many Law, Reform on released will be issued, acomplaint-warrant is if or acomplaint-summons, on released be will their delay to hoping defendants, These conditions. non-monetary on or recognizance plead and responsibility accept to incentive reduced a have may conviction, upon incarceration It justice. swift of goal on the impact significant a have will This fashion. timely a in guilty those encourage to practices and policies prosecution adapt and develop necessary to is therefore Page 73 of expenditure the before opportunity, earliest the at so do to guilty plead who defendants resources. judicial and prosecution significant current under that reveals Defender Public of the Office the by conducted study A that offer plea eleventh-hour an tender often prosecutors approaches, for trial date the as practice, offer. apreviously-tendered by contemplated one the than sentence lenient more a contemplates tactical a perceive attorneys defense offer practice, plea de-escalating common this of result As a the in offer plea prosecutor's a accepting off hold to clients their advising in advantage forthcoming. will be offer generous more a expectation that under cases non-detention and detention both in delays minimize least at or prevent To Division the and Office Prosecutor's County every for necessary be will it Law, Reform Bail the key the of One policy. plea escalating an enforce strictly and implement Justice to Criminal of of timing for the account must offers all plea that is system plea graduated such any of features after guilty pleads defendant if the sentence longer for a provide generally and plea, the the and case the prosecute to resources of investment additional the for account to indictment fashion. timely a in responsibility accept to defendant of the unwillingness rule general exception, the an warranting circumstances in change material Barring a plea graduated such Any lenient. more not time, over tougher grow offers plea that must be before guilty plead to defendants guilty for incentives practical provides only system not motion post-indictment presentations, jury grand in expended is effort and time significant provide and cooperate defendants to encourages also but preparation, trial and practices, offenders. other prosecuting investigating and in assistance substantial is time, over tougher become offers plea where system, escalating plea an of concept The already Offices Prosecutors' County some and Justice Criminal of Division The new. hardly cases trafficking drug in Furthermore, cases. of types certain in least at practice, a such employ all 2C:35-12, N.J.S.A. to pursuant only waiveable imprisonment of term mandatory involving a Attorney in the established system plea escalating the implement to required are prosecutors against assault sexual aggravated involving cases in Similarly, Guidelines.
[directive] Attachments:  (1)  Criteria for Ordering Home Detention and/or Electronic Monitoring a as of Condition  Pretrial Release (CN 12972)  (2)  Home Detention Screening form (CN 12973)  (3)  Electronic Monitoring Screening form (CN 12220) of ( 4)  Notification Expectations for Defendant Ordered to Strict Home Detention (CN 12872) of (5)  Notification Expectations for Defendant Ordered to Home Detention with Limited Exceptions (CN 12873)  (6)  Request for Leave from Home Detention form (CN 12740).  of Page 11  12  Chief Justice [...] cc: Criminal Presiding Judges  Criminal Division Judges Municipal Court Presiding Judges  Municipal Court Judges of [...], Chief Staff  AOC Directors and Assistant Directors of Clerks Court Special Assistants to the Administrative Director  Criminal Division Managers  Municipal Division Managers  [...], Chief, Pretrial Services Program  [...], Chief, Criminal Practice  [...], Assistant Chief, Pretrial Services Program Assistant Criminal Division Managers Assistant Municipal Division Managers of Page 12 12  Atachment 1  Criteria for Ordering Home DetenƟon and/or Electronic Monitoring as a CondiƟon of Pretrial Release (CN 12972)  New Jersey Judiciary Criteria for Ordering Home Detention (HD) and Electronic Monitoring (EM) as a Condition of Pretrial Release
[directive] These Guidelines apply to the offenses, listed below.  Accordingly, references, within these Guidelines, to a DWI offense, or a DWI refusal offense shall include all of the offenses referenced below:  N.J.S.A. 39:4-50: DWI.  Operating or allowing another person to operate a ! vehicle while intoxicated or with a blood alcohol concentration at, or 2  All Attorney General Directives and Guidelines related to DWI enforcement are available on the Division of Criminal Justice internet web site at www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj or www.njdcj.org under the headings “AG Directives,” “AG Guidelines,” or “DWI Enforcement.
[brief] After the crash, the tailing vehicle turned left from Myrtle Street onto Laurel Street and traveled southbound at a high rate of speed.  (4T95-15 to 100-2).  The video depicted [...] emerging from the driver side window of the van and walking away from the crash scene.  (4T100-3 to 102-4).  On August 30, 2015, a fisherman found a .40 caliber Glock semiautomatic handgun on the beach in Seabreeze along the Delaware Bay and turned it over to police.
[brief] Counsel has a duty “to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, and a failure to do so will render the lawyer’s performance deficient.  State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 217 (2004).  When a defendant claims that his attorney failed to adequately investigate the case, “he must assert the facts that an investigation would have revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant or the person making the certification.
[brief] [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................  1 LEGAL ARGUMENT ........................................................................  2  POINT I GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT.........................................................  2  A.  Lack of Any Meaningful Opportunity for Discovery .......................  2  B.  The Trial Court Erred in Relying Solely on Allegations Contained in [...]’s Verified Complaint as its Basis for Summary Judgment...........................................................................  4  C.  [...] Was Never Found to Have Been “Negligent” ..........................  7 POINT II [...] WAS NEITHER CONFLICTED NOR PROHIBITED FROM CHALLENGING THE CLAIMS BROUGHT BY AURORA AGAINST [...] .................................................................  10 POINT III  AURORA IS NOT ENTILED TO RECOVER THE PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT AGAINST [...] ATTRIBUTABLE TO TREBLE DAMAGES UNDER THE MCS-90 ENDORSEMENT ......  11 POINT IV  IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO APPLY THE MCS-90 ENDORSEMENT WITHOUT FIRST ADJUDICATING COVERAGE.............................................................................  13 POINT V AURORA DID NOT ASSERT ANY CLAIM AGAINST [...]........  13 POINT VI  THE TRIAL COURT NEVER CERTIFIED ANY JUDGMENT AS “FINAL” ..................................................................................................................  14  CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................
[brief] Plaintiff, [...], filed suit against [...] and co-Defendants, [...] and [...] (collectively referred to as “[...]”), for personal injuries she sustained in a three-vehicle accident that occurred on December 29, 2019.  The jury concluded that [...] was 40% at fault for the accident and that Plaintiff was 0% at fault even though both [...] and Plaintiff entered the same intersection with the same yellow light and had the same right of way.  The jury concluded that [...] was 60% at fault and awarded Plaintiff $3.5 million in damages.  The jury’s allocation of fault is against the weight of the evidence and illogical.  [...] was traveling north on Route 54 at the intersection of Jackson Road in Buena Vista, New Jersey at the time of the accident.  Plaintiff was traveling south on Route 54.  Both Plaintiff and [...] testified that the traffic signal controlling traffic on Route 54 changed from green to yellow as they approached the intersection.  Both testified that they believed they were too close to the intersection when the light changed to yellow to allow them to stop safely and intended to proceed through the intersection with the yellow light.  [...] was traveling west on Jackson Road.  He claimed that he was stopped at the red light and entered the intersection when the light turned green.  This testimony was inconsistent with the other evidence presented at trial and clearly rejected by the jury.  The investigating police officer testified that while the light controlling traffic on Route 54 is yellow, the signal controlling traffic on Jackson Road is red.  Moreover, the impact between the [...] vehicle and Plaintiff’s vehicle occurred north of the intersection (i.e., before Plaintiff even entered the intersection) and both Plaintiff and [...] testified that they were traveling similar speeds, between 55 and 60 miles per hour.  The jury’s allocation of fault is irreconcilable and illogical.
[directive] 3.6  Coordination Charging Decisions When Offenses Are Committed in Multiple Counties.  There may be cases where a defendant is arrested and may be charged with two or more in of offenses committed multiple counties (e.g., a in series burglaries committed different jurisdictions, eluding that crosses a county border, drug distribution occurring in multiple activities  In those charging/pretrial counties, etc.).  instances, it is important to coordinate the release decision so that one prosecutor's office assumes primary responsibility for determining whether apply for to request special release or seek pretrial or a complaint-warrant, to conditions, to detention revocation of release.  Accordingly, notwithstanding Section 3.3 or any other provision of this Directive, if a law enforcement officer or agency making an reason arrest has to believe that the defendant may be charged with offenses committed in more than one county, the officer or agency shall immediately on-call prosecutor, shall contact the duty assistant who contact the in other prosecutor's offices) the county(ies) where offenses were committed to coordinate the charging/pretrial release decision.
[brief] On November 16, 2007, the court granted a motion by [...] to file a third-party complaint against [...], [...]'s girlfriend, alleging that she may have been responsible for releasing the dogs in [...]'s vicinity.  The same day, the court granted plaintiffs' motion to consolidate this matter with a declaratory judgment action filed by [...], the insurer of [...] and [...].  Following completion of discovery, [...] and [...] filed separate motions for summary judgment.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RECONSIDERATION AS THE POLICY WAS NOT EFFECTIVE IN STOPPING THE DISCRIMINATION, NOR WAS IT ENFORCED PROMPTLY AS DEFENDANT [...] WAS NEVER ADMONISHED OR REPRIMANDED FOR HIS RACIALLY MOTIVATED CONDUCT.  (Pa280-282)  Defendants’ sole basis for deeming that they were not liable for the conduct that Defendant [...] engaged in comes under a belief that they have an affirmative defense as they allege the city had a well-established anti-discrimination and harassment policies.  Yet, this belief runs counter to the actions of Defendant.  In *Dunkley*, *supra*, the five elements used to determine if an employer has a proper anti-discrimination and/or anti-harassment policy considers: (1) it maintained a policy of anti-harassment and anti-discrimination in writing; (2) it set forth both formal and informal complaint procedures; (3) mandatory training for supervisors and training for all employees; (4) sensing or monitoring mechanisms; and (5) an unequivocal commitment from the top that is not just in words but backed up by consistent practice.
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................................................. - 1 - STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................. - 2 - LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................... - 6 -  I.  [...]’S “FREE RENT” CHARGE-BACK PROVISION IS A POORLY DISGUISED, UNLAWFUL PENALTY CLAUSE, AND THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING TO THE CONTRARY IS AGAINST THE GREAT WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY (Decided Below at 2T20-8 – 2T22-7)  ........................................ - 6 - A.  The Trial Court Erred in Ruling that the Rent Concession Charge-back Clause was not a Stipulated Damages Clause (Decided below at 2T20-8 – 2T20-9).  - 9 - B.  The Trial Court Erred in Ruling that the Rent Concession Chargeback Clause was Reasonable (Decided Below at 2T20-8 – 2T22-7).  ................................... - 11 - II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CONSUMER FRAUD ACT COUNTERCLAIMS ARISING FROM [...]’S USE AND ENFORCEMENT OF DISGUISED PENALTY CLAUSES IN RESIDENTIAL LEASES (Decided below at 2T24-21 – 2T31-6)  .............................................. - 17 -  A.  The trial court erred in ruling, at the pleading stage, that VL North’s practices did not constitute abusive, unconscionable, and/or deceptive commercial conduct (Decided below at 2T24-21 – 2T27-18)  ............................................................ - 17 - B.  [...] have Established Ascertainable Loss Under the CFA (Declined to reach below, 2T31-2 – 2T31-6).  ....................................................................... - 24 - III.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DEFENDANTS’ CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY “RATIFICATION”  OF THE LEASE (Decided below at 2T27- 19 – 2T28-12)  ................................................................................................ - 28 - IV.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING THE DEFENDANTS’ CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS WITHOUT OPPORTUNITY FOR CLASS DISCOVERY  (Decided below at 2T14-8 – 2T17-2)  ........................................... - 29 - CONCLUSION
[brief] CONSTANT SPEAKING OBJECTIONS, SIDEBARS, LIMITING OF PLAINTIFF’S EXPERTS’ TESTIMONY AND THE OVERALL CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL DEPRIVED PLAINTIFF OF A FAIR TRIAL.  (PA1-2)  Taking the testimony of [...], plaintiff’s expert on Nursing Home Administration, as an example of what transpired at this trial, his direct testimony encompasses 129 pages; of those pages, 68 pages, over half of his direct testimony, was spent on sidebars.  What happened with [...] is indicative of the way in which plaintiff’s witnesses were treated by the court.
[brief] THE BOARD ERRED IN DENYING THE TRANSFER OF THIS MATTER TO THE OAL TO HOLD AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO RESOLVE A MATERIAL DISPUTED FACT. **  Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Commissioner has the right to make the discretionary decision whether there are contested material issues of fact requiring an evidentiary hearing.  See *In re Farmer's Mut. Fire Assurance Ass'n of N.J.*, 256 N.J. Super. 607, 618 (App. Div. 1992).  A hearing is "mandated only when the proposed administrative action is based on disputed adjudicatory facts."  Id.; see also *N.J.A.C. 17:4-1.7(e)* (permitting the Board to retain the matter and issue an administrative determination where an appeal "involves solely a question of law.").  Here, it remains true that [...] voluntarily retired but not as avoidance as to disciplinary charges.  [...] retired as a result of his PTSD disability.  As explained in Point I, supra, if this Court finds that the administrative charges relate to the disability because both arise from the same shooting incident, then the separation of service rule barring the processing of [...]'s disability application simply does not apply as a matter of law, and the application must be considered on its merits by the pension board.  See In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, 454 N.J.Super. 386, 397-398 (App. Div. 2018).  However, in the event this Court somehow finds that the underlying charges do not relate to the claimed disability, then [...] respectfully requests a hearing to further develop the record with respect to the circumstances of his signing the settlement agreement to determine whether and to what extent the agreement is binding and/or to what extent the Board is estopped from relying upon said agreement.  As set forth in Point II, supra, language used in the settlement agreement strongly suggests that [...] retired because of his PTSD disability, yet the Board persists in its contention that [...] retired to avoid disciplinary charges.  To the extent this is a genuinely disputed issue of fact, a hearing may be necessary to resolve the matter, or this Court can take jurisdiction and decide certain undisputed facts.  Also, the Board’s concern that plaintiff could never return to the [...] was a moot point since it had been five years since the PTSD disability was determined at the time the Board refused to accept the disability application from [...] after the ALJ rules, and at no time did the Board order a fitness evaluation to determine if [...]’s PTSD had dissipated; which it did not according to the exhibits and submissions in the lower forum.
[brief] Although his cross-examination would likely “be more difficult,” without it, this does not mean the evidence was exculpatory.  Ultimately, all defendant could offer was speculation and possibilities as to what he may have been able to use the profile to prove.  Consequently, although [...] should have ended his analysis once he recognized the evidence may have actually inculpated defendant, he erred even further in failing to outline any legal basis for his opinion that the evidence was exculpatory.  This Court should reverse.  C.
[brief] ]  Then the prosecutor personally vouched for the competence of the DNA analyst:  You heard from [...], all the accreditations from New Jersey State Police Lab.  This isn’t some back woods place run out of a basement.  This is nationally accredited institution by the New Jersey State Police Office of Forensic Scientists.  Judge the credibility.  She knows what she’s talking about?  She knows a heck of a lot more about DNA than I do.  I think she does and she’s an expert in the field.  [5T 106-12 to 20 (emphasis added). ]  Those personal assurances by the prosecutor were not based on the evidence and in fact directly contradicted much of the evidence.  The prosecutor did not ask any of the police witnesses during trial whether they held preconceived notions about the investigation, but without any factual basis, the prosecutor repeatedly asserted that none of them did.  And the prosecutor’s assertions that the police followed “every lead” was not true.  See Garcia, 245 N.J. at 435 (prohibiting “making inaccurate factual assertions to the jury”).  The evidence showed that the police in fact failed to pursue critical leads, including the gray-clothed man from the bar whose clothes looked like the shooter’s and the residents of [...], near where the fleeing suspect disappeared.
[brief] On January 7, 2022, codefendant [...] pled guilty to count four, robbery as amended to a second-degree offense, and testified at trial against [...].  (4T 12-16 to 12-21; 10T, 11T, 12T 5-3 to 57-9) filed an interlocutory appeal (6T 4-4 to 12-11); this Court granted the State’s appeal and reversed the trial court’s ruling on February 2, 2022.  (8T 6-9 to 6-19)  On February 15, 2022, the jury found [...] guilty as charged.  (Da 4-6; 17T 18-11 to 21-1)  On May 10, 2022, [...] appeared before [...] for a hearing on his motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict/new trial.  [...] denied the motion (18T 5-5 to 6-16), and proceeded to sentence [...] as follows.  After merging felony murder with knowing or purposeful murder, and conspiracy to commit robbery and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose with robbery, [...] sentenced [...] to three concurrent prison terms: 35 years for murder, with a 30-year period of parole ineligibility, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(1); 15 years for robbery, 85% to be served without parole, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2; and seven years for the firearms offense, with a 42-month period of parole ineligibility, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c.  The requisite fines and monetary penalties were also imposed.  (Da 7-10; 18T 17-6 to 19-12)  [...] filed a Notice of Appeal on June 21, 2022.  (Da 11-15)
[brief] [Pa329, 331, 333, 339, 341, 343, 345, 347].  Additionally, the Board’s Planner noted that there were other three story residential buildings on [...].  [2T 39-12 to 40-4].  According to [...]’s architect, it was possible to reduce the building to two stories but doing so would make the project non-viable.  [2T 62-24 to 63-6].  This is because, as [...]’s planner, [...], P.P., later noted, multi-level senior housing communities need to have a smaller footprint so that the frail, elderly residents who inhabit them do not have to walk significant distances to dining, communal facilities, and other services; a building with fewer floors would need to make up the lost units from the third floor to keep it financially viable, which meant a bigger linear footprint.
[brief] 33  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  CASES  Baghdikian vs. Board of Adjustment  247 N.J. Super 45 (App. Div. 1991)  25 Bressman vs. Gash 131 N.J. 517, 529 (1993)  20,23 Burbridge vs. Mine Hill Township 117 N.J. 376, 385 (1990)  22  Charlie Brown vs. Board of Adjustment  202 N.J. Super 312, 321(App. Div. 1985)  23  Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Board 233 N.J. 546, 558 (2018)  6  El Shaer vs. Planning Board 249 N.J. Super 323, 330 (App. Div. 1991)  Cert. denied 127 N.J. 546 (1992)  25 Fallone Prop. V. Bethlehem Plan Bd., 369, N.J. Super. 552, 561 (App. Div. 2004)  32  Farrell vs. Estell Manor Zoning Board of Adjustment 193 N.J. Super 554, 556 (Law Div. 1984)  23 Hughes v. Monmouth University, 394 N.J. Super. 207, 232 (Law Div.2006), aff’d 394 N.J. Super. 193 (App. Div.), certif.. den. 192 N.J. 599 (2007)  22  Kramer vs. Bd. of Adj. of Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965)  22,25 Medici vs. BPR Company, 107 N.J. 1, 23 (1987)  22,25 O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169,184 (1983)  32 Sexton v. Bates, 17 N.J.Super,246,253 (Law Div. 1951)  20 Shell Oil vs. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Shrewsbury, 127 N.J. Super 60, 63 (1974)  24 Ward vs. Scott 16  N.J. 16, 23 (1954)  25
[brief] [...] also argued that the fair value of his interests should not be discounted where Plaintiffs had already been awarded damages for any and all claims of “oppression” or wrongful conduct before the Arbitrator directed the Court should decide valuation according to N.J.S.A. 42:2C-47c.  (11T9:2-11:5)  [...] requested that the Court use net asset value as the method of valuation, not book value.  He requested that the Court use [...]’s “net asset value” opinion, but as increased upon legal rejection of the $2.8 million imposed company “liability” to $9,061.545.  \(^2\)  One of the issues in dispute for the valuation hearing was whether [...]’s interest was 29.5% or 33% but the Court determined it to be the former.  (Pa3185)  On November 18, 2022, the Court issued a written decision.
[brief] #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | i | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | COUNTERSTATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 4 | | A. The Commencement Of The Prior Action In 2019 | 4 | | B. [...] Are Granted Summary Judgment In The Prior Action | 6 | | C. Leave To File A Second Amended Complaint Is Denied | 9 | | D. The Appellants’ Second Action Against [...] And The Dismissal | 12 | | E. Appellants’ Appeals In This Action And The Prior Action | 13 | | COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS | 14 | | A. The Property, The Lease And The Solar Rights | 14 | | B.