ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Even if [...] could establish a *prima facie* case of CEPA retaliation—she cannot—[...] cannot, and does not, reasonably dispute that her unauthorized receipt and entry of charge pay constitutes a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for her termination.  See N.J. ex rel. Santiago v. Haig's Serv. Corp., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113188, at *33 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2016) (noting theft from client was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination); see also Parikh v. UPS, 491 F. App’x 303, 307 (3d Cir. 2012) (affirming District Court’s finding that defendants met their burden of identifying a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff, i.e., falsifying timecards.); Rich v. Verizon N.J. Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203131, at *65 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2017) (defendant’s proffered reason for terminating plaintiff, that he falsified answers on a required report, was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his termination).  When asked at her deposition, [...] confirmed that an employee’s falsifying time records or adding additional time or compensation to their paycheck was sufficient grounds for termination.  (Pa298 at 81:21-82:10).  It cannot be disputed that [...] discovered [...]’s receipt of charge pay, that she reported it to [...], who raised it to [...], and that [...] launched an investigation.  Neither [...], nor [...], nor [...] dispute the accuracy of [...]’s notes, which reflect that charge pay was taken without express approval.  (Pa535-41; see also Pa297 at 80:10-14 ([...] admitting at her deposition that she had no firsthand knowledge of [...] ever approving charge pay for any staffing coordinator); Pa547-48 ([...] never received confirmation from [...] as to charge pay); Pa477 ([...] stated he never received approval from [...] to enter the charge pay)).  Based upon the undisputed findings of the investigation reflected in those notes, and the undisputed Kronos Time Card Audit Trial showing the payments, the “term panel” indisputably ended the employment of all three Plaintiffs.
[brief] In 2019, [...], a successful securities broker, put together a pooled investment fund.  Aa371-72.¹ [...], [...], and [...] acted as managers --- ¹ “Aa” and “Ab” refer, respectively, to Amaniera’s Appendix and Brief on this appeal.  “Pa” refers to the [...]’ Appendix on this appeal.  and each held an equal interest as members of 33.33% in this investment fund.  [...], who is a licensed attorney, took charge of designing the legal structure of the proposed investment fund.  Specifically, he suggested creating an income fund (the “[...]”) to act as a vehicle for raising capital from individual investors, which capital would in turn be loaned to a series of companies—the [...]—which, in turn, would invest in specific industries.  Id.  [...] and [...] were not managers or members of the [...].  To effectuate this structure, [...] raised the funds from individual investors, while [...] and [...] identified investment opportunities and managed those opportunities.  [...] and [...] also co-managed the [...], and were responsible for, among other things, keeping and maintaining the books and records relating to investments, preparing quarterly reports for investors, and managing the day-to-day operational activities.  The [...], formed in August 2019, raised more than $81 million from individual investors, which monies were loaned directly to the six, separate [...].  The [...] then used the loan proceeds to invest in companies and opportunities in the debt settlement, merchant cash advance, and real estate industries (the “Investment Companies”).  Beginning in the fourth quarter of 2021, the relationship between [...], [...], and [...] deteriorated.
[brief] The Appellate Division is required to apply an abuse of discretion standard of review when assessing the reasonableness of sanctions awarded, and there is no abuse of discretion.  Appellant argues that the attorney’s fees and costs imposed are unreasonable and the trial court erred in calculating them.  The trial court has expressly asserted that the initial attorney’s fees charged are actually low.  This determination does not come out of thin air and frankly, Appellant’s claim as such is disrespectful.  Prior to becoming a judge, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. was a practicing attorney for decades.  Additionally, as a judge, he meets attorneys every single day.  It is unreasonable and rude to assume that he doesn’t keep up with the value and standards of his chosen profession.  He would certainly have a better understanding of what attorneys at different skills levels charge than Appellant does.  An award for attorney's fees and costs is at the court's discretion.  Zyck v. Hartford Ins. Group, 150 N.J. Super. 431, 435, 375 A.2d 1232 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 521, 384 A.2d 501 (1977).  Except in extraordinary circumstances, an award of attorney's fees will not be disturbed on appeal.  Hermann v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co., 221 N.J. Super. 162, 168-69, 534 A.2d 51 (App.Div.1987).  There are no extraordinary circumstances in this case, nor is there evidence of an abuse of discretion.
[directive] is  These requirements are also included the Attorney General's Directive the Graves on in Act, addressed to prosecutors, issued by then Attorney General [...] November on 2008.  25,  As set forth the 1981 directive, the guidelines must also be observed dismissing or in in downgrading an indictment or counts thereof after indictment.  Additionally, a judge may deviate from the mandate of this directive, subject to requirements of law, only a result of as if, circumstances clearly not foreseen by the directive, or she finds compelling reasons to do he so states them the record.
[brief] (Pa32 to 91).  By virtue of his ownership of the Property, Defendant is a member of the Plaintiff’s association.  (Pa82 to 132).  By virtue of being a member of the Association, Defendant must pay corresponding fees as required by the Association Master Deed and By-laws.  (See ibid.)  On or about February 28, 2017, Plaintiff filed liens against Unit 1 and Unit 4 for amounts still unpaid by Defendant.  (Da33 to 35).  As a result of the liens, Defendant has been on notice of his debt for over three (3) years.  (Pa28).  As of December 1, 2020, Defendant had not paid common expenses pursuant to the terms of the Master Deed and Bylaws of the Association and owes the Association a sum of $92,435.80 for Unit 1, which continues to accrue.  (Pa28 to 29).  As of November 1, 2020, Defendant had not paid common expenses pursuant to the terms of the Master Deed and Bylaws of the Association and owes the Association a sum of $109,401.63 for Unit 4, which continues to accrue.  (Pa29 to 30).  As of December 1, 2020 and without limitation, Defendant owes Plaintiff a total of at least $201,837.63 for the Property, which continues to accrue.  Defendant does not dispute that he owes an extraordinary sum of unpaid association dues to Plaintiff; instead, he asserts that there should be a set-off for an expenditure he alleges he incurred to repair a main sewer connection to one of the condominium units.
[directive] Shooting from a moving vehicle.  Strict additional requirements must be met before an officer may shoot from a moving vehicle.  Every discharge of a firearm by an officer creates risk to the public and to other responding officers.  Firearms discharges from moving vehicles by law enforcement officers have proven to be inaccurate and ineffective, generally creating unacceptable levels of risk.  Due to these risks, law enforcement officers shall not discharge a firearm from a moving vehicle except in the following extraordinarily rare circumstance: (a) when the suspect is driving a vehicle toward persons other than the officer in a manner creating an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, such as in a terrorist attack; and (b) no other means are available at that time to avert or eliminate the danger.  4.8
[brief] As will be seen in the legal argument, numerous legal errors tainted the eventual guilty verdicts for all three of those offenses.  The State presented the following evidence at trial with regard to the wallet-ID offenses.  [...], an NJSP forensic photographer, testified that there are two principal kinds of NJSP official ID: a larger “leather billfold” that contains two separate identification cards -- one on each of the two panels of the billfold -- and the wallet ID, which is more the size of a credit card.  (11T 89-1 to 14; 11T 92-1 to 6; 11T 96-21 to 97-16)  Both types of IDs say, “Property of New Jersey State Police” on them.  (11T 93-7 to 17; 11T 95-3 to 7; 11T 97-11 to 100-25)  The wallet ID states the date on which the holder was most recently promoted, not when the card was issued; thus, even a replaced card would have the same date on it as the most recent original, according to Scozzafava.  (11T 99-7 to 22)  Scozzafava testified that defendant was issued his billfold and wallet IDs in 2014, but that he filed a form in which he claimed he lost his personal wallet on January 4, 2016 -- including his wallet ID -- and he was issued a new wallet ID card that Scozzafava printed on January 15, 2016.  (11T 104-7 to 107-25)  Scozzafava admitted that there is no restriction on a member’s possession of privately-printed NJSP business cards, and that those cards are not NJSP property.  (11T 109-5 to 21)  [...] was the first of many State witnesses to read\(^3\) from the NJSP rules and regulations regarding the legal obligations of a trooper to surrender NJSP equipment when suspended.
[brief] 34  #  TABLE OF CITATIONS | Case Name | Citation | Page(s) | |------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **State Cases** | | | | Bressman v. Gash, | 131 N.J. 517 (1993) | 12 | | Burbridge v. Governing Body of Mine Hill, | 117 N.J. 376 (1990) | 17 | | CBS Outdoor v. Lebanon Planning Board, | 414 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 2010) | 13 | | Fine v. Galloway Tp. Committee, | 190 N.J. Super. 432 (Law Div. 1983) | 14, 16 | | Hawrylo v. Board of Adjustment, | 249 N.J. Super. 568 (App. Div. 1991) | 20 | | Lang v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, | 160 N.J. 41 (1999) | 5 | | Mazza v. Board of Adjustment of Linden, | 83 N.J. Super. 494 (App. Div. 1964).
[brief] No such allegation is present here.  Finally, false light claims based on stealing someone’s name or likeness are subject to a six-year statute of limitations.  Smith, 451 N.J. Super. at 94.  Claims of this sort are grounded on the use of one’s name “without his consent, either to advertise the defendant's product or to enhance the sale of an article. ”  Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 77 (Ch. Div. 1967) (lawsuit brought by famous golfers, including [...], against game maker who used golfers’ names without consent).
[brief] For all these reasons, the Court should reverse [...]’s July 22 and September 8  Orders denying Rule 4:50 relief to [...], vacate the equitable distribution and alimony provisions contained in the Final Judgment of Divorce previously entered in this case, and remand for a fresh determination of those issues with all of the financial disclosures, discovery rights, and judicial findings of fact and law that New Jersey law requires.  Respectfully submitted, /s/ [...]  [...]  Counsel for Appellant, [...]
[brief] (3T 106-17 to 107-15)  [...] also had a coronary-artery bypass surgery in 1993 and an abdominal aortic aneurysm at some other unspecified time.  (3T 108-6 to 9)  [...] had no neurological issues but did have restriction in rotating his neck because of injury to his cervical spine.  (3T 110-6 to 20)  He was right-handed but had some impingement in his left shoulder as well.  (3T 109-17 to 19; 3T 110-21 to 111-21)  However, [...] admitted that [...] could ride a bicycle, and would have been able to reach and grab a weapon with his right hand.  (3T 117-19 to 118-15)  He could also grab something with his left hand and hold onto it, according to [...].  (3T 118-18 to 23)  The defense called a few witnesses, as follows.
[brief] Carty concerned a specific problem that repeatedly affected a large segment of the population, detained motorists asked to consent, because eighty percent of those persons who gave consent were “not charged with any violation” of law.  Id. at 645.  [...] was not subjected to “official intimidation or harassment” as those motorists were, ibid., because the police had video proof of her possession of defendant’s gun when they sought her consent.  Defendant’s reliance on *State v. Miller*, 342 N.J. Super. 474 (App. Div. 2001), is similarly misplaced.  In *Miller*, the third-party consent was found to be involuntary because the officers communicated through their words and actions that “it didn’t matter what” the third party said, the officers were committed to entering her home, which position one of the officers expressly conceded in answering a question from the trial judge during the suppression hearing.  *Id.* at 483.  Here, the officers’ words and actions consistently conveyed that they would respect the decision made by the [...].  Finally, defendant’s contention the trial judge erred “by not analyzing the mandatory *King* factors” (Db19) tries to create an obligation rejected by *King*, which rejection was reinforced by *Hagans*.  See *King*, 44 N.J. at 353 (“Since the factors mentioned above are only guideposts to aid a trial judge in arriving at his conclusion, they cannot purport to lay down rules of law which preclude him from determining the issue of voluntariness of consent by his consideration of the totality of the particular circumstances of the case before him. ”); *Hagans*, 233 N.J. at 42-43 (noting that “technological advancements” enhancing the ability of the trial judge to “better evaluate the manner in which” police obtain consent “are precisely why the *King* Court factors are guideposts rather than rigid absolute authority”); see also *State v. Williams*, 461 N.J. Super. 80, 104 (App. Div. 2019) (noting, but not criticizing, fact that trial judge did not “expressly articulate[” an analysis of King factors), certif. denied, 241 N.J. 92 (2020).  In sum, under the totality of circumstances, [...] Gross gave voluntary consent to the police to search the bedroom in which defendant’s gun was found.  Sufficient credible evidence supports the trial judge’s decision that she did.  CONCLUSION
[brief] See Inganamort, supra, 62 N.J. at 538 (Police powers of a municipality may exist under enabling statute in the absence of a statutory restraint).  Additionally, N.J.S.A. 40:48-2 provides further authority for an enactment of a municipal governing body to regulate noises.  That provision states:  Any municipality may make, amend, repeal and enforce such other Ordinances, regulations, rules, and by-laws not contrary to the laws of this state or of the United States, as it may deem proper and necessary for the good government, order and protection of persons and property, and for the preservation of the public health, safety and welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, and as may be necessary to carry into effect the powers and duties conferred and imposed by this subtitle, or by any law.
[brief] Id. at *8-9.  Assuming Plaintiffs’ claim was even cognizable under one of these three (3) limited circumstances, “a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing requires a showing of ‘bad motive or intention. ’”  Id. at *9, Wilson, supra, 168 N.J. at 246.  Based on this principle, nonparties to contracts cannot be held responsible for a breach.  FDIC Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 876 (3d Cir. 1994).  The only contract that Defendant was individually a party to was the 2017 [...], which the trial court did not find she breached.  36T50-1 to 51- 21.  The evidential record did not support a finding that Defendant did something that adversely affected the Plaintiffs’ rights under any of the contracts at issue in this case.
[brief] A.  The Highlands Act and Exemption #11.  In 2004, the Legislature enacted the Highlands Water Protection and Planning Act (“Highlands Act” or “Act”), N.J.S.A. 13:20-1 to -35, recognizing that the Highlands Region is an “essential source of drinking water, providing clean and plentiful drinking water for one-half of the State’s population” and providing a “vital link to the future of the State’s drinking water supplies. ”  N.J.S.A. 13:20-2.  The Legislature also recognized that the Region “contains other exceptional natural resources such as clean air, contiguous forest lands, wetlands, pristine watersheds, and habitat for fauna and flora, includes many sites of historic significance, and provides abundant recreational opportunities. ”  N.J.S.A. 13:20-2.  The Act establishes a “preservation area” within the Highlands Region, which has “exceptional natural resource value” subject to stringent water and natural resource protection standards, policies, planning, and regulation.  Ibid.  Proposed development in the preservation area must adhere to a regional master plan (RMP) created by the [...] ([...]) that embodies the Highlands Act’s ---  1  Because they are closely related, the procedural history and statement of facts are combined for efficiency and the court’s convenience.
[brief] This case involves a nearly twenty-year relationship between Plaintiff [...], an optician, and Defendant [...], (“[...]”), an ophthalmologist, during which Greenberg operated an optical shop next to, and as part of, [...]’ practice.  That relationship came to a crashing end after Defendant [...], d/b/a [...] (“[...]”), proposed to purchase [...]’ business, thereby inducing [...] to demand that Plaintiffs vacate the premises (on two months’ notice).  In response, among other claims, Plaintiffs brought a claim for tortious interference against [...] based upon Plaintiffs’ reasonable belief that (1) [...] was aware of Plaintiffs’ relationship with [...], but made an offer anyway, and (2) either [...] then demanded that [...] kick out Greenberg or [...]’s offer spurred [...] to do so.  To date, the transaction between [...] and [...] has not yet been consummated.  The Trial Court initially denied [...]’s motion to dismiss those claims.  However, on August 6, 2021—while paper discovery was ongoing and before a single deposition was taken—the Trial Court granted summary judgment solely because, in its view, no claim for tortious interference could lie where there was no subsequent transaction:  I don’t understand how there can be a theory that the . . . defendant herein . . . interfered with the tortious [sic] relationship, given the fact that there was no transaction that took place.  . . .  [I]t’s undisputed the transaction never took place.  That the New Jersey Retina backed away from the situation.  And under those circumstances, I don’t see . . . any possible way of meeting the four part standard under Printing Mart versus Sharp Electronics.  (1T 25:8-23).  That ruling was obviously in error.  A subsequent “transaction” is not required to set forth a claim for tortious interference.  The Trial Court then compounded this error by finding that Plaintiffs’ claim was frivolous (because, it reasoned, at “some point” Plaintiffs became aware that no transaction occurred) and awarded a staggering $72,984.95 in sanctions against Plaintiffs and their attorneys:
[brief] (Raised Below. Pa16. Pa30.)  Contrary to Respondent’s contention, adequate, timely, proper notice of the Ricci Act was not provided.  Respondent claims that posting the Ricci Act on the Division’s website is somehow adequate “notice” to all members and retirees enrolled in the State Police Retirement System.  Rb10.  However, this argument fails for several reasons.  The Ricci Act states:  The board of trustees shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this subsection and shall notify members and retirants in the retirement system of the enactment of this act, P.L.2019, c.157, within 30 days of enactment.  N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(e).  Pursuant to the Ricci Act, the Board was required to provide notice to members and retirants in the system.  A website posting is not sufficient notice to retirees or active members of the retirement system.  In re State & Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 270, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision of the Appellate Division.  The [...] and the [...] were improperly reducing reimbursements for out-of-network behavioral health services.  In the prior case, the Appellate Division found in favor of Yucht’s appeal which sought reimbursement at the statutory 80% of reasonable and customary charges for behavioral health services.  *In re Yucht*, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2188.
[brief] (*See* II.C, *supra*).  The [...] engaged in the aforesaid conduct without authorization from [...], [...], or the Plaintiffs, all to the detriment of the defendant companies from which they stole, and from [...] and [...], as anticipated beneficiaries of their equitable share of those funds.  *See Brown*, 323 N.J. Super. at 37.  Compounding matters, they deposited the funds into their joint account or the [...] account, outside of the Plaintiffs’ knowledge and control.  (13T9:23 to 29:9).  The appellants’ dispute as to the trial court’s factual --- 20
[brief] On that afternoon, traffic was as usual, traffic was heavy, and both parties were on First Street, sitting at the red light waiting to make a left onto Route 280 West.  Essentially plaintiff-appellant, [...], argues that the defendant-respondent, [...], failed to hold his turn and went wide into the right lane of 280 where the plaintiff was already and struck her vehicle on the driver’s door and left side.  And yes, the plaintiff was making a left turn despite there being a large painted white “straight arrow” on her lane of the roadway.  This complaint was filed by Mildred A. [...] on 11/20/2020 against the driver and owner of the vehicle which struck her.  After discovery, the defendants filed, pursuant to N.J. Ct. R. 4:46-2, a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that there exists no issue in facts and requested that summary judgment be granted to them as a matter of law.  After filing opposition to the motion and participating in Oral Argument on 01/22/2024, the Trial Court granted the defendant’s Motion and Dismissed the plaintiff’s case.  The Appellant is now seeking to reverse the Order of the Trial Court have the matter remanded to the Law Division for Jury Trial.
[brief] As argued above, these fundamental procedural flaws and violations of the absent [...]’s due process rights rendered the March 18, 2015 Final Judgment invalid from the start.  Denying relief on ground of untimeliness is improper and an abuse of discretion, especially since in this case, the final judgment was premised on default, where relief is supposed to be granted liberally, Marder v. Realty Const. Co., 84 N.J. Super. 313, 318 (App. Div. 1964), aff’d, 43 N.J. 508 (1964) – particularly for defaults in a divorce case against the plainly less monied and less powerful spouse, Curry v. Curry, 108 N.J. Super. 527, 529 (App. Div. 1970).
[brief] If a defendant’s confession is illegally induced in the first instance, then “a later confession always may be looked upon as fruit of the first. ”  State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525, 548 (2015) (quoting O’Neill, 193 N.J. at 171 n.13).  Thus, even if the phone calls had not constituted further interrogation, [...] suppression still would have been required because of the uncontested Miranda violation that preceded the formal interview and the phone calls.  [...] demonstrated sound discretion when he found—after the uncontested violation—that the phone statements were fruit of the invalid interrogation.