ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] “In interpreting a legislative enactment, the starting point is the language of the statute itself.  If the language is clear, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms. ”  Velazquez v. Jiminez, 172 N.J. 240, 256, 798 A.2d 51 (2002) (quoting Hubbard ex rel. Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392, 774 A.2d 495 (2001) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194, 61 L.Ed. 442, 452 (1917))).
[brief] NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES  Date Submitted: January 22, 2025  [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, [...]  [...] [...]  [...] Assistant Attorney General Of Counsel  [...]  Deputy Attorney General Attorney ID No. 011062011  On the Brief TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACT  .............  1  ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................................  15  POINT I  THE COMMISSION'S DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE IT WAS REASONABLE, WELL SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, AND CONSISTENT WITH THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATE POLICY (Addressing [...]'s Point II.A., and B.)  ........................................................................................................  15  POINT II  THE COMMISSION PROPERLY FOUND THAT DCF HAD JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE (Addressing [...]'s Point III.A., B., C., and D.) ..........................................................................................  25  CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................
[brief] [...]’s letter stated in full:  Dear [...]:  Your approved leave of absence expired on October 25, 2019.  You submitted medical documentation date[d] December 30, 2019, which states that you are able to return to work on January 7, 2020 with restrictions for 6 months.  The following restriction[s] were noted:  No heavy lifting, no squatting, no climbing and no kneeling.  Unfortunately, we do not have light duty.  Due to business need [...] will not be able to continue to hold your position open for you and as a result your employment will terminate effective January 6, 2020.  (Pa21)  Accordingly, as of January 6, 2020, [...] no longer was an employee of [...].  On January 22, 2020, after her employment with [...] already had been terminated, [...] produced a second doctor’s note.  (Id.)  Suspiciously, and in direct contradiction to the original doctor’s note produced several weeks earlier, the new note cleared [...] to return to work immediately.
[brief] A change from no personal guaranty to a full personal guaranty is clearly a material enlargement of the Guarantor’s obligations.  motion for reconsideration that its decision that any personal guarantees were terminated on May 11, 2016 did not turn on a statute of frauds analysis but rather on the point that once the lease was terminated there was no evidence at all that the individuals sought to be charged agreed to reinstate any personal guarantees that were created under the Lease.  As to the argument that the Court misapplied the statute of frauds
[directive] Attorney General Weapons and in the Seizure Directives.  4.  This Department will conduct a thorough Internal Affairs investigation even if the temporary or final restraining order is dismissed against a member of this Department.  5.  Following the reported incident, the Chief of Police or Law Enforcement Chief Executive of the primary investigative department or his/her designee will immediately contact the designated Principal Law Enforcement Contact person and advise that officer of the domestic violence incident and request that he/she perform the duties listed in Section VIII.
[brief] Following the entry of the 2020 Order, the responsibility for the oversight and disposition of the Respondents’ site plan application was delegated to the SHO.  Despite the delegation to the SHO, the Respondents’ filed a Litigants’ Rights application to the Trial Court for elimination of the condition of the Route 33 Signal.  Rather than direct the Respondents’ motion to the SHO, the Trial Court considered the application.  While the Trial Court ultimately denied the Respondents’ motion, it did make certain findings and provided a framework for the later consideration of relief from the provision of the Route 33 Signal by the SHO.  Initially, the Trial Court determined that the relief required by the Respondents was a waiver rather than a variance; despite the clear requirement for the Route 33 Signal in the VC-2 Zone.
[brief] During trial, [...]’s “mold” expert answered a question on direct examination, stating that it was “implausible” that “Stachybotrys Chartarum germinated in [...]’s food and produced a sufficient amount [sic] of mycotoxins to cause injury at any point in the 18 years he was living there. ”  2T63-14-21.  The language of the exception, however, does not contain any language about mycotoxins, or requiring “germination” of mycotoxins, or requiring that the policyholder prove the extent of injury caused directly by consumption of mycotoxins in food.  Construing the exception to require such proof violated every one of the rules of insurance policy interpretation discussed above.  As the *Cypress Point* Court pointed out, [...] could have restricted the scope of the exception to injury proved to have been caused by mycotoxins in food or by eliminating any exception to the mold exclusion entirely, as it had in its 2005-07 policies.
[brief] If each State had its own recall process, it would create confusion and inconsistent application, (Da0258, ¶¶ 66-75)  Plaintiff’s attempt through this lawsuit to impose state-law duties to recall or communicate with U.S. healthcare providers before FDA’s authorization is therefore impliedly preempted.  See PLIVA v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 623-24 (2011) (“[W]hen a party cannot satisfy its state duties without the Federal Government’s special permission and assistance, which is dependent on the exercise of judgment by a federal agency, that party cannot independently satisfy those state duties for pre-emption purposes.
[brief] Defendant’s claim is without merit.  [...]’s testimony, which was based upon his training, his experience, and the records that he was provided, was properly admitted and did not violate the holding of Burney.  Indeed, [...]’s demonstrative aid and his testimony clearly and unequivocally explained that he could not opine how close a phone was to a cell phone tower, but rather could state which towers were used and which antenna was utilized.  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting [...] to testify.
[brief] (Da29-111).  The requirements outlined and discussed therein were not optional or discretionary; they were mandatory.  Id.  As such, the above-discussed deviations from the permitted practices were an illegal application of the jury selection process.  Accordingly, for all of these reasons, defendant submits the jury selection process was flawed due to the lack of individual assessments of each juror’s proposed hardship by the Judge, at sidebar, and in the presence of counsel.  The jury selection process deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial.  As such, justice demands in this case that the defendant be afforded the utmost care and protection of his critical constitutional rights.  Thus, Defendant’s conviction must be overturned due to the Court’s error in the jury selection process.
[brief] JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S CEPA CLAIM  Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging violations of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 et seq. (Pal – Pa8).  The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants because the evidence on record sufficiently supports Plaintiff’s CEPA claim, precluding summary judgment as a matter of law.  There is sufficient evidence for Plaintiff to support her claims under CEPA, including that she had a reasonable belief that a violation of law, regulation, or clear mandate of public policy was occurring, engaged in protected whistleblowing activity, and suffered an adverse employment action that was causally related to her protected activity.
[brief] “To prevail, a debtor must prove:  ‘(1) she is a consumer, (2) the [party seeking payment] is a debt collector, (3) the . . . challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a ‘debt’ as the Act defines it, and (4) the [collector] has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt. ’”  Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel, 446 N.J. Super. 537, 549 (App. Div. 2016), quoting Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 2014).  Here, the trial court held correctly that Appellant failed to state a claim for an FDCPA violation because the claim is predicated entirely on a violation of the NJCFLA for which she lacks a private right of action.  Put simply, the trial court held that Appellant’s FDCPA claim cannot survive because it would amount to nothing less than bringing the same claim for a violation of the NJCFLA that she is precluded from bringing under state law.  The trial court’s decision is correct as a matter of statutory construction because Appellant’s FDCPA claim seeks to transform the NJCFLA into a privately actionable statute, which it is not.  A state licensing requirement is strictly a creature of state law, not federal law.  State law prescribes the remedy for noncompliance, not federal law.  Accordingly, there is no claim in this case that “the [collector] has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt. ”  Midland Funding LLC, supra (emphasis added).  At most, Appellant pled that Respondents violated state law.  Appellant, however, lacks a private remedy for any such violation, and cannot obtain under federal law what she cannot obtain under state law.  As discussed above, this logic is similar to the reason why Appellant cannot seek relief under the New Jersey Declaratory Judgment Law that she cannot obtain directly under the NJCFLA.  Statement of Reasons p. 11, citing *In re Resol. of State Comm'n of Investigation*, 108 N.J. at 46.  (Pa43-Pa44)  Appellant’s claims amount to an end-run around what she cannot do otherwise.  **B.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER DISMISSING COUNTS I-III OF PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED SINCE THE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM OF DISABILITY  DISCRIMINATION/FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE DISABILITY  In Counts 1-3 of the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged failure to accommodate a purported disability in violation of the LAD (Counts II and III simply relate to claimed damages for a LAD violation).  As discussed below, Counts 1-3 of the Second Amended Complaint were specious and/or hypothetical as pled and otherwise failed to state a claim for failure to accommodate disability. \(^2\)  In addition, as to the only member referenced with any level of specificity (albeit still inadequate), the Trial Court did not have jurisdiction over any discrimination claims as pertained to him since he elected to pursue his claims before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the New Jersey Division on Civil  \(^2\)  Plaintiff’s LAD claims were specious, to say the least.  To the extent, through its Complaint, Plaintiff was really seeking to challenge prior municipal action in the form of a promotion, it was required to bring an action in lieu of prerogative writs pursuant to Rule 4:69 within 45 days of such action.  The failure to do so also warranted dismissal of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint.
[brief] ”  Id. at 394, 774 A.2d 495 (internal quotations omitted).  The Court below held that Plaintiffs’ claims do not fit under the common knowledge exception because of “the importance of legal expert testimony in cases involving complex commercial transactions, the structure of those transactions”  1T 37:9-11.  The Court arrived at this holding by citing 2175 Lemoine Ave. Corp. v. Finco, Inc., 272 N.J. Super. 478, 640 A.2d 346, 353 (App. Div. 1994) and analogizing that case to the present matter.  1T 37:5-11.  Respectfully, the Trial Court misunderstood the facts of this case and misapplied the holding of Lemoine.  As the Lemoine Court explained:  Expert testimony may not be appropriate or necessary to establish proximate cause in every legal malpractice case, particularly where the causal relationship between the attorney’s legal malpractice and the client’s loss is so obvious that the trier of fact can resolve the issue as a matter of common knowledge.  However, such is not the case here.  In our view, legal expert testimony was necessary to show that the complex commercial transaction involving the Lemoine Avenue property could have been legally structured to permit Finco to receive the option and the partnership interest.  Id. at 489-90.  The facts of this matter are glaringly different from those in Lemoine, and the Trial Court’s analogy was palpably incorrect.  In Lemoine, the Court held that legal expert testimony was necessary to show that the complex commercial transaction involving the Lemoine Avenue property could have been legally structured to permit Finco to receive the option and the partnership interest.  Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims against [...] do not allege that any of the legal work of the transaction was structured inappropriately or negligently as in *Lemoine*.
[brief] A party cannot force the Court and/or opposing Counsel to go combing through the record to find factual support for relief they are seeking.  See State v. Rambo, 401 N.J. Super. 506, 527 (App. Div. 2008) (“Defendant makes a generalized complaint, without any specific references, that the trial court placed improper restrictions on stand-by counsel.  We decline to comb the record searching for any examples, indeed if any exist. ”) (emphasis added).  It is the Defendants’ “responsibility to refer [the Court] to specific parts of the record to support their argument. ”  Spinks v. Twp. of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 465, 474 (App. Div. 2008) (emphasis added).  “They may not discharge that duty by inviting [the Court] to search through the record [themselves].”  Id. (citing State v. Hild, 148 N.J. Super. 294, 296 (App. Div. 1977)).
[brief] J. 369 (2024) | 11 | Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hudson E. Pain Mgmt. Osteopathic Med. & Physical Therapy, 210 N.J. 597 (2012) .................................................................  12  State v. O’Donnell, 255 N.J. 60 (2023) ...........................................................................  24 W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506 (2023) .............................................................................  11  Statutes N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 to -6.2 .................................................................................................. passim N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1(d) ..............................................................................................................  21 N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2 ....................................................................................................................  21 N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4(a) ..............................................................................................................  17 N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4(c) ..............................................................................................................  16  N.J.S.A. 17:33A-1 to -30 .................................................................................................... passim N.J.S.A.17:33A-2 .................................................................................................................. 9, 13, 26, 29 N.J.S.A.17:33A-5 .................................................................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A.17:33A-5(a) ............................................................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A.17:33A-7 .................................................................................................................. 14 N.J.S.A.17:33A-7(a) .......................................................................................................... 9, 14, 20 N.J.S.A.17:33A-7(b) .......................................................................................................... 14, 20 N.J.S.A.17:33A-7(d) .......................................................................................................... 1, 14, 27 N.J.S.A. 17:33A-8(a)(1) ..................................................................................................... 1, 2 N.J.S.A. 17:33A-9 ............................................................................................................... 28, 30 N.J.S.A. 17:33A-16 .............................................................................................................. 1 INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING MY REQUEST TO COMPEL [...] TO PRODUCE AN ASSIGNMENT OF THE NOTE AND ASSIGNMENT OF THE MORTGAGE FROM [...] TO [...].  Raised Below: paragraph 38 (029a).  In 1T page 8 lines 2-6.  Bayview did not oppose and did not deny my claims and arguments.  The denial order is at (221a).  N.J.S.A. 46:9-9 states:  “All mortgages on real estate in this State, and all covenants and stipulations therein contained, shall be assignable at law by writing, whether sealed or not, and any such assignment shall pass and convey the estate of the assignor in the mortgaged premises, and the assignee may sue thereon in his own name, but, in any such action by the assignee, there shall be allowed all just set-offs and other defenses against the assignor that would have been allowed in any action brought by the assignor and existing before notice of such assignment. ”  The transfer of the Note and the Mortgage from Bayview to Nationstar is unlawful because there is no assignment.  Bayview did not oppose or deny this request, but [...] denied my request without statement of reason.  LEGAL POINT VII.
[brief] As argued above, the MOU contemplates the execution of the Operating Agreements – “one or more formal agreements between the Parties which may be necessary, proper or advisable” to rescue the Property – thereby bringing disputes concerning breaches of those instruments within the ambit of the MOU arbitration provision.  (Da311).  Similarly, these claims are arbitrable under the Operating Agreements.  Both Operating Agreements include an arbitration provision, which the motion court found makes clear how disputes are to be resolved (1T49:10-11).  The arbitration provision states as follows:  Arbitration.  Any dispute arising with respect to this Operating Agreement, or the making or validity thereof, or its interpretation, or any breach thereof, shall be determined and settled by arbitration in Bergen County, New Jersey, pursuant to the rules then pertaining to the American Arbitration Association.  Any award rendered shall be final and conclusive upon the parties and a judgment thereon may be entered in any court having jurisdiction.  (Da132).  The Operating Agreements require the arbitration of “any dispute arising with respect to [either] Operating Agreement, or the making or validity thereof, or its interpretation, or any breach thereof. ” (Da132, 149).  Given that the Operating Agreements are the necessary, proper and advisable agreements contemplated by the MOU, the claims asserted in the Chancery Action are arbitrable under the identical arbitration provision in each of those instruments.
[directive] A. identities.  No later than July 15, 2020, the Division of State Disclosure of officers’ Police, the Division of Criminal Justice, and the Juvenile Justice Commission shall each publish on its public website a brief synopsis of all complaints where a termination, reduction in rank or grade, and/or suspension of more than five days was assessed to a law enforcement officer since January 1, 2000.  These synopses shall include the identity of each officer subject to a final disciplinary action, a summary of their transgressions, and a statement of the sanction imposed.  B. officers.  At least seven days prior to the publication of the synopses described Notice to in Paragraph I.A, the relevant division shall provide notice to each officer it intends to identify, whenever possible.  In cases where the officer is no longer employed by the division, the division shall make reasonable efforts to contact the officer at their last known residential address, email address, or phone number.  II.
[brief] (Pa17).  Along with the yearly re-appointments, [...]’s designated status with [...] changed many times from employee to independent contractor back to employee.  (1T101:10-13).  For Factor #7 – Set Hours of Work and Factor #8 – Full Time Required, the ALJ found that while [...] had set hours on Wednesday, she did not work 5  Here, [...] noted that the other Municipal Prosecutor hired by [...] was hired through the RFP process.  (1T158:6-8).  full time.  (Pa16).
[brief] APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS CON’T VOLUME I Certification of Transcript Completion and Delivery dated February 20, 2024 .................................................................Pa065  Request for Oral Argument on behalf of Defendants filed March 20, 2024 ........................................................................Pa066  Victory Entertainment, Inc v. Schibell, No. A-3388-16T2, 2018 WL 3059696, (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 21, 2018) ......................................................Pa067 Dailey v. Borough of Highlands, No. A-3475-18T2, 2020 WL 6297469, (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. October 28, 2020) ...............................................Pa077 Discovery House v. Advanced Data Systems RCM, Inc., No. CV1921602KMJBC, 2020 WL 6938353, (D.N.J. Nov. 25, 2020)  ..............................................................................Pa081
[directive] Page 74  [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  10.1.4  Organization (Aggravating Factor Category #4)  This category of Aggravating Factors addresses the special dangers and harms associated with organized or sophisticated drug-distribution activities, which tend to be of a commercial, prolific, and ongoing nature.  It is expected that at least one of the following factors in this category would ordinarily apply if the defendant or others with whom the defendant was acting in concert had been targeted for investigation by the Statewide Narcotics Task Force or a county narcotics task force, or the case involved the use of sophisticated investigative techniques (e.g., obtaining telephone billing records, electronic surveillance, confidential informants, etc.), although these factors could certainly also apply, as the facts and circumstances warrant, to cases resulting from patrol interdiction or street-level drug enforcement activities.  This category of Aggravating Factors should not be used if the defendant is charged with and will plead guilty to the offense of being a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined at N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, since that offense already accounts for the nature of the defendant’s role and participation in a drug-distribution conspiracy.  Similarly, this category of Aggravating Factors should not be used where the defendant is subject to Special Application and Enhancement Feature A (Street Gang Involvement), since that feature, which takes precedence over this Aggravating Factor Category, accounts for the defendant’s participation, rank and role in organized criminal activity.