ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] MED-PAY BENEFITS ARE NOT PIP BENEFITS AND HAVE ALWAYS BEEN RECOVERABLE UNDER NJ LAW.  (Da1 – Da27).  In Ingersoll v. [...], 138 N.J. 236 (1994), the Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed the issue of the applicability of the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 et seq. to Medpay payments.  In that matter the injured party was riding a motorcycle and sought Medpay payments under two separate automobile insurance policies.  The Trial Court ruled that the statutory bar in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.2 precluded the stacking of Medpay benefits and that determination was upheld by the Appellate Division.  The Supreme Court reversed, drawing a distinction between Medpay benefits and PIP benefits ruling that only PIP benefits were barred from stacking pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.2.  The Supreme Court addressed Medpay benefits and stated:  The question is whether the extended-medical-expense-benefits provision of the Aetna policy is beyond plaintiff's reach because of section 4.2's anti-stacking provision.  We think not.  The extended medical benefits are a creature not of statute but of a regulation promulgated under legislative authority by the Commissioner of Insurance.  That regulation, N.J.A.C. 11:3-7.3(b), requires that every automobile policy "include excess medical payments coverage, corresponding to Section II, Extended Medical Expense Benefits Coverage of the personal automobile policy."  ...as we understand the statutory scheme, the Commissioner's implementation thereof, and the insurance industry's accommodation thereto, the extended-medical-expense-benefits provision represents a very narrow window of coverage to a limited class of persons who, like plaintiff in this case, are ineligible for basic PIP benefits...  The Aetna policy, which follows the standard form, recognizes the difference between that coverage and basic PIP by declaring the extended coverage inapplicable if the insured person is entitled to basic PIP benefits.  Ingersol Supra at 239.  The Court recognized that extended medical benefits coverage, now commonly known as Medpay, was created not by statute but by regulation promulgated under legislative authority by the Commissioner.  The functional difference between basic PIP coverage and Section II coverage were sufficient to satisfy the Court that the Legislature did not intend to include the extended-medical-expense-benefits coverage in the PIP statute’s prohibition against stacking.  The Court ultimately concluded that the Medpay benefits were not PIP benefits that were barred by the anti-stacking provision of the PIP statute.  In Warnig v [...], 636 N.J. Super. 563 (App 2003), the injured party was working as a bus aide and received $10,000 in Medpay benefits from their personal automobile insurance policy.
[directive] Attachment  4  Additional Questions for Certain Sexual Offenses (Use if committed on or after December 1, 1998)  English, English-Spanish, English-Haitian, English- Polish, English-Korean, & English-Portuguese Versions  NOTICE:  This is a public document, which means the document as submitted will be available to the public upon request.  Therefore, do not enter personal identifiers on it, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number, vehicle plate number, insurance policy number, active financial account number, or active credit card number.  New Jersey Judiciary  Additional Questions for Certain Sexual Offenses (Use if committed on or after December 1, 1998)
[brief] ✷: He filed a motion [12/15/19, 7:53:16 PM]  [...] Josh [...]: What kind?  He wasn't served?  [12/15/19, 7:53:30 PM]  [...] Josh [...]: He has clear title?  [12/15/19, 7:53:38 PM]  ✷: Claim he was out of the country [12/15/19, 8:09:49 PM]  [...]  Josh [...]: I can buy and fight him?  [12/15/19, 8:10:13 PM]  [...]  Josh [...]: He is clear title ?  He can get clear title [12/15/19, 8:10:34 PM]  ✷:  He offered me a good settlement 23.  [...] has previously contacted Plaintiff’s counsel [...], Esq. at [...]’s direction and Velasquez (despite his Certification to the Court) is well aware of the relationship between the two men and their numerous companies.
[brief] (7T:326-1 to 327).  During the shootings, [...] was standing outside the house by the front door but was able to see inside the house.  (6T:118-6 to 11).  [...] testified that he witnessed [...] shoot his sister [...] three times and kill her.  (6T:121-4 to 14).  [...] testified that he ran from the house because [...] turned the gun in his direction.  (6T:34-5 to 8);(6T:122-5 to 8).  After escaping from the house, [...] called 9-1-1 for help.
[brief] Nothing in Opinion 552 limits its holding only to municipal defendants or prohibits the application of its reasoning outside the facts of the case.  For example, just as a municipality and its employees would suffer financial strains if they are each forced to engage separate counsel, Pb22 (citing Opinion 552, 102 N.J. at 206), so too would [...] and [...] if forced to retain separate counsel.  Indeed, the strain on [...] would be enormous given that a separate attorney would have to represent each of [...]’s medical practice entity defendants.  See infra.
[directive] 10% permissible 2C:21-2.1(a-d) materials to make such documents; second degree; if actor exhibits or utters such Documents documents, third degree except that this statute does not apply if actor purchases alcoholic beverage underage or tobacco underage and there is no other fraud or injury to another; if 4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500 10% permissible actor possesses such documents, fourth degree.  2nd Degree $35,000 to $75,000
[brief] Admission of [...]’s opinion was not plain error.  If any error occurred, the standard of review for this evidence issue is plain error, since there was no objection below.  State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397, 411-12 (2020).  The admission of the opinion was not “clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ”  R. 2:10-2.  For one thing, [...] was not viewing any of the videos when he made the statement to the jury.  (12T96-5 to 97-10).  For another, defense counsel forced [...] to concede that his opinion was based solely on his review of the videos, which were before the jury, and that what [...] saw “resembled” the wallet ID.  (12T111-19 to 112-5).  That removed any implication [...] had “superior knowledge” beyond what the jury received.  Third, the judge had already advised the jury that it would decide what appeared in the videos, which advice she repeated after [...] testified.  There was no error, let alone plain error.
[brief] Per N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27, Plaintiff is required to show that her complaint is meritorious by submitting an affidavit from an appropriate medical expert attesting to the “reasonable probability” of professional negligence.  Ferreira at 150 (quoting Palanque at 404).  The Affidavit of Merit is required to be submitted within sixty (60) days of the filing of defendant’s answer or, for good cause shown, within an additional sixty-day period, for a total of 120 days from the date of defendant’s answer.  See Douglass v. Obade, 359 N.J. Super. 159, 160–61 (App. Div.), cert. den. 177 N.J. 575 (2003).  Despite, the text of the Affidavit of Merit Statute, New Jersey Courts “have recognized—consistent with our understanding of its legislative intent—two equitable remedies that temper the draconian results of an inflexible application of the statute. ”  See Ferreira at 151.  The first equitable remedy is known as substantial compliance, “plaintiff’s complaint will not be dismissed if the plaintiff can show that he has substantially complied with the statute. ”  Id.  The second equitable remedy is extraordinary circumstances, for which Plaintiff’s Complaint will dismissed without prejudice.  Id. at 151.  Here, in consideration of the Affidavit of Merit statute’s legislative purpose, Plaintiff’s substantial compliance and extraordinary circumstances, both of which will be more fully set forth in forthcoming sub-parts of Plaintiff’s Legal Argument, it would be contrary to the legislative intent of the Affidavit of Merit Statute to uphold the Trial Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint for a procedural violation when an Affidavit of Merit has been produced evidencing the meritorious nature of her claim, albeit after the timeframe to submit the Affidavit had lapsed.
[brief] [...]’s entire argument relies on unproven allegations, but New Jersey precedent requires more.  See, e.g., Superior Integrated Sols. v. Mercer Ins. Co. of N.J., No. A-1027-18, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2147, *23 (App. Div. Nov. 10, 2020) (citing SL Indus., 128 N.J. at 212) (“A claimant’s mere allegation of intentional harm does not alone justify an insurer’s refusal to provide a defense.
[brief] -  It is further clear that the full extent of Defendant’s obligations and payments from 10/1/1998 to 1/11/2022 have not been matched against each other in Probation’s “accounting. ”  That is, Probation has mismatched the payments period versus the period for amounts charged and due, and ignored evidence of further direct payments of support of $54,500 (see Reply, re Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of 5/12/2023, paragraph 6).  The Court overlooked this basic accounting principle and in this manner erred.
[brief] Specifically, educators complained that: “[[...]] doesn’t use high quality curriculum to meet the needs of students;” “[c]urriculum created ‘in-house’ lacks the materials and resources to reach all students;” “[t]he curriculum provided for math is awful, and not aligned properly with the [S]tate standards;” “[t]he curriculum is not appropriate for the population of students” taught and “creates a barrier for students to succeed and learn;” the District switches programs too often; the District is overly focused on strict adherence to pacing guidelines which “doesn’t allow teachers time to teach what is needed to get the students to meet” educational standards; and the District’s “curriculum in both math and ELA is riddled with mistakes that affect student growth. ” (Ra211).  Sadly, these are just some of the many issues and concerns teachers raised.  See ibid.  Also, district boards of education are required to implement systems for planning and delivering intervention and referral services, including multidisciplinary team approaches such as New Jersey’s Multi-Tiered Systems of Support (MTSS) Framework.\(^8\) N.J.A.C. 6A:16-8.1.  While [...] has \(^8\) MTSS is a three-tiered framework for support services.  (Ra213-14).  Tier 1 “provides high quality learning environments, evidence-based curricular and instructional practices, and a continuum of supports and interventions in general education classrooms;” Tier 2 “provides supplemental supports and nominally adopted MTSS, most teachers reported they did not know what MTSS was or said their school did not use it.  (Ra136; Ra216).  Even when implemented, the support systems were not able to be implemented effectively due to the District’s strict structure and pacing of local curriculum.  (Aa12; Ra216).  According to the Report, teachers struggle to meet student needs because “often almost the entire classroom requires Tier 2 intervention. ” (Ra216).  Further, school staff reported that [...] elects to end Tier 3 intervention (individual support) in third grade.  (Ra136; Ra216).  But, as explained above, “[t]his is especially problematic given the local policy extending [the] kindergarten cutoff date,” resulting in many third grade students still being “developmentally young” and “continuing to struggle with reading. ” (Ra135; Ra184-86).  Without the necessary tiered supports and structured intervention time, “the [developmental] gap will continue to expand for students. ” (Ra136).  3.
[brief] Subsequently, [...] arrived and interviewed both [...] and [...] who, unlike in their statements to [...], said the shooter “was known to them as [...]. ”  Both women provided a description of what “[...]” looked like and what he was wearing.  On cross-examination, Rodriguez acknowledged that although both said “[...]” was an individual “that they knew from the area ... they couldn't be sure of his identity due to the poor lighting conditions on the street. ”  Detective Rodriguez then proceeded to the hospital to interview the victim [...].
[brief] Plaintiff submits this Reply Brief in further support of its appeal and to further emphasize a serious error that the Board continues to make, including in its Brief filed on April 18, 2024.  Specifically, the Board has throughout the application proceedings and this litigation continuously claimed that the apartment complex site as it currently exists is nonconforming as it relates to density.  This is an inaccurate claim and understanding of the facts regarding the property, which has clearly had a strong effect on the Board’s decision-making.  At every point throughout this litigation, Plaintiff has attempted to clarify this severe misunderstanding; however, it remains to be a part of each argument presented on behalf of the Board.  Therefore, this Reply Brief will primarily focus on that point.  Plaintiff hereby incorporates the procedural history, statement of facts, and legal arguments set forth in its Appellate Brief filed on February 21, 2024 as if fully set forth herein.
[brief] A.  **[...] seeks the granting of TREC s as the appropriate remedy**  [...] seeks to have the Board award TREC s or a similar form of Solar Renewable Energy Certificate (“SREC”) for the application for floating solar in this matter, based upon the original TI Program.  [...]’s application was made timely, and the TI Program, while not accepting new applications in light of the Successor Program, is not “closed” in that TREC awards are ongoing, open applications remain in front of the Board for approval or denial, and TREC s granted under this Program will continue for the next 15 years at a fixed rate.  The only “closed” element of the Program is that no **new** applications are being accepted; but at least one application for a TREC project remains pending before the Board and awaiting a decision,\(^1\) and the matter pending in this appeal was timely filed.  \(^1\)  The open matter is [...], with a BPU Docket Number of [...], that was timely filed in August of 2021 and which, as of January 13, 2025, remains open and pending decision before the Board.  If the Board were to approve the Harmony Sand application, the Harmony Sand project would receive TREC s in the TI Program and be subject to TI Program rules.  B.
[brief] 1T12:23-25 to 13:1-25.  Defendants’ counsel ([...]) explained that the responses to the “Punch List” were collective, from both Defendant [...] and [...].  1T14:1-22.  The court responded, “[t]here is no such thing as a collective response. ”  The court noted that the responses were only certified by [...] on Defendant [...]’s behalf, but not by [...], which [...] said was also required.  1T16:16-25 to 17:1-15.  Defendants’ counsel affirmed that Defendant [...]’s responses would be identical and that Defendant [...]’s certification so affirming would be submitted that evening, which the court said was acceptable.
[brief] Whenever disturbance is proposed in areas with slopes exceeding 14.9%, a detailed grading plan and architectural plans shall be submitted.  The plans shall be designed to ensure that drainage and/or erosion problems will not result from the proposed developments.  The architecture of all buildings shall be designed to follow the natural topography to the greatest extent possible in order to minimize disturbance of steep slopes.  D.  Whenever any variance or grading permit is sought for any addition to or modification of an existing single-family dwelling, and/or the lot on which it is located, the Board of Adjustment, when acting on a variance, and the Township Engineer, when acting on a grading permit, may waive the requirements of Subsection A of this section to the extent they are applicable when it is reasonably clear that there exist no on-site slopes in excess of 14.9%, or that any slopes in excess of 14.9% are remote from the areas of proposed development and/or disturbance.
[brief] Defendant also pointed out that the municipal court’s ruling was “limited” and “generic” and that the State “actually had to ask the [municipal court] to clarify it” (1T7:6-11).  The Law Division then questioned Defendant’s slurred speech, glassy eyes, and trying to drive away after crashing into a telephone pole that split in half (1T8:2-5).  In response, Defendant argued that all of that goes to probable cause, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt (1T9:2-4).  Defendant argued that drinking in and of itself does not prove intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt because although slurred speech is an indicator of drinking, that alone does not mean Defendant was legally impaired to drive, especially when he passed the field sobriety tests (1T8:6 – 9:4).  Defendant further argued that an accident in and of itself does not prove intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt because there is nothing to dispute that he swerved out of the way to avoid a deer, and similar accidents happen every day even when the driver is not legally impaired (1T8:23 – 10:24).
[brief] (Dkts. ##265-66).  The following two exhibits were attached to plaintiffs’ letter (Dkt. #262): copies of correspondence between counsel, dated September 22 and October 2, 2015 (Exhs. A-B).  The following eight exhibits were attached to defendant’s letter (Dkt. #263): copies of correspondence between counsel, dated August 13, August 27 (with attachment), September 22, and October 2, 2015 (Exhs. A-B, D, F); and copies of e-mails between counsel, dated August 27, September 3, September 4 (with attachment), September 22, September 28, October 3, October 6, October 7, October 9, October 12, October 20, October 26, and October 29, 2015 (Exhs. C, E, G-H).  As set forth in plaintiffs’ letters (Dkt. #262, at 1-5; Dkt. #265, at 1-4), plaintiffs have proposed 103 search terms from the documents of five custodians, to which defendant objected on the basis of burdensomeness; plaintiffs have proposed three alternatives as a compromise as follows: (1) “sampling and iterative refinement[,]” under which defendant would produce “small samples of documents containing the agreed-on search terms, followed by an iterative analysis of the documents to hone the search terms;” (2) “the virtual warehouse[,]” which constitutes “a quick-peek protocol by which [defendant] provides the entire corpus of documents collected from the custodians,” followed by plaintiffs’ search “for a limited number of relevant documents, akin to an old-fashioned search through paper files in a warehouse;” or (3) “complete production[,]” described as a “straightforward production of all documents that hit on any search term with the use of a clawback agreement permitting [defendant] to retrieve any inadvertently produced documents.
[brief] Briefing submissions have thus far been made with no decision yet rendered (Pa).  In their scant and respective motions to dismiss the Complaint, the Respondents argued for the trial court to adopt the United States District Court’s (federal) date-of-accrual analysis of the dismissed federal claims, and otherwise merely reapply it in another forum to similarly bar the State law claims on statute-of-limitations grounds.  Without almost no legal authority in support, they merely parroted the United States District Court’s opinion, which looked to federal law to conclude that the claims accrued on the date of the verdict, not the judgment of acquittal date.  In opposition, the Appellant contended that the United States District Court’s opinion offered no foundation for the trial court to dismiss the Appellant’s State law claims, as only State, not federal, law could serve as the basis to decide when the State law claims accrued.  Making specific reference to the doctrine of substantial compliance, the Appellant pointedly responded that the timely filing of his State law claims in the United States District Court tolled the statute of limitations.  With respect to the focal issue in both the federal and State litigations, the Appellant argued that New Jersey’s final judgment rule and Rule 3:21-5 directed that the favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceeding – which is when the malicious prosecution claim accrued – occurred on the later date of the entry of the judgment of acquittal.
[directive] If the prosecutor's office declines to initiate a criminal investigation or the investigation is administratively closed, it shall notify the law enforcement agency of the outcome in writing.  6.3.4  As for administrative complaints, the internal affairs supervisor or law enforcement executive will direct that an internal affairs investigator conduct an appropriate INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | November 2022 28 investigation.  Investigators must strive to conduct a thorough and objective investigation without violating the rights of the subject officer or any other law enforcement officer.  Internal affairs investigators, and anyone who may be called upon to do an internal investigation, must be thoroughly familiar with the agency's entire internal affairs policy, including the protection of the subject officer's rights and the procedures for properly investigating internal complaints.  6.3.5
[brief] (Da5).  Defendant was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $5,000 to [...].  (Da5).  The charge of Possession of a Firearm For an Unlawful Purpose was merged into the Murder conviction.  (Da5).  On the third charge, Unlawful Possession of a Handgun, Defendant was sentenced to a concurrent term of 10 years with five years parole ineligibility.  (Id.).  The Certain Persons charge was dismissed.  (Id.).  Defendant was given jail credit in the amount of 1,298 days.  (Da7).  On February 15, 2022, the Appellate Division reversed Defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial.
[directive] Accepting Reports  Alleging Officer Misconduct  5.1.1  All complaints of officer misconduct shall be accepted from all persons who wish to file a complaint, regardless of the hour or day of the week.  This includes reports from anonymous sources, juveniles, undocumented immigrants, and persons under arrest or in custody.  Internal affairs personnel, if available, should accept complaints.  If internal affairs personnel are not available, supervisory personnel should accept reports of officer misconduct, and if no supervisory personnel are available, complaints should be accepted by any law enforcement officer.  At no time should a complainant be told to return at a later time to file their report.
[brief] Here, the bona fide physical threat was suspected to be the defendant, during an ongoing foot pursuit.  The threat was substantiated through the fact a homicide occurred and active shooter was in flight.  Moreover, defendant was found with a magazine (clip) on him and a gun in the area he was apprehended.  The CAD report importance to the defense during cross-examination was critical.  First, the CAD report takes defendant out of the "flight-zone" rout taking by the suspect, which detectives [...], [...] and [...] testified too.  Next, page seven (7) of the CAD report shows that a "suspect [not defendant] was taken into custody [05/07/19 18:08:44 54631]".  see. Da. 21.  Although, defendant was arrested on [...].  Which is depicted in the CAD report and the testimony of [...].  *Ibid.*  The CAD report's use during trial would have given the defendant the opportunity to explore who the other suspect in custody was, providing foundation for third-party guilt defense.  Lastly, [...] made several entries to CAD report and was the arresting officer who found the magazine (clip) on defendant.  However, [...] did not testify in this trial.  The jury was left void of this information.  Which negatively impacted the defense.