ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The Supreme Court has held that “prior dismissed charges may not be considered for any purpose” unless “the reason for consideration [is] supported by undisputed facts of record or facts found at a hearing. ”  K.S., 220 N.J. at 199.  Here the court considered [...]’s dismissed charges as evidence that he was “dancing through the raindrops” and “had constant run ins with the criminal justice system” until “finally has one hit. ”  (8T 72-21 to 74-25, 83-20 to 84-18, 105-8 to 11)  This violated K.S. E.  The Parole Disqualifier Imposed On Count Three Is Illegal.
[brief] ””  Tully, supra, 457 N.J. Super. at 124-127.  See Pepe v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 254 N.J.  Super. 662, 666 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 11 (1992).  The undisputed facts in the summary judgment motion record conclusively established that Plaintiffs’ conversion claims were derivative claims because Plaintiffs did not have a direct ownership interest in the funds they claimed were misappropriated.  See Strasenburgh, 146 N.J. at 551-52; Tully, 457 N.J. Super. at 126-27; Da00683 – Da0157.  Like in Pepe, the alleged damages claimed by Plaintiffs (i.e. diminishment of the “net value” of [...] and [...] because of diversion of funds) were alleged injuries done to the companies and not specific to Plaintiffs.
[directive] 5.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하는 법원 감독 마약 치료 프로그램(“마약 법정”)에 참가하기  위한 목적으로, 의무적 특별 보호관찰 기간이 선고될 가능성에 대해서  변호사와 논의하셨습니까?  만약 답변이 “아니요”이면 질문 으로 진행하십시오.
[brief] As described above, Plaintiffs-Appellants sued [...] and [...] in the 2015 Action alleging legal malpractice despite the fact that [...] did not represent them in the Pork Chop Hill transaction and neither gave them any advice, supplied them with any information, nor made any representations or assurances to them in connection with the deal.  259a-283a.  The Complaint and Amended Complaint in the 2020 Action, on the other hand, went one frivolous step further by alleging that [...] “lied” in his depositions for the 2015 Action by testifying that he believed the owner of [...] to be [...], the father of [...], whereas Plaintiffs-Appellants’ theory of the case was that [...] was really controlled by [...] and [...].
[brief] Pa038.  [...] pointed out that, even if Defendant did appear nervous, “mere nervous or furtive gestures are insufficient, standing alone, to rise to the level of an articulable suspicion. ”  2T48:5-7.  [...] also pointed out that, even if Defendant did flee the police, “(f)light alone is not enough without any to her articulable suspicion of criminal activity. ”  2T49:7-9.  [...] concluded that, since she did not find [...]’s testimony credible, it could not “be the corroboration for a 9-1-1 call. ”  2T50:17-19.  As such, [...] determined that she did not need to rule on whether evidence related to the 9-1-1 call was admitted as hearsay or non-hearsay.
[brief] The New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. §2A:23B-1 to -36, is nearly identical to the FAA and enunciates the same policies favoring arbitration.  Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 440 (2014).  The NJAA governs “all agreements to arbitrate made on or after January 1, 2003,” and exempts from its provisions only “an arbitration between an employer and a duly elected representative of employees under a collective bargaining agreement or collectively negotiated agreement.
[brief] See Kulbacki v. Sobchinsky, 38 N.J. 435, 459 (1962).  Here, Defendant [...] and Defendant [...] contend the jury should have assessed 100% fault to Defendant [...].  Db22. ("100% of the fault for the accident lies with [...].").  However, the evidence presented at trial, along with all legitimate inferences therefrom, unequivocally support a judgment in favor of Plaintiff against Defendant [...].
[brief] Defendant appealed --- 7  Document and transcript requests made by Deputy Public Defender [...] of the Conviction Integrity Unit were unable to be obtained.  (Da 14-16) under Indictment Number [...], and this Court affirmed his convictions and sentence.  (Da 17-18)  The New Jersey Supreme Court granted defendant Certification and summarily remanded to the trial court for resentencing pursuant to State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155 (2006) and State v. Johnson, 188 N.J. 262 (2006).  (Da 18)  On remand the trial court imposed the same sentence.  (Da 18)  Thereafter, defendant timely sought Post-Conviction Relief (PCR) raising ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  (Da 18)  Following a remand by this Court to allow defendant to supplement the record (Da 18-19), the PCR court denied the petition in a written decision entered on September 15, 2010.  (Da 19)  This Court affirmed the denial of PCR on July 19, 2011.  (Da 17-22)  On August 15, 2022, defendant filed a pro se first Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, including his certification in support thereof, on his convictions and sentence under Indictment Numbers [...] and [...].
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DIANA LACKS STANDING TO ASSERT CLAIMS FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (Raised Below: T1)**  The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Law (“UDJL”) at N.J.S.A. 2A:16-53 provides that “[a] person interested under a . . . written contract . . . or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute . . . [or] contract . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute, ordinance, [or] contract . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. ”  [...] is a person interested under a now void contract with [...], as well as a person whose rights, status, and legal relations are affected by a statute, *to wit*, the NJCFLA.  Therefore, [...] has standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief as pled in the Complaint.  Citing *In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation*, 108 N.J. 35, 46 (1987), the trial court reasoned that “[[...]] can’t circumvent the lack of a private cause of action by seeking relief under the New Jersey Uniform Declaratory Judgement Law. ”  T1 54:19-21.  Notwithstanding the analysis of private right of action under the NJCFLA, discussed *supra*, and the fact that *In re Resolution* addressed a statute\(^5\) which expressly prohibits a private right of action, the holding of *In re Resolution* was based on a conflict of competing equities not present here.  The court in *In re Resolution* reasoned that they would not impede the “clear public interest” of the Commissioner’s ability to investigate, prosecute, and thwart crimes perpetrated within the criminal justice system.  *See In re Resolution of State Com. of Investigation*, 108 N.J. at 45-47.  Here, there are no competing equities.  Even assuming *arguendo* that no private right of action exists under the NJCFLA, enjoining Defendants from attempting to enforce debts declared void by the legislature does not conflict with the goals of the NJCFLA or the Commissioner’s ability to enforce the same.  Indeed, enjoining Defendants from further unlicensed collection activity would further the legislative purpose of the NJCFLA, *to wit*, regulating the marketplace to ensure that only licensed entities participate.  The trial court’s \(^5\) State Commission of Investigation confidentiality requirements at N.J.S.A. 52:9M-15. reliance on *In re Resolution* and its reasoning based on the same are therefore in error as the trial court failed to analyze any competing equities in [...]’s petition for declaratory and injunctive relief.  Thus, the trial court’s Order granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be reversed.  **POINT VI.
[brief] [...]'s filing the previous lawsuit, ultimately dismissed for failure to state a claim, does not rise to the level of “an election which is binding” and determinative of a party's later attempt to litigate in a different forum.  See id. at 334, 540 A.2d 861.  Rather, defendants' “litigation conduct ... [was] consistent with [their] reserved right to arbitrate the dispute. ”  See Cole, supra, 215 N.J. at 280.  We therefore concur with the trial court that defendants did not waive and were not otherwise precluded from availing themselves of the statutory right of arbitral review.  *Id* at *1 and * 5- 6.  Although plaintiffs did so here, a party does not even have to try to enjoin or stay the proceeding in order to preserve its objection to jurisdiction.  In *Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc.*, 19 F.3d 1503 (3d Cir. 1994), *aff'd*, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), the plaintiffs asserted an objection to jurisdiction, but subsequently withdrew the objections and participated in a discovery conference.  The circuit court overturned the district court’s holding that the plaintiffs had waived jurisdictional objections.  Here, [...] reasserted their jurisdictional objection before commencement of the arbitration proceedings and again, two years later, before the panel heard any evidence, as soon as activity in the case had resumed.  The Kaplans did not waive their objections.  They reasserted them regularly during the arbitration proceeding.  Repeated objection was not required while the case lay dormant.  Their participation in the 1990 discovery conference did not waive their objections to the arbitrators' jurisdiction.  We cannot say that this act “clearly indicated [their] willingness to forego judicial review. ”  Pennsylvania Power Co., 886 F.2d at 50.  Id. at 1511–12.  In this case, there is all the more reason for the Court to find no waiver of an objection to the AAA jurisdiction.  In Wein, there was a “binding election” to litigate by participating in five years of litigation.  In Highgate, there was a “binding election” to arbitrate by participating in a two year arbitration, with five days of hearings, with no objection.
[brief] 82 N.J. at 402-407.  An instruction which appears to emphasize pressure to return a verdict is "inconsistent with jury freedom and responsibility" and "does not permit jurors to deliberate objectively, freely, and with an untrammeled mind."  Id. at 402.  Here, the judge’s failure to inquire after the second deadlock whether not a situation that involved a 4:45 p.m. second deadlock on what was necessarily the last day of deliberations; and there was not a judge applying subtle pressure by telling the jury that she would see how late she could keep the jury there that night.  Additionally, the Harris jury had not reached a partial verdict that could have been taken.  This is a very different situation than Harris, and not remotely a “close question” regarding the need to inquire whether further deliberation would be futile.
[directive] Serious 16 18 19 14 16 17 18 20 21 20 22 23  III NETWORK) 14 16 17 12 14 15 16 18 19 18 20 21 2C:35-3*  TRAFFICKING Category 16 18 19 14 16 17 18 20 21 20 22 23  Significant N.J.S.A. 14 16 17 12 14 15 16 18 19 18 20 21 II 6  History TABLE 12 14 15 10 12 13 14 16 17 16 18 19 UNDER NARCOTICS
[brief] 3731805, at *16 (App. Div. Aug. 30, 2012); State v. Johnson, No. A-2934-10T2, 2012 WL 2912754, at *3 (App. Div. July 18, 2012); State v. Delevry, No. A-2058-09T4, 2011 WL 5419745, at *9 (App. Div. Nov. 10, 2011); State v. Davis, No. A-2244-09T3, 2011 WL 2333357, at *7 (App. Div. June 15, 2011); State v. Johns, No. A-2423-08T4, 2011 WL 1631124, at *6 (App. Div. May 2, 2011); State v. Johnson, No. A-5330-06T4, 2010 WL 1427279, at *2 (App. Div. Apr. 9, 2010)  State v. Kennebrew, No. A-2245-04T4, 2007 WL 674655, at *9 (App. Div. Mar. 7, 2007); State v. Moore, No. A-6303-03T4, 2005 WL 3730557, at *5 (App. Div. Feb. 3, 2006).  (Dra1-188)
[brief] Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully asks that the Appellate Court (i) reverse the lower court’s April 3, 2023 Order, the September 27, 2023 Order and the November 14, 2023 Order and Vacate the Final Judgment for the reasons argued herein, and (ii) grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.  Dated: Newton, New Jersey  April 29, 2024  [...] [...] [...]  Attorneys for Appellants [...], [...] and [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION  [...], Plaintiff/Respondent, v. BLOCK 270, LOT 14 65  CLAREMONT AVE, TOWNSHIP OF IRVINGTON, STATE OF NEW JERSEY; ASSESSED TO: ROSA E. ALVAREZ-LOJA, ALFREDO ALVAREZ AND JOSE E. ANGAMARCA, Defendants/Appellants and [...]  Intervenor/Respondent.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE  DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, ESSEX COUNTY, CH. DIV., DOCKET NO. [...]
[brief] It is well settled that the test for determining whether a new trial will be granted because of … the intrusion of irregular influences is whether such matters could have a tendency to influence the jury in arriving at its verdict in a manner inconsistent with the legal proofs and the court's charge.  If the irregular matter has that tendency on the face of it, a new trial should be granted without further inquiry as to its actual effect.  The test is not whether the irregular matter actually influenced the result, but whether it had the capacity of doing so.  The stringency of this rule is grounded upon the necessity of keeping the administration of justice pure and free from all suspicion of corrupting practices.  It is said to be imperatively required to secure verdicts based on proofs taken openly at the trial, free from all danger by extraneous influences.  Panko v. Flintkote Co., 7 N.J. 55, 61-62 (N.J. 1951).
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ......................................  3 LEGAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................  10 POINT I .......................................................................................................................  10 LEGAL STANDARD OF REVIEW (Issues Not Raised Below) ..................  10 POINT II ....................................................................................................................  11  THE TRIAL COURT’S APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL HEARING OFFICER WAS IMPROPER AND WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS AS THERE WAS NO MT. LAUREL VIOLATION FOUND.  (M38-57; M477-513).  .........................................................................................................................  11  A.  The Trial Court Improperly Usurped the Zoning Board’s Powers and Conferred a Mount Laurel and Builder’s Remedy Upon Respondents.  (M1-64).  .........................................................................................  12  B.  The Process Fashioned by the Trial Court for the SHO was Flawed and Failed to Adequately Permit Township and Public Participation in the Hearing and was Inconsistent with the Municipal Land Use Law.  (M1-64; 462-473)  .........................  12  POINT III  .........................................................................................................................21  THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT THE MAYOR’S COMMENTS HAD UNDULY PREJUDICED THE ZONING BOARD’S ABILITY TO HEAR THE AMENDED APPLICATION WAS PRETEXTUAL.  (M38-51; M477-513)  ..............................................21  A.  The Trial Court’s Holding Concerning the Mayor’s Press Release Creates a Chilling Effect on the Ability of Local Public Officials to Comment on Important Community Issues.  (M38-51).  ..................................................................................................................27  POINT IV ..........................................................................................................................31
[directive] d. shall "Force" have the same meaning as defined in the Attorney General's Use of Policy.  The term shall physical, mechanical, Force "force" include enhanced mechanical, deadly and force.  "Investigation of criminal pertaining a offense" means any police activity to the investigation of an indictable crime, disorderly persons offense, or petty disorderly offense, including but not limited to responding to a report of a possible criminal offense; an investigative detention on or leading to reasonable and articulable based suspicion a criminal offense been or is being committed; an arrest to believe that has for criminal an interview of potential witness to a criminal offense; or a offense; a potential criminal canvassing an area, neighborhood, or premises for witnesses to a offense.
[brief] The introductory language of Paragraph 3 provides that: “All payments under Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be applied by Lender as follows. ” (Pa189 (emphasis added). )  Thus, looking first to Paragraph 1, the Mortgage provides that: “Borrower shall pay when due the principal of, and interest on, the debt evidenced by the Note and any prepayment and late charges due under the Note” (Pa188 (emphasis added)), and Paragraph 2 (id.) talks about monthly payments. \(^4\)  The latter clearly does not apply, as a short \(^4\)  The Trial Court did not make any findings that Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 “creat[e] an affirmative obligation on the part of its holder to both accept and apply all payments received on account of the Loan in the manner designed therein” as Respondent states.
[brief] This appeal constitutes the fourth attempt by Defendants to overturn this verdict, with the first three all being unequivocally denied by [...].  First, [...] addressed most of the issues argued herein when they originally appeared at trial.  Second, Her Honor entertained them on Defendants’ Motion for New Trial.  Third, she dispensed with them on Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration.  Defendants had three, separate opportunities to present a single meritorious argument now on appeal, and all three times, they failed.  As the Court will see in the following Brief, Defendants still fail to present a single valid reason why the verdict in Plaintiff’s favor should be overturned.
[brief] Id.  On November 29, 2018, Appellant met with Respondents [...] and [...].  (Pa230, Pa349-51, Pa382)  98:17-104:25, 106-109:19, 233:3-234:13.  Appellant believed this meeting was to discuss her reports of sexual harassment by [...].  Instead, Respondent [...] started the meeting by telling Appellant that she had received complaints about her clothing.  She tried to ask for more details about these alleged “complaints,” but was cut off by Respondent [...], who also said that Respondent [...] had told her that she (Respondent [...]) had previously met with Appellant and talked about her attire.  Id.  Appellant never had any such discussion with Respondent [...] and explained the same to Respondent [...].  This was first time she had ever heard about anyone complaining about her clothing, i.e., immediately after she complained about [...].  Id.  Although Appellant presented allegations of sexual harassment by [...] to Respondent [...] which required him to investigate, Respondent [...] did not do so.  Respondent [...] claimed he did not investigate because of the lawsuit, even though lawsuit was not filed until late January 2019, nearly two months later.
[brief] Similarly, the trial court’s reliance on the Prevailing Wage Statute’s definition of “public work” [N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.26(5)], is inapposite and belied by the DOL’s decision in [...].  Indeed, the PWCRA only refers to the Prevailing Wage Statute’s definition of “public work” to identify those projects governed by the PWCRA – which this Project clearly is.  N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51.  Nowhere in the PWCRA does it limit the registration requirement to only those who perform prevailing wage work.  The trial court’s reliance on the term “worker” as defined by the PWCRA was also improper.  That term is not used to define a subcontractor and, as illustrated in N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51, there is a clear distinction between a contractor and subcontractor with each having distinct obligations.  Even if that term is applicable to subcontractors (which it plainly is not), the term “worker” includes “labor” performed by “skilled or semi-skilled” labor “regardless of whether their work becomes a component part” of the project.  N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.50.  Pursuant to the Solicitation, and consistent with the referenced definition, the archeological subcontractor’s work is described as “labor for on-site services. ”  1334a.  Without limiting its role, the archaeological subcontractor is responsible for sifting through excavated materials and, if necessary, hand excavate in areas where potential historic artifacts may exist.  Thus, based on this definition, the archeological subcontractor is a “worker” performing work on the Project.  Respondents’ prior argument the DOL’s decision in [...] would have been decided differently if it was made after the PWCRA was amended to include N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.51a is nonsensical and unsupportable.  While the DOL Commissioner in [...] made its decision before the Legislature created this exception, the exception (if applied) would have had no impact on the DOL’s determination because the exception only applies if the subcontractor is not working on site.  1334a.  Therefore, when the subcontractor is performing work on site – as is the case here – the exception does not apply.  Moreover, given that the type of work performed by the land surveyor is substantially similar to the work to be performed by the archeological subcontractor, there is no basis to guess that the DOL would now reach a different conclusion.  C.
[brief] ## CASES | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | Angus v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Metuchen, 475 N.J. Super. 362 (App. Div. 2023) | 33, 34 | | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins., 142 N.J. 520 (1995).  | 46 | | Circus Liquors, Inc. v. Middletown Tp., 109 N.J. 1 (2009).  | 14 | | Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).  | 40 | | Dennery v. Bd. of Educ. of Passaic Cty. Reg’l High Sch. Dist. No. 1, Passaic Cty., 131 N.J. 626 (1993) | 15, 21, 24, 37 | | Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2 (1969).  | 37, 43 | | Dunbar Bev v. Brown, SEC Docket No. C25-11 (2011).  | 28, 38 | | Hemsey v. Bd. of Trustees, PERS, 198 N.J. 215 (2009).  | 14 | | Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980).  | 24 | | Hodrinsky v. Faussette, SEC Docket No. C11-21 (2021).  | 31 | | I/M/O Leonard, SEC Docket Nos. C56-19 and C57-19 (Consolidated) (2021) | 28, 29, 31, 38 | | I/M/O Treston, SEC Docket No. C71-18 (2021).  | 30, 31 | | In re Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254 (2010).  | 15 | | In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182 (2011).  | 14 | | In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644 (1999).  | 14 | | Jackson v. Concord Company, 54 N.J. 113 (1969).  | 14 | | L.A. Bd. of Educ. of Trenton, 221 N.J. 192 (1969).  | 14 | | Mary Carter Paint Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 333 F.2d 654 (1964), | 31 | | Matter of Musick, 143 N.J. 206 (1996).  | 36 | | Melnyk v. Fiel, SEC Docket No. C64-18 (2019).  | 26, 27, 28, 31 | | Nicoletta v. N. Jerey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 77 N.J. 145 (1978).  | 40 | | Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 101 N.J. 95 (1985).  | 14, 24 | | Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474 (1974).  | 43 | Silviera-Francisco v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Elizabeth, 224 N.J. 126 (2016)  .................................................. 13,40 Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J. Dept. of Entl. Prot., 191 N.J. 38 (2007)  ...........................................  14  STATUTES AND RULES
[brief] ”  Marrin v. Capital Health Sys., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112988, * 7 (D.N.J. July 20, 2017) (quoting Noren v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., 448 N.J. Super. 486, 497 (App. Div. 2017)).  This provision is only applicable in circumstances where “the employer [was] vindicated and the employee . . . proceeded without basis in law or fact. ”  Id.; see also N.J.S.A. 34:19-6 (“[a] court, . . . may . . . order that reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs be awarded to an employer if the court determines that an action brought by an employee under this act was without basis in law or in fact.