ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...] did not file a pretrial motion to compel a line-up, but instead waited until mid-trial before making the request.  More significantly, both [...] and [...] identified [...].  [...]'s identification of [...] from photographs shown to her four days after the homicide was admitted into evidence at trial, and she identified [...] during the trial as the man in the hotel room with the gun.  [...], who had known [...] as [...]'s brother or step-brother, also identified [...].  In other words, there was no significant question, considering “the nature and circumstances of the alleged crime,” whether identification of [...] was truly an issue.  *Id.* at 226.  The trial court acted well within its sound discretion when it denied [...]'s request for a line-up.  Cf. *Henderson*, supra, 208 N.J. at 288 (explaining that “to obtain a pretrial hearing, defendant has the initial burden of showing some evidence of suggestiveness that could lead to a mistaken identification”).
[brief] Moreover, a fair reading of Court Rule 4:28-1 does not require joinder of persons if relief can be had amongst the parties before the court in the absence of such person.  [...], as formed, never conveyed development rights to [...], LLC when that entity formed in 1999.  (Da63)  Subsection(b) of the rule sets forth the factors.  The factors to be considered by the court include: first, the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to that person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
[brief] Factors that support an articulable and reasonable suspicion a suspect is armed and dangerous include: a stop occurring in a high-crime area, see Privott, 203 N.J. at 26; see also State v. Valentine, 134 N.J. 536, 547 (1994) (explaining “the location of the investigatory stop can reasonably elevate a police officer's suspicion that a suspect is armed”); the knowledge and experience of police officers, see Valentine, 134 N.J. at 547 (“Terry itself acknowledges that police officers must be permitted to use their knowledge and experience in deciding whether to frisk a suspect. ”); see also Bard, 445 N.J. Super. at 156-57; and a suspect's movements towards a waistband, pocket, or other area of the body where the suspect is likely to conceal a weapon, see, e.g., Privott, 203 N.J. at 29; Bard, 445 N.J. Super. at 157-58; State v. Bellamy, 260 N.J. Super. 449, 457 (App. Div. 1992).  As the trial court properly found, [...]’s pat-down frisk was justified given the totality of the circumstances.
[brief] She set forth not only the confidential prejudicial information she imparted to [...], but also specific details of the conversation recounted by [...] as follows: (1) she provided documentation to [...]; (2) the date of the conversation; (3) the relevant statute of limitations; (4) potential extension of the filing date; and (5) the inclusion of family in California as potential petitioners.  [...] then attempts to argue that knowing the “strategy or weakness of [[...]’s] position and settlement posture” would not be privileged and substantially harmful because “both changed because of the January 2022 Will, which added potential beneficiaries to the mix. ”  On August 8, 2018, Decedent executed a Will leaving her entire estate to family members, including Petitioners, the natural objects of her bounty.  Pa43.  The January 2022 Will, executed four months after Decedent’s husband’s death was the first will that left the Respondents the lion’s share of the Decedent’s Estate.
[directive] C.  Sentencing  Municipal court judges exercise considerable discretion at sentencing.  For statutory offenses, the court’s discretion is subject to any statutory maximum or minimum penalties and based on the criteria prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 to -3 and N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2.  See R. 7:9-1(b).  A municipal prosecutor seeking to mitigate the consequences of a marijuana conviction may make favorable sentencing recommendations or not object to the defendant’s requests.
[brief] (Compare Pa114 with Pa25, ¶23).  Even then, they appeared at the November 17, 2022 hearing to object to the application (Pa26, ¶25 & ¶26).  They then filed this action after that hearing.  The second difference is that in Willoughby, the entire community was impacted.  After mounting “a well-publicized campaign” against the candidates who voted for the zoning change, the candidates who opposed the zoning change won the election and ultimately rezoned the property back to its original zoning.  Willoughby, 306 N.J. Super. at 271 & 278.  In this case, Plaintiff is a group of homeowners who live near the Redevelopment Area and live closest to the proposed development.  (Pa26, ¶26 & Pb1 & Da79).  Plaintiff contends “this case involves a public dispute over a proposed development which stands to significantly impact the adjacent residential neighborhood in various way[s] including by substantially increasing traffic in the area. ” (Pb15).  While the issue in Willoughby affected the entire municipality, the issue in this case predominately affects one neighborhood.  While Plaintiff may be impacted, there is no contention that there will be a significant impact to [...] as a whole.
[brief] The Court’s prior cases had “held that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense,” and “[i]n doing so, . . . held unconstitutional two laws that prohibited the possession and use of handguns in the home. ”  Id. at 17 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742 (2010)).
[brief] The MSRA provides the Director with broad powers in taking employment actions in municipalities “in need of stabilization and recovery,” and specifically authorizes the Director and/or his Designee to:  [T]ake any steps to stabilize the finances, restructure the debts, or assist in the financial rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery, including, but not limited to:  _____________________  3  Defendant [...] replaced [...] as the Director of the Division of Local Government Services in the Department of Community Affairs during the relevant time period.  (Pa000033, Compl. ¶ 4).  (f) amending or terminating any existing contracts or agreements, which shall not include bonds, notes, indentures, or other similar financing instruments and documents to which the municipality is a party, in accordance with the terms thereof; or unilaterally amending or terminating any contracts or agreements which shall not include bonds, notes, indentures, or other similar financing instruments and documents to which the municipality is a party, provided that the director determines that the unilateral termination or amendment is reasonable and directly related to stabilizing the finances or assisting with the fiscal rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery; (g) unilaterally modifying, amending, or terminating any collective negotiations agreements, except those related to school districts, to which the municipality is a party, or unilaterally modifying, amending, or terminating the terms and conditions of employment during the term of any applicable collective negotiations agreement, or both, provided that the director determines that the modifications, amendments, or terminations are reasonable and directly related to stabilizing the finances or assisting with the fiscal rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality in need of stabilization and recovery[.]...
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED UNDER A STRICTLY DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW THAT THE BOARD PROPERLY INTERPRETED THE WORD “DESIGN” IN THE ORDINANCE (Pa13-Pa15).  The trial court’s careful consideration - under a strictly “de novo” review – as to whether the Board properly interpreted the use of the word “designed” in the Building Height Definition should not be disturbed on appeal.  The express language of the Building Height Definition clearly supports a single --- \(^1\)  Plaintiff now argues that there is also ambiguity in the term “to allow” in the Building Height Definition, but this issue was never raised before the trial court, which is why the trial court did not address it in its opinion.
[directive] Instead, officers should collect the individual’s personal information and process them accordingly.  Those offenses are: Simple possession of more than 6 ounces of marijuana, 2C:35-10(a)(3)(b); • Simple possession of more than 17 grams of hashish, 2C:35-10(a)(3)(b); • Distribution of 1 ounce or less of marijuana, 2C:35-5(b)(12)(b); and • Distribution of 5 grams or less of hashish, 2C:35-5(b)(12)(b).  •  All four of these offenses constitute fourth-degree crimes, except when an individual engages in their first violation of the distribution offenses (which, as noted above, only results in a warning).  Officers should therefore charge these fourth-degree offenses by complaint-summons rather than complaint-warrant, and should not fingerprint the individual until their initial court appearance on the summons.  Finally, the odor of marijuana or hashish, either burnt or raw, by itself no longer establishes “reasonable articulable suspicion” to initiate a stop or search of a person or their vehicle to determine a violation of a possession offense or a fourth-degree distribution offense.  II.
[brief] See *Baghdikian v. Board of Adjustment of Borough of Ramsey*, 247 N.J. Super. 45, 50 (App. Div. 1991); see also *Osario v. West New York Rent Control Board*, 410 N.J. Super. 437, 442 (App. Div. 2009).  Notably, a case [...] relies upon, *Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt*, 45 N.J. 268 (1965), makes clear that board members are capable of conducting their own research and relying on facts outside of the record the parties present to them.  In *Kramer*, the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated that, The Board, however, is not obligated to function in a vacuum.  *Reinauer Realty Corp. v. Nucera*, 59 N.J. Super. 189, 201 (157 A.2d 524) (App.Div.1960), certif. denied, 32 N.J. 347 (160 A.2d 845) (1960).  Thus, the rule requiring that personal knowledge of Board members be set forth in the record applies only where the knowledge thus gained is made the Basis for the award of the variance.  *Giordano v. City Commission of City of Newark*, 2 N.J. 585 (67 A.2d 454) (1949); *Stolz v. Ellenstein*, 7 N.J. 291 (81 A.2d 476) (1951).
[brief] 1T85:16-86:17; 2T203:13-18.  Plaintiff asserted that when she returned to retrieve her belongings in early 2018, items had been removed from her apartment.  2T52:18-53:6.  However, [...] was not involved in this incident except that, after [...] was no longer living at the Bernardsville house, at [...]’ request [...] moved two boxes which were sitting near the open door in plaintiff’s space to the basement space used by [...], because [...] said they were too heavy for him to move.
[brief] On November 21, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County (Pa-1).  The case proceeded through discovery, and the Plaintiff’s deposition took place on February 4, 2020 (1T).  On May 1, 2020, the State Defendants, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Pa-10) which was granted as to the Plaintiff’s LAD claims, but not her CEPA claims, on August 7, 2020 (Pa-117).  Defendant filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment (Pa-123) which oral argument was heard on August 8, 2022 (2T).  An Order was entered granting Summary Judgment on that same date (Pa-171).  Plaintiff filed for reconsideration which was heard on February 21, 2023 (3T) and denied on that same date (Pa-173).  The Motion filed in Mercer County and heard by [...] was, as indicated above, granted as to Plaintiff’s LAD claims, but not her CEPA claims.  In 2022, the same Defendants filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment which was the same as the first Motion for Summary Judgment.  After discovery, the State Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which was heard by the Hon. [...], J.S.C. After oral argument, the Motion filed before [...] was the same Motion for Summary Judgment.  --- 1 T; Transcript of Plaintiff’s Deposition on February 4, 2020; 2 2T; Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment on August 8, 2022; and 3 3T; Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration on February 21, 2023. filed in 2022 by the same Defendants.
[brief] [...] was initially charged with simple assault as a result of the May 21, 2022 attack.  Pa4.  The [...] ultimately charged him with second-degree aggravated assault, later amended to third-degree.  See Da235, 3:3-20; Da237, 5:16-18.  Defendant [...] was also charged with third-degree aggravated assault.  Pa4.  Co-defendant [...] was charged with simple assault and N.D. with a juvenile offense.  Id.  On March 6, 2023, the trial court in this civil action, the Honorable [...], J.S.C., entered an order providing that, in light of the pending criminal matter, [...]’s deposition should not be taken for 180 days, with the stay to expire earlier if the criminal charges resolved sooner.
[directive] 대해 2014 유죄를 인정하는 경우, 판사는 다른 선고에 추가하여 종신 가석방 감독의 특별 선고를 내린다는 것을 아십니까?  Do you understand that if you are pleading guilty to the crime of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping pursuant to 2C:13-1c(2), endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4a, endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to 2C:24-4b(3), endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to offense was committed on or after February 2C:24-4b(5)(b)(i) or (ii) (if the 1, 2018), luring or an attempt to commit any of these offenses and the offense occurred on or after January 14, 2004, or violating a condition of a occurred special sentence of community supervision for life if the violation on or after July 1, 2014 the court, in addition to any other sentence, will impose a special sentence of parole supervision for life?
[brief] The facts and circumstances shown by the testimony of lay witnesses were sufficient to enable a jury to decide that question.  The expert’s opinion was based largely, if not entirely, upon the same facts and circumstances. ”); *People v. Eberle*, 265 A.D.2d 881, 882 (4th Dep’t N.Y. 1999) (concluding medical examiner’s testimony that infant died of “homicidal suffocation” was based on information learned from police rather than examiner’s professional or medical knowledge and therefore “intruded on the province of the jury to draw inferences and conclusions” from trial evidence).  In an instructive recent case applying these principles, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that a medical examiner’s opinions on the cause and manner of a baby’s death should not have been introduced at trial, as they “were not sufficiently based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge so as to assist the jury.
[brief] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9a-14a  [...]-to-[...] letter dated 4/18/23.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15a  [...]-to-[...] letter dated 2/17/23.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] N.J.S.A. 10:5-3 (legislative finding that “discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of the inhabitants of the State but menaces the institutions and foundations of a free democratic State”).  And a significant body of case law is in accord.  See, e.g., *Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees*, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984) (holding that “eliminating discrimination … plainly serves compelling state interests of the highest order”); *Dixon v. Rutgers*, 110 N.J. 432, 451 (1988) (confirming that “[t]he eradication of ‘the cancer of discrimination’ has long been one of our State’s highest priorities”); Peper, 77 N.J. at 80 (adding that “New Jersey has always been in the vanguard in the fight to eradicate the cancer of unlawful discrimination of all types from our society”); Gallo v. Salesian Soc’y, 290 N.J. Super. 616, 643 (App. Div. 1996) (agreeing that the state interest in combatting discrimination “is compelling, beyond cavil”).
[brief] Police transported him to the Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office.  (4T:102-16 to 103-25; 143-9 to 144-4).  The outside of the Impala was photographed and items that were located outside the vehicle were processed.  Defendant’s vehicle was then towed to a secured facility at the Prosecutor’s Office.  (4T:104-1 to 17; 5T:88-15 to 99-4).  Once at the Prosecutor’s office, defendant was searched again and items from his person removed.  More specifically, a black wallet containing defendant’s New Jersey Driver’s License and a New Jersey Firearms Purchaser Identification Card, in the name of [...].  (4T:144-5 to 8; 147-5 to 18).  The passenger found in the vehicle with defendant was identified as [...].
[brief] The Post Trial Order provides the following, in relevant part:  Because Defendant is in breach of the lease due to nonpayment of five months rent, the defendant is not due any refund of fit up costs under Section 4.02 of the Lease (Da1-2).  In addition, on the day the Post Trial Order was issued, [...] further articulated the basis for this holding on the record by stating, *inter alia*, that Tenant was not entitled to these reimbursement payments under Section 4.02 because such reimbursements are “only payable if you’re not in breach.  And you’re in breach … so you don’t get the fit up refund.  That’s my ruling …” (2T9-15 to 2T9-18).  [...] then reaffirmed this ruling by denying Tenant’s Motion for Reconsideration in its entirety (Da3) and clearly stating on the record, once again, that Tenant was not entitled to these reimbursements because “Tenant was in breach, when you’re in breach you don’t have to pay -- the landlord does not have to pay the fit up costs.  And I think that’s clearly outlined in the lease documents. ” (3T16-24 to 3T17-4).  Based on these clear and unambiguous findings of fact and conclusions of law, the parties and this Court were clearly apprised of the basis of [...]’s holdings.
[brief] [...] had a legal duty to appeal the Vermont Trial Court’s adverse rulings against [...] and his co-defendant Directors; and [...] clearly breached that duty.  As of March 5, 2021, there were at least “reasonable grounds to believe that the insured’s interests might be served by an appeal. ”  *Pharmacists*, 187 Vt. at 334, 993 A.2d at 421.  [...] has never even argued otherwise.  [...]’s premature, wrongful withdrawal of its defense of the HCH Action on March 5, 2021, forced [...] and his assignor to pay money to settle the case that [...] had been defending.  [...] is liable to pay that loss.  [...]’s summary judgment motion should have been denied, and [...]’s cross-motion for summary judgment should have been granted.  We ask this Court to rectify the error.  Dated: December 11, 2023  **[...]**  *Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant*  James W. [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...]  JAMES W. DABNEY, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. [...], Defendant/Respondent.
[brief] After considering its equitable power and the affidavits presented, the Board reasonably concluded that “[...] did not exercise reasonable diligence nor demonstrate reasonable grounds for such a protracted delay in filing the eligibility registration form,” where he filed his form approximately one year and one month past the deadline.  (Pa13-14).  Nor did [...] demonstrate extreme hardship in this matter, as he will continue to receive his Special Retirement benefits with concurrent retiree health benefits coverage.
[brief] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................  1  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................  2 LEGAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................  3  POINT I ..................................................................................................  3  STANDARD ON APPEAL (Not raised below)  POINT II ..............................................................................................  3  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY  JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT (Raised below; Pa1; T25-8-16)  POINT III ............................................................................................  9  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES/COSTS (Raised below; Pa11; T32-21-25; T49-15 to T49-25)  CONCLUSION .....................................................................................  11  | Document Name | Date | Appendix Page Number or Transcript | |---------------------------------------|----------|-----------------------------------| | Order Granting Summary | | | | Judgment | 1/23/2023| Pa1 | | Order (for damages, attorney’s fees and costs) | 10/12/23 | Pa11 | | Case/Other Authority | Category | Brief Page Number | |---------------------------------------------------------|----------------|-------------------| | R. 2:10-2 | Court Rule | 3 | | R. 4:36-2 (c) | Court Rule | 6 | | N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 | Statute | 9 | | Baer v. Sorbello, 177 N.J. Super. 1982 (App. Div. 1984) | Case Law | 4 | | Bilotti v. Accurate Forming Co., 39 N.J. 184 (1963) | Case Law | 4 | | Boyer v. Anchor Disposal and Sunshiner Maintenance, 135 N.J. 86 (1994) | Case Law | 4 | | Brill by. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | Case Law | 5 | | Buccianna v. Micheletti, 311 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div. 1998) | Case Law | 9 | | Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67 (1954) | Case Law | 4, 5, 7 | | Manetas v. International Pet. Carriers, Inc., 541 F. 2d 408 (C.A. N.J. 1976) | Case Law | 4 | Appellate Division
[brief] PLAINTIFF’S CONSENT WAS NOT REQUIRED IN ORDER FOR THE CITY TO AMEND THE REDEVELOPMENT PLAN AND ALLOW THE REDEVELOPMENT OF THE 290 OCEAN PROPERTY  Next, Plaintiff argues that it possessed blanket veto authority in perpetuity to prevent any further development in the Redevelopment Area by any other redeveloper.  Plaintiff’s self-serving argument is not only factually and legally without merit but reveals Plaintiff’s true motivation to stifle economic competition through baseless litigation.  There is no statutory provision in the LRHL which requires a municipality to obtain the written consent of other designated redevelopers of other properties located within the redevelopment area prior to any amendment of the redevelopment plan.  The power to amend a redevelopment plan lies solely with the governing body, subject to the report of the planning board.
[brief] 26 Najduch v. Independence Twp., 411 N.J. Super. 268 (App. Div. 2009) .... 28, 47 Nuckel v. Little Ferry Planning Bd., 208 N.J. 95 (2011) ......................... 18, 28 Paramus Multiplex Corp. v. Hartz Mtn. Indus., Inc., 236 N.J. Super. 104 (Law Div. 1987)  .....................................................
[brief] The trial judge similarly failed to consider the contractual offset clauses at all, not even mentioning them, much less analyzing their operation under the Lease.  In missing these crucial provisions, the trial court misapprehended and misconstrued § 4.02.  Paragraph one of the November 10, 2021 order and the entirety of the November 9, 2023 order should be vacated and the matter should be remanded so that the trial court can fix the amount Landlord owes Tenant for the unreimbursed Tenant’s Allowance installment payments under the Lease.  POINT III