ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The trial court correctly determined the 1999 Agreement clear and unambiguous insofar as the 1999 Agreement entitles the Township to connection fees related to the Subject Property.  Specifically, as explicitly held by the trial court, “the plain language of the 1999 Agreement . . . entitles [the Township] to all connection fees for users ‘outside the Borough’ for which sewage is transmitted through mains and lines through the Borough to the Township Treatment Plant.
[brief] [...] DID NOT CONDUCT DISCOVERY IN THE LAW DIVISION AND DID NOT WAIVE ARBITRATION  Plaintiffs argue that the "Respondents" waived their contractual right to arbitration by conducting discovery in the Law Division prior to filing their motion.  Pb10.  Plaintiffs' contention is incorrect.  [...] was not named in Plaintiffs' January 20, 2023 Complaint.  Pa0005-Pa0018.  As such, it did not participate in any discovery since it was not a party to the case.  It was not until December 7, 2023, that the Court entered an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion For Leave To File a First Amended Complaint to add, in relevant part, [...] as a Defendant.
[brief] A.  The Highlands Act and Implementing Rules Do Not Require An Analysis of Air Pollution and Climate Change Considerations.  Appellants argue that the Supreme Court intended, through the guidance set forth above, for [...] to “consider and account for the totality of the circumstances surrounding the project, including its contribution to the ongoing climate crisis. ”  Asb6.  Appellants interpretation would improperly enlarge the scope of [...]’s review under the Highlands Act, and is not supported by the plain language of the Highlands Act or the Supreme Court’s guidance.  As the Supreme Court explained:  [t]he goals of the preservation area are chiefly to promote preservation and conservation, N.J.S.A. 13:20-10(b)(1) to (8), but the final goal explicitly states that development should be limited to the maximum extent possible when it is ‘incompatible with preservation of this unique area,” id. at (9).  Simply stated, the Highlands Act does not preclude development in this area; it limits only development that is incompatible with preservation and would therefore cause a decline in the environmental quality of the region. ”  In re Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station ([...]), 258 N.J. at ____ (emphasis in the original).  Since the construction, operation, and maintenance of [...] has no permanent impacts on Highlands resource areas, [...] is clearly compatible with preservation and would not cause a decline in the environmental quality of the region.
[brief] First, if the “clear language of the [NJCFLA]” addressed the private right of action as PRA claims, there would be no need to analyze an implied private right of action here.  There is no language in the NJCFLA that addressed the private right of action.  Second, the trial court specifically held that [...]’s reliance on *LVNV Funding, LLC v. DeAngelo*, 464 N.J. Super. 103, 110 (App. Div. 2020), was misplaced as “[[...]] does not have the benefit of th[e] [FDCPA’s] countervailing policy interest,” i.e., curbing abusive debt collection practices.  *See* October 26, 2023 Statement of Reasons p. 2 (Da61); *see also* 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a); 15 U.S.C. § 1692(d).
[brief] “Erroneous instructions on matters material to a jury's deliberation are presumed to be reversible error” even where defense counsel did not object.  *State v. Jackmon*, 305 N.J. Super 274, 277-278 (App. Div. 1997); *State v. Sette*, 259 N.J. Super 156, 189 (App. Div. 1992) (same).  They are “presumed to be reversible error, and are thus poor candidates for rehabilitation under the concept of harmless error. ”  *State v. Diaz*, 144 N.J. 628, 641 (1996).  **B.
[brief] That question – based on a tangible application requesting DEP action will then proceed through the well-worn, traditional regulatory process to the Office of Administrative Law, Commissioner, and Appellate Division – not via a prerogative writ application to the Superior Court, Law Division on a municipal ordinance altering zoning that could lead to such a future development project.  Thus, because [...]’s theoretical concern is not yet ripe, Count Four of [...]’s challenge to the Ordinance and Plan as being invalid vis-vis the Public Trust Doctrine must be rejected as a matter of law (Pa1725-1727).  E.
[brief] THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST [...] UNDER THE MCS-90 ENDORSEMENT IN THE [...] POLICY IN ITS ORDER OF FEBRUARY 23, 2024 AS WELL AS IN REFUSING TO LATER VACATE SUCH ORDER A.  **The MCS-90 Endorsement Only Applies to Liability for “Negligence”. **  The MCS-90 endorsement would compel an insurer to pay “any final judgment recovered against the insured for public liability resulting from negligence in the operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles” (emphasis added) (PPCIa183).  [...] has not been adjudged negligent (PPCIa369-71), nor did [...] assert a negligence cause of action against [...] (PPCIa053-75).  The April 6, 2023 “Final Judgment” against [...] states only that “THE COURT FINDS that [...] is liable under the Spill Act for the Incident” (emphasis in original) (PPCIa370).  Negligence is not an element of liability under the Spill Act.  “Not only does the Spill Act not incorporate a common-law negligence standard of care, but it provides for strict liability without regard to fault. ”  *McCay Dev. Co. v. Jenny Oil Corp.*, A-6335-94-T1 (App. Div. Aug. 8, 1996) (slip op. at 6) (See PPCIa495-501 for a copy of the *McCay* opinion); see also, *Russell-Stanley Corp. v. Plant Indus., Inc.*, 250 N.J. Super. 478, 497-498 (Ch. Div. 1991) (Spill Act strict liability claims and common-law causes of action are to be pled separately).  Liability under the Spill Act arises against “any person who has discharged a hazardous substance, or is in any way responsible for any hazardous substance” and that person “shall be strictly liable, jointly and severally, without regard to fault, for all cleanup and removal costs no matter by whom incurred. ”  N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g; emphasis added.  “The Spill Act is supposed to be construed liberally to effectuate its purposes.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey has determined that a party ‘even remotely responsible for causing contamination will be deemed a responsible party under the Act’. ”  N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. PPG Indus., 197 F.3d 96, 106 (3d Cir. 1999) quoting In re Kimber Petroleum Corp., 110 N.J. 69, 85 (1988).  The April 6, 2023 “Final Judgment” against [...] is not a “final judgment recovered against the insured for public liability resulting from negligence in the operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles” that Prime, as [...]’s insurer, might be obligated to pay if the Prime policy did not afford coverage.  (Compare PPCIa183 to PPCIa369-71).
[brief] There is no basis in law to support Plaintiffs’ contention that all video from the date should have been preserved.  The incident was not captured on video and [...]’s policy is that it does not preserve video where an incident is not captured.  Plaintiffs failure to issue any notice of preservation is specifically relevant as [...] would be left to guess as to what footage, which aisles, and for how long footage could potentially be relevant to Plaintiffs’ case.  Therefore, the trial court did not err when it decided not to award an inference charge and granted [...]’s motion for summary judgment.  [...] submits that there is nothing in the record that should call for the reversal of the Order granting that motion.  CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, [...] respectfully submits that summary judgment was properly entered below.  This Court should now affirm its entry and deny Plaintiffs the relief they seek.
[brief] In the email, Defendant [...] wrote that he had decided not to go forward with the long-planned [...] succession agreement but rather to terminate him.  Da36, ¶ 64, with Da102 (1/28/23 email from [...] to [...] at 3:17 p.m. stating, “Bill [[...]], I’ve decided not to go forward with [...]’s [succession] agreement”).  In that email, [...] conspired with [...] – who was functioning as both [...]’s and [...]’s lawyer on the issue of a succession agreement – to conceal the decision not to go forward with [...] as a successor-manager of the entire Firm.  [...] wrote, “For obvious reasons, I’m not telling [...] anything now. ”  Da36, ¶ 64.  On February 1, 2023, at 4:05 p.m., [...] emailed [...] under the heading, “Severance Considerations,” obviously reflecting [...]’s retaliatory decision not only to appoint someone other than [...] as successor, but also to fire him in retaliation for all of the aforesaid protected activity.  The email provided attachments that would purportedly assist [...] in calculating severance for Plaintiff [...].  Id., ¶ 65.  Defendant [...]’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s succession as the Firm’s manager and to terminate him was in direct retaliation for Plaintiff having asked for the reasonable accommodation and family medical leave (because of Plaintiff’s disability and his son’s illness) as well as Plaintiff’s opposition to the aforesaid violations of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s RPCs.
[brief] There is a discussion of the duties of Condominium Associations and while Respondent generally does not disagree with the case law, it is respectfully submitted that this is unrelated to the present appeal.  (App. Brief, pp. 16-17).  Certainly, Appellant has not provided this Court, nor the court below, any analysis as to why or how this could provide a cognizable legal theory against Respondent.  Appellant then makes arguments relative to *res ipsa loquitur* doctrine.  (App. Brief, pp. 21-23).  These arguments were previously made in the Motion to Restore that was argued in front of [...] in July 2023.  (3T5:1923).  [...] indicated that this case did not involve that doctrine.  (3T7:21 - 8:4).  Appellant's Brief does not posit any reason, nor make any arguments, as to why the prior denial was improper.
[brief] However, if a written Master Plan existed, the Governing Body was not precluded from adopting a zoning ordinance inconsistent with that Master Plan, so long as consistent with a “comprehensive plan. ”  See *Bow & Arrow Manor v. West Orange*, 63 N.J. 335, 346-347 (1973).  However, that “practices under the old Law led to zoning enactments and procedures that often reflected inadequate planning or no planning at all. ”  *Pop Realty Corp. v. Springfield Tp. Bd. of Adj.*, 176 N.J. Super. 441, 448 (Law Div. 1980).  The reason that there was a need to conform to a “comprehensive plan” was to avoid zoning being enacted arbitrarily --- as a reaction to a concern of the moment or pressure of a few individuals.  See *Conlon v. Bd. of Public Works, Paterson*, 11 N.J. 363, 366 (1953); *Zaehring v. Long Beach*, 56 N.J. Super. 26, 33 (Law Div. 1959).  The 1975 MLUL created a more definitive and comprehensive emphasis upon planning and the Master Plan as the foundation for zoning action.
[brief] Da_154-157.  On August 2, 2023, during the pendency of these motions, this Court published its opinion in Neuwirth.  A few days before scheduled argument, the trial court adjourned the argument and ordered supplemental briefing on Neuwirth’s applicability to the pending motions.  Da_160-172; Da_173-180.  Argument was ultimately held on October 20, 2023 (Transcript filed separately).  On October 23, 2023, the trial court issued three separate Orders and a single Statement of Reasons denying the defendants’ motions.
[brief] “The standard is an objective one, meaning that the specific plaintiff need not prove that she was actually confused or misled, only that the objective least sophisticated debtor would be. ”  Jensen, 791 F.3d at 419; Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 499 (consumer who received but did not read a collection letter, the contents of which violates the FDCPA, may pursue statutory damages for the violation).
[brief] On January 17, 2017, [...] reaffirmed by resolution the designation of certain blocks as areas in need of redevelopment, including among others, Block 419 and 610, “to fulfill its affordable housing obligations. ”  508a.  The Council voted to amend the Redevelopment Agreement on July 18, 2017, to clarify that fifteen percent of the affordable housing set aside would be placed on-site at [...] Station and five percent may be “construct[ed] . . . elsewhere within the Borough (‘Off-site’). ”  155a.  Pursuant to the formula set forth therein, fifteen percent of all units at [...] Station equals twenty-two affordable units on-site, and five percent yields seven Off-site Units.  See ibid.  With a plan in place for realizing the construction of affordable housing and a willing partner to build it, on November 21, 2017, [...] and [...] entered a Settlement Agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”), with a corresponding obligation to provide twenty-two units on Block 419 and the option to provide seven units off-site.
[brief] In addition, plaintiff relies upon an unpublished opinion, specifically *Lakewood Realty Associates, LLC vs. Township of Lakewood Planning Board and RD Lakewood, LLC*.  Respectfully, this case echoes the previously well-known case law that is set forth in *Pond Run Watershed Association vs. Township of Hamilton Zoning Board of Adjustment*, 397 N.J. Super. (App. Div. 2008) and *Perlmart of Lacey, Inc. vs. Lacey Township Planning Board*, 295 N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 1996).
[brief] If the bill has not been referred to committee, it shall be forwarded to the Clerk of the General Assembly or the Secretary of the Senate, as appropriate.  8.  Whenever the Legislative Budget Officer has reason to believe that a fiscal note on any bill will be required more quickly than provided for in this act, he shall submit to the director an emergency request for fiscal information, which the director shall cause to be completed as quickly as possible, but in no case later than 10 *business* days.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................................................................1  FACTUAL BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................................2  August 17, 2017 .............................................................................................................................4  January 27, 2018............................................................................................................................5  May 29, 2018.................................................................................................................................6  Arrest and Interrogation of [...] .........................................................................................8  Text Messages to [...].........................................................................................9  Lack of Proof of [...]’s Presence in New Jersey .........................................................11  LEGAL ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................12
[directive] However, in those cases where established methods of identification of the deceased are unsuccessful, it may be necessary to rely upon the media to aid in identification by publishing a composite sketch or photograph of the victim.  If possible, the notifying officers should obtain pertinent medical information about the survivors prior to making the notification.  This will enable the notifying officers to respond more properly to the immediate needs of those who suffer chronic medical problems such as heart disease, hypertension, etc.  Upon arriving at the survivors' residence, the officers should introduce themselves, present their credentials, and politely request to be admitted.
[directive] Sędzia/Judge Approved by (For purposes of plea only)  Prokurator/Prosecutor udostępniony na mocy Dyrektywy Formularz #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11077-Polish strona 1 z 1 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11077-Polish page 1 of 1
[brief] **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**  Plaintiff filed his Complaint on January 12, 2020 (“Complaint”) in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division – Essex County, asserting claims against Defendants for wrongful termination, breach of contract and breach of the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, violation of the New Jersey Constitution, and False Light Invasion of Privacy.  (Pa3.)  Following early motion practice, the trial court dismissed the wrongful termination claim against Defendants, and the following three counts of the Complaint remained: - Second Count – Breach of Contract and Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Dealing, - Third Count – Violation of Article I, Paragraphs 1 and 6 of the New Jersey Constitution, and - Fourth Count – False Light Invasion of Privacy.
[brief] ”  Pa000305-306.  The Implementation Memo stated the following for new salaries:  -  **Effective June 7, 2017**, a new salary guide is hereby established for **all** current and future employees (including **future** promotions to the rank of Sergeant).  Police officers will be placed on the step that is closest to their current base salary.  (Step 15 is maximum for Police Officers).  Base salary is defined as the employee’s total pensionable salary.  The below salaries shall be the entire compensation for each employee.  Pa000209-210 (emphasis added).  The parties agreed to resolve Police 1 and entered into the November 17, 2017 Settlement Agreement, submitted to the Court on or about January 16, 2018, which incorporated all nonconflicting terms of the Implementation Memo.
[brief] Da034 Notice of Appeal filed April 22, 2024 .......................................................  Da036 Transcript Delivery Certification filed May 22, 2024 .................................  Da040 Notice of Motion to Compel Arbitration ...................................................  Da041 Certification of [...] in Support of Motion to Compel Arbitration ...............................................................................................  Da044 Exhibit A to Certification of [...] .................................  Da047  Exhibit B to Certification of [...]........................Da049  Exhibit C to Certification of [...]........................Da058  Exhibit D to Certification of William J.  Kaufmann ........................Da061  Exhibit E to Certification of [...] ........................Da066  Exhibit F to Certification of [...] ........................Da077  Exhibit G to Certification of [...]  ........................Da081  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] The elements of an unjust enrichment claim are: (1) the plaintiff expected remuneration from the defendant at the time she or he performed or conferred a benefit on the defendant; and (2) the failure of remuneration enriched the defendant beyond its contractual rights.  *VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp.*, 135 N.J. 539, 554 (1994).  Quantum meruit applies when “one party has conferred a benefit on another, and the circumstances are such that to deny recovery would be unjust. ”  *Kas Oriental Rugs, Inc. v. Ellman*, 394 N.J.  Super. 278, 286 (App. Div. 2007).  To prevail with a theory of quantum meruit, a party must establish the following: “(1) the performance of services in good faith, (2) the acceptance of the services by the person to whom they are rendered, (3) an expectation of compensation therefor, and (4) the reasonable value of the services. ”  *Starkey, Kelly, Blaney & White v. Estate of Nicolaysen*, 172 N.J. 60, 68 (2000) (internal quotations omitted).  In the present matter, Plaintiffs conferred a benefit on [...] by extensively limiting their use of sick time.  The average Plaintiff in this litigation who worked 25 years used 4% of sick leave under the promise that if they did not use their sick time, they would be compensated for that unused time at retirement.  (33a ¶116).  Defendants reaped the benefits of Plaintiffs coming into work every day as well as avoiding the payment of sick time and overtime to cover Plaintiffs if they called out.  (33a ¶117).  Plaintiffs satisfied their end of this agreement throughout the entirety of their careers.  (33a ¶118).  They had a reasonable expectation of payment in lieu of using their sick time.  This same analysis is applicable to Plaintiffs [...]'s, [...]'s, and [...]'s claims that they were unlawfully denied compensation for performing the duties of a sergeant following their promotions in 2016 up to the dates of their retirements.
[brief] Respondent Township makes numerous arguments regarding the dangerous condition element, and Appellant will not repeat the arguments already set forth in the initial brief.  However, Appellant would like to point out that in Respondent Township's brief [Pg21, 2], they state that Plaintiff referenced photographs which showed a smooth area of pavement.  It should be noted that those photographs referenced by Respondent Township are photographs that were taken after the subject parking lot was repaved and were simply provided to show the general location where the incident occurred, not the condition of the parking lot at the time of the incident.  There were other photographs that were provided from prior to the repaving of the parking lot which Appellant had marked and those photographs were not the photographs used when Respondent Township questioned Appellant about the pothole.  Instead, they used a Google maps image which was an image that was much farther away from the parking lot than the Appellant's photographs in an attempt to confuse Appellant and make it difficult for her to identify the area when she had already marked same on other photographs.  Therefore, based on the arguments set forth herein and in Appellant's brief, Appellant respectfully requests this Court find that the determination of the trial Court should be reversed.
[brief] [...] AND [...] WITH PREJUDICE (ISSUE RAISED BELOW: SEE OCTOBER 7, 2022, TRIAL COURT ORDER)  15  D.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE RESPONDENTS AND DENYING APPELLANT’S CROSS MOTIONS TO EXTEND DISCOVERY (ISSUE RAISED BELOW: SEE JANUARY 20, 2023, TRIAL COURT ORDERS)  17  1.  Exceptional Circumstances Exist to Re-Open and Extend Discovery  2.  The Appellant Has Substantially Complied with Discovery Proceedings  Warranting Adjudication of Her Claims on the Merits  E. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE JANUARY 20, 2023, ORDERS DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND DENYING APPELLANT’S CROSS MOTION TO EXTEND DISCOVERY (ISSUE RAISED BELOW: SEE MARCH 17, 2023, TRIAL COURT ORDER)