ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] 7  TABLE OF APPENDIX  I/M/O [...] – Petition for Assignment of “Preferred” TREC Factor For Floating Photovoltaic Solar Pursuant to the Board’s Transition Incentive Order, Order, New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, Docket No. [...], dated September 27, 2023 ...........................................001a I/M/O  A New Jerey Solar Transition Pursuant To P.L. 2018, C.17, Order, New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, Docket No. [...], dated December 6, 2019 ..................................................................................................................009a  I/M/O  A New Jersey Solar Transition Pursuant To P.L. 2018, C.17, Order, New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, Docket No. [...], dated January 8, 2020 ..................................................................................................................045a I/M/O The Community Solar Energy Program, Order, New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, Docket No. [...], dated August 16, 2023 (Appendix Omitted) ..............................................................................................................051a I/M/O The Petition Of [...] for “Preferred” TREC Factor for Floating Photovoltaic Solar Pursuant to the Board’s Transition Incentive Order, Order, New Jersey Board Of Public Utilities, Docket No. [...], dated July 15, 2020 .................................................................080a I/M/O the Implementation of L. 2012, C.24, The Solar Act of 2012, I/M/O a New Jersey Solar Transition Pursuant to P.L. 2018, C.17, and I/M/O A New Jerey Solar Transition Pursuant to P.L. 2018, C.17 – Order Granting an up to 12-Month Extension for Projects Seeking An Incentive Pursuant to Subsection (t) in the Solar Transition Incentive Program – Motion for Reconsideration, Order, New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, Docket Nos. [...], [...], and [...], dated April 26, 2023 .............................................................................................................088a
[brief] (40T:83-24 to 84-7)  His timeclock records and surveillance footage showed that he arrived at work at 6:46 a.m. and left work at 7:19 p.m. on February 8.  (40T:83-24 to 85-10)  [...] did not testify at trial.  [...] consented to a search of her iPhone.  (42T:226-8 to 14)  [...] extracted data from the phone using Cellebrite software, which generated a readable report of the phone’s call logs, chats, and web history.  (42T:227-9 to 230-5)  There was an eight-day gap in the web history found on the phone between January 31, 2019 at 4:19 p.m. and February 8, 2019 at 2:33 a.m.  (42T:234-11 to 23)  There was a gap in the call log on the phone between January 16, 2019 at 3:09 p.m. and February 8, 2019 at 6:43 a.m. (42T:239-18 to 24)  The Cellebrite software results reflected that files on the phone had been “modified” on February 7, 2019.
[brief] By telling the jurors that he was obligated to only present witnesses whom he knew to be truthful, the prosecutor strongly implied that he, by virtue of his position, had some secret inside knowledge as to who was telling the truth and who was not.  He had not called either of the victims because he knew that if he did, they would lie.  While he could not share the source of that knowledge with the jurors, he could still let them know of its existence.  By the same token, he also conveyed to the jury that he called the witnesses he did call, all of whom happened to be police officers, because he knew that they would tell the truth.  Although all the jurors indicated during jury selection that they would evaluate the testimony of police officers the same as they would that of any other witness, they had not been contemplating a situation in which the prosecutor, a figure of authority in the courtroom, indirectly advised them that he had personal knowledge that these officers were all telling the truth.  Conversely, the prosecutor’s statement also suggested that he knew that the defense witnesses, whose testimony ran contrary to the State’s theory of the case, were lying.
[brief] (2T22:24-23:23:7).  Plaintiff had a verbal agreement with Defendant to take only $1,000 a week from the pharmacy.  (2T24:3-6).  There were weeks, however, where plaintiff would take $1,500, $2,300, 5,000 a week from the pharmacy’s bank account without Defendant’s consent.  (2T25:1-18)  He wrote and signed a number of these checks to himself (2T26:10-27:11; 2T27:19-30:15).
[brief] Here, defendant has already had the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate his motion to suppress relating to his April 23, 2022 arrest.  At the time of his motion in Union County, he could have raised the alleged issue of officers’ failure to record or preserve body-worn cameras, the State could have developed the record regarding that issue during testimony, and the Union County court could have addressed the issue then.  Defendant’s failure to do so in Union County does not negate the fact that he has already had his day in court on the suppression motion.
[brief] Id at 322.  Similarly, our Plaintiff was clearly denied her constitutional right to practice her religion because she was not provided with any opportunity to go to church while confined.  Here, the Court acknowledged that the Notice of Claim was timely and that plaintiff’s contention that she was disallowed from going to Church would fall within the fourth and fifth count of the Complaint. (Pa).  However, in contradiction to Cruz, there were no factual findings by the trial Judge on this issue.  The defendants did not show any valid, rational connection" between the prison denial of plaintiff’s ability to go to church and any legitimate government interest.  The defendants did not show the availability of others means.  The defendants did not show that there would be any adverse affect on prison resources or any ripple effect on fellow inmates and staff if plaintiff was allowed to go to church.  Apart from its generalized boiler plate conclusory defense of the defendants’ action, the Court did not point to any conscious consideration on the part of the defendants for preventing plaintiff from exercising her right to attend church.  Here, Plaintiff’s right to practice her religion is protected under the Constitution.
[directive] Renorf County m and I, 1)- SEIZED US. in property, List describe excluding Currency reported  Part line  Include the 3) underlying offense and estimated value:  1 I I I Value Property Offense Estimated Underlying NJ/L&PS/DCJ B 8 998 Form 3 1 2 d Page 11  Report Program County Forfeiture of having List USE any ORDERS obtained by description the specific property.
[brief] 2T represents the Superior Court De Novo Trial transcripts – 4/24/2023  22  Details of [...] narrative changes are on page 16 and 17 of this brief.  23  The defendant had the capability to cross-examine; discovery documents received was incomplete and deemed as the defendant received a “sum and substance form of the discovery case”.  defendant’s discovery request, was clear and to the point from the initial request.  [...] goes on to say, the plaintiff’s witness, [...], testifying on behalf of [...] is an out-of-court statement and should not have been allowed in the case 2T7:3-7; furthermore, there is an obligation for the plaintiff to check they have identified the correct person of the alleged incidents proclaimed by [...].
[brief] POINT IV  THE TRIAL COURT'S JURY CHARGE CONCERNING THE DEFENDANT'S EXERCISE OF HIS RIGHT NOT TO TESTIFY WAS BIASED AND PREJUDICIAL, NECESSITATING REVERSAL.  U.S. CONST., AMEND.  VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947), ART. 1, PAR. 10.  (Not Raised Below)
[directive] PSP staff must complete the "Emergent Electronic Monitoring (EM) Alert( s) Reporting to Law Enforcement" form (CN 12999) promulgated by and attached to this Directive.  PSP staff If of must file a Violation Monitoring (VOM) no later than the next business day.  the defendant was arrested by law enforcement and the State has filed a Motion for Pretrial Detention on new charges, or a Motion Revoke Release on the monitored case, the VOM to shall be scheduled to be heard in conjunction with the defendant's Motion for Pretrial Detention a new charge or Motion to Revoke Release on the monitored case.
[brief] In fact, Board staff explicitly notes that, “Were Petitioner’s project granted for a waiver so that this general grid-supply project could enter the TI Program…”  Id. at 5.  (005a.)  Additionally, this argument is in direct contradiction to the Board’s long-standing approach of approving projects that are unlikely to make the PJM timelines.  See, e.g., I/M/O the Implementation of L. 2012, C.24, The Solar Act of 2012, I/M/O a New Jersey Solar Transition Pursuant to P.L. 2018, C.17, and I/M/O A New Jerey Solar Transition Pursuant to P.L. 2018, C.17 – Order Granting an up to 12-Month Extension for Projects Seeking An Incentive Pursuant to Subsection (t) in the Solar Transition Incentive Program – Motion for Reconsideration, Order, [...], Docket Nos. [...], [...], and [...], dated April 26, 2023 (hereinafter, “Reconsideration Order”).
[brief] (M-Da361).  E.  The Planning Board Approves [...]’ Conditional Use And Site Plan Application to Permit A Cannabis “Micro” Dispensary  The Board considered the applicability of Hoboken Ordinance B-446 and addressed the issue in its Resolution stating:  “notably, a condition placed upon retail cannabis use is that cannabis dispensaries may not be located within 600 feet of a primary or secondary school.  However, the Board finds that the Applicant began its approval process by applying to the Cannabis Review Board prior to the adoption and applicability of that Ordinance.  Accordingly, Applicant is entitled to application of the Ordinance as it existed at the commencement of its approval process, and this proximity requirement does not apply to the subject application. ”  (M-Da455, M-Da456)¹.  ¹  Also see Statement of Planning Board [...] (Da234).  On September 15, 2022, the Planning Board unanimously voted to approve [...]’ conditional use and site plan application for a cannabis “micro” dispensary which approval was memorialized in a Resolution adopted by the Planning Board on October 13, 2022.
[brief] These deviations are material because they give the jury the misleading impression that her employer conducted an internal investigation to discriminate against her because of her disability and to retaliate against her because of she obtained legal counsel.  Further, these deviations are material because they mislead the jury that Plaintiff’s municipal alliance position was taken away because of her disability.  Even though, Plaintiff’s pleadings, certified Answers to Interrogatories, and deposition testimony never made that allegation or tied those two allegations together.  In a case with such limited paper discovery, Plaintiff’s material deviations render this jury especially vulnerable to be misled and persuaded by prevarications or embellishments that were never pleaded as factual allegations in the Complaint, stated in her certified Answers to Interrogatories, or her deposition testimony.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s material deviation in her trial testimony in the respects outlined above demonstrate its capability to produce the unjust verdict awarded by the jury.
[brief] Similarly, [...]’s repeated references to puberty blockers and hormone replacement therapy, [...] Br. at 4–5, 13, 32—medical treatments that do require parental consent—have no bearing on whether schools notify parents of their children’s requests to use a different bathroom or a different name and pronouns.  Having conversations about using a different name, restroom, or clothing requires no medical skill or training, treatment plan, or diagnosis.  See Foote v. Town of Ludlow, No. 22-30041-MGM, 2022 WL 18356421, at *5 (D. Mass. Dec. 14, 2022), appeal docketed, No. 23-1069 (1st Cir. Jan. 17, 2023) (Aa138–39).
[brief] In Morris Cty. Fair Hous. Council, the court cautioned that:  The court probably has the power to grant such relief.  Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 285–290, 456 A.2d 390.  However, the Legislature has conferred responsibility upon the board to pass upon site plan applications.  This responsibility should be preserved, if at all possible.  Id. at 409.  A.
[brief] Nowhere in the transcript does the Court say it was formally ruling that the evidence was admissible, and the Court gave every opportunity for counsel to make a decision as to whether or not she was contesting the admission of the evidence, and indeed, asked counsel to think about it overnight and inform the Court the next day whether she wished to submit a brief or have a testimonial hearing on the issue.  (18T 32-3 to 32-21).  The next day, the Court addressed defense counsel and asked her if she would be contesting the admissibility of the statement and counsel indicated that she did not want to contest it and would address the statement in closing:
[brief] So, again, initially we had information that said there were 338 units existing on the site...  So, in actuality, where we assumed a existing parking ratio of 1.15 parking space per unit, it was actually much greater than that because there are only 266 units on the right side.  So, again, all of our calculations should have been based on 266 units.  [(Pa239-242) (emphasis added). ]  While this was of course a significant error, it was properly clarified to the Board, still at the early stages of the application, and the presentation proceeded.
[brief] And none of those exceptions allow for communications with mail vendors.  To the contrary, Congress articulated that it was highly concerned with the “invasions of individual privacy” arising from “abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices. ”  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a).  As a result of these concerns, Congress provided limits on the disclosure of a consumer’s information and protections against impermissible disclosures.  Thus, in § 1692c(b), Congress did indeed identify, with particularity, whom debt collectors may disclose consumer information and barred communications with everyone else.
[brief] The Appellate Court instructed:  The purpose of a derivative suit is to provide shareholders, or a representative shareholder, with a means to protect the interests of the corporation from the misfeasance and malfeasance of faithless directors and managers.  By contrast, a direct action is one in which liability is based upon an injury or violation of a duty owed to a particular shareholder.  To determine whether a complaint states a derivative or an individual cause of action, courts examine the nature of the wrongs alleged in the body of the complaint, not the plaintiff’s designation or stated intention.
[brief] Id.  Notwithstanding same, the trial court dismissed [...]’s complaint alleging IFPA violations, ruling that the [...] forum is the proper forum to litigation IFPA claims even though the Dispute Resolution Professionals have no authority to award treble damages.  See also, Coalition I where the Appellate Division stated that an insurance carrier would not be entitled to an award of attorney’s fees if it were successful in a No-Fault arbitration because there was no language in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1(b) expressing such intent.  Id., at 263.  Had the court below considered the constitutional and legislative arguments of Plaintiff-Appellant and its claims under the IFPA and how they interact with No-Fault ADR in Forthright, it would have found that its conclusion was clearly contrary to not only the law but common sense and logic.
[directive] 3.4  Post-Conviction Waivers  These Guidelines and the Table of Authorized Plea Offers in Appendix II apply to pretrial plea offers.  A prosecutor shall not tender a post-conviction offer to waive or reduce a mandatory term of imprisonment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35- 12 except in exchange for a defendant’s substantial cooperation in accordance with the criteria and provisions of Section 13 of these Guidelines.
[brief] [...] identifies no authority suggesting that the Division’s use of its website to fulfill this notice requirement was inadequate.  Even though the Division satisfied the only notice requirement under the Ricci Act through the website posting, it went above and beyond to provide additional notice to its members through other means.  On August 8, 2019, the Division provided a letter about the Ricci Act to all Certifying Officers and advised them of their responsibility to make the letter available to all members at their respective locations.  (Pa11).  On August 9, 2019, a postcard with information about the Ricci Act was mailed to [...]’s home address (as well as the home addresses of over 200,000 other retirees).  (Pa14; Pa66-68).  And, on June 10, 2021, the Division posted a news item on its website advising members and retirees that the statutory eligibility period to register under the Ricci Act was expiring soon and that they must submit the Eligibility Registration Form by July 8, 2021.
[brief] [...] did not testify to the events depicted in the video, nor did he identify the persons involved.  As Brown teaches, an authentication analysis requires consideration of “the evidential purposes for which the recording is being offered. ”  463 N.J. Super. at 52 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  The officer in Brown was able to identify the defendant in the apartment-building videos because he was the officer who interviewed the defendant.  Id. at 43-45.  The eyewitness was needed to authenticate the cell-phone video because she identified herself in the video and testified to the contents of the video.  Id. at 53.  Defendant offers no reason why [...] needed to speak with the store owner before viewing and downloading the surveillance video.
[brief] (Pa 15).  Accordingly, the trial Court found the Board’s professionals were credible in that the purpose of the revised lot grade was for stormwater management and sanitary sewer, rather than designed for the purpose of allowing increased building heights.  (Pa 15-16).  Therefore, the trial Court found that the Board properly interpreted the Building Height ordinance, and affirmed the Board Resolution below.  (Pa15-16).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I
[brief] (Ab14; Ab25).  This matter does not involve a challenge to the validity of the Civil Service statutes, or the rules promulgated thereunder, because the essence of [...]’s arguments is that his denial of the allegations contained in the complaint constituted a dispute of material fact warranting a contested hearing in the OAL pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.1(d) and that a local union office is not a State workplace under the State Policy.  (Ab14; Ab25).
[brief] RESPONDENT’S BRIEF DID NOT ADDRESS ISSUES  Examples of Appellant’s issues which Respondent’s Brief did not address:  Plaintiff’s Complaint is undated.  Db5; Complaint did not state date of alleged default.  Db6; CIS was not attached to Complaint.  Db7; Plaintiff’s billing methods appear irregular and suspect.  Db27; trial Court made a mistake when it denied Defendant’s affirmative defense of recoupment or set-off.  Db36; and there is no clear and concise heading for credit counseling and debt management services.  Db46.  III.
[brief] Similarly, here, [...] confirms that the CCIP policies “remained in effect” as to subcontractors other than [...], thereby admitting the “divisibility” of its CCIP coverage.  (Zb36.)  This coverage severability also vitiates [...]’s “multi-state risk” argument (Zb37), which again ignores the plain language of the regulation.  The first sentence of N.J.A.C. 11:1-20.1(a) states that it applies to “all commercial policies” other than those it specifically exempts in that first sentence.  The second sentence then separately addresses “multi-state location risks,” along with “policies subject to retrospective rating plans. ”
[brief] TABLE OF CITATIONS  ####  Cases - **Arroyo v. Durling Realty**, 433 N.J. Super. 238 (App. Div. 2013) ...................... 12, 13 - **Badiali v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Grp.**, 220 N.J. 544 (2015)  ...........................................  8 - **Berger v. Shapiro**, 30 N.J. 89 (1959) .................................................................. 11 - **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.**, 142 N.J. 520 (1995) ....................................  7 - **Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc.**, 89 N.J. 270 (1982) ............................................. 10, 12 - **Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc.**, 149 N.J. 496 (1997) ............................ 8 - **Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman**, 145 N.J. 395 (1996) ........................................... 7 - **D’Alessandro v. Hartzel**, 422 N.J. Super. 575 (App. Div. 2011) ............................... 12 - **Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd.**, 219 N.J. 395 (2014) .................................... 10 - **DeWees v. RCN Corp.**, 380 N.J. Super. 511 (App Div. 2005) ................................. 7 - **E&H Steel Corp. v. PSEG Fossil, LLC**, 455 N.J. Super. 12 (App. Div. 2018) 12, 13 - **Gaffney v. America on Wheels**, 16 N.J. Super. 484 (App. Div. 1951) ...................... 13 - **Giantonnio v. Taccard**, 291 N.J. Super. 31 (App. Div. 1996) .................................. 10 - **Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors**, 132 N.J. 426 (1993) ..........................................  8, 9 - **Mejia v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc.**, 241 N.J. 360 (2020) .........................................  7 - **Pareja v. Princeton Intern. Properties**, 246 N.J. 546 (2021) ...................................  9 - **Phillips v. Gelpke**, 190 N.J. 580 (2007) ..............................................................  10 - **Siddons v. Cook**, 382 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2005) ..........................................  7 - **Vander Groef v. A&P**, 32 N.J. Super. 365 (App. Div. 1954) ....................................  10 - **Wyatt by Caldwell v. Wyatt**, 217 N.J. Super. 580 (App. Div. 1987) ....................... 10
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRECLUDING THE DEFENSE FROM ELICITING RELEVANT AND PROBATIVE TESTIMONY THAT SUPPORTED ITS THIRD-PARTY GUILT DEFENSE AND ALLOWING THE STATE TO IMPROPERLY UNDERMINE IT.  (9T 70-2 to 75-6, 13T 4-1 to 12-18)  The State’s theory was that [...] and [...] committed the crime together; [...] as the driver, [...] as the shooter.  The defense theory was that [...] committed the crime with [...]; either man could have been the shooter or the driver.  The defense urged that Mason had the motive to kill [...] because they were engaged in a drug dealing rivalry.  The trial court incorrectly restricted the information the defense could elicit about Mason, keeping from the jury probative information that supported the defense theory of third-party guilt.  This error deprived [...] of his rights to due process and a fair trial.