ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The second Motion \textit{in limine} sought to bar any evidence by [...] in support of a \(^7\)  As set forth in greater detail under Section IV of the Legal Argument, the trial court, in its Statement of Reasons, held that in reaching his opinion that the invoices issued by [...] were unreasonable, [...] looked only at the retainer agreement between [...] and [...] and the legal bills sent to [...].  However, the trial court properly noted that [...] never looked at the discovery requests prepared, the discovery responses prepared, or the voluminous documents received or propounded by [...] in the underlying matter.  The trial court properly held that an expert’s opinion must have some factual basis, and the retainer agreement and the invoices issued did not provide a factual basis for a determination that [...] spent too much time and charged too much for the drafting of discovery responses or reviewing the voluminous documents (which [...] never saw). claim for damages, and to preclude [...] from claiming or arguing that he had sustained damages.  The trial before the Honorable [...], J.S.C. occurred between November 29, 2022 and December 6, 2022.
[brief] He used computer programs that were not standard in the industry or reliable, and incomplete and uncertified cell phone information.  He could not certify the accuracy of the two programs he used or his results.  (19T11-12 to 22; 19T12-9 to 17).  He did not know the actual range of the cell towers or the orientation of any of the tower antennae and could only approximate the general strength of the cell tower (16T93-1 to 96-14; 16T99-12 to 16), a practice found to constitute an improper net opinion in State v. Burney, 255 N.J. 1, 23 (2023) (“the net opinion rule, a corollary of N.J.R.E. 703, forbids the admission into evidence of an expert’s conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence or other data.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  He candidly acknowledged the phone company records, which he did not have, would have provided better information about the cell phone’s location.  He did not inspect the phone, and when the phone was examined, it did not contain a SIM card.  (19T11-23 to 12-3; 19T12-9 to 22).  Lastly, the PCR court noted that defendant never testified that he had his cell phone with him at the time he alleged he was elsewhere.  (19T14-19 to 15-11).  Because defendant presented no credible evidence that the cell phone records would have supported an alibi defense, and because the alleged alibi witnesses were also not credible, defendant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced given the overall strength of the State’s proofs.  See Gideon, 244 N.J. at 541 (the credibility of the alibi defense must be weighed against the strength of the evidence presented at trial and offered post-conviction).  The PCR court’s order denying defendant’s petition should be affirmed.
[brief] The formula expects that districts can provide T&E at a cost less than that calculated in the adequacy budget.  They need only raise the “required local share,” defined as the lesser of their LFS or the prior year’s tax levy.  N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5(b); Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 165.  Thus, districts are free to apply their expertise to determine the most efficient manner of meeting the unique needs of their students, even if that means that they are not spending at the adequacy budget level.\textsuperscript{16}  Carried to its logical conclusion, [...]’s suggestion that the State must fully fund an adequacy budget would chip away at districts’ autonomy over their own affairs, and require the State to dictate how each district should provide its students with T&E.  But the discretion the Legislature afforded districts with respect to their budgets is entirely consistent with the concept of home rule so imbedded in our State — a point [...] ignores completely.
[brief] Citing to Malanga, Plaintiff contends that the mere existence of petroleum products in the soil in excess of NJDEP remediation standards fails to show detriment to the public health or safety, similar to the way that the presence of asbestos failed to show detriment in Malanga.  (Pb23-Pb25).  Unlike in Malanga, where the municipality admitted there was no safety issues from the asbestos, detriment was established in this case based on the evidence presented below.
[brief] Beyond wrongly holding that rulemaking was not necessary, the ALJ and the Final Decision committed a fundamental legal error.  They posited that because “the regulations and Act do not define what constitutes excessive,” that somehow “g[ave] the Department the flexibility to assess rate requests” in whatever manner it chose on the fly, as it did here.  Pa84; Pa20, Pa26–27, Pa31–32 (similar).  That is not only wrong, it is backwards.  Facially flexible statutory text establishing a regulatory regime demands the promulgation of regulations.  See supra, at 26–29, 32–37 (collecting authority); Cammarata v. Essex Cnty. Park Comm’n, 26 N.J. 404, 410 (1958) (regulation promulgation provides “flexible control in areas where the diversity of circumstances and situations [an agency may encounter] forbids the enactment of legislation anticipating every possible problem which may arise and providing for its solution”).  If the Act gave the Department the sort of “boundless discretion” posited here, this Court’s precedent—like those of the Supreme Court—requires the Commissioner to adopt regulations implementing the Act’s “excessive” clause.  Matter of Farmers’, 256 N.J. Super. at 620–21.  For all these reasons, the decision below must be reversed.
[brief] E.g., the extra engineering fees, extra surveying fees, and extra legal fees required to submit revised plans to the town for ultimate project approval were a natural consequence of defendant [...]'s negligent failure to submit revised grading plans to the surveyor.  (Pa464)  The unnecessary removal of thousands of square feet of topsoil was the direct consequence of wrongly lowering the elevation of the site by 30 inches.  464a.  The contractors who performed this function can testify that their bills, already submitted to defendants, were reasonable and necessary.  We refer the Court to the factually similar case Golomore Associates v. New Jersey State Highway Authority, 173 N.J. Super. 55 (App. Div. 1980), where two excavation contractors sued the State for providing them with inaccurate soil elevation diagrams, causing them to lose money on a highway excavation contract.
[brief] As the Supreme Court held in Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451 (2003) when a defendant argues at summary judgment that an employee’s belief is unreasonable, the Court must determine whether there is a “substantial nexus” between the complained of conduct and the implicated law, regulation, or public policy.  Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 464.  If such a nexus exists, “the jury then must determine whether the plaintiff actually held such a belief, and if so, whether that belief was objectively reasonable. ”  Id. at 464-65.  Such a nexus is present in this case.  There is no need for a “trial within a trial” as to Defendant [...]’s ultimate criminal liability for statutory harassment.  In Mehlman, supra., the New Jersey Supreme Court held that an employee’s belief in the illegality of conduct does not need to be ultimately proven correct for the activity to be protected under CEPA.  153 N.J. at 193.  Rather, the only question is whether Plaintiff, as well as other individuals such as [...] and [...], had a reasonable belief that Defendant [...]’s conduct was illegal, and whether that conduct falls within a law that gives rise to the protections of CEPA.  Based on the facts and the text of the statute, the issue should not have been decided by the Court on summary judgment.  There is sufficient evidence to establish that Plaintiff satisfies the first CEPA prong.  A jury is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh conflicting evidence to determine whether the employee’s belief was objectively reasonable.
[brief] Defendant argued that the evidence showed ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  2T60.  With regard to the ballistics issue, having the countering expert like [...] could have impeached the claimed facts underlying the aggravated assault charge by raising reasonable doubt about the firing weapon itself.  The nature of the case would have been a lot different, I think, if -- if the defense attorney had been able to say, you know, he didn’t shoot the policeman through the glass.  This was a robbery of a 99 cent store, is a lot different then, and then he shot the police officer who responded to the scene.  It just made it a much different kind of a case.  And I think my ineffective assistance claim, at least the way I tried to articulate it for [...], is that, you know, granted it only really effects that one conviction, the second degree, but it really would have changed the tenor of the case number one, and even if Your Honor said, you know -- ‘cause what’s my argument, if you really think about it, my argument is, okay, well, they had a ballistics expert, [...].  You know, if I had gone out and looked at it and gotten Mr. [...], and to be frank, when we got Mr. [...], I was like, he’s not gonna be able to say anything, maybe ‘cause I’m not sufficiently expert in ballistics.  I didn’t think he was gonna really be able to make any -- words on the opinion.  And I was wrong.  He did.  And I think, you know, we have a dark area ‘cause we don’t have some of the evidence unfortunately.  It’s not the fault of The State.  But it’s not our fault either.  We’re kind of handicapped in that regard.  But I think what’s interesting about Mr. [...] is, if we had gone back in time, at least we could have countered The State’s expert opinion and tried to raise reasonable doubt on this issue of, maybe [...] didn’t shoot [...] in the knee.  And I think that a reasonable lawyer looking at that part of the case, you know, at least would have gone and consulted a Mr. [...], or somebody like him and would have gotten the kind of opinion that we’ve been able to show The Court, was attainable.
[brief] 31  Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189 (2016) ........................................................................................................ 7, 16  Triffin v. Am. Intern. Group, Inc., 372 N.J. Super. 517 (App. Div. 2004) .........................................................  23  Tuckey v. Harleysville Inc. Co., 236 N.J. Super. 221 (App. Div. 1989) .........................................................  8  United Hospitals Medical Center v. State, 349 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2002) ..........................................................  12, 13  Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 254 N.J. Super. 380 (App. Div. 1992) ......................................................... 35, 36 Waterson v. GM Corp., 111 N.J. 238 (1988) .................................................................................... 25, 26 COURT RULES
[brief] Nothing in the record, beyond the Complaint, indicates that the information was never shared with the other members of the Board, or that the Superintendent or Business Administrator/Board Secretary were unaware of the attorneys’ research.  The Attorney General’s Office, by the SEC, provided absolutely no evidence or discovery to support the allegations in the complaint, including the above-referenced hearsay.  See Sg136-162.  The SEC merely regurgitated the allegations in the Complaint.  Ibid.  To support for these “facts” the only discovery provided was a copy of the [...]’s Complaint, as well as the motion to dismiss pleadings, and the correspondence that occurred by the parties to the School Ethics Commission.  Ibid.  Nothing more.  In contrast, Appellant’s five certifications demonstrate that, at minimum, that a majority of the seven-member board discussed Regina [...]’s conduct independently with the Appellant and recommended that the Board Attorney investigate the matter.  See Sg192-201.  It has long been recognized that summary judgment, and by extension, summary disposition rulings must not “shut a deserving litigant from his trial. ”  The Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995) (quoting Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 77 (1954)).  Yet, the ALJ’s decision did precisely that by granting the Commission’s motion as to violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f) despite it lacking the requisite evidence to meet its burden of proof.  Accordingly, the SEC’s decision improperly considered certain facts and incorrectly applied the summary decision standard and thus must be overturned as it was arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law.
[brief] LEGAL ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................18  I.  THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF RETALIATION AGAINST DEFENDANT [...] AND DISMISSED COUNT  ONE OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT (8a)  ..................................................................................................................18  A.  The Lower Court Erred By Failing to Assume the Truth of the Retaliatory Actions  Pled by Plaintiff (8a-9a, 17a) ..................................................................................................................20  B.  The Lower Court Erred By Failing to Consider the Injunction When Determining Whether the Retaliatory Actions Were Materially Adverse (5a, 9a)  ..................................................................................................................23  C.  The Lower Court Erred By Failing to Consider the Standard Set by Roa v. Roa (7a-8a)  .................................................................................................................................25  II.
[brief] a.  Radios; Televisions; Phonographs.  . . . .  The operation of any radio receiving set, instrument, phonograph, machine or device so that it is clearly audible at a distance of **one hundred (100) feet** from the building, structure or vehicle in which it is located shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this section.  b.  Yelling; Shouting.  Yelling, shouting, hooting, whistling or singing on the public streets, particularly between the house of 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m., or at any time or place, which annoys or disturbs the quiet, comfort or repose of persons in any office, dwelling, hotel, motel or other type of residence or of any persons in the **vicinity**.  c.  Animals; Birds.  . . . . d. Horns.  . . . .  Da103-Da104.  (emphasis added)  Interestingly, a side-by-side analysis of the Millstone Ordinance 3-15.1 and Ordinance 17-2017 §146-7(p) reveal nearly identical language.  Further, the section of the Millstone Ordinance which sets forth noise violations and the 100 foot qualifier for such violations only pertains to subsection 3-15.2(a), versus Ordinance 17-2017 which states that proof of violation shall be determined by “plainly audible means as detected at more than fifty (50) feet from the property line from which the noise nuisance is emanating from” applicable to all subsections thereby providing far more specificity.
[brief] The sentencing court elaborated that the consecutive sentence was based on there being multiple victims at different times, but provided no further analysis.  *Id.* at 257.  The court remanded the matter for re-sentencing observing that the ticking of boxes does not create a mandate for a consecutive sentence, but rather is a guidepost to determine the overall fairness of a sentence for the defendant.  *Id.* at 270-71.  The court further observed that assessing “the overall fairness of a sentence requires a real-time assessment of the consequences of the aggregate sentences imposed, which perforce includes taking into account the age of the person being sentenced. ”  *Id.* at 273.  [...]’s sentence was premised on the presumption that the presence of multiple victims required consecutive sentences without regard to the overall fairness of the sentence to [...].
[brief] Plaintiff notes that the Law Division did not schedule a Ferreira conference, and cites to Moschella v. Hackensack Meridian Jersey Shore Univ. Med. Ctr., 258 N.J. 110 (2024) and Meehan v. Antonellis, 226 N.J. 216 (2016) for the proposition that a Ferreira conference may have resulted in her complying with the Affidavit of Merit requirement.  Moschella and Meehan both concerned Affidavits of Merit which were timely produced by the plaintiffs but which were substantively defective and addressed whether a Ferreira conference might have corrected the substantive issues.  In this case, by contrast, no timely affidavit was produced due to Plaintiff’s counsel somehow losing track of the timeline for fulfilling the statute’s requirements.  In that respect, the cases are distinguishable.
[brief] This matter arises from an alleged assault that occurred on or about May 21, 2022.  [Da1-Da29; Da93-Da124]  The plaintiff [...] asserts that her minor son, [...], was assaulted in part by defendant [...].  [Da1-Da29; Da93-Da124]  On or about January 2, 2024, defendant [...] pled guilty to assault in the 3rd degree as a pre-condition to be accepted into pre-trial intervention (“PTI”).  [Da233-Da256]  As part of that guilty plea, defendant [...] provided a factual basis for the charge of assault in the 3rd degree.  [Da233-Da256]  On March 8, 2024, [...] was accepted into the PTI program.  [Da428-Da443].  On May 13, 2024, during the civil deposition of defendant [...], plaintiffs’ counsel sought to question and cross-examine him with statements made during the guilty plea.  [Da306-Da324]  Counsel for Defendant [...] disagreed that plaintiffs’ counsel was permitted to do so pursuant to the holding of State v. Lavrik, 472 N.J. Super. 192 (App. Div. 2022), which held that a guilty plea entered as a condition of admission to PTI shall be held in an inactive status pending termination of the supervisory treatment and therefore, the guilty plea has no force or effect, unless PTI is violated.  [Da306-Da324]  Plaintiffs’ counsel contacted the court, and the court heard oral argument during the deposition.  [1T4-1 to 1T13-11].  The Court concluded there was no applicable privilege and plaintiff could proceed with questioning [...] on his guilty plea and plea allocation.  [1T13-12 to 1T21-9]  Thereafter, due to potential Fifth Amendment concerns, the deposition was discontinued by defendant [...]’s counsel despite plaintiffs’ counsel’s protest.  [Da229-Da230; Da416]  Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion to enforce litigant’s rights against defendant [...].  [Da226-Da441]  Defendant [...] filed a cross-motion to have the Court memorialize its oral decision of May 13, 2024 so he could seek an interlocutory appeal as well as requesting a civil stay of the court’s decision while interlocutory appeal was sought.  [Da412-Da426]  On July 19, 2013, the Court heard additional argument and issued an order capturing its oral decision of May 13, 2024.  [2T22-21 to 2T29-25; Da444-Da447].  The Court granted and denied plaintiff’s motion in part, denying plaintiff’s request for sanctions and compelling defendant [...]’s deposition within 45 days.  [2T22-21 to 2T29-25; Da444-Da445].  The Court granted defendant’s order with some minor revisions to memorialize the court’s oral decision of May 13, 2024 and denied defendant’s cross-motion for a civil stay.  [2T22-21 to 2T29-25; Da446-Da447].  Defendant [...] now files this motion seeking leave to file an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s orders dated July 19, 2014 enforcing litigant’s rights and compelling him to answer questions at the continuation of his deposition regarding his criminal plea allocution made as a precondition to being admitted to pretrial intervention.  STATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] [...] and the three remaining insurers, [...], [...], n/k/a [...] (“[...]”), and [...] (“[...]”) then proceeded to a bench trial that commenced on October 19, 2010, and concluded on January 6, 2011.  (Pa0091.)  On January 31, 2011, the trial court entered a Letter Opinion and Order with its findings of fact and conclusions of law.  (Pa0091.)  The court held that certain exclusions in the [...], [...], and [...]’ policies applied to partially preclude coverage.  _____________________
[brief] Accordingly, this places the initiation of this other procedure at about 9:57 p.m. -- or at about nine minutes after the 9:48 p.m. strip reading.  Given the timelines [...] confirmed concerning the performance of c-sections, there is no doubt that the procedure he was completing at 10:12 p.m. – when he was finally alerted to the [...]’ situation – started well \textit{after} 9:48 p.m.  In other words, [...] had more than enough to respond to the [...]’ case, if the c-section had been timely called at 9:48 p.m.  \textbf{Third}, the record establishes that, in contrast to the [...]’ case, the other c-section presented no emergency.
[brief] | CASES | Page(s) | |-------------------------------------------|---------| | Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., | 24, 47 | | 74 N.J. 588 (1997) | | | Casino Reinvestment v. Teller, | 36 | | 384 N.J. Super. 408 (App. Div. 2006) | | | Cummings v. Bahr, | 36 | | 295 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 1996)  | | | D’Atria v. D’Atria, | 37 | | 242 N.J. Super. 392 (Ch. Div. 1990) | | | Deemer v. Silk City Textile, | 46 | | 193 N.J. Super. 643 (App. Div. 1984) | | | Dolson v. Anastasia, | 22 | | 55 N.J. 2 (1969) | | | Dutton v. Rando, | 24 | | 458 N.J. Super. 213 (App. Div. 2019) | | | Fertile v. St. Michael’s Medical Center, | 47 | | 169 N.J. 481 (2001) | | | Frugi v. Bracigliano, | 23 | | 177 N.J. 250 (2003) | | | Guido v. Duane Morris LLP, | 37 | | 202 N.J. 79 (2010) | | | Hartpence v. Grouleff, | 32 | | 15 N.J. 545 (1954) | | | Kornbleuth v. Westover, | 36, 37 | | 241 N.J. 289 (2020) | | | Manalapan Realty v Township Committee, | 32 | | 140 N.J. 366 (1995) | | Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181 (App. Div. 2005)  .................................................................32  Neno v. Clinton, 167 N.J.  573 (2001) ..................................................................................40, 41, 42, 43, 46 Rogalsky v. Plymouth Homes Inc., 100 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div. 1968) .................................................................41 Ruff v. Weintraub, 105 N.J. 233 (1987) .........................................................................................46 State v. Alston, 312 N.J. Super. 102 (App. Div. 1998) ...............................................................44 State v. Balthrop, 92 N.J. 542 (1983) ............................................................................................31 State v. Brooks, 366 N.J. Super. 447 (App. Div. 2004) ...............................................................23 State v. Cole, 229 N.J. 430 (2017) .........................................................................................31, 45 State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1 (1998), cert. den. 532 U.S. 932 (2001) ...........................................32, 45 State v. Garrison, 228 N.J. 182 (2017) .........................................................................................32 State v. Hamilton, 193 N.J. 255 (2008) .........................................................................................30 State v. Harris, 209 N.J. 431 (2012) .........................................................................................30
[brief] ’” (quoting United Prop. Owners Ass’n of Belmar v. Borough of Belmar, 343 N.J. Super. 1, 47 (App. Div. 2001))).  The Amended Policy’s disparate impact is clear.  Even assuming that this policy were somehow facially neutral, it is beyond dispute—and Appellant does not dispute on appeal—that the Amended Policy will disproportionately impact transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students.