ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] When they affixed their signatures on the SPA, Plaintiffs manifested an agreement to the incorporation of the POS as part of the entire agreement relating to a subscription and purchase of [...] in the [...] development.  The POS was provided to Plaintiffs before the contract became binding, and they had a duty under the law to review that document.  Indeed, through express language in the SPA, Plaintiffs had reasonable notice that they should carefully review of the POS (along with all other contract documents) before the expiration of the applicable noticed cancellation periods.  Thus, under ordinary contract law, the POS should be considered as part of the SPA.  Reviewing the POS as part of the Court’s consideration of the total contract aids in resolving any claimed ambiguity with respect to the SPA’s arbitration provision.  By law, the POS must contain critical “guidance” information spelled out in twenty-three (23) subsections.
[directive] (As noted in § 3.1, the prosecutor also has the option to indicate on the Plea Negotiation Worksheet that there are insufficient facts available to determine the applicability of a given fact or circumstance.)  The overriding goal of uniformity would be seriously undermined if prosecutors were chilled by the prospect of time-consuming pretrial litigation from exercising reasoned judgment in deciding whether and how to apply a Special Offense Characteristic, Aggravating or Mitigating Factor, Special Application and Enhancement Feature, or Downward Departure.  Moreover, the critical objective of promoting the efficient and expeditious disposition of cases, and of conserving prosecutorial and judicial resources, would be lost if pretrial evidentiary hearings were held to resolve factual disputes as to the defendant’s relevant conduct and culpability.
[directive] This allocation framework is grounded in ethical obligations that include the duty to care, duty to steward resources to optimize population health, distributive and procedural justice, and transparency.  Consistent with accepted standards during public Ethical goals of the allocation framework: health emergencies, a goal of the allocation framework is to achieve benefit for populations of patients, often expressed as doing the greatest good for the greatest number.1,2  It should be noted that this goal is different from the traditional focus of medical ethics, which is centered on promoting the wellbeing of individual patients.3
[directive] See Appendix G.  8.2.3  However, the internal affairs investigator should be aware that other factors may also serve to affect a subject officer's decision to answer questions during a criminal interview.  For example, directing an officer to appear at a particular time and place may generate confusion on the officer’s part as to whether he or she is being required to participate in the interview.  When these circumstances or any other questions as to the need to provide a warning in criminal interviews are present, the internal affairs investigator should always consult with the County Prosecutor regarding whether the subject officer should be advised of their right against self-incrimination.
[brief] To accept Plaintiff’s characterization of her non-renewal as racially-motivated is to infer a racial overtone in every employment decision and every interaction between a supervisor and an employee of different racial background.  It would also permit an individual’s *subjective* perception and reaction to determine the *objective* question of the decisionmaker’s liability.  See *Williams*, 323 N.J. Super. at 503.  “The law should not find divisions where none exist. ”  Id.  In brief, a careful review of the record unequivocally shows that none of the actions by Defendants were in any way racially- or age-motivated.  For these reasons, her LAD discrimination claims should remain dismissed.
[brief] It is further underscored that not only did the HPC have the ability to determine materials per Nadelson, but in fact, the ability to make a determination which was subject to appeal by the Zoning Board as the applicant then had an avenue to Superior Court, if necessary.  Nadelson at 560.  Appellant’s interpretation of the MLUL is substantially the same as set forth in Nadelson.  Per 40:55D-109 b, d and e, the historic preservation commission has as duty to advise the board of adjustment on applications for development and provide written reports on zoning ordinance provisions.  Per 40:55D-70, the Zoning Board may hear and decide requests for interpretation of the zoning map or ordinance or for decisions upon other special questions upon which such board is authorized to pass by any zoning or official map ordinance.  NJSA 40:55D-70 (b).  Further per section (c), the Zoning Board may act “by reason of an extraordinary and exceptional situation uniquely affecting a specific piece of property or the structures lawfully existing thereon....”  NJSA 40:55D-70(c).  Appellant chooses to focus on what he deems to be the limitations of the power of the Historic Preservation Commission while Defendant supports the Historic Preservation Commission in their powers granted not only by the MLUL and Ordinances, but by the power statutorily invested in the Zoning Board of Adjustment to answer special questions relating to properties, provide interpretation an act in extraordinary and exceptional situations.
[directive] The term “unlawfully disrupts, delays or prevents the operation of” does not include non-violent conduct growing out  3rd Degree 10%  Permissible $25,000 to $75,000 of a labor dispute as defined in N.J.S.A. 2A:15-58; or 6.  Endangers or obstructs the safe operation of motor vehicles by using a traffic control preemption device to interfere with or impair the operation of a traffic control signal as defined in N.J.S.A. 39:1-1; or 64  Updated December 2, 2013
[brief] The Board does not dispute that [...] is a traffic expert.  Nor does the Board dispute that [...] data represents an industry standard with regard to data collection and projections.  But even an expert must base his or her testimony on data which supports his or her expert opinion, and the data used by [...] does not support testimony about differences (of the lack thereof) between traffic generated by 30 ft. tall warehouses and 50 ft. tall warehouses.
[brief] Within 5 days of posting this photograph and making this comment, Respondent made the social media posts that are the subject of Counts 1 and 4 of the Complaint (Ca199-201); • The school community protested Respondent and the Board as a direct result of Respondent’s Facebook posts at meetings of the Board and in her role as Board member (Ca075-076, Ca086, Ca098-099, Ca100-105); • The Board was subjected to litigation as a direct result of Respondent’s public social media posts (Ca107-114, Ca199-200, Ca214); • The Board passed two official Resolutions denouncing Respondent’s public social media posts (Ca072, Ca075-076); and • Respondent admitted in discovery – which was attached to the Motion for Summary Decision – that she actually compromised the Board by making the social media posts which were the subject of the underlying motion.  (Ca136-137 at RQAs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, Ca144-145 at Response to RQAs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,).  It was abundantly clear from evidence in the record before the Commission that Respondent had publicly campaigned for her seat on the Board from her Facebook account, that she posted photographic evidence of herself swearing in as a Board member, that she made a clear statement that she was a Board member, and – as the Commission even admits – that she was speaking on Board issues while a sitting Board member.
[brief] That is, Respondent offered no testimony or evidence to contradict the Appellant’s version of the happening of the accident and the key facts that supported a defense under *Mockler v. Russman*, 102 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1968).  (T2 14-4 through T2 16-24).  8.  Plaintiff relied upon three physicians who offered testimony at trial.  Specifically, Plaintiff relied upon [...], [...] and [...].  All three physicians provided testimony regarding Respondent’s injuries and their opinions regarding those injuries having resulted from the March 3, 2020 accident.  The Respondent’s physicians also offered testimony regarding their opinion on whether or not the Respondent suffered a permanent injury.  Only [...] mentioned that Respondent suffered an aggravation or exacerbation of a pre-existing condition to her cervical spine.  (T2 161-1 through 161-6).  Similarly, [...]’s reports did not provide a proper comparative analysis as is required by New Jersey law.  (Da51-Da54; Da55-Da62; T2 165-7 through T2 166-14).  9.  Neither Dr.  [...] nor Dr. [...] offered any opinion that Respondent had a pre-existing condition or suffered any aggravation.  They testified that there were minor age-appropriate degenerative changes of the cervical spine but offered no testimony that there was aggravation of pre-existing conditions.  [...] and [...] opined that the findings on the Respondent’s cervical MRI were the result of the March 3, 2020 accident.  10.  [...], who was called as a treating physician as distinguished from an expert, testified that the Respondent sustained a herniation at C6-7 of her cervical spine but also that she suffered an aggravation of pre-existing degenerative disc bulges at multiple levels within her cervical spine.  [...] only saw the Respondent on one occasion, January 13, 2023.
[brief] The Suit Limitation / Policy exclusion defense was properly asserted in Defendant-Respondent’s Answer.  Plaintiff-Appellant, next argues, that the suit limitation clause was not properly raised as an affirmative defense.  In making this argument, Plaintiff-Appellant states “[t]he policy’s alleged four-year limitation period would have ended on January 10, 2022.  [...] could have invoked its limitation defense as soon as May 2, 2022, when [...] first notified [...] of her claim. ” (Pb18).  Plaintiff-Appellant then argues that “[...] also failed to raise its four-year limitation defense in its Answer filed on July 2, 2023.
[brief] This is not implementing the EMP and the extensive body of climate change law "to the maximum extent practicable and feasible," it is expressing complete disregard.  If any individual proposal is to be measured against all of the total emissions in the entire State, from all sources (all tailpipes, powerplants, industrial plants, offices, residences, etc.), that amounts to no limitation at all.  This error is compounded because it disregards that the current regulator has no greenhouse gas emissions.  5.
[brief] We represent the Defendant-Appellant in the above-referenced appeal and we submit this letter brief in lieu of a formal brief in reply to the brief filed by Defendant-Respondent [...].  The decision below should be reversed, and this matter remanded to the trial court with instructions that the trial court calculate an amount to be paid to Defendant [...] for his paid and accrued legal fees and costs.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY........................................3  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I  THE ACTION BELOW AND THE GRC PROCEEDING CONSTITUTED AN “ACTION” OR “LEGAL PROCEEDING” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE FIRE DISTRICT’S BY-LAWS.........................................................................................3  A.  The GRC Case Was a “Legal Proceeding”  Within the Meaning of the Fire District’s Bylaws..............................................................................3  B.  [...]’s Interests Were Never Aligned with the Fire District’s Interest, and [...] Specifically Requested Indemnification........................................................................7  POINT II  THIS COURT CAN DETERMINE WHETHER THE GRC VIOLATED  MR. SIPE’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO ENTER THE ORDERS ON APPEAL........................................................................12  CONCLUSION
[directive] $500 to $2,500 10% permissible negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or attempts by physical 2C:12-1a(1)(2)(3)  Simple Assault menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, disorderly persons offense; if Petty Disorderly fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, petty disorderly persons offense.  $100 to $500 10% permissible  Persons  Actor attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes serious bodily injury, or under 2C:12-1b(1)  Aggravated Assault circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, recklessly causes 2nd Degree $35,000 to $100,000 10% permissible such injury.  2C:12-1b(2)
[brief] Zoning ordinances are to receive a reasonable construction and must be liberally construed in favor of the municipality.  State, Tp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 171 (1999); Atlantic Container v. Eagleswood Planning Bd., 321 N.J. Super. 261, 270 (App. Div. 1999).  The principles governing the interpretation of zoning ordinances are the same as those governing the interpretation of other ordinances and legislation in general.  See Schad, 160 N.J. at 170; AMN, Inc. v. So. Bruns. Tp. Rent Leveling Bd., 93 N.J. 518, 524–25 (1983).  The paramount goal of zoning ordinance interpretation is to discover and effectuate the local legislative intent.  Atlantic Container, 321 N.J. Super. at 270; White Castle v. Planning Bd., 244 N.J. Super. 688, 690–92 (App. Div. 1990), certif. den. 126 N.J. 320 (1991).
[brief] The lower court relied on the erroneous default judgement from 1990 (Pa7), that on its face should be deemed as a void judgement as matter of Third Circuit case law (cited in this appeal) due to deficiency of Service of Process, therefore the court piggybacked said final order issued on February 16, 2024 (Pa133) on a void judgment at its face.  The trial court failed to recognize the 1990 default judgment as void due to the challenge of Service of Process having failed to be proven by Plaintiff [...] in this litigant’s Motion to Vacate Arrears (Pa1; Pa6; Pa10; Pa21; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa41) by the person claiming validity of service (Third Circuit case law fully addressed and cited within this appeal establishing the person claiming validity must prove when challenged).  Nonetheless, the statutes of limitation for a Civil Rights violation as deemed by New Jersey (N.J. Ct. R. 4:104) would have been “tolled” due to proper service of process not being executed (Pa6; Pa21; Pa33 – Pa35) and equally of import was the court failed to recognize the plaintiff forsaken to prove validity of service (Pa1; Pa34-Pa35) when jurisdiction was challenged (Pa10-Pa11; Pa33-Pa35; Pa39-Pa40; Pa58-Pa59; Pa62) as established by cited Third Circuit case law.  If we consider the Supreme Court Case of Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 896 no. 86-1430 argued Nov. 30, 1987, decided Feb. 24, 1988, as this case will be cited for various established precedents, as Justice White clearly remarked, “When a person has been deprived of property in a manner contrary to the most basic tenants of due process, it is no answer to say his particular case due process of law would have led to the same result because he had no adequate defense upon the merits”, *Coe v. Amour Fertilizer Works*, 237 U.S. 413, 424, 35 S. Ct. 625, 629, 59 L. Ed. 1027 (1915).
[brief] Why is the State of New Jersey against this?  Why have they asked many attorneys from the Attorney General’s Office to defend this matter?  Why do they care about the envelopes in question when the tangible and historic value of the envelopes were the contents inside of the envelopes?  The ransom letters themselves are what need to be preserved indefinitely.  CONCLUSION  [...] has been seeking truth in this case for over a decade.  Based upon the clear and undeniable historical interest in this matter, so have many members of the New Jersey public.  Now, thanks to modern DNA technology, the truth is within reach.  Connecting the dots with the causal connection behind the legislative intent of OPRA, the executive intent of [...]’s Executive Order 110, makes it obvious that the statutory authority and the executive order in the State of New Jersey should entitle the public access to examine the Kidnapping case in its entirety.  For all of these reasons, the Court’s decision should be overturned, and [...] should be permitted by the New Jersey State Police to conduct the DNA tests requested, pursuant to OPRA.  Respectfully submitted, [...], ESQ.  Attorney for Plaintiff BY: /s/[...]  [...]  BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS
[brief] [Ibid.; (emphasis added)].  New Jersey courts cite with approval the rule that no unpublished opinion “shall constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. ”  See, e.g., Mount Holly Tp. Bd. v. Mount Holly, 199 N.J. 319, 332 n. 2 (2009) (reaffirming the dictate of the rule); Sciarotta v. Global Spectrum, 194 N.J. 345, 353 n. 5 (2008) (declining to address an argument based on an unpublished Appellate Division opinion); Matter of Belleville Ed Ass’n, 455 N.J. Super. 387, 407 (App. Div. 2018) (citing and relying on unpublished opinion violated R. 1:36-3).
[brief] On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction in the Law Division, Superior Court of New Jersey, Union County.  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT STATE OF NEW JERSEY  [...]  [...]  [...]  ATTORNEY NO. 030611989  DEPUTY  ATTORNEY GENERAL  DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE  APPELLATE  BUREAU [...] [...]  [...] OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF  January 6, 2025  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] (27T88:9-24).  Plaintiffs also requested $838,810.40 in pre-judgment interest, calculated at court interest rates for each transaction where the trial court determined the defendants had misappropriated funds.  (Pa364-66; Da1012-1014)  The trial court rejected that approach and instead awarded $190,480.68 in pre-judgment interest, calculated on the principal judgment dating back to July 20, 2020, when Plaintiffs’ filed suit.  (27T77:7 to 78:23).  The defendants separately moved for a stay pending appeal, and for partial reconsideration.
[brief] “Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power of a court to hear and determine cases of the class to which the proceeding in question belongs. ”  State v. Osborn, 32 N.J. 117, 122 (1960).  It has nothing to do with whether individual plaintiffs are statutorily prevented from bringing such suits.  See Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 n.4 (2014) (clarifying that “statutory standing” does not “implicate subject matter jurisdiction. ”).  Thus, “standing and subject matter jurisdiction are separate questions…  While standing, which is an issue of justiciability… addresses the question whether a federal court may grant relief to a party in the plaintiff’s position, subject matter jurisdiction addresses the question whether a federal court may grant relief to any plaintiff given the claim asserted. ”  Rent Stabilization Assoc. of the City of New York v. Dinkins, 5 F.3d 591, 594 n.2 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal citations omitted).  See also Leyse v. Bank of America National Ass’n., 804 F.3d 316, 320 n.3 (3d Cir. 2015) (“We have, in the past, suggested that ‘statutory standing is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction’ …But we have since retreated from this characterization, and the Supreme Court has made clear that it is incorrect. ”) (internal citation omitted); (Hertzberg v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh, 721 A.2d 43, 46 n.6 (Pa. 1998) (“the question of standing is not an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. ”).  The fact Plaintiff was prohibited by N.J.S.A. 42:2C–65(a) from filing its original Complaint did not involve the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this case.  Rather, it involved Plaintiff’s standing to bring this suit and case law makes clear – now that Plaintiff satisfies N.J.S.A. 42:2C–65(a), Plaintiff can proceed with this suit.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] (11T134-15 to 136-1; Sa1 at 10:57:45 to 10:58:03; Da60 to Da62).  [...] then asked defendant to sign and verify that he was fingerprinted.  (11T136-2 to 4; Sa1 at 10:58:03 to 10:58:05; Da62).  After fingerprinting, defendant emphatically offered cooperation, telling the officers to “just fucking ask” him what they “need[ed] to know,” asking what they were “missing,” and stating: “[t]alk to me. ” (11T136-12 to 19; Sa1 at 10:58:12 to 10:58:46; Da62).  [...] replied that the detectives would take him upstairs for an interview.
[brief] Rule 4:50-1 is designed to “reconcile the strong interests in finality of judgments and judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should have authority to avoid an unjust result in any given case. ”  Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380, 392 (1984).  Consequently, under Rule 4:50-1, a litigant has one year from the date that a judgment is entered to move to vacate that judgment, provided that his motion to vacate a judgment is based on mistake, newly discovered evidence or fraud.
[brief] In February 2020, Plaintiff asked Defendant to visit his hometown to spend time together.  However, surprisingly, Defendant declined, stating her family would not allow it unless he formally agreed to marriage.  Defendant emphasized cultural concerns, suggesting it would reflect poorly if she visited Plaintiff’s hometown without a prior marriage agreement.  Plaintiff was not ready to commit to marriage and the intention of the trip was for Plaintiff to also meet and consider other potential partners in India.  However, Plaintiff felt a strong personal commitment to Defendant following their few months of conversations and the recent death of her father.  Despite his reservation and only knowing Defendant for three to four months, Plaintiff decided to commit to marriage with Defendant.  1T64-65.
[brief] D.  Testimony of Petitioner [...]  Petitioner testified that he began working in law enforcement in the [...] in April 1989.  (1T18:20-24).  He started working at the [...] in 1992 and joined the [...] in 1999.  (1T10:11; 1T11:1).  Petitioner continued working for the [...] until April 30, 2013.  (1T12:25).  His final law enforcement position was with [...], which began operations on May 1, 2013, and for which his last day of work was October 17, 2015, the date of the accident.  (1T15:20-23;1T47:25).
[directive] N.J.S.A. evidence  New 1st Consent in IDRC  Test vehicle under of BREATH $500 standard to (Implied Breath months Referral imposed to motor $250 CHEMICAL Chemical “preponderance,” 6 39:3-10.24f commercial penalties imposed to Submit any 39:3-10.24f N.J.S.A. TO a penalties operates to SUBMIT upon 39:3-10.20 addition to content.
[brief] Likewise, public employees are afforded immunities pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:3-1, et seq.  Generally, immunity for a public entity is the rule and liability is the exception.  Fluehr v. City of Cape May, 732 A.2d 1035 (N.J. 1999); Wilson v. Jacobs, 760 A.2d 818 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2000); see also Brooks v. Odom, 696 A.2d 619 (N.J. 1997) (purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to reestablish the rule of immunity for public entities from liability for injuries to other).
[brief] Pareja v. Princeton Int’l Props., 246 N.J. 546, 549 (2021) .............................  5 State v. Wilson, 135 N. J. 4, 14-15 (1994)  .........................................................  13  Stewart v. 104 Wallace Street Inc., 87 N.J. 146, 157 (1981)  .........................  1  Velazquez v. Portadin, 163 N.J. 667, 689 (2000)  ............................................  6  Warrington v. Bird, 204 N.J. Super 611, 617 (1985).  .......................................  2