ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  App. Br. at 2, 34.  That is, [...] asks this Court to review evidence that supported pieces of [...]’s award at several construction projects, and demands that “the Court should correct those figures. ”  App. Br. at 37.  “Correcting” an arbitration award’s damages figures inherently requires a re-evaluation of evidence, i.e., an exercise beyond the scope of appellate review.
[brief] ” (T1, 21:7-8).  She further stated that the LSRP is responsible for determining when the Property is cleaned up.  (T1, 25:12-19).  Although contamination has existed on the Property since at least 1991, and several tons of contaminated soil have been removed from the Property in April 2018, November 2018 and April 2022 (Da144), Plaintiff’s LSRP testified that he is currently unable to determine the extent of the remediation that needs to be completed.  (T1, 32:13-17).  He explained that for the soil contamination, he is still waiting on the results of the soil investigation.  Free product was discovered in the soil under the building.  (T1, 13:1-3).  So we did a rigorous investigation last week that included collection of upwards of 20 samples underneath the building, 20 borings underneath the building, and soil samples for laboratory analysis to try to get a three-dimensional understanding of how much soil underneath the building is impacted so that we can determine an appropriate remedial strategy for it.  We should have that data in a couple of weeks.  (T1, 18:3-10) (emphasis added).  For groundwater data, the time for investigation will be even longer.
[brief] (40T:132-12 to 133-9).  The officers did not observe any blood in the home or recover any instruments that appeared to have caused the death.  (40T:114-20 to 115-25; 132-12 to 133-9).  The home did not appear to have been recently cleaned because dust was visible on surfaces throughout.  (40T:115-5 to 21; 133-6 to 12).  [...] noticed a “chemical smell” that was strongest in the kitchen and saw a sheet of cookies in the oven and grease splatter on the oven door.  (40T:109-4 to 110-18; 135-6 to 136-14).  The bottom of the oven looked like it had been cleaned and bleach wipes were found in the nearby trash.  (40T:109-23 to 110-18; 135-6 to 136-14).  [...]’s husband, [...], worked at [...].
[brief] *Id.* at 103.  Three years after the entry of judgment in the collection action, the client sued the firm for legal malpractice with respect to its handling of the action against the business associate before withdrawing as counsel.  *Id.* at 104.  The firm moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim based on the Entire Controversy Doctrine.  *Ibid.*  The trial court agreed that the client should have asserted their malpractice claim in the collection matter.  *Id.* at 104-05.  The Appellate Division affirmed that decision, confirming that, for purposes of the Entire Controversy Doctrine, the "underlying action" was the litigation between the client and the business associate, not the firm's collection action.
[brief] POINT II  THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE HIGHLY UNRELIABLE ALLEGED DYING DECLARATION.  ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE IDENTIFICATION CONTAINED IN THE DYING DECLARATION.  (Partially Raised Below: Da 5; 1T 93-14 to 99-22)  Over defense objection, and without conducting a testimonial hearing, the court ruled that [...] could testify about his son’s alleged dying declaration.  (Da 5; 1T 93-14 to 99-22)  The trial court’s ruling was in error.  [...]’s belated revelation of the dying declaration, after [...] had already been arrested for murder and [...] had seen [...]’s picture and name in a news story, was too unreliable to be admissible.  The trial court should not have permitted such unreliable, misleading, yet compelling evidence before the jury.  In addition, the jury was not given any guidance as to how to assess the reliability of [...]’s alleged statement.  Significantly, the statement was an identification: it identified [...] as the murderer.  In a case where the defense was misidentification, the failure to instruct the jury on [...]’s alleged identification of [...] was reversible error.  Admission of the statement, without any guidance to the jury, violated [...]’s rights to due process and a fair trial.  U.S. Const. amends.  VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, pars. 1, 9, 10.  His convictions must be reversed.
[brief] At oral argument, the trial court inquired as to whether the Appellant was present in court when the verdict of acquittal was announced, and counsel replied that he was.  1T17:23-25.  Apropos of nothing, the trial court sua sponte seemingly relied on this singular fact to inject the discovery rule and to dismiss the Complaint as time barred.  1T23:15-25.  Applying the discovery rule, an equitable doctrine whose purpose is to *toll* statutes of limitations, the trial court erroneously concluded that the verdict was the operative date because that was the moment when the Appellant knew or should have known of his legal injury.
[brief] (6T, Pg. 215, lines 2-12.)  [...]’s counsel did not understand the details of the argument, he had only been retained about a month before the trial (5T, Pg. 29, lines 14-17) and (4T, Pg. 314, lines 2-3).  But Mr. [...] himself had been complaining of bias and harassment from the beginning of Trial.  Moreover Mr. [...]’s attorney made many objections based on prejudice and other grounds and [...] made many objections as well and in a great majority, the Court ruled against Mr. [...].  Without the benefit of knowing what had happened on September 16, 2022, each of the various rulings at trial might have been disregarded as merely discretionary acts on the part of [...], but when viewed in light of the history, there can be no doubt that at the very least an appearance of bias (if not actual bias) due to Mr. [...] reporting to the [...] claims of corruption, bias, harassment, and weaponizing of the court created a dark cloud over the proceeding seriously calling into question whether justice was even possible for Mr. [...].
[brief] As plaintiffs’ counsel said in response to [...] asking “what has changed” since his August 27 ruling, “the discovery had been extended”; “we have a December 30th end date, and now we know that trial will not be before … there’s not even a trial date yet, again, so there is a good cause -- you know, there’s still a good cause standard for the request to bring a report. ”  2T24.  The “age of the case” was not plaintiffs’ fault -- even [...] did not find that.  This was a complicated medical negligence case involving several potentially responsible parties.  The COVID-19 delays exacerbated the time it took for the case to progress through discovery.  But the record before [...] showed that counsel for all parties, plaintiffs included, had pursued discovery diligently, and the Law Division had extended deadlines as needed to accommodate the discovery that was needed.
[brief] 13  A.  Exemption #11 Must Be Strictly and Narrowly Construed to Only Allow for a “Routine Upgrade” Rather than Simply an “Upgrade” (Aa0001)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13  B.  In 2013, the Appellate Division Determined that a “Routine Upgrade” is One Whose Purpose is to Serve the Reliability Needs of a Public Utility’s Existing Customer Base (Aa0001)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17  C.  Here, the Purpose of [...]’s Project is to Satisfy the Market Need of New Customers – Not the Reliability Need of [...]’s Existing Customers (Aa0001)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20 D.
[brief] Defendant/Appellant [...] (“[...]”) has resided as a tenant in Unit 11 at [...] (the “Unit” or “[...]’s Unit”), a property subject to the Hoboken Rent Control Ordinance (“Ordinance”), since approximately 1990-91.1T73:9-10.  In 1993, Plaintiff/Respondent [...]  (“[...]”), owned by [...] (“[...]”), purchased 703 Park Avenue, an eleven-unit building in Hoboken, New Jersey, for $525,000.  1T5:19.  Beginning in 2001, the units in the building were converted into condominiums.
[brief] (Pa313, Pa316, Pa317).  Plaintiff cites “[...]’s internal appeal letter” in his opposition, which upheld the decision to deny liability coverage for essentially the same four reasons as the denial letter.  (Pa271, Pa387).  Plaintiff asserts that by disproving the four (4) reasons in the denial letter, it unequivocally demonstrates that coverage applies.  (Pa271 – Pa 282).  Plaintiff further asserts under the “Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations” that it is “unreasonable to deny coverage based upon ambiguous policy language and ambiguities in the complaint. ” (Pa282).  Had [...] intended its policy to exclude coverage for intentional torts such as interference with contractual relations, assault, and harassment, then it was obligated to unambiguously state that in the policy (which it did not do).  (Pa273, Pa282).  Oral argument for defendant [...]’s motion to dismiss was heard on May 26, 2023.
[brief] A.  Both the Alleged Defendants’ Specific Negligence for Failure to Incorporate Terms In Chinese Agreements to English PSA or Defendants’ “Many Other Deviations” from Standard Practice  During Representation Had Caused No Actual Damages to Plaintiff  The Court below denied Defendants’ motion to vacate the Final Judgment without analyzing the facts and the application of the law other than stating that the relief requested is inconsistent with the decision of the Appellate Division decided on August 25, 2021 (Da25-40) in this matter.  (Da-14)\(^5\)  “Rule 4:50-1 provides in relevant part that on motion, with briefs, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a final judgment or order for the following reasons: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered evidence which would probably --- \(^4\)  In the history of American Jurisprudence, this case is likely the first instance where an astronomic attorney fee award over $1.547 million dollars was compounded with attorney fees in a legal malpractice case where the elements of causation and actual damage were never established in the matrimonial case.
[brief] Upon resuming, the detectives continued to challenge his alibi and asked what he had to say; when he again replied, “Nothing,” they showed him another video and kept accusing him.  (Da 109, 06:38:45 to 6:48:00)  They again asked what he had to say, and he repeated for the third and fourth time, “Nothing.  Got nothing [else] to say,” but they continued to accuse him and to ask about gunshots until he said for the fifth time, “I got nothing [else] to say” -- after which questioning finally ceased and he was formally arrested.
[brief] This case arises from Defendant [...]’s (“[...]”) decision to leave his employment with Plaintiff, [...] (“[...]”) for that of [...] in October of 2013.  See R. Doc. 1, p. 1.  [...] resigned on October 6, 2013, and [...] initiated this suit four days later, asserting a single claim for breach of an employment agreement and seeking injunctive relief restraining [...] from working for [...] in certain regards.  Id. at 10–13.  The employment agreement was originally signed in 2005 and contained restrictive covenants under which [...] agreed to refrain from certain competitive activities (hereinafter referred to as the “Employment Agreement”).  Id. at 2–7.  Generally, those covenants provided that [...] would neither work for [...]’s competitors nor solicit its employees to the same within certain geographical areas, which were mostly defined in terms of Louisiana Parishes.  Id.  Calcasieu Parish was not within those geographical areas.  After a telephone hearing, the Court granted Plaintiff’s TRO request on October 11, 2013.  See R. Doc. 7.  Ten days later, on [...]’s motion and with his consent, the Court extended the TRO by two weeks and continued a previously scheduled preliminary injunction hearing by roughly the same period.  See R. Doc. 17.  On October 21, 2013, just two days after the TRO was extended, [...] filed a First Amended Complaint, alleging that [...] not only breached his Employment Agreement, but that he acted in concert with [...] to steal valuable trade secrets and confidential information before his October resignation.
[brief] . . 44  Tyler v. Hennepin County, 143 S.Ct. 1369 (May 25, 2023)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 20, 22, 24-26, 28, 45 Simon v. Cronecker, 189 N.J. 304, 336 (2007)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27  US Bank Cust for PC7  First Trust v. Block 64, Lot 6, 2020 WL 4196664 (App. Div.)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33-35  TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED FROM Order Vacating Final Judgment
[brief] (Da193-95).  The Order, as proposed, specifically consolidated these actions “for purposes of discovery and trial,” also suggesting no intention for arbitration.  (Da193-95).  Plaintiffs were forced to conclude that [...]’s and [...]’s inaccurate Rule 4:5-1 certifications, refusal to engage in mutual discovery, repeat insistence on early mediation, motion to consolidate, and [...]’s late demand for arbitration were tactics, not coincidence.
[directive] (3)  Under circumstances that cause any victim of the underlying offense to be intimidated and 3rd Degree $10,000 to $50,000 10% permissible the victim reasonably believed that (a) the offense was committed with the purpose to intimidate the victim or any person or entity in whose welfare the victim is interested because of race, color, religion, gender, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, national origin or ethnicity, or (b) the victim or the victim’s property was selected to be the target of the offense because of the victim’s race, color, religion, gender, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, national origin, or ethnicity.
[brief] Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reinstate the Complaint, which was denied by [...] on November 10, 2016.  (SDa3).  The November 10, 2016 decision resulted in a 42-page transcript and was announced during the proceeding that took one hour and 11 minutes to complete.  The trial court, in denying plaintiffs’ Motion to Reinstate the Complaint as to [...] and [...], entered a well-reasoned and comprehensive decision.  (SDa5).  The trial court’s opinion quoted several portions of the plaintiffs’ Complaint in its decision.  (Id. at 14: 4-13).  The trial court provided a review, with quotations, of the pleadings filed by the plaintiffs and [...] and the [...] firm.  (Id. at 14:4-19:6.).  Specifically:
[brief] [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 14 to Cmplt.)…………..98a-100a January 6, 2020 Customer Claim Form and BBB Auto Line Rejection of Plaintiff’s Mediation Request (redacted) (Exbt.15 to Cmplt.)……………………………………………………………..101a-103a August 13, 2020 (redacted) [...] Service Invoice for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe (Exbt. 16 to Cmplt.)………..104a-107a November 27, 2020 photo of 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe’s instrument cluster showing a lit Check Engine light and a 73,573 odometer reading (Exbt. 17 to Cmplt.) ……………………..108a-109a December 19, 2019, August 13, 2020 and March 16, 2021 Service Invoices for 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe, (Exhibit B to [...] Certification)…………………………………………….110a-117a August 31, 2022 Offer of Settlement Letter from Defendant’s Counsel to Plaintiff’s Counsel (Exhibit C to [...] Certification)…………………………………………….118a-120a December 22, 2022 Settlement Agreement and Release, Notarized and Executed By All Parties And Their Counsel (Exhibit D to [...] Certification)…………………………………………….121a-128a
[directive] Você entende que em decorrência da sua declaração de culpa por  Do you understand that because of your plea of guilty to (Indicar o(s) crime(s) violentos de primeiro ou segundo grau sujeitos à Lei NERA) NERA (List First or Second Degree Violent Crime(s) to Which Applies) você será obrigado a cumprir 85% da pena imposta para este(s) crime(s) para ser elegível à liberdade condicional por este(s) crime(s)?  you will be required to serve 85% of the sentence imposed for that offense(s) before you will be eligible for parole on that offense(s)?
[brief] The respondents cited *NJSA 47:1A-3* to categorically deny to the appellant OPRA access to the records of their entrapments against him (Pa29), as they continued their entrapments against him even after he sued them.  2.  The respondents arbitrarily cited “confidentiality” and produced fully redacted memorandum (Pa16), which memorandum was the explanations of police chief [...] to the respondents for causing the denial of the Application, upon stipulating “I have determined to deny [...]’s request” (Pa19), as [...] suppressed the official recommendation which had recommended the grant of the Application (Pa18).
[brief] The trial judge chose to focus only on the Affidavits of Service, ignoring the other Plaintiff's defective certifications (not fulfilling their purpose) required by law to obtain a Final Judgment by Default, discovered by the defendants in September of 2023.  He said of the Process Server: "At best it's a mistake in terms of the Affidavit of Service.  At worst, it's a flat out lie."  (See October 19, 2023 Court Hearing Transcript: Page 14, lines 5-7) – he made no attempt to seek the truth.  Important, because if the latter, the Process Server lied, then the court has no jurisdiction and equally important the defendants were unjustly caused harm.
[brief] 3.  **Uniform policy is not needed in this context in that the subject of noise can be regulated for different purposes and in different ways.**  As related earlier, the Legislature has regulated, and has allowed for regulation by others, noise in different ways.  This is true even outside of the decibel related standards of the Noise Control Act.  Hence, one uniform policy for all purposes does not exist.  The environmental health consequences of noise are proper subjects for regulation under the Health Act.  However, other aspects of noise, i.e. the disturbance of peace, quiet, safety and general welfare of municipal residents fall under the domain of the governing body, as evidenced by the existence of the explicit power to regulate disturbing noises in the Home Rule Act.  Indeed, the fact that noise may in some ways, and for some objectives, fall under the realm of health and, therefore may be governed by the Health Act or the Local Health Services Act, does not diminish the fact that it can be regulated in other ways for other goals at other times.
[brief] AMENDED BRIEF BY APPELLANTS IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Docket No.: [...]  BRIEF ON BEHALF ON APPELLANTS, [...] AND [...], IN SUPPORT OF THE APPEAL FROM THE ORDERS DATED NOVEMBER 4, 2022 AND MARCH 28, 2023 OF HONORABLE  DANIEL R. LINDEMANN, J.S.C. [...]  [...], Esq.
[brief] Moreover, since November 5, 2007, the FHA Rules have contained a legacy provision protecting permitholders from changing flood hazard requirements.  N.J.A.C. 7:13-2.1 (effective April 5, 2021 to July 16, 2023).  When N.J.A.C. 7:13-2.1 was amended on July 17, 2023, this legacy provision continued with the modification of protecting all permits issued prior to July 17, 2023, the effective date of the IFPR.  N.J.A.C. 7:13-2.1(c)(1).
[brief] (Pa022).  From the moment the Judge read [...]’s report wherein he states that he asked plaintiff for [...]’s car keys so that he could make sure that the vehicle belonged to [...], he should have known that [...] was not a credible person.  (Pa023).  The story about a key sticking out of each hand poking through each knuckle which could be used as a weapon sound completely concocted.  (Pa023).  The maxim 'falsus in uno falsus in omnibus, while not mandatory rule of evidence, may be used as presumable inference as to the truthfulness of an individual.
[directive] INTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY & PROCEDURES | June 2021  6.2.6  Each agency should establish its own protocol for reviewing and purging performance notices and oral reprimands from an employee's personnel file.  Written reprimands should remain permanently in the employee's personnel file.  6.2.7  A letter shall be sent to the complainant explaining the outcome of the investigation.  If the allegation was unfounded or the officer was exonerated, this conclusion shall be stated and defined for the civilian complainant.  If the allegation was not sustained, the letter shall provide the complainant with a brief explanation why the complaint was not sustained (e.g., insufficient proof, lack of witnesses, etc.).  If the allegation was sustained and discipline was imposed, the letter shall state that the allegation was sustained and that the officer has been disciplined according to agency procedures.  See Appendix E.  6.3
[brief] APPEAL OF THE COMMISSION’S JULY 26, 2022  DECISION ON RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS (Ca165-174)........  35  A.  THE COMMISSION  ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED COUNT 5, AS APPELLANTS REASONABLY RELIED ON AN ADVISORY OPINION OF THE COMMISSION (Ca172-173; Ca194).  ........................................................................  37  B.  THE COMMISSION  ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED COUNTS 2 AND 3 BASED ON FACTS NOT IN THE RECORD AND OTHER PURPORTED FACTS  WERE CONTRADICTED BY THE UNCONTESTED RECORD (Ca172).  CONCLUSION TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS
[directive] 1.  Familiarization Requirements for Each Participant.  a.  Demonstrate the safe handling of weapon.  b.  Demonstrate proper loading and unloading techniques.  c.  Demonstrate the techniques of proper physical stance.  d.  Demonstrate the techniques of good marksmanship.  2.  Range - 25 yards.  3.  Target - FBI type Q target, either paper or cardboard.  Multiple targets may be used at the discretion of the agency executive or supervising firearms instructor.  4.  Course.  a.  Total of 50 rounds per participant.  b.  Double action is required for revolvers for all phases.  Semi-automatics are to be fired in the manner in which the individual weapon functions normally and are to be decocked when changing positions or hands.  c.  Reloading may take place at the discretion of the supervising firearms instructor.  Additionally, discretion may be used as to the number of rounds with which the magazines are loaded to accomplish reloading exercises during the course.  Similarly, the sequence of rounds fired at a given distance may be altered to accommodate a reloading exercise.  d.  To achieve a passing score of 80%, the participant must place a minimum of 40 shots within the border of the Q-target silhouette.  e.  Physical or simulated barricades are required in Phase I and may be used at the discretion of the agency during any subsequent phase.  Phase I  25-Yard Line.  Time: 30 seconds - stage 1, 25 seconds stages 2 & 3 10 rounds.  9-40 Revised (5/03)  Semi-Annual Firearms Qualification and Requalification Standards
[brief] Pa54, ¶ 85, Pa333, ¶ 85.  He did not consider either the preexisting water runoff or plaintiff’s claims in the Burke action of water runoff from the driveway.  Pa54-55, ¶¶ 84, 87, Pa333, ¶¶ 84, 87.  He did not calculate the amount of water runoff that would have taken place before the [...] purchased their property.  Pa55, ¶ 88, Pa333, ¶ 88.  Instead of presenting evidence of a breach of any duty of care, plaintiff merely claims that the [...]’ engineering expert, [...], P.E., did not rebut the claim that the gap in the Belgian block lining the [...]’ driveway caused water to flow onto plaintiff’s property.