ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] *2  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26* contemplates expansive discovery of “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense. ”  *Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)* (1).  Rule 26 further states: “Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. ”  *Id.*  There are limits to discovery, however.  The Supreme Court has held that there are “ultimate and necessary boundaries” to discovery.  *Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders*, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S.Ct. 2380, 57 L.Ed.2d 253 (1978).  In *Oppenheimer*, the Court held that “discovery of a matter not ‘reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence’ is not within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1). ”  *Id.* at 352.  Courts frequently restrict discovery based on relevance.  *See Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Div. Of Coltec Indus.*, 328 F.3d 309, 320 (7th Cir.2003) (upholding district court's limitations on discovery based upon relevance); *Kinkead v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.*, 49 F.3d 454, 457 (8th Cir.1995) (affirming district court's denial of motion to compel discovery based in part on irrelevance of documents in question); *Diak v. Dwyer, Costello, and Knox, P.C.*, 33 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir.1994) (upholding district court's denial of request for discovery regarding redacted tax returns); and *Detweiler Bros., Inc. v. John Graham & Co.*, 412 F.Supp. 416, 422 (E.D.Wash.1976) (requests for production of documents regarding building project were too broad and therefore not relevant where issues in case were limited to steam piping).
[brief] Our caselaw thus instructs that courts assess the circumstances (plural) giving rise to probable cause, not simply the very last step.  Those circumstances leading to the probable cause to search [...]’s car are far from unforeseeable and spontaneous.  Contrary to the State’s claims, [...]’s arguments do not “stretch” the holding from Smart.  (Sb 23-24)  Instead, as Smart instructed, [...] is simply asking this Court to analyze all the circumstances leading to probable cause—that narcotics officers surveilling a parking lot for narcotics activity saw narcotics activity from a car and therefore decided to specifically surveil the car and stop its occupant.
[brief] (Appx 533 at ¶45).  Plaintiff’s regular day shift at the [...] was one of the shifts affected by [...]’s decision.  (Appx 533 at ¶46).  [...] offered Plaintiff three other positions, all of which she rejected.  (Appx 533 at ¶46).  Plaintiff declined and told [...] she needed to work a day shift.  (Appx 533 at ¶47).  [...] then offered Plaintiff a day shift at the [...], which had the schedule Plaintiff wanted, from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. (Appx 533 at ¶48).  Plaintiff originally took this job but then decided she did not want it.  (Appx 533 at ¶49).  Plaintiff explained at her deposition that while at the [...], she got a flat tire, which led to her decision to leave the offered role:
[brief] Defendant watched violent and gory television shows and video games.  (6T88-12 to 88-20).  One of the videos defendant watched was the cartoon “Anime Berserk,” which was “very violent, hard to watch anime with a lot of killing and twisted stuff” with “a lot of blood. ” (6T88-24 to 89-5, 92-4 to 9, 92-19 to 93-1).  Defendant nonetheless was gentle, and still slept with his parents and believed in Santa Claus at age 16.
[brief] Having begun this process, Superior Courts throughout New Jersey have done so with near-consensus – nearly all rejecting Appellant’s letter vendor theory of liability.  See e.g., Miller v. Americollect, Inc., 2022 WL 20470401; Mhrez Decision; Mhrez Transcript; Rubin v. Transworld Systems, Inc., Case No. [...]; Elshabba v. Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC, Case No. [...].  Appellant’s hyper-technical, literal reading of the FDCPA was rejected by these courts to avoid absurd results and maintain the consistency of the general ---
[brief] Under the Public Trust Doctrine, the public has rights of access to, and the use of, the shores of tidal waterways in New Jersey.  See, Matthew v. Bayhead Imp. Ass’n 95 N.J. 306 (1984)  The illegal Government action challenged here is the passage of the Ordinance that adopts the Redevelopment Plan which effectively changes the potential use of the Plan area, its development, and public access to the beach/ocean.  Closing off public access points and abolishing 300 public parking spaces providing beach/recreation access is a clear violation of the Public Trust Doctrine.  The Trial Court ruling that [...] (and the public) cannot directly challenge the Ordinance adopting the Redevelopment Plan is incorrect.
[brief] As stated by the Trial Court, courts outside of this jurisdiction have adopted a four-factor test regarding whether a private entity may be considered a public agency for purposes of access to public records under the functional equivalent test: “(1) whether a governmental function was performed; (2) the extent of governmental funding; (3) the degree of government involvement or regulation; and (4) whether the government created the entity. ” (Da098).  Three of the four factors are met here.  While [...] did not create [...], [...] funds the emergency alerts and pays [...] to provide the emergency alert system.  [...] is involved in regulating [...] to the extent that [...] sets the terms of service.  And the strongest factor is the first, which is whether [...] provides a government function, which is a strong yes.  As discussed by the Trial Court, “[...] alerts include Covid-19 guidelines, vaccine information for senior citizens, and weather advisories. ” (Da099).  These activities, which are undisputed, certainly show that [...] was providing a public governmental function.  Based these foregoing factors, the Trial Court correctly held that [...] is a public entity.
[brief] ” (Da2804).  Similarly, on behalf of [...], [...] represented that consummation of the purchase would not “result in a breach of . . . any agreement, contract . . . or other arrangement to which the Company is a party or by which it is bound,” or “violate any provision of the charter or bylaws of the Company. ” (Da2805).  [...] made similar representations in the 2017 SPA.  (Da2825-26).  These representations (and those on behalf of [...]) survived closing.  (Da2806; 2827).  The trial court found breaches of the [...] Stockholders Agreement and the SPAs, which triggered these indemnity provisions and the requirement that, at the very least, [...] and [...] (as parties to the SPAs) pay Plaintiffs’ attorneys fees, expenses, investigation costs, and other costs of suit.
[brief] 2.  The Parental Secrecy Policy is not narrowly tailored to prevent harm.  a.  The Parental Secrecy Policy is not narrowly tailored to prevent parents from abusing their children.  The State argued below that the Parental Secrecy Policy also prevents parents from harming their transgender-identifying children.  ACa81–82.  The prevention of harm to children is assuredly a compelling government interest in the abstract.  But it violates both the substantive and procedural components of the Due Process Clause to presume that parents will harm their children without making specific factual findings in each individual case.
[brief] *Id.* at 35.  This Court largely agreed, and in doing so, adopted § 7.01(d) of The American Law Institute’s Principals of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (1992), which explained:  In the case of a closely held corporation ... the court in its discretion may treat an action raising derivative claims as a direct action, exempt it from those restrictions and defenses applicable only to derivative actions, and order an individual recovery, if it finds that to do so will not (i) unfairly expose the corporation or the defendants to a multiplicity of actions, (ii) materially prejudice the interests of the creditors of the corporation, or (iii) interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery among all interested persons.  (Emphasis added.)  In the case of closely held entities, “the normal policy reasons for requiring a plaintiff to employ the form of the derivative action may not be present or will be less weighty, even though the action alleges in substance a corporate injury.
[brief] The ALJ’s conclusion that [...] lied about TL’s alleged alcohol use is not founded upon fact and, thus, undercuts the ALJ’s basis for concluding [...] was not a credible witness.  The Decision further provides:  Appellant also lied about being under the influence of drugs.  ….  Appellant also lied to [...] by saying he was on-duty and therefore could not have been on drugs, when he was off-duty at that time.  Decision at p.43. (Pa54).  In fact, [...] never said anything to [...] about being under the influence of drugs, and [...] never asked.  Fornorotto testified that [...] exhibited some signs of being under the influence such as sweating which is equally attributable to [...] being nervous and upset about TL.  (T2 101:10-102:1; T4 76:5-15, 132:12-15).  Further, when [...] took an IA ordered urine test mere days after the TL incident, his urine tested negative for opioids or any other narcotic.  (T1 161:19-23; T4 149:12-150:5).  The ALJ’s finding that [...] lied about being on-duty at the time of the TL Incident is simply misguided.  The ALJ found, in another portion of the Decision that “[...] asked if appellant had taken drugs and he said, ‘No, I’m on the job,’ although he was off-duty at the time. ” (Pa45).  The ALJ mistakenly concluded that [...]’s statement “I’m on the job” indicated that he was currently working.  To the contrary, “I’m on the job” in police vernacular simply means that he is a police officer.  [...]’s statement was not meant to indicate that he is currently on duty, rather he was advising [...] that he is a fellow police officer.  Comparatively, even though the ALJ concluded that [...] was not a particularly credible witness (Pa31), the ALJ fully relied upon his testimony.  The Decision further states:  As set forth above, appellant also gave misleading and outright false statements regarding his third sinus surgery and going to Florida.
[brief] *Taniean*, 15 N.J. at 275 (emphasis added).  The difference in the impact that the awareness of a hazard has on the duties owed to a social guest/licensee and invitee is also shown through the Model Jury Charges that are given to a jury in a premises liability action:\(^2\)  **M.J.C. 5.20F(4)  Social Guest – Defined and General Duty Owed**  A social guest is someone invited to a host’s premises.  The social guest must accept the premises of the host as the social guest finds them.  **M.J.C. 5.20F(12)  Notice to Invitee or Obviousness of Defect**  a.  Affecting Negligence or Comparative Negligence  Whether defendant has furnished an invitee with a reasonably safe place for the invitee’s use may depend upon the --- \(^2\)  It has been noted that “[g]enerally speaking, the language contained in any model jury charge results from the considered discussion amongst experienced jurists and practitioners. ”  *Estate of Kotsovska v. Liebman*, 221 N.J. 568, 595 (2012).  other words, the host has no obligation to make the home safer for the social guest than for the host.  The host also is not required to inspect the premises to discover defects that might cause injury to the social guest.  If, however, the host knows or has reason to know of some artificial or natural condition on the premises which could pose an unreasonable risk of harm to the guest and that the guest could not be reasonably expected to discover it, the owner/occupier owes the social guest a duty to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe or to give warning to the guest of its presence and of the risk involved.  In other words, although a social guest is required to accept the premises as the host maintains them, the guest is entitled to the host’s knowledge of dangerous conditions on the premises.
[brief] The notice published in advance of the hearing and passage of Ordinance No. 13-2022 was deficient because it did not include a separate statement of purpose prepared by the clerk.  (Pa58-Pa61)  There is unquestionably an element of subjectivity in determining whether a notice published in accordance with N.J.S.A. 40:49-2 includes a sufficient “clear and concise statement” of the “purpose of the ordinance”.  In the instant case, however, the Court need not engage in that analysis.  That is because the required statement is entirely missing from the notice that the Township published following the first reading of Ordinance No. 13-2022.  Nevertheless, even assuming, arguendo, that publication of the ordinance’s title alone could somehow also satisfy the separate statement of purpose requirement (which it cannot), the same result would obtain in this case.  Although no reported decisions exist concerning the issue of the statement of purpose’s substantive sufficiency under N.J.S.A. 40:49-2, several analogous cases exist involving notices published pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1.  In fact, the Appellate Division has previously commented on the shared history of these statutes, noting that prior to the enactment of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.1, L. 1977, c. 395, which was also implemented as a cost saving measure, land use ordinances had to be published in entirety in accordance with the then-existing version of N.J.S.A. 40:49-2.
[directive] It does not address the use of oleoresin capsicum (“OC spray”), tear gas or other chemical agents, distraction devices (e.g., a “flash bang”) or the use of an asp or baton.  This policy supersedes and replaces all other policies, directives, memorandums or guidance provided by the [...] or the [...] on CEDs and other Less-Lethal Devices and Ammunition.  1.2  The terms CED, less-lethal device, and less-lethal ammunition are defined in Section 3 of this policy.  1.3  Any deployment of a conducted energy device or less-lethal device falls under the definition of “enhanced mechanical force” and will only be authorized if consistent with the Policy, including the provisions contained in this Addendum.  1  USE OF FORCE POLICY  Addendum A | December 2020
[brief] This would impose a new and arduous duty on the courts.  In her brief, the defendant cites United States v. Salamone, 800 U.S. 522, 537 (1975) to point out that defendants in a criminal trial are entitled to “the opportunity to have the jury drawn from venires representative of the community. ” (Db37 citing Salamone).  Salamone, however, dealt with whether the exclusion of all potential jurors with NRA affiliations was properly within the trial court’s discretion.  The case at present, however, deals with an exclusion for a specifically disqualifying prior criminal offense.  Where the judge reasonably relies on a potential juror’s representation that he or she has had a disqualifying conviction, the court must disqualify that juror under R. 2B:20-1(e).  Indeed, even Salamone itself sets forth the heavy burden an appellant faces in challenging a trial court’s discretion in jury selection, stating “In general, the allegation on appeal that the trial judge improperly conducted the voir dire examination of prospective jurors, in the absence of plain error, will not be heard where no objection is made before the [lower] court. ” (Salamone quoting Fed.R.Crim.P.51,52(b).  Where a trial court clearly relies upon a juror’s explicit and reasonable representation that he has a disqualifying conviction, there is no abuse of discretion and, where the defendant’s trial counsel did not object to the exclusion of the juror, it is not properly before the appellate court at all.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] Even after the limited arbitration review standard was adopted in Tretina the Supreme Court in Weiss, supra, vacated an arbitrator’s award based on the judicial duty to enforce public policy.  Id. at 447-448.  In doing so, the Court affirmed the “public policy” exception to the standard of review limitation in Tretina, and it definitively required judicial intervention whenever an arbitrator’s decision implicates public policy of the State as follows:  [O]ur task is to determine the circumstances under which an arbitration award that implicates a clear mandate of public policy should be subjected to judicial intervention to safeguard the public interest.  Assuming that the arbitrator's award accurately has identified, defined, and attempted to vindicate the pertinent public policy, courts should not disturb the award merely because of disagreements with arbitral fact findings or because the arbitrator's application of the public-policy principles to the underlying facts is imperfect.  If the correctness of the award, including its resolution of the public-policy question, is reasonably debatable, judicial intervention is unwarranted.  The judiciary's duty to provide an enhanced level of review of such arbitration awards is discharged by a careful scrutiny of the award, in the context of the underlying public policy, to verify that the interests and objectives to be served by the public policy are not frustrated and thwarted by the arbitral award.  However, if the arbitrator's resolution of the public-policy question is not reasonably debatable, and plainly would violate a clear mandate of public policy, a court must intervene to prevent enforcement of the award.  In such circumstances, judicial intervention is necessary because arbitrators cannot be permitted to authorize litigants to violate either the law or those public-policy principles that government has established by statute, regulation or otherwise for the protection of the public.
[brief] (Pa217 at ¶13.)  On November 30, 2023, Respondent filed its additional motion papers – refashioning the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment – seeking an order for Appellant to accept $30.53, plus interest on that balance, in alleged full dismissal and satisfaction of the mortgage.  (Pa217 at ¶15.)  On January 12, 2024, Appellant filed its opposition to Respondent’s motion for summary judgment and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking an order striking Respondent’s Answer and affirmative defenses, deeming this matter uncontested pursuant to R. 4:64-1(c), entering default, and transferring this matter to the Office of Foreclosure.  (Pa216 at ¶2.)
[brief] The State is liable as an “employer” for the discrimination and retaliation in the Judiciary and the Prosecutor’s Office because it employs those Public Officials, it’s a public accommodation or facility and it’s a public facility whose Manager, Agents or Employees have discriminated against [...].  N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(e).  Holding the State liable for these misdeeds of its officers, their possible immunity being personal to them is irrelevant, and Managers have no immunity for administrative action or inaction.  Ever since Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc. 132 N.J. 587, 603-04, 626 A.2d 445 (1993), NJ has been in a leading court system in dealing with sexual harassment.
[directive] Cash Bail Option 2C:21-1  Forgery in statute.  4th Degree $1,000 to $2,500  10% permissible (continued)  (continued)  Actor sells, transfers, or possesses with intent to sell, a writing which falsely purports to be a 2nd Degree $35,000 to $75,000  10% permissible driver's license, birth certificate or other document issued by a governmental agency which could be used to verify a person's identity or age or who make or possesses devices or False Government materials to make such documents; second degree; if actor exhibits or utters such 2C:21-2.1(a-d)  3rd Degree  $5,000 to $20,000
[brief] Waivers are distinguishable from variances in that the former effect relief from site plan or subdivision standards while the latter concern zoning standards.  See Wawa Food Market v. Planning Bd., Ship Bottom, 227 N.J. Super. 29, 34 (App. Div. 1988).  "The distinction between site plan or subdivision conditions and zoning requirements are often subtle.  For instance, onsite parking might be a waiver issue as to the size of the parking space but a zoning issue as to the number of parking spaces.  Presumably, off street, off site parking not otherwise permitted by ordinance would require a variance."  Cox & Koenig, Sec. 23-8(b) (2023 ed.).  In Wawa, [...] explained that off-street parking space and driveway width requirements, contained in the zoning ordinance, cannot be waived or relaxed by the planning board as part of site plan review.  Relief from the provisions of a zoning ordinance must be sought under the variance procedure.
[brief] After seeing what [...] believed to be a narcotics transaction involving [...]’s car, [...] called his partners, described [...]’s car, and asked them to surveil it and stop [...] when he returned to the car.  The item in violation of the law while on the other arguing that the defendant did not, for standing purposes, possess a privacy interest in the property seized”). police clearly had control over all these investigative steps.  And while those steps may have been reasonable, assuming the police did have reasonable suspicion, those planned investigative steps were certainly not spontaneous.  What occurred here is very different from the prototypical automobile exception case—where police stop a car for a traffic violation, happen to see or smell contraband in the car, and therefore conduct an immediate roadside search of the car for that contraband.
[brief] *State v. Ruffin*, 371 N.J. Super. 371, 391 (App. Div. 2004).  Appellate courts review the denial of a Wade hearing for an abuse of discretion.  *Ibid.*  “A threshold showing of some evidence of impermissive suggestiveness is required. ”  *Ibid.*  Our Supreme Court has described impermissible suggestibility as: the determination [of impermissible suggestibility] can only be reached so as to require the exclusion of the evidence where all of the circumstances lead forcefully to the conclusion that the identification was not actually that of the eyewitness, but was imposed upon him so that a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification can be said to exist.  *[State v. Madison*, 109 N.J. 233, 234 (1988). ]  In *State v. Henderson*, 208 N.J. 208, 218 (2011), the Court outlined a “non-exhaustive list” of factors that weigh on suggestiveness.
[brief] (4T 57-14 to 24)  The front passenger window of that car was “shattered inward,” [...] testified.  (4T 60-21 to 61-14)  [...] also testified that the semiautomatic handgun found at the property on Madison was a 9-mm. and was sitting on top of the magazine for that weapon, which had three bullets inside while the gun still had one in the chamber.
[directive] Attachment this standard operating to procedure delineates the policies and procedures for opening, transferring and reporting on the of these accounts as well as general file and information management- status for Trackinq the Holdins Period Forfeiture of and 2:6  Standards  Property  A.  Property forfeited a law enforcement agency, purchased by a law or to with the AGLEFA, enforcement agency funds from including shall be M A , held by the law enforcement agency for law enforcement purposes:
[brief] To that extent Reyes had little to do with this case.  However, the benefit of Reyes was that it exhaustively tracked the legal principles associated with the leasing of property in general as that topic was treated and analyzed by the Restatement of Torts going back almost ninety years to 1935.  In doing so the Reyes decision left no doubt that consideration of the principles of Section 358 is required and appropriate when determining the liability of a lessors in general: