ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] As defendants argued to [...] in moving for reconsideration of the July 22 judgment, “[t]he Court did not permit the [...] to present their Quiet Title claim.  Had the [...] been permitted to present their case in chief in as to their Quiet Title claim, the Court would have been apprised of above and additional critical facts that have not been addressed by this Court. ”  As claimants, the [...] should have proceeded first with their case in chief.  Instead, the Plaintiff/[...] proceeded first at trial - and proceeded on [...]' claim.  This is contrary to procedural law.  [...] should have been provided first opportunity to present evidence of their claim, and, while the Court has discretion, they should have been provided at least some opportunity to present their evidence of their Quiet Title claim.  How the Plaintiff and [...]/Ocwen can be awarded Final Judgment on [...]' claim of Quiet Title when [...] had no opportunity to present their evidence is significant grounds for motion for reconsideration and reversal of the Final Judgment.  Providing the Plaintiff (not established as a trust - or by financial accounts receivable) and [...]/Ocwen first opportunity to present evidence on [...]' Quiet Title claim has no precedence in law, and not providing the [...] an opportunity to be heard equally lacks in precedence.
[brief] *16  Before [...] testified, [...] objected to [...] identifying him in court.  Arguing that [...] had made no pretrial identification, [...] requested a Biggers\(^8\) hearing, or that he, [...], be placed in an appropriate line-up.  [...] asserted that in the absence of a pretrial identification, [...] identifying him in court would be unduly suggestive.  The court denied [...]'s application, noting that [...] had not filed a pretrial application concerning [...] identifying him.  The court knew of no precedent that would preclude an in-court identification by a witness who had a reasonable amount of contact with a suspect.  The court concluded that [...] had not made a sufficient showing to require an evidentiary hearing before [...] testified.  [...] essentially argues that [...] did not make sufficient observations of the perpetrator to identify [...] as that person, as evidenced both by [...]'s inability to identify [...] from two photographic arrays, and from [...]'s identification of another individual.  Consequently, the inherently suggestive procedure of [...] identifying [...] while [...] sat next to his attorney during the criminal trial resulted in the substantial likelihood, if not the reality, of irreparable misidentification.  [...] also argues that because [...] did not make any pretrial identification, [...]'s ability to identify [...] should have been the subject of a hearing or tested by a line-up.
[brief] 34T – June 22, 2020, vol. 1 (trial)  35T – June 22, 2020, vol. 2 (trial)  36T – June 23, 2020, vol. 1 (trial)  On August 1, 2018, Defendant, [...], was indicted along with co-defendants [...] and [...], by an Ocean County Grand Jury under [...].
[brief] [L]ike the parking lot in Garrison and the bridge in Levin, the park was not constructed for snow tubing.  It was constructed to provide, among other uses, a playground with slides and a jungle gym for young children.  There was no defect in the construction of the park or the playground equipment for its intended uses.  It was plaintiff’s decision to use the sloped area of the park for her snow tubing activity rather than the condition of the property itself that caused plaintiff’s accident and injury.
[brief] ”  Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015).  In order to extend to prolong the stop “beyond the time required to complete the stop’s mission,” an officer needs “reasonable suspicion independent from the justification for a traffic stop. ”  State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 540 (2017).  Accordingly, for instance, “[a]n officer may not conduct a canine sniff in a manner that prolongs a traffic stop beyond the time required to complete the stop’s mission, unless he possesses reasonable and articulable suspicion to do so. ”  Id. (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357).  For the same or similar reasons, “unless there is a reasonable and articulable basis beyond the initial valid motor vehicle stop to continue the detention after completion of the valid traffic stop, any further detention to effectuate a consent search is unconstitutional.
[directive] The Attorney General shall, through the Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy and in consultation with the Commissioner of Health and Senior Services, the Superintendent of State Police and representatives of providers of services to victims of human trafficking, to be designated by the Director of the Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy, coordinate the establishment of standard protocols for the provision of information and services to victims of human trafficking, including coordination of efforts with the appropriate federal authorities pursuant to the “Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003,” 22 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq. and shall make such protocols available to victims upon request.
[brief] [...] did not open [...]’s account or have [...] sign an account application out of self-interest.  [...] never alleged that [...] “encouraged [him] to repose special trust or confidence in its advice” or “represent[ed itself] as experts in a field and invited reliance of another party on such expertise. ”  *Stevenson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc.*, No. 14-5250, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70945, at *26 (D.N.J. June 2, 2015) (citations and quotation marks omitted).  [...] argues that a fiduciary relationship existed because he “was justified in believing the Bank would act in his best interest[.]” (Appellant Br., 44.)  However, [...]’s subjective ---
[brief] His ruling was also based on irrational, illegitimate claim w/o any evidence that “[...] can have a field day” with a Final Accounting.  Overwhelming substantiated evidence (114a-119a,par. 8) was my simple focus was on whether prior Accounting was accurate, & not contradicting substantiated facts that I also addressed in Reconsideration Motion w/o a “field day” (p. 12-20, par. 59)  His ruling overlooked [...]’s Oct. 26, 2022 letter, w/requests for Trust paying various fees, for reserve for discharged, Co-Trustee, [...] “to update Court approved intermediate accounting” which would be a Final Accounting, & his Mar. 23, ‘23 filed letter, w/request to pay legal fees, for reserve for “costs to finalize his administration of the [...], as permitted by3B:31-52(b) & authorized by Oct. 6, 2022 Judgement [par. 2 required Final Accounting]”.
[brief] And as [...] points out, and it was [...] who wrote the case, and I think it began, if I am not mistaken, with [...] here in [...].  So it is one of those landmark cases that everyone uses.  And when you apply it, I think it is fair, realistic, and accurate.  And honestly, this Court often would make adjustments, and, you know, it is just mind boggling how much time and effort -- and it just hasn't stopped.
[brief] Plaintiffs first believed that [...] was the sole member of [...] at all times relevant to this matter, following discovery (just prior to the filing of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate) of a Mortgage dated May 7, 2008 (570a), executed by [...] as sole member of [...].  Upon discovery of the Mortgage, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Vacate the Orders of November 16, 2016, and December 20, 2016.  In response to said Motion, counsel for [...], [...], Esq., and counsel for [...], [...], Esq., continued to maintain that [...] was owned solely by Teddy [...].  In their arguments to the Court, [...] and [...] pointed to the deposition testimonies of [...], [...], [...], and [...] in another matter and proffered for the first time in this litigation a purported Collateral Assignment (96a), to support their representation that [...] was solely owned by Teddy [...] (52a).  Based on the aforesaid misrepresentations, the Collateral Assignment was alleged to be the only reason [...] executed the Mortgage, and the Trial Court erroneously denied Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate on April 3, 2018.
[brief] Approximately two months before he voluntarily ended his employment with the Practice, on November 1, 2023, [...] filed the Chancery Complaint and an Order to Show Cause seeking a preliminary injunction ruling that his potential future employment with [...] at its Flemington office did not violate the terms of the Restrictive Covenant even though [...]’s Flemington Office was admittedly within the scope of the prohibited radius.  (Pa1-41).  At the time that [...] commenced his action, the Practice had not taken any steps to enforce the Restrictive Covenant, or even settled on a course of action.  The Chancery Court conducted oral argument on December 1, 2023 (1T), and subsequently on December 11, 2023 issued the December 2023 Order, denying [...]’s application without prejudice because it was not yet ripe.  (Ra4).  Specifically, the Chancery Court noted that [...] was still employed by the Practice, which had not taken any steps to enforce the Restrictive Covenant.
[brief] Exhibit I: [...] answers to Challenger interrogatories .........................Da265  Exhibit J: Option agreement ......................................................................Da309  Exhibit K: Letter from [...], Esq. to [...], Esq., dated 8/30/21……………………………………………………Da344  Stipulation As To Undisputed Facts, filed 11/11/22…………………………Da393  Volume IV (Pages 401 thru Da478)
[brief] *State v. Preciose*, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992).  Abuse of discretion defies simple definition; “[w]hile the concept is difficult to define with precision, an appellate court ‘may find an abuse of discretion when a decision ‘rest[s] on an impermissible basis’ or was ‘based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors’…
[brief] Pa163; Pa345-46.  Those available and appropriate warning and safety devices would have (1) alerted [...] of her “drifting” and (2) applied torque to the steering to keep the vehicle in its lane.  Pa159-70.  “The LKAS/RDM system available as optional equipment on the 2016 Honda CR-V would have prevented [...]’s lane departure and the collision with [...]’s Ford. ”  Pa150.  Due to the lack of those warning and safety systems, the subject CR-V failed to warn or otherwise to alert Ms. McNamara of her “drifting,” or to the crossing of the center line and did not take measures to avoid crossing the centerline and into oncoming traffic.
[directive] If a criminal investigation is initiated, the law enforcement agency shall receive periodic and timely updates concerning the course of the investigation.  While a criminal investigation is pending, complainants and witnesses may be referred by the law enforcement agency to the county victim witness office for information concerning the criminal investigation.  Once the criminal investigation is complete and a disposition of the allegation has been made, the prosecutor's office shall provide the law enforcement agency with its investigative file for use in the internal affairs investigation subject to applicable state statutes, court rules and case law.  If the prosecutor's office declines to initiate a criminal investigation or the investigation is administratively closed, it shall notify the law enforcement agency of the outcome in writing.  6.3.4
[brief] During the statement, [...] stated that he was staying at room 517 of the [...] in [...] and he executed a consent to search form for that apartment as well as his vehicle (a white Infinity), and his Iphone.  (24T 174-6 to 182-9).  At trial, [...], a resident of nearby apartment D16, testified that earlier that day at around 7:00 p.m., she was waiting near the back of her apartment when she recognized [...] approaching with another African- American man who was around [...]’s age and who she had seen with [...] on a prior occasion.
[brief] The original [...] Website contained only the barest of information regarding the dual degree program.  There was no intention that the website go beyond simply promoting the program.  It clearly did not list (or purport to list) all requirements for admission, let alone degree completion.  For example, Plaintiff-Appellant admitted that the Website did not address academic dishonesty (Plaintiff Dep. T146:18 – T148:4 at Pa.176), nor did it explain how many credits were needed to graduate with a dual degree.  (Plaintiff Dep. T148:5 – T149:4 at Pa.176).  Nor did the website state how many credits were required for each degree.  (Plaintiff Dep. T149:13-18 at Pa.176).
[brief] *Id.* at 55.  Thus, our Court has held “a party’s burden of proof on an element of a claim may not be satisfied by an expert opinion that is unsupported by the factual record **or by an expert’s speculation that contradicts the record. **”  *Ibid.* (emphasis added).  [...] rightly found Plaintiffs entire case (and theory of proximate cause) relied upon suppositions and expert testimony about situations that did not exist.
[brief] And that is why the sheriff (1T Line 17) granted those adjournments.  (1T Line 18)  I believe, both Your Honor and [...] (1T Line 19) accurately stated that if he is seeking adjournments (1T Line 20) beyond the two that he is afforded under statute he (1T Line 21) must do so by motion to the Court in the action in (1T Line 22) which the Sheriff’s Office is not a party to.  [...] is accurate that, back in December of 2017, [...] did void the previously entered Judgment of Foreclosure based upon an improper legal description in the Sheriff’s Deed which undid that (1T Line 24).
[brief] 2012)  .................................................................... 19, 43 Morley v. Contarino Bros., 2006 WL 2009046 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 20, 2006)  ..................  14  O’Donnell/Salvatori Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 339 F.R.D. 275 (W.D. Wash.  2021) ..................................................... 20 Palmer v. Cognizant Tech. Sols. Corp., 2021 WL 3145982 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2021) ....................................... 21 Payton v. N.J. Turnpike Auth., 148 N.J. 524 (1997) ............................................................................ 15, 19, 22, 42 R.L. v. Voytac, 402 N.J. Super. 392 (App. Div. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 199 N.J. 285 (2009) ........................................................................... 15, 33, 34 Rivers v. LSC P’ship, 378 N.J. Super. 68 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 296 (2005) ...... 11, 24 Schaefer v. Cedar Fair, 348 N.J. Super. 223 (App. Div. 2002) .................................................. 42 Shambry v. N.J. Transit Bus Operations, Inc., 307 N.J. Super. 390 (App. Div. 1998) .................................................. 25 SinglePoint Direct Solar LLC v. Solar Integrated Roofing Corp., 2023 WL 2585296 (D. Ariz. Mar. 21, 2023)
[brief] (PA002, Count 1, ¶1; PA026, No. 1; PA040, T5:L16-24).  He confirmed this New Jersey address at the time of the accident in his deposition.  (PA041, T10:L2-6).  This New Jersey address is recorded on the police report for the April 13, 2022 accident.  (PA070-071).  His relocation to New Jersey was a “permanent” move.  (PA046, T31:L13-24).  He considered the [...] address, his “home. ” (PA052, T56:L7-21).  The appellant/plaintiff garaged his 2002 Kia Sportage (the vehicle involved in the accident) in [...] 07050 at the time he applied for the [...] policy.  (PA048, T37:L5-9, T38:L25-T39:L10, T40:L7-10).  Appellant/plaintiff’s address was in New Jersey, and that plaintiff garaged his vehicles in New Jersey, for at least one year prior to the accident of April 13, 2022:
[brief] They made a decision not to consult with an engineer to determine an engineer’s duty of care when preparing preliminary plans for a redevelopment project, or how to interpret these plans.  After this, Plaintiffs received [...]’s Interrogatory Responses and safe harbor letter explaining why their claims were frivolous.  (Pa000102-18; Pa000121-22).  In response, Plaintiffs conducted *no* discovery from [...] to advance their common knowledge negligence and trespass claims.
[brief] Finally, [...] attempts to dress up as a standard of review issue new claims regarding alleged insufficient notice.  Specifically, [...] claims the trial court should have inferred a “layperson would not understand” the April 8 Notice’s reference to “adopting a redevelopment plan” referred specifically to warehousing implications and superseding zoning, and should have inferred a layperson “would not associate a series of block and lot numbers with particular properties. ” (Pb42).  For one, [...] did not present these issues to the trial court below, and thus has waived them here.  See Nieder, 62 N.J. at 234; Selective Ins. Co. of America, 208 N.J. at 586.  Even if it had, this again misconstrues the trial court’s opinion.  The court did not “assume” an interested person would understand these things, it merely held the notice statute only required the notice to “provide the public sufficient information so they will know the purpose of the Ordinance and may further inquire if they choose to do so. ” (Pa60).  As the court went on to explain in the opinion:  The reason for requiring publication prior to the adoption of an ordinance is to give residents the opportunity to learn that there may be something that they may want to become more informed about and to advise them how to do so.  If a resident is interested in the redevelopment plan being adopted, it is their responsibility to conduct the necessary research into the substance of the plan and the publication informs them of how to obtain a copy of the plan.  To require governing bodies to include specific phrasing that goes to the substance of a plan being adopted would be a slippery slope.  [Pa61].  As the above demonstrates, the trial court did not infer a layperson would understand the implications of the Redevelopment Plan or how to associate lot and block numbers with particular properties.  The court held the notice statute only required the published notice to give residents enough information to decide if they should become more informed about the subject of the ordinance, and provide the means to do so should they desire.  [...] did not accept this invitation, and it only has itself to blame.
[brief] M500-502.  It remains that the Respondents have never filed a formal application to the NJDOT for the Route 33 Signal; or for Route 33 access to the Property.  The unilateral decision to forestall the filing of any application to the NJDOT has resulted in significant delay to the Respondents; which is not attributable to the Board or the Township.  Further, until the formal application is filed to the NJDOT, the position of the NJDOT on the application is unknown.  [...] identified numerous situations within the vicinity of the Property where relief similar to the relief required by the Respondents has been granted by the NJDOT.  5T147 to 5T148; 5T161; 5T208.  The entire basis of the decision of the SHO to eliminate the Route 33 Sign seems to rely upon the “hunch” or “feeling” of [...]; more appropriately characterized as a “net opinion. ”  The Board submits that something more concrete must be the basis of such a decision; and without such evidential support, [...]’s testimony is a net opinion which must be disregarded.
[brief] A 3-story building has a greater impact than a 2½-story building and the application required a variance for exceeding the permitted number of stories.  Respondent argues that there is no difference between a 2½-story and 3-story building.  This is plainly false and defies common sense, which is the reason for the 2½-story limitation in some districts.  Common sense dictates that a three-story building will stack three sets of windows, thereby emitting 50% more light upon neighbors during evening hours than just two sets of windows.  [...]’s 3-story building plan stacks air-conditioning units under all windows, creating 50% more a/c noise.  Additionally, a 3-story building will have many more living units, more residents, require more parking, have more employees and more services than a 2½-story building in the same footprint.  [...]’s argument that the number of stories does not matter, as long as the height is met, is a red herring, is simply false, and it was clearly reasonable for the Board to so conclude.  b.
[brief] For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the Commissioner’s decision upholding the [...]’s termination of [...].  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEYS AT LAW  Attorneys for Respondent  [...]  By: /s/ [...]  [...], Esq.  Dated: March 25, 2024  [...], Appellant, v. [...], MIDDLESEX COUNTY, Respondent.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  CIVIL ACTION ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION  STATEMENT IN LIEU OF BRIEF ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
[brief] Order rejecting motion to demand documents, filed March 31, 2023  Motion to dismiss by Defendant [...], filed April 17, 2023  Order granting motion to dismiss complaint, filed May 12, 2023  Brief in support of Motion for leave to appeal by plaintiff, filed November 10, 2023  Motion Answer Opposition by Defendant [...], filed November 27, 2023  Motion Answer Opposition by Defendant [...], filed November 27, 2023  Appellate Court Order rejecting motion for leave to appeal, filed December 12, 2023
[brief] Defendants have suffered such substantial prejudice with Plaintiff's deliberate strategic decision to engage in piecemeal litigation, that the only appropriate recourse was for the Trial Court to grant the motion to dismiss.  (T33:1-8).  The record is replete with examples of loss of witnesses and evidence which resulted in Defendants being prejudiced.  Plaintiff cannot refute the countless examples that Defendants have provided of suffering prejudice, so Plaintiff simply diminishes their effect.  (Pb41).  With respect to loss of witnesses, Defendants cannot locate critical members of the Plaintiff organization.
[brief] ”  On August 11, 2023, [...] filed a Notice of Motion to Compel Discovery.  (403a-453a).  The motion was unopposed and heard on September 27, 2023 by the Honorable [...], J.S.C., who had assumed the matter following the elevation of [...] to the Appellate Division. \(^2\)  On September 27, 2023, Judge Adubato entered the Order Denying [...] LLC’s Motion to Compel Discovery and Reset Discovery Dates, determining that the April 3 Order remained “in effect” and effectively denying the Appellants’ continuing efforts to seek adjudication of the reserved-upon issues in Appellants’ pending motion to vacate (the “Sua Sponte Order”) (24a-25a).
[brief] In short, it provides Plaintiff with a very comfortable package.  Her only obligation was to contribute to the down payment on her house.  Plaintiff agreed to be responsible to pay half of the down payment (i.e. $70,000.00), however, she represented that she did not have those funds and the Defendant would have to frontload this sum of money for her.  (Her fallback position was that she would sell a property that she had won in a litigious battle involving her estranged, but natural father).  Regardless, Plaintiff intentionally misrepresented her financial situation by stating in the Agreement that she did not have the $70,000.00.
[brief] Established in 1915, with over 560 municipal members, the League appears as amicus curiae in cases that involve novel legal questions affecting municipalities generally, primarily at the appellate level.  See, www.njslom.org.  The [...] was “established in 1951 for the purposes of promoting education and professionalism among local government attorneys, and to assist members of the legal profession to better serve local governments in New Jersey. ”  See, www.njilga.org/about.  “The Institute intervenes as amicus curiae in cases which present novel questions affecting the public interest, often in conjunction with the [...].  The Institute is an affiliate of the League of Municipalities. ”  Id.  This is such a case.