ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] The statute does not use a “status” approach that bars claims only if the injured person at the time of the accident held the status of a “trespasser” in the traditional common law sense of the word.  This conclusion is supported by a plain reading of words of the statute as well as the Appellate Division’s thoughtful analysis in *Funes ex rel. Estate of Martinez v. Norfolk S. Corp.*, No. A-5348-10T1, 2012 WL 4069543, at *3 (App. Div. 2012), an unpublished opinion interpreting the statute.  In *Funes*, the Appellate Division analyzed the history of the statute, including the significant changes to the statute that were made when it was amended in 1998, in order to determine whether it applied to foreign railroads operating in New Jersey.
[brief] Da159 Exh L (Email of [...] to [...] dated March 27, 2023-Redacted As Redundant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Da161 Exh M (Email of [...] To [...] dated March 29, 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[brief] In that case, the [...] adopted an ordinance rezoning undeveloped woodland to permit a shopping center including a 120,000 square foot super [...].  Willoughby, 306 N.J. Super. at 270-71.  A citizens group opposed the development and mounted an organized campaign to unseat members of the Township Council who voted for the ordinance and “replace them with candidates committed to returning the zoning of . . . the property . . . .”  Id. at 271.  That effort was successful, and the newly comprised Council passed an ordinance reverting the property to its former zoning.  Id. at 271-72.  Before that ordinance took effect, however, the [...] quickly passed a resolution granting site plan approval to the developer under the revised zoning.  *Id.*  The *Willoughby* court found the matter to be a public rather than private dispute that justified enlargement because the public’s interest was evidenced by the centrality of the significant rezoning in the municipal election, in combination with substantial impacts on an adjoining neighborhood due to increased traffic on a major town thoroughfare.  *Id.* at 277-79.  In distinguishing *Willoughby*, the *Rocky Hill* court noted its decision to enlarge the writs’ filing period on the basis of a public interest abided the well-documented role the major zoning change played in political campaigns and municipal elections.
[directive] Dated: May 25, 2021 BODY WORN CAMERA May 2021 Version POLICY Office of the Attorney General | State of New Jersey Contents 1 Governing Principles .................................................................................................................. 1 2 Definitions ................................................................................................................................. 2 3 Police Department Policies Governing Deployment and Use of BWCs and Recordings ........... 4 4 Notice that BWCs are Deployed and Activated ......................................................................... 7 5 Standards Governing the Activation of BWCs ........................................................................... 9 6 Standards Governing the De-activation of BWCs upon the Request of a Civilian, When Discussing Investigation Strategy or Planning, or on Instruction of a Prosecutor .................. 12 7 Circumstances When BWC Activation/Use Is Subject to Special Conditions or Restrictions.. 15 8 Retention of BWC Recordings ................................................................................................. 18 9 Standards to Ensure Secure Storage and Accessibility of BWC Recordings ............................ 20 10 Restrictions on Access to and Use and Dissemination of BWC Recordings ............................ 23 11 Public Disclosure of BWC Recordings ...................................................................................... 26 12 Authority of County Prosecutor to Impose Additional Requirements .................................... 26 13 Violations ................................................................................................................................. 26 BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | May 2021 i 1
[brief] Park Crest Cleaners, LLC v. A Plus Cleaners & Alterations Corp., 458 N.J. Super. 465, 472 (App. Div. 2019) (citation omitted); See also Sikes v. Twp. of Rockaway, 269 N.J. Super. 463, 465-466 (App. Div. 1994); Kerney v. Kerney, 81 N.J. Super. 278, 281 (App. Div. 1963) (citations omitted) (“Our former highest court repeatedly stated that an appellant could not be permitted to attack a Chancery decree upon a ground of appeal nowhere stated in his petition of appeal, and refused to entertain any such ground. ”).  This also applies to the failure to list an issue on the Case Information Statement.  See Fusco v. Board of Educ. of City of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 460-461 (App. Div. 2002) (declining appellate review over an issue not sufficiently identified in the Case Information Statement); See also United Hospitals Medical Center v. State, 349 N.J. Super. 1, 7-8 (App. Div. 2002) (declining appellate review over an issue not identified in the notice of appeal or case information statement).  Defendant improperly raises various arguments in Defendant’s Brief before this Court and this case does not implicate the public interest.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF CITATIONS | II | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED | IV | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 2 | | POINT I | 2 | | DEFENDANTS’ SATISFACTION OF THE COLE CRITERIA PRESENTS  A COMPELLING BASIS TO PERMIT ARBITRATION (Da1-2) | 2 | | A. New Jersey Precedent  Addressing Waiver of Arbitration Through Implied Conduct Supports Defendants’ Position | 3 | | B.  Prejudice Remains a Viable, Non-Dispositive Component in Assessing Waiver of Arbitration | 8 | | C. Public Policy Still Favors Arbitration | 9 | | POINT II | 11 | | A VALID AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE EXISTS AND APPLIES TO PLAINTIFF (Da3) | 11 | | CONCLUSION | 15 | | Cases | PAGE | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C.  v. Quinn, 410 N.J. Super. 510 (App. Div. 2009) | 13 | | Antonucci v. Curvature Newco, Inc., 470 N.J. Super. 553 (App. Div. 2022) | 10 | | Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014) | 14 | | Cnty. of Passaic v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 498 (App. Div. 2023) | 14 | | Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center, 215 N.J. 265 (2013) | | | Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) | 15 | | Hudik-Ross, Inc. v. 1530 Palisade Ave. Corp., 131 N.J. Super. 159 (App. Div. 1974) | 4 | | Lucier v. Williams, et al., 366 N.J. Super 485 (2004) | 4 | | Marmo & Sons Gen. Contracting, LLC v. Biagi Farms, LLC, 478 N. J. Super. 593 (App. Div. 2024) | 8, 9 | | Morgan v. Sundance, 596 U.S. 411 (2022) | 8 | | Spaeth v. Srinivasan, 403 N.J. Super. 508 (App.Div. 2008) | 4, 5 | | White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 61 F.4th 334 (3d Cir. 2023) | 8 | | Young v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 297 N.J. Super. 605 (App. Div. 1997) | 13 | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration, entered by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on October 17, 2023 ........................................ Da1 Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s October 17, 2023 Order, entered by the Honorable [...], J.S.C. on January 30, 2024 .................. Da3 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The Trial Court’s January 26, 2024 Opinion clearly established that Defendants-Appellants satisfied the criteria in Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center, 215 N.J. 265 (2013), which assessed the impact of a party’s waiver on the proceedings.
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  In 2018, the [...] went from a full-time county counsel to a part-time county counsel.  The Plaintiff, [...], was chosen in 2018 to fill that position.  He faithfully served for three years combining both the requirements of the position and the Rules of Professional Conduct as they apply to every attorney.  Balancing both the requirements of the then-[...] (now-Commissioners) and the Rules of Professional Conduct, he refused to put forth a ballot question which violated the law for local ballot questions.  In addition, he objected to and refused to sanction personal counsel fees for the [...].  In 2021, Plaintiff’s contract expired and was not renewed.  He was succeeded by the Sheriff’s personal attorney whose legal fees he would not approve.
[brief] ” (Pa000200).  The parties further agreed that the “Implementation Memorandum dated June 7, 2017, which modified the collective negotiations agreements with [...] and the [...] shall remain in full force and effect except as modified by this Settlement Agreement. ” (Pa000201).  Following the settlement of the First Police Matter, the Appellate Division had its first opportunity to consider the MSRA, and confirmed that the “Legislature instructed the courts to liberally construe the MSRA ‘to give effect to its intent that severe fiscal distress in municipalities in need of stabilization and recovery shall be addressed and corrected.
[directive] The following uses are prohibited:  1.  A conducted energy device shall not be used or threatened to be used to retaliate for any past conduct or to impose punishment.  2.  A conducted energy device shall not be fired or discharged against a person who is exhibiting only passive resistance to an officer’s command to move from or to a place, to get onto the ground, or to exit a vehicle.  A conducted energy device shall not be fired or discharged against a person, for example, who is attempting instinctively to reduce the leverage of a wristlock, hammerlock, or other pain- compliance hold applied by an officer, or who is bracing or pulling against an officer’s attempt to pull/move him or her.  3.  A conducted energy device shall not be fired or discharged for the sole purpose of preventing a person from committing property damage.  4.  A conducted energy device shall not be fired or discharged against the operator of a moving vehicle unless the use of deadly force against the operator would be authorized.  5.  Two or more conducted energy devices shall not be discharged upon a person at the same time.  VII.
[brief] Rule 4:6-2(f).  In this case, Plaintiff alleged that unidentified affected members had been denied promotions and/or appropriate rank/place in terms of “seniority benefits and other emoluments of the[ir] positions. ”  For this purpose, it is of no moment that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint failed to identify the individuals allegedly adversely affected by a LAD violation, nor those whom Plaintiff’s action might adversely impact if Plaintiff were to be successful.  The relief Plaintiff requested established that those other individuals who could be so adversely impacted by Plaintiff’s action are indispensable parties, since Plaintiff seeks, directly or indirectly, to affect such other person’s promotions and/or standing/place with respect to seniority benefits and “other emoluments” of their positions.
[brief] (Ra1-2).  On September 8, 2021, respondent filed a Respondent's Answer to Dependency Claim Petition, admitting that the decedent was employed by respondent, but denying that her exposure occurred in the course of her employment.  (Ra3).  Petitioner filed a Notice of Motion for Essential Worker Presumption seeking to declare the decedent to be an essential employee and entitled to the presumption set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11 on November 4, 2021.  (Ra4-40).  Respondent filed an Answer to Motion for Essential Worker Presumption in opposition to petitioner's motion on December 13, 2021.  (Ra41-43).  On May 4, 2022, respondent filed an Answer to Motion Supplemental Pleading also in opposition to that motion. (Ra44-47).  Respondent filed a Notice of Motion to Recuse [...] on January 24, 2024.
[brief] Id.; (Pa723) 80:14-81:18.  Second, [...]’s position is an oversimplification of [...]’s testimony.  [...] specifically stated that he did not actually recall whether he was referring to the physical location of where [...] worked at the time he wrote the August 30, 2019 note.  (Pa873) 41:4-19.  [...] concluded based upon information provided by Appellant at the time, and the knowledge that she was experiencing a hostile work environment, that he felt there was enough information to advise her not to return to work.  Id. 38:19-24.  [...]’s argument, at best, presents an issue for the jury.  Third, the record clearly establishes that there is at the very least issues of material fact regarding Respondents’ unlawful sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation which warrants reversal of the lower court’s decision.
[brief] U.S. Const. amend XIV; N.J. Const. art. 1, § 1.  A protectable property interest in continued public employment exists if a litigant has a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to such employment.  Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see also Nicoletta v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 77 N.J. 145, 154-55 (1978) ("The chief ingredient of this kind of property interest such as to quicken the right to protection by procedural due process is a legitimate claim of entitlement.") (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).  "[T]he sufficiency of [a] claim of entitlement must be decided by reference to state law."  Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985).  ("Property interests . . . are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.") (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted); Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979) ("A claim of entitlement under state law . . . must be derived from statute or legal rule or through a mutually explicit understanding.").  In this case, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 provides that:
[directive] In either case, this requires the establishment of a unit or the clear allocation of responsibility and resources for executing the internal affairs function.  The unit will consist of agency personnel assigned to internal affairs by the law enforcement executive.  Personnel assigned to the internal affairs function serve at the pleasure of and are directly responsible to the law enforcement executive or the designated internal affairs supervisor.  4.1  Duties and Responsibilities  4.1.1  The purpose of the internal affairs function is to establish a mechanism for the receipt, investigation, and resolution of officer misconduct complaints.  The goal of internal affairs is to ensure that the integrity of the agency is maintained through a system of internal discipline where an objective and impartial investigation and review assure fairness and justice.
[brief] ”  See id. at ¶ 22.  On May 16, 2022, at 7:54 AM, Appellant dispatched a text message to Respondent [...], Appellant’s immediate supervisor, advising that she could return to work as early as that day.  See id. at ¶ 23.  Specifically, Appellant advised that she was planning to return to work on a full-time basis on May 18, 2022, but offered to work a half-day on May 16, 2022, so Appellant could begin to re-acclimate herself to work and catch up on updates that had occurred while Appellant was on her STD leave.  See id. at ¶¶ 23-24.  Respondent [...] did not respond to Appellant’s text message.  See id. at ¶ 25.  Instead, at approximately 8:45 AM the same day, Appellant received a text message from one of Respondents’ recruiters, Respondent [...], requesting a call with Appellant.  See id. at ¶ 26.  Approximately one (1) hour after Appellant sent the text offering to return to work for a half day on May 16, 2022, Respondents unceremoniously fired Appellant from her employment because of alleged “poor work performance.
[brief] Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division Unpublished Opinion decided October 22, 2012, in *Mattos v. Barn Brothers, Inc.*, 2012 WL 5187975 .................................................................................................Da6  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases: | Page(s) | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **Bergen v. Able Energy,** | 19, 26 | | 2009 WL 222943 (App. Div. Feb. 2, 2009) | | | **Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,** | 13 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | **Brower v. Wirtgen Group,** | 18-19 | | 2012 WL 3030242 (App. Div. Jul. 26, 2012) | | | **Calavano v. Fed. Plastics Corp.,** | 28 | | No. A-0353-09T1, 2010 WL 3257784 (App. Div. Aug. 18, 2010) | | | **Conley v. Guerrero,** | 13 | | 228 N.J. 339 (2017) | | | **Crippen v. Cent. Jersey Concrete Pipe Co.,** | 20, 25 | | 176 N.J. 397 (2003) | | | **Dadura v. Yum! Brands, Inc.,** | 18 | | 2008 WL 926634 (App. Div. Apr. 8, 2008) | | | **DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman,** | 14 | | 430 N.J. Super. 325 (App. Div. 2013) | | | **Estate of Sellino v. Pinto Bros. Disposal, LLC,** | 30 | | 2013 WL 5300076 (App. Div. Sept. 23, 2013) | | | **Fendt v. Abrahams,** | 19 | | 2013 WL 1405096 (App. Div. Apr. 9, 2013) | | | **Fermaintt ex rel. Est. of Lawlor v. McWane, Inc.,** | 27-28 | | 694 F. Supp. 2d 339 (D.N.J. 2010) | | | **Jarosz v. G & B LLC,** | 19, 26 | | 2013 WL 5268926 (App. Div. Sept. 19, 2013)
[directive] Attorney General [...] Guidelines 2 (2004 Revisions)  10.2.6  Youthful Offenders (Mitigating Factor #6)  Mitigating Factor #6 applies when the defendant at the time of the present offense was less than 26 years of age.  This age threshold is derived from N.J.S.A. 2C:43-5 (Young Adult Offender).  The point value for this mitigating factor is -2 if the defendant at the time of the offense was less than 21 years of age, and is -1 if the defendant at the time of the present offense was at least 21 years of age, but less than 26 years of age.  This mitigating factor shall not apply, however, to a defendant, regardless of age, who falls into Criminal History Category IV or V, or who has a pending charge for violation of the offense defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6 (using or employing a juvenile in a drug-distribution scheme), or who is subject to Special Application and Enhancement Feature A (“Street Gang Involvement”).
[brief] PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................4  A.  The School Funding Reform Act of 2008 .................................................................4  1.  The Adequacy Budget .........................................................................................5  2.  The Local Fair Share ............................................................................................7  3.  Equalization Aid ..................................................................................................8  4.  Adjustment Aid ...................................................................................................9  B.  The Supreme Court’s Determination That the School Funding Reform Act Is Constitutionally Sound .................................................................11  C.  Tax Levy Growth Limitation ..................................................................................12  D.  The [...] .................................................................13  1.  Background and Transition From State Control ..................................................13  2.  [...]’s Financial Condition .......................................................................15  3.  The District’s Funding Under the School Funding Reform Act .................................................................17  E.  Statutory Amendments and Their Effect on [...] .....................................20  1.  Revisions to the Formula for the 2018 and 2019 Budget Years .................................................................21  2.  Chapter 67: Amendments to the School Funding Reform Act .................................................................................................................. 23  3.  Chapter 68: Amendments to the Local Tax Authorization Act ...........................................................................................................  26  F. Appellants’ Lawsuit and Procedural Background ..............................................  27  ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................. 31
[brief] Expert testimony can be essential in combatting jurors’ misconceptions, informing them that commonly accepted notions are actually unfounded.  See, e.g., State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265, 304 (2018); State v. B.H., 183 N.J. 171, 1825 (2005).  Failing to enlist an expert can constitute ineffective assistance.  See, e.g., Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 273-74 (2014); State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 217-18 (2004).  Yet, the PCR court denied an evidentiary hearing by (1) wrongly concluding an expert would not have been permitted in the 2014 trial despite substantial, credible evidence to the contrary, owing to a fundamental misunderstanding of Henderson; (2) improperly presuming counsel made a strategic decision; (3) misapprehending the standard for a prima facie case; and (4) utterly dismissing the significance of the jury’s evaluation of the identification evidence.  (Da362-64)  Each is explained in more detail below.  In Henderson, our Supreme Court adopted a new paradigm for contesting, evaluating, and explaining to jurors variables that affect and diminish reliability of eyewitness identification.  208 N.J. 208 (2011).  This included ordering the development of enhanced jury charges.  Id. at 219, 298-99.  While noting certain advantages of charges and anticipating less need for experts, the Court made clear that expert testimony on eyewitness identification testimony was still permitted.  Id. at 298-99.  Undergirding Henderson is the premise that common sense is generally wrong when it comes to identification, and without detailed and specific guidance, jurors cannot properly “evaluate evidence offered by eyewitnesses who honestly believe their testimony is accurate.
[brief] DEFENDANT’S APPENDIX  Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce Settlement against [...] Da1 August 29, 2023, letter from [...] to Appellate Div. Da22 August 4, 2023, letter from [...] to Appellate Div. Da25  Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice as to [...] and [...], R.N. Da26  Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice as to [...]; [...], P.A.; [...]; [...]; [...]; and [...]
[brief] The court’s failure to rule on rehabilitation evinced its erroneous disregard for the expert psychological finding that [...] had rehabilitated, and that his conduct in prison was probative evidence of his ability to safely reenter society – thereby requiring substantial mitigation pursuant to Miller factor 5.  iii.  The court failed to properly apply Miller factor 2 (family and environment) by conducting a comparative rather than individualized analysis of Defendant’s childhood environment, and by disregarding expert psychological testimony indicating that Defendant’s traumatic childhood influenced his reckless behavior.  Miller factor 2 recognizes that juveniles have “limited control over their own environment and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime producing settings. ”  567 U.S. at 471 (citation omitted).