ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  (1T53:12-14)  But notwithstanding the specific requirements of the Subject Contract, when [...]’s counsel at the depositions inquired “what type of pipe” was ordered, [...]’s witnesses put no flesh on the bare bones of their allegations, as they consistently and repeatedly “just said `it was for pipe. ”  (1T54:22-24)  Accordingly, the Court determined that “we don’t know whether it’s for Schedule 40 pipe, schedule 10 pipe; we . . . just don’t know.  We don’t know the quantities.  We don’t know anything. ”  (1T54:24 – 1T55:1-2)  The Law Division further opined that “there’s all kinds of pipe in this world.  There’s not just schedule 10, there’s schedule 40, there’s PVC pipe, there’s other . . . pipe.  So we don’t know.  And . . . we will never know, because discovery is over.  . . .  We don’t know that these checks were for anything in . . . this alleged contract. ”  (1T55:13-19)  The Law Division stated that “it was very, very odd, to say the least, that they said that they paid hundreds of thousands of dollars to [...].  There’s no bills of lading.  There’s no orders.  There’s no emails.  There’s no text messages.  Nothing . . .  There’s testimony that . . . we made a phone call. ”  (1T56:9-14)  The Law Division emphasized that there’s zero.  There’s nothing.  We have checks, and nothing more.  There is nothing whatsoever to connect these checks to . . . this alleged quote or these contracts.  They could be for any other thing in the whole world.  . . .  [T]hey didn’t say it was for Schedule 40 piping.  They . . say its for pipe.  It’s for pipe.  Repeatedly, for pipe.  Not even going further than that.  (1T57:7-15)  Clarifying its reasoning and analysis further, the Law Division held and concluded that I have to rule that there is no material issue of fact with regard to damages.
[directive] o [...] to link CBVI providers in need of support on navigating the relationship with law enforcement to other successful CBVI organizations who have navigated the relationships successfully.  o I have asked county prosecutors to serve as a resource for law enforcement agencies in navigating their relationship with CBVI providers, for example, by providing consultation on drafting an agreement, implementing it, and addressing potential conflicts with CBVI providers.  The [...] will not be in a position of directly overseeing the CBVI and law enforcement relationships; rather, county prosecutors and [...], respectively, can provide consultation and support.
[brief] For these reasons, the Board’s final administrative determination denying [...]’s request to file his Eligibility Registration Form for amended benefits approximately one year and two months past the statutory deadline of the Ricci Act should be affirmed.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY  By: /s/ [...]  [...] (ID 276482018)  Deputy Attorney General  [...]  Dated: June 7, 2024  June 27, 2024  [...], Clerk Superior Court of New Jersey  Appellate Division Hughes Justice Complex 25 W. Market Street PO Box 006 Trenton, New Jersey 08625  RE: [...] v. [...]  DOCKET NO.: [...]  On Appeal from [...]  Docket No.: [...]  Dear Justices of the Appellate Division:  This office represents the Appellant, Nicholas [...], in the above captioned matter.  Please accept this reply letter brief in lieu of a more formal brief on behalf of the Appellant, retired Trooper Nicholas [...].  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] Even if the sentencing court were justified in placing substantial weight on both aggravating factors three and nine and could justify a maximum-term sentence on the manslaughter count, the court would have then had to separately evaluate whether the need for deterrence and incapacitation justified a consecutive sentence on top of the maximum-term manslaughter sentence as part of its fairness analysis under State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021).  (Db42-47)  Torres requires that the reasons for a consecutive sentence “contextualize[e] the individual sentences’ length, deterrent value, and incapacitation purpose and need. ”  Id. at 271.  In other words, even if the factors under State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985) permit consideration of a consecutive sentence, Torres requires the sentencing court to evaluate whether a consecutive sentence was necessary to fulfill the goals of deterrence and incapacitation.  Thus, the court here was required to evaluate whether the ten-year sentence on the manslaughter count would be sufficient to achieve the goals of deterrence and incapacitation, or whether a longer sentence was required, thereby justifying running the handgun count consecutive.
[brief] Counsel for [...] made a good faith and thorough effort to inform the newly assigned Judge of the facts and history pertaining to these matters and the fact that the prior Judge had reserved decision on fees and costs related to all of these proceedings.  The $125,716 legal bill not only covered the fees and costs of the motion, but it covered fees and costs incurred during the sixteen-month period from June 30, 2021 to October 20, 2022.  [...] always found that the work performed by counsel in this case was necessary and reasonable and the Court either approved all prior submissions or reserved decision.
[brief] 3T11-9; Da2477.  In 2010, [...] sought disability benefits from the Social Security Administration.  Following an evidentiary hearing conducted on June 21, 2010, an Administrative Law Judge of the Social Security Administration’s Office of Disability Adjudication and Review issued a detailed factual determination finding that Larry [...] was disabled from engaging in any “substantial gainful activity” as a result of his exposure to toxic mold in his condominium.
[brief] 1.  Does the ordinance conflict with state law, either because of conflicting policies or operational effect (that is, does the ordinance forbid what the Legislature has permitted or does the ordinance permit what the Legislature has forbidden)?  2.  Was the state law intended, expressly or impliedly, to be exclusive in the field?  3.  Does the subject matter reflect a need for uniformity?  4.  Is the state scheme so pervasive or comprehensive that it precludes coexistence of municipal regulation?  5.  Does the ordinance stand “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives” of the Legislature?  [Overlook Terrace, 71 N.J. 461-62 (internal citations omitted)].  The above case law is clear that in order to be preempted the subject must be the domain of State legislation because only the State preempts, and that the regulation must be comprehensive.  “A legislative intent to preempt a field will be found either where the State scheme is so pervasive or comprehensive that it effectively precludes the coexistence of municipal regulation or where the local regulation conflicts with the State statutes or stands as an obstacle to State policy expressed in enactment of the Legislature”.  Garden State Farms, Inc. v. Bay, 77 N.J. 439, 450 (1978).  However, because municipalities are due “a liberal construction of legislation in favor of local authority…legislative intent to supersede local powers must clearly be present. ”
[brief] A misrepresentation amounting to actual legal fraud consists of a material representation of a presently existing or past fact, made with knowledge of its falsity and with the intention that the other party rely thereon, resulting in reliance by that party to his detriment.  See *Foont-Freedenfeld v. Electro-Protective*, 126 N.J. Super. 254, 257 [314 A.2d 69] (App.Div. 1973), aff'd, 64 N.J. 197 [314 A.2d  The elements of scienter, that is, knowledge of the falsity and an intention to obtain an undue advantage therefrom, see Pomeroy, *supra* at 422; *Gordon v. Schellhorn*, 95 N. J. Eq. 563, 573-74 [123 A. 549] (Ch. 1924), are not essential if plaintiff seeks to prove that a misrepresentation constituted only equitable fraud.  *Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. New Horizons, Inc.*, 28 N.J. 307, 314 [146 A.2d 466] (1958).  See also *Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Tarnowski*, 130 N.J. Eq. 1, 3 [20 A.2d 421] (E. A. 1941); *Hernig v. Harris*, 117 N.J. Eq. 146, 150-51 [175 A. 169] (Ch. 1934).  Thus, "[w]hatever would be fraudulent at law will be so in equity; but the equitable doctrine goes farther and includes instances of fraudulent misrepresentations which do not exist in the law."  3 J. Pomeroy, *supra*, at 486-88.  [86 N.J. 619, 624-25, 432 A.2d 521 (1981)].
[brief] Knowledge of Plaintiff’s principal place of business would have clearly identified the correct address of Plaintiff’s executive officers.  Thus, misstating Defendant’s right to oral argument and instead describing oral argument as available only by Court direction frustrated Defendant’s ability to properly choose whether to request oral argument or not.  The incorrect statement as to principal place of business raises the issue of whether Declarant was properly granted authority to make the certification.  Declarant apparently received authority from [...] (Exhibit FF) (Da115).  There is no statement that Declarant received authorization to make the certification from one of Plaintiff’s executive officers.  Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 226, 232-234 (4th Cir. 2007), applied Congress’ and the Supreme Court’s clear intent to apply FDCPA to litigation activities of attorneys acting as debt collectors.
[brief] [2/28/22, 11:14:59 AM]  [...]: [...] selling?  [2/28/22, 11:15:14 AM]  [...]: [...] can I see the redmtion?  [2/28/22, 11:15:25 AM]  [...]: [...] may I buy your lien?  [2/28/22, 11:30:31 AM]  ✷: Are you ready?
[brief] AP: When he was talking to you in the car on these Fridays about hurting the family, was it just general, or was he specific?  [...]: I’m not sure.  AP: Okay.  [...]: Definitely he was having bad thoughts, he wanted to talk to the doctor.  AP: Okay.  [...]: But that was between him and her.  He didn’t say it to – AP: Right.  Again, he wasn’t talking to you, but you were in the car, yeah?  [...]: Yup.  AP: And you heard him.  [...]: I heard him.  AP: Okay.  What are the two rules about testifying?  (7T154-10 to 155-12, 156-1 to 2).  Michelle’s response of, “I know, tell the truth” was “almost inaudible. ” (17T76-20 to 77-4).  Defense counsel’s objection was sustained.  (7T155-14).  He did not request a limiting instruction.6
[brief] The [...] and the [...] were improperly reducing reimbursements for out-of-network behavioral health services.  In the prior case, the Appellate Division found in favor of Yucht’s appeal which sought reimbursement at the statutory 80% of reasonable and customary charges for behavioral health services.  *In re Yucht*, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2188.  Pra1.  As a result, the Commissions adopted resolutions to provide for reimbursement of the improper rate paid by members retroactive to 2009.  Identical to the within appeal, the [...] posted notice on their website with a link to a claim form.  *In re State and Sch. Emples. Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of Yucht*, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1938.
[brief] (Pa211, Smith Dep., T264:1-9, T137:1-5, 10-22, T138:6-25)  There was differential treatment and Appellant testified that there was an ever-increasing work load and she was subjected to bias by [...].  (Pa211, Smith Dep., T137:9-10)  Appellant complained of bias against her by [...] when she met with [...] who did nothing.  (Pa211, Smith Dep., T264:1-9)
[brief] While Defendants announced that they were implementing changes to the collective negotiations agreements between the police unions and the city as of June 7, 2017, many of the supposed changes stated in [...]'s June 7, 2017 Implementation Memorandum were ultimately not enacted.  Compare (217a-219a) & (230a-234a).  Instead of Defendants unilaterally dictating what changes were going to be made, the parties to the First Police Matter engaged in settlement discussions with retired Superior Court [...] on October 10, 2017 and November 17, 2017 which resulted in an amicable resolution of the litigation.
[brief] [...], ABC COMPANIES 1-10 (names for fictitious entities), JOHN DOES 1-10 (names for fictitious individuals), ABC COMPANIES 11-20 (names for fictitious entities)  and JOHN DOES 11-20 (names for fictitious individuals), Defendants-Respondents.  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION  DOCKET NO.: [...]  Civil Action On Appeal From: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION: PASSAIC COUNTY  DOCKET NO.: [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Hon. [...], P.J.Cv.  DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
[brief] The EEO letters and investigation report produced in discovery verify that Appellant and [...] were telling the truth.  *Id.*  Although the EEO had substantiated Appellant’s complaints of sexual harassment at the hands of [...], she continued to be subjected to retaliation at every opportunity.  Although [...] was suspended for four days, he appealed that decision.  (Pa966-76).  [...] and [...] settled the suspension dispute, resulting in a three-day suspension.  *Id.*; (Pa595-96) 125:24-128:4.  Furthermore, the investigation report confirms that [...] lied during the investigation by failing to disclose or acknowledge sending sexual text messages to Appellant.  [...] met with EEO investigator [...] in December 2018, after Appellant and [...] filed their internal EEO complaint.  (Pa746-48) 90:13-98:25.  [...] denied calling Appellant “babe. ”  [...] told the investigator he did *not* send inappropriate messages to Appellant.  (Pa749) *Id.* at 102:16-103:121.  [...]’s lies were verified by the initial interview report.  (Pa903-65, Pa908-09)  [...] was interviewed a second time once the lawsuit was filed, and the text messages were made public.  The lawsuit included copies of text messages that [...] sent to Appellant.  Therein, in relevant part, [...] admitted that his comment “he wants to bang or kiss or touch a boob,” was made in reference to [...] liking Appellant, and he further admitted to asking Appellant if she was “okay” after [...] got married.  *Id.*; (Pa591) 106:6-109:11.  After being confronted with the documentary evidence, [...] finally admitted that “after he was given the text messages, yeah, I realized that I did send some of these messages. ”  (Pa749-53) 104:1-9-108:2, 111:1-121-22 (admitting the second interview was conducted three months after the first “to follow up with new information presented in the lawsuit. ”).  Once confronted by the text messages in the second meeting, [...] admitted to sending the messages.  *Id.*
[brief] State v. Carter, 247 N.J. 488, 513, 255 A.3d 1139 (2021).  Thompson, supra, 250 N.J. at 572.  The legislature’s purpose as expressed in N.J.S.A 4:19-17 is to protect the public from “certain dogs” whose actions “are in part attributable to the failure of owners to confine and properly train and control these dogs. ”  Thus, the court’s findings of [...]’s meticulous training negated that [...] is potentially dangerous.
[brief] THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DENYING COVERAGE TO THE [...] UNDER WRIGHT V. STATE IS INCORRECT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND SHOULD BE REVERSED  (Not Raised Below)  As Appellant has conceded from the outset, the present matter is unique, and based on research, appears to be a matter of first impression. \(^2\)  To be clear, the [...]’s request for coverage is not premised on the TCA.  As previously noted, the underlying claim is not a tort claim, it is an Action in Lieu of Prerogative Writ.  The [...]’s position in denying coverage, and in its responding brief, is premised entirely on the [...]’s position that its obligation to provide coverage arises only in cases where the underlying cause of action arises under the TCA.  This position is both factually and legally incorrect.  Leaving aside the present matter, the [...] routinely provides coverage to prosecutor’s offices and employees when they are sued in federal or state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”) or the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“CRA”).  It is well settled that section 1983 claims and/or claims under the CRA are not torts.  \(^2\)  As noted in the [...]’s initial brief, there is an unreported Appellate Division decision dealing with a request for defense and indemnification under Wright v. State, 169 N.J. 422 (2001), arising in the context of an Action in Lieu of a Prerogative Writ, [...] v. [...], 2022 WL 1073027, Docket No. [...] (App. Div. 2022).  However, pursuant to R. 1:36-3, which provides such decisions are not precedent, this opinion is not referenced herein.  It should also be noted that the facts in the present matter, as well as the [...]’s position, are distinguishable from the situation in said decision.  covered by the TCA.
[brief] Q: So you then acknowledged in this agreement that [...] was for sale.  It was your intent back then to sell it, correct?  A: Our [intention] was to sell it many years prior.  Q: Okay.  A: Back – in fact, it – my father actually at one point actually wanted 9.75 million for the property.  Q: Okay.  But then [you] came down to 5.8 million in the -- A: It didn’t matter.  It – it was never going to sell.  Q: Okay.  But the $5.8 million didn’t come from [Ms.] Stavros.  It came from you for this terms of this agreement, correct?  A:  I did not give the term – I never came up with the 5.8 million, but I says -- I just, you know, shrugged my shoulders, says if that’s what was written down that’s what written down.  It’s meaningless because it never became.  2T87-88 (emphasis added).  HISTORY OF THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDING
[brief] (Pa277 at 9:17-24.)  [...] further noted that “this is a very important bill for the Pro-Life community.  And they have a right to be involved in the process. ”  (Pa281 at 13:14-20.)  On the floor of the Senate on January 10, 2022, [...] stated that as of January 6, 2022, he did not realize until he “happen to read it on some news source that the bill actually went through after hours.
[brief] Id. at 308.  Notation in the Bank’s table of contents here was not conspicuous.  See Leodori v. CIGNA Corp., 175 NJ 293 (2003) an acknowledgment form need not recite the arbitration clause verbatim so long as the form refers specifically to arbitration in a manner indicating an employee’s assent and the policy is described more fully in an accompanying handbook or in another document known to the employee.  Id. at 307.  (emphasis added).  That is also lacking here.  Nothing in the application acknowledges [...] received the deposit agreement with the arbitration clause.  Id. at 305 - stating that because the employee did not sign a receipt and agreement form, he did not assent to the arbitration.  The Bank asserts the application constitutes part of the account agreement because Plaintiff allegedly signed the application but not the account agreement.  The Account Agreement, Page 2 (Pa 91) states in non-highlighted print that “when you sign an account application or use your account you ... consent to the terms of the agreement.  (Pa 92).  The application does not have such language stating only that use of the account confirms customer’s receipt of and agreement to the bound by the account agreement.  (Pa 35).  The conflict is apparent.  There is no binding arbitration clause or other contract between the parties.
[brief] [...] testified that a few days before Decedent died, she received a call from Decedent, but [...] could hardly understand a word she was saying.  (10T 107:5-11).  [...] testified that the speaker on the phone “kept saying, there's a-Rubbermaid Box in her walk-in closet to the right.  Make sure you get it.  Not me but you know, that is all she could say. ” (10T107:11-16).  [...] continued “And then I repeated back to her, there's a Rubbermaid box on the right in her walk in closet walk-inur papers and she said "yes" and that's all she could say.  Then she hung up. ” (10T 107:16-21).  The speaker only referenced a Rubbermaid Box and made no mention of a prenuptial agreement.  No testimony was presented that supports a finding that there was an original prenuptial agreement in a Rubbermaid box.  The Court’s finding that the Rubbermaid Box contained an original prenuptial agreement is based solely on conjecture and far-reaching assumptions.
[directive] 17.  d.  [예/Yes]  [아니요/No]  귀하의  유죄 인정으로 인해 귀하가 당면할 가능성이 있는 이민 문제에 대해 상의했습니까?  “아니요”이면 17e  “예”이면  17f  변호사와 만약 번 질문으로 가고 로 가십시오.  넘어  Have you discussed with an attorney the potential immigration consequences of your plea?
[brief] It was, it was an accident, though.  It was, it was an accident, okay?  I didn’t mean to, but I did it out my window, like, to scare them.  I didn’t know it was going to hit.  You think I wanted to actually hit something?  Like, I did it out my window just to make a noise, you know what I mean?  [(7T166-9 to 17). ]  The State played the jail call—which also included lengthy statements by [...] accusing [...] of having affairs—for the jury at the trial.
[directive] Phase II 15 yard line.  Total 10 rounds.  Standing  Muzzle Depressed Position •  On command, shooter assumes a standing, shoulder ready, muzzle depressed position.  • On command fire 2 shots.  • Time: 4 seconds • Repeat twice • Total 6 rounds  Standing to Kneeling Position •  On command, shooter assumes a standing, shoulder ready, muzzle depressed position.  •  On command shooter assumes a kneeling position and fires 4 rounds.  • Time: 8 seconds --- STOP TIME --- Phase III 10 yard line.
[brief] Appellate courts in New Jersey "review a grant of a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action de novo, applying the same standard under R. 4:6-2(e) that governed the motion court."  *Wreden v. Township of Lafayette*, 436 N.J. Super. 117, 124, (App. Div. 2014).  The standard that applies to consideration of a motion to dismiss pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e) is well known: Such motions are judged by determining whether a cause of action is suggested by the facts.  Although the inquiry is limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint [,] a reviewing court searches the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary[.]  *Nostrame v. Santiago*, 213 N.J. 109, 127 (2013) (citations and quotations omitted).  When deciding a motion to dismiss, “the Court is not concerned with the ability of plaintiffs to prove the allegation contained in the complaint. ”  *Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp.*, 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (citing *Somers Constr. Co. v. Board of Educ.*, 198 F.Supp. 732, 734 (D.N.J. 1961)).  The test to be applied is "whether a cause of action is 'suggested' by the facts."  *Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.*, 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (citation omitted).  "[A] reviewing court 'searches the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary."  Ibid. (citation omitted).  "[P]laintiffs are entitled to every reasonable inference of fact," and our examination of the complaint should be one "that is at once painstaking and undertaken with a generous and hospitable approach."  Ibid.  For purposes of analysis, plaintiffs are entitled to every reasonable inference of fact.  Independent Dairy Workers Union v. Milk Drivers Local 680, 23 N.J. 85, 89 (1956).