ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ([...]).  Count  One of the Complaint sought “Declaratory Judgment  That the Arbitration Be Dismissed,” as well as rescission of the SPA, “[c]ompensatory damages, including the loss of any deposit and any costs incurred in relation to the transaction, and the loss in value of their unit as a result of the diminished size thereof, trebled under the provisions of the [Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”)],” as well as attorneys’ fees, costs of suit, and interest.  (DA6-7).  Count Two alleged violations of the CFA and requested the same relief as Count One.  (DA7-8).  Count Three alleged violations of the New Jersey Planned Real Estate Development Full Disclosure Act ("PREDFDA") and requested rescission of the SPA, refund of Plaintiffs deposit, compensatory damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.  (DA8-9).  Count Four alleged breach of contract, breach of implied duty of good faith and negligent/fraudulent misrepresentation/omission as to COA 99 and requested the same relief as Count Three.  (DA9).  In response to the OTSC entered by the Court, Defendants submitted opposition briefing.  (DA155-158).  On August 25, 2023, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. heard oral argument on Plaintiffs’ Order to Show Cause application.
[brief] In highlighting this fact, Appellant is not unmindful that “[t]he statute of limitations for claims under the NJCRA is two years[,]” Lapolla v. Cty. of Union, 449 N.J. Super. 288, 298 (App. Div. 2017)(citing N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a))\(^5\) and that the two-year statute of limitations is the same when applied to Appellants’ federal civil rights claims.  Freeman v. State, 347 N.J. Super. 11, 21-22 (App. Div. 2002).  However, NJCRA “is a means of vindicating substantive rights and is not --- \(^4\) N.J.S.A. 2A:14-4 governs actions related to leases.  It is presumed that the Court meant to say N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions.  \(^5\)  The Lapolla Court stated in dicta and without explanation that NJCRA has a two-year statute of limitations, consequently categorizing the Act as a personal injury claim.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has not qualified this dicta and settled law in the area provides a contrary view. a source of rights itself. ”  Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 98 (2014).  (Emphasis added).  The question, therefore, remains as to whether a malicious prosecution claim has a two-year statute of limitations.  Settled law stands for the proposition that Appellant’s malicious prosecution claim has a six-year statute of limitations.
[brief] Transcript of the January 10, 2024 Oral Argument on Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s Motions for Reconsideration……………1T Transcript of the November 9, 2023 Oral Argument on Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment………………2T TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED  Trial Court’s January 10, 2024 Order granting the Defendant [...]’s Motion for Reconsideration, thereby granting its Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and dismissing the Plaintiff’s Claim with Prejudice………………………………………..Pa 172 Trial Court’s January 10, 2024 Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of November 9, 2023  Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment……………………..Pa 166  Trial Court's opinion on January 10, 2024 rulings……………………………1T8-3  Trial Court’s November 9, 2023  Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ……………………………………..Pa 097  Trial Court's opinion on November 9, 2023 rulings……………………………2T8-3  # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] The MLUL permits qualifying, pre-existing, nonconforming uses and structures to co-exist with an ordinance that, on its face, prohibits them.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 provides, in pertinent part, that “Any nonconforming use or structure existing at the time of the passage of an ordinance may be continued upon the lot or in the structure so assigned and any such structure may be restored or repaired in the event of partial destruction thereof. ”  The “test of whether a nonconforming use or structure may be restored or repaired is whether there has been some quantity of destruction that surpasses mere partial destruction. ”  Motley v. Seaside Park Zoning Board, 430 N.J. Super. 132, 148 – 149 (App. Div. 2013); Certif. den. 215 N.J. 458 (2013).  The test also requires a determination of the owner’s intent to abandon.  In S&S Auto Sales, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment for Borough of Stratford, 373 N.J. Super 603 (App. Div. 2004), the Court held that the objective test for abandonment without regard to the owner’s intent was not authorized under New Jersey Law.  The Court cited, with approval, the Law Division’s decision in Borough of Belmar v. 201 16th Ave Belmar, 309 N.J. Super. 663, 674 (Law Div. 1997), holding that any confusion about the test for abandonment was put to rest by the “terse statement of law” in the case of Pavlanthas v. Atlantic City Zoning Board of Adjustment, 282 N.J. Super. 310, 313 (App. Div. 1995)
[brief] [...] overlooks the other harms [...] may suffer from having a judgment entered against him in a fatal motor vehicle case, such as the impact on his future employment and his credit score.  Moreover, the need to preserve this litigation’s integrity from manipulation by conflicted counsel is of equal, if not greater, significance.  Faced with the adverse testimony and factual positions of the Defendants, [...] correctly ruled that [...] was disqualified from jointly representing the Defendants due to an actual, concurrent conflict of interest.  This Court should affirm the trial court’s legally correct disqualification order.
[directive] NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS AND TIME TO FILE A PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION  RELIEF COLLOQUY (ENGLISH-LANGUAGE VERSION)  NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS AND TIME TO FILE A PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION  RELIEF COLLOQUY  You have 45 days from today to appeal your conviction and sentence.  [If the defendant was represented by private counsel, read the following:  If your private attorney does not continue to represent you on appeal, you or your attorney should contact the Criminal Division Manager's office to apply for a Public Defender.]  If you cannot afford counsel the Public Defender's Office will continue to represent you.  If you miss the 45 day deadline you can ask for a 30 day extension to file your appeal if you can show a good reason for missing the deadline.  If you miss the extended deadline you may lose your right to appeal.  Do you have any questions about your right to appeal?  You have 5 years from today's date to file a petition for post-conviction relief, unless an exception to this general rule applies as set forth in 3:22-12.  R.  Did you discuss the Notice of Appeal Rights and Time to File a Petition for Post- Conviction Relief  Appeal Rights with your attorney?  Did you sign the Notice of Appeal Rights and Time to File a Petition for Post- Conviction Relief?  Based on what you have said, I am satisfied that you have knowingly and intelligently executed the Notice of Appeal Rights and Time to File a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and clearly understand your appeal rights and time to file a post-conviction relief application.  Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #05-14 (08/25/2014), CN 10778-English
[brief] ”  See also N.J.S.A. 2C:33-31c (defining “dog fighting paraphernalia” and “bait” relative to the crime of dog fighting codified in Title 2C).  8  “Adopted in 1880, and amended in minor respects in 1915, the [animal cruelty] statute . . . deals, according to its heading, with the prevention of cruelty to animals, and specifies ‘animal or creature’ as including the whole brute creation (N.J.S.A. 4:22-15).
[brief] Neno, 167 N.J. at 583 (citing LaBrutto, 114 N.J. at 199).  In Neno, the investigating police officer was permitted to testify about hearsay statements of eyewitnesses who were scheduled to testify at trial and to offer the opinion that the plaintiff pedestrians that were struck by defendants “failed to properly cross the intersection. ”  Id. at 578-579.  The Court concluded that this testimony, which was based primarily on inadmissible hearsay, was not admissible and did not constitute lay opinion testimony based on the officer’s personal observations at the scene of the accident.  Id. at 585.  The diagram prepared by [...] was based on his personal observations at the scene of the accident and provides a clear and easily understood depiction of the accident and the points of impact.
[brief] As our Supreme Court has said, "Faith in the ability of a jury to examine the evidence critically and to apply the law impartially serves as a cornerstone of our system of criminal justice."  State v. Afanador, 134 N.J. 162, 178 (1993).  Hence, a reviewing court ought not disturb jury findings merely because it might have found otherwise upon the same evidence.  Ibid.  Indeed, "a jury verdict, from the weight of the evidence standpoint, is impregnable unless so distorted and wrong, in the objective and articulated view of a judge, as to manifest with utmost certainty a plain miscarriage of justice."  Carrino v. Novotny, 78 N.J. 355, 360 (1979); accord State v. Landeros, 20 N.J. 69, 82-83 (1955).  Here, defendant’s asserts that the jury verdict handed down in this case was a “miscarriage of justice.
[brief] That is, on the one hand, the Court was provided with Appellant’s probative, substantive and competent evidence of specific account error and demonstrated inadequacy of [...]’s “accounting” of 3/17/2022, and on the other hand, the Court had [...]’s generic, unsupported, non-specific without particularity to any of the account errors raised by Appellant.  **Rule 1:6-2** requires “responsive papers ... served stating with particularity the basis of the opposition to the relief sought. ”  [...] and [...] did not comply with the Rule and the Court failed to address the inadequacy of [...]’s response.  In this manner, the Court erred in its judgment and abused its judicial discretion.  7.
[brief] DECEDENT IS ENTITLED  THE BENEFIT OF THE PRESUMPTION BASED ON DEFINITION SECTION 3 OF N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11  Definitional Subsection 3 of the statute provides that during the State of Emergency an “essential employee” includes employees who “perform functions which involve physical proximity to members of the public and are essential to the public’s health, safety, and welfare. ”  N.J.S.A. 34:15-31.11.  It would seem axiomatic that a public school teacher, who was required to return to in-school instruction by virtue of an Executive Order during a raging pandemic, would be performing a function “which involve[d] physical proximity to members of the public and [was] essential to the public’s health, safety and welfare. ”  (Ibid).  Pursuant to the instructions of the Governor and her employer, the Decedent returned to work for in school instruction for students for the 2020 to 2021 school year starting in September of 2020 as per the admission by Respondent.  (Ra, Vol. I, page 3).  The Judge of Compensation took judicial notice of supporting evidence in the manner set forth in N.J.R.E. 203 to support her decision in finding Decedent to have been an “essential employee” entitled to the presumption of causation.
[directive] Each county, agency or department may use a CED application on a Firearms Training Simulator (FATS), or similar device equipped to do so, for purpose of CED training and re-qualification (but not initial qualification), provided that CED operators must re-qualify on the actual device selected by their department or agency at least once every two years to maintain their certification.  The use of a Firearms Training Simulator (FATS), or similar device must be done under the supervision of a Certified CED Instructor.  (Please note: Use of a Firearms Training Simulator (FATS), or similar device may not be permitted by the CED manufacturer for purposes of manufacturer re-qualification or manufacturer re-certification.)  7.
[brief] Table of Authorities  Cases  Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575 (2008) ..................................................4  Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218 (1998) ..............................................................................7  DiMarino v. Wishkin, 195 N.J. Super. 390 (App. Div. 1984)  .................................................5  Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Associates, 178 N.J. 144 (2003) ...............................2, 14  Hargett v. Hamilton Park OPCO, LLC, 477 N.J. Super. 390 (App. Div. 2023)  9, 10, 12, 13  Haviland v. Lourdes Med. Ctr. of Burlington Cnty., Inc., 250 N.J. 368 (2022)  ......8  Hubbard v. Reed, 331 N.J. Super. 283 (App. Div. 2000)  .....................................................8  Hyman Zamft & Manard, LLC v. Cornell, 309 N.J. Super. 586 (App. Div. 1998)  14  In re Petition of Hall, 147 N.J. 379 (1997)  ...........................................................................8  Medeiros v. O’Donnell & Naccarto, Inc., 347 N.J. Super. 536 (App. Div. 2002)  ....9  Meehan v. Antonellis, 226 N.J. 216 (2016) ...........................................................................8 Paragon Contractors, Inc. v. Peachtree Condominium Ass’n, 202 N.J. 415 (2010) ............................................................................................................................................14 Phillips v. Curiale, 128 N.J. 608 (1992) ..............................................................................8 Romano v. Maglio, 41 N.J. Super. 561 (App. Div. 1956) .....................................................4, 5 State v. Alfano, 305 N.J. Super. 178 (App. Div. 1997) .........................................................3 State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. 187 (1985) ..................................................................................3 Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 .............................................................................................................6, 7 N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 .............................................................................................................1, 6, 7, 8 N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29 .............................................................................................................7 Court Rules N.J. Court Rule 2:2-4 .............................................................................................................3 Administrative Code N.J.A.C. 10:37F-1.3 .............................................................................................................1 Statement of Facts and Procedural History  This matter arose with the filing of Plaintiff’s Complaint on February 26, 2024.
[brief] Curtis v. Cellco Partnership, 413 N.J. Super. 26, 33-37 (App. Div. 2010).  Curtis is an apt point of comparison.  There, the arbitration provisions were held to be “sufficiently clear, unambiguously worded, satisfactorily distinguished from the other [a]greement terms, and drawn in suitably broad language to provide a consumer with reasonable notice of the requirement to arbitrate” where the agreement stated:  Instead of suing in court, we each agree to settle disputes (except certain small claims) only by arbitration.  The rules in arbitration are different.  There’s no judge or jury, and review is limited, but an arbitrator can award the same damages and relief, and must honor the same limitations stated in the agreement as a court would.  [Curtis, 413 N.J. Super. at 31].  Additionally, the New Jersey Appellate Division found an arbitration provision invalid because the clause was not, “written in plain…clear and understandable language to the average consumer.  Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289, 303 (2016) (quoting Atalese, 219 N.J. at 446).
[brief] Plaintiffs-Respondents/Cross-Appellants, [...] and [...] ("Plaintiffs") are the owners of property designed to assist defendant [...] in meeting its affordable housing obligations.  Indeed, the site is among those properties constituting the Township's court-approved Mount Laurel compliance plan, which resulted from a settlement.  In an effort to develop the subject property, Plaintiffs filed a variance application for an inclusionary development with the Zoning Board, which application was initially approved.  However, following the discovery on the site of a bald eagle's nest, modifications to the previously approved variance application were required in order to provide a buffer protecting that bald eagle's nest.  That amended application seeking approval of modified variances (the "Amended Application") was submitted to the [...] Zoning Board.  However, largely due to the vociferous interference of the defendant Mayor, and the opposition he generated, the Amended Application was denied by the Zoning Board.  Thus, the case below, seeking reversal of that denial, was filed.  Following trial on the bifurcated Counts of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the Trial Court properly found that the Mayor unlawfully interfered with the Zoning Board hearing and decision, and correctly held that the Zoning Board's decision denying the Amended Application was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, with the Court deeming approved the variances that were sought on the Amended Application.
[brief] 9  INDEX TO APPENDIX  Complaint filed 8/16/2022........................................Pa 1  Answer and Counterclaim filed 9/8/2022...................... Pa 4  Answer to Counterclaim filed 9/8/2022.......................... Pa 9  Order transferring to Law Division filed 3/17/2023 ..........Pa 12  Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment filed 8/10/2023...Pa 13  Certification in support of motion filed 8/10/2023.......... Pa 15  Answering Certification filed 8/29/2023........................ Pa 53  Counterstatement of Material Facts............................. Pa 57  Order Denying Summary Judgment...............................Pa 59  Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact..........................Pa 61  Order Entering Judgment filed 6/7/2024..........................Pa 65  Notice of Appeal filed 7/18/2024................................. Pa 67
[brief] (See Doc. 134 at 7:22-8:4 (the [...] arguing that certain documents “are unrelated to the issues in this case”), 22:22-24 ([...]’s dispute is with the [...]’s culling of documents)).  This is improper given the broad scope of discovery and relevance at this stage; the important and expansive nature of this matter; the lack of insight that [...] has into the documents retained by the [...]; and as [...] noted at the December 10 hearing, the existence of a protective order that mitigates the potential harm of the [...] turning over irrelevant materials to [...].  (Id. at 26:13-15).  [...] is entitled to documents relevant to the [...]’s claims and its own defenses.  (See id. at 34:14-18 ([...] arguing that the [...] has “defined relevance in such a narrow way, so that issues that relate to our defenses” were not produced)).  While the Court does not want to micro-manage discovery, the Court finds it appropriate to utilize its discretion to grant [...]’s request to order the [...] to turn over all non-privileged documents that mention “[...]” or “[...].
[brief] And “[i]t is assumed that the Legislature is ‘thoroughly conversant with its own legislation and the judicial construction of its statutes. ’”  *Ayres v. Dauchert*, 130 N.J.Super. 522, 528 (App.Div.1974) (quoting *Brewer v. Porch*, 53 N.J. 167, 174 (1969)); see also *David v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co.*, 360 N.J. Super. 127, 143 (App. Div. 2003).  If the legislature wanted to (and/or intended to) remove the private right of action, it would have done so over the course of the several amendments to the statute described herein.  Thus, there is no indication that private enforcement of the NJCFLA is inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent or the legislative scheme of the NJCFLA; nor is there any rational argument that private enforcement would frustrate the NJCFLA’s purpose.  Indeed, private enforcement of the NJCFLA would further its purpose of policing the consumer credit industry in New Jersey.  However, even in the absence of an implied private right of action, Plaintiff has stated viable claims under the Consumer Fraud Act and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
[brief] The Home Rule Act, adopted in 1917, appears to predate the Health Act and the Local Health Services Act.  The Local Health Services Act was adopted as P.L. 1975, c. 329, effective April 1, 1976.  The Health Act provisions appear to have been adopted at different times.  The PHSCARA was adopted by P.L. 1950, c. 188.  The statutes dealing with regional health commissions were adopted by P.L. 1938, c. 67.  Hence, the court’s ruling below results in these acts, on which the Court states preemption rests, repealing portions of the Home Rule Act.  Because there is no expressed repeal of the Home Rule Act, the repeal is implied.
[directive] Federal Adoption Form  All requests for adoption must be reported on a form entitled "Request for Adoption of State or Local Seizure."  The requesting state or local agency should complete the form, but Directive No. 34 January 2000 17, of Page 3  5 federal personnel may at their discretion complete the form for the requesting state or local agency.  The state or local agency must also complete the Treasury Equitable Sharing Request Form (TDF-92.22.46) within days of 60 the federal adoption of a state or local seizure.
[brief] 2  The transcript erroneously states “[...]”  3  “1T” shall refer to the January 3, 2023, pretrial hearing transcript.  “2T” shall refer to the February 7, 2023, trial transcript.  “3T” shall refer to the March 7, 2023, trial transcript.  “4T” shall refer to the March 14, 2023, trial transcript.  “5T” shall refer to the August 3, 2023, trial de novo transcript.
[brief] This argument arises from the ether as Plaintiff testified about numerous CFA violations and argued below about its application.  The prior panel even stated “Plaintiffs also moved thirteen documents into evidence related to defendants' home improvement work and claimed none of them complied with the requirements of the CFA. ”  Pa151.  It then remanded expressly to determine “whether the nature of the transaction between the parties satisfies the CFA definition of "merchandise" under [the CFA…]” Pa159.  The panel would not have directed the trial court to consider something not been properly raised at the trial.  Despite this, Respondents not only do not discuss whether the CFA applies or not, they do not even cite to the CFA statutes or even a single case applying them.  Pretending something doesn’t exist is not sufficient, especially when it does.  Courts --- 1
[brief] An overpass on the Defendant [...]’s dark street with potholes was too low and not properly marked.  [Da35 & 5T36:1to 84:8]  A New Jersey citizen operating a truck as a part of his job struck the low overpass and following that occurrence had a neck fusion.  [Da35 & 5T36:1to 84:8 & Da185]  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.