ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pa50:24-25, Pa51:1-3.  Plaintiff asserts that the defendant’s failure to control his vehicle by taking the turn wide, coming into her lane, and striking her vehicle is evidence of the defendant's negligent failure to control his vehicle.  Second, the plaintiff has shown that the defendant violated N.J.S.A. §39:4-123 Right and Left Hand Turns, which provides the duties that a driver must meet while making a left-hand turn on a road other than two-way roadways, “... after entering the intersection the left turn shall be made so as to leave the intersection, as nearly as practicable, in the left- hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in such direction upon the roadway being entered. ”  N.J.S.A. §39:4- 123(c).  At deposition, [...] testified as to the happening of the accident:
[brief] *Valentine v. [...]*, No. [...], 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2023) at *1.  Just as in the case before this Court, Appellant did not allege in the Federal Action that she paid any money to [...] or [...], or that they collected any money from her.  She alleged only “intangible harm” based on receiving and reviewing the [...] Letter.  *Id.* at *5-6.  Appellant also sought relief in the Federal Action on the same basis as she does here: that [...] was “not licensed” as required by NJCFLA, and that such letter “deprived Plaintiff and other New Jersey consumers of truthful, non-misleading, information in connection with Defendants' attempt to collect a debt. ”  [Citation omitted.]  In other words, because “Defendants had no right to collect the Debt,” the “Defendants misrepresented the amount of the Debt” by sending the collection letter.  [Citation omitted.]  Plaintiff argues that “[u]nder the NJCFLA, the debt was rendered void by [...]'s unlicensed acquisition. ”  *Id.* at *5.  Respondents ultimately moved to dismiss the Federal Action for lack of standing to sue in federal court based on the lack of concrete harm.  The District Court granted Respondents’ motion and dismissed Appellant’s claims based on her failure to allege a concrete and particularized injury:  Plaintiff does not allege that she experienced any downstream consequence or adverse effect as a result of the [...] Letter, or that she took any action or inaction in reliance on the [...] Letter—she merely claims that she and other New Jersey consumers were "deprived . . . of truthful, nonmisleading, information."
[brief] [3T 56:21-25].  The Law Division called this walkway area a “parking lot” simply because it was a black-top surface.  Neither the Law Division nor the Respondents cited any provision of law, or any established safety code, holding that asphalt surfaces must always be considered parking areas.  In fact, such a rule makes no sense and would not rationally exist.  In its initial brief, Appellants cited relevant portions of the unrefuted opinion of its expert, setting forth why the subject area would be deemed a walkway inviting pedestrian use as per various safety codes.  The Law Division ignored this unrebuted opinion entirely, even though it contradicted its conclusory holding.  [Appellants’ Brief, pp.10-11].
[brief] 11 Greenberg v. Stanley, 30 N.J. 485 (1959) ...............................................................................  29  Griesz v. Household Bank (Ill.), 8 F.Supp. 2d 1031 (Ill. N.D. Ct. 1998) ..................................................  41 Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67 (1954) ............................................................................... 14, 16, 26 Kargman v.  Carlo, 85 N.J.L. 632 (E&A 1914) .................................................................. 25, 26 Kerney v. Kerney, 81 N.J. Super. 278 (App. Div. 1963) ......................................................... 12, 13 Kopin v. Orange Products, Inc., 297 N.J. Super. 353 (App. Div. 1997) ....................................................... 33, 34 Krieger v. Bank of Am., N.A., 890 F.3d 429 (3rd Cir. 2018) .................................................................. 42, 43 Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 516 (2011) .............................................................................. 14, 16 LVNV Funding, L.L.C. v. Colvell, 421 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2011) ...........................................................
[brief] The OAL Trial & Civil Service Commission Appeal  On March 6, 2023, [...] found that Appellant lacked credibility based on the OAL Trial testimony.  [Pa35].  [...] found that Appellant provided no notice to the department regarding his medications and had not been excused from his residency requirement during the time of his third sinus surgery.  [Pa38].  [...] also made the following conclusions: Appellant was required to report, and failed to report, his knowledge of or involvement regarding the Incident; Appellant was required to report, and failed to report the Vehicle Incidents, which included charges against individuals for possession of a CDS in Appellant’s vehicle; that Appellant should not have entrusted his vehicle to persons who were either unlicensed or driving with a suspended license on three (3) separate occasions in 2018; Appellant provided knowingly false information to police and EMTs responding to the Incident; Appellant did not report his opioid use or opioid prescriptions to his department, or to the responders on the night of the Incident; Appellant failed to disclose to [...] that he had been prescribed and was taking prescription medication capable of impairing his abilities; while on restricted sick leave, Appellant left New Jersey without the permission of his supervisor, a violation of the Sick Leave Policy; Appellant knowingly provided false information to the department in that he took sick leave for three (3) months to recover from his third sinus surgery but went to Florida to enter a drug rehabilitation program during that time; Appellant lied about his whereabouts when questioned by [...] on November 29, 2018; Appellant made false statements in his IA investigation interviews, and; Appellant’s opioid use was improper, and he was not forthcoming about his drug use during his IA interviews.
[brief] After considering its equitable power and the affidavits presented, the Board reasonably concluded that “[...] did not exercise reasonable diligence nor demonstrate reasonable grounds for such a protracted delay in filing the eligibility registration form,” where he filed his form approximately one year and nine months past the deadline.  (Pa14).  Nor did [...] demonstrate extreme hardship in this matter, as he will continue to receive his Special Retirement benefits with concurrent retiree health benefits coverage.  (Pa87-88).  It should also be noted that cases involving the use of the Board’s equitable power for reopening proceedings or relaxing deadlines “were bottomed on the inherent power of an administrative agency, in the absence of legislative restriction, to reopen or to modify and to rehear orders previously entered by it.
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 56:12-10(b)(3).  Id. at 326.  In *Delaney v. Dickey*, 244 N.J. 466, 497 (2020), [...] noted that the insertion of an arbitration provision indicates that a party “has given thought to the prospect that a client may be a future adversary and has selected the forum in which potential disputes will be resolved. ”  [...] analyzes at length the differences between arbitration and the court system, including discovery, finality, damages and, in particular, costs.  Id. at 494.  Further, not all arbitration provisions are alike.  The Court emphasized that “the basic advantages and disadvantages” of each element of arbitration proceedings be discussed.  Id. at 496.  Here, cost is a major factor.  Individuals who suffered significant damages to their property are now being required to pay an arbitrator $320.00 per hour and $2,200.00 per day in order to pursue their claims which they were never told in advance.  Nor were they advised in advance that [...] would be selected to arbitrate, nor did they receive its 38 pages of rules.  POINT TWO:
[brief] 4.  On November 2, 2021, Respondent shared a Facebook post stating:  Prayers are working, keep them coming for NJ, VA, [...], and all of the BOEs  See Exhibit 5 to Amended Complaint (Ca270).  5.  On November 2, 2021, Respondent posted a link that said “[...] & [...] - [...] ([...])” and typed out words above that link, stating:  Thank you [...] for the Endorsement .... our children will be blessed when we are elected today  See Exhibit 6 to Amended Complaint (Ca272).  The link in this post leads to a website called “[...]. ”  6.  On November 2, 2021, Respondent shared tentative results of her election to the Board, indicating that she was poised to win.
[brief] To the contrary, $84,000.00 of the settlement reportedly went to [...], which included repayment of an undocumented loan, $45,000.00 reportedly went to [...] to pay off his personal credit card debt, $40,000.00 reportedly went toward unpaid rent, and some went to legal fees.  (Aa28); 2T132:9-133:15.  It is disputed where the remainder of the money went.
[brief] In this case, the court skipped over two significant parts of the Model Jury Charge for robbery: the explanation of the second element and the identification of the element that elevates a robbery to a crime of the first-degree.  The court began by properly instructing the jury that in order to find the defendant guilty of robbery, it must be satisfied that the State has proven “each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: That the defendant was in the course of committing a theft and that while in the course of committing a theft the defendant threatened another with or purposely put him or her in fear of immediate bodily injury. ”  (4T 123-18 to 24)  The court proceeded to define the first element, that “the defendant was in the course of committing a theft. ”  (4T 123-25 to 125-8)  At this point, however, the court strayed from the model charge.  After defining the first element, the model charge reminds the jury of the second element of robbery and defines it.  The model charge reads:  “In addition to proving beyond a reasonable that the defendant was in the course of committing a theft, the State must also prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that in the course of committing that theft the defendant threatened another with or purposely put him/her in fear of immediate bodily injury. ”  Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Robbery in the First-Degree (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1)” (rev. Sep. 10, 2012).  The model charge then explains the meaning of the phrase “bodily injury” and advises the jury that no bodily injury need have resulted.  Ibid.  Here, the court entirely omitted the definition of the second element of robbery and instead incorrectly went straight to defining the element that elevates robbery to a first-degree crime.  The court told the jury that “[i]n addition to proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was in the course of committing a theft, the State must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that while in the course of committing that theft the defendant did not actually possess a deadly weapon, but, instead, purposely threatened the immediate use of such a weapon and purposely engaged in conduct or gestures which simulated possession of a deadly weapon and which would lead a reasonable person to believe defendant possessed such a weapon.
[brief] On May 9, 2019, [...] was charged in Municipal Court Complaint No. [...] with one count of second degree theft by deception, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4, for conduct occurring on or about March 18, 2014 in the City of Hoboken.  On May 17, 2019, [...] was charged in Indictment No. [...] with one count of second degree theft by deception, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4, for conduct occurring on or about March 18, 2014 in the City of Hoboken.  (Sa1-3).  The allegations involved a claim of the misappropriation of seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($750,000.00) from a group of investors between March and May of 2014.  From the outset, [...] has denied the allegation that any deception or theft took place as he attempted to develop the [...] project in a restaurant space leased by his family’s business, which also maintained a liquor license for that space.
[brief] I.  The Special Undertaking Contract.  This case centers on a defense and indemnity contract between plaintiff’s predecessor, [...] (“[...]”), and defendant [...] f/k/a [...] (“[...]”).  On February 7, 1972, [...] entered into a contract with [...] denominated “Special Undertaking by Purchasers of Polychlorinated Biphenyls” (the “Special Undertaking Contract”).  (Pa025-026).  The Special Undertaking Contract is a Missouri contract that requires [...], and now plaintiff (as [...]’s successor), to defend and indemnify [...], and its “future agents,” from “liabilities, claims, damages, penalties, actions, suits, losses, costs and expenses” “arising --- 2  The Statement of Facts (R. 2:6-2(a)(5)) and Procedural History (R. 2:6-2(a)(4)) are combined as one section because the relevant facts and procedure are intertwined, and defendants respectfully submit that they are more clearly presented in a single chronological narrative.
[brief] The Attorney General, appearing as amicus curiae, takes no position regarding whether the investigatory stop in this case should be upheld.  The Attorney General appears for the limited purpose of reiterating that racial profiling, in all its forms, must be eliminated from policing decisions.  The Attorney General asserts that consideration of a person's race or ethnicity -- in drawing an inference that an individual may be involved in criminal activity or in exercising police discretion with respect to how the officer will deal with that person -- will not be tolerated and is prohibited by Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2005-1, which established a statewide policy prohibiting the practice of "Racially-Influenced Policing."  The Attorney General notes, however, that under Directive No. 2005-1, when race is a descriptive factor in connection with a "Be-On-The-Lookout" announcement, or a pre-existing investigation into a specific criminal activity, it may be deemed an objective identifier.  The Attorney General emphasizes that the correct legal standard for adjudicating whether reasonable suspicion exists is the totality-of-the-circumstances test.  C.
[brief] The trial court denied Defendants’ motion for reconsideration in its entirety, referencing its comprehensive Opinion.  Da84-98.  The trial court also opined that [...], by failing to raise its purported statute of frauds defense until after trial, waived the defense.  Da91-94.  On the issue of the rate of post-judgment interest, the trial court emphasized that the equities mandated the imposition of the contract rate of interest.
[brief] The Tr. Co. of N.J. v. Sliwinski, 350 N.J. Super. 187 (App. Div. 2002)...............................................................8  W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506 (2023)..........................................................................................4  Rules R. 2:5-1(f).............................................................................................................6, 7 R. 2:5-1(f)(3)(i) ....................................................................................................7 Rule 2:6-1(a)(1)...................................................................................................10 Rule 2:6-2(a)(2)...................................................................................................10 R. 4:6-2(e) ...........................................................................................................2, 3, 4 Treatises [...], Current N.J. Court Rules ......................................................................7
[brief] Yet after [...] checked [...]’ license and registration, he did not have reasonable suspicion to continue to detain [...], or to ask [...] for consent to search.  [...] testified that he was suspicious of [...] because he was nervous and because his pupils were constricted, which he said led him to believe [...] was “possibly” under the influence or in possession of illegal drugs.  (1T 121-5 to 11, 122-17, 124-17 to 17)  In contrast, in his police report, [...] only said that he was suspicious of [...] because he discovered a non-extraditable out-of-state warrant.  (1T 130-13 to 131-2)  None of these circumstances, however, individually or cumulatively, created a reasonable belief that [...] was under the influence or in possession of drugs.  Thus, it was impermissible for [...] to ask [...] for consent to search or continue to question him after [...] denied him consent to search. \(^6\) --- \(^6\)  The OSC report found that a “significant portion of the six-day Conference [attended by [...] six months earlier] focused on officers taking proactive steps to detect criminality during the course of motor vehicle stops for speeding and minor traffic violations” and that “a number of the tactics taught were unjustifiably harassing and unconstitutional.
[brief] Pond Run Watershed v. Hamilton Tp., 397 N.J. Super. 336 (App. Div. 2008)  28, 29  Popular Refreshments, Inc. v. Fuller’s Milk Bar & Recreation Center, Inc., 85 N.J. Super. 528, 537 (App. Div. 1964)  19, 20 Shakoor Supermarkets v. Old Bridge Planning Bd., 420 N.J. Super. 193 (App. Div.), certify. denied, 208 N.J. 598 (2011)  28  Smith v. Fair Haven Zoning Bd. of Adj., 335 N.J. Super. 111, 123 (App. Div. 2000)  15 Tomko v. Vissers, 21 N.J. 226, 239 (1956)  12 Wawa Food Market v.  Planning Bd., Ship Bottom, 227 N.J. Super. 29, 34 (App. Div. 1988)  8  Wilson v. Brick Twp. Zoning Bd., 405 N.J. Super. 189, 202 (App. Div. 2009)  22  Wyzykowski v. Rizas, 132 N.J. 509, 518 (1993)  13, 14
[brief] ”  However, he also indicated in response to the Court’s question as to if any questions occurred before, that “nothing more than informal …” which the Court interpreted as a concession that some communications, may have begun in 2012.  Furthermore, counsel for [...] stated that they had seen text messages sometime in 2012 between [...] and [...] and / or [...].  Neither side however could pinpoint a month or date in 2012 within which the discussions began.  Therefore, the Court found that it would limit the date restriction on the discovery material.  As such, [...]’s request was granted, but the scope of the production is limited to the period of January 2012 to October 2013.  D.
[brief] Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Dismissing Complaint with Prejudice, and Denying Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (3/19/24)..............................Ja405–417 # TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ## Cases | Case | Page(s) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------| | **257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC v. Roberto,** | passim | | 477 N.J. Super. 339 (App. Div. 2023) | | | **Alloc o v. Ocean Beach & Bay Club,** | 7, 23 | | 456 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 2018) | | | **Armstrong v. United States,** | 16 | | 364 U.S. 40 (1960) | | | **Borough of Rockaway v. Donofrio,** | 20 | | 186 N.J. Super. 344 (App. Div. 1982) | | | **Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid,** | 16 | | 594 U.S. 139 (2021) | | | **Chance v. McCann,** | 18–19 | | 405 N.J. Super. 547 (App. Div. 2009) | | | **Cherokee Equities, L.L.C. v. Garaventa,** | 16 | | 382 N.J. Super. 201 (Ch. Div. 2005) | | | **Cnty. of Morris v. Fauver,** | 21 | | 153 N.J. 80 (1998) | | | **Coons v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.,** | 14 | | 96 N.J. 419 (1984) | | | **Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury,** | 10–11 | | 489 U.S. 803 (1989) | | | **First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles Cnty.,** | 12 | | 482 U.S. 304 (1987) | | | **Fox v. Millman,** | passim | | 210 N.J. 401 (2012) | | | **Hall v. Meisner,** | 16 | | 51 F.4th 185 (2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2639 (2023)
[brief] On Friday, December 7, 2018, just past 4:00 pm, when the plaintiff-appellant, [...], and the defendant-respondent, [...], were driving in heavy traffic on First Street Newark intending to get out of Newark and onto Route 280 Westbound.  Pa151.  While stopped at the red light at the intersection with Route 280, the plaintiff and the defendant were sitting side by side waiting to make left turns onto Route 280 when the accident occurred.  The defendant was aware of the plaintiff at the stoplight.  Pa125:17-22.  Plaintiff testified that two lanes habitually turned left from First Street onto Route 280.  Pa50:8-10.  Plaintiff was in the middle lane that was designed to go straight, but was going to turn left.  Pa153.  The plaintiff’s vehicle was struck on the left-hand driver's side with the front right bumper of the vehicle operated by the defendant, [...], and owned by the defendant, [...].  Pa50:24-25, Pa51:1-2.  The defendant failed to see the vehicle operated by the plaintiff while making the turn.  Pa121:24-25, Pa122:1-3.  The defendant did not hold his turn and correctly travel into the left lane of Route 280, but instead went wide into the right lane where the plaintiff already was and struck the plaintiff’s vehicle.  After the accident the defendant said to the plaintiff, “I know I should have stopped. ”  Pa55:22-25, Pa56:1-3.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[brief] À propos, relevant to Defendants’ unlicensed debt collection activity here, the DepoLink court acknowledged that violations of the CFA can arise from “affirmative misrepresentation[s], even if unaccompanied by knowledge of [their] falsity. ”  *DepoLink*, 430 N.J. Super. at 338 (quoting *Monogram Credit Card Bank of Ga. v. Tennesen*, 390 N.J. Super. 123, 133 (App.Div.2007)).  With respect to the trial court’s reliance on *Chulsky*, *Chulsky* was a case in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey decided before *Gonzalez*.  For those reasons alone, *Chulsky* cannot control here or overrule *Gonzalez*.  Moreover, the *Chulsky* court—interpreting substantive state law—asked a question that was explicitly answered by the New Jersey Supreme Court in *Gonzalez*, i.e., whether the “[CFA] applies, in like manner, to assignees or debt buyers who purchase and attempt to collect upon defaulted debt. ”  See *Chulsky*, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 838.  *Gonzalez* responded by explicitly determining that “collecting or enforcing a loan, whether by the lender or its assignee, constitutes the ‘subsequent performance’ of a loan, an activity falling within the coverage of the CFA. ”  *Gonzalez*, 207 N.J. at 577-78 (emphasis added).  Thus, the trial court’s reliance on *Chulsky* was in error as *Gonzalez* is controlling here—Defendants’ fraudulent, unlicensed debt collection activities constitute deceptive misrepresentations committed during the subsequent performance of the sale of merchandise.