ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] Any investments not purchased and redeemed directly from the issuer, government money -d. market mutual fund, local government investment pool, or the State of New Jersey Cash Management Fund, shall be purchased and redeemed through the use of a national or State bank located within this State or through a broker-dealer which, at the time of purchase or redemption, has been registered 9 continuously for a period of at least years pursuant to section of P.L. 1967, c.93 (C.49:3-56) and two has at least $25 million in capital stock (or equivalent capitalization if not a corporation), surplus reserves for contingencies and undivided profits, or through a securities dealer who makes primary US. Bank markets in Government securities and reports daily to the Federal Reserve of New York its US. position in and borrowing on such Government securities.
[brief] ”  State v. Williams, 219 N.J. 89, 100-01 (2019) (holding trial counsel’s decision not to object to potentially improper testimony for strategic reasons cannot form the basis for plain error under the doctrine of invited error).  Additionally, Our Supreme Court has long-held that defendants may not selectively introduce pieces of evidence that the prosecution would otherwise be unable to admit in their own case-in-chief for his own advantage, “without allowing the prosecution to place the evidence in its proper context.
[brief] CONCLUSION  It is respectfully submitted that the erroneous rulings of the trial court were so prejudicial against the Plaintiff as to result in a verdict that was a "miscarriage of justice," requiring that the Judgment be vacated and that a new trial be ordered.  (See Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2 (1969); R. 2:10-2 and R. 4:49-1).  Respectfully submitted, [...], Esquire  [...], Esquire
[brief] For sake of clarity, Defendants wish to point out to the Honorable Court that the Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of Facts (Pa 61-64) was never agreed to by Defendants and was simply just “proposed” by Plaintiff.  Further, the date of the fire which gutted the premises was April 21, 2022 and the reopening date of [...] after Defendants made the repairs was May 10, 2023.  (T3 5:7-12. 29:11-20)  STANDARD OF REVIEW  [...]’s verdict in this case was clear and supported by the adequate, substantial, and credible evidence in this case.  The scope of appellate review of a judgment entered in a non-jury case is limited.  The findings on which the judgment is based should not be disturbed unless they are not supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence in the record.  Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84; Pioneer National Title Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 155 N.J. Super. 332, 338, 382 A.2d 933 (App.Div.), aff’d o.b., 78 N.J. 320, 394 A.2d 360 (1978).  The fact findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge should not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced they are "so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice."  Rova Farms Resort, Inc., 65 N.J. at 484, 323 A.2d 495.  [...] relied on the plain and obvious language of the lease agreement as explained in the 20 written pages of the decision transcript.  (3T:3-23)  Inasmuch as [...]’s reasoning was supported by the “adequate, substantial, and credible evidence” presented at trial, Plaintiff’s appeal should be denied.  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT ONE
[brief] (Pa35).  An Opposition to the Motion was filed by the Defendant on September 16, 2024.  (Pa74).  [...] then held Oral Argument on October 2, 2024, and granted the Plaintiffs’ motion as to the defendant, [...].² (2TR15:19-28:6).  [...] also initially denied the Plaintiffs’ motion as to the ² Oral Argument was held before the Honorable [...] on October 2, 2024.  The transcript from this argument is designated as 2TR. Defendant, but ultimately reserved.  (2TR37:10-46:3; 53:3-8).  The Trial Court based its decision to initially deny the motion on the opinion that the Defendant did not employ the medical professionals at issue and the care and treatment did not occur at the Defendant’s facility and therefore, the Defendant could not be held vicariously liable.
[brief] B.  In granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s trespass claims, the Chancery Division disregarded testimony on Defendant [...]’s admissions  In the Third Count of his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a claim for trespass predicated on allegations that Defendants caused damage to Plaintiff’s plants by placing branches on them.  [11a].  The Chancery Division began its statement of reasons for granting summary judgment against Plaintiff on his trespass claim by stating:
[brief] Although [...] testified on direct examination that the Walmart parking lot was a “known narcotics area,” on cross-examination he admitted that he could not say whether the fourteen SET “activities” over a ten-year period related to narcotics arrests, and further, he admitted that his testimony that the lot was a “known narcotics” area was simply his opinion based upon its location on Route 37 and its proximity to the Parkway.  1T:39-6 to 39-15.  Such testimony did not provide sufficient credible evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the Walmart parking lot was a high narcotics area.
[brief] **THIS MATTER having been resolved by amicable settlement,** which settlement is embodied in a Consent Judgment entered by the Court on April 13, 2022; and **Paragraph 17 of the Consent Judgment having provided that the co-owners of the real estate...shall execute a listing for the sale of that property and if those co-owners fail to agree on the identity of a realtor** for the marketing and sale of the Property, a realtor shall be selected by the court; and The co-owners having failed to agree on the selection of a real estate professional for the marketing and sale of the Property; and …
[brief] While there was as a matter of necessity testimony elicited about the Hackensack Project (along with testimony about every other of the several projects that were the subject of the PTA), that evidence concerned only the specific issue in front of the Arbitrator—if the parties agreed on an EGP for the Hackensack Project and the agreed-upon amount.  [...]’s principal’s testimony and written statements concerning the Hackensack Project’s issues, including owner’s payments, were what was supposed to be the parties’ PTA-mandated good faith negotiations concerning the EGP for that project, an EGP the parties eventually agreed would be zero in light of the issues [...] inherited.  Those discussions did not concern the amount [...] was owed by [...] pursuant to the Hackensack Subcontract.
[brief] On January (inaudible) the [...] plenary reorganization meeting was held.  The meeting it remedied any possible defect in the notice provided for the original meeting which took place on January 11th, 2022.  A notice was sent to all, (inaudible) in the newspapers on January 28th, 2022.  A notice for publication is filed on January 29th and (inaudible) publish it.  Here, Plaintiff initially argues that the trial court’s opinion is inadequate solely because the court relied upon a single published opinion of the Appellate Division when entering judgment.  Pl.’s Br. at 25 (citing Twp. of Bernards v. State of New Jersey Dept. of Community Affairs, 233 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1989)).  Putting aside that the trial court amply cited to the OPMA statute, Plaintiff’s argument is not legitimate.  In New Jersey, “[a] trial court is bound to follow the rulings of an appellate court in this State, which decisions are binding when the same issues are presented.
[brief] Thus, our case law has rejected arguments that the inference is inappropriate in homicides involving guns when the actor’s intent was at issue.  Martini, 131 N.J. at 271.  That a weapon designed to cause death was used in a way that causes death bears a rational relationship to the actor’s intent to cause death.  But an ordinary object that is used in a manner that leads to a person’s death does not signify intent in the same way.  There is no basis in common experience that would lead one to understand that hitting a person with a wine chiller would necessarily lead to death in the way that shooting them would.
[brief] 21 Nero v. Hyland, 76 N.J. 213 (1978)............................................................................. 19 New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261 (2007).............................................................................. 6 N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, 447 N.J. Super. 182 (App. Div. 2016).................................................... 11, 19 N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. State, Office of Governor, 451 N.J. Super. 282 (App. Div. 2017).................................................... 11 N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. 541 (2017)............................................................................. 21 O’Shea v. Twp. of W. Milford, 410 N.J. Super. 371 (App. Div. 2009).................................................... 11 Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015)................................................................................. 6 Statutes N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13 ....................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 .............................................................................. 15, 17, 19 N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5 .................................................................................. 17, 18 N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 ........................................................................................................... 11-12,14 N.J.S.A. 47:1A-8 ............................................................................................................. 19 N.J.S.A. 47:3-8.1 to -8.32 .............................................................................................. 21 Regulations N.J.A.C. 13:1E-2.4 ......................................................................................................... 7, 12, 16 Other Authorities Executive Order No. 110 (Byrne 1981) .......................................................... 2, 10, 15, 16, 18, 22 N.J. Const. art. VIII, § II, ¶ 7 ......................................................................................... 22 N.J.R.E. 201(a) .................................................................................................................. 10 Publications [...], The history of the [...] from 1921 to the present ........................................................................................................ 1-2 PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
[brief] The contents of the Consent Order are clear.  For the purpose of completing the [...], the parties agreed to dismiss their claims in the Prior Litigation *without prejudice*. (Pa150 – Pa152).  To ensure that those dismissed claims would not be time-barred when later revived, the parties agreed that:  (i) if the claims that were voluntarily dismissed under the Consent Order were re-filed within sixty (60) days after the adjudication of the [...], such claims would not be barred by any defense based upon the statutes of limitation or repose; and (ii) that any new claims not asserted in the Prior Litigation, but asserted as part of a re-filed action, would receive the same benefit of tolling.  (Pa152 at ¶5).  Importantly, nothing in the Consent Order bars the parties from asserting claims after the sixty (60) day period.  (Pa150 – Pa152).  The claims asserted after the sixty (60) day period, however, would not benefit from the agreed-upon tolling, and would be subject to defenses based upon the statutes of limitations and repose.  (Id.).  The Consent Order says nothing more, and certainly does not mention the dismissal of any claim with prejudice.  Notwithstanding the clear contents of the Consent Order, the Trial Court below erred, by adding terms to the Consent Order that simply do not exist.
[brief] This immunity statute provides Railroads with immunity in certain circumstances where individuals are either improperly in a train’s right of way, or on railroad property.  The Appellant asserts that Summary Judgement was erroneously granted based on an overly broad, misinterpretation of this immunity statute.  The statute was carefully written and provides certain exceptions for circumstances where the immunity does not apply.  The plain language of this statute dictates that the Defendants, under the undisputed facts, are not entitled to the benefit of this Railroad Immunity Statute.  There is no dispute that [...] was walking in a crosswalk when she was struck by the train.  The plain language of the statute states that “This section shall not prohibit…a person from using a crossing established by the railroad”.  A crosswalk on the corner of [...] and [...] in the middle of the busy business district of [...], certainly is a “crossing established by the railroad”.  Based on this plain language, the instant motion must be denied.
[brief] Ibid.  Because an ambiguous indemnity contract is construed against the indemnitee, the Appellate Division reversed the order compelling [...] to indemnify [...] for [...]’s negligence.  Id. at 57-58.  Finally, in Meder, the Appellate Division again ruled that a contract with conflicting indemnity provisions is unenforceable in respect of the indemnitee’s own negligence.
[brief] In fact, during the Board hearings, Plaintiffs acknowledged that revised grading was for stormwater management purposes.  In Plaintiffs’ letter to the Board cited in their brief, it states “[d]ue to the number of buildings and the proposed development, the Applicant had to mound on the revised lot grade in order to accommodate stormwater management. ”  Though [...]’s expert disagreed that there was mounding (discussed supra.), Plaintiffs’ acknowledged that the revised grade was for stormwater management.  The number of buildings is irrelevant to the analysis because the Borough agreed to rezone the Property for those number of dwellings as part of its Settlement Agreement and affordable housing compliance.  Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that:  “Evidence supporting the Planning Board’s determination was clearly presented at the hearings below, and as a matter of the law the court cannot find that the Planning Board’s conclusion concerning the credibility of the experts and the reasons provided for the regrading of the property were arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. ”  (Pa12.)  For the forgoing reasons, the trial court properly determined that the findings of the Board in agreeing with the expert testimony of [...] and its own Board Planner and Board Engineer were not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.
[brief] Corroborating facts may include “records confirming the informant’s description of the target location, the suspect’s criminal history, and the experience of the officer who submitted the supporting affidavit. ”  *Ibid.*  However, a successful controlled drug buy has been singled out by the courts as persuasive evidence in establishing probable cause.  *Id.* at 556-57.  In this case, [...] spoke to police only after he was arrested for the possession of controlled dangerous substances.
[brief] As mentioned before, the concept of preemption exists only where the State Legislature has comprehensively and pervasively regulated the field, not because some other local government entity has passed an ordinance or regulation.  This is true because the case law unambiguously says it is true, and also, no logic or sense exists which would preempt a municipality in a field it otherwise could act, under its police powers, because another local entity has acted first, i.e., beating the municipality in its legislatively entrusted powers to the punch.  Despite this, the Court below ruled that is what happened here as one of the alternative grounds for concluding that Ordinance 17-2017 is preempted.
[brief] (Da107-113)  In support of the motion, Plaintiffs argued that “newly discovered evidence” existed that supposedly could not have been presented previously, and which allegedly revealed that “the actions of [...] fit clearly under the common knowledge exception of the [Affidavit of Merit] statute or were not acts of malpractice at all, but rather were clearly intentional torts and civil law theft. ”  (Da110)  On March 29, 2018, [...] held oral argument on Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate, during which Plaintiffs’ counsel argued:  [...]:  [Now] we know that [...] is actually [[...] (“[...]”)], and we only found out about this also recently, of concealment, and misrepresentation, and quite outright perjuries, now we know that [...] was the managing member and sole managing member of [...].  . . .  In this case, there was no legal issue.  . .  THE COURT: Then why did you plead one?  [...]:  At the time we—we didn’t have this—this is newly discovered evidence . . .  [Da146-147 (emphasis added)]  The supposed newly discovered evidence, cited during the March 29, 2018 oral argument in the 2015 action, dealt with the alleged ownership of [...].
[brief] (Pa 257)  The trial judge denied the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  The trial judge determined that a prima facie case of under the LAD for hostile work environment due to race was sufficiently established.  The Court found the first element was met because there was a material fact in dispute as to whether the comment was made due to the Plaintiff’s heritage.  The Court determined the second element was established because there is a material fact in dispute as to whether the comments made during the one-time incident could be considered severe and pervasive.  Finally, the court found the third and fourth element were met because a reasonable factfinder could determine that the comment would alter the environment of a reasonable person in Plaintiff’s protected class.  (Pa 254-Pa 264)
[brief] (Pa651; Pb9); 2) [...] (owned by Objector, [...]) was completely destroyed by fire in 1994 (and, as such, is not original or historic).  (Pa702; Pb9); and 3)  In the words of the Objectors, “27 and [...] are the only two homes situated directly across the street from the rear of the Subject Structure, and whose occupants would be the only residents in the surrounding area impacted .
[brief] Upon so rejecting Plaintiffs’ Responses to [...]’s Statement of Material Facts, which [...] submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs’ Global Statement of Material Facts, with exhibits annexed, which were offered in opposition to [...]’s motion for summary judgment, the Court should find that there has been no discovery in this case regarding the [...] and plaintiffs’ references to [...] should be rejected by the Court and there has been no discovery of alleged Strip Mall Proximity Estimates and references to alleged Strip Mall Proximity Estimates should be rejected by the Court.  It is further respectfully noted the certification of [...], Esq., dated June 15, 2021, erroneously states that [...] has been barred from testifying in this matter.  [Da19].  No Order was issued below barring [...] from testifying in this matter.  ARGUMENT POINT I THE LEASE AGREEMENT DID NOT PLACE NAMKOONG UNDER A CONTRACTUAL DUTY TO CLEAR SNOW AND ICE FROM THE LOCATION WHERE MR. COLLUCCI WAS ALLEGEDLY INJURED
[directive] Lt. Governor TO: All County Prosecutors FROM: [...], Attorney General DATE: June 5, 2020  SUBJECT: Guidance Regarding Police Use of Force  Like all of you, I am still reeling from the footage of [...]’s murder in Minneapolis.  His death reminds us that our country has a long way to go—not only in healing our nation’s racial divides, but also in addressing the systemic and implicit biases that prevent all Americans from equally securing our country’s great promises.  Now more than ever, we must redouble our commitment to building trust between law enforcement and the people we serve, especially those from historically marginalized communities.  Here in New Jersey, we are absolutely committed to a criminal justice system that is fair, just, and free of bias.
[brief] THE DECISION BELOW WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVERSED.  (Not Raised Below).  The substantial evidence presented does not support the final agency determination made by the [...].  Substantial evidence has been defined alternately as "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," and "evidence furnishing a reasonable basis for the agency's action."  Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 2010) (citations omitted).  The Board’s determination references a “presumption” that mail properly addressed with proper postage was received by the party it was addressed to.  However, [...] certified in an affidavit provided to the Board that he never received a postcard from the Division, regardless of if it was ever sent.  This affidavit should overcome any presumption that the postcard was received.  The Board’s decision failed to consider the almost one hundred affidavits of other active and retired troopers who also did not receive a postcard from the Division notifying them of the Ricci Act that were submitted to the Board in support of [...]’s appeal.  As such, the finding that it was “undisputed” that the Division sent the postcard to [...] (and others) is not supported by the facts and evidence presented.  Furthermore, any presumption claimed by the Board has clearly been rebutted by the overwhelming evidence presented in this matter.  Considering the evidence presented, the agency’s action does not have a reasonable basis.  Additionally, the Board failed to consider the evidence presented demonstrating that Registrations Forms submitted were not accepted by the Division because the Trooper(s) who submitted them were not sick at the time the Registration Form was sent.  [...] attempted to file an Eligibility Registration Form back in September of 2019.  [...] was denied the ability to register because he was told the Ricci Bill “is for those who are currently sick.  Not for possible future illnesses. ”  Pa119.  The Board also failed to consider the evidence presented regarding the [...] membership polling.  [...], President of the [...], polled his membership to ascertain whether anyone received notice of the Ricci Act.  Of the fifty-nine (59) [...] members (retired troopers) who responded to the polling, fifty-seven (57) did not receive any notice of the Ricci Act.  The Board ignored the evidence from this polling when making its determination.  In light of all of the evidence presented on [...]’s behalf, a reasonable mind could only conclude that these postcards were never received.  Without proper notice, [...] should have been permitted to register for the Ricci Act.  Therefore, the determination below should be reversed because it is against the substantial weight of the evidence.
[brief] So did the testimony.  [2T 77-23 to 79-25].  A conditionally permitted use would generate the same amount of traffic (2T 84-4 to 84-9), which pursuant to this Court’s decision in Regency Gardens v. Bd. of Adj., slip op., A-2283-13 (App. Div. Aug. 27, 2015)(Pa389), demonstrates that the traffic from the proposed use “can hardly be characterized as substantial . . .”
[brief] Accordingly, [...]’s question was “an ambiguous invocation of [his] right to counsel that required the detective to cease all questioning and seek clarification. ”  Id. at 631.  Because [...]’s question was at least an ambiguous request for counsel, the “detective was required either to cease questioning or to pose only questions designed to clarify whether defendant was invoking [his] right to consult with an attorney. ”  State v. Dorff, 468 N.J. Super. 633, 652 (App. Div. 2021); see also Alston, 204 N.J. at 624.