ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] A.  Background  1.  The Parties and the Property  Plaintiff is an affiliated entity of the [...], which is operated and controlled by brothers [...] (“[...]”) and [...] (“[...]” and, together, the “[...]”).  (2T34:21-23, 36:15-19, 42:14 to 43:5, 91:4 to 92:12.)  The [...] acquires, remediates and develops distressed and environmentally contaminated properties, and otherwise owns a large portfolio of residential, commercial, and industrial properties throughout New Jersey.  (2T34:24 to 37:11.)  Defendant [...] is the Executrix of the Estate of her late brother, [...], who owned the Property until his death in 2014.  (5T76:23 to 77:14.)  After Mr. Weinstein’s passing, Defendants took joint ownership and responsibility of the Property, including its associated environmental issues.  (4T234:5-22, 235:20 to 236:2.)  The Property was historically used as a scrap yard for heavy metals and recycling of batteries dating back to 1919.  (Pa0296; 8T16:21 to 17:9.)  Defendants’ family operated a scrap yard on the Property during most of this time, and in 2004, Defendants’ family leased the Property to another entity, [...], which continued the scrap yard operations at the Property until approximately 2018.  (Pa0295-97; 2T48:5-20; 4T236:7-21.)  In 2011, following a hydraulic oil spill on the Property and subsequent investigation by the NJDEP, and due to the historical uses of the Property, the NJDEP designated the Property as a contaminated site, and to date, the Property remains subject to remedial investigation and remediation obligations.  (Pa0295-97; 4T25:18-24, 164:2-20; 5T81:18-22; 6T7:20-24; 7T68:11-20; 8T6:19 to 7:1, 16:21 to 17:9.)  In 2018, Defendants decided to sell the Property.
[brief] It was not.  As of March 5, 2021, there clearly were at least “*reasonable grounds to believe* that the insured’s interests *might be served* by an appeal. ”  *Pharmacists*, 187 Vt. at 334, 993 A.2d at 421 (emphasis added).  [...] has never contested this point: not in its Denial Letter, and not in this case.  The Challenged Decision’s failure to address the duty to appeal articulated in *Pharmacists* and insurance treatises was prejudicial legal error.  Reversal, accordingly, is warranted.
[brief] THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT ERRONEOUSLY IDENTIFIES SEA BRIGHT AS AN ENTITY COVERED BY N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11.  (Aa19 – Aa21)  The Commissioner’s interpretation of N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11 ignores the plain language of the statute and instead interprets it in a manner so as to increase ambiguity and reach a conclusion not otherwise provided-for by the statutory text.  It is therefore erroneous and is owed no deference by this Court.  As set forth above, [...] is not any entity described in the statute as being permitted to seek withdrawal from [...] and [...].  Because the Commissioner misapplied the statute, the September 22, 2023, decision constitutes an abuse of discretion and should be reversed.  The Commissioner’s brief asserts that its interpretation of N.J.S.A. 18A:8 and 18A:13 is in accordance with the public policy encouraging the formation of K-12 districts.  (Cb13).  It notes that N.J.S.A. 18A:8-51 allows an ECS to include an eliminated former non-operating district in a consolidation plan created according to N.J.S.A. 18A:7-8(h), which supports its interpretation that the terms “merge” and “consolidate” are interchangeable.  Appellants disagree.  Instead, the text of N.J.S.A. 18A:8-51 shines a spotlight on the fact that, if it wanted to, the Legislature could have included entities such as [...] clearly and without ambiguity in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11, but did not.  It was capable of identifying a “former non-operating district” like [...], but it chose not to do so.  The Commissioner is not permitted to effectuate the wholesale expansion of a statutory provision beyond its clear, unambiguous text.  Next, the Commissioner asserts that, because N.J.S.A. 18A:8-50 provides for the governance of merged districts in accordance with N.J.S.A. 18A:13-1 *et seq.*
[brief] An appellate court “will not substitute [its] judgment unless the evidentiary ruling is ‘so wide of the mark’ that it constitutes ‘a clear error in judgment. ’”  *State v. Garcia*, 245 N.J. 412, 430 (2021) (quoting *State v. Medina*, 242 N.J. 397, 412 (2020)).  During the jury charge conference plaintiffs were appropriately denied an adverse inference charge based upon [...]’s absence at trial and was precluded from in commenting on his absence during closing arguments, because the jury already heard [...]’s testimony by way of videotaped deposition.  During plaintiff’s case in chief, counsel for the plaintiff subject only to certain limited redactions for evidentiary rulings effectively played almost the entirety of the videotaped deposition of Defendant, Ahmed [...].  As a result, the jury heard detailed testimony from [...], upon plaintiff’s counsel’s own questioning, as to how the incident at the Lowe’s store occurred; [...]’s employment history with Lowe’s and the training that [...] had undergone with Lowe’s immediately prior to the date of the incident and in the past when he had worked for Lowe’s on two (2) prior occasions and testimony regarding a number of other issues.  The jury via was able to assess [...]’s demeanor and credibility, just as if he was in court.  [...]’s testimony would have been no different if he was in court testifying live before the jury.  Where a party-witness has been deposed in the case, an adverse inference charge is not warranted.  Torres v. Pabon, 225 N.J.  167, 181-184 (2016).  In Torres, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the trial court improperly issued a jury charge pursuant to State v. Clawans, 38 N.J. 162 (1962) directly to the jury to consider drawing an adverse inference against Defendant, Pabon, from Pabon’s failure to testify after plaintiff presented Pabon’s deposition testimony to the jury.  In Torres, plaintiff during trial was permitted to read portions of the defendant’s testimony into evidence.  In the matter at bar, plaintiff was permitted and in fact did play almost the entire video taped deposition testimony of Defendant, [...] in his case in chief.  Therefore, the trial court in the instant matter did not abuse its discretion when denying plaintiff’s request for an adverse inference charge and when precluding plaintiff’s counsel from commenting on [...]’s absence during closing arguments.  A decision otherwise would have been inappropriate.
[brief] ........................................................................................................  13  I.  THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DEPARTMENT’S DISAPPROVAL OF GENWORTH’S APPLICATIONS AS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, AS WELL AS CONTRARY TO LAW.  (RAISED BELOW: PA1; PA53; PA120)  ........................................  13  A.  The ALJ and the Commissioner improperly rewrote during adjudication the Department’s actual disapproval letter .........................  15  1.  The Department’s disapproval letter was not based on “excessiveness” and cannot be upheld on that ground post hoc.  ................................................................. 15  2.  The Department’s finding of an “aggressive loss ratio target” in the disapproval letter confirms that the Department never made an “excessiveness” determination.  .................................................................  20  B.  The “excessiveness” ruling cannot stand even if the Department’s post-hoc rationalization was permitted under law.  ...... 23  1.  The Commissioner had to adopt regulations implementing the Act’s “excessive[ness]” provision to enforce it in the manner here.  .................................................................  24  a.  Not only do the Supreme Court and this Court require rulemaking to effectuate administrative law, but the Legislature found it imperative to effectuate this Act.  .................................................................  25  b.  Reversal is required because the absence of regulations meant that [...] lacked notice of how the Department would interpret and treat the term “excessive. ” ..............  28  2.  The ALJ’s and the Commissioner’s efforts to salvage an “excessive” rates determination fail.  ..................................37  CONCLUSION
[brief] For interpreting domestic relations contracts, the Appellate Division in *Massar v. Massar*, 279 N.J. Super. 89, 93 (App. Div. 1995) explained that:  [T]he contractual nature of [domestic relations] agreements has long been recognized and principles of contract interpretation have been invoked particularly to define the terms of the agreement and divine the intent of the parties.  In interpreting the agreement, the court will not draft a new agreement for the parties.  (emphasis added).  In the present case, the parties’ PSA (Ca14) was upheld by the trial court in its July 22, 2022 decision:  Having found [[...]’s] signature is on the PSA and MMA, and that [[...]] was provided with full copies of these documents at the time of the execution, when coupled with the language contained in the both documents concerning the right to legal representation to review the agreements, that each party was aware of the assets and debts of the other and that each entered into the agreement freely and voluntarily and without coercion, fraud or duress, the court finds that [[...]’s] assertions that she was unaware of the agreements and signed such without knowing her right to legal counsel, that she was under duress by [[...]] and that she never read the agreements nor understand same are found to be unpersuasive.
[brief] For anyone who has had the misfortune of reading (or even worse, either conducting or being present during) the deposition of [...]’s President, [...], [...]’s deposition was conspicuously and notoriously marked by the following: (1) [...]’s devastating admissions (throwing critical proofs in the garbage in the ordinary course of business); and (2) what can only be described as his prolonged and demented meltdown when asked the most basic questions pertaining to the virtually non-existent proofs “supporting” [...]’s case.
[brief] Moreover, any opinion based in unproven science and expressed in subjective terms such as ‘sufficient agreement’ or ‘consistent with’ may mislead the jury and will not be permitted. ”); Gardner v. United States, 140 A. 3d 1172 (D.C. 2016) (“[I]n this jurisdiction a firearms and toolmark expert may not give an unqualified opinion, or testify with absolute or 100% certainty, that based on ballistics pattern comparison matching a fatal shot was fired from one firearm, to the exclusion of all other firearms. ”).
[brief] (4T201:5-8).  [...] was not wearing the [...] uniform, which was a red vest (5T30:23-31:12) and, according to the police officer who arrived later, he was wearing a blue [...] name tag that was attached to the bottom of his untucked t-shirt facing to the right.  (4T104:1-21; Pa252).  He was pushing a broom, sweeping the floors.  (4T191:25-192:8; 7T58:23-59:6).  [...] knew he needed unsanded grout because the tiles on which he was to be working had a joint of less than one-eighth inch.  (7T59:13-21).  While plaintiff was holding a 10 pound bag of grout and trying to determine if it was sanded or unsanded, --- \(^4\)[...] did not testify at trial despite being noticed to appear by plaintiffs; his video recorded discovery deposition (redacted) was played for the jury.  he responded to Mr. [...]’s offer of assistance by asking whether it was “sanded or unsanded. ” (7T61:6-20).  According to [...], [...] replied “you should figure out what you need before you come to the store, and you should learn about grout before you start buying it. ” (4T193:8-17).  Both [...] (4T193:12) and the plaintiff testified that [...] did not give them an answer to the question about sanded or unsanded grout, so plaintiff told [...] he should learn about grout applications.  (4T96:21-97:5; 7T142:1-10).  Plaintiff testified that with that, [...] “flipped out,” and “[h]e said F word, you learn it, I have PhD in history, I don’t have to learn this.  And I don’t have to learn this shit.  And he’s like almost immediately turn around and start leaving. ” (7T62:8-12).  Still holding the bag of grout, the plaintiff followed behind [...] asking for his name so he could report him to the manager.
[brief] Cincinnati Insurance Companies. v. Hamilton Beach/Proctor-Silex, Inc., 2006 WL 299064 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2006) ..............................................  14  Clark v. Actavis Group hf, 567 F. Supp.2d 711 (D.N.J. 2008)  ..........................................................  8  Clark v. General Motors, 2016 WL 3574408 (S.D. Miss. June 23, 2016)  ...........................................  15  Clayton v. Alliance Outdoor Group, Inc., 2021 WL 1947886 (M.D. Ga. March 30, 2021) ..................
[brief] ”  (1T 51-5 to 51-12)  After finding [...] was a credible witness (1T 53-15 to 54-5), the judge identified aspects of [...]’s testimony that she found “very important. ”  (1T 57-4 to 57-5)  While acknowledging that six men in total were stopped and frisked that night, the judge focused on the observations made about the four men standing closer to Federal Street, “because the defendant was one of those four. ”  (1T 55-15 to 55-17; 1T 57-22 to 47-25; 1T 63-25 to 64-5)  The judge stated:  [[...]] was aware of law enforcement observations which are significant and they include that there are four males on --- \(^8\)  The prosecutor also argued that [...]’s discovery of a gun on the tire of a nearby car provided reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk the men.  (1T 51-13 to 52-15)  However, [...]’s testimony and the BWC footage clearly established that the stop and frisk was well under way before [...] saw the gun on the tire.
[brief] | DOCUMENT NAME | DATE | APPENDIX PAGE | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|---------------| | ORDER OF HON.  [...], DENYING DEFENDANT’S MUNICIPAL APPEAL AND VACATING PRIOR STAY OF THE MUNICIPAL ORDER  DATED MARCH 24, 2023.  | 8/21/23 | Da1 | # TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX | Description | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | ORDER OF HON.  [...], DATED AUGUST 21, 2023, DENYING DEFENDANT’S MUNICIPAL APPEAL AND VACATING PRIOR STAY OF THE MUNICIPAL ORDER DATED.................. | Da1 | | STATE V [...], [...], DATED FEBRUARY 27, 2019... | Da9 | | [...], DATED SEPTEMBER 15, 2022................. | Da14 | | [...], DATED SEPTEMBER 15, 2022.................. | Da15 | | DEFENDANT’S WITNESS LIST, DATED JANUARY 13, 2023....... | Da16 | | DEFENDANT’S TRIAL EXHIBITS, DATED FEBRUARY 7, 2023..... | Da19 | | D-1 | Da20 | | D-2 | Da21 | | D-3A | Da22 | | D-3A (legible version) | Da23 | | D-3B | Da24 | | D-3B (legible version) | Da25 | | D-3C | Da26 | | D-3C (legible version) | Da27 | | D-4 | Da28 | | D-5 | Da29 | | D-6 | Da31 | | D-6A | Da32 | | D-7A | Da34 | | D-7A (legible version) | Da35 |
[brief] It is an undisputed fact that [...] did not understand what the ROFR actually required.  [...]’s representative testified that its principals willingly and voluntarily signed the MFSA and the Amendments in order to do business as a branded fuel station, but that they did not fully understand how to comply with the ROFR.  Da181 ¶6, Da184 ¶13, Da196 ¶72-¶73.  In fact, [...], the de facto manager of [...], testified that she only became aware of the ROFR in 2018, when the [...] Defendants signed the Second Amendment.  Da184 ¶13.  She erroneously believed that [...] satisfied the ROFR simply by asking [...] if it wanted to purchase the Premises in 2021, before [...] had ever received an offer.  Da195-196, ¶70, 72.  This is not how the ROFR in the MFSA operated.
[brief] ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(b).  Congress also found that “[m]eans other than misrepresentation or other abusive debt collection practices are available for the effective collection of debts.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(c).  After making those findings, Congress expressed three distinct purposes for adopting the FDCPA.  The first purpose is “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).  The second purpose is “to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged. ”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).  Thus, Congress believed that enforcing the FDCPA would prevent law-abiding collectors from feeling the need to engage in prohibited practices to remain competitive.  The third purpose, which is not involved here, is “to promote consistent ³
[brief] If it’s plainly audible as detected more than 50 feet from the property line.  The plaintiffs did submit quite a few police reports as to this, none of which by the way, -- A summons has never been issued.  THE COURT:  That’s like almost the back of the courtroom maybe.  That’s maybe from me to the back of the courtroom is about 50 to 60 feet. …  THE COURT:  So I’m in the courtroom, right, I don’t use a microphone, right?  I know for sure that somebody in the back of the courtroom can hear me.  So the only difference between me being in my courtroom is me being at, I don’t know, one of the restaurants in [...].  I get a summons because somebody that far can hear me, when it would be expected for me to conduct myself that people can hear me in the courtroom?  THE COURT:  But this is 50 feet, right?  [...]:  50 feet from the property line.  So that gives a few more feet.  And a difference was drawn because [...] is much more dense in terms of residences.  THE COURT:  I don’t know.  So if your table, or the person is right within the property line, that’s like an example of in the courtroom, right?  Say my desk is the property line and I’m sitting, I don’t know, right before the property line.  And from where I am to where [the portrait of] [...] is at the wall, is probably a little over 50 feet.  I would estimate he’s probably about 60 feet.  I did it, the 10 –  THE COURT:  If Judy goes into the back of the courtroom -- [...], go to the back of the courtroom where [...] is.  How are you doing today, [...]?  THE OFFICER: I can hear you.  THE COURT:  I didn’t even talk loud that time.  Sometimes I’m loud.  I wasn’t even loud that time.  [2T56-14 through 2T60-10.]
[brief] On this score, New Jersey follows *Arizona v. Youngblood*, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), which imposes a bad faith standard for establishing a due process violation with regard to potentially exculpatory destroyed evidence.  See *State v. Marshall*, 123 N.J. at 109-110; *State v. Dreher*, 302 N.J. Super. 408, 482-483 (App. Div. 1997); *State v. Hollander*, 201 N.J. Super. at 479.  In particular, Courts must consider: (1) the bad faith or connivance by the government; (2) whether the evidence was sufficiently material to the defense; and (3) whether the defendant was prejudiced.  *Dreher*, 302 N.J. Super. at 483; *Hollander*, 201 N.J. Super. at 479.
[brief] Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67 (1954)  .........................5  Khutorsky v. Macy’s, Inc., 2013 WL 163301 UNPUB.  (App. Div. Jan. 16, 2013)  ..6  Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436 (2007)  ....................4  Lokar v. Church of the Sacred Heart, Mount Ephraim, 24 N.J. 549 (1957) ......6, 10 McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272 (1963) ..................................................9  Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem’l Hosp., 109 N.J. 523 (1988) .................................5  Teneian v. Meghrigan, 15 N.J. 267 (1954)  ........................................................................9  Wang v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125 N.J. 2 (1991)  .....................................................................5  Zentz v. Toop, 92 N.J. Super. 105, (App. Div. 1966), affd., 50 N.J. 250 (1967) ......8
[brief] (Pa116)  [...], as the Supervisor of the Pension Certifying Officer, determined the Petitioner was an employee of the Township entitled to be enrolled in PERS in 2015 (Pa116) and again in 2018 (Pa116).  [...] testified it was the Municipal Court and not the Petitioner who finds a replacement the few times she has called out sick or taken a vacation.  (T193-11)  [...] did not have any knowledge of anyone else in Petitioner’s Law Firm assisting her in performing her municipal prosecutorial duties.  (T193-16)  [...] testified that Petitioner’s hours of work and length of Court sessions are determined by the Administrative Offices of the Courts and the Municipal Court and not the Petitioner.  (T193-22)  [...] testified that he did not know if the Township contacts Petitioner outside of Court sessions on a regular basis.  (T194-3)  [...] also testified Petitioner does all municipal prosecuting on the premises except during the Pandemic.  (T194-7)  [...] testified that since the Court has gone back to in person appearances, Petitioner is required to appear in person.  (T194-14)  [...] acknowledged that it is the Municipal Court Judge and the Court Administrator that set the order and sequence of the Petitioner’s work and duties.  (T195-9)  [...] testified the Petitioner is given a conference room next to the Municipal Court to utilize as the prosecutor’s office and she can use the copier and general office equipment when she is on the premises.  (T195-24)  [...] did not know how the Court would contact Petitioner when Court is not in session.  (T196-18)  [...] was unaware of the difference in duties and responsibilities between the special DWI prosecutor and the Petitioner.  (T197-19)  Despite earlier testimony that all employees are required to submit timecards or timesheets, [...] confirmed that both the Municipal Court Judge and the Township Business Administrator, who are salaried employees like Petitioner, do not have to do so.  (T198-10)  Despite earlier testimony, [...] clarified that as far as people submitting timesheets, he was only aware of 3 out of 80 employees in the entire Township who did so.  (T199-2)  [...] acknowledged that Petitioner was not required to be part of the RFP process from 2015 to the present.  (T199-22)  [...] does not know if the Petitioner incurs any business or travel expenses as the municipal prosecutor to begin with.  (T201-8)  Despite earlier testimony about training, [...] was not aware that the Petitioner had to undergo scheduled municipal court security training.  (T201-21)  LEGAL ARGUMENT I.
[brief] A first amended complaint was filed on July 19, 2021.  Plaintiff filed the pending motion to file the Second Amended Complaint on October 7, 2021, and Counts 15, 16 and 17 are directed to defendant [...].  Fiberville Estate’s motion invoking Rule 4:6-2(e), yet effectively seeking summary judgment by using extensive extraneous materials, was an impermissible attempt to maneuver a “trial by papers,” and should have been denied out of hand.