ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] First, Appellant argues that the case at hand is identical to the case [...] v. [...], No. A-4350-08T3, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1291 (App. Div. June 14, 2010), an unpublished opinion which is not attached to Appellant’s brief or supplied to Respondent in violation of R. 1:36-3.  He alleges this case proves that he in fact has standing because he cherry picks a line from the opinion stating the court rejects the standing argument.  However, the facts and context in [...] v. [...] are not similar to this case.  Appellant’s misinterpretation here calls into question whether he actually understands the issues he is raising in this present suit.  In *[...] v. [...]*, plaintiff, [...], is a receptionist at an auto service center that had possession of a 2001 Chrysler Sebring that was abandoned at the shop.  [...] sells the car to [...] conditioned on the actual owner not coming back to redeem the car.  [...] sells this 2001 Sebring and a 1997 Sebring to [...] for $500 each.  [...] takes the cars into his possession.  A few days later, [...] asks for the 2001 Sebring back and [...] offered to return it for his money back.  However, [...] contends [...] never actually paid for the cars.  In response, [...] produces a check he made out to [...] as proof of payment, but this check he presented noted it was for an entirely different car.  [...] then argued that [...] lacked “standing to sue in her own name because she was representing an auto body shop that she did not own”.  *Id.* at *2* (emphasis added).  The court in *[...] v. [...]*, rejected [...]’s standing argument because [...]’s own physical proof is written out to [...] personally, not the auto body shop, giving her standing to pursue the complaint.  As the court notes, “[w]hatever arrangement [...] had with the shop owner to collect payments is between her and the owner. ”  *Id.* at *3*.  By citing this case, it is clear that Appellant is confused about the issues raised in this present case.
[brief] 1T62:21-25; 2T44:9-11, 84:8-10.  [...], [...] and plaintiff (but not [...]) all lived in a house in [...] that [...] rented for the business as well,\(^4\) as [...] insisted that plaintiff live in [...] despite the fact that her principal residence was \(^4\)  The total monthly rent was $6,500 payable to the landlord, [...].
[brief] [...] ruled that the Board’s refusal to consent to negotiations with, potentially, the entire Association violated the Act, and simultaneously found that the Association did not commit an unfair practice by demanding to hold open negotiations and refusing to negotiate with the Board absent the presence of its entire membership.  However, the Act states that “[r]epresentatives designated or selected by public employees for the purposes of collective negotiation…shall be the exclusive representatives for collective negotiation [emphasis added]…”  Notwithstanding this requirement, the Association seeks to avoid the Act’s “exclusive representation” provision by simply labeling all of its rank-and-file members, collectively, as its “Bargaining Council. ”  To accept such a disingenuous representation would effectively make the Act’s “exclusive representation” provision meaningless.  Put simply, any union could simply label their collective membership as some type of “committee” or “council” (such as here, the “Bargaining Council”) in order to usurp the Act’s requirements.  [...]’s acceptance of the Association’s argument that employee organizations can simply identify every single member in the organization as a “representative” contradicts the clear statutory requirement that a party must choose a representative of its membership to act on its behalf for negotiation purposes.  [...]’s holding not only violates the legislative requirements set forth in the Act, but, if permitted to stand, would lead to the absurd result that government agencies throughout the State could be required to negotiate with an association’s entire membership (some of which consist of tens of thousands of members) at the employee organization’s sole demand.
[brief] ARGUMENT  A.  This Court Must Review The Grant Of Summary Judgment DE NOVO, Accord No Deference To The Trial Court’s Conclusions, Resolve All Factual Disputes In Appellant’s Favor, And Give Appellant The Benefit Of All Favorable Inferences.  This Court reviews a lower court’s holding on a Motion for Summary Judgment de novo.  Hitesman v. Bridgeway, 218 N.J. 8, 26(2014).  Accordingly, “[a] trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. ”  *Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. Of Manalapan*, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).  Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue of material fact challenged and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ”  R. 4:46-2.  Thus, a reviewing court must determine whether “the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ”  *Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).  Notably, “summary judgment is rarely appropriate” in “[e]mployment discrimination cases,” because the paramount question of why an employer took an adverse employment action against a plaintiff ‘is clearly a factual question.
[brief] Even if there was “inquiry” notice, no one has stated what that inquiry should have been, or shown that Defendants did not conduct a diligent inquiry.  Even if Defendants were somehow the first people to notice a 1.3’ discrepancy between an old tax map, old deeds and the modern, approved and recorded subdivision, they actually conducted the gold standard of inquiry on the issue of the size and location of boundaries—THEY OBTAINED A SURVEY FOR THIS VERY TRANSACTION.  Their survey confirmed their lot was 66.3’ wide.  Is it so very hard to accept that the four deeds and the subdivision were correct, and the old deeds and tax maps were perhaps off by 1.3’ over 185’ (less than 1%), given modern advances in surveying and geolocation?
[brief] [DA348]  .........................  21  A.  The Board Improperly Evaluated the Public Interest at Stake .............  22  B.  The Board Improperly Evaluated the Detrimental Effects that Would Arise if the Project Were Approved ........................................  25  C.  The Board Failed to Consider Reasonable Conditions ......................... 35  D.  Because the Board Improperly Evaluated the Public Interest at Stake, Unreasonably Considered Detriments That Were Not Substantial and Did Not Impose any Conditions, the Board’s Balancing Analysis was Flawed from Inception .................. 39
[brief] *McQueen*, ESX-L-1439-22, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 640, at *9-11.  [...] went on to say:  The NJCFLA requires a “consumer lender” to obtain a license and defines a “consumer lender” as (in relevant part) a person who should be licensed to engage in the “consumer loan business”.  . . .  The Court must interpret and apply statutory text according to the plain, ordinary meaning of its terms.  It must also construe such text in the context of relevant definitions or other provisions of the statute examined in their entirety.  It is required to interpret in a manner that is consonant with the statutory purpose and that does not produce an absurd or nonsensical result.  . . . .  [A]s the statute and licensing requirement apply to original credit card issuers, there is ample reason to suppose that the Legislature intended to include purchasers of credit card accounts within the scope of a provision — the second sentence — that brings within its reach the purchasers of consumer loans.  *McQueen*, ESX-L-1439-22, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 640, at *11-14.  As shown by the litany of cases above, courts in this state have generally reasoned (completely aside from the private right of action) that attempting to collect a debt made void by mechanism of the NJCFLA constitutes a violation of the FDCPA, especially at the pleadings stage.
[brief] THE BOARD’S DENIAL OF ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS IS REASONABLE AND SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.  Judicial “review of administrative agency action is limited.  ‘An administrative agency’s final quasi-judicial decision will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record. ’”  Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (quotation omitted).  Courts defer to agencies’ “expertise and superior knowledge . . . in their specialized fields. ”  Hemsey v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Fireman’s Ret. Sys., 198 N.J. 215, 223 (2009) (quotation omitted).  Courts also afford “a ‘strong presumption of reasonableness’ to an administrative agency’s exercise of its statutorily delegated responsibilities. ”  Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014) (quotation omitted).  “A reviewing court ‘may not substitute its own judgment for the agency’s, even though the court might have reached a different result. ’”  In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (quotation omitted).
[brief] STATEMENT OF FACTS  On Saturday, August 4, 2018, at approximately 11:45 a.m., [...] was driving her 2016 Honda CR-V EXL, southbound on Cape May County Route 657, near mile marker 7.5.  Pa429.  County Route 657 is a two-lane road which is divided by a single dotted white line, with a 50-m.p.h. speed limit.  Pa458.  The sky was overcast.  Pa431.  The road was flat and mostly straight with occasional slight curves.  Ibid.  An eyewitness driving behind the CR-V noticed the CR-V was drifting back and forth within the lane for about five minutes before the collision.  Pa463 at 11:04-11.  The CR-V was traveling between 47 and 50 m.p.h. as it approached mile post 7.5 on a straightaway.  Pa458; Pa479.  The road was clearly marked and without obstructions.  Pa431; Pa458.  The CR-V started a slight leftward drift towards the dotted center line of the road.  Pa463 at 13:11 – 14:05; Pa471 at 11:18 – 13:03.  The CR-V continued its “drift” across the center line, directly into oncoming traffic.  *Ibid.*  A pickup truck coming northward swerved onto the shoulder to avoid the CR-V.  Pa464 at 15:25 – 16:08.  The car traveling behind the pickup truck, a Ford Escape driven by [...], swerved but could not avoid being struck head-on.  Pa431; Pa464 at 16:02-08.  The collision killed the CR-V driver, [...].  Pa429-30.  [...] was severely injured and succumbed to her injuries fifty-seven days later.  Pa430; Pa565.  The crash data from the CR-V revealed that for the five (5) seconds immediately prior to the crash, the steering torque exerted on the CR-V was zero (0), i.e., there was no measurable steering input.  Pa128; Pa479.  The crash data confirmed that turn signals were not engaged and the brake pedal was not depressed.  Pa128; Pa479.  The witnesses to the collision also did not observe any braking or attempt to steer back to the proper lane.  Pa430-31.  Defendant [...] had developed Lane Departure Warning (LDW) and Lane Keep Assist systems (LKAS) prior to 2016.
[brief] This remedy would be justified based upon the defense position that nothing further was necessary by way of discovery beyond a newly named expert and the defense failure to recognize the disclosure document as an alternate and substantial compliance with the Rules.  Simultaneously, co-counsel filed a supplemental in support of having the court allow additional time to obtain such a report.  (Pa517)  In that letter [...] said:  “We submit this letter as co-counsel for Plaintiffs to supplement [...]’s submissions.  It warrants emphasis that the Court has the discretion, and the right, to consider the prejudice to the parties and the Judiciary attending the procedural dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims.  The preclusion of supplemental reports, or experts (if deemed to be required notwithstanding [...]’ qualifications), causes the Plaintiffs to suffer the loss of patently meritorious claims through no fault of their own.  Thus, as things stand, the Plaintiffs are suffering extreme prejudice.  The Defendant, on the other hand, does not contend that it will be unduly prejudiced by having to defend the claims on the merits.  (A party cannot legitimately contend it has a right to rely upon a procedural deficiency that can be remedied.)  Similarly, the Judicial System has been woefully backed-up and according a finite delay to a long-delayed matter will not cause any harm.  Thus, we ask that Your Honor consider these factors when considering this application for reconsideration. ”  Based on the arguments raised, by demonstrating significant deficiencies in the defense position of the equities involved, the trial judge should have exercised his discretion in allowing the additional time for such a report.  Plaintiffs’ Brief on Reconsideration (Pa516) has the full explanation for such relief.  The trial court’s errors as outlined herein warrants a reversal of the dismissal order.
[brief] Rule 1:6–2 creates “a presumption of the right to oral argument [in] all non-discovery and non-calendar motions in civil cases. ”  Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 5 on R. 1:6–2(d) (2011); See also Raspanini v. Arocho, 364 N.J.Super. 528, 531 (App. Div. 2003).  The fact that the trial court failed to even address the implications of the Baker Property Settlement Agreement on Appellant’s rights under the “Repurchase Agreement” makes it evident that this issue was lost on the court below, and that Appellant was prejudiced by the inability to reinforce this point at oral argument.  Furthermore, in its ruling, the trial court fails to acknowledge that the “Repurchase Agreement” was more than just an agreement giving [...] some potential future right.  The trial court’s order is completely silent as to the implications of rescinding the entirety of the very agreement which effectuated the transfer of [...] from [...] to the Respondents, despite that being precisely what the court did.  As discussed in Appellant’s Brief, rescission is not an appropriate remedy when it cannot (or does not) return the parties to the ground upon which they originally stood.  Db44.  This is but one of many cases in which Respondents’ language (here, referring to a stock sale agreement which contained a repurchase option as simply a “Repurchase Agreement”) contributed to a misunderstanding of the true nature of the Respondents’ claims before the trial court and the fashioning of erroneous relief by that court.  It can be reasonably concluded that the court could have reached a different conclusion had the parties been permitted to argue their respective positions orally.  The court placed no findings on the record to establish that oral argument was not necessary when granting Respondents’ motion for summary judgment on the rescission count, despite a clear mandate to do so.  See Raspantini.  II.
[brief] ”  Gourdine, 2006 WL 2346278 at 2.  The Gourdine court stated, to the extent the plaintiffs sought to enforce a contractual right against the defendants which included a “reservation of rights”, “[t]he question of their rights to recover damages, then, as in Beukas, rests on defendants' reasons for the decision to alter or close the program and the manner in which it was accomplished. ”  Id. at *4.  There, the court reviewed opposing certifications to determine whether the proffered financial reasons for the closing of the program were valid, and determined the reasons provided were valid, and determined the facts were “one-sided. ”  Id.  Here, the court made no such evaluation of the reason related to the decision to alter the GPA requirement or the opt-in period.
[brief] The complaint alleges that [...] and its professionals referred patients insured by Plaintiffs to certain of the other defendants for pain-management and surgical procedures.  Pa0087 (Compl. ¶ 385).  Those defendants, who simultaneously owned, or were associated with, sizable independent medical practices, consulted with the patients at [...]’s offices and acted contrary to their own economic interests by allowing [...] to bill for and profit from those consultations and services instead of billing for them directly.  See Pa0087-0088, Pa0089, Pa0094 (Compl. ¶¶ 385, 388, 393, 409, 423).  To make up for that lost revenue, those defendants also recommended that the patients undergo procedures at an outpatient facility that they owned, and during the procedures, anesthesia was provided by professionals who worked for entities owned or controlled by those defendants.  Pa0087 (Compl. ¶¶ 386-387).  Thus, the recipients of referrals from [...] illegally split their fees with the referring defendants in exchange for the opportunity to treat [...] patients.  Plaintiffs attached an exhibit to the complaint detailing the claims for insurance benefits that violated the anti-kickback and self-referral laws.  See Pa0087, Pa0145-0149 (Compl. ¶ 384 & Ex. B).  The body of the complaint discusses specific examples of the unlawful conduct.  See Pa0088-0097 (Compl. ¶¶ 393-439).  Plaintiffs allege that Defendants submitted claims for insurance reimbursement that falsely represented that their services were eligible for payment, and that they concealed and failed to disclose that the services were not eligible due to kickbacks and self-referrals.  See Pa0109-0111 (Compl. ¶¶ 484-489).  Regarding the alleged kickbacks and self-referrals, the complaint seeks: (1) a declaratory judgment that [...]’s receipt of kickbacks for referrals violated New Jersey Board of Chiropractic Examiners regulations, Pa0099 (Compl. ¶¶ 451-455); (2) a declaratory judgment that other defendants violated New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners regulations by paying the kickbacks, Pa0101-0102 (Compl. ¶¶ 456-461); (3) a declaratory judgment that Defendants violated the Codey Act by referring, causing the referral of, or conspiring with, aiding and abetting, or urging each other, to refer patients for pain-management, anesthesia, and other procedures at or by entities controlled by some of the defendants, Pa0102-0105 (Compl. ¶¶ 462-474); (4) a declaratory judgment and disgorgement of the PIP benefits that Plaintiffs paid to Defendants due to unjust enrichment based on the alleged kickbacks and self-referrals, Pa0106-0107 (Compl. ¶¶ 475-483); and (5) compensatory and treble damages, investigation costs, and attorneys’ fees under the IFPA for false and misleading benefit claims, Pa0109-0112 (Compl. ¶¶ 484-492).
[brief] 1  The Procedural History and Statement of Facts are being combined for the convenience of the Court and all parties as they are so closely interwoven.  2  "Da" refers to Defendant's Appendix attached hereto in support of defendant's appeal.  3  [...], J.S.C., presided over defendant’s R. 3:21-10(b)(7) motion, which defendant filed in his NERA case on another indictment and these indictments were included for resentencing but were later removed and separated due to defendant’s counsel failing to provided the court with the sentencing transcripts of these convictions – thus this motion had to be refiled at a later date - in the previous matter Judge Paone DID GRANT defendant a two year reduction of that NERA sentence and that sentence was legal as well.
[brief] See, e.g., Johnson v. Gerresheimer Glass Inc., No. 21-CV-4079, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5984, 2022 WL 117768, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2022); see also Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 132 ("There is no public policy more important [*5] or more fundamental than the one favoring the effective protection of the lives and property of citizens.").  The Court further finds the facts alleged by Plaintiff fit within the parameters set by the Illinois Supreme Court.
[brief] However, even assuming the timing of the request mattered to the degree defendant contends, this Court should still deny his argument because the trial court properly found the delay in this case was not unreasonable due to the procedural history of the case.  Defendant was indicted on November 8, 2021.  (Da1 to 2; Da15; 2T9-7 to 8).  Defendant [...] filed a Motion to Suppress on February 28, 2022.  (Da15).  Defendant joined on March 5, 2022.  Ibid.  The trial court denied the Motion to Suppress on August 23, 2022.  (Da13 to 40).  However, if it had been granted, it would have negated the need for DNA testing.  Thereafter, one of the defendants sought a Graves waiver and if that co-defendant had accepted the plea, it would have negated the need for DNA testing; however, the co-defendant ultimately rejected the plea.  While that was pending, on November 10, 2022, the State notified counsel that it intended to seek DNA testing of the firearm to see if there was comparable DNA.  (2T9-20 to 23).  On January 12, 2023, only after determining comparative DNA existed, did the State seek to compel buccal swabs.  (Da41 to 57).  The State was not idly sitting on its hands, but rather was actively litigating the matter.  Thus, although the length of time between the incident and indictment and the motion to compel was lengthy, it was not unreasonable.  Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the State’s motion to compel a buccal swab.
[brief] Here, the Vermont Trial Court held [...] liable to pay sums of money to the [...] under Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 27A, § 4-117(a), which provides:  “A declarant, association, unit owner, or any other person subject to this title may bring an action to enforce a right granted or obligation imposed by this title, the declaration, or the bylaws.  The court may award reasonable attorney fees and costs. ”  Under this statute, “no showing of bad faith or deliberate misconduct . . . is required” to recover attorneys’ fees.
[brief] 2T27-11-13; 2T25-17-24.  Humans do not typically suffer injury from their daily inhalation or ingestion of mold and mycotoxins because the dosage is insufficient to cause injury.  2T27-14 to 2T28-4.  [...] used a well-accepted scientific methodology to evaluate whether [...] was injured by ingesting food contaminated by indoor-growing mold: an exposure pathway analysis.