ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] B.  Defendant [...]’s Interests Were Never Aligned with the [...]’s Interest, and Defendant [...] Specifically Requested Indemnification  Defendant’s interests were never aligned with the [...]’s interests, and he should have been represented by separate counsel provided by the District to represent his own separate interests.  [...] was told as much by the [...]’s attorney, when she stated outright to Mr. [...] that neither prior counsel for the [...] nor their firm represented him personally.  (Da126).  They told him that he was free to hire his own attorney and declined to provide him with representation.  (Ibid.).  His interests were not represented by the [...]’s counsel, and it was reasonable for Mr. [...] to request indemnification and independent representation, given that he was being individually targeted by the [...] for sanctions.  He was being asked to turn over his private communications to a public entity, and the [...] would have this Court believe that it was unreasonable for Mr. [...] to believe that his interests were not being protected and that he had to expend resources on his own behalf.
[brief] The Plain Language And Structure Of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 Make Clear That Subsection (a)(5) Bars Only Defendants Who Seek Admission To Recovery Court On A Firearms Conviction Or Who Have A Separate Pending Firearms Charge.  A proper interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(5) requires an examination of both the plain language of subsection (a)(5) as well as the structure of all the provisions in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 that govern Recovery Court eligibility.  “The Legislature’s intent is the paramount goal when interpreting a statute and, generally, the best indicator of that intent is the statutory language. ”  DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005).  A court must read words and provisions “in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.
[brief] For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff/Respondents respectfully request that the Trial Court’s Order of Judgment be affirmed and enforced against Appellant.  Respectfully submitted, [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent BY: ____________________________  [...]  Attorney I.D.: 028621986  DATED: November 20, 2023  REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, [...] OF COUNSEL & ON THE BRIEF: [...], Esquire (#037772003)  [...], Esquire (#117042014)  [...]  136 Franklin Corner Road, Unit B2 Lawrenceville, New Jersey  08648 [...]  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] The "MRA research data" are undisclosed.  During colloquy, the applicant claimed that the firm routinely touts this local research in Lakewood applications.  [...]:  14 peak hour trips, I mean, that's, that's not, that's not, it's way more than 14 to 18, respectfully, of that peak hour trips.  [...]:  It's the same numbers that are used on every traffic report that [...] submit, which they submit a majority of them as consistent with traffic counts that they've done . . .  2T19-19 to 2T20-2.  No one from [...] appeared before the Board to defend the research.  [...], the Board Chairman, observed that the proposed subdivision would intersect with a particularly narrow and congested area of Fourteenth Street.
[brief] **STANDARD OF REVIEW**  This Court reviews an appeal from a trial de novo for “sufficient credible evidence in the record to have led to the judge's findings. ”  *State v. Avena*, 281 N.J. Super. 327, 333 (App. Div. 1995) (citing *State v. Johnson*, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964). )  When this Court finds that the trial court’s decision was clearly “mistaken and so plainly unwarranted … the interests of justice demand intervention and correction … then, and only then, it should appraise the record as if it were deciding the matter at inception and make its own findings and conclusions. ”  *Id.*  This Court also reviews legal questions de novo.  *State v. Hemenway*, 239 N.J. 111, 125 (2019)(explaining no deference owed to the lower court’s decision on an issue of law).  In this matter, the de novo court violated [...]’s constitutional rights by exceeding the scope of review under the Court Rule for a trial de novo.
[brief] (Pa2129-2176.)  The CCIP Contract defines “Excluded Parties” to include:  “e.  Any other party or entity not specifically identified herein, that is excluded by [...] [] in its sole discretion, even if such party or entity is otherwise eligible. ”  (Italics added.)  (Pa2131.)  Further, Section 4.0 INSURANCE COVERAGE of the CCIP Manual provides for “4.2 Parties Not Covered” as follows:  Subcontractors of any tier who will not be included in participation in the CCIP (Nonparticipating Subcontractors) shall include all vendors, suppliers, truckers, material dealers, any contractors performing abatement or otherwise working with hazardous materials, and delivery services companies, regardless of contract size.  Nonparticipating Subcontractors shall not be permitted to work on the Project until they have provided to the Program Administrator (on behalf of [...] Building Corp.) the insurance certificate(s) and endorsement(s) as required in the Contract.  [...] Building Corp. has the right to include or exclude ANY SUBCONTRACTOR of ANY tier from participating in the CCIP at their sole discretion.  Consequently, [...] submitted a second proposal, Proposal 106846 ("Proposal Two"), on July 21, 2015, with a total estimate of $22,200, a lower amount than Proposal One based on [...]’s anticipation - at the time - that it would be enrolled in the CCIP.
[brief] \footnote{Petak v. City of Paterson, 291 N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 1996)("Because the Borough's accountability to the plaintiff is based on contract, the Borough is not immunized from liability for its failure to comply with the statutory mandates contract – i.e., delivery of potable water - fits the basis for breach of contract damages. \(^{80}\)  Were plaintiff to couch their claim as a tort subject to the TCA, that claim would fail because of the economic loss doctrine.
[brief] .................................................  31 Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169 (2003) .................................................................46  Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, 45 N.J. 268 (1965) ..............................................29  Lang v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 160 N.J. 41 (1999) .....................................28  Lavin v. Board of Educ. of City of Hackensack, 90 N.J. 145 (1982) ............... 46, 47 Litton Industries v. IMO Industries, 200 N.J. 372 (2009)
[brief] 457 N.J. Super. 34, 51 (App. Div. 2018).  The trial in that case was exceptionally complex, as it “went on for approximately six weeks” and “included close to two hundred exhibits, seven experts, numerous witnesses, and playback of prior witness statements. ”  *Ibid.*  A jury note said that it did not believe viewing a critical video again would “change anyone’s mind,” but never predicted further deliberations would not be fruitful.  *Ibid.*  If *Harris* was a “close question,” this case is not.
[brief] Next, [...] argues that its POA did comply with the Standard Specifications and provided sufficient indicia of the surety’s undertaking to deliver the Contract Bond at the time of execution.  To support its argument, [...] submits an after the fact and self-serving letter from the surety’s in-house attorney belatedly expressing the position that the company authorized execution of the Consent of Surety.  The answer to this argument, however, is textually driven by reference to the Standard Specification and the terms of [...]’s bid.
[brief] The court described the circumstances of its rejection of the plea bargain between the State and [...], stating that he had come to realize at [...]'s sentencing “how ... little regard [[...]] had for the rights and safety of others,” and that whenever he was released from prison, he would be “an instant danger to society. ”  The court then stated:  [Defendant is] not much better, and just the attitude I'm seeing here in court today with the way he's just smirking and everything, like this is a joke, really a joke, a walk in the park—  *4  Defendant interrupted the court, and said: “It's funny. ”  After hearing this comment, the court tentatively concluded that the plea bargain should not be accepted:  I just don't know that 16 do 85 is enough for a guy like this or a guy like Basim [...].
[brief] ......................... Pa0001  Respondent’s Civil Case Information Statement ...................... Pa0005 (H)  Unpublished Opinions: Lott v. Borough of Roselle, A-1123-19T4, 2020 WL 7688039 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 28, 2020)  ..................................................Pa2295  Awonusi v. Yaboh, A-3023-18T1, 2020 WL 1062395 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. March 5, 2020)  ..............................................................,;,,,Pa2304 (I)  Other parts of the record (see, R. 2:5-4(a)) essential to proper consideration of the issues:  P1a  March 1997  Deed .................................................................Pa0009 P4  Refund payment from [...] mortgage ........................................ Pa0014 P7  Tenant’s rent checks ..............................................................Pa0019 P10  Eviction action against tenant in 2009 .....................................Pa0041 P11  Bank statements with expenses paid .......................................Pa0045 P12  Payment made for repair person ..........................................Pa0473 P14  Homeowner insurance ..........................................................Pa0474 P15  Online tax payment ..............................................................Pa0505 P16  Defendants’ documentary production ....................................Pa0506 P20  Probate petition ...................................................................Pa0799 P26  Checks for 2020 CC transfer ..................................................Pa0820 P39  [...]’s decision regarding Brooklyn property .......... Pa0837 P40  Defendant’s [...] bank accounts .............................................. Pa0843 P44a  [...]’s trusts .................................................................. Pa1958 P44b  [...] .............................................................. Pa2213 P44c  [...]’s signatures over years .............................................. Pa2234 P51  Affidavit from [...] custodian ......................................................... Pa2268 D13  2019 deed and related docs signed produced by defendants ..... Pa2270 D17  [...]’s death certificate ....................................................... Pa2292  Consent Order entered on 12/18/2020 .............................................Pa2293  ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] Here, defendant’s argument that “the de novo court sought evidence of the police report that was not part of the evidentiary record in municipal court” (Db 18) is negated by the record.  Indeed, the record is clear that the specific report defendant takes issue with was never asked for by [...], nor did defendant submit any support for his argument that it was provided to [...] (see Da 43).  As the email indicates, it was the court clerk, and not [...], who asked, “I was reviewing transcripts and saw there was a S-1 Police Report and a S-1 link of [...] Video and D-1 link of [...] video.  Do you happen to have those to share? (Da 43-44).  When the clerk further stated that the municipal court said they did not have to provide the information, defense counsel’s response was to cite the court rule for the transfer of information from the municipal court to the law division – Rule 3:28-4(a).  Defense counsel also informed her that “as far as exhibits, no report was admitted into evidence, although it may have been marked for identification...I’ll have to check the transcript...if you have any further questions, feel free to contact me...[...]. ”  (Da 43).  Since defendant takes particular issue with this request, it can be assumed that the defense never sent the report.  The State can submit, without hesitation, that it never sent the report to the court.  [...] also specifically told defendant, during oral argument when defense counsel actually tried to argue what was in the police report that since it was not introduced into evidence, the court could not consider any information therein.
[brief] N.J.S.A. 59:2-1(a) specifically sets forth the re-establishment of governmental immunity by providing that: (e)xcept as otherwise provided by this act, a public entity is not liable for any such injury arising out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.  A limitation on recovery of damages was also incorporated in the New Jersey Tort Claims Act at N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d), which provides as follows:  “No damages shall be awarded against a public entity or public employee for pain and suffering resulting from any injury; provided, however, that this limitation on recovery of damages for pain and suffering shall not apply in cases of “permanent loss of a bodily function, permanent disfigurement or dismemberment for the medical treatment expenses are in excess of $3,600.00.
[brief] Courts exclude net opinion because without a proper factual and technical foundation, the expert’s opinion is speculative and will not aid the trier of fact.  Dawson v. Bunker Hill Plaza Assocs., 289 N.J. Super. 309, 323 (app. Div. 1996).  Here, the trial court heard extensive argument on whether the opinions that plaintiff’s experts offered were based on record evidence applied to generally-accepted standards.  T33:4-60:16.  The trial court then evaluated the evidence regarding the experts’ opinions.  T64:13-68:12.  It noted that plaintiff’s engineering expert did not explain what the engineering standards for his opinion were.  T64:19-65:7.  The trial court therefore ruled that “[t]here is nothing in the record that the Court will be able to look to other than pure speculation on the part of these experts, because nothing is tied to anything other than their opinion. ”  T67:21-:24.  Even if the matter went to trial, the trial court, as the trier of fact in this Chancery action, would be in no better position to reach a different conclusion in the absence of expert testimony that applied a generally-accepted standard to the record facts.  T67:20-68:12.  The record supported the trial court’s ruling.
[brief] (Aa758)  On July 15, 2022, shortly after [...] and [...] filed their respective petitions of appeal, Respondents jointly filed with the Commissioner a verified petition requesting authorization for the referenda expanding [...] to an all-purpose regional school district.  (hereafter, the “July 2022 Referendum Petition”).  The new all-purpose district would include students from [...], when and if [...]’s withdrawal from [...] and [...] was approved by the Commissioner of Education (Aa39-40).  Appellants later cross-moved to consolidate their petitions of appeal with the July 2022 Referendum Petition.
[directive] on  Petition for a Temporary Extreme Risk Protective Order of  There are four types civil petitions for temporary extreme risk protective orders, set as forth Guideline 2 ("Petition for Temporary Extreme Risk Protective Order'').  Specifically, the in of types petitions are as follows:  of (1) a family or household member can file a petition at the Criminal Division the Superior Court, except for a petition against a law enforcement officer respondent, which must be filed as noted (4) below, or may request a petition at a law enforcement agency in for filing with the court; (2) a law enforcement officer petitioner may file a petition with the court; (3) other persons who are neither family or household members nor law enforcement officers may request at a law enforcement agency that a law enforcement officer file a petition with the court; and (4) a petition against a law enforcement officer respondent must be filed at the law enforcement agency where the respondent officer is employed.
[directive] DEPARTMENT OF Box PO 080 TRENTON, NJ 08625-0080  [...]  Lt. Gouer-no~- DIRECTIVE NO.2018-2  ENFORCEMENT  GENERAL LAW  ATTORNEY Executives Enforcement Chief  All Law TO: General Grewal, Gurbir Attorney FROM: S. 2018 March 20, DATE: Testing Random Drug Mandatory SUBJECT: Statewide I.
[brief] Here, [...] unambiguously asserted his right to counsel when he told police “I’m [sic] got a lawyer coming cause I ain’t do nothing bro,” (Da 45) that he wanted to use his cell phone to “get the number to call this lawyer,” and that he “better get a lawyer. ”  (Da 55)  These assertions of [...]’s right to counsel should have immediately ended any interrogation.  Rather than stop questioning [...], the detectives continued to interrogate him during the booking procedure (See Da 45-63) and then brought him to the interrogation room for further questioning.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE PROVISIONS OF THE APRIL 23, 2022 ORDER.  Defendant-Appellant incorrectly contends that the Trial Court disregarded the terms of the Owner’s Consent Order dated April 23, 2022.  During oral argument on October 13, 2023, the Trial Court specifically addressed the terms of the Consent Order dated April 23, 2023 and considered Defendant-Appellant’s.  The Trial Court correctly determined that “the [...] couldn’t agree” and the decisions regarding the sale of the property “were to be left to [...]’s best judgment. ”  Tr. 32:1-21.  The January 13, 2023 Order was entered to allow for the Property to be sold and inherently did not require [...] to obtain unanimous consent from the Owners to sell the Property.  It is respectfully requested the Appellate Division consider this argument to be of no moment.  III.
[brief] The issue here is whether the original purchaser of the [...], at the time of that purchase, acquired an implied right to cross over what is now the [...] in order to access the beach.  As Plaintiffs themselves concede, nothing about Lennig involved any implied right to cross over the designated “tenting grounds” in order to access the nearby beach.  Therefore, nothing about *Lennig* can be used to imply that the [...], or any of their predecessors in title, had any implied right to cross over the [...] to reach the beach.  In other words, *Lennig* is exactly a “use” case and not an “access” case, and that distinction makes all the difference here.
[brief] ”  Defense Counsel advised the State that contact had been initiated.  Thereafter, in August 2021, Defense Counsel was advised by the attorney for “[...]” that the profile utilized by [...] Detective [...] to communicate with Defendant could not be located on the “[...]” server.  Defense Counsel advised the State accordingly.  It is clear from the materials submitted by the State that the State never sought to communicate directly with the attorney for “[...]” at any point during the pendency of Defendant’s matter before the Trial Court.  On September 5, 2023, the State again confirmed via email to Defense Counsel that the profile information utilized by [...] Detective [...] was not available.  Accordingly, on September 29, 2023, Defense Counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment.
[brief] Turning to Plaintiffs’ cross-appeal, this Court should not reverse the trial court’s discretionary ruling to deny Plaintiffs’ motion to file an amended complaint to implead [...] and assert malicious prosecution and libel per se claims against him.  Accepting as true all of the evidence in the motion record proffered in support of Plaintiffs’ application, the trial court found that Plaintiffs could not establish essential elements of those claims.  The trial court’s finding that such claims therefore would be futile was neither incorrect nor an abuse of discretion, and should be upheld.
[brief] Again, [...] is in the same office as the in-house process service company.  29.  [...] even picked [...]’s attorney and [...] for the second time, asked him who to use for a lawyer - [...] told him who to use for this lawsuit and [...] did use [...] to represent him as Intervenor in this lawsuit.  [12/6/22, 12:36:07 PM]  ✷: who are you using as a lawyer?  [12/6/22, 12:36:41 PM]  [...]
[brief] (See Da320-321.)  The trial court further held that the immunity afforded by New Jersey Laws of 2020, chapter 18 did not bar the suit because the exceptions to the immunity for “medical services, treatment and procedures that are unrelated to the COVID-19 emergency” and “acts or omissions constituting a crime, actual fraud, actual malice, gross negligence, recklessness, or willful misconduct” applied.  With respect to the first exception, [...] was admitted to [...] for rehabilitation after hip replacement surgery, not for treatment of COVID-19, and plaintiff alleged that [...] did not provide “basic medical care” to [...], leading to his death from exposure to COVID-19 while in a deteriorated condition.
[brief] On August 11, 2017, [...] was charged under Lawrence Ticket [...] with a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.  Da1.  She pled guilty to the offense on February 21, 2018 in the [...].  [...] filed a petition for post conviction relief in the matter on July 8, 2022 seeking to vacate her plea on grounds that at the time of her plea [...] received ineffective assistance of counsel.  Da2-5.  The petition for post conviction relief was heard before the Honorable [...], J.M.C., on November 14, 2022, however was ultimately denied for the reasons set forth on the record.  2T 28:10-21; 29:14-25; 30:1-1-25; 31:1-25; and 32:1-16.  Da6.  [...] filed Notice of Appeal to the Mercer County Law Division on December 5, 2022.  Da7-10.  The appeal was heard before the Honorable Judge [...], J.S.C., on November 29, 2023, whereby the denial of post conviction relief was affirmed.  Da11-26.  This appeal to the New Jersey Appellate Division follows.
[brief] Five days later, on March 14, 2020, in a statewide Notice to the Bar, the Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court, [...], and the Honorable [...], Acting Administrative Director of the trial judges, temporarily suspended all Landlord-Tenant calendars (Da149).  On March 16, 2020, one week after declaring a state of emergency, [...] issued Executive Order No. 104, providing in pertinent part, that because “gyms . . . are . . . locations where large numbers of individuals gather in close proximity,” and “suspending operations at these businesses is part of the State’s mitigation strategy to combat COVID-19 . . .  Gyms and fitness centers and classes” would be closed to the public for “as long as this Order remains in effect” (the “Gym Closure”) (Da110-Da118).  Between April and August 2020, while the statewide Gym Closure was in effect,\(^6\) Tenant did not make monthly rent payments to Landlord.  All loans Tenant received from the federal government under the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) went to fund payroll for Tenant’s employees (Da171-Da172).  Meanwhile, on June 8, 2020, about three months into the Pandemic, Landlord’s counsel sent Tenant a default notice for failing to pay rent in April, May, and June (Da162-Da166).  The letter made no reference to the fact that Landlord was itself already in breach of the Lease for never having made the $36,500 interest payment on Tenant’s Allowance that Landlord owed Tenant under § 4.02 of the Lease since August 1, 2019 (Da169;1T14-24 to 1T15-4).  **III.  Landlord sues Tenant for possession of the Premises**  On July 14, 2020, Chief Justice Rabner issued an order permitting new Landlord-Tenant complaints to be filed but continued the suspension of Landlord-Tenant trials (Da150-Da161).  --- \(^6\)  On June 26, 2020, Executive Order No. 157 continued the ban on indoor fitness centers, but permitted gyms to “open their outdoor spaces to the public” (Da119-Da138).  There is no evidence Tenants’ facility was equipped for this.  On July 22, 2020, Landlord filed the Complaint, alleging that Tenant owed $121,051.47 in unpaid rent plus interest and other charges collectible as additional rent in unpaid rent plus late fees, legal fees, and interest (Da94-Da95).