ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] On December 12, 2022 Plaintiff-Appellant filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs (Pa1) requesting the Court find Chesterfield Ordinance 2022-15 (Pa16) and Ordinance 2022-17 (Pa46) to be arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, to invalidate Ordinance 2022-15 (Pa16) and Ordinance 2022-17 (Pa46), and invalidate the Redevelopment Plan of [...].  On December 21, 2022, [...] (hereinafter “[...]”) filed a Motion to Intervene which the Trial Court granted in an Order dated January 11, 2023.  (Pa68-Pa70).  On December 30, 2022, Defendant-Respondent [...] and Township Committee of the [...] filed their Answer to the Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs.  (Da1).  On January 12, 2023 Defendant-Intervenor [...] filed its Answer to the Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs.  (Da13).  On January 24, 2023, the Board filed its Answer to the Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs.  (Da23).  On March 20, 2023, Plaintiff-Appellant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking judgment in its favor.  (Pa71).  On April 14, 2023, Defendant-Intervenor [...] filed its opposition Plaintiff-Appellant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking judgment in their favor and dismissing Plaintiff-Appellant’s Complaint.  (Da32).  On May 15, 2023, the Court entered an Order granting Defendant-Intervenor [...]’s cross motion for summary judgment, denying Plaintiff-Appellant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing Plaintiff-Appellant’s Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writ with prejudice.  (Pa636).  On that same date, the Court placed its decision on the record.  Plaintiff-Appellant filed a notice to appeal to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, on June 21, 2020.  (Pa535).
[brief] Campbell v. Dep’t. of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963) .........................20  DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 517 (2008)  ..............................................42  Feldman v. Town of Irvington Fire Dep’t, 162 N.J. Super 177, 182 (App. Div. 1978) ...........................................................................................................37  Hake v. Manchester Tp., 98 N.J. 302, 314 (1985)  ........................................31  Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)  ....................... 20, 43  In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 484 (2007) ..........................................................20  In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28–29 (2007) ............................................. 20, 37, 38  In re Polk, 90 N.J. 550, 578 (1982) ............................................................20  In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194–95 (2011) ...........................................passim Knoble v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 67 N.J. 427, 431–32 (1975).....20 Prince v. Himeji, L.L.C., 214 N.J. 263, 295 (2013) .....................................43
[brief] Why would I let the jury do that?  [...]:  It doesn't matter what you do for a living, you have common knowledge, right, that if it was painted 34 days before, it could cause the staircase to be slippery.  THE COURT:  No, who says that?  I don't know that.  If something is painted 30 days before, wouldn't it dry?  [...]:  No, I'm not saying that it wasn't dry, but depending on the type of paint -- THE COURT: Right, so that's what [...] is saying.  He's saying that there's no expert that shows that using this type of paint or that painting it 30 days in advance contributed to the fall, right?
[brief] The Standards Applicable to OPRA Cases | 3 | | B. OPRA, Privacy, Email Addresses and the Leading New Jersey Supreme Court Privacy Cases | 6 | | Point II | 17 | | The Email Records are “Public Records” | 17 | | Point III | 22 | | The Trial Court’s Award of Counsel Fees Should Be Affirmed | 22 | | Conclusion | 23 | # Table of Authorities ## Cases | Case | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Asbury Park Press v. Monmouth County, | 4 | | 406 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2009), aff’d o.
[brief] For the third time since the Appellate Division remanded this case in 2018, [...] cherry-pick partial statements from the panel’s decision, which taken out of context grossly misstate the panel’s mandate to the Chancery Division to resolve Plaintiffs’ fee applications.  The Wilfs distill the Appellate Division’s holding on this issue into a simple sentence: that “the court erred by finding that all of [...]’s and [...]’s claims rested on a common core of operative facts. ”  (Db34.)  The panel’s ruling, however, said much more than this.  The Appellate Division remanded the trial court’s decision on [...]’s original fee award only on one limited ground: that because the panel had narrowed the RICO limitations period “to the five years before October 1, 2009,” the trial court needed to “re-determine the amount of fees and costs to be awarded to plaintiffs” and “limit its award to the fees and costs reasonably devoted to plaintiffs’ pursuit of their respective RICO claims.
[brief] 34  State Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:34-1 .........................................................................................  31 N.J.S.A. 2A:34-2 .........................................................................................  31  Procedural History  Plaintiff [...], (“Plaintiff”) filed a verified complaint against his wife, Defendant [...] (“Defendant”) seeking an annulment.  Defendant opposed and sought a judgment of divorce.  A1, A5.  The family court heard trial over two days.  The court denied plaintiff’s petition for annulment and entered a June 14, 2024 final judgment of divorce between the parties adjudicating equitable distribution of some marital jewelry and awarding $5,327 in counsel fees to the defendant.  A6.  Plaintiff now appeals.  A8.  Statement of Facts
[brief] The relationship between Plaintiffs and [...] is contractual and is governed by the Customer Release, Assumption of Risk, Waiver of Liability, Arbitration and Indemnification Agreement ("the Agreement") which requires the parties to arbitrate all disputes arising out of the use of the premises or participation in the activities.  The evidence presented to the Trial Court established that on February 2, 2022, as a precondition of entry to [...] in [...] (hereinafter, "Park"), Plaintiff/Appellant, [...], (hereinafter "Plaintiff") executed the Agreement.  In executing the Agreement, Plaintiff agreed that all disputes with [...], arising out of the use of the premises or participation in the activities, are subject to mandatory arbitration before the [...] ("AAA").  While participating in the trampoline activities at the Park on February 2, 2022, Plaintiff was injured.  In contravention of the Agreement, Plaintiffs, [...] and [...], his wife, filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Bergen County.  [...] was not named as a Defendant in Plaintiffs Complaint.  [...] was brought into the litigation, by way of an Amended Complaint, nearly a year later.  [...] immediately sought to enforce the arbitration clause in the Agreement and filed a Cross Motion to Stay the Litigation and Compel Arbitration.  On May 2, 2024, the Honorable [...], J.S.C. correctly granted [...]'s Cross Motion.  On appeal, Plaintiffs reiterate the same legally flawed arguments that were made to the Trial Court that Plaintiff did not have sufficient time to read the Agreement and that the Agreement only applies to Plaintiffs' minor son.  The Trial Court properly rejected these arguments, finding that the Agreement is clear, valid and enforceable.  In so holding, the Trial Court noted that the Agreement was voluntarily signed by the Plaintiff on behalf of himself and his minor son as a precondition of entry to the Park.  Plaintiffs further argue that the Defendants waived any right to arbitration by participating in discovery.
[brief] (See Pa267 – Pa283).  That opinion specifically took the [...] to task for its failure to support these alleged “traffic issues” with any evidence, saying in relevant part:  Clearly, where there are four experts in the field [all put forth by [...]], versus unsupported questioning by a layperson with no apparent expertise, it is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable for the Board to accept the layperson’s suggestions over the scientific testimony and reports of the experts.  ...  The issue of [traffic] ingress and egress was a last-minute attempt to find some reason to deny the application but was not supported by any evidence.  [The [...]’s] decision was based entirely on a last-minute, unsupported colloquy held between [...] and [[...]’s Traffic Engineer] [...].  [T]he Resolution itself only generally refers to the fact that [...] failed to meet its burden without detailing any specifics regarding the actual concerns of ingress and egress.  Absent an ordinance to rely upon, and absent any specific reason why the ingress and egress is dangerous, the Court is left with no alternative but to find that the Board’s decision is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  Essentially, the Board concluded that it is denying the application simply because it says so.
[directive] If the review one incident triggers multiple performance indicators, that incident shall be double- or triple-counted, but shall not instead count as only one performance indicator.  The agency's chief executive may in his or her discretion determine that number of within a lower performance indicators atwelve-month period (i.e., one or two performance will trigger EW System review indicators) the process.  E.  Administration and Tracking shall  The agency's chief executive assign personnel to conduct the EW System function.  Typically, the EW System should be administered by internal the agency's affairs unit. of Supervisory officers subject officer's chain command in the also should be directly involved in any System review EW process.  Every shall tracking system department adopt a to enable the department to identify officers of who display the requisite number performance indicators necessary EW to trigger the System review in New process.
[brief] [...]’s conviction for possession of fentanyl must merge with the conviction for possession with intent to distribute that same fentanyl (counts 1 and 3); the same is true for the convictions for methamphetamine (counts 2 and 4).  After merging these convictions, [...]’s financial penalties must be reduced accordingly.  [...] was assessed a total of $6,730.  Of that total, $2,350 was assessed on the possession-only charges: $2,000 in Drug Enforcement and Demand Reduction fines; $100 in Forensic Laboratory fees; $100 in Victims of Crime Compensation Board fees; and $150 in Safe Neighborhoods Services Funds fees.  (Da 46)  These fines should be eliminated, resulting in a new total financial obligation of $4,380.  The judgment of conviction should, at minimum, be amended to indicate mergers and reflect the correct fees.
[brief] To be sure, it was defendant’s position that the statutes and regulations should not be introduced to the jury at all, but once plaintiff introduced those statutes and regulations to the jury they opened the door to impeachment of their experts’ opinions on purported violations of those statutes and regulations.  Defendant thus properly was allowed to rebut plaintiff’s implication that the statutes and regulations establish the standard of care by introducing evidence, by way of plaintiff’s experts own testimony, that the regulations relied upon by plaintiff’s experts were not violated in the first instance.  (See 7T123:24-132:23; 7T136:3-145:22; 7T190:7-198:24; 8T70:21-85:21; 8T118:1-129:16.)  The trial court then proceeded, at plaintiff’s request, to charge the jury that it could find “the facility” or the “nursing home”, [...], as well as its nursing staff, deviated from the standard of care applicable to a long term care facility.  (See generally Pa87-129.)  Additionally, the jury was specifically instructed that it could consider, as evidence of negligence, defendant’s violation, if any, of federal regulations relating to staffing and the allocation of resources.  (See Pa107-108.)  Defendant thus, once again appropriately and consistent with the rulings on the in limine motions and at trial, inquired as to plaintiff’s experts awareness of the results of complaint survey conducted by [...]—the agency authorized to enforce and apply the regulations—as extrinsic evidence relevant to the issue of credibility pursuant to N.J.R.E. 607, in order to rebut and impeach plaintiff’s expert’s claims that defendant failed to comply with the regulations.  (See 7T123:24-132:23; 7T136:3-145:22; 7T190:7-198:24; 8T70:21-85:21; 8T118:1-129:16.)  Hearsay “is a statement, other than one made by a declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
[brief] As stated by the Appellate Division, “[t]he legislature did not intend to give medical malpractice defendants the power to destroy a meritorious malpractice action by refusing to provide the very records the expert would need to prepare the affidavit. ”  Barreiro v. Morais, 318 N.J. Super. 461, 470 (App. Div. 1999).  In this lawsuit, Defendants have completely eschewed their responsibilities in all manners.  First, Defendants failed to timely respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint.  As such, Plaintiff consented to vacating the default and allowing Defendants to Answer Plaintiff’s Complaint, despite the fact that Defendants were out of time to do so.  Second, Defendants have failed and continue to be in default regarding Plaintiff’s outstanding discovery requests, most importantly of which, are the medical records that Plaintiff’s expert professional requires and is entitled to in preparing her affidavit of merit.  Despite lacking the required medical records from Defendants, Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s expert have made a good faith attempt to submit an affidavit of merit.  See (61a).  However, the Affidavit of Merit submitted by Plaintiff’s expert is lacking the medical records from Defendants that would further bolster and support Plaintiff’s meritorious claims for malpractice against Defendants.  It would be an entirely unjust and inequitable result if Defendants are allowed to be completely unresponsive and uncooperative with Plaintiff and still be entitled to a dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice when it is entirely the result of Defendants’ conduct that Plaintiff was unable to submit a comprehensive and timely affidavit of merit.
[brief] ”  *Allstars Auto. Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n*, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) (*quoting In re Stallworth*, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)).  See *In re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch. of Montclair Founders Grp.*, 216 N.J. 370, 383 (2013).
[brief] In this case, [...]'s conduct was palpably unreasonable.  [...] was struck in the crosswalk of the subject intersection due to backlighting created by a defective streetlight emitting 0.0 foot candles.  Whatever feeble lighting existed was blocked by tree branches, which [...] failed to trim.  While [...] was responsible for the placement and maintenance of the streetlight, [...]'s officials were the actual decisionmakers in light purchases.  Not a single witness who testified on behalf of [...] knew anything whatsoever about the light purchase process.  Key [...] officials, who worked for the [...] for decades, had no knowledge about the streetlight purchase process.  Moreover, these officials failed to retain proper engineering expertise to ensure that competent guidance was obtained from [...] about the suitability of street lighting near an intersection that [...] deemed a dangerous intersection.
[brief] Nonetheless, the conclusion in the [...] Report appears to be based upon the assumption that “the profile does not depict the fact that the pipe run, along with the rooftop discharge from the 7.7-ac proposed warehouse, discharge into a scour hold which also functions as a sediment forebay for Basin 2. ” (Aa2525) (emphasis added).  As a result, [...] later concludes that “2 ft to 2.5 ft of the soil media within the Filterra MTDs will constantly be saturated. ” (Aa2525).  Plaintiffs then allege that “[...] staff acknowledged the issue with regard to the Filterra MTDs and requested a response from [...].  However, a review of the final approved plans shows this was never addressed or redesigned.
[brief] Cal 72; 4.  As to Count 5, the Facebook post in question was posted prior to the time that Respondent was sworn in as a member of the Board and thus the Commission had no jurisdiction to regulate or sanction such conduct.  Cal 72.  Accordingly, the Commission dismissed the allegation in Count 4 that Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(a) and dismissed Counts 2, 3 and 5 in their entirety.
[brief] Moreover, the probative value of the evidence was [...]’s evasive and misleading deposition testimony about his criminal convictions more so than the convictions themselves.  The court undervalued the significance of [...]’s deposition testimony in which he said he could not recall when his convictions occurred.  Da89 at 41-1 to 42-23.  The trial court’s reasoning also means that a criminal conviction for possession of drugs is never admissible because it is not a crime of moral turpitude.
[brief] (Da272; 5T:121-21 to 123-2; Da187)  ..................................................................................................................................................................................  21  A.  Standard of Review .......................................................................................................  22  B.  The Jury’s Verdict Was Contrary to the Evidence .......................................................  24  II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF [...]’S PRIOR CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS AND IN DOING SO DENIED [...]  A FAIR TRIAL.  (Da42; Da45; Da187)
[brief] (3T:56-21 to 57-25, 30-23 to 31-8)  [...] felt that [...] was “someone who would look out for [him], someone who was showing an interest in [him]. ”  (Da 122)  In rejecting Miller factor three, the resentencing court did not discuss the copious evidence that the presence of [...]’s peers affected his participation in the offense, nor did the court mention [...].
[brief] The fact that other variances aside from the d(1) use variance and the d(4) FAR variances are required by the proposal mandates a conclusion that the granting of the use variance would substantially impair the intent and purpose of the Zone Plan and Zoning Ordinance. ”  Pa135-136 at ¶¶7-8; Pa140 at ¶14 (emphasis added); Pa133-134 at ¶3.  The Trial Court therefore properly found that the Board more than adequately set forth a rational basis for finding that [...] failed to demonstrate that [...] is particularly suitable for the intense development proposed.  Indeed, it could be easily concluded that the magnitude of the project at this particular location demonstrated that [...] in fact is particularly unsuitable for the proposed high-density project.
[brief] 25  D.  Counsel Fees, By Themselves, Cannot Constitute a Damage Giving Rise To A Cause of Action  .................................................................28  E.  Plaintiff Is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees to Set Aside PSA and to Obtain A New Judgment As a Result of “Natural and Necessary Consequence” of An Attorney’s Negligence, Because of Lack of Causation and Damages  ...............30  V. RULE 4:50-1(C) AND 4:50-3 PERMIT RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT BECAUSE OF FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION, OR OTHER MISCONDUCT OF AN ADVERSE PARTY (RAISED BELOW: DA62)
[brief] *Id.* at ¶¶ 79-116 (Pa14).  On March 27, 2023, Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Appellant’s Complaint.  (Pa26).  On October 4, 2023, the trial court granted Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss in its entirety.  (Pa31).  The trial court held correctly that the NJCFLA does not provide a private right of action; accordingly, private claims predicated on the NJCFLA claim, including for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and the FDCPA claim, may not be based on the NJCFLA.
[brief] As enacted, the legislature specifically included an exception to the provisions of the Act.  Section 2A:23B-2(c) states “[this] act governs an agreement to arbitrate whenever made with the exception of an arbitration between an employer and a duly elected representative of employees under a collective bargaining agreement or a collectively negotiated agreement. ”  This was the only exception included by the legislature in the language of the statute.  Most notably, the Act does not set forth any other exceptions nor any language allowing for the creation of same in the future.  If the legislature intended to allow other exceptions, they would have been included in the wording of the Act.  N.J.S.A.1:1-1 provides that when interpreting statutes, “the words and phrases shall be read and construed with their context, and shall, unless inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or unless another or different meaning is expressly indicated, be given the generally accepted meaning, according to the approved usage of the language. ”  Clearly, the language of the Act, when analyzed applying the aforementioned general rule of construction, precludes the creation of exceptions based on professional specialties and types of claims.
[brief] It is well recognized that a record which affords record notice of the transfer therein made may contain a statement or recital which does not of itself give either record notice or actual notice but which does place on inquiry one who is affected by the record .  . . .  A purchaser who is placed on inquiry is chargeable with notice of such facts as might be ascertained by a reasonable inquiry.  [Garden of Memories v. Forest Lawn Mem'l Park Ass’n, 109 N.J. Super. 523, 534-35 (App. Div. 1970) (citations omitted). ]  See also Pearson v. DMH 2 Ltd. Liab. Co., 449 N.J. Super. 30, 50 (Ch. Div. 2016) ("a party may be charged with inquiry notice where there are facts or circumstances indicating some outside claim that would prompt a reasonable purchaser to investigate further." (citing Friendship Manor, 244 N.J. Super. at 108)).  B.  [...] Had Actual and Inquiry Notice of [...]’s Claim to the Strip
[brief] In fact, there is a presumption against negligence.  Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 525 (1981); Riveria v. Columbus Cadet Corp., 59 N.J. Super. 445, 450 (App. Div. 1960); Vander Groef, 32 N.J. Super. at 370 (citing Hansen, 8 N.J. 133, 139-40).  It is also well established that a business owner is not a guarantor of its business invitees.
[brief] They cite a *de novo* standard of review, as if they were appealing an order compelling arbitration.  But that is not the procedural posture here.  Plaintiffs are not appealing an order substantively ruling on the Contract’s validity or compelling arbitration; they are appealing an order denying their motion to vacate the January Consent Order.  This Court is *not* tasked with reviewing the Contract’s enforceability *de novo*.  Rather, the Superior Court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate should be reviewed “under an abuse of discretion standard.
[brief] Pursuant to the regulations governing municipal tax maps, “[p]rivate . . . streets shall be shown as lots with separate lot numbers or shall be shown with dashed lines.  (See Standards,[12] Pages S1, S11, S26, and S36). ”  N.J.A.C. 18:23A-1.15(d).  The Standards further provide that private roads, regardless of whether they are shown as separate lots or with dashed lines, should be expressly labeled as “private. ”  (Da356.)  The Tax Map does not label the Roads as “private,”[13] does not have them as their own separate lot, and does not show them in dashed lines.  (Da175.)  Rather, the Tax Map depicts the Roads by listing their names within solid lines, which is how public roads are to be designated.  N.J.A.C. 18:23A-1.15(a) (“All dedicated streets, roads, and highways shall be shown by a solid line, considerably heavier than the lines used to show lot lines (See Standards, Page S1).”)  Plaintiffs have relied to their detriment on the Tax Map’s depiction of the Roads as public streets.