ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Foreseeability in a FELA case was found in *Dalka v. Wisconsin Central, Ltd.*, 811 N.W.2d 834 (Ct.App.Wis.2012).  The plaintiff conductor was working in a railyard when a co-worker’s personal vehicle was stolen out of the parking lot.  The car thief (later found to also be intoxicated) then drove the car onto the rail yard and directly at the plaintiff, who jumped out of the way and injured himself on either a rail or railroad tie.  The railroad argued it was not foreseeable that an intoxicated third party would steal a car, drive onto railroad property, and injure the plaintiff.  The appellate court determined that evidence of trespassers, the fact that crimes were previously committed by the trespassers, and a lack of security cameras created a genuine issue of material fact for the jury.  Another case demonstrating the low bar for foreseeability in FELA matters is *Burns v. Penn Central Co.*, 519 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.1975).  In *Burns*, a brakeman was riding in an open doorway as the train approached a train station and was *shot and killed by a sniper*.  Prior to the employee being shot, there had been reports of three stonings of passenger cars within three blocks of the slaying, and four additional stonings within 24 blocks.  The Second Circuit reversed the initial grant of summary judgment, “Based on the railroad's actual knowledge of stonings in the vicinity in recent months and its constructive (and indubitably actual) knowledge of the generally dangerous conditions prevailing in the neighborhood in which the fatality transpired, the jury would have acted well within its authority under the FELA by returning a verdict for [...].
[brief] [6T 32-13 to 33-5, 88-2 to 91-10].  [...] also compared the proposal favorably to zoning in other locations in [...] that permitted certain components of the multi-level senior housing community.  He noted that those zones are typically industrial or non-residential in character.  [6T 34-13 to 39-15, 49-5 to 52-12; Pa231-245].  In response to questions, [...] noted that while there are other zones in [...] that allow assisted living uses, the zoning standards in the LUDO prevented development.
[brief] 31  TABLE OF CONTENTS OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S APPENDIX – VOLUME 1  [...] (ICONA-3; 1T 198:1-22)  ..........................................................  Pa1 [...]  Social Media Advertisement (ICONA-5; 1T 198:1-22)  ..................................................  Pa47  [...] 2018 Website (ICONA-1; 1T 198:1-22)  ........................................................................  Pa48  2017  Emails between [...] and [...] (ICONA-2; 1T 198:1-22)  ..............................................  Pa49  2017  Emails between [...] and [...] (ICONA-4; 1T 198:1-22) ....................................................  Pa55  August 29, 2018  Letter from Arcadia to [...] (POST-9; 1T 120:1-22) ................................................ Pa63  2018  Executed Proposal (POST-2; 1T 21:8-13) ...............................................................................  Pa64  Louver Photos (ICONA-9; 1T 198:1-22) .........................................................................................  Pa65  July 10, 2019  Email from [...] to [...] (POST-6; 1T 39:1-22) .....................................................  Pa73  June 6, 2018  [...] Invoice (POST-4; 1T 26:1-22) ...................................................................  Pa74  Complaint by [...] Golden Inn LLC filed November 12, 2019 .......................................................  Pa75  Answer of [...] LLC filed January 6, 2020 ...........................................................................  Pa84  [...] Golden Inn LLC Answer to Counterclaim filed January 14, 2020 ..............................................  Pa97 Answer of [...] Outdoor Inc. filed February 27, 2020 .........................Pa103  Order and Opinion dated September 14, 2023 ..............................................Pa132  Final Order dated October 27, 2023 ..........................................................Pa178  Notice of Appeal .......................................................................................Pa179  Amended Notice of Appeal ........................................................................Pa193  Certification of Transcript Completion and Delivery .................................Pa198
[brief] Not only had the jury heard about [...]’s previous DUI, and his alleged affiliation with a violent biker gang, but they were also made aware that [...] dated multiple women at the same time and may have engaged in illicit drug use.  Further, [...]’s ex-girlfriend presented as an unstable individual heavily affected by drug use, barely resembling the woman [...] once knew, and the jury unavoidably would consider that this was the type of individual [...] associated with due to their previous relationship.  None of this should ever have been before the jury, and its effect proved fatal.  [...] became the womanizing gang-member involved in illicit activities whose account, regardless of how plausible it might be, could not possibly be more credible than the woman whose personal life had not been put on display.  Contrary to the unsavory picture painted throughout the trial, [...] was merely a 44-year-old father and small-business owner, with a virtually nonexistent history with the criminal justice system.
[directive] (2)  When it is alleged that nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct, has been committed against an unemancipated minor by a parent, guardian, or other person having care, custody and control of that child as defined in N.J.S.9:6-2, an applicant seeking a protective order shall not proceed under the provisions of P.L.2015, c.147 (C.2C:14-13 et al.), but shall report the incident to the Division of Child Protection and Permanency in the Department of Children and Families for investigation and possible legal action by the division pursuant to R.S.9:6-1 et seq. or other applicable law, including, when appropriate, petitioning the Superior Court pursuant to P.L.1974, c.119 (C.9:6-8.21 et seq.) for a protective order and other relief on behalf of the applicant and the unemancipated minor.
[brief] Hearing claims/rulings are palpably incorrect & irrational; made in arbitrary & unreasonable, manner; & overlooked significance of irrefutable probative, competent evidence contradicting Judges’ claims/rulings, & were NOT filed due to dissatisfactions.  (p. 12 to p. 22, par. 65) (p. 31-32, par. 12; p. 33, par. 29, to p. 41, par. 38)  Judge invented appealable, palpably incorrect “standards” that undermined unreasonable claims/rulings.  His primary unreasonable, illegitimate, “standard” was “This case has to end” period, irrationally regardless of legitimate factors that he should have considered to correct the Orders.
[brief] Pa320  Exhibit A, Exhibit G-18- View of (A) [...] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa322 Exhibit A, Exhibit G-19- View of (B) [...].  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa324  Exhibit A, Exhibit G-20- View of (C) [...] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pa326  Exhibit A, Exhibit G-21- View of (D) [...] ...................... Pa328 Exhibit A, Exhibit G-22- View of (E) [...] .....................
[brief] *Id.* at 421.  A driver who is knowingly involved in an accident resulting in damage to any attended vehicle (including the driver’s vehicle) must immediately stop at the scene (or stop as close to the scene as possible and return to the scene “forthwith”), and remain there until the requirements of subsection (c) of the statute have been fulfilled.  N.J.S.A. 39:4-129(a), (b).  “If a driver knowingly collides with a vehicle or other property that is unattended at the time of the accident, the driver has a duty to stop immediately and ‘then and there’ to locate and notify the owner or operator of the vehicle or other property, or (if a vehicle is struck) to attach the driver’s name or address in a conspicuous place on the vehicle.
[brief] See *Orji*, 277 N.J. Super. at 589 (finding “[w]hile we recognize that a defendant is entitled to a restitution hearing under certain circumstances, those circumstances do not exist here.  No dispute exists as to amount of restitution,” and “Defendant raised no objection to the concession made by his counsel nor did he dispute his ability to pay. ”).  Moreover, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(c)(2) mandates that “[t]he court shall not reduce a restitution award by any amount that the victim has received from the [...], but shall order the defendant to pay any restitution ordered for a loss previously compensated by the Board to the [...].
[brief] ”  (Pa435).  The [...]’s website initially provided, “Students will be asked to select or opt-out of a master’s pathway at the end of their first professional year,” and did not include any additional requirements.  (Pa435).  The website was an important part of advertising the program to students to get the word out into the community.  (Pa353).  Plaintiff understood the plain language of the advertisement meant that all students who were able to qualify to complete the doctorate program would also be able to complete the master’s program.  (Pa158).  The program was also advertised as a “remediation” program, which effectively ensured students did not fail their courses, to entice prospective students to apply and enroll into the program.
[brief] The protects the State from “private opportunism,” actions brought by relators who allege a fraud based on publicly disclosed facts and then seek a portion of the State’s recovery.  See United States ex rel. Bryant v. Cnty. Health Sys., Inc., 24 F.4th 1024, 1030-31 (6th Cir. 2022).  The bar is not designed to protect defendants.  After all, whether a fraud occurred and the State should be compensated are unrelated to whether the fraud was publicly disclosed in the specific manner required by N.J.S.A. § 2A:32C-9(c).  The 2023 Veto Amendment merely gives the State the option to indicate it does not need or want the protection the public disclosure bar affords without fully intervening.  Intervention and taking over litigation of the action entails a significant commitment of resources.  United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 286 F.3d 542, 546 (D. C. Cir. 2002).  Providing the State a less resource-intensive way to achieve the same result -- avoiding dismissal on public disclosure grounds -- vindicates the State’s interests in NJFCA matters.  The trial court properly held this was the Legislature’s intent.  4T 26:14-27:25.  The amendments to the NJFCA, including the 2023 Veto Amendment, “take effect immediately. ”  Pa31.  V.  The State Vetoes Dismissal on Public Disclosure Grounds
[brief] First, [...]’s unavailing attempt to bootstrap the PILOT agreement into the “public interest” factors ignores the agreement was the subject of an entirely separate municipal act.  The PILOT agreement between [...] and [...] was adopted by the Committee via Ordinance No. 36-2022 on November 11, 2022, nearly seven (7) months after the adoption of Ordinance No. 13-2022.  (Da30).  [...] offers no support to link this act, entered more than one half year after the ordinance it challenges, as justifying a public interest.  See Washington Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adj. v. Washington Twp. Planning Bd., 217 N.J. Super. 215, 225 (App. Div. 1987) (“[E]ven where an act “appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available”). of a municipal body may be regarded as so ‘utterly void’ as to be subject to collateral attack at any time, a direct review thereof must be ‘within the time prescribed by law’”) (quoting Marini v. Borough of Wanaque, 37 N.J. Super. 32, 40 (App. Div. 1955)).  Moreover, while [...] quotes the transcript of the hearing when Ordinance No. 13-2022 was adopted, the cited comments from [...] were made in the context of discussing [...]’s larger fiscal strategies, which generally include a transition away from traditional retail stores.  Contrary to [...]’s proffered inference, the Mayor did not state the town’s financial viability or ratables are tied to this ordinance.  (Pb17 – Pb18).  A review of the entirety of his remarks reveal that [...] also identified other sources of ratables the Committee was contemplating as alternatives to traditional retail, including medical offices, gas stations, and car washes.  (See 1T, 4:11-19).  Precedent elaborating how the use of public funds may be a public interest meriting enlargement of the filing period is found in Concerned Citizens v. Mayor and Council of Princeton Borough, 370 N.J. Super. 429 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 139 (2004).
[brief] When [...] would arrive at the tavern for his shift, he would expect to encounter only the tavern’s cleaner.  On February 1, 2016, as he walked into the tavern he encountered the unexpected – a six-foot-one-inch man with a beard, dark glasses, and a hood up exiting the tavern.  [...] initially assumed it was the “beer guy,” [...].  When [...] spoke with [...], and then [...], he learned that the man he had encountered leaving the tavern was not supposed to be in the tavern.  [...] immediately called the police.
[brief] MISCHARACTERIZES PLAINTIFFS’ ARGUMENT; MISSTATES LANGUAGE IN APPELLATE DIVISION CASE LAW; AND ADVOCATES FOR AN INTERPRETATION OF JURY CHARGE 5.60B THAT WOULD PLACE NEW JERSEY LAW IN CONFLICT WITH THE CURRENT SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING OF STALLION  REPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOR POINT II ......................................................................................................................................  6  THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER [...]’S KNOWN RESISTANCE TO THE BREEDING PROCESS  FURNISHED REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE IT MAY CAUSE INJURY WHEN BEING LED INTO THE BREEDING SHED IS A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY POINT III  ....................................................................................................................................  8  IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT THE TORT IMMUNITY PROTECTIONS PROVIDED IN THE EQUINE ACTIVITIES  LIABILITY ACT
[brief] The Municipality’s participation in the trial of the matter below was only to enforce the Notice of Violation if it was determined that site plan approval was required.  The Notice was issued following the Zoning Board’s determination that no site plan was ever obtained to use the property for parking.  The Trial Court held that the Zoning Board exceeded its authority in adopting its resolution, and thus held its action to be arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.  It thus held that the Notice of Violation was to be deemed void.  As the Defendant/Respondent Township advised the trial court, it really had no dog in this fight and would be guided by the ruling of the trial court regarding the need for site plan approval for this easement for a parking area.  Given the fact that at the time the Notice of Violation was issued – prior to a determination whether the parking area was either grandfathered or there was no need to comply with the site plan ordinance —it is submitted that the issuance of the Notice of Violation was appropriate at the time.  CONCLUSION  For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully submitted that the Defendant/Respondent [...] will continue to adhere to the rulings of the trial court and this Court regarding the issuance of the Notice of Violation.  Respectfully submitted, [...]
[brief] Rather, “[t]wo questions inhere in the determination whether a court should apply a statute retroactively. ”  *Twiss*, 124 N.J. at 467.  “The first question is whether the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive application. ”  *Ibid.*  (*citing Gibbons*, 86 N.J. at 522).  “If so, the second question is whether retroactive application is an unconstitutional interference with ‘vested rights' or will result in a ‘manifest injustice. ’”  *Ibid.*  (*quoting State, Dep't of Env'tl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp.*, 94
[brief] Boilerplate Objections  B.  Unduly Burdensome  *3  Plaintiff also makes an unduly burdensome objection.  The Court has no doubt that reviewing all of the documents that are “hits” from the search terms will be burdensome, but the question is whether the burden is undue.  In their objection, Plaintiff seems to argue relevance is on a sliding scale; specifically stating that the relevance of these documents is outweighed by the burden of producing the documents.  Plaintiff have admitted on multiple occasions that the ESI discovery was going to be voluminous in this case.  (See Docs. 108, 144, 150, 155, 177; see also 178 (summarizing certain ESI issues)).  A voluminous ESI case is always going to be burdensome.  This is an unfortunate reality of ESI heavy, high-dollar commercial cases.  However, the Court cannot say, given what is at stake, that the burden of document review is so high as to warrant denying Defendants relevant discovery.  Thus, given that the Court has found the request to be proportional, and that the parties have known from the beginning of this case that the discovery in this case would be significant (and have represented that knowledge to the Court on multiple occasions) the Court overrules Plaintiffs’ undue burden objection.
[brief] “15.  The Board finds that the variances sought pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70c relating to combined side yard setback, building height, building coverage and generator location may not be granted under the c(1) or c(2) standards.  There has been no demonstration of any exceptional property conditions or topography or other exceptional situation that would justify the finding of hardship so as to permit the granting of relief under the c(1) standard.  The Board believes that the only hardship that may exist here is necessarily self-created by the applicant’s desire for a building that is too large for the subject parcel.  In its consideration of the c variances, the Board has particularly focused on building coverage, which at a proposed 65.1% is more than 50% above the maximum permitted.  This substantiates the Board’s finding that the applicant is seeking to shoehorn a building on a parcel that is relatively quite small in configuration when the proposed development is considered.  In this regard, the Board finds that any hardship is self-created by the applicant’s desire for a building that is too large for the subject parcel.  16.
[brief] The PCR court in addressing the defendant's claims, which were supported by certifications, did not hold an evidentiary hearing as required by *State v. Porter*, 216 N.J. 343 (2013).  Further, the PCR judge made credibility determinations on the certifications without hearing from the witnesses as also required by *Porter*, *supra*.  The defendant also asserts that PCR court engaged in an unreasonable application of the *Strickland* test in its ruling by failing to address the issue that the defendant was significantly prejudiced by trial counsel's knowingly misleading the defendant into believing he had investigated and secured witnesses relevant for his suppression hearing and trial.  The defendant argued that there was no judicial authority for the issuance of a sneak and peek warrant in the State of New Jersey, as no legislative promulgation of such a heightened intrusion into a citizen's Fourth Amendment Constitutional right to be free from unreasonable intrusions has ever been adopted or approved at the time of defendant's case.
[brief] [...] is no longer the named redeveloper, (see Pa648), and the relief [...] seeks against the [...] was fully litigated, (see Pa790).  Finally, [...]’s reference to Section 28(4) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments does not save its claims from the doctrine of collateral estoppel.  (See generally Pb35–37.)  The Appellate Division, after considering the record, concluded that [...]’s motion to amend the complaint in the First Action to add a bad faith claim had no merit.  (See Pa789 (“In addition to being untimely, Plaintiff’s motion lacked merit. ”).)  It is fair to say that [...] did not succeed even under the least rigorous standard of persuasion.  A cursory review of the record reveals that the bad faith claim is frivolous.  The trial court’s denial of [...]’s Motion to Reinstate and dismissal of [...]’s Complaint with prejudice should be affirmed.
[brief] --- \(^1\)  Appellant shall refer to the transcripts of the hearings before the Board as follows: “1T” – September 30, 2020; “2T” – November 19, 2020; “3T” – January 20, 2021; “4T” – April 7, 2021; “5T” – May 20, 2021; “6T” – June 2, 2021; and “7T” – July 7, 2021, and the transcript from the Prerogative Writ Trial as follows “8T” – October 27, 2022.  The parties stipulated that the case was not ripe for appeal until the adjudication of the remaining counts of the complaints.  Da377.  A CMO dated July 21, 2023, set timelines for discovery on the remaining counts.  Da375.  The Board propounded discovery, and on October 17, 2023, [...] and [...] stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice as to all remaining counts.  Da382.  This appeal was then filed by the Board seeking to overturn the trial court’s reversal of the Board’s denial of the [...] application for development.  On December 19, 2023, [...] and [...] advised that [...]’s contract to purchase the property from [...] had expired, that [...] would no longer be a party to this action, but that [...] would assume [...]’s role and continue as Appellee herein.
[brief] 4.  The Trial Court Failed to Consider a State Supreme Court Case Directly on Point Holding that an Attorney Exemption in a Debt Negotiation Statute Violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine (T. at 9:5-17:19)  ..................................36  C.  The Trial Court Improperly Disregarded The Binding Deposition Testimony of [...]’s Designated Representative, [...].  (T. at 8:15-9:4)  ...........................................39  D.  The Trial Court Improperly Dismissed Count Two Of Plaintiffs’ Complaint In Holding That the Limited Attorney Exemption Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague.  (T. at 17:20-24:6)  .........................................................................................................................41
[brief] As this Court has already explained in this appeal, “It is thus beyond cavil that the Highlands Act represents ‘a comprehensive policy designed to protect environmental interests,’ exemptions from which are to be strictly construed. ”  Matter of Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station, 476 N.J. Super. 556, 566 (App. Div. 2023).  Considering this well settled legal principle, it is difficult to understand why [...] argued that it is restricted to only a “narrow” factual basis for its instant consistency determination under the Act.  To the contrary, [...] cannot look narrowly at the potential environmental impacts from this Project because it was required to err on the side of caution and look broadly at the facts with respect to all of the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act.  [...] was constrained to deny the exemption request and to require an ordinary permitting process under the Highlands Act if there were any reasonable doubts about potential environmental degradation to Highlands Resources as a result of the proposed Project.