ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] PPCIa369-371  Order granting in part [...]’s Motion to Reconsider the Court’s April 6, 2023 Order, dated July 31, 2023  PPCIa419-420 Transcript of Motion Hearing and Decision on [...]’s Motion to Reconsider the Court’s April 6, 2023 Order, dated July 31, 2023  Trans. of July 31, 2023 (1T)  Order granting [...]’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dated February 23, 2024 PPCIa447-448 Order denying [...]’s Motion to Reconsider the Court’s July 31 2023 Order, dated February 23, 2024  PPCIa449-450 Transcript of Motion Hearing and Decision on [...]’s Motion for Trans. of February 23, 2024 (2T) Partial Summary Judgment, dated February 23, 2024  Order denying the [...]’s Motion to Reconsider the Court’s February 23, 2024 Order, dated May 24, 2024 Transcript of Motion Hearing and Decision on [...]’s Motion to Reconsider the Court’s February 23, 2024 Order, dated May 24, 2024 | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, | 16 | | 142 N.J. 520 (1995) | | | Canal Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, | 38 | | 435 F.3d 431 | | | Family First Fed. Sav. Bank v. DeVincentis, | 36 | | 284 N.J. Super. 503 (App. Div. 1995) | | | Gobe Media Group, LLC v. Cisnero, | 24 | | 403 N.J. Super. 574 (App. Div. 2008) | | | In re Kimber Petroleum Corp., | 27 | | 110 N.J. 69 (1988) | | | Johnson & Johnson v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., | 33 | | 285 N.J. Super 575 (App. Div. 1995) | | | Leonardis v. Bunnell, | 36, 37| | 164 N.J. Super. 338 (App. Div. 1978) | | | Loigman v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., | 33 | | 235 N.J. Super. 67 (App. Div. 1989) | | | Magic Petroleum Corp. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., | 20 | | 218 N.J. 390 (2014) | | | Manahawkin Convalescent v. O’Neill, | 15 | | 217 N.J. 99 (2014) | | | McCay Dev. Co. v. Jenny Oil Corp., | 26 | | A-6335-94-T1 (App. Div. Aug. 8, 1996) | | | N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. PPG Indus., | 27 | | 197 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 1999) | | President v. Jenkins, 180 N.J. 550 (2004) ........................................................................................................... 38 QBE Ins. Co. v. P&F Container Services, Inc., 362 N.J. Super. 445 (App. Div. 2003) .................................................................................. 28, 29 Russell-Stanley Corp. v. Plant Indus., Inc., 250 N.J. Super. 478 (Ch. Div. 1991) ......................................................................................
[brief] To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ”  *Ibid.*; *Harris*, 181 N.J. at 432.  As a “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, *State v. Arthur*, 184 N.J. 307, 319 (2005), the error committed must be so serious as to undermine the court’s confidence in the jury’s verdict or the result reached.
[brief] **Conclusion**  For these reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the foregoing interlocutory orders entered by the Law Division excluding owner’s evidence at trial be reversed and that the matter be remanded for trial on the damages claims.  Dated: January 17, 2024  Respectfully submitted, [...]  [...], a Municipal Corporation of the State of New Jersey, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. [...], [...], [...], ADMINISTRATOR of the [...] and [...], Defendants/Appellant.
[brief] And neither does – do the, you know, the four, five, six different ideations that he tried to put forth previously.  I think everybody has given him every reasonable opportunity to try to do this properly.  It hasn't been done.  It's likely -- well, it can't be done at this point.  But I think everybody tried to give him the reasonable opportunity to do it.  It just hasn't been done.  And - - and I'm not going to permit this thing to go forward now, eight years later or seven years since the case has been filed, and let it keep going.
[brief] Specifically, plaintiff asserted that he was caused to fall as a result of coming into contact with a discarded piece of plywood covered by snow creating a hidden tripping hazard.  The fact of the presence of the plywood covered by snow at or near the dumpster at the site is undisputed.  The photographs of the site, taken by the plaintiff's wife, clearly show the plywood.  The fact that the plaintiff fell at the location of the plywood is also undisputed as plaintiff testified to waking up on top of the plywood and discovered that his pants were wet.  The fact that the plywood covered in snow was slippery is undisputed as plaintiff testified that he crawled off of the plywood because he could not stand due to slipping on it.
[brief] Citing to Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 482 (2016), the trial court found that all elements of the breach of contract had been proven by [...] by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the parties entered into an agreement, the Third Loan, (2) [...] did what the agreement required him, (3) [...] did not do what the agreement required, and (4) [...]’s breach, or failure to do what the agreement required, caused a loss to [...].  Da49.
[directive] Un máximo de $1,000 por un delito de 2º grado 3er (3)  Un máximo de $750 por un delito de grado (4)  Un máximo de $500 por un delito de 4º grado Multa TOTAL de S.C.V.T. F $  Do you understand that if the crime occurred on or after April 26, 2005, as a result of your guilty plea you will be required to pay a mandatory Sex Crime Victim Treatment Fund (S.C.V.T.F.) penalty as listed below for each offense for which you pled guilty?
[brief] BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT  [...]  Public Defender Office of the Public Defender  Appellate Section 31 Clinton Street, 9th Floor  Newark, NJ 07101 [...]  [...]  Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney ID: 349152020  Of Counsel and On the Brief  [...]  December 20, 2023  DEFENDANT IS CONFINED TABLE OF CONTENTS
[brief] IV.  Conclusion  IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff, [...]’s (“[...]”) Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Compel Compliance with the Protocol (R. Doc. 103) is GRANTED as set forth below:  IT IS GRANTED as to [...]’s request to image [...]’s iPhone and [...]’s iPhone.  IT IS FURTHER GRANTED as to [...]’s request for [...] to produce files which were withheld based on relevance and date restriction.  However, [...]’s request as to those files is limited from January 1, 2012, to the October 2013 date already designated by the parties, no later than fifteen (15) days from the oral argument on this motion, or by May 8, 2014.  IT IS FURTHER GRANTED as to [...]’s request for [...] and [...] to amend the current privilege logs and produce logs which have yet to be produced, to provide adequate descriptions of the files over which a privilege is being claims no later than fifteen (15) days from the oral argument on this motion, or by May 8, 2014.
[brief] (2T).  After hearing arguments, the motion court ruled from the bench, granting [...]’s motion and dismissing all claims against [...], with prejudice.  (2T, at 15-16).  The motion court interpreted the plain language of the agreement to determine that, once Plaintiff declared [...] in default and recovered its deposit, [...] had no further obligations to Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s rights under the agreement had been terminated.  (2T, at 13-16).  Accordingly, the motion court found that [...] could not be held liable for conduct that allegedly occurred well after the termination of the agreement.  (Id.).  The motion court entered an order granting [...]’s motion in its entirety.
[brief] (4T84:1-3).  [...] admitted he arrived at [...] at 10 a.m. and was not on the property at the time Plaintiff fell.  (4T87:5-7; 89:2-4).  [...] believed that [...] was responsible to do snow and ice removal and did not know anything about [...].  (4T89:12-18).  [...], as the owner of [...], testified at trial (4T).
[directive] PREHIRE SCREENING AND INVESTIGATION  A.  This Department will conduct thorough background investigations of all potential new employees to determine if there is a criminal history with particular attention to acts of domestic violence, sexual abuse, stalking, elder abuse or child abuse.  This Department will conduct a check of the Domestic Violence Registry to determine the existence of any active restraining orders and to determine if there is a history of domestic violence.  B.  All candidates will be interviewed about any history of acts of domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, elder abuse or child abuse and past or present restraining orders and their disposition.  C.  Those candidates with a history of perpetrating acts of domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, elder abuse or child abuse will be screened out at this point in the hiring process.  V.
[brief] The Court should also note that under the Department’s Public Access Rule, N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(k), the requirement for reasonable and meaningful public access applies only to new residential development and is described purely for illustrative purposes.  It must be emphasized that the corresponding public access rule for existing development, which applies when the proposal is limited to structural shore protection and/or accessory development, provides that the Department cannot require new public access where none previously existed.  See N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(k)(2)(i).  Therefore, the Department’s imposition of a new public access requirement at the Property under the circumstances presented directly contradicted its own established policies.  V.
[brief] Moreover, [...] does not seek to defend the Board’s equity assessment at $12,804 (based upon a formula created by the Board’s Chairwoman), which equals a monthly increase of $66.68 per month.  Da 54; 10T:172:10-25, 173:2-6; 11T:199:9, 225:3-5, 257:23, 244-259.  That is not surprising because the formula created by the Chairperson was mystifying and not understood by [...]’s attorney (and others).  Rather, [...] argues that [...]’s equity in the Unit is effectively zero because [...] profited in 2003 when selling the other units upon converting the Property into a condominium property.
[brief] L.A. Bd. of Educ. of Trenton, 221 N.J. 192, 204 (2015); Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J. Dept. of Envttl. Prot., 191 N.J. 38, 48 (2007); In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656-58 (1999).  While the Appellate Division will give weight to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory scheme, such interpretations need not be adopted where they are plainly unreasonable.  In re Advisory Op. No 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254 (2010).  In passing the School Ethics Act (Act) into law, the Legislature found and declared:
[brief] (See Mahoney, 188 N.J. at 376).  Defendant’s opinion that police did not pursue every single possible lead, no matter how practicable, does not mean that the prosecutor’s comment was improper where prosecutors are “entitled in summation to encourage the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. ” (State v. R.B. 183 N.J. 308, 330 (2005)).  It is ultimately the jury’s decision whether to draw the inferences urged by the prosecutor.  (Id. (quoting State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 125 (1982)).  Similarly, the prosecutor urged the jury to consider the State’s expert witness, forensic scientist [...], credible based on her extensive credentials that were elicited during her direct examination, including her seventeen years of employment with the New Jersey State Police Office of Forensic Sciences and her involvement with over 2,500 cases concerning DNA analysis.
[brief] To the extent that it may be argued that any reduction in sentence represents an undeserved windfall for the defendant, [...] cites approvingly to what this Court stated in State v. Eigenmann, 280 N.J. Super. 331, 348 (App. Div. 1995) (quoting United States v. Turner, 518 F.2d 14, 17 (7th Cir.1975)):  “‘[t]he potential for abuse in broad judicial power to increase sentences outweighs the possibility of giving a few defendants the benefits resulting from a judicial mistake. ’”  [...], 212 N.J. at 313.  CONCLUSION
[brief] Trial courts have a duty to obey the decision of the Appellate Division precisely as written.  *Flanigan v. McFeely*, 20 N.J. 414, 420 (1956).  “The mandate is a judicial precept that must be enforced as written.  Relief from its directions, even though manifestly erroneous, can be had only in the appellate court whose judgment it is. ”  In *Flanigan*, the New Jersey Supreme Court opined:  The subordination of the inferior tribunal is of the very essence of the appellate function; the mandate is the process directed to the execution of the appellate judgment, and is therefore a command to be obeyed.  The reinvestiture of jurisdiction in the inferior tribunal is in consonance with that judgment, and qualified accordingly.  *Flanigan* at 421.  An opinion from the Appellate Division is binding on all parties in the case in which the opinion was rendered.  *Eherenstorfer v. Div. of Public Welfare*, 196 N.J. Super. 405, 411 (App. Div. 1984).  Likewise, it is binding on the court whose opinion is being reviewed.  *Tomaino v. Burman*, 364 N.J. Super. 224, 232-234 (App. Div. 2003), certify. den. 179 N.J. 310 (2004).  Trial judges are bound to follow the rulings and orders of the Appellate Division and are not free to disregard them.  *Kosmin v. New Jersey State Parole Bd.*, 363 N.J. Super. 28, 40, 830 A.2d 914, 921-22 (App. 2003).  “Trial judges are privileged to disagree with the pronouncements of appellate courts; the privilege does not extend to non-compliance. ”  *Reinauer Realty Corp. v. Borough of Paramus*, 34 N.J. 406, 415 (1961).  In the within matter, the Defendant already filed an appeal of the order denying his motion to vacate the final judgment and the order denying his first motion for reconsideration.
[brief] ARGUMENT POINT I  THE LAW DIVISION PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT AND DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING HIM LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT.  (RESPONDING TO PLAINTIFF’S POINTS I, II, IV, AND V).  The trial court properly denied [...]’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint and dismissed any claims against State Defendants because [...]’s allegations in the current operative pleading—to the extent they can be deciphered—do not support any cognizable legal claim against State Defendants, and denial of leave to amend is proper because [...] has already had numerous opportunities to frame a proper pleading, and it is clear that the any claims he may advance in a proposed reframed pleading would fail as a matter of law.
[brief] CONSIDERING THE MBPA’S INTENT, A CHOICE OF LAW ANALYSIS NECESSITATES THE APPLICATION OF NEW JERSEY LAW TO THIS DISPUTE  [...] joins in Plaintiffs’ arguments that the trial court erred in applying New York law to this matter and that this Court should reverse the trial court’s order compelling arbitration.  If New York law is applied and the court’s order is left intact, the protections afforded to wholesalers under the MBPA, and New Jersey’s public policies seeking to neutralize uneven bargaining power in any contractual relationship, will be jeopardized.  If permitted to stand, the decision below will signal to all brewers that it can avoid this State’s mandates simply because a wholesaler with whom it contracts also engages in business in another State and/or agreed to disregard New Jersey’s laws.  This will not only undermine the distinct regulations governing the system established by our State, it will encourage brewers to only engage in business with wholesalers who also distribute to jurisdictions with less favorable protections to wholesalers, such as New York.  Stated differently, the trial court’s decision will embolden brewers to engage in the conduct that occurred here, and will harm family-owned and operated New Jersey beer wholesalers.  For this reason, the [...] submits that this Court should reverse the trial court’s order and remand with instructions that any analysis of the Wholesaler Agreement apply New Jersey law.
[brief] DEFENDANTS ADOPT THE SAME FLAWED ANALYSIS USED BY THE TRIAL COURT TO GRANT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.  In their brief, Defendants essentially rehash the same arguments that they made to the court below.  They argue that [...] did not have an attorney-client relationship with Defendants based on (1) a single statement made during his deposition that he would only sign a fee agreement with his longtime attorney, (2) the crossing out of [...]’s name and signature line in the engagement letter, and (3) [...]’s retention of another attorney to represent him in the will contest after Defendants failed to timely challenge the will.  The only difference now is that the Defendants are able to point to the lower court’s decision to grant their motion as evidence that these arguments are meritorious.  As explained in greater detail below, the lower court erred when it usurped the role of the jury in resolving genuine issues of material fact concerning the parties’ relationship in order to finding that no duty existed.  The lower court also placed too great an emphasis on the question of whether an attorney-client relationship existed despite [...] having presented substantial evidence that he relied on Defendants’ representation of his interests in the will contest.  As a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the [...]’s relationship with Defendants, the Court must reverse the lower court’s decision and remand for further proceedings.  A.
[brief] [...] fired a second shot, seeing that, while defendant was turning, he still had the gun in his hands.  Defendant then retreated inside the store.  (3T43-13 to 44-3).  As he tried to open the front door, [...] saw defendant, holding a gun, run from the back of the store.  [...] pushed [...] away.  [...] then heard gunshots and fell to the ground.  [...] was unable to identify defendant.
[brief] ”  Gibbons, 86 N.J. at 523.  In such circumstances, a court will look at the controlling law at the relevant time and consider the parties’ reasonable expectations as to the law.  James, 216 N.J. at 573.  An expectation of retroactive application “should be strongly apparent to the parties in order to override the lack of any explicit or implicit expression of intent for retroactive application. ”  Ibid.  Applying those principles to the present case, it is clear that the COVID Statute deserves retroactive application.
[brief] *The Language of the Plan Amendment*  The Amendment to the Oceanfront-Broadway Redevelopment Plan, Beachfront South Sector for Block 216, Lots 11, 12 & 24 (the “Plan Amendment”) indicated that “Block 216, Lots 11, 12 & 24 are [the] last remaining undeveloped parcels in the portion of the Beachfront South Redevelopment area between Pavilion Avenue and North Bath Avenue. ” (Pa285 to Pa297).
[brief] *State v. Herrera*, 469 N.J. Super. 559, 565 (App. Div. 2022) (citations omitted).  To determine whether convictions merge, the court reviews the case “de novo to ‘discern and effectuate the legislative intent underlying the statutory provision[s] at issue. ’”  *Ibid.* (citations omitted).  A conspiracy conviction merges with a completed offense if “the completed offense was the sole criminal objective of the conspiracy. ”  *State v. Hardison*, 99 N.J. 379, 386 (1985); see *State v. Jurcsek*, 247 N.J. Super. 102, 109-10 (App. Div. 1991).  In this way, the New Jersey Criminal Code views conspiracy like attempt, conceiving of conspiracy as a lesser-included offense of the completed offense.  *Hardison*, 99 N.J. at 386.
[brief] M.  To the fullest extent permitted by law, the Subcontractor shall indemnify and hold harmless the Contractor, and its consultants, agents and employees or any of them from and against all claims, damages, losses and expenses, including but not limited to attorneys’ fees, arising out of or resulting from performance of the Work, provided that such claim, damage, loss or expense is attributable to bodily injury, sickness, disease or death sustained by anyone, including employees of Subcontractor or to injury to or destruction of intangible property (other than the Work itself) including loss of use resulting therefrom, caused in whole or in part by negligent acts or omissions of the Subcontractor, anyone directly or indirectly employed by them or anyone for whose acts they may be liable, regardless of whether or not such claim, damaged, loss or expense is caused in part by a party Indemnified hereunder.  Such obligations shall not be construed to negate, abridge, or reduce other rights or obligations of indemnity which would otherwise exist between Contractor and Subcontractor.  See Da149-Da150 (emphasis added).  LEGAL ARGUMENT POINT I THE JURY’S VERDICT EXTINGUISHED ANY CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL COURT’S HOLDING ON CONTRACTUAL INDEMNIFICATION
[brief] When addressing whether OPRA reaches a private agency, the lower court found that the text of the OPRA statute specifically includes this type of situation.  It is the City’s position that the OPRA statute does not contemplate private entities being subject to OPRA.  The specific text of the OPRA statute is as follows:  “Government record” or “record” means any paper, written or printed book, document, drawing, map, plan, photograph, microfilm, data processed or image processed document, information stored or maintained electronically or by sound-recording or in a similar device, or any copy thereof, that has been made, maintained or kept on file in the course of his or its official business by any officer, commission, agency or authority of the State or of any political subdivision thereof, including subordinate boards thereof, or that has been received in the course of his or its official business by any such officer, commission, agency, or authority of the State or of any political subdivision thereof, including subordinate boards thereof.
[brief] ”  Id.; see also Cuccurullo v. Galinsky, 2010 WL 2089669 *11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).  Furthermore, “Counsel may urge the jury to ‘draw conclusions even if the inferences that the jury is asked to make are improbable, perhaps illogical, erroneous or even absurd, unless they are couched in language transcending the bounds of legitimate argument, or there are no grounds for them in the evidence. ’”  Cuccurullo v. Galinsky, 2010 WL 2089669 *12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010)(quoting Spedick v. Murphy, 266 N.J. Super. 573, 590-91 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 567 (1993); see Wimberly v. Paterson, 75 N.J. Super. 584, 604 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 38 N.J. 340 (1962), overruled in part on other grounds by Johnson v. Dobrosky, 187 N.J. 594 (2006); Botta v. Brunner, 42 N.J. Super. 95, 108 (App. Div. 1956), modified, 26 N.J. 82 (1958).  “We will not disturb the trial judge's discretion over summation argument unless ‘it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result. ’”  Cuccurullo v. Galinsky, 2010 WL 2089669 *12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010)(quoting R. 2:10-2).  In this case, examples of Plaintiff’s counsel’s misstatements and distortions include: misleading the jury by telling them, in no uncertain terms, that all of the alleged conduct occurred without pointing to one piece of evidence in support of this claim, or blurring the timeline of facts to bolster Plaintiff’s material deviation testimony that her [...] position was taken away because of her alleged mental disability and/or as retaliation for filing internal complaints or retaining counsel.