ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[directive] The acquittee shall continue to be committed to the custody the Commissioner 1. of the Department Health pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(3) to be confined in an appropriate institution and treated as a person civilly committed, where the acquittee shall undergo treatment as determined to be clinically appropriate; and If of the Commissioner or designee the institution to which the NGRI committee has been 2. of the clinical opinion that the committee may be unconditionally released or committed is or released on conditions without danger to self, others, or property, that they may be transferred to a less restrictive setting for treatment, then the Commissioner or designee at the institution shall provide this court and the counsel identified below with a report pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-9; and by Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), [...] ([...])
[brief] (39T:155-22 to 156-10)  The house was clean, but “smell[ed] funny. ”  (39T:157-21 to 158-12)  [...] estimated that around 50 people from the fire and police departments participated in an “extensive search” for the missing child.  (39T:166-9 to 24)  [...] found a purse that weighed around 10-15 pounds in a shallow hole in the backyard by a shed.  (39T:167-17 to 168-18; 172-3 to 14)  When he opened it, he saw several layers of white plastic bags inside.  (39T:171-16 to 172-14)  Another officer cut through the interior bags, revealing what he thought looked like a piece of cooked meat.  (39T:172-3 to 173-5; 175-8 to 11)  Believing the contents were not relevant to the search, the officers put the purse back on the ground.  (39T:172-19 to 173-5)  Around midnight that evening, [...] looked more closely at the bag and believed it might contain human bones.
[brief] This is a subsequent remedial measure and it - [...]: This is - THE COURT: - - in my mind it is the - - it is - [...]:  It’s for another purpose, though, Judge.  The rules - THE COURT: What is the - - I asked you yesterday specifically what the other purpose is and your answer yesterday was the completeness of the testimony.  That was insufficient.  [...]:  I didn’t know that this is what they - - they intended to do, Judge.  I don’t think - - I don’t - THE COURT: Did they - - did they provide you with an --- 5  Plaintiff was under no obligation to call an expert to challenge the defense expert, nor to call an expert to prove that the floor constituted a slip hazard.
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  Appeal Brief  PROCEDURAL HISTORY  1  STATEMENT OF FACTS  3  LEGAL ARGUMENT  29 POINT I - The Trial Court Rejected the ‘Law of the Case’ and Refused to Permit Plaintiff to Respond to the Motion; (Pa-171)  29 POINT II - When the Trial Court Rejected “Law of the Case,” Plaintiff Should Have Been Permitted to File a Response to the Original Motion; (Pa-173)  31 POINT III - Statute of Limitations (Pa-1)  POINT IV - The Court Below Cited No Authority (Pa-171)  37 CONCLUSION
[brief] On 12/30/16 [...] submitted the Affidavit of Lost Note of 2/12/14 to the Trial Court (088a).  An unauthenticated copy of the alleged Note was attached to that affidavit as Attachment 1 (091a).  That alleged Note was signed on 2/14/2005.  That Note was not indorsed to any party.  There was no assignment of the alleged Note to any party.  So since 2/14/2005 [...] has been the Note Holder of my mortgage.  Since 2/14/2005 [...] has not come forward to demand its loan.  So ten full years later on 2/14/2015 the mortgage Note became time barred and uncollectable based on N.J.S.A. 12A:3-118(a) and (b).
[brief] The Second Motion to Dismiss the Second Action.  On May 13, 2022, Defendants jointly moved again to dismiss the Second Action, for the most part restating the arguments set forth in the First Motion to Dismiss. (Pa368–70.)  After full briefing, the trial court heard oral argument on the second motion to dismiss (“July 8 Oral Argument”).  (See 3T.)  Defendants argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to the pending appeal, and the trial court agreed with that position.  (See 3T18:12–18, 3T43:3–8.)  Nevertheless, despite its own admission that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter, the trial court made a series of extraneous and contradictory “factual findings” that the court ultimately set aside and disregarded—as it should have.  (See 3T8:5–17, 3T9:18–11:21.)  For example, on the one hand, the trial court stated, “I don’t think there’s any dispute that up until February of 2021 when [[...]] allegedly had this phone call with [...] that he always suspected that there was some quid pro quo going on even if he didn’t know about the school.  We can all agree on that, right?” (3T8:12–17.)  On the other hand, the court stated: I am going to grant Mr. [...] the benefit of all reasonable inferences and credibility calls in connection with the motion in front of me.  I believe what he says, that the new evidence that supports the second Complaint was as a result of a February ‘21 conversation he had with [...].  The lightbulb goes off.  And he thinks now that’s the reason why they’re favoring [...], because they promised the school.  That’s what his testimony was.  I’m accepting it.  I’m making that finding of fact in connection with this motion.  [(3T10:6–16.)]  Those seven sentences of extraneous “findings of fact” comprise the entire basis for [...]’s present appeal.
[brief] Petitioner argues that the Commission was incorrect to dismiss his claims against the Board as a whole, and claims that the Commission’s decision has given the Board an “out” by permitting its members to conspire collectively to engage in unlawful conduct.  (Pb29.)  Petitioner misses the point.  The School Ethics Commission consistently has held that a complainant must prove an ethics violation by advancing “specific allegations against individual” board members.  The board itself cannot as an entity be subject to an ethics violation, nor can broad or sweeping claims of general misconduct or ethical violations be imputed to every board member.  See Lovett v. Asbury, C01-09 (SEC Apr. 28, 2009) (Ra42-45).  Petitioner here has done nothing more than lump together generalized, vague, and specious claims of misconduct against multiple Board members or the Board as a whole, and in contravention of the Act’s requirement that complainant’s bring particularized allegations against individual board members.  N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1, the Code of Ethics for Board Members, applies to individual board members.  It does not apply to administrators or to a board as a whole.  Therefore, Petitioner’s allegations in the complaint that the “Superintendent” or “the Board” violated any section of the Code of Ethics must be dismissed.  Accordingly, the allegations in Counts 1-4, 6-8, 12, 14, 15 and 18 which allege violations by “the Board” as an entity or “the Superintendent” properly were dismissed.
[directive] The term “unlawfully disrupts, delays or prevents the operation of” does not include non-violent conduct growing out of a labor dispute as defined in N.J.S.A. 2A:15-58; or Endangers or obstructs the safe operation of motor vehicles by using a traffic 6.  control preemption device to interfere with or impair the operation of a traffic 3rd Degree $25,000 to $75,000
[brief] Van Dunk, 210 N.J. at 474 (quoting Millison, 101 N.J. at 179).  Indeed, even “the finding of a willful violation under OSHA is not dispositive of the issue of whether [an employer] committed an intentional wrong” because “[t]he existence of an uncontested finding of an OSHA safety violation in the wake of [a] workplace injury does not establish the virtual certainty that Millison demands. ”
[brief] 31.  Nothing in the Trial Court record indicates that [...] has ever contributed financially to the $1,500.00 that [...] paid each month to [...].  32.  [...] and Johnny attempted to maintain normal relations but [...] became suspicious of their motives and used security equipment installed for the safety of the parents to monitor their visits (Pa394, [...] Matos Dep., 57:10-58:25).  33.  [...]’s three sons stopped visiting because they were so uncomfortable (Pa436, [...] Matos Dep. 60:22-61:1).  34.  [...] downloaded a Power of Attorney form and a Will form, filled it out to make himself Agent under the Power of Attorney and Executor of the Will, brought a notary to [...] and had his parents sign the documents (2T90:6-21, Pa97, Pa108).
[brief] (Pca4)  On March 6, 1994, police received a tip that [...] and two others were responsible for the victims’ deaths.  (Pca4).  Upon being questioned, [...] implicated defendant and [...] and provided information leading to the discovery of the gun used in the incident.  (Pca4).  Defendant was brought in for questioning on the same day but declined to give a statement.  (Pca4).  In his presentence interview defendant stated that he had consumed alcohol prior to burglarizing the victims, but that he was not drunk at the time.
[brief] The Trial Court carefully considered the parties’ arguments and properly held that the Complaint is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  In reaching this conclusion, the Trial Court properly determined that Appellants voluntarily agreed to be bound by the Consent Order which: (a) dismissed the Chancery Action without prejudice; (b) deferred further action pending resolution of the [...]; and (c) imposed a sixty-day deadline to revive the Chancery Action claims if the parties so chose.  The Court also correctly determined that the arbitration award in the [...] constituted a valid and final judgment of the [...].  Finally, the Court correctly determined that the Nacirema Award triggered the sixty-day refiling deadline and Appellants failed to file the Complaint within that time.  (Pa3-9 (Opinion)).  Applying these facts, the Court correctly determined that the Chancery Action’s claims were adjudicated “once the final award was rendered in the [...]” and the “sixty-day refiling deadline” passed.
[brief] Since their position on Point I is incorrect their argument in Point II that the trial judge failed to determine whether the revised lot grade was the result of mounding, terracing or other devices is pointless.  There has been no argument that the revised grading increased building height.  That was conceded from day one.  There was no need for the Trial Court to review that issue.  The language in the Ordinance “designed to allow increased building height” clearly demonstrates that the intent and purpose of the “design” must be to allow increased building height.  The Planning Board properly considered whether the intent and purpose of the applicant’s design was to increase building height and properly found that it was not.  The Trial Court properly agreed.
[brief] 2  LEGAL ARGUMENT  I.  THE DECISION IN RISE AGAINST HATE V. CHERRY HILL SHOULD BE STRONGLY CONSIDERED BY THE COURT AS DETERMINATIVE AS TO THE INSTANT MATTER .........................  3  II.  NEW AMENDMENTS TO THE OPRA STATUTE HAVE CLARIFIED THAT THE DOCUMENTS/RECORDS AT ISSUE ARE PRIVATE AND SHOULD NOT BE DISCLOSED  .........................................................4  CONCLUSION
[brief] (Aa 3 to 16)  The defendant has made a prima facie showing that he was irreparably prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to file the appropriate suppression motion challenging the sneak and peek.  In the defendant's case, there is no doubt that trial counsel was aware that the affidavit in support of the sneak and peek involved 1,270 pages, which he argued only about 84 pages makes any references to the defendant, that there were about 21 co-defendants, almost 25,000 wire-tap audio recordings and none of which directly incriminated the defendant, numerous inconsistencies and misrepresentations in the affidavit by the detectives and the lead prosecutor as well.  The defendant even paid trial counsel to obtain experts, which trial counsel misrepresented to the defendant he secured.  However, there is no reasonable justification that could possibly explain away trial counsel's gross negligence, misleading the defendant and the court.  The Sixth Amendment provides, inter alia: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
[brief] ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW  DIVISION  BERGEN COUNTY v. Trial Court  Docket No. [...]; [...] a/k/a [...]; and JOHN DOES  1 to 10 : [...] Sat Below: HON. [...], J.S.C.  Defendants-Respondents.  BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
[brief] She was initially enrolled in the [...] (“[...]”) as of September 1, 1991 based on her employment with the [...] (Aa9-14).  On September 1, 1997 she transferred to the [...] (Aa9-14).  On September 20, 2019, [...] filed a two-count complaint in the [...] against [...] asserting violations of the Diane R. Allen Equal Pay Act, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(t) as well as with the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to 42 (Aa49-56).  The complaint alleged that since her hiring in 1997 she did not receive the same pay increases received by her male colleagues despite the fact that she met the MA-30 criteria for same, standing for a master’s degree and 30 academic credits subsequent to her degree (Aa49-56).  The pay differentials between [...] and her male colleagues approximated 30% of her salary in the final three years of her employment (Aa49-56).  As of the date of [...]’ retirement effective May 1, 2021, she had accrued nearly 42 years of overall pensionable service with the [...] (Aa26-27).  ---
[brief] Anytime [...] got hurt on the job, he reported it, and a workers’ compensation claim was opened.  (1T56).  In the absence of a Report of Injury from 2009, [...] believed any reference to a 2009 accident or incident was simply a mistake.  (2T37-38).  [...] believed any reference to 2009 was more likely a typographical error than a real injury date.  (2T39).  [...] conceded the only evidence of a 2009 injury involving [...] stemmed from a report of [...] dated November 6, 2015.  (3T24; Pa161-Pa165).  No other medical reports or documentation mentioned a 2009 incident involving [...].  (3T25).  [...] was never provided with any accident/injury report for any injury occurring in 2009 as to [...].  (3T28).
[brief] The trial evidence unequivocally established that the City did not have notice of the missing sign prior to the accident.  At trial, Plaintiff’s case for notice only consisted of three work orders and a brief examination of [...], a City representative, to authenticate the work orders.  Da181; Da225; Da226; [5T27:12-35:17].  The three work orders included the February 2015 work order and two additional work orders dated December 13, 2011 and June 19, 2014, respectively.  Da181; Da225; Da226.  The December 2011 and June 2014 work orders were incomplete, only specifying the date of when the City was informed that the sign was down and did not provide any information as to when the City reinstalled the sign.  Da225; Da226; [5T423-23:4].  To avoid potential prejudice to the City, the work orders were only used to show prior instances where the sign was knocked down.  [5T4:23-23:4].  Plaintiff provided no further evidence as to the notice issue.  After the close of Plaintiff’s case, the City moved for a directed verdict and again raised the issue regarding the lack of notice.  [5T103:3-24].  Plaintiff relied only on the three work orders and [...]’s authentication of the work orders to establish notice.  Da181; Da225; Da226.  The February 2015 work order showed that the sign was knocked down and reinstalled six days later and was reinstalled approximately thirty-seven days before the accident.  Da181.  The December 2011 and June 2014 work orders only showed that the sign was previously knocked down.  Da225; Da226.  Plaintiff provided no additional testimony or documentary evidence indicating whether the City received any complaints about the sign from the time the sign was reinstalled in February to the date of the accident.  Although Plaintiff did not offer any evidence as to when the sign was knocked down after it was reinstalled in February, the trial court held that Plaintiff had made a prima facie case to send the case to the jury and denied the City’s motion.
[directive] 5.2  Circumstances When BWC Activation is Generally Required.  Except as otherwise expressly provided in Section 7 or any other provision in this Policy, or by law, an officer equipped with a BWC shall be required to activate the device whenever the officer is responding to a call for service or at the initiation of any other law enforcement or investigative encounter between an officer and a member of the public, to include any of the following circumstances,2 unless there exists an immediate threat to the officer’s life or safety that makes such activation impossible or dangerous; in such situations, the officer must activate the camera at the first reasonable opportunity to do so and it shall remain activated until the encounter has fully concluded and the officer leaves the scene: (a) the officer initiates an investigative detention (e.g., a Delaware v. Prouse traffic stop, a Terry v. Ohio criminal suspicion stop, or a checkpoint or roadblock stop); (b) the officer is responding to a call for service and is at or near the location to which the officer has been dispatched;  Two or more of the below-listed activities are likely to occur during a single encounter or event.  For 2 example, a frisk ordinarily occurs after an officer already has initiated an investigative detention (i.e., a “stop”), and a custodial interrogation typically occurs after the officer has arrested the person being interrogated.  Although these specified activities often will co-occur and overlap, they are presented in this Section to ensure complete coverage of the circumstances when a BWC must be activated.  The specified activity that occurs first during an unfolding encounter will trigger the obligation to activate a BWC.  As explained in Section 5.3, once activated based upon the initiation of any of the listed police activities, the BWC generally must remain in operation until the police-civilian encounter is concluded (i.e., until the officer is no longer interacting with or in the presence of the civilian), and not just while the officer is engaged in the specified activity that required activation.  BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY | January 2022
[brief] IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE  DIVISION INDICTMENT NO. [...] APPELLATE DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, v. [...], DEFENDANT/APPELLANT ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION  ENTERED BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW  DIVISION-CRIMINAL  THE HONORABLE  [...], J.S.C. APPELLANT'S BRIEF AND APPENDIX  Date of Submission to Court: May 10, 2023  Submitted by: [...], ESQUIRE  ATTORNEY ID: 018951974  [...] [...] [...]  [...]  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
[brief] Through the hallucinations, schizophrenia, dissociation and autism, this mitigating factor should’ve been given substantial weight and not downplayed.  Similarly, mitigating factor four (4) should’ve been given substantial weight.  The State’s expert never stated that [...] did not have a significant mental health issue.  The Court downplayed the weight on this factor and only considered facts that supported placing less weight on the mitigating factor.  For example, the Court stated, “he’s not mentally challenged because he graduated from high school. ” (17T:27-14 to 15).  The Court made no mention that at the time of the offense, [...] was at the [...].  (10T:81-11 to 21).  [...] testified that “[t]he [...] is an alternative school for individuals with significant disabilities. ” (10T:81-16 to 18).  Similarly, the Court substantially downplayed autism and stated, “while this order exists and maybe to a certain extent it may have some effect on his emotions, there’s nothing before me that shows that rose to any level that forced him or pushed him into doing this. ” (17T:207-18 to 22).  The Court should’ve place weight on mitigating factor eight.
[brief] *Pfaus*, 97 N.J. Super. at 8.  And the trial court had every reason to include this language when crafting this particular preliminary injunction.  As explained above, and as Appellants have never denied, the trial court found that the Original Policy was in effect for over four years without incident.  (Da137).  Appellants did not introduce record evidence substantiating any harms from that policy, or establish that it subjected them to federal or state liability.  See supra at 46.  Nor did they submit the terms of any new policy they wish to enact—let alone terms they would operate in a nondiscriminatory way.  Said another way, Appellants have not put forward a proposal to this court, and did not put forward any proposal to the trial court, other than a blanket-notification policy.  Nor is that a surprise, as they continue to wrongly claim that only blanket notification satisfies parental rights.  (Db24-32).  But if Appellants identify one, they can always seek a settlement with the State, or they can submit the policy to [...] for its approval in the administrative proceeding.
[brief] 3T77-14 to 3T78-23; 3T80-15 to 3T81-7.  Da1347-1451.  These materials were admitted into evidence and refute the Trial Court’s statement that [...] “did not identify scientific methodology in his report or on direct examination. ”  Da26-27.  The finding that [...]’s analysis lacked scientific support and that he “could not identify a single study addressing whether indoor-growing mold contaminates food and causes injury” is not merely unsupported by any evidence in the record, it is contradicted by the numerous studies concerning foodborne hazards of mold that were (a) cited in his expert report, (b) relied upon in reaching his conclusions, and (c) admitted into evidence as Trial Exhibit D-20, Da1347.
[brief] See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Governor [...] (Jan. 6, 1986) (“[I] believe these new laws, combined with the recently authorized Bureau of Securities, will substantially enhance the protection of New Jersey investors”); Ass. Fin. Ins. Comm. Statement to S. 2990 1 (June 12, 1997) (“[t]his Bill provides the Bureau of Securities strong enforcement powers to deal with securities firms and individuals regulated by the bureau who violate the law. ”).  The trial court’s restrictive interpretation of N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2) limiting the Bureau Chief’s remedies not only contradicts how the Bureau has interpreted and applied the Securities Law, it creates an outlier among the numerous orders and judgments of courts that have allowed both restitution and disgorgement in the same action.  As noted above, courts routinely ordered both restitution and disgorgement in Bureau enforcement actions.  No court – until now – has ever concluded that it lacked the statutory and equitable power to award both remedies in the same action.  Furthermore, the New Jersey Securities Law expressly provides in N.J.S.A. 49:3-75 that “[t]his Act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact similar laws and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of this act with related federal regulations.
[brief] (19T:100-10 to 22).  There were no abrasions or injuries to [...]’ hands or arms, and there were no drugs or alcohol in his system at the time of his death.  (19T:116-6 to 119-4).  Defendant’s tale of victimhood and tragic heroism in the face of an intruder was soon debunked through several pieces of evidence that the [...] had neglected to mention to police.