ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In particular, [...] provided a detailed procedural history of the case, which, among other things, described the prior rulings of the different judges that had been assigned to the case that had all found Defendants to be in default of their discovery obligations.  Da6-10, ¶¶ 1-30.  In detailing the history of Defendants’ discovery misconduct, [...]’s amplification observed:  “When asked to provide any correspondence about the mold issues, Defendants responded ‘none to my knowledge,’ however, Plaintiffs were in possession of at least one email, on which [[...]] was copied, in which the mold issues were discussed. ”  Da9, ¶ 24.  In describing the June 12 hearing, [...]’s amplification pointed out that “Defendants acknowledged they had not provided one piece of discovery or amended their answers since March 6, 2023. ”  Da10, ¶ 34.  [...]’s amplification also pointed out Defendants’ counsel’s dishonesty during the June 12 hearing in which she claimed that the March 6 argument “took two minutes,” when, in fact, after taking the time to listen to the audio recording of that hearing, [...] learned “[t]he hearing was over 20 minutes in which [...] went through multiple examples of how Defendants had not complied with discovery (as noted above). ”  Da11, ¶ 35.  Indeed, [...]’s amplification observed that Defendants’ counsel’s claim that “‘we did not go over… the February 8 case management conference’” to be “entirely false.  Id.  Ultimately, [...]’s amplification concluded: [...] was explicit about what Defendants had to do to have their answers restored.  They were not compliant.  Instead of filing a Motion for Reconsideration of his decision, they waited for almost three months to file the motion again.  In an almost four-year old case, the only paper discovery provided by Defendants relating to their years long ownership of a residential apartment complex were tax returns.  They did not provide bank statement[s], leases correspondence…  Having failed to provide the requested information and having done nothing to cure the defects noted by [...], th[e] proper remedy was to grant Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike with Prejudice and deny Defendants’ Motion to Reinstate.  [Da11, ¶ 38]  For the reasons described below, [...]’s ruling should be affirmed because her conclusions as stated on the record and in her amplification find ample support in both the law and the record.
[brief] Rule 4:5-1 does not have an exception to the notice rule if a plaintiff decides that defendant "presumably knew" of the possibility of litigation.  Plaintiff cannot refute a claim of prejudice by unilaterally determining that notice under Rule 4:5-1 would not have made a difference.  (Pb43).  Accordingly, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion when it found that there was no sanction short of dismissal which would address the substantial prejudice incurred by Defendants.  (T32:4-8).  CONCLUSION
[brief] Defendant being charged with driving while suspended was so thoroughly attenuated and essentially independent from the underlying drug investigation that led to the challenged stop of his car that the exclusionary rule would serve no purpose and thus does not apply to suppress his pre-existing status and unrelated fact that defendant was driving while having been suspended for drunk driving.  Defendant must answer for his driving while suspended, regardless of the admissibility of the unrelated drug evidence.  Perhaps had additional physical evidence been found on defendant incident to an arrest for driving while suspended, he might have a justiciable claim for suppression of the physical evidence.  But since no additional evidence was seized as a result of him being charged with driving while suspended, there is nothing to suppress and his charge for driving while suspended stands irrespective of the results of the motion to suppress.  Defendant being listed as a suspended driver for a prior drunk-driving offense preexisted the stop to investigate drug activity, as did the fact that police saw the car being driven by someone who was later identified as defendant who was the sole occupant of that car; and any alleged illegality in his stop for drug activity does not provide him a windfall loophole to avoid answering for the separate, unrelated, and dangerous crime of driving while suspended.  Any attempt to suggest that the evidence for his driving while suspended was the exclusive result of his challenged stop for drug activity would misstate the nature of the proofs needed to prove driving while suspended.  Defendant’s car was seen by police being driven prior to any police stop of his vehicle.  Indeed, he was the only occupant in the vehicle that had driven in and out of the parking lot.  And his presence on the driving while suspended list, which is already available to police, pre-existed the decision to stop.  Therefore, both the observed driving prior to the stop and his name already being on the suspended driver list were not proofs only learned by police as a direct result of the challenged stop.  True, the decision to charge defendant with driving while suspended was set in motion by the challenged stop, it was neither the direct and exclusive result of the stop as such, and when police learned of his suspended status, he was charged for the conduct he engaged in prior to the actual stop, namely his driving while suspended.  As a result, he must thus answer for his driving while suspended.
[brief] (Da58 at ¶ 3, fn1; Da201; Da313.)  “A” (the “Unnamed Road,” and collectively with the Boulevard, the “Roads”).  (Da58 at ¶ 4.)  The approval resolutions, along with the Developer’s Agreement entered into between the [...] and [...] on December 20, 2004 (the “2004 Developers Agreement”), required [...] to construct the Roads in compliance with the [...]’s specifications and to post a performance bond for the completion of same.
[brief] Here, as the court below correctly recognized, attempts were made in three different municipalities to administer the Alcotest to defendant.  The Alcotest machines in Denville and Rockaway Borough both experienced control test failures, so [...] transported defendant to Boonton to use their Alcotest machine.  Once a properly functioning machine was secured, the test was administered according to official procedure.  [...] allowed for the requisite waiting period between tests, removed all electronics from the room, checked defendant’s mouth to ensure that there were no foreign objects, and continuously observed defendant during the 20 minute waiting period to make sure that defendant did not do anything to impair the validity of the Alcotest readings.  (3T11:16 to 3T12:3; Aa46).  The court below noted that all records of these tests, including the additional foundational documents required by *Chun* and the Drinking Driver questionnaire, were properly admitted into evidence without any objection from defense counsel.  The court also acknowledged that [...] was properly certified to operate the Alcotest machine and his certification was entered into evidence without objection from defendant’s attorney.
[brief] (15T 109:17-23).  Between the parties’ original negotiations and exchange of spreadsheets in March 2014 and their handshake agreement in July of that year, [...] never reviewed company financial records, and [...] never provided support for the balance sheets, P-48 and P-50.  (15T 109:24 to 110:10).  The reason that [...] did not request any of this information from [...] was because after decades of friendship and partnership in business, [...] trusted [...] implicitly and relied on him for all finance-related matters in their shared business endeavors.
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[brief] ”) (internal citation omitted).  Thus, the vindication of constitutional rights through the NJCRA is subject to the same two-year statute of limitations as other personal injury claims.  N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.  This court has expressly stated as such.  See Lapolla v. County of Union, 449 N.J. Super. 288, 298 (App. Div. 2017) (“The statute of limitations for claims under the NJCRA is two years. ”) (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:14–2(a)); see also Smith v. Datla, 451 N.J. Super. 82, 99 (App. Div. 2017) (noting “LAD, NJCRA, and Section 1983” are “all . . . subject to a two-year statute of limitations”).
[brief] *County of Essex, supra*, 373 N.J. Super. at 550.  In the present case, the [...] did not receive any “benefit” from the Appellants for which compensation is due.  Appellants failed to make the required payment(s) due on the Lease with a third party and, as a result, the Lease was terminated, and the Appellants lost site control of the Property.  Appellants cannot claim that the [...] were unjustly enriched when Appellants lost their own solar rights.  5.
[brief] THE LOWER COURT DID NOT MAKE A CREDIBLE FINDING REGARDING CAUSAL CONNECTION (9a).  Defendants emphasize the lower court’s finding that “Plaintiff has failed to show how any of the above acts have even a remote relationship to the filing of [the initial lawsuit].”  Def.’s BOE and Restel Br., pg. 19; 9a.  This paltry sentence does not amount to a sufficient consideration of whether or not the retaliatory actions pled by Plaintiff are causally connected to the filing of her initial lawsuit.  Once again, this matter is at the motion to dismiss stage, and Plaintiff adequately pled a causal connection, given that she alleges that the retaliatory activities began after she filed her initial lawsuit and continued throughout the pendency of that lawsuit.  219a, ¶ 52.  The retaliatory activities pled by Plaintiff span a period of years, like the yearly rotation of grade level partners since the issuance of the Injunction.  221a, ¶ 67.  One of the incidents complained about by Defendant [...], which prompted the sham investigation, is that Plaintiff was attempting to further her case in the initial lawsuit by targeting her.  237a, ¶ 173.  Given all of this, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged a causal connection at the pleadings stage, and, the lower court erred by failing to perform even the most rudimentary analysis with respect to causal connection.  IV.
[brief] In Lopez, a 14-year-old boy was struck by a train after he went onto the right of way.  Id. at 199-200.  The engineer of the train was aware that trespassers could sometimes be present on the tracks in the area where the collision ultimately occurred.  Id.  However, he was not aware that anyone was actually present on the tracks as he approached the location of the collision because he could not see that area until after the train completed the curve just before it.  Id.  After coming out of the curve, the engineer saw the boy on the tracks and then immediately tried to stop the train.  Unfortunately, the train could not stop in time to avoid the collision.  Id.
[brief] This Court in *M. Spiegel & Sons Oil Corp. v. Amiel* found waiver under precisely the same circumstances as those currently before the Court.  No. A-1900-16T2, 2018 WL 1734035, at *6 (App. Div. Mar. 12, 2018).  The plaintiff in *Amiel* “submitted certifications from counsel in support of its attorney’s fee request and, in response, defendants did nothing.  Defendants opted not to contest the reasonableness of the requested attorney’s fees before the trial court, and instead chose to challenge the requested fees for the first time on appeal.
[brief] The trial court reviewed the NJCFLA and concluded there is no private cause of action created in the NJCFLA.  (Da61).  The plain language of the statute supports this conclusion.  The Appellate Division recently addressed the private right of action under the NJFLA issue in Woo-Padva v. [...], No. A-1996-21, 2023 WL 6157245 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 21, 2023).  (Pa1)  There the plaintiff claimed that the debt collector did not have a license to collect debt and therefore the underlying debt was void and not collectable pursuant to the NJCFLA.  The court noted  The Legislature, however, did not provide a private right of action under the CFLA – and plaintiff does not contend otherwise.  Instead, the Legislature determined that a “consumer lender” who violated the licensing provision of the CFLA would “be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree,” N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33, and authorized the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance to punish those who violate any provision of the CFLA by, for example, refusing to issue a license or imposing penalties in accordance with the CFLA, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-18.
[brief] Answer to School Ethics Complaint, filed by Appellee on October 9, 2022.  24.  Letter from [...] to Appellants and Appellee, dated October 11, 2022.  25.  Letter from [...], transmitting the above-captioned matter to the Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”), October 17, 2022.  26.  Letter from Appellee to the Honorable [...], A.L.J. (“[...]”), dated December 12, 2022, attaching a.
[brief] This report urges even more rapid action than the EMP itself.  Meeting the 80x50 goal will require very substantial reductions in GHG emissions in the transportation, residential and commercial, and electric generation sectors, given the predominant contributions of those sectors to New Jersey's total emissions.  [Ha115, emphasis added.]  Thus, the 80x50 Report sets the progression of reductions in natural gas consumption: in just ten years, a reduction of 22%, in another ten years, fully 64%.
[brief] Defendant repeatedly asserted his (albeit mistaken) belief that because the State had already obtained a saliva sample from him when he was arrested, and that the State’s request for a second sample meant something nefarious was going on.  (3T5-16 to 24)  Defendant also explained that he had never seen any lab report indicating what had been found at the crime scene and justifying their stated need to compare his DNA.  (4T30-3 to 13)  Once Defendant had been provided with the requested lab report, he agreed to provide a blood sample in lieu of a buccal swab.  (5T3-14 to 7-11)  No matter how misguided the court may have found Defendant’s opposition to the buccal swab, he repeatedly explained his reasons and ultimately consented to willingly give an alternative DNA sample—the blood sample that the State used to link Defendant to the saliva found at the crime scene.
[brief] The Trial Court Erred In Refusing To Apply Mitigating Factor Four When It Was Uncontested That [...] Suffered From Mental Health Issues That Contributed To The Commission Of The Offense.  The trial court further erred in refusing to give any weight to mitigating factor four (“There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant’s conduct, though failing to establish a defense,” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(4)) at sentencing.  Our courts have been clear that even where mental illness may not rise to the level of an affirmative defense or negate an element of an offense, evidence of mental illness that would relate to the defendant’s actions still requires the application of mitigating factor four.  See State v. Nataluk, 316 N.J. Super. 336, 349 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that although the defendant’s insanity defense was rejected at trial, “[i]t is difficult to understand how defendant's condition could not have constituted a mitigating factor”); accord State v. Nayee, 192 N.J. 475 (2007) (case summarily remanded where trial court failed to consider the defendant’s mental health in mitigation under factor four); see also State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 149 (2011) (evidence that the defendant suffered from Battered Women’s Syndrome was found relevant in support of mitigating factor four).
[brief] This argument conflates the issues presented below, and, more fundamentally, the difference between a constitutional challenge to a law and a challenge based on the doctrine of preemption.  See Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, The Constitution of the United States of America – Analysis and Interpretation, at 2317 (2013), available at www.gpo.gov/constitutionannoted (“State or local laws held to be preempted by federal law are void not because they contravene any provision of the Constitution, but rather because they conflict with a federal statute or treaty, and through operation of the Supremacy Clause. ”) (emphasis added).  Notably, there is no wording in the trial court’s opinion to suggest that it found the Ordinance facially invalid.  [...] did not argue that the Ordinance was unconstitutional – which it would have had to do in order for the “facial” versus “as applied” debate to be relevant here.  See, e.g., Abbott by Abbott v. Burke, 199 N.J. 140, 234 (2009) (“A statute may be declared unconstitutional in one of two manners.
[brief] **REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT INADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY AND FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON SECOND-DEGREE ROBBERY AS A LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE.  (Not Raised Below)**  The trial court made two instructional errors that each independently requires reversal.  First, the trial court inadequately instructed the jury on accomplice liability by failing to tell them that in order to convict [...] of armed robbery, they had to find that he shared [...]’s intent to commit the robbery with a gun.  Second, the trial court failed to instruct the jury on second-degree robbery, a lesser-included offense that was clearly indicated by the evidence.  These errors, individually and cumulatively, require reversal.  *U.S. Const.* amends.
[brief] First, unlike in Diaz, there is nothing in the record to suggest [...] was pursuing some type of strategy to mislead defendant.  Defendant was lawfully arrested apart from this case, and [...] only showed up to the station to question defendant when another officer thought that defendant might be the person in the attempt to identify flyer.  Rather than “provid[ing] an explanation that creates or reinforces a false impression as to the seriousness of the sentence that [] defendant was facing,” at worst all [...] did was withhold information from a possible suspect he had limited reason to believe was the robber he pursued.  Diaz, 470 N.J. Super. at 519.  There was no trickery and no deception as to the true reason he was in custody.  Second, unlike in Diaz, at the time he sat down with defendant, [...] had no information that “viewed collectively, would lead an objectively reasonable police officer to believe that defendant was criminally responsible for” the robbery.  *Id.* at 528.  [...] had been searching for the second suspect in the robbery, even pursuing various leads from other officers that had not panned out.  He had no more information to suggest this time would be different than he had with all those other leads.  As the trial court found, there was no probable cause to support charging or arresting defendant at that time for robbery.  All [...] knew at that moment was that there was an individual at the station who another officer believed resembled the second suspect in the flyer -- nothing more.  This further demonstrates that [...] owed defendant no explanation as to why he was showing him the photograph.
[brief] Plaintiffs/Respondents, [...], [...], [...], [...], [...] and [...] (collectively referred to as “[...]” or “Respondents”) brief fails to demonstrate why non-party-movant/Appellant [...]’s (“[...]”) deposition is relevant and necessary or why the information cannot be obtained through the normal course of discovery in the underlying Florida State Court litigation.  It is respectfully submitted that the trial court overlooked well established case law and Court Rules entitling [...] to protection from [...]’s unnecessary and unwarranted conduct.  It is therefore respectfully submitted that the trial court’s orders should be reversed and an order be entered quashing the subject subpoena as well as issuing an protective order.
[brief] [...]’s Denial Letter dated March 5, 2021 (Pa357–58) did not even suggest that there were not then “reasonable grounds to believe that the insured’s interests might be served by an appeal. ”  Pharmacists, 187 Vt. at 334, 993 A.2d at 421.  Instead, [...] cited appealable trial court rulings as justifying withdrawal of support for a pending appeal contesting, as erroneous, those very rulings.  The record overwhelmingly supports an inference that [...] succumbed to conflict of interest and wrongfully attempted to exploit, for its own benefit, disputed summary judgment rulings that [...] was duty bound to appeal for its insured’s benefit.  [...] clearly breached its duty to defend the HCH Action and must now live with the consequences of its wrongful, self-interested action.
[brief] This case is distinguishable from *Pivnick v. Beck*, 165 N.J. 670 (2000).  Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff was collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of whether or not Defendant was negligent in drafting [...]’s Will was wholly based on the case of *Pivnick v. Beck.* supra.  As this was the only authority cited for Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed, it is important to compare the holding in *Pivnick v. Beck* with the instant case.
[directive] Judge Date  Defendant's Attorney: Prosecutor's Office: Name --------------- Name --------------- Address Address ---------- Telephone Number Telephone Number ---------- ---------------  Fax ---------------- Fax ---------------  Em ail ---------------  Em ail ________  If yes, language _ Interpreter needed? No Yes ________  If ADA accommodation needed? No Yes yes, describe _ D  Contact List attached Form Promulgated Directive #21-20 (08/05/2020), CN 12563 (KROL Order 8) by New Jersey Judiciary
[brief] [OFFICIAL COPY REPRINT]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY ADOPTED FEBRUARY 21, 1980  Amend page 1, section 1, lines 12-13, omit "the chairman", insert "all members".  Amend page 1, section 1, line 16, after "sponsor,", omit "or the", insert "a"; omit "chairman", insert "member".  STATEMENT  These amendments permit any member of committee to which a bill has been referred to request a fiscal note on it.  SENATE STATE GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND INTERSTATE RELATIONS AND VETERANS AFFAIRS  COMMITTEE STATEMENT TO SENATE, No. 287 with Senate committee amendments  STATE OF NEW JERSEY
[directive] This Rule also provides that if a person bail.2 It charged with a crime punishable by death is not indicted within 3 months after commitment, the judge, for good cause shown, may admit the defendant to further allows that if an incarcerated defendant’s case is not moved for trial within 6 months after arraignment, a Superior Court judge, for cause shown, may discharge the defendant upon the defendant’s own recognizance.  Finally, the Rule provides that where the person has been arrested in an extradition proceeding, that person may be admitted to bail except where that person is charged with a crime punishable by death.  This Rule provides that a Superior Court judge may set bail for any offense.  Only a Superior Court judge may set bail for persons charged with murder, kidnapping, manslaughter, aggravated manslaughter, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, a person arrested in an extradition order.3