ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] Pa281-282.  Appellant’s arguments before this court rest upon his belief that the fifth prong under Dunkley was not satisfied because he believes the City could have done more to prove its “unequivocal commitment. ”  This, however, is nothing more than subjective disagreements with the effectiveness of the policy.  First, Appellant’s arguments appear to be that because a prima facie case had been established and affirmed by the trial court, the analysis should stop there and no affirmative defense can be presented on the City’s behalf.  This is contrary to the very purpose of the affirmative defense and is further contrary to what courts have routinely found, i.e., the affirmative defense is very much an aspect that can be reviewed and determined at the summary judgment stage.  Indeed, in Dunkley, the Appellate Division affirmed summary judgment by the trial court on the basis of the affirmative defense despite the trial court finding that a prima facie case of discrimination had been demonstrated by plaintiff.  Dunkley, supra, 437 N.J.Super. at 378.  The affirmative defense, if demonstrated on the record, permits the City here to receive summary judgment in its favor.  There is no requirement that the City, despite its proofs, then proceed to trial to prove the matter again.  The trial court is not devoid of authority to grant summary judgment on the basis of the affirmative defense and the Appellant offers no authority for same.  Moreso, Appellant complains that the discipline was not issued and that City could have held up [...]’s retirement or pension benefits.  Frankly, this is neither here nor there.  The Appellant’s beliefs in the effectiveness of the policy are not part of any analysis under the test reviewed in Dunkley.  The City set forth demonstrative proof at that it met these elements: (1) it maintained a policy of anti-harassment and anti-discrimination in writing; (2) it set forth both formal and informal complaint procedures; (3) mandatory training for supervisors and training for all employees; (4) sensing or monitoring mechanisms; and (5) an unequivocal commitment from the top that is not just in words but backed up by consistent practice.  None of these factors require the Appellant to agree with the outcome.  The trial court correctly considered these factors and noted how complete the record was as to each element.  Appellant’s subjective feelings about additional actions that the City could have taken requires authority that he does not have in this circumstance.  His disagreement, notwithstanding, the City unequivocally demonstrated all requisite elements for the application of the affirmative defense.  Accordingly, the trial court’s decision was proper and should be affirmed.
[brief] (Pa28; Pa53-54).  She paid $5,500.00 as a down payment and was obligated to make 72 monthly payments of $557.07 thereafter under a ---  1  Because the within appeal involves a trial court’s ruling on a fee application submitted by the attorney for the plaintiff-appellant, the concise procedural history and concise statement of facts, pursuant to Rules 2:6-2(a)(4) and (5), are hereby combined in order to avoid unnecessary repetition and confusion.  2The following notation is adopted as no transcripts exist: “Pa” denotes Plaintiff-Appellant’s Appendix.  Retail Installment Sales Contract ("RISC").  *Ibid.*; (Pa54).  The Santa Fe came with a written 5-year/60,000-mile basic warranty and a written 10-year/100,000-mile power train warranty.  *Ibid.*  In 2019, with only 46,645 miles on its odometer, the Santa Fe began losing or consuming approximately 1.5 to 2 quarts of oil per week.  *Ibid.*  The vehicle underwent oil consumption tests at defendant’s dealerships on January 28, February 4 and 15 and March 6, 2019.  *Ibid.*; (Pa54-55).  Defendant replaced its engine at [...] over a three-month period between March 20 and May 17, 2019.  *Ibid.*; (Pa55).  Thereafter, the Santa Fe began displaying other defects including a lack of engine power, the check engine light coming on and the engine emitting odd noises.  *Ibid.*; (Pa55-56).  These defects persisted despite eight (8) additional repair attempts at Hyundai dealerships which occurred on September 20, October 9 and 28, November 12 and December 31, 2019 as well as January 15, August 12 to 13 and September 11, 2020.  (Pa29; Pa42; Pa55-57).  In the November 28, 2020 Complaint, plaintiff requested, *inter alia*, a declaratory judgment cancelling the sales contract for the Santa Fe; an injunction requiring defendant or any holder or assignee of the RISC to pay off the loan balance and buy back the Santa Fe; a refund of plaintiff’s down payment and any monthly payments made on the RISC; consequential damages; and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
[brief] THE TRIAL COURT’S ADOPTION OF THE SPECIAL HEARING OFFICER’S RECOMMENDATION WAS PROCEDURALLY FLAWED AND THEREFORE REQUIRES REVERSAL.  (Issue not raised below).  The trial court appointed the SHO to oversee the Respondent’s Amended Application via its order dated October 15, 2020.  Specifically, the trial court set forth that the SHO was appointed pursuant to R. 4:41-5(b).  Under R. 4:41-5(b), the trial court can only act upon the report of the master, or in this case the SHO, after a party move’s for action on the report and a hearing is consequently held.  Here, while the parties each had an opportunity to make comments or objections to the report in supplemental filings with the trial court, no hearing was thereafter requested or held by the trial court.  Instead, the trial court entered its decision without any party moving to and without any hearing on the matter.  The procedural flaw cannot be overlooked.  The rule specifically identifies that the trial court’s action on the report can only occur “after hearing on the motion. ”  Without requiring a party to move on the SHO’s recommendations, it is clear that the result was a fait accompli.  Respondents were already given the benefit of the trial court’s usurpation of the [...]’s authority and granted their requested variances.  Thus, the site plan application became an “as of right” removing any doubt that Respondents site plan would be approved by the SHO.  By failing to adhere to the requirements under R. 4:41-5(b), the trial court compounded the procedural issues regarding the SHO and prejudiced the [...] to the benefit of the Respondents.  The [...] and [...] were not afforded an opportunity to argue the issues related to the SHO recommendations  Accordingly, the Court’s August 9, 2022 Order was improperly entered and should be reversed.  **CONCLUSION**
[brief] The first factor – whether “a new principle of law has been established” – clearly cuts against full retroactive application.  Tyler “unquestionably . . . establishes a new principle of law. ”  Roberto at 363.  The second factor looks at the “prior history of the rule in question, including its purpose and effect to determine whether retrospective application will further its operation. ”  Ibid.  The panel concluded that this factor tipped in favor of retroactivity because, though the TSL “promotes the worthy public interest goal of facilitating marketable titles to return properties to the paying tax rolls, there also exists the well-recognized public policy goal of protecting property owners’ interests. ”  Ibid.  The third factor asks whether retroactive application of the new rule “would produce substantial inequitable results such as injustice or hardship. ”  Ibid.  In assessing this factor, the panel concluded – correctly – that “application of full retroactivity would be unworkable and create a substantial hardship for taxing authorities, as well as third-party purchasers. ”  Ibid.  The panel recognized that imposing untold millions of dollars in unexpected liability on municipalities and third-party purchasers based on conduct that was commonplace and uncontroversially legal at the time is fundamentally inequitable.  Based on its analysis of these three factors, Roberto settled on pipeline retroactivity.  It appropriately balanced property owners’ rights without imposing crippling liability on lienholders.  That determination is sound.
[brief] [...] received $33,469.47 in terminal leave payments even though he did not have a written contractual agreement with [...] to receive a retiree sick time payout.  (Pa886, Rog.s., $44-45).  In November 2018, Defendants paid civilian [...] $95,164.92 in terminal leave \(^3\)  In its opposition brief, Defendants accuse the undersigned of misleading the Court regarding this issue and in the same breath they falsely assert, "the individuals identified by Plaintiffs as receiving payments in excess of $15,000 post-November 9, 2016 did not retire post-MSRA."  (Db44)  (emphasis in original).  However, it is undisputed that [...] retired "post-MSRA" as his retirement date was in December 2016, after the November 9, 2016 deadline. despite not having a written contractual agreement with the City to receive such benefits.  Defendants also paid civilian [...] $26,655.73 as a sick time payout despite the lack of a contractual agreement for same.  In sum, in October 2018, Defendants retroactively announced that November 9, 2016 was going to be the trigger date for whether [...] employees would received sick leave benefits capped at $15,000 or uncapped payouts.  However, as set forth above, Defendants did not even fully comply with this trigger date.  Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant Plaintiffs' appeal and remand this matter to the Trial Court for further proceedings.
[brief] On February 23, 2017, [...] was involved in a specific work-related injury.  (Aa30-Aa32).  As a result of the permanency of his injury, on August 21, 2018, he applied for his accidental disability pension benefits.  (Aa1-Aa3).  On April 23, 2019, the Board denied [...] his accidental disability pension benefits indicating the accident did not meet the accidental and unexpected requirement.  (Aa4-Aa6).  On April 30, 2019, request to appeal the Board's decision was sent.  (Aa7).  On June 20, 2019, the matter was transferred to the office of administrative law.  (Aa8).  A hearing was held, briefs were submitted, and on August 30, 2023, [...] rendered his initial decision upholding the Board's denial of accidental disability pension benefits to [...].  (Aa9-Aa19).  The Board, on October 19, 2023, upheld [...]'s decision.  (Aa20-Aa21).  On November 15, 2023, a notice of appeal and case information statement was filed with this court.  (Aa22-Aa29).
[brief] [...] Plaintiff v. CIVIL ACTION [...] and [...]  Defendants Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  MEMORANDUM OF LAW ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS  [...]  AND [...] IN OPPOSITION TO APPEAL FILED ON BEHALF OF [...] AND [...], INC.  [...], Esq.  [...]  [...]  Tel: [...]  Attorney ID #: 018721989  On the Brief: [...], Esq.  Attorney for: Atlas Septic, Inc. and Robert Van Saders  TABLE OF CONTENTS
[directive] "S 0J~, .!i!.¾ :iI].:il'?]gj gj-e-]-oj .:g.~!e, 20191d 12-%!  31 01-18 ~oJ]  CN 10079-Korean ~7.]- 7.] ojy~ ~ page 3 of7/;;J] ]7.]3/7 0 7.  Did you enter a plea of guilty to any charges a mandatory period of parole [Y es/ofl] [No/0 }i...J .ll.] that require ineligibility or a mandatory extended term?
[brief] Plaintiff-appellant [...] filed a complaint ([...]) on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated in U.S. District Court, D.N.J., Docket No. [...], against [...]  (presently d/b/a “[...]”), [...] Financial, LLC, and [...] (“[...]”).  In response, [...] f/k/a United Bank Card filed a motion to suspend the matter in federal court (see Pa000112) and then filed a motion in New Jersey Superior Court to reopen previous litigation that settled in 2015, viz., Roma Pizzeria v. [...] f/k/a United Bank Card, Docket No. [...] ([...]).  Respondent also filed a motion to enforce ([...]), arguing that Dr. Gannon’s federal complaint is precluded by the terms of the settlement agreement he agreed to as a member of the Roma Pizzeria class nearly a decade ago (see [...]).  Plaintiff filed an opposition ([...]) to [...]’s motion and asked that the court reopen [...] only for the limited purpose of declining jurisdiction and for entry of an order remanding back to federal court.  A hearing before the Hon. [...], J.S.C. (ret., on recall) was held Nov.17, 2023 (transcript references herein denoted as “H”).  The court granted the Defendant’s motion to reopen Roma Pizzeria, and enforced the 2015 Settlement, holding that Dr. Gannon’s claims were thereby precluded ([...]).  The federal court then dismissed Dr. Gannon’s complaint.
[brief] Defendant [...]’s actions after the October 6, 2021 fatal crash, including the use of traffic controllers, security staff, flaggers, and new directional signs in the parking area, demonstrate [...]’s knowledge of the need for pedestrian safety measures and that it would have been feasible for [...] to have implemented them prior to the happening of the fatal crash.  However, it was only after the tragic October 6, 2021 fatal crash that [...] instituted the use of traffic controllers, security and flaggers, and directional signage to protect the safety of its employees who it required to park in the distant employee area of the lot.
[brief] Plaintiff’s carelessness in commencing this action based on its erroneous metes and bounds description caused the Defendant to incur unnecessary and significant expert expenses and imposed an inequitable and an unfair burden upon the Defendant.  “Applying principles of fairness and justice, a judge sitting in a court of equity has a broad range of discretion to fashion the appropriate remedy in order to vindicate a wrong consistent with principles of fairness, justice, and the law. ”  Graziano v. Grant, 326 N.J. Super. 328, 342 (App. Div. 1999).  Under all of the facts and circumstances of this case, substantial justice will prevail only if Defendant is awarded reimbursement for expert fees necessitated by the Plaintiff’s carelessness in this case.
[brief] Any attempts by board members to go into some of the required information under the ordinances were improperly shut down.  A board member tried asking questions relating to stormwater management.  (1T30-12 to 1T31-  Analysis of stormwater management for subdivision applications is required under the MLUL and the township ordinance.  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-38(b)(3); N.J.S.A. 40:55D-38(c); Robbinsville Township Ordinance §142-77(B)(19), (21).  [...] did not directly respond to the question and stated it was an issue for site plan review.  (1T32-1 to 1T32-7).
[brief] ”  [...] Devs., 2018 WL 2449133, at *29 (emphasis added).  If the panel meant to impose a bright-line rule that on remand the trial court could not award [...] any fees for work performed before a particular date, it could have said so.  But it did not.  Nor does RICO support the [...]’ bright-line rule requiring recoverable fees and costs to be separated based on the filing date of the RICO claims.
[brief] I have been practicing law for forty-eight years.  Perhaps I am getting too old, too crotchety, but what happened here gets under my skin.  I have advocated zealously on behalf of [...], but have done so within the bounds of my ethical obligations.  Will the [...] be able to stand before this Court at oral argument and say that it has done the same thing, that it has turned square corners?  In good conscience, I do not believe that it can.  The decision below denying [...]’s motion to suppress must be reversed.
[brief] Pa2445, Pa2448.  [...] did not locate any documents that related to a cancellation of coverage under a general liability policy.  Pa2444.  Due to [...] and [...]’s wrongful denial of coverage under the [...], [...]’s own comprehensive general liability carriers, [...] and [...], were forced to defend [...] in the Hood litigation, subject to their continuing reservations of rights, and eventually reached a confidential settlement.  Pa1-Pa19, Pa669-Pa672, Pa674-Pa675.  In this litigation, [...], [...], and [...] seek reimbursement for the defense and indemnity of [...] in the Hood litigation, their attorneys’ fees and costs in pursuing this liability coverage litigation pursuant to Rule 4:42-9, and prejudgment interest.  LEGAL STANDARDS
[brief] It is further noteworthy to mention that the trial court’s reference to El-Sioufi and Spinks was limited.  To that end, the trial court cited El-Sioufi for the proposition that, “an investigation…without more, does not constitute an adverse employment action under the NJLAD,” and cited to Spinks for the principle that, “an employer must be free to investigate complaints of employee misconduct without fear of NJLAD liability.
[brief] To ensure that “the defendant is in fact guilty of the crime for which he is being sentenced[,]” *State v. Sainz*, 107 N.J.  283, 292 (1987), “[t]he trial court’s task is to ensure that the defendant has articulated a factual basis for each element of the offense to which he pleads guilty. ”  *State v. Campfield*, 213 N.J. 218, 232 (2013); see also R. 3:9-2 (guilty plea must be supported by factual basis).
[brief] This time, the Board awarded [...] $1,200 in management fees, $5,648.05 in condo fees, and an $800.31 annual return on equity, as opposed to the $419.35 in management fees, $5,772.73 in condo fees, and an $1,059.19 annual return on equity awarded previously.  Id.  Thereafter, on September 13, 2021, [...] appealed the Board’s decision to the Hon. [...], J.S.C.
[brief] ”  T4:20-21..The Defendants’ representative said they let people know that the USCF rules are followed.  “So as posted, that rulebook will be followed. ”  T4:22-23.  Additionally, their tournaments, including the one in question, are run by tournament directors.  And “the tournaments director always brings a rulebook onsite. ”  T5: 9-10.  In fact, the defendant’s representative [...], was the tournament director who ran this 2017 tournament.  The Plaintiff was well aware of how the Defendants ran their tournament and that rulebook applied to chess tournaments.
[brief] This argument was rejected by [...] during the March 29, 2018 oral argument.  (2T).  Additionally, numerous times in the 2015 case, plaintiffs cited to an Affidavit of Title executed by [...] on behalf of [...].  (622a).  However, the information included in this Affidavit of Title was redundant to the other documents (mortgage and bank signature card) that plaintiffs had in their possession even before the filing of the 2015 case.  (1a).  Therefore, the [...] properly argued before the trial court that the “newly discovered evidence” allegation held no merit for the Court to permit the Amended Complaint.  The trial court agreed on March 29, 2018 and held:  COURT:  I don’t see any reason to revisit that.  I’m going to deny the motion.  Whether it’s—whether this is deemed as simply another motion for reconsideration under 4:49-2, which is really what it appears to be, in reality, or under 4:50-1, it really is just asking the Court to revisit its decision, but in doing so fails to address the extensive analysis that the Court conducted under Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328.
[brief] As to what constitutes an "expert opinion," N.J.R.E. 703 provides that an expert opinion must be supported by facts or data in the record, or alternatively, an expert opinion must be "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject."  The “Net Opinion Rule” precludes experts from expressing bare conclusions, unsupported by factual evidence.  *Buckalew v. Grossbard*, 87 N.J. 512, 524 (1981).  The expert's opinion must be based upon "facts or data . . . perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.  *Beam*, supra, 3 N.J. at 215; *Stanley Co. of America v. Hercules Powder Co.*, 16 N.J. 295, 305-06 (1954); *Fink v. City of Paterson*, 44 N.J. Super. 129, 135 (App. Div. 1957).  When evaluating an expert, "a court must ensure that the proffered expert does not offer a mere net opinion."  *Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Community Corp.*, 207 N.J. 344, 372 (2011).
[brief] (2T36:8-21).  [...] testified he reviewed Petitioner’s prior medical records after he issued his narrative report, but did not author an addendum report to address them.  (2T36:8-23).  He was nevertheless questioned by Petitioner’s counsel about Petitioner’s prior incidents and injuries during the hearing as if they were “hypothetical” events.  (2T19:24-21:20).  In this context, [...] testified that both incidents were “remote” and that Petitioner appeared to be asymptomatic until 2015.
[directive] This approach re-affirms and strengthens New Jersey’s policy of prohibiting the use of a CED for pain compliance or in response to passive resistance.  By incorporating the statutory criteria for upgrading the resisting-arrest offense, the revised policy makes clear that a CED may be discharged only in response to active resistance (e.g., fighting) that poses a substantial risk of physical injury to the arresting officer, a victim, or innocent bystander.  The term “conducted energy device” is defined in Section III of this policy.
[brief] ***  This Assumption of Risk, Waiver of Liability, Arbitration and Indemnification Agreement ("Agreement") is dated as of the Effective Date which is the date appearing on the signature page, between [...] b/b/a [...] ("[...]") and the undersigned in his/her own capacity ("Adult Participant") and if any minor (s) is/are named in the signature block below (collectively "Child Participant", whether one or more) on behalf of, and as the parent or legal guardian for such Child Participant(s) (all parties collectively, "Participant")…  Pa0087.  Indeed, throughout the Agreement, the language is consistent that [...], the signatory to the Agreement, is bound by the Agreement.  The Agreement provides, in relevant portion, 4.  Assumptions of Risks.  By signing this Agreement, entering the Premises and/or participating in the Activities, Adult Participant, on behalf of himself, and on behalf of the child Participant(s), …  5.  Release of Claims.  **TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, ADULT PARTICIPANT, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF/HERSELF AND ON BEHALF OF ANY CHILD PARTICIPANT AND ON BEHALF OF ANY SPOUSE, HEIRS, EXECUTORS, AND REPRESENTATIVES OF ANY PARTICIPANT…**  6.  Indemnity.  **ADULT PARTICIPANT, ON HIS/HER BEHALF, AND ON BEHALF OF ANY CHILD PARTICIPANT(S), AND ON BEHALF OF ANY SPOUSE, HEIRS, EXECUTORS, AND REPRESENTATIVES…**  7.  Dispute Resolution/Waiver of Jury Trial.  If a dispute arises under this Agreement or from Participant’s use of the Premises or participation in the Activities…  8.  Acknowledgments by Participant.  Adult Participant acknowledges on behalf of himself/herself and on behalf of any Child Participant(s) that he/she/they would not be granted access to the Premises or the ability to participate in the Activities but for his/her agreement to the terms and conditions of this Agreement and these acknowledgments.  ***  Pa0087-Pa0089.  The Trial Court examined the above language prior to granting the Defendants’ Motions.  T.20 L.23-T. 24 L.10.  After reviewing same the Court concluded that "Plaintiff's contention that the language within the agreement is ambiguous is without merit and is unsupported by the language in the agreement itself.  T27 L. 24-T. 28 L. 2.  Based on the foregoing, and as established, the Trial Court correctly stayed the Superior Court litigation and compelled arbitration.
[brief] ]  [...] gave identical testimony in the underlying action:  We were enrolled and what I understood was that it was only that portion of the work that was to be excluded.  And the rest was going to fall under the CCIP.  We were never notified that we weren’t in the CCIP, but we were \(^5\) [...] and [...] representatives confirmed that a contractor’s unenrollment from CCIP is an unusual event.