ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] (Da17-Da18)  [...] then cited [...]’s testimony that:  Defendant had made a left turn against a red traffic light; told the police officer that he was on his way home from a bar; believed the light was “turning” when he went through; smelled of alcohol; admitted he had consumed alcohol that evening; and had a delayed response to [[...]’s] questions (Da18)  As to the field sobriety tests, [...] found:  The administration of these tests did not occur in a vacuum.  These tests were administered after [...] had already observed the Defendant operating his motor vehicle in an unsafe manner by making an illegal left turn at a red light, Defendant’s breath and vehicle smelled of alcohol, Defendant admitted to drinking alcohol that evening, and the Defendant had a noticeable delayed response to [...]’s questions.  (Da18)  The Judge then concluded that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty of DWI, finding:  The observations of [...], both before and during the administration of these field sobriety tests were sufficient, credible evidence that the Defendant as intoxicated…In this matter, this Court does not believe there is another reasonable explanation for Defendant’s driving behavior on the evening of the offense other than that he had consumed alcohol to a point where his driving would be impaired.
[brief] On March 23, 2023, Chancery Division uploaded to eCourts the following:  ORDER SHOW CAUSE-Denied by Judge [...] re: MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING [[...]].  On March 23, 2023, Chancery Division uploaded to eCourts the following:  1 Transcript Volume 1T (March 22, 2023)  “ORDER TO STAY CASE-Denied by Judge [...] re: MOTION TO STAY CASE [[...]].”  On April 21, 2023, plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Complaint, Removal of Improperly Filed Documents, to Correct, Reopen, Change of Venue And Division, Disqualification, and for Relief From Judgment (Pa 101-107, Pa 111-128)  On May 04, 2023, plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal with the Appellate Division.
[brief] SINCE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISCHARGING THE STATUTORY RECEIVER, AND SINCE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE MOTION OF LUCILLE LOPEZ AND ROBERT P. LOPEZ, JR.  TO INTERVENE, THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED (1T30-31 AND 1T24-31 AND 2T5)  The appellants, [...] and [...], argue that the trial court erred in discharging the receiver, and in denying their motion to intervene.
[brief] See Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, 330 N.J. Super. 252, 267 (App. Div. 2000) (“[W]aiver is defined as the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known and existing right, [and] [t]hus, waiver presupposes full knowledge of the right and intentional surrender. ”) (citations omitted).  Nor does a continuing violation exist here.  See, e.g., Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001) (in order to benefit from the doctrine, a plaintiff must establish more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts); Thomasian v. N.J. Inst. Of Tech., 2009 WL 260791 at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2009) (continuing wrong applies when an individual is subject to a “continual, cumulative pattern of tortious conduct”); Lipschultz v. Logan Assistance Corp., 50 F.Appx. 528, 530 (3d Cir. 2002) (“A continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not continual ill effects from an original violation. ”).
[brief] (1T15-10 to 22).  The officers subsequently asked for consent to search the vehicle based on the scent of marijuana, which defendant refused.  (1T16-2 to 6).  Officers then notified defendant that, in light of the probable cause to believe marijuana was present in the vehicle, they would be performing a search thereof.  (1T16-7 to 15).  Contemporaneously, a search of defendant’s actual identifiers revealed that he was the subject of suspended driving privileges and an active municipal court warrant, and accordingly placed in custody.  (1T17-9 to 18-2).  The search of the vehicle turned up a loaded, nine-millimeter handgun and a modified gas mask.  (1T18-19 to 19-19).  Given the training and experience of --- ²  The facts of this case pre-date the partial decriminalization of marijuana.
[brief] The Navigational Channels Rule, N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.7 prohibits development which would result in the loss of navigability and the placement of structures within 50 feet of any authorized navigation channel.  The Recreational Docks and Piers Rule, N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5(b)(9), requires that a proposed structure not hinder navigation or access to adjacent moorings, water areas, docks and piers.  The focus of Appellant’s challenge here is the length of [...]’s dock.
[brief] For purposes of its arguments in reply, [...] incorporates by reference the Procedural History and Statement of Facts Set forth at Pb4-14.  I.  SAPPORO’S JUSTIFICATION FOR APPLYING NEW YORK LAW IS MISPLACED (Pa5).  [...] tries to circumvent New Jersey law and the MBPA by contending, *ad nauseum*, that the bulk of [...]’s sales of [...] products occurs in New York.  But that contention is wholly misplaced because, under New Jersey’s three-tier distribution framework, [...] has no direct relationship to—or involvement with—[...]’s retail customers, and plays no role in such distribution other than to supply product to [...] \textit{in New Jersey}.  Unsurprisingly, applicable precedent holds that the final destination where a wholesaler’s sales of product physically ends up has no bearing on whether the MBPA applies to a dispute between a wholesaler and brewer.  To be sure, all of [...]’s dealings with [...] have been in New Jersey, including its bad faith conduct at the heart of the Complaint which the MBPA was designed to safeguard wholesalers against.
[brief] Reply Submission by [...]: Certification of [...], filed October 21, 2022 ..............................................................................  Pa1118  Exhibit A- Redevelopment Agreement between [...] and the [...] ............................................................  Pa1120  Exhibit B - [...] Resolution 84-16.....................................  Pa1154  *Per Rule 2:6-1(a)(2), briefs submitted to the trial court on the Motion for Summary Judgment are not included in the appendix.  #
[brief] The plain language of the Policy refutes the trial court’s above-described attempts to interpret Revised Policy 8463 as discriminatory.  The plain, unambiguous language of the policy controls.  *See Paff v. Byrnes*, 385 N.J. Super. 574, 579 (App. Div. 2006).  The court cannot presume that the Board intended something other than that expressed by the policy’s plain language.  *Soto v. Scaringelli*, 189 N.J. 558, 569–570 (2007).  The court cannot engage in conjecture or surmise which will circumvent the plain language.  *Id.*  *See also* In re Civil Commitment of J.G., 322 N.J. Super. 309, 322 (App. Div. 1999) (statutory language should be construed as written and not according to some unexpressed intention because a “court is not at liberty to indulge in a presumption that the Legislature intended something more than what it actually wrote in the law”).  The Revised Policy’s plain terms do not provide for disparate treatment based on protected class status.  Contrary to the trial court’s distorted gloss, the Policy neither authorizes notification because of students’ LGBTQ+ status nor defines LGBTQ+ status as an adverse impact (p. 13-14) (Da405-406).
[brief] See Sanderhoff v. Miller, No. A-1314-08T1, 2009 WL 4724274, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2009) (unpublished) (dismissing appeal because an order denying a motion to vacate “is not a final judgment, and [the party] has not sought leave to appeal such interlocutory order”).
[brief] “Related parties shall include but are not limited to the following: . . . l.  Attorney-in-fact of a reciprocal reporting entity or any affiliate of the attorney-in-fact. ” (Ra5-6 (emphasis added)).  The “reciprocal reporting entity” is [...], demonstrating that [...] and [...] are related parties subject to SSAP No. 25.  --- 6  The attorney-in-fact and the subscribers are also related parties, notwithstanding [...]’s repeated protestations to the contrary.  They “have common interests . . . by contract. ”  SSAP No. 25, ¶ 4.  (Ra5).  Each subscriber executes a POA as part of the application process.  (See Ra13).  The POA is a contractual document that allocates rights and obligations among subscribers, [...], and the Attorney-in-Fact.  However, the relationship at issue here is the one between [...] (the attorney-in-fact) and [...].
[directive] lndt~ce •lnt~•il):' Falrneu •Quallry Servk:e Track Application for Promotion to Phase 4  A: Name Date Submitted I  Current Address: Street City State Zip Code Telephone Email if  The following criteria must be met in order to phase up:  ( check box task is completed) of I have been in Phase 3 for a minimum 90 days.  Date entered phase 3: of of I have a minimum 45 consecutive days sobriety.  Sobriety date: if I am engaged in treatment and attending regularly, applicable.  Counselor verification signature: of am I following the conditions supervision.  Probation Officer verification signature: I am engaged in recovery support groups.  Home group: I am engaged in pro-social activities.  Activities: of my biggest struggles in Phase 3:  Three  Three accomplishments in Phase 3:  Three personal goals I would like to accomplish in the next phase:  Three ways I will maintain my recovery and remain law abiding:  Client Signature Date Track Application for Promotion to Phase 4
[brief] Because information provided by criminal informants “is not given in the spirit of a concerned citizen, but often is given in exchange for some concession, payment, or simply out of revenge against the subject . . . the information which they supply convey[s] a certain impression of unreliability. ”  *Ibid.* (quoting *State v.* Paszek, 184 N.W. 2d 836, 842 (Wis. 1971)); see also State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 506 (1986) (noting that anonymous informers, who “are themselves criminals in many instances,” are less reliable than ordinary citizens).  In evaluating whether a warrant affidavit demonstrates an informant’s credibility, courts consider two factors: veracity and basis of knowledge.
[brief] On October 6, 2021, at approximately 7:00 a.m., plaintiff [...] arrived at [...], her place of employment, and parked her vehicle in the employee-designated area of the hospital parking lot.  (Pa36).  As she started walking through the parking lot to go to work at the hospital, plaintiff was struck by a vehicle operated by a co-employee, [...] (Dember), a Registered Nurse, who was also reporting to work at [...].  (Pa36).  Plaintiff died as a result of the accident.  Despite seeking, and receiving, lifetime workers’ compensation death/dependency benefits, the decedent’s husband, plaintiff [...], as the Administrator Ad Prosequendum, also filed a wrongful death complaint against defendants [...] and various “Bayshore” entities.  (Pa62).  Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that Dember operated her vehicle in a “negligent, careless and reckless manner. ” (Pa63 at ¶ 6).  Through various corporate mergers, [...] is now a part of, or has been subsumed by, [...], or “[...]” ([...]).  (Pa103).  At the time of the accident, the decedent was employed as a nuclear medicine technologist for [...].  (Pa285).  At the time of the accident, Dember was employed as a Registered Nurse in the cardiac catheterization department for [...].  (Pa287).  In response to Dember’s supplemental interrogatories, [...] certified that, “the decedent was employed by [...] d/b/a [...] on October 6, 2021. ” (Pa281).  Further, [...] certified that, “defendant [...] was employed by [...] d/b/a [...] on October 6, 2021. ” (Pa281).  The decedent’s payroll statement (pay period September 5, 2021, through September 18, 2021) was from her employer [...].  (Pa285).  Similarly, Dember’s payroll statement (pay period September 5, 2021, through September 18, 2021) was from the same employer [...].  (Pa287).  In response to Dember’s Request for Admissions, [...] certified that, at the time of the accident, “[...] and [...] were employed by the same employer entity group. ” (Pa289).  As a result of this work-related accident under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act, the decedent’s husband, through the decedent’s estate, filed a workers’ compensation Claim Petition against the decedent’s employer, [...], under [...].
[brief] (3T7:8-9; 7:23-8:6).  (See note 1, supra).  Although [...] is a Board Certified Orthopedist and was qualified by the ALJ as such, he is no longer a practicing surgeon and has not been for more than ten years.  (2T5:12-18; 6:2-6; 9:206).  Miller v Public Employees Retirement System, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub Lexis 1917,10 (App. Div. 2014) [RA-4 Exhibit A].  (Affirming reliance on [...] over [...], because the agency “considered Lakin the more qualified expert because he was an active orthopedic surgeon” and “Weiss… explained he does not do surgery. ”).  “Ultimately, ‘the choice of accepting or rejecting the testimony of witnesses rests with the administrative agency, and where such choice is reasonably made, it is conclusive on appeal. ’”  Marter v Board of Trustees, supra, 2024 N.J. Super. at 11 [RA-17 Exhibit D], quoting Renan Realty Corp. v. State Department of Community Affairs, 182 N.J. Super 415, 421 (App. Div. 1981).
[brief] TABLE OF CONTENTS  LEGAL ARGUMENT  ........................................................................................................1  POINT I  BECAUSE THE SENTENCING COURT’S ANALYSIS OF THE STATE V. YARBOUGH FACTORS WAS IMPERMISSIBLY BASED ON DISMISSED CHARGES AND SPECULATION NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT, CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND BECAUSE THE COURT OFFERED NO OTHER VALID BASIS FOR THE IMPOSITION OF A CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE, THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE AND DIRECT THE TRIAL COURT TO IMPOSE THE CERTAIN PERSONS SENTENCE CONCURRENTLY TO THE ROBBERY SENTENCE.
[brief] A.  The Sentencing Court Erred In Finding Yarbough Factors  3A And 3C As It Relied On (1) A Dismissed Charge And (2) Speculation With No Basis In The Record That [...] Possessed The Handgun For A Meaningful Period Before Or After The Robbery.  .................................................................3  B.  The Certain Persons Statute Would Not Be “Neutered” Or Rendered Meaningless By The Imposition Of A Concurrent Sentence..................................................8  C.  The Sentencing Court’s Final Justifications For Imposing A Consecutive Sentence—That The Certain Persons Offense Is A Separate And Distinct Offense From Robbery And Would Be A “Free Crime” If Run Concurrent—Are Not A Valid Bases For Imposing A Consecutive Sentence.  ........................................................................................................12
[brief] In direct defiance of the trial court’s order granting Defendants’ motion to bar evidence outside discovery, Plaintiff’s opposition relied on the information that was specifically barred by the order and additional information outside of any discovery produced by the parties.  Some of these documents were irrelevant to Plaintiff’s claims and were submitted only to smear Defendants and cloud the fact that they were including barred information. \(^9\)  Despite Plaintiff’s best efforts, the trial court found in favor of Defendants and specifically noted that Plaintiff “admitted he cannot tell if he was paid in full for all of his jobs”.
[brief] Even a single factor can render a statement involuntary and thus inadmissible “regardless of its truth or falsity. ”  L.H., 239 N.J. at 43.  Psychological tactics by police can overbear a suspect’s will and render his statement involuntary.  Id. at 43-46.  Although some forms of police deception, such as lying about evidence, do not automatically mandate suppression, they remain a factor in the voluntariness analysis.
[brief] The issue seems to be that [...] is a pulmonologist as well as being a Critical Care Specialist.  This means he is not a surgeon and his Certification will be through the ABIM, whereby [...]’s is through the ABS.  However, given [...]’s clinical issues, there is no distinction in level of expertise between these certifications, as the problems pertinent to the case are those of management of bleeding and hemorrhagic shock.  Critical care experience, training and certification are equally pertinent to this patient’s clinical picture whether achieved through examination by the ABS or the ABIM.  Given these facts in light of the statute’s purpose of ensuring that there is meritorious basis for a medical malpractice case, this dismissal should be reversed.
[brief] To summarize the events in *[...]*: the defendant was initially “nudge[d]” out of the club by the bouncer; the defendant left and returned twenty minutes later with a sawed-off shotgun hidden under his coat; [...] instigated a second altercation with the bouncer by trying to go back into the club; then, fifteen minutes later, [...] shot a random passerby he believed to be the bouncer.  Id. at 405-09.  Such facts are much more conducive to a premeditated murder than anything in [...]’s case.
[brief] The bare conclusions of an expert, unsupported by factual evidence or substantial foundation, are inadmissible as a mere "net opinion."  Rempfer v. Deerfield Packing Corp., 4 N.J. 135, 145 (1950) (finding an expert's opinion so "completely lacking in proper foundation as to be worthless" and not admissible); Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 524 (1981) (Where an expert’s opinion is merely a bare conclusion unsupported by factual evidence, i.e., “a net opinion,” it is inadmissible).
[brief] (Pa002645 – 002646).  Appellants cannot maintain a breach of contract claim where the NDA term ended a year before the events at issue.  Appellants cannot point to any document or record outside of the bare allegations in their pleading to support an extension of the NDA in this matter, and the terms of the NDA clearly state that it terminated a year after Appellants produced documents in due diligence.  Thus, the trial court properly entered summary judgment because the NDA terminated well before any of the events Appellants describe in their Amended Complaint.
[brief] A comprehensive view starting with Oct. 1, 1999 will demonstrate Probation’s systematic, arbitrary and capricious enforcement of court Orders, corruption of the support account record, and denial of due process to Appellant.  7.  Although the Court finds Probation’s accounting complete (DA83) and cited the credit stipulated by the “accounting” of $17,121.94 (DA84), the credit is inadequate because the Court unfathomably failed to 1) acknowledge evidence of $54,500 in Appellant’s payments made directly to Respondent before probation was ordered to process support payments (DA471), failed to acknowledge the original trial court’s finding of overpayment (DA38), and the current Court failed to consider the inconsistency of Probation acknowledging part of the awards granted by court Order of 3/25/2004 (DA41), but not the full extent of awards – again, without consideration, investigation or consideration by the trial Court.  Again, no hearing was held to resolve disputed facts where Appellant could submit his proofs and challenge Probation in a court of law.  Appellant was denied due process.  8.  Given Probation’s recent withdrawal of its fabricated $16,000 in support arrearage charges after 23 years and its acknowledgment of $10,354 in credits erroneously denied Appellant for 18 years, it is clear that probation’s account record cannot be trusted, and Appellant’s claims of material account record error for the past 25 years have been vindicated.  As presented elsewhere herein, further material account errors are identified and need be adjudicated by way of hearing.  9.  Appellant therefore requests a remand Order from the Appellate Court for a hearing to present proofs of account errors, cross-examine and require probation to justify its support account record, resolve Probation account errors by way of fair and impartial adjudication of the issues.
[brief] This argument by plaintiff is equally meritless.  Whether [...] was “supposed” to start work at 6:45 a.m. and the accident occurred at 6:59 a.m. is wholly irrelevant.  [...] testified that the “majority of time,” she arrived at work at 7:00 a.m., and that the hospital’s work schedule is just “generic hours for the shift. ” (Pa325, 94:22-25 to 95:1-21).  Further, being fourteen minutes late for work can be caused by many things, such as getting caught behind a school bus that makes many stops; police officers blocking traffic because of a car accident; road detours from road construction/work; waking up fourteen minutes later than usual; and forgetting something and having to return home.  The statutory co-employee immunity is not limited only to employees who arrive at work “on time.
[brief] [...] gave the letter and video footage to [...].  This was on the date of May 7, 2019.  Two days later on May 9, 2019 both Appellant and [...] were notified that their contracts for the next school year would not be renewed.  There was no basis for why there would be non-renewal, however, this adverse action was taken in close proximity to Appellant and [...] complaining to a higher authority about the behavior of [...].  The Non-Renewal list did not set forth the reason that Appellant was being non-renewed.  Retaliation was jumping off of the page but was discounted by the Trial Court.  Other causes of action were similarly subjected to weighing and rejection by the Trial Court.
[brief] An expert witness may not opine as to the veracity of a defendant’s statement.  Rosales, 202 N.J. at 567.  [...] testified about the defendant’s state of mind in painstaking detail.  Moreover, [...] was permitted to hold the firearm and testify about [...]’s state of mind when he loaded the weapon.  (13T:169-10 to 171-2).  Similarly, [...] was permitted to testify as to why [...] wore sunglasses and earplugs.  (13T:171-15 to 21).  Throughout his testimony, [...] infringed on the jury’s decision-making function by constantly opining on the veracity of [...]’s statements to the police or other mental health professionals.
[brief] Despite the authority resting in the Commissioner of the DEP and the Division of Fish and Wildlife, the Council has been delegated the primary responsibility of protecting and developing an adequate supply of fish and game for recreation and commercial purposes through adoption of the Code, over which the Council has sole responsibility, and in the formulation of comprehensive policies.  (Pa100)  The Commissioner’s authority regarding the CBBMP is limited to the approval or disapproval of the policy.  The Commissioner cannot formulate the policy.  The sole authority for formulating the comprehensive policy and promulgating the Code rests with the Council.
[brief] A duty owed by a defendant is a prerequisite in an action of negligence.  *Strachan*, 109 N.J. at 529.  Whether a duty exists is typically a matter of law properly decided by the court, not the jury.  *Ibid.*  See also *Carvalho v. Toll Bros. & Developers*, 143 N.J. 565, 572 (1996); *Wang v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 125 N.J. 2, 15 (1991).  Negligence is “never presumed, and the mere occurrence of an accident causing injuries is not alone sufficient to justify an inference of negligence. ”  *Mockler v. Russman*, 102 N.J. Super. 582, 588 (App. Div. 1968).  See also *Szalontai v. Yazbo’s Sports Café*, 183 N.J. 386, 400 (2005) (citing *Myrlak v. Port Auth. of NY* and NJ, 157 N.J. 84, 95 (1999) (citing Meny v. Carlson, 6 N.J. 82, 91 (1950))); Long v. Landy, 35 N.J. 44, 54 (1961); Vander Groef v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 32 N.J. Super. 365, 370 (App. Div. 1954) (citing Hansen v. Eagle-Picher Lead Co., 8 N.J. 133, 139-40 (1951)).