ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] First Attempt at the 2022 Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan.  On February 28, 2022, the amendment to the Redevelopment Plan referenced in the County Agreement was addressed by the Law Division during a case management conference on the Builder’s Remedy Action.  As a result of that case management conference, the Court entered an Order as follows:  2.  The Borough’s governing body shall introduce an ordinance amending the Redevelopment Plan and refer same to the Planning Board on or before April 15, 2022.  3.  The Planning Board shall conduct a public hearing, make recommendations, and refer same back to the governing body on or before June 2, 2022.  4.  The Borough’s governing body shall approve an ordinance amending the Redevelopment Plan on or before June 30, 2022.  [Pa 138-39].  After an adjustment of the date for introduction of the ordinance, see Pa 112, 146, the Borough introduced the proposed amendment to the Redevelopment Plan which reflects the increase in the portion of the Property to be acquired by the County and provides for the construction of 300 residential units, including 70 units for low and moderate income households.  See Complaint ¶18; Pa 112.  On June 1, 2022, the Planning Board determined the amendment was consistent with the Master Plan.  See Complaint ¶22.  The amendment was adopted by the Mayor and Council on the ordinance’s second reading at the June 23, 2022 governing body meeting.  See Complaint ¶24.  Plaintiffs challenged the adoption of this ordinance as a violation of the automatic stay imposed in their ongoing bankruptcy proceeding.
[brief] New Jersey law recognizes that where a contract designates some provisions as being intended to survive the contract’s termination, other provisions that are not so designated do not survive such termination.  Foster Wheeler Passaic, Inc. v. Cty. of Passaic, 266 N.J. Super. 429, 439 (App. Div. 1993).  Here, specific performance was not deemed a “Termination Surviving Obligation” under the PSA.  Section 13.1 states that if [...] chose to terminate the PSA and receive back the escrow funds, that remedy would be its “sole and exclusive remedy” and that the parties would have “no further rights or obligations under” the PSA except for those obligations the PSA referred to as “Termination Surviving Obligations. ” (Pa115-116).  Section 11.1 of the PSA defined “Termination Surviving Obligations” as the obligations under the Agreement that were expressly provided to survive termination. ” (Pa114).  To this end, various sections of the PSA expressly provide that certain obligations will survive the termination of the PSA.  (See Pa101, §5.3(b) (purchaser indemnity obligation with respect to inspections); Pa101, §5.4 (covenant not to sue for environmental conditions); Pa115, §12.1 (confidentiality); Pa118, §16.1 (agreement to indemnify as to claims by brokers)).  Notably, the obligation to sell Plaintiff the Property or the right of Plaintiff to specific performance was not designated anywhere in the PSA as a Termination Surviving Obligation.
[brief] Further, the Appellants allege that the Applicants did not properly show that the variance would not have a substantial effect on the surrounding properties; and that the Resolution is an attempt to “create facts to justify” the Board’s conduct.  However, failed to analyze the facts with the relevant law and at best, simply disagrees with the Board’s conclusion because the Board found the pro se Applicants more credible than the plaintiff’s expert.  The Superior and Appellate Courts is not a venue to re-litigate facts already established by the Board, and plaintiff’s desire to get a second bite at the apple, is an insufficient basis to remand the application.
[brief] (8T 80-16 to 81-22)  The Court then stated that “deterrence in both a specific and general sense is extremely high,” but focused entirely on general deterrence, reasoning, “How many young people are gonna shoot somebody in the street this year?  I think we had one over the weekend; right?  This is not an unknown event, particularly here in [...]. ”  (8T 81-23 to 82-3)  Our courts have long held that, “[i]n the absence of a finding of a need for specific deterrence, general deterrence ‘has relatively insignificant penal value.
[brief] The unbrokenness of the buffer line separating the subdivided oceanfront lots from the [...] tells the tale: either there is no access whatsoever to the [...] from any point, including at the street ends, or that unbroken line has no significance beyond illustrating the boundary of what was still held by [...] and subsequently never used for any purpose.  Nothing in the record suggests access was intended for street ends alone.  Such a conclusion undermines the marketing objective of [...], to create ocean-front property owners.  Further, there is no designation on the 1925 Plan evincing a possible obstruction — such as a fence — to direct access from the Premises to the beach and ocean.  Such an impediment would constitute a change in circumstances for which an express designation is required.  See Restatement, § 2.13, cmt. b.  While the 1925 Plan clearly creates a right to cross over the [...] to access the high-water line, to the extent the 1925 Plan is deemed to be ambiguous, that ambiguity must be construed against the Defendants, who are the successors of the Plan’s drafter.
[brief] Although this panel is not obligated to follow the panel’s decision in Burt, the trial court was so obligated.  See Weir v. Mkt. Transition Facility of New Jersey, 318 N.J. Super. 436. 448 (App. Div. 1999) (“The trial court may disagree with our published decisions but it is obligated to comply with the procedures we mandate within them. ”).  If plaintiffs believe that Burt should be modified or overruled, the proper mechanism for that to occur was for the trial court to adhere to Burt, as it did from 2017 through the trial, and allow plaintiffs to pursue that argument to this Court on appeal.  The trial court remained obligated to follow Burt unless and until this Court were to reach the opposite conclusion.  The equitable logic of Burt remains sound.  If a plaintiff fails to exercise due diligence in ensuring that all potential defendants are properly and timely named as direct defendants, the consequences of that failure fall on the plaintiff, rather than a defendant.
[brief] See T18-19; Miller v. Americollect, Inc., 2022 WL 20470401 at *10 (noting that § 1692c(b) was meant to protect consumers from the embarrassment and reputational harm from having their debts disclosed to friends, family, neighbors, etc., and that a consumer is threatened with no such harm by a letter vendor assimilating transmitted information into a letter that is sent only to the consumer); Mhrez Decision at p.12 (“The facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint simply do not implicate the purpose for which the statutory protection exists.  No facts are presently alleged that would permit a conclusion that the alleged supplying of information by the debt collector to the letter vendor was in any way intended to, or had or could have had the effect of, harassing, embarrassing, or humiliating the debtor or was otherwise undertaken for any reason other than legitimate collection activities directed to the debtor. ”); Cavazzini v. MRS Associates, 574 F. Supp. 3d 134, 142 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (noting that “Congress intended to target certain especially harmful debt collection practices—not all communications by debt collectors to third parties,” and certainly not the mere transmission of data to a letter vendor); Barclift v. Keystone Credit Servs., Inc., 2022 WL 444267, *9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2022) (noting that Congress’s intent in including § 1692c(b) was to prevent disclosures to those who know the consumer and affect his or her reputation, not to companies hired to perform rote tasks like printing and sending a letter); Quaglia v. NS193, LLC, 2021 WL 7179621, *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2021) (same); Nyanjom v. NPAS Solutions, LLC, 2022 WL 168222, *5 (D. Kan. Jan. 19, 2022) (same).
[brief] ”  5T47-24/25.  During [...]’s testimony, trial counsel said, “I don’t want the Court to consider this evidence at all. ”  5T49-5/6.  After the testimony concluded, trial counsel said, “Judge, I just don’t think that this is the type of evidence that would be admissible in a New Jersey courtroom at this point. ”  5T52-8/11.  Trial counsel relied heavily on the Law Division case of *State v. Inglis*, id.
[brief] (10T:175-1 to 179-2).  [...] testified that a search of firearm records revealed no gun permit for defendant, and that defendant’s last known address was [...], which is the next street past Ellsworth if one is headed east away from Hoffman.  (12T: 29-19 to 30-2; 12T: 31-10 to 23).  [...] also testified that she noticed defendant to be right-handed, just like the shooter, when he was writing in the courtroom.  (12T:42-7 to 24).  [...] also testified that she assembled the various video footage that was played in the courtroom into a synchronized four-panel version that was in evidence.  (12T:22-1 to 12).  [...] testified that when defendant was transported to the Homicide Task Force after first being taken to Trenton police headquarters, defendant was wearing one sneaker, on his right foot, but when he arrived at the task force location, defendant was not wearing any sneakers.
[brief] ”  Ibid.  Here, the Prosecutor’s summation noted that victim [...] was “a husband, a son, a brother, business owner and his life was snuffed out that night. ” (16T:47-9 to 10).  The Prosecutor said, “We all want a fair trial for [...].  He is entitled to a fair trial.  . . . but you know what, a fair trial doesn’t mean one that the defendant gets what he wants out of a verdict. ” (16T:101-8 to 15).  The Prosecutor concluded by stating, “[...] was killed that night.  He was killed during this robbery and he deserves a fair trial and his family deserves a fair trial. ” (16T:101-22 to 24).
[brief] They did this because their audience demands “outrage. ”  Unlike in *Neuwirth*, the story that the [...] maliciously spread was on its face “wholly unbelievable. ”  Moreover, unlike in *Neuwirth*, where the allegedly defamatory story came from high-level State employees who were not of dubious veracity and thus credible—including the Governor, the Attorney General, and the plaintiff’s supervisors—the informant in [...]’s case was a second-grade student and the student’s story was uncorroborated in any way, thus adding the “informant of dubious veracity” prong to the analysis.
[brief] If either party lacked the mental capacity to consent to the marriage due to conditions like severe intoxication, drug influence, or mental illness at the time of the marriage, an annulment may be granted.  - Fraud --  Annulment is appropriate if the marriage was based on significant fraud that goes to the essence of the marriage contract.  This could include concealing pregnancy, mental illness, or other substantial matters that one party fraudulently concealed from the other.  The statute provides under subsection (d) that a judgment of nullity of marriage may be rendered where “The parties, or either of them, lacked capacity to marry due to want of understanding because of mental condition, or the influence of intoxicants, drugs, or similar agents; or where there was a lack of mutual assent to the marital relationship; duress; or fraud as to the essentials of marriage; and has not subsequently ratified the marriage. ”  Faustin v. Lewis, 85 N.J. 507, 510 (1981).
[brief] Except as provided in this section, no provision of this Act shall invalidate or modify any provision of any zoning, subdivision, or building code, law, ordinance or regulation.  In a case of conflict between the provisions of this Act and the provisions of any other law, ordinance or regulation governing or purporting to govern the creation, administration, disclosure requirements for sale of timeshare interests in a component’s site, the provisions of this Act shall control.  (emphasis).  N.J.S.A. 45:15-16.55.  The inherent conflict as to the elements required to be proved under the RETA and the CFA created undeniable confusion that resulted in the jury’s award under both Acts.  The jury’s verdict was ultimately molded into a judgment under the CFA, but [...] submits only judgment under the RETA should have been entered.
[brief] [...] used the information produced by the Board attorney’s investigation as the basis for the ethics complaint that he personally filed against [...] with the Commission.  *Ibid.*  Absent Board Policy 0174, [...] would not have had the ability to unilaterally request any legal services or advice from the Board attorney.  (Aa202; Aa235).  [...] has conceded all of these facts throughout these proceedings, (Ab5-6; Ab12-13; Ab20), but denies that his actions were improper, arguing that they fell within his authority as Board president.  He is wrong.
[brief] ”  G.A.H. v. K.G.G., 238 N.J. 401, 416 (2019).  Therefore, Plaintiffs’ failure to identify any inabilities or characteristics of [...] that would make a risk of harm foreseeable to [...] requires dismissal of the negligent training and supervision claim.  Instead of providing evidence of [...]’s specific inabilities or characteristics, Plaintiffs argue that [...]’s status as a trainee establishes that it was foreseeable to [...] that [...] posed a risk of harm to customers.  The flaw in this argument is that it presumes that all trainees pose a risk of harm to [...]’ customers because they would harm a customer if the trainee answers a question wrong and the customer becomes unhappy.  This theory of liability is not recognized by the New Jersey Supreme Court in its discussion of the elements of a negligent training and supervision claim, nor is it recognized by Model Jury Charge 5.76.  See Db at 29-32.  To the contrary, the Model Jury Charge requires that the employer knew of “the particular unfitness, incompetence, or dangerous attribute of the employee,” and that the employer “could have reasonably foreseen that hiring [or training or supervising] a person with the employee’s attributes created a risk of harm to others .  . . .”  Ibid.  (Emphasis added).  Accordingly, Plaintiffs have no evidence that proves that [...] knew or had reason to know that [...] posed a risk of harm to customers.  III.
[brief] (Da98).  The Court focused on what occurred in the Fall of 2017.  However, [...] also reviewed the events in 2018.  In the January 24, 2018 letter to the Surrogate in Bergen County, [...] wrote and indicated that he was representing [...].  Then, [...] drafted the Verified Complaint, which was filed January 24, 2018.  (Da1).  That Verified Complaint was served by [...] on [...] on March 26, 2018.  (Da1).  Those facts reinforced the Court’s view that [...] was not relying on [...].  (Da98).  That is a big part of the test referred to earlier.
[brief] ”  *State v. Arthur*, 184 N.J. 307, 333 (2005) (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 689).  Similarly, simple mistakes, bad strategy, or bad tactics “do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel unless, taken as a whole, the trial was a mockery of justice. ”  *State v. Bonet*, 132 N.J. Super. 186, 191 (App. Div. 1975).  Simply stated, the fact that a trial strategy fails does not necessarily mean that counsel was ineffective.  *State v. Bey*, 161 N.J. 233, 251 (1999).
[brief] [Ibid.]  As to the first exception to the conflict-of-law analysis, proposed amicus accepts the Plaintiffs’ factual allegations and joins in Plaintiffs’ legal argument set forth in Point II.B.i. (Pb18-19.)  As to the second exception, as is the case here and in all wholesaler agreements, a fundamental public policy of New Jersey is implicated, and application of New York law would contravene that policy.
[brief] (Pa27).  Judicial staff interviewed then [...] that same day and recommended for PTI for a six-month period.  *Ibid.*  The complaint suggests that the brief delay in locating the PTI application may be actionable because it allegedly “robbed [...] of a pre-trial PTI application, which are looked upon more favorably because they save the trouble of an indictment. ”  *Ibid.*  The prosecutor allegedly tried to “veto” PTI, stating that PTI is not available for people with mental illness, who can only get mental illness probation.  (Pa29).  [...] asserts that the prosecutor had no proof of “mental illness. ”  *Ibid.*  The criminal court accepted the prosecutor’s arguments against PTI for a time, allegedly stating that “people with mental illnesses need to stay on the State’s ‘radar screen’ for a longer period.  *Ibid.*  On January 2, 2015, [...] attempted to file a brief for reconsideration about the initial denial of PTI, also contending that [...] had certain alleged conflicts in handling [...]’s matter such as two lawsuits against [...] that [...] had filed on behalf of other clients, and also challenged the legality of [...]’s search at the time of [...]’s arrest.
[brief] Appellant also improperly attempts to expand this appeal to include, for the first time, a direct appeal of the 2019 Permit Modification.  Appellant’s Notice of Appeal to this Court does not identify the 2019 Permit Modification as the decision being appealed.  Furthermore, although Appellant does not specifically seek to include a direct appeal of the 2017 WFD Permit in its brief, Appellant conflates the components of [...]’s dock approved by the 2017 WFD Permit and the 2019 Permit Modification.  Appellant’s objection to the dock is based on its alleged impacts to navigability due to its length.  However, it was the 2017 WFD Permit and not the 2019 Permit Modification that approved the length of the dock.  Appellant did not appeal the 2017 WFD Permit, and [...] properly determined in its March 14, 2023 decision that Appellant’s hearing request for the 2017 WFD Permit was out of time.
[brief] ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT SPOLIATED CRITICAL EVIDENCE AND PREVENTED PLAINTIFFS FROM RETAINING AN EXPERT, [...] OWED PLAINTIFF  A NON-DELEGABLE DUTY AND BREACHED THAT DUTY  While Plaintiffs identified a liability expert and made every effort to retain that expert, the identified expert was not retained because he could not review the events surrounding the incident and appropriately render a report because of Restaurant Depot’s failure to preserve such footage.  Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs violated R. 1:6 because Plaintiffs presented no information attesting to the fact that the expert needed access to the surveillance footage in order to render an opinion.  Plaintiffs’ counsel, as an officer of the court, did certify to the trial court as to the veracity of this information.
[brief] [...] was the Chief of the Bureau of Safe Drinking Water and plaintiff’s direct supervisor.  (Pa246).  [...] suggests that [...] asked him in 2015 when he planned to retire.  (Pa881).  Plaintiff neglects to mention he had submitted applications for retirement as early as April 28, 2008, for a November 1, 2010 retirement date and continued to submit applications in 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, and on July 7, 2014.  (Pa709-Pa716).  [...] is described as the Assistant Director of Water Operations and oversaw the Bureau of Safe Drinking Water.
[brief] ”  Instead, the *Goodfellas* quote was used to emphasize the friendship between defendant and [...], which was presented to the jury via defendant’s interrogation video.  *(See Da67 at 4:08 to 4:33).*  The use of the *Goodfellas* quote was therefore reasonably related to scope of the evidence presented and fell within the “considerable leeway” that prosecutors are afforded to make “vigorous and forceful closing arguments. ”  *(Mahoney*, 188 N.J. at 376).  Defendant finally argues that the trial court “add[ed] to the compounding prejudice” against defendant by “commending counsel for their closing remarks” in the presence of the jury after the prosecutor concluded his summation.  *(Db38). *  However, the court complimented the professionalism of both attorneys throughout the entirety of the trial, not the merit of their respective summations:  Members of the jury, the evidence in this case has been presented and the attorneys have completed their closing arguments .  . . .  We now arrive at a time when you, as jurors, have to perform your final function in this case.  . . .  I would like to commend both counsel for the professional manner in which they have presented their respective cases and for their courtesy to the court and jury during the course of this trial.  Usually it’s my standard practice, you don’t see this, but I b[r]ing both counsels . . . after closings . . . into Chambers and I shake hands with them.  It’s the only time I shake hands with my counsels . . . because, you know, it’s a responsibility that they both have and it’s a function that attorneys perform in our courts.  (5T:114-24 to 115-17 (emphasis added)).  It is unlikely that the jury interpreted the trial court’s appreciation of the parties’ courtesy as an endorsement of the prosecutor’s summation and any alleged misconduct therein.  Had this been the case, defendant cannot show he was unduly prejudiced when the court would have therefore endorsed his closing as well, which strenuously attacked the credibility State’s witnesses, the police investigation, and the surveillance footage depicting the shooter.  (See 5T:72-4 to 81-11).  Ultimately, however, the trial court dispelled any notion that the jurors should rely solely on prosecutor’s arguments in summation by stating that comments by counsel were “not controlling,” that “summations . . . are not evidence and must not be treated as evidence,” and that “[a]lthough the attorneys may point out what they think important in this case, [the jury] must rely solely upon [their] understanding and recollection of the evidence that was admitted during the trial. ” (5T:121-1 to 11).  Accordingly, defendant has not demonstrated that the trial prosecutor engaged in misconduct and defendant’s convictions should therefore be affirmed.
[brief] Cupo*, 196 N.J. 502, 517 (2008), the Supreme Court set forth the proper standard to assess a defendant's request for recusal from a matter: “Would a reasonable, fully informed person have doubts about the judge's impartiality? ”  See also *State v. Dalal*, 221 N.J. 601, 606-07 (2015); *State v. McCabe*, 201 N.J. 34, 45-46 (2010) (internal quotation omitted) (requiring disqualification where judge and defense counsel were actively adversaries in another open, unresolved matter).  But while “the mere appearance of bias may require disqualification[,]…before the court may be disqualified on the ground of an appearance of bias, the belief that the proceedings were unfair must be objectively reasonable. ”
[brief] Plaintiff also does not seek any damages for other harms under the purview of the PLA, such as emotional distress. ”).  \item Shannon v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., No. 09-4171 (D.N.J. Apr. 14, 2010).  \end{footnotes} other statutory or regulatory schemes,\textsuperscript{108} the Legislature, presumed familiar with its laws, took no action to write into the SWDA or CMWSA special protections for municipalities facing contract claims.