ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] ”  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-2.  The New Jersey Supreme Court previously set forth the following factors to determine whether an agency has created an administrative rule: (1) is intended to have wide coverage encompassing a large segment of the regulated or general public, rather than an individual or a narrow select group; (2) is intended to be applied generally and uniformly to all similarly situated persons; (3) is designed to operate only in future cases, that is, prospectively; (4) prescribes a legal standard or directive that is not otherwise expressly provided by or clearly and obviously inferable from the enabling statutory authorization; (5) reflects an administrative policy that (i) was not previously expressed in any official and explicit agency determination, adjudication or rule, or (ii) constitutes a \textsuperscript{18}
[brief] Under the MSRA.  In the Complaint, Plaintiffs recognize the extraordinary financial crisis that [...] has faced over the past decade.  The City submitted to state monitorship pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:27BB in February 2011 in response to tax appeals filed by various casinos which, among other economic conditions, triggered an unprecedented financial crisis.  (Pa000325).  Despite the monitorship, the City continued to struggle financially, and “experienced a $14,000,000[] reduction in its real property tax base, a substantial decline in tax revenue, drastic property tax increases, and suffocating tax appeals.  The economic downturn resulted in the closure of 5 casinos, more than 11,000 people have lost their jobs, and [...] has one of the highest foreclosure rates in the nation. ” (Pa000265).  On May 27, 2016, then-Governor [...] signed S-1711/A-2569 into law, the MSRA, with bipartisan support.
[directive] Advancements in medical treatment over the past several decades have transformed HIV/AIDS from a devastating epidemic to a manageable, chronic disease—and require us to rethink how we enforce N.J.S.A. 2C:34-5(b), which criminalizes certain sexual activity by those living with HIV.  In 1997, New Jersey enacted N.J.S.A. 2C:34-5(b), which made it a third-degree crime for an individual living with HIV to engage in an “act of sexual penetration” without the informed consent of their partner.  At the time, doctors and researchers were still struggling to find effective medical treatments for the disease and an infection was thought to be a death sentence.  Since then, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has adopted treatment guidelines recommending a regimen of antiretroviral therapy (ART) for all adults and adolescents living with HIV.  These ART treatments have proven remarkably successful.  According to the CDC, individuals who adhere to their treatment plans can now reduce their viral loads to such a low level that the virus is undetectable in testing—and virtually impossible to transmit through sex.1  But even as the risk of infection and mortality has decreased, the stigma associated with the virus has remained high.  People living with HIV still face discrimination, and this stigma discourages people from learning their HIV status and, when appropriate, disclosing it to medical partners.2  providers and sexual  A number of professional organizations, including the American Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “HIV Treatment,” available at:  1  https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/basics/livingwithhiv/treatment.html.  The White House, National HIV/AIDS Strategy for the United States, July 2010, at ix.  2  New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer • Printed on Recycled Paper and Recyclable Medical Association and the American Psychological Association, have criticized laws that criminalize sexual activity by those living with HIV, on the grounds that they further stigmatize disease.3 the  For the same reason, in 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division laws.4 published a best practices guide encouraging states to repeal or significantly reform such  Of course, N.J.S.A. 2C:34-5(b) remains on the books, and it is the responsibility of the Legislature—not prosecutors—to decide whether and how the law should be modified.  And while relatively few individuals are charged with violating N.J.S.A. 2C:34-5(b), it is helpful to provide statewide guidance to ensure that its enforcement does not undermine current public-health strategies.
[brief] Instead, she --- 5  Although Delgado is a trial court decision, it illustrates New Jersey courts’ general aversion to, and rejection of, Appellant’s arguments regarding the legislative history of the NJCFLA. reiterates the same arguments as to the NJCFLA’s legislative history that courts have already rejected.  Appellant cannot circumvent the lack of private right of action, whether directly or by seeking declaratory or injunctive relief or relief under the CFA or FDCPA.  Accordingly, as discussed further below, her other claims necessarily fail.  B.
[brief] ”  State v. Harris, 298 N.J. Super. 478, 489 (App. Div. 1997) (quotations omitted).  In State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338, 342 (2005), the Court held that testimony that the police included defendant’s photograph in an array because the police “had developed defendant as a ‘suspect based on information received’” violated the Confrontation Clause.  Despite the absence of an objection, the Court held that such testimony “was inadmissible hearsay that violated defendant’s right of confrontation” and compelled reversal.  Ibid.
[brief] Pa80.  In an Endorsement entitled "New Jersey Part Two Employers Liability Endorsement,” [...] writes as follows:  “With respect to Exclusion C5, this insurance does not cover any and all intentional wrongs within the exception allowed by N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 including but not limited to bodily injury caused or aggravated by an intentional wrong committed by you or your employees or bodily injury resulting from an act or omission by you or your employees, which is substantially certain to result in injury. ”  Pa76.  On September 19, 2022, [...] sent a denial of coverage letter to [...].  Pa435.  Although [...] denied coverage and that it had a duty to defend, it offered [...] the “accommodation” of using [...], [...]’s counsel at bar, at no cost to [...].  Pa440.  On May 24, 2023, [...]’s personal counsel advised [...] of the [...] settlement demand of $2,700,000 and demanded coverage asserting that the C5 exclusion violated public policy.  Pa445.  By letter dated June 9, 2023, [...] restated [...]’s denial of coverage and, once again, offered his services at no charge to [...].  Pa451.  Defendant [...] insured [...] under an excess follow-form and umbrella coverage policy.
[brief] Specifically, the Borough found that the Property satisfied N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b) because all use of the Property had been discontinued as of January 31, 2023, when the Plaintiff terminated an existing lease for an illegal use and because all legal use of the Property ceased as of the end of 2017.  The Borough also found that the Property satisfied N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(d) because it contained underground storage tanks ("USTs") that were leaking petroleum products such as gasoline, diesel, and motor oils.  Despite official reporting of the leak in 1994, Plaintiff still has not completed investigating the extent of the contamination, having completed its first "robust" soil and water testing in May to June of 2023.  Testimony from the Plaintiff’s licensed site remediation specialist ("LSRP") indicated that he could not give any firm deadlines for completing remediation and could not yet opine as to the type of remediation that would be required because he did not have all of the data.  Evidence indicated that since 1994, Plaintiff routinely missed mandatory remediation deadlines and performed the bare minimum necessary to advance remediation only after municipal court actions were filed against Plaintiff.  In order to return this vacant, contaminated and unproductive property back into productive use, the Borough began the process to designate the Property as a Condemnation Redevelopment Area, which resulted in the designation of the Property on July 27, 2023.
[brief] The Complaint could not have been brought by [...]—because according to Appellant, its president, it now belonged to [...], his wife.  The Complaint could not have been brought by [...], because Appellant was the Managing Member of [...] and certainly would not have sued himself for his fraud.  Respondents’ claims against Appellant have always been for him breaching his fiduciary duties to them.  As the Managing Member for [...], Appellant owed a duty to his fellow Members, a duty he breached by fraudulently transferring $4,750,000 from [...] to himself, then transferring [...] to his wife, and then attempting to use his fraud to drive the value of [...] below $0 due to uncollectible loans; since it was not yet a cold day in hell, he would not have his companies pay [...] back.
[brief] DA001-DA006.  In her certified Answers to Interrogatories, Plaintiff never states that any of the Township Defendants knew about her alleged anxiety disability, or why she took FMLA leave in February 2018 or March 2019.  DA022-DA073.  Similarly, in her deposition testimony, Plaintiff never testified that any of the Township Defendants knew about her alleged anxiety disability, or why she took FMLA leave in February 2018 or March 2019.  Pltf.  T:133-1-25—160:1-16.  In sum, Plaintiff’s trial testimony materially deviated from her prior factual allegations in the pleadings, discovery responses, and her deposition testimony.
[brief] 220 N.J. at 199.  The Green Court had permitted consideration of dismissed charges during sentencing decisions because “the sentencing judge might find it significant that a defendant who experienced an unwarranted arrest was not deterred by that fact from committing a crime thereafter. ”  62 N.J. at 571.  The K.S. Court stated, “We disapprove of those statements in Brooks and Green because deterrence is directed at persons who have committed wrongful acts .  . . .  Accordingly, we hold that when no [] undisputed facts exist or findings are made, prior dismissed charges may not be considered for any purpose. ”  220 N.J. at 199.  The Court confirmed that K.S. applies to sentencing proceedings in State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293 (2019).
[directive] of  The Prevention Domestic Violence Act (PDVA) mandates that courts of must "protect victims violence that occurs in a family or family-like setting by providing access to both emergent and long-term civil and criminal remedies and sanctions, and by ordering those remedies and sanctions that are available to assure of the safety the victims and the public."  N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18.  Parties involved in a matter that includes domestic violence may seek resolution in the Family Division of while a criminal case may be simultaneously brought against one those parties.  Similarly, parties involved a domestic violence matter (FV docket) or a domestic in have violence contempt (FO docket) may a corresponding child protection (FN of docket) or child custody (FD docket) matter.  Judges hearing any these matters of must be aware any other court matters to ensure that orders are enforceable and not contradictory.  In the Criminal Division, a defendant may be released pursuant to the of Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA) with conditions no-contact with a victim, minor children in common or not in common, or other family members or friends of if Family the victim.  Additionally, sought by the victim, the judge may separately enter a temporary restraining order (TRO) and subsequently a final ADA ENSURING TO AN DOOR OPEN JUSTICE  Americans with Disabilities Act Directive #17-20 - Co-Occurring Contact Conditions
[brief] ..........................................................................................................................  16  Stump v. Whibco, 314 N.J. Super. 560 (App. Div. 1998) ......................................................................................... 41, 42, 43, 47 Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015) ..........................................................................................................................  17  Wilomay Holding Co. v. Peninsula Land Co., 36 N.J. Super. 440 (App. Div. 1955) ..............................................................................................  44  Statutes N.J.S.A. 2A:14-30 .............................................................................................................................  43 N.J.S.A. 2A:35-1 ...............................................................................................................................  18 N.J.S.A. 2A:62-1 ...............................................................................................................................  19, 29 Rules R. 4:46-2(c) ........................................................................................................................................  16  Other Authorities R.P.C. 3.7 ..........................................................................................................................................  38  Restatement (Second) of Torts §822 .................................................................................................  21  TABLE OF JUDGMENT, ORDER AND RULINGS  Order Denying [...]’s Pre-Answer motion to dismiss dated January 21, 2022 .........................................................Da21  Order Appointing [...] as Surveyor entered March 13, 2023......................................................Pa089  Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment entered August 17, 2023 and Statement of Reasons.............................Pa0163
[brief] To allege bad faith or improper motive, requires an allegation of a “malice-like” state of mind, which is more than something that is simply “unfair, not decent or reasonable, or dishonest. ”  Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J. 236, 251 (2001) (citation and quotation omitted).  Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint is entirely silent regarding the motives and intentions of [...].  In its brief, Plaintiff cites to paragraphs 42 to 53 of the Complaint as containing allegations of bad faith and improper motive.  (Pb44).  However, nowhere in these paragraphs is “improper motive,” “malice” or ‘bad intention” on the part of [...] alleged.  (See Pa11-13, ¶¶42-53).  Allegations that [...] “intentionally withheld” information, communicated with [...], “refused to keep Plaintiff apprised,” assisted [...] in closing a separate transaction and the like do not plead bad intention, bad motive or malice.  Moreover, the count in the Complaint alleging breach of the covenant of good faith does not allege bad motive or malice either.
[brief] The Court below failed to recognize CEPA’s social ramifications on the distinction between independent contractor and this Plaintiff.  The Court below was hung up on the fact that the Plaintiff was part of a partnership and that payments were made to the partnership.  That statement is contradicted by ¶ 4 of Plaintiff’s Certification indicating that [...], Esq. was assistant county counsel and [...] was employed by the County as a paralegal/secretary to county counsel in an office designated as his.  They constituted the county’s legal department.  And ¶ 8 which indicates, “During my term as county counsel, I was required by the County to be physically present with established office hours in the Administration Building on a daily basis and on call 24/7 to deal with emergent matters.  My practice was to spend mornings at [...], afternoons at the county and return to [...] after 5 p.m.  Point II
[brief] 31 State v. Hockett, 443 N.J. Super. 605 (App. Div.  2016) ............................................ 16, 18 State v. Joseph, 426 N.J. Super. 204 (App. Div.), certify. den. 212 N.J. 462 (2012) ............................................................................................... 15 State v. Lodzinski, 249 N.J. 115 (2021) ..................................................................... 25 State v. Marrocelli, 448 N.J. Super. 349 (App. Div. 2017) ........................................ 16, 17 State v. Mays, 321 N.J. Super. 619 (App. Div.), certif. den. 162 N.J. 132 (1999) ............................................................................................... 15 State v. R.J.M., 453 N.J.Super. 261 (App. Div. 2018) ............................................... 33 State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127 (1978) ............................................................................. 29 State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390 (2019) .................................................................. 16 State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 468 (2017) ............................................................................. 20, 32 State v. Ward, 240 N.J. Super. 412 (App. Div. 1990) ................................................ 27 State v. Williams, 190 N.J. 114 (2007) ..................................................................... 25 State v. Wright, 444 N.J. Super. 347 (App. Div. 2016)........................................... 27 STATUTES N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a.................................................................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a (1) ............................................................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a (2) ............................................................................................................. 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d .................................................................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d .................................................................................................................... 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b .................................................................................................................... 1 RULES N.J.R.E. 401 .............................................................................................................................. 16, 17, 19 N.J.R.E. 402 .............................................................................................................................. 16, 19 N.J.R.E. 609 .............................................................................................................................. 30 N.J.R.E. 609(b).......................................................................................................................... 28, 29 N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2)(ii)
[directive] Attached is the Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive 2004-4 regarding No. the standardization of external audits of County Prosecutor’s Office Forfeiture Funds which became effective October 25,2004.  Also attached is the Manual referred to in the Directive.  jk  Attachments  [...], Attorney General c. [...], First Assistant Attorney General, OAG  - - - - [...], Chef of Staff, Office of thecAttorney General, OAG Director [...], Office of Government Integrity  [...], Director, DCJ  [...], Chief of Staff, DCJ  [...], Assistant Director, DCJ  [...], Chief, Prosecutors Supervision Coordination Bureau, & Division Criminal Justice, DCJ of Chief State Investigator  [...]  Is New Jersey  An Equal Opportuniw Employer  ‘Printed Recycled Paper and Recyclable on is  ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE  2004-4 NO.  Standardization of External Audits of County Prosecutor’s Office Forfeiture Funds  WHEREAS, it is the policy of the Attorney General that all State, County and Municipal law enforcement agencies shall administer State and Federally forfeited funds and property in a uniform and manner, consistent with established State Federal law, regulations, directives, and standard operating procedures; and WHEREAS, the Attorney General the State’s chief law enforcement officer, has authority as to oversee the Forfeiture operations of the County Prosecutor’s Offices and ensure compliance with seq.; the forfeiture-related provisions of N.J.S.A.  2C:64-1 et N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 et N.J.S.A. seq.; 2C:21-25 et sea_.; N.J.S.A. 40A:5-1 et seq.; and, the State of New Jersey Forfeiture Program Administration Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’s 1-12); and WHEREAS, SOP 12 requires County Prosecutors to have aregistered municipal accountant (RMA)/certified public accountant (CPA) audit all accounts containing or related to forfeited and seized property, on an annual basis; and WHEREAS, the Attorney General has surveyed the manner in which the annual W C P A audits of County Forfeiture funds are conducted and has determined that utilization of a standardized format by external auditors would produce more accurate and timely audit results and would allow for more efficient and productive oversight of compliance with SOP’s, statutes, regulations, guidelines and directives; and WHEREAS, this determination was not made in response to any serious existing problem or emergent need, but rather was made in consultation with the County Prosecutors Association of 9 New Jersey to enhance the administration of State and Federally forfeited funds and property; NOW, THEREFORE, PETER C.
[brief] On July 8, 2015, the [...] filed a Verified Complaint seeking a declaratory judgment of compliance with its Mount Laurel obligations.  On November 21, 2017, Emerson settled with [...], 163a, which settlement was approved by the trial court and incorporated into a Conditional Final Judgment of Compliance and Repose dated January 25, 2019, 239a.  On March 16, 2021, the trial court granted [...]’s motion in aid of litigant’s rights and found that Emerson had violated the Judgment and settlement agreement through an “apparent failure of the timely development of affordable housing . . . approved and ordered by the court.
[brief] DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO CHARGE THE JURY ON PASSION/PROVOCATION  MANSLAUGHTER.  (5T115-8 to 5T116-1; 5T116-7 to 13; 5T117-2 to 5; 5T118-9 to 24; 6T5-1 to 3; 6T5-17 to 21)  ...........................................  15
[brief] In [...], the stipulation was filed on October 4, 2022, while in [...], the stipulations of dismissal were filed on June 7, 2023 and July 17, 2023.  Copies of the stipulations are included in the Appendix hereto as A01, A03 and A04, respectively.  Indeed, the criminal investigatory report at issue here related solely to the [...] matter.  Yet, it appears the plaintiff did not notify the court that the underlying cases had been dismissed.  such information may be withheld.
[brief] Times change.  Industries change.  Business models change.  Land use regulations governing these industries and businesses, where same are identified as permitted uses, need to reflect those changes in order to reasonably facilitate these permitted uses.  When they do not, it is for zoning boards of adjustment to evaluate the evidence showing that “disconnect”, and grant variances from those regulations to facilitate the development of that permitted use.  Imagine a zoning ordinance which permits hospitals, hotels, and cell towers in specific zones, but limits their heights to 20 feet, or two stories.  The functionality of those facilities is rendered useless by the height limitation.  To advance the purposes of the zoning ordinance, which recognizes the appropriateness of those uses in those zones, relief from the height constraint is required.  The same holds true here.  [...] has long determined that the land sitting on the Interstate 295 Exit 52 Interchange, bordered also by two county roads, is appropriate for warehouses and distribution centers.  In 1991, a 30 foot height limit was reasonable for the industry.  Over the last decade and a half, however, technological innovations, the use of racking systems and other forms of automation, have required warehouses to “go up” with higher ceilings and clearances.  While acknowledging that the site in this litigation is correctly zoned for warehouse use, Florence never bothered to adapt its regulations on height to this changing industry.  Thus, a height variance was needed to facilitate the development of this permitted activity.  The overwhelming—and unrebutted, uncontroverted—evidence proved the unreasonableness of this regulation.  The [...], however, ignored that evidence, misapplied the law, and denied the variance.  Judicial relief is required.  **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**