ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] In this case, Plaintiffs’ claims were not frivolous.  The imposition of sanctions based solely on the absence of a transaction subsequent to the alleged interference reveals not only a misunderstanding of both the nature of the tortious interference claim, as discussed above in Point I.A., but also the legal standards governing frivolous litigation.  At the time of filing, from Plaintiffs’ perspective, this appeared to be (and still appears to be) a classic case of tortious interference: Plaintiffs had a long-standing relationship with the [...] (3T 20:3-19; see also P354a-P356a, P366a-P369); that relationship ended (3T 20:17-19; see also P356a-P357a); and [...] was told that this relationship was ended because a potential sale to [...] (P389a).  The only missing element ([...]’s knowledge and intention) remains solely in [...]’s possession, but the abrupt nature of the relationship’s end, the “credit” for a new optical in Plaintiffs’ place, and the fact that [...] conducted due diligence which must have alerted it to Plaintiffs’ presence, (P750a-P755a), lead to the reasonable inference that the conduct was not sanctioned by the “rules of the game” to which Plaintiffs were accustomed.  See, e.g., Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Farmland Dairy Farms, Inc., 282 N.J. Super. 140, 198-99 (App. Div. 1995) (identifying elements of claim); Printing Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. at 757 (citations omitted) (“In other words, was the interference by defendant ‘sanctioned by the ‘rules of the game.
[brief] [...]  Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant  [...] [...]  [...]  On the Brief: [...], ESQ.  Attorney ID# 422902023 Date Submitted: September 9, 2024  #  TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Page | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | ii | | TABLE OF JUDGMENTS | iii | | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 1 | | STATEMENT OF FACTS | 1 | | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 1 | | POINT I | | | DEFENDANT, [...] IS NOT IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY (Pa1-7) | 1 | | POINT II | | | DEFENDANT  [...] IS NOT SHIELDED BY DISCRETIONARY IMMUNITY (Pa1-7) | 7 | | POINT III | | | PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT REPORT IS NOT AN INADMISSIBLE NET OPINION (Pa1-7) | 9 | | CONCLUSION | 10 | ## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases: | | --- | | **Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.**, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993) ...........................................  9 | | **Garrison v. Twp. of Middletown**, 154 N.J. 282, 712 A.2d 1101 (N.J. 1998) ............................................................................. 3 | | **Gonzalez-Lopez v. Perfect Trading, Inc.**, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60277 ................................................................................................. 9 | | **Norris v. Borough of Leonia**, 160 N.J. 427, 734 A.2d 762 (N.J. 1999) .................................................................................. 8 | | **Pineda v. Ford Motor Co.**, 520 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................... 9 | | **Roe by M.J. v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc.**, 317 N.J. Super. 72, 721 A.2d 302 (App. Div. 1998) .............................................................. 5, 6, 7 | | **Schneider v. Fried**, 320 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 2003) ..................................................................................................... 9 | | **Schwartz v. Jordan and Public Service Electric & Gas**, 337 N.J. Super. 550, 767 A.2d 1008 (App. Div. 2001) .......................................................... 4 | | **Sims v. City of Newark**, 244 N.J. Super. 32, 581 A.2d 524 (1990) .............................................................................. 7, 8 | | **Vincitore v. New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority**, 169 N.J. 119, 777 A.2d 9 (2001) ........................................................................................... passim | | **Weiss v. N.J. Transit**, 128 N.J. 376, 608 A.2d 254 (1992) ......................................................................................... 3 | | **Wymbs v. Township of Wayne**, 163 N.J. 523, 750 A.2d 751 (2000) ....................................................................................... 2 | ### Statutes & Other Authorities: - **N.J.S.A. 59:1-1–12-3** .............................................................................................................. 1 - **N.J.S.A. 59:4-2** ....................................................................................................................... 1, 5 TABLE OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RULINGS BEING APPEALED Page Order and Statement of Reasons of the Honorable [...]
[directive] Since these revisions do not become effective until Thursday, February 1, 2001, each law enforcement agency will have sufficient time to arrange for the reproduction and distribution of the new statements to all personnel and stations.  Please note, however, that the content of the attached Standard Statements cannot be altered or changed in any manner, and cannot be translated to any other language.  To facilitate the duplication of the revision to these Standard Statements, and to minimize costs, a camera ready copy of each revised Standard Statement is attached.  Each one has been formatted onto a single page and can be easily reproduced and incorporated into existing 2
[brief] (6T141-5 to 11; 6T142-1 to 4; 6T164-24 to 6T165-3; 6T165-10 to 14; 11T16-4 to 18; 13T34-24 to 13T35-2; 13T53-23 to 13T54-7).  The [...] was a large one with most of them living in Newark.  (13T34-20 to 23).  The promoters of the party to celebrate [...]’s life posted the event on Instagram and social media.  (6T142-5 to 7; 6T142-24 to 6T143-2).  This event was not gang-related but was a family party.  (13T74-9 to 13).  About two weeks before the events were to be held, [...] was hired to provide the security.
[directive] PROFICIENT ENHANCING 14. of Association Prosecutors County with the cooperation in Criminal Justice, of Division  The legal continuing present and develop shall Institute, Advocacy General's Attorney the and Jersey New and prosecutors assistant all (1) for Directive this and Law Bail Reform the on courses education assistant and Prosecutors County all (2) general, attorneys deputy Justice Criminal of Division this to pursuant authorized supervisors as designated general attorneys deputy and prosecutors (3) and of release, revocation or detention pretrial seek whether to on decisions approve to Directive release and/or detention pretrial conduct general who attorneys deputy and prosecutors assistant hearings.  revocation  81  Page Directive. of issuance this immediately operational upon become shall Section  This RCPORTS ANll STUDIES EVALUATION
[brief] (Pa134-Pa136).  On October 11, 2022, the trial court denied reconsideration, finding no “clear justification to interpret the ‘or’ [in N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2)] conjunctively. ” (Pa133).  The trial court reasoned that the word “or” in N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2) did not need to be read conjunctively in order to “avoid constructions that make the relevant statutory provisions redundant or meaningless. ” (Pa133).  The trial court reasoned that because of the distinct options in N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2), there was “no risk for the ‘phrases, before and after the or to mean the same thing. ’” (Pa133) (quoting Wildwood Storage Ctr., Inc. v. Mayor of Wildwood, 260 N.J. Super. 464, 471 (App. Div. 1992)).  In addition, the trial court also provided the following rationale for its decision:  [T]his Court otherwise finds no clear legislative intent for the meaning of the word “or” in this statute to depart from its normal, disjunctive interpretation.  As such, this Court affirms its prior finding and holds that N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(a)(2) authorizes Plaintiff to receive one, but not all three of the remedies set forth by the statute.
[brief] “The intervention of a trial judge in the questioning of a witness is both a power and duty, ad forms part of the judiciary’s general obligation to ensure a fair trial conducted in an orderly and expeditious matter. ”  State v. Medina, 349 N.J. Super. 108 (2002) (citing State v. Riley, 28 N.J. 188(1958)).  The intervention of a trial judge is a desirable procedure, but it must be exercised with restraint.  Village of Ridgewood v. Sreel Inv. Corp, 28 N.J. 121 (1958).  “There is a point at which the judge may cross that fine line that separates advocacy from impartiality. ”  Id. at 131.  Rule 611(a)(2) provides that the “court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence to … avoid wasting time. ”  “Expert testimony should be circumscribed by a limiting instruction to the effect that the jury should not consider the hearsay statement as substantive evidence relating to the question of guilt or innocence of the accused, but only as evidence tending to support the ultimate conclusion of the doctor on the question of insanity or diminished capacity. ”  State v. Farthing, 331 N.J. Super. 58, 78 (2000)).
[brief] “It is elementary that an expert witness is always subject to searching cross-examination on the basis for his opinion. ”  County of Ocean v. Landolfo, 132 N.J. Super. 523, 528 (App. Div. 1975); State, by State Highway Comm’r v. Azzolina Land Corp., 101 N.J. Super. 103, 106 (App. Div. 1968).  b)  [...]’S EXPERT OPINIONS ON “HIGHEST AND BEST USE” ARE FACTUALLY AND LEGALLY SUPPORTED; THE “PROJECT INFLUENCE DOCTRINE” IS NOT APPLICABLE.
[directive] N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10.  Reports of abuse  Any person having reasonable cause to believe that a child has been subjected to child abuse or acts of child abuse shall report the same immediately to the Division of Child Protection and Permanency by telephone or otherwise.  Such reports, where possible, shall contain the names and addresses of the child and his parent, guardian, or other person having custody and control of the child and, if known, the child’s age, the nature and possible extent of the child’s injuries, abuse or maltreatment, including any evidence of previous injuries, abuse or maltreatment, and any other information that the person believes may be helpful with respect to the child abuse and the identity of the perpetrator.  A- 16
[brief] As noted in Shields, “[i]t would be impractical to require the landlord here to prevent the harm…on property that it does not control,” noting that “[t]he landlord does not maintain a presence on the property and does not have access to information about the condition of the property. ”  Shields, 494.  In short, “fairness precludes the landlord’s liability for plaintiff’s injuries” where the landlord transferred control to a tenant.
[brief] A.  The plain language of the No-Fault Law requires arbitration of [...]’s claims.  Fundamentally, the issue before the Court is one of statutory interpretation—the meaning of No-Fault Law’s arbitration provision, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1, and whether it requires arbitration of [...]’s claims.  Based on the plain language, the answer to this question is yes.  The “best indicator” of the Legislature’s intent when enacting a statute is the statute’s language itself.
[brief] RESPONDENTS MANIFESTED THEIR ASSENT TO ARBITRATE THROUGH THEIR COURSE OF CONDUCT.  | 3 | | POINT III  [...]’S SHAREHOLDER ACCOUNT MANAGER WEBSITE PROVIDED MORE THAN ADEQUATE NOTICE OF ITS TERMS  | 7 | | A.  The Record reflects that Respondent [...] registered for and accessed [...]’s Shareholder Account Manager (SAM) website.  | 7 | | B.  [...]’s SAM website provided adequate notice of its terms of use under the evolution of *Wollen* and its progeny.  | 8 | | C.  *Wollen* and its progeny do not require expressed affirmative assent to the terms of service.  | 11 | | D.  Respondents’ attempts to distinguish *Racioppi* and *Vercammen* are not supported by the case law.  | 12 | | CONCLUSION | 15  | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[brief] 5  Dwight Assocs. v. Township of Fairfield, 2012  Tax Unpub. LEXIS 36 (N.J. Tax Unpub. LEXIS 36 (N.J. Tax Ct. Oct. 26, 2012)  ...............  44 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)  .................. 27 Beatty v. Farmer, 366 N.J. Super. 366 N.J. Super. 69 (App. Div. 2004) .. 26 Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995) .......... 26, 27 Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512 (1981) ............................. 44 Caldwell v. Haynes, 136 N.J. 422 (1994) .............................. 28, 31 Cipala v. Lincoln Tech., Inc., 179 N.J. 45 (2004) ....................... 27
[directive] After Jail County to Transport 4.12 be shall defendant Directive, the this to pursuant issued is acomplaint-warrant  When conduct to need considering the practicable, as soon jail as county the to transported requiring procedures identification witness defendant, of interview (e.g., activities investigative the and resources transport of availability the and participation) or presence defendant's to as recommendations preparing is program services pretrial the which during hours operating 2A:162-16.
[brief] [*Ibid.*]  New Jersey has adopted the same standard established by the United States Supreme Court in determining what constitutes an adverse employment action or reprisal in a retaliation claim under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.  (NJLAD).  *Roa*, 200 N.J. at 574-75 (2010) (citing *Burlington Northern*).  The Court in *Roa* held that  In addressing the question of how harmful an act of retaliatory discrimination must be in order to fall within the provision’s scope . . . a Plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well *might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination*.
[directive] If the offense occurred on or after March 13, 1995 and the sentence is to probation, or the sentence otherwise requires payments of financial obligations to the probation division, you must pay a transaction fee of up to $2.00 for each occasion when a payment or installment payment is made?  e.  If the offense occurred on or after August 2, 1993 you must pay a $75 Safe [Yes] [No] Neighborhood Services Fund assessment for each conviction?
[brief] Model Criminal Jury Charge, Unlawful Possession of a Handgun .................. 43 Model Criminal Jury Charge, Unlawful Possession of a Handgun, (rev. June 11, 2018)  .........................................................................................  42  [...] et al., Sequential Lineup Laps and Eyewitness Accuracy, 35 L. & Hum. Behav. 262 (2011)  ..............................................................14, 17 Report of the Special Master, Jun. 18, 2010 .........................................................11  [...] et al., The Effects of Allowing a Second Sequential Lineup Lap on Choosing and Probative Value, 21 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y and L. 121 (2015)  ...........................................................................................................  15  [...] et al., The Effects of Repeated Lineups and Delay on Eyewitness Identification, 4 Cognitive Res. Principles. & Implications (2019)  ..................................................................................................................  15  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[brief] At the time of [...]’s arbitration motion, two sets of document demands and four sets of interrogatories had been served by both sides, a combined over 4,400 pages of documents had been produced, Appellants had answered all three sets of [...]’s interrogatories, and [...]’s deposition had been noticed for May 30, 2024 (for which [...] then refused to appear).  Da334-54, 377.  Absent [...]’s self-imposed stay of discovery, discovery would have been completed in June 2024 – there was not “a substantial amount of work to be completed” as [...] would have this Court believe.
[brief] Closing 204T January 17, 2013  Closing 205T January 18, 2013  Closing 206T January 23, 2013  Closing 207T January 24, 2013  Closing 208T January 25, 2013  Closing 209T February 6, 2013  Closing 210T February 7, 2013  Closing 211T February 20, 2013  Closing 212T February 21, 2013  Closing 213T February 22, 2013  Closing 214T February 25, 2013  Closing 215T February 26, 2013  Closing 216T February 27, 2013  Closing 217T February 28, 2013  Closing 218T March 1, 2013  Closing 219T March 4, 2013 Closing 220T March 5, 2013  Closing 221T March 6, 2013  Closing 222T August 5, 2013
[brief] 29  ### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Cases | Page | |----------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | **Akhtar v. JDN Props. at Florham Park, LLC,** | | | 439 N.J. Super. 391 (App. Div. 2015) | 10 | | **Atlantic Fabrication & Coatings, Inc. v. SIM/Mestek Machinery, Inc.**| | | No. BER-L-003727-17, 2019 WL 13178933 (N.J. Super. L., Bergen Cnty. Apr. 16, 2019) | 13 | | **Black Creek Sanctuary Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Fortress Inv. Grp., L.L.C.**| | | No. A-5227-12T3, 2015 WL 1565644 (App. Div. Apr. 9, 2015) | 10, 12| | **Brach, Eichler, Rosenberg, Silver, Bernstein, Hammer & Gladstone, P.C. v. Ezekwo,**| | | 345 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2001) | 10, 11| | **C.f. Century Indem.
[brief] Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 46 (2020) (citing Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 316 (2019)).  Similarly, “[t]he issue of whether a party waived its arbitration right is a legal determination subject to de novo review. ”  Cole, 215 N.J. at 275 (citing Manalapan Realty LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).  The factual findings underlying the waiver determination are entitled to deference and are subject to review for clear error.  See Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483–84, 323 A.2d 495 (1974).
[brief] A contracting party has the right to expect the other party to exercise even discretion that is expressly unilateral in good faith.  See Nolan v. Control Data Corp., 243 N.J.Super. 420 (App. Div. 1990).  In Nolan, “[t]he written contract gave the employer the absolute and unfettered power to alter sales quotas and thereby compensation rates retroactively, currently or prospectively without notice and presumably without reason. ”  Id. at 421.  The Appellate Division in Nolan held that the employer must exercise this discretion in good faith and, in so doing, cited with approval a decision of then [...] of the D.C. Circuit regarding the appropriate analysis for contracts providing unilateral discretion:  . . . the reasonably understood effect of an expansive modifier varies from case to case depending upon the nature of the power at issue.  Where what is at issue is the retroactive reduction or elimination of a central compensatory element of the contract -- a large part of the quid pro quo that induced one party’s assent -- it is simply not likely that the parties had in mind a power quite as absolute as Tymshare suggests.  In the present case, agreeing to such a provision would require a degree of folly on the part of these sales representatives we are not inclined to posit where another plausible interpretation of the language is available.  Id. at 434 (quoting Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1154 (D.C.Cir.1984)).  Here, the “central compensatory element” of the MOU is the language providing that Plaintiff must pay “$3,000,000 upon the granting of enforceable final zoning approvals equal to: (i) a minimum of 82.50 units per acre for the Property, or (ii) such other lesser minimum units per acre acceptable to [Plaintiff] in its sole discretion …. (Da28-29).
[brief] Judicial discretion refers to a judge’s power to make a decision based on an individualized evaluation – but as guided by the principles of law.  Violations of law are not permitted, nor may they be excused by discretion when plain error is present.  [...] was aware that its publication on PACER was not just defamatory per se but a fraud upon the court.  Before its filing, [...] could have easily determined the veracity of the content by looking at the records.  The issues in Pennsylvania had been Ordered by the Court to be “expunged and physically destroyed” thirty-five years earlier by the Honorable [...], on December 19, 1975, (Pa 145 id at 3).  [...] knew or should have known that no charges existed.  Yet its zeal to prejudice the court and prevail in the lawsuit was much greater than its oath to its professional responsibilities and the law.
[directive] [No/Nie] (NA/Niedotyczy] other charges, or are presently serving a custodial term and the plea agreement is silent on the issue, the court may require that all sentences be made to run consecutively?  Czy rozumie Pan(i), ze jesli przyzna sic, Pan(i) do winy lub zostanie uznany(a) winnym/winn!l w zwi1!,Zku z innymi zarzutami lub jesli obecnie odbywa Pan(i) wyrok pozbawienia wolnosci, a porozumienie z prokuratorem nie porusza tej kwestii, S!!d moze wymagac odbycia kazdego z wyrok6w kolejno?  12.
[brief] II.  The Litigation over [...]’s Estate  [...] died on February 1, 2012, leaving behind a considerable estate, governed by a will and a living revocable trust (“[...]’s Estate Plan”).  (Da9-10, at ¶ 11).  [...] was the executor and trustee of [...]’s will and trust.  (Da10, at ¶ 12).  Both [...] and [...] are beneficiaries under [...]’s Estate Plan.  There was substantial litigation between the parties over [...]’s Estate Plan before and after his death.  (See id. at ¶ 13, Da139, Da192); [...], 2014 WL 2921601.  Their disputes culminated in a lengthy trial in the Chancery Division of the Bergen County Superior Court, which was resolved by an opinion and order issued on June 24, 2014 (the “Prior Litigation”).  See [...], 2014 WL 2921601.  The distribution of [...]’s interest in the Palm Beach Property became an important issue in the Prior Litigation.  See id., at *42 (describing the Palm Beach Property as a major source of contention).  The court in the Prior Litigation eventually held that, under [...]’s Estate Plan, [...] received a lifetime license to use the property twenty-one days per year, and a right to participate in the proceeds of any sale.  Id., at *18.  At the time of the Prior Litigation, [...] was still alive, but suffering from advanced Alzheimer’s Disease.  See id., at *3.  No aspect of [...]’s Estate Plan was at issue in the Prior Litigation.  See id., at *30 n.45 (noting [...]’s wills were not in evidence).  III.
[brief] ”  Lemelledo, 150 N.J. at 262 n.1.  When the NJCLA was combined with the New Jersey Residential Mortgage Lending Act  \(^2\) The New Jersey Residential Mortgage Lending Act ("NJRMLA"), N.J.S.A. 17:11C-51 to -89.  (“NJRMLA”), N.J.S.A. 17:11C-51 to -89, under the umbrella of the Licensed Lenders Act (“NJLLA”), the consumer-lending based provisions formerly known as the NJCLA became the “Consumer Finance Licensing Act. ”  Like the NJCLA before it (and the NJCFLA now), the NJLLA (now comprised of both consumer loan provisions and mortgage related provisions) enumerated the Commissioner’s enforcement mechanisms at subsection 18 and stated in subsection 33(b) that “[a] consumer lender who violates or participates in the violation of any provision of sections 3 . . . shall be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.  A contract of loan not invalid for any other reason, in the making or collection of which any act shall have been done which constitutes a crime of the fourth degree under this section, shall be void and the lender shall have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest or charges .  . . .”  New Jersey Licensed Lenders Act, 1997 N.J. A.N. 2513.  Moreover, “[t]he [NJ]CLA, as incorporated in the Licensed Lenders Act, allow[ed] for treble damages by aggrieved consumers, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-33b, and summary revocation of a lender's license, N.J.S.A. 17:11C-48a. ”  Lemelledo, 150 N.J. at 272.  In 2010, the NJLLA, N.J.S.A. 17:C-1 to -49, was divided, separating the New Jersey Residential Mortgage Lending Act (“NJRMLA”), N.J.S.A. 17:11C-51 to -89, from the NJCFLA—the NJRMLA and NJCFLA were now their own respective standalone statutes.