ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset huggingface dataset:
[brief] [...]’s Unlawful Dumping At The Leased Premises.  On or about September 19, 2023, more than two months after the parties executed the Settlement Agreement and one month before [...] was required to vacate, a neighboring property owner alerted [...] that [...] had been seen engaging in unauthorized and potentially unlawful conduct at the Leased Premises – namely, the importation of truckloads of unknown and unauthorized material, using unmarked trucks driven by unidentified individuals, that dumped and then spread large volumes of unknown material across the Leased Premises.  [Pa213 at ¶ 6].  In the weeks that followed, [...]’s environmental expert, [...], arranged for four long trenches to be dug across the north, west and east sides of the Leased Premises, and for 227 small test pits to be advanced in the areas of dumping.  [Pa305 at ¶ 6].  After measuring the depth and extent of the newly deposited material at different locations around the Leased Premises, [...] observed a clear delineation between the new materials and the prior surface area at the Leased Premises.  [Pa305 at ¶ 7].  These measurements, together with comparisons of new and old photographs of the site and trimble data, allowed [...] to calculate the volume of material that had been deposited by multiplying the depth measurements by the relevant square footage, which revealed that approximately 700 cubic yards of new construction and demolition materials had been dumped, together with 8,000-9,000 cubic yards of asphalt millings.  [Pa305 at ¶¶ 8-9].  To put this volume of material in perspective, it would take hundreds of dump trucks to deliver this quantity of materials, even using the largest “roll-off” containers which typically hold 30 cubic yards of material.  [Pa305 at ¶ 10].  By comparison, typical dump trucks carry less than 15 cubic yards of material.  [Pa305 at ¶ 10].  [...] shared this information with [...]’s LSRP and offered to accompany him on a visit the Leased Premises to see for himself, but he never responded.  [Pa306 at ¶¶ 13-15].  These events created an urgency for [...] to determine what, exactly, [...] had dumped across the Leased Premises and to prevent any further dumping (or damage) from occurring.
[brief] To support their intensity arguments, Plaintiff characterizes the overlay zoning as permitting warehouses that are 50 times larger than what was permitted in the underlying zoning and refers to the project as a 2,181,101 s.f. warehouse complex.  (Pb1).  Such a characterization is misleading.  The true facts indicate that the intensity of the Warehouse Project is not so significantly different to what was permitted without the Redevelopment Plan.  Importantly, over half of the Warehouse project is located within [...], has been approved, and can be built regardless of what is permitted in [...].
[brief] At oral argument in said motion to consolidate, [...], for whatever reason, attempted to undermine her previous clear holding, and characterize Plaintiffs’ clear, black and white English reading of said holding as an “interpretation”.  182a.  Ultimately, however, [...] stated that the “Court’s ruling will speak for itself. ”  182a.  Plaintiffs submit that the Court’s ruling does in fact speak for itself, and the ruling never stated that Plaintiffs’ new claims were barred as a result of the prior dismissal of prior claims.  Instead, the ruling stated that Plaintiffs would not be barred from filing these new claims in a new matter.  Therefore, the ruling stated that in weighing the prejudices, the Court found that there would be no prejudice to Plaintiffs in denying the motion to amend precisely because the new claims are not barred and can be filed in a new matter.  There was no “interpretation” given by Plaintiffs nor required by The Honorable [...], as any so-called “interpretation” to the contrary awkwardly and perplexingly attempting to fit a square peg into a round hole, whether by [...] irrelevantly after the fact in some other hearing, or by [...] in this matter, is erroneous.  Ultimately, [...]’s initial, clear ruling that Plaintiffs’ new claims were not barred by the dismissal of prior claims, was absolutely correct.  When The Honorable [...], J.S.C., dismissed the claims against [...] in the 2015 Action, she explicitly held that every single claim pled by Plaintiffs against [...] in the 2015 Action, however labeled, was a legal malpractice claim.
[brief] Undisputable proofs of Discrimination by and Abuse of Power by and or under the respondents against the appellant included the following:  a.  Disability accommodation sought by and for the 78 years old Mother was denied under the authority of the respondents by their employee [...], because of the appellant (Pa19), against the recommendation of the investigator, who stipulated in his report “I would recommend the installation of a handicapped parking space” (Pa18).  b.  This was done, when the public records of respondents showed that they had liberally approved about seventy (70) similar applications (Pa60).  c.  Respondents  Council members, unanimously and officially, had recognized the wrongfulness of the denial of disability accommodation by to the Mother (Pa20).  Yet, the trial judge’s findings of facts on the matter and the record to be reviewed above was the following (1T19, 15-18):
[brief] Equally without merit is defendant’s emphasis on [...]’s custodial status.  [...] was arrested on an unrelated warrant, was not handcuffed, and was not a target of this investigation.  In fact, it was [...] who advised police that he wanted to volunteer information about this case.  And while [...] claimed he was fed information by law enforcement, [...] found [...]’s testimony on this point to be flatly contradicted by his viewing of the recording and after having the opportunity to listen to both [...] and [...] testify.  As [...] (the lead investigator) testified, he did not even know of [...]’s existence prior to the interview.  (5T9-15 to 17; 5T29-7 to 8).  And as the judge found, the interview was conversational and unstructured.  Indeed, [...] largely gave lengthy narrative answers not suggested by the question.  E.g., (4T167-2 to 169-22; 4T170-6 to 22).  Numerous times throughout the interview, he stated that he did not know the answer to the question, e. g., (4T184-21 to 185-11), denied any facts assumed in the question, e.g., (4T197-18 to 24), or corrected the interviewer, e.g., (4T221-2 to 6).  Thus, as the judge correctly found, the mere fact that [...] was in custody did not render his statement unreliable, even if he was seeking a benefit in return.  Finally, with respect to [...]’s mental state, [...] had an opportunity to observe her testify and found her to be utterly incredible.  The judge’s credibility findings were reinforced by his viewing of her recorded statement, during which [...] spoke at ease, provided details about her conversations with defendant, and had no trouble remembering.  While defendant may disagree, that is not a basis to overturn credibility and factual findings that were fully supported by the record.  See State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249 (2015) (deference extends not only to trial court’s credibility findings, but also factual findings based on review of video and documentary evidence).  Ultimately, the overwhelming majority of the Gross factors weighed in favor of the judge’s finding that these out-of-court statements were reliable.  The jury had the opportunity to watch [...]’s and [...]’s trial testimony and pretrial statements and make its own determination about which account was true.  The jury also was repeatedly instructed, both prior to the playing of the statements and in the final jury charge, to consider the statements in context of the Gross factors and all the surrounding circumstances.  (6T26-7 to 29-10; 6T70-22 to 73-11; 6T115-5 to 118-7).  Because substantial credible evidence supported the reliability of the statements, [...] properly exercised his discretion in admitting them.  This ruling should be affirmed.
[brief] 7  I.  The Trial Court Correctly Determined the Interests of Justice Do Not Require an Enlargement of the Forty-Five Day Appeal Period.  (Pa55 – Pa58).  ..................................................................................................................  8  A.  The Trial Court Correctly Applied Rocky Hill in Determining that this Matter Does Not Implicate the Public Interest Exception to the Forty-Five Day Appeal Period.  (Pa55 – Pa58).  ...........................................
[brief] "Expert opinion is valueless unless it is rested upon the facts which are admitted or are proved."  *Townsend v. Pierre*, 221 N.J. 36, 58 (2015) (quoting *Stanley Co. of America v. Hercules Powder Co.*, 16 N.J. 295, 305 (1954)).  The net opinion --- \(^9\)  Plaintiffs acknowledge that the discovery rule does not generally apply to breach of contract claims.
[brief] THE PARTIES  Plaintiff, Respondent/Cross-Appellant, [...] a/k/a [...] (“[...]”) and Defendant [...] a/k/a [...] (“[...]”) were biological brothers.  They have nearly identical Chinese names, except one word in the middle name, Yin Fu Wu/Yin Shan Wu.  [...]’s English name is “[...]”.  [...]’s English name is “[...]. ”  (2T 116: 13-117-20, Jan. 5, 2023)  [...] died on April 10, 2020.  (Pa 2292).  The Estate of [...] (the “Estate”) was substituted as defendant in this action on or about November 9, 2020.
[brief] In their appellate brief, defendants maintain that the motion judge’s analysis was correct only by ignoring directly applicable New Jersey Supreme Court precedent of Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555 (2010).  Roa held that a plaintiff alleging retaliation must show only “that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.
[directive] Roadblocks must only be employed as a last resort in circumstances where deadly force would otherwise be justified.  (a) the use of a roadblock must be authorized by a supervisor; (b) at no time will a roadblock be established until all pursuing police vehicles are made aware of the roadblock and its location and have acknowledged this awareness; 5.12.1  Once a roadblock has been established and a vehicle or barricade has been positioned in the roadway, there shall be: (a) adequate distance to see the roadblock; (b) an avenue of escape; and (c) no one in the blocking vehicle(s).  5.13
[brief] (Aa67-86; Aa87-108).  Pertinently, [...] held that plaintiff’s reliance on two very old cases for the proposition that New Jersey has a six-year statute of limitations for malicious prosecution actions is clearly incorrect given the findings of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.  (Aa79).  [...] also noted that plaintiff abandoned this argument at oral argument and instead advanced a continuing violation theory, which is inapplicable because plaintiff was relying on “a separate and distinct event. ” (Aa79-80).  [...] pointed out that an action accrues “if the plaintiff is aware of facts [that] would alert a reasonable person [to] the possibility of an actual claim.  Medical or a legal certainty is not required. ” (Aa80-81).  Finally, [...] rejected plaintiff’s Tort Claims Act notice argument because libel and slander arising out of the filing and judgment of conviction are not constitutional claims and therefore are covered by the Act.  (Aa84).  [...] denied a motion by plaintiff for reconsideration on April 14, 2023.  (Aa109-123; Aa124-125).  **[...]’s Ruling.**
[brief] K.  The Township Committee believes that this Plan advances the following purposes of the MLUL:  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(a):  To encourage municipal action to guide the appropriate use or development of all lands in this State, in a manner which will promote the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare.  [See the foregoing statements]  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(c):  To provide adequate light, air and open space [most of the property will remain undeveloped].  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(g):  To provide sufficient space in appropriate locations for a variety of agricultural, residential, recreational, commercial and industrial uses and open space, both public and private, according to their respective environmental requirements in order to meet the needs of all New Jersey citizens.  [See the foregoing statements]
[brief] The more work done on the employer’s premises, the more indicative it is of employee status.  Both Petitioner and Respondent agree that she is required to do all her work during municipal Court sessions at the municipal building.  At the OAL Hearing, [...] refused to acknowledge that the Pandemic has changed this Factor worldwide.  Many individuals counted as employees and enrolled in various pension systems throughout the State of New Jersey, worked and continue to work off premises.  In an ironic twist, [...] herself, who is a state employee and presumably enrolled in the pension system, testified from her home during the OAL Hearing.  Since the Respondent did not update its report to analyze this once in a century Pandemic impact on the “IRS 20 Factor Test”, any position taken by Respondent on this issue must be rejected out-of-hand.  **FACTOR 10 – ORDER OR SEQUENCE SET**
[brief] See State v. Silva, 394 N.J. Super. 270, 275 (App. Div. 2007) (holding that a court can take judicial notice facts that “cannot seriously be disputed. ”).  Through that transaction, buyers would have been keenly aware that the SPA and POS requires certain disclosures by law.  See Van Duren v. Rzasa-Ormes, 394 N.J. Super. 254, 265 (App. Div. 2007) (parties were “highly sophisticated businesspeople. ”).  This agreement is also not a contract of adhesion that was drafted by a company who employs market forces to sell goods or services to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
[brief] First, without any citation, [...] asks this Court to affirm the Law Division’s holding that “since it’s a black top, it’s a parking lot.”  [Restaurant Brief, pp.22-23].  As previously discussed, if the surface is set up to invite pedestrian use; if it is reasonably foreseeable that pedestrians will use that area; or if the area is a “sidewalk” within standard safety codes, then it is a walkway or sidewalk.  [See Pa797].  Second, [...] argues the red-herring that Plaintiffs seek to define adjacent “to mean common areas abutting, adjoining, or contiguous with the tenant’s leased premises, located anywhere in the entirety of the shopping center.
[brief] The Rules of Evidence supported the admission of the dash-cam MVR video.  First, N.J.R.E. 803(C)(3), entitled “Then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition,” excludes from the definition of hearsay “[a] statement made in good faith of the declarant's then-existing state of mind, emotion, sensation or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. ”  Under this rule, “[a] non-expert witness may testify to such exclamations and complaints as indicate present existing pain and suffering. ”  De Palma v. Economy Auto Supply Co., 3 N.J. Misc. 827, 828 (Sup. Ct. 1925) (citations omitted).  “Such statements are deemed trustworthy[.]”  [...], Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, Comment 3 to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3) (Gann).  iii.
[brief] Plaintiff, a neurosurgeon, filed this civil action against Defendants to recover damages suffered as the result of Defendants’ willful misrepresentations, fraud, and breaches of duties in connection with the sales, marketing, and procurement of disability insurance coverage for him and his surgical practice.  (Pa11-Pa25).  Plaintiff was harmed by the conduct of the Defendants, insurance producers, whom he trusted to procure certain insurance coverage as they represented, which would pay benefits in the event he became disabled.  (Pa11-Pa30).  Despite suffering a disability that the Defendants promised would result in the payment of maximum benefits, Plaintiff has not received the benefits under the policies as represented by the Defendants.  (Pa7-Pa22).  The fraudulent conduct and unconscionable commercial practices alleged in the Complaint are the precise type of conduct the CFA was promulgated to punish and stop through enforcement actions by the Attorney General and by lawsuits of private litigants, like Plaintiff.  The Defendants, in their capacity as Plaintiff’s insurance producers, made willful misrepresentations and engaged in fraudulent conduct, which constituted unconscionable commercial practices in connection with the sales, marketing and procurement of disability insurance coverage for Plaintiff and his medical practice.  (Pa5-Pa6, Pa11-Pa25, Pa34-Pa41).  The Defendants’ unlawful acts and omissions caused Plaintiff to suffer significant economic damages, including the loss of disability insurance benefits, waiver of premiums, and consequential damages.  (Pa4-Pa47).  **CONCISE PROCEDURAL HISTORY**
[directive] Revised Brimage Guidelines at 76.  For essentially the same policy reasons explained in the ~ Guidelines, prosecutors should only ask the sentencing court to apply the statutory organized criminal activity aggravating factor where the prosecutor is aware of facts and reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom that provide a good faith basis to believe that the school zone defendant is directly and kaaowingly involved in organized criminal activities, lbid~ note 4, supra, explaining that because possessing a firearm in the course of committing the school 6 Se._~e zone offense in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1 is now a Graves Act crime, the interplay of the Revised Brima~e Guidelines and the Atton~ey General Directive to Ensure Uniform E~fforcement of the "Graves Act" will generally require the defendant to plead guilty to both the school zone and firearms offenses.
[brief] To support that theory, [...] intended to emphasize at trial [...]'s statement to [...] that if she stole the money from [...], [...] would “love her forever”; that [...] identified another person as the shooter; that others conspired to rob [...]; and that proceeds from the theft were recovered from [...] and [...]'s brother.  The court nonetheless concluded that [...] and [...] were not “urging antagonistic defenses at their core,” and depending on what evidence it believed, a jury could convict both defendants, convict one of them, or acquit them both.
[brief] As noted above, none of the guarantors ever took any action that affirmed their personal liability for the obligations of the Tenant LLC.  The next argument presented in Plaintiffs appeal brief is that the requirement in the month to month lease that any modifications to the lease must be in writing was waived.  This argument fails because there is nothing in the record that indicates that the conduct of the guarantors constituted a waiver of their right to require a signed writing if their obligations under the guarantor were to be modified or amended.  A reinstatement of their personal liability for the Tenant LLC obligations under the lease after termination of such obligations would certainly be a major expansion of guaranty obligations for which the guarantors could rightfully expect a new writing signed by them to confirm such reinstatement.  E.
[brief] “As a result of the degradation of the stair surface, water is trapped in the below surface pocket areas; and when freezing takes place the water expands to ice above the stair tread surface. ” (Pa354).  [...] also concluded that the coefficient of friction of the staircase when wet was much less than current building standards prescribed for walking safety.  (Pa350, Pa353).  The Defendants did not make an objection to [...]’s credentials or to the admissibility of the substance of this opinion.  In fact, the Defendants’ motions and the report of their expert, [...], did not even address [...]’s opinion about water infiltration.  Moreover, [...] mischaracterizes [...]’s opinion as only claiming the “stair design allows water to accumulate” (Pa424-425; see also [...] Brief at p. 18), while [...] had also concluded the longstanding, non-mitigated deterioration of the concrete steps allows water to infiltrate “below surface and to freeze over the tread surface” in cold enough temperatures.  (Pa354).  [...] also did not even address [...]’s opinion that “the locations of the handrails were too far from the walkway pathway[.]” (Pa354, Pa355).  Given the conflicting expert opinions, albeit [...]’s being the only opinion addressing water infiltration and freezing and the lack of a reachable handrail, [...] adduced sufficient evidence to present a genuine issue of material fact to the jury.
[brief] Thus, the jury in this case reasonably could have “resolve[d] its doubts in favor of” a conviction for passion/provocation manslaughter, despite its earlier finding that [...] had acted in self-defense, because the jury was not given any other way to address the harm from hitting [...] with the tire iron.  This risk that the jury here “compromise[d] on a verdict of guilt on the greater offense” because it was not offered the option of aggravated assault deprived [...] of her rights to due process and a fair trial and requires reversal.
[brief] [...]’s report did not directly address or refute [...]’s opinion in this regard.  [...]’s report merely mischaracterized [...]’s opinion as dealing with an “accumulation” of water rather than an infiltration and freezing or tried to argue that the rough surface of the concrete somehow made the landing “more tractive” when faced with an invisible layer of ice from a “trace” of freezing rain.  (Pa420; Pa424).  [...]’s report did not address the location of the handrails vis-à-vis an exiting pedestrian, at all.  [...]’s reliance on the grandfathering of the building at [...] from current building standards is also irrelevant.  This is not a negligence per se case based on violation of applicable building codes or other ordinances.  This is a common law negligence case, and the comparison of the existing conditions of the stairs to what are now recognized as safer guidelines to protect pedestrians such as Weidlich is only evidence to be considered in determining if the Defendants met their duty of care.
[brief] The first case is Herz v. [...], [...], 2015 WL 2465027, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 1, 2015) (Pa 145) which also involved an alleged personal guaranty of a commercial lease.  The lease included the following language:  “In the event of a default on the within Lease, [...] will be personally liable for all obligations, rents (past and future) and damages [etc.], due in connection with said Lease. ”  Id. at *1 (emphasis added).  [...]’s signature appears once on the lease, on the following line:  ________________________________________  [...], Tenant By [...], President  The Trial Court granted [...] summary judgment, finding no personal liability under the lease.  This was affirmed by the Appellate Division without difficulty on appeal.  The Appellate Division’s decision was solidly based on the principle that there was only one signature line and that you can’t “make someone liable for something that they never signed on the line for.
[brief] SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. [...]  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. [...], Defendant-Appellant.  CRIMINAL ACTION  On Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction of the Superior Court, Law Division, Ocean County Indictment No. [...]  Sat Below: Hon. [...], J.S.C.  Hon. [...], J.S.C. BRIEF AND APPENDIX
[brief] (18T19-7 to 34-24); Da25-27.  Further, the court ordered that this sentence be served consecutively to the defendant’s custodial sentence in Somerset County.  Ibid.  Defendant subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal.  On March 26, 2019, the Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the defendant’s conviction and sentence in a per curiam opinion.  See State v. Mitchell, A-3259-15T3; Da37-61.  Defendant thereafter filed a petition for certification with the Supreme Court.  On March 5, 2019, the Supreme Court denied the defendant’s petition for certification.  Da62.  --- 3